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marked below.
THE
PHYSICAL AND METAPHYSICAL
WORKS
OP
LORD BACON,
THE
PHYSICAL AND METAPHYSICAL
WORKS
OF
LORD BACON,
INCLUDING HIS
DIGNITY AND ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING,
IN NINE BOOKS;
AND HIS
NOVUM ORGANUM;
OB,
PRECEPTS FOR THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE.
JOSEPH DEVEY, M.A.
LONDON:
HENRY G. BOHN, YORK STREET, COVENT GARDEN.
1853.
PRINTED By
cox (BROTHERS) AND WYMAN, ORB AT QUEEN STREET,
LINCOLN'S-INN FIELDS.
PREFACE.
LORD BACON can. only be said to have carried the three
first parts of his Instauratio Magna to any degree of perfec-
tion. Of these the Sylva Sylvarum is but a dry catalogue
of natural phenomena, the collection of which, however
necessary it might be, Bacon, viewed as a sort of mechanical
labour, and would never have stooped to the task, had not
the field been abandoned by the generality of philosophers,
as unworthy of them. The two other portions of the
Instauratio Magna, which this volume contains, unfold the
design of his philosophy, and exhibit all the peculiarities of
his extraordinary mind, enshrined in the finest passages of
his writings.
Of the De Augmentis, though one of the greatest books
of modern, times, only three translations have appeared,
and each of these strikingly imperfect. That of Wats,
issued while Bacon was living, is singularly disfigured with
solecisms, and called forth the just censures of Bacon and his
friends. The version of Eustace Gary is no less unfor-
tunate, owing to its poverty of diction, and antiquated
phraseology. Under the public sense of these failures, ano-
ther translation was produced about sixty years ago by
Dr. Shaw, which might have merited approbation, had not
the learned physician been impressed with the idea that he
could improve Bacon by relieving his work of some of its
choicest passages, and entirely altering the arrangement.
In the present version, our task has been principally to
rectify Shaw's mistakes, by restoring the author's own
VI PREFACE.
arrangement, and supplying the omitted portions. Sucli
of Shaw's notes as were deemed of value have been re-
tained, and others added where the text seemed to re-
quire illustration. Due care also has been taken to point
out the sources whence Bacon drew his extraordinary stores
of learning, by furnishing authorities for the quotations and
allusions in the text, so that the reader may view at a glance
the principal authors whom Bacon loved to consult, and
whose agency contributed to the formation of his colossal
powers.
The version of the Novum Organum contained in this
volume is that by Wood, which is the best extant. The
present edition of this immortal work has been enriched with
an ample commentary, in which the remarks of the two
Playfairs, Sir John Herschel, and the German and French
editors, have been diligently consulted, that nothing may
be wanting to render it as perfect as possible.
J. D.
CONTENTS.
THE GREAT INSTAURATION.
Author's Announcement, Preface, and Account of the
Work Pages 1-20
I. THE DIGNITY AND ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING,
IN NINE BOOKS.
"%.* The Contents are yiven in full at pages 21-26.
II. NOVUM ORGANUM.
Preface 380
BOOK I. ON THE INTERPRETATION OP NATURE AND THE
EMPIRE OF MAN . . . . 383
BOOK II. ON THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE OR THE
BEIUN OF MAN 448
FRANCIS OF VERULAM'S
GREAT INSTAURATION.
Announcement of the Author.
FRANCIS OF VERULAM THOUGHT THUS, AND SUCH IS THE METHOD
WHICH HE DETERMINED WITHIN HIMSELF, AND WHICH HE THOUGHT
IT CONCERNED THE HYING AND POSTERITY TO KNOW.
BEING convinced, by a careful observation, that the human
understanding perplexes itself, or makes not a sober and
advantageous use of the real helps within its reach, whence
manifold ignorance and inconveniences arise, he was deter-
mined to employ his utmost endeavours towards restoring
or cultivating a just and legitimate familiarity betwixt the
mind and things.
But as the mind, hastily and without choice, imbibes and
treasures up the first notices of things, from whence all the
rest proceed, errors must for ever prevail, and remain uncor-
rected, either by the natural powers of the understanding
or the assistance of logic ; for the original notions being
vitiated, confused, and inconsiderately taken from things,
and the secondary ones formed no less rashly, human know-
ledge itself, the thing employed in all our researches, is not
well put together nor justly formed, but resembles a magni-
ficent structure that has no foundation.
And whilst men agree to admire and magnify the false
powers of the mind, and neglect or destroy those that might
be rendered true, there is no other course left but with
better assistance to begin the work anew, and raise or re-
build the sciences, arts, and all human knowledge from a
firm and solid basis.
This may at first seem an infinite scheme, unequal 'to
human abilities, yet it will be found more sound and judi-
2 B
2 THE GREAT INSTAURATION.
cious inau ie course hitherto pursued, as tending to some
issue ; whereas all hitherto done with regard to the sciences
is vertiginous, or in the way of perpetual rotation.
Nor is he ignorant that he stands alone in an experiment
almost too hold and astonishing to obtain credit, yet he*
thought it not right to desert either the cause or himself,
but to boldly enter on the way and explore the only path
which is pervious to the human mind. For it is wiser to>
engage in an undertaking that admits of some termination,
than to involve oneself in perpetual exertion and anxiety
about what is interminable. The ways of contemplation,
indeed, nearly correspond to two roads in nature, one of
which, steep and rugged at the commencement, terminates
in a plain ; the other, at first view smooth and easy, leads
only to huge rocks and precipices. Uncertain, however,
whether these reflections would occur to another, and ob-
serving that he had never met any person disposed to apply
his mind to similar thoughts, he determined to publish what-
soever he found time to perfect. Nor is this the haste of
ambition, but anxiety, that if he should die there might
remain behind him some outline and determination of the
matter his mind had embraced, as well as some mark of his
sincere and earnest affection to promote the happiness of
mankind.
AUTHOR'S PREFACE.
Of the state of learning That it is neither prosperous nor greatly
advanced, arid that a way must be opened to the human understand-
ing entirely distinct from that known to our predecessors, and
different aids procured, that the mind may exercise her power over
the nature of things.
IT appears to me that men know neither their acquire-
ments nor their powers, but fancy their possessions greater
and their faculties less than they are; whence, either valuing
the received arts above measure, they look out no farther ;
or else despising themselves too much, they exercise their
talents upon lighter matters, without attempting the capital
PREFACE. 3
things of all. And hence the sciences seem to have their
Hercules' Pillars, which bound the desires and hopes of
mankind.
But as a false imagination of plenty is among the
principal causes of want, and as too great a confidence in
things present leads to a neglect of the future, it is
necessary we should here admonish mankind that they do
vnot too highly value or extol either the number or useful-
ness of the things hitherto discovered ; for, by closely in-
specting the multiplicity of books upon arts and sciences, we
find them to contain numberless repetitions of the same
things in point of invention, but differing indeed as to the
manner of treatment ; so that the real discoveries, though at
the first view they may appear numerous, prove upon exa-
mination but few. And as to the point of usefulness, the
philosophy we principally received from the Greeks must be
acknowledged puerile, or rather talkative than generative
as being fruitful in controversies, but barren of effects,
The fable of Scylla seems a civil representation of the
present condition of knowledge; for she exhibited the coun-
tenance and expression of a virgin, whilst barking monsters
encircled her womb. Even thus the sciences have their
specious and plausible generalities; but when we descend to
particulars, which, like the organs of generation, should pro-
duce fruits and effects, then spring up loud altercations
and controversies, which terminate in barren sterility.
And had this not been a lifeless kind of philosophy, it
were scarce possible it should have made so little progress
in so many ages, insomuch, that not only positions now fre-
quently regain positions still, but questions remain ques-
tions, rather riveted and cherished than determined by
disputes ; philosophy thus coming down to us in the persons
of master and scholar, instead of inventor and improver.
In the mechanic arts the case is otherwise these com-
monly advancing towards perfection in a course of daily
improvement, from a rough unpolished state, sometimes
prejudicial to the first inventors, whilst philosophy and the
intellectual sciences are, like statues, celebrated and adored,
but never advanced ; nay, they sometimes appear most per-
fect in the original author, and afterwards degenerate. For
since men have gone over in crowds to the opinion of their
B2
4: THE GBEAT INSTAURATION.
leader, like those silent senators of Kome, a they add nothing
to the extent of learning themselves, but perform the servile
duty of waiting upon particular authors, and repeating their
doctrines.
It is a fatal mistake to Suppose that the sciences have
gradually arrived at a state of perfection, and then been
recorded by some one writer or other ; and that as nothing
better can afterwards be invented, men need but cultivate
and set off what is thus discovered and completed ; whereas,
in reality, this registering of the sciences proceeds only from
the assurance of a few and the sloth and ignorance of many.
For after the sciences might thus perhaps in several parts
be carefully cultivated ; a man of an enterprising genius
rising up, who, by the conciseness of his method, renders
himself acceptable and famous, he in appearance erects an
art, but in reality corrupts the labours of bis predecessors.
This, however, is usually well received by posterity, as
readily gratifying their curiosity, and indulging their indo-
lence. But he that rests upon established consent as the
judgment approved by time, trusts to a very fallacious and
weak foundation ; for we have but an imperfect knowledge
of the discoveries in arts and sciences, made public in diffe-
rent ages and countries, and still less of what has been done
by particular persons, and transacted in private ; so that
neither the births nor miscarriages of time are to be found
in our records.
Nor is consent, or the continuance thereof, a thing of any
account ; for however governments may vary, there is but
one state of the sciences, and that will for ever be democratical
or popular. But the doctrines in greatest vogue among the
people, are either the contentious and quarrelsome, or the
showy and empty ; that is, such as may either entrap the
assent, or lull the mind to rest : whence, of course, the
greatest geniuses in all ages have suffered violence ; whilst
out of regard to their own character, they submitted to the
judgment of the times, and the populace. And thus when
any more sublime speculations happened to appear, they were
commonly tossed and extinguished by the breath of popular
opinion. Hence time, like a river, has brought down to us
a Pedarii senat.ores.
PREFACE, 5
what is light and tumid, but sunk what was ponderous and
solid. As to those who have set up for teachers of the sciences,
when they drop their character, and at intervals speak their
sentiments, they complain of the subtilty of nature, the
concealment of truth, the obscurity of things, the entangle-
ment of causes, and the imperfections of the human under-
standing ; thus rather choosing to accuse the common state
of men and things, than make confession of themselves. It is
also frequent with them to adjudge that impossible in an art,
which they find that art does not affect ; by which means they
screen indolence and ignorance from the reproach they merit.
The knowledge delivered down to us is barren in effects,
fruitful in questions, slow and languid in improvement, ex-
hibiting in its generalities the counterfeits of perfection, but
meagre in its details, popular in its aim, but suspected by its
very promoters, and therefore defended and propagated by
artifice and chicanery. And even those who by experience
propose to enlarge the bounds of the sciences, scarce ever
entirely quit the received opinions, and go to the fountain-
head, but think it enough to add somewhat of their own ;
as prudentially considering, that at the time they show their
modesty in assenting, they may have a liberty of adding.
But whilst this regard is shown to opinions and moral
considerations, the sciences are greatly hurt by such a languid
procedure ; for it is scarce possible at once to admire and
excel an author : as water rises no higher than the reservoir
it falls from. Such men, therefore, though they improve
some things, yet advance the sciences but little, or rather
amend than enlarge them.
There have been also bolder spirits, and greater geniuses,
who thought themselves at liberty to overturn and destroy
the ancient doctrine, and make way for themselves and their
opinions ; but without any great advantage from the dis-
turbance j as they did not effectively enlarge philosophy and
arts by practical works, but only endeavoured to substitute
new dogmas, and to transfer the empire of opinion to them-
selves, with but small advantage; for opposite errors proceed
mostly from common causes.
As for those who, neither wedded to their own nor others'
opinions, but continuing friends to liberty, made use of
assistance in their inquiries, the success they met with did
6 THE GREAT INSTAUEATION.
not answer expectation, the attempt, though laudable, being
but feeble ; for pursuing only the probable reasons of
things, they were carried about in a circle of arguments,
and taking a promiscuous liberty, preserved not the rigour of
true inquirers ; whilst none of them duly conversed with
experience and things themselves. Others again, who
commit themselves to mechanical experience, yet make their
experiments at random, without any method of inquiry.
And the greatest part of these have no considerable views,
but esteem it a great matter if they can make a single dis-
covery ; which is both a trifling and unskilful procedure,
as no one can justly or successfully discover the nature of any
one thing in that thing itself, or without numerous experi-
ments which lead to farther inquiries. And we must not
omit to observe, that all the industry displayed in experiment
has been directed by too indiscreet a zeal at some prejudged
effect, seeking those which produced fruit rather than know-
ledge, in opposition to the Divine method, which on the
first day created time alone; delaying its material creations
until the sun had illumined space.
Lastly, those who recommend logic as the best and surest
instrument for improving the sciences, very justly observe,
that the understanding, left to itself, ought always to be
suspected. But here the remedy is neither equal to the
disease, nor approved ; for though the logic in use may be
properly applied in civil affairs, and the arts that are founded
in discourse and opinion, yet it by no means reaches the
subtilty of nature ; and by catching at what it cannot hold,
rather serves to establish errors, and fix them deeper, than
open the way of truth. b
Upon the whole, men do not hitherto appear to be happily
inclined and fitted for the sciences, either by their own in-
dustry, or the authority of authors, especially as there is little
dependence to be had upon the common demonstrations and
experiments ; whilst the structure of the universe renders it
a labyrinth to the understanding j where the paths are not
only everywhere doubtful, but the appearances of things and
their signs deceitful ; and the wreaths and knots of nature
b For exemplifications of these opinions, the reader may consult
Morhof's "Polyhistor.," and the other writers upon polymathy and
literary history. Skaw.
PREFACE. 7
intricately turned and twisted : c through all which we are
only to be conducted by -the uncertain light of the senses,
that sometimes shines, and sometimes hides its head ; and by
collections of experiments and particular facts, in which no
guides can be trusted, as wanting 'direction themselves, and
adding to the errors of the rest. In this melancholy state
of things, one might be apt to despair both of the under-
standing left to itself, and of all fortuitous helps ; as of a
state irremediable by the utmost efforts of the human
genius, or the often-repeated chance of trial. The only clue
and method is to begin all anew, and direct our steps in a
certain order, from the very first perceptions of the senses.
Yet I must not be understood to say that nothing has been
done in former ages, for the ancients have shown themselves
worthy of admiration in everything which concerned either
wit or abstract reflection ; but, as in former ages, when men
at sea, directing their course solely by the observation of the
stars, might coast along the shores of the continent, but
could not trust themselves to the wide ocean, or discover new
worlds, until the use of the compass was known : even so
the present discoveries referring to matters immediately
under the jurisdiction of the senses, are such as might easily
result from experience and discussion ; but before we can
enter the remote and hidden parts of nature, it is requisite
that a better and more perfect application of the human
mind should be introduced. This, however, is not to be
understood as if nothing had been effected by the immense
labours of so many past ages ; as the ancients have per-
formed surprisingly in subjects that required abstract medi-
tation, and force of genius. But as navigation was imperfect
before the use of the compass, so will many secrets of nature
and art remain undiscovered, without a more perfect know-
ledge of the understanding, its uses, and ways of working.
For our own part, from an earnest desire of truth, we
have committed ourselves to doubtful, difficult, and solitary
ways ; and relying on the Divine assistance, have supported
our minds against the vehemence of opinions, our own in-
ternal doubts and scruples, and the darkness and fantastic
c By wreaths and knots, is understood the apparent complication of
causes, and the superaddition of properties not essential to things ; as
light to heat, yellowness to gold, pellucidity to glass, &c. Shaw.
8 THE GREAT INSTAURATION.
images of the mind ; that at length we might make more
sure and certain discoveries for .the benefit of posterity.
And if we shall have effected anything to the purpose, what
led us to it was a true and genuine humiliation of mind. Those
who before us applied themselves to the discovery of arts,
having just glanced upon things, examples, and experiments;
immediately, as if invention was but a kind of contemplation,
raised up their own spirits to deliver oracles : whereas our
method is continually to dwell among things soberly, without
abstracting or setting the understanding farther from them
than makes their images meet ; which leaves but little work
for genius and mental abilities. And the same humility
that we practise in learning, the same we also observe in
teaching, without endeavouring to stamp a dignity on any
of our inventions, by the triumphs of confutation, the cita-
tions of antiquity, the producing of authorities, or the mask
of obscurity ; as any one might do, who had rather give
lustre to his own name, than light to the minds of others.
"We offer no violence, and spread no nets for the judgments
of men, but lead them on to things themselves, and their
relations ; that they may view their own stores, what they
have to reason about, and what they may add, or procure,
for the common good. And if at any time ourselves have
erred, mistook, or broke off too soon, yet as we only propose
to exhibit things naked, and open, as they are, our errors
may be the readier observed, and separated, before they con-
siderably infect the mass of knowledge ; and our labours be
the more easily continued. And thus we hope to establish
for ever a true and legitimate union between the experi-
mental and rational faculty, whose fallen and inauspicious
divorces and repudiations have disturbed everything in the
family of mankind.
But as these great things are not at our disposal, we here,
at the entrance of our work, with the utmost humility and
fervency, put forth our prayers to God, that remembering the
miseries of mankind, and the pilgrimage of this life, where
we pass but few days and sorrowful, he would vouchsafe,
through our hands, and the hands of others, to whom he has
given the like mind, to relieve the human race by a new act
of his bounty. We likewise humbly beseech him, that what
is human may not clash with what is divine ; and that when
PREFACE. I)
tlie ways of the senses are opened, and a greater natural light
set up in the mind, nothing of incredulity and blindness
towards divine mysteries may arise; but rather that the
understanding, now cleared up, and purged of all vanity and
superstition, may remain entirely subject to the divine
oracles, and yield to faith, the things that are faith's : and
lastly, that expelling the poisonous knowledge infused by
the serpent, which puffs up and swells the human mind, wo
may neither be wise above measure, nor go beyond the bounds
of sobriety, but pursue the truth in charity.
We now turn ourselves to men, with a few wholesome
admonitions and just requests. And first, we admonish them
to continue in a sense of their duty, as to divine matters ; for
the senses are like the sun, which displays the face of the
earth, but shuts up that of the heavens : and again, that
they run not into the contrary extreme, which they certainly
will do, if they think an inquiry into nature any way forbid
them by religion. It was not that pure and unspotted
natural knowledge whereby Adam gave names to things,
agreeable to their natures, which caused his fall ; but an
ambitibus and authoritative desire of moral knowledge, to
judge of good and evil, which makes men revolt from God,
and obey no laws but those of their own will. But for the
sciences, which contemplate nature, the sacred philosopher
declares, " It is the glory of God to conceal a thing, but the
glory of a king to find it out." d As if the Divine Being
thus indulgently condescended to exercise the human mind
by philosophical inquiries.
In the next place, we advise all mankind to think of the
true ends of knowledge, and that they endeavour not after it
for curiosity, contention, or the sake of despising others, nor
yet for profit, reputation, power, or any such inferior con-
sideration, but solely for the occasions and uses of life ; all
along conducting and perfecting it in the spirit of benevo-
lence. Our requests are, 1. That men do not conceive we
here deliver an opinion, but a work ; and assure themselves
we attempt not to found any sect or particular doctrine, but
to fix an extensive basis for the service of human nature.
2. That, for their own sakes, they lay aside the zeal and
d Prov. xxv. 2.
10 THE GREAT INSTAURATIOtf.
/
prejudices of opinions, and endeavour the common good ;
and that being, by our assistance, freed and kept clear from
the errors and hinderances of the way, they would themselves
also take part of the task. 3, That they do not despair, as
imagining our project for a grand restoration, or advancement
of all kinds of knowledge, infinitely beyond the power of
mortals to execute ; whilst in reality, it is the genuine stop
and prevention of infinite error. Indeed, as our state is
mortal, and human, a full accomplishment cannot be expected
in a single age, and must therefore be commended to
posterity. Nor could we hope to succeed, if we arrogantly
searched for the sciences in the narrow cells of the human
understanding, and not submissively in the wider world.
4. In the last place, to prevent ill effects from contention,
we desire mankind to consider how far they have a right
to judge our performance, upon the foundations here
laid down : for we reject all that knowledge which is too
hastily abstracted from things, as vague, disorderly, and ill-
formed ; and we cannot be expected to abide by a judgment
which is itself called in question.
DISTRIBUTION OF THE WORK.
IN SIX PARTS.
1. Survey and Extension of the Sciences; or, the Advancement of
Learning.
2. Novum Organum ; or, Precepts for the Interpretation of Nature.
3. Phenomena of the Universe ; or, Natural and Experimental History,
on which to found Philosophy.
4. Ladder of the Understanding.
. Precursors, or Anticipators, of the Second Philosophy.
B. Second Philosophy; or, Active Science.
WE divide the whole of the work into six parts : the first
whereof gives the substance, or general description of the
knowledge which mankind at present possess ; choosing to
dwell a little upon things already received, that we may the
easier perfect the old, and lead on to new ; being equally in-
clined to cultivate the discoveries of antiquity, as to strike
out fresh paths of science. In classing the sciences, we com-
DISTRIBUTION OP THE WORK. 11
prehend not only the tilings already invented and known,
but also those omitted and wanted ; for the intellectual
globe, as well as the terrestrial, has both its frosts and
deserts. It is therefore no wonder if we sometimes depart
from the common divisions. For an addition, whilst it alters
the whole, must necessarily alter the parts, and their sections ;
whereas the received divisions are only fitted to the received
sum of the sciences, as it now stands. With regard to the
things we shall note as defective ; it will be our method to
give more than the bare titles, or short heads of what we
desire to have done ; with particular care, where the dignity
or difficulty of the subject requires it, either to lay down
the rules for effecting the work, or make an attempt of our
own, by way of example, or pattern, of the whole. For it
concerns our own character, no less than the advantage
of others, to know that a mere capricious idea has not
presented the subject to our mind, and that all we desire and
aim at is a wish. For our designs are within the power of
all to , compass, and we ourselves have certain and evident
demonstrations of their utility. We come not hither, as
augurs, to measure out regions in our mind by divination,
but like generals, to invade them for conquest. And this is
the first part of the work.
When we have gone through the ancient arts, we shall
prepare the human understanding for pressing on beyond
them. The second object of the work embraces the doc-
trine of a more perfect use of reason, and the true helps
of the intellectual faculties, so as to raise and enlarge the
powers of the mind; and, as far as the condition of humanity
allows, to fit it to conquer the difficulties and obscurities of
nature. The thing we mean, is a kind of logic, by us called
The Art of interpreting Nature ; as differing widely from
the common logic, which, however, pretends to assist and
direct the understanding, and in that they agree : but the
difference betwixt them consists in three things, viz., the end,
the order of demonstrating, and the grounds of inquiry.
The end of our new logic is to find, not arguments, bub
arts ; not what agrees with principles, but principles them-
selves : not probable reasons, but plans and designs of works
a different intention producing a different effect. In one the
adversary is conquered by dispute, and in the other nature
12 THE GREAT INSTAURATION.
by works. The nature and order of the demonstrations
agree with this object. For in common logic, almost our
whole labour is spent upon the syllogism. Logicians hitherto
appear scarcely to have noticed induction, passing it over
with some slight comment. But we reject the syllogistic
method as being too confused, and allowing nature to escape
out of our hands. For though nobody can doubt that those
things which agree with the middle term agree with each
other, nevertheless, there is this source of error, that a
syllogism consists of propositions, propositions of words ; and
words are but the token and signs of tilings. Now, if the
first notions, which are, as it were, the soul of words, and
the basis of every philosophical fabric, are hastily abstracted
from things, and vague and not clearly defined and limited,
the whole structure falls to the ground. We therefore
reject the syllogism, and that not only as regards first
principles, to which logicians do not apply them, but also with
respect to intermediate propositions, which the syllogism con-
trives to manage in such a way as to render barren in effect,
unfit for practice, and clearly unsuited to the active branch
of the sciences. Nevertheless, we would leave to the syllo-
gism, and such celebrated and applauded demonstrations,
their jurisdiction over popular and speculative acts; while, in
everything relating to the nature of things, we make use of
induction for both our major and minor propositions ; for
we consider induction as that form of demonstration which
closes in upon nature and presses on, and, as it were, mixes
itself with action. Whence the common order of demon-
strating is absolutely inverted ; for instead of flying imme-
diately from the senses, and particulars, to generals, as to
certain fixed poles, about which disputes always turn, and
deriving others from these by intermediates, in a short,
indeed, but precipitate manner, fit for controversy, but unfit
to close with nature ; we continually raise up propositions
by degrees, and in the last place, come to the most general
axioms, which are not notional, but well defined, and what
nature allows of, as entering into the very essence of things.*
This passage, though tersely and energetically expressed, is founded
upon a misconception of deduction, or, as Bacon phrases it, syllogistic
reasoning, and its relation to induction. The two processes are only
reverse methods of inferences, the one concluding from a general to a
particular, and the other from a particular to a general, and both
DISTRIBUTION OP THE WORK. 13
But the more difficult part of our task consists in the form
of induction, and the judgment to be made by it ; for that
form of the logicians which proceeds by simple enumeration,
is a childish thing, concludes unsafely, lies open to con-
tradictory instances, and regards only common matters; yet
determines nothing : whilst the sciences require such a form
of induction, as can separate, adjust, and veiify experience,
and come to a necessary determination by proper exclusions
and rejections.
Nor is this all ; for we likewise lay the foundations of the
sciences stronger and closer, and begin our inquiries deeper
than men have hitherto done, bringing those things to the
test which the common logic has taken upon trust. The
logicians borrow the principles of the sciences from the
sciences themselves, venerate the first notions of the mind,
and acquiesce in the immediate informations of the senses,
when rightly disposed; but we judge, that a real logic should
enter every province of the sciences with a greater authority
schemata are resolvable into propositions, and propositions into words,
which, as he says, are but the tokens and signs of things. Now if
these first notions, which are as it were the soul of words and the basis
of eveiy philosophic fabric, be hastily abstracted from things, and vague
and not clearly defined and limited, the whole structure, whether
erected by induction or deduction, or both, as is most frequently the
case, must fall to the ground. The error, therefore, does not lie in the
deductive mode of proof, without which physical science could never
advance beyond its empirical stage, but in clothing this method
in the vulgar language of the day, and reasoning upon its terms as if
they pointed at some fact or antithesis in nature, instead of pre-
viously testing the accuracy of such expressions by experiment and
observation. As such notions are more general than the individual
cases out of which they arise, it follows that this inquiry must be made
through the medium of induction, and the essential merit of Bacon lies
in framing a system of rules by which this ascending scale of inference
may be secured from error. As the neglect of this important prelimi-
nary to scientific investigation vitiated all the Aristotelian physics, and
kept the human mind stationary for two thousand years, hardly too
much praise can be conferred upon the philosopher who not only pointed
out the gap but supplied the materials for its obliteration. The ardency
of his nature, however, urged him to extremes, and he confounded the
accuracy of the deductive method with the straw and stubble on which
it attempted to erect a system of physics. In censuring intermediate
propositions, Bacon appears to have been unaware that he was con-
demning the only forms through which reason or inference can manifest
itself, and lecturing mankind on the futility of an instrument which he
was employing in every*page of his book. Ed
14 THE GREAT INSTAURATION.
than their own principles can give ; and that such supposed
principles should be examined, till they become absolutelj
clear and certain. As for first notions of the mind, we
suspect all those that the understanding, left to itself,
procures ; nor ever allow them till approved and authorized
by a second judgment. And with respect to the informations
of the senses, we have many ways of examining them ; for the
senses are fallacious, though they discover their own errors ;
but these lie near, whilst the means of discovery are
remote.
The senses are faulty in two respects, as they either fail or
deceive us. For there are many things that escape the
senses, though ever so rightly disposed ; as by the subtil ty of
the whole body, or the minuteness of its parts; the distance
of place; the slowness or velocity of motion; the common-
ness of the object, &c. Neither do the senses, when they lay
hold of a thing, retain it strongly; for evidence, and the in-
formations of sense, are in proportion to a man, and not in
proportion to the universe. 1 * And it is a grand error to assert,
that sense is the measure of things. 6
b Bacon held, that every perception is nothing more than the con-
sciousness of some body acting either interiorly or from without upon
thafc portion of the frame which is the point of contact. Hence all the
knowledge we havo of the material world arises from the movements
which it generates in our senses. These sensations simply inform us
that a wide class of objects exist independent of ourselves, which affect
us in a certain manner, and do not convey into our minds the real pro-
perties of such objects so much as the effects of the relation in which they
stand to our senses. Human knowledge thus becomes relative ; and
that which we call the relation of objects to one another, is nothing more
than the relation which they have to our organization. Hence as these
relations of objects, either internal or exterior to the mind vary, sensa-
tions must vary along with them, and produce, even in the same indi-
viuual, a crowd of impressions either conflicting or in some measure
opposed to each other. So far as these feelings concern morals, it
is the business of ethics to bring them under the influence of reason,
and, selecting out of them such as are calculated to dignify and elevate
man's nature, to impart to them a trenchant and permanent character.
As respects that portion which flow in upon the mind from the internal
world, it is the peculiar province of induction as reformed by our author,
to separate such as are illusory from the real, and to construct out of
the latter a series of axioms, expressing in hierarchical gradation the
general system of laws by which the universe is governed. Ed.
c The doctrine of the two last paragraphs may appear contradictory
to the opinion of some philosophers, who maintain the infallibility of
DISTRIBUTION OF THE WORK* 15
To remedy this, we have from all quarters brought to-
gether, and fitted helps for the senses ; and that rather by
experiments than by instruments ; apt experiments being
much more subtile than the senses themselves, though
assisted with the most finished instruments. We, therefore,
lay no great stress upon the immediate and natural percep-
tions of the senses, but desire the senses to judge only
of experiments, and experiments to judge of things : on
which foundation, we hope to be patrons of the senses, and
interpreters of their oracles. And thus we mean to procure
the things relating to the light of nature, and the setting
it up in the mind ; which might well suffice, if the mind
were as white paper. But since the minds of men are so
strangely disposed, as not to receive the true images of
things, it is necessary also that a remedy be found for this
evil.
The idols, or false notions, which possess the mind, are
either acquired or innate. The acquired arise either from
the opinions or sects of philosophers, or from preposterous
laws of demonstration ; but the innate cleave to the nature
of the understanding, which is found much more prone to
error than the senses. For however men may amuse them-
selves, and admire, or almost adore the mind, it is certain,
that like an irregular glass, it alters the rays of things, by its
figure, and different intersections.
The two former kinds of idols may be extirpated, though
with difficulty; but this third is insuperable. All that can
be done, is to point them out, and mark, and convict that
treacherous faculty of the mind ; lest when the ancient errors
are destroyed, new ones should sprout out from the rank ness
of the soil : and, on the other hand, to establish this for
ever, that the understanding can make no judgment but by
the senses, as well as of reason ; but the dispute perhaps turns rather
upon words than things. Father Malbranche is express, that the
senses never deceive us, yet as express that they should never be
trusted, without being verified ; charging the errors arising in this case
upon human liberty, which makes a wrong choice. See *' Recherches
de la Ve>iteY' liv. i. chaps. 5, 6, 7, 8. The difference may arise only
from considering the senses in two different lights, viz. physically, or
according to common use ; and metaphysically, or abstractedly. The
Nwum Oryanum clears the whole. See also Matin Mersenus,'" De la,
V&ite' des Sciences." E* Find. Pyth. ii. 21. z Cic. ad Att. ii. 1.
* Seneca's Epistles, iii. near the end.
D2
36 ADVANCEMENT OP LEABNING. [BOOK I.
If it be objected, that learning takes up much time, which
might be better employed, I answer that the most active or
busy men have many vacant hours, while they expect the
tides and returns of business ; and then the question is, how
those spaces of leisure shall be filled up, whether with plea-
sure or study? Demosthenes being taunted by ^Eschines, a
man of pleasure, that his speeches smelt of the lamp, very
pertly retorted, " There is great difference between the objects
which you and I pursue by lamp-light." b No fear, therefore,
that learning should displace business, for it rather keeps
and defends the mind against idleness and pleasure, whicji
might otherwise enter to the prejudice both of business and
learning. 5, For the allegation that learning should under-
mine the reverence due to laws and government, it is a mere
calumny, without shadow of truth; for to say that blind
custom of obedience should be a safer obligation than duty,
taught and understood, is to say that a blind man may tread
surer by a guide than a man with his eyes open can by a
light. And, doubtless, learning makes the mind gentle and
pliable to government, whereas ignorance renders it churlish
and mutinous; and it is always found that the most bar-
barous, rude, and ignorant times have been most tumultuous,
changeable, and seditious.
6. As to the judgment of Cato the Censor, he was punished
for his contempt of learning, in the kind wherein he of-
fended, for when past threescore the humour took him to
learn Greek, which shows that his former censure of the
Grecian learning was rather an affected gravity than his
inward sense. And, indeed, the Romans never arrived at
their height of empire till they had arrived at their height
of arts; for in the time of the two first Caesars, when their
government was in its greatest perfection, there lived the
best poet, Virgil; the best historiographer, Livy; the best
antiquary, Varro; and the best, or second best orator, Cicero,
that the world has known. And as to the persecution of
Socrates, the time must be remembered in which it occurred,
viz., under the reign of the Thirty Tyrants, of all mortals the
bloodiest and basest that ever reigned, since the government
b Plutarch's Life of Demosthenes, not said of ^Eschines, but
Pythens.
c Plutarch's M. Cato.
BOOK L] OBJECTIONS TO LEARNED MEN REFUTED. 37
had no sooner returned to its senses than that judgment was
reversed. Socrates, from being a criminal, started at once
into a hero, his memory loaded with honours human and
divine, and his discourses, which had been previously stigma-
tized as immoral and profane, were considered as the re-
formers of thought and manners. d And let this suffice as an
answer to those politicians who have presumed, whether
sportively or in earnest, to disparage learning.
We come now to that sort of discredit which is brought
upon learning by learned men themselves ; and this proceeds
either (1) from their fortune, (2) their manners, or (3) the
nature of their studies.
1. The disrepute of learning from the fortune or condition
of the learned, regards either their indigence, retirement, or
meanness of employ. As to the point, that learned men grow
not so soon rich as others, because they convert not their
labours to profit, we might turn it over to the friars, of whom
Machiavel said, "That the kingdom of the clergy had been long
since at an end, if the reputation and reverence towards the
poverty of the monks and mendicants had not borne out the
excesses of bishops and prelates." 6 For so the splendour and
magnificence of the great had long since sunk into rudeness
and barbarism, if the poverty of learned men had not kept up
civility and reputation. But to drop such advantages, it is
worth observing how reverend and sacred poverty was
esteemed for some ages in the Roman state, since, as Livy
says, " There never was a republic greater, more venerable,
and more abounding in good examples than the Roman, nor
one that so long withstood avarice and luxury, or so much
honoured poverty and parsimony." f And we see, when
Rome degenerated, how Julius Caesar after his victory was
counselled to begin the restoration of the state, by abolishing
the reputation of wealth. And, indeed, as we truly say that
blushing is the livery of virtue, though it may sometimes
proceed from guilt,? so it holds true of poverty that it is the
attendant of virtue, though sometimes it may proceed from
mismanagement and accident.
d Plato, Apol. Socr. e Mach. Hist, de Firenza, b. 10.
* Livy's preface, towards the end.
* Diog. Cyn. ap. Laert. vi. 54 ; compare Tacitus, Agric. 45, of
Domitian, " Ssevus vultus et rubor, a quo se contra pudorem muniebat."
38 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [BOOK I.
As for retirement, it is a theme so common to extol a
private life, not taxed with sensuality and sloth, for the
liberty, the pleasure, and the freedom from indignity it
affords, that every one praises it well, such an agreement
it has to the nature and apprehensions of mankind. This
may be added, that learned men, forgotten in states and not
living in the eyes of the world, are like the images of Cassius
and Brutus at the funeral of Junia, which not being repre-
sented as many others were, Tacitus said of them that " they
outshone the rest, because not seen." h
As for their meanness of employ, that most exposed to
contempt is the education of youth, to which they are com-
monly allotted. But how unjust this reflection is to all who
measure things, not by popular opinion, but by reason, will
appear in the fact that men are more careful what they put
into new vessels than into those already seasoned. It is
manifest that things in their weakest state usually demand
our best attention and assistance. Hearken to the Hebrew
rabbins : " Your young men shall see visions, your old men
shall dream dreams;" 1 upon which the commentators observe,
that youth is the worthier age, inasmuch as revelation by
vision is clearer than by dreams. And to say the truth, how
much soever the lives of pedants have been ridiculed upon
the stage, as the emblem of tyranny, because the modern
looseness or negligence has not duly regarded the choice of
proper schoolmasters and tutors ; yet the wisdom of the
ancientest and best times always complained that states were
too busy with laws and too remiss in point of education.
This excellent part of ancient discipline has in some measure
been revived of late by the colleges of Jesuits abroad; in
regard of whose diligence in fashioning the morals and culti-
vating the minds of youth, I may say, as Agesilaus said to
his enemy Pharnabasus, "Talis quum sis, utinam noster
esses."*
2. The manners of learned men belong rather to their
individual persons than to their studies or pursuits. No
doubt, as in all other professions and conditions of life, bad
and good are to be found among them; yet it must be ad-
mitted that learning and studies, unless they fall in with
h Annals, in. 76. * Joel ii. 28. k Plut. Life of Agesil.
BOOK I.] OBJECTIONS TO LEARNED MEN REFUTED. 39
very depraved dispositions, have, in conformity with the
adage, " Abire studia in mores," a moral influence upon men's
lives. For my part I cannot find that any disgrace to learn-
ing ban proceed from the habits of learned men, inherent in
them as learned, unless peradventure that may be a fault
which was attributed to Demosthenes, Cicero, the second Cato,
and many others, that seeing the times they read of more
pure than their own, pushed their servility too far in the
reformation of manners, and to seek to impose, by austere
precepts, the laws of ancient asceticism upon dissolute times.
Yet even antiquity should have forewarned them of this
excess ; for Solon, upon being asked if he had given his citi-
zens the best laws, replied, " The best they were capable of
receiving." 1 And Plato, finding that he had fallen upon
corrupt times, refused to take part in the administration of
the commonwealth, saying that a man should treat his coun-
try with the same forbearance as his parents, and recall her
from a wrong course, not by violence or contest, but by
entreaty and persuasion. Caesar's counsellor administers the
same caveat in the words, "Non ad vetera instituta revocamus
quse jampridem corruptis moribus ludibrio sunt." n Cicero
points out the same error in the second Cato, when writing
to his friend Atticus: "Cato optime sentit sed nocet
interdum Reipublicse ; loquitur enim tanquam in Republica
Platonis, non tanquam in fece Romuli." The same orator
likewise excuses and blames the philosophers for being too
exact in their precepts. These preceptors, said he, have
stretched the lines and limits of duties beyond their natural
boundaries, thinking that we might safely reform when we
had reached the highest point of perfection.? And yet him-
self stumbled over the same stone, so that he might have
said, " Monitis sum minor ipse meis." 1 *
3. Another fault laid to the charge of learned men, and
arising from the nature of their studies, is, " That they
esteem the preservation, good, and honour of their country
before their own fortunes or safeties." Demosthenes said
Well to the Athenians, " My counsels are not such as tend to
1 Plutarch, Solon. ra Epist. Z. iii. 331 ; and cf. Ep. T. iii. 316.
" Sallust, Cat. Conspiracy. Cicero to Atticus, epis. ii. 1.
P Oratio pro L. Muraena, xxxi. 65.
<* " I am unequal to my teaching." Ovid, Ars Amandi, ii. 548.
40 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [BOOK L
aggrandize myself and diminish you, but sometimes not ex-
pedient for me to give, though always expedient for you to
follow." 1 So Seneca, after consecrating the five years of
Nero's minority to the immortal glory of learned governors,
held on his honest course of good counsel after his master
grew extremely corrupt. Nor can this be otherwise; for
learning gives men a true sense of their frailty, the casualty
of fortune, and the dignity of the soul and its office ; whence
they cannot think any greatness of fortune a worthy end of
tneir living, and therefore live so as to give a clear and
acceptable account to God and their superiors; whilst the
corrupter sort of politicians, who are not by learning esta-
blished in a love of duty, nor ever look abroad into univer-
sality, refer all things to themselves, and thrust their persons
into the centre of the world, as if all lines should meet in
them and their fortunes, without regarding in storms what
becomes of the ship of the state, if they can save themselves
in the cock-boat of their own fortune.
Another charge brought against learned men, which may
rather be defended than denied, is, " That they sometimes
fail in making court to particular persons." This want of
application arises from two causes the one the largeness of
their mind, which can hardly submit to dwell in the exami-
nation and observance of any one person. It is the speech
of a lover rather than of a wise man, " Satis magnum alter
aiteri theatrum sumus." 3 Nevertheless he who cannot con-
tract the sight of his mind, as well as dilate it, wants a great
talent in life. The second cause is, no inability, but a rejec-
tion upon choice and judgment; for the honest and just
limits of observation in one person upon another extend no
farther than to understand him sufficiently, so as to give
him no offence, or be able to counsel him, or to stand upon
reasonable guard and caution with respect to one's self; but
to pry deep into another man, to learn to work, wind, or
govern him, proceeds from a double heart, which in friend-
ship is want of integrity, and towards princes or superiors
want of duty. The eastern custom which forbids subjects
to gaze upon princes, though in the outward ceremony bar-
r Oration on the Crown. Seneca, Ep. Mor. i. 7.
BOOK I.] AMIABLE INGENUOUSNESS OF LEARNED MEN. 41
barons, lias a good moral ; for men ought not, by cunning
and studied observations, to penetrate and search into the
hearts of kings, which the Scripture declares inscrutable.*
Another fault noted in learned men is, " That they often
fail in point of discretion and decency of behaviour, and
commit errors in ordinary actions, whence vulgar capacities
judge of them in greater matters by what they find them in
small." But this consequence often deceives; for we may
here justly apply the saying of Themistocles, who being
asked to touch a lute, replied, " He could not fiddle, but he
could make a little village a great city." u Accordingly many
may be well skilled in government and policy, who are
defective in little punctilios. So Plato compared his master
Socrates to the shop-pots of apothecaries painted on the out-
side with apes and owls and antiques, but contained within
sovereign and precious remedies. x
But we have nothing to offer in excuse of those unworthy
practices, whereby some professors have debased both them-
selves and learning, as the trencher philosophers, who, in the
decline of the Roman state, were but a kind of solemn para-
sites. Lucian makes merry with this kind of gentry, in the
person of a philosopher riding in a coach with a great lady,
who would needs have him carry her lapdog, which he doing,
with an awkward officiousness, the page said, " He feared
the Stoic would turn Cynic." y But above all, the gross flat-
tery wherein many abuse their wit, by turning Hecuba into
Hellena, and Faustina into Lucretia, has most diminished
the value and esteem of learning. 55 Neither is the modern
practice of dedications commendable ; for books should have
no patrons but truth and reason. And the ancient custom,
was, to dedicate them only to private and equal friends, or
if to kings and great persons, it was to such as the subject,
suited. These and the like measures, therefore, deserve
* Prov. xxv. u Cicero, Tuscul. Quaest. i. 2 ; Plutarch, Themistocles.
x Conv. iii. 215; and cf. Xen. Symp. v. 7.
y Lucian de Merc. Cond. 33, 34. The raillery couched under the
word cynic will become more evident if the reader will recollect the
word is derived from KVVOQ, the Greek name for dog. Those philoso-
phers were called Cynics who, like Diogenes, rather barked than
declaimed against the vices and the manners of their age. Ed.
2 Du Bartas Bethulian's Bescue, b. v. translated by Sylvester.
42 ADVANCEMENT OP LEARNING. [BOOK I.
rather to be censured than defended. Yet the submission
of learned men to those in power cannot be condemned.
Diogenes, to one who asked him " How it happened that
philosophers followed the rich, and not the rich the philoso-
phers?" answered, "Because the philosophers know what
they want, but the rich do not." a And of the like nature
was the answer of Aristippus, who having a petition to Dio-
nysius, and no ear being given him, fell down at his feet,
whereupon Dionysms gave him the hearing, and granted the
suit ; but when afterwards Aristippus was reproved for offer-
ing such an indignity to philosophy as to fall at a tyrant's
feet, he replied, " It was not his fault if Dionysius's ears were
in his feet." b Nor was it accounted weakness, but discretion,
in him c that would not dispute his best with the Emperor
Adrian, excusing himself, " That it was reasonable to yield
to one that commanded thirty legions." d These and the like
condescensions to points of necessity and convenience, can-
not be disallowed ; for thougii they may have some show of
external meanness, yet in a judgment truly made, they are
submissions to the occasion, and not to the person.
We proceed to the errors and vanities intermixed with
the studies of learned men, wherein the design is not to
countenance such errors, but, by a censure and separation
thereof to justify what is sound and good; for it is the man-
ner of men, especially the evil-minded, to depreciate what is
excellent and virtuous, by taking advantage over what is
corrupt and degenerate. "We reckon three principal vanities
for which learning has been traduced. Those things are
vain which are either false or frivolous, or deficient in truth
or ttse ; and those persons are vain who are either credulous
of falsities ot curious in things of little use. But curiosity
consists either in matter or words, that is, either in taking
pains about vain things, or too much labour about the deli-
cacy of language. There are, therefore, in reason as well as
experience, three distempers of learning; viz., vain affecta-
tions, vain disputes, and vain imaginations, or effeminate
learning, contentious learning, and fantastical learning.
The first disease, which consists in a luxuriancy of style,
has been anciently esteemed at different times, but strangely
* Laert. Life Biog. b Laert. Life Arist.
c Demonax, d Spavtiaxms, Vit. Adrian!, 15.
BOOK I.] STYLE CONSIDERED MORE THAN MATTER. 43
prevailed about the time of Luther, who, finding how great
a task he had undertaken against the degenerate traditions
of the Church, and being unassisted by the opinions of his
own age, was forced to awake antiquity to make a party far
him ; whence the ancient Authors both in divinity and the
humanities, that had long slept in libraries, began to be
generally read. This brought on a necessity of greater ap-
plication to the original languages wherein those authors
wrote, for the better understanding and application of their
works. Hence also proceeded a delight in their manner of
style and phrase, and an admiration of this kind of writing,
which was much increased by the enmity now grown up
against the schoolmen, who were generally of the contrary
party, and whose writings were in a very different style and
form, as taking the liberty to coin new and strange words,
to avoid circumlocution and express their sentiments acutely,
without regard to purity of diction and justness of phrase.
And again, because the great labour then was to win and
persuade the people, eloquence and variety of discourse grew
into request as most suitable for the pulpit, and best adapted
to the capacity of the vulgar; so that these four causes con-
curring, viz,, 1. admiration of the ancients; 2. enmity to the
schoolmen; 3. an exact study of languages; and, 4. a desire
of powerful preaching, introduced an affected study of
eloquence and copiousness of speech, which then began to
flourish. This soon grew to excess, insomuch that men
studied more after words than matter, more after the choice-
ness of phrase, and the round and neat composition, sweet
cadence of periods, the use of tropes and figures, than after
weight of matter, dignity of subject, soundness of argument,
life of invention, or depth of judgment. Then grew into
esteem the flowing and watery vein of Orosius, 6 the Portugal
bishop; then did Sturmius bestow such infinite pains upon
Cicero and Hermogenes; then did Car and Ascham, in their
lectures and writings, almost deify Cicero and Demosthenes;
then grew the learning of the schoolmen to be utterly de-
spised as barbarous; and the whole bent of those times was
rather upon fulness than weight.
Neither a Portuguese or a bishop, but a Spanish monk born at
Tarragona, and sent by St. Augustine on a mission to Jerusalem in the
commencement of the fifth century.
44 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [BOOK I.
Here, therefore, is the first distemper of learning, when
men study words and not matter; and though we have given
an example of it from later times, yet such levities have and
^RIl be found more or less in all ages. And this must needs
discredit learning, even with vulgar capacities, when they
see learned men's works appear like the first letter of a
patent, which, though finely flourished, is still but a letter.
Pygmajion's frenzy seems a good emblem of this vanity ; f for
words are but the images of matter, and unless they have
life of reason and invention, to fall in love with them is to
fall in love with a picture.
Yet the illustrating the obscurities of philosophy with
sensible and plausible elocution is not hastily to be con-
demned; for hereof we have eminent examples in Xeno-
phon, Cicero, Seneca, Plutarch, and Plato ;S and the thing
itself is of great use; for although it be some hinderance to
the sevei^e inquiry after truth, and the farther progress in
philosophy, that it should too early prove satisfactory to the
mind, and quench the desire of farther search, before a just
period is made ; yet when we have occasion for learning and
knowledge in civil life, as for conference, counsel, persuasion,
discourse, or the like, we find it ready prepared to our hands
in the authors who have wrote in this way. But the excess
herein is so justly contemptible, that as Hercules, when he
saw the statue of Adonis, who was the delight of Venus, in
the temple, said with indignation, " There is no divinity in
thee ;" so all the followers of Hercules in learning, that is,
the more severe and laborious inquirers after truth, wilt
despise these delicacies and affectations as trivial and effe-
minate.
The luxuriant style was succeeded by another, which y
though more chaste, has still its vanity, as turning wholly
upon pointed expressions and short periods, so as to appear
concise and round rather than diffusive ; by which contri-
vance the whole looks more ingenious than it is. Seneca^
f Ovid, Metam. x. 243.
ff M. Fontenelle is an eminent modern instance in the same way ;.
who, particularly in his " Plurality of Worlds," renders the present
system of astronomy agreeably familiar, as his "History of the Royal
Academy" embellishes and explains the abstruse parts of mathematics
and natural philosophy. Shaw.
BOOK I.] PURSUIT OF FANCIFUL SPECULATIONS. 45
used this kind of style profusely, but Tacitus and Pliny with
greater moderation. It has also begun to render itself
acceptable in our time. But to say the truth, its admirer"
are only the men of a middle genius, who think it adds^
dignity to learning; whilst those of solid judgment justly
reject it as a certain disease of learning, since it is no more
than a jingle, or peculiar quaint affectation of words. 11 And
so much for the first disease of learning. *
The second disease is worse in its nature than the former ;
for as the dignity of matter exceeds the beauty of words, so
vanity in matter is worse than vanity in words ; whence the
precept of St. '< Paul is at all times seasonable : " Avoid
profane and vain babblings, and oppositions of science falsely
so called." 1 He assigns two marks of suspected and falsified
science : the one, novelty and strangeness of terms ; the
other, strictness of positions ; which necessarily induces
oppositions, and thence questions and altercations. And
indeed, as many solid substances putrefy, and turn into
worms, so does sound knowledge often putrefy into a number
of subtle, idle, and vermicular questions, that have a certain
quickness of life, and spirit, but no strength of matter, or
excellence of quality. This kind of degenerate learning
chiefly reigned among the schoolmen ; who,, having subtle
and strong capacities, abundance of leisure, and but small
variety of reading, their minds being shut up in a few
authors, as their bodies were in the cells of their monasteries,
and thus kept ignorant both pf the history of nature and
times; they, with infinite agitation of wit, spun out of, a
small quantity of matter, those laborious webs of learning
which are extant in their books. For the human mind, if it
acts upon matter, and contemplates the nature of things, and
the works of God, operates according to the stuff, and is
limited thereby ; but if it works upon itself, as the spider
does, then it has no end ; but produces cobwebs of learning,
admirable indeed for the fineness of the thread, but of no
substance or profit. k
h Since the establishment of the French Academy, a studied plainness
and simplicity of style begins to prevail in that nation.
* 1 Tim. vi. 20.
k For the literary history of the schoolmen, see Morhofs "Poly hist/ 1
torn. ii. lib. i. cap. 14 ; and Camden's " Remains."
46 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [BOOK I.
This unprofitable mibtilty is of two kinds, and appears
either in the subject, when that is fruitless speculation or
controversy, or in the manner of treating it, which amongst
them was this : Upon every particular position they framed
objections, and to those objections solutions; which solutions
were generally not confutations, but distinctions ; whereas
the strength of all sciences is like the strength of a fagot
bound. For the harmony of science, when each part
supports the other, is the true and short confutation of all
the smaller objections j on the contrary, to take out every
axiom, as the sticks of the fagot, one by one, you may
quarrel with them, and bend them, and break them at
pleasure : whence, as it was said of Seneca, that he
"weakened the weight of things by trivial expression," 1
we may truly say of the schoolmen, " That they broke the
solidity of the sciences by the minuteness of their questions."
For, were it not better to set up one large light in a noble
room, that to go about with a small one, to illuminate every
corner thereof 1 Yet such is the method of schoolmen, that
rests not so much xipon the evidence of truth from arguments,
authorities, and examples, as upon particular confutations
and solutions of every scruple and objection ; which breeds
one question, as fast as it solves another ; just as in the above
example, when the light is carried into one corner, it darkens
the rest. Whence the fable of Scylla seems a lively image
of this kind of philosophy, who was transformed into a
beautiful virgin upwards, whilst barking monsters surrounded
her below,
" Candida succinctam latrantibus inguina monstris,"
Virg. Eel. vi. 75'.
So the generalities of the schoolmen are for a while fair and
proportionable \ but to descend into their distinctions and
decisions, they end in monstrous altercations and barking
questions. Whence this kind of knowledge must necessarily
fell under popular contempt ; for the people are ever apt to
contemn truth, upon account of the controversies raised
about it j and so think those all in the wrong way, who
never meet. And when they see such quarrels about sub-
tilties and matters of no use, they usually give into the
1 Quinctilian, lib. x. cap. 1, 130.
BOOK I.] DISREGARD TO TOUTH, AtfD CREDULITY. 47
judgment of Dionysius, " That it is old men's idle talk." m
But if those schoolmen, to their great thirst of truth, and
unwearied exercise of wit, had joined variety of reading and
contemplation, they would have proved excellent lights to
the great advancement of all kinds of arts and sciences.
And thus much for the second disease of learning.
The third disease, which regards deceit or falsehood, is the
foulest ; as destroying the essential form of knowledge,
which is nothing but a representation of truth ; for the
truth of existence and the truth of knowledge are the same
thing, or differ no more than the direct and reflected ray.
This vice, therefore, branches into two ; viz., delight in
deceiving and aptness to be deceived ; imposture and credu-
lity, which, though apparently different, the one seeming to
proceed from cunning, and the other from simplicity, yet
they generally concur. For, as in the verse,
" Percontatorem fugito ; nam garrulus idem est/'
Hor. lib. i. epis. xviii. v. 69.
an inquisitive man is a prattler ; so a credulous man is a
deceiver ; for he who so easily believes rumours, will as
easily increase them. Tacitus has wisely expressed this law
of our nature in these words, " Pingunt simul creduntque."*
This easiness of belief, and admitting things upon weak
authority, is of two kinds, according to the subject ; being
either a belief of history and matter of fact, or else matter
of art and opinion. We see the inconvenience of the former
in ecclesiastical history, which has too easily received and
registered relations of miracles wrought by martyrs, hermits,
monks, and their relics, shrines, chapels, and images. So
in natural history, there has not been much judgment
employed, as appears from the writings of Pliny, Carban,
Albertus, and many of the Arabians; which are full of
fabulous matters : many of them not only untried, but
notoriously false, to the great discredit of natural philosophy
with grave and sober minds. But the produce and integrity
of Aristotle is here worthy our observation, who, having
compiled an exact history of animals, dashed it very sparingly
with fable or fiction, throwing all strange reports which he
m Diog. Laert. iii. 18, Life of Plato. n Tacit. Hist. b. i. 51.
48 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [BOOK I.
thought worth recording in a book by themselves, thus
wisely intimating, that matter of truth which is the basis of
solid experience, philosophy, and the sciences, should not
be mixed with matter of doubtful credit ; and yet that
curiosities or prodigies, though seemingly incredible, are not
to be suppressed or denied the registering.
Credulity in arts and opinions, is likewise of two kinds j
viz., when men give too much belief to arts themselves, or
to certain authors in any art. The sciences that sway the
imagination more than the reason, are principally three ; viz.,
astrology, natural magic, and alchemy ; the ends or preten-
sions whereof are however noble. For astrology pretends
to discover the influence of the superior upon the inferior
bodies ; natural magic pretends to reduce natural philosophy
from speculation to works ; and chemistry pretends to
separate the dissimilar parts, incorporated in natural mix-
tures, and to cleanse such bodies as are impure, throw out
the heterogeneous parts, and perfect such as are immature.
But the means supposed to produce these effects are, both in
theory and practice, full of error and vanity, and besides, are
seldom delivered with candour, but generally concealed by
artifice and enigmatical expressions, referring to tradition,
and using other devices to cloak imposture. Yet alchemy
may be compared to the man who told his sons, he had left
them gold buried somewhere in his vineyard ; where they,
by digging, found no gold, but by turning up the mould about
the roots of the vines, procured a plentiful vintage. So the
search and endeavours to make gold have brought many
useful inventions and instructive experiments to light.?
Credulity in respect of certain authors, and making them
P As among the Egyptians, the Chinese, and the Arabians, if their
histories are to be credited. In later times, they make copper
out of iron, at Newsohl, in Germany. See Agricola "De Re Metal-
lica," Morhof, Fr. Hoffman, &c. Whilst Brand of Hamburgh was
working upon urine, in order to find the philosopher's stone, he
stumbled upon that called Kunckel's burning phosphorus, in the year
1669. See Mem, de 1'Acad. Royal, des Sciences, an 1692, And M.
Homberg operating upon human excrement, for an oil to convert quick-
silver into silver, accidentally produced what we now call the black
phosphorus, a powder which readily takes fire and burns like a coal in
the open air. See Me*m, de PA cad. an 1711. To give all the instances
of this kind were almost endless. Ed,
BOOK I.] UNREASONABLE DEFERENCE TO GREAT NAMES. 49
dictators instead of consuls, " is a piincipal cause that the
sciences are no farther advanced. For hence, though in
mechanical arts, the first inventor falls short, time adds per-
fection ; whilst in the sciences, the first author goes farthest,
and time only abates or corrupts. Thus artillery, sailing,
and printing, were grossly managed at the first, but received
improvement by time; whilst the philosophy and the sciences
of Aristotle, Plato, Democritus, Hippocrates, Euclid, and
Archimedes, flourished most in tho original authors, and
degenerated with time. The reason is, that in the mechanic
arts, the capacities and irfdustry of many are collected
together; whereas in sciences, the capacities and industry
of many have been spent upon the invention of some
one man, who has commonly been thereby rather obscured
than illustrated. For as water ascends no higher than the
level of the first spring, so knowledge derived from Aristotle
will at most rise no higher again than the knowledge of
Aristotle. And therefore, though a scholar must have faith
in his master, yet a man well instructed must judge for him-
self ; for learners owe to their masters only a temporary
belief, and a suspension of their own judgment till they are
fully instructed, and not an absolute resignation or perpetual
captivity. Let great authors, therefore, have their due, but
so as not to defraud time, which is the author of authors, and
the parent of truth.
Besides the three diseases of learning above treated, there
are some other peccant humours, which, falling under popular
observation and reprehension, require to be particularly
mentioned. The first is the affecting of two extremes ;
antiquity and novelty : wherein the children of time seem
to imitate their father ; for as he devours his children, so
they endeavour to devour each other ; whilst antiquity envies
new improvements, and novelty is not content to add with-
out defacing. The advice of the prophet is just in this case :
" Stand upon the old ways, and see which is the good way,
and walk therein." Q For antiquity deserves that men should
stand awhile upon it, to view around which is the best way;
but when the discovery is well made, they Bhould stand no
longer, but proceed with cheerfulness. And to speak the
i Jeremiah vi. 16.
50 ADVANCEMENT OP LEARNING. [BOOK
truth, antiquity, as we call it, is the young state of
world ; for those times are ancient when the world is ancient ;
and not those we vulgarly account ancient by computing
backwards ; so that the present time is the real antiquity.
Another error, proceeding from the former, is, a distrust
that anything should be discovered in later times that was
not hit upon before ; as if Lueian's objection against the
gods lay also against time. He pleasantly &sks why the gods
begot so many children in the first ages, but none in his
days ; and whether they were grown too old for generation,
or were restrained by the Papian law, which prohibited old men
from marrying ?* For thus we seem apprehensive that time
is worn out, and become unfit for generation. And here we
have a remarkable instance of the levity and inconstancy of
man's humour ; which, before a thing is effected, thinks it
impossible, and as soon as it is done, wonders it was not done
before. So the expedition of Alexander into Asia was at first
imagined a vast and impracticable enterprise, yet Livy after-
wards makes so light of it, as to say, " It was but bravely
venturing to despise vain opinions." 8 And the case was th&
same in Columbus's discovery of the West Indies, But
this happens much more frequently in intellectual matters,
as we see in most of the propositions of Euclid, which, till
demonstrated, seem strange, but when demonstrated, the
mind receives them by a kind of affinity, as if we had
known them before.
Another error of the same nature is an imagination that
of all ancient opinions or sects, the best has ever prevailed,
and suppressed the rest ; so that if a man begins a new
search, he must happen upon somewhat formerly rejected ;
and by rejection, brought into oblivion ; as if the multitude,
or the wiser sort to please the multitude, would aot oftea
give way to what is light and popular, rather than maintain
what is substantial and deep.
Another different error is, the over-early and peremptory
reduction of knowledge into arts and methods, from which
time the sciences are seldom improved ; for as young men
rarely grow in stature after their shape and limbs are fully
r Senec. imput. ap. Lact. Instit. i. 26, 13.
8 "Nihil aliud quam .bene ausus est. vana contemnere." Livy.
b, 10, c. 17.
BOOK I.] HUMAN INTELLECT OVERRATED. 51
formed, so knowledge, whilst it lies in aphorisms and obser-
vations, remains in a growing state ; but when once fashioned
into methods, though it may be farther polished, illustrated,
and fitted for use, it no longer increases in bulk and
substance.
Another error is, that after the distribution of particular
arts and sciences, men generally abandon the study of nature,
or universal philosophy, which stops all farther progress.
For as no perfect view of a country can be taken upon a
flat, so it is impossible to discover the remote and deep parts
of any science by standing upon the level of the same
science, or without ascending to a higher.
Another error proceeds from too great a reverence, and a
kind of adoration paid to the human understanding; whence
men have withdrawn themselves from the contemplation of
nature and experience, and sported with their own reason
and the fictions of fancy. These intellectualists, though
commonly taken for the most sublime and divine philosophers,
are censured by Heraclitus, when he says, " Men seek for
truth in their own little worlds, and not in the great world
without them : >n and as they disdain to spell, they can never
come to read in the volume of God's works ; but on the con-
trary, by continual thought and agitation of wit, they compel
their own genius to divine and deliver oracles, whereby they
are deservedly deluded.
Another error is, that men often infect their speculations
and doctrines with some particular opinions they happen to
be fond o or the particular sciences whereto they have most
applied, and thence give all other things a tincture that is
utterly foreign to them. Thus Plato mixed philosophy with
theology ; u Aristotle with logic ; Proclus with mathematics;
1 Text Empir. against St. Math. vii. 133.
u If it is true that God is the great spring of motion in the universe,
as the theory of moving forces is a part of mechanics and mechanics a
department of physics, we cannot see how theology can be entirely
divorced from natural philosophy. Physicists are too apt to consider
the universe as eternally existing, without contemplating it in its finite
aspect as a series of existences to be produced, and controlled by the
force of laws externally impressed upon them. Hence their theory of
moving forces is incomplete, as they do not take the prime mover into
account, or supply us, in case of denying him, with the equivalent of
his action. Ed.
v 9
52 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [BOOK I.
as these arts were a kind of elder and favourite children with
them. So the alchemists have made a philosophy from a few
experiments of the furnace, and Gilbert another out of the
loadstone : in like manner, Cicero, when reviewing the
opinions on the nature of the soul, coming to that
