Skip to main content

Full text of "Pleading and practice of the High court of chancery"

See other formats 


ncroft-WhitneyCo. 

PUBLISHERS 


AND     SELLERS    OF 

.AW   BOOKS 

SAN     FRANCISCO 


THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 

SCHOOL  OF  LAW 


PLEADING   AND    PRACTICE 


HIGH    COURT    OF    CHANCERY. 


Vol.  I. 


PLEADING   AND    PRACTICE 


OF    THE 


HIGH  COURT  OF  CHANCERY. 


BY   THE    LATE 


EDMUND    ROBERT    DANIELL, 


BARKISTER-AT-LAW. 


<&txtj)  American  lEUttion, 

WITH   NOTES   AND   REFERENCES   TO   AMERICAN   DECISIONS;    AN   APPENDIX   OF 

PRECEDENTS  ;    AND    OTHER    ADDITIONS   AND    IMPROVEMENTS, 

ADAPTING    THE    WORK    TO    THE    DEMANDS    OF 

AMERICAN  PRACTICE  IN  CHANCERY. 


Based  on  the  Sixth  English  Edition,  and  the  Fourth 
and  Fifth  American  Editions. 

By  J.  C.  PERKINS,  LL.D.  and  W.  F.  COOPER,  LL.D. 


By  JOHN   M.   GOULD,  Ph.D. 

author  of  "  the  law  of  waters,"  joint  author  of  "notes  on  THE  REVISED 

STATUTES,"  EDITOR  OF  STORY'S   "COMMENTARIES  ON  EQUITY 
PLEADINGS,"  TENTH  EDITION,  ETC. 


IN    THREE    VOLUMES. 

Vol.  I. 


BOSTON: 
LITTLE,   BROWN,   AND  COMPANY. 

1894. 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1871,  by 

J.    C.    PERKINS, 

In  the  Office  of  the  Librarian  of  Congress,  at  Washington. 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1879,  by 

LITTLE,    BROWN,   <fc   CO., 

In  the  Office  of  the  Librarian  of  Congress  at  Washington. 

Copyright,  1894, 
By  Little,  Brown,  &  Co. 


t 


The  University  Pbebs,  Cambridge,  Mass.,  U.  S.  A. 


PREFACE 

TO   THE  SIXTH   AMERICAN  EDITION. 


Several  years  after  the  publication  of  Judge  Cooper's  learned 
and  carefully  prepared  edition  of  this  classic  treatise,  the  elaborate 
Sixth  English  Edition  appeared,  which  combined  with  a  review  of 
the  new  procedure  under  the  Judicature  Acts  a  more  exhaustive 
collection  of  the  English  decisions  upon  the  subject  than  had  pre- 
viously been  attempted.  This  edition,  to  which  Lord  Esher  has 
since  referred  as  "  a  text-book  of  great  accuracy," 2  has  been  made, 
so  far  as  applicable  to  American  practice,  the  basis  of  this  edition ; 
and  the  text  and  notes  of  the  editions  of  Judge  Cooper  and  Mr. 
Perkins  have  all  been  carefully  compared  therewith  and  corrected 
or  amplified  therefrom.  In  order  to  secure  space  for  the  notes 
of  the  present  editor,  which  are  usually  indicated  by  letters  at  the 
foot  of  the  pages,  though  very  many  additions  of  decisions  and 
statements  have  also  been  added  to  the  old  notes,  the  plan  adopted 
in  the  last  English  edition,  of  stating  the  principles  with  their 
limitations  in  the  text,  and  transferring  the  illustrations  thereof 
to  the  old  notes,  has  in  general  been  followed.  All,  however,  that 
has  heretofore  made  this  treatise  so  valuable  and  conclusive  upon 
all  questions  of  equity  procedure  has  been  retained  in  the  text  or 
the  accompanying  notes. 

Three  years  of  nearly  constant  research  and  investigation  have 
now  been  devoted  to  the  task  of  making  this  edition  complete  and 
fully  abreast  of  the  times.  Special  attention  has  been  given  to  the 
latest  decisions,  both  English  and  American,  and  to  the  equity  side 
of  the  Code  procedure,  now  in  force  in  a  majority  of  the  States ;  and 

1  Butler  v.  Butler,  16  Q.  B.  D.  374,  377. 

a  6  7^36 


VI  PREFACE. 

while  the  details  of  local  practice  have  not  been  neglected,  it  is 
believed  that  few,  if  any,  decisions  upon  matters  of  general  interest 
have  failed  of  notice.  The  constant  aim  has  been  to  preserve  unity 
of  system  and  to  make  the  book  useful  and  exhaustive  as  an 
encyclopaedia.  The  citations  now  added  nearly  double  those  of  the 
last  American  edition,  and  the  new  cases  number  fully  ten  thousand. 
The  paging  indicated  by  stars,  in  the  margin,  is  that  of  the  Fourth 
American  Edition. 

The  late  Mr.  Justice  Bradley  has  referred1  to  Daniell  as  the 
leading  authoritative  commentary  upon  the  equity  practice  of  the 
Federal  Courts ;  and  as  this  work  has  been  so  intimately  connected 
with  the  history  and  development  of  equity  in  those  courts,  the 
uniformity  of  whose  procedure,  and  whose  great  increase  of  decisions 
in  recent  years,  render  them  of  first  importance,  the  most  careful 
attention  has  been  devoted  to  their  growth  and  development  of 
practice,  and  their  relation  to  State  practice.  The  equity  rules  of 
the  United  States  Supreme  Court  and  their  amendments  are  now, 
for  the  first  time,  annotated,  with  all  the  Federal  decisions  relat- 
ing to  their  construction. 

The  hope  is  indulged  that  so  vast  a  labor  will  be  of  good  service 
in  its  completed  form  to  a  profession  which,  as  a  whole,  rarely  errs 
in  accuracy  of  judgment. 

J.  M.  GOULD. 

Newton,  Mass.,  July  1,  1894. 

1  la  Thomson  v.  Wooster,  114  U.  S.  104. 


PREFACE 

TO  THE  FIFTH   AMERICAN  EDITION. 


The  work,  a  new  edition  of  which  is  now  offered  to  the  public, 
has  an  established  reputation,  and  fills  a  place  in  the  professional 
library,  occupied  by  no  other  book.  It  contains,  it  is  true,  much 
that  is  purely  local  to  the  practice  of  the  English  High  Court  of 
Chancery,  and  even  more  based  on  recent  British  legislation  and 
Orders  of  Court,  all  of  which  may  be  said  to  have  little  or  no 
application  to  the  American  equity  system.  But  it  is  precisely 
because  the  work  is  thus  complete,  giving  us  the  old  English  prac- 
tice in  Chancery,  with  the  modern  changes,  that  it  is  indispensable 
to  the  Judge,  the  practitioner,  and  the  diligent  student.  It  is  impos- 
sible to  thoroughly  master  a  difficult  point  of  practice,  or  even  to 
apply  with  intelligence  a  well-settled  point,  without  understanding 
its  origin,  and  tracing  it  through  all  its  changes,  legislative  and 
judicial.  From  no  other  work  can  the  necessary  information  be 
obtained  except  the  "  learned  and  accurate  "  treatise  of  Mr.  Daniell, 
as  adapted  to  the  American  practice  by  the  late  Judge  Perkins. 

The  main  duty  of  the  present  editor  has  been  to  bring  the  anno- 
tations down  to  the  present  day  by  a  citation  of  the  English  and 
American  authorities  since  the  publication  of  the  last  edition.  To 
do  this  thoroughly,  he  has  been  compelled  to  examine  nearly  a 
thousand  volumes  of  reports,  and  has  digested  and  cited  about 
twenty-five  hundred  cases.  The  Chancery  reports  proper,  both 
English  and  American,  have  generally  been  examined  case  by  case. 
He  lias  particularly  directed  his  attention  to  questions  of  practice 
which  have  come  into  prominence  within  the  last  decade,  such  as 
those  relating  to  injunctions,  especially  in  tax  and  bond  cases, 
receivers,  cross-bills,  consolidation  of   causes,  etc.     He  has  aimed 


Vlll  PREFACE. 

to  make  the  citations  complete  and  accurate,  with  such  a  statement 
of  the  ruling  as,  not  only  to  illustrate  the  subject  under  considera- 
tion, but  to  enable  the  reader  to  see  at  once  whether  any  particular 
case  bears  upon  the  point  he  is  investigating.  He  has  recast  the 
old  notes  in  many  instances  with  a  view  to  the  recent  decisions, 
and  to  bring  out  clearly  the  points  ruled.  Of  course,  in  so  volumi- 
nous a  work,  prepared  in  the  intervals  of  active  judicial  duty,  there 
will  be  errors  of  omission  and  commission,  and  the  editor  can  only 
hope  that,  as  these  defects  cannot  mar  the  original  work  nor  the 
labors  of  his  predecessor,  they  will  not  be  found  sufficient  to 
seriously  interfere  with  the  practical  utility  of  the  additions. 

Perhaps  he  should  add  that  he  has  cited  the  English  decisions 
since  the  Judicature  Act  of  1873  went  into  effect  without  using 
the  letters  L.  R.  as  a  prefix,  and  has  invariably  used  R.  as  the 
abbreviation  of  railroad,  and  Ry.  for  railway.  He  has  also,  occa- 
sionally, for  the  benefit  of  students,  called  attention  to  the  fact  that 
particular  chapters,  or  parts  of  chapters,  were  local  or  statutory, 
and  not  applicable  to  the  American  Chancery  practice.  The  table 
of  cases  and  the  indexes  have  been  revised  so  as  to  cover  all 
additions.  The  side  paging,  and  the  numbering  of  the  notes  follow 
the  last  edition,  with  which  the  profession  have  become  familiar, 
and  are  always  referred  to. 

W.  F.  C. 

Nashville,  Tenn. 
Sept.  6.  1879. 


CONTENTS. 


VOLUME    I. 


PAGB 

TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED xiii 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE  COMMENCEMENT  OF  A   SUIT 1-4 

CHAPTER  II. 

PERSONS  BY  WHOM  A  SUIT  MAY  BE   INSTITUTED. 

Sect.  I.    The  Queen's  Attorney-General 5-16 

II.     Foreign  Governments  and  States 17-20 

III.  Corporations,  Joint-Stock  Companies,  and  Partnerships 20-26 

IV.  Persons  residing  out  of  the  jurisdiction 27-36 

V.    Paupers 37-44 

CHAPTER   III. 

SUITS  BY  PERSONS  WHO    ARE  UNDER  DISABILITY. 

Sect.  I.     Generally 45 

II.     Aliens 45-53 

III.  Persons  attainted  or  convicted 53-58 

IV.  Bankrupts 58-66 

V.     Infants 66-82 

VI.     Idiots,  lunatics,  and  persons  of  unsound  or  weak  mind       82-86 

VII.     Married  women 87-128 


CHAPTER   IV. 
PERSONS  AGAINST  WHOM  A  SUIT  MAY  BE  INSTITUTED. 

Sect.  I.     Generally 129-130 

IL     The  Queen's  Attorney-General  and  Solicitor-General 130-140 

III.     Foreign  Sovereigns,  States,  and  Ambassadors 141-142 

IV:     Corporations,  Joint-Stock  Companies,  and  Partnerships 143-148 

V.     Persons  out  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court 149-154 

VI.     Paupers 154-156 

VII.     Persons  attainted  or  convicted 156 

VIII.     Bankrupts 157-160 

IX.     Infants 160-175 

X.     Idiots,  lunatics,  and  persons  of  unsound  or  weak  mind 175-178 

XI.     Married  women 178-189 


X  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER   V. 

PARTIES  TO   A   SUIT. 

PAGE 

Sect.  I.     Necessary  parties,  in  respect  of  the  concurrence  of  their  interests 

with  that  of  the  plaintiff -;._ 190-245 

II.     Parties  to  a  suit,  in  respect  of  their  interest  in  resisting  the  demands 

of  the  plaintiff       246-286 

IIL     Objections  for  want  of  parties 286-295 

IV.    Joinder  of  uninterested  parties 295-304 


CHAFIER  VI. 

THE  BELL. 

Sect.  I.    The  different  sort  of  bills 305-306 

II.     The  authority  to  file  the  bill 306-311 

III.  Bv  whom  prepared 311-313 

IV.  The  matter  of  the  bill 313-355 

V.     The  form  of  the  bill 355-391 

Generally 355-357 

1.  Address  of  the  bill       357 

2.  Names  and  addresses  of  the  plaintiffs 357-360 

3.  Stating  part 360-372 

4.  Charge  of  confederacy 372 

5.  Changing  part 372-374 

6.  Interrogating  part 374-377 

7.  The  prayer  for  relief 377-389 

8.  Prayer  for  process 389-391 

VI.    In  what  cases  the  bill  must  be  accompanied  by  an  affidavit    ....  392-396 

VII.     Printing  and  filing  the  bill 396-401 

VIII.     Amending  the  bill 401-427 


CHAPTER   VII. 

PROCESS  BY  SERVICE  OF  A  COPY  OF  THE  BILL  ON  FORMAL  DE- 
FENDANTS, AND  PROCEEDINGS  BY  SERVICE  OF  NOTICE  OF  THE 
DECREE. 

Sect.  I.    Process  by  service  of  a  copy  of  the  bill  on  formal  defendants     .    .     .    428-432 
II.     Proceedings  by  service  of  notice  of  the  decree 432-438 


CHAPTER   VIII. 

PROCESS  TO  COMPEL,   AND   PROCEEDINGS  LN  DEFAULT  OF, 
APPEARANCE. 

Sect.  I.     Service  of  the  copy  of  the  bill 439-456 

II.     Proceeding  where  no  service  of  a  copy  of  the  bill  can  be  effected  .     .     456-460 

III.  Proceedings  by  the  plaintiff,  where  service  of  the  copy  of  the  bill  has 

been  effected " 460-472 

IV.  Against  particular  defendants 472-479 


CHAPTER   IX. 

INTERROGATORIES  FOR   THE   EXAMINATION  OF  THE   DE- 
FENDANTS  IN   ANSWER   TO   THE   BILL 480-487 


CONTENTS.  il 


CHAPTER  X. 


PROCESS  TO  COMPEL,  AND  PROCEEDINGS  IN  DEFAULT  OF, 

ANSWER. 

PAGE 

Sect.  I.  Against  defendants  not  privileged,  nor  subject  to  disability   ....  48^"4^6 

II.  Against  particular  defendants tnt-   - 

III.  Effect  of  a  contempt  upon  the  proceedings  in  the  cause     .     .     .     .     .  504-dO* 

IV.  In  what  manner  contempts  in  process  may  be  cleared,  waived,  or 

discharged 5K~H2 

V.     Process  by  filing  a  traversing  answer  or  traversing  note au-oio 


CHAPTER   XI. 

TAKING  BILLS  PRO   CONFESSO. 

Sect.  I.    Preliminary  order toI~^o 

II.     Hearing,  decree,  and  subsequent  proceedings 525-532 


CHAPTER  XII. 

THE  DEFENCE   TO   A   SUIT 533-535 

CHAPTER  XIII. 

APPEARANCE 536-541 

CHAPTER  XIV. 

DEMURRERS. 

Sect.  I.    The  general  nature  of  demurrers 542-546 

II.     The  different  grounds  of  demurrer 547-584 

III.  The  form  of  demurrers 585-591 

IV.  Filing,  setting  down,  and  hearing  demurrers 591-597 

V.     The  effect  of  allowing  demurrers 597-599 

VI.  The  effect  of  overruling  demurrers 600-602 

CHAPTER   XV. 

PLEAS. 

Sect.  I.    The  general  nature  of  pleas 603-625 

II.     The  different  grounds  of  pleas 625  681 

III.  Form  of  pleas 681-689 

IV.  Swearing,  filing,  setting  down,  and  arguing  pleas 689-696 

V.     Allowing  pleas 696-699 

VI.     Saving  the  benefit  of  a  plea  to  the  hearing 699-700 

VII.  Ordering  a  plea  to  stand  for  answer 700-701 

VIII.     Overruling  pleas 701-703 

IX.    Amending  pleas,  and  pleading  de  novo 703-705 

CHAPTER    XVI. 

DISCLAIMERS 706-710 


xii  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  XVII. 

ANSWERS. 

PAGE 

Sect.  I.    General  nature  of  answers 711-729 

II.     Form  of  answers 729-738 

III.  Swearing,  filing,  and  printing  answers 738-758 

IV.  Exceptions  to  answers 758-774 

V.     Further  answers  —  answers  to  amended  bills 775-777 

VI.     Amending  answers  —  supplemental  answers 777-784 

VII.     Taking  answers  off  the  file 784-786 

VIII.    From  what  time  answer  deemed  sufficient 786 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 

THE  JOINDER  OF   SEVERAL  DEFENCES 787-789 

CHAPTER  XIX. 

DISMISSING  BILLS,  OTHERWISE  THAN  AT  THE  HEARING,  AND 
STAYING  PROCEEDINGS. 

Sect.  I.     Generally     .     .     . 790-801 

II.     For  want  of  prosecution 801-812 

III.  Where  the  suit  has  abated,  or  become  otherwise  defective     ....  812-815 

IV.  Cases  of  election 815-818 

CHAPTER  XX. 

MOTION  FOR  A  DECREE 819-827 

CHAPTER  XXI. 

REPLICATION 828-835 

CHAPTER  XXII. 

EVIDENCE. 

Sect.  L     Admissions       836-849 

II.     The  onus  proband i 849-852 

III.  Confined  to  matters  in  issue 852-860 

IV.  Of  the  effect  of  a  variance      .     . 860-862 

V.     Documentary  evidence  which  proves  itself 862-874 

VI.     Documentary  evidence  which  does  not  prove  itself 874-881 

VII.     Proving  exhibits  at  the  hearing  under  an  order 881-885 

VIII.     Who  may  be  witnesses       885-887 

IX.     Manner  of,  and  time  for,  taking  evidence 887-891 

X.     Affidavits,  and  ex-parte  examinations  before  an  examiner 891-903 

XI.     Viva  voce  evidence     . 903-919 

XII.     Interrogatories 920-926 

XIII.  Examination  of  witnesses  by  the  examiner  on  interrogatories    .     .     .  926-932 

XIV.  Examination  of  witnesses  de  bene  esse 932-941 

XV.     Demurrers  by  witnesses 942-945 

XVI.     Publication.     .     . 945-950 

XVII.     Suppression  of  depositions 950-951 

XVIII.     Re-examination  of  witnesses 952-955 

XIX.     Examination  of  witnesses  after  publication 955-961 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


[the  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 


A. 


A.  v.  B.  540 

Abadom  v.  Abadom  801 

Abbey  v.  The  R.  L.  Stevens        630, 

1427 

Abbot  v.  Allen  1653 

v.  Johnson  334,  335,  346 

Abbott  v.  Bayley  88 

v.  Edgerton  1661 

v.  Foote  1621 

v.  Middleton  1503 

v.  Monti  1073 

v   Parsons  1127 

v.  Sworder  990,  1400 

Abby  v.  Gilford  1202,  1798 

Abel  v.  Nodes  1307 

Abell  v  Heathcote  1316 

v.  Schreech  1213 

Abels  v.  Mobile  R.  E  Co.  1551 

Aberaman    Ironworks     Co.    v. 

Wickens  230,  279,  1469 

Aberavon  Tin  Plate  Co. ,  lie  27 

Aberdeen  v.  Chitty  1734 

Abergavenny,     Lady    v.    Aber- 
gavenny, Lady  354 
Abergavenny,  Lord  v.  Powell    952, 
954, 1574 
v.  Thomas                                  1164 
Aberystwith,    &c.    Ry.    Co.  v. 

Pierey  335 

Abingdon,  Lord  v  Thornhill  397 
Abouloffw  Oppenheimer  287,664 
Abraham  v.  Bubb  1630,  1634 

v.  Hannay  243 

v.  Newcombe  96 

Abram  v.  Ward  431 

Abrams  v.  Winshup  858 

Abrey  v.  Newman  203,  1514 

Abud  v.  Riches  508,  1045 

Accidental  and  Marine  Ins.  Co. 

v.  Gibbon  1553 

v  Mercati  26,  27 

Accumulator  Co.  v.  Consolidated 

E  S.  Co.  1069 

Acerro  v.  Petroni  920 

Acherley  v.  Roe  560,  561,  640,  641 
Acheson  v.  Stevenson  1638 

Acker,  Re  1705 

v.  Leland  1071 

Ackerson    v.    Lodi    Branch    R. 

Co.  215 

Acklin  v   Paschall  1158 

Ackroyd  v.  Briggs  207,  208,  245 

v.  Suiithson  1430 

Acland  v.  Gravener  1725 

Acme  CopyingCo.  v.  McLuro  1172 
Acomb  v.  Landed  Estate  Co.  1821 
Acquacknock  Water  Co.  v.  Wat- 
son 1639 
Acraman  v.  Bristol  Dock  Co.  1667 
v.  Price  1081 
Acres  v.  Little  79 
Acton  v  Market  1672 
Adair  v.  Adair                             1238 


Adair  v.  Barrington 

809 

v.  New  River  Co. 

274,  276 

v.  Shaw 

1423 

v.  Winchester 

197,  19!t 

v.  Young 

•    261 

Adair  County  v.  Ownby 

1756 

Adames  v.  H.illett 

1423 

Adams,  Ex  parte 

86 

v.  Adams    354,  726,844,  991,  1229 
v.  Bankart  1104 

v.  Barry  224 

v.  Batley  567 

v.  Bradley  200,  223 

v.  Bridgewater  Iron  Co.      759,  828 
v.  Brown        999,  1224,  1232, 1244, 
1247,  1248,  1208 
v.  Claxton  1310,  1337 

v.  Clifton  1418 

v.  Colthurst  32 

v.  Crittenden  1663 

v.  Dixon  1560,  1561 

v.  Evans  1074 

v.  Fisher  1717,  1829 

v.  Haskell  1747 

v.  Heathcote  1776 

v   Holbrook  255,  259 

v.  Howard        559,  590,  1381,  1642 
v.  Hudson  Co.  Bank  1676 

v.  Johnson  2300 

v.  Kehlor  Milling  Co.  860 

v.  Lockwood  1591 

v.  Mevrose  314 

v.  Michael  1635, 1636 

v.  Munter  1073 

v.  Myers  1305 

v.  Nixon  1561 

v.  Paynter  431 

v.  Peirce  92 

v.  Phillips  418 

v  Porter  372,  563,  564,  579, 

1457, 1557 
v.  Russell  950 

v  Sharon  1120 

v.  Shelby  837 

V.  Soule  1147 

v.  Stevens  151,290,518, 

1507,  1071 
v.  Valentine  1551 

v.  Waller  644,  1210 

v.  Whitcomb  1704 

t'  Woods  1733,1749 

Adams  County  v   Burlington  & 

M.  R.  R.  Co  402 

Adamson  v.  Adamson  38 

v.  Blackstock  465 

v   Hull  813,  1512,  1543, 1679 

v.  Hull  813,  1543 

v.  Wilson  1666 

Adamson's  Appeal  1461 

Adcock  v.  Peters  236,  645 

Adderly  v.  Smith  32 

Addis  v.  Campbell  1823,  1828 

Addison  v.  Hindmarsh  1485 


Addison?;.  Williamson  1131 

Addleman  v.  Masterson  906 

Aderholt  v.  Henry  1290 

Ad^er  v.  Pringle  790 

Adkins  v.  Bliss  1044,  1064, 1793 

Adkisson  v.  Dent  1168,  1320 

Aduey  v.  Flood  413 

Adreveno  v.  Mutual  Reserve  F. 

L.  Ass'n.  576 

Advocate,  Lord  v.  Douglas,  Lord  1464 
v   Dunglas  1495 

Adye  v.  Hanna  563 

iEtna  Ins.  Co.  v.  Tyler  1241 

African  Co.  v.  Parish  565 

African  Meth.    Ep.   Church    v. 

Conover  388, 1614 

African  Soc   v.  Varick  22 

Agabeg  v.  Hartwell  1400 

Agar  v.  Fairfax  1150,  1152,  1162 

v.  Gurney  769,  1208 

v.  Macklew  670 

v.  Regent's  Canal  Co.  10,  717, 

718, 1078,  1686 

Agar-Ellis,  lie  70, 108 

Agens  v.  Agens  560 

Ager  v.  Blacklock  &  Co.  731 

Aggas  v.  Pickerell  559 

Aglionby  ti   James  1147 

Agnew  v.  Bank  of  Gettysburg        25 

v.  Dorman  630,  1427 

v.  McGill  840 

v.  Whitney  1302 

Agriculturist    Cattle    Ins.    Co., 

lie  1327, 1328. 1330,  1738 

Aguilar  v.  Aguilar         102,  104,  106 

Aholtz  v.  Durfee  1120,  1580 

Ahrend  v  Odiorne  365,  552,  561 

Ahronfeldt  v.  Ahrenfeldt  1350 

Aiekles's  Case  878 

Aiken  v.  Kilburne  571 

v.  Smith  678 

Aikin  r.  Ballard  360,  361,  373 

v.  Harrington  532,  1484 

Ails  v.  Sublit  033 

Ainsley  v.  Sims  30,  63, 411,  413,  426, 

427 

Ain«lie  v.  Medlicott  109,  182 

v.  Sims  601,  791 

Ainsworth  v.  Bentley  1654 

v.  Roe  1388 

v.  Starkie  1557 

v.  Walmsley  1649 

Airey  v   Hall  1826 

Aislabie  v.  Rice  1403 

Aitchison  v  Lohre  1503 

Alabama  Gold  Life  Ins.  Co. ,  Ex 

parte  815 

v.  Lott  1661 

Alabama  G.  S  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hill     1566 
Alabama  Iron  &  Ry.  Co.  v   An- 

niston  Loan  &  T.  Co.  1743 

Alabama     Warehouse    Co.     v. 
Jones  418 


XIV 


TABLE   OF   CASES    CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 


Alan  v.  Jourdan  843 

Alardea  p.  Campbell  '"" 

Albany,    &c    Mln.   Co.   v.  Au- 
ditor-General 1661 
Albany  Bank  v  Schermerhorn    174'2 
Albeer.  Carpenter                    90,117 
Albert  V    Perry                    1353,  1354 
Albert,  Prince  v.  Strange       39,  155, 
911, 1647 
Albert  Average  Ass'n,  Re  1739 
Albion  Steel  &  Wire  Co.  v.  Mar- 
tin 1381 
Albrecht  v.  St.  Paul                    1675 
H   Sussman                       50.  51,  54 1 
Albritton  V.  Bird                 1621,  1624 
Alciuous  v.  Nigren               49,  61,  53 
Alcock  v.  Alcock  113 
Alcott  v.  Avery                             1608 
Aldborough,  Lord  v.  Burton  2« 
Alden  t>.  Beckley                            147 
v  Foster                           1000,  1224 
v.  Trubee                                   1624 
Alderman  v.  Bannister                 1543 
Alderson  v.  Biggars                       642 
v.  Harris                                        292 
v.  Henderson                               801 
Aldinger  v.  Pugh                           1685 
Aldred  v.  Halliwell                         1104 
Aldrich  v.  Sharp                          1255 
v.  Wilcox                                     328 
Aldridge  v.  Dunn                          1539 
v.  Menser                1568, 1569, 1570 
v  Thompson                    1565,  15'  9 
r.  Westbrook           730,  1390,  1413 
Aldworth  v.  Robinson                   972 
Alexander  v.  Adams                      633 
v.  Alexander                      110,  1136 
v.  Barker                                    1126 
v.  Berney                               21,  143 
V.  Cana                                220,  279 
v.  Colcord                                1081 
r   Easten                                   1594 
v.  Gibson                                   1101 
v  Hoffman                           231,279 
v.  Katte  26 
..Lee                                           2f 
v.  Markham                               }°<° 
»■  Miller                           iM  J""i 
v.  Mills                           1282, 1401 
v.  Mortgage  Co                            '*" 
v.  Moye                                        597 
v.  Nurse                                       »92 
v.  Osborne                                   %* 
v.  Pendleton                      6(5, 1682 
v.  Searcy  2V. 
v.  Taylor                               361,  41( 
v.  United  States                          5(8 
r.  Wallace                                   844 
r.  Wellington,  Duke  of            1485 
v   Williams                                   840 
v.  Wolley                                   1168 
Alexandria  Palace  Co.,  Re             14o 
Alford  v.  McCormac                        8J4 
Alikeni'   Howell                            1133 
Alison,  Re ,  Johnson  V.  Mounsey  652 
Allan  v.  Allan             317,1572,1573 
v  Copeland                                 °4( 
v.  Hoffman                                  15"8 
v.  Houlden                                  599 
v  United  Kingdom  Tel.  Co.     1028 
A  Hard  v.  Carleton                          303 
Allay  v.  Hutchins                        1100 
Allrard  v.  Skinner                         560 
Allcrofti'   Farnan                            226 
AlMav  v   Fletcher                         1485 
Alleghany  &  K.  B.  Co.  v.  We>- 

denfeld  1661 

Allegre  v.  Maryland  Ins.  Co         6/1 

Allen   Re  1449,  1847 

v.  Allen     91,  637,  830, 1048, 1314, 

1549, 1650 

v.  Annesley  936 

v.  Archer  »* 

r.  Bahcock  ™' 

v.  Barksdale  ™ 

V  Baugus  .  643'i^ 

v.  Belcher  I*3* 


Allen  v   Blunt  1002,  1146,^1147 

v  Bone  am'Rffl 

V.  Bonnett  8bbuV? 

v.  Central  R.  Co.  \g* 

v.  Chosen  Freeholders  163b 

v.  Coffman  3(9 

v  Crobcroft  lbb» 

v.  Crocket  J97 
v.  Curtis                        26, 144,  242 

v.  Davidson  68 

v.  Demarest  &■* 

iZS"  1282.S 

v.  Forbes  95 

•■  Gille,te  ilift 

v.  Harding  16b" 

v.  Hawley  16<< 

v.  Hilton  16o8 

v.  Houlden  nf6( 

■v.  Hyde  l'1^ 

v.  Jarvis  1235, 1442,  1474 

v.  Kennett  10(2 

t>.  Knight  224 

v  Lemoyne  tuw 

t>   Lewis  1381 

v.  Lloyd  1734 

v.  Loder  4o9 

».  McNew  no? 

t>.  Macpherson  40,  552,  664 

„   Miller  344',3oa 

».  Minor  1680 

v.  Montgomery  59 

i).  Montgomery  R.  Co.                341 

v.  New  York  517 

v.  0"  Donald  723,  840 

v.  Poole  281 

D.  Rand  906 

V.  Randolph  603,  661,  669 

v.  Robbins  1233,  1245 

v.  Boll  220,  1550 

v.  Saul  paw  1" '3 
v  Seckham     674, 1080, 1638,  1663 

v.  Shanks  1309 

v,  Simons  !'?( 

v.  Smith  294,  406,  624 

v.  Spring  426,  1515 

,.   State  Bank  395,892 

„.  Taylor  894 

v.  Tritch  1548 

v.  Turner  26,  246,  287,  289 

v   Watt  ,     633 

v.  Wilkins  90, 114,  ,117 

v.  Williams  W51 

v.  Wilson  I"}9 

v.  Winstandly  °\° 

v.  Woodruff  f,14 

v.  Woolley  644 

r   Woonsocket  Co.  Jig" 

Allender  ».  Trinity  Church         U30 

Aller  v.  .lones  tbb( 

Alley  •   Carroll  1546 

v.  Quintcr  „  390,  £31 

Allfrevr.  Allfrey  34E I,  66(  ,668, 
771,  840, 1185, 1186,  1230,  1268. 
148( 

Allgood  i'    Merrybent  &  D  Ry- 

Co.  1'°" 

Allhusen  r  Ubouchere  354 

Alliance  Milling  Co   0.  Eaton        (1-J 

Allin  ».  Hall  296 

Ailing  i..  Ailing  641 

Allis,  Re  888,  J33 

v    Bnrkstaff  „      "W\?„i 

v.  Stowell  314,  782,  829, 1069 

Allison    Re  1346 

"    Drake  280,  1580, 1584 

v.  Herring  1845 

Alloway  Creek  (S.  P.  Inhab.  of) 

v.  Strong  22 

Allsup  r.  Allsup  251 

Allyn  v.  Davis  443 

Alma  o.  I.oehr  lobl 

Almack  v  Moore  68 

Almond  v   Wilson  334 

Almony  v.  Hicks  648,  652,  1624 

Almyv  Daniels  659 

v.  Pycroft  «w 


Alpena  r.  Kelley  1650 

Alpha  v.  Payman  779 

Alsager  v.  Johnson  724,  728 

v    Rowley  323 

Alsop  v.  Bell  1428, 1527,  1542 

v.  Oxford,  Lord  1440,  1449 

Alston  v.  Alston  1358,  1551 

v.  Boyd 

v.  Jones  HO 

v.  Trollope  643,  644, 1211 
Alt  v.  Banholzer  605 
Althause  v.  Radde  1150 
Altman  v.  Royal  Aquarium  So- 
ciety 1653 
Alton  v.  Harrison  1057 
Altree  v.  Horden  402,  796,  797 

v.  Sherwin 


Alvanley,  Lord  v.  Kinnaird       1169, 
1276,  1283,  1844 
Alven  v.  Bond  1752 

Alviue  v  Bond  1271 

Alvord  v.  Stone  1463 

Alwood  v.  Mansfield  1666 

Ambler  v.  Macon  1358 

Ambrose  v.  Dunmow  Union        1399 
v.  Nott  815 

Ambrosio  v.  Francia  959 

Ambury  v.  Jones  547, 1557 

Amelung  v.  Seekamp  1631,  1669 

America  Life  Ass.  v.  Boogher     1642 
American  Academy  of  Arts  and 
Sciences  v.  Harvard  College 

2182,  2207,  2208 

American  Bell  Tel  Co  v.  Brown 

Tel.  Co.  1642 

v  Globe  Tel.  Co.  1642 

v.  McKeesport  Tel.  Co.  1642 

v.  Pan  Electric  Tel.  Co.  149 

v.  Southern  Tel.  Co.  314 

American  Bible  Society  V.  Price   417 

American  Box  M.   Co.  v.  Cros- 

man  1411 

American  Carpet  Linen  Co.  v 

Chipman  _  843 

American  Diamond  Drill  Co  v 

Sullivan  M.  Co  1408 

American  Diamond  R.  B.  Co  v. 

Sheldons  1120 

American   Dock  &  Imp.   Co.  v 

Public  School  Trustees  1073 
Ameiican  E.  Co.  v.  Fuller  378,  974 
American  Exchange,  Re  887 

American  Exchange  Bankr.  An- 
drews 1516 
V.  Inloes  386 
American  File  Co.  v.  Garrett        843 
American  F   L.  M.  Co.  v.  Ben- 
son 149 
v.  Sewell                              545,  586 
American  Freehold  L.  &  M.  Co. 

v.  Jefferson  385 

American  Ins.  Co.  v.  Oakley       533, 

1272,  1284, 1286, 1290, 1470 

American  Life  Ins.  &  Trust  Co. 

v.  Bayard  777,  1534 

r.  Sackett  886 

American  Loan  &  Trust  Co.  v. 

East  &  West  Ry  Co.  766 

American  Middling  Purifier  Co. 
v.  Atlantic  Milling  Co.  1640 

v.  Christian  1640 

American     Mortgage     Co.     v. 

O'Harra  843 

American  Refrigerating,  &c.  Co 

r.  Linn  *» 

American  R.  P   Co  v.  Knopp      314 
American   Solid  Leather  Button 
Co    v.    Empire    State    Nail 
Co.  314 

American  Tobacco  Co.  V.  Guest  1648 
American  Water  Works  Co.  v. 

Venner  l°b<J 

American  Wine  Co  v   Brasher     386 
American  ZylnniteCo   v.  Cellu- 

loid  Manuf  Co.  '     "i«(5 

Amerman  v.  Deane  1654 

Ames  v.  Ames  *"" 


Ames  v.  Birkenhead  Docks         173L 

v.  Brooks  _  ^ 

v  Chicago,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  m 

v.  Commyns  110° 

::Sa3         374,377,1648,1650 
Ames  Iron  Works  v.  West  157 

Amey  v.  bong  „    n 

Amherst  and  Belchertown  R.  «• 

t-.  Watson  A»* 

Amhurstv.  King  '^ 

Ammant    v.    New    Alexandria, 


&c.  Tump.  Co 
Amon  w.  Bobbett 
Amory  v.  Brodrick 

v-  Brown 

v.  Fairbanks 

v.  Fellows 

v.  Francis 

v  Lawrence 

v.  Lowell 
Amos  v.  Chadwick 

v  Heme  Bay  Pavilion  Prome- 
nade Co.  145,  195, 

t;.  Hughes 
Amsinck  v.  Barklay 


1051 

1548 

817 

327, 1643 

284 

906,  918,  929 

284 

737 

1411,  2021,  2282 

797,  1120 


TABLE   OP   CASES   CITED. 

[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 

Andrews    v.     City    Permanent 

Benefit  Building  Society         ila 

v    Cole  RO    110 

v.  Cradock  69  110 

v.  Emerson  *f°° 

v.  Essex  Ins.  Co.  !££ 

v.  Farnham  <**> 

v    Ford  1450 

v.  Oilman  782,1548,1550 

v.  Glenville  Woollen  Co.  ™ 

v.  Hobson  1549 

v.  Huckabee  <?°* 

■ti    Kihbec  AuuU 

v.  Lorkwood  604, 1527,  1543 

v.  McGuffog  \6 

v.  Merchant  Tailors'  Co. 


Anon  v.  Anon. 
3Atk.  567 
3  "  672 
3  "  644 
3  "  691 
3  "  809 
1  Barb.  Ch.  73 
5  Beav  92 
3      "   420 


1093 

1700.  1701, 

1707, 1712 

Amv  v.  Manning  726,  1743 

Sot   E.parle      1689,1690,1693 

Anderson  v.  Anderson  MOD 

v.  Bank  n  ,      . .     \84* 

v  Bank  of  British  Columbia    bit, 

<22 

V.  Baxter  652 

v.  Brown  ^ 

v.  Caraway  "i™ 

v.  Carr  jji* 

v.  Caunter  j^O 

v.  Cramer  852,  10kJ 

v.  De  Soer  3,8 

v.  Dow  ling  io-i 

f   Dwv6r  i^uo 

r.  Foulke    1061,  1283, 1284, 1286, 

v.  George 

v.  Guichard 

v.  Henderson 

v.  Irvine 

v.  Jacksonville  R.  Co 

v.  Kissam 


934,  940 

1358,  1359 

1743 

108 

1286,  1481 

576 

652 

797, 1640 

1734 

215 

16 

462, 1019,  1610 

363 


1132,  1138  | 

811, 1725  I 

1320 

165,  997 

287 

720 

447,  448,  652,  1674 

1579 

201 

864 

1467 

1642 

1320 

1503 

686, 1618 

1672 

216,  852 

1601 

1705, 1712 


,  Lewis 

v.  McNeal 

v.  McRoberts 

v.  May 

v.  Moberly 

v.  Monroe 

v.  Moore 

v   Morice 

v.  Mullenix 

v.  Noble 

v.  Northrop 

v   Palmer 

V.  Stamp 

v.  Stather   151, 162,  449,  452,  515, 

746,  897 

v.  Titmas  113* 

v.  Ward  1551 

v.  Watts  »7 

v.  Wells  1»° 

v.  Wilkinson  1561 

v  Wilson  390 

v.  Yates        71,  80,  980, 1008, 1599 

Andover  v.  Merrimac  Co.       115,  116 

Andrew  v.  Aitken  1507,  1539 

v.  Andrew  1218,  1318 

v.  Raeburn  JM 

v.  Spurr  1973 

v.  Wrigley  641 

Andrewes  v.  Walton  1069, 1453, 1492 

Andrews,  In  re  1352, 1364 

Andrews,      Re,     Edwards     v. 

Dewar  100 

Andrews  v.  Barnes  1408,  1563 

v.  Bishop  1560,  2010,  2199 

v.  Bohannon  1028 

v.  Brown  642,  685,  964,  1081 


v.  Palmer 

v.  Partington 

v.  Paschen 

v.  Salt  " 

v.  Scotton 

v  Solomon 

v.  Sparhawk 

v.  Spears 

v.  Stanton 

v.  Stelle' 

v.  Trinity  Hall 

v.  Walton 

v.  Williams 
Androscoggin   &    Kennebec  R 
Co.  v.  Androscoggin   R.  Co 
4  50R,  1046,  1683,  1684,  2150 
Angel  v.  Smith         1056,  1057   1058, 
1715,1717,1718,1743,1-44 

Angell,  Ex  parte  1*» 

Angell  v.  Angell  Jdi* 

v.  Davis  1463,14641465 

v.  Hadden   1206, 1560, 1564,  lo65, 

15b9 

v.  McLellan 
V.  Penn.  R.  Co. 
v.  Smith 
V-  Stone 
v.  Westcombe 
Angerstein  V.  Hunt 
Angier  v   May 
I      v.  Stannard 

v.  Webber 
1  Anglo- African    Steamship    Co., 

lie  149,447 

Anglo  Californian  Gold  Mining 

Co  ,  Re  1461 

Anclo-Danubian   Co.  v.   Roger- 

son  26,  817, 1082,  1666 

Anglo-Greek  Nav   Co  ,  He  1610 

Anglo-Italian  Bank  v.  Davies    1035, 

ft  1037,  1063,  1716 

Anglo-MoravianH.J.  Ry.^,^ 

Angus  v.  Clifford  26 

v.  Robinson  645,653,815 

Annesley  v   Ashurst 

Annin  V.  Annin 


1360 

402,  779 

42 

197 

547,  1557 

1683, 1685 

1676 

1412 

1654 


Anning  V.  La  vers 
Anon   Amb.  237 
"      252 
v.  Anon. 


XV 


512,  536, 1684 
235 
298 
1539 
660 
982 
947,  940 
872,  1574 


v.  Bridgewater  Canal  Co.  1671 

IBro.C  C.376  1699,1702 

2Cha.  Ca.  161  6(6,  6i9 

2       "        163  160,  1055 

2        "        164  331 

2  Chit.  425  113 » 

1  Clarke.  423  1299,  1300 

1  Col  273  "8 

1  C.  P.  Coop,  t  Cott.  61,  n.   1489 
IDeG.  &S.  321  429 

4  "        547 

1  Desaus.  124 

2  Dick.  775 
1  D.  &  L.  725 
1  Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  11 
1 
1 
2 
2 


1  Atk, 

1 

1 

1 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

3 

3 

3 

3 

3 

3 


89 
491 
521 
670 
1 

14 
113 
210 
469 
471 
607 
17 
70 
129 
219 
277 
350 
485 
524 
630 


346 
1266 
1573 
928 
564 
1540 
90 
1698, 1702 
37,  111 
643 
1398 
1671 
1699 
887 
1069 
469 
393,  552,  673 
666,  684 
815 
1070 
139 
1626 
1678 
1189 
600 


75 
80 

66,  pi. 
166,  pi. 


1073 
31 
1139 
1231 
328 
1560 

:      181 

219, 
228,272 

2  "  166,  pi.  27        272 

in    the    Duchy,    2    Eq     Cas 

Abr.  594,  pi.  3 
Freem.  22,  pi.  20 

2  Freem.  62 

1  Hare,  317  n. 
10     "     App.  27 

1  Hayw.  347 

1  Hayw.  144 

1  Hill  (s.  a),  251,  258,  259 

Hopk.    27 
"      101 

1  John.  143 

Uur.  N.S.    973,  V.  C.  W. 


260 
652 
668 
430 
160 
1047 
23 
960 


■  Jur.  1038 


324, 
839, 
588, 
385, 
1124, 


U  "  28,  L.  C. 

11  "  258,  V.  C 

17  "  435 

17  "  827,  V.  C 

18  "  770 
2  J.  &  W.  553 

L  I.  Hall,   16    July,    1816, 


E 
W. 


1605 

1594 

1030 

177,  444 

95, 100 

520 

1801 

96 

1139 

515 

69 

972 

1606 

161 

733 


MS. 
23  L.  J.  Ch.  24 
9L  T.  N.  S.  674,  M.  R. 
1M.  &C.  78 
1  Mad.  657 


395 

246 

494 

252 

253 

271 

276 

461 

463 

494 
10 

6  "  276 
9  Mod.  43 
Mos.  6 
"  66 
»  68 
»  86 
■<  175 
"  238 
"    304 

1  Newl.  573 

2  Pick.  165 
Pree.  Ch.  331 

9  Price,  210 

1  P.  Wms.  301 

2  "         68 


1775 
945 
152,  521 
348 
695 
817 
1320 
1286, 1287 
351 
1115 
974 
1408 
78 
910,  927 
1287 
1652 
1706,  1709 
1652 
81,  1429 
167, 172 
39 
37 
32 
752 
691 
1115 
921 
469,  1047 
1204 
842,  843 
1112, 1114, 1115 


XVI 


TABLE   OP   CASES   CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 


Anon  r.  A 

non. 

2  P.  V> 

ms.  283 

2 

464 

2 

481 

lSulk 

152 

1      " 

153 

1      " 

405 

2     " 

645 

2      " 

649 

3     " 

81 

4  Sim 

359 

8    " 

346 

12    " 

202 

2  Sim. 

N.  S.  54 

3  Swan.  139 

1  Tenn.  Ch.  2 

2  Ventr.  361,  N 

1  Vern.    45 

60 
104 
116 
131 
253 
261 
283 
318 
351 
707 


1  Yes.  Jr.    66 
1        "         93 


6 
8 
9 
V' 
11 
11 
12 
11 
16 
V, 
V, 
19 


140 
410 
453 
286 
332 
335 
336 
515 
148 
656 
287 

288 
612 
613 
573 
69 
341 
287 
169 
170 
4 
207 
169 
174 
300 
321 


1577 
690 
508 
1095 
1095 
1109, 1110 
1131 
1126 
10i>3 
1773, 1781 
1353 
33,  1605 
1349 
208 
497,  740 
.  2  677 

1239 
387 
815 
791 
1027 
932,  950 
254 
1227, 1231 
281,635 
1560,  1571 
118 
1786 
974, 1472,  1576, 
1653 
1662 
37,  28,  74 
1286,  1288 
1291 
179,  182 
1275 
1281 
1732 
1286 
347,  S54 
1057, 1717,  1718, 
1744 
1058 
1291 
1291 
934 
1458,  1559 
1169 
30 
793,  806,  811 
1046 
1722 
1455 
1371 
609,  806 
934 
936 
1025 
653,  1556 
1707 


Anthony  o.  Leftwicb  361 

v.  Rogers  1239 

r   Savage  894 

v.  State  190 

Antoine  i'.  Morshead  50 

Antrobus  v.  East  India  Co.  1112 


Apollinaris  Co.'s   Trade  Marks, 

In  re  27.  28,  197, 1648 

Apollinaris  Co.  v.  Wilson  28 

Apperly  v.  Page  240,  243,  544 

Appleby  v.  Duke  160,  216,  710 

Appleton  v.  Donovan  149 

v.  Horton  844 

v.  Sturgis  710 

Appold    v.     Prospect    Building 

Ass'n  1509 

Apps  v.  Day  1130 

Apthoro  v.  Comstock        1073,  10.6, 
'1077,1112,1114,1124,1135, 
1136,  1677,  1830 
Arabin,  Re  98 

Archbold  v.  Commissioners   328, 382 


1  Ves.  Sr.  326 

2  "  451 
2  "  489 
2  "  497 
2  "  520 
2        "       631 

2  "  661 
5  '*  656 
1  Wila.  22 

W.  N.  (1876)219 

3  V.  &  B.  94 

1  Y.  &  C.  Ex  331 

2  "  310 
v.  Bailey 

v  Bridge  water  Canal 
r    Bromley 
v.  Cooper 
v.  Davies 
v.  Jolland 

Ans.l.'ll  v.  Ansdell  1079,  1122 

Anson  v.  Towgood      797, 1275,  1277 
Anspach,  Margravine  of  v.  Noel 

988,1220 
Anstey  r.  Ilobson 
Anstice,  lie 
Anstruther  v.  Adair 

v.  Roberts 
Anthony  v.  Cowper 

v.  Dunlop 


1713 
1241,  1719 
103 

1467 
552 
663 
877 
286 


1716 

91 

915 

1437 

'1071 

30 

605 


1070 

347.  a54 

1256 

354 

1129 

1605 

960 

1061 

726 

1780 

696 

135,156 

127 

687.  688 

1755,  1756 


521 

642 

95 

688 
620 
1628 


Archboll  v.  Barrell 
Archdeacon  v.  Bowes 
Archer  o.  Gardner 
v .  Hudson 
v   Meadows 
v.  Mosse 
v   Slater 
Archibald  v.  Means 
Arcot,  Nabob  of  r.  East  India 

Co.  628,  629,  658,  683,  704 

Arden  v.  Arden  560,  652,  1040 

v.  Patterson  1961 

V.  Tucker  1104 

v.  Walden  444 

Ardley  v.  Guardians  of  St.  Pan- 
eras  1639 
Arendell  v.  Blackwell            217,  288. 
405 
Argall  r.  Pitts 
Argenbright  v.  Campbell 
Argo,  The 
Aria  v.  Emmanuel 
Arkansas  Yalley  L.  &  C.  Co 

Mann 

Arkwright  v.   Newbold 

Armengaud  v.  Coudert 

Armistead  v.  Bozman  829,  834 

v.  Durham        421,  598,  802,  1672. 

1673 

Armitage  v.  \Yadsworth       605,  628, 

1558 

Armour  v.  Walker  915 

Armsby  v.  Wood  885 

Armstrong  v.  Armstrong,    633,  986, 

1119,  1147, 1170,  1653,  1750, 

2088 

v.  Athens  Co.  344 

v.  Beaty  1046 

v.  Blake  1397 

v.  Burrows  918 

v.  Campbell  560,  644, 1259, 

1260 

v.  Chemical  National  Bank  _  1551 

v.  Cooper  973,  974 

v.  Crocker  720 

v.  Hickman  1680 

v.  Lear  1355 

r.  McClure  1277 

r.  Milburn  645 

v.  Potts  1668 

v.  Pratt  1550 

v.  Ross  418 

t>.  Savannah  Soap  Works  145 

v.  Scott  737,  846 

v,  Stockham  1801 

v.  Storer  244,  284,  790,  1390, 

1424 

v.  Syracuse  Screw  Co.  109 

t>.  Wilson  974,  1019,  1548 


Arnett  v  Paulett 

v.  Welch 
Arnlieim  v.  Finster 
Arnold  v.  Arnold 
v.  Bainbrigge 
v.  Blencowe 
v.  Cheseborough 
t\  Congreve 
v.  Dixon 
v.  Foot 
v.  Heaford 
v.  Mayor  of  Poole 
v.  Middletown 
v.  Patuxet  Yalley  Water  Co. 

579, 1817 
v.  Slaughter  737,  759,  1309 

v.  Thompson 
v.  Yoorhies 
Arnot  v.  Biscoe 
Arnott  v.  Hayes 
Arnoux  v.  Steinvrenner 
Arlington  v.  Liscom 

v.  Yarborough 

Arrowsmith  o.  Hill 

Arthur  v.  Case 

?•.  Hughes 

v.  Lamb 

Artisans1  Bank  v.  Treadwell       1741 

Arundel  v.  Arundel  546.  930 

Corp.  oiv.  Holmes  1556 

v.  Pitt  952 

Arundell,  Lady  v.  Phipps  1624,1652 

Arzbacher  v.  Mayer  545 

Asbach  v.   Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R. 

Co.  601 

Asbee  v.  Shipley  954,  1522 

Ascough  v.  Townshend  1683 

Asevado  r.  Orr  586 

Ash  v.  Cummings  1638 

v.  Daggy  619 

Ashbee  v.  Cowell  1291 

Ashburnham  v.  Thompson        1396, 
1416 
Ashburton,  Lord,  v.  Ashburton, 

Lady  1365 

Ashby  v.  Ashby  119 

v.  Bates  1096 

v.  Bell  1031 

v.  Kiger  1463 

v.  Power  869 

Ashford  v.  London,  C.  &  D.  Ry. 

Co.  1774 

v.  Patten  1580 

Ashlev  i'.  Ashley       1129,  1205,  1208 


1120 

782 

1642 

334,338 

214 

251 

782,  888,  2391 

2182 

1264 

1245 

605 

307 

1661 


995 
165 
846 
866 

792,  1382 
378 
121 
611 
303 
250 

1630, 1726 


v.  Zane 
Armstrong's  Foundry 
Armytage  v.  Haley 
A  maud  v.  Grigg 
Arndt  t>.  Griggs 
Arnett  v.  Finney 


1412 
57 
1130 

i,  782 
149 
660 


r.  Baillie 

675 

v.  Little  Rock 

334,  1071 

V.  Taylor 

536, 1513,  1534 

Ashlin  v.  Lee 

657 

Ashmall  v.  Wood 

202,  203,  204, 

1188, 1339 

Ashmead,  Re 

224 

v.  Colby           250, 

200,1232,1248, 
1298, 1315,  1317 

Ashmore  v.  Evans 

657 

Ashton  v.  Ashton 

922 

v.  Atlantic  Bank 

200,  220,  222, 

257,  327 

v.  Shorrack 

1597 

v.  Stock 

1632 

v.  Wood 

1321 

Ashton  Charity,  Re 

1855 

Ashuelot  R.  Co.  v. 

Cheshire  R. 

Co. 

1517 

Ashurst  t>.  McKenzk 

1164,  1638 

Ashwell,  Re 

653 

v.  Lomi 

852 

Ashworth  v.  Lord 

1241,  1385 

v.  Munn 

1794 

r.  Outram 

1686 

v.  Roberts 

720,  1556 

v.  Wrigley 

1699 

Asiatic  Banking  Co 

.  v.  Ander- 

son 

448 

Askew  v.  Booth 

229,  266 

v.  Millington 

796,  1588 

v.  Peddle 

1030,  1178 

v.  Poulterers'  Co. 

867,  870,  1682 

TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


XV11 


Askew  o.  Townsend  1544, 1683 

Asp  v.  Warren  1320 

Aspden  V.  Seddon      1448,  1453,  1629 
Aspen   Mining  &  Smelting   Co 

v   Billings  313,  J 120 

Aspinalls  to  Powell  1082 

Aspinwall  v.  Balch  1270 

v   Bourne  1312 

Astley  v.  Fountain  286,  288,  091) 

w.  Micklethwait  1430 

v.  Powis  1D33,  1259 

Aston,  lie  942,  944,  945 

v  Ashton  676,  1633 

v.  Curzon  678 

v.  Exeter,  Lord  579,  1558 

v.  Galloway  399 

v.  Meredith  1157 

Astor  v  Turner  1719 

Atchesou  v.  Atcheson  92 

Atchison  v   Murfree  1287 

Atchison  Street  Ry.  Co.  v.  Nave    3()3 

Atchley  v  Sprigg  851 

Athenaeum  Life  Assurance  Soc. 

v.  Pooley  552 

Atherton  v.  British  Nation  Ass. 

Co.  1470 

v.  Newhall  365 

v.  Nowell  103 

Athol,  Earl  of  v.  Derby,  Earl  of 

1060 
Atkins,  lie  1611 

Atkins  v.  Billings  231 

v  Chilson  1638,  1656 

v.  Cooke  27,  30,  31,  33,  359, 

1605 
v.  Faulkner  525,  526,  531 

v.  Hatton  713,  1164 

v   Palmer  383,935 

v.  Volmer  283 

v.  Wabash  &c.  Ry.  Co.  1734 

Atkinson,  Ex  parte  1087 

Atkinson,  lie  40 

v.  Abbott  307 

v.  Beckett  1069 

v.  Bedel  1713 

v.  Farmer  1283 

v.  Flannigan  1561 

v.  Foster  843,  844 

v.  Hanway  583 

v.  Henshaw  251,  1725 

v.  Leonard  1698, 1699,  1700, 

1703,  1704, 1708,  1713 
v.  Macreth  269,  448 

v  Mauks  973,  974,  994,  1459, 

1560,  '561,  1562.  1563, 
1568,  1569 
v.  Marks  1570 

v.  Parker  1525,  2059 

v.  Smith  1765 

Atkison  t»   Murfree  1286 

Atkyns  v.  Willoughby,  Lord        370, 
713 
v.  Wright    1818,  1822,  1828,  1832, 
1833 
Atlanta  Mills  v.  Mason      1110,  1168, 
1548 
Atlanta  Real  Estate  Co.  V-   At- 
lanta National  Bank  26 
Atlantic   De  Laiue  Co.  V-   Tre- 

di.k  1651 

Atlautic  Insurance  Co.   v.   Le- 

mar  601 

v.  Wilson  840 

Atlantic  R  Co.  v  Speer  1663 

Atlantic  Trust  Co.  v.  Cons.  El. 

Storage  Co.  369 

Atlas  Bank  v.  Nahant  Bank        244, 

794,  1056,  1613,  1741,  1748 

Attaquin  )\  Fish  1631 

Attenborough  v.  St.  Katharine's 

Dock  Co  1560,  1561 

Atterbury  v.  Gill  23^8 

v.  Wallis  675 

Attorney  General  v.  Acton  Local 

Board  10, 1637 

v.  Akers  10 

v.  Alford  1259,  2061 


[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 

Attorney-General  v.   Algonquin 
Club  1654 

v   Ancaster  1619 

v.  Ashburnham  16,  140 

v.  Aspinall  596 

v  Attwood  1232 

v.  Avon,  Portreeve  of        401,  407, 

1515 
v.  Backhouse  676 

v.  Bank  of  Columbia        395,  1733, 

1738 
v.  Barker  6,  10,  981 

v.  Basingstoke  10,  13,  1637 

v.  Berkeley  1834 

v   Bermondsey  Vestry  299 

v.  Berry  15 

v.  Birmingham  245,  406,  417, 

1525,  1636,  1638 
v.  Birmingham,  &c.  Board     1586, 

1683 
v  Birmingham,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  10 
v.  Bishop  of  Worcester  16 

v.  Bolton  15 

v.  Boston  1483 

v   Boston  Wharf  Co.  10 

v.  Boucherett  12,  16 

v.  Bouwens  250 

v  Boyle  1008, 1620, 

1681 
v.  Bradford  Canal  1636,  1638 

v.  Bradlaugh  10,  735.  886 

v.  Brandreth  1799 

v   Brecon  1620 

v.  Brereton  13 

v.  Brewers'  Co.  15, 1397,  1415 

v.  Brickdale  1800 

v.  Bristol,  Mayor  of  140 

v  Brooke  12, 1475,  1478 

v.  Brookshank  2095 

v.  Brown  8,  10,  273,  547,  584, 

599,  1637 
v.  Buck  nail  13 

v.  Bulpit  1101 

v.  Burch  810,  1558 

v.  Burridge  10 

v.  Burrows  1678 

v.  Butcher  1466 

v.  Butler  12 

v.  Cambridge  10 

v.  Cambridge  Consumers'  Gas 
Co.  13,  407,  417,  826,  1636, 

1637 
v.  Carmarthen,  Corp.  of  342 

v.  Carriugton  510,  1440, 

1449 
v.  Carte  15,  1436,  1437 

v.  Carver  517,  625 

v.  Catherine  Hall,  The  Master 

and  Fellows  of  2280 

v.  Chamberlaine  10 

v.  Chambers  10,  983 

v.  Chester  16,  1407,  1436 

v.  Chesterfield,  Earl  of       247,  323 
v.  Chicago,  &c   R.  Co.  1650 

v  Christ  Church  2182 

v.  Churchill  6 

v.  Clack  1342 

v.  Clapham  1004,  1S25 

v.  Clare  Hall  1854 

v.  Cleaver  1620,  1636 

v.  Clements  10 

V.  Clergy  Society  8 

v.  Clerkenwell  Vestry  10,  1637 

v.  Cockermouth  Local  Board      10, 
11, 13 
v.  Cohoes  10 

v.  Colney  Hatch  Asylum     13.  983, 
1635,  1637,  1638,  1640,  1650 
v.  Compton  8 

v   Constable  6,  10 

v.  Consumer's  Gas  Co  10 

v.  Continental  Life  Ins.  Co.         10 
v.  Cooper  404,  409,  426.  427, 

583,  805 
v  Cornthwaite  235 

v.  Coventry,  Mayor  of  1058 

v.  Cox  1503 


Attorney-General  v.  Cradock       336, 
337,  689 
v.  Crofts  10 

v.  Crossman  6,  16 

v.  Cuming  1413,  1436,  1652 

v.  Day  657,  1283,  1733,  1738 

v.  Dean  &  Canons  of  Manchester 
311 
v.  Delaware,  &c.  R.  Co.  1620 

v.  Detroit  10 

v.  Devonshire  7 

v.  Dew  951 

v.  Dounington  Hospital  430,  748 
v.  Dorking  Guardians  10,  287,  1637 
v.  Drapers'  Co.  16,  144o,  1449 

v.  Du  Plessis  5,  564,  565,  568 

v.  Durham,  Earl  of  342 

v.  Dyson  1263 

v.  East   Dereham   Corn   Ex- 
change 14.5 
v.  East  India  Co.  11 
v.  Eastlake        8, 1620, 1629, 1640, 

1663 
v.  East  Retford  146,  724.  1419 

v.  Edmunds  6,  134,  727,  731, 

1400 
v.  Ellison  1830 

v.  Ely,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  1640 

v.  Etheridge  757,  758 

v.  Evart  Booming  Co.  10,  12, 

1639 
l'.  Exeter,  Mavor,  &c.  of  1472 

v.  Fea  1861 

v.  Federal   Street   Meeting 

House  10 

v.  Fellows  311,  422 

v.  Finch  807 

v.  Fishmongers'  Co.       15,  16,  415, 
1436,  1534 
t>.  Flint  1111 

v.  Forbes  1636 

v.  Foster  1519,  1532 

v   Fox  1 I 

v   Fullerton  1164,  1165 

v.  Galway,  Mayor  of  1370,  1734 
v   Gardiner  10 

v .  Garrison  10 

v.  Gas  Light  and  Coke  Co.  10 

v  Gaskill  1650 

v.  Gaunt  261 

v.  Gee  1733 

v.  Gibbs       1417,  1420, 1424, 1426, 

1485 
v.  Goldsmith's  Co.  342 

v.  Gould  1653 

v.  Gower  678 

v.  Great  Eastern  Ry.  Co.  10,  13 
V.  Great  Northern  Ry.  Co.  10,  2328 
v.  Great  Western  &c.  Ry.  Co.    10, 

2328 
v.  Green  261 

r.  Greenhill  13,  1031 

v.  Haberdashers'  Co.  10,  14 

1383,  1436 
v.  Hackney  Local  Board  1636 

v.  Halifax  837,  1378,  1394 

v.  Hallett  6 

v.  Hailing  6,  134 

v   Hamilton  1152 

v.  Hane  10 

v.  Hanmer  16,  1458 

v.  Hardy  386 

v.  Hartley  .  16 

v   Harvey  14 

v.  Heath  12 

v.  Heelis  239,  242 

v.  Henderson  748 

v.  Hewitt  1861 

v.  Hill  291 

v   Hitchcock  1101 

v.  Hobert  1417,1418 

v.  Horner  10 

v.  Howe  9 

v.  Hudson  743,  744,  748 

v.  Hullett  134 

v.  Hunter  1680 

v.  Hurst  1427,  1430,  1536 


VOL.    I. 


XV111 


Attorney-General  v   Ilchester     2207 
V   I  re  :i  mongers'  Co.  15,  140 

v  Jackson  276,288,627 

r.  Jamaica  Pond  Aqueduct  10 

f  Jeanes  13,  384 

V.  Johnson  10,  1636 

v.  Kerr  15,  16,  1436 

V.  Kingston  6,  134 

v .  Kiugston-on-Thames, 

Mayor  of  13,  1636,  1650 

V.  Knight  16 

v.  Kohler  1513 

v  Lambe  7,  16 

v.  Lauibirth  169 

v   Lawes  1411,  1431,  1432 

V.  Leathersellers'  Co.  1069 

v   Leeds  10,  1636,  1637 

r.  Leicester  248,  268 

v   Le«is  16,140,899 

V.  Lichfield  8 

v   Life  &  Fire  Ins.  Co.  1748 

V.  Liverpool,  Corp.  of  1663 

v.  Logan  10 

V.  London  6,  10,  16,  134,  415,  579, 
601,  761,  1411, 1557,  1829,  1831, 
1832 
v.  London  &  N   W.  Ry.  Co.,    542, 
1591 
r.  Lonsdale,  Earl  1802 

v.  Lubbock  1222 

r    Lucas  10,  105,  568,  717 

v.  Lutou  Board  of  Health 

1638,  1663,  1681 
v.  Manchester  15,  1638 

v.  Manchester  &  Leeds  Ry.  Co. 

1008,  1620, 
v.  Marlborough,  Duke  of  1634 
v.  Marsh  424,  597,  1675 

r.  Mayor  of  Gal  way  12 

v  Mercers'  Co.  16,  145,  1406,  1821 
t'.  Merchant  Tailors'  Co.  289, 

343,  559 
v.  Merrimack  Manuf.  Co.  10 

v.  Metropolitan  Board  of 

Works  13, 1650 

v.  Metropolitan  District  Ry.  Co.   6 
V.  Middleton  12 

v.  Mid-Kent  Ry.  Co.  10 

v.  Mid  Kent  Ry.  Co.  &  South- 

Eastern  Ry.  Co.      1613,  1657, 
1662,  2323 
v.  Milward  871,  872 

V.  Molitar  10 

»  Monro  1469 

v.  Montgomery       1112,  1125,  1136 
r.  Moses  239,  336 

v.  Mullay  10,  105 

V.  Monro  1440,  1653 

V.  Murdoch  1417,  1653 

v  Murray  13,  69,  86,  110,  307 

li.  Naylor  276 

v.  Nethercoat  413,  952,  1450 

n.  Newark,  Corp.  of  1276 

v.  Newcombe  405 

II.  New  York,  &c.  R.  Co.  1479 

v.  Nicbol  1636,  1637,  1665 

«.  North  America  Life  Ins. 

Co.  1756 

II.  North  Met.  Tramways  Co.     720 
j;   Norwich  8,  1233,  1620 

v.  Norwood  1629 

«  Oglender  12,  15,  1405 

II  Owen  1405 

v.  Oxford  &c.  Ry.  Co.  10 

V.  Parker  12,  13,  14 

v.  Parkhust  9,  83 

li.  Parmenter  10 

v.  Parnther  852 

li.  Payne  1825 

* .  Pearson  268,  540,  883 

f.  Penruddocke  1164 

v    Phimtree  14 

v   Plymouth  16 

v    Plymouth,  Mayor  of  6 

v.  Poole  288,  337,  558,  2089 

li.  Pretyman  1174 

r.  Ray  872,  873,  940,  1574 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 

[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 

Attorney-General  v.  Read  10 

v.  Rees  485,  724 

v.  Kevere  Copper  Co.  10 

v  Reynolds  568 

v.  Richards  10,  1636 

ti.  Richmond  13,  1638 

v.  Rickards  156,  349,  630 

v  Rumford  Chemical  Works  8 
v.  Hyder  663 

v.  St.  Aubyn  6,  7,  16 

ii.  St.  Cross  1174 

v.  St.  Cross  Hospital  342 

v.  St.  Helens  1620 

v.  St.  John's  Hospital  16 

v  Salem  10 

v.  Sands  53 

v.  Scott  1502 

v.  Severne  10,  105 

v.  Sheffield  1640 

v.  Sheffield  Gas   Consumers' 

Co  1635,  1637, 1663 

li.  Shelly  276 

v.  Sherbourne    Grammar 

School  10,  12 

v.  Shield  506,  508,  592,  784 

v.  Shore  1174,1175 

li.  Shrewsbury  8,  1853 

v.  Shrewsbury  Bridge  Co.  3,6,  10, 
1H37 
v.  Sidney  Sussex  College  660 

»,  Sittingbourne  &  Sheerness 

Rv.  Co.  16,231,278,1222 

li.  Skinners'  Co.  13,  15,  16,  1069 
».  Smart  12,  14 

v.  Southampton,  Guardians  of    8, 
1620 
v.  Southampton,  Mayor  1635 

v.  Staffordshire  Copper  Co.  1636 
li.  Stamford  444,  474,  980,  1856 
v  Stamford,  Mayor  of  13 

li.  Stephens  209,  873,  1163 

v  Steward  1668 

v.  Stewart  16 

v.  Sudell  549,  563 

v.  Sutton  662 

v  Swansey,  &c.  Co.  1470 

v.  Tarr  10 

li  Tarrington  16,  230 

v  Taylor  15 

li.  Teather  10 

».  Terry  10,  1636,  1639 

i>.  Thames  River,  Conserva- 
tors of  1024,  1025,  1026 
v.  Thetford  1039 
ii.  Thompson  579, 1817,  1828,  1829 
v.  Thurnall  858 
v.  Tomline  10,  427,  974, 1031,  1639 
ii.  Tonna  1383 
v.  Tudor  Ice  Co.  10 
v.  Tunstall  Local  Board  1636 
li.  Twisden  200,  249 
t>.  Tyler  9,  12,  16 
v.  U.  K.  Elec.  Tel.  Co.  1635,  1636 
v  Utica  Ins.  Co.  10,  16*55 
ii.  Vernon  5,  10 
v.  Vigor  1750 
v.  Vincent  387 
ii.  Vint  1799 
v.  Vivian  10,  11,  13 
v.  Wakeman  415 
v.  Walthamstow  Local  Board  1637 
v.  Wareing  10 
ii.  Warren  137 
n.    West     Hartlepool     Imp. 

Com'rs  8,  1620 

v.  Whiieley  12,  1368 

v.  Whorwood  377,  483,  484 

v.  Wigan,  Mayor  ol    8,  1021,  1620, 
1670 
v.  Wilkins  675 

v.  Williams  10 

v.  Williamson  10,  12 

v.  Wilson  13,  22,  143,  193,  !»7 
v.  Wiltshire  10,  13 

».  Winchelsea  1427,  1430 

v.  Windsor,  Dean  and  Canons 
of  140, 1502,  1503 


Attorney-General  ;».  Woolrich  9.  10, 

83.  84 

ti.  Worcester  21,  143,  731,  778,  783 

v.  Worcester,  Bishop  of         1579, 

1854,  1855,  1856 

v.  Wright  10.  lf.95 

v   Wy  burgh  276,627 

v.  Wyggeston's  Hospital  16 

v.  Wvnne  200,  249 

».  Wyville  730,  1413 

Attleboro  Nat.  Bank  v.  Wendell  1407 

Attrill  v.  Rockaway  Beach  Imp. 

Co.  1765 

Attwood  v. 407 

Atwood  ii.  Banks  1626,  1655 

»   Hawkins  288 

v.  Small  299,  841 

Atwater  v   Fowler  641 

i'.  Kinman  3!*2 

li.  Russell  1411 

v  Townsend  48 

Atwell  ii   Fowles  1254 

A  twill  v.  Ferrett  547,  557,  585 

Atwood  ii   Chichester  178,  186 

li.  Portland  314 

ii.  Shenandoah  V.  R. Co    1517,1530 
li.  Small  1491 

Atwoo)  v.  Ferrier  347 

v  Merry  weather  26,  243 

Atwyn  v.  Perkins  671 

Aubrey  v.  Brown  2001 

v.  Hoper  1447 

Auburn    Button    Co.    v.    Syl- 
vester 1051 
Audenreid  ?'.  Railroad  Co.           1662 
Auditor,  The  v  Johnson  197 
Auditor-General  v.  Smith             1029 
Audsley  v.  Horn                    214,  271 
Augusta  Ice  Co.  v   Gray               1734 
Augusta  Nat.  Bank  v.  Printup     6^1 
Aultman  v.  Steinan                       324 
Aurora,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Lawrence- 
burgh                                     1650 
Austen  v.  Bird                                406 
v.  Gibbs                                     1138 
li.  Oilman                                  1540 
v.  Nicholas                                  867 
Auster  v.  Haines                  229,  1524 
Austerberry  i'.  Oldham                 1654 
Austin  v.  Austin                 1004,  1862 
ii.  Bainter                                    1147 
ii   Bank  of  England                     148 
v.  Chambers                                 855 
v.  Evans                                     1133 
ii.  Jackson                                 1376 
v.  Jones                                     1542 
r.  Raiford                                      334 
t»   Ramsey                                    327 
li.  Riley                              517,  1031 
».  Rutland  R.  Co.  60 
Australasia  Nat.  Bank  ii.  United 

Hand  in-Hand.  &c.  Co.  214 

Australian  Steam  Co.  v.  Flem- 
ing 26,  27,  34 
Austria,  Emperor  of  v.  Day  18,  1648, 
1670,  1881 
Automatic  W.   M.  Co.  ti.  Com- 
bined W.  M.  Co.  1409 
Autothrepic  Steam  Boiler  Co. 

lie  1440 

Avarne  v.  Brown  1220 

Avegno  v.  Schmidt  283 

Aveline  v.  Melhuish  1358 

Aveling  v.  Martin  492 

Averill  v.  Longfellow  1845 

ii.  Taylor  543 

Avery  v.  Fitch  330 

v.  Griffin  995,  1081 

ii   Holland  602,  987 

v.  Kellogg  346,347 

r.  Osborne  1419 

n.  Wilson  1600 

n.  Wood  1434 

Avory  v.  Andrews  1684,1685 

Axers  v.  Mussulman  318 

Axmand  v.  Lund  1643 

Ayer  v.  Ayer  108 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 


Ayer  v.  Messer 

737 

Ayers  v.  Chicago 

1548 

v.  Valentine 

424 

v  Wright 

197,  296,  344 

Ayles  v.  Cox 

1280 

Aylesford,  Earl  of  v 

Morris        1386 

v  Poulett 

1044 

Aylesworth  v.  Brown 
Ay  let  v    DoJd 

v.  Easy 
Aylett  v.  Ashton 

406 
1655 
1552 

186 

v  Lowe 
Ayliffe  v   Murray 
Aylmer  v  Aylmer 

1129 
894 
1256 

Aylmer  v.  Winterbottom 
Ay  1  ward  v   Lewis 
Aymer  v.  Gault 
Aynsley  v  Glover 
Ayres  v.  Carver 

v   Wiswall 
Ayscough  v.  Bullar 


XIX 


1416.  1420 
215,  283 
1568,  1569 
1080 
1553 
259 
405 


B. 


Baas  v.  Pain  1556 

Babb  v.  Lindley  231 

Babbitt  v.  Dotten  328 

v.  Savoy  1661 

Babcock  v    New  Jersey  Stock- 
yard Co.  1638,  1661 


1272 
737 


779 

51 

815 

1621 

312 

1638,  1665 

901 

165 

871 

1027 

1320 

1002 

1259 

402,  524 


v.  Perry 
v   Smith 
Babcock  &  Wilcox  Co.  v.  Pio- 
neer Iron  Works 
Baby  v.  Dubois 
Bach  v   Tuch 
Bachelder  v   Bean 
Bachman  ?>.  Einhorn 
Back  v.  Stacy 
Backhouse  v.  Alcock 
v.  Hornsey 
v.  Middleton 
v.  Wilde 
Bacon  v.  Abbott 
v.  Childs 
v.  Clerk 
v.  Griffith 
v.  Jones       1079,  1642,  1663,  1681 
v.  Robertson  26 

v.  Rogers  1188 

v.  Spottiswoode  1681 

Baddeley  v.  Bailey  888 

v.  Curwen  722 

v.  Harding  32 

Badeau  v.  Rogers     1560,  1561,  1562. 
1567,  1568,  1569,  1570 
V.  Tylee  1565 

Badeley  v.  Consolidated  Bank       269 
Badenx'  Trust,  Re  193 

Badgeley  v  Bruce  1165 

Badger  v.  Badger    327,  371,  560,  659 
v.  McNamara  547 

v.  Titcomb  331 

Badische  A.   &   E.  Fabrick  v. 

Schott  984,  1655 

Baesh  v.  Moore 
Baggett  v.  Beard 

v   Meux 
Baggott  v.  Henry 

v.  Sawyer 
Baglehole,  Ex  parte 
Bagley  v.  Searle 
Baguall  v.  Carlton 


1504 

1081 

100 

764 

1290 

50 

819 

387,  1039, 1400, 

1408 

v.  Davies  1654 

v.  Villar  1630 

Bagot?;  Bagot         1465,  1630,  1705, 

1733 

v.  Easton  334,  346,  384 

v    Legge  1433 

Bagshaw  v.  Batson  837 

v.  Buxton  Local  Board  1639 

v.  Eastern  Counties  Ry.  Co.      26, 

199,  206,  241 


v.  Newton 

v.  Winter 
Bahin  v.  Hughes 
Baile  v.  Baile 
Bailey,  Re 

v.  Adams 

v  iEtna  Ins.  Co. 


1427 

101,  102,  108 

189 

1846 

277,  10&5 

1780 

606,  640 

313 

i'  American  Cent.  Ins.  Co.       1622 
v.  Bailey  508,  861,  874,  1614 

v  Benton  379 

v.  Birkenhead  Ry.  Co.       333,  544, 
658 


Bailey  v.  Blanchard 
v.  Burchall 
v.  Burton 
v   Cadwell 
v  Collett 
v  Collius 
v  Crane 
v.  Devereux 
v  Dunkerley 
v.  Forbes 
v.  Ford 
v.  Gundry 
v.  Holden 
v.  Holson 
v.  Inglee 
v-  Lambert 
v.  Landingham 
v.  Leal 
v.  LeRoy 
v.  Macaulay 
v.  Maule 
v.  Morgan 
v.  Myrick 


1228,  1231 

1847 

328 

1699 

1277, 1801 

1654 

646 

511 

1820 

784 

1599 

27,  33.  358.  359 

601 

1630 

149,  224,  247 

709,  792 

1120 

1260 

603 

1093 

1492 

288 

213,  260,  287,  886, 

1180,  1237,  1300 

839 


v.  O'Bannon 
v.  Robinson 

v.  Ryder  314,  326 

v  Sewell  1111 

v.  Sisson  1150 

v.  Smith  58 

v  Tindall  1805 

v.  Todd  1308 

v.  Vincent  157 

v   Wilson  722 
Bailey  Washing  Machine  Co.  v. 

Young  732 

Baile  v.  Baile  78,  81 

Bailis  v.  Cochran  918 

Baillie  v.  Baillie  1627,  1628 

v   Blanchet  447 

v.  Jackson        153,  170.  1264,  2291 

v.  Sibbald  619,  639,  646 


Treharne 

Baily  v  Baily 
v   Bruton 
v   Haines 
v.  Macau  ley 
v  Taylor 
v   Worrall 

Bain  v.  Att  -Gen. 
v  Fothergill 

Bainbridgo,  Re 
v.  Burton 
v    Pinhorn 
v.  Wilcocks 

Baiubrigge,  Re 


122 

1270 

303 

1126 

1128, 1131 

1642,  1643,  1681 

230 

1573 

1082 

157 

237,  242 

255 

371,  667,  668,  1259 

1186 

Baddely  413,  421 ,  582,  598,  802 

1467,  1536,  1579,  1722,  1725 


v.  Blair 
v.  Moss 


v.  Orton 
Baines  v.  Babcock 

v  Baker 

v  Bromley 

v.  Geary 

v.  Lumley 

v  McGee 

v.  Ridge 

i'.  Story 
Bains  v.  Perry 
Baird  v.  Baird 


159  1234,  1414  1512, 
1737,  1741,  1764,  1765 
35,  36,  360,  423.  594, 
731,1448 


358,  680 
269 
1636 
1407 
1655 
653 
314 
441 
269 
1640 
281 


Baird  v  Goodrich  1653 

v.  Jackson  334 

v.  Powers  1^)3 

v.  Turnpike  Co.  994 

v.  Wells  332,  1653 

Baisley  v  Baisley  149,  536 

Baker,  Re  gg 

Baker  v.  Athill  370 

Backus      1716,  1722,  1729,  1733 
228 
106 
371,  555,  641,  667,  668 
697 
545 
1122 
2001 
327,  328,  852 
547,  1557 


v  Baker 

v   Bayldon 

v.  Biddle 

v.  Bird 

v.  Booker 

v.  Boon 

v  Boyldon 

v.  Bradley 

v.  Bramah 

v.  Brown 

v  Carter 

v.  Clarke  Institution 

v.  Commonwealth 

v.  Dean 

v   Dumaresque 

v.  Farmer 

v.  Grundy 

v.  Haily 

v.  Hart 


1130,  1561 
1419 
1411 
1841 

520 
1704 
1346 

645 
17( 


1002, 1070,  1112,  1137, 
1139 
v.  Harwood  218,  320 

v.  Henderson  1842 

v  Herts  &  Essex  W.  Co.         1731 
v.  Holmes  j  is 

v.  JeSeries  1714 

v.  Keen  513 

«•  King  1118,  1119,  1135 

■v-  Lee  1502,  1503 

v.  Loader  '298 

v.  Mayo  1253 

v  Mellish    300,583,584,592,597, 
1660 
v.  Mo   Pac.  Ry.  Co.  313 

v.  Morgan  1276 

v.  Morris  1254 

v.  Pritchard  563,  570 

t\  Redd  1625 

v.  Sebright  1633 

v.  Shy  1218 

v.  Sowter  168 

v.  Taylor  1668 

v  Wetton  370 

V.  Whiting      560,  644,  1463,  1472 
1479,  1530,  1575,  1581,  2169 
v   Williamson  1229 

v  Wind  1392 

v.  Wood  1395 

v  Young  1031 

Balch  v.  Smith  1350 

v.  Symes  1830,  1843 

v.  Tucker  1078 

v.  Wastall  8.  135,  156 

Balchen  v.  Crawford  1564,  1568 

Balcolm  v    N.  Y.  Life  Ins.  and 
Trust  Co.  678,  679,  759 


Balcom  v.  Terwilliger 
Baldwin  v.  Baldwin 

v.  Bank  of  Newbury 

v .  Canfield 

v.  Darner 

v-  Hale 

v.  Lawrence 

v.  Mackown 

v.  Miles 


1381 

107,  116 

458 

190 

809 

458 

245 

1535 

1461 


XX 


TABLE    OP    CASES    CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 


Baldwin  v.  Salter 

,.   Tucker  tool 

r   Useful  Knowledge  Society    1656 
Balfour  v.  Cooper  l-l? 

Balguy  u   Broadhurst  5<8,  (17,  I°£! 

v.  Chorley 
Ball  v.  Ball 

i .  Coutts 

«   Etches 

».  Harris 

».  Kemp-Welch 

v.  Mabry 

v.  Mannin 

v.  Montgomery 

v.  Oliver 

v    Kay 

v.  Sawyer 

v.  Tompkins 


102 

1166 

108 

425.  510 

166 

1163 

1743  1 

83 

104,  107,  1415 

251,1725,  1726 

1635,  1637 

737 

553 

BaTl  ^"Socket  Fastener  Co.  v. 

Kraetzer  * 

Ballard  v.  Catling  39,  41,  1590 

V    Eckman  "*g 

*  McCluskey    888,912,1463,2391 

r.  White  9bl>  1*J"' 

Balientine  17.  Beall  23b 

Ballin  17.  Ferst  ^a 

Ballou  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  *y 

Co  14b3 

,,  Hopkinton  303,  1413,  1639 

Balls  ».  Margrave  581,  680,  1558 

»  Strutt  „nl    ™-   4- 

Bally  v.  Kenrick  .24,  72o,  W< 

v.  Williams  31J,  i-ft 

Baltic  Co  v.  Simpson  983 

Baltimore  v.  Ohio  R.  Co     1561,  lobrf 
BaUimore  &c    R  Co  v.  Adams 

Express  Co  314 

Baltimore    &    Ohio    R    Co.    v. 

Arthur  lobl 

V   Fitzpatrick  6» 

u.  Wheeling,  City  of,  26,  144 

146,  73o,  846 
Baltimore  R.  Co.  v  Strauss  1639 
Baltimore  &  O    Tel.  Co  v.  In- 

terstate  Tel.  Co.  334,  81 1 

Baltzel  V.  Hall  &£> 

Ban.ford  ».  Bamford  116.,  119. 

,•    Watts  13.2,  1600,  1610 

Bampfield  ».  Vaugban  <£<$ 

Bamptont.   Birchall  ^560'1^ 

Bampton  &  Longtown  Ry  Co     1 


989  i  Bank  of  England 

v.  Moffat 

v.  Morice 

v.  Parsons 
Hindustan  v.  Hodgson 

r.  Robinson 
Kentucky  v.  Gay 
Marietta  v   Pindall 
Metropolis  v  Guttschlick 
Michigan  v.  Williams 


Lunn      147, 148  I  Bardwell  v.  Ames 


v.  Baker 
v.  Barker 


Mobile T  Planters'  and  Merch-  I      v   Nash 

ants'  Bank  837,  1796  |  Barker,  Re 

Monroe  v   Schermerhorn         16.6, 

lb.  I 

Niagara,  Matter  of         1234,  1414, 

B  1i4i 

Ogdensburg  v.  Arnold     284,  1717, 

Ontario  v.  Strong  444 

Orleans  v.  Skinner     20,  395, 1619, 
1669 
St  Marv  v.  St  John  525 

Scotland  v   Kerr  24 

Statesville  v,  Foote  14W 

Tenn   v   Burke  jj 

United  States  r.  Magill 


1639 

659 

883, 1679 

1654,  1683 

159 

303 

810 

1321 

1490 

1269 

209;  321.  362,  1163 

560,  1264,  1346,  1365, 

1841 

1074 

1577 

„'  Belknap     659,  1484,  1549,  1550, 

1553 


148  '      v  Baird 
1615    Barfield  v.  Kelly 
148        v   Nicholson 
397     Barger  v   Buckland 
397     Barham  v.  Hostetter 
1624  i      v   Longman 
24     Baring  and  Doulton,  Re 
652  !  Baring  v.  Harris 
24  661  !      v  Moore 


v   Ritchie 
v.  Schultz 
v   Weisiger 
v.  White 
Utica  v.  Messere 


69,  160,  997 

361  I 

1016  1 

1597,2379 

574,  576,  720, 

721,  758 

"Virginia  v.  Craig  130* 

Washtenaw  v.  Montgomery  lA 

Waterville  v   W.  W.  Back  2j 

Banker's  Case,  The  133 

Banker  r.  Walters  ,„„,.,£?« 

Bankhart  v.  Houghton       1635,  lb4U 
Bankheadt'   Alloway  bbi 

Bankier  v.  Poole  44. 

Banks  v.  American  Tract  Society  1638 

l.gS"    287,1291,1292,    732 


Banbury  i 

Peerage  Case 
Bancroft  v  Sawin 
v    Wardour 
v   Wentworth 
Band  v   Randle 
Banda,  Re 
Banert  v   Day 
Bangs  v   Hall 

v.  Strong 
Banigan  v.  Worcester 
Banister  v.  Bigge 

v   Way 
Bank,  The  v.  Butler 

v.  Carrollton  Railroad 

t;  Cowan 

v  Dugan 

v    Farques 

v.  l.abitut 

v.  Rose 

v.  Simonton 

v.  Trapier 


560,  646 

617 

313 

1639 

153,  232,  1283 

458 

217 

1099 

617 

884 

1019 

792,  793 

21.24 

1233 


..  Booth 
v   Caitwright 
v   Gibson 
v.  Goodfellow 
v.  Judah 
v.  Klein 
1).  Long 
v.  Manchester 
v.  ParKer 
v.  Walker 
Bannatyne  v.  Leader 
Banner,  Ex  parte 

v   Berridge 
Bannon  v.  Comegys 
Banta  v.  Calhoon 
v.  Moore 
„     Banwen  Iron  Co.,  Re 
133    Banyster  v.  Trussell 
951     Baptist  Church  v.  Uetfield 


1073,  1074 
1231 

1649,  1660 
1385 
560 


1580 

542,  843 

1624 

339 

1832, 1835 

1209 

642 

1517 

161,  167 

547,  584 

1597 

156 

1765 


323 
1029 
547 
849 
815 
986 
1259 
1277,  1278 
1409 
977,  1508 
107 
27 
1731 
447,  449,  809,  1413 
1029 
293 
683, 1124 
1290 
815 
1562 
991, 1584 
1404 
1794 
191,  244,  385 
1423, 1437 
982 
Barkhampstead  v.  Parsons  22 

Barklay  v.  Reay,  Lord  431  539,  lwM, 

Barksdaie  v  Butler 
Barkwell  v.  Swan 
Barkworth  V.  Young 
Barlee  v.  Barlee 


v  Birch 

v.  Craig 

v.  Dacie 

v.  Dixie 

v.  Dumaresque 

v.  Flagg 

v  Gregory 

v.  Harper 

v   Hemming 

v.  Johnson 

v.  Lea 

v  Lidwell 

v   Mariott 

v.  Piele 

v.  Purvis 

v.  Railton 

v.  Ray 

v  Richardson 

v  Smark 

V.  Swain 

v  Todd 

v  Venables 

v.  Vogan 

v.  Walters 

v  Wardle 

v.  Wyld 


601 

378 

365,  561,  2086 

112,  113 

732 

1637 

100 

1393,  1734,  1735 

295.  403,  426 


Barber,  lie  1368,  1414 

Barber,    Re,  Burgess  v.  \inm- 

come  "J° 

Dardier  »   Chapman  1  ' 

Barber  v   Barber    549,586,588,602 

041 

560,  645 

362 

328,  991, 1260, 1581 

1638 

115,  117 

201 

589 


v  Houston 
V   Hunter 
v   Mackrell 
v   Pen  ley 
v  Slade 
v.  Walker 
Birbey's  Appeal 


BankartV  Tennant    324,  1407.  1408 
Bank  Commissioners  v.  Bank  of 

Buffalo  30- 

Bank  of  Hindustan,  Re  944 

Bank  of  Alexandria  v.  Patton       lb» 

Augusta  v.  Earle  *& 

Bellows    Falls   v.  Rutland„„&,^oD 

Bur  R.  Co.         555,  628,  1628 

Bethel  v.  Pahquioque  Bank     1.41 

Danville  v.  Travers  J50 

Edwardsville  v.  Simpson  i» 


Barbon  v   Searle  15'9 

Barbour  v.  Watts  8b. 

v   Whitlock  iYl 

Barclay  v.  Bank  of  New  South 
Wales 

v.  Bowen 

v.  Brown 

r   Culver 

v  Plant 

v   Russell 
Bard  v   Bingham 
Barden  v.  Briscoe 


Barley  v   Pearson 
Barlow  v  Bailey 

v.  Devany 

v.  Gains 

v.  Osborneayi285,  1286","  1288, 'iKh 

v.  Scott  ]°8} 

Barnaby  v.  Tassell  }-oji 

Barnam  V   McDaniels  io.o 

Barnard,  Re,  Barnard  v.  White  108j 

Barnard,   Re,  Edwards  v.  Bar- 

nard  2-9 

Barnard  V.  Adams  1411 

v-  Bartholomew  1253,  1^58 

».  Darling  '46,  .48 

v   Ford  bb 

r.  Ford,  Carrick  v   Ford       66,  92 
v.  Hunter  485,  621,  716,  760, 

v.  Lea 
v.  Wallis 
v.  Wieland 
Barnardiston  r  Gibbon 
Barnardo  r.  Mcllugh 
Barndt  v.  Frederick 
Barne,  Re 
669  !  Barnebee  .'.  Beckley 
1476  |  Barned  V.  Barned 
1002.  14!>3        V   Laing 

1.385  i  Barnegat  City  Beach  Association 
1491  v.  Buzby  J™ 

17,  20,  136,  472    Barnes,  Re 

1727  I  Barnes  r   Abram 
1463  1     v  Addy 


1624 

838 

1611 

68 

815 

1368 

13i  >9 

652 

i,  1705 


947 


Barnes  v.  Chicago,  &c.  Ry.  Co.    991 

v.  Dewey  1578 

v   Dickinson  413 

V.  Dowling  1628 

v.  Harris  576 

v.  Hathorn  1635 

v.  Mays  1290 

v  Offer  1577 

v.  liacster  1390 

v.  Ridgway  410,  440 

v.  Robinson  92 

v.  Saxby  354 

v.  Taylor  585,  586.  1845,  2087 

v.  Trenton  Gas  Light  Co  545 

V.  Tweddell  784,  1451 

v.  West  354 

v   Wilson  1026,  1027 

Barneslv  v.  Powel  664,  184  i 

Barnett  V   Cline  1624 

v.  Grafton  420 

v.  Leuchars  1649 

v.  Montgomery  443 

v   Noble  419 

v.  I'eople's  Bank  594 

v.  Spencer  1600 

v.  Watson  930 

v.  Woods  314 

Baruey  v.  Baltimore  149,  190 

v.  Luckett  1661 

v   Puck  334 

V   Saunders  1369 

Barnhaui  v   Roberts  573 

Barnhardt  v.  Smith  933 

Barnsdale  v.  Lowe  1574 

Barnsley  Canal  Co.  v.  Twibell     1678 

Barnwell  v.  Ironmonger  1411 

Baron  v.  Korn  630 

Barr  p.  Barr  1726 

v.  Carter  251 

v.  Clayton  314 

v  Ilarding  1387 

v  Pittsburgh  Plate  Glass  Co    1395 

Barr's  Trust,  Re  846 

Barrack  v.  McCulloch  822,  843 

Barraclough  v.  Greenhough  877 

Barraque  ?».  Manual  327 

v   Siter  713 

Barre  National   Bank  v.    Hing- 

ham  Manuf  Co.  334 

Barrel  v   Benjamin  48 

v.  Joy  1259 

Barrere  v.  Barrere  2289 

Barret  v  Oliver  169 

Barrett  v.  Brown  193.  200 

v.  Buck  992,  1430 

v.  Burke  1658 

v  Carter  1461 

v.  Day  S54,  1618 

v.  Doughty  109,  589 

v.  Gaines  989 

v   Hartley  1391 

v.  Long  1091,1092 

v  McAllister  365 

v.  Oliver  68 

v.  Pardow  917 

v.  Pearson  1658 

v.  Power  32 

v   Sirgeant  852 

v.  Short  790 
v.   Stockton    and    Darlington 

Ry.  Co.  327 

v  Watson  905,918 

v.  Wheeler  860 

v.  White  1524 

Baxribeare  v    Brant  1538 

Barriclo  v.   Trenton   Mut.    Life 

and  Fire  Ins.  Co.  1523,  1531, 

1535 

Barringer  v.  Andrews  392 

Barrington,  He  160,  1607 

v  0  Brien  1581 

v   Tristram  1427 

Barritt  v.  Barritt  489,  742 

v.  Tidswell  785 

Barron  v   Barron  117 

v.  Gvillard  184,  591 

v.  Lancefield  1389 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 

[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 

Barron  v.  Robinson  1122 

Barrow  t).  Barrow   102,104,106,107. 

2001 

v.  Isaacs  1660 

v    Manning  92 

v.  Rhinelauder  667,  884, 1468,  1578 

v   Richards  1654 

v.  Wadkin  47 

Barrs  v.  Fewkes  320,  1470 

v.  Jackson  6G3 

Barry,  Ex  parte  1069 

v.  Abbott  542,  758 

v.  Barry  334,  1026 

V.  Briggs  1463    1491 

V    Cane  180,  181,  499,  500 

v   Croskey  446,  539,  599,  1556 

v.  Jenkius  33 

v.  Missouri,  K   &  T.  Ry  Co     149, 

215 

v   Stevens  551 

v.  Wrey  1389 

Barstow  v.  Smith  5S4 

Barteau  v.  Barteau  324 

Bartee  v.  Tompkins  335.  S45 

Bartels  v.  Schnell  659 

Barter  v   Dubeux  659 

Bartholomew  /•.  Harwinton         1576 

Bartle  v.  Wilkin  1387 

Bartles  v   Gibson  639 

Bartlett,  Ex  parte  1863 

Re      '  2203 

Bartlett,/??,  Newman  ;\  Hook  294 

v.  Bartlett  316,  1696,  1789 

v.  Fifield  10o2,  1576,  1577 

B.  Gale  737,760,839,846 

v.  Gillard  839 

v   Harton  809,  811,  970,  1601 

v  Johnson  1386,  1391 

17.  Marshall  1257 

v  Parks  191,  297,  551,  1929 

v.  Pickersgill  196 

V.  Smith  1098 

v.  The  Sultan  1561 

v.  West  Met'n  T.  Co  1731 

v.  Wood  1008,1381,1411 

Bartley  v.  Bartley  1837 

Barton  v.  Barbour  1743 

v  Barton    234,  304,  793.  811,  843, 

1371,  1402 

v.  Beatty  1002 

V.  Beer  87 

v  Chambers  1597 

v.  Cooke  1429,  1431 

v  Latour  1279,  1373.  1610 

V.  Moss  844 

v  North     Staffordshire     Piv. 

Co.  644, 933 

V.  Rock  811,  1458 

v   Tattersall  643,  21  Si! 

v.  Trent  15"6 

v.  Whitcombe  459,  832 

Barwell  v.  Corbin  76 

v.  Parker  1257,  1258 

Basanquet  v   Marsham  4o9 

Basey  v.  Gallagher        313,  594,  1147 

Bastaam,  Re  1409,  1411 

Baskett  r   Cafe  056,2117 

Basore  v.  Henkel  1628 

Bass  i'.  Bass  641 

Bassard  v    Lester  793 

Basset  v   Nosworthy  677 

Bassett  V.  Bratton  1699 

v.  Johnson  1110,1111,1111, 

1119,  1124 

t;.  Leslie  1561 

v.  Salisbury  M.nnuf.  Co.     686,689, 

696,  699,  700,  1031,  1636,  1688. 

1640 

Basse vi  v.  Serra  1432 

Basslord  v.  Blakesley  1830,  1838 

Bastard  V    Page  1009 

t'.  Smith  1102,1104 

Bastin  r.  Bidwell  1417 

v.  Carew  H 199 

Bastow  i'    Bradshaw  324 

Basye  v.  Beard  1567 

Batchelder,  Petitioner  1561 


XXI 


Batchelor,  Re  90 

D    Mi.ldleton  1387 

Bate  H   Bate  1819,  1&20 

v   Hooper  1370.  1416,  2060 

Bate  Refrigerator  Co.   V    Gillett 

1197,  1320, 1642 

Bateman  v   Bateman  14. 6 


v   Cook 

744 

v   Foster 

2292 

v  Margerison 

225,  295,  1367 

v.  Murray 

1658 

v.  Snoddy 

630 

v  AViatt 

1673,  1685 

v.  Willoe 

1621 

Bateman's  Trust, 

Re                      55 

Bates  v.  Babcock 

365,  601 

V.  Bates 

407 

v.  Bonnor 

1287,  1288,  1292 

v.  Brothers 

803,  1719,  1730 

v.  Christ's  College 

v.  Dandy 

124,  125,  126,  127 

v.  Delavan 

867,  1018 

v.  Eley 

1225 

v.  Gage 

1147 

v.  Graves 

1125 

v.  Great  Western  Tel.  Co.        1576 

v.  Loomis 

1600 

v.  Plonsky 

334 

v.  Preble 

1108 

v.  Sabin 

1299 

v.  Wheeler 

385 

Bateson  v   Choate 

385,  1051 

Bath,  Earl  of  i:  Abney                   124 

v.  Bradford  1258,  1314,  1321 

v.  Sherwin  1682 

Bath,  Lord,  v.  Sherwin  1661 

Bathe,  Re  83 

ii.  Bank  of  England    87,  111,  179, 

253 

Bather  ?'    Kearsley  403 

Bathurst,  Earl  v.  Burden  1655 

Batre  v.  Auze  458 

Batt  v  Birch  954 

v.  Proctor  149 

Battaile   v.    Maryland    Insane 

Hospital  986 

Battel  1  v.  Matot  85,  634 

Battelle  v.  Youngstown  Rolling 

Mill  633 

Batten    v     Dartmouth    Harbor 

Com'rs  1411,  1424 

v.  Earnley  1256 

v  Gedhye  553,  630 

v  Wedgwood  Coal  &  Iron  Co     1765 

Battenhauaen  v.  Bullock  1003 

Batterman  v.  Albright  212 

Batterson  v.  Ferguson  720 

Batthyany  b  Walford  354 

Batthyny,  Re  542 

Battle'?'   Bering  1033 

v.  Davis  1751 

v   (iriffin  1409 

v.  Street  659 

Batty  v.  Hill  1649 

I  Bauer,  Ri'  576 

i  Bauer's  Estate  418 

Bauer  v.  Mitford  16,  1469 

Baugfa  c.  Uainsey  849 

v.  Reed  1427 

Baughei-  r.  Eichelberger  860 

Bauknight  o.  Sloan  334 

Bauin,  Ex  parte  157 

Bauman  !•   Matthews  1081 

Baumgarten  V   Broadway  1654 

Bawtree  0.  Watson  1455,  1842, 

1845,  1846 

Bax  r.  Whitbread  1004 

Baxendale  v   Mi-Murray  827 

v.  Weft  Midland  Ry.  Co.  602 

>■.  West.. lint  urn  R.  W.  Co.        543 

Baxter  v.  Abbott  851,  852 

r    Blodgett  1809 

v.  Conoly  2265 

v  Knollvs  1150 

v.   New  York,   T    &  M.   Ry 

Co  839 

v  Nurse  1135 


xxn 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 


Baxter  v.  Portsmouth,  Earl  of 

v.  West 
Bayard's  Appeal 
Bayes  v  Hogg 
Bayless  v.  Orue 
Bay  ley,  lie 
v   Adams 
c.  Cass 

v.  De  Walkiers 
r.  Edwards 
ti.  l«ominster 
v   Mansell 
t>   Powell 
Baylies  v.  Baylies 

v    Payson 
Ba\  lis  v    Lawrence 
ii    Lucas 

v   Watkins      876,1071,1317,1642 
Bayly  v.  Bayly  501,  503 

v   Muehe  f™» 

v    Powell  1410 

Baynard  V.  Woolley  223,  2116 

Bayue's  Goods,  lie  251 

Bay  ties  v.  Ridge  453 

Baynham  v  Guy's  Hospital        J 
Bay  State  Iron  Co.  v.  Goodall 
Ba'vzor  v.  Adams 


83 

1727 

1051 

46 

26 

1440 

618,  700 

890 

734,737 

633 

1658 

1263 

1415 

1749 

1001,2182,  2260 

1M7 

1001,  1092 


Beatty  v.  Leacy 
Beaty  V   Bcaty 

v.  .ludy 

v  M'Corkle 

v.  Veon 


351 

1626 

303 

886 
1286 


T.    >  trvii  _     eon 

Beauchauip  V.  Gibbs     419,  54 J,  589, 


r.  Huntley,  Marquis 
?>.  Putnam 
?>.  Winn 
Beaufort  v.  Morris 
Duke  of  v.  Berty 
v.  Morris 
Phillips 


800 
1552 
1510 
2309 
1352,  1364 
1112,  1113,  1683 
1030 


Beach  v.  Beach 

v.  Bradley 

v.  Fulton  Bank 

v.  Mupgrove 

v.  Shaw 

v.  Sleddon 

v   White 
Beaching  v  Gower 
Beadel  v   Perry 

Beadles  v.  BurcU 
Beadon  V   King 
Beaird  v.  Foreman 
Beat  v  Gibson 
Beale  v.  Beale 

v  Hayes 

v.  Seiveley 

v  Thompson 
Beales  v  Spencer 
Beall  v.  Shaull 

v.  Smith 
Beals  v.  Cobb 


1961 

334 

584 

249 

778,  952,  1462 

149,  259,  1580 

978 

111 

197 

1098 

1613,  1638,  1662, 

1663,  1682,  2323 

378 

578,  645 

295 

1672,  1675 

1168 

543 

989 

946 

178 

559 

83 

190,  256,  259,  260, 

261.  28" 


v.  Guernsey 

v.  Illinois,  &e.  R.  Co 
Beaman  r.  Elliot 
Beamon  r   Ellice 
Bean  v  Clark 

v  Griffiths 

v.  Heath 

V   Morgan 

v.  Qnimby 

v.  Smith 
Beane  v  Morgan 
Beaney  v.  Elliot 
Bear,  Re 

v   Smith 
Bearblock  v.  Taylor 
Tyler 


1118 

694,  843 

2099 

1101 

694,  830 

398,  964,  985 

1060 

179 

576.  916 

2276 

88 

1368 

779 

1367, 1801 

1149 

1114,  1123, 1137 


Duke  of  v.  Taylor  1822 

Beaumont  v.  Bouftbee    378,383,bb< 

v.  Carty  ™* 

v.  Meredith  243.  U  <•-• 

Beayan  v.  Burgess  ,'Sg'-?g£r 

v.  Carpenter  810 ,  14o8 ,  15o3, 

v.  Mornington       1019,  1021,  1028. 

v.  Oxford,  Earl  of 
v.  Waterhouse 
Bebb  v.  Bunny 
Bechtel  v.  Sheafer 
Beck  v.  Allison 
v.  Beck 
v.  Henderson 
v.  Pierce 
Becke.  lie 

Beckenbridge  v.  Churchill 
Beckett  v.  Attwood 
v.  Bilbrough 
v.  Buckley 
Beck  ford  v.  Hood 
v.  Kemble 
v.  Wade 
V.  Wildman 
Beckhaus  v.  Ladner 
Beckwith  v.  Butler 
v.  Carroll 
v.  Smith 
v.  Wood 
Peckworth  v.  Butler 
Bectiye,  Countess  of  v.  Hodgson 

1502,  1503 

Beddall  v.  Maitland  154,  1081,  1407. 

1548 

v.  Page 
Beddinger  v.  Smith 
Beddingfield  v   Zouch 
Beddington  v   Beddington 
ISeddow  v.  Beddow 
Bedell  v.  Bedell 


1034 

760 

1278 

1561 

1660,  1663 

1548 

1003 

189,  642 

1841 

560 

1461 

329 

1037 

366 

1627 

559,  560 

1830,  1838 

843 

840,  1302 

1753 

1698 

15 12 

1230 


469 

68 

1050 

154 

1613 

592,  739 


Beets  v.  State 
Beevor  v   Lawson 

r.  Luck 
Beford  y.  Crane 
Begbie  v.  Fenwick 
Beggs,  Matter  of 
Behr  v.  Willard 
Behrens  v.  Pauli 

v.  Sieye  King 
Bein  v.  Heath 
Beioley  v.  Carter 
Beirne  v.  Wadsworth 
Belaney  v.  Belaney 

v.  Ffrench 
Belcher  v.  Belcher 

v.  M'Intosh 

v.  Whitmore 

v.  Williams 
Belchier  v.  Butler 
I  Belden  v.  Dayis 
I  Belding  v.  Willard 
Belew  v.  Jones 
Belfast,  Earl  of  v.  Chichester 


1099 

2222 

213 

845 

1449 

1463 

230 

663 

633,  637,  663 

87,  109,  111 

228 

945 

1479 

1842 

800,  1169 

1096 

992 

730.  1163 

1390 


838 
1276 
1029 
317, 
1573 

Belford  V.  Scribner  1643 

Belknap  v.  Belknap  1639,  1680 

v   Stone       305,311,314,374,389, 

402,  408 

v.  Trimble  1076,  1639 

Bell,  Re  1°°9 

Bell,  lie,  Carter  v.  Stadden 


Bell,  lie,  Lake  v.  Bell 
V.  Alexander 
v.  Antwerp  Line 
v.  Bell 
v.  Bird 
V.  Cade 
v.  Chapman 
v.  Cunningham 
v  Dayidson 
v.  Donohue 
v.  Dunmore 
v.  Farmers'     Deposit 

Bank 
v.  Gittere 
v   Gordon 
v   Hastings 
v.  Hunt 
ik  Hyde 
v.  Johnson 


Bearcroft  v  Berkeley  119 

Beard  V.  Bowler  692 

v   Heide  "lb 

v   Powis,  Earl  1543,  1799 

Beardmore  v.  Gregory   108. 109,  201, 

251,319,401,407,1515 


v.  Lead  well 
Beardsell  r   Schwann 
Beare  v.  Prior 
Beart  v.  Hewitt 
Beasley  v.  Kenyon 

v.  MaGrath 
Beasney,  Re 
Beatniffr  Gardner 
Beatrice,  The 
Beattie  v.  Johnstone 

Beatty  V   Beatty 
ii   De  Forrest 
v    Hinckley 
v.  Kurtz 


1635 

2316 

1239 

2314 

250 

841 

1795 

609 

18 

1348, 1352, 

1353 

1669 

1062 

334 

239 


Hoffman         15G0,  1570,  1571 

Bedford  Charities,  Re  12,  1855 

Bedford  v   Bedford  noJ°J?, 

v.  Leigh  2m\?^l 

Earl  of  r.  Romney,  Earl  of      19,3 

Bedingfield,  Re  J414 

Bedminster  Charities,  Re  lbUo 

Bedsole  v.  Monroe  ^ 

Bedwell  v.  Prudence  823,  0-4 

Bed  win  v.  Asprey  *g 

Beebe  v.  Guinault  Mod 

v.  Louisville,  &c.  R.  Co.  3J3 

v.  Morris  212 

Beech  v.  Haynes    711,  839,  840,  843, 

v.  Woodyard  797 

Beecher  v.  Anderson  145 

v.  Marquette  Mill  Co  1461 

Beeching  v.  Lloyd  234,  240,  303 

Beekman  v.  Peck  978,  1030 

V   Saratoga  and  Schen.  R.  R. 
Co.  W76 

Beeler  v.  Bullitt  165,  997 

v.  Dunn  251, 1359 

Beem  v.  Newaygo  Circuit  Judge 

Beer  v.  Tapp  1421 

Beerfield  v    Petne  113-i 

Beers  v.  Botsford  856,  1002 

v.  Broome  _       986 

Beeson  v.  Beeson  571, 1081 


641 

202 

149 

807, 1540 

6) 

1001 

49,52 

1624 

951 

26 

780,  781 

Nat'l 

843 

313 

1003 

429 

1560 

179,  445 

560,  867,  885,  896, 

1580 

v.  Mexborough,  Lord  1484 

v  Moon  °43 

v.  Morrison  91:j 

v.  New  York,  Mayor  of  1240,  1242 
v.  Pate  1440 

v  Read  1224 

ti  Rees  1668 

v  Shrock  19' 

r   Singer  Manuf  Co.  lb2U 

v.  Stocker  189 

v.  Thompson  «8o 

v.  Tinney  ,  J>7 

v  Turner  892,1264 

v  United    States    Stamping 

Co  23*> 

v.  Von  Dadelszen  *  ? 

v.  Walker  „„1n„'J 

v.  Waudby  402,  830 

ii   Wilson  „  _    "J! 

v  Woodward      342,  346,  34 1,  611, 
683,  700,  703,  1111,  1H2,  UlO; 

Bellaby  v.  Grant  M4g 

Bellamy,  In  re,  Elder  v.  Pearson  U. 
Bellamy  v.  Bellamy 

r.  Brickenden 

v  Cockle 

v.  Debenham 

»;£     280,  281,  2927400, '418 
VSSb 
Bellchamber  v   Giani  39,  1380.  1602 
Belle  v.  Thompson  ll»i 

Bellenger  v.  People,  The  oui 

Bellerophon,  The  &£1 

Bellew  V.  Bellew  438,  1428 


710,  1425 

1266 

364,989 

933,936,937 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 


XX111 


Bellingham  v.  Norrish 

v  Pearson 
Belloat  v.  Morse 
Bellona  Co's  Case 
Bellows  v.  Bellows 

v  Sowles 


2265 
1117 

31:» 
1669 
1071 

238 


v.  Stone      403,  406,  408,  579,  580, 

581,  615,  724,  725,  829.  844,  845, 

846,  860,  861.  1190,  1222,  1227, 

1230,  1248,  1531,  1623 

Bellwood  v.  Wetberell  579 

Beluiont   Nail  Co.  v.   Columbia 

Iron  &  Steel  Co.  236 

Belmonte  !'.  Aynard  29,  32 

Behnore,  Lord  v.  Anderson  747,918, 
929 
Belohradsky  v  Kuhn  1651 

Belshami)  Percival  1009,1017,1544. 
1833 
Belt,  R<-  99 

v.  Bowie  334,  517 

v   Lawes  1130 

Bel  ton  v   Smith  1468 

v.  Williams  197 

Beltzhoover  v.  Blackstock  572,  573 
Bemis  v  I'pham  303, 1638,  1639 
Benand,  Re  1347 

Beabow  v.  Davies  528,710 

»,  Low  324,  579,  720,  785,  855 

Bencraft  v.  Rich  1778 

B  ndey  v.  Townsend  2398 

lien. 1.  she,  Re  94,1608 

Benedick  v.  Lynch  369 

Benedict  v.  Williams  318 

Benefit  Life  Ass.  Co.  v.   Super- 
visors 1661 
Benfie.d  v.  Solomons  59,61.  62,  323, 
324,  1549 
Bengley  v.  Wheeler  243 
Ben  ham,  Re                                 1795 
v   Ro.ve                            1239,1247 
Benicia  Agr.  Works  v.  Creighton  669 
Bentaoo  v.  Wortley  161 
Betiner  v.  Kendall                          1638 
Be, meson  v   Bill                             1732 
Bennet  College  v.  Carey               1376 
Bennet  »   Bennet                           1360 
v.  Davis  59 
v   Lee                 170,  174,  175,  1577 
v    Leigh                                          170 
v   Kunyon                                      873 
v  Vade                        384,552,063 
r.  Whitehead                               1362 
Bennett's  Trusts,  Re  62 
Bennett  v.  Allcock                       1130 
v   Attkins               1396,  1416,  1419 
v   Baxter                           1170,  1814 
V    Bennett                                        128 
v.  Biddies                                    1611 
v.  Bury                                         1120 
v  Butterworth                           313 
v.  Chudleigh                         39,  155 
v  Colley                                     1724 
v.  Edwards                                  167 
v.  Fenton                                     149 
v.  Gamgee  63 
v  Glossop                                  1831 
v.  Going                 1416,  1422,  1423 
v  Hamill                   164,  174, 1276 
v.  Hamlin                                    759 
v.  Harfoot                                      168 
v.  Hoefner                                   1031 
v .  Honeywood                             421 
v  Leeds  Manuf.  Co.                  354 
v.  Lytton                                    1207 
v.  Moore                          1002, 1866 
v  Neale                            713,  1078 
v.  Oliver                                     1505 
v.  Pardini                                     1675 
v.  Partridge                               1387 
v,  Rees                                       1216 
v.  Robins                                   1748 
v.  Skeffington                               262 
v  Van  Sykel                              1463 
v.  Walker                              569,  675 
v   Waller                                      392 
v   Williams                                  1002 


Bennett  v.  Winfield  109 

v.  Winter  1028,  1030 

v.  Wood  438,  1213 

Bennington  Iron   Co.   v    Camp- 
bell 422,  770,  776 

Bennison  «/.  Jervison  11'  5 

Benscotter  v.  Green 

Benson  v.  Frederick 
v.  Cutler 
v.  Glastonbury  Canal  Co 


v.  Hadfield 
v.  Joues 
v.  Leroy 
v.  Olive 
v.  Vernon 
v.  Woolverton 

v.  Wright 
Bensusan  v.  Nehemias 
Bent  v.  Birch 

v.  Smith 

v.  Yardley 

v.  Young 
Benthani  v.  Haincourt 
Bentley,  Re 

v.  Bentley 

v.  Cowman 

v.  Craven 

v.  Fleming 

v.  Long  Dock  Co. 

v.  Mercer 

v  Robinson 


790 

1130 

1400 

861, 

1775 

337,  599,  715 

607 

885,  1180,  1615 

869 

1026 

844,  1016,  1539, 

1545 

68 

1394 

991 

844 

335 

562,  1556 

1237 

1355 

1213 

706 

1202 

1109,  1128 

1160 

8«)3 

162,  177,  475,  476, 

498 

Bentlif  v.  London,  &c.  F.  Co.       149 

Benton  v.  Gibson  1669 

Bentsen  v    Taylor  32 

Benyon  v .  Amphlett  180  i 

v.  Nettleford  564 

Benzein  v.  Kobinett  383,  1361) 

Benzien  v.  Lovelass  419 

Berdanatti  ;>.  Saxton  1576 

Berdoe  v.  Dawson  13S6 

Beresford,  Ex  parte  105 

v.  Batthany  561  I 

Lady  v.   Driver  1829 

Berg  v.  Radcliffe  2197 

Berger  v  Armstrong  1654 

o.  Jones  1587 

Bergholtz  v.  Ruckman  1580 

Bergmann  v.  McMillan  216 

Berjce  v.  Harris  342 

Berkeley,  lie  433 

v.  King's  College  1730 

v.  Standard  Discount  Co.  145 

Berkhampstead  Free  School,  Ec 

parte  1854 

Berkley  v    Ryder  782,  1550 

Berks  and  D mphin  Co  v.  Myers    22 

Berlin  v.  Melhorn  1274 

Bermes  v.  Frick  559 

Bermingham  v.  Tuite  1565 

Bernal  r.  Donegal,  Marquis  of    1703 

Bernall  v   Donegal,  Lord  885 

Bernard  v.  Papineau  961 

Lord,  Case  of  1633 

v.  Toplitz  l!il8 

Bernaseoni  v.  Farebrother  1134 

Berndston  v  Churchill  792 

Berne  v.  Eyre  1384 

City  off.  Bank  of  England    17,  18 

Bernett  V   Taylor  875,  1116 

Bernev  v.  Chambers  778 

v   Eyre  1148, 1149,  1383,  1384 

v.  Harvey  1077 

v.  Sewell  1716,  1719,  1724 

Bernheim  v.  Bernheim  313 

Bernie  v.  Vandever  1170 

Berrey  v.  Small  1237 

Berridge  v    Bellew  1449 

Berrigan  v.  Fleming  1540,  1546 

Berrington  v.  Evans  1211  I 

Berrow  v.  Morris       1530, 1537,  2060  j 

Berry,  Re  1361 

v   Armistead  2269 

v.  Attorney  General         1461,  1480  | 

v.  Clements  67  , 


Berry  r.  Gibbons 
v.  Hebblethwaite 
v.  Johnson 
v   Jones 
v.  Rogers 
v.  Sawyer 


280,  1342 
1390 
1276 
1732 
175,  556 
723,  810 
Berrvhill  v.  M'Kee  987,  14o2 

v.  Wells  1255 

Berryman  v.  Graham  1548 

Bertel  v.  Neveux  364 

Bertie  v.  Abington,  Lord  1752 

r.  Falkland,  lx>rd  1017,  1543 

Bertiue  v.  Varian  560,  641,  645 

Bertolacci  v.  Johnstone  415 

Berwick,  Mayor  of  v.  Murray      207, 
350,  351,  837,  895,  1394,  1830 
Besant  v.  Wood  ln9 

Besemeres  v.  Besemeres  1670 

Besley,  Ex  parte  1475 

v.  Besley  4ti5 

Bessant  v.  Noble  203 

Bessey  v.  Windham  1126 

Best  v    Applegate  9'J9 

v.  Drake  1632 

v.  Stampford  125 

v.  Stouehewer  1170,1203,1405,1428 
Betagh  ;;.  Concannon  1771,  1781 

Bethea  v.  Call  68 

Bethel  v   Abraham  1342 

v.  Wilson  217 

Bethell  v.  Casson  579,  1826 

Bethia  v    M'Kay  793 

Bethuue  )»   Bateman      414,  770,  776 
v    Farebrother  195,  196 

v.  Kennedy  10U7 

Bettes?).  Dana  15<*9 

Bettison  v.  Farringdon      1818,  1833 
Betton,  Re  125 

Betts  v.  Barton  453,  536,  790 

v.  Cleaver  1440,  1149 

v  Clifford  1379,  1440,  1681 

ti  De  Vitre         143,  145,  147, 1081 
r.  Gallais  1081, 1643 

v.  Menzies  578 

v.  Neilson  1080,  1081,  1643 

v.  Rimmel  398,  774 

v  Thompson  23!t,  243 

Betty  ».  Taylor  844 

Bevau  v.  Bevan  1279 

Kevau  and  Whitting,  Re  184.3 

Bevaus  j'   Diugman's  Turnpike    145 
Beveridge  v.  Ohetlain  861 

Beverley  v.  Miller  161 

v.  Walden  844,  1073,  1116 

Bevin  v.  Powell  1071,  1551 

Bewick  v.  Alpena  Harbor  Co.     1168 
Bewicke  r.  Graham  617,  1829 

Bewley  v.  Ottinger  S97 

v.  Seymour  307 

Bevnon  v.  Cook  1386 

Bianca,  The  406 

Bibb  v.  Htiwley  212 

Bibby  v.  Naylor  1525 

Bick  v.  Matley  1299 

v.  Motley  1311,  1367 

Bickel's  Appeal  560 

Biekerton  v.  Burrell  197 

Bickett  V.  Morris  1639,  1662 

Bickl'ord  v   Skeeves  (or  Skewes)  444, 
506,507,  1114 
Bickham  v.  Cross  999 

Bickley  r   Dorrington  323 

Bicknell  !'.  Bicknell  79 

v    Field  1627 

v.  Gough  612,  655 

Bicycle  Stepladder  Co.  v.  Gor- 
don 542 
Bidder  v.  Bridges  314,  546,  579,717, 
933 
v  McLean  586 
r.  Trinidad  P.  Co.                     1656 
Biddinger  V.  Wiland  68 
Biddis  v.  James                              863 
Biddle,  Re                                    1389 
v   Mason                                       1716 
v.  Ramsey                        1658,  1682 
Biddies  v.  Jackson                           96 


XXIV 


Biddulph,  Re  1798 

t'.  Camoys,  Lord        177,  451,  452, 

476,  766,  872,  939,  1574 

v.  Dayrell  177,  476 


v    Fitzgerald 

1169 

v.  St.  George,  Vestry  of 

1650 

t>.  St.  John 

847 

Bidlack  v.  Mason 

1751 

Itidulph  v.  Bidulph 

1383 

Bidwell  v.  Paul 

1716 

Biel,  Re 

852 

Bierue  v.  Ray 

843 

V    Wads  worth 

801 

Bilicld  v.  Taylor             220,  222,  257 

Bige!ow  v.  Bigelow       560 

644,  1772 

v  Oassedy 

212 

v.  Hartford  Bridge  Co. 

1637 

v.  Magee 

235 

v.  Morong               1411, 

1427,  1431 

v.  Winsor                   994 

,  995,  2356 

Biggleston  v.  Grubb 

1402 

Biggs  v.  Kowns 

1562, 1564 

v.  Penn 

268 

Bigler  v.  Reyber 

573 

Bignal  v.  Brereton 

1256 

Bignell,  Re 

1361 

v.  Atkins 

1509,  1533 

v.  Chapman 

1732 

Biguold  v.  Audland  394,  1561,  1562, 

1563,  1564, 

2003,  2158 

v.  Cobbold 

481 

Bigsby  v.  Dickinson 

858, 1488 

Biles's  Appeal 

1163 

Bill  v-  Cureton 

230 

v  Sierra  Nevada  Co. 

1620 

v.  W  U.  Tel.  Co. 

26 

Billing  v.  Brooksbank 

875 

v.  Flight                     604 

,  612,  2095 

Biilings  v.  Aspen  Mining 

&  S. 

Co. 

257,  560 

v  Mann 

552,  586 

Billingslea  v  Gilbert 

736, 1675 

v   Ward 

656 

Billout  v.  Morse 

407 

Billson  v.  Scott 

168,  2291 

Bilmver  v  Sherman 

209, 236 

Bilston,  Re 

1589 

Bilton  v.  Bennett 

523,  524 

Binfield  v.  Lambert 

875 

Bin  ford  v  Bawden 

93,99 

v   Dommett 

1125 

Bingham  v.  Bingham 

1622 

v  Cabot              314,  358,  3 

v.  Clanmorris            166, 

1226,  1227 

v.  Dawson 

1581 

v.  King 

1390 

v.  Yeomans 

417,  736 

Binglev  v.  Marshall 

1666 

Bingley  School,  Re 

1852 

Binkert  v.  Wabash  Ry.  Cc 

402 

Binks  v.  Binks 

1516,  1585 

Binney  v.  Plumley 

22 

Binuey:s  Case           20,  26 

468,  729, 
732,  733 

Binnington  v.  Harwood 

1393 

Binns  v.  Mount 

1776 

V.  Parr 

1781 

Binsted  v.  Barefoot 

1611 

Birce  v.  Bletchley 

365 

Birch,  Re 

1610 

Birch  v.  Birch 

1053 

v.  Corpin 

147 

v.  .loy 

1500 

v.  Sumner 

1359 

v.  Williams 

979 

Birchall,  Re,  Wilson  v.  Birchall 

Birchel,  Ex  parte 

Birchett  v.  Balling 

Bird,  Re 

Bird  v.  Appleton 

v.  Bird 

v.  Brancker 

v.  Butler 

v.  Davis 

v.  Gill 

v.  Harris 

v.  Heath 


TABLE   OF   CASES    CITED. 

[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 

Bird  v.  Hustler  413 

v.  Inslee  561 

v.  Kerr  1123 

v.  Lake    840,  884, 1598, 1599,  1670 

v.  Littlehales         1055,  1056,  1057, 

1058 

v.  Styles  844 

Bird-all  o.  Colie  1727 

v.  Hewlett  1253,1431 

Birdseye  v.  Heilner  694 

Birdsong  v.  Birdsong    190,  259,  287, 

1505 

Birkenhead  Docks  v.  Laird  826,  1001 

1484,  2182 

Birkett,  In  re  1770 

Birks  v.  Micklethwait  1413 

Birley  v.  Kennedy  1(77 

Birmingham  v.  Gallagher  243 

Birmingham  Brewing  Co.,  Re   1172, 

1767 

Birmingham  Estates  Co.  v.  Smith 

561 
Birmingham   W.    &   E.    Co.   v. 

Eivtou  Land  Co.  545 

Birnbaum  t>.  Solomon  1675 

Birne  v.  Hartpole  1584 

Biron  v.  Edwards  1120 

v.  Scott  200 

Birrell  v.  Dryer  546 

Birt  v.  Leigh  1096 

Bisbee  v.  Kvans  560 

Bischof^beim  v.  Baltzer       888,  933, 

1573,  23!  H 

v.  Brown  1838 

Bischoffshein  v.  Taaks  888 

Biscoe  v.  Brett  793,  806,  1216 

v.  Great  Eastern  Ry.  Co.  1080 

v.  Jackson  13 

v.  Land  Bank,  Undertakers  of  274 

v.  Waring  360 

v.  Wilks  1402 

Bishop,  Ex  parte     271,  1257,  1448, 

1453 

Re  1347 

v.  Abom  1019 

v.  Balkis  Cons.  Co.  26 

v.  Bishop  £61,  374, 1791 

v.  Chichester  713 

v.  Church  953 

v.  Godfrey  1033 

v.  Jones  52 

v.  Lewis  996 

v.  Little  645 

v.  McGillis  815 

v.  Williams  1168 

v.  Willis  732,  1472, 1611 

v.  Wood  402 

Bisbopp  v.  Colebrook  119 

Bishop's  Waltham  R.  Co.,  Re     1037 

Bishopsgate,  Re  1770 

Bissell  v  Briggs  458 

v.  Heath  1743 

v.  Kellogg  1624 

Bisset  v.  Burgess  1437 

Bithray,  Re  1037 

Bitzer  v.  Hahn  1253 

Biven  v.  Bostwick  860 

Bixby  v.  Bent  986 

Bizzey  v    Flight  1432 

Black  v.  Black  587,  603 

v.  Blakely  1260,  1418 

v.  Bordelon  256 

v.  Caruthers  1634,  1666 

v.  Creighton  1780 

v.  Delaware,  &c.  Canal  Co.       418, 

1650 

1346        v.  Enrich  1643 

1046        v.  Henry  G.  Allen  Co.  1643 

1233        v.  Huggins  26,  1664 

1138        v.  Jones  1126 

83        v.  Lamb         848,  1075,  1110,  1111, 

749  1115,  1116,  1117,  1124,  1139,  1463 

876        v.  O'Brien  1381 

109, 498, 886        v.  Scott  149 

1238        v.  Shreve     1077, 1110,  1112. 1115, 

307,437  1116,1117,1119,1121,1124 

1030,  1843    Blackbeard  v.  Liudigren  1282 


Blackborough  v  Ravenhill  1735 

Blackburn  v.  Caiue  998 

v.  Gregson  1147 

v.  Jep.on  22,  1077, 1475, 1489 

v.  Selma  R.  Co.  1286,  23i9 

v.  State  1774 

v.  Warwick  1252 

Blacker  v   Phepoe  855 

Blacket  v.  Finney  369 

Blackett  v.  Bates  1663 

v.  Black  553 

v.  Blackett  201,  318,  1722 

Blackford  v.  Davis   1221, 1232,  1233, 
1236,  1388 
Blackhall  v.  Coombs  1622 

Blackham  v.  Sutton  Coldfield       239 
Blackie  v.  Osmaston  542 

Blacklock  v.  Barnes  1240 

v.  Small  1427 

Blackman  r.  Cornish  1025 

Blackmore  v.  Barker  1281.  1492 

v.  Edwards  423,  427 

v.  Glamorganshire  Canal  Nav- 
igation 893, 1663 
v.  Howlett  162,  476 
v.  Smith                       159,  808,  815 
Blackwell  v.  Blackwell           254,  407 
v.  Harper  366 
Blackwood,  Re                           1607 

r.  1665 

Blagden  v.  Bradbear  656,  657 

Blagrave  v.  Blagrave  868,  870 

Blaiberg  v.  Parke  894 

Blain ,  Ex  parte  20,  26,  147 

v.  Agar  25,  243 

Blair  v.  Boggs  Township  School 

District  1667 

v.  Bromley  200,  302,  645,  880 

v.  Cordner  354,  1847 

v.  Drew  641 

v.  Johnson  553 

v.  Lippincott  Glass  Co.  197 

v.  Ormoud  236 

v.  Porter  1560,  1562 

v   Reading  790 

v.  St.  Louis  H.  &  K.  R  Co.      324 

v.  Toppitt  175S 

Blaisdell  v.  Bowers  715,  844 

v.  Stevens  417,  760 

Blake,  Re  68 

v.  Albion  Life  Ass.  Co.       348,  349 

v.  Alluian  256 

v.  Barnes  313,  790 

v.  Blake,     5,  45,  87,  421,  629,  630, 

804,  1589,  1726, 1771 

v.  Cox  819,  828 

v.  Foster  1581 

v.  Gale  1214 

v   Garwood  1561 

v.  Hey  ward  986 

v.  Heywood  1033 

v.  Hinkle  361 

v.  Jones  206 

v.  Smith  86 

v.  Veysie  860 

Blakeley  Ordnance  Co.,  Re         1038 

v.  Blakeley  1261 

Blakemore  v.  Allen  734 

v  Glamorganshire  Canal  Co.    1661 

Blakeney  v.  Dufaur        29,  31,  1728, 

1732 

v  Ferguson  842 

Blakeslee  v.  Murphy  1625 

Blakesley  v.  Pegg  1209 

Blakewell  V.  Tagart  1213 

Blakey  v.  Johnson  1079 

v.  Latham  1409 

Blaksley's  Trusts,  Re  1691 

Blanc  v.  Paymaster  Mining  Co.    206 

Blauchard,  Re  1841 

v.  Hawthorne  1685,1730 

v.  Cooke  158,517,1071, 

1110 

v.  Detroit  R.  Co.  1663 

v.  Hill  1649 

Bland  v.  Bland  40 

v.  Daniel         438,  1213,  1383,  1428 


TABLF    OF    CASES    CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 


XXV 


Bland  v.  Davison       429,  1507,  1522, 

1527,  1542 

v.  Fleeman  100 

•>>.  Dawes  100 

v.  Lamb  40,  14-i2 

v.  Warren  1131 

v.  Winter  267 

v.  Wyatt  204 

Blandheir  v.  Moore  llln 

Blandin,  Re  109 

Blaney  v.  Hendricks  1257 

v.  Sargeant  850 

Blann  v.  Bell  1213,  1430,  1472 

Blanshard  v.  Drew  159,  808 

Blantru  v.  Brackett  844 

v.  Hall  296 

Blatch  v.  Archer  467 

Blatchford  v   Chicago  Dredging 

Co.  1663 

Blatherwick  v.  Carey  843 

Blauvelt  v.  Ackerman  1296 

v.  Smith  1062 

Blaxland  V.  Blaxland  1328 

Blaydes  v   Calvert  1702 

Blease  V.  Garlington  1003,  1504,  2391 

Bleckley  v   Rymer  719 

Bledsoe  v   Carr  1576 

Bleeker  v.  Bingham  557 

Bleight  v.  M'llroy  1577 

Bleniel  v.  Shattuck  1591 

Blenkarne  v  Jennens  675 

Blenkhorn  v.  Penrose  418 

Bleukinsop  v.  Foster  1423,  1437 

Bleukinsopp  v.  Blenkinsopp        449, 

451,  452,  1055,  1824,  1834 

Blennerhassett  v.  Day  644 

Blessing  v.  Galveston  1661 

v.  John  Trageser  8.  C.  Works  314 

Blest  v  Brown  1394,  1399,  1407 

Bleuett  v  Jessop  1424 

Blevins  i>   Sympson  1416,  1417 

Blewett  v.  Blewett  1548 

Blewittu  Blewitt  672 

Blewit  v.  Thomas  319 

v.  Tregonning  1104 

Bleyer  v.  Blum  1699 

Bliffi.is  v.  Wilson  1299 

Bligh,  Re  85 

Bligh  v.  Benson  580 

v.  Darnley,  Lord  1033 

v.  O'Connell  86 

v.  Trodgett  110,  307,  309,  454 

Blight  v.  Banks  842,  1381 

Bliley  v.  Taylor  1728 

Blind  School  v  Goven  1796 

Blinkehorne  v.  Feast  1385 

Bliss  V.  Collins  806,  1675 

v.  Little  1463 

v.  Putnam  202,  1527 

Blithman,  Re  61 

Block  »   Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R 

Co  149 

Blockett  v.  Bates  1485 

Blodget  v.  Hobart  841,  1548 

Blogg  v.  Johnson  3S3,  1256 

Blois  v.  Betts  1766 

Blouifield  v.  Eyre      388,  13-32,  1614, 

1682 

Bloodgood  v.  Clark    898.  1505,  1598, 

1720,  1734 

v.  Kane  618 

Bloomar,  Re  166,  1162 

Bloomstein  V.  Brien  296,  1624 

v .  Clees  542 

Blore  v.  Ashby  406 

Blossom  v.  Railroad  Co.  1492 

Blount  v   Bestland  90 

v.  Burrow  227,  1229 

v.  Garen  549,  584 

v,  Kimpton  576 

v  O'Connor  1370 

v.  Winterton  259 

Blower  v.  Morrets  1558 

Bloxam  !•.  Chichester  756 

v.  Hopkinson  1040 

v  Metropolitan  Ry.  Co.      26,  241, 

244,  245,  899,  1598 


Bloxsome  v.  Chichester 
Bloxton  v   Drewit 
Bluck  v.  Colnaghi 

v.  Elliot 

v.  Galsworthy 
Bludworth  v.  Take 
Blue  v.  Watson 
Blue  Ridge  Clay  Co.  t 

Jones 
Bluestone  Coal  Co.  v.  Bell 
Bluett  v.  Jessop 
Blum  v.  Goldman 


756 

882,  883 

793,896,  811 

6t33 

578,  1834 

652 

1562,  1563 

.   Floyd- 

830 
1660 
1214 
1511 


Blumenthal  v.  Brainerd     1743,  1752 

Blundell,  Re  14H 

Bluudell  v.  Blundell  2lJ8 

Blundeu  v.  De»art  1842 

Blunt,  Re  1694,  16'J6 

v.  Clitherow  1750 

v.  Cumyus  1402 

v   Gee  1165 

Blyth  v.  Green  178 

v.  Lafone  1862 

Blythe  v.  Fladgate  217, 223, 269,  2116 

v.   Peters  1025 

Board  man  v.  Davidson  380 

■  Jackson  1228,  1229 

v.  Meriden  Britannia  Co.  1649 

Board  way  v.  Scott  1381 

Boatwright  v   Boatwright  648 

Bobb  v.  Bobb  334 

Bobbctt  v.   South   Eastern  Ry 

Co.  649 

Bock  v.  Bock  1507 

Bod  lam  V.  Riley  1258 

Boddington  v.  Rees  354 

v   Woodley  40,  43,  894 

Boddy  v.  Kent  814,  1511,  1542,  1589 
Bode,  Baron  de,  Re  133 

Boden  v    Dill  1081,  1666 

Bodeu's  Trust,  Re  193 

Bodger  v.  Bodger  824,  9.14 

Bodicoate  v.  Steers  1151,  1157 

Bodington  o   Harris  1134 

Bodkin  u   Fitzpatrick  l'J4 

Bodman  v.  Lake  Fork  Drainage 

District  630 

Bodmin,  Lady  v  Vandenbendy    677 
Bodwell  v.  Wilcox  1591 

Boehm  v   De  Tastet  508 

v.  Wood       1700,  1701, 1702, 1708, 
1710, 1711,  1713,  1729,  1741 
Boeve  «   Skipwith  1533 

Bofil  v.  Fisher  228 

Bogacki  v.  Welch  1679 

Bogirdus  v.   Rosendale  Manuf. 

Co.  26 

v.  Trinity  Church      607.  615.  617, 
625,  654,  694,  695,  697 
Boger,  Re  1685 

Bogert  v   City  of  Elizabeth  1661 

v   II  light  395,  1619 

Bogg  ti.  Midland  Ry.  Co  10'>1 

Boggs  v.  Brown 
Bogle  v.  Bogle 
Bo^ue  v.  Hnulston 
Bogwell  v.  Elliot 
Bohman  v   Lohinan 
Boileau  v.  Ratlin 
Boils  v.  Boils 
Bointon  v.  Parkinson 
Boisgerard  V.  Wall 
Bolander  v.  Peterson 
Bolckow  ;>.  Fisher 
Bol  len  v.  Nicholay 
Bolders  v   Saunders 
Holding  v.  Lane 
Bolgiano  v.  Cooke 
Holland,  Er  parte 
Bolles  c.  Bolles 
Boiling  v.  Turner 
Bollinger  v.  Chouteau 
Bolman  V    Lohman 
Bolster  v   Catterlin 
Bolton,  Re 


v.  Bolton 
V.  Bull 


1765 
1551,  1655 
367,  1643 

874 
304 

s:;s 

1673 
461 
190 
1648 
329,  720 
187 
727 
653 
363 
157 
334 
83 
1244,  1246 
402 
1631 
108 
1560 
409,  906,  937 
1612 


Bolton  v.  Dickens  561,  602 

v.  Flournoy  1'iTi 

v   Gardner    40,  617,  618,  669,  685, 

723,787,  L462 

v.  Lambert  196,561 

v.  Liverpool        571,  572,  579,  943, 

1831,  1834 

V.  Powell  324 

V.  Ridsdale  407,  1515 

c   Salmon  259 

v.  SUnnard  222 

v.  Williams  1569 

Bolion,  Duke  of  v.  Williams        1564 

Bol  ware  V    Craig  378 

Bomar  v.  Hagler  9:il 

v.  Means  303 

v.  Parker  790 

Bombay  Civil  Fund  Act,  Re        1395 

Bonaparte  v.  Camden,  Jtc.  R.  Co   46 

Bond,  Ex  parte  1360 

Re  1346 

v   Barnes  70,  398,  798 

v.  Bell  1401 

v.  Conway  113 

V.  Graham  250 

v.  Green  996 

V.  Greeuwald  1019,  1468,  1618 

v.  Hendricks  286,  390 

v.  Hopkins  559,  1660 

v  Ma\  or  of  Newark  1661 

v.  Simmons  114 

Bonelli,  Re  864 

Bonelli's  El.  Tel.  Co.,  Re  1607 

Bones  v   Angier  447 

Bontield  v  Grant    161,176,177,476 

Boiitil  V.  Purchas  1510 

Bon  ham  c.  Newcomb  10U3 

Bonithon  v    Hockniore  1246 

Bonnard  v.  Perryman  1620 

Bonnardet  v.  Taylor  1837 

Bounell  v.  Griswold  545 

v.  Lewis  1003 

Bonner  v.  Illinois  Land  Co.        1507 

v.  Johnston  1775 

v.  Worthington  1710  1711 

v.  Young  889 

Bonnewell  v.  Jenkins         1096,  1105 

Bonny  v.  Bonny  216 

Bouser  v.  Bradshaw    81,  1079,  1725. 

1847 

v.  Cox  1505 

Bonus  r.  Flack  1183,  1184 

Bookless  c   Crummack  1617 

Boon  v.  Colingwood  1713 

v   McGuckea  1069 

v   Pierpont  390,  586,  890 

r.  Rahl  536 

Boone  r.  Chiles  361,569,678 

Boone  County  v.  Burlington  & 

M.  R.  Co.  1584 

Booracm      r       North     Hudson 

County  R.  Co.  1637 

v   Wells  287 

Bnosey  ».  Fairlie  46 

Booth  v   Booth    815,837,1391,21ir, 
V.Clark  1742,1751 

v.  Coulton  1256,  1735 

v   Leicester    791,  800,  1256, 1553, 
1614.  1626,  i628 
V  Milns  1096 

v.  Penser  1309 

v.  Rich  167 

v  Smith  354,  759,  760 

v  Stamper  341,  601 

v   Thompson  1502 

v.  Turle  655,  657 

v.  Wiley  660 

v.  793 

Boothby  v.  Walker  l-i"> 

Bootle  v.  Blundell       875,  876.  1014, 
1116,  1124,  1135 
Boovev  v.  SutclifTe  1710 

Borah  v.  Archers  208,1158 

Borden  r.  -Curtis  208 

Bordierti.  Burrell  1071 

Boreham  v.  Bignall     430,  432, 1405, 
1427 


xxvl 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.  ] 


Boren  v.  Billington  402 

Borer  v.  Chapman  553,  1933 

Borland  v.  Haveu  313 

B.  Thornton  1621,  1640 

Borneo  Company  v.  Robinson      654, 
670 
Borough  v.  Whichcote  867 

Borrowscale  v.  Tuttle  994,  995 

Bors  i>   Preston  45 

Borthwick  v.  Evening  Post  1648 

Borton  v.  Dunbar  1490 

Bosauquet  v.  Marsham        682,  1531 
v.  Shortridge  1126 

Bosehetti  v.  Power        462,  749,  1780 
Bosher  v    Richmond  &  11.    L. 

(.o.  303 

Bosley  v.  M'Kiin  550 

v.  Phillips  233,  313,  408 

v.  Susquehanna  Canal  1683 

Bostic  v  Love  845 

Bostock  v.  N.  Staff.  Ry  Co.  1635, 

2307 

Boston  v.  Boylston  251 

Boston  Bank  v.   Skillings,   &c. 

Lumber  Co.  1561 

Boston   Diatite  Co   v.  Florence 

Manuf  Co.  1620,  1642,  1644 

Boston  Iron  Co.  v.  King    1232,  1244, 
1248,  1251 
Boston  Rubber  Shoe  Co.  V.  Bos- 
ton ll  ubber  Co.  10,  1648 
Boston  Water  Power  Co.  v   Bos- 
ton &  Worcester  R.  R.        549, 
1637 
Boston  Woven  Hose  Co.  v.  Star 

Rubber  Co.  197 

Boston  &  Lowell  R.  Co.  v.  Salem 

&  L.  R  Co.         1623, 1635,  1640 
Bostou  &   Prov.  R.  Co  v.  New 

York  &  N   E.  E.  Co.  1719 

Bostwi*  k  v  Menek  1742,  1751 

Bosville  v.  Brander  92,  122,  125 

v.  Van  Voorhis  542 

Boswell  v.  Coaks    68, 164,  307,  1381, 

1440 

v.  Otis  457 

Boswortb,  lie  1411 

Boteler  v.  Allington  569 

Bothomley  v   Squires  324,598,599, 

602,  803,  965 

Bothomly  V.  Fairfax  1740 

Bothwell  ».  Bonshell  86 

Botifeur  v.  Weyman  641,667 

Botsford  v.  Botsford  1407 

v   Burr  196,374 

Botten  v  Codd  87,179 

Bottle  Seal  Co  v  De  La  Vergne 

B.  &  S.  Co.  314 

Bottoms?).  Corley  109 

Bottorf  v  Conner  650,  601 

Bntts  r.  Patton  249 

Bouche  v.  Ryan  37,  74 

Boucher  v   Boucher  1 120 

Bouchier  v.  Dillon  1497 

Boucicault  r.  Delafield      63,  64,  814, 
1009,  1017.  1544 
Bouck  v.  Bouck  S23,  335,  336 

v.  Wilber  671 

Bodinot  r.  Small  324 

Bouldenr.  Lanahan  280,1056 

Bouldin  ».  Baltimore  1668 

Boulter  v.  Mut.  Loan  Ass'n         1652 
Boulton  v.  Beard  1418 

v.  Pritchard  1129 

Boulo  v.    New  Orleans,  &c    R. 

Co  1631 

Bound  V.  Wells  512,  536 

Bourbaud  v.  Bourbaud  6.3,  814, 

1588,  1675 

Bourdillon  v.  Adair  95 

V.  Baddeley  823 

Bourdin  v.  Oreenwood  646 

Bourdon  v.  Martin    1591, 1743,  1756 

Bourgeois  v.  Schrage  1461 

Bourke  v  Callanan  1073 

v  Davis  749.  892 

v.  Donoghue  1387 


Bourke  v   Kelly 

v  Nicol 
Bourn  v.  Bourn 
Bourne,  Ex  parte 

v   Brickton 

v.  Coulter 


630 
354 

1287 
152 

1470 
402,  423 


v  Hall  1551,  1552 

i'.  Mole  1772 

Bourton  v.  Williams  993 

Bousfield  v.  Hodges  1293 

v.  Mould  834 

Bouslog  v.  Garrett  371 

Bousquet  v.  Bent  1008 

Boussmaker,  Ex  parte  51,  52 

Bouton  v  Dement  236 

Bovill  v.  Bird  911 

v.  Clark  781 

v  Cowan  943,  1826 

v.  Crate  1663 

v.  Goodier  1139,  1525,  1652, 

1643 

v.  Hitchcock  1071,  1080 

v.  Smith  579 

Bowden,  lie  250 

v   Crow  324 

v.  Parrish  1290 

V.  Russell  1(  70 

Bowditch  v.  Banuelos  2030,  2031 

v.  Soltyk  1411,  1427,  156u 

Bowdon  v.  Allen  564 

Bowen,  He  1043 

Bowen,  lie,  Andrew  v.  Cooper      200 

v.  Brecon  Ry.  Co.  1743 

v.  Cross  402,  778,  780 

v.  Evans  675 

v.  Fairman  1772 

v.  Gilleylen  1461 

v.  Idley         71,  294,  403,  406,  409, 

776 

v.  Pearson  1825 

v.  Price  374,  480 

Bower  v.  Baxter  1661 

v   Cooper  1063 

v.  Morris  1260 

v.  Sockte  des  Affreteurs    du 

Great  Eastern  217 ,  324 ,  602 

v.  Swadlin  609 

Bower  Barff  R.  L.  Co.  v.  Wells 

R   I.  Co.  759 

Bowers  v.  Keesecher  334,341 

v.  Smith  68,  170,  1001 

Bowersbank  v  Colasseau   1738,1739 

Bowes,  lie  171 8 

v.  Bute,  Marquis  of  1163 

t;.  Farrar  732 

v.  Fernie  1824 

v.  Heapes  1386 

v.  Law  1081,  1654 

Bowie  v.  Ailsa  40,  1462 

v.  Minter  302,  1518 

Bowker  v  Nickson  13o3,  1311 

Bowland  v.  Sprauls  418 

Bowles'  Case  1633 

Bowles  v   Drayton  1369 

v   Rump  1151,  1161 

v.  Stewart  298,  378 

v.  Weeks  1263 

Bowling  v.  Scales  1722,  1845 

Bowling  Green,  &c.  v.  Todd        1841 

Bowman  v   Ash  369 

v.  Bell  1734 

v.  Bowman  1099 

v  Burnley  302 

v.  Chicago,  &c.  Ry.  Co.            779 

v.  Floyd  1648, 1650 

V.  Griffith  674 

v.  Lygon  689 

v  Marshall .  701 

v   Middleton  1073 

v.  O'Reilly  860 

v.  Ilodwell  944 

ii.  Wathen  560 

Bown,  lie  100 

v.  Child  933,  935,  936 

v.  Stenson  989 

Browne  v.  Ritter  1281 

Bowra  v.  Wright  73,  166,  1162 


Bowser  v.  Colby  882,  884,  1111, 

1658 

v.  Hughes  62 

Bowsher  v.  Watkins  200.  324 

Bowyer  v.  Beamish  604,  1527 

v.  Bright  1473, 1535,  1537 

v   Covert  252,  290 

v.  Griffin  1411 

v.  Pritchard  1568 

v.  Woodman  102,  653 

Box  v   Jackson  119 

Boxy  v .  McKay  245 

Boyce  v.  Grundy  630 

v.  Wheeler  1159 

Boyd,  Ex  parte  1556 

v.  Alabama  659 

v.  Boyd  68 

v.  Brookes  1425 

v.  Eby  852 

v .  Gill  193 

v.  Hamilton  1073 

v.  Heinzelman  816 

v.  Higginson  643 

v.  Hoyt       303,  334,  338,  340,  346, 

559 

v  Jaga  824,825 

v.  Jones  212 

v.  Mills  590,  601,  760 

v.  Moyle  344,  368.  429 

v  Murry  1722 

v.  Petrie  1003,  1209 

v.  Royal  Ins  Co.  1743 

v  State  1614 

v  Stewart  1120 

v.  Vanderkemp296,  526, 1476,  1580 

v.  Wiley  560,  1290 

Boydell  v.  Manby  1266 

Boyden  v  Partridge       193,  200,  222 

Boyer?'.  BlackweU  1288 

v.  Clark  1845 

B03  es  v.  Cook  973 

Boyle  v.  Brettws  Llantwit    C 

Co.  1732 

v.  Hardy  1253 

v.  Lysaght  1658 

v  Sacker  1474 

v.  Smithman  1835 

v   Wiseman  1103, 1105,  1125 

v.  Zacharie  1 

Boynton  r.  Barstow  314 

v.  Boynton       64,  1422, 1507,  1538 

11.  Brastow  2061 

v.  Djer  1369 

v.  Kneeseville  E.  L.  Co.  536 

v.  Richardson  1417 

Boys  v.  Morgan  1477 

BoVse,  Re  1627 

B03  se.  He,  Crofton  v.  Crofton      915 

v.  Cokell  766,  820,  1821 

v.  Colclough  664,890,1148 

v  Rossborough         552,  876,  1074, 

1075 

Bozon  v.  Bolland        540, 1842,  1845 

v.  Williams  674 

Brace  v.  Blick  883 

v.  Harrington  199 

v.  Marlborough,  Duchess  of     678, 

1390,  1424 

v  Ormond  1432 

v.  Ta\  lor  329 

v.  Wehnert  1660 

Bracebridge  »>   Buckley      1658,  1659 

Bracey  v  Sandiford  77 

Bracken  v.  Kennedy  690 

Brackenbury  v    Brackenbury     10i'9 

Brackett  v.  Tillot^on  ll'Bfl 

Bracton  v.  Morris  1481 

Bradberry  v  Brooke  40,1482 

Bradhurv  0   Butler  313 

V.  Dickens  1648,  loon 

v.  Sharp  lfi4,J! 

v.  Shawe  607,  79, 

Bradby  v.  Whitchurch  1417 

Bradford  0   Allen  1381 

v.  Bradford  597,  1-134 

ik  Central    Kansas    L.    &   T 

Co.  1842 


Bradford  v.  Felder  407,  1507 

v.  Geixs  238:1 

v.  Hamilton  1292 

v.  Nettleship  1800 

v.  Peckhain  1614,  1677 

v.  Young  205,  553,  663,  1469, 

1794 
Bradford    School    of  Industry, 

lie  16 

Bradish  v.  Ellamea  1267 

v  Gee  '  973,  974,  1585 

v.  Gibbs 

v .  Oruut 

Bradlaugh  v.  Clarke 

v   Newdegate 
Bradley  v.  Amidon 
v.  Bevington 
v.  Borlase 
v   Chase 
v.  Converse 
v.  Crackenthorp 
v.  Dibrell 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 
Brandred  v.   Paterson  Machine 


XXV11 


v.  Emerson 
v  Hitchcock 
v.  McKenna 
v.  Morgan 
v.  Richardson 
v.  Riches 
v   Root 
V.  Snyder 
V.  Stelfox 
v.  Webb 


100,  186 

402 

10 

1558 

69 

987,  1072,  1078 

710 

1397 

860 

939 

402, 1536 

87, 90 

1387 

122 

197 

1623 

674 

885.  886 

1243 

798 

844 


Shop  395 

Braudreth  v.  Lance  1644 

Brandt  v.  Klein  944 

Bran  ford  v.  Branford  564 

Branger  v.  Chevalier  1310 

Branham  v.  Commonwealth        li£5 
Branksea  Island  Co.,  lie  669 

Branscomb  v.  Gillian  1157 

Brantley  v.  Gunn  1315 

Brasbridge  v.  W'oodroffe  1427 

Brasfield  v.  French  597 

Brasher  v.  Cortlandt  286,  538 

v.  Macey  208,  1630 

v.  Van  Cortlandt  83,175,  100,  390 
Brass  &  Iron  Works  v.  Payne      552, 
1648 
Brassey  v.  Chalmers 

v   New  York,  &c.  R,  Co. 
Brassington  v.  Brassington 
Brasted  v.  Sutton 
Brattle  v.  Waterman 
Braund  v.  Devon,  Earl  of 
Braunstein  v.  Lewis 
Brawell  v.  Reed 


Bradley  &  H    M  Co  v.  Charles 

Parker  Co.  1642 

Bradshaw  v.  Bradshaw  907,  909,  943, 

1353,  1778,  1780 

v  Outram  283 

Bradstock  v.  Whalley  765 

v.  Whatley  291,  352,  461,  763 

Bradstreet  v.  Baldwin  915 

v.  Supervisors,  &c.  46 

Bradt  v.  Kirkpatrick      328,  329,  558 
Brad  well  v.  Weeks  49,  51,  538 

Brady  v   Brady 


Hamlett 

v.  McCosker 

v.  Waldron 

v.  Weeks 
Bragg  v.  Lyon 
Braham  v.  Bustard 
Brain  v.  Brain 
lira  man  I  v.  Jones 

v  Moss 
Braithwaite,  lip. 


1180 
1019 
298,  1520,  1546 
1030 
303,  34. 
1157 
1649 

399 
1254 
1578 

433 


Braxton  v.  Lee 
v.  Willing 
Bray,  lie 

v   Akers 

v.  Creekmore 

v.  Fromont 

v.  Laird 

v.  Thatcher 

v.  West 
Wood  ran 


209 

1734 

1842 

1717 

410 

311 

100 

1723 

997 

1077 

1803 

180,  181,  182 

418 

219 

1491 

345 

1436 

969 


1347 

26,  334 

1576,  1581 

974,  993,  1460 

1267 

1258 

1469,  1471 

324 

1841 

1111 

586 

325 

162,  475 

1257 

905,  918 


Braithwaite,  Re,  Braithwaite  v. 

Wallis  I779 

Braithwaite  v.  Kearns  891,  914 

r  Robinson  232 

Braker  v   Devereaux  208 

Braman  v.  Wilkinson  1551 

Bramblett  f>.  Pickett  1030 

Bramley  v.  Teal  I775 

Brampton  v.  Barker  678 

Bramston  v.  Carter  421,  802 

Bramwell  v   Halcomb        1645,  1646 
Branch,  Ex  parte  985 

Branch  r;.  Booker  219 

v.  Browne  I345 

i'.  Dawson  ttq 

Branch  Turnp  Co  v.  Yuba 
Brande  r.  Gilchrist 

v.  Grace 
Branden  v.  Cabiness 
Branilett  v.  Lance 
Brandford  v.  Freeman 
Brandling  v.  Humble 
Brandlyn  )'.  Ord 
Brandon,  Ex  parte 
Brandon  v  Brandon 


Bray  Electric  Tramway,  lie         1378 
Braybrooke  v   Attorney-General 

1501 
Braybrooke,  Lord  v.  Inskip  1220 
Braye,  Re  Hill 

Drayton  v.  Smith  1711   1713 

Brazier  0    Fortune  571 

Brazil,  Emperor  of  v.  Robinson       18 
Breach,  Ec  parte  1795, 1815 

v.  Casterton  1131 

Breadalbane,  Marquis  of  v. 

Chandos  664,  1626 

Brearcliff  v.  Dorrington  1040 

Brechen  v.  Hussell 
Breck  ?'.  Smith 
Breckenridge  v.  Brooks 


v  Crouch 
v.  Curling 
v   Mullenix 
v.  Xesbitt 
Sands 


1631 

313,  1551 

1660 

280,  856 

1647 

1128 

1800,  1801 

659,  674 

149 

281,  1476, 

1525,  1749,  1768 

987,  1599 

52 

917,  950 

51 

547,  548 


Brandon  Man.  Co.  v.  Prime-       601 

1548 


Brecton  v.  Russell 
Bree  v.  Marescaux 
Breed  v.  Lynn 

v.  Pratt 
Breeding  i'    Finley 
Breedlove  v.  Nicolet 
Breeze  v.  English 
Brend  v.  Brend 
Brendle  v.  Herren 
Brennan  v.  Preston 
'  v.  Vogt 

Brenner  ».  Bigelow 
Brent,  lie 

v  Dold 

v.  Maryland 
Brentwood  Brick  and  Coal  Co 

In  re 
Brereton  v.  Edwards 

V.  Gamul 
Breslauer  r.  Brown 
Bresler  n.  Pitts 
Bressemlen  v.  Decreets 


418 

1698 

551,  1247, 

1259,  1260 

417 

449 

1168 

851 

27 

45 

411,  423,992 

1003 


Brewer,  Ex  parte 

v.  Boston  Theatre 

D   Bowman 

v.  Connecticut 

v.  Squire 

v.  Tyringham 

v .  Yorke 

Brewis  v.  Lawson 

Brewster,  Matter  of 

v.  Bours 

v.  Hatch 

v.  Luut 

v.  Thorpe 

v   Wakefield 

Breyfogle  v.  Beckley 

Briaut,  In  re,  Poulterti.  Shackel  90, 

92 

v.  Dennett  1797 

v.   Reed        15C0,  1562,  1564 

v.  Thomas  334 

Brice  v.  Banister  1:9 

v.  Mallett  632 

r.  Miller  113 

Brick  v.  Staten  Island  Ry.  Co.    1642 

Brickhouse  v.  Hunter  1250 

Brickill  v   Baltimore  560 

v.  New  York  1195,  13n4 

Brickwood  v.  Harvey  523 

Bridge  v.  Bridge  953,  955 

v.  Brown  1359 

v.  Burns  964 

v.  Eddows  I077 

v.  Johnson  1502 

Bridesburg  Manufacturing  Co.'s 

Appeal  1561 

Bridger  v.  Parfold  1288 

v.  Thrasher  303,  314 

Bridges  v.  Canfield  27 


v.  Hinxmau 

v.  Longman 

v.  McKenna 

v.  Mitchell 

v.  Robinson 

v.  Sheldon 

v.  Sperry 
Bridewell  Hospital,  lie 
Bridget  v.  Hamer 


232 

1408 
109 
641 

1653 
1299,1381,1440 

1158 

1847 
223 


Bridgewater  v.  DeWinton     726, 

774,  1835 
Bridguian  v.  St.  Johnsbury  & 

L  C.  R.  Co.  190 

Bridgwood  v.  Wynn  1131 

Bridson  v.  Benecke  1642 


1029 
905 
546 
1624 
1799 
1073 
1841 

1653 
1040 


Bressler  v.  McCune 
Breton  v.  Mockett 
Brett,  Re 

v.  Carmichael 


677,  679,  700 

157 

1164 

283,  288, 

289,  419 

1468 

973 

1615 

1203 


v.  East  India  &  London  Ship 


ping  Co. 

v.  Forcer 

v.  Imperial  Gas  Co. 
Brevard  v.  Summar 
Brevoort  ?>.  Brevoort 

v.  Detroit 

v.  McJimsey 


1657 
92 

1666 
797,  1003 
228 
146.8 
16B0 


v.  M'Alpine 
Brien  v    Buttorff 

v.  Harriman 

v.  Jordan 

v.  Paul 
BrJerly  v.  Ward 
Brieseh  ».  M'Cauley 


1642 
543 
1732 

700 

1588,  1743,  1744 

526,  528 

1622 


Brings  r.  Beale  416,  804.  809 
v  French  1615,  1627,  1965,  2274 
v.   Law  1623 

V  liirhmond  2^1 
v.  Shaw                                         1R23 

V  Smith  1040 
v.  Wilson             643,  644,646.  1211 

Brigham  v.  Luddington        149,  191 

1743 

v   Wheeler  1352 

V.  While  1677 

Brighouse  ><  Margetson       536,  1600 

Bright,  Ex  parte  157 

Bright  v.  Boyd  2219 

v   Bright  1271 

v.  Eynon  1129 

V.  Legerton  1003 

v.  Rowe  2182 

v.  Spratt  1599 

v.  Tvndall  1001 

Brignall  v.  Whitehead       1510,  1690 

Brigstocke  ?>.  Roch  SlO,  1573 

Brill  v   Styles  542 

Brink  V    Morton  1111 

Brinkerhoffr.  Brown   303,  334,  &38, 

588,  982,  1290 

V.  Franklin  1026,  1550 


XXVIU 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 


Brinkerhoffti.  Lansing     1392,1399, 

v.  Thalhiuier  284 

Ki80 

Brinklcv  v.  Att.-Gen.  1573 

c   Avery  48 

Brinson  v.  Halden  1765 

Briuton  v.  Birch  2u3 

Brisco  v.  Kenrick  214 

Bristed  v.  Wilkins  1039,  1H41 

Bristol  v.  Morgan  194 

Bristol  Hydraulic  Co.  v.  Boyer  1639 

Bristol.  &c.  Co  v.  Maggs  364 

Bristow  v.  Towers  50 

v.  Whitmore  1001,2182 

Bristowe  v.  Needham  5<l4,  1747, 

1750,  1755 

Britain  v.  Cowen  161,  445 

British  Dynamite  Co.  v.  Krebs  1014, 

1503 

British  Empire  Shipping  Co  v. 

Somes  552,  1556,  1557,  1625 

Britisli   Equitable  Ass.  Co   v. 

Vale  of  Neath  By.  Co.  1513 

British  Imperial  Co  ,  Re  1596 

British  Mut.  lnv.  Co.  v.  Cob- 
bold  1841 
British   South   Africa   Co.    v. 

Conipanhia  de  Mozambique  629 
British  &  Foreign  Gas  Co.,  lie  1611 
Britnell  v.  Walton  508 

Briton  Medical  Life  Ass.  Ass'n, 

lie  1620,  1658 

Briton  Medical  &  G.  L.  Ass.  Co. 

v.  Jones  1120 

Briton  v.  South  Wales  Ry.  Co.    1130 

Brittain  v.  Dickson  1508 

Britten  v.  Britten  95 

Brlttin  v.  Crabtree  843 

Brittlebank,  He  1358 

v.  Goodwin  644,  1420 

v.  Smith  892 

Brittou  v.  Brewster  328 

v.  Johnson  993 

Broad  v.  Wickham  1743 

Broadbent  ?'.  Imperial  Gas  Co.  1635, 

1637 

Broadhead  v.  Marshall  1134 

Broadhurst  v.  Tunnicliff   1019,  1492 

Broadwood,  Re  9!) 

Brocas  v.  Lloyd  905,  908 

Brock  v.  North  Western  Fuel  Co.  357 

Brocken  V.  Martin  816 

Brocker  v.  Hamilton  1699 

Brocklebank,  Ex  parte  68,84 

V.  East  London  By.  Co.  1744,  1752 

r.  King's  Lynn  Steamship  Co.  26, 

Si 

Brorklesby  v.  Munn  1661 

Brocksopp  v.  Barnes  1233 

Brockway  r.Copp  547,721,837,1042 

v.  Wells  1392 

Broder  v.  Saillard  211,  261,  4"6, 

1168,  1637 

Broderlck's  Will  552 

Broderick  v.  Broderick  1622 

Brodie  r   Barry  1723 

v.  Bolton  1437,  1438 

v.  Johnson  1144 

v.  St   Paul  1388,  1404 

v.   Skelton  457 

Brograve  v.  Watts  1050 

Brokaw  r.  Brokaw  200,  314 

V.  McDougall  1159 

Bromage  v.  Davies  1284 

Bromberg  v.  Heyer        368,  545,  707 

Bromfield  V   Chichester  508 

Bromilow  v.  Phillips  887,  1069 

Bromley.  Re  187 

v.  Hnlland  197,247,552,1680 

v.  Kelly  316,  1779 

v.  Smith  135, 156,  243,  1386 

r.  Williams  241 

Bronson's  Case  1069 

v.  Keokuk  149,  191 

v.  Kinzie  1241 

v.  La  Crosse,  &c.  R.  Co.     26,  287, 

1463,  1548 


Bronson  v.  R.  R.  Co. 

994 

Brooch  v.  Kelly 

940 

Brook,  Re 

1168 

v.  Alcock 

39 

v.  Archer 

1081 

v.  Biddall 

908 

v.  Smith 

166,  1345 

Brook,  Lord  v.  Hertford,  Lord  72,  73 

Brooke,  Ex  parte 

157 

v. 

1219 

v.  Brooke 

1525 

V.  Clarke 

1679 

V.  Hewitt 

543 

v.  Hickes 

92, 105 

v.  Mosn  n       67,  68, 16E 

,801,1584 

v.  Tarbell 

K'76 

v.  Todd 

977 

Brooke,  Lord  v.  Warwick 

Earl 

of 

1489 

Brooker,  Ex  parte 

157 

Re 

1616 

v.  Brooker 

1616,  1734 

v.  Collier 

1268 

v.  Smith 

449 

Brookes  v.  Boucher 

380.  721 

v    Burt 

152 

v.  Wbitworth,  Lord 

335,  346 

Brookfield  v.  Bradley 

1029,  lf.24 

*'.  Williams 

1156-1158 

Brooking  v.  Maudslay  349,  354,  1573 
v.  Skewis  1387 

Brooklyn  White  Lead  Co.  v. 

Masury  1648, 1649 

Brookman,  Re  1608 

Brooks  v.  Barrett  851 

v.  Brooks  110,  179 

v.  Byam  723,  760, 1377, 1381,  1405 
v.  Cannon 


v.  Carpentier 
v.  Bias 
v.  fJibbons 
v.  Gillis 
v.  Greathed 

v.  Hamilton 
r.  Howard 
r.  Jones 
v.  Kelly 
V.  Lewis 
v.  M'Kean 
v.  Martin 
v.  Mead 
v.  Miller 
v.  Mills  County 
V.  Moody 
v.  Morison 
l<.  O'Hara 
v.  Purton 


325 

1631 

587,  588 

844 

1057, 1058,  1717, 

1718,  1744 

324 

1120 

1507 

1274,  1551 

295 

905,  918 

154S 

829 

378,  1642 

634 

777 

452 

314,  659, 1663 

690.  702,  706.  1590. 

1624,  1675,  2129 

v.  Railroad  Co.       1019,  1120 

v.  Reynolds   236,  250, 1207,  1615 

v.  Silver  *43 

v.  Snaith  1287 

v.  Spann  418 

v   Sutton  669,  700 

v.   Taylor  807 

r.   Wigg  888 

Brooksbank  v   Higginbottom    795 

v.  Smith  645 

Broome,  E.r  parte  1727 

Brophy  v.  Bellamy  1342,  1359 

v.  Holmes  1467,  1477 

Brotherton  v.  Chance  774 

v.  Hatt  675 

Brougham,  Lord  v.  Poulett, 

Lord  1428 

Broughton  v  Broughton  1234, 1235, 

1413,  1414 

V.  Lashmar  791 

v.  Martvn  507 

IV  Fitch'ford  1778 

Broward  r.  Hoeg  214 

Browder  v  Jackson  190 

Brower  i'   Cothran  1120 

Brown's  Appeal  1657 

Brown,  Ex  parte  168,  553,  907, 

1120,  1756,  1854 


Brown,  Re     70,  191,  494,  571,  1048,- 
1407,  1449,  1798,  1874 
r.  Armistead  997 

v.  Ashley  1639 

v.  Aspden  1472 

v.  Bark  ham  1259 

v.  Bigley  1846 

v.  Brown        79,553,  713,  846,  847, 
1029, 1228,  1320,  1626, 
2012 
v.  Bruce  732 

v.  Buck  334 

v.  Bulkley  737,  844,  845,  951 

v.  Burdett  1213, 1411,  1528 

v.  Burke  1076 

v.  Butter  802 

v  Byrne  1168 

V.Chambers  856,875 

v.  Clark  85,  102 

v.  Clarke  1138 

V.  Collins  108 

v.  Commonwealth  1624 

v.  Concord  1661 

v.  County  of  Buena  Vista         561 
v.  Crane  989 

v  Crowe  447 

v.  Dailey  1299 

v.  Dawson  41,  43 

v.  Desmond  629 

v.  De  Tastet   219,  1232, 1250, 1318, 
1782,  2242,  2279 
v.  Douglas  599 

v.  Dowthwaite  255 

v  Duluth,  &c.  R.  Co.  26 

v.  Easton  1081,  1666 

v  Edsall  548 

v.  Elton  92 

v.  Frost  1284 

v.  Fuller  1667,  1677 

v.  Gellatley  1448 

v  Gilmer  1288 

v.  Guarantee  Trust  Co  334 

v.  Half  1663,  1699,  1702 

v.  Hammond  658 

v.  Haskins  1678 

v.  Hay  ward  185,  876 

v.  Higgs  1475 

v.  Home  518,  526,  528 

v.  How  1417 

v.  Hull  68 

v.  Johnson  197, 199,  260,  287 

v.  Jones  1081 

v  J.  Wayland  Kimball  Co.        552 
v.  Kahnweiler  844 

v   Kalamazoo  Circuit  Judge     1071 
v.  Keating  764,  2124 

v.  Kelty  1775 

v.  Lake    244,  779,  1170,  1206,  1540 
v.  Lake  Superior  Iron  Co.         517, 
560, 1734 
v.  Lamphear  1973 

V.  Launan  874 

v  Lee  471,507,741 

v.  Lexington  and  Danville  K.  R. 

Co  633,659,800 

v.  McDonald  379 

v.  Marzyck  1062 

v.  Mathews  1481 

v.  Metropolitan  Gas  Light  Co.  1661 
v.  Miner  378,  1003,  1073 

v.  Minis  17 

v.  Newall  1553 

v.  North  113 

v.  Oakshott  1290,  1834 

v.  Pay  son  571 

v.  Perkins  670,  1250,  1827 

v.  Pickard  839 

v  Pierce  837,2389 

v   Piper  314 

v.  Pitman  251 

v.  Porter  643 

v.  Pringle  1795 

v.  Rentfro  974 

v.  Bbinehart  418 

v.  Ricketts  217,  225,238,  415,  417, 
692,  828,  834,  1598 
v.  Riggin  255 


Brown  v.  Robertson 

1594 

v,  Rogers 

63,417 

v.  Runals 

887 

v.  Rye 

1391 

v.  Sawyer 

4u3 

If.  Seidel 

1646 

v.  Severson 

1576 

if.  Sen  ell 

380,  1440 

v.  Simons     1237, 1239,  1243,  1245, 
1246,  1247,  1258,  13./1,  1392 
v.  Smith  1353,  1358,  1361 

v ,  South  Boston  Savings  Bank 

1385,  1918 
If  Stanton  452 

if.  Stead  259 

v.  Stewart  1677 

if.  Storey  1127 

if.  Story  39,  154 

v.  Swann  1556 

v.  Thomas  1517 

v.  Thornton  1557 

if  Trotman  1041,  1206 

v.  Troup  1551 

if.  Trustees  1620 

if.  Turner  1157 

if.  Vandermeuleu  1716 

if.  Vand}  ke  371,  667,  668 

v.  Wales  342,  1558 

if.  Walker  249 

v.  Wallace  1061,  1276,  1283 

v  Warner  1544 

v.  Weatherby  232 

if.  Weatherhead  79 

If.  Weldon  313 

v.  White  409,  991,  1576,  1580, 

2382 
if.  Williams  1299 

if.  Winans  1677 

if.  Wincoop  986 

if.  Winehill  1440 

v.  Wood  457,  875 

Browne,  Matter  of  1S41 

v  Blount  151,  1718 

v.  Browne  598 

V.  Collins  1225,  1413 

v  Groombridge  1428,  1528 

v   Huggins  229 

v.  Lockhart  972,  1378,  1601,  1835 
*  McClintock  1120,  1121,  1139 
v.  Monmouthshire   Ry.    and 

Canal  Co.  243 

v.  Murray  1097 

v.  Radford  649,  650 

if.  Savage  881,  981 

v.  Smith  978 

Browne's  Hospital,  Re,  v.  Stam- 
ford 13,  16 
Brownell  17,  Brownell      371,  667,  668 
v  Curtis                       548, 563,  691 
Browning  v.  Barker  1192 
V.  Barton                                     1192 
V.  Bettis                                       1720 
v-  Pratt  327 
v.  Sloman  783 
v.  Watkins                       1561,  1562 
Brownlee  v.  Lockwood                    251 
v.  Martin                                      1071 
v    Warmack                                 1548 
Brownsword  v.  Edwards        315,  542, 
549,  563,  587,  602,  615,  697 
Browse,  lie                                     1589 
Broyles  v.  Arnold                           1841 
Brine  v.  Allen                                  592 
v.  Bainbridge                              1408 
v.  Bonney                          1961,  2281 
v   Gale                                          1381 
v.  Kinloek                        1600,  1610 
v.  Manchester  &  Keene  R  Co.  1743 
v.  Prebendary  of  Deer               1503 
v.  Rawlins     "                            1130 
Bruen  v.  Crane                               197 
Bruere  v.  Wharton                          999 
Bruff  v.  Cobbold          894,  1026,  1460 
Bruin  v.  Knott                     1360,  1415 
Bruiton  if.  Birch                            203 
Brumagmi  v.  Chew  1462,  1472,  147'1, 
1479 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 

[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 

Brumfit  v.  Hart  821,  823 

Brumley    v.    Westchester    Co. 

Mauuf.  Soc.  145,  146,  735 

Brundage  v    Goodfellow  1307 

BruuUige  v   Morrison  1285 

v.  Rutherford  216 

Brundred  v.  Paterson   Machine 

Co.  1668 

Bruner  v  Battell  1031 

17.  Planters'  Bank  1622 

v   Threadgill  1385 

Brungger  v.  Smith  576 

Brunker,  Ex  parte  1698,1699,1700, 

1705 

Brunsdon  v   Allard  1846 

Brunskill  v.  Giles  1093,  1094 

Brunswick  v.  Lamb  790 

Brunswick,  Duke  of  v.  Cambridge, 

Duke  of  726,  764 

if.  Hanover,  King  of        17,  18,  20, 

141.  142 

Brurton  v.  Rutland  1151 

Brufclike  v.  Der  Nord   Chicago 

Schuetzen  V'erein  691.  1580 

Brush  Electric  Co.  v.  Brush-Swan 

E   L.  Co.  1548 

v.  California  Electric  Light  Co.  197 

Bryan,  lie,  Godfrey  i>   Bryan         92 

v.  Bl}  the      334,  342,  346,  347,  559 


v.  Bryan 

v.  Connick 

v.  Kales 

v.  Kennett 

v   McGee 

v.  Mansion 

v.  Morgan 

v.  Parker 

v.  Reed 

v  Rooks 

v.  Sanderson 

v.  Spruill 

v.  Truman 

v.  Twigg 

v.  Wastell 
Bryant,  Ite 

v.  Blackwell 

v.  Bull 

v.  Bu^k 

v.  Erskine 

v.  Leland 

v.  Livi-rmore 

v.  Packett 

v.  Puekett 

V    Reading 

v.  Russell 

v.  Tracy 
Brydges  v    Hatch 
Brygger  v  Schweitzer 
Brynier  v.  Buchanan 
Bryou   v     Metropolitan    Saloon 

Omnibus  Co.  1064,1408 

Bryson  v   Nichols  1235 

v.  Petty  388,  1042,  1480,  1705 

v.  Warwick   and  Birmingham 
Canal  Co.  398,  910 

v.  Whitehead  2265 

Bubb  v.  Yelverton  1633 

Buccleugh  v.  Cowan  334 

Buccleugh,   Duke   of  v.   Metro- 
politan Board  of  Works         1860 
Buchanan  v.  Berkshire  Life  Ins. 


91 

1717,  1744 

553. 560 

1584 

251 

1805 

1168 

1111 

980 

114 

1062 

121,  122,  324,  545 

783 

176,  1525 

410 

1673,  1684 

1390 

1037,  1453 

1402 

261 

155  i 

68 

644 

89 

1326 

1381 

68 

933 

1029 

1570 


XXIX 


Buck  v.  Webb  991 

Buckell  v.  Blenkhorn  2198 

Buckeridge  v.  Whalley        909,  1252, 

1253.  1478,  1479 

Buckingham  v.  Buckingham        1682 

v.  Corning    1517,  1523,  1537,  1579, 

1584 

v.  Peddicord  524 

v.  Wesson  1548 

Buckles  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St   P 


Ry.  Co 
Buckley,  lie 

v.  Baldwin 

v.  Cooke 

v.  Corse 

v  Cross 

v.  Howe 

v  Howell 

v.  Lyttle 

v.  Puckeridge 

v.  Royal  N.  L.  V.  Ass'n 
Buckmaster  v.  Buckmaster 


1576 

1814 

1716 

9U6 

412 

4D6 

411 

1874 

52 

79 

1731 

108, 

1753 

1487 

145,296 

1558 

1580 

1022 

1358 

1594 

858 

68 


207 


Co. 

1716 

v.  (lurry 

51 

v  Deslmn 

46 

t;  Green  way 

710, 1224 

v.  Hodgson 

691,  1831 

v   Lloyd 

1411 

v.  .Malins 

1510 

v.  01  well 

1653 

Buchard  v   Boyce 

216,  240 

Buck  v   Brown 

53 

v.  Dowley 

380 

V.  Evans 

1548 

v   Fawcett 

1460 

v.  Lodge 

1775 

v.  McCaughtry 

361 

v.  Smith 

1663 

v   Harrop 
Buckner  v.  Abrahams 

v.  Ferguson 
Bucknor  v.  Forker 
Bucks,  Duchess  of  !'.  Sheffield 
Buckworth  ('.  Buckwo/th 
Budd,  Ex  parte 

v.  Davison 

v   Rutherford 
Budden  v.  Wilkinson  579,  1829 

Budding  v.  Murdock     384,  406,  417, 
418 
Buildington  v.  Woodley  411 

Budeke  v    Rattermau  1222,  1250 

Buden  if.  Dore  579 

Budge  ».  Budge  796,  1409,  1457 

Budgeu  if.  Sage  797,  800 

Buehler  v.  Cheuvront  1461 

Buel  v.  Street  1462 

Buenos  Ayres  Ry  Co.  v  North- 
ern Ry.  Co  629,  1070 
Buerk  v.  Imhaeuser  378,  547,  559, 
726,  2385 
Buffalo  ».  Pocahontas  334 
Buffalo  Stone  Co.  v.  Delaware, 

&c.  R.  Co.  630 

BufTalow  v   BufTalow  347 

Buffiugton  v.  Harvey  256.  1463, 

1479, 1575, 1577 
Buffum's  Case  1032,  1056,  1686 

Buford  17.  Holley  1071 

v.  Kucker  735.  986 

v   Keokuk.  &c.  Packet  Co       losi 
Bugbee's  Appeal  1320 

Bugbee  17.  Sargent  287,  334,  341 

B  ugden  v  Smith  1829 

Bugg  17.  Franklin  122 

Buie     v.    Mechanics'    Building 

Ass'n  216 

Bulkeley  if.  Dunbar        298,  707,  708 

if.  Eglinton,  Earl  of  1436 

Bulkley  if.  Jones  2308 

v.  Van  Wyck        68, 169,  737,  753 


Bull  17.  Bell 

17.  Bull 

v.  Falkner 

If.  Griffin 

v.  Jones 

If.  Loveland 

v.  Nims 

v   Withey 
B u lien  17.  Michel 

v.  Ovey 
Buller  c.  Walker 
Bui  ley  V.  Bulley 
Bullinger  v.  Mackey 
Bullniore  if.  Wynter 
Bullock,  Ex  parte 

Ite 

v.  Adams 

v.  Boyd 

v.  Brown 

v-  Chapman 


846 
590 

324,1161 

602,  1065 

312,  733 

1611 

907 

1031 

188,  v. *'.* 

875,1116 

1686 

366 

1847 

829 

87 

53 

83 

378 

668 

1551 

1622 


XXX 


Bullock  v.  Corry 

v.  Holds 

v.  Gordon 

V.  Knox 

v.  Menzies 

r.  Perkins 

v.  Kiehardson 

v   Sadlier 

a    Wheatley 
Buluier  o   Allison 
Buloid  V.  Miller 
Bulow  v   W'itte 
Bulstrode  v.  Bradley 
Bum  pass  v.  Morrison 
Bumpus  v  Platner 


673 

53,  55,  58 

1076 

3:34,  851 

102,  104 

42b' 

484 

t>77 

1418 

1278 

1463, 1465 

105 

1224 

1051 

675,  1653 


Buubury  v.  Buubury  5(  (,  5i».i-£< ' 
1731,  1834 
Bundine  v.  Shelton  1|7' 

Bunford  V.  Steele  f** 

Buun,  Ex  parte  «* 

v.  Buun  717, 1835 

Bunnell's  Appeal  J<»' 

Buuuett,  lie  1610 

t;   Foster  1*^ 

Buutain  ».  Wood  °*^ 

Buutin  V   Lagow  M* 

Buuvau  ».  Mortimer      181,  loo,  44o, 

4!  19 

Burbauk  v   Burbauk  ,D„.1^'Q12 

Burbridge  »   Robinson       1824,  18i< 

Bun-h  v.  Coney  232,  586 

i'    Rich  *"" 

»!  Scott  1018,  1019,  1030 

Burcliard  o.  Macfarlane  581 

v.  Phillips  1205 

Burdell  v.  Denig  «« 

».  Hay  1*0 

Burden  v.  M'Elmoyle  <<» 

v  Stein  lb40 

Burdett  v  Hay  328,  1619 

v.  Norwood  115 , 

v   Rockley  1057,  1059, 1060 

Burdick  v.  Garrick  90,  304,  551,  641 

644,  12a9 

Bnrditt  v.  Grew  Pi8',^* 

Burdoine  »   Shelton  1002,  Ion 

Burdon  ».  Dean  10o,  I-- 

"»£»  309,1234,1414 

e.  Burns  **" 

Burger  v.  Potter  ^l 

Burgess,  Re  *j° 

i>   Bennett  8™ 

v   Bottomley  68 

D   Burgess  JY™ 

».  C.  Aultman  &  Co.  i« 

v.  Graffam  2g4l» 

r  hSSST  795,  1380,  1395 

I   Hills  795;  1380,  1395 

v   Ungley  1J*J 

*•  8mith  1<K  1TC 

t;   Wheate  135,  1* 

•.  Wilkinson         1197, 1198,  1296, 

Burgh  «   Kenny  13<  • 

Burgin  v.  Giberson  (80 

Burgoine  v.  Taylor  9,9 

Burk  v.  Brown  5*,  lob,  obi) 

Burke,  lie  86,  1361 

»•  Vurke  mB_  Jj»J 

v.  Crosbie  187, 12ib 

v.  Daly  If  ii 

v.  Fuller  1«*« 

D.  Jones  64- 

v    Lidwell  37 

Burkett  v.  Griffith  313 

v.  Randall  10(8 

v  Spray  1433,1457,1465 

v   Wall  1632 

Burkitt  I)   Ransom  143 1 

Burland's  Trade  Mark,  /Jl  re         149 

Burlen  v  Shannon  1«7 

Buries  t>.  Popplewell  1616 

Burleson  ».  MoDermott  2 

Burlew  v   II  ill  man  138 1 

v.  Quarrier  844 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 

[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 

Burling  r.  Tompkins  357 

Burlingaine  V    HoODS  dUd,  I»i» 

Burlington  bank  W.  Cottin  44d 

Burlington,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  York 

County  \]>*'\ 

Burliugtou  v   Carpenter  1UM 

Burmesler  v.  Baron  Von  Stenz      2o, 
813,  lold 
Burn  r   Bowes  .B.lVt\ 

Burnaby  v.  Baillie  56*',^i 

r.  Griffin  "02 

Burnaud  r.  Kodocanacni  Ado 

Burn. i p  v    Haskins   Steam-En 

giue  Co. 
Burnbly  v  Stainton 
Burne  v.  Breen 
Burnell,  He 

v.  Wellington,  Duke  of 
Burnet  v.  Claghry 

v   Denni-ton 

v.  Theobald 
Burnetts   Anderson 


V.  Boyd 

v.  Chetwood 

V.  Craig 

V.  Kinnaston 

v.  Lester 

v.  Nicholson 

v.  Sanders 

v.  Tate 
Burney  v.  Macdonald 

V.  Morgan 
Burnham  v.  Bennett 

v   Bailing  712,  797.  852,  1016,  1408 

v.  Kempton    303,  1637,  1639,  lb' 

v.  Rangely 
Burnhisel  v   Firman 
Burnley  v  Jeffersonville 
Burns  v.  Beck  Co. 
v.  Cushing 


641 
13l1 
£92 
630,  1624 
991 
1099 
583,  586 
851 
430 
417 
461 
383, 1577 
321 
1639 
1C33 
1649 
1732 
851,  1077 
378,  844 
1168 
1576 
149,  447 
728 
702 
68.  630 
1576, 1578 
874 
v  Trowbridge  Waterworks  Co 

v.  United  States  1580 

v   Watk ins  l obi 

Bushby  v.  Munday     800,  1626,  1628 

Bushel    v.  Commonwealth  Ins. 


Burton  v.  Dickinson 
V.  Fort 

v.  Galveston  &c  Ry.  Co 
v.  Gleason 
II   Perry 
v.  Plummer 
V.  Robertson 
v.  Scott 
v   Shaw 
v.  Shildbach 
v.  Tebbutt 
Burts  v   Beard 
Burwell  v.  Coates 
v.  llobson 

v.  Vance  County  Com'rs 
Bury  v   Bedford 
v.  Newport 
v.  Phillpot 
Busby  v.  Littlefield 

v.  Mitchell 
Buscher  v   Knapp 
Busfield,  lie 
Bush  v.  Adams 
v  Bush 
v   Linthicum 
v   Madeira 
v.  Sheldon 


142 

1257 

716 

334 

843 

1029 

1228 

569,  584 

311,  392 

1576, 1777,  2237 

295 


Edgefield 

v.  Fay 

v.  llobbs 

v.  Lynde 

v.  Rosenstein 
Burpee  v   Smith 
Burr's  Trial 
Burr  v.  Burton 

v   Sherwood 

v    Wilson 

v.  Wimbledon  Local  Board 
Burrall  v   Eames 

v.  Kaineteaux 
Burrard  v.  Calisher 
Burras  v  Looker 
Burrell,  lie 
Burrell  v.  Andrews 

v.  Delevante 

v.  Hatkley 

v.  Nicholson 
v.  Smith 
Burris  v.  Adams 
Burrough  v.  Martin 
Burroughs  v.  Booth 
v.  Elton 
v.  M'Neill 
V.  Oakley 


144 

183  499 

'  361 

1698 

1680 

31 

220 

1020, 1949 

317 

1411 

974 


907 

759 

117 

1351 

230 

1 

592,  739 

1168,  1366 

417,  736 

1437 

946 

1406 

6°4,  830 

2,  580,  1831 

706 

324 

1099 

915 

1209 

1298 

989, 1774,  1775 


Co. 
Bushell  v.  Bushell 
Bushnell  v.  Avery 
v.  Bushnell 
v.  Hartford 
Busk  v.  Beetham 
Busney  v.  Spear 
Butchardt  v.  Dresser 
Butcher  v.  Jackson 

v.  Pooler 
Butchers'  Ass'n  v.  Boston 
Butchers'  Slaughtering   Ass 

Boston  . 

Butchers"  Union  Co.  v.  Howell    lb«5 
Bute,  Marquess  of  v.  James  888 

Bute,  Marquis  of  v.  Glamorgan 

shire  Canal  Co.  182J,  l»d<5 

Bute,  Marquis  of  v.  Stuart         "4<, 

1348,  1627 

Butler,  Ex  parte  59 

v.  He  *£ 

v.  Ball  !642 

v  Borton  l°" 

v.  Butler  109,  223,  407, 1358,  170| 


659 


Burrow  v   Greenough 

v   Ragland 
Burrowes  v.  Forrest 

v  Gore 

v   Lock 
Burrows  v.  Jemineau 

v.  Stryker 

v   Unwin 

v.  Wene 
Burrv  Port  Co.  V.  Bowser 
Bursill   v.  Tanner  5(3,  6(b,  J4d 

Burson  v.  Dosser  1&H 

Burstall  v.  Beyfus  ,r^\^i 

v   Fearon  433,  438, 1507,  1540 

Burt    v.   British    National    Life 
Ass   Ass'n  244 

v.  Dennett  «' 

v  Ryner  .  }"J» 

Burton  v.  Darnley,  Earl  of  ldoo 


657 
552 

1861 
323 

1398 
664 
200 

1108 

1120 
43 


563,844 

295 

457 

718 

187 

1518 

1259 

1347 

42,  43,  1600 

465, 1048 

989 


v   Catlin 
v.  Clark 

v.  Cooper 

v.  Cot  ting 

v  Cumpston 

v.  Cunningham 

v.  Duncomb 

v.  Freeman 

v.  Gardener 

v.  Matthews 

v.  O'Hear 

v   Rashfield 

v.  Rashleigh 

v.  St  Louis  Life  Ins.  Co. 

v.  Spann 

r.  Wearing 

v  Withers 
Butler's  Trusts,  Hughes  v.  An- 

derson,  In  re  jjj 

Butler  Wharf  Co.,  Re  t™-\ 

Butlin  v.  Arnold  J^if 

v.  Masters    1082,  1120,  146,,  14(6, 
1642 
Butman  v.  Ritchie  951 

Butt,  Re  „  1(^5 

v.  Imperial  Gas  Co.  16d8 

Butterfield  v.  Macomber  ** 

Butters,  Ec  parte  ™ 

Butterworth  v.  Bailey  408,  low 


473 
473 
865 
335 
1055 
1790 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 


XXXI 


Butterworth  v.  Robinson  1845, 

1646 

Buttler  v.  Mathews         620,  521,  522 

BuMon  <;.  Price  1504 

Buttrk-k  i'    llolden  845,982 

Butts  v.  Genung  282 

Buxton  v.  Buxton  2080 

v.  James  46,  1640,  1643,  1863 

v   Lister  1405 

v  Maidin  1134 

v.  Monkhouse  1725 


Buzard  v   Houston  830 

v  McAnulty  839,  1071 

Byain  v.  Stevens  45 

v.  Sutton  203,  1809 

Byde  v.  Masterman  349,  352,  728 

Byers  v.  Kranklin  Coal  Co.  1019 

Byfield  v.  Provis  1475 

Byington  v.  Call  1591 

v.  Wood  1302,  13i)3 

Byue,  Ex  parte  1069 

v.  Potter  969 


Byng  v  Clark  742 

Bvnum  r.  Ewart  545 

Byrd  v   Nunn  785 

Byrne  v.   Brown  406 

v.  Byrne  1515,  1661 

v.  Frere  811,  869,  952,  953 

v.  Love  1350 

v.  Norcott  1421 

v.  Romaine  407 

Byron,  Lord  i<.  Johnston  1665,  1669 

Bywater's  Estate,  In  re  1734,  2127 


c. 


C  v.  D. 

Cabburn,  Re 
Cabeen  v.  Gordon 
Cabel,  Re 

Cabell  v.  Megginson 
Cable  ?'.  Alvord 

V,   Ellis 
Cabrera,  Ex  parte 
Cadbury  v.  Smith 
Gaddick  v.  Masson 
Cadigan  v   Brown 
Cadle  ft  Fowle 
Cadogan  v.  Kennett 
Cadwell's  Rank,  Re 
Cady  v.  Whaling 


1570 

1412 

292,  294 

1802 

392 
171(1 
1120 

142 

652 
64,  814 

3(13 
1472 
1652 
1417 

221 


Caermarthen,     Marquis     of     v 

Uawson  1054,  1060 

Cafe  v.  Bent  1342 

Caffrey  v.  Darby  1417 

Cage  v   Courts  916 

Cigill  v.  Wooldridge  1751 

C  iliala  v.  Monroe  557 

Ciben,  Ex  parte  83 

Cahill  v.  Cahill  92,  109 

v  Shepherd  52 

Cahoon  v.  Utica  Bank  334 

Cahoone  Barnett  Manuf.  Co.  v. 

Rubber  &  Celluloid  Harness 

Co.  298,  1642 

Caillard  v.  Caillard  1735 

Caillaud's  Co   v.  Caillaud  26 

Cain  v.  Worford  1463,  1491 

Caincs  v.  Fisher      497,  519,  524,  530 

Caird  v  Moss  645 

v.  Sime  1643,  1647 

Cairnes  v  Chabert  1724 

Cairo  &  Fulton  R.  Co.  v.  Titus  1123 

Cake's  Appeal  1299 

Cakraft  v.  Gibbs  1126 

r    Thompson  1081 

Caldecott  v.  Caldecott  217 

r   Harrison  96 

Calder  v.  Henderson  1029 

Caldicott  v.  Baker     38,  87,  110,  111, 

179 

Caldwell  v.  Albany,  Mayor,  &c. 

of  1493 

v.  Karnest  812 

v.  Fellowes  126,  1432 

v.  Hawkins  287 

v   Hodsden  1491,  1494 

v   King  402,  545 

v.  Knott  550,  1629 

v.  Leiber  1460 

i'.  Montgomery  560 

v.  Pagham  Harbour  Reel.  Co. 

10,  408,  561 

v  Stirewalt  1663 

v.  Taggart  190 

v.  Vanvlissengen  1642,  2315 

Cale  v   Shaw  1274 

Caledonian    Rv.   Co.    v.    Solway 

Junction  Ry.  Co.  1620 

Caley  v.  Caley  81 

Calhoun  v.  Powell  657 

California  &c.  Co.  v.  Cheney  El. 

Light  Co.  339 

California    Electrical  Works   v. 
Finck  559,  850 


California  Fig  Syrup  Co.  v.  Im- 
proved Fig  Syrup  Co.     145, 1648 
Calkins  v.  Evans  986 

Call  v    Ewing  318 

Callaghan  v.  Callaghan  1504 

v.  Myers  1643 

v   Rochfort  959,  960 

Callahan  v.  Jennings  1459 

Callanan  v.  Shaw  1463 

Calland  v.  Conway  1150 

Callendar  v.  Teasdale  1892 

Callender  v   Colgrove  1226 

Caller  v   Dade  318 

v.  Shields  1576,  1579 

Calley  v.  Richards  576,  1834 

Callow  v.  Callow  102 

v.  Howie  185 

v.  Mince  1193 

Calloway  v.  Dobson  402 

Calltim  v   Emanuel  284 

Calmady  v.  Calmady  1163 

Calne  Ry.  Co.,  Re  1037 

Calverly  v.  Phelp  220,  222,  257 

v.  Williams  1402,  1549 

Calvert  v.  Adams  1726 

v.  Day  27 

v.  Godfrey       166,  168,  1261,  1275, 
1278 
Calvit  v.  Markham  371,  688 

Calwell  v.  Boyer  841 

Camac  v.  Grant  36 

Cambefort  v.  Chapman  269 

Camblosv.  Philadelphia R  Co.   1662 
Cambottie  ?>.  Ingate  53 

Cambridge  University,  hi  re       1858 
Cambridge        Water-works      v. 
Somerville  Dyeing,  &c.  Co. 

334,  342 

Camden  v.  Mayhew  1285 

v.  Stuart  1302,  1320 

Camden  and  Ambov  R.R  Co.  v. 

Stewart    326.  327,  347,  349, 350, 

361,  362,  363,  790,  856,  1463, 

1492,  1676 

Camden,  &c.  v.  Rower  21 

Camden    Rolling     Mill     Co.    v. 

Swede  Iron  Co.  149 

Cameron  v.  Abbott  360 

v.  Cameron  449 

v.  San  Francisco  639 

Cameron's  Coalbrook,  &c  Rail- 
way Co.,  Re  574,  909,  1842 
Camille  v  Donato  1004,  1440 
Cammack  v.  Johnson  1715 
Cammann  v.  Traphagan  662 
Cammell  v.  Sewell  664 
Cammeyer    v.    United    German 

Lutheran  Churches  302 

Camp  "   Bates  1259,  1628 

v.  Mills  334 

v.  Simon  843 

v.  Taylor  26 

v.  Waring  418 

Campana  v.  Webb  899,  1669 

Campbell,  In  re  83 

v.  Allen  552 

v.  Allgood  1633 

v.  Andrews  358 

v.  Attorney-General  908,934, 1574 


Campbell  v  Bainbridge  1120 

v.  Baker  1283, 1285 

v.  Beaufoy  604,  608 

V-  Bowles  860 

v.  Bowne  1508.  1515 

v   Braxton  1770 

v   Brown  365,  1841 

v.  Campbell        70,  857,  992,  1236, 
1419,  1425,  1503 
v.  Compagnie  Generale  1716 

v.  Crutcher  1028 

v.  Dalhousie,  Earl  of  1574 

v.  Dickens  293 

v.  Foster  582,  1551 

v   French  95,  97 

v.  Gardner  1284,  1286,  1289, 

1290,  1291 
v.  Graham  2182 

v.  Hall  986 

v.  Harding  93,  96,  1795 

v.  Holy  land  16  >0 

v.  Home  1412 

v  Im  Thurm  157 

W.Joyce  158,411,696,812 

v.  Lloyd's  Bank  1716 

v.  Mackay    335,  336, 337,  340, 544, 
545  1 355 
v.  Macomb  284,'  1242 

v.  Mesier  1016 

v.  Morrison       386,  395,  1619,  1669 
v.  Moxhav  1266 

v.  New  York  1120,  1517 

v.  Paris,  &c.  R.  Co.  360 

v.  Patterson  843 

v.  Powers  314,  417,  986 

v.  Price  1579 

v.  Railroad  Co.  257 

v.  Richards  1100 

v  Runyon  1675 

t'.  Scholfleld  1644 

v.  Scott  1642 

v   Scougal  925 

v .  Seaman  1635 

v  Seeley  830 

v  Sheldon    201,  251,  392,  395, 555 
v.  Sloane  860 

v.  Snlomans  1559 

v.  Taul  351,  759 

v.  Tousey  251 

v.  Walker  1271 

v.  Wallace  201,251.553 

v.  Watson  222.  257 

v.  West  1508 

v.  Western  671 

Campden  Charities,  Re  13 

Campe  v.  Sanrier  1285 

Campian  v.  Kille    546,  778, 780,  864, 
1142 
Camps  v.  Marshall  177 

Canal  Co.  v.  Clark  1648 

Canal  Company  v.  Railway  Com- 
pany 863 
Canby  r.  Ridgeway  194.  986 
Candler  v.  Pettit  406,  1316,  1515, 
1531 
Cane  v.  Martin  1*44 
Canedy  v.  Marcy  1973 
Caney  v  Bond  2060 
Canneld  t'.  Andrew                       1638 


XXXll 


Carifield  v.  Sterling  1569,  1570 

Canham  v.  Fiske  1138 

v  Jones  lb48 

v    Neale  799,  1617 

Cann  »  Cann  940,  1070 

v.  Wilson  2b' 

Cannell  v  Beeby  1433,  1456 

Canning  v.  Canning  1158,  1160 

Cannock  v.  Jauncey  1832,  1835 

Cannon  v.  Beely  1456 

v.  Beggs  1257 

v.  Cannon  564 

v.  Collins  852 

v.  Hemphill  997,  1023 

v.  McNabb  1556,  1557 

v.  Norton  287,  841 

v.  Trask  26 

Canterbury,  Archbishop  of,  Ex 

parte  1799 

Canterbury,  Viscount,  Re  133 

u.  Attorney-General  133 

Canton  v.  McGraw  334,  885 

Canton  Steel  R    Co.  v.  Kanne- 

berg  1642 

Canton  Warehouse  Co.  v.  Potts    586. 
601 
Cant's  Estate,  Re  1004,  1464 

Cape  v.  Adams  90 

Cape  Breton  Co  v.  Fenn  26 

Cape  Fear  Bank  v.  Stiuemetz  24 

Cape  May,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  John- 
son 1614 
Capehart  v.  Huey  1382 
Capel  v.  Butler  153,  539 
v.  MeCollum  361 
Capell  v.  Landano  991 
Cape  Sable  Co.'s  Case  1676 
Capes  v.  Brewer  448 
Caplinger  v.  Sullivan  99 
Capner  v  Flemington  Co.  395 
Capon  v.  Miles  665 
Cappeau  v.  Baker  916 
Capps  v.  Capps  229,  1524 
Caproni  v.  Alberti  1643 
Capt  v.  Stubbs  1424 
Capwell  v.  Sipe  887 
Carberry  v.  German  Ins.  Co.  1842 
Cardale  v.  Watkins  1557 
Cardell  »  Hawke  236,  1209 
Cardiff,    Mayor    of    v.    Cardiff 

Water-works  Co.  1640 

Cardot  v.  Burney  1752 

Cardross,  Re  96 

Cardwell  v    Cheatman  676 

v.  Molyneux  1630 

v.  Tomlinson  83 

Carett  v.  Elubbell  1281 

Carew,  Ex  parte  157 

Carew,  fie  1291   1851 

v.  Cooper  974,  1053,  1730 

v.  Davis  1836 

v.  Johnston  173,  372 

Carej  »   Brown  223,  243,  1459 

v  Hatch  312 

v.  Hillhouse  286 

v  Hoxey  290 

v.  Smith  402.  424,  425 

v   Williams  857,  992,  1599 

Cargile  V-  Itagan  1274 

Cargill  v.  Bower  26 

v.  Kountze  1556 

Carleton  v.  Leighton  62 

v.  L'Estrange  420 

v.  M'Enzie  182 

v   Rugg  1638,  1663 

Carlisle  v.  Cooper        815,  1073,  16&5 

v.  Foster  1075,  1115 

v.  South  Eastern  Railway  Co. 

241,  242 

V.  Stevenson  1631,  1602 

v.  Tindall  1624 

v  United  States  57 

Countess  v.  Berkley,  Lord       1737 

v.  Carlisl  ,  Earl         1737 

Earl  of  v.  Goble  1584 

Carll  v.  Snyder  1655 

Carlon  v.  Farlar  1037 


TABLE    OP    CASES    CITED. 

[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 

Carlos  v.  Brook  960 

Carlsbad  v.  Tibbetts     357,  390,  551, 
1648 
Carlyle  v.  Carlyle  Water  Co.         608 
Carmarthen,   Mayor,  &c.  of  v. 

Evans  1095 

Carmichael  v   Bowder  342 

v.  Carmichael  655,  1252 

v.  Hughes  1358 

v.  School  Lands,  Trustees  of        25 

v.  Wilson  1234,  1414 

Caruace  v.  Grant  27 

Carnan  v.  Bowles  1646 

Carnatic,  Nabob  of  the  v.  East 

India  Co.         17,  628,  629,  658, 

704 

Carue  o.  Braucker     1081,  1343,  1366 

v.  Nicholl  1089,  1128 

Carueal  v.  Banks  1003 

v.  Day  626 

v.  Streshley  526,  538 

v  Wilson  718 

Carnegie  v.  Carnegie  100 

Carnes  v.  Piatt  573 

v.  Polk  1459 

Carney  v.  Emmons  986 

v.  Hadley  1638,  1663 

Carnick  v.  McKesson  843 

Carnochan  v.  Christie  1550 

Caro  v.  Maxwell  1461 

Carow  v.  Mowatt         281,  287,  1515, 

1516 

Carpenter  v   Aldrich  30 

v.  Cincinnati  R.  Co.  212 

v.  Cushman  1299 

v.  Eastern     and     Amboy    R. 

Co.  1148 

v.  Edwards  840 

v.  Gray  1548 

v.  Groff  1118 

v  Hoboken  298 

v.  Muchmore  1030,  1031 

v.  Providence  Ins.  Co.  1241 

v.  Reynolds  1461 

v.  Ritchie  830 

v.  Robinson  256 

v.  Snelling  881 

v.  Talbot  149 

v.  Wall  1101 

Carpmael  v.  Carvell  1403 

v  Powis  574,  943,  1834 

Carr,  Re  92,  1800 

v.  Appleyard  947 

v.  Callagban  249 

v.  Eastabrooke  104,  107,  1801 

v.  Henderson  1390,  1423 

v.  Inglehart  329,  558 

v.  Living  1347,  1361 

v.  Morlce  899, 1619,  1669 

v.  Taylor  90,  105 

v.  United  States  129,  141 

v.  Weld  729,  1676 

Carrick  v.  Ford  66,  92 

v.  Prater  840 

v.  Wigan  Tramways  Co.  1411 

v.  Young  815,  817,  818,  969 

Carrington  o.  Brents  161,  1032, 1033 

v.  Cantillon  448 

'v.  Cornock  870 

v.  Holly  793,  794 

V.  Pell  881,  981 

v.  Sweeney  1468 

Carrington,  Lord  v.  Payne  875, 

1116 

Carritt  v.  Real  &  P.  A.  Co.  674 

Carrodus  v.  Sharp  990,  14H8 

Carrol  v  Connel  12:13 

Carroll  v.  Brown  1624 

v.  Kerschner  214 

v.  Parran  1579 

v.  Parsons  739 

v.  Richardson  1548 

v.  Koosevelt  334 

v.  Sand  1624 

v.  Waring  603,  639,  686 

Carron  Co.  v.  Maclaren     1615,  1627, 

1674 


Carrow  v.  Adams  982 

v.  Ferrior  1683,  1720,  1725 

Carskadon  v.  Minke  334 

Carson  v.  Dunham  1618 

v.  Hughes  1157 

v.  Pickersgill  42.  155 

v.  Richardson  980,  1018 

Carta  Para  Mining  Co.,  Re  32 

Carte  v.  Ball  230,  380.  714 

Cartee  v.  Spence  586,  972,  1 1 78 

Carter,  In  re  1755 

v.  Balfour  336 

v   Barnard  1440 

v.  Bennett  1677 

v.  Bentall  431 

v.  Bosanquet  784 

v.  Campbell  1147 

v.  Carter        314, 1073,  1254,  1381, 

1432 

v.  Colrain,  Lord  1228 

v.  Draper  925 

v.  Ewing  892 

v.  Green  1436 

v.  Ingraham  378,  390,  991 

v.  Jones  193 

v.  Mills  230.  231 

v.  Montgomery         160,  161,  1382, 

1457 

v.  New  Orleans  149 

v   Pritchard  676 

v.  Privatt  987 

v.  Roundtree  1274 

v   Sanders  230,  233,  304 

v.  Silber  122 

v.  Sleeper  844 

v.  Taggart  104, 108,  2001 

v.  Thorn  1254 

v.  Torrance  523.  978 

v.  Treadwell  334,  2087,  2094, 

2(197 

v.  United  Ins.  Co.  197,  199 

v.  Wollschlager  329 

Carteret,  Lord  v.  Paschal      125,  127, 

1585 

Carthaus  v.  Ferrers  1249 

Carthew  v.  Barclay  972,  1601 

Cartier  v.  Carlile  1649 

Cartwright,  Re  1610,  1628 

v.  Cartwright  171.  864 

v.  Clark        1548, 1549,  1550,  1551, 

1552 

v.  Green  184,  563.  564 

v.  Hateley  145,  632 

v.  Last  983 

v  M'Gown  1150 

v.  Shepheard  1526 

v.  Wise  68 

Cartwright's  Case  1069,  1765 

Caruthers  v.  Hartsfield  1680 

Carver  v.  Leite  579 

v.  1'eck  236,  629 

v.  Richards  1403 

Carwardine  V   Wishlade  445 

Cary  v.  Bertie  1362 

v.  Cary  1699 

v.  Domestic  S   B.  Co.  1675 

v.  Faden  1646 

v.  Hamilton  1381 

v.  Herrin      124S,  1298,  1300,  1322 

v.  Hills  201,  319 

v.  Knowles  1370 

Cary  Manuf.  Co.  v.  De  Haven     1642 

Casamajor  v.  Strode  1614,  1619 

Casberd  V.  Attorney  General         133 

Casborne  v.  Bersham  1114 

Case  v  Abeel  1185, 1186,  1305 

v.  Blood  940 

v.  James  1693 

v.  Midland  Ry.  Co.  983,  1635, 

2307 

v.  Minot  627,  630 

v.  Potter  1228 

v.  Towle  1486 

Casey  v.  Arnott  454 

v.  Cincinnati  Typog.  Union      1642 

v   Goodinire  1772 

Cash  v.  Belcher  215,  709,  710 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  pagiug.] 


XX. till 


Cashell  v.  Kelly 
Casliin  B   I'radock 
CaskaJJou  v.  Kennedy 
Cason  V.  Round 
Cas*  v.  Higeubutaui 
Cassady  v    Woodbury 
Cassedy  v.  liigelow 
Cassell  v.  .Stiff 
Cassels  v.  Stewart 
Cassiday  V   McDauiel 
Cassidy  v.  Mc  Far  land 
c.  Sliimuiiu 


302,  715 

350,  L827 

231 

678 

1770 

379,  3S0 

1472,  1491 

46,  320,  1643 

219 

193,  247,  286 

1221 

149,  154,  191 


Cassoux  i».  Great  Luxembourg 


364 

908,  1209.  1600 

553,  1664 

149 

778 

1450 

325,  328 

1009 

64 

190 

549,  584 

Fanshaw, 

643 

1459 

664 

1648 

1653 

27 

1643 

1412 

236,  1071 

661 

445 

199 

1568 

929 

876, 

1071 

415,  914,  1004 

13^6,  1440,  1449,  1450 

1104 


Ky.  Co. 
Cast  v.  Poyser 
Castelli  v.  Cook 
Castello  v.  Castello 
Caster  v.  Wood 
Castle,  Re 
Castle  v.  Bader 
Castle's  Case 

Castle  Mail  Co.,  Ex  parte 
Castlemau  v   Berry 

v.  Veitcli 
Castleton,     Lord    v 

Lord 
Caston  v.  Caston 
Castrique  ;»,  Itnrie 
Caswell  v   Davis 

v.  Gibbs 
Catchcart  v   Hewson 
Ca'e  v.  Devon,  &c  Co. 
Cater,  Re 
Cates  v.  Allen 

v.  Loftus 

v   Woodson 
Cathcart  v   Lewis 
Catherall  v.  Davies 
Catherine  Dock  Co.  v.  Mantzgu 
Catholic  Publishing  Co.,  He 


v.  Wyman 
Catlin,  Re 

v.  Barker 

v.  Harned  1394,  1424 

Catling  v.  King  365,  561 

v.  Valentine  1635 

Cato  v.  Easly  161,  997 

Caton  v.  Caton  1377 

v  Coles  393,  1558 

v.  Lewis  1824 

v  Kidout  1230 

v  Willis  371 

Cator  v.  Butler  232 

v.  Croydon  Canal  Co.  206,  li>99 

v   Reeves  1265,  1266 

Catt  v.  Tourle  485,  760 

Cattell  v.  I.owry  1661 

v  Simons      507,1205,1207,1408, 

1842 

Catterall  v.  Hindle  1127 

v.  Purchase  1577 

Catterina  Chiazzare,  The  633 


C.  B.  Keog  Mauuf.  Co.  v.  Wins- 
ton 1716 
Cecil  v.  Cecil  843 
v.  Salisbury,  Lord  170 
Cecil   Natioual   Bank  v.    Thur- 

ber  2047 

Celluloid  Manuf  Co.  v.  Arling- 
ton Manuf.  Co.  911 
v.  Cellonite  Manuf.  Co.             1302 
v.  Goodyear  Dental  Co.       10,  1644 
v.  Russell                                     888 
Central  Co.  v.  Cushman                1654 
Central  Georgia  Bank  v   Iver- 

son  1585 

Central   Georgian   R   Co.   v. 

Mitchell  629 

Central  Mauuf  Co.  v.  Harts- 
home  20,  440 
Central  National  Bank  v  Con- 
necticut M.  L.  Ins  Co.     686,  830 
Central  Pacific  R   Co.  v   Dyer       334 
Central  Railroad  &  Banking 

Co.  v    Pettus  1411 

Central  R.  Co.  v.  Central  Trust 

Co.  1576,  2379,  2398 

v  Cincinnati,  J.  &M.  Ry.  Co  1746 
v   Kast  Tennessee,  V.  &  G. 

Ry.  Co.  1743 

v.  Grant  L.  Works  1580,  1584 

v.  Hiawassee  Co.  986 

v.  Marietta  &  N   G.  Ry.  Co.     1029 
v.  St.  Louis,  &c   Ry   Co.  1743 

v.  Saeffield,  &c    Ry.  Co.  1743 

v.  Southern  Inland  Nav.  & 

Imp.  Co  1683 

v.  Texas,  &c.  R.  Co    320,  740,  991 
v   Virginia  Steel   and   Iron 

Co  1120 

t;  Wabash,  &c   Ry.  Co.  1209, 

1299,  1716,  1743,  1746 

Central  Ry.  Co.  v   Kisch  1502 

Cerveny  v.  Chicago  Daily  News 


Cattley  v   Arnold 
Catton  v   Banks 

v.  Carlisle 

v.  Wyld 
Cauley  );.  Lawson 
Causton  v.  Holdich 
Cauty  v.  Houlditch 
Cavanaugh  v.  Scott 
Cave  v.  C  ive 

v.  Cork 

v.  Saunders 


1157 

1163 

1531,  1535 

1081 

344 

1423, 1437 

1598 

1542 

674,  2345 

1509, 1538,  1540 

641 


Cavender  v.  Bulteel  1488 

v  Cavender  "26,  828,  855 

Cavendish  v.  Fleming  1234 

v.  Mercer  1308, 1358,  1360 

Caverly  v.  McOwen  1841 

Cavil  v.  Smith  1054 

Cawley  v  Leonard  1026 

Cawthorn  v.  Chalie  588 

Cayce  v   Powell  87 
Cay  ley     v.     Sandycroft     Brick 

Co.  720 

Cazenove  v.  Cutler  1243,1245,1247 

v.  Pil  king  ton  2270 

VOL.  I.  —  c 


Co. 

Chace  v.  Holmes 
Chadbourne  v.  Coe 
Chadoin  v.  Magee 
Chadwell,  Re 

v.  Jones 

v  Jordan 

v.  Winston 
Chadwick,  Ex  parte 


545 

417,  736 

256 

1623 

1567 

815 

1614,  1623, 1624 

989 

506 


Broadwood      420,  615,  667,  702, 

704 

v.  Chadwick  15:H) 

v.  Holt  1036,  10.39 

v   Island  Beach  Co.  1062 


v.  Maden 

v.  Pubble 

v.  Turner 
Chaffen  v.  Wills 
Chaffers  v    Baker 

v.  Headlam 
Chaffin  v   Hull 

v.  Kimball 

v.  St.  Louis 


230,231,279 

1S21 

780,  782,  1485 

1107 

520,  1592,  15"4 

203,  204,  1771 

550 

326,  327,  526,  85'! 

1627 


Chaffraixv.  Board  of  Liquidation  197 

Chalfant  v.  Monroe 

170 

Chalk  v  Raine       829,  881,  8! 

982, 

1720 

«>.  Thompson 

1183, 

use 

v.  Wyatt 

1639 

Challenger  v.  Royle 

1640, 

1642 

Challie  v.  Gwynne 

795, 

1601 

Challnor  v.  Murhall 

318 

Chalmer  v.  Bradley 

725 

Chalmers  v.  Chambers 

378,  3' 

v.  Laurie 

434 

Chalon  v.  Webster 

251 

Chamberlain,  Ex  parte 

1743 

lie 

1798 

v.  Ager 

657 

V.  Almy 

1561 

o.  Chamberlain 

1328 

v.  Gallup 

1461 

v.  Juppiers 

1110 

v.  Knapp 

570 

v.  Thacker 

223 

Chamberlayne  v.  Brockett  1491 

v.  Dummer  1633,2306 

Chamberlin  v.  Estey  1418 

Chambers,  Ex  parte  1359 

v.  Baptist  Edu.  Society  20 

v.  Bicknell  202,  252 

v.  Bull  180 

v.  Caulfield  1130 

v.  Chalmers  361,  379 

v   Chambers  658 

v.  Goldwin  194,  260,  261,  668, 

1719,  1769 

v.  Penland  1625 

v.  Robinson  1135 

v.  Smith  837,  857, 1233,  1394 

v.  Toy  u  bee  1594 

v.  Warren  844 

v.  Wright  288 

Chambless  v.  Taber  1621 

Chainbliss  v.  Smith  841 

Cbamley,  Lord  v.  Dunsany,  Lord 

842,  86S,  1370 

Champ  v.  Moody  1368 

Chanipernowne  v.  Scott      1299,  1843 

Champion,  Ex  parte         1258,1259 

v.  Brown  285 

V.  Parish  318 

Champliu  v   McLeod  1653 

v.  New  York,  Corp.  of  735 

v.  Parish  254.365 

Champueys  v.  Buchan  417,  834, 

2369 

Chancey  v.  Fenhoulet  -        568 

».  May  25,  238 

Chaurellor  v.  Gummere  1284 

v.  Morecraft  223,  268 

Chandler,  He  1840 

v.  Brainard  916 

v.  Goodrich  1156 

v.  Herrick  852 

v.  Home  1101 

v.  Jenks  986 

v.  Pettit  1315 

v.  Siddle  1742 

Chandos,  Duke  oft'.  Talbot  183 

Chant  v.  Broyvn  577 

Chapeaurouge  v  Carteaux  1707 

Chapin  v  Coleman         618,  626,  842 

v.  Mann  2342 

v.  Perrin  1459 

v.  Sears  334 

v.  Walker  1551 

Chaplin,  He  1611 

v.  Chaplin  163 

Chapline  r.  Beatty  734 

v.  Betty  1676 

v   Chapiine  1061,  1277 

v.  Moore  1358 

Chapman,  Re  1770 

v.  Banker  &  Tradesman  Pub 

Co.  236,  312,  329 

i'.  Barney  402 

v.  Beach  1727 

v.  Brown  1020 

v.  Butler  560 

v.  Chapman  379,  381,  859 

v.  Corpe  652 

v.  Farmer  1237 

v.  Ferry  567 

v.  Forbes  559 

v.  Fowler  1286,  1292 

v    Hamilton  287,288 

v .  Hammersley  1462 

v.  Hunt  212,  314,  368 

v.  Lee  1556 

v.  Lipscomb  313 

v  McMillan  1299 

v.  Midland  Ry.  Co.  1444 

v.  Partridge  1138 

v.  Pittsburg  &  S.  R.  Co    208,  390, 
1221 
v.  Real  Property  Trust,  Lim'd. 

9S5, 1589 
v.  Robertson  1238 

v.  Smith  1111,  1112.  1248 

D.  Tibbits  1363, 1364 

v.  Toy  Ling  1632 


XXXIV 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 


1385 
660 
819 

lu20 


Chappedelaine  v  Dcchenaux665,668 

Chappellv  Davidson  lbbb 

v   Gregory  1463,  14b4 

v.  Griffith  *»* 

v.  Purday  "o4 

v.  Rees  £«" 

Chappie  v.  Cadell  *» 

Charitable  Asso.  v.  Baldwin   ^         -& 

Charitable  Donations,  Comm'rs 

of  v.  Hunter  "id 

Charkieh,  The  **1 

Charles  w.  Dunbar  -,«  So- 

».  Fiuchley  Local  Board       IV,. «° 
r.  Jones 
D.  Kowley 
v.  Shepherd 
Charles  Lafitte  &  Co.,  Be 
Charles  River  Bridge  v   Warren 

Bridge  945,  961,  1042,  lOib, 

1079,1110,1629,1635 
Charleston  Ins.  Co.  ».  Hotter  bdO 
Charleston  Ins.  &  Tr.  Co.  v. 

Sebrig  ZD 

Chariotte,  Columbia,  &c.  R.  ^°- 

m.      J''   iin'  10  id 

Charlton  v.  Charlton  1450,  1840 

v.  Coombes  578,  943,  1834 

v.  Scoville 
v.  West 

Charman  v.  Charman 

Charnock  v.  Dewing 

Charras  v.  Pickering 

Charter,  Ex  parte 
Charter 


Chennell,  Re,  Jones  V.  Chennell 

80,  o5o 

v.  Martin      1179,1181,1182,1185, 

119 1 

Chenowith  v.  Smith  1492 

Chepstow  Bobbiu  Mills  Co.,  Re      31 

Cheraw,  &c   R.  Co    v.  Marshall 

150i 

Cherokee  Nation  v.  Georgia  129 

Cherry  v.  Belcher  90 

v.  Clements  «« 

v.  Monro 

v.  Stein 

Chesapeake     &     Ohio    Co.     •■ 

Young  !6dl 

Chesapeake  &c.  Canal  Co.  v.  B. 

&  O.  R.  R  Co.  16i5,  16.6 

Chesapeake,  &c.  R   Co.  i».  Huse   395 
Cheshire  Iron  Works  v.  Gay 


Child  v.  Comber 

v.  Gibson 

v  Godolphin 

v.  Mann 
•  v   Stenning 
Childers  v.  Dean 
Childress  v.  Harrison 

v.  Hurt 

v.  Vance 
Childs  v   Horr 


655 

m 

655 

1560, 1566,  1569 

334,  385,  406 

1260 

12*7 

1281,  1-90 

1278 

829,  982 


Chase,  lie 
v.  Cannon 
t>  Chase 
v.  Dunham 
v.  Heaney 
tr.  Joiner 
v.  Kenniston 
v.  Lincoln 
v.  Locherman 
v.  Manhardt 
v.  Minot 
Palmer 


779 

177, 476 

1026 

1102 

36 

1182, 1319 

1411 

1381 

334 

634, 1621 

413,  414 

1841 

1285 

920 

875 

1411 

841,  1668,  1771 

1638 

90,314 


Cheshunt  College,  He 
Chess  v.  Chess 
Chester  v  Apperson 
v.  Canfield 
v   Chester 
v  Halliard 
v.  Life  Association 
v  Me'vopolitan  Ry.  Co. 
Chester  Iron  Co.  v.  Beach 
Cheswell  v.  Chapman 
Chesworth  V   Hunt 
Chetham  v.  lloare 
Chetwood  v   Brittan 

v.  Coffin 
Chetwynd  v.  Lindon 


1852 

1118 

386 

749 

1540 


v.  Searls      334,  335.  338,  341,  588 


v.  Springvale  Mills  Co 
v.  Tuttle 
v.  Vanderbilt 
v.  Winans 
Wooster 


940 
1642 

145 
1071 
1642 


Cheuvete  v.  Mason 

Chevet  v.  Jones 

Chew  v.  Bank  of  Baltimore 

v.  Hyman 
Chewett  v.  Moran 
Chibnall  v.  Paul 
Chicago  v.  Cameron  _ 

v.  Wright  1620,  16o0 

Chicago  &  Alton  R.  Co.  v.  Union  __ 
Rolling  Mill  Co  ' 

Chicago  &  A.   R.   Ferry  Co    v. 
Wiggins  Ferry  Co 

" »     -n     New 

1657 


1742 

58 

1620 

129,  130 

1425,  1778 

1459 

324 

137 

959 

4<-2 

1653 


15H f  15^1532;  1533    Chicago   &    A    R    Co.  ..  New 

1?.1^!  l°-1'  '     cin  i  Vnrk    &c    R.  Co. 


Keokuk 

1 

Union 


1743 


Chase's  Case  584  590  617,  787, 

1047,1166,  Iil5.  lilb 
Chatfield  v.  Berchtoldt  441,  453 

Chattanooga  Medicine  Co.  v. 

Thedford  1548 

Chatteris  v.  Isaacson  &o- 

v   Young  laoi,  ld>d 

Chatterton  v.  Thomas  409,  505 

v  Young  18" 

Chauncey  v.  Tahonrden  568 

Chav  tor  v.  Trinity  College  239 

Chealefl   Kenward  1J"'- 

Cheatham  v.  Audley,  Lord  1236 

v   Grugeon  128b,  l^ 

v.  Huff  ■>". 

v.  Morrison  ££ 

v.  Pearce  bl',£a 

Cheavinw   Walker  lb4H 

Chedworth,  Lord  V.  Edwards      1652 

Cheek  v.  Tilley  16" 

Cheeseborough  v.  Wngh*    4^4^J 

Cheesman,  Re  1*40 

v   Thorne  ***&» 

Cheever  v.  Perley  64 0   652 

t>  R.  &  B.  R   R  Co  4,  1021, 

1639, 1716, 1724, 1736 

Cheltenham  &  S.  Ry   Carriage 

and  W.  Co.,  lie  10 1 0 

Cheney  v.  Belcher  »w 

„.  Glea.son  986,  1168,  1470 

r.  Patton  65° 

»i   Straube  54- 

Chenuel  v  Churchman 


York.  &c  R.  Co 
Chicago.  S.c.  R.  Co.  v 

&c   Packet  Co. 
Chicago.    &c    R.  Co.   .. 

R   M.  Co.  1548 

Chicago  &  S.  E.  R  Co.  v.  Cason 

lilb,  lido 
Chicago,  &c.  R  Co  V.  Frary  1061 
Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Ot-         , 

tawa  lbM 

Chicago   Artesian   Well   Co.    V. 

Conn    Mutual  Ute  Ins.  Co.  1 

lOOd 

Chicago     Building     Society     r.^^ 

Chicago  &  Calumet  R   M.  Co  ^^ 

v   Scully  9,9 

Chicago  Land  Co.  v.  Peck  ^ 

Chicago,  m.  &  st.  P.  Ry  • 

Third  Nat.  Bank  1548 

Chicago  Mun.    G.  &  F.   Co.  v. 

Lake  „ 

Chicago  P   S    Exchange  v.  Mc- 

Claughrv  H*" 

Thicarro    St    L.  &  N.  0     R    Co 
Chl Macomb       178,  388,  543,  586 
590,  io» 
Chichester  v  Chichester 


B   Kansas  City,  &c.  R  Co.       15  I 
B     Chiles  v.  Boon  458,  513 

1638  |  Chillingworth  v.   Chillingworth 

Chils  v.  Gronlund  J';43 

Chilton  ».  Campbell  156i,  1664 

■K.London  239,  3bl,83i 

Chinn  v.  Caldwell  ^"O 

Chinnock  v    Ely,   Marchioness 
of  lu 

v  Sainsbnry  1081 

Chion,  Ex  parte  oJ 

Chipman  v.  Hartford,  City  of 
,      v   Sabbaton 
303    Chippendale  v  Tomlinson 
287, 1533    Chisholm  v.  Adams 
795,  1394        v.  Georgia,  State  of 
1553    Chissum  v.  Dewes 

Chittenden  v   Brewster 
Chitty  v.  Bray 

v.  Parker 
Chivers  v.  Bax 
Chlein  v.  Rabat 
Choate  v.  Tighe 
Cholmley  v.   Oxford,  Counters  ^ 

Cholmondeley  v.  Clinton      200,  "212, 

213  216,  229,  230,  233,  234  266, 

41  5,  408,  420,559, 577.672  1237, 

1461,1559,1619,1650 

Earl  v.  Oxford,  Earl  j33 

Chorltonf.  Dickie  970  9^9 

Choteau  v.  Rice    368,  82b,  (Ml,  ibdb 

Chowick  ».  Dimes  old,  104* 

Chownev   Bajlis  oo 

Christian  r.  Anderson  Wis 

«.  Atlantic  &N.C.  R.  Co.        133 

v  Cabell 

v  Crocker 

v.  Devereux 

v.  Foster 

v  State 

v.  Taylor 

v  Wrenn 

Christiansborg,  The 

Christie,  He 

v.  Cameron 

v  Christie 

I      v.  Craig 

v.  Gosling 

v  Griffing 

i  Christ  Church,  Ex  parte 

!  Christ-Church    Inclosure 

i      fie 

I  Christmas  v.  Campbell 

Christopher  v. 

v   Cleghorn 
Christophers  v.  Spaike 
v.  White 


794 


302 

206,  250,  319 

1432 

560 

724 

868, 1553 

633 

1358 

162,  476 

347,  34 !» 

16c3 

1503 

1677 

1611 

Act, 

239 
1670 
897 
431 
284 
1235, 1414 


Christ's  College  v.  Widdrington    843 
Christ's  Hospital,  Exgorte^^ 


v,  Donegal,  Marquis  of 

v.  Hunter 
Chick  v.  Nicholls 
Chickering,  Re 

v   Fullerton 
Chicot  V.  Ivequesne 
Chicot  County  w   Sherwood 
rhidwick  v.  Prehble 
Child  v.  Brabson 


858,  875, 

883,  912 

722,  769, 

1829 

813 

1423 

212,  236 

197 

297,  892 

545 

1821 

508 


13,  415,  1459 
i.    Attorney- 

138 

1157 

618 

1202 

169 

113,  187,  1411 

421.  506.  509  804, 

1031,  1589,  1591 

Chugg  v  Chugg  382,  1369 

Church  v.  Holcomb  « .  < 

v.  Ide  "     ']071 

^S  39,41,42,1590 


v  Grainger 

Governors    of 
General 
Christy's  Appeal 
Christy  v.  Christy 
Chubb  v.  Carter 

v   Griffiths 

v.  Stretch 
Chuck  v.  Cremer 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 


XXXV 


Churchill  v.  Bank  of  England    1042 

v  Collier  830 

v.  Lauer  303 

Churchward  v.  The  Queen  133 

Churton  v.  Douglas  1649,  1654, 

1655 

v.  Frewen  577,  781, 1834 

Chute  v.  Dacre,  Lady  778 

Cincinnati  v.  Cameron  355 

Cincinnati  R.  Co.  v.  Sloan         1463, 

1491 

Citizens   Coach   Co.  v.   Camden 

Horse  R.  Co.  1664,  1669 

Citizen's  National  Bank  v.  Day- 
ton 221 
Citizens'     Street    Ry.     Co.     v. 

Spahr  314 

City  Bank  v.  Bangs    842, 1470, 1481, 

1563, 1564, 1567, 1568, 1569, 1571 

v.  Bartlett  334 

t>   Skclton  1565 

City  of  lierlin.  The  149i) 

City  of  Glasgow  Bank,  Re  1069 

City  of  London  Brewery  Co.  v. 

Tennant  1631 

City  of  Moscow  Gas  Co.  v.  Int'l 

Financial  Society  26 

Citv  National  Bank  v.  Hunter    1461 

Clack  v.  Carlon  1235,  1414 

Claflin  v.  Bennett  417 

v.  Gordon  23-5 

v   Hamlin  161S 

v   Hopkinton  1661 

Clagett,  lie  1212 

v.  Phillips  572,  1834 

v.  Worthington  271 

Clancarty  v.  Latouche  666 

Clancy  v.  Craine  585 

Clanricarde,  Marquis  of  v.  Hen- 

ning  1397 

Claparede  v    Commercial  Union 

Association  417,  785 

Clapp  v.  Balch  30 

v.  Bromagham  1151 

t;   Dittman  313 

v.  Shephard  317 

v.  Sherman  1299,  1309 

v.  Stoughron  89,  128 

v.  Thaxter    1002, 1018, 1019, 1020, 
1030, 1475, 1575,  1579 
Clarbrough  v.  Toothill  1860 

Clare  v.  Clare  1411 

v.  Wood  884,  1037 

Clare  County   v.    Auditor-Gen- 
eral 1381 
Clarendon,  Earl  of  v.  Hornby    1156, 
1157 
Claridge  v.  Hoare           563,  564,  610 
Clark's  Appeal                              1661 
Clark,  Re.  99 
v.  Abington,  Lord                      1254 
v   Ball                                           1004 
v.  Bell                                           1270 
v .  Blair                                        659 
v.  Brown                                    1120 
v.  Burgh                                      125 
v.  Carlton                                  1168 
v.  Clapp                                     1618 
v.  Clark       98,  109,  389,  491,  1481, 
1648, 1699 
v.  Congregational  Society        1112. 
1116,  2337 
v.  Cort                                       2043 
v.  Covenant,  &c.  Ins.  Co.        1624 
v.  Crout                                         68 
v.  Davis                                395,  557 
v.  Dew                      505,  1721,  1725 
v.  Dibble                                      033 
v.  Fergusson                        28,  1643 
v.  Fisher                                      852 
v.  Flint                       550,  630, 1902 
v.  Freeman                                  1648 
v .  Ganz                                      1661 
v.  Garrett                                    15W1 
v  Gill                                   908,911 
V.  Oirdwood              298.  1416,  1433 
V.  Ha.l           1013,  1028,  1029,  1030 


Clark  v.  Harwood 

360 

v.  Hershey 

1168 

v.  Hezekiah 

109 

v.  Hull 

1531 

v.  Hunt 

846 

v.  Jacques 

1600 

v.  Jeffersonville  R.  Co 

354,  1631 

v .  Keene 

1530 

1532,  163o 

v.  London  School  Hoard          1081, 

1380, 1401 

v.  Long 

287,  292 

v.  Malpas          822,  889 

,  912,  1028, 

1083 

1440,  1554 

v.  Molyneux 

1126 

v.  Oakley 

844 

v.  Patterson 

634 

v.  Phelps 

547,  J 

v.  Piatt 

68 

v.  Raymond 

1716 

v.  Reed        1376, 

1381, 

1386, 13:t!>, 
1400.  1448 

v.  Reyburn 

1,256 

998,  2214, 
2215 

4,  360,  38 •> 

v.  Rivers,  Lord 

322,  £ 

v.  Robbin 

1246 

v.  Saginaw  City  Bank 

617 

v.  Sawyer 

1411 

v.  Simpson 

1610 

v.  Slay  ton 

2 

v.  Smith          197 

,  1242, 

1345,  1246 

v.  Soc.  in  Keene 

403 

406,  1076. 

1120 

,  1121, 

1125,  1147 

v.  Spears 

837 

v.  Stephenson 

1159 

v   Taylor 

1551 

v.  Turnbull 

354 

v.  Wardwell 

246, 

1661,  2323 

v.  Waters 

448 

v.  Webb 

253 

v.  Willis 

1221 

v.  Willoughby 

987 

t>.  Wilson 

325,  979 

v.  Wood 

1490 

v.  Wray 

418 

v.  Wright 

878 

Clarke,  Ex  parte 

511,  1069 

Clarke,  Re 

70,  S 

v.  Abingdon 

1254 

v.  Batters 

1653 

v.  Birley 

322 

v.  Brad  la  ugh 

154,  886 

v.  Bridge 

1484 

v.  Byne 

1565 

v.  Callow 

561 

v  Calvert 

58 

v.  Clark 

1638 

v.  Clarke 

424,  434 

v.  Clayton 

1151, 1161 

v.  Cookson 

1071 

v.  Dunn 

964,  96S 

v.  Klliott 

1774, 1775 

v.  Hart 

L377,   150.3 

v.  .Jennings 

956 

v.  Law 

889 

v  Morey 

49 

v.  Ormond,  Earl  of    388 

.666,667, 

669, 1615, 

1616,  1617 

J'   Ormonde 

1626 

v.  Periam 

348, 853 

v.  Price 

1654 

v.  Rawlins 

710 

».  Siffery 

920,  1099 

v.  Sampson 

1411,  1413 

V  Seton 

1254 

V.  Sibley 

1239  1 

v   Thornton 

1737 

V.  Tinsley 

951 

v.  Tipping 

63,  385,  4.1 

814,  1928 

v.  Toleman 

710 

t>.  Turton 

852 

V.  Van  Reimsdyk 

841 

,  842,  843, 
846 

v.  White 

844 

v.  Wilmot 

160.  710 

O.  Wilson 

195,  1774 

t\  Woodward 

95 

Clarke  v  Wyburn  40,  1482 

v  Yorke  418 

Clarke's  Charity,  Re  1854 

Clarkson  v.  De  Peyster         237,  2U5, 

301,  303,  315,  557,  559.  1253, 

1369,  1770,  1771,  1778 

v.  Dunning  159 

v.  Edge  1072,1081,1654 

v.  Elbridge  460 

v.  Read  1281,  1282 

v.  Scrogins  793 

Clason  v.  Lawrence  301 

v-  Morris  524,  532 

Clavey  v.  Lord  1071 

Clay  v.  EJgerton  313 

v.  Gurley  3:34 

v.  Pennington  1359,  1360 

v.  Richardson  1382 

v.  Ruflbrd  245 

v.  Towle  737 

Clay  and  Tetley,  Re  251 

Clay  brook  v    Wade  532 

Clayton  v.  Anthony  1624 

v   Chichester  525 

v.  Clarke  71.  80 

v   Finch  1053 

v.  Glover  1284 

v.  Gresham  98,  18o9 

v.  Martin  1666 

v.  Meadows  703.  705 

v.  Nugent  111!) 

v.  Thompson  842 

v.  Yarrington  1121,  1136 

Clayton  Mills  Manuf  Co.,  Re     1476, 

Claxton,  Ex  parte  74,  112 

v.  Claxton  •  68 

Clearke  v.  Angier,  Lord  90 

Cleaver  v.  Smith  801 

v.  Younger  1705 

Cleaves  v.  Foss  365 

Cleeve  v.  Gascoigne    1121, 1123,  1137 

V.  Mahaney  1635 

Clegg  v.  Clegg  170 

v.  Kdmondson  722 

v.  Fishwick  200,  1728,  1729 

i'.  Hands  324,  1654 

».  Rowland  250 

?'.  Varnell  335 

Cleland,  Ex  parte  1846 

v.  Casgrain  334 

v   Cleland  201,  251,  319 

Clement  v.  Langthorn  63 

v.  Maddick  1648.  2314 

».  Scott  1845 

Clement  Manuf.  Co.  i\  Upton  & 

Hart  Co.  197 

Clements,  Re  1069 

v.  Bowes  £34,  303,  304,  1514 

J'   Breresford  1756 

v.  Clifford  792 

r.  Greenwell  418 

v.  Gri  lith  899, 1598 

v   Lumpkin  418 

v.  Moore     737,  828,  840,  844, 1229 

v.  Welles  1654 

Clemons  v   Elder  256 

Cletnonston  v.  Blessig  49.  51 

Clench  v.  Dooley  1569 

Chphane  v.  Lord  Provost  1503 

Clerihew  v.  Lascelles  073 

Clerk  b.  Udall  11.35 

v.  Wright  655 

Gierke  v.  Anglesey,  Lord  90 

C'erkson  v.  Bowyer  221 

Cleveland  ;\  Burnham  1463 

v.  Chambliss  1548 

v.  Citizens'  Gas  Light  Co.        1636 

Cleveland  F.  &  B.  Co.  v.  United 

States  R.  S   Co.  1642 

Cleveland   Target   Co.  v.    U.  S. 

Pigeon  Co.  852 

Cleveland's  Harte  Estates.  Duke 

of,  Re  160,  1607,  1694 

Cleveland,  &c.   R.  Co.   v.  Erie, 

City  of  632, 6-33 

Cleveland,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Jewett 

1735 


XXXVI 


Cleverly  v.  Cleverly  1617 

Clews  r.  Brunswick  418 

t;.  Woodstock  Iron  Co.        149.  536 

Click  v.  Hums  1284 

Cliff  i'.  Bull  907,909 

v.  Wadsworth  1392 

Cliffe  v.  Wilkinson  34,  &5 

Clifford  v.  Coleuian  829,  833 

v.  Turrill  1015,1843,2117 

Clilton  r.  Anderson  1621 

v.  ISeutall  354.  785 

v.  Cnckuurn  1622 

v.  Haig        201,  252,  292,  294,  417, 

419 

v.  Orchard  13s*8 

v   Robinson  1664 

Ciiuon  lro.i  Co.  i:  Dye  1638 

Clinan  v   Cooke  1407 

Clinch  v.  Financial  Corp.       26,  241. 

243,244,1399,1821,1826 

Clinton,  Re  1800 

v.  Webster  1777 

Clippendale  v.  Masson  1097 

Clive  v.  Beaumont        321,  372,  1897 


p.  Carew 

185, 187 

Cloake,  Re 

895 

Clodfelter  v.  Hulett 

324 

Cloete.  He 

142 

Clogstoun  0.  Walcott 

1355 

Clotwortby  r   Mellista 

772 

Cloud  v.  Gresley 

629 

v.  Hamilton 

214,  1265 

V.  Whiteman 

378,  991,  1003 

Clough,  He 

1030 

v.  Adams 

417,418 

v.  Cross 

471 

v  Lambert 

1934 

Clouston  v.  Shearer 

1961 , 2040 

Clowes  v.  Beck 

1397 

V.  Dickenson           1459,  1467,  1489 

v.  Hilliard 

316,  405 

Clum  v.  Brewer 

1676 

Clutton  v.  Lee 

280 

v.  Pardon     1368,  1376, 1448,  1611, 
1843 

C'.vburn  r.  Reynolds  991,  1734 

Clyde    v.    Richmond  &   D.   R. 
Co  1743 

Clvmer  v.  James  292 

v.  Shaw  1562 

Coaks  v.  Boswell  68,  164 

Coal  E  Gas  Co.,  Re,  Grover's 

case  890 

Coale  r.  Chase  735 

v.  Garrison  1629 

v.  Mildred  199 

Coann  r.  Atlanta  Cotton  Factory 
Co.  243,2386 

Coast  Line  R   Co.  r.  Cohen         1637 

Coates  >■.  Cunningham  1716 

v.  Day  279 

v.  Lashley  1272 

v  Legard  334 

v.  McK.-e  186 

r.  Merrick  Thread  Co.      888,  1648 
v.  Pearson  976,  1552 

Coats  r  Chadwick  1069 

v.  Elliott  1054 

v.  Holbrnok  45 

Cobb*    Baxter  1548 

v.  Covenant  M   B.  Ass.  1110 

v.  Jamison  1168 

V.  Rice  1018,  1411, 1561 

Cobbett  v.  Iludson  1101 

Cobbev  v.  Knapp 
'    Wright 

Cohden  v  Maynard 

Cobham  r.  Dal  ton 

Coburn  r.  Ames 
v.  Cedar  Valley  Land  Co, 


Coch  v.  Allcock  &  Co. 
Cochran    v.    American 
Co. 

v.  Goodell 

v.  Lynch 

v.  Miller 


830 
830 

1267 
157 

1765 
1517. 

16:-7 

9a5 

Opera 

243 
212 
1314 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 

[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 

Cochrane,  Ex  parte  1743,  1744 

v.  Fearon  27,  154,  1605 

v.  O'Brien       147,  1560,  1568,  1570 

v   Phillips  1525 

r.  Willis  315,  542,  602 

Cock  v.  Evans  285,  402, 424,  778, 781 

v.  Rivie  1702 

Cockburn  v.  Edwards         1082,  1407 

r.  I'eel  17'il 

r.  Riphael         13,969,1440,1731, 

1737 

v.  Thompson         25,  217,  243,  291 

Cockcroft.  Ex  parte  1464 

Cockcroft,    lie,    Broadbent    v. 

Groves  68 

Cocke  r.  Gilpin  987, 1507 

v.  Trotter  844,  1553 

v.  Opshaw  11)73 

Cockel  v.  Phipps  106 

Cockell  v  Taylor  1392 

Cockerell  v.  Barber  1236 

v.  Cholnieley  954 

Cockes  v.  Sherman  214,  277 

Cocking  v.  Pratt  672,  1622 

Cockle  r.  Joyce  970,  979 

Cockney  v.  Anderson     447.  449,  549 

550 

Cockran  v.  Lynch  1321 

Cockrane  v.  Cockrane  1286 

Cockrell  v  Cockrell  1350 

v.  Gurley  371 

v.  Warren  1549 

Cockrill  v.  Maney  281 

v.  Sparke  647 

Cocks  v.  Chandler  1649 

v.  Foley  329 

v.  Gray  1388 

v.  Purday  1601 

v.  Stanley  777 

v.  \arney  334 

Cockshott    v.   London    General 

Cab  Co.  970,  979 

Codd  v.  Wooden  1624 

Coddington  v.  Idell  1381 

Coddrington  v.  Webb  1122 

Codington  v.  Mott  403,  406,415,425 

Codman  r.  Rodgers  641 

Codner  v.  Hersey  737 

Codrington  v.  Codrington      122.  718 

v.  Johnstone   170,  175, 1742, 1748, 

1769 

v.  Lindsay  122 

v.  Parker  1241,1719 

v.  Shelburn,  Earl  of  185 

Codwise  v.  Gelston  1587 

v  Taylor  284.  1004 

Coe  v.  Beckwith  236,  288 

v   Louisville  &  N   R.  Co.  298 

V.  Turner  341,  559 

Coeur    d'Alene  C.   &  M.  Co  v. 

Miners'  Union  1620, 1663 

Coffee  v.  Norwood  254 

Coffeen  v.  Brnnton  1648 

Coffev  v.  Norwood  256 

Coffin  v.  Chattanooga  W.   &  P. 

Co.  283 

v  Cooper  347,  351,  1218 

r   Easton  1110 

v.  Heath  68,  165,  167 

v.  Jones  916 

r.  Morrill  117 

v.  Murphy  887 

Coffman  o   Allin  778 

v   Langston  418 

Cogan  v.  Duffield  115 

v.  Ebden  1109 

V.  Stephens  991 

Cogdell  v.  Cogdell  1253 

Coger  r.  Coger  168 

('oglan  v.  Requeneau  1672 

Cogswell  v.  Bull  26 

p.  Dolliver  1228 

Coham  v.  Coham  1350 

Coheen  v  Gordon  249 

Cohen,  Ex  parte  1686 

V-  Alcan  449 

v  Ellis  1290 


Cohen  v.  Goldsboro  1650 

v.  L'Engle  1614 

v.  Me  >  era  1463 

v.  Mitchell  58,  157 

v.  Mutual  Life  Ins.  Co.  51 

v.  Poland  1661 

v.  Sharp  1624 

*.  Shyer  37,  1359 

v.  Waley  1791 

v.  Wolff  303 

v.  Woollard  1543,  1653 

Cohens  r.  Virginia  129 

Cohn  ».  Loui  ville,  N.  0.  &  T.  R. 

Co.  357 

Coiron  v.  Millaudon  149,  191 

Coke  v.  Fountain  868,  869 

v.  Gilbert  819 

r.  Wilcocks  679,  700 

Coker,  Ex  parte  157 

v.  Dawkins  1286 

v.  Farewell  1112,  11'8 

Colheck,  Re,  Hall  v.  Colbeck        405 

Colburn  v.  Barrett  722 

v.  Bronghton  341 

v.  Duncombe  320,  1644 

v.  Simms  1381,  1395, 1654, 

1681 

Colchester,  Mayor  and  Aldermen 

of  v     301.  315 

Colclough  v.  Bolger  709 

r.  Boyse  876 

v.  Ev^s  1523, 1534 

v.  Sterum  1275,  1276 

Colcock  ?>.  Furguson  1680 

Colden  v.  Haskins  76 

Colding  v.  Badger  1295, 1298 

Coldwell  v.  Giles  1019 

Cole  v.  Bean  1071,  1073 

v.  Burgess  1617 

v.  Cole  1252 

v.  Cunningham  629,  1618 

v.  Duke  1661 

v.  Eaton  1360 

v.  Flitrraft  633,634 

v.  Gray  184 

v.  Lake  Co.  197 

v.  M'Glathry  645.  649 

v.  Miller  165,  997,  1575 

v.  Oil-Well  Srpply  Co.  1743 

v.  Peyson  1629 

v.  Sands  16  ;9 

v  Savage  386 

v.  Scott  1459 

v.  Sewell  1152, 1162 

v.  Shetterly  843 

v.  Trnll     "  1258 

Cole  Silver  Mining  Co.  v.  Vir- 
ginia, etc.  Water  Co.  1662 
Colebourne  v.  Colebourne  1734 
Colebrook  p.  Jones  28 
Colebrooke,  Er  parte                    133 
r.  Attorney-General    133,  134, 139 
v.  Clarke                                    1291 
Cole  County  v.  Angney                 601 
Colegrave  v.  Juson                       1122 
V   Manley                                     1844 
Coleman,  Re                 86,  576,  1361, 
1814 
v.  Barnes                     276,  338,  345 
v  Colgate                                    920 
v.  Flavel                                     1648 
v.  Franklin                                1472 
v.  Gage                                       1676 
t.  Hudspeth                              1668 
v.  Hutchinson                            1150 
v .  Llewellin                                 999 
v.  Lvne                                        526 
r.  Martin                           287,  2391 
v.  Mawby                                   1141 
v.  Mellersh                         667,  1232 
v.  Moore                           1377,  1553 
v.  I'inkard                           233,  408 
v.  Ross                                         845 
v .  Ryan                                      1845 
v.  West  Hartlepool  Ry.  Co.     1070, 
1837 
Colerick  v.  Hooper                         197 


Coles  v.  Barrow  58 

v.  Booue  365 

v.  Buchanan  361 

v  Bullman  1137 

v.  Coles  1103 

v.  Forrest  257,  13*7 

v.  Gurney  448 

v.  Morris  821,  823,  888,  1599 

v  Sims  324,  1640,  1654,  1657, 1603 

v   Trecothick  S81,  981 

Coley  v.  Coley  956 

Colgate  v.  Compagnie  Francaise  145, 

1556 

v.  Western  U.  T.  Co.      1120,  1580 

Collard  v.  Allison  1642 

v.  Cooper  1667 

v.  Groom  997 

v   Hare  1454 

v.  Marshall  1620 

t;.  Roe  1464 

v.  Smith     181,  182,  498,  524,  733, 

754,  784 

Collas  v.  Ilesse  205 

College  v   Pike  1120 

Collet  v    Wollaston  157,  255 

Collett  v.  Collett  1426 

v  Dickenson  186,  187 

v.  Hover  231 

v.  Maule  1814 

v.  Preston  415,  1409 

Collette  v.  Goode  785 

Collier  v.  Bank  of  Newbern        1544 

v.  Chapman  841 

v.  Gray  1257 

v.  Nokes  1102,  1103 

v.  Whipple  1280,  1290 

Collinge  v.  1408 

Collings  v  City  of  CamJen  1661 

Colliugwood  v  Russell         315,  543, 

602 

Collins,  lie  1840 

Collins,  Matter  of  177 

v.  Barksdale  395 

v.  Burton  1490 

v.  Carey  1414 

v.  Casey  1235 

v.  Castle  1654 

v.  Collins  1633, 1699,  1859 

v.  Collyer  518 

v.  Elliot  915 

v  Greaves         793,  806,  811,  1216 
V.  Gresley  579 

v.  Griffith  267 

v.  Ins.  Co.  2 

v  Knight  334,  385 

v.  Lamport  1653 

v.  Locke  670 

v.  Loftus  200,  997 

v.  North  British  &  M.  Ins.  Co    843 
v.  North  side  Pub.  Co.  723 

V.  Saurey  1073 

v.  Shirley  157,  215 

v  Sinclair  1081 

v  Stix  334 

v.  Stuteley  1081 

V.  Taylor  244,  794,  1027 

v.  Walker  2318 

Collins  Co.  v.  Brown  24,  1649 

v.  Walker  1380,  1395 

Collins  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Ferguson     149 

Collinson  v  389,  1705,  1706, 

1707, 1708 

v.  Jackson  417 

v.  Lister       1009,  1017, 1485,  1544, 

2061 

Collis  v.  Collis  792,  1773 

v.  Swayne  54" 

Colliss  v.  Hector  203,  204 

Colloway  v.  Dobson  780 

Collyer  v.  Fallon  1053.  1730 

Oilman  v   Crump  '  1648 

v   Eastern  Counties  Ry.  Co.      26, 

241,  242.  245 

v.  Northcote        163,  183.  498,  7">4 

v.  Sarell  1029,  1410 

v.  Turner  792, 1197 

Colmer  v  Colmer  103  J 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 

[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 

Colmer  v   Ede  1843 

Colmore  v.  North  1737 

Colue   Valley  &  Halstead  Rail- 
way, lie  1791 
Colonial  Bank  v.  Hepworth  855 
Colonial   Life  As.-uiauce  Co.   v. 

Home  &  Colonial  Co.  1649 

Colonial  &  U.  S.  Mortgage  Co  V 

Hutchinson  Mortgage  Co.       145 
Colorado   Coal   &    Iron   Co.    v. 

United  States  8 

Colorado  Manuf.  Co  V.  McDon- 
ald 295 
Colpoys  v  Colpoys  2182 
Col^uhoun,  He  1448,  1449,  14Jl 
Colson  v.  Willi  ims  1^71 
Colston  v.  Gardiner  1050,  1054,  1055 
Colstrum  v.  Minneapolis  &  St. 

L.  Ry   Co  334 

Colt  i-   Colt  68,  991,  1584,  2397 

v   Cornwell  16*25 

v   Lesnier  240,  291,  :s92 

Coltart  v    Him  ltiOd 

Colton  ».  Ross     378,  379,  384,  1073, 

1074 

v.  Ward  989 

Columbia  Bank  v    Black  846 

Columbia  County  v.  Bryson         1620 

Columbian  Book  Co   v.  De  Gol- 

yer  1734 

Columbian  Gov"t  v.  Rothschild  18, 
19,20,  141,385 
Columbine  v.  Chichester  314,  549, 
550 
Columbus  las.  Co.  v  Humphries  334 
Columbus,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Ellis  830 
Columbus  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  With- 

erow  1675 

Colverson  v.  Bloomfield  1702 


Colvin,  In  re 

v.  Campion 

v.  Cor  win 
Colder  v  Colyer 

v.  Finch 
Combe  v.  Hughe3 
v  London,  Corp.  of  572,  580,'  1832 
1834 
Combs  v  Buswell 

v.  Tarlton 
Comer  v   Himes 
Comfort  v.  McTeer 
Comfort,  The 
Comley  V    Hendricks 
Commercial  Bank  v   Buckner 
v.  Corbett 
v.  French 

v.  New  York  State  Bank 
Commercial  Bank  Co..  Re      201,  664 
Commercial   Bank  of  India  and 

the  East,  Re  250 

Commercial  Mut.  Ins  Co.  v  Mc- 

Loon  344,  347,  1961,  1966 

Commercial  Wharf  Co.  v.   Win- 

sor  li)7,  1654 

Commerell  v   Bell      407,  1509,  1529, 

153-1,  1531 

v.  Hall  407,  1509,  1529,  1530 

v.  Poynton  1844 

Commina  v.  Brownfield  730 

",  Scott  602 

Commissioners  v.  Andrews  10 

Commissioners  of  Sewers  t>.  Gel- 

latly  243,  272,  406 

v   Glasse     239,  272,  345,  579,  597, 

873,  1381,  1675 

Commonwealth  v.  Andre  46 


1715,  1741 

1114 

330 

433,  437,  1213, 

1526, 1825 

675 

1430,  1433 


846 

197,  815 

1579 

287 

1019,  1120 

1K5 

545 

1734 

22 

1553 


v.  Arrison 

v.  Boston,  &c.  R  Co. 

v.  Buzzell 

v.  Desmond 

v   Drake 

v.  Eagle  Fire  Ins.  Co. 

v.  Eddy 

v.  Franklin  Ing  Co 

v.  Gould 


10 
10 
886  i 
546 
&34,  576  | 
1733,  1745, 
1751,  1755 
851 
1743  I 
1766, 


xxxvii 


Commonwealth  v.  Hawkins         1101 

v   Hide  in  Leather  Ins   Co.       1734  ' 

v.  Hill  886 

v.  Ins.  Co  1298 

v.  Jetfiies  907 

v.  Kneeland  546 

v  McLaughlin  1323 

v.  Mauley  116,  123 

v.  Mechanics'  Ins  Co.  1411 

v .  Perkins  720 

v.  Roby  llu7 

v.  Sumner  2 

Compagnie  du  Senegal  v.  Woods  671, 

1718 

Compauia   de   Mozambique   v 

British  South  Africa  Co.         629 

Couiptou  c    Bearcroft  1734 

v    Blox-ham  877 

v.  Grey,  Earl  579 

Comstock  v.  Frederickson  1743 

v.  Hadhme  852 

v.  Herron  360,  843 

v.  Rayiord  334 

Couacher  v ,  Couacher  1597 

Coualley  v.  Peck  418 

Conally  v   Cruger  1678 

Conant  i>.  Joues  1548 

v.  Kendall  13u0 

v.  Warren  87,547 

Couard  v   Atlantic  Ins.  Co  1241 

Concaunou  v.  Cruise  876 

Concha  u.  Concha  664,914, 1495, 1507 


G  L.  Ins 


Harts- 


1561 
737 
1600 
1053 
1003 
1377 
1260 

457 


Murrieta  1495,  1507 

Concklin  v.  Coddington      1386,  1392 

v.  Hall  160 

Concord  v.  Norton  514 

Condict  v    King  1569 

Conethard  v.  Hasted  949 

Coney,  Re  1734 

Cong  Ion  v    Aylesworth  579,  737 

Conger  v.  Cotton  843 

Congregational  Church,  Re         1855 
Congreve,  hi  re  1310,  1449 

Coningsby,  Lord,  v.  Jekyll    419,  597 
Conington  v  Gilliat     102,  1096,  1105 
Conley  v    Alabama 
Co. 

v  Nailor 
Conlon  t>.  Prior 
Conn  v.  Garland 

v.  Penn 
Connable  v   Bucklin 
Connecticut  v   Jackson 

Central    Manuf.    Co 
home 
Connecticut  &   P.   R.  R.  Co 

Hendee  790, 794 

Connecticut  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Kav- 

anagh  328 

Conn.    Mut.    Life    Ins.    Co.    v 

SchaetTer  573,  576 

v.  Smith  417 

V.  Union  Trust  Co.  576 

Connecticut  River  Lumber  Co 

Olcott  Falls  Co. 
Connell,  Re 
Connelly  v.  Carlin 

v   Fisher 

Connelly  Manuf.  Co  v.  Wattles  1663, 
1675 
Conner  »>  Armstrong 

v.  Chase 

v.  Smith 
ConnitTc    Kahn 
Connolly  »'.  Connolly 

v.  M'Dermot 

v.  Pardon 

ti.  Wells 
Connop  i'.  Hayward 
Connor  v.  Board  of  Education 

D   Connor 
Connors  v    Connors 
Conolan  V   Leyland 
Conover  v  Conover 

V   Sealy 

v.   Wailing  1282,  1284,  1286,  1289 
Conrad  v   Buck  536 


1164 
1038 

846 
852 


1559 

841 

402 

1459 

1576 

360 

1411 

149,  193,  208 

840,  1253 

557 

1726 

371 

87 

634,  639,  644 

334 


XXXV111 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  pagiog.] 


Conrad  v.  Mullison  287 

Conro  f.  Port  Henry  Iron  Co        235 
Couroy  v.  Oregon  Construction 

Co.  ^    542 

Conseuua  v.  Fanning     371,377,666, 
608,  1221,  1232,  1258,  llbl, 
148«J,  21«J3 
Conserva,  The  141 

Consett  V   Bell  324 

Cousociated  Pres.  Co.  of  Green's 

Farms  v.  Staples  1562 

Consolidated  B   A.  Co.  v.  Amer- 
ican P.  F.  Co  790 
Consolidated  Coal   1.0.    Schniis- 

seur  1654 

Consolidated  El   S  Co  v.  Atlan- 
tic Trust  Co.  1586 
Consolidated  E.  L.  Co.  v.  Crush- 
Swan  E   L.  Co.  334 
Consolidated   Fruit   Jar   Co.  v 

Strong  i.379 

Consols   Insurance   Co  ,  Official 

Manager  of,  v.  Wood  808 

Const  v   Barr     780,  1049,  1050,  16d3 

v.  Ebers  510 

v.  Harris  596,598,1671,1727 

Constable  v   Angel  1114 

v  Ho « iik  1000,  1224 

Constance  V.  Brain  1102 

Constitution,  The  141 

Consumers'   Gas  Trust  Co.   v. 

Harless  1770 

Contee  v  *>awson    191,  671,  736,  829 
v.  Lyons  1580 

v   Pratt  1580 

Continental  Ins.  Co.  v  Webb       570, 
1548,  1553 
Continental  Life  Ins.  Co.  v  Cur- 
rier 1621 
Continental  Trust  Co.  v.  Wet- 
more                             1051,  1743 
Contois  v.  Carpentier  48 
Contract  and  Agency  Co.,  In  re    27 
Contract  Co  v.  Tottenham  &  H 

J   Ry.  Co   W.  N.  1731 

Converse  v   Hood  1648 

v.  Johnson  648 

v  Michigan  Diary  Co.  559 

v  Meyer  920 

v   Ware  S  Bank  1503 

Conway  v  Alexander  1244 

v.  Felton  1233 

v   Stroud  200 

Conybeare  v.  Lewis  272 

Conyers  v.  Abergavenny,  Lord    1682 
v.  Gray  1699 

School,  Re  1857 

Cood  v.  Cood  1627,  1628 

Coogan  v  McCarron  1548 

Cook  »•   Arnham  1583 

v.  Bam6eld  1577 

«  Bath ,  Mayor  &  Corp  of       1637 
v   Bay  993,  1125 

v.  Beardsall  1131 

V.  Bee  781 

V.  Blunt  230 

v.  Bolton  1170,  1540 

v.  Brooinhead  948,  1552 

v.  Butt  262 

v  Catchpole  1861,  1862 

v.  Collingridge       1232,  1250,  2279 
v  Cook  1196 

v.  Detroit  &  M.  R  Co  1735 

v.   Dews  732,  733 

v.  Dey  448 

f.  Dorsey  1877 

v   Enchmarch  1072 

v.  Forbes  1637 

v.  Fowler  1257 

v.  French  1031,  1576 

i!   Had  ley  191 

v   Hall  938 

v.  Hart  1390 

v  Hath  way  64,  160, 1422 

v.  Hilliard  215 

v.  Houston  County  Commis- 
sioners 1169 


235 

280,  281,  379,  695 

326,  378,  S'i'J,  383 

1638 

14ll 

lo71 

1637 

1561,  1565, 

1570 

61 

873 

1516 

58 

560,  644 

452 

1608 

1576, 1J83 

1355 

1132,  1134 

1596,  1661,  1662 

1074 

843 

195,671,703,  1439 

802 

1340 

1081,  1635 

70,  110 

87,  179 

201,251,319.631 

1654 

993, 1366 

852 

1113, 1557 

1743 

534 

243 

568,  716, 1074, 

1440 

689,  732 

744.  892 

973,  1226,  1731, 

_  173ii 

Cooksey  v.  Haynes  1107,  1131 

Cookson  v.  Bingham  1429 

v.  Ellison  300 

v.  Lee  162, 177,  476,  498, 

1476 
Cool  v.  Higgins  225 

Coolev  >'.  Harris  1551 

v.  State  838 

Conmbe  r   Hughes  1433 

v.  Stewart  9!l9 

Coombs  r   Brooks  1082 

v.  Smith  1743 

t/.  Warren  547,  550 

Coon  7'   Abbott  890 

Coondo  r.  Mookerjee  563 

Coop  r    Dr.  Savage  P   D   Insti- 
tute 314,  843 
Coope  r.  Caiter  1370 
v.  Cresswell      658,  839,  1717,  172(1 
Cooper,  He   160,  611,  674,  1406,  16o7 


Cook  v.  Ligon 
v.  Maucius 
t».  Marty  u 
v.  Miller 
v.  Muuu 

v.  New  York  C  M.  Co. 
v.  North,  &c    R.  Co. 
V-  Uosslyu,  Earl  of 

v.  Sturgis 
v  Torton 
v.  'full 
ii.  Whellock 
v.  Williams 
V.  Wood 
v   Woodbury 
Cooke  v    bamneld 
v   Beale 
v    Berry 
iv  Chilcott 
v.  Choluiondeley 
v   Clayworth 
v.  Cooke 
v  Da  vies 
v.  Dealey 
V.  Forbes 
v.  Fryer 
v   Fuller 
v.  Gettings 
v.  Gilbert 
v   (iwyn 
v.  Lamotte 
v  Marsh 
v.  Orange 
v.  Richards 
v.  Smith 
v.  Turner 

v.  Westall 
v  Wilby 
Cookes  v.  Cookes 


Blisset 
v.  Brown 
v.  Cooper 
v   Crabtree 
v.  Dcnne 
v.  Doild 
v.  Eggington 
v.  Green 
v.  Hubbuck 
v    Knox 
v.  Lewis 


230 
Ms"> 

1199.  1471,  1503 

211,  329, 1033 

989 

1068 

1096 

444 

1638.  1663 

1589,  1590 

602,  701,  1590 


London,  &e.  Ry.  Co.   1387,  1 
v.  Macdonald  100,  906,  1203 

v.  McNeil  1434 

v.  Martin  194 

v.  New  Haven  Steamboat  Co.    630, 
1427 
v  Pitcher  1405,  1427 

v.  Powi--,  Earl  588 

v.  Pnrton  30,  30 

v.  Reilly  1730 

v.  Scott  1464,  1482 

v.  Uttoexeter  Burial  Board       779, 
7^0 
v.  Vesey  195 


Cooper  v.  Webb  243 

v.  Whittingham  1381 

v.  Wood  448 

Coosaw    Mining   Co.    v.    South 

Carolina  10 

Coote  v.  Ingram  1071 

v   Whittington  201,  319 

Cooth  v.  Jackson   607,  656,  699,  813, 

1405 

Cope  v.  Cope  319,  1809 

v.  De  La  Warr,  Earl  1020 

v   District  Fire  Ass'n  1650 

r.  Parry  195,  689,  732 

v.  Russell  459 

v  Thames  Haven  Dock  Co.     1102, 

1106 

Copeland  ».  Crane       845,  846,  1180, 

1223,  1226,  1249,  1250,  1302 

v   Granger  110,  182 

v.  Mape  1059 

v.  Stanton  904,  930 

v.  Webb  1071 

v.  Wheeler  169 

Copis  c   Middleton  279 

Copley  v.  Smithson  153 

Coppard  v.  Allen  248,  268 

Coppeard  r   Mayhew  312,  399 

Copper  v   Wells  670 

Coppin  v. 118 

v.  Coppin  1404 

v  Gray  643 

Coppinger  v   Gubbins  1630 

v  Shekleton  1419 

Coppring  v.  Cooke  1237 

Coquillard  v.  Suydam  365 

Corbet  v   Davenant  1160 

v   Tottenham  1358 

Corbett  v.  Corbett   39,  43,  940,  1118, 

1457 

v.  Jonas  1638 

Corbin  v   Emerson  197 

Corbus  v.  Teed  834,  843 

Corbyn  ».  Birch  474 

Corcoran  v  Chesapeake,  &c  Co.  1370 


v   Witt 
Cordner  v   Guedalla 
Cordwell,  Re 
Core  v.  Bell 

v.  Stickler 
Corey  v  Moore 

v.  Voorhies 
Cork,  Earl  of?/.  Russell 
Cork  v-  \\  illock 
Corker  v.  Jones 
Corley  v.  Corley 


1378,  1379 

1440 

102 

1628 

1576 

1120,  1309 

1667,  1675 

277, 1035 

640 

68 

91 


Corliss  v.  E.  W.  Walker  Co. 


1643 


Cormack  v.  Beisly  1846 

Cormick  v-  Ronayne  1846 

Cornell  v.  Green  '  314,  545 

v.  Hudson  647 

v.  McCam  1264 

v.  Utica  &c.  R.  Co.  1663 

Cornelius  v   Post  1631,  1668 

Cornet  v   Bertelsmann  843 

Cornill  v.  Hudson  652 

Corning  v.  Baxter  457,  458 

v.  Cooper  974 

t\  Lowerre  1637 

v.  Smith  277,  339 

v.  Troy  Iron  &  Nail  Factory  1459, 

1639 

Cornish  v.  Gest  208,263,1163 

v  Tanner  1561 

Cornwall,  Re  28 

v.  Hoyt  88 

v.  Saurin  243 

Cornwell  »'   Lee  346 

Corn  well  Manuf.  Co.  r.  Swift        303 

Corpening  v.  Worthington  542 

Corradine  v.  O'Connor  517 

Torrance  r.  Corrance  113 

Correspondent  Newspaper  Co.  v. 

Saunders  1648 

Corrie  v  Allen  406 

v  Clarke  1801 

Corry  v.  Curlewis  805 

v.  Trist  23 1 


Corsellis,  Re  68,  178,  1414 

v.  Corsellis  1863 

Cort  v.  Lassard  1657 

Cortes  Co.  v   Tannhauser  933 

Cortleyeu  v.  Ilathaway  1717 

Corwin  v.  Campbell  1631 

Cory  v.  Gertcken  169,  530 

v.  Hamilton  1463 

v.  Jacobsen  449 

v.  Thames  Iron  Works  1398 

v.  Yarmouth  &  Norwich  Ry 

Co.  1678 

Cosby  v.  Wickliffe  282,  360 

Cosens  v  Cognor  Ry.  Co.  1656 

Cosgrove  v.  Fisk  324 

Cosine  o.  Graham  365,  604 

Coslake  v.  Till  2265 

Cossey    v.   London   &  Brighton 

Ry.  Co.  573 

Costabadie  v   Costabadie  1342 

Costa  Rica  v  Strousberg  1058 

Costeker  v   Horrox  1777 

Coster  v.  Bank  of  Georgia  457 

v.  Clarke  1459 

v.  Coster  101,  102,  1202 

v.  Merest  1132 

v.  Murray     560,  641,  642,  644,  702 

Cotching  v.  Bassett  1638 

Cotes  v.  Turner  601,  761 

Cotham  v.  West         1182,  1252,  2298 

Cother  v.  Midland  Railway  Co.    1672 

Cottain  v.  Partridge  2095 

Cotten  v.  Fidelity  &c.  Co.  779 

Cotterell  v.  Stratton  1388,  1393, 

1411,  1443 

Cottier  v.  Stimson  843 

Cottiugham  v.  Shrewsbury ,  Lord 

842,  1370 

Cottington  o.  Fletcher  655 

Cottle  v.  Harrold  1663 

v.  Kremeutz  694,  830 

Cotton,  Re  1440 

v.  Banks  11*53 

v.  Clark        1409,  1412,  1416 

v.  Harvey  1177 

v.  Manering  628 

v.   Parker  .  1478 

t;  Penrose  1431 

v.  Scott  1548 

v.  Trefusis  175 

Cotton  Plantation  Co.,  Re  1705 

Cottrell,  Re  1360 

v.  .Stua  Life  Ins.  Co.  586 

v   Finney  1387,  1393 

Cottrill  v.  Cramer  354 

Coughliu  v.  N Y   Cent.  R  Co.     563 

Coulburn  v.  Carshaw  448 

Coulson,  Re  1*00 

v.  Graham  508 

v.  Walton  560 

v.  White  1'538 

Coulstingfl.  Coulsting        38,  40,  111 

Coulston  z.  Gardiner  1055,  1057 

Coulthurst  v.  Coulthurst  1548 

Coulton,  Re,  Uamling  v.  Elliott 

1594 
Counce  v.  Persons  Unknown  11  (3 
Council  If  lull's  v.  Stewart  1638 

Count  de  Wall's  Case  48 

County  Attorney  v.  Mav  10,  137 

County  Life  Ass.  Co.,  Re  1844 

Coupous  v.  Kauffman  178 

Courage  v.  Wardell  521 

Courand  v.  Hanner  1411,  1747, 

1748 
Courier,  The  1440 

Course  v.  Humphrey  730,  1413 

Court  v.  Jeffery  226 

Court  of  <Hi«ncery,  The  Suitors 

of  the,  Re  1441 

Courtecn  v.  Touse  1093 

Courtcnay  r.  Hoskins  930,  931,  1193 
Courthope  v.  Mapplesden  1632 

Courtney  v.  Stock  978 

v.  Turner  45 

Courtois,  Re  1605 

Courtoy  v.  Vincent  1040,  1694 


TABLE    OF   CASES   CITED. 

[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging  ] 

Cousens  v.  Cousens  1440 

v .  Rose  334.  346 

Cousins  v.  Smith  596,  1671 

t;  Vasey  821,823,842 

Coutts  v.  Acworth  852 

Covell  v   Chadwiek  1620 

Covenhoven  v  Shuler  301 

Coventry  v.  Coventry  1163,  1528 

v.  Loudon,  Brighton,  &  South 

Coast  Railway  Co.  715 

Coveny  v.  Athill  936,  1573 

Coverdale  v   Eastwood  14-1 

Covington  v  Gilliat  108 

Cowan  v.  Anderson  161,  445 

Coward  v.  Chadwiek  152,  1718 

v.  Coward  1228 

v.  I  urn  hi  1404 

Coward  &  Adams,  Re  87,  123 

Cowart  v.  Perrine  641,  644 

Oowbridge  Railway  Co  ,  Re         1"35 

Cowdin  v.  Crani         1700,  1702,  1713 

Cowdray  v  Cross  469,  1047 

Cowdrey  v.  Railroad  Co.   1309,  1731, 

1752,  1845 

Cowdry  v.  Cheshire  247 

v.  Day  1392,  13l»9 

Cowell  v.  Lippitt  1281 

v.  Simpson  1843,  1845 

v.  Taylor  32,  64 

Cowen  v.  Alsop  837 

Cowgill  v.  Rhodes     1071,  1075,  1384 

Cowin,  Re,  Cowin  v.  Gravett      1827 

Cowlan  v    Williams  1565 

Cowles  v.  Carter  726 

ti   Whitman  1376,  1377,  1381 

Cowley  v  Cowley  302 

Cowls  v.  Cowls  1350 

Cowman  v.  Lovett  402 

Cowper  v.  Scott  1464 

v.  Taylor  1054 

Earl  v.  Baker  1632 

Cowslad  v.  Cely       150,  252,  271,  2:»0 

Cowslade  v.  Cornish  1181 

Cowtan  v.  Williams  1565,  1570 

Cox  i).  Allingham    838,  858,  953,  955 

v.  Baunister  449 

v.  Barker  346,  1001 

v   Barnard  223 

v.  Bennett  13 

v.  Bockett  859 

v.  Chamberlain  1402 

v.  Colley  1573 

v.  Cox  1073,  1163 

v.  Dolman  644.  653 

v.  Hart  1276 

v.  James  68 

v.  Kitchin  1126 

v.  Land    and    Water  Journal 

Co.  1645,  1727 

v.  Lynn  1580 

v.  McLaughlin  860 

r.  Mitchell  633 

r  Mobile,  &c.  R.  Co.  1625 

V.  Paxtous  1652 

v    Peters  1727 

v.  Pierce  815,  1195.  1320 

v.  Roome  254 

v.  Scott  16fl9,  1702,  1710 

v.  Sprode  28> 

v.  Stephens         203,  269,  270,  292, 

891,914 

v.  Taylor  2<i.3 

v.  Wheeler  '^S+ 

v.  Wills  Mil 

i;.  Worthington  922 

v.  Wright  68.  78,  1595 

Coxer.  Hilsted  1269, 1270, 1272, 1608 

v.  Smith  1151 

v.  Phillips  354 

Coykendall  v.  Robinson  354 

Coyle  v.  Alleyne     353,  354,  508,  524, 

765 

Cozine  v.  Graham    365,  561,  655,  657 

Crabb  v.  Orth  536 

v.  Tnomas  425 

Crabbe  v.  Moubery  ltil 

Crabtree  v.  I. .inks  1548 


XXXIX 


Crackelt  v  Bethune  1417 

Cracknall  v.  Janson      213,  348,  351, 

894,  895,  1407,  1449,  1490 

Craddock,  Re  102 

v.  Shirley  989 

Cradock  v.  Cradock  920,  921 

v.  Owen  1029,  1321 

v.  Piper  1234,  1235,  1414, 

1490 


Craft  j>.  Russell 
v.  Thompson 

569 

544,  1625 

Cragg  v.  Alexander 

1386 

v,  Taylor 

1039 

Craggs  v.  Gray 

1339 

Cragin  r.  Lovell 

1584 

Craig  v.  Barbour 

294 

v.  Bolton 

28,30 

v.  Briggs 

891 

v.  Craig 

1258,  1302 

v.  Fenn 

1093 

v.  Johnson 

197 

t>.  Leipe 

612,  676 

v.  People 

1636 

v.  Phillips 

1399 

v.  Sebrell 

1002 

v.  Smith 

243 

v.  Steamer  Hartford 

994 

Craige  r.  Craige 

852 

Craighead  v.  Bank 

642 

Crain  v.  Parker 

169 

v.  Prather 

560 

C raker  v.  Parrott 

226 

Cramer,  Ex  parte 

203 

v.  Bird 

241 

v    Bode 

517 

v.  Clouah 

1548 

v .  Morton 

226,  227,  251 

v.  Watson 

334 

Crammer  v.  Atlantic 

City  Gas 

Co. 

72^,843 

Cranborne,  Viscountess  v.  Dal- 

mahoy 

113 

Cranbourne,  Lady  v.  Crispe          272 

Cranch  v.  Brissett 

1405 

Crandall  v  Dare 

659 

r.  Gallup 

986 

v.  Slaid 

37,  74,  79 

Crane  v.  Brigham 

1608 

v   Bunnell 

1623 

v.  Decamp 

1484,  1491 

v.  DemiDg 

287,  558 

v  Ely 

1551 

v.  Fairchild 

334,335 

v  Jullion 

448 

v.  Kilpin 

1253 

v.  McDonald 

1561 

v.  Powell 

619 

v.  Prather 

645 

Crane  Bros.  Manuf.  Co  B  Morse  354 
Cranford  v.  Tyrrell  1638 

Cranston  p.  Smith  365,  561,  656 

Cninstown,  Lord  v.  Johnston       629, 
843,  855,  1392,  1627 
Crapo  «•.  Kelly  1743 

Crapp  v.  Dodd  1511 

Orary  v.  Sprague  111-8 

Crass  v.  Memphis  &  Charleston 

R.  Co  1561 

Craven  v  Shair  1228 

D.  Tickell    '  1257 

V.  Traill  1469 

v.  Wright  1201 

Cravens  v.  Dyer  lnl 

c    Harrison  951 

Crawcour  v.  Salter  1462 

Crawford  v.  JEtt\n  Life  Ins.  Co       51 

v.  Attorney-General  133.139 

v.  Chorlev  *17 

t).  Crawford  37, 1622 

v  Fisher  1560,  1564,  1570 

v.  Forshaw  254 

v.  Harvey  386 

v.  Hornsea  Steam  Brick  Co.     A080 

v.  Liddel  641 

v.  Moore  860 

v.  Nral  1320 

-.  l'.-u»  49,50 


xl 


TABLE   OP   CASES    CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.  ] 


Crawford   v.   Protestant  Insane 

Hospital  1636 

v.  Ross  1663,  1734 

Crawley  v.  Clarke  10(56 

Crawshaw  v  Thornton  1565 

Orawshay,  Re  1409 

v.  Collins  1250,  1860,  1861 

v  Thornton  1561,  1564, 1566,  1610 

Creak  v.  Capell  1781,  1782 

Crease  v.  Babcock  256 

v.  Barrett  1126 

Creasor  v.  Kobinson        201,  251,  310 

death  v.  Smith  1580 

Credit  Co  ,  Re  885,  896 

v.  Arkausas  Central  R  Co.       325, 

714 

Credits  Gerundeuse  v.  Van  Weede  150 

Creed  v.  lir\  ne  443 

v.  Fisher  1091,  1130 

v.  Lancaster  Bank  1577 

v   Perry  119 

v.  Railway  256 

v   Scruggs  1625 

Creely  v.  Bay  State  Brick  Co        555, 


1631, 1662 
1379 
1677 

380 
1451 

287 


Creen  v.  Wright 
Cregar  v.  Creamer 
Creigh  v.  Boggs 
Creuietti  v.  Croin 
Crenshaw  v.  Ullman 
Crenver  Mining  Co.  v.  Willyams  214 
Crerar  v.  Sodo  1106 

Cresap  v.  Keuible  369 

Crescent  City  L.  S.  Co.  v.  Butch- 
ers' U   L  S.  Co.    543,  634,  2383 
Cresset  v.  Mitton 
Cresswell,  Ex  parte 

v.  Bateman 

v.  Cheslyn 

v.  Haines 

v.  Jackson 

v.  Parker 

'■.  Smith 
Creswick  v.  Creswick 
Cresy  v.  Beavan 

v.  Bevau 
Creuze  v.  Hunter 


v  London,  Bishop  of 

v.  Lowth 
Creveling  v.  Moore 
Crew  v.  Jolliff 
Crewe*  Lord  v.  Edleston 
Crews  v.  Burcham 
Crick  v.  Hewlett 
Crickett  v   Dolby 


368,  370 

1019 

229,  266,  1520 

1430 

1404 

1577 

628 

719,  1037 

948,  1552 

1619,  1678 

409,  583 

1255,  1256,  1259, 

1368,  1369 

1738,  1739 

1256,  1369 

1031 

1148,  1383 

1731 

210 

801 

1253,  1254 


Cridland  v.  De  Mauley,  Lord 


Crighton  v.  Daluner 
Crim  v.  Handley 
Crippen  v   Hermauce 

v   Ingersoll 
Cripps  v.  Wood 
Crips  v.  Talvande 
Crisman  v  Hiederer 
Crisp  v.  Platel 
Crispin  v.  Cumano 

v.  Miller 
Criterion  Gold  M.  Co.,  Re 
Crittenden,  Ex  parte 
Canfield 


421, 
1825 

1620 
1625 
1400 
1600 
1152 


1548 

1830,  1835 

1052,  1053 

1507 

27 

993 

68 

v.  Field  1075, 1076, 1077, 1463, 1639 

v.  Posey  119 

Crocker  v.  Collin3  542 


v.  Craig 

v.  Dillon 

v  Higgins 

v.  Loweiithal 

v.  Rogers 

v.  Whitney 
Crocket  v.  Lee 
Crockett  v.  Bishton 

v.  Drew 

v.  Sexton 


Crcckford  v   Alexander 
Croft  ?i   Arthur 
v.  Graham 


230,  245 

630 

190,  195,  324,  361 

1489 

314 

363 

327,  361,  1003 

894 

161 

1281 


1632 

1645 
371 


Croft  v.  Waterton 
Crofton  v.  Ilsley 
Crofts  v.  Middleton 

v   Oldfield 

v.  Wortley 
Croggan  v.  Allen 
CroggOD  v  Symons 
Crognan  v  Minor 


201 

1235 

915 

1056,  1057 

633,638 

1411 

1561,  1567 

339 


Cromack  v   Heath  coate  574 

Crompton  v.  Anthony  235 

v  Lea  1639 

v.  Wombwell  1523,  1534 

Cromwell  v.  County  of  Sac  659 

Crone  v.  O'Dell  12^1 

Cronin  v.  Watkins  602 

(Jronise  v.  Carper  991 

Cronkright  v.  liaulenbeck  1103 

Crook  c.  Brown  191 

v  Crook  895 

v.  Turpin  1507 

Crooker  i'    Houghton  1576 

Crookes  v.  Whitworth  113 

Crooks  v.  Whittord  197 

Cropper  v  Burton  837 

v.  Coburn  333 

v   Mellersh  215 

v.  Smith  402 

Crosbie,  Ex  parte  157 

Crosbv  v.  Hetherington  546 

v.  Stephan  1381 

v.  Wickliffe  235 

Croskey  v.  Bank  of  Wales  243 

v.    European    and    American 
Shipping  Co  551,  552.  771. 

1186,  1525,  1526,  1625 
Crosley  v.  Marriot  1699 

Cross,  Re  560,  1693 

v.  Bean  230 

v  Cross  69,  80,  814 

v.  De  Valle  1001   1548 

v.  Eglice  370 

v.  Keunington  1437 

v.  Morgan  779 

v  Thomas        461,  538.  1510,  1525 
Crosse  v.  Bedingfield     392,  395,  842, 
1246,  1254,  1558 
v.  Crosse  459 

v   General  Reversionary  Co.     1390 
Crosseing  v   Honor  322 

Crosskill  v.  Bower     1234,  1257,  1413 
Crossley  j>   Crowther  307 

v.  Glasgow  Life  Ass.  Society     251, 
1405 
v.  Lightowler  16*5,  1638,  1639 

v.  Maycock  199,  203,  561 

v.  Parker  1440 

v   Stewart  774 

v.  Tomey  579 

Crossman  v  Card  1253 

Crothers  v.  Lee  860 

Croton  Tump,  v  Rider  1623 

Crotty  i».  Eagle  68 

Crouch  v.  Credit  Foncierof  Eng- 
land 18 
v.  Hickin                             589,  788 
v.  Kerr                                           542 
v.  Waller          38,  39,  40,  111,  187, 
1482 
Croughton,  Re                                100 
Crow?;   Blythe                               1008 
v.  Cross                                        335 
V.  Owensboro  &  N.  R.  Co           378 
v.  Tyrell    408,  548,  619,  1558,  1559 
v.  Wood                            1058,  1737 
Crowder  v  Moore                         1716 
v.  Searcy                                      713 
v.  Stewart.                                    1425 
Crowe  v.  Del  Ris                             1556 
v.  Price                                         1053 
Crowell  v.  Botsford                        441 
v.  Keene                                       1003 
Crowfoot  v.  Mander             429,  1522 
Crowley's  Case                                   98 
Crowley  v.  Page                              llnl 
Cnwn  Bank,  Re                           887 
Crowningshield    v.    Crowning- 
bhield                               851, 852 


Crowther  v.  Appleby  907 

Croxon  v.  Lever  168 

Croxton  v.  May  108,  1795 

Cruger  v.  Haliday  314 

Cruikshauk  v.  Dutlin  1401 

v  Neath  &  Brecon  Ry.  Co.      1735 
Cruin  v.  Moore  1*519 

Crumb,  Ex  parte  1352,1364 

Crumlish  v.  Shenandoah  Valley 

R.  Co.  334,  402 

Crump,  Re  98,  100 

v.  Baker  1233 

v.  Ingersoll  630 

v  Lambert  1635,  1637,  2307 

v.  Perkins  1523 

Crutchneld  r,  Stewart  1029 

Crutchley  v.  Jerningham  1775, 

1780 

Cudahy  v.  Rhinehardt  1120 

Cuddon  v  Hubert  156 

v.  Morley  1681,  2309 

v  Tite  367,  544 

Cudworth  v.  Thompson  1358 

Cuff  v.  Platell       197,  301,  302,  315, 

557 

Culbertson  v.  Luckey  846 

Cullen,  Re  1841 

v.  Dawson  1561 

v.  Queensberry,  Duke  of    190. 216, 

238,272 

Culley  v.  Ilickling  1672 

Cullison  v.  Bossom  579 

Culloway  v.  Dobson  778 

Culver  v   McKeown  1381 

Culverhouse  v  Beach  46 

Culvert  v.  Godfrey  1284 

Cumberland  v.  Copeland  1644 

Cumberland  Tel.  Co.  v.  United 

El.  Ry.  Co.  1650 

Cumberland  Union  Banking  Co 

v.  Mary  port  Co.  1267 

Cumming,  In  re  177 

v.  Fraser  251 

v.  Roebuck  58 

v.  Slater  797 

v.  Waggoner  1190 

Cummings  v.  Barrett    328, 329, 1639 
v.  Burleson  10nl 

v.  Coleman  675,  677,  714 

v.  Cummings  378 

v.  Parker  1580 

v.  Stone  546 

v.  White  551 

Cummins  v.  Adams  1004 

v  Bennett  632,  659,  793,  796 

V.  Bromfield  1413 

r.  Cummius  227,  840,  1357 

r.  Fletcher  213 

v.  Little  1270 

v.  Nutt  1160 

v.  White  630 

Cundell  v.  Pratt  1103 

Cuningham  v.  Antrobus        116,  117 
Cunliffe  v.  Manchester  and  Bol- 
ton Canal  Co.  26,  144 
Cunningham  v.  Butler  629 
v  Campbell  702 
v.  Ferry                                       846 
v.  Foot                                         654 
v.  Freeborn                  713,  844,  847 
v.  Hall  940 
v.  McGrady                                1845 
v.  Pell                           223,  402, 539 
v.  Rogers                                    1536 
v.  Rome  R.R.  Co.                      1637 
v.  Schley                                      974 
v.  Steele                                       526 
v.  Wegg                                       628 
v.  Williams                                1281 
Cunvngham  v.  Cunyngnam       1475, 
1478,  1486 
Cupples  v.  Strahan                        405 
Curd  v.  Curd                        992,  1824 
v   Davis                                        1653 
v.  Lewis                                          632 
Cureton  ?'.  Taylor                          1381 
Curlewis  v.  Carter                876,  1071 


TABLE   OF   CASES    CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 


xli 


Curlewis  v   Whidborne  398 

Curling  v.  Austin     1261,  1366, 1368, 

1369,  1375 

v.  Flight  1218 

v.  Townsheud,  Marquis    738,  781, 

1717 

Curran  v.  Arkansas  141 

v  Craig  1743 

»  St.  Charles  Car  Co.       197,  1548 

Curie  v,  Bowyer  1617 

Currev,  Re,  Gibson  V.  Way  100 

Currie  v   Lewiston  634 

v.  Pye  1333,  1436,  1437 

Currier  v.  Howard  197 

v.  Studley  641 

v.  Webster  1240,  1245.  1386, 

1392 


Curriers'  Co   v  Corbett 

1081,  1082, 

11338 

Curry  v.  Lloyd 

378 

v.  McCauley 

60,  630 

v.  Peebles 

1576 

v.  Stokes 

1461 

Curteis  v   Candler 

1411,  1412 

Curtess  v  Smalridge 

1122 

Curteuius  v    Grant 

Rapids  K 

Cushing  v  Smith 

844 

Co. 

1650 

Cushman  v.  Bonfield 

860 

Curtis  v  Curtis 

1165 

1 16  J 

Cussen  v.  O'Connor 

1655 

v.  Fulbrook 

919 

Cust  v.  Boode 

592,  593 

v  Goodenow 

418 

v   Southee 

680 

v   Gooding 

212 

distance  v.  Cunningham 

1668 

v.  Lloyd 

793 

Cutfield  D.  Richards 

1390 

v.  Luun 

675 

Cuth!  ert  v.  Chauvet 

68 

v.  March 

1131 

v.  Creasy 

560 

v.  Master 

658 

v.  Ediuborough 

371 

v.  Muudy 

74, 

1824 

v.  Purrier 

1795 

v.  Piedmont  Co. 

634 

v    \\  estwood 

262,  274 

v.  Piatt 

1139 

!'.  Wharniby 

1204 

v.  Price 

1276 

Cutler,  In  re           97 

101 

102,  2001 

o.  Robinson 

1417 

v.  Creuier 

950 

v    Sheffield     1507, 

1527 

1583. 

1584 

II  Simons 

1775 

v.  Williams 

1561, 

1562 

v.  Tuttle 

190  287 

Curtiss  i>.  Grant 

449 

Catting,  Ex  parte 

1461,  1463 

v    Liviugstou 

545 

V-  Dana 

550,  555 

Curtius  v  Caledonian  Ins 

Co. 

203 

v.  Florida  Ry.  Co 

1299 

Curts  n.  Bardstown 

994 

v.  Gilbert 

303 

Curwen  v.  Milburn 

646 

Cutts  v.  Pickering 

575 

Curzon,  Ex  parte 

1440, 

1450 

v.  Thodi'y 

196,  231 

v   De  la  Zouch 

506,; 

592 

Cu..  ler  v.  Bogert 

71 

".  720,  758 

v.  Lyster       1153, 

1155, 

1158, 

1159 

v.  Morelaud 

338,  347,  1461 

D. 


Dabbs  v.  Dabbs  987,  1077,  1080 

v.  Nugent  551 

Da  Costa  v.  Da  Costa  71,  1248,  1298, 

1321 

Dade  v.  Alexinder  121 

v.  Madison  841 

Didswell  ,'.  Jacobs  1825 

Daggett  v.  Pratt  1257 

Dagley  v.  Kentish  1841 

Dagly  v.  Crump  779 

Dahlman  v.  Jacobs  630 

Dailey  v   Kinsler  190,  256,  674 

Daily  v.  Litchfield  246 

Daiuese  v.  Hale  864 

v  Kendall  1029 

Daintree  v.  Haynes  42,  43 

Dak  in  v  Cope  2265 

v   Union  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  590 

Daking  v.  Whimper  230 

Dakins  v.  Garratt        481,  1379,  1601 

Dalby  v  Pullen  1267 

Dale  r.  D  lie  1163 

v.  Griffith  407 

v.  Hamilton  1267 

v.  Kent  1463 

v.  M'Kvers  845,  982 

v  Rosevelt        868,  986,  1073,  1075 

1485,  1486,  1489 


Daley  v.  Russ 
Dalgiish  v   Jarvio 


411 

1588,  1593,  1664, 
1672,  1675,  1678 
1555 


Dallas  v    Glyn 
Dallimore  v  O^ilby 
Dally  v.  Worham 
D.ilmer  v.  Dashwood 
Dalrymple  v.  Lamb 
Dalston  v.  Coatsworth 
D'AHeyrac  v   Long 
Dalton  v  Angus 
i     v.  Carr 

v.  Fulham 
'     v   Hayter 

v.  Midland  Riilway 

v  Roach 

v   West  End  Street  Ry.  Co 
Daly  v.  Amberg 

v  Duggan 

v.  Kelly 

v.  Kirwan 

v.  Toole 
Dalzell  v.  Dueber  W.  C.  M  Co 
Darner  v   Portarlington,  Lord 
Dameron  v.  Jameson 
Dan  v    Brown 
Dana  v  Nelson 


1796 

774 

1717 

37,74 

1075 

1056 

1502 

1552 

1070 

386,  833 

197 

1003 

974 

1685 

740 

281,  1652 

588 

784 

700 

794 

256 

875 

881 


Dana  v.  Valentine      301,  1629,  1631, 
1637 
D.inbury  v   Robinson  1385,  1337 
Danby  v.  Danby  1770 
v.  Poole  877 
Dancer  v    Evett  1583 
v.  Hastings  1748,  1749 
Dando  v    Dando  1202 
Dandridge  v    Washington  254 
Dane  v.  Allen  117,  -!27 
v.  Walker  1411,  1561 
Danell  i'.  Page  771 
Danford  v  Cameron  1045,  1452 
v.  McAnulty  674 
Dan  forth  »   Bangor  933 
v.  Dinforth  1517 
v.  Morrical  1624 
v.  Phila.  &c.  Ry.  Co.  663 
v  Smith  379 
Dangar's  Trusts,  Re  1791 
Dangar  v.  Stewart  85,  525 
Dangerfield  v.  Claiborne  524,  951 
D'Angibau,  Re,  Andrews  v.  An- 
dre ws  96 
Daniel  v.  Boullard  841,  842 
v.  Brown  16  3 
v.  Ferguson  1665 
v.  Hanagan  68,  161 
v.  Metropolitan  Ry   Co  1105 


Mitchell 

tt  Morrison 

v.  Sinclair 

v.  Stewart 
Daniel  I  v.  Skipwith 
Daniels  v    Benedict 

v.  Davison 

v.  Taggart 


844,  1479,  2273 

341,  1548, 1549 

668 

1624 

284 

2027 

860 

666,  695,  697.  829 

.1462 

Danner  v   Danner  249 

Danner  Land  Co.    v.   Stonewall 

Ins.  Co.  855 

Dansey  v  Richardson  1139 

D'Aranda  v.  Whittingham  251,  283. 
288 
Darbey  v    Whitaker  670 

Darbv  w.  Oilligan  1756 

v.  Ouselev  1096,  1102,  1106 


Darkiu  v.  Marye  1274,  1278 

Darlev  v   Darley  1358 

v.  Nicholson     389,  898,  1706,  1714 
Darling,  Re  85 

v.  Hammer  334 

v  Osborue  1381 

v.  Stauiford  953 

Darlington's  Appeal  418 

Darlington.  Earl  v.  Bowes  1124,  1137 
Darlow  v.  Simlock  520 

v.  Sinnock  620,  528 

Darnell  v.  Reyny  691 

Darn  ley,  Lord  v.  London,  Chat- 
ham, and  Dover  Ry.  Co.         418 
Darrah  v.  Boyce  586 

Darrel  v.  Elen  1^60 

Darrell  v  Pritchard  1072, 1081, 1638, 
1641,  1662 
Darrington  v.  Borland  161,  1270 

Darrow  v  H  R  Home  Produce  Co  543 
Darst  v   Brockway  1651,  1665 

v.  Gale  1081 

Darston  v.  Oxford,  Earl  of  1228 

Dart  v.  Palmer  293 

Darthez  v.  Clemens  360,  368 

Dartmouth,  Lady  v.  Roberts         869 
Dartmouth  and  Torbay  Ry.  Co., 

Re  1800 

Dartmouth    Harbour  Com'rs  v. 


32 
150,  272,  290 
1828 
1790 
1918 
830 
1487 
1440 
1255 
1319 
1.  53 


v.  Richardson 
Dareh  v.  Toyer 

»'.  Tozer 
D'Arey  v.  Blake 
Darcy  t'    Kelley 
Darden  v   Burns 
Dare  Vallev  R  Co., 
Darey  v.  Whittaker 


Be 


161 
1106 
1126 
1165 
13 
1571 
1860 

113 


Dartmouth 
Darwent  ?'    Walton 
Darwin  v.  Clarke 

i'.  Darwin 
Dary  r.  Kane 
Dascomb  V   Marston 
Dashwood  v   Bulkeley,  Lord 

v.  Magniac 
Daub  v   Martin 
Daubeney  r.  Coghlan 
Dauhignv  V.  Davallon 
Daubney  v.  Leake       438,  1213,  1428 

v.  Shnttleworth  1594 

Daubuz  v.  Peel  291 

Daugars  v.  Rivaz         143,  1653,  1686 
Daugberty  v.  De-.rdorf  259 

Daunmeyer  w   Coleman  26 

Dauntley  v.  Hvde  1128 

Dausman  v.  Hooe  1581 

D'Auxy,  Duchesse  r   Porter  149 

Davenport  ?>   Auditor  General       843 

v.  Davenport      37.  39,  74.  77   165, 
354,1226,  1632.  1671,2286 

v.  Dows  26.  144 

v.   Goldberg  906,  1071,  1072,  1075, 
1079,  1080,  1643 


xlii 


avenport  v.  Uarbert 

1081 

V    .1. -lines! 

212 

v.  Jepson 

1071 

v.  Lamson 

1156 

v.  Phillips 

1080 

v   Powell 

1787 

v.  Receivers 

1752 

V.  Ky  lands  972,  1081 

v.  Sniffen  592,  739 

v  Stafford       383,  974,  1003,  1013, 

1014,  1369,  1478 

v.  Whitmore  2088 

Davers  v.  Davers  885,  896 

Davev  V.  Bennett  113 

v.  burrant         505,  796,  908,  1380, 

1602 

v.  Plestow  1617 

David  r   Frowd  1206,  1208 

v.  Williams  1201 

Davidson,  Re  61 

v.  Bowden  72,  164,  165 

t>   Burke  378 

v.  Butler  1542 

v.  Cooper  273 

t;   Foley  1515,  1520 

v.  Hastings,  Marchioness  of     444, 

449,  453,  456,  512,  536,  1066 

v.  Isbam  1635 

v.  Leslie  454 

v  Stanley  1107 

Davies,  Re  1069,  16:3 

v. 687 

v.  Boulcott  202,  204 

v.  Bush  1846 

v.  Clough  1651 

v .  Cracraft  1755 

v.  Davies     170,  217,  281,  324,  859, 

1009,  1017,  1544,  1635 

v.  Dodd  207 

v.  Getty  1621 

v   Jenkins  186,  187 

v.   I^eo  1669 

v.  Marshall   487,  801  1440,  1605, 

1638,  1681 

v.  Nixon  ,500,  1049.  1454 

v.  Otty  365,  385,  561,  657,  891 

v.  Racer  1654 

v.  Spurling  371,  669,  840 

v.  Whitehead  110 

v.  Williams  227,  582.  588 

Davile  17.  Peacock  1673 

Davis,  Re         60,  135,  649,  892,  1846 

Davis,  The  141 

Davis's  Trusts,  Re  13,_56 

Davis  v.  Amer  1729 

j».  American  &  F  C.  Union     1548 

V  Angel  316,  317,  660 
v   Ashwin  1264 

V  Ballenden  186 
r.  Barrett  1594 
v.  Battine  669,  815 
v  Bay  State  League  243,  1411 
v  Bean  1238 
v.  Bluck  1537.  1577,  1578,  1579 
t;  Chanter        201,  202,  598,  1459, 

1460 
v  Chicago  1661 

v.  Clayton  841 

v.  Combermere  1173,  1256 

v  Cook  1548 

v.  Cripps  344,  352,  759 

v  Davis        31 1 .  312. 313,  431 .  524, 
760,777,973,  1031,  1052, 
1055,  1102,  1120,  1317, 
1511,  1675 
ti  Dean  235 

v.  Delaware  Poor  Overseer  1621 
v.  Dendey  1246 

v.  Dowding  168 

v.  Duncan  1743 

v   Dver  1071 

v.  Dysart,  Earl  ol     316,  768,  1440. 
1447 
v.  Estey  251 

v.  Franklin  1001,  1590 

v.  Fulton  1669 

v.  Qalmoye  464 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging. 

Davis  v.  Gray  1482,  1743,  1751,  1752 
v.  Guiltord  860 

v.  Hall  556,  669 

v.  Hardy  1129 

v.  Harrington  1380 

j'.  Hart  1675 

v.  Headley  664 

v.  Hemingway  221,  256,  257 

v.  Hole  478 

v.  Hooper  288 

v.  James  354 

v   Logan  1166 

v.  Lowndes  1135 

v.  McNeil  1448 

v.  Mapes  718,721,723,724 

v.  Marlborough,  Duke  of  1717, 
1719,  1729,  1731,  1734, 
1741,  1764 
v.  May  1241,  1251 

v.  Miller  334,  346 

v.  Morris  147 

v  Morton  633 

v.  Newton  90,  91.  102,  122 

v.  Parker  629,  2072,  2259 

v.  Phelps  13i)3 

v.  Prout  108,  109,  430,  !i60 

v   Read  815 

v.  Reaves  1551 

v.  Reed  1631,  1637,  1667 

v.  Reid  944 

v.  Rogers  287 

v.  St-  Louis  &  S.  F  Ry.  Co.  1120, 
1168 
t>.  Sigourney  878 

z;.  Simpson  296 

v.  Smith  641 

v  Snell  59,  157 

v.  Speiden  597,  1031,  1576 

v.  Stevens  843 

v.  Sullivan  281 

v.  Symonds  1398 

v.  Taylor  1128,  1131 

v.  Tollemache  742 

v.  Turvey  1163 

v.  Whiffen  595,  1590 

v.  Whitmore  710 

Davis  S  M.  Co.  v  Dunbar  1580, 

1584 

Davison  v.  Attorney-General  139,  760 
v  Johnson  607,  613,  632,  670. 

694,  695 
v.  Rake  254 

v.  Kobiuson  867,  879,  1020 

v.  Schemerhorn  655,  684 

v.  White  11(56 

Davoue  v  Fanning  217,  342.  526, 
660,  1019,  2296 

Davy,  Re  ^3 

v.  Garrett  313,  324,  350,  855 

r.  Morgan  881 

v.  Seys  1422,  1423,  1474 

Davys  v.  Richardson  1794 

Daw  v.  Eley  579,  580,  1070,  1096 

Dawes  v.  Benn  230 

v.  Betts  1218,  1219 

v   Head  251 

r   Howard  1358,  1360 

v  Taylor  1427 

Dawkins  r.  Antrobus  332,  1653 

v.  Mortan         821,  823,  842,  1317, 

1327 

v.  Penrhyn  560,  639 

B.  Simonetti  800,  1627 

Dawson,  Re  1318,1350 

Dawson,  Re,  Johnston  v  Hill  176 
v.  Amey  790,  1548 

v.  Clark  1512 

v.  Dawson  371,  664,  668,  1278, 

17<i2 
r.  Drake  1239 

v.  Ellis  843,  1380 

v.  Fitzgerald  671 

v.  Harris  1138 

v  Jay  1348,  1350, 1600 

j\  Joy  2293 

v    Lepper  560 

v.  Newsome  796, 1588 


Dawson  v.  Parrot 

1416 

v.  Parsons 

1716 

v.  Pilling 

605,  628 

v.  Prince 

1487 

v.  Princeps 

1619 

v.  Raynes 

1756,  1763,  1767 

v.  Sadler 

590,  1621 

v.  Scriven 

1017, 1033 

v.  Shepherd 

406 

v.  Yates  1720, 1729,  1736 

Day,  Ex  parte  1618 

v.  Allaire  1120 

v.  Argus  Printing  Co.  1029 

v.  Arundle  676,  677 

r;.  Batty  433,  437,  1174,  1428 

v  Brownrigg  546,  1648 

t;  Croft        1172,  1610,  1695,  1726, 

1746 

v.  Cummings  197 

v.  Day  1040,  1265, 1696 

v.  Drake  262 

v.  Edwards  1129 

r.  Essex  County  Bank  144 

r    Cudgen  710 

v.  Holloway  1130 

v   Kerr  161 

v  Merry  1634 

v.  Perkins  844 

v  Postal  Telegraph  Co   1120,  1733 

v.  Snee  806,  1682 

v.  Walker  991 

v.  Whittaker  1346 

Dayrell  »  Champness  1630 

Dayton  ?-.  Dayton  216,  378 

v.  Dusenbury  1653 

v.  Melick      '  1550,  1653 

Dazet  v.  Landry  1286 

Deacon  r.  Deacon  709 

Deaderick  v.  Smith  1061,  1281,  1283, 

1567 

r    Wilson  334 

Deakin's  Case  468 

Dealty  v.  Murphy  361 

Dean,  Re,  Dean  v.  Wright  1490 

v.  Abel  978 

v.  Allen  1207 

v.  Crall  2101 

v.  Dean  655,  657 

v.  Emerson  1298,1317,1321 

v.  Lethbridge  455 

v   Madison  1961 

V   Richmond  88 

v.  Smith  1698 

v.  State  851 

v    Williams  1260 

v.  Wilson  1070,  1169 

Dean,  &c.  of  St.  Paul's,  Ex 

parte  1017 

Deane  v.  Hamber  815 

v  House  for  Aged  Colored 

Women  1427 

Deans  r.  Wilcoxon  334 

Dear  v   Sworder  1548 

v   Webster  632,  700 

Dearden  i>.  Villiers  62 

Deare  v.  Attornev-General  134,  139, 

140 

ti.  Soutten  103 

Dearfield  v.  Nims  26 

Dearin  v    Fitzpatrick  122 

Dearman  v.  Wye  he        652,  655,  656, 

1024,  2095 

Dearsley  v   Middleweek  1448 

Dearth  v.  Hide  and   Leather 

National  Bank  630,  778 

Deas  r.  Harvie  580 

c  Thorne  280,281 

Dea^e  r.  Moody  844 

Deaver  r.  ISeynolds  1282 

Deaville  v.  Deaville  912 

De  Balinhard  v    Bullock  434 

De  Baun  v   New  York  1661 

De  Bay  v.  Griffin  1846 

Debazin  v.  Debazin  1714 

De  Beaumont,  Er  parte  1801 

De  Be;iuvoir  v.  Benyon  1479 

v  Owen  639 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 

[The  references  are  to  the  star  pagiDg.J 


xl 


111 


DeBeauvoir  v  Rhodes 

Debeuhain  v.  Ox 

Debenture  Co.  v.  De  Murrietta 

De  Beruardy  v   Hardiug 

De  Biel  Gray  v.  Waruer 

De  Bode  V.  Reg. 

De  lirassac  v.  Martyn 

De  Brito  v.  Hillel 

Delirox's  Case 

De  Burgh  V   Clarke 

De  Burgh  Lawson,  Re 

De  Carriere  v.  De  Callone 

Decarters  v.  La  Farge 
Decker  v   Caskey 

v.  Miller 

v   Ruckman 
De  Coster  v.  La  Farge 
Decouche  ».  Savetier 
Dederick  v.  Farquhar 

v.  Fox 

v.  Hoysradt 
Deegan  v.  Capner 
Deeks  v.  Stanhope 


707 
1398 
406 

my 

14148  I 

133 

972  \ 

915,  »19 

951  I 

1491,  14:)3 

100 

i,  49, 1698, 

li99,  1704 

974,  1479 

1072,  1073,  1148 

1411,  1414,  1772 

1484,  1491 

1459 

644 

418 

630 

1567 

243 

240,  243,  598, 

1511, 1527 

157 

1631, 1641 

1029 

1448 

983 

1475 

2010 

1120 

555 


Deere,  Re 

v.  Guest 

v.  Nelson 

v.  Robinson 
Deerburst  V.  Jones 

v.  St.  Albans,  Duke  of 
Deering  v.  'fucker 

v.  Winona  H.  Works 
Deery  v.  McClintock 
Deeny  v.  Mazarine,  Duchess  of    178, 
179 
Deeves  v.  Met'n  Realty  Co.  1071 

De  Feucheres  v.  Dawes  1590 

Defflis  v.  Goldschtuidt  1795 

De  Florez  v.  Raynolds  1029 

De  Francesco  v.  Barnum  1657 

Defiles,  Re  867 

v.  Creed  1744 

De  (Jaillon  o.   L'Aigle  1141 

De  Geer  v.  Stone  47 

De  Geneve  v.  llannam  804,  806 

De  Go  ley  v.  De  Godey  1678 

]»e  Golls  v.  Ward  157,  225,  295 


De  Giaffenreid  v.  Brunswick, 

&c.  R.  Co. 
De  Greiff  v.  Wilson 
De  Greuchy  v.  Wills 
De  (iroot  v.  Jay 
De  Hart  v.  Baird 

v.  Stevenson 
De  lloghton  v  Money 
Dehou  v.  Foster 


1743 

405 

189 

1743,  1757 

844 

645 

230 

I,  629,  630, 

1032,  1613,  1615,  1627, 

1628,  1995 


Deignan  v.  Deignan 
Deiniel  v.  Brown 
De  .lough  v   Newman 
Delahere  v.  Norwood 
Delabigarre  v.  Bush 
De  la  Borde  v   Otlion 
De  Lacy  v.  Adams 

v    H  urst 
Delafield  v.  Anderson 

v.  Colden 

i'.  Guanabeus 

v   Illinois,  State  of 
De  la  Garde  v   Lempriere 
Delahanty  v.  Warner 
Delahay  v   McConnel 
Delaucey  v.  Seymour 
Delancy  v   Wallis 
Delany  v   Mansfield 
Delap  v.  Hunter 
Delapl  line  i».  Lawrence 
De  la  Rue  v.  Dickinson 
De  la  Salle  v   Moorat 
De  Lashmutt  v.  Sellwood 
De  la  Torre  ?'.  Bernales 
Delauney  v.  Mitchell 
Delavan  V    Duncan 
De  la  Vega  v   Vianna 
De  la  Vergne  v.  Evertson 


840,  843,  850 

819 

214,  279 

284 

1742 

1660 

407,418 

341 

1  +  12 

1665 

17.24 

92  106 

1650 

1476 

1073 

1674 

1716 

987,994 

1492 

722,  2316 

797 

214 

762 

1096 

989 

48 

237 


De  la  Warr,  Karl  V    Miles    1137.  1575 
Delaware,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.   Erie  R 

Co.  1731 

Del  &  Rar  Canal,  &c.  and  \. 
R.  &  T  Co  v.  Bar.  &  Del. 
Bay  R.  Co.  1618,  1H23.  1639. 

1640,  1050,  1662,  1668,  1678 
Delaware  L  &c.  R   To  )).  Central 

Stock-yard  &  T.  Co.     1662,  1663 
He  Leou  l>.  Hubbard  892 

Delevaute,  Re         1366,  1367,  1370. 
1374 
v  Child        1366,  1367,  1370.  1374 
Delfe  v.  Delamotte  2314 

Dell  B    Barlow  1482 

v.  Griffits  401 

v.  Hale  548 

Delondre  v.  Shaw  46,  302,  315 

Deloraiue  v   Brown  1580 

v.  Browne  559 

Deloiue  V   lL)llingsworth  320 

De  Louis  v  Meek  324 

Del  Pout  v.  Tastet  349 

Delta,  The  633 

Delta  County  Com'rs  v.  Gunni- 
son County  Com'rs  1621 
Delves  v.  Bagot,  Lord  922 
v.  Delves                                         129J 
De  Manneville  v    De  Manneville     74, 
453,  1045,  1350,  1705 
Demaree  v.  Driskill                          829 
Demarest  v.  Berry                1237,  1239 
v.  Hardham                                   303 
v.  Wyukoop        186,  221,  569,  640, 
675,  1395 
Demartin  v.  Albert                          313 
De  Mattos  v.  Gibson            1653,  16o6 
Demill  c.  Moffat                              1381 
De  Minckwitz  v.  Udney          606,  69  I 
Deiuing  v.  James                            1661 
De  Montmorency  v   Devereux      371. 
667,  668 
D.  M   Osborne  &  Co.  v  Missouri 

Pac.  R.  Co  1638 

De  Mott  v  Starkey  678 

Deuipsey  v.  Deuipsey  1278 

Den  c.  Farley  915 

v   Pidcock  1381 

v.  Tellers  1269 

v.  Wood  946 

Dence  v.  Mason  58,  63,  157,  160 

Deudel  v.  Sutton  215,  255 

Deudy  v   Cross  1830 

v.  Dendy  266,  1526 

Denis  i».  Rochussen  481, 485, 761,  776 

Deuison    Paper   Manuf.    Co     v. 

Robinson  Manut   Co  630 

Deniston  v.  Little  292,  384,  408, 

8^0,  861 

Denn  v  Barnard  1129 

V.  Spinning  221 

Deuuer  v.  Chicago,  &c  Ry.  Co     313, 

630 

Dennerlein  v   Dennerlein  1282 

Dennett  v.  Codman  2222 

v   Dennett  1479 

Denning  v.  Henderson  1278 

v.  Smith  678 

Dennis,  Re  1491 

v.  Dennis  371 

v.  Perry  26 

v.  Riley  1457 

Dennisou  v.  Bassford    524,  733,  737, 

784 

v   Lee  1258 

v.  Yost  564 

Denniston   v.    Chicago,    &c.    R. 

Co  1741 

Dennv  i'.  Denny  83 

v.  Filmer  158:^ 

v  Oilman  560 

v.  Hancock  1004 

v   Mars  35 

Densem  v.  El  worthy  222 

Denson  v  Denson  1577 

Denston  v.  Ashton  'i4 

Dent  v  Auction  Mart  Co.  1638 


815 
1060 
lto66 
555, 


156 

1491 

26 

630 

1101 

1566 

570 

147,  1564 

575,  944 

1054,  10.55 

646 

346 


Dent  v.  Dent  1053,  1177,  1826 

v.  Hertford   Hundred  of  1131 

v.  London  Tramways  Co  '^41 

v.  Turpin  208,  1649 

V.  Wardel  4^6 

Denton  v.  Denton       1699,  1703,  1704 

v  Jackson  930,  953 

Denver  &  R.  G.  Ry.  Co  v.  Deu- 

ver  &c.  R.  Co.  1548 

Denver  R.  L.  &  C.  Co.  v.  Union 

Pacific  Ry.  Co.  586 

Deuys  v.  Locock    615,  617,  620,  656, 
20.5 
De  Penny  v   Christie  149 

De  Pereda  v   De  Mancha  1347 

De  Peyster  v.  Golden  881 

v.  Graves  1675,  1676,  I6s5 

Depue  v.  Sergent  782 

De  fuy  v    Wabash 
Derby  v   Ancram 

Bank  v.  Heath 

Earl  of  v.  Athol,  Duke  of 

611,  629,  1556 
Derbyshire,  &c   Ry.  Co.  v.  Baiu- 

brigge  1037 

v.  Serrell  1621 

De  Kivafinoli  v.  Corsetti  1699, 1700, 
1702 
De  Rothschild  v.  Morrison 
Derrick  «'.  l^imar 
Derry  v.  Peck 

v.  Ross 
De  Sailly  v.  Morgan 
Desboro  v.  Harris 
Desborough  v.  Curlewis 

v  Harris 

v.  Rawlins 
Desbrow  v   Crommie 
Deshon  v.  Eaton 
Desilla  v  Schunck 
Des  Moines  &  M.  R  Co.  v  Alley    385 
Des  Moines  Gas  Co.  v.  Des  Moines 

1650 

v.  West  1717 

De  Sorbien  v  Bland  1"68 

Despau  v.  Swindler  546 

Desplaces  v.  Goris  347,  352,  721, 

728 
De  Tastet  v  Bordenave       10' 

v.  Bordieu 

v.  Lopez 

v   Sharpe 

v.  Tavern  ier 
De  Teissier  Settled  Estates,  Re    1233 
Detillin  v.  Gale  1385,  1391 

Detroit  v    Dean  26 

v   Detroit  City  Ry.  Co.  790 

V.  Wayne  Circuit  Judge  1675 

Detroit  Bank  ?>.  E.  G.  Barnum 

Wire  Works  1765 

Detroit,    &c.    Fire   Ins.   Co.    v. 

Rentz  491 

Detroit,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Detroit  1638 
Detweiler  v.  Holderbaum  149 

De  Uprev  v.  De  Uprey  1157 

Devall  v.  Scales  1625 

Devaucene  v.  Devaucene  1056,  1062 
De  Vaughn  V    Hustead  1073 

Devavnes  v   Morris  813,  1539 

v.  Robinson        201,268,271,1834 
De  Veney  v.  Gallagher  1631 

Devenish?'   Devenish  461 

Devereaux  v.  Cooper  722,  723 

Devey  v.  Thornton  1367,1411,  1418 
Devie  v.  Brownlow,  Lord  636,  1139 
Devine  v.  Harkness  1290 

De  Visme  v.  De  Vi-me  1278 

De  Visser  v.  Blackstone  1743 

De  Vitre  v.  Betts  1503 

Devlin  r  Commonwealth  1508 

v,  Chester  614 

De  Voe  r   Ithaca  &  Oswego  R.R 

Co  ^    1053 

Devousher  v  Newenham      265.  581, 

585,600,  1661,  1682 

Devonshire,  Re  1610 

Dew  v.  Clark  155,  936 


1083 
1729 
776 
658 
324 


xliv 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 
[The  leferences  are  to  the  star  paging.] 


1726 


Dew  v  Clarke 

De  Wall's  Count,  Case  47 

Dewberry  v   Shannon  334 

Dewduey ,  Ex  parte        559,  643,  646 

v   Palmer  1098 

Dewees  v.  Dewees  1553 

De  Weever  v   Kochport     1350,1361, 

2294 

v   Rockport  2294 

Dewell,  A'e,  Edgar  v.  Reynolds     2o2 

Dewey  v   St.  Albans  Trust  Co.      991 

Dewing  v.  Perdicaries  26 

De  Whelpdale  v.  Milbirn  262 

De  Wiutou  v.    Brecon.  Mayor  of 

1731,  1744 
De  Witt  v.  Hayes  1631 

De    Wolf  V.   A.   &   W.  Sprague 

Mauuf.  Co.  334 

v.  De  Wolf  219,  237,  288 

v.  Johnson  157,  885 

v.  Long  837,  845 

v.  Mallett  286,  445 

Dexter  v   Arnold    221,284,285,64(1, 

764,  841.  1062,  1019,  1030,  1240, 

1241,    1242,    1315,    1317,    1575, 

1576,    1577,    1578,    1579,    15,^0, 

1581,  1584 

v  Codnian  1110 

v.  Providence  Aqueduct  Co     1639 

Dey  v.  Dunham  855,  1902 

V.  Walton  1497 

Deybel's  Case  546 

De  Zouche  v  Garrison  1561 

Duegetoft  v.  Loudon  Assurance 

Co.  197 

D"Hornuisgee  v.  Grey  28 

Dial  v.  Gary  1019 

v.  Reynolds  277,  339,  1627 

Dias  v   Bouchaud  272,  287,  557 

v.  Merle  1523,  1578,  1580 

Dibbs  v.  Goren  152 

Dicas  v.  Lord  Brougham  2 

Dice  v.  McCauley  1164 

Dick  v  Dick  334 

v.  Muuder  28,  358 

v  Oil  Well  Supply  Co.  314 

v.  Strut hers  1743 

v.  Swintou    1700,  1704, 1706,  1713 

Dickenson  v.  Blake  1128,  1134 

v  Fisher  1122 

v.  Grand  Junction  Canal      1657, 

1681,  1682 

v.  Lockyer  1404 

j)  Teasdale  649,  608 

Dicker  v   Clarke  447,  449,  460.  461 

v.  Popham  1080 

Dickerson  v.  Ilodges  710 

v.  Stoll  H''4 

v.  Talbot  1294 

«   Winslow  334,  545 

Dickev  v.  Allen  844 

v.  Reed  1683 

Dickins  v   Harris  205,  li22 

Dickinson  v.  Davis  3<>2 

v   Lamoille  Co.  Nat.  Bank         215 

v   Legare  1257 

V  Railroad  Co.  841 
v  Seaver                                      1440 

V  Shee  1102 
Dicks  v  Brooks            858,  890, 1620 

v.  Yates  1377 

Dickson  v.  Harrison  195 

Didier  v.  Davison  609 

Dierden  v   Villiers  62 

Dierdon,  lie  880 

Dietrich  v.    Northwestern    Ry. 

Co.  1639 

Dietrichsen  v.  Cabburn  1656 

Diffenderffer  v.  Winder  1369 

Digby  v.  Boycatt  1202,  1798 

v.  Browne  1287 

Lord  v.  Meech  320 

Diggens  v  Gordon  1503 

Diggle  v.  Boulden  1062 

Diggs  o.  Wolcott  1627 

Dighton  v.  Withers    284,  1390.  1424 
Dike  v.  Greene  545,  557 


Dill  v.  Shahan  1548,  1553 

Dillard  v.  Harris  261,  853 

v.  Krise  1209 

v.  Manhattan  Life  Ins.  Co.         51 

Dillon  v.  Ashwin  710 

v   Barnard  545 

v.  Davis  409,  1536 

v.  Francis  312 

t>.  Mount  Cashell,  Lady  1722 

Lord  v.  Alvaies  6ii3 

Dills  v.  Doebler  1655,  1663 

Dilly  v.  Barnard  844 

v.  Doig  339,  1644 

v    Heckrott  361 

Dilmau  v  Schultz  45 

Dimes  v.  Grand  Junction  Canal 

Co.  1023 

v.  Steinberg  251,  664 

DiuiUioch  v   Atkinson  97 

Dimmock  v.  Bixby        237.  341.  549, 

559,  684 

Dinckle  v  Tiuirod  1150 

Dines  v.  Scott  1181,  1187,  1230 

Dingle  v.  Rowe  950 

Dingwall  v.  Heming  1458,  1565,  1558 

Diusuiore  v  Crossmau  392,395,  1556, 

1558 

v.  Hazelton 

v.  Westtott 

Diuwiddie  v   Bailey 

v.  Bell 
Dios  v.  Merle 
Diplock  v.  Hammond 


Dipper  v.  Durant 
Di  Savini  v.  Lousada 
Lisbrow  v.  Heushaw 

v  Johnson 
Disney,  lie 
Di  Sora  v   Phillipps 
District  Attorney   v.   Lynn 

Boston  R.  Co. 
Dix  v.  Briggs 
Dixon,  lie 

v.  Atley 

v.  Buell 

v.  Dawson 

v.  Dixon 

v.  Donaldson 

v.  Eaton 

v.  Enoch 

v.  tarrer 

v.  Krazer 

v   Gay  fere 

v.  Higgius 

v.  Holden 


722 

441 

561 

1157 

1177 

1560.  1561, 

1566, 1567 

413 

1346 

1497 

881,  981,  1031 

102 


Dod  v.  Paul 

659 

Dodd,  Ex  parte 

228 

v.  Bellows 

1565 

v.  Beuthal 

378 

v-  Cook 

1965 

V-  Flavel 

1081 

v.  Ghiselin 

74 

v.  Hartford 

1661 

v.  Holbrook 

1069 

v.  Neal 

1138 

v.  Webber 

449 

v.  Wilkinson 

349 

Dodder  v   Bank  of 

England         136 

Dodge  v.  Briggs 

334 

v.  Dodge 

1530 

v   Essex  Ins.  Co 

645 

v.  Fuller 

281,  287 

864 


& 

10 

329 

1488,  1603 

1774, 1775 

197 

1433 

1298 

286 

1558 

1556 

6,10 

720 

649 

890 

1620,  1648 

133 

686 

657,  961,  1405 

790,  <9l 

1267 

1057 

801,  804 

970 

1058 

..  Sumner  County  ConTrs  26 

v.  Wilkinson  1341 

v.  Wyatt      1522,  1523,  1524,  1531, 

1540 

Dobbs  v.  Protho  16-5 

Dobede  v.  Edwards       804,  809,  1593 

Doboy  &  Union  Tel    Co.  v.  De 


v   Loudon  Small  Arms  Co. 

v.  Olmiu8 

v.  Parker 

v.  Parks 

V,  Pyuer 

v.  Rowe 

v.  Rutherford 

v.  Shuui 

v.  Smith 


Mngathias 
D'Obree,  Ex  parte 
Dobree  v.  Nicholson 
Dobson  v.  Bowness 

c.  Dobson 

v.  Faithwaite 

v.  Festi 

v.  Grahiim 

v   Hartford  Carpet  Co. 

v.  Land 

V,  Leadbeater 

v   Pattinson 

r   Pearce 
Docker  v.  Horner 
Dockray  v.  Mason 


26 

67 

707 

1136 

1493 

1526 

149 

1556 

517, 1408 

1246 

622,  677 

1417 

1615,1627 

1809 

256 


v.  Gri.-wold  1073,  1076,1120, 1123, 

1147,  1453 

v    Israel  924 

v.  Northrop  1584 

v.  Pei  kins  314,  358,  374,  555,  656, 

628,  1258 

v.  Strong  1621 

v.  Tulleys  200 

v    Woolsey  26 

Dodgson,  lie  1809 

Dodslej  v   Kinnersley  1642 

Dodsou  v.  Bishop  1271 

v  Lomax  295,  1566 

v.  McKelvey  417 

v.  Scammell  974,  1459 

Dodsworth,  lie,  Spence  v.  Dods- 

worth  894 

Doe  c.  Andrews  575 

v.  Burdett  873 

V.  Childress  159 

v.  Deakin  873 

v.  Doe  406, 1631 

v.  Green  347,  1450 

v.  Horniblea  46 

v.  Perkins  1099 

t>.  Robertson  46 

v.  Roe       28,  313,  1097,  1135, 1675 
v  Sanger  660 

v.  Vallejo  1121 

v.  Warren  1259 

v.  Wolley  873 

Doe  d.  Bather  v.  Brayne  1128 

Fox  v.  Bromley  1097 

Gilbert  v.  Ross       1127,  1138,  1139 
Goslee  v.  Goslee  1106 

Lewis  v  Barter  1109 

Mason  v   Mason  1129 

Norton  v.  Webster  1098 

Phillips  v.  Benjamin  1127 

RowcliHe*'.  Egreuiont,  Earl  of  1105 
Strickland  v.  Strickland  1127 

Tathamv    Wright  1125,1126 

Tindalf   Roe  1132 

Tynham  v.  Tyler  1126 

Walsh  v.  Langfield  1126 

Wildgoose  ti.  Pearce  1098 

Worcester  Trustees  v.   Row- 
lands 1096 
Doechsner  v.  Scott           39,  111,  112 
Doggett  v  Eastern  Counties  Ry. 

Co  1528 

Doherty  r.  Allman  1628 

v  Holiday  243 

v.  Stevenson  109,  286, 390 

Dolder  v   Bank  of  England     17,  18, 

764,  780 

v  Huntingfield,  Lord     17,  18,  53, 

300,  546,  592 

Dole  v.  Wooldredge 

Dollard  V.  Taylor 

Dolling  v   Evans 

Dollman  v  Collier 

Dolly  v   Challin 

Dolman,  lie 

v.  Cook 
Dominicetti  v  Latti 
Dommett  v.  Bedford 
Domville  t>.  Barriugton 

v.  Solly 
Don  ti.  Lippman 


1071,  1110 

1463 

561 

1299 

414,  421 

33 

P.38 

1175 

1399 

1267,  1271 

1777, 1780 

48 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging  ] 


Donahue  v.  Flackler 

1279 

Donald  v.  Bather 

201,  262 

Donaldson  v.  Fairfax 

1103 

v  Johnson 

1312 

Done's  Case 

1703,  1705 

Done  v    Read 

689,  732,  783 

Donerail,  Lord  v.  Donerail,  Lady  853 

Donne  v.  Hart  124 

v.  Lewis  1017 

Donnell  v   Bennett  15,  96 

v  Columbian  Ins   Co  130'* 

v   King  612,  674,677 


v.  Parrott 
Donnellan  v.  Hardy 
Donnelly  v    Ewart 
Donner  v   Quartermaa 
Donohoe  V   Mariposa  Min   Co 
Donohue  ?>.  Chase 
Donovan  v.  Dunning 

v    Finn 

v   Fricker 
Dooby  v.  Watson 
Doody,  Re,  Fisher  v.  Doody 


1623 
867 
411 
1511 
1553 
1299 
334 
1037 
1251 
642 
1235, 
1414 

v.  Higzins  97, 191,  222,  225 

v.  Pierce     215,  260,  829,  834,  887, 

1180,  1226,  1237, 1241 

Dooley  v.  Potter  1253 

Doolittle  v.  Gooking  845 

v.  Lewis  251 

v.  Walton  1689 

Doon  v.  Bayer  846 

Doran  v   Everitt  1564 

v.  Simpson  323 

Dore  Gallery,  Re  911 

Dorft;.  Walter  1556 

Dorin  v   Dorin  1503 

Dorian  v.  Guie  1642 

Dormer  v.  Fortescue     393,  602,  611, 

987,1362,1532,1533,1558 

Dorn  v  Bayer  734,  737 

Dornford  v  Dornford  13-39 

Dorr  v.  Harrian  1*554 

v.  Tremont  National  Bank     1071, 

1110 

865 

648, 

1572 

291 

1061,  1277 

1845 

52 

334 

1400 

52 


Dorrett  v.  Meux 

Dorset,  Duke  of  v.  Girdler 

Dorsett  v.  Dorsett 
Dorsey  v.  Campbell 
v.  Corn 
v.  Kyle 
v  Lake 
v  Smith 
v.  Thompson 
Dorsheimer  v.  Rorback  83,249, 1029, 
1368 
Doss  v.  Tyack  974 

v.  Secretary  of  State  for  India 

18,629,1558 
719 
560 
117 
721 
517 
1027 
1610 
1158 
385 
1242 
1576 
417 

llul 


Dos  Santos  V.  Frietas 
Dossee  v.  Mookerjee 
Doswell  v.  Earle 
Dott  v   Hoyes 
Dotterer  v.  Freeman 
Doubleday  v.  Sherman 
Doubtfire  v.  Elworthy 
Doughaday  v.  Crowell 
Dougherty  v.  Humpson 

v.  M'Colgan 

v.  Morgan 

v.  Murphy 

v.  Shown 
Doughty    v.     West,    B 

Manuf.  Co. 
Douglas  v.  Andrews 

v.  Archbutt 


&   C 

2396 

1360 

858,  890, 1234,  1414, 

1601 

v.  Butler  109 

v.  Clay  250,  1207 

v.  Horsfall  221,  245,  273 

t>.  Terry  1704 

v.  Walbridge  334 

Douglass  v.  Baker  County  1675 

v.  Cline  1734 

v.  Culverwell  1399 

v.  Douglass  560 


Douglass  v   Evans 

525 

v.  Harrisville 

1661 

v  Joyner 

1567 

v.  M'Chesney 

1073 

v.  Merceles 

13U9 

v.  Phenix  Ins.  Co. 

604 

v   Sherman 

1507, 15H8 

v.  Thompson 

1677 

Dougrey  v.  Topping 

737,  1677 

Douthit  v.  Hipp 

214 

Douthwaite  v.  Spensley 

1782 

Douw  v.  Sheldon 

328,  558 

Dovenby  Hospital,  Re 

1611 

Dover  v-  Uarrell 

674 

v.  Portsmouth  Bridge 

1637 

Dover  Harbor,   Warden, 

&c.  of 

v.     London,     Chatham,    & 

Dover  Ry    Co 

1640 

Dovey  v.  Hobson 

1092,  1128 

Dow  v   Berry 

630 

v.  Dickinson 

1137 

V.  Eley 

1554 

v.  Jewell       68,  163,  164,  165,  167, 

169,  170,  171,  997 

1530,  1533 

Dowdall  v.  Lennox 

1381 

Dowden  v    Hook 

38,  111 

v  Junker 

1069 

Dowdeswell  v.  Dowdeswel 

201,  249, 

292,! 

Dowell  v   Applegate 

597 

v.  Covenhoven 

108,  110 

ti.  Mitchell 

630,  659 

t».  Tuffnell 

■    1285 

Dowle  v.  Lucy 

1293 

Dowley  v.  Winfield 

1795 

Dowling     v.    Falmouth 

U.     S 

Board 

1829 

v  Hudson                152 

1718,  1735 

v.  Legh 

838 

Down  v.  Yearley 

897 

Downer  v.  Dana 

1021 

v.  Wilson 

1515 

Downes  v.  East  India  Co 

595 

v.  Friel 

1019 

Downey  v.  Bullock 

1359 

Dowuie  v.  Nettleton 

579,  1556 

Downing,  Re 

58,  157 

v   Palmateer            284 

1628,  1630 

v   Pickeu 

1801 

Downing  College  Case  1440 

Downshire  v.  Tyrrell  1735 

Downshire,  Marquis  of  v.  San- 
dys, Lady  1634 
Dows  v  McMichael        695,  697,  704 
Dowson  v  Hirdcastle  1570 
v   Solomon  964 
Doyle,  petitioner                             1120 
v.  Muntz                      302,  419,  699 
v  San    Diego  Land  &   Town 

Co.  145 

v.  Wiley  938 

v  Wisconsin  1467 

Dozier  v   Edwards  216 

v.  Sprouse  992 

Drage  )».  Hartopp  149 

Drake  r    Brooki.jg  139  i 

v    Delliker  216 

V.  Drake  722,  984,  1003,  1577 

v  Goodridge  287,406 

v.  Syrnes  403,  485,  724,  776 

Dranquet  v.  Prudhomrne  850 

Drant  r.  Vause  161 

Draper  ?>.  Buxton  14^2 

v  Clarendon,  Lord  277 

v.  Crowther  628,  629 

v.  Jennings  214 

v.  Manchester  &  Sheffield  Ry. 

Co  1837 

Drapers'  Company  v.  Davis         1256 

Dravo  v   F'avel  551,  737 

Drax  v.  Somerset  &  Dorset  Ry. 

Co.  278 

Drayton  v  Logan  1076 

v.  Wells  1U8 

Drennan  o.  Andrew  32,  40,  1482 

v.  Huskey  1003 

Dresser  v.  Morton  40,  519,  528 


xlv 


Drever  v.  Maudesley       27.  53,  1205, 

1291. 1752 

Drevon  v.  Drevon  892,  915 

Drew  v   Beard  1299,  418,  1296. 

131  < 

v   Drew  6)5,  684,  721 

V.  Ilarman  259 

v.  Long  825 

v.  Norbury,  Earl  of  280 

v.  O'Hara  280 

v.  Power  66S 

Drewer.  ,  Re  1814 

Drewiy  v.  Barnes  1731 

v.  Thacker  1615,   1617,  1684, 

1686 

Drexel  v.  Berney  378,  1618 

Dreyfus  v.  Peruvian  Guano  Co.  ;<62, 

1556 

Drickle  v.  Timrod  1166 

Driggs  v.  Daniels  14ti3 

v.  Rockwell  944 

Drinan  v.  Mannix  36.  Ill,  112 

Dringer  v.  Erie  Ry.  Receiver       1584 

v.  Jewett  1029,  1584 

Drioli  v   Sedgwick  809 

Driver  v.  Cobb  1625 

v   Fortner  325,378,379 

Drogheda  v.  Malone      603,  612,  674 

Dromgoolei).  Spence  657 

Drope  V.  Miller  2335 

Drought  V.  Redford  1321 

Droullard  v.  Baxter  368,  411 

Drover  v   Beyer  389,  1699,  1706 

Druce  v.  Denison  105,  1809 

Druiffy    Parker,  Lord  1961 

Drummond  v  Drummond  449 

v.  Magruder  418 

v.  St   Albans,  Duke  of  641 

v.  Tillinghurst  29 

v  Westervelt  543 

Drury  v.  Bonner  630,  845,  846, 

847 

v  Molins  1656,  1672 

Drybutter  v.  Bartholomew  1404 

Dryden  v.  Foster  798 

v.  Froat  1388 

v  Robinson  670 

Du  Barre  v.  Livette  576 

Duberley  v.  Day  119, 127 

Dubless  v.  Flint  1780,  1782 

Dublin,    &c.    Ry    Co.   v.    Slat- 

tery  1503 

Dubois  v.  Dubois  874 

j>.  Hole  179,181,445,499 

Duboll  v   Field  1461 

Dubourg    de      St.    Colombe   v 

United  States  857,  1221 

Dubout  v.  Macpherson         406,  447, 
1596 
Duchess  of  Westminster  Silver 

Ore  Co  ,  Re  1490 

Duekcri).  Wood  1130 

Duckett  v  Gover  26,  242,  3i>8, 

599 

Duckworth  v  Duckworth     360,  361 

v.  Trafford  1734 

Ducoign  v.  Schreppel  1-127 

Dudgeon  v  Corley  730 

v.  Thomson  1492.  161 Q 

v.  Watson  83.  i;:;o 

Dudley  v  Bachelder        365,  661,  655 

v.  Balch  37 

t\  Burgen  123S 

v.  Congregation  378 

v    Facer  13*1 

v   Grayson  46 

v.  Witter  2*1 

Dues  v.  Smith  95 

Dufaur,  Re  1044 

v.  Sigel  1405 

Duff?>   Barrier  1029 

v.  Duff  630 

v.  First  National  Bans       328,  560 

v.  McDonough 

Duffield  v.  Denny  1203 

v.  Elwes  1044,  1742,  1793 

tJ.  Greaves  586 


xlvi 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging  ] 


Duffield  l)   Robeson  851,  852 

V  ^turges  819.  828 
Dutfort  v.  ArrowsmMi  70.  799 
Duffy,  lie  li'4 

v.  Jovce  27 

V  Moran  1074 
Dufour  v.  Kious  13S1 

v.  Long  1029 

v  Sigell  350,  759 

Dugau  V   Gittings  845 

Dugdale  v   Dugdale  1431 

v  Johnson  1600 

v   Robertson  2309 

Dnggan,  He  1610 

Duhamuiel  r   Pickering  50 

Duke  v    Barnett  988 

r    Harper  563 

V  Palmer  122 
Duke  of  Newcastle,  lit  1035,  1037 
Duke  of  Somerset,  lie  87 
Dula  v.  Seagle  1281 
Dulwich  College,  Re  15 
Dumford  v.  Duniford  632 
Duuimer  v   Chippenham      143,  145, 

297,  378,  566 

v  Pitcher  117 

Dumond  v.  Magee  90,  734,  2285 

Dumont  v  Fry  322,  630,  1168 

Dumoussay  v.  Delevit  48 

Duuphy  v.  Kleinsmith  1076 

Dumville  v  Ashbrooke  1731 

Dunball  v.  Walters  1638 

Dunbar  v.  Boldero  1609 

e  Johnson  371 

v.  Woodcock  986,  1259 

Duncalfu.  Blake  611 

Duncan  v  Campan  1463 

v  Campbell  104.  107 

v.  Chesapeake,  &c.  R  Co.        1734 

v  Dixon  122 

v.  Dodd  1286 

v  Ewing  1257 

v    Findlater  1752 

v   Greenwalt  313 

v.  Haves  1635 

v.  King  1110 

v.  Luntley  197 

v  Lvon  551 

v.  M  Calmont  1626 

v.  Varty         1137,  1139,  1148,  1149 

v.  Vereker  348 

r   Wiekliffe  285 

Duncomb  v.  Daniel  1096 

Duncombe,  Ex  parte  1699 

v.  Davis  761 

v  Greenacre  92,  101, 102,  108 

v.  Hansley  283 

v   Levy  431 

v   Lewis  413 

Dundas  v.  Dutens       307,  309,  1037, 

1053 

Dungannon,  Lord  v   Skinner         886 

Dungey  v   Angove    1560,  1561,  1562, 

1563,  1564,  1565,  1567,  1570 

Dunham  v.  Gates  842,  843,  847 


Dunham  v   Hyde  Park  549 

v  Jackson  847,  1702,  1705 

0   Miiiard  1061,  1283 

v.  Ramsey  267 

v.  State  1070 

v   Wiuans  930, 147y 

Dunklev  v.  Dunkley  102 

v   Scribnor  1055 

v.  Van  Buren  815 

Dunklin  v   Harvey  986,  1584 

Duulap  r   Clibbs  559 

V   M'Elvoy  458 

v.  Stetson  1624 

V.  Wilson  844 

Dunlevy  v   Dunlevy  1580 

Dunlop  v   Hubbard  1569,  1570 

Dunn,  Ez  parte  129 

v.  Barnum  674 

v.  Campbell  1561 

v   Clarke  447 

v.  Coates  553,  1556 

v.  Dunn    79,  81.  336,345,  443,  449, 

539,  844, 1111,  1121,  1S39, 

1842 

v.  Ferrior  412.  423 

v.  Graham  846 

v.  Keegin  686 

v.  McEvoy  32 

r   Snowden  17!<5 

v    Whitney  1228 

v.  Wolf  256 

Dunne  v.  Dunne  2198 

v.  Engiish  852,  1782 

Dunnell  v.  Henderson  1317 

Dunning  v   Hards  1214 

v   Stanton  457 

Duunock  v.  Dunnock  630 

Dunny  v  Filmore  1580, 1583 

Duuphy  v.  Traveller  Newspaper 

Association  334 

Dunsany  v  Shaw  697 

Duusback  v.  Collar  369 

Dunscomb  v   Dunscomb  1412 

v.  Ualtz  12s2 

Dunshee  v.  Parmelee  1259 

Dunstan  v    Patterson  1387 

Dunster  v.  Mitford  1467,  1468 

Dunthorne  v.  Bunbury  1380 

Dupignac  v   Van  Buskirk  1591 

Du  Plessisv  Attorney-General         5 

Dupont  v.  Johnson  1358, 1404,  1415. 

1417 

v.  Ward  508 

Duponti  v  Massey         407,  828,  2385 

Dupuy  t\  Gorman  1286 

v  Strong  208 

r   Welsford  68,  75 

Durand  v  Hutchinson  635 


Durant  v.  Bacot 

1973 

v.  Crowell 

1734 

v    Kssex  Co. 

659, 

790,  994 

v.  Moore 

1685 

Durbaine  v.  Knight 

188 

Durburow  v   Niehoff 

243 

Durdant  v.  Redman 

588 

Durell  v.  Pritchard  1072, 1080,  1081, 

1638,  1641,  1661 

Durfee  v.  Durfee  878 

v.  McClurg  737,846 

v.  Old  Colony,  &c.  R  R  Co        26 

Durham  v   Brackles  98,  710 

v.  Jackson  389 

v   Legard  1526 

v.  Taylor  448 

Durkee  v   Stringham  1484 

Durr  v.  Bowyer  91,  122 

Durrand,  Ex  parte  133 

Dursley  v.  Berkley  316 

Lord,  v  Fitzhardinge      317,  1572, 

1573 

Duryee  v.  Lingheimer  1550 

Dustin  v.  Newcomer  14ol 

Dutch  Church,  &c.  v   Mott  989 

ti   Smock  1320 

Dutch   West  India  Co.   t'    Van 

Moyses  24 

Dutton  i'.  Thomas  1734 

Du  Val  v.  Marshall  1722 

Duval  v.  Mount  1278 

Dtivall  v.  Farmers'  Bank  90.  91,  122 

v  Speed  272 

v.  Waters  1629, 1634,  1669 

Du  Vigier  v   Lee  652 

Du  Wahl  v.  Brauue  89 

Dux  Bucks  v.  Gayer  1237 

Duxbury  v.  Isherwood  150 

Dwight  Central  Vermont  R.  Co  590, 

603,  634 

v.  Humphreys  311,312 

v.  Northern,  &c   R   Co.  1081 

v   Pomeroy  849, 832 

v  Smith  369 

Dwinal  v  Smith  716 

Dwyer  v.  Olivari  216 

v.  St.  Louis  &  S.  F  R   Co       1071 

Dyckman  v.  Kernochan     1567,  1623 

I  Dyer,  Re,  Dyer  v.  Paynter  1157 

v  Clark  1950 

v   Kearsley  1615,  1616 

v.  Lincoln  658 

v  Potter  1382,  1401 

v.  Pulteney  279 

V.  Shurtleff  1381 

v.  Vinton  1157 

Dyers  Co   v.  King  1638 

Dvett  v  N.  A.  Coal  Co.  443,  445 

Dyke  v.  Cannell  1168 

v  Stephens  7,  68 

Dykes  v.  Taylor  1264,  1657 

Dymond  v.  Croft        448, 1175,  1596 

Dvnevor  Duffryn  Collieries  Co., 

Re  1611 

DyotttJ   Anderton  1186 

v  Dyott  31 

Dvson  v.  Benson  592 

v.  Hornby  61,  225,  1277 

v.  Morris     227,  252,  540.  857,  980, 

1510,  1533 

Dzialynski  v.  Jacksonville  Bank  584, 


E. 


Eado  t'.  Jacobs  579  : 

v.  Lingood  868 

Eadem  v   Lutman  1141 

Eaden  v.  Firth  876, 1071. 1072, 1080, 

1640,1641,1643 

Endes  v.  Harris     152,  281,  302,  1517 

Eadie  v.  Addison  364 

Eady  v   Watson  1798 

Eager,  Re  Eager  v.  Johnstone     449 

v   Price  1523, 1535,  1537 

r   Wiswall  1825, 1833 

Eagle  v   Beard  558,  586 

v   Le  Breton  426 

Eagle  Bank  v.  Chapin  25 

Eagle  fire  Ins  Co  v.  Cammet  194,228 


Eagle  Ins   Co  v.  Lent  389 

v   Pell  1246 

Eagle  Iron  Works,  Matter  of       173:) 

Eagle  Manuf.  Co.  t>.  Miller  2  19 

Eakin  V.  Herbert  1275 

Eames  v.  Eames         987,  1079,  1080, 

1110 

v.  Hacon      201,  202,  224,  250,  254 

v  Smith  1126 

Eardley  B   Knight  1381 

Eardy  ».  Headford  30 

Earl  r   Beadleston  1639 

v  De  Hart  1637,  1662 

v.  Ferris  109,  179,  182,  754 

v.  Matheny  1621 


Earl's  Trust,  Re  892 

Earle  v   Holt  207 

v.  Pickin  1192, 1193 

v.  Sidebottom  322,  336, 1169 

v   U'ood  1885 

Eirles  »   Earles  801 

Earp  v.  Lloyd       580,  725,  726,  774, 

1831 

Easlev  v  Tarkington  853 

Eastr  East  334.1229 

v.  Ryal  1418 

East    Anglian    Railway   Co    v. 

Goodwin  912, 913 

Eastburn  v.  Kirk     1381,  1463,  1668. 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


xivil 


[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 


Eastern  Counties  Ry.  Co.,  Re     1860 
East  India  Co.  v.  Atkius  565 


V. 

Bjizett 

1123,  1124,  list 

V. 

BoJdain 

1475,  1478 

V. 

Campbell 

563,  564,  7u2,  7o4 

V. 

Coles 

287,  559 

V. 

Donald 

713,  848 

V. 

Edwards  1561 

,  1563,  1564,  1565 

V. 

Ekines 

1393 

V. 

Henchman 

370,  506,  544 

V. 

Keighley 

1188,  1236,  1318 

V. 

Naish 

935 

V 

Neave 

565 

V. 

Kumbold 

444 

V 

Vincent 

1.338 

Edee  v   Strunk 
Edelin  v.  Lyon 

Edelsteu  v.  Edelsten 


1661 

770 


324 


East  Lancashire  Ry   Co  v.  Hat- 

tersley  1598,  1631,  1671 

East  Llangynog  Lead  Mining  Co  , 

Re  28 

East    Saginaw    S.    Ry.    Co 

Wiidman 
East  St   Louis  v   Trustees 
East   St.    Louis    C.   R.    Co    v. 

People 

Eastman    v.  Amoskeag    Manuf. 

Co.  1631,  1634,  1635,  1337, 1638, 

1639,  1640,  1641 

v.  Batehelder  1546 

v.  McAlpice  844 

v.  Plumer  385, 1889 

v  Savings  Bank  334 

v  Simpson  380,  1082 

Eastman  Co   v   Reichenbach       1650 

Easton  v.  Houston    &    T.    Ry. 

Co  1746 

r   Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  Co.       986, 

1019,  1770 

v.  London  Joint  Stock  Bank  1440, 

1449 

v.  New  York,  &c.  R  Co  1029, 

1665 

East  Pant  United  L.  M.  Co.  v. 

Merryweather  241,  306 

East  Tennessee  R.  Co  v.  Atlanta 

R   Co.  1743 

East   &    West  India    Docks    v. 

Littledale  151,  1564,  1566,  1568 
1728 
1611 
1081 
844 
1683 
1576 
631 
1677 

lass 

1247 

987 

1463 


Eastwick  v.  Conningsby 
Eastwood  v.  Glenton 

v.  Lever 
Eaton's  Appeal 
Eaton,  Re 

v.  Dickinson 

v.  Eaton 

v.  Jenkins 

v.  Lyon 

v  Simonds 

v,  Truesdail 
Eaton  R.  Co.  v.  Varnum 
Eatough    &    Co.    Lim'd,     Ex 

parte  630 

Eaves  v  Hickson  1418,  1421 

Ebb*  v  Boulnois  62,  157 

Eberhart  v  Gilchrist  1291 

Eberly  v.  Gross  3f4 

Eborn  v.  Zimpelman  879 

Ebrard  v.  Gassier  28 

Ecaubert  v.  Appleton  354 

Ecclcs  v.    Liverpool    Borough 

Bank  1601 

v   Timmons  128 

Ecclesall,  Overseers  of,  Re  1855 

Ecclesiastical     Commissioners, 

Ex  parte  1610 

v.  Marshall  280 

v.  North  Eastern  Ry.  Co.  560,  649 
Eehliff!;.  Baldwin  1652,  1665 

Eckrrt  v.  Binkley  779 

v    Wilson  1258 

Eckford  v.  Dekay  885 

v.  Eckford  1411 

Eckleman  v  Miller  1639 

Eddleston  v  Collins  125 

Eddowes  v.  Argentine  Loan  Co.    894 
Eddy,  Ex  parte  1743 

v.  Caprin  334 

v  Lafayette  1621 


1716 

610 

13S1.  1394, 

1648,  1649 

720 

1504 

1250 

1031,  1568 

1611 


Edelston  v.  Russell 
Edeu  v.  Bute,  Karl 
V.  Linireut'elter 
v  Naish 
v.  Thompson 
Eden  borough    v     Canterbury, 

Archbishop  of    1435,  1436,  1653 
Eden.-or  v.  Roberts  1570 

Kdevain  v.  Cohen  417,  659,  785 

Edgar  v.  Cleveuger  1516 

v.  Reynolds  133 

Edgcumbe  v.  Carpenter  1618 

Ed^ell  v    Francis  1130 

v.  Haywood  237,  559,  1037 

v.  Lowell  917 

Edgerv.  Knapp  1134,1137 

Edgertou  v.  Muse  1029 

Edge's  Parent,  Re  1071 

Edgett  v    Douglass  630 

Edgill  v  Brown  15-8 

Edgson  v.  Edgson  171.  429,  442 

Edichal  Bullion  Co  v.  Columbia 

G   M.  Co.  860 

Edie  v.  East  India  Co  1132 

Edinboro     Normal     School     v 

Cooper  1381 

Edington  v.  Banham  429,  1522 

Edison     Electric     Light    Co     v. 
United  States  Electric  Light- 
ing Co.  578,  581 
Edison  &  S    Electric  Light  Co. 

v.  Holland  406 

Edlesten  v.  Vick  2319 

Edm.inds  v.  Brougham,  Lord      348, 

355 

195 

2313 

1826 

461 

1517 

125,  246 

508 

1126 

418 

1169 

1725 

911 

157,  663 

703 

974 

856,  858 

295 

147 

394,395 


Edmond  v.  Caldwell 
Edmonds  v.  Benhow 

v.  Foley,  Lord 

v.  Nichol 

v.  Robinson 
Edmond>on  v   Harris 
Edmonson  V    Ueyton 

v.  Machell 
Edmund's  Appeal 
Edmunds  v.  Acland 

v.  Bird 

v.  Brougham 

v   Waugh 
Edmundson  v.  Hartley 
Edney  v   Edney 

v.  Jewell 

v  King 
Edridge  v.  Ed  ridge 
Edriugton  v.  Allsbrooks 
Edsall  v.  Vandemark 
Edsell  v.  Buchanan  370,  587,  640, 
650 
S69 
100,  109 


Edson  v.  Girvan 

Edward  v.  Cheyne 

Edward   Barr  Co.  v.  New  York 


&c.  Co. 
Edwardes  v.  Burke 
Edwards,  Ex  parte 
Ed  war,  Is,  Re 

v.  Abrey 

v.  Banksmith 

V.  Batley 

v .  Boiline 

v.  Carroll 

v  Chilton 

v.  Coombe 

V  Cunliffe 

v   Davies 

v.  Dignum 

v  Drake 

v.  Edwards 


v.  Evans 
v  Gill 
v.  Goodwin 
v .  Harvey 


v.  Hope 


1642 

29,31 

1353,  1584 

108,  1348,  1765 

86 

281 

1526 

1663 

1580 

1653 

157 

1000 

ss 

1182 

542 

283,  811, 173*.  1741, 

1771, 1780 

1126 

1274 

1181 

224,  1382.  1400, 1408, 

1421,  1795 

1447 


Edwards  v.  Jones  1823,  1829 

v   Lowther  406 

tf    M'Lear  780 

v.  MXeay  7-1 

v.  Massey        361,  1047,  1698,  1699 

v.  Matthews  11^8 

V    Maupiu  1274 

v.  Morgan  948,  lo52 

v    Poole  1(>44 

v.  Rogers  860 

v   Sartor  334 

v   Scott  1138 

v  Spaight  915 

v .  Tuck  1795 

Edwards-Wood  v   Baldwin  561 

Edwardson  v.  Maseby  1576,  1577 

Edwick  v.  Hawkes  1082 

Edwiu  v.  Thomas  1124,  1137 

Eedes  v.  Eedes  lU4,  lu7 

Effingham,     Lady     v.     Napier, 

Sir  J .  73 

Egan  v.  Baldwin  1424 

Egbert  v.  Greenwalt  851 

v.  Woods  217,  303 

Egerton  v.  Egerton  1417 

v.  Jones  1218 

Egg  v   Devey  793,  811 

Eggiutou  v   Burton  lo2 

Eggleston  v   Boardman  1845 

Kglin  v.  Dryden  100 

v.  Saudtr>on  1419 

Eglington,  Earl  of  v.  Lamb  1144, 1825 

Egmout  v.  Darell       876,  10*  J ,  1072, 

1U74 

v  Smith  195 

Egremout  v.  Cowell  360,  595 

v.  Egremout  161 

v   Thompson  229,  266 

Earl  of  v.  Hamilton  1542 

Eidam  v    Fiunegan  68 

Eigleburger  v.  Kibler  645 

Eillert  v   Craps  888,  947 

Ela  v.  Ela  560,  641 

Elam  v .  Barnes  556 

v  Donald  1290 

v   Garrard  237 

Elborne  v.  Goode       1427,  1430,  1432 

Elcock  v .  Glegg  171 

Elder  v    Bradley  353 

v.  Carter  1825 

v.  First  National  Bank  314 

v    Harris  779 

v.  Maclean  1696 

El  lerkiu  v.  Elderkin  68 

v.  Fitch  793 

v.  Shultz  197,  199 

Elders  v    Johnston  14vl 

Elderton,  Re  70 

V.  Lack  1112,1113 

Eldridge  v.  Burgess  63,  977,  979 

v   Hill  1681,  1682,  2'>40 

v.  Howell  1476,  1481 

i'   Porter  1599 

n    Wiirhtman  1031 

Electric  Telegraph  Co  ,  Re  944,  1594 

v   Nott  1598 

Electrical    Accumulator  Co.    v. 

Brush  Electric  Co  794 

v.  Julien  Electric  Co.  1120 

Electrolibration   Co     v.    Jack 

son  314,  594 

Eley,  Re  1847 

?)   Positive  Ass.  Co  307 

Elgce  v    Lovell  52 

Elias  r  Suowden  Slate  Quarries 

Co.  1632 

Elibank,  Lady  v.  Montolieu    92, 105, 
106 
Elizabethtown   Gaslight  Co    v 

Green  630 

Elkart  Car  Works  v.  Ellis  1743 

El  lame,  Re  1267 

Ellcr  i:  Bergling  190 

Ellerbe,  Re  909 

Ellerton  v  Thirsk  1671,  1684, 

1686 
Ellice  v.  Goodson  201,  409,  583 


xlviii 


TABLE   OP   CASES   CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging  ] 


EUice  v.  Roupell  681,1572, 1573, 1575 

v.  Walmsley  505 

Ellicott  v.  Nichols  64o 

v.  Warlord  17-11 

Ellington  0.  Clark  1444 

Elliugwuotl  V.  Stevenson  504 

Elliot  v.  Cochran  1029,  1308 

ii    Halinarack  106y,  1W70 

v.  Sinclair  WOG 

v.  touth  Devon  Railway  Co.     1127 

v.  Van  Voorst  131 

v.  Waring  122,  199 

Elliott  r    Amazon  Ins.  Co.  860 

v.  Balcoiu    1575,  1577, 1578. 1579, 

1582,  1584 

1794 

98 

37,  110,  111,  187,  1111 

1141 


Elton  v.  Elton 

v.  Larkius 
Elvy  v.  Norwood 
Elwell  v  Crowther 
Klwes  v.  Payne 
Elworthy  v.  Billing 
Elwyn  v.  Williams 
Ely  v.  Early 

v.  Edwards 

v.  Gay  ford 


1162| 
1100 

331,653 
1638 
1663 
1271 

119,  125 

1073 

407 

202,  204,  1514 


v  Elliott 
v.  Hooper 
v   I  nee 
v.  Nicklin 
II   Osborne 
v.  Pell 

v.  Kemmington 
v   Trahern 
Ellis,  Ex  parte 
Re 

v  Atkinson 

v.  Boston,  &c  R.  Co. 

v   Bowman 

v.  Davis 

v.  Deane 

t;   Ellis 

v.  Essex  M.  Bridge 

v.  Fletcher 

v  Foster 

v  Griffiths 

v.  King 

v.  Mi  Henry 

V   Maxwell 

v  Medlicott 

v.  No   Pacific  R.  Co. 

v.  Reynolds 

v.  Saul 

v.  Silber 

v.  Stewart 

v.  Vernon  Ice  Co. 
v.  Wait 

v.  Walmsley 

v.  Woods 

v.  Wren 
Ellison,  Ex  parte 
Re 

v.  Burgess 
v.  El  win 
v   Kittridge 
v.  Salem  C.  &  M.  Co 
v  Sharp 
v.  Thomas 
V.  Wright 
Elliston  v.  Morrison 
Ellsworth  0.  Curtis 
Ellwand  ti  McDonnell 
Ellzey  0.  Lane 
Elmendor  ll   Delancy 
Elmendorfr.  Taylor 
Elmer  v.  Creasy 

Elmhirst  »  Spencer  1636.  1637,  1638 
El  Modello  C  M  Co  v.  Gato  586 
Elms  v.  Hughes  115 

Elm^lie  v   Beresford  *>Z 

v.  Boursier 

Delaware    and    Schuylkill 


1673 
1005,  1370, 1550  | 
95  I 
830 
59 
100 
97 
1734 
1114 
533 
882 
87.  1413 
1364 
1381 
1278 
1224 
964 
631 
1321 
878 
334,  659 
149 
713,  783 
60,553 
37 
1743 
1440 
505 
678 
1638 
99,  1802 
706 
354 
119, 125 
1424 
1548 
1528 
438, 1460 
1388 
1639 
707,  708 
724 
1575 
286,  390 
149,  558.  560 
30ii,  720 
220,  418 


v.  New  Mexico  &  A.  R.  Co.      369 
630 
v.  Stewart  922 

v.  Warren  861,  941 

v.  Wilcox  1624 

Eniack  v.  Kane  1642 

Emans  v.  Emans    303,  331,  335, 339. 
340,  346.  347,  559,  5c-3,  598 

Embury  v  Bergamini  1027 

v.  Klemm  1029.  1580 

Emden  !'.  Carte 

Emeric  v   Alvarado 

Emerick  v   Armstron 

Emeris  v   Woodward 

Emerson  0.  Atkinson 
v.  Atwater 


Enochs  v.  Harrelson 
Enos  v.  Capps 
Enraght  v.  Fitzgerald 
Ensign  v.  Kellogg 
Ensminger  v.  Powers 
Ensworth  v.  Card 


590 

163 

1027,  1215 

197,  199 

1580 

1427 


Badger 
v.  Berkley 

v   Davies 

v.  Emerson 

v.  UarlanJ 

v.  Sims 

V.  Udall 

r.  Walker  Township 
Emery's  Trusts,  Re 
limery  v.  Bidwell 

v.  Downing 

v.  Erskine 

v.  Mason 

v.  Newsou 

v.  P.irrot 

v  Van  Sickle 


59,  406 

1461,  1716 

1461, 1485 

1031 

385, 1918 

1300 

1649 

882,  884 

1478,  1479,  2334 

805, 809 

622, 2095 

378 

1623 

314 

123,  179 

547 

524,  525,  529,  740 

303 

1168 

169,  516 

176 

1622 


v.  Lambert      194,  294,  1532,  1533 
Enthoven  v.  Cobb  1834 

Episcopal  Church  v  Leroy  619 

Equestrian  &  P.  B.  Co.,  Re  27 

Equitable  Life  Ass.  Soc.  v.  Laird 

402.  458 
v.  Patterson  190,  334,  589 

Equitable  Reversionary  Interest 

Society  v  Fuller  1791 

Erhardt  v.  Boaro  1628,  1638 

Erickson  v.  Nesmith      144,  149,  150, 

152,  267,  271,  272,  273,  282,  290, 

458,  1935 

v.  Smith  443 

Erie  Ry.  Co.  v.  Heath  _  2394 

v.  Ramsey  1557,  1567,  1568 

Erie  Tel.  Co.  v.  Grimes  586 

Ernest  v.  Govett  796,  801,  806 

v.  Partridge        590,  595,  796,  1440 

Weiss        26,  315,  542,  868,  1394 


Errat  v.  Barlow 

Errington  v.  Attorney-General 


Emigrant  Industrial  S   Bank  v. 

Goldman  214 

Emma  Silver  Mining  Co.,  Re        909 
v.  Emma  Silver  Mining  Co   of 

New  York  607 

v  Grant  157 

v.  New  York  Emma  S   M.  Co. 

1168 
Emmerson,  Re 

v.  Ind 
Emmet  v.  Tottenham 


v.  Aynesly 
Erskine,  Re 

v.  Bize 

v.  Garthshore 

v.  Henry 
Ervin  v.   Oregon  Ry.    &    Nav. 

Co. 
Erwin  v.  Davenport 

v  Lowry 

v.  Meyrose 

v  Oldham 

v.  Reese 

v.  Vint 
Esdaile  ;•.  La  Nauze 

v   Molineux 


1358 
139, 
1562 
1660 

106 
1828 

347 
1481 


1686 
1835 
259,  1386, 
1391 
610 
1824 
1517 


Emmott  v-  Mitchell 

v.  Walters 
Emory  v.  Keighan 
Empire  Loau  &  B.  Ass'n  v.  At 

lanta  1663 

Empress  Engineering  Co.,  Re       323 
Empringham  v.  Short       1059,  1304 


Canal  Co 

r.  M'Aulay 
Elridge  r   Smith 
Elritigton  >■    Elrington 
Elrod  ;•    Myers 
Elsam  v.  Allcock 
Elsev  v.  Adams 
Elsom,  He,  Thomas  t 
Elston  v    Blanchard 

r   Elston 

v   Wood 
Elt  v   Burial  Board 
Kiting  B.  Dayton 
El  toft  I)    Brown 
Elton  f   Curteis 


1614 

322,323 

552 

95 

1360 

39 

791.  898, 1669 

Elsora  71 

324 

9«5 

185 

396 

418 

1175 

999,  1259 


Empson  v.  Bowley 

v.  Fairfax 
Emslie  v  Wildman 
Endicott  v.  Mathis 
Endo  v   Caleham 
Endter  v   Le-mon 
Engel  e    Scheuerman 
Engelhardt,  Ex  parte 
England,  Re 

v.  Codrington 

v  Curling 

v.  Downs 

v.  Ventham 


1309,  1453 

4S1 

1109 

1132 

1664,  1684 

665 

1618 

1627 

157 

1349,  1359 

1392 

2236 

109,  1191, 1416 

1510 


England  Bank,  East  of,  Re        1041, 

1048 

Engleback  r   Nixon  157 

Engleheart  v.  Ordell  1740 

English  v.  Baring  1253,  2194 

v.  Foxall  378,  379 

v   Hayman  1540 

«.  Smock  1637 

v  Tottie  573 

Ennorr   Barwell  1599,2309 

v.  Galena  1120 

Eno  0.  Tatam  1491 


26 

1752 

1468 

1576 

1037 

587 

1026,  1030 

1651 

681,701,764,  766, 

2124 

r\  Peacock  1407 

0.  Stephenson        1218,  1219,  1220 
Eshhach  0.  Slonaker  149 

Espey  v.  Lake  1651 

E'pin  v.  Pemberton  675 

E>pinola  v   Blasco  378 

Essex  Co.  v.  Lawrence  Machine 

Shop  1935 

Essex  Freeholders  v.  Newark  City 

Nafl  Bank  630 

Essex  Paper  Co.  v  Greacen  586 

Estcourt  v.  Estccurt's  H   E.  Co. 

1397,  1650 

0.  Ewington  181,  182,  500 

Este  0.  Strong  986 

Estep  v.  Wat  kins  361,  847,  994 

Esterbrook  Steel  Pen  Manuf.  Co 

0.  A  hern  159 

Estes  r.  Belford  149 

v.  Worthington  269,  634 

Estill  v.  Clay 
E.-tis  v  Patton 
Estwick  0  Conningsby 
Etches  v   Lance 


286 
1625 
1728 
1670,  1704, 1707, 
1708 


Etna,  The 
Etting  0.  Marx 
Etty  0.  Bridges 
Eubank  0.  Wright 
Eubanks  v.  Leveridge 
European  Bank,  Re 
European  Central  Ry.  Co.,  Re 
Eustace  r.  Lloyd 
Evan  0.  Avon 
Evans,  Ex  parte 


Re 

v.  Bacon 
V   Bagshaw 
v  Benyon 
v.  Bicknell 
v.  Bremridge 


560 

1693 

1599 

652 

1603 

1255 

1627 

8,547 

1037,  1063,  1585, 

1733, 1736 

70  505,1168 

1584,  1585,  2069 

401,407 

1491 

324.  843 

553,1625 


Evans  v.  Brown 
v  Buck 

v.  Caiman 
v.  Carrington 
v.  Cassidy 
v.  Chism 
v.  Clement 
v.  Cleveland 
v.  Cogan 


v.  Coventry      234,  304,  1671, 1728 

v.  Davies  1064 

v.  Davis  387,  1398 

v  De  Lay  109 

v.  Dillingham  1743 

v   Eaton  915 

v.  Evans      200,  315,  542,  602,  868, 
970,1157,  1297,1300,1713 

v.  Gage  1661 

v.  Goodwin  630 

v   Harris  603,619,620 

v.  Jones  1429 

v.  Lewis  630 

v.  Mathias  1743,  1748 

v.  Parrott  1575 

v.  Richard  1818,  1833 

v.  Kobinson  1138 

t>   Schafer  378 

v.  Sheldon  790 

v.  Smallcombe  1-5' »3 

v.  Staples  1553 

v.  Tatein  251 

v.  Taylor  1618 

v  Twredy  642 

v.  Union  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  2398 


TABLE    OP    CASES    CITED. 

[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 

58    Evans  v.  Van  Hall  504 

334        v.  Williams  516,  1035 

189  Evans's  Estate,  lie  1411 
179,  553  Evansville  R.  Co.  v.  Maddux  542 
5,  45,  87     Evarts  v.  Beeker              457,  458,  518 

190.  292        v.  Nason  1268 

1576    Evartson  v.  Tappan  1369 

1542     Eveland  v.  Stepheusou  312 

185     Eveleth  v.  Wilson  849 

Evelyn  v.  Chippendale  28 

v.  Evelyn  320 

v.  Lewis  1(43 

Everard  v.  Warren  1227 
Everest  v.  Buffalo  L.  O.  Co.       1122, 
1403,  1642 

Everett  v.  Backhouse  14U4 

v.  Paxton  100 
v.  Prythergch              348,  354,  507 

v.  Winn  197,  424 

v.  Yowells  1107 

Everhart  v.  Everhart  553 

v.  Huntsville  College  357 

Everitt  v.  Watts  615,  620 

Evershed  v.  Evershed  1585 

Everson  v.  Matthews  38 

Evitt  v.  Price  1650 

Evory  «   Candee  2397 

Ewart  v.  Chubb  87,  179 

v.  Williams  1232 

Ewer  v.  Ambrose  1100 

Swing  v.  Armstrong  997 

v.  Duncan  360 

v.  Handley  121 

v  Highbee  161 


xlix 


Ewing  v.  Maury 

635 

v   Nickle 

1625 

v.  Orr  Ewing 

S57,  629 

v.  Shaunahan 

644 

Ewings  v.  Waite 

1292 

Ewins  v.  Gordon 

385 

Exchange  Banking  Co  ,Re  644 

Exeter  Bank  v.  Sullivan  646 

Exeter  College  v.  Rowland  345 

Exeter  and  Crediton  Railway  Co. 

v   Buller  241,  306 

Expo.-ito  v.  Bowdea  51 

Exton  v.  Greaves  1244 

v.  Turner  1122 

Evkyn,  Re  117 

Eyles  p.  Ward  1178,  1590,  1592 

Eyre  f.  Barrow  1069 

V.  Bret  1525,  1526 

».  Cox  236,  645 

v.  Dolphin  679,  698,  850 

v.  Guiding  1254 

V.  Hughes  1550 

v.  M'DoweU  1503 

V.  Marsden  1428-1430.  1465 

v.  Potter  328,  382 

v.  Rogers  579 

v.  Shaftesbury,  Countess  of    1347, 

1350,  1352,  1354 

*'.  Smith  157,  553 

Eyster  v.  Gaff  159,  197 

Eyton  v.  Denbigh  1744 

v.  Eyton  185,  1475 


F. 


Fabre  v.  Colden  90 

Fabrilius  v.  Cock  1133 

Facer  v.  Midvale  8.  W.  Co.  1642 

Fackler  v.  Worth  1056,  1062 

Fadden  v.  McFadden  1586 

Fadelle  v.  Bernard  68,  164 

Fagau  v.  Strong  27 

Fagg  v.  James  710 

Fahie  v.  Lindsay  1562 

Fahs  v.  Roberts  1517 

Failey  v.  Talbee  1743 

Fairbank  v.  Cudworth  1630 
Fairbanks  v.  Amoskeag  Bank      10U3 


v.  Belknap 
Fairbrothf  r  v.  Pratteut 


1561,  1565 
151,  1560, 
1568 
Fairburn  v.  Pearson  1727 

Fiirchild  v.  Hunt  1400 

F  lircloth,  He  36 

Fairfield  v.  Weston  1744 

Fairham,  &c.  Co.  v.  Adams         1636 
Fairlie  v    I)  •ut.ou  1104 

Fairly  v   Priest  344 

Fairmao  v.  Green  1358 

Fairthorne  v    Weston  333.  722 

Fait  i  v.  M'Intyre  1106 

Faithful  v    Hunt  257 

Faithful!  V    Ewen  1040,  1847 

F.ilcke  '■.  Scottish  Imperial  Ins. 

Co  1580, 2064 

Falk  v.  Gast  Lithograph  Co.        1643 

v  Howell  1643 

v.  Janes  1743 

v.  Turner  844 

Falkland  Islands  Co.  v.  Lafone    396, 

397,  731,  1548 

Fdk'and.  Lady  v.  Cheney,  Lord  1475 

Faikner  v.  Equitable  Reversion 


Falls  of  Neuse  Manuf.  Co.  v. 

Georgia  Home  Ins  Co.  1120 

Falmouth,  Earl  of  v.  Roberts      1128 

Fane  v    Fane  1405 

v.  Richards  1525 

Fanning  v.  Dunham  386,  1602 

v    Fly  1003 

v.  Foley  164 

v  Pritchett  841,842 

Fanshaw  v.  Fanshaw  629 

Fanshawe  v.  Tracy  1614,  1683 

Fant  v.  Miller  843,  1116 

Farabow  v.  Green  1628 

Farebrother  v.  Welchmau  1625 

Fargo  v.  Southeastern  Ry.  Co     1427 

Farhall  v.  Farhall  1842 

Farina  v.  Silverlock  995, 1649, 

2319 


Farington,  Re 
Farland  V.  Wood 
Farley  v.  Blood 


850,895 

369 

1560-1562.  1564, 

1565,  1568-1570 

1476 

604,  689,  830,  843 

1287 


ary  Soc. 

1276 

t;  Grace 

983 

Fill  P.  

53,57 

p    Elkins 

1726 

Fallon  v.  Railroad  Co 

1663 

Fallo.ves  v.  Williamson 

1509,  1511. 

1538,  1541 

Billow*  v.  Dillon.  Lord 

1367 

VOL.  I. — d 

t).  Farley 
v.  Kittson 

Farlow  v    Wieldon 

Farmer  v  Curtis  214,  215 

v   Dean  127 1 

v.  National  Life  Ass.  149 

v.  Rogers  334 

Farmers'  Bank  v.  Beasten  1744 

v.  Haunon  190 

Farmers',  &o.  Bank  v.  Ruse        1622 
v.  Vanmeter  1621,  1622 

Farmers'  and  Planters'  Bank  v. 

Martin  1283 

Farmers'  Loan  &  Trust  Co.  v. 

Bankers'  &  M.  Tel.  Co      1517 
v.  Burlington  &  S.   W.  Ry. 

Co  1743 

f  Central  R.  Co.  1168,  1467,  1743, 
1746 
v.  Green  Bay  R.  Co.  1580 

v.  Hoffman  House  1734 

v.  Kansas  City  R.  Co.  1716 

v   Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  1743 

v.  Reed  163 


Farmers'  Loan  &  Trust  Co.  v. 

Seymour  1508, 154 

v.  Texas  Western  Ry   Co.  517 

V.  Toledo  &  S.  H.  R.  Go.  1561 

v.  WateTman  1461 

Farmers'  Loan  Co.  v.  Central 

Iowa  R.  Co.  1168 

v  San  Diego  Street  Car  Co.        339 

Fanners'  National  Bank  v.  Llovd  214 

Farnam  v.  Brooks         324,  372,  560, 
641,644,645,  649,667 

Farnham  v.  Campbell  237,  559, 

1716 

v.  Clements         365,  558,  561,  655 

Farnell  v.  Bowman  133 

Farnsworth  v.  Cole  1166 

v.  Fowler  1673,  1684 

Farnum  v.  Blackstone  Canal 

Corp.  2312 

v  Boutelle  284 

v.  Burnett  844 

v.  Pitcher  1110 

Farquharson  v.  Balfour        725,  771, 

772,  773,  1439,  1828 

v.  Pitcher        806.  1380,  1601,  1621 

v.  Seton  664,  842,  868,  1370 

Farr  t».  Scott  989 

0.  Sheriffe  730,  1413,  1432 

Farrall  r   Davenport  1728 

Farrand   v.  Yorkshire  Banking 
Co.  674 

Farrant  r.  Lee  1630 

0.  Lovel  1630 

Farrar  v.  Barraclough  2116 

v.  Cooper  671 

v    Farrars  1271 

Farrel  p.  856 

Farrell  v.  Smith  250,  1207 

Farrer  v,  Clark  ia53 

)■   Hutchinson  1780 

f   Lacy  32 

v.  Sykes  899 

Farrindon  i>.  Lee  641 

Farrington  v.  Chute  670 

v.  Harrison  843 

v.  Parker  1412 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 


Farris  v.  Houston  1675 

Farrow  v.  Austin  1425 

v.  Kees  1394 

Farwell  v  Sturdivant        1241, 1252, 

1259,  1260 

Faulconberg,  Lord  v.  Peirce         1121 

Faulder  v.  Stuart  300,  483,  720 

Faulk  v.  Fau.k  1076 

Faulkland  v.  Stanion  52 

Famkner,  lie  18l7 

v.  Bolton  1001 

i    v  Daniel  201,291,292,1731 

v  .  Llewellyn  815 

Fauquier  v.  Tynte  877,  919 

Faure  v.  Winans  124*3 

Faussett  v.  Oruisby  1478 

Favershani  Charities,  lie   1797,  1852 

Faviel  v.  Eastern  Counties  Ry. 

Co.  307 

Fawrett  v.  Lawrie  241 

Fawcus  v.  Charlton  543 

Fawkner  v.  Watts  1358 

Fawkes  v.  Pratt  390 

Fay  v.  Bradley  1255 

V.  Howe  1369 

v.  Jones  584 

Fay  lor  v.  Brice  565 

Fear  v.  Cattle  189 

Fearev  v   Hayes  402,  417 

Fearns  v.  Young  81,  1233 

Fearusjde  v   Flint  650 

Fearon  v   Desbrisay  1031 

Fearv  v.  Stephenson  1510,  1533 

Feather  V    Reg.  133 

Featherstonaugh   v.    Lee    Moor 

Clay  Co  1650 

Feather-tone  v.  Cooke  332,  1728 

v.  Ormonde  Cycle  Co.  1642 

Feaver  v.  Williams     578,  1834,  1835 

Fechheimer  v.  Baum  313, 1381 

Feehter  v.  Montgomery  1654 

Feckhan  v.  Buffum     '  860 

Feehan  v.  Maudeville  407 

Feemster  v.  Markham  1507 

Feilden  v.  Slater  1657 

Feise  v.  Parkinson  1132,  1133 

Feiscel  v.  King's  College    1678, 1694, 

1697,  1730 

Felch  v.  Hooper      287,  292,  629,  841 

Fell  man  v  Gamble  850 

Felkin  v.  Herbert,  Lord       131,  462, 

536,  887, 1070,  1832 

V.  Lewis  1602 

Fell  v.  Brown         149,  151,  152.  194, 

214,  283,  997 

v.  Christ's  College  351,  539 

v.  Jones  1801  j 

v.  Lutwidge  318,  1409 

Fellingham  v   Sparror  10!)8 

Fellow  r.  Jermyn  134*3 

Fellows  v.  Barrett  37,  74  j 

v.  Deere  34,  403  j 

v.  Fellows  334,  338,  341,  I'll!) 

v  Muller  354  ; 

Felstead  v.  Gray  972,  973  I 

Felthamt;   Clark  291 

V  Turner  881 
Felthouse  v.  Bailey  910 
Felts  v.  Mayor  of  Memphis  23,  1512 
Felty  v  Calhoon  1576 
Female     Orphan     Asylum     v. 

Waterlow  1081 

Fenrott  v.  Clarke  885,  896, 1827 

Fendall  v.  Nash  ia58 

v   O'Connell  354 

Fcnelev  v.  Mahonev  37,  75 

Fcnhouletr'  Passavant  348,349,354 
Fenn  v    Edmonds  1564 

v.  Holme  313 

Fennall  v.  Brown  891,  1669 

Fenner  v.  Agutter  1299 

V  London   &   South    Eastern 

Ry.  Co.  573 

*  Taylor  106,107,1437 

i'.  WTson  1642  j 

Feonessy  v   Clark  720  | 

v  D  .y  1395  | 


Fennings  v.  Humphrey 

815 

817, 
1589 
425 

Fenno  v.  Coulter 

Feutiman  v.  Feutiman 

1359, 

22:  i2 

Feutou  v.  Browne 

1399 

v.  Clayton 

429 

v.  Crickett 

1310, 

1449 

V    Cumberlege 

901 

v.  Hughes            145, 

157,  296, 3( 

v.  Lowther 

10.33 

v.  Lumberman's  Bank  1591 

v.  Queen's  Ferry    Wire   Rope 

Co.  157,  225,  307 

v.  Wills  1430 

Fenwiek  v.  Bell  1100 

v.  Bulman  230,2,9 

v.  James  1112 

v.  Macey  640 

v.  lieed  299,  873, 1825,  1827 

Ferebeu  v.  Proctor  254 

Fergus  v.  Gore  642,  12t»0 

Ferguson  v.  Applenhite 


v.  Beavan 

2126 

v.  Dent 

39 

v.  Ferguson 

227,1069 

v.  Fisk 

292 

v.  Gibson 

1437 

v.  Kimball 

1489 

v.  Miller 

658,  661 

v.  O  Harra 

717.  788 

v.  Smith 

182,' 

v.  Tadman 

1471   1814 

v.  Wilson 

912, 1081 

13bl,  1488 

Fernandez,  Ex  parte  1)42,  1103 

t>   Corbiu  449,  1452 

Fernie  v.  Young       1071.  1080,  1087, 

1120,  1149, 1502 

Fernyhough  v   Naylor  897 

Ferraby  v.  Hobsou  328,  381 

Ferrand  v.  Bradford  397 

v.  Hamer  424,  698,  1675 

v.  Milligan  1126 

v.  Pelham  739 

Ferrar  v.  Ferrar  347 

Ferrer  v.  Barrett  267 

Ferrers  v.  Cherry  1542 

Countess  of  v.  Ferrers,  Eirl     1256 

Ferrier  v.  Atwool  579,  1832 

Ferrior,  In  re  17i0 

Ferris  v.  Hard  843,  850 

v.  Streeper  14*37 

Ferriss  v.  Lewis    266,  457,  1150,  1157 

Ferry  v.  Fisher  929 

v.  Laible  334 

Festiug  v .  Allen  1383 

Fetherly  v .  Waggoner  873 

Fettiplaee  ».  Gorges  186 

Feucheres,  Baron  de  v.  Dawes       748 

F'eutchwanger  v.  M'Cool        354,  749 

Few  v.  Guppy  581,  1113, 1557 

Fidelity  Ins.  Co.  v.  Shenandoah 

Iron  Co.  1168,  1312,  1408 

Fidelity  Ins  Co.'s  Appeal  1163 

Fidelity   Title   &    Trust   Co.    v. 

Weitzel  843 

Fidelity  Trust  Co.  v.  Gill  Car  Co.    60 

Fidelity   Trust   &   S.  V.  Co    v. 

Mobile  St.  Ry.  Co.        243,  1548, 

1743 

Fidel  le  v.  Evans  791 

Field,  Ex  parte  1689,  1690 

v.  Ashley  565 

v   Beaumont  1558 

v.  Great  Western  Ry.  Co.         1138 


r.  Hitchcock 

1231 

v.  Holland 

841 

1077,  1221 

v.  Holzman 

334 

v  Hopkins 

1414 

v.  Hutchinson 

561 

v.  Jones 

1715,  1741 

v.  Maghee 

197 

v   Moore 

108 

v  Op|>enstein 

1381 

v.  Robinson 

794 

v.  Ross 

993 

v.  Schieffelin  948, 1364, 1479, 1549, 
1550 


Field  v.  Seward  1214 

v.  Sowle  186,  850 

v.  Titmus  236,  1209,  1210 

v.  Wilbur  813 

v.  Williamson  165,  167 

Fielde  v.  Cage  838 

Fielden  v.  Blackburn,  Corp.  of   1638 

v.  lioscheu  888 

v.  Northern  Ry.  of  B.  A.  Co.     611 

V.  Slater  842,  891   S19,  1654 

Fieldtrv   Fielder  1288 

v   Higgiusou  1400,1408 

Fields  v.  Helms  &34 

v.  Hur.-t  1168 

v.  Wheatley  284 

Fiery  v.  Knimert  26,  334,  345 

Fieske  v.  Buller  451 

Fife  v.  Clayton  380,  3«5,  1551 

Filth  National  Bank  v.  Long  131 

Fifty  Associates  v.  Tudor  1638 

Fiider  v.  Bellingham  l'i92 

Fildes  v.  Hooker  1219 

Fi.kin  v.  Hill  418 

Finance   Co.  v.  Charleston  &c. 

R   Co.  1734 

Financial  Corporation  v.  Bristol 

and  North  Somerset  Ry.  Co.  785 

Finch  v   Brown  1252 

v.  Finch  153,  227,  565,  643 

v.  Hoi  linger  1625 

v  Shaw  676,  999, 1000, 1469 

v.  Westrope  426 

v.  Wincuelsea,  Lord       1538,  1539, 

1544,  1799 

Finden  v.  Stephens  316,  1378,  1379, 

1602 

Findlay  v.  Lawrence  805,  808 

Findley  v.  Hinde  392,  395 

Fingal  v.  Blake         1074,  1720,  1725, 

1732 

Finks,  lie  1770 

Fiuley  v.  Bank  of  U.  S.        194.  214, 

1207 

v.  Harrison  344 

V.  Lynch  989 

v.  Taylor  1580, 1584 

Finn's  Case  1118 

Finney  v.  Bedford  Ins.  Co.    195,  325 

v.  Godfrey  351 

v  Hinde  1041 

Finska  A.  A  v.  Brown  1385 

Firkins  v.  Low  579 

Firuiin  ;;.  Pulham  1417 

First  Congregational    Society  v. 

Trustees  of  the  Fund,  &c.     550 
First  National  Bank,  Be  1507 

v.  Bininger  1566 

v.  Bohne  659 

v.  Douglass  County  16*31 

v.  Forest  133 

v.  Houts  1051 

V.  Kingsley  546 

v.  Moore  334 

v   Navarro  1663 

v.  Salem   Capitol  Flour  Mills 

.Co  214, 1553 

v.  Smith  542 

r.  Stephenson  860 

v  Taylor  1639 

v   West  River  R.  Co.  1569 

First    Universalist    Society    v. 

Fitch  2030 

Firth  v.  Bush  449 

v.  Ridley  418 

v.  Slingsby  642,  646 

v.  The  Queen  133 

Fischers.  Blank  1648 

v.  Hayes    314,  829,  890,  1168,  2391 

v.  Laack  '03 

v.  O'Shaugnessey  314 

v.  Wilson  829,  830 

Fish  v   Dodge  1635 

v.  Howland  193,  220,  k38 

v.  Miller        614,  669,  695,  697,  829 

Fishback  v.  State  1069 

v.  Weaver  991 

Fishburn  v,  Sanders  1255 


Fishel  v.  Lueckel 
Fisher,  Re 

v.  Board 

v.  Brierley 

v.  Bunbury 

v   Carroll 


1643 
1770 
1653 
1503 
28 
1072 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 

[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging] 

Flegg  v.  Prentia  1036 

Fleischauer  v.  Dittenhoefer  1743 

Fleming  v.  Armstrong  1103 

v-  Collins  1634 

V.  East  1317,  1366,  1374 


li 


v.  Charter  Oak  Life  Ins.  Co.      550 
v.  Coffey  893 

v.  Essex  Bank  148 

v.  Fair  1120 

v.  Fisher  63,  740,  814,  1544 

v.  Holden  1517 

v  H  ipper  1150 

v.  Hubbell  216 

v.  Kay  285 

v.  Keane  332, 1(363 

v   London  Offices  Co.  309 

v.  Mee  691,  816 

v.  Melles  83,  86 

v.  Moog  349,  378,  737 

v.  Owen  347.  579 

v.  Porch  1073 

v  Price  722 

v  Quick  791 

v.  Stovall  794 

v.  Tucker  644 

fishmongers'  Co.  v.  East  India 

Co.  1637 

Fisk,  Ex  parte  1556,  1573 

Fisler  v.  Porch  844,  1073,  1076, 

1230 
Fitch  v.  Brower  1561 

v.  Chapman  681 

v  Fitch  68 

v.  Minshall  1274 

v.  Richardson  1713 

v.  Weber  47 

Fittou's  Estate,  Re  1366 

Fitton  v.  Macclesfield   39,  1576,  1583 
v.  Phoenix  Ass   Co.  1071 

Fitzgerald,  He  1433 

v.  Bult  810,  1558,  1625,  1672 

v.  Caldwell  1255 

V.  Chapman  123,  179 

v.  Cummings  584 

v.  Deshler  1663 

v.  Fitzgerald  123,  661,  1174 

v.  Gray  1698 

v.  Missouri  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  357 

v.  O'  Flaherty  839,855 

v.  Priugle  1416,  1419 

Fitzgerald  &  M.  C.  Co.  v.  Fitz- 
gerald 149 
Fitzgibbon  v.  Barry                        243 
Fitzherbert  v.  Fitzherbert     875,  876 
Fitzhugh  V    Everingham               1720 
v   Fitzhugh                      1120,  1147 
v.  Lee                                             935 
v.  McPherson              518,  539.  844 
Fitzmaurice  v.  Sadlier                     617 
Fitzpatrick  v  Domingo                 2388 
v  M  Donald                                 1817 
v.  Mahony                                    1252 
v.  Power                                      422 
v.  Smith                                       671 
Fitzsimmons  v   Ogden                     669 
Fitzwater,  Re                                 170 
v    Waterhouse                               170 
Flack  v   Holm    49,  1703,  1704, 1712, 
1713 
Fladong  v   Winter                          1209 
Flagg  v.  Bonnell                     632,  697 
v.  Mann                      657,  844,  2254 
Flamang's  Ca«e                             1632 
Flanagan  v  Nolan                1419,  1421 
Flanders  v.  Chamberlain               378 
v.  Hall                                            659 
Flaunagan  v.  Kips                        1629 
Flannery  v.  Flannery                    1381 
Flash  v.  Wilkerson                 236,  313 
Flavel  v.  Harrison                          1649 
Flavell  v.  Flavell                      918,  930 
Fleece  v.  Russell                               601 
Fleet  v.  Perrina                        89,  118 
Fleetwood    v.    Dorsey    Machine 
Co                                             860 
v.  Green                                     988 


v   Gilmer 
v.  Grafton 
v.  Nunn 
Fletcher  v.  Beatey 
v   Coleman 
v.  Crosbie 
v.  Dodd 
v.  Gibbon 
v.  Green 
v.  Holmes 
v.  Moore 


248 

235 

1618 

1638 

214 

1105 

1755,  1756 

268 

842,  1370 

230,  245,  1550 

70,  411 


v.  New  Orleans,  N.  E.  R   Co    313, 

565,  1654 

v.  Pollard  1250 

v.  Reed  1195 

v.  Rodgers  1627,  1628 

v   Rogers  1001 

v.  Wier  841,  886 

Flewellen  v.  Crane  545 

Flight  v.  Bolland  68.69 

v.  Couiao  1278 

v.  Cook  1652 

v.  Marriott  1491 

p.  Robinson  578,  1834 

v.  Thomas  1501 

Fliudt  v.  Waters  51 

Flint  v.  Brandon  1660 

v    Field  3i0 

v    Hutchinson  S   B   Co  1620 

Flint    River    Steamboat   Co.  v. 

Roberts  1071 

Fliut.jffy    Uaynes  1212 

Flippin  v.  Knaffle      1619.  1664,  1675 

Flockton  v.  Peake        551,  912,  1440, 

1144,  1799,  18:56 

v  Slee  1526 

Flood  v  Patterson  648 

Flora  v.  Rogers  778 

Florence  v.  Mallinson  1381 

Florence  Gas  Co  v   Hanby  1743 

Florence  Sewing  Machine  Co  v. 

Grover     &     Baker    Sewing 

Machine  Co.  149 

v   Singer  Manuf.  Co.  149 

Florida  v   Georgia  135,  441 

Florida  Central  R.  Co.  v.  Bisbee  991 

Flour  City  Nat.  Bank  v    Wech- 

selberg  26 

Flower  v.  Baker  449 

v    Klumbach  615 

v.  Bright  491 

v   Buller  113,  186,  206 

v  Gedye  971.  978 

V.  London,      Brighton,      and 

South  Coast  Ry.  Co  1650 

v.  Lloyd  438,  1504,  1575,  1584 


v   Rose 

149 

v.  Walker 

1217 

Flowerday  v.  Collet 

930 

Flowers  v.  Barker 

212 

Floyd  v   Barker 

1411 

v  Jones 

860 

v.  Nangle 

512, 536 

v    Ritter 

361,  407,  1567 

Fludyer  v  Cocker 

1402 

Flu^d  v.  Fluid 

1791 

Fluker  v.  Taylor 

551,  1929 

Flux  v.  Best 

1403 

Flynn,  Re,  Guy  v  McCarthy 


Foakes  v.  Webb 
Foden  v   Finney 
Fodringham  v.  Chomeley 
Fogg  v.  Blair 

v   Merrill 

v   Nevada  C   O.  Ry.  Co 

v   Order  of  the  Golden  Lion 

v    Price 

v   Rogers 

v   Union  Bank  418  1504 

Foley  v.  Hill  551,  655.  678.  679, 

1929,  2095 


237, 

1437 

573,  578 

97 

1671 
545 
517 
303 

17.33 
560 
338 


Foley  D  Maillardet  449,  452 ,  453, 536, 

550 

v.  Smith  505,  796,  1787 

Foliguo,  Re  1412 

Foliugo  v  Martin  1221,  1282 

Folland  v.  Lamotte  1595 

Follett  v  Delany  1663 

v  .lefferyes  577,  1651 

Folley  v  City  of  Passaic  1650 

Folsom  v   Marsh      1646,  1647,  1973, 

2314 

Fonda  v.  Burton  1320 

v   Sage  lb"24 

Fongay  v.  Conrad  996 

Fontelieu  v .  Gates  1461 

Fooks,  Re  1203 

v   Wilts  Ry.  Co.  1631 

Foote  v  Cuuard  Mining  Co.  26 

v.  Despain  1625 

v  Gibbs  659,  S94,  995 

v    tlayne  576 

*;   Mass   Benefit  Ass'n  536 

V   Sewall  1381 

v    Van  Ranst  1311 

Footman  v   Pray     190,  252,  253,  296 

Footner  e    Figes  1136 

Fopping  v.  Van  Pelt  157 

Forbes  v    Forbes  933 

Memphis,  &c   R.  Co.      287,  531 


v.  Uverby 
v.  Peacock 
v.  Phipps 
v.  Preston 
v.  Skelton 
v.  Stevens 
v.  Tanner 
v.  Taylor 
v  Tucker 
v.  Tuckerman 
v   Whitlock 

Force  v.  Martin 

Ford,  Re 


560 

1182,  1196 

119 

322,  802,  807,  808 

612,  625.  2095 

405,  407,  416,  418 

718.  1829 

1404,  1427 

602 

87,  986,  1018 

584 

1100 

102,  103 

v  877 

v.  Bartlett  441 

v.  Boucher  29 

v.  Chesterfield    160,  708,  710  1390, 

1411,  1424,  1425 

v   De  Pontes  1834 

v   Dolphin  1827 

v   Ford  960 

v.  Gardner  1113,  1120 

v.  Kansas  City,  &c.  R   Co.       1716 

v   Kurtz  1396 

v.  Lacy  1127 

v    Peering  320,  546 

v.  Philpot  1244 

v.  Rosenthal  236 

v.  Tennant    190,574,578,902  943 

v.  Tynte  983,  133",  1633 

v.  Wastell  998,  999   1028 

v.  White  61,  1*30,  216 

Ford's  Charity,  Re  1852,  1856 

Forderi).  Wade  877 

Fordyce  v.  Beecher  1765 

v.  Bridges  265 

v.  Ford  988 

Fore  v.  Fore  1491 

v .  Foster  197 

Foreign  Bondholders  v.  Pastor      142 

Fore   Street    Warehouse   Co    v 

Durrant  444 

Foreman  r.  Cooper  18  J7 

v    South  wood  797 

Forgay  v.  Conrad         994,  996, 1461, 

1463,  1491,  1492 

Fornian  v   Blake  797 

v.  Homfray  332 

Forniquet  V.  Forstall  345 

Fornshill  v   Murray  1076 

Forrest  v.  Elwes  1769 

v.  Forrest  1698.  1707 

v.  Manchester,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  26, 246 

e.  Robinson  601 

v.  Warrington  115 

Forrester  v.  Helme  885.  896 

v.  Read  1399 

v.  Vason  860 


lii 


Forrester  v.  Waller 

v.  Wilson 
Forrester's  Casi- 
Forsaith   Machine   Co 

Mills  L.  Co. 
Forshaw,  Re 
v.  Mot  train 
Forster  v.  Abraham 
v.  Davies 
v.  Hale 
v.  M'Kenzie 
v.  Menzies 
r   Patterson 
v.  Thompson 
Forsyth,  Re 
v.  Clark 
v  Ellice 
Forsythe  v.  McCreight 

v.  McMurty 
Fort  v.  Battle 
v.  GarUide 
v  Groves 
v   Orudorf 
v.  Ragusin 
Fortescue  V.  Hallett 
Forth  v.  Xenia 
Fort  Smith  v.  Brogan 
Fosbrook  v.  Woodcock 
Fosdick  V.  Schall 
Foss  v.  Crisp 
v   Harbottle 
v.  Haynes 
v.  Waguer 
Foster,  Re 
Foster  v.  Ballenberg 
v.  Bell 
v.  Bonner 
B   Bowman 
v.  Bradford 
t>.  Burem 
V.  Cautley 
v.  Cockerel! 
V.  Coleman 
v  Cooke 
v   Crossin 
v  Dawber 
v.  Deacon 
V    Donald 
v.  Elsworth 
V .  Everard 
Usher 


1647 
1625 
1647 
Hope 

1663 

1844 

60 

1282 

1434,  1440 

365 

643,  1211 

448,  461,  538,  1510 

651 


TABLE    OF   CASES   CITED. 

[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging  ] 

Foulkes  v.  Davies    230,  233,  335,  40 


643 

1841 

846,  1230 

857,  939 

1621 

790 

68 

1860 

1631,  1636 

325 

936 

472,491,519 

1081 

1517 

1667 

1731,  1741 

46 

26,  241,  243,  549 

341 

29,  1127 

38,  40,  111 

1637 

1755 

1526 

1003 

1283 

1461 

160,  161,  176 

1492 

1661 

379,  385 

1642 

706, 1418 

281,  1517 

1777 

1548 

88 

789 


.    Jones  691 

Fountain  v.  Caine  173 

v.  Ware  920 

v.  Young  576 

Fournier  v   Kent,  Duchess  of  1273 
Fourniquet  v.  Perkins  987,13'58,  1371 

Fourth  Nat.  Bank  v.  Frauklyn  546 

Fouty  v.  Poar  '  '9 

Fowke  v.  Draycott  64& 

Fowkes  v.  Chadd  1135 

v   Pascoe 

Fowle  v.  Laurason  551 

v.  Torrey  217 
Fowler,  Re,  Fowler  v.  Odell 


v   Foster     438,  553,  618.  630,  694. 
857,  1261,  1264,  1346,  1522 
v  Gladstoue 


v.  Barstow 
v   Bayldon 
V.  Davies 
v.  Down 
v  Fowler 
v.  James 
v.  Lee 
v  Lewis 
v.  Liles 
v.  Osborne 
v   Keynal 
v   Reynolds 
v.  Roberts 
v   Roe 
v.  Scott 
i\  Sunderland 
v   Ward 
Fowlet  v   Lewis 
Fowlkes  v.  Webber 
Fowley  v.  Palmer 
Fox  v.  Abbott 

v.  Bearblock 

v.  Birch 

v.  Blew 

v.  Charlton 

v.  Evans 

v.  Ford 

v.  Frost 

v  Garrett 

v   Hill 

v   Hudson 

v.  Mackreth 

v..  Morewood 

v.  Scard 

v  Suwerkrop 

v.  Yates 


452,  628  , 

203,  222,  1514  | 

38,  43 

58 

1842 

228 

1564,  1567,  1571 

287,  986 

401 

852 

268,  302,  859,  1367 

975 

1616 

1676 

1264 

860 

1775, 1776 

68 

460,536 

1246 

1511 

894 

1775 

27 

1031  1381 

875 

1073 

329 

1425 

1625 

1666 

1479, 1781 

805 

1654 

71,  1347 

604,  608,  688,  6h2 


v.  Goddard 
v.  Gressett 

*  Hall 

*  Harvey 
v  Hawden 
v  Hill 
v  Hodgson 
t'  Kenosha 
v.  Knowles 
v.  Mansfield,  C 

Co 

v  Mayer 

V   Menzies 

v.  McGregor 

v    Parker 

v   Roberts 

v   State 
•  v  Steele 

v.  Sutton 

v.  Swasey 

t;.  Townsend 

v   Trowbridge 

v.  Tyler 

v   Vassall 

V.  Watson 
.    v   Woodfin 
Foster's  Trusts,  Re 
Foteaux  v.  Lepage 


1309,  1316,  2196 

1315 

90,  571,  572.  573  576 

749,  892,  1266 

1108 


&  h 


314 

559,  560 

16H1 

417 

M.  R 

26,  1584 

1770 

448,  1510 

1815 

166, 167 

1386 

6 

1135 

951 

550,555 

1841 

212 

1461.  1481,  1485 

629,  633,  637,  684 

550 

1017 

905 

law 


Foxcroft  v.  Devonshire  1129 

Foxen  v.  Foxen  1432 

Foxon  v.  Gascoigne  1846,  1847 

Foxwell  v.  Bostock  398 

v.  Greatorex        65,  160,  1382.  1540 
v   Webster         339,  797,  801.  16- 

Foy  i>   Foy 

Foye  v   Patch 

Fozier  v   Audrews 

Fradella  J'.  Weller 

Fraedrich  v.  Flieth 

Frampton  v.  Stephens 
v.  Webb 


Francis,  The 

v   Bailey 

v.  Brooking 

v.  Browne 

v.  Castleuian 

v.  Flinn 

n.  Francis 

r.  G rover 

v   Harrison 

v.  Hay  ward 

v.  Wigzell 

v.  Wilson 
Francklyn  v.  Colhoun 

v    Fern 


1576 

659 

1416 

1380 

1071 

1165 

177,  178 

50 

1685 

102,20111 

412, 964,  985 

1257 

1620 

1842 

654 

200,  212,  215,  257 

1662 

183,  186,  719 

1254 

1052 

1391 


Fotherby  V.  Hartridge  652 

Fothergill  v   Kendrick  1(40 

v.  Rowland  599,  1596,  1663 

Fougeres  v   Murbarger         334,  1620 
Poulds  v.  Midgley        941,  1458,  15.4 


Franco  v   Bolton  564 

v   Franco  104,  223,  224 

v.  Meyer  809 

Francome  v.  Francome  394,  891, 
1562,  1669,  1709 

Frank  v   Basnett  817 

r   Brunneman  165jj 

v.  Denver,  &c    Ry.  Co.  1738 

v.  Frank  98,  1096 


Frank  v.  Humphreys  1073 

v  Morrison  743 

Frankland  v.  Overend  780 

Frankle  v.  Jackson  1743 

Franklin  v.  Bank  of  England        148 
v   Beamish  1370 

v.  Franklin  2u4 

v.  Frith  1417 

v.  Greene  379,  1076,  1147 

v.  Hersch  815 

v.  Keeler  350,  759,  1315.  1316 

v.  Meyer  985,  1168 

v  Osgood  379 

Frauklin  S.  Bank  v.  Taylor       1576, 
1584 
Franklin  Tel   Co  v.  Harrison       630 
Frauklinski  V   Ball  1081 

Franklyn  v.  Colquhoun     1052,  1)94 
Franks,  Ex  parte  88 

v   Weaver  1649 

Frantzius,  Carl  Von,  Re  133 

Fraser  v  Charleston  255,  865 

v.  Cooper,  Hall  &  Co.  243 

v   Fraser  1795 

v.  Hoyt  324 

v  Kershaw  1729 

v.  Palmer  1414 

v.  Thompson      162,  177,  475,  1457 
v.  Whaley  1678 

v   Whalley  241 

Fray  v  Drew  1024,  1025,  1026 

Frazer  v  Gordon  15"1 

v.  Jones  1387 

v.  Palmer  28,  1234 

v.  Sypert  1575 

Frazier  v.  Barnum  1715 

v.  Hall  1286 

v,  Pankey  232 

v  Swain  1302 

v.  Tubb  1491 

Freake  v.  Cranfelt  560,  642 

v.  Horsey  221 

Fream  r   Dickinson  930 

Frearson  v.  Loe  1642 

Frede  e   Pflugradt  1551 

Frederick  v.  Aynscombe  877 

v  David  471 

v.  Frederick  1364 

Free  v.  Buckingham  279,  334 

v.  Hinde  1J20 

Freebody  r.  Perry  1775 

Freehold  Land  and  Brick-making 

Co  v .  Spargo  26 

Freehc44     Mut.    Loan    Ass.    v 

Brown  "32 

Freeholders  v.  State  Bank  1733, 1742 
Freel  v.  Market  St.   Cable  Ry. 

Co  576 

Freeland  B   Cocke  1228,  1229 

v.  Heron  666 

b  Johnson  606,  669,  702,  704 

r.  Stansfeld  1729.  1948 

v.  Wright  1110,  1299 

Freeman  v   Arkell  1126 

v.  Butler  1835, 1836 

v.  Carpenter  1618 

B   Clay  1580 

B.  Cox  1780 

b.  Elniendorf  1624 

b.  Fairlie  106,  306,  580,  1250, 

1773,  1777,  1779,  1828 

b.  Freeman  228 

b.  Howe  1553 

B   Ledbetter  532 

v.  Pennington  1525 

v  Scofield  981 

v.  Staats  H47 

v.  Stephenson  10il 

v  Tatham  839. 12-9 

b.  Tottenham  and  Hampstead 

Railway  Co.  1071,  10^0. 

'  1641 

v.  Whitbread  1512,  1524 

Freeman's  Bank  v.  Vose  l!'71 

Freer?.   Hesse  1401,1408,1484 

v.  Rimner  10^4 

Freese  v.  Swayze  606 


TABLE  OF   CASES   CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 


liii 


Freeston  v.  Clay  don  807 

Freichnecht  v.  Meyer  1073 

Freidlander  v.  Pollock  536 

Freight  Money  v.  Monadnock       292 

Frelinghuysen  v.  Golden  1719 

v.  Nugent  '90 

Fremont  v.  Merced  Mining  Co.     555 

French,  Ex  parte  66 

v.  Baron  232,  1246 

v .  Chittenden  1476,  1480 

v.  Dmchy  1765 

v.  Dear  312 

v.  Dickey  549 

v  First  National  Bank  145 

v.  French  659 

V.  Gibbs  1168 

v.  Griffen  1550 

v.  Hay  1531 

v  Jacko  727 

v   Riiney  300,  720,  722 

v.  Robrchard  1561 

v  Scully  166 

v  Shoemaker  994 

v.  Shotwell  611.  700,  721,  974, 

1459 

v.  Windsor  1234 

Frere  v.  Green         934,  936.  937,  939 

Frese  v.  Bachof  407,1648 

Freston,  Re  l'»69 

Fretz  v.  Stover  1540,  1546 

Frewen,  Re,  Frewen  v.  Frewen   200, 

250 

Frey  v.  Demarest  551 ,  552,  553 

v.  Frey  1369 

v.  Lowden  303 

v   Owens  402 

Frey  tag  v   Hoeland  845 

Frick  w  Christian  County  554 

Fricker  v.  Peters  &  C.  Co.  1734 

Friedlander  v    Ehrenworth  1675 

v.  London  Ass.  Co.  1099 

Friedman  v.  Fennell  545 

Friend  v.  Solly  1440,  1449 

Frierson  v.  Alexander  794,  985 

r'ries  v.  Watson  1255 

Frietas  v.  Dos  Sandos  362 

Friley  v.  Hendricks  1579 

Frink  v.  Adams  843 

v.  Stewart  1638 

Fripp  v.  Chard  Railway  Co.       1725, 

1727,  1731 

Frisbie  v.  Bateman  1716 

Frisby,  Re,  Allison  v.  Frisby        649 

v.  Balauee  1381 


Friswell  v.  King 

1844 

Frith  v.  Lawrence 

1302 

17.  Lewis 

98 

v.  Wallaston 

631 

Frits,  Matter  of 

68,71 

Fritz  v.  Hobson  972,  996, 1030,  logo, 

1140,  1366,  1368,  1491,  1639 

Frodsham  v.  Frodsham  1323 

Fromew,  Re  1791 

Frost  v.  Beekman  678 

v.  Belmont  1411,  1434,  1453,  1661, 

2191,  2323 

t>.  Brunson  l'-15 

v.  Hamilton  992 

v.  Hilton  970,  979 

v.  Koon  214 

v .  Spitley  557,  2040 

v.  Ward  70,  799 

v.  Warren  13J9 

v   Wood  799,  800 

Frotherstone  v.  Jolland  1756 

Frow  v.  De  La  Vega  532 

F'rowd  v.  Baker  799 

v.  Lawrence  511,  1618 

Fry,  Ex  parte  39 

v   Ernest  505 

v.  Feanister  1299 

c  Fry  91, 101,  104,  122,  13  S 

v.  Hardy  1108 

v.  Lane  328 

v.  Mantell  732.  78 «,  784 

v.  Martel  732,  783,  784 

v.  Moore  149 

v.  Noble  1167 

v   Penn  547 

c   Richardson  630,  698 

v.  Street  1286 

Fryer,  Re  1261 

t\  Davies  1027 

v.  Wiseman      74,  86,  112,  164,  178 

Fry  rear  v.  Lawrence  714 

Fuentes  v.  Gaines  1567 

Fulcher  v.  Howell  160 

Fulham  v.  M'Cartliy  206,  230 

Fullagar  v.  Clark  1079 

Fuller  v.  Benjamin  150,  216 

v.  Cadwell  1621,  1623 

v.  Daniels  303 

v.  Fuller  1253 

v.  Green  1424 

v  Hovey  989 

v.  Ingram       553,  1557,  1625,  1664 

v   Knapp  601,715,759,2385 

v.  Lance  84 


Fuller  v.  Melrose  1640,  1661 

v.  Metropolitan  Life  Ins.  Co.     972 

v.  Montague  42 

v.  Redman  644,  646, 1211 

v.  Smith  68 

v.  Taylor  1664 

v.  Townsley-Myrick D.  G.Co.  1621 

v.  Willis  1474,  1475 

Fullerton  v.  Jackson  328,  558 

o.  Martin  266,  1524,  2059 

Fulton  v.  Davidson  1234,  1414 

v.  Gilmore  778,  780,  781,  782 

v  Golden  633,  635,  951 

v.  Greacen  1517 

«■.  Rosevelt  33,  37,  71,  74 

r.  Woodman  844 

Bank  v   Beach  182,  386, 512, 

733,  734.  736,  754,  784,  1494 

v.  N.  Y    &  Sharon  Canal  Co.    146, 

735.  886,  1457,  1458, 1476,  1535, 

1677 

Fulweiler  v.  Hog's  Back  Cons. 

M.  Co.  737 

Fuhvider  v.  Ingels  314 

Fulwood  v   Fulwood  1640,  1681 

Fund  v.  Bossieux  1493 

Funk  v.  M'Keoun  997 

v.  Rentchler  545 

Furber  v.  Furber  710 

t>.  King  448 

Furlong  v.  Riley  560 

Furman  v.  Clark  1676 

t\  Edwards  782 

v.  North  417 

Furneaux,  Ex  parte  1258 

Furuess  v.  Booth  13i0 

v.  Caterham  Railway  Co.  1731 

Furnival  !■    Bogle  974 

»>.  Brooke  177 

Furrer  r.  Ferris  1299 

Furtailo  v.  Furtado  78,  1595 

Furze  v.  Asker  1106 

v.  Hennet  799,  973 

v.  Sharwood  291 

Fussel  t>.  Downing  316 

t;.  Elwin  269,  291,  975 

Futcher  v.  Callow  561 

v.  Futcher  365,  561,  657 

Futvoye  v.  Kennard      505,  506,  507, 

797,806,9  0 

Fvfe's  Case  202,  203 

Fyfe  v.  Arbuthnot  1416 

Fyler  v.  Fyler  1030 

Fynn,  Re  1348,  1349, 1863 


G. 


G ,  Re 

68,108 

Gabbett  v  Cavendish 

1822 

Gabriel  v.  Sturgia 

710 

Ga.ld.  Re 

1342 

v.  Worrall 

1619 

G  affne  v  »    Hevey 

1436 

Gafney  v.  Reeves 

881 

Gagan,  Re 

576 

Gage  v.  Arndt 

1221 

v.  Billings 

1624 

v.  Brewster 

1245 

v.  Brown 

402 

v.  Bulkeley 

664 

v.  Chapman 

1624 

v.  Ewing 

59 

v.  Graham 

1661 

v   Harbert 

604 

v.  Hunter 

956 

v.  Kaufman 

557,  630 

v  Mayer 

1548 

v .  Parker 

1517 

v.  Parmele 

668 

v.  Rohrback 

1624 

v.  Smith 

604,  1716 

v.  Stafford 

33,635 

Gaines  v.  Agnelly 

722,  2384 

Gaines  v.  Brockerhoff  1320 
v.  Chew                       335,  345,  552 

v.  Fuentes  552 

v   Hale  1613 

v.  Kennedy  1624 

v.  Mau.sseaux  .'£{4 

it.  Miller  630 

v.  New  Orleans        313,  1302,  1550 

Gainsborough,   Countess  of   t>. 

Gilford  778,  1621 

Gainsford  v.  Blachford  1131 

v.  Gammer  848 

Gait  v.  Osbaldeston  640,  1559 

Galatian  v.  Erwin        674,  678,  1548, 

1549 

Gale  v.  Abbot  1681 

v.  Clark  458 

v.  Michie  1491 

v.  Niekerson  329 

Gallagher  v.  Roberts  694,  695 

Gallagher's  Appeal  1051 

Galland  v.  Galland  1686 

Gallatian  v.  Cunningham  612,  674 

Gallemore  v.  Gill  978 

Galley  v.  Baker  173 

Galloway  v.  Barr  1401 


Galloway  v.  Galloway 

378 

v    Hamilton 

658,  660 

v.  Jenkins 

303 

v.  London,  Mayor  of      1468,  1469, 

1660 

v.  Mackersey  1152 

v.  Perry  1309 

Galluchat,  Er  parte  1722 

Galphin  v.  M' Kinney  249,  254 

Gal  pin  r.  Page  1841 

Galsworthy  v.  Durrant  61 

Gait  v.  Carter  1073,  1076 

Galton  v.  Emass  1291 

v.  Hancock  282 

Galveston  R  Co.  v.  Cowdrey         287 

Gamage  v   Harris  630 

Gambert  >■.  Hart  1M1 

Gambie  v.  Atlee  111 

Gamble  j>   Gibson  1320 

t;.  Johnson  290,  837.  848 

v.  Loof  1624 

Games  v.  Bonnor  989 

(i  tmewell  Fire-Alarm  Tel  Co.  v. 

Brooklyn  314 

v.  Chillieothe  334 

v.  Mayor  313,  717 


liv 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CTTED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 


Gammon  v.  Stone  1396 

Ganahl  v.  Bleisner  1320 

Gandee  v.  Stansfield  1832 

Ganderton  v.  Ganderton  1299 

Gandv ■  r.  Gandy  193,322 

Gann  v.  Gregory  877 

v.  Johnson  1502 

Gaus  v   Harmison  1120 

v.  Reoshaw  989 

Gansev.>ort  v.  Limn  46 

Gant  v.  Alenloglu  2310 

Ganvill,  Re  39 

Garard  v.  Garard  542 

Garcias  v.  Ricardo  664, 1468 

Gardener  v.  Crossman  779 

?■.  Enuor  1399 

Gardiner  v.  Griffith  658 

v  Mason  447,  448,  1552 

v.  Miles  986 

v.  Rowe  1078 

v.  Simmons  1504 

v.  Tyler  1753 

Gardner  v. 1600 

v   Mane  1352 

v.  Broadbent  1643 

v.  Dangerfield  1824,  1836 

v.  Dering  1028,  1029 

v.  Field  1322 

v.  Gardner        186.  187,  642,  1076, 

1415,  1417,  1679 

v.  Garret  1616,  1617 

v.  Hooper  91 

v   Irvin  1835 

v   Kelso  254 

v.  Landcraft  529 

v.  London,  &c.  R.  Co.  1035, 

1731 

v.  Marshall  102,  1378 

v  Newburgh  303,  1639 

v.  Parker  1425 

v,  Raisbeck  860 

v  Schermerhorn  1284,  1286 

t>.  Sharpe  1735 

v.  Smith  1750 

v.  Tapling  170 

v  Terry  1621 

Garey  v.  Whirtingham  180, 181,  499, 

730, 1404,  1432,  1610 

Garforth  v.  Bradley         89,  114, 118 

Gariss  v.  Gariss  1678 

Garland?'  Garland  1733,  1738, 

1739 

v.  Littlewood  1370,2061 

v  Living  168 

v   Oram  579 

v.  Riordan  307 

v.  Scott  571 

Garle  v.  Robinsnn  1556 

Gar  ick  r.  Jackson  1224 

v.  Lawson  1001 

r   McArthur  844 

v   Strong  110,  402,  419,  588 

Garling  v.  Royds  1078 

Garlington  v.  Copeland  418,  986 

Garner  v.  Hriggs  1036 

t>.  Garner  1846 

e   Moore  1342 

Garnett,  Re,  Gandy  v.  Macauley  667 

Garnett  »   Bradley      28,  30,  42,  1503 

t;  Mason  986,  989 

Gamier,  Re  61,  85,  86 

Garnum  r.  Marshall  448 

Garr  v.  Bright  145,  296 

v.  Drake  68,  72 

v.  Gower  63 

Garrard  v.  Dinorben,  Lord  1257 

v.  Edge  354,  1817 

v.  Frankel  1973 

v.  Webb  987,  994 

Garratt,  Re  655 

v  Niblock  1588,  1796 

Garraud  !).  Lindley  1642 

Garretson  v.  Clark  2306 

v.  Cole  1056 

v.  Weaver  1728 

Garrett    v.    Bansted    &    Epsom 

Downs  Railway  Co.  1664 


Garrett  t».  Lancefield 

1524 

Geake  v.  Ross                              1257 

v   Lynch 

1676 

Geary  v.  Norton                           1395 

r.  Miss  ssippi   &  Alabama  R 

Geast  v.  Belfast,  Lord                   lb65 

Co 

345 

Geddes,  Ex  parte                          97 

v.  New  York  Transit  Co 

605. 

Gedge  v.  Traill                               324 

2398 

Gedye  v.  Matson                              270 

Garrick  v.  Ford 

92 

v.  Montrose,  Duke  of                 815 

Garrison  v.  Atlanta 

1620 

Gee  v.  Bell                                     1734 

Garrod  v   Holdeu 

501 

,503 

v.  Cottle     180,  181,  445,  498,  499, 
500,523 

Garrold.  Re 

1841 

Garrow  v.  Carpenter 

713 

v.  Gee                                            75 

Garstone  v.  Edwards 

1287 

v.  Gurnev                                  1003 

Garth  v.  Cotton         1630, 

1631, 

1634 

v  Mahood                        1214, 1427 

v.  Townsend 

1405 

1427 

v.  Pritchard                     1620,  1648 

v.  Ward 

280 

v.  Swan                  1107,  110s,  1128 

Gartland  v.  Nunn          293,  297 

298, 

Geer  v.  Winds                     1156,  1160 

302 

Geldand  v  Randall                        1271 

Gartside  v.  Gartside 

216 

Cell  v.  Hayward                               370 

v.  Isherwood 

1022 

1581 

v  Watson                                  1775 

v.  Outram 

565, 

1651 

Gelpeke  v.  Milwaukee,  &c,  R. 

Garvey  v.  Hibbert 

8ii2 

Co.                                          1062 

Garvin  v   Luttrell 

1505 

Geltson  ?•   Hoyt                               978 

»'.  Watkins 

517 

General  Exchange  Bank,  Re      1070 

Garwood  v.  Curteis       48' 

.  482 

1551 

General  Hospital  v.  State  Mot. 

v    Eld  ridge 

1073 

1076 

Life  Ins.  Co.                              555 

Gary  v.  Burnett 

892 

General  Ins.  Co.  v.  Benson            550 

v.  May 

283 

?'.  Kuhner                                   1713 

v   Mickler 

985 

Genet  v.  Delaware  &  H.  Canal 

Gascoygne's  Case 

1069 

Co.                                          1073 

Gascoyne  v.  Chandler 

834 

1626 

Genett  v  Tallmadge                    1364 

v.  Lamb 

859 

Gent,  Re                                       1069 

Gaskell  v  Chambers 

445, 

1772. 

v.  Harris                     102,  108,  2001 

1777 

1834 

Gentil  v  Arnaud                          1631 

v.  Durdin 

280 

Grorge  v.  Dean                               1661 

v.  Gaskell 

209 

v.  Goldsby                                   121 

Gaskill  v   Sine 

845 

v.  Johnson                                    641 

Gaskin  v.  Balls  324, 1654, 1661, 

1662, 

v.  Pilcher                                   1568 

1663 

v.  Reed                                        403 

Gason  v.  Wordsworth 

939 

v.  St.   Louis  Cable  <S  W.  Ry. 

Gasquet    v.    Crescent    City    B 

Co.                                      236 

Co. 

1312 

v.  Smith                                    1648 

Gass,  Re 

1801 

v.  Whitmore            987, 1072.  1079 

v.  Arnold 

843 

Geo.    A.     Macbeth   Co.   v.   Lip- 

v.  Mason                 1077 

1079 

1147 

pencott  Glass  Co.                        1642 

v-  Stinson 

959,  960 

George's  Creek  To  v   Detmold      311 

Gassett  v.  Grout 

91 

Georgia  v.  Brailsford           1619,  1670 

Gaston  v.  Frank  um      372,  989 

1897 

Georgia,    Governor    of  v.   Ala- 

Gas   Works  Const.  Co.  v 

Moe 

- 

drago                                          17 

heimer 

1542 

Georgia  Lumber  Co.  v.   Bissell 

v.  Standard  G.  L.  Co. 

1542 

1705 

Gaters  v.  Madeley 

114 

Gephart  v.  Starrett                      1744 

Gates  v.  Boomer 

230 

Gerard  v.  Penswick                       1824 

v.  Buckland 

89 

',898 

Geraty  v.  Druiding                       1621 

V.  Gates 

1809 

Gerber  v.  Grabel                            1638 

v.  Jacob 

640 

Gere  v.  New  York  Central  Co. 

Gatewood  v.  Leak 

790 

1591 

1675 

Gathercole  v.  Wilkinson 

448 

German  v.  Chapman                    1657 

Gatti  r.  Webster 

1366 

v.  German                                 15"'5 

Gatty  ?'.  Farquharson 

1130 

v.  Machin                                    350 

Gaudet  Freres,  Re 

1031 

German-American   Seminary  v. 

Gaugh  v   Da  vies 

58 

Saenger                                  1540 

Gaullaherr.  Gaullaher 

657 

German-American  Title  &  T.  Co. 

Gault  v.  Goldthwaite 

1081 

r.  Shallcross                            659 

v.  Hoagland 

531 

German    Reformed    Church    v. 

v.  Wallis 

1620 

Von  Puechelstein                     358 

Gaunt  v.  Froelicb 

586 

Gernoe  v.  Boccaline    395,  695,  1703, 

v  Johnson 

249,  4; 

1707 

v.  Taylor        730, 1207, 

1255, 

1413, 

Gerrard  v.  Dawes                          1845 

142!i, 

1424 

Gerrish  v.  Black  410,  414,  986,  1239, 

Gause  v    Knapp 

542 

1247 

Ganther  v.  Meinertzhaageu 

447 

v.  Bragg                                     1548 

Gavin  v.  Osborne 

435 

v.  Hunt                                      1621 

Oawthorpe  v.  Gawthorpe 

1722 

v.  Mason                                      851 

Gawtry  v    Leland 

1654 

v.  Towne                     343,  385,  846 

Gay    v.    Brierfield    Coal 

&    1 

Gerry  v.  Stimson                          1624 

Co. 

'  634 

Gest  v.  Packwood                            569 

v  Gilmore 

630 

Gething  v.  Keighley               371,  668 

v.  Skeen 

588 

v   Vigurs                                        558 

Gayle  v.  Johnson 

243 

1411 

Getman  v.  Beardsley           1413,  1417 

v.  Singleton 

1004 

Gerzler  v.  Saroni                             1576 

Gaylord  v.  Beardsley 

354 

Geyer  v.  Douglass                          1584 

Gaylords  v.  Kelshaw 

256 

Giacometti  v.  Prodgers    92,  102,  104, 

Gayner  v.  Wilkinson 

120 

106 

Gay  nor  v.  Blewett 

1716 

Giant  Powder  Co.  v.  California 

Gaynor's  Goods,  Re 

252 

Powder  Works          601,  1120, 

Gaytes  v.  Franklin  Sav.  Bank 

1625 

1591 

Geach  v.  Ingall 

1096, 

1128 

v  Safety  Nitro  Powder  Co.        703 

TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


IV 


[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging  ] 

Gilbert  v.  Gilbert  28,  29,  30,  33 

v.  Guignon  1449 

v,  James  295 

v.  Lee  1417 

v.  Lewis       157,  158,  299,  324,  656, 
578,  589 

v.  McEachen  1359 

v.  Mosier  846 

v.  Nantucket  Bank  30 

v.  Schwenck  13'54 

t;.  Showerman  1635 

v.  Sutliff  287 

v.  Tomlinson  1525,  1526 

v.  Van  Arman  945,  2392 

v.  Wetherell  1187 

Gilbertson  v.  Gilberts     1428,  1528 
Gilchrist,  Ex  parte  157,  1488 

v.  Cannon  1491,  1507,  1509 

v.  Oator  102 

v   Stevenson  193 

Gildart  v.  Moss  1307 

Gile  v   Devens  1710 

v.  Eaton  755 

v.  Giles  778,  1536 

v.  Powell  1104 

Gill   v.  Continental  Union  Gas 

Co.  1038 

v.  Eyton  1835 

v.  Fleming  61 

v.  Gilbard  895 

v.  Rayner  410,  416,  819 

Gillam  v  Tavlor  1433 

Gillespie  ».  Alexander       1206,  1207, 

1208 

v.  Cummings  334 

Gillett  »   Hall  1532,  1536 

v.  Robbins  843 

Gillette  v.  Wiley  560 

Gilliam  v.  Spence  233 

Gillian  v.  Allen  1675 

Gilliland  v  Cullum  991,  l"3l 

Gillis  v.  Hall  1678 

Gillon  v.  Turnbull  1253 

Gillot  v.  Kettle  1648 

Gillott  v.  Esterbrook  1649 

Gills,  Re  108 

Gilnian  v.  Cairnes  288,  290 

v.  Sheboygan  1650 

Gilmer  v.  Slorris  659 

v.  Wallace  860 

Gilmore  v.  Anderson  378.  1642 

v.  Gilmore    1046,  1150,  1180, 1188, 
13C0 

v   McClure  542 

v   Patterson  842 

v.  Sapp  517 

Gilpatriek  ;•   Glidden  402.  1019 

Gilpin  v.  Southampton,  Lady      1617 
Gilpin    County    Mining    Co    v. 

Drake  313 

Gilpins  v   Consequa        918,  919,  929 
Gilroy*s  Appeal  1614 

Gilson  v.  Hutchinson  1168 

Giltenan  v.  Lamert  1624 

Gingell  v.  Home  552,  664 

Girard   Life  Ins.  Co.  v    Cooper 

1299 
Girdlestone  ,'  Lavender  1266 

Girod  v.  Michoud  993 

Gisborne  v.  Qisborne  1503 

Gist  v.  Cattel  644 

V.  Frazier  1284 

!J   Gist  1234 

Githcrs  v  Clarke  1511 

Sittings  t>   Dew  1629 

Giveans  v   McMurtrv  886 

Givens  v.  M'Calmont         1240,  1242, 
1244 
t'.  'j'idmore  845 

Gladdon  v.  Stonemin  1723        v.  Houston 

Gl.idson  v   Whitne"  232 

Gladstone  v.  Musurus  Bey     141,142,        v.  Locke 
1631  147        »•.  Thorpe 

395,  1703        v.  Ottoman  Bank  18, 142,  599    Gobe  v  Carlisle 

1246,  1746     Gladwin  v  Gladwin  2360  I  Goble  v  Andruss 

675,895,974,1031,     Giaenzer  v   Wiederer  1642  I      v.  Gale 

1045,  1793    Glaister  v   Hewer  101  I      v.  Grant 


Gibbes    v.    Greenville,    &c.    R. 

Co.  1743 

Gibbins  v.  Howell  1291,  1749 

v   Mainwaring  1718.  1735 

v   North    Eastern    Metropol- 
tan  Asylum  District  990 

Gibbon's  Appeal  1172 

Gibbons  v   Bressler  1625 

v.  Caunt  1306 

v.  Kibbey  95,  98 

v.  Ogdeu  1828 

v.  Waterloo  Bridge  Co.       145,  842 

Gibhs?'    Bryant  1253 

v.  Churton  1542 

t;.  Clagett  346,  347,  559 

v.  Daniel  1470 

v  David  1724, 1729,  1734 

v  Gihbs  396,  1443,  1562,  1570 

v  Guild  560,645,649 

v.  Hodge  216 

v.  Hooper  1121, 1122, 1137 

v.  La  SociiHe  Industrielle  631 

v.  Meraud  1700,  1702 

v    Parkinson  634,  815 

v   Philhpson  1069 

v   Pike  1127,1137 

t\  Ross  577 

v.  Tunaley  1130 

Gibby  c.  Hall  1677 

Gibert  v.  Colt  1698, 1704,  1705, 

1707,  1709,  1710,  1713 

Gibney  r  Clayton  1837 

Gibraltar    v.     Malta     Banking 
Co.  1603 

Gibson,  Re  86 

v   American  Loan  &  T.  Co.       243 
v-  Black  830 

v   Broadfoot  1320 

v  Burgess  629,  974 

v.  Carson  361 

v.  Charters  1678 

v.  Clarke  1774,  1775 

t>.  Compton  1459 

i;  Cranley,  Lord  795,  977,  1380 
v.  Crehore  1013,  1028,  1234,  1247, 
1252,  1259 


v  Fifer 

645 

v.  Goldsmid 

385 

v  Goldthwaite 

1561,  1562,  1564, 

1565 

v.  Green 

1579 

v.  Hewett 

1836 

V.  Ingo 

295,  403,  417,  455 

v.  Jayne 

584 

v.  Kinven 

1004 

v  M'Cormick 

378,  379 

v.  McCarty 

43 

v   Marshall 

1062 

v  Martin 

17*5 

v.  Moore 

1621 

v.  Muskett 

1129,  1135 

v.  Nicol 

710,  1387 

t;   Peters 

1743 

v   Randolph 

1462 

v.  Reese 

425,  1371 

v  Scevengton 

518 

ti  Seagrim 

2213 

r.  Smith 

1670 

v.  Tilton 

734,  735,  1676 

v  Trowbridge  Furniture  Co. 

236,  303 

v  Whitacre  629 

»'.  Whitehead  609 

v  Wills  202.  203 

v.  Wollard  1328 

Gidding's  Appeal  1051 

Giddings  (>   Giddings  35.36 

Giffard  v.  Hort     228,  259, 265.  1276, 

1461,1478,1521,1584 

v.  Williams  123C 

GifTord  v.  Thorn  986 

Gilbert,  Ex  parte  564 

v  Arnold 

v  Colt 

v.  Deneley 

v.  Endean 


Glann  v.  Younglove  115 

Glanvil  v.  Trelawney  262 

Glanvill,    Re,    Ellis     v.    John- 
son 110,  113,  187 
Glascott  v.  Lang          328,  382,  1619, 
1626,  1678 
Glasuer  v.  Weisberg  1561 
Glass  v.  Beach  1118 
v.  Hulbert                           380,  847 
v.  Oxenham  2)0 
Glasscott  v.  Coppe"  Miners'  Co. 

145,  585,  1678 

Glassington  v.  Thwaites        707,  708, 

761,  7J5,  1736 

Glasson,  Re  1366 

Glazbrook  i>   Gilatt  1604 

Glaze  v.  Drayton  997 

Glazier  v.  ISailey  1624 

v.  Rolls  No   1,  26 

Gleason  v.  Bisby       1698,  1699.  1702. 

1713 

v  Clisby  1709 

v.  Cook  630 

v.  Smith  1461 

Gleaves  v.  Ferguson  1264,  1302 

o.  Morrow  347,  349,  715,  722,  724, 

758,  759,  764 

v.  Payne  91 

Gledhill  v.  Hunter  1072 

Glee  v.  Manhattan  Co.  640 

Glegg  v.  Legh        569,  579,  584,  597. 

606 

Gleghorne  r.  Gleghorne  843 

Glen  v.  Fisher  90,  1395 

v.  Hall  1648 

Glen  Iron  Works,  Re  1579 

Glengall,  Earl  of  v.  Frazer         724, 

1822 

Glenn  v.  Blackford  1278 

v.  Clapp  1291 

v  Clark  1548 

v.  Cockey  383 

v.  Dimmock  1019,  1120 

v.  Doyle  281 

v.  Fowler  1623 

v.  Hebb  829 

v.  Maguire  642,  P525 

t\  Marbury  1741 

v.  Noonan  1019 

v.  Wotten  1270 

Glenny  t\  Smith  1049 

Glenton  v.  Clover  1712 

Glines      v.      Supreme      Sitting 

Order  1718 

Globe  Ins.  Co.  v.  Boyle  334 

c.  Lansing  284 

Globe  Ins.  Co.,  Receivers  of  the. 

In  re  1715 

Glos  v.  Randolph  2119 

Glossop  V.  Heston  Local  Board 

10,  1637 
Glossup  v.  Harrison  1767 

Gloucester,  Mayor  and  Corp.  of 

v.  Wood  1469,  1470 

Glover  v.  Dauheny  I486 

v.  Greenback  Alkali  Co.  898 

r.  Hall  1557,  1830, 1832,  1833 

r   Hembree  542.  1299 

i'.  Hodges  1489 

v.  Millings  918 

v.  Rogers  710 

v.  Webber  77 

r.  Weedon  108.  700 

Glyn  v.  Caulfield       578, 1825,  1826, 

1834 

v.  Duesbury  1560,  1564 

v.  Soarcs  301 

Glynn  v.   Bank   of  England       843, 


565,  1129,  1556, 
1557 
1560,  1569,  1570 
1740 
221 
323,  544.  545 
269 
852 


lvi 


TABLE   OP   CASES    CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 


Godbold  v  Ellis 
Godbolt  v.  Watts 
Goddard  v.  Cox 

v.  Haslam 

v.  Jobnsoo 

v.  Keeble 

v.  May 

v   Ordway 

v.  Parr 
Godfrey  v.  Chadwell 

17.  Furzo 

v.  Littel 

v.  Maw 

v.  Tucker 


1276, 1316, 1317 

203 

90,  116 

369 

1561 

1467 

354,  785,  894 

214,  277,  278 

59 

1163,  1164 

797 

315.  401,407,542, 

1037,  1394, 1515 

1558 

1242,  1245,  1246 

1150, 1381 

113 

449 

1501 

Railway 

390 

1017 

946 

887, 1103 

819 

137 

1777 

642 


417,  834  i  Goodday  v  Sleigh  791 
386  I  Goodden  v.  Coles                     190,  212 

Goodell  v.  Blumer  1624 

Goodenough  v.  Alway  866 

V   Goodenough  1166 

v  Powell  1077 

Goodess  v.  Williams  266 

Goodfellow  v.  Prince  1648 


V.  Turner 
v.  Watson 
v  White 
Godkin  v.  Ferrers,  Earl 
Godson  v.  Orok 

v.  Hale 
Goebel    v.    American 

Supply  Co. 

Goelct  v    Lansing 

Goff  ».  Goff 

Goffln  ?•.  Donnelly 

Gohegan  v.  Barlow 

Goiug  v.  Emery 

Gold  v.  Canham 

V-  Whitcomb 

Goldberser  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.  1321 

Golden  v.  Maupin  1166 

v.  Newton  528 

t>.  The  Morning  News  149 

Golden  Fleece  Co.  v.  Cable,  &c, 

Co.  46,  865 

Golder  v.  Golder  797,  799 

Goldey  v.  Beeker  328 

GoMhawk  o.  Duane  1254 

Goldicut  v.  Beagin  1128 

Goldman  «   Page  217 

Goldmark  v.  Kreling  1675 

v.  Rosenfeld  1461 

Goldsby  v.  Goldsby  1580 

Goldsmid    v.    Tunbridge    Wells 
Improvement   Commission- 
ers 1638 
v.  Stonehewer  200 
Goldsmith  v.  American  P.  C.  Co.  197 
v.  Gilliland                          60,  149, 
314,  627 
40,  42,  478,  495, 
1051,  1054,  1055 
1918 
59, 156,  1438 
215,  222,  257 
Wells     Imp. 

1687 
1624 
1347 
385, 1551 
817 
674 
576 
1608 
1413 
675 
1744 
940 
349,  505,  510,  728 
1413 
1625 
378 
586, 1584 
1744 
1044, 1674, 1683. 
1684 
25,  216,  239,  405, 
1203,  1206,  1369 
Goodacre  v  Skinner 
Goodale  v  Gawthorne 

v.  Goodale 
Goodall's  Trade-mark 
Goolall  v.  Harris 
v   Little 
v   Skerratt 


Goodford  v.  Stonehouse  &  Nails- 
worth  Railway  Co.  231 
Goodhand  v.  Ayseough  1-143 
Goodhue  v.  Churchman  1575 
Goodier  v.  Ashton  167 
Goodloe  v.  Dean  843 
Goodman  v.  Barbour  287 

v.  Jones 

v.  Kine 

t.  Niblack 

r.  Sayers 

v.  Whitcomb  1727 

Goodlier  v.  Browning 
Goodrich  v.  Marsh 

v .  Pendleton 


1300 

1014,  1630 

149 

1700 

1728,  1736 

1228 

215,  222,  257 

27,  30.  603,  607, 

618,  645,  700,  702,  13S2,  1412 


v.  Goldsmith 

v.  Osborne 

v.  Russell 

v.  Stonehewer 

v.     Tunbridge 
Com'rs 
Goldstein  v.  Kelly 
Goldsworthy,  Re 
Goldthwait  v.  Day 
'     v.  Lynch 
Goleborn  v   Alcock 
Gnltra  v.  Wolcott 
Gr>mbault,  Re 
Gomley  v.  Wood 
Gomm  v.  Parrott 
Gomme  v.  West 
Gompertz  v.  Ansdell 

v.  Best 

v.  Kensit 

v.  Pooley 
Gonzales  v.  Hukil 
Gooch  v.  Green 

v.  Haworth 
r   Marshall 

Good  i'.  Blewitt 


T.  Roilnev 

v.  Shotbolt 
Goodright  v.  Sanl 
Goodson  v.  Ellison 

v.  Richardson 
Goodwin,  lie 

v.  Archer 

v.  Bell 

v.  Bishop 

v.  Clarke 
v.  Gibbons 
v.  Goodwin 


70,  944 
1663 
1648 
1347,  1352 
576,  578, 1829,  1834 
1510 


347,  349,  363 

1571 

1138 

219 

1631 

162,  1285 

32 

430 

639,  759, 1253, 

2124 

1700, 1701 

1135 

255,  294,  405,  410, 

416,  1530,  1532 

845 


Gorely  r.  Gorely  1601 

Gorham  v.  Gorham  9,  83,  208 

v-  Toomey  1628 

Gorham  Co.  v.  White  1648 

Gorman  v.  M'Culloch  15F3 

v   Russell  272 

Gormley  v.  Bunyan  608,  !*33 

v.  Clark  lub2 

Gornall,  lie  351,1353 

Gorrell  v.  Gates 
Gort,  Viscountess  v.  Clark 
Goslin  v.  Corry 

v.  Wilcock 
Gosling  v.  Gosling 
Gosman,  lie 
Gosnell  v.  Bishop 
Goss,  Re 

v.  Simpson 

V.  Singleton 
Gossett  v.  Kent 
Gossom  v  Donaldson 
Gossop  j'.  Wright 
Gut  ».  Cook 
Gottfried  u.CresceDt  Brewing  (^o. 

1309,  1320 

v.  Miller 
Goucher  v.  Clayton 
Gough  v.  Crane 

v.  Herbert 

v.  Offley 
Gould  r.  Dnmmett 


v.  Hammond 
v.  Jones 
v.  Miller 
v.  Moore 

v.  New  York  R.  Co. 
v.  Robarts 
Goodyear  v  Day 
v.  Providence  Rubber  Co. 


251 


99 
1650 
18 
1643 
1079, 
2397 
Goodyear  Dental  V.  Co.  v.  White 

1507,  1542 
Goodyear    Rubber    M     Co.    v. 

Goodyear  Rubber  Co.  1648 

Goodyere  v.  Lake  1368,  1486 

Goold   v.    Great    Western    Deep 

Dean  Coal  Co.  1650 

v.  O'Keeffe  885 

Goose  v.  Bedford  385 

Gordon  v.  Bell  844 

v.  Cheltenham  Railway  Co.      1663 

v.  Gordon  326,  852,  941.  1004, 

1117,  1119 

243 

724 

1221,  1240,  1296,  1920, 

1926,  2193,  2229 

406 

214 

630 

v.  Jesson   65,  159, 1510.  1512,  1525 
v.  Lewis        1231,  1240,  1241,  1242, 
1243,  1244,  1252,  1296,  1302 


v .  Green 
v.  Hammell 
v.  Hobart 

v.  Holland 

r    Horsfall 

James 


v.  Moore 

T.  Pym 

v.  Rockafellow 

V    Ross 

r.  Rothley 

v.  St.  Paul  H   Works 

v  Shaw 

v.  Simpkinson 

v  Sims 


17 

240 

678 

1584 

1781, 1782 

334 

624,  678 

262,  547 


Godchild  v.  Terrett 


232 


844,  1061,  1281,  1282, 

1284,  1286,  1290 

v.  Stevens  1166 

Gore  Langton,  Re  1610 

Gore  v.  Bowser  574,  943 

v.  Harris  574,  943 

v.  I'urdnn  1022,  1476 

r.  Stacpoole  266,  1501 

Go.ee  v.  Clements  860 


10«1 
1127 
1129 
1001 

133 

1600 

8:3 

840 

986,  989 

302 

1276 

418 

161,  1457 


197 

511, 153  I 

630 

1558 

581,1833 

1443 


v.  Elgin  City  Banking  Co.        1195 
v.  Gould  645,  844,  1997 


v.  Granger 

v.  Hayes 

v.  Head 

v .  Kemp 

v.  Norfolk  Lead  Co. 

v.  Spencer 

17.  Stanton 

v.  Tancred 

v.  Twine 

v.  Wheeler 

p.  Williamson 
Goulder  v.  Camm 
Gourand  v.  Trust 


1463 

225,  23T 

26 

147 

1101 

443,  488 

986 

1251, 1577, 1583 

507 

259 

843,  844,  847 

191 

1649 


Gourkey  v.  Toledo  &  Ohio  K?. 

Co.  1168 

Gonroud  v.  Edison  &  G.  Tel.  Co.     26 
Gout  v.  Aleploglu  1649 

Gouthwaite  v.  Rippon         424,  1602, 
1671 
Gouvernenr  v  Elmendorf    948,  1549 


v  Titus 
Gove  v.  Lyford 

v.  Pettis 
Gover  v.  Christie 

t\  Lucas 
Stilwell 


1680 

994,  995,  1515 

562 

197 

924 

1379,  1798 


Governesses'  Benevolent  Institu- 
tion v.  Rusbridger       316,  1431, 
1779 
Governors  of  Grey-Coat  Hospital 

v.  Westminster  Imp.  Com'rs  277 
Govet  v.  Armitage  59 

Gowan,  Re,  Gowan  v.  Gowan        108 
Gowan  r   Broughton  1430 

v.  Jefferies  1718 

Gower  v  Gower  12;  0 

Gowing  v.  Mowberry  710 

Gowland  v.  De  Faria  13Sti 

Gozman  v.  Cruger  1st; 

Grabenheimer  v  Blum  1517 

Graces.  Hunt  111 

v.  Neel  15 1 ; 

v.  Nesbit  ■  •  ■ 

v.  Terrington  217,  13.  4 

Graff  v   Barnum  140'2 

Gratham  v.  Turnbull    554,  670,  1-'  8 
Grafton  V   Hilliard  1635 

v.  Watson  1043 

Graham,  Re  1347.  1790 

v.  Berryman      378,  844,  886,  1550, 
1961 

v.  Birkenhead  Railway  Co.         241 

r.  Boston  H.  &  E  R.  Co.  560, 

1584 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging  ] 


lvii 


Graham  v  Campbell  1466, 1652,  1678 

v  Carter  216,221 

v.  Coape  707,  708 

v   Dahlonega  Gold  M.  Co.  334, 

1038 

v   Davidson  667 

a  Elmore  562,  590 

v  Fitch  183,  445,  499 

v.  Geneva  Lake  C   M   Co.  197 

v.  Graham     1233, 1299,  1338, 1342 

v  Hardin  994 

v  Horn  1392 

v.  Ingleby  897 

v   Maxwell      800,  1615,  1617,  1627 

v.  Minneapolis  190 

v  Nelson  561,  654 

v.  Newcastle-upon-Tyne  1638 

v.  Oliver  856 

v  Railroad  Co.  1003,  2193 

v.  Sublett  161,  841 

v.  Tankersley  782,  1548 

v.  Torrance  641 

v   Wick  ham  1233,  1438 

v.  Williams  1258 

v.  Wiuterson  60 

Grainge  v.  Warner  1696 

Grainger  v  Slingsby  1485 

Granard,  Karl  of  v.  Dunkin         1648 

Granberry  v.  Granberry  1247 

Grandin  v  Leroy  650 

Gi-aud    Juuction    Canal   Co    v. 

Dimes  1614 

Grand  Rapids  v   Weiden  1638 

Grand   Rapids   &    I    R.  Co.    v. 

Sparrow  1071 

Grand  Rapids  School  Furniture 
Co   v.  Haney  School  Furni- 
ture Co.  1642 
Grand     Trunk     Company     v 

Brodie  808 

Grand  U.  Order  v.  Merklin  314 

Grane  v.  Cooper  1836 

Granely  v.  Barnard  1654 

Granger  v.  Bassett  912 

v.  Batchelder  974 

Grangers'    Business     Ass'n    v. 

Clark  2120 

Grannis  v.  Clark  363 

Grant,  Re  103,  205 

?>   Anderson  445 

v   Bryant  1745 

v  Davenport  1737 

v.  Dexter  1745 

v  East  &  West  R.  Co.      986,  1029 

v.  Easton  664 

v.  Grant        424,  1699,  1712,  1714, 

1798 

v.  Ingram  36 

t\  Lathrop  1624 

v  Mills  113 

v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  334,  617,  1029, 

1720 

v   Schmidt  300,  303 

v.  Thompson  83 

v .  Van  Schoonhoven  109,  160, 

161,  191 

Grant's  Cases  1042,  1359 

Granville  v.  Betts  585 

Earl  v.  M'Neill  254 

Lady  v.  Ramsden  582,  660 

Grassman  o   Bonn  267 

Grassmeyer  v.  Beeson  1161 

Grattan  v.  Appleton  2025,  2205 

v.  Wiggins  284 

Gravatt  v  Tann  71 

Grave,  In  re  1297 

Gravel  v.  Clough  1385 

Gravely  v.  Barnard  1672 

Gravenor  r>.  Miles  1292 

v  Woodhouse  1126 

Graves  v.  Alden  846 

v   Blondell  604 

v.  Budgel  884 

f.  Corbin  33-4 

v.  Downey  649,  684 

v   Fresh  559 

v.  Pinchback  249 


Graves  v.  Short  1108 

v   Wright  1209,  1210 

Gray,  Re  307 

v.  Adamson  710 

v.  Barnard  166,  168,  228 

v    Bateman  920 

v   Beck  630 

v   Bell  73,  166 

v   Brignardello  999,  1017 

v  Campbell  425,  508,  510 

v.  Chaplain  25,  242 

v.  Chaplin  1724 

v.  Chicago  R  Co.  1614, 1683,  2897 
v.  Chiswell  236 

V.  Faris  844 

v.  Gaither  1722 

v   Gray  1282,  1377 

c   Haig  403, 1250,  1552 

V  Hays  419,  549 
v.  Lewis  26,  244,  1743 
v  Murray  930,  952 
v  National  Steamship  Co.  191 
v.  Ohio  <&   Pennsylvania    R 

Co  1640 

v.  Parke  68 

v.  Paul  1558 

u.- Pent  land  907 

v   Russell  1646 

v.  Sherman  2012 

c.  Smith  365 

v.  Thompson  1418 

v.  Washington  667 

v,  Wilson  671 

Graydon  v   Church  1751 

V  Graydon  1157 
Grays,  lie  108 
Grayson  y   Atkinson                      875 

v.  Moncure  1165 

v   Virginia  446 

Grazbrook  v.  Giliatt  1696 

Greames  v.  Stritho  1699 

Greasby,  He  1705 

Greason  v.  Keteltas  671 

Great  Australian  Gold  M.  Co   v. 

Martin  452, 628 

Great     Eastern    Railway    Com- 
pany,  Ex  parte  1028 
Great  Eastern  Ry    Co.,  Re  1030 
Great      Falls     Manuf.    Co.    v. 

Henry  1623 

v.  Worster  1032,  1628,  1639 

Great    Luxemburg   Rv    Co     v 

Magnay  "300,  721, 1397 

Great  Northern  Copper  M.  Co., 

Re  1027 

Great    Northern    Ry.    v     Man- 
chester,   Sheffield,   &     Lin- 
colnshire Ry.  1656 
Greatrex  v.  Greatrex  1663 
Great   Western  Colliery  Co    v. 

Tucker  "3^0,  720,  722 

Great    Western  Compound   Co 

v   Etna  Ins   Co.  302 

Great  Western  Ry.  Co.  v.  Bir- 
mingham &  Oxford  Ry 
Co  1619, 1652, 1661 

v   Cripps  1622 

v.  Oxford,     Worcester,      and 
Wolverhampton   Ry.   Co. 

1663,  1678 
v.  Oxford,  &c.  1640 

v.  Rushout  1620 

Great  Western  Ry    of  Canada  v. 

Braid  1127 

Great  wool  v.  Sims  1138 

Greaves,  He  176,  643,  1607 

v  Atkinson  669,674 

17  Gouge  26 

v.  Greaves  626 

v.  Griffith  1699 

v.  Smith  434 

v.  Tofleld  675 

Greece,  King  of  v.  Wright  18 

Greedup  v  Franklin  County       1661 

Greedy  v.  Lavender       104,  107,  73o 

1432 

Greele  v.  Emery  1290 


Greeley  v.  Provident  Bank  1716 

Green,  Ex  parte  1359 

r.  Arnold  279 

v.  Badley  69,  160,  1370 

v.  Bostwick  1742 

v.  Branton  Imj 

v.  Briggs  1440 

v.  Charnock  28,  29,  i3 

v  Coleby  973 

i;  Covillaud  385 

v.  Creighton  553,  630 

v.  Crockett  974 

v.  Dodge  546 

v.  Gascoyne  1430 

v  Grant  243 

v.  Green  109,  867,  974 

v.  Harrison  37,  13, 1 

v.  Huey  1081 

v.  Humphreys  fr4o 

v .  .i.-iikms  1576,  1577,  1579, 

1583 
v.  Lanier  1297 

v.  Low  825,  1600, 1671 

v.  Lowes  1652 

v.  Lyon  187 

v  McKenney  286 

v  Mc Kinney  457 

V.  Massie  1568 

;    Measures  1175 

0   Monks  1217 

v.  Morris  1973 

v  Mumford  1560,  1565 

t;.  Neal  633,  635,  637 

v.  Otte  106 

17.  Pallas  1668 

v.  Phila  Freestone  &  Granite 

Co.  1081 

v.  Pledger         449,  456,  842,  1335, 
1370, 1596,  1615 
v.  Poole  282 

v.  Pulsford  1675 

v.  Richards  334,  346,  9S9 

v   Robinson  544 

v.  Rutherforth  629 

v.  Sevin  384,  785 

v.  Snead  655,  657,  712,  821 

v.  Tanner  844 

v  Terwilliger  714 

v.  Thomson  508 

v  Tippah       County      Super- 
visors 418 
v.  Vaughan  844 
v.  Weaver                                    566 
v.  Wheeler  932 
v.  Winter              1233,  1467,  1468, 
22!  17 
v.  Wright                                 1138 
Green,  Re,  Green  v.  Pratt  83 
Greenaway  v.  Adams                     1103 
v  Rotheram                                112 
Greencastle  v.  Hazelett                 1638 
Greene  v.  Canny                               303 
v.  Greene                                    1165 
v.  Harris         2,  615,  617,  624,  666, 
667.  703 
r.  Mumford                      1560,  1661 
v.  Sisson                       237,  290,  292 
v.  United  States  Dealers'  Ass'n 

1643 
Greenfield  v  Frierson  1625 

Greenhalgh    r.     Manchester    & 
Birmingham  Railway  Co. 

1631,1663 

v  Rumney  1525,  1526 

Greenhouse,  Ex  parte      1191,  1851 

Grecnin  v.  Hoey  1675 

Greening  v   Beckford  1696 

r.  Greening  512 

Greenlaw  v  Greenlaw  1284 

v.  Kernahan  161,  1625 

v.  King  571 

Greenleafr  Queen  288,1515 

Greenlee  v.  McDowell  1567,  1578 

Greenough  v.  Eccles  1100 

v.  Gaskell    571,  672, 674,  575,  576, 

943. 1834 

v.  Shorrock  113,  187 


lviii 


Greenslade  v  Dare  676 

Greenwalt  v.  Duncan  1548 

Greenway  v.  Bromfield  653 

Greenwell  v.  Greenweil       1308,  135* 

Greenwich  Bank  v.  Loom  is         1575 

Greenwood  v.  Atkinson        282,  781, 

1533 

v.  Churchill  346 

v.  Firth  284 

v.  Greenwood  1824,  1832 

v.  Hornsey  1662 

v.  Parsons  956 

v   Percy  1151 

v.  Kothwell  1835 

v.  Sutcliffe  1395 

v   Sutherland  1001 

v  Taylor  284 

Gree   v.  Laws  364 

v.  Turner  1517,  1580 

v   Willis  1120 

Gregg,  Re  892,  1044,  1840 

v   Garrett  614 

v.  Massachusetts    Med     Soc. 

1653 

r  Slater  1393 

v.  Taylor  1082,  1212,  1319 

Gregor  v.  Molesworth  659.  1583 

Gregory  v.  Boston  Safe  Deposit 

Co  1770 

v.  Dodge  1467,  1481 

v.  Forrester  200 

v  Gardiner  1056 

v.  Molesworth  72,  73,  997 

v.  Paul  88 

v.  Pierce  88 

v.  Pike  154S 

v.  Power  10U3 

v.  Spencer  793,  806,  811 

v.  Stetson  149,  190 

v.  Swift  149 

v.  Weaver  747 

v.  West  1367 

Gregson,  Re      642,  1465,  1488,  1842 

v  Oswald  1544,  1545 

Gr<  ig  v.  Somerville  1206,  1208 

Grenfell  v.  Windsor,  Dean  of      1730 

Grepe  v.  Loam  354 

Gresham  V.  Luke  2190 

v.  Peterson  1698 

v   Price  1416,  1417 

Greshold  v  Markham  214 

Gresley  v,  Adderley  1717,  1718 

v   Mousley  577,  1822 

Gretton  v   Mees  1395 

Greville  r  Greville  1338 

Grew  v   Breed  477,  1042, 1053, 

1585,  1691 

Grey,  Re  100 

v  fliiswell  1033 

v.  Dickenson  1013 

v.  Northumberland,    Duke  of 

1633,  1675 
Grey's  Brewery  Co.,  Re  1847 

Grey    Coat    Hospital    v.    West- 
minster Impr.  Commission- 
ers 1531 
Grey  de  Wilton,  Lord  v.  Saxon 

1655,  1672 

Grider  v.  Apperson  633 

G Hells  v.  Gansell  953 

Grier  v   Wilt  314 

Grierson  v   Eyre  1634 

Grimes  v.  Grimes  1163 

Griffin  v.  Archer  157 

v  Brady  664,  1380 

v.  Merrill  339 

v  Morgan  1508,  1524,  2359 

v.  Pickett  1624 

v .  Spence  254 

v.  State  Bank  735 

v   Wilson  281.  1516 

Griffing  v.  Gibb  544,  639 

Griffith    v.    Augusta  &    K.   R 

Co  545 

r  Bateman  200,  249 

v   Hronaugh  1539 

0.  Coleman  90 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 

[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging] 

Griffith  v.  Griffith  612,  675,  678, 

1147,  1713,  1741,1765,1766 

V.  Hadley  1272,  1291 

v.  Hilliard  1638 

v.  Hood  109,  110 

B    Lewis  329 

v.  Merritt  1549 

v.  Pound  200,  212,  243 

v.  Kicketts  317,  357,  358,  909, 

1097 

v   Segar  334 

v.  Vanheythuvsen  230,  301 

Griffiths,  Ex  parte  62 

v.  Cow  per  1045 

v.  Crvstal  Palace,  &c.  Co.        1774 

v  Griffiths  1844, 1848 

v   Hamilton  663 

v  Hatchard  1280 

v  Jones  1273 

v.  Wood  732 

Griffy  v.  Enders  1159 

Giigg  V   Landis  369 

v.  Sturgis  710 

Grigg's  Case  629 

Griggs  v.  Gear  1576,  1582,  1583 

v.  Gibson  1359 

v.  Staplee  230,  301,  384,  751, 

1400 

v  Thompson  1562 

Grignon  v.  Astor  222 

Grigsby  v.  Weaver  1073,  1136 

Grillion  v.  Rotch  1525 

Grim  v   Walbert  138 

v   Wheeler  715 

Grimes  v.  French  326,  378,  379, 

380 

v  Grimes  586,  1584 

v   Harrison  1444 

V   March  1395 

Grimmett's  Trusts,  Re  83,  85 

Grimsby  v.  Webster  1696 

Griniston  v.  Timm  1463 

Grimwood  v.  Shave  40,  1482 

Grinnell  v.  Merchants'  Ins.  Co 

1205, 1207 
Grissell  v.  Peto  1284 

Grist  v.  Forehand  1355 

Gnswold  v.  Central  Vermont  R. 

Co  634 

v.  Griswold  906 

v.  Hazard  1312,  1580 

V.  I  ii man  805 

v.  Jackson  9S6 

v  McMillan  59 

v  Simmons  1552 

v   Waddington  49 

Grocev  Field  1580 

Groch  v.  Stenger  1017 

GrofTs  Appeal  1650 

Groom,  Re  1862 

r.  Attorney-General  497.  523 

v.  Stinton  1024,  1483 

Groome  v.  Sporne  541 

Gross  c   George  W.  Scott  Man uf 

Co.  149, 2386 

v.  Pearcy  1281,  1282 

Grosvenor  V   Allen  237,  559 

v  White  542 

Grote  v.  Bing  1735 

Grotenkemper  v.  Carver  1546 

Grove,  Re  102,  103 

v.  Bastard  1001,  1408 

v  Fresh  346.  347.  1249 

v.  Rentch  324.  328,  .341,  363 

v.  Young  933,  935,  936,  937,  1148, 

1384 

Grover  v.  Stilwell  1611 

Grover  &  Baker  Sewing  Machine 

Co.  v  Millard  519.  526 

v.  Radcliffe  664 

Groves  v.  Clarke  106,  1516 

v.  Gordon  46 

v.  Groves  1209,  1795, 

1836 
v  Lane  201,203 

v.  Levi  201,  203 

V.  Perkins  106 


Groves  v.  Webber 

1624 

Grubb  v.  Browder 

1459 

v.  Kolb 

1625 

v.  Lockabill 

231 

Gruber  v.  Baker 

324 

Grugeon  v.  Gerrard 

1073 

Gruggen  v.  Cochrane 

1256 

Grumbrecht  v.  Parry 

720 

Grundy  v.  Grice 

2214 

Gruning  v   Prioleau       452,  53 

•,591 

Grunwell  v   Garner 

229 

1524 

Guadalupe  County  v    Johnston   368 

Guaga  Iron  Co.  V   Dawson 

24 

Guavus  v.  Fontaine 

1050 

Gubbins  t'  Creed 

1242 

Gude  v.  Mumford 

354 

Gudger  V.  Western  N.  C. 

R.  Co 

269.  31 

Guebelle  v.  Epley 

1683 

Guernsey  r.  American  Ins  Co. 

334 

v  Carver 

330 

Guest  c.  Brooklyn 

1624 

v.  Cuwbridge  Ry.  Co 

1035 

v.  Honifray 

1398 

v.  Sims 

165 

v.  Smythe                895, 

1271 

1285 

Guilbert  v.  Hawles 

793 

Guild  v.  Phillips 

1584 

Guilden  Sutton,  Ex  parte 

1323 

Guilford,  Mayor  of  v.  Clark 

546 

Guill  v.  Pierce 

1511 

Guillam  v.  Holland 

1253 

Guillon  v.  Rotch 

1526 

Guinness  v.  Land  Co 

1650 

Guion    r.    Liverpool,   &c 

Ins 

Co 

1461 

Gulf,    C.    &    S.   F.   R. 

Co.   v 

Nelson 

'1556 

v   Washington 

324 

,601 

Gullan  v.  Trimbey 

100 

Gullett  v  Housh 

1576. 

1580 

Gully's  Case 

58 

Gully  v.  Remy 

1257 

Gultenberger  v.  Woods 

1639 

Guuby  v.  Thompson 

1716 

Gunn  v   Bolckow 

1770 

v   Mason 

1505 

v.  Prior 

605,6! 

Gunnell  v.  Bird 

843 

v.  Whitear 

1413 

Gunther    v.    Liverpool,  L 

&  G 

Ins.  Co 

1440 

Gunton  r  Zantzinger 

1282 

Guppy  v   Brown 

916 

Gurden  V.  Badcock 

1751, 

1757 

Gurish  v  Donovan 

409 

Gurney,  Re 

224 

v   Ford 

860 

v  Jackson 

no, 

1425 

Gurnev,  Re,  Mason  v  Mercer        560 

Guthrie  r.  Kahle  1240 

v.  Morrell  256 

v  Quinn  736 

v.  Walrond  1526 

Guy  v.  Churchill  1517 

v  Doak  1733 

v.  Guy  70,  71,  78,  79,  1595 

t).  Hernance  1961 

v.  Pearkes  103 

Guyot  v  Hilton  1556 

Gwatkin  v.  Campbell      245, 304,  417 

Gwillim  v   

Gwilt  v.  Crawley 

Gwin  v.  Harris 

Gwinett  v.  Bannister 

Gwinn  v   Whitaker 

Gwjer  v.  Peterson 

Gwynn  v.  Butler 
v.  Dorsey 
v   Leth  bridge 
v.  Lethbrigge 

Gwvnne  v.  Ldwards 


v.  Gell 
Gwyon  v.  Gwyon 
Gyles  v   Wilcox 
Gynn  v-  Gilbard 


734,  737 

1131 

1031 

1621 

1255 

797 

417 

1235 

1467, 1468,  1470 

380 

1461,  1476, 

1480 

560 

819, 1535 

1645 

68.1347 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 


11X 


H. 


H  ,  /?e  1840 

H's  Estate,  Re  1719 

Haas  v  Chicago  Building  Soc.  1719, 
1734 
Haase  v .  Roehrschied  1368 

Haberdashers'  Company   v.   At- 
torney-General 1417,  1418 
Habcrghani  v.  Ridehalgh  1433 
v.  Stansfield                                 llHo 
v.  Vincent  416 
Hack  v.  Leonard                           1659 
Hacker  v.  Mid  Kent  Railway  Co.  279 


Hackett  V    Baiss 
Hack  ley  v   Draper 

v.  Mack 
Hackney  v.  Vawter 
Hackwith  v   Damron 
Hackwood  v.  Lockerby 


1638 
1743 
1551 
1650 
287 
453,  460, 
462,  540 
930,  952 
390 
803 
645 
1127 
Tr. 

144 


Haddix  v.  Haddix 

Haddoch  v.  Thomlinson 

Had  Ion  v.  Peeler 

Hadix  v.  Davison 

Hadley  v.  Baxendale 
v.    Freeduian's    Sav. 

Co. 

v.  London  Bank  of  Scotland  1652, 
1664 
v.  McDougall  1826 

v.  Pethcal  1600 

v   Russell  267,  273  282 

Haffey  v.  Haffey  1702 

Hagaman  v.  Cloud  County  1661 


Hagan  v.  Blindell 

v   Buck 

v.  Patterson 

v.  Walker 
Hagar  v.  Whitraore 
Hagell  v.  Currie 


1620 

198 

313 

214,  253,  3^3 

779 

1772, 1774, 

1780 

Hagenhach  v.  Howard  1661 

Hagerstown  Turnpike  v.  Creeger    22 

Hagerty  v   Lee  1663 

llagewisch  v.  Silver  1736 

Haggard  v   Benson  37 

V.  Pelieier  Frferes  354 

Haggarty  v.  Pittman  1720,  1723 

Haggett  v.  Welsh  1860 

Haggin  v.  Comptoir  d'Escompte 

de  Paris  149.  445 

v    Raymond  1071 

Haggitt  v.  Iuiff  744,  892 

Hagthorp   v.    Elook  374,    614, 

675,717,720,  758,844,1239, 

1242,  1245,  1462 

Hague  v   Wheeler  .  1638 

Hal  id  v.  Concordia  Society  1654 

Haig  v  Gray  216 

v.  Homan  1576 

Haljrh,  Re  1858 

v.  Dixon  430 

v   Grattan  1747 

v.  Haigh  186,  979 

v  .laggar  1632 

v   Kaye  619,  657 

Haunt  v.  Burr  1716 

v.  Case  1668 

v.  Lucia  1676 

v.  Morris  Aqueduct,  Prop,  of  735, 

845,  891 

Haikman  v.  Fernie 

Haine  v.  Taylor 


Haines  v.  Beach 

v  Carpenter 

v   Hewitt 

v .  Oatman 

v  Taylor 
Hair  v.  Avery 
Hake  t>    Brown 
Hakell  r.  Wright 
Hake  well,  In  re 

v   Webber 


1128 

16&5.  1636 

194,  277 

834,  1627 

1159 

68 

1637, 1640 

119 

1120 

1654 

111 

978 


Hakewill,  Ex  parte        38,39,1863 
Re  39 

Halcomb  v,  Halcomb  1315 

v.  Kelly  418 

v.  Managers  New  Hope  D.  B. 
Co.  1147 

Haldane  v.  Eckford     505,  1526,  1825 

Halldeuby  v  Spofforth        1411,  14--3 

Hale  V.  Boustead  157 

v.  Continental  Life  Ins.  Co       519, 
735,  759 
0.  Cove  1108,  1138 

v.  Duncan  1743 

v.  Hale  991,  1584,  1728 

v.  Lewis  979 

v.  Nashua  &  Lowell  R.  Co         334 
v.  Point  Pleasant  &  0   R   R. 

Co  1663 

v  Saloon  Omnibus  Co.    1566,  1570 
e   Sheldrake  99 

v   Thomas  1684 

Hales  v.  Pomfret  245,  262,  839 

v.  Shaftoe  1053,  1054 

Haley  v.  Bagley  260 

v    Bannister 

Halfhide  r.  Kenning 
v.  Robinson 

Halifax    Joint  Stock   B.   Co 
Gledhill 


1360 

671 

83 

'  675 
v.  Sowerby  Bridge  T.  H   Co.      323 


Hall,  Re 
v.  Austin 
v   Baldwin 
V    Barrows 
v.  Bennett 
v.  Bodley 
;     Bushill 
v.  Byron 
v.  Claggett 
v.  Clive 
v.  Craig 
v.  Dana 
v.  Dodge 
v   Doran 
v    Eve 
v.  Ewin 
v.  Kowlkes 
v   Hall 


880,  1794.  1840 

251,  252,  268,  272 

1561 

1G48,  1649 

309 

723 

1404 

850 

737 

1524, 1525, 1526,  2059 

1565 

1042 

994 

1111 

371 

1654 

380,  582,  1548 

155,333,  059,852,1159, 


1660,  1727,  1728,  1771.   1 
Hallett  1251,  1419 


v.  Harris 

v.  Hoddesdon 

v.  Hugonin 

v  Jenkiuson 

v.  Jones 

v.  Lack 

v.  Lamb 

v   Laver 

v.  Law 

v.  Lay  ton 

v.  Linn 

v   Macdonald 

v.  Mcl'herson 

v.  Maltby 

v.  Morris 

v .  Muiliner 

v.  Noyes 

v.  Paulet 

v   Pierce 

v  Radcliffe 

V.  Roche 

v.  School  District  No  4 

v.  Stone 

v.  Stothard 

v.  Stout 

v.  Taylor 

v.  Truman 

v.  Turner 

v.  Urquhart 

v   Warren 

)'.  Westcott 

t1.  Whiston 


220,  1551 

548,  871,  1573 

119 

1729, 1774 

1354 

404 

1031 ,  1492 

309.  1S45 

1151 

1076 

1071 

1425,  1778 

793,  1614 

327,  852,  856 

279 

1307 

605,  615 

39 

378 

539,  1510 

466 

418 

1130 

1134 

933 

1168 

485,  760,  889 

590 

1291 

852 

1302 

1961,  2274 


Hall  v.  Wood  722,  723 

v.  Young  115,  117 

Hall's  Charity,  Re  1854,  1855 

Hall  Dore's  Contract,  Re  1282 

Hall's  Estate,  Re  865 

Hallack  v.  Loft  659,  15*4 

Hallady  v.  Johnson  1550 

Hallett  v.  Cousins  llol 

v.  Cumpton  551 

v.  Furze  214 

v.  Hallett     190,  217,  225.  236,  238, 

240,  303,  1177,  1507 

Hal  lev  v.  Webster  852 

Halliday,  Re  1863 

v.  Temple  1820 

Halliley  v.  Henderson  1205 

Halliwell  v.  Phillipps  1633 

Hal  lock  v.  Bacon  1317 

v.  Smith  214,  215,  930,  952 


234,  243,  303, 

915 

181,  499 

726 

852,  1620 

1467,  1498 

1727 


Hallows  v.  Fernie 

Halsam,  Ex  parte 
Halsey  v.  Ball 

v   Brotherhood 

v.  Van  Auiringe 

r.  Windham 
Halstead    v.   Commissioners    of 

Lake  '      46 

v   Shepard  345 

Halstead  United  Charities,  Re     1610 
Halsted  v.  Meeker  378 

v.  Tyng  1226 

Haly  v .  Barry  1039,  1041 

v  Goodson  Di53 

Ham  v  Schuyler  1624 

Hambly  v.  Trott  1634 

Uamblyn  v.  Ley         1055,  1057,  1058 
Hambrick  v.  Jones  1029,  1031 

Hambridge  v   De  la  Crouee  307 

Hambrook  v  Smith  568.  764 

Hamburger  v.   Poetting  27,  28 

Uamer-ley  v.  Brown  948 

v   Lambert        50,  51,  52,  947,  948, 
949,  956,  1578 


Hamerton  V.  Rogers 
Hamilton  v.  Arrowsmith 

v.  Bankin 

ti   Brewster 

v.  Buckmaster 

v.  Cummings 

v.  Davies 

r   Denny 

v.  Dobbs 

v.  Eaton 

v   Gilman 

v  Girdlestone 

v.  Hamilton 

v.  Hibbert 

v.  Houghton 

v   Littlejohn 

v.  Lyster 

r   Marks 

v   Morris 
t'   Nott 


13!»2 
95 
297 
1766 
1328 
1961 
448 
1245 
1622 
51 
163 
1722,  1733 
100,  122 
691 
1258,  1276,  158  i 
1501 
679 
394,  395, 1562,  1563, 
1567,  1667 
1151 
673 
Savannah,  F.  &  W  Uy.  Co.  149 
v   Sheppard  645 

v.  Southern  Nevada  M.  Co.       402, 
991,  1221 
v.  Whitridge  1637 

v.  Williford  674 

v   Wood  640,  1675 

V.  Worsefold  1632 

v.  Wvnne  1723 

Duke"  of  p.  Meynal  939 

Hamilton  Loan  &  T.Co  V.Gor- 
don 843 
Hainley  v.  Gilbert                       2182 
Hamlin  v.  Bridge  178 
v.  Stephenson  67 
«   Wright                         1742,  1751 
Ilaiimi  v  Stevens                           290 


Ik 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 


Hammersch!ag   Manuf.    Co.   v. 

Judd  888  ' 

H.iinmerslaugh  v   Farrior  892  j 

Hauiuierslev  v.  barker  791 

v.  Wyckoli  395,  1619  | 

Hauimertou  v.  Honey  1004,  1106 

Hammond  v  Attwood  59 

v.  Fuller  1662 

v   Hammond  486,  1253 

r.  Maundrell  16S9 

V.  Messenger     198,  199,  550,  2043. 
20b9 

v   Michigan  Bank 

v.  Neame 

v.  Puller 

v   Schofield 

v.  Taylor 

V    Winchester 

v.  Wordsworth 
Uamond  8   

v   Bradley 

v.  Walker 

Hamond's  Case 

II  s  1 1 1 1  >  v   Hamp 

v.  Robinson 


335 

147,  1431 

1639 

269 

467 

1663 

919 

932 

168 

223,447,1771. 

1779 

951 

1079 

252,253,288,337, 

371,  598, 1675,  1734 

1075 

1780 

1417 

1133 

1425,  1426 


Hanon  v.  Weil  1716 

Hanover  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v   Brown 

830 
Hanover,  King  of  v.  Wheatley       17, 
18,  925 
Hanover  Nat   Bank  v   Klein  842 

Hansard  r   Hardy  650,  999 

Hans-ell  v    Hansell  709 

Hansen  v   Miller  116,  117 

Hanslip  v.  Kitton        895, 1821,  1825 
Hansom  Cab  Co.  v.  Verkes  26 


Hanson,  He 

v.  Bean 

v.  Gardiner 

v.  Keating 

v   Lake 

u   Murray 

v.  Patterson 

v.  Reece 
Hansucker  V.  Walker 
Hapgood  w.  Houghton 
Haralson  v.  George 
Harbeu  V.  Phillips 


1856,  1857 

576 

1631,  1668,  1670 

91,124,385 

1404 

1790 

1002 

1846 

1286 

90,117 

1274,  1282 

26,  241,  244, 

1650 

1234,  1414 

1433 


Hampden  v.  Hampden 

v   Wallis 
Hampshire  v.  Bradley 

v.  Harris 
Hampsou  v.  Brandwood 

v.  Hampson  1077, 1082,  1124 

Hampton  v  Coddington  312,  732 

v   Holman  1001 

v.  Nicholson  418 

v.  Pool  1701 

v  Quayle  418 

Hanbury  r.  Hussey  1157 

v.  Litchfield  380 

r.  Ward  539,  1510 

Hanby  v   Henritze  1517 

Hanchett  v   Briscoe  119 

Hancock,  He  653 

v.  Attorney-General  156 

v.  Carlton  612,  697,  699 

v.  Hancock  166,  641 

v.  N.  Y.  Life  Ins.  Co.  51 

v.  Rollison  807 

v  Toledo,  &c.  R.  Co.  1734 

v   Walsh  1614 

v    Wooten  236 

Hancocks  v.  Lablache  178,  631 

Haud  B   Dexter  558 

v.  King  807 

v.  Savannah  &  C.  R.  Co.  1411 

v   Weidner  843 

Handford  v.  Handford  1003.  1189 

v  Storie  243,  790,  793,  794 

Handler  v   Billings  1197 

r   Davies  1427 

r.  Heflin  1556 

v.  Metcalf  1785 

Handly  v  Munsell  1548 

Hands  v   Hands  1699 

Ilandv   V.   Cleveland   &  M.    R. 

Co.  1765 

v.  Scott  1299 

Haney,  Re  1596,  1607 

Hanger  v.  Fowler  1846 

Hankey  v.  Simpson  667 

V.  Vernon  1621 

Hankin  v   Middleditch  933 

Hanlon  r.  Doherty  576 

v.  Primrose  314 

Hanly  v.  Levin  68 

Hantnan  v.  Riley  215,257 

Hanmer  v.  Chance  861 

Hannah  r.  Hodgson  1551 

Hannam  v  South  London  Water 

Works  Co  809,  1659 

Hannas  v   Hannas  991 

Hannay  v.  McEntire  1670,  1700. 

1707 

Hannibal.  &c.  R  Co.  v.  Shipley 

1666 

Hano  v  Bigelow  1654 


Harbin  v   Darby 

v.  Masterman 
Harborough,  Earl  v  Shardlow     1139 
Harborough,  Lord  v.  Wartnaby 

1274,  1307, 1592,  1594,  1685 
Hardcastle  o.  Smithson  274 

Hardee  v.  Gibbs  1512 

»   Wilson  1029 

Hardeman  v.  Harris  718 

Harden  v.  Hays  852 

Hardenburgh  v.  Blair  ld37 

Harder  v.  Harder  294,  302 

Hardey  v.  Baley 
Hardie  !».  Bulger 
Hardiman,      lie,     Pragnell     V 

Batten  . 
Hardin  v.  Boyd 

v  Swoope 
Harding  v  Cox 

v   Durand 

v.  Egin 

v.  Glover 


418 


1157 

4<  2 
334 
416,  418 
560 
657,  590,  788 
1728 


v  Handy   149, 285,  324,  361,  1226 

131 '< 

v.  Harding  734,  1282 

v   Hardrett  675 

v.  Hawkins  843 

v.  Tingey  419,  425,  480,  598, 

1602 

v.  Wheaton  2279 

v.  Wick  ham  654,  t.70 

v.  Williams  866 

v   Yarbrough  1282 

Hardingham  v.  Nicholls  677 

Uardman  v   El  lames      609,  615,  620, 

622,  624,  673,  678,  682,  1822, 1833, 

2095 

Hardt  V.  Liberty  Hill  C   M.  Co 

1675 
Hardwick  v.  Bassett     526,  837,  978, 


v.  Wright 
Hardy  v   Beaty 
v.  Caley 
v   Dartnell 
v   Eckersley 
v.  Hardy 
v  Heard 
Hull 


1231,  1825 

1381 

298 

814 

1398 

807,  810 

837 

429.  1449,  1522 


v   Reeves      560,  561,  640,  650,  679 


1668 
875 
North   Western 

190 

1173.  1411 

217,  219 

771 

900, 1408 

1829 

911 


Summers 
Hare  v-  Hare 
v  London    & 

Ry.  Co 

v.  Rose 

Hares  v.  Stringer 

Harford  v.  Lloyd 

v.  Purrier 

v.  Rees 

v   Reeves 

Hargrave  »   Harerare  68,  851,  1015, 

1026, 1027, 1034, 1112,  1114, 1115, 

1137,  1456,  1726 


Hargrave  v.  Kettlewell  1794 

v.  Tindal  164 

Hargraves  v.  White  972 

Hargreaves,  He  236,  989 

v.  Michell  642,  654 

v   Wright  344 

Haring  v.  Kauffman  1684 

Harker,  Ex  parte  1698 

Harkinson's  Appeal  1654 

Harlan  v.  Barnes  997 

Harland  v.    Bankers  &  M.  Tel 

Co  1427, 1743 

v  Emerson  615,  619,  620 

v.  Garbutt  85 

v.  Person  334,542 

Harlock  v.  Ashberry  652,  1072 

v.  Smith  1440 

Harloe  v  Harloe  1213,  1528 

Harlow  v.  Mister  193 

Harman  v  Davis  1584 

v.  Easton  1666 

v   Foster  1755 

v.  Jones  1640 

v.  Lewis  1120 

v   Wagner  1716 

Harmer  v.  Gooding  367,  544 

v.  Harris  1409,1449 

v.  Plane  1642 

v.  Priestly  2230 

Harmon  v.  Byram  281 

v  Campbell  525,  531 

v.  Kentucky  Coal  Co.  1716 

Harner  v.  Price  1621 

Harnett  v.  Yielding  1405 

Harnish  v   Bramer  1621 

Harnsberger  i'  Cochran  1168 

Harp  v.  Osgood  195, 325 

Harper  v   Elberton  1071 

v.  Hayes  1285 

v.  Hendricks  559 

v.  McElroy  1638 

v.  Munday  1420,  1421 

v.  (VBrien  633 

v.  Uaveuhill  319 

v.  Vaughan  1461 

Harpham  v.  Shacklock  674 

Harrald,  He  1447 

Harrell  v  Wilson  1-90 

Harries  v.  Kees  298, 1778 

Harrigan  v.  Bacon  417 

Harrington  v.  Becker  814,  1539, 

1541 

v.  Chastel  1680 

v.  Du  Chatel  16S0 

v.  Harrington  547,868,1221,1469, 

1614 

r.  Slade  1532,  1536 

Harris,  Ex  parte  1750 

He  98,  893,  1608, 1847 

v.  Brisco  563,  1558 

v  Butterley  1138 

v.-  Carter  286,287 

v.  Clap  1254 

v.  Collett  1556,  1625,  1672 

v.  Collins  844,  1073 

v  Cornell  231 

v   De  Tastet  1178 

v.  Dietrich  522 

v   Edmondson  1577 

v.  Fleming  452,  536 

v.  Fly  992, 1221,  1296, 

1599 

v.  Gamble  785 

v.  Gaudy  799 

v.  Hamlyn          162,  177,  475, 1387 

v.  Harris       70, 168,  620,  622,  749, 

1167,  1551,  1832 

v.  Hess  1770 

v.  Billiard  996,  1378 

v  Hines  790 

v.  Hooper  214 

v  Ingledew  232,679,  695,697,875, 

883 

v.  James  261,  732 

v.  Jenkins  347 

v.  Knickerbacker  408,  860 

v.  Lee  103 


Harris  v.  Lewis 
v   Lightfoot 
v.  Macintosh. 
v.  Milburn 
v.  Mills 

v.  Mutual  Life  Ins  Co. 
v    Pepperell 
v-  Pollard 
v.  Quine 
v .  Rich 
t;   Roth  well 
v.  Schryock 
i;.  Start, 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 

[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.  J 

1596     Hart  v.  Coffee  267 

800        v.  Colley  1648 

1110        v.  Denham  1723,  1768 

201         ?■.  (iranger  378   633 

560,  639,  640        v.  Hannibal,  &c    R.  Co.  1663 

v.  Il.irt  880,  9S1,  1542 

v.  Henderson  418 

n.  Herwig  1663 

v.  Jamaica  Pond  Aqueduct  10 

v.  McKeese  314 

v.  Mallet  630 

v.  Montefiore  1825 

v.  Phillips  637 

v.  Roberts  801,  964 

v.  Sanderson  617 


ki 


v.  Andrews 
v    Arniitage 
v  Borwell 
v  Coydell 
V   Crewster 
v.  Crown 
v.  Buckle 
v.  Cage 
v.  Cockerell 
v.  Coppard 
v.  Delinont 
v.  Eldridge 
v.  Every 
v   Fane 
t'.  Farnsworth 
v.  Farrington 
V.  Forth 
v  Gibson 
v.  Good 
v.  Guest 
v.  Gurney 
v-  Hall 
v   Harrison 
v.  Hart 
v.  Hogg 


41 

1973 

1610 

643 

1543 

328 

1650 

15!»0 

542,  1629 

1102,  1104 

59 

283,  561,  652,  815 

321 

236 

165,  167,  997 

1233 

721 

122 

332,  1728 

712, 1805 

1755 


v.  Johnson 

v.  Kennedy 

v.  Lane 

v.  Leutner 

v.  Lynes 

v.  MeMennomy 

v,  Masselin 

V.  Mexican  Ry.  Co 

r   Morton 

v.  Nettleship 

t>.  Nixon 

r.  1'ennell 

t*.  Pryse 

v   Ray 

r.  Richards 

v   Righter 

f.  Rowan 

v.  Rumsey 

v.  St.  Mark 


1551 
26 
92 

1129 

1667 

13!  )9 

733,  783 

1165 

1203 

1129 

994 

608,  726 

675 

641 

1636 

328,  382 

800,  1626 

1479 

76,77, 1132,  11&3 

2231 

303,  339,  340,  365,  366. 

588 

842,886,887 

187 


796, 1588 

1443 

815 

1382 

1323 

599 

287 

663,  1621 

361 

277 

247 

2027 

1169,  1342 

200,  323,  324 

175,  288,  290,  556 

973 

Church  1635 


v.  Southampton,  Corp.  of  1020 
r.  Southampton,  Mayor  of  1474 
v.  Southcote  563,  569,  607,  611. 
676,  1385 
v.  Stewardson  225.  237,  257,  277. 
521 
1649 
1440 
1675 
1741 
107S 
55,  56 
230 
1392 
645 


v.  Taylor 
v.  Wearing 
i'.  Yerby 

Harrisson  v.  Duignan 

Harrod  v.  Harrod 

Harrop,  Re 

Harry  v.  Davey 

Harryman  v.  Collins 

Harsell  v.  Kelley 

Hart  v.  Albany,  Mayor,  &c.  of  1629, 

1631 

v.  Bleight  1284 

v.  Brand  1401 

v.  Carpenter  844 


v.  Scruggs  891 

v.  Small  1593 

v.  Stephens  114 

v.  Ten  Eyck        284,  839.  840,  843, 

844,  1176,  1180,  1229,  1230 

v.  Tims  1720 

v.  Tulk  403  448,  454.  1012.  1015. 

1510,  1597,  1734,  1738,  2059 

v.   Wingate  997 

Hartell  v.  Van  Buren  632,  635 

Harter  v   Colman  213 

Hartford  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bonner 

M.  Co.  303,  334 

Hartga  v.  Bank  of  England  148 

Hartland  v   Dancocks  1114 

Lady  v.  Atcherley  176 

Hartley,  Re  1734 

v.  Boynton  536 

v.  Gilbert  85 

v.  Matthews  385,  842 

v.  Russell  557,  563 

v.  Swayne  1563 

llai-tinan  i'.  Dowdel  120 

Hartmann  i<  Hartmann  1150 

Hartridge,  Ex  parte  1620 

v.  Rockwell  1640,  1664 

Hartshorn  v.  Eames  590.  787, 


Hartshorne  v.  Hartshorne 


v.  Watson 
Hartt  v.  Harvey 
Hartwell  v.  Colvin 

v.  Townsend 

v.  Whitman 
Hartwright  v.  Badham 
Hartz  v.  Schrader 
Harvard  College  v.  Soc.  for  Pro- 
moting Theolog  Education     10, 
137, 138 


1150, 
1165 

1098 
1619 
1205 
1583 
845,  846 
1131 
1729 


Harvey,  Re 
v.  Ashley 
v.  Beck  with 
v.  Bignold 
v.  Bradley 
v.  Branson 
v.  Clayton 
v.  Cooke 
v   Coxwell 
v.  Crawford 


187,1841 
100 
145 
243 
743, 1370, 1581 
9!  13 
576 
294 
70,  799 
1260 


v.  Croyden   Union  R.  S.  Au- 
thority 973,  1031 
v.  E-ist  India  Co.  391 


Hall 
Harvey 


412, 1675, 1685 
225,  1045,  1055,  1069, 
1213.  1527 


V.  Hewitt 
v.  Jacob 
v.  Lord 
v.  Lovekin 
v.  Mitchell 
r.  Morris 
v.  Mount 
r.  Mountague 
i».  Murrell 
v.  Renon 
v.  Tebbutt 
v.  Towle 
v.  Tyler 
r.  Varney 
v.  Wilde 
Uarvie  v.  Banks 


1237 


1131 
32 
407 
564 
1106 
570 
1394 
1683 
1578 
522 
1392 
967 
628 
1743 
1209 
1246 


Harwell  v.  Lehman  214,  550 

v   Potts  17.33 

Harwood  V   Kirby  279 

V   Railroad  Co.  1640 

Hasbiouck  v.  Shuster  1516 

Haskell  l>.   Haskell  57J 

v.  Hilton  197  291,557 

v-  New  Bedtord  1638 

v   Raoul  994.  1578 

Haskius  v.  Rose  1684 

Ha<lar  t>   Ho; lis  781 

Hasluck  17.  Stewart  449 

Hassall  v.  Wright  1643 

Hassan  !'.  City  of  Rochester         1661 
Hassel)  v.  Van  Houten  295 

Ilastie  v.  Hastie  858,  890,  1019 

Hastings  (Lady),  Re,  Uallett  v- 

Hastings  109,  642 

v.  Belden  589,  1618 

v.  Cropper  1561,  15<>3 

v.  Ivall  163J.  1832 

v.  Palmer  806 

v.  Wiswall  1259 

Lord,  v.  Beavan      1039,  1040,  1694 
Haston  v  Castner  235 

Hatch  v,  H83, 1781 

v.  Calvert  l<i0 

V.  Dana  269 

v.  Eustaphieve  311,  395,  733 

v.  Indianapolis  &  S.  R.  Co.     1304, 
2395 
v.  Searles  1213 

v.  Spoffbrd  633 

v.  The  Newport  1120 

v.  Wallamet  I   B.  Co.  1675 

v.  White  284 

Hatcher  v.  Chambersburg  Nat. 

Bank  1120 

v.  Hatcher  385,  1584 

v  Massey  190 

Hatchett  v.  Cremome  1322 

Hatfield  v   Montgomery  640 

Hathaway  v.  Baldwin  351 

v.  Crocker  1101 

v.  Hagan        790,  1298,  1299, 1548, 

1551 

v  Russell  1168 

0.  Scott  746 

Hathornthwaite  v.  Russel  1722 

Hat-Sweat  M.  Co.  v.  Davis  S  M. 

Co.  790, 1642 

Hatton,  Re  157 

v.  Harris  1029 

?•.  Haywood  1037,  1054 

Haughwort  v.  Murphy  281 

Haulenbeck  v.  Cronkr'ight  1156,1321 

Hauser  v.  Roth  1079, 1298,  1310 

Ilausmeister  v.  Porter  630 

Hautton  v.  Hager  42 

Havelock,  lie  1610 

v.  Havelock  1358 

Haverfield  v.  Pyman  1828,  1829 

Haverhill  Loan  Fund  Assoc,  v. 

Cronin  284 

Havers  v .  Havers  1722 

Haverstick  v.  Sipe  1638 

Haviland  ».  Bloom  90,  102,  105 

Hawv   Vickers  202 

Hawarden  )•   Dunlop  452,  456 

Hawes  v.  Bamford  893,  1671 

r.  Draeger  851 

V.  Johnson  39 

?•.  Oakland  26 

r.  State  573 

Hawke,  Re  1797 

?•    Kemp  1595 

Hawker  v.  Himcombe         1029,  1030 

llaukes  v.  Barrett  800 

?'.  Hawkes  1163 

v.  Holland  1735,  1741 

v   Kennebeck  546 

Hawkesley  V.  Gowan  1694 

Hawkesworth  v.  Chaffey  561 

v.  Dewsnap  879 

Hawkins  7'.  Blake  405 

v.  Craig  225  237 

v.  Crook  518,  523,  1059,  1061 


Ixii 


Hawkins  v.  Day  1314 

v  D0d  1801 

v-  Gardiner  '!'l 

v.  Gathercole   460,  578, 1730,  1743, 
1834 

v.  Hale 

V.  Hall 

v.  Ha»kins 

v.  Holmes 

0.  Lusconibe 

r.  Pearson 

v.  Smith 

V.  Watts 
Hawkshaw  v   Parkins 
Hawkswortb,  lie 

v   Hawksworth 
Hawley  v.  Bennett 


v.  Cramer 

f   Donnelly 

v.  James 

v.  Steele 

V    Wolverton 
Haworth  v.  Bostock 
Hawse  v  Moody 
Hawtayue  v   Bourne 
Hawthorne,    He,   Graham   v 


443 

1452.  1453 

38,  217,  218,  370 

655 

74,  170 

418 

1841 

1359 

1652 

1794 

108 

1543,  1544, 

1686 

269,  551 

893 

1001,  1489 

133,  211,  261,  1639 

349,  373,  759 

841 

334 


Massey 
Hay  v   Bowen 

v.  Estell 

v.  State 

v-  Willoughby 
Haycock  v.  Haycock 
Hay  den  V.  BuckliQ 

o.  Marmaduke 

v.  Thrasher 
Hajes,  He 

v  Bickelhoupt 

v.  Billings 

v.  Brotzman 


629 

1405,  1411 

1150,  1151 

892 

983 

208*,  211,  255 

281 

2H4 

1675 

99,  1802 

1424 

1675 

1751 


v.  Dayton  334,  543,  601,  2383, 2384 

v.  Hayes  197 

v.  Johnson  _     1560 

v.  Leguin  747,  784 

v.  Miles  1588 

Hayes's  Appeal  334 

Haygarth  v.  Wearing  1386 

Hayllar  v.  Sherwood  58 

Havman  v  Rugby  School 


Ha_\  mes  v.  Cooper 
Hayne  t'.  Gould 

v   Hayne 
Hayner  v.  Stanly 
Haynes  V   Ball 


1040,  1696,  1846 

1157 

607,  1075,  1550 

659 

493,  508,  509,  512, 

526 

681,1611 

1795 


v.  Barton 
v.  Haynes 

v.  Hazlerige  1664 

Hayney  v.  Coyne  563 

Havnie  v.  Hail  645 

Hays,  Ex  parte  135!» 

v.  Carr  860 

v.  Cornelius  214 

v.  Harmony  Grove  Cemetery     989 

v.  Hays  1296 

v.  Humphreys  283 

v.  Jackson  1772 

v.  State  546 

Hayter,  Ex  parte  1589 

Havward  V   Andrews  197 

v.  Carroll  841 

v.  East    London   Waterworks 

Co  16«2 
t'.  French  1180 
v   Pry  8, 136.  156 
v.  tlray  1180 
v.  Havward         771,  772,  773,  1327 
v.  National  Bank  378,  379 
t;.  Pile  203,  1527 
t>.  Price  1327 
v.  Roberts  732 
v.  Stephens  893 
v.  Stillingfleet  1630 
Havwarden,  Viscountess  v.  Dun- 
lop  1596 
Haywood   v.   Brunswick    P.   B. 
Society  1654 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 

[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 

Haywood  v.  Hutchins  551  | 

v   Lincoln  Lumber  Co.  1734  i 

v.  Marsh  645,  1475,  1476  | 

0.  Miner  12'j6,  1317 

v.  Ovey  271 

Hajzlett  V    McMillan  161  i 

Hazard  v.  Dillon  303.  334 

v   Durant      26.  149.  235,  489,  505, 
507,  526,  531,  608,  1743 
v.  Griswold  314,  324 

v  Hidden  974 

Hazeldine  v.  Grove  H2i 

Hazelhurstt;  Sea  Isle  City  Hotel 

Co  843 

Hazeu  v  Durliug  236,  1615 

v   Thurber  1166 

Hazleton  V.  Bright  1069 

Hazzard  v.  Credit  Mobilier  26 

Heacock  v.  Stoddard  916 

Head  II.  Egerton  676 

v.  Godlee  1473,  1581 

v  Head  76,  851,  1578 

v   Teyuhani,  Lord  206 

Heald  v.  Hay  448,  1674 

Healey,  He  887 

v.  J  agger  834,  952 

v.  Simp.-ou  542 

Heanley  v.  Abraham  805,  830 

Heap  v.  Hartley  197 

v.  Jones  1436 

Heaps     v     Commissioners     of 

Churches  40 

Heard  v.  Borgwardt  406 

v.  March  1522 

v.  Pilley  196,  365,  561 

Hearle  v.  Greenbank  97 

Hearn  v.  Way  593 

v.  Tennant  1673,  1683,  1684 

Hearne  v.  Ogilvie  525 

v.  Stowell  1127 

Heartt  v   Corning         603,614,685, 
686,  689,  690,  699,  1250 
Heath  v.  Ashley  997 

v.  Bucknall  1637,  1638 

v.  Chadwick  59 

t\  Chapman  1530 

v.  Crealock         362,  674,  878,  907, 
909 
v.  Ellis  26,  242,  296 

v.  Erie  Ry.  Co.  193,  1556 

v.  Fisher  1264 

v.  Griswold  H68 

v.  Heath  90,  91 

v.  Lewis         87,  107, 123.  179,  407, 
513,  832,  1512,  1530,  1531 
v.  Percival  21 0,  250 

,..  Pugh  649,  652.  1072 

v    Vrelan  149- 

Heathcote  v   Edwards        1588,  1796 
v-    North   Staffordshire   Rail- 
way Co  1620,  1663 
Heather  v   Waterman  495 
Heathley  t>  Thomas  187 
Heatlev  v   Finster  678 
v.  Newton                             195,  14 1 4 
Heaton  J'.  Dearden  209 
Heavner  v.  Morgan  860 
Hebbard  v.  Haughian  574 
Hechmer  v  Giliigan                       1561 
Heck  v.  Buckley                             1687 
v.  Vollmer                            109,  1676 
Heckman  v   Mackey  41 
Hecksher  v   Crosley  28 
Hedges  v.  Bowen                              861 
v    Cardonnel                       1318,  1486 
I  Heeman  v.  Midland                       1828 
Hftfield  Waterworks  v.  Yeomans  543 
Hffflmi  v.  Bowers                           1675 
Heffron  v.  Gage                             B'62 
|      v  Gore                                         559 
Hefner  v.  Hesse                               1081 
Heggie  v.  Hill                                    334 
Heidritter  v.  Oil-cloth  Co.            1743 
Heighington  v.  Grant          668,  1252, 
1260, 1416, 1420, 1421,  1432, 
1449,  1464 
Heineman  v.  Hale                           149 


Heinlen  v.  Cross 
Heinrich,  The 

Heinrich  v.  Sutton 
llciii>lir  v    Friedman 
1 1 .  iron.  Re 
Ilea-  > .  liexley.  Lord 

v.  Ogle 
Heller  v.  Royal  Ins.  Co. 
Hellnian,  Re 
Helm  i-    Hardin 
Helmetag  v.  Frank 
Helmick  v.  Davidson 
Helms  v.  Franciscus 
Heniberow  v.  Frost 
Heming  v   Archer 

v.  Dingwall 

t\  Leilchild 


1675 
1S46 
307 

907 

1064,  1066 

202,204,643 

520 

590 

1798 

220,  256,  1505 

860 

790 

76,  90,  91 

852 

1279 

1555,  1558,  2047 

1399,  1449 


v  Swinnerton         554,  1621,  1857, 

1858 

Hemings  o  Pugh  551 

Hemming,  Ex  parte  62,  157 

v  Dingwall         414,  770,  776,  1458 

v.  Maddick 
Hemphill  v.  M'Kenna 

r.  Miller 
Hemry  V.  Macdonald 
Hemsley  v.  Myers 
Hendee  v.  Howe 


1'iukt-rton 
Henderson,  He 
v.  Alloway 
t;.  Atkins 
v.  Campbell 
v.  Carbondale    Coal   & 

Co. 
v.  Cook 


415,  1102 
1664 
951 
1417 
1620 
1381 
146 
555,664 
1639 


v.  Dennison 
t'.  Dodds 
v-  Henderson 
v.  Henshall 
v.  Hopper 
v.  Jones 
v.  M'lver 
v  Mathews 
v   Meggs 
v   Meyers 
v.  Moss 
v.  Phillipson 
v   Runcorn 

Co. 
v.  Sherman 
v-  Underwriting  &  A.  Ass 

v  Walker 
Hendruk  v.  Robinson 

v   Wood 
Hendricks  v.  Craig 

v   McLean 
Hcndriks  v.  Montngu 


447 

Coke 

387.  1019 

582,  587,  589,  1579, 

1580 

601 

1423,  1437 

555.  664,  1628 

1029 

443 

2319 

1235 

736.801 

518 

417 

1770 

905 

&    Alkali 

1079 


Soap 


334 

39, 

1556 

1752 

1028 

629 

915 

997 

328, 1648 

560 


Uendrickson  v.  Uendrickson 

v.  Hinckley  1625 

v.  Wallace  659 

Hendrig  v.  Clay  1528 

Ileneage  v    Aikin  1600 

Henley  v   Brooke  1044 

v.  H.  nley  542 

v.  Phillips  1412.  1415 

v.  Stone  280,  681,  742 

Henly  v   Gore 

Henman  v   Lester 

Helm  v   Walsh 

Itencegal  0.  Evance 

Hennessee  v.  Ford 

Hennessey  v.  White 

Hennessy  v.  Wright 

Hennet  o.  Luard 

Hennewinkle  v.  Georgetown        1661 

Henniker  r   Chafy  1611 

Henuing  v.  Raymond  743 

v   Samuel  H32 

v.  Willis              200,  210,  367,  1395 

Henuinger  r.  Heald  334.  659 

Hennings  v.  Conner  7^8 

Henrick  v.  Blair  671 

Heurie  r-  Johnson  1157 

I  Henry  v.  Armstrong  852 


1103, 1126 
1727,  1728 
909 
632 
87 
581 
794,  795 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 


lxiii 


Henry  v.  Blackburn 
v.  Browu 

v.  (J  lark 
V-  Costello 
v.  Doctor 
v.  Ellis 


187 
406 

2227 
784 

10.33 

lutiy 


v.  Great     Northern     Railway 

Co.  1652 

v.  Gregory  312,  732 

v.  Lee  1099 

v   McKittrick  334 

v-  Ogle  91 

v  Suttle  Sol) 

v   Travellers7  Ins.  Co.      417,  1029. 
1290,  1461,  1523, 1825 
v.  Tapper  1624 

v.  United  States  1381 

County  v.   Winnebago  Drain- 
ing Co.  560 
Henr.  Clay  and  Bock  &  Co.  Re  1648 
Henshaw  v.  People's  Mutual  N. 
G   Co.                                      1638 
v.  Wells                  1370, 1716,  1734 
Hensley  v.  Whiffin  214 
Hen>loe's  Case                                  227 
Hen  wood  v   Jarvis              1623,  1678 
Hepburn  v.  Auld  989 
v.  Dunlap                                       989 
v.  Durand                                      726 
v-  Lordan                         1635,  lb'38 
Hepburn's  Case  49 
Hepworth  v.  Uenshall                    888 
v.  Heslop                1265,  1278,  1390 
Herbert  v.  Hedges                           1163 
v   Herbert                             324,  500 
v.  Kowles  52 
V.  Sayers  58 
v.  Torball  67 
v.  Wren                                      1105 
Lord  v.  Pusey                              7*54 
Hercy  v.  Ballard                               644 
v.  Diuwoody                               1&J7 
v.  Ferrers                                       581 
Herd  v.  Lupton                               809 
Herdsman  ;;.  Lewis              1071,  1073 
Hereford,  Bishop  of  v.  Adams      1437 
Herefordshire  Banking  Co.,  Re  1253 
Her^el  v.  Laitenberger         287,  1548 
Herle  v.  Greeubank                       1308 
Herman  v-  Duuba.r    1610,  1741,  1705 
Herndon  v.  Gibson                       1290 
v.  Hurter                                    1746 
Herr  p.  Bierbower                        1031 
Herrell  v.  11  iimum                        1037 
Herrett  v.  Reynolds        507,  509,  800 
Herrkk  v.  Belknap  1195,  1294,  1298, 
1300,  1301,  1309 
v   Racine  Warehouse  Co.          1493 
Herring  v.  Bischoffsheiin               350 
v.  Clobery                574,  1468,  1487 
v.  Goodson                                   851 
v.  Polley                                     1019 
v.  Swain                                       707 
v.  Wickham                                 675 
v.  Yeo                                           228 
Herrington  v.  Hubbard                  287 
v.  Robertson                              1381 
Hersey  v.  Veazie                         26,  144 
Hershberger  v.  Blewett                   790 
1  Hershee  v.  Hershey                         974 
1  Hershy  v.  Baer     '                      1017 

Hersou  v.  Chicago  &  Alton  R. 
1  Co.  1463 

Hertford,  Borough  of    v.  Hert- 
ford, Poor  of  1419 
Marquis  of,  Re               1089.  1090, 
1691,  1693 
v.  Boore  309 
v.  Suisse                     446,  461,  1590 
t)    Zichi,  Count  de  255 
Hertford  Charities,  Re                  1610 
Hertz  v  Union  Bank                   1019 
Hervey  v.  Beckwith  272 
v.  Fitzoatrick                             1722 
v.  Smith                           1635,  1002 
v.  Talbutt                                    1457 
Hesing  v.  Attorney-General    12,  146 


Hesketh,  The  32  | 

Heslop  v.  Metcalfe  1844 

Hess  v.  Lowrey  1511  | 

v.  Vose  60,  1150 

Hester  v.  Hester  307,  074 

v.  Thorn. -uu  1-21 

V.  Weston  589,  590 

Hettihewage   Siman      Appu     v. 

Queen  s  Advocate  141 

Heugh  v.  Kail  ot  Abergavenny     298 


v.  (Jairett 
0.  Scard 
Heusner    ? 
Co. 


579,  720 
1417 
Mutual    Life    Ins. 

1561 

553 

983 

1187 

250.  326,403, 


Heu.^tis  V.  Johnson 
Heward  v.  Wheatley 
Hewes  v.  Hewes 
llewett  V-  Adams 

406,  425,  853,  971,  1716,   1732, 

1733 

v.  Foster  1416,  1420 

Hewitson  v.  Sherwin  355 

p.  Todhunter       202,  203,  204,  896 


Hewitt,  Re 

193 

v.  Campbell 

843 

v.  Dement 

418 

v.  Hewitt 

611, 618, 704 

v.  Loosemore 

674 

v.  M'Cartney 

505 

v.  Montclair 

287 

v.  Nanson 

1266,  1207 

v.  Prime 

576 

v.  v\  hite 

396 

Hewitt's  Case 

176,  1149 

Hewlett  v.  Cruchley 

1132 

v.  Davis 

1273,  1282 

v.  Miller 

380 

Hextv.  Walker 

296 

Hey  v.  Schooley 

993 

Heyer  v.  Bromberg 

334 

v   Pruyn 

652 

Heygate  v.  Annesley 

118 

v.  Thompson 

182,  031 

Hey  man,  Ex  parte 

897 

v.  Landers 

1607 

v.  Uhlman 

536,829 

Heyn  v.  Heyn 

1175 

Hey s  v.  Ashley 

657 

Hey  wood  v.  City  of  Buffalo 

v.  Miner 

1112 

v.  Wait 

L594,  1673,  1684 

Hiatt  v.  Brooks 

68 

Hibbard  V.  Eastman 

1621,1022, 

1023 

v.  Morrison 

1021 

Hibbert  v.  Durant 

726 

v.  Hibbert 

1737 

Hiberuia  S.  &  L.  Co. 

t>.  Jones      145, 

417,418,  779 

Hicheus  i>.  Congreve 

240,  295,  403, 
1772 

193 

v   Kelly 

Hick  v.  Lockwood 

1733 

Hie  key,  Ex  parte 

1009 

v.  Stone 

801 

Hickman  v.  Cooke 

347 

v.  Upsall 

652,850 

Hickok  v.  Farmers'  and  Mecha- 

nics' Bank 

906,  928,  929 

Hickox  v.  Elliott 

200 

Hicks  v.  Blanchard 

576 

v.  Campbell 

190.  338,  598 

v.  Chadwell 

1249, 1300 

r.  Ferdinand 

1120,  1580 

o.  Hastings 

1103 

v.  Hicks 

1750 

v.  Hogan 

1108 

v.  Jackson 

559 

v.  Oliver 

418 

D.  Raincock 

5*6 

v.  Wrench 

1412 

Hickson  /'.  Aylward 

007 

r.  Lombard 

328, 382 

v.  Mobley 

709 

»'.  Rucker 

12«2 

Hidden  v.  Jordan     1240,  12 

1246 

Hiddingh  v.  Denyssen  1120 

Hide  v.  Haywood  1410 

v.  Petit  1050 

Hiern  v.  Mill  379,  380,  075 

Higbee  v   Bacon  1230 

v.  Brown  lcilO 

v.  Camden  &  Amboy  R.  Co     1601," 

1677 

Higdon  v.  Higdon  851.  9S0 

v.  Thomas  195 

Higginbotiiam  v.  Burnet       547,  584 

Higgins  !■.  Crawfurd  0-.2 

e.  Krankis  710 

v.  Hoppock  590 

v  Mills  1480 

v.  New  York  1508 

v   Shaw  1642 

v.  Woodward  1669,  1676,  1085 

Higgin.-on  v.  Adir  17i:9 

v.  Blockley  704,  21^4 

v.  Hall      '  68,  83,  18^5 

v  Wilson  182,031 

High  v.  Batte         283,  612,  074,  077, 

678,  726 

v  Worley  237 

Higham,  Ex  parte  90 

Highstone  v.  Franks  314,  639 

High  ton  v.  Treherue  980 

Hightour  v.  Rush  1067 

Hightower  v.  Mustian  288 

v.  Smith  1377 

Hilary,  Re  1347 

Hildebraud  v.  Beasley  1518 

Hildreth  v.  Skillenger  lo77 

Hildyard  v .  Cressy         408,  624,  681, 

694,  729, 1559 

Hiles  v.  Case  1743 

i'   Moore  1734,  1735 

Hill  v.  Adams  261 

v.  Barclay  1658,  1659 

v.  Billingsley  1623 

v.  Biuuey  840 

v.  Bonner  204 

v.  Bowers  1003 

v.  Bush  843 

v.  Bute,  Earl  ot  737,  738,  760 

v.  Campbell  534 

v.  Challinor  1528 

v.  Chapman  1360,  1486,  1489, 

1801 

v.  Cooper  87 

v.  Crarv  720 

v.  Curtis  319,  1027 

v.  Davison  1653 

v.  Durand  200 

v.  Eyre  418 

v.  Fulbrook  1103 

?'.  Gaunt  813 

v.  Great  Northern  Ry.  Co.  380 

v.  Greenwood  1108 

r.  Hart-Davis  454,  895,  1020 

v.  Hibbit  868,  940,  1440 

v.  Hill  334,  418,  885, 1530 

v.  Hoare  1079 

v.  Hoover  986 

v.  King  983,  1330 

v.  Lewis  250 

v.  Managers  10 

v-  Maury  1580 

v.  Newman  204 

v.  Proctor  149,  191,  1164 

v.  Keardon  28,  315,  542,  1394 

v.  Reno  1150 

v.  Rimell   1594, 1596,  1607,  1735 

v.  Saylea  1638,  1639 

v.  Smith  243,  1408 

v.  South  Staffordshire  Ry.  Co. 

1027,  1028.  1257 
t».  Thompson  1642,  1644,  1070 

v.  Tollit  744 

v.  Townley  283,  50* 

v.  Townsend  121 

v.  Turner  1551,1624 

v.  Walker  643,  1425 

v.  Ward  1075 

v.  Williams  844 

v.  Yates  1092,  1128 


lxiv 


TABLE    OP    CASES    CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 


Hill  v.  Young  1157 

Uillearv,  Re  1440 

v.  Hurdle  379 

v.  Thompson  1003 

Hiller  v.  Collins  1675 

Uilliard  v.  Eiffe  328,  382 

v.  Fulford  1426 

v.  1 1  1 1  i - 1 1  n  1570 

v.  Mutual     Ben.      Life    Ins. 

Co.  51 

v.  Smyth  140 

Hilligoss  v.  (irinslade  1620 

llilluianr.  Hurley  1638 

Hillsr   Barnard  243 

v.  Croll  1656 

v.  Evans  1081 

v.  Hills  73 

ti.  M'Rae  216,  269,324 

v.  Nash  216,  2ly 

v.  Parker  1743 

v.  Putnam  243 

v.  Reeves  1743 

v.  Springett  266,  407 

Hilton  v.  Fowler  1130 

v.  Granville,  Earl  1640,  1663,  1664 

v.  Guvot  664 

v.  Lawson  629,  1586 

v.  Lothrop     87,  260,  285,392,305, 

1556,  1558 

v.  Woods  1381 

Hi  me  v.  Dale  1645 

Hinchman  v.  Kelley  560 

v.  Paterson  Horse  R.  Co.         303, 

1635 

Hinckley  v.  Gilman,  &c.   R.  Co. 

1461,  1492 

v,  Pfister  385,  1120 

Hiucks,  lie  307 

Hincks  v.  Nelthorpe  570 

Hind  v.  Whitmore    36,  74,  111,  796, 

811,  1378 

Hinde  v.  Blake  1043 

v.  Morton      813,  1511, 1512, 1526, 

1527 

v.  SkeUon  631 

v.  Vattier  873 

Hinder  v.  Streeten  1404 

Hindle  v.  Birch  1131 

v.  Dakin  1278 

Hindley  v.  Emery     1080, 1641,  1656 

Hindman  v.  Aledo  712 

v.  Taylor  640.  1559 

Hindmarsh  v.  Southgate       164,  174 

Hinds  v.  Keith  1120 

Hindson  v.  Weatherell  664,  913, 

1488 

Hine  v.  Dodd  843,  846 

r.  New  Haven  556,  630,  801 

Hiues  v.  North   Carolina,  State 

of  17, 24 

v.  Spruill  642 

Hinings  v.  Hinings  1802 

Hinkley  v.  Moreau  48 

Hinrichs  v.  Berndes  1620 

Hinsdale  D.  G.  Co.  v.  Tilley  236 

Hinson  v.  Adrian  214 

v.  Pickett  1479 

Hinton  v.  citizens'  Mutual  Ins. 

Co.  779 

v.  Galli        1731,  2127,  235.3 

v.  Winsor  1461 

Hiorns  v.  Holtom  710,  1266 

v.  Holton  1425 

Hipkins  ».  Hipkins  1065 

Hipp  v.  Babin  556,  630 

Hippesley  v.  Horner  1111 

v.  Spencer  1630 

Hirsch  v.  Im  Thura  1861 

v.  Whitehead  1618 

Hirst,  Re  1267 

v   Procter  895 

HHop  v.  Wvkeham  1610 

Hitch  v.  Walls  1124 

v.  Wells  162,  476 

Hitchcock  r.  Carew  883 

t>.  Caruthers  601 

v.  Clendiuen  95 


Hitchcock  v.  Giddings 

v  .  Jacques 

v.  Rhodes 

v.  Skinner 

v.  Tremaine 
Hitchen  v.  Kirks 
Hitchens  v.  Congreve 

V.  Lauder 
Hitehman  v.  Stewart 
Hite  v.  Hite 

v.  Salter 
Hitner  v.  Suckley 
Hix  i'.  Gosling 

v.  Whittemore 
Ilixon  v.  Eastwood 
Hoagland  v.  Titus 
Hoare,  A'e 

lie,  Hoare  v.  Owen 

v.  Breniridge 

v.  Contencin 

v.  Dickson 

v.  Hoare 


1400 

410  ! 

763 

961,  1151,  1158 

1479 

251,  1720,  1725 

26,160 

605,658 

271,  2250 

1254 

1112 

447 

186,  402 

852 

214 

1675, 1677 

1347 

1716 

1624 

550 

39 

13 


v.  Niblett 
v.  Parker 
v.  Peck 
v   Silverlock 
Uobart  v.  Abbot 
o.  Andrews 


v  Johnstone   841, 1188,  1315,  1339 

269 

614,  683 

550,  560 

1132 

194,  215,  261 

197,  199,  260.  365, 

668,  860 

v.  Frisbie  361 

v.  Stone  1772 

Hobarts  v. 1263 

Hobbs,  Re,  Hobbs  v.  Wade  651 

v.  Dane  Manut.  Co.  63 

i'.  McLean  1411 

v.  Memphis  R.  Co.  549,  864 

v.  Reid  203 

t>.  Wayet  477 

Hobday  v.  Peters  187 

Hobhouse  v.  Courtney  447,  448 

v.  Hollcombe  1742,  1743 

Hobler,  Re  974 

Hoboken  Savings  Bank  v.  Beck- 


man 
Hobson,  Re 

v.  Bagnall 

v.  Doe 

v.  M'Arthur 

v-  Shearwood 

v  Sherwood 
Hoby  v.  Hitchcock 
Hock  v.  Hock 
Hoddel  v.  Pugh 
Hodder  v.  Rufnn 
Hodgden  !'.  Hodgden 
Hodgdon  r.  Farrell 

v   Heidnian 

v.  White 
Hodge  v.  Hawkins 

?'.  Holmes 
Rexworthy 


726 

1063 

1616 

1118 

379 

1694,  1845 

1152.  1743,  1748 

29,  31,  32,  53 

875 

1384 

1281,  1283,  1285 

1255 

1269 

283 

630 

1369 

284 

1308 


Hodgen  v.  Guttery  1624 

Hodgens  r.  Hodgens  106 

Hodges,  Re       1323,  1347,  1606,  1797 
v.  Ancrum  1106 

V.  Beverley  116 

v.  Bowen  861 

v.  Don  1  ton  890 

v.  Fincham  1623 

r.  Hodges  598,  690 

v.  Millikiu  1578,  1579 

v.  Mullikin  1005,  1031 

v-  New  England  Screw  Co.  26 

v.  Patrick  975 

v.  Pingree     1112,  1150,  2027,  2325 


v.  Salomons 

1315 

v.  Screw  Co. 

144 

v.  Seaboard  &  R.  R. 

1638 

v.  Smith 

1568, 

1569 

v.  Welsh 

1646 

v.  Williams 

186 

v.  Wise 

445 

Hodges's  Trust,  Re 

68 

Hodgkin  v.  Longden 

547 

,548 

Uodgkinson   v.    National 

Live 

Stock  Ins.  Co. 

243 

Hodgman  v.   Chicago,  &c.  R. 

Co.  1661 

Hodgson,  Re  217 

Re,  Beckett  v.  Ramsdale  269 

v.  Barvis  1138 

v.  Butterfield  764 

v.  Cash  1413 

v.  Clarke  1427 

v.  Duce  1638,  1661,  1682 

v.  Espinasse  360,  3(59 

v.  Farrell  1289 

v.  Forster  311,  1129 

v.  Hodgson  462,465,521, 

1048 
v.  Merest  858 

v.  Powis,  East  1640 

v.  Shaw  1279 

v.  Smithson  1461 

v.  Thornton  712 

v.  Williamson  187,  642 

Hodle  v.  Healey  640 

Hodson  v. 877 

v.  Ball  1370,  1536,  1537,  1579, 

1581,  2060 

v.  Cash  730 

v.  Coppard  1683 

v.  Warrington,  Earl  of       885.  896 

v.  Watson  1731 

Hoe  t>.  Wilson  287 

Hoffman  v.  Duncan  1732 

v.  Knox  986,  1576 

v.  Livingston  1591,  1669 

v.  McMorran  860 

v.  Pearson  974 

v.  Postel  1083 

v.  Savage  1156 

v.  Schoyer  517 

v.  Skinner  1402,  1450 

v.  Smith  1147 

v.  Van  Dieman  1770 

Hoffmann  v.  Postill       579,  580,  716, 

718,  719,  720,  764,  1020,  1554 

Hofiick  v  Reynolds  593,  598 

Hogan ,  Re  749,  891 

D.  Branch  Bank  ol  Decatur        735 

v.  Burnett  324 

v-  Kavanaugh  553 

v.  McFarland  418 

v.  Short  195 

v.  Walker  279,  290,  292 

Hogarth  v.  Miller  1503 

Hoge  r.  Fisher  851 

v  Penn  1801 

Hogencamp  ?>.  Ackerman  718 

Hogg  v.  Kirby  1642, 1648 

v.  Price  592 

v.  Scott  1641,  1681 

Hoggart  v   Cutts        1560,  1564,  1565 

v.  Scott  989 

Hoggat  v.  McCrory  551,  552 

Hogge  v.  Burgess  1503,  I860 

Hoghton,  Re  174,  1370 

Re,  Hoghton  v.  Fiddey  1580 

v.  Fiddey  1578 

v  Hoghton  852,  855,  1367 

Hogue  v.  Curtis  817 

Holiorst  v.  Howard  1507 

Hoitt  v.  Burleigh     1076,  1078,  1079, 

1110.  2334 

Holabird  v.  Burr      1224, 1240, 1248, 

1298,  1299,  1317 

Holbecke  v.  Sylvester         1310,  1449 

Holbrook  v.  Henderson  142 

Holbrooke  v.  Cracroft  1457 

Holcomb  v.  Mosher  369 

Holcombe  v.  Antrobus  1590 

v.  Holcombe  868,  1235,  1461,  1485. 

1745,  1746,  1747 

v.  Trotter  813 

Holden,  Ex  parte  1033 

Re  99, 1802 

v.  Gilbert  1238 

v.  Hearn  68,  170.  K59 

v.  Holden  156,  580,  884 

v.  Hoyt  1743 

v.  Kvnaston       236,  794,  795,  1395 

v.  McMakin  1463 


Holden  v.  Silkstone,  &c.  Co.        1120 

v.  Stickuey  246 

v.  Upton  1743 

v.  Waterlow  113 

Holder  v.  Durbin  1263 

Holderman  0.  Jones  1120 

Holderness  v.  Lamport  1653 

lloldemesse  v.  Hankin  843,  1560 

Holderstaffe  v.  Saunders  1620 

Holding,  Ex  parte  985 

v.  Barton     655,  657,  712,  2115 

Holdrege  v   Gwynne  305,  1619,  1677 

Holdsworth  v.   Dartmouth  (May 


1100 

2  92 

1643 

674 

1643 

270,  271 

1411 

909 

1548 

1416, 1430 

68 

403,  702 

723 

257,  277 

1071 

1601 

477,  1386 

1157 

116 

252 

2095 

1720 

956 

1353 

1169 

503 

410 

1061 

1666 

1707 

1501 

1411 

171 

1542,  1543 

887,  1069 

1385 

v.  McDonald     1576,  1577,  1578 

v.  Shakeshaft   315,  317,  383,  542. 

1369,  1394 

Hollington,  Re  1064 

Hollinrake  v.  Truswell  1643 

llollins  v.  Brierfield  Coal  &  Iron 

Co.  1734 

Hollis  v.  Bulpett  386 

v.  Burton  782 

v.  Shaffer  1648 

Hollis's  Case  214,  279.  642 

Hollister  v.  Barkley   844,  1180, 1222, 

1230,  1256,  1257,  1250, 

1676,  1677 

v.  Lefevre  1561 

v.  Stewart  634 

Holloway,  lie  573 

v.  Cheston  1474 

v.  Holloway  1651 

v.  Millard  327 

v.  Phillips  398,  964,  985 

Holly  v.  Bass  517, 1031 

Holly  Manuf.  Co.  v.  New  Ches 

ter  Water  Co. 
Hollyford  Copper  M.  Co.,  Re 
Holman  v   Bank  of  Norfolk 
v.  Kimball 


or) 

v.  Holdsworth 

v.  McCrea 

v   Shannon 
Hole  v    Bradbury 

v    Harrison 
Ilolfnrd  v.  Phipps 

v   Yate 
Holgate  v.  Eiton 

v.  Haworth 
Holker  v.  Parker 
Holkirk  !».  Holkirk 
Holladay  Case,  The 
Holland  v   Baker 

v.  Challen 

v   Craft 

v.  Cruft 

v.  Holland 

v.  Moody 

v.  Prior 

v.  Sproule 
Hollenbeck  v.  Donnell 
Holies  v.  Carr 
Holley  v.  Chamberlain 

v.  Glober 

v.  Younge 
Holliday  v.  Biordon 

v.  Bruner 

v.  Meyers 

v   Riodan 
Hollier  v.  Eyre 
Hollinger  v.  Syms 
Hollings  v.  Kirkby 
Hollingshead's  Case 
Hollingsworth  V.  Duane 

v.  Koon 


".  Riddle 

v.  Vallejo 
Holme  v.  Brown 

v.  Guy 

v.  Pringle 
Holmes,  Re 

v.  Arundel,  Corp.  of 


214 

1069 
342 
576 

1577 

860 

1624,  1625 

311 

1501 
100,  1&3,  629 

1313 


v.  Baddeley     572, 

v.  Bell 
v.  Chester 

VOL.  I.  —  e 


740,  1551,  1S19. 

1S34 

1718,  1726 

296 


TABLE   OF   CASES    CITED. 

[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 

Holmes     v.     Eastern     Counties 

Railway  1307 

v.  Field  69 

v.  George  1677 

v.  Holmes  114,  547,  548,  12y8. 

129y,  1300,  1726 

v.  Penney  178 

v.  Remsen  994 

v.  Shaver  1282 

v.  Sherwood  145 

v   Turner  2217 

v.  Upton  1631 

v.  Weaver  1081 

Holroyd  v.  Wyatt      1278,  1285,  1286 

Holsuian   v     Boiling   Springs 

Bleaching  Co.     1635,  1637,  1638, 

1639 

Holstcomb  v.  Rivers  1230 

Holt,  He     160,  898, 1049,  1671,  1675 

v.  Daniel  590 

v   Holt  12!i0 

v.  Jesse  1031 

v.  Mill  214 

v.  Weld  83  i 

Uolworthy  v.  Allen  1409 

V.  Mortloek  1622 

Holyoake  v.  Shrewsbury  &  B 

Ry.  Co.  1637 

Holvoke  v.  South  Hadley  Falls 

Ice  Co.  887 

Homan  v   Moore  1565 

Home  v.  Fish  645 

v.  Jobs  1677 

v.  Patrick  183,  499 

v.  Wallis  880 

Home  Assurance  Ass.,  Re        26,  31, 

1605 

Home  Ins.  Co  v.  Atchison  &c 

R   Co  313 

v  Howell  1627 

Hone  v.  Van  Schaick  1461,  1489 

Honeyman  v-  Lewis  1133 

v.  Marryat  1501 

Honeywood  v.  Selwin  717 

Honner#.  Morton  119,  125 

Honore  v.  Colmesnil      668,  951,  1320 

Hony  v.  Honv        559,  612,  624,  646, 

617 

Hooberrv  v.  Harding  1037 

Hood  v.  Aston  1651,  1665 

v.  Burlton  97 

v.  Clapham  1370 

».  Cooper  1013 

v  Green  1580 

v-  Hood  286 

v.  Inman  349,  361,  728 

v.  Irwin  313 

v.  Lynn  1661 

v.  Marquess  1(173 

v.  N.  Y.  &  N.  H.  R  Co.  1628 

v-  North  Eastern  Ry.  Co.         1394, 

1400 

v.  Oglander  988 

v.  Phillips  307,  308,  300 

v.  Pimm  858,  1487 

v.  Wilson  1437 

Hooe  v   Marquess  1073 

Hook  v.  Dorman    395,  588,  683,  1558 

v.  Ross  471 

Hooker  v.  Olmstead  284 

Hookham  v.  Pottage  1648 

Hooks  v.  Sellers  1311,1314 

Hoole  v.  Great  Western  Railway 

Co.  241,  244 

v.  Roberts  1610,  1694,  1696 

v.  Smith  322 

Hoolcv  ?'.  Hatton  851 

Hooper,  Re  1317 

v   Brodrick  1656,  1662 

v.  Campbell  015 

v.  Goodwin  12«>I 

v.  Gumm         576,  1021,  1834,  1836 

v-  Hooper  1417 

v.  Lane  1069 

v.  Paver  1590 

v.  Winston   1713,  1742,  1749.  1751. 

1762 


lxv 


Hooper  v.  Yonge  1062 

Hoover  v .  Donnally  230 

v.  Montclair.  &c.  R.  Co.  1731 

v.  Mo.  Pac   Ry   Co  890 

v.  Rawlings  892 

Hope  v.  Atkins  1132 

v.  Carnegie  180,  182,  186,  448, 

409,  1463,  1627,  1683,  1684 

v.  Fiddell     868,  883,  900,  912,  943, 

1827,  1842 

v.  Fox  109 

v.  Hope        447,  448,  935.  936,  937, 

938,  1147,  1348,  1360.  2129,  2293 

V.  Threlfall  b90,  913,  1488 

Hopewell  v.  Barnes  1040 

Hopkiu  v.  Hopkin         749.  891,  17o9 

Hupkius,  Re,  Dowd  v.  Hawtiu  1169, 

1722 

v.  Clay  brook  457 

v.  Counel  1752 

v   De  Kobeck  142 

v.  Gilman  671 

v.  Hopkins  229,  266 

v-  Lee  986 

v  Medley  1150 

v.  Ito.-eclare  Land  Co.  279 

v-  Snedaker  385 

v.  Spurlock  840 

v.  Stephenson  1242 

v.  Strump  871 

v.  Walker  2346 

v.  Worcester  &  B.  Canal  1727 

v.  Young  3o3 

Hopkiusou  v.  Bagster  1182 

v.  Burghley,  Lord  1647,  1837 

v.  Ellis  1432,  1433 

v.  Rolt  1503 

v.  St.  James  1444 

Hopkirk  v.  Bell  51 

v.  Page  190 

Hopper  v.  Fisher  161 

v.  Hopper  713 

Hoppock  v.  Cray  378,  153) 

Hopson  v .  Harrell  298 

Hopwood  v    Derby,  Earl  of         1075, 

1079,  1112 

Horan  v.  Wooloughan  1389 

Horbach    v    Hill  233 

Hord  v.  Colfert  1073 

Hore  v.  Becher  123 

Horford  ;■    Wilson  1126 

Horlock  v.  Priestley  1422 

v.  Smith  1252,  1389,  1841 

v.  Wilson  515 

Horlor  v.  Carpenter  1127 

Horn  v   Coleman  1464 

v.  Detroit  Dry- Dock  Co.  986 

v    Kilkenny  Railway  Co.  1615 

Hornby  v.  Cardwell  406 

v  Holmes  447 

v.  Matcham  2215 

Hornet'.  Barton  1473,1476 

v.  Home  1437 

i).  McKenzie  1090 

v    1'ountain  85 

V  Shepherd  1411 
Horner  v   Horner                   318,  630 

v.  Ovler  1443 

V  Wheelwright  895 
Hornor  v.  Hanks  1548 
Hornsby  v.  Eddy                            1743 

v.  Lee  119 

Hornum    Patent    Man.    Co.    v. 

Brooklyn  R.  Co  334 

Horrellr.  Witts  1726 

Horry  v.  Calder  429 

Horseburg  v.  Baker  1528 

Horsley  v.  Bell  273 

v.  Chaloner  1417 

v.  Cox  1440 

v.  Fawcett  223,  421 

Horton,  Re  362 

v.   Baptist  Church  and 

Society  1560,  1569 

v.  Bassett  659 

v.  Brorklehurst  416,  417,  «34 

v.  Sayer  671 


lxvi 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.  ] 


Horton  v.  Thompson  582, 1531 

Horwood,  Be  894 

v.  Schmedes  987,991,1539 

Ho.sack  v.  Rogers     1053,  1411,  1412, 

1771 

Hosford  v.  Nichols  1260 

HosUen  v.  Sincock     1391,  1394,  1395 

Ho.-king  v.  Terry  1577,  157rf 

Hoskins,  lie  86,  226 

v.  Campbell  798 

V.  Cole  639 

v.  Lloyd  609 

V.  White  68 

Hospes  v.  Northwestern  Manuf. 

Co.  1051,  2048 

Hoste  V.  Pratt  1359 

Hotchkiss  v.  Trustees,  &c.  20 

llotten  v.  Arthur  1645 

Hottenstein  v.  Conrad  1734 

Houck  v.  Bridwell  68 

v.  Camplin  121 

Hough  v   Oanby  169 

v.  Doyle  169 

v.  Lawrence  918 

D.  Martin  1669,  1818 

v.  Richardson  645,  844 

v.  Ryley  95 

v.  Williams  1191,  1196 

Hougham  v.  Sandys  1194 

Houghton  v.  Bankart  I860 

v.  Barney  1448 

v.  Davis  197 

v  Godschall  1543 

t;   Kendall  1560,  1569,  1572 

v.  Reynolds  360,  370 

v.  Sowles  1163 

v.  West  1577 

Houlditch  v.  Donegal,  The  Mar- 
quis of  635,  855,  1522, 1731 
Hou.se,  Ex  parte  1584 
Be  659 
V.  Dexter  285 
v.  Lockwood                               1551 
V.  Mullen                      334,  559,  659 
V.  Walker                                   1291 
Houseman  v.  Houseman              1411 
House    Property    Co.    v.  H.   P. 

Horse  Nail  Co.  211 

Houseworth  v.  Hendrickson        1712 

Hously  v.  Lindsay  1283 

Houston  v  Blackman    254,  261,  405 

v.  Briscoe  812,  1512 

v  Levy  243 

v.  Mossman  1255 

v.  Sadler  816 

v  Sledge  830 

v  Sligo  659 

Hovelman    v.    Kansas  City  H. 

R   Co.  1650 

Hovenden  ?>   Anneslev,  Lord        135, 
136,  543,  559,  560,  644,  645 
Hovey  v   McDonald  1743 

V   Rubber  Tip  Pencil  Co.  1081 

How,  Be  1799 

v .  Best  146,  296 

v.  Hall  878 

v.  Jones  1461 

v.  Strode  1126 

Howard,  Matter  of  1205 

Re  1851 

v.  Barnwell  1151,1152,1161 

V.  Bond  1062 

v.  Chaffers  1366,  1374 

r.  Gossett  1096 

v.  Gunn  1647 

v.  Howard  28 

v.  Lowell  Machine  Co.     1073,  1765 
v.  Milwaukee  &c.  R.  Co.  1062 

t;  Moffatt  90, 101 

V.  Newman  507 

V.  Okeover  561 

v.  Palmer  1734 

V.  Papera  1722 

«.  Prince  319, 1604 

v.  Rhodes  1416 

V.  Robinson  18*5 

v.  -Salisbury,  Earl  of  1362 


Howard  v.  Scott  1298,  1299 

v.  Smith  1411 

v.  ft   Paul  Plow  Works  1642 

v   Stephenson  1168 

v.  Thompson  1643 

v.  Warfield  1624 

Howard  Man.  Co   v.  Water  Lot 

Co  367 

Howarth,  Be  166 

Howuen  v.  Rogers  1700, 1703 

Howe  v.  Duppa  586,  673 

v.  Grey  505,  810 

v   Harvey  358,  562 

v  Hunt  1081 

v.  Jones  1750 

v.  Lemon  1062 

v  M'Kernan  721 

v.  Nickerson  554 

v  Robius  390 

v  Russell  777,  778,  780, 1232, 

1248,  1298,  1300,  13*1,  1322 

v   South  Park  Com'rs  1461 

v.  Willard    399,  439,  441.  457,  539, 

1618,  1667,  1675,  1684 

Howe  Sewing  Machine  Co.,  Be       27 

Howel  v.  Howel  1475 

Howell  v.  Arkmore  145 

v.  Ashmore  146,  569,  570-  579 

v.  City  of  Buffalo  334 

■v.  Coningsby,  Lord  1055 

v   Foster  190 

*.  George  843,  1380 

v   Harding  1845 

v.  Kightley  1312 

v.  Lewis  83 

v.  Sebring  324,  327,  402,  415,  1289 

v.  Tyler  1440 

v.  Waldron  633 

v.  West  346 

v   Western  R.  Co.  284 

Howell's  Estate  888 

Howells  v.  Wilson  1550 

Howerton  v.  Sprague  1678 

Howes,  Matter  of  1457 

v.  Chester  52 

v  Downing  737 

v    Patterson  418 

Howkins  v.  Bennett  448,  710 

v.  Howkins    389, 1701,  1702,  1703, 

1705 

Howland  v.  Fish  225 

v    Kenosha  County  586 

Rowland's,  Sir  R  ,  Case  67 

llowlett    v.    Central      Carolina 

Und  Co  1743 

Howling  v.  Butler  701 

Howorth  v.  Samuel  1137 

Howse  v.  Chapman   1427.  1429,  1430 

Howthv  Owens    193,208,627,1567 

Hoxey  v.  Carey  295,  801 

Hoxiev   Carr  190,289 

?'   Scott  740 

Hoxsey  ik  New  Jersey  M.  R.  Co    560 

Ho\al  v.  Brvson  837 

Hoye  v.  Penn  443,  1460 

Hoyland  S   C.  Co  ,  Be  1738 

Hoyle  v   Livesey  972 

v.  Moore  390 

Hoyt  v   Clarkson  371 

V-  Gelston  1463 

V.  Hellen  1352 

v.  Hilton  68 

v  Hovt  328,  382,  630,  1648 

v.  Jesse  973,  974 

v   Smith  402 

Hubbard.  Be  1449 

v.  Borden  195 

v.  Burrell  256 

v.  Epps  642,  1211 

v.  Gorham  354 

v.  Hewlett  1186 

v.  Hubbard  851,  1163 

v.  Johnson  230 

v  Latham  438,  1213,  1428 

v.  McNaughton  324 

v.  Town  1638 

v.  Turner  682,  1551 


Hubbell  v  Currier  1901 

V.  De  Laud  701,  8i3 

v.  Merchants'  Bank  256 

v.  Von  Schoening  9e9 

v.  Warren  244,  245,  1169 


tluber  v.  Myers  S   Depot 

197 

Hubertson  v   Goold 

1511 

Huble  v   Clark 

878 

liuckenstine's  Appeal 

1635 

Huddleston  v.  Briscoe 

981 

lluddlestone  v.  Uuddlestone 

1166 

Uudgins  v   Kemp 

1302 

llutlnit  v   Nash 

214, 

1265 

Hudson  v.  Allison 

974 

•c    Heunett 

795, 

1380, 

1395 

v   Brown 

1"96 

v.  Buck 

561 

v    Dungworth 

430 

v    Eiseiunayer  Milling  Co 

236 

v.  Fernvhough 

418 

v.  Grenifell           485 

,716 

760, 

1819 

v.  Hudson 

1553 

v.  Maddison 

303 

344, 

1678 

v.  Majoribanks 

11:  .8 

v.  Temple 

1624 

v  Trenton,  &c,  Manuf 

Co. 

857, 

1004, 

1221, 

1232 

Hue  v.  Richards 

1*29 

Huerstal  v.  Muir 

1461 

Huffv   Miller 

1461 

v   Ri  pley 

552 

Huffard  v.  Gottberg 

284 

Huffman  v   Barkley 

933 

v   Hummer 

778 

Huger  v.  Huger 

168 

v   S   Carolina 

446 

Hugg  v.  City  of  Camden 

1662 

Huggins  v  York  Buildings  Co. 

611, 

636, 

1262 

1538 

Hughes  v.  Biddulph 

571 

572, 

1824 

*    Blackwell 

844 

v.  Blake                661,  695,  82 

v.  Bloomer 

771 

,781 

v  Boone 

576 

v.  Budd 

1131 

v.  Came 

1517 

v.  Chester  and  Holyhead  Ry 

Co 

'  983 

v.  Clerk 

774 

1559 

v.  C«iok 

342 

v.  Devlin 

1150 

v  Dunlap 

1071 

v.  Eades 

152,  8i 

v  Edwards 

640 

v  Empson 

2060 

v  Evans 

108 

V-  Garner             6' 

8,  846, t 

t>   Garth 

677 

v   Hamilton 

1286 

!'.  Hatchett 

1716 

v.  Hughes      559,  1135 

1359, 

1300, 

1743 

1748 

v  Jones     556.  826 

,978 

979, 

1029, 

10ai,  1123, 1124, 

1368 

1577 

15H0 

v-  Key 

1413 

v   Lewis 

805 

V.  Lipscombe 

1282 

v  London  &c  Assurance  Co 

836 

v  Millikin 

1584 

v.  More 

196 

v.  Phelps 

881 

v   Science 

1347 

v-  Smith 

1369 

v.  Spittal 

913, 

1189 

1339 

v.  Stickney 

1576 

v.  Tennison 

338 

v.  Thomas 

767 

v.  Washington 

1017 

v  Wells 

187 

v.  Wheeler 

1724 

v  Williams     749, 

1182 

1235 

,1244 

v.  Wynne 

642 

,  1254 

Hughey  v.  Bratton 

1548 

Hughson  v.  Cnokson 

211 

Hugill  v.  Wilkinson 

652 

Hugonin  v.  Baseley 
Huguenin  v.  Basely 

1720 

,  1721 
1470 

TABLE    OP    CASES    CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging] 


lxvii 


Hugunin  v.  Thatcher  28 

Huish  v.  Sheldon  1133 

Hukill  v.  Guffey  565 

II ulbe't  v.  Douglas  1561 

v.  McKay  1209,  17U7 

Hulett  v.  Stockwell  1071 

Hulfish  v.  O'Brien  1653 

Huliug  v.  Farwell  1221 

Hulkes  v.  Day  1040,  1694,  1695,  l>i96 
Hull  v.  Oaughy  1461 

v.  Falconer  1205,  1206,  1208 

v.  Noble  369 

Hull  &  Hornsea  Ry.  Co.,  Re  1035, 
1037 
Huilett  v.  Spain,  King  of  17,  141 
Hulley  v.  Security  Trust  Co.  1630 
Hulni  &  Lewis,  Re  1069 

Hulme  v.  Shreve  1639 

v.  Tenant  186 

Hulsted  v.  Meeker  383 

Hulton  v   Sandys  885 

Humber  Iron  Works  Co  ,  Re      1474 
Humberd  v.  Kerr  190 

Humberston  v.  Humberston  135 

Humbert  v.  Trinity  Church,  Rec- 
tor, &c.  560 
Humble  v   Humble                       1278 
v.  McDonough                             840 
v.  Shore                                       280 
Hume  v.  Babington                        539 
v.  Commercial  Bank          715,  971, 
1467 
v.  Pocock                           418, 1487 
v.  Scott                                        960 
Humes  v.  Scruggs                   659,  828 
1 1 uin page  v.  Rowley                      1114 
Humphrey  v.  Archibald                581 
v   Browning                                 1845 
v.  Foster                              987,  989 
v.  Hollis                                       230 
v.  Morse                                     1383 
Humphreys  v.  Atlantic   Milling 
Co.                                            630 
v.  Blevins               1116,  1124,  1147 
v.  Cousins                                    211 
v.  Harrison                                  1630 
v.  Hopkins                                 1743 
v.  Humphreys    318,  407,  691, 1671 
v.  Incledon                        318,  1510 
v.  Pensam                                    868 
V.  Tate                                            321 
Humphries  v.  Roberts                  1291 
V.  Taylor  Drug  Co.                     1556 
Humphrys  v.  Moore                       1422 
Hungarian    Hill   O.    M.    Co.   v. 

Moses  1551 

Hungate  v.  Gascoigne  674 

v.  Gascoyue  1537,  1577,  1578 

Hungerfor'd  v.  Cushing        341.  1734 

v.  Jagoe  1137 

Hungerford's  Case  1461 

Hunham  v    Llewellyn  560 

Hunn  v.  Norton        1259,  1381,  1415. 

1417 

Hunnewell  v.  Goodrich  2361 

Hunnings  v.  Williamson        354,  564 

Hunt  v.  Acre  233 

v.  Anderson  553,  1557 

v.  Andover  1427 

v.  Blackburn  578 

v.  Booth  38,  109 

v.  Chicago  Horse  Ry.  Co.  10 

v.  Clarke  887 

v .  Columbian  Ins.  Co.  1751 

v.  Ellison  1003 

v.  Elmes  679, 1831,  1832 

v.  Fisher  1286 

d.  Fownes  1387 


Hunt  v.  Gookin 

717,  721 

v.  Hayt 

365 

v ,  Holland 

409, 422 

v.  Hunt 

108,  553,  1626 

v.  Johnson 

619 

v.  Lever 

448 

v.  Lewin 

998,  1377,  1463 

v.  McClanahan 

1846 

v.  Nevers 

1258 

v  Niblett 

515 

v.  Peacock 

219 

v.  Penrice 

617,  619,  701 

v.  Priest 

1058,  1718 

v.  Pullen 

914 

v.  Rooney 

190,  194 

v.  liousmaniere 

419,  846,  2357 

v.  Strong 

1460 

v.  Terril 

663 

v.  Van  Derveer 

216 

v.  Wallis 

739 

v.  Wickliffe 

287,  295, 457 

1044,  1452,  1590 
692 

v.  Ayre 

v.  Belcher 

551,  1459 

v.  Daniel 

1529 

v.  Dash  wood 

1382 

v.  Dublin  &c   Ry. 

Co.       881,  1817 

v.  Fletcher 

917 

v.  Hallett 

117,  124 

i'.  Hutton 

986 

v.  Jones 

837 

v.  Kennedy 

1120 

v.  Lawrence 

1364 

v.  McCoy 

378 

v.  Macklew 

214 

v.  Marlboro 

1463 

v.  Myatt 

2214 

v.  Nockolds        653,  690,  692,  702, 
741,  1397 
v.  Potts  61 

v.  Robbins  523 

v.  Spotswood  645 

v.  Stewart  664 

v.  Walters  675 

v.  Wortley  1528 

v.  Young  250 

Huntingdon,     Trustees    of    v. 

Nicoll  1462 

Huntington  v.  Allen  1624 

v.  Little  Rock  &c  Ry.  Co.  991,1580 
v.  Palmer  26 

v.  Saunders  319,  737 

Huntingtower,  Lord  v.  Sherbom  63. 
813,  814.  1451 
Hunton  v.  Equitable  Life  Assur- 
ance Society  313 
Huntress  v.  Epsom                        14-34 
Hurd  v.  Aschernian                334,  843 
v.  Case                                        1548 
v.  City  of  Elizabeth         1742,  1751 
v.  Everett                               402,  40B 
v.  Haines  739 
''.  Simpson                                     559 
Hurlhatt  v    Harnett                       1168 
Hurlburd  v.  Freelove          1473,  1478 
Hurlburt  v.  Britain                        829 
v.  Hurlburt                                 576 
Hurlbut  v.  Hutton                         972 
Hurlbutt   v.  N.   W.    Spaulding 

Saw  Co.  313 

Hurley  v.  Coleman  1653 

v.  Murrell  1205 

Hursell  v.  Bird  236 

Hurst  v.  Coe  26 

v.  Everett  634 

v.  Hurst  168,  285,  447,  1265,  1266, 

1430 

v.  Jones  839 


Hurst  v.  Padwick  28 

Hurt  !•.  Stull  1267 

v.  Long  165,  1576,  1580 

Husband,  hire  894 

v.  Aldrich  1150 

Huse  v.  Washburn  1073 

Husham  v.  Dixon  462 

Husley  v.  Robinson  1019 

Huson  v.  McKenzie  217 

Hussey  v.  Dole  190,  287,  292 

v.  Home  Payne  364.  561 

Huston  v.  Cassidy  1318 

v.  M'Ciarty         285,  286,  287,  289, 

295,  3:h) 

v.  Noble  285 

Hutcheon  v.  Mannington  892 

Hutcheson  v.  smith  1250 

Hutchings,  lie  100 

v.  Smith  119 

Hutchins  v  Childless  842 

Hutchinson,  Re  1169 

V-  Ay  res  559 

v.  Blumberg  1643,  1648 

v.  Brock  49,  52 

v.  Freeman     438,  1213,  1374,  1428 

v.  Hampton  1753 

v.  Haslam  553 

v    Horner  1594 

v.  Hutchinson  1786 

17.  Massarene  1715,  1741 

v.  Mershon  334 

v.  Norwood  68 

v.  Piper  1134 

v.  Reed  294,  406,  709 

v.  Sinclair  846,  847 

v.  Stephens  972 

v.  Swift  358,  1474 

v.  Tindall  1230 

Hutson  v.  Sadler  1294 

Hutton  v.  Beeton  1754 

v.  Hepworth  1600 

v.  Mansell  1277,  1278 

v.  Mayne  166 

v.  Rossiter  236,  1225 

v.  Scarborough  Cliff  Hotel  Co.  1650 

v.  Sealy  1265 

v.  Smith  441,  511 

Hutts  v.  Martin  1163 

Huxham  v   Llewellyn  598 

Hyam  v.  Terry  1468 

Hyatt,  Re  1075 

Hyde  v.  Edwards  366,  1349 

v.  Forster  1059,  1545 

v.  Greenhill  1059,  1060 

i'.  Hyde  113,  893,  1048 

v.  Lamherson  1580 

v.  Lodge  1175 

v   Price  1255 

v.  Warden  1729 

v.  Warren  1563 

v.  Whitfield  1704,  1707, 

1712 

Hyer?>  Caro  1523 

v.  Deaves  1267 

v.  Little  737 

Hygeia  Water  Ice  Co.  v.   New 

York  H.  I.  Co  1648 

Hyliard  v.  White  681 

Hylton  i'.  Morgan  1661 

Hyman  v.  Devereux  1081 

v.  Helm  633,  800 

v.  Smith  1274,  1575 

v.  Wheeler  33t 

Hynam  v.  Dunn  1638,  1663 

Hynson  v.  Voshell  844 

Hyre  )>.  Lambert  314 

Hyslop  v.  Powers  1461 

Hythe,  Mayor  of,  v.  East    1081,  1082 


lxviii 


TABLE   OK   CASES   CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 


I. 


laege  v.  Bossieux  1302 

Iasigi  v.  lirown  2178 

v.  Chicago,  B   &  Q   R.  Co.       1417 
Ibbetson,  Ex  parte  157 

Ibbottson  v.  Rhodes  848 

Idaho  &  Oregon  Land  Imp.  Co. 

v.  Bradbury  1071 

Ide  v.  Ball  Engine  Co.        1548,  1642 
Idley  v   Bowen  1461,  1489 

lglehart  v.  Bierce  221 

v.  Vail  188!) 

Ihl  v   St.  Joseph  Bank  933 

Ihlee  v  Henshaw  197 

Ilchester,  Earl  of,  Ex  parte       1004, 
1350, 1351,  1352 
Her  v.  Roath  1076,  1576 

lies  v    Flower  40 

v.  Turner  1128,  1135 

Illiugworth  !'.  Rowe  1561 

Illinois  v.  Illinois  Central  R.  Co.      6 
Illinois  Laud  Co.  v.  Speyer  586 

lllsley  v.  Jewett  646 

llsley  v.  Nichols  1710 

Inolay  v.  Carpentier  1622 

Imperial  Bank  of  India  v.  Bank 

of  Hindustan  26,  27 

Imperial  Fire  Ins.  Co  v.  Gun- 
ning 1682 
Imperial  Gas  Co  v.  Broadbent    1637 
Imperial  Mercantile  Credit  As- 
sociation, lie  1038 
Imperial  Refining  Co  v.  Wyman  405, 
418 
Importers'  Bank  v.  Littell  1556 
Improvement  Commissioners  v. 

N.  J.  Midland  R.  Co.  1637 

Inby  v.  M"Crea  652 

Ince's  Case  907 

Inchbald  v   Barrington     1629,  1635, 
1639,  1641 
v.  Robinson  1071,  1635,  1639 

Inchiquin  r.  French  1619 

Inchley  v   Alsop  244,  1540 

Incledon  ?>•  Northcote  124 

Incorporated  Society  v.  Rich- 
ards 1252 
Ind,  Coope  &  Co.  v.  Emmerson  674, 
675 
India  Mutual  Tns   Co.  v.  Bigler  1573 
Indianapolis  Land  Trust  v.  Hoff- 
man 630 
Indianapolis  Nat.    Gas   Co.    v. 

Kibby  1638 

Indianapolis  Water  Co.  v.  Am- 
erican Strawboard  Co.  1638 
India    Rubber   Comb   Co.    v. 

Phelps  2389 


Indigo  Co  v.  Ogilvy  149 

Indurated  Fibre  I.  Co.  v   Grace    314 
Inebriates'  Home  v.  Kaplan         1517 
Ingalls  v.  Lord 
lngate  v.  Lloyd  Austriaco 
Iugersoll  v.  Ingersoll 

v.  Stjger 
Ingham  v.  Bickerdike 

v.  Ingham 


Waskett 

Iugilby  v.  Shafto 

Iugle  v.  Partridge 

v.  Richards 
Inglee  v.  Coolidge 
luglessi  v.  Spartali 
lnglis  v  Campbell 

v.  Haigh 
Ingraham  v.  Dunnell 

v.  Hall 
v.  Postell 
Ingram,  lie 
v.  Little 
v.  Mitchell 
v.  Morgan 
v.  Sherard 
v  Smith 
v.  Stiff 


1576 

449 

68,  532 

843 

1352 

775 

1525 

579,  722,  1556 

808, 809 

643 

630 

724 

529, 1452 

2095 

263, 1629, 

1637,  1610 

330 

1253 

1791 

178,  841 

953 

1653 

642 

842,  1370 

1648,  1666 


Inhabitants,  &c.  v.  Seymour       1620 


Inloesi*   Harvey 
Inman  v.  Wearing 

v.  Whitley 
Innes  v.  Evans 
v.  Jackson 
V.  Lansing 
v  Mitchell 


1056 

337,  3S5,  386, 

587,  1928 

725 

615,  620 

292 

635,  1727 

298,  345,  449, 

452 

87,  122, 179 

633 

1751 


Insole,  lie 

Insurance  Co.  v.  Bnme 
v.  Needles 

International  &  G.  N.  By   Co. 
v.  Smith 
V-  Williams 

International  Trust  Co.  r.  In- 
ternational Loan  &  T.  Co 

Interstate  Land  Co.  v.  Maxwell 
Land  Grant  Co. 

Investment  Co   v    Ohio  &   N. 
W.  R.  Co. 

Inwood  v.  Twyne 

Iowa   Barb  Steel  Wire  Co    v. 
Southern  Barbed  Wire  Co. 


1591 
27 


1648 
545 


1743 

1365 


Ipswich  Co  v-  Story 
Irby  v.  Irby 
i.  M'Crea 


145, 
1642 
1772 
1282,  1433 
1256 


Ireland  v.  Abbott 

1248, 1252 

v.  Eade 

1741, 1752 

v.  Trembath 

95 

Ireson  v.  Denn 

213 

Ireton  v.  Lewis 

216 

Iron  Age  Pub.  Co.  v 

Western 

Union  Tel.  Co. 

543 

Irons  v,  Crist 

161,538 

Irvin  v.  Clark 

1276 

o.  Ellis 

1051 

v.  Gregory 

2,  305 

Irvine  i'   McRee 

1062 

v   Sullivan 

952, 1078, 1413 

v.  Viana 

762 

v .  Young 

666 

Irving,  He 

157 

v.  DeKay                 1426 

v.  Dunscomb 

1495 

v   Pearson 

266 

Irwin  v.  Dearman 

1130 

v.  Drake 

1551 

v.  Everson 

1728 

v.  Grey 

133 

v.  Lewis 

1624 

v.  Meyrose 

890 

v.  Reed 

1118 

v.  Vint 

1030 

Isaac,  lie,  Jacob  v.  Isaac 

v   Gompertz 

1798 

v.  Humpage 

1621,  1668 

Isaacs  v   Boyd 

68 

v.  Clark 

323 

v.  Cooper 

1643 

v.  Steele 

378 

v   Weatherhouse 

1779 

Isenberg  v.  East  India  House 

Estate  Co. 

1081,  1638, 

1663 

Isham  v.  Miller 

707 

Isle  of  Wight  Ferry  Co.,  Re        10*5, 

Isle  of  Wight  Ry.  Co. 

v.  Tahour- 

din 

26 

Ismoord  v.  Claypool 

999 

Isnard  v.  Cazeaux  3S 

,  41, 1593,  1598 

Israel  v.  Jackson 

1071 

Iverson  v  Saulsbury 

985 

Ives  v.  Ashelby 

790 

v.  Hazard 

844 

v.  Medcalfe 

839 

v.  Sumner 

641 

Iveson  v.  Harris 

1619 

Ivory,  lie,  Hunkin  v. 

Turner     1726 

Ivy  J'.  Clawson 
v.  Kekewick 

1071 
579 

Izard  v.  Bodine  857, 1221. 1248, 

1298, 1321 


J. 


Jacklin  v.  Wilkins    1594, 1596, 
Jackman  v.  Mitchell 
Jackson,  lie 

v.  Adams 

v.  Ashton   314,  327,  357,  358, 
374,  407, 

v.  Bailey 

v.  Barry 

v.  Benson  200,  210, 

v.  Betta 

v.  Blanshan 

!>.  Brighton  Aquarium  Co. 

v.  Britton 

v.  Cartwright 

i).  Cassidy  898, 

v.  Catliu 

v.  Cator  324, 


16R7 

Jackson  v  Christman 

873 

Jackson  v.  Innes                           125 

1398 

v.  Cutright 

778 

v.  Ivimey                                     806 

323 

v.  Davenport 

29,  1527 

v.  Jackson       161,  980, 1018,  1180, 

46 

v   Denison 

907 

1181, 1184,  1185, 1297,  1299, 

361, 

?'.  Duchaire 

1138 

1300, 1317,  1358,  1546, 1576, 

,  556 

v.  Edwards 

266,  1283 

1579, 1580, 1663 

1118 

v.  Ewer 

569 

v.  Jones                                     1677 

1075 

V.  Forrest 

334 

v.  King                                        851 

,367 

v.  French 

576 

v  Kruger                                    405 

875 

v.  Freyer 

1507 

v.  La  Grange                               875 

873 

v.  Given 

675 

v.  Leaf             388,  799,  1615,  1617 

1070 

v.  G\o* 

559 

v.  Lever                                      1277 

46 

v.  Grant 

1548, 

1549,  1553 

v.  Lingan                                   1215 

361 

v.  Hankey 

2294 

v.  Mawby                                     508 

1669 

v.  Haworth 

183,  499,  ', 

v.  McChesney                      569,  675 

53 

v.  Henry 

569,  675 

v.  Newcastle,  Duke  of     1081,  1638 

1670 

v.  Hull 

830 

v.  North  Eastern  Ry.  Co.            63 

Jackson  v.  North  Wales  Rv.  Co.  369. 
601 
149,  16a 
603,  1394 
656,  657,  712,  714, 
840 
780,  782 
1433 
1698,  1700,  1703,  1706, 
1707 
10, 137,  138,  2207 
809 
189,  267 
324 

v.  Riga  Railway  63,  814,  1525 

v.  Rowe       612,  674,  675,  676,  677, 
679,  704,  2095 


v.  Norton 

v.  Ogg 

v.  Oglander 

v.  Parish 
v.  Pease 
v.  Petrie 

v.  Phillips 
v.  Puruell 
v.  Rawlins 
v.  Itceve 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  pacing  J 

Jamison  v.  Burlington  &  W.  R. 
Co.  1120 

v.  May  1622 

Janes's  Appeal  1381 

Janney  v.  Boyd  860 

Jauson  v.  Rauy  846 

v   Solarte     "  719 

Jaques  v.  Esler  1(353 

V.  Hall  1516 

v.  Method.  Epis.  Church  9«7, 

1317,  1371,  1491 

Jaquet  v.  Jaquet      1312,  1317,  1366, 

1595 

v.  Saunders  295 

Jarmain  v.  Chatterton  1461 


I XIX 


v.  Rowell 
v.  Saunders 
v  Scauher 
v.  Shanks 
v  Stevenson 
v  Stiles 
v   Strong 
v.  Turner 
v.  Turnley 
v.  Van  Dusen 
v.  Vandyke 
v.  Ward 
v.  Woolley 


324 

1658 

254 

447 

1654 

1594 

408,  1559 

167,  9'17 

1001,  2182 

851,  852 

875 

266,  1525, 1526 

647 


Jacksonville  Ry    Co.  v.  Ameri- 
can Const.  Co.  1411 
Jacob  o.  Hall 

v.  Lorenz 

v.  Lucas 
Jacob  i  v.  Schloss 
Jacobs  v  Hooper 

v.  Laybourn 

v.  Richards 

v.  Tarleton 

v.  Turpin 
Jacobsou  v.  Blackhurst 
Jacoby  v   Qoetter 

v.  Kiesling 

v   Whitinore 
Jacoway  v.  McGarrah 
Jacques  v.  Miller 
Jacquet  v.  Jacquet 
J  affray  p.  Raab 
Jaffrey  v.  Brown 


James,  Ex  parte 
v.  Ash  ton 

V,  Atlanta  Street  R.  Co 
v.  Atlantic  Delaine  Co 
v.  Bion 
v.  Brooks 
v.  Center 
v.  Cresswicke 
v.  Crow 
v  Despott 
v   Dore 
v.  Downes 
v.  Fisk 
v.  Gwynne 
v.  Harding 
v   Herriott 


1517 

230 

1491 

594 

1098 

852 

1106 

1489 

1560 

1675 

1732,  1734 

1655 

1549 

1082 

654 

1746 

313, 1290, 1299, 

1320 

1622 

201,  203 

586 

256,  815 

806 

1076,  1120 

1461 

523 

970,  979 

149 

39,  518 

1683,  1685 

1576 

1331 

1517,  1525 

547,  1557 


v  James  169,  170,  218,  406,  410, 
753,  1383 

v  Jefferson  1672 

v.  Kerr  564 

v.  Lawrence  330 

v  McKernon  327,  377,  852 

v  McPhee  843 

v.  North  1714 

v.  Owens  1673 

v-  Parnell  875,1116 

v-  Philips  511 

v.  Prichard  1566 

v.  Rice  528 

v .  Sadgrove  626 

v  Sams  1561 

v.  Smith  196,  365 

Jameson  v.  Brick  &  Stone  Co.        58 

v.  Deshields  288,295 

v.  Moseley  997 

Jamieson  v.  Teague  1395,  1655 


Jarman  v.  Wiswall 
Jarrett  v.  Jarrett 

V   White 
Jarrold  v.  Houlston 


260,  1029 

1077 

1151 

1645,    1646, 

2314 

553,  1621,  1626 

590,  684,  700 

34 

1852,  1856 

663,  664 

1642 

880 


Jennet  v.  Bishopp 

554 

Jenuey  v.  Bell 

60 

v.  Mackintosh 

629 

Jenning  v.  Smith 

1819 

Jennings  v.  Beale 

1618 

v   Uevey 

456 

v.  Dolan 

1299 

v.  Durham 

1071 

v.  Foster 

1163 

V.  Johnson 

197 

Jarvis  v.  Chandler 

v   Palmer 

v.  Shand 
Jarvis'  Charity,  Re 
Jauncy  v  Sealey 
Jay  v.  Ladler 
Jearrard  v.  Tracy 
Jebb  v  Tugwell  170,  266, 1512,  1524, 
2059 
Jeff  Davis,  The 
Jefferies  v.  Harrison 
Jeffers  v.  Forbes 
Jefferson  v.  Cullis 

v   Dawson 

v.  Durham,  Bishop  of 

v.  Gaines 

B.  Hamilton 

v  Jefferson 
Jeffery  v.  Bowles 

v.  Fitch 

V   Stephens 
Jeffery s  v.  Boosey 

v.  Dickson 

v  Smith 
Jeffreys  v.  Marshall 

v   Yarborough 
Jeffries  v.  Jeffries 
Jeffria  ».  Whittuck 
Jeff  ryes  v  Agra,  &c   Bank 


Jegon  v   Vivian 
Jellard,  lie 

Jencks  v   Probate  Court 
Jenkin  v.  Vaughan 
Jenkins,  Re 

v.  Bennett 

v.  Briant 

v.  Bryant 

v.  Bushby 

v.  Cross 

v.  Eldredge 


1846 

1422 

303 

703 

688 

8 

334 

1614 

790,  1003 

1646 

1120 

380 

46, 1643 

280 

1727,  1768, 1800 

1417 

1301 

417 

922 

1397, 

1398 

881 

1794 

852 

832,  969 

116,  205 

1835 

1296, 1757 

454,  1256,  1847 

1071,  1079,  1829 

1537 

659,  856.  957,  9(30, 


v.  Jordan      212,  213,  215,  257,  280 

v.  Merton  College  780 

v  Moore  675 

v.  Nugent  1568 

v.  Paterson  255,  1207 

v.  Pearce  596,  692 

v.  Philadelphia  &  R  R.  Co.     1.16 

v   Pierce  7<J0 

v-  Rigby  1035 

v .  Springs  403 

Jennison  v.  Hapgood  1234,  1236 

Jeuour  v.  Jenour    1004,  1431,  1464, 

1466,  1528,  --181 

Jensen,  Re  1765 

Jepson  v.  Greenaway  935 

Jerard  v.  Sauders  678 

Jerdein  v.  Bright  307,  308,  314,  323, 

336 

640 

1686 

457,  458 

1559 

1346 

96 

180 

392,  394, 1562 


Jeremy  v.  Best 
Jermain  v.  Chatterton 

v.  Langdon 
Jermy  v.  Best 

V.  Preston 
Jernegan  v.  Baxter 

v.  Glasse 
Jerome  ».  Jerome 


994,  1029,  1030,  1191, 1194,  1472 
1479,  1186,  1523,  1533,  1537, 
1575.  1577.  1578,  1583,  2101 


v   Greenwald 
t>     f l.-i II II.-IU 

v   Hiles 

v.  Intern'l  Bank 

v  Jackson 

v  Jones 

v.  Morris 

v.  Noel 

v-  Parkinson 

v   Prewit 

v   Rees 

?\  Van  Schaack 

t\  Waller 

v.  Wild 
Jenkinson  v.  Royston 

t'   Vermillion 
Jenkyus  v    Bushby 
Jenner  v.  Jenner 


8S5,  886,  2394 
630 


1517 

1408,  1638 

658 

852,  1123,  1126 

46 

1699,  1701 

1578 

354,  418 

1150,  1151 

1675 

1476 

713 

369 

571,  1834 

1001,  1071,  I072, 

1622 

v.  Morris        103,  1189,  1&39,  1381. 

1408,  1485,  1839 

V.  Traeey  5fil) 

Jenness  i>  Smith  217 


v.  McCarter  214,  1731 

v.  Ro^s  lt>31 

Jerrard  v.  Saunders      569,  673,  715, 
1661 
Jersey  City  G.   L.  Co.  v.  Con- 
sumers' Gas  Co.  1663 
Jervis  v.  Berridge         280,  385,  1929 
v.  Uenwood                                1660 
v.  White                  872,  1777,  1782 
v.  Wolferstan                   1233.  1438 
Jervoise,  Me                        1785,  1794 
v.  Clark                                    1526 
v.  Clarke                                     1268 
v.  Northumberland,  Duke  of    877 
v  Silk                                         1358 
Jesse  v.  Bennett    218,  222,  224,  226 
269 
v.  Lloyd                                      1233 
Jessel  v.  Chaplin                           1641 
Jesson  v.  Brewer                           1017 
Jessop  v.  King                              1658 
Jessup  v.  Hill                                1712 
v.  Illinois  Central  R.  Co.  190, 1548 
Jesus'  College  v  Bloom               1634 
v.  Gibbs                        713,  714.  7h3 
Jeudwine  v.  Agate     1169,  1212,  1254 
v.  Alcock                                    1218 
Jew  v.  Wood              1564,  1565,  1567 
Jewell  v.  Rock  River  Paper  Co    1309 
Jewett  v .  Bowman                651,  1683 


v.  Cunard 
v-  Dringer 
v .  Miller 
v.  Palmer 
v.  Scott 
v.  Tucker 

Jewin  V.  Taylor 

Jewitt,  Re 


1^39 

1468 

1284 

612,  674.  677,  678 

1156,  1160 

243.  250 

354.  7S5 

1069,  1843 


.lewson  v.  Moulson    90,  92,  101,  102, 
124 
Jeyes  v.  Foreman  1591 

Jinks  )>.  Banner  Lodge  630 

J.  L.  Mott  Iron  Works  r.  Stand- 
ard Manuf  Co.  888 
■load  ?'.  Ripley                                 1796 
Job,  Rv                                            1046 
v.  Banister                                   1659 
v.  Job                      1260,  1370,  1581 
Joberns  v.  Couch                            1525 
Jochumsen  v.  Suffolk  Savings 

Bank  1507 


lxx 


Joddrell  v.  Joddrell 
Jodiell  n.  Jodrell 

v.  Slauey 
Johu  v.  Brown 

v.  Jones 

r.  Lloyd 
Johnassou  v.  Bonhote 
Johues  v.  Clauguton 
Johns  v   Harper 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging] 


355 
1361 

726 
1536 

»al 

422 
602 
1058 
1584 


Johnson  v.  Slawsen 
v.  Story 
v.  Swain 
v.  Telford 
v.  Thomas 


v.  James     "  226,  579 

e  Johns  1734, 1735 

v.  Keardon  214 

Johnson,  Ex  parte  894,1047 
lit                           1069, 1366,  1734 

Re,  Sly  v.  Blake  654 

Re,  Steele  v .  Cobham  1722 

v.  Ames  560 

v.  Arnwine  932 

v.  Aston  1772 

v  Atkinson  1561,  1565 

v.  Atlantic  Ave   R.  Co.              1221 
v   Barnes              453,  455,  536,  537 

v.  Board  ot  Education  1463 

i;.  Bower  632 

v.  Branch  1120 

v.  Britt  1161 

v  Brooklyn  &  C.  R  Co.  1642 

ii.  Br»wu  338 

v.  Burgess  1036,1054 

v.  Candage  237,257,  2i2 

v.  Cherokee  Land  Co.  324 

v.  Chippindall  1052,  1057 

V.  Christian  256 

t;  Clendenin  1608,  1711 

v.  Compton  236,  300 

v.  Cooper  548 

v.  Corey  1677 

v.  Crippen  843 

v  Curtis  138, 371,  666 

v  Desiuineere  518 

v   Donnell  617,998 

v.  Drumniond  303 

v.  Durner  418 

v   Edge  1642 

v.  Everett  987,  993 

v.  Faruum  1716 

v.  Hesseuuieyer  3i9 

v.  Fitzhugh  607, 1508 

v   Florida  Transit  Co.               1517 

v.  Foster  259 

v.  Freer  403,  1552 

v.  Gallagher  113,  187,  1D03 

v.  Gardiner  1385 

v  Garrett  .  1269, 1272 

v.  Gere  1653 

v  Gillett  1491 

v.  Goldswaine  1655 

v.  Hainesworth  1079 

v.  Hammersley  244,  1170,  1525, 
1540 

v.  Harrison  51,  630 

v .  Helmstaedter  224,  361 

v.  Hines  1276 

v.  Horlock  813 

v.  Hunter  37 
v.  Johnson        104,  106,  444, 1166, 
1461, 1485,  1584 

v.  Kelly  1031 

v.  Lander  122 

v.  Leake  1528 

v.  Lindsay,  No  2  40 

v.  Lusk  117 

v.  McCabe  68 

v.  Mantz  378 

v.  Mever  216,  1195 

v.  Na'gle  443 

v.  Northey  1585 

V.  I'urkiuson  334 

V    Peck  1528 

t'.  Petrie  1032 

v.  Pierson  844 

v.  Pinney  504,  1591 

v.  Prendergast  382,  1369 

v   Rankin  192,  1505 

17.  Richardson  843 

t-.  St.  Louis,  &c.  Ry.  Co.          1618 

v.  Shepard  793 


844 
1845 
779 
1235 
281,  1166,  1517,  1527 
1542 

v.  Todd  1082, 1118,  1405 

v.  Tomlinson  1031 

v-  Touchet  126 

v.  Tucker    350,  352.  431,  759,  760, 
707,  831,  1716,  1718,  1719, 
1835 
V.  Tulare  C.  S.  Court  1039 


v.  Turner 
v.  Vail 


86 


108,109,110,  111,  llll, 
1903 

v.  Walker  1061 

v.  Waters  236,  418,  536,  1019 

v.  Wilcox  &  Giblis  S.  M.  Co.      542 
v.  Wyatt        1071,  1081,  1666,  1681 

Johnson  R.  S.  Co.  v.  Union  S.  k 

S.  Co  1548 

Johnson  Steel  Street-Rail  Co.  v . 

Northbranch  Steel  Co.  1817 

Johnston  v.  Glenn  1660 

v.  Hanuer  1575 

v.  Hvde  1631 

v.  Johnston        117,  585,  586,  1468 
v.  Keener  1743 

v.  McArthur  1624 

v.  Macconuell  443 

v.  Markle  Paper  Co.  236 

v.  Reardon  1300 

v.  Roe  560 

v.  Salvage  Association  851 

v.  Standard  Min.  Co.  560 

v.  Todd        1113,  1114,  1124,  1136, 
1427,  1432,  1433,  1595 
v.  Trade  Ins.  Co.  43 

V.  Ure  1184 

Johnstone  v.  Baber  1151,  1157 

v.  Beattie  1348,  1350,  1352. 

1355 
v.  Browne  1*9 

v  Cox  674,  14!!l 

v.  Hall  1638 

v.  Hamilton  437 

v.  Royal  Courts  Co.  1661 

Joint  Stock  Discount  Co  ,  lie      202, 
203 


v   Brown 

202,  407,  1529 

Joley  v   Stockley 

1669 

Joliet  Street  Ry.  Co 

v.  Call        1556 

Joliffe  v.  Baker 

328 

v.  Hector 

1236 

v.  Twyford 

1428 

Jolland  v.  

1732,  1755,  1756 

Jolliffe  v.  East 

1427,  142U 

v.  Mundy 

1137 

v.  Pitt 

641,  648 

Jolly  v .  Arbuthnot 
v.  Carter 

707, 1370 
347,  729 

Joly  v.  Swift 

883 

Jones,  Ex  parte 

58,61,1070 

Re            61,  109, 

1213,  1286,  1328, 
1389,  1428,  1802 

1362 

Re,  Calver  v.  Laxton       lu34,  1425 

v.  Abraham 

843 

v.  Adair 

165 

v   Alephsin 

1700, 1707,  1712 

v-  Andrews 

1829 

v.  Bailey 

1266 

v  Barker 

314 

v.  Barrett 

208 

v   Bartholomew 

1597 

v.  Basset 

1518 

v.  Batten 

399, 1379,.  1600 

v.  Beet 

844 

v   Belt 

844 

v.  Beverley 

532 

v   Binns 

158,  420,  698 

v.  Bolles 

328 

v.  Boston  Mill  Corp          477. 1042, 

IKO.1 

v.  Brain 

1617 

v.  Brandon 

449,  522 

v-  Brent 

172  j 

ones  v.  Brinker  361 

v.  Brittan  829 

v.  Cargill  447 

v.  Chappell  211,  1628 

v.  Charleuiont  588,  804,  1590 

v   Commissioners  1650 

.".  Com.  Bank  of  Columbus      1672 
v  Couoway  645 

v   Cowles  300 

v.  Davenport  417,  1576,  1578 

v.  Davids  315,  542,  1S94 

v.  Da  vies  125 

v.  Davis         497,  531,  605.  619,  630 
v   Dr.-.ke  161,  445 

v.  Evans  1425 

v.  Ewing  1687 

v   Farrell  199,  1564 

v.  Fawcett  37,  111,  112 

v.  Fa^ erweather  1579 

v.  Foster  334 

v.  Foulkes  203,  18n9 

v.  Foxall  855 

v.  Frost  588,  607,  1847 

v.  Fulghum  539,  1653 

v.  Gale  646 

v.  Garcia  del  Rio  242,  243,  344 

v.  Geddes  452,  1626,  1628 

v.  Gilham  1567,1568,1569 

v.  Goodchild  135.  224 

v.  Goodrich  1725 

v.  Graham  1508 

v.  Gregory  552,  1479 

v.  Griffith  829,  881,  883,  982 

v .  Hardesty  *41 

v.  Harris  166 

v.  Hart  197,296 

v.  Heavens  1654 

v.  Holliday  1463 

v.  Hough  1133 

v.  How  223,  225,  255 

v.  Howell  819 

v.  Howells       319,  1510,  1533.  1809 
v.  James  220,  226 

v.  Jones       247,  292,  362,  379.  593, 
679,  690,  756,  807   810,  841, 
844,  846,940,984,  1117, 
1228,  1229.  1382,  1421, 
1516,  1523,  1533,  1558, 
1617,  1632,  1685,  1861 
v.  Keen  116,  555,  630,  1745 

v.  Kennicott  1705 

v  Kenrick  1583 

v.  Kirkpatrick  221 

v.  Lamar  1299 

v.  Langham  354 

v.  Lansing  793,  794 

v.  Leadville  Bank  1734 

v  Lewis         740,  1142,  1382,  1406, 
1417,  1604 
v.  Little  Rock  1637 

v.  Lloyd  83 

v.  Lucas  920 

v.  Magill  1676 

v  Mason  444,  845,  1402 

v  Massey  1169,  1544,  1679 

v  MrKenna  1507,  1539 

i>.  McPhillips  402,  407 

v.  Mitchell  1433 

v.  Morehead  1407 

v.  Morgan  809 

v.  Morrall  1368,  1370,  2061 

v.  Newhall  652 

v.  Nixon  659,  661 

v.  North  1709 

v.  Payne  68 

v   Pengree  641 

v.  Perrott  807 

v.  Pickslav  710 

v.  Planters'  Bank  353 

v.  Powell    72,  80,  1178,  1179,  1309, 
1347, 1352, 1353,  1510, 
1542,  1787 
v.  Pugh  1720 

r.  Reese  418 

v.  Reid  334 

v.  Richards  578 

v.  Richardson  90, 114,  111 


Jones  v.  Ricketts 

1399 

v.  Roberts 

1587 

1591 

v.  Robinson 

1162 

v.  Rose 

404 

1069 

v.  Sampson 

1700 

v.  Schall 

1735 

v.  Scott 

642 

v   Searle 

1410 

v.  Segueira  637,  661,  695,  097 

v.  Shepherd  394,  1502 

v.  Skipwith  430 

v.  Skipworth  002 

v.  Sims  1507 

v    SI  tin  son  334 

v.  Smith    213,  249,  331,  922, 1543, 
1550,  1765 

v.  Spencer  347,  351,  700,  951 

v.  Stoekett  1253 
17.  Strafford,  Earl  of    590,  690,  810 

v.  Stroud  1099 

o.  Taylor  596,  1671 

v.  T  hacker  1548 

0   Thomas  678,  1560 

v.  Thome  1463 

v.  Tinney  795 

v.  Totty  1156,  1159 

v.  Tuberville  652,  841 

v  Turnbull  893,  1608 

v  Turner  986 

v.  Van  Doren  378,  418 

v.  Wadsworth  417,  1381 
v.  Ward        1260, 1351, 1352,  1364 

v   Wattier  692,  694 

v  Wedgewood  1861 


TABLE   OF   CASES    CITED. 

[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 

Jones  v.  Welling  418 

v.  Williams  631,1138,1543 

v.  Wilson  987,  994,  1491 

v.  Wood  Street  Warehouse  Co.  9U5 

v.  Zollicoffer  1575 

Jones's  Mortgage,  In  re  lol 

Jones's  Settled  Estates,  Re  1329 

J  ope  v.  Mor.-head  1152 

Jopling  v.  Stuart  402,  524 

Jopp  v.  (Jeering  1528 

v.  Wood         230,  1460,  1461, 1473. 

1480,  1581 

Jopp's  Case  1770 

Jordan,  Ex  parte  287,  1401 

v.  Agawam  Woollen  Co.  980 

v.  Clarke  378,  379 

v.  Cummings  87,  88 

v.  Jones  186 

v.  Jordan  758 

v.  Sawkins  656 

v.  Seifert  659 

v.  Thomas  1621 

V.  Williams  1623 

Jorden  v.  Money  847 

Jordon  v.  Trumbo  386 

Jortin  v.  South  Eastern  Ry.  Co.  2115 

Joseph  v.  Doubleday  1676 

v.  Goode  1169 

v.  Macowsky  1648 

v.  Mott  1033 

v.  Perry  1085 

v.  Turkey  62 

v.  Webster,  lie  1603 

Josey  v.  Rogers  1548,  1549 


lxxi 


Joslin  v.  Wheeler  553,  638 

Jossaume  v.  Abbot  318 

Jourueay  v.  Brown  1403 

Jourolmon  v.  Massengill  059 

Jowett  v.  Broad  1321 

Joy  v.  St  Louis  629 
v.  Wirtz                149,  151,  190,  2y4 


Joyce  />•  De  Moleyns 

675 

v   Gunnels 

617 

V.  Rawlins 

1526 

Judah  v.  Chiles 

1687 

Judd  v.  Bushnell 

328 

v.  Hatch 

1677 

v.  Lawrence 

45 

v.  Plum 

1443 

v.  Seaver 

386,841 

,842 

v.  Wartnaby 

742 

v.  Wilson 

332 

Judkius,  Re 

1203 

v.  Lovelace 

334 

Judson  i'.  li kiln- hard 

68 

t'.  Courier  Co 

256,  418, 

2396 

?'.  Emanuel 

194 

v.  Gibbons 

227 

v.  Toulmin 

334 

,  345 

Julia  Fisher,  The 

154 

Julian  v.  Reynolds 

251 

v.  State 

10 

Jumpson  v.  Pitchers 

1220 

Jupp,  Re 

109 

Justice  v.  McBroom 

1544, 

1683 

Justices  v.  Cosby 

395 

v  Croft 

1660, 

1663 

of  Coventry,  Re 

1610, 

1797 

K. 


aehler  v.  Dobberpuhl 

1675 

V.  Halpin 

1614 

aighn  v.  Fuller 

1677 

ain  o.  Ross 

801 

alorania,  The 

815 

Kamm  v.  Stark  1613,  1062 

Kauipf  v.  Jones  1413 

Kanawha  Lodge  v.  Swann  1548 

Valley  Bank  v.  Wilson  1576 

Kane  v.  Bloodgood         560,  644,  652 

v.  Hamilton  16o8 

v.  Huggins  Cracker  Co.  1642 

v.  Maule  16 

v.  Reynolds  16,  1513 

v.  Vanderburgh     1629,  1630,  1633 

v.  Van  Vranker       833,  1398,  1600 

v.  Whitman  993 

v.  Whittick  987,  993,  1400 

Kankakee  &c.  R  Co.  v.  Horan      839 

Kansas  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Atchison  367 

v  Bayles  1743 

Kaolatvpe     Engraving    Co      v. 

Hoke  314 

Karr  v.  Karr  457,  1369 

Kase  v.  Greenough  991 

Kauffman  v.  Griesmer  2o4 

o.  Walker  1269,  1274 

Kivanagh  v.  Wall  456,  1735 

Kay  v.  Fowler  1171,  1221,  12i»6 

v.  Hargreaves  570 

v  Johnson  1081 

v.  Jones  303,341,344 

d,  Marshall      609,  690,  1499,  1642, 

2ii95 

v.  Scates  1961 

v.  Smith  889,  1020,  1823 

v.  Watson  1580 

Kaye,  In  re  1346,  1858 

v  Bank  of  Louisville  1377 

v.  Cunningham  1058 

v   Fosbrooke  59,  225 

v.  Wall  722,  761 

Kean  v.  Johnson  26,  287 

v   Lathrop  793,  794 

Keane,  Re  1070 

Kearley,  Re  61,  157 


Kearney  v.  Harrell 

v.  Jackson 

v.  Macomb 

v.  Smith 
Kearsley  v.  Phillips 
Keates  v.  Burton 

V.  Lyon 
Keating  v.  Sparrow 
Keats  v   Hugo 
Kebel  v.  Philpot 
Keck  «'.  Allender 
Kedive,  The 
Keeler  v.  Green 

v.  Keeler 
Keen,  Re 

v.  Breckenridge 

v.  Stanley 
Keenan  v.  Keenan 
Keene  V.  Johnston 

f.  Kimball 

i\  Price 
Keener  11.  Moss 
Keeper,  Lord  v.  Wyld 
Kehoe  v.  Carville 
Keiffer  v.  Barney 
Keighley  r.  Brown 
Keil  v.  West 


1073 

1468 

2010 

1625 

578 

254 

324,  1654 

1658 

1638 

1114 

1576 

1470 

1657 

225,237 

1010 

1743 

783 

249 

100 

1643 

1184 

1157 

2,  357,  675 

740 

1002 

797 

1031,  1062 


Keisselbrack  v.  Livingston  1401 

Keith  v.  Day  999 

v.  Keith  334 

v   Trapier  lli;c> 

Keithley  r.  Keithley  1071,  1073 

Kekewich  v.  Langston        1358,  2292 

v.  Marker  1633 

Kelk  v.  Archer  798,  800 

v    Pearson  893,  1637 

Kellam  v.  Sayer  287 

Kellar  v.  Beelor  217,  1507 

Kellaway  p.  Bury  354 

»'.  Johnson  268,  272 

Keller  v.  Stolzenbach    659,  829,  2384 

Kelletfv.  Kellett       1459,  1496,  1502 

Kelley  v   Bradford  989 

v.  Greenleaf  1950,  2246,  2290 

v-  Kelley  630,  1122 

v.  McKinney  1120 


Kelley  v.  Ypsilanti  Stay  M.  Co.   1642 

Kellner  v.  Mutual  Life  Ins   Co.     694 

Kellock,  Re  307,  1847 

Kcllock's  Case  284 

Kellogg,  Matter  of  1745 

v.  New  Britain  324 

v.  Rockwell  1240 

v.  Wood  855 

Kellom  v.  Easley  1679 

Kelly,  Matter  of  1841 

v  Crapo  1743 

v.  Eckford  1553,  1819 

v.  Hooper  1380,  1395,  1681 

v.  Hutton      1694,  1646,  1727,  1837 

v.  Israel  215 

v.  Jackson  298,  617 

v.  Kershaw  417 

V.  Leunon  1476 

v   Rogers  298,  308 

v.  Sherlock  1130 

v.  Wallace  324 

Kelminster  V  Pratt  64 

Kelner  v.  Baxter  238,  269 

Kelsall  0.  Hennet  678 

v.  Kelsall  170,  174.  175 

v.  Minton  1800 

Kelsey  v  Kelsey  1724 

v.  Snvder  906 

v.  Weston  1459,  1467 

Kelso  v.  Jessop  1282,  1294 

v.  Taber  186 

Kelson  v.  Kelson  1323 

Keltv  v.  High  1019 

Kemball  r.  Walduck       159,  808,  815 

Kemble  v.  Kean  1654,  1656 

Kemp  i'   Bird  1654 

v.  Burn  1417,  1419 

v.  Latter  628 

v.  Lyon  974 

v.  Mackrell    1123,  1528,  1549.  1622 

v.  Pryor  651.  552 

v.  Squire  1026 

v.  Tucker  650,  1621 

v.  Waddingham  1034 

v.  Wade         1177, 1179, 1188, 1309, 

1339 


lxxii 


Kemp  v.  Westbrooke 
Keuipgon  b   Ashbee 
Keuiptou  v.  Burgess 
Kenan  v.  Miller 
Kendall  v.  Beckett 

t;.  Granger 

v.  Hamilton  217,  269,  288  (527 

v.  Hovey  1165,  1166 

v.  Mawters  387,  996. 1410 

Kendall  ville  Refrigerator  Co    v 

Davis  1556 

Kendig  v.  Dean  149,  790 

Keudrick  v.  Whitfield  555 

t;.  Whitney  1476 

Kenebel  v.  Scrafton  1390,  1424 

Keniston  v.  Keniston  1168 

Kenmare  v.  Casey  354 

Kenn  v.  Neek  1127 

Kenuard  v  Christie  1280 

v.  George  1971,  1972 

Kennaway  v.  Tripp  29,  31 

Kennebec  Railroad  v.  Portland 

R-tilroad  334 

Kennebec  &  Port.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Port   &  Kennebec  R.  R.  Co. 
22,  145,  261,  296,  314,  334,  335, 
338,  344 


Kennedy  v.  Ball 
V.  Baylor 
V.  Bell 
v.  Brown 
v.  Cassillis 
v.  Creswell 
v.  Daly 
v.  Davis 
v.  Edwards 
v.  George 
V-  Green 


v.  Indianapolis  &c.  R.  Co 


1576,  1577, 1678 

845 

1579 

563 

1626 

695 

187,  1584 

197 

36,598,797,806 

1836 

675,  1830 


1071, 

1743 

249,  344,  1294,  1548 

424,  1675 

658,  717,  943 


v .  Kennedy 

v.  Lewis 

v.  Lyell 

v   Meredith 

v.  Sedgwick  1795 

v.  St.  Paul  R.  Co  1731 

v.  Thorp  1742 

v.  Wakefield  364,  579 

v.  Winn  560 

Keuner  v   Hard  1544 

v .  Smith  1577 

Kennerty  v.  Etiwan  Phosphate 
Co  418 

Kenney  v  Consumers'  Gas  Co.       10 
v.  Kelliher  1591 

v.  Ranuey  1743 

Keunon  v  Dickins  1259 

Kenny  v.  Gillet  1648 

v.  Cdall  90,  101,  102,  121,  122 

Kenrick  v.  Clayton  592,  690 

v.  Danube  C.  &  M   Co.  1644 

v.  Wood  110,  1450,  1595 

Kensington  v   Inglis  •  51 

Kensington,  Lord  P.  Bouverie       328 
v.  Metropolitan  Ry.  Co.  1395 

Kensit  v.  Great  Eastern  Ry.  Co.  1639 

Kent  r    Burgess  1079 

v.  Freehold    Land  and  Brick- 
making  Co  1459 
v.  Jacobs  429 
v.  Kent                                         1539 
v.  Lake  Superior  Ship  Canal 

Co  545, 660 

v.  Lee  342 

v.  Owensboro  Bank  545 

v.  Pickering  1616 

v.  Ricards  1625 

Kenton   Furnace  R.  &  M.  Co.  v. 

McAlpin  313 

Kentucky  &  Indiana  Bridge  Co. 

v.  Krieger  1069 

Kentucky  S.  M  Co.  v.  Day  357 

Kenyon  v   Clarke  1624 

f.  Kenyon  70,  1165 

v.  Worthington  250,  1207 

Keogh,  lie  10H9 

Keogh  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Whlston     1716 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 

[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 

2231  I  Keokuk  N.  L.  Packet  Co.  v.  Da-  ) 

852  vidson  1765  : 

659,  79U  I  Kepley  v.  Carter  830 

298     Keppell  v.  Bailey  308  i 

421  i  Ker  v.  Cloberry  1303,  1312 

1853     Kerchuer  v.  Kempton     108,  185,  187 

v.  McEachern  !i74 

Kern  V.  llazierigg  280 

v.  Strausberger  1625 

v.  Wyatt  1580 

Keruagliau  v.  Williams         241,  243, 

244 

Keruick  v.  Kernick       102,  104,  107, 

354,  785,  894 

Kernot  v   Critchley  426,  1399 

v.  Potter  551 

Kerou  v.  Coon  1677 

Kerr  v.  Campbell  815 

v.  Freemau  850 

v  Gillespie       27,  28,  31,  358,  359, 

402,  577 

v.  Lansing  3 '3 

v-  Love  1258 

v-  Munster,  Duchess  of  28 

v.  Preston  1620 

v.  Hew  1558 

v.  South  Park  Com'rs    1017  ,  1(173 

Kerrick  v.  Brausby  552,  663 

v.  Saffery  215 

Kerrison  v   Stewart  200,  256 

Kershaw,     lit,     Whittaker      v 

179,  187 


Kershaw 
v.  Kelsey 
v.  Matthews 
v.  Thompson 
Kessinger  v.  Whittaker 


1729.  1736 

1042,  1056 
1063 


Ketchaui  v.  Brazil  B.  C.  Co 


l."i;5 


Ketchum  v.  Breed  1120,  1580 

v  Driggs  556 

Kettle  v.  Crary  217,  238 

v.  Van  Dyck  260,  261 

Kettlewell  v.  Barstow    320,  674,  692, 

812,  1826 

Kevan  v   Crawford         180,  355,  892, 

996.  1001, 1370,  1409 

Key  v.  Snow  109 

Keyesr.  Pueblo  S.&  R  Co.  1073, 1H63 

Keymer  v.  Pering  931 

Keys  v.  Bush  1723 

v .  Keys  1731 

v.  Mathes  3u3 

Keyser  v.  Renner  314,  405,  1517 

Keystone  Manganese   and   Iron 


Co  v.  Martin 
Keyworth,  In  re 
Kibler  r.  Whiteman 
Kidd,  Ex  parte 

v,  Cheyue 

v.  Hiirry 

p.  Mauley 
Kiddie  r.  Debrutz 
Kitldill  v.  Farnell 
Kidger  v.  Worswick 


Kidney  v.  Cockburn 

Kiff  r.  Roberts  (No.  2) 

Kihlholz  v.  Wolff 

Ki  bee  v.  Sneyd 

Kilbey  o.   Haviland 

Kilbourn  v.  8underland 

Kilbourne  v.  Allyn 

Kilbreth  v.  Root 

Kilby  v.  Stanton 

Kilcrease  v   Blythe 

Kildare.  F^irl  of  v.  Eustace 

Kilgore  o,  Hair 

Kilgour    v.    New    Orleans    Gas 
Liirht  Co.  149, 191,  334.  384 

Killian  v.  Ebbinghaus        630,  1071, 
1561 

Killinger  ?'.  Hartman  407 

Killock  r   Gregg  319 

Kilminster  r.  Pratt  814 

Kilmorey,  Lord  v.  Thackeray     1655 

Kimball  v    Brown  642 

v   New   Hampshire  Bible  Soc- 
iety 1111 


1029 

1778 

379,  385 

1581 

438,  1460,  1581 

1620 

852 

837 

1801 

485,  621,  760, 

1819 

1124 

39 

1019 

1317 

1080 

217,  630 

1061 

830,  1551 

227 

161.  538 

1050 

1734 


Kimball  v.  Ward 

733 

Kimber  v.  Emsworth 

2(2 

v.  Press  Ass'n 

KfiO 

Kimberley  v.  Fox 

1961 

v.  Jennings 

1656 

Kimberly  v.  Arms    1320,  1576,  15S0, 

1584 

v.  Sells  547,  549,  584 

Kimble  v.  Seal  1517 

Kimmel  v.  Kimmel  960 

Kimpton  v.  Eve         1656,  1673.  1685 

Kinahan  v.  Kinahan  149 

Kiucaid,  Re  97,  101,  102,  103 

Kincart  v  Sanders  1507 

Kindell  v.  Titus  108,  161 

Kinder  v.  Forbes  448 

v.  Jones  1633 

King,  lie  1416,  1417,  1648 

v.  Alberton  1134 

V.  Allen  548 

v.  Arundel,  Countess  Dowager 

of  5 

v.  Baldwin  551 

v  Bardeau  2'^59 

v.  Barnes  986,  10fi9 

v.  Bill  11162 

v   Brigham  1164 

v.  Bryant  506,  528,  1175,  1424 

v.  Burr  1398 

v.  Carr  781 

v.  Clark  1457 

v.  Corke  328,  384,  417,  861 

v.  Davis  324 

v.  Dundee  Mortgage,  &c.  Co.  1576, 

1579 

v.  Enterprise  Ins  Co.  1550 

v.  Galloway  295 

V.  Heniing  626 

v   Higgins  1624 

v.  Holcombe  700 

v.  Howard  670 

v.  Isaacson  lt-02 

v.  King     68,  393, 1379,  1411 ,  1490, 

1558,  1617,  1725 

v.  Little  128 

v.  Lucas  113 

v.  McVickar  715 

v   Malcott  643 

r   Martin  158,256 

v.  Morris  and  Essex  R.  Co.     1637, 

1650 

v.  Noel  807 

v.  Pratt  894 

v.  Ray  723,  726 

v.  Rossett  379 

v.  Ruckman  1029,  1472 

v.  Sandeman  979 

v.  Savery  1029,  1442 

v.  Smith  284, 1614,  1630,  1699 

v.  t-tate  Mutual  Fire  Ins  Co   1239, 

1241,  1246 

v   Stewart  215 

v.  Strong  1426.  1427 

v  Taylor  1431,  1433 

v.  Townshend  2040 

v  Trice  368 

v.  Turner  424 

v.  Williamson  1097 

v.  Wooten  P69 

Kingdom  v.  Boakes  843 

Kinglake  v.  Bevis  1127 

Kingley  v.  Young  296 

Kingman  v.  Maisey  1618 

Kingsbury  v.  Buckner  68.  1548, 

1580 

t'  Flowers  216,334 

Kingsford  v.  Poile  457,  !  98 

Kingsland  r.  Roberts  641 

Kingsley,  Re  87,  179 

v.  Young  197,  247 

Kingsman  v.  Kingsman  111 

Kingston  v.  Corker  324 

j    Cowbridge  Ry    Co.  1731 

v .  Tappen  930 

Kingston"s,  Duchess  of,  Case      576, 

664 

Kingwood  Bank  v.  Jarvis  1294 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  pagiug  ] 


Kinlock  ».  Meyer  254 

Kinmonth  v.  Brigham  144,  2200 

Kinnaird  v.  Trollope  815 

Lord  i).  Christie  12S0 

Kinnan  v.  42d  St.,  &c.  R.  Co.         60 

Kinuesley  ('    Simpson  605 

Kinney  v.  Cous'd  Va.  M-  Co.        385 

v.  Crocker  1743 

v.  Ensign  1772 

v.  Pierce  1298 

Kino  v.  Rudkin  280,  1096,  lluo, 

1517,  163l 

Kinsey,  Re  1340 

v.  Grimes  848 

v.  Howard  334 

v.  Kinsey  660 

Kinsliela  v.  Lee  992 

Kinsler  v.  Clark  1668 

Kinsman  v.  Barker  1253 

Kinzie  v.  Penrose  665 

Kipp  v.  llanna  407,  499 

Kirby  v.  Barton  U>18 

v.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co    145, 

217 

v.  Tavlor  694,  700 

Kireton  Coal  Co.,  Ex  parte        1459 

Kirk  v.  Bromley  Union  1544 

v.  Clark  205,  220 

v.  Du  Bois  378,  1507 

v.  Jones  1278 

v.  Kirk  953,  954 

v.  Milwaukee  D.  C.  Manuf  Co. 

1070 
v.  Morrow  314 

v.  Keg.  133 

Kirk  by    Ravensworth   Hospital, 

Ex  parte  1853 

Kirkham  v.  Smith  1391 

Kirkneaton     Local     Board     v 

Ainley  1638 

Kirkland  v.  Telling  1003 

Kirkley  v.  Burton  312,  422 

Kirkman  v  Andrews  684 

v.  Booth  1230,  1414 

v.  Handy  1629 

v.  Honnor  1674 

v.  Jervis  1096 

v   Vanlier  1222 

Kirkpatrick  v  Buford  295 

v.  Corning  222,  243,  34:t 

v.  Love  1229 

v.  Meers  490 

v.  Peshine  1654 

v   White  _     611 

Kirksey  v.  Means  378,  379 

Kirkwood  v.  Lloyd  989 

v.  Webster  1440 

Kirsch  v  Derby  542 

Kirtland  v   Moore  1561 

Kirwan  v.  Daniel  151,  2!»1 

v.  Kirwan  444 

v.  Latour  58 

Kisor  v.  Stancifer  377 

Kitcat  v.  Sharp  887,  1070 

Kitchen  v.  Himble  1525 

v.  Itavburn  314 

Kitcherside  v.  Mvers  630 

Kitchin  V   Himble  1510 

v.  Hughes  522 

Kitching  v.  Kitching  1072 


Kitchins  v.  Harrall 
Kittle  v.  De  Graaf 

!•.  De  Lamater 

v.  Kogers 

v   Van  Dyck 
Kittlewell  v.  Barstow 
Kitto,  Re 


192 
314 
1081 
1642 
194 
411 
1411 


Kittredge  v.  Claremont  Bank      630, 

722,  723,  724,  735.  759,  769 

v.  McLaughlin  1259, 1391 

Klaus  v   State  68 

Klein  v.  Fleetford  1675 

v .  Horiue  425 

v.  Jewett  1752 

Klepper  V    Powell  692 

Kline  v.  Baker  864 

c.  L'Auioureux  1360 

Klock  v.  Robinson  1255 

Kloebe,  lie  47,  202 

Klumpp  v.  Gardner  15i*l 

Knapman,  lie  1409 

Knapp  v.  Buruaby  1254 

v.  Burnham  1238 

v.  Douglass  Axe  Co.       1613,  1639, 

1662,  2323 

v.  Marshall  987 

v.  Snyder  1623 

v.  White  1317 

v.  Williams  1/31 

Knapping  v.  Tomlinson  99 

Knatchbull  v.  Fearnhead  1411 

v.  Fowle    68,  74,  86,  112,  163,  164, 

178 

v .  Hallett  357 

Knebell  v.  White  386,  1928 

Kneeland  v.  Brass  Foundry        1743 

v.  Luce 
Knibb  8.  Dixon 
Knickerbocker  v   De  Freest 


v.  Harris 
Knierim  v.  Schmauss 
Knight,   Be 

v.  Atkisson 

v.  Bowyer 

v.  Brawner 

v.  Bulkley 

v.  Cawthron 

v.  Corv 

f.  De  Blaquiere 

c.  Duplessi 


1743 

1073 
161, 
163 
846 

1205 
901 
561,  659,  994,  1579 
387 
118 

1053 

431 

28,  358 

27,3i 

1725 


v.  Houghtalling  1062 

v.  Knight        70,  92,  109.  282,  283 

1054,  1202,  1T*>8 

v.  Maclean  1254 

v.  Marjoribanks  594,  1291 

v.  Martin  1U2 

v.  Mosely  8 

v.  Plimouth,  Lord  1751 

v.  Pocock     212,  226,  257,  277,  433 

v.  Pursell  1449 

v  Sampson  576 

v.  Watts  1708 

?)    Weiskopf  1461 

v.  Yarborough  1562 

v  Young  530,  1026 

Brothers  v.  Ogden  797 

Knight's  Trusts  Re  1411,  1412 

Knoblauch  B   Minneapolis  1675 

Knoop  v.  Bohmricb.  26 


Knott,  Re 
v.  Coitee 
v.  Cottee 


v.  Morgan 
v.  Stearns 
Knowles,  Re 
v.  Chapman 
v.  Greeuhill 
Haughton 


lxxiii 


1416 

1051 

1252, 1267, 1416, 1420, 

2295 

2319 

1365 

1809 

1245,  1251,  1^52 

14T9 

332 


v.  Rhydydefed   Colliery   Com- 


pauy 

v.  Roberts 

v.  S pence 
Kuowltou  v.  Hanbury 
Knox  v.  Brown 

v-  Columbia  L.  I.  Co, 


v.  Gye 


v,  Hayman 

V.  M;i_\0 

v.  Mo.-er 
v-  Picket 
i'.  Smith 
v.  Symmonds 


810,  1591 
354 
969 
1548 
158,  791 
986  1019, 
1120,  1576 
313,  315,  418,  560,  561, 
641,649 
26 
1163 
974,  1020 
1411,  1412,  1418 
361 
414,  770,  7J6 


Knox  County  v   Harshmau 


2398 


Knye  v.  Moore  206,  345 

Kobbi  v.  Underhill  550 

Koeber  v.  Sturgis  102 

Koehler  v.   Farmers  &  Drovers 

Nat.  Bank  1684 

Kohn  v.  McXulta  1071 

Koons  v.  Blanton  1071 

Kooutz  e.  Northern  Bank  1749 

Kopper  v.  Dyer  517, 1548,  1918 

Koppiuger  v.  O'Donnell 
Korue  v.  Korne 
Kornegay  v.  Carroway 
Kortjohn  v.  Seimers 
Kortright  v.  Cady 


Kraker  v.  By  rum 
Krapt  v.  Wickey 
Krehl  v.  Burrell 


1561,  1562 
334 
378 
1501 
1243,  1246 
1360 

ia>5 

986,  987,  1080, 
1140,  1662 
1368,  1376 
1621 
790 
314,  369 
287 
656 
1548 
1320 
1680 
418,  1677 
855 


v.  Park 
Kreichbaum  v.  Bridges 
Kreider  v.  Mehaffy 
Krick  v.  Jansen 
Krippendorf  v.  Hyde 
Kronheim  v.  Johnson 
Krueger  r.  Ferry 
Krumbhaar  v.  Griffiths 
Kruson  v.  Kruson 
Kuhl  v   Martin 
Kuhliger  v.  Bailev 
Kunkel  p.  Markell  214,  341,  361,  368 
Kuntz  r.  White  Co.  1675 

Kurtz  v.  Spence  418 

Kuttner  v.  Haines  1580 

Kutz's  Appeal  1299 

Kuyper     b.      Reformed     Dutch 
Church    584,588,590,601,694, 
718,720,721,761 
Kyle  v.  McKenzie  1548 

v.  Perdue  1548 

v.  Riley  788 

Kynaston  v.  East  India  Co.  166 

v-  Perry  797 


L. 


Labadie  v.  Hewitt          346,  559 

1150 

Lacon  v.  Mertins 

1245 

Labouchere  !>   Dawson 

1655 

Lacroix  v.  Lyons 

313 

v.  Wharncliffe 

1653 

j'.  May 

590 

Lacassagne  B.  Chapuis 

790 

Lacy  !■.  Burchnall 

70 

Lacey,  Ex  parte 

157 

v.  Hill 

1174 

v.  Baker 

1461 

v.  Rnckett 

63 

v.  Forrester 

1129 

v.  Wilson 

675 

Lachlan  V.  Reynolds 

1276 

1284 

Ladbroke  v.  Sloane        797, 

799,  Dil- 

Lackett  v.  Rumbaugh 

636 

1770 

Ladbrooke  v.  Bleadou 

798 

Lackey  v.  Curtis 

29C 

Ladd  o.  Chase 

1561 

Ladd  r   Harvey 

r.  Putnam  1238 
Ladies  Benevolent  Soc.  v.   Bene- 
volent Soc.  1662 
Ladner  v.  Ogden  1548 
Lafavour  r.  Justice  601 
Lafayette  v.  Fowler  1661 
Co  v.  Neely  324,  328,  2398 
Ins  Co,  v.  French  357 
Lafferty  v.  Turley  64S 


lxxiv 


Lafitte,  Re  1440 

Latitte's  Claim  1440 

Lafoue  v.  Falkland  Islands  Co.     413, 
577,  786,  1651,  1552.  1555, 1821, 
1824,  1834,  1838 
Laforest,  Re  62 

La  Grange,  &c.  R.  Co.  V-  Mem- 
phis, &c.  K.  Co.         1370, 1550, 
1577 
Laidlev  v.  Merrifield  987,  1491 

Laiglit  v.  Morgan  893,  394,  547 

v.  Cell  1284,  1290 

Laiug  v  Kaine  848 

v.  Zeden  1566,  1569,  1618 

Lainhart  v.  Reilly  287 

Luiuson  v.  Lainson  1256,  1257 

Laird  v.  Boyle  378 

v.  Briggs  384,  401,  782,  10u3 

Lake  v. 734,  737 

v.  Austwick  1546 

v.  Causfield  877 

v.  Deer  1129 

v   Haseltine  154 

v.  Hayes  643 

v   Meares  1050 

v.  Peisley  866,  868 

v.  Skinner  882,  883 

Lake  Krie  &  W.  R.  Co.  V.  Hatch  546 
Lake  Superior  Iron  Co.  v.  Brown 

1286, 1507 
Lake's  Trusts,  Re  649,  650 

Lakeman  v.  Agua  Fria  Gold  M. 

Co.  683 

Lakens  v  Fielden  592,  739,  748 

Lakin,  Ex  parte  1357 

Lamar  v.  Micou  546 

Lamare  V-  Dixon  1889 

Lamb  v.  Beaumont  Temperance 

Hall  Co.  1051 

V.  Evaus  1650 

V-  Jeffrey  597 

v.  Munster  564,  717 

Lambe  v.  Orton         1312, 1366,  1477, 
1487,  1795,  1823 
Lambert  v.  Addison  332 

v   Fisher  1137 

v.  Hill  1594,  1971 

v.  Hutchinson  1040,  1041 

v.  Jones  425 

v.  Lambert       281,  601,  1549,  1550 
v.  Lomas  482 

v.  Lyddon  1138 

v  Maris  892 

v  Neuchatel  Asphalt  Co    26,  1650 
v.  Newark  1606,  1797 

v.  Northern    Railway   of   Bu- 
enos Ay  res  243 
v   People                              563,  567 
v.  Peyton                                     1004 
v  Rogers  581 
v.  Turner                             162,  476 
Lambie  v .  Lambie                         1798 
LaMert  V.  Stanhope  809 
Laming  v.  Gee  438,  1370,  1577,  1581, 
1584 
Lamon  v.  McKee                 1069,  1770 
Lampton  p.  Lampton  844 
Lamson  v.  Drake                   378, 1309 
Lanahan  v.  Gahan                         1631 
Lancashire  v.  Lancashire  1079,  1465, 
1600,  1721,  1725 
and  Yorkshire  Ry. 
Co.  r.  Evans                791,  808, 810 
Lancashire,  &c.  Bank  v.  Tee  187 
Lancaster,  Re                     38,  40,  111 
v.  Choate                1626,2284,2349 
v.  DeTrafford                            1081 
v.  Evors              300,  720,  722,  1829 
v.  Lair  811 
v.  Lancaster                               1573 
v.  Roberts  586 
v.  Thornton  77 
v.  Ward                    848,  1079, 1116 
Lancaster  and  Carlisle  Ry.  Co 

v.  North-Western  Ry.  Co      1620 
Lancaster   Mills    v.  Merchants' 
Cottonpress  Co.  517 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED. 

[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 

1209,  1407, 
1423 
548 
1515 
1364 
1475,  1479 
Canada    v. 

1817 


Lancefield  l>.  Iggulden 

Lancy  !'.  Randlett 
Land  v.  Cowan 
v.  Land 
v.  Wick  nam 
Corporation     of 

Pules  ton 
Credit  Co.  v.  Fermoy  193, 

1029,  1064,  1678 
Credit  Society  of  Ireland,  Re 

943 
Landars  v.  Allen  1001 

Landed  Estates  Co.  v.  W*eediug_  138  J 


Lander  v.  lngersoll 

v.  Parr 

v.  Weston 
Landis  v   Olds 
Landou  v.  -Morris 

v.  Ready 
Lane,  Re 

v.  Crombie 

v.  Ellzey 

v.  Hardwicke 

v.  Hobbs 

v.  Jackson 

v.  Lane 


6 

27,111 
.19 

378,  381 

1721 

402,  530 

892,  1359,  1360 

850 

504,658,  1591 

162,  169.  448,  476 

1029,  1030 

675,  1040 

1738 


v.  Loudou  Bank  of  Scotland      732 
v.  Newdigate  1639,  1662,  1663, 


v.  Oliver 
v.  Paul 
v.  Schouip 
V.  Smith 
v.  Sterne 


Li7l 
1061 
763,  1821 
1637 
62,  63,  158,  606,  631 
1743 


Lanesborough  v.  Kilmaine     676,  677 
Laufranchi  v.  Mackenzie 


247 


Lang,  Ex  parte 

v.  Brown 

v.  Griffith 

v.  Superior  Court 

v.  Waring 

v.  Whiddon 
Langdale  v.  Briggs 

v.  Gill 

v.  Langdale 

Lady  v.  Briggs 
Langdon  v.  Branch 

v.  Goddard 

v.  Pickering 
v.  Potter 
v.  Roane 
Lange  0.  Jones 
Langell  V.  Langell 
Langen  v.  Tate 
Langford,  Re 
v.  May 
v.  Pitt 
v.  Wray 
Langham  v.  Great  Northern  Ry 

Co  795,  1380,  1667 

Langhorne  v.  Harland  1397 

Langley,  Ex  parte  1665.  1673, 

6      '  1684,  1686 

1057 

1060 

856,  945,  964.  1399 

1723 

2r5 

1062 

1003 

1246 

1560,  1563, 

1564 

1425.  1778 

1571 

12ft5,  1390 

386,  774 

1274 


157 

1298 

1697 

1591 

216,  9!  4 

83 

1001,  2182 

1530 

792 

1001 

303 

720,  728,  759,  844. 

852.  1997 

349,  350,  729,  759 

318 

1003 

277 

545 

915 

1743, 1791 

913 

989 

1488 


v  Bredon 

v.  Breydon 

v   Fisher 

v.  Hawk 

v.  Oxford,  Earl  of 

v.  Voll 
Langmaid  v.  Reed 
Langstaffe  V.  Fenwick 
Langston  r.  Boylston 

Langton  v.  Higgs 
o.'Horton 

V'.  Langton 

v.  Wait* 
Langyher  v.  Patterson 
Lanham  v.  Pirie    191,  832,  967,  2042 
Lanier  v.  Alison  1628 

v   Hill  407 

Lankford  v.  Jackson  1284 

Lann  v.  Church  1845 

Lanning  v.  Heath  412.  424 

Lanoy  v.  Athol  97,  105,  1360 


Lansdale  v.  Smith  660 

Lansdown  v.  Elderton  690 

Lausdowue,  Marquis  of  v.  Lans- 
dowue,    Marchioness    Dow- 
ager of  1634 
Lansiug  v.  Albany  Ins.  Co.        1576, 
1676,  1578 
v.  Easton                          1683,  1686 
v.  Goelet  ^84 
v.  Mcpherson                   1026,  1286 
v.  Pine                                    562,  567 
v.  Russell                1120,  1124,  1125 
Lanum  v.  Steele  518 
Lapev   Taylor                                1417 
Lapej  ra  v.  United  States  67 
Lapham  v.  Green                              195 
Lapresse  V.  Falls                   1073.  1076 
Laprimaudaye  v.  Teissier    116,  1778, 
1785,  1794 
Lapton  v.  Almy                             1277 
Larabrie  v.  Brown                 394,  1563 
Larcom  r.  Olin                                1620 
Lardner  v  Ogden                1548,  1551 
Lareau  V.  Davignon  46 
Largan  v.  Bowen                          1615 
Large  v.  De  Ferre  77 
v.  Van  Doren               212,  220,  259 
I^argeu  v.  Bowen                            1764 
Larimore  v.  Wells                            &J4 
Larkin  v.  Mann          526,  1073,  1163, 
1154,  1166.  1158 
Larkins  v.  Biddle            334,  340,  402 
ci  Murphy                                  12:i5 
v.  Pax  ton                          1423.  1437 
Larmuth  v.  Simmons                   1624 
Laroche  V.  Wakeman  58 
Larrqbee  v.  Grant                          1120 
Larrison,  v.  Peoria,  &c.  R.  Co. 

733 
Larrowe  v.  Beame  676 

Larsen  v.  Oregon  Ry.  &  Nav. 

Co.  830 

Larsh  v.  Brown  846 

Larue  v.  Larue  994 

Lasell  v.  Powell  1272 

Lash  ».  McCormick  1671 

v.  Miller         159,  1510, 1524,  1525, 

2059 

Lashlev  v.  Hogg  793,  1205 

Laslett  v.  Cdffe  1266 

Lasseur  v.  Tyrconnel  1809 

Lataillade  r.  Orena  £45 

LaUh  v.  Latch         226,  251,  433,  438 

Latham  v.  Chafee  634,  1734 

i'.  Kenrick  64 

v.  Wiswall  424 

Lathbury  v.  Brown  1130 

Lathrop  v   Knapp  1751 

v   Nelson  1277 

v.  Sn.alley  1417 

v  Stewart  546 

Latimer,  Ex  parte  1440 

v  Ayletbury,  itc.  Ry.  Co.       1656, 

1730,  1731 

v.  Neate  1830,  1833,  1835 

Latouch  v.  Dunsany  1549 

Latouche  r.  Sampson  768 

Latour  v.  Bland  1644 

Latta  Ex  parte  28.  1605 

V.  Kilbourn  1029 

Latter  v.  Da^hwood  1252 

Latting  v.  Hall  881 

v.  Latting  339,  340 

Laud  v.  Cowan  326 

v   Sargent  604 

Lauderdale  Co  r  Foster  60 

Laughlin  r.  President,  &c.  1631 

Laugh  ton  V.  Atkins  874 

v.  Harden  266,  584 

Laura  Jane  v.  Hagen  652 

Laurence  ;\  Maule  868 

Lauri  v.  Renad  46 

Laurie  v.  Burn  515 

v.  Crush  1525, 1526 

v.  Laurie  1673 

Lautour  v.  Attorney-General       315, 

643,602 


Lautour  v.  Holcombe  27,  34,  796,  810 

Lautz  v.  Gordon  1548 

La  Vega  v.  Lapsley  2391) 

Laverty  v.  Moore  1029 

Lavihart  v.  Reilly  390 

Law,  Re  86,  1  61 

v.  Ford  1718,  1727,  1728 

f .  Garrett  671 

v  Hunter  857,  1189 

v   Law  324,  94b 

v.  London  Indisputable  Co       485, 

621,716,760,1819,1820 

v.  Philby  283 

v   Rigby  561,  633 

v.  Scott  111  7 

Liwes  v  Gibson         1397,  1398,  1403 


Lawtord  v.  Spicer 
Lawlesx  v.  Mansfield 
Lawley  v    llalpeu 

v.  Waldon 
Lawrance  v.  Norreys 
Lawrell  v.  Titchborne 
Lawrence,  Re 

v-  Austin 


1008,  1070 
371 
112 
209 
324,  354,  392 
949 
1841 
1081,  1638.  1641, 
1661,  1663 
v.  Bank  of  the  Republic  256 

v.  Berney  1580 

v.  Bolton  1523,  1535 

t'.  Bowie  1421 

v.  Campbell  577,  1834 

r   Cornell  1028 

u   Derby  354 

v.  Hester  860 

v.  Horton  1638.  lfWil 

V.  Lane  280  281 

v.  Lawrence  37,  38,  713,  845  ' 

v.  Maule  870  I 

t;.  Philpot  1677 

v    Pool  694 

v  Remington  633 

v.  Richmond  1017 

v.  Rokes      149,  150,  151,  216,  219, 
290,  641 
v.  Smith  1642,  1645 

t>  Traner  545 

Lawrence  Manuf.  Co  v.  Janes 

ville  Cotton  Mills 
Lawrenson  v.  Butler 
Lawne  v.  Lees 
Lawry  v.  Houston 
Lawson  v.  Barker 
V.  Drake 
v.  Jordan 
v.  Menasha  W.  Co. 
v.  Stoddart 


Wright 
Lawton  v.  Green 

f   Lawton 

v    Price 
Lay  v   Brown 
Layton  v.  Ivans 

»'.  Mortimore 
Lazarus  v.  Mozley 
Lea  v.  Parker 

r    Keed 

V.  Robeson 

v  Sax by 
Vanbibber 


1586 

1405 

1339 

121 

254 

1300 

1566 

1639 

908,  1336 

270 

1666 

1617 

908,  944,  1225 

91 

424 

156.  502 

1822 

32 

666 

645 

720 

402,  524 


Lea  Conservancy  Board  !'.  Tot- 
tenham Local  Board  1638 
Lea's  Trust,  Re  193 
Leach  v   Fobes  844,  1902,  2264,  2338 
v.  Jones                                      1019 
v.  Leach                                        13eJ[ 
Leacraft  o.  Demprey      590,  617,  668 
682,  694,  700,  703,  788,  789 


Leaoroft  v   Maynani 
Leadhetter  v.  , 

Leadbitter,  Re 
Leader,  The 
Leader  v.  Moody 
Leah,  Re 
Xeahy  v.  Arthur 
Leake  v  Bundy 

v.  Cordeaux 

v.  Leake 

v.  Smith 


1384,  143: 
1646 

59,61,157 
1846 
1654 
1843 
1719 
1508 
1929 
1699 
1663 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 

[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging  J 

Leauian  v.  Brown    451,  452,  4S0,  481 

Learned  v.  Castle  1638 

v.  Tillotson  lo71 

V.  Walton  1051 

Learoyd  u.  Halifax  Joint  Stock 

B   Co,  571,  573,  1835 

Leary  v   Long  659 

Leather  Cloth  Co.  v   American 

Leather  Cloth  Co  164',  1649 

v.  Bressey  426 

v.  Hirschfield  852,  1082 

v.  Lorsont  1649,  1654 

Leathes  v.  Newit  262 

Leatuley  v.  McAndrew  20,  26 

Leavenworth  ;;.  Pepper  360 

Leavitt  v  Cruger   180,  182,  445,  476, 
498,  499,  524,  538,  733,  754,  784 
v.  Fisher  1569 

Leavy  v.  Leavy  255 

Leaycraft  v.  Deuipsey     361,  371,  668 
v   Heddeu  186 

Le  Baron  v.  Cronibie  1118 

Lechuiere  v.  Brasier       165,  858,  859, 
1276.  1276 
v.  Brazier       1214,  1218,  1423,  1806 
v    Brotheridge  100 

»'  Clamp  832,  969,  998 

v.  Clapp  820 

Lechmere  Bank  v.  Boynton         2152 
Lechuiere  Charlton's  Case  1070 

Le  Clea  v  Trot  17 13 

Leddel  v   Starr  1550,  1716 

Leduc  v.  Ward  190 

Ledwich,  Ex  parte  1069 

Ledwith  v.  Jacksonville     1517,  1620 
2048 
Lee,  Ex  parte  52 

v.  Angas  907.  909,  1097 

v.  Beatty  1073,  1076,  1124 

v.  Bickley  1406 

v.  Blackstone  417  i 

v.  Boutwell  378  I 

v   Braxton  997  | 

v.  Brown  1398,  1427  1 

v.  Cargill  1667,  1675  I 

v.  Cone  380 

v  Delane  1405,  1426,  1427 

v   Dennistoun  65,  835 

v.  Gibbings  1620,  1643 

v  Haley  1649 

p.  Hammerton  945 

v   Lee  63,  64,  1234,  1530.  1544 

v .  Melendez  2329  1 

V.  Milner  1636  | 

v.  Pain  851  j 

v   Park  1615,  1616  I 

r    Pmdle  383,  1368.  1381  ' 

r   Read  564,  741 

i'-  Rogers  52  | 

v  Kuggles  1624  | 

I1    Ryder  177 

v.  Saogster  65  \ 

v   Shaw  992  j 

*   Shore  1129,  1135 

'••  Stig-:r  fa;  ; 

v  Stone  331  | 

11   Walker  1402  ; 

v.  WiKock  1298  ■ 

v.  Wilmot  646 

Leech  i'   Bailey  713 

v.  Bolland  889 

v.  State  ]614 

v  Trollop  570,  675 

Leedham  v,  Cbauner  1423 

Leeds  v  Lewis  1327 

v.  Mar   Ins.  Co.  841 

Duke  of  r   Amherst,  Earl  of      649 
v.  Amherst,  Lord  1634 

v   Strafford.  Earl  of  1164 

Leeds  Estate  Co  v.  Shepherd    26  27 
Leeming.  Re  1354 

Lees  i).  Jones  1727 

v.  Lees  893   1457 

v.  Nuttall  1484    1611 

II    Patterson  1704,  1705.  1712,  1714 
Leese  v.  Knight      160.  162,  163   177, 
460,  476,  533,  538 


lxxv 


Leeson  v   Smith  1130 

Leet  v.  Gersham  Life  Insurance 

Society  1096,  1128 

v.  Jenkins  14>;0 

Leete  v.  Jenkins  14;1 

Lefevre  v.  Laraway    1286,  1290,  12.(1 

Leffingwell  v   Chave  1667 

Le  Fort  v.  Delafield  72 

Lefroy  v   Lefroy  1286,  1287 

Leftwick  v.  Hamilton  469,  1625 

Legal  v.  Miller  380 

Legard  v.  Daly  1123,  1136,  1139 

v   Hodges  1799 

v.  Sheffield  829 

Le  Gendre  v.  Byrnes  56  J 

Legg  i>.  Mackrell  1416 

Legge  v.  Edmonds  564 

Leggett  v.  Dubois  1544 

11   Postley  563,  564,  721, •  1557 

v   Sellon  169 

Leggo  v.  Richards  2060 

Leggott  v.  Barrett  1665 

Legh  r.  HaVerfield  380,  860 

v.  Hewitt  1655 

v.  Holloway  1148 

Le  Grand  v-   Hampden  Sidney 

College  20 

r.  Whitehead  1368 

Le  Grange  v.  McAndrew  3d 

Le  Heup,  Ex  parte  347 

Lehigh  Coal  &  Navigation  Co. 

v.  Central  R  Co.  1743 

Lehigh  R  Co.  v  McFarlan  361, 

797,  1682 


Lehman  11   Dozier 

v.  Ford 
Lehmann  v.  McArthur 
Lehmans  v    Ford 
Lehuoti  v.  Fisher 
Leicester,  Ex  parte 

v.   Leicester 


1551 
1548 
1081,  1889 
1553 
1591 
1825 
816 


Earl  ol  v.   Perry  606,  1558 

I  Leigb,  Re  1594 

Re,  Leigh  v.  Leigh  108 

I      »'  Birch  720,  721,  722 

I      »•  Boyd  880 

v.  Clark  1676 

»   Everhart  563 

!'•  Leigh  369,  1660 

v  Macaulay  1774,  1776 

v.  Thomas  236,  24o 

v.  Turner  637,  638,  697,  1312 

Leighton  v   Lelghton  1427,1661, 

1682 

v  Merrill  13«1 

v  Orr  852 

»   Young  313.  1621 

Leitch  v   Abbott  324,  328  666 

v  Cumpston  1029,  1602 

v   Wells  281 

11    Wentworth  1661 

Leite  v  Johnston  801 

v   Vicmi  627  819 

Leitendorfer  11  King  310 

Leitn,  He  1769 

Lei  t  ham  11   Cuoick  1631 

Leland  v.  Griffith  1287 

Leman  v.  Alie  1385,  1405 

v   Newnham  465 

Lemaster  r   Burkhart  361,  849,  862 

Lemheek  v   Nye  1638 

Leinmon  r    Dunn  256 

Lemoine  v.  Garston  1648 

Lemon,  Re  68 

v  Yorkshire  Waggon  Co.  405 

Lcnaghan  v.  Smith       181,  183,  217, 

219 

Lenders  v.  Anderson  449 

Le  Neve  r.  Le  Neve  675 

V.  Norris  1576 

Leng  v.  Hodges  1795 

Lengsfield  v.  Richardson  673 

Lennon  v  Napper  1658 

v   Porter  261 

Lenoir  v   Winn  418 

Lenox  v.  Mitchell  1469 

v  Netrebe  169 


lxxvi 


Lent  v.  Padelford 
Lentilhon  0.  Moffat 
Lenton  v   Brudenel 
Lenz  v.  Prescott 
Leo  v   Lambert 
v.  Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co. 

Leonard  v.  Atwell 

v.  Cook 

v.  Groome 

v  Jamison 

v.  Ozark  Land  Co. 

v.  White 

v.  Wildes 
Leon  N    Bank  v   Gill 
Leopard  v   People 
Leroy  v.  Dickinson 
Le  Roy  v   Servis 

V.  \ eeder 
Leslie  v.  Baillie 

v.  Cave 

v.  Leslie 
Lespinasse  v.  Bell 
Lesquire  v.  Lesquire 
Lester  v   Archdale 

v.  Bond 

v-  Garland 

v   Mathews 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 


363 
303 
1209 
334 
1713 
26, 314, 
1614,  2398 
1686 
1517 
214 
1568 
2398 
1551 
1260 
1461 
1556 
1669 
547 
392,  547 
128 
579 
349,  728 
1738 
282 
809 
449 
67 
974,  1584,  1585 
Le  Texier  u.  Auspach,  Margrave 

of  184 

v     Anspach,    Margrave    and 

Margravine  of  145 

v.  Anspach,  Margravine  of       15 


Lewis,  Re 
v.  Allenby 
v.  Armstrong 
V.  Baird 
Baldwin 


Letliem  V.  Hall 
Lethley  v.  Taylor 
Lett,  lie 

v.  Morris 

v.  Parry 

v    Randall 
Leucke  v.  Tredway 
Leuty  v.  Hillas 
Levan  v.  Patton 
Le  Ya.-seur  v   Scratton 
Levenson  v   Elson 
Lever  v.  Goodwin 

v.  Heritage 
Leverich  v   Adams 
Leverick  v.  Meigs 
Leveridge  v.  Marsh 
Levert  V   Redwood 


loi, 
299.378 
1355 
181 
1446 


Levett  v   Letteney 
Levi  v   Evans 
v  Heritage 


385,  722 

527 

559 

231 

1625 

119 

1730 

1648,  1649 

808,  810,  815 

1355 

325 

214 

526,  881,  1296, 

1314 

1046 

536,  630 

159,  808,  810, 

815 

513 

52,68 

178, 841 

863 

868 


l>    Ward 

Levine  v,  Taylor 

Levmg  v.  Caverly 

Levisay  v   Delp 

Leviston  v   French 

Levitt  v.  Levitt  8!>3 

Levv,  Re,  Levin  v.  Levin  894 

v.  Baillie  1130 

t    Uvy  163.  1075 

v.  Milne  1129 

v.  ?.hrevpport  1661 

v   Stfinbach  1625 

r    Wa.ker  1655,  1660 

I^wark  v   Carter  1282 

Lewarne  t'.  Mexican  Int'l  Imp 

Oo  559,  2398 

Lewellin  v.  Cobbold  431 

n    Mackworth  1581,  1584 

Lewen  v   Stone  1961 

l#wer   Earl  of  v  Barnett  157 

Lewers  v.  Shaftsbury,  Earl  of    1081, 
1889 


v.  Bank  of  Kentucky 
v.  Brass 
v.  Campau 
v  Clewes 
v   Clowes 


I/ewes,  Re 

>  Morgan 
Lewin,  lie 

v.  Allen 

v.  Guest 

V   Jones 

V.  Moline 

v  Wilson 
Lewin's  Trust,  Inre 


850, 1389,  1795 

1255,  1684 

41 

268 

1220,  1408 

710 

972 

652 

104,  107,  2001 


61,  94,299 

993,  1436,  1588 

1380,  1602 

617,716 

452,  453,  536 


24 
561 
1463 
640 
980 


Cocks    552,  556,  630, 1071,  1699 


v  Cooper 
v.  Darling 
v.  Davies 
v.  Duncombe 
v.  Dwight 
r   Edmund 
v.  Evans 
v.  Fielding 
v.  Fullarton 
v.  Glass 
v.  Godman 
V-  Hawkins 
v.  Herndon 
v.  Hiuton 
v.  James 
v    King 
v_  Lewis 


602 

232,  287,  418 

1835 

653 

1254 

336 

1453 

679 

1642,  1645,  1646 

1551 

1195 

278,  815 

989 

1027 

889,  1776 

1772 

372,  974,  1302 

1817 


Londesborough,  Earl  of 
Loper 


334 
Loxham  1405 

v    Maris  875 

o.  Marshall  641 

v.  Mason  843 

v  Matthews  438,  1428 

v.  Mew  281 

v.  Mohr  545 

v.  Morland  468 

v.  Nangle  216 

v   Nobbs  68,  69 

v  Outlaw         171,  839,  1509,  1540, 
1546 
v.  Owen  841,  844,  92.5 

v   Pennington  575 

v.  Pleasants  1580 

V-  Providence  1650 

v.  St  Albans  Iron  Works  334 

v.  Shainwald  389 

v  Simonton  740,  1031 

v  Smith        1466, 1600,  1651,  1676 
1661 


v   Spencer 

v  Thomas  1079 

n.  Trask  1411 

v.  Webber  1391 

v.  Wilson  1463 

v  Zouche,  Lord  1738 

Lewis's  v.  Goodbody  1648 

v   Lewis  974 

Lewisburg  Bank  v.  Sheffey  1019 

Lewi.-ton     Falls    Manuf    Co.   v. 

Franklin  Co  388 

Lexington  Natl   Bank  v.  Guynn  1661 

Trustees  of  v.  McConnell  20 

Ley  t>.  Cox  1157 

v.  Ley  1"38 

Leycester  v  Logan  1626 

v.  Norris  203,  152 1 

Levland  V.  Ley  land  417,  1524 

Lh'oneux    v.  Hong  Kong    &   S 

Banking  Co.  27 

Libby  v.  Hodgdon  144 

v  Norris  243 

ji   Scherman  860 

Lichfield,  Earl  of  v.  Bond      717.  763 

Lichtenauer  v.  Cheney  314,  409,  41 1 , 

2382 

Lick  v  Ray  }624 

Lidbetter  v   Long  598,  14H0 

v.  Smith  1275 

Liddall  v   Nicholson  893,  1801 

Liddell,  lie,  Liddell  v.  Liddell       168 

v.  Liddell  1726 

l,   MVickar  1231,  1235 

Lidney  &  Wigpool  Iron  Co. 

v   Bird  27,  1444,  1794 

Liebig's  Cocoa  Works    Limited, 
lie  149 


Liebig's  Extract  of  Meat  Co.  B 

Hanbury  1649 

Liebmann  v.  McGraw  418 

Liebstein  v.  Mayor  of  Newark    1661, 

1677 

Life  Association  v.  Boogher         1644 

Ligan  v.  Henderson  314 

'.i^gett  r.  Glenn  576,  634 

Liggon  r  Smith  778 

Light  v  Governor  933 

v.  Light  9,  83,  86 

Lightbourne  v   Holyday  116 

Lightburn  r.  Swift  1276 

Lightfoot  v  Bass  186 

v.  Price  1260 

Like  v  Beresford  104.  1599 

Lillard  v.  Porter  4<>3 

Lilley.  Re  1605 

v.  Allen  1775 

Li  Hie  v   Legh  1490 

v  Lillie  27,  28,  29 

LMiendahl  v.  Detwiller  334 

Lillienthal  !■   Washburn        689,843 

Lima&  H    F.  Ry   Co.,  Re  1591 

Limehouse  Works  Co.,  Re  1026 

Lincoln  »   Bassett  58,  60 

v.  Purcell  549 

v   Rut.  &  Bur  R.  R  Co.         1560, 

1561 

v.  Windsor    1234,  12&5,  1413,  1414 

v.  Wright  655,  657,  712,  921, 

922,  1001,  1590 

Bishop  of  v  Ellis  869 

Lind  v   Isle  of  Wight  Ferry  Co 

1650,  1831 

Linder  v.  Lewis  224,  517 

Lindesay  v.  Lindesay  1573 

Lindlev  v.  Cravens  288 

v.  Russell  334 

Lindsay,  Ex  parte  1069 

v.  American  M   Co.  1716 

v   Eth  ridge  1668 

v.  Gibbon  1166 

v.  Homerton  1235 

v.  Lindsay  652 

v.  Lynch       384,  408,  847,  860,  861 

ii.  Rankin  675 

v.  Tyrrell        37,  39,  75,  1474,  1483 

Petroleum  Co  v.  Hurd  850 

Lindsey  v.  1731 

v   Stevens  740 

v  Western  Mutual  Aid  Society  378 
Lindsley  v.  James  145 

v.  Personette  586 

Liney  v .  Wetherley  9 

Linford  v.  Cooke  1796 

Ling  v.  Colman  248,  253 

Lingan  v   Henderson     182,  379,  385, 
457,  532,  618,  734,  885,  933,  1005 
Lingen  v   Simpson  1829 

Lingood  v.  Croucher  297,  298 

Lingwood  r.  Stowmarket  Paper- 
Making  Co.  1639, 1672,  2308 
Link  v.  Jarvis  417 
Linley  I)  Taylor                  1428,  1528 
Linn  v.  Carson  408 
v.  Green  324 
v   Wheeler                                 1675 
Linnell  v   Battey                            1624 
Linton  v   Denham                          1677 
v.  Mayor  of  Athens                  1661 
Linwood  v   Andrews                      1069 
Linzee  v  Mixor                             1654 
Lippencott  v.  Ridgway  837 
Lippiat  1'   Holley  796 
Liupincott  v.  Shaw  Carriage  Co. 

1411 
Lippitt    v     American    Wood 

Paper  Co.  1051 

Lipscomb  v.  Palmer  1861 

Lisbon  Steam  Tramways  Co.,  Re  905 
Lishey  v   Lishey 

v.  Smith  550 

Listen  ?■   Reave  197,  325 

List's  Case  1069 

List  Pub.  Co  v  Kellel  1643 

Lister  v ,  Bell  1336 


Lister  v  Leather 

v   Lister 

v.  Meadowcroft 

V    Muudell 

v   Sherringham 

v   Thompson 

v    Wood 
Lister's  Hospital,  Re 
Litch  v   Clinch 
Litchfield  v.  Ballou 

v  Jones 
Lithgow  !>   Lyon 


Little,  Re,  Harrison  v.  Harrison 

100 

v.  Archer  584 

v   Buie  295 

v.  Cooper  548 

t<   Dusenberry  1743 

v.  Knox  1556 

v.  Merrell  1249,  1550 

v.  Parkfield  C.  Co.  1650 

v    Price  1640 

v.  Stephens  694,  830 

Littlehales  v  Gascoyne  1418 

Littlejohn  V.  Attrill  1638 

v.  Muun  733,  784 

Littler  v.  Thomson  887,  1070 

Littlewood  i».  Collins  798,  79:) 

Litton  i>   Armstead  312 

v   Litton  _     1256 

Liverpool  v  Chippendall        771,  784 

&  G.  \V   Steam  Co.  v  Pboeuix 

Ins   Co.  546 

Household    Stores     Ass'n    v. 

Smith  1613 

Marine  Credit  Co   v.  Hunter     47 

Mayor,    &c,    of    v     Chorley 

Waterworks  Co  1636 

Livesay  v.  Feamster  1675 

Livesey  v.  Harding  1265.  1696 

v.  Livesey  171,  1316,  1522 

v.  Wilson  781 

Livey  v.  Winton  402,  1551 

Livingston  v.  Kreelaud  1522 

v.  Gibbons  536,  828 

v.  Harris  563,  564,  721 

v.  Hayes  418 

v.  Hubbs      1577,  1578, 1579,  1581, 

1582,  1583 
v.  Kane  634,  815,  816 
v  Livingston              392,  547.  549. 

555,  760,  1631,  1676 
v   Lvnch  24 

v   Marshall  418 

v   Maryland  Ins.  Co  50 

v  Met  El.  Ry.  Co  1320 

v  Noe  164,  1276,  1577,  1578, 

1583,  15"<4 
v  Story  313,  547,  628,  787 
v.  Tompkins  563,  1657 
v   Van  Ingen                     1613,  1613 

Living-tone  v   Cooke  510 

Llanelly  Ry.  Co.  v.    London   & 

N   W  Ry  Co.  671 

Llangynog   Lead    Mining     Co  , 

Re  26 

Llanover  v   Homfray  868,  870 

Llewellyn  v.  Badeley  1824 

Lloyd,  Re  1041 

Re,  Allen  v   Lloyd  75,  1732 

v.  Adams      1556,  1557, 1624,  1625, 

1664 

v  Attwood  675 

v.  Brewster  379,  381,  385,  402,  408, 

424,  426,  1450 

v.  Cheetham  1053,  1730 

v  Cross  436,  437 

v.  Davies  75 

v   Dimmack  267,269 

t;  Griffith  1262 

v.  Gurdon  1651,  1665 

v.  Hicks  986 

v  Johnes  228,  229,  265,  266,  1276, 

1519,  1520,  1521 

v  .Jones  3*3 

v.  Kirkwood  1584 

v   Lauder  157,  255 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED. 

[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 

791,  1599     Lloyd  v.  Lloyd  431,  1233,  1423 

1047    1157        v   Loaring      24,  25,  236,  238,  239, 

289  245,  289,  405.  419,  597 

1133        v-  London,  Chatham,  and  Do- 

1426  ver  Ry  Co.  1650,  1654.  1657 

720        v.  Maheam  403 

2315        v.  Mason         106,  1742,  1846,  2001 

311,  1852        i>.  Mytton  183 

850,  1548        v.  Passingham         1103,  1720,  1721 

328         v    Pennie  888 

578  !      v.  Pughe  117 

1257         v.  Purves  1831 

v.  Smith  223,  267,  606,  669 

v.  Solicitors  and  General  Life 

Assurance  Co    593,  690, 756,  831 

V.  Spillet  1415 

v  Trimleston  1725 

v.  Waring  58,  65,  1512 

v.  Whitty  15li9 

v   Williams  106,  1258 

Loader  v.  Price  1528 

Loames  v.  Edge  1889 

Lock  v.  Armstrong  668 

v   Bagley  403,  405 

v   Foote  171,839 

v.  Lomas  710 

v.  vvilson  646 

Locke  v.  Bennett  551 

v.  Colman      1121,  1122,  1124,  1139 

v.  Sioux,  &c    Ky.  Co  879 

Lockett  v.  Cary  1827 

v   Lockett  722,  724,  727,  857 

v   Rumbough  236 

Lockey  v.  Lockey  641 

Lockhard  v.  Brodie  573 

Lockhart  v   Cameron  115 

v  City  of  Troy  1669,  1677 

v.  Gee  123:» 

v.  Reilly  2116 

Lockier  v  Smith  1772 

Locking  v   Parker  649,  652 

Lockley  v   Pye  1130 

Loekman  v   Reilly  214 

Lockwood  v.  Cleveland      1029,  1551, 

1576 

v   Fenton  1350 

v.  Kitteringham  1624 

v.  London   <&    North  Western 

Railway  Co  1081 

v.  Nye  633 

Loder  o    Whelpley  576 

Lodge  v    Pritchard    1232,  1250,  1419 

v.  Twell  1029 

Loeb  v.  Willis  659 

Loeustein  v.  Biernbaum  1699 

Lofland  v.  Coward  797,  1120 

Loftus  v.  Swift  1237, 1385,  1391,  1393 

Logan  v.  Coorg,  Princess  of         1731 

v.  Fairlie  201,250,  1*50 

v  Grant  497,  531 

v   Greenlaw  634 

v.  McCall  Pub.  Co.  2127 

V.  Steele  906 

v.  Troutman  1234 

v   Weinholt  1254 

Login  v  Coorg,  Princess  of  1144 

Loinsworth  v    Rowley  825 

Loker  v.  Rolle         370,  545,  547,  552 

Lomas  v.  Wright  1934 

Lomax  v.  Hide     214,  277,  278,  1245, 

1388.  1389 

Lombard  v  Morse       68,  83,  109,  405 

Inv.  Co  v  Carter  1770 

Lomerson  v.  Vroom  243 

London  v.  Att.-Gen.  12 

v.  London  1165 

v   Mitford  1)358 

v.  Nash  1660 

V.Perkins  274,341,870 

v.  Pugh  1655 

v  Richmond  207.  257 

v   Thomson  1819 

v    Wilmington  1661 

Bishop  of  v   Fytche  564 

v.  Nicholls  84,  208 

Corp.  of  v.   Liverpool,  Corp. 

of  607 


lxxvii 


London,  Corp.  of  v.  Southgate     1080 
Mayor  of  i>.  Ainsiey  563 

v.  Bolt  1665 

v.  Hedger  1656 

v.  Levy  566,  583,  584,  611,  1558 
Association  v  Londou  &  In- 
dia Docks  Joint  Committee  12 
Ast>uiaiice  t'  East  ludia  Co.  590, 
601 
&c.  R.  Co   v  Lancashire,  &c 

R.  Co.  1631 

&c.   Ry.  Co.  v   Imperial   Mer- 
cantile Credit  Association       602 
»;   Kirk  573 

Bank  v.  Hart  888-  915 

Birmingham    &   Bucks    Rail- 
way, Re  1440,  14-50 
&    Birmingham    Ry.    Co     v. 
Grand  J  unction  Canal  Co     1008, 
1070 
v.  Winter                     380,  853,  861 
&  Blackwall  Ry   Co.  v  Cross  211, 
354 
v.  Limehouse  Board  of  Works  424, 
1379,  1602,  1671 
Brewery  Co   v.  Teuueut  1080 
Brighton,    and    South    Coast 

Ry.  Co  ,  Re        1852,  1855   1856 

&  C.  B  Co.  v   Lewis  1651 

Chartered  Bank   of  Australia 

v   Lempriere  100,  187,  328, 

3s2 

and    Chatham    Ry     Co.,    Ex 

parte  1800 

C.  &.  D.  Ry   Co.  v.  Land  Fi- 
nanciers 1775 
Chatham,  and  Dover  Ry    Co. 
v  Imperial  Mercantile  Credit 
Assoc                                 596,  1671 
Chatham,    &    Dover    Ry     v 
South-Eastern  Ry.          542,  671, 
1378 
and  Colonial  Co.  v   Elworthy  807 
and    County    Assurance   Co., 

Re  1327 

and   County   Banking  Co.   v. 

Bray  87 

&  County  B.  Co.  v.  Dover       1264 
Flour  Co  ,  Re  1070 

Gas  Light  Co  )'.  Spottiswoode    269 
Joint    Stock    Bank    i>    Mayor 

of  London  391 

&  Lancashire  Paper  Mills  Co  , 

Re  942 

Monetary     Advance     Co.     v. 

Bean  528 

Monetary    Advance    and    As- 
surance Co  v  Brown  998 
&  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Ex  parte    1794 
t;    Evans                                       1632 
and    North-Western    Railway 

v.  Lancaster,  Corp.  of  1774 

&  P.  Bank  v.  Bogle  187,  189 

&  Prov   Ins.  Co.  v  Seymour     664 
Road  Car  Co  v.  Kellv  39 

Steam  Dyeing  Co.  v.  Digby     1008, 
1395 
&  S.  W.  Ry.  Co  Ex  parte      1610 
&  S.  W.  Bank  v   Facey  1735 

Syndicate  v   Lord  1781 

v   Love  1777 

Tilbury,    &    S.    Ry.    Co.    v- 

Kirk  720 

Waterworks  Co  ,  Ex  parte      1610 

&  Y    Bank  v    Pritt  1655 

Londonderry,  Lady,  v   Baker      5!»8, 

659,  661 

t'    Bramwell  821 

Londonderry     and     Enniskillen 

Ry.  Co  t»   Leishman  554 

Lonergan  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R  Co.  357 
Long,  Re  161 1 

vBilke  1182,1133 

v.  Bowring  --1' 

v.  Bullard  H20 

v.  Burton  403,  1552 

t'   Crossley  406,  1534 


lxxviii 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging] 


Long  v.  Dickinson  190 

v  Dupuy  270 

r  Grauberry         1542,1577,1578, 

1579 

r    Ilitclicock  11"1 

r.  Jarratt  1274 

ii    Kee  1051 

v   Long  1031, 12.54,  1255.  1276 

V   McGregor  385 

v.  Majestre  322,  323.324 

v.  Smith  1625 

v.  Stone  1514 

i>.  Storie       202,  204,  632,  637.  796, 

797,  811 

v   Tampico,  The  141 

o.  Tardy  30 

v-  Totteuham  30 

v   Welter  1282 

v.  White  108,  847 

n    Yonge  243 

Dock  Co  v.  Bentley  1618 

Longbottoui  v.  Pearee  96 

Longboume  v.  Fisher  1169 

LougJeudale     Cotton    Spinning 

Co.,  Re  798 

Long.ellow  v    Longfellow  993 

Longinotto  v   Morss  1404 

Longman  v    Winchester     1645,  1646 
Longmire  v   Fain  1320 

Lougwood     Valley     R      Co     v 

Baker  1662 

Longworth  v  Bellamy    182,  445,  452 

v   Flagg  995 

v.  Hunt  645 

v  Taylor  280,406,422,539 

Lonsdale  v.  Moies  1296 

Earl  of  v.  Wordsworth  1226 

Lord  v.  Littledale  297 

Lookout  Bank  v.  Susong  417 

Loonies  v  Stotherd    1423, 1424, 1425 

Loomis  »   Fay  840 

Lopez,  Ex  parte  157 

v   Deacon  1826 

Lord,  Re  1225,  1859 

v.  Bigelow  24 

v.  Colvin     885,  891,  896.  919,  977, 

1144,  1469,  1470,  1845,  2130 

v  Copper  Miners,  Gov.  &  Co. 

ot  242.  243 

v.  Kellett  306,  533 

v.  Lord  1214,  1225 

v   Purchas  1722 

v  Thornton  354 

v.  Underdunck  230,  287 

v   Wardle  1126,  1138 

v   Wormleighton  1616,  1843 

Lorentz  v.  Lorentz  1580 

Lorenz  v.  Jacobs  1157 

Lorillard  ;•  Coster  287,  1001 

Lorimer  p.  Lorimer  805,  811 

Loring  v.  Marsh  634 

v.  Salisbury  Mills  197 

v.  Steinman  850 

v.  Thomdike  1560,  2334 

Lorton  V    Kingston  429 

v   Seaman  1590 

Lorwall  v.  Gridley  405 

Lorway  v.  Lousada  629 

Los  Angeles  ?\  Signoret  367 

Loscombe  V    Russell  332 

Loskey  v  Reid  1355 

Lothbury  v    Brown  1142 

Lothrop  c   Commercial  Bank  24 

Lottery  Co.  v   Clark  1378 

Lottinier  r   Lord  1715 

Lou  bier  v  Cross  1582 

Loud  v  Holden  2220 

v   Sargent  604 

Louis  v   Meek  302 

Louisiana  National  Bank  V  New 

Orleans  1661 

State  Lottery  Co.  v  Clark        1561 

Savings  Bank  Co  ,  Re  1765 

Louisville,  N.  O    &c.  R.  Co  v 

R.  an  1029 

Louisville  and  R   R  Co  v   Stet- 
son 314,  374 


Louisville,  Trustees  of  v.  Gray    1680 

Louisville  Underwriters  v.  Pence  779 

Loundes  v.  Miller  1461 

Louusbun  V    Purdy  l!)61 

Lousada  v.  Tempter      408,  548,  1559 

Louvall  v   Gridley  216 

Louvallev   Menard  1158 

Love  v.  Allison  1778 

v   Baker  1626 

v.  Blewit       1576,  1577,  1578,  1579 

v   Braxton  843,  847,  1147 

v.  J  acorn  b  254 

v   Keowne  334 

v  Morrill  1164 

v.  White  641 

Lovedeu  v    Milford  937 

Luvejoy  i'   Chapman  1381 

v.  Irelan  246,  256 

Lovelaud  (,'   Garner  840 

Lovell  v    Andrew  242 

v.  Cragin  1548 

v.  Farrington   191.  327.  361,  365 

v.  Galloway     1458,  1556,  1557, 

1559,  1614,  1625,  1672.  2047, 

2126 

e.  Hicks  1486,  1487 

Lovering  v   King  283 

Loves;  v  Smith  256,  405 

Lovett,  Re,  Ambler  v.  Lindsay    201, 

227, 319 

v.  Longmire  o'.>0 

v  Lovett  106,  107,  1112, 

1114 

r  Steam  Saw  Mill  Ass  845 

Loving  v  Marsh  633 

Lowr    Bouverie  26,1398 

v.  Carter  1412,  1419 

v   Innes  1638,  1672 

t-   Mills  1029,  1031 

v.  Mussey  633,  659,  800,  994 

V.  Rou  Hedge  46,  1643 

ti    Ward  46,  1646 

Lowden  v.  Blakey  573 

Lowdon  v  Hierons  1129 

Lowe  v. 1565 

v.  Baker  1626 

v.  Blake  507 

v  Burke  586 

v  Farlie  250 

v   Firkins  948  1552 

v.  Fox  8 1 

v.  Holme  1407 

v  .lolliffe  HOI 

v  Lowe  987,  1752 

v-  Lucey  1669 

v  Morgan  211,212 

v    Peacock  633,  1557 

v   Richardson  1565 

v  Thompson  354 

v   Travnor  1147 

v   Watson  266.  1526 

v   Williams         349,352,593,690, 

727,  756,  765 

Lowell  v.  Leland  284 

Lowenbein  v    Fuldner  1657 

Lowenstein  )'■  Biernbaum  1381 

V   Glidewell  1548,  1553 

Lowery  v   Craig  123 

Lowes  v   Lowes  1540 

Lowndes,  Re  68 

v.  Bettle  1632,  1633,  1682 

v.  Chisolm  1242 

v.  Collens  1257 

v   Cornford  1561 

v.  Garnett  and  Mo=eley   Gold 

Mining  Co.       590,  610,  617,  618, 


Lowson  v   Copeland 
Lowten  v   Colchester 

Lowther  v.  Andover 

v  Carlton 

t'.  Heaver 
Loy  i'   Duckett 
Loyd  v.  Cardy 

v.  Freshfield 

v   Hicks 

v   Malone 

v  Mansell 

v.  Spillet 

»    Wuittey 
Lozear  v  Shields 
Lozier  v  Van  Saun 
Lubiere  v-  Genou 

Lucas  ?•   Arnold 
i .  Bank  of  Darien 


v.  Norton 

v    Robertson 

v  Taylor 
Lownds  v   Williams 
Lowry  v   Armstrong 

v  Jackson 

v.  Morrison 

V   Tew 

v.  Williams 
Lows,  Ex  parte 


1633 

35 

59,225 

1207 

845 

354 

1542 

678 

1463 

970,  979 


v.  Bank  of  Georgia 

v  Calcraft 

v.  Commerford 

v.  Dixon 

v.  Evans 

v.  Harris 

v  Hickman 

v.  Holder 

v.  King 

v.  Lucas 

v.  Moore 

v   Morse 

v.  Oliver 


1418 

477, 1053, 

1528 

999 

675 

417,  1660 

224,  1795 

1700,  1704.  1706 

576 

1029 

164. 174,  1580 

172,  173,  1584 

1415 

1266 

1392,  146.5 

1560,  1564 

868,871,  1189, 

1553 

264 

149,  236,  286, 

844 

24 

1166,  1167 

1660 

365 

568 

1053,  1734 

1698, 1699,  1700 

637 

1151 

169 

1286 

1381 

360 


Peacock     1440,  1449,  1696,  1845 

v  Rickerich  128 

v   Seale  227 

v.  Siggers  634 

?>.  Temple  1310,  1449 

v   Williams  881 

Bank  v.  King  1163 

Luce  v.  Graham  409.  422 

Lucena  v   Barnewall  2205 

Luckett  v.  White  346,  347 

Lucknow  v.  Brown  1358 

Lucton  Free  School  v   Smith         4U5 

Luddy's  Trustee  v.  Peard  _60 

Ludgater  v   Cliannell  1757 

Ludlow  v.  Greenhouse       1461,  1853, 

1854,  1856 

1002,  1577 

1042,  1056 

62 

550,  551 

77 

382,  1399 

329 

407 


v.  Kidd 

v.  Lansing 

v  Ramsey 

v.  Simond 
Ludolph  v  Saxby 
Luff  v.  Lord 
Lufkin  v  Galveston 
Luft  v.  Gossrau 
Luke  v 
Co 
Luker  v   Dennis 
Lull  v.  Clark 
Lumb  17.  Beaumont 

V.  Milnes 
Lumley  v.  Desborough 

v   Hughes 

v.  Timms 

v.  Wagner 
Lumsden  v.  Fraser 
Lun  v  Johnson 
Lund  v  Blanchard 


outh  Kensington  Hotel 

212,  223 

1596,  1654 

1320 

354, 1817 

122 


28 

230 

1654, 1656,  1663 

287,  289,  569 

837 

25,  268,  288, 

289,  336,  599 

V.  Skanes  Enskilda  Bank         1548 

Lunt  v.  Stephens  ^     1516 

Lupton  v   Lupton  76,2012 

v.  Stephenson  1732 

v.  White  1231,  1241 

Lury  v.  Pearson  1861,  1862 

Lush,  Re  122 

Lush's  Trust,  Re  92 

Lushington  v.  Boldero       1630,  1634 

v.  Sewell  162,  177 

Lusk  v.  Thatcher  559 

Luthwich  V   Attorney-General      133 

Lutterel's  Case  67,  1630 

Lutwych  v   Winford  1275 

Lux  t\  Haggin  1639 


Luxton  v .  Stephens  1383 

Luyties  v    Holleuder  164S 

Lyall  v.  Fluker  t>5l 

Lydall  V.  Martinson  292,  9.6 

Lyddon  v   Ellison  1795 

Lyde  v.  Eastern  Bengal  Ry.  Co.    i43 

Lyell  v.  Kennedy     59,  .354.  408,  571, 

57a,  5/y,  bl7,  1556 

Lygon  v.  Coventry,  Lord  1360 

Lyle  v.  Bradford  280,  390 

v.  Ell  wood  892 

v.  Scarth  1393 

v   Yarborough,  Earl  of  99U 

Lyles  v.  Hatton  1624 

v.  Lyles  1463 

Lyman  v.  Bonney  26,  144 

Lynch  to  Chance  1440 

v  Hartford  Fire  Ins.  Co.  633,  815 

v.  Johnson  342 

v.  Lecesne  785,  2129 

v.  Macdonald  1071 

v.  Morse  881 

v.  St.  John  1461 

v.  Willard  392,  550 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 

Lynchburg  Iron  Co  v.  Tayloe       197 

Lvnde  v   Columbus  &c   Ry.  Co. 

2101 
v.  Eastern  Bengal  Ry.  Co.         1620 

Lyndon  National  Bank  v.  Wells 

River  Manuf  Co.  298 

Lyndsay  v.  Lynch  995 

Lyne  v.  Lockwood  87!) 

v.  Lyne  1163,  1366,  1370 

v.  Pennell  1610,  1571 

v.  Willis  167 

Lynn  v.  Beaver  1405,  1426.  1427 

v   Bradley  119,  122 

v   Buck  1183 

Lyon  v   Baker  1414 

v.  Clark  1254 

v.  Colville  642 

v.  Oreenbay  Ry.  Co.  186 

v.  Home  852,  1397 

v.  Hunt  846 

v.  McKenna  1422 

v.  McLaughlin  1637 

v.  Mercer  176 

v.  Park  1542 


Ixxix 


Lyon  v  Perin  &  Gaff  Manuf.  Co.  986 
v.  Powell  2b3 

v  Saudford  194,  277 

v.  Tallmadge       401,  417,  659,  660, 
828,  852,  1019 
v .  Tevis  296,  2U8 

v.  Tweddell  324,  579,  720 

Lyons,  lie  2,  1346 

v.  Bienkin  70,  1349 

v.  Brooks  713 

v.  McCurdy  334 

v.  Piper  __     1508 

v.  Read  732,  783 

v   Van  Riper  1546 

Lys  v.  Lee  1512, 1530,  1540 

v.  Lys  1157 

Lysagiit  v.  Clark  144 

v.  Edwards  286 

Lyse  v.  Kingdon  1411,  1417 

Lyster  v.  Stickuey  790,1517 

Lyttou  v.  Great  Northern  Rail- 
way Co.  1660 
v.  Lytton                                    1580 
v.  Steward              1636,  1669,  1677 


M. 


M.,  Re 

Maber  v .  Hobbs 

v   Maber 
Maberly  v.  Turton 
Maberry  v.  Neely 
Mabry  v.  Churchwell 


508 
883 
646 
1358 
186 
790,  1286 


McCampbell  v  Brown 

v.  Henderson 
M'Campbell  v.  Gill 
MeCatuy  v.  Key 
M'Canu  v.  Beere 


217 

1542 

837,  846 

283 
1825 


McAllister  v.  Bishop  of  Roches- 
ter 406 

v.  Clopton  837,  846 

M'AUister  v.  M'Allister  319 

v.  Olmstead  1350 

McAlpin  v.  Jones  1751 

M'Andrew  v.  Bassett         1380,  1394, 
1395,  1649 
M'Anslan  v.  Green  1233 

Macarmick  v.  Buller  98 

M' Arthur  V-  Dudgeon  1225 

v  Kelly  1670 

McArthur  v.  Matthewson  1638 


v.  Scott 

v.  Williamson 
Macartney  v.  Garbutt 

v.  Graham 
Macarty  v.  Gibson 
Macaulay  v.  Phillips 


200,  216 

2542, 1507 

142 

207,  1394 

1755 

101,  104, 

107 

v.  Shackell  565,  566,  1556 

Macauley  v  Collier  1597 

v.  White  Sewing  Machine  Co.  629, 

1507 

McBean  v.  Chandler  1661 

Macbeath  V.  Ellis  1132 

Macbeth  v.  Haldeman  133 

McBride  v.  Commissioners  1628 

v.  Gwynn  1276,  1302 

v.  Lindsay  273 

v.  Mclntyre  195 

M' Bride  v.  .Malcomson  1163 

M'Broom  v.  Somerville  811 

Macbryde  v  Eykyn  109 

McBurney  v.  Carson  149 

McCabe  v   Bank  of  Ireland  39 

v.  Bellowes  214,  216, 334, 

347 

1505 

1517 

121,  191 

1113, 1578 


Maccabe  v.  Hussey 

McCaffrey  v.  Benson 

McCaleb  v.  Crichfleld 

McCall  v.  Graham 
v.  Harrison 
v.  McCall  1001 

v.  McCurdy  1576 

v.  Yard  259,  292 

Maccallum  v.  Turton  563,  564 

M'Calmont  v.  Rankin  151,  152,  382, 
1490 

M'Camber  v.  Oilman  1242,  1245 


McCann  v.  Borradaile     39,  111,  112 

v   South  Nashville  Street   R. 

Co.  1663 

McCarren  v.  Coosan  790 

McCarron  v.  Cassidy  1243,  1244 

McOarcer's  Estate,  Re  1418 

McCarthy,  Re  576 

M'Carthy  v.  Goold  1053,  1730 

McCartin  v.  Trephagen  249 

McCartney  v,  Calhoun  341 

v   Cassidy  1675 

McCarty  v  Chalfant  1302 

McCasker  v.  Brady  1538 

v  Golden  114 

McCauley  v.  Kellogg  1661 

v.  Sears  1561 

v.  Six  216,  15ii8 

McClanahan  v.  Davis  547 

v.  Henderson  1158 

v.  Ware  1677 

v.  West  630 

McClane  v.  Shepherd  669,  830 

McCla^key  v.  Barr  759 

t;  O'Brien  322,127:* 

McClean,  Re  74 

McClellan  v.  McClellan  73 

McClenny  v.  Ward  517 

Macclesfield,  Earl  of  v.  Blake      1292 

v.  Bradley  1134,  1138 

McCloskey  v.  Barr  604,  608 

McClungt).  Sueed  560 

v.  Steen  790 

McClure  v.  Farthing  68 

v   Harris  989 

M'Comb  v.  Armstrong  588 

v.  Wright  989, 1215,  2261 

McComb  v.  Chicago,    St    Louis 

&c.  R.  Co.  145 

v.  Lobdell  860 

v.  Spangler  339 

McConihay  v.  Wright  313 

McConnaughty  v   Pennoyer  30.3 

McConnel  v.  Hodson  1550 

v.  Holobush  1243,  1244,  1246 

v.  Smith  1017,  1541, 

1551 

M'Connell  v.  Hector  60 

v.  M'Connell     190,  314,  384,  1382, 

1407 

M'Connico  v.  Curzen  1258 

McConomy  v.  Reed  1299 


McConville  v.  Gilmour  149 

McCorkle  v.  Breni  1677 

McCormack  v.  James  1168,  2394 

McCormick  v.  Chamberlin     700,  760 

v.  Garnett  95,  864 

v.  Grogan  1503 

v.  Hilbrook  186 

McCormick  Harvesting  M    Co. 

v.  Schneider  536 

M'Corquodale  v.  Bell  573 

M'Coun  v.  Delauy  9y4 

McCoy  v.  Allen  322,  991 

v.  Boley  212,  686 

v.  Broderick  37 

v.  Nelson  314 

v.  Rhodes  1229 

McCrackan  0   Valentine  1180,  1188 

McOracken  v    Finley  1578,  lo79 

McCrady  v.  Davie  780 

v.  Jones  782,  1299 

McCray  v.  Lowry  1029 

McOrea  v.  New  York  El.  R.  Co.     208 

M'Crea  v.  Purmort  373 

M'Cready  v.  Thomson  1638 

McCredie  v.  Senior  1462,  1683 

M'Creery  v.  AUender  46 

McCreery  v.  Cobb  145,  1556 

McCreight  v.  Foster  197,  279 

Maccubbin  v   Matthews  918 

McCulla  v.  Beadleston  360,  547 

McCullen  v.  Metropolitan  Life 

Ins   Co.  1561 

M'Cullochs,  He  1347,  1352 

M'Cullnck  v.  Cotbatch  1286 

v.  Dawes  643 

v.  Gregory  1284 

McCullough  t)   Barr  843 

v.  Merchants'  Loan  and  Tr 

Co.  1733 

MeCully  v.  Peel  843 

Mr  Daniel  0   James  1579 

r.  Marvgold  1147 

McDanieis  V.  Cutler  1841 

v   Harbour  1298 

M'Daniells  v.  Barnum  386,  844 

McDermot  v    Blois  68  S 

McDermott  v.  French  178 

v .  Kealy  1023,  1028 

v.  Thompson  162 

M'Dermutt  v.  Strong  236 

Macdonald  v.  Macfarlane  1525 

v.  Shepard  1381 

McDonald  v.  Asay  1517 

v   Burke  1440 

v.  Crockett  550 

v.  Des  Moines  Valley  R.  Co.       991 


lxxx 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 


McDonald  v.  M'Cleod  844 

v.  M  Donald  68,844 

v.  Mc.Mahon  1507 

v.  Mobile  Life  Ins.  Co.       526,  531, 

li)03 

v.  Murphee  1661 

v  Rehrer  630 

v.  S.ilcui  Capital  F.  M.  Co.         605 

v.  Unaka  Timber  Co.  1381 

v.  Weir  68 

v.  Whitney  1580 

v.  Willis  892 

v.  Yungbluth  1551 

M'Donnel  v.  Evans  1102 

McDonnell  v   Eaton        109,  216,  334 

v.  Mc.Mahon  1385 

MacDouough  v.  Gaynor     1699.  1700, 

1703,  1704,"  1706,  1708,  1709. 

1712,  1713 

v.  O'Flaherty  154 

Macdougal  v    Purrie:  782 

McDougaid  v  Dougherty      295,  406, 

424,  1076,  1182,  1298,  1321 

v.  Gardiner  26,  242 

v    U'illiford  401,  418 

Macdougall  v.  Gardner  26,  242 

w.  Jersey  Imperial  Hotel  Co       243 

McDowell's  Appeal  1381 

Mc Dowel,  v.  Bank  of  W.  &  B.      1073 

v.  Heath  560 

v.  McDowell  1621 

v.  Morrell  1580 

v.  Perrine  1120,  1580 

M'Dowl  v.  Charles         113,  118,  560, 

721 

McDufl  v.  Beauchamp  1512 

M'Elhattan  V   Howell  91 

McElrath  v   Pittsburgh,  &c.  R. 

Co.  1627 

McElroy  v.  Ludlum  842 

v.  Swope  1320 

McElwain  v  Willis        288,  329,  402, 

408,  419,  558,  1535 

M'Elwee  v.  Sutton         392, 393,  1457 

M'Evers  v.  Lawrence  1750 

McEvoy  v.  Leonard  334 

McEwan  v.  Crombie  1411 

McEwen  v.  Broadhead  613,  636, 

637,  695,  697 

v.  Butts  1286 

».  Zimmer  149 

Macey  v  Childress         365,  561,  633, 

635,  637,  1548,  1615 

v.  Metropolitan  Board  of  Works 

1650 

McFadden  8   Schill  559 

McFarlan  v.  Rolt  578,  1834 

McFarlai.d,  Re  1411 

v.  McDowell  1676.  1677 

Marfarlane,  Re  1361 

M'Farlane,  Re  86 

M'Gachen  v.  Dew  268 

McGahee  v.  Gold  1625 

M'Gahee  v.  Sneed  678 

McGan  v.  O'Neil  1071 

M'Gnrel  v.  Moon  485,  716 

M'G.irrah  v.  Prather  1563 

McGavock  v.  Bell  164,  1293 

v.  Elliott  526 

M'Gee  v.  Davie  284 

v.  McGee  1706,  1707,  1711 

u.  Smith  1004,  1631,  1675 

McGehee  v.  Lehman  1031 

v.  Mott  974 

v.  Polk  1707,  1708, 1709 

McGillin  v.  Claflin  536 

M'Gilldowney  v-  Pemberton  109 

McGillvray  v.  Moser  1777 

McGinnis  v.  Erie  County  560 

McGlaughlin  v  O'Rourke  1550 

McGlothlin  v.  Hemery  378 

McGoldrick  r.  McGoldrick  213 

M'Gowan  v.  Hall  784 

v.  .'ones  1076 

McGowan  v.  Middleton  1548 

McGowen  v.  Young         838,  844,  845 

McGown  v.  Sandfori  1284 


McGown  v.  Yerks 

1532 

1533 

v.  Yorks 

1:4,  215 

McGrath,  Re 

68,  108 

M'Gregor,  Ex  parte 

1271 

v.  Bainbrigge 

1122 

v.  Comstock 

1845 

v.  McGregor 

227 

1550 

v.  Shaw 

29 

v.  Topnam   1021,1112, 

1116, 

1124, 

1137,  1139, 

1147, 

1469 

Macgregor  v.  Cunningham 

1676 

MacGregor  v.  East  India  Co. 

622, 

640 

1559 

McGuffey  v.  McCain 

334 

Mcduffie  i'.  Planters'  Bank 

840 

McGuire  v.  Circuit  Judge 

1548 

)'.  Wright 

1^99 

McHan  );.  Ordway 

324 

M'Hardy  v.  Hitchcock 

800, 

1780, 
1829 

Macheca  v   Panesi 

1320 

MacHenry  v   Daviet 

113,  li 

Mc  Henry,  Re 

157 

1490 

v.  Lewis                      24c 

,633 

1628 

i .  Moore 

1317 

v.  New  York,  P.  &  0.  R.  Co.  26 
Macher  v.  Foundling  Hospital  1656 
Machinists'   National  Bank   v. 

Field  378 

McHugh  v.  Astrophe  32 

I  Mcllvoy  v  Alsop  .  163,  538 

Mcintosh  v.  Alexander  346 

v.  Great  Western  Ry.  Co.  145, 

414  724,  842.  871.  933,  9:35, 

936,938,  939.  1257,  1300. 

1369,  1470,  1822,  1833 

v  Ogilvie  1615,  1703 

v.  Stewart  1068 

Macintosh  v.  Townsend  1475 

Mclntvre  v.  Connell     267,  599,  1038 

v.  McDonald  1381 

v.  Maucius  564,  1557 

v.  Storey  1661 

v.  Thomson  2333 

v.  Union  College,  Trustees  of   145, 

349,  718,  729,  759,  764 


v.  Wright 

360 

Mclver  v.  Clarke 

385 

M'lver  v.  Wattles 

630 

Mack  v.  Spencer 

1642 

Mackall  v.  Casilear 

378 

v.  Mackall 

1580 

v.  Richards 

1539,  1676 

v.  West 

334 

Mackay  v.  Dick 

5H1 

McKay  v  Broad 

230 

v.  McKay 

411,  779,  782 

v .  Wakefield 

221 

M'Kay  v.  Smith 

314 

M'Kenire  v.  Fraser 

873,  875 

M'Kenna  v.  Everett 

183,  9&5,  936, 

937 

v.  George 

270 

v   Everitt 

2129,  21H7 

Mackenzie  v.  Childers 

1654 

v.  Coulson 

1966 

v   Flannery 

1551 

v.  Fox 

334 

v.  Mackenzie  893,  1047,  1842 

v.  Powis,  Marquis  of         474,  1057 
v.  Taylor  1426 

McKenzie  ?'."  Ward  well  1845 

Mackerell  v    Fisher  421 

Mackett  v.  Heme  Bay  Commis- 
sioners 1070 
M'Keverakin  v.  Cort              177,  476 
McKewan  v.  Sanderson        702,  1398 
Mackey  v.  Bell                      994,  1575 
Mackie  t>   Cairnes                         1424 
o.  Darling  1771 
McKillop  r.  Taylor                       1686 
McKim  v.  Odoin    145,  418,  458,  477, 
497.  1067 
v.  Thompson     778,  782,  841,  1460. 
1462, 1770,  1771 
v.  Voorhes                                 1627 
McKinley  v.  Irvine  247 


McKinney  v   Kuhn  1561 

v   Pierce  1248,  1300 

M'Kinnie  v.  Rutherford  199 

McKiunon  v.  McDonald  1425 

o.  Wolfenden  1461 

Mackintosh,  Ex  parte  39 

v.  Flint  &  P.  M   R.  Co.  1517 

MeKinzie  v.  Mathews  1081 

McKleroy  v  Tulane  385 

Macklin  v   Richardson  1681 

McKnight  v.  Walsh  1358,  1369 

McKomb  v.  Kankey  1061,  1275 

McKusick  v.  Seymour  1051 

Mackworth  v.  Briggs  1201 

v.  Marshall  158 

v.  Penrose  868 

v.  Thomas  1254 

McLachlan  v.  Lord  890 

McLane  v.  Manning  325 

McLaren,  Ex  parte  157 

M'Laren  v.  Charrier  891 

v.  Steapp  584 

Maclaren  v.  Stainton  800,  1596, 

1615,  1627,  1664 

Maclary  v.  Reznor  1675 

McLaughlin,  Re  149,  1596 

M'Laughlin  v.  Daniel  361 

r.  Gilmore  576 

McLaurin  r.  Wilson  933 

Maclean  v.  Dawson       201,  203,  449, 

452,  453,  536 

v.  Jones  579,  1829 

McLean  v.  Fleming  1648,  1663 

v.  Lafayette  Bank  334 

v.  McKay  1654 

v.  Presley  284 

McLear  v.  Hunsicker  864, 1250 

M'  Lellan  v.  Crofton  641 

v.  Osborne  339,  406 

McLennan  v.  Johnson  243 

r.  Kansas  City  &c   R.  Co.  894 

M'Leod  v.  Annesley       218,  220,  226, 

280 

v  Lyttleton  403 

v.  Phelps  1741 

Macleod  v.  Buchanan  1696 

MLin  v.  M'Namara      399,  857,  971, 

992,  1599 

?•.  Robinson  1623 

McLure  v.  Colclough  784 

McMahon  v   Burchell   327, 855,  856, 

984,  1003.  1929 

v  Rawlings  318 

v.  Rooney  324.  517 

v.  Sisson  807 

McMaken  v.  McMaken  233,  287 

McMann  v.  Westcott  418 

McManus  v.  Cooke  365,  847 

M'Mechen  v.  Story  413 

Mc.Michael  v.  Brennan  779 

McMicken  v.  Perin     1019,  1175,  1302 

McMillan  B   Baxley  559 

v  Lauer  1638 

v.  N.   Y.   Waterproof  Paper 

Co.  1961 

V.  Otis  860 

v.  Richards  652 

M'Millan  v.  Eldridge  1463 

McMillin  v.  St.  Louis  &  M.  V. 

T.Co.  314 

McMinn  )'   Phipps  1291 

McMinnville,  Sue.  R.  Co.  If.  Hug- 
gins  1613,  1662 
McMish  v.  Richardson  547 
M'Morris  v.  Elliot  728 
Mc  Mullen  v.  Richie              664,  1553 
Mc.Murray  v.  Van  Gilder                 303 
Macnab  v.  Mensal                            490 
Macnaghten  v,  Boehm                  1470 
McNair  v.  Pope                             1734 
t'.  Toler  52 
McNairy  v.  Eastland                      378 
v.  Mayor  of  Nashville                 1491 
M'Namara  v.  Arthur                      995 
v.  Dwyer       254,  1704,  1707,  1709 
1713 
v    Irwin                                     1668 


Macnamara  v.  Sweetman  361 

M'Naughtan  v.  Hasker         795, 1380 

M'Naughten's  Case  lloO 

McNaugntou  v.  Osgood  1110 

McNeil  v.  OaU  1258,  1391,  1392 

V.  Garratt  1673,  1686 

v.  Magee  569,  847 

M'Neill  v.  Cahill  994 

v.  Masterson  216 

Macnet  v.  Macnet  1350 

M'.Vew  v.  Toby  329 

McNitt  v.  Logan  675 

McNultat)   Lockridge  1743 

MePhee  v.  Veal  1663 

McPherson  v.  Cox  563,  1845 

v.  Horsel  444 

v.  Israel  1234 

v.  Rathbone  907 

v.  Rockwell  1491 

v.  Watt  852,  1841 

McPike  v.  Pen  1624 

v.  Wells  149,  191 

M'Queen  v.  Farquhar  675,  1402. 

1403 

MoQuigan  v.  Delaware  L.  &  W. 

R.  Co.  1556 

Maequire  v.  O'Reilly  328 

McRae,  Re  254,  324,  1342 

v.  London,    Brighton,   and 

South  Coast  Ry.  Co,     1080,1081 

Macrae,  Re,  Foster  v.  Davis         1722 

v.  KUerton  1390 

v.  Smith  800,  1615 

Mac  Kite  v.  Holdsworth  1643 

v.  McRea  251 

v.  Wood  1125 

McRea,  Re,  Norden  v.  McRea       237 

v  Atlantic,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.        1619 

v  David  779,  781 

McReightti.  Aitken  83 

Macreth  v.  Nicholson     443,  453,  536 

McSween  v.  McCown  1168 

Mactier  v.  Osborn  565 

McTighe  v.  Dean  1780 

McVeagh,  Re,  McVeagh  v.  Cro- 

all  1177,  1209,  1474,  1825 

McVeigh  v  United  States  62 

McVey  v.  Rrendel  1648 

M'Vicar  v.  Wolcott  1463 

McWhirtertf.  Halsted  1561 

McWhorter  v.  McMahan  860 

v.  Standifer  986 

Mc  Williams  v.  Morgan  1666 

MeWorterv   Benson  1233 

Mad    Plank  Road  Co.  v.  Wat. 

Plank  Road  Co  611 

Maddeford  v.  Austwick  1231 

Maddisoa  i>.  Alderson  655,  847 

v   Chapman  1428 

V.  Pye  1430 

Maddox  v   Apperson  1584 

v  Maddox  675 

Madeley  v.  White  1381 

Maden  v.  Catanach  887 

v.  Veevers  678 

Maderias  v   Cutlett  194 

Madgwick  v.  Wimble  1729 

Madison  Avenue  Baptist  Church 

v.  Oliver  Street  Baptist  Church 

1239 

Madison  University  v.  White       1073 

Madox  v-  Jackson  203,  267,  271, 

282 

Madrazzo,  Ex  parte  130 

Magan  v.  Magan  398,  496,  1589 

Magarity  v.  Shipman  1320,  1381 

Magbee  V.  Kennedy  8!K) 

Magdalen  College  v   Athill  342 

v.  Sibthorp  292 

Magee  p.  Magee  630 

Magennis  v.  Parkhurst  1686 

Maggi.  Re  1257 

He,  Winehouse  v.  Winehouse  1034 

Magic  Ruffle  Co.    v.  Elm  City 

Co.  570,  1320 

Magill,  lie  1069 

v.  Kauffman  1118 

VOL.  I. f 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 

[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 

Magill  v.  Mercantile  Trust  Co.       790 

Maguay  p.  Davidson  203 

v.  Knight  1133 

v.  Mines  Royal  Co.  1614,  H25 

Magnus  v.  National  Bank    05y,  1685 

Magnusson  v.  Charleson  1168 

Magrane  v.  Archbold  1658 

Magrath  v.  Muskerry,  Lord         1658 

Maguire  v.  Allen  1718 

v.  Maddiu  14ti6 

v.  Maguire  186 

Mahalm  v.  M'Cullagh  Life  Ass. 

Co.  1440 

Mahan  v.  Brown  1638 

v   Cavender  10 Tl 

Mahaney  v.  Lozier  734,  737 

Mahaska  County  State  Bank  v 

Christ  402, 1551 

Mahler  v.  Schmidt  334 

Mahuke  v.  Neale  1073 

Mahon,  Re  864 

v.  Crothers  1719 

Mahoney  v.  Frasi  1135,  1139 

Mahony  v.  Widows'  Assurance 

Fund  573 

Mahurin  v.  Bickford  1255 

Mail  Co.  v.  Flanders  1459 

Main  v.  Main  1029 

Maine  Wharf  v.  Custom-house 

Wharf  1639 

Mainland  v.  Upjohn  260 

Mai  u  price  v.  Pearson  53 

Mair  v.  Himalaya  Tea  Co.  1667 

Maitland  v.  Backhouse      1651,  1672 

v.  Rodger  492,  525 

v.  Wilson  677 

Major  v.  Aruott  359,  724 

v.  Auckland  59 

v.  Fickiin  737 

6.  Major  1014,  1411,  1600 

Makepeace  v.  Haythorne      197,  301, 

302,  305 

v   Rogers  551 

v.  Romieux  354,  785 

Makepeice  v.  Dillon  469 

Makings  v.  Makings  1422 

Malan  v.  Young  984 

Malcolm  v.  Andrews  1698 

v.  Montgomery  1734 

v  O'Caliaghan  1745,  1747 

v.  Scott  855,  856, 1491 

Maiden  v.  Fyson  1403 

Malev  v.  Shattuck  50 

Mali  Ivo,  The  633 

Malin  v.  Malin  86,  193,  220,  294 

v.  Tavlor  1127 

Mating  'v.  Hill  1403 

Matins  v.  Greenway  308,  1527, 

15'J9 

v.  Price  1137,  1148,  1440 

Mallabar  v.  Mallabar  1419 

Mai  lack  v.  Galton  167,  1S7 

Mallett  v  Dexter  1997 

Mallory  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Fox         1434, 

2396 

Mallow  v.  Hinde      149,  151,  216,  290 

v.  Kelley  852 

Malmesbury  Ry.  Co.  v.  Budd      671, 

1862 

Malone  v.  Malone  1119 

v,  Morris  951 

Maloney  v.  Dewey  1620 

Malony,  Re  224 

v.  Kernan  612 

v.  Kourke  212 

Malpas  v.  Ackland  249 

Malthis  v.  Town  of  Cameron        1661 

Man  v.  Rickets  58,  65.  159.398.  873, 

876,  985,  1075,  1275,  1283, 

1383,  1407,  1502,  1503,  1504, 

1512 

Manatt  v   Starr  R43 

Manaudes  »   Mann  560 

Manbv,  lie  307,  809 

v.  Bewicke     28,  358,  579,  866,  867, 

889,1003,1004   1822, 

1823,  1831 


lxxxi 


Manby  v.  Manby 

643 

v.  Owen 

1681 

v.  Robinson 

1562,  1567 

Manchester  v.  Day 

1677 

v.  Dey 

1669 

v   Mathewson 

1546 

Manchester  College  v.   Isher- 

wood  797 

Manchester,   Duke  of  v.   Bon- 
ham  1431 
Manchester  Fire  Ass.  Co  v.  Stock- 
ton C.  H.  &  A.  Works    145,  547 
v   Wykes  1558 
Manchester  &  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Con- 
cord R.  Co  564 
Manchester  and  Leeds  Ry.  Co., 

Re  1605 

Manchester  New  College,  Re      1854, 
1855,  1856 
Manchester  Railway  v.  Worksop 

Board  1635 

Manchester  and  Sheffield   Ry. 
Co.  v.  Worksop   Board   of 
Health     741,  769,  770,  775,  1638 
Manchester  &  Stafford  Ry.  Co. 

v.  How  448 

Mandell  v.  Green  1411 

Mandeno  v.  Mandeno        1264,  1433, 
1456 
Mander  v.  Falcke  1654, 1685 

Manderson  v.  Commercial  Bank    26, 
144 
Mandeville  r.  Harman  1655 

v.  Mandeville  1722 

v.  Reynolds  861 

v.  Riggs  190,  273 

v.  Wilson  641 

Maugan  t.  Met.  E.  S.  Co.  1071, 

1463 
Manhattan  Co.  v.  Evertson  678, 

1171 
v.  Wood  1648 

Manhattan  Life  Ins.  Co.  v  War- 
wick 51 
Manhattan  Man    &  Fert.  Co.  v. 

N.  J.  Stockyard  Co.  1662 

v.  Van  Keuren  1662 

Maniere  v.  Leicester  516,  819 

Manigalt  v.  Deas  1576 

Manion  v.  Fahey  987,  1575 

v.  Titsworth  123 

Manisty  v.  Kenealy  628,  1072 

Mankel  v.  Belscamper  385 

Mauks  v.  Holroyd  394 

Mauleverer  v.  Warren  178 

Manley  v.  Robinson  1563 

v  Slason  1032 

Manlove  v.  Ball  1245 

r.  Burger  1751 

Manly  v.  Bewicke  2114 

Mann  t>.  Appel  328,  552 

0.  Bruce  255 

v.  Butler  190,  238 

t>.  Edwards  860 

v.  Flower  1618 

v.  Higgins  120,  334 

V.  Richardson  633,  999,  1224, 

1248 

v.  Ricketts  1017,  1022 

t'.  Stennett  1767 

i'.  Stephens  324 

v.  Utica  1624 

r    Ward  885 

v.  Wilkinson  2310 

v.  Young  1591 

Manners  r.  Charlesworth   1156,  1159 

v.  Furze  1291,  1722, 

1737 

0.  Johnson  1654,  1662 

?'.  Manners  1151 

v.  Mew  674 

Manning  v  Gloucester  301,  315 

v.  Klein  243 

v.  Lechmere  862,  1230 

v.  Manning  726,  1238 

v.  Pursell  877 

v.  Thesiger  226,  238 


lxxxii 


Marios  v.  De  Tastet  390 

Mausel  v   Clauricarde  901 

Mansell  v.  Feeuey  327,  356,  485, 

590,  618,  620,  624,  701,  716,  788, 

1822,  1823,  1824,  1829 

Manser  v.  Dix      572,  578,  1834, 

v.  Jenner  1669 

Mansfield  v.  Gambril  720 

v.  Green  1801 

v   Shaw  1665 

v.  Shi  up  1562 

v.  Whatcum  First  Nat    Bank 

1770 
Mansfield,  C.   &  L.  M.  Ry    Co. 

v  Swan  1427 

Mansfield,  Earl  of  v.  Ogle   1036,  1266 
Mauson  v   Burton  815 

Mansony  v.  Bank  1463 

Mansur  v.  Pratt  68,  161 

Mansy  v.  Mason  856 

Mant  v.  Leith  1418 

Mantle  v.  Noyes  2081 

Mauton  v.  Bates  1130 

v   Man  ton  1052 

v.  Hoe  236,  794 

Many  v.  Beekman  Iron  Co     145,  334 
Mapes  v.  Coffin  1459,  1489, 1401 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CTTED. 

[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 

Marling  1>.  Stonehouse  &  Nails- 
worth  Ky.  Co.        231,  279,  1731 


Maple  v.  Shrewsbury 
Mapleson  v.  Bentham 

v.  Massini 
Marasco  I).  Bolton 
Marble  Co.  v.  Ripley 
March  v.  Davison 

t).  Eastern  R.  Co. 


Marlow  v.  Barlow  186 

Marouey  v.  O'Dea  1240 

Marquis    of     Londonderry     t>. 

Rhoswydol  Lead  M.  Co.  406 

Marr  v.  Littlewood  1726 

v.  Southwick  1258,  125'J 

Marriage  v.  Skiggs  1400,  1615 

Marrigauld  v.  beas  986 

.Marnot  v.  Marriot  664 

Marriott  v  Anchor  Reversionary 

Company  944,  945 

v.  Chamberlain  576.  579 

v.  Kirkham  215,  1266 

v   Marriott  347,  1384 

Marrow,  Be  1389,  1610 

Marryatt  v.  Marryatt  316,  1779 

Marsack  v.  Reeves 

Marsden,  Be 

v.  Blundell 

v.  Bound 

Marselis  v.  Morris  Canal,  &c. 


Martin,  Be 
v.  Atkinson 
v.  Baldwin 
v.  Beauchamp 
v  D'Arcy 
v.  Dwelly 
v.  Foley 
v.  Fust 
v.  Gilleylen 
v.  Gleasou 
v.  Graves 
v.  Greene 
v   Hadlow 


1794 

1654 

154 

1667 

1663 

563,  566,  570, 

1557 

26,  238, 245, 

670, 1628,  2185,  2196 

v.  Head  105 

v.  Ludlum  573 

Marchaut  v  Marchant  1739 

Marco  v.  Low  1627,  1628 

Marcos  v.  Pebrer  336 

Marcus  Sayre  Co.  v.  Bernz  196 

Marder  v.  Wright  378 

Mare  v.  Earle  1398 

v.  Lewis  1841 

V   Malachy  240 

v.  Sandford  1398 

v .  Warner  1398 

Margetson  v.  Wright  1643 

Margetts  v.  Perks  336 

Margrave  v.  Le  Hook  213,  330 

Maria  v.  Hall  49 

Maries  v.  Maries  307 

Marine  Bank  v  Biays  1245 

Marine  Ins  Co.  v.  Hodgson        1621, 

1623 

v  St  Louis,  &c.  Ry  Co.  197 

Marine  Inv   Co.  v.  Haviside  881 

Marine  Mansions  Co.,  Be 

Marine    &    Fire    Ins.,    &c.     t 

Early 

Marine  &  R.  P.  &c.  Co.  v.  Brad- 
ley 553 
Marion  v.  Titswortb.  121 
Marke  v.  Locke                        430,  431 
Markell  v.  Kasson                         1548 
Marker  v  Marker                         1633 
Markham,  Be                                 1461 
v .  Augier                                   1625 
v.  Howell                                      1628 
v.  Middleton                     1130,  1141 
v.  Smith  2K2 
v   Townsend                                1296 
Markle  v.  Markle                     178,  500 
Marks  v   Beyfua  581 
v.  Fox                                         1320 
v.  Jaffa                                         1643 
v   Murphy  °8fi 
Marks  A    W.  C.  Co  v.  Wilson     1381 
Maikwell,  Be                               1852 
Mark  wick  v  Hardingham  651 
v   Pawson  793 
Marlatt  v.  Smith                            1311 
t;   Warwick    886,  1180,  1289,  1540. 
1545 
Marlborough,    Duchess     of    v. 

Wheat  1299 


13S1 

y?o 

939 
341, 
684 
221 
2 
1743 
550,  555 
785 
385,  485,  716,  719,  722, 
943 
1027 
214 
395,  564,  587,  597 
v.  Mayor  of  Pontefract  350 

v.  Mitchell  782,  839,  853 


Marsh  v.  Austin 
v.  Crawford 
v  Goodall 
v   Haywood 
v.  Hunter 
v.  Keith 


v.  Lasher 
v.  Lee 
v   Marsh 


378 


v.  Oliver 
v.  Parks 
v.  Railroad 
v   Sibbald 
v.  Supervisors 
v.  Whituiore 
Marshal  v.  Crutwell 
Marshall,  Be 
v   Anderson 
v.  Cave 
v.  Cliff 
v.  Colman 
v.  Conrad 
v.  Cooper 
v.  Dudley 
v.  Fowler 
v.  Frislde 
v.  Gilliard 
v.  Gil  man 
v.  Hills 

v  Holloway 

v-  Lewis 

v.  Lockett 

v.  Love  lass 

v.  McAravey 

V.  Marshall 

v.  Means 

v   Meech 

v.  Mellersh 

v,  Minter 

v  Olds 

v.  Otto 

r.  Rench 

v.  Ross 

v.  Sladden        2E 

v.  Smith 

t>.  Thompson 

v.  Turnbull 

v.  Watson 

v.  Wheeler 
Marshall!,  Be 
Marshfield,  Re 

v.  Weston 
Marshman  v.  Conkling 
Mars  ton  V.  Brackett 


227,  560 

1411 

1299,  2185,  2106 

1113 


1661 

560 

117 

438 

1166 

1242 

849 

332 

46 

1845 

1255 

102 

916 

334,  336 
324 
998 

1233,  1414 

123,  124 

1743 

419 

284 

149,1073,1648 

335.  344 
1845 

728,  1593 
1081 
418 
1765 
1150 
1649,  1087 
,382.  1400,  1417 
653 
1073,  1076 
368,  629, 1618 
1660 
1279 
1805 
653,  1817 
1227 
186 
,  918,  1075, 
1076,  1079,  1115 
Martano  v.  Mann  30,  111 

Martelli  v.  Holloway  1503 

Marten  v   Wichelo  859 

Marter  v   Marter  826 

Martigny  v.  Smith  515 


v.  Headon 
v.  Iteming 
v.  Hewitt 
v.  Holgate 
v.  Kerridge 
v.  Kilbourn 
v.  Lutkewitte 
v.  McBryde 
v.  Martin 


83,1840 

782 

634 

39 

1501 

1463 

1168 

424, 1602,  1671 

1580 

1038 

1961 

846 

1264,  1510,  1524, 

1526 

1638 

2047 


v.  Mayberry 
v.  Meyer 
v   Mitchell 
v.  Morris 
v.  Murphy 
v.  Norman 
v.  Nutkin 
v.  Parsons 
v.  Patching 
v   Peck 
v   Pond 
v.  Powning 
v.  Price 
v.  Purnell 


1503 

494,  1048 

1481 

382 

290,  368 

91,  104, 122,  345,  586, 

645, 1033,  1615,  1746 

1567 

149 

106 

259 

1655 

514 

1653 

1625 

540 

251 

149 

60,634 

1638 

1510, 

1526 

913,  1044,  1488,  1490 

30 


v.  Py croft 

v.  Russell 

v.  Smith  1151 

v .  Spicer  482 

v.  Spiers  551 

v.  Thraster  1249 

v.  Travellers'  Ins.  Co.  1100 

v.  Tyree  1542 

v.  Van  Schaick  1727, 1728 

v.  Weil  354 

v.  Whichelo  859 

v.  White  1305 

v.  Whitmore  38,  39 

v.  Willis  1057 

v   Wright  1648 

Martindale  v.  Brown  1492 

v.  Picquot  1261 

Martine  v.  Lowenstein  1463 

Martinius  v   Helmuth  151,  1567 

Marty  n  v.  Blake  1256 

v   Podger  1134 

Martyr  v.  Lawrence  14*2 

Marvel  v.  Ortlip  1675 

Marvin  v.  Elwood  1561 

v.  Stew  1772 

Marx  v.  Heidenheimer  920 

Mary,  The  564,717 

Marye  v  Dyche  584 

Maryland  and   New  York  Coal 

and  Iron  Co.  v.  Wingert         845 
Manet  v.  Pittsburgh 


Mason.  In  re 
v   Bogg 
v   Brentini 
v.  Broadbent 
v.  Codwise 
v.  Cotton 
v.  Crosby 
v,  Daly 
V-  Debow 
v.  Eakle 
v.  Foster 
v.  Franklin 
v.  Gardiner 
v.  Gardner 
v.  Goodburn 
v.  Haddon 
v   Hamilton 


406,  1842 

284 

1407 

653 

1214,  1423,  2191 

1639 

1322 

1003,  1317 

170,  753,  778 

1255 

361 

291,  295,  339 

1549 

31,  386 

1572 

1862 

1569,  1570 


TABLE    OF   CASES   CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 


lxx 


Xlll 


Mason  v.  Harper's  Ferry  Bridge 
Co  1675 

Harris  26,  241 

V.  Hartford,  &c.  R.   Co.  830,  1517, 
1542,  23S5 
v.  Hoyle  303 

v.  Lake  387,  419 

v.  La  Society  des  Metaux  26 

v  McGirr  1550 

v.  McGore  845 

v.  Mason  349,  759,  1073 

v.  Murray  424 

v.  Peck  844 

v   Pelletier  867 

v.  Ponieroy  236 

V.  Rollins  1636,  1637 

v.  Roosevelt  1363 

v.  Sanborn  1629 

v.  Sanford  1542 

v.  Spurlnck  323 

v.  Supreme  Court  1716 

v.  Wakeman  722,  2114 

v.  York  and   Cumberland   R. 
R  Co.     197,  23S,  403,  793,  1293, 
1300,  1516,  1518,  1536 
Massa  v.  Cutting  329 

Massachusetts  General  Hospital 
v.  State  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co        555, 
630 
Massachusetts   Mutual   L.    Ins. 
Co  v.  Chicago  &  A  R.  Co.  149, 
641 
Massam  v.  Thorley's  C.  F  Co.    1681 
Massereene,  Lord,  Re  1803 

Massey  v  Allen  26,  32,  942 

v  Gillelan  27,  33 

v.  Gorton  236 

v.  Goyder  1097 

v.  Massey  328,  1370 

Massie  v.  Donaldson       170,  444.  526 
v.  Graham  1576,  1577,  1578,  1579, 
1580,  1582 
v.  Watts  1032,  1615,  1627 

Massou  v.  Anderson  797,  1548 

Massy  v.  Batwell  280 

v.  Massy  885 

v.  Rowen  1503 

Master  v   Hamilton  1115 

v  Hansard  324,  1654 

Masterman  v.  Lenin  1568 

v.  Lewis  1676 

v  Midland  Railway  of  Ireland  414 
v  Price  843,  1467 

Masters  r  Barnes  248,252 

v.  Barnwell  1131 

v  Beckett  1548 

v   Braban  1077 

v.  Rossie  Galena  Lead  Mining 
Co  145 

Masterson  v   Finnegan  328 

v.  Herndon  1461,  14H5 

v.  Howard  52 

Mastin  v   Hallev  1663 

Mather,  Ex  parte  386 

v.  Lay  1626 

v.  Nesbit  1743 

v.  Shelmerdine  42 

Mathews  v.  Bishop  of  Bath         1150 
v.  Jones  1652 

v  Tripp  1071 

Mathias  v  Witts  Nav  Co  1620 

v.  Yetts  298 

Matson  v.  Melchor  852 

v  Swift  1265,  1610 

Mattel  v.  Conant  634 

Matthaei  v.  Galitzin  629 

Matthew  v.  Northern  Assurance 

Co.  1770 

Matthewman,  Ex  parte  187 

Matthews  v.  Bagshaw  1236 

v  Chichester        37  593,  594,  690, 

756 

v.  Copeland  128 

v.  Herdtfelder  933 

v.  Hoagland  576,  578 

v   Lalance  &  G.  M.  Co.       700,  843 

v.  Lloyd  256 


Matthews  v.  Matthew, 
v   Mears 
v.  Mu  nster 
v    Palmer 
v.  Roberts 
v  Smith 
v  Stubbs 
v   Swallow 
v.  Walwvn 
v.  Whittle 


1150 

1507 

974 

797 

632,  637,  986 

1070 

1285 

2255 

260,  667,  668, 1253 

189,  371 


Matthewsou  v.  Stockdale    1645,  1646 


Matthias  v    Warrington 
Matthison  v   Clarke 
Mattocks  v.  Tremaine 


378 
12^4,  1414 
395,  1705, 
1707,  1708 
1469 
345 
430 
1610 
1642 
318,  4ti5 
1099 
278 


Mattos  v  Gibson 
Maud  v  Acklom 
Maude  v.  Copeland 

r.  Maude 
Mauger  v    Dick 
Maughan  V   Blake 

v   Hubbard 
Maule  v.  Beaufort,  Duke  of 

v   Bruce  8b/,  St>8 

Mauley  v.  Shaw  1110 

Maultsby  v.  Carty  2 

Maund  v.  Allies  948,  949,  1836 

Maunder  v   Lloyd  b'29 

Maundrell  v.  Maundrell  1661 

Mauusell  v.  Egan  1766 

v.   Midland    Great    Western 
Railway  Co  1650 

Maupin  v   Daniel  1298 

Maurice  v.  Wainewright  1277 

Mauricet  v.  Brecknock  1130 

Maury  v  Lewis  361,  407,  847, 

1296 

ii.  Mason  714.  721,  1003 

Maury  County  v.  Lewis  County     22 
Mavor  v.  Dry  406,  426 

Maw  v.  Pearson       63,  248,  323,  551, 
1525 
Mawe  v.  Heaviside  98 

Mawer  v  Mawer  518 

Mawer's  Case  1705 

Mawhood  v.  Labouchere  430 

v  Milbanke  1806, 1841 

Mawman  v.  Tegg  1646 

Maxfield  v.  Burton  674,  679 

Maxim  Nonlenfelt  Guns  Co.  v. 


Nordenfelt 

1655 

Maxwell  c  Cochran 

236 

v.  Finnie 

246 

v.  H.igg 

1648,  1649 

v.  Johnson 

843 

v.  Maxwell 

1426,  1503 

v.  Stewart 

1625 

v.  Wettenhall 

1213,  1258 

v.  Wightwick 

710 

Maxwell    L.    G.    & 

R. 

Co.    v. 

Thompson 

1579 

May  v.  Armstrong 

101,  1549 

V.  Bisgendeu 

912, 1397 

t>.  Darden 

1463 

v  Eastin 

1391 

v  Goodwin 

550 

v   Head 

979 

v.  Hook 

511 

v.  May 

1168 

v.  Newton 

243 

v.  Parker 

314,  555 

v   Prinsep 

893 

v  Roper 

97 

v.  Selby        223,  236,  291,  292,  360 

v.  Skey 

103 

v  Sloan 

656 

v  Thomson 

364 

Mayberry.f.  Brooking 

154,291. 

1008 

1473,  1475 

Maybury  v.  Grady 

1411 

Mayburry  v.  Brien 

1165 

Mayd  v.  Field 

187,  1432 

Mayer  v.  Claretie 

149 

t'.  Denver,  &c.  R 

Co. 

26,  334 

v.  Frith 

766 

D   Galluchat 

719 

1234,  1414 

v  Journeymen  S. 

C.  A 

-s'n      1620 

Mayer  v.  Mayer  1581 

v.  Murray         328,  652,  1239,  1260 
v.  Speuce  1599,  1U44,  1670 

v.  Tyson  524 

v.  Woodhall  1623 

Mayes  v.  Hendry  740 

v.  Mayes  1209 

Mayfair  Property   Co.  v.   John- 
ston 1161 
Mayfield  v.  Wadsley  1127 
May  her  v.  W   Va.  Oil  Co.  1274 
Mayhew,  lie                         1411,  1842 
v.  Maxwell                        1683,  2314 
Maynard  v.  Bond                          1744 
v  Esher                                      1638 
v.  Green                                      1517 
v.  Moseley                                    1004 
v.  Pomfret                                 1052 
v.  Tilden  407 
Mayne  v  Butler  892 
v.  Butter                            893,  1801 
v.  Griswold                                  379 
v.  Hawkey                                  1844 
v  Hochin            413,  414,  770,  776 
r   Macartney                               1287 
Mayo  v.  Foster                                1630 
v.  Harding                         853,  1286 
v.  Jones                                          852 
v.  Murchie                                   302 
Mayor  v.  Coffin                             1120 
v  Collins                            717,  1824 
v .  Cooper                            630,  1427 
v.  Murray                                   1370 
Mayor  of  Bristol  v.  Cox                 573 
Mayor  of    Lyons    v     Advocate- 
General  of  Bengal  13 
Mayor  of  N.  Y.  v.  N    Y    Ferry 

Co.  1683 

Mayre  v.  Root  545 

Mays  v.  Wherry  1580,  1715 

Mayse  v.  Biggs  801 

Mazarredo  v.  Maitland  596,  694, 

720,  761,  776 

Meach  v  Chappell  894 

v.  Perry  655 

v.  Stone  365,  561 

Meachain  v  Cooper  906,  1225 

v.  Williams  341 

Meacher  v.  Young  1359,  2292 

Mead  v   Arms  1030,  1479, 1575, 1576 

v  Ask-w  850 

v.  Combs  860 

v   Day  837,  850 

v.  Merritt  554,  1032,  1627 

v.  Orrery,  Lord  1736,  1737 

v.  Piatt  630 

t>.  Raymond  860 

r.  Stirling  369,  1620 

v.  Walker  1071 

Meadbury  v.  Isdall  885 

Meade,  Re  157 

v.  Norbury  1468 

Meaden  v  Sealey  1734,  1735 

Meader  v.  M'Cready  1394 

Meades  v.  Guedalla  202 

Meadors  v   Askew  361,  860 

Meadow   Valley    Mining   Co.    t\ 

Dodds  1463 

Meadows  v.  Kingston,  Duchess 

of  614,  663,  664,  679 

Meagher  t;.    Minnesota    T.    M. 

Co.  1461 

Meagoe  v.  Simmons  1106 

Mealea  v.  Meales  90 

Mealor  v.  Talbot,  Lord       1564,  1565 
Means  v.  Dowd  653,  1995 

Meara  v  Holbrook  1752 

Mears  v.  Best  168,  1266 

r.  Dole  417.  1320 

Mebane  t>   Mebane  371 ,  668 

Mechanics'  Bank  v   Bank  of  N. 

Brunswick  1307,  1311,  1312 

v  Goodwin  24 

v.  Landauer  217,  1765 

v.  Levy  361,  373,  377,  715,  718,  721 
v.  Setons  '-95 

Mechanics'  Foundry  v.  Ryall      1663 


lxxxiv 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 


Meddowcroft  v.  Campbell      59,  109, 
290 
M.-der  v.  Birt  678 

Medler    v.    Albuquerque    Hotel 

Co.  1299 

Med  lock  r   Cogburn  1567 

Medow,  Re  1610 

Medsker  »>.  Bonebrake  1320 

Medway  Cotton  Manuf.  v.  Adams    22 

Meek  v.  Burnley  25 

v.  Carter  1659 

v.  Chamberlain  1-5 

„    Kaly  1507 

v.  McCall  1073 

v.  Mathis  987,  994,  1492 

v.  Ward  820,  898 

v.  Witherington  5^9 

Meeker  v   Evans  1272 

v  Marsh       607,  677,  695,  700,  703 

v  Sprague  1716 

v.  W'inttarop  Iron  Co  26 

Meggot  v.  Meggot  1166,  1167 

Meggy  v   Imperial  Discount  Co.    157 

Mehan  v.  Chicago,  &c.  R  Co.     1122 

Meier  v.  Kansas  Pac   Ry   Co.       1765 

Meigs  v.  Lister  1635 

Meiklam  v.  Elmore     63,  64,  808,  814 

Meiklau  v.  Campbell  452 

Meinertzhagen  v   Davis  992 

Meiuuai'd  v    Youngblood    295,  1120, 

1614 

Meissner  v.  Buek  1548 

Meldrum  v.  Hayes  75,  1413 

v.  Scorer  200,  254 

Melford  v.  Peters  1191 

Melhado  v    Watson  157 

Melhuish  v   Collier  1100,  1101 

Melin  v    Taylor  1129 

Meliorucchi  v.  Royal  Exchange  ____ 

Assurance  Co  177 1 

Meliorucchy  v  Meliorucchy     30,  53 

Melien  v   Banning  216 

v  Moline  Iron  Works  149 

Mellersh  v   Brown  652 

Mellick  i).  President,  &c.  of  the 

Asylum  2182 

Mellingr   Bird  1611 

v.  Melliug  "6 

Mellish  o.  Williams  1576 

Mellor  r   Hall  592,  691 

v.  Porter  73,  165 

t>   Thompson  984 

Mellows  i\  Bannister  448 

Melsheimer  v  Hommel  559 

Melton  v.  Withers  1515 

Meluish  v.  Milton  663 

Melville  v.  Matthewson  1591 

Memphis  Appeal  Pub.  Co  v.  Pike  148 
Memphis  Bank  v.  Oldham  10(3 

Memphis  City  v.  Dean  26 

Memphis  Gayoso  Gas  Co.  v.  Wil- 
liamson 26 
Memphis  and  Charleston  R.  Co. 

v.  Gaines  1661 

Memphis  &  V.  R.  Co.  v.  Owens    596 
Mendenhall  v.  Hall  283 

Mendes  v.  Guedalla        109,  204,  820 
ii  Mendes  1351 

Mendham  v.  Robinson    65,  159,  1512 
Mendizabel  v    Hullett  413,414 

v  Machado  640,  155!) 

Meneely  v   Meneely  1649 

Meneudez  r  Holt  1648 

Menier  v.  Hooper's  Tel.  Works       26 
Menifee  v.  Menifee  844 

Menude  v.  Delaire  659 

Menzies  v   Connor  797 

Mercantile  Bank  v.  Carpenter       411 
Mercantile  Ins   &c.  Co.  v.  River 

Plate,  &c   Co.  629 

Mercantile  S.  D.  Co.  v.  Dimon     1561 

Mercantile  Trust  Co.  v.  Kanawha 

&  0   Ry.  Co.  314,  1743 

v.  Missouri,  &c.  Rv.  Co.  283 

v   Missouri,  K.  &T.  Ry.  Co    1120 

v.  Portland  &  O.  R.  Co      149,  215 

v.  Rhode  Island  H  T.  Co.         586 


Mercartuey  v.  Crittenden  790 

Mercers'  Co.,  Ex  parte  30,  42 

v.  Great  Northern  Ry.  Co  889,1598 

Merchant  v.  Bowyer  779 

Merchants'  Bank  V.  McLeod        1743 

v.  Masonic  Hall  Trustees  407 

v.  Moulton  1071.  1073,  1110 

v.  Stevenson  235,  41H,  257 

Merchants'   Detective   Ass'n    v. 

Detective  M.  Agency    1648,  1659 
Merchants'  Int'l   S.   B.    Co.    v. 

Lyon  634 

Merchants'  Nat.  Bank  v.  Chat- 
tanooga Construction  Co. 


Co 


Hogle 
v.  Sabin 
v.  Trustees 
Merchant  Tailors 

Gen. 
Merchants'  Trading  Co 

ner 
Mercier  v   Lewis 

v.  Pepperell 
Meredith,  Re 

v.  Johns 
Meredyth  v.  Hughes 
Merest  v   Harvey 

v.  Hodgson 
Meriden    Britania   Co. 

ker 
Meridian   News  Co.  v. 

Wing  Paper  Co 
Meriel  v.  Wymoudsold 
Merithew  v.  Sampson 
Meriwether  v.  Booker 
Merklein  v.  Trapnell 
Merlin  v.  Blagrave 


586 
1556 
547 
v.  Att  - 

599,  1436 
v.  Ban- 

1596 

1549 

1860 

1051 

1625 

1448, 1453 

1130 

185 

v.    Par- 

1649 
Diem  & 

1716 
272 
1930 
121,  124 
1157 
34,  1405,  142 


Metcalfe,  Re 
Re,  Hicks  v.  May 
v.  Beckwith 
v.  Brown 
v.  Metcalfe 


5,  45,  87 
1205 
1165 
589 

318,  1541 


.    I'ulvertoft  280,  1720,  1734 

M.  E   Church  v.  Jaques        100,  186, 
374,  715,  717,    720,   758    1228, 
1302,  1377,  1381,  1543,  1800 
Methodist   P.  Church  v.    Balti- 
more. Mayor,  &c.  of  1622 
Metier  v.  Metier     184,  1!"5,  498,  547, 
562,  570,  584,  886,  1556,  1557 
Metropolitan  Bank,  Re  942 
v  Offord       157,  158,  314,  420,  698 
v.  Pooley                                      354 
Metropolitan  Board  of  Works  v. 

Sant  1072 

Metropolitan    Coal    Consumers' 


St. 


560 


Merrewether  v.  Mellish  626,  682,703 


Merriam  v.  Barton 

v   Baxter 

v   Goodlett 

v  Goss 

v.  Holloway  Pub  Co 

v  Smith 
Merrifield  v.  Ingersoll 

v.  Jones 

v.  Lombard 
Merrill,  Re 

v.  Elam 

v.  Houghton 

v.  Humphrey 

v.  Lake 

v.  Merrill 

v.  Plaintield 

V.  Washburn 
Merrimack  Mauuf. 

ner 
Merriman,  Re 

v   Can no van 

v   Goodman 

v   Polk 
Merritt  v.  Brown 

v  Hughes 
Merry  v    Freeman 

v.  Nickalls 
Merryfield  v  Jones 
Merr.vweafher  v   Mellish 

v.  Moore 
Mersey  Docks  Trustees  v.  Gihhs 

1635, 1752 
Mersey  Railwav,  fn  re  1733 

Mersey  Steel  Co.  v.  Nay  I  or  2^4 

Merteus  v  Haigh        4i'3,  1555,  1828, 

Merwin  v.  Smith      1269, 1272, 1668, 
1669,  1676, 1677 
Messchaert  v    Kennedy 


1240,  1463 

1248,  1298 

385 

1244,  1385 

586 

197 

1029 

1666 

1638 

1294 

1716,  1734,  2127 

530 

1661 

303 

349 

545,  2323 

324 

Co.  v.  Gar- 

1648 

102 

561.  642 

152,  528 

1624 

369,  844 

2027 

256 

1471 

1666,  23  4 

1843 

1650 


402 
1847 
1129 


Messenger,  In  re 
Messer  v.  Boyle 

v  Storer 
Messervey  v.  Barelli 
Messonier  v.  Kauman 
Metcalfi'.  Cady 

V.  Hervey 

V.  Hoopingardner 

v.  Metcalf 

V.  Putnam 


1842,184 

1266 

545 

242 

1467, 1468 

334,  335 

584, 1561,  1562 

277,1158 

1071 

1961 


Ass'n,  Re 
Metropolitan  Nat     Bank  v 

Louis  Dispatch  Co. 
Metropolitan  Ry  Co.,  Re 

v.  Wright 
Metropolitan  Trust  Co.  v.  Tona 

wanda,  &c.  R.  Co.  214 

Wletzv  Wood  418 

Metzger  v.  Metropolitan  El.  Ry. 

Co.  840 

Metzler  v  Wood        1096,  1105,  1648 
Meule  v.  Goddard  1138 

Meurer's  Will  1411 

Meux  v.  Bell  1297,  1563,  1570 

v.  Maltby 
v   Watkius 
Mewshaw  v.  Mewshaw 
Mexborough,  Earl  of  v  Bower 
Mexican     Central     Ry.    Co. 

Pinkney 
Mexican  Ore  Co.  l> 

M   Co 

Mey  v  Gulliman 

Meyer  ?>.  Campbell 

v.  Gateus 

v.  Herrera 

v.  Johnston 

v.  Meyer 

v.  Moutriore 

v  Montriou 

Meyers  v.  Busby 

v   Dittmar 

v  Scott 

Meymott  v.  Meymott 

Mey  rick,  Re 

v  James 

v.  Laws  1339  1341,  1605,  1851 

Meysinberg  v.  Schleiper  1081 

Michael  v  Fripp  1578, 1580 

Michel  v.  Bullen  1448, 1453 

Michell  v.  Harris  671 

v.  Michell  100 

Michelmore  v.  Mudge  119,  121 

Michielsv  The  Empire  Palace       28 

Michigan  State  Bank  v.  Gardner  190, 

191,223 

v.  Hustings  129 

Miehoud  v   Girod  994,997 

Mickle  v.  Maxfield     1028,  1120,  1579 

Mickles  v   Dillaye       1243,  1244,  1245 

v.  Thayer  659.  994 

Micklethwait  t/.  Micklethwait     1633, 

1671 

v.  Moore  579.  1819 

Micklethwaite  v.  Atkinson     178,  841 

v.  Winstanley  254,  340.  1207 

Micou  v  Ashurst  334,  385 

v  Davis  1284 

Middaugh  v.  Fox  560 

Middlebrook  v.  Bromley         561,687 

Middlecomer   Marlow  92 

Middleditch  v   Sharland  66< 

r   Williams  68 

Middlemas  v.  Wilson    351,  894, 1003 

Middlesex  Bank  v   Minot  284 

Middleton,  Re  1433 

v   Bankers'  Tel.  Co.  1304 

v  Barned  1104,1127 


756 
371 
670 

536 
Mexican  G. 

1661, 1687 
838 
933 
1548 
45 
1731 
1712 
1188 
1339 
314 
1492 
334 
983, 1330 
1852 
919 


TABLE    OP    CASES    CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 


lxxxv 


Middleton  v.  Chichester  820 

v.  Dodswell  1665, 1722,  1734 


v.  Flat  River  Co, 
v.  Franklin 
V.  Greenwood 
v.  Magnay 

v.  Middleton 
v.  Poole 
v.  Selby 
v.  Sherburne 

v.  Spicer 
v.  Younger 
Lord  v.  Eliot 


303 

1637 

1082 

1081,  KI82 

1149,  1384 

1778 

1551 

1074,  1079,  1721, 

1725,  1734 

135 

1801 

1392 


Miller  v.  Furse 
v.  Gow 
v.  Gregory 
V.  Hall 
v.  Harris 
v.  Henderson 
v.  Howard 
v.  Huddlestone 
v.  Jackson 


Middletown   S.  Bank   v.   Bach- 

arach  283 

Midland  Counties  Benefit  Build- 
ing Society,  Re  1479 
Midland,  &c.  Ferry  Co.  v.  Wil- 
son 1637 
Midland  Ry   Co.,  Re  1797 
v.  Brown  1440 
v.  London  &   North-Western 
Ry   Co.  1650 
Midleton,  Lord  v.  Power  387 
Midiner  v.  Midmer                 418,  860 
Miers  v.  Zanesville  &  Maysviile 

Turnpike  Co.  635 

Milan  Steam  Mills  v.  Hickey        1663 


Milbank  v.  Revett 

1726, 1728 

Mildniay  v.  Methuen 

1257 

v  Miidmay 

677 

v.  Quieke 

1163 

Mildred  v.  Austin 

277, 10&5 

v.  Robinson 

1033 

Miles  v   Boyden 

68 

v  .  Davis 

224 

v   Durnford 

230,  233.  3)3 

v.  Harrison 

1428 

t>.  Hawkins 

203 

v.  Kaigler 

68 

v.  Knight 

1338, 1795 
758,  843,  844 

v.  Miles        374,  722, 

v.  New  Zealand  A. 

E 

Co.           365 

v.  O'Hara 

1118 

V   Presland 

1039, 

V.  Stanley 

671 

V.  Strong 

418 

v   Williams 

7 

Milhan  v.  Sharp 

1637 

Milk  v.  Moore 

1075,  1076 

Milkman  v.  Ordway 

380 

Mill  v.  Mill 

957,  958 

Mill's  Estate,  Re 

1451 

Mt  Han  v.  Hood 

601 

Millar  v.  Craig 

1230 

v.  El  win 

620,  521 

v.  Harper 

1720 

Millard  v.  Burroughes 

1450 

V   Mairor 

• 

328 

Millard's  Case 

677 

Mill-dam  Foundry  v 

Hovey        146, 

35 
Mill   River   Loan   Fund  Ass.  v. 

Clatlin  591 

Miller,  Re  354,  1694 

v.  Avery  737,  846,  884,  1653 

v.  Baltimore  C   M.  Co.  334 


v.  Bear 

197 

?>.  Beverleys 

1231 

v.  Buchanan 

349 

v.  Cabell 

68 

v.  Cameron 

231 

v  Campbell 

102 

v.  Caruthers 

875 

v.  Chittenden 

1150 

V-  Clark 

1576 

v.  Cook 

402 

986,  1517 

v.  Cotten 

S26 

v.  Davidson 

236 

v ■  District  of  Columbia 

840 

v.  Dorsey 

643 

v-  Dows 

627 

V.  Fasse 

590 

v.  Fenton 

607, 1550 

v.  Ford 

547 

V.  Foree 

843 

787 

840,843 

711,  1550 

256,  457 

334, 336 

197,  215 

1317 

223,  1051,  1052 

860 


v.  Jamison    302,  337,  380,  557,  587 

('.Justice  986 

v.  Kershaw  194 

v.  Lincoln     1239, 1386,  1393,  1448 

v.  Lord  378 

v.  M'Can  292,  295,  403,  4i in 

v.  MoCarr  1623 

t>.  Mackenzie  1742,  1751 

v.  M'Crea  287,  289 

v .  McDougal  1677 

V.  M  Intyre  560,  639 

v.  Miller       1048, 1157, 1712,  1771, 

2289 

v.  Palmer  1622 

v.  Pine  Mining  Co.  357 

v.  Powell  798 

v.  Pridden         218,  859,  991,  1409, 

1694 

v.  Rushforth  1031,  1322 

v.  Russell  1118 

t\  Saunders  715 

v.  Scammon  552 

v.  Sherry  1276,  1280 

v.  Smith  403 

v.  Taylor  402,  1129 

v.  Thatcher  361 

v.  Tobin  972 

v.  Tolleson  843 

v.  Wack  840,  844,  1073,  1076 

u.  Warmington  135,  209,  1161 

i\  Wheatley  762 

v.  Whittaker  247,  409 

v.  Whittier      287,  294,  1241,  1245, 

1302 

v.  Wright  529 

Miller-Magce  Co.  v.  Carpenter     542. 

551 

MiUican  v.  Vaoderplank     1275,  1294 

Milligan  v.  Milledge       149,  150,  219, 

290,  390,  603 

v.  Mitchell  240,  245,  292,  295, 

403,  405,  416,  417,  582,  715, 1579, 

1653 

Milliken  v.  Barrow  1743 

Millington  v.  Fox     1376,  1380,  1381, 

1394,  1395,  1649,  1681 

v.  Loring  348 

Mills  v.  Bally  700 

v.  Banks  1475,  1476 

v.  Barlow  114 

v.  Bowyers'  Co.  1860 

v .  Brown  544,  545 

v  Cobby  1686 

v.  Dennis  68,  163, 165, 167, 168, 169, 

170,  753,  997 

v.  Dudgeon  813 

v.  Dunham  1655 

v.  Farmer  16,  140,  1436 

t\  Finlay  1843 

v.  Fox  108 

e   Fry  815,  817 

t'.  Gleason  1661 

v.  Gore  841 

v.  Hanson  1780,  1781,  1797 

v.  Hoag  993, 1461,  1516,  1518- 

v.  Hurd  334 

«;  Jennings         200,212,213,215, 

257 

v.  Knapp  630 

v.  Mason  1549 

t>   Metcalf  314 

v.  Northern  Railway  of  Buenos 

Avres  Co.  243 

v.  Parkhurst  815 

v.  Pitman  828 

v.  Scott  417 

v.  Townsend  147 

v.  Wayne  Circuit  Judge  1675 


Millsaps  v.  Pfeiffer  1537,  1556 

Millspaugh  v.  M' Bride  978,  1026, 

1030,  1284 

Milltown,  Lord  v.  Stuart      826,  970, 

1597.  1609,  l»»l 

Milly  v.  Harrison  '  1429,  1459 

Milner  v.  Colmer  92,  97 

v.  Harewood,  Lord  170 

v.  Meek  1489 

t).  Milner  1515 

Milner's  Settlement,  Re  100 

Milues  v.  Busk  100 

V.  Davisou  1396 

v.  Gery  671 

Milsingtown,  Lord  v.  Portmore, 

Earl  of  1667 

Milson  v.  Carter  1029 

Miltenberger  v.  Loginsport  Ry. 

Co.  1716,  1738,  1743 

Milward  v.  Oldfield  406 

Mil.    &    Chil.  Turnpike   Co.   v. 

Brush  22 

Milwaukee  i>.  Sullivan  354 

&c  R.  Co.  v.  Soutter     1463,  1491, 

1715,  1731 

Mims  v.  Mims  214,  837 

Miner  v.  Caples  1164 

v.  Smith  259 

Minet  v.  Hyde  95,  97 

v.  Morgan  573,  575,  1832 

Mineve  v.  Row  950 

Minirie    v.    Railway    Passengers 

Ass.  Co.  671 

Mining  Co.  v   Delany  1684 

Miuke  v.  Hopeman  1635 

Minn  v.  Stant  295 

Minneapolis,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mil- 
ner 1620 
Minnesota  Bank  v.  Hayes  1770 
Minnesota  Co.  v.  St.  Paul  Co.  1517, 
1553 
Mining's  Appeal  1631 
Minor,  Ex  parte  1275 
Minors  v.  Battison  1342,1503 
Minot  v.  Curtis  20 
Minshaw  v.  Jordan  1680 
Minter,  lie  1043,  1170 
Minthnrne  v.  Tomkins  1018,  1042 
Minturn  v.  Seymour  1668,  1672.  1675 
Minuse  v.  Cox  14.3 
Mireliouse  v.  Herbert  1260,  1397 
Mississippi  Mills  v.  Cohn  630 
Miss.  R.  Co.  v.  Gaster  24 
Mississippi  and  Mobile   R  Co.  v. 

Cromwell  1889,  1902 

Missouri  K.  &  T.  Rv.  Co.  v.  El- 
liott 630 
Missouri   Pac.   Ry.    Co.   v.  Mc- 

Cartv  1508 

v.  Texas  &  P   Ry.  Co.      f.nr,,  12li9, 
1299,  1309,  1743 
v.  Tex.  Pac.  Ry.  Co  1743 

Missouri  R.  Co    v.  Commission- 
ers 1650 
Mitchel  v.  Manchester,  Duke  of 

1743, 1748 
Mitchell,  Re  1327, 1337,  1850 

Re,  Wavell  v.  Mitchell  215 

/•.  Bailey  291 

V.  Berry        1268, 1290,  1577,  1578, 
1580 
v   Bunre  633,  1032 

v.  Bunch     1627,  1698,  1699,  1700, 
1704,  1713 
v.  Cline  1157 

i\  Commissioners  1661 

v  Condy  1070,  1765 

0.  Dors  1032 

v.  Draper  1054 

r    Green  547,  570,  584 

v.  Harris  671 

v.  Hayne  1560,  1565,  1671 

V.  Homfray  852 

v.  Kingman  83 

t'.  Koecker  563 

v.  Lenox      287,  292, 642,  558,  604, 
1486 


lxxxvi 


Mitchell  v.  Lowndes 

V.  Miii  5 . 1 1 1 

V.  Oakley 

v.  SehouQover 

v   Smart 

v.  Smith 

v.  Thome 

v.  Tighe 

V.  Walker 

t>.  Wiuslow 
Mitchell's  Case 


Mitford  v.  Mitford  120, 122,  125,  127 
v   Reynolds  1318,1436 

Mittens  v.  Foreman  354 

Mix  v.  Hotchkiss  341,  344,  1246 

Moat  v.  Holbien         1673,  1684,  1685 
Mobile   Savings  Bank  v.   Board 
of  S  u  pervisors  324 ,  334 

v.  Burke  334 

Moblev  i .  Dubuque,  &c.  Co.         841 
v.  Hamit  904,  918,  930 

Mocatta  v.  Lousada  1432 

v  Murgatroyd  1392 

Moch  v   Virginia  Fire  Ins.  Co.      664 
Mockett,  He  14!'l 

Moelle  v.  Sherwood      674,  1019,  1120 
Moenich  v.  Fenestre  1655 

Moet  v.  Couston       1394, 1395, 1600, 
1649, 1679 
Moffat  v   Buruie  1202 

v.  United  States  8 

Moffats  v.  Farquharson  238 

Moffatt  v.  Barnes  1254 

v   Farquharson  216,238,269 

Moftvt  r.  Claberts  856 

Mogg  v.  Mogg  1619,  1632 

Moegridge  v.  Hall  938,  1574 

t,   Thackwell  16,  140,  1436 

v.  Thomas  1594,  1596,  1667 

Mogul    Steamship    Co.    v.    Mc- 
Gregor 1620,  1664 
Mohawk"  Bank  v.  Atwater    886, 1272 
Bridge  Case  1151 
and   Hudson   R.  Co.   v.   Ant- 

cher  1637 

v  Clute       1561,1562,1563,1564, 

1565,  1571 

Mohler  v.  Wiltberger  793 

Mohun  V.  Mohun  143b 

Moiru  Mudie  1844 

Mold  v.  Wheatcroft  1082,  2321 

Mole  v.  Mansfield  H5< 

v.  Smith  188,  339,  974, 1307,  2182, 

2265 

Molesworth,  Re  1357 

v.  Howard  72. 

v.  Rolibins  *°« 

v  Snead  825,  972,  1373 

v   Lord  Vernev  801 

MollfU  *•.  Enequist  1556,  1621. 1625, 

1669,  1672, 1675 

Mollineux  V.  Powell  227,  1630 

Moloney  u.  Smith  28 

Molonv  v.  Kernan  675,677 

Molyneux   lie  1161,1169 

Moncaster,  Lord  V.  Braithwaite  783, 

784 

Monck  v.  Tankerville,  Earl  of       427 

Monrkton  r   Attorney-General      131 

Mondey  V.  Mondey  163,  167 

Monell  r.  Lawrence  1459 

Money,  Re  „  39 

v.  Jordan  847,  1676,  16*3 

Monil  v.  Lawson  13i 

Monk  v.  Pomfret  323 

Monkhouse  v.  Bedfo-d,  Corp.  of 

1000,  1470, 1478 
Monmouth  v.  Leeds  1381 

Monnett  V   Turpie  629 

Monnins  v.  Monnins  568 

Monro  v.  Taylor  990,  1400 

Monroe  v.  James 

V.  Lewald  1120 

Monroe's  Will,  Re  576 

Monroe  Cattle  Co.  v.  Becker  843 

Monroy  c   Monroy  728 

MoDtague  v.  778 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 
[Tho  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 

8"4    Montague  v.  Boston  &  Albany 
361,837  R.  Co.  1309 

1623        v.  Flockton  1654,  1657 

1507        v.  Lobdell  197,  199 

1567        v.  Selb  780 

61,562,1556        v.  Turpin  271 

303,  320        Lord  v.  Dudman      570,  1556,  1620 
328,  558    Montara  v.  Hall  1314,  13*30 

1301     Montefiore  v.  Behrens  1039 

120    Mouteith  v.  Taylor         158,  159,  808 
576     Montesquieu  !•.  Sandys  327 

Montgomerie   v.  Bath,  Marquis 

of  212 

Montgomery,  Re  1747 

v.  Attoiney-GeDeral  1122 


v.  Calland"  1252,  1391,  1393 

v   Chadwick  1240,  1243 

v.  Floyd  253 

v.  01  Well  1548,1551 

v.  Itich  986 

v.  Whitworth  296, 1567 

Monti  r.  Bishop  1551 

Moutitiori  v.  Browne  1205 

Mom  penny  v. 424,  1602,  1671 

v.  Deriug  170,  lo20,  1021 

v.  Monypenny  1470,  1503 

Mooar  v.  Harvey  648 

Moodalay  v   Morton      145,  331,  1557 

Moodie  v.  Bainbridge  1808 

v.  Baunister       152,  290,  644,  658, 

1211 


Moore  v.  Langford 
v.  Lipscombe 
v.  Lockett 
v.  Lyttle 
v.  McClintock 
v.  McGaha 
v.  M  Nauiara 
v.  Meynell 
v.  Mitchell 
r.  Moberly 
v.  Moore 


1182 

1463 

837 

328,  558 

846 

1621 

280 

180 

378 

270 

91,120,302.469,511, 

1047, 1577,  1581 

202 

214 

552 

177,  476 

1669,  1676 

1009,  1016 

1003 

350,  351,  895 


Moody  v.  Fry 

233 

v.  Gay 

149,  150 

v    llebberd 

1594,  1597 

v.  Learning 

947 

v.  Metcalf 

844 

v.  Payne 

946,  949 

v.  Rowell 

920 

v  Steggles 

1639 

Mooers  v.  White 

641 

Moon  v  Trask 

652 

Mooney  v.  Cooledge 

1631 

Moons  v.  De  Bernales 

857.  865, 1079 

Moor  v.  Anglo-Italian  Bank         629. 

1627, 1628 

v.  Somerset 

629 

v.  Veazie 

197,  240 

v.  Welsh  Copper  Co 

632.  635 

Moore,  lie 

1069,  1694 

v.  Alden 

1411 

v.  Anderson 

286 

V.  Armstrong 

682,  601 

v.  Barnheisel 

1561 

v.  Beaman 

1120 

V.  Beauchamp 

219 

v.  Blagrave 

200,  249 

v.  Booth 

1069 

v.  Bray 

573 

v.  Bruce                  1172 

v.  Cabel 

1240 

v.  Cable                   1242,  1244,  12 

v.  Cord 

1624 

v.  Craven 

579,  717 

v.  Crawford 

560.  860 

v.  Deakin 

1071 

v.  Degraw 

1237,  1240 

v.  Dixon 

1432 

v.  Edwards 

656,  657 

v.  Fountleroy 

1381 

v.  Frowd 

1234,  1413 

v.  Gamble 

1623 

v.  Gennett 

149,  443,  449 

v.  Gentry 

100 

v.  Gleaton 

225,  1707 

v.  Granger 

1463 

t>.  Green 

517 

t>.  Greene 

324 

v.  Hallum 

1624 

V.  Harper   321,  868 

871,  891, 1553 

v   Hood 

251 

v.  Holt 

633.  635.  695 

f.  Hudson         180, 

389, 1705,  1706 

v.  Hunter 

737 

v  Huntington 

1576 

v.  Hylton 

1676,  1677 

v.  Knight 

298,  645 

v.  Lake  Co. 

860 

v.  Morris 

v.  Morton 

v  Munn 

v.  Platel 

v.  Reed 

v.  Robinson 

v.  School  Trustees 

v.  Smith 

v.  Stevenson 

v.  Taylor  1734 

v.  Titman  1170 

v.  Tuckwell  1126,1127 

v.  Osher  1560,  1561 

v.  Walker  1644 

v.  Walter  1339 

V.  Wright  458 

v  Zabriskie  1236 

Moore's  Appeal  1777 

Moores  v.  Moores  348,  852,  853 

Moors  v.  Moors  87,  712,  843 

v.  Washburn  1381 

Moran  v.  Hays  249 

v  Johnston  1716,  1734 

v.  Palmer  360 

v.  Pellifant  197 

Morant,  Re  1607 

Mordaunt  v.  Benwell  1346 

v.  Hooper  1725 

Mordue  v.  Palmer  1408^1861 

More  II,  Mayhow  677,  678 

Moreau  v.  Edwards  1655 

v.  Polley  1696 

V.  Saffarans  346 

Moredock  v.  Williams  1668,  1677 

Morehouse  v.  Jackson  12^8 

it.  Newton  1250 

Moreland  v.  Richardson  1632 

Morenhout  p.  Higuera  1150 

Mores  v.  Mores  150,  152 

Moreton  v.  Chandler  645 

v.  Harrison  607,  618,  829 

Morewood  v.  Currey  236 

v.  Hall  1152 

Morey  v.  Forsyth  19" 

v.  Vandenbergh  824 

Morford  V  Hamner  1716. 1720,  1730 

Morgan,  Ex  parte      987,  1147,  1149 

Re                 .  349,674 

v.  1586 

v.  Bovne  235 
v.  Davey  595,  599, 602, 730, 731,  808 

v.  Day  540 

v.  Elam  186 

v.  Elford  1471 

v.  Elstob  1213 

v.  Fuller  1078,  1083 

v.  Graham  1661 

r.  Great  Eastern  Ry.  Co.  795, 1380 

v.  Harris  548 

v.  H.tchell  1338,  ia50 

v.  Higgins  1232 

v.  Huggins  1411 

v.  Jones  177,  444 

v.  Kansas  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  26 
v.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.  1164 

v.  Lariviere  18,  142 

v.  Lewis  1190 

V.  M'Adam  1649 

ii.  Marsack  1566 

v   Meuth  378 

v.  Morgan    163,  230,  285,  461.  661, 
989,  1362,  1368,  1459, 
1536,  1716 
v.  New  York  and  Albany  R. 

Co.  239,406 


TABLE   OP   CASES   CITED. 


Ixxxvn 


Morgan  v.  Palmer 

1638 

v. 

Railway  Co. 

149 

v. 

Scudauiore 

1527, 

1528 

v. 

Shaw 

575, 

943,  944 

1774 

V 

Shepherd 

334 

v. 

Smith 

321 

V 

Thorne 

68 

v. 

Tifdon 

844 

v. 

Tipton 

1551) 

V 

Turner 

1061 

V 

Worthington 

365 

Morgan's  La.,&c. 

Co. 

v.  Texas 

Hot 

Central  Ky.  Cc 
iarty  v.  Mason 

. 

1019, 

154S, 
1553 

?yo 

Morire  p.  Durham,  Bishop  of      1290 
Monson  v.  Morison   72,  163,  505,  543 
v.  Tumour  619 

Moritz  v.  Splitt  378 

Morley  V.  Bridges  1393 

v.  Ulavering  1043,  1220,  17:»3 

v.  Green  290 

v.  Morley      212,  226,  257,  259,  891 
v.  Rennoldson  150 

v.  White  200,  409,  630 

Morniug   Journal  Ass'n   v.  Ru- 
therford 1029 
Moruington  v.  Keen  42 
Moruiugton           573,  578,  1834 


Earl  of  v.  Smith 

807,  809 

Lord  v.  Keane 

1830 

Morocco  Co  v.  Fry 

542,  13'.)4 

Morphett  v.  Jones 

847,  1668 

Morrall  v.  Pritchard 

1370,  1577, 

1578,  1594 

Morrell  v  Dickey 

1355, 1412 

v.  Fisher 

1428 

v.  Kelley 

1320 

v.  Pearson 

1683 

t>.  Wootten 

1825 

Murret  v.  Westerne 

214,277,278, 

660 

Morrice  v.  Bank  of  England       1033, 

1615 

v.  Swaby 

1824,  1825 

Morrill  v.  Morrill 

778,  1150, 1157, 

1158 

Morris  v.  Ashbee 

1645,  1646 

v.  Barclay 

287 

v.  Barker 

726 

v.  Bull 

1278 

v.  Caonan 

1382 

v.  Clarkson 

1270 

v.  Cleasby 

1129 

v.  Colinan 

1654,  1727 

V.  Davies 

974, 1137,  1460 

v.  Dillingham 

1256 

v.  Edwards 

485,  579,  889 

v.  Elme 

1750, 1768 

v.  Fort 

363 

v   Hay  ward 

468 

v.  inn 

1683 

v.  Honeycombe 

743 

v.  Howell 

1817 

r;.  Hoyt 

846 

v  Islip 

1393 

v.  Kelly 

320,  1644 

v.  Llanelly  Ry.  and  Dock  Co. 

983,  1330 
v.  M'Neil  1700 

v.  Merritt  1073 

v.  Morris     86, 170,  243,  349, 1573, 

1633,  1860 
v.  Morris  &  C.  D.  Co.  855 


v  Mowatt 

1061,  1209,  1282 

v  Nixon 

841 

v  Owen 

1590 

v   Parker 

721,  723.  724 

v.  Peyton 

974,  1019 

v.  Richardson 

987,  1484,  1491 

v.  Robinson 

87 

v.  Ross 

671 

v  Smith 

1049 

v.  Taylor    1,  963,  1168,  1296,  1314 
v.  Timmins  1163 

t>.  Vivian  1107,1108.1131 

v.  White  843,  1584 


[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 

Morris  v.  Williams  943 

v.  Wilson  990 

v.  Wright  1643,  1645 

Canal,  &c,  Co.  v.  Biddlet         1675 
v.  Central  Ry.  Co.  1631,  1637, 

1669 
v.  Dennis  1621 

V.  Fagan  1631,  1677 

v.  Fagin  1613 

v.  Jersey  City  1661,  1668 

and  Essex  R.   Co.  v.  Hudson 

Tunnel  R.  Co.  1631 

v.  Pruddeu  303,  1661 

Morris  Wilsou  &  Co.  v.  Coventry 

M.  Co.  1643 

Morrish  v.  Murray  1127 

Morrison,  He  1361,  1801 

v.  Arnold  1673,  1574 

v   Barrow       987,  1072,  1079,  1148, 

.       2338 

v.  Beckwith  1653 

v.  Bowman  378 

v.  Coleman  1675 

v.  Durr  843 

v.  Hart  361,  849,  862 

v.  M'Leod  1240 

v .  Marquardt  1638 

v.  Mayer  782 

v.  Moat  1070,  1651,  2319 

v.  Morrison  1423,  1470,  1471, 

1548,  1768, 1769 

v.  Searight  1530,  1536,  1549 

v.  Stewart  843 

Morrisse  v.  Inglis  1276,  1286 

Morrissey  v.  Broomal  1071 

Morrit  v.  Walton  1526,  2059 

Morrow  v.  Fossick  1533 

v.  Lawrence  247,  296 

v.  Wessell  1282 

Morse  v.  Buckworth  565 

v.  Earl  89 

v.  Hill  560,  844,  1320 

v.  Hovey  191,  737 

v.  Lyman  255 

v-  Machine  Water  Power  Co.      287 

v  Roach  877 

v.  Royal  842 

v.  Sadler  225 

v.  Slason  851 

v.  Smith  997,  1459 

v.  Stearns  1411,  1561 

v.  Worcester  1638 

Morshead  v.  Frederick  1284 

v.  Reynolds  1213 

Morss  v.  Domestic  S.  M.  Co.         1686 

Mortgage  Co.  v   Jefferson  385 

Mortimer  v.  Cipsey  4~>7 

v.  Cottrell  1632 

v.  Fraser  546,  599 

^.Hartley  315,  542,  6o2 

v.  M'Callon  1126 

v.  Mortimer  202,  203,  204 

v.  Orchard  380,  843,  860,  861, 

14H6 

v.  Picton  1791 

«   West  69,  685 

M  >rtimore  v.  Soares  818 

Mortland  v.  Mortland  552, 1302 

Mortlock  v.  Buller  989,  995 

v.  Leathes  1772 

v.  Mortlock  399 

Morton,  lie  98 

v.  Great  Eastern  Ry.  Co.  1775 

v.  Grenada  Academies       549,  557, 

71< 

v.  Miller  1175,  1596 

v.  New  Orleans  &c  Ky.  Co.       402 

v.  Palmer  39,  5"5 

v.  Weil  338 

v  White  881 

Mosbv  v.  Haskins  1623 

v.  Withers  1286 

Moscatti  r.  Lawson  1105 

Moseby  ?'.  Partee  1676 

Moseley  V.  Armstrong  S4l 

v.  Brush  197,  19!) 

v-  Cocke  9S6 


Moseley  v.  Cresseys  Co.  240,  241,  242 
v.  Gassett  837 

v   Hankinson  1276 

v.  Moseley  1617 

v .  Victoria  Rubber  Co.  576 


v.  Ward 
Mosely  v.  Mosely 

v.  Virgin 
Moser  r.  Marsden 
Moses  v.  Brodie 

v.  Mayor,  <&c. 

v.  Murgatroyd 

i\  Wooster 
Mosier  v.  Beale 
Moiw,  lie 


1416, 1417 

951 

1404,  1660 

406 

367 

1620 

1412 

1507 

87 

1844 


v.  Anglo-Egyptian  Nav.  Co.  561, 
661,  1548,  ,545) 

v.  Bainbrigge  324,  1008 

v.  Baldock  1475 

v.  Buckley  615 

v.  Dunlop  96 

v.  McCall  1003 

v.  Syers  397.  1601 

Most}  d  v.  Brooke  164,  1584 

v.  Emmanuel  1525 

v.  Vabrigas  643 

v.  Mostyn  1276 

Motion  !\  King  1539 

v.  Moojen  58 

Motley  v.  Downman  1*>49 

Mott  v.  Black  wall  Ry.  Co.  1111 

v .  Carter  221 

V.  Hall  760 
v.  Harrington 


1248, 1298,  1299. 

1301) 

940 

211,  1080,  1407 

284 

London  Assurance 

197 
403 
1129 
144 
904,  918,  930 
230 


v.  Ramsey 

v.  Shoolbred 

v.  Shreve 
Motteux  v. 
Co. 

t>.  Mackreth 
Mould  v.  Griffiths 
Moulin  v   Ins.  Co 
Moulson  v.  Hargrave 
Moulton  17.  Chaffee 

v.  Edmonds  1218 

v.  Reid  1492 

v.  Richardson  1081 

Mounce  v.  Byars  780, 1075 

Mound  Citv    Life   Ins.    Co    v. 

Harding  1286, 12?9 

Moundsville  v  Ohio  River  R.  Co.  312, 

1662 

Mounsey  v.  Burnham 

i      v.  Earl  of  Lonsdale 


Mounson  r.  West 
Mount  v.  Manhattan  Co. 
v.  Potts 


426 
1378,  1379, 
1600 
1107 
682 
842. 1370 


Mount  Carbon  Coal  Co.  v.  Blanch- 


ard 

Mountcastle  r  Moore 
Mountford,  Ex  parte 

r.  Scott 

v.  Taylor 
Mountfort,  Ex  parte 


331 
1284 
1&54 
675 
726 
1349.  1357, 
1603 
Mount  Hope  Iron  Co.  v.  Dear- 
den  1157 
Mountnorris,  Earl  of  r.   White    1658 
Mount  Olivet  Cemetery  v.  Budcke 

'410,  412,  1675 
Mountstuart  v.  Mountstuart  1355 
Mount  Vernon  Bank  v.  Stone  328 
Mourilyan,  Re  1044.  1590 

Mouseley  v.  Basnett  816,  817 

Mowatt  v.  Graham  942 

Mower  v.  Kip  1254 

Mowrev  v.  lad.  and   Cinn.  R. 

Co.  1614 

Mowrv  v.  Baraboo  Bank  1381 

v.  Bishop  1259, 1260 

0  Davenport  1120 

r.  Hill  313 

V    Whitney  10 

Moxhay  V  Inderwick  1^54 

Moxon  v.  Bright  551 


lxxxviii 


Moxon  v.  Payne  328 

Moye  v.  Bateman  1848 

Hoyezs  v.  Coiner  175(5 

Mozeley  t'.  Cowie  328,  417 

Mozley  v.  Alston       26,  240,  242,  243 

v.  (Jowie  284 

Mrzena  v.  Brucker  349,  728,  75!) 

M.  Schandler  B.  Co.  v.  Welch      1620 

Muckleston  v.  Brown  483,  647 

Mudd  v.  Suckermore  1147 

Mudgett  v.  Gager  149,  150.  191 , 

216,  219,  290 

Muggeridge,  Re  1491 

Muir  v.  Howell  1663 

Muirhead  v.  Evans  1090 

Muldoon  v.  Muldoon  1561 

Muldrow  v.  Du  Bose      792,  793,  794 

Mulford  v.  Reilly  1031 

Mulbearo  v.  Press  Pub.  Co.  887 

Mulholland  v  Hendrick  856 

Mullakin  v.  Mullakin  830 

Mul  an  v.  United  States  8 

Mullen  v.  Strieker  1638 

Mulleue  v   Hussey  1285 

Muller  v.  Dows  357 

v.  Henry  1683 

Mullett  v.  Christmas  28 

Muliikiu  v.  Mullikiu  1282 

Mullins  v.  Aiken  1003 

v.  Howell  1603 

v.  Hussey  385 

v.  Towushend  1276 

Mullock  v.  Jenkins  242 

Mullows  f.  Bannister  448 

Mulloy  v,  Paul  715,  971 

v.  Young  861 

Mulock  v.  Mulock       559,  956, 1076, 

1124,  1678 

Mulvey  v.  Gibbons  215 

Mum  ford  v.  Muniford  49 

v.  Murray  90, 122,  2297 

v.  Stohwasser  1398 

Munch  v.  Cockerell         247,  248, 268 

v.  Shabell  418 

Munchus  v.  Harris  860 

Munday  v.  Knight         324,  360,  370 

v.  Shatzell  392 

v.  Vail  853 

Mundv  v.  Howe,  Earl  1359 

v.  JollitTe  38 

v  Mundy  1150,1165,1166 

Mundy's  Landing  Co.  v    Hardin 

378 
Munn  v.  Marsh  283 

Munns  v.  Isle  of  Wight  Ry.  Co.  1222 
Munor  o.  De  Tartel  152 

Munro  v   Meech  659 

v.  Smith  1643 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 

Munro  v.  Wivenhoe  &  Bright- 
lingsea  Ry.  Co.   1598,  1664, 1671 

Muuroeff.  Tousey  1643 

Mudsoi)  v   Bowen  334 

v.  Curtis  1381 

v.  Reed  1073,  1076 

Munster  v.  Lamb  887,  1103 

Munt  v.  tih  lies  88 

v.  Shrewsbury  and  Chester  Ry. 
Co.  1620 

Murch  v.  Concord  Railroad  545 

Murdock  v.  Ratcliffe  346 

I      v.  Walker  1620 

Murdoek's  Case  780,  781, 1630, 

1639,  1664 

Murfree  v  Carmack  67 

v.  Leeper  27 

Murkle  V.  Murkle  754 

Murphev  v.  Amer.  Life  Ins.  and 

Trust  Co.  1460 

Murphy  v.  Clark  314,  385 

v.  Conway  1501 

v.  Gibbs  418 

v.  Jackson  235,  247,  258,  270,  779 
v.  Lincoln  590,  1638 

V.  Murphy  1468 

v.  New  York  Central  R.  Co.  940 
v.  New  York  Police  Board  1620 
v.  Oldis  41,  43,  154 

v.  Savannah  1585 

v.  Smith  13*0 

v.  Spaulding  1468 

v.  Vincent  889 

v.  Work  918 

Murray ,  Re  1299, 1841 ,  1846 

v.  Ballou  678,  679, 1382 

v.  Barlee  113 

v.  Barlow  280 

v.  Blatchford  844,  1013,  1028, 

1029,  1594 
v.  Bogue  1646 

v.  Bush  1503 

v.  Butler  1096 

v.  Clayton  1686 

v.  Cockerell  1726 

v.  Coster  560.  720,  721 

v.  Dehon  1263,  1603 

v.  De  Rottenham  2220 

v.  Elibank,  Lord  96, 101,  106, 

107,  1516 
v.  Elston  907,  1676 

v.  Finster  678 

v.  Hay  302,303,341,345 

v.  Lylburn  280 

v.  Newbon  114 

v.  Phillips  1382 

v.  Schooner  Betsey  50 

v.  Shadwell  634 


Murray  v.  Toland  666,  668 

v.  Vipart  447 

v.  Walter  1825,  1826 

Murrell  v.  Clapham  37,  74 

Murriet  v.  Lvon  180 

Murrow  v.  Wilson  30,  31 

Muscott  v.  Halhed  355 

Muse  v.  Egerton  113 

Musgrave,  Ex  parte  60 

v.  Medex  310,  1712 

v.  Nevinson  1129 

v.  Parry  67 

v.  Pulido  17,  628 

v.  Stevens  1072 

Musgrove  v.  Flood  96 

v.  Lusk    164,  974,  1296, 1317,  1575 

v.  Nash  1754 

v.  Staylor  1679 

Muskerry  v.  Skerrington  1411 

Mussel  v.  Morgan  1584 

Mussell  v.  Cooke  655 

Musselman  *>.  Stohl  1508 

Musselwhite  v.  Spicer  1654 

Mussina  v.  Bartlett  462,  5i'4 

Musters  v.  Wright  226 

Mutrie  v.  Binney     354,  555,  633,  664 

Mutter  v.  Chauvel  1516,  1523 

v.  Eastern  &  M.  Ry.  Co.  26 

v.  Hudson  1261 

Muttleburv  v.  Haywood  1849 

Mutual  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Balch      1275 

v.  Cokefair  759 

v.  Sturges  524, 1286 

Mutual  Society,  Re  1438 

Mycock  v.  Beatson  552 

Myer  v.  Hart  1381 

Myers  v.  Bradford  1313 

v.  Daniels  1463 

t».  Dorr  695 

v.  Farrington  302 

v.  Fenn  287 

v.  Gemmel  1638 

v.  Hanlon  645 

v.  Kin/.ie  844 

v.  McGahagan  601 

v.  Murray  357 

v.  Myers"       68,  90,  91,  1253,  1259, 

1260,  1358,  1369 

v.  Pickett  1580 

v.  Raymond  1282 

v.  Trimble  1686 

v.  United  Guaranty,  &c.  Co.    276. 

338 

Myles  v.  Burton  100 

Mynatttf.  Hubbs  1131 

Mynd  v.  Francis  586 

Mynn  v.  Hart  29 

Myrick  v.  Adams  458 


N. 


N.  v.  N.  162 

N.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Nunnally  634 

Nacoochee,  &c.  Co.  v.  Davis  1468 

Naddo  v.  Bardon  560 

Nadin  v.  Bassett  915 

Nagle  c.  Edwards  713 

Nagle-Gillman  v.  Christopher  108, 


Nail  v.  Mobley  334 

v.  Punter  319 

Naish  v.  Browne 
Nalder  v.  Hawkins  6 

Nalle  v.  Austin 
Namee  v.  Groot 
Nanney  !'.  Martin 

v.  Vaughan 

v.  Williams 
Napier  r   Bullwinkle 

v.  Daniel 

v.  Effingham  73,  173, 


v.  Elam 


840,  1229, 


,341 

,780 
1106 
3,71 

314 
1021 

118 
lfi78 
1362 
1638 
1109 
174, 

175 
1553 


Napier  v.  Napier     101, 102,  106,  784 

r.  Routledge  2304 

v   Staples  1223,1225 

Nash  »   Dillon  1422 

v.  Evangelical     Lutheran 

Church,  Rector  of  144 

v.  Hunt  1302 

v.  Nash  116 

v  New  England  Life  Ins.  Co.    303 
v.  Smith      287,  289.  294.  394,  585, 
586,  1561, 1562,  1563,  1566,  1567 
v.  Suinburn  1131 

Nashua  &   Lowell  R.  Co.  v.  Bos- 
ton &  L.  R.  Co.  1221 
Nashville  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Conk        313 
Nasom  r.  Clarkson                       1251 
Nathan  r.  Tompkins            542,  1675 
Manuf.  Co.  v.  Craig  314 
Newman  &  Co.,  Re            149,  447 
Nation  v   Cameron                           314 
National  Association  v.  Carstairs 

449,  452,  453,  536,  889 


National  Bank  v.  Bryant 
v.  Carpenter 
v.  Garlingame 
v.  Goddard 
v.  Insurance  Co. 
v.  National  Bank 


867 
2384 
186 
295 
830 
907 


v.  Sprague    1281,  1296, 1299, 1316, 
1492,  1550 
v.  United  Hand  in  Hand  Co. 

1393 
of  Commerce  v.  Smith  418 

&  P.  Bank  v.  Thomas  187 

Bolivian  Nav.  Co.  v.  Wilson     1438 
Cash  R.  Co.  v.  Boston  Cash  I. 

&  R.  Co.  1642 

Furnace  Co.  v.  Moline  M.  I. 

Works  842 

Hotel    Co.  v.  Crane  Brothers 

Manuf.  Co.  790 

Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Pingrey  1561 

Manuf.  Co.  v.  Meyers  314 

Park  Bank  v.  Halle  545 


National  Permanent   M.  B.  B. 

Society  v.  Raper  1224 

Provincial  Bank  v.  Evans  170 

v.  Jackson  674 

Provincial  Plate  Glass  Ins.  Co. 

v.  Prudential  Ass.  Co.  1080, 

1398,  1638 

S.  S.  Co.  v  Tugman  357 

Trust  Co.  v.  Murphy  1742 

Union  Bank  v  Reed  324 

Natz  v.  M'Phersou  678 

Naudain  v.  Ormes  545 

Naumberg  v.  Hyatt  313 

Navulshaw  v.  Brownrigg  551 

Naylor,  Ex  parte  1205 

v.  Bvland  170 

v.  Middleton  1678 

v.  Smith  1169 

v.  Wright  422 

Neaderhouser  v.  State  546 

Neafie  v.  Neafie      635,  659,  660,  094 

1019 

Neal,  Re,  Weston  v.  Neal        39,  797 

v.  Foster  1548,  1553 

v.  Keel  1258 

v.  Ogden  846 

v.  Rathell  334 

v.  Robinson  861,  1230 

Neale,  Re  1347 

v.  Bealing  1055,  1749 

v.  Cripps  1632 

V.  Hagthorp       254,  715,  837,  992, 

1239,  1243,  1245,  1599 

v.  Neale  1622 

v  Neales  417,  418,  23'.)8 

v.  Pink  1741 

v.  Ute  287 

Neary  v.  Jones  11*54 

Neate  v.  Dennian  628 

v   Latimer  1830,1835 

t'.  Marlborough,  Duke  of         1037 

Neave  v  Douglas  1745 

Nebraska  v.  Iowa  13S1 

Neck  v.  Gains         420,  692,  696,  699, 

780 

Needham  v.  Needham         512, 1030, 

1043,  1703 

v.  Smith  176,  1487 

Needier  v.  Deeble  214,  277 

v.  Kendall  1583 

Needles  v.  Needles         114,  118,  121, 

_   123 

Neely  v.  Anderson  287,  288 

Neep  »'.  Abbot  884 

Neeson  v.  Clamp  914 

Neilson  v  Betts  1080,  1503 

V.  Churchill  192 

v.  Dickinson  846 

v.  Frv  313 

v.  M 'Donald  2278 

Neininger  v.  State  777 

Nell  v.  Snowden  1125 

Nellis  v.  Pennock  Manuf.  Co.      107, 

334,  402 

Nelms  v.  Clark  1463 

Nels  v.  Yocum  542 

Nelson,  Ex  parte     1054, 1055, 1057 

v.  Barter         394,  1560,  1563,  1566 

v.  Becker  576 

v.  Booth       1232, 1251, 1252, 1259, 

1261 

v.  Dubois  365 

v.  Duncombe  86 

v.  Dunn  1549 

v.  Ferdinand  109,  385 

v.  Hill  346 

v.  Hubbard  1734 

v .  Oldfield  663 

v.  Pastorino  149,  536 

v.  Pinegar  836,  837 

v.  Ponsford  723 

v.  Seaman  206.  976 

v.  United  States  951 

Earl  v.  Bridport,  Lord     864,  1200, 

1381 

Nelthorpe  v.  Holgate  197 

r.  Pennyman  1285 


TABLE   OP   CASES   CITED. 

[The  reterences  are  to  the  star  paging.] 

Nephi  Irrigation  Co.  v.  Jenkins 

1168 
Neptune  Ins.  Co.  v.  Dorsey  1245 

Neror  v.  Hurnand  1468,  1470 

Nesbit  v.  St.  Patrick's  Church    497, 
520 
Nesbitt  v.  Berridge        315,  542,  544, 
1386,  13:i4 
736,  784,  785 
361,881 
2027 
1463 
1638 
325 
824 
635, 1211 
870 
1386 
844.  886 
829,881,982 
1477 
9!  14 
1973 
726 
1234, 1413 
176 
1638 
1400 


lxxxix 


?'.  Dallam 
Nesmith  v.  Calvert 

V.  Dinsmore 
Nestor  v.  Swift 
Nethery  v    Payne 
Neuman  v.  Godfrey 
Neve  v.  Pennell 

v.  Weston 
Nevil  v  Johnson 
Nevill  v.  Snelling 
Neville  v.  Demeritt 

v.  Fitzgerald 
Nevinson  v.  Stables 
Nevitt  v.  Bacon 
Nevius  w.  Dunlap 
New  v.  Barne 

v.  Jones 

v.  New 
New  Albany  v.  White 
Newall  v.  Smith 

t1.  Telegraph  Construction  Co 

485,1824 

v.  Wilson  1643 

v.  Wright    '  284 

Newark  Aqueduct  Board  v.  Pas- 
saic 1636 

and  N    Y   R.  Co.  v.  Mayor  of 

Newark        1,  1076,  1077 

Plank  Road  Co   v.  Elmer  993, 

1684 

Savings  Inst.  v.  Jones  200 

Newavgo  County  Manuf   Co  v. 

Stevens  843 

Newbegin  v.  Bell  1424, 1437 

Newberry,  Re  108 

v.  Alexander  1120 

v.  Iilatchford  10,  1548 

v.  Stuart  1320 

Newbery,  Re  226, 1862 

v.  James  1651 

Newbiggin  by  the  Sea  Gas  Co.  r. 
Armstrong  307,  308 


Newbigging  v.  Adam 

552 

Newbold.  Re 

436 

v.  Ridgeway 

1166 

Newbould  r.  Smith 

652 

New  Braintree  v   Southworth         190 

New  Brunswick  &  Canada  Rail- 

way Co.  r.  Conybeare 

1399 

Newhurgh  u    Bickerstaffe 

1362 

Earl  of  v.  Newburgh,  Count- 

ess of 

1111 

&c,  Turnpike  V  Miller 

1623, 

1680 

Newbury  v   Marten 

167 

Lnrd  v.  Wren 

636 

Newhy  v.  Harrison 

1666,  1678 

v.  Highway  Com'rs 

1638 

v.  Sharpe 

384,  401 

Newcastle.  Duke  of,  Re 

1349 

v.  Broxtowe,  Inhab.  of 

1126 

Newcastle-upon-Tyne     V. 

Att- 

Gen 

1650 

Newcomb  v.  Clark 

195,  325 

v.  Horton                     230,  240,  344 

v.  White 

790 

Newcombe  v  Chicago  N.  W.  Ry 

Co 

334 

Newcomen  r   Coulson 

1666  1678 

Newdigate  v.  Johnson 

629 

V.  Newdigate 

1536,  1537 

Newell  v.  Burbank 

329 

v.  Newton 

546 

v  Nichols 

850 

v.  Sass 

1661 

v.  Smith 

1752 

v-  West 

1299 

v.  Wheeler 

1624 

Newen  v.  Wetten 

1262 

New  England  Bank  v.  Lewis        615, 

726,  844 

&c  ,  Bank  v.  Newport 

Steam  Factory  216,262,  260, 

282,  335 

New  England  M.  S  Co.  v  Powel.  3S5 

Newenham  v.  Pemberton       443,  444 

Newgong  Tea  Co  ,  Re  945 

Newhall  v  Hobbs  715,  720,  721 

V    Kastens  1560,  1561 

Newhouse  v   Mitford  1029 

New  Jersey  v.  New  York        17,  129, 

446,  536,  543 

&c.  Co.  v.  Ames  220 

Mut.  Life  Ins   Co  v.  Corbin     1434 

Patent  Tauning  Co.  v.  Turner  658 

Protection  and  Lombard  Bank 

v.  Thorp  24 

Zinc  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  Franklinite 

Co.  1472, 1476,  1479,  1519, 

1521,  1538 

Newkirk  v.  Willett  570 

Newland  v.  Champion  324 

v.  Gaines  1017 

v.  Gentry  68 

v.  Glenn  1019 

v.  Horseman  664,  056 

v.  Rogers  334,  341 

v.  Steer  907, 1177, 1209, 1820,  L825 

New  Loudon  Bank  v.  Lee     ^36,  202, 

294,  550 

Newlove  v.  Callaghan  726 

Newman  v.  Alford  1648 

v.  Auling  1255 

v.  Davenport  1743 

v.  De  Lorimer  652 

v.  Godfrey  146,  197,  296.  300 

v.  Hatch  1437 

v.  Hodgson  318, 1809 

v.  Hutton  684 

v.  James  845 

v.  Kendall  930,  052 

v.  Landrine  27,  30.  31 

w.Moody  590,857,2397 

v.  Morris  1625 

w.  Norris  1209 

v.  Selfe  161.  176,  178,  1266 

v.  Wallis  605.  627,  703.  704 

v.  White  690,  741 

New  Mexico  Land  Co.  v.  Elkins 

206,  418 
New  Orleans  v.  Gaines        1296,  1302 
r.  Paine  1620 

v.  Peake  1029,  1716 

G.  L   &  B.  Co.  v.  Dudley  658, 

1073,  1079,  1110,  1125 
M.  &  C.  R  Co.  t'.  New  Orleans 

659.  1003 
Nat.  Bank  w.  Bohne  630 

N.  B.  Ass  v.  Le  Breton  255 

&  N.  E.  R.  Co.  v  Mississippi 

&c.  R.  Co.  1663 

R.  Co.  v.  Dunn  1661 

Railroad  v.  Morgan  1491 

Newport,  &c  Bridge  Co.  w.  Doug- 
lass 1719 
Newry  v.  Kilmorey                486,  776 
Newsham  v.  Gray  791 
Newxom  v.  Bowyer  89 
v.  Shearman                              1448 
Newton,  Re                                    894 
w.  Askew                           1069,  1604 
w.  Baker                                     1320 
v    Bennett                         1360,  1420 
v.  Chorlton              1597,  1600,  1667 
w.  Curzon                              _     1359 
v-  Dimes                               719,  774 
w.  Dousilass                                1567 
v   Egmont,  Earl  of    257,  258,  270. 
277 
j'.  Egmont,  Lord                 289,  699 
r.  Grand  Junction  Ry.  Co       1450 
0.  Lucas                                      13^3 
v.  Metropolitan  Ry.  Co              31 S 
w.  Newton                                       63'l 
v  Ricketts        506,  805,981,  1601. 
1726 


xc 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging] 


Newton  v.  Swasey  365,  657 

B.  Taylor  I860 

v.  Terry  779 

v.  Thayer    589,  603,  694,  828,  829, 
830 
v   Thomson  1847 

v.  Willis  1213 

New    Westminster    Brewery    v. 

Hannah  405 

New  York  v.  Connecticut  17 

New  York  &  B.   C.  P.   Co.  v. 

New  York  C   P.  Co.  8,  933, 1573 
New  York  B.  &   P    Co.  v.  Ma- 

gowan  1642 

New  York  Chem.  Co.  v.  Flowers 

180,  524,  754,  784 
New  York  Co.  v.  Water  Co.  630 

New  York  Drv  Dock  Co.  v.  Amer- 
ican Life' Ins.  &  Trust  Co.    1621 
New  York  Filter  Co  v  Schwartz- 

walder  1642 

New  York  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Ely        24 
v.  'looker  402 

New  York  Guaranty  Co.  V.  Mem- 
phis Water  Co  197 
New  York  Ice  Co.  v.  N.  W.  Ins. 

Co.  385 

New  York  Life  Ins   Co.  v.  Clop- 
ton  51 
v.  Statham  51 
New  York,  <Xrc.  R.  Co.  v.  Haws   1625 


v.  Robinson 
N     Y.   &   N.  H. 

Schuyler 
New  York,  N.  H. 

Martin 


830 
R.  R.   Co.   v. 

585 
&  H.  R.  Co.  v. 

974,  1840 


New  York  &c.  Pol.  Co.  v.  New 
York  C   P.  Co.  10 

New  York  Printing  Co.  v.  Fitch 

1631,  1664 

New  York  P.  &  0   R.  Co.  v   New 

York,  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  Co.      1743 

New  York  &  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.  v. 

Jewett  1765 

Nias  v.  Adamson  157 

v.  Northern  and  Eastern  Ry. 
Co.  572,  578 

Nihertt).  Baghurst  1621,  Lo75 

Niblett  v.  Daniel  883 

Nice  v.  Purcell  1073,  1"76 

Nichol  v.  Bestwick  1130 

v.  Davidson  County  726 

v.  Ridley  657,  867 

v.  Steger  1360 

v    Vaughan  1077 

Nicholas  v.  Murray  586 

Nicholl  v.  Boyd  1765 

v.  Jones     571, 803,  809,  889,  1823, 

1834 

v.  Wheeler  485,  579,  889 

Nicholls,  Re  1611 

v.  Dowding  1098 

v.  E'.ford  795,  977 

v.  Haslam  1440 

v.  Ibbetson  912,  1670 

v.  Kearsly  1666 

v.  Nichols  1209, 1210 

v.  Perry  Patent  Arm  Co  1715 

v.  Roe  554,  1621,  1858 

v.  Ward  180,  181, 182,  500 

Nichols,  Ex  parte  199 

v.  t'olville  1467 

v.  Eaton  1037 

V.  Ela  1110,  1299 

v  Levy  1037 

to  Nixey  157 

v.  Pitman  1643,  1647 

v.  Rogers  324,  407 

v.  Scranton  Steel  Co.  418 

v.  Williams  231 

Nicholson,  Re  83, 1610 

v   Carline  92,  102 

v.  Drury  Estate  Building  Co.     87, 

123 

1413,  1422 


Nicholson   v.  Knapp 

v.  Norton 

v.  Patterson 

v.  Peile 

v.  Pirn 

v.  Squire 

v   Wilborn 
Nickersou   v.  Atchison 

Co. 
Nickle  v.  Stewart 
Nicklin  v.  Hobin 

v.  Patten 
Nickolson  v.  Knowles 
Nickson  v.  Richardson 
Nicol  v.  Vaughan 
Nicoll  v   Boyd 

v.  Huntington 

v.  Roosevelt 
Niell  v.  Motley 
Niemann  v.  Harris 
Nightingale  J>.  Dodd 

v   Lawson 
Niles,  Matter  of 

v.  Anderson 

v.  Williams 
Nimmo  v  Commonwealth 
Nims  v.  Nims 
Nisbett  v  Murray 
Nix  v.  Winter 
Nixon  v.  Albion  Marine  Ins.  Co. 

849,  881,  981 

v.  Richardson  -       1609,  1700 

v.  Sheldon  32 

Noad  v.  Backhouse  1730 

Noake,  Re  108 

Nobel's  Explosives  Co.  v.  Jones  298, 
"j,41" 
Nobkissen  v.  Hastin; 
Noble  v.  Edwardes 

v.  Garland 

v.  Kennoway 

v.  Martin 

v.  Meymott 

v.  Moses 

v.  School  Directors 

v.   Stow 


1652 
1409,  1845 
1625 
421 
555 
1588 
1351 
;c.  R. 

313 

1576,  1584 

1618 

765,  766 

1561 

1698 

851,  1077,  1082 

1765 

1382,  1400, 1680 

1541 

85 

899,  1669 

885 

1233 

1841 

544.  545 

556,  630 

1234 

1221 

1427,  1429 

360 


607,  703 

989 

548 

1130 

1118 

1411 

349 

1029 


1373, 1525,  1540,  1579, 

1778, 1785,  1794.  1795 

v.  Wilson   1315,  1316,  1676,  1677 

Nobles  v.  Hogg  1172 

Nodine  r   Greenfield      194,  229 

Noe  v.  Gibson  1743 

v.  Noe  617 

Noel  v  Fitzgerald  952 

v.  King  403,  740,  1551,  1552 

v.  Noel  182,  986,  1120,  1824 

v.  Robinson  1475 


316,  681 

314,  1659 

908,  16n0,  1659 


v.  Ward 
Nokes  v    Fish 

v.  Gibbon 

v   Seppings  1772,  1773 

Nolan  v.  Shannon  930 

Noland  v.  Turner  217 

v.  Ormston  1580 

Nolen  v.  Woods  378 

Nonmagnetic  Watch  Co.  v.  As- 
sociation Horlogere  Suisse     149, 
517 
Noonan  v.  Bradlev  1472 

v.  Caledonia  Gold  M.  Co.  402 

v.  Lee  1042 

v  Orton  887,  888 

Norbury  e.  Calbeck  1419 

v.  Meade  1459,  1467,  1496, 

1498 

Lord  v.  Kitohin  1662 

Norcom  ».  Rogers       8,  9, 10,  83,  84. 

86 

Norden  v.  Defries  573 

Norfolk,  Duke  oft'.  Worthy  195 

&  W.  R.  Co.   v.   Postal   Tel 


Falkner 
Gibb 
J  eyes 


1530 
1329,  1344 


Cable  Co. 
Trust  Co.  v.  Marye 
Norman,  Re 
v.  Beaumont 
v.  Huddleston 
v.  Johnson 
v.  Stiby 


579,  1556 
1661 
•27,  31,  34 
1092, 1128 
1550 
1406 
602 


Norman  v.  Villain  88,  179 

Norman  Scott-Russed  v.  London, 

Chatham  and  Dover  Ry.       1682 

Normandie,  The  933 

Normauville  v.  Stauning    1599,  1670 

Norris  v.  Bean  236 

v.  Chambres  629 

v.  Cotterill  449,  452 

v.  Freeman  1129 

v.  Haggin  334,  560 

v.  Harris  ia50 

v.  Hassler  216 

v.  Jackson  336,  1081,  1660 

v.  Lake  1716 

v,  Leman  243 

v.  Le  Neve  1165,  1576 

v.  McLam  314 

v.  Norris  1410 

v.  Ormond  1660 

v.  Scott  324 

v.  Wright  268 

Nortclitfe  v.  Warburton        280,  400, 

1034 

North  v.   Great    Northern   Ry. 

Co.  1380 

v.  Great  Western  Ry.  Co.         795, 

796 

v.  Perrow  1677 

v.  Peters  295 

v.  Stafford,  Earl  of  584 

North    American    Coal     Co.   e. 

Dyett  402,  1476,  1480, 

1533^ 

North  Australian  Territory  Co. , 

Re  720, 942 

North  Carolina  Gold  Amalg 
Co.  v.  N.  C.  Ore  Dressing 
Co.  1666 

North  Carolina  R.  Co.  v.  Drew     888 
North-Eastern  Ry.   Co.  v.  Mar- 
tin 551 
North  London  Ry.  Co.  V-  Great 

Northern  Ry.  Co.  211,671, 

1858 
North,  Lord  v.  Gray,  Lord  1573 

North  Penn.  Coal  Co.  v    Snow- 
den  1071 
North  River  Bank  v.  Rogers         424 
North  River  Ins.  Co.  v.  Holmes 

1286 
North  Staffordshire  Steel  Co.  v. 

Camoise  1660 

North  Western  Bank  v.  Nelson     601 
North  Wheal  Exmouth  Min  Co., 

Re  915,  1333 

North  Whitehall  v.  Kellar  974 

Northam,  Ex  parte  39 

Northampton  Coal  Co.    v.  Mid- 
land Waggon  Co.  27,  1474 
Northampton  National  Bank  v. 

Crafts  200 

Northcote  v.  Duke  1658 

r.  Northcote  764 

Northern   Counties   Ins.   Co    v. 

Whipp  674 

Northern   Counties  Union    Ry. 

t>.  North-Eastern  Ry.  1775 

Northern  Illinois  C.  &  I.  Co.  v. 

Young  1584 

Northern     Pacific     R.     Co.     v. 

Amacker  2040 

v.  Cannon  1618 

r    Herbert  1120 

v    Paine  313,  850 

v.  Roberts  586 

v.  Walker  334 

v.  Whalen  1638 

Northern  R.  Co.  v.  Ogdensburg, 

&c.  R.  Co.  1551 

Northern  Transportation  Co  v. 

Chicago  1635 

Northey  v .  Northey  255 

v.  Pearce  1661 

Northfleet  Brick  Co  ,  Re  1610 

Northman  v.  Liverpool,  &c.  Ins. 

Co.  63,  355, 1508,  1518 

Northop  v  Wright  873 


Northumberland,    Duke     of   v. 

Bowman  649 

v.  Todd  749,  892 

Northup  v.  Hatch  563,  564,  567 

Northy  v.  Northy  1238 

Norton,  Ex  parte  116,  1029 

v.  Berlin  Iron  Bridge  Co.  149 

v.  Cooper        307,  309,  1244, 1393, 
1464,  2213 
v.  Florence  Land  Co.  629,  633 

v.  Grover  1734 

v.  Hepworth  448,  454 

v.  Hixon  •  1031 

v.  Meador  186 

v.  Nichols  1643, 1679, 1681 

t;.  Pritchard  1051 

v.  Russell  1408 

v.  Steinkopf  820,  826,  1420 

t>.  Talmadge  1033 

v.  Turvill  642.  714 

v.  Walsh  1120 

v.  Warner  722,  723 

v.  White  813,  814,  1512 

v.  Woods  146,  759,  1409 


TABLE   OP   CASES    CITED. 

[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 

Norvall  v.  Pascoe  800 

Norway  v.  Norway  1436 

v.  Kowe  349.  728,  1201,  1631, 

1717,  1727,1768 

Norwich  v.  Brown  243 

Norwood  v.  Manning  1255 

v  Norwood  674,  846,  12-2 

Nothard  v.  Proctor  173.1 

Notley  v.  Palmer  1359,  1524 

Nottidge  v .  Priehard  1503 

v.  Prince  852 

Nottingham    Union    Guardians 

v.  Tomkinson  849 

Nottley  v.  Palmer  99,  1802,  205:> 

Nourse  v    Finch  1426 

Novosielski  v.  Wakefield  1001,2222 
Nowell,  Re  1040,  1694,  1697 


XC1 


v    Whitaker 
Nowgong  Tea  Co  ,  Re 
Nowland  v.  Glenn 
Noyes  v.  Crawley 

v.  Hall 

v.  Inland  &  S.  C.  Co 


41,  156 

945 

1014 

560,  641 

215 

840 


v.  Rich 


1736, 1742, 1750 


Noyes  v.  Sawyer 

194,  212 

,405 

v.  Willard 

607 

,608 

Noysomhed,  The  Danish  Ship 

553 

Nudd  o.  Powers 

560 

Nugent  v.  Jenkinson 

803 

v    Vetzera 

1346, 

1348 

Nultou's  Appeal 

8*3 

Nulton  v.  Isaacs 

334 

Nuneaton  Local   Board 

v.  Gen 

eral  Sewage  Co. 

10 

Nunn  v.  Barlow 

1425 

v.  D'Albuquerque 

1649 

v.  Hancock 

1004 

v.  Harvey 

1358 

v.  Nunn 

1299 

Nurse  v.  Bunn 

839 

v.  Durnford 

86 

.307 

Nushaum  v.  Stein 

1734 

Nussbaum  v.  Heilbron 

1556 

Nutting  U.  Hebdin 

632 

Nye  v  Maule 

43, 

1082 

Nyse  wander  v.  Low  man 

815 

o. 


Oakes  v.  Turquand 
Oakey  v    Dal  ton 
Oakley  V.  O'Neill 

v.  Patterson  Bank 

V-  Trustees 
Oats  v.  Chapman 
O'Bannon  v  Myer 
Ober  v.  Gallagher 

v.   Planting  Co 
Oberle  v.  Lerch 
Obert  v.  Obert 
O'Brian  v.  Fry 
O'Brien  v.  Bowes 

v.  Creig 

IT.  Klli  >t 

v   Heeney 

v   Hulfish 


1600 

1507 

497,  520 

1715 

1624 

599 

844 

149,  191 

1735 

1365 

1151 

844 

1072, 1079 

1624 

844 

287 

1550 


v.  Lewis        1042, 1065,  1485, 1486 

v  Mahon  1538 

v  Maitland  162,  476 

v   Manders  497 

v.  Obrien  1633 

v   Stephens  1032 

v.  Tyssen  542 

O'Bryne  v.  O'Bryne  1147 

O'Callaghan  v.  Barnad  1670 

v.  Cooper  1416,  1421 

v.  Murphy  93'J 

Occleston  v.  Fullalove  229 

Ocean  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bigler  1573 

v.  Field  563,  564 

Ochsenbein  v.  Papelier        664,  1621 

O'Counell  v   M'Namara  1586 

V.  The  Queen  1091 

O'Conner  v  Sierra  Nevada  Co.      30, 

35.36 

v.  Wilson  1624 

O'Connor  v.  Cook  1075,  1123 

v.  Cooke  1076 

v.  Debraine  1713 

v.  Delaney  8'i0 

V.  Malone  1119,1137,113  1 

v.  Mechanics'  Bank  1746 

v.  Richards  1287 

O'Dayt).  Bowker  1029 

Odd    Fellows    J.    8.    Ass'n     v. 

Merklin  190 

Oddie  t>.  Hrown  1430 

v.  Woodford  14fi9 

Odell  v.  Hart  504 

Odiorne  v.  Seavey  1154 

Odom  v.  Owen  582,  1548,  1551 

Odorless  Excavating  Co  v.  Lau- 

man  1642 

Oelrichs  v.  Spain         630,  1081,  1666 
O'Farrel  v.  O'Farrel  937 


O'Ferrall,  Ex  parte  103 

Offeley  v.  Morgan  586 

Otfen  v   Harman  1408 

Official  Manager  v.  Carstairs        449, 
452,  453,  889 
Official  Receiver,  Ex  parte  576 

Offley  v.  Jenney 
Ogden  v.  Battams 

v.  Davidson 

v.  Fossick 

v.  Gibbons 

v.  Kip 

v.  Moore 

v .  Ogden 

v.  Thornton 

v.  Walker 
Ogg  v.  Leinart 
Ogilby  v.  Gregory 
Ogilvie.  Re 

v.  Hearne 

v.  .leaffreson 

v.  Knox  Ins.  Co. 
Oglander  ?>  Baston 

v.  Oglander 
Ogle  v.  Bell 

v.  Brandling 

v.  Cook 

v.  Ege 

v.  Koerner 
Oglesby  v.  Attrill 
O'Grady  v.  Barry 
Oijshury  v.  La  Farge 
O'llagao,  Ex  parte 
O'Halloran  v.  King 
O'Hara  v.  Eiliott 

v-  McConnell 


226.  227,  252 
1232 
1276 
1657 
406,23')8 
1664 
4H 
720 

417,  418 
1661 
1376 

905 

1035 

33,  37,  530 

677 

274,  287 

89.  118 

1263 

1463 

9S4 

875, 1116 

1613 

790 

418,  659 
402,  406 

9' 14 

1847 

100 

1440 

163, 189,  1467 

2379 

1536,  1587 

868,828 


v.  Shepherd 
O'Hare  v   Downing 
Ohio  v  Ellis  303,  344,  346,  34 

Ohio  Central  R.   Co.  v   Central 

Trust  Co.  1042 

Ohio,  &c.  R  Co.  v.  Fitch  1742 

Ohio  &  Miss.  R.  Co.  v.  Anderson 

1743 
Ohling  v.  Lnitjens  550,  860 

Ohlsen  v.  Terrero  906,  1100 

Ohm  v.  San  Francisco  545 

Ohrlv  v.  Jenkins  710 

Oil  Run   Petroleum  Co.  v.  Gale 

1567 
O'Keefe  v.  Cannon  369 

V  Casey  1352 

O'KelleyV   Oholston  1290 

O'Kelly  v.  Bodkin  1211 

Olcott  v.  Bynum  284 


Old  v.  Old  1680 

Oldaker  v.  Hunt  1635,  1638 

Oidalev.  Whitcher  28 

Oldfield  v.  Cobbett  38,  39, 155, 

491,  505,   509,    796,   813,   1049, 

1454,  1683 

Old  Folks'  Society  v.  Millard        991 

Oldham  v.  Collins  90,  217 

v.  Kboral  1547,  1585 

v   Hughes  97 

v.  Oldham  1707,  1708 

v.  Stonehouse  1481),  1491 

Old    Hickory    Distilling   Co.   v. 

Bleyer  594,  985 

Olding  v.  Poulter  324 

Olin  v.  Hungerford  1033 

Oliva  v.  Bunaforza  334,  559 

Oliver  v.  Bank  of  Tennessee  916 

v.  Burt  1796 

Cunningham  215,  659 


1727. 


?».  Hamilton 

v,  Hunting 

v.  Look 

v.  Memphis,  &c  R.  Co 

v   Moore 

v.  Mut   Comm.  Mar.  Ins.  Co  1966 

V.  Oliver  108,  1004 

v.  Palmer  190,  385 

v.  Piatt  334,  335,  346  347 


1728 
655 
314 

1661 

886 


v.  Richardson 

v    Wright 
Ollendorff?'   Black 
Ollerenshaw  v.  Harrop 

Olley  v.  Fisher 
Olmstead  v   Loomis 
Olnev  t>   Eaton 
Olwell  v  Montgomery 


1166 

912 

46,  1643 

1019,1021, 

1027 

315 

303,  1637 

1033 

637 


Olvphant  v.    St.    Louis  Ore  & 

Steel  Co.  214 

Omaha  S   Rv.  Co.  v.  Beeson         287 

O'Mahonev  v.  Belmont       1715,  1743 

V.  Burdett  1503 

v.  Lucke  1743 

O'Malley  v.  Blease  1413 

Omaly  v   Owen  284 

O'Mealey  v   Wilson  50 

Omerod  v.  Hardman     988,  989,  1475 

Omvchund  v.  Barker  891 

Omierdonk  v.  Gray  1237,  1550 

O'Neal  v.  Boone  860 

Oneida  Countv  Bank  v.  Bonney   634 

ONeil  v  Hamill  1191 

v.  Jones  1658 

v.  Kansas  City,  S.   &  M.  R. 

Co.  1434 


xcu 


Onge  v.  Truelock 
Ong.ey  v.  Hill 
O'Niell  v.  Walker 
Ouioiis  17.  Cohen 

v.  Naish 

v.  Tyrer 
Only  v.  Walker 
Onslow,  lit 


796,  1457 
906 
1051 

385,  1400 
1131 
1004 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 

O'Rourke  v.  Cleveland  608    Ottey  v.  Pensam 

17.  Commissioner  for  Railways  1860 

v.  Elsbree  1492 

Orphan  Asylum  v.  McCartee  793, 
1715,  1722 


99 
1630,  1656 
v.  Wallis  1485 

Ontario  Bank  v.  Mumford     197,  199 
v.  Hoot  365,  657 

v.  Schermerhorn  411 

v.  Strong  457 

Onward     Building     Society    v. 

Smithson  645 

Onyon  v.  W'ashbourne  1744 

Ooddeen  v  Oakeley  1672,  1675 

Oppeuheini  v.  Leo  Wolf  1561 

v.  Martin  877 

Oram  v.  Dennison  457,  524,  529 

Orange  v.  Pickford        849,  873,  881, 
981,  2190 
Co.  Bank  v.  Worden  1691 

Orchard's  Case  1069 

v   Hughes  1042 

Orcutt  v.  Orms  700 

Ord  v   Fawcett  1829 

v.  Huddleston  630,  697 

v.  Noel  1576,  1578 

v  Smith  650 

Oregon  Ry.  &  Nav.  Co.  v.  Gates  1618 
v.  Swinburne  726 

&  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Northern  Paci- 
fic R.  Co.  1517 
Oregonian  Ry.  Co  v.  Oregon  Ry 

&  Nav.  Co.  26,  354,  630 

O'Reilly  v.  Brady  1315,  1316 

Orendorf  v.  Budlong  543 

Orford,  Earl  of  v.  Churchill        1426 
Orgain  v.  Ramsey  1076 

Organ  v-  Gardiner  1585 

v.  Memphis  &  L.  R.  Co.  1150 

Orger  v.  Sparke  1162 

Orient  Steam  Nav.  Co  v.  Ocean 

Marine  Ins.  Co.  1770 

Oriental  Bank  v.  Nicholson        652, 

1565,  1571 

Steam  Co.  ».  Briggs  598,  1490 

Original    Hartlepool    C.    Co.   v. 

Gibbs  10S1 

Orkey  v.  Bend  296 

Orme,  Re,  Evans  v.  Maxwell      1425 

Ormerod  v.   Bleasdale  1488 

Ormes  ?>.  Beadel  712 

Ormond.Lady  v.  Hutchinson  839, 1559 

Marquis  of  v,  Kynnersley        1860 

Ormsby,  Re  1747 

v.  Bakewell  886 

v.  Palmer  739 

v.  Union  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  542 

O'Rourke  v.  Central  City  Soap 

Co.  1648 


Orr  v.  Bowles 
v.  Diaper 
v.  Dickinson 
v.  Littlefield 

v    Merrill 


28 

1556, 1557,  1558 
1653 

1642, 1643, 1676, 
1677 

1676 


Orr  W.  D.  Co.  v   Larcombe  1561 

Orrell  v.  Busch  634 

Orrell  General  Colliery,  &c   Co., 

A'e  659 

Orrock  v.  Binney  224 

Orser  v.  Hoag  46 

Orthwein  v.  Thomas  851 

Ortigosa  v.  Brown  674 

Ortley  v.  Messere  83 

Orton  v.  Baiuurigge  794 

v.  Smith  552, 1624 

Orwell  v.  Hincbinbrooke,  Lord    1213 
Osbaldeston  v.  Askew  1217 

Osbaldiston  v.  Crowther  177 

Osborn  v   Heyer  1734,  1735 

v.  London  Dock  Co.  2047 


v    Morgan 
v.  Thompson 
v.  U.  S   Bank 
Osborue,  Re 
v.  Barge 
v.  Denne 
v.  Foreman 
v.  Harvey 


2001 

1096 

129,  1651, 1661 

109, 1004 

214,  1548,  1553 

15,  81,  1437 

223,  1285,  1288 

1729,  1734 


v.  Jullion    585,  586,  591,  592,  593, 

598,  789,  2087 

v.  Lawrence  363 

v.  London  Dock  Co  942,  1103 

v.  Morgan  92,  98 

to  Rowlett  1401 

v.  Taylor  225 

v.  Usher  1461 

v.  Van  horn  1358 

r.  Williams  668,  1675 

v.  Wisconsin  Central  R.  Co.      303 

Osbourn  v  Fallows  257,  259 

Osgood  v.  Breed  874 

O'Shea  v.  O'Shea  1069, 1835 

O'Sheehy  v.  O'Sheehy  448 

Osmaston  v.  Land  Financiers        894 

Osmond  v.  Tindall  350,  951 

Ostell  v.  LePage  664,  800 

Osterberg  v.  Union  Trust  Co.      1283 

Ostle  v.  Christian  1611 

Ostrander  ■;;.  Webber  630 

Oswald,  Re  1144 

v  Kampmann  149 

Oteri  v.  Scalzo  552, 1320,  1660 

Other  v.  Smurthwaite    324,  381,  911 

Otis  v.  Lindsay  1259 

v.  Shants  542 

v.  Wells  457 


1304, 1305, 1307, 
1308, 1309,  1310 
1423,  1427 
1469,  1470 
113,  499 


Ottley  v.  Gilby 
Otto  v.  Lindford 
Ottway  v.  Wing 

Ousley  v.  Anstruther  1278 

Outhwaite  v.  Outhwaite  1167 

Outland  v.  Outland  334 

Outlaw  v.  Cherry  1517 

Outram  v.  Outram  1102 

Outwell  v.  Van  Winkle  120 

Outwin,  Re  1604 

Overend  &  Gurney  Co.  r.  Gibb  26 
Ovenugtou  v.  Ward  201,  318,  1722 
Overly  v.  Tipton  243 

Overman  v.  Overman  1525 

Wheel  Co    v.  Elliott  Hickory 


Cycle  Co. 

314 

Overstreet  v.  Bate 

560,  644 

v.  Thompson 

926 

Overton  v.  Bauister 

684 

v.  Bigelow 

1475,  1476 

v.  Bolton 

1257 

v.  Memphis,  &c.  R 

Co. 

1734 

Overy  v.  Leighton 

761 

Ovey,  Re,  Broadbent  v.  Barrow     13 
Ovington  v.  Smith  1081 

Owden  v.  Apel  1571 

v.  Bankhead  402,  1017 

v.  Campbell  109 

v.  Cooper  1579 

v.  Fields  1639 

v.  Ford  1662 

v.  Foulks  1292 

v.  Griffith     1393, 1397, 1463,  1464 
v.  Homan  1715,  1717 

v.  Jones  838 

v.  Nodin  344 

v.  State  129 

v.  Thomas  849,  881.  981 

v.  Warburton  1131 

v.  Wynn  1829 

Owens  v  Dawson  838 

v.  Dickenson     186,  226,  236,  1209, 
1210 
v.  Emmens  894 

v.  Hanney  52 

Owing's  Case      292,  1004, 1507, 1724 
Owings  v  Norwood  917 

v.  Owings  1476 

v.  Rhodes  1561 

v.  Worthington  1463 

Oxburgh  v.  Fincham  1540 

Oxenden  v.  Cropper  32 

Oxenham  v.  Esdaile  706 

Oxford  v.  Reid  100 

and   Cambridge,  the  Univer- 
sities of  v  Kichardson         1642, 
1643 
Oyster  v.  Oyster  659 

Oystermouth  Ry.  &  T.  Co.  v. 

Morris  ■  241 

Ozark  Land  Co.  v.  Leonard  713,  1031 


P. 


Pace  v.  Bartles  720 

v.  Marsden  168 

v.  Potter  536 

Pacific  Hotel  Co  v.  Lieb  1661 

Nat.  Bank  17.  Mixter  1561 

Ry.  Co.  v.   Atlantic  &  P.  R. 

Co.  216,  334,  560 

v.  Cutting  991,  1548 

v.  Ketchum  1504,  1716 

v.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  1584 

v.  Wade  1071 

Steam  Co.  v.  Gibbs  26,  1666 

Packer  v.  Packer  96 

17.  Wyndham  115,  124,  125 

Packham  v.  Newman  1132 

Packington's  Case  1633 

Packington  v.  Packington  1678 


Pack  wood  v  Maddison 
Paddock  v.  Lance 
Paddon  v.  Winch 
Padgett  ».  Baker 
Padley  v.    Lincoln   Waterworks 
Co.  297,671,721, 

Padwick  v.  Hurst  360,  651.  " 

r.  Piatt  206, 

Page  v.  Bennett 

v.  Foster  1243, 

17.  Lever 

v.  Olcott 

v.  Page 

v.  Townsend  301,  302, 

v.  Webster 

v.  Whidden 

v.  Young 


798 

Page  Woven-Wire  Fence  Co.  v. 

860 

Land 

1642 

1444 

Paget  v.  Ecte 

629 

1565 

v.  Foley 

653 

Paige  v.  Smith 

1743, 1752 

,722 

v.  Willett 

850 

1929 

Pain  v.  

180,  681 

,302 

Paine  v.  Edwards 

795,  1265 

1659 

v.  Hutchinson 

2255 

1245 

v.  Noelke 

864 

677 

v.  Schenectady  Ins. 

Co 

324,  633, 

327 

864 

1184 

v  Slocum 

517 

,315 

v  Warren 

1556 

1150 

Pakington  v.  Benbow 

1406 

334 

Pale  v  Mitchell 

124 

630 

Palk,  Re 

224 

Palk  v.  Clinton,  Lord     213,  214,  295, 

379,383 

Palmer,  Re  970,  979 

V.  Aylesbury,  Lord    934,  940,  1117 

v.  Carlisle,  Karl  of  212,  259 

v.  Flower  1524 

v.  Goren  1275 

v.  Joues  1233,  1411 

v.  Locke  324,  1040,  1401 

v.  McCorinick  149 

v.  Mallet  212,  1»355 

v.  Merrill  1461 

v.  Oakley  1353 

v.  Palmer  369,  445 

v.  Perry  1368 

v.  Ranken  1381 

v.  Scriven  1743 

v.  Stevens  219 

v.  Travers  1620 

v.  Trower  1101 

v.  Truby  1770 

v.  Van  Doren  885,  886,  1699 

v.  Vaughan  1730 

v.  Walesby  83,  86,  307,  308 

v.  Wright  1723.  1825 

Palo  Alto  Banking  Co.  v.  Mabar  1620 

Pankey  v   Raum  1075 

Panueil  v.  Uurley  1538 

v.  Tayler  1704,  1710 

v.  Taylor  180 

Pante  v.  Bethel  998 

Pan  ton  v   Labertouche  35 

v.  Tefft  843 

v.  Williams  1107 

Paper  Bottle  Co.,  lie  27 

Paper  Staining  Co.,  Ex  parte      157 

Parailice  v.  Sheppard  37,  38 

Paragon   &   Spero   Mining  Co  , 

Re  1041,  1044 

Paramore  v.  Greenslade  1275 

Paray  v.  Hodgson  1363 

Parberry  v.  Gorarn  294 

Pardee  V   De  Cola  855 

v.  Steward  214 

Pardo  v.  Bingham       647,  652, 1459, 

1462 

Pare  v.  Clegg  241,  419,  1734 

Paredes  v.  Lizardi  985 

Parfit  v.  Lawless  852 

Pariente  v.  Bensusan     414,  770,  776 

Paris  v  Gilham        1560,  1564,  1565, 

15H9 

v   Hughes  1194 

Parish  v.  Poole  1440 

v  Sloan  341 

Park  »   Ballentine  406 

v.  Johuson  986,  989,  990,  995, 

1013 

v  Meek  994 

v.  New  York,  &c.  R.  Co.  1743 

v    Wiley  1770 

Parke  v.  Brown  1031 

v.  Christy  735,  750 

Parker,  Re  1734,  1794 

v.  Alcock  667,  669,  692,  20: 15 

v   Ausell  1135 

v-  Ash  652 

v.  Backus  1734 

v   Baker  8m 

v.  Barker      1561,  1562, 1563,  1566 

v.  Beavans  326 

v-  Blighton  1845 

v.  Blythmore  697 

v-  Britt  1567,  1625 

v.  Browning  1743,  1748,  1750 

v.  Carter  373,  576 

v.  Concord  830 

v.  Dacres  1918 

v.  Dawson  506 

v.  Dee  1027 

v-  Downing  1021,  1026 

v.  Dunn  1741, 1752 

v.  Fairlie  727 

v-  Flagg  597 

v.  Foote  1638 

v  ■  Ford  408,  1559 

v.  Francis  1594 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 

[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 

Parker  v.  Fuller  214  I 

v.  Grant  402,  424,  524,  529,  1026 
v.  Great  Northern  Ry.  Co.  1667 
v.  Great  Western  Ry.  Co.  1129 

v.  Hayes  917,  951 


XC1U 


Hutchinson 
v.  Lech  mere 
v.  Lloyd 
v.  Logan 
v.  McKeuna 
v.  M' William 
v.  Marco 
v.  May 
v.  Moore 
v.  Morrell 

v.  Newland 
v.  Nickersou 


v.  Nickson 
v.  Nightiu" 


1257 
117 
449 
986 
1399 
1101 
887 
7,  9.  10 
1720 
842,  984,  1003,  1082, 
1467,  1476,  1491,  2336 
1576 
630,  1071,  1073, 
1302,  1320 
368,  426 
1654,  2313 


He 


v.  Parker       1411,  1510,  1703,  17 1 

v.  Partlow  1283 

v.  Peters  228 

v.  Phetteplace  843 

v   Riugham  1615 

v.  Simpson  796 

v.  Small  215 

v.  Thornton  1095,  1128  j 

v.  Watkins  1389  ! 

v   Williams  1667,  1673  I 

v.  Wiunipiseogee  Lake  Co.  550,  630 

Parkersburg  v.  Brown  328 

Parkes  v.  Gorton  840 

v.  Stevens  1148 

v.  White  1407,  1417 

Parkes'  Charity,  Re  l->55 

Parkhurst  v.  Cory  1241 

v.  Kinsman  1537,  1577,  1579, 

1715,  1722,  2388 

v.  Lowten    563,  565,  567,  577,  879, 

942,  943,  944 

v.  Race  1003 

v.  Van  Cortlandt  2278 

Parkin  v.  Moore  920 

Parkins  v   Hawkshaw  576 

Parkinson  v.  Chambers    38,  33,  485, 

1822,  1831 

v.  Francis  865 

v.  Hanbury       41,  42.  43,  371,  666. 

792,  981,  1440,  1479 

v.  Ingram  1196,  1197 

v.  Lee  rag  663 

v.  Lucas  1331,  1542 

v   Potter  142 

v.  Trousdale  758,  1676,  1677 

v.  Wentworth  49,  52 

Parkman  v.  Aicardi  290 

v.  Welch  846 

Parks  v.  Doty  159 

v.  Jackson  1571 

v.  Parks  1584 

v.  Rucker  641 

Parlement  Beige,  The  141 

Parlett  ?»   Guggenheimer  1648 

Parley's  Park  S.  M.  Co.  v.  Kerr    314 

Parmalee  r.  Lewis  1^77 

Parmelee  v.  Kgan  237,  243.  559 

Parmiter  r.  Coupland  1107 

v.  Parmiter  1460,  1461,  1480 

Parmley  v.  St  Louis,  &c.  R.  Co    1661 

Paniell  v.  Kingston  191 

v.  Price  1369 

v.  Wood  896,  1S17 

Parr  v  Att  -Gen  887 

v.  Jewell  382 

v.  London,  Chatham  &  Dover 

Ry  Co  573 

v.  Lovegrove  989,  9S10 

Parrill  v.  McKinley  425 

Parrot  v.  Paulet  828 

v.  Treby  1396, 14 ID 

Parrott,  lie,  Walter  v.  Parrott      108 

v.  Quernan  1014 

v.  Shellaud  554,  670 

Parry,  Re  1611 

v.  Ashley  1776 


Parry  v.  Owen  851,  553 

v.  Rogers  1573 

Parsous,  Re,  Stockley  v.  Parsons  316 
Parsons  v.  Dunne  95,97 

v.  Greenville  R.  Co.  633 

v.  Groome  1041,  16!  6 

v.  Hardy  782 

v.  Heston  324,  852 

v.  Howard  149,  191,  216 

v.  Neville  216 

v.  Parsons  91,  120 

v.  Robertson  1824 

v.  Robiuson  1029 

v.  Spoouer  2.3 

Parsons  Water  Co.  v.  Hill  418 

Partee  v.  Kortrecht  545 

v.  Thomas  143.  314 

Partington  v.  Att  -Gen.         201,  250 
v-  Bailey  199,  808 

v.  Booth  1683,  16S6 

v.  Reynolds        26,  27,  33,  39,  359, 
796, 1260,  1370,  1578.  1579, 
1581,  1605 
Partridge  v.  Foster  1037 

v.  Haycraft  326,  356,  378,  414, 

761,  764,  770,  771,  776 
v.  Jackson  312 

v.  Perkius  1576 

v.  Usborne  1578, 1582 

Pascall  v.  Scott  948,  1552 

Pascault  v.  Cochran  1716 

Paschall,  In  re  1845 

v.  Thurston  1585 

Pascoe  v.  Pascoe  127 

Pashler  v.  Vincent  157 

Pasley  v.  McConnell  1051 

Pasman  v.  Montague  860 

Pasmore,  Re  33,  1605 

Passiugham  v.  Sherborn  1368 

Passmore  v.  Moore  165,  1286 

Passumpsic  Savings  Bank  v.  Na- 
tional Bank  1551 
Patch  v.  Dalton  230 
v.  Gray                                       1031 
v.  Ward   173,  373,  280, 1002,  1021, 
1381,  1399,  1584,  1832 
1835,  2069 
Patching  v.  Barnett                       1433 
v.  Dubbins                        1654,  1681 
v.  Gubbins                                 1654 
Patent  Type  Co.  v  Walter  1642,  2315 
Paterson  v.   Long                              230 
v.  Scott                                       1480 
r.  Zachariah                                 1096 
&  Hud.  R.   R.  Co.  v.  Jersey 
City                                   368,  545 
Patman  v.  Harland                        674 
Paton  c.  Langley                              256 
v.  Majors                            328,  1556 
V.  Rogers                              990,  1219 
Patrick,  Re                                   1432 
r.  Andrews  178 
v.  Blackwell                           725,  726 
v.  Clay                                         1257 
v.  Harrison                        1651,  1665 
v.  Isenhart                           378.  590 
v.  Jackson                                    1667 
v.  Joyner                                    1618 
v.  McManus                                   354 
v.  Warner                                      1042 
V.  White                                         295 
Pattee  V  Harrington                        114 
Patten  r.  Cilley                               1029 
r.  Moor                                        576 
Patten  Paper  Co  v.  Kaukauna 

Waterpower  Co  303,  &34 

Patterson  r.  Baugs  1558 

v.  Bloomer  1081 

v.  Clark  1716 

V.  Cobb  643 

v.  Eakin  1120 

v.  Gaines  846 

v.  Kellogg  334 

r.  Kingland  1081 

v-  Lvnde  26 

v.  Miller  1613,  1619 

v.  Patterson  563,  564,  906 


XC1V 


Patterson  v.  Read  1120 

t'.  Scott  843 

v.  Slaughter  674,  778, 1578 

r.  Stapler  197 

Pattison  v.  Hull  1550 

Patton  v.  Ashley  844 

v.  Bencini  237 

v.  Cone  668,  857 

v.  Glatz  334,  552 

v.  J.  M,  Brunswick  &  Balke 

Co.  737 

v.  Overton  251 

Paty  v.  Simpson  414,  770,  776 

Patty  r.  Middleton  674 

Paul  v.  Baltimore  &  0.  &  C.  R. 

Co.  357 

v.  Paul  1115,1147 

v.  York  1365 

Pauli  r.  Von  Melle  1563 

Paulison  v.  Van  Iderstein  109 

Paull  ».  Mortimer  1722 

Paulling  v.  Creagh  1548 

v.  Sturgis  845 

Pauncefort  v.  Lincoln,  Lord  3  8 

Pavie  v.  Acourt  180,  500,  681 

Pawiet  v.  Delavel  100 

v.  Lincoln,  Bishop  of  210,  293 

Pawson  v.  Smith  708 

Paxton  v.  Bell  32 

v.  Douglas  236,  388,  564,  565, 

1182,  1615,  1617 

v.  Wood  191 

Payne,  Be,  Randle  v.  Payne  37, 

111,  796 

v.  Baxter  1743 

v.  Beech  62,  159,  606,  1577 

v.  Berry  302,  543,  547,  557 

v.  Bullard  1556 

v.  Coles  868 

v.  Collier  1773, 1774 

v.  Compton  270,  569 

v.  Cowan  1667 

v.  Dicker  68, 59,  598,  1463 

v.  Evens  1416 

v.  Hathaway  645 

v.  Hook  149,  313 

v.  Ibbotson  1100 

v.  Kansas,  &c.  Rv.  Co.     630,  1638 

v.  Little    35,  36,  69,  110,  112,  415, 

905,  1438 

v.  Long  1795 

v.  O'Shea  1621 

v.  Parker  223,  1417,  1420 

v.  Richardson  287 

Paynes  v.  Coles  1230 

Paynter  v.  Carew  794,  795,  1754 

v.  Houston  1212, 1298 

Pavson  v.  Lamson  630,  1618 

P.  Caland,  The  1503 

Pea  v.  Waggoner  643 

Peabody  v.  Flint       22,  26,  144,  238, 

1640 

v.  Hamilton  45 

v.  Kendall  1003,  1073 

v.  Norfolk  1650,  1987,  2064 

v.  Tarbell  1081 

Peace,  Re  1847 

Peace  &  Waller,  Re  87.  186 

Peaoham  v.  Daw  1774 

Peachie  v.  Twyecrosse  586 

Peacock,  Ex  parte  157 

Peacock,  Re  109 

v.  Bedford,  Duke  of    776,  778,  783 

v.  Colling  243  3t6 

v.  Evans  1380 

v.  Lowe  1557 

v.  Monk  235,  1211 

v.  Peacock  1727,  1728 

v.  Penson  230 

v.  Saggers  224 

v.  Sievier  804 

Peacock's  Case  928 

Peake  v   Highfield  1077 

v.  Ledger  223,  224 

v.  Peake  1071 

t>.  Young  1279 

Pearce.  Ex  parte  157 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 

[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 

Pearce   Re  1799 

v.  Boggs  1U73 

v.  Crutchfield  1660,  1085 

v.  Foster  573 

v.  Gray  663,  1001,  1590 

v.  Grove  779 

v.  Lindsay   1025,  1026,  1027,  1441), 

1483 

v.  Morris  1385 

v.  Newlyn  13'.'8 

r.  Nix  840 

v.  Pearce  81,  1^85 

»   Piper  25 

v.  Rice  594,694 

r.  Watts  1394 

v.  Wrighton  809,  813 

Pearcy  v.  B\bee  1104 

Peareth  v.  Peareth  561 

I'earl  v.  Nashville  551 

Pearne  v.  Lisle  1699,  1703 

Pears  v.  Laing  657 

Pearse,  Ex  parte  1382,  1457 

v.  Brooks  1042 

v.  Cole  111,  15:i5 

v.  Dobinson      660,  700,  769,  1019, 

1584 

v.  Green  1369 

v.  Laing  »,52 

v.  Pearse  348,  354,  577, 

1834 

Pearson,  Re  149 

v.  Bank  of  England  148 

V.  Belchier  41,  43 

v   Belsher  42 

i>.  Cardon  1561,1565 

v-  Carr  1029 

v.  Darrington  1191 

v.  Knapp  1182,  1315 

v.  Northern  R.  Co.  780 

v-  Pearson  1427 

i'.  Rowland  955 

v.  Tower  645 

v.  Ward  933,  937,  938 

v.  Wilcox  893 

v  Wolfe  42 

Peart,  Ex  parte  1606 

v.  Taylor  392,  393 

Pease  v.  Benson  1386 

v.  Cheesbrough  236,  248,  253 

v.  Fletcher  1719 

v.  Pattinson  13 

v    1'ea.se  570 

Peaslee  v.  Barrey  1028 

Pea.- ley,  Re  564 

v.  Barney  365 

Peatfield  v.  Benn  1342 

v.  Barlow  1486 

v  Barrow  1846 

Peay  v.  Duncan  6H7 

v.  Shenck  1725 

Peck  v.  Ashley  570, 1557 

v.  Burgess  669 

v.  Crane  1618 

v.  Elder  303,  1035 

v.  Gaither  1889 

v.  Hamlin  11^3 

v.  Henderson  254 

v.  Hozier  48 

v.  Hunter  850 

v.  Mallows  321 

v.  Peck  378,  379,  732 

t>.  Sexton  552 

v.  Stimpson  1411 

v.  Trinsmaran  Iron  Co.  1727 

Peckettv  Short  1136 

Peckam    v     Haverhill,    North 

Parish  in  144 

v.  Peckham  1352 

Pedder  v.  Pedder  880,  1525 

Pedrick  v.  White      1523, 1524,  1531 , 
1535 

Peek  v.  Boone  576 

v.  Gurney  1503 

D.  Matthews  1654 

v.  Spencer,  Earl  405,  940 

Peel,  Re  83 

Peeler  v.  Lathrop  843 


Peer  v.  Cookerow  1461, 1467, 1476, 

1485,  1507,  1508,  1527,  1539, 

1540,  1542, 1545,  1546 

Peerce  o  Alley  1666 

t>.  Atney  1081 

Peers  v.  Ceeley  1388 

v.  Needham  1156,  1157,  1159 

Pegg  v.  Capp  444 

v.  Davis  524,  525 

r.  Wisden  1276 

Pegce  v.  Burnell  940 

Peile  v.  Stoddart  412,  421,  1832, 

2114 

Peirce  v.  Graham  1580 

v.  Watkin  877 

v  Young  1136 

Pelhani  v.  Edelmeyer  314,  843 

v   Gregory  264 

Lord  v.  Harley,  Lord  1061 

v.  Newcastle,  Duchess  of         1053, 

1056,  1057,  1059 

Pell  v   Elliott  1507 

Northampton  Ry.  Co.  1731 


Pellatt  v.  Nichols 
Pellet  r.  Shephard 

Pel  lew  v.  

Polling  r.  Goddard 
Pells  v.  Brown 

v.  Coon 
Pelly  v-  Wathen 


Pel  ton  v.  Harrison 
Pember  v.  Mathers 
Pemberton,  Ex  parte 
Re 

Langmore 


824,  1599 

1961 

760 

1770 

266 

813 

387, 1389, 1842, 

2218 

100,  187, 1408 

843,  846,  848 

1842 

1459 

431 


v.  MGill  187,  445,  707,  774 

V.  Marriott  97 

v.  Pemberton  876,  1124,  1125,  1371 

v.  Popham  236 

v.  Riddle  199 

v.  Topham  794 

Pence  »,  Pence  190 

Pender  v.  Lushington      26,  241,  242 

Pendergast  v.  Greenfield  1071 

Penderil  v.  Penderil  953 

Pendlehury  v.  Walker  588 

Pendleton  v.  Bank  of  Kentucky     24 

v.  Dalton  659,  860.   .663 

v.  Eaton  1400 

v.  Evans  518,525.526 

v.  Fay  1509,  1523.  1537,  1546. 

1577,  1578, 1579, 1580,  15X1 


v.  Rooth 

264,151 

v.  Russell 

1743 

Penedo  v.  Johnson 

20 

Penfoid  v.  Kelly             152,  429,  453 

v  ■  Mould 

97 

v.  Nunn 

207 

v.  Ramsbottom 

596 

Peninsular  Bank,  7?e 

1471 

v  Darther 

1625 

Peninsular  Iron  Co.  v.  Stone       1427 

Penkethman  v.  White 

1827 

Penn  v.  Baltimore,  Lord 

20,  136, 

262, 1627 

o.  Bibby       1081,  1120, 

1121.  1127, 

1643 

v.  Craig 

1272 

v.  Jack           1081,  1105 

1107,  1643 

v.  Tolleson              1270 

1286,  1290 

Pern   Bank's  Estate 

1320 

Pennefather  v   Short 

1068,  1069 

Pennell  r.  Davison 

913 

v.  Deffell 

59 

r.  Home 

65,835 

v-  Roy 

1615,  1628 

Penney  v  Goode 

1826,  1827 

v  Todd 

1741 

Pennie  v.  Reis 

545 

Penniman  v   Hill 

1102 

v.  Hollis 

264,  266 

v.  Norton 

1508.  1522 

Pennington  v.  Alvin         37,  111.  112 

v.  Beechey 

678.  2i"i95 

v   Brins..p  Hall  Coal  Co 

1637,1638 

v   Buckley 

224,  1431 

TABLE   OF   CASES    CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 


XCV 


Pennington  v.  Gittings  846 

v.  Governor  392 

v.  McVVhirter  200 

v.  Muncaster,  Lord  1302,  1311 

Pennock  v.  Ela  369,  379,  383 

v   Freeman  645,  916 

Pennoyer  v.  Neff  149,  458,  029 

Pennsylvania  v.  Wheeling  Bridge 

Co.  10,  1576,  1662 

Pennsylvania  Ins.  Co.  v  Bauerle 

216.  255 
v.  Jacksonville  R,  Co.  1743 

Pennsylvania  R   Co    v.  Allegh- 
eny R.  Co.  551 
v.  Davenport  634 
v   Thompson                               1687 
Penny  v.  Beavan                      236,  794 
v.  Francis                                    800 
v.  Hoper                                      321 
v.  Jackson                                   324 
V   Parker                                      1614 
V.  Penny                              268,  1528 
v.  Pretor                                    1345 
v.  Watts   201, 251,  675, 1117, 2089 
Penrice  v.  Parker                             563 
v.  Williams                        996,  1366 
Pen  roth  v.  Penroth  72 
Penruddock  v.  Hammond              578 
Pensermeau  v.  Pensenneau            385 
Pensotti  v.  Pensotti                        1463 
Pensou  v.  Lee                                1096 
Pentlarge  v.  Kirby                 630,  1427 
v.   Pentlarge                                     702 
Peutney  v.  Lynn  Paving  Comm'rs 

1081,  1619,  1650 
Penvill  i)   Luscombe  663 

Peop.e  v.  Albany  &  Vt.  R.  Co. 

1663 
v.  Allison  1841 

v.  Auditor-General  1381 

v.  Ballard  10 

v.  Barnes  1687 

v-  Barton  1699 

v.  Beaudry  10 

v.  Bennett  1042 

V,  Berry  354 

v.  Houcbard  1614 

v.  Brooklyn,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  10 

v.  B rower  1590 

v.  Buffalo  Common  Council      1461 
v .  Canal  Board  1650 

v.  Chee  Kee  646 

v.  Clark  12 

v.  Cole  1841 

v  Conklin  46 

v.  Cooper  645 

v.  Craft  443 

v.  Davis  961 

v.  Donohue  1508 

v.  Dwyer  1461 

v.  Elmer  470 

v  Globe  M.  Ins.  Co.  1282 

v.  Goodrick  1841 

v   Harris  676,  578 

v.  Huron  Circuit  Judge  1576 

v.  Ingersoll  10 

v.  Jacob  12 

v  . I  ones  1755 

v.  Kirkpatrick  1381 

v.  Leary  1841 

1       v.  Lindsay  1461 

(       v.  McC  umber  354 

3       v.  McKenna  324 

,       v  McLain  1150 

v.  Mahon  573 

v.  .Marine  Court  Justices  1508 

V.  Mather  564,  960 

v.  Mercien  1350 

v.  Met   Tel   Co.  10 

v.  Morrill  335,  341 

v.  Mutual  Benefit  Associates    1746 
v  Mut.  Union  Tel.  Co.  10 

v.  North  San  Francisco  Home- 
stead Ass.  12 
V.  Norton                                     I735 
V .  Pfeiffer                                     1461 
V.  Purviance  12 


People  v.  Rice  1461 

v.  Rogers  1047 

v.  Simouson  10 

v.  Sliuev  676 

v.  Spalding  891 

v.  Spauldiug  1686 

v   Stapleton  1069 

v.  Sturtevant  1684 

v.  Swift  728 

v.  Tweed  10 

v.  Van  Buren    .  1685 

v.  Wheeler  470 

v.  Wilson  1069 

v.  Wong  Wang  545 

v.  Wood  646 

People's  Bank  v.  Fancher  1734 

Gas  Co.  v.  Tyner  1620 

Savings  Bank  v.  Bates  569 

3.  Bank  v.  Look  1561 

Peoria  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mitchell  1463 

v.  Shertz  1650 


Peper  v   Fordyce 
Pepper  v.  Green 

v.  Henzell 

v.  Pepper 
Peppitt,  Re 


193,  1427 
145 

62,  158,  631 
1028,  1030 
192 


Perceval  v.  Perceval  1432 

Percival  v.  Caney  178,781,  841 

v.  Dunn  199 

v.  Stamp  1710 

Lord  and  Lady  v.  Phipps  1648 

Percy  v.  Percy  112 

Perdue  v.  Brooks  1168,  1385 

Periue  v.  Dunn  659,  9!)4,  998, 

2222,  2225 

v.  Swaine  182,  754,  784,  951 

Pering,  Re  133 

Perianal  v.  Squire  43 

Perkin  v   Bradley  291 

v.  Proctor  58 

Perkins  v.  Bradley     65,  56,  140,  147 

v.  Brock  843 

v.  Collins  395,  1619 

v.  Ede  1276 

v.  Elliott  186 

v.  Fourniquet  987,  989,  1492 

v.  Guy  574 

v.  Hays  418 

v.  Hendryx         313,  536,  779,  986, 

1122 

v.  McGavock  1381 

v.  Nichols  843,  982 

v.  Partridge  1578,  1579 

v   Perkins  1457,  1846 

I'erkinson  v.  Trousdale  720 

Perks  v.  Stothert  1463 

v.  Stottart  908 

v.  Wycombe  Ry.  Co.  138Q 

Perkyns  v    Baynton  1259 

Perls  v.  Saalfeld  1655 

Perot  v.  Cooper  669 

Perpetual  Curate,  Ex  parte       1408 

Penin  v.  Lebus  1279 

v.  Lepper  195,  H68 

Perrine  v.  Cooley  861 

Perring  v  Tucker  1097 

Perrot  v.  Perrot  1630 

Perry,  lie  86 

v.  Barker  284 

v.  Carr  361 

v .  Dorset  1707 

v.  Hamilton  I860 

v.  Jenkins  I542 

v.  Knott  219,  268,  272 

v.  Littlefield  586 

v.  Marston  650 

v.  Merchants"  M.  Ins.  Co.  659 

v.  Michaux  1677 

v.  Oriental  Hotel  Co.  1716 

v.  Parker  1629,  1637,  1664 

v.   Perry  165  402 

v.  Phelips  1473, 1576,  1577,  1580, 

1581,  1615 

v.  Phillips  1014 

v.  Shipway  11,53 

V.  Truefitt  1649 

v.  Turpin  435,  716 


Perry  v  Walker  40,  41,  42,  43,  1594, 

1626 

v.  Weller  1^7 

Perry,  &c   Iron  Mining  Co.,  lie   154 

Perryclear  v.  Jacobs  1^2 

Person  v.  Merrick  214 

v.  Nevitt  15K4 

Pertou,  Re  851 

Peru.  Republic  of  v   Weguelin        20 

Peruvian    Guano    Co.    v.   Bock- 

woldt  633 

Pesbeller  v.  Uammett  593 

Pestel  v .  Primm  1548 

Petch  v.  Dalton  230,  262 

Peter  v.  Thomas-Peter  160,  229 

Peterborough  v.  Norfolk  868 

Peters  v.  Delaplaine  939 

v.  Grote  1361 

v.  Lilly  39 

v.  Neely  390 

v.  Rosseter  1ij02 

v.  Rule  1072, 1080 

v.  Van  Lear  341 

Petersburg  Savings  Co.  v.  Man- 
hattan Fire  Ins  Co.  920 
Peterson  v.  Bailiff  68 
v.  Peterson                                   1261 
v.  Poignard                                    294 
v.  Simpkins                        890,  1642 
Petit  c.  Chevelier                            2319 
Petley  v.  Eastern  Counties  Rail- 
way Co                                    1667 
Peto  v.  Attorney  General               523 
v.  Brighton,  Uckfield,  &  Tun- 
bridge  Wells  Railway  Co.      1650 
v.  Hammond                                  278 
Petrakion  v.  Arbeely                      13S1 
Petre  v.  Duncombe                230,  279 
»■  Petre                     675,  1526,  2059 
Lord,  Ex  parte                         1360 
Pettes  v.  Bingham                   851,  852 
Pettibone  v.  Derringer                   918 
v.  Hamilton                                 303 
v.  Stevens                                     1233 
Pettit  v.  Baird                                 190 
v.  Candler                                    726 
v.  Cooper                                        991 
v.  Hope                                         545 
v.  Shepherd                                1624 
Pettit's  Estate,  Re                   61.  157 
Petty  v.  Daniel                                1598 
v.  Fogle                                        334 
v.  Hannum                                  53^ 
v.  Lonsdale                          489,  804 
v.  Malier                                           87 
V.  Petty                                         1796 
v.  Taylor                                      843 
Peugh  v.  Porter                             \\\ 
Pewabic  Mining  Co.  v.  Mason     1271 
1312 
Peyton  v.  Bond                                75 
v.  GreeYi                                        1230 
v.  McDowell                              1882 
v.  Smith                            1232,  1350 
Pfanschmidt  v.  Kelly  M.  Co.      1120, 
1580 
Pfeaff  v.  Jones                               1019 
Pfeiffer  v.  Kiehn                             1147 
PtVltz  v.  Pfeltz                      1018,  1577 
Pfingst  v   Senn                                1638 
Pflster  v.  Wade                               1561 
Pfohl  v.  Simpson                    243,  3<i3 
Phelan,  Re                                  1791 
».'.  Ganebin                                    1743 
Phelps  v.  Elliott       60,  313,  402,  700 
v .  Garrow                                     604 
v.  Green                  1151,  1163,  1166 
v   Harding                                    1624 
v.  Hartwell                            850,  851 
v.  McDonald                                 629 
v.  Olive                                           725 
v.  Peabody                                 1640 
v.  Phelps                                        444 
v.  Prothero         384,  779,  780,  781 
817,  1490,  1491, 1618,  1625,  1634 
v.  Sproule           252,  667,  68.0,  2n:i5 
PhemTs  Trusts,  Re               850,  1795 


XCV1 


TABLE   OP   CASES   CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.  ] 


Philadelphia  R.  Co.  v.  Cooper     163S 

&  Trenton  K.  Co.  v.  Simpson  2397 

Puilaiutnopic  Society  v.  Hobson  1422 

Plnlhower  v.  Tod  406 

Pliiiipps  v.  Clark  1522 

Philips  v.  Atkiuson  172!l 

v.  Darbie  1545 

v.  Gibbons  690 

v.  Philipps  320,  321,  326,  360, 

363,  368,  1411 

v.  Turner  1250 

Phillipo  v.  Munnings  652 

Phillipott's  Charity,  Re  1854 

Phillips    Ex  parte  1365 

He  108 

v.  Allen  1929 

V.  Barbaroux  1395 

v.  Beal  644 

v.  Belden  668 

v.  Benson  1271,  1274 

v.  Board  man  1639 

17.  Carew  394,  934,  1573 

v.  Chamberlaine  877 

v.  Davies  1407 

v.  Earner  1102 

v.  Eiland  1716,  1720 

v.  Evans  1835 

ti.  Ford  850 

v.  Furber  60 

v.  Goding  415 

v.  Gutteridge  1266 

v.  Hassell  91 

v.  H  afield  1130,1137 

v.  Hudson  239,  1490 

v.  Hunter  61 

v.  Kearney  537 

v.  Kingfield  960 

v   Langhorn  698 

v.  Leavitt  215 

v.  Library  Co.  149 

v.  Martin  1129 

v.  Mullings  852 

v.  Negley  1584 

v.  Phillips     42,  551   674.  675,  680, 

712,  1003,  1483,  1929,  2246 

v.  Prentice  894 

v.  Prevost  720,  721 

v   Prichard  1664 

v.  Richardson  846 

v.  Royal  Niagara  Hotel  Co.        378 

v.  Rudle  1482 

v.  Schooley  360 

v.  Sinclair  561,  640 

V   Sylvester  1653 

v.  Symes  309 

v  Thomas  1961 

v.  Thompson    952,  986,  1151,  2335 

r    Warde  890 

v.  Wesson  287 

V.  Willetts  1105 

Phillipson  v.  Gatty  218,  220 

v  Gibbon  988,  992,  1395 

Philps,  Re  86 

Phinizv  i'.  Augusta  &  K   R  Co.  1765 

Phippen  v.  Brown  1510,  1524 

Phipps  v.  Bishop  of  Bath  and 

Wells  1716 

r.  Henderson  1201 

v   Jackson  1657 

v    Kelly  60 

v.  Sedgwick  186 

Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  v.  Abbott  236 

v.  Day  586 

M.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Ilinesley  860 

Nat.  Bank  e   Cleveland  Co        313 

Phosphate   Sewage  Co.  v.  Hart- 

mont  298 

v.  Molleson  633,  634 

Piatt  v.  Oliver        603,  615,  617,  683, 

702 

Picard  v  Hine   110,  187,  1411,  1903, 

2289 

Pickatice,  Re  893,  1608 

Pickard  v.  Mattheson         1029,  1030 

v  Roberts  98 

Pickel  r.  Isgrigg  542 

Pickens  v.  Kuisely  378,  418 


Pickens  v.  McCoy  1073 

Pickering  v.  Cape  Town  Ry.  Co.  1469 


Dawson 

i'.  Day 

v.  Ely,  Bishop  of 

v.  Hanson 

v.  Pickering 

v.  Rigby 

v.  Stephenson 

v.  Williams 
Picket  v.  Merchants'  Bank 
Pickett  v   Chilton 

v.  Ferguson 

v.  Hewlings 

v.  Loggan 
Pickford  v.  Brown 


1134 

843 

1656 

424 

369.  667 

1819 

26,  243 

241 

1840 

829,  997 

1618 

1320 

796,  1026,  1457 

266,  1428,  1433. 

1512,  1524,  2059 

307 

633,  635,  660,  797 

154 

418 

287,  443 

2086,  2088 

177 

1649,  1663 

1184 

176 

78,  1595 


v.  Ervington 
v.  Hunter 

Pickle  v    Pickle 

Picquet  v.  Augusta 
v   Swan 

Pictou  v.  Lockett 

Piduocke  v.  Boultbee 

Pidding  v.  How 

Piddock  v.  Brown 

Piddocke  v.  Smith 

Pidduck  v.  Boultbee 

Piedmont,  &c   Ins.  Co.  v  Maury  287 

Pierce  v.  Beattie  1235 

v.  Brady  1579 

v.  Burnham  89 

v.  Equitable  Life  Ass.  Society  1621 
v.  Faunce  190,  246,  287,  1240, 

1242,    1243,    1245.    1246,    1248, 
1252,  1260,  1298,  1971 
v   Fesigans  634 

v.  Franks  1399 

v.  Gates  844 

v   Hammond  1317 

v.  Lamson  1961 

v.  McClellan  714 

v.  Nichols  989 

v.  Thornly  120 

v  Union  Pac.  Ry   Co.  1556 


v.  West 

v.  Wilson 
Piercy  v.  Adams 

v.  Beckett 
Pieri  v.  Shieldsboro' 
Pierpont  v.  Fowle 

v.  Harrisville 
Piers  v.  Piers 
Piersou  v  Barclay 

v.  Catlin 

v.  Clayes 

v.  Cutler 

v.  David 

v.  Ivey 

v.  Meaux 

v.  Robinson 

v.  Ryersoa 

v.  Smith 
Pierstoff  r.  Jorges 
Pieters  v.  Thompson 
Pietroni  V  Transatlantic  Co 
Piety  v.  Stace 
Piffard  v  Beeby     75,  485 

Pigg  v  Corder 
Piggin  v.  Cheetham 
Piggott  v   Croxhall 

v.  Stewart 
Pigot  v   Stace 
Pigott,  Re 

v.  Pigott 

v.  Stratton 

v.  Young 
Pigue  v.  Young 
Pike  v.  Bates 

v.  Dickinson 

r.  Fitzgibbon 

v.  Frank 

v.  Hoare 

t>.  Keene 

v.  Nicholas 


422,  829,  834 

1484 

365 

1517 

589 

550,  555,  589, 

1151 

1650 

1503 

267 

847 

843,  844 

843 

230,  517,  560 

644 

722,  837 

269 

840 

118 

659 

32,  815 

398 

1417 

760,  1045, 

1819 

10r>3 

993 

959,  960 

206 

691 

1694 

12\  222 

1654 

797,  1402 

617 

1675 

60 

113,  187 

147 

1075 

20,26 

1643,  1645 


Pilcher,  Re  1072 

v   Arden  1843,  1847 

Pile  o.  McBratney  457 

Pilkington  v   Baker  1732 

v.  Himsworth  743,  748.  *<98 

Pilkintou  v.  Cotten  1298 

v.  Wignall  1515,  1534 

Pillan  v.  Thompson  905,  910 

Piller  v.  Roberts  406 

Pillers,  Ex  parte  1055 

Pilley  v.  Robinson  406,  559,  627 

Pilling  v.  Aruiitage  847 

v   Pilling  1267,  2346 

Pillow  v.  Pillow  379 

v.  Sentelle  1548 

v.  Shannon  678,  951,  1505 

v.  Thompson  1640 

Pillsbury  r.  Dugan  997 

Pillsworth  v.  Hopton  1632 

Pirn  v.  Wilson  1626,  1655 

Pimbley  v.  Molyneux  794 

Pimm  v.  Insall  1293 

Pince  v.  Beattie  1413,  1414 

Pincers  V   Robertson  746 

Piuch  v.  Anthony      407,  1515,  1523, 

1524 

Pinchin  v.  London  and  Black- 


wall  Ry.  Co. 
Pindall  v.  Trevor 
Pindar  v.  Pindar 

v.  Smith 
Pine,  Re 

v.  Ellis 

t»   Shannon 


985,  1663,  1664 

257 

1526 

1113,  1119 

1177.  1209,  1825 

1177,  1209,  1825 

212 


13l»7 


Pine  Lake  Iron  Co.  v  La  Fayette 

Car  Works  1756 

Pineo  v .  HefTelfinger  1675 

Pinfold  v.  Bouch  1417 

v.  Piulold  808 

Pingree  v.  Coffin    152,  197,  378,  886, 

887,    917,    927,    961,    1013, 

1028,  1081,  1181,  1299,  1317, 

1368,  1484,  15H8,  1509,  1511, 

1524,  2181,  2185.  2186,  2196, 

2222,  2226,  2229,  2252,  2367, 

2372 

v.  Hodges  1119 

Pink  v.  Trade  and  Labor  Unions 

1620 
Pinkard  V.  Smith  121 

Pinkers  v.  Peters  1510 

Pinkerton  v.  Barnsley  Canal  Co    892 
Pinkett  v.  Wright  1468 

Pinkum  v.  Eau  Claire  586 

Pinkus  v.  Peters  267,  1533 

Pinneo  v.  Goodspeed  1320 

Pinner  v.  Knights  307,  308,  309 

Pinney  v.  Hunt     205,  663,  877,  1726 
Pinnock  v.  Clough  1400 

Pinson  ».  Williams  852 

Pioneer   Gold   Mining   Co    v. 

Baker 
Pioneer  Manuf.  Co  v.  Phoenix 

Ass.  Co 
Pioneer  Wood  Pulp  Co.  v.  Bens 

ley 
Pipe  v.  B:i reman 
Piper  v   Gittens 
v .  Piper 

v.  St    Paul  Trust  Co 
Pisani  v.  Attorney-General 

v.  Lawson 

Pit  it.  Cholmondelev  668 

Pitcher  v.  Helliar      1718, 1734,  1735 

Pitman  v.  Thornton  1019 

Pitt  o.  Arglass,  Earl  of       1580,  1583 

v.  Bonner 

v    Brewster 

v.  Lord  Dacre 

v.  Hill 

v.  Hunt 

v.  Maclew 

v.  Mackreth 

v .  Page 

v.  Pitt 

v.  Snowden 

Pitt  man  v.  McClellan 


145 

372 

1637 

190 

805 

1628 

1381 

74,  852 

45 


1754 

253 
1438 

663 
124, 125 

312 
131) 
1466 
178,  180 
1748 

526 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED. 

[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 


XCVll 


itts  v  Hooper 

722,  758 

v.  La  Fontaine 

64 

v.  Mower 

195 

v.  Powledge 

1550 

v.  Short 

589 

v.  Tilden 

1254 

Pittsburgh  Co.  's  Appeal  630 

Pittsburgh,  &c.  Ry.  Co  v.  Bal- 
timore &  0.  R.  Co.  1157 
Pittsford  v.  Chittenden  851 
Pixley  v.  Roai  oke  Nay.  Co.           630 
Place  v.  Provideuce                 726,  843 
Plants.  Barclay                   1491,  1624 
v.  Kendrick                                  1826 
v   Pearman                                    280 
Plant  Seed  Co.  v.  Michel  Plant 

Co.  1381 

Planters'  Bank  v.  Fowlkes  l*i79 

v   Laucheimer  1675 

Planters'  Ins.  Co.  v.  Selma  Sav- 
ings Bank  418 
Plasket  v.  Beeby  164 
Platel  v.  Craddock                            109 
PlatiDg  Co.  v.  Farquharson          8-7, 
1070 
Piatt  v.  Button                             1643 
v.  Gilchrist                                1653 
v.  Judson                                     525 
v.  Mead                                          324 
v.  Philadelphia  &  R.  R.  Co.    1716, 
173o 
v  Routh                                    1610 
v.  Squire     194,  208,  212,  415,  425, 
1386,  1407,  1408 
v.  Walter                                     398 
Platts  v.  Button                            1643 
Plaut  v.  Plaut                                   390 
Player  v  Anderson                   27,  358 
Playford  v.  Hoare                           1402 
Pleasanton  v.  Raughley                 842 
Pleasants  v.  Glasscock  334,  379,  3"*5, 
551 
v.  Kortrecht                              1845 
v  Logan                             406, 1533 
v.  Ross                                671,  1123 
P.  &  M.  Bank  v.  Dundas             1577 
Pledge  v.  Bass                               1399 
Plestow  v.  Johnson                35,  1737 
Pleydell  v.  Dorchester,  Earl  of    1130 
Plimpton  v.  Spiller                       1663 
v.  Winslow                                    149 
Plintoffu   Haynes                          1369 
Plitt,  Ex  parte                          1214 
Piomer  v.  Macdonough                 1069 
Plomley,  Re  70 
v.  Felton                                        1U5 
Plowden  v  Campbell                        28 
Plowes  v.  Bossey                     564,  851 
Plowman  v.  Williams                       67 
Piumbev   Plumbe                          321 
Plume  v.  Beale                               663 
Plumer  v.  Gregory                           269 
v   Macdonald                               1(169 
v  McDonald  Lumber  Co.          1507 
Plummer  v.  Doughty                     221 
v.  May                          296,  299,  632 
Plunket  v.  Joyce              72,  404,  418 
v.  Penson                     283,  290,  613 
Plunkett  v.  Cavendish           623,  662 
v.  Cobbett                                  1096 
v.  Lewis                             797, 1314 
Plymouth  v.  Russell  Mills            1585 
Plymouth,  Countess  of  v.  Bladon  659, 
817 
Pocock  v.  Att.-Gen.                         13 
v.  Reddington                           1420 
Podmore  v.  Gunning                    1721 
v.  Skipwith                          781,  782 
Pogson  v.  Owen                              191 
Pohl  v.  Pontier                               365 
Poindexter  v.  Blackburn               117 
v.  Jeffries                               90,  105 
Pointon  v.  Pointon                         334 
Poirier  v.  Fetter                            1650 
Pole  v.  Joel                          1488,  1603 
v.  Leask                                      1501 
Polhemus  v.  Emson             385,  1158 
VOL.  I. — g 


Polini  v.  Gray  1469 

Polk  v.  Gallant  197 

v.  Plummer  23 

Pollard  v.  Doyle  808,  1234,  1413. 

1591 
v.  Photographic  Co.  1643 

v.  Yoder  1257 

Pollock  v,  Birmingham,  Wolver- 
hampton, and  S.  Valley  Ry. 
Co.  99,  1802 

v   Boyd  1618 

v.  Braiuerd  1395 

v.  Buie  68 

v.  Hester  2307 

v.  Lester  303,  345,  1635 

v.  Rabbits  1654 

Pomeroy  v.  Baddeley  1102 

v.  Fullerton  385 

v.  Manin  2397 

v.  Winship  1073 

Pomfret,  Earl  v.  Windsor,  Lord  646, 
882 
Pond  v   Allen  1051 

v.  Clark  197 

v.  Cook  1743,  1751 

v.  Sib'ey  149 

v.  Vermont  Valley  R.  Co.  801 

Ponder  v.  Cox  1621 

Pondir  v.  New  York,&c.  R.  Co.  1765 
Ponsardin  v.  Peto  1649 

v.  Stear  801 ,  806 

Ponsford  v.  Hankey  321,  322 

v.  Hartley  236,  360 

v.  Swaine  298,  671 

v.  Walton  880 

Pontchartrain  R.  Co.  v.  New  Or- 
leans &  Carrollton  R.  Co.      1640 
Pool  v.  Dial  1320 

v.  Gramling  1299 

v.  Horton  1463 

v.  Lloyd  548 

v.  Morris  101 

v.  Pool  1378 

v.  Sacheverell  1070 

Poole  v.  Franks    64, 1421, 1448,  1453 
v  Gordon  773 

v.  Larkins  1236 

v  Lloyd  547 

v.  Marsh  209 

v.  Pass  1411, 1436 

v.  Poole  642 

v.  Shergold  12 1 7 

Pooley,  Re  1414 

v.  Bosanquet  280 

v.  Driver  1444 

v.  Quilter  1490 

v.  Ray  250,  1207 

Pooley's  Trustee  v.  Whetham,  32,  64 
Poor  v.  Carleton       1668,  1669,  1672, 
1675, 1676,  1677,  1995 
v   Hazleton  120 

v.  Robinson  1250 

Poor's  Lands  Charity,  In  re  13 

Poore  v.  Clark  210 

Pope,  Re  98,  1035 

v.  Al'.is  838,  840,  860 

v.  Bell  1675 

V.  Bish  703 

v.  Briggs  1511 

v  Curl  1647,1648,2314 

v   Duncannon  1621 

v.  Erdman  1282 

v  Great  Eastern  Ry.  Co.         1775, 
1776 
v.  Gwyn  164 

v.  Lem  aster  997 

v.  Leonard  26  334 

v   Melone  209 

v.  Salamanca  Oil  Co.  312,  334 

V.  Stansbury  584 

Poplar  &  Blackwall  Free  School, 

Re  13 

Poplin  v.  Hawke  874 

Poppers  v.  Meagher  1527 

Popple  v.  Henson  13S3,  1407 

Porch  v.  Fries  1351,  1352 

Porous  Plaster  Co.  v.  Seabury      313 


Porrett  v.  White  1780 

Portarlington  v.  Damer  1469 

Earl  of  v.  Damer  797,  798,  799 

1591,  1615 

Lord  v.  Graham  1674 

v.  Soulby  618,  714,  721,  1627, 

1628,  1651,21)95 

Port  Clinton  R.  Co.  v.  Cleveland 

R.  Co.  1663 

Portal  v.  Hine  1050 

Porter  v.  Bank  of  Rutland  841 

v.  Bauks  1320 

v.  Burton  1460 

v.  Cooper  1142 

v.  Cox  64,  814 

v   Frenchman's  Bay,  &c.  Co.    545 

v   Hill  646 

v.  Jennings  840 

v.  Kingman  1734 

v.  Lopez  1163, 1726 

v.  Neckervis  20 

v.  Porter  83,  1731 

v.  Sabin  1743 

v.  Sherman  Countv  B.  Co.        559 

v.  Spencer       395, '551, 1698, 1699, 

1702 

v.  Vaughan  811 

v-  Young  334 

Porter's  Trusts,  Re  865 

Portis  v.  Fall  1620 

Portland,  Countess  of  v    Prod- 

gers  89, 178,  179 

Portlington  v.  Tarbock  1586 

Portman  v.  Mill  1218 

Portoues  v.  Holmes  1320 

Port  Royal  Railroad  Co.  v.  Ham- 
mond 629 
Portsmouth,  Earl  of  v   Fellows     348 
Portsmouth,  Lord  v.  Effingham, 

Lord  1577,  1578 

Portsmouth  Livery  Co    v.  Wat- 
son 24,  25 
Portugal,  Queen  of  v.  Glyn  658 
Portz  v.  Schantz                             1381 
Post  v   Boardman  146 
v.  Kimberly                                 551 
v .  Lee                                          1269 
v.  Leet                              1286, 1290 
v   Mackall                              176,  214 
v.  Marsh                                     1400 
v   Stevens                                     1416 
v.  Toledo,  &c.  Railroad     145,  562, 
1556 
Postal  Tel.  Cable  Co  v.  Norfolk 

&  W  R.  Co  1683 

Postell?'   Skirving  96 

Postgate  r.  Barnes    92, 110,  149,  152 
Postmaster-General,  Ex  parte    58, 
61, 157 
Postlethwaite,  Re  576,  678 

v.  Howes  249,287 

v.  Maryport    Harbour    Trus- 
tees 1727, 1731 
v.  Travers  521 
Poston  v.  Eubank  194 
Pott  v  Gallini                                 7«l7 
Potter,  Re                                       110 
v.  Baker                                     1481 
v.  Barclay                                     1536 
V.  Beal                                1029,1178 
v.  Chapman                               1672 
v.  Gardner                                   232 
v.  Hiseox                                    1355 
v.  Holden                     287,  289,  294 
v.  Hoi  lister                                  629 
i>.  Potter                    840,  858,  1819 
v.  Waller                              387,  720 
0   Webb                                        1254 
V.  Whitney                                1642 
Potter  Land  &  W.  Co.  v.  Bas- 

kin  149 

Potts  v.  Britten  153 

v.  Butler  1672 

v.  Hahn  334 

i>   Leighton  1747,  1754,  1755 

i>.  Smith  1638 

v.  Thames  Haven  &  Dock  Co    223 


XCV111 


TABLE   OF   CASES    CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 


Potts  v  Trotter  1311, 1312 

v.  Turts  953 

v.  Warwick,  &c.  Canal  Co.     1731, 
1744 
v.  Whitmore       415,  421,  492,  493, 
500 
Pouder  v.  Tate  1517 

Poulson  v.  Collier  881 

Poultney  v  La  Fayette  2397 

Pountain,  In  re  83 

Poupardtf.  Fardell  890 

Powden  v.  Johnson  885 

Powell,  Re  1049 

t;.  Aiken  2309 

t\  Bernard  28 

v.  Calloway  972 

v  Cleaver  875,  1116,  1350 

t'.  Clement  1463 

v.  Cockerell  303,346,431,432,583, 
1600 
v.  Davton,  &c.  R.  Co.  303 

v.  Dowdle  1551 

v.  Elliott  1376 

r.  Hall  1549 

v.  Heather  1538 

v.  Hopson  1468 

v  Jewesbury  409,583 

v.  Kane  347,  894,  895,  1598 

v.  Knight  272 

v.  Lovegrove  1490 

v.  Hanson      844, 1116,  1117,  1124 
i».  Martin  968,  970 

v.  Martyr  1402 

v.  Mayo  418 

v.  Merrett  96 

v.  Monson  Manuf.  Co.   1165,  1905, 
2288 
v.  Pacific  R.  Co.  666 

v.  Phillips  229 

v .  Powell  109,  813,  814, 1264, 

1276, 1327,  1417, 1512 
v  Powis,  Earl  of  345 

v.  Prentice  180,  183 

v.  Robins  165,  168 

v.  Sanger  1654 

v  Sims  1638 

v.  Sonnett  1109 

v  Thomas  324 

v.  Trotter  1245,  1391,   1392, 

1393 
v.  Wallworth  1169 

v   Williams  1071 

v   Wood  1114 

v.  Wright  149, 150.  280,  1652 

v.  Young  378 

Powell,  &c.  Coal  Co.  v.  Taff       1663 
Power  v  Barham  1104 

v.  Holman  61 

v.  Keeder  551 

v   Reeves  1466 

v.  Walker  1644 

Powers  v.  Heery       1628, 1631, 1669 
v.  Large  1071 

t>.  McKenzie  639 

v  Raymond  1071,  1110 

Powlet,  Earl  v.  Herbert  1418 

Powley  v.  Walker  1655 

Powys  v  Blaerave      757,  1634,  1732 
b.  "Mansfield  327,  852 

v  Shrewsbury   Potteries    Ry. 
Co  1513 

Poyer  v.  Des  Plainea  1620 

Poynes  v.  Creagh  303 

Poyser  v  Minor  979 

Praed  i>   Graham  1130 

Prall  v   Hunt  1591 

Prance,  lie  892 

v.  Sympson  560 

Pratt  i'.  Archer  424 

v  Bacon  406,  425,  828,  1448 

v   Bank  of  Windsor  443 

v.  Barker  294,  406,  410 

v   Boston    &    Albany      Rail- 
road 197 
v.  Brett                              1630,  1656 
v.  Bull                                       1033 
v  California  Mining  Co.  560 


Pratt  p.  Inman 

1059 

v.  Jenner 

179,  1802 

v.  Keith 

288,  589 

v.  Lamson 

1299 

v.  Northam 

1997 

f.  Pond 

1961,  2274 

v.  Rathbun 

1205 

v   Koseland  Ry.  Co. 

1638 

v.  Taunton  Copper  Co. 

197 

.  v.  Taylor 

628,687 

v.  Tenner 

87 

v.  Walker 

1600 

Preble  v.  Longfello 

1359 

Preece  r.  Corrie 

127 

v.  Seale 

1407 

Prees  v.  Coke 

998,  1386 

Prendergast  v.  Lusbington          153, 

ldfiQ 

v.  Prendergast 

1502, 1503 

Prentice  v.  Kimball 

287 

v.  Phillips 

1836 

v.  Prentice 

191 

Prentiss  v.  Paisley 

1576 

Preschbaker  r.  Freeman 

847 

Prescott  v.  Everts 

368,  371 

v.  Hubbell 

402 

Presley  v.  Davis 

1358 

Pressley  v.  Harrison 

1733 

Prestall's  Case 

156 

Prestidge  v.  Pendleton 

371 

Prestney  v  Colchester 

1602 

Preston  v.  Aston 

197 

v  Barker 

1286, 1292 

v.  Carr 

571 

v  Carter 

236 

v.  Collett 

412,801 

v  Dickinson 

451,  452 

v.  Fitch 

1511 

v.  Grand  Collier  Dock  Co.  241 

v.  Guyon  241 

v.  Lamont  628 

v.  Luck  1663 

v.  Smith  545,547,1556,1620,1628, 
1638 
v.  Walsh  230,  560 

v  Wilson  60,  553 

Preston  Corp.  v.  Fullwood  Local 

Board  402 

Preteca  v  Maxwell  Land  Grant 

Co.  630 

Prevost  o.  Benett  860, 1407 

v.  Gorrell  &3S 

Prewit  v.  Graves  378 

Prewitt  v.  Lambert  855 

Price,  Ex  parte  1846 

Re  1433,  1440 

v.  Berrington       85,328,813  1078 

v.  Carter  165 

v.  Carver  165,  166,  167,  168, 

2217 

v.  Clavenger  1676 

v.  Coleman  314,  334 

v.  Copner  650 

v.  Dewey  659 

v  Dewhurst  1470,1480,1481, 

1627 

v  Evans  1616 

v.  Gardiner  985 

v   Gardner  398,  964 

v.  Hobbs  1166 

v.  Hutchison  456,  1069 

v  .lames  547 

v  Lawton  1653 

v   Loaden  1417 

r   Lvtton  840,  1183 

v  M'Beth  1234.  1413 

r   Manning  920.  1099 

v.  Mavo  578 

v  Meth.  Epis.  Church  1669 

r.  Minot  26,  334,342, 

1001 

v.  Moxon  1290 

v.  Nesbit  987,  1491, 1492 

v.  North  1169 

v.  Price        679,  1288, 1381,  1392, 

1600 

v  Rickards  63,64 


Price  v.  Salusbury 
j'.  Sanders 
v.  Severne 
v.  Shaw 
v.  Thompson 
v.  Tyson 
v,  Upshaw 


415,  1469 
216 
1130 
1226 
1271 
728 
642 


v.  Webb      422,  455,  512,  536,  537, 
1590 
v.  White  1745 

v.  Williams  670,  1141,  1717 

v.  Winter  68 

Price's  Candle  Co.  v.   Bauwens 

Candle  Co.  1642 

Prichard  v.  Gee  936 

i'.  Littlejohn  1551 

v   Murray  719 

v.  Norris  1203 

Prichittr   Kirkman  1001 

Prickett  r.  Tuller  1676 

Pride  v.  Budd  100 

v.  Fooks  1420 

Prideaux  v  Prideaux  1288 

Priest  v.  Hamilton  69 

v.  Perrott  1003 

Priestley's  Appeal  1580, 1584 

Priestly  v.  Wilkinson  1386 

Priestman  v.  Thomas  553 

Prigmore  v.  Shelton  1276 

Prime  o   Titmarsh  1129 

Prime's  Estate,  He  1120 

Primm  v.  Raboteau  378 

Primrose,  Tie  1412 

Prince  v.  Boston  10 

v.  Cooper  1264 

v  Farrell  1551 

v.  Gundaway  536 

v.  Hevlin  644 

v.  Hine         730,  731,  1356,  1359, 

1413 

v.  Howard  1013 

r.  Samo  1104 

v.  Smith  1228 

Prince  Henry,  He  892 

Prince  Manuf.    Co.  v.    Prince's 

Metallic  Paiut  Co.  1648 

Prince  of  Wales  Assoc,  v.  Pal- 
mer 204 
Princeton  r.  Adams                      2012 
Pring,  Re                                      1611 
Pringle  v.  Gloag         1408,1447,  1846 
r.  Hodgson  102 
v   Pringle                            116,  117 
Printup  v.  Patton                          838 
v.  Rome  Land  Co.                       586 
Prioleau  v.  United  States  17,  20,  24, 
141,  145,  296 
Prior  v.  Bagster                            1746 
Priors  v.  White  30 
Pritchard  r.  Draper          1370,  1515, 
1520 
v  Fleetwood                              1724 
r.  Foulkes                                    923 
v.  Hicks                     217, 254, 1412 
v.  Roberts  81 
Privett  v  Calloway                       1463 
Probasco  V.  Probasco                     1734 
Probate,  Judge  of  v.  Heydock     1254 
Proctor  v.  Bayley        554,  1380,  1395 
v  Cheshire  City  Council            406 
v.  Cooper                                    1035 
v.  Farnam                                  1285 
v.  Ferebee                                  1032 
r.  National  Bank  of  the  Re- 
public                                      629 
v.  Reynel                                      1060 
v.  Smiles                                        576 
v.  Webber  22 
Produce  Bank  v.  Morton              1463 
Prole  v.  Soady  87,  116, 119, 122, 179, 
893 
Proper  v.  Monmouthshire  Canal 

Co.  1503 

Proskauer  v.  People's  9.  Bank      349 

Prosser  r   Bank  of  England  865 

v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  1639 

Protheroe  v.  Forman  663,  1621,  1624 


Proud  v.  Bates 
Proudfit  v.  Pickett 
Proudfoot  v.  Hume 
Prout  v.  Underwood 
Providence  Bank  v.  Wilkinson 

v   Wilson 
Providence  Institution  v.  Barr 


1449 

536 
1780 
726 
1565 
1560 
605, 
608 

Providence  Rubber  Co.  v.  Good- 
year 1580 
Provident  Institution  v.  White    1060 
Provincial  Bank  v.  Brocklebank  686 
Provincial  Banking  Co.  v.  Til- 

lett  •  159 

Provost  v.  Gratz  1479 

Prowett  v.  Mortimer  1648 

Prudential  Ass.  Co.?'.  Edmonds  1503 
v.  Knott  1620,  1644.  1648 

v.  Thomas  1567,  1568,  1623 

Prussia,  King  of  v.  Kuepper  18 

Prutzman  r.  Pitesell  753 

Prver  v  Gribble  796,  1031,  1588 

Pryor  v.  Hill  104,  122 

Pryse  v.  Cambrian  Ry.  Co.  1775 

v.  Pryse  316,  552 

Prytherch,  Re,  Prytherchf  .Wil- 
liams 1716 
Pudge  v.  Pitt  813 
Pugh,  Ex  parte                   102,  2001 
lie  113 
v.  Arton                                     1390 
v.  Bell                                          645 
v.  Currie                                        216 
v.  Golden  Valley  Ry.  Co.         1650 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 

Pugh  v.  Heath  649 

v   Holt  994 

v.  Vaughan  1631 

v.  Winona,  &c.  R.  Co.  1461 

Pugsley  v.  Freedniau'a  Sav.  & 

Tr.  Co  460,  536 

Pulbrook,  Ex  parte  1014,  1015 

r.  Richmond  Cons.  M   Co.  244 

Pulhani  v.  McCarthy  302 

Pullan  v.  Cincinnati,  &c,  R.  Co  281, 

1619 

v.  Rawlins  878 

Pullen  v.  Baker  395 

v.  Pullen  1120 

v.  Ready  1622 

v.  Smith  718 

v  Snelus  655,  656 

v.  White  1106 

Pulley  v  Hilton  1113 

Pulliam  v.  Christian  987,  1492 

o.  Pulliam       857,  1252,  1305,  23l»5 


XC1X 


Pullman  v.  Baltimore  &  Ohio 

R.  Co.  1642 

v.  Stebbins  256,  334 

Pullman  Palace  Car  Co.  v.  Cen- 
tral Trans.  Co.      790,  1548,  1621 
v.  Missouri  P.  Ry   Co.  545 

Pulteuey  v   Shelton  448,  1655. 

1685 
v.  Warren  1362, 1634, 1660 

Pulver  v   Harris  1845 

Punchard  v.  Tomkins  1040 

Punderson  O.  Dixon  1013 

Purcell  v.  Blennerhassett  643 


Purcellr.  M'Namara959, 1171,  1181, 

1185,  1196 

v  Manning  1581 

v.  Miner  1580 

v.  Purcell  844 

Purdew  v.  Jackson  119,  125 

Purdy  v.  Henslee  790 

Purefoy  v.  Purefoy  213,  330 

Pure  Spirit  Co  v.  Fowler  27 

Purkis  v   Date  892 

Purser  v.  Darby  1377,  1404 

Pusey  v.  Clenison  1235,  1772 

v  Desbouvie  605,  700, 1622 

v.  Wright  843,  844,  850 

Puterbaugh  v.  Elliott  601 

Putnam  v.  Clark  850,  1576 

v.  Commonwealth  Ins.  Co.       1299 

v.  Day  1577 

v.  Hollender  314,  334 

v.  I.yon  418 

v   Putnam  1386, 1507 

v.  Ritchie  1364 

v.  Sweet  26,  239,  303 

v   Valentine  1631 

Pybus,  Re  1847 

Pycroft  v  Williams  1044 

Pyke  v   Holcombe  113 

t'.  North  wood  1774 

r.  Waddingham  989 

Pyle  v.  Cravens  90 

v.  Price  288,  588 

Pym  v.  Pym  1365,  1731 

Pyncent  v.  Pyncent228, 675, 922,  951 

Pyrah  v.  Woodcock  33d,  649 


Q. 


Quaokenboss,  Ex  parte  1588 

Quackenbush  v.  Leonard    994,  1169, 

1543 

v.  Van  Riper  1677 

Quantot-k  v.  Bullen  170,406,410.  859 

Quarles  v.  Quarles  1005 

Quarman  v.  Williams        1040,  l'i41, 

1695 

Quarrell  v   Beckford    1241,  1244, 

1251,  1368, 1370, 1376, 1448, 

1719,  1780 

Quarrier  v.  Carter  1002, 1576 

v.  Colston  1651 

Quartz  Hill  C.   G    M.   Co.  v. 

Beall  1620,  1643,  1670 


Queade's  Trusts,  lie 

100,  123 

Quinby  v.  Carhart 

850 

Queen,  The  (See  R) 

v.  Conlan 

1071 

Queen's  Case 

1102 

1103, 1104 

Quince  v   Quince 

253 

Queen's  Benefit  B. 

3ocie 

ty,  Re 

Quincy  v.  Sharpe 

646 

1611 

v.  Steel 

26,  313 

Queensberry,  Duke 

off. 

Sheb- 

Quincy,  &c.   R.   Co. 

f.   Hum- 

beare 

1647 

phrevs 

1734,  1743 

Queen's  College,  Ex 

parte 

Quin  Ian  v.  Reiser 

668 

v.  Darby 

1620 

Quinn  v.  Brittain 

1242 

Quitter  v.  Heatly 

896 

v  Leake 

360,  557,  801 

V.  Mapleson 

1488 

Quintz  v.  Quintz 

1320 

Quin  v.  Britham 

1719 

Quirolo  i\  Ardito 

314 

v.  Green 

1562,  1566 

Quitman  County  v.  Stritze 

v.  Patton 

1566 

v.  Ratcliff 

1822,  1831 

R. 


R    I 

.  Abingdon, 

Earl  of 

1106 

V 

Adey 

1105 

V. 

Ashwell 

564 

V. 

Aspinall 

546 

V 

Ball 

1101 

V. 

Ball  de  Bewdley 

1112 

V. 

Uarber 

1105 

V 

Barthwick 

874 

V. 

Bell 

1106 

V. 

Bignold 

1106 

V 

Boyes 

717 

,942 

1103 

V 

Brooke 

1102 

V. 

Burdett 

1108 

V. 

Burridgo 

1092 

V. 

Castro 

1070 

V. 

Chapman 

920 

V. 

Colley 

1101 

V. 

Cox 

578 

V 

Cumberland  Justices 

307 

V 

v. 

Despard 
Doutre 

1087 

1092 
133 

V. 

Duncombe 

1102 

V 

Edmonds 

1091 

1095 

R.  v.  Edwards 

1108 

v .  Fitzwater,  Lord 

1108 

v  Fowler               8 

135,156,  1108 

v.  Grant 

1127,  1137 

t>  Grosvenor 

1636 

v.  Hancock 

17->:J 

r.  Hart 

1"86 

v.  Hilditch 

1106 

v.  Hill 

1098 

t'.  Home 

Him; 

v.  Hughes 

1094 

v.  Johnson 

1092,  1109 

v.  Jordan 

1069 

0,  Kin  near 

1108,  1131 

i'.  Mainwaring 

865 

v.  Marsden 

1106 

V.  Martin 

1108 

v.  Millis 

1501 

v.  Murphy 

1108 

v.  Newman 

1102 

v.  Norwich 

1650 

v.  Ramsden 

1100 

v .  Richardson 

1131 

R.  v.  St.  George 

1101 

v.  Sealhert 

1108 

r.  Staffordshire  County  Court 

Judge 

1069 

v  Teal 

1126 

i     Truro,  Lord 

744 

v.  Watklnson 

575 

r.  Watson 

1103,  1104 

v.  Weaver 

865 

v.  Webb 

1102 

V.  Whitehead 

1098 

v.  Wooller 

1109,  1131 

V.  Wylde 

1101 

V.  Wyndham 

146 

Rabberman  v.  House 

860 

Rnhheth  r   Squire 

732,  783 

Babbitts  ''•  Woodward 

1051 

Rabe  v   Dunlip 

26 

Raby  v   Ridehalgh 

1370 

Rackham  r  Siddall 

706,  1484 

Radam  v.  Capital  M   D. 

Co.           779 

Radcliff  v.  Corrothers 

15*1 

v.  Rowley 

645 

-TABLE   OP   CASES   CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 


Radcliffe,  Re                134,  895,  2191 
v.  Eccles  1345 
t>.  Kursuian  672,  584 
v.  Portland,  Duke  of  163* 
v.  Varuer  1023 
Radclyffe.  Re  1417 
Radu-  v.  Yeargin  1221 
Radford  v   Folsom         634,  659,  1750 
j>.  in  nes  1675 
v.  Roberts  461 
v.  Wills  1403 
v.  Wilson  678 
Ridley  !>    Ingram  2191 
R.ie  v.  Mayor,  &c.  1463 
Raeburu  V    Andrews  28 
Rifalsky  v.  Boehm  542 
R.ttierty  v.  Central  Traction  Co    3(i3 
Ratfety  v.  King  302,  715 
Rigau  v.  Echols  885 
Raggett,  ite,  Ex  parte  Williams  213 
Ragland  v.  Broaduax  1548,  1553 
Ragsdale  v.  Holmes  334 
Raguec  «.  Roll  1238 
Raiker  v   Pike  2238 
Railroad  Co.,  Ex  parte  281,  1548. 
1553 
v.  Bradley  1491 
v.  Duraut  861 
V.  Harris  144 
v.  Neal  1625 
v  Orr  243 
v.  Smith  1743 
v.  Soutter  1491 
Railway  Co.  v.  McCarthy  1650 
Railway  Sleepers  Supply  Co.,  Re     67 
Raincock  v.  Simpson  1748 
v  Young  780,  782 
Raine  v.  Wilson  177,  444 
Rainey  v.  Rainey  737,  1677 
Rains  v.  Rainey  1214 
Rainsdon,  Re  111 
Rainsdon's  Trusts,  Re  87.  179 
Rainwater  v.  Elmore  1101 
Raistrick  v.  Elsworth  784,  8u2 
Rajah  Salig  Ram  v.  Secretary  18 
Rakes  v.  Brown  1508 
Ralli  v.  Universal  Marine  As- 
surance Co.  1470 
v.  UniversalMarine  Insurance 
Co.  1490 
Ralph  v.  Carrick  1431 
Ralphs  v.  Hensler  546 
Ralston  v.  Sharon  1584 
Ram.  Ex  parte  224 
Ramey  v.  Green  1536 
Ramkissenseat  v.  Barker  45,  736, 
750,  891,  948,  1552 
Ramon  v.  Ramon  1356 
Ramsbotham  v  Senior  1355 
Ramsbottom  v.  Freeman  1667,  1735 
Ramsdall  v.  Craighill  1673 
Ramsden  v.  Brearley  87 
v.  Dyson  1660 
v.  Hylton  1622 
v.  Langley  1245,  1388 
Ramsey  v.  Brailsford  989 
v.  Temple  546 
Ramshaw  v  Greenhill  1059 
Ramv  v    Kir  892 
R-mcliffe  v    Parkyns  873 
Rand  v.  Cutler  1385 
v.  Macmahon  876,  878 

V  Redington  1623 
v.  Walker  200 

Randall    v.     Chesapeake,    &c. 

Canal  Co.  671 

v.  Christianson  407,  418 

v.  Morgan  365 
v.  Mumford  63,  64, 1508, 1679 
v.  Pavne         986,  1017, 1576,  1584 

v   Peckham  1021,  1476 

v.  Phillips  844 

v   Pryor  1062 

V  Randall  1320 
v.  Richardson  1638 
v.  Riehford  954 
v.  Sanderson  1638 


Randall  v.  Songer  1002 

v.  Venabie  2391 

Raudell,  In  re,  Randell  v.  Dixon     13 
Handheld  v.  Randrield      1742,  1743, 
1744 
Randie  v   Adams  1160 

v   Boyd  986 

Randolph  v.  Daly    269,  338,  344,  368 
v  Dickenson  110,  1507,  1546 

v.  Glos  850 

v.  N.  J    West  Line  R.  Co.         1961 
v   Rmdolph  641,  1578 

v  Rosser  1377,  1463 

Randolph's  Appeal  982,  1552 

Randon  v.  Cartwright  1580 

Rands  v.  Pushmau  1318 

Raney  v.  Kirk  892 

Ranger    v.    Champion    Cotton- 
Press  Co  26,  559 
v.  Great  Western  Rv.  Co  145, 
582,  671,  1534,  1535,  1537,  1821 
Rangley  v    Webster  458 
Ranken  v   East  and  West  India 
Docks  R'way  Co.          1662,  1663 
v.  Harwood                                1615 
Rankin  V    Harwood                        1615 
v.  Hnskisson                    1654,  1663 
v.  Maxwell  838 
Ranking,  Re                   202,  203,  1611 
Ranning  v   Reeves                         1081 
Ransom  v   Davis                             1301 
v.  Geer                  191,  227,  390,  991 
v.  Stonington  Savings  Bank     146, 


735 
1359 

lfiSO 
378 

1128 
760 


Ransome  v.  Burgess 
Rantzen  v.  Rothschild 
Raper  t».  Sanders 
Raphael  v   Bank  of  England 
v.  Birdwood 
V.  Boehm  1251,  1260,  1420 

2'.  Ongley  448 

v  Thames  Valley  R.  Co.  1657 

Rapier  v.  Gulf  City  Paper  Co.      340, 
860 
Rar  &  Del,  Bay  R.  Co.  v.  Del. 
&  Rar.  Canal  &  C.  &  A.  R. 
and  T.  Cos.  2323 

Rasbotham  v.  Shropshire  Union 

Rv.  Co.  720 

Rushleigh  v.  Dayman  972,  973 

Rashley  v   Masters     1383,  1411,  1414 

Ratcliff  v   Roper  455 

v.  8tretch  369 

Ratcliffe  v.  Winch      1616,  1617,2060 

Rathbone  v.  Eckford  796 

v.  Warner  1680 

Rather  v   Young  1029 

Ratteubury  v.  Fenton  660,  1482 

Rattison  v.  Hull  l'J95 

Rattray  v.  Bishop  1673, 1683 

v .  Darley  1552 

v.  George  42 

Ratzer  r    Hatzer  633,  1470 

Rau  v   Robertson  1461 

v  Von  Zedlitz  236,  1548 

Raub  v.  Masonic  M.  R.  Ass'n      1461 

Raupman  v.  Evausville  1081 

Raven  r   Kerl  71,  1347 

Rawlings  v.  Lambert     201 ,  318,  385, 

419,  425,  598, 1602 

v   Rawlings  1576 

Rawlins  r   Desborough  1104 

v.  M'Mahon  203,  1809 

v.  Powel  779,  1489 

v.  Wickham     905,  915,  1400.  2237 

Rawlinson  v.  Moss  1844.  1848 

v.  Stringer  1051,  1059 

Rawnsley  v.  Trenton  Mut.  Ins. 

Co.  1715 

Raworth  v.  Parker  824,  826 

Rawson,  Ex  parte  1584 

v.  Copland  1238 

v.  Samuel  972 

Rawstone  v.  Preston  Corporation  571 
Rawstorne  v.  Bentley  1658 

Ray  r. 1055 

v.  Conner  1030, 1602 


Ray  v.  Conners 

v.  Doughty 

v.  Feu  wick 

v.  Lines 

v.  Oliver 

v.  Walton 

v.  Womble 
Rayl  v.  Hammond 
Rayley  v.  Best 


1591 

1(>76 
199 

1638 

1269 
906 
408 

1381 
209,  1164 


Raymond  v .  Boston  Woven  Hose 


Co. 

v  Brown 

v .  Came 

v.  Isham 

v.  Lakeman 

v.  Russell 

v,  Simonson 

v.  State 

v .  Tapson 
Rayner,  Re 

v.  Castlee 

v.  Jones 

v.  Julian 

v .  Koehler 

t>.  Oastler 

v.  Pearsall 

v .  Stone 
Raynes  v.  Wyse 


1642 

884,912 

1249 

1258 

1288,  1291, 1450 

573 

542,641,692 

129 

901 

160 

640 

1120 

335,586 

319 

650 

641 

1660 

1700,  1701 


Raynham  Congregational  Society 
v.  Raynham  Fund  630 


Raynor  v.  Mintzer 
Rea  v.  Longstreet 

v.  Rea 
Reab  v.  M'AUister 
Read,  Re 

v.  Barton 

v.  Consequa 

v.  Cramer 

v.  Dews 

v.  Fite 

v.  Patterson 

v.  Prest 

v.  Read 

v.  Wotton 
Read's,  Sir  Thomas,  Case 
Readdy  v.  Pendergast 
Reade  v   Bentley 

v.  Lacy 

v   Sparkes 

v  Woodroffe 

Reading  v.  Ford 

v.  Stover 

Dispensary,  Re 
Ready  v.  Munday 

v.  Scott 
Reagan  v.  Bishop 

v.  Evans 


256 

1624 

894 

1253 

1317 

592,  785,  1439 

413,  748, 1672 

378,  379,  382 

1670, 1672, 1683 

1795 

243 

222,  980 

1165 

334 

1050 

852 

1443 

2314 

1406, 1413 

300,  621,  720,  727, 

760 

829 

586 

1854 

666 

582 

1290 

418 


Real   Estate  Associates    v.  San 

F'raucisco  Supr.  Court  1735 
Real  P.  A.  Co.  v.  McCarthy         1449 

Rearden  v.  Minter  1134 

Reay,  Re  880 

v.  Raynor  407 

Reckefus  v.  Lyon  334 

Rector  v.  Fitzgerald  1580 

v.  Mark  1253 

v.  Rector  842 

Redding  v.  Wilkes  365 

v  Wright  933 

Reddington  v.  Lanahan  1556 

Redeeker  v.  Bowen  1163 

Redfearn  v .  Sowerby  1844 
Redfern  v.  Redfern  564,  717,  1824 
Redfield  v.  Genesee  Co.,  Super- 


visors of 

v  Gleason 
Redin  v.  Branhan 
Red  Jacket  Tribe  v.  Hofl 
Redman  v.  Forman 
Redmond  v.  Dana 

v.  Dickerson 
Redondo  v.  Chaytor 
Reece,  Re 


1565 
380 
557 
589 

1638 

346 

545 

28,  53,  359 

1443 


J?e,  Gould  V.  Dummett  1012 

v.  Reece  1013,  1136,  1470 

v.  Taylor  1037, 1039.  1041 


Reece  v.  Trye  578,  1834 

Reed  v.  Bauk  of  Newbury  550 

v.  Barton  449,  1U45 

v.  Brooks  1284 

v.  Clark  84!) 

v.  Clarke  550 

v.  Conococheque  Bank  24 

v.  Cumberland,  &c.  Canal  Co.     10 

v.  Cumberland  M.  F.  Ins.  Co.  590, 

726,  759 

v.  Dews  1640 

v.  Don  Pedro  Mining  Co.  992 

v.  Holliday  1643 

v.  Jones       1222,  1236,  1250,  1300, 

1301,  1315 

v.  Kemp  1553 

v    Lawrence  1120 

v  Noe  989 

v.  O'Brien  368 

v.  Prest  905,  906 

v.  Reed     216,  334,  845,  1232,  1242, 

1243,  1244,  1245,  1248,  1252, 

1259,  12H8 

v  Rens.  Glass  Manuf.  Co         1253 

v.  Warner  736 

Reeder  v.  Machen  1461 

Reeks,  Re  188 

Rees,  Ex  parte  1854,  1  56 

Re  438,  1593 

v.  Bradley  448 

v   Evans  347 

v.  Lawless  838 

v.  Metropolitan     Board     of 

Works  1233 

v.  Peltzer  1666 

v.  Richmond  243 

v.  Smith  10!)7 

v.  Waters  90 

Reese  v.  Copeland  1286 

v.  Kinkead  324 

v.  Reese  586 

Reese  Kiver  Silver  Mining  Co. 

v.  At  well  59,  225,  405 

v.  Smith  1503 

Reeve,  lie  1213,  1428 

v   Attorney-General  131,  133 

v.  Dalby  108,  636 

v.  Gibson  1434 

v.  Goodwin  1771 

v.  Hodson  506,  865,  872, 1115, 1559 

v.  Parkins  1652 

v.  Reeve  1261 

v.  Richer  223 

v.  Whitmore  1228 

Reeves  ».  Adams  296 

v.  Baker  348,  814 

v.  Cooper  1623 

v.  Glastonbury  Canal  Co.  993 

v.  Greenwich  Tanning  Co.  543 

v.  Neville  1765 

v    People  106:) 

v.  Reeves  1158 

Reformed  Dutch  Church  v.  Fox  1003 

Hegeustein  i'.  Pearstein  1777 

Regiua  (See  R.) 

Regla  v.  Martin  174 

Re  hden  v   Wesley  821 ,  823 ,  824 

Rehkopf  v.  Kuhland  1168 

Reichel  v.  Magratb.  354,  728 

Reid,  Ec  parte  360 

v.  Atlanta  1638 

v.  Barton  1439,  2129 

v.  Bead  584 

v.  Explosives  Co.  1743 

v.  Gilford  203,  1639,  1676 

v.  Huff  1209 

v.  Langlois  576,  577,  944, 

1825,  1834 

v.  McCallister  843 

v-  Middleton  1742,  1743 

v.  Morton  1274 

v.  Reid  102 

v.  Steam  1567 

v.  Stuart  1507,  2056 

v.  Vanderheyden  217,  1461 

Reifsnider  v.  American  Imp.   P. 

Co.  149,  536 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 

[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 

Reilly  v   Reilly  659,  790 

Reimers  v.  Druce  664 

Reinbeek,  The  633 

Reiner  v.  Marquis  of  Salisbury      51, 
133,  629,  1556,  1558 
Reinhardt  v.  Meutasti  261,  1638 

Reiustadler  v.  Reeves  636 

lieissner  v.  Anuess  607 

Remer  v   Mackay  149 

v.  McKay  1548 

Remingtou  v.  Foster  630 

Remington     Paper    Co.    v.    La. 

Printing  Co.  1743 

Remnant  v.  Hood        730,  1376,  143-' 
Remsen  v.  Remsen     857,  1171,  118  >, 
1191, ll94,  1195,  1221,  1222, 
1227,  1296,  13  il 
Renals  v.  Cowlishaw  324,  1654 

Reoard  V.  Livinstein  1670 

Rend  v.  Venture  Oil  Co.  1638 

Rendall  v.  CrystalPalace  Co.        1650 
v.  Rendall  1725,  1726 

Rendell  v.  Carpenter  642 

Rendle  v.  Metropolitan  &  Pro- 
vincial Bank  888,  944 
v.  Rendle  1648 
Renfro  v.  Goetter                          1548 
Renick  v.  Ludington  991 
Rennell  v   Kimball              1300,  1317 
Reno  v.  Hale                                    1271 
Renshaw  v   Taylor                           283 
Rentfroe  v.  Dickinson           967,  1675 
Renton  v.  Chaplin                          1727 
Renvoize  v.  Cooper       194,  216,  221, 
1000 
Renwick  v.  Macomb               194,  277 
v   Wilson              402,  412,  413,  424 
Repplier  v.  Buck                              379 
Republic  of  Chili  v.  Rothschild      20 
Republic  of  Costa   Rica  v.    Er- 

langer  18,  19,  20,  27,  32, 

141 

v.  Strousberg  1661 

Kepulilie  of  Honduras?'.  Soto  18 

Republic  of  Liberia  v    Imperial 

Bank  IS,  19,  507,  801 

v.  Roye  19,  20,  26,  141,  507 

Republic     of     Paraguay,      Ex 

parte  1025 

v.  Lynch  1070 

Republic  of  Peru  v   Dreyfus  18, 

567 

v.  Peruvian  Guano  Co.        18,  354, 

542 

t\  Ruzo  868 

v.  Weguelin  19,  141,  1471 

Requa  v   Rea  1281,  1286,  1290 

Res  pass  v.  Breckenrid^e  1158 

v.  McClanahan       1576,  1578,  157!) 

v.  Morton  1505 

Rt-spulilica  v.  De  Longchamps       142 

Rettig  c.  Newman  782 

Retzer  v.  Wood  560 

Reuben  v  Thompson  454 

Reubens  v.  .loel  313 

Revell  v.  Rlake  66 

Revere  v.  Boston  Copper  Co.  26, 

144 

v.  Boston  Cotton  Co.  1661 

Revill,  He  1366 

Revolk  v.  Kraemer  1628 

Rex  (See  R.) 

Reyburn  v   Mitchell  407 

Reynell  v.  Sprve  298,  388,  578,  1 166, 

1614,    1682,    1824,    1828,    1829, 

1834 

Reynes  ?\  Dumont  1621 

Reynolds,  Ex  parte       60,  553,  564, 

717,  942,  1103 

Re  .       99, 1047, 1451 

v.  Rank  1071 

v.  Blake  1276 

v.  Bullock  1660 

v.  Crawfordsville  Bank       642,  829 

v.  Everett  1679 

v   First  Nat.  Bank  794 

v.  Godlee  578, 1827,  1837 


CI 


Reynolds  v.  Hennessy  659,  790 

v.  Howell  308,309,  851 

v.  Jones  747,  897 

v.  Lewis  1615 

v.  McMillan  1845 

v.  Morris  860 

v.  Nelson  805 

v.  Pharr  846 

v.  Pitt  1658,  1659 

v.  Reynolds  851,  1576 

v.  Stockton  1743,  1765 

Reynoldson  v.  Perkins         264,  265, 
998 

Rhea  v.  Allison  676 

v.  Puryear  418 

v.  Rhenner  88 

Rheinstein  v.  Bixby  1734 

Rlioads  v.  Rhoads  68 

Rhode  Island  v.  Massachusetts       2, 
17,  604,  607,  695 

Rhodes,  Re  850 

In  re,  Rhodes  v.  Rhodes  85 

v.  Buckland  1652 

v.  Cousins    1698,  1699,  1700, 1702, 
1707,  1708 
v.  Dawson  26,  29,  32,  1571 

v.  Dunbar  1635 

v.  Hayne  810 

v  Mostyn,  Lord  1717,  1718 

v.  Moxhay  284 

v.  Rhodes  868,  1189,  1327 

v.  Swithenbank  68 

v.  Williams  994 

Rhymney  Railway  v    Rhymney 
Iron  Co.  383 

Ricardo  v.  Cooper  417 

v .  Garcias  664 

Ricards,  Ex  parte  1357 

Rice,  He  1841 

v.  First  Division,  &c.  R.  Co. 

1461 
v.  Gordon  1835 

v.  Hale  395,  1698,  1699, 1703,  1707, 
1709,  1711,  2103,  2329 
v.  Hosiery  Co.  360 

v.  Howard  1099 

v.  Hunt  293.  298 

v.  Merrimack  Hosiery  Co.        314, 
843 
v.  Orgies  1423 

v.  Peet  83 

v.  Rice  1178 

v.  Tobias  1675 

v.  Yakima  &  P.  C.  R.  Co.  586 

Rich  v.  Austin  844 

v.  Brav  553 

v.  f'ockell  100 

v.  Thomas  1668 

Richards,  Ex  parte  1389 

Re  674 

v.  Allis  790,  986 

v.  Barlow  1409 

v.  Butcher  1648 

v.  Butler  316,  1556 

v.  Chambers  98,  186 

v.  Chave  1725 

v.  Chesapeake  &  Ohio  R.  Co. 

1733 
v.  Cooper  214 

V.  Curlewis  822,  890 

v.  Dadley  533 

v.  Davies  332 

v.  Evans  370 

v.  Griffith  674 

v.  Jackson  571 

v.  Mackall  560 

v.  Millett  109 

v.  Morris  Canal,  &c.  Co.         1213, 
1309,1310  1811 
v.  Perkins  1722,  1723 

v.  Pierce  334,  338,  341 

v.  Platel        1477,  1482,  1612.  1843 
v.  Revitt  1657 

v.  Richards         114,  220,  365,  1752 
v.  Rose  1136 

v.  Salter      1563,  1564,  1568,  158U, 
2004 


cii 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 

[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.  ] 


Richards  v.  Scarborough  Market 
Co.  404,  1847 

v.  Swan  1364 

v.  S vines  1112,1123 

v.  Todd  V6M,  1548 

v.  Travellers'  Ins  Co.  843 

v.  Watkms  1823,  1824,  1825 

v.  West  lti  1 3 

v.  Wood  1027,  1481 

Richardson,  Re  143i 

v.  Allan  1101 

v.  bank  of  England        1777,  1780, 
1781,  1782 
v.  Brooks  334 

v.  Davidson  1018 

v.  Douehoo  759 

v.  Eyton  796,  1588 

v.  Keary  1103 

v.  Fisher  1133 

v.  Gilbert  320,  367 

v.  Golden  924,  951 

v.  Hadsall  212 

v.  Hastings         190,  237,  240,  243, 
591,  600,  1827,  1837,  2086 
v.  Horton  1303,  1306 

v.  Huluert  247 

v.  Jenkins  1437 

v.  Jones  1042, 1061,  1462 

v.  Larpent  239,  241,  243 

v.  Leake  645 

v.  Lightfoot  1677 

v.  M'Kinson  334 

v.  Miller  71 

v.  Peacock  1654 

v.  Richardson  42,  43,  409,  647 

v.  Rusbridger  1431 

v.  Scott  1661 

v.  Wallace  779,  782 

v.  Wallis  1239 

v.  Ward         1261,  1321,  1764, 1765 
v.  Younge  651 

Riches  v.  Owen  60 

Richmond  v.  Adams  Nat  Bank      83 
v.  Gray  369.  989,  1031 

v.  Dubuque  R  Co.  1682 

v.  Irons        236,  402, 405,  407,  418, 
1210 
v.  Richmond  848,  961,  1116 

v.  Tayleur  164,  165,  173,  174, 

1584 
v.  White  1425,  1778 

v.  Yates  1720 

Richmond,  Duke  of  v.  Miln  46 

Richmond    Enquirer  v.  Robin- 
son 1625 
Richter  v.  Jerome  933 
v.  Union  Trust  Co.                      933 
Richwiuev.  Presbyterian  Church 

1517 

Rickard  v.  Talbird  1166 

Rickards  v.  Attorney-General      349, 

1463,  1492,  1503 

t>.  Hough  919 

v.  Murdork  1100 

v.  Rickards  1163 

Rickcord  v.  Nedriff  447 

Ricker  v.  Alsop  224 

v.  Brooks  334 

v.  Powell  1584 

Ricketson  V.  Merrill  1411 

Rirkett  v.  Johnson  1628 

Ricketts  v.  Lewis  15"] 

v.  Martin  1025 

v.  Mornington  505  980 

V.  Turquand  876,  1075,  1383 

Ricks  v.  Baskett  557 

Rico  v.  Gualtier  1702,  170.3 

Ridabock  v.  Lew  1481 

Riddell  v.  Errington  98 

Riddle  v   Bowman  1245 

r.  Motley  584,1515,1531 

v.  Whitehill  641 

Rideout,  fie  564.  849 

Rider  v.  Bngley  1716 

v.  Kidder  453,  1045 

Ridgeley  v.  Warfield  607 

Ridgely  v.  Bond  235,  363, 1527,  1528 


Ridgeway  v.  Darwin  1229 

v.  Toram  1580 

Ridgley  v.  Riggs  363 

Ridgway  v.  Bank  of  Teun.  1625 

r.  Clare  194li 

v.  Edwards  156 

v.  Ewbauk  1096 

v.  Gray  1283 

v   Kyunersley  710 

v.  Newstead  1474 

v   Phillips  1097 

v.  Roberts  1079,  1640 

v   Wharton  657 

Ridifer  v  O'Brien  1226,  1317 

Riding  V.  Hawkins  417 

Ridings  v.  Johnson         283, 313, 630 

Ridler  v.  Ridler  9, 83 

Ridley  v.  Obee  780 

v.  Ridley  891,914,1316 

v.  Tiplady  1331 

Ridout    v.    Plymouth,   Earl    of 

1737 
Ridsdale      Allanbee     v.     Great 

Western  Ry.  Co.  448 

Riegel    v.   American    Life    Ins. 

Co  713 

Rigby  v.  Connol  1652,  1653 

v.  Great  Western  Ry.  Co.        1148, 

1640 

v.  Macnamara  1285,  1292 

v.  Rigby      516,  624,  731,  777,  1829 

v.  Strangways  432,  797 

Rigdon  v.  Conley  720 

Rigg  v.  Hancock  378,  1614 

v.  Wall  968,  970,  979 

Riggs  v.  Dickinson  1156 

r   Huffman  1579 

v.  Murray  1468 

Riley,   Re  1029 

v.  Carter  324 

v.  Croydon  791 

v.  Lyons  634.  683 

v.  Western  Union  Tel  Co.        1661 

Riudskopf,  Re  933 

v.  Platto  1556 

Rinehart  v.  Long  334 

v  Rinehart  227 

Ringgold  v.  Jones         898,  951.  1073 

v.  Ringgold  1003,  1253. 1259, 

1260,  1369 

v.  Stone  324,  702 

Ringgold's  Case         1459, 1460,  1468 

Ringo  v.  Woodruff  1548 

Ringold  v.  Jones  1250 

Ringrose  v.  Todd  1124 

Ringwalt  v.  Ahl  1117 

Rio  Grande  R  Co.  v   Scanlan       1661 

Riopelle  v    Doellner  1550,  1557 

Ripley  v   Moysey  1428 

V.  Sawyer  170 

v.  Warren  546 

v.  Waterworth  261 

v.  Woods  122 

Ripon  v   Hobart  1629 

Rippe  r.  Stogdill  334 

Rippon  v.  Priest  877 

Risca  Coal  Co.,  lie      807,  980,  1016. 

1473 

Riselev  V.  Sheppard  865,  1543 

Rishton  v.  Grissell     771,  1221,  1250. 

1296 

Ri-t  v.  Hobson  365 

Ritchie  v.  Aylwin  607 

v.  Howsfie'ld  1134 

v   Broadbent  98 

v   Humberstone  797 

v.  Williams  1772 

Ritter's  Appeal  643 

Rirtson  v.  Stordy  47 

River  Steamer  Co.,  Re  646 

Rivers  v   Gregg  1360 

Roach  v.  Garvan        887,  1069,  1861, 

ia52 

V.  Hillings  312 

v   Rutherford  989 

Rnake  v.  Kidd  989 

Roane  v.  Pickett  271 


Roanoke  Gas  Co.  v.  Roanoke         860 

Roath  v.  Driscoll  1639 

v.  Smith  221 

Robarts  v.  Buee  1408, 1846 

V.  L  lay  ton  1561 

Robb  v.  Carnegie  1638 

Robbins  v,  Abrahams  182 

v.  Arnold  2511 

v.  Codman  850 

v.  Cooper  2'  37 

v.  Goldingham  1844 

v.  Robbius  169 

v.  Sand  Creek  T.  Co.  334 

Roberdeau  v.  Rous         543,  555,  584 

Robert  V.  Brice  1265 

Robert  Gere  Bank  v.  Innian  340 

Roberts,  Re      101,  1254,  1411, 1482, 

1616,  1745, 1798 

v.  Anderson  868,  1669,  1677 

v.  Ball  1042,  1065,  1455 

v.  Birgess  844,  10^7 

V.  Chamberlain  256 

v.  Clayton  321,  589 

v.  Collett  96,  97 

v.  Eberhardt  332,  1727,  1728 

V.  Evans  87,  109 

v.  Hartley  612,  690 

v.  Hodges  1675 

v.  Hughes       710,  1128, 1131,  1282 

v.  Johns  1168 

V.  Jones  696 

v.  Kelly  847 

v.  Kendall  933 

v.  Kerslake  1149,  1384 

v.  Kuights  45,  48,  629 

v.  Kuffin  668 

v.  Le  Hir  700 

v.  Lloyd  42 

v.  Madocks  319,  6"5 

v.  Marchant  286,  1484 

v.  Moreton  61 

v.  Morgan  1791 

V.  Oppenheim  573,  1838 

v.  Peavey  1549 

v.  Quincv,  0.  &  K.  R  Co  815 

v.  Roberts  228,  316,  795,850,  977. 

1290,  1380,  1652 

v.  Russell  135 

v.  Salisbury  844,  846,  1462 

v.  Scoones  1384 

v.  Stanton  161 

v.  Starke  334 

v.  Stower  1051 

v.  Tennell  837 

v.  Totty  1468 

v.  Tunstali  269 

v.  Walker  56,  58, 1430,  2182 

v.  Walley  579 

v.  White  1081 

v.  Williams  370,  1307,  1391 

Robertshaw  v.  Bray  1775 

Robertson,  Re  1847 

v.  Archer  1228 

v.  Armstrong  248 

V   Barbour  874 

v.  Biugley   547,  617,  787,  987, 1462 

v.  Campbell  1635 

v.  Carson  149 

v.  Crawford  518 

v.  Great  Western  Ry   Co.  230 

v.  Howard  543 

v.  Kemble  202,  204 

r.  Londonderry,  Lord  583 

r.  Lubbock      '  702 

v  Miller    524,  526,  529,  1026,  1027 

V.  Nnrris  1225 

v.  Quiddington  1660 

v.  Robertson  37,  38.  39 

v.  Scott  316.  1779 

v.  Shewell  1828 

v.  Skelton  1275.  1282 

v.  Southgate    159,  230,  1525,  1527, 

1529 

v.  Stevens  341,342 

v.  Wilkie  48,  1703 

v.  Winch  1697 

v.  Winchester  1029,  1553 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 


cm 


Robeson  v.  Pittinger  1638 

Robin,  The  1444 

Robins,  lie  99 

v.  Hodgson  283 

Robinson,  Ex  parte  1019,  1841 

Re  113 

Re,  Robinson  v.  Robinson  92 

v.  Allison  190 

v,  Anderson  1073 

v.  Aston  162,  177,  475 

v   Atlantic  Ry.  Co.  1743 

v.  Bailey  1542 

v   Battle  House  Co.  855 

v.  Baugh  303 

v.  Belt  1029 

v.  Bingley  589 

v  Bland  1224 

v.  Brown  867 

v   Brutton  36 

v.  Byron,  Lord      1631.  1632,  1639, 
1662,  1668,  1672,  1683,  1687 
v.  Campbell  1 

v.  Cook  1126,  1127 

v.  Cooper  171.  839 

v.  Cropsey  1381 

v.  Cross  334,  335 

v.  Cumming  1228,  1251,  1256 

v.  Dart  186 

v.  Davies  919 

v  Dhuleep  Singh  245,  867 

v.  Dix  559 

v.  Dolores  Land  Co.  324 

v.  Drakes  1491 

v.  Elliott  1424 

v.  Frainpton  1524 

v  Galland  1053 

v.  Gallier  850 

v.  Govers  1540 

v.  Guild  334,  342,  344,  584 

v.  Iladley  1734 

v.  Hardin  847 

v.  Harrison  1610 

v.  Hiutrager  217 

v  Hook  560 

v.  India  Chartered  Bank  602 

v.  International  Life  Ins.  Co.      51 
v.  Jenkins  1561 

v  Joplin  1624 

v.  Kitchin  566 

v.  Lewis  1475 

v.  Litton  67,  1630 

v.  Lowater  826 

v.  Mandell  840 

v.  Manuelle  1015 

v.  Missisquoi  R.  Co.  4u2 

v.  Nash  512,  536 

v.  Newdick  1024,  1026 

v.  Norton  63,  64,  814,  1542 

v.  Pett  12*3,  1234,  1413 

v.  Philadelphia  &  R.  R.  Co.     679, 
855 
v.  Pickering  186,  187 

v.  Preswick  1630 

v.  Reid  1625 

v.  Reynolds  88,  179 

v.  Robinson       220,  334,  1586,  2262 
v.  Rokeby,  Lord  442,  445 

v.  Rosher  71)  1 

v.  Rudkins  1019 

v.  Sampson  841,  1479,  1575 

v  Satterlee  2391 

V   Scotney  1229 

v.  Simmons  1320 

v.  Smith        26,  190  287,  290.  292, 
558,  564,  588,  604 
v.  Springfield  Co.  197,  334 

v.  Stewart  843,  847 

v.  Stigleman  844 

v.  Taylor  1473,  1483.  1734 

K  Thompson  581,586 

v.  Townsend  525 

v.  Wall  1458,  1555,  1559 

v.  Wheeler  1621,  1625 

v.  Williamson  1126 

v.  Wood  1306,  lt;94 

t>.  Woodgafe  726 

Robinson's  Trusts,  Re  1030 


Robinson  Tobacco  Co.  v.  Phil- 
lips 855 
Robsou,  Re  133 
v.  Cranwell                                   11)26 
v.  Devon,  Earl  of        159,  521,  808, 
815,  1397 
v.  Dodds             240,  245,  399,  1070 
v.  Flight                               721.843 
v.  Wnittinghain     995,  1072,  1081. 
1638 
Roby  i'.  Cossitt                               544 
v.  Scholes                                     1044 
Roch  v.  Callen                                 1422 
Rochdale  Caoal  Co  v.  King         3^4, 
485,  760,  1657,  1678,  1819,  1822 
Roche  v.  Morgell   378.  381,  611,  613, 
616,  619,  669,  670 
Rochester,  Re                               1770 
i\  Anderson                                   381 
v.  Lee                                           790 
Rochester,  Corp   of  v.  Lee     21,  9!i5, 
1137,  1148.  1149,  1464 
Rochester,   Major,   &c,    of    v 

Curtiss  1664,  1670 

Rochester  Distilling  Co.  v.  Dev- 

endorf  817 

Rochester,  H.   &   L    R.   Co.   v. 

New  York,  &c.  R.  Co.  1684 

Rochester  R.  Co  v.  Robinson  313 
Rochfort  c.  Battersby  59,  157,  1496 
Rock  v.  Cook  1064,  1744 

v.  Mathews  1G68 

Rock  Portland  Cement  Co.  v. 

Wilson  1082 

Rocke  v.  Hart  1416 

Rockwell  ik  Folsom  933,  !»37 

V.  Morgan  347,  1202 

Rodlaui  o   Hetherington      81,  17o4, 

1706,  1707,  1713 

v.  Morley  658 

Roderigas  v.  East  River  Savings 

Institution  1507 

Rodes  v    Blythe  1260 

Rodgers  t>.  Dibrell  1576 

v.  Ellison  444 

v.  Jones  418 

v.  Nowill     1112,  1113,  1136,  1147, 

1642,  1649,  1681 

v   Rodgers  406,  1677 

Rodick  v.  Gandell  1827 

Hodman  v.  Forline  1492 

Rodney  v.  Hare  829.  834,  983 

Roe  v.  Davies        384,  861,  890,  1058, 

1451 

v.  Gudgeon  1781 

Roemer  v.  Neumann  517.  1019,  1031 

v.  Simon  1019.  1504 

Roffey,  Ex  parte  642 

v    Bent  1089 

v.  Miller  63,  1525 

Rogers,  Ex  parte  1051 

v.  Abbott  1643 

v.  Acaster  119,  123,  127 

v.  Blackwell  334 

v.  Burton  1099 

v.  Challis  1081 

v.  Cincinnati  1627 

v.  Clark  D55 

v.  Cruger  169,  734,  753,  1497 

v.  Danforth  1668 

v.  De  Forrest  424 

v.  Duhart  313 

v.  Fryer  412 

v.  Goore  970 

v.  Gore  834 

v.  Holly  1403 

v.  Hooper  38,  830 

v.  Horn       110,  307,  973,  974,  1"31 

v   Hosack  141)3 

v.  Hull  Dock  Co.  1650 

v.  Jones  203,  1444 

v.  King  635 

r.  Kirkpatrick  493 

v.  Lambert  1561 

v.  Linton  150,  219 

v.  M'Maeham  1550 

v.  Maddocks  1655 


Rogers  v.  Marshall  870 

v.  Mitchell  829,  844,  845,  982 

v.  N.  Y.  &  T   L.  Co.  313,  378 

v.  Parker  1625 

v.  I'aterson  504,  1481,  1591 

v.  Rathbuu  386 

v.  Reissner  1120 

v.  Rogers     257,  294,  401,  402.  415, 

418.    424,   552,   1008,    1018, 

1028,  1080,  1074,  1369,  137'), 

1460,  1600,  177'.',  1793 

v.  Ross  1426,  1427.  1724 

v.  Saunders  369 

v.  Solomons  407,  1530 

v.  Thomas  851 

v .  Traders'  Ins   Co.  198 

v .  Van  Nortwick  26 

v.  Vosburgh        354,  634,  815,  816, 

1618 

v.  Ward  187,  361,  368,  1903 

Rogers  Locomotive  and  Machine 

Works  v.  Erie  It.  Co.  1662 

Rogers  T.  Co.  v.  Mergenthaler  L. 

Co.  1642 

Rolfe  v.  Gregory  560 

v.  Harris  1659 

v.  Peterson  1(555 

v    Rolfe  K557 

Hollestot.  v.  Morton  277 

Rollins  v.  Forbes  557 

v  Henry  1720, 1725 

v.  Hinks  1643 

luv.  Co.  v.  George  298 

Rolls  v  Miller  1662 

v.  Yate  195 

Rolt,  Re  133 

v.  Somerville,  Lord  584 

V.  White  199 

Romaine  v.  Hendrickson       243,  374, 

430 

Rome  Bank  v.  Haselson  236 

Rome,  &c   R.  Co.  v.  Rochester   1663 

Romilly  v.  Grint  42 

Romine  v.  State  1381 

c.  Vance  992 

Romney  v.  750 

Rondanez    v.    Mayor    of   New 

Orleans  I650 

Rooke  v   Kensington,  Lord        1001, 

2182 

Rookes  v.  Rookes  1318 

Roome  v   Nicholson  354 

Hooper  v.  Harrison  832 

Roosevelt  v.  Crommelin  45 

V.  Ellithorp  1382 

Root  v   Lake  Shore  Ry.  Co.  630 

v    Paine  1062 

v.  Ry.  Co.  6.TI 

v.  Wood  worth  1517 

v   Woolworth  1584 

Rootham  v    Dawson  393 

Roots  v.   Mason  City  S     &  M 

Co.  ir>51 

Koper,  Re,  Roper  v.  Doncaster    109, 

179 

Rr,  Taylor  v.  Bland  1368 

v.  Lencion  671 

v.  Wren  1258 

Lumber  Co  v   Wallace  313 

Ropes  v.  Upton  1654 

Roscarrick  v.  Barton  214  264 

Rose  V    Blakemore  1103 

v.  Brown  '.171,  1506 

v.  Calland  988,  1401,  1402 

v   Clark  197 

v.  Clarke  2043 

v.  Gannel  547,548,1557,  1572 

!'.   King  419 

v.  Mvnatt  361,  407,  861 

v.  Page  214,  279 

v   Rolls  95 

v.  West  555 

v.  Woodruff  617,  518 

Rosenberg  r.  Lind  )  1355 

Rosehorough  r    Rosohorough       1359 

Rosenbaum  v.  Couucil  Bluffs  Ins. 

Co.  313 


CIV 


Rosenbaum  v.  Foss 

674 

Rosenkrans  v.  Snover 

1158 

Rosenthal  v.  McMaun 

659 

v.  Reynolds 

1648 

Roskell  v.  Whitworth 

1071,1079, 

1080 

1637,  1639 

Ross,  Ex  parte 

643 

v.  Aglionby 

1077 

v.  Boswell 

546 

v.  Butler 

1635,  1636 

v.  Carpenter               406,  420,  2382 

v  Colville 

1047 

v.  Crary 

217 

v.  Ewer 

186 

v.  Gibbs 

573,  577 

v.  Gutteriuge 

157 

v.  Harper                 1486, 

1623,  2305 

v  New  England  Ins.  Co.          1110 

t;.  Page 

1631 

v.  Koss 

316, 1779 

v.  Shearer 

147,  1689 

t'.  Tatham 

1207 

v.  Union  Pacific  R.  Co. 

1663 

v.  Wharton 

117 

V.  Williams 

1766 

v.  Woodford 

892 

v.  Woods 

1625 

Rosse  v.  Rust 

994 

Rossiter  v.  Miller 

655,  990 

*   Pitt 

859 

Ro-well's  Case 

1630 

Rotherham  v.  Battson 

1404 

Rothschild  v.  Portugal,  Queen  of    '20 

v.  Whitman 

542 

Rothwell  v.  Benshall 

178 

v.  King 

576 

v.  Rothwell 

1172,  1773, 

1780 

Rouche  v.  Williamson 

46 

Roudabush  v.  Miller 

1286 

Rough  v  Simmons 

314 

Roulston  v  Ralston 

351 

Round  v .  Bell 

653 

Roundell  v.  Breary 

1003 

v.  Currer 

1543,  1799 

Roundlett  v.  Jordan 

841 

Roundtree  v.  Gordon 

846 

Rourke,  Re 

135 

Rouse  v   Jones 

1615,  1616 

Rouskulp  v   Kershner 

542,694 

Routh  v.  Kinder 

248 

v   Peach 

371 

v.  Webster 

1648 

Routledge  v.  Low 

46,  1643 

Roveray  v.  Grayson 

151 

Row,  lie 

99 

v.  Row 

1429,  1430 

Rowan  v.  Bowles 

326,  361 

v.  Mercer 

214 

v.  State  Bank 

1298 

Rowbotham  t».  Jones 

303 

Rowe  v. 

933,938 

v.  Brenton 

1106 

v   Granite  Bridge 

1637 

v.  Gudgeon 

769 

v.  Jackson 

106 

V.  London  School  Board           1082 

v.  Patterson 

324 

v.  Phillips 

658 

v.  Teed 

607,  656 

17.  Tonkin 

583,  591 

v.  White 

2040 

v.  Wood     607,  670,  671 

,  672. 1239, 

1624 

1719,  1768 

Rowell  v.  Jewett 

314 

v.  St.  Louis 

1115 

Rovt  land  v.  Evans 

203,  1267 

v.  Garman 

294 

v.  Miller 

1654 

t;.  Oakley 

95 

v.  Sturgis             829,  881, 

Rowlands  v.  Tucker 

1437 

Rowlandson  v.  Fenton 

1097 

Rowlatt  v.  Cattell 

1594 

Rowley  v   Adams      1189, 

1192.  1193, 

1198, 1280, 1373, 

1468,1477, 

1610 

TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 

[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 

Rowley  v.  Benthuysen  987 

v.  Burgess  1202 

v.  Eccles       358,  600,  603.  680,  702 

v.  Ridley  495,  953,  1055 

v.  Scales  2 

v.  Van  Benthuysen  1460, 1462,1463 

v.  Williams  694 

Rowley's  Appeal  843 

Rownaon,  tie,  Fields.  White        643 

Roworth  v.  Wilkes  366 

Rowsell  v.  Morris  201,  280,  288,  292, 

319 

Rowth  v   Howell  1751 

Rowtou  v.  Rowton  657 

Roy  v.  Gibbon  1772,  1773 

Rot al  v.  Johnson  9!l4 

Royal  Mail  Packet  Co.  v.  Braham  449 

Royall  v.  McKenzie  1315 

Royce  v.  Tarrant  287.  289 

Royds  v.  Royds  1416,  1419 

Royle,  Re,  Fryer  v.  Royle     236,  645 

v.  Wynne  816 

Rubber  Co.  v.  Goodyear       536,  1224 

Rubery  v.  Grant  348 

v.  Morris  155 

Ruby  *;.Abyssinian  Society  1242, 1243 

v.  Strother  175 

Rucker  v.  Howard  1395 

v  Scholefield  203,  1009,  1017 

Ruckman  v.  Astor  1237,  124S 

v.  Cory  560 

v.  Decker  561,  714,  993,  1017, 

1018  1366 

v.  Palisade  Land  Co.  68,  74 

v.  Stephens  87.  215 

Rudd  v.  Darling  1069 

v.  Rowe  794 

v.  Speare  176 

Ruddy,  Be  205 

Rude  v.  Whitchurch  839,  1229 

Rudge  v.  Weedon    87, 179,  181,  538, 

1526 

Rudow  v.   Great  Britain  M.   L. 

Ass.  Society  1406 

Rue  v.  Meirs  68 

Ruegger  i<.  Indianapolis  R.  Co.     634 

Ruffles  v.  Alston  92 

Ruffner  v.  Hewitt  190,  1370 

Rufford  v   Bishop  1297 

Rugan  v.  Sabiu  560 

Ruge  v.  Apalachicola  0-  C.  Co.   1663 

Ruirgles  v.  Eddy  782 

Ruhling  v.  Hackett  1971 

Rulluff,  Ex  parte  232 

Rumbly  r.  Staiuton  790 

Rumbold  v  Cowl  670 

v.  Forteath         579,  673,  694,  812, 

1337,  1319,  1822,  1831 

Rumney  v.  Maud  200 

v.  Mead  24'J 

v.  Walter  1070 

v.  Willis  1396 

Rump  v.  Greenhill        335,  336,  589, 

797,  2086 

Rumsey  v.  Rumsey  1329 

Rundell  v.  Marquis  of  Donegal      214 

v.  Murray  1643 

v.  Rivers,  Lord  1210 

Rundle  v   Foster  574,  943,  'J44 

v.  Rundle  69 

Runge  v.  Schleicher  852 

Runk  v   St.  John  1751 

Rush,  Re  1054,  1555 

v.  Higgs  236,  1015 

v.  Smith  1102 

Rushbrooke  v.  Farley  418 

Rushing  v.  Thompson  1031 

Rushout  v.  Turner  822 

Rushworth  v.  Pembroke,  Countess 

of  869 

v.  Smith  1743 

Rusling  v.  Bray  1320 

v   Rusling  1071 

Ruspini  v.  Vickery  590 

Russ  v.  Wilson  1640 

Russell  v.  Ashby      1699,  1700,  1707, 

1713 


Russell  v.  Atkinson 

958 

v.  Austin 

1166 

V.  Ball 

1092 

v.  Barstow 

630 

v.  Blake 

1242 

v.  Buchanan 

1319 

v  Cambefort  140, 147,  14!),  445 
v.  Chicago  Trust  &  S.  Bank  1120 
v   Clark  652 

v.  Clarke  149,  151,  289 

v.  Copp  646 

v.  Craig  1508 

v.  Di'  keschied  1556 

v.  East  Anglian  Rv.  Co.  1057, 

1058,  1683/1731,  1743,  1744 
v  Ely  652 

v.  Fanning  1147 

v.  Garrett  334 

v.  Gregg  779 

v.  Jackson  573,  576,  577,  578, 

1834 
v   Lamb  790,  1548 

v.  Lath roo  986 

v.  London,     Chatham     and 

Dover  Ry.  Co.  1618, 1682 

v.  Loring  550,  630 

v.  McLellan  1176,  1573 

v.  Moffit  845 

v.  Pellegrini  1861 

v.  Place  659 

v.  Plaice  1344 

v   Russell  332,  671,  1463 

v.  Sharp  75,  76,  163 

v.  Shenton  211 

v.  Skipwith  49 

v.  Smithies  1240,  1242 

v.  Southard  1239,  1241 

v.  Tapping  1017 

v.  Texas  &  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  1752 

v.  Wakefield  Waterworks  Co.      26, 

241,  243 

Russia  Cement  Co.  v.  Le  Page     1648 

Rust  v.  Mansfield  8il 

v.  Rust  1150 

v.  Victoria  Graving  Dock  Co.     211 

Rustomjee  v.  Reg.  133 

Ruston  v.  Tobiu  26,  888 

Rutgers  v.  Hunter  2259 

v    Kingsland  1961 

Rutherford,  Re  560, 1462 

v.  Dawson  1771 

v.  Douglas  1726 

v.  Metcalf     504,  1662,  1664,  1683, 

1684 

v.  Miller  159 

v  Nelson  904,918.930 

v.  Wilkinson  1768,  1769 

Rutland  v.  Paige  1548 

Rutley  v.  Gill  1278 

Rutter  v  Baldwin  184 

v  Marriott  1278 

v.  Tallis  1744 

v.  Tregent  785 

Rutty  v.  Person  1073 

Rutzen,  Baron  de  v.  Farr  1125,  1126 

Ryan  v   Anderson  200,  302 

v   Anglesea  R.  Co.  2124 

v   Ashton  1841 

v.  Blount  967 

v.  Lamson  1561 

v.  McLeod  986 

v.  Mutual    Tontine    W      C. 

Ass'n  1654.  1660 

v.  Nesbitt  1411,  1421 

v   Ring  27 

v.  Shawneetown  334 

Rychman  v.  Parkins  1733 

Ryder  v   Bentham  1638,  1602 

v.  Gower  1290,  1461 

v.  Inverarity  986 

v  Topping  216,  334 

Rye,  Re  1323 

Ryes  v.  Wellington,  Duke  of         131 

Rylandsv.  Latouche  1538,  1547,  1585 

Rymer  v.  Cook  1106 

Ryves  v.  Coleman  1368 

v.  Ryves  370,  547,  552 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 


CV 


S. 


S.  v.  h. 

Sabin  v.  Gilman 
Sablicich  v.  Russell 
Sachs  v.  Speiluian 
Sackett  v.  Hill 


508 
1355 

553 

328,  666 

1068 


Sackett's  Harbor  Bank  v.  Blake     26 
Sackvill  v.  A.yleworth  316,  1573 

Saddingtou  v.  Kinsman         120,  122 
Sadler  v.  Glover  686 

v-  Green  1481 

v.  Lovett  1516 

Safety  Fund  Bank  v.  Westlake     860 
Safford  v.  People  1058,  1752 

Saffron  Waldeu  S.  B.  B.  Society 

v.  Rayner  307,  674 

Sage  v.  Central  R.  Co.        1460,  1485, 
1492 
v.  Memphis  &.  L.  R.  Co.  1734 

Sagory  v.  Bay  less  1018,  1022 

Sahlgaard  8   Kennedy  100,  1584 

Sainstry  v.  G rammer  207 

St.  Albans,  Duke  of  v.  Skipwith  1630 
St.  Albyn  v.  Harding  1386 

St.  Aubvn  v.  Smart  269 

St.  Clair  v.  Smith  161 

Sainter  v.  Ferguson  1654,  1657 

St.  Felix  v.  Rankin  1158 

St.  George,  Re  1852 

v.  St.  George  726 

St.  Giles,  lie  1852 

St.  Helen's  Smelting  Co.  v.  Tip- 
ping 1635 
St.  John  ».  Besborough,  Earl  of     37 
Lord  v.  St.  John,  Lady  348 
v.  Harrison  435 
St.  John's  College  v.  Carter       1683, 
1686 
v.  Pratt                            1683,  1686 
St.  Joseph  R.  Co.  v.  Smith           1752 
St.  Joseph  &  St.  Louis  R.  Co.  v. 

Humphreys  1743 

St.    Katherine   Dock    Co.   v. 

Mautzgu  "47 

St.  Lazaire,  He  1368 

St.  Louis  Life  Ins.  Co. v.  Alliance, 

&c.  Life  Ins.  Co.  1568 

St    Louis  Perpetual  Ins.  Co.  v. 

Cohen  144 

St.  Louis  &e.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wilson     26 
St.  Luke's  v.  St.  Leonard's  1104 

St.    Mary    Magdalen    College, 

Pres.  of  v.  Sibthorp       408,  418. 
1490 
St.  Nazaire  Co.,  Re  401 

St.  Paul's.  Minor  Canons  of  v. 

Crickctt  659 

St.   Paul's,  Warden   and   Minor 

Canons  of  v.  Kettle  1078 

v.  Morris  1124,  1125 

St.  Sepulchre,  Vicar  of,  Re  1014 

St.  Stephens,  Re  13 

St.  Victor  v.  Devereux     38,  43, 1590, 

1779,  1780 

Sale  r.  Kitson  215,  257 

v.  McLean  552,  1548,  1549 

v.  Meggett  1073 

v.  Sale  71,  1347 

v.  Saunders  127 

Salem,  City  of  v.  Eastern  R.  R 

Co.  1640 

Salem  National  Bank  v.  Salem 

Co.  1548 

Sales  v.  Lusk  1716 

Saleski  v.  Bovd  974,  1459 

Salfield   v.  Sutter  County  Land 

Imp   Co.  313 

Salisbury  v.  Baggot  662 

v.  Metropolitan  Ry.  Co.     241,  245 
Bishop  of  v    Phillips  1157 

Earl  of  v.  Cecil  580 

Earl  of  v.  Newton  122 


Salisbury  Mills  v.  Townsend  197, 1561 

Salkeld  v.  Johnston  1491 

v.  Phillips  583 

v  Science             685,  670,  676,  680 

Sallee  v.  Duncan  846 

Salmina  v.  Juri  1381 

Salmon  v.  Anderson  1785,  1794 

v.  Clagett  374,  720,  734.  758, 

843,  845 

v.  Dean  611,  618 

v.  Green  429 

v.  Osborn  I860 

v.  Smith  842 

v.  Wooton  633 

Salomon  v.  Hertz  1650 

Salomons  v.  Knight  1620 

v   Laing  144,  241 

Saloy  v.  Block  2u8 

Salsbury  v.  Falk  324 

Salt  v.  Cooper  1037,  1585,  1733,  1734 

Salter,  Ex  parte  1603 

v.  Hradshaw  1386 

v.  Kreuger  256 

v.  Scarborough  547 

v.  Tildt-sley  795,  799,  800 

V-  Tobias  654 

Saltmarsh  v.  Hockett  709 

Saltus  v.  Tobias  607,  609 

Salvidge  v.  Fulton  893 

17.  Hyde  336,  337,  346 

Salvin  v.  North  Brancepeth  Coal 

Co.  1635 

Salway  v.  Salway  1751 

Same  v.  Sackett  777,  1534 

Samis  v.  King  26 

Sammes  v.  Rickman  1368,  1419 

Sammis  v.  Bennett  1459 

v.  L'Kugle  1561 

v.  Wightman  200 

Sammon  v   Bennett  576 

Sample  v.  Frost  576 

v.  Sample  349 

Samples  v.  Bank  722,  2384 

Sampson  v.  Appleyard  1129 

v.  Hunt  1002 

v.  Mudge  1622 

v.  Smith  1636 

v.  Swettenham  579 

&  Wall,  Re  108 

Samsinego  v.  Stiles  197 

Samson  v.  Samson  234 

Samuda  v.  Furtado  664 

v   Lawford  1660 

Samuel  v.  Jones         1409,  1411,  1412 

v.  Rogers  449,  550 

v.  Samuel  255,  1174 

v.  Wiley  161)8 

Sanborn  v.  Adair  334,  346,  837 

v.  Dwineli  334 

v   Kittredge  361,  844 

v.  Perry  14ti3 

v   Rogers  365 

v.  Sanborn  406,  425 

Sanchez  v.  Newman  1461 

Sanders,  Re  226 

v.  Benson  315,  603,  1394 

v.  Gate  wood  986,  1031 

v.  Godley  444 

v.  Gray  1283 

v.  Howe  915 

v.  Kelsey  345 

v.  King        605,  615,  619,  620,  669, 

2095 

v.  Miller  1428,  1432,  1433 

?'.  Murney  691 

v  Page  124 

v.  Peck  1385 

v.  Plunkett  1675 

v.  Pope  165!) 

v.  Sanders  651 

v.  Wilson  1239 


Sanders  v.  Yonkers  2040 

Sanderson,  Re  1443 

v.  Chadwick  1404 

v.  Cockermouth   Railway  Co. 

1660 

v.  Sanderson  334,  591 

v.  Stoddart  14L'3 

v.  Walker  1420,  1610 

Sandeford  v.  Lewis  790 

San  Diego  v.  Allison  1624 

Sand  ford  v.  1193 

v.  Ballard  1726 

v.  Biddulph  1197 

v.  Clarke  1408 

v.  Head  1019,1031,1584 

v.  McLean  1166 

v.  Morrice  842.  1370 

v.  Remington  575,  951 

v.  Sandford  75 

Sandilauds  v.  Innes  217 

Saudon  v.  Hooper    1242,  1243,  2213, 

2223 

Sands  v.  Beardsley  1073 

v.  Champlin  1997 

v.  Codwise  1459 

v.  Hildreth  978 

v.  Thompson  649 

Sandys  v.  Long  358 

v.  Watson  1419 

Saner  v.  Bilton  1407.  1630 

v.  Deaven  813, 977 

Sanford  v.  Sinclair  1735 

Sangar  v.  Gardiner  1453 

Sanger  v.  Newton  418 

v.  Nightingale  639 

v.  Wood  634,  815 

Sangosa  v.  East  India  Co.  290 

Sanitary  District  v.  Cullerton      1108 

Sauquirico  v.  Benedetti      1654,  1657 

Sansoni  v.  Sansom  1053 

Sanxary  v.  Hunger  1624 

Sanxter  v.  Foster  1640,  1642 

Sapp  v.  Phelps  334,  1386 

Sapphire,  The  18 

Sapte  v.  Ward         153,  188,  253,  539 

Sarah,  The  1395 

Saratoga  County  Supervisors  v. 

Seabury  1561 

Sargant  v.  Read        1727,  1732,  1734, 

1735 

Sargeant  v.  First  National  Bank  836 

v.  Howley  1508 

Sargent  v.  Johnson  1734 

v.  Sargent  1411 

v.  Wilson  214 

Sarsfield  v.  Van  Vaughner  328 

Sartwell  v.  Fields  1463,  1491 

Satrerfield  v.  Malone  569 

Satterley  V.  Robinson  671 

Satterwhite  v.  Davenport  768 

Saul  v.  Met'n  Ry.  Co.  1686 

Saull  v.  Browne  300,  720,  1»'20 

Sauls  c.  Freeman  16>>3 

Saum  r.  Stingley  369,  1577 

Saumarez  v.  Saumarez  230,  1740 

Saunders  v.  Allen  844 

v.  Druce       200,  324,  604,  608,  612, 

1474 

v.  Frost         1,  406,  411,  638,  123 ', 

1243,     1246,     1252,    1376,    1381, 

1385,    1386,    1391,    1392,    1400, 

1515 

v.  Gatling 

v.  Gray  1282 

v.  Gregory  1401 

v.  Hord  560 

v.  Jones  324,  579,  720,  855 

v.  Leslie  698,  850 

v.  Prunty  1299 

v.  Saunders  295.  1435 

v.  Smith  1643,  1645 


CV1 


Saunders  v.  Soutter 
v.  Tottenham,(&c.  Ry.  Co 


V.  Walter 

v.  Warton 

v.  Wiel 
Sauza  v.  Belcher 
Savage,  Ite 

v.  Aiken 

v.  Brocksopp 

V.  Carrol 

v .  Carter 

v.  Lane 

v.  Merriain 

v.  Suialebroke 

v.  Snell 
Savery  v.  King 
Savile  v.  Bruce 

v.  Savile 
Saville,  lie 

v.  Tancred 
Savin,  Ex  parte 
Savings  Bank  v.  Benton 

v.  Holt 


1327,  1367 
55 
567 
547 
307,  309,  1611 
830 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 

[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 

313    Schenck  v-  Peay  447, 1553 

1774     Schennerhorn  v.  Barhydt  233 

v.  Maliaffie  974 

Schermerhorne     v,      Schermer- 
horne 2293 
Schettler  v.  Fort  Howard  1661 


175,  1078 

1553 

236 

318 

590 

1524 

1503 

1001 

1284,  1285 

1611 

223 

1069 

1111 

1385 


Savings,  &c.  Society  v.  Austin    1661 
Savory  v.  Dyer  388, 1614 

Sawtelle  v.  Rollins  68,  63 

Saw\er.  He  16*3 

i'.  Baldwin  90,91,96,1427 

v.  Birchmore    944,  945,  1206,  1208 


417 


'09,  782 

1576 

1973 

1648 

795 

334,  330 

189,  518 

1642 

216 

933 

1620 


Schmidt  v.  Dietericht 

v.  Limehouse 

v.  Miller 
Schmitten  v.  Faulks 
Schneider  v.  Batt 

v.  Brown 

v.  Foote 

v.  Lizardi 


v.  Campbell 

v.  Davis 

V-  Hovey 

v.  Kellogg 

v.  Mills 

v.  Noble 

v.  Sawyer 

Spindle  Co  v.  Turner 
Sawyers  o.  Bakers 
Sax  v.  Davis 
Saxby  v.  Easterbrook 

v.  Manchester  &c  S.  Rv.  Co.  261 

v.  Saxby  1592,  1594,  1685 

Saxon  v.  Barksdale  588,  590 

Saxton  v.  Davis  60,  340,  553 

Say  v.  Creed  218 

Sayer  v.  Austin  1255 

v.  Bradley  1503 

v   Devore  314 

v.  Wagstaff  200 

Sayers  v.  Collyer  1080,  1654 

Sayles  v.  Tibbitts  206,  287,  325,  659, 
994 
Saylor  t>.  Mockbie  504 

Saylors  v.  Saylors  259 

Sayre  v.  Elyton  Land  Co.  1274 

v   Fredericks  847 

Scaffold  v.  Hampton  799,  973 

Scaife  v.  Scaife  1140,  1385 


40,  1485,  1486 

70,  108 

1260 

1640 

713 

1501 

46 

1376 

327 


Si-ales  v.  Nicliols  529 
Scan  Ian,  fte 

v.  Houston 

V.  Howe 

v.  Scanlan 

v.  Usher 

v.  Wright 
Scarborough  v.  Burton 
Scarf  v   Soulby 
Scarisbrick    v.    Skelmersdale, 

Lord  1476,  1580 

Scarpellini  »>.  Ateheson  114 

Scarry  v.  Eldridge  259 

Scarth  v.  Cotton  165 

Scatchmer  v.  Foulkard  42 

Scattergood  v.  Harrison  1233 

v   Keeley  1390 

Scawin  v.  Scawin  296 

Schalkt'.  Schmidt  1619,  1675 

Schauer  v.  Field  _     1643 

Scheetz's  Appeal  1076,  1631 

Seheiffelin  v.  Weatherred  1551 

Schi'lcamp  v.  Schrader  1631 

Schell  v.  Schroder  1772 

Schelmardine  v.  Harrop  193 

Schenck  v.  Conover  1275,  1467, 

1468,  1470 

v.  Ellingwood  220 

v.  Hartford  Fire  Ins.  Co.  313 


Schieffelin  v.  Stewart  1253,  1369 

Schindel  v.  Gates  646 

Sclijott  v.  Schjott  68,  110,  308 

Schlecht's  Appeal  17'20 

Schlesinger  v.  Turner         1395,  1643 
Schlettor  v.  Smith  371 

Schley  v.  Dixon  26,  144 

Schluderberg  v.  Robertson  1463 

Schluter  v.  Harvey  1665 

Schmemann  v.  Rothfus  1377 

Schniid    v.  Scovill    Manuf.  Co. 

1381 

302 

1257 

1304 

1664 

406 

1638 

313 

20,597,598,599,6i2, 

1675 

v.  Seibert  1008 

Schnur  j>.  Hickcox  1770 

SchoefTer  v.  Hunnewell  1463 

Scholefield  v.  Heafield  166,  168,  269, 
1345 
Scholes  v.  Brook  26 

Scholey  v.  Central  Railway  1469 

Schomp  v.  Schenck  563 

School  Commissioners  v.  Tuller 

1676 

School  District  v.  Blaisdell  24 

v.  Brown  1461 

v.  Price  1164 

v.  Weston  1568 

Schoole  v.  Sail  193,  815 

Schoonmaker  v.  Gillet        1683,  1684 

Schoonover  v.  Bright  1638 

Schotsmans    v.    Lancashire    & 

Yorkshire   Ry.  Co.  1080 

Scho.-e  v.  Schmincke  1643 

Schram  v.  Baker  1543 

Schreffler  v.  Nadelhoffer  830 

Schroederu-Cleugh  1450 

v.  Loeber  60 

Schroeppel  v.  Redfield    328,  329, 558 
Schroers  v.  Fisk  313 

Schubkagel  v-  Dierstein  576 

Schulenberg-Boeckeler    Lumber 

Co.  v.  Hay  ward  329 

Schulenburg.  Ex  parte  1069 

Schultzr.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co. 

v.  Winter 
Schumacher  v.  Schwencke 


Scott  v.  Broadwood 
v  Carter 
v.  Clarkson 
v.  Cons.  Ban1; 
v.  Crawford 
v.  Cumberland 
v.  Dunbar 
v.  Duucombe 
v.  Fenhoulett 
v.  Fenwick 
v.  Fleming 
v.  Hancock 
v.  Hastings,  Lord 
v.  Homer 
v.  Jackman 
v.  Jailer 
v.  Jones 
v.  Lalor 

v.  Liverpool,  Corp.  of 
v.  Liverpool,  Mayor  of 
v.  McOann 
v.  Macfarland 
v.  Malcolm 


803 

1643, 
1648 

Schuyler  v  Curtis  1*543 

v.  Hoyle  90,  117,  121,  123 

v.  Pelissier  1564,  1567 

v.  Schlicht  1556 

Schuyler's  Steam  T.  Co  ,  He       1743 

Schwab  v.  City  of  Madison  1620 

v.  Mabley  901 

Schwabacher  v.  Becker  _95 

Schwartz  v.  Keystone  Oil  Co.      1756 

v.  Wechler  559 

Schwarz  v.  Wendell  666 

Schwoerer  v.    Boylston  Market 

Assoc.  208,287,302 

Sclater  v.  Cottam       1234,  1387,  1413 


Scofield  v.  Bokkelen 

v.  Stoddard 
Sconce  v.  Whitney 
Scoones  v.  Morrell 
Score  v.  Ford 
Scott.  /?<- 

v.  Allett 

i'.  Allgood 

v.  Ames 

v.  Armstrong 

v.  Avery 

v.  Becher 


1619 

1195 

163 

990,  14  8 

1779 

1069,  1851 

785 

370 

1676 

1743 

670,  671 

1722,  1723 


640, 1559 

781 

829 

68 

1463 

1430 

1397,  1399 

229 

261 

860 

1844 

643 

1040 

1327 

1280 

1042 

642 

1550,  1551 

671 

890 

891 

221 

855 


v.  Mansfield,  &c.  R.  Co.  287 

v.  Maxwell  1169 

v.  Miller  563    569,  ft" 

v   Neely  1071,  1556 

v.  Nesbitt  386,  1286 

v.  Nicholl  193 

v.  Nixon  989 

v.  Onderdonk  1961 

v.  Padwick  973 

v.  Pinkerton  1249 

v.  Platel  1755 

v.  Porter  445 

v.  Rand  633 

v.  Rayment  995,  1081 

v.  Rowland  1551 

v.  Royal  Wax  Candle  Co.  449 

v.  Sampson  852 

v.  Scott  1404 

v.  Spashett  102,  2001 

v.  Stanford  1646 

v.  Streatham  221 

v.  Walker  865 

v   Wharton  1629,  1630 

v.  Wheeler        454,  515,  1510,  1828 
Scottish     Union     Ins.     Co.    v. 

Steele  895 

Scottish  Widows'  Fund  v.  Craig    190 
Scottof.  Stone  70S 

Scotts  v.  Hume  722 

Scouren  v.  Bender  1516 

S  C.  Railroad  Co.  v.  Toomer       1119 
ScrafTord    v.    Gladwin    County 

Supervisors  1381 

Scranton  v.  Stewart  576 

Screven  v.  Clark  1751 

Screwmen  v.  Smith  1120 

Screw  Mower  v.  Mettler  1621 

Scribner  t;.  Henry  G.  Allen  Co. 

1643 

v.  Williams  I486 

Scrimeger  v.  Buchannon  341 

Scriven,  He  803 

v.  Tapley  106 

Scrivener,  Ex  parte  386 

Scruby  v.  Payne  229 

Scrujrgs  v.  Driver  251 

Scrutton  v.  Pattillo  117 

Scuddem.  Bogert  729 

v.  Trenton  Delaware  Falls  Co. 

10J6 
Scullv  v.  Lord  Dundonald         974, 
}  1589 

Sculthorpev.  Tipper  1420 

Scurrah  ».  Scurrah  1213, 1726 

Scurry  v.  Morse  252 

Scutt  v.  Freeman  984 

Seabright  v.  Seabright  894 

Seabury  v.  Grosvenor  1648 

Sea,    Fire,  and    Life  Assurance 

Company,  Re  1°20 

Seager  v.  Aston  647 

Seaeers,  Ex  parte  18o6 

Seagram  v.  Tuck  642, 1755,  1757 

Seagrove  v.  Parks  149 


Sea  Ins.  Co.  v.  Day  833 

v   Stebbins  894,  1717,  1719, 

1748 

Seal  v.  Brownton  1385 

Sealey  v.  Gaston  87,  110,  li'o 

Seals  V.  Phfeiffer  334,  418 

Sealy  v.  Laird  17'  '5 

Seauian,  In  re  1755 

i;.  Hicks  12(59,  1282 

v.  Ne'herclift  OS  7.  Uu3 

v.  Itisrgiua  1286 

v.  Slater  1511 

v.  Stoughton  63 

Se, miens  v.  Kiggins  1289 

Se.ir.h  v.  Search  314,  360 

Searey  v .  Morgan  165 

Searight  v.  Payne  611,  *> LT 

Searing  v.  Searing  117,  118 

Searle  v.  Colt  652 

v.  Cooke  1164 

v.  Fairbanks  1381 

v.  Lane  1033 

v.  Matthews  1570 

Searles  v.  Jacksonville  R.  Co.      287, 

1715 

Searls  v.  Bouton  843 

Sears  v.  Barnum  86(1 

v.  Bellingham  875 

v.  Carrier  341,  345,  634 

V.  Hardy  243 

v.  Hyer  732 

v.  Jackson  659,  1457 

v.  Powell  291 

Seat  v    Knight  1748 

Seaton  v.  Clarke  149 

v.  Uraut        26,  245,  317,  329,  399, 

7-45,  790 

t>  Seaton  108,  122 

Seaver  v.  Phelps  83 

Seay  v.  Fergus.in  402 

v.  Hughes  1625 

Seborn  v.  Beckwith  418 

Sebring  v.  Mersereau  279 

v.  Sebring  560,  801 

Seccomb   v.  Allyn  2148 

Secconibe  v,  Fitzgerald  1077 

Sechler  v.  Stark  1381 

Secombe  v.  Campbell  674,  843 

Second   Cong.    Society   v.    First 

Cong.  Society  885 

Secoru.  Singleton         312.  590,  1517 
Secretary    of  State  for  War  v. 

Chubb  16 

Bedden  t;.  Connell  26 

Seddon  v.  Bolton  Bank  1417 

v.  Virginia,  &c.  Co.  145 

Sedgwick  v  Cleveland      63.  159, 197, 

280,  281,  1508,  1518,  1520.  1522, 

1534,  1540 

v.  Watkins  1704,  1705 

Seear  v.  Home  Property  &  Inv. 

Co.  278 

v.  Lawson         63,  1517.  1525,  1545 

v.  Webb  801,826,970 

Seebor  v.  Hess  639,  1600,  1607, 

1686 

Seeley  v.  Mahew  11.33 

Seely  v.  Hills  314 

Seelye  v.  Boehm  407 

Secrle  v.  Richardson  940 

Seers  v.  Hind  1416 

Sefton,  Lord  v.  Salisbury,  Lord 

1682 
Segee  v.  Thomas  339 

Segram  v.  Tuck  1711 

Seguiu  v.  Maverick  1575,  1576, 

1577,  1584 
Seibert  v.   Minneapolis,  &c.   R. 

Co.  212 

Seibert  C.  O.   C.  Co.  v.  Newark 

L.  Man.  Co.  779 

Seibert    0.   O.    Co.    v.     Phillips 

L    Co.  197 

Seideubach  v.  Denklespeil  1765 

Seidentopf  V.  Annabil  1491 

Sei.ller,  Ex  parte  27,  31,  1605 

Seifred  v.  People's  Bank  617 


TABLE   OF   CASES    CITED. 

[The  references  are  to  the  star  pacing.] 

Seifreid  v.  People's  Bank     512,  615, 

7S4 

Seighortuer  v.  Weisseuboin  1727 


Seigle  v.  Seigle 

1320 

Seilaz  v.  Hausou 

3-.  53 

Seinieus  v.  Sellers 

•J  10 

Seitz  v.  Mitchell 

843,  844 

Seixas  v.  King 

629 

Seixo  v.  Piovezeude 

lo49 

Selby  v.  Crew 

563 

V.  Nettlefold 

l<i39 

v.  I'ouifret 

213 

v.  Powis 

1129 

v.  Selby 

1682 

Selchow  v.  Baker 

1663 

Selden  v.  Preston 

52 

v.  Vermil,>a 

1675 

Self  v.  Jeukins 

1650 

v.  Madox 

1056 

Selfe  v.  Pare 

1540 

Seligman   v.   Real  Estate 

Trust 

Co. 

579 

Sellars  v.  D.iwson 

1542 

Sellaa  v.  Dawson             64 

814,  1542 

Sellers  v.  Dawson 

64,  814 

?».  Phoenix  Ins.  Co. 

26 

Sellon  v.  Lewen 

700 

Sells  v.  Hubbell 

249,  255 

Selway  v.  Chappell 

955 

Selwyn  v.  Garfit 

372 

CV11 


Seymour  v.  Hazard    395, 1699,  1702 


Long  Dock  Co. 
v.  Sevuiour 
Shackelford  v.  Shackelford 
Shaik.e  v.  Baker 
Shackleford  '•.  Helm 
Shacklett  0.  Polk 
Shadden  v.  Patrick 
Saaetler  V    Chambers 


Selyard,     Lady   v.    Harris,    Ex- 
ecutors of  248,  271 
Semmens  v.  Walters  035 
Semmes  v.  Boykin                           424 

v.  Mutt  803 

Semple  v.  Holland  803 

v.  London  &  Birmingham  Ry. 

Co.  58 

Semrow  v.  Semrow  1069 

Seneca  Falls,  Village  of  v.  Mat- 
thews 1668,  1669,  1676 
Senft  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.  1517 
Sen  house  v.  Earl             570,  660,  675 

v.  Hall  1485 

Senior  v.  Armytage  1656 

v.  Pawson    "1081,  1613  1619,  1635, 

1638, 1:540,  1662,2038. 

2312,  2323 

v.  Pritchard  1614,  1625,  1672 

Sentance  v.  Porter  1395 

Senter  v.  Mitchell  60 

Serff  V.  Acton  Local  Board  196 

Sergeson  v.  Sealey  1365 

Sergison  v.  Beavan  447, 1025 

Sergrove  v.  Mayhew        62,  158,  606, 


632 

,  669,  703 

Serle  v   Fardell 

1168 

v  St.  Eloy 

77,  4H 

Scries  v,  Cromer 

9S6 

Seroka  r.  Kattenburg 

180 

Servi  e  v.  Castaneda 

142 

Servis  v.  lieatty 

676 

Sessions  v.  Romadka 

843 

Seton  v.  Slade 

369 

,  709.  99(1 

Settled  Estates  Act,  Re 

12S5 

Setzer  ?>.  Beale 

1073 

Severn  V.  Fletrher 

408,  1559 

Sevier  )'    Given  way 

1301 

Sevin  v.  Deslandes 

1C5:5 

Sewall  e.  Robbins 

040 

v.  Sewall 

1395 

Sewel  v.  Freeston 

1122 

Sewell  v   Ashley 

22(5 

v.  Bridge 

666 

v.  Gadden 

446,  4(51 

v.  Johnson 

1284 

v.  Moxcy 

2043 

Sewing  Machine  Co.  v 

Dunbar   1'jSo 

Sexsmitb  v  Smith 

1661 

Sexton,  Ex  parte 

1791 

V.  Henderson 

1401 

v.  Smith 

SIT 

Seybert  v.  Rol)inson 

848 

Seymer  v.  Noswnrthy 

677 

Seymour  r.  Bailey 

52 

V .  Delancey 

989, 

1073,  22(5(5 

V.  Edwards 

216 

1 

5)0 

17(55 

]>,.,;, 

13S1 

186 

11^7 

1239,  1242, 

lzdl.  1252 

334 


Shafer  r.  O'Brien 

Siiafer  Iron  Co.  v.  Iron  Circuit 

Judge  149 

Shaffer  v.  Fetty  334 

Shalt  i>.   Pheuix  Mut.  Life  Ins. 

Co.  1587 

Shaftesbury,  Earl   of  v.   Marl- 
borough, Duke  of  1731 
Shaitesbury,   Lady    v.    Arrow- 
smith                               570,  1831 
Shafto  v.  Bolchow                   210,  aj4 
Shaftoe  v.  Shaftoe  1705 
Shaft-bury 's,  Earl  of,  Case           1351 
Shaftsbury,  Lord  !'.  Haunam       1351 
Shainwald  v.  Lewis       140,  3S9,  1051, 
1584.  169J,  1732 
Shakel  v.  Marlborough, Duke  of  1720 
v.  Roche                                       1620 
Shakels  v.  Richardson  232 
Shakopee  Manuf.  Co.,  Re             1734 
Shallcross  v.  Hibber-on                1286 
Shales  r.  Barrington           1385,  1404 
Shampeau  v.  Connecticut  R.  L 

149,  830 


Co. 

Shaud  v.  Kidd 
Shann  v.  Jones 
Shannon  v.  Bradstreet 

v.  Davis 

v.  Erwin 

v.  Fechheimer 

v.  Hanks 

v.  Marselis 

v.  Speers 
Shapherd,  Re 
Shapiro  v.  Burns 
Shapland,  Re 
Shapleigh  v.    Chester  Electric 

Light  &  P.  Co. 
Shard,  Re 

Shardlow  v  Cotterill 
Sharon  v.  Hill  634,  829,  2392 

v.  Terry  1507 

Sharon  Canal  Co  v.  Fulton  Bank   20 
Sharp  v.  Ashton  424 


1281 
126 
1734 
378,  380 
418 
1734 
1653 
2222 
1037 
1482 
1059 


39 
661 


Brice 
u.  Carter 
v.  Hesa 
v.  Hullett 
v.  Lu-Oi  4 

v.  McHenry 
v.  Morrow 
c    Kcissner 
V.  Roalule 
v.  Runk 
v.  St.  Siuveur 
v.  Scarborough,  Earl  of 
/■  Taylor 

V     \\  ilife-il.ie 

V.  Wright 
Sharps  »   Allen 

V.  lilondeau 

r    Foy 

r.  i  !:imon 

v.  Sin  Paulo  R.  Co. 

r  Sharps 
Sharpies  v.  Sharpies 
Shirro.l  v.  Winfield 
Sharxhaw  v  (Jibo< 
Sbattock  B   Shattock 
Shattuck  ?•.  (Larson 
Shaver  v.  Brain  ird 

r.  Lawrenre  County 

v.  Williams 
Shaw.  E.r  parte 

V.   Abbott 

v.  Beck 


1130 

563,  1741 

1282,  1461,  1402 

(53.  si 4 

,  1174,  1225,  1528 

60 

857,  1232 

843 

1402 

886 

47 

1254 

389,  1705.  2185 

313 

144S,  1752 

985 

4  51,  158 

113,  122,  [87 
225 
200,  226,  325 
lisr, 
1426 
1(517 
1608 
1^7 
1961 
2S7 
298 
155(1 

1827 

1918 
444 

lou7 


CV111 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 


Shaw  v.  Bill  1532 

v.  Chase  586 

v.  Chiug  300, 182U 

v.  Colwell  Lead  Co.  843 

v.  Coster        394,  1560,  1561,  156a, 
1563,  1564,  1566,  1570 


v.  Dwight 

v.  Earl  of  Jersey 

V.  Forrest 

v.  Foster 

v.  Hardingham 

i>.  lloadley 

v.  Jolinsou 

v.  Lindsay 

V.  Lindsey 

v.  Millsaps 

v.  Neale 


1624 

lb58 

1601 

197,  279 

222 

259 

653,  1413 

449,  9z9,  952 

593 

1548 

1036, 1846 


v.  Norfolk  Countv  R  R  Co,     220, 

222,  25"7,  273,  1076,  2220 

v.  Patterson  602,  987,  1371 

v .  Pickthall  1431 

v.  Hhodes  1754 

v.  Simpson  1268 

v.  Smith  1817,  1838 

v.  Stanton  1641 

v.  Wier  1668 

V.Wright      1052,1054,1055,1059, 

1741 

Shaw's  Claim  (No.  2),  Re  10(4 

Shay  47.  Pettes  1973 

Shea  v.  Knoxville,  &c.  R.  Co.       314 

Sheafe  v.  Sheafe  1961 

Shealy  v.  Toole  542 

Shearman  v.  Christian  1481 

v.  Findley  449 

Shedd  v.  Garfield  374,  584,  658 

SUedden  v.  Patrick  1074,  1080, 1122, 

1127,  1502 

Shee  v.  Harris  1734 

Sheehan  v.  Great  Eastern  Rv. 

Co.  208,  287,  406.  559 

Sheeler  v.  Speer  920 

Sheffield  v.  Buckingham,  Duchess 
of  165,  474,  1022 

v.  Buckinghamshire,  Duchess 

of  1624,  1626 

v.  Sheffield  1463 

Sheffield  &  B.  Coal  Co.  v.  Gor- 
don 1221,  l'i99 
Sheffield  Canal  Co.  v.  Sheffield 

&  Rotherham  Ry.  Co.  1824 

Sheffield  Furnace  Co.  v.  With- 

erow  590 

Sheffield  and  Rotherham  Ry.  Co., 

Re  1341 

Sheffield  Water  Works  v.  Yeo- 

mans  274,  602,  1682 

Sheidley  v   Auttman  894 

Shelberry  v.  Briggs  188 

Shelburne,  Countess  of  v.  Inchi- 

quin,  Lord  77 

Shelby  v.  Shelby  642,  645,  856 

Shelden  v.  Walbridge  1556 

Sheldon  v.  Fortescue  173,  1492 

v.  KenkukNo  Line  P.  Co  303,559 

v.  Rockwell  1639,  1640,  1663 


v.  Weldman 

642 

Shelley  V.  

936, 937 

Shelly  v.  Pelham 

1748 

v.  Shelly 

1601 

Shellman  v.  Scott 

1677 

Shelton  v   Johnson 

281 

v.  Van  Kleeck 

1576, 15S0 

v.  Watson 

2182 

Shenandoah  Valley 

R.  Co.   v. 

Dunlnp 

378 

v.  Griffith 

418 

Shepard  v.  Aker8 

1257,  1366,  1369 

v.  Brown 

551,  552 

v.  Ford 

734 

v.  Manhattan  Ry. 

Co.                208 

v.  Shepard 

123,  361 

v.  Taylor 

1120 

Shephard,  Re,  Atkins  v.  Shep- 

hard 

1507 

v.  Guernsey 

236 

v.  Merrill 

406,  671, 1532 

Shephard  v.  Ross  1032 

Shepherd  v.  Churchiil         166,  1151, 

1162,  1163 

v.  Groff  1657 

v.  Gwinnett  280 

v.  Hirsh,  Pritchard,  &  Co.        147, 

445 

v.  Hughes  1540 

v.  Jones  394,  1562 

v.  Lloyd  589 

v.  McClain  1180,  1382 

v.  Morris  1819 

v.  Pepper  1720 

v.  Ross  County  1062 

v   Thompson  915 

v.  Titley  _  1586 

v.  Towgood  1537.  2061 

Sheppard  v.  Akers  383,  737,  760 

v.  Duke  653 

v.  Elliott  1251 

v.  Gilmore  324,  1071 

v.  Harris  162.  475 

v.  Lane  1580 

v.  Nixon  630 

r.  Oxenford  1728 

v.  Sheppard  1410,  1433,  1795,  1803 

v.Smith  1417,1419 

v.  Starke  217,  302,  1029 

v.  Yocum  1461 

Shepperd  (».  Murdock  640 

She'  atz  )'.  Nicodemus  327 

Sherburne  v.  Middleton  1501 

Sheridan  v.  Andrews  281 

v.  Cameron  390 

v  Colvin  1620 

Sheriff  v.  Axe  1234 

v.  Oil  Co.  334 

Sherin  v.  Smith  987,  1371 

Sherlock  v.  Barned  1138 

Sherman  v.  American  Stove  Co.    303 

v.  Ballou  1363 

v.  Beale  671 

v.  Burnham  109 

v.  Cox  277 

v.  Elder  100 

v.  Fitch  1961 

v.  Partridge  1569 

v.  Reigart  121 

v.  Sherman  666,  1702,  1707 

v.  Withers  641 

Sherratt  v   Bentley  1436 

v  Mountford  1487 

v.  Sherratt  108,  113 

Sherrill  v.  Harrell  1677 

Sherrington  v.  Smith  1580,  1583 

Sherrit  v.  Birch,  217,  266 

Sherry  v.  Perkins  1638 

v.  Smith  588 

Sherwiu  v.  Shakespear      1004,  1020. 

1400,  1489 

Sherwood,  Re  1234,  1413 

v   Beveridge  1003,1276,1291 

v.  Clark  590 

v.  Rivers  430 

v.  Smith  1360 

v.  Sutton  641,  645 

v.  White  1672 

Sheward  v.  Citizens'  Water  Co.     542 

v.  Sheward  1574 

Shewell  v.  Jonefc  1449 

v.  Shewell  1202 

Shewen  v.  Vanderhorst         643,  644, 

794.  1210 

Shickle     v.     South     St.     Louis 

Foundry  Co.  334 

Shickle   Iron  Co.  v.  S.  L.  Wiley 

C.  Co.  149 

Shield  v.  Anderson  645 

Shields  v.  Arndt  1639 

v.  Barrow     149,  287,  290,  293,  294, 

334, 384,  385,  425,  1548 

*.  Boucher  1122.  1137 

v.  Bryant  161, 165 

v.  McClung  1625,  1675 

v.  Sniff  2K3 

v.  Thomas  207,  345 

|  Shiers,  Re  157 


Shillaber  v.  Robinson  193 

ShillKu  v.  Collett  92,  1863 

Shiilitoe  o   Claridge  1138 

Shinier  v.  Morris  Cana  ,  &c.  Co 

1631 

Shine  v.  Boiling  985 

v.  Gough  1207 

Shiukie  v.  Covington  1620 

Ship  v.  Crosskill  1399 

Shipbrooke,   Lord  v.    Hinchin- 

brook,    Lord  1368,    1588, 

1799 

Shiphard  v.  Lutwidge  164 

Shipley  v.  Johns  1542 

v.  Reasoner  402 

Shipman  v.  Holt  1648 

Shipton  v.  Rawlins  268,  272 

Shipwav  r.  Ball  96 

Shirk  o.  Covle  1508 

Shirley  v.  Ferrers,  Earl        933,  936, 

1176,  1258, 1306. 1474,  1573 

t\  Hugar  68 

v  Matthews  1127 

Shirt  v.  Westby  1258 

Shittler  v    Shittler  1383, 1437 

Shobev  Carr  1253 

Shoecraft  v.  Beard  1385 

Shoemaker  r   National  Bank       1614 

v.  South  Bend  S.   A   Co.  1642 

Shoe   &  Leather  Rep.   Ass'n  v. 

Bailey  579 

Shoesmith  v.  Byerly  1639 

Shone   v.  City  of  London  Real 

Property  Co.  1638 

Shore  v.  Shore  1745 

v.  Wilson  12 

Short  v.  Downer  518 

v   Kieffer  369 

v.  Lee  1075 

v.  Macaulay  2338 

Shorthill  v.  Ferguson  417 

Shortley  v.  Selby  1214 

Shortridge,  lie  887  984 

Shotbolt  v.  Biscow  1560 

Shotts  v.  Bovd  586 

Shotwell  v.  Smith  1717,  1719 

v.  Taliaferro  282 

Shovelton  v  Shovelton  1413 

Showell  r.  Winkup  316,  405 

Shrader  v.  Walker  295 

Shrapnel  v.  Gamgee  744 

v.  Laing  1385 

Shrewsbury,   Earl    of  v.    North 

Staffordshire  Ry.  Co.  602, 

1531 
v.  Trappes  398, 1440,  1471 

Shrewsbury  Hospital,  Ex  parte 

1800 
Shrewsbury   R.  Co.  v.   London 

Rv.  Co.  987,  1491 

Shrewsbury  School,  Re     1611,  1854, 
1855 
Shrewsbury  &  B.  Ry.  f.  Stour 

Valley  Ry.  2328 

Shrewsbury  &  Chester  Ry.  Co. 
v.    Shrewsbury   &  Birming- 
ham Ry.  Co.  1652,  1661, 
1663 
Shrimpton  v.  Laight  1649 
Shropshire  r.  Lvle  569 
Shropshire  U.  R.   &  C.  Co.  v. 

Reg.  674 

Shrubsole  v.  Schneider     1084,  1114, 
1463 
Shubrick  v.  Guerrard  1628 

Shuee  v.  Shuee  385 

Shuff  v  ■  Holdaway  1749,1766 

Shugart  r   Thompson  3.1 

Shull  v.  Kennon  1156 

Shulties  v-  Reiser  1461 

Shuman  r.  Shuman  851 

Shurmer  v.  Hodge  1596,  1G07 

Shurts  v.  Howell  235 

Shute  v.  Gustin  974 

v.  Hogee  119 

Shuttloworth  v.  Bristow  1225 

v.  Howarth      217,  438,  1213, 1428 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging  ] 


Shuttleworth  v.  Uowatt 

v.  Laycock 

v.  Lonsdale,  Earl  of 

v.  Lowtlier 

v.  Nicholson 

v.  Noyes 
Shye  v    Llewellen 


1213 
331 
1066 

1391 

1105 

116 

1460 


Sibbald  v   Lowrie        413,  786,  1552, 

1555,  1821 

Sibbering  17.  Balcarras,  Earl  of     27, 

357,  358 

Sibert  v.  McAvoy  1147 

Sibley  v.  Saffel  1861 

v.  Simonton  262 

Sicard  o.  Whale  48 

Sichell  v.  Raphael    1707,1712,  1713, 

1714 

Sichler  v.  Look  214 

Sickell  v.  Raphael  2330 

Sickles  v.  Gloucester  Co.  2391 

Siddcn  v.  Forster  1183 

v.  Lediard  709 

Sidebothani  8.  Barrington  1400, 

1408 

Sidebottom  v.  Adkins  489,  717, 

942 

v.  Barrington  1219 

v.  Sidebottom  398 

Sidener  v.  White  1625 

Sides  v   Scharff  256 

Sidgiert).  Tyte  524 

Sidingham,  Re  1354 

Sidney  v.  Perry  663,  691 

v.  Ranger  1267,  1271 

v.  Sidney  883,  1652 

v.  Wilnier  1610,  1611 

Sieveking  v.  Behrens         1563,  1564, 

1567 

Sifflun  v.  Davis  168,  215,  1266 

Signiau  v.  Lundy  1548 

Sikes  v.  Truitt  547 

Silber  Light  Co.  v.  Silber         26,  68, 

242 

Silberberg  v.  Pearson  586 

Silcock,  Re  _    99 

v.  Roynon  707,  710 

Silk  v.  Osborne  58 

Sill  v.  Worswick  61 

Sillibourne  v.  Newport  1342 

Sillman  v.  Bowen  1166 

Silloway  v.  Columbian  Ins.  Co.    144, 

235, 1938 

Sills  i'.  Brown  1100 

Silsbee  v.  Lucas  1081 

Silva.  lie  83,  85 

v.  Garcia  1628 

Silver  i'  Campbell  1282 

v.  Kendrick  303 

v.  Norwich,   Bishop  of  1718, 

1730 

r.Stein  201,203,1514 

Silver  Lake  Bank  v.  North     24,  1245 

Silver  Spring  Co.   v    Wansuck 

Co  1638 

Simmonds,  Re  1426 

V.  Du  Barre  747 

v.  Great  Eastern  Ry.  Co.         1015 
v.  Kinnaird,  Lord  495,  1053 

v.  Palles  526 

Simmons  v.  Bates  176 

v.  Baynard  68,165,1163 

v.  Gutteridge  1181,  1182 

v.  Hanover  193 

v.  Heaviside  1607 

v.  Ingram  216 

D.Jacobs      1168,1171,1221,1296, 
1300,  2185,  2198 
v.  Rose  1736,  1767 

v  Saul  55:5 

v.  Shirley  1237 

v.  Simmons  830,  869 

v.  Stover  1449 

v  Tongue  1282 

v.  Wood  498,  516,  1749 

Simms  v   Guthrie  149 

V.  Lloyd  1401 

v.  Richardson  287 


Simms  v.  Thompson 
SiuioD  v.  Ash 

v.  State 

v.  Townsend 
Simons,  Re 

v.  Bagnell 

v.  McAdam 

v   Milman 
Simplot?'   Simplot 
Simpson,  Ex  parte 

v.  Alexander 

v.  Barton 

v.  Bathurst 


1019 

1825 

851 

1677 

991 

794. 1109 

1391 

319,  030 

378,  856,  860 

347.351,354 

68,  69,  72 

492 

63 

v.  Brewster        632,  793,  796,  1409 
v.  Brown  677,  1834 

v.  Burton  3o8 

v.  Carson  1770 

v.  Chapman  1654 

v.  Dennison  1620 

v.  Denny  215,  257 

v.  Downs  1575 

v.  Fogo  645,  664 

v.  Hart  1463 

v.  Holliday  1120 

v.  Howden,  Lord  1621.  1680 

v.  Malherbe  914,  1439 

v.  Ritchie  1163 

v.  Sadd  818,  989,  2257 

v  Savage  211 

v.  South  Staffordshire  Water- 
works Co.  1650 
v.  Terry                                        1221 
v.  Wallace  334 
v   Watts                                     1577 
v.  Westminster   Palace   Hotel 
Co.                    241,  1503,  1650 
Sims  v  Adams  334 
v.  Bonner  27 
v.  Burk                                      1548 
v   Cross                                         1004 
v.  Laws                                       1468 
v.  Lyle                         603,  614,  617 
V   Ridge                                        1169 
Sinclair  v.  Commissioners            1661 
v.  Jackson                   331,  652,  653 
v.  Price                             1135,  1136 
i\  Sinclair  68 
v.  Stevenson                                1100 
Singer  v.  Audsley                         1599 
v.  Steele                                     1299 
Singer    Man.    Co.    v.   Domestic 

Sewing  Machine  Co.  1642, 

1644 
Singer  Sewing    Machine   Co.  v. 

Button  Hole  Co.  1657 

Singer  Sewing  Machine  Manuf. 

Co.  v.  Wilson        891,  914,  1003, 
1642,  1648 
Singleton  v.  Cox  215 

v  Gale  526 

v.  Gayle  287,  841 

v.  Hopkins        166, 227,  265,  1162, 
1103 
v.  O'Blenis  197 

v.  Scott  860 

v.  Selwyn  340,  561 

v.  Singleton  1575, 1578, 1579, 

15*1 
v.  Tomlinson  1382 

Sinnett  r.  Herbert  1491 

v.  Moles  1676 

Sinnickson  v  Bruere  1248, 1298, 
1321 
Sioux  City,  kc.  Rv.  Co.  v.  Chi- 
cago, &c.  Ry  Co.  295 
Sird-field  v  Thacker  1008 
Siter  v.  Jordan  121 
Sitlington  r  Brown  735,  743 
Sitwell  r.  Millersh  1280 
r.  Sitwell  1273,  1274 
Sivell  v  Abraham  794,  795,  13*0 
Skarf  v.  Soulby  991 
Skeats  v  Hurst  906 
Ske.4  v  Spraker  276,  838 
Skeene  v.  I'epper  1213 
Skeet  v.  Lindsay  646 
Skeetes,  lie                                   1862 


C1X 


448, 1044 
1479 
895 
1490, 1615 
1854,  1855 
328,  301 
1159 
926,  1057 
Great  Northern  Ry.  Co.  573 

Judson  564,  567,721 

M'Douall  365,  656 


Skegg  v.  Simpson 
Skeggs,  Re 
Skidmore,  Re 
Skiggs,  Re 
Skiuuer,  Ex  parte 

V.  Bailey 

v.  Carter 

v.  Dayton 


v   Shew 
V.  Todd 
Skinners"  Co.  v   Irish  Society 


1642 

187 

1599, 

1724 

Skip,  Ex  parte  386 

v.  Harwood    1684,  1715,  1716,  1728 

Skipp  v.  Wyatt  1389 

Skipwonh  v   Westfield       1555,  1558 

Skirrett  v.  Athy  1397 

Skirrow  v.  Skirrow  1432 

Skrine  v.  Powell  1458,  k"74 

Skrymsher  v.  Northcote    1029,  1030. 

1430,  1432 

Slack  v.  Black  561,  2103 

v.  Evans  349,  728 

v.  Midland  Ry.  Co.  1082 

v.  Walcott     *  1508 

v.  Wood  1622 

Slade,  Re,  Slade  v.  Hulme  1053 

v.  Rigg  259,  2231 

Slagle  v  Bodmer  987 

Slaney  v.  Sidney  1564,  1566 

v.  Wade  1124,  1137 

Slason  v   Wright         845,  1548,  1553 

Slater  v.  Banwell  715,  1556 

v  Canada  Central  R.  W.  Co.     378 

v.  Cobb  1548 

v  Slater  1794 

v.  Smith  365 

Slatter  v.  Carroll  251 

Slee  v.  Bloom  1314,  1320 

v.  Manhattan  Co.  1385,  1391,  1392 

Sleech  v   Thorington  1<_>2 

Sleeman  v.  Sleeman  171 

V   Wilson  560 

Sleght  v.  Kade  53 

Sleight  b   Lawson  328, 1232 

Slessinger  v    Buckingham  843 

Slevin,  Re,  Slevin  v.  Hepburn         13 


Slingsby  v.  Boulton 

1566 

v.  Hale 

1583 

v.  Moulton 

1561 

Sloan  v.  Little 

722,  723 

v   Sloan 

1580,  1584 

Sloggett  v.  Collins 

403 

v   Viant 

29,  359,  1553 

Sloman  v.  Kelley 

564 

r   New  Zealand 

20,  142,  445 

V    Walter 

1657 

Sloop  Chester  Case 

50 

Small  v.  Attwood  196 

243,  301,  403, 
684, 719 

v.  Boudinot 

324 

v.  Small 

1071 

Smallcombe's  case 

660 

Smalley  v   Clark 

1846 

v.  Corliss 

1315,  1316 

Smallwood  v.  Lewin 

754,781,782 

V   Butter 

70 

Smart  v   Bradstock 

225.  237 

v  Flood 

1736 

v.  Hunt 

050 

v.  M'Lellan 

1283 

v   Tranter 

663 

Smedburg  v  Mark 

1699,  1707 

Smedes  v.  Umightalin 

g               1254 

Smedlev  V    Hill  1125 

Smets  v   Williams  328,  329,  558,  004 
Smiley  v.  Bell  197, 199 

v.  Jones  549 

Smilie  v.  Siler 

Smilie's  Estate  121 

Smith,  Ex  parte  1584,  1846 

Re     61,  62,  10r»,  102.  108.  157.  043. 
653,  1504,  1002,  1073,  1844 

Re,  Williams  v.  Frere       909,  1825 


ex 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 


Smith  r.  A<  ton  1015 

v.  Allen  544,  1025 

V.  Altuus  11S7,  1189,  1191 

v .  Amer.  Ins.  &  Tr.  Co  1567 

r.  Audrews  222,  1932 

v    Armitage  328 

r. -Armstrong  1312,  13o0 

v.  Atkinson  190 

v.  Attorney-General  316 

v.  Aykwell  1651 

v.  Babcock  402,  703,  778,  781 

v.  Badbani  64 

v.  Bailey  1391 

v  Baker  823,  842,  901,  913,  1370 
v.  Baldwin  294 

v  Ballantyne  601 

v.  Barber  1156 

v.  Barnes  419,  597,  1832,  1835 

r.  Bartholomew  292 

v    Bate  1352 

v.  Beaufort,  Duke  of  580, 1S29,  1  31 
v.  Betty  848,  10i3,  1147 

v.  Bicknell  135 

v.  Biggs  9^2 

v.  Black  1271,  1286 

v.  Blackman  858,  875 

v.  Blake  1663 

v.  Blivens  1638 

v.  Biofield  509 

v.  Bolden  224,  1417 

v.  Boston,  C.  &  M.  R.  Co.  670 

v.  Bourbon  County  630 

v.  Bricker  815 

v.  Britain  1283 

v.  Brittenham  197,  517,  790 

v.  Britton  237,  287 

v.  Brooksbank  200,  249 

v.  Brownlow,  Earl  239, 243, 341,873 
v.  Brush  1224,  1248 

v.  Bryon  585,  777 

v.  Buller  915,  1378,  1440,  1449 
v.  Burnham  1,  83,  374,  406,  856 
v.  Butler  Co  ,  Conim.  of  7 

v.  Capron  321,  369 

v.  Castles  30  ,'31 

v.  Chambers  837,  857,  1233,  1394 
V.  Chandos  1250 

V.  Chapman  277 

v  Charter  Oak  Life  Ins  Co.  51 
r.  Chichester  1842 

v.  Clark  374,  844 

v.  Clarke  853, 1666 

v.  Clay  561 

v.  Coffin  887 

v.  Coleman  418 

v  Collyer  1629, 1  33 

v.  Cook  991,  1686 

v.  Cooke  1634 

v.  Copleston  1254 

v.  Cornfoot  358 

v.  Cowell  986, 1037, 1585,  1733 
v.  Creagh  319 

v.  Creasy  1520 

v   Cremer  1416 

v  Croom  1076,  1110,  1478 

v.  Cunningham  532 

v.  Dale  1410 

v  Daniell  575,  1832 

v.  Daniel  ly  542 

v.  Davidson  833 

v   Davies  893,  998 

v.  Day  1446,1661,1662 

V  Dearmer  1149,  1384 

v.  Dixon  424,  1602 

v.  Dorn  559 

v.  Dowling  1829 

v   Drake  645 

v.  East  India  Co.  581 

r.  Edwards  152 

v   Effingham  1147,  1440,  1468, 

1474,  1488.  1738.  1744 
v  Etches  28,37,38,109,  111 

v.  Eustis  1165 

v.  Everett  552.  1660 

v   Ewing  843,  850 

v.  Fisher  721 

v.  Floyd  37,  74 


Smith  v.  Fly 

645 

v.  Ford 

991 

v.  Fox 

560 

1558 

v.  Gage 

190 

v.  Gale 

287 

v   Gauilen 

785 

v.  Godbold 

383, 

1369 

v.  Goldsworthy 

273 

v.  Gooch 

216 

v.  Graham 

1193 

v  Great  Western  Rv.  Co.  1503 

v.  Green  298,  1391 

v.  Grim  256 

v.  Giiswold  552 

v.  Guy  797,  798,  800 

v.  Hadley  402,  418 
v.  Hammond    29,  1409,  1565,  1571 

v.  Harley  197 

v.  Harrigan  1271 

v.  Harris  1765 

v.  Hartley  781 

v.  Harwood  1610 

v   Ilaitwell  1651,  1665 

V.  Henley  880,  981 

v.  Hibernian  Mine  Co.  150 

v.  Hill  652,  653 

v.  Holmes  1467 
v.  Horsfall      812,  1511,  1512, 1526, 
1527 

v.  Huntington  906 

v.  Hurst  236,  1037 

t'.  Jackson  1774 

v.  J  eyes  1727,  1728 

v.  Jones  330 

v  Kane  122 

v.  Kay  562 

v.  Kelley  590,  787,  788 

r.  King  1638 

v.  Kirk patrick  929 

v   Lakeman  1070 

«'.  Lampson  1253 

v.  Lard  1619 

v.  Lasher  723,  726 

v.  Lathrop  633 

v.  Lawrence  227 

v.  Leathart  238,  245 

v.  Leveaux  551 

v.  Lloyd  1774,  1775 
v.  London  and  South  Western 

l!y.  Co.  1642 

v.  Long  128 

v.  Lowe  1727 

v.  Lowry  1622 

v   Lyon  149 

v   Lrster  1764 

v.  McDonald  165 
v.  McLain                 334, 1567,  1625 

v.  McNeal  659 

v   Manchester  1650 

V.  Manning  1507 

v.  Marable  1097 

v.  Marshall  448 

v.  Martin  1073 

v.  Massie  1824 

v.  Matthews  91,  329 

V.  Mitchell  287 

v.  Moff.tt  68,  59,  60,  61 

v.  Moore  194 

v  Morchead  550 

V.  Morpnn  1034,  1099 

v   Mules  1654 

v.  Nelson  1276 

v.  Nethersole  1704 

v  Northumberland  725 

v.  O'Grady  1411 

v  Owen  1638 

v.  Palmer  161 

v.  Parke  443 

r.  Patton  334,  1120 

v   Pawson  39,  41 

v.  Payne  197 

v.  Pearce  1621 

r.  Pearman  999 

v.  People  1069 

V.  Peters  1662 

v.  Pettingill  1631,  1632 

v  Pierce  1381 


Smith  v.  Pilgrim  858,  890 

v.  Pilkiuton  1241,  1252 

v.  Pouifret,  Earl  of  857,  15!'9 

v.  Ponath  892 

v.  Poor  26 

v.  Portland  200 

v.  Potter  737,  837,  846 

v   Poyas  1634 

v.  Head  569 

v.  Republic  Life  Ins.  Co.  395 

v.  Richnell  193 

v.  Kobinson  1266 

V.  Rock  630,  1169 

v.  Rowe  313 

v.  Rvan  1621 

v.  Sackett  191 

v.  St.  Louis  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co. 

145,  402,  524,  712.  737,  760,  837, 

1531,  1533,  1567,  1615 

v.  Schwed  1621 

v.  Serle  /29,  785 

v.  Shaffer  1381 

v.  Shane  846 

v.  Sherman  417 

v.  Smacksmen  Ins.  Co.  1136 

v.  Smith   68,  102,  303,  a25,  358, 

381,  383,  426,  680,  780,  793.  916, 

1003,  1080,  1158,  1301,  1314, 

1369,  1426,  1427,  1476,  1493, 

1517,  1624,  1638,  1641,  1662, 

1663,  1681,  1718,  1722,  1723 

v .  Snow  217,  219 

v   Spence  100 

v.  Spinolla  48 

v.  Standard  L  M.  Co.       269 

v.  Steen  1210 

v.  Swansea  Dock  Co        1599,  1671 

v.  Sweet  100 

v  Swormstedt  238,  239.  241 

v  Target  1565 

v  Tebbitt  852 

v.  Thomas  1818 

v.  Thompson  465 

v  Todd  1255 

v.  Trimble  517,531,1004 

v.  Turner  321,  974,  1575,  1583 

v.  Turrentine  294 

v.  A'anderhurst  1255 

v   Weguelin  18,  141,  448 

v.  Wells  904,  968 

r.  West  249,  829,  834 

v.  Wheatcroft  380,  861,  1551 

v.  Whitmore  554,  670,  1020 

v.  Wigton  402 

v   Wilkinson  1232 

v.  Williams  2-13,  329 

v.  Wilson  576 

v  Winter  1845,1847 

v.  Wood  324,  560 

v  Woodfolk  405,986 

v   Worthington  1274 

v.  Wycoff  262 

v  Yell  575 

Smith's  Case  1109 

Estate  119 

Goods,  lie  251 

Smith,  Knight  &  Co  ,  Re  905 

Smitha  e   Flournoy  546 

Smith-Barrv  v.  Dawson  1685 

Smithbv  v.  Stinton  200 

Smithefs  V    Fitch  1638 

Smithly  r  Hinfon  252 

Smoot  v   Strauss  860 

Smyth,  lie  178,1575,1578 

v   Balch  1625 

V.  Carter  1633 

v.  McKernan  1320 

v  Myers  109 

v.  N"  O   C    &  B.  Co.  630 

Smythe  v   Clay  1580 

v   Fitzsimmons  1576 

v   Henrv  653 

Snaggr.  Frizell  1393 

Snapp  v   Purcell  381 

Snavely  v.  Harkrader  346 

Snead  v.  Green       655,  657,  712,  821 

v.  M'Coull  425 


Sneed  v.  Atherton  1158 

v.  Ewing  _       _  1074 

Snelgrove  v.  Snelgrove  676,  677,  678 

Snell,  In  re  1842 

v.  De  Land  1221 

v   Dwight  986 

v.  Fewell  .  2120 

v.  Harrison  lod 

v.  Hyat  176 

v.  Mitehel)  1889 

v.  Timbrel!  1132 

Snelling  v.  Boyd  197 

v.  Watrous  507 

Snodgrass  v.  Butler  1565 

Snook  0    Pearsall  559 

v  Sutton  1364 

v.  Watts  176 

Snoutfer  v   Hansbrough  1120 

Snow  v.  Alley  815 

v.  Bolton  1045, 1051,  1451 

v.  Booth  653 

v.  Boston  Blank  Book  Manuf. 

Co.  560,  714 

v  Oounselman  683 

v.  Hole  69, 160,  170 

v.  Teed  1463 

Snowball  v.  Dixon  39,  155 

Suowden  v.  Snowden  4.38 

v.  Tyler  630 

Snowdon  v    Metropolitan  Rail- 
way Co.  1474 
Snowhill  v.  Snowhill      113,  115,  117 
Snowman  ».  Harford  369 
Snyder  v.  Botkin                          1576 
v.  Cabell                                      211 
v.  Hopkins                                 1628 
v.  Martin  830 
v.  Pharo                                       1071 
v  Seeman                                  1675 
v.  Snyder                                   1159 
v.  Summers                                 1497 
Soames  v.  Edge                   1080,  1660 
Sobernheimer  v.  Wheeler               236 
Sobey  v.  Sobey          1702,  1705, 1713 
SocitHe  Fonciere  v.  Milliken  149 
Society    Generate    v.    Dreyfus 

Brothers  452 

Society  for  Prop.  Gosp.  v.  Hart- 
land  190 
v.  New  Haven  24 
v.  Wheeler                                 24,  50 
v.  Young                                       24 
Socola  v.  Grant                      314,  586 
Soden  V.  Soden                                 378 
Soffe  v.  Prince                                  938 
Sohier  ?>.  Burr                              1561 
v.  Williams                            227,  229 
Solicitor,  A,  Re         1555,  1685,  IU17 
Sol  ley  v.  Wood                                307 
Sollory  v.  Leaver                          1724 
Solly  v.  Greathead                          1046 
Solomon  v.  Hritton                        1129 
v    Fitzgerald                                  216 
v.  Solomon                 2S1,  286,  1517 
v.  Stalman                       lo')4,  1597 
Soltau  v.  De  Held      1597, 1635,  1«37 
Somerby  v.  Buntin                          589 
Somers  v.  Torrey                    347,  729 
Somerset,  Re                                    68 
Somerset  County  Bank  v.  Veghte  655 
Somerville  v   Mackay          1818,  1829 
v.  Mayes                                     1666 
Somes  v.  Martin                            1610 
Somner  v.  Charlton                       1286 
Sonnet  v.  Powell                             1190 
Sonsmith   v.  J.    P.    Donaldson, 

The  518 

Soper  v.  Manning  314 

Sorchan  v.  Mayo  1765 

Sorden  v.  Conton  1127 

Soria  v.  Stowe  1031 

Sorrel  v.  Proctor  1418 

Sortwell  i".  Montpelier  &  W.  R. 

R.  Co.  1253 

Sotheran  v.  Smear  92,  103 

Soudon  v.  Hooper  1240 

Soulby  v.  Pickford  1104 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 

[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 

Soule  v.  Corning  816 

South  «'.  Leavy  1^58 

South  &  North  Alabama  R.  Co. 

v.  H'il.-on  860 

Southall  !'.  British  Mutual  Life 

Assurance  Co.  780 

v.  McKeand  1136 

Southampton  Co.  v.  Southamp- 
ton Board  551 
Southampton  &c.,  Co.  v.  Pinnock  26 
v.  Rawlins              26,  485,  807,  809 


CXI 


Southard  v.  Rexford  564 

v.  Russell  15*0 

v.  Sutler  212 

v .  Sutton  280 

Southbrijge    Savings     Bank    v. 

Mason  1320 

South  Carolina  v  Georgia  1576 

South  Carolina  Bank  v.  Case  24 

Southeastern  Ry.  Co.,  lie      99,  1802 
Southeastern  Ry.  Co  v.  Brogden  551 
v   London.  Brighton,  &  South 

Coast  Ry.  Co.  1775 

v.  Martin  551 

v.  Submarine  Telegraph  Co      547, 

810,  1557.  1558,  2047 

Southern  Express  Co.  v.  Western 

N.C.  R.  Co.  1743 

So.   Life  Ins    &   Trust  Co.   v. 

Lanier  302 

Southern  Marble  Co.  v.  Stegall     324 
Southern    Medical    College    v. 

Thompson  1648 

Southern  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Trear  861 
Southern  Pacific  Co.  v.  Denton  551 
Southern  Pacific  R  Co.  v.  Oak- 
land 1663 
Southern  Ry.  News  Co  v  Russell  564 
Southern  Steam  Packet  Co.  v. 

Roger  443 

Southey  v.  Nash  1101 

v.  Sherwood  1645,  1647 

Southmayd  v.  McLaughlin  1631 

South  Molton  v.  Attorney-Gen- 
eral 13 
South  Ottawa  v.  Perkins               863 
South  Park  Com'ra  v   Kerr           361 
South  Platte   Land  Co.   v.  Buf- 
falo County                              1601 
South  Sea  Co.  v.  Bumsted             505 
v.  Doliffe                                         576 
v.  Wymondsell             645,  648,  655 
South  Staffordshire  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Hill  791.  808,  810 

South  Wales  Ry.  Co.  V.  Wythes  1668 
Southwestern    L.    &  D.  Co.  v. 

Robertson  10.39 

Snuthwick,  Matter  of  1846 

Southwort.h  v.  Taylor  1666 

Soutter  v.   Milwaukee,  &c.    R. 

Co  1517 

Souverhye  v   Arden  22s3 

Souzer  w   De  Meyer       589,  612,  615, 

617,  652,  653,  674,  694,  700,  704, 

787 

Soward  v.  Leggatt 

Sowdon  v.  Marriott 

Sowerhy  I)    Fryer 

*    Lockerby 

v.  Warder 

Sowle  ?).  Champion 

Sowles  v.  First  Nat.  Bank 

v.  Witters 
Sowry  v.  Sowry 
Sowton  r   Cutler 
Bpaddacinl  v.  Treaey 
Spain,  King  oft'.  Hullett 


1006 

1401 

1630 

11 29 

506 

1291 

553 

1743 

99,  1802 

1686 

894 

20,  164, 

421 

v  Machado     17,  18,  197,  301.  802, 

315,  557,  1468,  1469,  1881 

v.  Mendazahel  17 

Spain,  Queen  of  v.  Parr  20 

Spalding  v.  Dodge  357 

v.  Ruding  2231 

Spang  v.  Robinson  1395 

Spanish  General  Agency  Co.  f . 

Spanish  Co.  1675 


Spann  v.  Spann  1029 

Sparenburgh  v.  Bannatyne  49 

Spargur  w.  Heard  87,  109 

Sparhawk  v.  Buel  67,  14S9 

v.  Wills        1-32,  1238,  1239,  1243, 

1248,  1298,  13o0,  1317,2-^3 

Spark  v.  Long  13  >9 

Sparke  v.  Ivatt  1112 

Sparkes  v.  Barrett  1097 

Sparks,  lie  14u4 

v    Farmers'  Bank  1073 

)•    Liverpool  Water  Works  Co.  1058 

Sparling  V    B  re  re  ton  533 

Sparrow  v.  E»ing  9b9 

v.  Fiend  1150,  1157 

v    Hill  1407,  14-19 

Spartali  v.  Constantionide  209 

Spaulding  v.  Farwell      349,  728,  759 

v.  Keeley  1069 

v.  Warner  1150 

Speak  v.  Metcalf  177,  444 

v.  Ranso.n     1588,  1668,  1673,  1675 

Spearing  V    Lynn  1030 

Special   Bank  Commissioner  v. 

Cranston  Savings  Bank        1304 

v.  Franklin  Sav.  Inst.  1745 

Special  Reference,  lie  1009 

Speedlove  v.  Speedlove  1725 

Speer  v.  Crawter  209,  547,  1163. 

1164 

Speering's  Appeal  26 

Sueidall  v.  Jervis  801 

Speidel  v.  Ilenrici  560,  860 

Speller  v  Bristol  Steam  Nav.  Co.  449 

Spence,  lie  1348 

v   Allen  952 

v.  Armour  1281,  li91 

v.  Dodd  843 

v.  Hanford  1737 

v.  Hogg  231 

».  McDonough  1638 

v  Simis  1221 

Spenceley  v.  De  Willott  1102 

Spencer,  Re  298,323,  1809 

Re,  Thomas  v.  Spencer  100 

v.  Allen  1065 

v.  Armstrong  235 

v.  Boyes  164 

v  Bryan  692 

v.  Bryant  43.  156 

v.  De  Willott  1132 

v.  Fortescue  850 

v.  Lee  216 

v.  London  &  Birmingham  Ry. 

Co.  1636, 1663 

v.  Luttrell  576 

v.  Pee  1573 

v.  Shaw  201,318,1722 

v.  Stearns  1463 

v  Van  Duzen  407 

v.  Ward  1422,  1432 

Spendler  v.  Potter  262 

Spensley,  Re  14'23 

Sperling  v.  Rochfort  93,  96,  100.  186 

Sperrj   v   Miller  550 

Speyers  v.  Desjardins  3^5 

Spicer  v   Dawson  907 

V.  Hoop  1619,  1054 

v.  Martin  324,  1654 

v.  Taylor  559 

Spickernell  v.  Hotham  1075 

Spies  v  Chicago.  &c.  R  Co    193  328 

Spike  v   Harding        1151,  1163,  1104 

Spill  v.  Celluloid  Manuf  Co.       1580 

Spillane  t'     Missouri    Pac.    Rv. 

Co.  001,630 

Spiller,  Re  1861,  1491 

v.  Spiller  lii47 

Spink  v.  Francis  1620,1686 

Spires  v  Sowell  796,  797 

Spirett  r.  Willows  103,  105,  108 

Spitley  v.  Frost  &59 

Spin  e  v.  Hughes       913,  1189, 1339 

V.  WaltOTi  897,  1098 

Spivey  v.  Frazee  784 

v.  .Jenkins  290 

Spofford  r.  Manning       590,  708,  787 


CX 11 


Spokes  v.   Banbury    Board    of 

Health  1638,  168 

Spong  v.  Hogg 
Spoonor,  He 

v.  McConnel 

v.  Payne 
Sporle  v .  Barnaby 
Sporrer  v.  Eitler 
Spottiswoode  v.  Clarke 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 


1134 

1320 

1670 

521,  1053 

97 

S81 

1640,  1645, 

1663,  167s 

59,  61,  224 

1553 

1386 

1029 

2397 

1133 

557,  1635 

457 

760 

1561 


Spragg  v.  Binkes 

v.  Corner 
Sprague  v.  Graham 
v  Joues 
v.  Litherberry 
v.  Mitchell 
V-  Rliodes 
v.  Sprague 
d.  Tyson 
v.  Wesc 
A.  &  W.  Sprague  Manuf.  Co.  v. 

Hoyt  60 

Spring  v.  Albin  361 

Spring  v.  Domestic  S.  M.  Co.        630 

v.  Gray  641,  642 

v   Jenkins  294 

v.  Sandford  12S3 

v  South  Car.  Ins.  Co.    1563,  1565, 

156U 

v.  Woodworth  1360 

Springer  ».  Austin  971 

v.  Yanderpool  249,  255 

Spriugett  v.  Dashwood       1417,  141'.' 

Springfield  v   Hurst  262 

r   Ollett  1405 

Springhead  Spinning  Co.  v.  Riley 

1620,  1648 
Sproull's  Appeal  1298 

Spiunt  v.  Hugh         1033,  1C51,  1755 
Spr\e  o.  Reynell  796 

Spurgeon  v.  Hooker  1664 

Spurlock  v.  Fulks  15'15 

Spurr  v  Benedict  1624,  1961 

v  Scoville  149,151,458,  629 

Spurrier  v  Fitzgerald  619 

v.  Spurrier  1801 

Squibb  v.  McFarland  1461 

Squier  v.  Shaw  785 

Squire,  Ex  parte  880 

v   Hewlett  630 

v   Lincoln  236 

v   1'ardoe  13S5 

v   Pershall  1466 

Squirrel  v.  Squirrel  37,  74 

S  S.  White  Dental  Co.  v.  Sib- 
ley 1643 
Stables,  Re  86 
Stace  v.  Gage                           222,  257 
v.  Mabbot                         1121,1124 
Stacey  v.  Southey                        1202 
v.  Spratley              1075,  1148,  1384 
Stack,  lie                                        1744 
Stackhouse  v.  Barnston        559,  560, 
561,  639,  642 
v.  Jersey,  Countess                     676 
Staekpole  v.  Beaumont                   105 
v.  Curtis                                     1061 
Stackpoole  v.  Callaghan  28 
Stadler  v.  Hertz                                732 
Stafford  v.  American  Mills  Co.    1743 
V-  Anglesey,  Earl  of                     135 
v.  Brown     373,  467,  488.  531,  760. 
763,  893,  1590 
v.  Bryan          560,  844,  123n,  1378. 
1379,  1579,  1600 
v.  Burn                                        497 
v.  Coxen                                     1082 
V    Fi.ldon                                     1369 
V.  Hiiiginbotham  42 
v.  Howlett        406,  407, 1515, 1531 , 
1534,  1535 
v  London,  City  of                      208 
v  Mott                                       1255 
v.  Rogers                          1313,  1319 
Stafford,  Earl  Df  v.  Buckley  7 
Stafford  Charities,  Re                  1432 
Stafford  Nat  Bank  v.  Sprague      313 


Staffurth  v.  Pott 
Stagg  v.  Beekman 

V.  Kuowles 
Stagoll,  lie 
Stahl  v.  Gotzenberger 
Stahle  v.  Winter 


710 
1772 

8u8 
1611 
1147 

1525 


Stahlschmidt  v.  Lett     159,  643,  969, 

137a,  1425,  1446,  1525 

Staight  v.  Burn  1638 

Staines  v.  Giffard  1801 

v.  Maddox         37,  79,  80,  81,  1455, 

1457 

v.  Morris  1381,  1400,  1402 

v.  Kudlm  1266 

Staiutou  v   Carron  Co  200,  324, 

800,  1004,  1253,  1723 

v.  Chadwick  579,  1469,  1832 

Staley  v.  Barrett  2115 

v.  Murphy  lti2l 

Stalling  r.  Goodloe  1583 

Stamford,  Re  lb7* 

Stamford,  Earl  of  v.  Dawson        1444 

Stamford  v.  Stamford  Horse  R. 

Co.  659 

Stamper  v.  Barker  119,  122 

Stamps  v.  Birmingham  k  Stour 

Valley  Railway  Co.  780 

Standard  Bank  v.  Stokes  163!' 

Standen  v.  Edwards  1123,1137,  1148 

Staudering  v.  Hall  99 

Standewicke  v.  Watkins  1131 

Standish  v.  Liverpool  1640 

v.  Parker  633 

v.  Radley  1576,  15M 

v.  Whitwell  13y9 

Standley  v.  Roberts  1561 

Stanes  v.  Parker  1234 

Stanford  v  Murphy  402 

Stanger  Leathes  v.  Stanger  Leatbes 

1730 
Stanhope  v.  Nott  576 

v.  Stanhope  87 

Staniar  v.  Evans  298,  1029,  1414 

Staniland  v.  Staniland  7u,  71 

r.  Willott  1399 

Stanley,  Re  98 

v.  Bond  526, 1039,  1041,  1678 

v.  Coulthurst  1765 

v.  Kean  874 

v.  Mather  283 

v.  Risse  1071 

v.  Robinson  712 

v.  Sullivan  1062 

v.  Wrigley  1151 

Stanley,  Lady  v.  Earl  of  Shrews- 
bury 1080 
Stannard  v.  Graves                        1120 
r.  Harrison  H73 
v.  St.  Giles  Vestry                     1670 
Stanney  v.  Walmsley              954.  955 
Stansbury  v.  Arkwright         362.  371 
Stan.-field  v.  Habergham  1630,  1631, 
li,33 
v.  Hobson     211,  212,  257,  259  651 
Stanton  v.  Ala.,  &c.  R.  Co          1316, 
1320,  1731,  1743,  1752 
v.  Embrey                            633,  634 
v.  Hatfield                        1437,  1438 
v.  Knight  642 
v.  Percival                   178,  829,  841 
Stan  way,  Re                                  1794 
Stamford  v.  Tudor                       1182 
Stapilton  v.  Stapilton               74,  384 
Stapler  t'.  Hardeman                     1029 
Staples  v.  Staples                          1120 
v.  Turner                                   1624 
Stapleton,  Ex  parte  64 
v.  Conway                                  1256 
Stapylton  v.  Peill                         1713 
Starbuck  v.  Mitchell  86 
Stark  v.  Cheathem               214,  1265 
v.  Hunton                                    644 
v.  Starr                                        659 
v.  Thompson                               974 
Starkie,  Ex  parte              1358,  1363 
v   Richmond                     1639,  1662 
Starks  v.  Redfield                         1375 


Star  N.  Co.  v.  O'Connor  1655 

Starue  v.  Farr  lb3 

Staines  v.  Newson        550,  555,  1081, 
1663 
Starr  v.  Maidstone  1380 

Starr's  Estate  855 

Starteu  v.  Bartholomew  70,  71,  1347 
State  v.  Allen  552,  1073 

v-  Anderson  10 

v.  Bank  of  Tennessee  129 

v.  Benniugham  10 

v.  Black  Kivcr  Phosphate  Co.  321 
v.  Blakemore  1254,  1766 

v.  Boswell  960 

v.  Brown  334,  1463 

v.  Buck  1069 

v.  Butler  1756 

v.  Calloway  1650,  1661 

v.  Central  R.  Co.  21 

v.  Churchill  1071 

v.  Civil  District  Judge  1620 

v.  Clark  67,  1:359 

v.  Columbia  842 

v.  County  Court  1637, 1650,  1661 
v.  Cross  864 

v.  Cutler  1683,  1G84 

v.  Davis  1069 

v.  Dayton  &  S.  E.  R.  Co.  10 

v.  De  Wolf  886 

v.  District  Court  536 

v.  District  Judge  1675 

v.  Durein  16£3 

v.  Fagan  1637 

v.  Farish  1119 

v.  Farmers'  L.  &  T.  Co.  10 

v.  Foot  236,  334 

v-  Frew  887,  1069 

v.  Gooch  1756 

v.  Hannibal,  &c.  R.  Co.  1120 

i'.  Hardie  6 

r.  Hemingway  794 

V.  Henthorn  1069 

v.  Hill  123 

v.  Hopkins  879 

v.  Horner  536 

v.  Hyde  1309 

v.  Jacksonville,  &c.  R.  Co.  1742 
v.  Johnson  1463 

v.  Kennedy  10 

v.  King  1716 

v.  Knight  1069 

v.  Kolsem  1576 

v.  Lewis  1381 

v.  Levy  904 

v.  Litchfield  907 

v.  Lon.-dale  944 

v.  Mclutire  1168,  1170,  1171, 

1298,  1317 
v.  Mariou  County  Com'rs  10 

v.  Maury  566 

v.  Mayes  10 

v.  Mead  21 

v.  Mewberter  574 

V.  Nashville  Savings  Bank  894 
v.  New  Orleans,  &c.  R.  Co  634 
r.  Northern,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  1716 

v.  Paris  Ry.  Co.  10 

v.  Pierce  1683 

v.  Roanoke  Nav.  Co.  1286 

v.  Rush  County  Com'rs  1614 

v.  Rust  1686 

v.  St.  Louis,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  354 

v.  Samuels  881 

v.  Saunders  1620 

v.  Schwtickardt  1620 

v.  Spartanburg,  &c.  R.  Co.  1492 
v .  Sturgis  1744 

r.  Temple  133 

v.  Turner  190 

v.  Ward  129 

v.  Wavman  1254 

v.  White  572 

v.  White's  Creek  Turnpike  Co.  10 
v.  Williams  324 

v.  Wolfenden  1661 

v.  Wormick  1434 

State  Bank  v.  Bell  1608 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 


State  Bauk  v  Edwards  845 

v.  Reeder  422 

State  las   Co.  v.  Gennett  147,  994, 

1561,  1570 

v  Sax  148 

State  ot  Ohio  v.  Hinchin  864 

State  Railroad  Tax  Cases  1661 

Statham  v   llall  1564 

Staunton  v   Harris  1278,  1283 

Stead,  Re  652,  653 

v   Course  1-72 

v.  Stead  798 

Steam  Gauge  &  L.  Co  v.  Mey- 

rose  659 

Steam  Stone  Cutter  Co  v  Sears  1051 

Stearns  v.  Hubbard  657 

v.  Page  617,  788,  1997 

v.  Reidy  860 

v.  Stearns  843 

Stebbing  v.  Atlee  9J5 

Stebbins  b.  St.  Aune  303,  331 

v   Savage  1461 

Steed  v.  Cragh  126 

Steedman  v.  Marsh  369 

v.  Poole  805 

Steeds  v.  Steeds  669 

Steel  v.  Cobb  176,  178 

v   Chester  1846 

v    Matthews  645 

v.  Parsons  445 

r.  Preece  1264 

Steele  v.  Cobham  1734 

v.  Gordon  461 

v.  Uutchina  16s6 

v   Lewis  289,  2:i5 

V.  Maunder  259 

v.  Mi  Hand  Ry.  Co.  426 

v.  Mott  43 

v   North  Met  R  Co.  1620 

v.  Plomer     452,  476,  498,  512,  784 

v.  Savory  9i  19 

v  Smirt  453 

v.  Stewart  577, 1834 

v.  Stuart  449,  452 

ti.  Taylor  281,  287 

v.  White  1461 

Steer  u  Steer        201,318,  917,  1722 

Stees  v.  Kranz  1675 

Sreff  v.  Andrews  612 

Stegner  v.  Blake  933 

Steiger  i».  Heidelberger  843 

v.  Hillen  1166 

Stein  v   Benedict  589 

v.  Bienville  W.  S.  Co.  1637 

v.  Bowman  917 

v.  Hauck  1638 

v.  Kobertson  385 

Steinau  v.  Gas  Co.  1657 

Steinbach  e   Hill  329 

o.  Relief  Fire  Ins.  Co.  1961,  1966 

Steinberg  v.  Tyler  365 

Steines  v.  Franklin  County        1463, 

1479 

Steinhauser  v.  Mason  1540 

v  Spraul  418 

Steinkeller  v   Newton  1099 

Steinmetz  v.  Halthin  103,  106,  122 

Steinriede  B.  Tegge  417 

Steinway  v  Steinway  852 

Stent  B.  Wickens  774 

Su-nton  v.  Jerome  371 

Stephen,  Re  1485,  1608 

v   B  all  186,  212 

v  Diniels  1661 

v.  Yandle  644 

Stephens,  Re  642 

v.  Berry  628,  629 

v.  Biehnell  617,  531 

v.  Biney  866 

v   Frost  295 

v.  Giylord  1772 

v.  Heathcote        821,  822.  823.  842 

v.  James  1350,  2294 

v   Lawry  I860 

v.  Louch  486 

v   Monongahela  Nat.  Bank         634 

v.  Neale  465,  489 

VOL.  I.  —  A 


Stephens  v   Newboroug'n  1440 

v.  Orman  844 

v.  Overstolz  586 

v.  Porter  83,  108 

v.  Totty  123 

v    Wanklin  911 

v   Whitehead  334 

v.  Workman  1687 

Stephenson  v.  Austin  190 

v.  Biney  868 

v.  Davis       144,  149,  305,  314,  440, 
458,  549,  555,  1032 
v   Houlditch  1586 

v.  Mackay  8U9 

v.  Stephenson  68,  79,  169,  170,  737, 
753 
v.  Strutt  88,  179 

v  Wilson  1622 

Stephenton  v  Gardiner         592,  663 
Stepp  v.  National  Life  Associa- 
tion 850 
Steptoe  v  Pollard                         1003 
Sterl  v.  Sterl                                    1549 
Sterling,  Ex  parte            1842,  1843 
v.  Ashton                                     1931 
v.  Thompson                              1314 
Sterm  v  Drinker                           365 
Stern  v.  Sedden  441 
Sternberger  v.  McGovern  313 
Sterndale  v.  Hankinson        643,  1211 
Sterrick  v   Pugsley  357 
Sterry  v.  Arden                      952,  1549 
Steuart  v   Gladstone     839,  855,  859. 
976,  1660 
Stevens,  Ex  parte                       1611 
v    Beals                                    90,  116 
v.  Beekman                                  1631 
v   Benning                                   1644 
v.  Brett  795 
v.  Coffeen                                   1008 
v.  Cooper                              655,  849 
v.  Davison                                  1731 
v   Dewey                                     1578 
v.  Guppy            378,  381,  384,  995, 
1027 
v.  Hayden                                    360 
v.  Hey                               1577,  1578 
v   Keating      812,  1379,  1640,  1642 
v  Lock  wood                                330 
v  Melcher                                  1508 
v.  Miner                                     1298 
v.  Ni*bet                                    1770 
v    Pell                                           1142 
v.  Pillen                                   1423 
v  Post                 713,  737,  840,  846 
v.  Praed                       804,  809,  9.»5 
V.  Railroads  794 
v.  Smith                                        11  a> 
v  South  Devon  Railway  Co.     243, 
1620 
v.  Stevens          70,  139,  1548,  1549. 
1553 
tt   Trevor-Garrick  100 
v.  Van  Cleve  8">1 
v.  Warren                                     1560 
V.  Williams                            37,  111 
Stevenson  v    Abington  438 
v.  Anderson    150,  151.  1560.  1562, 
1565.  1567,  200.3 
v.  Austin                      237,  257,  272 
v.  Buxton  385 
r    Hano                                      1395 
Steward   v.   Bank  of  England      142 
v.  East  India  Co.                  145,  297 
v.  Gordon  K60 
v.  North  Met.  Tramways  Co.    418, 
785 
v   Roe                                 403,  15£2 
v   Steward                                    1700 
Stewart,  In  re                    1514,  1*02 
v.  Barry                                     1676 
v.  Beard                                     1026 
v   Beebe                                        1751 
v.  Chesapeake    &    O.     Canal 

Co.  149,  659 

v.  Clark  999,  1224.  1248 

v.  Crane  1309 


Stewart  v.  Dunn 
v.  Duvall 
v   Fauiler 
v   Flint 
v.  Flowers 


CX111 


273 

169,  406 

1407 

586,  601 
1816 


v  Forbes        973, 1013,  1029,  U5:i, 

14ii3 

D.Graham     1704.1705,1708,1713 

v.  Great  Western  Ry.  Co.         553, 

1625 

v.  Hoare  1846 

v   Huntington  815 

c    lnglehart  1073 

v.  Jackson  221 

v.  Johnson  1677 

v   Lay  1752 

v  Lispenard  851  ' 

v   Meuzies  1503 

v.  Noble  1258 

v  Nurse  1443 

v.  Pollard  1232 

v.  Smithson  1648 

v.  Stewart  29,30,31,334,426 

v   Townsend  779 

v.  Turner  1168 

v  U.  S   Ins  Co.  24 

v.  Wilson  1253 

Stickland  v.  Aldridge  657 

Stifle  v.  Everitt  98,  104.  123 

Stiles  v.  Allen  1188 

v   Donaldson  641 

Still  v.  Reading  197,314 

Stilphen  V   Read  1120 

Stilson  v.  Leeman  1381 

Stilt  v.  Hilton  1677 

Stilwell  v  Adams  367 

v.  M'Neely  220,  588 

v  Wilkius  1721 

Stimpson  v.  Green  1258,  1298 

v.  Putnam  1046,  1683,  1684, 

2150 

Stimson  v.  Lewis  272 

v.  Meade  1281 

Stinson  v.  Ashley  100 

v.  Hil.Jrup  312 

V.  Pickering  68 

Stinton  v.  Taylor   807, 809,  830,  831 , 

833 

Stirrat  v  Excelsior  Manuf  Co.     314, 

349 

Stitt  r.  Hilton  1675 

Stitwell  B.  Williams  1721 

Stobart  v   Todd  906 

Stock  v   Vining  1433 

Stockbridge  Iron   Co.    v.  Cone 

Iron  Works        305,  1086, 1440 

v.  Hudson  Iron  Co         1071,  1076, 

lllo,  1675 

Stocken  r   Stocken  1359,  1485 

Blocker  v   Heggerty  1562 

V.  Planet  R.  Society  1660 

v.  Wedderhun  1656 

Stock  ley  r   Rowley  550 

v.  Stock  lev  1580,  1622 

Stockman  B  Wallis  1716 

Stockport  District  Water  Works 

Co   b.  Jowett  1672 

Stockton  v.  Anderson  193 

V  Briggs  1619 
v.  Lockwood  2040 
r    Williams  1031 

Stockton  &  Darlington  Ry.  Co. 

V.  Hrown  1650 

Stockton   &   Hartlepool   Ry.  Co. 
v.  Leeds  &  Thirsk  Ry    Co. 

1620 
Stoddard  v.  McLane  320 

v.  Sloan  894 

Stoever  v  Stoever  59 

Stogden  v.  Lee  100 

Stoke  v.  Robson  193 

Stokes  v  Citv  Offices  Company 

983,  1330,  1638 
v.  Clendon  270 

V  Edmeades  1072 
v.  Heron  1.503 
v.  Holdcn                              56,  135 


CX1V 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 


Stokes  v.  Taylor  232 

Stokoe  v.  Rob.-on  _   1&*2 

Stuue  V.  Anderson  372.  37'J,  443 

V   Bartlett         212,261,  1*39,  1245 

v.  Blackburn  1098 

r.  Boston  &  Maine  Railroad        58 

v  Buckner  279 

,   v  City  of  London  Real  Prop 

trty  Co  1638 

V.  Damon  851 

v  Davies  422 

v  Dennis  671 

v   Duncan  518,  532 

v  Hobart  1613,1021 

v   Hyde  1845 

v   Lickorish  1235,  1414 

v    Lidderdale  1053.  1730 

*•   Locke  212,  809, 1259, 1377, 1381. 
1463, 1466,  1926 
542,  692,  713,  758,  845 
63 
1561 
1107 
60,553.630 
1169 
1650,  173> 


v.  Moore 

v    Parks 

v.  Reed 

v   State 

V.  Thomas 

v   Van  Heythusen 

v.  \\  etuiore 


Straker  v.  Ewing  1399 

v.  Graham  1131 

Strange  v.  Bell  1560 

v.  Collins  378,  384,  782 

v  Harris  1771 

v.  Thouias  1182 

!■    Watson  378,  3:4 

Strangeways,  Ex  parte  182 

Strangford  v   Green  1249 

Strattord  v    Baker     1540,  1594,  161 H I 
v.  Boswortb  1399 

Strathmore  v.  Bowes  1633 

Strattou  v.  Davidson  151,  171s, 

1729 

v.  Hernon 

v  Physio-Medical  College 
v.  Reisdorph 

Straughan  r.  Hallwood 
v.  Wright 

Strauss  v.  Goldschmidt 

Stray  er  v   Stone 

Street  v.  Auderton 
v.  Maryland  Cent.  Ry  Co. 


v  Wishart  75, 1732 

Stouemetz   Printers'  M    Co    v. 

Brown  Folding  M.  Co.    334,  349, 
1548 
Stoney  V.  Saunders  1017 

Stouington     Savings     Bank     v 

Davis  1221,  1246,  2193 

Stooke  v   Vincent  109,  636 

Stopturd    v.   Canterbury.   Lord 

1360 
Storer    v.    Great    Western   Ry 

Co.  4?4 

v  Jackson  1678 

t;   Johnson  1840 

Storev  v  Lennox  620 

v   People  1069 

Storm  v   Davenport        159,  249,  280 

«   Mann  1629,  1669 

Stormout?"  Wickens  1167 

Storms  v .  Storms  828 

Storr  v,  Pannell  161 

Storrs  v.  Barker  2271 

v   Benbow  1476 

v.  Payne  1566 

v.  Wallace  334 

Storry  v.  Walsh  1277 

Story,  Ex  parte  1H9 

.   v   Brown  1222 

v   Hawkins  9j4 

v.  .lerscv     City    and    Bergen 

Point  Plank  Road  Co.        1620 
v.  Johnson  1156,  1158,  1486 

v  Livingston      100,191,287.302, 
1180,  1195.  1222. 
1302,  1316 
v  Odin  1638 

v  Official  Manager 


v.  Rigby 
Streeten  v   Whitmore 
Strelley  V   Pearson 
Stretch  v   Gowdey 

v.  Stretch 

Strettou  v. 

Stribling  v.  Hart 
Strickland  v.  Strickland 
426,  607 

V    Weldon 
Strike  v.  McDonald 
Strike's  Case 
Striker  v   Mott 
Stringer,  lie 

v   Harper 
Stringer's  Case 
Strode  r   Blackburne 

v.  Little 
Strohuieyer  v  Zeppenfeld 
Strong,  lie 

v.  Blanchard 


v  Shultz 

v.  Tonge 

v    Vermont 

V.  Windsor,  Lord 

Stotesbury  v.  Vail 
Stothart  v    Burnet 
Stntt  v   Meanock 
Stoughton  v.   Lynch 

Stonrton  v   Stourton 
Stout  »  Cook 

l>  Curry 

v    Seabrook 
Stoutenburgh  v.  Peck 
BcovrII  b   Banks 
Stow  /•.  Russell 
Stowell  v  Waddingham 

I.i.l y  p  Cole 
Stracy  p.  Blake 
Btrader  v  Byrd 

v.  Graham 
Btradley  v.  Circuit  Judge 
Str.iit  v.  National  Harrow  Co.      1642 


1240 

99 

1553 

662.  676,  677, 

678,1725,  1727 

748,  1676 

551 

164.  174.  13H7 

668,  1250, 

1257 

10S 

630 
1628 

560 
1676 
14«i2 

545 
1628 
1539 
1126 
658, 1002 

630 
1031 


v.  Carlyle  Press 

v  Moore 

v.  Smith 

v.  Sproul 

v   Strong 
Strother  r.  Dutton 
Stroud  v   Deacon 
Stroughill  v.  Gulliver 
Strousberg  v.  Republic  of  Costa 

Rica  141 

Strudt  v.  Roberts  1126 

Strudwick  v.  Pargiter 


552 

1411 

214 

1517 

1151 

406 

13M 

172  . 

1743. 

1765 

671 

1  b3 

1661 

1745,  1755 

287 

1278 

1031 

252,  406, 

,  947,  1513 

12 

918,  1476 

945 

209 

544 

1428,  1433 

26 

677,  1163 

629 

1407 

64 

1237,  1239, 1241. 

1244 

1461 

434,  436 

115.  117 

354 

268, 1611 

992 

579 

1474 


StuUtf   Goode  781 

Stulz  v.  Stulz  879 

Stumui  v.  Dixon  1169 

Stump  v  Beattv  458,513 

Stuuz  v.  Stuuz  1150 

Stupart  v.  Arrowsmith  234,  3U4 

Sturch  v.  Young  1600,  1724 

Sturge,  lit  re  1361 

v.  Dimsdale  1440,  1450,  1608 

v   Eastern  Union  Ry   Co.  1652 

v.  Starr  247 

Sturgeon  r.  Burrall  334 

v   Booker       '.'73,  1474, 1593,  lot '3 

Sturgcs  v   Knapp  1255 

r    Longworth  457 

Sturgess  v.  Cary  1930 

I  Sturgis,  lie,  M   P.  Syndicate  27 

v   Cary 


2252 
v.  Champneys  91,  92 

v  Corp  100,  186 

v   Morse  891,  919, 1484 

Sturla  v.  Freccia  32 

Sturoc,  lie  1069 

Sturt  v  Hellish  641,  648 

Sturtevant  v   Jaques  989 

r    Waterbury  846,  847 

Sttirz  v.  De  la  Rue  1644,  1670 

Stutz  v   Handiey  236 

Stuyvesant  v  New  York,  Mayor, 
&c  ,  of 

Style  o.  Martin 

Styles  v   Shipton 

Suher  v    Allen 

Sublette  v.  Tinney 

Sublicich  v.  Russell 

Suckling  v.  Gabb 

Suess  v.  Noble 

Suffern  v.  Butler 
v  Johnson 

Suffield,  Lord  e    Bond 
and  Watts,  Re 

Suffolk,  Earl  of  v  Green 


i84 

1584 

792 

334 

560 

1567 

1770 

1620 

1677 

284 

352,  756 

1040 

584,  611, 

1573 

v  Howard  1385 

Sugden  r   Hull  469,  470,  1047 

v.  Lord  St.  Leonards  1462 

Suggt'   Silber  H'71 

v   Thornton  536 

Suggitt.  Re  102,  103,  108 

Sui>se  v  Lowther,  Lord  1470 

Sulger,  Ex  parte  1055 

Sullings  v.  Goodyear  Dental  Vul- 


Stuart,  lie 
v  Ancell 
v.  Barrowes 
r.  Boulware 
v   Bute,  Lord 
v.  Colter 
v.  Gay 

v.  Hendricks 
v.  Lloyd 
v.  Moore 

v.  Welsh 

r.  Worrall 
Stubbings  v.  McGregor 
Stubbs.  Re,  Hanson  v.  Stubbs 

v.  Burwell 

v    Dunsany 

V     be:ivitt 
•  v   Leigh 

v  Sargon 
Stucker  r.  Stucker 
Stucky  v.  Stuckv 
Studabaker  v.  Markley 
Studd  v   Acton 
Studdert  v.  Grosvenor 

V.  Von  Steiglitz 
Studholme  v.  Hodgson 


1389 

1679 
15S8 

1746,  1756 

724 

341,  1151,1163 

1286 

1299 

415,  2168 

68,  1347, 1348,  1-350. 

1627 

1560,  1561 

2225 

1600 

1034 

951 

978 

1622 

1518 

96, 1177,  1485,  1595 

194,  212 


canite  Co. 
Sullivan  V   Bevan 
v.  Iron  S   M.  Co. 
v.  Jacob 
v.  Jennings 
v  Judah 
r   Latimer 
r   O  Conner 
r    I'lii;lips 
li   Portland,  &c.  R   Co 


633 

1424 

313,  545 

1488 

1^82 

1673,  11384 

1172 

1120 

303,  1638 

560,  561, 

630,  714 

v.  Rcdfield  1643 

v    Sullivan  69 

r    Winthrop  1254 

Sullivant  v.  Weaver  518 

Sully  v    Drennan  26 

Sultan  v.  Providence  Tool  Co        630 
Suizbacher  v.  Shoe  &  Leather 

Bank  1563 

Sulzer  r.  Watson  10il 

Summerfield  v.  Prichard  IS 

Summerlin  v.  Fronterina  S.  M. 


328 
1463 
468 
26 
837 
1426. 1427 
Studwell  v.  Palmer  1003, 1481, 1504. 
1505 


Co. 
Summers  v.  City  Bank 

v.  Dame 

li   Farish 

v.  Moseley 

r    Murray 
Summersett  v.  Jarvis 
Sumner  B.  Sessoms 

r   Thorpe 

v   Waugh 
Snmsinn  V    Crutwell 
Sunderland,  Freemen, 
Ex  parte 


303 

87 

890,  PS6 

1673 

1102 

617,  682,  789 

58 

1286 

665 

281 

1719 

&c,  of, 

1121 


Supervisors  v.  Deyoe  1682 

v.  Durant  1017 

n   Keuuieott  14rfl 

v.  Mineral  Point  R.  Co  _378 

&c.  v.  Mississippi,  &c   R.  Co    733, 

759,  784,  838 

Supreme  Council  V.  Bennett        1561 

Supreme  Sitting  of  Order  v. 

Baker  1716,  1734 

Surget  v.  Byers  852 

Surr  v.  Walmsley  905 

Sussex,  Earl  of  v.  Temple  86'J 

Sussex  I'eerage  Case  864 

Sutcliffe,  Re  720 

Suter  v   Matthews  552 

Sutherland  v  De  Virenne     202,  2n3, 

201 

v.  Lake  Canal  Co.  211 

v  Straw  281 

v.  Young  9> 

Sutphen  v.  Fowler  1032,  13-12, 

1457 

Sutton,  Re  199 

v.  Dog.-ett  1437,  1433 

v.  Downing  23  il 

v.  Furniss  1566 

v.  Gatewood  601 

v.  .(ones  1732 

V.  Mashiter  1617 

v.  Rees  1745 

v  Scarborough,  Lord  655 

v.  Schonwald  1284 

n  Stone  264,  1054 

v.  Sutton  650 

Sutton  Pit.  t  Parish  v   Cole  22 

Sutton  Harbour  Co.  v.  Hitchens7'»l, 

14,2,  1405 

Suydam  v  Truesdale  780 

Swabey  v.  Dovey  482 

v.  Sutton  720,  721,  722 

Swaby  v.  Dickon  1747,  1750 

Swain,  lie  560 

v.  Follows  32,  111 

v   Hall  1129 

Swaine   v.  Great  Northern  Ry. 

Co.  1072,  1650 

v.  Maryott  8.50 

v   Perine  1165,  1166 

v.  Wilson  1652 

Swale  v.  Milner  1424 

v.  Swale  798,  799,  1723 


TABLE   OF   CASES    CITED. 

[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 

Swallow  o.  Binns  l'Jl,  202,  203,  204, 

1514 

v.  Day  780,  781 

Swau,  Inre  1713 

v.  Castleman  544 

v   Clark  292 

v.  Dent  13W 

v   Horton  161 

v.  Swan  279 

v.  Webb  1264 

v.  Wheeler  1231 

Swan  Land  &  Cattle  Co  v.  Frank 

26 
Swan's  Settlement,  Re  101 

Swanholm  v.  Reeser  843 

Swann  v.  Swann  110.  307 

Swansea  v.  Quirk  573 

Swansea  Shipping  Co  v.  Duncan 

lo'.tf 
Swansea  Vale  Ry.  Co.  v.  Budd  1837 
Swauston  v.  Lishniau  1838 

v.  Twickenham    Local   Board 

1468 
Swanzy  v.  Swanzy  30,  31,  53,  359 
Swart  v.  Central  Trust  Co.  1770 

S  vartz  v.  Chickering  8>»9 

Swayne  v.  Swayne  1696 

v   Lyon  186 

Swayze  v.  Swayze  335,  347 

Swearingen  v    Pendleton  251 

Swedesborough  Church  v.  Shivers 

328,  329 

Sweeny  v.  Coffin  460,  536 

v.  Hull  4<>3 

v.  Williams  630 

Sweet  ?'.  Converse  559 

v.  Meredith  1220,  1282 

v.  Parker  222.  737 

v.  Southcote  569,  675 

v.  Syracuse  1  '34 

Sweetzer  v.  Buchanan  1556 

Sweny  v.  Smith  241 

Swepson  v.  Exchange  &  D.  Bank 

334 

v.  Rouse  63 

Swett  v.  Stark  569 

Swift,  Re  95 

E.r  parte  1359 

v.  Eckford  334,  339,  342,  402 

424 

v.  Edson  259 


cxv 


Swift  v.  Grazebrook       79,  1469,  1470 
v.  Jenks  1637 

v.  Meyers  149 

V.  Munn  1126 

v.  State  Lumber  Co.  190 

v  Stebbius  200,222,457 

v.  Swift  724,  1213,  14^8,  1862 

V.  Wiley  875 

Swinbanks,  Ex  parte  630 

Swiuborne  V.  Nelson      300,  720.  721. 
1829,  2114 
Swindall  v.  Bradley  1668,  1669 

Swindell  v  Birmingham  Syn- 
dicate 1071 
Swine,  Re,  Mellor  v.  Swine  1029 
Swiuteu  v.  Swinfen  974,  1121,  1124, 
114H,  1385 
Swinnerton  v.  Stafford,  Marquis 

of  1129,  1135 

Switzer  v   McCulloch  1638 

v  Skiles  365,  655 

Sword  v   Allen  1663 

Syckel  r.  Emery         1629,  1630,  1676 


Sydney  v.  S>  dney 

1726 

Sydolph  v.  Moukston 

764 

Sykes,  Re 

18,7 

v.  Dyson 

1061 

V.  Hastings 

1732 

v.  Sacerdotti 

154 

v.  Schofield 

1157 

V.  Sykes 

1648 

S.  kes'  Trusts,  Re 

914 

Sylvester  v.  Craig 

601 

r   Hall 

1097 

V.  Jerome 

780 

Sylvis  v.  Svlvis 

313 

Sym's  Case 

126 

Syme  v.  Johnson 

1481 

Symes  v.  Glynn 

236,  248.  2 

v.  Magnay 

1564 

1570 

Symmes  v.  Strong 

73 

',842 

Symonds  n.  City  Bank 

324 

v.  Cumberland,  Duchess  of 

510 

v.  Jenkins 

1779 

v.    \  ilkes 

100 

S}  mons   Re,  Luke  v.  Tomkin 

328, 

1260, 

1581 

f.  De  Barros 

508 

v.  Mnlkern 

674 

Sympsnn  v   Prothero 

1845, 

1846 

Syz  B   Redfield 

1309 

T. 


Tabbernor  v.  Tabbernor  308 

Tabele  v.  Tabele  1425 

Tabor  v.  Cunningham  328,383,139) 
Tabuteau  v.  W  irburtou  1600 

Taendsticksfabriks  A.  Vulcan  v. 

Myers  1648 

Taft  !>.  Taft  860 

Tagg  v.  South  Devon  Ry.  Co.     1837 

Xasgart  v.  Boldin  117 

Tainter  v.  Clark  845,  982 

v.  Morristown,  Mayor  of  1677 

Tait  v  Jenkins  1723 

v -  N.  Y   Life  Ins    Co.  51 

r.  Northwick,  Lord  1286 

Taite  v   Gosling  324,  1654 

v.  Pallas  li)4 

Talbot  v   Bowen  657 

v.  Braddill  1244 

v.  Cruger  817 

v.  Frere  652,  1392 

v.  Keay  810 

v.  Kemshead  710 

v.  M'Gee  1550 

v.  Marshfleld         1342,  1362.  1417. 

1420,  1771,  1824, 1834.  1836 

v.  Radnor,  Lord  401,  407 

v.  Rutledge  1229 

v   Shrewsbury,  Earl  of  1.352, 1355 

v.  Staniforth  1386,  1622 


Talbot  v.  Talbot  76,  77 

»'.  Todd  993,994 

Earlr   Hope  Scott         1632.1721, 

1723,  1725 

Taliaferro  v.  Branch  Bank  1621 

v.  Foot  361,  392 

v.  Minor  1234 

Talleyraud  V    Boulanger        48.  1704 

Tallmadge  v.  Lovett  561,  588 

Tally  v   Tally  1588 

Talmadge  r.  Bell  1552 

Talmage  v.  Pell  286,  302,  780 

Tamarra    v.    Southern    Illinois 

University  1^81 

Tampier  v.  Ingle  421,  1600 

TampUn  v  James  1080,  1082 

Tarn  worth,     Lord     v      Ferrers, 

Lord  1633,  1672 

Taner  r.  Ivie  37,  72,  80,  13^8 

Tanev  v.  Woodmansee  1381 

Tanfield  r.  Davenport  92 

p.  Irvine  152,  1718,  1734 

Tangve  r    Stott  1080 

Tanker-lv  v.  Pettis  1576 

Tann,  AV  1"426 

Tanner,  Re  70 

v.  Carter  1488, 1490, 1603 

v.  Dancey  1423 

v.  Heard  1393 


I  Tanner  v.  Strutton  770 

J  Tanuueray  ti   Bowles  794  1380 

Tansev  v.  McDonnell  63 1   1553 

Tanswell  v   Scurrab  811.914 

1  Tantlinger  v   Sullivan  1638 

Tapley  v   Goodsell  1507 

Tapling  v.  Jones  1638 

Tappan  v.  Evans  542,  603.  1072, 

1075  1110,1528,  1941,2384 

v.  Smith  1616,  1517,  1518 

v.  Western  &  A.  R  Co.  41S 

Tappen  v    Norman  72,  161 

Tnppln  v.  Heath  671 

Taprell  v.  Tavlor  43 

Tarbell  v.  Dnrant  378 

Tarbuck  v.  Tarbuck  309,  1001, 

1590 

V   Woodcock  698.  730 

Tardrew  V   Howell  13«3.  1437 

Tarleton  v.  Barnes  687,  661 

ti.  Dver  170,421 

v.  Bfornbv       59,  60,  553,  606,  659 

Tarratt  p.  Lloyd  202,  203,  204. 

2127 

Tarver  v.  Tarver  5.72,  874 

Tasburgh,  Re  94 

Tash  l)   Adams  1640,  1661 

Tasker  v  Small  230,  1459,  1485, 

1489 


CXV1 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 

[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging  ] 


Tassell  v.  Smith  213 

Tate  v.  Goff  1150 

v.  Leithead  1524,  1526 

v.  Ohio  &  Miss  R.  Co.       303,  334 

Tateui  v.  Gilpin  1002 

Tatham  v.  Parker  1059 

v.  Wright      876,  1117,  1124,  1149, 

1385 

Taton  !>.  National  Standard  Land 

M.  &  I.  Co.  1220 

Tattcrsall  v.  Groote  670 

Tattershall  v.  Crampton  5ol 

Tattou  »    London  and   Lanca- 
shire Fire  Ins.  Co.         979,  1079 
Tatuni  v.  Hines  1003 

v   Walker  378,  407 

Taunton  v.  Morris  92,  102,  104 

v    lJepler  669 

Tavenuer  v.  Barrett  195 

Tawell  v.  State  Co.  1072 

Tayleur,  In  re  316,  1573 

Tayloe  v.  Bond  1001 

Taylor,  Ex  parte  193 

lie         13,  69,  86,  438, 1213, 1428, 
1361, 1842,  1851 
1862,  1863 
r.  Allen  253,  1722 

v.  Ans.'ey  162,  476 

v.  Aditon  1126 

v.  B&iUj  601.789 

v  Baker  1385,  1392 

».  Bank  of  Alexandria  24 

r.  Bank  of  Illinois  24 

v   Barclay  19,  546 

V.  Bate  286 

v.  Bay  City  Street  Ry.  Co.         303 
v.  Best  142 

r.  Boardman  1743 

v.  Bogert  778 

r.  Bogg  1430 

r.  Bouehier  40 

v.  Boyd  1062,  1250 

r.  Brown  1074 

v.  Brownfield  1081 

f.  Carpenter    45,  1648, 1649,  1087, 
2318 
V.  Central  R.  &  B   Co.  1120 

v.  Charter  Oak  Life  Ins.  Co     1580 
v.  Coates  993 

v.  Colgate  1061,  1277 

v.  Columbian  Ins  Co.  1751 

v.  Commonwealth 
v.  Cooper 


D'Egville 
V.  Dodd 
v.  Dowlen 
r.  Duckett 
V.  Duncanson 
v.  Eckersley 
v.  Fisher 
r.  Foster 
v.  Glanville 
t>.  Gooch 
v.  Gordon 
r.  Grange 
r.  Hall 
v.  Haylin 

Heming 


867 
1277 
1312 


1465 

973 

617.  666 

1729,  1744 

390,  489,  490,  742 

576 

1412 

779 

443 

1487 

1396 

371,666 

740,  1819 


v   Holmes   109,  145,  545,  560,  1622 


t\  Jardine 

v  Johnston 

v.  Keily 

v.  Kilgore 

v.  King 

V.  Leiteh 

v.  Life  Ass'n. 

v.  Luther 

»'.  Ma\  rant 

»'.  Meads 

r   Midland  Ry.  Co. 

v.  Milner 

f.  Mitchell 

r.  Morton 

v.  Neate 

?'.  Obee 

v.  Oldham 

v.  Pearson 


1063 

852 

894 

1302,  13-0 

334 

1707 

313 

722,  723,  2227 

1135,  1136 

100. 186 

197,  1470 

592,690 

563 

1624 

1728 

780 

70,  1732 

1583 


Taylor  v.  Pede 
v.  Person 
v.  Philips 
v.  Phillips 
l\  Pophaui 

v.  Portington 
v.  Read 


v.  Robertson 

v.  Roe 

V.  Ruudell 

v.  Russell 

v.  Salmon 

V.  Satti  rthwaite 

v.  Scrivens 

v.  Sharp 

v.  Shaw 

v   Sheppard 

v.  Smith 

v.  Soper 

V.  Southgate 

v.  Tabrum 

v.  Taylor 


177 

1076 
73,  166 
443 
1409,  1464,  1473, 
1474 
1660 
994,  1317,  1319,  1491, 
1494 
1296 
1051 
724,  1826, 1827 
674 
240,  508,  1837 
1561 
1806 
1575, 1577,  1579 
420,  699,  789 
1(21 
334,338 
1737 
797,  1465 
381,  1421 
183.  324,  499,  505, 
1256,  1536,  1582,  2060 
v.  Titus  780 

v.  Tompkins 
V.  Topham 
v.  Waters 
V.  Webb 
v.  W'emyss 
v.  Wood 
v.  Wrench 
Taylor's  Estate,  lie 


551 
1409 
1799 
256,287,  1131 
630,  6*8 
942 
762 
402 
Taylor  County  v.  Standley  815 

Taylor,  McBean,  &  Co.  v.  Chan- 
dler 1661 
Tazewell  v.  Saunders  1254 
Tazewell  County  v.  Fanners'  L. 

&  T.  Co.  1584 

Tea  Co   r.  Jones  157 

Teaff  v.,  Hewitt  986 

Teague  v.  Dendy  729 

v.  Richards  992,  1616 

Teal  r.  Wood  worth  175 

Teale  ».  Teale  1572,  1574 

Teall  v.  Slaven  560 

? .  Watts  1157 

Tebbs  r   Carpenter  1416, 1420 

Tebbutt  r   Potter  796 

Tedder  ?•.  Stiles  402 

Tediowe  v.  Esher  951 

Teed  v.  Carruthers  706.  7 10 

i.  Marvin  1407 

v.  Reese  1208 

Tehama  County  v.  Bryan  313 

Tekait    Doorga   Persad  Singh  r. 

Tekaitni  Doorga  Konwari        659 

Telegraph  Co  v.  Davenport  19" 

Tel'ord  r   Met' n  Board  1620 

v.  Ruskin  724 

Tempest  v.  Camoys,  Lord     319,  631, 

700,  1342 

r.  Ord  1750,  1764 

Templar  r.  Sweat  12!il 

Temple  r    Baltinglass,  Lady  663 

v.  Bank  of  England  147,  1663 

r.   Foster  628 

v    Lawson  1376,  1410 

?•.   London    and    Birmingham 

Railway  Co  59 

v.  Scott  216 

Temple  Bar,  The  1i»ti 

Templeman  v    Warrington  1610 

Tenant  V   Ellis  30 

v.  Grav  1254 

v.  Hamilton  1101 

Tench  v.  Cheese     352,  728,  729,  759, 

1697 

Tenham,  Lord  v.  Herhert  16S2 

Tennant  ;•.  Trtnchard  1"13 

v.  Wilsmore  "81 

Tennent  v.  Battey  235 

t'.  Patton  993 

Tennessee  Hospital  r.  Fuqua       1361 

Tenney  v.  Bell  553 

Tenney's  Case  1070 


Tentle  v  Muncy  123 

Terhune  v.  Colton  1484,  1489 

v.  Midland  Ry.  Co.  1601 

Terrell,  lie  1443 

v.  Higgs  1625 

v.  Iugersoll  1461 

v  Souch  511 

Terre    Haute   &    L.    R.  Co.  v. 

Sherwood  601 

Terrewest  v.  Featherby  1616 

'1'errill  v.  Higgs  552 

Terry,  Ex  parte  1478 

He  1069 

v.  Abrahams  1461 

v.  Brunson  123 

v   Cape  Fear  Bank  991,  1209 

v.  Commercial  Bank        974,  1584, 

1585 

v.  Murtin  1756 

v.  Munger  815 

v.  Rosell  385,  652 

v.  Sharon  1507 

v.  Stukeley  1481 

Terwit  v.  Gresham  869 

Tetley  v.  Giidith  113 

Tetraultr   Labbe  634 

Tevis  v.  Richardson  90,  91,  457 

Tew  r.  Winterton,  Earl  of  1254,  1256 

Tewart  v.  Lawson  1765 

Texas  v.  Hardenberg  378 

Texas  Cent.  Rv   Co.  v.  Stewart      68 

Texas  &  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cox       1743 

v.  Boyd  1743 

v  Johnson  1743 

Texas  Trunk  R  Co  v  Lewis       1765 

Texeire  v.  Da  Costa  1728 

Teynham,  Lady  v.  Lennard         1352 

Thacker  v.  Key  1427 

Thackeray  r.  Parker  11-3 

Thames  and  Medwav  Canal  Co. 

v.  Nash  1568 

Thames   &  Mersey  M.  Ins.  Co. 

v.  Continental  Ins.  Co  780 

Thames  Haven  Co.  v.  Hall  307 

Than  v  Smith  175,  177 

Thanet,  Earl  of  r.  Patersou  1663 

Thannhauser  v   Cortes  Co  28 

Tharp,  He  1768 

Tharpe  v.  Stallwood  1133 

r.  Tharpe  1738,  1739 

Thatcher  r.  Lambert  778 

Thayer  r.  Holland  1385 

v.  Lane  1150 

v.  Mann  652, 1233 

D.  Smith  1961 

v.  Tha\er  1157 

r.  Turner  385 

Theed  v.  Debenham  1638 

Thellusson  v.  Rendlesham,  Lord  1503 

r.  W'oodfnrd  1731,  2197.  2344 

Therry  r.  Henderson  71^8,  "99 

Theurer  v.  Brogan  216 

Tbewlis  v.  Farrar  85,  1525 

Thexton  v.  Edmonston         858,  889, 

890 

Thever  v.  Tombs  1399 

Thickuesse  v.  Acton  183,  499 

Thiedemann  v.  Goldschmidt        1651 

1  hielman  v.  Carr  1  r.5 1 

Third  v  Goodier  1131 

Third  Avenue  R   Co.  r.  Mayor   1682 

Third    Avenue    Sav.    Bank   v. 

Din.ock  780 

Third  Burnt  Tree  Building  So- 
ciety, Re  1610 
Third  National  Bank  r  Skillings 

Lumber  Co.  1561 

Thistlethwaite  ;•.  Gamier  1524 

Thomas,  Ex  parte  1488 

Re  286,  894,  912 

r.  Adams  287,  289,  294 

v.  Atherton  1249,  1400 

v  Beals  385 

r   Bernard  417,  426.  826 

v.  Bibb  1071 

t\  Boswell  190 

v.  Brashear      542,  692, 1624,  1680 


i 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 

[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.  ] 


CXVll 


Thomas  v.  Burt  1580 

v.  Buxton  1539 

v.  Cole  1481 

v.  Cross         1035, 1037,  1040,  1696 
v.  Davidson  1282 

v.  Davies  318,  1734,  1WJS 

v.  Dawkin  1  i38.  1739 

v.  De  Baum  1062,  1275,  1283 

v.  Dike  69 

v.  Doub  341,  782 

v.  Dougty  32 

v.  Dunning  212,225,272- 

v.  Eastwood  1399 

v.  Ellis  43 

v.  Elson  1474 

»\  Finlayson 

v.  Griffith  1207, 1208,  1212 

v.  G wynne  166 

v.  Bail  1046 

f   Harvie  1577,1579,1580 

v.  Hawkins  1662 

v.  Hite  3i9 

v.  Hobler  242,  385 

v.  Horn  1677 

v  James  1631 

v.  Jersey  444,  474 

v.  Jones        1437, 1438, 1801,  2309 
v.  Lloyd  1400 

v.  Marshall  645 

v.  Merchants'  Bank  144 

v.  Montgomery  1202 

v.  Nokes  1044 

v.  Oakley  1632,  1633 

v.  Paliu  1743,  1793 

V.  Parry  9n8 

v.  Phillips  13:i9 

v.  Powell  1279 

v.  i 'rice  lo0 

v.  Puddlesbury  1393 

v.  Rawlings       770,  774,  943, 1559, 
1576,  1577,  1579 
v.  Rees  336,  345 

v.  Reg.  133 

V.  Roberts  1349 

r   Safe  Deposit  Co.  1411 

v-  Selby  429 

u.  Sellman  334 

v.  Sheppard  101 

v.  Stokes  1463 

v.  Taylor  423 

v  Thomas  162,  475,  793, 1795 

V  Townsend  1402 

v.  Tyler  602 

v.  Visitors  of  Frederick  Co. 
School      402,  409,  781.  784,  828, 
1407,  1532 
v.  Walker  1349 

v.  Warner  361,  4 "7 

v.  Western  Car  Co.  1756 

v.  White  644 

v.  Williams  1350,  1620 

v.  Wilson  1255 

Thomas  Huston  El.  Co.  v.  Sperry 

El   Co  334 

Thomason  v.  Moses  1405,  1 427 

v.  Neeley  _   1553 

v .  Smithson  378,  379 

Thomasson  v.  Kennedy  1124 

v.  Tucker  841 

Thoinlinson  v.  Dixon  1080 

Thomond,  Lord,  Case  of  1565 

Thompson,  Ex  parte  386 

Re  56,  57,  87,  100 

He,  Stevens  v.  Thompson  111 

v.  Allen  1676 

j;   Andrus  1657 

v.  Baskerville  214 

v.  Boyle  1845 

v.  Brown         236,  986,  1033, 1615, 

2246,  2294,  2297 

v.  Butler  123 

V.  Catlett  1299 

v.  Childress  1234 

v.  Clark  843,  855 

v.  Clay  294 

v.  Clive  1408,  1426, 1427 

v.  Cooper  1214, 1424 


Thompson  v.  Corrie  410 

v.  Derham  1626 

v.  Dimond  1282 

v.  Donaldson  865 

v.  Dunn  720,  721,  1829 

v.  Ebbetts  1571 

v.  Falk  677,  1-34 

v.  Geary  ltji6 

v.  German  Valley  R.  Co.  907 

v.  Goulding   980,  lul6,  1018,  1019, 
1028,  1030,  1110,  1475,  1575 
v   Graham  227 

v.  Griffin  1358,  1359 

r.  Hall  1679 

v.  Harrison  885 

v.  Hawley  380 

v.  Hey  wood  378 

v.  Hill  814,  1507,  1515,  1544 

v.  Hudson  710  j 

v.  Jones  162,  448,  476 

p.  Judge  416  | 

v.  Knight  795  I 

v.  Lake  23>  I 

v.  Lambe  840,  1229,  1230 

v.  London,  University  of  54:», 

589,  699,  1854 


197 
974,  1575,  1580 
1624 
72ii 
1642 
1444 
372 
890  I 
801 
293,  986 
v.  Pennsylvania  R  Co.    106'J,  1683 
v.  Phoenix  Ins   Co.  560,  1743 

v.  Planet  Building  Society  599 

t'.  Railroad  Cos.  313,  630 

v.  Reno  Savings  Bank 


v.  McDonald 
v.  Maxwell 
o.  Mebane 
v.  Mills 

v.  Montgomery 
V.  Moore 
v.  Moxey 
v.  Partridge 
v.  Paul 
v.  Peebles 


t>.  Scott 
v.  Seiby 
v.  Smith 
r.  Stanhope 
v.  Symonds 
v.  Thompson 
v.  Todd 
v.  Tompkins 
ii.  Trotter 
v.  Turner 

v.  Union  Elevator  Co. 
v.  Waithman 
v.  Walker 
v.  Watson 
v.  Webster 
p.  Wild 
t>.  Woodfine 
>.  Wooldridge 


1743,  1752,  1984 

691.  1734 

1653,  1703 

1647 

336 

12,  88.  790,  856 

657 

1696,  1778 

1175 

1073 

1380 

647 

1035 

12 

849,  881,  9al.  1400 

701,  7n3 

1106 

830 


360 

919 

14'H 

328,  357,  642,  652. 

653 

19 

653,14*3 

517,  1576 

1417 


Thompson's  Appeal 
Thompson's  Case 
Thomson  p.  Dean 
V.  Eastwood 

v.  Powles 
v.  Thomson 
P.  Woo st or 
Tliorby  r.  Yeates 
Thorley's  Cattle  Food  Co  V.  Mas 

sam  162<\  1648 

Thorn  v.  Germand         406,  415,  417, 

692 

v.  Smith  175,444 

r   Sweeney  1631 

Thorndlkev  Hunt    1697, 1797,  1840 

p.  Thorndike  1627 

Thome  p.  Halsey        395,  1703,  1707 

v-  Mosher  353 

v.  Newman  1240,  1242 

v.  Sweeney  1668 

v.  Towanda  Tanning  Co-  631 

Thorneloe  p   Hill  1648 

Thornewell  v.  Johnson  674 

Thornevcroft  v.  Crockett  1244 

Thomh'ill  p.  Manning  999,  1028 

v.  Milbank  1802 

v.  Thornhill  1286,  1750 


Thornley  v.  Thornley  122 

Thornton  V    Fairfax  281 

V.  Finch  1035 

v.  Grant  1639,  1640 

r.  Henry  655,  657 

v.  Highland  Ave.  R.  Co.  1461 

t;.  Hi^li  tower  2,3 

ti.  Houtze  559 

v.  M'Kewan  1625 

v.  Ramsden  324 

r.  Roll  1638 

v   Stewart  392 

v.  Washington  S.  Bank  1716 

Thorp  e   Farquer  195 

r.  Holdsworth  7»5 

v  Minor  68 

v.  Pettit  1676 

Thorpe  v.  Freer  1403 

v.  Ja.kson  269 

v.  Macauley        564,  584,  597,  600, 

720 

v.  Mattingley  1503,  1507 

Thorson  v.  Peterson  546 

Thouron  v.  East  Tennessee,  &c. 

R.  Co.  1770 

Three  Towns  Banking   Co.   v. 

Maddever  560 

Threldkeld  v  Dobbins  371 

Threlfell  i:  Harrison  12b5 

v.  Wilson  113 

Thrifts  B    Fritz  659 

Thring  v.  EJgar    605,  615,  619,  620, 

621,624,678 

Throckmorton  v.  Crowley    737,  1403 

v.  Throckmorton  838 

Thropp  v.  Field  1683 

Thrupp  v.  Goodrich  112.  113 

Thnrgood  v.  Cane  528 

Thurlow  v.  Tr.eby  459 

Lord,  Case  of  1291 

Thurman  v  Morgan  1765 

r.  Shelton  334,  346,  347,  559 

Thurmand  ;■.  Clark  418 

Thurmond  v.  Durham  1558 

Thurston  v.  Arnold  1889 

i\  Ma^tcrton  873 

Thurston  County  v.  Scammel      1381 

Thurtell  v.  Beaumont        1133,  1134 

Thwaites  v.  Sainsbury  1139 

Thvnne  p.  Cary  6<;2 

v.  Shove  552, 1660 

r.  St.  Maur  87 

Tibballs  v.  Bidwell  296 

v  Sargeant  1734, 1735 

Tibbetts  v.  Perkins  1079 

Tib'.its  v.  Tibbits  1163 

Tibbitts  v.  Phillips  1727 

Tibbs,  Re  1359 

Tice  v.  School-district  No.  18        560 

Tichborno  v.  Mostyn  887,  1070 

v.  Tichborne  204,  251, 1070, 

1726 

Ticke!  r.  Short  666 

Tickner  v.  Smith  1417 

Tidd  P.  Clare  589 

i    Lister  92, 104,  118.  123 

Tidman  p.  Trego  179 

Tidswell.  Re  1860 

p    Bowyer  780 

Tidwell  p.  Ariel  1405 

Tirl,  /.■,.  1030 

Tieman  v   Austin  1961 

Tiernan  p.  Wilson      1269,  1272,  14 IS 

Tiernay  v   Klein  1842 

Tiffin  P.  Parker  398 

Ti.-ard  !•   Moffitt  1638 

Tighlman  p.  Proctor  1830 

Tilden  P,  Green  13 

Tildesley  v.  Harper        402,  406,  417, 

785.  861 

Tilghman  v.  Camden  1320 

r.  Werk  1576,  1680 

Till.  E.r  parte  1735 

Tillett,  Re  1828 

r.  Pearson 
Tilley  v.  Bridges  12S2 

v.  Thomas  989 


CXV111 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 


Tillinghast  V  Champlin       328,  778,  ' 

780, 1715,  1741  | 

Tillman  v  Reynolds  1845 

v.  Thonias  586 

Tiliotsou  r.  Hargrave     74,  163,  1190  | 

v.  Mitchell  890  | 

Tillott,  lie,  Lee  v.  Wilson  18a' 

TilMone,  Ke  1785,  1794,  179 


Tilly  v.  Wharton 
T ilunn  v.  Cannon 
Tilton  tf.  Barrell 

V.  Cofield 

tf.  Tilton 
Timberlake  v.  Cobbs 
Tiuims  tf.  Shannon 


1122 
106  i  I 
659 
281,  1"25 
406,  1531 
842 
361 


Timp.-ou  t'.  Loudon  &  N.  Y.  R. 

Co.  85 

Tinison  tf.  Wilson  1071 

Tindal  v.  Cobham  1776 

Tindallr.  Castle  1654 

Tink  tf.  Rundle  1743 

Tinkler  If.  liiudmarsh  1727 

v.  Rowland  1109.  1127 

v.  Swaynie  212,  216 

Tinsley  tf.  Penniman  860 

Tippiu  If-  Coleman  349 

Tipping  v.  Clarke  722,  725.  726 

It.  Power  284,  710,  1390,  1423, 1778 

V.  St.  Helen's  Smelting  Co        1637 

Tippins  v.  t  oates  943,  944 

Tipton  !'.  Wcrtham  334 

Tipton  G.  C.  Co.  v.  Tipton  M. 

C.  Co  1388 

Tison  v.  Tison  1551 

Tittensen  It.  Peat  605,  670 

Titterton  it.  Osborne  309 

Titus  v.  Hobart  48 

Tobey  v.  Bristol,  County  of  671  [ 

v.  Foreman  1549  i 

v.  Leonard  844  I 

Tobin  tf.  Dixon  121 

v.  Queen,  The  133,  511 

v.  Reg  131,  133  ; 

v.  Walkinshaw  190.  844  j 

v.  Wilson  394,  1562 

Tod  tf   Baylor  1166 

v.  Tod  1465 

Todd.  Re  95 

v.  Bishop  920 

v.  Dowd  1281 

v.  Em  by  1133 

v.  Fisk  1621 

v.  Gee  548,  584 

v.  Lackey  1576 


v.  Minn.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co. 


196 


v.  Muu.-on  576 

v.  Rich  1732 

v.  Sterrett  225,  295 

v.  Stewart  157 

v.  Studholme  1208 

v.  Taft  1902 

Toder  v.  Sansam  973 

Toker  v.  Tokei  852 

Toland  if.  Sprague  641 

Tolderly  v.  Colt  1721,  1725 

Toledo,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Detroit, 

&c.  R  Co.  1663 

v.  Pennsylvania  Co.  1620 

Toledo  Tie  &  L.  Co.  v.  Thomas     689 

Tiller  v   Carteret  629,  1627 

Tolman  v.  .lohnstone  1101 

Tolson  if.  Dykes  1047 

v.  Jervis  1016 

Tomkin  v.  Lethbridge  592,785 

Tomkins  v.  Harrison  936,  938 

v.  Lane  1800 

Tomkinson  v.  Balkis  Cons.  Co.       26 

tf.  South  Eastern  Ry.  Co.   340,  354 


Tomliuson  if.  Harrison        1704,  1708 
r.  Laud  and  Finance  Co.  32 

v.  Lymer  579 

t>.  Swinnerton  788 

V.  Tomlinson  1486 

v.  Ward         1377,  1381,  1734.  1736 
Tomliuson  &  VV,  M.  Co.  v.  Shatto 

1734 

Tommey  v.  Sprang  1502 

v.  White  1576 

Tompkins  v.  Anthon  694 

it.  Halleck  1643 

v.  Hollister  699 

v,  Stephens  1073 

v.  Tompkins  874 

Tompkyns  v.  Ladbroke  105 

Tompson  v.  Bank  of  Redemption  545 

v.  Knights  1380 

Tomson  ».  Judge  1515 

Tung  v.  Oliver  1676,  1677 

Tonkin  v.  Lethbridge        1515,  1520, 

1534,  1547 

Tonvbee  v.  Ducknell  1-79 

Toofn   Foley  149,536 

Tooke  v.  Hartley  284 

Tooley  v.  Kane  1274 

Tonmer  v.  Rhodes  1001 

Toosey  v.  Burchell     281,  1174,  1175, 

1517 

Tootal  v.  Spicer  1437 

Tooth  v.  Canterbury,  Dean  and 

Chapter  of       210,230,262,579 

Topham  v.  Lightbody  992 

v.  M'Gregor  1099 

v.  Portland  1144   1471 

Topliffiv  Jackson  2,  1250,  1297 

v.  Topliff  1302 

Topp  r.  I'ollard  1368,  1371 

v.  White  629,  1653 

v.  Williams  1I''>4 

Toppan  v.  Evans  1532 

Topping  ?>.  Searson  454,  1848 

Tori .<K'k  v.  Laing  1128 

v.  Lamy  1109 

Tcrkington,  Ex  parte  894 

Torpedo  Co.  v  Clarendon  1620 

Torr  v.  Torr  521.  527 

Torrance  v.  Bolton  1395 

Torre  ».  Brown  1256,  1503 

Torrence  !».  Davidson  1461 

Torrent  tf.  Booming  Co.  1624 

v.  Hamilton  334 

tf.  Rogers  314 

Torre\  v.  Camden,  &c.  R  Co.     1640 

v   Shaw  12-^1 

Totten  v.  Nance  1031 

Tottenham  if.  Barry  536,  628 

v.  Emmet  259,  13S6,  1391 

Totty  v.  Ingleby  461 

Touline  v.  Clark  844 

Toulmin  v  Copland  1250, 1536,  1537, 

1578, 1579, 1777 

v-  Hamilton  3'>2 

r.  Hedley  1126 

o.  Keid  385,  1561, 1563,  1564, 

1568 

Tourton  if.  Flower  288,  318,  599 

Towend  If.  Toker  1526 

Tower  Manuf.  Co.  tf.  Thompson  236, 


Towle  v.  American  Building  So- 
ciety 1716, 
It.  Bannister 
v.  Janvrin 
v  Pierce      150,216,219,288, 


Tomlin  If.  Budd 

v.  Luce 

it.  M  'Chord 

v  Tomlin 
Tomline  tf.  Reg. 
Tomlins  v.  Palk 
Tomlinson  v.  Claywell 

t'.  Greenfield 

v.  Gregg 


1403 

1271 

989 

236,  857 

133 

1029. 1030 

342 

646 

1392 


v.  Swasey 

tf.  Towle 
Town  tf.  Needham 
Towne  if.  Bonnin 

v.  Smith 
Town  ley  v  Bed  well 

v   Deare 

v.  Jones 
Townsend,  Re 

v.  Bogert 

v.  Carpenter 


616 

1079, 
313, 


1734 

284 

552 

290, 

361 

1411 

1666 

840 

.740 

844 

1476 

1569 

1131 

13S9 

1556 

197 


Townsend  v.  Champernowne      285, 

1403, 1408 

v.  Graves 

1073, 1076 

v.  Griggs 

444 

v.  Hargraves 

365 

v.  Ives 

1116 

v.  Kendall 

1347,  1355 

v.  Mcintosh 

845 

v.  Parton 

314 

v.  Simon 

1282 

v.  Smith                   978, 1479,  1492 

v.  Townsend           1120 

1476,  1493 

v.  Tuttle 

235 

v.  Williams 

905 

Townshend  v.  Duncan 

361, : 79 

tf.  Ives 

875 

v.  Norwich,  Bishop  of 

1436 

v  Townshend      639,  644,  702,  852 

Marquis  off   Stangroom          1399 

Towsey  v  Groves 

71,76 

Trabue  V.  B'ankhead 

281,  1534 

tf.  Holt 

443 

Tracewell  v.  Boggs 

779 

Tracy  v  Tracy 

1630 

Trade-mark  Cases 

1648 

Tradesmens'  Bank  r.  Hyatt           722 

Trafford  V.  Blanc 

417 

v.  Wilkinson 

602 

v   Young 

874 

Traill  v.  Baring 

382 

Transatlantic  Co.  t;  Pietroni         31, 

1720 

Trant,  Re 

1731 

Traphagen  v.  Jersey  City 

1663 

v.  Voorhees 

1579 

Trapier  tf.  Waldo 

283 

Trappes  1).  Meredith 

418,  1144 

Trash  v.  White 

661,640 

Trask  v.  Stone 

69 

Traver  If.  Purdy 

850 

Travera  v.  Buckly 

476,  499 

if.  Ross         542,  603,  692,  758,  760, 
785 
v.  Townsend  1370,  1421 

Traverse  City,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Sey- 
mour 1614 
Travis  v.  Challenor  869 
v  Milne                                200.  324 
v.  Waters         987,  994,  1377,  1381, 
1410,  1463,  1472,  1476,  1479, 
1491,1527 
Trayer  v.  Reeder  861 
Trayhern  v.  Mechanics'  Bank     1019 
Treadwell  tf   Brown       334,  379,  584, 
1557 
if.  Cleaveland               617,  518,  716 
v.  Lennig                             737,  843 
v.  Patterson  329 

Trecothick  tf. 1391 

r.  Austin  197.  560.  644 

Tredegar,  Lord  if.  Windus  817,  1618, 
1625,  1634 
Tredwell  r.  Byrch  37,  244 

Trefusis  v.  Clinton  1277,  1292 

v.  Cotton  174 

Trefz  tf.  Knickerbocker  Life  Ins. 

Co.  664 

Treiber  v.  Shafer  68 

Trelawney  tf.  Thomas  1138 

tf.  Williams  554 

Treleaven  ».  Bray  230 

Tremaine  tf.  Tremaine  354,  785 

Tremolo  Patent  418 

Tremper  v.  Brooks  1743 

Trench  If.  Semple  1510 

Trenchard  r.  Warner  1003 

Trentham  If.  Deverill  1099 

Trenton  Banking  Co.  v.  Rossell  1119, 
1124 
».  Woodruff  1075, 1110,  1716 


Trescott  If.  Smith 
Trethewy  v.  Helyar 

Trevanian  v.  Mosse 
Trevelyan  v.  Charter 
Trevet  v.  Creath 
Trevillian  tf.  Knight 


270 
1213,  1428, 
1430 
677 
1029 
68 
1026 


Trevor  v  Bluck  1770 

Trewick  v.  Paramore  13i3 

Trezevant  v.  Broi'ghton  113,  1538 
v.  Frazer  1196,  1215,  1311,  1319, 
1695 
Tribble  V.  Tribble 
Triebert  v.  Burgess 
Triggc.  Trigg 


Trilly  r.  Keefe 
Trim  v.  Baker 

v.  Barker 
Trimble  v.  Dodd 

Trimleston  v.  Hamill 

v.  Kemmis 

Lord  v.  D'Alton 

v.  Hauiil 

v.  Lloyd 
Trimmer  v.  Todd 
Trinity  House  v.  Burge 
Triplett  v.  Jameson 

v.  Wilson 
Tripp  v.  Cook 


90 

395,  17:35 

1154,  13n2 

528 

601 

739 

857.  992. 1236, 

1358,  1599 

1239, 1240 

815 

1119 

1393 

1119 

1507 

567 

1234 

1576 

1284,  1290,  14<X), 

1462,  1463 

v.  Gifford  68 

v.  Vincent         327,  978, 1026,  1463 

Tritt  v.  Caldwell  115 

v.  Cohvell  121 

Trollope  v.  Routledge  14  (2 

Trotter  v.  Heckscher  1548,  1603 

v.  Maclean  639,  1395,  1632 

v.  Trotter  463,  1197,  1198 

v.  Walmesley  992 

Troughton  v   Binkes  323 

v.  Gettey  301,  315 

v.  Gilley  157 

v.  Hill  88 

Troup  v.  Haight  668,901,930, 1238, 

1550, 1551 

v.  Ricardo  61,  312 

v.  Sherwood  957,  959,  960 

v.  Troup  1009,  1017,  1528 


v.  Wood                            1965, 

2273 

Trousdale  v.  Maxwell 

1675 

Trout  y.  Emmons 

845 

Trow  v.  Berry 

1320 

Troward  v.  Attwood 

792,  7! 

v.  Bingham 

1422 

Trowbridge  v.  Caulkins 

1157 

Trow  City  D.  Co.  v.  Curtin 

565 

Trowell  v-  Shenton 

602 

Troy  &  Greenfield  Railroad 

v. 

Commonwealth 

141 

Troy  Iron  and  Nail  Factory 

V. 

Corning 

2356 

Trubody  v.  Brain 

1138 

Trueheart  v.  Price 

1680 

Trufort,  Re 

417,  6' 

Truitt  v.  Truitt 

281 

Trull  v.  Rice  1294 

Trulock  v.  Uobey       214,  1003,  1240, 
1241,  1576,  1926,  2223 
Truman  v.  McCollum  313 

v.  Redgrave  1657,  1663,  1725 

Trumbull  v.  Gibbons    734.  736,  748, 
784,  785,  951 
Trust  and  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Jen- 
kins 402,  409,  524,  776 


Trustees  v.  Field 

1031 

v.  Greenough 

1411 

v.  Proctor 

1053 

Try  v.  Try 

1744 

Tryatt  v-  Lindo 

735 

Tryon    v.   National 

Provident 

Inst. 

287,  405 

Tsclieider  v.  Biddle 

671,  1658,  1861 

Tubb  v-  Fort 

630 

Tubbs,  Re 

102.  103.  108 

Tubman  v.  Wason  Manuf.  Co.     2048 

Tuck  v.  Manning 

1770 

v.  Rayment  767 

v.  Silver  1642,  1666 

Tucker  v.  Andrews  90.  91 

v.  Bean  165 

v.  Buffuin      1240,  1244,  1247,  1258 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 

[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 

Tucker  v.  Cheshire  R.  Co.   758,  759, 

764 

t>.  Collinson  41 

v.  Dabbs  68 

r.  Heruainan  157 

v.  Kenniston  1961,  2040 

v  Sanger  1073   1075 

v.  Tucker  341,345, 

13*3 

v.  Welsh  llol 

v.  Wilkins  1528 

v.  Wilsun  68,  1525 

v.  Zimmerman  200 

Tuckley  v.  Thompson  284,  13:0 

Tuder  v    Morris  215 

Tudway  v   Jones      59,  407,  420,  699, 

1530 

Tuer's  Will  Trusts,  Re  85 

Tufuell,  Re  133 

«.  Constable  l!'34 

Tufton  V   H.irdinge  1566 

Tnfts  b    Little  1716 

Tugwell  ?'   Hooper         431,  577,  578, 

lr34 

Tulk  v.  Moxhay  1654,  1662 

Tullar  v.  Baxter  559 

Tullett  v.  Armstrong  15  9 

Tullit  v.  Tullit  1365 

Tulloch  v.  Hartley  1163 

v.  Tulloch  1264 

Tullock  v.   Belleville  P.   &  S. 

Works  394 

Tune  v.  Cooper  121 

Tunnard  tf-  Littell  110 

Tunno  v.  Edwards  58 

Tunstall  v   Boothby  1730 

v.  Pollard  251 

Tupper  v.  Powell  386 

Turbot  v. 950 

Turley  v   Turley  1299 

Turnbull,  hire  893 

v.  Janson  908 

v.  Prentiss  Lumber  Co.  1734 

Turner,  Re  1826 

v.  Alabama  Mining  Co.  26 

v .  Baptist  Missionary  Union     335, 
34o,  1624 
v.  Berry  190,  1580,  1583 

v-  Burkinshaw  1820 

v.  Burleigh  882,  926,  930 

v.  Clifford  1054 

v.  Cole  1544, 1679 

v.  Collins  _  852,  1435 

v.  Conant  334 

v.  Correy  1230 

v.  Cuthrell  1675 

v.  Davis  815 

v.  Debell  624 

v.  Dorgan  505 

v.  Doubleday  336 

v.  Frampton  1427 

v.  Gowdon  1432 

v.  Hancock  1411,  1416 

v.  Hannibal  &  St.  J.  R.  Co.     1793 
v.  Highway  Board  1631 

v.  Hill  1551 

v.  Hind  223 

v.  Hodgson  1028 

V.  Holman  842,  847 

V.  Hughes  1222,  1250 

v.  Indianapolis,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  1286, 
1743 
v.  Johnson  1385 

v   Letts  81, 1842,  1843 

V.  London  &  3   W.  Ry.  Co.     1009, 
1016,  1544 
v.  Major  1660 

0.  Marriott  1551,  2256,  2266 

v.  Maule  1117 

v.  Mirfield  1681 

v.  Mitchell  fill 

v.  Morgan  1157 

v.  Moy  241,  243 

v.  Mullineux  1412 

v  Muskegon  Co.  1440 


CX1X 


Turner  v.  Nicholls  631 

v.  Pearte  10h8 

v.  Pierce  334,  1004 

v.  Robinson   62,  158,  336,  606,  631 

v.  Rutledge  1003 

v.  Scott  1»>72 

v.  Snowdon  162,  452,  476 

v.  Sowden  162,  449,  452.  176 

v.  Spooney  1638 

v.  Tepper  15»I 

v.  Trelawny  953,  954 

v.  Turner  37,  74,  78,  108.  382,  524, 

908,  <J74,   1259,   1320.   1321, 

1369    1386,  1437,  1449,  1-450, 

1476,  1478,  1484,  1487,  1602, 

1743,  I8ti0 

v.  Wight  1652 

v.  Wright  1624.  L633 

Turner  Coal  Co.  v.  Glover     586,  830 

Turner's  Sir  E  ,  Case  124,  1^5 

Turney  v.  Bay  ley  1829,  1830 

Turnham  v.  Turnham  191 

Turuipseed  v.  Hawkins  875 

Turnley  v.  Hanua  940 

Turnock  v.  Satoris  1440 

Turquand  v.  Dawson  1132,1138 

v.  Kirby  26 

v.  Knight  576 

v.  Marshall  26,  243,  1397 

Turrill  v.  Muzzy  644 

Turton  v   Barber  573 

v.  Turton  1648 

Tussaud  t'.  Tussaud  1648 

Tuthill  v.  Scott  1383 

Tutin,  He  102 

Tuttle  v.  Church  1630 

v.  Dewey  997 

v.  Fowler  121 

Tutton  v.  Andrews  1125 

Tutwiler  v-  Dunlap  259 

v-  Tuskaloosa  Coal  Co.  334 

Tuxbury's  Appeal  1460 

Tweddell  v.  Tweddell  1622 

Tweed  ile,  Re  95,  13 17 

Tweedie  v.  Phelps  1045 

Tweedy,  Re  1(305 

Twenty  man  v.  Barnes  1113 

Twigg  v.  Fifield  1277 

v.  Potts  1126 

Twiggs  v.  Chambers  1845,  18 16 

Twistleton  v.  Thelwel  1422 

Twognod  v.  Swanston  668 

Two  Sicilies,  King  of  v.  Wilcox     17, 

18,  567,  1881 

Twycross  v.  Drevfus  18 

Twytord  v.  Traill  251, 1316 

Twynam  v.  Porter  2n.'f,  1846 

Tylden,  Re  99,  1802 

Tylee  v  Tylee  1731,  1737 

Tyler,  Re  99,  1743 

Re.  Tyler  0.  Tvler  13 

v.  Bell  250,  289,  598 

'  v.  Connolly  1069 

v   Drayton      579,  580,  1818,  1824, 

1829.  1^30 

o.Galloway  209.  1 18 

v.  Savage  630 

v  Simmons  1295,1309,1176, 

1481 

v.  Thomas  280,  281,  4<H) 

v.  Toms  1279 

v.  Tyler  576 

Tyndale  r.  Warre  1286 

Tvng  r.  Thaver  1188.12  49 

Tyntet'.  Hodge  29,33,  34,  .358.  1537, 

1553,  1582 

Tyree  v.  Bingham  12 

v.  Williams  989 

Tvron  v.  Sutton  116 

Tysen  v.  Wabash  Ry.  Co.  1716 

Tvson.  E.r  parte  53 

v.  Applegate  200,  212 

t>.  Cox  1467 

r.  Fairclough  1726 

v  Pole  560 


cxx 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 


IT. 


Udall  v.  Kenney  91 

Uhle  v.  Buruham  933 

Uhlfelder  v.  Levy  16^8 

Uhlmanu  v.  Arnholt  &  S.  B.  Co. 

737,  838 

Uhthoff  v.  Huntlngfield,  Lord     713, 

860 

Ulbricht  v.  Eufaula  Water  Co.      303 

Urufreville  v.  Johnson  211,  303 

Uinpleby     v.    Waveney     Valley 

Railway  Co.        14(55,  1510,  1527, 

1529 

Underdown  v.  Stannard  893 

Underhill,  Re  911 

v.  Mobile  Fire  D.  Ins.  Co.  560 

v.  Van  Cortlandt        550,  555,  671, 

852,  906,  947,  948,  949,  951,  1524 

Underwood  v.  Dugan  5:30 

v.  Frost  1731 

v.  Gerber  417 

v.  Hatton  1207 

V.  Hitchcox  1405 

v.  Jee  797 

r.  Pack  1284 

v .  Secretary  of  State  for  India 

1823 

v.  Trower  1417 

Underwood's  Case  1684,  1686 

Ungar  v.  Sugg  1642 

Ungless  v.  Tuff  1791 

Union  Bank  v.  Crine  313 

v.  Geary  737,  845,  846 

v.  Kent  674 

v.  Kerr  388, 1561 

v.  Knapp  641,  1228 

Union  Branch  R.  R.  Co.  v.  East 

Tenn.  &  Georgia  R.  R.  Co.  603 
Union  Fire  Ins  Co.  v.  Osgood  21 
Union  Ins.  Co.  v   Benit  1463 

v.  Van  Rensselaer  1392,  1457 

Union  M.  E.  Church  v.  Wilkinson  216 
Union  Mut.  Ins  Co.  v.  Commer- 
cial Mut.  Mar.  Ins.  Co.        1897, 
2265 
v.  Kellogg  717 

Mut    Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Chicago 

&  W.  I.  R.  Co.  1770 

v.  Slee  1172 

Union  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  Balti- 
more 1556 
v.  Botsford  1556 
i'.  Cheyenne  303 
v.  Chicago  &c.  Ry  Co.  629 
v.  Hall  1663 
v.  Harmon  986 
v.  Lincoln  County  1650 
V.  McShane  1661 
v.  Mertes  39,  797 
v.  Reese  933 
Union     Passenger    Ry.    Co.    v. 

Baltimore  630 

Union    Sugar  Refinery   v.    Ma- 

thiesson  1,  978,  1028,  1322 

Union  Trust  Co.  v.  Illinois  Mid- 
land Ry.  Co.  1743 
v.  St.  Louis  R.  Co.  1731 
v.  Souther                                  1743 
t;.  Walker  1743 
United  Horse-shoe  Co.  v.  Stewart 

1081 
United  Lines  Tel.  Co.  v.  Boston 

Safe  Deposit  Co.  1276 

v.  Grant  630,  1620 

v.  Stevens  974,  1019,  1584 

United    Merthyr  &c.    Collieries 

Co.,  Re  12.33,  1632 

United  Nickel  Co.  v.  Worthing- 

ton  269 

United  Ports  and  General   Ins. 

Co.,  Re,  Brown's  Case  1020 

United  R.  Co.  v .  Hoppock   548,  1558 


United  Railroad  &  Canal  Com- 
panies v.  Long  Dock  Co.         782 

United  Security  Life  Ins.  Co.  v. 

Vandergrift  283 

United  States  v.  Alexandria  560 

V.  American    Bell    Telephone 
Co.       8, 149,  313,  334,  402,  779, 
888 
v.  Arnold  1254 

v.  Babcock  907 

v.  Bank  of  the  Metropolis  129 

v.  Barney  129 

v  Beebe  8,  560 

v.  Bell  Telephone  Co.  608 

V.  Benner  142 

v.  Blight  17 

v.  Budd  843 

v.  California  Land  Co.        604,  674 
v.  Cameron  933,  1573 

v.  Central  Pacific  R.  Co.  190 

v.  Clarke  129,  141 

v.  Colgate  8 

v.  Curtner  334 

v.  Dal  es  Military  Road  Co.         697 
v.  Des  Moines  Nav.  Ry.  Co.        545 


Duluth 

Emerson 

Ferguson 

Gillespie 

Gomez 

Green 

Gunning 

Hancock 

Hawkins 

Holmes 

Horn  Hing 

Hutton 

Iron  Silver  M   Co 

Jeffers 

Lafontaine 

Loughrey 

Lyman 

Mc  Daniel 

McElroy 

McGraw 

McLaughlin 

McRea  1 


1614 

1069 

815,  843.  850 

217,  559,  2384 

1003, 1017 

1350 

8, 10,  890 

8 

129 

1070 

933 

1556 


142 

1422 

536 

10 

129 

560 

8 

354,  759, 1556 

18.20,387,56" 


611,626,  680,696,  864,  1881 
Marshall  Silver  M.  Co.  8 

Masich  1716 

Maxwell  Land  Grant  Co.  8 

Memphis  &  L.  R  R   Co.      1687 
Minor  8 


Morris 

Parniele 

Parrott 

Patterson 

Pereheman 

Peters 

Pings 


780 

195,  325 

190,  1628,  1677 

10»;9 

17 

17 

933 


Pittsburgh  &c.  R.  Co.  10 

Pratt  Coal  Co.  87,  334,  a", 

2380 
17, 18,  20, 141,  1881 
129 
129 


Prioleau 

Ringgold 

Robeson 

Rose 

Samperyac 


San  Jacinto  Tin  Co. 

Smith 

Southern  Pacific  R.  Co. 


1076, 1147, 1576, 

1578,  1580 

8,10 

906 

586, 

1381 

.  Throckmorton  8 

.  Tichenor  8,  560 

.  Tilden  933 

.  Trans-Missouri  Freight  Ass.  855 
.  Treadwell  630,  1427 

.  Trinidad  Coal  &  C.  Co.  8 

.  Twenty-Eight    Packages, 
&c.      '  563, 564 


United  States  v.  Union  Pac.  R. 
Co. 
t\  Wagner 


v.  Wells 
v.  Wentz 
v.  White 
v-  Wilder 
v.  Wilkins 


10 
17,  18.  19,  141,  145, 
296,  1881 
129 


129 


V.  Workingmen's  Am  Council 

737,  1620,  1663 
United  States,  Pres.  of  v.  Drum- 

mond  20 

United   States  C.  S.  Co.  v.  Am- 
erican C.  I.  Co  314 
United  States  Ins.  Co.  v.  Central 

Bank  712 

United  States  Mutual  Ace.  Ins. 

Co.  r  Rei.-inger  1621 

United  States  Trust  Co.  v.  Roche 

222 

v.  Wabash  W.   Ry.  Co.  1743 

United  Tel.  Co.  v.  Patterson        1378 

United  Telephone  Co.  v.  Bassano  64, 

157 

v.  Don  oboe  850 

Univer.-ity  v.  Cambreling  443 

v.  Finch  52 

v.  Miller  46 

University  of  Aberdeen  v.  Irvine 

1503 
University  College  v.  Foxcroft   1059, 
1060,  1510 
University  of  Glasgow  v.  Balliol 

College  149 

University  of  Oxf.  &  Camb.  v. 

Richardson  1C29 

University  Life  Ass.  Co.  r.  Metro- 
politan Railway  Co.  1650 
Unsworth,  Re                               1391 
v.  Woodcock                    1818,  1829 
Untereiner  v.  Miller                       1493 
Untermeyer  v.  Freund                 1642 
Updike?;.  Bartles                           1457 
v.  Doyle   244,  643,  794,  1221.  1296, 
1298,  1309,  1615 
Upfull,7?e  1814 
Upham  v.  Brooks                         1241 
v.  Draper  726 
Upington  v.  Oviatt  303 
Upjohn  v.  Upjohn                          993 
Upman  v.  Elkan                             1649 
Upmann  v.  Forrester  261 
Upperton  v.  Harrison                   1390 
v.  Nickolson                               1339 
Upton  v.  Brown       1225,  1227,  WZ, 


v.  Ferrers,  Lord 

v.  Lowten 

v  Sow  ten 

v.  Tribilcock 

v.  Vanner 
Upton,  Warren,  Re 
Ure  v.  Lord 
Urey  v.  Urey 
Urlin  v.  Hudson 
Urmston  v.  Singleton 
Urner  v.  Kayton 
Urquhart,  Re. 

v.  Butterfield 
Usborne  v.  Usborne 
Usher  v.  Jouitt 

v.  Martin 
Utica  Ins.  Co.  v.  Lynch 

Utley  v .  Fee 
Utten  v.  Utten 
Utterson  v.  Mair 
Uvedale  v.  Uvedale 
Uxbridge,  Earl  of,  Ex  parte       1841 
Lord  v.  Staveland        322,  360,  387 


174S 

1257 

732 

732 

274 

304 

1854,  1856 

1526,  1527 

1411 

636,  638,  688 

1043, 1220 

1381 

447 

864 

1630 

1425 

1561 

718,  720. 

723 

991 

1712 

323,  543,  1723 

164,  1422 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 


CXXi 


V. 


Vaccaro  v.  Cicalla  1411 

Vacuum  Oil  Co.  v.  Buffalo  L.  0. 

Co.  1642 

Vacy  v.  Vacy  2<i3 

Vadala  v   Lawea  6*54 

Vaiden  v.  Stubblefield  292 

Vaigneur  v.  Kirk  1073 

Vail  v.  Central  R  Co.  543 

Vail  Ian  t  v.  Dodemead  576,  944 

Vaise  v.  Delaval  1131 

Vale  v.  Bayle  113S 

v.  Davenport  1285 

v.  Merideth  707,  710 

v.  Oppert  1842 

Valensin  v.  Valensin  109 

Valentine  v.  Ford  88 

v.  Teller  1056,  1002 

Vallance  v.  Birmingham  &c.  Inv. 

Co.  406 

Vallence  v.  Weldon    1311,  1312,  1320 

Van  v .  Corpe  1194 

v.  Price  1070 

Van  Allen,  In  re  1716 

Van  Alstw.  Hunter  1074,  1124,  1130 

Van  Benschooten  v.  Lawson        1260 

Van  Bergen  v.  Van  Bergen         1639, 

1602 

Vanbibher  v.  Beirne  313 

Van  ISokkelen  v.  Cook  190 

v.  Tinges  200 

Van  Huren  v.  Olmstead  13!l2 

Vanbussum  v.  Maloney      1270,  1270 

Vance,  Re  1909 

v.  Edwards  1370 

v.  Lancaster  330 

v.  Vance  847 

Vancleave  v.  Beam  233 

Vancleef  v.  Sickles  303 

Vancouver  v.  Bliss     843, 1380,  1381, 

1403 

Vandant  v.  Allmon  37? 

Vandegrift  v.  Herbert  844,  845 

Vandemark  v.  Schoonmaker       1631 

Vamlenburg  v.  Van  Rensselaer    1596 

Vanderbeck  v.  Peck  422 

Vanderbilt  v.  Central  R.  Co         1743 

Vanderhaise  v.  Hugues       1238,  1247 

Vanderheyden  v.  Vanderheyden 

1235,  1745 
Vanderpoel  v.  Van  Valkenburgh  233 
Vanderveer  v.  Holcombe  1548 

Vandervere  v.  Reading  777,  778,  780, 
781 
Vandervoort  v.  Williams  167) 

Van  Deventer  "   Stiger  529 

Van  Doren  v.  Robinson  220,  256,  292 
v.  Van  Doren  1279 

Van  Dresser  v.  Oregon  R   &  N 

Co.  149 

Van  Duzen  v   Van  Duzen         91,  108 

Vand\keu.  Brown  371 

Vandyne  v.  Vandyne  1270,  1272 

v.  Vreeland  657 

Vane  v.  Barnard,  Lord  1633 

v.  Cobbold  1127 

v.  Cockermouth  Railway  Co     I860 

v.  Vane  83,  88,  650,  3574 

Earl  v.  Rigden  200,  324 

Van  Epps  v.  Van  Deusen       91,  101, 

120,  122,  287,294 

Van  Every  v.  Adams  1843 

Van   Gelder  v.  Sowerby   Bridge 

Flour  Society  405 

Van  Giesen  v.  Van  Houten  1257 

Vangilder  v.  Hoffman  1073 

Van  Hook  v.  Pendleton  901 

v.  Throckmorton    280,  1062,  1516, 

1518 

v.  Whitlock  500,  607,  609,  721 

Van  Horn  v.  Pendleton  2391 

v.  sfniith  920 


Van  Houten  v.  Van  Winkle  334 

Van  Keuip  v.  Bell  1300 

Van    Kuren    v.    Trenton,   &c, 

Manuf  Co.  1677,  2319 

Van  Leonard  v.  Stocks  295 

Van  Mater  v   Couover  1652 

v.  Sickler  340 

Vanmeter  v.  Borden  1002 

Vann  v.  Barnett  1734,  1782 

Van  Namee  v.  Groot  951 

Vauner  v   Frost  300 

Vannerson  v.  Cord  1282 

v.  Leverett  630 

Van  Ness  v.  Van  Ness         1172,  1320 

Van  Oulen  v   Van  Ohlen  1845 

Van  L'elt  v.  Chattanooga  R.  Co.      68 

Van  Reimsdyke  v.  Kane        149,  842 

Vanrenen  v.  Piffard  798 

Van  Rensselaer  v.  Brice        728,  729, 

704 

v  Bruce  759 

Van  Rhyn  v.  Vincent  644 

Van  Saudau,  Ex  parte        511,  1070 

He  1684 

i>.  Moore  25,  26,  242,  243,  730 

v.  Rose  1673,  10S5 

Van  Sehaak  v.  Saunders  283 

Vansciver  v.  Bryan  853 

Vansittart  v.  Collier  1274 

v.  Vansittart  1404 

Van  Tyne  v.  Bunce  329,  558 

Van  Valtenburg  v.  A 1  berry  734,  1551 

Van  Vechten  ?\  Terry  273 

Van  Vleet  v  Sledge  560 

Van  Vorst,  Ex  /»  rte  1794,  1796 

Van  Vronkerv.  Eastman  1247,  1248, 

1252 

Van  Walters  v   Marion  County 

Board  920 

Van  Weel  v.  Winston  324 

Van  Wert  v   Boyes  1517 

Van  VVt-zel  v.  Van  Wezel  1481 

Van  Wych  v.  Seward  663.  1073 

Vanzandt  v.  Argentine  M  Co.      1675 

V'anzeller  v.  Vanzeller       1703,  1704, 

1708 

Vardon's  Trusts,  Re  122 

Varick  v.  Briggs  569,  675 

v.  Dodge  604 

v.  Smith  334,  589 

Varley,J?e  891,1608 

Varner  v.  Young  804 

Varney  v.  Bartlett  197 

v  Pope  1039 

Varnon's  Trusts,  Re  100 

Varrian  v.  Berrian  1501 

Vartcg  Chapel,  Re  893,  1608 

Vass  v.  Arrington  1274 

Va-sar  ».  Hill  740 

Vattier  v.  Hinde  509 

Vaughan  v.  Central  Pac.  R.  Co.    570 

v.  Cutrer  1570 

v.  East  Tenn.  &  Va   R   Co.        570 

v.  Fitzgerald   548,  871,  1383, 1573, 

1574 

v.  Gooch  1294 

v.  IIi<*gins  1401 

v.  Llovd  1192 

v.  Martin  1099 

v.  Parr  106,  114 

v.  Rogers  528 

v.  Thurston  1419 

v.  Vanderstegen       187,  1843.  1844 

r   Vaughan  1616,  1740,  1700 

v.  Welsh  691,  816 

v.  Williams  495 

v  Wilson  113 

v.  Worrall  954,  955,  1098 

Vaughn  v  Fuller  1621 

v   HalHday  1459 

v.  Uann  1578 


Vaughn  v.  Vaughn 
Vauu  v.  Hargett 
Vavasseur  v.  Krupp 
Veach  v.  Schaup 
Veal  v.  Veal 


1846 
341 
141 

1246 
95 


Veazie  v.  Williams       196,  302,  1523, 

1530 

Veeder  v.  Fonda  1269 

v.  Moritz  395 

Veghte  v.  Raritan  Water  Power 

Co.  346, 347 

Veile  v.  Blodgett  843,  846 

Veitch  r.  Irving  34 

Venable  v.  Smith  1003 

Venables  v.  Schweitzer  942,  944 

Venderhaise  v.  Hugues  1246 

Venner  v  Atchison,  T.   &  S   F. 

R  Co  547 

Venning  v.  Loyd  635,  800,  1027, 

1770 
Vent  v.  Paeey  571,  572,  808 

Ventilation  and  Sanitary  Im- 
provement Company  v.  Ed- 
elston  791 

Vent  nor  Harbor  Company,  Re  1035, 
1037 
Venus,  The  50 

Verdier  v   Foster  719 

Vere  v.  Glynn  4'2 

Vereker  v.  Gort  1309 

Veret  v.  Duprez  204,  251 ,  1726 

Verity  v.  Wylde  1842,  1845 

Vermillion  v    Bailey  1298 

Vermilye  v.  Verniilye  1401 

Vermilyea  v.  Fulton  Bank    145,  146, 
735 
v.  Odell  415,  806,  833 

Vermont  Copper  Mining  Co  v. 

Barnard  1397 

Vermont  R   Co.  v.  Vermont,  &c 

R  Co.  1731 

Verney,  Earl  v.  Macnamara  779 

v  Thomas  1548 

Vernon,  JBe  674 

Re,  Ewens,  &  Co.  298 

v.  <'holmondcley  1257 

v   Croft  1794 

v.  Cue  412 

v.  Hal  lam  1055 

v.  Hunkey  1134 

v.  St  .lames's  Vestry  1637 

V.  Thellu.-son  1016   1617 

v.  Vawdry  667,  668 

v.  Vernon  368,  558,  1070 

»'.  Wright  14:>6 

Verplanck  v.  Caine?      543,  584.  1715 

v.  Mercantile  Ins   Co.       286,  390, 

401,  402,  400,.  407,  424, 425,  1735, 

1748 

Verree  v.  Hughes  1255 

Vesev  ».  El  worthy  1274 

Vestris  v.  Hooper  63.814 

Vetten  v.  Wallace  851 

Vctter  v   Schreiher  573 

Vetterlein  v.  Barker  1680,  1684 

V.  Barnes  200 

Vial!,  He  1389 

Vialle  v.  O'Reilly  1735 

Vibart  v.  Vihart  281 

Vicar  of  St   Sepulchre,  Re  1014 

Vicarv  P.  Farthing  1108 

r.  \Vidgcr  1567 

Vice  v.  Thomas  652 

Vickercy   !•    London,   &c.   Ry. 

Co.  1141 

Vickers  v.  Bell  227,  252 

v.  Vickers  1397 

Vickshurg  &c.  R.  Co.  v.   Phil- 
lips 236 
Victor  Scale  Co  v.  Shurtleff        1701 
\  idler  v.  Parrott                  1791,  1795 


CXX11 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 


Vigel  v.  Hopp                                 843 

Viney  v.  Bignold 

671 

Vigere  v.  Audley,  Lord          406,  445, 

v.  Chaplin     1030,  1031,  1410 

1491 

5U8,  592,  1532,  1534 

Vint  v.  Padget 

213 

Vigrass  v.  Binfield                         1773 

Viutun  v    King 

1238 

Village    of   Nunda   v.   Crystal 

Yirden  v.  Needles 

991 

Lake                                          1661 

Virginia  v    Dunaway 

1621 

Yillard  v.  Chorin                            13  j9 

Virginia  Manuf.  Co.  v  Hale 

145, 

Villavaso  v.  Barthet                        634 

547 

Vinal  ti   Continental  C  &  I.  Co.     26 

Virtue  v.  Miller 

68 

Vinee  !■   Walsh                               2360 

Vivian  v.  Kennelly 

78 

Vincent,  lie                                    236 

v.  Little 

1817 

Re,    Parhani   v    Vincent          645 

Vliet  v.  Lowmasou 

1676 

v.  Godson                                     1615 

v.  Sherwood 

1618 

v.  Going                             652,  1281 

v.  Wyckoff 

1395 

r.  Hunter              '      29,  359,  1553 

Voak  v  National  Inv.  Co. 

779 

v.  Matthews                                  974 

Vogler  v.  Montgomery 

1624 

r  Spicer                         1633,2307 

Voigtlander  v.  Brotze 

1062 

v.  Watts                                         429 

Ycifljn  v.   Commercial   M.    In* 

. 

Viue,  Ex  parte              '       58,157 

Co. 

852 

Volans  o.  Carr  1361 

Voorhees  v.  De  Myer  197,  989 

v.  Polbenius  68 

v.  Voorhees  844 

Voorheez  v.  Bonesteel  382 

Vorlev  r.  Jerram  884 

Vose  v.  Philbrook  149,  216,  219 

269,  314,  374 

V.  Trustees  1467 

Voshell  v.  Hynson     1715,  1716,  1734 

Vowles  p.  Young  504 

Vredenburg  r.  Johnson  328,558 

Yreeland  r   Bramhall  850 

v.  N.  J.  Stone  Co.  1677 

r.  Yreeland  334 

Vroom  v.  Ditmas       658,  1017,  1385, 

1392 

Vyse  v.  Foster  269,  1233,  1474 

Yyvyan  v.  Vyvyan  1562,  1563 


w. 


Wabash  and  Erie  Canal 

Co.  v. 

Walburn  v.  Ingilby     199 

320,  1468, 

Walker  v.  Kendall 

1255 

Beers 

990 

I4t;9.  !<•>>■< 

v.  Kennedy 

1821 , 1822 

Wabash  &c   Ry.  Co.  v.  Central 

Walcot  r.  Walcot 

428, 429 

v.  Locke       365,  547, 561.  619,  655, 

Trust  Co. 

214, 1120 

v    Walker 

1645 

1557 

2095,2103 

Wabash  Ry.  Co.  v.  Dykeman      1716 

Walcott  v   Lyons 

405 

r.  Main 

973 

Waddilove  v.  Taylor 

454, 1389, 

v   Melick 

loas 

v.  Micklethwait        511 

,  553.  1063. 

1696 

1801,  1848 

V.  Watson 

843 

1614,  1625 

Wade  v.  Amer.  Col.  Soc 

1463 

Walden  v   Chambers 

115,  118 

t  Morris 

1276 

v.  Boxly 

121 

Waldo  V-  Caley 

1467, 

1469,  1471, 

v   Mottram 

K355 

V.  Keefe 

162 

1475 

v  Needham 

1127 

v.  Ordway 

1131 

Waldron,  Ex  parte 

1350 

v.  Page 

165 

v.  Pulsifer 

559,  590 

v.  Frances 

1437 

v   Poole 

894 

r.  Stanley 

309 

Waldy  v-  Gray 

878 

v.  Powers 

303,  334 

v   Ward 

1390 

Waletf.  Salter 

37 

v.  Seligmann 

438 

Wadeer  v.  East  India  Co. 

145,  5S1 

Wales  o.  Bank  of  Michigan 

V   S breve 

1625 

Wadeson  v.  Rudge 

236,  24S 

v.  Newbould 

347 

v.  Siggers 

972 

Wadtiam  V.  Rigg 

1327 

r.  Wales 

1745 

v.  Simpson 

1777 

Wadhams  v.  Gay 

1586 

Wales,  Prince  of 

•  Lamb 

1832 

r.  Smalwood 

280 

Wad  ley,  Re 

1591 

Princess  of  v 

.iverpoo 

,  Earl 

v.  Smith 

852 

Wadman  v.  Birch 

1201 

of     16, 364, 

579.  740 

796.  1818, 

v.  Stevens 

1841 

Wadsworth  v.  Spain,  Queen  of 

1819, 

1826,  1833 

v.  Stone 

1675 

Wafer  v.  Mocato 

1659 

Wales  Associatior 

,  Prince  of  t'. 

r.  Symonds              268 

1486,  2116 

Waffle  v.  Yanderheyden 

£39,  1667 

Palmer 

204 

v  Taylor 

74 

Waggoner  v.  Gray 

1228,  1229, 

Walford  v. 

197,  279 

v.  Wainwright 

1626 

1250 

Walker,  Re 

106,108 

851,  1433. 

v   Walker  118,323,726 

,  1342.  1660 

t\  Wolf 

1120 

1608 

v.  Ware,  &c,  R.  Co 

1221 

Wagner  v.  Cohen 

1277 

v.  Armstrong 

418 

v.  Wheeler 

1657 

v.  Mears 

41,  43 

v.  Beanlands 

1844 

v.  Wild 

1763,  1767 

v.  Railway  Co. 

1614 

v.  Berry 

840 

v.  Wildman 

575 

Wagstaff  v.  Bryan 

352,  729 

v.  Blackmore 

159 

v.  Wingfield 

1303,  1312 

v.  Read 

677 

v.  Blakeman 

63 

r.  Wocdward 

857,  1189 

Waine  v   Crocker 

561 

v  Bradford  Old  Bank 

199 

v.  Zorn 

1624 

Wainford  v   Heyl 

187 

r.  Brewster 

261, 

1635,  1637 

Walklin  r.  Johns 

28 

Wainwright  v.  SeweJl 

795.  1395 

v  Brooks 

197,  1654 

Walkup  v.  Zehring 

341 

Waite  r    Bingley 

877,  1157 

v.  Brown 

1556 

Wall  o.  Bushby                 74, 

v   Morland 

123,  179 

v   Bunke'.l 

1168 

v.  Cockerell 

2270 

v.  Semple 

1212 

v.  Burchnall 

1716 

v.  Fairley 

191 

t\  Tern  pier 

218 

v.  Campbell 

737 

v.  Livezay 

850 

v.  Waite 

1213 

V.  Carey 

1003 

v.  Rogers 

67,  68, 119 

t\  Wingate 

790 

v  Chicago  Cou 

■ier  Co. 

1030 

v.  Stubbs    658,  686,  68 

7,  688,  732, 

Wakalee  v.  Davis 

560 

v  Christian 

1704,  1714 

733 

Wake  v.  Conyers 

1164 

v.  Clarke 

1642 

v.  Thomas 

149 

v   Parker 

108, 109 

v.  Crowder 

75 

Wallace  v.  Auldjo 

92.  106 

Wakefield  v.  Buccleugh, 

Duke 

v   Crystal  Palace  D.  G 

Po        1440 

v.  Castle 

1468 

of 

16«6 

v.  Devereaux 

385, 

388,  1614, 

v.  Clark 

2379,  2397 

V.  Childs 

1166 

1618 

r.  Greenwood 

1346 

v.  Llanelly  Railway  and 

Dock 

v.  Drury 

102 

v   Holmes 

292 

Co. 

654,  670 

r.  Duncan 

860 

v.  Loomis 

860,  1731 

v.  Marr 

165 

v.  Easterby 

28 

r   Mease 

915 

r    Newton 

1842 

v.  Ferrin 

68 

v.  Pat  ton 

1503 

Wakeham  ;•   Lome 

168 

p.  Fletcher 

394,  1562 

r   Railroad  Co. 

359 

Wakelin  v.  Walthal 

843 

v.  Gilbert 

1531 

v.  Sortor 

329,  1561 

Wakeman  v.  Bailey 

299 

t;  Grady 

1073 

v.  Taliaferro 

115 

v   Gillespy 

1676. 1677 

v.  Hallett 

145,  161 

.  286.  457, 

v.  Wallace 

737.  760 

v.  Grover                    214,  2 

1299,  1457 

r.  Wilson 

1062 

844 

v.  Hill 

737 

v.  York 

1081 

v.  Kingsland 

1561 

v.  Hull 

68 

Wallack  v.  Society,  &c 

1620 

v.  Rutland,  Duchess  of 

1262 

v.  Hurst 

461 

Wallamet    Iron    Bridge 

Co.    e 

Walbanke  v.  Sparks 

1567 

v.  Jefferies 

294 

Hatch 

l.'SO 

Walbridge  v  English 

215 

v.  Jones 

1663 

Wallasey  Local  Board  v.  Gracey      12 

TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 


CXX111 


Wallaston  v.  Tribe 
Walleu  v.  Williams 
Waller  v.  Bassett 

v.  Demint 

v.  Hanger 

v.  Harris 

v.  Pedlington 

v.  .shannon 

v.  Taylor 

v.  Turner 
Walley  v.  Walley 
Walling  v    Beers 


852 

1042, 1056 

1207 

560 

14 

999,  1619,  2222 

804,  805 

334 

334 

1034 

150 

629 


Wallingford  v.  Mutual  Society 

324,  371 
Wallis,  Re 

v.  Dai  by 

v.  Frazier 

V.  Hirsch 

v.  HoJ;son 

V  Ho  Ison 

V.  Morris 

V.  Portland,  Duke  of 

V.  Portland 


1414 
515 
365 

1862 

858,  875 

67 

277 

563 

1558 

1277 

1029,  1030 

794,  808,  1395 

1665 

508 

42 

392,  1558 

1476 

1250 


V  Sarel 
v   Thomas 
V.  Wallis 
v   Willis 

Wallop  v.  Brown 

v.  Warburton 

Walmsley  !',  Child 

v.  Foxhall 

v    Walnislev 

Wallworth  v   Holt    26,  239,  241.  332 

Wallwyn  V    Lee  676,  677 

Walpole  v.  Cooper  354 

Walrond  v.  Parker  1452 

v   Walrond  1404 

Walser  v.  Seligman  26 

Walsh,  Re  108 

v.  Gilmer  383 

v.  Ma«on  lu41 

v.  Memphis  &c.  R.  Co.  26 

v.  Smyth  402,  406,  422,  1479 

V  Trevannion  170 
v.  United  States  10 
v.  Walsh             68,  73, 1355, 1359, 

1802 
v.  Wason  \i<h 

v   Wright  860 

Walsham  v  Stainton    337,571,577, 
1834 

Walsingham,  Lord  v  Goodrieke  572 
578,  943,  1834 

Walter  v   Baltimore  Bank  1461 

v.  Fow'er  354 

v.  Glanville  625,  669 

v.  MeNabb  840 

v.  Maunde  1433 

v   Patey  13  >6 

V.  Riehl  214 

v.  Rutter  909 

v.  Saunders  124 

v  Selfe  1635,2307 

v.  Steinkopff  1381,  1643 

Walters,  In  re  Moore  v.  Bemrose 

1434 
Re,  Neison  v.  Walters  838 

v.  Anglo-American  M.  &  T.  Co 

1738 
v  Northern  Coal  M.  Co.  708 

v.  Upton  1775 

v.  Walters  216,  1425 

v.  Webb  649',  1448 

v.  Woodbridge  68,  1233 

Walthall  v.  Riyes  314 

Waltham,  Ex  parte  1611 

v.  Broughton  1378 

Waltham  Bank  v.  Waltham         1241 

Walton  )>   B.oadbent  354,  785 

v.  Cody  371 

v.  Coulson  170,  2»7 

v.  Detroit  C.  &  B.  R.  Mills  1561 
V.  Herbert  441 

v  Hill  1771 

v.  Hobbs  840 

v.  Johnson  1614,  1743 

v.  Perkins  378 


Walton  v  United  States  129 

v   Van  Mater  980 

v   Walton  845 

v   Westwood  360,  545 

v.  Withingion  1Z42 

Wambaugh  c.  Gates  1276 

Wainburzee  v.  Kennedy  417,419,644, 

645 

Wamesit  Power  Co.   v.  Sterling 

Mills  H50 

Wampler  v.  Wolfinger  52  i 

Wand  v.  Docker  1036 

Wandsworth,  &c   Co  v.  Wright  241 
Wankford  v.  Wankford  1772 

Wanklyn  v.  Wilson  1780 

Wanmaker  v   Van  Buskirk   644,  844 
Wanneker  v   Hitchcock  553 

Wanner  v.  Sisson  868 

Warbass  v.  Armstrong  1417 

Warbritton  v.  Demorett  545 

Warburton  v.  Kdge  1843 

v.  Hill  1039,  1040,  1694,  1616 

v.  London  and  Blackwall  Rail- 
way Co.  424,593,1675 


Ward,  Re 

v.  Alton 
v.  Amory 
v.  Arch 
v   Arredondo 
v.  Bassett 
v.  Booth 


v.  Cartwright 
v   Clay 
v.  Cooke 
v.  Cornwall 
V-  Davidson 
v.  Eyre 
v  Gamgee 
v.  Higgs 
v.  Hill 


160, 1361,  1607,  1736, 
1814 
1181 
93,  96,  97 
653 
149,  1032,  1627 
223 
401,  407,  1055,  105 


v   Hollins 
v.  Jewett 
v.  Kent 
v.  Longsden 
v.  Lowndes 
v.  Macliinlay 
v.  Meath 


538,  1510,  1529 

588 

346,  1291 

1059 

1381 

1257 

744 

1072 

1073,  1076, 1077,  lo80, 

1463 

257,  1276 

1296,  1318 

1576 

476 

1271 

1265, 1390,  1424 

185 


v.  Northumberland,  Duke  of     310 
v   Paducah  &  M   R.  Co.  1168 

v.  Parlin  417 

v.  Patton  418 

v   Peck  547 

v.  St   Paul    '  1352 

v   Sebring  447 

v   Seymour  280 

v.  Shakeshaft  236,710,1036,1425, 
1525 

V    Sheffield  4^8 

v.  Sittingbourne  &c.  Ry.   Co     26, 
5S5.  5! '9 
P.  Society  of  Attorneys  1050 

v.  Swift  454,455,  1741,  1743, 

1750,  1755 
r.  Trathen  1276 

V.  Van  Bokkelin  107,  1877 

v.  Ward  37,  38,  64,  75.  7''.   32 

■3  17.300,807,814,  1320,  1411 


P.  Waterman 
v.  Whitfield 
v.  Woodcock 
v.  Wyld 

V  Yates 
Ward's  Case 
Warde,  Re 

V  Dickson 
v.  Warde 


230 

402 
503 
1408 
102,  103,  108,  1432 
156 
1791 
826,  1276 
576,  578,  1«34. 
1863 
Warden  v.  Borts  1412 

Wardlaw  v  Erskine  1172 

Wan  lie  v   Carter  1027 

v.  Claxton  596,  1671 

Wardman  v    Belliouse  1127 

Wards  v   Billups  1883 

Wardsboro  v.  Whittingham         1625 
Wardwell  v.  Wardwell  1350 


Ware  v.  Cumberlege  16 

"•  Curry  334,  559 

v.  Galveston  City  Co  560 

v.  Grand       Junction      Water 

Works  Co  1020 

v.  Horwood  1022 

v   Supreme  Sitting  Order  1743 

v.  Watson  1286,  I288 

Warfield  v    Banks  7^9 

v   Fisk  83 

Waring?;   Crane  71,78 

v.  Lockett  808 

v.  Robinson  794 

v.  Tnrton  2<mj 

Waringtou  v   Wheatstone  1561, 

1562,  1563,  1567 

Warman  r   Zeal  996,1028 

Warne  v.  Routledge  187.  1644 

Warner,  Re  Kyi 

v   Armstrong  1380,  1602 

v.  Baynes  H57 

v.  Burton  14S4 

v.  Daniels  550,  {'Ah 

v.  De  Witt  County  Bank  214 

v.  Gouveruour  1717 

v   Hare  1299 

v.  Jacob  644.  652 

v.  McMillin  1621 

v.  United  States  Land  Co.  364 

v.  Warner  109,  1120,  1580 

Warnig  v.  Manchester,  Sheffield, 

&  Lincolnshire  Railway  Co.  1600 

Warren,  Re  100 

v.  Buck  109 

v.  Burton  214 

v.  Fursteuheim  1507 

v  Hofer  13,55 

v.  Hoi  brook  564 

v.  Howard  200 

v.  Marcy  281 

v.  Moody  409 

v.  Postlethwaite  430, 1432 

r.  Swiuburi.e  892 

v.  Twilley  982 

v.  Warren  334,  335,  341, 

711 

v.  Williams  1159 

Warrick  v.  Hull  1548 

v.  Queen's  College  i'39, 

243,  398,  984,  985,  1817,  1827 

Warring  v.  Freear  1073 

Warrington  v   Sadler  208 

Warter  v    Anderson  1417 

Warthen  v.  Brantley  302,  337 

Warthy  r    Shields   "  1073 

Wartman  v.  Swindell  329 

Wartnaby  v.  Wartnaby  86 

Warwick  v.  Bruce  1133 

v.  ('<>x  798 

Earl  of  v   Beaufort,  Duke  of      806 

Charities,  /,',  1855,  1856 

Wash  v   Beard  458 

Washburn  V  Great  Western  Ins. 

Co.  1981 

Washburn   >K"   Mncn  Manuf  Co 

v  Chicago  G    W   F.  Co.  230 

V.  Patterson  g2 

Washineton  v   Emery        1613,  1619 
v.  Parks  1624 

Washington  Bank  V  Eccleston  1031 
Washington  Sc  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Dis- 
trict of  Columbia  ]820 
Washington  &c.  K.  Co.  v.  Brad- 
leys  830  23«2 
Wasliington  Bridge  Co.  r  Stewart  9^6 
Washington  City,  &c.  R.  Co  v. 

Southern  Md    It    Co.  1461 

Washington  Ins   Co   v   Slee         1513 
Washington  University  0.  (ireen 

1613,  1677 
Washoe  Mining  Co.  v    Ferguson 

26,  29,  82,  1553 

Waska  V   Klaisner  1221 

Wasney  V.  Tempest       579.  580,  1832 

Wason  v.  Sanborn     1613,  1631,1635, 

1637,  1689,  1640 

v  Westminster  Imp.  Com'rs    157S 


CXXIV 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 


Wastell  v.  Leslie        1440, 1525, 1697, 
1745,1753,  1797 
Waterhouse  v.  Comer  1743 

v.  Wilkinson  1285,  1291 

v.  Worsnop  83 

Waterlow  v   Bacon  553,  1623 

v.  Burt  1213,  1428 

v.  Stiarp  1723 

Waterman  v.  Banks  1320 

v.  buck  715,  1168, 1221,  1517 

v.  Clark  565 

r.  Curtis  1247 

v.  Dutton  1075,  1079,  1110, 

1111 
V.  Shipman  1716 

Waters  v.  Barton  1743 

v.  Chambers  691 

v.  Couily  1076 

v.  Creagh  846 

v.  Glanville  625 

v.  Mayhew  688,  703 

v.  Perkins  559 

v.  Shaftsbury,  Earl  of       563,  857, 
1835 
v   Taylor         332,  508,  1727, 1728, 
1S41 
v.  Travis  1495 

v.  Waters  448,  1121,  1124,  1275 
Waters  P.  O.  Co  v.  Little  Kock  1620 
Waterton  v.  Burt  1428 

v.  Croft  447,  448,  601,  740,  1551 
Watertown  o   Cowen  302,  930 

Watford  Burial  Board,  Re  1852 

Wattord  &  Rickmansworth  Rail- 
way Co.  r.  London  &  North- 
Western  Railway  Co.       551,  671 
Watkin  v.  Parker  501,  503 

Watkins  v.  Atchison  910,  1117,  1574 
v.  Brent  251,  1725,  1726 

v.  Bush  597 

v.  Carlton  1120 

t».  Harwood  639 

v.  Hatchet  676 

v.  Jerman  1062 

v.  Law  ton  1576 

V.  Maule  1213 

v.  Scottish  Imperial  Ins.  Co.     149 
v.  Stockett  361,843 

v.  Stone  607,  662,  683,  703 

v.  Washington  190 

Watkyns  v.  Watkyns  104,  107 

Watlington  v.  llowley  281 

Watmore  V.  Dickson  959 

Watney  v.  Trist  332,  1660 

Watson,  Re  99,  1802 

Ex  parte  157 

».  Bennett  1860 

v.  Birch  1211,  1289, 1290 

v.  Bvrd  544 

v.  Cave  245, 1461 

v.  Citizens'  Sav.  Bank  1841 

r.  ('leaver  822,  870,  890 

v.  Cox  341 

v   Dennis  119 

v.  Ferrell  1638 

v.  Fuller  1255 

v.  Great  Western  Ry.  Co  1137 

t>.  Hawkins  583 

v.  Holliday  157 

v.  Life  414 

v.  Lion  Brewing  Co.  190 

v.  Loveday  1525 

v.  Lvon  1843,  1845 

v.  Manhattan  Ry.  Co.  1071 

v.  Marshall  97,  101,  102,  108 

V-  Murray  368 

V   Northumberland,  Duke    of 

1152,  1154, 1159,  1160 
v.  Palmer  846 

v.  Parker         984,  1003, 1558, 1934 
v.  Reeve  1131 

v.  Renwick  1828 

t> .  Rodwell        354,  880, 1003, 1841 
v.  Row  1409,  1410, 1449 

v.  Smith  974 

v  Stevens  1576 

v  Stockett  846 


Watson  r.  Sutro  2027 

v.  Olbricht  1284 

v.  Waruock  1350 

v.  Wells  328 

V.  Whitmore  1127 

v   Wigginton  1551 

v.  Williams  986 

Watt  v.  Barnett  447 

v.  Cobb  1622 

v.  Crawford  1533 

v.  Leach  83 

v.  Watt  758 

Watteu  v.  Billam      29,  30,  359,  1553 

Watters  v  Jones  215 

Watts,  lie  1393,  1589 

Re,  Smith  v.  Watts  1327 

v   Adler  630 

v.  Eglinton,  Lord        418,  588,  598 

v  Gayle  271 

v   Hughes  448 

v.  H\de  292,384,418 

v.  Jefferyes  1040.  1041,  1694 

v   Kelly  28,  358,  359 

v.  Lawrence  1829 

v.  Martin  1287,  1288,  1290 

v.  Overstreet  1051 

v.  Penny  1458,  1555,  1559 

v.  Porter  1040 

v.  Steele  1358 

v.  Sweeney  1548 

v.  Svmes  213,  1489 

v.  Thomas  127 

v.  Tittabawassee  Boom  Co.      1381 

o.  Waddle  989,  1032, 1033 

v.  Watts  899,  1520 

Waugelin  v  Goe  1661,1679 

Waugh,  Re  110 

v.  Riley  46 

v-  Schlenk  517 

v.  Wren  189 

Wauters  v.  Van  Vorst  1714 

Wavell  v.  Mitchell  200 

v.  Watson  1638,  1661,  1C63 

Way  v  Bragaw      237,  338,  559,  632, 

633,634 

v.  Fov  1468,  1470 

t;.  Mullett  1918 

Way  land  v.  Tysen  354 

Wayn  v.  Lewis  285,  1266 

Wayne  County  S  Bankr.  Airey   1561 

Wead  ?'.  Cantwell  68 

Weak  v.  Calloway  1134 

Weakley  v    Pearce  1003 

Weale  v.  West  Middlesex  Water 

Works  243 

Wearing  v.  Ellis  60,  62 

Weatherhead  v.  Blackburn    581,  586 
Weatherley  V  Ross  1638 

Weatherspoon  v.  Carmichael         324 
Weaver  v   Alter  1548 

v.  Field  634 

v.  Livingston  402,  524 

r.  Miss   Boom  Co.  1638 

v.  Poyer  1625 

Webh  v.  Bvng  1001 

v.  Claverden  552,1148,1149, 

1383,  1384,  1385 
v.  Crawford  860 

v.  De  Bcauvoisin  1428 

v.  Direct  London  and  Ports- 
mouth Railway  Co  1020 
v.  East  5fi4.  879,  943 
v.  England  315,  542,  1394 
v.  Foster  354 
v.  Fox  58 
v.  Fuller  639 
V  Hunt  1638 
v.  Kirbv  202  252 
v.  Pell  "841,  1576,  1577,  1579,  1583 
v.  Plummer  1656 
v.  Portland  Manuf.  Co.  303,  1639 
v.  Robbins  860 
v.  Rose  1647 
v.  Salmon  448 
v.  Shaftesbury,  Earl  of  1263, 
1342,  1366 
v.  Shaw                                    1320 


Webb  v.  Vermont  Central  R.  Co  193 


v.  Ward 
v.  Wardle 
v.  Webb 

v.  York 
Webb's  Appeal 

Ca-e 
Webber  o.  Gage 

v.  Hunt 


v  Randall 

v.  Taylor 

v.  Webber 
Weber  v.  Weitling 
Webster,  Re 
Armstrong 


58 

407,  1509,  1530 

730,  974,  995,  1234, 

1413,  1575 

1244 

119,  121 

1647 

317,  1637 

1013,  1251, 

1252 

1029 

247,  287 

1795 

1289, 1305 

1840 

659 


British   Empire  Assurance 


Co. 

v.  Diamond 

v.  Dillon 

v.  Friedeberg 

v.  Guy 

v.  Hall 

v.  Harwinton 

v.  Higgins 

v.  Hill 

r.  Hitchcock 

v.  Leigh  Hunt 

v.  McDaniel 

v.  Manby 

v.  Peet 
Power 


203,  1257 
1584 

1654,  1656 

1129 

37 

1561 


1274 

993, 1516,  1523 

1843, 1844 

1564 

812,  1378, 1379, 

1450 

860,  1628 

324,325 


v.  South-Eastern  Railway  Co.  1631 

v.  Taylor  1063 

v.  Thompson  801 

v.  Threlfall  313,  719 

v.  Webster  615,  648,  1648 

v.  Whewall  885,  896 

v.  Woodford  83 

Webster  Loom  Co   v.  Higgins     1120 

Weddall  v.  Nixon  1402 

Wedderbum  v.  Wedderburn  95,  800, 

817,  1250,  1614,  1618,  1628 

Wedderburne  v.  Llewellyn         1597, 

1601,  1602 

v  Thomas  519 

Wedgwood  v  Adams  995,  1405, 

1423, 1427 

Wedlake  v.  Hutton  683 

Wedmore  v.  Bristol,  Mayor  of   1081, 

1650 

Weed  v.  Small      665,  667,  668, 1548, 

1551 

v  Mutual  Ben.  Life  Ins  Co.      852 

Weeding  v   Mason  1142 

Weeding  398,  1803 


Weeks  v  Cole 

v.  Evans 

v   Heward 

v  Milwaukee,  &c.  R.  Co 

v   Stourton 

v.  Weeks 
Weems  v.  Brewer 
Weeuer  v.  Brayton 
Weguelin  v.  Lawson 
Wehle  v   Loewy 
Weide  r.  Porter 
Weider  v   Clark 
Weigel  v.  Walsh 
Weighley  v   Coffman 
Weightman  v.  Powell 
Weil  v   Lehmayer 
Weinberg  r   Weinberg 
Weinreich  v.  Weinreich 
Wei.%  Blatter  of 

v.  Goetter 
Weise  v  Wardle 


31 
233 
h  13 
669 


Weisman  v.  Heron  Mining  Co. 

v.  Smith 
Weiss  v    Dill 
Wekett  v.  Raby 
Welby  v   Still 
Welch  v   Barber 

v.  Bunce 


1150 

1283 

1648 

1045 

354 

196 

837 

1631 

790 

410,  425,  522 

1411 

815 

216 

177 

1734 

157,  256 


626. 
717 
1550 
1235 
1466 
1069 
1069 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 


cxxv 


Welch  v.  Knott 

1649 

v.  Lewis 

1546 

v.  Welch 

430 

Welchman,  Re 

102 

Weld  v.  Bon  ham 

237,  544 

Weldhen  8.  Scattergood 

111 

Weldon  v.  Gounod 

150 

v.  Neal 

418 

v.  Riviere 

87 

v.  Winslow 

87 

Welford  V.  Daniell 

501 

v.  Liddel 

641 

v.  Stainthorpe 

1833 

Wellbeloved  V.  Jones 

137,  138 

Wellborn  s.  Tiller  346,  559,  586 

Welter  v.  Fifzhugh  1413 

Wellesley  v.  Beaufort  2293 

v.  Beaufort,  Duke  of      1346,  1347, 

1348, 1349 

v.  Mornington      38,  39,  111,  16!l4, 

1760 

v.  Wellesley     37,  38,  42.  Ill,  588, 

598,  1019,  1021,  1061,  1346, 1347, 

1349,  1483,  1633 

Lord  v.  Mornington,    Earl  of 

523,  1673,  1683,  1685,  2127 
Wellesley's  Case  1070 

Welling  v.  La  B  au  1120,  1320 

Wellington  8.  Mackintosh  671 

Wellman  v.   Howland  C.   &   I. 

Works  26 

Wells,  Ex  parte  57 

Re  37 

v.  Beall  1151,  11  >5 

v.  Bridgeport,  &c.  Co.        344,  360 

v.  Cooper  10!  12 

v  Dayton  1661 

v.  Fish  645,  915 

v.  Gibbs  1039,  1409,  1694 

v.  Glen  1176 

v  Houston  844 

v.  Kilpin  1037,  1718 

v.  London,  T.  &  S.  Ry.  Co      1639 

v.  Malbon  87,  123,  179,  1113 

v.  Miner  1561 

v.  Oregon  Ry.  &  Nav.  Co.  349 

v.  Partri  Ige  334 

v   Roloson  1771 

v.  Sewell's  Point  Guano  Co.      334, 

559 

v  Smith  68,  369,  538 

v.  Strange     190,  216,  269,  342,  385 

v.  Stratton  731,  841 

v-  Vermont  R   Co.  1675 

v.  Wales  1753 

v.  Wood  778,  780,  782 

Wells.  Fargo,  &  Co   l\  Miner  60 

v  Oregon  Ry    &  Nav.  Co.        1683 

Wells'  Will  Case  874 

Weltnan  v    Welman  852 

Welsh  v.  Solenberger  517 

Welton  c.  Dickson  16^0 

Weltzler  v   Shaunman  12K4 

Wendell,  Matter  of  2337 

v    French  1234,  H14 

v   Highstone  890 

v.  Lewis  1448,  14S6 

v.  Van  Rensselaer      190,  238,  2271 

Wenham,  He,  Hunt  v.  Wenham 

643 

v.  Bowman  1047 

v.  Switzer  8!K) 

Wenman,  Lord  v  Osbaldiston       504 

Wenn  v.  Wenn  1362 

Wenner  v.  Thornton  991 

Wentworth  v.  Lloyd    919,  943,  1440, 

1503,  1504 

Werdermann  8.  Societe  Generale 

d'Electricite"  287,  559 

Werner  v.  Reinhardt  991 

Wernwagg  v.  Brown  1002,  1255 

Wesket  V.  Carnevali  1672 

Wesling  v.  Schrass  611 

WesselU  v.  Wessells  857,  992,  1599 
Wesson  v.  Washburn  Iron  Co.  1635 
West,  In  re  65 

v.  Chamberlain  284 


West  w  Coke 

424 

v.  Davis 

9 

v.  Duncan 

l!)0 

v.  Hall 

361 

v.  Jones 

1392,  1399 

v.  McMullan 

601 

v.  Ma)  or  of  New  York 

1620 

v.  Miller 

212 

v.  Paige 

1,961 

v.  Randall  149.  190,  200,  217, 

219,  224,  236,  238,  239,  240,  2ft6, 

334,  342 

v.  Shaw  1576 

v.  Skip  1249,  1586 

v.  Smith  290,  443,  643,  1603, 

1611,  1667,  1675 

v.  Swan  1734 

v.  Swinburne  799,  1617 

v.  Tvlor  313 

l'.  Utica  1381 

p.  Vincent  1292 

v.  Walker  1639 

v.  Weaver  1716 

v.  White  1071,  1114 

West    Boylston    Manuf.   Co.   v. 

Searle  195 

Westbrook  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Warren  1639 
Westbrook's  Trusts  1610 

Westbury-on-Severn  Rural  Sani- 
tary Authority  B   Meredith    329 
Westby  v.  Westby  70,  77,  1039,  1722 
Westcott  »   Cady  1546 

v.  Culliford  1405 

West  Devon  Great  Consols  Mine, 

He  974 

Westerfield  v.  Bried  748 

Western  v.  Macdermott        324,  1654 
Western    Benefit  Building  Soci- 
ety, Re  891 
Western    of  Canada   Oil    Lands 
Co.,  In  re                903,906,942 
v.  Walker  26 
Western  Division  R  Co  v.  Drew 

2391,  2392,  2395 
Western  Ins.  Co    v.   Eagle  Fire 

Ins.  Co.  214 

Western  Land  Co.  v.   Guinault 

334,  559 
Western  National  Bank  v.  Perez  149 
Western  Pacific  R  Co.  v.  United 

States  8 

Western  Ry.  v.  McCall  418 

Western  Reserve  Bank  v.  Potter  215 
v.  Stryker  778,  780 

Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Am- 
erican Bell  Tel  Co.  790 
v.  Western  &  A.  R  Co.  1618 
Westf  ill  v.  Scott  296 
Westfield  b.  Skipwith  1555,  1558 
West    Hartlepool     Ry.    Co.    v. 

Jackson  1513 

Westhead  v.  Riley  1716 

v.  Sale  965 

Westinghouse   Air-Brake  Co.  v. 

Carpenter  1642 

Westlake  v.  Farrow  334 

W'estley  B.  Williamson        1382,  1421 
Westmeath  b.  Salisbury  1003 

West    Midland    Railway   Co.  v 

Nixon  230 

Westminster  &  Brymbo  Colliery 

Co.  v.  Clayton  1824 

Dean  of  ;»  Cross  689 

v    Willard  601 

Westmoreland  B.  Martin  1168 

Westmoreland  Co.  v.  F'ielden  60 

West  of  England  Bank  v.  Can- 
ton Ins   Co.  1556 
v  Nickolls  720 
Weston  v.  Berkeley                        678 
v   Bowes  262 
v  Clowes                                    1437 
v  Empire  Assurance  Co.   327,  829, 
855.  859 
v   Haggerston                  1031,  1321 
V.  Hunt  23 
v.  Jay                                         1186 


Weston  v  Keighley  2C3 

v   Watts  1746 

Weston's  Case  1485 

Westover  B,  Chapman  1411 

West  Portlaud  H.  Ass'n  t.  Lowns- 

dale  639 

West  Retford  Church  Lands,  Re 

1854 

W.  Va  Oil  Co.  v.  Vinal  1548 

Westwood,  lie  1356 

Wetenhall  B.  Dennis  1423.  1437 

Wetherell  B.  Collins      259,  260,  1387 

Wetmore  v.  Dyer  458 

B.  Fiske  1548 

v.  Harper  lul9 

v   St    Paul  &  P   R.  Co.  1584 

Wetteuhall  r.  Davis  1423,  1437 

Weymouth  v.  Boyer      219,  382.  885_, 


v.  Lambert 
Whalan  v.  Cook 
Whale  v.  Griffiths 
Whalen  v.  Olmstead 
Whaley  v  Braucker 

v.  Dawson 

v.  Norton 
Whalley  v   Ramage 

v.  Suffield,  Lord 

v.  Whalley 
Wham  v.  Love 
Wharam  )\  Broughton 


1407,  1467 
448 
1576 
743 

108 

1632,  1666 

33!".  1161 

348,  852 

1410 

795,  977,  1380 

645,  1848 

1233 

172,  188, 


1032, 1(154.  1U58,  1059, 1060, 1543 
Wharton  b.  May        1032,  1626,  1627 


B.  Stoutenburgh 

v.  Swann 

?>   Wharton 
Whatton  v.  Craddock 
Wheat  v .  Graham  7! 

v.  Griffin 
Wheatcraft,  In  re 
Wheatcroft  V   Hickman 
Wheatley,  Re 

v.  Bastow 


1461 
413 
726 

1259 
J,  742,  769. 

1837 
328 

1849 

1503 
123 

1840 


v.   Westminster  Brymbo   Col- 


liery Co 
Wheaton    v. 
Co. 


1663.  1741.  1861 
Atlantic    Powder 

411 
13!'l 
1638 
1646 
87 


v.  Graham 

v.  Maple 

t;.  Peters 

v.  Phillips 
Wheeler,  Re 

v   Alderman 

v.  Bartlett 

v   Bedford 

v.  Gill 

v.  Howell 

v.  Le  Marchant 

v.  Matins 

V.  Perry 

v.  Piper 

v.  Trotter 

v.  United  Kingdom  Tel.  Co. 

v.  West 

Wheeler,  &c.  Man.  Co.  v.  Shakes- 
peare 1649 
Wheelhouse  v.  Calvert  800 
Wlieelock,  Re                               1718 

B.  Lee  K'71 

Wlielan  B.  Cook  1578 

V.  Sullivan  182,426 

Wheldaleo.  Partridge  1405 

Whelplev  v.  Van  Epps  745 

Whereattu  Ellis  1168,  1461 

Whetley  Brick  &  P.  Co.,  He       1756 
Whetstone  o.  Daviefl  1072 

Whicherley  r   Whicherlev  122 

Whicker  v   Hume      1383,  1436,  143 


1299 
441 
659 

1253 

652 

573 

63,  64,  814.  1679 

2010 
615 

a53 

354 

339 


Whipple  r.  Brown 

?'.  Dow 

V.  Fair  Haven 

V.  Whitman 
Whistler,  The 

v.  Ay  1  ward 

v.  Newman 

v.  Webb 


11  <-8 

1358,  1360 

378 

974 

759 

1044 

1418 

250 


CXXV1 


TABLE    OP    CASES    CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.  ] 


Whistler  v.  Wigney  724 

Whitaker,  In  re  85,  1351 

v.  Dillard  lt*>l 

v  Forhes  629 

t'.  Leach  1027 

v.  Newman  1075 

v.  Thurston  1175 

v.  Wi.ker.sham  1621 

v   Wright     1192,  1194,  1209,  1210, 

1615 

Whitbeck  v.  Edgar       337,  557,  1548 

Wuitbread  v.  Gurney  578 

v.  Lyall  997 

r.  Roberts  1266 

Whitby,  Be  86 

Whitchurch,  Ex  parte  467 

v.  Bevis  365,  619,  657 

r.  Golding  392,  393,  1558 

Whitcomb  v.  Minchin         160,  1534, 

1540 

White,  Re  192 

972 

313 


r.  Allatt 
i'.  Baker 
r.  Bank  of  U.  S. 
t'   Barker 
v.  Bartlett 
v.  Barton 
v.  Baugh 
v.  Bigelow 
v.  Bower 
v.  Boyce 
v.  Bromige 
Brown 


658 
724 
214 
1772 
1751 
334 
1551 
552 
36,  39,  423.  598 
999,  1000,  1241,  1246 
v.  Buccleugh,  Duke  of  1503 

v.  Buloid  1548,  1549,  1550,  1552, 
1553 
1029 
•  371 
555 
222 
109,  1635,  1637,  1638 


v.  Butcher 

v.  Campbell 

v.  Carpenter 

v.  Chitty 

v.  Cohen 

v.  Cox 

v.  Curtis  287,  288,  342 

v.  Davis  390 

v.  Delschneider  293 

V.  Duvernay 

v   Eastern    Union    Railway 

Company 
v.  Empire  Assoc.  Co. 
V.  Fitzhugh 


1085 

368 

1544 

1401 

350,  922,  951.  959, 

1486 

1052,  1053 

778,  783 

1&59 

29,30 

1390 

153.  604 

734,  737,  778,  844, 

846,  1042,  1298,  1315,  1317,  1318 

Hayward  1059,  1060 

96,  98,  100 

893 

177,  405 

214 

592,  785 

1077 

1416.  1419 

1748 

211,  261 

798, 1302.  1314,  1320. 

1322 

f.  Jones  1655 

V.  Kennedy  269 

V.  Kibling  1118 

v.  Lee  843 

v.  Lisle         1082,  1119, 1137,  1139, 
1149, 1379,  1467,  1476 


v.  Foljambe 
v.  Fussell 

v.  Geraerdt 

v.  Godbold 

v.  Grane 

v.  Greathead 

t'.  Gudgeon 

v.  Ball 

v.  Hampton 


v   Herrick 
v.  Hess 
v.  Hinton 
v.  Holman 
v.  Howard 
v.  Hussy 
v.  Jackson 
v.  James 
v.  Jameson 
v.  Johnson 


v.  Lowgher 

t'.  North  West  Stage  Co. 

v.  Okisco  Co. 

v.  Owen 

t>.  Park 

V.  Parnther 

v.  Pearce 


629 
1491 
1317 
195 
286 
1586 
1846 


White  v.  Peterborough,  Bishop 
of  1390,  1424,  1719,  1730 

v.  Robinson  68 

v  Secor  221 

v.  Smale  322,  360,  1725,  1748 

v.  Soto  402 

17.  Steinwacks  1678 

v.  Steward  433,  1517 

v.  Story  115J 

v.  Taylor  923 

v.  Tommey  lu29 

v.  Utlev  1461 

v.  Walker  1031,  1296,  13»1 

v.  Warner  1659 

v.  White    339,  346,  559,  779,  1263, 
1551,  2320 
v.  Williams  724,  Vs31,  1238 

v.  Wilson       852,  1124.  1149,  1287, 
1290,  1383,  1384 
v.  Yaw  361 

White's  Creek  Turnpike  Co.  v. 

Davidsou  County  1637 

White  Star  C   G.  M.  Co.,  Re         417 
Whiteaves  r.  Melville  204 

Whitebread  v.  Brockhurst    365,  607, 
608,  656 
Whitecotton  v.  Simpson  328 

Whitehall    Lumber   Co.    v.   Ed- 
mans  354 
Whitehaven  Bank  v.  Thompson    448 
Whitehead  v   Bellamv                  1166 
v.  Bennett               1703,  1705,  1749 
v.  Cunliffe  783 
v-  Eutwhistle                             1071 
v.  Kitson                1620,  1642,  1644 
v.  Lvnes                    611,  1063,  1755 
v.  North                                     1O30 
v.  Shattuck                                1071 
Whitehouse  v.  Hemmant             1127 
f.  Partridge                     1702,  17o5, 
1712 
Whitehurst  v.  Coleen                   1071 
Whitelegg  v    Whitelegg                1669 
Whiteley,  Re,  Whiteley  v.  Lea- 
royd                                        1035 
v.  Davis                                        1505 
Whiteley  &  Roberts,  Re              1860 
Whitelocke  v.  Baker  43 
Wbiteman's  Estate                        1282 
Whitenach  v.  Stryker                    852 
Whiteside  v.  Puiliam         1170, 1175, 
1317 
Whitesides  v.  Dorris                          90 
v   Lafferty                570,  1741,  1752 
White  Water  Valley   Canal  Co. 

?•   Comegvs  1565 

Whitfield,  Ex  parte         1354,  1364 

v.  Aland  1099 

v.  Evans  334 

v.  Lequeutre  1276 

v    Priekett  1040,  1042,  1694 

v.  Roberts  999,  1266 

Whitford  v.  Clark  County  932 

Whiting  v.  Bank  of  V.  S.     190.  294, 

994,  996, 998,  1019,  1575, 

1576,  1577,  1579 

v.  Bassett  95,  893 

r.  Hollister  3'i 

v.  Rush  707 

)•.  White  650 

v.  Whiting  1150.2037 

Whitley  v   Honeywell  445,  448 

v   Martin  855 

Whitlock  B    Marriot  312 

r.  Willord  1461 

Whitman  v.  Abernathy  277 

V.  Brotherton  I486 

r.  Fisher  553 

Whitmarsh  v.  Campbell       350,  402, 

406,  424,  759 

v  Robertson  123,  1411 

Whitmore  v.  Francis  386 

v.  Oxborrow  63,  814 

v.  Rvan  449.  452 

v.  Turquand  1770,  1780 

Whitney  v.  Belden    720,  WXt,  1008, 


Whitney  i\  Bigelow 

646 

v.  Cotton 

216 

V.  Cowan 

1560 

v.  Demiug 

1386 

v.  Fairbanks 

334 

v.  Goddard 

647 

v.  Leimiiuster  Savings  Bank  1320 
v.  M'Kiuney  194,  197,  260 

p.  Mayo  190,191,239,241,272 
v  New  York,  Mayor  &c.  of  806 
v.  Preston  830 

v.  Sauche  546 

v.  Smith  217,  280,  438 

v-  Stearns  165 

v.  Union  Railway  Co.  347, 1654 
v.  Whitney  342 

Whitridge  v.  Whitridge  560 

Whitsett  r.    City   Building   As- 
sociation 1214,1411,1437 
Whittaker  v.  Fox  .         398 
?'.  Howe  1663 
r.  Marlar                                 79,  80 
v   Whittaker  1218 
Whittemore,  Re  1716 
r.  Ad;ims  48 
v.  Amoskeag  Nat.  Bank           2398 
v.  Cowell                                     256 
r   Fisher                                    1320 
Whitten  v.  Jennings         1643,  1644, 
1670 
V.  Sawyer                                       107 
v.  Whitten                                 339 
Whittenton  Manuf  Co.  v.  Mem- 
phis &  0  R.  P.  Co.               313 
Whitthorue  v.  St.   Louis  Mut. 

Life  Ins.  Co.  615,  682 

Whittingham,  Re  122 

r.  Burgoyne  587 

v.  Wooler  1643, 1645, 1646, 

1681 
Whittingham's  Trusts,  Re  87,  179 
Whittingstall  r.  King  »>" 

Whittington  p.  Edwards       244,  513, 
797,804 
v.  Gooding  203,  253 

Whittle  v.  Artis  536 

v   Henning  99,  119,  123   1225 

Whitton  v.  Jennings         1343,  1644, 
1670 
v.  Wass  648 

v   Whitton  279,  1150 

Whitwood  v.  Kellogg        1386,  1391, 
1393 
Whitwood  Chemical  Co  v.  Hard- 
man  1657 
Whitworth  v.  Davis  157 
v.  Gaugain                                   1720 
v.  Whyddon           251,  1485,  1488, 
1603.  1725 
Whopham  v.  Wingfield          81,  1429 
Whyman  v.  Legh                            547 
Whvte  v.  Ahrens                             666 
v.  Whyte                                       851 
Wice  ?'."  Commercial   Fire   Ins. 

Co.  37 

Wich  v.  Parker  485,  761,  776 

Wichalse  v.  Short  1584 

Wiche'8  Case  125 

Wickenden  r.  Rayson        1025,  1027, 
1265,  1266 
Wickens     r      Townsend,     Mar- 
chioness of  182, 1748 
Wickersham  v.  Crittenden  334 
v.  Denman                                   1163 
Wickham,  Re,  Marony  v.  Tay- 
lor         354,  505,  797,  980,  1069, 
1453 
v.  Evered                                   1774 
v.  Hardy                                       1861 
r.  Nicholson                                1266 
Wickliffe  r.  Breckenridpe  281 
v.  Clav                      293,  1480,  1550 
Wick«  v.  Clutterbuck                   1126 
v.  Hunt                                      1081 
Widgery  v.  Tepper        117.  123.  438, 
1039,  1579, 1584 
Wiegleb  v.  Thomsen                    1029 


Wier  v  Simmons 

V.  Tucker 
Wier's  Appeal 
Wigan  v.  Kowlaud 
Wiggin  v.  Heywood 


200 

722, 1720 

1696 

877 
236 


Wiggingtou  v.  Pateman         70U,  792 

Wiggins  r.  Bethune  74 

i°  Peppin  307,  533,  1449 

v.  Pryor  905,915  918.  930 

Wiggle  c.  Owen  994,  1492 

Wigglesworth  v.  Dallison  1656 

Wigham  v.  Measor  1263 

Wiglit  v.  Prescott  844 

Wightinan  !'.  Brown  1028 

v.  Whieltou      821,  822,  823,  1070, 

2126 

Wigram  v.  Rowland  824 

Wike  v.  Lig'.itner  900 

Wilber  e.  Seldcn  1118 

Wilherforce  b   Hearfield  1103 

Wilbur  v   Collier  406 

v   Tobey  40 

Wilcher  V   Robertson  1270 

Wilcocks  v.  Carter  1620 

v.  Wlkocks  1054 

Wilcox  v.  Badger  659 

v.  Davis  324 

v.  Drake  1349 

v.  Henry  49 

v.  M  Lean  1587 

V.  Pratt  197 

v  Saunders  313 

v   Sturt  663 

v.  Wheeler  1637,  1640 

v.  Wilcox  4,  1352,  1478 

v.  Wilkinson  1475 

Wilcoxon  v.  Wilkins  449,  401 

Wild  v.  Bauning  1205 

V.Gladstone  686,688 

v.  Hobson  39,  796,  797,  1457 

v   Murray  29,  359,  1553 

v.  Wells  1166 

Wilde  v.  Gibson  328,382 

v.  Jenkins  666,  668 

v.  Lock  hart  1390 

V.  Walford  1409 

v.  Wilde  795,  1380 

Wilder  v   Boynton  793 

v.  Ember  68 

v.  Keeler  1204,  1516,  1517 

v.  Pigott  83 

Wildes  !'.  Dudlow  1200 

Wilding  v.  Andrews  1277,  1775 

v.  Bean  149 

Wildman  v.  Lade  1027 

Wiles  v.  Cooper  730,  1413 

v.  Hiles  101 

Wiley  v  Angel  284 

v.  Pistor  885,  890 

Wilford  v   Beaseley  1552 

Wilbelm  v.  Byles  230 

Wilhelm'a  Appeal  560 

Wilheui  v.  Keynolds  824 

Wilboit  V.  CunTiingham  313 

Wilkes  v.  Rogers  1316,  13">8 

v.  Saunion  1'_'33 

v.  Smith  214 

Wilkes's  Case  7 

Wilkin  v.  Nainby  507,  508,  519, 

529,  1590 

v.  Wilkin  379,  1151,  1106 

Wilkins  o  Aikin  1645,  1646 

v.  Fry  227 

v.  Kirkbride  277,  339 

v.  May  8i5 

v  Reeves  215 

v.  Shalcroft  629 

V.  Sibley  1691 

v  Stevens  1319,  1589 

v  Wilkins  526 

v.  Williams  1738,  1739 

v   Woodfln  846,  847 

Wilkinson,  Re  1010 

v.  Bauerle  542 

v.  Beal  152, 170,  378.  379 

v .  Belsher        37,40,42,301,406, 

414,  792 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 

[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 

Wilkinson  /•.  Bewick  1752 

v.  Brewer  1436 

v.  Castle  1103 

v.  Charlesworth     92.  105.  113,  813 

v.  Clements  1596,  1600,  lo63 

v.  Dobbie  233,  313,  349,  385 

v   Dodd  349 

v.  Fowkes        282,  982,  1531,  1533, 

1535 

w.Gibson  87,122,  179,349 

v.  Hartley  990,  1408 

i;.  Henderson  324 

v.  Hensiiaw  1379,  MX) 

v.  Hull  &c  Dock  Co.  1491 

v.  Joberns  1103 

v.  Letch  1301 

v.  Lewis  29 

v.  Lindgren  1427 

v-  Malin  1138 

v.  Oliver  165,  997 

v.  Parish  1577 

v.  Payne  1129 

v.  Perrin  254,  1507 

v.  Rutherford  1743 

v.  Schneider  95 

v.  rearcy  1561 

v.  Stringer  912 

v.  Trustees  1110 

v.  Turner  520 

v.  Wilkinson  997,  1235 

Wilks  v.  Fitzpitrick  98,  104 

Willan,  lie  161 

v.  Willan        956,  1189,  1196,  1197, 

1215,  1467,  1471,  1578,  1579 

Willard  v.  Fiske  1380,  1393 

v  Sperry  330 

v.  Willard  2027 

v.  Wood  1071 

Willats  v.  Bushby  150 

v.  Cay  96 

Willbauks  v.  Duncan  1680 

Willcock  v.  Terrell  1033,  1053 

Willcocks  v.  Butcher  1256 

Willcox  v    Bellaers  14"1 

Willenhall  Chapel,  Re  1852 

Willes  v.  Levett  815 

Willesford  v  Watson  671 

Willett  v.  Thiselton  1824 

v    Woodharns  388 

Wm.  Braufoot,  The  v.  Hamilton 

1440,  1444 
William    Rogers  Manuf.  Co.    v. 

Rogers  1657 

Williams,  Ex  parte  1358,1658 

He  1844 

Re,  Williams  v .  Williams         1034 
v.  Adkyns  1434 

V.  Allen  86,  201,  202,  218,  226,269 
1361,  1802 
v.  Attenborough  1271,  1278,  1280, 
1292 
v.  Attorney-General  811,  1725 

v.  Ayrault  1027 

v.  Baily  553 

v.  Bank  of  M.  25 

v.  Bankhead  149,  190,  191 

v-  Hegnon  14^3 

v.  Benet  1120 

c.  Benton  1215 

v-  Berry  328,  1070 

v.  Bevnon  1466 

v.  Bishop  1147 

v.  Blakey  1073 

v.  Bolton,  Duke  of  1630 

v.  Brisco  561 

v.  Broadhead  866,  870 

r.  Butcher  14^5 

v.  Carle  114  1552 

v.  Carmarthen  &  Cardigan  Ry 

Co.  1028,"  1030 

v.  Cassady  1434 

v  Chard  1169,  1540 

v.  Close  1024 

v.  Cooke  1539 

v.  Corwin  525 

v.  Coward  87,  178 

v.  Crosling  32 


CXXV11 


Williams  v.  Currie  1130 

v.  D.ivies         763,  1097,  1624,  1609 
v.  Day  194 

v.  De  Boiuville  1594 

v.  Douglas  351 

v.  Dunn  272 

v.  Farrington  567 

v.  First  Presby't  Society  324 

v.  Gibbea  1206,  1207,  1208 

v.  Gleuton  1471 

v.  Goodchild         I486,  1488,  1490, 

16H3 
v.  Grant  County  Court  303 

V-  Gray  838 

v.  Great   Western   Railway 

Company  1093,1128 

v.  Gue.-t  1U77,  1082 

v.  Halbert  1505 

v.  Hall  1676,  1677 

v.  Headland  1207 

v.  Hilton  1243,  1246 

v.  Hintermeister  1716 

v.  Hodgson  842 

v.  Hollingsworth  678,  986 

v.  Uoughtaling  1200 

v.  Hubbard  271 

v.  Jacksou      407,  1509,  1522,  1530 
v.  Jenkins  17a6,  17^:9,  1734 

v.  Jersey  324,  1654,  1663 

v.  Johns  1069 

v.  Johnson  1048 

v.  Jones      210,  236,  367,  380,  707, 

1411 
v.  Kinder  1508 

v.  Knipe  859 

v.  Lee  663,  664,  665 

v   Llanelly  Ry  &  Dock  Co       266 

V-  Llewellyn  852 

v.  Longfellow  708 

v.  M'Namara  1633 

V.  Maitland  886 

v-  Matthews  1561 

v.  Mattocks  1395 

v.  Mellish  1582 

v.  Morgan  1746 

v.  Neel  334,  345 

v.  Neil  974 

v.  Newton  493 

v.  Nolan  1719 
v.  Page        201,  203,  304,  809.  810, 
812,  994, 1021, 1022.  1027, 
1397,  1407 

v.  Palmer  1459 

v.  Parkinson  501 

v.  Poole  203 

v-  Pouns  1468 

v.  Powell  1420 

v.  Preston  1490 

v.Price  230,1074,1239 
v.  Prince  of  Wales  Life  Co        1837 

v.  Raggett  1032 

v.  Rhodes  1276 

v.  Roberts  1624 

v.  Rome  314 

v.  Rowland  807 

V    Russell  190 

v.  St.  George's  Harbor  Co        1476 

v.  Salmnnd  234,  242,  243,  94 

v-  Savage  Manuf  Co  778,  779 

v.  Sexton  314 

v.  Shaw  380 

v.  Smith  215,  200 

v-  Sorrell  1391,  1395 

v.  Starke  425 

v.  Starr  860 

it.  Steward  547 

v.  Stewart  280,  1623 

v.  Svmonds  1694,  1697 

v.  Thomas  855,  1896 

v.  Thompson  623.  5'24 

v.  Thorn  1°37 

v.  Unitea  States  8,  328.  1120 

v.  Vreeland  886.  951 

v.  Wager  1299 

v.  Walker  1668 

v.  Ware  1794 


CXXV111 


Williams  v.  Watkina 
v.  West 
V.  Wheaton 
v.  Whingates 
v.  Wilcox 
v   WilKins 


644 
341 
334 
232 
1127 
42 


v.  Williams  248,251,252,266,679, 

823,  824,  843,  868,  870,  876, 

891,   9U6,   936,   1071,   1075, 

1163,  1384,  1484, 1485,  1525, 

1526,  1634,  1654,  1665 

v.  Winans        280,  281,  1515, 1517. 

1531 

v.  Woodruff  1290 

v   Wright  1563 

v.  Young  575 

Williamson  v  Barbour  371,  667 

v.  Beckham  186 

v  Belsher  38 

v.  Dale  1284,  1286, 

1290 

v.  Gordon  167 

v.  Ha>  cock  333.  841 

v.  Hyer  1462 

v.  Jeffreys  1005,  1517,  1525 

v.  Johnson  997 

v.  London  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.      830 

v.  Lonsdale  230,262 

v.  M'Clintock  354 

v.  Montgomery  1079 

V.  More  951 

V.  Naylor  1205 

v.  New  Albany  R.  Co.  1733 

v.  New  Jersey   Southern   R 

Co  220 

v.  North  Staffordshire  Ry.  Co 

1444 

V   Seaber  2061 

v.  Selden  256 

v.  Smoot  24 

v.  Swindle  1167 

V.  Sykes  524,529 

v.  Wilson       794,  1715,  1716,  1727, 

1728,  1745,  1747,  1764 

Willie  v   Lugg  213 

Williman  r   Holmes  266 

Willimautic   Linen  Co   v.  Clark 

Thread  Co.  378,  1580 

Willimott  v.  Ogilby  1017 

Willing  v.  Consequa  48,  916 

Willingale  v.  Maitland  239 

Willingham  v.  King  369 

Willis  v.  Baddeley  1556, 1825 

v.  Beauchamp  354 

V.  Childe  774 

v.  Corlies  1734 

v.  Cowper  1033 

v-  Evans  422 

v.  Farrer  1122 

v.  Garbutt  32 

V.  Henderson  190,  238,  252 

v.  Hiscox  1419 

t;.  Howe,  Earl  650 

v.  Jernegan  666,  667 

v   Parkinson  1029,  1164 

v  Willis  170 

Williston  v.  Mich   Southern  and 

Northern  Ind    R.    It.  Co 

144,  190,  23S,  403 
v.  Salmon  1561 

Willitts  v    Waite  1751 

Willmer  v.  Kidd  1744 

Willmott  v.  Barber     324.  1377,  1395 
Willoughby  v   Chicago  Junction 

Railways  &c.  Co.  635 

v.  Lawrence  1654 

v.  Storer  13 

v.  Willoughby  1726 

Wills,  Re  37,  111,  351. 

1404 
v.  Dunn  253 

v.  Luff  999,  1037 

v.  Mc Kinney  840 

v.  Pauly  87, 109 

v.  Pugh  807 

V.  Slade  209 

V.  Whitmore  281 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 

[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging  ] 

Willson,  Re,  Att.-Gen.  v    Wood 

hall  406 

Willway,  Re  1874 

Willyauis  v   Hodge  178 

Wilu.er  r   R/tilroad  Co        1731,  1743 

Wilmington  M.  Co   v.  Allen        388, 

1614 

Wilinot  v.  Freehold  H   P   Co         32, 

354,639 

v.  Hellaby  1074 

v.  Kellaby  1074 

v.  Maccabe  566 

Wilson,  Re  102,  1342,  2001 

v.  Allen  990,  1408 

v.  Augers  1279 

v.  Applegarth  992 

v.  Balcarres  B.  S.  Co,  406 

f>.   Itanium  1115 

v.  Bates  605,  506,  507, 

797 
v.  Beadle  402 

v.  Beddard  1124.  1137 

v.  Bellows  279,  559 

v.  Bird  387 

v.  Biscoe  279 

v.  Blanco  142 

v.  Brownsmith  1427 

v.  Bull  1156 

v.  Carver  837 

v.  Chickering  197 

v.  Church  19,  145,  272, 

406,  1469 
v.  City  Bank  290,  292 

v.  City  of  Mineral  Point  1631 

v.  Clifton  897 

v.  Cluer  1252 

v.  Davidson  County  197 

v.  Davis  1463 

v.  De  Coulon  916 

v.  Donaldson  887 

v.  Doran  1770 

v.  Eifltr  287,  1481 

v.  Emmett  1844 

v.  Ferrand  633,  800 

V.  Forster  579 

v.  Ginger  1114 

v.  Grace  738 

v.  Gray  398 

v.  Green  1157 

v  Greenwood        1727, 1728, 1729, 
1732,  1948 
v  Gutteridge  1841 

v.  Haecker  1081 

v.  Hall  601 

v   Hammonds  356,  620,  630 

n.  Hart  1164,  1654 

v.  Hayward  277 

v.  Heaton  1428 

v.  Hicks  1130 

v.  Hill  586 

v.  Hillyer  678 

v.  Holcomb  846 

v.  Hooil  1847 

v.  Horr  378 

v.  Hyatt  1624 

v.  Kilcannon  652 

v.  Lynt  346,  347 

v.  McCullough  1624 

v.  Marsh  1255 

v.  Martin-Wilson  A   F.  A.  Co    149 
v.  Me  ne-ohas  68 

v.  Metnilfe      506,  1052,  1148,  1241, 
1251,1319,  1369,  1370,  1393, 
1542 
V.  Mitchell  91S 

v.  Moore  200,  269 

v.  New  York,  Mayor  of  1661 

v.  Northampton,  &c   R  Co     573, 
578,  1080,  1834 
v.  O'Leary  851 

v.  Parker  834 

v.  Polk  County  369 

v.  Rastall  575,  576 

v.  Rhodes  268 

v.  Riddle  797,  1073 

v.  Roach  1364 

v  Robertson  1627 


Mlson  v  Rockwell 

1638 

v.  Round 

1847 

v.  Kusling 

801 

v.  Scruggs 

702 

v.  Shawe 

497 

v.  Shively 

12 

v.  Smith 

892 

v   Squire 

1427,  1431 

v.  Stanhope 

243,  544,  602 

v.  Stolley 

2385 

v.  Thomson 

1406, 1448 

v.  Thornbury 

884.  1077 

v.  Todd 

1536,  1537, 

2060 

v.  Towle 

737,  846 

v.  Troup 

573 

V.  Turner 

1361 

v.  Union  Bank 

21 

v.  Watermau 

517 

v.  Webb 

1577 

v  Webber 

579,  1554 

t>.  Welch 

1736, 1743 

v.  West  Hartlepool  Ry.  Co      1469, 
1470 
v.  Weatherherd  817 

v.  Wilson     307,  308,  553,  694,  810, 
936,1234,  1247,  1311   1481, 
1527,  1723,  1377 
v  Win  term  ute  782 

Wilton  »  Clifton  746 

v.  Hill      37,67,68,111,112,1779 
v.  Jones  223,  257 

v.  Rum  ball  432 

Wiltshire,  Re  1261 

v.  Marshall  85,  908 

Wiltshire  Iron  Co.,  Re  1486 

Wil  ts  Railway  Co  ,  Re  1347 

Wimberg  v.  Schwegeman  1663 

Wimbleton  Local  Board  v  Croy- 
den  Rural  Sanitary  Author- 
ity 1675 
Winans  v  Winans                844,  1271 
Winbourn.iJe                              1743 
Winch  v.  Page  92 
Wincham  Shipbuilding  Co  ,  Re     26 
Wiucliell  v  Coney                          334 
Wiucbelsea  v  Garretty                 1695 
r    Wauchope                               1124 
Winchelsea,  Earl  of  v.  Garettv   1077, 
1078,  1082, 1462 
Winchester  v.  Browne                     830 
v.  Evans                                     1627 
v.  Jackson                  664,  842,  1627 
v.  Loud                                        149 
v.  Winchester           165,  974,  1120, 
1439, 1576  1577 
Winchester,  Bishop  of  v   Beavor 

167,  194,  261,  278 

v.  Bowker  1825,  1829 

v.  Knight  1634 

v   Mid  Hants  Ry   Co         230,  231, 

278,  1U21 

v.  Paine  281,  999,  1402 

Winder  v   Diffcnderffer  942 

Windham  v.  Cooper  810,  1556 

v.  Giuhilei  1742 

v.  Graham  1405,  1426 

Windley  v.  Bradway  891 

Windrin  v   Philadelphia  1662 

Windsors.  Cross  1029 

v.  McVeigh  853 

v   Windsor  286,  390 

Windsor  &  Annapolis  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Keg.  133 

Winfield  v   Bacon  1565 

Wing  v.  Angrave  850,  1503 

v.  Davis  194,  212 

v.  De  La  Rionda  1508 

v.  Fairhaven  1620,  1640,  1641, 

1664,  1668,  1669,  1675 

v   Goodman  1548,  1551 

v.  Morrell  230 

v.  Sherrer  552 

v.  Spaulding  1561 

v.  Tottenham,  &c  R.  Co  1221 

v.  Wing  660 

Wingard  v.  Jameson  1584 


Wingate  v.  Haywood  1623 

Wingfield,  Ex  parte  157 

Wingo  v.  Hardy  545,  726 

Wingrove  v.  Thompson  202 

Wioham  v.  Crutcher  325,  531 

Wiukworth  v   Wiakworth    096, 1796 

Winn  v.  Albert  1515,  1523 

v.  Bowles  197 

v.  Bull  561 

v.  Fletcher  630 

v.  Patterson  873 

Winue  v.  Reynolds  1108 

Winnebrenner  v  Colder  327 

Winninghoff  v   Wittig  1120 

Winnipissiogee  Lake  Co  v.  Perley 

1971,  1972, 

v.  Worster  287.  292,  358,  374, 

1613,  1631,1637,  1639 

v  Young  20, 25,  325,  358, 

546,  561 

Winooski  Turnp.  Co.  v.  Ridley     915 

Winpenny  v.  Courtney  1197 

Winscom,  Re  1863 

Wiuship  v.  Bass  1772 

v  Pitts  1634 

v.  Waterman  1309 

Winslow  e.  Ancratn  1255 

v.  Collins  1463,  1464,  1405 

v   Dousman  341 

v.  M.  &  P.  R.  Co.  257 

v  Nason  378,  1069, 1684 

Winsor  v.  Bailey  334,  737 

v.  Pettis  338 

Winston  v.  Campbell     165,  170,  753 

v.  Mitchell  418 

v.  Tennessee  and  Pac   R.  Co.   1650 

Winter  v.  Butt  1100 

v.  City  Council  1461 

v.  Dancie  919 

V.  Innes  1298,  1588 

•  v.  Mobile  Savings  Bank  830 

v.  Quarles  5*2 

v.  Smith  334 

Winterbottom  v.  Ingham  1215 

Winterfield  i\  Bradnum  154 

Winters  v.  Claitor  542 

Winthrop  v.  Elderton  688 

v.  Ethel  1029,  1461 

v.  Farrar  403,  405,  1512 

v.  Murray   413,  707,  792,  808,  1407 

v.  Royal  Exch.  Ass   Co.  28 

v.  Winthrop  796,  1588 

Winthrop  Iron  Co.  v.  Meeker      1716 

Wintle,  Re  865 

Wintle    v.    Bristol    and    South 

Wales  Railway  Co  1663 

Wirdman  »   Kent  1403,  1466 

Wirt  ».  Hicks  314 

Wisconsin  i».  Pelican  Ins.  Co.       357 

Wisden  »   Wisden  903 

Wise,  Re  1606 

v  Grand  Ave.  R  Co.  314 

v.  Lamb  1073 

v.  Williams  357 

Wiser  v.  Bliehly  254,  282,  1030, 

1478,  1575,  1570,  1577,  1578, 

1579,  1581,  1582 

Wisewold,  Re  1044,  1590 

Wisner  v    Barnet  559,  644 

v.  Grant  2897 

Wistar's  Appeal  1889 

Wiswall  v.  Sampson  1207 

Wiswell  v  Starr  149,  790,  1732, 

1733,  1735 

Witby  v.  Norton  1017 

Witham  v  Bland       1050,  1055,  1057 

v.  Salim  430 

Wither  v.  Winchester,  D  and  C. 

of  8 

Witherell  i;.  Wiberg  652 

Witherington  v   Banks  1240 

Withers  v.  Morrell  1653 

v.  Sims  334 

v.  Warner  21 

Witney  v   Haigh  1601 

Withrow  v.  Smithson  177 

Withy  v    Mangles  1499 

VOL.  I.  —  i 


TABLE   OP   CASES    CITED. 

[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 

Witkowski  v.  Hern  418 

Wits  v.  Polehampton  1130,  1134 

Witt  v.  Corcoran  1086,  1403 

v   Ellis  692 

Wittenbrock  v.  Bellmer  1461 

Witters  v.  Foster  15n7 

v  Sowles    2,  630,  1019,  1120,  1320 
Wittrnau  v.  Oppenneim  1643 

Witts  v.  Campbell  112,  403 

Witty  r.  Marshall  1352 

W  J   Johnson  Co.  v.  Hunt         1657 
Woddrop  v.  Price  986,  1033 

Woffeuden  v.  Woffenden 
Wolcote  v  Robbins 
Wolf  v.  Wolf 

v   Underwood 
Wolfe  v.  Birch 

v.  Burke 

v.  Matthews 
Wollaston  v.  Hakewell 
Wollen3ak  t'   Reiher 

V   Sargent 
Wollet  v.  Roberts 
Wolley  v.  Brownhill 
Wollstonecraft,  Ex  parte 


CXX1X 


1164 
563,  564 
1556 
1630 
1620 
1652 
1098 
500 
1642 
839 
713,  841 
1350, 
2293 
Wolmershausen      v.     Wolmers- 

hausen  1642 

Wolverhampton  &  Staffordshire 

Banking  Co.  v.  Bond      447,  448 
Wolverhampton  &  W  Rv   Co  i\ 

London  &  N.W.Ry.  Co.  671, 1596 
Woman's  Union  Miss.  Society  v. 

Mead  1411 

Womerslev,  Re  1040 

v.  Church  1638 

v.  Merritt  24.  25,  26,  239,  405 

Wonham  v.  Machiu  1265,  1390,  1424 

Wontner,  Re,  Brown  v.  White      868 

Wood,  Re  99,  100.  974 

v.  Ainley  1394 

v.  Anderston  Foundry  Co.         149 


v.  Ay  1  ward 

364 

v.  Barker 

1398 

v.  Barnicott 

1168 

v.  Beadell 

388,  1614 

v  Boosey 

46 

v.  Boucher 

1610 

v.  Bradell 

388 

v.  Braxton 

1628 

v.  Brewer 

1463 

v.  Briant 

652,  1253 

v.  Brush 

780 

v.  Carpenter 

560 

v.  Chart 

46 

v.  Cole 

916 

v.  Cooper 

1099, 1459 

V.  Currey 

555 

v.  Downes 

1777,1781 

v.  Dummer 

272 

v.  Edwards 

1775 

v.  Farthing 

1467 

v.  Freeman 

1061 

v.  Gregory 

1157 

v  Griffith    1460,  1468 

1477.  1473, 

1480 

v.  Hammerton 

959 

v,  Harpur 

749,  891 

v.  Hitchings  570, 

"17, 

1725.  1726, 
1750 

v.  Hubbard 

997 

v.  Hudson           60, 

551 

1286,  1556 

v.  Hurd 

1129 

v.  Keyes 

1017 

v.  King  Mauuf.  Co 

545 

v.  Lambirtta 

1311 

V.  Lee 

1166,  1234 

v.  Lenox 

1621 

V.  Lillies 

671 

t>.  Logsden 

162,  498 

v.  Lyne 

394 

,  1562,  1563 

?•    Mackinson 

1102 

v.  Majoribanks 

1406 

v.  Mann       349,  569,  676.  728,  729, 

948,  949,  952,  956,  957,  959.  960, 

1061,    1275,    1277.     1281,    1284, 

1623,  1577,  1578 


Wood  v.  Met'n  Life  Ins.  Co.  418 

v.  Midgley  365,  561,  588,  2086 

V.  Miluer  1468 

v.  Oregon  Dev.  Co.  1734 

v.  Robson  671 

v.  Rowcliffe  1652 

v.  Rowe  607,  671,  672 

v.  Silcock  561 

v.  Skelton  2095 

v.  Stane  858,  876 

v.  Strickland        615,  697,  704,  879 
v.  Sutcliffe  1637.  1663 

v.  Taunton  1860 

v.  Taylor  709 

v.  Thompson  599 

v.  Vincent  1040,  1041,  1695 

v.  Warner  1032 

v.  Westborough  630 

v.  White  230,  231 

?•.  Williams  193 

v.  Wood       46, 109,  110,  329, 1678 
Woodall  v.  Holliday  58 

v.  Moore  1580 

Woodard    v.    Eastern    Counties 

Ry.  Co.  855 

Woodburn  v   Woodburn  1120 

Woodburn's  Trusts,  lie  1412 

Woodbury  v.  Luddy  2259 

Woodcock  v.  Bennet  377,  1229 

v.  King  810,  1558 

v.  Oxford,  Worcester,  &  Wol- 
verhampton Railway  Co.       1601 
Wooden  v.  Wooden  1676 

Woodfin,  Re  1585 

v.  Anderson  236,  643 

v.  Phoebus  553 

Woodford  v.  Eades  1130 

Woodgate  v   Field       236,  1209,  1210 
Woodger  v  Crumpter  783 

Woodhatch  v   Freeland        840,  894, 
1822 
Woodhouse  ».  Woodhouse  201 

Wondhull  v.  Neafie  1282 

Wooding  v   Bradley  1309 

Woodley  v.  Johnson  1115 

Woodman  v.  Coolbroth  921 

v.  Freeman  630 

v.  Saltonstall  1961 

Woodroffe  v.  Daniel     424,  764,  1836, 
2124 
v.  Titterton  1191 

v.  Wood  1075 

Woodroft  v.  Soys  139.3 

Woodruff  v   Brown  1653 

v.  Depue  1258 

V.  Dubuque  &c.  R   Co.  737 

v.  North  Bloomfield  G.  M.  Co.  3*5 
v.  Straw  1168 

r.  Woodruff  231 

r.  Young  303 

Woodrum  v   Kirkpatrick  1553 

Wo.. a-  v.  Dike  657 

v.  1'itz  546 

v.  M' Innes  452 

r.  Monell  1271 

V.  Morrell     340.  347,  349,  722,  723. 
726,  728,  729,  759,  760,  768 
v.  Oliver  1225 

v.  Rankin  1259 

v.  Sowerby  236,  336,  360.  645 

V.  Svmmes  1707 

v.  Woods   571.  578,  730,  834.  1026, 
1413,  1^:J4 
Woodside  r  Morgan  1120 

v.  Woodside  994,  1492 

Woodson  v.  Palmer  1381 

V.  Smith  1215 

Woodstoek  Bank  v  Lawson        1245, 
1246 
Woodward  v.  Astley  354 

v.  Brace  1304 

v.  Conebear  181,493,1453 

v.  Donally  1864 

?'.  Dromgoole  1621 

v.  Eastern  Counties  Ry.  Co.     1395 
v.  Oylea  1655 

v.  Hall  191,  334 


cxxx 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 
[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 


Woodward  v.  King    1674,  1683,  1687 
V.  Lincoln,  Earl  1074,  1683 


v.  I'liillips 
v.  Pratt 
v.  Roberta 
r.  Schatzell 
V,  Twinaine 
V.  Williamson 

I      Wood 

r   Woodward 

Woodworth  >■  Campbell 

v.  Edwards 

r   Spring 

v.  Van  Buskirk 
Woodyard  v.  I'olsley 
Woodyatt  v.  Gresley 
Woodyear  v.  Schaefer 
Wool.' Matter  of 

i .  Tow  nsley 
Wooley  !■.  Drew       > 
Woolf  v.  Pemberton 
Woolfryes  v   Woolfryes 
Woollam  v   Hearn 


1244,  1245,  13S6 

'.15 

881 

1699, 1704 

509,  784 


212,220,287 
109,  1407,  1533 

2i>ll 

392,  395 

1355 

1021 

1209 

1724,  1734 

1638 

1841 

1590 

1580 

68,  69,  70 

84 

408,  860,  861, 

995 

v.  Ratcliff  1649 

Woollauds  v.  Crowther  96,  98 

Woollaston  v.  Wright  245 

Woollatt  v   Woollatt  1425 

Woolley  v   Colman  1159,  1267 

v.  North  London  Ry.  Co.  573 

Woolley's  Trusts,  Re  868,  893 

Woolman  v.  Ilearn  384 

Woolridge  v    McKenna  74 

Wools  v.  Walley  387 

Woolwich  v  Forrest  22 

Woolv  v.  Drag  1245 

Wooster  v.  Blake  700,  2383 

p.Clark  890,945,2392 

r.  Gumbirnner       1171,  11S0,  2394 

v.  Handy  2397 

v.  Muser  694 

V.  Plvniouth  1071 

v.  Woodhull  524,  529,  1026 

Wooten  v.  Smith  1668,  1677 

Woots  /•.  Tucker  1583 

\\  ooten  v.  Wooten  1405 

Wootten  v.  Burch  545,  718 

Worcester  v.  Truman  1683 

Worden  v.  Ellers  1662 

v.  Searls  1029 

Wordsworth  v.  Dayrell  100 

,■    Parkins  1520 

Worgan  v   Rvder  1167 

Work  v.  McCoy  779 

Working-Men's  Mutual  Society, 

Re  911 

Wormald  »  De  Lisle  368 

Worman  V.  Worman  555,  659 

Worms  r.  De  Valdor  5 

Worruser    v.    Merchants'    Nat 

Bank  1716 

Wormslev.  R»  286,  351,  1449 

/,'.  .  Haines  )•.  Wormsley  8P5 


Worsham  v.  Goar  916 

v.  Gove  915 

Worsley  ?'.  Watson  570 

Worssam.  Re  852 

Worswick,  Re,  Robson  v.  Wors- 

wick  571, 1835 

Worth  v.  M'Kenzie  176 

Wortham  v.  Dacre,  Lord    1377,  1404 

v.  Pemberton  91,  110,  111 

Wortheu  v   Badgett  1061 

Worthington,  lie  99,  1802 

v.  Batty  1643 

v.  Charter  Oak  Life  Ins.  Co.        51 

v.  Dublin  &c.  Ry.  Co.  573 


v.  Hiss 
v.  Lee 
v   M'Craer 
v.  Scribner 
v.  Ware 
Wortlcy,  Re 
v.  Birkhead 


1320 

215,  708,  1018 

1359 

581 

1620 

798 

173,  582,  660. 1581 


V    Start 
Worraker  v.  Pryer 
Worral  v.  Miller 

v.  Nicholls 
Worrall  v.  Harford 

v,  .Johnson 

r.  Marlar 

v   White 
Worrell  v.  Wade 
Worrill  v.  Coker 


1225 

236,  245 

1395 

13D6 

1845 

1842,  1S45 

102 

36 

1548,  1553, 1556 

1716 


Wotherspoon  v.  Currie 

1648 

Wotton  v.  Copeland 

209 

Woven  Tape  Skirt  Co., 

Re           1746 

Wragg,  Re 

1280 

v.  Morley                   438, 

Wray,  Re 

1069 

r.  Hutchinson 

715 

v.  Jamison 

1751 

v.  May 

1117 

v.  Thorn 

1128 

v.  Thornes 

1092 

Wren  v.  Kirton 

1277,  1752 

Wrench  v.  Wynne 

1041 

Wright,  Re 

100,  1798 

v.  Angle        593,  690 

,  756,  805,  831 

v.  Arnold 

97 

v.  Atkyns                  388,  1614,  1630 

v.  Barlow 

299.  301,  791 

v.  Bates 

845 

v.  Black 

29 

v.  Bourdon 

369 

r.  Bundy 

214,  220 

v.  Campbell 

783 

v.  Cantzou 

1287 

v.  Castle 

307,  3"8,  533 

v.  Chard 

180,  187,  1409 

v.  Clifford 

979 

v.  Cornelius 

270 

v.  Dame        145,  146 

,  361,  547,  588 

V.  Dorset 

1511 

v.  Dufield 

1^40 

v.  Dunklin 

985 

v.  Eaton 

1623 

v.  Edwards 

822 

v.  Everard 

28 

v.  Frank 

1548 

v.  Gay 

1584 

r.  Howard 

303,  13li9 

r.  Hunter 

1404 

v.  Irving 

398 

r.  King 

101,  454,  1847 

v.  Kirby 

1390,  1424 

v.  Larnmth 

905,  1213 

r.  Lukes 

1781 

v.  Lvnde 

1397 

v.  McKean 

857 

v.  Maidstone,  Lord 

3!  «2 

r.  Mayer 

574,  1825 

v.  Mayo 

571 

v.  Meek 

607, 1517 

Wright  v.  Miller  165. 1019 

v.  Mills  18,  196,  581 

v.  Mitchell  1799 

v.  Mudie  1409 

v.  Navlor  1347 

v.  Phillips  991,  1567 

v.  Phipps  1517 

v.  Plumptree  545 

v.  Robotham  1162 

r.  Rutter  97 

v.  Santa  Clara  Mining  Asso- 
ciation 296 
v.  Smith                                       1403 
v.  Strother  986 
v.  Tatham       810,  1458,  1573,  1574 
v.  Vanderplank                           1358 
v.  Vernon      1158,  1535,  1734,  1831 
v.  Wellesley                                 1051 
v.  Wilkin    385,  756,  906,  945,  1725 
v.  Willcox                         1097,  1105 
v.  Wright      88.  311,  312,  389,  408, 
1061,1119,  1148.  1232,1234, 
1260,  1277,  1369,  1384,  1412, 
1845 
Wrixon  v.  Vize                     652,  1741 
Wroe  v.  Clayton                    463,  1453 
v.  Seed                                1417, 1418 
Wrottrs  Case  133 
Wrotteslev  r.  Bendish    169,  183,  568 


v.  Methodist  Episcopal  Church. 
Trustees  of 


S,  0 


1827 

1437 

1386 

994 

561 

1069 

1169 

1551 

1120 

1350 

182 

644 

144,  296,  842 

1675 

1221 

Wycombe  Railway  Co   v.  Don- 

nington  Hospital  995,  1081 

Wye  Valley  Ry.  Co   r.  Hawes       243 
Wyersdale"  School,  Re  1857 

Wvkes  v.  Ringleberg  179 

Wvkliam  v.  Wykham  1405 

w'\Mr.  Ward  10n3 

Wj  Hie  v  Ellice      29,  30,  31,  33,  409, 
583,  681,  1362,  1590 
v.  Green  1047 

Wylly  A.  Trustees  v.  Sanford        334 


Wroughton  v.  Barclay 

v.  Colquhoun 
Wyatt  v.  Cook 

v.  Garlington 

v.  Luton 

v.  People 

v.  Sadler 

v.  Sweet 

v.  Thompson 

v.  Wood 
Wybourn  v   Blount 
Wych  r.  East  India  Co 

v.  Meal 
Wyckoff  v  Cochran 
AVycoff  v.  Combs 


Wylson  v.  Dunn 
AVyman  v   Babcock 

v.  Knight 

v.  Southward 

r.  Wilcox 
Wymer  v.  Dodds 
Wyndham  v   Ennismore 

v.  Ennismore,  Lord 
Wynkoop  v.  Van  Beuren 
Wvnn  v.  Morgan  98 

Wynne  v.  Callander 

v.  Edwards 

v   Griffith 

i:  Hughes 

r.  Humberston 

r.  Newborough,  Lord 


364 

1923,  2227, 

2228 

1062 

48 

418 

406 

221 '4 

1355 

1675 

),  990,  1408 

346 

1003 

1220 

70S 

1825,  1S34 

173:-!,  1738, 

1739,  1749 


Y. 


Yalden,  Ex  parte 
Vale  v.  Baum 

'■.  hoderer 
Yancy  v    Batte 

V    Ken  wick 
Yard  v.  Ocean  Beach  Ass'n 


1843 
1679 
186 
1158 
361 
1317, 
1395 


Yardley  '•.  Arnold 

v.  Holland 
Yare  v   Harrison 
Yarnall  v.  Rose 
Varrington  v   Robinson 
Yate  v.  Lighthead 
Yates  v  Compton 


1098 

Yates  >•.  Crewe 

167 

640 

v.  Farebrother 

1772 

771,  1781 

v.  Hambly 

260,  1251,  1252 

701 

v.  Hardy 

763.  1184 

243 

?'.  Jack 

1638 

396, 1526 

v.  Law 

334 

227,  254 

v.  Madden 

2182 

Fates  v.  Mouroe  296,  1123 

v.  Plumbe  1328 

i    Sherrington  116,  117 

v.  Tiadale  1564 

v.  University  College  1459 

Tattoo  v.  Loudon  &  L.  F.  Ins. 

Co.  .1071 

Yauger  v.  Skinner  85,  366 

Yeager  v.  Wallace  1743 

Yearsley  v.  Uudgett  519,  521 

i).  Yearsley  1379, 1589,  1590 

Yearwood's  Trusts,  Jit  349 

Yeatman  v.  Belluiaiu  S8;  189 

v   Mou-ley  440 

8    Read  1012 

v   Yeatman  200,251,324 

Ye  it'in  v   Lenox  303 

Vi  o  !     Krere  1316 

Yeoui  ins  v   Haynes  1213 

v   Kilvington  1683 

Yerbury,  Re,  Ker  v.  Dent  1035 

Yescombe  v.  Landor  1037 

Yetts  v   Biles  1601 

v    Norfolk  Ry.  Co  242,  243 

v.  Palmer  1722,  1725 

Yewens  v.  Robinson  59 

Yick  Wo  v.  Crowley  1620 

Yingling  v   Hesson  1117 

Yoke  v.  Barnet  91 

Yonge  v.  McCormick  1677 

Yongus  »   Billups  1622 

York  v.  Brown  1234,  1413 

v.  Pilkington  1164 

v.  White  244.  794 

York, Archbishop  ofv.  Stapleton  582, 

1182 

York  Buildings  Co.,  Case  of      6,  1.33 

York,  Mayor  of  v.  Pilkington      272, 

341,  1620. 1682 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 

[The  references  are  to  the  star  paging.] 

York  Mauuf.  Co.  v.  Cutts  544 

York  and  North  Midland  Ry.  8. 

Hudson  742.  1513 

Yorke  r   Fry  605,  615,  619,  620 

v.  Yorke  536 

Yorkshire  Banking  Co.  8.  Mul- 

lau  418,  1650,  1716 

Yorkshire  Waggon  Co.  v.  New- 
port Coal  Co.  406 
Yosi  v.  Aldersou                               1031 
8.  Devault                                  1081 
Youde  8.  Cloud                               1416 
Youl,  Re                              .     1611 
Youle  v.  Richards                  711,  >s44 
Young,  Ex  parte  147 
Ex   parte,   lit   Quartz    Hill 

Co.  889 

v.  Aronson  60 

v.  Bank  of  Alexandria  So:; 

v.  Brassey  1669 

v.  Buckett  1728 

v.  Bush  793 

v.  Butler  1653 

v.  Clarendon  Township  560 

v.  Clarksville  Man.  Co.  732 

8.  Cusliing  149 

8.  Davis  67 

8.  Dearborn  1845 

8.  Edwards  1163 

v.  Emery  1620 

v.  English  1843  '• 

8.  Everest  1374, 1422, 1437  i 

8.  Fernie  876,  1071,  1642  \ 

8   Gentis  830  j 

8.  Goodson  1591  i 

v.  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co.  1120 

8.  Grundy  837 

v.  Henderson  986,  1576 

8.  Hodges  334  I 


cxxxi 


Young  v.  Hopkins 

846 

8.  Keighly 

1576,  1577,  1578 

v.  Leamington 

v.  Lillard 

989 

8.  Lyons 

267,271,341 

v   Macrae 

1049 

i.  Montgomery  &  Eufaula  R. 

Co.  2U,743 

8.  Quincey  B05,  B  7 

v.  Rathbone  369,  989,  1218 


v.  Key  uolds 

1227 

r.  Rodes 

199 

v.  Rondout  &  K  G.  L. 

Co.      1675 

v   State 

57.; 

V.  Sutton 

1163 

r.  Teague 

1286,  1291 

v.  Tliomas 

1381. 1463 

V.  Ward 

215 

r   Waterpark,  Lord 

653 

v.  Wheeler 

r.  White               609,  617,  61! 

8.  Wiight 

848 

r.  Young 

815, 1157 

Youngblood  8.  Schamp 

395.  11  -. 

1668,  1669 

v.  Youngblood 

552 

Younge  v.  Cocker 

73 

v.  Cooper 

1161 

r.  Duncouibe 

1774 

8   Pate 

1255 

Youngs,  Re,  Doggett  8.  Revett      39, 

797,  14^-0 

Yourie  v.  Nelson            3* 

,  177   1233. 

1457, 1846 

Yovatt  v   Winyard 

1650 

Yow  8.  Townsend 

1031 

Yuengling  8.  Johnson 

1614 

Yule  8.  Yule             1699 

17o4.  1706, 

1707, 1708 

z. 


Zabel  v  Harshman 

Z  ibriskie  v.  .Jersey  City  &  1 

It.  R.  Co. 
7.  imbaco  v.  Cassavetti 
Zane  v.  Cawley 

v    Kink 
Zearing  v.  Ruber 
Zecharie  v.  Bowers 


590 

Zeininger  r  Schnitzler 

860 

Zell's  Appeal 

641 

1637 

Zelle  v.  Workingmen's  B.  Co. 

190 

764 

Ziegler  8.  Chapin 

1071 

844 

Zieverink  v.  Kemper 

2 

197 

Zihlman  v.  Zihlman 

1561 

1654 

Zimmer  v.  Miller 

1401 

458 

Zimmerman  8.  Huber 

1301 

Zimmerman  8.  Willard  324 

Ziou  Church  8.  St.  Peter's  Church 

25 

Zivi  v.  Einstein  840 

Zulueta  8.  Vincent        446,  461 .  462, 

520,  711 

Zunkel  v.  Litchfield  920,  1168 


ADDENDA. 


Dawson  >'  Whitehaven  Bank  125 
De  Stacpoole  v.  De  Stacpoole  108 
Driskill  v.  Cobb  1621 


General  Share  Trust  Co.  v.  Chap- 
man 1842 


Howard  v.  Shrewsbury,  Earl 


THE    PRACTICE 


OF    THE 


HIGH    COURT    OF    CHANCERY. 


*  CHAPTER  I. 

THE   COMMENCEMENT   OF    A    SUIT. 


*1 


The  practice  of  the  Court  of  Chancery,  and  of  its  various  offices,  is 
regulated  by  rules  laid  down  in  Acts  of  Parliament,  in  the  General  Orders 
of  the  Court  passed  or  promulgated  from  time  to  time,  in  the  Regula- 
tions of  the  Judges  for  the  conduct  of  business  in  their  chambers  and 
of  the  Registrars  of  the  Court  respecting  the  transaction  of  business  in 
their  office,  and  by  custom  or  usage,  to  be  ascertained  generally  from 
former  decisions  of  the  Court;1  the  decisions  of  the  Court  are  also 
important  in  determining  the  construction  to  be  put  upon  the  Acts  of 
Parliament,  General  Orders,  and  Regulations. 

It  will  be  the  object  of  this  Treatise  to  explain  the  practice  of  the 
Court  in  reference  to  its  equitable  jurisdiction.2 


t  "  Ancient  and  uniform  practice  consti- 
tutes the  law  of  the  Court,  as  much  as  a  positive 
order,"  per  Lord  Eldon,  2  Mer.  2.  "  Great  care 
is  necessary,"  says  Mr.  Justice  Clifford,  "in 
Equity  suits,  in  following  closely  the  rules  of 
the  Court  and  the  settled  course  of  practice; 
otherwise  the  bar  would  become  confused,  and 
the  Court  rind  itself  involved  in  difficulties  far 
greater  than  need  be  if  the  regular  course  of 
practice  is  pursued."  Union  Sugar  Ref.  v. 
Mathiesson,  3  Cliff.  146. 

2  By  the  original  Judiciary  Act,  and  now 
by  the  U.  S.  Rev.  Stats.  §  913,  the  forms  and 
modes  of  proceeding  in  suits  of  Equity  in 
the  U.  S.  Courts  shall  be  according  to  the 
principles,  rules,  and  usages  which  belong  to 
Courts  of  Equity.  And  the  settled  doctrine  of 
the  U.  S.  Supreme  Court  is,  that  the  remedies 
in  Equity  are  to  be  administered  according  to 
the  practice  of  Courts  of  Equity  in  England,  the 
parent  country  from  which  we  derive  our 
knowledge  of  them.  Robinson  v.  Campbell,  3 
Wheat.  222;  Boyle  ».  Zacharie,  6  Pet.  658; 
Clark  v.  Reyburn,  8  Wall.  323  ;  Smith  v. 
Burnham,  2  Sumner,  612,  625.  And  by  Rule 
90  of   the   Rules   of    Practice,     prescribed    in 

VOL.    I.  —  1 


1842  by  the  U.  S.  Supreme  Court  for  the 
Courts  of  Equity  of  the  United  States,  it  is 
provided  that  where  those  rules  or  the  rules 
of  the  Court  itself  do  not  apply,  the  practice  of 
the  Circuit  Court  shall  be  regulated  by  the  pres- 
ent practice  of  the  High  Court  of  Chancery  in 
England,  "so  far  as  the  same  may  reasonably 
be  applied  consistently  with  the  local  circum- 
stances and  local  convenience  of  the  district 
where  the  Court  is  held,  not  as  positive  rules, 
but  as  furnishing  just  analogies  to  regulate  the 
practice." 

In  the  States  of  the  Union,  the  old  rules  of 
English  Chancery  practice  are  recognized  as 
the  basis  of  their  Chancery  practice.  West  o. 
Paige,  1  Stockt.  203,  Morris  v.  Taylor,  23  N.J. 
Eq.  131, 134;  Newark  and  N  Y.  R.  Co  r.  Mayor 
of  Newark,  id.  515,  517;  Bur  rail  v.  Karnes, 
5  Wis.  260.  "Not,"  as  said  by  Wilde  J.  in 
Saunders  t>.  Frost,  5  Pick.  272,  "  indiscrimi- 
nately, but  only  as  they  appear  reasonable  and 
comformable  to  the  spirit  of  nur  system  of  juris- 
prudence and  general  rules  of  practice."  Rules 
of  Court  are  designed  for  the  general  guidance 
of  suitors;  but  the  Chancellor  may  make  an 
order  in  a  particular  case  altering  or  departing 


*3 


THE   COMMENCEMENT   OF    A    SUIT. 


*  2  *  A  suit  on  the  Equity  side  of  the  Court  of  Chancery,  on  behalf  of 

a  subject,  is  ordinarily  commenced  by  preferring  a  petition,  con- 
taining a  statement  of  the  plaintiff's  case,  and  praying  the  relief  which 
he  considers  himself  entitled  to  receive.1  (a)  This  petition,  when  pre- 
ferred by  a  subject,  is  called  in  the  old  books  an  English  Bill,  by  way  of 
distinction  from  the  proceedings  in  suits  within  the  ordinary  or  common- 
law  jurisdiction  of  the  Court,2  which,  till  the  statute  of  4  Geo.  II.  c.  26, 
were  entered  and  enrolled,  more  anciently  in  the  French  or  Norman 
tongue,  and  afterwards  in  Latin  ;  whereas  bills  in  Chancery  were,  from 
very  early  times,  preferred  in  the  English  language.3  The  bill  is  ad- 
dressed to  the  Lord  Chancellor,  Lord  Keeper,  or  Lords  Commissioners, 
for  the  custody  of  the  Great  Seal ; 4  unless  the  seals  are  in  the  Queen's 
hands,  or  the  holder  thereof  himself  is  a  party,5  in  which  case  the  bill  is 
addressed  to  the  Queen  herself,  in  her  Court  of  Chancery.6 

If  the  suit  is  instituted  on  behalf  of  the  Crown,  or  of  those  who 
partake  of  its  prerogative,  or  whose  rights  are  under  its  particular  pro- 
tection, such  as  the  objects  of  a  public  charity,  the  matter  of  complaint 
is  offered  to  the  Court,  not  by  way  of  petition,  but  of  information7  by 
the  proper  officer,  of  the  rights  which  the  Crown  claims  on  behalf  of 
itself  or  others,  and  of  the  invasion  or  detention  of  those  rights 

*  3        for  which   the    suit   is    instituted.8      This   proceeding  *  is  then 

styled  an  information.1    The  rules  of  practice  incidental  to  these 


from  a  rule  of  Court.  Greene  v.  Han-is,  11 
R.  I.  5,  citing  Rhode  Island  v.  Massachusetts, 
14  Pet.  210,  257;  Rowlev  v.  Scales,  1  S.  &  S. 
511;  In  re  Lyons,  1  Dr.  &  W.  327,  333;  Dicas 
v.  Lord  Brougham,  6  C.  &  P.  249;  Burrell  ». 
Nicholson,  6  Sim.  212.  See  also  Marsh  v. 
Crawford,  1  Swan,  116,  and  compare  Maultsby 
v.  Carty,  11  Hum.  361. 

1  As  to  the  value  of  the  subject-matter,  see 
Cons.  Ord.  IX.  1.  (b) 

2  As  to  the  procedure  on  the  common-law 
side  of  the  Court,  see  12  &  13  Vic.  c.  109; 
Orders  of  29  Dec.,  1848,  and  3  Aug.,  1849, 
Chitty's  Arch.,  1741 ;  and  post,  Chap.  XXXIX. 
§  7,  Receivers. 

3  See  Ld.  Red.  8:  1  Spence,  Eq.  Jur.  368; 
Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  7.  There  are  some  bills  in 
early  times  in  the  French  language.  See  Cal. 
Proc.  Chan.,  printed  by  Public  Rec.  Com., 
1827,  cited  Ld.  Red.  8,  "n.  (o). 

4  Ld.  Red.  78.  As  to  Lords  Commissioners, 
see  Hardy's  Life  of  Ld.  Langdale,  vol  2,  p. 
258,  et  seq.  In  the  United  States,  suits  are 
commenced  by  bill  or  petition  addressed  to 
tire  Chancellor,  Judge,  or  Judges  presiding  in 


the  particular  Court,  either  by  name  or  official 
designation.  Infra,  357,  n.  1;  Story,  Eq.  PL 
§  26;  Barb.  Ch.  Pr.  35. 

5  See  Lord  Keeper  v.  Wyld,  1  Vera.  139; 
Coop.  Eq.  PI.  23. 

6  Ld.  Red.  7.  In  Massachusetts,  where 
cases  in  Equity  may  be  commenced  by  bill 
or  petition,  with  a  writ  of  subpoena,  according 
to  the  usual  course  of  proceedings  in  Equity, 
or  inserted  in  an  original  writ  of  summons, 
or  of  summons  and  attachment,  &c.,'see  Pub. 
Stats,  c.  151 ,  §§  6,  7.  "  Had  the  statute  omitted 
to  prescribe  any  form  of  process,  or  to  give  any 
authority  to  the  Court  to  make  one,  the  bill  as 
used  in  England  in  Chancery  proceedings,  and 
the  proceedings  under  it,  as  there  practised, 
would  necessarily  have  been  adopted  here." 
Per  Parker  C.  J.  in  Commonwealth  v.  Sumner, 
5  Pick.  365,  366.  An  action  of  contract,  praying 
for  relief  in  Equity,  is  to  be  treated  as  a  suit 
in  Equity.  Topliff  v.  Jackson,  12  Gray,  565; 
Irvin  r.  Gregory,  13  Gray,  215. 

7  Ld.  Red.  7. 

8  Ld.  Red.  22;  Story,  Eq.  PL  §  8. 

i  The   title   "  information  "   is    no    longer 


(a)  The  date  on  which  the  bill  is  filed  is 
the  earliest  that  can  be  assigned  as  the 
commencement  of  a  suit  in  Equity.  Clark  v. 
Slayton,  63  N.  H.  402;  Collins  v.  Ins.  Co.  91 
Tenn.  432.  The  notice  by  lis  pendens  begins 
only  when  service  is  made  on  the  defendant. 
Duff  v.  McDonough  (Penn.).  25  Atl.  Rep.  608. 
See  Burleson  v.  McDermott  (Ark.),  21  S.  W. 
2 


Rep.  222;  Zieverink  r.  Kemper  (Ohio),  34  N. 
E.  Rep.  250.  The  time  when  judicial  proceed- 
ings were  begun  to  avoid  the  bar  of  a  statute 
may  be  proved  by  parol  evidence.  Witters  v. 
Sowles,  32  Fed.  Rep.  765. 

(b)  The  Chancery  Consolidated  General 
Orders  of  1860  were  repealed  by  the  Rules  of 
the  Supreme  Court,  1883. 


THE    COMMENCEMENT   OP   A    SUIT.  *  3 

two  methods  of  instituting  a  suit  in  Equity  are  substantially  the 
same. 

Where,  however,  the  relief  sought  to  be  obtained  is  the  administration 
of  the  estate  of  a  deceased  person,  a  summary  and  inexpensive  practice 
has  been  established  by  the  Act  to  Amend  the  Practice  of  the  Court 
of  Chancery,2  which  provides  that,  in  cases  of  this  description,  without 
either  formal  pleading,  or  any  direct  application  to  the  Court  itself, 
a  summons  may  at  once  be  obtained  at  the  chambers  of  the  Master  of 
the  Rolls,  or  of  a  Vice-Chancellor,  and  an  order  be  made  on  the  hearing 
thereof  to  administer  the  estate.  Where,  also,  it  is  sought  to  obtain 
the  appointment  of  a  guardian  for  an  infant,  or  an  allowance  out  of 
his  property  for  his  maintenance,  the  application  may  be  made  by 
summons.3 

Again,  under  Lord  Justice  Turner's  Act,4  a  very  convenient  form  of 
application  to  the  Court  was  provided  for  cases  where  the  parties,  agree- 
ing upon  the  facts  that  form  the  foundation  of  their  claims,  are  desirous 
of  obtaining  a  judicial  decision  upon  the  construction  of  an  instrument, 
or  tipon  almost  any  point  of  law  resulting  from  the  admitted  facts.  In 
cases  of  this  description,  the  parties  are  enabled,  without  going  through 
any  forms  of  pleadings,  at  once  to  submit  the  case  that  they  have  agreed 
upon  for  the  decision  of  the  Court. 

Many  Acts  of  Parliament,  under  which  statutory  powers  are  con- 
ferred upon  the  Court,  point  out  the  particular  mode  by  which  relief 
thereunder  is  to  be  sought  from  the  Court ;  and  it  may  be  stated,  as  a 
general  rule,  that  a  person  seeking  the  aid  of  the  statutory  jurisdiction 
must  apply  by  a  petition,  which  is  not  regarded  as  the  commencement 
of  a  formal  suit.5 


used  in  England,  the  proceedings  being  by 
waj'  of  action  and  commenced  by  writ  of 
summons.  Att.-Gen.  v.  Shrewsbury  Bridge 
Co.  W  N.  (1880)  23;  42  L.  T.  79^  and  see 
K.  S.  C.  Ord.  I.  1. 

2  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §§  45,47.  This  Act, 
being  either  obsolete,  superseded,  or  repro- 
duced by  the  R.  S.  C.  1883,  was  repealed  by 
46  &  47  Vic.  c.  49,  §  4.  Sched. 

3  See  post,  Chap.  XXIX.  §  2,  Proceedings 
in  the  Judges'  Chambers  (Infants). 

*  13  &  14  Vic.  c.  35,  §§  1-18. 

5  Infra,  Chap.  Xl.IV.  General  Equity  juris- 
diction in  Massachusetts  was  conferred  upon 
the  Supreme  Judicial  and  Superior  Courts 
by  Pub.  Stats,  c.  151 ;  Stat,  of  1883,  c.  223,  and 
1891,  c.  383.  In  New  York,  the  jurisdiction 
of  Equity,  part  of  which  was  to  exercise  its 
powers  at  all  times,  devolved  upon  the  Su- 
preme Court.  A  justice  of  that  Court  might 
hear  a  petition  in  Chambers  in  those  matters 
where  the  usage  of  the  Chancellor  was  so  to 
do     Wilcox  v.  Wilcox,  14  N.  Y.  575. 

In  regard  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court 
of  Chancery  in  Vermont,  see  Cheever  v.  R.  & 
B.  R.  R.    Co.  39    Vt.    654.       In    Maine,   see 


Androscoggin   &   Kennebec    R    R.  Co.  v.  An- 
droscoggin 1!.  It.  Co.  49  Maine,  392. 

By  the  "  Supreme  Court  of"  Judicature  Act  " 
of  1873  it  was  provided  in  England  that  all 
suirs  previously  commenced  by  bill  or  informa- 
tion in  the  High  Court  of  Chancery  shall  he 
instituted  in  the  tligh  Court  of  Justice  estab- 
lished by  that  Act,  by  a  proceeding  to  be 
called  an  action:  that  "suit"  shall  include 
"action,"  and  "action"  shall  mean  a  civil 
proeeedingcommeneed  by  writ,  or  in  such  other 
manner  as  may  be  prescribed  by  rules  of  Court, 
and  shall  not  include  a  criminal  proceeding  by 
the  Crown  ;  that  "cause"  shall  include  any 
action,  suit,  or  other  original  piuceeding  be- 
tween a  plaintiff  and  a  defendant,  and  any 
criminal  proceeding  by  the  Crown;  and  "mat- 
ter" shall  include  every  proceeding  in  the 
Court  not  in  a  cause.  L.  R.  8  Stat.  349,350. 
This  Act  also  provides,  in  effect,  for  the  ad- 
ministration of  equitable  relief  to  either  plain- 
tiff or  defendant  in  all  cases  in  which  such 
relief  would  have  been  given  by  a  Court  of 
Equity.  Ibid.  317.  See  1  Dan.  Ch.  Prac. 
(6th  Eng.  ed.)  Introd. 


*5  *  CHAPTER   II. 

PERSONS   BY   WHOM    A    SUIT   MAY   BE   INSTITUTED. 

Section  I.  —  The  Queen's  Attorney-General. 

It  is  a  general  rule,  subject  to  very  few  exceptions,  that  there  is  no 
sort  or  condition  of  persons  who  may  not  sue  in  the  Court  of  Chan- 
cery, and  this  rule  extends  from  the  highest  person  in  the  State  to  the 
most  distressed  pauper.1 

The  Sovereign  herself  has  the  same  right  which  a  subject  has  to  insti- 
tute proceedings  in  her  own  Courts  for  the  assertion  of  any  right  claimed 
either  on  behalf  of  herself  or  others ;  and  the  same  principles  which  entitle 
a  subject  to  the  assistance  of  the  Courts,  to  enable  him  to  assort  his  rights, 
are  equally  applicable  to  the  Sovereign.  Thus  a  suit  has  been  instituted 
on  behalf  of  the  Queen  to  have  the  benefit  of  a  discovery  from  persons 
charged  to  be  aliens,  of  the  place  of  their  birth,  in  order  to  assist  her  in 
a  commission  to  inquire  into  their  lands,  with  the  view  of  seizing  them 
into  her  hands  by  inquisition.2  For  the  same  reason,  where  an  office 
cannot  be  found  for  the  Crown  without  the  aid  of  a  Court  of  Equity,  the 
Court  will,  at  the  suit  of  the  Crown,  interfere  to  restrain  the  commission 
of  waste  in  the  mean  time.8 

It  has  been  said  that  the  Queen  is  not  bound  to  assert  her  rights  in  any 
particular  Court,  but  that  she  may  sue  in  any  of  her  Courts  which  she 
pleases,  without  reference  to  the  question  whether  the  subject-matter 
of  her  suit  is  such  as  comes  within  the  peculiar  jurisdiction  of  such 
Court.4  Thus  she  may  have  a  quare  impedit  in  the  Queen's  Bench,5  or 
she  may  elect  to  sue  either  in  a  Court  of  Common  Law  or  in  a  Court  of 
Equity.6  Upon  an  accurate  examination,  however,  of  the  cases  that  have 
given  rise  to  these  general  assertions  of  the  rights  of  the  Crown,  it  ap- 
pears that  equitable  grounds  were  alleged  in  each  case  for  instituting  the 

l  As  to  a  person  under  disability  suing  in  2  Du  Plessis  v.  Att.-Gen.,  1  Bro.  P.  C.  ed. 

a  foreign  country,  see  Worms  v.  De  Valdor,  Toml.  415,  419. 

W.  N.  (1880)  16;  28  W.  R.  346,  Fry  J.     As  3  Att.-Gen.  v.  Du  Plessis,  2  Ves.  286.    As 

to  disabilities  arising  from   (1)  outlawry  in  a  to  office  found,  see  now  22  &  23  Vic.  c.  21,  §  25. 

civ  1  action  abolished  by  the  Civil  Procedure  4  n  Rep.  68b;  ib.  75  a;  Plowden,  236,  240, 

Acts,  Repeal  Act,  1879  (42  &  43  Vic.  c.  59,  244. 

§  3),  and  1  Dan.  Ch.  Prac.  (5th  ed.)  pp.  52-  «  11  Rep-  68  b 

54;   (2)  excommunication    was    abolished    by  6  The  King  r.  Arundel,  Hob  109  ;  Att.-Gen. 

53  Geo   III.  c.  127,  §  3,  and  popish  recusancy  v.  Vernon,  1  Vern.  2(7,   370;  2  Ch.  K.   353; 

was  virtually  abolished  bv  31  Geo.  III.  c.  32;  1  Eq.  Cas.  Ab.  75,  pi.  1;  133,   pi   16;  and  see 

(3)  as  to  duress  and  civil"  status  of  a  nun,  see  the  cases   cited    8  Beav.  283,  and   the  Judg. 

Re  Metcalfe,  2    De  G.  J.  &  S.  122;    10  Jur.  ment,  p.  287. 
N   S    224,  287;  Evans    v.  Cassidy,  11  Ir.  Eq. 
243;  Blake  v.  Blake,  4  lr.  Ch.  349. 
4 


THE   QUEEN'S    ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 


*6 


proceedings  in  Chancery.  It  seems,  nevertheless,  to  be  true,  that 
the  Queen  may  proceed,  in  questions  relating  to  *  the  property  *6 
to  which  she  is  entitled  in  right  of  her  Crown,  either  in  a  Court 
of  Law  or  in  a  Court  of  Equity ;  and  that  where  she  has  caused  a  Court 
of  Equity  to  be  informed  that  an  intrusion  has  been  committed  on  her 
land,  although  no  matter  of  equitable  jurisdiction  has  been  stated,  yet 
the  information  has  been  entertained  :  but  in  such  cases,  if  any  ques- 
tion of  law  arises,  the  Court  will  put  it  in  the  course  of  trial  by  a  Court 
of  Law,  and  retain  the  information  till  the  result  of  such  trial  is  known.  1(a) 
In  general,  however,  suits  on  behalf  of  the  Crown  are  instituted  in  the 
Court  which,  by  its  constitution,  is  most  properly  adapted  to  the  case, 
and  the  Court  of  Exchequer  being  the  general  Court  for  all  business 
relating  to  the  Queen's  revenue  or  property,  the  practice  has  been  to  insti- 
tute there  all  proceedings  relating  to  the  property  of  the  Crown. 


i  Att.-Gen.  to  the  Prince  of  Wales  v.  Sir  J. 
St.  Aubyn,  Wightw.  167,  and  the  cases  there 
cited;  see  also  Att.-Gen.  r.  Mayor  of'Plymouth, 
id.  134.  By  the  5  Vic.  c.  5,  §  1,  it  is  enacted, 
that  on  Oct.  15,  1841,  all  the  power,  authority, 
and  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  of  Exchequer  at 
Westminster  as  a  Court  of  Equity,  should  be 
transferred  and  given  to  the  High  Court  of 
Chancery.  Upon  tills  statute  Lord  Langdaie, 
M.  R.,  in  Att.-Gen.  v.  London,  8  Beav.  285, 
said  he  thought  "  the  almost  unavoidable  con- 
struction of  the  Act  made  it  so  operate  as  to 
leave  to  the  Court  of  Exchequer  everything  that 
was  not  exercised  or  exercisible  by  that  Court 
as  a  Court  of  Equity,  and  to  transfer  to  the 
Court  of  Chancery  all  that  was  exercised  or 
exercisible  by  the  Court  of  Exchequer  as  a 
Court  of  Equity."  Hence,  in  all  matters  af- 
fecting the  rights,  property,  and  revenue  of 
the  Crown,  the  Court  of  Exchequer,  sitting  on 
the  Equity  side,  had,  before  the  Act,  a  juris- 
diction, notwithstanding  the  Crown  might,  in 
the  particular  cases,  have  had  a  legal  remedy, 
and  that  this  jurisdiction  has  by  the  Act  been 
transferred  to  the  Court  of  Chancery;  and 
that,  by  virtue  of  that  transfer,  the  Crown  is 
now  enabled,  in  matters  of  revenue  depend- 
ent upon  legal  rights,  to  sue  in  the  Court  of 
Chancery,  even  though  there  would  be  no 
jurisdiction  in  similar  cases  between  subject 
and  subject.  This  decision  was  affirmed  by 
the  House  of  Lords;  but  their  lordships  care- 


(a)  It  is  for  the  officers  of  the  Crown  to 
make  out  clearly  the  prerogative  in  an}-  case 
where  they  claim  to  be  on  a  different  footing 
from  the  subject,  as  regards  procedure  in  any 
litigation;  and  in  an  information  in  the  nature 
of  a  transitory  action,  the  Attorney-General 
may  lay  and  retain  the  venue  where  he  pleases. 
Att.-Gen.  v.  Churchill,  8  M.  &  W.  171;  Att.- 
Gen.  to  the  Prince  of  Wales  v.  Grossman,  L.  R. 
1  Ex.  381,  386;  Dixon  v.  Farrer,  56  L.  J.  Q.  B. 
63,  affirming  55  id.  497;  17  Q.  B.  D.  658. 


fully  avoided  determining  this  question,  as  to 
which  they  expressed  great  doubt.  1  H.  L. 
Cas.  440  In  whatever  way  this  question  may 
be  ultimately  decided,  it  has  been  held  by  the 
Court  of  Exchequer  that  it  still  retains  an 
equitable  jurisdiction  in  matters  of  revenue. 
Att.-Gen.  v.  Hailing,  15  M.  &  W.  687,  700 ;  Att.- 
Gen.  v.  Hallett,  id.  97;  8  Beav.  288,  n.  But 
see  Att.-Gen.  v.  Kingston,  6  Jur.  155,  Ex;  Att.- 
Gen.  v.  Barker,  L.  R.  7  Ex.  177.  The  procedure 
in  suits  by  information  in  the  Court  of  Ex- 
chequer relating  to  the  revenues  of  the  Crown 
was  regulated  03*  "  The  Crown  Suits  Act, 
1865  "  (28  &  29  Vic.  c.  104),  and  Reg.  Gen. 
Exch.  14th  March,  1866;  L.  R.  I  Ex.  389; 
12  Jur.  N.  S.  Pt.  II.  182.  The  power  of  that 
Court  over  revenues  is  now  possessed  by  the 
Queen's  Bench  Division,  Sup.  Ct.  of  .Fud. 
Act,  1873  (36  &  37  Vic.  c.  66),  as  modified 
by  order  in  Council  of  Jan.  6,  1881.  See  Att.- 
Gen.  v.  Metropolitan  District  Ry.  Co.  5  Ex. 
D.  218,  C.  A.;  Att.-Gen.  r.  Constable,  4  Ex. 
D.  172;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Barker,  L.  R.  7  Ex.  177; 
Att.-Gen.  v.  Shrewsbury  Bridge  Co.  W.  N. 
(1880)  23,  M.  R.  Where  "the  Court  of  Chancery 
would  have  jurisdiction,  as  between  subject 
and  subject,  it  seems  clear  that  the  Crown, 
may  file  an  information  in  that  Court  for  an 
account.  Att.-Gen.  v.  Edmunds,  L.  R.  6  Eq. 
381,392,  V.  C  G.  :  and  see  Att.-Gen.  v.  Lon- 
don, 1  H.  L.  Cas.  440;  see  also  the  case  of 
York  Buildings  Co.  2  Atk.  56. 


As  to  criminal  and  quo  warranto  infor- 
mations, see  Shortt  on  Informations;  10  Am. 
&  Eng.  Encl.  of  Law,  702.  An  informa- 
tion in  the  nature  of  a  quo  warranto,  though 
a  criminal  proceeding  in  form,  is  a  civil 
remedy.  State  v.  Hardie,  1  Ired .  (N.  C.)  42; 
Saunders  t\  Gatling,  81  N.  C.  298;  Ames  v. 
Kansas,  111  U.  S.  449;  Foster  v.  State,  112 
U.S.  201;  Illinois  v.  Illinois  Central  R.  Co 
33  Fed.  Rep.  721. 


*  8  PERSONS   BY   WHOM    A    SUIT   MAY   BE   INSTITUTED. 

*7  *  In    all  cases  where   the    rights   of   the    Queen,    or   of   those 

who  partake  of  her  prerogative,  are  the  subject  of  the  suit,  the 
name  of  the  Sovereign  is  not  made  use  of  as  the  party  complaining;  but 
the  matter  of  complaint  is  offered  to  the  Court  by  way  of  information 
given  by  the  proper  officer.  That  officer,  if  the  information  is  exhibited 
in  any  of  the  Superior  Courts  at  Westminster,  is  the  Attorney-General, 
or  if  the  office  of  Attorney-General  should  happen  to  be  vacant,  the 
Solicitor-General.1 

Besides  the  cases  in  which  the  immediate  rights  of  the  Crown  are 
concerned,  the  Queen's  officers  may,  in  some  cases,  institute  proceed- 
ings on  behalf  of  those  who  claim  under  the  Crown,  by  grant  or  other- 
wise ;  or,  more  correctly  speaking,  those  who  claim  under  the  Crown  may 
make  use  of  the  Queen's  name,  or  of  that  of  her  proper  officer,  for 
the  purpose  of  asserting  their  right  against  a  third  party,2  or  they  may 
sue  in  their  own  names,  but  in  such  case  they  must  make  the 
*8         Attorney-General  *  a  party  to  the  suit.1  (a) 


i  Ld.  Red.  7,  21,  22:  Wilkes's  case,  4 
Burr.  2527;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  49.  The  Sover- 
eign also  has  officers  of  the  same  description 
in  the  county  palatine  of  Lancaster  and  in 
the  Duchy  of  Lancaster.  But  the  Attorney- 
General  in  a  county  palatine,  or  other  like 
jurisdiction,  is  not  recognized  as  such  in 
Westminster- Hall :  arguendo,  Att.-Gen.  to 
the  Prince  of  Wales  v.  St.  Aubyn,  Wightw. 
178;  see  Same  v.  Lambe,  11  Beav.  213;  Same 
r.  Grossman,  L.  R  1  Ex.  381;  12  Jur.  N.  S. 
712;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Devonshire,  14  Q.  B.  I). 
195;  Dyke  v.  Stephens  (No.  2),  W.  N.  (1885) 
177  ;  and  11  Geo.  IV.;  1  Will.  IV.  c.  70;  and  6 
&  7  Will.  IV.  cc.  19,  87,  as  to  the  jurisdictions  of 
the  Bishops  of  Durham  and  Ely,  and  as  to  Wales 
and  Chester.  Rights  purely  public  are  to  be 
enforced  in  the  name  of  the  State,  or  the  officer 
intrusted  with  the  conduct  of  public  suits. 
Smith  v.  Comm.  of  Butler  County,  6  Ohio,  101. 
While  the  office  of  Attornev-General  was  abol- 


(a)  A  certified  copy  of  an  order  from  the 
U.  S.  Attorney-General  to  a  District  Attorney, 
directing  a  suit  in  Equity  to  be  proceeded 
with,  proves  that  the  bill  was  filed  by  the  for- 
mer's authority.  Mullan  v.  United  States,  118 
U.  S.  271 ;  10  Fed.  Rep.  785.  A  bill  in  equity 
lies  to  annul  a  patent  for  land  which  recites  that 
it  is  brought  by  the  United  States  by  a  certain 
U.  S.  District  Attorney,  and  is  signed  with  the 
name  of  the  Attorney-General  by  such  District 
Attorney.  Ibid.  When  the  United  States  is 
bound  to  issue  a  patent  to  the  true  owner  of 
land,  its  Attorney-General  may  sue  in  equity 
in  its  name,  to  annul  a  patent  for  the  land,  issued 
through  the  patentee's  fraud.  United  States  v. 
Beebe,  127  U.  S.  338;  Colorado  Coal  &,Iton 
Co.  v.  United  States,  123  U.  S.  307;  United 
States  v.  Throckmorton,  98  U.  S.  61;  United 
States  v.  Marshall  Silver   M.   Co.   129  U.    S. 


ished  in  Massachusetts,  most  of  the  duties  of 
that  officer,  which  were  not  required  to  be  per- 
formed by  him  personally,  having  been  dis- 
tributed among  and  vested  in  the  District 
Attorneys,  as  the  local  prosecuting  officers, 
Shaw  C.  J.  said  he  was  "  strongly  inclined  to 
the  opinion  that  the  filing  of  an  information 
in  Equity  was  not  a  duty  which  the  Attorney- 
General  was  required  to  do  personally;  that 
duty  would  have  vested  in  a  Solicitor-General, 
if  there  had  been  one;  it  was  necessarily  inci- 
dent to  the  office  of  Attorney-General,  and  was 
vested  in  the  District  Attorneys  in  their  respec- 
tive districts."      Parker  v.  May,  5  Cush.  340. 

2  Dwyer,  1  PI.  7,  8;  Keilw.  169;  5  Bac. 
Ab.  tit.  Prerog.  F.  3;  Miles  v.  Wi'liams,  1  P. 
Wins.  249,  252;  Earl  of  Stafford  v.  Buckley, 
2  Ves.  Sr.  170,  181. 

i  Balch  v.  Wastall,  1  P.  Wins.  445;  Hay- 
ward  v.  Fry,  id.  446 ;  see  also  Rex  v.  Fowler, 
Bunb.  38. 


579;  United  States  v.  Hancock,  133  U.  S.  193; 
United  States  r.  Trinidad  Coal  &  C.  Co  137 
U.  S.  160;  United  States  v.  Tichenor,  12  Fed. 
Rep.  415;  United  States  v.  McGraw,  id.  449 ; 
United  States  v.  White,  17  id.  561;  United 
States  r.  Rose,  24  id.  196.  The  same  rule 
applies  to  a  patent  obtained  by  mistake  which 
prejudices  the  rights  of  the  government  or  the 
public.  United  Mates  v.  San  Jacinto  Tin  Co. 
125  U.  S.  273;  Western  Pacific  R.  Co.  v.  United 
Siates,  108  U.  S.  510;  Williams  v.  United 
States,  138  U.  S.  541;  30  Fed.  Rep.  3u9.  Such 
fraud  or  mistake  must  be  specifically  averred 
and  clearly  proved.  United  States  v.  Maxwell 
Land  Grant  Co.  122  U.  S.  365;  United  States 
r.  Iron  Silver  M.  Co.  128  U.  S.  673.  In  such 
cases  the  government  is  not  precluded  by  fraud 
of  its  officers  in  issuing  the  patent.  Moffat  v. 
United  States,  112   U.  S.  24.     If   not   the   real 


THE    QUEEN'S    ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 


9 


Informations  may  also  be  exhibited  by  the  Attorney-General  or 
other  proper  officer,  in  support  of  the  rights  of  those  whose  protection 
devolves  upon  the  Crown  as  supreme  head  of  the  Church.  Thus  the 
Queen,  as  supreme  head  of  the  Church,  is  the  proper  guardian  of  the 
temporalities  of  the  bishoprics;  and  an  information  may,  therefore,  be 
brought  by  the  Attorney-General  to  stay  waste  committed  by  a  bishop.2 

In  like  manner,  the  Attorney-General  may  exhibit  informations  on 
behalf  of  those  who  are  considered  to  be  under  the  peculiar  protection 
of  the  crown  as  parens  patrice  :  such  as  the  objects  of  general  charities,3 
idiots  and  lunatics.4  Moreover,  this  privilege  of  the  Attorney-General 
is  not  confined  to  suits  on  behalf  of  charities,  strictly  so-called,  but  has 
been  held,  in  many  instances,  to  extend  to  cases  where  funds  have  been 
made  applicable  to  legal  and  general  purposes.5  The  rule  in  such  cases 
appears  to  be,  "  that  where  property  affected  by  a  trust  for  public  pur- 
poses is  in  the  hands  of  those  who  hold  it  devoted  to  that  trust,  it  is 
the  privilege  of  the  public  that  the  Crown  should  be  entitled  to  intervene 
by  its  officer,  for  the  purpose  of  asserting,  on  behalf  of  the  public  gen- 
erally, that  public  interest  and  that  public  right  which  probably  no 
individual  could  be  found  willing  effectually  to  assert,  even  if  the  interest 
were  such  as  to  allow  it."  6 

*  Suits  on  behalf  of  idiots  and  lunatics  are  usually  instituted         *9 
by  the  committees  of  their  estates ;  but  where  there  has  been  no 
committee,  or  where  the  interest  of  the  committee  is  likely  to  clash  with 
that  of  the  persons  whose  estates  were  under  his  care,  informations  have 


2  See  Knight  v.  Mosely,  Amb.  176 ;  Wither 
v.  D.  &  C.  of  Winchester,  3  Mer.  421,427; 
Jefferson  v.  Bishop  of  Durham,  1  Bos.  &  Pull. 
129,  131. 

3  See  Att.-Gen.  v.  Clergy  Society,  8  Rich. 
Eq.  (S.  C.)  190;  Wright  v.  Trustees  of  Meth. 
Epis.  Church,  1  Hoff.  Ch.  R.  202;  2  Kent,  285- 
288,  4  id.  507. 

4  See  Norcom  v.  Rogers,  16  N.  J.  Eq. 
484. 

5  Att.-Gen.  v.  Brown,  1  Swanst.  265;  Att.- 
Gen.  c.  Shrewsbury,  6  Beav.  220,  227 ;  Evan 
v.  Avon,  29  Beav.  144;  33  Beav.  67;  6  Jur. 
N.  S.  1361;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Lichfield,  11  Beav. 
120;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Norwich,  16  Sim.  225,229; 
Att.-Gen.  v.  Guardians  of  Southampton,  17 
Sim.  7,  13;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Eastlake,  11  Hare, 
205;  17  Jur.  801;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Wigan,   Kay, 


party  in  interest,  it  is  affected  by  laches  on  the 
part  of  those  whose  interests  it  supports.  United 
States  v.  Beebe,  supra ;  Same  t.  Wentz,  34 
Fed.  Rep.  154.  The  bill  need  not  offer  to  re- 
pay the  purchase  money.  Moffat  v.  United 
States,  supra ;  United  States  r.  Minor,  114 
U.  S.  233. 

The  United  States  may  also  maintain  a  bill 
in  equity  to  cancel  a  patent  for  an  invention 
obtained  by  fraud.  United  States  v.  American 
Bell  Tel.  Co.  128  U.  S.  315;  32  Fed.  Rep.  591; 


268;  5  De  G.  M.  &  G.  52;  18  Jur.  299;  Att.- 
Gen.  v.  West  Hartlepool  Imp.  Commissioners, 
L.  R.  10  Eq.  152. 

6  Per  Sir  J.  L.  Knight  Bruce  V.  C.  in  Att.- 
Gen.  v.  Compton,  1  Y.  &  C  C.  417,  427.  In 
Massachusetts  under  Pub.  Stats,  c.  17,  §  6.  the 
Attorney-General  is  required  to  enforce  the 
due  application  of  funds  given  or  appropriated 
to  public  charities  within  the  State,  and  prevent 
breaches  of  trust  in  the  administration  thereof. 
The  power  of  the  Attorney-General  or  public 
prosecutor  to  institute  a  proceeding  for  the 
enforcement  of  a  public  charity,  is  a  common- 
law  power,  incident  to  the  office.  Parker  v. 
May,  5  Cush.  336,  338,  per  Shaw  C.  J.  See 
Wright  v.  The  Trustees  of  the  Meth.  Epis. 
Church,  1  Hoff.  Ch.  11.  202;  and  Code  of  Ten- 
nessee, §  3409,  tt  seq. 


United  States  v.  Gunning,  18  id.  511;  New 
York  &  B.  C  P.  Co.  r.  New  York  C.  P.  Co. 
9  id.  587.  Such  a  bill  is  not  maintainable  on 
grounds  that  have  already  been  sustained  in  a 
suit  for  infringement  of  the  patent.  United 
States  v.  Colgate,  32  Fed.  Rep.  624.  The 
Attorney-General  cannot,  in  his  own  name, 
"as  he  is  the  Attorney-General  of  the  United 
States,"  maintain  a  bill  to  repeal  a  patent  for 
an  invention.  Att.-Gen.  v.  Rumford  Chemical 
Works,  32  Fed.  Rep.  608. 

7 


*  10  PERSONS   BY   WHOM    A  SUIT   MAY   BE   INSTITUTED. 

been  exhibited  on  their  behalf  by  the  Attorney-General,  as  the  officer 
of  the  Crown ; !  and  in  such  a  suit,  if  no  committee  has  been  appointed, 
the  Court  will  proceed  to  give  directions  for  the  care  of  the  property  of 
the  lunatic,  and  for  proper  proceedings  to  obtain  the  appointment  of  a 
committee.2  Persons  incapable  of  acting  for  themselves,  whether  com- 
ing under  the  description  of  idiots  or  lunatics  or  not,  may  sue  by  their 
next  friend,  without  the  intervention  of  the  Attorney-General.3 

It  seems  that  when  an  information  is  filed  on  behalf  of  a  lunatic,  he 
must  be  named  as  a  party  to  the  suit,  and  that  merely  naming  him  as  a 
relator  will  not  be  sufficient ; 4  a  distinction,  however,  appears  to  be  taken 
between  cases  where  the  object  of  the  suit  is  to  avoid  some  transaction 
of  the  lunatic,  on  the  ground  of  his  incapacity,  and  those  in  which  it  is 
merely  to  affirm  a  contract  entered  into  by  him  for  his  benefit,  or  to 
assert  some  claim  on  his  behalf.5  In  the  former  case  it  was  held,  that 
the  lunatic  ought  not  to  be  named  as  plaintiff,  because  no  man  can  be 
heard  to  stultify  himself;  if  he  is  named,  however,  it  is  no  ground  for 
demurrer.6  The  reason  for  making  a  lunatic  a  party  in  proceedings  of 
this  nature  appears  to  be,  that  as  no  person  can  be  bouud  by  a  decree  in 
a  suit  to  which  he,  or  those  under  whom  he  derives  title,  are  not  parties, 
and  as  a  lunatic  may  recover  his  understanding,  the  decree  will  not  have 
the  effect  of  binding  him  unless  he  is  a  party ;  and  upon  the  same  prin- 
ciple it  is  held,  that  where  a  suit  is  instituted  on  behalf  of  the  lunatic 
by  his  committee,  the  committee  must  be  named  as  a  co-plaintiff,  in 

order  that  the  interest  of  the  committee  in  the  lunatic's  estate 
*10      may  be  barred.7     The  *  same  reason  does  not  apply  to  cases  of 

idiots,  because  in  contemplation  of  law  they  never  can  acquire 
their  senses  ;  they  are,  therefore,  not  considered  necessary  parties  to  the 
proceedings  on  their  behalf.1 

1  SeeAtt.-Gen.  v.  Parkhurst,  1  Ch.  Cas.  1  Att.-Gen.  v.  Woolrich,  1  Ch.  Cas.  153; 
112;  Att.-Gen.tr.  Woolrich,  id.  153;  Att.-Gen.  and  see  post.  Chap.  III.  §  7,  Idiots  and  Luna- 
v.  Tyler,  1  Dick.  378:  2  Eden,  230;  Norcom  v.  tics  (Plaintiffs).  The  powers  conferred  upon 
Rogers,  16  N.  J.  Eq.  484.  the   Attorney-General   and   Commissioners   by 

2  Att.-Gen.  v.  Howe,  Ld.  Red.  30,  n   (m).  59  Geo.  III.  c.  91,  continued  by  2  &  3  Will.  IV. 

3  Liney  v.  Wetherley,  Ld.  Red.  30,  n.  (n);  c.  57,  §  11,  to  institute  proceedings  concerning 
Light  v.  Light,  25  Beav.  248;  West  v.  Davis,  charities,  were  practically  superseded  by  ''The 
Rolls,  1863,  W.  No.  83:  and  see  post,  Chap.  Charitable  Trusts  Acts.  1853  to  1869,"  16  &  17 
III.  §  7,  Idiots  and  Lunatics  (Plaintiffs).  Vie.  c.  137;  18  &  19  Vic.  c.  124;  23  &  24  Vic. 
Infra,  86,  n.  1.  c.  136:  25  &  26  Vic.  c.  112;  32  &  33  Vic.  c. 

*  Att.-Gen.  v.  Tyler,  1  Dick.  378;  2  Eden,  110.  See  post,  Chap.  XXXVIII.  As  tothemar- 
230;  Ridler  v.  Ridler,  Eq.  Cas.  Ab.  279.  See  riage  laws  of  England  and  proceedings  there- 
Story  Eq.  PI.  §  64;  Gorham  v.  Gorham,  3  Barb,  under,  see  4 Geo.  IV.  c.  76;  6  &  7  Will.  IV.c.85; 
Ch.  R.  24.  1  Vic.  c.  22;  3  &  4  Vic.  c.  72  ;  19  &  20  Vic.  c. 

6  Att.-Gen.  v.  Parkhurst,  1   Ch.  Cas.  112;  119;  12  &  13  Vic.  c.  68,  §  15;  24  &  25  Vic.  c. 

Att.-Gen.  v.  Woolrich,  id.  153.  100,  §  53;  36  &  37  Vic.  c.  66,  §  34  (2);  R.  S.  C. 

6  Ridler  v.  Ridler,  1  Eq.  Ca.  Ab.  279,  pi.  5;  Ord.  1. 1 ;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Willshire,  W.  N.  (1875) 

and  see  Tothill,  130.     See  infra  83.  182;  Same  v.  Severne,  1  Col.  313  ;  8  Jur.  595; 

1  Norcom    v.    Rogers,    16  N.    J.   Eq.   484.  9  .Tur.  574;    Same  v.  Lucas,  2  Hare,  566;    2 

Under  the  16  &  17  Vic.  c.  70,  the  custody  of  Phil.   753;    Same   v.  Teather,  29  W.  R.  347; 

the  estate  is  usually  committed  to  the  commit-  Same   v.  Wareing,  28  W.   R.  623  ;    Same  v. 

tee   by  an   order  of   the   Lord    Chancellor  or  Akers,  W.  N.  (1872)  45;    2   Seton.  768;    Same 

Lords  Justices,  which,  however,  by  §  63,  has  v.  Clements,  L.  R.  12  Eq.  32;    Same  v.  Read, 

the  same  force  and  validity  as  a  grant  under  id   38;  Same  v.  Mullay,  4  Russ.  329;   7  Beav. 

the  Great  Seal.    For  form  of  order,  see  Elmer's  351. 
Prac.  126. 

8 


THE   QUEEN'S   ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 


*10 


In  all  cases  of  suits  which  immediately  concern  the  rights  of  the 
Crown,  its  officers  proceed  upon  their  own  authority,  without  the  inter- 
vention of  any  other  person;'2 (a)  but  where  the  suit  does  not  iinniedi- 


2  Ld.  Red.  22,  Att.-Gen.  v.  Vernon,  1  Vern. 
277,  370;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Crofts,  1  Bro.  P.  C.  ed. 
Toml.  136. 

The  Attorney-General  cannot  bring  a  bill  or 
information  to  redress  a  private  wrong,  as,  for 
example,  to  restrain  a  city  council  from  mak- 
ing a  water-rate  merely  nominal,  under  a 
statute    which    required    the    revenues   to    be 


(a)  As  to  informations  against  purprestures, 
or  intrusions  and  encroachments  upon  the 
Sovereign's  rights  in  tide  lands,  and  public 
nuisances,  see  Att.-Gen.  v.  Richards,  2  Anst. 
603;  Same  v.  Burridge,  10  Price,  350;  Same  v. 
Parmenter,  id.  378,  412;  Same  v.  Terry,  L.  R. 
9  Ch.  423;  Same  v.  London,  18  L  J.  Ch.  314; 
Same  v.  Chambers.  4  De  Gex  &  J.  55;  Same  v. 
Johnson,  2  Wils.  Ch.  87 ;  Same  v.  Cbamberlaine, 
4  K.  &  J.  292;  Glossop  ?;.  Heston  Local  Board, 
12  Ch.  D.  102;  A.-G.  v.  Tomline,  id.  214;  Same 
v.  Shrewsbury  Bridge  Co.  21  Ch.  D.  752;  Same 
v.  Williamson,  60  L.  T.  930;  Pennsylvania  v. 
Wheeling  Bridge  Co.  18  How.  518;  13  id.  518; 
United  States  v.  Pittsburgh  &c.  R.  Co.  26  Fed. 
Rep  113 ;  Story,  Eq.  Jur.  §  921.  As  to  penalties, 
see  Att.-Gen.  v.  Bradlaugh,  14  Q.  B.  D.  667. 

In  the  earlier  periods  of  the  English  law 
the  Sovereign  doubtless  sued  as  did  the  subject, 
by  the  same  writ,  "by  his  attorney,"  and  with 
the  same  process  and  incidents;  and  even  at 
the  present  day,  the  right  of  the  Crown  in 
England  is  not  limited  to  informations,  but 
extends  to  the  bringing  of  an  action  in  the  ordi- 
nary sense.  See  Bradlaugh  v.  Clarke,  8  App. 
Cas".  354,  375;  Dixon  v.  Fairer,  17  Q.  B.  D. 
658.  The  Exchequer  Division  in  England  now 
has  all  the  powers  formerly  possessed  by  the 
Court  of  Exchequer  respecting  the  revenue,  un- 
affected by  the  Judicature  Acts.  Att.-Gen.  v. 
Constable^  4  Ex.  D.  172. 

The  Attorney-General  may  maintain  an  in- 
formation in  Equity  to  restrain  a  corporation, 
exercising  the  right  of  eminent  domain  under 
legislative  authority,  from  so  abusing  or  per- 
verting its  powers  as  to  create  a  public  nui- 
sance or  endanger  public  interests.  Agar  v. 
Regent's  Canal  Co.  Cooper  temp.  Eldon,  77; 
Att.-Gen.  v.  Great  Northern  Ry.  1  Dr.  &  Sm. 
154;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Mid-Kent  Ry.  L  R.  3  Ch. 
100;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Leeds  Corp.  L.  R.  5  Ch.  583; 
Att.-Gen.  v.  Great  Eastern  Ry.  Co.  11  Ch.  D. 
449;  5  App.  Cas.  473;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Great 
Northern  Ry.  4  De  G.  &  Sm.  75;  Att.-Gen. 
v.  Leeds,  18  W.  R.  517;  Nuneaton  Local  Board 
v.  General  Sewage  Co.  L.  R.  20  Eq.  127; 
Att.-Gen.  v.  Shrewsbury  Bridge  Co.  21  Ch.  D. 
752;  Coosaw  Mining  Co.  v.  South  Carolina, 
144  U.  S.  550;   People  v.  Ballard  (N.  Y.),  32 


appropriated  to  keep  down  the  interest  on  the 
debt  created  for  the  erection  of  the  waterworks, 
and  to  the  creation  of  a  sinking-fund  to  meet 
the  principal.  Att.-Gen.  v.  Salem,  103  Mass. 
140.  Or,  to  restrain  a  private  trading  corpora- 
tion from  doing  acts  not  authorized  by  its 
charter.  Att.-Gen.  v.  Tudor  Ice  Co.  104  Mass. 
239. 


N.  E.  Rep.  54;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Cohoes,  6  Paige, 
133;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Cambridge,  16  Gray,  247; 
Att.-Gen.  v.  Tudor  Ice  Co.  104  Mass.  239, 
Att.-Gen.  v.  Jamaica  Pond  Aqueduct,  133  Mass. 
361. 

But  this  remedy  does  not  preclude  an 
individual  from  maintaining  a  suit  at  law  or 
in  Equity  founded  upon  injury  to  his  private 
property.  Attorney-General  v.  Logan  (18SU), 
2  Q.  B*.  100:  65  L.  T.  162;  Hart  v.  Jamaica 
Pond  Aqueduct,  133  Mass.  488.  The  Attor- 
ney-General, when  suing,  either  ex  'j/iciu  or  at 
the  relation  of  a  private  individual,  to  restrain 
a  railway  company  or  public  body  from  trans- 
gressing statutory  powers,  or  to  enforce  the 
terms  of  an  express  enactment,  is  not  required 
to  prove  that  the  public  suffers  injury  from  the 
act  complain'  d  of.  Att.-Gen.  v.  Cockermoutb 
Local  Board,  L.  R.  18  Eq.  173.  See  Same  v. 
Oxford  &c.  Ry.  Co.  2  VV.  R.  330;  Same  v. 
Great  Eastern  Ry.  Co.  11  Ch.  D.  449;  5  App. 
Cas.  473.  The  information  may  be  granted 
with  costs,  when  such  illegal  acts  tend  to 
injure  the  public,  although  no  evidence  of 
actual  injury  is  given.  Att.-Gen.  v.  Shrews- 
bury Bridge  Co.  21  Ch.  D.  752.  As  to  his 
proceeding  to  restrain  the  opening  of  railways 
ordered  to  be  postponed  by  the  Board  of  Trade 
in  England,  see  5  &  6  Vic.  c.  55,  §  6;  7  &  8 
Vic.  c.  85,  §§  17,  18;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Great  West- 
ern  &c.  Ry.  Co.  4Ch.  D.  735;  Same  v.  Same, 
L.  R.  7  Ch.  767,  770;  Same  v.  Birmingham 
&c.  Ry  Co.  4  De  G.  &  S.  490 ;  Same  v.  Great 
Northern  Ry.  Co.  1  Dr.  &  Sm.  154,  162;  6  Jur. 
1006.  In  England  an  action  may  by  amend- 
ment be  changed  to  an  information  and  action 
without  prejudice  to  a  pending  motion  in  the 
action,  the  Attorney-General's  sanction  being 
obtained.  Caldwell  v.  Pagham  H.  R.  Co.  2 
Ch.  D    221. 

In  Massachusetts  informations  in  Equity  in 
the  name  of  the  Attorney-General  are,  apart 
from  statute,  sustained  in  only  two  classes  of 
cases  :  — 

1st.  Those  of  public  nuisances  which  affect 
or  endanger  the  public  safety  or  convenience, 
and  require  immediate  judicial  interposition, 
like  obstructions  of  highways,  public  landings, 
and    navigable   waters.     District   Attorney  v. 


10 


PERSONS   BY   WHOM    A    SUIT   MAY   BE   INSTITUTED. 


ately  concern  the  rights  of  the  Crown,  they  generally  depend  upon  the 
relation  of  some  person  whose  name  is  inserted  in  the  information,  and 


Lynn  &  Boston  R.  Co.  16  Gray,  242;  Att  - 
Gen  v  Cambridge,  id.  247;  Att. -Gen  v.  Boston 
Wharf  Co.  12  Gray,  553;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Tudor 
Ice  Co.  104  Mass.  239;  Att.-Gen.  v  Tarr,  148 
Mass.  309.  See  Att.-Gen.  v.  Gardiner,  117 
Mass.  329;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Williams,  140  Mass. 
329;  People  v.  Beaudry  (Cal.),  27  Pac.  610, 
Att.-Gen  v.  Brown,  24  N.  J.  Eq.  89;  Hunt  v. 
Chicago  Horse  Ry.  Co.  121  III.  638;  20  III. 
App.  282;  United  States,  v.  Pittsburgh  &c.  R. 
Co.  26  Fed.  Rep.  113.  Such  an  information 
lies  against  a  quasi  public  corporation  to  re- 
strain acts  which  are  ultra  vires  and  illegal, 
impair  public  rights  in  waters  reserved  for 
public  uses,  and  injure  the  public  health.  Att.- 
Gen.  v  Jamaica  Pond  Aqueduct,  133  Mass. 
361.  See  Hart  v.  Same,  id.  488;  Att.-Gen.  v. 
Revere  Copper  Co.  152  Mass.  444;  Att.-Gen. 
v.  Hane,  50  Mich.  447;  State  v.  Paris  Ry.  Co. 
55  Texas,  76.  In  cases  of  public  nuisai  ce,  the 
Attorney-General  ma}'  proceed  at  the  relation 
of  any  person,  though  such  person  does  not  reside 
near  it  and  is  not  interested  in  the  property. 
Att.-Gen.  r.  Basingstoke,  24  W.  R.  817.  A 
local  board  may  in  England  act  as  relators  in  a 
suit  brought  by  the  Attorney-General.  Att.- 
Gen.  v.  Logan  (1891),  2  Q.  B.'lOO. 

2d.  Those  of  trusts  for  charitable  purposes, 
•where  the  beneficiaries  are  so  numerous  and 
indefinite  that  the  breach  of  trust  cannot  be 
effectively  redressed  except  by  suit  in  behalf  of 
the  public.  County-Attorney  v.  May,  5  Cush. 
336;  Jackson  v.  Phillips,  14  Allen,  539;  Att.- 
Gen.  B  Garrison,  101  Mass.  223.  In  these  cases 
the  Attorney-General  alone,  without  a  relator, 
may  represent  those  beneficially  interested. 
Burbank  v.  Burbank,  152  Mass.  254;  State  v. 
Benningham  (Wis.),  51  N.  W.  Rep.  724. 

Informations  have  also  been  held  maintainable 
for  other  purposes:  as  to  prevent  the  perversion 
of  public  funds,  People  v.  Tweed,  13  Abb.  Pr. 
N.  S.  25,  152  (overruled  in  People  v.  Ingersoll, 
58  N.  Y.  1),  see  Att.-Gen.  v.  Detroit,  26  Mich. 
263 ;  or  to  prevent  the  discontinuance  of  a  public 
market,  Att.-Gen.  v.  Detroit,  71  Mich.  92,  see 
Att.-Gen.  v.  Horner,  14  Q.  B.  D.  222.  State  v. 
Dayton  &  S.  E.  R.  Co.  36  Ohio  St.  434;  but 
not  apparently  to  remedy  maladministrations 
in  office  by  trustees  or  executors.  People  v. 
Simonson,  126  N.  Y.  299. 

An  information  in  the  nature  of  scire  facias 
lies  by  the  government  to  annul  letters-patent 
for  an  invention  obtained  by  fraud  :  Mowry  v. 
Whitney,  14  Wall.  434;  Celluloid  Manuf.Co. 
v.  Goodyear  D.  V.  Co.  13  Blatch.  375;  New 
York  &c.  Pol.  Co.  v.  New  York  C.  P.  Co.  9 
Fed.  Rep.  587;  United  States  v.  Gunning.  18  id. 
511,  or  a  patent  for  land  so  obtained,  U.  S  v. 
San  Jacinto  Tin  Co.  125  U.  S.  273;  or  in  the 

10 


nature  of  a  bill  of  discovery  and  account  where 
no  bond  for  duties  is  given,  or  where  such 
bond  is  lost  or  destroyed.  U.  S.  v.  Lyman,  1 
Mason,  182;  Walsh  v.  U.  S.  3  Wood.  &  M. 
341.  Informations  in  Equity  do  not  lie  to 
impeach  collaterally  the  title  to  office  of  the 
board  of  police  of  a  city  appointed  by  the 
Governor,  the  proper  remedy  being  by  an  in- 
formation in  the  nature  of  a  quo  warranto, 
Prince  v.  Boston,  148  Mass.  285;  or  to  restrain  a 
private  trading  corporation  from  doing  acts  not 
authorized  by  its  charter,  or  at  the  relation  of 
an  individual  to  protect  his  private  interests  by 
restraining  a  corporation  from  further  use  of  its 
powers  and  the  usurpation  of  public  franchises 
not  its  own :  Kenney  v.  Consumers'  Gas  Co. 
142  Mass.  417,  Boston  Rubber  Shoe  Co.  v. 
Boston  Rubber  Co.  149  Mass.  436;  Att.-Gen.  v. 
Salem,  103  Mass.  138;  Att.-Gen,  v.  Tudor  Ice 
Co.  104  Mass.  239;  Reed  v.  Cumberland  &  O. 
Canal  Co.  65  Maine,  132;  People  v.  Ingersoll, 
58  N.  Y.  1;  Com'th  v.  Arrison,  15  Serg.  & 
R.  127;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Moliter,  26  Mich.  444; 
Att -Gen.  v.  Great  Eastern  Ry.  Co.  11  Ch. 
D.  449;  5  App.  Cas.  473;  United  States  v. 
Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  98  U.  S.  569;  Att.-Gen.  B. 
Utica  Ins.  Co.  2  John.  Ch.  471;  20  Cin'n.  Law 
Bull.  287,  302;  or  for  the  redress  of  private  in- 
juries. Ibid.;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Evart  Booming  Co. 
34  Mich.  462:  United  States  v.  San  Jacinto  Tin 
Co.  125  U.  S.  273,  People  v.  Brooklyn  &c  Ry. 
Co.  89  N.  Y  75;  State  v.  Farmers'  L.  &  T. 
Co.  (Texas)  17  S.  W  60;  State  v.  Kennedy, 
id.  67.  An  order  will  not  be  made  upon  an 
information  to  do  an  impossible  act;  and,  in 
compelling  the  performance  of  public  duties,  if 
existing  conditions  are  to  be  changed,  the  Court 
will  consider  the  balance  of  convenience.  Att.- 
Gen.  v.  Dorking  Guardians,  20  Ch.  D.  595, 
Att.-Gen.  v.  Gas  Light  and  Coke  Co.  7  Ch.  D. 
217;  Same*.  Acton  Local  Boa>d,  22  Ch.  D.  221; 
Charles  v.  Finch  ley  Local  Board,  23  Ch.  D. 
767;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Clerkenwell  Vestry  (1891),  3 
Ch.  527;  05  L.  T.  312,  Hill  v.  Managers,  4  Q. 
B.  D.  433.  As  to  the  employment  of  addi- 
tional counsel  by  the  Attorney-General,  see 
Julian  v.  State,  122  Ind.  68;  State  v.  Mayes,  28 
Miss.  706;  State  v.  Anderson,  29  La.  ah  774; 
People  v.  Met.  Tel.  Co.  64  How.  Pr.  66;  Att.- 
Gen.  v.  Continental  Life  Ins.  Co.  88  N.  Y.  571 ; 
People  v.  Met.  Tel.  Co.  11  Abb.  N.  Cas.  304; 
People  v.  Mut.  Union  Tel.  Co  2  Civ.  Proc.  Rep. 
295  ;  Commonwealth  v.  Boston  ike.  R.  Co.  3 
Cush.  (Mass.)  25.  As  to  his  personal  liability 
for  the  costs  of  an  unsuccessful  suit  against  a 
county,  see  State  v.  Marion  County  Com'rs,  85 
Ind.  489.  In  a  suit  instituted  by  the  trustees  of 
a  charity  to  obtain  the  instruction  of  the  Court, 
the  Attorney-General  should  be  made  a  party 


THE    QUEEN'S    ATTORNEY-GENERAL.  *  11 

who  is  termed  the  Relator?  This  person  in  reality  sustains  and  directs 
the  suit,  and  he  is  considered  as  answerable  to  the  Court  and  the  parties 
for  the  propriety  of  the  proceedings,  and  the  conduct  of  them  ; 4  but  he 
cannot  take  any  step  in  the  cause  in  his  own  name,  and  independently  of 
the  Attorney-General.5  Where,  therefore,  a  notice  of  motion  was  given 
on  behalf  of  a  relator,  it  was  held  that  the  notice  was  irregular.6  And 
where  the  relator  was  also  plaintiff  the  Court  refused  to  hear  him  in 
person  on  behalf  of  the  Attorney-General.7 

It  sometimes  happens  that  the  relator  has  an  interest  in  the  matter  in 
dispute,  of  an  injury  to  which  interest  he  is  entitled  to  complain.  In 
this  case  his  personal  complaint  being  joined  to  and  incorporated 
with  the  information  given  to  the  Court  by  the  *  officer  of  the  *11 
Crown,  they  form  together  an  information  and  bill,  and  are  so 
termed.  In  some  respects  they  are  considered  as  distinct  proceedings  ; 
and  the  Court  will  treat  them  as  such,  by  dismissing  the  bill  and  retain- 
ing the  information,  even  though  the  relief  to  be  granted  is  different 
from  that  prayed.1  Thus,  where  the  record  was  both  an  information  for 
a  charity  and  a  bill,  and  the  whole  of  the  relief  specifically  prayed  was 
in  respect  of  an  alleged  interest  of  the  relator  in  the  trust  property, 
which  he  did  not  succeed  in  establishing,  although  the  bill  was  dis- 
missed with  costs,  the  information  was  retained  for  the  purpose  of  regu- 
lating the  charity.2  It  is,  however,  necessary  that  the  person  joined 
as  plaintiff  should  have  some  individual  interest  in  the  relief  sought ; 
and  where  persons  were  made  plaintiffs  who  asked  nothing  for  them- 
selves, and  did  not  show  that  they  were  individually  entitled  to  any- 
thing, a  demurrer  to  the  whole  record  was  allowed  ;  but  as  there 
appeared  to  be  a  case  for  relief,  leave  to  amend,  for  the  purpose  of 
converting  the  suit  into  an  information  only,  was  given,  and  the  Court 
directed  that  the  plaintiffs  should  remain  on  the  record  in  the  character 
of  relators,  in  order  that  they  might  be  answerable  for  costs.3 

Although  it  is  the  general  practice,  where  the  suit  immediately 
concerns  the  rights  of  the  Crown,  to  proceed  without  a  relator,  yet 
instances  have  sometimes  occurred  where  relators  have  been  named. 
In  such  cases,  however,  it  has  been  done  through  the  tenderness  of  the 

3  Ld.  Red.  22;  1  Ves.  .Jr.  247.  n.     See  Att.-  6  Att.-Gen.  v.  Wright,  3  Beav.  447;  and  see 

Gen.  v.  Proprietors  of  the  Federal-street  Meet-  Att.-Gen.  v.  Haberdashers'   Co.  15  Beav.  397; 

in^-house,  3  Gray,  1;    Att.-Gen.  v.  Merrimack  Att.-Gen    v.  Wyggeston's  Hospital,  16  Beav 

Manuf.  Co.   14  Gray,  580;    Att.-Gen.  v.  Con-  313;  Att  -Gen.  v  Sherborne  Grammar  School, 

sumers'  Gas  Co.  142  Mass    417.  18   Beav.  256;    18  Jur.  636;    Parker  v.  May,  5 

*  Ld.  Red.  22;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Vivian,  1  Russ.  Cush.  336,  337. 
226,  236.  7  Att.-Gen.  v.  Barker.  4M.  &  C.  262. 

s  Parker  v.  May,  5  Cnsh.  337,   per   Shaw  1  See    Att.-Gen.     v.     Cockermouth     Local 

C.  J.;  see  Commissioners  e.  Andrews,  10  Rich.  Board,  L.  R.  18  Eq.  172. 

Eq.  (S.  C.)4;    State  v.  White's  Creek  Turn-  2  Att.-Gen.    v.   Vivian,    1    Russ.  226,  233, 

pike  Co.   3  Tenn.  Ch.  163.      As  to  the  reten-  235;  2  Swnnst.  215. 

tion  of  former  procedure  under  the  Sup.  Ct.  of  3  Att.-Gen.  v.  East    India  Co.  11  Sim.  380, 

Jud.  Act,  see  36  &  37  Vic.  c.  66,  §  23  ;   38  &  386. 
39  Vic.  c.  77. 


defendant.  Harvard  College  v.  Society,  3  General  need  not  be  a  party  when  trustees  of  a 
Gray,  280;  Jackson  v.  Phillips,  14  Allen,  539,  chanty  are  appointed  by  the  donor.  Newberry 
579.      In  Illinois  it  is  held  that  the  Attorney-      v.  Blatchford,  106  111.  584. 

11 


12 


PERSONS   BY    WHOM    A    SUIT   MAY   BE   INSTITUTED. 


officers  towards  the  defendant,  in  order  that  the  Court  mighf,  award 
costs  against  the  relator  if  the  suit  should  appear  to  have  been  improp- 
erly conducted ;  it  being  a  prerogative  of  the  Crown,  except  in 
*12  certain  special  cases,  not  to  pay  costs  to  a  subject.4  *  The  intro- 
duction of  a  relator  is,  however,  in  such  actions,  a  mere  act  of 
favor  on  the  part  of  the  Crown  and  its  officers,  which,  though  usual,  may 
be  withheld;  and  upon  the  whole  it  seems  that,  although  in  cases  of 
informations  for  charities  the  general  and  almost  universal  practice  is 
to  have  a  relator  for  the  purpose  of  answering  the  costs,  yet  the  rule 
is  not  imperative  ;  and  the  Attorney-General,  as  the  officer  of  the  Crown, 
may,  in  the  exercise  of  his  discretion,  bring  such  an  action  without  a 
relator.1  (a) 


4  See  3  BI.  Com.  400;  2  Mad.  Prin.  &  Pr. 
Ch.  (3d  Loud,  ed.)  203  and  note;  1  Smith  Ch. 
Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  99;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  8.  That 
oppression  may  thus  arise  to  defendants  if  no 
relator  is  named,  see  Att.-Gen.  v.  Fox,  Ld. 
Red.  23  n.  (//),  where  their  expenses  almost 
equalled  the  value  of  the  property. 

1  See  Re  Bedford  Charity,  2  Swanst.  520;  see 
contra,  Att.-Gen.  v.  Oglender,  1  Ves.  Jr.  264; 
Ld.   Red.  99;  and   see  Att.-Gen.  v.    Smart,  1 


(a)  The  relator  in  an  information  to  enforce 
a  charitable  trust  must  pay  the  costs  if  his 
case  discloses  no  merits.  Strickland  v.  Wel- 
don,  28  Ch.  D.  426;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Butler,  123 
Mass.  504;  Burbank  v.  Burbank,  152  Mass. 
254;  post,  p.  15.  If  there  is  no  case  for  the 
public,  the  relator  cannot  have  the  informa- 
tion retained  as  a  bill.  Att  -Gen.  v.  Evart 
Booming  Co.  34  Mich.  462;  Wilson  v.  Shively, 
10  Oregon,  267,  276.  See  Thompson  v.  Thomp- 
son, 6  Houst.  (Del.)  225.  Conversely,  if  there 
is  no  private  right  or  special  damage,  the 
sanction  of  the  Attorney-General  is  necessary, 
and  the  suit  must  be  treated  as  in  the  nature 
of  an  information.  Wallasey  Local  Board  v. 
Gracey,  36  Ch.  D.  593;  London  Association 
v.  London  &  India  Docks  Joint  Committee 
(1892),  3  Ch.  242.  The  Attorney-General, 
after  assenting  to  the  use  of  the  State's  name 
in  an  information  in  which  the  relator's  interest 
preponderates,  does  not  control  the  suit  and 
cannot  withdraw  such  assent  to  the  relator's 
prejudice  during  its  pendency.  People  v. 
North  San  Francisco  Homestead  Ass.  38  Cal. 
564;  People  v.  Clark,  72  Cal.  289;  People  v. 
Jacob  (Cal.),  12  Pac.  222.  See  Hesing  v. 
Att.-Gen.  104  III.  292;  People  v.  Purviance, 
12  Brad.  (111.),  216.  In  Att.-Gen.  v.  William- 
son, 60  L.  T.  930,  where,  after  considerable 
expense  was  incurred  by  the  defendant  to  an 
information  filed  without  a  relator,  he  was 
informed  that  the  Attorney-General  did  not 
intend  to  proceed,  and  moved  to  dismiss  the 
information  with  costs,  it  was  held  that,  as  the 
suit   had    been   determined,  the  Crown  could 

12 


Ves.  Sr.  72;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Middleton,  2  Ves. 
Sr.  327;  Att.-Gen.  of  the  Duchy  of  Lancaster 
v.  Heath,  Prac.  in  Ch.  13.  In  proceedings 
under  the  59  Geo.  III.  c  91,  and  2  &  3  Will. 
IV.  c.  57  (see  ante,  p.  9,  n.  1),  it  was  not  the 
practice  to  have  a  relator.  See  also  "  The 
Charitable  Trusts  Act,  1853"  (16  &  17  Vic. 
c.  137),  §§  18,  20,  43.  See,  however  Att.-Gen. 
v.  Boucherett,  25  Beav.  116. 


not  be  ordered  to  pay  the  defendant's  costs. 
A  defect  of  parties,  where  a  town  is  not  joined, 
is  not  cured  by  the  fact  that  a  committee  of 
the  town  are  relators.  Att.-Gen.  v.  Parker, 
126  Mass.  216.  When  proceedings  by  quo 
warranto  are  provided  by  statute  against  a 
private  charitable  corporation  for  misappro- 
priation of  its  funds,  individual  members  of 
the  association  cannot  maintain  a  bill  in 
equity  for  redress  and  a  receiver,  although 
the  Attorney-General  refuses  to  be  a  plaintiff 
and  is  made  a  defendant.  Tyree  v.  Bingham, 
100  Mo.  451.  See  Thompson  v.  Watson,  48 
Ohio  St.  552.  The  Attorney-General  and  re- 
lator will  not  be  permitted  to  maintain  con 
flicting  views  on  the  same  side  of  the  case. 
Att.-Gen.  v.  Sherborne  Grammar  School,  18 
Beav.  256.  But  the  former  may  act  as  counsel 
for  defendants  upon  an  information  filed  in 
his  name  by  relators.  Shore  ft  Wilson,  9 
Ch.  &  Fin.  355.  The  objection  that  there  is 
an  adequate  remedy  at  law  has  been  held 
inapplicable  to  an  information  tiled  by  the 
Attorney-General.  Att.-Gen.  v.  Mayor  of  Gal- 
way,  1  Moll.  95.  But  see  London  v.  Att.- 
Gen  1  H.  L.  Cas.  440.  In  informations  in 
cases  of  charity,  the  general  prayer  is  usually 
sufficient  to  obtain  any  relief  adapted  to  the 
case.  Att.  Gen.  v.  Brooke,  18  Ves.  319.  A 
prayer  for  the  wrong  relief  will  not  prevent 
the  granting  of  proper  relief,  if  the  Court 
decides  to  act  at  all.  Att.-Gen.  v.  Smart.  1 
Ves.  72:  Att.-Gen.  v.  Middleton,  2  Ves  327; 
Att.-Gen.  v.  Whiteley,  14  Ves.  241. 


THE   QUEEN'S    ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 


13 


With  respect  to  suits  by  the  Attorney -General  on  behalf  of  idiots  and 
lunatics,  it  seems  that  it  is  not  only  necessary  that  the  lunatic  should  be 
a  party,  but  also  that  there  should  be  a  relator  who  may  be  responsible 
to  the  defendant  for  the  costs.  Thus  where  it  appeared  that  the  lunatic 
had  been  made  the  relator,  the  Court,  on  a  motion  being  made  that  a 
responsible  relator  should  be  appointed,  directed  that  all  further  pro- 
ceedings should  be  suspended  until  a  proper  person  should  be  named  as 
relator  in  his  stead.2 

*  Any  person  who  is  not  under  any  of  the  legal  disabilities  after       *13 
mentioned  may  be  a  relator  ;  *  but  a  written  authority,  signed  by 
hiin,  permitting  his  name  to  be  used,  must  be  filed  with  the  information.2 
A  corporate  body  may  be  a  relator  8  or  a  relator  and  plaintiff.4 

It  has  not  been  deemed  necessary  that  relators  should  be  interested 
in  the  charities  concerning  which  they  institute  proceedings ; 6  and  the 
Court  was  in  the  habit,  in  the  times  when  a  much  stricter  system  of 
practice  prevailed  than  at  present,  of  relaxing  several  of  its  rules  on 
behalf  of  charities.  Thus,  where  the  relief  sought  was  erroneous  and 
refused,  the  Court  still  took  care  to  make  such  decree  as  would  best 
answer  the  purposes  of  the  charities.6  (a) 


2  Att.-Gen.  v.  Tyler,  2  Eden,  230;  Ld.  Red. 
29,  n.  (1);  and  see  S.  C.  at  hearing,  1  Dick. 
378. 

i  Smith  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  99. 

2  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  11 ;  see  now  R  S.  C. 
1883,  Ord.  XVI.  20.  For  form  of  authority, 
see  Vol.  III.  In  an  injunction  case,  the 
authority  was  allowed  to  be  filed  the  day 
after  the  information.  Att.-Gen.  v.  Murray, 
13  W.  R.  65,  V  C.  K.  Where  the  solicitor 
had  given  the  relator  an  indemnity  against 
the  costs,  the  information  was  ordered  off  the 
file,  with  costs  to  be  paid  by  the  relator  and 
solicitor.  Att.-Gen.  v.  Skinners'  Co.  C.  P. 
Coop.  7.  The  authority  may  be  dispensed 
with  in  informations  under  the  4  Geo.  IV. 
c.  76,  §  2  5;  Att.-Gen  v.  Wiltshire,  W.  N. 
(1875)  182,  V.  C.  H  ,  and  see  as  to  retention 
of  existing  procedure,  Sup.  Ct.  of  Judic.  Act, 
1873  (36  &  37  Vic.  c.  66),  §  23,  and  same  of 
1875  (38  &  39  Vic.  c.  77,  §  21). 

3  See  Att.-Gen.  v.  Wilson,  C.  &  P.  1;  Att.- 
Gen.  v  Cambridge  Consumers'  Gas  Co.  L.  R. 
6  Eq.  282;  L.  R.  4  Ch.  71;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Cocker- 
mouth  Local  Board,  L.  R.  18  Eq.  172;  Att.- 
Gen.  t'.  Colney  Hatch    Asylum,  L.   R.   4  Ch. 


149;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Basingstoke,  45  L.  J.  Ch. 
726. 

4  See  Att  -Gen.  v.  Conservators  of  the 
Thames,  1  H.  &  M.  1 ;  8  Jur.  N.  S.  1203; 
Att.-Gen.  v.  Metropolitan  Board  of  Works, 
1  H.  &  M.  298;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Greenhill,  33 
Beav.  193;  9  Jur.  N.  S.  1307,  Att.-Gen.  v. 
Mayor  of  Kingston-on-Thames,  11  Jur.  N.  S. 
596";  13  W.  R.  880,  V.  C.  W. ;  Att.-Gen.  v. 
Richmond,  L.  R.  2  Eq.  306;  12  Jur.  N.  S.  544, 
V.  C.  W.;  Att  -Gen.  v.  Great  Eastern  Ry.  Co., 
L.  R.  6  Ch.  572,  L.  C. 

o  Att.-Gen.  v.  Vivian,  1  Russ.  226,  236. 
See,  however,  Att  -Gen.  v.  Bucknall,  2  Atk. 
328;  South  Molton  v.  Att.-Gen.  5  H.  L.  Cas. 
1;  Re  Poplar  &  Blackwall  Free  School,  8  Ch. 
D.  543. 

6  Att.-Gen.  v.  Jennes,  1  Atk.  355;  Att.- 
Gen.  v.  Bucknall,  2  Atk.  328;  Att -Gen.  v. 
Whiteley.  11  Ves.  241,  247;  Att.-Gen.  v. 
Oglender,  1  Ves.  Jr.  246  ;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Middle- 
ton,  2  Ves.  Sr.  327;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Brereton,  id. 
425;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Mayor  of  Stamford,  2  Swanst. 
591 ;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Parker,  1  Ves.  Sr.  43;  3  Atk. 
576. 


(a)  Re  St.  Stephens,  39  Ch  D  492;  Hoare 
v.  Hoare,  56  L.  T.  147,  Biscoe  v.  Jackson,  35 
Ch.  I).  460;  Re  Ovey,  Broadbent  v.  Barrow,  29 
Ch.  D  560;  Darcy  v.  Kelley,  153  Mass.  433. 
The  mode  of  administration  or  execution  is  not 
strictly  of  the  substance  of  the  gift.  Biscoe  v. 
Jackson,  35  Ch.  D.  460.  The  jurisdiction  to 
act  on  the  cy  prh  doctrine  upon  the  failure  of  a 
specific  charitable  bequest  arises  whether  the 
residue  is  given  to  a  charity  or  not,  unless  a 
direction  can  be  implied  from  the  will  that  the 


bequest,  if  it  fails,  should  go  to  the  charity. 
Mayor  of  Lyons  v.  Advocate-General  of  Bengal, 
1  App.  Cas.  91.  See  Andrews  v.  McGuffog,  11 
App  Cas.  313;  Pocock  v.  Att -Gen.  3  Ch. 
P.  342;  Biscoe  V  Jackson.  35  Ch.  D.  460; 
Willoughby  v.  Storer,  22  L.  T.  896.  Under 
this  doctrine  the  Court  may  order  a  fund,  be- 
queathed to  be  expended  for  a  charity  abroad, 
to  be  paid  to  a  committee  resident  in  the  coun- 
try on  their  undertaking  to  apply  it  to  the  gen 
eral  purposes  of  another  similar  chantv  in  the 

13 


*14 


PERSONS    BY   WHOM    A    SUIT   MAY   BE   INSTITUTED. 


It  appears,  on  reference  to  the  old  cases,  that  where  a  relator  himself 

claims  an  interest  in  the  subject-matter,  of  the  suit,  and  proceeds 

*14       by  bill  as  well  as  by  information,  making  himself  both  *  plaintiff 

and  relator,  the  suit  abates  by  his  death.     Where,  however,  the 

suit  is  merely  an  information,  the  proceedings   can   only   abate  by  the 

death  or  determination  of  interest  of  the  defendant.1 

If  there  are  several  relators,  who  are  also  plaintiffs,  the  death  of  any 
of  them,  while  there  survives  one,  will  not  in  any  degree  affect  the  suit; 
but  if  all  the  relators  die,  or  if  there  is  but  one,  and  that  relator  dies,  the 
suit  is  not  abated.  It  is,  however,  irregular  for  the  solicitors  of  a  relator 
to  proceed  in  a  charity  information  after  the  death  of  the  relators  or  of 
a  sole  relator  ;  and  the  Court  will  not  permit  any  further  proceedings 
till  an  order  has  been  obtained  for  liberty  to  insert  the  name  of  a  new 
relator,  and  such  name  is  inserted  accordingly  ;  otherwise  there  would 
be  no  person  to  pay  the  costs  of  the  suit,  in  case  the  information  should 
be  deemed  improper,  or  for  any  other  reason  should  be  dismissed.2 
Where  a  relator  dies,  the  application  for  leave  to  name  a  new  relator 
should  be  made  by  the  Attorney-General,  or  with  his  consent,  and 
not  by  the  defendant ;  otherwise  the  defendant  might  choose  his  own 
prosecutor.8 

With  respect  to  informations  on  behalf  of  idiots  and  lunatics,  it  seems 
that  it  is  not  only  necessary  that  the  lunatic  should  be  a  party,  but  also 
that  there  should  be  a  relator  who  may  be  responsible  to  the  defendant 
for  the  costs  of  the  suit.  Thus,  in  the  case  of  the  Attorney-General  v. 
Tyler,  mentioned  in  the  note  to  Lord  Redesdale's  Treatise,4  it  appears 

i  Waller  r.  Hanger,  2  Bulst.  134;  Ld  Red.  1  Jur.  N.  S.  1062,  Att.-Gen.  v.  Plumtree,  5 
100.     See  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  L.  Mad.  452;  2  Mad.  Prin.  &  Pr.  Ch.  (3d  Lond. 

2  Ld.  Red.  100,  Att.-Gen.  v.  Haberdashers' 
Co.  15  Beav.  397,  16  Jur.  717. 

3  Ld.  Red   100,  n.  (e)  Att.-Gen.  v.  Harvey, 


ed.)  203,  204. 

«  Ld.  Red  29 ;  2  Eden,  230. 


foreign  country  designated.    Re  Davis's  Trusts, 
61  L.  T.  430      If  an   institution,   to   which   a 
charitable  bequest  is  made,  comes   to  an  end 
after  the  testator's  death,  and  before  payment 
of  the  legacy,  there  is  no  lapse,  but  the  legacy, 
failing  to  be  administered  by  the  Crown,  will 
usually  be  applied  to  charitable  purposes.     In 
re  Slevin,  Slevin  v.  Hepburn  (1891),  2  Ch.  236; 
64  L.  T.  311.    See  Biscoe  v.  Jackson,  35  Ch.  D. 
460,  55   L.  T.  607;    35  W.   R.  152;    Pease  v. 
Pattinson,  32  Ch.  D.  154.     If  the  object  of  a 
charitable  bequest  is  definite  and  wholly  fails, 
the  bequest  cannot  be  carried  out  cy  pros.     In 
re  Tavlor,  Martin  r.   Freeman,  58  L  T.  538; 
Re    White's   Trust.   33   Ch.  D.   449.     In  New 
York,  the  doctrine  of  cy  pres,  upholding  chari- 
table gifts  when  no  beneficiary  is  named,  is  not 
recognized.     Tilden   v.  Green,  130  N.   Y.  29. 
After  a  formal   application  once    made   for   a 
scheme,   under  the   English    Charitable  Trust 
Act  of  1860,  the  jurisdiction   of   the  Charity 
Commissioners  attaches  absolutely  to  the  charity 
and  cannot  be  ousted  by  withdrawing  the  ap- 
plication before  the  scheme  is  completed  and 
14 


sealed.  In  re  Poor's  Lands  Charity  (1891),  3 
Ch.  400.  An  unauthorized  cypres  application 
of  charity  funds  by  trustees,  though  long-con- 
tinued, is  no  ground  of  objection  to  a  new  au- 
thorized application  Re  Campden  Charities, 
18  Ch  1).  310;  24  id.  218.  See  Re.  Browne's 
Hospital  v.  Stamford,  60  L.  T.  288  If  two 
charities  are  administered  for  the  same  object, 
such  a-  maintaining  a  school,  the  funds  of  one 
charity  may  be  applied  under  the  Court's  sanc- 
tion to  the  discharge  of  a  mortgage  upon  prop- 
erty belonging  to  the  other  charity.  Cockburn 
v.  Raphael,  W  N.  (1891)  14.  The  rule  against 
perpetuities  does  not  apply  to  a  transfer,  in  a 
certain  event,  of  property  from  one  charity  to 
another  Christ's  Hospital  r.  Grainger.  1  Mac. 
&  G.  460:  In  re  Tyler.  Tyler  v.  Tyler  (1891), 
3  Ch.  252;  65  L.  f.  367;  In  re  Randell.  Ran- 
dell  v.  Dixon,  38  Ch.  D.  213.  An  advowson  is 
not  an  exception  to  the  general  law  as  to 
charitable  trusts  Re  St.  Stephen's,  39  Ch.  D. 
492.  considering  the  dicta  in  Att  -Gen.  v. 
Parker,  supra. 


THE    QUEEN'S    ATTORNEY  GENERAL.  *  15 

* 

that  the  lunatic  had  been  made  the  relator,  but  that  on  a  motion  being 
made  that  a  responsible  relator  should  be  appointed,  Lord  Northington 
directed  that  all  further  proceedings  in  the  cause  should  be  suspended, 
until  a  proper  person  should  be  named  as  relator  in  his  stead.  This 
appears  to  be  the  cause  reported  in  Mr.  Dickens's  Reports,5  in  which, 
upon  the  hearing,  it  was  objected  that  the  lunatic  was  not  a  party  to 
the  suit,  although  he  was  named  as  relator. 

The  object  in  requiring  that  there  should  be  a  relator  in  informations 
exhibited  on  the  part  of  the  Attorney-General,  is,  as  we  have  seen/ 
that  there  may  be  some  person  answerable  for  the  costs,  in  case  they 
should  have  been  improperly  filed.  Thus,  where  the  information  was 
held  to  have  been  unnecessary,  and  in  contradiction  to  the  right, 
the  costs  were  ordered  to  be  paid  by  the  relator.7  But  where  *  the  *15 
relator  insisted  upon  a  particular  construction  of  the  will  of  the 
person  by  whom  the  charity  was  founded,  and  in  which  there  was  con- 
siderable ambiguity,  although  he  failed  in  satisfying  the  Court  that  his 
construction  was  the  right  one,  and  the  information  was  consequently 
dismissed,  the  Court  did  not  make  him  liable  to  the  costs  of  the  defend- 
ant ;  it  refused,  however,  to  permit  the  costs  to  be  paid  out  of  the  funds 
of  the  charity.1  And  in  general,  where  an  information  prays  a  relief 
which  is  not  granted,  but  the  Court  thinks  proper  to  make  a  decree 
according  to  the  merits,  so  that  the  information  is  shown  to  have  had  a 
foundation,  the  relator  will  not  be  ordered  to  pay  the  costs.2 

Where  relators  conduct  themselves  properly,  and  their  conduct  has 
been  beneficial  to  the  charity,  they  are  usually  allowed  their  costs  ; 8  and 
it  seems  that  on  the  principle  that  otherwise  people  would  not  come 
forward  to  institute  proceedings  on  behalf  of  charities,  relators,  where 
there  is  nothing  to  impeach  the  propriety  of  the  suit,  will,  upon  obtain- 
ing a  decree  for  the  charity,  be  allowed  their  costs  as  between  solicitor 
and  client,  the  difference  between  the  amount  of  such  costs  and  the 
amount  of  the  costs  which  may  be  recovered  by  the  defendants,  being 
charged  upon  the  fund  recovered  by  the  information,  or  on  the  estate 
which  is  the  subject  of  the  suit  ;4  and  that  in  special  cases  the  relators 
may  be  allowed  their  charges  and  expenses,  in  addition  to  the  costs  of 
the  suit  as  between  solicitor  and  client,  but  such  cases  must  depend 
upon  their  peculiar  circumstances,  which  must  be  brought  forward  and 
established  by  evidence.5  But  where  they  incurred  expenses  without 
the  sanction  of  the  Court  or  Master,  in  obtaining  information  for  the 
purpose  of  preparing  a  scheme,  they  were  only  allowed  their  expenses 

5  Ante,  p.  9.  Ves.  424;  see  also  id.  425;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Carte, 

6  Ante,  p.  12.  1   Dick.   113;  Reames  on  Costs,   App.  No    2. 

7  Att.-Gen.  v.  Smart,  1  Ves.  Sr.  72;  Att-  22!);  Moggridge  V.  Thackwell,  7  Ves.  311,  88; 
Gen.  v.  Parker,  3  Atk.  570,  576;  1  Ves.  Sr.  43.  affirmed  by  H.  L.,  see  13  Ves.  416  ;  but  see  Att  - 

1  Att.-Gen.  v.  Oglender,  1  Ves.  Jr.  246.  Gen.  v.   Fishmongers'  Co.  1  Keen,  492.  where 

2  Att.-Gen.  v.  Bolton,  3  Anst.  820;  see  Att.-  party  and  party  costs  only  were  allowed  For 
Gen.  v.  Hartley,  2  J.  &  W.  353.  form  of  order  for  costs,  see  1  Seton,  554,  555. 

3  Beames  on  Costs,  14;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Brewers'  5  Att.-Gen.  v.  Kerr,  4  Beav.  297,  303;  Re 
Co.  1  P.  Wins.  376.  Dulwich  College,  L.  B.  15  Eq.  294,  M.  R.;  but 

4  Att.-Gen.  v.  Kerr,  4  Beav.  297,  303;  Att.-  see  Att.-Gen.  v.  Skinners'  Co.  Jac.  629;  Att.- 
Gen.  v.  Taylor,  cited  in  Osborne  ».  Denne,  7  Gen.  v.  Manchester,  3  L.  J.  Ch.  64. 

15 


*  16  PERSONS    BY   WHOM    A    SUIT   MAY   BE   INSTITUTED. 

actually  out  of  pocket ; 6  and  where  a  petition  would  have  done,  instead 

of  an  information,  the  relators  were  refused  their  costs.7 
*16  *  As  the  principal  object  in  having  a  relator  is,  that  he  may  be 

answerable  for  the  costs  of  the  proceedings,  in  case  the  informa- 
tion shall  appear  to  have  been  improperly  instituted  or  conducted,  it 
follows,  as  a  matter  of  course,  that  such  relator  must  be  a  person  of 
substance ;  and  if  it  is  made  to  appear  to  the  Court  that  the  relator  is 
not  a  responsible  person,  all  further  proceedings  in  the  information 
will  be  stayed,  till  a  proper  person  shall  be  named  as  relator.1 

An  information  by  the  Attorney-General  without  a  relator  cannot  be 
dismissed  for  want  of  prosecution;  it  is  his  privilege  to  proceed  in  what 
way  he  thinks  proper;  but  an  information  in  his  name  by  a  relator,  is 
subject  to  be  dismissed  for  want  of  prosecution  with  costs.  2(a) 

It  has  been  said  that,  as  the  Sovereign,  by  reason  of  his  prerogative, 
does  not  pay  costs  to  a  subject,  so  it  is  beneath  his  dignity  to  receive 
them ;  but  many  instances  occur,  in  the  course  of  practice,  in  which  the 
Attorney-General  receives  costs.  Thus,  in  the  case  of  successful  pro- 
ceedings with  respect  to  charities,  the  Attorney-General  will  usually  be 
allowed  his  costs  as  between  solicitor  and  client,8  and  in  special  cases 
his  charges  and  expenses  in  addition;  4  and  where  collusion  is  suspected 
between  the  defendants  and  the  relators,  the  Attorney-General  attends 
by  a  distinct  solicitor,  and  always  receives  his  costs.5  The  Attorney- 
General  also  constantly  receives  costs  where  he  is  made  a  defendant  in 
respect  of  legacies  given  to  charities ; 6  where  he  is  made  a  defendant 
in  respect  of  the  immediate  rights  of  the  Crown  in  cases  of  intestacy; 
and  in  charity  suits,  costs  have  been  frequently  awarded  to  the  Attorney- 
General  in  interlocutory  matters,  independently  of  the  relator.7     And 

s  Att-Gen.  v.  Ironmongers'  Co.  10  Beav.  36,  88;  affirmed  by  H  L.,  13  Ves  416;    Mills 

194   196  v.  Farmer,  19  Ves.  490;  1  Mer.  104;  Att.-Gen. 

7  Att.-Gen.  v.  Berry,  11  Jur.  114;  see  Re  v.  Lord  Ashburnham,  1  S.  &  S.  394. 
Poplar  &  Blackwall  Free  School,  8  Ch.  D.  543.  4  Re  Dulwich  College,    L.  R    15  Eq.    294, 

i  Att.-Gen.  v.  Tyler,  2  Eden,  230;    see  also  M.  R.;  and  see  Att.-Gen.  v.  Kerr,  4  Beav.  297, 

Att.-Gen.  v.  Knight",  3  M.  &  C.  154.    It  is  pre-  303.    For  form  of   orders,   see  1  Seton,  554, 

sumed  that  the   same  rules,   for  determining  Nos.  11,  12. 

who  is  a  "  person  of  substance,"  apply  here  as  6  For  form  of  order  for  costs  of  Attorney- 

in  the  case  of  next  friends  of  married  women ;  General  appearing  separately  from  relators,  see 

as  to  whom,  see  post,  Chap.  HI.  §  8.     There  Att.-Gen.  v.  Wyggeston  Hospital,  2  June,  1855, 

is  a  reported  case  in  which  a  relator  was   re-  A.  1024;  1  Seton  (3d  ed.),  351,  No.  13. 
quired  to  give  security  for  costs,  see  Att.-Gen.  6  Moggridge   v.  Thackwell,  7  Ves.  36,  88; 

t>.  Skinners'  Co.    C.  P.  Coop.  1,  5;    and  see  Mills  v.  Farmer,  19  Ves.  483,490;  I  Mer.  55, 

Att.-Gen.  r.  Knight,  3  M.  &  C.  154.  104 ;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Lewis,  8  Beav.  179. 

2  In  the  Court  of  Exchequer  the  order  was  7  See  Att.-Gen.  v.  Lord  Ashburnham,  1  S. 
that  the  defendant  may  go  without  a  day,  upon  &  S.  394,  397;  See,  however,  Burney  v.  Mac- 
paying  his  costs  to  be  taxed.     1  Fowler,  104.  donald,  15  Sim.  6,  16. 

3  Moggridge  v.  Thackwell,  1  Ves.  475 ;  7  Ves. 

(a)  As  to  the  power  of  the  Attorney-General  of  the  Attorney-General,  or  with  his  consent, 

to  compromise  suits  relating  to  charities,  see  alter  the  scheme  of  a  charity  as  settled  by  its 

Att.-Gen.  v.  Boucherett,  25  Beav.  116;   Att.-  previous  decree.     Att.-Gen.  v.  Bishop  of  Wor- 

Gen.    v.  Fishmongers'  Co.  C.  P.  C.  85;    An-  cester,  9  Hare,  328;    Att.-Gen.   v.  St.  John's 

drews   v.  Merchant   Tailors'  Co.  7  Ves.  223;  Hospital,  L.  R.  1  Ch.  92;  Re  Browne's  Hos- 

S.  C.  nam.  Andrews  v.  Trinity  Hall,   9  Ves.  pital  v.  Stamford,  60  L.  T    288;  Att.-Gen.  v. 

525.    Upon    substantial    grounds    the    Court  Stewart,  L.  R.  14  Eq.  17;  see   Re  Bradford 

may,  from  time  to  time,  upon  the  application  School  of  Industry,  W.  N.  (1893)  60. 

16 


FOREIGN    GOVERNMENTS    AND   STATES. 


18 


it  would  appear  that  the  principle  that  the  Attorney-General  never 
receives  or  pays  costs  may  be  modified  in  this  way,  namely,  that  the 
Attorney-General  never  receives  costs  in  a  contest  in  which  he  could 
have  been  called  upon  to  pay  them,  had  he  been  a  private  individual.8 
Provision  was,  however,  made  by  the  18  &  19  Vic.  c.  90,  for  the 
payment  of  costs  by  or  to  the  Crown,  in  proceedings  instituted,  after 
the  passing  of  that  Act,  on  its  behalf;  and  by  the  Customs  Inland 
Revenue  and  Savings  Bank  Act,  1877, 9  in  all  proceedings  at  the  suit 
of  the  Crown  under  the  Customs  Act,  the  same  rule  as  to  costs  is  to  be 
observed  as  in  proceedings  between  subject  and  subject  in  matters 
relating  to  the  revenue.10 

In  an  action  by  the  Attorney-General  without  a  relator,  costs  may  be 
ordered  to  be  paid  by  one  defendant  to  another  defendant;  and  where 
in  a  charity  case  some  of  the  defendants  supported  the  contention  of 
the  Attorney-General,  they  were  allowed  their  costs  as  between  solici- 
tor and  client,  to  be  taxed  and  paid  out  of  the  fund;  such  costs  as 
between  party  and  party  to  be  repaid  by  the  defendants  who  opposed 
the  proceedings.11 

In  a  suit  by  the  Crown  to  restrain  the  construction  of  a  tramway, 
the  Court  refused  to  grant  an  interim  injunction,  except  upon  the  terms 
of  the  usual  undertaking  as  to  damages  being  given  by  the  Crown.12 


♦Section  II.  — Foreign  Governments  and  States. 


17 


It  is  now  settled  that  a  foreign  sovereign  or  State  can  sue  in 
the  municipal  Courts  of  Great  Britain.1    *  It  seems,  however,  that     *18 


8  Att.-Gen.  v.  London,  2  M'N.  &  G.  247, 
269,  271,  273;  12  Beav.  171,  M.  R.,  and  on 
demurrer  in  H.  L.,  1  H.  L.  Cas.  471,  and  Lord 
Cottenham's  comments  on  this  case,  2  M'N.  & 
G.  271;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Drapers'  Co.  4  Beav.  305; 
Ware  v.  Cumberlege,  20  Beav.  510;  Kane  v. 
Maule,  2  Sm.  &  G.  331,  S.  C.  on  appeal, 
nom.  Kane  v.  Reynolds,  4  De  G.  M.  &  G.  565, 
569  ;  1  Jur.  N.  S.  148. 

9  40  &  41  Vic.  c.  13,  §  5. 

w  Att.-Gen.  v.  Hanmer,  4  De  G.  &  J.  205; 
5  Jur.  N.  S.  693;  Att.-Gen.  o.  Sittingbourne 
&C.  Ry.  Co.  35  Beav.  268,  272 ;  L.  R.  1  Eq. 
636,  640;  and  see  Bauer  v.  Mitford,  9  W.  R. 
135.  For  form  of  order  see  1  Seton,  556, 
No.  17;  see  also  24  &  25  Vic.  c.  92,  §  1,  in 
cases  as  to  succession  duty. 

n  Att.-Gen.  v.  Chester,  14  Beav.  338;  Att.- 
Gen.  v.  Mercers'  Co.   18  W.  R.  448,  V.  C.  J. 

i2  Secretary  of  State  for  War  v.  Chubb,  43 
L.  T.  83,  M.  R.  As  to  the  Attorney-General 
of  the  Queen  Consort,  see  39  &  40  Geo.  III. 
c.  88,  §§  8, 9  ;  1  Bl.  Com.  220;  Ld.  Red.  24,  99; 
36  &  37  Vic.  c.  66,  §  23;  38  &  39  Vic.  c.  77, 
§  21.  As  to  a  Queen  Dowager,  see  Att.-Gen. 
v.  Tarrington,  Hardres,  219.  As  to  the  Attor- 
ney-General to  the  Prince  of  Wales,  see  Att.- 
Gen.  v.  St.  Aubyn,  Wightw.  167;    Att.-Gen. 

VOL.    I.  —  2 


v.  Plymouth,  id.  134;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Lambe,  11 
Beav.  213;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Crossman,  L.  R.  1  Ex. 
38H  12  Jur.  N.S.712.  The  Princess  of  Wales 
may  sue,  during  coverture,  by  her  next  friend. 
Princess  of  Wales  v.  Lord  Liverpool,  1  Swanst. 
114. 

1  King  of  Spain  v.  Machado,  4  Russ.  225, 
236;  Hullett  v.  King  of  Spain,  2  Bligh,  N.  S. 
31;  S  C.  7  Bligh,  N.  S.  359;  1  CI.  &  Fin. 
333;  see  also  City  of  Berne  v.  Bank  of  Eng- 
land, 9  Ves.  347;  Dolder  v.  Bank  of  England, 
10  Ves.  352;  Dolder  v.  Lord  Huntingfield,  11 
Ves.  283  ;  King  of  the  Two  Sicilies  v.  Willcox, 
1  Sim.  N.  S.  301,  332;  15  Jur.  215;  United 
States  v.  Prioleau,  2  H.  &  M.  559;  11  Jur. 
N.  S.  792;  United  States  v.  Wagner,  L.  R. 
3  Eq.  724;  S.  C.  L.  R.  2  Ch.  582;  Prioleau  v. 
United  States,  L.  R.  2  Eq.  659;  United  States 
v.  McRea.  L.  R.  3  Ch.  79;  L.  R.  4  Eq.  327. 
See  Barclay  v.  Russell,  3  Ves.  Jr.  424,  431 , 
see  also  Nabob  of  the  Carnatic  v.  East  India 
Co.  1  Ves.  Jr  371;  2  id.  56;  Duke  of  Bruns- 
wick V.  King  of  Hanover,  6  Beav.  1;  2  H.  L. 
Cas.  1;  King  of  Hanover  v.  Wheatley,  4  Beav. 
78;  Musgrave  v.  Pulido,  5  App.  Cas.  102. 

The  doctrine  that  the  sovereign  of  one  State 
may  maintain  a  suit  in  the  Courts  of  Equity 
of  another  State,  is  now  established  in  allirm- 

17 


18 


PERSONS   BY   WHOM    A    SUIT   MAY   BE   INSTITUTED. 


this  right  of  suit  is  confined  to  those  cases  in  which  it  is  sought  to 
enforce  the  private  rights  of  such  sovereign  or  State,  or  of  the  subjects 
thereof;1  and  that  the  infringement  of  his  prerogative  rights  does  not 
constitute  a  ground  of  suit.2(a)  A  subordinate  officer  of  a  foreign  gov- 
ernment cannot,  without  its  authority,  take  proceedings  in  the  name  of 
his  government,  against  a  superior  officer  in  this  country.3 

To  entitle  a  foreign  government  to  sue  in  the  English  Courts,  it  is 


ance  of  the  right,  upon  very  satisfactory 
principles.  See  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  55;  Brown  v. 
Minis,  1  M'Cord,  80.  A  foreign  sovereign 
State  adopting  the  republican  form  of  govern- 
ment, and  recognized  by  the  English  govern- 
ment, can  sue  in  the  English  Courts  in  its  own 
name  so  recognized.  United  States  v.  Wagner, 
L.  R.  2  Ch.  582.  If  a  State  were  to  refuse 
permission  to  a  foreign  sovereign  to  sue  in  its 
Courts,  it  might  become  a  just  cause  of  war. 
Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  55;  King  of  Spain  r.  Mendaz- 
abel.  5  Sim.  596;  Edwards.  Parties  in  Eq.  3:?.  34, 
35;  Calvert  on  Parties,  c,  3,  §  27,  pp.  310,  311 
By  the  U.  S.  Constitution,  foreign  States  are 
expressly  authorized  to  sue  in  the  Courts  of 
the  United  States.  Const.  U.  S.  Art.  III.  §  2. 
One  of  the  States  of  the  Union  may  appe;ir 
as  plaintiff  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States,  against  either  another  State,  or  the 
citizens  thereof.  Const.  U.  S-  Art.  III.  §  2; 
Governor  of  Georgia  v.  Aladrago,  1  Peters, 
110;  United  States  v.  Peters,  5  Cranch,  115; 
United  States  v.  Blight,  3  Hall,  Law  Journ. 
197;  United  States  v.  Percheman,  7  Peters,  51; 
New  York  r.  Connecticut,  4  Dallas,  1;  New 
Jersey  v.  New  York,   5   Peters,   284;    Rhode 


Island  v.  Massachusetts,  13  Peters,  23;  S.  C. 
14  Peters,  210,  3  Story,  Const.  U.  S-  §§  1675- 
1683;  Nabob  of  the  Carnatic  v.  East  India  Co. 

I  Sumner's  Ves.  371,  note  («).  One  State,  as 
a  corporation,  may  sue  in  the  Courts  of  another 
State.  Delafield  "v.  Illinois,  2  Hill  (N.  Y.), 
159;  S.  C.  8  Paige,  527;  Hines  v  North  Caro- 
lina, 10  Sm.  &  M.  529. 

1  King  of  Spain  v  Machado,  4  Buss.  225, 
560,  2  Bligh,  N.  S.  60;  see  also  Columbian 
Government  v  Rothschild,  1  Sim.  94;  King  of 
Hanover  r.  Wheat  ley,  4  Beav.  78;  Duke  of 
Brunswick  v.  King  of  Hanover,  6  Beav.  1;  2 
H.  L.  Cas.  1 ;  King  of  the  Two  Sicilies  v.  Will- 
cox,  1  Sim.  N.  S.  301,  and  post,  Chap.  IV.  §  4, 
on  the  liability  of  foreign  States  to  be  sued. 

2  Emperor  of  Austria  v.  Day,  3  De  G.  F.  & 
J.  217,  251,  252;  7  Jur.  N.  S.  639,  644,  see 
also  United  States  v   Pnoleau,  2  H  &  M  559: 

II  Jur.  N.  S.  792;  12  id.  724;  United  States  v. 
Wagner,  L.  R.  3  Eq  724.  V.  C.  W.;  L.  R.  2 
Ch.  Ap.  582,  L.  C.  &  L.  JJ.;  United  States  v. 
McRae,  L.  R.  4  Eq.  327,  V.  C  W.;  L.  R.  3 
Ch.  79,  L.  C. 

8  Republic  of  Liberia  v.  Imperial  Bank,  25 
L.  T.  N   S. 866. 


(a)  A  suit  lies  by  a  foreign  soveieign  in 
either  a  Federal  or  State  Court  to  protect  the 
property  of  his  nation;  and  such  suit  is  not 
abated  by  his  death  or  deposition  while  it  is 
pending.  The  Sapphire,  11  Wall.  164;  King 
of  Prussia  v.  Kuepper,  23  Mo.  553.  A  foreign 
sovereign  may  be  required,  as  a  non-resident 
plaintiff,  to  give  security  for  costs  when  suing 
upon  a  commercial  transaction.  Emperor  of 
Brazil  v.  Robinson,  5  Dowl.  522  ;  King  of 
Greece  r.  Wright,  6  Dowl.  12;  The  Beatrice, 
36  L.  J.  Adm.  10  ;  Republic  of  Costa  Rica  v. 
Erlanger.  3  Ch.  D.  62.  In  New  York,  a  for- 
eign independent  government,  which  sues  as 
a  plaintiff  there,  may  be  required  to  give  secur- 
ity for  costs  as  a  non-resident,  under  the  Code 
of  Civil  Proc.  §  3268.  Republic  of  Honduras 
v.  Soto,  112  N   Y  310. 

Municipal  Courts  have  no  jurisdiction 
to  enforce  engagements  between  sovereigns 
founded  upon  treaties.  Doss  v.  Secretary 
of  State  for  India,  L.  R.  19  Eq.  509  ;  Rajah 
Salig  Ram  v.  Same,  L.  R.  Ind.  App. 
Sup.  119,  126.  The  Court  of  Chancery  may 
18 


proceed  to  administer  a  trust  fund  in  its 
custody,  although  a  foreign  sovereign  who 
is  interested  in  it  may  not  think  fit  to  come 
before  the  Court  in  a  suit  relating  thereto. 
Morgan  r.  Lariviere,  L.  R.  7  H.  L.  423;  L.  R. 
7  Ch.  550.  But  the  existence  of  the  trust 
must  not  be  in  dispute;  for  if  this  is  denied 
with  respect  to  funds  in  the  possession  of  an 
agent  of  the  foreign  government  within  the 
jurisdiction,  the  suit  cannot  proceed  in  the 
absence  of  such  government.  Wright  r.  Mills, 
63  L.  T.  186.  See  Gladstone  v.  Ottoman  Bank, 
1  H  &  M.  505  ;  Twycross  v.  Dreyfus,  5  Ch 
D.  605.  The  negotiation  by  a  government 
of  a  loan  in  a  foreign  country  does  not  intro- 
duce into  the  contract  the  peculiar  laws  of 
such  country.  Smith  r.  Wegueliu,  L.  R.  8 
Eq.  212  ;  Goodwin  v.  Robarts,  1  App.  Cas. 
476 ;  L.  R.  10  Ex.  76,  337.  A  suit  cannot  be 
maintained  in  England  upon  the  bonds  of  a 
foreign  government.  Ibid.;  Crouch  v.  Credit 
Foncier  of  England,  L.  R.  8  Q- B.  374,  Twy- 
cross v.  Dreyfus,  5  Ch.  D.  605. 


FOREIGN   GOVERNMENTS    AND   STATES.  *  19 

necessary  that  it  should  have  been  recognized  by  the  government 
there;  and  where  the  foreign  State  has  been  recognized,  the  recogni- 
tion is  conclusive,  and  the  Court  cannot  listen  to  any  objections  to  its 
title.4  (b)  This  point  appears  to  have  been  first  discussed  in  The  City 
of  Berne  v.  The  Bank  of  England,*  which  arose  from  the  application 
of  a  person  describing  himself  as  a  member  of  the  common  council 
chamber  of  the  city  of  Berne,  on  behalf  of  himself  and  of  all  others 
the  members  of  the  common  council  chamber  and  the  burghers  and 
citizens  of  that  city,  to  restrain  the  Bank  of  England  and  South  Sea 
Company  from  permitting  the  transfer  of  certain  funds  standing  in  the 
names  of  trustees,  under  a  purchase  by  the  old  government  of  Berne 
before  the  revolution:  the  application  was  opposed  on  the  ground  that 
the  existing  government  of  Switzerland,  not  being  acknowledged  by 
the  government  of  this  country,  could  not  be  noticed  by  the  Court;  and 
Lord  Eldon  refused  to  make  the  order,  observing  that  it  was  extremely 
difficult  to  say  that  a  judicial  Court  can  take  notice  of  a  government 
never  recognized  by  the  government  of  the  country  in  which  the  Court 
sits,  and  that  whether  the  foreign  government  was  recognized  or  not, 
was  matter  of  public  notoriety. 

The  fact  of  a  foreign  State  having  been  or  not  having  been  recog- 
nized by  the  local  government  must  be  judicially  taken  notice  *  of  *19 
by  the  Court,  even  though  there  is  an  averment  introduced  into 
the  pleadings  that  the  government  in  question  has  been  recognized.1 
It  has  also  been  held  that  the  Courts  in  England  will  not  entertain 
a  suit  for  matters  arising  out  of  contracts  entered  into  by  individuals 
with  the  governments  of  foreign  countries,  which  have  not  been 
acknowledged  by  the  government  of  that  country.2 

A  foreign  sovereign  or  State  sues  by  the  name  by  which  he  or  it  has 
been  recognized  by  the  government  of  this  country,  and  is  not  bound  to 
sue  in  the  name  of  any  officer  of  the  government,  or  to  join  as  co-plaintiff 
any  such  officer  upon  whom  process  may  be  served,  or  who  may  be  called 
upon  to  give  discovery  upon  a  cross-bill;3  but  the  proceedings  may  be 

4  Emperor  of  Austria  v.  Day,  2  GifT.  628;  the  government,  or  to  join  as  co-plaintiff  any 
7  Jur.  N.  S.  483;  3  De  G.  F.  &  J.  217;  7  Jur.  such  officer  on  whom  process  may  be  served, 
N.  S-  639.  and  who  may  be  called  upon  to  give  discovery 

5  9  Ves.  347;  and  see  Dolder  v.  Bank  of  upon  a  cross-bill ;  reversing  the  order  of  Sir  W. 
England,  10  Ves.  353;  Dolder  v.  Lord  Hunt-  Page  Wood  (Lord  Hatherley)  in  S.  C.  L.  R.  3 
ingfield,  11  Ves.  283.  Eq  724.     In  the  above  case"  (L.  R.  2  Ch.  589, 

1  Taylor  v.  Barclay,  2  Sim.  213,  220.  5!)2),  Lord  Justice  Turner  said:   "  In  the  cases 

2  Thomson  v.  Powles,  2  Sim.  194,  210.  referred  to,  the  form  of  government  was  mon- 
8  In  United  States  v.  Wagner,  L.  R.  2  Ch.      archical;  and  I  take  it  that,  in  such  cases,  the 

582,  it  was  held  that  a  foreign  sovereign  State  public  property  of  the  State,  so  far  as  it  is 
adopting  the  republican  form  of  government  is  not  by  the  Constitution  of  the  State  otherwise 
not  bound  to  sue  in  the  name  of  any  officer  of      destined,  vests  in   the  sovereign,  subject  to  a 


(b)  If  a  revolutionary  or  de  facto  govern-  Ch.  D.  348.     See  Republic  of  Peru  v.  Peruvian 

ment  is  overthrown  by  the  previously  existing  Guano  Co.  36  Ch.   D.  489.      Probably  al=o  if 

government  after  its  recognition  by  a  foreign  there  has  been    no    international    recognition, 

State,  the  restored    government   cannot   repu-  property  acquired    under   such  contracts  can- 

diate  contracts  made  by  it  with   a   subject  of  not    be     recovered    abroad     in     violation    of 

such  foreign  State,  but    in    litigation    thereon  such  contracts.      Ibid.;  The  Beatrice,  36  L  J. 

merely    takes    the    rights    of    the    recognized  Adm.  9. 
government.     Republic  of  Peru  v.  Drevfus,  38 

19 


*  20  PERSONS   BY   WHOM    A    SUIT   MAY   BE   INSTITUTED. 

stayed  until  the  foreign  sovereign  or  State  has  named  a  person  who  can 
give  discovery,  and  if  an  order  for  such  discovery  be  not  obeyed,  the 

Court  has  power  to  dismiss  the  suit.4  And  where  a  foreign  State 
*20     comes  voluntarily  as  a  suitor-plaintiff  into  *  a  Court  of  Law  or 

Equity  in  England,  it  becomes  subject,  as  to  all  matters  connected 
with  that  suit,  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court.1  It  may  therefore  be 
ordered  to  give  security  for  costs,2  and  a  bill  filed  by  it  may  be  dis- 
missed with  costs.3  An  ambassador,  or  minister  plenipotentiary,  of  a 
foreign  State,  does  not  properly  represent  that  State  in  a  Court  of  jus- 
tice,4 and  cannot  sue  in  his  own  name  on  behalf  of  the  foreign  sovereign 
or  State.5 

It  seems  that  a  colonial  government,  existing  by  letters-patent,  which 
is  in  some  degree  similar  to  a  corporation  possessing  rights  in  England, 
may  sue  there,  and  ought  to  be  regulated  by  the  law  of  England,  under 
which  it  has  existence ; 6  thus,  a  decree  was  made  for  the  specific  per- 
formance of  articles  executed  in  England  under  seal  for  mutual  con- 
siderations respecting  the  boundaries  of  the  two  provinces  of  Maryland 
and  Pennsylvania  in  North  America,  although  the  original  jurisdiction, 
in  cases  relating  to  boundaries  between  provinces,  was  admitted  to  be 
in  the  King  in  council,  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Courts  being  founded 
upon  the  articles  which  were  considered  to  give  jurisdiction  to  the 
Superior  Courts  whatever  the  subject-matter  might  be.7 

Section  III.  —  Corporations,  Joint- Stock  Companies,  and  Partnerships. 

The- right  to  sue  is  not  confined  to  natural  persons.  The  power  to 
sue  and  be  sued  in  their  corporate  name  is  a  power  inseparably  incident 
to  every  corporation,  whether  it  be  sole  or  aggregate.8 

moral  obligation  on  his  part  to  apply  it  for  the  *  Republic   of  Liberia    v.   Imperial    Bank, 

benefit  of  his  subjects;  and  when  he  sues  in  L.  R.  16  Eq.  179,   V.  C.  M. ;  L.  R.  9  Ch.  569, 

respect  to  the  public  property,  he  sues,  not  as  L.  JJ.;     S.  C    nom.  Republic   of   Liberia    v. 

the  mere  representative  of  the  State,  but  as  the  Rove,  1  App.   Cas.   139,   H.   L.  (E);  Republic 

person  in  whom  the  property  is  vested  for  the  of  Costa  Rica  v  Erlanger,  1  Ch.  D.  171,  C.  A. 

benefit  of  the  State.     In  the  case  of  a  republic,  See  also  Republic  of  Peru  v.  Weguelin,  L.  R. 

the  public  property  of  a  State  remains   in  the  20  Eq.  140,  V.  C.  H.;  post,  p.  141. 

State,   and  the  State,  therefore,  and  not  any  J  Rothschild  v.  Queen  of  Portugal,  3  Y.  & 

mere  officer  of  the  State,  is  the  proper  party  to  C.  Ex.  594;  King  of  Spain  v.  Hullett,  7  Bligh, 

sue  for  it."     Similar  remarks  were  made  by  the  N.  S.  359;  1  CI.  &  Fin.  333;  and  cases  ante, 

Lord  Chancellor  and  Lord  Cairns  in  the  same  17,  n 

case.      See   United   States   v.  Drummond,   33  2  Republic  of  Costa  Rica  r.  Erlanger,  W.  N. 

Beav.  449.     Wilson  v.  Church,  9  Ch.    D.  552.  (1876)  210.  225;  24  W.  R.  880,  955. 

But   the   Court  may  stay  proceedings   in   the  3  See  United  States  v.  McRae,  L    R.  8  Eq 

original  suit  until  the  means  of  discovery  are  69,  77,  V.  C.  L;  Queen  of  Spain  v.  Parr,  39  L. 

secured   in   the   cross-suit.      United   States  v.  J.  Ch   73;  18  W.  R.  110,  112,  V.  C.  J. 

Wagner,  L.  R.  2  Ch.  Ap.  582,  per  Lord  Chan-  4  Schneider  v.    Lizardi,  9  Beav.   461,  466; 

cellor  and    Lord   Cairns,    L    J.  ;    Republic  of  Columbian  Government  v.  Rothschild.  1  Sim. 

Peru  r.  Weguelin,  L.  R.  20  Eq.  140  ;  and  may  94.     As  to  confidential  agents,  see  Republic  of 

dismiss  the  suit  if  its  order  be  not  properly  Chili  v.  Rothschild,  W.  N.  (1891)  138. 

obeyed.     Republic  of  Liberia  v.  Rove,  1   App.  6  Penedo  v.  Johnson,  29  L.  T.  N.  S.  452; 

Cas.  139.      But  the    complainant  will  not    be  22  W.  R.  103. 

allowed  to   select   the   officer  of    the    foreign  6  Barclay  v.  Russell,  3  Ves.  424,  434;  and 

government  to  be  made  co-defendant  with  a  see  Sloman  v.  New  Zealand,  1  C.  P.  D.563,  C  A. 

view   to  discovery,    and   to   stay   proceedings  7  Penn  v.  Lord    Baltimore,  1  Ves.  Sr.  444, 

until  such  person  has  appeared  and  answered.  446,  2  L.  C  in  Eq.  (4th  ed.)  939. 

Republic  of  Costa  Rica  c.  Erlanger,  1  Ch.  D.  171.  8  1  Bla.  Com.  475;  Hotchkiss  v.  Trustees,  7 

20 


CORPORATIONS    AND    JOINT-STOCK    COMPANIES.  *  22 

As  corporations  must  take  and  grant  by  the  corporate  name,  so 
by  that  name  they  must,  in  general,  sue  and  be  sued;9  and  they 
*  may  sue  by  their  true  name  of  foundation,  though  they  be  better  *21 
known  by  another  name.  Thus,  where  the  masters  and  scholars 
of  the  Hall  of  Valens  Mary,  in  Cambridge,  brought  a  writ  by  that  name, 
which  was  the  name  of  their  foundation,  though  they  were  better 
known  by  the  name  of  Pembroke  Hall,  the  writ  was  held  good.1 

When  a  corporation  by  prescription  has  more  than  one  name,  it  may 
sue  by  the  one  name  or  the  other,  alleging  that  it  and  its  predecessors 
have  from  time  immemorial  been  known,  and  been  accustomed  to  plead, 
by  the  one  or  by  the  other.2 

A  suit  by  a  corporation  aggregate,  to  recover  a  thing  due  to  it  in  its 
corporate  right,  must  not  be  brought  in  the  name  of  its  head  alone, 
but  in  the  full  corporate  name,  unless  it  appear  that  the  Act  of  Parlia- 
ment or  charter  by  which  it  is  constituted  enables  it  to  sue  in  the  name 
of  its  head;  and  though  it  appear  that  the  head  of  a  corporation  is 
enabled  to  sue  in  his  own  name  for  anything  to  which  the  corpora- 
tion is  entitled,  it  will  not  be  precluded  from  suing  by  its  name  of 
incorporation.3 

Where  an  Act  of  Parliament  grants  anything  to  a  corporation, 
the  grant  shall  take  effect,  though  the  *  true  corporate  name  be     *22 
not  used,  provided  the  name  actually  used  be  a  sufficient  descrip- 
tion of  the  corporation ;  though  it  may  be  doubtful   whether,  in  suing 


John.  356;  Sharon  Canal  Co.  v.  Fulton  Bank, 
7  Wend.  412;  Chambers  v.  Bap.  Educ.  Soc.  1 
B.  Mon.  216;  Le  Grand  v.  Hampden  Sidney- 
College,  5  Munf.  324;  Trustees  of  Lexington  v. 
M'Connell,  3  A.  K.  Marsh.  224  ;  Central  Manuf. 
Co.  v.  Hartshorne,  3  Conn.  199;  Bank  of  Or- 
leans v.  Skinner,  9  Paige,  305.  In  England, 
partners  may  now  sue  and  be  sued  in  their  firm 
name.  R.  S.  C.  (1883)  Ord.  XVL  14, 15;  Ord. 
VII.  2;  Ex  parte  Blain,  12  Ch.  D.  522,  533; 
Leathley  v.  McAndrew,  W.  N.  (1875)  259; 
Pike  v.  Keene,  W.  N.  (1876)  36;  24  W.  R. 
322;  Republic  of  Liberia  v.  Rove,  1  App.  Cas. 
139. 

9  A  corporation  can  be  called  upon  to  answer 
only  by  its  proper  name.  Biriney's  case,  2 
Bland,  99.  So  a  corporation  can  sue  only  by 
the  name  and  style  given  to  it  by  law.  Porter 
v.  Neckervis,  4  Rand.  359.  See  Minot  v.  Curtis, 
7  Mass.  444.  In  Winnipiseogee  Lake  Co.  v. 
Young,  40  N.  H.  428,  Bell  C.  J.  said:  "The 
practice,  we  think,  is  nearly  universal,  that  a 
corporation  is  described  in  its  bill  by  its  cor- 
porate name,  with  the  addition  of  the  fact  that 
it  is  a  corporation  duly  established  by  law  in 
such  a  state,  and  having  its  place  of  business  at 
such  a  place;  and  a  corporation  defendant  is 
described  in  the  same  way.  In  the  case  of 
public  corporations  created  by  public  laws  the 
Court  is  officially  to  take  notice  of  the  cor- 
porate character."     See  Withers  v.  Warner,  1 


Str.  309.  A  law  creating  a  bank,  with  author- 
ity to  issue  circulating  notes  intended  to  con- 
stitute the  currency  of  the  country,  is  a  public 
law,  and  need  not  be  given  in  evidence.  Wil- 
liams i'.  Union  Bank,  2  Hum.  339.  "  But  in  the 
case  of  private  corporations,  created  by  charters 
or  private  Acts,  the  Court  is  not  merely  not 
bound  to  take  notice  of  the  corporate  names  as 
such,  but  they  cannot  officially  take  such  notice. 
The  party  is  bound  to  allege  it,  as  a  fact  to  be 
proved,  if  he  would  avail  himself  of  it.''  See 
also  Union  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v  Osgood,  I  Duer, 
707;  State  v.  Mead,  27  Vt.  722;  State  v.  Cen- 
tral Railroad  Co.  28  Vt.  584;  State  v.  Same,  28 
Vt.  583;  Camden  &<\  v.  Rower,  4  Barb.  127; 
Bank  v.  Simonton,  2  Texas,  531. 

A  corporation  may  acquire  a  name  by  usage, 
as  by  retaining  its  original  name  after  a  legisla- 
tive change,  and  an  adjudication  in  bankruptcy 
made  against  it  by  the  name  so  acquired  is 
valid.     Alexander  v.  Berney,  28  N.  J.  Eq.  90. 

1  44  Ed.  HI.  35;  1  Kvd'on  Corp.  253;  and 
see,  as  to  title  by  which  municipal  corporations 
must  sue  and  be  sued,  Rochester  v.  Lee.  15 
Sim.  376;  Att.-Gen.  r.  Worcester,  2  Phil.  3;  1 
Coop.  temp.  Cott.  18. 

»  See  9  Ed.   IV.  21:  13  Hen.  VII.   14:  16 
Hen.  VII.  1;  and  21  Hen.  VI.  4,  which  last 
seems  contra. 
a  2  Salk.  451. 


21 


*  23  PERSONS   BY   WHOM    A    SUIT   MAY   BE   INSTITUTED. 

to  enforce  its  claim   under   that   Act,    it   can   use   the  name   therein 
mentioned.1 

A  corporation,  being  a  body  whose  identity  is  continuous,  may 
impeach  transactions  carried  into  effect  in  its  own  name  by  its 
former  governing  body ;  for  the  members  of  the  governing  body  of  the 
corporation,  as  its  agents,  are  bound  to  exercise  its  functions  for  the 
purposes  for  which  they  were  given,  and  to  protect  its  interests  and 
property;  and  if  such  agents  exercise  those  functions  for  the  purpose 
of  injuring  its  interests,  and  alienating  its  property,  the  corporation  is 
not  estopped  from  complaining,  although  the  act  done  was  ostensibly 
an  act  of  the  corporation.2 

A  corporation  aggregate,  whicli  has  a  head,  cannot  sue  or  be  sued 
without  it,  because  without  it  the  corporation  is  incomplete.3  It  is 
not,  however,  necessary  to  mention  the  name  of  the  head;4  nor  is  it 
necessary,   in  the  case  of  corporations  aggregate,  to  name  any  of  the 

individual  members  by  their  proper  Christian  and  surnames.5 
*23  *A  corporation  sole,  suing  for  a  corporate  right,  having  two 

capacities,  a  natural  and  a  corporate,  must  always  show  in 
what  capacity  he  sues.1  Thus,  a  bishop  or  prebendary,  suing  for  land 
which  he  claims  in  right  of  his  bishopric  or  prebend,  must  describe 
himself  as  bishop  or  prebendary;  and  if  a  parson  sues  for  anything 
in  right  of  his  parsonage,  he  ought  to  describe  himself  as  parson. 
A  sole  corporation  differs  in  this  respect  from  a  corporation  aggre- 
gate, because  the  latter  having  only  a  corporate  capacity,  a  suit  in  its 
corporate  name  can  be  only  in  that  capacity.2  It  also  differs  from 
corporations  aggregate,  in  that  by  the  death  of  a  corporation  sole  a  suit 

1  10  Mod.  207,  208;  1  Kyd  on  Corp.  256.  A  town  may  sue  by  the  description  of  A  & 

A  declaration,  upon  a  promissory  note,  that  it  B,  and  the  rest  of  the  inhabitants  of  such  town, 

was  made  to  the  Medway  Cotton  Manufactory,  instead  of  using;  the   corporate  name   merely, 

a  corporation,  &c,  by  the  name  of  K.  31.  &  Co.,  Barkhampstead  v.  Parsons,  3  Conn.  1.     And  a 

was  held  good  on  demurrer.     Medway  Cotton  county  in  Tennessee  may  sue  in  the  name  of  t1  e 

Manufactory   r.   Adams,    10   3Iass.   360.     See  Justices  composing  the  County  Court.     3Iaury 

Charitable  Association  v.  Baldwin,  1  3Iet.  359:  County  r.  Lewis  County,  ]  Swan,  236. 
Commercial  Bank  i\  French,  21  Pick.  586.     If,  2  Att.-Gen.  v.  Wilson,  C.  &  P.  1,  21,  24. 

in  a  contract  with  a  corporation,  its  name  be  so  3  2  Bae.  Ab.  tit.  Corp.  E.  2. 

given  as  to  distinguish  it  from   other  corpora-  4  1  Kyd  on  Corp  281. 

tions,  it  is  sufficient  to  support  an  action  in  the  5  2  Inst.  666.     The  corporation's  "  property 

true  corporate  name.     Hagerstown  Turnpike  v.  is  legally  vested  in  itself,  and  not  in  its  stock- 

Creeger,  5  Har.  &  J.  122;  S.  P.  Inhabitants  of  holders.     As  individuals  they  cannot,  even  by 

Alloway  Creek  r.  Strong,  5  Halst.  323;    Berks  joining  together  unanimously,  convey  a  title  to 

and  Dauphin  Co.  v.  3Iyers,  6  S.  &  R-  16;    Wool-  it,  or  maintain  an  action  at  law  for  its  posses- 

wich   v.  Forrest,  Penning.  11:  First  Parish  in  sion,  or  for  damages  done  to  if.     Nor  can  they 

Sutton    v.  Cole.  3   Pick.  232;   Mil.  and   Chil.  make  a  contract  that  shall  bind  it,  orenforce  by 

Turnpike  Co.  t.  Brush,  10  Ohio,  111.  action  a  contract  that  has  been  made  with  it." 

A  misnomer  of  a  corporation   in  a  grant  or  Chapman  J.  in  Peabody  v.  Flint,  6  Allen,  55, 

obligation  will  not  prevent  a  recovery  in  the  56.     See  Kennebec  &  Port.  R.  R.  Co.  r.  Port.  & 

true  name,  the  latter  being  shown  by  proper  Kennebec  R.  R.  Co.  54  3Iaine,  173.     Hence,  in 

averments.     Bank  of  Tenn.  v.  Burke,  1  Coldw.  Chancery,  a   suit  by  members  in  their  corpo- 

623.  rate  capacity  does  not  become  defective  by  the 

Contracts  made  by  mere  servants  or  agents  death  of  some  of  them.     Blackburn  v.  Jepson. 

of  corporations  may  be  sued  in  the  name  of  the  3  Swanst   132,  138. 

corporations.     Binney  v.  Plumley.   5  Vt.  500.  1  2  Bac.   Ab.   tit.   Corp.   E.  2;   Weston    r. 

See  Proctor  v.  Webber,  1  Chip."  371;  African  Hunt,  2  Mass.  500. 
Society  v.  Varick,  13  John.  38.  2  Ibid. 

22 


CORPORATIONS    AND    JOINT-STOCK    COMPANIES.  *  24 

by  him,  although  instituted  in  his  corporate  capacity,  becomes  abated,3 
which  is  not  the  case,  as  we  have  seen,  with  respect  to  suits  by  corpo- 
rations aggregate. 

It  is  to  be  observed,  that  upon  the  death  of  a  corporation  sole,  there 
is  a  material  distinction  with  regard  to  the  right  to  revive.  If  the 
plaintiff  was  entitled  to  the  subject-matter  of  the  suit  for  his  own 
benefit,  his  personal  representatives  are  the  parties  to  revive;  but  if  he 
was  only  entitled  for  the  benefit  of  others,  his  successor  is  the  person 
who  ought  to  revive.  Thus,  if  the  master  of  a  hospital,  or  any  simi- 
lar corporation,  institutes  proceedings  to  recover  the  payment  of  an 
annuity  and  dies,  his  successor  shall  have  the  arrears,  and  not  his 
executors,  because  he  is  entitled  only  as  a  trustee  for  the  benefit  of  his 
house;  but  it  is  otherwise  in  the  case  of  a  parson;  there  the  executors 
are  entitled,  and  not  the  successor,  because  he  was  entitled  to  the 
annuity  for  his  own  benefit.4  On  the  same  principle,  if  a  rent  due  to 
a  dean  and  chapter  be  in  arrear,  and  the  dean  dies,  the  rent  belongs  to 
the  succeeding  dean  and  chapter ;  but  if  the  rent  be  due  to  the  dean  in 
his  sole  corporate  capacity,  it  shall  go  to  his  executors,  and  they  must 
revive.5 

Although  corporations  aggregate  are  entitled  to  sue  in  their  cor- 
porate capacity,  the  Court  will  not  permit  parties  to  assume  a 
*  corporate  character  to  which  they  are  not  entitled;  and  where  *24 
it  appears  sufficiently  on  the  bill  that  the  plaintiffs  have  assumed 
such  a  character  without  being  entitled  to  it,  a  demurrer  will  hold.1 
Thus,  where  a  bill  was  filed  by  some  of  the  members  of  a  lodge  of  Free- 
masons against  others,  for  the  delivery  up  of  certain  specific  chattels, 
in  which  bill  there  was  great  affectation  of  a  corporate  character 
in  stating  their  laws  and  constitutions,  and  the  original  charter  by 
which  they  were  constituted,  a  demurrer  was  allowed  "because  the 
Court  will  not  permit  persons  who  can  only  sue  as  partners,  to  sue  in  a 
corporate  character;  and,  upon  principles  of  policy,  the  Courts  of  this 
country  do  not  sit  to  determine  upon  charters  granted  by  persons  who 
have  not  the  prerogative  to  grant  them."  2 

8  But  see  contra,  Polk  v.  Plummer  2  Humph.  Rank  v.  Simontor.,  2  Texas,  531.     See  Mech- 

500;  Felts  v.  Mayor  of  Memphis,  2  He:i<l,  650;  anics'    Bank    v.   Goodwin,    2    Green,    439.     A 

Ezell  v.  Justices,  3  Head,  586;  Anon.  1  Hayw.  corporation  chartered  in  one  State  may  sue  in 

144.  the   Courts  of   another  State.     Williamson  v. 

4  1  Kyd  on  Corp.  77.  Smoot,  7  Martin  (La.),  31;    Lucas  v.   Bank  of 

5  1  Kyd  on  Corp.  78.  Georgia,  2  Stew.  (Ala.)  147;    New  York  Fire 

1  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  497;  see  Livingston  v.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Ely,  5  Conn.  560;  Cape  Fear  Bank 
Lynch,  4  John.  Ch.  573,  596.  P.  Stinemetz,  1  Hill,  44;    Hank  of  Michigan  ''• 

2  Lloyd  v.  Loaring,  6  Ves.  773;  Womersley  Williams,  5  Wend.  478;    7  Wend.  53'.i :    Ports- 
v.  Merritt,  L.  R.  4  Eq.  695.      A  foreign  corpo-  mouth    Livery  Co.   r.    Watson,    10    M;i*s.    91 
ration  may  sue  in  its  corporate  name  in  Chan-  Taylor  t'.  Bank  of  Alexandria,  5  Leigh,  471 
eery,  as  well  as  at  Law.     Silver  Lake  Bank  v.  Bank  of  Edwardsville    v  Simpson,  1    Mo.  184 
North,  4  John.  Ch.  372;  Story  Eq.  PL  §  55;  Lothrop    v.    Commercial    Bank    of    Scioto,    8 
Society  for  Propagating  the  Gospel  v  Wheeler,  Dana,    114;    New  Jersey    Pro'ection    Bank    v. 
2    Gall.     105;     Society    for   Propagating    the  Thorp,    6  Cowen,    46;    Pendleton    ?•.   Bmk    of 
Gospel  v.  New  Haven,  8  Wheat.  464;    South  Kentucky,  1  Monroe,  171;  Taylor  p.   Bank  or 
Carolina  Bank  »>.  Case,  8  B.  &  C.  427;    Bank  Illinois,   7  Monroe,  584;   Bank  of  Marietta  v. 
of  Scotland  v.  Kerr,  8   Sim.  246;  Collins  Co.  Pindall,   2   Rand.  465;  Reed    v. Conococheqne 
v.  Brown,  3  K.  &  J.  423;  3  Jur.  N.  S.  929;  Bank,  5  Rand.  326;  Bank  of  Augusta  V.  Earle, 
Prioleau  v.  United  State,  L.  R.  2  Eq.  668;  The  13  Peters,  519;    Stewart  v.   U.  S.   Ins.  Co.   9 

23 


25 


PERSONS    BY   WHOM    A    SUIT   MAY   BE   INSTITUTED. 


A  suit  may  be  brought  in  England  by  a  foreign  corporation,  in  its 
corporate  name  and  capacity,8  and  in  pleading  it  is  not  necessary  that 
it  should  set  forth  the  proper  names  of  the  persons  who  form  such  cor- 
poration, or  show  how  it  was  incorporated; 4  though,  if  it  is  denied,  iu 
must  prove  that  by  the  law  of  the  foreign  country  it  was  effectually 

incorporated.5 
*  25  *  Although  corporations  aggregate  are  entitled  to  sue  in  their 

corporate  capacity,  the  court  will  not  permit  suits  to  be  brought 
by  persons  assuming  a  corporate  character  to  which  they  are  not 
entitled;1  when  however  there  are  numerous  parties  having  the  same 
interest,  one  or  more  may  sue  as  individuals  on  behalf  of  themselves 
and  the  other  persons  interested.2 

By  the  7  Will.  IV.  &  1  Vic.  c.  73,  the  sovereign  is  empowered  to 
grant  letters-patent,  establishing  companies,  and  providing  that  the 
companies  so  established  shall  be  able  to  sue  and  be  sued  by  their 
public  officer;  and  many  joint-stock  companies  or  associations  for 
insurance,  trading,  and  other  purposes,  have  from  time  to  time  been 
established  by  special  Acts  of  Parliament,  which,  although  they  have 
not  formed  them  into  corporations,  have  still  conferred  upon  them 
many  privileges,  in  consequence  of  which  such  companies  have  acquired 
something  of  a  corporate  character;  amongst  other  privileges  so  con- 
ferred, may  be  reckoned  that  of  suing  and  being  sued  in  the  name  of 
their  public  officer.3 

Where,  however,  any  members  of  a  company,  established  under 
these  Acts,  wish  to  sue  the  directors  or  others  who  are  members  as  well 


Watts,  126;  Miss.  R.  Co.  v.  Gaster,  20  Ark. 
455;  B:ink  of  Washtenaw  v.  Montgomery,  2 
Scam.  422;  Guaga  Iron  Co.  v.  Dawson, 
4  Blackf.  202;  Mechanics'  Bank  v.  Goodwin, 
2  Green,  239;  Lewis  v.  Bank  of  Kentucky, 
12  Ohio,  132.  A  State  is  a  corporation,  and 
may  sue  as  such  in  another  State.  Delafield  v. 
Illinois,  2  Hill  (N.  Y.),  159,  S.  C.  8  Paige, 
527;  Hines  v.  North  Carolina,  10  Sm.  &  M. 
529. 

3  See  preceding  note. 

4  Angell  &  Ames,  Corp.  §  632. 

5  Dutch  West  India  Co.  v.  Van  Moyses, 
2  Ld.  Ray.  1535;  1  Strange,  612.  As  to  the 
necessity  of  proving  the  corporate  existence  of 
a  foreign  corporation,  see  School  District  r. 
Blaisdell,  6  N.  H.  198;  Lord  r.  Bigelow,  8  Vt. 
445;  Society  &c.  v.  Young,  2  N.  H.  310;  The 
Guaga  Iron  Co.  v.  Dawson.  4  Blackf.  203; 
Portsmouth  Livery  Co.  v.  Watson,  10  Mass. 
92;  Bank  v.  Simonton,  2  Texas,  531. 

In  case  of  foreign  corporations,  the  plain- 
tiffs, under  the  general  issue,  are  bound  to 
show  their  corporate  capacity,  but  the  Court 
will  take  notice,  ex  officio,  of  the  capacity  of 
corporations  created  in  Ohio  to  sue  in  that 
State.  Lewis  v.  Bank  of  Kentucky,  12  Ohio, 
132;  see  Agnew  v.  Bank  of  Gettysburg,  2  Har. 
&  G.  478;  Portsmouth  Liverv  Co.  v.  Watson, 

24 


10  Mass.  92;  Eagle  Bank  of  New  Haven  v. 
Chapin,  3  Pick.  180;  Carmichael  r.  Trustees  of 
School  Lands,  3  How.  (Miss.)  84;  Wil  iams 
v.  Bank  of  Michigan,  7  AVend.  539;  Bank  of 
Waterville  v.  W.  W.  Bk.  13  How.  Pr.  270; 
Zion  Church  v.  St.  Peter's  Church,  5  W.  & 
S.  215;  Winnipiseogee  Lake  Co.  v.  Young,  40 
N.  H.  420,  428. 

1  Lloyd  v.  Loaring,  6  Ves.  779;  Womersley 
v.  Merritt,  L.  R.  4  Eq.  695. 

2  See  Chancey  v.  May,  Prec.  in  Ch.  592; 
Good  v.  Blewitt,  13  Ves.  397;  Cockburn  v. 
Thompson,  16  Ves.  321,  325 ;  Pearce  v.  Piper,  17 
Ves.  l;BIain  v  Agar,]  Sim.  37,  43;  2  Sim.  289; 
Gray  v.  Chaplain,  2  S.  &  S.  267,  272;  2  Russ. 
126;  Van  Samlau  r.  Moore,  1  Russ.  441;  Lund 
v.  Blanchard,  4  Hare,  290,  292;  Womersley  v. 
Merritt,  L.  R.  4  Eq.  695,  V.  C.  M.;  and  see 
pout.  Chap.  V.  §  1,  Purties;  R.  S.  C.  Ord. 
XVI.  9. 

3  For  the  history  of  such  companies,  and  of 
the  provisions  regulating  them,  see  Van  San- 
dan  r.  Moore,  1  Russ.  441,  458.  As  to  abate- 
ment by  death  of  a  public  officer,  see  7 
Geo.  IV.  c.  46.  §  9,  and  Burmester  v.  Baron 
von  Stenz,  23  Beav.  32.  For  form  of  order  to 
substitute  a  new  officer,  see  Meek  v.  Burnley, 
M.  R.  12  Jan.,  1863,  Reg.  Lib.  B.  6;  and  2 
Seton,  1528,  No.  5. 


CORPORATIONS    AND   JOINT-STOCK    COMPANIES. 


26 


as  themselves,  they  may  maintain  such  a  suit  in  their  own  individual 
capacities,  either  suing  by  themselves,  and  making  the  rest  of 
the  company  *  defendants,  or  suing  on  behalf  of  themselves  and      *26 
the  other  members  of  the  association.1     Although  the  rights  and 


1  Hichens  v.  Congreve,  4  Russ.  562;  Wall- 
worth  v.  Holt,  4  M.  &  C.  619,  635;  Colman  v. 
Eastern  Counties  Ry.  Co.  10  Beav.  1';  Bag- 
sliaw  v.  Eastern  Counties  Ry.  Co.  7  Hare,  114; 
2  M.  N.  &  G.  389;  Heath  v.  Ellis,  12  Met. 
601;  Allen  v.  Curtis,  26  Conn.  456;  Putnam  v. 
Sweet,  1  Chand.  (Wis.)  286;  Saekett's  Harbor 
Bank  v.  Blake,  3  Rich.  Eq.  225;  Cunliffe  v. 
Manchester  and  Bolton  Canal  Co.  1  M.  &  R. 
131,  note;  Manderson  v.  Commercial  Bank,  28 
Penn.  379;  Bait.  &  Ohio  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Wheel- 
ing, 13  Gratt.  40. 

Peabody  v-  Flint,  6  Allen,  52;    Robinson  v. 


(a)  Lambert  v.  Neuchatel  Asphalt  Co.  51 
L.  J.  Ch.  882;  Pickering  v.  Stephenson,  L.  R. 
14  Eq.  322;  Ward  v.  Sittintfbourne  &c.  Ry. 
Co.  L.  R.  9  Ch.  488;  Isle  of  Wight  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Tahourdin,  25  Ch.  D.  320;  Studdert  y."Grosve- 
nor,  33  Ch.  D.  528;  Sellers  v.  Phcunix  Ins. 
Co.  13  Fed.  Rep.  20.  Formerly  it  was  held 
that  a  suit  in  Equity  will  not  be  entertained  by 
a  shareholder  of  a  public  company  on  behalf 
of  himself  and  other  shareholders,  to  restrain 
the  directors  from  acts  alleged  to  be  ultra 
vires,  when  he  really  sues  by  direction  of  a 
rival  company  and  to  protect  its  interests. 
Forrest  r.  Manchester  &c.  Ry.  Co.  9  W.  R. 
818,  affirming  30  Beav.  40;  Seaton  v.  Grant, 
36  L.  J.  Ch.  638;  L.  R.  2  Ch.  465.  See  Russell 
v.  Wakefield  Waterworks  Co.  L.  R.  20  Eq. 
474.  But  it  has  since  been  held  that  the  share- 
holder, though  chargeable  with  mala  Jides,  was 
entitled  to  have  his  right  enforced.  Bloxom 
v.  Met.  Ry.  Co.  L.  R.  3  Ch.  337;  Mutter  v. 
Eastern  &  M.  Ry.  Co.  38  Ch.  D.  92.  As  to 
the  use  of  the  company's  name  as  plaintiff  by 
a  member  or  the  directors,  see  Pender  o.  Lush- 
ington,  6  Ch.  D.  70;  Duckett  v.  Gover,  id.  82; 
Mason  v.  Harris,  11  Ch.  I).  97;  Harben  v. 
Phillips,  23  Ch.  D.  14;  Ruston  v.  Tobin,  W  N. 
(1880)  19;  post,  p.  242:  Cape  Breton  Co.  v 
b'enn,  17  Ch.  D.  198.  Even  when  the  use  of 
the  company's  name  is  unauthorized,  it  may 
be  stricken  out  as  plaintiff,  and  liberty  given 
to  amend  by  adding  its  name  as  defendant. 
Silber  Light  Co.  v.  Silber,  12  Ch.  D.  717;  27 
W.  R.  427.  See  Hawes  v.  Oakland,  104  U.  S. 
450;  Detroit  v.  Dean,  106  U.  S.  537.  A  share- 
holder who  sues  the  company  may  obtain  dis- 
covery of  privileged  communications  between 
the  company  and  its  legal  advisers  relating  to 
the  subject-matter  of  the  action,  if  paid  for 
with  the  funds  of  the  company  Gouroud  v. 
Edison  &  G.  Tel.  Co.  57  L.  J.  Ch.  498. 

The  directors  of  a  public  company  are  trus- 


Smith,  3  Paige,  222;  see  Hersey  v.  Veazie,  24 
Maine,  9;  Smith  v.  Poor,  40  Maine,  415; 
Schley  v.  Dixon,  24  Ga.  273;  Kean  v.  John- 
son 1  Stockt.  401 ;  Binney's  case,  3  Bland, 
142,  Revere  v.  Boston  Copper  Co.  15  Pick. 
351,  see  Durfee  v.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.  5  Allen, 
230.  Ordinarily,  where  the  act  complained  of 
is  capable  of  confirmation  by  the  corporation 
or  company,  redress  should  be  first  sought 
through  the  company,  (a)  Foss  v.  Harbottle, 
2  Hare,  461;  Mozley  v.  Alston,  1  Phil.  790; 
McDougaU  v.  Gardiner,  1  Ch.  D  14;  infra, 
p.   243.     But    if   the    action    of    the   corpora- 


tees  of  their  powers  for  the  shareholders,  but 
not  for  the  creditors.  Re  Wincham  Shipbuild- 
ing Co.  9  Ch.  D.  322.  They  are  not  necessarily 
liable  for  the  representations  of  co-directors 
and  other  officers.  Cargill  v.  Bower,  38  L.  T. 
779. 

A  suit  cannot  be  maintained  by  a  corpora- 
tion organized  under  a  void  charter.  Doboy  & 
Union  Tel  Co  v  De  Magathias,  25  Fed.  Rep. 
697.  Lack  of  a  corporate  existence  is  plead- 
able in  abatement  or  bar;  lack  of  capacity  to 
sue  in  the  particular  case,  in  abatement  only. 
Oregonian  Ry.  Co.  v.  Oregon  Ry.  &  Nav.  Co. 
23  Fed   Rep.  232. 

Rule  94  of  the  U.  S.  Supreme  Court  (zee  post, 
Vol.  III.)  requires  that  a  bill  by  a  shareholder 
against  the  corporation,  founded  upon  a  right 
which  it  may  assert,  shall  specify  the  plaintiffs 
efforts  to  obtain  its  action,  and  the  reasons  of 
his  failure.  See  Leo  v  Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co. 
17  Fed.  Rep.  273;  McHenry  v.  New  York,  P. 
&  O.  R.  Co.  22  id.  130;  Ranger  v.  Champion 
Cotton-Press  Co.  52  id.  611,  and  see  Quincv  v. 
Steel,  120  U.  S.  241;  Bacon  v.  Robertson',  18 
How  480.  Hence  the  bill  of  one  stockholder 
on  behalf  of  himself  and  the  other  stockholders 
for  an  accounting  must  show  the  use  of  all 
proper  means  on  his  part  to  induce  the  corpo- 
ration and  stockholders  to  take  action  in  the 
matter  complained  of;  its  financial  ability  to 
act,  or  the  offer  of  proper  indemnity  for  legal 
proceedings.  Hawes  v.  Oakland,  104  U.  S. 
450;  Huntington  v.  Palmer,  id.  482;  Daun- 
meyer  v  Coleman,  8  Sawyer,  51 ;  11  Fed  Rep. 
97;  Morgan  v.  Kansas  Pac.  Ry  Co.  15  id  55; 
Bill  v,  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.  16  id.  14;"Foote  ».  Cunard 
Mining  Co.  17  id.  46  ;  Foster  v.  Mansfield  &C.  R. 
Co.  36  id.  627:  see  Hansom  Cab  Co.  v.  Verkes, 
141  III.  320;  Alexander  v.  Searcy,  81  Ga.  536; 
Knoop  v.  Bohmrich,  49  N.  J.  Fq.  82;  Hazard  r. 
Durant,  19  Fed.  Rep.  471.  If  the  suit  is  suc- 
cessful, and  the  conduct  of  the  corporation  is 

25 


26 


PERSONS    BY   WHOM    A    SUIT   MAY   BE   INSTITUTED. 


duties  of  the  public  officer  are  chiefly  to  sue  and  be  sued  on  behalf  of  the 
company,  in  matters  arising  between  the  company  on  the  one  hand, 


tion  is  controlled  by  stock  procured  by  the 
fraud  complained  of,  the  bill  by  one  share- 
holder on  behalf  of  himself  and  all  other 
shareholders  will  be  sustained.  Atwool  v. 
Merryweather,  L.  R.  5  Eq.  464,  note.  And 
see  Hodges  v.  New  England  Screw  Co.  1  R.  I. 
312;  March  v.  Eastern  R.  Co.  40  N.  H.  567. 
So  if  the  act  complained  of  is  ultra  vires  of 
the  corporate  powers,  Clinch  v.  Financial 
Corporation,  L.  R.  5  Eq.  450;  S.  C.  4  Ch. 
117;  Gray  v.  Lewis,  L.  R.  8  Eq.  526;  and  see 
infra,  243,  note.  Or  if  the  act  is  intended  to 
prevent  the  shareholder  from  exercising  his 
legal  right  to  vote,  Cannon  v.  Trask,  L.  R. 
20  Eq.  669;  Pender  v.  Lushington,6  Ch.  D.  70. 
Or  where  the  majority  of  an  incorporated 
company  propose  to  benefit  themselves  at  the 
expense  of  the  minority,  Menier  v.  Hooper's 
Telegraph  Works,  L."  R.  9  Ch.  350.  Or 
where   the    directors  so   act   as   to   prevent  a 


condemned,  such  stockholder  is  entitled  to  be 
reimbursed  from  the  corporate  funds,  his  actual 
expenditures  and  attorney's  fees.  Meeker  v. 
Winthrop  Iron  Co.  17  Fed.  Rep.  48.  Those 
acting  in  a  transaction  which  violates  the  rights 
of  a  minority  of  the  stockholders  are  proper 
parties  to  a  suit  in  equity  by  the  minority, 
although  the  transaction  has  been  ratified  by 
the  majority.  Ervin  r.  Oregon  Ry.  &  Nav. 
Co.  27  Fed.  Rep.  625.  An  assignee  of  railroad 
stock,  who  has  not  registered  it,  or  been  rec- 
ognized as  a  stockholder,  cannot  sue  in  behalf 
of  himself  and  other  stockholders  to  restrain 
ultra  vires  acts.  Brown  v.  Duluth  &c.  R.  Co. 
53  Fed.  Rep.  889.  And  even  a  stockholder 
must  act  promptly  in  such  case.  Rabe  v. 
Dunlap  (N.  J.),  25  Atl.  Rep.  959. 

The  corporation  is  a  necessary  party  where 
its  transactions  with  others  are  sought  to  be  set 
aside  by  such  a  bill.  Bell  v.  Donohue,  17  Fed. 
Rep.  710.  As  to  non-resident  corporations,  see 
Walser  v.  Seligman,  13  Fed.  Rep.  415.  In 
general,  the  corporation  is  a  necessary  party  to 
any  suit  in  Equity  which  involves  its  property 
or  business  interests.  See,  under  different  cir- 
cumstances, Swan  Land  &  Cattle  Co.  v.  Frank, 
148  U.  S.  603;  39  Fed.  Rep.  456;  St.  Louis&c. 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Wilson,  114  U.  S.  60;  Sully  i\ 
Drennan,  113  U.  S.  287;  Davenport  v.  Dows, 
18  Wall.  626;  Dewing  v.  Perdicaries,  96  U.  S. 
193;  Wellman  v.  Howland  O.  &  I.  Works,  19 
Fed.  Rep.  51;  Walsh  v.  Memphis  &c.  R.  Co 
id.  152;  6  id.  797;  Mayer  v.  Denver  &c  R.  Co. 
41  id.  723;  Flour  City  Nat.  Bank  v.  Wechsel- 
berg,  45  id.  547,  Rogers  v.  Van  Nortwick,  id. 
513  ;  Vinal  v.  Continental  C.  &  I.  Co.  35  id. 
673;  136  U.  S.  653;  Hazard  v.  Durant,  11  R. 
1. 195,  207;  Price  v  Minot,  107  Mass.  49;  Dear- 

26 


majority  of  the  members  from  exercising  a 
proper  control  over  the  affairs  of  the  company. 
McDougall  v.  Gardiner,  L.  R.  20  Eq.  383  ;1 
Ch  D.  13,  L.  R.  10  Ch.  606.  Where  the  object 
of  the  suit  is  to  recover  damages  from  an  officer 
of  a  corporation  for  a  fraudulent  misappropria- 
tion or  conversion  of  the  corporate  property, 
the  action  can  only  be  brought  by  a  stockholder 
after  application  to  and  refusal  by  the  corpora- 
tion to  sue.  Greaves  v.  Gouge,  69  N.  Y.  154; 
Black  v.  Huggins,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  780.  And  so 
where  the  suit  is  against  a  third  person  for  a 
wrong  to  the  detriment  of  the  corpora'ion,  one 
stockholder  may  sue  for  himself  and  others 
where  he  has  first  rmde  an  application  to  the 
directors  of  the  company  to  institute  the  suit, 
and  they  have  refused.  Duckett  v.  Gover,  6 
Ch.  D.  82;  Memphis  v.  Dean,  8  Wall.  73, 
Bronson  v.  La  Crosse  R.  Co.  2  Wall.  28  5; 
Dodge   v.    Woolsey,    18   How.    331;  Memphis 

field  v.  Nims,  110  Mass.  115;  Lyman  i\  Bonney, 
101  Mass.  562;  Pope  v.  Leonard,  115  Mass  286. 
See  Bogardus  v.  Rosendale  Manuf.  Co.  7  N.  Y. 
147,  151  :  Patterson  v.  Lynde,  112  III.  196 ; 
Turner  V.  Alabama  Mining  Co.  25  111.  App. 
144;  Atlanta  Real  Estate  Co.  v.  Atlanta  Na- 
tional Bank,  75  Ga.  40;  Dixon  v.  Sumner 
County  Com'rs,  25  Kansas,  519;  Fiery  v.  Em- 
mert,  36  Md.  464;  Hurst  v.  Coe,  30  W.  Ya. 
158;  Camp  o.  Taylor  (N.  J.),  19  Atl.  968;  Allen 
i'.  Turner,  11  Gray,  436;  Samis  r.  King,  40 
Conn.  298.  The  corporation  has  been  held  not 
to  be  a  necessary  party  to  a  suit  to  require  its 
officers  to  register  a  transfer  of  its  stock.  Gould 
v.  Head,  41  Fed.  Rep.  240.  So,  upon  a  bill 
which  prays  for  the  reconveyance  of  shares  of 
stock  in  a  bank  obtained  by  conspiracy  and 
fraud,  and  an  injunction  against  their  transfer, 
the  bank  is  not  a  proper  parly,  if  no  charges  are 
made  against  it.  Dennis  r.  Perry,  12  R.  I.  540. 
See  Alexander  v.  Katte,  10  Abb.  N.  Cas.  443; 
63  How.  Pr.  262. 

In  a  suit  for  deceit  or  fraud  against  the  di- 
rectors of  a  company,  proof  of  a  false  statement 
made  by  them  carelessly  and  without  reason- 
able ground  for  believing  it  true,  does  not 
establish  fraud,  although  it  may  be  evidence  of 
fraud.  Deny  v.  Peck,  14  App  Cas.  337;  61 
L.  T.  265;  37"  Ch.  D.  541;  Glazier  v.  Roll<  No. 
1,  42  Ch.  D.  436.  See  Bishop  v.  Balkis  Cons. 
Co.  25  Q.  B.  D.  77,  512;  Low  v.  Bouverie, 
[1891]  3Ch  82;  65  L  T.  533;  Angus  v  Clif- 
ford, [1891]  2  Ch.  449;  63  L.  T.  684;  Scholes 
v.  Brook,  63  L.  T  837;  Knox  v.  Hayman,  67 
L.  T.  137;  Tomkinson  v.  Balkis  Cons.  Co. 
[1891]  2  Q.  B.  614;  64  L.  T.  816;  Cann  w. 
Willson,  39  Ch.  D.  39. 


CORPORATIONS    AND    JOINT-STOCK    COMPANIES. 


26 


and  strangers  or  persons  who  are  not  partners  on  the  other,  yet  it 
seems  that  the  public  officer  may  also  institute  proceedings  against 
certain  of  the  directors,  in  respect  to  past  transactions,  to  compel 
them  to  refund  sums  alleged  to  be  due  from  them  to  the  partnership.2 

The  Statute  7  &  8  Vic.  c.  110  was,  from  the  year  1844  until  the 
passing  of  "The  Joint-Stock  Companies'  Act,  1856,"  3  the  statute  which 
regulated  the  constitution  and  management  of  almost  all  joint-stock 
companies;  4  and  questions  may  still  occur  with  reference  to  companies 
constituted  under  it;5  but  it  was  repealed,  as  to  all  future  companies, 
by  §  107  of  the  last-mentioned  Act;  and  that  section  was  repealed  and 
re-enacted  by  the  20  &  21  Vic.  c.  14,  §  23.  The  Act  of  1856,  as  modi- 
fied by  the  Joint-Stock  Companies'  Acts  of  1857  and  1858,  regulated 
the  constitution  and  management  of  joint-stock  companies  uutil  the 
passing  of  "The  Companies'  Act,  1862, "6  which  repealed  these  Acts, 
but  consolidated  and  re-enacted  them;  and  this  last-mentioned  Act  has 
been  amended  by  "The  Companies'  Acts,  1867,  1877,  1879,  and  1880. 7 
For  the  present  purpose,  however,  it  is  sufficient  to  observe,  that  all 
companies  constituted  under  these  Acts  became  and  still  become,  upon 
certificate  of  incorporation,  a  body  corporate,  by  the  name  prescribed 
in  the  memorandum  of  association.8 


Gayoso  Gas  Co.  v.  Williamson,  9  Heisk.  314  ; 
Cogswell  v.  Bull,  29  Gal.  320;  Charleston  Ins. 
&  Tr.  Co.  V.  Sebrig,  5  Rich.  Eq.  342  ;  Bayless 
v.  Orne,  1  Freem.  Ch.  173.  Sec  also,  for  cases 
in  which  bills  by  shareholders  have  been  sus- 
tained under  exceptional  circumstances,  many 
of  the  cases  cited  in  the  first  part  of  this  note, 
and  Gray  v.  Lewis,  L.  R.  8  Ch  1035;  L.  R.  8 
Eq.  526;  Hazard  v.  Durant,  11  R.  I.  195.  In 
this  last  case,  the  English  authorities  are 
reviewed,  and  it  is  held  that  a  general  allega- 
tion of  "  often  requested  "  is  a  sufficient  aver- 
ment of  a  request  of  the  corporation  to  sue,  as 
a  matter  of  pleading,  and  that  a  request  made 
to  an  executive  committee  of  aboard  of  man- 
agers, to  whom  the  authority  of  the  corporation 
had  been  delegated,  sustained  the  averment. 
And  if  the  bill  shows  a  state  of  facts  from 
which  it  appears  that  a  request  would  be  una- 
vailing, no  request,  it  seems,  is  necessary. 
Brewer  v  Boston  Theatre,  104  Mass.  378,  389. 
And  see  Speering's  Appeal,  71  Pa.  St.  1.  And 
when  the  same  persons  were  directors  in  two 
corporations,  one  of  which  was  indebted  to  the 
other,  and,  being  more  largely  interested  in  the 
debtor  corporation,  were  about  to  discontinue 
an  action  on  the  demand,  then  barred  by  the 
Statute  of  Limitations,  a  receiver  was  appointed, 
at  the  instance  of  a  stockholder  of  the  creditor 
company,  to  carry  on  the  suit.  Hazzard  r. 
Credit  Mobilier,  7  Rep.  360,  U.  S.  C.  C.  Pa. 

2  See  Harrison  r.  Rrown,  5  De  G.  &  S.  728; 
and  see  Sedden  v.  Connell,  10  Sim.  58,  76. 

8  19  &  20  Vic.  c.  47. 

4  This  Act  did  not  apply  to  banking  and 
insurance  companies.     See  §  2. 


s  See  Womerslev  v.  Merritt,  L.  R.  4  Eq. 
695. 

6  25  &  26  Vic.  c.  89. 

'  30  &  31  Vic.  c.  131:  40  &  41  Vic.  c.  26; 
42  &  43  Vic.  c.  76:  43  Vic.  c.  19. 

8  By  25  &  26  Vic.  c.  89,  §  69.  where  there  is 
reason  to  believe  that  the  assets  of  a  limited 
company,  suing  in  Equity,  may  be  insufficient 
for  payment  of  costs,  the  company  mav  lie  re- 
quired to  give  security  for  costs.  See  Australian 
Steam  Co.  o  Fleming,  4  K.  &  J.  407;  Caillaud's 
Co.  v.  Caillaud,  26  Beav.  427:  5  .Tur.  N.  S.259; 
Southampton  &c.  Co.  v.  Rawlins.  2  N.  R.  544, 
M.  R.;  9  Jur.  N  S.  887;  Southampton  &c.  Co. 
v.  Pinnock,  11  W.  R.  978.  M.  R.;  Washoe 
Mining  Co.  v.  Ferguson,  L.  R.  2  Eq.  371, 
V.  C.  W.  The  security  must  be  given  where, 
the  company  being  in  a  course  of  winding-up, 
the  suit  is  by  the  official  liquidator.  Freehold 
Land  &  Brickmaking  Co.  v.  Spargo,  W.  N. 
(1868)  94,  M.  R .;  and  it  may  be  required 
where  the  company  is  plaintiff  in  a  cross-suit. 
City  of  Moscow  Gas  Co.  v.  Int'l  Financial 
Society,  L.  R.  7  Ch.  225;  20  W.  R.  196;  Acci- 
dental &  Marine  Ins.  Co.  i\  Mercati,  L.  R.  3 
Eq.  200,  V.  C.  W.  The  security  is  not  con- 
fined to  £100,  I  ut  is  in  the  judge's  discretion, 
and  must  usually  be  for  an  amount  equal  to 
the  probable  amount  of  costs  payable.  Imperial 
Bank  of  India  o.  Bank  of  Hindustan,  L.  R  1 
Ch.  437:  12  Jur.  N.  S.  493,  L.  J.I.,  overruling 
Australian  Steam  Company  t\  Fleming,  ubi 
supra  ;  and  see  pott,  p.  33.  See  R.  S.  ('.  I,V.  2 
(Ord.  Feb.,  1876,  n.  7);  Western  of  Canada 
Oil  Lands  &  Works  Co.  v.  Walker,  L.  R.  10 
Ch.628;  W.  N.  (1875)  209, T.C.  M.;  Brockle- 

27 


27 


PERSONS    BY   WHOM    A    SUIT   MAY   BE   INSTITUTED. 


*  27       *  Section  IV.  — Persons  residing  out  of  the  Jurisdiction. 

The  rule  that  all  persons,  not  lying  under  the  disabilities  after 
pointed  out,  are  entitled  to  maintain  a  suit  as  plaintiffs  in  the  Court  of 
Chancery,  is  not  affected  by  the  circumstance  of  their  being  resident 
out  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court,  unless  they  be  alien  enemies,  or 
are  resident  in  the  territory  of  an  enemy  without  a  license  or  authority 
from  the  government  here.1 

In  order,  however,  to  prevent  the  defendant  or  respondent,  in  the 
case  of  a  petition,  from  being  defeated  of  his  right  to  costs,  it  is  a  rule, 
that  if  the  plaintiff  '2  or  his  next  friend,3  or  the  petitioner 4  (a)  if  he  is  not 


bank  r.  King's  Lynn  Steamship  Co.  3  C  P. 
D.  365;  costs  already  incurred,  Rhodes  v. 
Dawson,  16  Q.  B.  D.  548.  On  an  application 
for  an  injunction  by  a  limited  company,  the 
Court  will  require  an  undertaking  as  to  dam- 
ages by  some  responsible  person.  Anglo-Dan u- 
bian  Co.  v.  Rogerson,  10  Jur.  N.  S.  87,  M.  R. ; 
Pacific  Steamship  Co.  v.  Gibbs,  14  W.  R.  218, 
V.  C.  W.  In  England,  as  to  discovery  from  a 
corporation  or  company,  see  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  XXI. 
4  ;  Massey  v.  Allen,  W.  N.  (1878)  246,  V.  C. 
H.  Partners  may  now  sue  there  in  the  firm 
name,  their  names  and  residences  being  sup- 
plied upon  demand.  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  VII.  2  ; 
Ord.  XVI.  10,  11;  Ord.  XXXI.  21;  Ord.  XLII. 
5,  20.  See  Ex  parte  Blain,  In  re  Sawyer,  12 
Ch  522,  533;  Leathley  v.  McAndrew,  W.  N. 
(1875)  259;  Republic  of  Liberia  i".  Rove,  1 
A  pp.  Cas.  139  ;  Pike  v.  Keene,  W.  N.  (1876) 
36  ;  24  W.  R.  322.  As  to  suits  by  official  man- 
agers under  the  Winding-up  Acts,  see  25  &  26 
Vic.  c.  89,  §§  95,  133  (7);  and  see  §§  87,  151, 
195,  202;  Turquand  v.  Kirby,  L.  R.  4  Eq  123, 
M.  R.;  Turquand  v.  Marshall,  L.  R.  6  Eq.  112, 


(ti)  A  petit'oner  in  a  winding-up  petition, 
who  was  resident  abroad,  and  who  had  obtained 
judgment  in  an  undefended  action  against  a 
company,  was  not  required  to  give  security  for 
costs  upon  the  company's  application.  In  re 
Contract  and  Agency  Co.  57  L.  J.  Ch.  5.  See 
Re  Sturiris,  M.  P.  Syndicate,  53  L.  T.  715;  34 
W.  R.  163  Where  it  appeared  that  the  plain- 
tiff in  a  suit  had  sufficient  property  in  Eneland 
to  pay  the  costs  in  case  he  should  fail,  the  Court 
on  appeal  discharged  the  order  for  security.  Re 
Howe  Sewing  Machine,  41  Ch.  D.  118.  See  In 
re  Apollinaris  Co.'s  Trade  Marks  (1891),  1  Ch. 
1.  See  also  Hamburger  r.  Poetting,  30  W.  R. 
769.  So  if  the  defendant  has  in  his  possession 
money  of  the  plaintiff,  or  has  delayed  unreason- 
ably in  making  his  application,  and  the  plaintiff 
has  meanwhile  incurred  expense,  an  order  for 
security  for  costs  will  not  be  made.  Duffy  v. 
Joyce,  25  L.  R.  Ir.  42.  The  right  to  demand 
security  for  costs  may  be  lost  by  laches.  See 
28 


M.  R.;  L.  R.  4  Ch.  376,  382,  L.  C;  11  & 
12  Vic.  c.  45,  §§  50,  52.  53,  60;  Ernest  ». 
Weiss,  2  Dr.  &  Sm.  561;  9  Jur.  N.  S.  145; 
Stringer's  case,  id.  475;  Leeds  Estate  &c. 
Co.  v.  Shepherd,  36  Ch  D.  787;  Overend  & 
Gurney  Co.  v.  Gibb,  L.  R.  5  H.  L.  480,  L.  R. 
4  Ch.  701 ;  Mason  v.  La  Soctete'  des  Metaux,  37 
W.  R.  735  (foreign  company's  property);  1 
Dan.  Ch.  Prac.  (6th  Eng.  ed.)  p.  310.  As  to 
suits  by  liquidators,  see  19  &  20  Vic.  c  47, 
§§  90,  102  (7)  ;  21  &  22  Vic.  c.  60,  §  6;  Massey 
v.  Allen,  W.  N.  (1878)  246,  V.  C.  H.  ' 
i  Story  Eq.  PI.  §§  51-54. 

2  Though  suing  as  executor  or  administrator, 
Knight  v.  De  Blaquiere,  Sau.  &  S.  648 ;  Mur- 
free  v.  Leeper,  1  Overt.  1. 

3  Kerr  v.  Gillespie,  7  Beav.  269. 

4  Drever  v.  Maudesley,  5  Russ.  11  ;  Ex 
parte  Seidler,  12  Sim.  106;  Re  Norman,  11 
Beav.  401;  Atkins  v.  Cooke,  3  Drew.  694; 
Partington  v.  Reynolds,  6  W.  R.  307  ;  Re 
Llangynog  Lead  "Mining  Co.  23  W.  R.  587; 
Re  Home  Assurance  Ass.  L.  R.  12  Eq.  112. 


Ibid.;  Sims  v.  Bonner,  16  N.  Y.  S-  800;  Fagan 
v.  Strong,  11  id.  766;  International  &  G.  N. 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Williams,  82  Texas,  342.  By 
applying  for  security  for  costs  a  defendant 
waives  any  objection  as  to  service.  Lhoneux 
v.  Hong  Kong  &  S.  Banking  Co.  33  Ch.  D. 
446. 

Other  recent  English  cases  upon  security 
for  costs,  by  a  company,  or  upon  a  petition 
for  winding  up  a  company,  are:  Northampton 
Coal  Co.  v.  Midland  Waggon  Co.  7  Ch.  D. 
500;  Re  Aberavon  Tin  Plate  Co.  59  L  T.  498; 
Lydney  &  Wigpool  Iron  Ore  Co.  v.  Bird,  23 
Ch.  D.  358;  Pure  Spirit  Co.  v.  Fowler,  25 
Q.  B.  D.  235 ;  Leeds  Estate  Co.  v.  Shepherd,  36 
Ch.  D.  787;  Re  Howe  Sewing  Machine  Co. 
41  Ch.  D.  118;  Re  Criterion  Gold  M.  Co.  id. 
146;  Re  Paper  Bottle  Co.  40  Ch.  D.  52;  Re 
Equestrian  &  P.  B  Co.  1  Meg.  166;  Ryan 
v.  Ring,  25  L.  R.  Ir.  186. 


PERSONS   RESIDING    OUT    OF   THE   JURISDICTION. 


*28 


a  party  to  the  cause, 5  is  resident  abroad,  the  Court  will,  on  the  appli- 
cation of  the  defendant,  or  respondent,  order  him  to  give  security  for 
the  costs  of  the  suit  or  petition,  and  in  the  mean  time  direct  all  pro- 
ceedings to  be  stayed; 6  and  such  an  order  may  be  made  where  a 
foreign  government  is  the  plaintiff.7  *A  plaintiff  resident  in  *28 
Ireland 1  or  Scotland  may,  it  seems,  be  ordered  to  give  security 
for  costs.2 (a) 

Where  there  is  a  co-plaintiff  resident  in  England,  the  Court  will  not 
make  an  order  that  a  plaintiff  who  is  abroad  shall  give  security  for 
costs ; 3  and  where  the  plaintiff  is  abroad  as  a  land  or  sea  officer  in  the 


6  Cochrane  v.  Fearon,  18  Jur.  568. 

6  Fox  v.  Blew,  5  Mad.  147;  Lillie  v.  Lillie, 
2  M.  &  K.  404;  Lautour  v.  Holcombe,  1  Phil. 
202,  204;  Newman  v.  Landrine,  14  N.  J.  Eq. 
291 ;  Barker  v.  Lidwell,  1  Jones  &  Lat.  703. 
And  it  lias  been  h»ld  that  in  default  of  the 
plaintiff  giving  security  for  costs  when  ordered, 
his  bill  should  be  dismissed.  Carnac  v.  Grant, 
1  Sim.  348;  Massey  v.  Gillelan,  1  Paige,  644; 
Breeding  v.  Finley,  1  Dam,  477;  Bridges  v. 
Canfield,  2  Edw.  Ch.  217.  But  if  the  non- 
resident plaintiff  sues  as  executor  or  adminis- 
trator, it  has  been  held,  that  the  defendant 
cannot  compel  security  for  costs.  Goodrich  v. 
Pendleton,  3  John.  Ch.  520:  Catchcart  v.  Hew- 
son,  1  Hayes,  173.  Especially  after  plea,  3 
John.  Ch.  520.  As  to  giving  security  where  all 
the  plaintiffs  are  out  of,  but  the  next  friend  is 
within,  the  jurisdiction,  see  Lander  v.  Parr,  16 
L.  J.  Ch.  269,  L.  C. 

7  Republic  of  Costa  Rica  v.  Erlanger,  3  Ch. 
D.  62.  Where  a  plaintiff  appears  to  have  no 
permanent  residence,  he  will  be  made  to  give 
security  for  costs.  Bailey  v.  Gundry,  1  Keen, 
53;  Flayer  v.  Anderson,  15  Sim.  104;  10  Jur. 
169  ;  and  see  Calvert  v.  Day,  2  Y.  &  C.  Ex. 
217  ;  Sibbering  v.  Earl  of  Balcarras,  1  De  G.  & 
S.  683;  12  Jur.  108;  Hurst  v.  Padwick,  12 
Jur.  21;  Liimley  v.  Hughes,  2  W  R.  112; 
Manby  v.  Bewicke,  8  De  G.    M.  &  G.  468  ;  2 


(a)  A  foreigner  who  usually  resides  abroad, 
but  resides  temporarily  in  England  in  order 
to  enforce  a  claim  by  action,  cannot  be  required 
to  give  security  for  costs.  Redondo  v.  Chaytor, 
4  Q.  B.  D.  453.  And  in  Ebrard  v.  Gassier,  28 
Ch.  D.  232,  following  this  decision,  it  was  held 
that,  where  one  of  the  plaintiffs,  who  were 
par  ners,  came  to  England  after  an  order 
was  made,  although  for  a  temporary  purpose, 
the  defendants  were  not  entitled  to  security  for 
costs.  See  also  Hamburger  v.  Poetting,  47 
L.  T.  249;  Re  Cornwall,  15  L.  R.  Ir  144.  The 
Order  LXIII.  r.  15,  was  made  for  the  purpose 
of  overruling  Redondo  v.  Chaytor.  See  Re 
Apollinaris  Co.'s  Trade  Marks  (i891),  1  Ch.  1 ; 
63  L.  T.  502,  which  also  holds  that,  where 
an  appellant  resides  abroad,  and  it  is  clear  that 


Jur.  N.  S.  671;  Oldale  v.  Whitcher,  5  Jur. 
N  S.  84,  V.  C.  K.,  Knight  v.  Cory.  9  id.  491, 
V.  C.  W.;  Dick  v.  Munder,  11  id.  819;  13  W. 
R.  1013,  M.  R.  The  rule  extends  to  the  next 
friend  of  a  plaintiff.  See  Kerr  v.  Gillespie,  7 
Beav.  269  ;  Watts  v.  Kelly,  6  W.  R.  206. 

1  Hill  v.  Reardon,  6  Mad.  46;  Moloney  r. 
Smith,  1  M'Cl.  &  Y.  213;  and  see,  as  to  plain- 
tiff resident  in  Ireland  suing  here  in  other  cases, 
Craig  v.  Bolton,  2  Bro.  C.  C.  609.  See  also 
Mullett  v.  Christmas,  2  Ball  &  B.  422;  Stack- 
poole  «.  Callaghan,  1  Ball  &  B.  566. 

2  Kerr  r.  Duchess  of  Minister,  Bunb.  35;  Ex 
parte  Latta,  3  De  G.  &  S.  186.  See  31  & 
32  Vic  c.  54,  §  5;  Raeburn  v.  Andrews,  L.  R. 
9  Q.  B.  118;  Re  East  Llangvnog  Lead  Mining 
Co.  W.  N.  (1875)  81 ;  23  W.  R.  587,  M.  R.  See 
also  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  LV.;  Garnett  v.  Bradlev,  3 
App.  Cas.  944;  2  Ex.  D.  349. 

8  Winthrop  v.  Royal  Exch.  Ass.  Co.  1  Dick. 
282;  Walker  v.  Easterby,  6  Ves.  612;  Green 
v.  Charnock,  1  Sumner's  Ves.  396,  and  note 
(a);  D'Hormusgee  v.  Grey,  10  Q.  B.  D.  13; 
Orr  v.  Bowles,  1  Hodges,  23:  Doe  v.  Roe,  id. 
315;  Gilbert  v.  Gilbert,  2  Paige,  603;  Burgess 
v.  Gregory,  1  Edw.  Ch.  439.  This  rule  does  not 
apply  where  a  husband,  who  has  no  substantial 
interest,  is  co-plaintiff  with  his  wife.  Smith  v. 
Etches,  1  H.  &  M.  711;  10  Jur.  N.  S.  124. 
No  indorser  is  required  in  Massachusetts,  where 


the  respondent  will  find  within  the  jurisdiction 
ample  assets  on  which  he  can  levy  execution, 
security  for  costs  will  not  be  ordered.  As  to 
security  for  costs  upon  a  motion  for  a  new  trial, 
see  Hecksher  v  Crosley  (1891),  Q.  B.  224:  39 
W.  R.  211 ;  Walklin  v.  Johns,  7  T.  L.  R.  181. 
See  generally,  Michiels  v.  The  Empire  Palace, 
60  L.  T.  132;  Howard  v.  Howard.  30  L.  R.  Ir. 
340;  Thannhauser  v.  Cortes  Co.  9  Fed.  Rep. 
225;  Hugunin  v.  Thatcher,  18  id.  105.  A  plain- 
tiff who  gives  a  false  statement  of  his  residence, 
will  be  required  to  give  security  for  costs, 
as  he  is  thus  guilty  of  a  fraud  upon  the  Court. 
Frazer  o.  Palmer,  3  Y.  &  C  Ex.  279.  As  to  a 
foreign  claimant  coming  in,  see  Apollinaris  Co. 
v.  Wilson,  31  Ch.  D.  632. 


29 


*  29  PERSONS    BY   WHOM   A    SUIT    MAY   BE   INSTITUTED. 

service  of  her  Majesty  he  will  not  be  ordered  to  give  security  ; 4  and  so 
where  he  is  resident  abroad  upon  public  service,  as  an  ambassador  or 
consul,  he  cannot -be  called  upon  to  give  security.5  Peers  of  the  realm, 
although  they  are  privileged  from  personal  arrest,  must,  if  they  reside 
abroad,  give  security  for  costs;  for,  although  such  costs  cannot  be 
recovered  by  personal  process,  they  may  by  other  process,  if  the  plain- 
tiff becomes  a  resident  in  this  county. 6  And  it  may  be  stated  gener- 
ally that,  wherever  a  plaintiff  is  out  of  the  jurisdiction,  the  defendant 
is  entitled  to  security  for  costs,  unless  it  is  distinctly  shown  that  the 
plaintiff  is  exempted  from  his  liability.7 

As  a  general  rule,  the  plaintiff  in  a  cross-suit  cannot  be  called  upon 

to  give  security  for  costs  to  the  plaintiff  in  the  original  suit,  on  the 

principle  that  a  cross-bill  is,  in  reality,  a  portion  of  the  defence 

*  29      *  to  the  original  bill ; x  but  his  co-defendants  to  the  cross-bill  may 

move  for  such  security  against  their  plaintiff;2  and  it  has  been 
held,  that  a  bill  to  restrain  an  action  at  Common  Law  is  so  far  a  defen- 
sive proceeding  as  to  exempt  the  plaintiff  in  Equity  from  the  liabil- 
ity to  give  security  for  costs;3  but  on  the  other  hand,  a  defendant  in 
an  interpleader  suit,  being  out  of  the  jurisdiction,  was  looked  upon  as 
plaintiff,  and  ordered  to  give  security  for  costs ; 4  and  so  also,  a  defend- 
ant who  had  obtained  the.  conduct  of  the  cause  has  been  required  to 
give  security.5  And  where  the  right  to  require  security  for  costs  from 
a  plaintiff  out  of  the  jurisdiction  had  been  waived,  such  waiver  did  not 
preclude  the  defendant  from  requiring  security  from  the  representative 
of  the  original  plaintiff,  by  whom  on  his  death  the  suit  was  revived, 
and  who  was  also  out  of  the  jurisdiction,6  or  from  the  plaintiff  on 
his  amending  the  bill  and  stating  thereby  that  he  was  out  of  the 
jurisdiction.7 

A  plaintiff  cannot  be  compelled  to  give  security  for  costs,  unless  he 
himself  states  upon  his  bill  that  he  is  resident  out  of  the  jurisdiction, 
or  unless  the  fact  is  established  by  affidavit;  and  the  mere  circumstance 
of  his  having  gone  abroad  will  not  be  a  sufficient  ground  on  which  to 
compel  him  to  give  security,  unless  it  is  stated  by  the  plaintiff  himself, 

one  of  two  or  more  plaintiffs  is  an  inhabitant  of  v.  Shaw,  2  De  G  &  S.  360;  Sloggett  v.  Viant, 

the  State.     Pub.  Stats,  c.  161,  §  24.  13  Sim.    187;  Wild   v.   Murray,  18  Jur.  892; 

*  Evelyn  v.  Chippendale,  9  Sim.  497;  Clark  Tynte  v.  Hodge,  2  J.  &  H.  692;  8  Jur.  N.  S. 

v.  Fergusson,  1  Giff.  184;  5   Jur.  N.  S.  1155;  1226;  Washoe  Mining  Co.  v.  Ferguson,  L.  R.  2 

Fisher  v.  Bunbury,  Sau.  &  S.  625;  Wright  v.  Eq.  371. 
Evcrard,  Sau.  &  S.  651.  2  Sloggett  r.  Viant,  13  Sim.  187;  see  post, 

5  Colebrook  v.  Jones,  1  Dick.  154;  Beames  p.  154,  note  («). 

on  Costs,  123.     As  to  ambassadors  resident  here  3  Watteeu  v.  Billam,  3  De  G.  &  S  516;  14 

and  their  servants,  seepost,  p   141.     The  Court  Jur.  165;  Wilkinson  v.  Lewis,  3    Giff.  394;  8 

of  Queen's  Bench  has  required  a  Judge  in  the  Jur.  N.  S.  908. 

East  India  Company's  service  to  give  security.  4  Smith  r.  Hammond,  6  Sim. 10,  15.    But  see 

Plowden  v.  Campbell,  18  Jur.  910,  Q.  B. ;  see  Belmonte  ».  Aynard,    4  C.   P.    D.   221,   352; 

Powell  r.  Bernhard,  1  Hogan,  144.  Rhodes  v.  Dawson,  16  id.  548. 

6  Lord   Aldborough  v.  Burton,  2  M.  &  K.  5  Mynn  v.  Hart,  9  Jur.  860,  V.  C.  K.  B. 
401,  403.  6  Jackson    v.    Davenport,  29    Beav.  212;  7 

1  Lillie  v.  Lillie,  2  M.  &  K.  404.    As  to  secu-  Jur.  N.  S   1224. 
rity  by  a    limited   company,  see  ante,  p.  26,  7  Wyllie  v.  Ellice,  11  Beav.  99;  12  Jur  711; 

n.  (8).  and  see  Stewart  v.  Stewart,  30  Beav.  322. 

l  Vincent  v.  Hunter,  5  Hare,  320;  M'Gregor 

30 


PERSONS   RESIDING    OUT    OF   THE   JURISDICTION. 


30 


or  shown  upon  affidavit,   that  he   is  gone  abroad  for  the  purpose  of 
residing  there.8 

Whenever  security  is  asked  for,  the  question  arises  whether  the 
party  is  resident  abroad  or  not  within  the  meaning  of  the  rale.  Thus, 
if  a  plaintiff  went  abroad,  under  circumstances  rendering  it  likely  that 
he  will  remain  abroad  for  such  a  length  of  time  that  there  is  no  reason- 
able probability  of  his  being  forthcoming,  when  the  defendant  might  be 
entitled  to  call  upon  him  to  pay  costs  in  the  suit,  that  was  held 
sufficient;9  and  where  *  a  plaintiff,  domiciled  in  Scotland,  took  *30 
furnished  lodgings  in  London,  and  then  filed  his  bill,  it  was  held 
that  he  must  give  security  for  costs;1  and  so,  where  the  plaintiff  went 
out  of  the  jurisdiction  on  matters  connected  with  the  suit,  he  was 
ordered  to  give  security ;  but  on  his  return  the  order  was  discharged.2  (a) 

In  order  to  entitle  a  defendant  to  require  security  for  costs  from  a 
plaintiff,  he  must  make  his  application  at  the  earliest  possible  time 
after  the  fact  has  come  to  his  knowledge,  and  before  he  takes  any 
further  step  in  the  cause;  (b)  therefore,  where  the  fact  of  the  plaintiff 
being  resident  abroad  appears  upon  the  bill,  he  must  apply  before  he 
puts  in  his  answer,  or  applies  for  time  to  do  so:  either  of  which  acts 
will  be  considered  as  a  waiver  of  his  right  to  the  security.8     Filing  a 


8  Green  v.  Charnock,  3  Bro.  C.  C.  371 ;  2 
Cox,  284;  1  Ves.  Jr.  39G;  Hoby  v.  Hitchcock, 
5  Ves.  699;  Edwardes  v.  Burke,  9  L.  T.  N.  S. 
406. 

a  Blakeney  v.  Dufaur,  16  Beav.  292;  2  De 
G  M.  &  G.  771 ;  17  Jur.  98  ;  and  see  Kennaway 
v.  Tripp,  11  Beav.  588:  Drunimond  v.  Tilling- 
hurst,  15  Jur.  384,  Q.  B. ;  Stewart  v  Stewart, 
20  Keav.  322;  Wyllie  v.  Ellice,  11  Beav.  99;  12 
Jur.  711;  White  v.  Greathead,  15  Ves.  2;  1 
Hoff.  Ch.  Pr.  200;  Ford  v.  Boucher,  1  Hodges, 
58.  It  is  well  settled  that,  to  constitute  one  a 
resident,  his  residence  must  be  of  a  fixed  and 
permanent,  and  not  of  a  mere  temporary,  char- 
acter. Graham  Prac.  505.  An  absence  of 
eighteen  months  will  not  be  regarded  as  merely 
temporary,  Foss  v.  Wagner,  2  Dowl.  P.  C. 
499 ;  even  though  it  is  sworn  that  the  party  is 
soon  expected.  Wright  v.  Black,  2  Wend. 
258;  Gilbert  v.  Gilbert,  2  Paige,  603. 

1  Ainsley  v.  Sims,  17  Beav.  57;  17  Jur.  657; 
and  see  Cambottie  v.  Inngate,  1  W.  R.  533,  V. 
C.  W.;  Swanzy  v.  Swanzy,  4  K.  &  J.  237;  4 
Jur.  N.  S.  1013". 

2  O'Connor  v.  Sierra  Nevada  Co.  24  Beav. 
435. 


(a)  In  Martin  v.  Russell,  21  L.  R.  Ir.  196, 
the  plaintiff,  who  had  no  fixed  residence  and 
was  a  sea-faring  man,  but  who  resided  with  his 
family  in  the  jurisdiction  on  his  return  from 
abroad,  was  ordered  to  give  security  for  the 
costs  of  his  suit. 

(6)  Under  the  present  English  practice,  it 
seems  that  the  judge  has  a  judicial  discretion  to 
direct  security  for  costs  to  be  given  at  any  time. 


3  Meliorucchy  v.  Meliorucchy,  2  Ves.  S   24; 

1  Dick.  147;  Craig  v.  Bolton,  2  Bro.  C.  C.  609; 
Anon.,  10  Ves.  287  ;  and  see  Swanzy  v.  Swanzy, 
4  K.  &  J.  237;  4  Jur.  N.  S.  1013*;  Murrow  v. 
Wilson,  12  Beav.  497;  Cooper  v.  Purton,  8  \V\ 
R.  702;  and  see  Long  v.  Tottenham,  1  Ir.  Ch. 
Rep.  127;  Atkins  v.  Cooke,  3  Drew.  694:  3 
Jur.  N.  S.  283;  Newman  v.  Landrine,  14  N.  J. 
Eq  291;  Long  v.  Tardy,  1  John.  Ch.  202; 
Goodrich  v.  Pendleton,  3  John.  Ch.  520.  In 
Massachusetts,  though  a  writ  sued  out  by  the 
plaintiff,  who  is  not  an  inhabitant  of  the  State, 
is  not  indorsed  as  is  required  by  Gen.  Stats,  c. 
123,  §20;  Pub  Stats,  c.  161,  §24;  yet  the  defend- 
ant must  make  the  objection  at  the  first  term, 
or  he  will  be  held  to  have  waived  it.  Carpenter 
v.  Aldrich,  3  Met.  58;  see  Whiting  v.  Hollister, 

2  Mass.  102;  Gilbert  v.  Nantucket  Bank,  5 
Mass.  98;  Clapp  v.  Balch,  3  Greenl.  216.  The 
practice  in  New  York,  under  the  Act  of  that 
State  authorizing  the  defendant  to  require  secu- 
rity  for  costs,  allows  the  application  to  be  made 
at  any  stage  of  the  cause,  if  the  plaintiff  was  a 
non-resident  at  the  commencement  of  the  suit, 
and  continues  so.  Burgess  v.  Gregory,  1  Edw. 
Ch.  449. 


Martanot'.  Mann,  14  Ch.  D.  419,  where  security 
was  required  from  a  next  friend;  and  see  Ex 
parte  Mercers'  Co.  10  Ch.  D.  481;  Arkwright 
r.  Newbold,  W.  N.  (1880)  59.  "The  case  of 
Garnett  v.  Bradley,  3  App.  Cas.  944,  decides 
that  all  Acts  of  Parliament  dealing  with  costs, 
which  are  inconsistent  with  Ord.  LV.,  are  gone 
unless  they  are  specially  preserved."  Tenant 
v.  Ellis.  6  Q.  B.  D.  46. 

01 


31 


PERSONS   BY   WHOM    A    SUIT   MAY   BE   INSTITUTED. 


demurrer  has,  however,  been  held  not  to  be  a  waiver;4  and  where  the 
plaintiff  amended  his  bill,  and  stated  thereby  that  he  was  out  of  the 
jurisdiction,  the  defendant  was  held  not  to  be  precluded  from  requiring 
security  for  costs,  although  he  had  some  notice  of  the  plaintiff  being 
resident  abroad  previously  to  the  date  of  the  amendment.6 

If  the  plaintiff  is  not  described  in  the  bill  as  resident  abroad,  and 
the  defendant  does  not  become  apprised  of  that  fact  before  he  puts  in 
his  answer,  he  may  make  the  application  after  answer;  if,  however,  he 
takes  any  material  step  in  the  cause  after  he  has  notice,  he  can- 
*31  not  *then  apply.1  Where  in  a  petition  under  an  Act  of  Parlia- 
ment, authorizing  the  Court  to  make  an  order  in  a  summary 
manner  upon  petition,  the  petitioner  was  out  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
Court,  and  the  respondent  answered  the  affidavits  in  support  of  the 
petition,  it  was  held 2  that  he  had  not  thereby  lost  his  right  to  require 
the  petitioner  to  give  security  for  costs,  but  that  he  might  make  the 
application  on  the  petition  coming  on  to  be  heard.3 

If  a  plaintiff,  after  filing  a  bill,  leaves  the  kingdom  for  the  purpose 
of  settling,  and  does  actually  take  up  his  residence  in  foreign  parts,  it 
is,  in  any  stage  of  the  cause,  ground  for  an  order  that  he  shall  give 
security  for  costs.4  The  application  for  the  order  should  be  made  as 
early  as  possible  after  the  defendant  has  become  apprised  of  the  fact; 
and  it  is  not  enough  to  support  such  an  application  to  swear  that  the 


*  Watteeu  v.  Billam,  3  De  G.  &  S.  516;  14 
Jur.  165;  Goodrich  v.  Pendleton,  3  John.  Ch. 
520;  Priors  v.  White,  2  Moll.  361;  Eardy  v. 
Headford,  4  Moll.  464. 

5  Wyllie  v.  Ellice,  11  Beav.  99;  12  Jur. 
911;  and  see  Stewart  v.  Stewart,  20  Beav. 
322. 

1  Where  the  plaintiff  was  described  in  the 
original  bill  as  late  of  the  West  Indies,  but 
then  of  the  city  of  London,  and  the  defendant, 
having  answered,  filed  a  cross-bill  against  the 
plaintiff,  but,  exceptions  having  been  taken  to 
the  answer,  put  in  a  further  answer,  and  then 
applied  to  the  Court  that  the  plaintiff  in  the 
original  bill  might  give  security  for  costs,  alle- 
ging in  his  affidavit,  that  upon  applying  to  the 
plaintiff's  solicitor  in  the  original  suit  to  appear 
for  him  to  the  cross-bill,  he  discovered,  for  the 
first  time,  that  the  plaintiff  did  not  reside  in 
London,  as  alleged  in  the  bill,  but  in  Ireland,  — 
it  w:is  held,  that  as  the  defendant  had.  in  his 
cross-bill,  stated  the  plaintiff  to  be  resident  in 
Ireland,  and  after  that  had  answered  the  excep- 
tions to  his  answer  to  the  original  bill,  he  had 
thereby  taken  a  step  in  the  cause  after  it  was 
evident  that  he  had  notice  of  the  plaintiff's 
being  out  of  the  jurisdiction,  and  had  thereby 
precluded  himself  from  asking  for  security  for 
costs,  and  the  motion  was  therefore  refused. 
Mason  v.  Gardner,  2  Bro.  C.  C.  ed.  Belt,  609, 
notes;  and  see  Wyllie  v.  Ellice,  11  Beav.  99; 
Smith  v.  Castles,  1  Gray,  108. 

2  Ex  parte  Seidler,  12  Sim.  106.  See  also 
Re  Home  Assurance  Ass.  L.  R.  12  Eq.  112,  V. 

32 


C.  M.;  Re  Norman,  11  Beav.  401;  Re  Chepstow 
Bobbin  Mills  Co.  36  Ch.  D.  563. 

3  See,  however,  Atkins  v.  Cook,  3  Drew. 
694;  3  Jur.  N.  S.  283.  Where  the  defendant 
had  sworn  to  his  answer  before  he  had  notice  of 
the  fact  of  the  plaintiff  being  resident  abroad, 
but,  in  consequence  of  some  delay  in  the  Six 
Clerks'  Office,  the  answer  was  not  filed  till 
after  the  defendant  had  been  informed  of  the 
plaintiff's  residence,  a  motion  that  the  plaintiff 
might  give  security  for  costs  was  considered  too 
late,  although  the  defendant  himself  was  not 
privy  to,  or  aware  of,  the  delay  which  had  taken 
place  in  filing  his  answer.  Dyott  v.  Dyott,  1 
Mad.  187;  and  as  to  laches,  see  Wyllie  v. 
Ellice,  11  Beav.  99;  12  Jur.  711:  Swanzy  v. 
Swanzy,  4  K.  &  J.  237;  4  Jur.  N.  S.  1013; 
Murrow  v.  Wilson,  12  Beav.  497. 

4  Anon.  2  Dick.  775;  Hoby  v.  Hitchcock,  5 
Ves.  699;  Weeks  v.  Cole,  14  Ves.  518;  Busk  v. 
Beetham,  2  Beav.  537;  Kerr  v.  Gillespie,  7  Beav. 
269;  Kennaway  v.  Tripp,  11  Beav.  588;  Stewart 
o.  Stewart,  20  Beav.  323 ;  Edwardes  v.  Burke, 
9  L.  T.  N.  S.  406,  V.  C.  K.  See  also  Busk  v. 
Beetham,  2  Beav.  537;  Blakeney  v.  Dufaur,  2 
De  G.  M.  &  G  771 ;  17  Jur.  98.  In  Massa- 
chusetts, if  a  plaintiff  in  a  process  at  Law  or  in 
Equity,  after  its  commencement  removes  from 
the  State,  the  Court  where  the  suit  is  pending 
shall,  on  the  motion  of  any  other  party,  require 
the  plaintiff  to  procure  a  sufficient  indorser. 
Gen.  Stats,  c.  129,  §  29;  Pub.  Stats,  c.  167, 
§  30 ;  Smith  v.  Castles,  1  Gray,  108. 


PERSONS   RESIDING   OUT   OF   THE   JURISDICTION. 


*32 


plaintiff  has  merely  gone  abroad,  but  the  evidence  should  go  on  to  show 
that  he  is  gone  to  settle  abroad.5 

*  To  entitle  a  defendant  to  an  order  that  the  plaintiff  may  give  *  32 
security  for  costs,  it  is  necessary  that  the  plaintiff  should  abso- 
lutely be  gone  abroad:  the  mere  intention  to  go  will  not  be  sufficient.1 
In  a  case,  however,  where  the  plaintiff,  who  was  an  alien  enemy,  was 
under  confinement  preparatory  to  his  removal  out  of  the  country,  upon 
a  warrant  by  the  Secretary  of  State  under  an  Alien  Act,  the  proceed- 
ings were  stayed  until  he  gave  security  for  costs,  although  he  was  not 
actually  gone  out  of  the  country.2  (a) 

From  analogy  to  the  course  adopted  where  the  plaintiff  is  resident 
out  of  the  jurisdiction,  the  Court  will,  upon  application,  restrain  an 
ambassador's  servant,  whose  person  is  privileged  from  arrest  by  the 
7  Anne,  c.  12,  from  proceeding  with  his  suit  until  he  has  given  security 
for  costs.8 


«  Ibid.;  White  v.  Greathead,  15  Ves.  2.  The 
affidavit  should  also  show  clearly  that  the  de- 
fendant did  not  know  of  the  plaintiff's  removal 
before  taking  the  last  step  in  the  cause,  or  the 
application  will  be  denied.  Newman  v.  Land- 
rine,  14  N.  J.  Eq.  291. 

i  Adams  v.  Colthurst,  2  Anst.  552 ;  Willis 
v.  Garbutt,  1  Y.  &  J.  511;  1  Barb.  Ch.  Pr.  103; 
Hoby  v.  Hitchcock,  5  Ves.  699. 


(o)  In  case  of  the  plaintiff's  bankruptcy, 
security  for  costs  is  not  confined  to  future 
costs,  but  if  promptly  applied  for,  may  include 
costs  already  incurred.  Brockiebank  &  Co.  v. 
King's  Lynn  Steamship  Co.  3  C.  P.  D.  365, 
overruling  Oxenden  v.  Cropper,  4  Dowl.  574; 
Massey  v.  Allen,  12  Ch.  D.  807.  See  Rhodes 
v.  Dawson,  16  Q.  B.  D.  548;  Re  Carta  Para 
Mining  Co.  19  Ch.  D.  457.  In  England  the 
amount  of  the  reasonable  security  to  which  the 
defendant  is  entitled,  and  the  time,  manner, 
and  form  in  which  it  should  be  given,  are  in 
the  judge's  discretion.  It  may  be  increased 
while  the  proceedings  are  pending.  Republic 
of  Costa  Rica  v.  Erlanger,  3  Ch.  D.  62;  Sturla 
v.  Freccia,  W.  N.  (1877)  188;  W.  N.  (1878) 
161;  Paxton».  Bell,  24  W.  R.  1013;  W.  N. 
(1876)  221,  249.  The  English  rule  now  is  that, 
poverty  being  no  bar  to  a  litigant,  security  for 
costs  may  be  required  from  a  nominal  plaintiff 
for  the  benefit  of  some  one  else,  but  not  from  a 
plaintiff  trustee  in  bankruptcy,  even  though  he 
is  insolvent  in  fact.  Ibid.;Cowell  v.  Taylor, 
31  Ch  D.  34.  In  the  case  of  an  appeal,  "an 
insolvent  party  is  not  excluded  from  the  Court, 
but  only  prevented,  if  he  cannot  find  security, 
from  dragging  his  opponent  from  one  Court  to 
another."  Bowen  L.  J.  in  Cowell  v.  Taylor, 
supra;  Swain  v.  Follows,  18  Q.  B.  D.  585; 
Drennan  v.  Andrew,  L.  R.  1  Ch.  300;  Nixon  v. 
Sheldon,  53  L.  J.  Ch.  624.  As  to  security  for 
costs  of  appeal,    see   also  Pooley's  Trustee  v. 

VOL.    I. 3 


2  Seilaz  v.  Hanson,  5  Ves.  261.  As  to  secur- 
ity for  costs  from  persons  under  sentence  of 
transportation,  see  Baddeley  v.  Harding,  6 
Mad.  214;  Harvey  v.  Jacob,!  B.  &  Aid.  159; 
Barrett  v.  Power,  9  Exch.  338 ;  18  Jur.  156 ; 
Dunn  v.  M'Evoy,  1  Hogan,  355. 

3  Anon.  Mos.  175;  Goodwin  v.  Archer,  2  P. 
Wms.  452;  Adderly  v.  Smith,  1  Dick.  355. 


Wetham,  33  Ch.  D.  76;  28  id.  38;  Re  Clough, 
35  Ch.  D.  7;  Ellis  v.  Stewart,  id.  459;  Farrer 
v.  Lacy,  28  Ch.  D.  482;  Washburn  &  Moen 
Manuf.  Co.  v.  Patterson,  29  Ch.  D.  48;  Smith 
v.  Badham,  66  L.  T.  822;  The  Hesketh,  [1891] 
A.  C.  628;  Thomas  v.  Dougty,  W.  N.  (1887) 
51;  Wilniot  v.  Freehold  H.  P.  Co.  W.  N. 
(1885)  65.  As  to  "  visible  means  "  under  30 
&  31  Vict.  c.  142,  §  10,  see  Lea  v.  Parker,  13 
Q.  B.  D.  835.  A  corporation,  as  plaintiff,  can- 
not be  required  to  give  security  for  costs 
because  a  receiver  of  its  property  has  been 
appointed.  Dartmouth  Harbour  Com'rs  r. 
Dartmouth,  L.  J.  55  Q.  B.  483.  The  rule  that 
a  defendant  cannot  be  required  to  give  security 
for  costs  does  not  apply  to  a  sheriff's  inter- 
pleader, where  both  the  plaintiff  and  the  de- 
fendant in  the  issue  are  really  in  the  position 
of  plaintiffs  in  an  ordinary  suit.  Williams  v. 
Crosling,  3  C.  B.  957;  Tomlinson  v.  Land  and 
Finance  Co.  14  Q.  B.  D.  539;  see  Belmonte  v. 
Aynard,  4  C.  P.  D.  221,  352.  But  in  the 
absence  of  statute,  a  third  person  who  is 
substituted  as  defendant  in  interpleader  pro- 
ceedings, and  who  is  a  non-resident  and 
irresponsible,  will  not  be  ordered  to  give 
security  for  costs  as  a  condition  of  being  per- 
mitted to  prosecute  his  claim.  McHugh  v. 
Astrophe,  20  N.  Y.  S.  877.  As  to  increase  at 
chambers,  see  Bentsen  v.  Taylor,  [18D3]  2  Q.  B. 
193. 


33 


*  33  PERSONS   BY   WHOM    A   SUIT    MAY   BE   INSTITUTED. 

By  the  old  practice,  £40  was  the  amount   of   security  required  to 
answer  costs  by  any  plaintiff  who  was  out  of  the  jurisdiction 

*  33      *  of  the  Court,  but  this  sum  has  been  increased  to  £100.^   Where 

a  person  out  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  presents  a  petition 
to  have  his  solicitor's  bills  taxed,  it  seems  that  he  must  give  security 
for  the  costs  of  the  petition,  and  also  for  the  balance  that  may  be  found 
due  from  him  on  the  taxation.2 

Where  it  appears  on  the  bill 8  that  the  plaintiff  is  resident  out  of  the 
jurisdiction,  an  order  that  he  give  security  for  costs  is  obtained  on 
motion  of  course,  or  more  usually  on  petition  of  course,4  presented  to 
the  Master  of  the  Rolls,  on  production  of  the  stamped  copy  of  the  bill 
served  on  the  defendant,  or  other  authenticated  copy  thereof. 

In  other  cases,  a  special  application  by  motion  or  summons5  must  be 
made.  The  notice  of  motion,  or  the  summons,6  must  be  served  on  the 
plaintiff's  solicitor,  and  the  application  must  be  supported  by  evidence 
of  the  facts  entitling  the  applicant  to  the  order. 

The  order  directs  the  plaintiff  to  procure  some  sufficient  person  on 
his  behalf  to  give  security,  according  to  the  course  of  the  Court,  by 
bond  to  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerk  in  whose  division  the  cause  or 
matter  is,7  in  the  penalty  of  £100,  conditioned  to  answer  costs,  in  case 
any  shall  be  awarded  to  be  paid  by  the  plaintiff;  and  it  restrains 
proceedings  in  the  mean  time.8 

When  an  order  of  course  has  been  obtained,  it  must  be  served  on  the 
plaintiff  or  his  solicitor;  service  of  a  special  order,  made  on  notice  to 
him,   is  unnecessary. 

The  security  is  given  in  one  of  the  following  modes:  (1)  The 
plaintiff's    solicitor    prepares    a   bond    in    the    terms    of    the    order,9 

l  Gage  v.  Ladv  Stafford,  2  Ves.  557;  Cons.  *  Wyllie  v.  Ellice,  11  Beav.  99;  12  Jur.  711. 

Ord.  XL.  6.     See  R.  S.  C.  LV.  2  (Ord.  Feb.,  s  Tynte  v.  Hodge,  2  J.  &  H.  692. 

1876,  r.  7);  and  2   Seton,  1643,  for  forms.    The  6  For  forms  of    notice  and   summons,   see 

order  applies   to   the  case   of  a  plaintiff,  with-  Vol.  III. 

in   the  jurisdiction,  ordered  to  give  security.  "  See  Cons.  Ord.  I.  38.     As  to  the  form  of 

Bailey  v.  Gundry,  1  Keen,  53.     The   Court  re-  the  order  for  security  and  service,  see  2  Seton, 

fused  to  increase,  upon  an  interlocutory  appli-  1269;  Tilsley's  Digest,  218;  1  Smith's  Pr.  866; 

cation,  the  amount  of  security;  Barry  v.  Jen-  Braithwaite's  Pr.  534. 

kins,  19  L.  T.  N.  S.  276,  V.  C.  M.  It  seems,  »  For  forms  of  orders,  see  Seton,  1269, 1270. 
however,  that  in  the  case  of  a  petition,  the  9  The  bond  is  in  the  following  form  : — 
amount  is  still  only  £40.  Atkins  v.  Cooke,  3  "  Know  all  men  by  these  presents,  that  we, 
Jur.  N.  S.  283,  V.  C.  K.;  Partington  v.  Rey-  A  B,  of  the  city  of  London,  merchant,  and 
nolds,  6  W.  R.  307,  V.  C.  K.  In  New  C  D,  of  the  same  place,  merchant,  are  held 
York,  the  penalty  of  the  bond  was  required  to  and  firmly  bound  to  ,  Esq., 
be  at  least  $250 ;  but  the  Court  in  a  proper  in  the  penal  sum  of  ,  for 
case  might  enlarge  it,  and  might  either  fix  the  which  payment  to  be  well  and  faithfully  made ; 
amount  itself  or  refer  it  to  a  Master.  2  Rev.  we  bind  ourselves  and  each  of  us,  our,  and  each 
Stats.  N.  Y.  620,  §  4;  Fulton  v.  Rosevelt,  1  of  our  heirs,  executors,  and  administrators,  firm- 
Paige,  179;  Massey  v.  Gillelan,  1  Paige,  644;  ly  by  these  presents.  Sealed  with  our  seals,  &c. 
Gilbert  v.  Gilbert,  2  Paige,  603.                                      "  Whereas    L   R,    plaintiff,    has  lately    ex- 

2  Ibid.;  Ogilvie  v.  Hearne,  11  Ves.  599;  hibited  his  bill  of  complaint  in  her  Majesty's 
Anon.  12  Sim.  262;  see  also  Re  Passmore,  1  High  Court  of  Chancery  against  R  S,  defend- 
Beav.  94;  Re  Dolman,  11  Jur.  1095,  M.  R.  ant,  touching  the  matter    therein  contained: 

3  What  is  stated  in  the  text  as  to  a  bill  suit  Now  the  condition  of  this  obligation  is  such, 
will  apply,  mutatis  mutandis,  to  a  summons  that  if  the  above  bounden  A  B  and  C  D,  or 
suit,  petition,  or  other  proceeding  in  which  either  of  them,  their  heirs,  executors,  or  admin- 
security  is  directed  to  be  given.  istrators,  do  and  shall  well  and  truly  pay,  or 

34 


PERSONS   RESIDING    OUT   OP   THE   JURISDICTION.  *  35 

*  engrosses  it  on  paper  bearing  a  2s.  6d.  inland  revenue  stamp,1  *34 
procures  it  to  be  executed  by  the  obligor  or  obligors,  lodges  it 
with  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerk,2  and  on  the  same  day  serves  notice 
thereof3  on  the  solicitor  of  the  defendant  who  obtained  the  order;  it  is 
also  advisable  to  serve  the  notice  on  the  solicitor  of  any  co-defendants 
who  have  not  applied  for  security; 4  and  the  security  is  deemed  to  have 
been  given  on  the  day  the  bond  is  lodged.5  (2)  The  plaintiff,  instead 
of  giving  the  bond  in  the  first  instance,  may  serve  the  defendant's 
solicitor  with  a  notice  6  of  the  name,  address,  and  description  of  the 
proposed  obligor  or  obligors;  and  if  no  objection  be  made  by  him  within 
two  days  thereafter,  the  bond  may  be  prepared,  executed,  lodged,  and 
notified  as  above  explained.7  (3)  The  plaintiff  may  apply  by  special 
motion8  or  summons,9  that,  in  lieu  of  giving  a  bond,  he  may  pay  a  sum 
of  money  into  Court,  to  a  separate  account,  to  answer  the  costs;  the 
amount  should  be  sufficient  to  cover  the  sum  mentioned  in  the  order 
directing  the  security  to  be  given,  and  the  costs  of  bringing  it  into 
Court  and  getting  it  out.10  The  usual  amount  is  £120;n  no  evidence  in 
support  of  the  application  is  necessary,  beyond  the  production  of  the 
former  order;  the  costs  of  the  application  are  made  costs  in  the  cause. 
The  order  is  drawn  up  and  passed  by  the  Registrar,  and  entered,  and 
the  money  is  paid  into  Court  in  the  manner  hereafter  explained. 

One  obligor  is  sufficient,  but  it  is  prudent  to  have  two  or  more;  as 
on  the  death  or  bankruptcy  12  of  the  sole,  or  sole  surviving,  obligor,  the 
defendant  is  entitled  to  apply  by  special  motion,13  or  summons,14  that  a 
new  security  may  be  given,  and  for  a  stay  of  proceedings  in  the  mean 
time. 

Where  one  or  more  of  several  defendants  have  obtained  an  order  for 
security,  it  is  advisable  to  extend  the  bond  to  the  costs  of  all  the 
defendants,  as  otherwise  the  defendants  who  have  not  obtained  the 
order  may  afterwards  apply  for  a  further  bond  as  to  their  costs ; 
and  it  is  presumed  that,  where  a  bond  embracing  the  *  costs  of  *  35 
all  the  defendants  is  lodged  with  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerk,  and 
notified  to  them,  he  will  hold  the  bond  on  behalf  of  all  the  defendants ; x 

cause  to  be  paid,  all   such   costs   as  the  Law  Fellows  v.  Deere,  3  Beav.  353;  Re  Norman,  11 

Court  shall  think  fit  to  award  to  the  defendant  Beav.  401. 

on  the  hearing  of  the  said  cause  or  otherwise,  9  Jarvis  v.  Shflnd,  V.  C.  W.  at  Chambers, 

then  this  obligation  to  be  void,  or  else  to  re-  30   Jan.,   1804;    Reff.   Lib.  A.  164;  Merlin    v. 

main  in  full  force  and  virtue.     Sealed  and  de-  Blagrave,  Seton,  1270.     For  forms  of  notice  of 

livered,  &c."  motion  and  summons,  see  Vol,  III. 

1  If  the  bond  is  for  a  larger  sum  than  £100,  1°  Cliffe  v.  Wilkinson,  4  Sim.  123. 

an  increased  stamp  of  Is.  3d.  for  each  additional  »  See  Cliffe  n, Wilkinson,  ubi  supra  ;  Austra- 

£50  is  payable ;  see  Tilsley's  Digest,  218.  lian  Co.  v.  Fleming,  4K.&  J.  407.     In  the  case 

2  The  bond  should  be  indorsed  with  the  of  a  petition  it  is  presumed  £60  would  be  suffi- 
short  title  of  the   cause  or  matter,  the  words  cient. 

"Bond  for  Security  for  Costs,"  and  the  name,  *2  Transatlantic  Co.  V.  Pietroni,  cited  Seton, 

&c,  of  the  solicitor  leaving  it.  1269;  Cliffe  v.  Wilkinson,  4  Sim.  122. 

3  For  form  of  notice  see  Vol.  III.  13  Latour  v.  Holcombe,  1  Phil.  262;  and  see 

4  Braithwaite's  Pr.  534.  Veifch  v.  Irving,  11  Sim.  122. 

5  Ibid-  14  Tynte  v.  Hodge,  2  J.  &  H.  602.    For  forms 

6  For  form  of  notice,  see  Vol.  III.  of  notice  of  motion  and  summons,  see  Vol.  III. 

7  Braithwaite's  Pr.  533.  l  See  Lowndes  v.  Robertson,  4  Mad.  465; 

8  Cliffe  v.  Wilkinson,  4  Sim.  122;  and  see      and  see  Ord.  I.  38. 

35 


*  36  PERSONS    BY   WHOM    A    SUIT   MAY   BE   INSTITUTED. 

and  that  a  separate  bond  or  bonds  cannot  afterwards  be  required.2 
Whatever  number  of  bonds,  however,  may  be  given,  they  all  form  a 
security  for  one  sum  only.8  A  solicitor  should  not  be  surety  for  his 
client.4     The  bond  of  an  incorporated  society  has  been  held  sufficient.5 

The  defendant,  on  receiving  notice  that  a  bond  has  been  lodged  in 
the  hrst  instance,  may,  if  dissatisfied  with  the  bond,  apply  by  special 
motion,6  or  summons,7  that  in  lieu  of,  or  in  addition  to,  such  bond,  the 
plaintiff  may  be  ordered,  within  a  limited  time,  to  give  security  for 
costs,  according  to  the  course  of  the  Court,  or  in  default  thereof,  that 
the  bill  may  be  dismissed  with  costs,  and  that  in  the  mean  time  all 
proceedings  may  be  stayed.8  The  application  should  be  supported  by 
affidavit  showing  that  the  obligor  is  not  a  solvent  person;  and  may  be 
opposed  by  his  own  affidavit,9  justifying  in  double  the  amount  named 
in  the  bond,10  and  by  other  evidence  that  he  is  a  person  of  substance. 
The  costs  of  inquiring  into  the  circumstances  of  the  proposed  surety 
have  been  allowed.11 

Where  the  plaintiff  in  the  first  instance  submits,  for  approval,  the 
name  of  the  proposed  obligor,  the  defendant,  if  he  objects  to  the  person 
proposed,  must  notify  his  objection  to  the  plaintiff's  solicitor  within  a 
reasonable  time : 12  otherwise,  the  plaintiff  may  complete  and  lodge  the 
bond.  The  plaintiff,  on  receiving  notice  of  the  defendant's  objection, 
must  either  propose  another  person,  or  the  person  already  offered  must 
justify  by  affidavit 13  in  double  the  sum  for  which  he  is  to  be  bound;  " 
and  in  the  latter  case  it  is  presumed  the  plaintiff  should  file  the  affi- 
davit, and  lodge  the  bond,  and  give  notice  thereof  to  the  defendant.15 

If  the  plaintiff  fails  to  comply  with  the  order  to  give  security,  the 
defendant  may  apply  by  special  motion,  or  summons,16  that  the  plain- 
tiff give  security  within  a  limited  time,  or,  in  default,  that  his 

*  36      *  bill  may  be  dismissed  with  costs ;  and  that  proceedings  may,  in 

the  mean  time,  be  stayed.1 

2  See,  however,  1  Smith's  Pr.  866:  Braith-  in  lieu  of,  or  in  addition  to,  the  persons  pro- 
waite's  Pr.  532.  posed.    It  is  conceived,  however,  that  the  usual 

3  Lowndes  v.  Rohertson,  4  Mad.  465.  practice  is,  as  stated  in  the  text,  to  notify  the 

4  Panton  v.  Labertouche,  1  Phil.  265;  7  Jur.  objection  to  the  plaintiff  before  applying  to  the 
589.  Court.    For  form  of  notice  of  objection,  see  Vol. 

5  Plestow  v.  Johnson,  1  Sm.  &  G.  App.  20;  of  Forms. 

2  W.  R.  3.  13  For  form,  see  Vol.  III. 

6  Panton  v.  I/tbertouche,  1  Phil.  265;  7  Jur.  M  See  1  Turn.  &  Ven.  764;  1  Grant,  444. 
589.  I5  The  bond  was  formerly  put   in  suit  in  the 

7  For  forms  of  notice  of  motion  and  sum-  Petty  Bag  Office,  the  procedure  in  which  was 
mons.  see  Vol.  III.  regulated  by  12  &  13  Vic.  c.  109. 

8  Giddings  0.  Giddings,  10  Beav.  29,  and  16  For  forms  of  notice  of  motion  and  sum- 
the  cases  collected,  ib.  31;   and  see  Denny  v.  mons.  see  Vol.  III. 

Mars,  Seton,  1279,  where  the  order  is  given;  1  Cooper  v.  Purton,  1  N.  R.  468,  V.  C.  W.; 

Payne  v.  Little,  14   Beav.  647;   O'Connor  v.  and   see  Giddings   v.  Giddings,  10   Beav.  20, 

Sierra  Nevada  Co.  23  Beav.  608.  and   cases  collected  10  Beav.  31;    Knight  v. 

9  See  form  in  Vol.  III.  De  Blaquiere,  Sail.  &  S.  648;  Payne  v.  Little, 
1°  See  1  Turn.  &  Ven.  764;  1  Grant,  444.  14  Beav.  647;  O'Connor  v.  Sierra  Nevada  Co. 
U  Bainbrigge  v.   Moss,   3  Jur.  N.  S.   107,  23  Beav.  608;   Kennedy  v.  Edwards,  11  Jur. 

V.  C.  \V.  N.  S.  153,  V.  C  W.;  see  also  Camac  v.  Grant, 

12  See,  however,  Cliffe  v.  Wilkinson,  4  Sim.  1  Sim.  348;  2  Sim.  570;  White  r.  Bromige,  26 

122,  where  the  defendant  moved  on  notice  that  W.  R.  312.  Charras  v.  Pickering,  39  L.  J.  Ch. 

the  plaintiff  might  be  ordered  to  give  security  190,  Le  Grange  v.  McAndrew,  4  Q.  B.  D.  210- 

36 


PAUPERS.  *  37 

The  day  on  which  an  order  that  the  plaintiff  do  give  security  for 
costs  is  served,  and  the  time  thenceforward  until,  and  including,  the 
day  on  which  such  security  is  given,  is  not  reckoned  in  the  computation 
of  time  allowed  a  defendant  to  make  his  defence  to  the  suit.2  If  it 
becomes  necessary  for  the  defendant  to  put  the  bond  in  suit,  he  must 
obtain  an  order,8  on  special  motion  or  summons,  that  he  may  be  at 
liberty  to  do  so,  and  may  have  the  bond  delivered  out  to  him  for  that 
purpose,  and  may  use  the  name  of  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerk,  the 
obligee,  on  giving  him  an  indemnity,  —  such  indemnity  to  be  settled  by 
the  Judge,  if  the  parties  differ.  The  notice  of  motion  or  summons  4 
must  be  served  on  the  plaintiff's  solicitor;  and  the  application  must  be 
supported  by  production  of  evidence  of  the  costs  having  been  directed 
to  be  paid,  and  of  the  amount  and  non-payment  thereof.  The  order  on 
such  application  is  drawn  up  by  the  Registrar;  a  plain  copy  of  it  is 
lodged  with  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerk,  together  with  a  receipt  for  the 
bond,  and  an  undertaking  to  indemnify  him  against  the  costs  of  any 
proceedings  to  be  taken  thereon  in  his  name;  and,  if  satisfied  there- 
with, he  will  deliver  out  the  bond.  The  receipt  and  undertaking  are 
required  to  be  signed  by  the  defendant  applying,  and  also  by  his  solici- 
tor, and  are  usually  written  at  the  foot  of  the  copy  of  the  order.5 

Where  money  has  been  paid  into  Court  as  security  for  costs,  in  lieu 
of  a  bond,  an  application  may  be  made  at  chambers,  by  summons,6  for 
payment  thereout  of  any  costs  ordered  to  be  paid  by  the  plaintiff  to  the 
defendant.  The  summons  must  be  served  on  the  plaintiff,  and  on  any 
co-defendants  interested  in  the  fund,  and  must  be  supported  by  evi- 
dence of  such  payment  having  been  directed,  and  of  the  amount  paya- 
ble, and  by  production  of  the  Accountant-General's  certificate  of  the 
fund  being  in  Court. 

If,  subsequently  to  the  order  directing  security  for  costs  to  be  given, 
the  plaintiff  becomes  resident  within  the  jurisdiction,  he  may  apply, 
on  special  motion  or  summons,7  that  the  order  may  be  discharged;  but 
he  must  pay  the  costs  of  the  application.8 


*  Section  V.  —  Paupers.  *  37 

It  has  been  before  stated *  to  be  a  general  rule,  subject  to  very  few 
exceptions,  that  there  is  no  sort  or  condition  of  persons  who  may  not 

For  circumstances  under  which  the  time  to  give  5  Braithwaite's  Pr.  535.  536.     For  forms  of 

security  was  extended,  see  Grant  v.  Ingram,  20  receipt  and  undertaking,  see  Vol.  III. 

L.  T.  N.  S.  70,  V.  C.  M.    For  form  of  order,  see  6  For  form  of  summons,  see  Vol.  III. 

2  Seton,  1541,  No.  4.  7  For  forms  of  notice  of  motion  and  sum- 

2  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.   14;  see  Henderson  mons,  see  Vol.  III. 
v.  Atkins,  7  W.  R.  318,  V.  C.  K.;  Drinan   v.  8  O'Connor  v.  Sierra  Nevada  Co.  24  Beav. 

Mannix,  3  Dr.   &  \V.  154.     For  the  time  al  435;    Mathews    v.   Chichester,   30   Beav.    135. 

lowed   for  making   the  defence,  see  R.  S.  C.  For  more  on  the  subject  of  security  for  costs, 

Ord.  XXII.  1-3.  see  post,  Chap.  III.  §  2.  Alien;  Chap.  VI.  §  5, 

8  Robinson  v.  Brutton,  6  Beav.  147;  Bain-  The  Bill;  Ogilvie  v.  Hearn,  11  Ves.  600;  Wor- 
brigge  v.  Mo<s,  3  Jur.  N.  S.  107,  V.  C.  W.;  Reg.  rail  v.  White,  3  Jo.  &  Lat.  513;  Hind  r.  Whit- 
Lib.  1857,  A.  283.  more,  2  K.  &  J.  458,  462;  Drinan  v.  Mannix, 

4  For   forms   of    notice   and   summons,    see  3  Dr.  &  W.  154. 
Vol.  III.  l  Ante,  p.  5. 

37 


37 


PERSONS   BY   WHOM    A    SUIT   MAY   BE   INSTITUTED. 


sue  in  the  Court  of  Chancery.  Amongst  the  exceptions  to  this  rule, 
those  who  are  in  indigent  circumstances  are  not  included,  and  any  per- 
son, however  poor  he  may  be,  being  in  other  respects  competent,  has 
the  same  right  as  another  to  commence  proceedings  in  the  Court  of 
Chancery  for  the  assertion  of  his  claims;  and  that,  without  being 
required  to  give  any  security  for  the  payment  of  costs  to  the  opposite 
party,  in  case  he  fails  in  his  suit.2  This  liberality  is  extended  to  the 
case  of  the  next  friends  of  infants ; 3  indeed,  any  other  rule  would 
amount  to  a  denial  of  justice  to  the  children  of  poor  persons,  who  might 
become  entitled  to  property,  and  yet  be  precluded  from  asserting  their 
rights,  by  reason  of  their  inability  to  procure  substantial  persons  to  be 
their  next  friends.4  With  regard  to  the  next  friend  of  a,  feme  covert, 
the  rule  is  different,  for  it  has  been  held,  that  the  next  friend  of  a 
married  woman  must  be  a  person  of  substance ; 6  because  a  married 


2  Such  is  the  law  of  Massachusetts,  Feneley 
v.  Mahoney,  21  Pick.  212;  and  Tennessee, 
Dudley  v.  Baleh,  4  Hay.  192,  Code  of  Tenn. 
§  3192.  This  right  must  not  be  abused;  see 
Burke  v.  Lidwell,  1  Jo.  &  Lat.  703,  where  a 
pauper  plaintiff  was  required  to  give  security, 
the  person  really  interested  having  nominally 
assigned  to  the  pauper,  in  order  to  avoid  lia- 
bility to  costs;  see,  however,  Worrall  r.  White, 
3  Jo.  &  Lat.  513,  515.  See  as  to  requiring  secu- 
rity for  costs  from  insolvent  plaintiff  in  a  class 
suit,  Tredwell  v.  Byrch,  1  Y.  &  C.  Ex.  476. 

3  The  next  friend  of  a  minor  plaintiff  can- 
not be  compelled  to  give  security  for  costs. 
St.  John  v.  Earl  of  Besborough,  1  Hogan,  41 , 
Fellows  v.  Barrett,  1  Keen,  119;  Murrell  i'. 
Clapham,  8  Sim.  74.  Nor  would  the  Court 
enter  into  any  inquiry  as  to  the  circumstances 
of  a  proposed  next  friend  of  an  infant  in  place 
of  another  whom  it  became  important  to  exam- 
ine as  a  witness.  Davenport  v.  Davenport,  1 
S.  &  S.  101. 

The  early  English  cases  are,  however,  uni- 
form that  the  next  friend  of  an  infant  should 
be  a  person  of  substance,  otherwise  he  may  be 
ruled  to  security.  Wale  v.  Salter,  Mos.  47, 
citing  Webster  v.  Guy,  decided  by  the  Lord 
Chancellor  on  the  previous  day;  Anon.  Mos. 
86;  Anon.  1  Atk.  570;  Turner  v.  Turner,  2 
P.  W.  297;  see  Anon.  1  Ves.  410:  Squirrel  v. 
Squirrel,  2  Dick.  765.  In  view  of  these  authori- 
ties, Chancellor  Walworth  required  the  insol- 
vent next  friend  of  an  infant  to  give  security 
in  Fulton  v.  Kosevelt,  1  Paige,  178.  See  Dal- 
rymple  v.  Lamb,  3  Wend.  424;  Wice  t\  Com- 
mercial Fire  Ins.  Co.  2  Abb.  N.  Cas.  325.  And 
where  a  party  is  enabled,  by  rule  of  court,  such 
as  the  98th  rule  of  Lord  Bacon  (Beames's  Or- 
ders, 44),  or  by  statute,  to  prosecute  a  suit  as  a 
pauper,  upon  taking  a  prescribed  oath  of  pov- 
erty, the  next  friend  of  an  infant  cannot  sue 
in  forma  pauperis,  the  privilege  being  consid- 
ered as  personal.    Wilkinson  v.  Belsher,  2  Bro. 

38 


C.  C.  272;  Anon.  1  Ves.  Jr.  409;  Green  v.  Har- 
rison, 3  Sneed,  131;  Cohen  v.  Shyer,  1  Tenn. 
Ch.  192.  Nor  can  the  next  friend  of  a  married 
■woman.  Lawrence  v.  Lawrence,  3  Paige,  287. 
Nor  the  informer  in  a  qui  tarn  action.  Johnson 
v.  Hunter,  1  Leg.  Rep.  168.  An  executor  or 
administrator  cannot  sue  in  forma  pauperis. 
Paradice  v.  Sheppard.  1  Dick.  136;  McCoy  v. 
Broderick,  3  Sneed,  203;  infra,  38,  n.  3. 

But  the  Court  may,  upon  being  satisfied  by 
the  report  of  the  Master  that  there  is  probable 
cause  for  proceeding,  authorize  an  infant  to  sue 
by  next  friend  in  forma  pauperis,  Fulton  v. 
Rosevelt,  1  Paige,  178.  Though  the  affidavit  of 
the  infant  alone  will  not  sustain  the  order,  Lind- 
say v.  Tyrrell,  2  De  G.  &  J.  7.  And  may,  in 
like  manner,  permit  a  wife  to  file  a  bill  against 
the  husband  In  forma  pauperis,  Robertson  v. 
Robertson,  3  Paige,  387.  But  see  contra,  Ward 
v.  Ward,  2  Dev.  Eq.  553. 

The  next  friend  of  a  married  woman  may 
be  charged  with  the  costs  in  a  proper  case, 
Re  Wells,  12  W.  R.  97.  So  may  the  next 
friend  of  an  infant.  Haggard  v.  Benson,  3 
Tenn.  Ch.  268,  279;  see  infra,  79,  note.  But, 
ordinarily,  if  the  suit  be  prosecuted  in  good 
faith,  the  costs  will  be  paid  out  of  the  infant's 
estate.  Staines  v.  Maddox,  Mos.  319;  Caley 
v.  Caley,  25  W.  R.  528;  Taner  v.  Fire,  2  Ves. 
466;  Smith  v.  Floyd,  1  Pick.  275;  Feneley  v. 
Mahoney,  21  Pick.  212;  Bradford  v.  French, 
110  Mass.  365;  Bouche  v.  Ryan,  3  Blackf.  472; 
Yourie  v.  NeLon,  1  Tenn.  Ch  614.  In  Massa- 
chusetts, upon  a  construction  of  their  statutes, 
it  has  been  held  that  the  next  friend  of  an  in- 
fant is  not  chargeable  with  costs  Crandall  v. 
Slaid,  11  Met.  288. 

4  See  Anon.  1  Ves.  Jr.  p.  410;  Squirrel  v. 
Squirrel,  2  Dick.  765;  2  P.  Wms.  297,  n.;  Dav- 
enport v.  Davenport,  IS  &  S.  101;  Murrell  v. 
Clapham,  8  Sim.  74;  Fellows  t\  Bairett,  1  Keen, 
119.     See  preceding  note. 

5  Anon.  1  Atk.  570;  Pennington  v.  Alvin, 


PAUPERS.  *  38 

woman  and  an  infant  are  differently  circumstanced,  as  the  infant  can- 
not select  his  own  next  friend,  but  must  rely  upon  the  good  offices  of 
those  who  are  nearest  to  him  in  connection,  or  otherwise  his  rights 
might  go  unasserted,  but  the  married  woman  has  the  power  of  select- 
ing: she  is,  therefore,  if  she  sues  by  a  next  friend,  required  to  select  a 
person  who,  if  her  claim  should  turn  out  to  be  unfounded,  can  pay  to 
the  defendant  the  costs  of  the  proceeding. 

In  consequence  of  the  provisions  of  Stat.  11  Hen.  VII.  c.  12, 6 
*the  Courts  of  Law  admitted  all  persons  to  sue  in  forma  pauperis  *  38 
who  could  swear  that  they  were  not  worth  £5,  except  their 
wearing-apparel,  and  the  subject-matter  of  the  suit.  This  practice  of 
the  Courts  of  Law  was  followed  by  Courts  of  Equity,  although  persons 
suing  in  these  Courts  do  not  come  within  the  provisions  of  the  Act  of 
Parliament  above  referred  to,1  and  they  extended  the  relief  to  the  case 
of  defendants.2 

The  privilege  is  not  extended  to  a  plaintiff  or  a  defendant  suing  or 
being  sued  in  a  representative  character,  as  executor  or  administrator; 8 
but  the  case  of  a  person  sustaining  the  mixed  character  of  executor  and 
beneficiary  is  an  exception  to  the  general  rule;  although  in  order  to 
prevent  any  undue  practice  in  suing  in  forma  pauperis,  and  under  color 
of  that  privilege  obtaining  dives  costs,  a  special  order  is  necessary.4 
An  exception  to  the  strict  application  of  the  rule  has,  however,  been 
made,  by  allowing  an  executor  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis,  for  the 
single  purpose  of  clearing  a  contempt  incurred  in  the  cause.5 

It  is  said,  that  a  person  filling  the  character  of  next  friend  cannot 
sue  in  forma  pauperis,6  although,  as  we  have  seen  before,  the  poverty 
of  a  next  friend  of  an  infant  is  no  ground  for  dismissing  him;  and 
formerly  there  was  some  uncertainty  as  to  the  practice,  when  a  married 
woman  could  not  obtain  a  substantial  next  friend  to  sue  on  her  behalf ; 7 

1  S.  &  S.  264;  Jones  v.  Fawcett,  2  Phil.  278;  Part  IV.  22-31.     The  Act  11  Hen.  VII.  c.  12, 

Stevens  v.  Williams,  1  Sim.  N.  S.  545;  Wilton  was  repealed  by  4G  &  47  Vic.  c.  49,  §  4  Sched. 
v.  Hill,  2  De  G.  M.  &  G.  807-809;    Hind   v.  3  Paradice    v.    Sheppard,     1     Dick.    136  ; 

Whitmore,2K.  &  J.458;  Re  Wills,9  Jur.  N.  S.  Beames  on  Costs,  79  App.    No.  21;   Oldlield 

1225;  12  W.  R.  97,  V.  C.  S.;  Elliott  v.  Ince,  7  v.  Cobbett,  1  Phil.  613  ;  2  Beav.  446  ;  3  Bear. 

De  G.  M.  &  G.  475;  3  Jur.  N.  S.  597;  Smith  432  ;   10  Jur.   2  ;   Fowler  v.   Davies,   16  Sim. 

v.  Etches,  1  H.  &  M.  711;   10  Jur.  N.  S.  124;  182;  12  Jur.  321  ;  St.  Victor  v.   Devereux,   6 

Re  Payne,  23  Ch.  D.  288;  and  see  post,  Femes  Beav.  584  ;  8  Jur.  26. 
Covert  Plaintiffs.  4  Thompson   v.   Thompson,    H.    T.     1824, 

Where  the  same  person  was  the  next  friend  cited  1  Turn.  &  Ven.  513 ,-  and  see  Rogers  v. 
of  an  infant  plaintiff  and  of  a  married  woman  Hooper,  1  W.  R.  474,  V.  C.  K.  ;  Everson  r. 
plaintiff,  Lord  St.  Leonards  stayed  the  proceed-  Matthews,  3  W.  R.  159,  V.  C.  W.  ;  Parkin- 
ings  in  the  cause  until  the  next  friend  of  the  son  v.  Chambers,  lb.  34,  V.  C.  W.  As  to  the 
feme  plaintiff  was  changed  or  gave  security  for  affidavit  in  such  a  case,  see  Martin  v.  Whit- 
costs.     Drinan  v.  Mannix,  2  Dru.  &  War.  154.  more,  W.  N\  (1869)  42  ;  17  W.  R.  809,  L.  C. 

6  Beames  on  Costs,  72.  6  Oldfield  v  Cobbett,  1  Coll.  169. 

1  See  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §50;  1  Harr.  Ch.  Pr.  by  6  Anon.  1  Ves.  Jr.  410.  The  reason  is, 
Newl.  389,  390;  1  Hoff.  Ch.  Pr.  67,  et  seq. ;  that  the  privilege  of  suing  in  forma  pauperis 
Isnard  v.  Cazeaux,  1  Paige,  39.  is  personal      Williamson   v.    Belsher,    2    Bro. 

2  See  post,  Chap.  IV.  §  7,  P'tuper  Defend-  C.  C.  272 ;  Robertson  v.  Robertson,  3  Paige, 
ants.  In  England  this  practice  has  been  adopted  387  So  of  the  next  friend  of  a  married 
in  the  Chancery  Division  of  the  High  Court  of  woman.  Lawrence  v  Lawrence,  3  Paige,  267. 
Justice.     Sup.  Ct.  of  Jud.  Act,  1873  (36  &  37  See  ante,  37,  n   3. 

Vic.  c.  66),  §  23;   id.  of  1876  (38  &  39  Vic.  7  See  Dowden  v.  Hook,  8  Beav.  299. 

c.  77),  §  21.     See  R.  S.  C.  1883,  Ord.  XVI. 

39 


39 


PERSONS   BY   WHOM   A   SUIT   MAY   BE   INSTITUTED. 


but  now  she  may,  on  an  ex  parte  motion,8  supported  by  affidavit  that 

she  is   unable  to  procure  any  substantial   person  to  act  as  her  next 

friend,9  obtain  an  order  authorizing  her  to  institute  and  prosecute 

*39      a  suit;10  *  to  carry  on  proceedings  alter  decree; *  or  to  appeal2 

without  a  next  friend,  in  forma  pauperis. 

It  seems  also  that,  in  a  proper  case,  an  infant  will  be  permitted  to 
sue  by  a  next  friend  in  forma  pauperis,  on  an  ex  parte  motion,  sup- 
ported by  affidavit  that  the  infant  cannot  procure  any  substantial  person 
to  act  as  next  friend.  8  (a) 

A  husband  and  wife  may  obtain  an  order  of  course  to  sue  in  forma 
pauperis,  in  respect  of  the  wife's  reversionary  interest;4  and  where  a 
woman  was  ordered  to  be  examined  pro  interesse  suo,  respecting  a  claim 
set  up  by  her  to  some  lands  taken  under  a  sequestration,  but  was  unable 
from  poverty  to  make  out  or  support  her  right,  liberty  was  given  to  her 
to  do  so  in  forma  pauperis. h 

Proceedings  under  the  Trustee  Relief  Act6  and  presumably  the 
Infant  Custody  Act 7  may  be  prosecuted  in  forma  pauperis  ;  and  so 
also  may  claims  in  a  suit  by  persons  who  are  not  parties; 8  but  in  these 
cases,  the  order  is  made  on  application  by  an  ex  parte  motion,9  sup- 
ported by  affidavit,  and  is  not  of  course. 

A  plaintiff  may  be  admitted  to  sue  as  a  pauper  upon  the  usual 
affidavit,  at  any  time  after  the  bill  has  been  filed,  or  summons  issued  , 10 


8  For  form  of  motion  paper,  see  Vol.  III. 

9  For  form  of  affidavit,  see  Vol.  III. 

1°  Re  Foster,  18  Beav.  525  ;  Wellesley  v. 
Wellesley,  16  Sim.  1  ;  1  De  G  M.  &  G.  501  ; 
Wellesley  v.  Mornington,  18  Jur.  552,  V.  C. 
K. ;  Re  Lancaster,  18  Jur.  229,  L.  C.  &  L.  JJ.; 
Crouch  v.  Waller,  4  De  G.  &  J.  43  ;  5  Jur. 
N.  S.  326  ;  Re  Barnes,  10  W.  R.  464,  V.  C.  S.  ; 
Smith  v.  Etches,  1  H.  &  M.  711  ;  10  Jur.  N.  S. 
124  ;  3  N.  R.  457 ;  Adamson  v.  Adamson,  2 
Seton,  655  ;  and  see  Ex  parte  Hakewill,  3  De 
G.  M.  &  G.  116.  The  decision  in  Page  v. 
Page,  16  Beav.  588,  where  such  an  order  was 
discharged,  is  overruled  by  these  cases;  but  see 
Caldicott  v.  Baker,  13  W.  R  449,  V.  C.  K. 
The  order  is  not  as  of  course,  Coulsting  v. 
Coulsting,  8  Beav.  463 ,  9  Jur.  587  ;  and  has 
been  held  not  to  be  allowable  where  the  suit  is 
against  the  husband.  Ward  v.  Ward,  2  Dev. 
Eq.  553.  It  has  also  been  held  that  a  wife  can- 
not sue  her  husband  by  her  trustee,  but  only 
by  a  next  friend.  Hunt  v  Booth,  1  Freem.  Ch. 
215.  Under  the  construction  of  the  divorce 
statutes  in  Tennessee,  the  wife  has  been  per- 
mitted to  sue  without  a  next  friend,  and  in 
forma  pauperis.  Hawkins  v.  Hawkins,  4  Sneed, 
105.  Upon  a  proper  application,  a  wife  may 
be  permitted  to  file  a  bill  against  her  husband, 
for  a  separation,  in  forma  pauperis.  But  this 
will  not  be  done  until  the  Court  has  ascertained 
by  the  report  of  a  Master,  that  she  has  probable 


cause    for    filing  such    a    bill.     Robertson    v. 
Robertson,  3  Paige,  387. 

i  D'Oechsner  v.  Scott,  24  Beav.  239  ;  see 
M'Cann  v.  Borradaile,  37  L.  J.  Ch.  124 ;  Re 
Ganvill,  31  Ch  D.  532. 

2  Crouch  v.  Waller,  4  De  G.  &  J.  43  ;  5 
Jur.  N.  S  326  ;  and  see  Martin  v.  Whitmore, 
W.  N.  (1869)  42;  17  W.  R.  809,  L.  C.  ;  R.  S. 
C.  Ord.  XVI.  8. 

3  Lindsay  v.  Tyrrell,  2  De  G.  &  J.  7;  24 
Beav.  124  ;  *3  Jur.  N.  S   1014. 

4  Pitt  v.  Pitt,  1  Sm.  &  G.  App.  14  ;  17  Jur. 
571. 

5  James  v.  Dore,  2  Dick   788. 

6  Re  Money,  13  Beav.  109,  the  Act  is  10  & 
11  Vic.  c.  96. 

7  See  Re  Hakewill,  3  De  G.  M.  &  G.  116; 
the  Act  is  2  &  3  Vic.  c.  54  (repealed  by  36  & 
37  Vic.  c.  12)  ;  and  see  post,  Vol.  II.,  Infant 
Custody  Act. 

8  See  Re  Shard,  Partington  v.  Reynolds, 
cited  2  Seton,  1646,  No.  2,  where  the  order  is 
given  ;  and  see  in  other  cases  Ex  parte  Hake- 
will, 3  De  G.  M.  &  G.  116  ;  Ex  parte  Fry,  1 
Dr.  &  S.  318. 

9  Not  by  petition,  see  2  Seton,  1646;  for 
form  of  motion  paper,  see  Vol.  III. 

10  See  Parkinson  v.  Chambers,  3  W.  R.  34, 
V.  C.  W.  ;  Braithwaite's  Pr  562 ;  but  a  mar- 
ried woman  may  apply  before  bill,  if  the  draft 
bill  has  been  settled  and  signed  bjr  counsel, 


(a)  In  the  Federal  Courts  infants  may  sue  or  defend  in  forma  pauperis.     Ferguson  v.  Dent, 
15  Fed.  Rep.  771;  see  infra,  p.  42,  n.  (a).    For  those  courts,  see  27  U.  S.  Stat,  at  L.  252. 

40 


PAUPERS. 


40 


but  he  will  be  liable  to  all  the  costs  incurred  before  his  admission,11 
and  to  costs  previously  ordered  to  be  paid,  without  being  first 
dispaupered.12 

It  seems  doubtful  whether,  after  a  dismissal  of  a  former  suit,  a 
plaintiff  will  be  permitted  to  sue  again  for  the  same  matter  in  forma 
pauperis,  without  paying  the  costs  of  the  first  suit;  13  (b)  but  the  circum- 
stance that  the  suit  is  a  second  suit  for  the  same  matter  as  a  former 
suit,  in  which  the  plaintiff  had  likewise  sued  as  a  pauper,  is  no  ground 
of  objection  to  the  second  suit,  unless  it  can  be  justly  characterized  as 
very  vexatious.14 

*  A  pauper  may  appeal,1  (a)  and  where  a  party  has,  in  any  stage  *  40 
of  the  suit,  obtained  the  common  order  for  his  admission  as  a 
pauper,  no  special  order  is  required  to  enable  him  to  appeal ; 2  but 
where  he  has  not  been  already  admitted  as  a  pauper,  an  order  which 
can  only  be  made  by  the  Court  of  Appeal,  authorizing  the  appeal  in 
forma  pauperis,  is  necessary; s  and  it  seems  that  a  certificate  of  coun- 
sel that  there  are  special  and  strong  grounds  for  the  appeal  may  be 
required.4 

In  order  to  be  permitted  to  sue  in  forma  pauperis,  the  plaintiff  must 


Wellesley   v.   Mornington,   18    Jur.    552  ;    Re 
Barnes,  1*0  W.  K.  464,  V.  C.  S 

n  Mos.  68  ;  and  see  Ballard  v.  Catling,  2 
Keen.  606  ;  Church  v.  Marsh,  2  Hare,  652  ;  8 
Jur.  54 ;  Smith  v.  Pawson,  2  De  G.  &  S.  490  ; 
Prince  Albert  v.  Strange,  id.  652,  718  ;  13  Jur. 
507. 

12  Davenport  v.  Davenport,  1  Phil.  124  ; 
Brown  v.  Story,  1  Paige,  588.  See,  however, 
Bennett  v.  Chudleigh,  2  Y.  &  C.  C.  C.  164  ; 
Snowball  v.  Dixon,  5  De  G.  &  S.  9. 

13  Corbett  v.  Corbett,  16  Ves.  407,  410,  412  ; 
Brook  v.  Alcock,  20  March,  1834,  V.  C.  E., 
cited  1  Smith's  Ch.  Pr.  555;  but  see  Fitton 
v.  Earl  Macclesfield,  1  Vern.  264;  and  see  Chit- 
ty's  Arch.  1292  ;  Hawes  v.  Johnson,  1  Y.  & 
J    30. 

"  Wild  v.  Hobson,  2  V.  &  B.  105.  112  ;  see 
Brook  v.  Alcock,  and  Elsam  v.  Alcock,  cited  1 


(b)  In  such  case  a  Judge,  in  his  discretion, 
may  properly  refuse  leave  to  the  plaintiff  to  sue 
in  forma  pauperis.  McCabe  v.  Bank  of  Ireland, 
14  App.  Cas.  413  ;  Martin  v.  Beauchamp,  25  Ch. 
D.  12.  Courts  of  Equity,  unlike  the  Law  Courts, 
will  not  always  require  a  plaintiff  who  can  show 
a  valid  excuse,  to  pay  the  costs  of  his  first  suit 
before  prosecuting  a  second  suit  for  the  same 
cause.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Mertes  (Neb.), 
52  N.  W.  1099.  But,  in  general,  a  motion  in 
an  Equity  suit,  which  has  been  refused  with 
costs,  cannot  be  renewed  until  those  costs  are 
paid.  See  Bellchamber  v.  Giani,  3  Madd  550; 
Oldfield  v.  Cobbett,  12  Beav.  91  ;  see  Re  Neal, 
Weston  v.  Neal,  31  Ch  D.  437  ;  Re  Youngs, 
Doggett  v.  Revett  (No.  2).  id.  239:  Henderson 
v.  Underwriting  &  A.  Ass.  65  L.  T.  616,  732; 


Smith's  Ch.  Pr.  874.     As  to  married  women, 
see  Kiff  v   Roberts  (No.  2),  33  Ch.  D.  265. 

i  Bland  v.  Lamb,  2  J.  &  W.  402  ;  contra, 
Taylor  v.  Bouchier,  2  Dick.  504  ;  Bolton  v. 
Gardner,  3  Paige,  273  ;  and  see  post,  1482. 

2  Drennanu.  Andrew,  L.  R.  1  Ch.  300,  L  C.j 
and  see  cases  cited,  ib.  301,  n.  (7). 

3  2  Seton,  1646 ;  see  also  Clarke  i\  Wyburn, 
12  Jur.  167,  L.  C. ;  Heaps  v.  Commissioners  of 
Churches,  ib.  n.  ;  L.  R.  1  Ch.  301,  n.  (7); 
Brad  berry  v.  Brooke,  25  L.  J.  Ch.  576  ;  4  W. 
R  699,  L.  JJ.  ;  Crouch  v.  Waller,  4  De  G.  &  J. 
43 ;  5  Jur  N.  S.  326  ;  Grimwood  v.  Shave,  5 
W.  R.  482,  L.  C.  For  form  of  order,  see  2 
Seton,  1646,  No  3.  See  Bowie  v.  Ailsa,  13  App. 
Cas.  371.  The  order  is  obtainable  on  ex  parte 
motion. 

*  Grimwood  v.  Shave,  5  W.  R.  482,  L.  C  ; 
and  see  L.  R.  1  Ch.  301,  n   (7). 


Hall  v.  Paulet,  66  L.  T.  645  ;  White  v  Bromige, 
26  W.  R.  312  ;  Peters  v.  Lilly,  11  P.  D.  145. 
The  same  rule  is  acted  upon  by  the  Law  Courts. 
Hoare  v.  Dickson,  7  C.  B.  164  ;  Morton  v. 
Palmer,  9  Q.  B.  D.  891;  see  Ex  parte  Mackin- 
tosh. 13  Q.  B.  D.  235.  As  to  ordering  security 
for  costs,  instead  of  dismissing  the  suit  for  want 
of  prosecution,  see  Wilmott  v.  Freehold  H.  F. 
Co.  52  L.  T.  743.  If  the  order  is  obtained  by 
the  defendant,  with  stay  until  given,  he  may 
still  move  to  dismiss  the  suit  for  want  of  prose- 
cution. London  Road  Car  Co  v.  Kelly,  18  L.  R. 
Ir.  43. 

(a)  As  to  a  pauper  appellant's  costs  on  a 
successful  appeal  to  the  House  of  Lords,  see 
Johnson  v.  Lindsay  No.  2,  [1892]  A.  C.  210. 


41 


*  41  PERSONS   BY   WHOM    A    SUIT   MAY   BE   INSTITUTED. 

lay  a  case  before  counsel  for  his  opinion  whether  or  not  he  has  reason- 
able ground  for  suing,6  and  must  present  a  petition  to  the  Master  of 
the  Rolls,6  containing  a  short  statement  of  his  case,  and  of  the  pro- 
ceedings, if  any,  which  have  been  had  in  the  cause,  and  praying  to  be 
admitted  to  sue  in  forma  pauperis,  and  that  a  counsel  and  a  solicitor 
may  be  assigned  him  if  not  an  infant.7 

This  petition  must  be  accompanied  by  the  case  laid  before  counsel 8 
for  his  opinion,  and  his  opinion  thereon  with  an  affidavit  of  the  party 
or  his  solicitor,  that  the  case  contains  a  full  and  true  statement  of  all 
the  material  facts  to  the  best  of  his  knowledge  and  belief,9  and  must  be 
supported  by  an  affidavit,  sworn  by  the  plaintiff,  that  he  is  not  worth 
the  sum  of  £25,  his  wearing-apparel  and  the  subject-matter  of  the  suit 
only  excepted.10  The  meaning  of  the  affidavit  is,  that  the  plaintiff  has 
not  £25  in  the  world  available  for  the  prosecution  of  the  suit-,  and  if 
he  can  make  an  affidavit  with  truth  in  that  sense,  the  omission  to  set 
forth  the  details  of  his  means,  and  the  circumstances  which  render 
them  unavailable,  is  not  such  an  omission  of  material  facts  as  will 
induce  the  Court,  on  that  ground  alone,  to  discharge  the  order.11 

This  affidavit  must  be  sworn  by  the  party  himself;  and  in  a  case  in 
which  it  afterwards  appeared  that  the  affidavit  had  been  sworn  by  a 
third  person,  the  party  was  dispaupered.1"2 

The  petition  and  case  for  the  opinion  of  counsel,  and  an  office 

*  41      copy  of  the  plaintiff's  *  affidavit,  and  usually  also  a  copy  of  the 

bill,  are  now  lodged  at  the  Chancery  Register's  office,  where,  if 
no  cause  to  the  contrary  is  seen,  an  order  is  drawn  up  and  entered,  by 
which  the  petitioner  is  admitted  to  sue  in  forma  pauperis,  and  a  counsel 
and  solicitor  are  assigned  to  act  on  his  behalf.1  (a) 

The  order  should  be  served  upon  the  opposite  party  as  soon  as  possi- 

5  R.  S.  C.  1883,  Ord.  XVI.  23.  debts  of  the  plaintiff,  as  appears  at  one  time 

6  Now  to  the  High  Court  of  Justice.  to   have   been   allowed     per  Sir  J.  L    Knight 

7  But  a  plaintiff  feme  covert  cannot  obtain  Bruce,  V.  C,  in  Perry  v.  Walke-,  1  Coll  233; 
the  order  as  of  course,  and  it  must  therefore  Beanies  on  Costs,  80,  and  see  fomi  of  affidavit, 
be  applied   for  on  an  ex  parte  motion  in  the  Vol.  III. 

Court  to  which  the  cause  is  attached.     Coul-  U  Dresser  v.  Morton,  2   Phil.  286;  and  see, 

sting  v  Counting,  8  Beav.  463;  Be  Lancaster,  as  to  the    poverty  which  entitles  a   person  to 

18  Jur.  229,  L.  C.   &  L.   JJ.;   Re   Foster,  18  sue  in  forma  pauperis,  Allen  v.  McPherson,  5 

Beav.  525.     Now,  the  order  seems  to  be  as  of  Beav.   469,   485;  Boddington  v.  Woodley,   id. 

course  in  the  case  of  a  married  woman.     See  555;    Goldsmith  i>.    Goldsmith,   5    Hare,    125; 

45  &  46  Vic.   c.   75,  §1;  R.   S   C.   1883,  Ord.  Perry  v.  Walker,  1  Coll.  233,  236. 

XVI.    16.      For    form    of    motion    paper,    see  12    Wilkinson  r.  Belsher.  2  Bro  C.  C.  2T2. 

Vol.  III.  1  For  form  of  order,  see  2  Seton,  1271.  Where 

8  As  to  the  duty  of  counsel  for  a  pauper,  an  order  had  been  obtained  on  an  ex  parte 
see  lies  v  Flower,  6  L.  T.  N.  S.  843,  L.  C.  application  that  the  plaintiff  be    permitted  to 

9  Cons.  Ord  VII.  8;  R.  S.  C.  1883,  Ord.  XVI.  prosecute  in  forma  pauperis,  the  same  was 
24.  see  Re  Atkinson,  23  L R.  Ir.  509.  For  forms  vacated  with  costs.  Isnard  v.  Cazeaux,  1 
of  petition,  certificate,  and  affidavit,  see  Vol.  III.  Paige,  39 

10  The    affidavit  must  not  except  the    just 


(a)  The  rules  of  R.  S.  C.  1883,  Ord.  XVI.  to  obtaining  leave  by  summons  in  Chambers, 

do  not  oblige  a  party  having  leave  to  sue  in  see  Re  Lewin.  33  W    R    128.     A  non-resident 

forma  pauperis  to  "have   counsel   or  solicitor  plaintiff  may  be  allowed   to  sue  in  forma  pav- 

assigned  to  him;  and  where   they  are  not  as-  peris  in  a  proper  case.    Heckmani'.  Mackey.  32 

•igned,  he  may  appear  in  person.      Tucker  v.  Fed.  Rep  574;  Harris  v.  Mutual  Life  Ins.  Co. 

Collinson,  16  Q.  B.  D.  562,  54  L.  T.  128, 263.  As  13  N.  Y.  S.  718. 
42 


PAUPERS.  *  42 

ble;  for  a  plaintiff  admitted  to  sue  in  forma  pauperis  has  been  ordered 
to  pay  dives  costs  to  the  defendant,  in  respect  of  a  step  in  the  cause 
taken  before  service  of  the  order;  ~  it  seems,  however,  that  there  is  a 
discretion  in  the  Court  in  such  cases,  and  that  the  order  to  sue  in 
forma  pauperis  is  not  necessarily  inoperative  in  all  cases  until  service.8 
The  order  should  also  be  lodged  with  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerk,  for 
entry  in  his  books ; 4  and  must  be  produced  to  the  officers  of  the  Court 
whenever  required  by  them. 

If  an  order  has  been  obtained  as  of  course  upon  a  suppression  of 
material  facts,  it  will  be  discharged  on  an  application  by  motion  on 
notice.5 

After  admittance,  no  fee,  profit,  or  reward  is  to  be  taken  of  the 
pauper  by  any  counsel  or  solicitor,  for  the  despatch  of  his  business, 
whilst  it  depends  in  Court,  and  he  continues  in  forma  pauperis  ;  nor  is 
any  agreement  to  be  made  for  any  recompense  or  reward  afterwards; 
and  any  person  offending  is  to  be  deemed  guilty  of  a  contempt  of  Court; 
and  the  party  admitted  giving  any  such  fee,  or  making  any  such  agree- 
ment, is  to  be  thenceforth  dispaupered,  and  not  be  admitted  again  in 
that  suit  to  sue  in  forma  pauperis.6 

The  counsel  or  solicitor  assigned  by  the  Court  to  assist  a  person 
admitted  in  forma  pauperis,  either  to  sue  or  defend,  may  not  refuse  so 
to  do,  unless  he  satisfies  the  Judge  who  granted  the  admittance  with 
some  good  reason  for  his  refusal.7 

When  a  pauper  has  had  counsel  assigned  to  him,  he  cannot  be  heard 
in  person.8 

No  process  of  contempt  will  be  issued,  at  the  instance  of  any  person 
suing  or  defending  in  forma  pauperis,  until  it  be  signed  by  his  solicitor 
in  the  suit-,  and  all  notices  of  motion  served,  or  petitions  presented,  on 
behalf  of  any  person  admitted  to  sue  or  defend  in  forma  pauperis 
(except  for  the  discharge  of  his  solicitor)  must  be  signed  by  his  solici- 
tor; and  such  solicitor  should  take  care  that  no  such  process  be  taken 
out,  and  that  no  such  notice  or  petition  be  served,  needlessly,  or  for 
vexation,  but  upon  just  and  good  grounds.9  If  the  solicitor  of  the 
pauper  does  not  prosecute  the  suit  properly,  he  will  be  discharged  and 
ordered  to  deliver  up  all  the  papers  in  the  suit  to  the  new  solicitor  of 
the  pauper,  subject  to  his  lien  for  the  money  which  on  taxation  may  be 
found  due  to  him  for  costs.10 

*  A  pauper  may  move  to  dismiss  his  bill  without  costs,1  but      *42 

2  Ballard  v  Catling,  2  Keen.  606;  see  also  655;  4  Beav.  452;  and  see  Cons.  Ord.  III.  10; 
Smith  v.  Pawson.  2  De  G.  &  S.  490.  Brown  r.  Dawson,  2  HoL'an,  76,  as  to  the  lia- 

3  Church  v.  Marsh,  2  Hare,  652:  8  Jur.  54.  bilities  of  a  pauper"*  solicitor. 

4  Braithwaite's  Pr.  563.  The  ord  :r  is  now  m  Hannaford  v.  Hanna,  W.  N.  (1871)  37; 
lodged  at  the  Central  Office  of  the  Court.  19  W.  K.  429,  V.  C.  S.     For  form  of  order,  see 

6  See  Nowell  v.  Whitaker,  6  Beav.  407.  1  Seton,  637,  No.  2. 

6  Cons.  Ord.  VII.  9.  10;  See  now  R.  S.  C.  1  Although  in  Pearson  v.  Belsher,  3  Bro. 
1883,  Ord.  XXVI.-XXVIII.  C.  C.   87,    it   is  stated   that    the  dismissal    is 

7  Ibid.  only  to  be  made  on  payment  of  costs,  the  order 

8  Parkinson  v.  Hanbury,  4  De  G.  M.  &  G.  was  drawn  up  without  costs;  see  Reg.  Lib. 
508.  1789,  B.  524,  entered  Pearson  v.  Wolfe;  3  Bro. 

9  Cons.  Ord.  VII.  11 ;  R.  S.  C.  1883,  Ord.  C.  C.  87,  ed.  Belt,  n.  1;  Beames  on  Costs,  88. 
XVI.  29,  30;  Perry  v.  Walker,  2  Y.  &  C.C.C. 

43 


*  43  PERSONS    BY   WHOM   A    SUIT   MAY   BE    INSTITUTED. 

the  motion  must  not  be  made  ex  parte; 2  and  a  pauper  cannot  amend 
his  bill  by  striking  out  defendants,  except  on  payment  of  their  costs.8 
If  a  cause  goes  against  a  pauper  at  the  hearing,  he  is  not  ordered  to 
pay  costs  to  the  defendant;  it  is  said,  however,  that  he  may  be  pun- 
ished personally,  although  the  practice  of  inflicting  such  punishment 
appears  to  be  now  obsolete.4 

It  seems  to  have  been  formerly  considered,  that  where  a  plaintiff 
sues  in  forma  pauperis,  and  has  a  decree  in  his  favor  with  costs,  he 
will  only  be  entitled  to  such  costs  as  he  has  been  actually  out  of 
pocket; 8  but  it  is  now  settled,  that  the  costs  of  a  successful  pauper  are 
in  the  discretion  of  the  Court; 6  (a)  and  where  costs  are  ordered  to  be 
paid  to  a  party  suing  or  defending  in  forma  pauperis,  such  costs  are  to 
be  taxed  as  in  other  cases,  unless  the  Court  or  a  Judge  otherwise 
directs.7  Where  an  appeal  against  a  decree  in  favor  of  a  person  suing 
in  forma  pauperis  was  dismissed  without  costs,  the  deposit  was  ordered 
to  be  paid  out  to  the  pauper.8 

A  pauper  may  be  ordered  to  pay  the  costs  occasioned  by  scandalous 
matter  inserted  by  him  in  the  proceedings.9 

If,  at  any  time,  it  is  made  to  appear  to  the  Court  that  he  is  of  such 
ability  that  he  ought  not  to  be  allowed  to  sue  or  to  continue  to  sue 
in  forma  pauperis,  the  Court  will  dispauper  him;10  therefore,  where  it 
was  shown  that  a  pauper  was  in  possession  of  the  property  in  question, 
he  was  ordered  to  be  dispaupered,  though  the  defendant  had  a 
*43  verdict  at  Law,  and  might  *take  a  writ  of  possession  at  any 
time;  *  so  also  where  a  plaintiff  had  offered  by  her  bill  to  redeem  a 

2  Parkinson  v.  Hanbury,  4  De  G.  M.  &  G.  order,  Wellesley  v.  Wellesley,  1  De  G.  M.  & 
508;  and  see  Wilkinson  v.  Belsher,  2  Bro.  C.  G.  501;  Mornington  v.  Keen,  3  W.  R.  429 ;  24 
C.  272.  L.  J.  Ch.  400,  V.  C  W.;    Phillips   v.  Phillips, 

3  Wilkinson  v.  Belsher,  2  Bro.  C.  C.  272.  4  De  G.    F.  &  J.  208,  220;   8  Jar.  N.   S.  145, 

4  Har.  391.  L.  C.     If  a   party,   suing  in  forma  pauperis, 

5  Angell  r.  Smith,  Prec.  Cha.  220;  see  amends  his  bill  after  answer  under  the  common 
Williams  v.  Wilkins,  3  John.  Ch.  65.  order,  it  must  be  upon  the  payment  of  costs,  as 

6  Scatchmer  ?>.  Foulkard,  1  Eq.  Cas.  Ab.  inordinary  suits;  and  if  he  has  a  meritorious 
125,  pi.  3;  Hautton  r.  Hager,  cited  in  Angell  claim  to  amend  without  costs,  he  must  apply 
v.  Smith,  Prec.  Cha.  220;  Wallop  v.  War-  to  the  Court  by  special  motion  upon  affidavit 
burton,  2  Cox,  409;  Rattray  v.  George,  16  Ves.  and  notice  to  the  adverse  party.  Richardson 
233;  Church  v.  Marsh.  2  Hare,  655;  8  Jur.  54;  v.  Richardson,  5  Paige,  58. 

Roberts   v.   Lloyd,   2   Beav.    376;    Stafford   v.  8  Phillips  v.  Phillips,  4  De  G.  F.  &  J.  208, 

HigSinbotham,"2  Keen,  147.     And  see  R.  S.  C.  220;  8  Jur.  N.  S.  145,  L.  C. 

Ord.  I.V.;  Garnett  v.  Bradley,  3  App.  Cas.  944,  9  Per  Lord   Eldon,  in  Rattray  v.  George,  16 

H.  L.;  Ex  parte  Mercers' Co.  10  Ch.   D.  481,  Ves.  234;  Tothill,  237. 

M.  R.  A  plaintiff  suing  in  forma  pauperis,  and  ln  Romillv  v.  Grint,  2  Beav.  186;  Mather 
recovering  a  legacy  against  executors,  when  v.  Shelmerdine,  7  Beav.  267;  Butler  v.  Gar- 
there  was  no  unreasonable  delav  on  their  part,  dener,  12  Beav.  525;  Ferry  v.  Walker,  1  Coll. 
ought  not  to  recover  dives  costs,  but  only  the  229,  236;  8  Jur.  680;  Goldsmith  v.  Goldsmith, 
actual  expenses  of  the  suit,  to  be  paid  by  the  5  Hare,  125;  Daintree  v.  Haynes,  12  Jur.  594, 
executors  out  of  the  assets.  Williams  v.  Wil-  V.  C.  E. 
kins,  3  John.  Ch.  65.  >  Wyatt's  P.  R.  321 .    See  Spencer  v.  Bryant, 

7  Cons.  Ord.  XL.  5 ;  R.  S.  C.  1883,  Ord.  XVI.  11  Ves." 49 :  see  also  Taprell  v.  Taylor,  9  Beav. 
31;  see  Beames  on  Costs,  77;   forcases  since  the  493;  Butler  v.  Gardener,  12  Beav.  525. 


(a)  Under  the  English  S.  C.  Rules  of  1883  tion  to  his  solicitor  or  fees  of  counsel.      Carson 

a  successful  plaintiff  in  an  action  in  forma  pan-  v,  Pickersgill,  14  Q.  B.  D.  859.    See  post,  p.  155, 

pen's  tried  before  a  Judge  and  jury  is  entitled  to  n.  (a).     As  to  appeals  by  infant  paupers,  see 

costs  out  of  pocket  onlv,  and  not  to  remunera-  Fuller  v.  Montague,  53  Fed.  Rep.  206. 

44 


PAUPERS.  *  44 

mortgage  if  anything  should  be  found  due  on  it,  she  was  ordered  to 
be  dispaupered;2  and  an  officer  upon  half  pay  (which  is  not  alienable) 
was  not  permitted  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis,  notwithstanding  he 
had  taken  the  benefit  of  the  Insolvent  Act.8  The  application  to  dis- 
pauper is  made  by  special  motion  on  notice,4  and  should  be  made 
without  delay.5 

At  Common  Law,  if  a  pauper  act  vexatiously  or  improperly  in  the 
conduct  of  the  action,  the  Court  will  order  him  to  be  dispaupered; 6  and 
in  like  manner,  in  Courts  of  Equity,  if  a  party  who  is  admitted  to  sue 
in  forma  pauperis  be  guilty  of  vexatious  conduct  in  the  suit,7  or  of  vexa- 
tious delays,  or  make  improper  motions,  he  will  be  dispaupered,  though 
the  Court  always  proceeds  very  tenderly  in  such  points ; 8  and  it  has 
been  said  that  a  pauper  is  liable  to  be  committed  if  he  files  an  improper 
bill,  as  otherwise  he  might  be  guilty  of  great  oppression.9  The  fact 
that  the  pauper  has  been  supplied  with  money  by  a  charitable  subscrip- 
tion for  the  purpose  of  assisting  him  in  the  conduct  of  the  suit,  although 
it  may  afford  ground  for  impeachment  as  maintenance,  is  no  ground 
upon  which  he  can  be  deprived  of  his  right  to  sue  as  a  pauper. 10 

Where  an  issue  is  directed  in  a  pauper's  suit,  he  must  be  admitted  as 
a  pauper  in  the  Court  in  which  the  issue  is  to  be  tried,  or  otherwise  he 
cannot  proceed  in  it,  in  forma  pauperis.11  In  a  case,  however,  where 
the  plaintiff,  a  pauper,  claimed  as  heir-at-law,  and  the  defendant 
claimed  under  a  will  and  deed,  which  were  disputed,  the  bill  was 
retained  with  liberty  to  the  plaintiff  to  bring  an  action;  and  the  tenants 
were  ordered  to  pay  the  plaintiff  £150  to  enable  him  to  go  to  trial.12 

An  order  admitting  a  party  to  sue  or  defend  in  forma  pauperis,  while 
in  force,18  exempts  the  pauper  from  the  payment  of  any  fees 
*  in  the  offices  of  the  Court,  except  for  office  copies  made  therein;  *  44 
for  such  copies,  a  charge  of  one  penny-halfpenny  per  folio  is 
made.1  Copies  of  documents  which  the  pauper  may  himself  make  will 
be  marked  as  office  copies,  without  charge.2  The  charges  for  copies  of 
pleadings  and  other  proceedings  and  documents  delivered,  pursuant  to 
the  General  Orders,  by  the  solicitors  of  parties  to  the  suit,8  to  a  person 

2  Fowler  v.  Davis,  16  Sim.  182;  12  Jur.  321.  son    v.    Richardson,  5  Paige,  58.     A  pauper's 

8  Boddington  v.  Woodley,  5  Beav.  555.  solicitor  may  be  made  to  pay  the  costs  of  any 

4  For  form  of  notice,  see  Vol.  III.  irregular   proceeding.      Brown    v.    Dawson,    2 

6  See  St.  Victor  v.  Devereux,  9  Jur.  519,  L.  Hogan,  76. 

C. ;  Parkinson  v.  Hanbury,  4  De  G.  M.  &  G.  9  Pearson  v.  Belchier,  4  Ves.  627,  630. 

508.  10  Corbett  v.  Corbett,  16  Ves.  407,  412. 

«  2  Chitty's  Arch.  1280.  n  Gibson  v.  McCarty,  Cas.  temp.  Hardwicke, 

1  Wagner  v.    Mears,    3    Sim.    127;  and  see  311. 

Perry  v.  Walker.  1  Coll.  229;  8  Jur.  680.  12  Perishal   v.    Squire,  1  Dick.  31;  Beanies 

8  Whitelocke  v.  Baker,  13  Ves.  511;  Wag-  on  Costs,  76;  App.  22;  but  see  Nye  v.  Maule, 

ner  v.  Mears,  3  Sim.  127 ;  Daintree  v.  Haynes,  4  M.  &  C.  342,  345. 

12  Jur.  594,  V.  C.  E.;  and  see  Perry  v.  Walker,  "  See  Thomas  v.  Ellis,  8  Ch.  D  518,  C  A., 

1  Coll.   229.  8  Jur.   680;  Burry   Port   Co.   v.  as  to  fees  already  due  when  order  obtained. 

Bowser,    5    VV.    R.   325,    V.    C.    K.;  Steele  v.  >  Braithwaite's  Pr.  563;  and  see  Wyatt's  P. 

Mott,  20  Wend.  679.     A  party  suing  as  a  poor  R.  320;  Beames's   Orders.    216,    n.   (143);  see 

person  is  chargeable   with  the  costs  of  setting  now  R.  S.  C.  1883,  Ord.  XVI.  25. 

aside  his  proceedings  for  irregularity,  or  of  a  2  Braithwaite's  Pr.  563;  and  see  Wyatt's  P. 

contempt  (Murphy  v.  Oldis,  2  Moll.  475),  or  of  R.  320;  Beames's  Orders,  216,  n.  (143);  Order 

expunging  impertinent  or  scandalous  matter,  in  as  to  Court  Fees,  28  Oct.,  1875,  r.  5. 

the  same  manner  as  other  suitors.     Richard-  8  Rules  3,  4,  and  5  of  the   36th  Gen    Order 

45 


*  44  PERSONS   BY   WHOM    A    SUIT   MAY   BE   INSTITUTED. 

admitted  to  sue  or  defend  in  forma  pauperis,  or  to  his  solicitor,  by  or 
on  behalf  of  any  other  party,  are  to  be  at  the  rate  of  one  penny-half- 
penny per  folio;  but  if  such  person  shall  become  entitled  to  receive 
dives  costs,  the  charges  for  such  copies  are  to  be  at  the  rate  of  four- 
pence  per  folio;  and  nothing  is  to  be  allowed,  on  taxation,  in  respect  of 
such  charges,  until  such  person,  or  his  solicitor,  shall  have  paid  or 
tendered  to  the  solicitor  or  party  by  whom  such  copies  were  delivered, 
the  additional  twopence-halfpenny  per  folio.  But  this  proviso  is  not 
to  apply  to  any  copy  which  shall  have  been  furnished  by  the  party 
himself  who  is  directed  to  pay  the  costs,  and  not  by  his  solicitor.4 

The  charges  for  copies  delivered  by  a  person  admitted  to  sue  or 
defend  in  forma  pauperis,  other  than  those  delivered  by  his  solicitor, 
are  to  be  at  the  rate  of  one  penny-halfpenny  per  folio.5 

relate  to  copies  of  documents  not  made  or  de-  4  Regul.  to  Ord.  Part  IV.  2. 

livered  by  the  officers  of  the  Court,  but  by  the  5  Regul.  to  Ord.  Part  IV.  2,  3.    For  more  on 

solicitors  of  other  parties  in  the  cause.  the  subject  of  Paupers,  see  post,  Chap.  IV.  §  7. 

46 


*  CHAPTER  III.  *45 

SUITS    BY   PERSONS   WHO    ARE   UNDER   DISABILITY. 
Section.  I.  —  Generally. 

The  disabilities  by  which  a  person  may  be  prevented  from  suing  may 
be  divided  into  two  sorts, — namely,  such  as  are  absolute,  and,  during 
the  time  they  last,  effectually  deprive  the  party  of  the  right  to  assert 
his  claim  ;  and  such  as  are  qualified,  and  merely  deprive  him  of  the 
power  of  suing  without  the  assistance  of  some  other  party  to  maintain 
the  suit  on  his  behalf.  Of  the  first  sort  are  the  disabilities  which  arise 
from  Alienage,  Outlawry,1  Attainder,  Conviction  of  Felony,  and  Bank- 
ruptcy;  of  the  second  sort  are  those  which  arise  from  Infancy,  Cover- 
ture, Idiocy,  and  Lunacy. 

Section  II.  —  Aliens. 

By  the  old  law  no  alien,  whether  friend  or  enemy,  could  sue  in  the 
Queen's  Courts  ;  but  the  necessity  of  trade  gradually  did  away  with  the 
too  rigorous  restraints  and  discouragements  which  formerly  existed,  and 
it  is  now  clear  that,  for  a  mere  personal  demand,  an  alien  born,  provided 
he  be  not  an  alien  enemy,  may  sue  in  the  Courts  of  this  coun- 
try.2 (a)     It  was  at  one  time  doubtful  to  what  extent  the  *  copy-       *46 

1  Outlawry  in  civil  proceedings  was  abol-  cited,  and  Evans  v.  Cassidy,  11  Irish  Eq.243; 

ished  by  42  &  43  Vic.  c.  59,  §  3.     The  disabili-  Blake  v.  Blake,  4  Irish  Eq.  349. 

tiesof  outlawry  and  excommunication  are  either  2  Ramkissenseat  v.  Barker,  1  Atk.  51;  see 

wholly  unknown  in  America,  or,  if  known  at  also    Pisani    v.    Lawson,    6   Bing.    N.    C.    90; 

all,  are  of  very  limited  local  existence.     Story,  Story,  Eq.   PI.  §§  51,  52.     An  alien  friend  is 

Eq.  PI.  §  51.     See  Roosevelt  v    Urommelin,  18  entitled    to   the    benefit,    and    subject    to    the 

John.  253;  Dilman  v.  Schultz,  5  S.  &R   36.     It  action,   of    the    insolvent    laws   of   the    State 

has  lately  been  held  in  England,  that  a  nun  is  where  he  resides.     Judd  v.  Lawrence,  1  Cush. 

neither  civilly  dead,  nor  under  any  disability  3.     In  the  Courts  of  the  United  States  he  is 

arising  from  duress   or   undue    influence.     Re  entitled  to  claim   the   same  protection  of   his 

Metcalfe,  2  De  G.  J.  &  S.  122;  10  Jur.  N.  S.  rights  as  a  citizen  is.     Taylor  v.  Carpenter,  3 

287,  L.  JJ.;  ib.  224,  M.  R.;  and  see  as  to  civil  Story,  453;  S.  C.  2  Wood".  &  M.  1 ;  Coats  v. 

death,  and  the  status  of  a  nun,  the  cases  there  Holbrook,  2  Sandf.  Ch.  586;  Byam  v.  Stevens, 


(a)  In  the  United  States,  one  alien  may  sue  Hamilton,   106  Mass.  217.    Under  the  Act  of 

another  in  a  State  Court,  when  both  are  tran-  Congress  of  Aug.  13,  1888  (25  Stat,  at  Large, 

siently  present,  upon  a  contract  made  abroad.  434),  a  U.  S.  Circuit  Court  has  no  jurisdiction 

Roberts  v.  Knights,  7  Allen,  449;  Johnston  v.  of  a  suit  by  a  citizen  of  the  district  against  an 

Trade  Ins.  Co.  132  Mass.  432.     So  an  absent  alien  who  is  temporarily  in  the  district.    Meyer 

foreigner  may  there  maintain  a  transitory  action  v.  Herrera,  41  Fed.  Rep   65.     A  foreign  consul 

against  a  citizen   of  another  State,  although  is  not  presumed  to  be  an  alien.    Bors  v.  Preston, 

service  of  process  was  made  on  a  foreign  mail-  111  U.  S.  252. 
steamer  before  reaching  her  dock.    Peabodj'  v. 

47 


47 


SUITS    BY   PERSONS   WHO    ARE   UNDER   DISABILITY. 


right  of  a  foreigner  would  be  protected ; *  but  it  was  decided  that 
where  a  foreign  author  owes  a  temporary  allegiance  by  residence  in 
England,2  or  any  part  of  the  British  dominions,8  at  the  time  of  his  first 
publication  of  the  work,  and  has  not  previously  published  it  elsewhere, 
he  is  an  author  within  the  protection  of  the  Copyright  Acts.  By  sev- 
eral recent  Acts,  a  system  of  international  copyright  has  now  been 
established.4 

The  right  of  an  alien  to  sue  in  the  English  Courts  was,  at  Common 

Law,  confined  to  cases  arising  from  personal  demands ;  for  although  an 

alien  might  trade,  and  therefore  maintain  personal  actions,  he  could  not 

maintain  either  real  or  mixed  actions, 5  because,  though  in  amity, 

*47       he  was    incapable   of   holding    real    property.6       *  Now,   by  the 

"  Naturalization  Act,  1870,"  1  real  and  personal  property  of  every 


4  Edw.  Ch.  119.     An  alien  does  not  lose  his 
right  to  sue  in  the  Courts  of  the  United  States, 
by  residing  in  one  of  the  States  of  the  Union. 
Breedlove  v.  Nicolet,  7  Peters,  413. 
i  Delondre  v  Shaw,  2  Sim.  237. 

2  Jefferys  v.  Boosey,  4  H.  L.  Cas.  815;  1 
Jur.  N.  S*  615,  overruling  S.  C.  4  Exch.  145; 
in  Exch  Ch.  6  Exch  580. 

3  Low  v.  Routledge,  L.  R.  1  Ch.  42,  11  Jur 
N  S.  939 ;  affirmed,  nom.  Routledge  v.  Low, 
L.  R.  3  H.  L.  100;  Low  v.  Ward,  L.  R.  6  Eq. 
415,  V.  C.  G. 

4  7  &  8  Vic.  c.  12.  and  15  &  16  Vic  c.  12 ,  25 
&  2G  Vic.  c  68;  26  U.  S  Stats,  at  Large,  1110, 
§  13,  Buxton  v.  James,  5  De  G.  &S.  80;  16  Jur. 
15 ;  Ollendorff  v.  Black,  4  De  G.  &  S.  209, 14  Jur. 
1080;  Cassell  v.  Stiff,  2  K.  &  J.  279;  Wood  v. 
Boosey,  L.  R.  2  Q.  B.  340 ,  affirmed,  L.  R.  3  Q 
B.  223,  Exch.  Ch. ;  Wood  v.  Chart,  Wood  v. 
Wood,  W.  N.  (1870)  118,  L.  R.  10  Eq.  193: 
Boosey  w.  Fairlie,  7  Ch .  D.  301 ;  and  see  as  to  an 
alien's  copyright  in  designs,  24  &  25  Vic.  c.  73, 
which  was  repealed,  after  Dec.  31,  1883,  by 
46  &  47  Vic.  c'57,  §  113,  Sched.  3;  see  49  & 
50  Vic.  c.  33;  Lauri  v.  Renad  (1892),  3  Ch.  402. 

6  Co.  Litt.  129  b. 

6  Co.  Litt.  2  b.  The  title  of  an  alien  friend 
to  land  purchased  by,  or  devised  to  him,  is  good 
against  everybody  but  the  State,  and  can  only 
be  divested  by  office  found,  or  by  some  act  done 
by  the  State  to  acquire  possession.  M'Creery 
v.  Allender,  4  Har.  &  M'H.  409;  Groves  v. 
Gordon,  1  Conn.  Ill;  Marshall  v.  Conrad,  5 
Call,  364;  University  v.  Miller,  3  Dev  191; 
Doe  v.  Homib)ea,  2  Hayw.  37;  Buchanan  v. 
Deshon,  1  Har.  &  G.  280,  Scanlan  v.  Wright, 
13  Pick.  523;  Jenkins  v.  Noel,  3  Stew  60;  Doe 
v.  Robertson,  11  Wheat.  322;  Dudley  v.  Gray- 
s  n,  6  Monroe,  260;  Jackson  v.  Adams,  7 
Wend.  367;  Bradstreet  v  Supervisors  &c.  13 
Wend.  546;  Wilbur  v.  Tob^y.  16  Pick.  179; 
Foss  v.  Crisp,  20  Pick.  124,  Waugh  v  Riley,  8 
Met.  295;  People  v.  Conklm,  2  Hill,  67;  Hal- 
stead  v.  Commissioners  of  Lake,  56  Ind.  363. 
An  alien  will  be  protected  in  the  possession  of 

48 


public  lands  against  trespassers.  Courtney  v. 
Turner,  12  Nev.  345.  But  not  against  one  who 
connects  himself  with  the  government  title. 
Golden  Fleece  Co.  v.  Cable  &c  Co  12  Nev.  312 
The  disability  of  aliens  to  hold  real  estate  has 
been  partially  removed  in  some  States,  and 
wholly  in  others.  See  2  Kent,  53,  54,  note; 
Mass"  Gen.  Stats,  c.  90.  §  38;  (Pub.  Stats,  c. 
126,  §  1),  Rouche  v.  Williamson,  3  Ired.  (N.  C.) 
146,  Duke  of  Richmond  v.  Miln,  17  L.  312. 
In  States  where  an  alien  cannot  hold  real 
estate,  of  course  he  cannot  maintain  ejectment; 
but  if  he  is  in  possession  of  real  property,  he 
may  maintain  trespass,  quart  clausum  /regit. 
Bayes  v.  Hogg,  1  Hayw.  485.  But  an  alien's 
right  to  sustain  an  action  for  the  recovery  of 
land  in  case  of  an  intrusion  by  an  individual  was 
maintained  in  M'Creery  v.  Allender,  4  Har.  & 
M'H.  409.  Bradstreet  v.  Supervisors  &c.  13 
Wend.  546;  Waugh  v.  Riley,  8  Met.  295;  see 
also  Scanlan  v.  Wright.  13  Pick.  523,  Jackson 
v.  Britton,  4  Wend-  507;  Jackson  ex  dem. 
Culverhouse  v.  Beach,  1  John.  Cas.  399,  Ganse- 
voort  v.  Lunn,  3  id  109;  Orser  v  Hoag,  3  Hill, 
79.  See  Lareau  v.  Davignon,  1  Buff.  N.  Y. 
Sup.  Ct.  128.  An  alien  who  holds  land  under 
a  special  law  of  a  State  may  maintain  a  suit  in 
the  Circuit  Court  of  the  United  States  relating 
to  such  land.  Bonaparte  v.  Camden  &c.  Rail- 
road Co.  1  Bald.  316;  see  Commonwealth  v. 
Andre,  3  Pick.  224. 

i  33  &  34  Vic  c.  14,  §  2;  by  §  16  of  which  Act 
power  is  given  to  the  legislatures  of  British  pos- 
sessions to  give  the  privileges  of  naturalization 
within  their  own  limits;  by  §  12  regulations 
are  made  as  to  evidence  under  the  Act;  and 
bv  §  18  the  former  Alien  Acts  (7  &  8  Vic  c  66, 
and  10  &  11  Vic  c.  83)  are  repealed.  See  as  to 
the  rights  of  descendants  of  British  subjects 
who  had  settled  abroad  before  the  Act,  Fitch  v. 
Weber,  6  Hare,  51.  See  also  Count  De  Wall's 
case,  6  Moore  P.  C  216;  12  Jur  145;  Barrow  v. 
Wadkin,  24  Beav.  327;  Rittson  v.  Stordy,  3  Sm. 
&  G.  230;  1  Jur  N.  S  771 ;  2  id  410;  De  Geer 
v.  Stone,  22  Ch.  D  243. 


ALIENS.  *  48 

description  may  be  taken,  acquired,  held,  and  disposed  of  by  an  alien  in 
the  same  manner  in  all  respects  as  by  a  natural-born  British  subject : 
and  a  title  to  real  and  personal  property  of  every  description  may  be 
derived  through,  from,  or  in  succession  to  an  alien,  in  the  same  manner 
in  all  respects  as  through,  from,  or  in  succession  to  a  natural-born 
British  subject :  subject  to  the  proviso  that  the  enactment  (1)  shall 
not  confer  any  right  on  an  alien  to  hold  real  property  situate  out  of 
the  United  Kingdom,  and  shall  not  qualify  an  alien  for  any  office  or  for 
any  municipal,  parliamentary,  or  other  franchise  ;  (2)  shall  not  enti- 
tle an  alien  to  any  right  or  privilege  as  a  British  subject,  except  such 
rights  and  privileges  in  respect  of  property  as  are  thereby  expressly 
given  to  him  ;  (3)  shall  not  qualify  an  alien  to  be  the  owner  of  a 
British  ship ;  (4)  shall  not  affect  any  estate  or  interest  in  real  or  per- 
sonal property  to  which  any  person  has  or  may  become  entitled, 
either  mediately  *  or  immediately,  in  possession  or  expectancy,  in  *48 
pursuance  of  any  disposition  made  before  the  passing  of  the  Act,1 
or  in  pursuance  of  any  devolution  by  law  on  the  death  of  any  person 
dying  before  the  passing  of  this  Act.2 

If  one  alien  sues  another  upon  a  contract  entered  into  in  a  foreign 
country,  it  would  be  contrary  to  all  the  principles  which  guide  the 
Courts  of  one  country  in  deciding  upon  contracts  made  in  another,  to 
give  a  greater  effect  to  the  contract  than  it  would  have  by  the  laws  of 
the  country  where  it  took  place  :  therefore  a  French  emigrant  resident 
in  England  was  not  permitted  to  enforce  securities  obtained  by  duress 
from  another  French  emigrant,  for  the  payment  of  a  demand  alleged  to 
be  due  from  him  under  an  obligation  entered  into  in  France  as  security 
for  another,  and  for  which,  according  to  the  laws  of  France,  his  person 
could  not  be  affected ; 8  and  upon  the  same   principle  a  writ  ne  exeat 

i  This  was  the  12th  of  Ma}',  1870.  Story  Conf.  Laws,  §  270.  et  seq. ;  De  La  Vega 

2  This  section  is  not  retrospective.     Sharp  v.  Vianna,  1  B.  &  Ad.  284;   Liverpool  Marine 

t.  St.  Sauveur,  L.  R.  7  Ch.  343,  L.  C.  Credit  Co.  v.  Hunter,  L.  R.  3  Ch.  479;  In  re 

8  Talleyrand  v.  Boulanger,  3  Ves.  447,  450.  Kloebe,  28  Ch.  D.  175.     But  the  remedy  will 

Suits    are    maintainable,   and    are    constantly  be  applied  according  to  the  law  of  the  place 

maintained,   between   foreigners   where   either  where  it  is  pursued.     A  controversy  between 

of  them  is  within  the  territory  of  the  State  in  two  foreigners,  who  are  private  citizens,  is  not 

which  the  suit  is  brought,  both  in  England  and  cognizable  in  the  Courts  of  the  United  States 

America.     Story  Conf.  Laws,  §  542.  under  the  Constitution.     See  Barrell  v.  Benja- 

In  Bnnley  v.  Avery,  Kirby,  25,  it  was  held  min,  15  Mass.  357. 
that  a  plea  in  abatement  that  both  parties  are  In  De  La  Vega  v.  Vianna,  1  B.  &  Ad.  284, 

aliens,  and  that  the  contract  declared  on  was  it  was  held  that  one  foreigner  may  arrest  an- 

made  in  a  foreign  country,  and  was  to  have  other  in  England  for  a  debt  which  accrued  in 

been  performed  there,  is  good ;  and  in  Dumous-  Portugal  while  both  resided  there,  though  the 

say  v.  Delevit,  3  Har.  &  J.  151,  an  action  of  Portuguese  law  does  not  allow  of  arrest  for 

replevin  was  held  abatable,  on  a  plea  that  both  debt;  and  Lord  Tenterden  C.  J.  remarked,  that 

parties  were  aliens,  and  the  Court  therefore  had  a  person  suing  in  England  must  take  the  law 

not  jurisdiction.     But  in  Barrell  v.  Benjamin,  as  he  finds  it,-  he  cannot,  by  virtue  of  any  regu- 

15  Mass.  354,  the  Court  were  inclined  to  the  lation  in  his  own  country,  enjoy  greater  advan- 

opinion  that  one  foreigner  may  sue   another,  tages  than  other  suitors  in   England,  and    he 

who   is   transiently  within  the  jurisdiction   of  ought   not,  therefore,  to   be   deprived    of  any 

the  Courts  of  a  State,  upon  a  contract  made  superior  advantage  which  the  law  of  this  coun- 

between  them  in  a  foreign  country.     And  see  try  may  confer.     He  is  to  have  the  same  rights 

Roberts  v.  Knight,  7  Allen,  449.    In  construing  which  all  British  subjects  are  entitled  to.     The 

such  contracts,  the  law  of  the  place  where  the}'  remedy  upon  contracts  is  governed  by  the  law 

are  made  will  be  administered.     lb.   p.  357;  of  the  place  where  the  parties  pursue  it.     See 
vol.  i.  — 4  49 


*  50  SUITS   BY   PERSONS   WHO    ARE   UNDER   DISABILITY. 

regno  was  not  granted,  where  it  appeared  that  the  transactions  between 

the  parties  were  entered  into  upon  the  faith  of  having  justice 
*49      in  the  place  where  they  respectively  resided.4    If,  *  however,  one 

of  the  parties  is  an  Englishman,  and  they  were  both  resident  in 
different  countries  at  the  time  the  contract  was  entered  into,  the  Court 
will  not  discharge  a  ne  exeat  obtained  by  the  party  resident  in  Eng- 
land, against  the  other  who  had  casually  come  there,  on  the  ground 
that,  by  the  law  of  the  country  of  which  the  other  was  a  native,  he  would 
be  exempt  from  arrest  for  a  debt  of  the  same  nature.1 

With  respect  to  alien  enemies,  it  is  clear  that  an  alien  enemy  not  resi- 
dent here,  or  resident  here  without  the  permission  of  the  government, 
cannot  institute  any  suit  whatever  in  this  country,  either  for  real  or  per- 
sonal property,  until  both  nations  be  at  peace  ; 2  and  it  is  said  that  the 
question  whether  he  is  in  amity  or  not,  should  be  tried  by  the  record, 
namely,  by  the  production  of  the  proclamation  of  war.8  It  is  to  be 
observed  that  by  the  proclamation  of  war  subjects  of  the  enemy  resident 
here  are  usually  permitted  to  continue  so,  so  long  as  they  peaceably 
demean  themselves,  so  that  such  persons  are  to  be  deemed  in  effect  alien 
friends ; 4  therefore,  where  an  alien  enemy  has  lived  here  peaceably  a 
long  time,  or  has  come  here  for  refuge  and  protection,  the  Court  will 
discountenance  a  plea  of  alienage  against  him.5  It  seems,  also,  that  a 
prisoner  of  war  may  sue  upon  a  contract  entered  into  by  him  during  the 

time  of  his  captivity.6 
*50  *  The  mere  circumstance  of  residing  in  a  foreign  country,  the 

government  of  which  is  at  war  with  this  country,  and  of  carry- 
ing on  trade  there,  is  sufficient  to  constitute  any  person  an  alien  enemy, 
even  though  he  would  not  otherwise  be  considered  in  that  character.1 

also  Whittemore  v.  Adams  2  Cowen,  626;  Will-  Exch.  135, 141,  note ;  Dean  v  Nelson,  10  Wall. 

mg  v.  Consequa,  1  Peters  C.  C.  317;   Contois  158;  10  Am.  Law  Reg.  N    S.  221,  and  note. 

v.  Carpentier,  1  Wash.  C.  C.  376;  Wyman  v.  3  Co.  Litt.  by  Harg.  &  But.  129  b.  n.  2. 

Southward,  10  Wheat.  1;  Don  v.   Lippman,  5  4  Co.  Litt.  by  Harg.  &  But.  129  b  n  3. 

CI.  &   Fin.  1;   Hinkley  v.  Moreau,  3  Mason,  5  Wyatt's  P.   R.  327;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  52, 

88;   Titus  v.  Hobart,  5  Mason,  378,   Atwater  Bradwell  v.  Weeks.  1  John.  Ch.  208;  Russell  v. 

v.  Townsend.  4  Conn.  47;    Story,  Conf.  Laws,  Skipwith,  6  Binn.  241. 

§§  568-571.    The  same  doctrine  was  maintained  6  Sparenburgh  v.  Bannatyne,  1  Bos.  &  P- 

in   Smith  v.  Spinolla,  2  John.  198.     See  also  163;  Maria  ».  Hall,  2  Bos.  &  P.  236;  1  Taunt. 

Peck  v.  Hozier,  14  John.  346;  Sicard  v.  Whale,  33;  Crawford  v.  The  William  Penn,  3  Wash. 

11  John.  194;  Talleyrand  v.  Boulanger,  3  Sum-  C.  C.  484. 

ner's  Ves.  447   note  (t).  In  many  cases  an  alien  enemy  is  entitled 

4  Robertson  v.  Wilkie,  Amb.  177;   and  see  even  to  sue  for  his  own  rights;   as    when  he 

De  Carriere  v.  De  Calonne,  4  Ves    590,  as  to  is   permitted  to   remain  in  the  country,  or  is 

granting   a  writ  of  ne  exeat  regno  against  for-  brought  here  as  a  prisoner  of  war.     He  is  rec- 

eigners.  ognized  in  our  Courts  in  his  character  as  execu- 

i  Flack  v.  Holm,  1  J.  &  W.  405,  413,  418.  tor;  and  in  all  cases  his  property  is  protected 

2  Co.  Litt.  129  b.;  6  T.  R.  23;  1  Bos.  &  P.  and  held  in  trust  for  him  until  the  return  of 

163;  3  Bos.  &  P.  113;  Alcinous  v.  Nigren,  4  El.  peace.     Bradwell  V.  Weeks,  1  John.  Ch    208, 

&  Bl.  217;  S.  C.  nom.  Alcenius  v.  Nygren,  1  Bell  v.  Chapman,  10  John.  183;  Clark  <c.  Morey, 

Jur.  N.  S.  16;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §§  51-54 ;  Mum-  10  John.  69;  Hutchinson  v.  Brock,  11  Mass. 

ford   v.   Mumford,   1    Gall.   366;    Bradwell   v.  119;   Parkinson   v.  Wentworth,   11  Mass.   26; 

Weeks,  1   John.  Ch.  208;   Crawford   v.  Wm.  Russell  v.  Skipwith.  6  Binn.  241. 

Penn,  1  Peters  C.  C.  106;  Wilcox  v.  Henry,  1  i  1    Kent,  76,  et  seq. ;   Case   of  the   Sloop 

Dall.  69:  Bell  r.  Chapman,  10  John.  183;  Hep-  Chester,   2    Dallas,    41;    Murray   v.    Schooner 

burn's  case,  3  Bland,  95;  Griswold  v.  Wadding-  Betsey,  2  Cranch,  64;   Maley  v.   Shattuck,   3 

ton,  16  John.  438;  Clemonston  v.  Blessig,  11  Cranch,  488;  Livingston  v.  Maryland  Ins.  Co. 

50 


ALIENS.  *  51 

Thus,  a  subject  of  a  neutral  State,  resident  in  a  hostile  State  in  the 
character  of  consul  of  the  neutral  State,  will,  if  he  carry  on  trade  in  the 
hostile  country,  be  considered  as  an  alien  enemy,  and  disqualified  from 
suing  in  the  Courts  of  this  country ;  although,  had  he  merely  resided 
there  in  his  diplomatic  character,  he  would  not  have  been  disqualified.2 
And  even  if  a  British  subject,  residing  in  a  foreign  State  which  is  at  war 
with  this  country,  carries  on  trade  there  without  a  license  from  the  gov- 
ernment of  this  country,  his  trading  will  be  considered  such  an  adherence 
to  the  enemy  as  to  incapacitate  him  from  maintaining  a  suit  here  ; 8 
and  although  he  be  an  ambassador,  or  other  representative  of  the  Crown 
residing  in  a  hostile  State,  yet  if  he  carries  on  trade  in  such  State  with- 
out a  license,  he  will  deprive  himself  of  the  right  to  sue  in  the  municipal 
courts  of  this  country,  because  he  is  lending  himself  to  the  purposes 
of  the  enemy  by  furnishing  him  with  resources : 4  but  if  a  subject  of 
this  country,  residing  in  a  hostile  country,  has  a  license  from  this  gov- 
ernment to  trade,  he  will  not  incur  any  disability  so  long  as  he  confines 
himself  to  the  trade  authorized  by  such  license.6 

The  disability  to  maintain  a  suit  on  account  of  alienage  extends  to 
all  cases  in  which  an  alien  enemy  is  interested,  although  his  name  does 
not  appear  in  the  transaction ; 6  thus,  it  has  been  held,  that  an  action  at 
Law  cannot  be  maintained  upon  a  policy  of  insurance  upon  the  property 
of  an  alien  enemy,  even  though  the  action  is  brought  in  the  name  of  an 
English  agent,7  and  though  it  is  alleged  that  the  alien  is  indebted 
to  the  agent  in  more  money  *  than  the  value  covered  by  the  *51 
policy.1  Where,  however,  a  certain  trading  of  an  alien  enemy 
(namely,  for  specie  and  goods  to  be  brought  from  the  enemy's  country  in 
his  ships  into  our  colonial  ports)  was  licensed,  it  was  held,  that  an  insur- 
ance on  the  enemy's  ship,  as  well  as  on  the  cargo,  was  in  furtherance  of 
the  same  policy,  which  allowed  the  granting  of  the  licenses  to  authorize 
the  trade  ;  and  that  an  action  by  an  English  agent  to  recover  the  amount 
of  the  insurance  on  the  ship,  might  be  maintained,  notwithstanding  the 
ship  belonged  to  an  enemy ;  but  it  was  held  that  the  principal  could 
not  sue  in  his  own  name.2 

The  disability  to  sue  under  which  an  alien  enemy  lies  is  personal,  and 
therefore  he  cannot,  it  seems,  institute  a  suit  for  the  purpose  of  obtain- 
ing a  discovery,  although  he  seeks  no  further  relief.8 

7  Cranch,  506;  The  Venus,  8  Cranch,  253;  The  specified  articles  to  this  country,  were  to  use 
Francis,  8  Cranch,  363;  Society  v.  Wheeler,  2  such  license  beyond  its  expression,  for  the  pur- 
Gall.  105.  pose  of  dealing  in  articles  to  which  it  has  no 

2  Albrecht  v.  Sussman,  2  V.  &  B.  323.  relation,  he  cannot  maintain  that  such  dealing 

8  M'Connell   v.   Hector,   3  Bos.  &  P.  113;  is  not  an  enemy's  dealing.     Ex  parte  Bagle- 

O'Mealey  v.  Wilson,   1  Camp.   482.     But  he  hole,  18  Ves.  529. 

may   lawfully   provide   for  the    necessities  of  6  Crawford  v.  The  William  Penn,  1  Peters 

Englishmen  detained  abroad,  and  may,  on  the  C  C.  106.     It  is  no  objection,  after  the  war, 

return   of   peace,    enforce   contracts   made   for  that  the  suit  was   originally  brought   by  the 

such  purposes.     Antoine  v.  Morshead,  6  Taunt,  plaintiff  as  trustee  for  an  alien  enemy.     Haiu- 

237;  Duhammel  v.  Pickering,  2  Stark.  92.  ersiey  v.  Lambert,  2  John.  Ch.  508. 

*  Ex  parte  Baglehole,  18  Ves.  525,  528.  *  Bristow  v.  Towers,  6  T.  R.  35. 

6  Ex  parte    Baglehole,    18   Ves.    529 ;    see  l  Brandon  v.  Nesbitt.  6  T.  R.  23. 

Crawford  v.  The  William  Penn,  3  Wash.  C.  C.  2  Kensington  8.  Inglis,  8  East,  273. 

48-1.     If  a  person  having  a  license  to  reside  in  8  Daubigny  v.  Davallon,  2  Anst.  462;  but 

a  hostile  country,  and  to  export  com  or  other  see  Albrecht  v.  Sussman,  2  V.  &  B.  324,  326, 

51 


52 


SUITS    BY   PERSONS   WHO    ARE   UNDER   DISABILITY. 


It  is  to  be  observed  that  the  right  of  an  alien  to  maintain  a  suit  relat- 
ing to  a  contract  is  only  suspended  by  war  if  the  contract  was  entered 
into  previously  to  the  commencement  of  the  war,  and  it  may  be  enforced 
upon  the  restoration  of  peace.4  Upon  this  principle,  in  bankruptcy,  the 
proof  of  a  debt  due  to  an  alien  enemy,  upon  a  contract  made  before  the 
war  broke  out,  was  admitted,  reserving  the  dividend.8  But  no  suit  can 
be  sustained  to  enforce  an  obligation  arising  upon  a  contract  entered  into 

with  an  alien  enemy  during  war,  such  contract  being  absolutely 
*52       void.6    And  where  a  policy  of  insurance,  *  on  behalf  of  French 

subjects  was  entered  into  just  before  the  commencement  of  the 
war,  upon  which  a  loss  was  sustained  in  consequence  of  capture  by  a 
British  ship,  after  hostilities  had  commenced,  the  proof  of  a  debt  arising 
from  such  policy,  which  had  been  admitted  by  the  commissioner  in  bank- 
ruptcy, was  ordered  to  be  expunged.1 

A  defence  on  the  ground  that  the  plaintiff  is  an  alien  enemy,  should 
be  made  by  plea  before  answer.  Thus,  where  a  bill  was  filed  by  a 
plaintiff  residing  in  a  foreign  country  at  war  with  this,  for  a  commission 
to  examine  witnesses  there,  and  the  defendant  put  in  an  answer,  an 
application  for  an  order  for  the  commission  was  granted ;  though  it  was 
objected  that  the  Court  ought  not  to  grant  a  commission  to  an  enemy's 

327.   An  alien  friend  mav  maintain  a  bill  for      Courts  held  that  the  contract  was  merely  sus- 


discovery  in  aid  of  a  suit  in  a  foreign  country, 
2  Story,"  Eq.  Jur.  §  1495;  Mitchell  v.  Smith,  1 
Paige,  287;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  53  in  note.  But 
see  Reimer  v.  Salisbury,  2  Ch.  D.  378.  Infra, 
1556,  note. 

4  Alcinous  v.  Nigren,  4  El.  &  Bl.  217 ;  S.  C. 
nom.  Alcenius  v.  Nygren,  1  Jur.  N.  S.  16; 
Flindt  t\  Waters,  15  East,  280;  Hamilton  v. 
Eaton,  2  Marsh.  C.  C.  1;  Buchanan  v.  Curry, 
19  John.  137;  Clemontson  v.  Blessig,  11  Exch. 
135,  141,  note;  Hamersley  v.  Lambert,  2  John. 
Ch.  508;  Bradwell  v.  Weeks,  1  John.  Ch. 
206.  And  in  Massachusetts  the  statutes  of 
limitation  of  personal  actions  are  expressly 
suspended  in  favor  of  an  alien  during  war. 
Gen.  Stats,  c.  155,  §  8;  Pub.  Stats,  c.  197,  §  10. 
See  Hopkirk  v.  Bell,  3  Cranch,  454.  A  plea 
that  the  plaintiff  was  an  alien  enemy  is  suf- 
ficiently answered  by  a  treaty  of  peace,  made 
after  the  plea  was  filed.  Johnson  ;*.  Harrison, 
6  Litt.  226.  The  Court  will  take  notice  of  the 
fact,  though  the  plaintiff  do  not  reply  to  it.  Ibid. 
Treaties  with  foreign  nations  are  part  of  the 
law  of  the  land,  of  which  the  Courts  are  bound 
to  take  notice.  Baby  v.  Dubois,  1  Blackf.  255. 
The  effect  of  the  late  Civil  War  upon  con- 
tracts of  life  insurance  came  frequently  before 
the  Courts,  and  resulted  in  conflicting  decisions. 
Some  of  the  Courts  held  that  the  contracts 
between  citizens  of  the  rebellious  States  and 
insurance  companies  of  the  loyal  States  were 
annulled  by  the  war.  Dillard  v.  Manhattan 
Life  Ins.  Co.  44  Ga.  171;  Tait  v.  N.  Y. 
Life  Ins.  Co.  1  Flippin,  288;  4  Rig.  Cas. 
479;  Worthington  v.  Charter  Oak  Life 
Ins.   Co.  41    Conn.   372.    A  majority  of  the 

52 


pended  by  the  war.  Robinson  v.  International 
Life  Ins.  Co.  42  N.  Y.  54;  Cohen  v.  Mutual 
Life  Ins.  Co.  50  N.  Y.  610;  Manhattan  Life 
Ins.  Co.  v.  Warwick,  20  Graft.  614;  N.  Y.  Life 
Ins.  Co.  v,  Clopton,  7  Bush,  174;  Hilliard  v. 
Mutual  Benefit  Life  Ins.  Co.  37  N.  J.  L. 
444.  In  Smith  v.  Charter  Oak  Life  Ins.  Co.  1 
Cent.  L.  J.  76  (Mo.),  and  Hancock  v.  N.  Y.  Life 
Ins.  Co.  13  Am.  L.  Reg.  N.  S.  103;  4  Big.  Cas. 
488  (Va.),  the  assured  were  allowed  the  value 
of  the  policy,  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war, 
subsequent  premiums  having  been  tendered  to 
an  agent  in  the  Confederate  States.  In  New 
York  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Statham,  93  U.  S.  24,  the 
U.  S.  Supreme  Court  held  that  the  contract  was 
terminated  by  the  war,  but  gave  the  assured 
the  equitable  value  of  the  policy  at  that 
date.  In  Crawford  v.  ./Etna  Life  Ins.  Co.  (5 
Cent.  L.  J.  100,  and  note)  the  Supreme  Court 
of  Tennessee  allowed  the  assured  the  value  of  a 
paid-up  policy  on  the  day  of  the  involuntary 
cessation  of  payments. 

5  Ex  parte  Boussmaker,  13  Ves.  71. 

6  Ibid.;  see  Exposito  v.  Bowden,  in  Ex.  Ch. 
7  El.  &  Bl.  779;  5  W  R.  732,  as  to  the  dissolu- 
tion of  contracts  by  a  declaration  of  war. 

i  Ex  parte  Lee,  13  Ves.  64.  The  principle 
upon  which  this  case  was  decided  is  fully 
stated  by  Lord  Ellenborough  in  Brandon  v. 
Curling,  4  East,  410,  where  it  is  laid  down  as  a 
rule  that  every  insurance  on  alien  property  by 
a  British  subject  is  with  this  implied  exception, 
''that  it  shall  not  extend  to  cover  any  loss  hap- 
pening during  the  existence  of  hostilities  be- 
tween the  respective  countries  of  the  assured 
and  assurer." 


ALIENS.  *  53 

country,  the  Court  being,  as  it  seems,  of  opinion  that  the  objection  had 
come  too  late.2 

It  does  not  appear  what  would  be  the  effect  of  a  war  breaking  out 
between  the  country  of  the  plaintiff  and  this  country,  after  the  com- 
mencement of  the  suit ;  but,  from  analogy  to  what  was  formerly  the 
practice  of  the  Court  with  regard  to  outlawry,  namely,  that  if  it  is  not 
pleaded  it  may  be  shown  to  the  Court  on  the  hearing,  as  a  peremptory 
matter  against  the  plaintiff's  demands,  because  it  shows  the  right  to  the 
thing  to  be  in  the  Queen,3  it  is  probable  that,  under  such  circumstances, 
the  proceedings  would  be  stayed.4  (a) 

It  appears  to  be  the  essence  of  a  plea  that  the  plaintiff  is  an  alien 
enemy,  to  state  that  the  plaintiff  was  born  out  of  the  liegance  of  the 
Queen,  and  within  the  liegance  of  a  State  at  war  with  us  ;  and  that  a 
defence  containing  words  which  amount  in  substance  to  an  allegation  of 
these  facts,  will  be  sufficient,  although  they  are  not  averred  with 
the  same  strictness  that  is  required  by  the  rules  of  *  law.1  *53 

It  is  to  be  observed  that  the  Courts  here  take  notice,  without 
proof,  of  a  war  in  which  this  country  is  engaged ;   but  a  war  between 
foreign  countries  must  be  proved.2 

In  all  cases  where  a  person  is  permitted  to  sue  in  Equity,  if  he  states 
himself  in  his  bill  to  be  resident  abroad,  or  if  it  comes  to  the  knowledge 
of  the  defendant  that  he  is  actually  so,  the  defendant  may  obtain  an 
order  of  the  Court  that  the  plaintiff  shall  give  security  to  answer  to  the 
defendant  the  costs  of  the  suit.8  The  practice  with  respect  to  this  rule 
has  been  before  stated,4  and  is  applicable  to  aliens  and  foreigners  as  well 
as  to  natural  born  subjects.5  It  seems  that  an  alien  resident  in  this  coun- 
try will  not  be  required  to  give  security  for  costs,  although  his  residence 
here  is  merely  temporary,  and  for  the  purpose  of  carrying  on  the  suit.6 

3  ?!;"* '  SpPheS  ^  VeS'  335<  8fter  jUdsment'  the  Co»rt  ™"  n^  on  motion, 

Gilb.  For.  Bom  53  stay  or   set  aside  the   execution.     Buckley  v. 

«  Story    Eq.  PI.  §  54.    If  the  pla.nt.ff  be-  Lyttle,  10  John.  117.     See  Owens  v.  Haniiev, 

comes  an  alien  enemy  after  the  commencement  9  Cranch    180  " 

of  the  suit,  the  defendant  may  plead  it.    Bell  1  Dau'bigny  v.  Davallon,  2  Anst.  462,  468. 

£  Chapman,  10  John.  18-3.    But  as  the  d.sa-  2  DoIder  „  Lord  Hunt;n'gfield>  „  y^  20,. 

bility   is  merely  temporary,  if  the  suit   is  not  and  Bee  Alcinoua  r.   Ni-ren   4  El   &  Bl   217- 

abated    during   the    war    it  is    no   objection  S.  C.  nam.  Alcenius  v.  Nvgren.  1  Jn'r.  N.  S.  17.' 
afte.    the  war  that  the  plaintiff  was   an   alien  8  Meliorucchvr.  Meliorucchv  2  Ves  Sr  24  ; 

enemy    when    the    suit  was   brought.    Ham-  Green  ,.  Charnock,  1   Ves.  Jr.  396:   Hobv  • 

ereleyr.  Lambert,  2  John.  Ch.  508.     The  effect  Hitchcock    H  V-  mo.    Q  -i  w     "°'\\'- 

„f  n,„  „i  „    t    1:  •  j  r  niuncock,  &    Ves.  699     Seilaz  v.  Hanson,   lb. 

of  the  plea  of  alien  enemy  ,s  not  to  defeat  the  261 .   Drever  ,   MaiulpsIev   &  Ruga   n 
process ,  entirely,  but  to  suspend  it.     Hutchin-  4  See  ante,  pp.  27-37." 

son  v.  Brock,  11  Mass.  119;  Parkinson  v.  Went-  5p.„,m      '       .    ,      ,.  ...      .. 

w-nrth    11  Mo  «,  o«     t„   ■  t     1  ''°r  m'Te  as  to  trading  with  alien  enemies, 

worth.  11  Ma-^s.  26     Levine  v.  Tavlor,  12  Mass.  co„  ti,«  n™~  t.  a    .    t %    ■»*        t         -,- 

o    11  1         1       ui  ..  a.  t-  l     Vv,  see    "'e  Hoop,  ludor  s  L.  C.  Merc.  Law,  787- 

8;  llamersleyt'.  Lambert,  2  John.  Ch. 508.  g13  ■  ' 

Where  the  plaintiff  becomes  an  alien  enemy  6  Cambottie  ?•.  Inngate,  1  W.  R.  533   V.  C. 

{(i)  In  such  case,  the  proceedings  should  be  Howard,  18   Wall.   99;  McNair  r    Toler    21 

continued,  and  not  dismissed.    Ex  parte  Bouss-  Minn.  175.     He  mav  be  bound,  like'  other  non- 

"T1"  ^f8'  U>  Faulkland  v.  Stanion,  12  residents,  hv  notice  bv  publication.  University 

Mod.   400;  Elgee    v.   Lovell,   1   Woolw.    102;  v.    Finch,    18    Wall.  'l06;    Lee    v    Rogers     2 

Levine  o.Taylor,  12  Mass.  8 ;  Kershaw  v.  Kelsey,  Sawyer,  549 ;  Sevmour  v.  Railev,  06  111    288 ; 

100  Mass.  561,  563 ;  Bishop  r.  Jones.  28  Texas,  Selden  v.  Preston,  1 1  Bush.  191  j  see  Ludlow  v. 

294;  cmtra,  Howes  v.  Chester,  33  Ga.  89.     An  Ramsey,  11  Wall.  581;  Horsey  v.  Thompson, 

al.en  enemy  may  be  sued,  and  is  entitled  to  all  37  Md   25     He  cannot  defend;  on  the  pround 

he   usual   means    of    defence.      McVeigh   v.  that  he  is  an  alien  enemv.     Horsey  v.  Kyle,  30 

united  States,   11   Wall.   259;    Masterson   v.  Md.  512;  see  Herbert  v.  Rowles.  id.  271." 

53 


*  54  SUITS   BY   PERSONS   WHO    ARE   UNDER   DISABILITY. 


Section  III.  —  Persons  attainted  or  convicted. 

Formerly,  after  judgment  of  outlawry,  or  of  death,  in  a  prosecution 
for  treason  or  felony,  the  criminal  was  said  to  be  attainted,  attinctus,  or 
blackened,7  and  became  incapable  of  maintaining  a  suit  in  any  Court  of 
justice,  either  civil  or  criminal,8  unless  for  the  purpose  of  procuring 
a  reversal  of  his  attainder.9  He  also  incurred  a  forfeiture  of  all  his 
property,  real  and  personal,  and  was  disqualified  from  holding  any 
which  he  might  in  future  acquire,  either  by  descent,  purchase,  or  con- 
tract ; 10  but  since  July  4,  1870,11  no  confession,  verdict,  inquest, 
*54  conviction,  or  judgment,  *  of  or  for  any  treason  or  felony,  or  felo 
de  se,  causes  any  attainder  or  corruption  of  blood,  or  any  forfei- 
ture or  escheat ;  the  law  of  forfeiture  consequent  upon  outlawry  is, 
however,  not  affected.1  No  suit  for  the  recovery  of  any  property, 
debt,  or  damage  whatsoever  can  be  brought  by  any  convict 2  against  any 
person  while  he  is  subject  to  the  operation  of  the  Act,8  and  every  con* 
vict  is  incapable,  during  such  time,  of  alienating  or  charging  any  prop- 
erty, or  of  making  any  contract ;  but  these  disabilities  are  suspended 
whilst  he  may  be  lawfully  at  large  under  any  license.4 

With  respect  to  the  forfeiture  of  real  estates  by  attainder,  there  was 
a  distinction  between  attainders  for  treason  and  for  felony.  By 
attainder  for  treason,  a  man  forfeited  all  estates  of  inheritance,  whether 
fee-simple  or  fee-tail,  and  all  rights  of  entry  on  lands  or  tenements 
which  he  had  at  the  time  of  the  offence  committed,  or  at  any  time  after- 
wards, and  also  the  profits  of  all  lands  and  tenements  which  he  had  in 
his  own  right,  for  life  or  years,  so  long  as  such  interest  subsisted  ; 6  but 

\V. ;  Redondo    v.  Chaytor,   4  Q.   B.    D.    453,  son,    W.    N.    (1871)    161;    25    W.    R.     768, 

C.  A.;  and  see  Ainsley  v.  Sims,  17  Beav.  57;  V.  C  H. 

17  Jur.  657;  Swanzy  v.  Swanzy,  4  K.&  J.  237;  in  Bullock  v.  Dodds,  2  B.  &  Aid.  277. 

4  Juv.  N.  S.  1013.  u  The  date  on  which  ttie  33  &  34  Vic.  c.  23 

'  4  Bla.  Com.  381.  received  the  royal  assent. 

8  See  as  to  pleading  convictions,  Ld.  Red.  l  33  &  34  Vic.  c.  23,  §  1. 

229  ;  Buck  v.  Brown,  2  Atk.  399;  Fall   r. ,  2  The  word   "convict"  means  any  person 

May,  1782,  Ld.  Red.  233.  against  whom,  after  the   passing  of  the   Act 

9  Ex  parte  Bullock,  14  Ves.  452.  464.  A  (i.  e.,  4th  July,  1870).  judgment  of  death,  or  of 
person  attainted  under  the  Act  of  New  York,  penal  servitude,  has  been  pronounced  or  re- 
1799,  is  considered  as  civiliter  mortuus.  Jack-  corded  by  any  Court  of  competent  jurisdiction 
son  r.  Catlin,  2  John.  248.  One  attainted  un-  in  England,  Wales,  or  Ireland,  upon  any  charge 
der  the  Act  cannot  sustain  an  action  for  rent  of  treason  or  felony.  33  &  34  Vic  c.  23,  §  6. 
due  to  him  previous  to  the  passing  of  the  Act,  8  The  convict  ceases  to  be  subject  to  the 
or  make  it  a  set-off  in  an  action  by  his  lessee,  operation  of  the  Act  when  he  dies  or  becomes 
Sleglit  v.  Kade,  2  John.  236.  bankrupt,   or  has  suffered  any  punishment  to 

A  plea  of  attainder  is  of  rare  occurrence,  and  which  sentence  of  death  pronounced  or  re- 
a  plea  of  this  sort  in  Equity  would  probably  corded  against  him  has  been  lawfully  com- 
be construed  with  the  same  strictness  as  the  muted,  or  has  undergone  the  full  term  of  penal 
like  plea  is  at  Law.  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  723.  In  servitude  for  which  judgment  has  been  pro- 
England,  he  was  not  disqualified  from  holding  nounced  or  recorded  against  him,  or  such  other 
such  land,  stock,  or  choses  in  action  as  he  holds  punishment  as  may  have  been  duly  substituted 
as  a  trustee  or  mortgagee;  see  13  &  14  Vic.  for  such  full  term,  or  has  received  a  pardon  for 
c.  60,  §  46;  and  see,  before  the  Act,  Ex  parte  the  treason  or  felony  of  which  he  has  been  con- 
Tyson,  1  Jur.  472  ;  nor  lands  of  which  he  victed.  33  &  34  V.c.  c.  23,  §  7. 
is'  only  equitable  owner.  Att.-Gen.  v.  Sands,  *  33  &  34  Vic.  c.  23,  §§  8,  30. 
Hardres.  488;  Tudor,  R.  Prop.  760-796.  A  6  4  Bla.  Com.  381.  Descent  maybe  traced 
power  of  revocation  imperfectly  executed  by  through  a  person  attainted  since  1833;  see  3& 
a  felon  has   been   aided      Mainprice  v    Pear-  4  Will.  IV.  c.  106.  §  10. 

54 


PERSONS    ATTAINTED    OR   CONVICTED.  *  55 

with  respect  to  the  attainder  for  felony,  the  54  Geo.  III.  c.  145  enacted 
that,  except  in  cases  of  high  treason,  petit  treason,  and  murder  or  abetting 
the  same,  no  attainder  should  extend  to  the  disinheriting  any  heir,  or 
to  the  prejudice  of  the  right  or  title  of  any  person,  except  the  offender 
during  his  life  only  ;  and  upon  the  death  of  the  offender,  every  person  to 
whom  the  right  or  interest  of  any  lands  or  tenements  should  or  might, 
after  the  death  of  such  offender,  have  appertained,  if  no  such  attainder 
had  been,  might  enter  thereupon.6 

The  forfeiture  of  real  estate,  consequent  upon  attainder  of  treason  or 
felony,  related  backwards  to  the  time  of  the  treason  or  felony  com- 
mitted, so  as  to  avoid  all  intermediate  sales  or  incumbrances,  but  not 
those  before  the  fact.7  The  forfeiture  of  goods  and  chattels 
*  had,  however,  no  relation  backwards;  so  that  those  only  which  *55 
a  man  had  at  the  time  of  conviction  were  forfeited.1  But  by  attain- 
der, not  only  all  the  personal  property  and  rights  of  action  which  a  man 
actually  had  were  forfeited,  but  all  personal  property  and  rights  of  action 
which  accrued  to  the  offender  after  attainder  were  forfeited  and  vested 
in  the  Crown,  without  office  found ; 2  so  that  attainder  might  be  well 
pleaded  in  bar  to  an  action  on  a  bill  of  exchange  indorsed  to  the  plaintiff 
after  his  attainder.8  Lands  also  were  forfeited  upon  attainder,  and  not 
before ;  but  goods  and  chattels  were  forfeited  upon  conviction.4  In  out- 
lawries for  treason  or  felony,  lands  were  forfeited  only  by  judgment,  but 
goods  and  chattels  were  forfeited  by  a  man's  being  put  in  the  exigent.5  (a) 

If  a  party  claiming  a  title  to  property  under  an  attainted  person  were 
to  institute  proceedings  in  a  Court  of  justice  relating  to  that  property, 
his  claim  might  be  met  by  pleading  the  attainder  of  the  person  from 
whom  his  claim  was  derived ; 6  and  in  such  case  the  time  when  the  for- 
feiture accrued  might  be  an  important  point  for  consideration. 

With  respect  to  such  felonies  as  were  not  punishable  with  death,  the 
felon  on  conviction  forfeited  his  civil  rights  ;  but  the  punishment  endured 
had  the  like  effect  and  consequences  as  a  pardon  under  the  Great  Seal, 7 
and  restored  the  offender  to  his  civil  rights,  on  the  determination  of  the 
period  of  punishment.8 


«  54  Geo.  III.  c.  14a.     All  copyhold  estates  Dodds,  2  B.  &  Aid.  258;  Chowne  v.  Baylis,  31 

were  forfeited  to  the  lord,  and  not  to  the  Crown,  Beav.   351;  Saunders  v.  Warton,  9  Jur.  N.  S. 

unless  there  was  an  Act  of  Parliament  or  an  570,  V.  C.  S. 

express  custom  to    the  contrary,  1  Watk.  on  2  Office  found  was  aholished  hy  22  &  23  Vic. 

Copy.   326,  1  Cruise's  Dig  307;  and  the  for-  c.  21,  §  25. 

feiture  in  such  case  did  not  accrue  upon  mere  8  Bullock  p.  Dodds,  2  B.  &  Aid.  258. 

conviction,    but  only  on    complete   attainder,  *  4  Bla.  Com.  387;   Perkins  v.  Bradley,  1 

3  B.  &  Aid.  510,  2  Vent.  38;  unless  by  special  Hare,  219. 

custom  to  the  contrary.  5  4  Bla.  Com.  387;  see  also  33  &  34  Vic.  c. 

7  4  Bla.  Com.  381-6;  Tudor,  R.  Prop.  792.  23,  §  1. 

1  4  Bla.  Com.  387;  Perkins  P.  Bradley,  1  6  Ld.  Red.  232. 

Hare,  219,  228.  But  a  colorable  alienation  to  7  9  Geo.  IV.  c.  32,  §  3. 

avoid  a  forfeiture  would  be  void  as  against  the  8  See  Williams,  Pers.  Prop.  44;   and  post, 

Crown.     S.  C.  1  Hare,  227;  and  see  Bullock  v.  p.  58. 


(a)  A  conviction  in  New  South  Wales  causes  a  forfeiture  of  the  felon's  property  in  England. 
Re  Bateman's  Trust,  L.  R.  15  Eq.  355. 

5o 


57 


SUITS   BY   PERSONS   WHO    ARE   UNDER   DISABILITY. 


Forfeiture  of  land  only  arose  on  attainder ; 9  and  therefore,  in  the  case 
of  a  felony  not  capital,  the  offender,  though  convicted,  might  convey  or 

create  a  valid  trust  of  his  real  estate,10  and  might  dispose  thereof 
*56      by  will.11    But  all  the  personal  property  possessed  by  *  him  at  the 

time  of  his  conviction,1  or  which  afterwards  accrued  to  him,  before 
the  term  of  punishment  expired,  was  forfeited  to  the  Crown,2  including 
personal  property  held  in  trust  for  him,3  and  a  vested  interest,  in  remain- 
der, in  the  proceeds  of  land  actually  converted ; 4  but  not  a  contingent 
legacy,  where  the  event  on  which  the  contingency  depended  did  not  hap- 
pen till  after  the  punishment  had  been  endured ;  5  nor  a  vested  interest, 
in  remainder,  in  land  directed  to  be,  but  not  actually  converted.6 

An  administrator  of  the  property  of  any  convict  may  be  appointed  by 
the  Crown.  The  appointment  is  revocable,  and  upon  his  death,  or  revo- 
cation of  his  appointment,  a  new  administrator  may  be  appointed,  who 
will  be  the  successor  in  Law  of  the  former  administrator ;  and  all  prop- 
erty vested  in,  and  powers  given  to,  the  former  administrator  devolve 
upon  and  vest  in  the  new  administrator,  who  is  bound  by  all  the  acts  of 
the  former  administrator.7 

Upon  the  appointment  of  the  administrator,  all  the  real  and  personal 
property,  including  choses  in  action,  to  which  the  convict  is,  at  the  time 
of  his  conviction,  or  becomes,  whilst  subject  to  the  Act,  entitled  (except 
property  acquired  by  him  while  at  large  under  any  license  s),  vests  in 
the  administrator,9  who  has  absolute  power  to  deal  therewith.10  The 
convict,  or  any  person  claiming  an  interest  in  the  property,  cannot  call 
in  question  any  acts  bona  fide  done  by  the  administrator;11  and,  subject 
to  the  powers  and  provisions  of  the  Act,  the  property  is  to  be  preserved 
and  held  in  trust  by  the  administrator,  and  on  the  convict  ceasing  to 
be  subject  to  the  Act,  is  to  revert  to  him,  his  heirs,  executors,  or 
administrators.12    If  no  administrator  is  appointed,  an  interim  curator, 

who  has  in  general  the  same  power  as  the  administrator,  may  be 
*57      appointed,  *and  from  time  to  time  removed  j1  and  all  judgments 

and  orders  for  payment  of  money  may  be  executed  against  the 


9  See  Re  Harrap,  3  Drew.  726. 

10  Lewin  on  Trusts,  27. 

n  1  Jarm.  Wills,  33,  2  Prideaux,  Conv.  268. 
i  No  forfeiture,  however,  followed  conviction 
under  the  10  &  11  Vic.  c.  82,  §  12;  13  &  14 
Vic.  c.  37;  or  18  &  19  Vie.  c.  126.  By  6  &  7 
Vic.  c.  7,  §  3,  convicts  holding  tickets  of  leave 
are  enabled  to  hold  personal  property,  and  to 
maintain  actions  in  respect  thereof,  while  their 
tickets  remain  unrevoked. 

2  4  Bla.  Com.  387;  Roberts  v.  Walker,  1  R. 
&  M.  752. 

3  Lewin  on  Trusts,  695. 

4  Re  Thompson,  22  Beav.  506. 

5  Stokes  v.  Holden,  1  Keen,  145,  153:  Re 
Davis's  Trusts,  27  L.  T.  477. 

6  Re  Thompson,  22  Beav.  506,  where  land 
having  been  taken  under  the  powers  of  a  local 
Act,  it  was  held  that  the  felon  was  entitled  to 
the  fund  representing  it  as  realty. 

56 


7  33  &  34  Vic.  c.  23,  §  9. 

8  33  &  34  Vic.  c.  23,  §  30. 

9  33  &  34  Vic.  c  23,  §  10. 

1°  33  &  34  Vic.  c.  23,  §  12.  The  administra- 
tor may  pay  out  of  the  property  the  costs  of 
the  prosecution  and  of  executing  the  Act 
(§  13),  and  the  debts  and  liabilities  of  the  con- 
vict, and  may  deliver  any  property  coming  to 
his  hands  to  any  person  entitled  to  it  (§  13) ;  and 
may  out  of  the  property  make  compensation  to 
any  person  defrauded  by  the  criminal  or  fraudu- 
lent acts  of  the  convict  (§  15). 

11  33  &  34  Vic.  c.  23,  §  17. 

12  33  &  34  Vic.  c.  23,  §  18.  Unless  other- 
wise ordered,  the  costs  as  between  solicitor  and 
client,  and  the  charges  and  expenses  of  the 
administrator  incurred  in  reference  to  the  prop- 
erty, are  a  first  charge  thereon ;  33  &  34  Vic.  c- 
23,"  §20. 

i  33  &  34  Vic.  c.  23,  §§  21-26. 


PERSONS   ATTAINTED    OR   CONVICTED.  *  58 

property  in  the  hands  of  the  interim  curator,  or  of  any  person  who  may 
have,  without  legal  authority,  taken  possession  of  the  property  of  the 
convict;2  and  all  judgments  or  orders  may  be  executed  by  writ  of  scire 
facias  or  otherwise  against  property  vested  in  the  administrator.8 

Proceedings  may  be  taken  by  summons  to  make  any  administrator 
or  interim  curator  account,  before  the  property  reverts  to  the  convict ;  * 
and,  subject  to  the  provisions  of  the  Act,  the  administrator  or  interim 
curator  is  liable,  when  the  convict  ceases  to  be  subject  to  the  Act,  to 
account  for  all  property  received  by  him.5 

Conviction  is  taken  advantage  of  by  plea,  and  it  seems  that  such  a 
plea  would  be  judged  with  the  same  strictness  as  if  it  were  a  plea  at 
Law.6 

In  order  to  bar  a  plaintiff's  suit  on  the  ground  of  an  offence  committed, 
it  is  not  always  necessary  to  show  an  attainder  or  conviction ;  for  if  a 
plea  goes  to  show  that,  in  consequence  of  an  offence  committed,  no  title 
ever  vested  in  the  plaintiff,  conviction  of  the  offence  is  not  essential  to 
the  plea.7 

Where  a  judgment,  pronounced  upon  a  conviction  for  treason  or  felony, 
is  falsified  or  reversed,  all  former  proceedings  are  absolutely  set  aside  ; 
and  the  party  stands  as  if  he  had  never  been  accused ; 8  he  may,  there- 
fore, sue  in  a  Court  of  Equity,  in  the  same  manner  that  he  might  have 
done  if  no  conviction  had  taken  place. 

The  disqualification  arising  from  a  conviction  may  also  be  obviated 
by  the  Queen's  pardon  ;  or  by  enduring  the  punishment  imposed.9  A 
pardon  formerly  could  only  have  been  granted  under  the  Great  Seal ; 
but  now,  a  warrant  under  the  Royal  sign  manual,  countersigned  by  one 
of  the  Principal  Secretaries  of  State,  granting  a  free  pardon  and  the 
prisoner's  discharge  under  it,  or  a  conditional  pardon,  and  the  perform- 
ance of  such  condition,  is  as  effectual  as  a  pardon  under  the  Great 
Seal.10 

There  is  a  great  difference  between  the  effect  of  a  pardon  and  of  a 
reversal.  In  the  case  of  a  reversal,  the  party  is,  as  we  have  seen,  in  all 
respects  replaced  in  the  same  condition  that  he  was  in  before  the  com- 
mencement of  the  proceedings  ;  but  a  pardon  has  not  that  effect.11  Thus, 
a  person  who  has  been  convicted  and  pardoned  cannot  sue  upon  any 
right  accrued  to  him  before  his  pardon,  although  he  may  for  a  right 
accrued  afterwards.12 

*Where  a  pardon  is  conditional,  the  effect  of  the  conviction  is  *58 
not  removed  until  the  condition  has"  been  performed  ;  and  a  felon 

2  As  to  enforcing  decrees  and  orders,  see  case  of  a  capital  felony,  enduring  the  punish- 
post.  Chap.  XXVI.  ment  did  not  have  the  effect  of  a  pardon  ;  see 

3  33  &  34  Vic.  c.  23,  §  27.  See  2  Chitty's  9  Geo.  IV.  c.  32,  §  3.  See,  as  to  effect  of 
Arch.  934,  935.  pardon,    Armstrong's   Foundry,    6  Wall.  766; 

i  33  &  34  Vic.  c.  23,  §  28.  Lapeyra  v.  United  States,  17  Wall.  191 ;  Car- 

5  33  &  34  Vic.  c.  23,  §  29.  lisle  v.   United  States,   16  Wall.  147.     Pardon 

6  Ld.  Red.  229  ;  and  see  Burk  v.  Brown,  2  may  be  conditional.  Ex  parte  Wells,  18  How. 
Atk.  397.  307*. 

7  Fall  v. ,  May,  1782,  Ld.  Red.  233.  i°  6  Geo.  IV.  c.  25,  §  1  ;  7  &  8  Geo.  IV.  c. 

8  4  Bla.  Com.  393."  28,  §  13. 

9  33  &  34  Vic.  c.  23,  §  7  ;  see  Leyman  v.         «  4  Bla.  Com.  402. 

Latimer,  3  Ex.  D.  15,  352.    Formerly  in  the         12  1  Com.  Dig.  Abatement,  E.  3. 

57 


*58 


SUITS   BY   PERSONS   WHO    ARE   UNDER   DISABILITY. 


who  had  been  sentenced  to  transportation  1  was  not  restored  to  his  civil 
rights  until  the  term  of  his  transportation  had  expired,2  and  therefore  it 
was  held  that  personal  property  which  did  not  belong  to  a  felon  at  the 
time  of  his  conviction,  but  which  accrued  to  him  afterwards  during  the 
time  of  his  transportation,  was  forfeited  to  the  Crown.3 

Sectiox  IV.  —  Bankrupts  and  Liquidating  and  Compounding  Debtors. 

The  disability  to  maintain  a  suit  on  account  of  bankruptcy  arises  from 
a  bankrupt  not  being  capable  of  holding  the  property  which  is  the  object 
of  the  suit,  or  rather  from  the  fact  that,  by  the  bankruptcy,  all  the  bank- 
rupt's property,  whether  in  possession  or  action,  is  vested  in  the  trustee 
of  his  property ; 4  and  a  bankrupt,  even  though  undischarged,  is  not  per- 
sonally disqualified  from  suing,  and  may,  in  many  cases,  sustain  suits 
either  at  Law  or  in  Equity,5 (a)  —  as,  for  instance,  to  restrain  a  nuisance, 


i  Under  8  Geo.  III.  c.  15. 

2  Bullock  v.  Dodds,  2  B.  &  Aid.  258  ;  and 
9ee  4  Bla.  Com.  400;  Gully's  case,  Leach's 
Crown  Law,  99.  As  to  the  remission  of  trans- 
portation, see  5  Geo.  IV.  c.  84,  §  26  ;  Gough  v. 
Davies,  2  K.  &  J.  623  ;  and  as  to  remission  by 
colonial  governors,  see  now  6  &  7  Vic.  c.  7. 

s  Roberts  v.  Walker,  1  R.  &  M.  752,  766. 
Transportation  is  abolished  by  20  &  21  Vic.  c. 
3,  and  penal  servitude  substituted  by  16  &  17 
Vic.  c.  99  ;  and  see  27  &  28  Vic.  c.  47. 

*  By  the  Bankrupt  Act,  1869  (32  &  33  Vic. 
c.  71),  §  17,  the  property  of  the  bankrupt  is, 
immediately  upon  the  adjudication,  to  vest  in 
the  Registrar,  and  is,  on  the  appointment  of  a 
trustee,  forthwith  to  pass  to  and  vest  in  the 
trustee.  A9  to  the  appointment  of  trustee,  see 
§  14.  As  to  release  of  trustee,  see  §§  51-53  ; 
as  to  death  and  removal  of  trustee  and  suits  by 
and  against  him,  see  §  83.  As  to  liquidation 
by  arrangement,  see  §  125.  As  to  composition 
with  creditors,  see  §§  126,  127.  See  also  the 
Liquidation  Act,  1868  (31  &  32  Vic.  c.  68)  ;  see 
now  46  &  47  Vic.  c.  52.  As  to  entering,  under 
former  Bankrupt  Law,  a  suggestion  on  the 
death  or  removal  of  an  assignee  plaintiff,  see 
Lloyd  ».  Waring,  1  Coll.  536;  Man  v.  Ricketts, 
7  Beav.  484 ;  9  Jur.  1103;  1  Phil.  617 ;  and  see 
16  Beav.  440.      As  to  when  the  Court  of  Bank- 


(a)  In  Motion  v.  Moojen,  L.  R.  14  Eq.  202, 
Bacon  V.  C.  held  that  an  uncertified  bankrupt 
is  incapable  of  suing  in  Equity,  though  the  bill 
charges  fraud  against  all  the  defendants,  in- 
cluding the  creditors'  assignee.  See  Smith  v. 
Mnffatt,  L.  R.  1  Eq.  397 ;  Payne  v.  Dicker,  L.  R. 
6  Ch.  578  ;  Bailey  v.  Smith,  10  R  I.  29.  A 
compounding  debtor  is  usually  entitled  to  the 
control  of  his  property.  Ex  parte  Jones,  L.  R. 
10  Ch.  663.  See  Ex  parte  Postmaster-General, 
He  Bonham,  10  Ch.  D.  595.  As  to  his  recovery 
58 


ruptcy  is  the  proper  tribunal  for  determining 
the  assignee's  claims,  see  Ex  parte  Brown,  11 
Ch.  D.  148  ;  Ex  parte  Pannell,  6  Ch.  D.  335  ; 
Ex  parte  Dickens,  8  Ch.  D.  377  ;  Waddell  v. 
Toleman,  9  Ch.  D.  212  ;  Ex  parte  Fletcher,  id. 
381. 

6  See  Herbert  v.  Saver,  5  Q.  B.  965,  978  ; 
Calvert  on  Parties,  199,  et  seq. ;  Story,  Eq.  PI. 
§§  495,  726;  Elderkin  v.  Elderkin,  1  Root,  139; 
Hilliard,  B.  &  I.  384.  For  instances  in  which 
bankrupts  have  been  allowed  to  sue  at  law,  see 
Perkin  v.  Proctor,  2  Wils.  382  ;  Summersett  v. 
Jarvis,  6  Moore,  56;  3  B.  &  B.  2;  Coles  v. 
Barrow,  4  Taunt.  754  ;  Chippendall  v.  Tomlin- 
son,  4  Doug.  318  ;  1  Cooke's  B.  L.  428;  Silk  v. 
Osborne,  2  Esp.  140  ;  see  Selwyn,  N.  P.  Sup 
323  ;  Evans  v.  Brown,  1  Esp.  170  ;  Fowler  v. 
Down,  1  Bos.  &  P.  44  ;  Laroche  v.  Wakeman, 
Peake,  190;  Webb  v.  Ward,  7  T.  R.  296;  Webb 
v.  Fox,  7  T.  R.  391 ;  Clarke  v.  Calvert,  3  Moore 
96  .  Jameson  v.  Brick  &  Stone  Co.  L.  R.  4  Q. 
B.  D.  208;  Cook  v.  Whellock,  24  id.  658;  Cohen 
v.  Mitchell,  25  id.  262;  dimming  v.  Roebuck,  1 
Holt,  N.  P.  172  ;  Lincoln  v.  Bassett,  9  Gray, 
355  ;  Merrick's  Estate,  5  Watts  &  S.  1.  A 
bankrupt  can  in  his  own  name  maintain  a  suit 
brought  before  he  was  declared  a  bankrupt,  for 
a  wrong  done,  unless  his  assignee  should  inter- 
pose  an    objection.     Sawtelle    v.    Rollins,    23 


for  personal  labor,  see  In  re  Downing.  4  Ch.  D. 
689  The  fact  that  the  plaintiff  is  an  undis- 
charged bankrupt  is  not  alone  sufficient  ground 
for  requiring  him  to  give  security  for  costs. 
Cook  v.  Whellock,  24  Q.  B.  D.  658  ;  see  34  Sol. 
J.  521.  Nor  will  security  for  costs  be  always 
granted  on  the  ground  of  the  impecuniosity  of 
the  defendant  making  application  in  the  suit. 
He  Barber,  Burgess  v.  Vinnicoine  (No.  2),  55  L. 
J.  Ch.  624;  54  L.  T.  728. 


1 


BANKRUPTS.  *  59 

or  the  infliction  of  any  injury  of  a  private  or  particular  nature,  without 
making  his  assignees  parties  ; 6  or  to  recover  damages  for  any  per- 
sonal wrong  ; 7  and  where  sued  at  Law  upon  *  a  bond  or  note,  he  has  *59 
been  allowed  to  tile  a  bill  of  discovery,  in  order  to  obtain  proof 
that  such  bond  or  note  was  fraudulently  procured.  The  specific  relief 
prayed  is,  however,  material  in  determining  whether  the  assignee  is  a 
necessary  party  to  the  bill ;  for  where  it  prayed  that  the  instrument 
upon  which  an  insolvent  debtor  was  sued  at  Law  might  be  delivered  up, 
the  assignee  was  considered  a  necessary  party.1  Where,  also,  persons  claim- 
ing to  be  creditors  of  bankrupts,  instead  of  seeking  relief  in  the  bank- 
ruptcy, brought  an  action  against  the  bankrupts,  and  the  bankrupts  filed  a 
bill  seeking  a  discovery  in  aid  of  their  defence  to  the  action,  and  praying 
that  the  accounts  between  them  and  the  plaintiffs  at  Law  might  be  taken, 
and  that  the  plaintiffs  at  Law  might  pay  the  balance,  a  plea  of  bankruptcy 
was  overruled;  the  Court  being  of  opinion  that  the  bankrupts  were 
entitled  to  the  discovery  and  account,  although  they  were  not  entitled  to 
that  part  of  the  prayer  which  sought  the  payment  to  them  of  the  balance.2 
An  undischarged  bankrupt  may  maintain  an  action  to  recover  dam- 
ages for  breach  of  a  contract  which  was  entered  into  by  him  after  adju- 
dication, subject,  however,  to  the  right  of  the  trustee  to  interfere,— which 
he  may  do  even  after  the  commencement  of  the  suit,  and  may  claim  to 
be  added  as  a  plaintiff  to  such  suit.8  In  general,  however,  a  bankrupt, 
although  entitled  to  the  surplus  of  his  estate  which  remains  after  pay- 
ment of  his  debts,4  cannot  sue  for  any  property  which  is  vested  in 
the  trustee  under  the.  bankruptcy,  even  though  there  may  be  collusion 
between  him  and  the  persons  possessed  of  the  property.6  Thus,  where 
a  bill  was  filed  by  a  bankrupt  to  recover  property  due  to  his  estate, 
stating  that  the  commission  against  him  was  invalid,  and  that  there  was 
a  combination  between  his  assignees  and  the  debtor,  to  which  a  demurrer 

Maine,  106  ;  Tunno  v.  Edwards,  3  Brev.  510  ;  2  Lowndes  v.  Taylor,   1   Mad.  423.     This 

Kirwan  v.  Latour,  5  H.  &  John.  289  ;  Hayllar  decision  was  afterwards  affirmed   on   appeal. 

v.  Sherwood,  2  Nev.  &  M.  401.     The  bankrupt  1    Mad.  425;  2   Rose,   432;   and  see  Govet  v. 

has  the  exclusive  right  to  sue   for  a  trespass  Armitage,  2  Anst.  412;  Kaye  v.  Fosbrooke,  8 

upon  exempt  property  committed  prior  to  the  Sim.  28. 

proceedings  in  bankruptcy.    Seiling  v.  Gunder-  8  Emden  r.  Carte,  17  Ch.  D.   169,  Fry  J  ; 

man,  35  Texas,  545.    And  see,  where  the  plain-  ib.  708,  C.  A.,  q.  v.  also  (pp.  11,  172,  173)  for 

tiff   has   been   declared  a   bankrupt  after  the  the  distinction  between  a  cause  of  action  ac- 

commencement  of  suit,   Woodall  v.   Holliday,  cruing  before  and  one    accruing   after   bank- 

44  Ga.  18.     A  claim  for  an   injury  done  to  a  ruptcv. 

party  by  the  negligence  of  another  did  not  pass  4  f  he  Bankruptcy  Act,  1869  (32  &  33  Vic. 

by  an  assignment  of  his  estate  under  the  insol-  c.  71),  §  45.     The  Bankruptcy  Repeal  and  In- 

vency  laws  of  Massachusetts  before  the  recovery  solvent  Courts  Act  of  1869  (32  &  33  Vic.  c.  83, 

of  judgment.     Stone  v.  Boston  and  Maine  Rail-  §  20)  was  repealed  by  46  &  47  Vic.  c.  39,  §  1, 

road,  7  Gray,  539.  Dut  without  reviving  the  former  practice. 

«  Semple  v.  London  &  Birmingham  Ry.  Co.  6  Tarleton  v.  Hornby,  1  Y.  &  C.  Ex.  172.  An 

»  >.  im.  209.  assignment  under  a  commission  of  bankruptcy 

7  Ex  parte  Vine,    In  re  Wilson,   8  Ch.  D.  does  not  pass  property  belonging  to  the  bank- 

364,  C.   A.;  Dence  v.  Mason,   W.  N.   (1879)  nipt  as  factor,  executor,  or  trustee.    Vide  Co  k's 

177,  C.  A.    As  to  earnings  of  personal  labor  of  B.  L.  c.  8,  §§  15,  16,  17;  1  Deacon's  B.  L.  c.  9, 

bankrupt,  see  Re  Downing,  Ex  parte  Banks,  4  §§  10.  222;  Archhold's  Bankruptcy,  328-333  ;  32 

Ch.  D.  689.  &  33  Vice.  71,  §15;  .£z  parte  Ellis,  1  Atk.101; 

1  Balls  v.  Strutt,  1  Hare,  146 ;  Meddowcroft  Bennet  v.   Davis,   2  P.  Wins.  816;    Ex  parte 

v.  Campbell,  13  Beav.  184.  Butler,  Amb.  74;  Ex  parte  Chion.  3  P.  Wms. 

59 


*60 


SUITS   BY   PERSONS    WHO    ARE    UNDER    DISABILITY. 


was  put  in,  Sir  John  Leach,  V.  C,  allowed  the  demurrer,  saying  that  if 
it  had  been  true  that  the  commission  was  invalid,  the  plaintiff  ought  to 
have  tried  its  validity  by  an  action,  and  could  not  by  bill  impeach  the 
commission,  and  that  if  there  were  a  combination  between  the  debtor 
and  his  assignees,  his  proper  course  was  to  apply  by  petition  to  have 
the  assignees  removed  and  new  assignees  appointed.6  It  also  appears 
that  the  creditors  of  a  bankrupt  cannot  under  such  circumstances  sue ; 
and  further,  that  there  is  no  distinction  in  this  respect  between  bank- 
rupts themselves  and  their  creditors,  or  persons  claiming  under  them,7 
and  that  the  Court  will  not  in  general  give  relief  where  it  can 
*60       be  obtained  in  *  bankruptcy ; 1  (a)  and  that  if  the  bankrupt  has 


187,  n.  (a) ;  Godfrey  v.  Furzo,  ib.  185 ;  Harris  v. 
Truman,  7  Q.  B.  D.  340,  356;  Pennell  v.  Deffell, 
4  De  G.  M.  &  G.  372,  379;  Lyell  v.  Kennedy, 
14  App.  Cas.  437,  459 ;  18  Q.  B.  D.  796 ;  and  see 
Lewin  on  Trusts,  218-223;  12  &  13  Vic.  c.  106, 
§  130. 

s  Hammond  v.  Attwood,  3  Mad.  158;  see 
also  Yewens  v.  Robinson,  11  Sim.  105,  120; 
Payne  v.  Dicken,  L.  R.  6  Ch.  578 ;  lie  Lead- 
bitter,  10  Ch.  D.  388.  The  bankrupt  may,  in  a 
clear  case,  obtain  leave  to  suit  in  the  name  of 
the  assignee.  See  Spagg  v.  Binkes,  5  Ves.  583, 
589;  Benfield  v.  Solomons.  9  Ves.  77,  82;  Smith 
v.   Moffatt,  L.  R.  1  Eq.  397;  12  Jur.   N.  S.  22, 

V.  c.  w. 

•  Heath  v.  Chadwick,  2  Phil.  649;  and  see 
Major  v.  Auckland,  3  Hare,  77;  Goldsmith 
v.  Russell,  5  De  G.  M  &  G.  547 ;  Reese 
River  S.  M.  Co.  V.  Atwell,  L.  R.  7  Eq.  347; 
Tudway  v.  Jones,  1  K.  &  J.  691;  Rochfort  v. 
Battersbv,  2  H.  L.  Cas.  403,  409 ;  Davis  v.  Snell, 
28  Beav.  321;  6  Jur.  N.  S.  1134;  2  De  G.  F. 


(a)  The  established  rule  now  is  that  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  Court  of  Chancery  is  not 
ousted  by  a  bankruptcy  act  without  express 
words  in  the  statute  which  provides  the  new 
jurisdiction.  Stone  v.  Thomas,  L.  R.  5  Ch.  219, 
224:  Pike  v.  Dickinson,  L.  R.  7  Ch.  61 ;  Ellis  v. 
Silber,  L.  R.  8  Ch.  83;  Jenneya.  Bell.  2  Ch.  D. 
547;  Ex  pnrte  Musgrave,  10  Ch.  D.  94;  West- 
moreland Co.  i'.  Fielden,  [1891]  3  Ch.  15,  27; 
see  Ex  parte  Reynolds,  15  Q.  B.  D.  169;  Sharp 
v.  McHenry,  55  L.  T.  747;  Curry  v.  McCau- 
Iey,  20  Fed.  Rep.  583.  And  in  general, 
without  such  express  words,  a  Court  of  Equity 
is  not  divested  of  any  matter  of  equitable 
cognizance  by  a  statute  giving  to  a  Court  of 
Law  power  over  the  same  matter.  Schroeder 
v.  Loeber  (Md.),  24  Atl.  Rep.  226  ;  Fidelity 
Trust  Co.  v.  Gill  Car  Co.  25  Fed.  Rep.  737; 
Austin  v.  Rutland  R.  Co.  17  id.  446:  Hess  v. 
Vose,  52  111.  472;  Phipps  v.  Kelly,  12  Oregon, 
213;  Kinnan  v.  42d  St.  &c.  R.  Co.  21  N.  Y.  S. 
789.  See  Dehon  r.  Foster,  4  Allen  (Mass.), 
545:  Wood  v.  Hudson  (Ala.),  11  So.  Rep.  530. 

New  remedies    created    by  State     statutes 

60 


&  J.  463.  See  Stoever  v.  Stoever,  9  Serg.  &  R. 
434;  Griswold  v.  McMillan,  11  111.  590;  Allen 
v.  Montgomery,  48  Miss.  101. 

i  See  Riches  v.  Owen,  W.  N.  (18G8)  158, 
V.  C.  G. ;  L.  R.  3  Ch.  820,  L.  JJ.;  Bell  v.  Bird, 
L.  R.  6  Eq.  635,  V.  C.  G. ;  Martin  v.  Powning, 
L.  R.  4  Ch.  356,  L.  JJ. ;  Stone  v.  Thomas,  L.  R. 
5  Ch.  219,  L.  C. ;  Phillips  ».  Furber,  18  W.  R. 
479,  M.  R. ;  L.  R.  5  Ch.  746;  see  also  Forshaw 
v.  Mottram,  W.  N.  (1867)  191,  V.  C.  S.;  Gra- 
ham v.  Winterson,  L.  R.  16  Eq.  243;  Saxton 
r.  Davis,  18  Ves.  72,  79;  Tarleton  v.  Hornby,  1 
Y.  &  C.  Ex.  172,  188;  Smith  v.  Moffatt,  L.  R. 
1  Eq.  397;  12  Jur.  N.  S.  22,  V.  C.  W.;  see 
Lincoln  v.  Bassett,  9  Gray,  355.  For  special 
circumstances  under  which  relief  was  given, 
see  Preston  v.  Wilson,  5  Hare,  185;  Wear- 
ing ».  Ellis,  6  De  G.  M.  &  G.  596 ;  2  Jur.  N.  S. 
204,  1149  ;  Luddy's  Trustee  v.  Peard,  33  Ch. 
D.  500.  It  has  been  held  that  an  insolvent 
debtor,  who  has  made  a  general  assignment, 
may  on  proof  of  his  paying  all  debts  due  at  the 


enlarging  equitable  rights  may  be  enforced  in 
the  Equity  Courts  of  the  United  States.  Gold- 
smith v.  Gilliland,  22  Fed.  Rep.  865;  Wells, 
Fargo  &  Co.  v.  Miner,  25  id.  533;  A.  &  W. 
Sprague  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Hoyt,  29  id.  421.  But 
rights  enforceable  in  the  State  Courts  will  not 
be  followed  in  the  Federal  Courts  when  con- 
fusion or  conflict  of  interests  may  result. 
Hence  the  same  receiver  appointed  in  the  for- 
mer Court  will  not  necessarily  be  re-appointed 
in  the  latter.  Young  v.  Aronson,  27  Fed.  Rep. 
241.  And  the  right  to  setoff  a  judgment  or 
decree  of  one  of  these  Courts  in  the  other  is 
restricted.  Lauderdale  Co.  v.  Foster,  23  Fed. 
Rep.  516.  A  provision  in  a  State  Code  which 
permits  a  defendant  to  demand  from  the  plain» 
tiff  more  certain  and  definite  statements  in  his 
complaint  does  not  apply  to  the  Federal  Circuit 
Court  sitting  in  equity.  Phelps  v.  Elliott,  26 
Fed.  Rep.  881.  But  supplementary  proceed- 
ings allowed  by  State  law  for  discovery  of  the 
debtor's  property  at  Law  or  in  Equity,  may 
be  enforced  in  the  Federal  Courts.  Senter  v. 
Mitchell,  16  Fed.  Rep.  206. 


BANKRUPTS. 


62 


property  in  a  foreign  country,  where  the  bankrupt  laws   of  England 

do  not  prevail,  still  he  cannot  bring  an  action  with  reference  to  it 

in  *  England.1  *61 

The  trustee  in  bankruptcy  does  not  stand  in  the  position  of  a 
trustee  for  the  bankrupt.2 

The  rules  with  regard  to  bankrupts  applied,  by  analogy,  to  persons 
who  had  taken  the  benefit  of  the  Insolvent  Debtors'  Acts,  who  were 
equally  considered  as  being  divested  of  all  right  to  maintain  a  suit  in 
respect  of  any  surplus  to  which  they  might  eventually  be  entitled  ; 3  but 
these  provisions  are  no  longer  in  force.4  A  liquidating  debtor  is  not 
deprived  of  the  control  of  his  property  until  the  passing  of  the  creditors' 
resolution,  and  the  appointment  of  a  trustee.6  A  compounding  debtor  is 
not  generally  deprived  of  control  over  his  property.6 

*  The  disability  of  a  bankrupt  to  maintain  a  suit  does  not  apply  *G2 
to  a  bankrupt  who  has  obtained  his  order  of  discharge,  where  he 
is  suing  in  respect  of  property  acquired  after  the  close  of  the  bank- 
ruptcy, even  though  the  bankrupt  has  not  obtained  an  order  of  discharge,1 
or  after  the  passing  of  a  resolution  granting  the  bankrupt  his  discharge, 
even  though  the  bankruptcy  is  not  closed.2  A  bankrupt  may,  as  we  have 
seen,  after  his  order  of  discharge  has  taken  effect,  become  entitled  to 
property  in  the  same  manner  that  he  might  before  his  bankruptcy ; 3  but 
in  the  case  of  an  insolvent  debtor,  his  future  property  was  made  liable 
to  the  payment  of  his  debts  contracted  before  his  discharge. 


time  of  his  discharge,  bring  ejectment  in  his 
own  name,  for  lands  assigned  by  him,  without 
any  formal  reassignment.  Power  v.  Holman, 
2  Watts,  218.  As  to  disclaimer  by  the  assign- 
ees in  a  foreclosure  suit,  see  Ford  v.  White, 

16  Beav.  120. 

1  Sill  v.  Worswick,  1  H.  Bl.  665;  Hunter  v. 
Potts,  4  T.  R.  182  ;  Phillips  v.  Hunter,  2  H.  Bl. 
402;  Bentield  v.  Solomons,  9  Ves.  77,  and  see 
Re  Blithman,  L.  R.  2  Eq.  23,  M.  R.;  35  Beav. 
219;  Re  Davidson,  L.  R.  15  Eq.  383. 

*  Re  Leadbitter,  10  Ch.  D.  388. 

8  Gill  v.  Fleming,  1  Ridg.  P.  C.  431;  Spragg 
v.  Biukes,  5  Ves.  583;  Dyson  v.  Hornby,  7  De 
G.  M.  &  G.  1;  Cook  v.  Sturgis,  3  De  G.  &  J. 
506,  5  Jur.  N.  S.  475;  Troup  v.  Ricardo,  10  Jur. 
N.  S.  859,  1161 ;  12  W.  R.  1135,  M.  R. ;  13  W. 
R.  147;  4  De  G.  J.  &  S.  489,  L.  C. ;  Smith  v. 
Moffatt,  L.  R   1  Eq.  397;  12  Jur.  N.  S.  22,  V. 

C.  W.;  Roberts  v.  More  ton,  W.  N.  (1869)28; 

17  W.  R.  397,  V.  C.  J.  As  to  insolvents  under 
5  &  6  Vic.  c.  116,  see  Wearing  v.  Ellis,  6  De 
G.  M.  &  G.  596;  2  Jur.  N.  S.  204,  1149.  A 
suit  for  administration  of  a  deceased  insolvent's 
estate  may  be  instituted  by  a  scheduled  credi- 
tor. Galsworthy  v.  Durrant,  2  De  G.  F.  &  J. 
466;  7  Jur.  N.  S.  113;  29  Beav.  277;  6  Jur.  N. 
S.  743;  see  Smith  v.  Moffatt,  L.  R.  1  Eq.  397; 
12  Jur.  N.  S.  22,  V.  C.  W.;   Re  Smith,  24  Ch. 

D.  672.  As  to  suits  by  assignees  of  the  surplus, 
see  Spragg  v.  Binkes,  5  Ves.  583,  589.  Cook  v. 
Sturgis,  3  DeG.  &  J  506 ,  5  Jur.  N.  S.  475; 
see  Re  Gamier,  L.  R  13  Eq.  532. 


4  The  Bankruptcy  Repeal  and  Insolvent 
Courts  Act,  1869  (32  &  33  Vice.  83),  §  20,  and 
schedule.  All  persons,  whether  traders  or  non- 
traders,  were  made  subject  to  the  Bankrupt 
Laws  by  32  &  33  Vic.  c.  71,  §  6;  c.  83,  §  20. 

5  The  Bankruptcy  Act,  1869,  32  &  33  Vic.  c. 
76,  §  125  (5)  &  (6);  Ex  parte  Postmaster  Gen- 
eral, Re  Bonham,  10  Ch.  D.  595. 

6  Ex  parte  Jones,  Re  Jones,  L.  R.  10  Ch. 
663,  665;  Re  Lewis,  3  Ch.  D.  113;  Re  Kearlev, 
7  Ch.  D.  615. 

i  32  &  33  Vic.  c.  71.  §§  15,  47;  In  re  Petit 's 
Estate,  1  Ch.  D.  478,  V.  C.  B. 

2  32  &  33  Vic.  c.  71,  §§  48,  49;  Ebbs  r.  Boul- 
nois,  L.  R.  10  Ch.  479,  L.  JJ.;  In  re  Bennetts 
Trusts,  id.  490;  Ex  parte  Hemming,  13  Ch.  D. 
163;  Re  Smith,  24  Ch.  D.  672. 

3  Under  the  Bankruptcy  Act,  1861,  since 
repealed  by  the  32  &  33  Vic.  c.  83,  §  20,  and 
schedule,  the  Court  might,  however,  grant  the 
order  of  discharge,  subject  to  any  condition 
touching  after-acquired  property  of  the  bank- 
rupt; see  24  &  25  Vic.  c.  134,  §  159,  rule  3;  and 
see  Ex  parte  Griffiths,  10  Jur.  N.  S.  785,  787, 
L.  C.  Property  coming  to  the  bankrupt,  be- 
tween the  time  of  pronouncing  the  order  of 
discharge  and  the  time  allowed  for  appealing 
therefrom,  belongs  to  the  bankrupt,  when  the 
order  is  not  recalled  or  suspended  on  appeal - 
Re  Laforest,  9  Jur.  N.  S.  851;  11  W.  R.  738, 
L.  C. 


61 


*  63  SUITS   BY   PERSONS   WHO    ARE   UNDER   DISABILITY. 

Where  the  bankruptcy  of  the  plaintiff  has  occurred  previously  to  the 
filing  of  the  bill,  and  the  fact  appears  upon  the  bill,  it  may  be  taken 
advantage  of  by  demurrer  ;4  and  if  the  fact  does  not  so  appear,  it  should 
be  pleaded  by  way  of  defence.5  In  the  case  of  a  plea  to  a  bill  by  an 
insolvent  debtor  against  his  assignees  and  a  debtor  to  the  estate,  the 
facts  stated  in  the  plea  appeared  upon  the  face  of  the  bill,  and  yet  the 
plea  was  held  good;6  and  it  has  been  held,  that  as  at  law  any  matter 
which  arises  between  the  declaration  and  the  plea  may  be  pleaded,  so 
bankruptcy  or  other  matters  arising  between  the  bill  and  plea  may  be 
pleaded  in  equity.7 

In  pleading  bankruptcy  it  was  the  rule  that  all  the  facts  should  be 
stated  successively  and  distinctly,  and  it  was  not  sufficient  to  say  that  a 
commission  or  fiat  of  bankruptcy  was  duly  issued  against  the  plaintiff, 
under  which  he  was  duly  found  and  declared  a  bankrupt,  and  that  all 
his  estates  and  effects  have  been  thereupon  duly  transferred  to  or  become 
vested  in  the  assignees  ; 8  a  plea  of  bankruptcy  must  have  stated  distinctly 
the  trading,  the  contracting  debts,  the  petitioning  creditor's  debt,  the  act 
of  bankruptcy,  the  commission  or  fiat,  and  that  the  plaintiff  had  been 
found  bankrupt ;  but  it  may  be  doubted  how  far  this  rule  would  now  be 

strictly  enforced.9 
*63  *  With  respect  to  the  bankruptcy  of  the  plaintiff  after  the  com- 

mencement of  a  suit,  or  after  plea  and  answer  put  in,  it  seems 
that  the  bankruptcy  of  a  sole  plaintiff  does  not  strictly  cause  an  abate- 
ment, but  renders  the  suit  defective  ; 1  or,  according  to  Lord  Eldon,2 
"  this  Court,  without  saying  whether  bankruptcy  is  or  is  not  strictly  an 
abatement,  has  said  that,  according  to  the  course  of  the  Court,  the  suit 
is  become  as  defective  as  if  it  was  abated." 8  Hence,  if  the  assignees  of 
a  bankrupt,  sole  plaintiff,  desire  to  prosecute  the  suit,  they  must  obtain, 
on  motion  or  petition  of  course,4  an  order  enabling  them  so  to  do.5 
And  if  they  elect  not  to  continue  the  suit,  such  election  is  not  a  bar  to  a 
subsequent  action  by  them  for  the  same  cause  of  action.6  Upon  the 
non-prosecution  of  a  suit  in  which  the  plaintiff  has  become  bankrupt, 

*  Benfieldr.  Solomons,  9  Ves.  77,  82:  Story,  1  Lee  v.  Lee,   1   Hare,  621;    see  Hobbs  v. 

Eq.  PI.  §  495.     The   plea  need   not  be  put  in  Dane  Manuf.  Co.  5  Allen,  581:  Northman  v. 

under  oath.     Dearden  v.  Villiers,  16  W.  R.  479,  Insurance   Companies,  1  Tenn.   Ch.   312,  319; 

S.  C.  nom.  Dierden  v.  Villiers,  37  L.  J.  Ch.  Swepson  v.  Rouse,  65  N.  C.  34. 

482,  overruling  Joseph   v.  Tuckev,  2  Cox,  44.  2  Randall  v.  Mumford,  18  Ves.  427. 

See  Ebbs  v.  Boulnois,  L.  R.  10  Ch.  479.  3  Jackson  v.  North  Eastern  Ry.  Co.  5  Ch.  D. 

5  In  England  it  mav  be  pleaded,  although  it  844;  Eldridge  o.  Burgess,  7  Ch.  D.  441.  But 
takes  place  between  the  delivery  of  the  state-  the  bankrupt  may  appeal  against  a  personal 
ment  of  claim  and  the  statement  of  defence.  order.      Dence   v.  Mason,   W.  N.  (1879)  177. 

6  Bowser  v.  Hughes,  1  Anst.  101.  See  Sawtelle  v.  Rollins,  23  Maine,  196;  Hilliard, 
1  Turner  v.  Robinson,  1  S.  &  S.  3;  Sergrove      B.  &  I.  397,  et  seq. 

v   Mavhew,  2  M'N.  &  G.  97;  Lane  t>.  Smith,  14  *  The  latter  seems  preferable.     See  2  Seton, 

Beav.*49;  Payne  v.  Beech,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  708.  1530;  Roffey  v.  Miller,  24  W.  R.  109;  Walker 

And  see  infra,  p.  606,  607.  v.  Blakeman,  W.  N.  (1876)  112. 

8  Carleton  v.  Leighton,  3  Mer.  667,  671;  5  See  note  3  above;  R  S.  C.  Ord.  L.  3,  4; 
Lane  v.  Smith.  14  Beav.  49.  Seear  v.  Lawson,   16  Ch.  D.   121;   Jackson  v. 

9  See  Pepper  v.  Henzell.  2  H.  &  M.  486:  and  Riga  Railway.  28  Beav.  75;  for  forms  of  mo- 
the  Bankruptcy  Act,  1869  (32  &  33  Vic.  c.  71),  tion  paper  and  petition,  see  Vol.  III. 

§  10;  post,  p.  69;  but  see  Lane  v.  Smith,  14  6  Bennett  v.  Gamgee,  2  Ex.  D.  11;  W.  JS. 

Beav.  49;   see  Lacy  v.  Rockett,  11  Ala.  100;      (1877)  20;  25  W.  R.  293. 
Seaman  v.  Stoughton.  3  Barb.  Ch.  344;  Stone 
v.  Par^  1  Chand.  60. 

62 


BANKRUPTS. 


64 


the  defendant,  if  he  wishes  to  get  rid  of  the  suit  entirely,  must  adopt 
a  course  of  proceeding  analogous  to  that  pursued  where  the  plaintiff 
obtains  an  injunction  and  dies,  —  in  which  case  the  defendant  may  move 
that  the  injunction  be  dissolved,  unless  the  representatives  of  the  de- 
ceased plaintiff  revive  within  a  certain  time  ;s  he  must  move  that  the 
trustee  may,  within  a  specified  time  (usually  three  weeks)  after  notice 
of  the  order,  take  proper  supplemental  proceedings  for  the  purpose  of 
prosecuting  the  suit  against  him,  or  in  default  thereof  that  the  plain- 
tiff's bill  may  stand  dismissed.6  Where  the  bankruptcy  has  taken  place 
after  decree,  the  motion  should  be  that  the  trustee  may,  within  a  limited 
time,  elect  whether  he  will  prosecute  the  suit,  or  that  in  default  all  fur- 
ther proceedings  should  be  stayed.7 

This  is,  however,  not  a  motion  of  course,  and  the  trustee  must  be 
served  with  the  notice  of  it.8  It  should  also  be  supported  by 
*  an  affidavit  of  the  facts;1  and  the  dismissal  will  be  without  *64 
costs,  as  a  bankrupt  cannot  be  made  to  pay  costs.2  (a)  Where, 
however,  the  bankruptcy  takes  place  between  the  hearing  and  judgment, 
the  Court  will  not,  before  giving  judgment,  compel  the  assignees  to 
revive.8  After  the  bankruptcy  of  the  plaintiff,  the  defendant  cannot 
make  the  ordinary  motion  to  dismiss.4 

7  Whitmore  v.  Oxborrow,  1  Coll.  91 ;  Clarke 
V.  Tipping,  16  Beav.  12. 

8  The  plaintiff  need  not  be  served.  Brown 
v.  Rogers,  22  July,  1869,  Reg.  Lib.  2168,  V.  C. 
J.,  where  the  order  was  directed  to  be  drawn  up 
without  notice  to  the  plaintiff;  and  see  form  of 
order,  Seton,  1278,  No.  6.  See  contra,  Vestris 
v.  Hooper,  8  Sim.  570;  see  abo  Randall  v. 
Mumford,  18  Ves.  424, 428 ;  Wheeler  v.  Malins,  4 
Mad.  171.  As  to  the  proper  time  for  making  the 
application,  see  Sharp  v.  Hullett,  2  S.  &  S.  496. 

i  Porter  v.  Cox,  5  Mad.  80. 

2  Wheeler  v.  Malins,  4  Mad.  171;  Lee  v. 
Lee,  1  Hare,  621;  Meiklam  v.  Elmore,  4  De 
G.  &  J.  208;  5  Jur.  N.  S.  904;  Boucicault  v. 
Delafield,  supra. 

s  Boucicault  v.  Delafield,  12  W".  R.  8,  V. 
C.  W. 

4  Lord  Thurlow  held  that  such  an  order, 
pending  the  bankruptcy  of  the  plaintiff,  was  a 
nullity,  and  therefore  refused  to  discharge  one 
obtained  under  such  circumstances.  Sellas  v. 
Dawson,  2  Anst.  458,  n. ;  S.  C.  nom.  Sellers  v. 
Dawson,  2  Dick.  738;  Robinson  v.  Norton,  10 
Beav.  484.  The  motion  cannot  be  made  after 
the  execution  by  the  plaintiff  of  a  trust  deed 
under  the  Bankruptcy  Act,  1861  (24  &  25  Vic. 
c.  134) ;  Price  v.  Rickards,  L.  R.  9  Eq.  35,  V. 
C.J. 


5  Wheeler  v.  Malins,  4  Mad.  171;  Lord 
Huntingtower  v.  Sherborn,  5  Beav.  380;  Robin- 
son v.  Norton,  10  Beav.  484;  Fisher  v.  Fisher, 
6  Hare,  628;  2  Phil.  236;  Meiklam  v.  Elmore, 
4  De  G.  &  J.  208;  5  Jur.  N.  S.  904;  Jackson  v. 
Riga  Railway,  28  Beav.  75;  Boucicault  v.  Dela- 
field, 10  Jur.  N.  S.  937;  12  W.  R.  1025,  V.  C. 
W.;  10  Jur.  N.  S.  1063;  13  W.  R.  64,  L.  JJ.; 
Simpson  v.  Bathurst,  L.  R.  5  Ch.  193,  L.  C. 

6  See  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  349,  and  note;  Sedg- 
wick v.  Cleveland,  7  Paige,  287,  290;  Garr  v. 
Gower,  9  Wend.  649;  2  Barb.  Ch.  Pr.  65,  66. 
This  is  the  course  before  decree;  after  decree, 
the  motion  should  ask  to  stay  all  further  pro- 
ceedings; Clarke  v.  Tipping,  16  Beav.  12  ;  and 
see  Whitmore  v.  Oxborrow,  1  Coll.  91;  and 
an  application  by  the  defendant  for  an  order 
to  revive  under  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  52,  after 
decree,  was  refused,  Maw  v.  Pearson,  12  W.  R. 
701,  M.  R. ;  where  the  bankruptcy  has  occurred 
in  a  foreign  country,  see  Bourbaud  v.  Bourbaud, 
12  W.  R.  1024,  V.  C.  W. ;  Clement  v.  Langthorn, 
W.  N.  (1868)  181,  186,  V.  C.  G.  For  forms  of 
notice  of  motion,  see  Vol.  III.;  and  for  an  order 
in  like  case,  see  Seton,  1278.  The  same  practice 
should  be  followed  where  the  plaintiff  has  exe- 
cuted a  trust  deed  under  the  Bankruptcy  Act, 
1861  (24  &  25  Vic.  c.  134);  Price  v.  Rickards, 
L.  R.  9  Eq.  35,  V.  C.  J. 

(a)  In  Ex  parte  Castle  Mail  Co.  35  W.  R. 
83,  it  was  held  that  costs  may  be  given  against 
an  undischarged  bankrupt.  As  to  requiring 
security  for  costs  upon  proof  of  a  party's  in- 
solvency or  bankruptcy,  see  United  Telephone 
Co.  v.  Bassano,  31  Ch.  D.  630;  Re  Strong  (No. 
2),  id.  273;  Pooley's  Trustee  v.  Whetham  (No. 


2),  33  Ch.  D.  76;  Smith  v.  Badham,  66  L.  T. 
822.  Security  for  costs  will  not  be  required 
from  a  trustee  in  liquidation  suing  for  the  bene- 
fit of  the  estate,  even  though  he  is  insolvent. 
Denston  v.  Ashton,  L.  R.  4  Q.  B.  590;  Cowell 
v.  Taylor,  31  Ch.  D.  34. 


63 


*  65  SUITS   BY   PERSONS   WHO    ARE   UNDER   DISABILITY. 

The  rule  of  practice,  by  which  a  defendant  is  required  to  give  notice 
to  the  trustee  in  the  case  of  the  bankruptcy  of  a  plaintiff,  is  confined  to 
the  case  of  a  sole  plaintiff,  who,  becoming  bankrupt,  is  supposed  to  be 
negligent  of  what  is  sought  by  the  bill,  and  the  Court,  to  prevent  sur- 
prise and  save  expense,  requires  notice  to  be  given  to  the  trustee  ;  but 
there  is  no  instance  where  the  Court  has  taken  upon  itself  to  interpose 
the  rule  where  there  are  two  plaintiffs,  one  of  whom  is  solvent  and  the 
other  insolvent ;  for  it  is  as  competent  to  the  solvent  plaintiff  as  it  is  to 
the  trustee,  to  rectify  the  suit.6 

In  the  case  of  an  injunction  granted  at  the  suit  of  a  plaintiff  who  after- 
wards becomes  bankrupt,  the  practice  which  has  been  adopted  is  to 
require  the  bankrupt  to  bring  the  trustee  before  the  Court;  and  the 
Court  will  make  an  order  to  dissolve  the  injunction  and  dismiss  the  bill, 
unless  the  trustee  shall  be  brought  before  it  within  a  reasonable  time; 
which  order,  it  seems,  may  be  served  upon  the  bankrupt  alone,  as  it  is 
supposed  that  the  bankrupt  will  find  the  means  of  giving  the  trustee 
notice.6     Such  an  order  will  also  be  without  costs. 

"When  the  trustee  elects  to  continue  the  suit  and  obtains  a  supple- 
mental order  authorizing  him  to  prosecute  it,  he  becomes  liable  to  the 
costs  of  the  suit  from  the  commencement;7  and  where  the  plaintiff  had, 
previously  to  his  bankruptcy  and  the  supplemental  order,  been  ordered 
to  pay  the  costs  of  a  proceeding,  the  proceedings  in  the  suit  were  stayed 

until  the  payment  of  such  costs.8 
*65  *  A  suit  does  not  abate  by  the  death  or  change  of  the  trustee 

plaintiff,  but  the  Court  may,  upon  the  suggestion  of  such  death 
or  change,  allow  the  suit  to  be  prosecuted  in  the  name  of  the  surviving 
or  new  trustee.1  An  order  is  necessary  for  this  purpose,  which  may  be 
obtained  on  motion  or  petition  of  course.2 

It  was  formerly  necessary,  in  all  actions  where  the  assignees,  either 
as  plaintiffs  or  defendants,  claimed  property  under  the  bankrupt,  to 
prove  strictly  the  three  requisites  to  support  the  commission,  namely,  the 
trading,  the  act  of  bankruptcy,  and  the  petitioning  creditor's  debt,  as 
well  as  that  the  commission  was  regularly  issued,  and  the  assignment 
duly  executed  to  the  assignees.  Upon  failure  of  proving  any  one  of 
these  matters  (the  proof  of  which  added  considerably  to  the  costs  of  an 
action,  and  was  often  difficult  to  be  established  by  strict  rules  of  evi- 
dence), the  assignees  were  nonsuited,  and   thus  frequently  prevented 


6  Caddick  v.  Masson,  1  Sim.  501 ;  Latham  v.  ton,  Re  Nathan,  10  Ch.  D.  586.     Dismissing 

Kenrick,    1    Sim.  502;  Kelminster  v.    Pratt,   1  Bills  and  Slaying  Proceedings. 

Hare,  632;  but  see  Ward  v.  Ward,  8  Bea%\  379  ;  >  12  &  13  Vic.  c.  106,  §  157.    This  section 

11  Beav.  159;  12  Jur.  592.  applies  only  to  the  case  of   trustees  suing  as 

6  Randall  v.  Mumford,  16  Ves.  424,  428;  plaintiffs,  see  Gordon  v.  Jesson,  16  Beav.  440; 
Wheeler  v.  Malins,  4  Mad.  171.  It  would  seem  the  practice  with  respect  to  trustees  as  defend- 
that  under  the  present  practice  the  trustee  ants  will  be  stated  in  the  next  chapter;  and  see 
should  be  served  with  notice  of  the  motion.  Man  c.  Rickets,  1  Phil.  617;  Mendham  v.  Robin- 

»  Poole  v.  Franks,  1  Moll.  78.     See  Boynton  son,  1  M.  &  K.  217,  Lloyd  v.  Waring,  1  Coll. 

v.  Boynton,  9  Ch.  D.  250;  4  App.  Cas.  733;  Pitts  536. 

r.  La  Fontaine,  6  App.  Cas.  482.  2  For  forms  of  motion  paper  and   petition, 

8  Cook  v.  Hathway,  L.  R.  8  Eq.  612,  V.  C.  see  Vol.  III. 
M. ;  and  see  Chap.  XIX.  §  1.     Ex  parte  Staple- 

64 


INFANTS.  *  67 

from  recovering  a  just  debt  due  to  the  bankrupt's  estate.  To  provide  in 
some  measure  for  this  evil,  it  was  enacted,3  that  if  the  bankrupt  do  not 
dispute  the  fiat  or  petition  within  certain  limited  periods,  the  "  London 
Gazette,"  containing  a  copy  of  the  order  of  the  Court  of  Bankruptcy 
adjudging  the  debtor  to  be  a  bankrupt,  shall  be  conclusive  evidence  of 
the  bankruptcy  and  of  the  date  of  the  adjudication,  as  against  the  bank- 
rupt, and  against  all  persons  whom  the  bankrupt  might  have  sued  if  not 
adjudged  bankrupt ;  and  even  the  circumstance  that  the  bankrupt  is  an 
infant  will  be  held  not  to  prevent  the  "  Gazette  "  being  conclusive.4 

It  was  held  under  the  old  law,  that  where  the  defendants  to  a  suit, 
brought  by  the  assignees  of  a  bankrupt,  were  infants,  they  would  be 
entitled  to  dispute  the  validity  of  the  bankruptcy,  without  giving 
the  notice  required  by  the  *  Act.1.  The  words  of  the  present  *66 
statute  seem  to  be  sufficient  to  meet  such  a  case,  and  render  it 
clear  that,  even  as  against  infant  defendants,  the  "  Gazette  "  shall  be  con- 
clusive evidence  of  the  bankruptcy.2 

Where  a  plaintiff,  suing  under  the  former  practice  as  assignee  in 
bankruptcy,  had  not  been  actually  appointed  assignee  at  the  time  of 
filing  the  bill,  but  before  the  hearing  he  was  so  appointed  as  from  a 
date  antecedent  to  the  filing  of  the  bill,  it  was  held  that  he  was  entitled 
to  maintain  the  suit.3 


Section  V.  —  Infants. 

In  consequence  of  their  incapacity,  persons  under  disability  are  unable 
to  compromise  their  rights  or  claims :  but  where  these  rights  and  claims 
are  merely  equitable,  the  Court  of  Chancery  may,  in  general,  order  the 
trust  property  to  be  dealt  with  in  whatever  mode  it  may  consider 
to  be  for  the  benefit  of  cestuis  que  trust  who  *  are  under  disability  ;  *67 
and  therefore  has  power  to  compromise  such  rights  or  claims.1 

8  12  &  13  Vic.   c.   108,    §   233;  Taylor   on  J  This  was   decided   by     Sir   John     Leach 

Evid.  §§  1477,  1556.  V.  C.  in  the  case  of  Bell  v.  Tinney,  4  Mad  ;J7-'. 

*  In  re  West,  3  De  G.  M.  &  G.  198.      By  in  which  a  bill  was  riled   by  the  assignees  of 

12  &  13  Vic.  c.  106,  §§  234,  235,  it  was  also  a  bankrupt  to  set  aside  a  settlement  which  had 

enacted,  that  in  any  action  or  suit,  other  than  been  made  by  the  bankrupt  upon  his  wife  and 

an  action  or  suit  brought  by  the  assignees  for  children. 

any  debt  or  demand  for  which  the  bankrupt  -  And  it  is  now  provided  that  the  pro- 
might  have  sustained  an  action  had  he  not  been  duction  of  a  copy  of  the  "  London  Gazette," 
adjudged  bankrupt,  and  whether  at  the  suit  of  containing  a  copy  of  the  order  of  the  Court  of 
or  against  the  assignees,  no  proof  shall  be  Bankruptcy  adjudging  the  debtor  to  be  a  bank- 
required  of  the  petitioning  creditor's  debt,  or  nipt,  is  conclusive  evidence  in  all  legal  pro- 
of the  tea  ling,  or  act  of  bankruptcy,  respect-  ceedings  of  the  debtor  having  been  duly 
ively,  unless  notice  be  given  that  these  matters  adjudged  a  bankrupt  and  of  the  date  of  the 
will  be  disputed.  See  Taylor  on  Evid.  §§  1556,  adjudication.  The  Bankruptcy  Act,  1809  (32 & 
A.  1559;  l'ennell  v.  Home,  3  Drew.  337 ;  and  33  Vic.  c.  71).  §  10.  See  Bevel!  v.  Blake, 
see  Lee  v.  Dennistoun,  -21)  Beav.  465,  where  Sir  L.  R.  7  C.  P.  300;  8  id.  533;  Ex  parte  French, 
John  Rom  illy  fid.  K.  held  the  provisions  to  be  52  L.  J.  Ch.  48. 

inapplicable  to  the  present   practice  in   Chan-  3  Barnard  v.  Ford,  Carrick  v.  Ford,  L.  R.  4 

eery;  but,  in  exercise  of  the  general  jurisdic-  Ch.  247,  L.  JJ. 

tion  which  the  Court   possesses  over  pleadings,  J  Brooke  v.  Lord  Mostyn,  2  Pe   G.  J.  &  S. 

gave  the  defendants  ten  days  from  the  date  of  373,  415;   10  Jur    N.  S.  1114,  1116:    and  see 

the  application,  within  which  to  give  notice  of  Wilton  t.  Hill,  25  L.  J.  Ch.  156.    V.  C.   K.; 

the  intention  to  d  Bpute.  Wall  v.  Rogers,  L.  R.  9  Eq.  58.  M.  R. 

vol.  i.  —  5  bj 


68 


SUITS   BY   PERSONS   WHO    ARE    UNDER   DISABILITY. 


The  laws  and  customs  of  every  country  have  fixed  upon  particular 
periods,  at  which  persons  are  presumed  to  be  capable  of  acting  with 
reason  and  discretion.  According  to  the  English  law,  a  person  is  styled 
an  infant  until  he  attains  the  age  of  twenty-one  years,  which  is  termed 
his  full  age.2 

An  infant  attains  his  full  age  on  the  completion  of  the  day  which  pre- 
cedes the  twenty-first  anniversary  of  his  birth  ;  but,  as  the  law  will  make 
no  fraction  of  a  day,  he  may  do  any  act  which  he  is  entitled  to  do  at  full 
age,  during  any  part  of  such  day.  Thus,  the  will  of  a  man  born  on  the 
1st  of  February,  at  eleven  at  night,  if  made  on  the  last  day  of  Jan- 
uary, in  the  twenty-first  year  of  his  age,  at  one  in  the  morning,  is  a 
good  will.8 

Although,  for  many  purposes,  an  infant  is  under  certain  legal  inca- 
pacities and  disabilities,  a  suit  may  be  sustained  in  any  Court,  either 
of  Law  or  of  Equity,  for  the  assertion  of  his  rights,  or  for  the  security 
of  his  property;  and  for  this  purpose  a  child  has  been  considered  to 
have  commenced,  his  existence  as  soon  as  he  is  conceived  in  the 
womb.4  Under  such  circumstances,  it  is  termed  in  law  an  infant  en 
ventre  sa  mere,  and  a  suit  may  be  sustained  on  its  behalf ;  and  the  Court 
will,  upon  application  in  such  suit,  grant  an  injunction  to  restrain  waste 
from  being  committed  on  his  property.5  In  Robinson  v.  Litton,6  Lord 
Hardwicke  seems  to  have  considered  that  the  point  that  a  Court  of 
Equity  would  grant  an  injunction  to  stay  waste  at  the  suit  of  an  infant 
en  ventre  sa  mere,  though  it  had  often  been  said  arguendo,  had  never 
been  decided ;  but  it  seems  that,  though  Lord  Hardwicke  was  not  aware 
of  the  circumstance,  such  an  injunction  was  actually  granted  by  Lord 
Keeper  Bridgman.7  But  an  infant  can  do  nothing  which  can  bind 
*68  himself  to  the  performance  *  of  any  act;  and  therefore  where 
from  the  nature  of  the  claim  made  by  the  infant  it  would  follow 
that,  if  the  relief  sought  were  granted,  the  rules  of  mutuality  would 
require  something  to  be  done  on  his  part,  the  suit  cannot  be  maintained. 
Thus,  an  infant  cannot  sustain  a  suit  for  the  specific  performance  of  a 
contract;  because,  in  such  cases,  it  is  a  general  principle  of  Courts  of 
Equity  to  interpose  only  where  the  remedy  is  mutual,  and  if  specific 
performance  were  ordered  at  the  suit  of  the  infant,  there  would  be  no 
power  in  the  Court  to  compel  him  to  perform  it  on  his  part,  either  by 
paying  the  money  or  executing  a  conveyance.1 


2  Jacob's  Law  Diet.  tit.  Infant.  The  age  of 
majority  of  females  is  fixed  by  the  Constitution 
of  Vermont  at  eighteen  years.  Young  v. 
Davis,  Brayt.  124;  Sparhawk  ».  Duel,  9  Vt.  41. 

8  Salk.  44,  025  ;  Sir  R.  Rowland's  case, 
id.  265;  1  Ld.  Ray.  480;  2  id.  1096;  1  Bla. 
Com.  463;  1  Jarman  on  Wills,  29;  Herbert  v. 
Torball,  1  Sid.  142;  S.  C.  Raym.  84;  State  v. 
Clark,  3  Harring.  557;  Hamlin  v.  Stephenson, 
4  Dana,  597.  As  to  fractions  of  a  day,  and 
when  they  will  and  will  not  be  regarded  in 
the  law,  see  D'Obree,  Ex  parte,  8  Sumner's 
Ves.  83,  note  (a);  Lester  v.  Garland,  15  id.  248; 
note  (3) ;  Ee  Railwav  Sleepers  Supply  Co.  29 

66 


Ch.  D.  204;  Murfree  v.  Carmack,  4  Yer.  270; 
Berry  v.  Clements,  9  Hum.  312;  S  C.  on 
appeal,  11  How.  398,  Plowman  v.  Williams,  3 
Tenn.  Ch.  181. 

4  See  Wallis  v.  Hodson,  2  Atk.  117. 

6  See  Musgrave  v.  Parry,  2  Vern.  710;  Story, 
Eq.  PI.  §  59,  note. 

6  3  Atk.  209,  211;  see  also  Wallis  v.  Hod- 
son,  2  Atk.  117. 

i  Lutterel's  case  cited  Prec  Ch.  50. 

J  Flight  V.  Bolland,  4  Russ.  298;  Hargrave 
v.  Hargrave.  12  Boa  v.  408;  but  Bee  Allen  v. 
Davidson,  16  Ind.  416. 


INFANTS. 


68 


On  account  of  an  infant's  supposed  want  of  discretion,  and  his  inabil- 
ity to  bind  himself  and  make  himself  liable  to  the  costs,  he  is  incapable 
of  bringing  a  suit  without  the  assistance  of  some  other  person,  who  may 
be  responsible  to  the  Court  for  the  propriety  of  the  suit  in  its  institution 
and  progress.2    Such  person  is  called  the  next  friend  of  the  infant ;  (a) 


2  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  XVI.  8:  Hoyt  v.  Hi'ton,  2 
Edw.  Ch.  202.  There  must  be  a  next  friend 
for  everv  application  on  behalf  of  an  infant, 
Cox  v.  Wright,  9  Jur.  N.  S.  981;  11  W.  K. 
870,  V.  C.  K. ;  see  also  Stuart  v.  Moore,  9 
II.  L.  Cas.  440;  4  Maeq.  H.  L.  1,  36,  n. ;  7  Jur. 
N.  S.  1129;  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  XVI.  8.  In  Ex  parte 
Brocklebank,  6  Ch.  D.  358,  it  was  held  that  an 
infant  creditor  may  issue  a  debtor's  summons 
in  bankruptcy  in  his  own  name  without  a  next 
friend.  An  infant,  by  being  made  party  to  a 
suit,  becomes  thereby  a  ward  of  Court.  Gynn 
v.  Gilbard,  1  Dr.  &*S  356;  7  Jur  N.  S.91; 
and  see  Stuart  v.  Moore,  9  H.  L.  Cas.  440; 
4  Macq.  H.  L.  1,  30,  n.;  7  Jur.  N.  S.  1129;  Re 
Hodge's  Trust,  3  K.  &  J.  213;  3  Jur.  N.  S. 
860.  Where  a  plaintiff  tiles  a  bill  as  an  hi/an', 
infancy  is  a  material  allegation,  and  must  be 
proved,  or  admitted  by  the  answer.     Boyd  v. 


(a)  "  Every  prochein  ami  is  to  be  considered 
as  an  officer  of  the  Court,  specially  appointed 
by  them  to  look  after  the  interests  of  the  infant." 
Parke  B.  in  Morgan  v.  Thorne,  7  M.  &  W. 
400.  An  infant's  next  friend  may  prosecute 
the  suit  without  previous  authority  from  the 
Court.  Judson  v.  Blanchard,  3  Conn.  579  ; 
Klaus  v.  State,  54  Miss.  644  ;  Bcthea  v.  Call,  3 
Ala.  449.  As  his  power  commences  with  the 
suit,  he  cannot  make  a  special  previous  demand 
necessary  for  its  prosecution.  Miles  r.  Boyden, 
3  Rick.  213.  A  next  friend  can  institute  a  suit 
on  behalf  of  a  married  woman  only  by  her 
authority.  Schjott  v.  Schjott,  45  L.  T.  333. 
An  infant  married  woman,  whose  adult  husband 
is  joined  as  a  co-plaintiff  with  her,  need  not  sue 
by  next  friend.  Welch  r.  Bunce,  83  Ind.  382. 
In  McDonald  v,  Weir,  76  Mich.  243,  a  co-plain- 
tiff was  at  the  trial  appointed  next  friend  of  a 
plaintiff  then  discovered  to  be  an  infant.  A 
defendant  should  not  be  next  friend  of  an  infant 
plaintiff.  Re  Burgess,  Burgess  v.  Bottomley, 
W.  N.  (1883)  177  ;  see  Lewis  v.  Nobbs,  8  Ch. 
D.  591.  A  father  has  the  first  and  best  right 
to  represent  his  child  as  next  friend.  Woolf  p. 
Pemberton,  C  Ch.  D.  19  ;  Rue  v.  Meirs,  43  N. 

J.  Eq.  377;  see  Re  G ,  [1892]  l  Ch.  292  ; 

49  &  50  Vic.  c.  27  ;  Re  McGrath,  [1892]  2  Ch. 
496  ;  Wilson  v.  Me-ue-chas,  40  Kansas,  648. 
Where  a  father,  after  authorizing  a  stranger  to 
art  as  next  friend  to  his  infant  children,  died, 
and  his  will  appointed  his  wife,  their  mother, 
guardian  of  the  children,  the  mother  was  held 
to  have  the  right  to  be  substituted  as  next 
friend.     Hutchinson    v.    Norwood,   31    Ch.    D. 


Boyd,  6  Gill  &  J-  25 ;  see  Shirley  v.  Hagar,  3 
Blackf.  228  and  note  ;  Hanly  v.  Levin,  5  Ham. 
227. 

As  to  the  time  for  appointing  a  prochein  ami, 
see  Wilder  v.  Ember,  12  Wend.  191;  Matter  of 
Frits,  2  Paige,  374  ;  Fitch  v.  Fitch,  18  Wend. 
513;  Haines  v.  Oatman,  2  Doug.  430.  In 
Massachusetts  the  next  friend  will  be  admitted 
by  the  Court  without  any  other  record  than  the 
recital  in  the  count.  Miles  v.  Boyden,  3  Pick. 
213.  See  also  T revet  v.  Creath,  Breese,  12; 
Judson  v.  Blanchard,  3  Conn   579. 

"The  law  knows  no  distinction  between 
infants  of  tender  and  of  mature  years,  and 
as  no  special  authority  to  sue  is  requisite 
in  the  case  of  an  infant  just  born,  so  none  is 
requisite  from  an  infant  on  the  very  eve  of 
attaining  his  majority."  Parke  B.  in  Morgan 
v.  Thorne,  7  M.  &  W.  400,  408. 


237.  In  England  it  is  held  that  a  married 
woman  cannot  be  a  next  friend.  Ibid.;  Re 
Somerset,  34  Ch.  D.  465.  But  in  this  country 
it  has  been  held  that  a  married  woman  can  be 
an  infant's  next  friend  when  a  judgment  for 
the  costs  of  the  suit  can  be  collected  from  her. 
Budd  v.  Rutherford  (Ind.),  30  N.  E.  1111.  As 
to  an  illegitimate  child,  see  Barnardo  r.  Me- 
Hugh,  [1891]  A.C  388.  The  next  friend  must 
have  no  personal  interest,  however  remote  or 
indirect.  Re  Burgess,  25  Ch.  D.  243  ;  Re  Cor- 
sellis,  50  L.  T.  703.  Without  a  guardian  ad 
litem,  there  can  be  no  recovery  against  an  infant. 
Thorp  v.  Minor  (N.  C),  13  S.  E.  Rep.  702. 
The  appointment  of  a  next  friend  and  his  ac- 
ceptance should  usually  appear  of  record  ;  but  a 
natural  guardian,  whose  authority  does  not  so 
appear,  may  be  shown  by  parol  to  possess  it. 
Simmons  v.  Baynard,  30  Fed.  Rep.  532;  Stin- 
son  v.  Pickering,  70  Maine,  273;  Fuller  v. 
Smith,  49  Vt.  253  ;  Clark  v.  Piatt,  30  Conn. 
282  ;  Price  v.  Winter,  15  Fla.  G6  ;  Treiber  v. 
Shafer,  18  Iowa,  29;  Rhoads  v.  Rhoads.  43  III. 
239  ;  Myers  r.  Myers,  6  W.  Va.  369;  Daniel  I). 
Hanagan,  5  J.  J.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  48.  As  to  a 
widowed  mother's  authority,  see  Re  Lemon, 
19  L.  R.  Ir.  575.  If  there  is  a  general  guardian 
and  he  does  not  appear,  or  has  an  adverse  in- 
terest, a  guardian  ad  litem  takes  his  place  in 
the  suit.  Mansur  v.  Pratt,  101  Mass.  (id  : 
Stiison  V.  Pickering,  70  Maine.  273  :  Wells  r. 
Smith.  44  Miss.  290  ;  Miller  v.  Cabell.  81  Ky. 
178  ;  Wead  V.  Cantwell.  3b  Hun,  528  ;  Peter- 
son v.  liailiif  (Minn.),  54  N.  W.  Rep.  185  An 
infant   cannot  sue  without  a  next  friend  or 

67 


68 


SUITS    BY    PERSONS    WHO    ARE    UNDER    DISABILITY. 


and  if  a  bill  is  filed  on  behalf  of  an  infant  without  a  next  friend,  the 
defendant  may  move  to  have  it  dismissed  with  costs,  to  be  paid  by  the 


guardian,  even  when  emancipated  by  his 
parents.  Hoskins  v.  White  (Mont  ),  32  Pac 
Rep.  163.  Van  Pelt  v.  Chattanooga  K.  Co. 
(Ga,)  15  S.  E.  Rep.  622.  The  fact  that  infant 
defendants  are  represented  by  a  general  guar- 
dian, instead  of  a  next  friend,  as  is  warranted 
by  the  practice  of  a  State  Court,  does  n<t  affect 
the  conclusiveness  of  its  judgment  in  a  Federal 
Court.  Colt  v.  Colt,  111  U.  S  566.  The  lower 
Court  of  Bankruptcy,  from  which  an  appeal  is 
taken,  is,  it  seems,  the  proper  tribunal  to  ap- 
point the  guardian  ad  litem.  Re  Lowndes,  3  M 
B.  R.  216. 

While  undue  facility  should  not  be  given  to 
mere  volunteers,  yet  no  discouragement  will  be 
placed  in  the  way  of  persons  suing  in  good 
faith  as  next  friends.  Nalder  v.  Hawkins,  2 
Myl.  &  K.  243.  An  adult  defendant  may,  it 
seems,  waive  the  benefit  of  a  next  friend  to  an 
infant  plaintiff  as  security  for  costs.  Ex  parte 
Brocklebank,  6  Ch.  D.  358,  360.  No  appoint- 
ment or  subsequent  confirmation  by  the  infant 
party  is  requisite,  whether  he  is  of  tender  age 
or  of  years  of  discretion  ;  and  it  is  immate- 
rial whether  he  is  cognizant  of  the  proceedings, 
or  whether  he  is  in  the  country  or  abroad. 
Middleditch  ?;.  Williams,  47  N.  J  Eq.585.  See 
Simpson  on  Infants  (2d-ed.),  468;  Schouler, 
Dom.  Rel.  (4th  ed.)  §  449.  If  an  infant  on 
coming  of  age  repudiates  a  Suit  brought  in  his 
name,  his  name  should  be  stricken  out  as  plain- 
tiff and  added  as  a  defendant.  Silber  Light 
Co.  v  Silber,  12  Ch.  D.  717,  724. 

The  power  of  a  next  friend  extends  to  all 
matters  properly  relating  to  the  conduct  and 
prosecution  of  the  suit,  and  he  may  therefore 
arrange  for  hearings,  the  taking  of  depositions, 
&c.  Higginson  v.  Hall,  10  Ch.  D.  235;  Knack- 
bull  v.  Fowle,  1  Ch.  D.  604  ;  Dupuy  v.  Wels- 
ford,  42  L.  T.  730  ;  Kingsbury  v.  Buckner,  134 
U.  S.  650  ;  Beddinger  v.  Smith  (Ark.),  13  S. 
W.  734  ;  Walker  v.  Ferrin,  4  Vt.  53  ;  Pollock 
v.  Buie,  43  Miss.  140;  Biddinger  v.  Wiland,  67 
Md.  359  ;  Walker  r.  Ferrin,  4  Vt.  523.  He  may 
employ  an  attorney  at  law  for  the  suit,  and  if 
there  is  no  general  guardian,  he  has  authority 
to  receive  payment  of  the  judgment  recovered, 
receipt  for  it  and  enter  satisfaction  thereof. 
Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad  Co.  v.  Fitzpatrick.  36 
Md.  619.  He  is  not  a  "  party  to  the  action  " 
within  the  English  rules  of  1875,  so  as  to  be 
■compellable  to  make  a  discovery  of  documents. 
Dyke  v  Stephens,  30  Ch.  D.  189;  Scott  v.  Con3. 
iBank,  W.  N.  (1893)  56;  Gray  v.  Parke,  155 
Mass  433.  And  he  is  not  in  strictness  a  party 
to  the  suit  for  any  purpose.  Ibid  ;  Sinclair  v. 
Sinclair,  13  M.&W.  646;  Ruckman  v  Palisade 
Land  Co.  1  Fed.  Rep.  367;  Brown  v.  Hull,  16 
Vt.  673  ;  Brvant  v.  Livermore,  20  Minn.  313, 
68 


342,  McDonald  v.  McDonald,  24  Ind.  68  The 
suit  is  not  abated  if  the  next  friend  dies,  or  the 
minors  reach  their  majority  while  it  is  pending; 
but  they  may  then  appear  and  prosecute  the 
suit  as  adults.  Tucker  v.  Wilson,  68  Miss.  693. 
The  answer  should  properly  neither  admit  nor 
deny  the  plaintiff's  charges,  but  submit  the 
matter  to  the  Court's  judgment  and  protection. 
Dow  v.  Jewell,  21  N.  H.  470  ;  Bush  v.  Linthi- 
cum,  59  Md.  344;  pod,  p.  169.  The  answer,  if 
made  and  sworn  to  by  next  friend,  is  not  evi- 
dence in  the  suit  in  the  infant's  favor.  Bulk  lev 
v.  Van  Wyck,  5  Paige,  536  ;  Stephenson  v. 
Stephenson,  6  Paige,  353;  or  against  the  in- 
fant in  other  suits.  Hiatt  v.  Brooks,  11  Ind. 
508.  See  Coffin  v.  Heath,  6  Met.  (Mass  )  76  ; 
Benson  v.  Wright,  4  Md.  Ch.  278.  But  the 
next  friend  cannot,  without  the  Court's  ap- 
proval, vitally  affect  or  impair  the  infant's 
interests  by  waivers,  admissions,  omissions,  or 
stipulations.  Morgan  v  Thome,  7  M.  &  W. 
400;  Holden  v.  Heani,  1  Beav.  445  -,  Mills  v. 
Dennis,  3  John.  Ch.  367:  Bowers  v.  Smith,  10 
Paige,  193;  Bryant  v.  Tracy,  27  Abb.  N.  Cas. 
183,  and  note  ;  Walsh  v.  Walsh,  116  Mass. 
377  ;  Tripp  v.  Gifford,  155  Mass.  108  ,  Claxton 
v.  Claxton,  56  Mich.  557 ;  Cartwnght  v.  Wise, 
14  111.  417  ;  Simpson  v.  Alexander,  6  Cold. 
(Tenn.)  630  ;  McClure  v  Farthing,  51  Mo  109; 
Henly  v.  Gore,  4  Dana  (Ky.),  133  ;  Ingersoll 
v.  Ingersoll,  42  Miss.  155  ;  Johnson  v.  McCabe, 
id.  255. 

The  next  friend  cannot,  of  his  own  motion, 
submit  the  cause  to  arbitration.  Tucker  r. 
Dabbs,  12  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  18;  Jones  v.  Payne, 
41  Ga.  23  ;  Fort  v.  Battle,  13  S.  &  M.  (Miss.) 
133.  Or  bind  the  infant's  estate  for  attor- 
ney's fees,  although  an  all  wance  therefor  may 
be  made  by  the  Court.  M.  E.  Church  0. 
Jacques,  3  John.  (N.  Y.)  1  ;  Houck  v.  Brid- 
well,  28  Mo.  App.  644.  The  attorney  acting 
for  an  infant  plaintiff  is  the  attorney  of  the  next 
friend.  Almack  v.  Moore,  2  It.  L.  R.  90. 
Nor  can  he,  without  the  express  sanction  of  the 
Court,  compromise  the  suit.  Cuthbert  v.  Chau- 
vet,136N.  Y.  332;  32  N.  E.  Rep.  1088;  Edsall 
v.  Vandemark,  39  Barb.  589  :  Tripp  v.  Gifford, 
155  Mass.  108  ,  Miles  v.  Kaigler,  10  Yerg. 
(Tenn.)  10  ;  Crotty  v.  Eagle  (W.  Va.),  13  S. 
E  Rep.  59  ;  Isaacs  v  Boyd,  5  Porter  (Ala.), 
388  ;  Holker  v  Parker,  7  Cranch,  496  ;  Clark 
v.  (rout  (S.  C),  13  S.  E.  Rep.  602;  see  Walsh 
»■  Walsh.  116  Mass.  377;  Brooke  v.  Mostyn,  2 
DeG.  J.  &  S  373,  415;  Wilton  v-  Hill,  25 
L.  J.  Ch.  156  ;  Wall  v.  Rogers,  L.  R.  6  Eq.  58. 
Hence  an  agreement  that,  if  there  is  no  appeal 
from  a  judgment  of  non-suit  against  an  infant 
plaintiff,  the  defendant  will  not  ask  for  costs, 
though  fairly  made,   is  for  the  next  friend's 


INFANTS. 


69 


solicitor.  In  a  case,  however,  where  a  bill  was  filed  by  the  plantiff  as 
an  adult,  and  it  was  after  wards' discovered  that  he  was  an  infant  at  the 
time  of  tiling  the  bill,  and  still  continued  so,  it  was,  at  the  hearing  of  a 
motion  by  the  defendant  that  the  bill  be  dismissed,  with  costs  to  be  paid 
by  the  plaintiff's  solicitor,  ordered  that  the  plaintiff  should  be  at  liberty 
to  amend,  by  inserting  a  next  friend.3 

When  an  infant  claims  a  right,  or  suffers  an  injury,  on  account  of 
winch  it  is  necessary  to  resort  to  the  Court  of  Chancery,  his  near- 
est relation  is  supposed  to  be  the  person  who  will  take  him  *  under  *69 
his  protection,  and  institute  a  suit  to  assert  his  rights  •  *  and  it 
is  for  this  reason  that  the  person  who  institutes  a  suit  on  behalf  of  an 
infant  is  termed  his  next  friend.  But,  as  it  frequently  happens  that 
the  nearest  relation  of  the  infant  is  the  person  who  invades  his  rights, 
or  at  least  neglects  to  give  that  protection  to  the  infant  which  his  con- 
sanguinity or  affinity  calls  upon  him  to  give,  the  Court,  in  favor  of  in- 
fants, will  permit  any  person  to  institute  suits  on  their  behalf:2  and 
whoever  thus  acts  the  part  which  the  nearest  relation  ought  to  take,  is 


3  Flight  v.  Bolland,  4  Russ   298. 
i  See  Bank  of  the  United  States  v.  Ritchie, 
8  Peters,  128. 

2  Andrews  v  Cradock,  Prec.Ch.  376,  Anon. 
1  Atk.  570;  Story,  Eq.  PI,  §  58,  note.  See 
Cross  v.  Cross,  8  Beav  455.  A  defendant, 
however,  may  not  be  a  plaintiffs  next  friend, 
Payne  v.  Little,   13   Beav.   114;  Anon.  11  Jur. 


258,  V.  C.  E.;  unless  he  is  wholly  without 
interest  in  the  subject-matter.  He  Taylor,  W. 
X.  (1881)  51,  M.  R.  But  when  the  husband 
was  a  defendant  in  right  of  his  wife,  and  next 
friend  of  the  infant  plaintiff,  his  name  was 
stricken  out  as  defendant,  and  the  wife  given 
liberty  to  defend  separately.  Lewis  o.  Nobbs, 
8  Ch.  D.  591. 


benefit,  and  not  for  the  infant's,  if  the  latter  is 
without  property,  and  is  not  binding  upon  the 
infant.  Rhodes  v.  Swithenbank,  22  Q.  B.  D. 
577.  If  the  next  friend  acts  in  good  faith  and 
with  reasonable  care,  the  taxed  costs  in  a  suit 
in  which  he  is  unsuccessful  will  be  reimbursed 
to  him.  Voorhees  v.  Polhemus,  30  N.  J.  Eq. 
456,  and  note.  See  Walters  v.  Woodbridge,  7 
Ch.  D.  504.  He  is  liable  for  his  negligent 
management  causing  injury  to  the  infant. 
Knickerbocker  v.  De  Freest,  2  Paige,  304.  And 
if  he  officiously  procured  his  appointment,  or 
lias  mismanaged  the  case  or  shown  bad  faith, 
lie  may  be  taxed  with  costs,  though  not  strictly 
a  party  to  the  suit.  lit  Blake,  29  Ch.  D.  913  ; 
Smith  v.  Smith,  108  N%.  C.  365.  A  guardian 
is  not  responsible  for  a  loss  sustained  by  his 
ward  from  his  failure  to  resort  to  a  new  and  ex- 
traordinary remedy,  the  scope  and  effect  of 
which  are  doubtful.  White  v.  Robinson,  64 
N.  < '.  698.  A  guardian,  having  no  title  or  in- 
terest in  his  ward's  estate,  cannot  maintain  a 
bill  in  Equity  in  his  own  name  to  avoid  the 
ward's  conveyance  of  his  property.  Lombard 
v.  Morse,  155  Mass.  136.  Even  when  another 
Court  has  ordinarily  exclusive  jurisdiction  of 
infants'  property  rights,  a  purchase  on  credit  by 
a  guardian  for  his  ward,  which  does  not  directly 
relate  to  the  latter's  estate,  is  cognizable  in 
Equity.  Corker  v  Jones,  110  U.  S.  317. 
The  Court  will  always  interpose  to  protect  thu 


infant  against  the  next  friend's  misconduct  or 
his  collusion  with  the  adverse  party.  The  Etna, 
Ware,  462  ;  Crittenden  v.  Cantield,  87  Mich. 
152;  Newland  v.  Gentry,  18  B  Mon.  (Ky. ) 
666;  Barrett  v.  Oliver,  7  Gill  &  J.  (Md.j  191  ; 
Fowlet  v.  Lewis,  36  W.  Va.  112  ;  Eidam  v. 
Finnegan,  48  Minn.  53  ;  16  L.  R.  A.  507.  It 
may  make  a  reference  to  a  Master  to  determine 
whether  a  suit  instituted  by  next  friend  is  for 
the  infant's  benefit,  Garr  v.  Drake,  2  John. 
Ch.  542  ;  and  it  may  at  any  time  substitute 
another  person  m  place  of  the  next  friend. 
Walker  v.  Hull,  35  Mich.  488  ;  Benly  V.  (lore, 
supra.  It  may  remove  the  next  friend  for  other 
causes  than  misconduct,  —  such  as  a  refusal  to 
appeal.  Dupuy  v.  Welsford,  28  W.  R.  762  ; 
42  L.  T.  730.  It  will  use  great  care  in  sanction- 
ing a  compromise  of  the  infant's  interests. 
King  v.  King,  15  III.  187.  It  cannot,  it  seems, 
sanction  such  compromise  against  the  wishes  of 
the  guardian  ail  litem,  acting  under  counsel's 
advice.  See  Re  Birchall,  Wilson  v.  Birchall, 
10  Ch.  I).  41  ;  Wilton  ».  Hill,  25  L.  .1.  Ch  156, 
V.  C  K.  :  Brooke  o  lord  Mostyn,  2  De  G.  J. 
&  S.  373,  415:  Fadelle  v.  Bernard.  19  W.  R. 
555:  Re  Cockcroft,  Broadbent  v  Groves,  24  Ch 
D  94;Coakst>.  Boswell.ll  A  pp.  Cas.  232,  over- 
ruling Boswell  v.  Conks.  27  Ch.  1).  4:24:  ante, 
p.  66.  As  to  the  form  of  a  judgment  or  decree 
in  the  infant's  favor  see  Texas  Cent.  Ky.  CO.  v. 
Stewart  (Texas),  20  S.  W.  Rep   962. 

69 


TO 


SUITS    BY    PERSONS    WHO    ARE    UNDER    DISABILITY. 


also  styled  the  next  friend  of  the  infant,  and  is  named  as  such  in  the 
bill.8  And  although  an  infant  has  had  a  guardian  assigned  him  by  the 
Court,  or  appointed  by  will,  yet,  where  the  infant  is  plaintiff,  the  course 
is  not  to  call  the  guardian  by  that  name,  but  to  call  him  the  next  friend. 
But  where  the  infant  is  defendant,  the  guardian  is  so  called;  and  if 
the  guardian  be  so  called  where  the  infant  is  plaintiff,  it  is  no  cause  of 
demurrer.4 

Before  the  name  of  any  person  is  used  as  the  next  friend  of  an  infant, 
he  must  sign  a  written  authority  to  the  solicitor  for  that  purpose,  which 
authority  is  filed  with  the  bill.5 

It  frequently  occurs  that  two  or  more  suits  for  the  same  purpose  are 
instituted  in  his  name,  by  different  persons,  each  acting  as  his  next 
friend;  in  such  cases  the  Court  will,  where  no  decree  has  been  made  in 
any  of  the  suits,  direct  an  inquiry  to  be  made  at  chambers  as  to  which 
suit  is  most  for  his  benefit,  and  when  that  point  is  ascertained  will 
stay  the  proceedings  in  the  other  suits.6  Where  no  decree  has  been 
made  in  any  of  the  suits,7  and  they  are  all  attached  to  the  same  branch 
of  the  Court,  and  none  of  them  are  in  the  paper  for  hearing,  such 
inquiry  will  be  directed  on  an  ex  parte  motion;8  the  Court  being  sat- 
isfied, in  the  first  instance,  with  the  allegation  that  the  suits  are  for 
the  same  purpose.9  Where  the  suits  are  attached  to  different 
*  70  branches  of  the  Court,  an  order  *  must  be  obtained,  in  the  first 
instance,  for  the  transfer  of  one  of  the  suits,  so  that  they  may 
both  be  before  the  same  Judge ; 1  and  the  order  for  the  inquiry  is 
obtained  on  special  motion,  of  which  notice  must  be  given  to  the  other 
parties  to  the  suits.2 

The  order  for  the  inquiry  should  be  made  in  both  suits,  and  does  not 


3  Ld  Red.  25  ;  see  Snow  r.  Hole,  15  Sim. 
161;  Green  v.  Badley,  7  Beav.  271. 

•>  Toth.  173;  Wyatt's  P.  R.  221;  see  Holmes 
V.  Field,  12  III.  421.  An  infant  may  sue  by  1  i is 
next  friend,  notwithstanding  he  have  a  guard- 
ian, if  the  guardian  do  not  dissent.  Thomas  c. 
Dike,  11  Vt.  273;  see  Trask  r.  Stone,  7  Mass. 
241.  The  general  guardian  of  infants  cannot 
file  a  hill  in  his  own  name  to  obtain  possession 
of  the  property  of  his  wards.  But  he  must 
file  it  in  the  name  of  the  infants  as  their  next 
friend.  Bradley  v.  Amidon,  10  Paige,  235. 
Ami  if  he  sues  in  their  name  as  their  general 
guardian,  he  will  be  treated  as  a  next  friend. 
Simpson  v.  Alexander,  6  Coldw.  619.  The 
Court  never  appoints  a  guardian  to  prosecute 
for,  but  only  to  defend,  an  infant  party.  Priest 
v-  Hamilton,  2  Tyler,  44. 

5  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86.  §  11;  see  R.  S  C. 
1883.  Ord  XVI  20;  46  &  47  Vic.  c.  49,  §  4, 
Sched.;  Cox  v.  James,  19  Ch  T>.  55;  as  to  his 
liability,  see  Re  Flower,  19  W.  II.  578,  and  as 
to  costs,  see  post,  p.  79  In  an  injunction  case 
the  authority  was  permitted  to  be  tiled  the  day 
after  an  information.  Att.-Gen.  v  Murray,  13 
W  R.  65,  V  C.  K.  For  form  of  authority, 
see  Vol.  Ill 

70 


6  Ld.  Red.  27;  Mortimer*.  West,  1  Swanst. 
358;  Virtue  v.  Miller,  19  W.  R.  406 ;  Story,  Eq. 
PI.  §  60.  For  forms  of  the  orders,  see  2  Seton, 
707,  Nos.  8,  9. 

"  Rundle  v.  Rundle,  11  Beav.  33. 

8  For  forms  of  motion  paper,  and  notice  of 
special  motion,  see  Vol.  III. 

9  Sullivan  v.  Sullivan,  2  Mer   40. 

1  This  was  the  course  pursued  in  Knight  v. 
Knight,  L.  J.T.,  and  M.  R.,  29  June,  1859,  and 
V.  C.  Stuart,  29  June,  1859,  and  9  Nov.,  1859. 
Compare  Duff  or  t  r.  Arrowsmith,  5  De.  G.  M. 
&  G.  434.  The  order  fur  transfer  is  made  by 
the  L.  C.  or  L.  JJ  ,  and  the  M.  R.  if  transferred 
from  or  to  the  M.  R.  (5  Vic.  c.  5,  §  30),  and  by 
the  L.  C.  or  L.  JJ.  alone  in  other  cases;  but 
the  order  will  not  be  made  unless  the  consent 
of  the  Judges  from  and  to  whom  the  cause  is 
transferred  is  first  obtained.  Such  consent  is 
usually  signified,  as  of  course,  on  the  matter 
being  mentioned  by  the  counsel  of  the  party 
moving.  Formerly,  it  would  seem  that  the 
order  for  inquiry  might  be  made  by  either 
Court,  without  either  of  the  causes  being  trans- 
ferred.     Starten  r.  Bartholomew,  5  Beav.  372. 

2  See  Bi>nd  v.  Barnes,  2  De  (i  F.  &  J.  387. 
For  form  of  notice  of  motion,  see  Vol   III. 


BANKRUPTS.  *  71 

of  itself  stay  the  proceedings  in  the  suits ; 3  and  the  amendment  of  one 
of  the  bills,  pending  the  inquiry,  does  not  stay  the  inquiry.4  When 
the  result  of  the  inquiry  has  been  certified,  any  application  that  may 
be  necessary  is  made  by  motion,  on  notice.  Under  special  circum- 
stances, the  Court  may,  upon  motion,  on  notice,  make  an  order  staying 
the  suits,  without  directing  an  inquiry.5 

If  upon  the  inquiry  it  appears  that,  although  it  would  be  beneficial 
to  the  infant  to  prosecute  the  first,  yet  it  will  be  more  beneficial  to  him 
to  prosecute  a  subsequent  suit,  the  Court  will  stay  the  first  suit,  and 
give  the  next  friend  his-  costs.6  Where  a  decree  has  been  made  in 
any  of  the  suits  it  is  not  usual  to  direct  an  inquiry;7  but  the  other 
suits  will  be  stayed,  liberty  being  given  to  each  of  the  next  friends  in 
the  stayed  suits  to  apply  for  the  conduct  of  the  suit  in  which  the  decree 
was  made.8  When  another  next  friend  takes  upon  himself  to  file  a 
second  bill,  it  is  incumbent  upon  him  to  show  some  defect  in  the  first 
suit,  or  a  decided  preference  in  the  second;  if  their  merits  are  only 
equal,  the  priority  must  prevail.9 

As  a  check  to  the  general  license  to  institute  suits  on  behalf  of 
infants,  the  Court  will,  upon  the  application  of  the  defendant,  or  of 
any  person  acting  as  next  friend  of  the  plaintiff  for  the  purpose  of  the 
application,10  where  a  strong  case  is  shown  that  a  suit  preferred  in  the 
name  of  an  infant  is  not  for  the  infant's  benefit,  or  is  instituted  from 
improper  motives,  direct  an  inquiry  concerning  the  propriety  of  the 
suit;11  but  an  objection  at  the  hearing  to  the  propriety  of  the 
suit  was  held  too  late.12  («)  If,  upon  such  inquiry,  it  *  appears  *  71 
that  the  suit  is  not  for  the  benefit  of  the  infant,  either  the  pro- 
ceedings will  be  stayed,1  or  else,  if  there  is  no  excuse  for  the  fact  of  the 

3  Westby  v.  Westby,  1  De  G.  &  S.  410;  11  9  Per  Lord  (Tottenham,  Campbell  v.  Camp- 
Jur.  704.                                                                       bell,  2  M.  &  C  30;  and  see  Harris  r.  Harris, 

4  Goodale  v.  Gawthorne,  1  M'N.  &  G.  319,      10  W.  R.  31,  V.  C.  K. 

323;  but  it  is  irregular,  in  such  a  case,  to  obtain  10  Guy  v.  Guy,  2  Beav.  460. 

an  orderof  course  to  amend.    Fletcher  v.  Moore,  n  Stevens  v.  Stevens,  6  Mad.  97;  Lyons  v. 

11  Beav  617;  13  Jur.  1063.  Blenkin,   Jac.  245,259;  Smallwood   ».  Butter, 

5  Staniland  v.  Staniland,  M.  R.,  21  Jan.,  9  Hare,  24.  For  form  of  notice  of  motion,  see 
1864;  2  Seton,  708,  No.  10;  and  see  Frost  v.  Vol.  III.  For  form  of  order,  see  2  Seton, 
Ward,  12  W.  R.  285,  L.  J.J.;    2  De  G.  J.  &  S.  707,  No.  7. 

70;  Harvey  v.  Coxwell,  32  L.  T.  N.  S.  52.  12  Lacy  v.  Burchnall,  3  N.  R.  293. 

6  Starten  v.  Bartholomew,  6  Beav.  143.  1  LA.   Red.   27;    see   also  Da  Costa  v.   Da 
»  Taylor  v.  Oldham,  Jac.  527;  but  see  Har-      Costa,  3  P.   W.    140;  Richardson  v.  Miller.   1 

risv.  Harris,  10  VV.  R.  31,  V.  C.  K.  Sim.   133;    Fulton  v.  Rosevelt,   1  Paige,    178; 

s  Kenvon  v.  Kenyon,  35  Beav.  300 ;  and  see  Bowel)  v.  Idle}',  1  Edw.  Ch.  148  ;  Story,  Eq.  PI. 

Frosty.  Ward,  2  De  G.  J.  &  S.  70;  Harris  p.  §60.     In   Da  Costa  v.  Da  Costa,  the  inquiry 

Harris,  10  W.  R.  31,  V.  C.  K.  was  directed  upon  a  petition;  but  the  modern 


(a)    A  child  being  by  birth  subject  to  its  drews  v.  Salt,  L.  R.  8Ch.  622;  Re  Clarke,  21 

father,  "  it  is  for  the  general  interest  of  fami-  Ch.   D.  817;    Re  Scanlan,  40  Ch.  D.  200;  Re 

lies,  and  for  the  general  interest  of  children,  Plomley,  47  L.  T.  283.     The  father  has.  there- 

and  really  for  the  interest  of  the  particular  in-  fore,  the  strongest  risiht  to  be  his  child's  next 

fant,  that  the  Court   should  not,  except  in  very  friend.      Woolf  v.   Pemberton,  6  Ch.  D.    19; 

extreme  cases,  interfere  with  the  discretion  of  ante,  p.   68,    note.      As   to    custody,    see   Re 

the  father,  but  leave  him  to  the  responsibility  Elderton,  25  Ch.  D   220;  Re  Brown,  13  Q.  B. 

of    exercising    that   power  which   nature   has  D.  614.     As  to  advances  and  maintenance,  see 

given  him  by  the  birth  of  the  child."     In  re  Re   Tanner,  53  L.  J.  Ch.  1108;  Re  Evans,  26 

Agar-Elhs,  24  Ch.  D.  317,  334.     See  also   An-  Ch.  D.  58. 

71 


72 


SUITS    BY   PERSONS    WHO    ARE   UNDER    DISABILITY. 


suit  having  been  instituted,  the  bill  will  be  dismissed  with  costs,  to  be 
paid  by  the  next  friend;  2  and  where  it  appeared  clearly  upon  affidavits 
that  the  suit  was  commenced  by  the  next  friend  to  promote  his  own 
views,  and  not  for  the  benefit  of  the  infant,  such  an  order  was  made 
summarily,  and  without  an  inquiry.3  Where  an  application  was 
made  on  behalf  of  the  defendants,  that  the  next  friend  of  the  infant 
plaintiff  be  restrained  from  further  proceeding  with  the  suit,  and  that 
a  new  next  friend  might  be  appointed  to  conduct  it  in  his  stead,  — 
which  application  was  supported  by  strong  affidavits  to  show  that  the 
suit  had  in  fact  been  instituted  from  improper  motives,  for  the  purpose 
of  benefiting  the  solicitor,  at  whose  request  the  person  named  as  next 
friend  (who  was  a  stranger  to  the  family,  and  had  lately  held  the  situa- 
tion of  farm  servant  or  bailiff  at  monthly  wages)  had  consented  to  act 
as  such,  — the  Master  was  directed  to  inquire,  not  only  whether  the  suit 
was  for  the  benefit  of  the  infant,  but  whether  the  next  friend  was  a 
fit  and  proper  person  to  be  continued  in  that  character,  and  who  would 
be  the  proper  person  to  conduct  the  suit  in  case  the  next  friend  was 
removed.4  Where  a  decree  is  made  in  the  suit,  it  is  irregular  to  direct 
an  inquiry  whether  any  benefit  has  accrued  to  the  infant  from  the  suit 
in  such  a  form  as  to  make  the  answer  to  that  inquiry  depend  on  the 
result  of  the  accounts  directed  by  the  decree.5 

The  result  of  the  cases  seems  to  be  that  the  Court  exercises  a  very 
careful  discretion6  on  the  one  hand,  in  order  to  facilitate  the  proper 
exercise  of  the  right  which  is  given  to  all  persons  to  file  a  bill  on  behalf 
of  infants;  and  on  the  other,  to  prevent  any  abuse  of  that  right  and 
any  wanton  expense  to  the  prejudice  of  infants.7 

No  inquiry,  however,  as  to  the  propriety  of  the  suit,  will  be 
*72  *  ordered  at  the  instigation  of  the  next  friend  himself;  because 
the  Court  considers,  that  in  commencing  a  suit,  the  next  friend 
undertakes,  on  his  own  part,  that  the  suit  he  has  so  commenced  is  for 
the  benefit  of  the  infant.1  This  rule,  nevertheless,  applies  only  to 
cases  where  an  application  is  made  for  such  an  inquiry  in  the  cause 
itself;  if  there  is  another  cause  pending  by  which  the  infant's  property 
is  subject  to  the  control  and  disposition  of  the  Court,  such  an  inquiry 
is  not  only  permitted,  but  is  highly  proper,  when  fairly  and  bona  fide 
made,  and  may  have  the  effect  of  entitling  the  next  friend  to  repayment 


practice  is  to  apply  to  the  Court  upon  motion,  of 
which  notice  is  given  to  the  next  friend.  See, 
however,  Anderton  v.  Yates,  5  De  G-  &  S.  202. 

2  Fox  i\  Suwerkrop,  1  Beav.  58:5 ;  Re  Elsorn, 
Thomas  v.  Elsom,  W.  N.  (1877)  177. 

8  Sale  v.  Sale,  1  Beav.  586 ;  see  also  Guy  v. 
Guy,  2  Beav.  460;  Staniland  v.  Staniland,  ante, 
p.  70. 

■J  Naldert'.  Hawkins,  2  M.  &  K.  243:  Tow- 
sey  v.  Groves,  9  Jur.  N.  S.  194;  11  W.  R.  252, 
V  C.  K.;  see  also  Clayton  v.  Clarke,  2  Giff. 
575;  7  Jur.  N.  S.  562,  9  W.  R.  718,  L.  JJ.  ; 
Raven  v.  Kerl,  2  Phil  632;  Gravatt  v.  Tann, 
15  W.  R.  38:3,  M.  R.;  W,  N.  (18G6)  327,  405, 
L.  JJ. 

72 


5  Clayton  v.  Clarke,  3  De  G.  F.  &  J.  682; 
7  Jur.  N.  S.  562;  2  Giff.  575;  7  Jur.  N.  S.  252. 

6  Per  Lord  Langdale  M.  R.  in  Starten  v. 
Bartholomew,  6  Beav.  144;  and  see  Clayton  v. 
Clarke,  mpra. 

7  See  Matter  of  Frits,  2  Paige,  374;  Waring 
v.  Crane,  2  Paige,  79 

1  Jones  v.  Powell,  2  Mer.  141.  But  a  refer- 
ence will  be  directed,  as  to  the  propriety  of  the 
suit,  upon  the  petition  and  affidavit  of  the  infant 
that  the  suit  was  commenced  without  his  knowl- 
edge, and  that  he  believed  it  to  be  groundless 
Garr  v.  Drake,  2  Johu.  Ch.  542. 


INFANTS.  *  73 

of  his  costs  out  of  the  infant's  estate,  even  though  the  suit  should  turn 
out  unfortunate,  and  the  bill  be  dismissed  with  costs.2 

If  an  infant  is  made  a  co-plaintiff  with  others  in  a  bill,  and  it  appears 
that  it  will  be  more  for  his  benefit  that  he  should  be  made  a  defendant, 
an  order  to  strike  his  name  out  as  plaintiff,  and  to  make  him  a  defend- 
ant, may  be  obtained  upon  motion  or  summons,  on  notice  in  either 
case;3  and  an  infant  heir-at-law,  out  of  whose  estate  a  charge  is  sought 
to  be  raised,  ought  to  be  made  a  defendant,  and  not  a  plaintiff,  although 
he  is  interested  in  the  charge  when  raised;  and  where  an  infant  heir 
had,  under  such  circumstances,  been  made  a  co-plaintiff,  the  cause  was 
ordered  to  stand  over,  with  liberty  for  the  plaintiffs  to  amend,  by  mak- 
ing the  heir-at-law  a  defendant  instead  of  plaintiff,  and  thereupon  to 
prove  the  settlement  anew  against  him  as  a  defendant.4  The  reason 
given  for  this  practice  is,  because  an  infant  defendant,  where  his 
inheritance  is  concerned,  has  in  general  a  day  given  him,  after  attain- 
ing twenty-one,  to  show  cause,  if  he  can,  against  the  decree,  and  is  in 
some  other  respects  privileged  beyond  an  adult;  but  an  infant  plaintiff 
has  no  such  privilege,  and  is  as  much  bound  as  one  of  full  age.5  In 
amicable  suits,  however,  it  is  often  an  advantage  to  make  an  infant  the 
plaintiff;  because  he  may  have  such  relief  as  he  is  entitled  to,  though 
not  prayed  for.6 

An  infant  is  usually  bound  by  a  decree  in  a  cause  in  which  he  him- 
self is  plaintiff,  yet  there  is  no  instance  of  the  Court  binding  the  inheri- 
tance of  an  infant  by  any  discretionary  act;  and  from  this 
principle  it  follows,  that  where  an  infant  *  heir  is  plaintiff,  it  is  *  73 
not  the  practice  to  establish  the  will,  or  to  declare  it  well 
proved,1  although,  if  there  be  no  question  raised  concerning  its  validity, 
the  Court  will  in  many  respects  act  upon  it.2 

In  general,  where  decrees  are  made  in  suits  by  infant  plaintiffs,  it  is 
not  usual  to  give  the  infant  a  day  to  show  cause.3  (a)     When  a  day  is 

2  Taner  v.  Ivie,  2  Ves.  Sr.  466.  It  is  for  the  ants;  see  post,  Chap  IV.  §  10;  and  see  Seton, 
Judge's  discretion  whether  the  inquiry  shall  he      419,  686-689,  and  cases  there  cited. 

granted.     Penroth  v.  Penroth,   W.   N.    (1874)  *  See  post,  p.  73.     A  decree  against  an  adult 

68;  22  W.  R.  461,  L.  JJ.  as  if  an  infant,  will  not   hind   him.     Snow  v. 

3  Tappen  v.  Norman,  11  Ves.  563;  see  Le  Hole,  15  Sim.  161,  Green  v.  Badlev,  7  Beav. 
Fort  v.  Delafield,  3  Edw.  Ch.  32.     For  forms  of  271,  273. 

notice  of  motion  and  summons,  see  Vol.  III.  1  Hills  v.  Hills,  2  Y.  &  C.  C.  C.  327;  Taylor 

4  l'lunket  v.  Joice,  2  Sch.  &  Let  159.  v.  Philips,   2  Ves.  Sr.  23;  Belt's  Sup.  to  Ves. 
6  Lord  Brook  v.  Lord  Hertford,  2  P.  Wms.      Sr.  259. 

518;  Gregory  v.   Molesworth,  3  Atk.  626;  see  2  The   Court    has    now   power,    under   the 

also   Morison    v.    Morison,   4   M.    &   C.    216;  Trustee  Act,  to  declare  the  infant   a    trustee, 

Davidson  v.  Bowden,   5  Sneed,  129;  Simpson  and  to  vest  the  lands.     Bowra  v.  Wright,  4  Ue 

v.  Alexander,   6   Coldw.  619.     The  practice  of  G.  &  S.  265;  see  Seton,  571 ;  et  seq.,  and  post, 

giving  infants  a   day  to  show  cause   is   now  Chap.  XXVIII.  §  1. 

nearly  obsolete;  but  the  present  state  of  the  3  Gregory  v.  Molesworth,  3  Atk.   626;  but 

law  on  this  subject  will  be  more  suitably  stated  see  Lady  Effingham  v.  Sir  John  Napier,  4  Bro. 

in  the  future  chapter  concerning  infant  defend-  P.  C.  ed.  Touil.  340;  Sir  J.   Napier  v.  Lady 


(a)  See  Mellor  v.  Porter,   25  Ch.   D.  158;  day  to  show  cause,  McClellan  v.  McCIellan,  65 

Younge  v.  Cocker,  32  W.  K.  359;  Gray  v.  Bell,  Maine,  500;  contra,  when  the  infant   is  simply 

46  L.  T.  521;  post,  p.  165.    An  infant  trustee,  a  trustee,  although  the  trust  arises  by  implica- 

who  possesses  an  interest  in  the  trust  estate,  tion  of  law.     Walsh  v.  Walsh,  116  Mass.  377. 
and  also  holds  the  legal  title,  is  entitled  to  such 

73 


*  74  SUITS    BY   PERSONS   WHO    ARE   UNDER   DISABILITY. 

given  to  an  infant  plaintiff  to  show  cause  against  a  decree  after  he 
comes  of  age,  the  proper  course  appears  to  be  to  have  the  cause  reheard ; 
for  which  purpose  he  must,  within  the  period  appointed  by  the  decree, 
present  a  petition  of  rehearing.4 

An  infant  is  usually  bound  by  the  effect  of  any  suit  or  proceedings 
instituted  on  his  behalf,  and  for  his  benefit;  yet  if  there  has  been  any 
mistake  in  the  form  of  such  suit,  or  the  proceedings  under  it,  or  in 
the  conduct  of  them,  the  Court  will,  upon  application,  permit  such 
mistake  to  be  rectified.5  Thus,  an  infant  plaintiff  may  have  a  decree 
upon  any  matter  arising  from  the  state  of  his  case,  though  he 

*  74      has  not  particularly  mentioned  and  insisted  upon  it,  *  and  prayed 

it  by  his  bill.1  (a)  And  where  the  persons  acting  on  behalf  of  an 
infant  plaintiff,  by  mistake  make  submissions  or  offers  on  behalf  of  the 
infant,  which  the  infant  ought  not  to  have  been  called  upon  to  make, 
the  Court  will  not  suffer  the  infant  to  be  prejudiced  thereby.2  (b)  But 
in  general,  in  matters  of  practice,  infants  are  as  much  bound  by  the  con- 
duct of  the  solicitor  acting  bona  fide  in  their  behalf  as  adults; 3  although 
it  seems  that  the  next  friend  should,  before  he  consents  to  any  departure 
from  the  ordinary  course  of  practice,  obtain  the  sanction  of  the  Court, 
or  of  a  Judge  in  chambers.4  The  application  at  chambers  is  made  by 
summons.,5 

It  seems  to  have  been  the  opinion  of  Lord  Eldou,  that  facts  could  not 
be  stated  in  a  case  for  the  opinion  of  a  Court  of  Law  so  as  to  bind 
infants;6  but  this  is  not  now  of  any  practical  importance,  as  the  Court 
is  now  prohibited  from  directing  a  case  to  be  stated  for  the  opinion  of 
any  Court  of  Law.7 

It  has  been  before  stated  8  that  any  person,  who  may  be  willing  to 
undertake  the  Office,  may  be  the  next  friend  of  an  infant;  and  it  seems 
that  even  a  person  who  has  been  outlawed  in  a  civil  action  may  fill 
that  character.9     Though  formerly  doubted,10  yet  the  next  friend  of  an 

Effingham,   2  P.  Wins.  401;  Mos.  67,  for  an  II.  60);  but  see  Knatchbull  v.  Fowle,  1  Ch.  D. 

exception   to   this  rule,    under   very  peculiar  604;  Fryer  v.  Wiseman,  W.  N.  (1876)  3;  24  W. 

circumstances.  R.  205. 

4  Wyatt's  P.  R.  225;  see  ante,  p.  72,  n.  5  For  form  of  summons,  see  Vol.  III. 

5  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  59.  6  Hawkins  v.  Luscombe,  2  Swanst.  392. 

i  Stapilton  v.  Stapilton,  1  Atk.  2,  6;  2  Wh.  »  15  &  16  Vic.  c  86,  §  61.     By  Sir  George 

&  T.  L.  Cas.  (6th  ed.)  920;  see  also  De  Mamie-  Turner's  Act,  infants  are  enabled  to  concur  in  a 

ville  v.  De  Manneville,  10  Ves.  52,  59;  Walker  special  case.     13  &  14  Vic.  c.  35,  §§  4,  6. 

v.  Taylor,  8  Jur.  N.  S.  681,  H.  L.  »  Ante,  pp.  37,  69. 

2  Serle  v.  St.  Eloy,  2  P.  Wms.  386.  »  Gilb.  For.  Rom.  54. 

3  Tillotson  v.  Hargrave,  3  Mad.  494;  Wall  w  Ld.  Red.  26;  Turner  v.  Turner,  1  Stra. 
v.  Bushby,  1  Bro.  C.  C.  484,  487;  Knatchbull  708,  2  P.  Wms.  297;  2  Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  238,  pi. 
v.  Fowle,  1  Ch.  D.  604.  18.     See  ante,  p.  37,  note  3. 

4  Ord.  5  Feb.,  1861,  r.  24  (7  Jur.  N.  S.  Pt. 


(a)  In  Pisani  v.  Attorney-General,  L.  R.  5  case  of  a  cestui  que  trust.     Dodd  v.  Ghiselin, 

P.  C.  516,  it  was  held  that  a  party  who  knows  27  Fed.   Rep.  405;  Wiggins  v.  Bethune,  29  id. 

that  other  parties  to  the  suit  are  infants,  and  51;    Ruckman  v.  Palisad-e  Land  Co    1  id   367 

consents  to  a  certain  course,  cannot  afterwards  (case  of  a   married  woman);  see  Re  McClean, 

repudiate  his  consent  because  of  their  inability  26  id.  49,  Woolridge  v.  McKenna,  8  id.  650. 
to  approve.     In  the  Federal  Courts  the  citizen-  (&)  An  infant  plaintiff  cannot  be  ordered  to 

ship  of  a  minor,  who  sues  by  his  guardian,  deter-  make  discovery  of  documents.    Curtis  v.  Mundy, 

mines  the  Court's  jurisdiction,  contrary  to  the  [1892]  2  Q.  B.  178. 


74 


INFANTS.  *  75 

infant  need  not  be  a  person  of  substance ;  u  and  *  apparently  an      *  75 
infant  may  sue  by  his  next  friend  in  forma  pauperis,  on  a  special 
case  being  made.1 

If  the  next  friend  of  an  infant  does  not  do  his  duty,  or  if  any  other 
sufficient  ground  be  made  out,  the  Court  will,  on  motion  or  summons, 
on  notice,2  order  him  to  be  removed.3  Thus,  he  will  be  removed  if 
he  will  not  proceed  with  the  cause,4  or  will  not,  when  the  infant  so 
desires,  appeal  from  an  order  therein;5  and  he  may  also  be  removed, 
if,  although  not  actually  guilty  of  any  impropriety  or  misconduct,  he 
is  connected  with  the  defendants  in  the  cause  in  such  a  manner  as  to 
render  it  improbable  that  the  interest  of  the  plaintiff  will  be  properly 
supported.6 

In  Peyton  v.  Bond,1  it  appeared  that  the  solicitor  for  the  infants 
acted  for  the  father  also,  and  had  been  for  ten  years  his  confidential 
solicitor,  and  Sir  Anthony  Hart  V.  G.  said  that,  although  by  high 
authority  it  was  proper  in  family  suits  that  the  same  solicitor  should 
be  employed  for  all  parties,  yet  the  Court  will  watch  with  great  jealousy 
a  solicitor  who  takes  upon  himself  a  double  responsibility,  and  decided 
that  the  solicitor  of  the  father  ought  not  to  continue  in  the  character 
of  solicitor  of  the  next  friend. 

The  next  friend  of  an  infant  cannot  be  receiver  in  the  cause;  for  it  is 
the  duty  of  the  next  friend  to  watch  the  accounts  and  conduct  of  the 
receiver,  and  be  a  control  over  him;  and  the  two  characters  are  incom- 
patible,  and  cannot  be  united.  8  (a) 

If    the    next    friend    of    an    infant    takes    any    proceeding    in    the 

11  Anon.  1  Ves.  Jr.  410;  Squirrel  v.  Squirrel,  writ,  or  to  procure  a  sufficient  Endorser,  or  to 

2  Dick.  765;  Fellows  v.  Barrett,  1   Keen,  119;  become  nonsuit.     But  see  Feneley  v.  Mahonv 

Davenports.  Davenport,  1  S.  &  S.  101;  Murrell  21  Pick.  212,  214. 

v.  Clapham,  8  Sim.  74;  and  see  Hind  v.  Whit-  1  Lindsey  v.  Tyrrell,  24  Beav.  124;  3  Jur. 
more,  2  K.  &  J.  458 ;  Ex  parte  Claxton,  L.  R.  N.  S.  1014;  2  De  G.  &  J.  7  ;  ante,  p.  39. 
7  Ch.  532.     In  Smith  v.  Floyd,  1  Pick.  275,  it           2  For  forms  of  notice  of  motion  and  sum- 
was  held  that  an  infant  plaintiff,  who  sues  by  mons,  see  Vol.  III. 

prochein  ami,  is  under  the  statutes  of  Massa-  8  Russell  v.  Sharp,  1  Jac.  &  W.  482;  Lander 

chusetts,   liable  for  costs;  and  in  Crandall  v.  v.  Ingersoll,  4  Hare,  596. 
Slaid,  11  Met.  288,  it  was  held  that  a  prochein  *  Ward  t\  Ward,  3  Mer.  706. 

ami,  as  such,  is  not  liable  for  costs;  although  it  5  Dupuy  v.  Welsford,  W.  N.  (1880)  121;  28 

was  suggested  in  the  latter  case  by  Wilde  J.  W.  R.  762   V.  C.  B. 

that  this  Beems  to  be  contrary  to  the  English  8  Peyton   r.    Bond,  1   Sim.  390;  Bedwin  r. 

practice.     See  also  Bouche  v.  Ryan,  3  Blackf.  Asprey.  11  Sim.  530;  Towscv  v.  Groves,  9  Jur.' 

472.     But   where    a    person   who   prosecutes    a  N.  S.    194;   11  W.   R.  252,  V.  C.   K. ;  and  see 

suit    in   the   name  of   an    infant,   as    his   next  Gee  v.  Gee.  12  W.  R.  187,  L.  J.T.;  Sandford  v. 

friend,  is  insolvent,  he   will  be  compelled,  on  Sandford,  9  Jur.  N.  S.  398;   11   W.   R.  336   V. 

the  application  of  the  defendant,  to  give  seen-  C.  K.;  Lloyd  v.  Davies,  10  Jur.  N.S.  1011. ' M. 

rity  for  costs.      Fulton    v.   Rosevelt,  1   Paige,  R.:    Prffard  v.  B-ebve.  W.  N.  (18661  268;'  14 

178;  Dalrymple  v.  Lamb,    3   Wend.  424.     In  W.  R    948,  V.  C.  K. ;  Walker  v.  Crowde'r    2 

Crandall  v.  Slaid,  11  Met.  288,  290,  it  was  said  Ir.-d.  Ch.  478. 
by  Wilde  ,1.  that  in  all  cases,  if  the  defendant  "   1  Sim.  391. 

doubts  the  ability  of  the  infant  to  pay  costs,  the  8  Stone   r.  Wishart,  2  Mad.  64.      See  also 

prochein  ami  may  be  compelled  to  indorse  the  In  re  Lloyd,  Allen  r.  Lloyd,  12  Ch.  D.  447. 


(a)  A  next  friend,  if  removed  on  the  ground      he  acted  for  the  infant's  benefit.     Meldrum  v 
of  expediency,  may  recover  his  costs,  includ-      Hayes,  21  W.  R.  746,  V.  C.  B. 
ing  an  unsuccessful  motion  for  a  receiver,   if 

75 


*  77  SUITS    BY    PERSONS    WHO    ARE    UNDER    DISABILITY. 

*  7G      *  cause  which  is  incompatible  with  the  advancement  of  the  suit, 

such  as  moving  to  discharge  an  attachment  issued  by  the  solicitor 
in  the  regular  progress  of  the  cause,  the  Court  will  direct  an  inquiry 
whether  it  is  fit  that  such  next  friend  should  continue  in  that  capacity 
any  longer.1  But  so  long  as  the  next  friend  continues  such  on  the 
record,  he  is  considered  by  the  Court  to  be  responsible  for  the  conduct 
of  the  cause.2 

The  next  friend  of  an  infant  plaintiff  was  formerly  considered  so  far 
interested  in  the  event  of  the  suit  that  neither  he  nor  his  wife  could  be 
examined  as  a  witness;3  but  this  disability  has  been  removed  by  the 
statutes  for  improving  the  law  of  evidence.4 

In  general,  a  next  friend  will  not  be  allowed  to  retire,  at  his  own 
request,  without  giving  security  for  the  costs  already  incurred;5  and 
although  any  person  may  commence  an  action  as  next  friend  of  an 
infant,  yet  when  once  before  the  Court  in  that  character,  he  will  not,  it 
seems,  be  removed  on  his  own  application  unless  the  Court  is  informed 
of  the  circumstances  and  respectability  of  the  person  proposed  to  be 
substituted  in  his  place,  and  that  such  person  is  not  interested  in 

*  77      the  subject  of  the  action.6    *  The  application  to  substitute  a  next 

friend,  in  lieu  of  one  desirous  to  retire,  is  made  by  summons,  on 
notice  to  the  defendants.1 

When,  in  consequence  of  the  death,  incapacity,2  or  removal  of  the 
next  friend  of  an  infant,  pending  the  suit,  it  becomes  necessary  to  appoint 
a  new  next  friend,  the  proper  course  of  proceeding  is  for  the  solicitor  of 
the  plaintiff  to  apply  for  an  order  appointing  a  new  next  friend  in  his 
stead,3  whose  fitness  need  not  be  proved;4  and  after  such  appointment, 
the  name  of  the  new  next  friend  should  be  made  use  of  in  all  subse- 
quent proceedings  where  the  former  one  would  have  been  named. 
Before  the  defendant  has  appeared,  the  name  of  the  new  next  friend 
may  be  introduced  into  the  record,  under  an  order  as  of  course  to 
amend;  and  after  appearance  the  same  may  be  done,   where  the  new 


1  Ward  v.  Ward,  3  Mer.  700.  friend  shall  give  security,  to  be  approved  of  by 

2  Russell  v.  Sharp,  1  .lac.  &  W.  482.  the  Judge  if  the  parties  differ,  to  answer  the 

3  Head  r.  Head,  3  Atk.  511.  But  it  has  defendant's  costs  to  that  time,  in  case  any  shall 
been  held  that  a  person  who  is  made  a prochein  be  awarded.  See  2  Seton,  705,  No.  2.  The 
ami  to  an  infant  without  his  knowledge  or  con-  security  usually  given  is  a  recognizance. 

sent  is  not  disqualified  from  being  a  witness.  6  Harrison  v.  Harrison, 5  Beav.  130;  Melling 

Harwell  v.  Corbin,  1  Rand.  131;  see  Lupton  ».  v  Melling,  4  Mad.  261;  and  see  Talbot  v.  Talbot, 

Lupton,  2  John.  Ch.  614.     In  a  case  where  it  L   R.  17  Eq.  347,  M.  R.;  Lander  v.  Ingersoll,  4 

appeared  that  the  next  friend  of  an  infant  pla:n-  Hare,  596. 

tiff  was  a  material  witness,  the  Court  allowed  1  For  form  of  summons,  see  Vol.  III. 

another  person  to  be  substituted  in  his  place,  2  A  female  next  friend  will,  on  marriage, 

upon  his  giving  security  for  the  costs  previously  become  incapacitated  to  act  further  as  such. 

incurred.     Colden  v.  Haskins,  2  Edw.  Ch.  311;  3  Westby  v.  We.-tby,  2  C.  P.  Coop.  temp. 

Helms  v.  Franciscus,  2  Bland,  544;   Davenport  Cott.  211. 

v.  Davenport,  1  S.  &  S.  101.  *  Talbot  v.  Talbot,  L.  R.  17  Eq.  347,    M. 

*  6&  7  Vic.  c.  85;  14  &  15  Vic.  c.  99,  §  2;  R.;  Davenport  r.  Davenport,  1  S.  &.  S.  101; 

16  &  17  Vic.  c.  83.  Harrison  v.   Harrison,  5  Beav.  130.     It  seems 

5  Ld.Red.  27,  note  (y) ;  Davenport  v.  Daven-  that  the  fitness  of  the  new  next  friend  need  be 

port,  1  S.  &  S.  101 ;  Colden  v.  Haskins,  3  Edw.  proved  only  when  the  application  is  by  the  old 

Ch.  311.     It  is  sometimes  made  a  term  of  the  next  friend  to  be  discharged.      See  Talbot  v. 

order  to  substitute,  that  the  substituted   next  Talbot,  supra. 


6 


INFANTS.  *  I  8 

next  friend  is  appointed  in  the  place  of  a  deceased  next  friend,5  if  the 
application  for  the  order  is  made  by  the  solicitor  who  acted  in  the  suit 
for  the  deceased  next  friend :  if  not  so  made,  an  order  to  change  solici- 
tors must  be  obtained  before  the  application  to  appoint  the  new  next 
friend.  In  other  cases  the  order  may  be  obtained  on  the  plaintiff's 
petition,  as  of  course,  if  the  defendant's  solicitors  subscribe  their  con- 
sent thereto;  if  not,  by  motion  or  summons,  on  notice.6  If  the  plain- 
tiff's solicitor  omits  to  take  this  step  within  a  reasonable  time,  the 
defendant  may  apply  to  the  Court  by  motion  on  notice,7  for  an  order 
directing  the  appointment  of  a  new  next  friend,  and  for  the  insertion 
of  his  name  as  such  in  the  proceedings.8  In  Large  v.  De  Ferre? 
the  new  next  friend  was  appointed  by  the  Chief  Clerk's  certificate, 
without  further  order. 

The  order  appointing  the  next  friend  must,  in  every  case,  be 
*  served  on  the  solicitors  of  the  defendants  in  the  cause,  and  be      *  78 
left  for  entry  in  the  cause  books  kept  by  the  Clerks  of  Records 
and  Writs.1 

Before  appointing  a  new  next  friend,  the  Court  or  Judge  requires  to 
be  satisfied  of  his  willingness  to  act;  and  an  authority  signed  by  such 
next  friend  should  be  produced  and  filed.2 

On  any  application  on  behalf  of  an  infant  plaintiff,  which  is  not 
made  by  his  next  friend,  a  next  friend  must  be  named  for  the  purposes 
of  the  application.3 

Where  a  bill  has  been  filed  in  the  name  of  an  infant,  his  coming  of 
age  is  no  abatement  of  the  suit;  but  he  may  elect  whether  he  will  pro- 
ceed with  it  or  not.4  If  he  goes  on  with  the  cause,  all  future  proceed- 
ings may  be  carried  on  in  his  own  name,  and  the  record  need  not  be 
amended  or  altered;5  he  will  also  be  liable  to  all  the  costs  of  the  suit, 
in  the  same  manner  as  he  would  have  been  had  he  been  of  age  when  the 
bill  was  originally  filed.6  If  he  chooses  to  abandon  the  suit,  he  may 
obtain  an  order,  on  motion  of  course,  or  on  petition  of  course,  to  dis- 
miss it  on  payment  of  costs  by  himself,7  or  he  may  refrain  from  taking 
any  step  in  it;  but  he  cannot  compel  the  next  friend  to  pay  the  costs, 

5  For  forms  of  motion  paper  and  petition,  tado,  6  Jur.  227,  and  see  Guy  V.  Guy.  2  Reav. 
see  "Vol.  III.;  and  for  the  order  on  motion,  see  4G0.  A  notice  of  motion  should  be  given  by 
2  Seton,  705,  No.  2.  the  infant  by  his  next  friend,  and  not  merely 

6  For  forms  of  notice  of  motion  and  sum-  by  the  next  friend.  Pidduck  v.  Boultbee,  2 
mons,  see  Vol.  III.;  and  for  the  order,  see  2  Sim.  N.  S.  223. 

Seton,  705,  No.  2.  4  Wyatt's  P.  R.  225.     As  to  what  amounts 

7  For  form  of  notice  of  motion,  see  Vol.  III.      to  an  adoption  of  the  suit,  see  Raile  r    Baile, 

8  As  to  the  former  practice,  where  the  order      L.  R.  13  Eq.  497,  V.  C.  W. 

was    obtained   on   ex  parte  motion,  see    Lan-  6  Wyatt's  P.  R.  225;  1  Fowl.  Ex.  Prac.  421. 

caster  v.   Thornton,    Amb.   308;     Ludolph    v.  The  title  of  the  suit  in  such  case,  however,  is 

Saxby,  ibid.;  12  Sim.  351;  Countess  of  She!-  corrected,  to   read   thenceforth    thus:   "A    B, 

burnev.  Lord  Inchiqnin,  Amb.  898,  n.;  12  Sim.  late  an  infant,  by  C  D,  his  next  friend,  but 

352:  Rracey  r.  Sandiford,  3  Mad.  468;  Glover  now  of  full  age,  plaintiff." 
i'.  Webber,  12  Sim.  351.     For  form  of  motion  «  Coop.    Eq.    PI.    29;  Waring   v.    Crane,    2 

paper,  see  Vol.  III.  Paige,  79;  Story,  Eq  PL  §  59. 

9  Braithwaite's  Pr.  558.  7  Where  a  decree  has  been  made,  the  appli 

1  Ibid.  cation  should  be  a  special  motion  to  stay  pro 

2  For  form,  see  Vol.  III.  ceedings.     For  form  of  motion  paper,  see  Vol. 
8  Cox  v.  Wright,  9  Jur.  N.  S.  981  ;  11  W.      III. 

R.  870,  V.  C.  K.  explaining  Furtado  v.  Fur- 

11 


*  79  SUITS    BY    PERSONS    WHO    ARE    UNDER    DISABILITY. 

unless  it  be  established  that  the  bill  was  improperly  filed.8  Therefore, 
where  an  infant,  on  attaining  twenty-one,  moved  to  dismiss  a  bill  filed 
on  his  behalf,  with  costs  to  be  paid  by  the  next  friend,  the  Court  refused 
to  make  the  order,  but  directed  the  bill  to  be  dismissed,  on  the  late 
infant  plaintiff  giving  an  undertaking  to  pay  the  costs,  and  the  costs  of 
the  next  friend.9 

If  the  infant  refrains  from  taking  any  step  in  the  suit,  he  cannot  be 
made  liable  to  costs;  thus,  where  the  next  friend  of  an  infant  died 
during  the  minority  of  the  plaintiff,  who,  after  he  came  of  age,  took  no 
step  in  the  cause,  and  the  defendant  brought  the  cause  on  again,  and 
procured  the  bill  to  be  dismissed,  such  dismissal  was  without  costs; 
because  the  plaintiff,  not  having  been  liable  to  costs  during  his  infancy, 
and  never  having  made  himself  liable  by  taking  any  step  in  the  cause 
after  attaining  twenty-one,  and  there  being  no  next  friend  to  be  respon- 
sible for  them,  there  was  no  person  against  whom  the  Court  could  make 
an  order  for  payment  of  costs.10  (a)     In  that  case  the  next  friend,   if 

living,  would;  of  course,  have  been  liable  to  the  payment  of  the 
*  79     costs  to  the  *  defendant,  the  general  rule  being,  that  the  next 

friend  shall  pay  the  defendant's  costs  of  dismissing  the  plain- 
tiff's bill;  and  so,  if  a  motion  is  made  on  behalf  of  an  infant  plaintiff 
which  is  refused  with  costs,  such  costs  must  be  paid  by  the  next  friend.1 
When  directed  to  pay  the  costs,  the  next  friend  will  not,  in  the  absence 
of  a  reservation  in  the  order  directing  the  payment,  be  allowed  such 
costs  out  of  the  estate.2 

Where  an  infant,  on  coming  of  age,  repudiates  the  suit,  that  repudia- 
tion relates  back  to  the  commencement  of  the  suit,  overriding  all  that 
has  been  done  in  it.8  An  infant  co-plaintiff,  on  coming  of  age,  and 
desiring  to  repudiate  the  suit,  if  he  takes  any  step,  must  move,  on 
notice,  not  to  dismiss  the  bill,  but  to  have  his  name  struck  out  as  co- 
plaintiff; 4  and  if  the  next  friend  requires  it,  the  late  infant's  name 
must  be  introduced  in  the  future  proceedings  as  a  co-defendant.6  After 
an  infant  sole  plaintiff  comes  of  age,  his  next  friend  ought  not  to  take 
any  proceedings  in  the  cause  in  the  name  of  the  plaintiff,  even  though 
they  are  consequential  on  former  proceedings.6  An  infant  co-plaintiff, 
on  coming  of  age,  will  not  be  allowed  to  appear  by  another  solicitor  or 
counsel,  unless  he  has  duly  changed  his  solicitor.7 

8  If  the  bill  was  improperly  filed,  the  infant  2  Caley  v.  Caley,  W.  N.  (1877)  89;  25 
may  abandon  the  suit,  and   the  costs  will  be      W.  R.  528,  V.  C.  H. 

charged   upon   the    next    friend.      Waring  v.  s  Dunn  v.  Dunn,  7  De  G.  M.  &  G.  29  ;  Uur. 

Crane,  2  Paige,  79.  N.  S   123,  per  L.  J.  Turner. 

9  Anon.  4  Mad.  461;  see  Damant  v.  Hen-  4  Acres  v.  Little,  7  Sim.  138;  Guy  V.  Guy, 
nell  33  Ch.  D.  224.  2  Beav.    460;  Cooke  v.   Fryer,   4  Beav.    13. 

10  Turner  v.  Turner.  1  Stra.  708;  2  P.  Wms.  For  form   of  notice  of  motion,   see  Vol.  III.; 

297;  Ld.  Red. 26,  n.  (t);  and  see  Dunn  v.  Dunn,  and     for    form    of    order,    see    Seton,    1253, 

7  De  G.  M.  &  G.  25  ;  1  Jur.  N.  S.  122;  3  Drew.  No.  8. 
17-  18  Jur.  1068.  5  Bicknell  v.  Bicknell,  32  Beav.  381;  9  Jur. 

i  Bucklev    v.    Puckeridge,    1    Dick.    395.  N.  S.  633. 
Costs   must*  be    paid    by  the   next   friend   in  6  Brown    v.    Weatherhead,    4    Hare,    122; 

every  instance  where  there   is   no    foundation  Brown  v.  Brown,  11  Beav.  562. 
for   the    suit.      Stephenson   v.    Stephenson.    3  7  Swift  v.   Grazebrook,   13  Sim.    185.     See 

Hayw.   123;    Story,    Eq.   PI.   §   59.    But  see  Ballard  v.  White,  2  Hare,  158;  R.  S.  C.  1883, 

Crandall  v.  Slaid,  11  Met.  288.     Ante,  37,  n.  3.  Ord.  VII.  3. 

(a)  See  Vivian  v.  Kennelly,  63  L.  T.  778;  White  v.  Duvernay,  [1891]  P.  290. 
78 


INFANTS.  *  81 

The  rule  above  referred  to,  that  a  next  friend  is  liable  to  the  costs 
of  dismissing  a  bill,  or  of  an  unsuccessful  motion,  is  applicable  only 
as  between  the  next  friend  and  the  defendant  in  the  cause;  for  the 
Court  is  extremely  anxious  to  encourage,  to  every  possible  extent,  those 
who  will  stand  forward  in  the  character  of  next  friend  on  behalf  of 
infants,8  and  will,  wherever  it  can  be  done,  allow  the  next  friend  the 
costs  out  of  the  infant's  estate  of  any  proceeding  instituted  by  him  on 
behalf  of  the  infant,  even  though  unsuccessful,9  provided  he  appears 
to  have  acted  bona  fide  for  the  benefit  of  the  infant.10 

*  An  inquiry  may  be  directed  whether  it  is  for  the  benefit  of  *  80 
the  infant  to  proceed  with  a  suit.1  It  seems,  however,  that  such 
an  inquiry  will  not  be  directed,  on  the  application  of  the  next  friend, 
in  the  suit  respecting  which  the  reference  is  sought,2  but  that  the  next 
friend  must  carry  it  on  at  his  own  risk;  which  appears  to  be  a  proper 
restraint  to  prevent  suits  of  this  description  from  being  rashly  under- 
taken; for  as,  on  the  one  hand,  the  next  friend,  in  case  a  fund  should 
be  recovered  by  means  of  the  suit,  has,  through  his  solicitor's  lien  for 
his  costs  upon  that  fund,3 an  adequate  protection  from  losing  the  charge 
he  may  have  been  put  to  by  means  of  the  suit,  so  the  risks  which  he 
runs  of  losing  those  costs,  in  case  the  suit  should  be  unsuccessful,  teuds 
to  make  persons  cautious  in  undertaking  proceedings  of  this  nature  on 
behalf  of  infants,  without  having  very  good  reason  for  anticipating  a 
successful  result. 

If  it  should  appear  that  the  next  friend  has  acted  from  improper 
motives,  and  has  not  instituted  the  suit  for  the  benefit  of  the  infant,  he 
will  not  be  allowed  his  costs ; 4  and  if  the  next  friend  has  not  used  due 
diligence  to  acquire  a  proper  knowledge  of  the  facts  of  the  case,  and 
the  bill  should  be  dismissed,  or  an  order  discharged,  upon  facts  which, 
though  not  known  when  the  bill  was  filed,  or  the  motion  made,  might 
have  been  known  if  proper  inquiry  had  been  made,  the  next  friend 
will  not  be  allowed  the  costs  out  of  the  infant's  *  estate.1  *81 

A  solicitor,  conducting  a  cause  on  the  part  of  an  infant,  has  the 
same  lien  upon  the  money  recovered  in  the  suit  by  his  means,  and  at 
his  expense,  as  he  has  in  the  case  of  an  adult;2  and  therefore,  if  the 
suit  is  successful,  the  next  friend  is,  in  general,  secure  from  being  put 
to  any  charges  on  the  infant's  behalf.  But  it  seems  that  a  solicitor 
who  obtains  possession  of  papers,  as  solicitor  to  the  next  friend,  has 
not  any  lien  upon  them  by  virtue  of  such  possession.8 

8  Whittaker  v.  Marlar,  ]  Cox,  286.  Clarke,  3  De  G.  F.  &  J.   682;   7  Jiir.  N.  S. 

9  See  Palmer  v.  Jones,  22  W.  R.  009,  M.  R.;      562. 

Pritehard  v.  Roberts,  L.  R.  17Eq.222,  V.  C.  H.  1  Pearce  v.  Pearce,  9  Ves.  548;  Roddam  r. 

10  Staines  i>.  Maddox,  Mos.  319;  Taner  v.  Hetlierington,  5  Ves.  91,  95;    and   see   Caley 

Ivie,  2  Ves.  Sr.  466;  Cross  v.  Cross,  8  Beav.  v.  Caley,   W.  N.  (1877)  89;    25  W.    R.   528, 

455;  Anderton  v.  Yates,   5  De  G.  &  S.  202  ;  V.  C.  H. 

Meldrmn  v.  Hayes,  21  \V.  R.  746,  V.  C.B;  see  2  Staines  v.  Maddox,  Mos.  319;  Pritehard 

He  Jones,  W".  N.  (1883)  14;  31  W.  R.  399.  i\  Roberts,  L.  R.  17  Eq.  222,  V.  C.  H. ;  and  see 

1  Taner  v.  Ivie,  2  Ves.  Sr.  469.  Bnnser  v.  Bradshaw,  7  Jur.  N.   S.  231 ;   9   id. 

2  Jones  v.  Powell,  2  Mer.  141;  ante,  p.  72.  1048;  9  W.  R.  229;  10  W.  R.  481;  4  Giff.  260; 
8  Staines  v.  Maddox,  Mos.  319.  Baile  v.  Baile,  L.  R  13  Eq.  497,  V  C.  W. 

4  Whittaker   r.   Marlar,    1   Cox,  286;   and  8  Montagu   on  Liens,  53;    and  see  Turner 

see  Cross  v.  Cross,  8  Beav.  455;  Clayton  v.      v.  Letts,  20  Beav.  185;  7  De  G.  M.  &  G.  243; 

79 


*  83  SUITS    BY    PERSONS    WHO    ARE    UNDER    DISABILITY. 

It  is  said,  that  where  a  legacy  is  given  to  an  infant,  the  testator 
makes  it  necessary  to  come  into  this  Court  for  directions  how  to  lay  it 
out;  and  that,  therefore,  such  an  application  ought  to  be  considered  as 
incumbrance  on  the  estate,  and  the  costs  must  be  paid  out  of  the  assets.4 
But  under  the  Legacy  Duty  Act,  36  Geo.  III.  c.  52,  §  32,  the  executor 
may  pay  the  infant's  legacy  into  Court,  and  is  then  discharged;  and 
the  infant,  when  he  comes  of  age,  may  apply  for  it.5  Before  that  Act, 
an  executor  could  not  safely  pay  an  infant's  legacy  without  a  decree. 

It  is  presumed  that  the  rule  above  laid  down  will  not  apply,  so  as  to 
prevent  an  infant  legatee  from  receiving  his  costs,  in  case  he  is  obliged 
to  institute  proceedings  in  consequence  of  the  executor's  omitting  to 
avail  himself  of  the  Act  by  paying  the  money  into  Court,  since  there  is 
power  given  by  the  Act  by  which  the  executor  can  be  compelled  to 
pay  the  legacy  without  a  suit;  and  that  where  the  executors,  though 
admitting  assets,  have  refused  or  neglected  to  pay  the  legacy  into 
Court,  they  would  be  decreed  to  pay  the  costs. 


*  82     *  Section   VI.  —  Idiots,    Lunatics,  and  Persoixs  of   Unsound  or 

Weak  Mind. 

Although,   as  before  observed,1  in  certain  cases  suits  on  behalf  of 

idiots  or  lunatics  may  be  instituted  in  the  form  of  informations  by  the 

Attorney-General,  yet  the  proper  course  of  proceeding  to  assert  their 

rights  in  Equity  is  by  a  suit2  in  the  name  of  the  lunatic:  which,  as  he 

is  a  person  incapable  in  Law  of  taking  any  step  on  his  own 

*  83      account,  is  brought  by  the  committee  of  his  estate,  if  *any;  or  if 

none,  by  his  next  friend,  who  is  responsible  for  the  conduct  of 
the  suit.1  (a)     The  lunatic,  if  suing  by  his  committee,  must  be  named  a 

1  Jur.  N.  S-  487,  1057;  Dunn  v.  Dunn,  7  De  G-  might  apply  for  it  by  summons,  where  the  fund 

M.  &  G.  25,  29;   1  Jur.  N.  S.  122;  3  Drew.  17;  or  stock  does  not  exceed  £300,   under  Cons. 

18  Jur.  1068.     The  cases  of  Osborne  v.  Denne,  Ord.  XXXV.  1  (2). 

7  Ves.  424,  and  Fearns  v.  Young,  10  Ves.  184,  l  Ante,  p.  9. 

conflict  as   to    a  next   friend's  right    to  costs  2  Or,  where  applicable,   hy  administration 

beyond   taxed   costs.      For  more   as    to   costs  summons,  under  15  &  16  Yic.  c.  86,  §§  45-47; 

of  infants'  suits,  see  Beames  on  Costs.  69-71,  see  post,  Chap.  XXIX. 

83-87.  l  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  XVIII.      "The  law  of  the 

4  Anon.  Mos.  5.  Court  of  Chancery  undoubtedly  is  that,  in  cer- 

5  Whopham  v.  Wing-field,  4  Ves.  630.     He  tain  cases  where  there  is  a  person  of  unsound 


(a)  Actions  regarding  property,  real   or  per-  61  L.  J.   Ch.  89;   65  L.  T.   672;  Cardwell  o. 

sonal,  including  partition  suits,  may  be  brought  Tomlinson,  54  L.J.  Ch.  957;  lie  Bullock,  35 

by  a  person  of  unsound  mind,  not  so  found,  by  W.    R.   109;  55  L.  T.  722.     In  England,  if  a 

a  next   friend.     Porter  r.   Porter,   37  Ch.  D  person  of  unsound  mind,  not  so  found,  suing  as 

420:  [Watt v.  Leach,  26  W.  E.  475 ;  overruling  plaintiff  by   next    friend,   becomes   a    lunatic 

Halfhide   ».   Robinson,   supra;  Waterhouse  ?'.  pending  the  suit,  and  a  committee  is  appointed, 

Worsnop,  59  L.  T.    140;  see  Denny  r.    Denny.  the  committee  may  obtain  an  order  for  leave  to 

8   Allen.    311;    Dudgeon    o.   Watson.  23   Fed.  continue  the    suit  under  Ord.  L.  rule  4.     Re 

Rep.   161.     If  the  alleged  lunatic  is  of  sound  Green,  Green  v.  Pratt,  48  L.  -T.  Ch.  681.     An 

mind,  the  Court  msy  direct  an  inquiry  and  dis-  inspection  by  the  official  solicitor  of  documents 

miss  the  suit  on  his  application,  and  the  next  and  securities  deposited   by  a    lunatic  with  a 

friend  will  be  ordered  to  pay  the  costs.    Palmer  company    for  safe   custody,    may   be   ordered 

v.  Walesbv,  L.  R.  3  Ch   732,  Howell  v.  Lewis,  before  the  appointment  of  a  committee  of  the 

'  80 


LUNATICS. 


83 


co-plaintiff  with  the  committee,  as  well  in  a  bill  as  in  an  information, 
on  his  behalf; 2  (b)  where,  however,  the  object  of  the  suit  is  to  avoid 
some  transaction  entered  into  by  the  lunatic  on  the  ground  of  his  inca- 
pacity at  the  time,  it  has  been  held  that  a  lunatic  ought  not  to  be  a 


mind,  not  found  so  by  inquisition,  and  there- 
fore incapable  of  invoking  tiie  protection  of  the 
Court,  that  protection  may,  in  proper  cases, 
and  if  and  so  far  as  it  may  be  necessary  and 
proper,  be  invoked  on  his  behalf  by  any  person 
as  his  next  friend."  Per  Sir  VV.  M.  James 
L.  J.  in  Beall  «.  Smith,  L.  R.  9  Cli.  85,  91 ;  where 
the  proceedings  in  such  a  suit  were  held  good 
up  to  the  appointment  of  a  receiver,  but  the 
proceedings  after  the  finding  of  an  inquisition 
were  treated  as  irregular  and  void.  In  Half- 
hide  r.  Robinson,  L.  R.  9  Ch.  373,  a  bill  for  the 
partition  of  land  in  which  a  lunatic  was  one  of 
the  tenants  in  common,  filed  by  the  lunatic,  by 
her  uncle  as  next  friend,  was  held  by  the 
same  eminent  Lord  Justice  to  be  "  altogether 
irregular."  "  I  wish  it  to  be  understood,"  he 
added,  "  that  a  bill  cannot  be  filed  by  a  next 
friend  on  behalf  of  a  person  of  unsound  mind 
not  so  found  by  inquisition,  for  dealing  with 
his  real  estate."  Afterwards,  in  Jones  t'.  Lloyd, 
L.  R.  18  Eq.  205,  which  was  a  bill  by  a  Lunatic 
partner  by  next  friend  for  a  dissolution,  settle- 
ment, and  receiver,  Sir  G.  Jessel,  Master  of  the 
Rolls,  thought  it  clear,  both  upon  reason  and 
authority,  that  an  equity  on  the  part  of  a 
lunatic  may  be  asserted  by  next  friend,  in  the 
absence  of  a  committee.  In  addition  to  Beall 
v.  Smith,  L.  R.  9  Ch.  85,  he  cites,  as  authority, 
Light  v.  Light,  25  Beav.  248;  Fisher  ».  Melles, 
L.  R.  18  Eq.  2(58,  and  the  books  of  practice,  in 
which,  he  says,  "  I  find  the  proposition  so  laid 
down  in  the  widest  sense."     See  also  Vane  v. 


lunatic's  estate.  In  re  Campbell,  13  Ch.  D. 
323.  The  Court  has  power  to  bind  the  equi- 
table interests  of  lunatics,  not  so  found  by 
inquisition,  by  making  an  election  on  their 
behalf.  Wilder  v.  Pigott,  22  Ch.  D.  263;  and 
it  may  order  income  paid  to  a  lunatic's  wife  for 
his  maintenance.  Re  Silva,  58  L.  T.  46.  The 
Chancery  Court  has,  however,  no  jurisdiction 
to  apply  the  property  of  a  lunatic  (not  so  found) 
to  his  maintenance,  unless  he  has  money  in 
Court,  or  the  Court  has  control  over  his  prop- 
erty by  reason  of  some  pending  suit  or  proceed- 
ing relating  thereto.  Re  Grimmett's  Trusts, 
56  L.  J.  Ch.  411);  W.  N.  (1887)  37.  The  bus- 
band  of  a  female  lunatic  has  no  absolute  right 
to  be  appointed  the  committee  of  her  person. 
Re  Davy,  [1892]  3  Ch.  38.  As  to  applications 
for  examination  of  alleged  lunatics,  see  Re 
Bathe,  [1891]  3  Ch.  274;  65  L.  T.  205.  Pend- 
ing an  application  for  inquisition,  the  Court 
may  appoint  an  interim  receiver  of  the  lunatic's 
estate,  and  in  case  of  urgency  it  may  do  this 
VOL.  I.  —  6 


Vane,  2  Ch.  D.  124:  and  Higginson  v.  Hall,  10 
Ch.  D.  235,  where  it  was  held  that  a  defendant 
was  entitled  to  an  affidavit  of  documents  from 
the  next  friend  of  a  lunatic  plaintiff.  See  also 
Stephens  v.  Porter,  11  Heisk  348;  Norcom  v. 
lingers,  16  N.J.  Eq.  484.  On  the  other  hand, 
in  Dorsheiiner  v.  Roorback,  18  N.  J.  Eq.  440, 
Ch.  Zabriskie,  on  motion  for  that  purpose, 
ordered  a  bill  filed  in  the  name  of  an  idiot,  by 
next  friend,  to  be  taken  from  the  file,  saving, 
"  I  find  no  case  or  authority  in  which  it  is  held 
that  the}'  (idiots  and  lunatics)  may  sue  by  a 
next  friend,  either  a  volunteer  or  appointed." 

A  liquidation  petition  in  bankruptcy  can- 
not be  filed  by  a  next  friend  in  the  name  of  the 
lunatic.     Ex  parte  Cahen,  10  Ch.  D.  183. 

In  some  of  the  United  States,  Courts  of 
Equity  are  authorized  to  appoint  committees 
of  idiots  and  lunatics,  while  in  other  States  the 
appointment  of  guardians  is  intrusted  to  other 
Court*,  usually  the  County  or  Probate  Courts, 
Story,  Eq.  Pl."§  G5.      See"  Matter  of  Wendell, 

1  John.  Ch.  600;  Brasher  v.  Van   Cortlandt, 

2  John.  Ch.  242,  246.  In  Massachusetts,  the 
Courts  of  Probate  have  the  exclusive  authority 
to  appoint  guardians  of  insane  persons.  Gen. 
Stats,  c.  109,  §  8:  Pub  Stats,  c.  139,  §  7.  For 
Virginia,  see  Boiling  v.  Turner,  6  Rand.  584, 
Vermont,  see  Smith  v.  Burnham,  1  Aik.  84; 
New  Jersev,  Dorsheiiner  v.  Roorback,  18  N.  J. 
Eq.  438. 

2  Story,  Eq.  PL  §  64  and  note;  see  Gorham 
v.  Gorham,  3  Barb.  Ch.  24. 


upon  an  ex  parte  application.  In  re  Poun- 
tain,  37  Ch.  D.  609.  See  52  &  53  Vic.  c.  41, 
§§  26,  52;  47  &  48.Vic.  c.  64,  §  10  (3);  53  &  54 
Vic.  c.  5,  §§  123,  299,  300,  as  to  the  application 
of  a  lunatic's  property  to  his  support  or  that  of 
his  family.  See  also  54  &  55  Vic.  c.  65,  as  to 
the  removal  of  an  alien  lunatic  to  his  own  coun- 
try. See  52  &  53  Vic.  c.  41,  §  44.  The  guar- 
dian of  an  insane  person,  having  no  title  or 
interest  in  his  ward's  estate,  cannot  maintain  a 
bill  in  his  own  name  to  set  aside  a  conveyance 
by  the  ward.  Lombard  v.  Mors*,  155  Mas-. 
136.  As  to  the  appointment  of  a  p»rson  to  con- 
vey, under  the  Trustee  Act,  1850,  the  interest 
of  a  mortgagee  who  is  of  unsound  mind,  see  Re 
Jones,  33  Ch.  D.  414;  Re  Nicholson,  34  Ch.  D. 
663;  Re  Martin,  id.  618;  Re  Peel,  55  L.  T. 
554. 

(b)  See  Warfield  v.  Fisk,  136  Mass.  219; 
Richmond  ».  Adams  Nat.  Bank,  152  Mass.  359; 
Bird  v.  Bird,  21  Gratt.  712. 


81 


*  84  SUITS   BY    PERSONS   WHO    ARE   UNDER   DISABILITY. 

co-plaintiff,3  because  it  is  a  principle  of  Law  that  no  man  can  be  heard 
to  stultify  himself.4     This  distinction  was  recognized  and  adopted  in 
some  early  cases,5  but  it  would  scarcely  be  considered   important  in 
modern  times;  and  where  a  bill  was  brought  by  a  lunatic  and  his  com- 
mittee, to  avoid  an  act  of  the  lunatic's  on  the  ground  of  insanity,  a 
demurrer,  on  the  ground  that  a  lunatic  could  not  be  allowed  to  stultify 
himself,  was  disallowed:6  the  Lord  Chancellor  observing,  that 
*  84     the  rule  *  that  a  lunatic  should  not  be  admitted  to  excuse  himself, 
on  pretence  of  lunacy,  was  to  be  understood  of  acts  done  by  the 
lunatic  to  the  prejudice  of  others,  but  not  of  acts  done  by  him  to  the 
prejudice  of  himself. 

An  idiot  is  not,  it  seems,  a  necessary  party  to  a  suit  instituted  on  his 
behalf.1  But  neither  an  idiot  nor  a  lunatic  can  institute  a  suit,  nor  can 
one  be  instituted  on  his  behalf,  without  the  committee,  if  any,  of  his 
estate  being  a  party,  either  as  a  co-plaintiff  or  as  a  defendant;'2  and 
therefore  where  the  committee  of  a  lunatic  filed  a  bill  on  behalf  of  the 
lunatic,  without  making  himself  a  co-plaintiff,  the  case  was  directed  to 
stand  over,  with  liberty  to  amend,  by  making  the  committee  a  co- 
plaintiff;3  and  in  Bishop  of  London  v.  Nichols,*  a  bill  for  tithes  by 
the  bishop  and  sequestrator,  during  the  incapacity  of  the  incumbent, 
was  dismissed,  because  neither  the  incumbent  nor  his  committee  was  a 
party. 

If  a  person  exhibiting  a  bill  appear  upon  the  face  of  it  to  be  either 
an  idiot  or  a  lunatic,  and  therefore  incapable  of  instituting  a  suit  alone, 
and  no  next  friend  or  committee  is  named  in  the  bill,  the  defen  I.uit 
may  demur ; 5  but  if  the  incapacity  does  not  appear  on  the  face  of  the 
bill,  the  defendant  must  take  advantage  of  it  by  plea.6  The  objection 
arising  from  lunacy  extends  to  the  whole  bill,  and  advantage  may  be 
taken  of  it,  as  well  in  the  case  of  a  bill  for  discovery  merely,  as  in  the 
case  of  a  bill  for  relief;  for  the  defendant  in  a  bill  of  discovery,  being 
entitled  to  costs,  after  a  full  answer,  as  a  matter  of  course,  would  be 
materially  injured  by  being  compelled  to  answer  such  a  bill  by  a  person 

3  A  lunatic  is  not  a  necessary  party  plaintiff  interfere  to  set  aside  the  contracts  and  other 

with  his  committee,  on  a  bill  to  set  aside  an  act  acts,  however  solemn,  of  persons  who  are  idiots, 

done  by  the  lunatic  under  mental  imbecility,  lunatics,  and  otherwise  wore  compotes  mentis,  is 

Ortley  r.  Messere,  7  John.  Ch.  139.    See  infra,  fraud.  1  Story,  Eq.  Jur.  §  227.    Alston  v.  Boyd, 

175,  n.  9  6  Humph,  504. 

*  In  America  this   maxim   has    seldom,  if  6  Att.-Gen.  v.   Woolrich,    1  Ch.  Cas.   153; 

ever,  been  recognized  in  any  of  the  Courts  of  Att.-Gen.  r.  Parkhust,  id.  112. 
Common  Law.     Mitchell  v.  Kingman,  5  Pick.  6  Ridler  v.  Ridler,  1  Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  279,  pi.  0; 

431;  Webster  v.  Woodford,  3  Day,  90;  Grant  and  see  Tothill,  130,  Story,  Eq.  Jur.  §  226. 
V.  Thompson,  4  Conn.  203;   Lang  v.  Whiddon,  *  Att.-Gen.  v.    Woolrich,    1  Ch.  Cas.    153; 

2  X.  H.  435;  Seaver  v.  Phelps,  11   Pick.  304;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Parkhust,  id.  112. 
McReight  v.  Aitken,  1  Rice,  56;  Rice  v.  Peet,  2    Fuller  v.  Lance,  1  Ch.  Cas.  19;  Story,  Eq. 

15  John.  503.     It  is  justly  denounced   by  Mr.  PI.  §  64,  and  note. 

Justice  Story,   1   Eq.  Jur."  §  225.     In  modern  3  Woolfryes   v.  Wool f ryes,  Rolls,   Feb.  17, 

times    it   is   abandoned    in    Equity,    and    the  1824,  MSS. 
English  Courts  of  Law  seem  inclined  as  far  as  4  Bunb.  141. 

possible  to  escape  from  the  maxim.     Baxter  v.  5  Ld.  Red.  153;  Norcom  v.  Rogers,  16  N.  J. 

Earl  of  Portsmouth,  5  B.   &  C.   170;  Ball  r.  Eq.  484. 
Mannin,  3  Bligh,  N.  S.  1.  6  Ld.  Red.    153,   229;    see   Story,   Eq.  PI 

The  ground  on  which  Courts  of  Equity  now  §  725;  Ex  parte  Brocklebank,  6  Ch.  D.  358. 
82 


LUNATICS.  *  85 

whose  property  is  not  in  las  own  disposal,  and  who  is  therefore  incapa- 
ble of  paying  the  cost.7 

If  the  plaintiff  became  a  lunatic  after  the  institution  of  a  suit, 
it  *  was  formerly  requisite  that  a  supplemental  bill  should  be  *85 
hied,  in  the  joint  names  of  the  lunatic  and  of  the  committee  of 
his  estate,  which  answered  the  same  purpose  as  a  bill  of  revivor  in 
procuring  the  benefit  of  former  proceedings; *  and  if  the  committee  of  a 
lunatic's  or  idiot's  estate  died,  after  a  suit  had  been  instituted  by  him 
for  the  benefit  of  the  idiot  or  lunatic,  and  a  new  committee  was 
appointed,  the  proper  way  of  continuing  the  suit  was  by  a  supplemen- 
tal bill  filed  by  the  idiot  or  lunatic  and  the  new  committee :  but  under 
the  present  practice  of  the  Court  the  suit  would  be  continued,  in  either 
of  these  cases,  by  a  supplemental  order  or  order  of  revivor.2  After  a 
decree,  and  pending  proceedings  under  an  inquiry,  the  Court  will  stay 
the  cause  till  the  result  of  the  proceedings  in  lunacy  concerning  the 
plaintiff   is   known.3 

A  committee,  previously  to  instituting  a  suit  on  behalf  of  an  idiot  or 
lunatic,  should  obtain  the  sanction  of  the  Lord  Chancellor  or  Lords 
Justices  of  Appeal,  who,  by  virtue  of  the  Queen's  sign  manual,  are 
intrusted  with  the  care  of  lunatics.  In  order  to  obtain  such  sanction, 
a  statement  of  facts  showing  the  propriety  of  the  suit  should  be  laid 
before  the  Master  in  Lunacy,  and  a  report  obtained  from  him  approv- 
ing the  suit;  which  report  must  be  confirmed  by  the  Lord  Chancellor  or 
Lords  Justices.4 

Contracts  entered  into  and  completed  by  a  lunatic,  without  fraud  in 
the  parties  dealing  with  him,  will  not  be  set  aside  as  a  matter  of  course, 
even  where  such  contracts  are  overreached  by  the  inquisition  taken  in 
lunacy,  and  may  be  void  at  law; 5  but  the  interference  of  the  Court 
will  depend  very  much  upon  the  circumstances  of  each  particular  case; 
and  where  it  is  impossible  to  exercise  the  jurisdiction  in  favor  of  the 
lunatic  so  as  to  do  justice  to  the  other  party,  the  Court  may  refuse 
relief,   and  leave  the    lunatic  to  his  remedy,    if  any,   at  law.6  ((f)     It 

'  Ld.  Red.  153,  229.  of    new    next    friends   of   idiots,   lunatics,   or 

1  See  Brown  v.  Clark,  3  Wooddeson,  Lect.  persons  of  weak  mind  is  the  same,  mutatis 
378,  nutis,  where  the  form  of  such  a  bill  is  mutandis,  as  in  the  case  of  infants;  see  ante, 
stated.  pp.  75,  76      See  1 5  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  11. 

2  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  52,  and  Ord.  XXXII.  3  Hartley  v.  Gilbert.  13  Sim.  596. 

R.  S.  C,  Ord.  L  3,  4.     See  2  Seton,  1527;  Dan-  4  i6  &  17  Vic  c.  70,  §§  70-73,  91-97;  and 

gar  v.  Stewart,  9  W.  R.  266,  V.  C.  K. ;  Thewlia  14th  Ord.  in  Lun.  of  7th  Nov.,  1853,  17  Jur. 

v.  Farrar,  cited,  Seton,  1166;  Timpson  v.  London  Pt.  II.  445,   see  Elmer's  Prac.  42. 

&  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  11  W.   R.  558;   Harland  v.  6  i>nce   v.  Berrlngton,   3   M'N.  &  G.  486, 

Garbutt,  \V.   N.  (1881)   8,  V.  C.  B.;  and  see  490;  Yauger  v.  Skinner,  14  N.  J.  Eq.  389 

pott, Chap.  XXXIII.,  Revivor  and  Supplement.  c  Shelf    on    Lun.   551;  Niell  v.  Morley,  9 

Lor  forms  of  motion  paper  and  petitions,  see  Ves.  478,  481,  482. 
Vol.  III.     The  practice  as  to  the  appointment 


(a)  See  Wiltshire  v.  Marshall,  14  L.  T.  N.  S.  Q.  B.  D.  264.     Equity  Courts  may  give  direc- 

396.     The  law  implies  an  obligation  on  the  part  tions   for  a   lunatic's  maintenance   out  of    his 

of  a  lunatic  to  pay,  out  of  his  own  property,  property,  either   income  or  capital,   under   its 

for  necessaries  supplied  to  him  and  suitable  to  control,  but  have  no  jurisdiction  to  appoint  a 

his  position   in  life.     In  re  Rhodes,  Rhodes  v.  guardian  of  his  person.     Re  Bligh,  12  Oh.  I>. 

Rhodes,  44  Ch.  I).  94.     A  charging  order  must  364;  He  Brandon's  Trusts,  13  Ch.  D.  77:>;   Re 

be  definite  in  amount.     Home  v.  Fountain,  23  Gihnmett's  Trusts,  56  L.  J.  Ch.  419;  Re  Silva, 

83 


8G 


SUITS    BY    PERSONS    WHO    ARE    UNDER    DISABILITY. 


seems  also,  that  although  a  contract  is  entered  into  by  a  lunatic  subse- 
quent to  the  date  from  which  he  is  found  by  the  inquisition  to  have 
become  lunatic,  yet,  if  the  fact  of  his  being  a  lunatic  at  the  time  of  the 
contract  is  denied  by  the  defendant,  the  establishment  of  that  fact  is 
indispensably  necessary;  and  formerly  when  the  Court  had  any  doubt 

upon  it,  it  directed  an  issue  to  try  it.7 
*86  *  Persons  of  full  age,    but  who  are   incapable   of  acting  for 

themselves,  though  neither  idiots  nor  lunatics,  have  been  per- 
mitted to  sue  by  their  next  friend,  without  the  intervention  of  the 
Attorney-General;  l  and  it  seems  that  if  a  bill  has  been  hied  in  the 
name  of  a  plaintiff,  who  at  the  time  of  filing  it  is  in  a  state  of  mental 
incapacity,  it  may,  on  motion,  be  taken  off  the  file.2  If,  however,  a 
suit  has  been  properly  instituted,  and  the  plaintiff  subsequently 
becomes  imbecile,  that  circumstance  will  not  be  a  sufficient  ground  for 
taking  the  bill  off  the  file.3 

The  committee  of  a  lunatic,  and  the  next  friend  of  a  person  of 
unsound  mind,  before  he  consents  to  any  departure  from  the  ordinary 
mode  of  taking  evidence,  or  of  any  other  procedure  in  the  suit,  should 
first  obtain  the  sanction  of  the  Court  or  Judge;4   and  the  committee 


i  Niell  v.  Morley,  9  Yes.  47S 

1  Ld.  Red.  30  cites  Elizabeth  Liney,  a 
person  deaf  ami  dumb,  by  her  next  friend, 
against  Witherly  and  others,  in  Ch.:  Decree, 
1  Dec,  1760;  ditto  on  Supplem.  Bill,  4  March, 
1779.  See  Fisher  v.  Melles,  L.  R.  18  Eq:  208, 
n.  7.  If  a  person  have  religious  scruples 
against  being  a  party  to  a  suit,  he  may  sue 
by  his  next  friend.  Malin  v.  Malin,  2  John. 
Ch  2-'i8.  A  person  in  dotage,  or  an  imbecile 
adult,  may  sue  by  next  friend.  C.  D.  Owing's 
case,  1  Bland,  373;  Bothwell  v.  Bonshell,  1 
Blind,  373;  see  Story,  Eq.  PL  §66.  As  to 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  of  Chancery  with 
regard  to  the  property  of  a  lunatic  not  so 
found  by  inquisition,  see.  Nelson  v.  Duncombe, 
9  Bear.  211,  216,  219;  10  Jur.  399;  Edwards 
r.  Abrey,  2  C.  P.  Coop.  temp.  Cott.  177;  Peters 
v.  Grote,  id.  192;  7  Sim.  238,  Re  Burke,  2 
De  G.  F.  &  J.  124;  Re  Taylor,  ib  125;  Re 
M'Farlane,  2  J.  &  IL  073;  8  Jur.  N,  S.  208; 
Light  v  Light,  25  Bear.  248;  Williams  v. 
Alien,  33  Bear.  241;  9  Jur.  N  S.  1219;  Star- 
buck  o.  Mitchell,  1  W.  N.  253,  M.  R. :  Re 
Coleman,  1  W.  N.  209,  V.  C.  S. ;  Re  Law,  7 
Jur.  N  S  410,  Y.  C.  W.;  Johnson  v.  Turner, 
W.  N.  (1868)  305,  V.  C.  M.;  Re  Baker,  L.  R. 
13  Eq  108;  Re  Gamier,  id.  532;  Morris  v. 
Morns  W.  N.  (1872)  107;  Re  Philps,  28  L.  T. 
X.  S.  530,  Y.  C.  M.;  Re  Perry,  W.  N.  (is:;,) 
17;  23  W.  R.  334;  Vane  v.  Yan'e,  2  Ch.  D.  124; 


Re  Whitby,  W.  N.  (1877)  208;  Bligh  v.  O'Con- 
nell,  26  W.  R.  311;  Re  Hoskins,  W.  N.  (1880) 
62;  and  see  2  Set  n,  709,  No.  11,  and  ante,  p.  9. 
By  the  25  &  26  Vic.  c.  80,  a  summary  jurisdic- 
tion is  conferred  in  lunacy  over  the  property 
of  an  alleged  insane  person,  for  his  benefit, 
where  of  small  amount,  without  inquisition  or 
issue;  and  see  Ord.  in  lunacj'  thereunder  of 
7  Nov.,  1862,  in  Elmer's  Prac.  363;  8  Jur. 
N.  S.  Pt.  II.  513.  See  Ex  parte  Adams,  4 
De  G.  J.  &  S.  182;  10  Jur.  N.  S.  137,  L.  C; 
Re  Stables,  4  De  G.  J.  &  S.  257;  10  Jur.  N.  S. 
245;  Re  Gibson,  L.  R.  7  Ch.  52;  Re  Faircloth, 
13  Ch.  D.  307.  In  the  case  of  a  bill  on  behalf 
of  a  person  of  weak  mind,  as  in  the  case  of 
infants  and  married  women,  a  written  authority 
to  use  the  name  of  the  next  friend  must  be 
filed  with  the  bill,  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  11. 
For  form  see  Vol.  III.  And  see  Att.-Gen.  v. 
Murray,  13  W.  R.  65,  V.  C.  K.,  ante,  pp.  13, 
n.  (4),'  69,  n.  (6);  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  XVIII.  The 
next  friend  of  a  person  of  weak  mind  is,  in 
every  respect,  in  the  same  position  as  the  next 
friend  of  an  infant. 

2  Wartnaby  v.  Wartnaby,  Jac  377;  Blake 
v.  Smith,  Younge,  596  ;  Palmer  v.  Walesby, 
L.  R  3  Ch.  732,  L.  JJ.  ,  Nurse  v.  Durnford,  13 
Ch.  D.  764  ;  Norcom  v.  Rogers,  16  N.  J.  Eq.  48  L 

s  Wartnaby  r.  Wartnaby,  Jac.  377  ;  Story, 
Eq.  PI.  §66    " 

4  For  form  of  summons,  see  Vol.  III. 


57  id.  281;  Re  Tuer's  Will  Trusts,  32  Ch.  D. 
39  See  Re  Darling,  39  Ch.  D.208:  R<  W'hit- 
aker,  42  Ch.  D  119.  Where  an  Englishman 
resident  in  France  was  there  found  to  be  of 
unsound   mind,   Malius   V.   C.  held   that    his 

84 


French  committee,  who  applied  for  transfer  to 
him  of  a  fund  in  Court  belonging  to  the  lunatic, 
was  entitled  to  receive  the  dividends  only.  Re 
Gamier,  20  W.  R.  288. 


MARRIED    WOMEN. 


87 


should  also  obtain  that  of  the  Lord  Chancellor  or  Lords  Justices  of 
Appeal  sitting  in  Lunacy.5 


*  Section  VII. — Married  Women. 


87 


By  marriage,  the  husband  and  wife  become  as  one  person  in  law; 
and  upon  this  union  depend  all  the  legal  and  equitable  rights  and  dis- 
abilities which  either  of  them  acquires  or  incurs  by  the  intermarriage. 
One  of  the  consequences  of  this  unity  of  existence  and  interest  between 
the  husband  and  wife  is,  that  at  Common  Law  a  married  woman  «an- 
not,  except  in  the  cases  mentioned  below,  during  the  continuance  of  her 
coverture,  institute  a  suit  alone;  therefore,  whenever  it  is  necessary  to 
apply  to  a  judicial  tribunal  respecting  her  rights,  the  proceeding  must 
be  commenced  and  carried  on  in  their  joint  names.1  The  exceptions  to 
this  rule  are,  when  the  husband  can  be  considered  civiliter  mortuus, 
and  when  the  wife  is  judicially  separated  from  her  husband,  or  has 
obtained  a  protection  order;2  in  which  cases  the  wife  is  looked  upon 


5  Ord.  5th  Feb.,  18G1,  r.  24  (7  Jur.  N.  S. 
Pt.  II.  GO);  Knatchbull  v.  Fowle,  1  Cli.  D.  004, 
M  R.  ;  Fryer  v.  Wiseman,  W.  N.  (187G)  3  ;  24 
W.  R.  205,"  V.  C.  H. 

i  See  Hilton  v.  Lothrop,  46  Maine,  297  ; 
Williams  v.  Coward,  1  Grant  (Penn.),  21  ; 
Bradley  v.  Emerson,  7  Vt.  369.  In  Massachu- 
setts, a  married  woman  may  sue  and  be  sued  in 
all  matters  having  relation  to  her  separate 
property,  business,  trade,  services,  labor,  and 
earnings,  in  the  same  manner  as  if  she  were  sole. 
Pub  Stats,  c.  147,  §  7  ;  Conant  v.  Warren,  6 
Gray,  5G2.  If  property  belongs  to  the  wife 
alone,  as  her  sole  and  separate  property,  an 
action  respecting  it  should  be  in  her  name  alone, 
and  her  husband  should  not  be  joined.  Hen- 
nessey o  White,  2  Allen,  48,49  In  Kentucky, 
a  wife  may  sue  alone  in  an  action  relating  to 
her  separate  property.  Petty  v.  Malier,  14  B. 
Mon.  24G.  So  in  New  Hampshire  :  Jordan  v. 
Cummings,  43  N.  II.  134-136,  under  recent 
statutes.  So  by  the  Code  of  Procedure  in  New 
York  ;  and  when  the  action  is  between  herself 
and  husband,  she  may  sue  or  be  sued  alone. 
In  no  case  need  she  prosecute  by  a  guardian  or 
next  friend.  2  Kent  (11th  ed.),  154,  note. 
Under  the  New  York  Acts  of  I860  and  18G2  a 
married  woman,  trading  on  her  own  account, 
may  be  sued  alone  on  a  note  given  by  her  in 
the  course  of  her  trading.  Barton  v.  Beer,  35 
Barb.  (X.  Y.)  7S.  Having  a  perfect  capacity 
to  sue,  she  will  be  held  responsible  for  the  acts 
of  her  attorney  or  solicitor,  and  for  the  want  of 
ordinary  diligence  on  her  part.  Cayce  v. 
Powell.  20  TVxas,  7G7.  In  Louisiana,  in  a  bill 
by  a  wife  to  be  relieved  from  a  mortgage  made 


by  her,  on  the  ground  of  her  disability  to  con- 
tract, her  husband  may  properly  be  joined  with 
her  as  prochein  ami.  Bein  v.  Heath,  G  How 
U.  S.  228.  A  married  woman,  entitled  by  law 
to  sue  in  her  own  name,  may  declare  without 
alluding  to  her  husband.  Jordan  v. Cummings, 
43  N.  H.  134;  see  Wheaton  v.  Phillips,  12  N.  J. 
Eq.  221. 

2  20  &  21  Vic.  c.  85,  §§  21,  25,  26,  45  ;  21 
&  22  Vic.  c.  108,  §§  G-8 ;  27  &  28  Vic.  c.  44  , 
and  see  22  &  23  Vie.  c.  61,  §§  4,  5  ;  23  &  24 
Vic.  c.  144,  §  6;  33  &  34  Vic.  c  93;  Re  Rains- 
don's  Trusts,  4  Drew.  446  ;  5  Jur.  N.  S.  55  ; 
Re  Kingsley,  26  Beav.  84  ;  4  Jur.  N.  S.  1010; 
Cooke  v.  Fuller,  26  Beav.  99  ;  Rudge  v. 
Weedon,  4  De  G.  &  J.  216;  5  Jur.  N.  S.  380, 
723;  Bathe  v.  Bank  of  England,  4  K.  &  J.  564; 
4  Jur.  N.  S.  505  ;  Re  Whittingham's  Trusts, 
10  Jur.  N.  S.  818  ;  12  W.  R.  775,  V.  C.  W.  ; 
Caldicott  b.  Baker,  13  W.  R.  449,  V.  C.  K. ; 
Sealey  v.  Gaston,  ib.  577,  V.  C.  W  ;  Wells  v. 
Malbon,  31  Beav.  48  ;  8  Jur.  N.  S.  249;  Heath 
v.  Lewis,  10  Jur.  N.  S.  1093:  13  W.  R.  128; 
Prole  p.  Soady,  L.  R.  3  Ch.  220  ;  Re  Insole,  35 
Beav.  92  :  L.  R.  1  Eq.  470  ;  Pratt  v  Tenner, 
L.  R.  1  Ch.  493;  12  Jur.  N.  S.  557;  Wilkson  r>. 
Gibson,  L  R.  4  Eq.  162  ;  Botten  v.  Codd,  W. 
N.  (1869)  199  ;  Re  Coward  &  Adams,  L.  R. 
20  Eq.  179  ;  Ewart  ».  Chubb,  id  454  :  Rams- 
d.ii  a.  Brearley.  L.  R.  10  Q.  B.  147.  Nicholson 
v  Drury  Estate  Buildings  Co.  7  Ch  D  18;  see 
now  Hill  r.  Cooper,  W.  N.  (1893)  88;  [18931 
2  (}.  B.  85.  As  to  what  is  the  wife's  separate 
property,  see  33  &  34  Vic.  c.  93,  §§  1-5.  7.  8. 
10  ;  Summers  v.  City  Bank.  L  R.  9  C.  P.  580; 
Morris  v.  Robinson,  27  W.  R.  312. 

85 


SUITS    BY    PERSONS    WHO    ARE    UNDER    DISABILITY. 


as  restored  to  her  rights  and  capacity  as  a  feme  sole,  and  may  Sue 
alone,  (a) 

With  respect  to  what  is  called  a  civil  death  in  law,  Lord  Coke  says 
that  a  deportation  forever  into  a  foreign  land,  like  to  a  profession,8  is 
a  civil  death,  and  that  in  such  cases  the  wife  may  bring  an  action,  or 
may  be  impleaded  during  the  natural  life  of  her  husband;  and  so,  if  by 
an  Act  of  Parliament  the  husband  be  attainted  of  treason  or  felony, 
and  is  banished  forever,  this  is  a  civil  death,  and  the  wife  may  sue  as 

a  feme  sole;  but  if  the  husband  have  judgment  to  be  exiled  but 
*88      for  a  time,  which  some  call  a  relegation,  *this  is  no  civil  death.1 

At  Law,  also,  every  person  who  is  attainted  by  ordinary  process 
of  treason  or  felony,  is  disabled  to  bring  any  action,  for  he  is  extra 
legem  positus,  and  is  accounted  in  law  civiliter  mortuus;  2  and  where 
the  husband  is  an  alien,  and  has  left  this  kingdom,  or  has  never  been 


3  The  profession  of  a  person  as  a  nun  is 
no  longer  a  civil  death,  and  does  not  prevent 
such  person  from  dealing  with  property,  if 
otherwise  sui  juris.  Metcalfe's  Trusts,  2  De 
G.  J.  &  S.  122  ;  10  Jur.  N.  S.  22+,  287 ;  Evans 
v.  Cassidy,  11  Irish  Eq.  243;  Blake  v.  Blake,  4 
Irish  Eq.*349. 

i  Co.  Litt.  133  a.;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  61; 
Wright  v.  Wright,  2  Desaus.  244  ;  Cornwall  v. 
Hoyt,  7  Conn.  420;  Troughton  v.  Hill,  2  Hayw. 
406  ;  Robinson  v.  Reynolds,  1  Aiken,  174. 

Mr.  Chancellor  Kent,  2  Kent  (11th  ed.),  154, 
155,  in  reference  to  this  point,  remarks  that 
"  Lord  Coke  seems  to  put  the  capacity  of  the 
wife  to  sue  as  a  feme  sole  upon  the  ground 
that  the  abjuration  or  banishment  of  the  hus- 
band amounted  to  a  civil  death.  But  if  the 
husband  be  banished   for  a  limited  time  only, 


(a)  Under  the  Married  Women's  Property 
Act,  1882  (45  &  4G  Vic.  c.  75),  a  married  woman 
may  hold  her  own  property  separately,  and  sue 
and  defend  like  a  feme  sole,  without  a  next 
friend,  and  without  joinder  of  the  husband.  See 
also  R.  S-  C.  1883,  Ord.  XVI.  16;  Lowe  r.  Fox, 
15  Q.  B.  D.  667  ;  Weldon  t\  Winslow,  13  id. 
784;  Conolan  v.  Leyland,  27  Ch.  D.  632  ;  Wel- 
don v.  Riviere,  53  L.  J.  Q.  B.  448.  This  statute 
is  limited  to  suits  relating  to  herself  personally, 
and  does  not  abrogate  the  general  rule  that 
a  married  woman  cannot  act  as  a  next  friend 
or  guardian  ad  litem.  Re  Duke  of  Somerset, 
Thynne  v.  St.  Maur,  34  Ch.  D.  465 ;  London  & 
County  Banking  Co.  v.  Bray,  W.  N.  (1893)  130. 
As  to  the  effect  of  a  dissolution  of  marriage  on 
the  husband's  right  to  the  wife's  property,  see 
Bullmore  v.  Wynter,  22  Ch.  D.  619.  A  divorce 
decree  rusi  does  not  change  the  wife's  status. 
"Ellis  r.  Ellis,  8  P.  D.  188;  Stanhope  v.  Stanhope, 
11  P.  D.  103  ;  Moors  r.  Moors.  121  Mass  232. 
As  to  costs,  see  Re  Peace  &  Waller,  24  Ch.  I). 
405.  As  to  making  the  husband  a  defendant  to 
a  suit  against  his  wife,  see  also  Roberts  v.  Evans, 

86 


though  it  be  no  civil  death,  the  better  opinion 
is  that  the  consequences,  as  to  the  wife,  are  the 
same,  and  she  can  sue  and  be  sued  as  a  feme 
sole."  See  also  Ex  parte  Franks,  1  M.  &  Scott, 
1.  In  Robinson  v.  Reynolds,  1  Aiken,  174,  this 
point  was  considered  and  the  English  cases  ably 
reviewed  ;  but  the  question  was,  by  this  case, 
still  left  unsettled,  whether  transportation  or 
banishment  of  the  husband  by  law,  for  a  limited 
time  only,  would  be  sufficient  to  give  the  wife 
the  capacity  to  sue  and  be  sued  as  a  feme  sole. 
It  seems,  however,  from  the  case  of  Foster  v. 
Everard,  Craw.  &  Dix,  135,  that  a  feme 
covert,  whose  husband  has  been  transported  for 
a  limited  term  of  years,  will  not  be  allowed  to 
sue  in  Equity  as  &feme  sole. 

2  2  B.  &"p.  231  ,•  4  Esp.  27  ;  Bac.  Ab.  tit. 
Bar.  and  Feme  (M)  ;  9  East,  472. 


7  Ch.  D.  830 ;  Re  Thompson,  38  Ch.  D.  317.  To 
a  suit  to  foreclose  a  mortgage  made  to  a  married 
woman,  her  husband,  in  whose  possession  the 
mortgage  is,  though  he  is  non-resident  and  out 
of  the  jurisdiction,  should  be  a  party.  Ruckman 
v  Stephens,  11  Fed.  Rep.  793.  A  husband  who 
joins  his  wife  in  an  answer  to  a  foreclosure  suit, 
though  not  made  a  party,  will  be  bound  by  the 
decree.  Anderson  v.  Watts,  138  U.  S.  094.  In 
Massachusetts  a  husband  who  has  no  personal 
interest  need  not  be  a  party  to  a  bill  by  his 
wife  relating  to  her  separate  estate.  Forbes  v. 
Tuckerman,  115  Mass  115;  Stat,  of  1874,  c.  184, 
§  3.  See  Mosier  r.  Beale,  43  Fed.  Rep.  358.  In 
California,  the  husband  may  properly  join  as 
co-plaintiff  in  a  suit  to  establish  a  water  right 
belonging  to  his  wife,  Spargur  v.  Heanl,  90 
Cal.  221.  The  Federal  Courts  are  not  controlled 
by  a  State  statute  which  permits  a  married 
woman  to  sue  in  Equity  in  her  own  name.  Wills 
v.  Pauly.  51  Fed.  Rep.  257.  In  those  Courts, 
when  the  wife's  separate  estate  is  charged,  tho 
husband  is  a  proper  party.  United  States  v. 
Pratt  Coal  Co.  18  Fed.  Rep.  708. 


MARRIED    WOMEN. 


89 


in  this  country,  the  wife  may,  during  such  absence,  sue  alone,8 
although  in  ordinary  cases  the  absence  *  of  the  husband  affords      *  89 
no  ground  for  the  wife's  proceeding  separately.1 

In  these  respects,  Courts  of  Equity  follow  the  rules  of  Law.2  In 
Equity,  however,  as  well  as  at  Law,  the  general  rule,  which  requires 
the  husband  to  be  joined  in  a  suit  respecting  the  rights  of  his  wife, 
prevails,  except  under  particular  circumstances,  which  will  be  hereafter 
pointed  out:  but  at  Law  there  exists  a  distinction  between  actions  for 
property  which  has  accrued  to  the  wife  before  marriage,  and  actions 
for  property  which  has  come  to  her  afterwards,  —  which  distinction  does 
not  prevail  in  Equity;  for  with  respect  to  such  debts  and  other  choses 
in  action  as  belong  to  the  wife  and  continue  unaltered,  since  the  husband 
cannot  disagree  to  her  interest  in  them,  and  as  he  has  only  a  qualified 
right  to  possess  them,  by  reducing  them  into  possession  during  her  life, 
he  is  unable  to  maintain  an  action  for  such  property  without  making 
his  wife  a  party; 3  but  for  all  personal  estate  which  accrues  to  the  wife, 

8  2  Esp.  554,  587  ;  1  B.   &  P.  357 ;  2  B.  &      husband  was  never  within  the  Commonwealth, 


P.  226;  1  Bos.  &  P.  N.  R.  80  ;  11  East.  301; 
3  CamD.  123  ;  5  T.  R.  679,  G82  ;  8  T.  R.  545  ; 
Stephenson  v.  Strutt,  W.  N.  (1872)  137,  20 
W.  R.  745  ;  see  Norman  v.  Villars,  2  Ex.  D. 
359;  Munt  v.  Glynes,  20  W  R.823;  Gregorys. 
Paul,  15  Mass.  31;  Jordan  v.  Cummings,  43  N. 
H.  134.  Where  the  husband  had  never  been 
in  the  United  States,  and  had  deserted  his  wife 
in  a  foreign  country,  and  she  came  here  and 
maintained  herself  as  a.  feme  sole,  she  was  held 
entitled  to  sue  and  be  sued  as  a  feme  sole. 
Gregory  v.  Paul,  15  Mass.  31,  35,  n.  a,  and 
cases  cited.  So  where  the  husband,  a  citizen  of 
and  a  resident  in  another  of  the  United  States, 
compelled  his  wife  to  leave  him  without  pro- 
viding any  means  for  her  support,  and  she 
came  into  Massachusetts  and  maintained  her- 
self there,  for  more  than  twenty  years,  as  a 
single  woman,  sh*  was  held  entitled  to  sue  as 
a  feme  sole.  Abbot  v.  Bayley,  6  Pick.  89. 
The  principle  of  the  above  decisions  has  been 
extended  still  further  by  the  Gen.  Stats,  of 
Mass  c.  108,  §  29  and  c.'l09,  §§  31,  32  ;  Pub. 
Stats,  c.  147,  §§  7,  29.  See  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  61, 
and  note  to  this  point  ;  2  Kent,  155.  In  Beane 
v.  Morgan,  4  M'Cord,  148,  S.  C.  1  Hill,  8,  it 
was  held  that  if  the  husband  leave  the  State, 
without  the  intention  of  returning,  the  wife  is 
competent  to  contract,  to  sue  and  be  sued,  as  if 
she  were  a  fern e  sole.  See  Valentine  v.  Ford, 
2  Browne,  193  ;  Robinson  r.  Reynolds,  1 
Aiken,  174  ;  Troughton  v.  Hill,  2  Ilayw.  406  ; 
Rhea  v.  Rhenner,  1  Peters,  105  ;  Edwards  v. 
Davies,  16  John.  286  ;  Moore  v.  Stevenson,  27 
Conn.  14  ;  Yeatman  v.  Bellmain,  1  Tenn.  Ch. 
589.  In  Gregory  v  Pierce,  4  Met.  478.  Shaw 
C.  J.  observed  that  "  the  principle  is  now  to 
be  considered  as  established  in  this  State,  as 
a  necessary  exception  to  the  rule  of  the  Common 
Law  placing  a  married  woman  under  disability 
to  contract  or  maintain  a  suit,  that  where  the 


or  has  gone  beyond  its  jurisdiction,  has  wholly 
renounced  his  marital  rights  and  duties,  and 
deserted  his  wife,  she  may  make  and  take  con- 
tracts, and  sue  and  be  sued  in  her  own  name  as 
a  feme  sole.  It  is  an  application  of  an  old  rule 
of  the  Common  Law,  which  took  away  the  dis- 
ability of  coverture  when  the  husband  was  ex- 
iled or  had  abjured  the  realm.  Gregory  v. 
Paul,  15  Mass.  31  ;  Abbot  r.  Bayley,  6  Pick. 
89.  In  the  latter  case,  it  was  held,  that,  in  this 
respect,  the  residence  of  the  husband  in  another 
State  of  these  United  States,  was  equivalent  to 
a  residence  in  any  foreign  State  ;  he  being 
equally  beyond  the  operation  of  the  laws  of  the 
Commonwealth  and  the  jurisdiction  of  its 
Courts.  But  to  accomplish  this  change  in  the 
civil  relations  of  the  wife,  the  desertion  by  the 
husband  must  be  absolute  and  complete  ;  it 
must  be  a  voluntary  separation  from  and  aban- 
donment of  the  wife,  embracing  both  the  fact 
and  the  intent  of  the  husband  to  renounce  de 
facto,  and  as  far  as  he  can  do  it,  the  marital 
relation,  and  leave  his  wife  to  act  as  a  feme  sole. 
Such  is  the  renunciation,  coupled  with  a  con- 
tinued absence  in  a  foreign  State  or  country, 
which  is  held  to  operate  as  an  abjuration  of  the 
realm." 

A  wife,  who  is  divorced  a  mensa  et  thoro, 
may  sue  as  ajeme  sole  on  causes  of  action  aris- 
ing after  the  divorce.  Dean  v.  Richmond,  5 
Pick.  461 ;  Pierce  v.  Burnham,  4  Met.  303;  see 
2  Kent.  156. 

i  11  East,  301;  Du  Wahl  v.  Braunc,  1  IT.  & 
M.  178;  4  W.  R.  646. 

2  See  Ld.  Red.  28;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  61  .  Poop. 
Eq.  PI.  30;  Calvert  on  Parties,  414;  Countess 
of  Portland  v.  Prodgers,  2  Vein.  104;  I  Eq.  < 'as. 
Ab.  171,  pi.  1;  Newsome  v.  Bowyer,  3  1'.  Wins. 
37. 

8  1  Bright,  H.  &  W.  63,  and  the  cases  there 
cited,  notis.     In  Clapp  v.  Stoughton,  10  Pick. 

87 


90 


SUITS    BY   PERSONS   WHO    ARE   UNDER   DISABILITY. 


or  to  the  husband  and  wife  jointly,  during  marriage,  and  for  all  cove- 
nants made  or  entered  into  with  them  during  that  period,  the  husband 
may,  at  Law,  commence  proceedings  in  his  own  name;  because  the 
right  of  action  having  accrued  after  marriage,  the  husband  may  dis- 
agree as  to  his  wife's  interest,  and  make  his  own  absolute :  an  intention 
to  do  which  he  manifests  in  bringing  an  action  in  his  own  name,  when 
it  might  have  been  commenced  in  the  name  of  both  of  them; 4  and  in 
such  case  it  has  been  held,  that  if  the  husband  recover  a  judgment  for 
a  debt  due  to  the  wife,  and  die  before  execution,  his  personal  represen- 
tative will  be  entitled  to  the  benefit  of  it,  and  not  the  wife.5 
*  90  *  The  distinction  above  pointed  out  does  not,  however,  a*s  has 
been  stated,  exist  in  Courts  of  Equity,  where  it  seems  necessary 
that  in  all  cases  in  which  the  husband  seeks  to  recover  the  property  of 
the  wife,  he  should  make  her  a  party  co-plaintiff  with  himself,  whether 
the  right  to  the  property  accrued  before  or  after  marriage.1  («) 

Where  a  married  woman  sues  as  personal  representative,  the  husband 
ought  to  be  joined  as  co-plaintiff  with  her;  and  if  the  objection  is  not 
made  until  the  hearing,  the  Court  will  allow  the  bill  to  be  amended  by 
making  husband  and  wife  co-plaintiffs.2 


4",  it  was  remarked  by  Mr.  Justice  AVilde:  "I 
think  the  true  rule  is,  that  in  all  cases  where 
the  cause  of  action  survives  to  the  wife  the 
husband  and  wife  must  join,  and  he  cannot  sue 
alone.  This  rule  will  go  farther  than  any 
other  to  reconcile  all  the  cases.  In  all  actions 
for  choses  in  action  due  to  the  wife  before  mar- 
riage, the  husband  and  wife  must  join;  and 
among  all  the  conflicting  cases,  I  apprehend 
not  one  can  be  found  in  which  it  was  held  that 
the  husband  could  sue  alone,  where  the  cause 
of  action  would  clearly  survive  to  the  wife." 
See  Morse  v.  Earl,  13  Wend.  271;  Bryant 
v.  Puckett,  3  Hayw.  252 

4  Ibid.  62;  and  see  Add.  Cont.  7G1. 

5  Oglanderp.  Baston,  1  Vern.  396;  Garforth 
r.  Bradley,  2  Yes.  Sr.  675,  677.  See  Fleet  v. 
Pernns,  L.  R.  4  Q.  B.  500;  3  id.  536. 

1  See  Cherry  v.  Belcher,  5  S'ew.  &  P.  133; 
Tribble  r.  Tribble,  5  J.  J.  Marsh.  180;  Brad- 
ley v.  Emerson,  7  Yt.  369.  Thus,  where  a 
legacy  was  given  to  a  woman  whilst  she  was 
covert,  and  the  husband,  without  her,  exhibited 
a  bill  for  it,  to  which  the  defendant  demurred, 
on  the  ground  that  the  wife  ought  to  have  been 
joined  in  the  suit,  the  demurrer  was  allowed. 
Clearke  v.  Lord  Angier,  Freeman,  160;  S.  C 
nom.  Gierke  v.  Lord  Anglesey,  Nels.  78;  see 
also  Blount  v.  Bestland,  5  Ves.  515;  Anon.  1 
Atk.  491;  Meales  v.  Meales,  5  Yes.  517,  n.; 
Carr  v.  Taylor,  10  Yes.  574,  579;  Chase  v. 
Palmer,  25   Maine,  348.  In  such  case  the  hus- 


(a)  When  a  husband  is  indebted  to  a  testator 
whose  will  bequeaths  property  to  his  wife,  the 
wife's  equity  to  a  settlement  is  prior  to  the 
right  of  retainer  bv  the  executors  for  the  hus- 

88 


ban!  and  wife  are  necessary  parties.  Schuyler 
v.  Hoyle,  5  John.  Ch.  196;"  Oldham  v. Collins, 
4  J.  J.  Marsh.  50;  Foster  v.  Hall,  2  id.  546; 
Griffith  v.  Coleman.  5  id.  600;  Pyle  r.  Cravens, 
4  Litt.  18.  In  the  case  of  Goddard  r.  Johnson, 
14  Pick. 352,  at  Law,  it  was  decided  that  a  hus- 
band may  sue  in  his  own  right,  after  the  death 
of  his  wife,  for  a  legacy  accruing  to  the  wife 
during  the  coverture.  In  this  case  the  Court 
said  :  "  We  think  the  husband  might  have  sued 
alone,  had  the  wife  been  still  living,  and  con- 
sequently that  this  action  may  be  sustained.  It 
is  a  well  settled  principle  that  a  chose  in  action 
accruing  to  the  wife  during  coverture  vests 
absolutely  in  the  husband."  In  Hapgood  v. 
Houghton,  22  Pick.  480,  the  Court  cm  firmed 
the  above  decision.  See  Sawyer  r.  Baldwin, 
20  Pick.  378;  Davis  v.  Newton, 6  Met.  543-545; 
Allen  17.  Wilkins,  3  Allen,  322,  323,  Stevens  v. 
Beals.  10  Ciish.  291,  Albee  v.  Carpenter,  12 
Cush  382;  Jones  v  Richardson,  5  .Met.  249, 
per  Shaw  C.  J. 

The  subject  of  the  husband's  right  to  a  legacy 
bequeathed  to  his  wife,  or  to  a  distributive  share 
in  an  estate  in  which  she  is  interested,  is  fully 
considered,  and  the  authorities  collected,  in 
Blount  v.  Bestland,  5  Sumner's  Yes.  515,  Per- 
kins's note  (a);  Carr  v.  Taylor,  10  id  574, 
Perkins's  note  (c). 

2  Burdick  v.  Garrick,  L.  R.  5  Ch.  233.  But 
see  now  the  Married  Women's  Property  Act, 
1882  (45  &  46  Vic  c.  75,  §  18). 


band's  debt.  In  re  Briant,  Poulter  r  Shackel, 
39  Ch.  D  471,  following  Carr  v.  Taylor,  supra; 
In  re  Batchelor,  L.  R.  16  Eq.  481. 


MARRIED    WOMEN. 


90 


The  ground  upon  which  Courts  of  Equity  require  the  wife  to  be 
joined  as  co-plaintiff  with  her  husband  in  suits  relating  to  her  own 
property,  is  the  parental  care  which  such  Courts  exercise  over  those 
individuals  who  are  not  in  a  situation  to  take  care  of  their  own  rights; 
and  as  it  is  presumed  that  a  father  would  not  marry  his  daughter  with- 
out insisting  upon  some  settlement  upon  her,  so  those  Courts,  standing 
in  loco  //ore i/f is,  will  not  suffer  the  husband  to  take  a  wife's  portion, 
until  he  has  agreed  to  make  a  reasonable  provision  for  her,3  or  until 


3  Per  Lord  Hardwicke,  in  Jewson  r.  Moul- 
son,  2  Atk.  41!t.  This  point  is  very  fully  con- 
sidered in  2  Kent,  138,  et  seq.  If  Ihe  husband 
wants  the  aid  of  Chancery  to  get  possession  of 
his  wife's  property,  or  if  her  property  be  within 
the  reach  of  the  Court,  he  must  do  what  is  equi- 
table by  making  a  reasonable  provision  out  of 
it  for  the  maintenance  of  her  and  her  children. 
Whether  the  suit  for  the  wife's  debt,  legacy,  or 
portion,  be  by  the  husband  or  his  assignees,  the 
result  is  the  same,  and  a  proper  settlement  on 
the  wife  must  first  be  made  of  a  proportion  of 
the  property.  Ibid. ;  Howard  v.  Moffatt,  2  John. 
Ch.  206;  Duvall  V.  Farmers'  Bank,  4  Gill  &  J. 
282;  Whitesides  v.  Dorris,  7  Dana,  106  ;  Dumond 
r.  Magee,  4  John.  Ch.  -318;  Kenney  v.  Udall, 
5  John.  Ch.  404;  Haviland  v.  Bloom,  6  John. 
Ch.  178;  Mumford  v.  Murray,  1  Paige,  620; 
Fabre  v.  Colden,  1  Paige,  166;  Tucker  v.  An- 
drews, 13  Maine,  124;  Glen  v.  Fisher,  6  John. 
Ch.  33:  Cape  v.  Adams,  1  Desaus.  567;  Heath 
V.  Heath,  2  Hill,  Ch.  104;  Rees  v.  Waters,  9 
Watts,  90;  Myers  v.  Myers,  1  Bailey,  Eq.  24; 
Helm  v.  Franciscus,  2  Bland,  545;  Tevis  v. 
Richardson,  7  Monroe,  660;  Poindexter  v.  Jeff- 
ries, 15  Gratt.  363.  It  has,  at  length,  become 
the  settled  rule  of  the  Courts  of  Equity  in  New 
York,  that  they  will  interfere,  and  restrain  a 
husband  from  recovering  at  Law  his  wife's 
property,  until  he  makes  a  provision  for  her. 
Fry  v.  Fry.  7  Paige,  462;  Martin  v.  Martin,  1 
Hoff.  Ch.462;  Udall  v.  Kenney,  3  Cowen,  500. 
Chancery  will  interfere  in  such  case,  on  a  bill 
filed  by  or  on  behalf  of  the  wife,  Van  Epps  v. 
Van  Deusen,  4  Paige,  64;  or  on  a  petition, 
Davis  v.  Newton,  6  Met.  543. 

The  result  of  the  cases  seems  to  be,  that 
whenever  the  interests  of  a  married  woman  are 
brought  before  the  Court,  in  opposition  to  the 
claims  of  her  husband,  they  will  be  attended 
to,  whoever  the  person  applying  to  the  Court 
may  be.  2  Story,  Eq.  Jur.  §  1414;  Van  Duzen 
V.  Van  Duzen,  6  Paige,  360;  Davis  v.  Newton, 

0  Met.  543,  544.  Sec  a  discussion  on  this  sub- 
ject of  sett!  ■  1 1 1 . •  1 1 1  in  such  ca^es,  in  Parsons  V. 
Par- ons,  9  X.  II.  300.  320,  et  seq. 

In  some  of  the  States  the  power  of  afford- 
ing such  protection  to  the  wife  does  not  exist. 
Parsons  v.  Parsons,  9  N.  H.  309,  320,  et  seq.; 
Yoke  v.  Barnet,  1  Binney,  358;  Matter  of  Miller, 

1  Ash.  323.  In  Sawyer  v.  Baldwin,  20  Pick. 
387,  in  reference  to  securing  a  provision  for  the 


wife  in  such  cases,  the  Court  remark,  that  the 
"  practice  prevails  to  some  extent  in  New  York, 
but  is  repudiated  in  other  States.  It  would 
seem  to  be  repugnant  to  what  we  deem  the 
legal  rights  of  the  husband,  and  would  never 
be  carried  so  far  here  as  it  has  been  in  Eng- 
land." But  in  Davis  v.  Newton,  6  Met.  543, 
speaking  of  the  wife's  right  to  a  suitable  allow- 
ance in  such  cases,  the  Court  remark,  that  it 
"  is  an  equity  which  Courts  will  uphold  in  all 
cases  where  the  husband,  his  creditors,  or  his 
assignees  have  occasion  to  come  into  Court  to 
obtain  possession  of  the  property,  and  wherever 
a  Court  of  Equity  can,  in  any  form,  exercise 
jurisdiction  over  the  subject."  "The  authority 
of  the  Court  to  make  such  allowance  is  a  well- 
established  principle  of  Equity,  and  has  been 
recognized  by  this  Court."  Per  Shaw  C.  J.  in 
Gardner  v.  Hooper,  3  Gray,  398,  404;  see  Gas- 
sett  v.  Grout,  4  Met.  488. 

Mr.  Chancellor  Kent,  2  Kent,  141,  142,  re- 
marks that,  "though  such  a  protection  cannot 
be  afforded  to  the  wife  in  Pennsylvania,  where 
there  is  no  Court  of  Chancery,  nor  in  New 
Hampshire,  where  Equity  powers,  to  a  specific 
extent  only,  are  conferred  by  Statute  upon  the 
Supreme  Court  of  Common-Law  jurisdiction; 
yet  I  presume  that  it  exists  in  must  of  the  other 
States  where  Courts  are  established  with  dis- 
tinct Equity  powers,  according  to  the  English 
system,  or  with  legal  and  equitable  powers 
united,  according  to  the  more  general  prevail- 
ing practice  in  the  LTnited  States.  It  exists  in 
Georgia,  Maryland,  and  Tennessee,  anil  in  the 
latter  State  protection  is  even  afforded  in  their 
Courts  of  Law.  Corley  v.  Corley,  22  Ga.  178; 
M'EIhattan  v.  Howell,  4  Ilayw.  10:  Phillips  v. 
Hassell,  10  Humph.  107;  Duvall  v.  Farmer.-' 
Bank  of  Maryland.  4  Gill  &  J.  282."  So  in 
Maine.  Tucker  v.  Andrews,  13  Maine,  124. 
For  other  States,  see  Heath  v.  Heath,  2  Hill,  Ch. 
104;  Myers  v.  Myers,  1  Bailey,  Eq.  24;  Helm  v. 
Franciscus,  2  Bland,  545;  Tevis  v.  Richardson, 
7  Monroe,  660;  Durr  v.  Bowyer,  2  M'Cord,  368; 
Argenbright  v  Campbell,  3  Hen.  &  M.  144- 
In  North  Carolina,  if  the  aid  of  a  Court  of 
Equity  is  required  by  the  husband  to  enable 
him  to  take  possession  of  his  wife's  property. 
he  must  make  reasonable  provision  for  her. 
But  in  that  State  the  wife  cannot,  by  a  suit  in 
Equity,  stop  him,  though  he  be  insolvent,  from 
taking  possession,  unless  her  claim  be  founded 

89 


*92 


SUITS   BY   PERSONS   WHO    ARE   UNDER   DISABILITY. 


*  91      they  have  given  the  wife  an  *  opportunity  of  making  her  election, 
whether  the  property  shall  go  to  her  husband,  or  shall  be  made 
the  subject  of  a  settlement  upon  her  and  her  children. 

This  right  of  a  wife  is  termed  her  equity  to  a  settlement;  and  it 
attaches  whenever  proceedings  are  pending  in  the  Court  of  Chancery,1 
with  reference  to  her  personal  property,2  or  her  equitable  interest 
in  real  estate,3  except  as  against  the  particular  assignee  of 
*92  *  her  life-estate,1  or  her  own  creditors  at  the  time  of  her  mar- 
riage.2 She  may  herself  institute  proceedings  for  the  purpose 
of  raising  her  equity;8  and  it  may  be  enforced  as  soon  as  the  property  to 
which  she  is  entitled  is  actually  in  possession,  though  not  actually  dis- 
tributable.4 The  right  attaches  to  the  wife's  life-interest,  subject  to 
the  above-mentioned  exception ; 6  but  not  to  the  arrears  of  the  income  of 
real  or  leasehold  property  which  her  husband  has  assigned  to  a  particu- 
lar assignee.6  It  does  not  attach  to  property  in  which  the  wife  and 
husband  have  a  joint  interest,7  or  to  property  which  he  takes  as  an 
executor  and  not  by  virtue  of  his  marital  right,  though  the  wife  takes 
a  share  of  the  residue  under  the  will.8 

The  right  of  a  married  woman  to  have  a  settlement  made  upon  her- 
self and  her  children  is  totally  distinct  from  her  right  by  survivorship 
to  such  of  her  choses  in  action  as  have  not  been  reduced  into  possession 
during  the  joint  lives  of  herself  and  husband.  The  right  by  survivor- 
ship is  a  legal  right,  applying  equally  to  her  legal  and  equitable  inter- 


upon  a  marriage  settlement.  Bryan  v.  Bryan, 
1  Dtv.  Eq.  47;  Allen  v.  Allen,  6  Ired.  Eq.  293. 
The  wife's  equity  extends  as  well  to  real  as 
to  personal  property.  Moore  v.  Moore,  14  B. 
Mon.  259.  In  this  last  case  it  was  allowed  to 
her  out  of  the  proceeds  of  lands  which  de- 
scended to  her  during  coverture;  and  she  was 
permitted  to  assert  this  right  by  original  bill. 
Where  a  wife  joined  her  husband  in  the  con- 
veyance of  lands,  and  the  husband  became  in- 
solvent before  the  price  was  paid,  a  suitable 
settlement  was  decreed  to  her  out  of  the  price. 
Lav  v.  Brown,  13  B.  Mon.  295. 

1  See  Sup.  Ct.  of  Jud.  Act,  1873  (36  &  37 
Vic.  c.  66,  §  24). 

2  Even  where  the  fund  is  not  in  Court,  see 
Henry  v.  Ogle,  1  C.  P.  Coop.  temp.  Cott.  447. 

3  Sturgis  v.  Champneys,  5  M.  &  C.  97 ; 
Hanson  v.  Keating,  4  Hare,  1;  Wortham  v. 
Pcmberton,  1  De  G.  &  S.  644;  Barnes  v.  Rob- 
inson, 9  Jur.  N.  S.  245;  11  W.  R.  276,  V.  C.  S.; 
but  see  Gleaves  v.  Payne,  1  De  G.  J.  &  S.  87. 
In  Smith  v.  Matthews,  3  De  G.  F.  &  J.  139,  it 
was  hell  that  the  possible  estate  by  curtesy  of 
the  husband  cnuld  not  be  interfered  with. 

i  Tidd  r.  Lister,  3  De  G.  M.  &  G.  857,  861, 
869;  10  Hare,  140;  18  Jur.  543:  and  see  Dur- 
ham v.  Crackles,  8  Jur.  N.  S.  1174,  V.  C.  W. 

2  Barnard  v.  Ford,  Carrick  r.  Ford,  L.  R. 
4  Ch.  247. 

3  Ladv  Elibank  v.  Montolieu,  5  Ves.  737; 
1  Wh.  &  T.  L.  Cas.  (6th  ed.)  486;  and  cases 

90 


collected  in  Bosvil  v.  Brander,  1  P.  Wms.  459; 
Duncombe  v.  Greenacre,  2  De  G.  F.  &  J.  509; 
7  Jur.  N.  S.  175;  Postgate  v.  Barnes,  9  Jur. 
N.  S.  456;  11  W.  R  356,  V.  C.  S.;  Barnes  v. 
Robinson,  9  Jur.  N.  S.  245;  11  W.  R.  276,  V. 
C.  S.;  Sotheran  v.  Smear,  W.  N.  (1858)  296; 
Ruffles  o.  Alston,  L.  R.  19  Eq.  539,  V.  C.  M.; 
and  see  Giacometti  v.  Prodgers,  L.  R.  14  Eq. 
253,  V.  C.  M.  L.  R.;  Nicholson  v.  Carline,  22 
W.  R.  819;  8Ch.  338. 

*  Re  Robinson,  Robinson  v.  Robinson,  12 
Ch.  D.  188,  V.  C.  H.;  and  see  Jewson  v.  Moul- 
son,  2  Atk.  419;  De  La  Garde  v.  Lempriere,  6 
Beav.  344;  Osborne  v.  Morgan,  9  Hare,  432; 
Wallace  v.  Auldjo,  1  Dr.  &  Sm.  216;  9  Jur. 
N.  S.  687;  2  N.  R.  567,  L.  JJ. ;  1  De  G.  J.  & 
S.  643. 

5  Sturgis  v.  Champneys,  5  M.  &  C.  97;  Wil- 
kinson v.  Charlesworth,  10  Beav.  324.  See 
Taunton  v.  Morris,  8  Ch.  D.  453;  11  id.  779, 
where  the  rule  was  applied,  and  the  whole  estate 
was  settled  on  the  wife.  But  see  Shillito  v. 
Collett,  7  Jur.  N.  S.  385,  where  V.  C.  Kinders- 
ley  held  that  an  annuity  given  to  a  married 
woman  by  will  might  be  paid  to  her  husband 
without  her  consent  in  Court. 

6  Re  Carr,  L.  R.  12  Eq.  609.  V.  C  M. 

i  Ward  b.  Ward,  14  Ch.  D.  506,  M.  R. ;  Re 
Brvan,  Godfrey  r.  Bryan,  id.  516,  V.  C.  M. 

"s  Knight  v.  Knight,  L.  R.  18  Eq.  487,  V.  C. 
H.  See  In  re  Briant,  Poulter  v.  Shackel,  39 
Ch.  D.  471,  481. 


MARRIED    WOMEN.  *  93 

est;  but  her  right  to  a  settlement  depends  upon  the  peculiar  rule  of 
Courts  of  Equity  before  alluded  to,  which,  standing  in  loco  parentis 
with  regard  to  a  feme  covert,  will  not  suffer  the  husband  to  take  the 
wife's  portion  until  he  has  agreed  to  make  a  reasonable  provision  for 
her  and  her  children,  unless  they  are  satisfied  that  it  is  with  her  free 
consent  that  it  is  paid  over  to  him.9  This  rule  of  Equity  has  been 
recognized  and  acted  upon  from  a  very  early  period,10  and  was  acknowl- 
edged and  followed,  even  where  a  wife  has  had  a  demand  in  her  own 
right,  and  application  was  made  to  a  Court  of  Equity  to  enforce  it.11 
Where,  however,  the  demand  is  not  one  which  accrues  to  the  husband 
in  right  of  his  wife,  although  he  may  be  entitled  to  it  under  a  contract 
made  upon  his  marriage,  yet  if  he  alone  has  the  right  to  sue  for  it,  the 
equity  of  the  wife  to  a  settlement  will  not  attach;12  and  when  she  has 
been  guilty  of  a  fraud,  she  will  not  be  permitted  to  set  up  her  equity 
to  a  settlement  as  against  a  purchaser.13 

*In  order  to  ascertain  whether  the  married  woman  waives  her  *93 
equity  to  a  settlement,  and  consents  to  her  husband  taking  the 
property,  the  practice  of  the  Court  is,  when  she  is  resident  in  London, 
or  is  willing  to  attend,  for  the  Judge  to  examine  her  apart  from  her 
husband,  at  the  time  of  pronouncing  the  decree  or  order  disposing  of 
the  fund ; 1  in  which  case  a  note  of  the  examination  is  made  by  the 
Registrar  in  Court,  and  is  embodied  in  the  decree  or  order.  If  the 
married  woman  is  unable  or  unwilling  to  attend  the  Court,  owing  to 
her  residence  in  the  country  or  other  cause,  her  examination  may  be 
taken  by  commissioners,  under  an  order  specially  appointing  them  for 
this  purpose.2  Such  order  may  be  made  in  various  forms,  and  at  dif- 
ferent stages  of  the  proceedings.  Thus,  where,  on  pronouncing  the 
decree  or  order  dealing  with  the  fund,  it  is  suggested  by  counsel  that 
an  immediate  examination  of  the  wife  by  commissioners  is  intended, 
the  Court,  to  save  expense,  will  sometimes  direct  the  fund  to  be  carried 
over  to  the  separate  account  of  the  wife,  and  by  the  same  order  appoint 
the  commissioners,  reserving  liberty  to  apply;  in  which  case,  on  com- 
pletion of  the  examination,  an  application  for  payment  out  of  the  fund 
may  be  made  by  petition,8  or,  in  cases  where  there  is  jurisdiction  at 
chambers,  by  summons.4  Or  the  Court  will  direct  the  drawing  up  of  the 
decree  or  order  to  be  suspended  for  a  few  days,  to  afford  an  opportunity 
of  taking  the  examination  in  the  interval :  in  the  latter  case,  an  ex 
parte  summons5  is  thereupon  taken  out  for  an  order  to  appoint  the 

9  Jewson  v.  Moulson,  2  Atk.  410.  row  v.  Manning,  W.  N.  (1878)  122,  V.  C.  II.; 

1°  Tanfield  v.  Davenport,  Tothill,  114;   and  Cahill  v.  Cahill,  8  App.  Cas.  420. 
see  1  Spence,  Eq.  Jur.  581,  596.  i  On   this  subject   sec  2  Seton,  661-680;  1 

11  .lewson  v.  Moulson,  2  Atk.  419;  Milner  v.  Bright's  II.  &  W.  88  ;  2  Story,  Eq.  Jur.  §  1418, 
Colmer,  2  P.  Wras.  641;  Adams  v.  Peirce,  3  P.  and  cases  cited;  Ward  v.  Amory,  1  Curtis,  419, 
Wins.  11;  Brown  v.  Elton,  Lb.  202;  Harrison  ?•.  432;  Campbell  v.  Harding,  6  Sim.  283  ;  Sperl- 
Buckie,  1  Stra.  239;  Winch  v.  Page,  P.unb.  86;  ing  v.  Rochfort,  8  Sumner's  Yes.  175,  note; 
Middlecome  v.  Marlow,  2  Atk.  519.  Binford  ».  Bawden,  1  id.  512,  and  note  (a)  and 

12  Brooke  v.  Hiekes,  12  W.  R.  703,  V.  C.  S.;  cases  cited  ;  2  id.  38. 

and  see  Brett  v.  Forcer,  3  Atk,  403.     For  case  2  See  form,  Seton,  658,  No.  4. 

of  a  legacy  given  to  husband  and  wife  jointly,  8  For  form,  see  Vol.  HI. 

see  Atcheson  v.  Atcheson,  11  Bcav.  485,  488.  4  Ibid. 

18  Me  Lush's  Trusts,  L.  R.  4  Ch.  691:  Bar-  6  ibid. 

91 


*  94  SUITS    BY   PERSONS    WHO    ARE    UNDER    DISABILITY. 

commissioners;  and  when  the  examination  has  been  completed,  the 
matter  is  mentioned  again  to  the  Court,  and  the  decree  or  order  is 
directed  to  be  drawn  up,  embodying  therein  the  result  of  the 
examination. 

Where,  in  any  case,  a  fund  has  been  carried  over  to  the  wife's  sepa- 
rate account,  an  application  to  deal  with  it  may  be  made  by  petition;  ° 
or,  where  there  is  jurisdiction  at  chambers,  by  summons.7     When  made 
by  petition,  the  usual  course  is  to  get  the  petition  answered  for  a  day 
sufficiently  distant  to  allow  of  the  examination  being  taken  in 

*  94      the  mean  time;  on  the  petition  being  thus  answered,  *  an  ex  parte 

summons  1  is  taken  out  at  chambers  for  an  order  to  appoint  the 
commissioners,  and  the  examination  is  taken  thereon  before  the  peti- 
tion is  heard.  If  the  petition,  in  any  case,  is  brought  on  before  the 
wife  is  examined,  an  order  to  examine  her  will  be  made,  and  the  peti- 
tion will  be  ordered  to  stand  over  till  the  return  thereto;2  after  such 
return,  the  petition  will  be  placed  in  the  paper  and  disposed  of. 

If  the  application  for  payment  out  is  made  by  summons,  evidence 
of  the  title  to  the  fund  should  be  adduced  on  the  hearing,  and  the  sum- 
mons will  be  adjourned  till  after  the  examination;  to  procure  which,  a 
summons3  is  next  taken  out  for  an  order  to  appoint  commissioners; 
and  when  the  examination  has  been  perfected,  the  summons  to  pay  out 
is  brought  on  again,  and  an  order  made.  The  married  woman  may, 
however,  attend  for  examination  by  the  judge  at  chambers,  on  the  sum- 
mons to  pay  out  the  fund,  so  as  to  save  the  expense  of  an  examination 
by  commissioners.4 

It  is  usual,  but  not  essential,  to  appoint  professional  persons  as  com- 
missioners; and  they  must  not  be  concerned  for  the  husband  in  the 
matter  to  which  the  examination  relates,  and  an  affidavit  as  to  this  fact 
is  required;  but  it  does  not  appear  to  be  the  practice  to  require  an 
affidavit  of  their  fitness,  unless,  perhaps,  where  they  are  to  act  abroad, 
and  do  not  seem,  by  their  descriptions,  to  be  legal  practitioners  or  public 
functionaries.  Three  or  four  persons  are  ordinarily  appointed,  two  of 
whom  may,  and  usually  do,  act  without  the  rest.  An  examination  by 
one  commissioner  only  is  not  deemed  sufficient. 

The  married  woman,  on  attending  the  commissioners,  is  examined  by 
them  secretly  and  apart  from  her  husband,5  to  whom,  in  what  manner, 
and  for  what  purpose  she  is  willing  and  desirous  that  the  fund  should 
be  disposed  of;  they  read  over  to  her  the  order  under  which  the  exami- 
nation is  taken,  and  explain  to  her  its  purport;  the  examination  is 
taken  in  writing,  and  is  signed  by  her;  a  certificate  of  the  examination, 
written  at  the  foot  thereof,    is  then  signed  by  the  commissioners;  an 

6  For  form,  see  Vol.  III.  nation   of   married   women  in   cases   occurring 

1  Ibid.    Sometimes  liberty  to  apply  at  cham-  in  the  Judge's  chambers.     For  form  of  order, 

bers  is  expressly  given  by  the  order  directing  where  the   examination    is  taken  at  chambers, 

the  carrying  over  of  the  fund;  Re  Flotchkiss,  see  2  Seton,  601,  No.  3. 

L.  R.  8  Eq.  043,650,  V.  C.  J.  5  The  husband,  or  his  solicitor,  or  any  per- 

1  For  form,  see  Vol.  III.  son  connected  with  them,  should  not  be  present 

2  See  form  of  order,  2  Seton,  662,  No.  4.  at  this  examination;  see  Re  Bendyshe,  3  Jur. 

3  For  form,  see  Vol.  III.  N.  S.  727;  5  W.  R.  816,  V.  C.  K.;   Re  Lewis, 
*  The  Chief  Clerks  have  been  authorized  by  24  W.  R.  103,  V.  C.  H. 

the    Judges  to  take,  and  do  take,  the  exami- 

92 


MARRIED    WOMEN.  *  95 

aclffiavit  verifying  all  the  signatures  is  made;  and  the  examination, 
certificate,  and  affidavit 6  are  filed  at  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerks' 
Office,7  whence  office  copies  are  procured. 

Where  the  married  woman  is  abroad,  an  order  will  be  made 
*  appointing  commissioners  resident  there;1  and  the  mode  of  *95 
taking  and  authenticating  an  examination  out  of  the  British 
dominions  is  exemplified  by  the  following  case.  In  Minet  v.  J/ ;/</<■,- 
the  order  was,  that  she  should  appear  before  some  of  the  plaintiffs,  and 
a  magistrate  of  Leyden,  to  be  privately  examined  as  to  her  consent; 
such  examination  to  be  in  writing,  in  the  French  or  German  language, 
and  to  be  signed  by  her,  and  attested  by  notaries  public,  whose  cer- 
tificate thereof  was  also  to  be  in  writing,  either  in  the  French  or  Ger- 
man language.  It  was  also  ordered,  that  such  signing  and  certificate 
should  be  verified  by  the  affidavit  of  some  credible  witnesses,  either  in 
the  German  or  French  language,  before  a  proper  magistrate  of  Leyden; 
and  that  the  examination,  certificate,  and  affidavit  should  be  translated 
into  English  by  certain  notaries  public,  sworn  to  the  truth  of  their 
translation.8 

Where,  however,  the  wife  is  domiciled  abroad,  and  in  a  country  by 
the  law  of  which  there  is  no  equity  to  a  settlement,  but  the  whole  is 
payable  to  the  husband,  her  consent  is  not  necessary;4  but  that  the  law 
is  so,  must  be  proved  as  a  fact  in  each  case.5  Where  a  married  woman 
was  resident  abroad,  a  sum  exceeding  £200,  to  which  she  was  entitled, 
was  ordered  to  be  paid  to  her  attorney,  who  was  authorized  under  a 
power  executed  by  her  and  her  husband  to  receive  it  for  her  separate 
use.6 

Before  a  fund  belonging  to  a  married  woman  will  be  paid  out  of 
Court,7  an  affidavit  is  required  to  be  made  by  the  husband  and  wife, 
that  no  settlement,  or  agreement  for  a  settlement,  has  been  made;  or, 
if  there  is  any  settlement  or  agreement,  then  an  affidavit  by  them 
identifying  the  instrument,   and  stating  that  there  is  no  other;  8  and 

6  For  forms,  see  Vol.  III.;  and  see  Re  Tas-  and  the  Court  will  direct  a  settlement.  In  re 
burgh,  1  V.  &  13.  507.  Tweedale'a  Settlement,  John.  109. 

7  Now,  at  the  Central  Office  of  the  Supreme  5  M'Cormick  v.  Garnett,  ubi  supra.  In 
Court  of  Judicature.  Sutherland  v.  Young,  5  L.  T.  N.  S.  738,  M.  R  , 

1  Parsons  o.  Dunne,  2  Ves.  Sr.  60;  Bourdil-  legacies  of  £250  each  to  a  Frenchman's  daugb- 
lon  f.  Adair,  3  Bro.  C.  C.  237  ;  Gibbons  v.  ters,  married  to  French  subjects,  were  ordered 
Kibbey,  7  Jur.  N.  S.  1298;  10  W.  R.  55,  V.      to  be  paid  to  the  wives. 

C.  K.;  Wedderburn  v.  Wedderburn,  M.  R.  in  6  Alien  v.  Forbes,  4  L.  J.  Ch.  530,  M.  R. 

Chamb.  5  Aug.,  186-1;  Ireland  v.  Trembath,  13  7  See  Hough  v.  Kyley,  2  Cox,  157;  Elring- 

L.  T.  N.  S.  626,  V.  C.  S.  ton  v.  Elrington,  4  Drew".  545. 

2  2  Bro.  C.  C.  663.  8  For  forms  see  Vol.  III. ;  Britten  v.  Briiten, 

8  2  Bro.  C.  C.  ed.  Belt,  p.  662,  n.  1 ;  see  also  9  Beav.  143.  When  the  joint  affidavit  cannot  be 
Parsons  v.  Dunne,  Belt's  Sup.  to  Ves.  Sr.  276.  obtained,   as   where    both   husband   and    wife 

4  Campbell   v.  French,  3  Ves.  321;    Dues  v.  refused  to  join  in  an  affidavit   in  favor  of  an 

Smith,   Jac.    544;  Anstruther   v.  Adair,    2    M.  assignee,  the  Court  has  been  satisfied  with  other 

&  K.  513;    Hitchcock  v.  Clendinen,  12  Beav.  evidence.    Rowland    v.   Oakley.    14  Jur.  845, 

534:  M'Cormick  v.  Garnett,  5  De  G.  M.  &  G.  V.  C.  K.  B.:  Anon    3  Jur.  X.  S.  839,  V.  ('.  W. 

278;  18  Jur.  412;   Re  Swift,  W.  N.  (1872)  192,  The  fund  will  be  paid  out  upon  affidavit  of  the 

V.  CM,  where  the  married  woman  was  domi-  wife   alone,  and  other  affidavits  showing  that 

ciled  in  Australia;  see,  however,  Schwabacher  the  husband  is  resident  abroad  and  refused  to 

v.  Becker,  2  Sm.  &  G.  App.  4;  but  if  the  feme  join,  or  that  there  was  difficulty  in  procuring 

covert  is  a  ward  of  Court,  the  case  is  different,  the  usual  joint  affidavit.    Elliott  v.  Remington, 

93 


*96 


SUITS    BY    PERSONS    WHO    ARE    UNDER    DISABILITY. 


the  instrument  must  be  produced.9  Where  produced  in  Court,  the 
counsel  of  the  husband  and  wife  certifies  that  he  has  carefully  perused 
it,  and  that  the  fund  in  question  is  not  affected  thereby ;  10  but  where 
produced  in  chambers,  an  affidavit  by  their  solicitor  to  the  like  effect  is 
required.11  On  an  application  for  an  order  to  examine  the  wife,  unless 
the  affidavit  of  no  settlement  be  produced,  the  order  will  direct 
*96  that  it  be  made  before  the  *  examination  is  taken:1  in  which 
case  it  is  usual  to  swear  the  affidavit  before  one  of  the  com- 
missioners appointed  by  the  order,  if  he  is  competent  to  administer  an 
oath.  Where  the  marriage  is  not  otherwise  proved,  the  affidavit  should 
state  the  time  and  place  of  the  marriage,  and  a  certificate  thereof  should 
be  exhibited.2 

As  a  general  rule,  the  examination  of  the  wife  will  not  be  taken  by 
the  Court  until  the  amount  of  the  fund  is  clearly  ascertained,3  except 
where  it  is  subject  only  to  a  deduction  for  costs; 4  but  her  consent  has 
been  taken  as  to  the  part  ascertained  from  time  to  time.5  Formerly  it 
was  not  the  practice  of  the  Court  to  direct  a  fund  belonging  to  a  married 
woman  to  be  paid  out  of  Court  at  the  hearing  of  the  cause; 6  but  it  was 
directed  to  be  transferred  to  a  separate  account,  usually  entitled  the 
account  of  the  husband  and  wife;  and  after  such  transfer,  a  petition 
was  presented  for  payment  out  of  Court  of  the  money  so  transferred.7 
Later,  by  statute,  where  the  wife  appeared  in  Court  and  consented,  the 
fund  might  be  directed  to  be  paid  out  at  the  hearing  of  the  cause,  or 
on  further  consideration.8 

If  the  wife  be  not  of  full  age,  she  is  incapable  of  giving  her  consent; 
in  that  case,  therefore,  the  Court  will  not  examine  her,  but  will  require 
the  husband,  in  case  he  applies  to  the  Court  for  her  equitable  property, 
to  make  a  proper  settlement  upon  her.9  If  the  wife  is  of  age,  and  per- 
sists in  giving  her  consent,  and  waiving  her  equity  to  a  settlement,  it 
appears  that   the   Court  cannot  refuse  to  act  in   accordance  with   her 


9  Sim.  502;  Wilkinson  v.  Schneider,  L.  R.  9 
Eq.  423.  See  Whiting  v.  Bassett,  L.  R.  14  Eq. 
70,  V.  C.  W.;  Woodward  v.  Pratt,  L.  R.  16 
Eq.  127,  V.  C.  M.  As  to  the  affidavit  required 
where  the  wife  was  dead,  and  an  affidavit  of  no 
settlement  could  not  be  obtained,  see  Clarke  v. 
Woodward,  25  Beav.  455.  Where  the  settle- 
ment was  Scotch,  the  Court  required  the  affi- 
davit of  a  Scotch  advocate  that  it  did  not  affect 
the  fund.  Re  Todd,  Shand  v.  Kidd,  19  Beav. 
582.  The  affidavit  has  been  dispensed  with 
where  the  sum  was  under  £10.  Veal  v-  Veal, 
L.  R.  4  Eq.  115,  M.  R. 

9  Rose  v.  Rolls,  1  Beav.  270. 

io  Britten  v.  Britten,  9  Beav.  143,  144;  and 
see  Hamilton  v.  Arrowsmith,  W.  N.  (1877) 
261,  V.  C.  H. 

11  For  form,  see  Vol.  III. 
i  See   form  of  order,  2  Seton,  662,   No.  4. 
The  V.  C.  Kindersley  requires  the  affidavit  to 
be   produced   before    the  order  to  examine   is 
made.     Seton,  663. 

2  See  form  of  affidavit  in  Vol.  III. 

94 


3  Sperling  v.  Rochfort,  8  Ves  164,  178; 
Woollands  v.  Crowther.  12  Ves.  174,  178; 
Jernegan  v.  Baxter,  6  Mad  32 ;  Moss  v.  Dunlop, 
8  W.  R.  39,  V.  C.  W.;  S.  C.  nom.  Anon. 
5  Jur.  N.  S.  1124. 

4  Packer  v.  Packer,  1  Coll.  92 ;  Musgrove  v. 
Flood.  1  Jur.  N.  S.  1086,  V.  C.  W. ;  Roberts 
v.  Collett,  1  Sm.  &  G  138. 

s  Powell  v.  Merrett,  2  Seton,  668. 

6  Campbell  v.  Harding,  6  Sim.  283. 

7  Ibid 

8  13  &  14  Vic.  c  35,  §  28 ;  and  see  ante,  p.  93. 

9  Stubbs  v.  Sargon,  2  Beav.  496;  Abraham 
v.  Newcombe,  12  Sim.  566;  In  re  D'Angibau, 
Andrews  v.  Andrews,  15  Ch.  228;  Re  Cardross, 
7  Ch.  D.  728 ;  Postell  v.  Skirving,  1  Des.  158; 
Cheathem  v.  Huff,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  616.  As  to 
the  course  where  the  wife  is  non  compos,  see 
Caldecott  v.  Harrison,  2  Seton,  670.  In  Ship- 
way  v.  Ball,  16  Ch.  D  376,  V.  C.  M.,  the 
income  was  ordered  to  be  paid  to  the  infant 
married  woman  on  her  separate  receipt  until 
further  order. 


MARRIED   WOMEN.  *  97 

wish.10  In  Ex  parte  Higham,11  however,  Lord  Hardwicke  considered 
himself  entitled  to  object  to  the  whole  fund  being  paid  over  to  the  hus- 
band, who  was  in  trade,  even  though  the  wife  consented;  but  in  the 
previous  case  of  Willats  v.  Cay,12  where  the  wife  had  appeared  in 
Court,  and  being  examined  desired  that  the  whole  money  might  be  paid 
to  her  husband,  the  Master  of  the  Rolls,  although  the  parties  had  mar- 
ried without  the  consent  of  the  wife's  relations,  and  the  husband 
appeared  to  be  insolvent,  refused  to  refer  it  to  the  Master  to 
*  consider  a  scheme  for  securing  a  provision  for  the  wife,  —  observ-  *  97 
ing,  that  it  was  never  done  unless  circumstances  of  fraud,  or  of 
compulsion  on  the  part  of  the  husband  appeared,  and  that  a  wife  might 
as  well  dispose  of  her  personal  estate,  over  which  she  has  an  absolute 
control,  as  of  real  estate,  which  she  might  do  by  joining  in  a  fine  with 
her  husband.1 

It  would  seem  that,  as  long  as  the  money  remains  in  Court,  the  wife 
may  claim  a  settlement  out  of  it,  although  she  has  consented  to  its 
being  paid  to  her  husband;  or  that,  at  any  rate,  this  is  so  where  she 
was  not  aware  of  material  circumstances  at  the  time  of  giving  her 
consent.2  (a) 

It  seems  that,  where  a  wife's  consent  has  been  already  given  upon 
her  examination  before  another  competent  tribunal,  she  need  not  be 
again  examined.3  And  so  it  has  been  held,  that  where  a  married 
woman  is  entitled  to  a  share  of  money  arising  from  the  sale  or  mort- 
gage of  an  estate  which  has  been  sold  or  mortgaged,  and  in  order  to 
effect  such  sale  or  mortgage  she  has  joined  in  levying  a  fine  of  her 
share,  and  for  that  purpose  has  undergone  the  usual  examination  in 
the  Court  where  such  fine  has  been  levied,  she  will  be  barred,  by  the 
fine,  of  her  equity  for  a  settlement.4 

The  right  of  a  married  woman  to  have  a  settlement  made  of,  or  out 
of,  a  fund  in  Court,  arises,  however  small  the  fund  may  be;  but  if  it  is 


10  See 2  Story,  Eq.  Jur.  §  1418,  note;  Mur-  Wright  v.  Rutter,  2  Ves.  Jr.  673;  Minet  v. 

ray  v.  Lord  Elibank,  10  Ves.  84,  and  note;  S.  C.  Hyde,  2  Bro.  C.  C.  663;  Dimmoch  v.  Atkinson, 

1  Wh.  &  T.  L.  Cas.  (6th  ed.)  493,  501;  Ward  v.  3  Bro.  C.  C.  195;  Ellis  v.  Atkinson,   ib.  565; 

Amory,  1  Curtis,  419,  432  ;  Sawyer  v.  Baldwin,  Hood  v.  Burlton,  4  Bro.  C.  C.  121. 
20  Pick.  378,  388.  2  Watson  v.  Marshall,  17  Beav.  363;  Pen- 

11  2   Ves.    Sr.   579;  the   ground   of  decision  fold  v.  Mould,  L.  R.  4  Eq.  562,  V.  C.  M. 
appears  to  have  been   that  the  lady  had  been  3  Campbell  v.  French,  3  Ves.  321,  323. 

a  ward  of   Court;    see  also  Biddies  v.  Jackson,  4  May  v.  Roper,  4  Sim.  360.     The  wife  may 

26  Beav.  282;  3  De  G.  &  J.  544;   4  Jur.  N.  S.  waive  her  right  by  permitting  the  conveyance  : 

1069;  5  id.  901;  Longbottom  v.  Pearce,  3  De  G.  Wright  v.  Arnold,  14  B.  Mon.  638;  so  by  join- 

&  J.  545,  n.  ((j);  White  v.  Herrick,  L.  R.  4  Ch.  ing  in  a  receipt  for  the  price:  Geddes  ex  parte, 

345.  4  Rich.    Eq.  301;    or  it  may   be   voluntarily 

12  2  Atk.  67.  waived:  Ward  v.  Amory.  1  Curtis,    419;   see 
1  SeeMilner  v.  Colmer,  2  P.  Wms.  639,  642;  now  3  &  4  Will.  IV.  c.  74,  §  77,  substituting 

Lanoyu.  Athol,  2  Atk.  444,  448;  Oldham  v.  an   acknowledged   deed   for  a  fine:  Shelford, 

Hughes,  ib.  452;  Hearle  v.  Greenbank,  3  Atk.  R.  P.  Stat.  369,  370.     See  now  as  to   her  ac- 

695,  709;  Parsons  v.   Dunne,  2  Ves.   Sr.    60;  knowledgment,  45  &  46  Vic.  c.  39,  §  7. 


(a)  In  Pemberton  v.  Marriott,  47  L.  T.  332,  upon  her  and   her  infant  children,  was  held 

a  married  woman,  having  obtained  a  decree  entitled  to  the  property  absolutely  as  against 

declaring  that,  subject  to  a  certain  inquiry  and  her  children,  her  husband  having  died  before 

a  certain  direction,  property  should  be  settled  the  decree  was  carried  into  effect. 

95 


*  98  SUITS   BY   PERSONS   WHO    ARE   UNDER    DISABILITY. 

under  £200,  or  is  likely  to  be  reduced  thereto  by  costs,5  or  produces 
less  than  £10  a  year,6  she  may  waive  her  equity  to  a  settlement  without 
being  separately  examined.7 

When   the   payment,    transfer,    or    delivery   out  of     Court   of    any 

money    or   securities   to   an   unmarried    woman    is   directed,    and   she 

marries  before  payment,  transfer,  or  delivery,  and  the  sum  does  not 

exceed  £200,  or  £10  a  year,  the  same  will  be  paid,  transferred  or 

*  98      delivered  *  to  the  woman  and  her  husband,  upon  proof  of  the 

marriage,  and  such  affidavit  of  no  settlement  as  has  been  men- 
tioned above;1  or,  in  case  there  has  been  a  settlement,  upon  the  affi- 
davit of  the  solicitor  that  in  his  judgment  the  settlement  does  not 
affect  the  fund.2  But  where  the  fund  in  Court  exceeds  the  limit  just 
mentioned,  a  special  order  for  payment  is  necessary:  which  can  be 
obtained  at  chambers,  on  ex  parte  summons,3  supported  by  the  produc- 
tion of  the  order  under  which  the  fund  was  directed  to  be  paid  to  the 
woman,  the  certificate  of  the  fund,  and  an  affidavit  by  her  and  her  hus- 
band of  the  marriage,  and  of  no  settlement; 4  or  by  petition,5  on  the 
like  evidence,  where  there  is  no  jurisdiction  at  chambers. 

The  Court  will  not,  in  general,  dispense  with  the  separate  examina- 
tion of  the  married  woman,  in  cases  where  it  is  proposed  to  pay  to 
her  on  her  separate  receipt  a  fund  which  is  not  settled  to  her  separate 
use;  as  that  would  be,  in  effect,  the  same  as  payment  to  the  husband.6 

The  equity  to  a  settlement  attaches  upon  the  husband's  legal  right  to 
present  possession;  and  the  principle  has  no  application  to  a  remainder 
or  reversion,  which  can  only  be  passed  to  the  husband  when  it  falls 
into  possession.7  With  respect  to  an  interest  of  this  description,  it 
has  been  stated  generally,  that  the  Court  will  not  allow  the  wife,  by 
any  act  of  hers  during  coverture,  to  bind  her  future  rights.  Without 
her  consent,  the  Court  will  not  deal  with  it  or  dispose  of  it  at  all;  and 
her  consent  the  Court  will  refuse  to  take.8  Thus,  a  petition  which 
had  for  its  object  the  payment  to  the  husband  of  a  sum  of  money,  to 

5  Roberts  v.  Collett,  1  Sm.  &  G.  138;  but  14  W.  R.  449,  V.  C.  S.,  where,  husband  con- 
see  Sporle  v.  Barnabv,  10  Jur.  N.  S.  1142,  V.  senting,  fund  was  paid  on  separate  receipt  of 
C.  S.  wife.     As  to  separate  examination,  see  Elliott 

6  See  2  Seton,  660;  Cons.  Ord.  I.  1.  v.  Hooper,  W.  N.  (1874)  57;  Re  Morton,  id. 

7  Re  Kincaid,  1  Drew.  326.  The  case  of  181 ;  31  L.  T.  N.  S".  82;  Frith  v.  Lewis,  W.  N. 
Foden  v.  Finney,  4  Russ.  428,  is  not  now  (1881)  145;  Clark  v.  Clark,  W.  N.  (1866)  106; 
binding.  Re  Cutler,  14  Beav.  220;  and  see  14  W.  R.  449;  Anon.  3  Jur.  N.  S.  839;  Re 
Doodv  v.  Higgins,  2  Jur.  N.  S.  1068,  V.  Pope,  W.  N.  (1873)  79;  21  W.  R.  646;  Re 
C.  W.  Crump,  34  Beav.   570;    Re  Stanley,  61  L.  T. 

1  Ante,  p.  95.  169;   Deignan  v.  Deignan,  13  L.  R.   Ir.  278; 

2  Cons.  Ord.  I.  1-3.  See  Chan.  Funds  Con-  Riddell  r.  Errington,  26  Ch.  D.  220;  Re  Harris, 
sol.  Rules,  1874.  r.  52  (L.  R.  9  Ch.  1);  Clayton      28  Ch.  D.  171 ;  Re  Arabin,  52  L.  T.  728. 

v.  Gresham,  10  Ves.  288.  '  Pickard  v.  Roberts,  3  Mad.  385. 

3  See  form  in  Vol.  III.  8  Per  Lord  Cottenham,  in  Frank  v.  Frank, 

4  [bid.  3  M.  &  C.   178;    Woollands  v.  Crowcher,  12 

5  ibid.  Sumner's  Ves.  174,  Perkins's  note  («)  and  cases 

6  Mawe  v.  Heaviside,  7  Jur.  N.  S.  817;  9  cited;  2  Story,  Eq.  Jur.  §  1413,  and  notes  and 
W.  R.  649,  V.  C.  K.;  Gibbons  v.  Kibbey,  7  cases  cited;  Wilks  v.  Fitzpatrick,  1  Humph. 
Jur.  N.  S.  1298;  10  W.  R.  55.  V.  C.  K. ;  White  54.  She  may.  however,  now  release  her  equity, 
v.  Herrick,  L.  R.  4  Ch.  345;  and  see  2  Seton,  under  the  provisions  of  the  20  and  21  Vic. 
666;    but  see  Clark  v.  Clark,  1  W.  N.  106;  c.  57. 

96 


MARRIED   WOMEN. 


*100 


which  the  wife  was  entitled  in  reversion  after  the  death  of  her  mother, 
was  refused.9 

*  Where  the  fund  has  arisen  from  the  sale  of  land,  and  the  *99 
married  woman  can  elect  whether  she  will  take  it  as  land  or 
money,  the  Court  will  take  her  separate  examination  in  order  to  enable 
her  to  make  her  election,  and  will,  on  her  consent,  pay  the  fund  to  her 
husband ; 1  but  if  the  land  was  subject  to  an  entail,  it  seems  that  a  dis- 
entailing assurance  must  be  executed  by  her.2 

A  married  woman,  entitled  under  settlement  to  a  reversionary  inter- 
est in  a  fund  in  Court,  cannot,  by  obtaining  assignments  of  all  the 
interests  in  the  fund  previous  to  that  settled  upon  herself,  make  herself 
absolutely  entitled  to  the  whole  fund,  so  as  to  have  it  paid  out  of  Court 
to  her  nominee.8 

*  Where  property  is  settled  to  the  separate  use  of  a  married  *  100 
woman,  her  separate  examination  is  not  necessary  in  order  to 

pass  her  interest  to  a  purchaser;  as  to  that  property,  she  is  &  feme  sole, 
and  as  such  has,  unless  she  is  restrained  from  anticipation,1  (a)  a  dispos- 


9  Pickard  r.  Roberts,  3  Mad.  384;  see  Stifle 
v.  Everitt,  1  M.  &  C.  37,  41;  Richards  v.  Cham- 
bers, 10  Ves.  580;  Ritchie  v.  Broadbent,  2  J. 
&  W.  456;  Osborne  v.  Morgan,  9  Hare,  434; 
and  post,  p.  117,  et  seq.  But  see  Macarmick  v. 
Buller,  1  Cox,  357. 

i  Standering  v.  Hall,  11  Ch.  D.  652;  Re 
Robins,  27  W.  R.  705.  See  Re  Silcock,  3  Russ. 
369;  Binford  v.  Bawden,  1  Ves.  Jr.  512;  2  id.  38; 
Rt  Silcock,  3  Russ.  369,  under  the  repealed 
Act;  Ex  parte  Ellison,  2  Y.  &  C.  Ex.  528;  Re 
Tyler,  8  W.  R.  540,  V.  C.  W. ;  Re  Hayes,  9 
W.  R.  769,  V.  C.  K. ;  Re  Worthington,  ib.  n. ; 
Re  Belt,  W.  N.  (1877)  201;  25  W.  R.  901,  V. 

C.  B.;  2  Seton,  665,  666. 

2  Re  Tylden,  9  Jur.  N.  S.  942,  V.  C.  K. ;  Re 
Butler,  L.  R.  16  Eq.  479;  Re  Broadwood,  1  Ch. 

D.  438;  Re  Reynolds,  3  Ch.  D.  61;  see  Sowrv 
t\  Sown-,  8  Jur.  N.  S.  890,  V.  C.  S.;  Re  South 
Eastern  Railway,  30  Beav.  215;  Re  Holden,  1 
H.  &  M.  445;  Re  Holden,  10  Jur.  N.  S.  308, 
V.  C.  S.;  Re  Watson,  ib.  1011,  L.  JJ.;  Notley 
v.  Palmer,  L.  R.  1  Eq.  241;  11  Jur.  N.  S.  968, 
V.  C.  K. ;  Re  Row,  L.  R.  17  Eq.  300,  V.  C.  M. ; 
Re  Wood,  L.  R.  20  Eq.  372,  V.  C.  M.  Such  an 
order  was  refused  by  V.  C.  K.  in  Re  Tylden,  9 
Jur.  N.  S.  942;  but  see  Re  Watson,  ubi  supra. 
For  order  for  payment  to  the  husband,  on  the 
wife's  election  to  take  money  as  land,  see  Seton, 


(a)  A  gift  to  a  married  woman's  separate 
use  is  not  to  be  implied  merely  from  the  exist- 
ence of  a  restraint  on  anticipation.  Baggett 
v.  Meux,  1  Coll.  138;  1  Phil.  627;  Stogden  v. 
Lee,  [1891]  1  Q.  B.  661;  64  L.  T.  494.  A 
restraint  on  anticipation  is  equivalent  to  a 
restraint  on  alienation.  Re  Currey,  Gibson  v. 
Way,  32  Ch.  D.  361;  Re  Andrews,  Ed  wards  v. 
Dewar,  30  Ch.  D.  159;  Re  Spencer,  Thomas  v. 
Spencer,  id.  183.     A  clause  restraining  antici- 

VOL.    I.  —  7 


660;  and  after  a  disentailing  assurance  and  her 
examination,  ibid.  Where  the  fund  was  small, 
not  exceeding  £30,  her  examination  was  dis- 
pensed with,  Re  Clark,  5  N.  R.  32,  V.  C.  S.; 
S.  C.  nam.  Pollock  v.  Birmingham,  Wolver- 
hampton, and  Stour  Valley  Railway  Co.,  Re 
Clarke,  11  Jur.  N.  S.  7;  13  W.  R."401.  So 
where  the  fund  was  under  £50.  Knapping  v. 
Tomlinson,  W.  N.  (1870)  107;  18  W.  R.  684, 
V.  C.  M.  As  to  the  formalities  required  by  the 
3  &  4  Will.  IV.  c.  74,  in  the  case  of  a  married 
woman,  see  Shelford,  R.  P.  Stat.  402,  et  seq., 
and  717,  etseq.;  and  for  precedents  of  disentail- 
ing deeds,  ib.  Appx. ;  2  Prideaux,  Conv.  431, 
et  seq.;  3  Davidson,  Conv.  1284,  1315. 

3  Whittle  v.  Henning,  2  Phil.  731;  11  Beav. 
222;  Story  v.  Tonge,  7  Beav.  91;  Hale  v.  Shel- 
drake, 60  L.  T.  292;  In  re  Onslow,  39  Ch.  D. 
622.  Nor,  a  fortiori,  will  the  purchase  by  the 
husband  of  the  life-estate  entitle  the  wife  to  the 
property  absolutely.  Caplinger  v.  Sullivan,  2 
Humph.  547.  Or  the  surrender  to  him  of  such 
life-interest.  Goodwin  v.  Moore,  4  Humph.  221. 
And  see  infra,  119,  note  3. 

1  See  Symonds  «.  Wilkes,  12  W.  R.  541,  M.R.; 
Re  Ellis, "L.  R.  17  Eq.  409,  M.  R.  :  Re  (^rough- 
ton,  8  Ch.  D.  460,  V.  C.  B.;  Re  Bown,  27  Ch. 
D.  411. 


pation  may  apply  to  gifts  of  capital  or  income. 
Ibid.;  fleGrey,  34  Ch.  D.  712.  In  Re  Var- 
non's  Trusts.  31  Ch.  D.  275,  where  a  fund  for 
an  infant  wife's  separate  use  for  life,  with  re- 
straint on  anticipation,  was  settled  by  a  mar- 
riage settlement,  which  contained  a  covenant 
by  her  to  settle  future  property,  the  wife  was 
not  required  to  elect  between  after-acquired 
property  and  her  interest  in  the  settled  fund, 
but  was  held  entitled  to  both.     As  to  restraint 

97 


100 


SUITS   BY   PERSONS   WHO    ARE   UNDER   DISABILITY. 


ing  power  over  it,2  whether  it  is  in  reversion  or  possession.3  Upon  the 
same  principle,  where  a  married  woman  to  whom  an  annuity  was 
bequeathed  for  her  separate  use,  joined  with  her  husband  in  assigning 
part  of  it  for  a  valuable  consideration,  and  she,  the  husband,  and  the 
purchaser,  afterwards  filed  a  bill  against  the  executors  of  the  testator 
under  whom  the  annuity  was  claimed,  a  doubt  having  occurred 
whether,  in  such  a  case,  a  decree  could  be  taken  by  consent,  Sir  J. 
Leach  M.  R.  was  of  opinion  that  it  could,  and  directed  the  decree  to  be 
drawn  up  accordingly.4 

The  rule  that  the  Court  will  give  effect  to  a  married  woman's  aliena- 
tion of  such  property,  does  not  extend  to  transactions  with  her  husband, 
which  are  looked  upon  by  the  Court  with  jealousy ;  so  much  so,  that 
the  Court  has  refused  to  pay  the  separate  money  of  the  wife  to  the  hus- 
band, without  the  examination  of  the  wife  in  Court.5  Although,  in 
general,  a  wife  may  not  dispose  of  her  separate  property  to  her  hus- 
band, unless  by  consent  in  Court,  or  before  commissioners,  yet  several 
instances  have  occurred  where  wives,  by  acts  in  pais,  have  parted  with 
separate  property  to  their  husbands.6  But  such  gifts  are  never  to  be 
inferred  without  very  clear  evidence.'  (b) 

If  a  married  woman,   upon  being   examined   apart   from  her   hus- 


2  Sug.  Powers,  173,  217;  Taylor  v.  Meads, 
4  De  G.  J.  &  S.  597;  11  Jur.  N.  S.  166;  Pride 
v.  Budd,  L.  R.  7Ch.  64;  Bishop  v.  Wall,  3  Ch. 
D.  194;  Cooper  v.  Macdonald,  L.  R.  7  Ch.  288. 

3  Sturgis  v.  Corp,  13  Ves.  190;  and  see  Keene 
v.  Johnston,  1  Jones  &  Car.  255 ;  see  Sperling 
v.  Rochfort,  8  Sumner's  Ves.  175,  and  note  (a) 
and  cases  cited ;  2  Story,  Eq.  Jur.  §  1413  and 
notes. 

4  Stinson  v.  Ashley,  5  Russ.  4;  but  it  would 
seem  that  there  must  be  an  affidavit  of  no  set- 
tlement, Anon.  3  Jur.  N.  S.  839,  V.  C.  W. 

5  2  Bright,  H.  &  W.  257 ;  Gullan  r.  Trim- 
bey,  2  J.  &  W.  457,  n.;  Wordsworth  v.  Day- 
rell,  2  Jur.  N.  S.  631,  V.  C.  K. ;  see  Milnes  v. 
Busk,  2  Ves.  Jr.  498;  Anon.  3  Jur.  N.  S.  839; 
Lechmere  v.  Brotheridge,  32  Beav.  353,  360;  9 
Jur.  N.  S.  705.  See  White  v.  Herrick,  L.  R.  4 
Ch.  345.    As  to  the  mode  by  which  the  husband 


on  anticipation,  see  also  Stevens  v.  Trevor- 
Garrick,  [1893]  2  Ch.  307;  Re  Milner's  Settle- 
ment, [1891]  3  Ch.  547;  Hamilton  r.  Hamilton, 
[1892]  1  Ch.  396;  Re  Holmes,  67  L.  T.  355; 
Kraunstein  v.  Lewis,  64  L.  T.  285;  65  id.  449; 
Pelton  v.  Harrison,  [1891]  2  Q.  B.  422;  65 
L.  T.  514:  Re  Wood,  63  L.  T.  197;  Oxford  v. 
Reid,  22  Q.  B  D.  548 ;  Everett  v.  Paxton,  65 
L.  T.  383;  Michell  v.  Michell,  [1891]  P.  208; 
64  L.  T.  607;  Re  Hutchings,  58  L.  T.  6;  Re 
Smith,  51  L.  T.  501;  London  Chartered  Bank 
n.  Lempriere,  L.  R.  4  P.  C.  572;  Thomas  v. 
Price,  46  L.  J.  Ch.  761 :  Re  Queade,  54  id. 
786;  Re  Warren,  52  id.  928;  Smith  v.  Spence, 
27  Ch.  D.  606;  O'Halloran  v.  King,  id.  411, 
98 


can  be  excluded,  where  the  wife  is  entitled  to 
stock  for  her  separate  use,  see  2  Seton,  662. 
But  see  Re  Crump,  34  Beav.  570,  where  a  fund 
settled  to  the  separate  use  of  a  married  wo- 
man was  ordered  to  be  transferred  into  the  joint 
names  of  herself  and  her  husband. 

6  Pawlet  v.  Delaval,  2  Ves.  Sr.  663;  see 
Sherman  v.  Elder,  1  Hilton  (N.  Y.)7  178,  476. 

7  Rich  v.  Cockell,  9  Ves.  369;  Harvey  v. 
Ashley,  cited  2  Ves.  Sr.  671;  3  Atk.  607;  Co. 
Litt.  by  Harg.  3  a.  n.  A  wife  may  bestow 
her  separate  property  upon  her  husband,  by 
appointment  or  otherwise,  as  well  as  upon  a 
stranger.  2  Story,  Eq.  Jur.  §§  1395,  1396; 
Methodist  Epis.  Church  v.  Jaques,  3  John.  Ch. 
86-114;  Bradish  v.  Gibbs,  id.  523;  see  Smith 
v.  Sweet,  1  Cush.  470-473.  See,  as  to  income 
of  separate  estate,  infra,  186,  n.  2. 


Re  Thompson,  W.  N.  (18S4)  28;  Re  Wright, 
15  L.  R.  Ir.  331 ;  Myles  v.  Burton,  14  id.  258. 
The  power  given  to  the  Court  by  the  English 
Conveyancing  and  Property  Act  of  1881,  §  39, 
to  dispense  with  a  restraint  on  anticipation,  is  a 
discretionary  power,  and  is  exercised  only  with 
caution.  Re  Little,  Harrison  v.  Harrison,  40 
Ch.  D.  418.  A  married  woman's  separate  estate 
is  equitable.  Barlow  v.  Devany,  36  Fed.  Rep. 
577;  40  id.  97. 

(b)  See  Carnegie  v.  Carnegie,  30  L.  T.  460; 
Re  Blake;  Blake  v.  Power,  60  L.  T.  663;  Re 
De  Burgh  Lawson,  55  L.  J.  Ch.  46;  Edward  v. 
Cheyne  (No.  2),  13  App.  Cas.  385. 


MARRIED    WOMEN.  *  102 

band,  *  refuses  to  give  her  consent  to  the  money  being  paid  to  *  101 
him,  the  consequence  of  such  refusal  is,  that  the  Court  directs  a 
proper  settlement  to  be  made,  generally  determining  at  once1  the 
amount  to  be  settled,  and  referring  it  to  chambers  to  approve  of  the 
necessary  deed;  and  the  proceedings  are  usually  completed  there,  with- 
out further  mention  to  the  Court.2  If  the  fund  is  small,  it  is  usual,  for 
the  purpose  of  saving  the  expense  of  a  deed,  to  settle  the  fund  at  once 
by  the  order.8 

Although  the  Court  will,  in  general,  oblige  the  husband  to  make  a 
settlement  upon  his  wife  and  children  of  any  property  which  he  may 
be  entitled  to  in  right  of  his  wife,  for  the  recovery  of  which  it  is  neces- 
sary to  resort  to  a  Court  of  Equity,  yet,  where  there  is  no  suit  pending, 
the  husband  is  authorized  to  lay  hold  of  his  wife's  property,  wherever 
he  can  find  it.4 

If  no  suit  is  pending  with  reference  thereto,  a  trustee  who  is  in  pos- 
session of  the  wife's  property,  real  or  personal,  may  pay  the  rents  of 
the  real  estate  to  the  husband,  or  may  hand  over  to  him  the  personal 
estate;5  and  the  Court  will  not,  upon  bill  filed,  recall  it.6  But  the 
trustee  may  equally  refuse  to  pay  the  husband  till  compelled  by  the 
filing  of  a  bill,  in  order  that  the  wife  may  obtain  the  full  benefit  of 
the  protection  afforded  her  by  a  Court  of  Equity;  and  the  circumstance 
that  the  wife  joined  the  husband  in  making  the  demand  is  of  no  weight 
whatever.7  Where,  however,  a  bill  has  already  been  filed,  a  trustee's 
discretion  is  gone;  as  the  bill  makes  the  Court  the  trustee,  and  takes 
away  from  the  actual  trustee  his  right  of  dealing  with  the  property, 
without  its  sanction. 

With  respect  to  the  nature  of  the  settlement  made  by  the  Court,  and 
the  interest  given  to  the  wife,  no  certain  rule  can  be  laid  down,  the 
amount  being  entirely  in  the  discretion  of  the  Court,  and  depend- 
ing upon  the  particular  circmnstances  of  *each  case.1     If  the    *  102 

1  Coster  v.  Coster,  9  Sim.  597,605;  Napier  and  notes;  see  Van  Epps  v.  Van  Deusen  4 
r.  Napier,  1  Dr.  &  War.  407.  Paise,  64;  Fry  v.  Fry,  7  Paige,  462,  Wiles'  v. 

2  For  forms  of  orders,  see  2  Seton,  672,  673;  Wiles,  3  Md.  1;  Pool  v.  Morns,' 2!)  Ga.  -374. 
and   for  the   practice   at  chambers,   see  post,  6  Murray  v.  Lord  Elibank,  10  Ves.  90;  S.  C. 
Chap.  XXIX.  1  Wh.  &  f.  L.  Cas.  (6th  ed.)  49-3,  501. 

3  2  Seton,  673;  Re  Cutler,  14  B»av.  220;  6  Glaister  v.  Hewer,  8  Ves.  206:  Macaulay 
Bagshaw  ».  WTinter,  5  De  G.  &  S.  466;  Wat-  v.  Philips,  4  Ves.  15;  Murray  v.  Elibank,  10 
son  v.  Marshall,  17  Beav.  363;  and  see  abstract  Ves.  90;  2  Story,  Eq.  Jur  §  1410. 

of  order,  ib.  p.  365;  Re  Kincaid,  1  Drew.  326;  1  He  Swan's  Settlement,  12  W.  R.  738,  V. 

Wright  v.  King,  18  Beav.  461:  Duncombe  v.  C.  W.;  2  II.  &  M.  34;.  but  see  Beaumont  i\ 

Greenacre   No.  2,  29  Beav.' 578;   for  form  of  Carty,  32  Beav.  586;  May  v.  Armstrong,  W.  N. 

summons    for    the   settlement  of  a   fund,   see  (1866)   233,  V.   C.    S. ;    Re    Roberts,    W.    X. 

Vol.  III.     Where  the  husband  refused  to  exe-  (1869)  88;  17  W.  R.  639,  V.  C.  M. 

cute  the  settlement,  and  the  trustees  declined  1  Re  Suggitt,  L    R.  3  Ch.  215;  Giacometti 

t"  art,  the  fund  was  ordered  to  remain  in  Court  v.  Prodgers,  L.  R.  u  Eq.  253;  L.  R.  8  Ch.  338; 

assettled,  and  the  interest  to  be  paid  to  the  wife  Aguilar    v.   Aguilar,    5   Mad.  414:    Kenny  v. 

for  her  separate  use  for  life,  Re  Butt,   cited,  Udall,  5  John.  Ch.  464:  2  Kent  (11th  ed.).  140, 

Seton   671.  141,     This  equity  of  the  wife  stands  upon  the 

m  ,      ,71  «"  ^oulson'  2  Atk-  419'  2  Kent  peculiar  practice  of  the  Court,  and  not  on  any 

lor    t! U        '  "?Vard  "■  M°ffat'  2  John"  Ch-  Keneral  reasoning.     Kennv  r  Udall,  supra;  2 

mLToTr8 '■  wep,r\2 TTCord; Ch- 36;   Story- =*■ Jur- § 1407; 2 Keiu <llth ^ li0> 

Matter  of  Hume  Walker,  1  Llovd  &  G.  159,      141. 
cases  temp.  Plunket;   2  Story,  Eq.  Jur  §  1403^ 

99 


102 


SUITS   BY   PERSONS   WHO    ARE   UNDER   DISABILITY. 


husband  is  living  with  her,  and  maintaining  her  and  her  children, 
he  will,  in  the  absence  of  any  special  crcumstances,  be  allowed  the 
interest  on  the  whole,  so  long  as  he  maintains  her.2  When  the  hus- 
band is  not  living  with  the  wife  and  maintaining  her  and  her  children, 
as  when  he  has  become  bankrupt  or  insolvent,  or  has  deserted  her,  the 
whole,  or  some  portion  of  the  fund  will  be  settled,  immediately,  upon 
the  wife  and  children.  The  amount  which  will  be  settled  depends  upon 
all  the  circumstances  of  each  particular  case ; 3  but  the  whole  fund  has 
been  settled  where  the  husband  was  bankrupt,  and  had  received  large 
advances  from  the  wife's  father; 4  where  the  husband  deserted  his  wife, 
and  contributed  nothing  to  her  support; 5  where  the  husband  was  bank- 
rupt and  had  received  large  sums  in  right  of  his  wife; 6  and  where  the 
husband  was  bankrupt,  and  had  deserted  his  wife;7  and  in  the  recent 
reports,  numerous  cases  will  be  found  in  which,  under  the  circum- 
stances, the  whole  fund  was  settled.8  (a) 


2  Bullock  v.  Menzies,  4  Ves.  798;  Sleech  v. 
Thorington,  2  Ves.  Sr.  560.  Where  the  hus- 
band lives  with  his  wife,  and  maintains  her, 
and  lias  not  misbehaved,  the  course  is  to  allow 
him  to  receive  the  interest  and  dividends  on 
all  property.    Kenny  v.  Udall,  5  John.  Ch.  464. 

3  The  Court  may,  in  its  discretion,  give  the 
whole,  or  part  only,  of  the  property  to  the  wife, 
according  to  the  circumstances  of  the  case. 
Kenny  v.  Udall,  5  John.  Ch.  464;  Haviland  v. 
Bloom  6  id.  178.  180,  181.  The  amount  of 
such  provision  must  depend  on  circumstances, 
amongst  which  the  amount  of  the  property,  the 
age,  health,  and  condition  of  the  wife,  the  num- 
ber, age,  sex.  and  health  of  her  children,  if 
any,  would  be  fit  subjects  of  consideration.  In 
this  respect,  in  a  case  directly  before  the  Court, 
it  would  be  proper  for  the  Court  to  avail  itself 
of  the  aid  of  a  Master,  to  inquire  into  and 
report  the  circumstances,  and  to  report  what 
■would  be  a  suitable  provision  for  the  wife. 
Cases  may  be  supposed,  in  which,  if  the  prop- 
erty were  small,  and  had  been  kept  entirely 
distinct  from  that  of  the  husband,  and  where 

.  the  exigencies  of  the  family  were  such  as  to 
require  it,  it  would  be  proper  to  appropriate  the 
whole  of  such  property  to  the  use  of  the  wife 
and  her  children.  Davis  v.  Newton,  6  Met. 
544.  "The  Court  may,  in  its  discretion,  give 
the  whole,  or  part  only,  of  the  property  to  the 
wife,  according  to  the  circumstances  of  the 
case."  2  Kent  (11  ed.),  140,  141;  Haviland  v. 
Bloom,  6  John.  Ch.  178,  180,  181. 

*  Gardner  v.  Marshall,  14  Sim.  575.  584. 

6  Gilchrist  ».  Cator,  1  De  G  &  S.  188.     Re 


Ford.  32  Beav.  621;  9  Jur.N.  S.  740,  tfeTutin, 
W.  N.  (1809)  141,  V.  C.  S.  See  49  &  50  Vic. 
c.  52.  In  Kernick  v  Kernick,  4  N.  R.  533,  V. 
C.  W.,  where  the  husband  had  deserted  the 
wife,  but  maintained  their  children,  the  whole 
fund  was  settled  on  her  for  life:  but  leave  was 
reserved  to  him  to  apply,  on  her  death,  in 
respect  of  the  payment  to  him  of  any  part  of 
the  income  during  his  life. 

6  Conington  v.  Gilliat,  W.  N.  (1876)  275; 
25  W  R.  69,  Y.  C  H.;  Scott  v.  Spashett,  3 
M'N.  &  G.  599. 

v  Dunkley  ».  Dunkley,  2  De  G.  M.  &  G.  390, 
396. 

8  Re  Cutler,  14  Beav.  220;  Marshall  v. 
Fowler,  16  Beav.  249;  Re  Kincaid,  1  Drew. 
326 ;  Watson  r.  Marshall,  17  Beav.  362;  Francis 
v.  Brooking,  19  Beav.  347;  Barrow  v.  Barrow, 
5  De  G.  M  &  G.  782;  Gent  v.  Harris,  10  Hare, 
384;  Re  Wilson,  1  Jur.  N.  S.  569.  V.  C.  S.; 
Koeber  r.  Sturgis,  22  Beav.  588;  Re  Disney,  2 
Jur.  N.  S.  206,  V.  C.  W.;  Re  Welchman,  1 
Giff.  31;  5  Jur.  N.  S.  866;  Smith  v.  Smith,  3 
Giff.  121;  Ward  r.  Yates,  1  Dr.  &  S.  80;  Dun- 
combe  «?.  Greenacre,  29  Beav.  578;  7  Jur.  N.  S. 
650;  Re  Tubbs.  8  W.  R.  270,  V.  C.  K.;  and  see 
Re  Grove,  3  Giff.  575;  9  Jur.  N.  S.  38;  Re 
Merriman,  10  W.  R.  334;  Kernick  v.  Kernick, 
4  N.  R.  533,  V.  C.  W.;  Taunton  v.  Morn's,  8 
Ch  D.  453;  11  id.  779  (life  estate);  Bowyer  v. 
Woodman,  W.  N.  (1867)  13;  Re  Smith,  id. 
283;  Miller  ».  Campbell,  W.  N.  (1871)  210; 
Re  Cordwell,  L.  R.  20  Eq.  644;  Nicholson  V. 
Carline,  W.  N.  (1874)  151;  22  W.  R.  820;  Re 
Craddock,  W  N.  (1875)187. 


(a)  In  Reid  v.  Reid,  33  Ch.  D.  220,  223, 
the  husband's  disregard  of  an  order  of  Court 
for  restitution  of  conjugal  rights,  and  his  state- 
men*  that  they  should  not  live  together  again, 
were  treated  as  aggravated  misconduct,  and 
the  whole  fund  to  which  the  wife  was  entitled 
was  settled  upon  the  wife  and  children.     But 

100 


where  a  husband,  being  an  undischarged  bank- 
rupt, was  living  with  his  wife  and  contributed 
something  to  her  support  from  his  earning. 
only  two  thirds  of  the  wife's  fund  was  directed 
to  be  settled  upon  her.  Callow  v.  Callow,  55 
L  T.  154. 


MARRIED    WOMEN.  *  104 

In  other  cases  the  fund  has  been  divided;9  and  in  the  older 
cases  one  half  has  been  frequently  settled ; 10  but  the  rule  that  *  one    *  103 
half  is  generally  the  proportion  settled,  which  is  often  referred 
to  in  the  older  reports,  is,  it  would  seem,   not  much  regarded  in  the 
more  recent  cases.      Where,  however,  the  fund  is  under  £200,  it  is  the 
usual  practice  not  to  divide  it.1 

The  Court  will  not,  however,  permit  the  equity  of  the  wife  to  main- 
tenance out  of  her  own  fortune,  to  be  defeated  by  any  trick  or  contriv- 
ance for  that  purpose  on  the  part  of  her  husband.  If,  therefore,  as  in 
Colmer  v.  Colmer,2  he,  with  an  intention  to  desert  her  (which  he  after- 
wards carries  into  effect),  makes  a  fraudulent  conveyance  of  his  and 
her  property,  upon  trust  to  pay  his  own  debts,  the  transaction  will  not 
prejudice  her  right  to  maintenance;  but  the  Court  will  follow  her  prop- 
erty into  the  hands  of  the  trustees,  and  order  an  allowance  for  her, 
suitable  to  her  fortune  and  the  circumstances  of  her  husband,  although 
it  may  be  necessary,  in  order  to  effect  that  purpose,  to  resort  to  part  of 
his  own  property  so  vested  in  trust. 

The  Court  will,  as  has  been  shown,  not  only  appropriate  the  interest 
of  a  wife's  equitable  property,  for  her  support,  in  cases  where  she  has 
been  deserted  by  her  husband,  or  obliged  to  leave  him  in  consequence 
of  his  improper  conduct  toward  her,  but  it  will,  under  similar  circum- 
stances, if  a  stranger  has  advanced  to  the  wife  money  for  her  mainte- 
nance, order  it  to  be  repaid  to  him  by  the  husband,8  or  direct  the 
amount  advanced  with  her  sanction  to  be  repaid  out  of  her  estate.4 

*  If  a  husband  is  willing,  and  offers  to  maintain  his  wife,  and  *  101 
she,  without  sufficient  reason,  refuses  to  reside  with  him,  upon 
his  application  for  the  interest  of  her  fortune,  the  Court  will  order 
payment  of  it  to  him,  even  though  he  declines  to  make  a  settlement 
upon  her.1  And  when  she  has  been  guilty  of  gross  misconduct  and  has 
eloped  from  her  husband  without  a  sufficient  reason,  the  Court  will  not, 
in  general,  interfere  to  allow  her  a  maintenance  out  of  her  equitable 
property.2 

9  Napier  v.  Napier,  1  Dru.  &  War.  407;  C.  S.;  Sotheran  v.  Smear,  W.  N.  (1868)  296, 
Coster  v.  Coster,  9  Sim.  597;  Ex  parte  Pugh,  1      V.  C.  S. 

Drew.  202;  Bagshaw  v.  Winter,  5  De  G.  &  S.  2  Mos.  118,  121;  see  also  Athertonr.Nowell, 

466;  Walker  v.  Drury,  17  Beav.  482;  Re  Sug-  1  Cox,  229. 

gitt,  L.  R.  3  Ch.  215."  3  Jenner  v.  Morris,  1  Dr.  &  Sm.  218;  affd.  3 

10  Jewson  v.  Moulson,  2  Atk.  417,  423;  Wor-  De  G.  F.  &  J.  45;  7  Jur.  N.  S.  375;  Deare  v. 
rail  v.  Marlar,  1  Cox,  153;  2  Dick.  647;  Brown  Soutten,  L.  R.9Eq.  151.  See  49  &  50  Vic.  c.  52. 
i).  Clark,  3  Ves.  166;  Pringle  v.  Hodgson,  ib.  *  i  Bright,  II.  &  W.  258;  Guy  v.  Peakes, 
617,  620;  Steinmetz  v.  Halthin,  1  Glyn  &  J.  64;  18  Ves.  196;  and  see  Re  Ford,  32  Beav.  621 ;  9 
Ex  parte  O'Ferrall,  ib.  347;  Archer  v.  Gardner,  Jur.  N.  S.  740.  It  will,  moreover,  enforce  it  as 
C.  P.  Coop,  340;  Spirett  v.  Willows,  12  W.  R.  a  debt  against  the  husband.  Harris  v.  Lee,  1 
734,  V.  C.  S.;  affirmed  by  L.  C,  L.  R.  1  Ch.  P.  W.  482:  Deare  v.  Soutten,  L.  R.  9  Eq.  151 ; 
520;  12  Jur.  N.  S.  538  In  Spirett  v.  Willows,  Jenner  v.  Morris,  3  De  G.  F.  &  J.  45.  the  last 
L.  R.  4  Ch.  407,  the  settlement  made  was  of  expressly  overruling  May  r.  Skey,  16  Sim.  588. 
three  fourths  of  the  fund.  !  Bullock  v.  Menzies,  4  Ves.  798:  see,  how- 

1  Re  Kincaid,  1  Drew.  326;  Ward  v.  Yates,  ever,    Eedes   v.  Eedes,   11  Sim.  569;   see  Gia- 

1  Dr.  &  S.  80;  Archer  v.  Gardner,  C.  P.  Coop,  cometti  v.  Prodgers,  L.  R.  14  Eq.  253;  L.  R   8 

340;  Spirett  v.   Willows,    12    W.   R.  734;    Re  Ch.  338;  Aguilar  r.  Aguilar,  5  Mad.  414;    Fry 

Tubbs,  8  W.  R.  270,  V.  C  K.;  Re  Suggitt,  L.  v.  Fry,  7  Paige,  462 ;  Martin  v.  Martin,  1  Hoff. 

R.  3  Ch.  215;  but  see  Re  Grove,  3  Giff.  575  ;  9  Ch.  462;  2  Kent  (11th  ed.),  140. 

Jur.  N.  S.  38;  Re  Grant,  14  W.  R.  191,  V.  2  i  Bright,  H  &  W.  249,  et  seq.:  Watkyns 

101 


*  105  SUITS   BY   PERSONS   WHO    ARE   UNDER   DISABILITY. 

The  question  whether,  in  the  case  of  a  particular  assignee  claiming 
by  purchase  from  the  husband  for  a  valuable  consideration,  the  Court 
would  or  would  not  impose  upon  him  the  condition  of  making  a  settle- 
ment, was  long  considered  doubtful ; 3  it  is  now  settled,  however,  that 
such  an  assignee  of  a  capital  fund  is  bound  to  make  a  provision,  out  of 
the  fund,  for  the  wife  and  her  children; 4  but  the  assignment  for  value 
by  a  husband,  of  his  wife's  life  estate,  will  prevail  against  her,5  though 
he  afterwards  deserts  her,  or  leaves  her  destitute,6  during  their  joint 
lives,  but  not  after  his  death.7  On  principle,  however,  it  seems  diffi- 
cult to  distinguish  between  the  case  of  a  capital  fund  and  a  life 
interest.8 

Although,  in  general,  the  Court  allows  the  husband,  whilst  he  main- 
tains his  wife,  the  income  of  her  property,  yet  it  must  not  be  sup- 
posed that  this  is  an  absolute  right  on  his  part,  or  that,  upon 

*  105    *  the  death  of  the  husband,  his  representative  is  entitled  to  the 

arrears  of  income  accrued  during  his  life.  As  a  general  rule, 
the  wife  surviving  is  entitled  to  all  property  of  her  own  not  reduced 
into  possession  during  the  coverture;  and  this  applies  to  the  arrears  of 
life  income  which  accrued,  but  were  not  received,  during  the  coverture.1 

Under  the  Marriage  Acts,2  in  the  case  of  a  marriage  solemnized 
between  parties  under  age,  by  false  oath  or  fraud,  the  guilty  party  is 
to  forfeit  all  property  accruing  from  the  marriage;  but  such  property 
may,  by  order  of  the  Court,  made  upon  information  filed  by  the  Attorney- 
General,  be  secured  for  the  benefit  of  the  innocent  party,  or  the  issue 
of  the  marriage,  as  the  Court  shall  think  fit,  so  as  to  prevent  the  offend- 
ing party  from  deriving  any  interest  in  any  estate,  or  pecuniary  bene- 
fit from  the  marriage.  Under  the  Act,  4  Geo.  IV.  c.  76,  it  has  been 
held,  that  the  Court  has  no  discretion  to  mitigate  the  penalty,  but  m 
the  case  of  the  property  being  that  of  the  wife,  is  bound  to  settle  and 
secure  all  such  property,  past,  present,  and  future,  for  the  benefit  of 
herself,  or  the  issue  of  the  marriage.8 

It  appears  formerly  to  have  been  considered,  that  if  the  husband  had 
made  a  settlement  upon  his  wife  upon  their  marriage,  the  wife  would 
be  debarred  of  her  right  to  a  further  provision  out  of  any  property 
then  unsettled,  or  which  might  subsequently  accrue  to  her.4    This  is 

v.  Watkyns,  2  Atk.  97;  Ball  v.  Montgomery,  2  s  Elliott  v.  Cordell,  5  Mad.   149;  Stanton  v. 

Ves.  Jr."  191;    Duncan  v.   Campbell,   12  Sim.  Hall,  2  R.  &  M.  175. 

616:  Carr  v.  Eastabrooke,  4  Ves.  146,  Barrow  6  Tidd  v.  Lister,  3  De  G.  M.  &  G.  587;  18 

v.  Barrow,  5  De  G.  M.  &  G.  795 ;  2  Story,  Eq.  Jur.  543. 

Jur.  §§  1419,  1426;  but  see  Re  Lewin's  Trusts,  "'  Stiffe  v.  Everitt,  1  M.  &  C.  37. 

20   Beav.  378;   Kernick  v.   Kernick,   4  N.  R.  8  Re  Duffy,  28  Beav.  386  ;    see  Taunton  0. 

353,  V.  C.W. ;  Greedy  v.  Lavender,  13  Beav.  62.  Morris.  8  Ch.  D.  453  ;  11  Ch.  D.  779. 

3  Like  V.  Beresford,  3  Ves.  506,  511;  Pryor  1  Wilkinson  v.  Charleswortb,  10  Beav.  324. 
r  Hill,  4  Bro.  C.  C.  139;  Macaulay  v.  Philips,  2  4  Geo.  IV.  c.  76,  §  23,  and  19  &  20  Vic.  c. 
4  Ves.  19.  119.  §  19.     See  ante,  p.  10. 

4  Macaulay  v.  Philips,  4  Ves.  19;  Franco  v.  8  Att.-Gen.  t>  Mullay,  4  Russ.  329;  7  Beav. 
Franco,  4  Ves.  515,  530;  Johnson  v.  Johnson,  1  351;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Lucas,  2  Hare,  566;  2  Phil 
J.&  W.  472;  Carter  v.  Tapsart.  5  De  G.  &  S.  753;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Severne,  1  Coll.  313. 

49,  1  De  G.  M.  &  G.  286;  Tidd  v.  Lister,  3  id.  4  Lanoy  v.  Duke  of  Athol,  2  Atk.  448;  see 

857;  10  Hare,  140;  18  Jur.  543;  Wilks  v.  Fitz-      Poindexter  v.  Jeffries,  15  Gratt.  363. 
patrick,  1  Humph.  54. 

102 


MARRIED    WOMEN. 


*10G 


not  now  the  rule,5  but  in  such  cases  it  depends  upon  the  terms  of  the 
settlement;  and  if  it  appears,  either  by  express  words  or  by  fair  infer- 
ence, that  it  was  the  intention  of  the  parties  that  the  husband  should 
be  the  purchaser  of  the  future  as  well  as  the  present  property  of  the 
wife,  the  Court  will  not  require  an  additional  settlement  to  be 
made.6  But  in  *  determining  the  amount  to  be  settled,  any  pre-  *  106 
vious  settlement  is  always  taken  into  consideration ; l  as  is  also 
the  amount  of  property  received  by  the  husband  in  right  of  his  wife.2 

The  wife's  equity  to  a  settlement  out  of  a  capital  fund  is  not  for  her 
benefit  only,  but  for  that  of  herself  and  children ; 8  and  though,  as  has 
been  before  stated,4  she  may,  upon  her  examination,  waive  it,  she  can- 
not take  the  benefit  of  it  for  herself,  and  relinquish  it  on  behalf  of  her 
children.  The  equity  does  not,  however,  survive  to  the  children,  after 
her  death ; 5  but  in  such  case,  the  whole  fund  will  go  to  the  husband  by 
survivorship,6  and  the  children  have  no  equity  after  the  death  of  the 
mother  unless  there  has  been  a  contract,  or  an  order  for  a  settlement, 
in  her  lifetime.7  Where  there  has  been  an  order,  it  would  appear  that 
the  children  should  carry  on  the  suit  by  an  order  to  continue  the 
proceedings.8 

The  wife  may,  at  any  time  before  the  settlement  has  been  finally 
ordered,   waive  her  right,    so   as   altogether   to   defeat   her   children.9 


«  March  p.  Head,  3  Atk.  720  ;  Thompkyns 
v.  Ladbroke,  2  Ves.  Sr.  591,595;  Burdon  v. 
Dean,  2  Ves.  Jr.  607;  Stack  pole  v.  Beaumont,  3 
Ves.  89,98;  Lady  Elibank  v.  Montolieu,  5  Ves. 
737  ;  1  Wh.  &  T.  L.  C.  486;  Barrow  v.  Barrow, 
18  Beav.  529;  5  De  G.  M.  &  G.  782;  Spirett  v. 
Willows,  3  De  G.  J.  &  S.  293;  11  Jur.  N.  S. 
70;  5  Girt.  49. 

6  Brooke  r.  Hickes,  12  W.  R.  703,  V.  C  S. 
In  Haviland  v.  Bloom,  6  John.  Ch.  178,  the 
rule  in  Equity  was  considered  as  settled,  that 
the  wife's  equity  to  a  suitable  provision  for  the 
maintenance  of  herself  and  her  children,  out  of 
her  separate  estate,  lying  in  action,  was  a  valid 
right,  and  extended,  not  only  to  property  which 
she  owned  dum  sola,  but  to  property  descended 
or  devised  to  her  during  coverture.  A  new 
equity  arises  to  the  wife  upon  property  newly 
acquired,  and  attaches  upon  it  equally  as  upon 
that  which  she  brought  with  her  upon  mar- 
riage. In  Ex  parte  Beresford,  1  Desaus.  263, 
the  Court,  after  a  full  discussion,  ordered  a  new 
settlement  in  favor  of  the  wife  on  a  new  acces- 
sion of  fortune.    See  Carr  v.  Taylor,  10  Ves.  574. 

1  Lady  Elibank  v.  Montolieu,  5  Ves.  737; 
Freeman  v.  Fairlie,  11  Jur.  447,  V.  C.  E. ;  Re 
Erskine,  1  K.  &  J.  302;  Aguilar  v.  Aguilar,  5 
Mad.  414;  see  also  Giacometti  r.  Prodgers,  , 
L.  R.  14  Eq.  253,  V.  CM.;  L.  R.  8  Ch.  338. 
The  settlement,  for  this  purpose,  must  either 
express  it  to  be  in  consideration  of  the  wife's 
fortune,  or  the  contents  of  it,  altogether,  must 
import  it,  and  plainly  import  it,  as  much  as  if 
it  were  expressed.  Per  Lord  Eldon,  in  Druce 
v.  Denison,  6  Ves.  395. 


2  Green  v.  Otte,  1  S.  &  S,  250,  254 ;  Napier 
v.  Napier,  1  Dr.  &  War.  407. 

8  Murray  V.  Lord  Elibank,  10  Ves.  84  ; 
Lloyd  v.  Williams,  1  Mad.  450,  459  ;  Re 
Walker,  L.  &  G.  temp.  Sug.  299;  Hodgens  v. 
Hodgens,  4  CI.  &  F.  323;  11  Bli.  62;  2  Kent, 
140.  Johnson  v  Johnson,  1  J,  &  W.  472, 
contra,  would  not  now,  it  is  apprehended,  be 
followed. 

*  Ante,  p.  92. 

5  Scnven  v.  Tapley,  2  Eden,  337;  Amb.  509; 
Fenner  v.  Taylor,  2R.&  M.  190;  De  la  Garde 
v.  Lempriere,  6  Beav.  344;  Baker  v.  Bayldon,  8 
Hare,  210;  Lovett  v.  Lovett,  John.  118,  Wal- 
lace v.  Auldjo,  2  N.  R.  567,  L.  J  J. ;  2  Dr.  & 
Sm.  216;  9  Jur.  N.  S.  687;  1  De  G.  J.  &  S. 
643;  2  Story,  Eq.  Jur.  §  1417  and  note. 

6  Wallace  v.  Auldjo.  ubi  supra. 

1  Murray  v.  Lord  Elibank,  10  Ves.  84,  92; 
Lloyd  v.  Williams,  1  Mad.  450,  404,  467;  and 
see  Lloyd  V.  Mason,  5  Hare,  149,  152:  Cockel 
v.  Phipps.  1  Dick.  391;  Groves  v.  Clarke,  1 
Keen,  132,  136;  S  C.  sub  nom.  Groves  v.  Per- 
kins, 6  Sim.  576,  584;  but  see  Vaughan  v.  Parr, 
20  Ark.  600. 

8  See  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  L.  r.  4;  and  for  the 
practice  under  which  a  supplemental  suit  was 
necessary,  see  Murray  v.  Lord  Elibank,  10 
Ves.  84." 

9  Barrow  v.  Barrow,  4  K.  &  J  409,  424 ;  and 
see  Kowe  v.  Jackson,  2  Dick.  604;  Murray  V. 
Lord  Elibank,  10  Ves.  84;  Martin  v.  Mitchell, 
cited  ib.  89;  Steinmetz  v.  Hahhin,  1  Glyn  & 
J.  64. 

103 


*  108  SUITS   BY   PERSONS   WHO    ARE   UNDER   DISABILITY. 

*  107    She  cannot,  however,  *  after  insisting  upon  her  right  to  a  settle- 

ment as  against  her  husband's  assignees  in  bankruptcy,  subse- 
quently waive  her  equity,  and  defeat  her  children's  interests,  except  it 
be  in  favor  of  the  assignees.1  After  a  contract  entered  into  on  the  part 
of  the  husband  to  make  a  settlement,  it  would  seem  that  the  wife  can 
waive  it  as  far  as  her  own  interest  is  concerned,  but  not  for  her 
children.2 

The  rights  of  the  husband  are  concluded  by  the  order  directing  a 
settlement  to  be  made ;  so  that  the  death  of  the  wife  after  such  order 
will  not  prevent  the  order  from  being  carried  into  effect  for  the  benefit 
of  the  children.3  But  the  rights  of  the  wife  are  not  concluded  until  a 
further  order  approving  of  the  particular  settlement  has  been  made;  so 
that  if  the  husband  should  die  before  that  has  been  done,  she  will  be  at 
liberty  to  repudiate  the  settlement,  and  to  insist  on  her  rights  by 
survivorship.4 

If  the  husband  is  willing,  and  offers  to  maintain  his  wife,  and  she, 
without  sufficient  reason,  refuses  to  reside  with  him,  payment  to  him  of 
the  interest  of  her  fortune  may  be  ordered,  though  he  declines  to  make 
a  settlement  upon  her;  and  when  she  has  been  guilty  of  gross  miscon- 
duct, and  has  eloped  from  him  without  sufficient  reason,  the  Court  will 
not  in  general  interfere  to  allow  her  a  maintenance  out  of  her  equita- 
ble property.8  In  some  cases,  however,  under  special  circumstances,  a 
settlement  in  her  favor  has  been  made,  though  she  was  living  in  adul- 
tery; 6  and  if  she  is  not  an  adulteress,  the  mere  fact  of  her  living  apart 
from  her  husband  is  no  bar  to  her  equity.7  In  cases  of  this  description, 
the  fact  of  the  husband  living  apart  from  his  wife,  and  not  supporting 
her,  is  a  reason  against  the  fund,  or  the  income,  being  paid  to  him;8 

but,  nevertheless,  in  some  cases,  this  has  been  done.9 
*  108  Where  female  wards  of  Court  are  married  without  its  *  con- 
sent, although  they  afterwards  live  in  adultery,  the  Court  will 
enforce  a  settlement;1  because,  the  marriage  being  a  contempt,  the 
Court  thereby  obtained  jurisdiction  to  commit  the  husband,  in  conse- 
quence of  his  misconduct,  until  he  should  make  a  proper  settlement, 
and  will  not  part  with  that  power  until  that  act  be  done,  whatever  may 
be  the  irregularity  of  the  wife's  conduct:  which  may  be  attributed,  in 

i  Whittem  v.  Sawyer,  1  Beav.  593;   Barker  Atk.  97;  Duncan  v.  Campbell,  12  Sim.  616;  and 

v.  Lea,  6  Mad.  330.  see  judgment  of  L.  J.  Turner  in  Barrow  v.  Bar- 

2  Anon.  2  Ves.  Sr.  671;  and  Fenner  v.  Tay-  row,  5  De  G.  M.  &  G.  795. 

lor,  2  R.  &  M.  190,  reversing  S.  C.  1  Sim.  169;  6  Greedy  v.   Lavender,   13  Beav.   62;    Re 

Lovett  i'.  Lovett,  John.  118.  Lewin's  Trust,  20  Beav.  378. 

a  Murray  p.  Lord  Elibank,  10  "Ves.  84;  Wal-  "  Eedes  v.  Eedes,  11  Sim.  569;  and  see  Ker- 

laee  v.  Auldjo,  2  Dr.  &  Sm.  223.  nick  v.  Kernick,  4  N.  R.  533,  V.  C.  W. 

*  Macaulay  v.  Philips,  4  Ves.  19;  Baldwin  8  Carr  r.  Eastabrooke,  4  Ves.  146. 

v.  Baldwin,  5  De  G.  &  S.  319;  and  see  Heath  .     9  Ball  v.  Montgomery,  2  Ves.  Jr.  191 ;  Dun- 

v.   Lewis,  10  Jur.  N.  S.  1093;  13  W.  R.  129;  can  v.  Campbell,  12  Sim.  616.  635,  638. 

4  Giff.  665,  where  the  wife,  being  subsequently  1  Ball  v.  Coutts,  1  V.  &  B.  292,  301,  304;  ffe 

divorced,  was  allowed  to  repudiate  the  settle-  Walker,  L.  &  G.  temp.  Sug.  299;  and  see,  gen- 

ment.  e/ally.  as  to  the  mode  in  which  the  Court  deals 

6  1  Bright,   H.  &  W.  252;  Carr  v.  Easta-  with  the  property  of  a  female  ward  marrying 

brooke,  4  Ves.   146;   Ball   v.  Montgomery,  2  without  consent,  Field  v.  Moore   7  De   G.  M. 

Ves.   Jr.   191,    199;   Watkyns  v.  Watkyns,  2  &  G.  691;  2  Jur.  N.  S.  145;  19  Beav.  176. 
104 


MARRIED   WOMEN. 


108 


some  degree,  to  her  husband's  conduct  in  procuring  such  a  clandestine 
marriage,  (a) 

With  reference  to  the  form  of  the  settlement,  the  principle  on  which 
the  Court  acts  is  to  let  in  the  equity  of  the  wife  and  children,  and  to 
that  extent  to  exclude  the  husband's  marital  right,  but  as  soon  as  that 
equity  is  satisfied,  the  provisions  of  the  settlement  ought  to  end,  and 
the  marital  right  ought  to  return ;  2  and  the  practice  is  to  settle  the 
property  in  trust  for  the  wife,  for  her  separate  use,  for  life,  without 
power  of  anticipation,  with  a  power  of  appointment  by  deed  or  will 
among  her  children  by  her  present,  future,  or  a  former  marriage  accord- 
ing as  she  may  appoint,  and  in  default  of  appointment  amongst  such 
children  equally,8  and  in  default  of  children,  in  trust  for  her  hus- 
band or  his  assignees,4  whether  he  does  or  does  not  survive  her  or  her 
children.5  Where  the  right  to  a  settlement  is  established,  the  usual 
provision  for  the  children  follows  as  a  matter  of  course  wholly  irre- 
spective of  any  fortune  they  may  have.6 


2  Per  Ld.  Cairns,  then  L.  J.,  Re  Suggitr,  L. 
R.  3  Ch.  215,  218;  Re  Noake,  W.  N.  (1880) 
107;  28  W.  R.  762,  V.  C.  B. ;  and  see,  as  to 
form  of  settlement,  Spirett  v.  Willows,  L.  R.  4 
Ch.  407,  L.  JJ.;  Walsh  v.  Wason,  L.  R.  8 
Ch.  482,  L.  C.  &  L.  J.  M. 

3  See  Spirett  v.  Willows,  L.  R.  4  Ch.  407. 
410,  and  2  Seton,  677;  Oliver  v.  Oliver,  10  Ch. 
D.  765,  Fry  J.;  and  see  Re  Gowan,  Gowan  v. 
Gowan,  17  Ch.  D.  778,  M.  R.;  Re  Barnard, 
Barnard  v.  White,  56  L.  T.  9;  Re  Parrott, 
Walter  v.  Parrott,  33  Ch.  D.  274. 

4  Spirett  v.  Willows,  L.  R.  1  Ch.  520;  12 
Jur.  N.  S  538,  L.  C. ;  L.  R.  4  Ch.  407,  L.  JJ. ; 
and  see  Carter  v.  Taggart,  1  De  G.  M.  &  G. 


(a)  Re  Bolton,  [1891]  3  Ch.  270;  40  W.  R. 
145;  In  re  Leigh,  Leigh  v.  Leigh,  40  Ch.  D. 
290;  Re  Grays,  27  L.  R.  Ir.  609.  Such  wards 
should  not  become  postulants  or  novices  in  a 
convent  without  the  consent  of  the  Lord  Chan- 
cellor. Re  Gills,  27  L.  R.  Ir.  129.  Cases  re- 
lating to  lunatics  and  wards  of  Court  may  be 
heard  in  private.  Nagle-Gilman  v.  Christopher, 
4  Ch.  D.  173.  The  jurisdiction  over  infant 
wards  is  not  affected  by  their  mental  or  phy- 
sical disability,  but  the  Court  will  direct  their 
treatment.  Re  Edwards,  10  Ch.  D.  605.  A 
father,  who  having  made  his  children  wards 
of  Court,  makes  application  for  assistance  in 
directing  their  religious  education,  does  not 
necessarily  abdicate  his  parental  authority. 
In  re  Agar-EIlis,  10  Ch.  D.  49;  24  id.  317; 
Stourton  o.  Stourton,  8  De  G.  M.  &  G.  768.  See 
Rt  Scanlan,  40  Ch.  D.  213;  Hawksworth  v. 
Hawksworth,  L.  R.  6  Ch.  539;  Hunt  v.  Hunt 
(No.  1),  28  Ch.  D.  606.  In  directing  a  ward's 
religious  education,  the  Court  will  regard  the 
father's  religious  views,  if  not  dangerous  or 
immoral.  In  re  Newberry,  L.  R.  1  Eq.  431; 
L.  R.  1  Ch.  263;  Andrews"  v.  Salt,  L.  R.  8  Ch. 
622;  In  re  G ,  [1892]  1  Ch.  292;  Re  Walsh, 


280;  Bagshaw  v.  Winter,  5  De  G.  &  S.  466; 
Gent  v.  Harris,  10  Hare,  383;  Ward  v.  Yates, 
1  Dr.  &  S.  80;  Re  Smith,  W.  N.  (1867)  283, 
V.  C.  W.;  Re  Suggitt,  L.  R.  3  Ch.  215,  L.  J  J. ; 
Croxton  ».  May,  L.  R.  9  Eq.  404,  V.  C.  J.; 
and  for  order,  see  id.  409;  Re  Noake,  W.  N. 
(1880)  107;  28  W.  R.  762;  2  Seton,  676,  et  seq.; 
and  see  form  of  order,  where  fund  was  settled 
by  the  order,  Watson  v.  Marshall,  17  Beav. 
365;  Duncombe  v.  Greenacre  No.  2,  29  Beav. 
578;  Re  Tubbs,  8  W.  R.  270,  V.  C.  K.;  2 
Seton,  673,  No.  5,  675,  No.  6. 

5  Walsh  v.  Wason.  L.  R.  8  Ch.  482. 

6  Covington  v.   Gilliat,    W.    N.  (1876)  275; 
25  W.  R.  69,  V.  C.  H. 


13  L.  R.  Ir.  269.  The  Court  may  direct  what 
religion  infants  should  be  brought  up  in,  though 
they  are  not  wards  of  Court.  Re  McGrath, 
[1892]  2  Ch.  496;  [1893]  1  Ch.  143.  As  to  con- 
trol of  education,  see  also  Whalen  v.  Olmstead 
(Conn.),  15  L.  R.  A.  593  The  Court  of  (  'han- 
cery  has  no  jurisdiction  to  compel  a  ward  of 
Court  to  make  a  settlement  of  his  or  her  prop- 
erty. Biu'kmaster  v.  Buckmaster,  35  Ch.  I). 
21 ;  33  id.  482;  affirmed  nam.  Seaton  v.  Seaton, 
13  App.  Cas.  61 ;  Mills  v.  Fox,  37  Ch.  D.  153; 
Re  Leigh,  40  Ch.  D.  290.  But  where  a  female 
infant  married  under  seventeen  years  of  age,  a 
settlement  of  her  property  was  direc'ed  after 
she  attained  that  age.  Re  Phillips.  34  Ch.  D. 
467.  The  costs  of  a  settlement  of  the  property 
of  a  female  ward  of  Court,  made  upon  her  mar- 
riage with  the  Court's  sanction,  may  be  ordered 
paid  out  of  the  corpus  of  the  settled  property. 
De  Stacpoole  v.  De  Stacpoole,  37  Ch.  D.  139; 
see  Re  Sampson  &  Wall,  25  Ch.  D.  482.  Car- 
rying a  fund  to  the  separate  account  of  an  alien, 
non-resident  infant,  who  is  not  a  party  to  the 
suit,  does  not  make  such  infant  a  ward  of 
Court.     Brown  v.  Collins,  25  Ch.  D.  56. 

105 


*109 


SUITS   BY   PERSONS   WHO    ARE   UNDER   DISABILITY. 


Having  now  treated  of  the  subject  of  a  married  woman's  equity  to  a 
settlement,  into  which  we  have  been  led  in  considering  the  ground  on 
which  the  Court  of  Chancery  requires  a  wife  to  be  joined  as  co-plaintiff 
with  her  husband  in  suits  relating  to  her  own  property,  we  may  return 
to  the  subject  of  suits  by  femes  covert  generally.7  It  is  now  settled, 
that  all  cases  in  which  the  husband  and  wife  sue  as  co-plaintiffs  together, 
or  in  which  the  husband  sues  as  next  friend  of  his  wife,  are  regarded 
as  suits  of  the  husband  alone.8  And  upon  this  principle,  where  a  mar- 
ried woman,  having  a  separate  interest,  joins  as  a  co-plaintiff  with  her 
husband,  instead  of  suing  by  her  next  friend,  the  suit  will  not  prejudice 

a  future  claim  by  the  wife  in  respect  of  her  separate  interest.9 
*  109       *  In  general,  therefore,  where  the  suit  relates  to  the  separate 

property  of  the  wife,  (a)  it  is  necessary  that  the  bill  should  be 
filed  in  her  name,  by  her  next  friend, J  otherwise,  the  defendant  may  de- 


7  A  wife  may,  in  a  Court  of  Equity,  sue  her 
husband,  and  be  sued  by  him.  2  Story,  Eq. 
Jur.  §§  1363,  1414;  Van  Duzen  v.  Van  Duzen, 
6  Paige,  3C6;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  61,  and  note,  and 
cases  cited  to  this  point;  Long  v.  White,  5  J.  J. 
Marsh.  230;  Dowell  v.  Covenhoven,  5  l'aige, 
581;  Bennett  v.  Winfield,  4  Heisk.  440.  A 
husband,  who  lias  received  the  rents  and  profits 
of  real  estate,  held  in  trust  for  the  separate  use 
of  the  wife,  who  has  separated  from  him,  is 
rightly  joined  as  a  defendant  in  a  bill  by  her 
against  the  trustees  to  enforce  the  trust.  Aver 
v.  Aver,  16  Pick.  327. 

8  Wake  v.  Parker,  2  Keen,  59,  70;  Davis  v. 
Prout,  7  Beav.  288,  290  ;  Johnson  v.  Vail,  14 
N.  J.  Eq.  423.  A  fortiori,  if  the  wife  be  in- 
sane, the  bill  being  in  the  joint  name  of  hus- 
b-.ind  and  wife  for  partition  and  sale  of  her 
land.  Stephens  v.  Porter,  11  Heisk.  341.  And 
see  Kerchner  v.  Kenipton,  47  Md.  568.  In 
Tennessee,  the  husband,  it  seems,  in  matters  of 
business,  represents  the  wife.  Kindell  o.  Titus, 
9  Heisk.  727;  Stephens  v.  Porter,  11  Heisk.  348. 
A  plea  of  insolvency  of  the  husband  was  dis- 
allowed to  a  bill  by  him  and  his  wife  for  pay- 
ment of  an  annuity  bequeathed  for  the  benefit 
of  the  latter,  which  had  fallen  into  possession 
after  the  insolvency,  the  assignees  declining  to 
interfere.  Glover  v.  Weedon,  3  Jur.  N.  S.  903, 
V.  C.  S.  And  as  to  course  pursued  where  a 
married  woman  had,  in  ignorance,  been  made 
a  plaintiff  as  a  feme  snle,  see  Sherratt  v.  Sher- 
ratt,  W.  N.  (1873)  104,  21  W.  R.  572. 

9  Hughes  v.  Evans,  1  S.  &  S  185;  Turner  v. 
Turner,  2  De  G.  M.  &  G.  28.  37;  Johnson  v. 
Vail,  14  N.  J.   Eq.  423,  426,  and  cases  there 


(n)  No  particular  form  of  words  is  necessary 
in  order  to  vest  property  in  a  married  woman 
for  her  separate  use.  Re  Peacock,  10  Ch.  D. 
490;  Bland  v.  Dawes,  17  Ch.  1).  794.  But  if 
the  property  is  not  actually  settled  to  her  sepa- 
rate use,  the  husband  cannot  make  his  wife  deal 
with  it  as  if  it  were  separate  property.    Cahill 

106 


cited  to  this  point.  And  see  Beardmore  v. 
Gregory,  2  H.  &  M.  491;  11  Jur.  N.  S.  363. 
It  has  been  decided,  that  a  suit  by  a  husband 
and  wife  against  the  trustees  of  the  wife's 
separate  property,  cannot  be  pleaded  in  bar  to 
a  subsequent  suit  by  her  by  her  next  friend 
against  the  trustees  and  her  husband,  although 
the  relief  prayed  in  both  suits  is  the  same. 
Reeve  v.  Dalby,  2  S.  &  S.  464.  On  this  prin- 
ciple, a  plea  of  release  by  the  husband,  to  a  bill 
by  the  husband  and  wife  for  property  limited 
to  her  separate  use,  was  held  good.  Stooke  v. 
Vincent,  1  Coll.  527. 

1  Griffith  v.  Hood,  2  Ves.  Sr.  452;  Roberts  v. 
Evans,  7  Ch.  D.  830,  Fry  J.;  and  see  Mac- 
bryde  v.  Eykyn,  W.  N.  (1867)  367,  V.  C.  M. 
Where  the  bill  is  filed  to  rectify  a  marriage 
settlement,  the  wife  ought  to  be  a  party  inde- 
pendently of  her  husband.  McGilldowney  v. 
Pemberton,  10  L.  T.  N.  S.  292,  V.  C.  w".  (6) 
As  to  the  right  of  a  married  woman  to  sue  for 
an  injunction  to  prevent  injury  to  her  separate 
estate,  see  White  v.  Cohen,  1  Drew.  312; 
Green  v.  Green,  5  Hare,  400,  n. ;  Wood  e. 
Wood,  19  W.  R.  1049,  V.  C.  M.  See  also, 
generally,  Hunt  v.  Booth,  1  Freem.  Ch.  215  ; 
Bridges  v.  MeKenna,  14  Md.  258:  Knight  v. 
Knight,  2  Hayw.  101;  Grant  v.  Van  Schoon- 
hoven,  9  Paige,  255;  Sherman  v.  Burnhani,  6 
Barb.  S.  C.  403;  Heck  v.  Vollmer,  29  Md.  507, 
511.  In  Bein  v.  Heath,  6  How.  U.  S.  228,  Mr. 
Justice  McLean  said,  "  Where  the  wife  com- 
plains of  the  husband,  and  asks  relief  Hgainst 
him,  she  must  use  the  name  of  some  other  per- 
son in  prosecuting  the  suit;  but  where  the  acts 
of  the  husband  are  not  complained  of,  he  would 


v.  Cahill,  8  App.  Cas.  420,  Butler  v.  Butler,  16 
Q.  B.  D.  374,  378. 

(//)  Her  heirs  are  necessarv  parties  to  a  suit 
to  set  aside  a  married  woman's  will  and  to  in- 
validate a  marriage  settlement  in  her  favor. 
McDonnell  v  Eaton,  18  Fed.  Rep.  710. 


MARRIED    WOMEN. 


*109 


mur 2  upon  the  ground  that  the  wife  might  at  any  future  time  institute  a 
new  suit  for  the  same  matter,  and  that,  upon  such  new  suit  being  insti- 
tuted, a  decree  in  a  cause  over  which  her  husband  had  the  exclusive 
control  and  authority  would  not  operate  as  a  valid  bar  against  her  sub- 
sequent claim.8  Where,  however,  the  suit  is  for  a  chose  in  action  of  the 
wife,  not  settled  to  her  separate  use,  the  defendant  cannot  object  to 
the  husband's  suing  jointly  with  her  as  co-plaintiff;  nor  will  her  right 
to  a  settlement  be  prejudiced  by  the  fact  of  her  husband  being  so 
joined. 

Where  the  wife  sues  by  her  next  friend,  the  husband  must  still  be  a 
party,  and  it  is  usual  to  make  him  a  defendant;  4  but  a  husband  having 
no  adverse  interest  to  his  wife,  may  be  made  a  co-plaintiff,6  or  a  co- 
petitioner.6  (r) 

As  a  wife  may  sue  her  husband  in  respect  of  her  separate  property,7 


seem  to  be  the  most  suitable  person  to  unite 
with  her  in  the  suit.  This  is  a  matter  of  prac- 
tice within  the  discretion  of  the  Court." 

2  See  Johnson  v.  Vail,  14  N.  J.  Eq.  423; 
Barrett  v.  Doughty,  25  N.  J.  Eq.  379.  But 
if  the  objection  be  only  raised  on  final  hearing, 
an  amendment  will  be  permitted.  Paulison  v. 
Van  Iderstein,  28  N.  J.  Eq.  306;  Roberts  v. 
Evans,  7  Ch.  D.  830.  And  see  Doherty  v. 
Stevenson,  3  Tenn.  Ch.  25. 

3  Wake  v.  Parker,  2  Keen,  59,  70;  Smyth  v. 
Myers,  3  Mad.  474;  Owden  v.  Campbell,  8  Sim. 
551 ;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  63  and  note;  see  also  War- 
ren v.  Buck,  4  Beav.  95,  as  to  the  time  when 
the  objection  can  be  taken  by  the  defendant; 
and  see  Hope  v.  Fox,  1J.  &  H.  456  ;  7  Jur.  N.  S. 
186,  where  the  suit  related  to  the  execution  of 
a  power  vested  in  a  married  woman ;  and  see 
Mendes  v  Guedalla  (No.  2),  10  W.  R.  485,  V. 
C.  W.  If  the  husband  and  wife  join  in  a  suit 
as  plaintiffs,  or  in  an  answer  as  co-defendants, 
it  will  be  considered  as  the  suit,  or  the  defence 
of  the  husband  alone,  and  it  will  not  prejudice 
a  future  claim  by  the  wife  in  respect  of  her 
separate  interests,  nor  will  the  wife  be  bound 
by  any  of  the  allegations  therein  in  any  future 
litigation.  Johnson  v.  Vail,  14  N.  J.  Eq.  423; 
Bird  v.  Davis,  14  N.  J.  Eq.  467,  479.  In  Eng- 
land, claims  by  a  husband  and  wife  may  now  be 
joined  with  claims  bv  either  of  them  separately. 
R.  S.  C  Ord.  XVII.  4. 


i  Wake  i'.  Parker,  2  Keen,  59;  England  v. 
Downs,  1  Beav.  96 ;  Davis  v.  Prout,  7  Beav.  288, 
290;  Roberts  v.  Evans,  7  Ch.  D.  830,  Pry  .1.: 
and  see  Hope  v.  Fox,  ubi  supra ;  Richards  v. 
Millett,  11  W.  R.  1035,  M.  K. ;  9  Jur.  N.  S. 
1066.  The  practice,  when  the  husband  improp- 
erly joins  with  the  wife  as  plaintiff,  is  not  to 
dismiss  the  bill,  but  to  give  permission  to  the 
wife  to  amend  by  adding  a  next  friend,  and 
making  the  husband  a  defendant;  and  when 
no  objection  is  interposed,  to  decree  the  fund 
to  be  paid  to  a  trustee  for  the  use  of  the  wife. 
Johnson  v.  Vail,  14  N.  J.  Eq.  423. 

5  Beardinore  v.  Gregory,  2  H.  &  M.  491:  11 
Jur.  N.  J.  363  ;  but  see  Roberts  v.  Evans,  7  Ch. 
D.  830,  Fry  J.,  and  see  Smyth  v.  Myers,  3 
Mad.  474;  Meddowcroft  v.  Campbell,  13  Beav. 
184;  Platel  v.  Craddock,  C.  P.  Coop.  469,  481; 
Smith  ».  Etches,  1  H.  &  M.  558;  9  Jur.  N.  S. 
1228;  10  id.  124. 

6  Re  Osborne,  W.  N.  (1878)  179,  M.  R. 

7  See  Woodward  v.  Woodward.  3  De  G.  J. 
&S  672;  9  Jur.  N.  S.  882,  L.  C;  Powell  v. 
Powell,  9  Humph.  477.  In  a  suit  by  a  wife  for 
her  separate  estate,  the  husband  is  a  necessary 
defendant.  Johnson  v.  Vail,  1  N.  J.  Eq.  423. 
As  to  restraining  the  husband  from  interfer- 
ing with  and  injuring  such  estate,  see  Green 
v.  Green,  5  Hare,  400,  n. ;  Wood  v.  Wood,  19 
W.  R.  1049,  V.  C.  M. 


(c)  So  under  the  Code  Procedure,  a  husband 
may  be  joined  as  plaintiff  with  his  wife  in  an 
equitable  action  relating  to  her  separate  prop- 
erty. Spargur  v.  Heard,  90  Cal.  221.  In  Ten- 
nessee, in  such  case,  the  wife  may  sue  by  next 
friend,  making  her  husband  a  defendant.  Key 
v.  Snow,  90  Tenn.  663.  But  in  the  Federal 
Courts,  in  view  of  Equity  Rule  87,  which  pro- 
vides  for  the   appointment  of  a  next  friend, 


a  State  statute  providing,  like  the  Cal.  Code  of 
Civil  Procedure,  §  370,  that  a  married  woman 
may  sue  alone  respecting  her  separate  property, 
does  not  govern  Equity  suits,  and  her  bill  is 
demurrable  if  she  does  not  sue  by  next  friend. 
Wills  i'.  Pauly,  51  Fed.  Rep.  257.  See  Arm- 
strong v.  Syracuse  Screw  Co.  16  Fed.  Rep. 
168;  Taylor  v.  Holmes,  14  id.  498;  Douglas  v. 
Butler,  6  id.  228. 

107 


110 


SUITS   BY   PERSONS   WHO    ARE   UNDER   DISABILITY. 


so  may  a  husband  in  a  similar  case  sue  his  wife.8  (d)     Such  a 
*  110    *  suit,   however,  can  only  be  in  respect  of  his  wife's   separate 

estate ;  for  a  husband  cannot  have  a  discovery  of  his  own  estate 
against  his  wife.1 

Whenever  it  is  necessary  that  a  suit  respecting  the  property  of  a 
married  woman  should  be  instituted  by  her  next  friend,2  the  suit 
must  be  brought  in  her  name,  by  the  next  friend  who  is  named  as  such 
in  the  bill,  as  in  the  case  of  an  infant.3     A  bill,  however,  cannot,  as 


8  Warner  v.  Warner,  1  Dick.  90;  Ainslie 
v.  Medlicott,  13  Ves.  266 ;  and  making  her  a 
defendant  is  an  admission  that  the  suit  relates 
to  her  separate  estate.  Earl  v.  Ferns,  19  Beav. 
67;  Uur.  N.  S.  5;  2  Story,  Eq.  Jur.  §  1368; 
Story,  Eq.  PI.  §62;  Copeland  v.  Granger,  3 
Tenn.  Ch.  487.  In  a  suit  to  set  aside  a  will 
securing  to  the  testator  s  daughter,  who  is  a 
married  woman,  and  to  her  issue,  a  share  of  the 
testator's  property,  for  her  separate  use  during 
coverture,  the  husband  and  wife  should  not 
join  as  parties  plaintiff,  their  interests  being  in 
conflict;  but  the  wife  should  be  made  a  defend- 
ant. Alston  v.  Jones,  3  Barb.  Ch.  397.  Where 
a  suit  is  instituted  by  a  wife  for  the  protection 
of  her  separate  property  against  creditors  of 
the  husband,  the  husband  cannot  legally  be 
joined  as  plaintiff,  his  interest  claimed  by  the 
creditors  being  adverse  to  that  of  his  wife. 
Johnson  v.  Vail,  14  N.  J.  Eq.  423;  Tunnard  v. 
Littell,  23  N.  J.  Eq.  264.  A  married  man  may 
sue  his  wife  ill  her  character  of  executrix,  for  a 
debt  due  to  him  by  the  testator.  The  institution 
of  the  suit  by  the  husband  will  be  considered 
as  an  authority  to  her  to  be  sued.  Alexander 
t\  Alexander,  12  La.  An.  588. 

1  Brooks  v.  Brooks,  Prec.  Ch.  24. 


(d)  A  wife  may  undoubtedly  become  her 
husband's  creditor,  and  prove  against  his  es- 
tate in  bankruptcy.  Re  Blandin,  1  Lowell, 
543;  In  re  Jones.  9  N.  B.  R.  556.  In  Wood- 
ward v.  Woodward,  3  De  G.  J.  &  S.  672,  Lord 
Westbury  L.  C.  said:  "  This  Court  has  estab- 
lished the  independent  personality  of  a  feme 
covert  with  respect  to  property  settled  to  her 
separate  use.  ...  It  is  quite  clear  that  if  money, 
part  of  the  income  of  her  separate  estate,  be 
handed  over  by  her  to  her  husband,  upon  a 
contract  of  loan,  she  may  sue  her  husband  upon 
that  contract."  See  Moore  v.  Page,  111  U.S.  117; 
2  Kent  Com.  163;  Bennett  v.  VVintield,  4  Heisk. 
440;  Bottoms  v.  Corley,  5  id.  1;  Clark  ».  Heze- 
kiah,  24  Fed.  Rep.  663;  Valensin  v.  Valensin, 
28  id.  559.  A  wife  who  has  power  to  sue  her 
husband  has  power  also  to  compromise  the  suit, 
or  to  bind  herself  to  abstain  from  instituting  it. 
Besant  v.  Wood,  12  Ch.  D.  605;  Clark  v.  Clark, 
10  P.  D.  188, 195.  Under  the  Married  Women's 
Property  Act  of  1882  (45  &  46  Vic.  c.  75),  as 
before,  it  is  competent  for  a  husband  to  sue 
his  wife,  and  to  charge  her  separate  estate  for 

108 


2  Griffith  v.  Hood,  2  Ves.  Sr.  452;  Story, 
Eq.  PI.  §§  61,  63  ;  Dowell  v.  Covenhoven,  5 
Paige.  581 ;  Wood  v.  Wood,  8  Wend.  357 ;  Gar- 
lick  v.  Strong,  3  Paige,  440.  Leave  to  file  bill 
by  a  married  woman  without  a  next  friend 
refused,  although  the  validity  of  the  marriage 
was  contested.  Caldicott  v.  Baker,  13  W.  R. 
449,  V.  C.  K.;  and  see  Sealey  v.  Gaston,  ib. 
577,  V.  C.  W.  A  defendant  cannot  act  as  next 
friend  of  a  married  woman  plaintiff.  Payne  v. 
Little,  13  Beav.  114;  but  a  married  woman 
defendant  may  appeal  by  a  co-defendant  as  her 
next  friend.  Elliot  v.  Ince,  7  De  G.  M.  &  G. 
475;  3  Jur.  N.  S.  597.  She  cannot,  however, 
present  a  petition  of  appeal  without  a  next 
friend,  although  another  person  joins  in  the 
petition,  and  the  suit  relates  to  her  separate 
estate.     Picard  v.  Hine,  L.  R.  5  Ch.  274. 

8  Ld.  Red.  28.  Where  the  husband  is  under 
any  of  the  disabilities  enumerated,  ante,  p.  87, 
the  wife  is  considered  as  a  feme  sole,  and  may 
sue  without  the  intervention  of  a  next  friend; 
and  where  he  is  out  of  the  jurisdiction,  see 
Postgate  v.  Barnes,  9  Jur.  N.  S.  456;  11  W.  R. 
356,  V.  C.  S.  Any  objection  for  wnnt  of  a 
next  friend  should  be  made  as  soon  as  possible. 
Sealev  v.  Gaston,  13  W.  R.  577,  V.  C.  W. 


money  loaned  by  him  to  her  after  their  mar- 
riage* Butler  v.  Butler,  16  Q.  B.  D.  374:  14  id. 
831;  Re  Jupp,  39  Ch.  D.  148;  see  Re  Roper,  39 
Ch.  D.  482;  Lombard  v.  Morse,  155  Mass. 
136;  Nelson  v.  Ferdinand,  111  Mass.  300.  A 
husband's  claim  to  repayment  from  hi-  wife  of 
money  loaned  to  her  may  be  barred  by  anal- 
ogy to  the  Statute  of  Limitations.  Re  Lad\r 
Hastings,  35  Ch.  D.  94.  In  certain  States,  as, 
e.  g.,  in  Massachusetts  and  California,  a  married 
woman  may  sue  alone  to  recover  her  separate 
property.  Mass.  Pub.  Stats,  c.  147,  §  7;  Lom- 
bard v.  Morse,  155  Mass.  136;  Evans  t".  De  Lay, 
81  Cal.  103.  In  both  England  and  Scotland  a 
wife  may  make  an  effectual  gift  to  her  husband 
of  her  separate  income;  but  in  Scotland  she 
has  the  further  right  to  revoke  the  gift,  even 
after  her  husband's  death,  and  to  reclaim  the 
donated  property  so  far  as  it  is  unconsumed. 
Edward  v.  Cheyne  (No.  2),  13  App.  Cas.  385. 
By  45  &  46  Vic.  c.  75,  §  3,  46  &  47  Vic.  c.  52, 
§  152,  loans  made  by  a  wife  to  her  husband 
for  purposes  of  trade  are  part  of  his  assets  in 
bankruptcy. 


MARRIED   WOMEN. 


Ill 


in  the  case  of  an  infant,  be  filed  by  a  next  friend  on  behalf  of  a  married 
woman,  without  her  consent;4  and  if  a  suit  should  be  so  instituted, 
upon  special  motion,  supported  by  evidence  of  the  matter,  it  will  be 
dismissed  with  costs  to  be  paid  by  the  next  friend,5  or  his  solicitor.6 

As  in  the  case  of  an  infant,  a  written  authority  from  the  next  friend 
to  use  his  name  must  be  filed  with  the  bill.7  (a)  So  also,  in  all  applica- 
tions to  the  Court,  by  petition  or  otherwise,  by  a  married  woman  with 
respect  to  her  separate  estate,  she  must  apply  by  her  next  friend,8  and 
if  the  application  is  not  made  by  the  next  friend  who  has  previously 
acted  for  her,  a  next  friend  for  the  purpose  of  the  application  must  be 
named;  if  an  application  is  made  without  a  next  friend,  the  solicitor  for 
the  applicant  may  be  ordered  to  pay  the  costs.9 

*The  next  friend  of  a  married  woman  need  not  be  a  relation,1  *  111 
but  he  must  be  a  person  of  substance,  because  he  is  liable  to 
costs : 2  and  in  this  respect  there  is  a  material  difference  between  the 
next  friend  of  a  feme  covert  and  of  an  infant;  for  any  person  may  file 
a  bill  in  the  name  of  an  infant,  but  the  suit  of  afevie  covert  is  substan- 
tially her  own  suit,  and  her  next  friend  is  selected  by  her.8  In  the 
former  case,  therefore,  as  we  have  seen,4  the  Court  does  not  require 
that  the  next  friend  should  be  a  person  of  substance,  because  if  the 


4  Ld.  Red.  28.  For  form  of  consent,  see 
Vol.  III.  If  she  is  an  infant,  her  consent  is 
unnecessary.  Wortham  v.  Pemberton,  1  De 
G.  &  S.  644;  9  Jur.  291;  but  see  Re  Potter, 
L.  R.  7  Eq.  484,  487,  V.  C.  M. 

6  Andrews  v.  Craddock,  Prec.  Ch.  376  ; 
Gilb.  Rep.  36;  Cooke  v.  Fryer,  4  Beav.  13; 
Kenrick  v.  Wood.  L.  R.  9  Eq.  333,  V.  C.  M. 
Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  61;  Randolph  v.  Dickerson,  5 
Paige,  751.  The  objection  cannot  be  taken  by 
a  defendant.  Schjott  r.  Schjott,  19  Ch.  D.  94; 
but  see  Davies  v.  Whitehead,  1  W.  N.  162, 
M.  R. 

6  Schjott  v.  Schjott,  19  Ch.  D.  94. 

M5  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  11 ;  see  now  R.  S.  C. 
188!,  Ord.  XVI.  20,  33-41 ;  46  &  47  Vic.  c.  49, 
§  4,  Sched.  For  form  of  authority,  see  Vol.  III. 
In  an  injunction  case,  an  information  was 
allowed  to  be  filed,  on  an  undertaking  to  file 
the  authority  the  following  day.  Att.-Gen.  v. 
Murray,  13'  W.  R.  65,  V.  C.  K.  Authority 
from  the  married  woman  to  the  next  friend  is 
not  now  to  be  filed.  Rogers  v.  Horn,  26  W.  R. 
432,  M.  R.  And  see,  as  to  liability  of  next 
friend,  whose  name  had  been  used  without  his 
knowledge,  previously  to  this  Act,  Bligh  v. 
Tredgett,  5  De  G.  &  S.  74. 

8  Re  Waugh,  15  Beav.  508;  but  she  may 
apply  without  a  next  friend,  where  she  has 
obtained  a  protection  order  under  20  &  21 
Vic.  c.  85,  §  21.      Bathe  v.  Bank  of  England, 


4  K.  &J.  564;  4  Jur.  N.  S.  505;  Re  Rains- 
don,  5  Jur.  N.  S.  55,  V.  C.  K.:  4  Drew.  446. 
9  Pearse  v.  Cole,  16  Jur.  214,  V.  C.  K. 
Where  a  writ  of  summons  has  been  issued  on 
behalf  of  a  married  woman  by  a  per«on  pur- 
porting to  be  her  next  friend,  acting  in  person 
and  without  the  employment  of  a  solicitor,  it 
and  all  subsequent  proceedings  may  be  set 
aside.  Swann  v.  Swann,  W.  N.  (1*880)  191, 
M.  R. 

1  The  husband  may  be  joined  with  his 
wife,  as  next  friend,  in  a  suit  in  which  he  has 
no  interest,  in  Louisiana.  Bein  v.  Heath.  6 
How.  U.  S.  228.  See  Johnson  v.  Vail,  14 
N.  J.  Eq.  423. 

2  Anon.  1  Atk.  570;  Pennington  v.  Alvin, 
1  S.  &  S.  264;  Drinan  r.  Mannix,  3  Dr.  & 
War.  154;  Lander  v.  Parr,  16  L.J.  Ch.  269; 
Beech  v.  Sleddon,  39  L.  J.  Ch.  123;  Jones  v. 
Fawcett,  2  Phil.  278;  Stevens  v.  Williams,  1 
Sim.  N.  S.  545;  Wilton  v.  Hill,  2  De  G.  M.  & 
G.  807-809;  Hind  r.  Whitmore,  2  K.  &  .T.  458, 
where  all  the  cases  are  reviewed;  Re  Wills,  9 
Jur.  X.  S.  1225 ;  12  W.  R.  97,  V.  C.  S. ;  Elliott 
v.  Ince,  7  De  G.  M.  &  G.  475:  3  Jur.  N.  S.  597. 
For  form  of  order,  see  2  Seton,  656,  No.  3. 
See  also  Dowden  v.  Hook,  8  Beav.  399,  402, 
which  must  now  be  looked  upon  as  overruled. 

8  Gambie  r.  Atlee.  2  De  G.  &  S.  745:  but 
see,  where  she  is  an  infant,  Wortham  v.  Pem- 
berton, 1  De  G.  &  S.  644;  9  Jur.  291. 

4  Ante,  p.  74. 


(a)  The  next  friend,  when  once  appointed, 
so  long  as  his  name  remains  upon  the  record, 
continues  liable  for  costs,  even  of  an  appeal, 


though  the  notice  of  appeal  may  not  purport 
to  be  given  by  him.  Re  Glanvill,  Ellis  v. 
Johnson,  31  Ch!  D.  532. 

109 


*  112 


SUITS    BY    PERSONS    WHO    ARE    UNDER    DISABILITY. 


friends  of  an  infant  are  poor,  the  infant  might,  by  such  a  rule,  be 
deprived  of  the  opportunity  of  asserting  his  right:  but  in  the  case  of 
a  feme  covert,  as  the  object  for  which  a  next  friend  is  required  is  that 
he  may  be  answerable  for  the  costs,5  the  Court  expects  that  the  person 
she  selects  to  fill  that  office  should  be  one  who  can  pay  the  costs,  if  it 
should  turn  out  that  the  proceeding  is  ill-founded;  and  therefore,  if  the 
next  friend  is  in  insolvent  circumstances,  it  will  order  the  suit  to  be 
stayed  until  he  gives  security  for  costs.6  The  application  for  security 
for  costs  may,  it  seems,  be  made  at  any  time  in  a  proper  case.7 

It  is  obvious  that  cases  might  arise  where  the  rule,  that  the  next 
friend  of  a  feme  covert  must  be  a  person  of  substance,  would  be,  prac- 
tically, a  denial  of  justice.  In  such  cases  the  Court,  as  we  have  seen,8 
allows  her  to  sue,  or  continue  a  suit,  without  a  next  friend;  and  if 
need  be,  in  forma  pauperis; 9  or  to  present  a  petition,  without  a  next 
friend,  in  a  case  where  the  Court  has  jurisdiction  without  suit.10  (a) 

If  the  next  friend  of  a  married  woman  dies,  or  becomes  incapable  of 
acting,  or  if  for  any  reason  the  plaintiff  desires  to  remove  her  next 
friend,  she  may,  at  any  time  before  any  defendant  has  entered 
*  112  an  appearance  to  the  bill,  introduce  the  *  name  of  a  new  next 
friend,  under  an  order  as  of  course  to  amend.  After  appearance, 
the  same  may  be  done,  where  a  new  next  friend  is  to  be  named  in  the 
place  of  a  deceased  next  friend,  if  the  application  for  the  order  is  made 
by  the  solicitor  1  who  acted  in  the  suit  for  the  deceased  next  friend;  but 
in  other  cases,  the  order  to  appoint  a  new  next  friend  is  special,  and  must 


5  See  Be  Wills,  9  Jur.  N.  S.  1225;  12  W.  R. 
97.  V.  C.  S. 

6  Smith  v.  Etches,  1  H.  &  M.  711 ;  9  Jur. 
N.  S.  1228 ;  10  id.  124.  A  next  friend  has  been 
ordered  to  give  security  for  costs,  though  the 
husband,  who  had,  however,  no  substantial 
interest,  was  a  co-plaintiff,  S.  C. ;  but  see 
Caldicott  v.  Baker,  13  W.  R.  449,  V.  C.  K. 
See  as  to  waiver  of  right  to  apply  for  security, 
M'Cann  v.  Borradaile,  W.  N.  (1867)  252;  i6 
W.  R.  74,  175;  37  L.  J.  Ch.  124. 

1  Martano  v.  Mann.  14  Ch.  D.  419. 

8  Ante,  p.  37;  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  XVI.  8. 

9  Wellesley  v.  Wellesley,  16  Sim.  1;  1  De 
G.  M.  &  G.  501:  Wellesley  v.  Morniugton,  18 
Jur.  552,  V.  C.  K.  ;  Be  Foster,  18  Beav.  525 ; 


Be  Lancaster,  18  Jur.  229,  L.  C.  and  L.  JJ.; 
D'Oechsner  v.  Scott,  24  Beav.  239:  Crouch  v. 
W'aller,  4  De  G.  &  J.  43;  5  Jur.  N.  S.  326  ;  Be 
Barnes,  10  W.  R.  464,  V.  C.  S.;  Smith  v. 
Etches,  ubi  sujwa.  An  order  for  this  purpose  is 
necessary,  which  may  be  obtained  on  special 
application  by  ex  parte  motion,  see  Coulsting 
v.  Coulsting,  8  Beav.  463.  For  form  of  order, 
see  2  Seton,  655,  No.  2.  For  form  of  motion 
paper,  see  Vol.  III. 

w  In  re  Hakewell,  3  De  G.  M.  &  G.  116 ; 
17  Jur.  334. 

1  If  not  made  by  him,  an  order  to  change 
solicitors  must  be  obtained  before  the  applica- 
tion is  made,  ante,  p.  77. 


('()  Although  a  married  woman  suing  alone 
cannot  be  ordered  to  rind  security  for  costs  on 
the  ground  of  poverty,  such  security  may  be 
ordered  when  the  next  friend  alone  is  liable  for 
the  costs,  and  it  is  too  late  for  the  plaintiff, 
after  obtaining  judgment  by  her  next  friend,  to 
claim  to  sue  alone.  In  re  Thompson,  Stevens 
V.  Thompson.  38  Th.  D.  317.  In  Be  Payne,  23 
Ch.  D.  288,  a  distinction  was  made  between  in- 
fants and  married  women  suing  by  next  friend, 
and  it  was  held  that,  as  a  married  woman  has 
power  to  select  her  next  friend,  failure  of  the 

110 


next  friend  to  pay  costs  in  one  suit  is  ground 
for  staying  a  second  suit  for  the  same  purpose 
with  another  next  friend;  contra,  in  the  case  of 
infants.  See  Swain  v.  Follows,  18  Q.  B.  D.  585; 
Weldhen  v.  Scattergood,  W.  N.  (1887)  69.  In 
Kingsman  v.  Kingsman.  6  Q.  B.  D.  122  it  was 
held  that  the  dismissal  of  the  defendant's  ap- 
plication that  a  married  woman's  proceedings 
upon  a  protection  order,  obtained  but  deemed 
inapplicable,  should  be  stayed  until  a  next 
friend  or  security  was  supplied,  amounted  to 
leave  to  her  to  sue  without  a  next  friend. 


MARRIED    WOMEN.  *  112 

be  obtained  either ou  motion  or  summons,  on  notice.2  Where  the  appli- 
cation to  appoint  a  next  friend  in  place  of  one  deceased  is  not  made  by 
the  solicitor  who  acted  in  the  suit  for  the  latter,  the  solicitors  must  be 
changed  before  the  application  is  made. 

Where,  however,  a  married  woman  applies  for  leave  to  change  her 
next  friend,  it  is  in  the  discretion  of  the  Court  to  grant  or  refuse  the 
application;  and  it  will  be  refused,  where  there  is  reason  to  believe 
that  the  defendant's  security  for  costs  will  be  thereby  prejudiced;3 
if  the  order  be  made,  the  new  next  friend  is  usually  required  to  give 
security  to  answer  the  past  costs,  and  to  abide  by  the  order  of  the  Court 
as  to  future  costs; 4  and  the  retiring  next  friend  has  also  been  required 
to  give  security  for  the  costs  incurred  up  to  the  time  of  the  change.6 

Upon  an  application  to  appoint  a  new  next  friend,  the  Court  or  Judge 
usually  requires  to  be  satisfied  of  his  willingness  to  act;  this  may  be 
evidenced  by  the  production  of  his  written  consent.6 

If  the  plaintiff  neglects  or  refuses  to  obtain  the  order  in  the  case  of 
the  next  friend's  death,  the  defendant  may  apply  to  the  Court,  by 
motion  upon  notice,  for  an  order  directing  her  to  name  a  new  next 
friend  within  a  limited  time,  or  in  default  that  the  bill  may  be  dis- 
missed with  costs;7  and  where  the  next  friend  becomes  bankrupt,  an 
order  will,  in  like  manner,  be  made,  discharging  the  next  friend  with- 
out prejudice  to  his  liability  for  costs  previously  incurred,  and  staying 
the  proceedings  until  a  solvent  next  friend  is  appointed  or  the  plaintiff 
has  obtained  leave  to  sue  without  a  next  friend.3 

Wherever  a  new  next  friend  is  appointed,  the  order  appointing  him 
must  be  served  on  the  solicitors  of  the  defendants,  and  be  left  for  entry 
in  the  cause  books  kept  by  the  Clerks  of  Records  and  Writs;9  and 
thereupon,  in  all  future  proceedings  in  the  cause,  the  name  of  the  new 
next  friend  so  appointed  will  be  introduced,  in  the  place  and  stead  of 
the  former  next  friend.10 

The  next  friend  of  a  married  woman,  before  he  consents  to  any 
departure  from  the  ordinary  mode  of  taking  evidence,  or  of  any  other 
procedure  in  a  suit,   should  obtain  the  sanction  of  the  Court,  or  of  a 

2  For  forms  of  notice  of  motion  and  sum-  next  friend,  2  Seton,  655.     A  married  woman 

mons,  see  Vol.  III.;  and  for  form  of  order,  see  wn0  has  consented  to  an  order  of  the  Court  is 

Seton,  1252.  bound   thereby  so   far  as    it  extends,  and   no 

s  Jones   v.   Fawcett,   2   Phil.   278;   and    see  farther.     Thrupp  v.  Goodrich,  18  W.  R.  125, 

Greenaway  v.  Rotheram,  9  Sim.  88.  M.  R. 

*  Lawley  v.  Halpen,  Bunb.  310  ;    Percy  v.  7  Barlee  v.  Barlee,  1  S.  &  S.  100.     For  form 

Percy,  M.  K.  in  Chamb.  9  Dec,  1863.    For  form  0f  notice,  see  Vol.  III. 

of  order,  see  Seton,  1252.  8  Wilton  v.  Hill,  2  De  G.  M.  &  G.  807  ; 

5  Payne  v.  Little,  14  Beav.  647  ;  16  Beav.  D'Oechsner  «.  Scott.  24  Beav.  239;  M'Cann  v. 
563:  Witts  v.  Campbell,  12  Ves.  493.  Borradaile,  W.  N.  (1867)  283;  37  L.  J.  Ch    124- 

6  For  form  of  consent,  see  Vol.  III.  In  16  W.  R.  74,  175,  V.  C.  M.;  and  see  form  of 
England  a  married  woman  may,  by  leave  of  order,  2  Seton.  656,  No.  4;  see  also  Pennington 
the  Court  or  a  Judge,  sue  without  a  next  friend  r.  Alv.n,  1  S.  &  S.  264;  Drinan  v.  Mannix,  3 
on  giving  such  security  (if  any)  for  costs  as  the  Dr.  &  War.  154;  Ex  parte  Clnxton  L.  R  7  Ch. 
Court  or  a  Judge  may  require,  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  532;  and  see  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  XVI.  8.  For  form 
XVI.  8.     For  form  of  order,  see  2  Seton   645,  of  notice  of  motion,  see  Vol.  III. 

No.  1.    The  application  for  leave  is  made  by  »  Now  at  the  Central  Office  of  the  Supreme 

an  ex  parte  motion  or  summons  supported  by  Court  of  Judicature, 

affidavits   showing  the  object  of  the  proposed  w  Braithwaite's  Pr.  558. 
action,  and  why  it  is  desired  to  sue  without  a 

111 


113 


SUITS    BY   PERSONS   WHO    ARE   UNDER   DISABILITY. 


Judge   in    chambers.11      The    application    at    chambers   is    made    by 

summons.12 
*  113        *  If  the  next  friend  of  a  married  woman  goes  to  reside  out  of 
the  jurisdiction,  the  practice  with  respect  to  giving  security  for 
costs  is  the  same  as  if  the  next  friend  had  been  himself  the  actual 
plaintiff.1 

Upon  filing  a  bill  in  Chancery,  either  by  her  next  friend  or  in  forma 
pa  uperis,  a  married  woman,  in  respect  of  the  suit,  is  held  to  have  taken 
upon  herself  the  liabilities  of  a  feme  sole,  and  therefore  may  be 
attached;2  her  separate  estate  becomes  liable  to  pay  the  costs  in- 
curred ; 3  (a)  and  an  undertaking  as  to  damages  may  be  required  from 
her  in  respect  to  her  separate  estate.4 

If  a  bill  has  been  filed  by  a  feme  sole,  and  she  intermarry  pending 
the  suit,  the  proceedings  are  thereby  abated,  and  cannot  properly  be 
continued  without  an  order  of  revivor.5     If,  however,  a  female  plaintiff 


"  Ord.  5  Feb.,  1861,  r.  24  (7  Jur.  N.  S.  Pt. 
II.  60);  see,  however,  Knatchbull  v.  Fowle,  1 
Ch.  D.  604,  M.  R.;  Fryer  v.  Wiseman,  W.  N. 
(1876)  3;  24  W.  R.  205,"  V.  C.  H. 

12  For  form  of  summons,  see  Vol.  III. 
i  Alcock  v.  Alcock,  5  De  G.  &  S.  671,  ante, 
p.  28. 

2  Ottway  v.  Wing,  12  Sim.  90. 

3  Barlee  v.  Barlee,  1  S.  &  S.  100;  Murray  v. 
Barlee,  4  Sim.  82,  91;  3  M.  &  K.  209,  219;  see, 
however,  Re  Pugh,  17  Beav.  336.  And  an 
undertaking  as  to  damages  may  in  such  case  be 
required  of  her.  Holden  v.  Waterlow,  15  W. 
R.  139.  Where  a  married  woman  has  consented 
to  an  order  of  Court,  she  is  bound  by  it  so  far 
as  it  extends.  Thrupp  v.  Goodrich,  18  W.  R. 
125.  And  her  consent  may  be  given  by  counsel 
of  herself  and  husband.  Crookes  v.  Whitworth, 
10  Ch.  D.  289.  As  to  the  liability  of  the  wife's 
separate  estate  for  her  debts  and  engagements, 
see  Johnson  v.  Gallagher,  7  Jur.  N.  S.  273;  9 
W.  R.  506,  L.  JJ.;  3  De  G.  F.  &  J.  494,  where 


(a)  In  re  Glanvill,  31  Ch.  D.  532  (see  also 
Hyde  v.  Hyde,  13  P.  D.  166),  it  was  held  thflt 
only  such  part  of  the  separate  estate  of  a 
married  woman  suing  without  a  next  friend  is 
liable  for  costs  as  she  was  entitled  to  free  from 
restraint  on  alienation,  when  she  commenced 
the  proceedings.  But  under  the  Married 
Women's  Property  Act  of  1882  such  costs  may 
be  collected  from  such  separate  estate  as  she  has 
when  the  order  to  pa)'  costs  is  made.  Cox  v. 
Bennett  (No.  2),  [1891]  1  Ch.  617;  64  L.  T.  380. 
A  married  woman,  having  visible  means  of 
payment,  should  not,  it  seems,  be  required  to 
give  security  for  costs.  Brown  v.  North,  9  Q. 
B.  D.  52;  fhrelfall  V.  Wilson,  8  P.  D.  18;  Re 
Isaac,  Jacob  v.  Isaac,  30  Ch.  D.  418;  In 
re  Robinson,  W.  N.  (1885)  147.  In  gen- 
eral, a  married  woman's  contracts  can  be 
112 


the  cases  are  reviewed ;  Greenough  v.  Shorrock, 
4  N.  R.  40,  L.  JJ.;  3  N.  R.  599,  M.  R.;  Mac- 
Henry  v.  Davies,  L.  R.  10  Eq.  88  ;  Chubb  v. 
Stretch,  L.  R.  9  Eq.  555;  Sharpe  v.  Foy,  L.  R. 
4  Ch.  35. 

*  Holden  v.  Waterlow,  15  W.  R.  139,  L.  JJ. 

5  See  Trezevant  ».  Broughton,  5  W.  R.  517; 
Seton,  1165, 1170,  M.  R.  Where  a  woman  filed 
her  bill  as  a  spinster,  and  it  afterwards  appeared 
she  had  a  husband  living,  proceedings  were 
stayed,  on  motion  by  the  defendant,  till  the 
appointment  of  a  next  friend.  Grant  v.  Mills, 
29  L.  T.  11  ;  and  see  Pyke  v.  Holcombe,  9  Jur. 
368,  V.  C  K.  B. ;  Davey  v.  Bennett,  3  W.  R. 
353,  V.  C  W.  See  Sherratt  v.  Sherratt,  W.  N. 
(1873)  104;  21  W.  R.  572.  In  England  the  suit 
does  not  abate  by  a  marriage  if  the  cause  of 
action  continues,  the  husband  being  made  a 
party  by  order  of  course.  R.  S.  C  Ord.  L  1-4, 
see  Darcy  v.  Whittaker,  W.  N.  (1876)  17  ;  24 
W.  R  244,  V.  C.  B.  See  now  45  &  46  Vic  c. 
75,  §  1. 


enforced  only  against  property  which  formed 
part  of  her  separate  estate  at  the  date  of  the 
contract.  Pike  v.  Fitzgibbon,  17  Ch.  D.  454; 
14  id.  837;  King  p.  Lucas,  23  Ch.  D.  712.  See 
Flower  v.  Buller,  15  Ch.  D.  665.  The  statement 
of  claim  upon  her  contract  must  allege  that  she 
has  separate  estate.  Tetley  v  Griffith,  57  L.  T. 
673;  36  W.  R.  96.  In  South  Carolina  it  is  held 
that  in  a  suit  upon  a  wife's  contract  an  allegation 
that  the  contract  relates  to  her  separate  estate  is 
unnecessary  when  the  disability  of  coverture 
does  not  appear  upon  the  complaint.  Brice  v. 
Miller  35  S.  C.  537.  The  trustee  of  a  marriage 
settlement  may  be  heard  in  opposition  to  an 
application  to  alter  such  settlpment,  but  not  in 
support  thereof.  Corrance  v.  Corrance,  L.  R. 
1  P.  &  D.  495. 


MARRIED   WOMEN.  *  114 

marries,  and  afterwards  proceeds  in  the  suit,  as  a  feme  sole,  the  mere 
want  of  an  order  of  revivor  is  not  an  error  for  which  a  decree  can  be 
reversed,  upon  a  bill  of  review  brought  by  a  defendant ;  because,  after 
a  decree  made  in  point  of  right,  a  matter  which  may  be  pleaded  in 
abatement  is  not  an  error  upon  which  to  ground  a  bill  of  review.6 

It  has  been  determined,  that  if  a  female  plaintiff  marries  pending  a 
suit,  and  afterwards  before  revivor  her  husband  dies,  an  order  of 
revivor  becomes  unnecessary:  her  incapacity  to  prosecute  the  suit  being 
removed;  yet  the  subsequent  proceedings  ought,  however,  to  be  in  the 
name  and  with  the  description  wbich  she  has  acquired  by  the  marriage.7 

Where  a  bill  has  been  filed  by  a  man  and  his  wife  touching  the  per- 
sonal property  of  the  wife,  and  the  husband  dies  pending  the  suit,  no 
abatement  of  the  suit  takes  place,  but  the  wife  becomes  entitled  to  the 
benefit  of  the  suit  by  survivorship,8  unless  any  act  has  been  done  which 
may  have  the  effect  of  depriving  her  of  that  right;  and  she  may 
continue  the  suit  without  an  order  of  revivor.9  *  If,  however,  *  114 
she  does  not  think  proper  to  proceed  with  the  cause,  she  will  not 
be  liable  to  the  costs  already  incurred:  because  a  woman  cannot  be 
made  responsible  for  any  act  done  by  her  husband  during  the  coverture; 
but  if  she  takes  any  step  in  the  cause,  subsequent  to  her  husband's 
death,  she  will  make  herself  liable  to  the  costs  from  the  beginning.1 

A  different  rule,  with  respect  to  the  right  to  continue  a  suit  instituted 
by  a  husband  and  wife,  prevails  when  the  wife  dies  in  the  lifetime  of 
her  husband,  from  that  which  is  acted  upon  when  the  husband  dies  in 
the  lifetime  of  his  wife;  for  in  the  former  case,  although  the  husband, 
upon  the  death  of  his  wife,  becomes  entitled  to  all  her  choses  in  action, 
he  does  not  acquire  such  title  by  survivorship,  but  in  the  character  of 
her  personal  representative,  and  before  he  can  continue  the  suit,  he 
must  take  out  administration  to  her  effects  2  and  then  obtain  an  order 

6  Viscountess  Cranborne  v.  Dalmahoy,  Nels.  2  See  Pattee  v.  Harrington,  11  Pick.  221; 
85;  1  Ch.  R.  231.  So  at  law,  if  a  woman  sues  Needles  v.  Needles,  7  Ohio  St.  432;  McCasker 
or  is  sued  as  sale,  and  judgment  is  against  her  v.  Golden,  1  Bradf.  (N.  Y.)  64;  Williams  v. 
as  such,  though  she  was  covert,  she  shall  be  Carle,  10  N.  J.  Eq.  543.  A  right  of  the  husband 
estopped,  and  the  sheriff  shall  take  advantage  to  administer  on  his  wife's  choses  in  action,  for 
of  the  estoppel.  1  Salk.  310;  1  Roll.  Abr.  869,  his  own  benefit,  is  held  to  be  incompatible  with 
pi.  50.     See  infra,  186.  the  legislation  of  Vermont.    Holmes  r.  Holmes, 

7  Ld.  Red.  60;  and  Godkin  v.  Earl  Ferrers,  28  Vt.  765.  It  has  been  held  in  Massachusetts, 
there  referred  to.  that  the  administrator  of  the  estate  of  a  married 

8  And  it  extends  to  interest  accrued  during  woman  may  maintain  an  action  upon  a  note 
the  life  of  the  husband,  and  not  received.  given  and  made  payable  to  her  during  cover- 
Wilkinson  v.  Charlesworth,  10  Beav.  324;  11  ture,  if  during  her  life  her  husband  did  not 
Jur.  644.  reduce  it  to  possession,  or  do  any  act  indicating 

9  M'Dowl  v.  Charles,  6  John.  Ch.  132;  an  intention  to  take  it  to  himself.  Allen  »\ 
Vaughan  v.  Wilson,  4  Hen.  &  M.  453.  The  Wilkins,  3  Allen,  321.  Bigelow  C.  J.  said; 
executor  of  a  deceased  husband  cannot  main-  "  His  right  to  reduce  it  to  possession  was  at  an 
tain  a  suit  upon  &  chose  in  action  which  accrued  end  on  the  dissolution  of  the  marriage  by  her 
during  coverture  to  the  wife  of  the  deceased,  decease.  It  was  then  a  chose,  in  action,  and, 
who  survived  him,  and  which  was  not  reduced  being  a  promissory  note  payable  to  the  order 
into  possession  by  him.  Bond  v.  Conway,  11  of  the  wife,  no  one  could  sue  upon  it,  unless 
Md.  512;  Snowhill  v.  Snowhill,  1  Green  Ch.  he  could  trace  a  title  to  it  under  the  original 
30.  payee,"  pp.  322,  323.     See  2  Kent  (11th  ed.), 

1  Ld.  Red.  59;  see  also  3  Atk.  726;  Bond  v.  135,  136;  Garforth  v.  Bradley,  2  Yes.  Sr.  675; 

Simmons,   ib,  21;  Mills  v.  Barlow,  11  W.   R.  Richards  v.  Richards,  2  B.  &  Ad.  447;  Gaters 

351,  3  De  G.  J.  &  S.  426,  L.  JJ.  v.  Madeley,  6  M.  &  W.  423;  Hart  v.  Stephens, 
VOL.  i.  —  8  113 


*  115  SUITS   BY   PERSONS   WHO    ARE   UNDER    DISABILITY. 

of  revivor.3  If  after  the  death  of  the  wife,  the  husband  were  to  die 
before  the  termination  of  the  suit,  the  party  to  continue  the  suit  is  the 
person  to  whom  administration  has  been  granted.  According  to  the 
present  practice  of  the  Court  of  Probate,  administration  is  granted  to 
the  representatives  of  the  husband,  unless  the  next  of  kin  of  the  wife 
are  the  persons  beneficially  entitled ;  the  former  practice  having  been 
otherwise.4 

If,  however,  any  act  has  been  done  the  effect  of  which  would  have 
been  to  deprive  the  wife  of  her  right  by  survivorship,  and  to  vest 

*  115    the  property  in  *  the  husband  absolutely,  the  husband  may,  it  is 

apprehended,  continue  the  suit  in  his  individual  character,  with- 
out taking  out  administration  to  his  wife.  In  such  case,  however,  it 
will  be  necessary,  if  such  act  has  taken  place  subsequently  to  the  insti- 
tution of  the  suit,  to  bring  the  fact  before  the  Court  by  means  of  an 
amendment  or  a  supplemental  statement  or  bill,  unless  it  appears  upon 
the  proceedings  which  have  already  taken  place  in  the  cause. 

This  distinction  renders  it  important  to  consider  what  the  circum- 
stances are  which  will  have  the  effect  of  so  altering  the  property  as  to 
vest  the  right  to  the  wife's  personal  property  absolutely  in  the  husband, 
and  entitle  him  to  proceed  in  a  suit  without  assuming  the  character  of 
her  personal  representative. 

A  mere  intention1  to  alter  the  property  will  not  have  such  effect; 
and  therefore  the  mere  bringing  an  action  at  law,  or  filing  a  bill  in 
Equity,  will  not  alter  the  property,  unless  there  be  a  judgment  or  decree 
for  payment  to  the  husband  alone.2 

An  appropriation  by  an  executrix  of  so  much  of  the  assets  of  her 
testator  as  is  necessary  to  discharge  a  legacy  bequeathed  to  a  married 
woman,  is  not  such  a  change  of  the  property  as  would  vest  it  in  the 
husband.  But  it  seems,  that  if  a  person  indebted  to  a  married  woman, 
or  holding  money  belonging  to  her,  bring  such  money  or  property  into 
Court,  in  a  cause  to  which  the  husband  and  wife  are  parties,  such  bring- 
ing into  Court  will  be  considered  as  an  alteration  of  the  property ;  for, 
as  properly  it  could  only  have  been  paid  or  delivered  during  coverture 
to  the  husband,  the  circumstance  of  its  having  been  brought  into  Court 
does  not  alter  the  rights  of  the  parties,  and  it  is  considered  as  a  pay- 

6  Q.  B.  937;  Scarpellini  v.  Atcheson,  7  Q.  B.  2  See  Strong  v.  Smith,  1  Met.  476.     To  con- 

864;    Jones   v.  Richardson,  5  Met.   247,   249;  stitute  a  reduction  to  possession,  and  a  change 

Bryant'.  Rooks,  25  Ga.  622;  Vaughan  v.  Parr,  of  property  of  the  wife's  chnses  in  action,  the 

20  Ark.  600.  husband  must  do  some  positive  and  unequivo- 

8  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  L.  4.     For  form  of  order,  cal  act  to  reduce  them  to  his  own  possession, 

where  husband,  being  defendant  in  wife's  suit,  Barber  v.  Slade,  30  Vt.  191;  Elms  v.  Hughes, 

revives   as   her  administrator,    see   Murray  v.  3  Desaus.  155;  Hall  v.  Young.  37  N.  H.  134; 

Newbon,  Seton,   1164.     The  order  can  be  ob-  Andoverr.  Merrimack  Co.,  id.  437;  Snowhill  r. 

tained  on  motion  or  partition  of  course.     See  Snowhill,  1  Green  Ch.  36,  37;  Glann  v.  Young- 

post,  Chap.  XXXIII.,  Revivor  and  Supplement.  love.  27  Barb.  480;    Lockhart  v.  Cameron,  29 

4  Wins,  on   Executors,  360.     See  Bryan  v.  Ala.  355;  Walden  v.  Chambers,  7  Ohio  St.  30; 

Rooks,  25  Ga.  622;  but  see  Vaughan  r.  Parr,  Wallace  r.  Taliaferro,  2  Call,  .447.     The  reduc- 

20  Ark.  600.  tion  necessary  is  that   into  possession,  not  of 

1  See   1  Bright,  H.  &  W.   48;    Forrest  v.  the  thing  itself,  but  of  the  title  to  it.     Strong 

Warrington,   2   Desaus.   254,  261;    Barber  v.  J.  in  Tritt  ».  Caldwell,  31  Penn.  St.  233.     See 

Slade,  30  Vt.  191.  2  Davidson,  Conv.  223-228. 

114 


MARRIED    WOMEN. 


116 


ment  or  delivery  to  him.3  For  the  same  reason,  jewels  of  the  wife, 
deposited  in  Court  by  the  husband  under  an  order,  were  considered  as 
belonging  to  the  husband's  executors,  and  not  to  the  representative  of 
the  wife  who  had  survived :  because,  having  been  in  the  possession  of 
the  husband,  even  a  tortious  act  could  not  devest  that  property,  and  turn 
it  into  a  chose  in  action; 4  much  less  could  a  payment  into  Court  under 
an  order.  And  so,  where  a  married  woman,  who  was  the  committee  of 
the  estate  and  person  of  her  lunatic  husband,  was  entitled  to  stock 
standing  in  the  name  of  a  trustee  for  her,  and  this  stock  was,  by 
an  order,  *  transferred  into  the  name  of  the  Accountant-General,  *  116 
in  the  matter  of  the  lunacy,  and  part  of  it  was  afterwards  sold 
out  and  applied  in  payment  of  costs  in  the  lunacy,  Lord  Lyndhurst 
held  that  the  mode  in  which  the  stock  had  been  dealt  with  amounted 
to  a  reduction  into  possession  by  the  husband.1  If,  however,  a  fund  in 
Court  be  carried  over,  by  order,  to  the  joint  account  of  the  husband  and 
wife,  the  case  will  be  different,  and  the  wife  will  not  be  deprived  of 
her  right  by  survivorship,  unless  something  is  done  by  her  husband  or 
his  incumbrancer  to  reduce  the  fund  into  possession; 2  and  it  seems, 
that  a  mere  payment  or  transfer  of  money  or  stock  to  trustees,  for  the 
benefit  of  the  wife,  will  not  give  the  husband  the  absolute  right  to  the 
money,  to  the  exclusion  of  the  wife.3 

It  appears  formerly  to  have  been  considered  that  a  promissory  note 
given  to  a  wife  during  coverture  became  the  property  of  the  husband 
absolutely,  as  the  wife  could  not  acquire  property  during  coverture;4 


3  Packer  v.  Wyndham,  Prec.  Ch.  412. 

4  Ibid. 

i  In  re  Jenkins,  5  Russ.  183,  187.  The 
right  of  a  husband  to  reduce  to  his  possession 
the  chases  in  action  of  the  wife,  cannot  be 
exercised  by  a  guardian  appointed  over  him 
as  an  insane  person,  but  the  property  continues 
vested  in  the  wife.  Andover  v.  Merrimack 
Co.  37  N.  H.  437. 

2  Ibid. ;  and  see  Prole  v.  Soady,  L.  R.  3  Ch. 
220-  Baldwin  v.  Baldwin,  5  De  G.  &  S.  319  ; 
Laprimaudaye  v.  Teissier,  12  Beav.  20U;  13  Jur. 
1040. 

8  Pringle  v.  Pringle,  22  Beav.  631 ;  and  see 
Ex  parte  Norton,  8  De  G.,  M.  &  G.  258  ;  2 
Jur.  N.  S.  479;  see,  however,  Hansen  v.  Miller, 
14  Sim.  22,  26;  8  Jur.  209,  352;  Cuningham 
v.  Antrobus,  16  Sim.  436,  442;  13  Jur.  28; 
Burnham  v.  Bennett,  2  Coll.  254;  9  Jur.  888; 
Cogan  v.  Duffield,  L.  R.  20  Eq.  789. 

4  Lord  Hardwicke,  in  Lightbourne  v.  Holy- 
day,  2  Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  1,  pi.  5;  2  Mad.  135,  n . ; 
Hodges  v.  Beverley,  Bunb.  188;  see  Yates  v. 
Sherrington,  11  M*.  &  W.  42,  and  12  M.  &  W. 
855,  as  to  the  effect  of  bankruptcy  of  the  hus- 
band upon  a  promissory  note  given  to  the  wife 
dum  sola.  So  it  has  been  held  in  Massachu- 
setts, both  as  to  promissory  notes  and  as  to 
legacies  and  distributive  shares  in  intestate 
estates,  the  separate  property  of  the  wife;  the 
necessity  for  a  reduction  to  possession  seems 


to  have  been  overlooked.  Thus,  in  Common- 
wealth v.  Manley,  12  Pick.  173,  it  was  deter- 
mined by  the  Court  that  a  promissory  note 
given  to  a  feme  covert  for  her  separate  use, 
for  the  consideration  of  her  distributive  share 
in  an  intestate  estate,  becomes  immediately  the 
property  of  the  husband.  This  was  afterwards 
confirmed  in  Stevens  v.  Beals,  10  Cush.  291. 
See  Shuttleworth  v.  Noyes,  8  Mass.  229;  Tryon 
v.  Sutton,  13  Cal.  490;  Holland  v.  Moody]  12 
Ind.  170.  And  in  Goddard  r.  Johnson.  14  Pick. 
352,  it  was  even  decided,  that  a  husband  might 
sue  in  his  own  right,  after  the  death  of  his  wife, 
for  a  legacy  accruing  to  the  wife  during  the 
coverture,  although  he  had  done  nothing  to 
reduce  it  to  possession  during  her  lifetime. 
The  same  was  maintained  in  Hapgood  v. 
Houghton,  22  Pick.  480,  and  in  Albee  v. 
Carpenter,  12  Cush.  382,  386.  See  Strong 
v.  Smith,  1  Met.  476.  But  the  Court  seem 
to  have  receded  from  the  doctrine  in  Jones  v. 
Richardson,  5  Met.  247,  249,  and  admitted  that 
it  was  "contrary  to  decided  cases."  And  in 
Allen  v.  Wilkin*,  3  Allen,  321,  322,  Bigelow 
C.  J.  said:  "  In  a  certain  sense,  a  chose  in 
action  which  becomes  the  property  of  the  wife 
during  coverture  may  be  said  to  be  the  abso- 
lute property  of  the  husband.  He  has  the  right 
to  do  any  act  to  reduce  it  into  his  own  posses- 
sion. So  long  as  he  and  his  wife  are  butk 
living,  the  entire  jus  disponendi  is  in   him." 

115 


118 


SUITS    BY   PERSONS   WHO    ARE   UNDER   DISABILITY. 


*  117    but  it  has  been  held 5  *  that  a  note  given  to  a  wife  is  a  chose  in  action 

of  the  wife,  and  survives  to  her  on  the  death  of  her  husband.1 
The  circumstance  of  the  husband  having  received  the  interest  and  part 
of  the  capital  in  his  lifetime,  for  which  he  gave  a  receipt,  does  not  alter 
the  nature  of  the  property,  but  the  rest  of  the  money  still  remains  a 
chose  in  action.2  In  general,  however,  if  the  husband,  either  alone  or 
jointly  with  his  wife,  authorizes  another  person  to  receive  the  property 
of  the  wife,  whether  it  be  money,  legacy,  or  other  thing,  and  such  person 
actually  obtains  it,  such  receipt  will  change  the  wife's  interest  in  the 
property,  and  be  a  reduction  into  possession  by  the  husband,3  and  the  cir- 
cumstance that  the  wife  was  an  administratrix  and  only  entitled  to  a 

distributive  share  of  the  property  does  not  make  any  difference.4 

*  118        *  The  mere  proof,  in  bankruptcy  by  the  husband  of  a  debt  due 

to  the  wife  will  not  alter  the  property  of  the  debt,  and  it  still 
remains  a  chose  in  action.1  It  seems,  however,  that  an  award  by  an 
arbitrator  giving  money  to  the  husband,  to  which  he  was  entitled  in 
right  of  his  wife,  will  have  the  effect  of  altering  the  property,  and 
giving  it  to  the  husband  absolutely.2 


And  it  was  decided  in  this  case,  that  the  admin- 
istrator of  the  estate  of  a  married  woman  may 
maintain  an  action  on  a  note  given  and  made 
payable  to  her  during  coverture,  if  during  her 
life  her  husband  did  not  reduce  it  to  possession, 
or  do  any  act  indicating  an  intention  to  take  it 
to  himself.  The  Mass.  Statutes  (Pub  Stats,  c. 
147)  now  provide  that  a  married  woman's  prop- 
erty shall  continue  her  own,  and  that  she  may 
acquire  property  as  if  she  were  sole. 

5  Nash  v.  Nash,  2  Mad.  133. 

1  Allen  v.  Wilkins,  3  Allen.  321 ;  Jones  v. 
Richardson,  5  Met.  247,  249;  2  Kent  (11th  ed.), 
135;  Barber  v.  Slade,  30  Vt.  191;  Barron  v. 
Barron.  24  Vt.  375;  Hall  v.  Young.  37  N.  H. 
134,  145,  146;  Coffin  v.  Morrill,  22  N.  H.  352; 
Snowhill  i\  Snowhill,  1  Green  Ch.  30;  Dane  r. 
Allen,  id.  415;  Poindexter  v.  Blackburn,  1 
Ired.  Ch.  286. 

In  Hall  r.  Young,  37  N.  H.  146,  it  is  stated 
as  the  settled  law  of  New  Hampshire,  that  the 
personal  property  of  the  wife  at  the  time  of  the 
marriage,  or  accruing  to  her,  in  her  own  right, 
subsequently,  whether  it  consists  in  specific 
chattels,  money,  or  chases  in  fiction,  and  how- 
ever it  may  fall  to  her,  whether  by  legacy,  gift 
inter  vivos  or  causa  mortis,  as  her  distributive 
share  in  the  estate  of  a  person  deceased,  or 
otherwise,  if  it  accrues  independently  of  her 
husband,  and  not  upon  any  consideration  mov- 
ing from  or  connected  with  him,  it  remains 
hers  until  he  exercises  his  marital  right  by 
reducing  it  to  possession. 

If  stock  be  taken  by  the  husband  in  the 
name  of  himself  and  wife,  the  wife  will  take 
by  survivorship,  unless  the  gift  be  rebutted 
bv  evidence  of  a  contrary  intent.  Dummer 
v.  Pitcher,  2  M.  &  K.  262;  S.  C.  5  Sim.  35; 
Fowkes  v.  Pascoe,  L.  R.  10  Ch.  343;  Lloyd  v. 

116 


Pughe,  L.  R.  14  Eq.  241;  L.  R.  8  Ch.  88;  Re 
Eykyn,  6  Ch.  D.  115;  Marshal  v.  Crutwell, 
L.  R.  20  Eq.  328.  So,  if  a  note  be  taken  pay- 
able to  husband  and  wife  on  a  consideration 
passing  from  the  husband.  Johnson  v.  Lusk, 
6  Coldw.  113;  S.  C.  1  Tenn.  Ch.3.  So,  of  the 
undivided  interest  of  the  wife  as  distributee  in 
chattels,  although  the  chattels  be  reduced  to 
possession  by  the  husband.  Ross  v.  Wharton, 
10  Yerg.  190*. 

2  Nash  v.  Nash,  2  Mad.  133,  139;  Scrutton 
v.  Pattillo,  L.  R.  19  Eq.  369,  373,  V.  C.  M.; 
Parker  v.  Lechmere,  12  Ch.  D.  256,  Fry  J.; 
Hunter  v.  Hallett,  1  Edw.  Ch.  388.  The 
receipt  by  a  husband  of  dividends  accruing 
from  stock  standing  in  his  wife's  name,  is  evi- 
dence of  a  reduction  to  possession  of  the  divi- 
dends, but  not  of  the  stock.  Burr  v.  Sherwood, 
3  Bradf.  (N.  Y.)  85.  See  Taggart  v.  Boldin, 
10  Md.  104.  If  the  husband  takes  a  new  secu- 
rity in  his  own  name,  for  a  debt  due  to  his  wife, 
while  sole,  her  right  by  survivorship  is  thereby 
destroyed.     Searing  v.  Searing,  9  Paige,  283. 

8  Doswell  v.  Earle,  12  Ves.  473;  see  also 
Burnham  r.  Bennett,  2  Coll.  254.  9  Jur.  888; 
Hansen  v.  Miller,  14  Sim.  22,  26;  8  Jur.  209, 
352:  and  Cuningham  v.  Antrobus,  16  Sim. 
436,  442;  13  Jur.  28;  2  Kent  (11th  ed.),  137; 
Schuyler  v.  Hoyle,  5  John  Ch.  196;  Johnston 
v.  Johnston.  1  Grant  (Penn.),  468;  Scrutton  r. 
Pattillo,  L.  R.  19  Eq.  369,  V.  C.  M.;  Widgery 
v.  Tepper,  5  Ch.  D.  516,  V.  C.  M. ;  7  id.  423, 
C.  A.;  but  see  Pringle  v.  Pringle,  22  Beav. 
631. 

4  Re  Barber.  Hardier  ?•  Chapman,  11  Ch.  D. 
442,  Fry  J. ;  and  see  Huntley  v.  Griffith,  F. 
Moore.  452;  Goldsborough,  59. 

1  Anon.  2  Vern.  707. 

2  Oglander  v.  Baston,  1  Vern.  396. 


MARRIED    WOMEN.  *  119 

With  respect  to  the  effect  of  a  judgment  at  Law  in  altering  the  prop- 
erty of  a  wife's  chose  in  action,  much  depends,  as  we  have  seen,8  upon 
whether  the  wife  is  or  is  not  named  in  the  proceeding.  If  the  wife  be 
not  a  party  (which  she  need  not  be  at  Law,  if  the  right  accrued  to  her 
during  coverture),4  a  judgment  in  an  action  commenced  by  the  husband 
will  vest  the  property  in  him;  so  that,  in  the  event  of  his  death  before 
execution,  the  wife  would  be  deprived  of  her  right  by  survivorship.5 
This,  however,  will  not  be  the  case  if  the  wife  is  a  party;  in  which 
case,  if  the  husband  dies  after  judgment  and  before  execution  sued  out, 
the  judgment  will  survive  to  her.6 

Decrees  in  Equity,  as  we  have  seen,7  so  far  resemble  judgments  at 
Law  in  this  respect,  that,  until  the  money  be  ordered  to  be  paid,  or 
declared  to  belong  to  the  one  or  the  other,  the  rights  of  the  parties  will 
remain  undisturbed;8  but  an  order  for  payment  of  a  sum  of  money  to 
the  husband,  in  right  of  his  wife,  changes  the  property,  and  vests  it  in 
the  husband.9  And  where  a  decree  or  order  has  been  made  by  the 
Court  for  the  payment  of  a  sum  of  money  to  the  husband  and  wife,  and 
either  party  dies  before  payment,  the  money  will  belong  to  the 
survivor.10  *  Upon  the  same  principle,  in  Forbes  v.  P/ilpps,1  *  119 
where  a  decree  was  made  that  one  sixth  of  the  residue  to  which 
the  wife  was  entitled  should  be  paid  to  her  and  her  husband,  and  the 
wife  died  before  the  money  was  received,  it  was  held  that  the  husband 
was  entitled  to  the  money,  not  as  administrator  to  the  wife,  but  as  sur- 
vivor under  the  decree. 

Where  the  chose  in  action  is  not  capable  of  immediate  reduction  into 
possession,  as  where  it  is  in  reversion  or  expectancy,  an  assignment  of 
it  by  the  husband  will  not  bar  the  right  which  the  wife  has  by  sur- 
vivorship 2  unless  it  is  actually  reduced  into  possession  before  his 
death;3  and  where  a  prior  life-interest  is  assigned  to  the  wife,  there 
will  be  no  equitable  merger,  so  as  to  enable  the  husband  and  wife  to 

8  Ante,  p.  89.  the  wife,  though  her  name  might  not  have  been 

4  Ibid.  necessarily  joined  in  the  proceedings.      Muse 

5  Oglander  v.  Baston,  ubi supra;  see  Pierson  v.  Edgerton,  C.  W.  Dud  Eq.  179;  Knight  r. 
v.  Smith,  9  Ohio  St.  554;  Needles  v.  Needles,  Brawner,  14  Md.  1. 

7  Ohio  St.  432.  i  1  Eden,  5<)2;  and  see  Prole  i>.  Soady,  L. 

6  Garforth  v.  Bradley,  2  Ves.  Sr.  676;  see  R.  3  Ch.  220,  where  an  order  for  payment  to 
Fleet  v.  Perrins,  L.  R.  4  Q.  B.  500;  2  Kent  the  assignee  of  husband  and  wife  of  a  fund 
(11th  ed.),  137,  138;  McDowl  v.  Charles,  6  standing  to  their  joint  account,  made  after  a 
John.  Ch.  132;  Searing  v.  Searing,  9  Paige,  decree  nisi  for  a  dissolution  of  the  marriage, 
283.  but  before  decree  absolute,  was  held  not  to  be 

'  Ante,  p.  115.  equivalent  to  a  reduction  into  possession,  and 

8  See  Heygate  v.   Annesley,  3   Bro.  C.  C.  not  to  bar  the  wife's  survivorship. 
(Perkins's  ed.)  362,  Mr.  Eden's  note  (a),  where  2  Purdew  v.  Jackson.  1  Kuss.  10:  Hornier  v. 
the  cases  on  this  subject  are  cited  and  consid-  Morton,  3  Russ.  65;  Watson  v.  Dennis,  id.  90; 
ered;  Knight  v.  Brawner,  14  Md.  1.  Stamper  t?   Barker.  5  Mad.  157,  164;  see  also 

9  Heygate  v.  Annesley,  3  Bro.  C.  C.  362;  Hornsby  v.  Lee.  2  Mad.  16;  Hutchings  v. 
and  see  Tidd  v.  Lister,  3  De  G.  M.  &  G.  857,  Smith,  9  Sim.  137;  2  Jur.  131. 

871:    10  Hare,  140;    18  Jur.  543;    Walker  v.  8  Ashby  v.  Ashby.  1  Coll.  553:  8  Jur.  1159: 

Walker,  25  Miss.  367;  Walden  »,  Chambers,  see  also   Ellison  t>.  Elwin,   13   Sim.   309,    315, 

7  Ohio  St.  30.  S.  C.  nam.  Elwyn  v.  Williams,  7  Jur.  337  :   Box 

10  Nanney  v.  Martin,  1  Ch.  Rep.  234;  Coppin  v.  Jackson,   Dru.  42,  83;  2  Con.  &  L.  605:  Le 

v- )  2  P.  Wins.  496.     If  there  be  a  decree  Vasseur  ?•.  Scratton,  14  Sim    116;  Michel  more 

in  Equity  in  favor  of  the  husband  and  wife,  r.  Mudge,  2  Giff.  183;  Prole  v.  Soady,  L.  R.  3 

aud  the  husband  dies,  the  decree  will  survive  to  Ch.  223,  L.  J.  Ld.  Cairns. 

117 


*  120 


SUITS    BY   PERSONS   WHO    ARE   UNDER   DISABILITY. 


deal  with  the  reversion,  and  bar  her  right  of  survivorship  unless  it  is 
actually  reduced  into  possession.4 

By  the  20  &  21  Vic.  c.  57,  a  husband  and  wife  can  now,  however,  in 
the  manner  and  subject  to  the  restrictions  therein  mentioned,  effectually 
assign  her  reversionary  interest  in  personal  estate. 

In  the  case  of  assignments  by  act  of  Law,  no  distinction  exists  between 

assignments  of  clwses  in  action  capable  of  immediate  reduction 

*  120    into  possession,  and  those  which  are  not  so.5     *Thus,  where  a 


■i  Whittle  v.  Henning,  2  Phil.  731,  735;  12 
Jur.  1079;  ib.  298;  11  Beav.  222;  21  Jur.  298; 
overruling  Creed  v.  Perry,  14  Sim.  592,  and 
Hall  v.  Hugonin,  ib.  595;  10  Jur.  940;  and  see 
B.sbopp  v.  Colebrook,  11  Jur.  793,  V.  C.  E.; 
Hanchett  v.  Briscoe,  22  Beav.  496;  Shute  v. 
Hogge,  58  L.  T.  546;  Crittenden  v.  Posey,  1 
Head(Tenn.),  311;  Duberley  v.  Day,  16  Beav. 
33;  Rogers  v.  Aeaster,  14  Beav.  445;  Lynn  v. 
Bradley,  1  Met.  (Ky.)  232;  Hair  v.  Avery,  28 
Ala.  267;  ante,  99,  n.  3.  But  it  is  held  in  Penn- 
sylvania that  a  husband  may  assign  for  a  val- 
uable consideration  the  wife's  chases  in  action, 
whether  they  be  presently  reducible,  or  be  rever- 
sionary interests,  or  possibilities.  Webb's  Ap- 
peal. 21  Penn.  248;  Smith's  Estate,  22  Penn.  130. 

The,  Court,  it  seems,  has  the  power  to  bind 
a  married  woman,  by  sanctioning,  in  a  pro- 
ceeding to  which  she  is  a  party,  the  compromise 
of  a  suit  instituted  by  her  for  the  recovery  of 
trust  funds  in  which  she  has  a  reversionary 
interest;  but  she  should  be  a  respondent.  Wall 
v.  Rogers,  L.  R.  9  Eq.  58.  See  44  &  45  Vic.  c. 
41,  §39. 

5  No  distinction  exists  between  legal  and 
equitable  choses  in  actum,  or  between  assign- 
ments of  the  latter  for  valuable  considera- 
tion, and  voluntary  or  general  assignments. 
Homsby  V.  Lee,  2  Mad.  16;  Purdew  v.  Jack- 
son, 1  Russ.  24,  42,  70;  see  also  Hutchings 
v.  Smith,  9  Sim.  137:  2  Jur.  231;  Honner  v. 
Morton,  3  Russ.  65;  Watson  v.  Dennis,  ib.  90; 
Stamper  v.  Barker,  5  Mad.  157,  164.  It  is  said 
by  Mr.  Chancellor  Kent,  2  Kent  (11th  ed.),  137, 
that  a  voluntary  assignment  by  the  husband  of 
the  wife's  choses  in  action,  without  consideration, 
will  not  bind  her,  if  she  survives  him ;  see  also 
to  the  same  effect,  Hartman  v.  Dowdel,  1  Rawle, 
279 ;  Parsons  v.  Parsons,  9  N.  H.  321,  322  ; 
Saddington  v.  Kinsman.  1  Bro.  C.  C.  (Perkins's 
ed.)  51  and  notes  ;  Mitford  v.  Mitford,  9  Sum- 
ner's Ves.  87,  note  (b).  The  husband  may 
assign,  for  a  valuable  consideration,  his  wife's 
choses  in  actln  to  a  creditor,  free  from  the 
wife's  contingent  right  of  survivorship.  Such 
an  appropriation  of  the  property  is  the  exerci  e 
of  an  act  of  ownership  for  a  valuable  purpose, 
and  an  actual  appropriation  of  the  chattel  which 
the  husband  had  a  right  to  make.  Schuyler  v. 
Hovle,  5  John.  Ch.  196;  Kenny  v.  Udall,  5 
John.  Ch.  464;  Lawry  v.  Houston,  3  How. 
118 


(Miss.)  394;  Siter  v.  Jordan,  4  Rawle,  463; 
Tritt  v.  Col  well,  31  Penn.  St.  228.  The  doc- 
trine that  the  husband  may  assign  the  wife's 
choses  in  action  for  a  valuable  consideration, 
and  thereby  bar  her  of  her  right  by  survivor- 
ship in  the  debt,  but  subject,  nevertheless,  to 
the  wife's  equity,  has  been  frequently  declared, 
and  is  understood  to  be  the  rule  best  sustained 
by  authority.  2  Kent  (11th  ed.),  137;  Bryan 
r.  Spruill,  4  Jones,  Eq.  (N.  C.)  27;  see  Tobin 
v.  Dixon,  2  Met.  (Ky.)  422;  Sherman  v.  Rei- 
gart,  7  W.  &  S.  169  ;  Webb's  App.  21  Penn. 
St.  248;  Smilie's  Estate,  22  Penn.  St.  130.  It 
is  held  in  Alabama,  that  the  husband's  assignee 
for  valuable  consideration  is  not  entitled  as 
against  the  wife  to  her  choses  in  action,  unless 
he  reduces  them  to  possession  during  coverture. 
George  v.  Goldsby,  23  Ala.  326;  Arrington  v. 
Yarborough,  1  Jones,  Eq.  72;  but  see  Tuttle  v. 
Fowler,  22  Conn.  58,  and  Marion  v.  Titsworth, 
18  B.  Mon.  582;  Hill  v.  Townsend,  24  Texas, 
575;  2  Kent  (11th  ed.).  138,  139,  notes;  Siter 
v.  Jordan,  4  Rawle,  468;  Meriwether  v.  Booker, 
5  Litt.  256  ;  Pinkard  v.  Smith,  Litt.  Sel.  ('as. 
331;  Houck  v.  Camplin,  25  Miss.  378;  Needles 
v.  Needles,  7  Ohio  St.  432. 

The  wife's  interest  in  reversion  or  remainder 
in  personalty  survives  to  the  husband.  Dade 
v.  Alexander,  1  Wash.  30  ;  Ewing  v.  Handley, 
4  Litt.  346;  Tune  v.  Cooper,  4  Sneed,  296; 
Wade  v.  Boxly,  5  Leigh,  442.  And  in  such 
case  a  previous  conveyance  by  husband  and 
wife  will  clothe  the  assignee  with  a  good  title. 
McCaleb  v.  Crichfield,  5  Heisk.  288. 

A  general  assignment  in  bankruptcy,  or  under 
insolvent  laws,  passes  the  wife's  property,  and 
her  choses  in  action,  but  subject  to  her  right  by 
survivorship;  and  if  the  husband  dies  before 
the  assignees  have  reduced  the  property  to 
possession,  it  will  survive  to  the  wife:  for  the 
assignees  possess  the  same  rights  as  the  hus- 
band before  the  bankruptcy,  and  none  other. 
Van  Epps  v  Van  Deusen,  4  Paige,  64 ;  Out  well 
v.  Van  Winkle,  1  Green  Ch.  516;  Mitford  v. 
Mitford,  9  Sumner's  Ves.  87,  Perkins's  notes  («) 
and  (<•)  ;  Saddington  v.  Kinsman,  1  Bro.  C.  C. 
(Perkins's  ed.)  44,  notes;  Mitchell  v.  Winslow, 
2  Story,  630;  Moore  v.  Moore,  14  B.  Mon.  259; 
Poor  v.  H-izleton,  15  N.  H.  564  ;  Mann  v.  Hig- 
gins,  7  Gill,  265. 


MARRIED    WOMEN. 


*122 


married  woman  had  a  vested  interest  in  possession  in  a  legacy,  and  her 
husband  became  bankrupt  and  died,  it  was  decided  that  the  widow, 
and  not  the  assignee  in  bankruptcy,  was  entitled  to  the  money;  because, 
under  the  bankruptcy,  there  could  not  pass  to  the  assignee  a  larger 
right,  or  better  title,  than  the  husband  himself  had,  which  was  a  right 
to  reduce  the  legacy  into  possession,  but  which  was  not  done  in 
his  lifetime.1  Of  course  the  whole  *  interest  of  the  husband,  at  *122 
the  time  of  the  bankruptcy,  in  the  wife's  chose  in  action,  passes 
under  the  bankruptcy.1  (a) 

It  follows,  therefore,  that  an  assignment  by  the  husband  of  his  wife's 
equitable  chose  in  action  will  neither  have  the  effect  of  depriving  the 
wife  of  her  right  to  it  in  the  event  of  her  surviving  her  husband,  nor  of 
depriving  her  of  her  equitable  right  to  a  settlement  out  of  it,  should 
any  application  for  that  purpose  be  made  by  her  during  the  lifetime  of 
her  husband.2  And  even  the  wife's  concurrence  in  the  assignment  by 
her  husband  during  coverture  (unless  under  the  powers  conferred  by 
the  Act  above  referred  to) 3  will  not  have  the  effect  of  rendering  such 
assignment  valid  against  her  claim  by  survivorship,  in  cases  where  an 
assignment  by  her  husband  alone  would  not  have  had  that  conse- 
quence.4 (b)     Where  the  married  woman  is  an  infant,  the  circumstance 


i  Pierce  v.  Thornely,  2  Sim.  167,  176;  and 
see  Gayner  v.  Wilkinson,  2  Dick.  491 ;  1  Bro. 
C  C.  50,  n. ;  Mitford  v.  Mitford,  9  Ves.  87,  95. 

i  Ripley  v.  Woods,  2  Sim.  165  ;  Duke  v. 
Palmer,  10  Rich.  Eq.  380;  Bugg  o.  Franklin,  4 
Sneed  (Tenn.),  129. 

2  Ante,  p.  89 ;  Bryan  v.  Spruill,  4  Jones,  Eq. 
(N.  C.)  27.  In  Kenny  v.  Udall,  5  John.  Oh. 
464 ;  S.  C.  3  Cowen,  590,  it  was  held,  that  the 
wife's  equity  attached  upon  her  personal  prop- 
erty, whenever  it  was  subject  to  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  Court,  and  was  the  object  of  a  suit, 
in  any  hands  to  which  it  might  come,  or  in 
whatever  manner  it  might  have  been  trans- 
ferred. It  makes  no  difference  whether  the 
application  to  the  Court  for  the  propert^v  be  by 
the  husband,  or  his  representatives  or  assignees, 
or  by  the  wife  or  her  trustee,  seeking  a  provi- 
sion out  of  the  property.  This  equity  is  equally 
binding,  whether  the  transfer  of  the  property 
be  by  operation  of  Law,  under  a  commission  of 
bankruptcy,  or  by  levy  of  an  execution,  or  by 
act  of  the  party  to  general  assignees  or  to  an 
individual,  or  whether  the  particular  transfer 
was  voluntary,  or  made  upon  a  good  and  valu- 
able consideration,  or  in  payment  of  a  just  debt. 
Durr  t>.  Bowyer,  2  M'Cord,  Ch.  (S.  C.)  368; 
Duvall  v  Farmers'  Bank  of  Maryland,  4  Gill 
&  J.  282;  Earl  of  Salisbury  v.  Newton,  1  Eden, 
370;  Bosvil  v.  Brander,  1  P.  Wins.  458;  Lynn 


v.  Bradley,  1  Met.  (Ky.)  232;  Bradley  v.  Mc- 
Kenna,  14  Md.  258. 

In  Davis  v.  Newton,  6  Met.  537,  the  Court 
held,  that  while  an  assignee  of  an  insolvent 
debtor,  under  the  Statute  of  Massachusetts, 
1838,  c.  163,  is  proceeding  to  reduce  the  chases 
in  aetiun  of  the  debtor's  wife  to  possession,  or 
after  he  has  obtained  payment  thereof,  and  be- 
fore distribution  of  the  debtor's  estate,  the  wife 
may  apply  to  the  Court,  by  bill  or  petition,  for 
a  suitable  provision  to  be  made  for  her  out  of 
the  proceeds  of  such  chases  in  action,  and  the 
Court  will  make  such  provision  according  to 
the  circumstances  of  the  case.  See  also  to  the 
same  point,  Mitford  v.  Mitford,  9  Ves.  87,  Per- 
kins's notes;  Pryor  v.  Hill,  4  Bro.  C.  C.  (Per- 
kins's ed.)  143,  note  (a);  Van  Epps  v.  Van 
Deusen,  4  Paige,  64;  Smith  v.  Kane,  2  Paige, 
303;  Steinmetz  v.  H;ilthen,  1  Glyn  &  Jam.  64; 
Elliot  v.  Waring,  5  Monroe,  341;  Saddington  v. 
Kinsman,  1  Bro.  C.  C.  (Perkins's  ed.)  44,  and' 
notes;  Perryclear  v.  Jacobs,  9  Watts,  509; 
Mum  ford  o.  Murray,  1  Paige,  620;  Fry  v.  Fry, 
7  Paige,  462;  Martin  v.  Martin,  1  Hoff.  Ch.  462; 
Burden  v.  Dean,  2  Sumner's  Ves.  607,  note  (a) ; 
Lumb  v.  Milnes,  5  Ves.  517,  note  (b),  and  cases 
cited  ;  Dearin  v.  Fitzpatrick,  1  Meigs,  551. 

8  20  &  21  Vic.  c.  57. 

*  See  Re  Whittingham,  10  Jur.  N.  S.  818*, 
12  W.  R.  775,  V.  C.  W.,  as  to  effect  of  protec- 


(rt)  Marriage  does  not  sever  the  wife's  joint 
tenancy  in  a  chose  in  action  not  reduced  into 
possession  by  her  husband.  In  re  Butler's 
Trusts,  Hughes  v.  Anderson,  38  Ch.  D.  286, 
disapproving  Baillie  v.   Treharne,    17  Ch.    D. 


388.  An  absolute  divorce  changes  their  tenancy 
bv  entireties  to  a  joint  tenancy.  Thornley  v. 
fhomley,  [1893]  2  Ch.  229. 

(b)  See  Prole  v.  Soady,  L.  R.  3  Ch.  220,  L.  J. 
Ld.  Cairns;  Wilkinson  v.  Gibson,  L.  R.  4  Eq.  lti'2, 
119 


*123 


SUITS   BY   PERSONS   WHO    ARE   UNDER   DISABILITY. 


of    her   father   being    party  to    the    deed   will    not    alter    the   wife's 
interest.5 

With  respect  to  the  effect  of  a  release  by  the  husband,  in  depriving 
his  wife  of  her  right  by  survivorship  to  her  choses  in  action,  not  reduced 
into  possession  during  the  coverture,  it  appears  that  he  can  release 
debts  due  to  her  before  marriage;  legacies  absolutely  given  to 
*  123  her; 6  and  interests  accruing  to  her  under  the  *  Statutes  of  Dis- 
tributions, and  the  like; x  and  that  these  acts  might  be  done  by 
him,  although  he  and  his  wife  were  divorced  a  mensa  et  thoro,  because 
the  marriage  still  subsisted.2  (a)  It  seems,  also,  that  where  a  bond,  or  a 
promissory  note,  is  given  to  secure  an  annuity  to  a  single  woman,  and 
she  afterwards  marries,  her  husband  may  release  the  bond  or  note;  and 
if  he  releases  the  security,  there  is  an  end  to  the  annuity.3 

Where,  however,  the  interest  of  the  wife  in  the  chose  i?i  action  is 
reversionary,  the  release  of  the  husband  is  as  inoperative  as  his  assign- 
ment, to  affect  the  wife's  right  by  survivorship.4  It  seems  also  that 
the  assignment  or  release  by  the  husband  during  coverture  of  his  wife's 
annuity,  does  not  prevent  her  right  by  survivorship  to  payments  accru- 
ing after  his  death;  it  being  considered  that  each  successive  payment 
thereof  constitutes  a  separate  reversionary  interest.5 


tion  order,  in  defeating  an  assignment  of  rever- 
sionary interest  which  fell  into  possession  after 
the  order  had  been  obtained.  See,  as  to  the 
effect  of  judicial  separation,  Johnson  v.  Lander, 
L.  R.  7  Eq.  228;  Re  Insole,  35  Beav.  92;  L.  R. 
1  Eq.  470;  11  Jur.  N.  S.  1011,  M.  R.  But  the 
wife's  fraud  will  prevent  her  from  claiming 
her  equity  to  a  settlement  against  a  purchaser. 
In  re  Lush's  Trusts,  L.  R.  4  Ch.  591.  So  fraud 
will  give  a  mortgagee  of  husband  and  wife  a 
preference  over  the  wife  and  others  claiming 
under  a  marriage  settlement.  Sharpe  v.  Foy, 
L.  R.  4  Ch.  35. 

5  Stamper  v.  Barker,  5  Mad.  157,  164. 

6  Gilb.  Eq.  88;  2  Roll.  134;  1  Bright,  H.  & 
W.  72.  SirL.  Shadwell  V.  C.  held,  however,  in 
the  case  of  Harrison  v.  Andrews,  13  Sim.  595, 
that  a  receipt  was  insufficient. 

1  2  Kent  Com.  135-137;  Commonwealth  v. 
Manley,  12  Pick.  175;  Marshall  v.  Lewis,  4 
Litt.  141;  Tentle  v.  Money,  2  J.  J.  Marsh.  82; 
Schuyler  v.  Hoyle,  5  John.  Ch.  196;  Manion  v. 


Tits  worth.  18  B.  Mon.  582;  Lowery  v.  Craig, 
30  Miss.  19 ;  Needles  v.  Needles,  7  Ohio  St.  432. 

2  Stephens  v.  Totty,  Nov,  45;  Cro.  Eliz.  908; 
but  this  cannot  be  done  after  a  dissolution  of 
marriage,  nor  after  a  judicial  separation  or  pro- 
tection order.  Wells  v.  Malbon,  31  Beav.  48; 
8  Jur.  N.  S  249;  Heath  v.  Lewis,  10  Jur.  N.  S. 
1093;  13  W.  R.  128,  V.  C.  S.;  Re  Coward  and 
Adams,  L.  R.  20  Eq.  679,  M.  R.;  Nicholson  r. 
Drury  Estate  Building  Co.  7  Ch.  D.  48,  Fry  J. 

3  Hore  v.  Becher,  12  Sim.  465;  6  Jur.  93. 
See  Shepard  v.  Shepard,  7  John.  Ch.  57.  See 
Widgery  v.  Tepper,  5  Ch.  D.  516;  Fitzgerald  v. 
Fitzgerald,  L.  R.  2  P.  C  83. 

4  Rogers  v.  Acaster.  14  Beav.  445;  see  Terry 
v.  Brunson,  1  Rich.  Ch.  68. 

s  Stiffe  v.  Everitt,  1  M.  &  C.  37,  41 ;  Thomp- 
son v.  Butler,  Moore.  522;  Whitmarsh  v.  Rob- 
ertson, 1  Y.  &  C.  C.  C.  715;  6  Jur.  921;  Whittle 
v.  Henning.  2  Phil.  731;  12  Jur.  1076;  and  see 
Tidd  v.  Lister.  3  De  G.  M.  &  G.  857,  874;  18 
Jur.  543;  10  Hare,  140. 


V.  C.  W.;  Codrington  v.  Lindsay,  L.  R.  8  Ch. 
578,  £81:  S.  C-  nom.  Codrington  r.  Codrington, 
L.  R.  7  H.  L.  854.  Respecting  election  by  mar- 
ried women,  see  Seaton  v.  Seaton,  13  App.  Cas. 
61 ;  Carter  v.  Silber,  [18911  3  Ch.  553 ;  65  L.  T. 
51 ;  Serrell  on  Election,  c.  14;  Hamilton  v.  Ham- 
ilton, [1892]  1  Ch.  396,  holding  that  if  a  mar- 
ried woman  elects  to  avoid  a  covenant,  her 
interests  in  other  property  under  the  settlement 
should  be  impounded  to  compensate  those  who 
lose  by  her  election.  See  also  Re  Queade's 
Trusts,"  54  L.  J.  Ch.  786;  Re  Wheatley,  27  Ch. 

120 


D.  606;  Re  Vardon's  Trusts,  28  Ch.  D.  124;  31 
Ch.  D.  275.  An  infant's  settlement  of  property 
on  her  marriage  is  voidable  at  her  election,  as 
regards  her,  but  not  void.  Duncan  v.  Dixon, 
44  Ch.  D.  211. 

(n)  A  married  woman,  afterobtainingadecree 
of  judicial  separation,  is  a  feme  sole  with  re- 
spect to  property  which  she  acquires,  or  which 
devolves  upon  her  after  such  decree.  Waite  v. 
Morland,  38  Ch.  I).  135.  See  Re  Emery's 
Trusts,  50  L.  T.  197;  Fitzgerald  r.  Chapman, 
1  Ch.  D.  563. 


MARRIED    WOMEN.  *  125 

The  rules  above  laid  down  apply  to  those  interests  of  the  wife  which 
are  of  a  strictly  personal  nature.  In  the  case  of  those  interests  which 
fall  under  the  description  of  chattels  real,  important  distinctions  exist 
with  respect  to  the  effect  of  an  assignment  by  a  husband,  in  barring  his 
wife  of  her  right  in  them  by  survivorship.6 

The  interest  given  by  the  law  to  the  husband  in  the  chattels  real 
which  a  wife  has,  or  may  be  possessed  of  during  marriage,  is  a  qualified 
title,  being  merely  an  interest  in  right  of  his  wife,  with  a  power  of 
alienation  during  coverture; '  so  that,  if  he  does  not  dispose  of  his  wife's 
terms  for  years  or  other  chattels  real  in  his  lifetime,  her  right 
by  survivorship  will  not  be  defeated;  if,  *  however,  he  does  not  *124 
alien  them,  and  he  survives  his  wife,  the  law  gives  them  to  him, 
not  as  representing  the  wife,  but  as  a  marital  right.1 

These  rules  equally  apply  where  the  interest  of  the  wife  in  the 
chattel  is  only  equitable ;  thus,  if  a  term  of  years,  determinable  upon 
lives,  is  assigned  to  trustees  in  trust  for  a  woman  who  marries  and 
dies,  the  trust  of  the  term  survives  to  the  husband  and  he  need  not  take 
out  administration;2  and  if  a  man  assigns  over  the  trust  of  a  term 
which  he  has  in  right  of  his  wife,  this  will  prevail  against  the  wife, 
though  she  survives,3  subject,  however,  to  her  equity  to  a  settlement.4 

A  distinction  has  been  attempted  to  be  drawn5  between  a  term  in 
trust  to  raise  money  for  a  woman,  and  a  trust  of  the  term  itself  for  the 
woman;  but  the  Master  of  the  Rolls  determined  that  no  such  distinc- 
tion could  be  taken.6  It  lias  also  been  held,  that  if  the  wife  has  a 
judgment,  and  the  judgment  debtor's  land  is  extended  upon  an 
eleyit,  the  husband  may  assign  it  without  consideration.  *  So,  *  125 
if  a  judgment  be  given  in  trust  for  a,  feme  sole  who  marries,  and, 
by  consent  of  her  trustees,  is  in  possession  of  the  land  extended,  the 
husband  may  assign  over  the  extended  interest;  and  by  the  same  rea- 
son, if  she  has  a  decree  to  hold  and  enjoy  lands  until  a  debt  due  to  her 
is  paid,  and  she  is  in  possession  of  the  land  under  this  decree  and  mar- 
ries, the  husband  may  assign  it  without  any  consideration,  for  it  is  in 
the  nature  of  an  extent.1  A  husband  may,  as  Ave  have  seen,  assign  his 
wife's  mortgage  for  a  term;  but  if  the  mortgage  be  in  fee,  then  it  seems 
clear  that  the  wife's  right  to  the  debt  by  survivorship  is  not  affected  by 
any  assignment  made  by  the  husband,  or  by  his  bankruptcy,  unless  the 
debt  is  reduced  into  possession  in  his  lifetime.2 

6  On  this  subject,  see  1  Bright,  H.  &  W.  Vern.  7.  18  :  2  Ch.  Cas.  73:  Marshall  v.  Lewis, 
94-111.  4  Liu.  hi  ;  Hunter  v.  Hallett,  1  FAvr.  Ch.  388. 

7  In  a  marginal  abstract,  9  Mod.  104,  it  is  s  Packer  r.  Wyndham,  Prec.  Ch.  412,  418  ; 
said  that  a  wife  being  possessed  of  a  term  of  Sanders  v.  Page,  3  Ch.  Rep.  223;  Pitt  v.  Hunt, 
years,  and  having  married  an  alien,  the  mar-  1  Vern.  18  ;  2  Ch.  Cas.  73  ;  Donne  v.  Hart,  2 
riage  is  not  a  gift  in  law  of  the  term.  R.  &  M.  360,  364 

1  Pale  v.  Michell,  2  Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  138,  pi.  4,  *  Hanson  v.  Keating.  4  Hare,  1. 

n.  (n)-   Earl   of  Bath  v.  Abney,  1   Dick.  263,  5  Walter  v.  Saunders,    1  Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  58, 

arg.,  2  Kent  (11th  ed.),  134.     The  wife's  inter-  pi.  5. 

est  in  a  chattel  real  may  be  as«igned  by  the  «  See  also  Packer  v.  Wyndham,  Prec.  Ch. 

husband.     Meriwether  v.  Booker,  5  Litt.  256.  412,  418. 

-  Pale  v.  Michell,  ubi  supra  ;  and  see  Jew-  i  Lord  Carteret  v.  Paschal!,  3  P.  Wins.  200. 

son  v.  Moulson,  2  Atk.  417,  421;  Bates  t\  Dandy,  2  Burnett    v.    Kinnaston,    2     Vern.     401; 

id    207;  S.   C.  3   Russ.   72,    n.  ;    Incledon   r.  Mitford  v.  Mitford.  9  Ves.  87,  95  ;  Packer  r. 

Nnrthcote,  3  Atk.  430  ;  Sir  E.  Turner's  case,  1  Wyndham,  ubi  supra  >  Purdew  v.  Jackson,  1 

121 


126 


SUITS    BY   PERSONS   WHO    ARE   UNDER   DISABILITY. 


It  is  an  established  principle,  in  deciding  upon  the  effect  of  mort- 
gages, whether  of  the  estate  of  the  wife  or  the  estate  of  tne  husband, 
that  if  the  wife  joins  in  the  conveyance,  either  because  the  estate 
belongs  to  her  or  because  she  has  a  charge  by  way  of  jointure  or  dower 
out  of  the  estate,  and  there  is  a  reservation,  in  the  proviso  for  redemp- 
tion of  the  mortgage,  which  would  carry  the  estate  from  the  person  who 
was  owner  at  the  time  of  executing  the  mortgage,  there  is  a  resulting 
trust  for  the  benefit  of  the  wife,  or  for  the  benefit  of  the  husband, 
according  to  the  circumstances  of  the  case.8  (a) 

Although  the  husband  is  considered  entitled  to  assign  the  trust  of  a 
term  or  other  real  chattel  created  for  the  benefit  of  his  wife,  yet,  where 
a  term  or  chattel  real  has  been  assigned  in  trust  for  a  wife,  with  the 
privity  or  consent  of  her  husband,  then  he  cannot  dispose  of  it.4     A 
fortiori  he  may  not,  if  he  makes  a  lease  or  term  of  years  for  the  benefit 
of  his  wife.5     And  where  a  term  was  raised  out  of  the  wife's  inheri- 
tance,  and  vested  in  trustees  for  purposes  which  were  satisfied,   and 
subject  thereto  for  the  benefit  of  the  wife,  her  executors,  administra- 
tors, and  assigns,  it  was  held  that  the  particular  purpose  being  served 
for  which  the  term  was  raised,  the  trust  did  not  go  to  the  husband,  who 
was  the  administrator  of  the  wife,  but  followed  the  inheritance.6     From 
this  it  may  be  inferred  that  the  assignment  of  the  trust  of  such 
*  126    a  term  by  the  husband  in  the  *  lifetime  of  the  wife  would  not 
affect  the  wife's  interest  in  it  by  survivorship. 
It  seems  that  an  absolute  transfer  or  assignment  by  the  husband  of 
his  wife's  term  of  years,  or  other  chattel  real,  is  not  requisite  to  deprive 
the  wife  of  her  right  by  survivorship;  but  that,  since  an  agreement  to 
do  an  act  is  considered  in  equity  the  same  as  if  the  act  were  done,  so, 
if  the  husband  agrees  or  covenants  to  dispose  of  his  wife's  term  of  years, 
such  covenant  will  be  enforced,  although  he  dies  in  her  lifetime.1 


Russ.  68  ;  Hornier  v.  Morton,  3  Russ.  65  ;  Elli- 
son v.  El  win,  13  Sim.  309 ;  S.  C.  nom.  Elwyn  v. 
Williams,  7  Jur.  337  ;  overruling  Bosvil  v. 
Brander,  1  P.  Wms.  458  ;  Bates  r.  Dandy,  2 
Atk.  207  ;  3  Russ.  72,  n. 

3  Lord  Redesdale,  in  Jackson  v.  Innes,  1 
Bligh,  126  ;  16  Ves.  356  ;  cited  by  Sir  J.  L. 
Knight  Bruce  V.  C.  in  Clark  v.  Burgh,  2  Coll. 
227  ;  9  Jur.  679  ,  and  see  Eddleston  v  Collins, 

3  De  G  M.  &  G.  1,  15 ;  Pigott  v.  Pigott,  L.  R. 

4  Eq.  549,  V.  C.  W. ;  Re  Betton,  L.  R.  12  Eq. 
553.  V.  C.  W.  And  see  Edinondson  v.  Harris, 
2  Tenn.  Ch.  434. 

4  Sir  E.  Turner's  case,  1  Vern.  7  ;  see  also 
Bosvil  ».  Brander,  1  P.  Wms.  458  ;  Pitt  v. 
Hunt,  1  Vern.  18,  where  Lord  Nottingham, 
however,  said,  that  to  prevent  a  husband)  he 
must  be  a  party  to  the  assignment. 

s  Wiche's  case,  Scacc.  Pasc.  8  Jac,  cited  1 
Vern.  7   Ed.  Raithbv,  notis. 


(a)  See  Plomley  v.  Felton,  14  App.  Cas.  61, 
66  ,  Jones  v.  Davies,  8  Ch.  D.  205  ;  Dawson  v. 
122 


6  Best  v.  Stampford,  2  Freem.  288  ;  2 
Vern.  520;  Prec.  Ch.  252.  In  Anon.  9  Mod.  43, 
a  ft  me  covert,  who  was  divorced  a  mensa  tt 
thoro,  and  had  alimony  allowed  to  support  her, 
applied  to  the  Court  to  restrain  her  husband 
from  selling  a  term  of  years  of  which  she  was 
possessed  before  her  marriage  ;  the  Court  at 
first  refused  the  injunction,  because  the  separa- 
tion a  mensa  tt  thorn  did  not  destroy  the  mar- 
riage ;  but  afterwards,  upon  counsel  still  press- 
ing Cor  an  injunction,  in  order  that  the  merits 
of  the  cause  might  come  before  the  Court,  and 
insisting  very  much  upon  the  hardship  of  the 
case,  the  Court  granted  it,  on  the  ground  that, 
though  the  marriage  continues  notwithstanding 
the  divorce,  yet,  under  such  circumstances,  the 
husband  does  nothing  in  his  capacity  of  hus- 
band, nor  the  wife  in  that  of  wife.  This  was 
merely  an  interlocutory  ori'er. 

i  Bates  v.  Dandv,  2  Atk.  207  ;  3  Russ.  72, 


Whitehaven  Bank,  4  Ch.  D.  639;  6  Ch.  D.218; 
Meek  r.  Chamberlain,  8  Q   B.  D.  31. 


MARRIED    WOMEN.  *  127 

The  power  which  the  law  gives  the  husband  to  alien  the  whole  inter- 
est of  his  wife  in  her  chattels  real,  necessarily  authorizes  him  to  dispose 
of  it  in  part;  if,  therefore,  the  husband  is  possessed  of  a  term  of  years 
in  right  of  his  wife  or  jointly  with  her,  and  demises  it  for  a  less  term, 
reserving  rent,  and  dies,  such  demise  or  underlease  will  be  good  against 
her,  although  she  survives  him:  but  the  residue  of  the  original  term 
will  belong  to  her,  as  undisposed  of  by  her  husband.2 

So  also,  if  the  husband  aliens  the  whole  of  the  term  of  which  he  is 
possessed  in  right  of  his  wife,  upon  condition  that  the  grantee  pay  a 
sum  of  money  to  his  executors,  and  then  dies,  and  the  condition  is 
broken,  upon  which  his  executors  enter  upon  the  lands,  this  dis- 
position by  the  husband  will  be  sufficient  to  bar  the  wife  of  *  her  *  127 
interest  in  the  term,  it  having  been  wholly  disposed  of  by  him 
during  his  life,  and  vested  in  the  grantee.1  It  seems,  however,  that  if 
the  condition  had  been  so  framed  that  it  might  have  been  broken  in  the 
husband's  lifetime,  and  he  had  entered  for  the  breach,  and  had  then 
died  before  his  wife,  without  making  any  disposition  of  the  term,  she 
would  be  entitled  to  it  by  survivorship:  because  the  husband,  by 
re-entry  for  a  breach  of  the  condition,  was  returned  to  the  same  right 
and  interest  in  the  term  as  he  was  possessed  of  at  the  time  of  the  grant; 
namely,  in  right  of  his  wife.2 

In  cases  of  assignments  by  the  husband  of  his  wife's  chattels  real, 
the  wife  will  be  equally  barred  of  her  survivorship,  whether  the  assign- 
ment be  for  a  valuable  consideration,  or  without  any  consideration.3  But 
there  is  a  distinction  where  the  disposition  is  of  the  whole  or  part  of 
the  property,  and  where  it  is  only  a  collateral  grant  of  something  out 
of  it:  for  although,  if  a  husband  pledges  a  term  of  years  of  his  wife  for 
a  debt,  and  either  assigns  or  agrees  to  assign  all  or  part  of  such  term  to 
the  creditor,  the  transaction  will  bind  the  wife; 4  yet,  if  the  transaction 
be  collateral  to,  and  does  not  change  the  property  in  the  term,  as  in 
the  grant  of  a  rent  out  of  it,  then,  if  the  wife  survives  the  husband,  her 
right  being  paramount,  and  her  interest  in  the  chattel  not  having  been 
displaced,  she  will  be  entitled  to  the  term,  discharged  from  the  rent.5 

Moreover,  it  has  been  decided,  that  the  husband  cannot  assign  a 
reversionary  interest  of  his  wife's  in  chattels  real,  of  such  a  description 
as  that  it  cannot  by  possibility  vest  during  the  coverture.6  (a) 

n.  ;  see  also  Steed  v.  Cragh,  9  Mod.  43  ;  Shan-  3  Lord  Carteret  v.  Paschal,  3  P.  Wins.  197, 

non  v.  Bradstreet,  1  Seh.  &  Lef.  52  ;  and  see  200  ;  Mitford  v.  Mitford,  9  Ves.  99. 

Caldwell  v.  Fellowes,  L.  R.  9  Eq.  410,  V.  C.  J.  4  Bates  v.  Dandy,  2  Atk.  207;  3  Russ.  72,  n. 

(a  case  of  joint  tenancy) ;  Johnson  v.  Touchet,  s  Co.  Litt.  184  b. 

37  L.  J.  Ch.  25.  6  Duberley  v.  Day,  16  Beav.  33  ;  16  Jnr. 

2  Sym's  case,  Cro.  Eliz.  33  ;    Co.  Litt.  46  b.  581 ;  Rogers  „.  Acaster,  14  Beav.  445  ;  and  see 

1  Co.  Litt.  46  b.  Sale  v.  Saunders,  24  Miss.  24. 

2  See  Watts  v.  Thomas,  2  P.  Wms.  364,  366. 


(n)   In  re  Bellamy,  Elder  v.  Pearson,  25  Ch.  during  the  coverture,  is  no  longer  treated  as  a 

D.  620.  624,  Kay  J.  after  reviewing  the  deci-  mere  possibility  which  is  unassignable,  but  it  is 

sions   said  :  "  Accordingly   I  must  take   it  to  like  any  other  chattel  real  of  the  wife  in  this 

be  settled  that  a  vested  reversionary  interest,  respect  at  least,  namely,  that  the  husband  can 

subject  to  a  life-estate  in  leasehold  property,  assign  it  during  the  coverture,  and  while  it  is 

which  might  by  possibility  come  into  possession  still  reversionary." 

123 


*  128  SUITS   BY   PERSONS   WHO    ARE   UNDER   DISABILITY. 

In  regard  to  the  right  of  the  husband's  executors,  or  his  surviving 
wife,  to  rent  reserved  upon  underleases  of  her  chattels  real,  and  to  the 
arrears  of  rent  due  at  the  husband's  death,  there  is  a  difference  of 
opinion  in  the  books,  which  may  probably  be  reconciled  by  attending  to 
the  manner  in  which  the  rents  were  reserved.  If  the  husband  alone 
grant  an  underlease  of  his  wife's  term  of  years,  reserving  a  rent,  that 
would  be  a  good  demise,  and  bind  the  wife  so  long  as  the  sub-demise 
continued;  the  husband's  executors,  therefore,  would  be  entitled  not 
only  to  the  arrears  due  at  his  death,  but  to  the  subsequently  accruing 
rents;  the  reversion  would,  however,  be  in  the  wife.7  And  it  would 
seem  that  the  principle  of  the  last  case  would  entitle  the  executors,  to 
the  exclusion  of  the  surviving  wife,  to  subsequent  rents  and  all  arrears 
at  the  husband's  death,   although  the  wife  was  a  party  to  the 

*  128    underlease,  provided   the  rent  were  *  reserved  to  the   husband 

only ;  because  the  effect  of  the  sub-demise  and  reservation  was 
an  absolute  disposition,  pro  tanto,  of  the  wife's  original  term,  which 
she  could  not  avoid,  and  the  rent  was  the  sole  and  absolute  property  of 
the  husband.1  But  if,  in  the  last  case,  the  rent  had  been  reserved  by 
the  husband  to  himself  and  wife,  then,  as  their  interests  in  the  term 
granted  and  the  rent  reserved  were  joint  and  entire,  it  is  conceived  that 
the  wife,  upon  surviving  her  husband,  would  be  entitled  to  the  future 
rents,  and  that  she  would  be  equally  entitled  to  the  arrears  of  rent  at 
her  husband's  death;  because  they  remaining  in  action,  and  being  due 
in  respect  of  the  joint  interest  of  the  husband  and  wife  in  the  term, 
would,  with  their  principal  the  term,  survive  to  the  wife.2  It  may 
lastly  be  remarked  that,  by  the  law  of  Scotland,  the  choses  in  action  of 
the  wife  become  the  property  of  the  husband,  without  any  condition  on 
his  part  of  reducing  them  into  possession.  If,  therefore,  an  English 
testator  leaves  a  legacy  to  a  married  woman  domiciled  in  Scotland,  and 
her  husband  dies  before  payment,  the  legacy  is  the  property  of  the  hus- 
band's representatives,  and  not  of  the  widow.  Where,  however  in 
such  a  case,  the  executors  paid  the  legacy  to  the  widow,  in  ignorance  of 
the  law  of  Scotland,  the  payment  to  her  was  held  to  be  good.8 

-  1  Roll.  Abr.  344,  345  ;  Co.  Litt.  46  b.  ;  2  tucky,  even  under  Rev.  Stats,  art.  2,  §  1,  p.  387, 

Lev.  100  ;  3  Keb.  300  ;  1  Brigbt,  H.  &  W.  43-  the  wife  has  not  a  separate  estate  in  the  rents 

47  ;  The  husband's  executors  could  not  distrain:  of  her  lands,  though  she  may  have  an  equity  to 

see  Bac.  Abr.  tit.  Distress  (A)  ; v.  Cooper,  a  settlement  out  of  the  rents,  as  against  her 

2  Wilson,  375  ;  Preece  v.  Corrie,  5  Bing.  24  ;  husband's   vendees.     Smith   v.    Long,    1  Met. 

Pascoe  v.  Pascoe,  3  Bing.  N.  C.  808.  (Kv.)  486.     So  in  Tennessee  the  rents  of  the 

1  The  rents  and  profits  of  a  wife's  real  estate,  wife's  realty  belong  to  the  husband,  and  may  be 

which  accrue  during  coverture,    belong  abso-  subjected  by  his  creditors,   although  the  hus- 

lutely  to  the  husband,  and  do  not  survive  to  the  band's  interest  in  the  land  cannot,  by  statute,  be 

wife  after  his  death.     Clapp  v.  Stoughton,  10  sold  during  coverture  by  virtue  of  any  judgment, 

Pick.   463;    Bennett  v.    Bennett,   34  Ala.   53;  decree,  or  execution   against   him.     Lucas   v. 

Matthews   v.   Copeland,  79   N.  C.  493.     It  is  Rickerrieh,  2  Memph.    L.  J.  86.     But  the  law 

otherwise  with  the  rents  and  profits  of  land  for  has  been  since  changed  by  Statute  of  1879. 

which  husband  and  wife  are  suing  in  right  of  24  Vin.  Abr.  D.  a.  117. 

the  wife  ;  these  rents,  as  well  as  damages  for  3  Leslie  V.  Baillie,  2  Y.  &  C.  C.  C.  91,  95  ; 

waste,  upon  the  husbMnd's  death,  survive  to  the  7  Jur.  77. 
wife.    King  v.  Little,  77  N.  C.  138.    In  Ken- 


124 


♦CHAPTER  IV. 


129 


PERSONS   AGAINST   WHOM    A    SUIT    MAY   BE   INSTITUTED. 

Section  I.  —  Generally. 

Having  pointed  out  the  persons  who  are  capable  of  instituting  suits 
in  Equity,  and  considered  the  peculiarities  of  practice  applicable  to  each 
description  of  parties  complainant,  we  come  now  to  the  consideration 
of  the  persons  against  whom  suits  may  be  commenced  and  carried  on, 
and  the  practice  of  the  Court  as  applicable  to  them. 

A  bill  in  Equity  may  be  exhibited  against  all  bodies  politic  and  cor- 
porate, and  all  other  persons  whatsoever  who  are  in  any  way  interested 
iu  the  subject-matter  in  litigation,1  except  only  the  Sovereign,  the  Queen- 
consort,  and  the  Heir-apparent,  whose  prerogatives  prevent  their  being 
sued  in  their  own  names,  though  they  may  in  certain  cases,  as  we  shall 
see  presently,  be  sued  by  their  respective  Attorneys  or  Solici- 
tors General.2     *But  there  are  some  persons  whose  rights  and     *130 


i  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  68. 

2  In  England  the  King  and  Queen,  though 
they  may  sue,  are  not  liable  to  be  sued;  and  in 
America  a  similar  exemption  generally  belongs 
to  the  Government  or  State.  Story,  Eq.  PI. 
§  69.  This  rule  applies  only  where  the  State  is 
a  part}'  to  the  record,  and  not  where  the  State 
is  only  interested  in  the  subject-matter  of  a  suit 
brought  against  her  officers  in  their  official  capa- 
cit}'  in  a  Court  of  Chancer}'.  Michigan  State 
Bank  v.  Hastings,  1  Douglass,  225;  Osborn  v. 
United  States  Bank,  9  Wheat.  738. 

No  direct  suit  can  be  maintained  against  the 
United  States,  without  the  authority  of  an  Act 
of  Congress,  nor  can  any  direct  judgment  be 
awarded  against  them  for  costs.  Marshall  C. 
J.  in  Cohens  v.  Virginia,  6  Wheat.  411,  412; 
United  States  v.  Clarke,  8  Peters,  444;  United 
States  v.  Barney,  C.  C.  Maryland,  3  Hall,  L. 
J.  128;  United  States  v.  Wells,  2  Wa*h.  C. 
C.  161.  But  if  an  action  be  brought  by  the 
United  States  to  recover  money  in  the  hands  of 
a  party,  he  may,  by  way  of  defence,  set  up  any 
legal  or  equitable  claim  he  has  against  the 
United  States,  and  need  not  in  such  case  be 
turned  round  to  an  application  to  Congress. 
Act  of  Congress,  March  3,  1797,  c.  74,  §§  3, 
4;  United  States  v.  Wilkins.  6  Wheat.  135, 
143;  Walton  v.  United  States,  9  Wheat.  651; 
United  States  v.  McDaniel.  7  Peters,  16;  United 
States  v.  Ringgold,  8  Peters,  163;  United  States 
v.  Clarke,  id.  436;  United  States  v.  Robeson,  9 
Peters,  319  ,  United  States  v.  Hawkins,  10  Peters, 


125 ;  United  States  v.  Bank  of  the  Metropolis, 
15  Peters,  377. 

Without  an  Act  of  Congress,  no  direct  pro- 
ceedings will  lie  at  the  suit  of  an  individual 
against  the  United  States  or  its  property;  and 
no  officer  of  the  Government  can  waive  its 
privileges  in  this  respect,  or  lawfully  consent 
that  such  a  suit  may  be  prosecuted  so  as  to  bind 
the  Government.  Carr  n.  Uniied  States,  98 
U.  S.  433;  S.  C.  19  A.  L.  J.  219.  The  rule  is 
the  same  in  relation  to  the  State  and  its  officers, 
except  in  those  cases  specially  provided  for  by 
the  Constitution  of  the  United  States.  Ex 
parte  Dunn,  8  S.  C.  207;  Owen  v.  State,  7  Neb. 
108;  State  v.  Hill,  54  Ala.  67;  State  v.  Ward, 
9  Heisk.  100;  State  v.  Bank  of  Tennessee,  3 
Baxter,  395.  And,  therefore,  the  Court  of  Chan- 
cery cannot  entertain  a  bill  by  a  public  creditor 
against  the  State  to  compel  a  set-off  of  a  de- 
mand due  to  him  from  the  State  against  an 
independent  demand  which  the  State  holds 
against  him.     Raymond  v.  State,  54  Miss.  562. 

Formerly  one  of  the  United  States  might  be 
sued  by  the  citizens  of  another  State,  or  by 
citizens  or  subjects  of  any  foreign  State.  See 
Chisholm  v.  State  of  Georgia,  2  Dallas,  419. 
The  law  in  this  respect  was,  however,  changed 
by  an  amendment  of  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States,  which  (Art.  XI.  of  the  Amend- 
ments) declares  that  the  judicial  power  of  the 
United  States  shall  not  be  construed  to  extend 
to  any  suit  in  Law  or  Equity,  commenced  or 
prosecuted  against  one  of  the  United  States  by 

125 


*  131         PERSONS    AGAINST   WHOM    A    SUIT   MAY   BE   INSTITUTED. 

interests  are  so  mixed  up  with  those  of  others,  that  a  bill  cannot  be 
brought  against  them,  unless  such  other  persons  are  joined  with  them 
as  co-defendants  ;  and  there  are  other  persons  who,  their  interests  being 
independent,  may  be  sued  alone  upon  the  record,  but  are  incapable,  from 
the  want  of  maturity,  or  the  weakness  of  their  intellectual  faculties,  of 
conducting  their  own  defence,  and  must,  therefore,  apply  for  and  obtain 
the  assistance  of  others  to  do  it  on  their  behalf. 

In  the  first  class  are  included  married  women,  whose  husbands  were 
formerly  to  be  joined  with  them  as  co-defendants  upon  the  record,  — 
unless  they  were  plaintiffs  or  exiles,  or  had  abjured  the  realm,  or  the 
wife  had  been  judicially  separated,  or  had  obtained  a  protection  order,1 
or  leave  to  defend  without  her  husband,2  —  and  persons  who  have  been 
found  idiots  or  lunatics,  whose  committees  must  be  made  co-defendants 
with  the  persons  whose  property  is  intrusted  to  their  care.3 

Under  the  second  head  are  comprised  infants,  and  all  persons  who, 
although  they  have  not  been  found  lunatics,  are  nevertheless  of  such 
weak  intellect  as  to  be  incapable  of  conducting  a  defence  by  themselves ; 
in  both  which  cases  the  Court  will  appoint  guardians,  for  the  purpose  of 
conducting  the  defence  on  their  behalf. 

There  is  another  class  of  persons,  who,  although  they  are  under  no 
personal  disability  which  prevents  their  being  made  amenable  to  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  Court,  yet  from  the  circumstances  of  their  property 
being  vested  in  others,  either  permanently  or  temporarily,  are  not  only 
incapable  of  being  made  defendants  alone,  but  so  long  as  the  disability 
under  which  they  labor  continues,  ought  not,  as  a  general  rule,  to  be 
parties  to  the  record  at  all.  In  this  class  are  included  bankrupts,  out- 
laws, and  persons  attainted  or  convicted  of  treason  or  felony. 

Sectiox  II.  —  The  Queen's  Attorney- General  and  Solicitor- General. 

In  certain  cases  the  Queen's  Attorney-General  may,  as  representing 
the  interests  of  the  Crown,  be  made  a  defendant  to  a  bill  in  Ecpuity  ;  but 
this  is  to  be  understood  as  only  applicable  to  cases  in  which  the  interests 

of  the  Crown  are  incidentally  concerned  ;  for  where  the  rights  of 
*131     the  Crown  are  immediately  in  question,  as  in  cases  in  *  which  the 

Queen  is  in  actual  possession  of  the  property  in  dispute,  or  where 
any  title  is  vested  in  her  which  the  suit  seeks  to  divest,  a  bill  will  not 
in  general  lie,  but  the  party  claiming  relief  must  apply  to  the  Queen 
herself  by  Petition  of  Right.1 

citizens  of  another  State,  or  by  citizens  or  sub-  the  Union.     See  Chisholm  v.  State  of  Georgia, 

jects   of   any   foreign    State.      This  inhibition  2  Dallas,  418.     See  also  Ex  parte  Madrazzo, 

applies  only  to  citizens  or  subjects,  and  does  7  Peters,  627;  ante,  p.  17,  note. 

not  extend  to  suits  by  a  State  or  by  foreign  J  See  ante,  p.  87. 

States  or  Powers.     The   Cherokee   Nation  v.  2  See  R.  S.  C.  XVI.  8,  and  now  45  &  46  Vic. 

Georgia,  5  Peters,  1 ;  New  Jersey  v.  New  York,  c.  75. 

id.   284.     They  retain   the   capacity  to   sue  a  8  Ld.  Red.  30. 

State  as  it  was  originally  granted  by  the  Con-  »  Reeve  v.  Att.-Gen.  2  Atk.    223,  cited  1 

stitution;   and  the  U.   S.   Supreme  Court  has  Ves.  Sr.  446  ;   Ld.  Red.  31,  102;  Ryes  v.  Duke 

original  jurisdiction  in  the  case  of  suits  by  a  of  Wellington,  9  Beav.  579,  600;  see  also  Fel- 

foreign   State  against  one  of  the  members  of  kin  v.  Lord  Herbert,  1  Dr.  &  S.  608;  8  Jur. 

126 


the  queen's  attorney-general.  *  132 

A  Petition  of  Right  to  the  Queen  is  a  document  in  which  the  peti- 
tioner sets  out  his  right,  legal  or  equitable,  to  that  which  is  demanded 
by  him,  and  prays  the  Queen  to  do  him  right  and  justice,  and,  upon  a 
due  and  lawful  trial  of  his  right  and  title,  to  make  him  restitution.  The 
proceeding  by  Petition  of  Right  exists  only  for  the  purpose  of  reconcil- 
ing the  dignity  of  the  Crown  and  the  rights  of  the  subject,  and  to  pro- 
tect the  latter  against  any  injury  arising  from  the  acts  of  the  former; 
but  it  is  no  part  of  its  object  to  enlarge  or  alter  those  rights.2 

The  law  relating  to  Petitions  of  Rights,  and  the  procedure  therein,  is 
amended  and  simplified  by  a  recent  Act  of  Parliament,8  the  object  of 
which  is  to  assimilate  the  proceedings,  as  nearly  as  may  be,  to  the 
practice  in  actions  and  suits  between  subject  and  subject,  and  to  pro- 
vide for  the  recovery  of  costs,  (a)  This  statute  enacts  that  a  Petition  of 
Right  may  be  intituled  in  any  one  of  the  Superior  Courts  of  Common 
Law  or  Equity  at  Westminster,  in  which  the  subject-matter,  or  any 
material  part  thereof,  would  have  been  cognizable  between  subject  and 
subject ;  shall  state  the  Christian  and  surname,  and  usual  place  of 
abode,  of  the  suppliant,  and  of  his  attorney  if  any,  and  set  forth,  with 
convenient  certainty,  the  facts  entitling  him  to  relief ;  be  signed  by  him, 
his  counsel  or  attorney  ;  and  be  then  left  with  the  Home  Secretary  for 
her  Majesty's  fiat  that  right  be  done.4 

The  Act  and  the  General  Order  issued  in  pursuance  thereof 5  also  pro- 
vide that,  upon  such  fiat  being  obtained  to  a  Petition  of  Right  in  Chan- 
cery, the  petition  and  fiat,  together  with  a  printed  copy  thereof,  where  it 
is  in  writing,  shall  be  filed  at  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerk's  office,  and  be 
marked  with  the  name  of  the  Judge  before  whom  it  is  intended  to  be 
prosecuted  ; 6  that  printed  copies  for  service  shall  be  sealed  in  the  same 
manner  as  bills ; 7  that  interrogatories  may  be  filed  and  marked,  and 
served  with  the  petition,  for  the  examination  of  the  respondents, 
other  than  the  *  Attorney-General ; 1  that  a  copy  of  the  petition  #132 
and  fiat  shall  be  left  at  the  office  of  the  Solicitor  to  the  Treasury, 
with  an  indorsement  thereon,  praying  for  a  plea  or  answer  on  behalf  of 
her  Majesty  within  twenty-eight  days ; 2  that  a  copy  of  the  petition, 
allowance,  and  fiat  shall  be  served  upon,  or  left  at  the  last  or  usual  or 
last  known  place  of  abode  of  the  person  in  the  enjoyment  of  the  prop- 

N.  S.  90  ;  and  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  69,  n.,  where  Mr.  2  per  Lor(j  Cottenham,  in  Monckton  v.  Att.- 

Justice  Story  remarks  that,   "in   America  no  Gen.  2  M'N.  &  G.  412. 

such  general  remedy  by  Petition  of  Right  exists  3  23  &  24  Vic.  c.  34. 

against  the  Government ;  or  if  it  exists  at  all,  it  4  Ibid.  §§  1,  2.     For  form  of  petition,  see 

is  a  privilege  created  by  statute  in  a  few  States  ib.  Sched.  No.  1,  and  Vol.  III. 

only.     In  cases  where  the  Government  has  an  5  Ord.l  Feb.,  1862;  7Jur.  N.  S.  Pt.  11.283. 

interest   in  the  subject  as  a  matter  of  public  6  Cons.  Ord.  rr.  1,  2. 

trust,  it  is  presumed  that  the  Attorney-General  ?  Cons.  Ord.  r.  3. 

may  be  made  a  defendant,   as  he  may  be  in  l  Cons.  Ord.  r.  4.     For  form  of  mterroga- 

England."     See  Elliot  v.  Van  Voorst.  3  Wall,  tories,  see  Vol.  Til. 

Jr.  299;  Fifth  Natl.  Bank  v.  Long,  9  Chi.  Leg.  2  Act,  §§  3-5.     For  forms  of  indorsement, 

News,  381,  per  Blodgett  U.  S.  Dist.  J.  see  ib.  Sched.  Nos.  2,  3;  and  Vol.  III. 


(")  Under  this  Act,  as  before,  the  Crown  310;  14  id.  505.  The  Act  was  extended  to 
may  plead  double  to  a  Petition  of  Right  without  Ireland  by  36  &  37  Vic.  c.  69 ;  see  now  44  &  45 
leave  of  Court.      Tobin  v.  Reg.  16  C.  B.  N.  S.      Vic.  c.  59,  §  6;  47  &  48  Vic.  c.  71,  §  3, 

127 


*  133         PERSONS   AGAINST   WHOM   A    SUIT   MAY   BE   INSTITUTED. 

erty  or  right,  indorsed  with  a  notice  requiring  him  to  appear  within 
eight  days,  and  to  plead  or  answer  within  fourteen  days,  after  service  ; 
that  such  person,  if  he  intends  to  contest  the  petition,  must  enter  an 
appearance  to  the  same ; 8  that  further  time  to  plead  or  answer,  or  to 
demur,  may  be  allowed  by  the  Court  or  a  Judge ; 4  that  in  default  of  plea, 
answer,  or  demurrer  in  due  time,  the  Court  or  Judge  may,  on  the  applica- 
cation  of  the  suppliant,  order  the  petition  to  be  taken  as  confessed ; 5 
that  a  decree  may  be  made  thereupon,  or  upon  demurrer,  or  after  hear- 
ing ; 6  that  costs  may  be  recoverable  by  or  against  the  Crown,  the  sup- 
pliant, and  any  other  parties  to  the  proceedings  ; 7  that  the  Judge  shall, 
on  the  application  of  the  suppliant,  certify  to  the  Lords  of  the  Treasury, 
or  to  the  Treasurer  of  the  Household,  any  decree  entitling  the  suppliant 
to  relief,  and  they  may  thereupon  satisfy  him  the  same ; 8  that  persons 
may  sue  and  defend  in  forma  pauperis  ;9  and  generally,  that  the  prac- 
tice and  course  of  proceeding  in  reference  to  suits  shall  be  applicable  to 
Petitions  of  Right,  which  in  this  respect  are  to  be  considered  as  bills  ; 10 
but  the  Act  is  not  to  prevent  any  suppliant  proceeding  as  before  the 
passing  thereof.11 

According  to  the  practice  before  the  passing  of  the  Act,  the  petition 
was  to  be  determined  in  Chancery,  and  the  method  was  this  :  the  peti- 
tion was  presented  to  the  Queen,  who  subscribed  it  with  these  words  : 
"  Soit  droit  fait  al  jmrtie"  that  is,  "Let  right  be  done  to  the  party;" 
and  thereupon  it  was  delivered  to  the  Chancellor,  in  forma  juris  exe- 
quend,  that  is,  to  be  executed  according  to  law ;  and  directions  were  given 
that  the  Attorney-General  should  be  made  a  party  to  the  suit ; 12  upon 
the  petition,  however,  the  Court  would  neither  adjudicate  upon  the 
merits,  nor  inquire  into  the  facts.  The  whole  duty  of  the  Court,  at  that 
stage  of  the  proceedings,  was  to  permit  the  party  to  pursue  the  usual 
course  of  prosecuting  his  suit,  and  for  that  purpose  a  commis- 
*133  sion  was  directed  to  *  issue,  to  inquire  into  the  allegations  of  the 
petition.  The  order  for  the  commission  could  not,  however,  be 
obtained  without  direct  application  to  the  Court,  and  notice  to  the 
Attorney-General.1 

The  case  of  Viscount  Canterbury  v.  Attorney-General,2  was  a  Petition 
of  Right,  in  which  the  petitioner,  Viscount  Canterbury,  claimed  compen- 
sation from  the  Crown  for  damages  alleged  to  have  been  done  in  the 
preceding  reign,  to  some  property  of  the  petitioner,  while  Speaker  of 
the  House  of  Commons,  by  the  fire  which,  in  the  year  1834,  destroyed 
the  two  Houses  of  Parliament.      To  this  petition  a  general  demurrer 

8  For  form   of  appearance,    see    the    Act,  9  Cons.  Ord.  rr.  5,  6. 

Sched.  No.  4;  and  Vol.  III.     No  time  is  lim-  10  Act,  §  7;   Cons.  Ord.  r.  7;   by  r.  8,  the 

ited  for  the  entry  of  an  appearance  on  behalf  of  officers  of  the  Court  are  to  perform  similar  du- 

the  Queen.  ties,  and  the  fees  and  allowances  are  to  be  the 

4  Act,  §§  4,  5.     For  forms  of  pleas,  answers,  same  as  in  suits  between  subjects, 

and  demurrers,  see  Vol.  III.  H  Act,  §  18. 

6  Act,  §  8.  12  Coop.  Eq.  PI.  23;   Ld.  Red.  31;  and  see 

6  Ibid.  §§  8,  9.  Anstey  on  Petitions  of  Right. 

7  Ibid.  §§  11,  12.  i  Re  Robson,  2  Phil.  84. 

8  Act.  §§  13,  14.    For  form  of  certificate,  see  2  1  Phil.  306,  324. 
ib.  Sched.  No.  5;  and  Vol.  III. 

128 


THE   QUEEN  S   ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 


133 


was  filed  by  the  Attorney-General,  and  was  allowed  by  Lord  Lyndhurst ; 
from  whose  judgment  it  would  appear  that  the  Petition  of  Right  is  the 
remedy  which  the  subject  has  for  an  illegal  seizure  on  the  part  of  the 
Crown,  of  lands  or  goods,  but  that  there  is  no  such  form  of  proceeding 
applicable  to  a  case  which,  as  between  subject  and  subject,  would  be  a 
claim  for  unliquidated  damages.3  (a) 

Although,  in  general,  a  bill  cannot  be  filed  against  the  Attorney- 
General  for  the  purpose  of  enforcing  equitable  rights  against  the  direct 
interests  of  the  Crown,  yet,  in  certain  cases,  bills  were  entertained  on 
the  Equity  side  of  the  Court  of  Exchequer,  as  a  Court  of  Revenue, 
against  the  Attorney-General,  as  representing  the  Queen,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  establishing  claims  against  the  estates  or  revenues  of  the  Crown, 
which  in  the  Court  of  Chancery  or  other  Courts  could  not  have  been 
instituted  without  proceeding  in  the  first  instance  by  Petition  of  Right.4 
There  is  another  class  of  suits  against  the  Attorney-General,  which 
were  frequently  instituted  on  the  Equity  side  of  the  Court  of  Exchequer, 
as  a  Court  of  Revenue ;  namely,  suits  for  the  purpose  of  relieving  account- 
ants to  the  Crown  against  the  decisions  of  the  Commissioners  for  Audit- 


3  In  addition  to  the  cases  above  referred  to, 
the  following  are  some  of  the  recently  reported 
cases  of  Petitions  of  Right:  Re  Baron  de  Bode, 
and  Re  Viscount  Canterbury,  2  Phil.  85;  1  C. 
P.  Coop.  temp.  Cott.  143,  where  the  practice  was 


De  G.  &  J.  44;  Re  Holmes,  2  J.  &  H.  527;  8 
Jur.  N.  S.  76;  Tobin  v.  The  Queen,  16  C.  B. 
N.  S.  310,  315;  10  Jur.  N.  S.  1039. 

4  Luthwich   v.    Att.-Gen.,    referred    to    in 
Reeve   v.    Att.-Gen.   2  Atk.  223;    Casberd  v. 


fully  considered  bj' Lord  Cotten ham;  Re  Carl      Att.-Gen.    6  Price,  411;    and   see  5  Vic.  c.  5, 
Von  Frantzius,  2  De  G.  &  J.  126;   Re  Rolt,  i      ante,  p.  5. 


(a)  A  commission  will  not  be  ordered  upon 
a  Petition  of  Right  without  notice  to  the  Attor- 
ney-General. Re  Robson,  2  Phil.  84.  A  Peti- 
tion of  Right,  when  indorsed,  generally  goes  to 
the  Court  of  Chancery,  the  other  Courts  obtain- 
ing jurisdiction  only  by  a  special  indorsement. 
Re  Pering,  2  M.  &  W.  873.  The  Sovereign 
cannot  be  sued  by  a  Petition  of  Right  for  a 
wrong  or  tort,  the  only  remedy  being  to  sue 
the  servant  of  the  Crown  who  commits  it, 
Tobin  v.  Reg.  16  C.  B.  N.  S.  310;  14  id.  505; 
see  Farnell  v.  Bowman,  12  App.  Cas.  G43;  or 
for  infringement  of  letters  patent  by  the  Admi- 
ralty. Feather  v.  Reg.  6  B.  &  S.  257;  see 
Dixon  v.  London  Small  Arms  Co.  1  App.  Cas. 
632.  A  Petition  of  Right  will,  however,  lie  for 
a  breach  of  contract  by  the  Crown,  though 
resulting  in  unliquidated  damages.  The 
Banker's  case,  14  How.  St.  Tr.  1;  Wroth's 
case,  Plow.  452;  Macbeth  v.  Haldemnn,  1  T.  R. 
178;  Feather  v.  Reg.  6  B.  &  S.  294;  Thomas 
v.  Reg.  L.  R.  10  Q.  B.  31 ;  see  De  Bode  v.  Reg. 
3  H.  L.  Cas.  449;  13  Q.  B.  380;  Re  Tufnell,  3 
Ch.  D.  164;  Burnand  v.  Rodocanacbi,  5  C.  P. 
D.  427  ;  7  App.  Cas.  333  ;  Kirk  v.  Reg.  L.  R.  14 
Eq.  558;  Irwin  v.  Grey,  3  F.  &  F.  636,  n; 
Churchward  v.  The  Queen,  L.  R.  1  Q.  B.  173; 
Fnth  v.  The  Queen,  L.  R.  7  Ex.  365;  Tomlme 
v.  The  Queen,  4  Ex.  D.  252;  The  Queen  r. 
vol.  i.  —  9 


Doutre,  9  App.  Cas.  745 ;  Re  Banda,  W.  N. 
(1884)  80;  1  Seton  on  Judgments  (5th  ed.), 
348.  It  is  not  material  whether  the  breach  is 
caused  by  the  acts  or  the  omissions  of  the 
Crown  officials.  Windsor  &  Annapolis  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Reg.  11  App.  Cas.  607.  In  aid  of  a  Petition 
of  Right  the  Crown  may  obtain  a  discovery,  but 
the  suppliant  cannot.  Tomline  v.  Reg.  4  Ex. 
D.  252;  Thomas  v.  Reg.  L.  R.  10  Q.  B.  44; 
Reiner  v.  Salisbury,  2  Ch.  D.  378,  386.  The 
Statute  of  Limitations  cannot  be  pleaded  to  a 
Petition  of  Right.  Rustomjee  v.  Reg.  1  Q.  B. 
D.  487;  2  id.  69.  When,  upon  such  petition, 
it  appears  that  the  Crown  has  had  the  benefit 
of  m  >ney  coming  into  its  hands  for  a  longer  or 
shorter  period,  in  consequence  of  an  intestacy 
or  supposed  intestacy,  it  will  be  held  liable  for 
interest,  whether  the  money  came  to  its  nomi- 
nee as  administrator,  or  under  an  order  declar- 
ing it  beneficially  entitled.  Edgar  v.  Reynolds, 
27  L.  J.  Ch.  562;  Re  Gosman,  42  L.  T.  804. 

In  this  country  a  State  is  a  necessary  party 
to  proceedings  in  Equity  in  which  its  property 
is  sought  to  be  applied  to  payment  of  its  obli- 
gations, and  the  suit  fails  when  it  cannot  be 
sued.  Christian  v.  Atlantic  &  N.  C.  R.  Co. 
133  U.  S.  233;  State  v.  Temple,  134  IT.  S.  22. 
As  to  making  the  Secretary  of  War  a  party, 
see  Hawley  v.  Steele,  6  Ch.  D.  521. 

129 


*  135         PERSONS   AGAINST  WHOM    A    SUIT   MAY   BE   INSTITUTED. 

iug  the  Public  Accounts,  under  the  25  Geo.  III.  c.  52.  It  was  decided, 
before  the  abolition  of  the  equitable  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  of  Ex- 
chequer,5 that  when  public  accountants  had  reason  to  be  dissatisfied 
with  the  determination  of  such  Commissioners,  either  in  disallowing 
their  articles  of  discharge  or  in  imposing  surcharges,  they  might  pro- 
ceed on  the  Equity  side  of  the  Exchequer,  against  the  Attorney-General, 
and  not  against  the  Commissioners ;  and  that  the  proper  mode  of  pro- 
ceeding in  such  cases  was  by  bill  only,  and  not  by  motion  or 
*134  petition.6  It  was  also  held,  that  the  statutes  *  providing  for 
the  relief  of  accountants  to  the  Crown  were  not  confined  to  cases 
where  the  accountant  had  actually  been  sued  or  impeded ;  but  that  he 
might  proceed  immediately,  even  during  the  passing  of  his  accounts,  by 
bill  in  Equity,  as  it  were  quia  timet.1  There  seems  no  reason  to  doubt 
that  accountants  to  the  Crown  are  now  entitled  to  the  same  relief;  and 
it  also  appears  that  the  jurisdiction  in  all  the  above  cases  is  still 
retained  by  the  Court  of  Exchequer,2  but  that  the  Court  of  Chancery 
has  concurrent  jurisdiction.3 

Where  an  accountant  to  the  Crown  seeks  relief  by  means  of  a  bill 
against  the  Attorney-General,  the  Attorney-General  cannot,  if  the 
accountant  is  entitled  to  relief,  protect  himself  by  demurrer  from  mak- 
ing discovery ; 4  and  although  it  does  not  appear  to  have  been  decided 
that  a  bill  of  discovery  can  be  filed  against  the  Attorney-General, 
*135  *  for  a  discovery  of  facts  that  can  be  neither  in  his  personal  nor 
in  his  official  knowledge,  or  that  the  Crown  is  bound,  through  the 
medium  of  the  Attorney-General,  to  make  that  discovery,  yet  it  is  the 
practice  for  the  officers  of  the  Crown  to  throw  no  difficulty  in  the  way 
of  any  proceeding  for  the  purpose  of  bringing  matters  before  a  court  of 
justice,  where  any  real  point  that  required  judicial  decision  occurs. 

In  cases  in  which  the  rights  of  the  Crown  are  not  immediately  con- 
cerned, that  is,  where  the  Crown  is  not  in  possession,  or  a  title  vested 
in  it  is  not  sought  to  be  impeached,  but  its  rights  are  only  incidentally 
involved  in  the  suit,  it  is  the  practice  to  make  the  Queen's  Attorney- 
General  a  party  in  respect  of  those  rights.1     Indeed,  it  seems  that  in 

5  By  5  Vic.  c.  5,  ante,  p.  5.  United   States,  before  a  replication  had  been 

«  Colebrooke    v.   Att.-Gen.    7    Price,    146;  filed,  tor  leave  to  intervene,  not  technically  as 

Crawford  v.  Att.-Gen.  id.  1;   Ex  parte  Cole-  a  party  to  the  suit,  was  allowed,  and  leave  was 

brooke,  id.  87;  Ex  parte  Durrand,  3  Anst.  743;  given  him,  without  becoming  a  party  to  the 

Case  of  York  Buildings  Co.  2  At k.  56.  suit,  to   tile   testimony  and   be  heard  on    the 

1  Colebrooke  v.  Att.-Gen.  ubi  supra.  argument,  but  not  to  interfere  with  the  plead- 

2  Att.-Gen.  v.  Hailing,  15  M.  &  W.  687,  ings  or  evidence  on  behalf  of  either  of  the 
700:  Att.-Gen.  v.  Hullett,  id.  97;  8  Beav.  288,  States.  Florida  v.  Georgia,  17  How.  U.  S. 
n.;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Kingston,  6  Jur.  155,  Ex.  478.     This  course  of  procedure  was   admitted 

3  Att.-Gen.  v.  London,  8  Beav.  270,  285;  1  to  be  at  variance  with  the  English  practice  in 
H.  L.  <"as.  440;  Att.-Gen.  r.  Edmunds,  L.  R.  6  cases  where  the  Government  have  an  interest 
Eq.  381;  and  see  ante,  p.  5  ;  36  &  37  Vic.  c.  in  the  issue  of  the  suit;  but  it  was  adopted  to 
60,  §  34.  obviate  an  objection,  that  seemed  to  arise,  that 

4  Deare  v.  Att.-Gen.  1  Y.  &  C.  Ex.  197,  the  United  States  could  not,  under  the  provi- 
207.  sions  of  the  Constitution,   become  a  party  ir. 

1  Ld.  Red.  30,  102.     In  a  suit  pending  in  the  United  States  Courts,  in  the  legal  sense  of 

the  U.  S.  Supreme  Court,  relative  to  disputed  the  term,  to  a  suit  between  two  States.     The 

boundary  between  two  States,  a  motion  made  other  States  were  held  to  be  concerned  in  the 

by  the    Attornev-General    on    behalf    of    the  adjustment  of  the  boundary  in  dispute,  and 

130 


THE    QUEEN  S    ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 


13G 


all  cases  of  this  description,  in  which  any  right  appears  to  be  in  the 
Crown,  or  the  interest  of  the  Crown  may  be  in  any  way  affected,  the 
Court  will  refuse  to  proceed  without  the  Attorney-General,'2  unless  it  is 
clear  the  result  will  be  for  the  benefit  of  the  Crown,3  or  at  least  that  it 
will  not  be  in  disaffirmance  or  derogation  of  its  interests.4 

Thus,  in  Balch  v.  Wastall,5  and  in  Hay  ward  v.  Fry,6  where,  in  conse- 
quence of  the  outlawry  of  the  defendants,  it  was  held  that  all  the  defend- 
ants' interest  was  forfeited  to  the  Crown,  the  Court  directed  the 
plaintiff  to  obtain  a  grant  of  it  from  the  Exchequer,  *  and  to  make  *136 
the  Attorney-General  a  party  to  the  suit.  In  Burgess  v.  Wheate,1 
Lord  Hardwicke  directed  the  case  to  stand  over,  in  order  that  the  Attor- 
ney-General might  be  made  a  party ;  and  in  Penn  v.  Lord  Baltimore,2 
which  was  a  suit  for  the  execution  of  articles  relating  to  the  boundaries 
of  two  provinces  in  America,  held  under  letters-patent  from  the  King, 
the  cause  was  ordered  to  stand  over  for  the  same  purpose.  In  like  man- 
ner in  Hovenden  v.  Lord  Annesley?  in  which  the  parties  claimed  under 
two  distinct  grants  from  the  Crown,  each  reserving  a  rent,  but  of  dif- 
ferent amounts,  it  was  held  that,  inasmuch  as  the  rights  of  the  Crown 
were  concerned,  the  Attorney-General  ought  to  be  before  the  Court.4 
In  Barclay  v.  Russell?  Lord  Rosslyn  dismissed  the  bill,  because  a  title 
appeared  upon  the  record  to  be  in  the  Crown,  although  no  claim  had  been 
made  on  its  behalf;  and  upon  the  same  principle,  in  Dodder  v.  Bank 
of  England?  Lord  Eldon  refused  to  order  the  dividends  of  stock  pur- 
chased by  the  old  Government  of  Switzerland,  which  had  been  received 


their  interests  are  represented  by  the  United 
States.  Taney  C.  J.  said:  "It.  would  hardly 
become  this  tribunal,  intrusted  with  jurisdic- 
tion where  sovereignties  are  concerned,  and 
with  power  to  prescribe  its  own  mode  of  pro- 
ceeding, to  do  injustice  rather  than  depart  from 
English  precedents.  A  suit  in  a  Court  of  jus- 
tice between  such  parties,  and  upon  such  a 
question,  is  without  example  in  the  jurispru- 
dence of  any  other  country.  It  is  a  new  case, 
and  requires  new  modes  of  proceeding.  And 
if,  as  has  been  urged  in  argument,  the  United 
States  cannot,  under  the  Constitution,  become 
a  party  to  this  suit,  in  the  legal  sense  of  that 
term,  and  the  English  mode  of  proceeding  in 
analogous  cases  is  therefore  impracticable,-  it 
furnishes  a  conclusive  argument  for  adopting 
the  mode  proposed.  For  otherwise  there  must 
be  a  failure  of  justice."  Several  of  the  Judges 
dissented. 

2  By  5  &  G  Vic.  c.  69,  §  2  (repealed  by  46 
&  47  Vic.  c.  49,  §  4,  Sched.;  but  reproduced 
by  R.  S.  C.  188:),  Ord.  XXXVII.  36),  the  Attor- 
ney-General is  to  be  made  a  party  defendant 
in  all  suits  under  that  Act  touching  any  honor 
&c.  in  which  the  Queen  may  have  any  estate 
or  interest.  As  to  the  necessity  of  making  the 
Attorney-General  a  party  in  the  cases  of  aliens, 
felons,  no  heir-at-law,  no  next  of  kin,  lunatics 
and  idiots,  see  ante,  Chap.  II.  §  1;  Calvert  on 


Parties,  388,  et  seq.  See,  where  no  heir-at-law 
can  be  found,  Humbertson  v.  Humbertson,  1 
P.  W.  332.  Burgess  v.  Wheate,  1  Eden,  177; 
Smith  v.  Bicknell,  1  V.  &  B.  51,  53,  note; 
Miller  v.  Warmington,  1  J.  &  W.  484.  And 
where  no  next  of  kin  can  be  found,  Jones  v. 
Goodchild,  3  P.  W.  33;  Middleton  v.  Spicer,  1 
Bro  C.  C.  201.  Where  next  of  kin  of  a  lunatic 
are  unknown,  petition  under  Trustee  Act,  1850, 
should  be  served  on  Attorney-General,  and  not 
on  Solicitor  to  the  Treasurv.  Re  Rourke,  2  De 
G   J.  &  S.  426. 

3  Hovenden  v.   Lord  Annesley,   2  Sch.  & 
Lef.  618. 

,  4  Stafford   v.    Earl   of   Anglesev,    Hardres, 
181. 

5  1  P.  Wins.  445. 

6  lb.  446;  and  see  Rex  r.  Fowler,  Bunb.  38; 

v.  Bromley,  2   P.  Wins.  269;  Bromley  v. 

Smith,  26  Beav.  644,  674.  As  to  felons,  see 
Stokes  v.  Holden,  1  Keen,  145,  147;  Roberts  r. 
Russell,  1  R.  &  M.  752;  lie  Davis,  27  L.  T. 
477. 

i  1  Edon,  177,  181. 
2  1  Ves.  Sr.  444. 
8  2  Sch.  &  Lef.  607. 

4  Sch.  &  Lef.  617. 

5  3  Ves.  424,  436. 

6  10  Ves.  352,  354. 

131 


137 


PERSONS   AGAINST   WHOM    A    SUIT   MAY   BE    INSTITUTED. 


before  the  filing  of  the  bill,  to  be  paid  into  Court  by  the  trustees,  on  the 
application  of  the  new  Government,  which  had  not  been  recognized  by 
the  Government  of  this  country,  until  the  Attorney-General  was  made 
a  party  to  the  suit.  But  although,  in  cases  where  a  title  in  the  Crown 
appears  upon  the  record,  the  Court  will  not  make  a  decree  unless  the 
Attorney-General  be  a  party  to  the  suit,  yet  it  seems  that  the  circum- 
stance of  its  appearing  by  the  record  that  the  plaintiff  has  been  con- 
victed of  manslaughter,  and  that  a  commission  of  attainder  has  been 
issued,  will  not  support  a  plea  for  not  making  the  Attorney-General  a 
party  ;  because  an  inquisition  of  attainder  is  only  to  inform,  and  does 
not  entitle  the  Crown  to  any  right.7  It  seems,  however,  that  in  this 
respect  an  inquisition  of  attainder  differs  from  a  commission  to  inquire 
whether  a  person  under  whom  the  plaintiff  claims  was  an  alien ;  the 
former  being  only  for  the  sake  of  informing  the  Crown,  but  the  latter 
to  entitle.8 

The  necessity  of  making  the  Attorney-General  a  party  is  not  confined 
to  those  cases  in  which  the  interests  of  the  Crown  in  its  own  right  are 
concerned,  but  it  extends  also  to  cases  in  which  the  Queen  is  consid- 
ered as  the  protector  of  the  rights  of  others.  Thus,  as  we  have  seen,9 
the  grantee  of  a  chose  in  action  from  the  Crown  may  either  institute 
proceedings  in  the  name  of  the  Attorney-General,  or  in  his  own  name, 

making  the  Attorney-General  a  defendant  to  the  suit ;  and  so,  in 
*137     suits  in  which  the  *  Crown  may  be  interested  in  its  character  of 

protector  of  the  rights  of  others,  the  Attorney-General  should  be 
made  a  party.  So  the  Attorney-General  is  a  necessary  party  to  all 
suits  where  the  subject-matter  is,  either  wholly  or  in  part,  money  appro- 
priated for  general  charitable  purposes  ;  because  the  Queen,  as  parens 
patriot,  is  supposed  to  superintend  the  administration  of  all  charities, 
and  acts  in  this  behalf  by  her  Attorney-General.1  Where,  however,  a 
legacy  is  given  to  a  charity  already  established,  as  where  it  is  given  to 
the  trustees  of  a  particular  foundation,  or  to  the  treasurer  or  other  officer 
of  some  charitable  institution,  to  become  a  part  of  the  general  funds  of 
such  foundation  or  institution,  the  Attorney-General  need  not  be  a 
party,  because  he  can  have  no  interference  with  the  distribution  of  their 
general  funds.2  And  it  seems  that  there  is  a  distinction  where  trustees 
of  the  charity  are  appointed  by  the  donor,  and  where  no  trustees  are 
appointed,  but  there  is  a  devise  immediately  to  charitable  uses  ;  in  the 
latter  case,  there  can  be  no  decree  unless  the  Attorney-General  be 
made  a  party,  but  it  is  otherwise  where  trustees  are  appointed  by  the 
donor.8 


7  Burk  v.  Brown,  2  Atk.  397. 

8  Ibid. 

9  Ante,  p.  7. 

1  "  The  duty  of  maintaining  the  rights  of 
the  public,  and  of  a  number  of  persons  too 
indefinite  to  vindicate  their  own,  has  vested  in 
the  Commonwealth,  and  is  exercised  in  Massa- 
chusetts, as  in  England,  through  the  Attorney- 
General.  Going  p.  Emory,  16  Pick.  119;  County 
Attorney  v.  May,  5  Cush.  338-340;  Gen.  Stats. 
c.  14,  §  20,  Pub.  Stats,  c.  17,  §  6.    It  is  upon 

132 


this  ground  that,  in  a  suit  instituted  by  the 
trustees  of  a  charity  to  obtain  the  instructions 
of  the  Court,  the  Attorney-General  should  be 
made  a  party  defendant,  as  he  has  been  by 
order  of  the  Court  in  this  case."  Gray  J.  in 
Jackson  v.  Phillips,  14  Allen,  539,  579,  580; 
see  Harvard  College  v.  Society  for  Promoting 
Theological  Education.  3  Gray,  280. 

2  Wellbeloved  v.  Jones,  1  S.  &  S.  40,  43; 
Chitty  p.  Parker,  4  Bro.  C.  C  38. 

8  4  Vin.  500,  pi.  11,  nutis ;  2  Eq.  Cas.  Abr. 


THE    QUEEN'S    ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 


139 


*  The  rule  that,  in  cases  where  a  legacy  is  given  to  the  trustees  *138 
of  a  charity  already  in  existence,  for  the  general  purposes  of  the 
charity,  it  is  not  necessary,  in  a  suit  concerning  it,  to  make  the  Attorney- 
General  a  defendant,  applies  only  to  those  charities  which  are  of  a  per- 
manent nature,  and  whose  objects  are  defined  ;  for  it  has  been  determined 
that  where  legacies  are  given  to  the  officers  of  a  charitable  institution, 
which  is  not  of  a  permanent  nature,  or  whose  objects  are  not  defined,  it 
is  necessary  to  make  the  Attorney-General  a  party  to  a  suit  relating  to 
them.1  Even  in  cases  where  a  legacy  is  given  to  the  trustees  of  a  charity 
already  in  existence,  the  trusts  of  which  are  of  a  permanent  and  definite 
nature,  unless  it  appears,  from  the  terms  of  the  bequest,  that  the  trusts 
upon  which  the  legacy  is  given  are  identical  with  those  upon  which  the 
general  funds  of  the  corporation  are  held,  it  is  necessary  to  make  the 
Attorney-General  a  party.2 

The  Attorney-General  is  a  necessary  *  party  only  where  the     *139 
charity  is  in  the  nature  of  a  general  charity  ;   and  where  it  is 
merely  a  private  charity,  it  will  not  be  necessary  to  bring  him  before 
the  Court.     Thus,  where  the  suit  related  to  a  voluntary  society,  entered 
into  for  the  purpose  of  providing  a  weekly  payment  to  such  of  the  niem- 


167,  pi.  13,  n.  Therefore  where  a  bill  was  filed 
to  establish  a  will  and  to  perform  several  trusts, 
some  of  them  relating  to  charities  in  which  some 
of  the  trustees  were  plaintiffs,  and  other  trus- 
tees and  several  of  the  cestui  que  trusts  were 
defendants,  an  objection,  because  the  Attorney- 
General  was  not  made  a  defendant,  was  over- 
ruled, it  being  considered  that  some  of  the 
trustees  of  the  charity  being  defendants,  there 
might  be  a  decree  to  compel  the  execution  of 
trusts  relating  to  these  charities.  Monil  v. 
Lawson,  4  Vin.  500,  pi.  11;  2  Eq.  Cas.  Abr. 
167,  pi.  13.  It  appears  from  a  subsequent  part 
of  the  case  that  one  of  the  trustees  of  the  charity 
was  abroad.  In  that  case,  it  was  said  that  if 
there  should  be  any  collusion  between  the  par- 
ties relating  to  the  charity,  the  Attorney-Gen- 
eral might,  notwithstanding  a  decree,  bring  an 
information  to  establish  the  charity  and  set 
aside  the  decree,  and  that  he  might  do  the 
same,  though  he  were  made  a  defendant,  in 
case  of  collusion  between  the  parties.  But  it 
seems  that  the  mere  circumstance  of  the  Attor- 
ney-General not  having  been  made  a  party  to 
the  proceeding  will  not  be  a  sufficient  ground 
to  sustain  an  information  for  the  purpose  of 
setting  aside  a  decree  made  in  a  former  suit, 
unless  the  decree  is  impeached  upon  other 
grounds.  Att.-Gen.  v.  Warren,  2  Swanst.  291, 
311. 

1  Thus  in  Wellbeloved  v.  Jones,  1  S.  &  S. 
40,  43,  where  a  legacy  was  given  to  the  officers, 
for  the  time  being,  of  an  academical  institution 
established  at  York  for  the  education  of  dis- 
senting ministers,  which  officers,  with  the  ad- 
dition of  such  other  persons  as  they  should 
choose  (in  case  they  should  think  an  additional 


number  of  trustees  necessary),  were  to  stand 
possessed  of  the  money,  upon  trust,  to  apply 
the  interest  and  dividends  for  the  augmentation 
of  the  salaries  of  dissenting  ministers,  a  prefer- 
ence being  given  to  those  who  should  have  been 
students  in  the  York  institution,  and  in  case 
such  institution  should  cease,  then  upon  trust 
that  the  persons  in  whose  names  the  fund 
should  be  invested,  should  transfer  the  same 
to  the  principal  officers  for  the  time  being  of 
such  other  institution  as  should  succeed  the 
same,  or  be  established  upon  similar  principles, 
a  bill  filed  by  the  officers  of  the  institution, 
praying  to  have  the  fund  transferred  to  them, 
to  which  the  Attorney-General  was  not  a  party, 
was  ordered  to  stand  over,  with  leave  to  amend 
by  making  the  Attorney-General  a  party;  the 
Judge  observing  that  the  Court  could  never 
permit  the  legacy  to  come  into  the  hands  of  the 
plaintiffs,  who  happened  to  fill  particular  offices 
in  the  society,  but  would  take  care  to  secure 
the  objects  of  the  testator  by  the  creation  of  a 
proper  and  permanent  trust,  and  upon  hearing 
the  cause,  would  send  it  to  the  Master  for  that 
purpose;  and  that  it  would  be  one  of  the  duties 
of  the  Attorney-General  to  attend  the  Master 
upon  the  subject. 

2  Corporation  of  the  Sons  of  the  Clergy  v. 
Mose,  9  Sim.  610,  613.  A  bill  in  Equity  for 
the  transfer  of  a  public  charity  to  new  trustees 
may  be  filed  by  the  present  trustees  in  their 
own  names,  making  the  Attorney-General  a 
defendant.  Harvard  College  v.  Society  for  pro- 
moting Theological  Education,  3  Gray,  280; 
Governors  of  Christ's  Hospital  v.  Att  -Gen.  5 
Hare,  257;  see  Jackson  v.  Phillips,  14  Allen, 
539. 

133 


*  140         PERSONS   AGAINST   WHOM    A    SUIT    MAY   BE   INSTITUTED. 

bers  as  should  become  necessitous,  and  their  widows,  the  objection  was 
overruled  that  the  Attorney-General  was  not  a  party  :  because  it  was  in 
the  nature  only  of  a  private  charity.1 

Where  the  Attorney-General  is  made  a  defendant  to  a  suit,  it  is,  it 
seems,  entirely  in  his  discretion  whether  he  will  put  in  a  full  answer  or 
not.2  Formerly,  he  merely  stated,  by  a  general  answer,  that  he  was  a 
stranger  to  the  matter  in  question,  and  that,  on  behalf  of  the  Crown,  he 
claimed  such  rights  and  interests  as  it  should  appear  to  have  therein, 
and  prayed  that  the  Court  would  take  care  of  such  rights  and  interests 
of  the  Crown  in  the  same.8  In  cases,  however,  in  which  the  interests  of 
the  Crown,  or  the  purposes  of  public  justice  require  it,  a  full  answer 
will,  it  seems,  be  put  in  : 4  as  in  Craufurd  v.  The  Attorney- General? 
where  the  Lords  of  the  Treasury  had  directed  that  the  question  might 
be  brought  before  the  consideration  of  a  Court  of  justice,  and  it  would, 
therefore,  have  been  unbecoming  in  the  Attorney-General  to  urge  any 
matter  of  form  which  might  prevent  the  case  from  being  properly  sub- 
mitted to  the  Court  before  which  it  was  brought.6  In  Errington  v.  The 
Attorney- General,''  the  Attorney-General,  being  one  of  the  defendants  to 
a  bill  of  interpleader,  put  in  the  usual  general  answer,  upon  which  the 
other  defendants  moved  that  the  bill  might  be  dismissed,  and  the  injunc- 
tion dissolved;  the  Attorney-General  opposed  the  motion,  and  at  the 
same  time  prayed  that  he  might  be  at  liberty  to  withdraw  his  general 
answer,  and  put  in  another,  insisting  upon  the  particular  right  of  the 
Crown  to  the  money  in  question :  which  was  granted. 

The  answer  of  the  Attorney-General  is  put  in  without  oath,  but  is 
usually  signed  by  him.  And  it  seems  that  such  an  answer  is  not  liable 
to  be  excepted  to,  even  though  it  be  to  a  cross-bill  filed  by  the  defendant 
in  an  information,  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  a  discovery  of  matters 
alleged  to  be  material  to  his  defence  to  the  information.  We  have, 
however,  seen  before  that  where  a  cross-bill  is  filed  against  the  Attorney- 
General,  praying  relief  as  well  as  discovery,  he  cannot  protect  himself 
from  answering  by  means  of  a  demurrer:8  but  whether  he  could, 
*140  by  such  means,  protect  himself  *from  answering  a  mere  bill  of  dis- 
covery, does  not  appear  to  have  been  decided ;  it  is  most  probable 
that  he  might,  and  that  the  Court  would,  in  such  a  case,  if  discovery 
were  wanted  from  the  Crown,  leave  the  party  to  prefer  his  Petition  of 
Right.1 

Under  the  more  recent  practice,  the  usual  course  was  for  the  Attor- 
ney-General to  put  in  no  answer  ;  but  in  cases  of  the  description  above 
mentioned,  it  is  presumed  that  the  proper  course  is  to  file  interrogatories 
for  his  examination,  and  that  he  would  then  put  in  a  full  answer. 

The  right  of  the  Attorney-General  to  receive  his  costs,  where  he  is 
made  a  defendant  to  a  suit,  has  been  before  noticed.2     It  will  suffice, 

1  Anon.  3  Atk.  277.  6  See  also  Deare  v.  Att.-Gen.  1  Y.  &  C.  Ex. 

2  Davison  v.  Att.-Gen.  5  Price,  398,  n.    See      197. 

Stevens  v.  Stevens,  24  N.  J.  Eq.  77,  86.  7  Bunb.  303. 

8  See  Bunb.  303;  1  Hare.  223.  8  Deare  v.  Att.-Gen.  ubi  supra;  ante,p.  134 

*  See  Colebrooke  v.  Att.-Gen.  7  Price,  192.  *  Ibid. 

6  7  Price.  1.  2  Ante,  p.  12. 

134 


FOREIGN   SOVEREIGNS,    STATES,   AND    AMBASSADORS.  *  141 

therefore,  here  to  repeat,  that  he  constantly  receives  his  costs,  where  he 
is  made  a  defendant  in  respect  of  legacies  given  to  charities  ;  and  that  in 
Moggrldge  v.  Thackwell,3  costs  were  given  to  all  parties,  including  the 
Attorney-General,  as  between  solicitor  and  client,  out  of  the  fund  in 
Court.  It  appears  also  that  he  frequently  receives  his  costs  where  he  is 
made  a  defendant  in  respect  of  the  rights  of  the  Crown,  in  cases  of 
intestacy.4  There  is,  however,  no  invariable  practice  of  giving  him  his 
costs  in  all  cases  out  of  the  fund,  the  subject-matter  of  the  suit.5- 

During  the  vacancy  of  the  office  of  Attorney-General,  the  Solicitor- 
General  may  be  made  a  defendant  to  support  the  interests  of  the  Crown ; 8 
and  where  there  has  been  an  information  by  the  Attorney-General,  the 
object  of  which  has  been  to  set  up  a  general  claim  on  behalf  of  the 
Crown,  at  variance  with  the  interests  of  a  public  charity,  the  Solicitor- 
General  has  been  made  defendant,  for  the  purpose  of  supporting  the 
interests  of  such  charity  against  the  general  claim  of  the  Attorney- 
General.  On  the  other  hand,  where  an  information  was  filed  by  the 
Attorney-General,  claiming  certain  property  for  charitable  purposes, 
inconsistent  with  the  rights  of  property  of  the  Crown,  the  Solicitor- 
General  was  made  a  defendant,  as  the  officer  on  whom  the  representa- 
tion of  such  rights  had  devolved.7 

*  Section  III.  —  Foreign  Sovereigns,  States,  and  Ambassadors.     *141 

It  has  before  been  stated  that  a  foreign  Sovereign  or  State,  recognized 
by  this  Government,  may  sue  either  at  Law  or  in  Equity,  in  respect  of 
matters  not  partaking  of  a  political  character; *  and  it  has  been  deter- 
mined, that  if  he  files  a  bill,  a  cross-bill  may  be  filed  against  him, 
because,  by  suing  here,  he  submits  himself  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
Court;  and  in  such  a  case,  if  required,  he  is  bound  to  answer  upon  oath,2 
or,  if  a  body  politic,  to  name  some  person  who  can  give  discovery.8  (a) 

8  7  Ves.  36,  88,  affirmed  by  H.  L.;  see  13  and  it  seems   that    the  Prince  of  Wales,  as 

Ves.  416;  Mills  v.  Farmer,  19  Ves.  483,  490;  Duke  of  Cornwall,  has  the  same  prerogative, 

1  Mer.  55,  104;  Att.-Gen.  v.   Lewis,  8  Beav.  although  no  cases  appear  in  the  books  wherein 

179.  that  point  has  been  decided  or  discussed.     See 

4  Att.-Gen.  v.  Earl  of  Ashburnham,  1  S.  &  ante,  p.  16,  n.  12. 
S.  397 ;  ante,  p.  12;  see  now  18  &  19  Vic.  c.  90,  t  Ante,  p.  17,  and  notes. 

§  1,  as  to  costs  of  Attorney-General  in  revenue  2  Hulle.tt  v.  King  of  Spain,  2  Bligh,  N.  S. 

suits;  and  24  &  25  Vic.  c.  92,  §  1,  in  cases  as  47;  1  Dow  &  CI.  169;  S.  C.  7  Bligh.  N.  S.  359; 

to  succession  duty.     And  see  23  &  24  Vic.  c.  1  CI.  &  Fin.  333;  United  States  v.  Wagner,  L. 

34,  §§  11,  12;  ante,  p.  132.  R.  2  Ch.  582;  Rothschild  v.  Queen  of  Portugal, 

6  Perkins  v.  Bradley,  1  Hare,  219,  234.  3  V.  &  C.  Ex.  594.     The  Court  may  stay  pro- 

6  Ld.  Ked.  102.  ceedings  in  the  original  suit,  until  the  means 

7  Att.-Gen.  v.  Dean  and  Canons  of  Windsor,  of  discovery  are  secured  in  the  cross-suit.  See 
24  Beav.  679;  4  Jur.  N.  S.  818;  8  H.  L.  Cas.  Columbian'Government  v.  Rothschild,  1  Sim. 
369;  6  Jur.  N.  S.  833;  and  see  Att.-Gen.  v.  94;  Prioleau  v.  United  States,  L.  R.  2  F.q.  659; 
Mayor  of  Bristol,  2  J.  &  W.  312;  3  Mad.  319;  S.  C.  nom.  United  States  v.  Prioleau,  12  Jur. 
Att.-Gen.  v.  Ironmongers'  Co.  2  M.  &  K.  578,  n.  N.  S.  724;  United  States  v.  Wagner,  L.  R. 
As  to  obtaining  the  appearance  or  answer  of  3  F.q.  724.  And  it  may  dismiss  the  suit  if  its 
the  Attorney-General,  see  post,  Chap.  VIII.  order  be  not  properly  obeyed.  Republic  of 
§  4;  Chap.  X.  §  2.  The  Queen-consort  must  Liberia  v.  Rove,  1  App.  Cas.  139.  Ante,  p.  19, 
be  sued  by  her  Attorney  or  Solicitor  General,  n.  4;  20,  n.  1. 

in  the  same  manner  as  a  King  or  Queen  regnant;  8  Ibid.;  Republic  of  Costa  Rica  i>.  Erlanger, 


(a)  In  a  suit  against  a  foreign  government,      resident   in   England,  in    Smith  v.  Weguelin, 
substituted  service  was  directed  on  its  minister      W.  N.  (1867)  273.    If  a  suit  is  brought  against 

135 


*  142         PERSONS   AGAINST   WHOM    A   SUIT   MAY   BE   INSTITUTED. 


The  question  whether  a  foreign  Sovereign,  who  has  not  submitted  to 
the  jurisdiction,  can  be  sued  in  the  Courts  of  this  country,  was  raised  in 
Duke  of  Brunswick  v.  The  King  of  Hanover,*  where  the  defendant,  as  a 
subject  of  this  kingdom,  having  renewed  his  allegiance  after  his  acces- 
sion to  the  throne  of  Hanover,  and  exercised  the  rights  of  an  English 
peer,  the  general  object  of  the  suit  was  to  obtain  an  account  of  property 
belonging  to  the  plaintiff,  alleged  to  have  been  possessed  by  the  defend- 
ant, under  color  of  an  instrument  creating  a  species  of  guardianship 
unknown  to  the  law  of  England.  None  of  the  acts  complained  of  took 
place  in  this  country,  or  were  done  by  the  defendant  before  he  became 
King  of  Hanover ;  and  these  acts  appeared  to  be  of  a  political 
*142  character.  *As  it  did  not  appear  that  the  alleged  acts  and  trans- 
actions of  the  defendant  were  of  such  a  description  as  could  ren- 
der him  liable  to  be  sued  in  this  country,  his  demurrer  to  the  bill  was 
allowed.  It  further  appears  from  this  case  that  as  a  Sovereign  prince  is 
prima  facie  entitled  to  special  immunities,  it  ought  to  appear  on  the  bill 
that  the  case  is  not  one  to  which  such  special  immunities  extend.1 

There  have  been  cases  in  which,  the  Court  being  called  upon  to  dis- 
tribute a  fund  in  which  some  foreign  Sovereign  or  State  may  have  had 
an  interest,  it  has  been  thought  expedient  and  proper  to  make  such  Sov- 
ereign or  State  a  party.  The  effect  has  been  to  make  the  suit  perfect  as 
to  parties,  but  as  to  the  Sovereign  made  a  defendant,  the  effect  has  not 
been  to  compel,  or  attempt  to  compel,  hi  in  to  come  in  and  submit  to 
judgment  in  the  ordinary  course,  but  to  give  him  an  opportunity  to  come 
in  and  claim  his  right,  or  establish  his  interest  in  the  subject-matter  of 
the  suit.2  The  Court  may,  however,  administer  the  fund,  although  he 
does  not  come  in ; 3  and  the  agent  of  a  foreign  Government  may  be 


1  Ch.  D.  171;  Republic  of  Peru  v.  Weguelin, 
L.  R.  20  Eq.  140;  Hettihewage  Shnan  Appu 
v.  Queen's  Advocate,  9  App.  Cas.  571,  588. 

4  6  Beav.  1 ;  affirmed  2  H  L.  Cas.  1 ;  and 
see  Wadsworth  v.  Queen  of  Spain,  17  Q.  B. 
171;  Gladstone  v.  Musurus  Bey,  1  H.  &  M. 
495;  9  Jur.  N.  S.  71;  Strousberg  v.  Republic 
of  Costa  Rica,  27  W.  R.  125.  An  English 
Court  has  no  jurisdiction  to  enforce  the  con- 
tracts of  a  foreign  government  in  England. 
Smith  v.  Weguelin,  L.  R.  8.  Eq.  198. 

i  See  6  Bpav.  1,  58. 

2  Ibid.  39.     In  Gladstone  v.  Musurus  Bey, 


1  H.  &.  M.  495,  9  Jur.  N.  S.  71,  the  Sultan 
was  made  a  defendant,  but  did  not  appear. 
If  the  Court  cannot  give  relief  against  the  gov- 
ernment the  suit  fails.  Gladstone  r.  Ottoman 
Bank,  1  H.  &  M.  505;  Lariviere  v.  Morgan, 
W.  N.  (1872)  42,  60;  L.  R.  7  Ch.550;  Foreign 
Bondholders  v.  Pastor,  23  W.  R.  109;  W.N. 
(1874)  204;  Steward  v.  Bank  of  England,  W. 
N.  (1876)263;  Smith  v.  Weguelin,  15  W.  R. 
558;  L.  R.  8  Eq.  198;  W.  N.  (1867)  273;  15 
W.  R.  558. 

3  Morgan  v.  Lariviere,  L.  R.  7  H.  L.  423. 


the  agent  of  a  foreign  power,  and  it  is  admitted 
as  a  defendant  upon  its  own  application  for 
the  purpose  of  releasing  its  property  from  the 
restraint  of  an  injunction,  the  privilege  of  sov- 
ereignty is  not  waived.  Vavasseur  v.  Krupp, 
9  Ch  I).  351.  The  property  of  a  foreign  sover- 
eign cannot  be  reached  by  a  suit  in  rem.  The 
Constitution,  4  P.  D.  39;  TheParlement  Beige, 
5  P.  D.  197.  As  to  the  right  of  a  consul  of  a 
foreign  government  to  intervene  and  claim  a 
vessel  as  its  property,  see  The  Conserva,  38 
Fed.  Rep.  431.  In  The  Charkieh,  L.  R.  4 
Adm.  &  Ecc.  59,  it  was  said  that  a  sovereign 

136 


who  assumes  the  character  of  a  trader,  waives 
his  privilege;  but  this  view  will  not  be  taken 
in  the  Courts  of  the  government  against  which 
the  suit  is  brought.  Troy  &  Greenfield  Rail- 
road v.  Commonwealth,  127  Mass.  43;  United 
States  v.  Clarke,  8  Pet.  436;  Curran  v.  Arkan- 
sas, 15  How.  304;  The  Davis,  10  Wall.  15; 
Carr  v.  United  States,  98  U.  S.  433;  Long  v. 
The  Tampico,  16  Fed.  Rep.  491.  An  assign- 
ment of  a  claim  against  a  foreign  government, 
made  before  it  is  established,  will  be  upheld  in 
Equity.     Peugh  v.  Porter,  112  U.  S.  737. 


CORPORATIONS    AND    JOINT-STOCK   COMPANIES. 


143 


restrained  from  sending  out  of  the  jurisdiction  securities  which  it  had 
been  agreed  should  be  retained  in  the  country.4 

The  Governor  and  Government  of  a  colony  cannot  be  sued  in  England 
upon  a  contract  made  by  their  agent  in  the  name  of  the  Sovereign.5 

An  Ambassador,  authorized  and  received  as  such  by  her  Majesty,  can- 
not be  sued  in  the  Courts  of  England,6  unless  he  is  himself  a  subject  of 
the  Sovereign  to  whom  he  is  accredited  ;  in  which  case  it  seems  he  enjoys 
an  immunity  from  legal  process  extending  only  to  such  things  as  are 
connected  with  his  office  and  ministry.7  (a) 


*  Section  IV.  —  Corporations  and  Joint-Stock    Companies   and 

Partnerships. 


*143 


Corporations  aggregate  are  sued  by  their  corporate  name,  —  that  is, 
their  name  of  foundation  ;  it  seems,  however,  that  if  a  corporation  by 
prescription  be  known  by  a  particular  name,  it  is  sufficient  to  sue  it 
by  that  name.1  But  where  the  commencement  of  it  appears  by  the 
record,  it  cannot  be  sued  by  any  other  name  than  that  under  which  it 
has  been  incorporated.2 

A  corporation  aggregate  which  has  a  head  cannot  be  sued  without  it,3 


4  Foreign  Bondholders  v.  Pastor,  23  W.  R. 
109. 

s  Sloman  v.  New  Zealand,  1  C.  P.  D.  563. 

6  7  Anne,  C.  12  ;  which  Act  professes  to  be, 
and  has  frequently  been  adjudged  to  be,  de- 
claratory, and  in  confirmation  of  the  Common 
Law,  1  B.  &  C  162.  See  as  to  this  statute, 
Service  v.  Castaneda,  2  Coll.  56;  Taylor  v. 
Best,  14  C.  B.  487;  18  Jur.  402;  See  also  Glad- 
stone r.  Musurus  Bey,  ubi  supra,  in  which  V.  C. 
Wood  held  on  this  statute  that  a  foreign  am- 
bassador cannot  be  impleaded  before  an  English 
tribunal.  The  5th  section  of  the  Act  excepts 
the  case  of  a  bankrupt  in  the  service  of  any 
ambassador. 

"  Duke  of  Brunswick  v.  King  of  Hanover, 
6  Beav.  52;  1  Kent,  38,  182. 


(«)  The  privilege  of  an  ambassador  also 
extends  to  immunity  against  all  civil  suits  in  a 
friendly  country  through  which  he  is  passing  to 
the  place  of  his  diplomatic  duties.  Holbrook 
v.  Henderson,  4  Sandf.  (N.  Y.)  619;  Wilson  v. 
Blanco,  4  N.  Y  Sup.  714.  The  immunity  is 
not  personal,  but  is  the  privilege  of  his  gov- 
ernment; hence  his  assent  to  any  infringement 
of  that  privilege  is  immaterial.  United  States 
v.  Benner,  Baldw.  234.  The  privilege  extends 
to  the  domestic  servants  and  the  secretary  and 
attache  of  the  ambassador  who  perform  bona 
fide  and  substantial  services  for  him.  Hopkins 
v.  De  Robeck,  3  T.  R.  79 ;  Parkinson  v.  Potter, 
16  Q.  B.  D.  152;  Ex  parte  Cabrera,  1  Wash. 
232;  United  States  v.  Lafontaine,  4  Cranch, 
C.  C.  173;  United   States   v.  Jeffers,   id.  704; 


1  Ante,  p.  21;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Worcester,  2 
Phil.  3;  1  C.  P.  Coop.  temp.  Cott.  18. 

2  Ibid.  See  ante,  p  21,  note.  But  see  Alex- 
ander v.  Berney,  N.  J.  Eq.  90,  where  an 
adjudication  in  bankruptcy  against  a  corpora- 
tion by  its  original  name,  after  a  legislative 
change  of  name,  was  held  valid. 

s  2  Bac.  Ab.  tit.  Corp.  (E.),  pi.  2.  In 
Daugars  v.  Rivaz,  28  Beav.  233,  249,  6  Jur. 
N.  S.  854,  it  was  held  that  the  corporation  of 
the  French  Protestant  Church  having  become 
divided  into  separate  churches,  and  there  be- 
ing no  public  officer  at  the  head  of  the  corpo- 
ration, the  bill  was  properly  tiled  against  the 
governing  body  of  the  particular  church,  and 
not  against   the   corporation   by   its  corporate 


Respublica  v.  De  Longchamps,  1  Dallas,  117. 
In  Re  Cloete,  65  L.  T.  102;  7  T.  L.  R.  565,  a 
British  subject,  who  was  appointed  honorary 
attache  of  the  Persian  embassy  in  London,  was 
held  not  entitled  to  use  such  appointment  to 
shield  him  from  a  petition  in  bankruptcy,  or 
other  civil  process  relating  to  business  carried 
on  in  London.  But  in  general  a  British  sub- 
ject, so  accredited  by  a  foreign  government, 
is  exempt  from  the  local  jurisdiction  in  the 
absence  of  an  express  condition  that  such  juris- 
diction is  retained.  Macartney  v.  Garbutt, 
24  Q.  B.  D.  368.  An  attache  to  a  foreign  am- 
bassador in  England  is  not  liable  for  rates 
assessed  on  his  private  residence.  Parkinson 
v.  Potter,  16  Q.  B.  D.  152. 

137 


*  145         PERSONS   AGAINST   WHOM    A    SUIT   MAY   BE   INSTITUTED. 


but  it  is  not  necessary  to  mention  the  name  of  the  head.4  It  is  not  in 
general  proper  to  make  individual  members  of  aggregate  corporations 
parties  by  their  proper  Christian  aud  surnames ;  though  individual  mem- 
bers and  officers  of  a  corporation  may  be  made  parties  for  the  purpose 
of  making  them  answerable  for  unauthorized  5  or  illegal 6  acts  which  they 
have  done  in  the  name  of,  or  with  the  sanction  of  the  corporation.7 
*144  In  *  Attorney- General  v.  Wilson,1  a  corporate  body,  suing  both  as 
plaintiff  aud  relator,  sustained  a  suit  against  five  persons,  formerly 
members  of  the  corporation,  in  respect  of  unauthorized  acts  done  by 
them  in  the  name  of  the  corporation.2 

It  has  been  thought  that,  as  a  corporation  can  sue  within  a  foreign 
jurisdiction,  there  is  no  reason  why  it  may  not  be  sued  without  its  juris- 
diction, in  the  same  manner,  and  under  the  same  regulations,  as  domestic 
corporations ; 8  and  accordingly  in  some  States  foreign  corporations  have 
been  held  to  answer  to  actions  in  their  Courts.4 

The  practice  of  making  the  officers  or  servants  of  a  corporation  par- 
ties to  a  suit,  for  the  purpose  of  eliciting  from  them  a  discovery,  upon 
oath,  of  the  matters  charged  in  the  bill,  has  been  too  frequently  acted 
upon  and  acknowledged  to  be  now  a  matter  of  doubt.5  The  first  case 
which  occurs  upon  the  point  is  an  anonymous  one,  in  Vernon,6 
*145  where  a  bill  having  been  filed  against  a  *  corporation  to  discover 
writings,  and  the  defendants  answering  under  their  common  seal, 
and  so,  not  being  sworn,  would  answer  nothing  to  their  prejudice,  it 


4  3  Salk.  103;  1  Leon.  307;  Dummer  v. 
Chippenham,  14  Ves.  245,  254. 

s  Att.-Gen.  v.  Wilson,  C.  &  P.  1,  21. 

6  Betts  v.  De  Vitre,  11  Jur.  N.  S.  9, 11;  34 
L.  J.  Ch.  289. 

t  As  to  obtaining  discovery  from  a  corpora- 
tion, see  post,  p.  145,  note  (a),  and  Chap.  XLII. 
Discovery. 

i  C.  &  P.  1,  21  ;  Angell  &  Ames,  Corp. 
§676. 

2  There  are  cases  in  which  a  bill  in  Equity 
will  lie  against  a  corporation  for  diverting  or 
misapplying  its  funds  or  credit  &c,  by  one  of 
its  members.  Cunliffe  r.  Manchester  and  Bol- 
ton Canal  Co.  1  My.  &  K.  131,  note.  See  ante, 
26,  n.  1,  and  infra,  243,  n.  4.  The  company 
is  a  necessary  party  to  a  bill  by  a  policy-holder 
against  the  officers  of  a  mutual  insurance  com- 
pany, who,  having  funds  to  pay  the  plaintiff's 
loss,  neglected  to  pay  it,  and  fraudulently 
applied  the  funds  to  other  purposes.  Lyman 
v.  Bonney,  101  Mass.  562.  And  see,  as  to 
the  necessity  of  making  corporation  a  party, 
Davenport  c.  Dows,  18  Wall.  626. 

3  Bushel  v.  Commonwealth  Ins.  Co.  15  Serg. 
&R.  176;  Angell  &  Ames,  Corp.  §  402. 

4  Day  v.  Essex  County  Bank,  13  Vt.  97:  St. 
Louis  Perpetual  Ins.  Co.  v.  Cohen,  9  Mo.  422; 
Hadley  o.  Freedman's  Sav.  &  Tr.  Co.  2  Tenn. 
Ch.  122. 

Corporations  created  by  any  other  State, 
having   property   in    Massachusetts,    shall  be 

138 


liable  to  be  sued,  and  their  property  shall  be 
subject  to  attachment,  in  like  maimer  as  resi- 
dents of  other  States  having  property  in  that 
State  are  liable  to  be  sued  and  their  property 
to  be  attached.  Mass.  Gen.  Stats,  c.  68,  §  15; 
Pub.  Stats,  c.  105,  §  28;  Silloway  v.  Columbian 
Ins.  Co.  8  Gray,  199;  see  Libby  r.  Hodgdon,  9 
N.  H.  394;  Moulin  v.  Ins.  Co.  4  Zabrisk.  222; 
Thomas  v.  Merchants'  Bank,  9  Paige,  215; 
Nash  v.  Rector  &c.  of  the  Evangelical  Luth- 
eran Church,  1  Miles,  78;  Peckham  »•  North 
Parish  in  Haverhill,  16  Pick.  274;  Erickson  v. 
Nesmith,  4  Allen.  237. 

But  in  Willistnn  v.  Mich.  Southern  R.  R. 
Co.  13  Allen,  400,  it  was  held  that  no  equitable 
relief  can  be  granted  in  Massachusetts  against 
a  foreign  corporation  which  has  neither  officers 
nor  place  of  business  in  Massachusetts,  for  a 
failure  to  declare  and  pay  dividends  according 
to  the  stipulations  of  their  certificates  of  stock. 
Service  of  the  writ  has  been  made  in  ttijs  case 
only  by  trustee  process,  attaching  funds  in  the 
hands  of  the  debtors  of  the  defendants  in 
Massachusetts.  See  Stephenson  v.  Davis,  56 
Maine,  73. 

s  Ld.  Red.  188,  189. 

6  1  Vern.  117;  but  the  answer  cannot  be 
read  against  the  corporation.  Wych  v.  Meal,  3 
P.  Wms.  310,  312  ;  Gibbons  v.  Waterloo  Bridge 
Co.  1  C.  P.  Coop.  temp.  Cott.  385;  WTadeer 
v.  East  India  Co.  29  Beav.  300;  7  Jur.  N.  S. 
350. 


CORPORATIONS   AND    JOINT-STOCK    COMPANIES. 


145 


was  ordered  that  the  clerk  of  the  company,  and  such  principal  members 
as  the  plaintiff  should  think  tit,  should  answer  on  oath,  and  that  the 
Master  should  settle  the  oath.  In  Glusscott  v.  Copper  Miners'  Com- 
pany,1 where  the  plaintiff  was  sued  at  Law  by  a  body  corporate,  and  tiled 
his  bill  for  discovery  only,  making  the  governor,  deputy-chairman,  one 
of  the  directors,  and  the  secretary  of  the  company  co-defendants  with 
the  company,  a  demurrer  to  the  bill,  objecting  that  an  officer  of  a  cor- 
poration could  not  be  made  a  co-defendant  to  a  bill  which  sought  for 
discovery  only,  or,  at  any  rate,  that  individual  members  could  not  be 
joined  as  defendants  with  the  corporation  at  large,  was  overruled.2  (a) 

Fenton  v.  Hughes,  7  Sumner's  Ves.  287,  Per- 
kins's note  («);  Brumley  v.  Westchester  Co. 
Mauuf.  Co.  1  John.  Ch.  366;  Verniilyea  v.  Ful- 
ton Bank,  1  Paige,  37;  Walker  v.  Hallett.  1 
Ala.  (N.  S.)  379;  Kennebec  and  Portland  R.  R. 
Co.   v.  Portland  and   Kennebec  R.   R.  Co.  54 


i  11  Sim.  305;  see  Att.-Gen.  v.  Mercers' 
Co.  9  W.  R.  83;  Att.-Gen.  v.  East  Dereham 
Corn  Exchange,  5  W.  R.  486 ;  Ranger  v.  Great 
Western  Ry.  Co.  4  De  G.  &  J.  74;  5  Jur.  N.  S. 
1191;  Harvey  v.  Beckwith,  2  H.  &  M.  429; 
Pepper  v.  Green,  ib.  478;  see  also  Moodaley  v. 
Morton,  1  Bro.  C.  C.  469.  Lord  Eldon,  in 
Dummer  v.  Chippenham,  14  Ves.  254,  men- 
tioned it  as  his  opinion  that  the  case  of  Stewart 
v.  East  India  Co.  2  Vern.  380,  in  which  a  de- 
murrer to  a  bill  against  the  company  and  one 
of  its  servants  is  reported  to  have  been  allowed, 
is  a  misprint;  and  that,  instead  of  st  ting  that 
the  demurrer  was  allowed  without  putting  them 
to  answer  as  to  matter  of  fraud  and  contrivance, 
which  is  nonsense,  it  should  have  been  that 
the  demurrer  was  disallowed,  with  liberty  to 
insist  by  their  answer  that  they  should  not  be 
compelled  to  answer  the  charges  of  fraud,  &c.; 
this  case,  however,  appears  to  be  correct^'  re- 
ported. See  M'lntosh  v.  Great  Western  Ry. 
Co.  2  De  G.  &  S  770. 

-  Officers  and  members  of  a  corporation  may 
be  made  parties  to  a  bill  so  far  as  the  bill  seeks 
for  discovery,  though  they  have  no  individual 
interest  in  the  suit,  and  no  relief  can  be  had 
against  them.  Wright  v.  Dame,  1  Met.  237; 
Cartwnght  v.  Hateley,  1  Sumner's  Ves.  293, 
note  (1),  Le  Texier  v.  Margrave,  5  Ves.  322; 


(a)  See  In  re  Alexandria  Palace  Co.  16  Ch. 
D.  58;  Amos  v.  Heme  Bay  Pavilion  Prom- 
enade Co  54  L.  T.  264,-  Colgate  v.  Companie 
Francaise,  23  Fed.  Rep  82,  Hibernia  Ins.  Co. 
v.  St.  Louis  &  N.  O.  Trans.  Co.  10  id.  596; 
Post  v.  Toledo  &c.  Hailroad,  144  Mass.  341; 
Chase  v.  Vanderbilt.  62  N.  Y.  307;  Buckner  r. 
Abrahams,  3  Tenn.  Ch.  346  ;  McCreerj'  v.  Cobb, 
93  Mich.  463;  Virginia  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Hale,  93 
Ala.  542. 

An  officer  of  a  defendant  corporation,  who 
is  not  himself  a  party  to  the  suit,  cannot,  under 
the  Equity  Rules  of  the  U.  S.  Supreme  Court, 
be  required  to  give  discovery.  French  t\  First 
National  Bank,  7  Ben.  488;  Kirbv  v.  Lake 
Shore  Ry.  Co  14  Fed.  Rep.  261.  Nor  can  he 
be  made  a  party  to  a  cross-bill  for  the  purpose 
of  obtain  ng  information  which  was  not  re- 
ceived by   him   as   an   officer  or   stockholder. 


Maine,  173,  184;  see  Garr  v.  Bright,  1  Barb. 
Ch.  157;  Masters  v.  Rossie  Galena  Lead  Mining 
Co.  2  Sandf.  Ch.  301;  Mclntyre  v.  Trustees  of 
Union  College,  6  Paige.  229;  Many  v.  Beekman 
Iron  Co.  9  Paige,  188;  Governor  &  Co.  of  the 
Copper  Mines,  5  Lond.  Jur.  264;  Bevans  v. 
Dmgman'8  Turnpike,  10  Barr,  174;  McKim  v. 
Odom,  3  Bland,  421 ;  United  States  v.  Wagner, 
L.  R.  2  Ch.  587,  588.  Prioleau  v.  United 
States,  L.  R.  2  Eq  667,  668.  The  reason  for 
the  relaxation  of  the  general  rule,  that  a  mere 
witness  cannot  be  made  defendant  in  the  case 
of  a  corporation,  is  that  the  answer  of  a  cor- 
poration is  not  put  in  under  oath,  and  that 
hence  an  answer  is  required  from  some  person 
or  persons  capable  of  making  a  full  discovery, 
as  the  agents  or  the  officers  of  a  corporation. 
Howell  v.  Arkmore,  9  N.  J.  Eq.  92;  Lmdsley 
v.  James,  3  Coldw.  485;  Smith  v.  St.  Louis 
Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.  2  Tenn.  Ch.  599.  Under  the 
Judicature  Act,  the  officers  of  a  corpora'ion 
cannot  be  made  defendants.  Wilson  i\  Church, 
9  Ch.  D.  552. 


McComb  v.  Chicago,  St.  Louis  &c.  R-  Co.  19 
Blatch.  69.  Officers  of  a  corporation  who  make 
an  invalid  contract,  under  which  its  property  is 
retained  by  the  other  party  to  the  contract,  are 
not  necessary  parties  to  its  bill  against  that 
party.  Pioneer  Cold  Mining  Co.  r.  Baker,  20 
Fed.  Rep.  4.  Contra,  if  the  officers  are  guilty  of 
fraud  or  collusion.  Taylor  V.  Holmes,  14  Fed. 
Rep.  498.  The  officers,  when  joined  in  a  suit 
against  the  corporation,  are  not  merely  nominal 
parties.  See  Doyle  v.  San  Diego  Land  &  Town 
Co.  43  Fed.  Rep.  349  ;  Iowa  Barb  Steel  Wire  Co 
v.  Southern  Barbed  Wire  Co.  30  id.  123;  Sed- 
don  v.  Virginia  &e.  Co.  36  id.  6;  Manchester 
Fire  Ass.  Co.  v.  Stockton  C.  H.  &  A.  Works,  38 
id.  378,  Colonial  &  U.  S.  Mortgage  Co.  v.  Hutch- 
inson Mortgage  Co.  44  id.  219.  Discovery  can, 
it  seems,  be  obtained  from  a  stockholder  only 
when  he  has  the  desired  information  and  there 

139 


*  146         PERSONS   AGAINST   WHOM    A    SUIT   MAY   BE   INSTITUTED. 

Where  the  officer  of  the  corporation  from  whom  the  discovery  is 
sought  is  a  mere  witness,  and  the  facts  he  is  required  to  discover  are 
merely  such  as  might  be  proved  by  him  on  his  examination,  he  ought  not 
to  be  made  a  party.  Thus,  where  an  officer  of  the  Bank  of  England  was 
made  a  party,  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  from  him  a  discovery  as  to  the 
times  when  the  stock  in  question  in  the  cause  had  been  transferred, 
*146  and  *  he  demurred  to  the  bill,  the  demurrer  was  allowed  on  the 
ground  that  the  officer  was  in  that  case  merely  a  witness.1 

But  although  it  is  not  an  unusual  practice  to  make  the  clerk  or  other 
principal  officer  of  a  corporation  a  party  to  a  suit  against  such  corpora- 
tion, for  the  purpose  of  eliciting  from  him  a  discovery  of  entries  or 
orders  in  the  books  of  the  corporation,  yet,  where  such  is  not  the  case, 
it  is  still  the  duty  of  the  corporation,  when  informed  by  the  bill  or 
information  of  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  claims  made  upon  it,  if 
required  to  put  in  an  answer,  to  cause  diligent  examination  to  be  made 
before  putting  in  the  answer,  of  all  deeds,  papers,  and  muniments  in 
their  possession  or  power,  and  to  give  in  their  answer  all  the  informa- 
tion derived  from  such  examination ;  and  it  was  said  by  Sir  John 
Leach  M.  B.  that  if  a  corporation  pursue  an  opposite  course,  and  in 
their  answer  allege  their  ignorance  upon  the  subject,  and  the  informa- 
tion required  is  afterwards  obtained  from  the  documents  scheduled  to 
their  answer,  the  Court  will  infer  a  disposition  on  the  part  of  the  cor- 
poration to  obstruct  and  defeat  the  course  of  justice,  and  on  that 
ground  will  charge  them  with  the  costs  of  the  suit.2 

Where  a  suit  is  instituted  against  a  corporation  sole,  he  must  appear 
and  defend,  and  be  proceeded  against  in  the  same  manner  as  if  he  were 
a  private  individual.  But  where  corporations  aggregate  are  sued  in 
their  corporate  capacity,  they  must  appear  by  attorney,  and  answer 
under  the  common  seal  of  the  corporation ; 3  however,  those  of  the  cor- 
poration who  are  charged  as  private  individuals,  must  answer  upon  oath. 

1  How  v.  Best,  5  Mad.  19.     A  mere  witness  Met.  237  ;  Post  v.  Boardman,  10  Paige,  580  ; 

ought  not  to  be  made  a  party  to  a  bill,  although  Norton  v.  Woods,  5  Paige,  251. 
the  plaintiff  may  deem  his  answer  more  satis-  2  Att.-Gen.  v.  Burgesses  of  East  Retford,  2 

factory  than  his  examination.     Story,  Eq.  PI  M.  &  K.  40. 

§ij  234,  Slit,  and  note;  2  Story,  Eq.  Jur.  §  1499;  3  1  Grant  Ch.  Pr.  120;  Brumley  v.  West- 

Wigram,   Discovery  (Am.  ed.),  p.  165,  §  235;  Chester  Manuf.  Society,  1  John.  Ch.  366;  Bait. 

Hare,  65,  68,  73,  76;  Newman  r.  Godfrey,  2  &  Ohio  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Wheeling,  13  Gratt.  40; 

Bro    C.  C.  (Perkins's  ed.)  332;  Howell  V.  Ash-  Fulton   Bank  v.  New  York  and  Sharon  Canal 

more,  9  N.  J.  Eq.  82;  see  Wright  v.  Dame,  1  Co.  1  Paige,  311;  Yermilyea  v.  Fulton  Bank,  1 


is  no  officer  to  make  the  discovery.    Berkeley  v.  Fed.  Rep.  725;  3  McCrary,  405.     The  directors 

Standard  Discount  Co.  13  Ch.  D.  97;  9  id.  643.  of  a  corporation  may  be  joined  as  defendants 

In    such   case  the  corporators  or  stockholders  to  a  bill  against  it  fur  infringing  a  trademark, 

must  at  least  be  named  in  the  bill  as  defendants.  Armstrong  v.  Savannah   Soap  Works,  53  Fed. 

Beecher  v.  Anderson,  45  Mich.  543.     The  fact  Rep.   124.     Upon  allegations  that  certain  de- 

that  an  action  lies  at  law  under  a  statute  to  en-  fendants  are  using  a  defendant  corporation  as  a 

force  contribution  for  corporate  obligations  from  means  of  infringing  the  plaintiff's  trademark, 

a  stockholder  does  not  preclude  a  bill  in  Equity  and  that  they  are  substantially  the  corporation, 

for    a  discovery,  accounting,   and  contribution  they  are  properly  joined  as  defendants.     Cali- 

against  all  the  resident  stockholders,  who  must  fornia  Fig  Syrup  Co.  v.  Improved  Fig  Syrup 

themselves  look  to  non-resident  stockholders  for  Co.  51  Fed.  Rep.  296. 
further  contribution.     Holmes  v.  Sherwood,  16 

140 


CORPORATIONS    AND    JOINT-STOCK    COMPANIES.  *  147 

If  the  majority  of  the  members  of  a  corporation  are  ready  to  put  in 
their  answer,  and  the  head  or  other  person  who  has  the  custody  of  the 
common  seal  refuses  to  affix  it,  application  must  be  made  to  the  Court  of 
Queen's  Bench  for  a  mandamus' to  compel  him,  and  in  the  mean  time  the 
Court  of  Chancery  will  stay  the  process  against  the  corporation.4 

*  It  may  be  here  stated,  that  by  the  7  Will.  IV.  and  1  Vic.  c.  73,     *147 
her  Majesty  is  enabled  to  grant  letters-patent  constituting  com- 
panies, and  providing  that  the  company  thereby  constituted  shall  be  sued 
by  one  of  the  public  officers  of  the  company  appointed  for  that  purpose.1 

By  the  Companies  Act,  1862,  every  company  constituted  under  that 
Act  is,  upon  certificate  of  incorporation,  constituted  a  body  corporate, 
by  the  name  prescribed  in  the  memorandum  of  association,  and  capable 
forthwith  of  exercising  all  the  functions  of  an  incorporated  company, 
and  having  perpetual  succession  and  a  common  seal.2  (a) 

The  Bank  of  England  was  formerly  a  necessary  party  to  a  suit  relat- 
ing to  any  stock  standing  in  its  books,  either  for  the  purpose  of  com- 
pelling or  authorizing  it  to  suffer,  or  of  restraining  it  by  injunction  from 
permitting,  a  transfer  of  such  stock  ;  but  now,  the  Court  has  power  to 
make  an  order  to  such  effect,  although  the  bank  is  not  made  a  party ; 3 
and  if  the  bank  is  made  a  party  in  such  a  case,  the  plaintiff  will  be 
ordered  to  pay  the  costs  occasioned  thereby.4  Before  the  Court  will 
make  an  order  on  the  bank  in  these  cases,  a  certificate  signed  by  their 
accountant  that  the  fund  in  question  is  standing  in  the  name  of  the  party, 
or  of  the  person  of  whom  he  is  the  representative,  must  be  produced  ; 
and  the  bank  is  required  to  deliver  this  certificate  to  the  solicitor  of  the 
party  applying.5 

Where  money  in  the  public  funds,  or  the  stock  of  any  company,  is  the 

Paige,  37 ;  Ransom  v.  Stonington  Savings  Bank,  165,  V.  C.  W. ;  11  Jur.  N.  S.  9 ;  and  for  form  of 

13  N.  J.  Eq.  212;  Cooper's  Eq.  PI.  325;  Story,  order  therein,  see  ib.  217.     As  to  the  process 

Eq.  PI.  §  874-  3  Hoff.  Ch.  Pr.  239.     They  may  for  compelling  the  appearance  or  answer  of  a 

make  and  adopt  any  seal  pro  hac  vice.    Ransom  corporation,    see  post,    Chap.   VIII.  §   4,   and 

v.  Stonington  Savings  Bank,  supi-a  ;  Mill-dam  Chap.  X.  §  2. 

Foundry  v.  Hovey,  21  Pick.   417;    Hendee  v.  3  39  &  40  Geo.  III.  c.  36.     Where  the  bank 

Pinkerton,    14   Allen,  381.     The  answer   of  a  has  an  interest,  or  discovery  from  it  is  sought,  it 

corporation  should  be  signed   by  the  president.  must  be  made  a  party,  see  §  2;  and  see  Temple 

It  is  usual  for  the  secretary  or  cashier  to  sign  v.  Bank  of  Kngland,  6  Ves.  770,  772;   Edridge 

it  also.    1  Barb.  Ch.  Pr.   156;  L.  R.  6  C.  B.  v.  Edridge,  3  Mad.  386;  Perkins  r.  Bradley,  1 

411.  Hare,  219,232;  Hammond  v.  Neame,  1  Swanst. 

4  Rex  v.  Wyndham,  Cowp.  377;  2  Bac.  Ab.  35,  38;   Ross  v.  Shearer,  5  Mad.  458;  Gould  r. 

tit  Corp.  (E.)  2.  Kemp,  2  M.  &  K.  304,  311 ;  Gladstone  v.  Musu- 

1  See  ante,  p.  25.  rus  Bey,  1  H.  &  M.  495;  9  Jur.  N.  S.  71. 

2  25  &  26  Vic.  c.  89,  §  18;  and  see  ante,  4  Edridge  v.  Edridge,  ubi  supra ;  Perkins  v. 
p.  26.     As  to  the  personal  liability  to  costs  of  Bradley,  vbimpra. 

the  directors  of  a  limited  company,  sued  with  «  39  &  40  Geo.  HI.  c.  36,  §§  1,  2. 

the  company,  see  Betts   v.  De  Vitre,  5  N.  R. 


(a)  As  to   suing   in    England,   in   the   firm  ris,  10  Q.  B.  D.  436;  Alden  n.  Berkley,  25  Q. 

name,  members  of  a  firm  apparently  consisting  B.  I).  543;  Russell  v.  Cambefort,  23  Q.  B.  D. 

of  two  or  more  persons,  and  discovery  as  to  such  526.     Service  on  one  member  of  a  foreign  firm 

firms  composition,  see  R.  S.  C.  Old  XVI.  10,  within  the  jurisdiction  is  good  service  on  all 

14  (Ord.  June,  1876,  r.  8);    id.  XXXI.  20,  21;  the  partners,   even  when  they  all  reside  and 

Piker.  Frank,  W.N.  (1876)  36;  24  W.  R.322;  are  domiciled  out  of  the  jurisdiction.    Shepherd 

Ex  parte  Blain,  Re  Sawers,  12  Ch.  D.  522,  533:  v.  Hirsch,  45  Ch.  D.  231.     See  furth.  r,  infra, 

Ex  parte  Young,  19  Ch.  D.  124;  Davis  v.  Mor-  p.  149,  n.  (6). 

141 


149 


PERSONS    AGAINST    WHOM    A    SUIT    MAY    BE    INSTITUTED. 


subject  of  dispute  between  two  parties,  the  bank  or  company,  if  they 
desire  to  apply  to  the  Court  of  Chancery  for  protection,  should  do  so  by 
filing  a  bill  of  interpleader.6 

The  Bank  of  England  is  not  bound  to  take  notice  of  any  trust 
*148  affecting  public  stock  standing  in  their  *  books  :  all  that  they  have 
to  do  is  to  look  to  the  legal  estate  ;  and  therefore,  if  the  person 
entitled  to  the  legal  estate  applies  for  a  transfer  to  himself,  the  bank 
must  permit  the  transfer,  and  are  not  bound  to  look  further  to  see 
whether  the  stock  is  trust  stock.1  And  the  interest  of  any  stockholder 
dying  is  transferable  by  his  executors  or  administrators,  notwithstand- 
ing any  specific  bequest  thereof.2  There  are  certain  means  provided  by 
statute,8  by  which,  upon  summary  application,  orders  may  be  obtained 
restraining,  for  a  limited  period,  the  transfer  of  stock  or  the  payment  of 
dividends.  For  the  practice  on  those  points  the  reader  is  referred  to  the 
chapter  on  Orders  in  the  Nature  of  Injunctions.4 


*149     *  Section  V.  —  Persons  out  of  the  Jurisdiction  of  the  Court. 

Where  a  suit  affects  the  rights  of  persons  out  of  the  jurisdiction, 
the  Court  will  in  some  cases,  where  there  are  other  parties  concerned, 
proceed  against  those  other  parties  ;  and  if  the  absent  persons  are  merely 
passive  objects  of  the  judgment  of  the  Court,  or  their  rights  are  inciden- 
tal to  those  of  the  parties  before  the  Court,  a  complete  determination  may 
be  obtained  without  them.1     Thus,  in  Attorney-General  at  the  relation 


6  Birch  v.  Corbin,  1  Cox,  144;  Mills  v. 
Townsend,  109  Mass.  115;  State  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Gennett,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  82.  With  respect  to  the 
right  of  the  Bank  of  England  to  apply  to  a 
Court  of  Equity  to  restrain  any  action  brought 
against  it  by  an  executor  or  other  person  hav- 
ing a  legal  right  to  call  for  a  transfer  of  funds, 
see  Bank  of  England  v.  Lunn,  15  Yes.  569  577, 
and  the  cases  there  cited;  Cochrane  v.  O'Brien, 
2  Jo.  &  Lat.  380;  Desborough  v.  Harris,  5  De 
G.  M.  &  G.  439;  1  Jur.  N.  S.  986. 

1  See  Eisher  v.  Essex  Bank,  5  Gray,  373, 
377,  378.  Memphis  Appeal  Pub.  Co.  v.  Pike, 
9  lkisk.  697;  State  Ins.  Co.  v.  Sax,  2  Tenn.  Ch. 
507. 

'■*  The  National  Debt  Act,  1870  (33  &  34  Vic. 
c.  71 ),  §  23;  Bank  of  England  v.  Moffat,  3  Bro. 
C.  C  260;  5  Ves.  668,  and  note;  and  see  Bank 
of  England  v.  Parsons,  5  Yes.  665;  Hartga  v. 
Bank  of  England,  3  Ves.  55,  58.  By  1  &  2 
Geo.  I.  c.  19.  §  90.  by  which  the  management 
of  the  public  stocks  or  annuities  was  first 
given  to  the  governor  and  company  of  the 
Bank  of  England,  the  stock  created  by  that 
Act  was  declared  to  be  personal  estate;  and  it 
was  provided  that  any  person  possessed  of  such 
stock  or  annuities  might  devise  the  same  by 
will  in  writing,  attested  by  two  or  more  credible 
witnesses.  These  clauses  were  repeated  in  all 
subsequent  Acts  creating  stocks  of  this  nature, 


and  gave  rise  to  considerable  discussion  as  to 
whether  the  bank  were  bound  to  take  notice  of 
a  specific  devise  of  stock,  attested  by  two  wit- 
nesses, and  registered  according  to  the  provi- 
sions of  the  Acts,  and  whether  they  were 
justified  in  resisting  a  claim  to  such  stock  set 
up  by  the  executor.  Pearson  v.  Bank  of  Eng- 
land^ 2  Bro.  C.  C.  529;  2  Cox,  175;  Bank  of 
England  v.  Parsons,  ubi  supra  ;  Austin  v.  Bank 
of  England,  8  Ves.  522;  Bank  of  England  v. 
Lunn,  15  Ves  569 ;  Franklin  v.  Bank  of  England, 
1  Russ.  575,  582  ;  and  see  Franklin  v.  Bank  of 
England,  9  B.  &  C.  156;  Wins.  Exors.  p.  725. 
But  by  the  8  &  9  Vic.  c.  97  it  is  enacted 
that  all  shaves  of  public  stock  standing  in  the 
name  of  any  deceased  person  may  be  transferred 
by  the  executors,  notwithstanding  any  specific 
bequest  of  the  stock  so  to  be  transferred. 

3  5  Vic.  c.  5.  §§  4-6;  Cons.  Ord.  XXVII. j 
R.  S.  C.  Ord.  XLVI.  2a,  3-11  (Ord.  Apr.,  1880, 
rr.  21-30). 

4  See  post,  Chap.  XXXVII. 

i  Ld.  Red.  31.  32;  and  see  Powell  v.  Wright, 
7  Beav.  444,  450;  Fell  v.  Brown,  2  Bro.  C  C. 
(Perkins's  ed.)  276,  and  notes;  Lucas  v  Bank 
of  Oarien,  2  Stewart,  280;  Joy  v.  Wirtz,  1 
Wash.  C.  C.  517;  Erickson  v.  Nesmith,  46  N. 
H.  371.  The  general  rule  is  stated  in  Lawrence 
v.  Rokes,  53  Maine,  110;  see  Vose  v.  Pliilbrook, 
3  Story,  347  ;  Van  Reimsdyke  v  Kane,  1  Gall 


PERSONS    OUT   OF   THE   JURISDICTION    OF   THE   COURT. 


149 


of  the  University  of  Glasgow  v.  Bal'iol  College?  which  was  an  informa- 
tion filed  to  impeach  a  decree  made  in  1699,  on  a  former  information3 


3?1;  Bailey  r.  Inglee,  2  Paige,  278  If  the  ab- 
sent party  is  so  concerned  in  the  subject-matter 
that  a  decree  between  the  immediate  litigants 
cannot  be  made  without  seriouslv  affecting  his 
rights,  the  Court  will  refrain  from  proceeding 
further.  Cassidy  v.  Shimmin,  122  Mass.  406  ; 
McPike  v.  Wells,  54  Miss.  136 ;  Hill  v.  Proctor, 
10  W  Va.  59;  Mudgett  v.  Gager,  52  Maine, 
541.  "This  ground  of  exception,"  says  Mr. 
Justice  Story,  "is  peculiarly  applicable  to  suits 
in  Equity  in  the  Courts  of  the  United  States, 
which  suits  can  be  maintained  in  general  only 
by  and  against  citizens  of  different  States.  If, 
therefore,  the  rule  as  to  parties  were  of  univer- 
sal operation,  many  suits  in  those  Courts  would 
be  incapable  of  being  sustained  therein,  because 
all  the  proper  and  necessary  parties  might  not 
be  citizens  of  different  States;  so  that  the  juris- 
diction of  the  Court  would  be  ousted  by  any 
attempt  to  join  them.  On  this  account  it  is  a 
general  rule  in  the  Courts  of  the  United  States 
to  dispense,  if  consistently  with  the  merits  of 
the  case  it  can  possibly  be  done,  with  all  parties 
over  whom  the  Court  would  not  possess  juris- 
diction." West  v.  Randall,  2  Mason,  196; 
Russell  v.  Clarke,  7  Cranch,  69,  98;  Milligan  o. 
Milledge,  3  Cranch,  220  ;  Simms  v.  Guthrie,  9 
Cranch,  19,29;  Elmendorf  v.  Taylor,  10  Wheat. 
152  ;  Mallow  v.  Hinde,  12  Wheat.  193;  Hard- 
ing v.  Handy,  11  Wheat.  103;  Ward  v.  Arre- 
dondo,  1  Paine,  C.  C.  413,  41-1.  See  the  Act  of 
Congress  on  this  subject,  passed  Feb.  28,  1839, 
c.  36,  §  1,  and  now  Rev.  Stats.  §  737,  et  seq.,  by 
which  an  important  alteration  has  been  effected. 
If  the  person  not  before  the  Court  be  indispen- 
sable, the  jurisdiction  fails,  notwithstanding  the 
Act  of  Congress.    Coiron  v.  Millaudon,  19  How. 


(a)  See  also  infra,  p.  190,  note;  Equity  Rule 
47;  Payne  v.  Hook,  7  Wall.  425;  Robertson  v. 
Carson,  19  Wall.  105;  Gregory  v.  Stetson,  133 
U.  S.  579;  affirming  Gregory  v.  Swift,  39  Fed. 
Rep.  708;  Goodman  v.  Niblack,  102  U.  S.  560; 
Kendig  v.  Dean,  97  U.  S.  423;  Pond  v.  Sib- 
Icy.  19  Blatch.  198;  Florence  S.  M.  Co.  v. 
Singer  Manuf.  Co.  8  id.  113;  Morgan  v.  Rail- 
way Co.  21  id.  134;  Brigham  v.  Luddington,  12 
ill.  237;  Young  v.  Cushing,  4  Biss.  456;  Parsons 
B  Howard,  2  Woods,  1;  Black  t\  Scott,  9  Fed. 
Rep.  186;  Shainwald  v.  Lewis,  5  id.  510;  Haz- 
ard v.  Durant,  19  id.  471;  Carters.  New  Orleans, 
id.  659;  Goldsmith  v.  Gilliland,  24  id.  157;  Bell 
v.  Donohue,  17  id.  710;  Gross  v.  George  W. 
Scott  Manuf.  Co.  48  id.  35;  Martin  v.  Mever, 
45  id.  435.  See  also  U.  S.  Rev.  Stats.  §  738; 
18  Stats,  at  Large,  470,  §  8;  24  id.  552,  §  5; 
American  F.  L.  M.  Co.  v.  Benson,  33  Fed.  Rep. 
456;  Carpenter  v.  Talbot,  id.  537;  Mercantile 


113;  Williams  v.  Bankhead,  19  Wall.  563.  See 
Ober  v.  Gallagher,  93  U.  S.  199  ;  Parsons  v. 
Howard,  2  Woods,  1;  Kilgour  v.  New  Orleans 
Gas  Light  Co.  2  Woods,  144;  Bronson  v. 
Keokuk,  2  Dill   498.  (a) 

But  a  decree  cannot  be  made  against  a  defend- 
ant personally  who  has  never  been  an  inhabitant 
of  the  State,  or  served  with  process  in  it.  Moody 
v.  Gay,  15  Gray,  457;  Spurr  v.  Scoville,  3Cush. 
578.  See,  now,  Pennoyer  v.  Neff,  95  U.  S.  714. 
See  also  Moore  v.  Gennett,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  375 ; 
McEwen  v.  Zimmer,  Sup.  Crt.  Mich.  18  Law 
Reg  92. 

A  bill  alleging  that  three  of  the  four  defend- 
ants were  not  inhabitants  of  the  State,  will,  on 
demurrer,  be  dismissed  as  to  them,  when  no 
service  has  been  made  on  them.  Stephenson 
v.  Davis,  56  Maine,  73.  The  only  service  made 
in  this  case  upon  the  parties  demurring  was  an 
attachment  of  their  re;d  and  personal  property. 
See  Spurr  v.  Scoville,  3  Cush.  578.  But  the 
Court  will  not  dismiss  a  bill  on  a  mere  sug- 
gestion that  certain  stockholders,  who  are 
defendants,  are  not  residents  of  the  State,  and 
therefore  the  Court  has  no  jurisdiction  as  to 
them.  Wiswell  v  Starr,  50  Maine,  381,  384. 
In  Postgate  v.  Barnes,  9  Jur.  N.  S.  456,  V  C. 
S.,  a  demurrer  to  the  bill  of  a  married  woman 
to  enforce  her  equity'  to  a  settlement,  on  the 
ground  that  her  husband  was  only  made  a 
defendant  when  he  should  come  within  the 
jurisdiction,  was  overruled;  and  see  Jacksnu  v. 
Norton,  4  Jur.  N.  S.  1067;  7  W.  R.  4,  M.  R. 
See  infra,  p.  190. 

2  Dec.  11, 1744 ;  Ld.  Red.  32,  n.  (w). 

3  Reported  in  9  Mod.  407. 


Trust  Co.  v.  Portland  &  O.  R.  Co.  10  id.  604; 
Mass.  Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  13 
id.  857;  Castello  v.  Castello,  14  id.  207;  Beach 
v.  Musgrove,  16  id.  305;  Mellen  v.  Moline  Iron 
Works,  131  U.  S.  352.  This  statute  (U.  S.  Rev. 
Stats.  §  737),  being  remedial,  is  construed  liber- 
ally. McBurney  v.  Carson,  99  U.  S.  567.  It 
is  treated  as  an  affirmance  of  the  Equity  rule. 
Shields  v.  Barrows,  17  How.  130;  Barney  ». 
Baltimore,  6  Wall.  285.  It  does  not  apply  to 
the  removal  of  causes.  Ames  v.  Chicago  &c. 
Ry.  Co.  39  Fed.  Rep.  881.  Under  it  a  decree 
cannot,  as  above  stated,  be  entered  in  the 
absence  of  an  indispensable  party.  Ibid.;  Win- 
chester v.  Loud,  108  U.  S.  130;  Conolly  v. 
Wells,  33  Fed.  Rep.  208;  Kendig  v.  Dean.  97 
U.  S.  423;  Goodman  v  Niblack.  102  U.  S.  556; 
Ober  r.  Gnllagher,  93  U.  S.  199  ;  Detweiler 
o.  Holderbaum,  42  Fed.  Rep.  337;  Duchesse 
D'Auxy  v.  Porter,  41  id.  68;  Wall  v.  Thomas, 
113 


*  149         PERSONS    AGAINST   WHOM    A    SUIT   MAY   BE   INSTITUTED. 


by  the  Attorney- General  against  the  trustees  of  a  testator,  his  heirs-at- 
law  and  others,  to  establish  a  will  and  a  charity  created  by  it,  alleging 
that  the  decree  was  contrary  to  the  will,  and  that  the  University  of 
Glasgow  had  not  been  made  a  party  to  the  suit,  Lord  Hardwicke  over- 
ruled the  latter  objection,  as  the  University  of  Glasgow  was  a  corpora- 
tion out  of  the  reach  of  the  process  of  the  Court,  which  circumstance 
warranted  the  proceedings,  without  making  that  body  party  to  the 
suit,  (b) 

id.  620;  Smith  v.  Lyon,  38  id.  53;  Hamilton  v. 
Savannah,  F.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  49  id.  412;  Collins 
Manuf.  Co.  r.  Ferguson,  54  id.  721;  Barry  v. 
Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  27  id.  1.  If  four 
out  of  rive  mortgage  trustees  are  served  with 
process,  the  fifth,  if  non-resident,  may  be  dis- 
pensed with  as  a  party.  Stewart  v.  Chesapeake 
&  O.  Canal  Co.  1  Fed.  Rep.  361.  As  to  ser- 
vice by  publication,  see  U.  S.  Stats,  of  Mch. 
3,  1875,  §  8  (18  Stats,  at  Large,  470),  which  Act 
js  construed  strictly.  Batt  v.  Proctor,  45  Fed. 
Rep.  515;  Non-magnetic  Watch  Co.  v.  Associa- 
tion Horlogere  Suisse,  44  id.  6.  A  State  may 
provide  by  statute  that  in  adjudications  of 
titles  to  real  estate,  non-residents  may  be 
brought  in  by  publication.  Arndt  V.  Griggs, 
134  U.  S.  316.  If  a  non-resident  is  induced  by 
fraud  to  enter  the  State,  service  there  made 
upon  him  is  void.  Toof  v.  Foley  (Iowa),  54 
N.  W.  Rep.  59.  So  of  a  foreign  corporation, 
when  its  president,  upon  whom  service  is  made, 
is  inveigled  into  the  State.  Fitzgerald  &  M. 
C.  Co.  v.  Fitzgerald,  137  U.  S.  98.  Contra, 
where  the  nonresident  comes  voluntarily  to 
attend  Court.  Baisley  t\  Baisley  (Mo.),  21 
S.  W.  Rep.  29;  see  Plimpton  v.  Winslow,  9 
Fed  Rep.  365. 

(6)  Drage  v.  Hartopp,  28  Ch.  D.  414.  In 
general,  and  apart  from  statute,  a  foreign  cor- 
poration, which  at  the  commencement  of  the 
suit  does  not  do  business  and  has  not  an  office 
or  place  of  business  within  the  jurisdiction, 
cannot  be  made  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  with- 
out its  consent,  and  its  officers  or  agents,  com- 
ing within  the  jurisdiction,  do  not  bring  with 
them  their  official  functions  for  the  purpose  of 
responding  to  suits.  Fitzgerald  &  M.  C.  Co.  v. 
Fitzgerald,  137  U.  S.  98;  Clews  v.  Woodstock 
Iron  Co.  44  Fed.  Rep.  31;  Reifsnider  v.  Ameri- 
can Imp.  P.  Co.  45  id.  433;  Camden  Rolling 
Mill  Co.  v.  Swede  Iron  Co.  32  N.  J.  L.  15; 
Phillips  v.  Library  Co.  141  Penn.  St.  462;  Flor- 
ence Sewing  Machine  Co.  v.  Grover  &  Baker 
Sewing  Machine  Co.  110  Mass.  1,  9.  See 
Shickie  Iron  Co.  v.  S.  L.  Wiley  C.  Co.  61 
Mich.  226:  McConville  v.  Gilmour,  36  Fed. 
Rep.  277;  Golden  v.  The  Morning  News.  42  id. 
112;  Bentlif  v.  London  &c.  F.  Co.  44  id.  667. 
When  provision  is  made  by  local  statute  for 
service  upon  the  agent  of  a  foreign  corporation, 
such  agent  must  be  one  who  represents  the  cor- 
poration as  matter  of  fact,  and  not  one  created 

144 


by  implication  or  construction  without  regard 
to  the  parties'  intent.  United  States  v-  Amer- 
ican Bell  Telephone  Co.  29  Fed.  Rep  17; 
American  Bell  Telephone  Co.  v.  Pan  Electric 
Tel.  Co.  28  id.  625:  see  Societe  Fonciere  v- 
Milliken,  135  U.  S.  304;  Block  v.  Atchison,  T.  & 
S.  R.  Co.  21  Fed.  Rep.  529;  Estes  v.  Belford,  22 
id.  275 ;  Shampeau  v.  Connecticut  R.  L.  Co.  37  id. 
771;  Van  Dresser  v.  Oregon  R.  &  N.  Co.  48  id. 
202;  FHrmer  v.  National  Life  Ass.  50  id.  829; 
Wilson  v.  Martin-Wilson  A.  F.  A.  Co.  149  Mass. 
24;  Norton  v.  Berlin  Iron  Bridge  Co.  51  N.  J. 
L.  442;  Burgess  v.  C.  Aultman  &  Co.  80  Wis. 
292;  Shafer  Iron  Co.  v.  Iron  Circuit  Judge,  88 
Mich.  464.  In  proceedings  in  rem,  as  to  fore- 
close a  lien,  the  Court's  jurisdiction  is  not 
dependent  upon  personal  service  on  absent  par- 
ties, and  service  by  publication  is  sufficient. 
Oswald  ».  Kampmann,  28  Fed.  Rep.  36;  Mar 
tin  r.  Fond,  30  id.  15;  Palmer  v.  McCormick, 
id.  82:  28  id.  541 ;  Remer  v.  Mackay,  35  id.  86; 
Ellis  r.  Reynolds,  id.  394;  Swift  t\  Meyers, 
37  id.  37;  Bennett  v.  Fenton,  41  id.  283;  Potter 
Land  &  W.  Co.  v.  Baskin,  43  id.  323.  A  part- 
nership composed  of  foreigners  resident  abroad, 
but  carrying  on  business  within  the  jurisdiction 
in  England,  are  not  served  by  service  on  their 
manager  at  their  principal  place  of  business 
within  the  jurisdiction.  Russell  v.  Cambefort, 
23  Q.  B.  D.  526.  Where  one  partner  resided 
within  the  jurisdiction  and  the  other  without, 
the  partnership  itself  was  held  not  to  be  "  prop- 
erty within  the  jurisdiction,"  so  as  to  affect  the 
absent  partner  by  a  decree  for  dissolution,  an 
account,  and  a  receiver.  Eshbach  t.  Slonaker, 
1  Penn.  Dist.  Ct.  32.  As  to  the  present  practice 
in  England  as  to  service  of  the  writ  in  a  suit 
against  a  foreign  firm,  see  Russell  v.  Cambefort, 
23  Q.  B.  D.  526;  Western  National  Bank  v. 
Perez  (1891),  1  Q.  B.  304;  Lysaght,  Ltd.  v. 
Clark,  id  502;  Dobson  v.  Festi,  2  id.  92;  Heine- 
man  v.  Hale,  id.  83;  Indigo  Co.  v.  Ogilvy, 
[1891]  2  Ch.  31;  Appleton  v.  Donovan,  7  T.  L. 
R.  554;  Flower  v.  Rose,  id.  280. 

In  a  suit  to  restrain  infringement  of  a  trade- 
mark against  a  company  having  its  registered 
office  in  Scotland,  with  several  branches  in  Eng- 
land, leave  was  given  to  serve  the  writ  out  of 
the  jurisdiction,  as  an  injunction  could  be  en- 
forced by  sequestration  against  its  property  in 
England".  In  re  Burland's  Trade-Mark,  41  Ch. 
D.  542,  distinguishing  Marshall  v.  Marshall,  38 


PERSONS   OUT    OF   THE    JURISDICTION   OF   THE   COURT. 


150 


*  And  so,  where  a  bill  was  filed  for  the  recovery  of  a  joint  debt  *150 
against  one  of  two  partners,  the  other  being  out  of  the  kingdom, 
the  question  before  the  Court  was:  whether  the  defendant  should  pay 
the  whole  or  only  a  moiety  of  the  debt ;  and  Lord  Hardwicke  was  of 
opinion  that  he  ought  to  pay  the  whole.1  Upon  the  same  principle,  a 
bill  may  be  brought  against  one  factor  without  his  companion,  if  such 
companion  be  beyond  sea ; 2  and  where  there  were  two  executors,  one 
of  whom  was  beyond  sea,  and  a  bill  was  filed  by  a  residuary  legatee 
against  the  other,  to  have  an  account  of  his  own  receipts  and  pay- 
ments :  the  Court,  upon  an  objection  being  taken  at  the  hearing,  on 
the  ground  of  the  absence  of  the  co-executor,  allowed  the  cause  to  go  on.3 

When  a  person  who  ought  to  be  a  party  is  out  of  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  Court,  that  fact  being  stated  in  the  bill,  and  admitted  by  the  defend- 
ant, or  proved  at  the  hearing,  is,  in  most  cases,  a  sufficient  reason  for 
not  bringing  him  before  the  Court ;  and  the  Court  will  proceed,  without 
him,  against  the  other  parties,  as  far  as  circumstances  will  permit.4  On 
this  principle,  the  Court  has  frequently  made  decrees  without  prejudice 
to  the  rights  (if  any)  of  absent  parties,  or  reserving  all  questions  in  which 
they  were  interested,  and  determining  only  such  as  did  not  affect  them.5 

In  bills  of  interpleader,  also,  a  plaintiff  may  proceed  with  his  suit  and 


1  Darwent  v.  Walton,  2  Atk.  510;  Erickson 
v.  Nesmith,  46  N.  H.  371.  This  rule,  that  the 
Court  can  proceed  to  a  decree  against  those 
parties,  who  are  within  the  jurisdiction,  must 
be  taken  with  the  qualification  that  it  can  be 
done  without  manifest  injustice  to  the  absent 
party.  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §§78,82;  Milligan  v.  Mil- 
ledge,  3  Cranch,  220;  Towle  v.  Pierce,  12  Met. 
329;   Lawrence  v.  Rokes,  53  Maine,  110,  116. 

A  bill  seeking  an  adjustment  of  the  accounts 
between  the  part-owners  of  a  vessel,  some  of 
whom  reside  without  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
Court,  cannot  be  sustained,  unless  such  non- 
residents are  summoned  to  answer,  or  it  appears 
from  the  allegations  in  the  bill  that  not  only 
their  interests  will  not  be  prejudiced  by  the 
decree,  but  also  that  they  were  not  necessary  to 
the  just  ascertainment  of  the  merits  of  the  case. 
Mudgett  v.  Gager,  52  Maine,  541 ;  Fuller  v.  Ben- 


jamin, 23  Maine,  255.  It  is  not  enough  for  the 
bill  to  allege  that  "the  plaintiff  does  not  claim 
there  is  any  thing  due  to  him  from  said  non- 
residents; or  that  he  does  not  seek  thereby  to 
recover  any  thing  from  them."  Mudgett  v. 
Gager,  supra. 

2  Cowslad  v.  Celv,  Prec.  Ch.  83. 

3  Ibid. 

4  Ld.  Red.  164;  see  also  Smith  v.  Hibernian 
Mine  Company,  1  Sch.  &  Lef.  238,  240;  Rogers 
v.  Linton,  Bunb.  200 ;  Walley  v.  Walley,  1  Vern. 
487  ;  Duxbury  v.  Isherwood,  12  W.  R.  821,  V. 
C  W.;  Erickson  v.  Nesmith,  46  N.  H.371,  376. 

5  Willats  v.  Busby,  5  Beav.  193,200;  Powell 
v.  Wright,  7  Beav.  444,  450  ;  Morley  v.  Ken- 
noldson,  2  Hare,  570,  585  ;  7  Jur.  938;  Mores 
v.  Mores,  6  Hare,  125,  127,  135  ;  12  Jur.  620; 
see  Moody  v.  Gay,  15  Gray,  457. 


Ch.  D.  330.  See  also  Kinahan  v.  Kinahan,  45 
Ch.  D.  655;  Wood  v.  Anderston  Foundry  Co. 
36  W.  R.918;  Watkins  v.  Scottish  Imperial  Ins. 
Co.  23  Q.  B.  D.  285;  Haggin  v.  Comptoir  d'Es- 
cnmpte,  id.  519.  The  English  Court  of  Chancery 
has  no  jurisdiction  to  authorize  notices  of 
orders  and  other  proceedings  in  the  winding  up 
of  a  company  to  be  served  on  non-residents. 
Be  Anglo-African  Steamship  Co.  32  Ch.  D. 
34*.  affirming  54  L.  T.  372.  And  as  to  service 
out  of  the  jurisdiction,  see  Re  Nathan  Newman 
&  Co.  35  CD.  1  ;  Re  Liebig's  Cocoa  Works 
Limited.  59  L.  T.  315;  Nelson  v.  Pastorino,  49 
L.  T.  564;  De  Penny  v.  Christie,  [1891]  2  Ch. 
63;  Bell  v.  Antwerp  Line,  [1891]  1  Q.  B.  103; 
Sea^rove  v.  Parks,  id.  551 ;  Wilding  v.  Bean, 
id.  100;  Re  Pearson,  [1892]  2  Q.  B.  263;  James 

VOL.   I.  —  10 


v.  Despott,  14  L.  R.  Ir.  71 ;  Re  McLaughlin,  25 
id.  513;  Mayer  v.  Claretie,  7  T.  L.  R.  40.  As  to 
substituted  service,  see  Fry  v.  Moore,  23  Q.  B. 
D.  395;  Wilding  0.  Bean."  [1891]  1  Q.  B.  100; 
Milliard  v.  Smyth.  36  W  R.  7.  If  a  plaintiff, 
having  leave  to  serve  a  writ  of  summons  out  of 
the  jurifdiction,  exhausts  all  means  to  make 
such  service  personally,  substituted  service  by 
registered  letter  will  be  allowed.  Seaton  r. 
Clarke,  26  L.  R.  Ir.  297.  The  court  cannot 
order  service  of  an  originating  summons  out  of 
the  jurisdiction.  Re  Busfield,  32  Ch.  D.  123, 
Leave  will  not  be  given  to  serve  a  summons  for 
taxation  of  costs  upon  a  foreigner  out  of  the 
jurisdiction.  Ex  parte  Brandon,  54  L.  T,  128; 
34  W.  R.  352. 

145 


*  151         PERSONS   AGAINST   WHOM   A   SUIT   MAY   BE   INSTITUTED. 

obtain  an  injunction  against  a  party  resident  in  this  country,  although 
the  other  parties  claiming  the  property  are  out  of  the  jurisdiction.6  (a) 
In  such  cases,  however,  the  plaintiff  is  bound  to  use  prompt  diligence  to 
get  the  parties  who  are  absent  to  come  in  and  interplead  with  those  who 
are  present.  If  he  does  not  succeed  in  doing  so  within  a  reasonable 
time,  the  consequence  is,  that  the  party  within  the  jurisdiction 
*151  must  have  that  which  is  represented  *to  be  the  subject  of  com- 
petition, and  the  plaintiff  must  be  indemnified  against  any  pro- 
ceeding being  afterwards  taken  on  the  part  of  those  who  are  out  of  the 
jurisdiction.1  Upon  the  same  ground,  where  a  party  to  a  bill  of  inter- 
pleader, who  has  been  served,  will  not  appear,  and  stands  out  all  the 
process  of  contempt,  the  bill  may  be  taken  pro  confesso  against  him,  and 
he  will  be  decreed  to  interplead  with  the  other  defendants.2 

Where,  however,  the  person  who  is  out  of  the  jurisdiction  is  one 
whose  interests  are  principally  affected  by  the  bill,  the  Court  cannot 
proceed  in  his  absence,  even  though  the  parties  having  the  legal  estate 
are  before  the  Court ; 8  thus,  where  a  judgment  creditor,  who  had  sued 
out  an  elegit  upon  his  judgment,  filed  a  bill  for  equitable  execution 
against  real  estates,  which  were  vested  in  trustees  upon  certain  trusts, 
the  Court  would  not  proceed  with  the  cause,  because  the  equitable  ten- 
ant for  life,  subject  to  the  trusts,  was  abroad.4  Upon  the  same  prin- 
ciple, bail  cannot  maintain  an  injunction  against  a  creditor,  who  has 
recovered  a  verdict,  where  the  principal  debtor  is  out  of  the  jurisdiction.5 
In  a  case  where  a  contract  for  the  sale  of  an  estate  in  the  West  Indies 
had  been  entered  into  by  a  person  who  resided  there,  and  had  got  into 
possession  without  paying  the  purchase-money,  and  a  suit  was  instituted 
in  this  country  by  the  vendor  against  the  consignees  appointed  by  the 
purchaser,  Lord  Lyndhurst  refused  to  entertain  a  motion  for  a  receiver 
of  the  proceeds  of  the  consignments,  on  the  ground  that  the  purchaser, 
who  was  the  principal  defendant,  was  abroad,  and  had  never  been  served 
with  a  subpoena.6 

6  Stevenson  v.  Anderson,  2  Ves.  &  B  407,  and  the  decree,  ib.  69,  n.  (c).    Where  the  rights 

411.  of  a  defendant  in  Equity,  who  resides  out  of  the 

1  Ibid.     For  tins  purpose,   "  if  the  plaintiff  State  and  has  had  notice  of  the  suit,  but  does 

can  show  that  he  has  used  all  due  diligence  to  not  appear  and  answer,  will  not  be  prejudiced 

bring  persons  out  of  the  jurisdiction  to  contend  by  the  decree,  the  bill  may  be  taken  pro  con- 

with  those  who  are  within  it,  and  they  will  not  fesso  as  to  him.     Adams  v.  Stevens,  49  Maine, 

come,  the  Court,  upon  that  default,  and  their  so  362. 

abstaining  from  giving  him  an  opportunity  of  3  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  81;  Fell  v.  Brown,  2  Bro. 

relieving   himself,   would,    if   they   afterwards  C.  C.  (Perkins's  ed.)  278,  279,  notes;  Joy  v. 

came  here  and  brought  an  action,  order  service  Wirtz,  1  Wash.  C.  C.  517  ;  Russell  v.  Clarke, 

on  their  attorney  to  be  good  service,  and  enjoin  7  Cranch,  72.  Mallow  v.  Hinde,  12  Wheat.  193; 

that  action  forever:  not  permitting  those  who  Lawrence  v.  Rokes,  53  Maine,  110,  113  ;  Spurr 

refused  the  plaintiff  that  justice,  to  commit  that  v.  Scoville,  3  Cush.  578. 

injustice  against  him."    Per  Lord  Eldon,  2  Ves.  4  Browne  v.  Blount,  2  R.  &  M.  83  ;  and  see 

&  B.  412  ;  see  also  Martinius  v.  Helmuth,  G.  Kirwan  v.  Daniel,  7  Hare,  347  ;  M'Calmont  v. 

Coop.  245,  248:  reported  also  in  some  copies  of  Rankin,  8  Hare,  1  ;  14  Jur.  475;  Anderson  v. 

2  Ves.  &  B.  412,  n. ;  East  and  West  India  Dock  Stather,  2  Coll.  209. 

Co.  u.  Littledale,  7  Hare,  57.  5  Roveray  r,  Grayson,  3  Swanst.  145.  n. 

*  Fairbrother  v.   Prattent,   Dan.   Exc.   64;  6  Stratton  v.  Davidson,  1  R.  &  M.  484- 


(a)  In  Credits  Gerundeuse  v.   Van  Weede,  jurisdiction  upon  a  foreigner  who  claimed  the 

12  Q.  B.  D.  171,  the  defendant  was  given  leave  goods  sued  for  by  the  plaintiffs.    See  also  Wet 

to  serve  an  interpleader  summons  out  of  the  dou  v.  Gounod,  15  Q.  B.  D.  622. 

146 


PERSONS   OUT   OF   THE   JURISDICTION    OF   THE   COURT.  *  153 

*  It  has  been  held,  that  a  receiver  of  a  mortgaged  estate  may  be  *152 
appointed,  notwithstanding  the  absence  of  the  mortgagor.  Thus, 
in  Tanfield  v.  Irvine,1  an  application  for  a  receiver  had  been  made  to  Sir 
John  Leach,  V.  C,  by  the  grantee  of  an  annuity,  which  was  secured  by 
an  equitable  charge  upon  an  estate ;  and  though  the  grantor  had  gone 
abroad,  and  had  not  appeared  to  the  suit,  his  Honor  refused  the  applica- 
tion, on  the  ground  that  the  Court  had  not  jurisdiction  to  deprive  a  man, 
who  was  not  present,  of  the  possession  of  his  estate  ;  but  upon  the  motion 
being  renewed  before  Lord  Eldon,  he  made  the  order  for  a  receiver,  but 
guarding  it,  however,  in  such  a  way  as  not  to  prevent  any  person  having 
a  better  title  to  the  possession  of  the  estate,  from  ousting  him  if  they 
pleased.  His  Lordship  observed,  that  he  did  not  see  why  the  rights  of 
the  equitable  mortgagee  were  to  be  taken  away,  by  the  circumstance  that 
the  mortgagor  had  not  entered  an  appearance,  and  could  not  be  compelled 
to  do  so  ; 2  and  that  a  second  mortgagee  might  be  delayed  to  all  eternity, 
if  the  residence  of  the  mortgagor  out  of  the  jurisdiction  were  to  have  the 
effect  which  the  Vice-Chancellor  had  given  it. 

It  is  usual,  in  cases  where  any  of  the  persons  who,  if  resident  in  this 
country,  would  be  necessary  parties  to  a  suit,  are  abroad,  to  make  such 
persons  defendants  to  the  bill,  stating  the  fact  of  their  being  abroad : 
which  fact,  unless  they  appear,  must  be  proved  at  the  hearing ; 8  and, 
notwithstanding  the  observation  of  Lord  Redesdale  cited  above,  it 
seems  that  the  admission  of  the  parties  before  the  Court  is  not  evidence 
on  which  the  Court  will  act.4  When  the  proof  of  this  fact  at  the  hear- 
ing is  not  such  as  to  satisfy  the  Court,  the  usual  practice  is  to  direct  the 
cause  to  stand  over  for  the  purpose  of  supplying  the  proper  evidence.5 
In  some  cases,  however,  if  there  are  preliminary  inquiries  or  accounts 
to  be  taken,  they  have  been  directed  to  be  proceeded  with  in  the  mean- 
time ; 6  and  in  others,  an  inquiry  as  to  the  fact  has  been  directed.7 
In  P enfold  v.  Kelly?  an  application  was  refused  *  for  leave  to  *153 
serve  a  defendant  coming  within  the  jurisdiction  after  decree,  and 
against  whom  no  specific  relief  was  prayed,  with  a  copy  of  the  bill. 

Where  a  party  who  was  named  as  a  defendant,  but  had  never  been 
served,  appeared  by  counsel  at  the  hearing,  and  consented  to  be  bound 

1  2  Russ.  149,  151;  see  also  Coward  v.  Chad-  *  Wilkinson  v.  Real,  4  Mad.  408;  Hughes 
wick,  ib.  634,  and  150,  n. ;  Dow1ing».  Hudson,  14  v.  Eades,  1  Hare,  486,  488 ;  6  Jur.  255 ;  Eggin- 
Beav  423,  and  cases  collected  in  the  note  thereto.  ton  v.  Burton,  1  Hare,  488,  n.;   M'Calmont  v. 

2  See  Fell  v.  Brown,  2  Bro.  C.  C.  (Perkins's  Rankin,  8  Hare,  1 ;  14  Jur.  475. 

ed.)  278,  279,  »nd  notes.  s  Egginton   v.    Burton,    1    Hare,    488,    n.; 

3  Moodie  v.  Bannister,  1  Drew.  514;  see  Emith  o.  Edwards.  16  Jur.  1041,  V.  C.  S. 
Erickson  v.  Nesmith,  46  N.  H.  371.  The  party  As  to  necessary  evidence,  where  there  is  delay 
sliould  not  be  named  as  a  defendant  "when  he  between  the  making  and  drawing  up  of  the 
shall  come  within  the  jurisdiction,"  but  as  order,  see  Anon.,  9  L.  T.  N.  S.  674,  M.  R. 
being  "out  of  the  jurisdiction:'7  see  Jack-  6  Butler*;.  Borton,  5  Mad.  40,  42;  Hughes 
son  v.  Norton,  4  Jur.  N.  S.   1067;  7  W.  R.  4,  v.  Eades,  1  Hare,  486;  6  Jur.  255. 

M.   R.;    Story,  Eq.    PI.   §   80;    Munor  v.    De  7  Mores  v.  Mores,  6  Hare,  136:  12  Jur.  620; 

Tartel,  1  Beav.  109;  Brookes  v.  Burt,  1  Beav.  Eades  v.  Harris,  1  Y.  &  C.  C.  230,  234;  but 

109;  Pingree  v.  Coffin,  12  Gray,  288,  303.  304;  see  Dibbs  r.  Goren,  1  Beav.  457. 

Postgate    v.    Barnes,  9   Jur.    N.    S.    456;    11  8  i2  W.  R  286,  and  see  Cons.  Ord.  X.  11, 

W  R.  456,  V.  C.   S.:  see,  however,  Merriman  18. 

9.  Goodman,  1  W.  N.  46,  M.  R. 

147 


*  154         PERSONS   AGAINST   WHOM    A    SUIT   MAY   BE   INSTITUTED. 

by  the  decree,  the  defect  arising  from  his  not  having  been  served  was 
held  to  be  cured.1 

In  some  cases,  where  a  defendant  has  been  abroad  during  the  proceed- 
ings in  a  cause,  he  has  been  allowed  to  come  in  after  a  decree  has  been 
pronounced,  and  to  have  the  benefit  of  it,  without  the  process  of  filing 
a  supplemental  bill.2 

An  order  for  leave  for  a  defendant  to  come  in,  after  decree,  may  be 
obtained  by  petition,  of  course,  if  the  plaintiff  will  consent  thereto.  If 
he  will  not  consent,  notice  of  motion,  or  a  summons,  must  be  served  on 
him.8  The  petition,  notice  of  motion,  or  summons,  usually  asks  that 
the  defendant,  on  submitting  to  be  bound  by  the  decree  and  proceedings 
already  had,  may  be  at  liberty  to  enter  an  appearance  to  the  bill,  and 
may  have  the  like  benefit  of  the  decree,  and  may  be  at  liberty  to  attend 
the  subsequent  proceedings,  as  if  he  had  appeared  at  the  hearing.  A 
copy  of  the  order,  when  passed  and  entered,  should  be  served  on  the 
solicitors  of  the  other  defendants,  and  on  the  plaintiff's  solicitor  when 
the  order  is  made  on  petition.  On  production  of  the  order  to  the  Record 
and  Writ  Clerk,  an  appearance  for  the  defendant  may  be  entered  in  the 
usual  way  ;  and  notice  thereof  must  be  given,  on  the  same  day,  to  the 
plaintiff's  solicitor ; 4  and  the  cause  thenceforth  proceeds  against  such 
defendant  in  the  ordinary  manner. 

In  the  case  of  infants,  however,  the  Court  must  be  satisfied,  by  inquiry 
or  otherwise,  that  it  is  for  their  benefit  to  adopt  the  proceedings.6 
*154  *  Where  a  defendant  is  stated  to  be  abroad,  he  is  not  consid- 
ered a  party  to  the  suit,  at  least  not  till  he  has  been  served  with 
the  bill,  for  the  determination  of  any  point  of  practice  arising  between 
the  plaintiff  and  the  other  defendants  ;  therefore,  an  order  to  amend 
cannot  be  obtained,  after  the  usual  time,  on  the  ground  that  a  defend- 
ant abroad  has  not  answered.1  (a) 

1  Capel  v.  Butler,  2  S.  &  S.  457,  462;  and  ilar  order  was  made  by  Lord  Lyndhurst, 
see  Sapte  v  Ward.  1  Coll.  24.  For  form  of  in-  after  a  cause  had  been  heard  upon  further 
troductory  part  of  decree,  see  Seton,  3,  4;  and  directions.  White  v.  Hall,  1  R.  &  M.  332; 
1  Coll.  25.  and   see   Prendergast  v.   Lushington,  5  Hare, 

2  Thus,  in  Banister  v.  Way,  2  Dick.  686,  177;  Potts  v.  Britton,  M.  R.  in  Chamb.  22 
after  a  decree,  pronounced  in  a  suit  by  a  residu-  Dec,  1864. 

ary  legatee,  establishing  a  will,  and  directing  3  Braithwaite's  Pr.  323.     For  form  of  order, 

the  necessary  accounts,  others  of  the  residuary  see   Seton,   1250;  and   for  forms    of    petition, 

legatees,  who  were  abroad,  applied  to  have  the  notice  of  motion,  and  summons,  see  Vol.  III. 

benefit  of  the  decree,  submitting  to  be  bound  by  4  For  forms  of  pi-cecipe  and  notice,  see  Vol. 

it,  and  an  order  was  made  by  Lord  Thurlow  III. 

(they    submitting    to   the    decree)   that    they  6  Copley  v.  Smithson,   5   De  G.  &  S.  583; 

should  be  at  liberty  to  enter  their  appearance,  Baillie  v.   Jackson,  10  Sim.  167;  see  Finch  v. 

and  should  have  the  like  benefit  of  the  decree  Finch,  W.  N.  (1808)  191. 

as   if  they  had   put  in   an  answer,   and   had  1  King  of    Spain   v.    Hullett,  3  Sim.   338; 

appeared  at  the  hearing  of  the  cause.    A  sim-  Cassidy  v.  Shimmin,  122  Mass.  406. 


(n)  A  defendant,  or,  in  the  case  of  a  petition,  when  the  claim  and  counter-claim  arise  out  of 

a  respondent,  if  non-resident,  will  not  be  ordered  different  matters,  but  not  when  both  arise  from 

to  give  security   for  the  plaintiff's  costs.     Re  the  same   transaction.     Mapleson  v.   Massini, 

Perry    &c.    Iron    Mining   Co.   2  Ch.  D.  531;  supra;  Winterheld   v.   Bradnum,  3  Q.  B.    D. 

Cochrane  v.  Fearon,  18  Jur.  568;  Mapleson  v.  324;  Sykes   v.  Sacerdoti,  15  id.  423;  Lake  v. 

Massini,  5  Q.  B.  D.  144.    If  such  defendant  or  Haseltine,    55  L.   J.   Q.    B.   205;  see   Beddall 

respondent   brings   a  cross-action   or  counter-  v.  Maitland,  17  Ch.  D.  174;  The  Julia  Fisher, 

claim,  he  will  be  ordered  to  give  such  security  2  P.  D.  115;  ante,  p.  29. 

148 


PAUPERS.  *  155 

Under  the  present  practice  of  the  Court,  however,  such  questions  as 
we  have  been  considering,  with  reference  to  defendants  out  of  the  juris- 
diction, will  be  of  comparatively  rare  occurrence  ;  for  the  Court  can  now, 
in  many  cases,  direct  service  on  persons  out  of  the  jurisdiction  ; 2  and  can 
also,  when  the  suit  is  defective  for  want  of  parties,  and  the  defendant 
has  not  taken  the  objection  by  plea  or  answer,  make  a  decree,  if  it  shall 
think  fit,  saving  the  rights  of  absent  parties.8 

And  it  may  here  be  observed  that,  as  a  general  rule,  persons  are  not 
now  named  parties  to  a  suit  unless  direct  relief  is  sought  against  them ; 
and  therefore,  if  they  happen  to  be  out  of  the  jurisdiction,  it  will  in 
general,  on  the  authority  of  Browne  v.  Blount 4  and  the  other  cases  before 
referred  to,  be  necessary  to  serve  them. 


Section  VI.  —  Paupers. 

Although  the  11  Hen.  VII.  c.  12,5  before  referred  to  as  the  Act  under 
which  the  practice  of  admitting  parties  to  sue  in  forma  pauperis  origi- 
nated,6 did  not  extend  to  defendants,  and  consequently  a  defendant  in 
an  action  at  Law  is  never  allowed  to  defend  it  as  a  pauper,7  yet  a  greater 
degree  of  liberality  is  practised  in  Courts  of  Equity ;  and  a  defendant 
who  is  in  a  state  of  poverty,  and,  as  such,  incapable  of  defending  a 
suit,  may  obtain  an  order  to  defend  in  forma  pauperis,  upon  making 
the  same  affidavit  of  poverty  as  that  required  to  be  made  by  a  plain- 
tiff.8 Indeed,  originally,  the  right  of  admission  in  forma  pauperis 
appears  to  have  been  confined  to  defendants.  By  Lord  Bacon's  orders 
it  is  said,  that  "any  man  shall  be  admitted  to  defend  in  forma 
pauperis  *upon  oath  ;  but  for  plaintiffs,  they  are  ordinarily  to  be  *155 
referred  to  the  Court  of  Requests,  or  to  the  provincial  counsels,  if 
the  case  arise  in  the  jurisdictions,  or  to  some  gentlemen  in  the  country, 
except  it  be  in  some  special  cases  of  commiseration,  or  potency  of  the 
adverse  party."  1 

It  has  been  before  stated,  that  no  person  suing  in  a  representative 
character  is  allowed  the  privilege  of  proceeding  in  forma  pauperis. 
The  same  rule  applies  to  defendants  sued  in  a  representative  character, 

2  2  &  3  Will.  IV.  c.  33;  4  &  5  Will.  IV.  the  Act  of  Assembly  extends  in  terms  only  to 

c.  82;  Cons.  Ord.  X.  7;  R.  S.  C.  Old.  VI.  1,  2;  plaintiffs.     Pickle  v.  Pickle,  Halst.   N.  J.  Dig. 

XI   1;  Clarke  v.  Bradlaugh,  7  Q.  B.  D.  151;  8  177.     It  seems  to  be  doubtful,  in  New  York, 

id.  63;  8  App.  Cas.  354;    Beddington  v.  Bed-  whether,   in  any  case,  a  party  can  defend  in 

dington,  1  P.  D.  426.    See  post,  Chap.  VIII.  §  1.  forma  pauperis.     The  doubt  prows  out  of  the 

8  Cons  Ord.  XXIII.  11;  Mayberry  v.  Brook-  peculiar    phraseology   of    the    Statute  in    that 

ing,  7  De  G   M.  &  G.  673;  2  Jur.  N.  S.  76.  State.     Brown  v.  Story,  1  Paige,  588. 

*  2  R.  &  M.  83.  ante,  p.  151.  A  party  will  not  be  deprived  of  the  privilege 

5  Repealed  or  superseded  by  46  &  47  Vic.  of  defending  himself  in  forma  pauperis  on 
49.  §  4.  Sched. ;  R.  S.  C.  1883,"  Ord.  XVI.  Pt.  account  of  his  misconduct. '  Murphv  r.  Oldis,  1 
IV.  22-31.  Hogan,  219. 

6  Ante,  p.  38.  i  Beames's    Ord.    44.,      Sand.    Ord.    122. 

7  2  Chitty's  Arch.  1289.  This  order   is  abrogated    by  the  Cons.   Ord.; 

8  McDonough  v.  O'Flaherty,  1  Beat.  54.  In  but  see  ib.  Prel.  Ord.  r.  5:  see  also  Lord 
New  Jersey  the  privilege  of  defending  in  forma  Clarendon's  Orders,  Beanies.  215-218;  Sand. 
pauperis  is  granted  in  a  proper  case,  although  Ord.  312;  now  Cons.  Ord.  VII.  9-11. 

149 


*  156         PERSONS    AGAINST   WHOM    A    SUIT    MAY    BE    INSTITUTED. 

even  in  cases  where  they  have  received  no  assets  of  the  estate  of  the 
testator  whom  they  represent.2 

The  solicitor  to  the  Suitors'  Fund,  or  other  officer  appointed  by  the 
Lord  Chancellor,  is  to  visit  Whitecross  Street  Prison  8  quarterly,  ex- 
amine the  prisoners  confined  for  contempt,  and  report  his  opinion  on 
their  cases  ;  and  the  Lord  Chancellor  may  thereupon  assign  a  solicitor  to 
defend  the  prisoner  in  forma  pauperis.  A  like  assignment  may  also  be 
made,  in  the  case  of  persons  confined  for  contempt  in  other  prisons,  upon 
the  jailer's  report,  and  after  investigation  by  the  solicitor  to  the  Suitors' 
Fund.4     The  assignment  is  made  without  an  application  to  the  Court.5 

The  order  admitting  a  party  to  sue  or  defend  in  forma  pauperis,  has 
not  the  effect  of  releasing  him  from  costs  ordered  to  be  paid  prior  to 
his  admission,  but  the  payment  of  such  costs  may  be  enforced  in  the 
usual  manner;  it  may,  however,  be  doubtful  whether  the  admission 
may  not  have  a  retrospective  effect  upon  costs  incurred  before  the  date 
of  his  admission,  but  concerning  which  no  order  for  taxation  and  pay- 
ment has  been  made.6  It  appears  that  where  the  plaintiff  dismissed  his 
bill  against  a  pauper  defendant,  the  practice  is  to  allow  the  defendant 

dives  costs.7  (a) 
*156  *  To  entitle  a  party  to  defend  as  a  pauper,  he  must  make  an 
affidavit  similar  to  that  required  from  a  plaintiff  applying  to  sue 
in  that  character ;  and  it  seems  that  if  he  is  in  possession  of  the  prop- 
erty in  dispute,1  or  of  property  which  he  is  prevented  from  dealing  with 
by  injunction,2  he  cannot  be  admitted,  or.  if  admitted,  he  may,  upon 
the  fact  being  afterwards  shown  to  the  Court,  be  dispaupered.  In  this 
and  in  most  other  respects,  the  rules  laid  down  with  regard  to  persons 

2  Oldfield  v.  Cobbett,  1  Phil.  613;  ante,  p.  38  discharged,  without  payment  of  the  costs  of  the 

3  Substituted,  by  25  &  26  Vic.  c.  104,  for  contempt;  considering  the  Court  to  have  power 
the  Queen's  prison.  to  make  such  an  order,  either  under  its  general 

4  23  &  24  Vic.  c.  149,  §§  2,  5;  and  see  §§  3,  authority  independent  of  the  11  Geo.  IV.  &  1 

4,  6,  and  pott,  Chap.  X.  §  2.  Will.  IV.c36,  or.under  that  statute  combined 

5  Layton  v.  Mortimore,  2  De  G.  F.  &  J.  with  its  general  authority.  Bennett  v.  Chud- 
353.  leigh,   2  Y.  &  C.  C.  C.    164;    see,   however, 

6  Davenport  v.  Davenport,  1  Phil.  124;  see,  Snowball  v.  Dixon,  2  De  G.  &  S.  9;  and  Dew 
however,  Prince  Albert  v.  Strange,  2  De  G.  &  v.  Clark,  16  Jur.  1,  L.  C;  3  M'N.  &  G.  357; 

5.  652,  718;   13  Jur.  507,  where  a  defendant,      Hall  v.  Hall,  L.  R.  11  Eq.  290. 

having  been  admitted  to  defend  in  the  course  7  Rubery  v.  Morris,  1   M'N.   &  G    413;  16 

of  the  cause,  was  ordered,  at  the  hearing,  to  Sim.  312,  433;  12  Jur.  689.     Unless  otherwise 

pay  the  plaintiff's  costs  up  to  the  time  of  such  directed,  costs  ordered  to  be  paid  to  a  party 

admission.     Where   a   defendant,    being  com-  suing  or  defending  in  forma  pauperis,  are  to 

mitted   for  not   answering,   had   subsequently  be  taxed,  as  dives  costs.     Cons.  Ord   XL.  5. 

obtained  permission  to  defend  in  forma  pan-  *  Spencer  v.  Bryant,  11  Ves.  49 ;  see  also 

peris,  and  thereupon  had  put  in  his  answer,  Sir  Wyatt's  P.  R   321. 

J.   L.   Knight  Bruce  V.  C.  ordered  him  to  be  2  Ridgway  v.  Edwards,  L.  R  9  Ch.  143. 


(a)  In  Carson  v.  Pickersgill,  14  Q.  B.  D.  did  in  fact  pay  to  his  counsel  or  solicitor,  and 

859,  871,  Bowen   L.  J.  considers  that  the  deci-  upon  proof  that  he  had  paid  such  costs,  he  was 

sion  in  Rubery  v.  Morris,  supra,  probably  led  allowed  to  tax  them  as  against  his  opponent." 

to  Cons.  Ord.  XL.  5,  and  says  that,  down  to  He  concludes  that,   under  the  Rules  of  the  Su- 

the  Judicature  Acts,  the  costs  of  the  pauper  preme  Court  of  1883,  Order  XVI.,  the  pauper 

were  at  common  law  not  in  the  discretion  of  is  not  now  to  be  allowed  costs  which    he  was 

the  Court,  while  the  Chancery  Court  had  power  never  obliged  to   pay,  simply  because  he  has 

over  them ;  that  "  dives  costs  appear  to  be  costs  chosen  to  pay  them  after  obtaining  judgment 
which  the  pauper,  although  not  bound  to  pav, 

150 


BANKRUPTS,   AND    LIQUIDATING    AND    COMPOUNDING   DEBTORS.      *  157 

suing  in  forma  pauperis*  are  applicable  to  persons  defending  in  that 
character ;  the  only  difference  being  in  the  form  of  application  for  ad- 
mission; for  the  petition,  in  the  case  of  a  defendant,  is  much  shorter 
than  in  the  case  of  a  plaintiff,  and  is  not  required  to  contain  any  state- 
ment of  the  case,  or  to  be  accompanied  by  any  certificate  of  counsel.4  If, 
however,  there  has  been  a  suppression  of  any  material  fact  in  the  peti- 
tion, the  order  will,  on  the  motion,  with  notice,  of  the  plaintiff,  be 
discharged.5 

A  person  who  is  not  a  defendant  to  a  suit  cannot  be  admitted  to  defend 

in  forma  pauperis.6 

Section  VII.  —  Persons  attainted  or  convicted. 

It  is  said  that  all  persons  disabled  by  law  from  instituting  or  maintain- 
ing a  suit  may,  notwithstanding,  be  made  defendants  in  a  Court  of  Law, 
and  cannot  plead  their  own  disabilities.7  This  rule  would  appear  to  be 
adopted  in  Courts  of  Equity,  in  those  cases  at  least  where  the  suit  seeks 
to  establish  a  pecuniary  demand  against  the  person  made  a  defendant. 
Where,  however,  the  proceeding  is  in  rem,  and  a  person  under  any  of 
the  disabilities  alluded  to  is  interested  in  the  subject  of  the  suit,  then 
it  would  seem,  that  as  the  interest  of  the  party  is  entirely  vested  in  the 
Crown,  the  Attorney-General  would  be  the  proper  defendant.8  Whether 
in  such  case,  the  party  himself  should  be  joined,  is  a  point  which  does 
not  appear  to  have  been  determined ;  but  it  is  submitted  that  the  rule, 
that  no  person  can  be  made  a  party  to  a  suit  against  whom  no  relief  can 
be  prayed,  will  apply  to  this  case,  as  well  as  to  that  of  bankrupts. 

*  Section  VIII.  —  Bankrupts,  and  Liquidating  and  Com-         *157 
pounding  Debtors. 

It  follows  from  general  rule  that  no  person  can  be  made  a  party  to  a 
suit  against  whom  no  relief  can  be  prayed,1  that  bankrupts,  whose  inter- 
ests,  whether  legal  or  equitable,  have  devolved  upon  their  assignees, 

8  Ante,  pp.  41,  42.  brought    against    him    for    debt    or    trespass. 

*  See  Cons.  Ord.  VII.  9-11;  XL.  5.     Regu-  Banyster  v.  Trussell,   Cro.    Eliz.   510;    Coke's 

lation  to  Ord.  IV.  2.     The  defendant  need  not  Entries,   246;    see   also   Ward   and    Prestall's 

enter  an   appearance   before  applying  for  the  cases,  in  1  Leon.  329;  and  Vin.  Ab.  Attainder 

order.    Braithwaite's  Pr.  563.     An  application  (B)  3. 
in  behalf  of  an  infant  defendant  for  leave  to  8  See  Balch  v.  Wastall,    1    P.  Wins.   445: 

defend  in  forma  pauperis,  will  not  be  enter-  Hay  ward  v.   Fry,    ib.   446; v.  Bromley,  2 

tamed  before  the  appointment  of  a  guardian  ad  P.  Wms.   269,  270;  Rex  v.  Fowler,    Bunb.  38; 

litem.     Matter  of  Byrne,  1  Edw.  Ch.  41.     For  Cuddon  r.   Hubert,  7  Sim.  485;  and  see  Att.- 

forms  of  petition  and  affidavit,   see   Vol.    III.  Gen.  v.  Rickards,  8   Beav.   380;    Goldsmith  v. 

For  forms  of  order,  see  2  Seton,  1046,  No.  1.  Russell,  5   De  G.   M.  &  G.   547;  Bromley  v. 

5  Nowell  v.  Whittaker,  6  Beav.  407.  Smith,  26  Beav.  644;  Hancock  v.  Att.-Gen.  10 

«  Holdeno.  Holden,  W.  N.  (1808)  180.  Jur.  N.  S.  557;  12  W.  R.  569,  V.  C  K.     Out- 

7  Treatise  on  Star  Chamber,   part  3,  §  6  (2  lawrv  in  a  civil  action  is  now  abolished      42 

Collect.  Jurid.   140).     It  is  said  in  the  above  &  43  Vic.  c.  59.      As  to   persons  convicted  of 

Treatise,  that  persons   attainted  of  treason   or  treason  or  felony,  see  33  &  34  Vic.  c.  23. 
felony  are  excepted  out  of  this  rule;   but  it  has  l  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  231,  and   cases  cited   in 

been  decided,  in  many  cases,  that  a  defendant  notes;  Todd  v.  Stewart,  6  J.  J.  Marsh.  432. 
cannot  plead  his   own  attainder  to  an   action 

151 


*  157 


PERSONS   AGAINST   WHOM   A   SUIT   MAY   BE   INSTITUTED. 


need  not  be  made  parties  to  suits 
affected  by  the  bankruptcy.2  (a) 

2  Whitworth  v.  Davis,  1  Ves.  &  B.  545,  547 ; 
DeGolls  v.  Ward,  3  P.  Wms   311,  n. :  Collins©. 
Shirley,   1  R.  &  M.  638;  Judgment  of  Lord 
Cottenham  in    Rochfort  v.  Battersby,  2  H.  L. 
Cas.  408;   2  J.  &  Lat.  431;   and  see  Davis  v. 
Swell,  28  Beav.  321 ;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  233  and 
note;  De  Wolf  v.  Johnson,  10  Wheat.  384.    So 
in  case  of  a  registered  trust  deed,  the  assignor 
need  not  be  a  party.     Fenton  v.  Queen's  Ferry 
Wire  Rope  Co.  L.  R.  7   Eq.  267.      Counsel  for 
an   insolvent    appearing   separately   from   his 
assignees  will  not  be  heard.  Edmunds  v.  Waugh, 
1  W.  N.  7,  V.  C.  K.;  L.  R.  1  Eq.  418.     As  to 
bankruptcy  generally,   see  Robson  on    Bank- 
ruptcy;   Bump  on  Bankruptcy.     As   to   what 
property  passes  to  the  trustee,  see  Bankruptcy 
Act,  1809,  c.  71,   §  15.     As  to   what  property 
does  not  so  pass,  see  id  ;  Re  Downing.  4  Ch. 
D.  689  ;  Ex  parte  Vine,  8Ch.  D.  364.  As  to  the 
reputed  ownership  clause,  see  Ex  parte  Bright, 
10  Ch.  D.  566;  Ex  parte  Wingfield,  id.  591. 
As  to  choses  in  action  not  being  such  within 
this  clause,   see  Re  Irving,  7  Ch.  D.  419;  Re 
Bainbridge,  8  Ch.  D.  218;  Ex  parte  Ibbetson, 
id.  519.     As  to  the  effect   of  an  order  of  dis- 
charge on  the  bankrupt's  after-acquired  prop- 
erty, see  Ebbs  v.  Boulnois,  L.  R.  10  Ch.  479; 
Re  Pettit's  Estate,    1  Ch.  D.  478.     As  to  the 
effect  of  a  discharge  from  one  set  of  joint  and 
separate  creditors,  see  Meggy  v.  Imperial  Dis- 
count Co.  3  Q.  B.  D.  711.     As  to  the  effect  of  a 
trustee  allowing  the  debtor  to  retain  some  of 
the  property,   see   id. ;    Troughton   v.   Gilley, 
Amb.  630:  Ex  parte  Martin,  15  Ves.  115;  Ex 
parte  Bourne,  2  Gl.  &  J.  137 :  Nias  r.  Adamson, 
3  R.  &  Aid.  225;  Tucker  v.  Hernaman,  4  De  G. 
M.  &  G.  395;  1  Sm.  &  G.  394;  Engleback  p. 
Nixon,  L.  R.  10  C.  P.  645;  Ex  parte   Bolland, 
9  Ch.   D.  312.      Debts  not   provable   may   be 


relative  to  any  property  which  is 


enforced   against    the    bankrupt,   or    under  a 
liquidation.     See  32  &  33  Vic.  c.  71,  §  125;  Ex 
parte  Baum,  L.  R.  9Ch.673;  Ex  parte  Brooker, 
2  Ch.  D.  57;    Re  Meade,  3  Ch    D.   119;    Ex 
parte  Brooke,   id.  494;  Ex  parte    Postm:ister- 
General,  10  Ch.  D.   595;  Ex  parte  Crosbie,  7 
Ch.  D.  123.     See  Ex  parte  Blakemore,  5  Ch. 
D.  372;  Ex  parte  Pearce,  13  Ch.  D.  262;  Wat- 
son v.  Holliday,  20  Ch.    D.   780.     As  to  what 
claims  are  provable,  see  Ibid.;  Ex  parte  Pea- 
cock, L.  R.  8  Ch.  682;  Ex  parte  Coker,  L.  R.  10 
Ch.  652 ;  Cobham  v.  Dalton,  id.  655 ;  Re  Deere, 
id.  658.     Upon  the  effect  of  the  order  of  dis- 
charge, see  32  &  33  Vie.  c.  71,  §  49;  c.  62,  §  4; 
Emma  Silver   Mining  Co.  v.  Grant,  17  Ch.  D. 
122  ;  Earl  of  Lewes  v.  Barnett,  6  Ch.  D.  252; 
Robson  on  Bankruptcy.      As   to   making  the 
trustee  a  co-defendant  to  an  action  against  the 
bankrupt,   see  Gilbert  v.  Lewis,  1    De  G.  J.  & 
S.  38;  9  Jur.  N.  S.  187  ;  Ex  parte  Coker,  L.  R. 
10  Ch.  652;  Dence  v.  Mason,  W.  N.  (1879),  177; 
Metropolitan  Bank  r.  Offord,  L.  R.  10  Eq.  398; 
Hale  v.  Boustead,  8  Q.  B.  D.  453.     Respecting 
composition    with  creditors,  and  suits  against 
compounding  debtors;  see  32  &  33  Vic.  c.  71, 
§§  72,  126  ;  Pashler  v.  Vincent,  8   Ch.  D.  825; 
Re  Kearley,  7  Ch.  D.  615;  Re  Shiers,  id.  416; 
Ex  parte  Lopez,  5  Ch.  D.  65;  Ex  parte  Wat- 
son, 2  Ch.  D.  63:  Ex  parte  Lang,  id.  971 ;   Ex 
parte  Lace)',  16  Ch.  D.  131;  Ex  parte  McLaren, 
id.  534;  Breslauer  v.  Brown,  3  App.  Cas.  672; 
Campbell  v.  Im  Thurm,  1  C.  P.  D.  267;  Mel- 
hado  r.  Watson,  2  C.  P.   D.  281;  Edwards  v. 
Coombe,  L.  R.  7  C.  P.  519;  Re  Hatton,  L.  R.  7 
Ch.  723;  Ex  parte  Carew,  L.  R.  10  Ch.  308; 
Eyre  v.  Smith,  25  W.  R.  871 ;  Ex  parte  Paper 
Staining  Co.  L.  R.  8  Ch.  595;  Re  McHenry,  21 
Q.  B.  D.  580.     See  1  Dan.  Ch.  Prac.  (6th  Eng. 
ed.)  170. 


(a)  The  assignee  is  not  a  trustee  for  the 
bankrupt.  Re  Leadbitter,  10  Ch.  D.  388.  If 
the  debtor,  having  a  general  power  of  appoint- 
ment by  deed  or  will,  dies,  his  trustee  in  liqui- 
dation has  no  power  to  appoint  the  property  in 
his  right  or  place.  Nichols  to  Nixey,  29  Ch. 
I).  1005;  see  Ex  parte  Gilchrist,  17  Q.  B.  D. 
521.  Until  the  trustee  intervenes  a  bankrupt's 
transactions,  respecting  property  acquired  after 
his  bankruptcy,  with  any  person  dealing  with 
him  bona  fide  and  for  value,  either  with  or 
without  knowledge  of  the  bankruptcy,  are  valid 
against  the  trustee.  Cohen  v  Mitchell,  25  Q. 
B.  D.  262.  Where  an  injunction  was  gran-ted 
restraining  the  defendants  from  infringing  the 
plaintiff's  patent  by  making  and  selling  instru- 
ments, the  defendants,  having  appealed  and 
then  become  bankrupt,  were  held  to  be  still 
interested,  as  they  would  still  be  liable  per- 
sonally for  breach  of  the  injunction.     United 

152 


Telephone  Co.  v.  Bassano,  31  Ch.  D.  630.  So  in 
cases  ol  breach  of  trust,  when  there  is  no  ade- 
quate legal  remedy,  relief  may  be  had  inequity, 
though  the  defendant  becomes  insolvent.  Ames 
Iron- Works  v.  West,  24  Fed.  Rep.  313.  Prop- 
erty acquired  by  a  liquidating  debtor  after  his 
discharge  does  not  vest  in  his  trustee,  although 
the  liquidation  is  not  closed.  Ebbs  v.  Boulnois, 
L.  R.  10  Ch.  479  ;  Re  Smith,  24  Ch.  D.  672. 
A  Court  of  Bankruptcy  will  not  restrain  a  suit 
for  fraud,  against  a  debtor  in  that  position,  by 
a  creditor  who  has  proved  his  debt  in  the  liqui- 
dation. Ex  parte  Hemming,  13  Ch.  D.  163; 
Ross  v.  Guttendge,  52  L.  J.  Ch.  280;  48  L.  T. 
117.  A  creditor  is  not  bound  by  a  composition 
when  there  has  been  a  misstatement  as  to  his 
debt.  Breslauer  r.  Brown,  3  App.  Cas.  672; 
Ex  parte  Engelhardt,  23  Ch.  D.  706;  see  Tea 
Co.  v.  Jones,  43  L.  T.  255. 


BANKRUPTS,  AND    LIQUIDATING    AND    COMPOUNDING   DEBTORS.      *  158 

Upon  this  principle,  a  demurrer  put  in  by  a  bankrupt,  who  was  joined 
as  a  co-defendant  with  his  assignees,  in  a  bill  to  enforce  the  specific  per- 
formance of  an  agreement  entered  into  by  him  previously  to  his  bank- 
ruptcy, was  allowed.8 

It  is  said  b}7-  Lord  Redesdale  that,  although  a  bankrupt  made  a  party 
to  a  bill  touching  his  estate  may  demur  to  the  relief,  all  his  interest 
being  transferred  to  his  assignees,  yet  it  has  been  generally  understood, 
that  if  any  discovery  is  sought  of  his  acts  before  he  became  a  bank- 
rupt, he  must  answer  to  that  part  of  the  bill  for  the  sake  of  the  dis- 
covery, and  to  assist  the  plaintiff  in  obtaining  proof,  though  his  answer 
cannot  be  read  against  his  assignee  ;  otherwise,  the  bankruptcy  might 
entirely  defeat  the  ends  of  justice.4 

*  When  the  bankruptcy  of  a  defendant  does  not  appear  on  the  *158 
face  of  the  bill,  or  has  occurred  subsequently  to  the  tiling  of  the 
bill,  but  before  the  expiration  of  the  time  for  putting  in  his  answer, 
the  defendant  may  take  the  objection  by  way  of  plea.1  He  may  also 
state  the  bankruptcy  of  a  co-defendant,  by  way  of  objection  for  want  of 
parties,  even  where  it  took  place  after  the  filing  of  the  bill.2 

A  bankrupt  can  be  made  a  party  to  a  bill  for  the  mere  purpose  of  dis- 
covery and  injunction ; 8  but  there  is  no  doubt  that  if  he  is  made  a  party 
for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  relief  against  him,  he  may  demur  to  the 
bill,  and  that  in  such  case  his  demurrer  will  protect  him  from  the 
discovery  as  well  as  the  relief ;  where,  however,  fraud  or  collusion  is 
charged  between  the  bankrupt  and  his  assignees,  the  bankrupt  may  be 
made  a  party,  and  he  cannot  demur,  although  relief  be  prayed  against 
him.  Thus,  where  a  creditor,  having  obtained  execution  against  the 
effects  of  his  debtor,  filed  a  bill  against  the  debtor,  against  whom  a  com- 
mission of  bankrupt  had  issued,  and  the  persons  claiming  as  assignees 
under  the  commission,  charging  that  the  commission  was  a  contrivance 
to  defeat  the  plaintiff's  execution,  and  that  the  debtor  having,  by  per- 
mission of  the  plaintiff,  possessed  part  of  the  goods  taken  in  execution 

3  Whitworth  v.  Davis,  1  Ves.  &  B.  545;  see  question.  See  Gilbert  v  Lewis,  1  De  G.  J.  & 
also  Griffin  v.  Archer,  2  Anst.  478;  Lloyd  v.  S.  38;  2  J.  &  H.  452;  9  Jur.  N.  S.  187:  Weise 
Lander,  5  Mad.  282,  288;  Collet  v.  Wollaston,  v.  Wardle,  L.  R.  19  Eq.  171;  Bailey  v.  Vincent, 
3  Bro.  C.  C.  228.  5  Mad.  48;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  223,  n. 

4  Ld.  Red.  161;  Fopping  v.  Van  Pelt,  1  Hoff.  i  Turner  v.  Robinson,  1  S.  &  S.  3;  Lane  r. 
Ch.Pr.  545.  This  opinion  has  given  rise  to  Smith,  14  Beav.  49;  .Tones  v.  Binns,  10  Jur. 
much  discussion,  and  is  made  the  subject  of  an  N.  S.  119;  12  W.  R.  329,  M.  R.;  33  Beav.  362; 
elaborate  judgment  by  Sir  Thomas  Plumer  Peppery.  Henzell,  2  H.  &  M.  486;  HJur.  N. 
V.  C.  in  the  case  of  Whitworth  v.  Davis  (1  S.  840;  and  see  Campbell  v.  Joyce,  L.  R.  2Eq. 
Ves.  &  B.  545;,  in  the  course  of  which  he  ob-  377,  V.  C.  W. 

serves  that  "the  case  of  Fenton  v.  Hughes  (7  2  Sergrove  v.  Mayhew,  3  M'N.  &G.  97. 

Ves.  287;  see  also  Le  Texier  v.  Margravine  of  3  p|ea  0f  defendant's  bankruptcy  overruled; 

Anspach,  15  Ves.  159,  166)  lays  down  a  broad  be  being  the  manager,  secretary,  and  a  member 

principle,  namely,  that  a  person  who  has  no  in-  of  the  committee  of  an  association;  and   dis- 

terest,  and  is  a  mere  witness  against  whom  there  covery  was    required    from    him    in    order    to 

could  be  no  relief,  ought  not  to  be  a  party;  a  obtain  contribution  from  the  members.    Pepper 

bankrupt  stands  in  that  situation :  a  competent  v.  Henzell.  2  H  &  M.  486:  11  Jur.  N.  S.  840, 

witness,  having   no    interest,    against  whom,  which  see  for  form  of  plea.     For  plea  of  tru«t 

therefore,  no  relief  can  be  had  at  the  hearing;  deed  registered  under  the  Bankruptcy  Act,  1861 

he  falls  precisely  within   that  general   rule."  (24  &  25  Vic.  c.  134),  see  Metropolitan  Bank  v. 

He,  however,  allowed  the  demurrer  in  the  case  Offord,  W.  N.  (1870)  74. 
before  him,  without  determining  the  general 

153 


*  1G9         PERSONS   AGAINST   WHOM    A    SUIT   MAY   BE   INSTITUTED. 

for  the  purpose  of  sale,  instead  of  paying  the  produce  to  the  plaintiff  had 
paid  it  to  his  assignees  :  a  demurrer  by  the  alleged  bankrupt,  because  he 
had  no  interest,  and  might  be  examined  as  a  witness,  was  overruled.4 
Upon  the  same  principle,  where  a  man  had  been  fraudulently  induced 
by  the  drawer  to  accept  bills  of  exchange  without  consideration,  and  the 
drawer  afterwards  indorsed  them  to  others  :  upon  a  bill  filed  against  the 
holder  and  drawer  of  the  bills  of  exchange,  for  a  delivery  up  of  the  bills, 
and  an  injunction,  the  drawer's  plea  of  his  bankruptcy,  which  took 
place  after  the  bill  filed,  in  bar  to  the  bill,  was  overruled.5 

Where  a  defendant  becomes  bankrupt  after  the  commencement  of  the 
suit,  the  bankruptcy  is  no  abatement,  and  the  plaintiff  has  his  choice, 
either  to  dismiss  the  bill  and  go  in  under  the  bankruptcy,  or  to  go  on 
with  the  suit,  making  the  assignees  parties.6  (a)  It  seems  that  in  Knox 
v.  Brown,"1  Lord  Thurlow  permitted  the  plaintiff  to  dismiss  his 
*159  own  bill  without  costs,  because  it  was  by  the  *  act  of  the  defend- 
ant himself  that  the  object  of  the  suit  was  gone.  In  a  subsequent 
case,1  however,  the  Court  of  Exchequer  refused  to  make  such  an  order 
without  costs;  and  in  Monteith  v.  Taylor, 2  where  a  motion  was  made  on 
behalf  of  the  defendant,  who  had  become  bankrupt,  to  dismiss  the  plain- 
tiff's bill  with  costs,  for  want  of  prosecution,  Lord  Eldon,  although  he  at 
first  entertained  a  doubt  whether  he  could  make  such  an  order  with 
costs,  afterwards  expressed  an  opinion  against  the  plaintiff  upon  that 
point,  upon  which  the  plaintiff  submitted  to  give  the  usual  undertaking 
to  speed  the  cause  ;  and  in  Blackmore  v.  Smith*  Lord  Cottenham,  after 
referring  to  the  order  made  in  the  last-mentioned  case,  in  the  Registrar's 
book,  held,  that  if  the  bill  were  dismissed  it  must  be  with  costs. 

It  appears  from  the  two  cases  last  referred  to,  that  a  defendant  may, 
notwithstanding  he  has  become  bankrupt,  move  to  dismiss  the  plain- 
tiff's bill  for  want  of  prosecution ;  and  it  is  the  practice,  on  such  a  mo- 
tion, to  dismiss  the  bill  with  costs.4 

Where  a  party  who  is  a  defendant  to  a  suit  becomes  bankrupt,  it  will 
be  necessary  for  the  plaintiff,  if  he  proceeds  with  the  suit,  to  bring  the 
assignees  before  the  Court  by  amendment  or  a  supplemental  order  ; 5  (1>) 

4  King  v.  Martin,  2  Ves.  J.  641,  cited  Ld.  Kemball  v.  Walduck,  1  Sm.  &  G.  App.  27 ; 
Red.  162;  but  see  Gilbert  v.  Lewis,  1  De  G.  J.      18  Jur.  69. 

&  S.  38;  2  J.  &  H.  452;  9  Jur.  N.  S.  187.  5  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §§  52,  53;  R.  S.  C. 

5  Mackworth  v.  Marshall,  3  Sim.  368.  Ord.  L.  1-4;  Lash  v.  Miller,  4  De  G.  M.  &  G. 

6  Monteith  v.  Taylor,  9  Ves.  615.  841;  1  Jur.  N.  S.  457;  Storm  v.  Davenport,  1 
'  2  Bro.  C.  C.  186.  Sandf.  Ch.   135.     It  is  to   be  borne  in  mind, 

1  Rutherford  v.  Miller,  2  Anst.  458.  that  there  is  a  difference  in  reference  to   this 

2  9  Ves.  615.  point  between   cases   of  voluntas  alienation, 

3  1  M'N.  &  G.  80.  and   cases   of    involuntary   alienation,    as    by 

4  Blackmore  e.  Smith,  ubi  sup. ;  see  also  insolvency  or  bankruptcy  of  the  defendant. 
Robson  v.  Earl  of  Devon,  3  Sm.  &  G.  227;  This  distinction  is  fully  discussed  in  Sedgwick 
Levi  v.  Heritage,  26  Beav.  560,  which  were  v.  Cleveland,  7  Paige,  290-292;  see  also  note  to 
cases  of  insolvent  debtors;  overruling  Blan-  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  342.  After  the  assignees  have 
shard   v.   Drew,   10   Sim.  240;   see,    however,  been  made  parties,  the  bankrupt  appears  to  be 


(a)  See  Blanchard  v.  Cooke,  144  Mass.  207,  W.    N.    (1876),    112;  Barter   v.    Dubeux,    7 
218.  Q.  B.  D.  413;  Esterbrook  Steel  Pen  Manuf.  Co. 

(b)  See  also  Provincial   Banking  Co.  v.  Til-  v.  Ahem,  30  N.  J.  Eq.  341. 
lett,  W.  N.  (1869)   222;  Walker  r.  Blackmore, 

154 


BANKRUPTS,   AND   LIQUIDATING   AND   COMPOUNDING   DEBTORS.      *  160 

and  it  has  been  decided,  that  where  the  assignee  of  a  bankrupt  has 
been  already  before  the  Court  as  a  defendant,  and  such  assignee  die 
or  is  removed,  and  a  new  assignee  is  appointed  in  his  stead,  the  suit 
abates,  and  an  order  to  carry  on  the  proceedings  against  such  new 
assignee  must  be  obtained  in  like  manner  as  against  the  original 
assignee.6  (a) 

Where  a  bill  has  been  filed  against  a  defendant  who  afterwards 
became  bankrupt,  and  a  supplemental  bill  was  in  consequence  filed 
against  his  assignees,  the  evidence  taken  in  the  original  cause  pre- 
viously to  the  bankruptcy  was  allowed  to  be  read  at  the  hearing 
*  against  the  assignees ;  but  where  it  appeared  that  some  of  the  *160 
witnesses  in  the  cause  had  been  examined  after  the  commission 
issued,  and  before  the  supplemental  cause  was  at  issue,  an  objection 
to  reading  their  depositions  was  allowed ;  but  the  objection  was  over- 
ruled in  so  far  as  it  extended  to  the  witnesses  who  had  been  previously 
examined.1 

It  has  been  held  that,  on  the  death  of  the  assignee  of  an  insolvent's 
estate,  where  no  new  assignee  has  been  appointed,  a  party  having  a 
demand  against  the  insolvent,  but  not  having  proved  under  the  insol- 
vency, may  sue  the  executors  of  the  deceased  assignee.2 

Trustees  of  bankrupts  brought  before  the  Court  by  order  to  continue 
the  proceedings  may  be  made  liable  to  the  costs  of  the  whole  action, 
where  they  improperly  resist  the  plaintiff's  claim  ; 3  and,  after  some 
difference  of  opinion  upon  the  subject,  it  has  been  determined,  that  in 
foreclosure  suits,  where  assignees  are  made  parties  as  defendants,  in 
respect  of  the  equity  of  redemption,  they  are  not  entitled  to  their  costs 
from  the  plaintiff,  even  though  they  may  have  received  no  assets  of  the 
bankrupt  wherewith  to  pay  them.4  A  defendant  who  has  become  bank- 
rupt may  appeal  from  a  personal  order  which  has  been  made  against 
him.5 


treated  as  out   of  the   suit;  see   Robertson    v.  Younge,  386;  Mendham  v.  Robinson,  1  M.&K. 

Southgate,  5  Hare,  223;  Stahlschmidt  v.  Lett.  217;  Man   v.   Ricketts,   7    Beav.   484;  1   Phil, 

ib.  595;  and  see  Seton,  1166.   For  forms  of  sup-  617  (decided  on  similar  clause  in  former  Bank- 

plemental   order,  see  Seton,  1165;    Nos.  5,  6;  rupt  Act),  and  cases  there  cited, 

and  for  forms  of  motion  paper  and  petition,  see  *  Hichens  v.  Congreve,  4  Sim.  420. 

Vol.  III.;  and  see  ante,  p.  64.  But  see  now  Doe  2  Fulcher   v.  Howell,  11   Sim.  100;  and  see 

v.  Childress,  21  Wall.  642;  Payne  v.  Beech,  2  ante,  p.  62. 

Tenn.  Ch.  711;  Eyster  v.  Graff,  91  U.  S.  521 ;  3  Whiteoinb  v.  Minchin,  5  Mad.  91  ;  Cook 
Esterbrook  Steel  Pen  Man.  Co.  v.  Ahern,  30  v.  Hathway,  L.  R.  8  Eq.  612,  617;  but  see 
N.  J.  Eq.  341,  and  note.  And  see  Barger  Foxwell  v.  Greatorex,  33  Beav.  345. 
v.  Buckland,  28  Gratt.  850;  Parks  v.  Doty,  13  4  Appleby  v.  Duke,  1  Phil.  272;  Clarke  v. 
Bush,  727.  Wilmot,  ib.  276;  Ford  V,  White,  16  Beav.  120, 
6  Gordon  v.  Jesson,  16  Reav.  440.  The  and  cases  there  cited;  and  see  Ford  v.  Chester- 
157th  section  of  the  Bankrupt  Act,  12  &  13  field,  16  Beav.  516 ;  but  see  Eglin  v.  Dry- 
Vic,  c  106,  referred  to  ante,  p.  65,  applies  only,  den,  16  W.  R.  837;  see  also  post,  Chap.  XVI. 
it  would  seem,  to  plaintiffs;  see  Gordon  v.  Jes-  Disclaimers 
son,   u'/i  sup.;  and   see   Bainbrigge    v.   Blair,  6  Dence  v.  Mason,  W.  N.  (1879)  177. 


(")  An  assignee  in  bankruptcy,  who  has  lent  conveyance  by  the  bankrupt  prior  to  his 
been  discharged  upon  his  accounts,  is  not  a  bankuptcy.  Clarkson  v.  Dunning,  22  Abb 
necessary  party  to  a  suit  to  set  aside  a  fraudu-      N.  C-  439. 

155 


*  161 


PERSONS   AGAINST   WHOM    A    SUIT   MAY   BE   INSTITUTED. 


Section  IX.  —  Infants. 

Infants  as  well  as  adults  may,  as  we  have  seen,6  be  made  defendants 
to  suits  in  Equity  ;  and,  in  such  cases,  it  is  not  necessary  that  any  other 
person  should  be  joined  with  them  in  the  bill ;  nor  is  it  usual  for  the 
plaintiff  to  describe  them  as  infants  in  his  bill,  unless  any  question  in 
the  suit  turns  upon  the  fact  of  their  infancy.  (a) 

Infants,  on  account  of  their  supposed  want  of  capacity,  are  not  them- 
selves permitted  to  defend ;  and  therefore,  where  a  defendant  to  a  suit, 
or  the  respondent  to  a  petition,7  is  an  infant,  a  proper  person,  who  ought 
not  to  be  a  mere  volunteer,8  should  appear,  put  in  his  defence  for  him, 
and  generally  act  on  his  behalf  in  the  conduct  and  management  of  the 
case.9  This  person  is  called  "  the  guardian  of  the  infant ; "  and 
*161  is  generally  styled  "  the  guardian  ad  litem"  *  to  distinguish  him 
from  the  guardian  of  the  person,  or  of  the  estate.1 


6  Ante,  p.  130. 

"  Re  Barrington,  27  Beav.  272;  Re  Ward, 
2  Giff.  122;  6  Jur.  N.  S.  441;  Re  Duke  of 
Cleveland's  Harte  Estates,  1  Dr.  &  Sm.  46;  see 
Re  Cooper,  9  W.  R.  631. 

8  Anon.  10  Hare,  App.  27;  Foster  u.  Cautley, 
10  Hare,  App.  24;  17  Jur.  370;  and  see  Leese 
v.  Knight,  8  Jur.  N.  S.  1006;  10  W.  R.  711. 
It  is  usual  to  appoint  the  nearest  relative  of 
an  infant  defendant  as  his  guardian  ad  litem. 
Bank  of  United  States  v.  Ritche,  8  Peters, 
128 ;  Grant  v.  "Van  Schoonhoven,  9  Paige,  255. 
And  see  where  no  one  applies,  Anon.  2  Ch.  Cas. 
163;  2  Fonbl.  236 ;  Conclin  «.  Hall,  2  Barb.  Ch. 
136;   Carter  v.  Montgomery,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  457. 

9  A  decree  against  an  adult  defendant,  as  if 
an  infant,  was  held  not  to  bind  him.  Snow  v. 
Hole,  15  Sim.  161;  Green  v.  Badley,  7  Beav.  271. 

i  In  a  suit  against  an  infant,  process  should 
be  served  upon  him.  and  a  guardian  ad  litem 
appointed  by  the  Court.  Carrington  v.  Brents, 
1  McLean,  17;  Walker  v.  Hallett,  1  Ala.  379; 
Graham  v.  Sublett,  6  J.  J.  Marsh.  45.  A  guar- 
dian ad  litem  need  not  be  appointed,  if  the 
infant  has  a  probate  or  general  guardian,  unless 
the  interests  of  the  infant  and  such  guardian 
are  in  conflict.  Mansur  V.  Pratt.  101  Mass.  60. 
So  in  Tennessee  the  general  guardian  represents 
the  infant.  Britain  v.  Cowan,  5  Humph.  315; 
Co  wen  v.  Anderson,  7  Coldw.  291. 

In  New  York,  the  appearance  of  an  infant 
is  entered  by  his  guardian  ad  litem,  who  is 
appointed  by  the  Court  on  petition  for  that 
p-irpose.  Knickerbocker  ».  De  Freest,  2  Paige, 
304;  Grant  v.  Van  Schoonhoven,  9  Paige,  255; 
See,  in  Ala.,  Cato  v.  Easly,  2  Stewart,  214 ;  Dar- 
rington  v.  Borland,  3  Porter,  10. 


Infants  above  the  age  of  fourteen  years 
should  be  consulted  in  the  appointment  of  a 
guardian  ad  litem,  if  that  course  would  not  be 
attended  with  too  much  trouble  or  expense. 
Walker  v.  Hallett,  1  Ala.  379.  Courts  may 
appoint  guardians  ad  litem  to  non-resident 
infants.  Walker  v.  Hallett,  1  Ala.  379; 
Graham  v.  Sublett,  6  J.  J.  Marsh.  45;  Smith  v. 
Palmer,  3  Beav.  10;  Kilcrease  v.  Blythe,  5 
Humph.  378.  And  they  may  provide  reason- 
able compensation  for  such  guardians.  Walker 
v.  Hallett,  1  Ala.  379;  Graham  v.  Sublett,  6  J. 
J.  Marsh.  45;  see  Gott  v.  Cook,  7  Paige,  523. 
It  is  error  to  enter  a  decree  against  infant 
defendants  without  assigning  them  a  guardian 
ad  litem.  Roberts  v.  Stanton,  2  Munf.  129; 
Irons  v.  Crist,  3  A.  K.  Marsh.  143;  St.  Clair  v. 
Smith,  3  Ham.  363 ;  Crockett  v.  Drew.  5  Gray, 
399;  Swan  v.  Horton,  14  Gray,  179;  Ewing  v. 
Highbee,  7  Ham.  198;  see  Darby  i'.  Richardson, 
3  J.J.  Marsh.  544  ;  Beverley  v.  Miller,  6  Munf. 
99;  Cravens  v.  Dyer,  1  Litt.  153;  Shields  v. 
Bryant,  3  Bibb,  525.  The  guardian  must  have 
accepted  the  appointment,  and  that  fact  should 
appear  of  record.  Daniel  v.  Hannagan,  5  J. 
J.  Marsh.  49. 

Where  infant  defendants  had  not  been  served 
with  process,  but  upon  inspection  of  the  record 
it  appeared,  that,  upon  their  motion,  a  guardian 
ad  litem  had  been  appointed,  who  proceeded  in 
the  cause,  the  Court  held,  that  a  decree  against 
the  infants  was  not  void,  and  therefore  could 
not  be  impeached  in  a  collateral  suit.  Day  v. 
Kerr,  7  Mo.  426.  So,  where  there  is  an  actual 
appearance  by  guardian  ad  litem,  recognized  by 
the  Court,  although  there  is  no  order  of  record. 
Hopper  v.  Fisher,  2  Head,  153  ;  Greenlaw  v. 


(a)  As  to  dispensing  with  notice,  by  the 
appointment  of  a  guardian  ad  litem,  to  an 
unborn  child,  see  Re  Rayner,  W.  N.  (1891) 

156 


152.  As  to  proceedings  upon  the  birth  of  an 
infant,  who  is  a  necessary  party,  pending  the 
suit,  see  Peter  v.  Thomas-Peter,  26  Ch.  D.  181. 


INFANTS. 


162 


Formerly  it  was  usual,  upon  the  appointment  of  a  guardian  ad  litem, 
for  the  infant  to  appear  personally  in  Court.2  This  is  no  longer 
necessary, 8  but  the  order  may  be  obtained  upon  motion  of  course, 
or  upon  petition  of  course,  presented  at  the  Rolls  in  the  name  of  the 
infant ;  the  application  being  supported  by  an  affidavit  of  the  infant's 
solicitor,  that  the  proposed  guardian  has  no  interest  in  the  matters  in 
question  in  the  suit,  adverse  to  that  of  the  infant;  and  it  must  also 
be  proved  by  the  same  affidavit,  or  by  that  of  some  other  person,  if 
the  solicitor  is  not  sufficiently  acquainted  with  the  proposed  guardian, 
that  he  is  a  fit  and  proper  person  to  be  appointed.4  A  co-defendant  may 
be  the  guardian  ad  litem,  if  he  has  no  adverse  interest ; s  but  neither  the 
plaintiff,  nor  a  married  woman,  nor  a  person  out  of  the  jurisdiction,6 
can  be  such  guardian. 

*  No  step  in  the  suit,  on  behalf  of  the  infant,  will  be  regular,  *1G2 
till  a  guardian  ad  litem  has  appeared  for  him.1  If  no  appearance  by 
a  guardian  is  entered  on  behalf  of  the  infant,  the  plaintiff  must,  before 
further  proceeding  with  the  action  against  the  infant,2  apply  to  the  Court 
or  a  Judge  that  a  solicitor  may  be  appointed  his  guardian.  The  applica- 
tion is  made  by  motion,  of  which  notice  8  must  be  served  upon  or  left  at 
the  dwelling-house  of  the  person  with  whom,  or  under  whose  care,  the 
infant  was  at  the  time  of  serving  the  bill,4  and  if  such  person  is  not 
the  father  or  guardian,  notice  must  also  be  served  upon  the  father  or 
guardian.  Where  the  infant's  father  was  dead,  service  of  the  notice 
at  the  house  of  the  infant's  mother  and  step-father  was  held  sufficient ; 5 
and  where  the  plaintiff  was  unable  to  discover  where  the  parents  lived, 
service  was  deemed  sufficient  on  the  head  of  a  college,  of  which  the 


Kemehan,  4  Sneed,  371;  Kindell  v.  Titus,  9 
Heisk.  738;  Jackson  v.  Jackson,  2  Tenn.  Leg. 
Rep.  275.  It  is  not  necessary  to  serve  a  copy  of 
a  bill  in  Equity  on  a  guardian  ad  litem,  after  his 
appointment.    Jones  v.  Drake,  2  Ha}'\v.  237. 

The  Court  will  not  appoint  a  person  guardian 
ad  litem  for  an  infant  defendant,  on  the  nomina- 
tion of  the  plaintiff.  Knickerbocker  v.  De 
Freest,  2  Paige,  304. 

2  Crabbe  v.  Moubery,  5  De  G.  &  S.  347; 
Benison  v.  Wortley,  ib.  648;  Tap  pen  v.  Nor- 
man, 11  Ves.  563. 

3  See  Drant  v.  Vause,  2  Y.  &  C  C.  C.  524  ; 
7  Jur.  637,  L.  C. ;  Egremont  v.  Egremont,  2  De 
G.  M.  &  G.  730:  17  Jur  55;  Foster  v.  Cautley, 
10  Hare,  App.  24;  17  Jur.  370;  Storr  v.  Pannell, 
1  W.  R.  209,  V.  C.  S  ;  Walker  v.  Hallett,  1 
Ala.  379;  Banta  v.  Calhoon,  1  A.  K.  Marsh. 
107;  Carter  v.  Montgomery,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  450. 

4  Braithwaite's  Pr.  46,  47;  see  now  R  S.  C. 
1883,  Old.  XVI.  18.  For  form  of  order,  see  2 
Seton,  705,  No.  3;  706,  No.  4;  and  for  forms  of 
motion  paper,  petition,  and  affidavit,  see  Vol. 
HI.  Where  the  infant  is  a  respondent  to  a 
petition,  and  a  guardian  ad  litem  is  to  be 
appointed,  the  application  must  be  supported  by 
an  affidavit  that  the  petition  has  been  served  on 


the  infant.  Re  Willan,  9  W.  R.  689;  see  In  re 
Jones's  Mortgage,  22  W  R.  837.  As  to  ser- 
vice, see  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  IX.  4  ;  2  Seton,  1624, 
Nos.  7,  8. 

5  See  Bonfield  v.  Grant,  11  W.  R.  275,  M.  R. ; 
Newman  v.  Selfe,  ib.  764,  M.  R. ;  Anon.  9 
Hare,  App.  27 

6  Anon.  18  Jur.  770,  V.  C.  W. 

i  Lushington  v.  Sewell,  6  Mad.  28.  See  Re 
Goodwin,  W.  N.  (1879)  218;  N.  v.  N.  22  W.  R. 
819.  An  appearance  by  the  plaintiff's  solicitor 
for  an  infant  defendant  is  irregular,  and  of 
no  validity.  Cons.  Ord.  X.  5;  Leese  v.  Knight, 
8  Jur.  N.  S.  1006;   10  W.  R.  711,  V.  C.  K. 

-  If  no  answer  is  required  from  the  infant 
(as  is  usually  the  practice),  and  no  voluntary 
answer  is  put  in,  the  defendant  is  considered, 
after  the  expiration  of  the  time  for  answering 
voluntarily,  to  be  in  default.  Bentley  v.  Robin- 
son, 9  Hare,  App.  76. 

3  For  form  of  notice  of  motion,  see  Vol.  III. 

4  Taylor  v.  Ansley,  9  Jur.  1055:  Christie  v. 
Cameron,  2  Jnr.  N.  S.  635,  V.  C  W. ;  and  see 
Cons.  Ord.  VII.  3;  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  XIII.  1. 

s  Hitch  v.  Wells,  8  Beav.  576,  and  see 
Thompson  v.  Jones,  8  Ves.  141;  Lane  v.  Hard- 
wicke,  5  Beav.  576. 

157 


*  163  PERSONS    AGAINST   WHOM    A   SUIT    MAY    BE   INSTITUTED. 

infant  was  an  under-graduate.6  If,  however,  an  appearance  has  been 
entered  for  the  infant,  service  upon  the  solicitor  is  sufficient.7  (a)  Upon 
the  motion,  the  Court  must  be  satisfied  that  the  bill  has  been  duly 
served,8  and  that  the  notice  of  the  application  was  served  after  the 
expiration  of  the  time  allowed  for  appearing  or  answering,  and  at  least 
six  clear  days  before  the  day  in  such  notice  named  for  hearing  the  appli- 
cation ; 9  but  the  Court  or  Judge,  on  hearing  the  application,  may  dis- 
pense with  service  on  the  father  or  guardian.10  The  official  solicitor  n 
is  the  person  usually  appointed. 

If  the  infant  is  out  of  the  jurisdiction,  the  same  course  must  be  fol- 
lowed ; 12  but  in  such  a  case  where  he  had  no  substantial  interest,  and 
had  been  served  with  the  bill,  the  Court  dispensed  with  service  of  notice 

of  the  application.13 
*163  *  If  the  guardian  dies  pending  the  suit,  a  new  guardian  must  be 
appointed  in  his  place;  this  is  done  in  the  same  manner  as  the 
original  guardian  was  appointed,  and  upon  similar  evidence.1  All  orders 
appointing  guardians  must  be  left  at  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerks'  Office 
for  entry.2 

Where  the  infant  is  a  married  woman,  it  is  nevertheless  necessary 
that  she  should  defend  by  her  guardian ;  though  it  appears  to  be  the 
practice  to  appoint  her  husband  to  be  her  guardian  where  he  is  a  defend- 
ant with  her,  and  they  intend  to  defend  jointly.3 

The  duty  of  the  guardian  is  to  properly  defend  the  suit  for  the  infant ; 
and  it  seems  that  he  is  responsible  for  the  propriety  and  conduct  of  the 
defence ; 4  and  if  he  puts  in  an  answer  which  is  scandalous  or  imperti- 

6  Christie  v.  Cameron,  ubi  supra.  son,  1  Giff.  337.:  4  De  G.  &  J.  659;  but  where 

I  Cookson  v.  Lee,  15  Sim.  302;  Bentley  V.  there  is  property  of  the  infant's  with  which  the 
Robinson,  9  Hare,  App.  76;  Wood  v.  Logsden,  Court  can  deal,  it  will,  it  seems,  direct  the  costs 
id.  26.  t0  be  paid  out  of  it.     Robinson  v.  Aston,  9  Jur. 

8  For  mode   of  service,  see  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  224.  V.  C.  K.  B. 

IX.  1.      An  infant  defendant,  who  cannot  be  12  O'Brien  v.  Maitland,  10  W.  R.  275,  L.  C; 

served,  and  whose  interest  is  merely  reversion-  and  see  Anderson  v.  Stather,  10  Jur.  N.  S.  383. 

ary,  may  be  struck  out  by  amendment.    Black-  13  Lambert  v.  Turner,  10  W.  H.  335,  V.  C. 

more  p.Howett,  30  L.  T."  101.  K.  ;  Turner  v.  Sowden,  10  Jur.  N.  S.  1122;  13 

9  Sundays  are  included.    R.  S.  C.  Ord.  LVII.  W.  R.  66,  V.  C  K  ;  2  Dr.  &  Sm.  265,  nom. 

2;  see  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.  11  ;  Brewster  v.  Turner  v.  Snowdon. 

Thorpe,  11  Jur.  6.     For  form   of   affidavit  in  l  Ante,  pp.  160,  161. 

support  of  motion,  see  Vol.  III.  2  Braithwaite's  Pr.  47.     Now  at  the  Central 

io  Cons.  Ord.  VII.  3;  see  Leese  v.  Knight,  8  Office. 

Jur.  N.  S.  1006;    10   W.   R.  711,  V.   C.    K. ;  3  Colman  v.  Northcote,  2  Hare,  147;  7  Jur. 

McDermott  v.   Thompson,   29   Fla.   299.     For  528,  and  cases  there  referred  to.     A  decree  in 

form  <>f  order,  see  Seton,  1251.  Chancery  is  erroneous  which  is  rendered  against 

II  To  the  Suitors'  Fee  Fund.  Thomas  v.  a  woman  who  is  shown  by  the  bill  to  be  bo'b. 
Thomas,  7  Beav.  47:  Sheppard  v.  Harris,  10  a  minor  and  a  feme  covert,  where  no  appear- 
Jur.  24,  V.  C.  K.  B.  Where  he  is  appointed,  ance  by  or  for  her  has  been  entered,  and  no 
the  Court  provides  for  his  costs,  Cons.  Ord.  XL.  guardian  ad  litem  appointed.  OHara  v.  Mac- 
4;  usually  directing  the  plaintiff  to  pay  them,  Connell,  93  U.  S.  150. 

and  add  them  to  his  own.      Harris  v.  Hamlyn,  4  Knickerbacker  v.  De  Freest,  2  Paige,  304. 

3  De  G.  &  S.  470;  14  Jur.  55;  Fraser  v.  Thomp-      A  guardian  ad  litem  may  consent  to  any  mat- 


(a)  In  Wade  P.  Keefe,  22  L.  R.  Ir.  154,  a  appearance   for   him.  was   held   not   liable  for 

solicitor,  who  in  ffood  faith,  and  without  knowl-  costs  subsequeutly  incurred  by  the  plaintiff  in 

edge  of  the  defendant's  infancy,  entered  an  the  suit. 

158 


INFANTS. 


164 


nent,  he  is  liable  for  the  costs  of  it ;  except,  however,  in  the  case  of  gross 
misconduct,  a  guardian  ad  litem  will  not  be  ordered  personally  to  pay 
the  costs  of  a  suit  which  he  has  defended  unsuccessfully.5  Sometimes 
the  guardian  is  ordered  or  decreed  to  perform  a  duty  on  behalf  of  the 
infant ;  his  refusal  or  neglect  to  do  which  will  subject  him  to  the  censure 
of  the  Court.6 

If  the  guardian  of  an  infant  defendant,  or  the  next  friend  of  an  infant 
plaintiff,  does  not  do  his  duty,  or  other  sufficient  ground  be  made  out, 
the  Court  will  remove  him.7  The  application  should  be  made  by  the 
infant,  by  his  next  friend  for  the  purpose  of  the  application.8  It  has 
been  said9  that  infants  are  as  much  bound  by  the  conduct  of  their 
solicitor  as  adults ;  thus,  an  issue  devlsavlt  vel  non  may,  it  seems,  be 
waived  on  the  part  of  the  infant.10  And  so,  although  the  Court  does  not 
usually,  where  infants  are  concerned,  make  a  decree  by  consent,  without 
an  inquiry  whether  it  is  for  their  benefit,11  yet  when  once  a  decree 
has  been  pronounced  without  that  *  previous  step,  it  is  considered  *1G4 
as  of  the  same  authority  as  if  such  an  inquiry  had  been  directed, 
and  a  certificate  thereupon  made  that  it  would  be  for  their  benefit ;  and 
in  the  same  manner,  an  order  for  maintenance,  though  usually  made 
after  an  inquiry,  if  made  without,  would  be  equally  binding.1 


ter  relating  to  the  conduct  of  the  cause,  such  as 
consenting  to  take  the  evidence  by  affidavit. 
Knatchbull  v.  Fowle,  1  Ch.  D.  604.  It  is  the 
special  duty  of  the  guardian  ad  litem  to  submit 
to  the  Court,  for  its  consideration  and  decision, 
every  question  involving  the  rights  of  the  in- 
fant affected  by  the  suit.  Ibid.;  Dow  v.  Jewell, 
21  N.  H.  486,  487,  and  to  make  a  vigorous  de- 
fence of  the  interests  of  the  infant.  Sconce  v. 
Whitney,  12  111.  150;  Enos  v.  Capps,  12  111. 
255.  If  the  guardian  ad  litem  neglects  his  duty 
to  the  infant,  whereby  such  infant  sustains  an 
injury,  the  guardian  will  not  only  be  punished 
for  his  neglect,  but  he  will  also  be  liable  to  the 
infant  for  all  the  damages  he  may  have  sustained 
thereby.     Knickerbacker  v.  De  Freest,  supra. 

Where  a  person  consents  to  act  as  guardian 
ad  litem,  he  must  put  in  a  pleading;  and  is 
not  to  stop  the  plaintiff  by  neglecting  it,  merely 
because  he  thinks  bis  wards  are  improper  or 
un necessary  parties.  Farmers'  Loan  and  Trust 
Co.  v.  Reed,  3  Edw.  Ch.  414.  The  infant's 
answer  is  generally  confined  to  a  mere  sub- 
mission of  his  rights  and  interests  in  the  mat- 
ters in  question,  to  the  care  and  protection  of 
the  Court.  The  answer  in  such  cases  generallv 
is  that  the  infant  knows  nothing  of  the  matter, 
ami  therefore  neither  admits  nor  denies  the 
charges,  but  leaves  the  pl.iintiff  to  prove  them 
as  he  shall  be  advised,  and  throws  himself  upon 
the  protection  of  the  Court.  Dow  v.  Jewell, 
21  X.  H.  487,  per  Gilchrist  C.  J. 

5  Morgan  v.  Morgan,  11  Jur.  N.  S.  233. 

6  Hinde.  241. 

7  Russell  v.  Sharpe,  1  J.  &  W.  482;  Leese 
r.  Knight,  8  Jur.  N.  S.  1006;  10  W.  R.  711. 


The  application  for  this  purpose  may  be  made 
by  summons  or  motion;  for  forms,  see  Vol.  III. 

8  Ante,  p.  71. 

9  Tillotson  v.  Hargrave,  3  Mad.  494;  see 
Morison  v.  Morison,  4  M.  &  C.  216,  226. 

10  Levy  v.  Levy,  3  Mad.  245. 

11  Dow  v.  Jewell,  21  N.  H.  486,  487;  Mills 
v.  Dennis,  3  John.  Ch.  368;  Mondey  v.  Mon- 
dey,  1  V.  &  B.  223.  Neither  a  default  nor  a 
decree  pro  confesso  can  be  taken  against  an 
infant.  Enos  v.  Capps,  12  111.  255;  Wells  v. 
Smith,  44  Miss.  296;  Mcllvoy  v.  Alsop,  45 
Miss.  335.  A  decree  cannot  be  entered  against 
an  infant  without  proof  to  sustain  the  case. 
Hamilton  v.  Oilman,  12  111.  260. 

i  Wall  v.Bushby,  1  Bro.  C.  C.484,  488:  per 
Gilchrist  C.  J.  in  Dow  v.  Jewell,  21  N.  H.  487; 
and  see  ante,  p.  68,  n.  (a) ;  Brooke  v.  Mostvn, 
10  Jur.  N.S.  554,  M.  R. ;  id.  1141;  L.R.4H.L. 
304;  33  Beav.  457;  2  De  G.  &  S.  373,  417; 
Fadelle  v.  Bernard,  19  W.  R.  555;  Boswell  v. 
Coaks,  27  Ch.  D.  424,  454;  Coaks  v.  Boswell,  11 
App.  Cas.  232;  as  to  compromises  with  the 
Court's  sanction  where  infants  are  interested, 
see  Musgrove  v.  Lusk,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  576.  By  an 
order,  it  was  provided  that  any  consent  by  the 
guardian  to  any  mode  of  taking  evidence  or 
other  procedure,  should,  if  given  with  the 
sanction  of  the  Court  or  Judge  in  chambers, 
have  the  same  effect  as  if  the  infant  were  not 
under  disability,  and  had  given  such  consent. 
Ord.  5  Feb.,  1861,  r.  24  (1  Jur.  N.  S.  Pt. 
II.  60).  For  form  of  summons  to  obtain  the 
Judge's  sanction,  see  Vol.  III.  As  to  his  con- 
sent to  taking  evidence  by  affidavit,  see  Knatch- 
bull  v.  Fowle,  1  Ch.   D.  604;  Fryer  v.  Wise- 

159 


*  165  PERSONS   AGAINST    WHOM    A    SUIT   MAY   BE   INSTITUTED. 

An  infant  defendant  is  as  much  bound  by  a  decree  in  Equity  as  a  per- 
son of  full  age  ;  therefore,  if  there  be  an  absolute  decree  made  against 
a  defendant  who  is  under  age,  he  will  not  be  permitted  to  dispute  it, 
unless  upon  the  same  grounds  as  an  adult  might  have  disputed  it ;  such 
as  fraud,  collusion,  or  error,  (a) 

To  impeach  a  decree  on  the  ground  of  fraud  or  collusion,  the  infant 
may  proceed,  either  by  a  bill  of  review  or  supplemental  bill  in  the  na- 
ture of  a  bill  of  review ;  or  he  may  so  proceed  by  original  bill.  He 
may  also  impeach  a  decree,  on  the  ground  of  error,  by  original  bill ; 
and  he  is  not  obliged,  for  that  purpose,  to  wait  till  he  has  attained 
twenty-one.2 

Among  the  errors  that  have  been  allowed  as  sufficient  grounds  on 
which  to  impeach  a  decree  against  an  infant,  is  the  circumstance  that, 
in  a  suit  for  the  administration  of  assets  against  an  infant  heir,  a  sale 
of  the  real  estate  has  been  decreed  before  a  sufficient  account  has  been 
taken  of  the  personal  estate.3  And  so,  if  an  account  were  to  be  directed 
against  an  infant  in  respect  of  his  receipts  and  payments  during  his 
minority,  such  a  direction  would  be  erroneous.4  Another  ground  of 
error  for  which  a  decree  against  an  infant  may  be  impeached  is,  that  it 
does  not  give  the  infant  a  day  after  his  coming  of  age  to  show  cause 
against  it,  in  cases  where  he  is  entitled  to  such  indulgence.5 

It  was  an  established  rule  at  Common  Law,  that  in  all  actions  for 
debt  against  infant  heirs  by  specialty  creditors  of  their  ancestors,  either 
party  was  entitled  to  pray  that  the  parol  might  demur ;  that  is,  that  the 
proceedings  might  be  stayed  until  the  heir  had  attained  his  full 
*165  age.6  This  rule  was  the  foundation  of  a  *  similar  practice  in 
Equity  in  like  cases  ;  *  so  that,  when  any  suit  was  instituted,  either 
by  a  specialty  creditor  or  by  a  simple  contract  creditor,  the  equity  of 
which  depended  upon  the  legal  liability  of  the  heir  to  pay  out  of  de- 
scended assets  the  specialty  debts  of  his  ancestor,  no  relief  could  be 
obtained  against  the  heir  during  his  minority,  but  the  decree  contained 
a  direction  for  liberty  to  apply  when  the  heir  should  have  attained 
his  full  age;  accompanied,  in  the  case  of  a  suit  by  a  simple  contract 
creditor,  with  a  declaration  of  the  right  to  have  the  assets  marshalled. 
Courts  of  Equity  did  not,  however,  confine  this  species  of  protection  to 
cases  precisely  similar  to  those  in  which  the  parol  could  demur  at  Law ; 
but,  by  a  kind  of  analogy,  they  adopted  a  second  rule,  by  which,  in  cases 

man,  W.  N.  (1876)  3;  24  W.  R.  205;  R.  S.  C.  6  3  Bla.  Com.  300;  Plasket  v.  Beeby,  4East, 

Old.  XXXVIII.  485;  Com.  Dig.   Enfant  (D)   3;   id.   Pleas,  2 

2  Richmond   v.  Tayleur,    1    P.  Wms.  737;  (E)  3.     Where   the  infant   is  a  trustee.  Equity 

Brook  v.  Mostyn,  ubi  supra;  S.  C.  sub  nam.,  may  direct  a  sale  notwithstanding  tlie  infancy. 

Mostyn  v.  Brooke,  L.  R.  4  H.  L.  304;  Living-  See  Hargrave  v.  Tindal,  1  Bro.  C.  C.  136,  n.; 

ston  v.  Noe,   1   Lea,   64;  McGavock  v.  Bell,  3  Uvedale   v.    Uvedale,   3    Atk.    117;    Pope  v. 

Coldw.  517;  Loyd  v.  Malone,  23  III.  43.  Gwyn,  8  Ves.  28,   n.;  Shiphard   v.  Lutwidge, 

s  Bennett  v.  Hamill,    2   Sch.   &  Lef.  566;  id.  26;  Spencer  v.  Boyes,  4  Ves.  28,  29,  n. 
Davidson  v.  Bowden,  5  Sneed,  129.  1  See    Powell     v.     Robins,     7     Ves.    209; 

4  Hindmarsh    v.    Southgate.    3   Russ.    324  Chaplin  v.  Chaplin,  3  P.  Wms.  368 ;  Lechmere 

327 ;  see  Stott  v.  Meanock.  10  W.  R.  605.  v.    Brasier,    2  J.    &   W.    287,   290 ;  Scarth  v. 

8  Bennett  ». Hamill, ubi  supra;  2  Kent,  245.  Cotton,  Cas.  temp.  Talb.  198. 


(a)  See  Fanning  v.  Foley  (Cal.),  33  Pac.  Rep.  1098. 
160 


INFANTS. 


166 


of  foreclosure  and  partition,  and  in  all  cases  in  which  the  real  estates  of 
an  infant  were  to  be  sold  or  conveyed  under  a  decree  of  the  Court,  and 
consequently  the  execution  of  the  conveyance  was  necessarily  deferred, 
the  infant  had  an  opportunity,  after  attaining  twenty-one,  to  show  cause 
against  the  decree.2  For  this  purpose  a  provision  was  inserted  in  the 
decree,8  giving  the  infant  a  day  to  show  cause  against  it  within  a  certain 
time  after  he  came  of  age.4  The  insertion  of  this  clause  in  a  decree  for 
a  conveyance  by  an  infant  of  his  estate,  was  so  strictly  insisted  upon  in 
all  cases,  that  the  omission  of  it  has  been  considered  as  an  error  in  the 
decree.6  (a) 

By  the  Act  11  Geo.  IV.  &  1  Will.  IV.  c.  47,  the  parol  demurrer  was  abol- 
ished, and  the  cases  in  which  the  clause  giving  the  infant  a  day  to  show 
cause  ought  to  be  introduced,  were  materially  lessened  in  number  ; 6  for 
by  the  10th  section 7  of  that  statute  it  is  enacted,  that  from  and 
after  the  passing  of  the  *  Act,  where  any  action,  suit,  or  other  *166 
proceeding  for  the  payment  of  debts,  or  any  other  purpose,  shall 


2  See  Price  v.  Carver,  3  M.  &  C.  162,  163. 

8  See  Harris  v.  Youman,  1  Hoff.  Ch.  178; 
Wilkinson  v.  Oliver,  4  Hen.  &  M.  450  ;  Shields 
v.  Bryant,  3  Bibb,  525;  Dow  v.  Jewell,  21 
N.  H.  470;  Anderson  v.  Irvine,  11  B.  Mon. 
341;  Cole  v.  Miller,  32  Miss.  89;  Guest  v. 
Sims,  1  Tenn.  79.  The  rule  applies  where  the 
infant  is  directed  to  convey,  not  where  title  can 
be,  and  is  divested  by  the  decree.  Sheffield  v. 
Duchess  of  Buckingham,  1  West,  684;  Mills  v. 
Dennis,  3  John.  Ch.  146;  Winston  v.  Campbell, 
4  H.  &  M.  477;  Rogers  v.  Clark,  4  Sneed,  668; 
Winchester  v.  Winchester,  1  Head,  460.  See 
infra,  166,  n.  5;  168,  n.  4;  997,  n.  1;  1276, 
n.  3.  Where  a  decree  against  an  infant  de- 
fendant permits  him  to  show  cause,  within  a 
certain  time  after  he  comes  of  age,  why  the 
decree  should  not  be  enforced,  he  cannot  assail 
the  decree  in  any  manner  he  may  choose, 
without  regard  to  the  course  of  practice  pur- 
sued by  adult  defendants,  but  he  must  apply 
to  the  Court  for  leave  and  direction.  Field  v. 
Williamson,  4  Sandf.  Ch.  613.  And  the  cause 
must  be  one  which  existed  at  the  time  the 
decree  was  pronounced.  Walker  v.  Page,  21 
Gratt.  636. 


(a)  See  ante,  p.  73,  n.  (a);  Whitney  v. 
Stearns,  11  Met.  (Mass.)  319;  Perry  v.  Perry, 
65  Maine,  399  ;  Smith  v.  McDonald,  42  Gal. 
484;  Bulow  v.  Witte,  3  S.  C.  308;  Davidson  v. 
Bowden,  5  Sneed,  129;  Hurt  v.  Long,  90  Tenn. 
445;  Simmons  v.  Baynard,  30  Fed.  Rep  532. 
In  Mellor  v.  Porter,  25  Ch.  D.  158,  upon  a 
review  of  the  authorities,  it  was  held  that  a 
direction  to  convey  when  the  infant  is  twenty- 
one  years  of  age  would  not  authorize  the  Court 
to  declare  him  a  trustee  before  that  age,  and  in 
the  case  of  an  equitable  mortgage,  the  follow- 
ing form    of    direction   in   the    decree  —  that 

VOL.   I.  — 11 


4  The  words  of  the  decree  in  such  cases 
were  as  follows:  "And  this  decree  is  to  be 
binding  on  the  defendant,  the  infant,  unless 
he,  on  being  served,  after  he  shall  have  attained 
his  age  of  twenty-one  years,  with  subpoena  to 
show  cause  against  this  decree,  shill,  within 
six  months  from  the  service  of  such  svbpienn, 
show  unto  this  Court  good  cause  to  the  con- 
trary." 2  Seton,  685,  No.  2;  see  Dow  v.  Jewell, 
21  N.  H.  491. 

5  Richmond  v.  Tayleur,  1  P.  Wins.  737. 
An  absolute  decree  against  an  infant,  without 
giving  him  day  after  he  comes  of  age  to  show 
cause  against  it,  will  be  reversed.  Beeler  v. 
Bullitt,  4  Bibb,  11;  Passmore  v.  Moore,  1  J.  J. 
Marsh.  591 :  Jones  v.  Adair,  4  J.  J.  Marsh.  220; 
Arnold  v.  Voorhies,  id.  507;  Searey  v.  Mor- 
gan, 4  Bibb,  96;  Wright  v.  Miller,  4  Barb. 
(S.  C.)  600;  Coffin  v.  Heath,  6  Met.  76. 

6  See  2  Macpherson  (Lond.  ed.  1842),  360, 
361,  411. 

7  The  repeal  of  this  section  by  42  &  43  Vic. 
c.  59,  §  2,  Sched.  Pt.  II.,  did  not  revive  the 
practice  of  parol  demurrer.     Id.  §  4  (4). 


"the  infant  defendants  upon  their  attaining 
twenty-one  execute  a  proper  conveyance  to  the 
plaintiffs  to  be  settled  by  the  Judge  in  case  the 
parties  differ."  and  giving  them  a  day  to  show 
cause  —  was  approved,  as  in  accordance  with 
the  practice  established  by  Price  v.  Carter, 
sup?-a,  and  the  unreported  case  of  Backhouse 
v.  Hornsey.  See  also  Gray  v.  Bell,  W.  X. 
H882)  78;"  30  W.  R.  606.  The  infant  himself 
should  be  made  a  party  to  a  bill  affecting  his 
title  to  real  estate.  Tucker  v.  Bean,  65  Maine, 
352;  Wakefield  v.  Marr,  65  Maine,  341. 

161 


167 


PERSONS    AGAINST   WHOM    A    SUIT   MAY   BE   INSTITUTED. 


be  commenced  or  prosecuted  by  or  against  any  infant  under  the  age  of 
twenty-one  years,  either  alone  or  together  with  any  other  person  or  per- 
sons, the  parol  shall  not  demur ;  but  such  action,  suit,  or  other  proceed- 
ing shall  be  prosecuted  and  carried  on  in  the  same  manner,  and  as 
effectually,  as  any  action  or  suit  could  before  the  passing  of  the  Act  be 
carried  on  or  prosecuted  against  any  infant,  where,  according  to  law,  the 
parol  did  not  demur ;  and  by  the  11th  section,  the  Court  was  enabled,  in 
suits  for  the  payment  of  the  debts  of  a  deceased  person,  to  compel  an 
infant  to  convey.1 

One  effect  of  this  power  was,  that  in  decrees  for  the  sale  of  estates 
for  the  payment  of  debts,  the  provision,  giving  the  infant  a  day  to  show 
cause,  was  omitted.  It  appears,  however,  that  although  the  power 
given  by  the  statute  was,  as  to  these  particular  suits  for  the  payment 
of  debts,  considered  a  sufficient  reason  for  omitting  the  clause  in  ques- 
tion, yet,  in  all  other  decrees,  where  a  conveyance  was  required  from 
an  infant,  the  law  remained  as  before  ;  and  the  practice  of  giving  the 

infant  a  day  to  show  cause,  therefore,  remained  the  same.2 
*  167  *  In  the  case  of  a  foreclosure,  whether  the  legal  estate  be J  or 
be  not  vested  in  the  infant,  it  is  still  usual  to  insert  in  the 
decree  a  clause  allowing  the  infant,  six  months  after  he  comes  of  age, 
to  show  cause  against  the  decree,2  unless  the  infant  is  a  trustee.3 
Yet,  in  cases  of  foreclosure,  the  only  cause  which  can  be  shown  by  the 


1  Brook  v.  Smith,  2  R.  &  M.  73;  and  the 
infant  may  be  attached.  Thomas  r.  Gwynne, 
8  Beav.  312.  Subsequent  Acts  are:  2  &  3  Vic. 
c.  60;  11  &  12  Vic.  c.  87  ;  13  &  14  Vic.  c.  60; 
15  &  16  Vic.  c.  55;  16  &  17  Vic.  c.  70;  31  & 
■12  Vic.  c.  40,  and  see  2  Seton,  712-714;  id. 
1114,  No.  4  (for  form  of  order);  Foster  v. 
Parker,  8  Ch.  D.  147. 

2  Price  r.  Carver,  3  M.  &  C.  157,  163: 
and  see  Scholefield  v.  Heafield,  7  Sim.  669  ;  8 
Sim.  470;  Ball  r.  Harris,  8  Sim.  498;  1  Jur. 
706  ;  Affd.  4  M.  &  C.  264:  3  Jur.  140;  Hutton 
?\  Mayne,  3  Jo.  &  Lat.  586;  Jones  r.  Harris, 
■i  Ir.  Eq.  65.  It  seems  to  have  been  intended 
by  the  30th  section  of  the  Trustee  Act,  1850, 
13  &  14  Vic.  c.  60,  to  obviate  the  necessity 
of  inserting  in  such  decrees  the  clause  giving 
tlie  infant  a  day  to  show  cause,  Headlam's 
Trustee  Acts,  p.  59;  that  section  extends  to  all 
cases  where  a  decree  for  the  conveyance  of 
lands  may  be  made  by  a  Court  of  Equity;  and 
with  respect  to  all  such  cases,  it  enables  the 
Court  to  carry  its  decrees  into  effect,  by  orders 
vesting  the  estates  and  interests  of  infants, 
and  other  persons  under  legal  disabilities,  in 
the  persons  to  whom  the  conveyance  is  to  be 
made.  Accordingly,  in  a  partition  suit,  Sir 
J.  L.  Knight  Bruce  V.  C.  made  an  order, 
declaring  that,  after  the  partition  should  have 
been  made,  an  infant  defendant  would  be  a 
trustee  within  the  Trustee  Act  as  to  the  other 
parties.  The  effect  of  such  an  order  is,  that 
the  aggregate  estate  may  be  vested  according 

162 


to  the  partition  sanctioned  by  the  Court, 
instead  of  postponing  the  conveyances  until 
the  infant  shall  have  attained  twenty-one,  and 
shall  have  had  opportunity  of  showing  cause 
against  the  decree.  And  it  is  presumed  that, 
in  all  cases  where  a  conveyance  is  required 
from  an  infant,  the  section  above  referred  to 
will  apply,  and  it  will  no  longer  be  necessary 
to  insert  in  the  decree  the  direction  giving  the 
infant  a  day  to  show  cause  after  he  shall  have 
attained  twenty-one.  Bowra  v.  Wright,  4  De 
G.  &  S.  265;  15  Jur.  981;  see  also  Shepherd 
v.  Churchill,  25  Beav.  21;  Re  Bloomar,  2 
De  G.  &  J.  88;  Singleton  v.  Hopkins,  1  Jur. 
N.  S.  1199,  V.  C.  S.;  see,  however,  Hancock 
v.  Hancock,  Seton,  577,  822.  In  cases  of 
election  which  must  be  made  speedily,  and 
cases  of  like  nature,  the  Court  always  assumed 
jurisdiction  to  bind  infants'  realty  without 
giving  day.  Bingham  v.  Clanmorris,  2  Mol. 
393;  French  v.  Scully,  cited  in  note  to  that 
case;  Taylor  v.  Phillips.  2  Ves.  23;  Calvert  v. 
Godfrey,"  6  Beav.  109  ;  Re  Howarth,  L.  R.  8 
Ch.  415 ;  Gray  v.  Barnard,  1  Tenn.  Ch.  301. 

1  Booth  r.  Rich,  1  Vern.  295;  Williamson 
v.  Gordon,  19  Ves.  114;  Anon.  Mos.  66; 
Bennett  r.  Edwards,  2  Vern.  392;  Price  v. 
Carver,  3  M.  &  C.  161. 

2  Newbury  r.  Marten,  15  Jur.  166;  Yates  v. 
Crewe,  Seton,  685;  and  see  ib.  689;  but  see 
Fisher  on  Mortgages,  631. 

3  See  Foster  v.  Parker,  8  Ch.  D.  147. 


INFANTS.  *  168 

defendant  is  error  in  the  decree;  and  it  has  been  held,  that  he  may  not 
unravel  the  account,  nor  is  he  so  much  as  entitled,  to  redeem  the 
mortgage  by  paying  what  is  due.4 

The  clause  giving  the  infant  a  day  to  show  cause  against  a  decree  of 
foreclosure  after  attaining  twenty-one,  must  be  inserted  in  the  order  for 
making  the  decree  absolute,  as  well  as  in  the  original  decree;  and  in 
Williamson  v.  Gordon5  an  order  was  made,  upon  motion,  for  varying  a 
decree,  in  which  the  clause  had  been  omitted,  by  directing  its  insertion. 

It  was  said  by  the  Court  in  Booth  v.  Rich,5  that  where  there  is  an 
infant  defendant  to  a  bill  of  foreclosure,  the  proper  way  is  to  decree  the 
lands  to  be  sold  to  pay  the  debt,  and  that  such  a  sale  would,  bind  the 
infant;  but  in  Goodier  v.  Ashton?  Sir  William  Grant  M.  R.  said  that 
the  modern  practice  was  to  foreclose  infants,  and  refused  to  refer  it  to 
the  Master  to  inquire  whether  a  sale  would  be  for  the  benefit  of  the 
infant.  In  a  subsequent  case,  however,  Lord  Eldon  said8  that  it  would 
be  too  much  to  let  an  infant  be  foreclosed  when,  if  the  mortgagee 
would  consent  to  a  sale,  a  surplus  *  might  be  got  of  perhaps  *163 
£40 JO,  considered  as  real  estate  for  the  benefit  of  the  infant. 
His  Lordship  accordingly  made  a  decree,  by  which  it  was  referred  to 
the  Master,  to  inquire  and  report  whether  it  would  be  for  the  benefit  of 
the  infant  that  the  estate  should  be  sold.  In  that  case  the  reference 
was  to  be  made  only  in  case  the  mortgagee  consented ;  and  the  same 
appears  to  have  been  the  order  in  Pace  v.  Marsden;  x  but  in  Wakeham 
v.  Lome,  and  Hamond  v.  Bradley,*  like  decrees  appear  to  have  been 
made,  without  its  being  stated  that  they  were  made  by  consent,  or  even 
that  a  sale  was  prayed.  It  is  to  be  observed,  also,  that  in  those  cases, 
as  well  as  in  Pace  v.  Marsden,  the  decree  was  made  for  a  sale,  without 
a  previous  reference  to  inquire  whether  it  would  be  for  the  benefit  of 
the  infant.  In  Pace  v.  Marsden,  however,  it  seems  that  a  sale  was 
prayed  by  the  bill,  In  Price  v.  Carver,*  Lord  Cottenham  seems  to 
have  suggested  that  a  decree  for  sale  was  the  proper  course,  as  against 
an  infant  defendant;  and  in  the  event  of  such  a  decree,  it  would  appear 
that  no  day  to  show  cause  is  given.4     Now,  however,  in  all  foreclosure 

4  Mallack  v.  Galtnn,  3  P.  Wms.  352;  Lyne  have  six  months  after  coming  of  age,  to  show 

r.  Willis,    id.   n.    [B] ;   Bishop  of   Winchester  cause   against  a  decree.     This   must   be   dona 

v.  Beavor,   3   Ves.  314,   317.     This,  however,  whenever  the  inheritance  is  bound.     The  right 

must  not  be  understood  as  applying  to  cases  of  the  parol  to  demur  is  abolish' d  by  statute 

where  the  decree  has  been  obtained  by  fraud,  in   New   York,    in   all   cases   of    descent    and 

or  where  the  infant  claims  by  a  title  paramount  devise.    Harris  ».  Touman,   1  Hoff.  Ch.  178; 

to  the  mortgage;  see  post,  172.     In  decrees  of  see  Field  v.  Williamson,    4   Sandf.   Ch.  613. 

foreclosure  against  an  infant,  there  is,  accord-  But  the  rule  giving  an  infant  a  day  after  his 

tag  to  the  old  and  settled  rule  of  practice  in  coming  of  age  is  still  in  force.     Coffin  v.  Heath, 

Chancery,  a  day  given  when  he  comes  of  age,  6  Met.  81. 
■anally   six   months,    to    show   cause    against  5  19  Ves.  114. 

the  decree,  and   make  a   better   defence,  and  6  1  Vern.  295. 

he  is  entitled   to   be  called    in  for  that    pur-  1  18  Ves.  84. 

pose   by   process  of   subpcena.     2   Kent,  245;  8  Mfondey  v.  Mondey,  1  Ves.  &  B.  223. 

Jackson    v.  Turner,   5    Leigh,    119:    Mills    v.  i  Seton,  275,  1st  ed! 

Dennis,    3    John.    Ch.    367;    Dow    v.  Jewell,  2  Ibid. 

21   N.  H.  470,  491.     Unless   the   rule   is  dis-  »  3  M.  &  C.  157,  161. 

pensed  with  by  statute  regulations  in  specific  *  Scholefield    v.   Heafleld,    7    Sim.    669.    8 

instances,  as   in    partition   and   foreclosure,  it  Sim.   470;    Davis  v.   Dowding,   2  Keen,  245; 

is  the  rule  in  New  York  that  an  infant  is  to  ante,  p.  165,  note  3. 

163 


169 


PERSONS    AGAINST   WHOM    A    SUIT   MAY   BE   INSTITUTED. 


suits,  the  Court  is  empowered,  if  it  thinks  fit,  to  direct  a  sale,  instead 
of  a  foreclosure; 5  and  where  it  is  for  the  benefit  of  the  infant,  it  is  the 
practice  to  do  so.6  Where  the  value  of  the  mortgaged  property  was 
clearly  less  than  the  amount  due  to  the  mortgagee,  the  Court,  at  the 
hearing,  made  an  absolute  decree  for  foreclosure  against  an  infant 
defendant,  upon  the  plaintiff's  paying  the  infant's  costs.7 

Mere  irregularities  and  errors  in  the  proceedings  of  the  Court  will 
not  invalidate  a  sale,  or  prevent  a  good  title  from  being  made  under  a 
decree.8  It  seems,  however,  that  if  there  is  a  material  error  in  sub- 
stance, as  well  as  in  words  and  form,  a  purchaser  may  object  to  the 
title,  and  the  Court  will  discharge  him  from  his  contract.  Thus, 
where  a  sale  of  an  infant's  estate  was  ordered,9  merely  because  it  was 
beneficial  to  the  infant,  and  without  there  being  any  person  who 
*  169  had  a  right  to  call  *  upon  the  Court  to  sell  the  estate  for  the  sat- 
isfaction of  a  claim  or  debt,  Lord  Langdale  M.  R.,  considering 
that  such  an  order  was  not  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court,  allowed 
an  objection  to  the  title,  made  in  consequence  of  the  irregularity  of  the 
decree.  An  infant  who  has  acted  fraudulently  may  be  ordered  to  pay 
the  costs  of  a  suit  occasioned  by  his  misconduct.1 

Where  an  answer  is  put  in  on  behalf  of  an  infant,  it  is  put  in  upon 
the  oath  of  the  person  appointed  his  guardian;  2  but  the  infant  is  not 
bound  by  such  answer,  and  it  cannot  be  read  against  him:8  the  true 


5  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  48;  and  see  Hurst 
v.  Hurst,  16  Beav.  372;  Powell  v.  Robins,  7 
Sumner's  Ves.  211,  note  (1),  and  cases  cited; 
Harris  v.  Harris,  6  Gill  &  J.  Ill;  Garland  v. 
Living,  1  Rand.  396;  Coger  v.  Coger,  2  Dana, 
270,  in  reference  to  the  circumstances  under 
which  Courts  will  decree  a  sale  of  the  lands 
descended  to  infants.  In  Mills  ?•.  Dennis,  3 
John.  Ch.  367,  which  was  a  bill  for  fore- 
closure of  a  mortgage,  Mr.  Chancellor  Kent 
observed:  "The  practice  with  us  has  been  to 
sell,  and  not  to  foreclose,  as  well  where 
infants  as  where  adults  are  concerned.  I 
think  this  course  must  generally  be  most 
beneficial  to  the  infants  as  well  as  to  the 
creditors;  and  there  can  be  no  doubt  of  the 
authority  of  the  Court  to  pursue  it.-'  In  case 
of  a  decree  for  the  sale  of  the  mortgaged 
premises,  the  decree,  it  is  understood,  will 
bind  the  infant.  Mills  v.  Dennis,  3  John. 
Ch.  367,  369. 

6  Mears  v.  Best,  10  Hare,  App.  51;  Siffkin 
v.  Davis,  Kay,  App.  21. 

"  Croxon  v.  Lever.  10  Jur.  N.  S.  87;  12 
W.  R.  237,  M.  R.,  following  Billson  v.  Scott, 
2  Seton,  712.  V.  C.W.;  see  ^Bennett  v.  Harfoot, 
W.  X    (1871)  4;  24  L.  T.  N.  S.  86. 

8  Calvert  v.  Godfrey,  6  Beav.  97,  107; 
Baker  v.  Sowter,  10  Beav.  343,  348;  ante, 
p.  161,  note  1. 

9  Calvert  v.  Godfrey,  6  Beav.  97,  109.  See 
Brown  Ex  parte,  8  Humph.  200;  Gray  v. 
Barnard,  1  Tenn.  Ch.  2U8;  Huger  v.  Huger,  3 

164 


Des.  18.  As  to  the  Court's  statutory  power  to 
sell  infants'  estates,  see  post,  Chap.  XLV. 
§  6;  44  &  45  Vic.  c.  41,  §  41;  45  &  46  Vic. 
c.  38,  §  59;  Be  Liddell,  Liddell  r.  Liddell,  31 
W.  R.  238. 

i  Chubb  v.  Griffiths,  35  Beav.  127;  and  see 
Cory  v.  Gertcken,  2  Mad.  10. 

2  Ld.  Red.  314.  The  order  appointing 
the  guardian  must  be  produced  to  the  person 
before  whom  the  answer  is  sworn.  Cons.  Ord. 
VII.  4.  Where  a  guardian  ad  litem  has  been 
appointed,  an  order  may  be  obtained,  on  a 
petition  of  course,  by  the  plaintiff,  to  file  an 
infant's  answer  without  oath,  or  without  oath 
or  signature  of  his  guardian.  For  form  of 
petition,  see  Vol   III. 

3  Leggett  v.  Sellon,  3  Paige,  84;  James  v. 
James,  4  Paige,  115  ;  Stephenson  v.  Stephen- 
son, 6  Paige,  353;  Rogers  v.  Cruger,  7  John. 
581  ;  Bulkley  v.  Van  Wyck,  5  Paige,  536  ; 
Stewart  v.  Duvall,  7  Gill  &  J.  180:  Bank  of 
Alexandria  v.  Patton,  1  Rob.  (Va.)  500  ;  Crain 
v.  Parker,  1  Ind.  374.  It  is  the  duty  of  the 
Court  to  see  that  the  rights  of  an  infant  are  not 
prejudiced  or  abandoned  by  the  answer  of  his 
guardian.  Barret  v.  Oliver,  7  Gill  &  J.  191. 
An  infant  is  not  bound  by  a  guardian's  waiver 
of  service  of  process.  Robbins  v.  Robbins,  2 
Carter,  74;  Lenox  v.  Netrebe,  1  Hemp.  251.     • 

The  answer  of  an  infant  by  his  guardian  ad 
litem,  is  not  evidence  in  his  favor,  although  it  is 
responsive  to  the  bill,  and  sworn  to  by  the 
guardian  ad  litem.     Bulkley  v.  Van  Wyck,  5 


INFANTS. 


170 


reason  of  which  is,  because  in  reality  it  is  not  the  answer  of  the  infant, 
but  of  the  guardian,  who  is  the  person  sworn,  and  not  the  infant;  and 
the  infant  may  know  nothing  of  the  contents  of  the  answer  put  in  for 
him,  or  may  be  of  such  tender  years  as  not  to  be  able  to  judge  of  it.1 
This  being  the  case,  it  would  be  useless,  and  occasion  unnecessary 
expense,  to  call  upon  an  infant  to  put  in  a  full  answer  to  the  plaintiff's 
bill;5  and  it  is,  therefore,  held,  that  exceptions  will  not  lie  to  the 
answer  of  an  infant,  for  insufficiency.6 

It  is  not  now  the  practice  to  require  any  answer  from  an  infant. 
Formerly,  when  an  answer  from  every  defendant  was  necessary,  an 
infant's  answer  was  generally  confined  to  a  mere  submission  of  his 
rights  and  interests  in  the  matters  in  question  in  the  cause  to  the  care  and 
protection  of  the  Court;7  the  infant  might,  however,  state  in  his  answer 
anything  which  he  meant  to  prove  by  way  of  defence ; 8  and  he  may 
now  file  a  voluntary  answer  for  this  purpose,9  whenever  it  is  for  his 
benefit  so  to  do,  as  in  many  cases  it  may  be; 10  but  whatever  admissions 
there  may  be  in  the  answer,  or  whatever  points  may  be  tendered 
thereby  in  issue,  it  appears  *that  the  plaintiff  is  not  in  any  *  170 
degree  exonerated  from  his  duty  in  proving,  as  against  the 
infant,  the  whole  case  upon  which  he  relies.1  (a) 

Where  an  infant  defendant,  on  coining  of  age,  is  dissatisfied  with  the 
defence  put  in  by  his  guardian,  he  may  apply  to  the  Court  for  leave  to 
amend  his  defence,  or  to  put  in  a  new  one, 2  and  it  seems  that  this  privi- 
lege applies  as  well  after  a  decree  has  been  made  as  before.8  But  an 
infant  wishing  to  make  a  new  defence,  must  apply  to  the  Court  as  early 


Paige,  536;  Stephenson  v.  Stephenson,  6  Paige, 
353.  A  plaintiff  cannot  in  any  form  of  plead- 
ing compel  an  infant  to  become  a  witness 
against  himself.  Bulkley  v.  Van  Wyck,  ubi 
supra  ;  infra,  753,  n.  6. 

4  Wrottesley  V.  Bendish,  3  P.  Wins.  236  ; 
see  Hough  v.  Doyle,  8  Blackf .  300 ;  Hough  v. 
Canby,  8  Blackf.  "301. 

6  Strudwiek  v.  Pargiter,  Bunb.  338. 

»  Copeland  v.  Wheeler,  4  Bro.  C.  C.  256; 
Lucas  v.'  Lucas,  13  Ves.  274  ;  Ld.  Red.  315  ; 
Leggett  v.  Sellon,  3  Paige,  84;  Bulkley  v.  Van 
Wyck,  5  Paige,  536. 

"»  Mills  v.  Dennis,  3  John.  Ch.  367,  368; 
Dow  o.  Jewell,  21  N.  H.  470,  486,  487. 

8  Per  Richards  C  B.  in  Atty.-Gen.  v.  Lam- 
birth,  5  Price,  398. 

9  For  formal  parts  of  an  infant's  answer,  see 
Vol.  III. 

10  Lane  v.  Hardwicke,  9  Beav.  14S.  O  d. 
XIII.  1,  empowering  the  plaintiff  to  tile  a  trav- 
ersing note  in  default  of  answer,  does  not,  it 


seems,  apply  to  an  infant  defendant.  Emery  v. 
Newson,  10  Sim.  564. 

i  Holden  v.  Hearn,  1  Beav.  445,  455;  3  Jur. 
428  ;  Mills  v.  Dennis,  3  John.  Ch.  367,  368  ;  2 
Kent.  245;  Winston  v.  Campbell,  4  Hen.  &  M. 
477  ;  Massie  v.  Donaldson,  8  Ohio,  377. 

2  Stephenson  v.  Stephenson,  6  Paige.  353  ; 
James  r.  James,  4  Paige,  115.  An  infant  defend- 
ant docs  not  lose  his  right  to  object  to  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  Court  at  the  hearing,  upon  the  ground 
that  the  remedy  is  at  law,  although  his  guar- 
dian ad  litem  has  omitted  to  raise  such  objection 
in  his  answer.    Rowers  v.  Smith,  10  Paige,  193. 

Where  the  infant  under  leave  does  amend  his 
answer,  or  puts  in  a  new  one,  on  coming  of  age, 
the  plaintiff  may  amend  his  bill,  and  may  waive 
an  answer  under  oath  by  the  infant  so  coming 
of  atfe.    Stephenson  v.  Stephenson.  6  Paige,  353. 

8  Kelsall  v.  Kelsall,  2  M.  &  K.  409.  416  ; 
Snow  v.  Hole,  15  Sim.  161  ;  10  Jur.  347  ;  Cod- 
rington  v.  Johnstone,  cited  1  Smith  Pr.  275 ; 
Seton,  685. 


(a)  In  Willis  v.  Will's,  61  L.  T.  610;  38  W. 
R.  7,  infants  being  interested  in  a  suit  for  sale 
of  land  in  lieu  of  partition,  the  Court  required 
allegations  in  the  claim,  which  were  admitted 
in  the  defendant's  pleading,  to  be  verified  by 


affidavit.  See  Clegg  v.  Clegg,  17  L.  R.  Ir.  118; 
Ripley  r.  Sawyer,  31  Ch.  D.  494  ;  Fitz water  v. 
Waterbonse,  52  L.  J.  Ch.  83  ;  Gardner  r.  Tap- 
ling,  33  W.  R.  473. 

165 


*  171  PERSONS    AGAINST   WHOM   A   SUIT   MAY   BE   INSTITUTED. 

as  possible  after  attaining  twenty -one;  for  if  he  is  guilty  of  any  laches, 
his  application  will  be  refused.4 

The  same  reasons  which  prevent  an  infant  from  being  bound  by  his 
answer,  operate  to  prevent  his  being  bound  by  admissions  in  any  other 
stage  of  proceeding,  unless  indeed  such  admissions  are  for  his  benefit. 
Thus,  it  was  held  that,  where  an  infant  is  concerned,  no  case  could  be 
stated  by  the  Court  of  Chancery  for  the  opinion  of  a  Court  of  Law, 
because  an  infant  would  not  be  bound  by  the  admissions  in  such  case.5 
Upon  the  same  principle  it  has  been  held,  that  an  infant  is  not  bound 
by  a  recital  in  a  deed  executed  during  infancy.6     Consequently  where 

there  are  infant  defendants,  the  plaintiff  must  prove  the  whole 
*171    case  as  against  the  infants.7     For  the  same  *  reason  where  a  will 

relating  to  real  estate  is  to  be  established  in  Chancery,  and  the 
heir-at-law  is  an  infant,  it  is  always  nceessary  to  establish  the  due 
execution  of  the  will  by  the  examination  of  witnesses. 

From  the  report  of  the  cases  of  Cartwright  v.  Cartwright  and 
Sleeman  v.  Sleeman,  in  Mr.  Dickens's  Reports,1  it  seems  to  have  been 
held,  that  where  the  heir-at-law  in  an  original  suit,  being  adult,  had  by 
his  answer  admitted  the  due  execution  of  the  will,  but  died  before  the 
cause  was  brought  to  a  hearing,  leaving  an  infant  heir,  who  was  brought 
before  the  Court  by  revivor,  the  will  must  be  proved  per  testes  against 
the  infant  heir.  But  in  Livesey  v.  Livesey,2  Sir  John  Leach  M.  R. 
held,  that  the  circumstance  of  the  first  heir  having  admitted  the  will, 
rendered  it  unnecessary  to  prove  it  against  the  infant;  and  in  a  subse- 
quent case,3  Sir  Lancelot  Shadwell  V.  C.  expressed  himself  to  be  of  the 
same  opinion  as  the  Master  of  the  Rolls,  and  said  that  he  had  referred 
to  the  entries  of  the  cases  of  Sleeman  v.  Sleeman  and  Cartwright  v. 
Cartwright,  in  the  Registrars'  book;  and  that  with  respect  to  the 
former  no  such  thing  as  is  mentioned  by  the  reporter  appears  to  have 
taken  place,  but  the  original  heir  having  admitted  the  will,  the  Court 
established  it;  and  with  respect  to  the  latter,  all  that  was  stated  was, 
that  on  hearing  the  will  and  proofs  read  (not  saying  what  proofs),  the 
Court  declared  that  the  will  ought  to  be  established.4 

4  Bennet  r.  Leigh,  1  Dick.  89.  In  the  case  made  parties,  to  be  read  against  them.;  but  see 
of  Bennet  r.  Lee,  2  Atk.  48",  and  529,  referred  Baillie  r.  Jackson,  10  Sim.  167,  as  to  accounts; 
to  in  the  margin  of  1  Dick.  89  as  S.  C,  the  and  see  Jebb  v.  Tugwell,  20  Beav.  461.  In 
application  was  made  during  the  infancy,  see  Mills  v.  Dennis,  3  John.  Ch.  367,  which  was  a 
post,  174;  and  see  Cecil  r.  Lord  Salisbury,  2  suit  for  foreclosure,  it  was  held,  that  there  could 
Vern.  224;  Mason  v.  Debow.  2  Hayw.  178;  be  no  valid  decree  against  an  infant,  by  default, 
Morris  v.  Morris,  11  Jur.  260,  V.  C.  K.  B.;  nor  on  his  answer  by  guardian  :  but  the  plain- 
Monypenny  r.  Dering,  4  De  G.  &  J.  175  ;  5  tiff  must  prove  his  demand  in  Court,  or  before 
Jur.  N.  S.  661.  a  Master,  and  the  infant  will  have  a  day  in 

5  Hawkins  v.  Luscombe,  2  Swanst.  392;  but  Court,  after  he  comes  of  age,  to  show  error  in 
it  was  done  in  Walsh  v.  Trevannion,  16  Sim.  the  decree  See  Massie  r.  Donaldson,  8  Ohio, 
178  ;  12  Jur.  547.     See  R.  S.  C  Ord.  XIX.  17.  377  ;  Walton  r.  Coulson,  1  McLean.  125;  Chal- 

6  Milner  v.  Lord  Harewood,  18  Ves.  274 ;  fant  v.  Monroe,  3  Dana,  35  ;  Dow  v.  Jewell,  21 
see  Davies  v.  Davies.  L.  R.  9  Eq.  468.  N.  H.  480,  487. 

1  Wilkinson  r.  Beal,  4  Mad.  408  ;  Holden  v.  *  2  Dick.  545,  787  ;  4  Sim.  133. 

Hearn,  1  Beav.  445,  455  ;  National  Provincial  2  Cited  4  Sim.  132. 

Bank  v.  Evans,  30  W.  R.  177  ;  51  L.  J.Ch.97 ;  3  Lock  r.  Foote,  4  Sim.  132.      See  Lewis  t. 

Re  Fitzwater,  52  id.  83.     See  also  Quantock  v.  Outlaw,  1  Tenn.  140. 

Bullen,  5  Mad.  81.  where  the  Court  refused  to  4  See  also  Robinson  v.  Cooper,  4  Sim.  131. 

allow  evidence,  takeu  before  the  infants  were  Such  a  statement  by  an  ancestor  plaintiff,  in  a 

166 


INFANTS.  *  172 

Where  an  infant  has  a  day  given  him  by  the  decree  to  show  cause 
against  it,  the  process  served  upon  him  at  his  coming  of  age  is  a  writ 
of  subpoena,  which  is  a  judicial  writ.5 

The  subpoena  is  prepared  by  the  solicitor,  will  be  sealed  upon  its 
mere  presentation  and  without  production  of  the  decree  or  order  referred 
to  in  it,  and  need  not  be  served  personally.6  It  is  served  by  delivering 
a  copy  thereof,  and  of  the  indorsement,  to  the  late  infant  personally,  or 
to  his  servant,  or  some  member  of  his  family,7  at  his  dwelling-house, 
or  usual  place  of  abode,  and  at  the  same  time  producing  the  original 
subpoena.*  If  service  cannot  be  thus  effected,  an  application  may  be 
made  to  the  Court,  by  ex  parte  motion,9  supported  by  affidavit,  to  direct 
some  other  mode  of  service ; 10  and  if  the  order  be  made,  a  copy  of  it 
must  be  served  with  the  subpoena,  in  the  manner  prescribed  by  the 
order. 

*  The  service  of  the  subpoena  will  be  of  no  validity,  if  not  made  *  172 
within  twelve  weeks  after  the  teste  of  the  writ.1 

If,  after  the  service  of  the  subpoena  to  show  cause,  the  party  does  not 
appear  within  the  time  limited,  the  decree  will  be  made  absolute,  with- 
out entering  an  appearance  for  him,2 upon  &nex  jiarte  motion,  supported 
by  an  affidavit  of  service  of  the  subpoena,  evidence  that  the  infant  is  of 
age,  and  the  Registrar's  certificate  of  no  cause  shown.3 

In  cases  of  foreclosure,4  unless  fraud  or  collusion  has  been  made  use 
of  in  obtaining  the  decree,5  or  the  title  claimed  by  the  infant  is  para- 
mount the  mortgage,6  the  only  cause  which  can  be  shown  by  an  infant 
after  attaining  twenty-one,  against  making  absolute  a  judgment  for 
foreclosure,  is  error  in  the  judgment;  and  he  will  not  be  permitted  to 
unravel  the  account,  or  even  to  redeem  the  mortgage  on  paying  what 
is  due.7    The  reason  of  the  distinction  between  the  case  of  a  claim  by 

bill,  is  an  admission  binding  on  his  infant  heir,  the  survivor,  had   mortgaged  the   estate,  and 

Hollings  v.  Kirkby,  15  Sim.  183.  died,  leaving  the  infant  his  heir-at-law  :  upon 

5  2  Kent,  245,  and  note  ;  Dow  v.  Jewell,  21  a  bill  filed  by  the  mortgagee  against  the  infant 
N.  H.  491.  For  form  of  writ,  see  Ord.  Sched.  to  foreclose,  the  infant  stated  in  his  answer  that 
E.  6;  and  Vol.  III.;  for  forms  of  praecipe  and  the  estate  had  been  purchased  and  paid  for  by 
indorsement,  see  Vol.  III.  his  great-uncle,   who  devised  the  same  to  his 

6  Braithwaite's  Pr.  266,  267.  grandfather  for  life,  with  remainder  to  his  heirs 

7  Such  member  should  be  an  inmate  of  the  in  tail,  and  so  claimed  the  estate  as  heir  in  tail 
house.     Edgson  v.  Edgson,  3  De  G.  &  S.  629.  by  a  title   paramount  the  mortgage  ;  but  the 

8  See  Cons.  Ord.  X.  1;  XXVIII.  6.  Court  decreed  an  account,  and  that  the  defend- 

9  For  form  of  motion  paper,  see  Vol.  III.  ant  should  redeem  or  be  foreclosed,  unless  he 
10  See  Cons.  Ord.  X.  2 ;  Elcock    v.  Glegg,  2      showed  cause  within  six  months  after  he  came 

Dick.  764.  of  age,  on  the  ground  that  the  grandfather  being 

1  Cons.  Ord.  XXVIII.  9.  by  the  deed  joint-tenant  in  fee  with  his  brother, 

2  Gilb.  For.  Rom.  160;  Wharam  v.  Brough-  whom  he  survived,  must  have  appeared  to  the 
ton,  1  Ves.  Sr.  185.  mortgagee  to  have  a  good  title.     The  infant, 

3  See  2  Seton,  711,  714  ;  Hinde,  436,  440.  however,  when  he  came  of  age,  upon  being 
For  forms  of  orders  absolute,  see  2  Seton,  711,  served  with  a  subpnena  to  show  cause,  moved 
No.  2  ;  and  for  forms  of  motion  paper  and  affi-  for  leave  to  amend  his  defence,  by  putting  in 
davit,  see  Vol.  III.  a  new  answer,  and  swore  that  he  believed  he 

4  Ante,  p.  167.  could  prove  that  the  mortgagee  had  notice  of 

5  Loyd  v.  Mansel,  2  P.  Wins.  73.  the  trust  for  his  great-uncle  at  the  time  he  lent 

6  Thus,  in  a  case  where  an  estate  had  been  the  money,  which  was  a  point  not  insisted  upon 
conveyed  to  the  great-uncle  and  grandfather  of  in  his  former  answer  ;  and  the  Court  made  the 
the  infant,  as  joint-tenants  in  fee,  and  upon  the  order.     Anon.  Mos.  66. 

death  of  the  great-uncle,  the  grandfather,  being  ?  Cases  ante,  p.  167,  n.  1,  3. 

167 


*  174  PERSONS   AGAINST   WHOM    A    SUIT    MAY   BE   INSTITUTED. 

the  infant  paramount  the  mortgage,  and  that  of  a  claim  subject  to  the 
mortgage,  is  obvious;  for  in  the  latter  case,  it  will  be  presumed  that 
the  Court  would  not  have  made  the  decree  had  it  not  been  satis- 
*173  tied  *that  the  mortgage  was  properly  executed,  and,  therefore, 
it  would  not  be  reasonable  to  allow  a  party,  claiming  subject  to 
that  deed,  to  disturb  the  title  which  the  mortgagee  had  acquired  under 
it;  but  in  the  former  case,  the  mortgage  may  have  been  properly  exe- 
cuted, and  the  account  taken  under  it  may  have  been  perfectly  correct, 
and  yet  the  mortgagor  may  not  have  had  a  title  to  make  the  mortgage: 
in  which  case  it  would  not  be  just  to  preclude  the  infant  from  an 
opportunity  of  establishing  a  case  which  may  not  have  been  properly 
submitted  to  the  decision  of  the  Court  at  the  time  the  decree  was 
pronounced. 

In  ordinary  cases,  where  an  infant  has  a  day  given  him  to  show  cause 
against  making  a  decree  absolute,  he  may  either  impeach  the  decree  on 
the  ground  of  fraud  or  collusion  between  the  plaintiff  and  his  guardian, 
or  he  may  show  error  in  the  decree.  He  may  also  show  that  he  had 
grounds  of  defence  which  were  not  before  the  Court,  or  were  not  insisted 
upon  at  the  hearing,  or  that  new  matter  has  subsequently  been  discovered, 
upon  which  the  decree  may  be  shown  to  be  wrong. 

If  the  late  infant  seeks  to  controvert  the  decree  on  the  ground  of 
fraud  or  collusion,  he  is  not  bound  to  proceed  by  way  of  rehearing  or  by 
bill  of  review,  but  he  may  impeach  the  former  decree  by  an  original 
bill,  in  which  it  will  be  enough  for  him  to  say,  that  the  decree  was 
obtained  by  fraud  or  collusion;  he  may  in  like  manner  impeach  the 
decree  by  original  bill,  even  though  his  ground  of  complaint  against  it 
is  confined  to  error.1  In  such  cases  it  is  not  necessary  for  the  infant  to 
wait  till  he  comes  of  age  before  he  seeks  redress,  but  application  for 
that  purpose  may  be  made  at  any  time.2 

If  the  late  infant  seeks  to  impeach  the  decree,  by  showing  that  he 
had  grounds  of  defence  which  were  either  not  before  the  Court,  or  not 
insisted  upon  at  the  original  hearing,  he  might,  under  the  old  practice, 
apply  to  the  Court,  either  by  motion  or  petition,  for  leave  to  put  in  a 
new  answer;  and  it  seems  that  such  application  might  be  made 
*174  ex  parte,  and  was  a  matter  of  course;3  but  under  *the  later 
practice  (unless  an  answer  has  been  put  in,  or  it  is  thought 
desirable  to  put  one  in,  on  behalf  of  the  infant),  it  is  conceived  the 
form  of  the  motion  or  petition  will  be  for  leave  to  make  a  new  defence. 

Although  it  was  a  matter  of  course  that  an  infant  defendant  to  a 
suit,  who  had  had  a  day  given  him  to  show  cause  against  the  decree 

1  See  ante,  164,  n.  3.     In  the  case  of  gross  mental  bill  in  the  nature  of  a  bill  of   review, 

fraud  or  collusion  used  in  obtaining  a  decree,  Wortley  v.  Birkhead,  3  Atk.  809,  811;  Galley 

the  Court  will  entertain  an  original  bill  for  the  v.  Baker,  Gas.  temp.  Talb.  201. 
purpose  of  impeaching  it,  even  though  the  party  2  Richmond   v.    Tayleur,   1   P.   Wms.   737; 

complaining  was  not  an  infant  at  the  time  of  Carew  v.  Johnston,  2   Sch.  &   Lef.  292;   see 

the  decree  pronounced;  see  Loyd  v.  Mansel,  2  P.  Patch  v.  Ward,  L.  R.  3  Ch.  203,  207. 
Wms.  73;  Sheldon  v.  Fortescue,  3  P.  Wms.  111.  3  Fountain  v.  Caine,  1  P.  Wins.  504;  Napier 

In  general,  however,  where  no  fraud  is  alleged,  v.  Lady  Effingham,  2  P.    Wms.  401;  Affd.  4 

the  proceedings  to  set  aside  a  decree,  if  it  has  Bro.  P.  C.  ed.  Toml.  340  ;  Bennet  v.  Leo,  2  Atk. 

been  signed  and  -enrolled,  must  be  by  bill  of  529,  531;  Kelsall  v.  Kelsall.  2  M.  &  K.  409,  in 

review,  or,  if  not  signed  and  enrolled,  by  supple-  which  the  cases  are  reviewed. 

168 


INFANTS.  *  175 

after  attaining  twenty-one,  might  have  leave  to  put  in  a  new  answer, 
yet,  if  he  was  plaintiff  in  a  cross-bill,  and  that  suit  or  any  part  of  it 
had  been  dismissed,  he  was  not  allowed  to  amend  his  cross-bill,  or  to 
file  a  new  one  for  the  same  matter.1  He  might,  however,  file  a  bill  of 
discovery  in  aid  of  the  case  intended  to  be  made  by  his  answer;  and  it 
seems  that  if  he  did  so,  the  time  of  six  months  allowed  by  the  course 
of  the  Court  for  a  defendant  to  show  cause  why  a  decree  should  not  be 
made  absolute  after  he  comes  of  age,  was  not  so  sacred  but  that  in  par- 
ticular cases,  and  where  the  matter  was  of  consequence,  the  Court 
might  enlarge  it.2 

Although,  where  a  day  is  given  to  an  infant  to  show  cause  against  a 
decree,  he  need  not,  as  we  have  seen,8  stay  till  that  time,  before  he 
seeks  to  impeach  it  on  the  ground  of  fraud,  collusion,  or  error,4  yet,  if 
he  proceeds  on  the  ground  that  he  is  dissatisfied  with  the  defence  which 
has  been  made,  and  wishes  to  make  a  new  defence,  he  must,  in  general, 
wait  till  he  has  attained  twenty-one  before  he  applies :  because,  if  he 
should  apply  before,  and  there  should  be  a  decree  against  him  upon  the 
second  hearing,  he  may  with  as  much  reason  make  similar  appli- 
cations, and  so  occasion  *  infinite  vexation.1  *175 

Where  an  infant  defendant  on  coming  of  age,  having  obtained 
leave  to  put  in  a  new  answer,  does  so  accordingly,  he  may  show  that  fact 
for  cause  why  the  decree  should  not  be  made  absolute,  and  the  plaintiff 
must,  it  seems,  proceed  upon  the  answer  according  to  the  rules  of  the 
Court  in  other  cases.2  And  consequently,  if  the  defence  is  replied  to, 
the  defendant  may  examine  witnesses  anew  to  prove  his  defence,  which 
might  be  different  from  what  it  was  before.8 

1  Sir  J.  Napier  v.  Lady  Effingham,  Howard,  3  Ante,  p.  173. 

cited  Mos.  07,  68.  4  Richmond  v.  Tayleur,  1  P.  Wins.  737. 

2  In  Trefusis  v.  Cotton,  Mos.  203,  where  a  1  This  was  the  opinion  original!}'  expressed 
defendant,  on  attaining  twenty-one,  and  being  by  Lord  Hardwicke,  in  Bennet  v.  Lee,  2  Atk. 
served  with  a  subpama  to  show  cause  against  a  487,  though  he  afterwards  held,  in  the  same 
decree,  Hied  a  bill  against  the  plaintiffs  in  the  case,  that  as  the  facts  upon  which  the  infant 
original  suit  for  discovery,  and  applied  to  the  wished  to  rest  his  new  defence  were  of  long 
Court  to  have  the  time  for  showing  cause  en-  standing,  and  the  witnesses  were  consequently 
larged  till  the  defendants  to  the  bill  of  discovery  very  old,  and  might  die  before  he  came  of  age, 
had  put  in  their  answer,  Lord  King  made  an  the  infant  might  put  in  a  better  answer.  lb. 
order,  enlarging  the  time  for  three  months  after  532.  And  so,  in  Savage  v.  Carrol,  1  Ball  &  B. 
the  six  months  were  expired;  and  on  that  time  548,  leave  was  given  to  the  infant  defendant, 
being  out,  and  the  defendants  not  having  put  in  upon  the  same  grounds,  to  put  in  an  amended 
a  full  answer,  the  time  was  twice  enlarged  upon  answer  before  attaining  twenty-one,  but  it  was 
motion  quousque.  (For  forms  of  petition  to  en-  subsequently  held  in  the  same  case  (2  Ball  & 
huge  the  time  for  showing  cause,  see  2  Newl.  B.  244),  that  where  an  infant,  before  attaining 
214;  Hinde,  572.)  It  seems,  however,  from  a  twenty-one,  obtains  leave  to  put  in  a  new  an- 
subsequent  notice  of  the  same  case  (4  Mos.  308),  swer,  he  will  thenceforth  be  considered  as  plain- 
that  an  infant,  after  he  attains  twenty-one,  can-  tiff,  and  as  such  will  be  bound  by  the  decree, 
not  controvert  the  original  decree  by  a  new  bill  In  proceedings  by  an  infant,  on  coming  of  age, 
praying  relief,  unless  for  fraud  or  collusion,  or  to  set  aside  a  decree,  which  has  been  rendered 
for  error  (see  Richmond  v  Ta\  leur,  1  P.  Wms.  against  him  while  under  age,  he  should  give 
737;  see  Loyd  v.  Malone,  23  111  43;  Regla  «>.  notice  to  the  other  parties  to  the  decree.  Ruby 
Martin,  19  Cal.  463;  ante,  164,  n.  3),  and  that  v.  Strother,  11  Miss.  417. 

if  he  does  so,  the  original  decree  may  be  pleaded  2  Cotton  v.  Trefusis,  Mos.  313. 

in  bar  to  such  new  bill.     See  also  Bennett  v.  s  Napier  v.  Lord  Effingham,  2  P.  Wms.  401, 

Hamill,  2  Sch.  &  Lef.  566  ;  Hindmarsh  v.  South-  403  ;  and  see  Codrington  v.  Johnstone,  2  Seton, 

gate,  3  Russ.  324;  Stott  v.  Meanock,  10  W.  R.  711;  Kelsall  v.  Kelsall,  2  M.  &  K.  409,  416. 
605;  Re  Hoghton,  L.  R.  18  Eq.  573. 

169 


*  176  PERSONS   AGAINST   WHOM   A    SUIT   MAY   BE   INSTITUTED. 


Section  X.  — Idiots,  Lunatics,  and  Persons  of  Unsound  or  Weak  Mind. 

An  idiot  or  lunatic  may,  as  we  have  seen,4  be  made  a  defendant  to  a 
suit;  but  then,  where  he  has  been  found  of  unsound  mind  by  inquisition, 
he  must  defend  by  the  committee  of  his  estate,  who,  as  well  as  the 
idiot  or  lunatic,  is  a  necessary  party.5  No  order  is  required  in  the  suit 
to  entitle  the  committee  to  defend;  but  the  committee  must  obtain  the 
sanction  of  the  Lord  Chancellor  or  Lords  Justices  in  the  lunacy,  before 

defending,  in  the  same  manner  as  before  instituting  a  suit.6 
*  176  *  Usually  the  lunatic  and  his  committee  make  a  joint  defence 
'to  the  suit;  but  if  the  idiot  or  lunatic  has  no  committee,  or  the 
committee  is  plaintiff,  or  has  an  adverse  interest,  an  order  should  be 
obtained,  on  motion  or  petition  of  course,  supported  by  affidavit,1 
appointing  a  guardian  to  defend  the  suit; 2  and  it  is  the  same  where  he 
is  respondent  to  a  petition.3  Where,  after  decree,  the  committee  died, 
and  a  new  one  was  appointed,  an  order  was  made,  on  motion,  that  in 
all  subsequent  proceedings  the  name  of  the  new  committee  should  be 
substituted  for  that  of  the  former ; 4  where  no  decree  had  been  made, 
such  an  order  was  refused ; 5  now,  however,  in  both  these  cases,  an 
order  to  carry  on  and  prosecute  the  suit  may  be  obtained,  on  motion  or 
petition  of  course.6 

Lunatics  not  so  found  by  inquisition,7  and  persons  of  weak  intellect, 
or  who  are  by  age  or  infirmity  reduced  to  a  second  infancy,8  must 
defend  by  guardian,  who  will  be  appointed  on  an  application  by 
motion,  or  on  petition  of  course,  in  the  name  of  the  person  of  unsound 
mind; 9  and  it  is  the  same  in  the  case  of  a  petition  where  no  suit  has 
been  instituted.10  The  application  must  be  supported  by  affidavits 
proving  the  mental  incapacity  of  the  defendant,11  the   fitness  of  the 


4  Ante,  p.  130. 

5  Ld.  Red.  30,  104;  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  XVIII.; 
Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  70;  Harrison  v.  Rowau,  4  Wash. 
C.  C.  202.  In  Brasher  v.  Van  Cortlandt,  2 
John.  Ch.  242,  245,  it  was  held  not  necessary, 
in  New  York,  to  make  the  lunatic  himself  a 
party  defendant  to  a  bill  for  payment  of  his 
debts,  but  his  committee  only,  where  he  had  a 
committee.  So  in  Teal  v.  Woodworth,  3  Paige, 
470.  See  Berry  v.  Rogers,  2  B.  Mon.  308.  But 
in  a  suit  where  there  are  conflicting  interests 
between  a  lunatic  and  his  committee,  which 
must  be  settled  in  the  cause,  both  should  be 
made  parties.    Teal  r.  Woodworth,  3  Paige,  470. 

6  Ante.  p.  85.  As  to  service,  see  R.  S.  C 
Ord.  IX.  5;  Thorn  v.  Smith,  W.  N.  (1879)81; 
S.  C.  nom.  Than  v.  Smith,  27  W.  R.  617. 

1  For  forms  of  motion  paper,  petition,  and 
affidavit,  see  Vol.  III. 

2  See  R  S.  O.  Ord.  XVIII.;  T.d.  Rpd.  104; 
Snell  v.  Hyatt,  1  Dick.  287;  Lady  Hartland  p. 
Atcherlev,  7  Beav.  53;  Worth  v.  M'Kenzie,  3 
M'N.  &  G.  363;  Snook  v.  Watts,  2  Seton  706; 
New  v.  New,  6  Paige,  237  ;  Hewitt's  case,  3 
Bland,  184 ;  Post  v.  Mackall,  id.  486.     For  form 

170 


of  order,  see  2  Seton,  706,  No.  5.  See  Emery 
v.  Parrot,  107  Mass.  95,  where  a  guardian  ad 
litem  was  appointed  for  a  non-resident  de- 
fendant of  unsound  mind,  and  afterwards  a 
guardian  for  the  same  person  was  appointed  in 
the  State  of  his  residence. 

3  See  Be  Greaves,  2  W.  R.  365;  2  Eq.  Rep. 
616,  L.  C.  &  L.  JJ. 

«  Lyon  v.  Mercer,  1  S.  &  ,S.  356;  Bryan  v. 
Twigg,  3  Eq.  Rep.  62;  3  W.  R.  42,  V.  C.  K. 

5  Rudd  v.  Speare,  3  De  G.  &  S.  374. 

6  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §52;  Seton,  1166, 
1170;  and  see  post.  Chap.  XXXIII.,  Revivor  and 
Supplement;  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  L.  1-4;  Snook  »'. 
Watts,  2  Seton,  706. 

'  Ld.  Red.  104;  and  see  Bonfield  v.  Grant, 
11  W.  R.  275,  M.  R.;  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  XVIII. 

8  Ld.  Red.  103;  and  see  Newman  ?•.  Selfe, 
11  W.  R.  764,  M.  R. ;  but  see  Steel  v.  Cobb,  id. 
298,  M.  R. 

9  For  forms  of  motion  paper  and  petition, 
see  Vol.  HI. 

i°  Re  Greaves,  2  W.  R.  355  ;  2  Eq.  Rep.  516, 
L  C.  &  L.  JJ. 

n  Simmons  v.  Bates,  20  L.  T.  272. 


LUNATICS.  *  177 

proposed  guardian,  and  that  he  has  no  adverse  interest.12  A  co- 
defendant  may  be  appointed,  if  he  has  no  adverse  interest ; 18  (a)  but  not 
the  plaintiff,  nor  a  married  woman,  nor  a  person  resident  out  of  the 
jurisdiction.14 

If  the  guardian  dies,  it  appears  that  a  similar  evidence  of  mental 
incapacity  is  necessary,  in  support  of  the  application  for  the  appoint- 
ment of  a  new  guardian,  to  that  required  on  the  original  application.15 
The  death  of  the  guardian,  and  fitness  of  the  person  proposed  in  his 
place,  must  also  be  proved.  The  application  should  be  made  by  motion 
of  course,16  or  petition  of  course  at  the  Rolls,  or  by  summons.17 

*  Where  an  application  for  the  appointment  of  a  guardian  is  *  177 
intended  to  be  made  by,  or  on  behalf  of,  a  defendant  of  unsound 
mind,  or  weak  intellect,  ■  an  appearance  should,  in  the  first  place,  be 
entered  for  him  at  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerks'  Office;  but  no  subse- 
quent step  can  be  taken  on  his  behalf,  till  the  order  for  a  guardian  has 
been  obtained.1  (b)  If  such  order  is  not  obtained  on  his  behalf,  the 
plaintiff  must  apply  for  the  order;  and  in  this  case  an  appearance  for 
the  defendant  is  not  necessary,  the  entry  of  an  appearance  on  his 
behalf  by  the  plaintiff  being  irregular.2  The  plaintiff's  solicitor  should 
not  on  the  instructions  of  his  client  act  for  the  defendant  or  enter  an 
appearance  for  him.3 

Where  the  plaintiff  applies,  he  must  do  so  by  motion,  notice  of 
which  must  be  served  upon  or  left  at  the  dwelling-house  of  the  person 
with  whom,  or  under  whose  care,  the  defendant  was  living  at  the  time 
of  serving  the  bill,4  or,  where  an  appearance  has  been  entered  for  him, 
upon  the  solicitor  who  entered  it.5     And  upon  the  motion,  the  Court 

13  Piddocke  v.  Smith,  9  Hare,  395;  HJur.  3  Camps  v.  Marshall,  L.  R.  8  Ch.  462. 
1120;  and  see  Fosters.  Cautley,  10  Hare,  App.  Where  a  guardian  is  appointed  at  the  instance 
24;  17  Jur.  370.  For  form  of  affidavits,  see  of  the  plaintiff,  it  is  usual  to  appoint  the  solici- 
Vol.  III.  tor  to  the  Suitors'  Fee  Fund.     Cons.  Ord.  VII. 

is  Bonfield  v.  Grant,  11  W.  R.  275,  M.  R.;  3;  M'Keverakin  v.  Cort,  7  Beav.  347;  Biddulph 

Newman  v.  Selfe,  id.  764,  M.  R.  v.  Lord  Camoys,  9  Beav.  548;  10  Jur.  485.     If 

14  Lady  Hartland  v.  Atcherley.  7  Beav.  53.  there  is  any  friend  of  the  defendant  who  is  a  tit 

15  See  Needham  v.  Smith,  6  Beav.  130.  person,  lie  will   be  appointed,  in   preference  to 

16  Ibid.  the  solicitor  to  the  Suitors'  Fee  Fund.    Ibid.; 

17  According  to  the  present  practice,  the  order  Moore  v.  Platel,  7  Beav.  583;  and  see  Charlton 
may  also  be  obtained  on   petition  of  course  at  v.  West,  3  De  G.  F.&J.  156;  7  Jur.  N.  S.  614; 
the  Rolls.     For  forms  of  motion  paper,  petition,  Bonlield  v.  Grant,  11  W.  R.  275,  M.  R. 
summons,  and  affidavit,  see  Vol.  III.  4  Cons.  Ord.   VII.   3;    see   R.   S.  C.  Ord. 

i  See  Lushington  v.  Sewell,  6  Mad.  28;  Tay-  XIII.  1. 
lor  v.  Pede,  W   N.  (1881)74;    29  W.  R.627;  5  Cookson  v.  Lee.  15  Sim.  302;    Bentley  v. 

Osbaldiston  v.  Crowther,  1  Sm.  &  G.  App.  12.  Robinson,  9  Hare,  App.  76.     These  were  cases 

2  Cons.  Ord.  X.  5;  Leese  v.  Knight,  8  Jur.  of  infants,  but  doubtless  apply  to  the  case  of 

N.  S.  1006;  10  W.  R.  711,  V.  C.  K.  persons  of  unsound  mind. 


(")  See  ante,  p.  83.  note  (a).    The   present  that  the  defendant  is  an  infant,  it  is  within  the 

English  practice  permits  a  guardian  adlitem  for  Court's  discretion   to  determine   whether   the 

a  lunatic    defendant  to    be  appointed   at  the  judgment    should   be    set   aside.     Furnival    v. 

instance  of  a  co-defendant  when  necessary.    Re  Brooke,  49  L.  T.  134.     For  the  present  English 

Dawson,  Johnston  v.  Hill,  41  Ch.  D.  415.  Rules   in   Lunacy,   see  W.  N.  (1893),  Orders 

(6)  Under  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  XIII.  1,  relating  to  and  Rules,  p.  3.  A  decree  or  judgment  en- 
defendants  who  are  infants  or  lunatics  not  so  tered  against  a  lunatic  is  not  void.  Withrow 
found  by  inquisition,  if  the  plaintiff  signs  judg-  v.  Smithson,  37  W.  Va.  757;  White  v.  Hiuton 
meat  for  default  of  appearance,  not  knowing  (Wyo.),  17  L.  R.  A.  66. 

171 


178 


PERSONS    AGAINST   WHOM    A    SUIT   MAY   BE   INSTITUTED. 


must  be  satisfied  that  the  bill  has  been  duly  served,6  and  that  the  notice 
of  the  application  was  served  after  the  expiration  of  the  time  allowed 
for  appearing  or  answering,  and  at  least  six  clear  days  before  the  day 
in  such  notice  named  for  hearing  the  application.7  It  is  usual,  unless 
there  is  some  friend  of  the  defendant  who  is  a  fit  person,  and  will  under- 
take the  defence,  to  appoint  the  official  solicitor  to  be  the  guardian.8 

The  order  is  made  under  the  jurisdiction  in  Chancery,  and  not  in 
Lunacy;9  and  if  the  fact  of  the  infirmity  is  disputed,  or  the  order  has 
been  irregularly  obtained  by  the  defendant,  the  plaintiff  may  move, 
on  notice  to  the  defendant,  to  discharge  the  order;  and,  if  necessary, 
the  Court  will  direct  an  inquiry  whether  the  defendant  is  competent 
or  not.10 

The  defendant,  on  his  recovery,  must  apply  by  motion,  on  notice  to 

the  plaintiff  and  to  the  guardian,11  that  the  order  assigning  the  guardian 

may  be  discharged.12    Where  the  defendant  had  delayed  apply- 

*  178     ing,   the  motion  was  *  granted,  but  he  was  ordered  to  pay  his 

guardian's  costs,  although  having  liberty  to  add  them  to  his  own.1 

The  answer  of  an  idiot  or  lunatic  is  expressed  to  be  made  by  his 
committee  as  his  guardian,  or  by  the  person  appointed  his  guardian  by 
the  Court  to  defend  the  suit.2  (a) 


6  See  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  IX.  5.  The  defendant 
should,  it  seems,  be  served  personally.  Morgan 
v.  Jones,  W.  R.  381,  V.  C.  W.  ;  Anon.  2  Jur. 
N.  S.  324,  V.  C.  W.  As  to  substituted  service 
on  the  medical  officer  of  an  asylum  in  which  the 
defendant  has  been  placed,  although  the  un- 
soundness had  not  been  found  by  inquisition, 
see  Raine  v.  Wilson,  L.  R.  16  Eq.  576;  see 
also  Than  v.  Smith,  27  W.  R.  G17;  Speak  v. 
Metcalf,  2Tenn.  Ch.  214;  infra,  444,  n.  6. 

1  Cons.  Ord.  VII.  3.  That  Sundays  are  not 
included,  see  ante,  p.  162,  n.  For  forms  of  no- 
tice of  motion  and  affidavit,  see  Vol.  III. ;  a'.d 
for  form  of  order,  see  2  Seton,  706,  No.  6.  The 
Court  will  provide  for  the  costs  of  the  solicitor 
to  the  Suitors'  Fee  Fund  where  he  is  appointed 
guardian,  usually  by  directing  the  plaintiff  to 
pay  them,  and  add  them  to  his  own.  See  Cons. 
Ord.  XL.  4  ;  and  Harris  v.  Hamlyn,  3  De  G.  &  S. 
470;  14  Jur  55;  Fraser  v.  Thompson,  4  De  G. 
&  J.  659;  1  Giff.  337 ;  5  Jur.  N.  S.  669  ;  and  see 
Robinson  v.  Aston,  9  Jur.  224,  V.  C.  K.  B. 

8  M'Keverakin  v.  Cort,  7  Beav.  347;  Moore 
v.  Platel,  id.  583;  Biddulph  v.  Lord  Camoys,  9 
Beav.  548;  10  Jur.  485;  Biddulph  v.  Dayrell, 
15  L.  J.  Ch.  320 ;  and  see  Charlton  v.  West,  3  De 
G.  F.  &  J.  156;  7  Jur.  N.  S.  614;  Bonfield  v. 
Grant.  11  W.  R.  275. 

'-»  Pidcocke  v.  Boultbee,  2  De  G.  M.  &  G. 
898. 

1°  Lee  v.  Ryder,  6  Mad.  294;  2  Seton,  1251; 
Matter  of  Collins,  18  N.  J.  Eq.  254;  Matter 


(a)  Under  the  present  English  practice,  a 
guardian  ad  litem  is  not  a  party  to  the  suit 
within  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  XXI.  1,  and  cannot  be 
172 


of  Weis,  16  id.  319;  In  re  dimming,  1  De 
G.  M.  &  G.  537,  550.  So,  if  after  inquisition 
found,  it  be  suggested  that  he  has  been  restored 
in  mind.     Yourie  v.  Nelson,  1  Ttnn.  Ch.  275. 

11  For  form  of  notice  of  motion,  see  Vol. 
III. 

12  See  Blyth  v.  Green,  W.  N.  (1876)  214; 
Frampton  v.  Webb,  11  W.  R.  1018,  V.  C.  W., 
where  the  order  made  was  in  fact  for  a  change 
of  solicitors. 

i  Ibid. 

2  Ld.  Red.  315.  It  was  held,  in  Leving  v. 
Cavt-rly,  Prec.  Ch.  229,  that  the  answer  of  a 
superannuated  defendant,  put  in  by  his  guar- 
dian, may  be  read  against  him;  but  this  prop- 
osition appears  to  have  been  doub'ed,  and  it  is 
conceived  that  should  the  point  now  arise, 
it  would  be  decided  otherwise.  See  Mickle- 
thwaite  v.  Atkinson,  1  Coll.  173,  Percival  v. 
Caney,  4  De  G.  &  S.  610,  somewhat  fuller 
reported  on  this  point,  14  Jur.  1062;  S.  C.  nom. 
Stanton  v.  Percival,  3  W.  R.  391;  24  L.  J.  Ch. 
369,  H-  L.  A  female  defendant,  above  sixty 
vears  of  age,  who  had  been  deaf  and  dumb 
from  her  infancy,  was  admitted  to  appear  and 
defend  by  guardian.  Markle  v.  Markle,  4 
John  Ch.  168 ;  see  Manleverer  v.  Warren,  2 
Jones,  47.  The  answer  of  an  idiot  or  lunatic 
is  similar  to  that  of  an  infant,  and  should  be 
sworn  toby  his  committee,  in  the  same  manner 
as  the  answer  of  an  infant  is  verified  by  his 
guardian  ad  litem.     1  Barb.  Ch.  Pr.  154;  see 


compelled  to  answer  interrogatories.  Ante, 
p.  68,  note  (a);  Ingram  ?'.  Little,  11  Q.  B.  D. 
251;  lie  Corsellis,  48  L.  T. 


425. 


MARRIED   WOMEN. 


179 


Where  the  infirmity  is  the  result  of  bad  health,  the  practice  is  to 
allow  time  to  file  the  answer,  and  not  to  assign  a  guardian.3 

The  committee  or  guardian  of  a  person  of  unsound  mind,  whether  so 
found  by  inquisition  or  not,  before  he  consents  to  any  departure  from 
the  ordinary  course  of  procedure  in  the  suit,  should,  it  seems,  first 
obtain  the  sanction  of  the  Court,  or  of  the  Judge  in  chambers;  and 
the  committee  should  also  obtain  that  of  the  Lord  Chancellor  or  Lords 
Justices  sitting  in  Lunacy.4 

All  orders  appointing  guardians  should  be  left  at  the  Record  and 
Writ  Clerks'  Office  for  entry.5 


Section  XI.  —  Married  Women. 

Where  a  suit  is  instituted  against  a  married  woman,  her  husband 
should  also  be  a  party,6  unless  he  is  an  exile,  or  has  abjured  the 
realm,7  or  been  banished  by  Act  of  Parliament,8  or  been  transported 
under  a  criminal  sentence,9  or  is,  it  seems,  an  alien  enemy,10  or  there 
has  been  a  judicial  separation,  or  the  wife  has  obtained  a  pro- 
tection *  order  under  the  Divorce  Acts,1  or  a  decree  nisi  for  a    *179 


Rothwell  v.  Benshall,  1  Bland,  373;  Coupous 
v.  Kauffman,  3  Edw.  Ch.  311.  For  the  formal 
parts  of  such  answer,  see  Vol.  III.  As  to  the 
answers  of  imbecile  prisoners  confined  for  con- 
tempt, see  11  Geo.  IV.  &  1  Will.  IV.  c.  36,  §  15, 
r.  0,  and  post,  Chap.  X.  §  2. 

3  Willyams  v.  Hodge,  1  M'N.  &  G.  516; 
and  see  Patrick  v.  Andrews,  22  L.  J.  Ch.  240, 
M.  R.;  Steel  v.  Cobb,  11  W.  R.  298,  M.  R. ; 
Newman  v.  Selfe,  ib.  764,  M.  R.  As  to  ad- 
missions of  facts  pleaded,  see  R.  S.  C.  Ord. 
XIX.  17. 

*  Ord.  5.  Feb.,  1861,  r.  24;  Knatchbull  p. 
Fowle.  1  Ch.  D.  604;  Fryer  v.  Wiseman,  W.  N. 
(1876)  3;  24  W.  R.  205.  For  form  of  sum- 
mons, see  Vol.  III. 

5  Braithwaite's  Pr.  47  ;  now  at  the  Central 
Office.  As  to  inspection  of  documents  in  the 
Master's  or  Register's  custody,  see  Re  Smyth, 
15  Ch.  D.  286. 

6  Hancocks  v.  Lablache,  3  C.  P.  D.  197  ; 
Atwood  v.  Chichester,  3  Q.  B.  D.  722;  and 
see  Holmes  v.  Penney,  3  K.  &  J.  90;  3  .lur. 
N.  S.  80;  see  2  Story",  Eq.  Jur.  §  1368;  Story, 
Eq.  PI.  §  71;  Williams  v.  Coward,  1  Grant 
(Penn.),  21;  Hamlin  v.  Bridge,  24  Maine,  145; 
McDermott  v.  French.  15  N.  J.  Eq.  78;  Cal- 
vert, Parties,  269;  and  notwithstanding;  he  is 
a  bankrupt,  Beales  v.  Spencer,  2  Y.  &  C.  C.  C. 
651 ;  8  Jur.  236.  Husband  and  wife  may  defend 
a  suit  in  forma  pauperis,  under  an  order  of 
course.  Pitt  v.  Pitt,  1  Sm.  &  G-  14;  17  Jur. 
571. 

7  Ld.  Red.  24,  30,  105.  As  to  a  husband's 
liability  for  his  wife's  antenuptial  debts,  see 
33  &  34  Vic.  c.  93,  §  12;  37  &  38  Vic.  c.  50. 


8  Countess  of  Portland  v.  Prodgers,  2 
Vern.  104;  2  Kent,  155. 

9  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  71;  Calvert  on  Parties, 
414;  Broom's  Com.  592,  and  cases  cited  ib.  n. 
(b).  And  so  when  the  husband  is  a  resident 
of  another  State.    Ante,  88,  n.  3. 

10  Deerley  v.  Duchess  of  Mazarine,  Salk.116. 
i  20  &  21  Vic.  c.  85.  §§  21,  25,  26,  45;  21 

&  22  Vic.  c.  108,  §§  6-8;'  27  &  28  Vic.  c  44; 
22  &  23  Vic.  c.  61,  §§  4,  5;  23  &  24  Vic.  c.  144, 
§  6;  Rudge  v.  Weedon,  4  De  G.  &  J.  216;  5  Jur. 
N.  S.  380,  723;  Re  Rainsdon's  Trusts,  4  Drew. 
446  ;  5  Jur.  N.  S.  55;  Cooke  V.  Fuller,  26 
Beav.  99;  and  other  cases  cited  ante,  p.  90;  Re 
Kingsley,  26  Beav.  84;  4  Jur.  N.  S.  1010; 
Pratt  ».'  .Tenner,  L.  R.  1  Ch.  493;  Bathe  v. 
Bank  of  England,  4  K  &  J.  564;  4  Jur.  N.  S. 
505;  Wells  v.  Malbon,  31  Beav.  48;  8  Jur. 
N.  S.  249  ;  Re  Whittingham's  Trusts.  10  Jur. 
N.  S.  818;  12  W.  R.  775;  Caldicott  i*.  Baker, 
13  W.  R.  449;  Sealey  v.  Gaston,  13  W.  R. 
577;  Heath  v.  Lewis,  "id.  128;  10  Jur.  N.  S. 
1093;  Re  Insole,  11  id.  1011;  35  Beav.  92;  L. 
R.  1  Eq.  470;  Pratt  o.  Jenner,  L.  R.  1  Ch. 
493;  12  Jur.  N.  S.  557;  Prole  t\  Soady,  L.  R. 
3  Ch.  220;  Wilkinson  v.  Gibson,  L.  R.  4  Eq. 
162;  Botten  v.  Codd,  W.  N.  (1869)  199; 
Ewart  i'.  Chubb,  L.  R.  20  Eq.  454;  Norman  v. 
Villain,  2  Ex.  D.  359.  If  the  marriage  has 
been  dissolved,  she  is  sued  in  her  maiden 
name.  Evans  V.  Carrington,  1  J.  &  H.  598; 
6  Jur.  N.  S.  268;  7  Jur.  N.  S.  197  ;  2  De  G., 
F.  &  J.  481.  And  where  the  wife  has  obtained 
a  protection  order,  she  is  usually  described  in 
the  title  as  "a  married  woman,  sued  as  ti/'ems 
sole:'    Tidman  v.  Trego,  M.  R.  1863,  T.  44. 

173 


*  179 


PERSONS    AGAINST   WHOM    A    SUIT    MAY   BE   INSTITUTED. 


dissolution  of  the  marriage;2  in  which  cases  the  wife  is  consid- 
ered in  all  respects  as  a  feme  sole,3  and  may  be  made  a  defendant, 
without  her  husband  being  joined.4  In  certain  cases  a  husband  may, 
in  Equity,  make  his  wife  a  defendant.5  Thus,  where  she  has  before 
marriage  entered  into  articles  concerning  her  own  estate,  she  is  con- 
sidered to  have  made  herself  a  separate  person  from  her  husband,  and, 
in  such  a  case,  upon  a  motion  by  the  husband  to  commit  her  for  not 
answering  interrogatories,  she  was  ordered  to  answer.6  A  husband, 
however,  cannot  make  his  wife  a  defendant,  in  order  to  have  from  her  a 
discovery  of  his  own  estate.7 

There  are,  however,  cases  in  which,  although  the  husband  and  wife 
are  both  named  as  defendants,  the  suit  may  be  proceeded  with  against 
the  wife  separately,  (a)  Thus,  if  the  suit  relates  to  the  wife's  separate 
property,  and  the  husband  be  beyond  seas,  and  not  amenable  to  the 
process  of  the  Court,  the  wife  may  be  served  with,  and  compelled  to 
answer  the  bill.8  In  Dubois  v.  Hole,9  a  bill  was  filed  against  a  man 
and  his  wife  for  a  demand  out  of  the  separate  estate  of  the  wife,  and, 
the  husband  being  abroad,  the  wife  was  served  with  a  sub])oena,  and, 
upon  non-appearance,  was  arrested  upon  an  attachment;  and  she  hav- 
ing stood  out  all  the  usual  process  of  contempt,  the  bill  was  taken  pro 
confesso  against  her.10  But,  in  order  to  entitle  the  plaintiff  to  compel 
the  wife  to  answer  separately,  the  husband  must  be  actually  out  of  the 
jurisdiction;  and  the  mere  circumstance  that  he  was  a  prisoner  was 
held  not  to  be  a  sufficient  ground  for  obtaining  an  order  for  a  separate 
answer.11 


2  Stephenson  v.  Strutt,  W.  N.  (1872)  137;  20 
W.  R.  745;  but  see  Norman  v.  Villars,  2  Ex. 
D.  359. 

3  Countess  of  Portland  v.  Prodgers,  2  Vera. 

104. 

*  1  Inst.  132  b..  133  a.;  Robinson  v.  Rey- 
nolds, 1  Aiken,  74;  Bean  v.  Morgan,  1  Hill,  Ch. 
8 ;  ante,  90,  note. 

5  Brooks  r.  Brooks,  Prec.  Ch.  24;  ante, 
110.  By  making  her  a  defendant,  he  admits 
that  the  property  in  question  is  her  separate 
estate  ;  and,  therefore,  a  demurrer  was  allowed 
to  a  bill,  by  -which  he  claimed  to  be  entitled  to 
the  property  himself.  Earl  r.  Ferris,  19  Beav. 
67  :  1  Jur.'N.  S.  5. 

6  Brooks  v.  Brooks,  ubi  supra. 
1  Ibid. 

8  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  71.    An  order  for  leave 


to  serve  a  bill  and  interrogatories  seems,  in 
such  case,  necessary;  Hinde,  85;  Nayler  v. 
Byland,  Seton,  1240;  9  Sim.  253;  Tarlton  v. 
Dyer,  id.  253.  The  order  may  be  obtained 
on  ex  parte  motion,  supported  by  affidavit. 
As  to  service,  see  R.  S.  C.  1883,  Ord.  IX.  3. 
For  form  of  orders,  see  2  Seton,  1623,  No.  5; 
1624,  No  6  ;  and  for  forms  of  motion  paper  and 
affidavit,  see  Vol.  III. 

9  2  Vern.  613. 

1(1  2  Vern.  614,  in  notis ;  see  also  Bell  v. 
Hyde,  Prec.  Ch.  328,  and  the  cases  there 
cited. 

ii  Anon.  2  Ves.  Jr.  332.  If  the  wife  be 
absent,  the  husband  may  obtain  time  to  issue  a 
commission  to  obtain  the  wife's  oath  to  the  an- 
swer; and  if  she  refuse  to  answer,  the  bill  may 
be  taken  pro  confesso  against  her.     Leavitt  v. 


(a)  Section  1,  sub-section  2  of  the  English 
Married  Women's  Property  Act,  1882  (45  & 
46  Vic.  c.  75),  which  makes  such  women  having 
a  separate  estate  liable  to  be  sued  "  in  contract, 
or  in  tort,  or  otherwise,"  makes  them  liable  to 
suit  on  any  ground  upon  which  a  single  woman 
can  be  sued.  Re  Kershaw,  Whittaker  ?•.  Ker- 
shaw (No.  2),  45  Ch.  D.  320  ;  see  Re  Roper, 
Roper  v.  Doncaster,  39  Ch.  D.  482.  By 
that  Act  married  women  may  be  sued  as 
femes  sole,  without  joinder  of  their  husbands, 
and  may  defend  personally  without  obtaining 

174 


an  order  for  that  purpose.  A  married  woman 
who  obtains  a  decree  for  judicial  separation  is 
a  feme  sole  only  with  respect  to  property  ac- 
quired by  her  after  the  decree.  Waite  r. 
MorIand/38  Ch.  D.  135;  see  Fitzgerald  v. 
Chapman,  1  Ch.  D.  563;  Re  Emery's  Trusts, 
50  L.  T.  197 ;  see  ante,  p.  87,  n.  (a).  A  married 
woman  owning  land  is  a  necessary  party  to  a 
bill  to  enjoin  her  husband  from  removing  the 
lateral  support  of  her  soil.  Wykes  v.  Ringle- 
berg,  49  Mich.  567.  _  


MARRIED    WOMEN.  *  181 

*  The  Court  will  compel  a  woman  to  appear  and  answer  sepa-  *  180 
rately  from  her  husband,  where  the  demand  is  against  her  in 
respect  of  her  separate  estate,  and  the  husband  is  only  named  for 
conformity,  and  cannot  be  affected  by  the  decree;  where  there  is  no 
separate  property  belonging  to  the  wife,  she  cannot  be  proceeded 
against  without  her  husband,  unless  she  has  obtained  an  order  to 
answer  separately;  in  which  case  she  will  be  liable  to  the  usual  pro- 
cess of  contempt,  if  she  does  not  put  in  her  answer  in  conformity  with 
the  order  which  she  herself  has  obtained.1 

It  maybe  observed  here  that  a  feme  covert  executrix  or  administra- 
trix is  not  considered  as  having  a  separate  property  in  the  assets  of  her 
testator  or  intestate;  and  upon  this  ground  a  writ  of  ne  exeat  regno, 
against  a  married  woman  sustaining  that  character,  will  not  be 
granted.2 

A  married  woman  and  her  husband  in  general  defend  an  action 
jointly ; 3  but  where  a  married  woman  is  living  separate  from  her  hus- 
band, and  is  not  under  bis  influence  or  control,4  or,  it  seems,  where 
she  obstinately  refuses  to  concur  with  him  in  any  act  necessary  for 
their  joint  defence,5  the  Court  will,  upon  the  application  of  the  hus- 
band, give  him  leave  to  put  in  a  separate  answer.  The  application  is 
made  by  motion,  of  which  notice6  must  be  given  to  the  plaintiff,7  and 
which  must  be  supported  by  an  affidavit  of  the  husband,8  verifying  the 
circumstances;  and  proc.ess  of  contempt  will  then  be  stayed  against 
him  for  want  of  his  wife's  answer,  and  the  plaintiff  must  proceed 
separately  against  the  wife.9 

If  the  separate  answer  of  the  husband  is  received  and  filed  at  the 
Record  and  Writ   Clerks'    Office,    before  an  order   for   him   to 
*  answer  separately  has  been  obtained,  it  is  an  irregular  proceed-    *181 
ing;1  and  the  plaintiff  may  move,  on  notice  to  the  husband,  that 

Cruger,  1  Paige,  422.    See  Halst.  Dig.  170-174.  acted  in  Jernegan  r.  Glasse),  he  should  not  have 

The  plaintiff  may  stipulate  to  receive  the  joint  granted  the  writ. 

answer,  sworn  toby  the  husband  alone.  Leavitt  3  For  form  of  defence,  see  Vol.  HI. 

r.  Cruger,  1  Paige,  422;  New  York  Chem.  Co.  *  See  Chambers  v.  Bull,  1  Anst.  269;  Barry 

v.  Flowers,  6  Paige,  654.  v.  Cane,  3  Mad.  472;  Garey  v.  Whittingham,  1 

1  Powell  v.  Prentice,  Ridg.  258.  Husband  S.  &  S.  163;  Gee  v.  Cottle,  3  M.  &  C.  180; 
and  wife  may  defend  a  suit  in  forma  pauperis,  Nichols  v.  Ward,  2  M'N.  &  G.  140. 

and  the  order  for  leave  to  do  so  is  of  course.  5  j^,  Red.  105-,    Pain   v.  ,  1   Ch.  Cas. 

Pitt  v.  Pitt,  17  Jur.  571,  V.  C.  S.;  1  Sm.  &  G.  296;   Murriet  v.   Lyon,  Bunb.   175;  Pavie  v. 

APP-  l4-  Acourt,  1  Dick.  13." 

2  Pannell  v.  Taylor,  T.  &  R.  96,   103.     In  6  For  form  of  notice,  see  Vol.  III. 

that  case,  Lord  Eldon  had  originally  granted  ~  Whether  notice   should   be   given  to   the 

the  writ,  upon  the  authority  of  Moore  v.  Mey-  wife  also,  qua  re ;  see  1  S.  &  S.  163-  2  M'N   & 

nell,  1  Dick.  30,  and  Jernegan  v.  Glasse,   id.  G.  143. 

107;  3  Atk.  409;  Amb.  62;  and  T.  &  R.  97,  8  See  Barry  v.  Cane,  3  Mad.  472.  n.;  Hope 

ii.(6);  but  see  Moore  v.  Hudson,  6  Mad.  218 ;  v.  Carnegie  (No.  2),  L.  R.  7  Eq.  263  ;  for  form 

i  L.  P.  Loop.  temp.  Cott.  245.     As  to  the  writ  of  affidavit,  see  Vol.  III. 

of  ne  exeat,  see  post,  Chap  XXXVIII.    As  to  »  See  Brav  v.  Akers,    15  Sim.  610;   Storv 

R°?h  °nSUoah  (leJence'see  Kevan  "-Crawford,  Eq.    PI.   §   71;    Leavitt   v.   Cruger,    1    Paige, 

6  Ch.  D.  29;   Wright  v.  Chard,  4  Drew.  702.  421. 

But  upon  further  argument,  he  was  of  opinion  i  Gee  v.  Cottle,  3  M.  &  C.  180;  Nichols  v 

that  it  could  not  be  maintained.-observing,  that  Ward,  2  M'N.  &   G.   140;  and  see  Garev  v 

it  ne  had  been  apprised  of  the  circumstances  of  Whittingham,    1  S.    &   S.   163;    Lenaghan   v. 

tne  case  of  Moore  v.  Meynell  (upon  the  author-  Smith,  2  Phil.  539. 

ity  of  which  Lord  Hardwicke  appears  to  have 

175 


*  182  PERSONS   AGAINST   WHOM    A    SUIT   MAY   BE   INSTITUTED. 

the  answer  may  be  taken  off  the  file  for  irregularity;2  or  he  may  sue 
out  an  attachment  against  the  husband  for  want  of  the  joint  answer; 3 
or  he  may  waive  the  irregularity,  and  move,  on  notice  to  the  wife,  and 
an  affidavit  of  the  facts,  that  she  may  answer  separately.4  The  hus. 
band,  if  in,  custody  for  not  filing  the  joint  answer,  cannot  clear  his 
contempt  by  putting  in  the  separate  answer  of  himself; 5  he  should 
move,  on  notice  to  the  plaintiff,6  supported  by  his  own  affidavit7  of  the 
facts,  for  leave  to  answer  and  defend  separately  from  her,  and  that, 
upon  putting  in  his  separate  answer,  he  may  be  discharged  from 
custody.8 

Where  a  married  woman  claims  an  adverse  interest,9  or  is  living 
separate  from  her  husband,10  or  he  is  mentally  incompetent  to 
answer,11  or  she  disapproves  of  the  defence  he  intends  to  make,12  she 
may,  on  motion  or  petition  of  course,13  obtain  an  order  to  defend  sepa- 
rately;14 and  if  a  husband  insists  that  his  wife  shall  put  in  an  answer 
contrary  to  what  she  believes  to  be  the  fact,  and  by  menaces  prevails 
upon  her  to  do  it,  this  is  an  abuse  of  the  process  of  the  Court,  and  he 
may  be  punished  for  the  contempt.15 

If  the  husband  has  put  in  his  answer  separately  from  his  wife,  under 

an  order  so  to  do,16  or  without  an  order  and  the  plaintiff  desires  to 

waive  the  irregularity ; 17   or  an  order  has  been  made  exempting  the 

husband  from  process  for  want  of  her  answer; 18  or  if  she  refuses  to  join 

with  him   in  answering;19  or  if  he  is  abroad;20  or  if  the  suit 

*  182    relates  to  her  separate  estate,  and  she  is  abroad,21  or  *they  live 

apart;1  or  if  the  husband,  from  mental  incapacity,  is  unable  to 
join  with  her  in  answering; 2  or  if,  after  the  joint  answer  is  put  in,  the 
husband  goes  abroad,  and  the  bill  is  amended,  and  an  answer  is 
required  thereto; 8  or  if  the  fact  of  marriage  is  in  dispute  between  the 

2  Gee  v.  Cottle,  and  Nichols  v.  Ward,  ubi  practice,  usually  obtained  on  petition  of  course 

supra ;  Collard  v.  Smith,  13  N.  J.  Eq.  43,  45.  at  the  Rolls  ;  and  it  appears  from  information 

For  form  of  notice,  see  Vol.  III.  obtained  from  the  Secretary  of  the  M.  R.,  that 

8  Gee  v.  Cottle,  ubi  supra  ;  Garey  v.  Whit-  the  practice  is  to  make  the  order  on  the  appliea- 

tingham,  1  S.  &  S.   163;  Nichols  v.  Ward,  2  tion  of  the  wife,  whenever  she  is  made  a  defend- 

M'N.  &  G.  140.  ant  in  respect  of  her  separate  estate,  without 

4  Nichols  v.  Ward,  2  M'N.  &  G.  143,  n.  inquiring  whether  in  fact  the  interests  of  the 
For  form  and  notice  of  affidavit,  see  Vol.  III.  husband  and  wife  are  adverse.     If  their  inter- 

5  Gee  v.  Cottle,  3  M.  &  C.  180.  ests  are  adverse,  the  order  will  be  made,  though 

6  Quare,  if  the  wife  should  be  served,  see      the  suit  does  not  relate  to  her  separate  estate. 
1  S.  &  S.  163;  2  M'N.  &  G.  143.  15  Ex  parte  Halsam,  2  Atk.  50. 

1  Barry  v.  Cane,  3  Mad.  472,  n.  16  Bray  v.  Akers,  15  Sim.  610;  Seton,    1255, 

8  See  Nichols  v.  Ward,  2  M'N.  &  G.  143;      No.  4. 

Seton,  1255,  No.  5.     For  forms  of  notice  of  "  See  Nichols  v.  Ward,  2  M'N.  &  G.  140. 

motion  and  affidavit  in  support,  see  Vol.  III.  18  Ibid.  143,  n. 

9  Ld.  Red.  104;  Anon.  2  Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  66,  19  Woodward  v.  Conebear,  8  Jur.  642,  V. 
pi.  2.  C.  W. 

10  Ld.  Red.  104;  Rudge  v.  Weedon,  7  W.  20  Dubois  v.  Hole,  2  Vern.  613;  Bunyan  v. 
R.  368,  n.,  V.  C.  K.                                                    Mortimer,  6  Mild.  278;   Lethley  v.  Taylor,   9 

11  Estcourt  v.  Ewington,    9    Sim.   252,   and      Sim.  252. 

cases  there  referred  to;  2  Jur.  414.  21  Nichols  v.  Ward,  2  M'N.  &  G.  143,  n. 

12  Ld.  Red.  104;  Ex  parte  Halsam,  2  Atk.  50.  J  Wiikens  v.  Marchioness  of  Townsend,  cited 
18  For  form  of  order  on  motion,  see  2  Seton,      1  Smith's  Pr.  410,  n.;  Seton,  1256. 

655,  No.  1;  and  for  forms  of  motion  paper  and  2  Estcourt  v.  Ewington,  9  Sim.  252;  2  Jur. 

petition,  see  Vol.  IIL  414. 

14  The  order  is,   according    to  the  present  8  Carleton  v.  M'Euzie,  10  Ves.  442. 

176 


MARRIED    WOMEN.  *  183 

husband  and  wife : 4  the  plaintiff,  where  no  order  for  her  to  answer 
separately  has  been  obtained  by  her  or  her  husband,  may,  on  motion, 
supported  by  an  affidavit  of  the  facts,  obtain  an  order 5  that  she  may 
answer  separately  from  her  husband.6  Notice  of  the  motion7  should 
be  given  to  the  wife ; 8  and  if  she  is  abroad,  an  order  for  leave  to  serve 
her  there  with  the  notice  is  necessary,9  and  may  be  obtained  on  an  ex 
parte  motion.10 

Where  a  woman  was  made  a  defendant  to  a  bill  filed  for  the  purpose 
of  establishing  a  will  against  her,  and  a  man  who  pretended  that  he 
was  her  husband,  but  which  the  woman  denied :  on  her  making  appli- 
cation to  answer  separately,  Lord  Hardwicke  ordered  that  she  should 
be  at  liberty  to  put  in  a  separate  answer,  but  without  prejudice  to  any 
question  as  to  the  validity  of  the  marriage.11 

In  general,  the  separate  answer  of  a  feme  covert  ought  to  have  an 
order  to  warrant  it,  and  if  put  in  without  an  order,  it  will  be  irregular 
and  may  be  taken  off  the  file.12  But  if  a  husband  brings  a  bill  against 
his  wife,  he  admits  her  to  be  a,  feme  sole,13  and  she  must  put  in  her 
answer  as  such,  and  no  order  is  necessary  to  warrant  her  so  doing;  u 
and  if  she  does  not  put  in  her  answer,  the  husband  may  obtain  an  order 
to  compel  her  to  do  so.15 

Although,  strictly  speaking,  the  answer  of  a,  feme  covert,  if  separate, 
ought  to  be  warranted  by  an  order,  yet  if  her  answer  be  put  in  without 
such  an  order,  and  the  same  is  a  fair  and  honest  defence,  and 
deliberately  put  in  with  the  consent  of  the  husband,  and  *  the    *  183 
plaintiff  accepts  it  and  replies  to  it,  the  Court  will  not,  on  the 
motion  of  the  wife,  or  of  her  executors,  set  it  aside.1 

The  separate  answer  of  a  married  woman  is  put  in  by  her  in  the  same 
manner  as  if  she  were  a  feme  sole,  without  joining  any  guardian  or 
other  person  with  her; 2  and  when  put  in  under  an  order,  she  has,  it 
seems,  the  full  time  for  answering  from  the  date  of  the  order.8     If, 

*  Longworth  v.  Bellamy,  Seton,  1245.  filing  a  replication.     Fulton  Bank  v.  Beach,  2 

6  For  forms  of  order,  see  Seton,  1255,  Nos.  Paige,  307;  S.  C.  6  Wend.  36  ;  Collard  v.  Smith, 

4>  6.  13  N.  J.  Eq.  45.     If  the  wife  apprehend  that 

6  See  Hope  v.  Carnegie,  L.  R.  7  Eq.  254;  S.  her  husband  will  not  make  a  proper  defence  for 
C.  ih.  263.  her,  she  may,  as  of  course,  obtain  leave  to  an- 

7  For  forms  of  notice  of  motion  and  affidavit  swer  separately.  Lingan  v.  Henderson,  1  Bland, 
in  support,  see  Vol.  III.  270;  see  Anon.  2  Sumner's  Ves.  332,  note  (a); 

8  Nichols  r.  Ward,  2  M'N.  &  G.  143,  n.  ;  Ferguson  v.  Smith,  2  John.  Ch.  139. 

Seton,  1255,   1256;    but  see   Bray  r.  Akers,  15  «  See  Earl  v.  Ferris,  19  Beav.  67;    1   Jur. 

Sim.  610;  Hope  v  Carnegie,  I..  R.  7  Eq.  263.  N.  S.  5 ;  ante,  p.  109,  note  9. 

»  See  Nichols  p.  Ward,  2  M'N.  &  G.  143,  n.  "  Ex  parte  Strangeways,  3    Atk.  478;    Ld. 

10  For  form  of  motion  paper,  see  Vol.  III.  Red.  105;   Higginson  v.  Wilson,  11  Jur.  1071; 

H  Wybourn  v.  Blount,  1  Dick.  155.  Copeland  v.  Granger,  3  Tenn.  Ch   487. 

12  Wyatt's  P.  R.  53;  and  see    Higginson  v.  M  Ainslie   v.   Medlicott,   13    Ves.  266.     See 

Wilson,  11  Jur.  1071,  V.  C.  K.  B.;  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  XXIX. 

XVI.  8;  Noel  p.  Noel,  13  Ch.  D.  510;  Heygate  »  Duke  of  Chandos  v.  Talbot,  2  P.  Wms. 

f.  Thompson,  L.   R.  8  Eq.  354.     For  form  of  371,  601. 

order,  see  2  Seton,  655,  No.  1.     An  answer  of  2  For  formal  parts  of  such  answer,  see  Vol. 

a  wife,  put  in  separately,  without  a  previous  III. 

order,  was  suppressed  for  irregularity       Perine  3  Jackson  v.  Haworth,  1  S.  &  S.  161.    When 

v.  Swaine,  1  John.  Ch.  24;  Lenvitt  v.  Cruger,  1  an  order  to  answer  separately  has  been  obtained, 

Paig-,  421  ;  Collard  p.  Smith.  13  N.  J.  Eq.  43;  it  should  be  produced  to  the  Commissioner  before 

Bobbins  p.  Abrahams,  1   Halst.  Ch.  16.      But  whom  the  answer  is  sworn,  and  be  referred  to 

the  irregularity  will  be  waived  by  the  plaintiff  in  the  jurat  (for  form,  see  Vol.  III.);  and  the 

vol.  i.  — 12  177 


*184 


PERSONS   AGAINST    WHOM    A    SUIT    MAY   BE   INSTITUTED. 


however,  the  married  woman  is  an  infant,  she  cannot  answer,  either 
separately  or  jointly,  until  a  guardian  has  been  appointed  for  her;4 
such  appointment  will  be  made  by  order,  on  motion  of  course  or  on 
petition  of  course,  supported  by  affidavit  of  the  fitness  of  the  proposed 
guardian.5 

A  married  woman,  obtaining  an  order  to  answer  separately  from  her 
husband,  renders  herself  liable  to  process  of  contempt,  in  case  she  does 
not  put  in  her  answer  pursuant  to  the  order; 6  but  an  order  for  leave  to 
sue  out  such  process  is  necessary,  and  may  be  obtained  by  the  plaintiff 
on  an  ex  parte  motion.7 

Where  husband  and  wife  are  defendants  to  a  bill,  the  wife  will  not 
be  compelled  to  give  any  discovery  which  may  expose  her  to  a  for- 
feiture ; 8  neither  is  she  compellable  to  discover  whether  she  has  a 
separate  estate,  unless  the  bill  is  so  framed  as  to  seek  to  charge  the 
property  settled  to  her   separate  use,    and   to  warrant   the   Court   in 

making  a  decree  against  it.9 
*  184        *  A  wife  cannot  be  compelled  to  make  a  discovery  which  may 

expose  her  husband  to  a  charge  of  felony;  and  if  called  upon  to 
do  so,  she  may  demur.1  In  like  manner,  a  married  woman  cannot  be 
made  a  party  to  a  suit,  for  the  mere  purpose  of  obtaining  discovery 
from  her,  to  be  made  use  of  against  her  husband.2 


order  must  be  produced  at  the  office  of  the 
Record  and  Writ  Clerks,  at  the  time  of  filing 
the  answer.     Braithwaite's  Pr.  45,  397. 

*  Colman  v.  Northcote,  2  Hare,  147;  7  Jur. 
528;  Braithwaite's  Pr.  47. 

5  For  forms  of  motion  paper  and  petition, 
and  affidavit  in  support,  see  Vol.  II [. 

6  Powell  v.  Prentice,  Ridg.  P.  C.  258; 
Lenaghan  v.  Smith,  2  Phil.  537;  Bunyan  v. 
Mortimer,  6  Mad.  278;  Home  v.  Patrick,  30 
Beav.  405;  8  Jur.  N.  S.  351 ;  Bull  v.  Withey, 
9  Jur.  N.  S.  595,  V.  C.  S.;  Graham  v.  Fitch, 
2  De  G.  &  S.  246 ;  12  Jur.  833. 

'  Taylor  v.  Taylor,  12  Beav.  271;  Thick- 
nesse  v.  Acton,  15  Jur.  1052,  V.  C.  T.;  Home  v. 
Patrick,  Bull  r.  Withey,  ubi  supra.  As  to  notice 
in  other  cases,  see  Graham  v.  Fitch,  ubi  supra  ; 
Bushell  v.  Bushell,  1  S.  &  S.  164 ;  M'Kenna  v. 
Everett,  Seton,  1256,  No.  7.  For  form  of  mo- 
tion paper,  see  Vol.  III. 

8  Wrottesley  v.  Bendish,  3  P.  Wins.  235, 
238. 

9  Thus,  where  a  bill  was  filed  against  a  man 
and  his  wife,  for  the  purpose  of  enforcing  the 
specific  performance  of  an  agreement  alleged 
to  have  been  entered  into  by  an  agent  on  their 
behalf  for  the  purchase  of  an  estate  from  the 
plaintiff,  and  in  support  of  the  plaintiff's  case 
it  was  alleged  that  the  wife  had  septirate  moneys 
and  property  of  her  own,  and  had  joined  with 
her  husband  in  authorizing  the  agent  to  enter 
into  the  agreement,  but  the  bill  prayed  merely 
that  the  husband  and  wife  might  be  decreed 
specifically  to  perform  the  agreement,  and  did 
not  seek  anv  specific  relief  against  her  separate 

"178 


estate :  the  wife  having  obtained  an  order  to  that 
effect,  put  in  a  separate  demurrer  as  to  so  much 
of  the  bill  as  required  from  her  a  discovery 
■whether  she  h:id  not  separate  money  and  prop- 
erty of  her  own,  and  answered  the  rest.  Upon 
argument,  Sir  Thomas  Plumer  V.  C.  allowed 
the  demurrer,  on  the  ground  that  as  the  decree, 
in  cases  where  a  feme  covert  was  held  liable, 
had  been  uniformly  against  the  separate  estate, 
and  not  against  the/eme  covert  herself,  and  as 
the  bill  did  not  seek  any  decree  against  any 
trustees,  or  particular  fund,  but  only  against 
the  wife,  it  could  not  be  supported,  and  the 
interrogatory,  if  answered,  would  consequently 
be  of  no  use.   Francis  v.  Wigzell,  1  Mad.  258. 

i  Cartwright  ».  Green,  8  Ves.  405,  410;  see 
Story,  Eq.  PL  §  519. 

2*2  Story,  Eq  Jur.  §  1496.  Therefore,  in 
Le  Texier  v.  The  Margrave  of  Auspach,  5  Ves. 
322,  329;  and  15  Ves.  159,  164,  where  a  bill 
was  filed  against  the  Margrave  to  recover  a 
balance  due  to  the  plaintiff  upon  certain  con- 
tracts, to  which  bill  the  Margravine  was  made 
a  partv,  as  the  agent  of  her  husband,  for  the 
purpose  of  eliciting  from  her  a  discovery  of 
certain  vouchers  which  were  alleged  to  be  in 
her  possessions  demurrer  by  the  Margravine 
separately  was  allowed  by  Lord  Rosslj'n,  and 
afterwards  upon  rehearing  by  Lord  Eldon,  after 
the  Margrave's  death.  Upon  the  same  principle, 
where  a  bill  was  filed  against  a  man  and  his 
wife  for  discovery  in  aid  of  an  action  at  law, 
brought  against  him  to  recover  a  debt  due 
from  the  wife  dum  sola,  a  separate  demurrer 
put  in  by  the  wife  was  allowed.    Barron  v. 


MARRIED    WOMEN.  *  186 

It  was  supposed  that  the  admission  of  a  will,  in  the  separate 
answer  of  a  married  woman,  who  was  the  heiress-at-law  of  the 
*  testator,  was  sufficient  evidence  to  enable  the  Court  to  declare  *  185 
the  will  established; *  but  it  has  now  been  decided,  that  such  evi- 
dence is  not  sufficient  for  that  purpose,  or  to  bind  her  inheritance.2  As  a 
general  rule,  however,  the  separate  answer  of  a  married  woman  may 
be  read  against  her.3 

Where  a  husband  and  wife  are  made  defendants  to  a  suit  relating  to 
personal  property  belonging  to  the  wife,  and  they  put  in  a  joint  answer, 
such  answer  may  be  read  against  them,  for  the  purpose  of  fixing  them 
with  the  admissions  contained  in  it;  but  where  the  subject-matter 
relates  to  the  inheritance  of  the  wife,  it  cannot,4  and  the  facts  relied 
upon  must  be  proved  against  them  by  other  evidence.5  And  it  seems 
that  the  joint  answer  of  the  husband  and  wife  may  be  read  against  the 
wife  with  reference  to  her  separate  estate,  as  well  as  her  separate 
answer,  on  the  ground  that  in  such  a  case  she  cannot  be  compelled  to 
answer  separately.6 

In  Ward  v.  Heath''  a  bill  was  exhibited  against  the  husband  and 
wife,  concerning  the  wife's  inheritance:  the  husband  stood  out  all  pro- 
cess of  contempt,  and  upon  its  being  moved  that  the  bill  might  be 
taken  pro  confesso,  it  was  opposed,  because  the  wife,  having  in  the 
interim  obtained  an  order  to  that  effect,  put  in  an  answer,  in  which 
she  set  forth  a  title  in  herself;  and  the  Court  decreed  that  the  bill 
should  be  taken  pro  confesso,  against  the  husband  only,  and  that 
he  should  account  for  all  the  profits  of  the  *  land  which  he  had  *  186 
received  since  the  coverture,  and  the  profits  which  should  be 
received  during  coverture. 

Grillard,  3  V.  &  B  165;    see  Metier  v.  Metier,  conduct  and  affecting  only  her  own  interests. 

18   N.  J.  Eq.  270.      In  Rutter  v.  Baldwin,   1  Metier  v  Metier,  18  N.  J.  Eq.  270. 
Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  227,  pi.  15,  the   Court  agreed  4  Evans  v.  Cogan,  2  P.  Wins.  449;  Kerch- 

clearly  that  a  wife  can  never  be  admitted  to  ner  v   Kempton,  47  Md.  508. 
answer,   or  otherwise  as   evidence,    to   charge  5  In   Merest    r.  Hodgson,  9  Price,  503  (see 

her  husband;  and  that   where  a  man  marries  also  Elston   v.  Wood,   2   M.    &  K.   678),    the 

a  widow  executrix,  her  evidence   will   not  be  L.  C.  B.  Alexander  refused  to  permit  the  joint 

allowed  to  charge   her  second   husband.     See  answer  of  the  husband  and  wife  to  be  read,  but 

Cole  v.  Gray,  2  Vera.  79;  16  &  17  Vic.  c.  83.  ordered  the  cause  to  stand   over,  to   give   the 

But  iu  that  case,  the  wife  having  held  herself  plaintiffs  an  opportunity  of  proving  the  facts 

out   as  a   feme    sole,    and    treated    with    the  admitted. 

plaintiff    and  other  parlies  to  the   cause,  who  6  Callow  v.  Howie,  1  De  G.  &  S.  531;  11  Jur. 

were  ignorant  of  her  marriage,  in  that  char-  984;  Clivev.  Carew,  1  J.  &  H.  199,207;  5  Jur. 

acter,    and     it    having    been    proved    in    the  N.  S.  487,  V.  C.  W.    In  Eyton  v.  Eyton,  Prec. 

cause    that    on    some   occasions   the  husband  Ch.  116,  it  appears,  on  first  view,  as  if  the  sepa- 

had  given  in  to  the  concealment  of  the   mar-  rate  answer  of  a  husband  had  been  admitted  by 

riage,  the  Court  allowed  the  answer  of  the  wife  the  Master  of  the  Rolls  to  be  read  as  evidence 

to  be  read  as  evidence  against   the   husband,  against   the  wife  in   a   matter   relating  to  her 

and  decreed  accordingly.  inheritance;    but   the   reason  of  the  decree  in 

1  Codrington  v.  Earl  of  Shelburn,  2  Dick,  that  case  appears  to  be  that  his  Honor' con- 
475.  ce'ived  that  the  counterpart  of  the  settlement, 

2  Brown  v.  Hayward,  1  Hare,  432;  6  Jur.  which  appears  to  have  been  produced,  was 
847;  see  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  XIX.  17;  Comley  v.  considered  to  be  sufficient  evidence  of  the  set- 
Hendricks,  8  Blackf.  189.  tlement  :  at  least  this  appears  to  have  been  the 

3  Ld.  Red.  104,  105.     The  peculiar  relations  ground    upon    which    the    case   was    decided 
of  husband  and  wife  will  not  protect  her  from  on  the  appeal  before  the  Lord  Keeper  Wright, 
making  a  discovery  relating  solely  to  her  own  7  2  Ch.  Cas.  173;  1  Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  65,  pi.  4, 

179 


186 


PERSONS   AGAINST   WHOM    A    SUIT   MAY   BE   INSTITUTED. 


The  Court  will  not  make  a  personal  decree  against  a  feme  covert 
alone.1  She  may  pledge  her  separate  property,  and  make  it  answerable 
for  her  engagements; 2  but  where  her  trustees  are  not  made  parties  to  a 
bill,  and  no  particular  fund  is  sought  to  be  charged,  only  au  order 
charging  any  separate  estate  to  which  she  may  be  entitled  can  be  made.3 


i  Hulme  v.  Tenant,  1  Bio  C.  C.  16,  21; 
Francis  v.  Wigzell,  1  Mad.  258,  263;  Aylett 
v.  Ashton,  1  M.  &  C.  105,  111;  see  Atwood  v. 
Chichester,  3  Q.  B.  D.  722,  725;  Davis  v. 
Ballenden,  46  L.  T.  797;  Haigh  v.  Haigh,  31 
Ch.  D.  478;  Hope  v.  Carnegie  (No.  2),  L.  R. 
7  Eq.  2G3;  see  also  Jordan  v.  Jones,  2  Phil. 
170,  172,  where  the  Court  refused  to  compel 
a  married  woman  to  execute  a  conveyance 
of  an  estate  not  settled  to  her  separate  use  ;  but 
in  cases  of  this  description,  the  married  wcman 
can  usually  be  established  to  be  a  trustee,  and 
then  an  order  under  the  Trustee  Acts  may 
be  obtained. 

The  general  rule,  that  Equity  will  not  give  a 
personal  decree  against  a.  feme  covert,  prevails  in 
the  United  States.  Phipps  v  Sedgwick,  95  U.  S. 
3;  Maberry  t\  Neely,  5  Humph  337;  Chatter- 
ton t>.  Young,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  768,  771.  Nor  will  a 
personal  judgment  at  law  sustain  a  proceeding 
in  Equity  to  subject  the  separate  estate  of  a 
married  woman,  unless  the  demand  was  of  a 
character  for  which  the  separate  estate  would 
be  liable  without  judgment,  where  there  is  any 
restriction  on  the  power  of  the  feme  to  charge 
the  property.  Swayne  v.  Lyon,  67  Penn.  St. 
436;  Chatterton  v.  Young,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  768. 
But  in  California  it  has  been  held  ttiat  on 
the  foreclosure  of  a  mortgage  made  by  a  mar- 
ried woman  on  her  separate  estate,  a  personal 
judgment  may  be  rendered  against  her  for 
any  unsatisfied  balance  of  debt.  Marlow  v. 
Barlow.  7  Rep.  583.  And  this  would  seem  to  be 
the  logical  result  of  enabling  a  married  woman 
to  act  as  a  feme  sole  touching  her  separate 
property.  Natl.  Bk.  v.  Garlmghame,  36  How. 
Pr.  369.  The  iiuthorities  are  conflicting  upon 
the  point  of  the  validity  of  a  personal  judg- 
ment against  a  feme  covert  at  law.  Freem. 
on  Judgts.  §§  149,  150.  In  North  Carolina 
and  Tennessee  the  validity  of  such  judgments, 
as  against  collateral  attack,  has  been  upheld. 
Green  v.  Branton,  1  Dev.  Eq.  508;  Crawford  v. 
Crawford,  1  Tenn.  Leg.  Rep.  37.  While  Mr. 
Justice  Field,  in  an  able  opinion,  has  decided 
that  a  judgment  against  a  married  woman 
upon  a  contract  not  binding  upon  her  is  void. 
Norton  v.  Meader,  4  Sawyer,  603.  So.  in 
Swayne  v.  Lyon,  ubi  supra,  it  was  held  that 
every  judgment  against  a  married  woman 
which  does  not  show  her  liability  on  its  face  is 
void.     See  also  Hix  v.  Gosling,  1  Lea,  572. 

2  See  Sperling  v.  Rochfort,  8  Sumner's  Ves. 
175,  182,  Perkins's  note  (a),  and  cases  cited; 
Fettiplace  v.  Gorges,  3  Bro.  C.  C.  (Perkins's  ed.) 
8,  10,  and   note,   and  cases   cited;   Taylor   v. 

180 


Meads,  4  De  G.  J.  &  S.  597;  Robinson  v.  Pick- 
ering, 16  Ch.  D.  660. 

A  wife  may,  within  the  power  under  which 
she  holds  separate  estate,  bestow  the  property 
upon  her  husband,  as  well  as  upon  a  stranger: 
Meth.  Epis.  Church  v.  Jaques,  3  John.  Ch.  86; 
Bradish  v.  Gibbs,  3  John.  Ch.  523;  Stephen  v. 
Beall,  22  Wall.  329;  or  charge  it  for  his  debts: 
Demarest  v.  Wyncoop,  3  John  Ch.  523:  Field 
v.  Sowle,  4  Russ.  112  ;  Marshman  v.  Conklin, 
21  N.  J.  Eq.  549  ;  Hodges  v.  Williams,  Sup. 
Crt.  Tenn.  cited  2  Tenn.  Ch.  679;  and  become 
the  debtor  of  her  husband  for  money  borrowed 
to  improve  her  separate  estate:  Gardner  v. 
Gardner,  22  Wend.  526;  S.  C.  7  Paige,  112. 
And  a  wife  who  permits  her  husband  for  years 
to  receive  and  appropriate  the  income  of  her 
separate  estate  cannot  compel  him  to  account  to 
her  therefor  except  from  the  time  permission  is 
revoked.  Lyon  v.  Greenbay  Ry.  Co.  42  Wis. 
548;  Lishey  v.  Lishey,  2  tenn.  Ch.  5.  The 
wife  may  charge  her  separate  estate  for  debt 
within  the  power  under  the  instrument  of 
title,  but  the  general  rule  is  that  the  written 
contract  must  on  its  face  show  the  intent  to 
charge.  Yale  v.  Dederer,  68  N.  Y.  329; 
Maguire  v.  Maguire,  3  Mo.  App.  458;  Gozman 
v.  Cruger,  69  N.Y.  87;  Chatterton  v.  Young, 
2  Tenn.  Ch.  768;  Shacklett  v.  Polk.  4  Heisk. 
104.  And  if  the  instrument  under  which  she 
claims  limits  the  power  of  disposition  either 
directly  or  by  pointing  out  the  mode,  the  charge 
must  be  within  the  power.  Ross  v.  Ewer,  3 
Atk.  156  ;  Morgan  v.  Elam,  4  Yerg.  375;  Leay- 
craft  v.  Hedden,  3  Green,  Ch.  512;  Williamson 
v.  Beckham,  8  Leigh,  20.  The  Court  has  no 
power,  even  with  the  consent  of  the  feme,  to 
pass  her  separate  estate  beyond  the  power 
reserved.  Richards  v.  Chambers,  10  Ves.  580; 
Sturgis  v.  Corp,  13  Ves.  190;  Robinson  v.  Dart, 
Dud.  Eq.  128.  And  even  where  the  intent  to  bind 
the  separate  estate  is  declared,  the  betteropinion 
is  that  the  property  will  not  be  bound  unless 
the  contract  inured  to  the  benefit  of  the  feme 
or  the  separate  estate.  Perkins  v.  Eliott,  23 
N  J.  Eq.  526,  Kelso  v.  Tabor,  52  Barb.  125; 
McCormick  v.  Hilbrook,  22  Iowa,  487;  Coates 
v.  McKee,  26  Ind.  233;  Lightfoot  v.  Bass,  2 
Tenn.  Ch.  677. 

3  Davies  v.  Jenkins,  6  Ch.  D.  728 ;  Collett  v. 
Dickenson,  11  Ch.  D.  687;  Flower  v.  Buller, 
15  Ch.  D.  665;  Re  Peace  &  Waller,  24  Ch. 
D.  405.  For  form  of  the  order,  see  2  Seton, 
1671.  In  Francis  v.  Wigzell,  1  Mad.  258, 
where  a  bill  was  filed  against  a  husband  and 
wife  for  the  specific  performance  of  an  agree- 


MARRIED    WOMEN. 


187 


If  a  married  woman,  having  a  general  power  of  appointment,  by  will, 
over  real  or  personal  estate,  makes,  by  her  will,  her  separate  property 
liable  to  the  payment  of  her  debts,4  a  Court  of  Equity  will  apply  the 
estate  so  disposed  of  in  the  payment  of  written  engagements 
entered  into  by  her,  and  in  the  discharge  of  her  general  *  debts; l  *187 
and  apply,  in  the  same  manner,  property  settled  to  the  separate 
use  of  a  married  woman  for  life,  with  remainder  to  such  persons  as  she 
shall  by  will  appoint,  and  in  default  of  appointment  to  her  children  or 
next  of  kin  and  which  she  in  the  exercise  of  the  power  has  appointed.2 
But  a  married  woman's  separate  estate  is  not  liable  even  for  general 
contracts,  which  from  their  nature  cannot  have  reference  to  her  separate 
estate,  and  a  fortiori  it  is  not  liable  for  general  torts.3  The  creditors 
have  no  charge  upon  the  separate  estate,  so  that  in  a  creditors'  suit  for 
payment,  an  injunction  to  restrain  the  married  woman  from  alienating 
the  separate  estate  will  not  be  granted  before  the  hearing.4 


ment  for  the  purchase  of  an  estate,  charging 
that  the  wife  had  separate  property  sufficient  to 
answer  the  purchase-money,  but  without  pray- 
ing any  specific  relief  against  such  separate 
estate,  a  demurrer  put  in  by  the  wife,  to  so  much 
of  the  bil  as  sought  discovery  from  her  whether 
she  had  a  separate  estate  or  not,  was  allowed. 

4  In  Owens  v.  Dickenson,  C.  &  P.  48,  54, 
4  Jur.  1151,  where  a  married  woman  had 
made  her  will  in  pursuance  of  a  power,  and 
thereby  charged  her  real  estate  with  the  pay- 
ment of  debts,  Lord  Cottenham  entered  into 
the  principles  upon  which  Equity  enforces  the 
contracts  of  married  women  against  their 
separate  estate,  and  rejected  the  theory  that 
such  contracts  are  in  the  nature  of  executions 
of  a  power  of  appointment,  observing:  ''The 
view  taken  by  Lord  Thurlow,  in  Hulme  v. 
Tenant,  1  Bro.  C.  C.  16,  is  more  correct. 
According  to  that  view,  the  separate  property 
of  a  married  woman  being  a  creature  of  Equity, 
it  follows,  that,  if  she  has  power  to  deal  with 
it,  she  has  the  other  power  incident  to  prop- 
erty in  general;  namely,  the  power  of  con- 
tracting debts  to  be  paid  out  of  it ;  and  inas- 
much as  her  creditors  have  not  the  means  at 
law  of  compelling  payment  of  those  debts, 
a  Court  of  Equity  takes  upon  itself  to  give 
effect  to  them,  not  as  personal  liabilities,  but  by 
laying  hold  of  the  separate  property,  as  the 
only  means  by  which  they  can  be  satisfied." 
Acting  upon  this  principle,  Lord  Cottenham  re- 
ferred it  to  the  Master.to  inquire  what  debts  there 
were  to  be  paid  under  the  provisions  of  the  will. 

1  See  also  as  to  the  liability  of  a.  married 
woman's  separate  estate,  Vaughan  v.  Vander- 
stegen,  2  Drew.  165,  363;  Hobday  v.  Peters 
(No.  2),  28  Beav.  354;  6  Jur.  N.  S.  794; 
Wright  v.  Chard,  4  Drew.  673 ;  5  Jur.  N.  S. 
1334 ;  1  De  G.  F.  &  J.  567;  6  Jur.  N.  S.  470; 
Clive  v.  Carew,  1  J.  &  H.  199;  5  Jur.  N.  S. 
437;  Johnson  v.  Gallagher,  7  Jur.  N.  S.  273; 
9  W.  R.  506,  L.  J  J. ;  3  De  G.  F.  &  J.  404; 


Bolden  v.  Nicholay,  3  Jur.  N.  S.  884  ;  V.  C. 
VV.;  Greenough  v.  Shorrock,  3  N.  R.  599; 
Shattock  v.  Shattock,  L.  R.  2  Eq.  182,  M.  R.; 
Rogers  v.  Ward,  8  Allen,  387;  Picard  v.  Hine, 
L.  R.  5  Ch.  274;  Gardner  v.  Gardner,  22 
Wend.  526;  Sharpe  v.  Foy,  L.  R.  4  Ch.  35; 
Chubb  v.  Stretch,  L.  R.  9  Eq.  555;  Ex  parte 
Matthewman,  L.  R.  3  Eq.  781 ;  12  Jur  N.  S. 
982;  MacHenry  v.  Davies,  L.  R.  6  Eq.  462; 
S.  C.  L.  R.  10  Eq.  88;  Butler  r.  Cumpston, 
L.  R.  7  Eq.  16;  Re  Bromley,  21  W.  R.  155; 
Green  v.  Lyon,  id.  830  ;  London  Chartered  Bank 
of  Australia  v.  Lempriere,  L.  R.  4  P.  C.  572; 
Wainford  v.  Heyl,  L.  R.  20  Eq.  321;  Lan- 
cashire &c.  Bank  v.  Tee,  W.  N.  (1875)  231; 
Mayd  i\  Field,  3  Ch.  D.  587  ;  National  &  P. 
Bank  v.  Thomas,  24  W.  R.  1013;  Davies  v. 
Jenkins,  6  Ch.  D.  728;  London  &  P.  Bank 
v.  Bogle,  7  Ch.  D.  773  ;  Collett  v.  Dickenson.  11 
Ch.  D.  687  ;  Pike  v.  Fitzgibbon,  17  Ch.  I).  454; 
Hodgson  v.  Williamson,  15  Ch.  D.  87;  Skin- 
ner v.  Todd,  W.  N.  (1881)  166;  30  W.  R. 
267.  For  forms  of  judgments  against  separate 
use  of  married  women,  see  2  Seton,  687-689; 
Picard  v.  Hine,  L.  R  5  Ch.  278.  As  to  costs  of 
trustee  of  separate  estate,  see  Picard  v.  Hine, 
supra  ;  London  &  P.  Bank  v.  Bogle,  7  Ch.  D. 
773,  776;  Collett  v.  Dickenson,  11  Ch.  D.  687. 
Where  the  contract  is  for  the  protection  of  her 
separate  realty,  as  by  the  making  of  a  levee. 
Henry  v.  Blackburn  (Sup.  Crt.  Ark.),  1  Memph. 
L.  J."  194. 

2  Re  Harvey,  13  Ch.  D.  216 ;  and  see 
Heathley  v.  Thomas,  15  Ves  596;  Hughes  v. 
Wells,  9  Hare,  749,  772;  Johnson  v.  Gallagher, 

3  De  G.  F.  &  J.  494  ;  7  Jur.  N.  S.  273;  London 
Chartered  Bank  of  Australia  V.  Lempriere.  L.  R. 

4  P.  ('.  572  ;  but  see  Vaughan  r.  Vanderstegen, 
2  Drew.  165,  363;  Hobday  v.  Peters  (No.  2), 
28  Beav.  354;  6  Jur.  N.  S.  794;  Shattock  v. 
Shattock,  L.R.  2  Eq.  182  ;  35  Beav.  489. 

8  Wainford  t\  Heyl,  L.  R.  20  Eq.  321. 
4  National   &  P.  Bank   v.  Thomas,  24  W. 
181 


*  188       PERSONS   AGAINST    WHOM    A    SUIT   MAY   BE   INSTITUTED. 

Where  a  married  woman  is  entitled  to  a  copyright  for  her  separate 
use,  it  seems  that  she  can  contract  not  to  grant  to  any  person  during  a 
definite  period  a  license  to  publish  the  work,  and  that  such  contract  can 
be  enforced  against  a  licensee  with  notice.5 

Where  the  Court  thought  a  married  woman  defendant  ought  to  pay 
certain  costs,  and  it  did  not  appear  that  she  had  separate  estate,  the 
Court  gave  the  plaintiff  liberty  to  apply  for  payment  of  these  costs, 
in  case  of  any  moneys  becoming  payable  to  her  separate  use.6 

If  the  equity  of  redemption  of  a  mortgaged  estate  comes  to  a  mar- 
ried woman,  and  a  bill  is  brought  against  her  and  her  husband  to  fore- 
close it,  upon  which  a  decree  of  foreclosure  is  pronounced,  the  wife  is 
liable  to  be  absolutely  foreclosed,  notwithstanding  coverture,  and  will 
not  have  a  day  given  her  to  redeem  after  her  husband's  death;7  and 
where  a  widow  tiled  a  bill  to  set  aside  a  decree  of  foreclosure  pro- 
nounced against  her  and  her  husband  during  coverture,  and  to  be  let  in 
to  redeem,  and  the  mortgagee  pleaded  the  proceedings  and  decree  in  the 
former  cause,  the  plea  was  allowed.8  Where  an  estate  has  been  sold 
under  a  decree  of  the  Court,  a  feme  covert  is  as  much  bound  by  the 
decree  as  a,  feme  sole,  although  it  may  be  to  her  prejudice;  as  it  would 
most  ruinously  depreciate  the  value  of  property  sold  under  a  decree  in 
Equity,  if,  where  there  is  neither  fraud  nor  collusion  in  the  purchaser, 
his  title  could  be  defeated.     But  a  decree  obtained  by  fraud  is  invalid.9 

If  a  married  woman  defendant  desires  to  appeal,  she  must  do  so  by 
her  next  friend,10  who  may  be  a  co-defendant;11  or  she  should  obtain 

an  order  to  appeal  in  forma  pauperis  without  a  next  friend.1'2  (a) 

*  188        *  Where  a  suit  has  been  instituted  against  a  man  and  his  wife, 

and  the  husband  dies  pending  the  proceedings,  the  suit  will  not  be 

abated.1  When  a  female  defendant  marries,  no  abatement  takes  place ;  but 

the  husband's  name  should  be  introduced  in  all  subsequent  proceedings.2 

R.    1013;  Robinson   v.  Pickering,   16   Ch.   D.  9  Burke  v.  Oosbie,  1  Ball  &  B.  489;  Ken- 

660.  nedy  o.  Daly,  1  Sell.  &  Lef.  355. 

6  Warne  v.  Routledge,   L.  R.  18  Eq.  497,  ">'  Elliot  v.  Ince,  7   De  G.  M.  &  G.  475;   3 

M.  R.  Jur.  N.  S.  597;  Picard  v.  Hine,  L.  R.  5  Ch.  274. 

6  Temberton  v.  M'Gill,  1  Jur.  N.  S.  1045;  «  Ibid. 

V.  C  W.  12  Crouch  v.  Waller,  4   De  G.  &  J.  43;    5 

7  Mallack  v.  Galton,  3  P.  Wms.  352,  but  Jur.  N.  S.  326;  ante,  pp.  39,  40,  111;  and  see 
the   decree  ought  not  to  be   made  absolute  at      R.  S.  C.  Ord.  XVI.  8. 

once,  even  by  consent  on  an  affidavit  verifying  i  See  Ld  Red.  59;  Shelberry  v.  Briggs,  2 
the  amount  due.  Harrison  i>.  Kennedy,  10  Vern.  249;  1  Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  1,  pi.  4;  Durbaine«. 
Hare.  A  pp.  51.  But  see  Kerchner  r.  Kempton,  Knight,  1  Vern.  318;  1  Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  126,  pi.  7. 
47  Md.  568,  where  it  was  held  that  such  a  *  Ld.  Red.  58;  Wharam  v.  Broughton,  1 
decree,  although  consented  to  by  the  husband,  Ves.  Sr.  182;  and  see  Sapte  v.  Ward,  1  Coll.  25; 
was  not  binding  on  the  wife,  the  husband  hav-  Re  Reeks,  W.  N.  (1881)  168.  As  to  the  suppos- 
ing no  authority  to  employ  counsel  to  represent  sion  of  the  marriage,  see  Thomas  v.  Finlayson, 
her  in  such  a  litigation  without  her  assent.  19  W.  R.  255.     For  the  title  of  their  joint  an- 

8  Mallack  v.  Galton,  3  P.  Wms.  352.  swer  in  such  case,  see  Vol.  III. 

(a)  If   a  married  woman    appeals  without  it  was  held  that  costs  recovered  by  the  plain- 

a   next   friend,    and  has   no  separate  property  tiffs  in  their  suit  against  a  married  woman,  but 

except  such  as  she  is  restrained  from    antici-  execution  for  which  was  limited  to  her  separate 

pating,  she  will  be  required  to  give  security  for  property,  could,  after  she  became  a  widow,  be 

the    costs    of    the    appeal.     In    re    Kershaw,  set  off  against  their  liability  to  her  personally 

Whittaker  v.  Kershaw,  44    Ch.    D.  296.      In  for  costs  in  other  proceedings.     See  Re  Glan- 

Pelton  v.  Harrison  (No.  2),  [1892]  1  Q.  B.  118,  vill,  Ellis  v.  Johnson,  31  Ch.  D.  532. 
182 


MARRIED    WOMEN. 


189 


Where,  by  the  death  of  the  husband,  a  new  interest  arises  to  the 
wife,  it  seems  that  she  will  not  be  bound  by  the  former  answer.3 
Under  the  later  practice,  however,  it  would  not,  it  seems,  be  held 
necessary  for  the  plaintiff  to  take  any  step  in  the  cause,  in  order  to 
enable  a  widow  to  raise  a  new  defence. 

Where  a  man  *and  his  wife  are  defendants  to  a  suit,  if  the  *189 
wife  dies,  there  will  be  an  abatement  of  the  suit.  Thus  where,  a 
man  having  married  an  administratrix,  the  plaintiff  obtained  a  decree 
against  him  and  his  wife,  after  which  the  wife  died,  it  was  held  that 
the  suit  was  abated,  and  that  the  new  administrator  ought  to  be  made 
a  party,  before  any  further  proceedings  could  be  had  in  the  cause.1 

A  married  woman  is  not  a  necessary  party  to  a  suit  seeking  to  charge 
her  husband's  interest  in  her  real  estate.2  («) 


8  Thus,  where  a  bill  was  filed  by  the  assignees 
of  a  husband  to  compel  the  specific  perform- 
ance of  a  contract  for  the  sale  of  a  part  of  his 
estate,  to  which  the  wife  was  made  a  co-de- 
fendant in  respect  of  certain  terms  of  years 
which  were  vested  in  her  as  administratrix  of 
a  person  to  whom  the  terms  had  been  assigned 
to  protect  the  inheritance,  and  she  had  joined 
with  her  husband  in  putting  in  an  answer,  by 
which  she  claimed  to  be  dowable  out  of  the 
property,  upon  the  death  of  her  husband  an 
objecion  was  taken  to  the  suit  being  proceeded 
with  till  a  supplemental  bill  had  been  filed 
against  her,  in  order  to  give  her  an  opportunity 
of  making  another  defence  in  respect  of  the 
right  of  dower  which  had  become  vested  in  her, 
and  Sir  Thomas  Plumer  M.  R.  said  that  her 
former  answer  could  not  be  pressed  against 
her,  because,  in  the  former  case,  she  was  made 
a  party  as  administratrix  ;  but  the  right  to 
dower  which  she  then  had  was  not  claimed  by 
her  as  representative,  but  in  her  own  character, 
and  it  was  an  interest  that  had  devolved  upon 
her  since  her  answer  was  put  in :  his  Honor, 
therefore,  held  the  suit  to  be  defective.  A 
supplemental  bill  was  thereupon  filed  against 
the  widow,   in  order  to   enable   her  to   claim, 


(a)  Respecting  the  husband's  liability  for 
his  wife's  ante-nuptial  debts,  see  37  &  38  Vic. 
c.  50;  33  &  34  Vic.  c.  93;  44  &  45  Vic.  c. 
41,  §  39;  45  &  4f!  Vic.  c.  75,  §§  13-15;  Bell  v. 
Stoeker.10  Q.  B.  D.  129;  Matthews  v  Whittle, 
13  Ch.  D.  811;  De  Greuchy  v.  Wills,  4  C.  P. 
D.  362 ;  Fear  v.  Castle,  8  Q.  B.  D.  380.  As  to 
the  husband's  co«ts,  see  London  &  I'.  Bank 
v.  Bogle,  7  Ch.  D.  773.  A  married  woman's 
separate  estate  will  not,  it  seems,  be  charged 
on  the  mere  ground  of  her  having  acquiesced 
in  or  approved  of  a  breach  of  trust.  Sawyer 
v.  Sawyer,  28  Ch.  D.  595,  605.  But  in  such 
a  case  the  husband  is  liable  if  she  has  been 
only  negligent  and  is  not  chargeable  with 
active  misconduct.  Bahin  v.  Hughes,  31  Ch. 
D.  390  In  Beck  v.  Pierce,  23  Q.  B.  D.  316,  it 
was  held  that  an  unsatisfied  judgment  at  law 


in  her  separate  character,  what  she  had  before 
claimed  in  her  character  of  wife.  Upon  hear- 
ing the  cause,  however,  Lord  Eldon,  although 
he  recognized  the  principle  laid  down  by  Sir 
Thomas  Plumer,  said  that  he  should  have  been 
inclined,  in  that  case,  to  have  come  to  a  differ- 
ent decision,  as  he  thought  that  it  would  have 
been  difficult  for  the  widow,  in  her  answer  to 
the  supplemental  bill,  to  state  her  case  differ- 
ently from  the  way  in  which  it  had  been  stated 
in  her  former  answer.  Mole  0.  Smith,  Jac. 
490,  495;    1  J.  &  W.  G65. 

1  Jackson  v.  Rawlins,  2  Vern.  195;  fb.  ed. 
Raithby,  n.  (2).  But  her  trustee,  the  trust 
being  active,  is  a  necessary  party  to  a  bill 
seeking  to  divest  her  of  her  own  interest. 
O'Hara  v.  MacConnell,  93  U.  S.  150.  As  to 
the  plaintiff  compelling  the  appearance  and 
answer  of  the  husband  and  wife,  in  those  cases 
in  which  they  answer  jointly,  and  for  the  pro* 
cess  in  those  cases  in  which,  according  to  the 
above  principles,  a  separate  answer,  by  either 
the  one  or  the  other,  ought  to  be  filed,  see 
post,  Chap.  VIII.  §  4;  Chap.  X.  §  2. 

2  Waugh  v.  Wren,  9  Jur.  N.  S.  365;  11 
W.  R.  244. 


against  a  wife's  separate  estate  was  not  a  bar 
to  a  suit  for  the  wife's  debt  contracted  before 
marriage  against  her  husband  who  had  received 
with  her  assets  sufficient  to  pay  the  debt.  A 
judgment  against  a  married  woman  was,  under 
the  circumstances,  ordered  to  be  paid  by  in- 
stalments out  of  her  separate  estate,  in  John- 
stone v.  Browne,  18  L.  R.  Ir.  428.  Since  the 
Married  Women's  Property  Act.  1882,  husband 
and  wife  may  be  sued  jointly,  or  the  wife  may 
be  sued  alone,  for  her  wrongful  acts.  Seroka 
v.  Kattenburg,  17  Q.  B.  D.  177.  A  Court  of 
Equity  will  not  set  aside  a  judgment  by  de- 
fault against  a  married  woman  upon  a  note 
to  which  she  might  have  pleaded  coverture. 
Evans  v.  Caiman,  92  Mich.  427;  Yeatman  v. 
Bellmain,  74  Tenn.  488. 

183 


190 


♦CHAPTER   V. 


OP   PARTIES   TO    A    SUIT. 


Section  I.  —  Of  Necessary  Parties,   in   respect  of  the   Concurrence 
of  their  Interests  with  that  of  Plaintiff. 

It  is  the  constant  aim  of  a  Court  of  Equity  to  do  complete  justice  by- 
deciding  upon  and  settling  the  rights  of  all  persons  interested  in  the 
subject  of  the  suit,  so  as  to  make  the  performance  of  the  order  of  the 
Court  perfectly  safe  to  those  who  are  compelled  to  obey  it,  and  to  pre- 
vent future  litigation.1  For  this  purpose,  all  persons  materially  inter- 
ested in  the  subject  ought  generally,  either  as  plaintiffs  or  defendants, 
to  be  made  parties  to  the  suit,2  or  ought  by  service  upon  them  of  a  copy 
of  the  bill,8  or  notice  of  the  decree,4  to  have  an  opportunity  afforded  of 
making  themselves  active  parties  in  the  cause,  if  they  should  think 
fit.5  (a) 

i  Ld.  Red.  163;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §§  72,  76; 
Caldwell  v.  Taggart,  4  Peters,  190;  Joy  v. 
Wirtz,  1  Wash.  C.  C.  517;  Mandeville  v. 
Riggs,  2  Peters,  482;  Cutler  v.  Tuttle,  19  N. 
J.  Eq.  549,  556;  Richardson  v.  Hastings,  7 
Beav.  323,  326;  Hare  v.  London  and  N.  W. 
Ry.  Co.  1  J*.  &  H.  252.  It  seems,  however, 
that,  under  the  modern  English  practice,  the 
Court  is  less  unwilling  to  relax  the  rule  in 
special  cases.  Ford  v.  Tennant,  29  Beav.  452; 
3  De  G.  F.  &  J.  697;  7  Jur.  N.  S.  615,  L.  J  J. 

2  Ld.  Red.  164;  L.  R.  8  St.  349. 

3  Cons.   Ord.   X.   11,   14,   15.      As  to  the 


present  English  practice,  see  1  Dan.  Ch.  Prac. 
(6th  Eng.  ed.)  194,  e t  seq. 

4  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  42,  r.  8. 

5  Orders,  August,  1841,  23d  and  26th.  Gen- 
erally, all  persons  interested  in  the  subject  of  a 
suit  should  be  made  parties,  plaintiffs,  or  de- 
fendants. Stephenson  v.  Austin,  3  Met.  474, 
480;  Williams  v.  Russell,  19  Pick.  162,  165; 
West  v.  Randall,  2  Mason,  181 ;  Pipe  v.  Bate- 
man,  1  Clarke  (Iowa),  369;  New  Braintree  v. 
Southworth,  4  Gray,  304 ;  Crocker  v.  Higgins, 
7  Conn.  342;  Footman  v.  Pray,  R.  M.  Charlt. 
291;    Watkins  v.  Washington,  2  Bland,  509; 


(a)  See  also  Scottish  Widows'  Fund  v. 
Craig,  20  Ch.  D.  208;  Goodden  v.  Coles,  59  L. 
T.  N.  S.  309;  Leduc  v.  Ward.  5  Asp.  M.  C. 
571  ;  Gregory  v.  Stetson,  133  U.  S.  579;  Wil- 
liams v.  Bankhead,  19  Wall.  571;  Barney  v. 
Baltimore  City,  6  Wall.  280;  Jessup  v.  Illinois 
Central  R.  Co.  36  Fed.  Rep.  735;  Farmers' 
Bank  v.  Hannon,  14  id.  593  ;  United  States  v. 
Central  Pacific  R.  Co.  11  id.  449;  Bland  v.  Flee- 
man,  29  id.  669;  Gest  v.  Packwood,  39  id. 
525;  West  v.  Duncan,  42  id.  430;  Van  Bok- 
kelen  v.  Cook,  5  Sawyer,  587;  Smith  r.  Gage, 
11  Biss.  137;  Baldwin  v.  Canfield,  26  Minn.  43; 
Graham  v.  Minneapolis,  40  Minn.  436;  Pettit 
v.  B:tird,  10  Phila.  57;  Long  v.  Dickinson,  id. 
108;  Thomas  v.  Boswell,  14  Phila.  197;  Odd 
Fellows  J.  S.  Ass'n  v.  Merklin,  65  Md.  579; 
Bridgman  v.  St.  Johnsbury  &  L.  C.  R.  Co  58 
Vt.  198;  Moore  v.  Gentry,  25  S.  C  334;  Castle- 
man  v.  Berrv,  86  Va..604;  Hatch  v.  Calvert, 

184 


15  W.  Va.  90;  Ruffner  v.  Hewitt,  14  id.  737; 
Humberd  v.  Kerr,  8  Baxter  (Tenn.),  291; 
Browder  v.  Jackson,  3  Lea  (Tenn.),  151; 
Howell  v.  Foster,  122  111.  276;  Zelle  v.  Work- 
ingmen's  B.  Co.  10  111.  App.  335;  Watson  v. 
Lion  Brewing  Co.  61  Mich.  595;  Swift  v.  State 
Lumber  Co.  71  Wis.  476;  Hunt  v.  Rooney, 
77  Wis.  258;  Robinson  v.  Allison  (Ala.),  12 
So.  Rep.  382;  Hatcher  v.  Massey,  71  Ga. 
793,  796;  Dailey  v.  Kinsler,  31  Neb.  340; 
Smith  v.  Atkinson  (Col.),  32  Pac.  Rep.  425; 
State  r.  Turner,  49  Ark.  311;  Anthony  v. 
State  (Kan.),  30  Pac.  Rep.  488.  Those,  for 
instance,  who  seek  to  set  aside  judicial  decrees, 
charge  trusts,  and  fasten  supposed  liens  because 
of  joint  interests,  should  all  be  before  the 
Court  that  it  may  be  justly  determined  to  what 
extent  and  in  whose  favor  a  decree  should  be 
made.  Sahlgaard  v.  Kennedy,  13  Fed.  Rep 
242. 


PERSONS   HAVING    CONCURRENT    INTERESTS   WITH    PLAINTIFF.      *  191 


*  The  strict  application  of  this  rule  in  many  cases  creates  diffi-    *  191 
culties,   which  have  induced  the  Court  to  relax  it;    and,  as  we 
shall  see,  it  has  long  been  the  established  practice  of  the  Court  to  allow  a 


Hoxie  v.  Carr,  1  Sumner,  172;  Whiting  v. 
Bank  of  United  States,  13  Peters.  6-14; 
Hopkirk  v.  Page,  2  Brock.  20;  M'Connell  v. 
M'Connell,  11  Vt.  290;  Evans  v.  Cliism,  18 
Maine,  220;  Hussey  v.  Dole,  24  Maine,  20; 
Beals  v.  Cobb,  51  Maine,  348;  Pierce  v.  Faunce, 
47  Maine,  507;  Oliver  v.  Palmer,  11  Gill  &  J. 
426;  Willis  v.  Henderson,  4  Scam.  20;  Wells 
v.  Strange,  5  Ga.  22;  Turner  r.  Berry.  3  Gil- 
man,  541 ;  Hicks  v.  Campbell,  19  N.  J.  Eq.  183 ; 
Pence  v.  Pence,  13  N.  J.  Eq.  257.  The  general 
rule  requiring  all  persons  interested  to  be  made 
parties  to  the  suit  is  confined  to  parties  to  the 
interest  involved  in  the  issue,  and  who  must 
necessarily  be  affected  by  the  decree.  Michi- 
gan State  Bank  v.  Gardner,  3  Gray,  308,  per 
Thomas  J.  It  is  a  ride,  which  is  more  or  less 
within  the  discretion  of  the  Court,  and  may  be 
dispensed  with  when  it  becomes  extremely  dif- 
ficult or  inconvenient.  Wendell  v.  Van  Rens- 
selaer, 1  John  Ch.  349;  Hallett  v.  Hallett,  2 
Paige,  15;  Cullen  v.  Duke  of  Queensberry,  1 
Bro.  C.  C.  101,  and  Mr.  Belt's  notes;  Mann  v. 
Butler,  2  Barb.  Ch.  362;  Birdsong  v.  Birdsong, 
2  Head,  289;  Tobin  v.  Walkinshaw,  McAll.  C. 
C.  26;  United  States  v.  Parrott,  id.  271;  West 
v.  Randall,  2  Mason,  181;  Brasher  v.  Van  Cort- 
landt,  2  John  Ch.  242;  Boisgerard  v.  Wall,  1 
Sm.  &  M.  Ch.  404;  Whitney  v.  Mayo,  15  111. 
251;  Soc.  for  Prop,  of  Gospel  v.  Hartland,  2 
Paine,  C.  C.  536.  Where  the  persons  interested 
are  so  numerous  as  to  make  it  impossible,  or 
very  inconvenient,  to  bring  them  all  before  the 
Court,  a  part  of  them  may  file  a  bill  in  behalf 
of  themselves,  and  all  others  standing  in  the 
same  situation.  Robinson  v.  Smith,  3  Paige, 
222;  per  Foster  J  in  Williston  v.  Michigan 
S.  N.  R.  R.  Co.  13  Allen,  406.  See  Filer  v. 
Bergling,  3  McArthur,  189.  As  to  infants, 
see  ante,  p.  160;  Equitable  Life  Ass.  Society 
v.  Patterson,  1  Fed.  Rep.  126. 

The  Court  will  proceed  against  the  parties 
before  it,  although  the  suit  relates  to  the  rights 
of  persons  out  of  the  jurisdiction.  Ante,  p.  149, 
and  notes.  This  ground  of  exception  to  the 
general  rule  was  peculiarly  applicable  to  suits 
in  Equity  in  the  Courts  of  the  United  States. 
It  was  accordingly  held  that  where  a  decree  in 
relation  to  the  subject-matter  of  litigation  can 
be  made  without  concluding  the  rights  of  a 
person  out  of  the  jurisdiction,  that  person  is 
not  an  essential  party.  Story  v.  Livingston,  13 
Pet.  359.  To  the  end  of  directing  the  exercise 
of  this  exceptional  jurisdiction,  certain  rules, 
and  particularly  rules  22  and  47,  given  infra, 
2380,  2386,  were  prescribed.  Congress  also 
undertook  to  legislate  on  the  subject  by  the  Act 
of  Feb.  28,  1839,  c.  36,  and  now  bv  the  Rev. 


Stats.  §  737,  et  seq.  If,  however,  the  person  not 
before  the  Court  be  indispensable,  the  jurisdic- 
tion fails,  notwithstanding  the  rules  and  the 
statutes.  Williams  v.  Bankhead,  19  Wall.  563; 
Coiron  v.  Millaudon,  19  How.  113 ;  Parsons  v. 
Howard,  2  Woods,  1;  Kilgour  v.  New  Orleans 
Gas  Light  Co.  2  Woods,  144.  See  also  Ober  v. 
Gallagher,  93  U.  S.  199;  Bronson  v.  Keokuk, 
2  Dill  498;  Brigham  v.  Luddington,  12  Blatch. 
237;  ante,  p.  149,  n.  (a).  And  see  where  a 
plea  of  non-joinder  of  parties  was  held  bad  un- 
der §  737.  Gray  v.  National  Steamship  Co.  7 
Rep.  581,  U.  S.  C.  C.  N.  Y. 

This  is  also  the  rule  of  the  State  Courts.  If 
the  absent  party  is  so  concerned  in  the  subject- 
matter  that  a  decree  between  the  immediate 
litigants  cannot  be  made  without  seriously 
affecting  his  rights,  the  Court  will  proceed  no 
further.  Cassidy  v.  Shimmin,  122  Mass.  406; 
McPike  v.  Well*,  54  Miss.  136;  Hill  v.  Proctor, 
10  W.  Va.  59;  Mudgett  v.  Gager,  52  Maine, 
541.     See  ante,  p.  149,  n.  1. 

All  persons  having  the  same  interest  should 
stand  on  the  same  side  of  the  suit;  but  if  any 
such  refuse  to  appear  as  plaintiffs,  they  may  be 
made  defendants,  their  refusal  being  stated  in 
the  bill.  Contee  v.  Dawson,  2  Bland,  264; 
Pogson  v.  Owe,  3  Desaus.  31;  Cook  v.  Ilad- 
ley,  Cooke,  465;  Morse  v.  Hovey,  9  Paige, 
197;  Bartlett  v.  Parks,  1  Cush.  86;  Whitney 
v.  Mayo,  15  111.  251;  Smith  r.  Sackett,  5  Gil- 
man,  534;  Lovell  v.  Farrington,  50  Maine,  239. 
Parties  should  not  be  joined  as  plaintiffs  in  a 
suit  without  their  knowledge  or  consent;  if 
they  are,  the  bill  as  to  them  should  be  dis- 
missed. Gravenstine's  App.  49  Penn.  St.  510. 
Parties  having  conflicting  interests  in  the 
subject  of  litigation  should  not  be  joined  as 
plaintiffs  in  the  suit.  Grant  v.  Van  Schoon- 
hoven,  9  Paige,  255;  Turnham  v.  Turnham,  3 
B.  Mon.  581;  Michigan  Rank  v.  Gardner,  3 
Gray,  308,  309,  per  Thomas  J.;  Crook  v. 
Brown,  11  Md.  158;  Johnson  v.  Vail,  14  N.  J. 
Eq.  423,  425.  And,  therefore,  a  principal  in  an 
alleged  breach  of  trust  cannot  be  joined  as  a 
co-plaintiff  with  the  persons  alleged  to  have 
been  thereby  injured,  in  an  action  against  the 
parties  charged  with  participating  in  the  fraud. 
Paxton  v.  Wood,  77  N.  C.  11.  Where  parties 
have  an  interest  to  a  certain  extent  in  common, 
and  seek  the  same  relief,  they  may  join  in  the 
same  bill.  Wall  v.  Fairley,  73  N.  C.  464.  So 
defendants  may  be  joined  who  have  an  inter- 
est, though  not  to  the  same  extent,  in  the  de- 
mand. Woodward  v.  Hall,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  164. 
A  person  may  file  a  bill  in  a  double  capacity, 
as  executor  and  as  an  individual.  Ransom  v. 
Geer,  30  N.  J.  Eq.  249. 

185 


*  192  OF   PARTIES   TO    A    SUIT. 

plaintiff  to  sue  on  behalf  of  himself  and  of  all  the  others  of  a  numerous 
class  of  which  he  is  one,  and  to  make  one  of  a  numerous  class  (as  the 
members  of  a  joint-stock  company)  the  only  defendant,  as  represent- 
ing the  others,  on  the  allegation  that  they  are  too  numerous  to  be  all 
made  parties;1  and,  in  addition,  the  Court  was  empowered,2  whenever 
it  thinks  tit,  to  adjudicate  upon  questions  arising  between  parties, 
without  making  other  persons  who  are  interested  in  the  property  in 
question,  or  in  other  property  comprised  in  the  same  instrument,  par- 
ties to  the  suit.3  When  the  Court  acts  on  this  power,  the  absent 
parties  are  not  bound  by  the  decree; 4  whereas,  in  the  cases  first  alluded 
to,  the  absent  parties  are  generally  bound.5 

The  application  of  the  general  rule  above  referred  to  will  be  con- 
sidered first  with  reference  to  those  whose  rights  are  concurrent  with 
the  rights  of  the  party  instituting  the  suit,  and  secondly  with  refer- 
ence to  those  who  are  interested  in  resisting  the  plaintiff's  claim. 

With  respect  to  the  first  class  it  is  to  be  observed  that  (subject  to 
the  provisions  of  the  late  Act  above  pointed  out)  it  is  required  in  all 
cases  where  a  party  comes  to  a  Court  of  Equity  to  seek  for 
*192  *that  relief  which  the  principles  there  acted  upon  entitle  him 
to  receive,  that  he  should  bring  before  the  Court  all  such  parties 
as  are  necessary  to  enable  it  to  do  complete  justice,  and  that  he  should 
so  far  bind  the  rights  of  all  persons  interested  in  the  subject  as  to 
render  the  performance  of  the  decree  which  he  seeks  safe  to  the  party 
called  upon  to  perform  it,  by  preventing  his  being  sued  or  molested 
again  respecting  the  same  matter  either  at  Law  or  in  Equity.  For  this 
purpose,  formerly  it  was  necessary  that  he  should  bring  regularly 
before  the  Court,  either  as  co-plaintiffs  with  himself  or  as  defendants, 
all  persons  so  circumstanced  that,  unless  their  rights  were  bound  by 
the  decree  of  the  Court,  they  might  have  caused  future  molestation  or 
inconvenience  to  the  party  against  whom  the  relief  was  sought. 

But  later  a  plaintiff  was  enabled,  in  many  cases,  to  avoid  the  expense 
of  making  such  persons  active  parties  to  the  cause,  by  serving  them 
with  copies  of  the  bill  under  the  general  order,1  or  with  notice  of  the 
decree  under  the  English  Act.2  The  practice  arising  under  these  pro- 
visions  will  be  stated  hereafter;  for,  as  it  does  not  affect  the  principle 
requiring  all  persons  concurrently  interested  with  the  plaintiff  to  be 
bound  by  the  decree,  but  only  substitutes,  in  some  cases,  an  easier  mode 

1  The  rule  which  excuses  the  omission  of  it  has  done  so.  See  also  Swallow  v.  Binns,  9 
parties  byname  for  sufficient  cause  applies  to  Hare,  App.  47;  17  Jur.  295;  Lanham  v.  Pirie, 
non-resident  parties  defendant,  made  such  by  2  Jur.  N.  S.  1201,  V.  C.  S.;  Prentice  v.  Pren- 
publication.  McCaleb  v.  Crichfield,  5  Heisk.  tice,  10  Hare,  App.  22;  Re  Brown,  29  Beav.  401; 
288.  Goulder  v.  Camm,  1  De  G.  F.  &  J.  146,  150; 

2  See  Cons.  Ord.  III.  5-7;  VII.  1,  2;  X.  6  Jur.  N.  S.  113.  And  see  now  Supreme  Court 
11-18;  XVI.  1-6;  XVII;  XXIII.  18-20;  31  &  of  Judicature  Act  of  1873,  L.  R.  8  St.  352. 

32  Vic.  c.  40,  §  9.  4  Doody  r.  Higgins,  9  Hare,  App.  32. 

»  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  51  (repealed  by  44  &  6  Barker  r.  Walters,  8  Beav.  92. 

45  Vice.  59,  §  3,  Sched.;  46  &  47  Vic.  c.  49, §  4,  i  Cons.  Ord.  X.  11,  14. 

Sched.;  see  now  R.  S.  C  1883,  Ord.  XVI.  33-  2  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  42,  r.  8  (now  super- 

41).     The  Court  acted  on  this  power  in  the  case  seded  by  R.  S.  C.  1883;  46  &  47   Vic.  c  49, 

of  Parnell  v.  Hingston,  3  Sm.  &  G.  337,  which  is  §  4,  Sched.). 
believed  to  be  the  only  reported  case  in  which 

186 


PERSONS   HAVING   CONCURRENT   INTERESTS   WITH   PLAINTIFF.       *  193 


of  accomplishing  that  end,  it  will  be  convenient,  in  the  first  instance, 
to  consider  what  is  the  nature  of  those  concurrent  rights  and  interests 
which  render  it  necessary  that  the  persons  possessing  them  should  be 
made  either  active  or  passive  parties  to  the  suit. 

In  general,  where  a  plaintiff  has  only  an  equitable  right  in  the  thing 
demanded,  the  person  having  the  legal  right  to  demand  it  should  be  a 
party  to  the  suit;8  for,  if  he  were  not,  his  legal  rights  would  not  be 
bound  by  the  decree,4  and  he  might,  notwithstanding  the  success  of  the 
plaintiff,  have  it  in  his  power  to  annoy  the  defendant  by  instituting 
proceedings  to  assert  his  right  in  an  action  at  Law,  to  which  the  decree 
in  Equity  being  res  inter  alios  acta  would  be  no  answer,  and  the  defend- 
ant would  be  obliged  to  resort  to  another  proceeding  in  a  Court  of 
Equity  to  restrain  the  plaintiff  at  Law  from  proceedings  to  enforce  a  de- 
mand which  has  been  already  satisfied  under  the  decree  in  Equity.  This 
complication  of  litigation  it  is  against  the  principles  of  Equity  to  per- 
mit, and  it  therefore  requires  that  in  every  suit  all  the  persons  who  have 
legal  rights  in  the  subjects  in  dispute,  as  well  as  the  persons  having  the 
equitable  right,  should  be  made  parties  to  the  proceedings.5 

*  Upon  this  ground  it  is,  that  in  all  suits  by  persons  claiming    *  193 
under  a  trust,   the  trustee  or  other  person  in  whom  the  legal 
estate  is  vested  is  required  to  be  a  party  to  the  proceeding;  l  (a)  and  the 


«  See  Johnson  v.  Rankin,  2  Bibb,  184; 
Neilson  v.  Churchill,  5  Dana,  341.  It  is  not 
allowable  to  file  a  bill  in  Chancery  by  the 
legal  owner  "to  the  use  of"  the  beneficial 
owner,  but  the  latter  should  sue.  Kitchins 
v.  Harrall,  54  Miss.  474. 

*  Ld.  Red.  179;  see  36  &  37  Vic.  c.  66, 
§  24  (6). 

5  As  to  appointing  a  person  to  represent 
next  of  kin  or  others  of  a  class,  see  now 
R.  S.  C  1883,  Ord.  XVI.  9  a.;  Re  Peppitt,  4 
Ch.  D.  230;  Re  White,  30  W.  R.  837.  In 
a  suit  under  a  statute  which  provided  that 
any  inhabitant  of  a  town  might  maintain  a 
suit  in  Equity,  by  bill  or  petition,  to  restrain 
the  town  from  a  misapplication  of  money  in 
violation  of  a  statute  under  which  it  was 
received,  the  plaintiffs  averred  that  they  were 
inhabitants  of  the  town,  and  men  of  property, 
liable  to  be  taxed  therein,  and  that  the  appli- 
cation of  the  money  contemplated  by  the  town 
would  be  a  direct  injury  to  them;  it  was  held 
that  the  plaintiffs  had  such  an  interest  in  the 
money  and  in  its  application  as  would  entitle 
them  to  maintain  such  bill,  if  any  qualification 
of  interest  were  necessarv.     But  it  seems  that 


no  such  Qualification  of  interest  is  requisite  for 
this  purpose.  Simmons  r.  Hanover,  23  Pick.  188. 
i  Malin  B  Malin,  2  John.  Ch.  238;  Fish  v. 
Rowland,  1  Paige,  20;  Cassiday  v.  McDaniel, 
8  B.  Mon.  519;  Carter  v.  Jones,  5  Ired.  Eq. 
196.  Where  an  estate  has  been  limited  by  a 
marriage  settlement  to  a  trustee  and  his  heirs, 
upon  trust  during  the  lives  of  the  plaintiff  and 
his  wife,  to  apply  the  profits  to  their  use,  with 
remainder  to  the  children  of  the  marriage,  with 
remainder  over,  and  a  bill  was  brought  by  the 
persons  interested  under  that  settlement  to  set 
aside  a  former  settlement,  as  obtained  by  fraud, 
it  was  held  that  the  plaintiff  could  have  no 
decree  because  the  trustee  was  not  a  party  (9 
Mod.  80).  Where  it  appeared  that  a  mortgage 
had  been  made  to  a  trustee  for  the  plaintiff, 
it  was  determined  that  the  trustee  was  a  neces- 
sary party  to  a  suit  to  foreclose  the  Equity  of 
redemption.  Wood  r.  Williams,  4  Mad.  185; 
Hichens  r.  Kelly.  2  Sm.  &  6.  264;  see  Boyden 
p.  Partridge,  2  Gray,  190.  A  deed  of  land, 
with  power  of  sale,  whether  to  the  creditor 
or  a  third  person,  is,  in  Equity,  a  mortgage, 
if  the  equity  of  redemption  be  reserved.  Shil- 
laber  v.  Robinson,  97  U.  S.  68. 


(a)  Peper  v.  Fordyce,  119  U.  S.  469 ;  Starne 
v.  Farr,  17  111.  App.  491;  Harlow  v.  Mister,  64 
Miss.  25.  Joint  trustees  should  all  be  made 
parties  in  matters  of  account.  Howth  v.  Owens, 
29  Fed.  Rep.  722;  Connelly  v.  Wells,  33  id. 
205.  Trustees  are  not  debtors  and  creditors  as 
between  themselves  with  respect  to  the  trust 
money.    Ex  parte  Taylor,    18  Q.  B.  D.  295. 


Cestui  que  trvsts  may  make  the  trustee  a  defend- 
ant when  his  interest  is  adverse.  Partee  v. 
Thomas,  11  Fed.  Rep.  769;  Webb  r.  Vermont 
Central  R.  Co.  9  id.  793;  see  Gandy  v.  Gandy, 
30  Ch.  D.  57;  Barrett  v.  Brown,  86"  N.  C.  556. 
A  cestui  que  trust,  who  seeks  relief  in  Equity 
for  a  breach  of  trust  by  the  trustees,  may  sue 
any  or  all  of  them  at  his  election,  the  wrong 

187 


*  194  OF    PARTIES   TO    A    SUIT. 

rule  is  the  same  whether  the  trust  be  expressed  or  only  implied.  Thus, 
where  the  executor  of  a  mortgagee  riles  a  bill  to  foreclose  a  mortgage  of 
freehold  or  copyhold  estate,  he  should  make  the  heir-at-law  of  the 
mortgagee  a  party ; 2  because,  although  according  to  the  principles  upon 
which  the  Courts  of  Equity  proceed  money  secured  by  mortgage  is  con- 
sidered as  part  of  the  personal  estate  of  the  mortgagee,  and  belongs  on 
his  death  to  his  personal  representative,  yet,  as  the  legal  estate  is  in 
the  heir,  he  would  not,  unless  he  was  before  the  Court  when  it  was 
pronounced,  be  bound  by  the  decree.  There  is  another  reason  why  it  is 
necessary  to  bring  the  heir  before  the  Court  in  a  bill  to  foreclose  a 
mortgage,  because  if  the  mortgagor  should  think  proper  to  redeem  the 
estate  under  the  decree,  he  will  be  a  necessary  party  to  the  reconvey- 
ance.8 And  so  important  is  it  considered  in  such  a  case  that  the  heir 
should  be  a  party,  that  where  the  mortgagee  died  without  any  heir  that 
could  be  discovered,  the  Court  restrained  his  executor  from  proceeding 
at  Law  to  compel  payment  of  the  mortgage  money,  and  ordered  the 

money  into  Court  till  the  heir  could  be  found.4 
*194        *If  the  descent  of  the  legal  estate  has  been  diverted,   it  is 

only  necessary  to  have  before  the  Court  the  person  in  whom  it  is 
actually  vested; *  and  therefore,  where  a  mortgagee  has  devised  his 
mortgage  in  such  manner  as  to  pass  not  only  the  money  secured,  but 
the  legal  estate  in  the  property  mortgaged,  the  devisee  alone  may  fore- 
close without  making  the  representatives  of  the  original  mortgagee  a 
party.2  And  upon  the  same  principle,  where  a  mortgagee  in  his  life- 
time actually  assigns  his  whole  interest  in  the  mortgage,  even  though 
the  assignment  be  made  without  the  privity  of  the  mortgagor,  the 
assignee  alone  may  foreclose  without  bringing  the  original  mortgagee 
before  the  Court;3  and  where  there  have  been  several  mesne  assign- 
ments of  the  mortgage,  the  last  assignee,  provided  the  legal  estate  is 
vested  in  him,  will  be  sufficient  without  its  being  necessary  to  bring  the 
intermediate  assignees  before  the  Court.4    The  conveyance,  however, 


2  Scott  v.  Nicholl,  3  Russ,  476.  ve«t  the  estate.     See  post;  and  see  Re  Boden's 

3  Wood  P.Williams,  4  Mad.  186.  Trust,  1   De  G.   M.  &  G.  57;  9  Hare,   820; 

4  Schoole  v.  Sail,  1  Sch.  &  Lef.  177.  The  Re  Lea's  Trust,  6  W.  R.  482,  V.  C.  W. ;  but 
result  of  this  case  was,  that  after  the  cause  see  Be  Hewitt,  27  L.  J.  Ch.  302,  L.  C.  and 
had   remained    some   years   in   Court,   it   was  L.  JJ. 

thought  worth  while  to  get  an  Act  of  Parlia-  :  See   Eagle   Fire    Ins.    Co.   v.  Cammet,   2 

ment  to   revest   the   estate,   on   an   allegation  Edw.  Ch.  127. 

that  the  heir  could  not  be  found.  See  also  2  Williams  v.  Day,  2  Ch.  Cas.  32;  Ren- 
Stoke  v.  Robson,  19  Ves.  385;  3  V.  &  B.  54;  voize  v.  Cooper,  6  Mad.  371 ;  1  S.  &  S.  364. 
Smith  v.  Richnell,  ib.  notis;  Schelmardine  v.  3  Chambers  v.  Goldwin,  9  Ves.  209;  Story, 
Harrop,  6  Mad.  39.  The  difficulty  experi-  Eq.  PI.  §  189;  Bishop  of  Winchester  v.  Beavor, 
enced  in  the  case  referred  to  is  now  met  by  3  Sumner's  Ves.  314,  and  note  (n);  Whitney 
the  provisions  of  the  Trustee  Act,  1850,  §  19,  v.  M'Kinney,  7  John.  Ch  144. 
which  enables   the  Court,  in   such  a  case,   to  4  Chambers  v.  Goldwin,  9  Ves.  269. 


being   several  as   well  as  joint.     Land  Credit  ton  v.  Anderson,  40  N.  J.  Eq.  486.     The  trustee 

Co  v.  Fermoy,  L.  R.  8  Eq.  7;  L.  R.  5  Ch.  763;  under  a  railroad  deed  of  trust  is  not  a  necessary 

Att.-Gen.  v.  Wilson,  4  .Tur.  1174;  Heath  v.  Erie  party  to  a  bondholder's  suit  to  compel  perform- 

Ry.  Co.  8  Blatch.  347,  411;  Boyd  v.  Gill,  21  id.  ance  of  the  railroad's  agreements  in  the  deed. 

543;  Gilchrist  v.  Stevenson,  9  Barb.  9;  Stock-  Spies  v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  30  Fed.  Rep.  397. 
188 


PERSONS    HAVING    CONCURRENT    INTERESTS   WITH    PLAINTIFF. 


195 


must  have  been  absolute,  and  not  by  way  of  sub-mortgage; 5  for  if  there 
be  several  derivative  mortgagees,  they  must  all  be  made  parties  to  a  bill 
of  foreclosure  by  one  of  them.6 

The  principle  that  requires  a  trustee,  or  other  owner  of  the  legal 
estate,  to  be  brought  before  the  Court  in  suits  relating  to  trust  property, 
applies  equally  to  all  cases  where  the  legal  right  to  sue  for  the  thing 
demanded  is  outstanding  in  a  different  person  from  the  one  claim- 
ing the  beneficial  interest.  Thus,  where  a  bill  is  filed  for  *  the  *  195 
specific  performance  of  a  covenant  under  seal  with  one,  for  the 
benefit  of  another,  the  covenantee  must  be  a  party  to  a  bill  by  the  per- 
son for  whose  benefit  the  covenant  was  intended,  against  the  covenantor.1 
And  so  upon  a  bill  filed  for  the  specific  performance  of  a  covenant  for 
the  surrender  of  a  copyhold  estate  to  A,  in  trust  for  others,  the  Court 
said,  that  as  the  effect  of  a  surrender,  if  decreed,  would  be  to  give  the 
legal  estate  to  A,  he  ought  to  be  a  party;  otherwise  another  suit  might 
become  necessary  against  him.2 

The  preceding  cases  arose  upon  covenants  entered  into  under  seal; 
the  same  rule  does  not,  however,  apply  to  less  formal  instruments,  such 
as  ordinary  agreements  not  under  seal,  where  one  party  contracts  as 
agent  for  the  benefit  of  another.  In  such  cases  it  is  not  necessary  to 
bring  the  agent  before  the  Court;  because,  even  at  Law,  it  is  the  right 
of  the  principal  to  interpose,  and  supersede  the  right  of  his  agent,  by 
claiming  to  have  the  contract  performed  to  himself,  although  made  in 
the  name  of  his  agent.3     This   principle  was  acted  upon  where  the 


&  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  191;  Kittle  v.  Van 
Dyck,  1  Sandf.  (N.  Y.)  76,  cited;  infra,  260, 
n."  5. 

*>  Thus,  where  A  made  a  mortgage  for  a 
term  of  years  for  securing  .£350  and  interest  to 
B,  who  had  assigned  the  term  to  C,  redeem^ 
able  by  himself  on  paying  .£300  and  interest, 
and  B  died,  and  C  brought  a  bill  against  A 
to  foreclose  him  without  making  the  represen- 
tatives of  B,  the  original  mortgag  e,  parties, 
it  was  held  by  the  Court  thai  there  was  plainly 
a  want  of  proper  parties.  Hobart  v.  Abbot,  2 
P.  Wms.  643;  Kittle  v.  Van  Dyck,  1  Sand. 
(N.  Y.)  76;  Hunt  v.  Rooney,  77  Wis.  258.  As 
to  chattel  mortgages,  see  Smith  v.  Moore,  49 
Ark.  100.  The  general,  although  not  univer 
sal,  rule,  is  that  all  incumbrancers,  as  well  as 
the  mortgagor,  should  be  made  parties,  being, 
if  not  indispensable,  at  least  proper,  parties  to 
a  bill  of  foreclosure,  whether  they  are  prior  or 
subsequent  incumbrancers.  Findley  v.  Bank 
of  United  States,  11  Wheat.  304;  Haines  « 
Beach,  3  John.  Ch  459;  Ensworth  v.  Lam- 
bert, 4  John.  Ch.  605 ;  McGown  V.  Yorks, 
6  John.  Ch.  450;  Bishop  of  Winchester  v. 
Beuvor,  3  Sumner's  Ves.  314,  note  (a);  Taite 
v.  Pallas,  1  Hogan,  261;  Bodkin  v.  Fitz- 
patrick,  1  Hogan,  308;  Canby  v.  Ridgeway. 
Halst.  N.  J.  Dig.  168;  Lyon  v.  Sandford,  5 
Conn.  544;  Renwick  v.  Macomb,  1  Hopk. 
277;  Fell  v.  Brown,  2  Bro.  C.  C.  (Perkins's 


ed.)  278,  279,  notes;  Maderias  v.  Cutlett,  7 
Monroe,  476;  Wing  v.  Davis,  7  Greenl.  31; 
Poston  v.  Eubank,  3  J.  J.  Marsh.  44;  Stucker 
v  Stucker,  id.  301 ;  Cooper  v.  Martin,  1  Dana, 
25;  Noyes  v.  Sawyer,  3  Vt.  160;  Judson  v. 
Emanuel,  1  Ala.  N.  S.  598;  Miller  v.  Kershaw, 
1  Bailev,  Eq.479;  Bristol  v.  Morgan,  3  Edw. 
Ch.  142,  Nodine  v.  Greenfield,  7  Paige,  544; 
see  Piatt  v.  Squire,  12  Met.  494.  See  infra, 
214,  notes  5,  7,  8;  277,  279. 

i  Cooke  v.  Cooke,  2  Vern.  36 ;  1  Eq  Cas.  Abr. 
73,  pi.  8;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  209.  See  Re  Cooper, 
Cooper  v.  Vesey,  20  Ch.  D.  611. 

2  Cope  t.  Parry,  2  J.  &  W.  588;  and  see 
Rolls  v.  Yate,  Yelv.  177;  1  Bulst.  25  b. 

3  Crocker  v.  Higgins,  7  Conn.  342.  The 
party  in  interest  in  a  contract,  resting  in 
parol  may  sue  upon  it.  Lapham  v.  Green, 
9  Vt.  407;  Story,  Agency,  §  418,  el  seq. ;  Pitts 
v.  Mower,  18  Maine,  361 ;  Edmond  v.  Cald- 
well, 15  Maine,  340;  Higdon  v.  Thomas,  1 
Har.  &  G.  153;  White  v.  Owen,  12  Vt.  361; 
Dunlap's  Paley's  Agency,  324.  note ;  Hogan 
r.  Short.  24  Wend.  461 ;  Thorp  v.  Farquer,  6 
B.  Mon.  3. 

In  the  case  of  the  United  States  v.  Par- 
mele,  1  Paine,  C.  C.  252.  it  was  held  that  no 
action  will  lie  in  the  name  of  the  principal, 
on  a  written  contract  made  by  his  agent  in 
his  own  name,  although  the  defendant  may 
have    known     the     agent's     character.      See 

189 


196 


OF   PARTIES   TO    A    SUIT. 


plaintiff,  not  wishing  to  appear  as  purchaser,  procured  J.  S.  to  bargain 
for  him,  who  signed  the  contract  (not  as  agent)  and  paid  the  deposit  by 
his  own  check;  yet,  inasmuch  as  it  was  the  plaintiff's  money,  he  was 
allowed  to  maintain  an  action  for  it  without  showing  any  disclaimer  by 
J.  S.4  Upon  the  same  principle,  in  Equity,  if  the  plaintiff  had  filed  a 
bill  against  the  vendor,  for  a  specific  performance,  he  would  not  have 
been  under  the  necessity  of  making  J.  S.  a  party  to  the  suit,  because, 
if  he  had  succeeded  in  his  object,  performance  of  the  contract  to  the 
plaintiff  might  have  been  shown  in  answer  to  an  action  at  Law  by  J.  S., 
whose  title  was  merely  that  of  agent  to  the  plaintiff,  (a)  It  is,  however, 
frequently  the  practice  to  join  the  auctioneer  as  co-plaintiff  with  the 
vendor  in  suits  for  specific  performance  of  contracts  entered 
*  196  *  into  at  auctions ; 1  but  that  is  because  he  has  an  interest  in  the 
contract,  and  may  maintain  an  action  upon  it.  He  has  also  an 
interest  in  being  protected  against  the  legal  liability  which  he  may 
have  incurred  in  an  action  by  the  purchaser  to  recover  the  deposit.2 

In  order  to  enable  the  plaintiff  to  dispense  with  the  necessity  for 
making  the  agent  entering  into  a  contract  for  his  employer,  in  his  own 
name,  a  party  to  a  suit  to  enforce  such  contract,  he  must  allege  and 
prove  that  he  was  actually  an  agent  in  the  transaction,  as  appears  to 
have  been  done  in  Bethune  v.  Far ebr other,*  by  proving  that  although 
the  money  was  paid  by  the  check  of  the  agent,  it  was  in  fact  the  money 
of  the  purchaser.  If  the  fact  of  the  person  contracting  being  the  agent 
of  the  plaintiff  does  not  appear  from  the  contract,  and  the  plaintiff  is 
not  able  to  show  the  agency,  by  proving  that  the  money  was  his  own, 
or  some  equally  conclusive  fact,  he  must  make  the  agent  a  party,  either 
as  co-plaintiff  with  himself  or  as  a  defendant,  in  order  to  bind  his  inter- 
est;   for  otherwise  such  agent  would  have  a  right  to  sue  either  in 


Clarke  v.  Wilson,  3  Wash.  C  C.  560;  New- 
comb  v.  Clark,  1  Denio,  226;  Finney  v.  Bed- 
ford Ins.  Co.  8  Met.  348.  Collyer,  Partn. 
(Perkins's  ed.)  §§  412.  G53;  Dunlap's  Paley's 
Agency,  324,  note;  Harp  v.  Osgood,  2  Hill, 
216;  West  Boylston  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Searle,  15 
Pick.  225;  Hubbard  v.  Borden,  6  Whart.  79, 
92.  This,  however,  is  not  universally  true, 
as  appears  in  the  case  of  factors  making 
written  contracts  in  their  own  name  for  the 
purchase  or  sale  of  goods  for  their  principals. 
So  in  cases  of  agents  procuring  policies  of 
insurance  in  their  own   names  for  the  benefit 


(a)  Those  who  have  possession  of  trust  funds 
may  be  joined  as  defendants  when  the  trustee 
is  sued  for  an  accounting.  McBride  v.  Mcln- 
tyre  (Mich.),  51  N.  W.  Rep.  1113.  A  stake- 
holder, who  still  holds  the  fund  in  dispute, 
should  be  a  party  to  a  suit  relating  to  its  dis- 
position. Perrin  v.  Lepper,  26  Fed.  Rep  545. 
An  auctioneer  who  holds  a  large  deposit,  which 
is  involved  in  the  suit,  is  a  proper  party  defend- 
ant to  a  bill  for  specific  performance ;  but  the 

190 


of  their  principals,  and  in  other  cases  com- 
mented on  in  Story,  Agency,  §  161. 

4  Duke  of  Norfolk  v.  Worthy,  1  Camp  337; 
Sugd.   V.  &  P.  237. 

i  See  Cutts  v.  Thodey,  13  Sim.  206,  211; 
and  see  7  Ves  289. 

2  But  where  an  auctioneer  used  fraud  to 
enhance  the  price  of  property  sold  at  auction, 
it  was  held  that  in  a  suit  in  Equity  by  a 
purchaser  for  relief  against  the  sale,  it  was  not 
necessary  to  make  the  auctioneer  a  party. 
Veazie  v.  Williams,  8  How.  U.  S.  134. 

3  Cited  5M&S.  385. 


practice  of  joining,  in  such  a  bill,  auctioneers 
who  hold  but  a  small  deposit,  is  not  favored. 
Egmont  v.  Smith,  6  Ch.  D.  469.  An  auctioneer 
is  not  a  proper  party  for  discover}-  only,  but  is 
properly  made  a  defendant  to  a  bill  to  rescind 
a  purchase  at  auction  on  the  ground  of  his 
mock-bidding.  Dickson  v.  Harrison,  9  Ch.  D. 
243 ;  Heatley  v.  Newton,  19  Ch.  D.  326;  Amos 
v  Heme  Bay  P.  &c.  Co.  54  L.  T.  264;  see 
Tavenner  v.  Barrett,  21  W  Va.  656,  673. 


PERSONS   HAVING   CONCURRENT   INTERESTS   WITH    PLAINTIFF.      *  197 

Equity  for  a  specific  performance  of  the  same  contract,  or  to  bring  an 
action  at  Law  for  the  recovery  of  the  money  paid  to  the  defendant; 
and  parol  evidence  on  the  part  of  the  defendant  would  in  either  case  be 
inadmissible  to  show,  in  opposition  to  the  written  contract,  that  the 
purchase  was  made  on  behalf  of  another.4  (a)  The  same  rule  will  apply 
if  the  agent  contracted  as  well  on  his  own  behalf  as  in  the  capacity  of 
agent  for  another.  In  that  event  the  bill  must  be  filed  in  his  own 
name,  and  in  that  of  the  person  on  whose  behalf  he  acted,  or  at  least 
such  person  must  be  a  party.  Upon  this  principle,  where  a  contract 
was  entered  into  for  the  purchase  of  an  estate  by  certain  persons  in 
their  own  names,  but  in  fact  on  their  own  account,  and  also  as  agents 
for  other  parties,  a  bill  to  rescind  the  contract  was  filed  in  the  names 
of  both  of  the  agents,  and  of  the  other  parties  for  whom  they 
contracted.5 (&) 

With  respect  to  the  effect  of  a  sub-contract  in  rendering  it  necessary 
to  bring  the  party  concerned  in  it  before  the  Court  in  a  litigation 
between  the  original  contracting  parties,  the  following  distinction  has 
been  made;  namely,  if  A  contracts  with  B  to  convey  to  him  an  estate, 
and  B  afterwards  contracts  with  C  that  he,  B,  will  convey  to 
him  the  same  estate,  in  that  case  C  is  not  a  necessary  *  party  to  *  197 
a  suit  between  A  and  B  for  a  specific  performance;  but  if  the 
contract  entered  into  by  B  with  C  had  been,  not  that  he,  B,  should 
convey  the  estate,  but  that  A,  the  original  vendor,  should  convey  it  to 
C,  then  C  would  have  been  a  necessary  party  to  a  suit  by  B  against  A 
for  a  specific  performance.1 

Upon  the  principle  above  stated,  it  is  presumed  that  where  a  man 
enters  into  a  contract  which  is  expressed  in  the  instrument  itself  to 
have  been  entered  into  by  him  as  agent  for  another,  he  would  not  after- 
wards be  allowed  to  sue  for  a  performance  of  that  contract  on  his  own 
behalf,  on  the  allegation  that  he  was  not  authorized  to  act  as  agent, 
without  bringing  the  party,  on  whose  behalf   it  was  expressed  to  be 

4  Bartlett  v.  Pickersgill,  1  Cox,  15;  1  Eden,  »  v.    Walford,  4  Russ.  372;   see  Nel- 

515;  see  2  Sudgen,  V.  &  P.  (7th  Am.  ed.)  911,  thorpe   v.  Holgate,  1  Coll.  203,  and  the  cases 

and  notes;  Botsford  v.  Burr,  2  John.  Ch.  409;  there  cited;    McCreight  v.  Foster,  L.  R.  5  Ch. 

Hiifthes  ».  More,  7  Cranch,  176.  604;  W.  N.   (1870)    157;    18  W.   R.    905,    L. 

5  Small  v.  Attwood,  Younge,  407,  455;  6  CI.  C.  aff'd,  nom.  Shaw  v.  Foster,  L.  R.  5  H.  L. 
&  F.  232.  321. 


(«)  The  decision  in   Bartlett  v.  Pickersgill,  Ch.   D.   295;  37   W.    R.   236,  434.     Acts  per- 

though  impeached  in  Heard  v.  Filley,  L.  R.  4  formed  by  officers  or  agents  may  be  alleged  in 

Ch.  548,  and  elsewhere,    is   still  law  upon  the  the  complaint,  without  stating  their  names,  as 

same   facts.     Hence  if  an  agent,  having  parol  performed  by  the  defendant.     Todd  v.  Minn.  & 

authority  to  purchase  property,  purchases  in  his  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  37  Minn.  358;  Weide  v.  Porter, 

own  name  and   with  his  own  money,  takes  a  22  Minn.  429      An  agent  cannot  make  himself 

conveyance  to  himself,  and  denies  the  agency,  a   trustee   against  his    principal.     Wright    v. 

section  7  of  the   Statute  of  Frauds  is  a  good  Mills,  63    L.   T.   186.      A    contractor    is    not 

defence  against  the  principal.     James  v.  Smith,  usually  to  be  joined  as  a  defendant  in  a  suit 

[1891]  1  Ch.  384;  65  L.  T.  544;  63  L.  T.  524.  against  his  employer  for  injury,  done  in  carry- 

(b)  The  principal's  right  to  afterwards  ratify  ing  out   the  latter's   contract.      Serff  t*.  Acton 

and  enforce   the  contract   of  his  agent  is  not  Local   Board,  55  L.  J.  Ch.  569;  54  L.  T.  379; 

affected  by  the  fact  that   the  other  party  has  see   Marcus  Sayre  Co.  v.    Bernz  (N.   J.),    20 

already  repudiated  it.     Bolton  v.  Lambert,  41  Atl.  Rep.  911. 

191 


*197 


OP   PARTIES   TO    A    SUIT. 


made,  before  the  Court.3  At  Law  it  has  been  held  that  a  plaintiff 
under  such  circumstances  could  maintain  an  action,  by  procuring,  from 
the  party  on  whose  behalf  he  appeared  to  have  entertained  the  contract, 
a  renunciation  of  his  interest.8 

The  ground  for  making  the  agent  a  party  is  merely  the  interest 
which  he  has  in  the  contract,  and  wherever  he  has  no  interest  whatever 
in  the  property  in  litigation,  or  in  the  contract,  and  cannot  be  sued 
either  at  Law  or  in  Equity  respecting  it,  he  ought  not  to  be  made  a 
party;  and  if  he  is  made  a  co-plaintiff  in  the  suit,  a  demurrer  upon  that 
ground  will  be  allowed;4  though  now,  in  such  a  case,  the  Court  may 
grant  such  relief  as  the  special  circumstances  of  the  case  require.5 
Upon  this  principle  an  agent  who  bids  at  an  auction  for  an  estate,  and 
signs  the  memorandum  in  his  own  name,  need  not  be  made  a  co-defend- 
ant with  his  employer  in  a  bill  for  a  specific  performance  of  such 
agreement.6 

The  assignor  of  a  legal  chose  in  action,  or,  if  he  is  dead,  his 
personal   representative,    should   be   a   party;7  for   as   an  assignment 


2  See  Add.  Cont.  600,  624. 

8  Bickerton  v.  Burrell,  5  M.  &  S.  383. 

*  King  of  Spain  v.  Machado,  4  Russ.  228, 
241;  vide  etiam,  Cuff  v.  Platell,  id.  242,  and 
Makepeace  v.  Hay t home,  ib.  244;  Jones  v. 
Hart,  lHen.  &  M."  470. 

5  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  49. 

6  Kingsley  v.  Young,  Rolls,  July  30,  1807, 
Coop.  Eq.  I'l.  42;  see  also  Lissett  v.  Reave,  2 
Atk.  394;  Newman  v.  Godfrey,  2  Bro.  C.  C. 
332,  cited  Ld.  K'ed.  160;  see  Avers  v.  Wright, 
8  ["red.  Eq.  229. 

7  Corbin  v.  Emerson,  10  Leigh,  663 ;  Bell  v. 
Shrock,  2  B.  Mon.  29 ;  Combs  v.  Tarlton,  id. 
194;  Allen  v.  Crocket,  4  Bibb,  240;  Bromley  v. 
Holland,  7  Sumner's  Ves.  3,  note  (c);  Voorhees 
v.  De  Myer,  3  Sandf.  Ch.  614;  The  Auditor  v. 
Johnson,  1  Hen.  &  M.  536;  Bradley  v.  Morgan, 
2  A.  K.  Marsh.  369;  Elderkin  v.  Shultz,  2 
Blackf.  345;  Currier  v.  Howard,  14  Gray,  511, 
513;  Ensign  v.  Kellogg,  4  Pick.  1;  Chaffraix  v. 
Board  of  Liquidation,  11  Fed.  Rep.  638.  In 
Trecothick  v.  Austin,  4  Mason,  16,  41,  et  seq., 
it  was  strenuously  maintained  by  Mr.  Justice 
Story  that  the  assignor  in  a  chose  in  action  is 
not,  in  Equity,  a  necessary  party,  where  the 
suit  is  by  the  assignee  and  the  assignment  is 
absolute.  Miller  v.  Henderson,  10  N.  J.  Eq. 
320;  see  Ward  v.  Van  Bokkelin,  2  Paige,  289; 
Bruen  v.  Crane,  1  Green,  Ch.  347;  Everett  v. 
Winn,  1  Sm.  &  M.  Ch.  67;  Snelling  v.  Boyd, 
2  Monroe,  132;  Kennedy  v.  Davis,  7  Monroe, 
372;  Morey  v.  Forsyth,  Walker,  Ch.  465; 
Beach  v.  White,  id.  495;  Dixon  v.  Buell,  21 
III.  203;  Colerick  v.  Hooper,  3  Ind.  316; 
Varney  v.  Bartlett,  5  Wis.  270;  Moor  v.  Veazie, 
32  Maine,  343,  355;  Whitney  v.  M'Kinney,  7 
John.  Ch.  144;  Brown  v.  Johnson,  53  Maine, 
246,  247  ;  Pingree  v.  Coffin,  12  Gray,  302,  303. 
In  Hobart  v.  Andrews,  21  Pick.  526,  531,  532, 

192 


Mr.  Justice  Wilde  seems  inclined  to  favor  the 
same  doctrine.  And  it  was  so  held  in  Haskell 
v.  Hilton,  30  Maine,  419;  see  Anderson  v. 
Wells,  6  B.  Mon.  540;  Clark  v.  Smith,  7  B. 
Mon.  273;  Day  v.  Cummings,  19  Vt.  496.  In 
Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  153,  the  law  on  this  subject  is 
thus  stated:  "In  general,  the  person  having 
the  legal  title  in  the  subject-matter  of  the  bill 
must  be  a  party,  either  as  plaintiff  or  as  defend- 
ant, though  he  has  no  beneficial  interest  there- 
in; so  that  the  legal  right  may  be  bound  by 
the  decree  of  the  Court.  In  cases,  therefore, 
where  an  assignment  does  not  pass  the  legal 
title,  but  only  the  equitable  title,  to  the  prop- 
erty, as,  for  example,  an  assignment  of  a  chose 
in  action,  it  is  usual,  if  it  be  not  always  indis- 
pensable, to  make  the  assignor,  holding  the 
legal  title,  a  part}'  to  the  suit.  Indeed,  the  rule 
is  often  laid  down  far  more  broadly,  and  in 
terms  importing  that  the  assignor,  as  the  legal 
owner,  must  in  all  cases  be  made  a  party, 
where  the  equitable  interest  only  is  passed. 
See  Corbin  v.  Emerson,  10  Leigh,  663;  Smith 
v.  Harley,  8  Maine,  559.  But  it  may  perhaps 
be  doubted  whether  the  doctrine  thus  stated  is 
universally  true.  The  true  principle  would 
seem  to  be,  that  in  all  cases  where  the  assign- 
ment is  absolute  and  unconditional,  leaving  no 
equitable  interest  whatever  in  the  assignor,  and 
the  extent  and  validity  of  the  assignment  is  not 
doubted  or  denied,  and  there  is  no  remaining 
liability  in  the  assignor  to  be  affected  by  the 
decree,  it  is  not  necessary  to  make  the  latter  a 
party.  At  most  he  is  merely  a  nominal  or 
formal  party  in  such  a  case.  It  is  a  very  differ- 
ent question  whether  he  may  not  properly  be 
made  a  party,  as  a  legal  owner,  although  no 
decree  is  sought  against  him;  for  in  many  cases 
a  person  may  be  made  a  party,  though  he  is 
not  indispensable.    See  Thompson  v.  McDonald, 


PERSONS   HAVING   CONCURRENT   INTERESTS   WITH    PLAINTIFF. 


198 


*  of  a  chose  in  action  is  not  recognized  in  a  Court  of  Law,  and    *  198 
is  only  considered  good  in   Equity,  the  recovery  in   Equity  by 


2  Dev.  &  Bat.  Eq.  477,  Wilson  v.  Davidson 
County,  3  Tenn.  Ch.  536.  But  where  the 
assignment  is  not  absolute  and  unconditional, 
or  the  extent  or  validity  of  the  assignment  is 
disputed  or  denied,  or  there  are  remaining 
rights  or  liabilities  of  the  assignor,  which  may 
be  affected  by  the  decree,  there  he  is  not  only  a 
proper,  but  a  necessary  party."  Montague  v. 
Lobdell,  11  Cush.  114,  115;  Beltonu.  Williams, 
4  Fla.  11;  see  Craig  v.  Johnson,  3  J.  J.  Marsh. 
573;  Houghton  v.  Davis,  23  Maine,  33.  The 
promisee  named  in  a  written  contract  to  convey 
land,  who  has  transferred  it  by  an  uncondi- 
tional verbal  assignment,  need  not  be  made  a 
party  to  a  suit  by  his  assignee  for  specific  per- 
formance of  the  contract.  Currier  v.  Howard, 
14  Gray,  511.  In  Field  v.  Maghee,  5  Paige, 
539,  it  was  held,  that  the  assignee  of  a  chose  in 
action,  which  has  been  absolutely  assigned,  is 
not  authorized  to  file  a  bill  for  the  recovery  of 
the  same,  in  the  name  of  the  assignor;  see  also 
Miller  v.  Bear,  3  Paige,  467,  468;  Whitney  V. 
M'Kinney,  7  John.  Ch.  144;  Sedgwick  v. 
Cleveland,  7  Paige,  287;  Polk  v.  Gallant,  2 
Dev.  &  Bat.  Eq.  395;  Snelling  v.  Boyd,  5 
Monroe,  172.  But  if  the  assignee  be  a  mere 
nominal  holder,  without  interest  in  the  thing 
assigned,  then  the  suit  should  be  brought  in 
the  name  of  the  party  in  interest.  Rogers  v. 
Traders'  Ins.  Co.  6  Paige,  583;  see  Patterson 
v.  Stapler,  7  Fed.  Rep.  210. 

It  has  been  recently  held  in  England,  in 
Hammond  v.  Messenger,  9  Sim.  327,  that  the 
assignee  of  a  debt,  not  in  itself  negotiable,  is 
not  entitled  to  sue  the  debtor  for  it  in  Equity, 
unless  some  circumstances  intervene,  which 
show  that  his  remedy  at  Law  is,  or  may  be, 
obstructed  by  the  assignor.  The  same  doctrine 
has  also  been  distinctly  held  in  New  York  and 


(i)  This  appears  to  be  now  the  accepted 
rule.  See  Hayward  v.  Andrews,  106  U.  S.  672, 
675;  New  York  Guaranty  Co.  v.  Memphis 
Water  Co.  107  U.  S.  205;  Hayes  v.  Hayes,  45 
N.  J.  Eq.  461.  In  Virginia,  see  Lynchburg 
Iron  Co.  v.  Tayloe,  79  Va.  671;  Fore  v.  Foster, 
86  Va.  104;  Preston  v.  Aston,  85  Va.  104.  See 
further,  as  to  parties  in  cases  of  assignments, 
Commercial  Wharf  Co.  v.  Winsor,  146  Mass. 
55'J;  Smith  v.  Payne,  56  N.  Y.  Super.  Ct. 
451;  Mason  v.  York  &c.  R.  Co.  52  Maine, 
82;  Smith  v.  Brittenham,  109  111.  540;  Cole  v. 
Lake  Co.  54  N.  II.  242;  Marine  Ins.  Co.  v.  St. 
Louis  &c.  Ry.  Co.  41  Fed.  Rep  643;  Robinson 
v.  Springfield  Co  21  Fla.  203,  Samainego  v. 
Stiles  (Ariz.),  20  Pac.  607.  Also  where  forgery 
or  fraud  is  an  issue,  see  Dalton  v.  Midlmd 
Railway,  12  C.  B.  458;  Duncan  v.  Luntlev.  2 
Ma.  N.  &  Gord  30;  s.  c.  2  Hall  &  Twells,"78; 
VOL    I  — 13 


other  States.  Carter  v.  United  Ins.  Co.  1  John. 
Ch.  463;  Ontario  Bank  v.  Mumford,  2  Barb. 
Ch.  596;  Adair  v.  Winchester,  7  Gill  &  J.  114; 
Smiley  v.  Bell,  Martin  &  Yerg.  378;  Moseley 
v.  Brush,  4  Rand.  392;  see  also  Rose  v.  Clark, 
1  Y.  &  Col.  Ch.  534,  548  ;  Motteux  v.  London 
Assurance  Co.  1  Atk.  545;  Dhegetoft  v.  Lon- 
don Assurance  Co.  Moseley,  83.  Mr.  Justice 
Story  says  that  "this  doctrine  is  apparently 
new;  and  never  has  been  adopted  in  America. 
The  general  principle  here  established  seems  to 
be,  that  wherever  an  assignee  has  an  equitable 
right  or  interest  in  a  debt,  or  other  property  (as 
the  assignee  of  a  debt  certainly  has),  there,  a 
Court  of  Equity  is  the  proper  forum  to  enforce 
it,  and  he  is  not  to  be  driven  to  any  circuity  by 
instituting  a  suit  at  law  in  the  name  of  the  per- 
son, who  is  possessed  of  the  right."  2  Story,  Eq. 
Jur.  §  1057  a.;  Townsend  v.  Carpenter,  11  Ohio, 
21.  But  see  Walker  v.  Brooks,  125  Mass.  241, 
where  the  conclusions  of  Judge  Story  are  re- 
viewed, and  it  is  held,  that  Equitj-  will  not 
entertain  a  bill  by  an  assignee  of  a  strictly  legal 
right,  unless  lie  shows  that  the  assignor  refuses 
the  use  of  his  name,  or  that  the  action  at  Law 
would  not  afford  adequate  relief,  (a)  To  the 
same  effect  are  Angell  v.  Stone,  110  Mass.  54; 
Hogan  v.  Buck,  44  Vt.  285. 

In  Ontario  Bank  v.  Mumford,  above  cited, 
Chancellor  Walworth  cited  with  approbation 
the  case  of  Hammond  v.  Messenger,  and  reaf- 
firmed the  doctrine  it  contains  to  its  full  extent. 
"As  a  general  rule,"  said  he,  "this  Court  will 
not  entertain  a  suit  brought  by  the  assignee  of 
a  debt,  or  of  a  chose  in  action,  which  is  a  mere 
legal  demand  ;  but  will  leave  him  to  his  remedy 
at  Law  by  a  suit  in  the  name  of  the  assignor." 
See  also  Gover  v.  Christie,  2  Harr.  &  J.  67; 
Winn  v.  Bowles,  6  Munf.  23. 


Taylor  v.  Midland  Railway,  28  Beav.  287,  and 
8  H.  L.  Cas.  751;  Telegraph  Co.  v.  Davenport, 
97  U.  S.  369;  Pratt  v.  Boston  &  Albany  Rail- 
road, 126  Mass.  443.  See  Pratt  v.  Taunton 
Copper  Co.  123  Mass.  110;  Salisbury  Mills  p. 
Townsend,  109  Mass.  115;  Loring  v.  Salisbury 
Mills,  125  Mass.  138. 

In  England  the  assignee  of  the  registered 
proprietor  of  a  trade-mark  may  sue  to  prevent 
its  use,  although  the  assignment  has  not  been 
registered.  Ihlee  v.  Henshaw,  31  Ch.  D.  323; 
see  Jennings  v.  Johnson,  37  Fed.  Rep.  364.  As 
to  the  assignee  of  a  patent  for  an  invention 
suing  as  sole  plaintiff  for  infringement,  see 
Wilson  v.  Chickering,  14  Fed.  Rep.  917:  Nellis 
?-.  Pen  nock  Manuf.  Co.  13  id.  451 ;  Gottfried  v. 
Miller,  10  id.  471 ,  Seibert  C.  O.  Co.  v.  Phillips 
L.  Co.  id.  677;  Graham  v.  Geneva  Lake  C.  M. 
Co.  11  id.  139;  Merriam  v.  Smith,  id.  588; 
193 


199 


OF   PARTIES   TO    A    SUIT. 


*  199  the  *  assignee  would  be  no  answer  to  an  action  at  Law  by  the 
assignor,  in  whom  the  legal  right  to  sue  still  remains,  and  who 
might  exercise  it  to  the  prejudice  of  the  party  liable; 1  in  which  case 
the  party  liable  would  be  obliged  to  file  another  bill  against  the  plaintiff 
at  Law,  for  the  purpose  of  restraining  his  proceedings. 

Upon  this  ground,  where  an  obligee  had  assigned  over  a  bond,  and 
died,  and  the  assignee  sued  for  it  in  Equity,  the  cause  was  directed  to 
stand  over,  to  make  the  personal  representative  of  the  obligee  a  party;2 
and  in  another  case,8  where  the  assignor  of  a  bond  was  dead,  and  there 
was  not  a  representative,  it  was  held,  on  a  bill  filed  by  the  assignee 
against  the  obligor  for  a  ne  exeat,  that  there  was  a  want  of  parties.  In 
like  manner,  where  a  bill  was  filed  by  the  assignees  of  a  judgment, 
without  the  assignor  being  a  party,  it  was  held,  that  the  plaintiffs  could 
not  go  on  with  that  part  of  their  case  which  sought  payment  of  the 
debt.4 

For  the  same  reason,  where  a  bill  was  filed  against  the  directors  of 
an  unincorporated  joint-stock  company,  by  a  holder  of  shares,  of  which 
some  were  original,  and  some  were  alleged  to  be  derivative,  without 
stating  with  respect  to  the  derivation  of  them,  the  manner  in  which  he 
had  become  possessed  of  them,  or  whether  they  had  been  transferred  to 
him  in  the  manner  in  which,  according  to  the  regulations  of  the  com- 


1  See  the  remarks  of  Thomas  J.  in  Mon- 
tague v.  Lobdell,  11  Cush.  Ill,  114,  115;  and 
also  the  remarks  of  Wilde  J.  in  Hobart  v. 
Andrews,  21  Pick.  526,  531,  532,  upon  the 
above  statement  by  Mr.  Daniell.  Brown  v. 
Johnson,  53  Maine,  246.  And  see  Jones  v. 
Farrell,  1  De  G.  &  J.  208,  where  the  assignor 
sued  at  Law,  and  the  debtor,  with  notice  of 
the  assignment  before  suit  brought,  paid 
him,  the  debtor  was  again  compelled  to  pay 
the  assignee  on  bill  filed  by  such  assignee. 
See  also  Rolt  v.  White,  31  Beav.  520,  where 
it  was  held  that  the  right  of  set-off  by  the 
debtor  was  the  same  in  Equity  as  at  Law. 

-  Brace  v.  Harrington,   2  Atk    235;   Coale 

Goldsmith  v.  American  P.  C.  Co.  2  id.  239; 
Still  v.  Reading,  9  id.  40.  An  exclusive 
license,  as,  for  example,  to  sell  under  letters- 
patent,  when  not  coupled  with  a  grant,  con- 
fers no  property  in  the  subject-matter,  and 
Kives  the  licensee  no  title  to  sue  in  his  own 
name.  Heap  v.  Hartley,  42  Ch.  D.  461;  see 
Re  Apollinaris  Co.'s  Trade  Marks,  63  L.  T.  162. 
A  patentee  and  his  licensee,  whose  license  is 
not  exclusive,  cannot  join  as  plaintiffs  in  a 
suit  for  infringement.  Blair  r.  Lippincott 
Glass  Co.  52  Fed.  Rep.  226.  But  the  licensee 
of  the  exclusive  right  to  a  territory  under  a 
patent  may  join  the  owner  as  co-plaintiff  even 
against  his  will  in  a  suit  against  an  infringer. 
Brush  Electric  Co.  v.  California  Electric  Light 
Co.  52  Fed.  Rep.  945;  see  Huher  v.  Myers  S. 
Depot,  34  id.  725;  Boston  Woven  Hose  Co.  v. 

194 


v.  Mildred,  3  Harr.  &  J.  278;  see  Ensign  v. 
Kellogg,  4  Pick.  1.  As  to  equities  where  the 
assignment  is  absolute,  see  36  &  37  Vic.  c.  66, 
§  25  (6) ;  Brice  v.  Banister,  3  Q.  B.  D.  569;  Be 
Sutton,  12  Ch.  D.  175;  Ex  parte  Nichols,  22 
Ch.  D.  782;  Percival  v.  Dunn,  29  Ch.  D.  128; 
Wa'ker  v.  Bradford  Old  Bank,  12  Q.  B.  D. 
511. 

3  Ray  r.  Fenwick,  3  Bro.  C.  C.  25. 

4  Cathcart  r.  Lewis,  1  Ves.  Jr.  463;  Part- 
ington v.  Bailey,  6  L.  J.  Ch.  N.  S.  179,  M.  R.; 
M'Kinnie  v.  Rutherford,  1  Dev.  &  Bat.  Eq. 
395;  Elliott  v.  Waring,  5  Monroe,  339;  Pem- 
berton  v.  Riddle,  id.  401 ;  Young  v.  Rodes,  id. 
500;   Elderkin  v.  Shultz,  2  Blackf.  346. 


Star  Rubber  Co.  40  id.  167 ,  Clement  Manuf. 
Co.  v.  Upton  &  Hart  Co.  id.  471;  Curran  v.  St. 
Charles  Car  Co.  32  id.  835.  Predecessors  in  a 
pretended  title  need  not  be  joined  in  a  bill  to 
compel  the  present  holder  to  release  it.  Crooks 
r.  Whitford,  40  Mich.  599.  Where  a  half  in- 
terest in  a  contract  has  been  equitably  assigned, 
the  assignor  and  assignee  may,  under  the 
Indiana  Code,  join  as  co-plaintiffs  in  a  suit 
thereon.  Singleton  v.  O'Blenis,  125  Tnd.  151; 
see  Wilcox  v.  Pratt,  125  TsT.  Y.  688. 

An  assignee  pendente  lite  is  a  purchaser  with 
notice,  and  need  not  be  brought  in  as  a  party. 
Eyster  v.  Gaff,  91  U.  S.  521;  Moran  v.  Pelli- 
fant.  28  III.  App.  278;  Checkering  v.  Fullerton, 
90  111  520;  Zane  v.  Fink,  18  W.  Va.  693;  Pond 
v.  Clark,  24  Conn,  370,  384. 


PERSONS    HAVING    CONCURRENT   INTERESTS   WITH    PLAINTIFF.      *  200 


pany,  such  transfer  ought  to  have  been  made,  Lord  Brougham  appeared 
to  think  that  the  persons  by  whom  the  shares  had  been  assigned  to  the 
plaintiffs  ought  to  have  been  parties  to  the  suit.5 

The  same  principle  appears  to  have  been  acted  upon  by  the  Court  of 
Exchequer,  in  certain  cases  in  which  bills  have  been  filed  for  tithes,  by 
lessees,  under  parol  demises  (which,  in  consequence  of  tithes  being 
things  lying  in  grant,  are  void  at  Law),  in  which  *  cases,  upon  *200 
demurrers  being  put  in  and  submitted  to,  the  Court  has  permitted 
the  plaintiffs  to  amend  their  bills,  by  making  the  lessors  parties  to  the 
suit.1 

Although  the  assignor  of  a  chose  in  action  is  sometimes  made  a  party 
defendant,  yet  the  more  general  practice  is  (especially  where  the  assign- 
ment contains,  as  it  almost  always  does,  a  power  of  attorney  from  the 
assignor  to  the  assignee  to  sue  in  his  name),  to  make  the  assignor  a 
co-plaintiff  in  the  bill;  although  it  seems,  that  even  if  the  assignment 
is  stated  upon  the  bill,  and  consequently,  that  there  is  an  admission 
of  the  fact  as  between  the  co-plaintiffs,  still  it  is  necessary  to  prove 
the  assignment,  in  order  to  show  that  there  is  no  misjoinder  of  plain- 
tiffs ; 2  though  now,  it  is  conceived  that  such  proof  would  certainly  not 
be  required.8 

A  creditor  or  legatee 4  of  a  person  deceased  may,  in  some  cases, 
under  peculiar  circumstances,  such  as  an  allegation  of  fraud  or  collu- 
sion,5 bring  a  bill  against  a  debtor  to,6  or  creditor  of,7  the  estate,  (a)    Yet 


8  Walburn  v.  Ingilby,  1  M.  &  K.  61 ;  C.  P. 
Coop  temp  Brough.  270;  see  Bagshaw  v.  East- 
ern Union  Ry.  Co.  7  Hare,  114;  13  Jur.  602; 
affirmed,  2  Mac.  &  G.  389;  14  Jur.  491,  L.  C; 
<  n.sslev  p.  Glasgow  Life  Ass.  Co.  4  Ch.  D. 
421. 

1  Henning  v.  Willis,  3  Wood,  29;  Jackson 
v.  Benson,  M'Lel.  62. 

2  Snyer  v.  Wagstaff,  2  Y.  &  C  230  ;  Chol- 
mor.deley  v.  Clinton,  4  Bligh,  123 ;  Ryan  v. 
Anderson,  3  Mad.  174 ;  Blair  v.  Bromlej',  5 
Hare,  554;  affirmed.  2  Phil.  354  ;  11  Jur.*115, 
617;  Sammis  v.  Wightman,  31  Fla.  45. 

3  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  49.  If  the  assignor 
be  made  a  defendant,  and  admit  the  assign- 
ment, the  opposite  party  is  thereby  concluded. 
Burrows  p.  Stryker,  47  Iowa,  477. 


4  See  Yeatman  v.  Yeatman,  7  Ch.  D.  210. 

5  Gregory  p.  Forrester,  1  M'Cord  Ch.  325 ; 
post,  ch.  6,  §  4.  and  cases  cited. 

6  Att.-Gen.  v.  Wynne,  Mos.  128;  Wilsons. 
Moore,  1  Myl.  &  K.  126,  142,  337  ;  see  also 
Saunders  r.  Druce,  3  Drew.  140  ;  and  this  has 
been  done  in  cases  of  partnership.  Bowsher  v. 
Watkins,  1  R.  &  M.  277  ;  Travis  v.  Milne,  9 
Hare.  141  ;  and  see  Stainton  v.  Carron  Co..  18 
Beav.  146  ;  18  Jur.  137;  Harrison  v.  Righter, 
11  N.  J.  Eq.  389,  Morley  r.  White,  L.  R.8Ch. 
731  ;  Evans  v.  Evans.  23  N.  J.  Eq.  71. 

1  Earl  Vane  p.  Rigden,  18  W.  R.  308.  V.  C. 
M.;  L.  R.  5  Ch.  663,  see,  however,  S.  C,  W. 
N  (1870)  210  ;  18  W.  R.  1092,  L.  C.  &  L.  J. 
James. 


('<)  A  trustee's  mere  refusal  to  sue  does  not 
entitle  a  cestui  que  trust  to  sue  in  his  own  name. 
Sharpe  p.  San  Paulo  Brazilian  Ry.  Co.  L.  R.  8 
Ch.  597.  So  a  mere  refusal  by  a  legal  personal 
representative  to  sue  for  outstanding  assets  does 
not,  in  the  absence  of  special  circumstances, 
justify  a  residuary  legatee,  or  next  of  kin,  in 
suing  the  legal  personal  representative  and  the 
debtor  to  the  estate.  Yeatman  p.  Yeatman,  7 
Ch.  D.  210.  When  the  circumstances  enable  a 
cestui  que  trust  to  sue  in  his  own  name,  all  the 
other  cestui  que  trusts  should  be  made  defend- 
ants in  order  to  prevent  a  multiplicity  of  suits. 
Meldrum  ».  Scorer,  56  L.  T.  471. 
A  cestui  que  trust  is  not  a  necessary  party  to 


a  bill  by  a  trustee  to  foreclose  a  mortgage. 
Dodge  r.  Tulleys,  144  U.  S.  451.  In  England, 
see  Goldsmid  r.  Stonehewer,  9  Hare  App.  38  ; 
Francis  p.  Harrison.  43  Ch.  D.  183;  Griffith  »•. 
Pound  45  Ch.  D.  553;  Mills  v.  Jennings,  13 
Ch.  D.  639.  In  Wave]]  v  Mitchell,  64  L.  T. 
560  ;  \V.  N.  (1891)  86,  the  cestui  que  trusts  were 
held  to  ho  sufficiently  represented,  in  a  foreclo- 
sure action,  bv  the  trustees,  for  the  purpose  of 
taking  the  accounts  against  the  mortgagees.  In 
general,  the  trustee,  as  plaintiff,  sufficiently 
represents  the  estate,  and  the  cestui  que  trusts 
are  not  necessary  parties  when  the  suit  does  not 
involve  their  relations  to  each  other.  Re 
Frewen,  Frewen  v.  Frewen,  60  L.  T.  953  ;  Re 

195 


201 


OF    PARTIES    TO    A    SUIT. 


such  a  suit  cannot  be  maintained  without  the  personal  representative 
being  a  party,8  even  if  he  has  actually  released  his  interest  in  the  prop- 
erty.9 But  it  seems  that  a  specific  legatee,  suing  trustees  for  his 
legacy,  need  not  make  the  executor  a  party,  if  he  alleges  that  he  has 
his  assent.10  And  so  it  has  been  held,  that  an  administratrix  of  an 
intestate,  although  she  had  assigned  his  interest  in  a  partnership  con- 
cern to  his  next  of  kin,  was  the  proper  person  to  file  a  bill  against  the 
surviving  partners  to  have  the  partnership  accounts  taken. u 

Where  a  testator,  having  been  resident  in  India,  where  all  his  prop- 
erty was,  died  there,  having  made  a  will,  whereby  be  bequeathed 
*  201  the  residue  of  his  estate  to  persons  resident  in  this  country,*  but 
appointed  persons  in  India  his  executors,  who  proved  the  will 
there,  and  remitted  the  proceeds  to  their  agent  in  this  country,  it  was 
held,  that  the  residuary  legatees  could  not  maintain  a  suit  against  the 
agent,  without  having  a  representative  to  the  testator  in  England,  before 
the  Court.1 

Where  a  claim  on  property  in  dispute  would  vest  in  the  personal 
representative  of  a  deceased  person,  and  there  is  no  general  personal 
representative  of  that  person,  an  administration,  limited  to  the  subject 
of  the  suit,  was  necessary  to  enable  the  Court  to  proceed  to  a  decision 
on  the  claim ;  but  the  Court  was  empowered,  by  the  forty-fourth  section 
of  the  Act  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  if  it  thinks  fit,  to  appoint  a  person  in  such 
cases  to  represent  the  estate,  or  to  proceed  in  the  absence  of  any  such 
representative. 

Where,  however,  the  object  of  the  suit  is  the  general  administration 


8  Rumney  v.  Mead,  Rep.  temp.  Finch,  336 ; 
Griffith  v.  Bateman,  id.  334  ;  Att.-Gen.  v. 
Twisden,  id.  336;  Conway  v.  Stroud,  2  Freem. 
188;  West  v.  Randall,  2  Mason,  181.  If,  how- 
ever, the  executor  is  an  outlaw  and  cannot  be 
found,  the  suit  may  proceed  without  him. 
Heath  v  Percival.  1  P.  Wms.  682,  684  ;  2  Eq. 
Cas.  Abr   167,  pi.  14  ,  630,  pi.  2. 

9  Smithby  v.  Stinton,  1  Vern.  31. 

™  Smith  v.  Brooksbank,  7  Sim.  18,  21;  see, 
however.  Moor  r.  Blagrave,  1  Ch.  Cas.  277,  and 
observations  on  this  case  in  Smith  v.  Brooks- 
bank. 

11  Clegg  v.  Fishwick,  1  M'N.  &  G.  294,  299; 
12  Jur    993.     And  see  where  the  uncollected 


Bnwen,  Andrew  v.  Cooper,  45  Ch.  D.  444  ; 
Rand  v.  Walker.  117  U.  S.  340;  Vetterlein  v. 
Barnes,  124  U.  S.  169  ;  McArthur  v.  Scott,  113 
U.  S.  340  ;  Vetterlein  v.  Barker,  45  Fed.  Rep. 
741  ;  Smith  v.  Portland,  30  Fed.  Rep.  734  ; 
Hickox  v.  Elliott,  10  Sawyer,  415  ;  Ashton  v. 
Atlantic  Bank,  3  Allen,  217  ;  Boyden  v.  Par- 
tridge, 2  Gray,  190  ;  Jewett  v  Tucker,  139 
Mass.  566  ;  Northampton  National  Bank  v. 
Crafts,  145  Mass.  444  ;  Adams  v.  Bradley,  12 
Mich.  346  ;  Barrett  v.  Brown,  86  N.  C.  556  ; 
Warren  v.  Howard,  99  N.  C.  190  ;  Waring  v. 
Turton,  44  Md.  535 ;  Van  Bokkelen  v.  Tinges, 

196 


debts  were  divided  among  the  distributees  by 
decree  of  Court.  Pennington  v.  McWhirter,  8 
Humph.  130. 

i  Logan  v.  Fairlie,  2  S.  &  S.  284  ;  Christian 
v.  Devereux,  12  Sim.  264  ;  Partington  v.  Att.- 
Gen.,  L.  R.  4  H.  L.  150;  Re  Commercial  Bank 
Co.  L.  R.  5  Ch.  314  ;  but  see  Fames  v.  Hacon, 
16  Ch.  D.  407  ;  18  Ch.  D.  347.  See  Campbell 
v.  Wallace,  10  Gray,  162  ;  Campbell  v.  Sheldon, 
13  Pick.  8  ;  Story,  Conf.  Laws,  §  513,  and  notes, 
§  514  b.  ;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  179.  Executors  re- 
siding abroad,  or  who  have  never  acted  on  the 
estate,  are  not  necessarily  made  parties  to  the 
suit.  Clifton  v.  Haig,  4  Desaus.  330;  Story,  Eq. 
PI   §  179. 


58  Md.  53;  Newark  Savings  Inst.  v.  Jones,  35 
N.  J.  Eq.  406;  Tyson  v.  Applegate,  49  id.  305; 
Brokaw  v.  Brokaw,  41  id.  215  ;  Swift  v.  Steb- 
bins,  4  Stew.  &  Port.  447  ;  Collins  v.  Loftus 
(10  Leigh,  5),  34  Am.  Dec.  719,  note;  Tucker 
v.  Zimmerman,  61  Ga  599  ;  Hill  v.  Durand,  50 
Wis.  354  ;  Wier  v.  Simmons,  55  Wis.  637:  Biron 
v  Scott,  80  Wis.  206 ;  post,  p.  223.  In  a  suit 
to  defeat  the  trust  in  whole  or  in  part,  the  trus- 
tee is  the  only  necessary  defendant  when  the 
cestui  que  tr-usts  are  bound  bjr  his  acts.  Ibid.; 
Kerrison  v  Stewart,  93  U.  S.  155. 


1 


PERSONS    HAVING    CONCURRENT    INTERESTS    WITH    PLAINTIFF.       *  202 

of  the  estate,  a  general  personal  representative  is  always  necessary ;  a 
and  the  Court  will  not  proceed  in  such  a  suit  when  the  estate  is  only 
represented  by  an  administrator  ad  litem;  3  nor  appoint  a  person  to 
represent  the  estate  under  the  section  above  referred  to,4  and  a  general 
personal  representative  is  a  necessary  party  to  a  suit  against  an  execu- 
tor or  administrator  de  son  tort.5 

When  the  object  of  the  suit  is  only  to  bind  the  estate,  it  is  sufficiently 
represented  by  an  administrator  ad  litem  ; 6  and,  as  a  general  proposi- 
tion, an  administrator  ad  litem  represents  the  estate  to  the  extent  of  the 
authority  which  the  letters  of  administration  purport  to  confer;7  and 
where  a  limited  administration  has  been  granted,  and  general  letters 
of  administration  are  afterwards  granted,  the  general  administrator  is 
bound  by  the  proceedings  in  a  cause  in  which  the  estate  was 
represented  by  a  limited  administrator. 8  *  The  Attorney-General  *  202 
does  not  represent  the  estate  of  a  deceased  illegitimate  person, 
so   as    to  dispense    with  the    necessity  of  a  personal  representative.1 

A  person,  to  whom  letters  of  administration  have  been  granted  as 
attorney  for  a  person  abroad,  represents  the  estate  of  the  deceased.2  (a) 

The  power  of  the  Court  to  appoint  a  person  to  represent  the  estate  of 
a  deceased  person  is  only  intended  to  be  acted  on  when  there  is  a  diffi- 


2  Penny  v.  Watts,  2  Phil.  149,  153  ;  Donald 
r.  Bather,  16  Beav.  26  ;  Barber  v.  Walker,  W. 
N.  (1867)  127;  15  W.  K.  728,  L.  JJ. ;  Rowsel1 
V.  Morris,  L.  R.  17  Eq.  20 ;  Re  Lovett,  Ambler 
v.  Lindsay,  3  Ch.  D.  198;  Dowdeswell  v. 
Dowdeswe"ll,  9  Ch.  D.  294. 

8  Croft  v.  Waterton,  13  Sim.  653  ;  but  see  2 
Phil.  552  ;  Groves  v.  Levi,  or  Groves  v.  Lane, 
9  Hare  App.  47;  16  Jur.  1061 ;  and  see  Wood- 
house  v.  Woodhouse,  L.  R  8  Eq.  514,  V.  C.  S. 
If  necessary  for  the  protection  of  the  estate,  a 
bill  praying  an  injunction  and  receiver  maybe 
filed,  although  there  is  no  personal  representa- 
tive. Steer  v.  Steer,  13  W.  R.  235,  V.  C.  K. ; 
2  Dr.  &  Sm.  311;  but  see  Spencer  v.  Shaw.  W. 
N.  (1875)  115.  A  bill  filed  before  administra- 
tion to  protect  the  assets  is  demurrable,  if  it 
asks  an  account.  Rawlings  v.  Lambert,  1  J.  & 
H.  458  ;  Overington  v.  Ward,  34  Beav.  175  ; 
Blaekettv.  Blackctt,  W.  N.  (1871)65;  19  W. 
R.  559. 

4  Groves  v.  Levi,  supra;  Silver  v.  Stein,  1 
Drew.  295  ;  9  Hare  App.  82  ;  James  v.  Aston, 
2  Jur.  N.  S.  224  ;  see,  however,  Maclean  v. 
Dawson,  27  Beav.  21,  369  ;  5  Jur.  N.  S.  1091  ; 
Williams  v.  Page,  27  Beav.  373. 

6  Penny  v.  Watts,  2  Phil.  149,  153;  Creasor 


v.  Robinson,  14  Beav.  589  ;  15  Jur.  1049 ; 
Beardmore  v.  Gregory,  2  H.  &  M.  491;  11  Jur. 
N.  S.  363  ;  Cary  v.  Hills,  L.  R.  15  Eq.  79  ; 
contra,  Cleland  v.  Cleland,  Prec.  Ch.  64  ;  Coote 
v.  Whittington,  L.  R.  16  Eq.  534  ;  and  see 
Cooke  v.  Gittings,  21  Beav.  497. 

6  Ellice  v.  Goodson,  2  Coll.  4  ;  Davis  v. 
Chanter,  2  Phil.  545,  549  ;  Devaynes  v.  Robin- 
son, 24  Beav.  97,  98;  3  Jur.  N."  S.  707,  708  ; 
Maclean  v.  Dawson,  27  Beav.  21,  369  ;  5  Jur. 
N.  S.  1091  ;  Williams  v.  Allen,  10  W.  R.  512, 
L.  JJ.;  4  De  G.  F.  &  J.  71  ;  overruling  S.  C. 
29  Beav.  292 ,  8  Jur.  N.  S.  276. 

7  Faulkner  v.  Daniel,  3  Hare,  199,  207  ; 
Davis  v.  Chanter,  supra ;  Williams  v.  Allen, 
32  Beav.  650  ;  Woodhouse  v.  Woodhouse,  L.  K. 
8  Eq.  514,  V.  C.  S. 

8  Davis  v.  Chanter,  supra ;  and  Harris  v. 
Milburn,  2  Hagg.  64,  referred  to,  2  Phil.  552. 
So,  where  the  revivor  was  under  a  statute 
against  the  heirs  of  the  decedent.  Anderson  v. 
McRoberts,  1  Tenn.  Ch.  279. 

i  Bell  v.  Alexander,  6  Hare,  543,  545. 

2  Chambers  v.  Bicknell,  2  Hare,  536;  and 
see  Webb  v.  Kirby,  7  De  G.  M.  &  G.  376  ;  3 
Jur.  N.  S.  73. 


(a)  The  legal  personal  representative  ap- 
pointed by  the  forum  of  a  deceased  person's 
domicil  is  entitled  to  the  deceased's  personal 
estate  received  through  any  letters  of  adminis- 
tration, and  the  next  of  kin  cannot  make  any 
claim  against  the  estate  except  through  his  in- 


tervention.   Eames  v.  Hacon,  16  Cb.  D.  407  ; 
18  id.  347. 

Foreign  creditors  are  entitled  to  the  same 
dividends  with  English  creditors  in  the  adminis- 
tration of  the  English  estate  of  a  deceased  per- 
son domiciled  abroad.  Re  Kloebe,  28  Ch.  D.175. 

197 


203 


OF    PARTIES    TO    A    SUIT. 


culty,  either  from  insolvency  or  some  other  cause,  in  obtaining  repre- 
sentation to  a  deceased  party; 3  and  it  is  always  in  the  discretion  of  the 
Court  whether  it  will  act  on  the  power;4  and  where  there  are  real 
litigating  parties  before  the  Court,  but  it  happens  that  one  of  the  class 
interested  is  not  represented,  if  the  Court  sees  that  there  are  other 
persons  present  who  bona  fide  represent  the  interest  of  those  absent,  it 
may  allow  that  interest  to  be  represented;  but  it  will  not  allow  the 
whole  adverse  interest  to  be  represented,5  and  a  representative  of  the 
estate  will  not  be  appointed;  where  the  estate  of  the  deceased  person  is 
that  which  is  being  administered  in  the  suit,  where  the  interest  of  the 
deceased  person  is  adverse  to  that  of  the  plaintiff,  or  where  this  represen- 
tative of  the  deceased  person  has  active  duties  to  perform.6  The 
power  of  the  Court  will  be  acted  on  where  the  estate  to  be  represented 
is  sought  to  be  made  liable ; 7  and  pending  proceedings  in  the  Probate 
Court,  a  representative  has  been  appointed ; 8  and  where  the  next  of  kin 
refused,  or  after  notice  neglected,  to  take  out  administration;9  and 
where  the  executor,  who  had  proved  the  will  in  India,  refused  to  prove 
it  in  England; 10  and  where  it  was  uncertain  whether  the  person  whose 
estate  was  to  be  represented,  and  who  was  a  necessary  party  to  the  suit, 
and  beneficially  interested,  was  dead  or  alive,11  and  where  the  dead 
person  was  the  plaintiff  who  had  died  before  judgment  insolvent,  and, 
as  far  as  could  be  ascertained,  intestate.12  Where  there  are  other  per- 
sons parties  to  the  suit  in  the  same  interest  as  the  deceased  party,  it  is 

conceived  that  the  Court  will,  generally,  permit  the  suit  to  pro- 
*203    ceed  without  any  representative  *of  the  estate  of  such  party;1 

so,  also,  when  the  deceased  person  was  an  accounting  party,  and 
without  any  beneficial  interest,  and  died  insolvent; 2  and  in  a  partner- 


8  Long  v.  Storie,  Kay  App.  12;  and  see 
Joint  Stock  Discount  Co.  v.  Brown,  L.  R.  8 
Eq.  376,  V.  C.  J. 

*  Tarratt  v.  Llovd,  2  Jur.  N.  S.  371,  V. 
C.  W. 

5  Gibson  v.  Wills,  21  Beav.  620;  and  see 
Hewitson  v.  Todhunter,  22  L.  J.  Ch.  76,  V.  C. 
S.;  Meades  v.  Guedalla,  10  W.  R.  485,  V.  C. 
W. ;  Re  Joint  Stock  Discount  Co.,  Fyfe's  Case, 
17  W.  R.  870,  M.  R. 

6  Moore  v.  Morris,  L.  R.  13  Eq.  139. 

i  Dean  and  Chapter  of  Ely  v.  Gayford,  16 
Beav.  561 ;  Joint  Stock  Discount  Co.  v.  Brown, 
L.  R.  8  Eq.  376,  V.  C.  J.;  and  see  Re  Ranking, 
L.  H.  6  Eq.  601,  V.  C.  G. 

8  Hele  v.  Lord  Bexley,  15  Beav.  340 ;  Rob- 
ertson p,  Kimble,  W.  N."(1867)  305,  M.  R. 

9  Tarratt  v.  Lloyd,  supra :  Ashmall  v.  Wood, 
1  Jur.  N.  S.  1130*  V.  C.  S.;  Davies  v.  Boul- 
cott,  1  Dr.  &  Sm.  23 ;  see  also  Swallow  v.  Binns, 
9  Hare  App.  47;  17  Jur.  295;  Haw  v.  Vickers, 
1  W.  R.  242. 

i°  Sutherland  v.  De  Virenne,  2  Jur.  N.  S. 
301,  V.  C.  S.;  see  also  Bliss  v.  Putnsun,  29 
Beav.  20;  7  Jur.  N.  S.  12. 

11  Mortimer  v.  Mortimer,  11  W.  R.  740. 

198 


12  Wingrove  v.  Thompson,  11  Ch.  D.  419. 

i  Abrev  v.  Newman,  10  Hare  App.  58;  17 
Jur.  153;  Cox  v.  Tavlor,  22  L.  J.  Ch.  910,  V. 
C.  K.;  Kucker  v.  Scholelield,  7  L.  T.  N.  S. 
504,  V.  C.  VV.;  Twynam  v.  Porter,  VV.  N. 
(1869)  228,  V.C.J.;  and  see  Bessant  v.  No- 
ble, 26  L.  T.  Ch.  236,  L.  C.  In  Tarratt  v. 
Lloyd,  supra,  however,  the  Court  appointed  a 
representative. 

2  Chaffers  v.  Headlam,  9  Hare  App.  46; 
Magnay  v.  Davidson,  id.  82:  Band  v.  Randle, 
2  W.  R.  331,  V.  C.  W.;  Rogers  v.  Jones,  1 
Sm.  &  G.  17,  19;  16  Jur.  968;  Leycester  r. 
Norris,  10  Jur.  N.  S.  1173;  13  W.  R.  201, 
V.  C.  K. ;  but  see  Cox  9.  Stephens,  9  Jur.  N.  S. 
1144,  1145;  11  W.  R.  929,  V.  C.  K  See  also, 
Ashmall  v.  Wood,  supra,  where  in  a  similar 
case  a  person  was  appointed  to  represent  a 
deceased  party;  and  see  Whittington  v.  Good- 
ing, 10  Hare  App.  29.  In  Miles  v.  Hawkins,  1 
C.  P.  Coop.  temp.  Cott.  366,  which  was  a  simi- 
lar case  before  the  Act,  an  objection  for  want 
of  parties  was  overruled  ;  see  also  Goddard 
v.  Haslam,  1  Jur.  N.  S.  251,  V.  C.  W.;  and 
Madox  v.  Jackson,  3  Atk.  406. 


PERSONS    HAVING    CONCURRENT    INTERESTS   WITH    PLAINTIFF. 


204 


ship  suit  where  the  deceased  party  was  the  mortgagee  of  a  partner's 
share,  but  had  been  paid  off  and  died  insolvent.3 

The  power  of  the  Court  to  appoint  a  person  to  represent  the  estate, 
or  to  proceed  without  a  representative,  will  not  be  acted  upon  when  the 
absent  person  would  have  to  be  active  in  the  execution  of  the  decree 
which  the  Court  is  called  upon  to  make;4  nor  where  the  whole  adverse 
interest  is  unrepresented; 5  nor  where  the  general  administration  of  the 
estate  to  be  represented  is  sought; 6  nor  where  the  deceased  was  an 
accounting  party ; 7  nor  where  there  is  personal  responsibility  attached 
to  the  position; 8  nor  will  the  Court  direct  money  to  be  paid  to  a  per- 
son appointed  under  this  section.9 

The  44th  section  of  the  Act  expressly  extends  to  other  proceedings, 
as  well  as  suits ; 10  and  it  has  accordingly  been  held  that  it  applies 
to  special  cases  and  petitions.11  The  proper  person  to  be 
*  appointed  under  this  section  is  the  person  who  would  be  ap-  *  204 
pointed  administrator  ad  litem;  1  but  the  Court  will  not  appoint 
a  person  against  his  will.2  It  would  seem  that  the  plaintiff  may  apply 
for,  and  obtain,  an  order  under  the  44th  section  on  motion,  without 
serving  the  other  parties  to  the  cause  or  proceeding; 3  but  notice  must 
be  given  to  the  person  entitled  to  take  out  administration  to  the 
deceased   party ; 4   the   Court,   can,    however,    make  the   order   at  the 


8  Williams  v.  Poole,  21  W.  R.  252.  See 
also  Hay  ward  V.  Pile,  L.  R.7  Ch.  634;  Colliss 
v.  Hector.  L.  R.  19  Eq.  334,  337.  341;  Hobbs  v. 
Reid,  W.  N.  (1876)  95,  Curtius  C.Caledonian 
Ins.  Co.  19  Ch.  D.  534;  Crossley  v.  Glasgow  Life 
Ass.  Co.  4  Ch  D.  421 ;  Webster  v.  British  Em- 
pire M.  L.  Ass.  Co.  15  Ch.  D.  169.  Before  the 
late  Act,  in  some  cases,  when  it  has  appeared 
at  the  hearing  of  a  cause  that  the  personal 
representative  of  a  deceased  person,  not  a  party 
to  the  suit,  ought  to  be  privy  to  the  proceedings 
under  a  decree,  but  that  no  question  could 
arise  as  to  the  rights  of  such  representative,  the 
Court  has,  on  the  hearing,  made  a  decree, 
directing  proceedings  before  one  of  the  Masters 
of  the  Court,  without  requiring  the  representa- 
tive to  be  made  a  party  by  amendment  or  other- 
wise, an'l  has  given  leave  to  the  parties  in  the 
suit  to  bring  a  representative  before  the  Master, 
on  taking  the  accounts  or  other  proceedings 
directed  by  the  decree.     Ld.  Red.  178. 

4  Fowler  v   Bayldon,  9  Hare  App.  78. 

6  Cox  v.  Stephens,  9  Jur.  N.  S.  1144,  1145; 
11  W.  R.  929,  V.  O.K.;  Gibson  v.  Wills,  21 
Beav.  620 ;  and  see  Vacy  v.  Vacy,  1  L.  T.  N.  S. 
267.  V.  C.  W. 

6  Groves  v.  Levi  or  Lane,  9  Hare  App.  27; 
10  Jur.  1011;  Silver  v.  Stem,  1  Drew.  295;  9 
Hare  App.  82;  James  v.  Ashton,  2  Jur.  N.  S. 
224,  V.  C.  W.;  Bruiton  ».  Birch,  22  L.  J.  Ch. 
911,  V.  C  K.;  Williams  v.  Page,  27  Beav. 
373;  Maclean  v.  Dawson,  27  Beav.  21,  369; 
5  Jur.  N.  S.  1091. 

7  Rowland  c.  Evans,  33  Beav.  202. 


8  Re  Joint  Stock  Discount  Co.,  Fyfe's  Case, 
17  W  R.  870,  M.  R. 

9  Bvain  v.  Sutton,  19  Beav.  646;  Rawli'  s 
V.  M'Mahon,  1  Drew.  225;  9  Hare  App.  82; 
Jones  v.  Foulkes,  10  W.  R.  55,  V.  C.  K. 

i°  See  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  44. 

11  Swallow  v.  Binns,  9  Hare  App.  47;  17 
Jur.  295;  Ex  parte  Cramer,  9  Hare  App.  47; 
Hewitson  v.  Todhunter,  22  L.  J.  Ch.  76,  V.  C. 
S. ;  re  Ranking,  L.  R.  6  Eq.  601,  V.  C.  G. ;  and 
see  post,  Chap.  XXXV.  §  3;  Petitions,  and 
Chap.  XVIII.,  special  case. 

i  Dean  of  Ely  v.  Gayford,  16  Beav.  561 ; 
and  see  Hele  v.  Lord  Bexley,  15  Beav.  340; 
Ashmall  v.  Wood,  1  Jur.  N.  S.  1130.  V.  C  S.; 
Sutherland  v.  De  Virenne,  2  Jur.  N.  S.  301, 
V.  C.  S  ,  where  the  Court  appointed  the  execu- 
tor who  had  not  proved;  see  also  Mortimer  r. 
Mortimer,  11  W.  R.  740,  M.  R. ;  Shallow  v. 
Binns,  9  Hare  App.  47;  17  Jur.  295:  Hewitson 
v.  Todhunter.  22  L.  J.  76,  V  C  S. ;  Robertson 
v.  Kemble,  W.  N.  (1867)  305.  M.  R. 

2  Prince  of  Wales  Association  v.  Palmer,  25 
Beav.  605;  Hill  v.  Bonner,  26  Beav.  372.  Long 
v.  Storie,  Kay  App.  12;  Whiteaves  v.  Melville, 

5  W.  R.  676,  V.  C.  W.;  Joint  Stock'  Discount 
Co.  v.  Brown,  L.  R.  8  Eq.  376,  380,  V.  C.  J.; 
Colliss  v.  Hector,  L.  R.  19  Eq.  334.  V.  C   H. 

3  2  Seton,  1534;  Davies  t>.  B  uilcott,  1  Dr. 

6  Sm.  23;  see,  however,  contra,  Chaffers  v. 
Headhim,  9  Hare  App.  46. 

4  Davies  v.  Boulcott,  supra  ,•  Tarratt  v. 
Lloyd,  2  Jur.  N.  S.  371,  V.  C.  W.  ;  Joint 
Stock  Discount  Co.  v.  Brown,  L.  R.  8  Eq.  376, 

199 


*  205  OP    PARTIES    TO    A    SUIT. 

hearing.5  No  appearance  is  required  to  be  entered  by  the  party 
appointed ;  but  notice  of  his  appointment,  and  of  the  name  and  address 
of'  the  solicitor  who  will  act  for  him,  should  be  given  to  the  Record  and 
Writ  Clerk,6  for  the  purpose  of  service;  and  the  order  should  be  pro- 
duced to  him  for  entry.7 

Under  the  Court  of  Probate  Act,  1857  and  1858,  the  Court  of  Probate 
has  power,  pending  litigation  as  to  the  validity  of  a  will,  or  the  right 
to  administration,  to  appoint  an  administrator,  who  has  all  the  powers 
of  a  general  administrator,  except  the  power  of  distributing  the  estate, 
but  who  is  to  act  under  the  direction  of  the  Court  of  Probate; 8  and  the 
same  Statute  also  enables  the  Court  of  Probate,  in  certain  cases,  where 
necessary  or  convenient,  to  appoint  any  person  either  general  or  limited 
administrator  to  a  deceased  person.9  If,  at  the  expiration  of  twelve 
calendar  months  from  the  death  of  any  testator  or  intestate,  the  execu- 
tor or  administrator,  to  whom  probate  or  administration  has  been 
granted,  is  then  residing  out  of  the  jurisdiction,  the  Court  of  Probate 
may,  upon  the  application  of  any  creditor,  next  of  kin  or  legatee,  grant 
a  special  administration,  limited  "  for  the  purpose  to  become  and 

*  205    be  made  a  party  to  a  bill  or  bills  to  be  exhibited  against  him  *  in 

any  of  her  Majesty's  Courts  of  Equity,  and  to  carry  the  decree 
or  decrees  of  any  of  the  said  Courts  into  effect,  and  not  further  or 
otherwise ; "  and  it  has  also  been  enacted,  that  the  Court  of  Equity  in 
which  such  suit  shall  be  depending,  may  appoint  (if  it  shall  be  need- 
ful) any  person  or  persons  to  collect  in  any  outstanding  debts  or 
effects  due  to  such  estate,  and  to  give  discharges  for  the  same;  such 
persons  or  person  giving  security,  in  the  usual  manner,  duly  to  account 
for  the  same.  The  Paymaster-General,1  or  the  Secretary  or  Deputy 
Secretary  of  the  Bank  of  England,  is  enabled  to  transfer,  and  the  Bank 
is  to  suffer  a  transfer  to  be  made,  of  any  stock  belonging  to  the  estate  of 
such  deceased  person,  into  the  name  of  the  Paymaster-General,  in  trust 
for  such  purposes  as  the  Court  shall  direct  in  any  suit  to  which  the 
person  to  whom  such  administration  has  been  granted  is  a  party;  but 
if  the  executor  or  administrator,  capable  of  acting  as  such,  returns 
to  and  resides  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  pending  such  suit, 
such  execut  r  or  administrator  is  to  be  made  party  to  such  suit;  and 
the  costs  incurred  by  granting  such  administration,  and  by  proceeding 
against  such  special  administrator,  are  to  be  paid  by  such  person  or 
persons,  or  out  of  such  fund,  as  the  Court  directs.     Where  an  infant  is 

V  C  J.     Where,  after  decree,  the  representa-  e.  78).      Where  a  representative  is  thus  ap- 

tion  is  required  for  the  purpose  of  accounts  or  pointed  of  the  estate  of  a  deceased  party  to  the 

inquiries  at  Chambers,  the  application  for  the  cause,  the   title   of  the  cause  is  corrected  by 

order  may  be  made  there  by  ex  parte  summons.  introducing,  after  the  deceased's  name,  "  since 

For  forms  of  orders  dispensing  with  and  appoint-  deceased,  and  also  A.  B.  appointed  by  order, 

ing  representatives,  see  Hele  v.  Lord  Bexley,  dated day  of 188—,  to  represent  his 

15  Beav.  340  ;  2  Seton,  1531,  1532.    For  forms,  estate."     Ibid. 

see  Vol.  III.  8  20  &  21  Vic.  c.  77,  §  70;  21   &  22  Vic. 

5  Hewitson  v.  Todlmnter,  22  L.  J.  Ch.  76,  c.  95,  §  22:  and  see  Veret  v.  Duprez,  L.  R.  6 
V.  C.  S.;  Mendes  v.  Guedalla,  10  W.  R.  485,  Eq.  329.  V .  C.  M. ;  Tichborne  v.  Tichborne,  L.  R. 
V.  C.  W.  1P.&  D.  730. 

6  Now  at  the  Central  Office.  9  20  &  21  Vic.  c.  77,  §  73. 
i  Braithwaite's  Prac.  561;  (see  42  &  43  Vic.  1  35  &  36  Vic.  c.  44,  §  4. 

200 


PERSONS    HAVING    CONCURRENT    INTERESTS    WITH    PLAINTIFF.      *  20G 

sole  executor,  administration  with  the  will  annexed  must  be  granted  to 
the  guardian  of  such  infant,  or  to  such  other  person  as  the  Court  of 
Probate  shall  think  fit,  until  such  infant  shall  have  attained  the  full  age 
of  twenty-one  years;  at  which  period,  and  not  before,  probate  of  the 
will  is  to  be  granted  to  him.  And  the  person  to  whom  such  adminis- 
tration is  granted  is  to  have  the  same  powers  vested  in  him  as  an 
administrator  has,  by  virtue  of  an  administration  granted  to  him 
durante  minore  cetate  of  the  next  of  kin.2  And  now,  by  the  "Court  of 
Probate  Act,  1858,"  such  limited  administration  may  be  granted, 
whether  it  be  or  be  not  intended  to  institute  proceedings  in  the  Court 
of  Chancery.8 

In  some  cases,  where  the  trustee  has  had  no  beneficial  interest  in  the 
property,  and  was  not  possessed  of  a  legal  estate  which  he  could  set  up 
at  law  to  the  annoyance  of  the  defendant  in  Equity,  the  rule  which 
requires  that  the  trustees,  or  other  persons  having  the  legal  estate  in 
the  thing  demanded,  should  in  all  cases  be  before  the  Court,  has  been 
dispensed  with,  and  the  Court  has  permitted  bills  to  be  filed  by  the 
cestui  que  trusts  without  making  such  trustee  a  party,  the  cestui  que 
trusts  undertaking  for  him  that  he  shall  conform  to  such  decree  as  the 
Court  shall  make.4 

*  Where,  although  new  trustees  of  a  settlement  had  been  duly  *206 
appointed,  the  trust  property  had  not  been  assigned  or  trans- 
ferred to  them,  they  were  held  necessary  parties  to  a  suit  for  carrying 
the  trusts  of  the  settlement  into  execution.1  But,  where  a  bill  was 
filed  to  carry  the  trusts  of  a  will  into  execution,  whereby,  amongst 
other  things,  lands  were  limited  to  trustees  for  a  term  of  years,  to  raise 
a  sum  of  money  by  way  of  portions  for  younger  children,  two  of  which 
younger  children  had  assigned  their  shares  of  the  sum  to  be  raised  to  a 
trustee  for  the  benefit  of  the  others,  but  which  last  trustee  was  not 
before  the  Court;  it  was  considered  that  as  the  trustees  of  the  term  who 
had  the  legal  estate,  and  all  the  children  who  had  the  beneficial  inter- 
est, were  parties,  there  was  no  occasion  to  make  the  other  trustee  a 
party.'2  And,  where  a  man  had  executed  a  deed,  providing,  in  case  of 
his  death,  for  a  woman  and  her  children,  and  had  deposited  it  in  the 
hands  of  an  attorney  for  the  benefit  of  all  parties,  but  afterwards  pro- 
cured possession  of  it  himself,  it  was  held,  on  demurrer,  that  the 
woman  and  her  children  could  maintain  a  suit  to  compel  him  to  deliver 
up  the  deed,  without  making  the  attorney  with  whom  it  was  deposited, 
and  against  whom  no  breach  of  trust  was  alleged,  a  party.8  (  a) 

2  38  Geo.  III.  c.  87;  20  &  21  Vic.  c.  77,  §  74,  Re  Grant,  1  P.  D.  435;  Pinney  v.  Hunt,  6  Ch. 
and  21  &  22  Vic.  c.  95,  §  18 ;  see  36  &  37  Vic.      D.  98 ;  Bradford  v.  Young,  26  Ch.  I).  656. 

c.  60;  §§  16,  31,  76;  38  &  39  Vic.  c.  77;  Collas  *  Kirk  v.  Clark,  Prec.  in  Ch.  275. 

v.  Hesse,  12  W.  R.  565,  V.  C.  K.;  Dickens  v.  1  Nelson  v.   Seaman,  1  De  G.  F.  &  J.  368; 

Harris,  W.  N.  (1866)  93,  V.  C.  S.  6  Jur.  N.  S.  258. 

3  21  &  22  Vic.  c.  95,  §  18.     See  Re  Ruddy,  2  Head  v.  Ld.  Teynham,  1  Cox,  57. 
L.  R  2  P.  &  D.  330;  Re  Jenkins,  28  \V.  R.  431 ;  3  Knye  v.  Moore,  1  S.  &  S.  61,  64. 


(t)  A   married    woman   may  give   a   valid  charge  against  her  separate  estate  thus  acquired, 

charge  on  her  expectancy  as  heir  or  under  the  the  trustees   under  the  will  are  not  necessary 

will  of  a  living  person  ;  and  if,  after  such  per-  parties  thereto.      Flower  v.  Buller,  15  Ch.  D. 

sou's  death,  a  suit  is  brought  to  enforce  such  665. 

201 


*  207  OF   PARTIES   TO    A    SUIT. 

For  the  same  reason,  although,  as  we  have  seen,4  the  assignor  of  a 
chose  in  action  is  a  necessary  party  to  a  suit  by  the  assignee,  yet  the 
assignee  of  an  equitable  interest  in  the  nature  of  a  chose  in  action  may 
maintain  a  suit  for  the  assertion  of  that  interest  without  bringing  the 
assignor  before  the  Court; 5  and  where  such  an  interest  has  been  settled 
upon  trust,  a  cestui  que  trust  may  sue  for  its  recovery  without  joining 
the  trustees  as  co-plaintiffs.6 

The  principle  that  the  person  having  the  legal,  as  well  as  the  person 
having  the  equitable  right  to  sue  should  be  before  the  Court,  applies  to 
all  persons  who  had  legal  demands  against  the  defendant  arising  out  of 
the  same  master;  thus,  as  an  assignee  of  a  lease  may  be  sued  for  non- 
performance of  the  covenants  both  by  the  lessor  and  the  original  lessee 
from  whom  he  derives  title,  neither  the  lessor  nor  lessee  will  be  per- 
mitted to  institute  proceedings  against  him  in  respect  of  his  covenants, 
without  having  the  other  before  them,  in  order  that  the  rights  of  both 
may  be  settled  at  the  same  time.7 

*  207         *  The  rule  which  requires  all  persons  having  a  similar  right  to 

sue  with  that  of  the  plaintiff  to  be  brought  before  the  Court,  does 
not  apphy  to  a  bill  filed  by  the  last  indorsee  of  a  bill  of  exchange  which 
has  been  lost,  against  the  acceptor;  in  which  case  it  has  been  held  that 
neither  the  drawer 1  nor  the  prior  indorsers  are  necessary  parties ; 2 
because,  in  such  cases,  the  ground  of  the  application  to  a  Court  of 
Equity  is  the  loss  of  the  instrument;  and  relief  is  only  given  upon  the 
terms  of  the  plaintiff  giving  the  defendant  ample  security  against  being 
called  upon  again  by  the  drawer  or  indorsers,  in  case  they  should 
become  possessed  of  the  instrument.8  And  it  seems  also  that  the 
drawer  is  not  a  necessary  party,  where  a  suit  is  instituted  by  an  acceptor 
against  the  holder  of  a  bill  of  exchange  which  is  forthcoming,  for  the 
purpose  of  having  it  delivered  up.4 

The  principle  that  persons  having  co-existent  rights  with  the  plain- 
tiff to  sue  the  defendant  must  be  brought  before  the  Court  in  all  cases 
where  the  subject-matter  of  the  right  is  to  be  litigated  in  Equity, 

4  Ante,  p.  198.  original  lessee  were  not  parties,  the  Lord  Chan- 

5  Blake  v.  Jone«,  3  Anst.  651  ;  Cator  v.  cellor  said,  that  to  make  the  proceedings  unex- 
Croydon  Canal  Co.  4  Y.  &  C.  Ex.  405,  419;  8  ceptionable,  it  would  be  very  proper  to  have 
Jur.  277,  L.  C;  Padwick  v.  Piatt,  11  Beav.  503;  them  before  the  Court,  for  that  it  did  not  ap- 
Fulham  v.  M'Carthy,  1  H  L.  Cas.  703;  Bag-  pear  to  him  but  that  the  plaintiff  might  have 
shaw  v.  Eastern  Union  Ry.  Co. 7  Hare.  114;  13  had  a  satisfaction  at  law  against  the  executors, 
Jur.  602;  affirmed.  2Mac.&G.  389;  14  Jur.  491;  and,  if  so,  the  plaintiff's  equity  will  be  their 
Sayles  p.  Tibbitts,  5  R.  I.  79.  See  New  Mexico  equity.  Sainstry  v.  Grainmer,  2  Eq.  Cas.  Abr. 
Land  Co.  v.  Elkins,  20  Fed   Rep.  545.  165,  c   6.     The  same  objection  was  allowed  in 

6  Piggott  v.  Stewart,  W.  N.  (1875)  69.  City  of  London  v.   Richmond,  2  Vern.  421;  1 

7  Where  a  man  granted  a  lease  of  houses  Bro  P.  C.  ed.  Toml.  516,  which  was  also  the 
for  thirty  years  to  B,  who  covenanted  to  keep  case  of  a  bill  against  the  assignee  of  a  lease,  for 
them  in  good  repair,  and  died  having  be-  payment  of  rent  and  performance  of  covenants. 
queathed  the  term  to  his  wife,  and  afterwards  !  Davies  v.  Dodd,  4  Price,  176. 

by  mesne   assignments  the  term  became  vested  2  Macartney  r.  Graham,  2  Sim.  285. 

in  a  pauper,  but  the  houses  becoming  out  of  3  Respecting  the  jurisdiction  in  cases  of  1  'st 

repair  and  the  rent  in  arrear.  a  bill  was  brought  notes  and  bills,  see  1  Story,  Eq.  Jur.  §§  85.  86. 

by  the  lessor  against  the  assignee  for  repairs  4  Earle  v.  Holt,  5  Hare,  180,  see,  however, 

and  an  account  of  the  arrears  of  rent;  upon  an  Penfold  v.  Nunn,  5  Sim.  405. 

objection  being  taken,  that  the  executors  of  the 

202 


PERSONS    HAVING   CONCURRENT    INTERESTS    WITH    PLAINTIFF.      *  208 

applies  equally  to  cases  where  another  person  has  a  right  to  sue,  for 
the  same  matter  in  Equity;  in  such  cases  the  defendant  is  equally 
entitled  to  insist  that  the  person  possessing  such  right  should  be 
brought  before  the  Court  before  any  decree  is  pronounced,  in  order  that 
such  right  may  be  bound  by  the  decree.6  Thus,  where  a  bill  was  filed 
by  a  vicar  against  a  sequestrator  for  an  account  of  the  profits  of  a  bene- 
fice, received  during  its  vacation,  it  appears  to  have  been  thought  by 
the  Court  that  the  bishop  ought  to  have  been  a  party  to  the  suit, 
because  the  sequestrator  *  was  accountable  to  him  for  what  he  *  208 
had  received;1  and,  on  the  other  hand,  where  a  bill  was  filed  by 
a  bishop  and  a  sequestrator  against  an  occupier  for  an  account  of  tithes 
during  the  lunacy  of  the  incumbent,  who  had  been  found  a  lunatic 
under  a  commission,  it  was  held  that  the  incumbent  or  his  committee 
ought  to  have  been  a  party.2  It  seems,  however,  that  where  a  living  is 
under  sequestration  for  debt,  the  incumbent  may  maintain  a  suit  for 
tithes  without  making  the  sequestrator  or  the  bishop  a  party.8  Upon 
the  same  principle,  where  a  suit  is  instituted  on  behalf  of  a  lunatic 
either  by  the  Attorney-General  or  his  committee,  the  lunatic  himself 
must  in  general  be  a  co-plaintiff,  because  he  may  recover  his  senses, 
and  would  not  be  bound  by  the  decree.4 

In  the  above  cases,  the  person  required  to  be  a  party  had  a  concur- 
rent right  with  the  plaintiff  in  the  whole  subject  of  the  suit;  the  same 
rule,  however,  applies  where  he  has  only  a  concurrent  right  in  a  portion 
of  it;  thus,  where  there  are  two  joint-tenants  for  life,  and  one  of  them 
exhibits  a  bill,  the  other  must  be  a  party,  unless  the  bill  shows  that  he 
is  dead,5  and  where  a  bill  is  brought  for  a  partition,  either  by  joint- 
tenants  or  tenants  in  common,  as  mutual  conveyances  are  decreed,  all 
persons  necessary  to  make  such  conveyances  must,  except  as  hereafter 
stated,  be  parties  to  the  suit;6  and  where  one  tenant  in  common  had 
granted  a  lease  of  his  share  for  a  long  term  of  years,  the  lessee  was 
held  to  be  a  necessary  party  to  the  suit,  at  the  expense,  nevertheless, 
of  his  lessor,  who  was  to  be  responsible  for  his  costs.7  («)    Where,  how- 

5  See  Shields   v.   Thomas,   18   How.  U.  S.  this  rule  seems  to  have  been  disregarded.   Pout, 

253  p.  213,   note.     Where  A,  B,  and  C  were  joint 

1  Jones  v.  Barrett,  Bunb.  192.  lessees  under  the  City  of  London,  and  A    and 

2  Bishop  of  London  v.  Nichols,  Bunb.  141.  B   brought  a  bill  against  the  lessors  to  have 
8  This  appears  to  have  been  the  opinion  of  certain  allowances  out  of  the  rent,  and  it  ap- 

Lord  Lyndhurst  C.  B.  in  Warrington  v.  Sadler,  peared  upon  the  hearing  that  C.  was  living,  an 

Younge,  283,  where  a  decree  was  made  in  a  objection,  because  he  was  not  a  party  to  the  bill 

suit  by  a  vicar  for  tithes,  although  the  vicarage  was  allowed.     Stafford  v.  City  of  London,  1  P. 

w:is  under  sequestration,  and  the  occupiers  had  Wms.  428;  1  Stra  95. 

actually  paid  certain  alleged   mod  uses   to  the  6  Anon.,   3  Swan.   139,  n.   (2);  Brasher  v. 

sequestrator.  Macey,  3  J.  J.  Marsh.  93 ;  see  31  &  32  Vic.  c.  40 ; 

4  See  ante,  pp.  9,  82,  Gorhain  0.  Gorham,  3  3!)  &  40  Vic.  c.  17;  Braker  v.  Devereaux,  8 
Barb.  Ch.  24.  Paige,  513.    Every  person  interested  in  land  be? 

5  Haycock  v.  Haycock,  2  Ch.  Cas.  124;  longing  to  co-tenants  should  be  made  party  to  a 
Weston  w.  Keighley,  Rep.  temp.  Finch,  82.  bid  for  partition.  Borah  v.  Archers,  7  Dana,  176. 
But  see  Piatt  v.  Squire,  12  Met.  494,  in  which  7  Cornish  v  Gest,  2  Cox,  27. 

(a)  See  Borden  v.  Curtis,  46  N.  J.  Eq.  468;  33  id.  205.    The  widow  and  administratrix  of 

Dupuy  v.  Strong,   37   N.   Y.   372;    McCrea  V.  a  tenant  in  common  of  land  i<  a  proper  party 

New  York   El.  R.  Co.  13  Daly,  302;  Howth  V.  to  a  suit  against  a  railroad  corporation  for  injury 

Owens,  29  Fed.   Rep.  722;  Connolly  v.  Wells,  to  the  land  and  an  injunction.   Shepard  V.  Mau- 

203 


*  210  OF   PARTIES   TO    A    SUIT. 

ever,  three  out  of  forty -seven  tenants  in  common  filed  a  bill  for  an 
injunction  to  restrain  the  digging  of  stone  on  the  common  property,  a 
demurrer  for  want  of  parties  was  overruled ; 8  and  where  a  tenant  in 
common  had  demised  his  share  for  a  long  term  of  years,  it  was 
*209  *held  that  the  termor  for  years  was  entitled  to  file  a  bill  for  a 
partition  against  the  other  tenants  in  common,  to  endure  during 
the  term,  without  bringing  the  reversioner  of  the  share  demised  before 
the  Court; 1  and  so,  it  seems,  where  one  of  the  parties  is  only  tenant 
for  life,  he  may  maintain  a  suit  for  a  partition  without  the  party 
entitled  in  remainder,  who  is  not  in  esse.2. 

Where  the  object  of  a  suit  is  to  ascertain  boundaries,  the  Court  will 
not  entertain  it  without  having  the  remainder-men  and  all  parties 
interested  before   it.3 

It  is  not  in  general  necessary,  in  questions  relating  to  real  property, 
that  the  occupying  tenants  under  leases  should  be  parties,  unless  their 
concurrence  is  necessary,  as  in  the  case  above  referred  to  of  the  lessee 
of  a  tenant  in  common;  or  unless  the  object  of  the  suit  is  to  restrain 
an  ejectment  brought  against  them  instead  of  against  their  landlord;  as 
in  Lawletj  v.  Waldon,*  in  which  Lord  Eldon  allowed  a  demurrer  for 
want  of  parties  to  a  bill  by  the  owner  of  an  estate,  to  restrain  an  action 
of  ejectment  against  his  tenant  without  making  him  a  party,  observing, 
however,  that  if  the  plaintiff  in  Equity  had  been  made  a  defendant  at 
Law,  as  he  might  have  been,  he  should  not  have  thought  it  necessary 
to  make  the  tenant  a  party  to  the  bill,  notwithstanding  his  being  a 
co-defendant;  but  that,  as  he  was  the  only  defendant  at  Law,  he  must 
be  a  party  to  the  bill.5 

If  lessees,  or  other  persons  having  only  limited  interests  in  the  prop- 
erty, seek  to  establish  any  right  respecting  such  property,  it  is  neces- 
sary that  they  should  bring  the  owners  of  the  inheritance  before  the 
Court,  in  order  that,  in  case  the  suit  is  unsuccessful,  the  decree  of  the 
Court  dismissing  the  bill  may  be  binding  upon  them.     Thus,  if 

*  210    *  a  leaseholder  brings  a  bill  to  establish  a  right  of  common,  he 

8  Ackroyd  v.  Briggs,  14  W.  E.  25,  V.  C.  S.  parties  who  are  before  the   Court,  and   those 

i  Baring  v.  Nash,  1  Ves.  &  B.  551 ;  Heaton.  whom  they  virtually  represent.     1  Story,  Eq. 

v.  Dearden.  16  Beav.  147.  Jur.  656;  Gaskell  v.  Gaskell,  6  Sim.  643;  Wot- 

2  Wills  v.  Slade,  6  Ves.  498;  see  also  Bras-  ton  v.  Copeland,  7  John.  Ch.  140;  Striker  v. 

sey  v.  Chalmers,   4  De  G.   M.   &  G.  528;  16  Mott,  2  Paige,  387,  389;  Woodworth  v.  Camp- 

Beav.  223.     It  does  not  constitute  any  objec-  bell,  5  Paige,  518. 

tion    in    Equity,  that   the   partition   may  not  3  Rayley  v.   Best,   1  R    &  M.  659;  see  also 

finally  conclude  the  interests  of  all  persons,  as,  Miller  t.  Wannington,  1  J.  &  W.  484;  Speer 

where  the  partition  is  asked  only  by  or  against  v.  Crawter,  2  Mer.  410;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Stephens, 

a  tenant  for  life,  or  where  there  are  contingent  1  K.  &  J.  724,  1  Jur.  N.  S  1039;  6  De  G.  M. 

interests  to  vest  in  persons  not  in  esse.     For  the  &  G.  Ill ;  2  Jur.  N.  S.  51 ;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  165. 

Court   will    still    proceed     to    make    partition  All  the  tenants  in  common  should  be  parties  to 

between   the    parties  before    the   Court,    who  a  suit  for  adjusting  land  titles.    Pope  v.  Melone, 

possess   competent    present    interests,    such  as  2  A.  K.  Marsh.  239. 

a  tenant  for  life  or  for  years.     The  partition  in  4  3  Swan.  142;  Poole  v.  Marsh,  8  Sim.  528 

such  cases,  however,  is  binding  only  upon  those  6  See  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  151. 

hattan  Ry.  Co.  117  N.  Y.  442.     One  of  several  J.  &  H.  139.  See  Schwoerer  v.  Boylston  Market 
co-owners  of  a  patent  may  sue  alone  to  recover  Association,  99  Mass.  285;   Chapman    v.  Pitts- 
profits  resulting  from  its  use.    Sheehan  v.  Great  burg  &  S.  R.  Co.  18  W.  Va.  184,  Saloy  v.  Block, 
Eastern  Ry.  Co.  16  Ch.  D.  59;  Dent  v.  Turpin,  2  136   U.   S.  338. 
"    204 


PERSONS   HAVING    CONCURRENT   INTERESTS   WITH    PLAINTIFF.      *  211 

must  bring  the  persons  in  whom  the  fee  of  his  estate  is  vested 
before  the  Court; 1  and  so,  in  a  suit  in  Equity  to  establish  a  right  to 
fees  in  an  office,  although  in  an  action  at  Law  for  such  fees  it  is  not 
necessary  to  make  any  person  a  party  but  the  one  who  has  actually 
received  such  fees,  yet  in  Equity  it  is  necessary  to  have  all  persons 
before  the  Court  who  have  any  pretence  to  a  right.2 

Upon  the  same  principle,  where  a  bill  was  filed  by  a  lessee  against  a 
lord  of  a  manor,  and  the  tenant  of  a  particular  house,  to  have  the  house, 
which  obstructed  the  plaintiff's  way,  pulled  down,  and  to  be  quieted  in 
the  possession  of  the  way  for  the  future,  an  objection  for  want  of  par- 
ties, on  the  ground  that  the  plaintiff's  lessor  was  not  before  the  Court, 
was  allowed.8 

These  cases  all  proceed  upon  the  principle  before  laid  down,  namely, 
that  of  preventing  a  defendant  from  being  harassed  by  a  multiplicity  of 
suits  for  the  same  thing;  in  consequence  of  which  principle  it  is  held 
to  be  a  rule  of  a  Court  of  Equity,  that  if  you  withdraw  a  question  from 
a  Court  of  Law  for  the  purpose  of  insisting  upon  a  general  right,  you 
must  have  all  the  parties  before  the  Court  who  are  necessary  to  make 
the  determination  complete,  and  to  quiet  the  question.4 

The  application  of  this  rule,  however,  is  strictly  confined  to  cases 
where  the  lessee  seeks  to  establish  a  general  right;  where  he  only  seeks 
that  which  is  incidental  to  his  situation  as  tenant,  he  need  not 
make  his  landlord  a  party.5  Thus,  *a  tenant  may  bring  a  suit  *211 
to  restrain  a  private  nuisance  without  making  the  lessor  a  party, 
and  if  the  nuisance  be  of  a  temporary  character,  the  tenant  only  can 
sue;  and  the  lessor  cannot  himself  maintain  the  suit.1  The  tenant  and 
occupier  of  a  house  is  liable  for  the  continuance  of  a  nuisance  on  the 
premises,2  even  though  the  nuisance  existed  before  he  took  possession; 3 
but  in  the  latter  case,  notice  should  be  given  to  him  to  remove  the 
nuisance  before  the  suit  is  brought.  But  where  the  occupier  of  lands 
grants  a  license  to  another  to  do  certain  acts  on  the  land,  and  the 
licensee  in  doing  these,  commits  a  nuisance,  the  occupier  may  be  made  a 
defendant  to  a  suit  to  restrain  the  nuisance.4  And  it  would  appear 
that  such  occupier  is  a  necessary  party  to  a  suit  in  which  an  injunction 
is  sought,  where  he  is  the  person  who  can  in  future  authorize  or  permit 
the  continuance  of  the  nuisance.6  (a) 

i  Poore  v.  Clark,  2  Atk.  515;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  Jur.  N.  S.  361;  Mott  v.  Shoolbred,  L.  R.20Eq. 

§  121.  22;  Jones  v.  Chappell,  id.  539;  Broder  v.  Sail- 

2  Pawlet  v.  Bishop  of  Lincoln,  2  Atk.  296.  lard,  2  Ch.  D.  692  ;  Cooper  v.  Crabtree.  19  Ch. 

8  Poore  v.  Clark,  2  Atk.   515.     See  Shafto  D.  193;  20  id.  589;  Rust  v.  Victoria   Graving 

v.  Bolckow,  34  Ch.  D.  725.  Dock  Co.  36  Ch.  D.  113;  Gale   on   Easements 

4  Poore  v.  Clark,  2  Atk.  515;  see  Crews  v.  (5th  ed.),  649,  et  seq. 
Burcham,  1  Black,  U.  S   312.  2  Russell  v.  Shenton,  3  Q.  B.  449;  Humph- 

6  See  Tooth  v.  Dean  &  Chapter  of  Canter-  reys  p.  Cousins,  25  W.  R.  371;  Broder  v.  Sail- 
bury,  3  Sim.  61.     In  a  suit   by  parol  lessee  of  lard,  2  Ch.  D.  692. 

tithes,  the  lessor  must  be  joined.     See  Hen-  8  Gale  on  Easements  (5th  ed.)  659;  Broder 

ning  v.  Willis,  3  Wood,  29;  2  Guil.  898,  Jack-  v.  Saillard,  2  Ch.  D.  692;  House  Property  Co. 

son  v.  Benson,  McLel.  62;  13  Price,  131,  and  v.  H.  P.  Horse  Nail  Co.  29  Ch.  D.  190. 
see  Williams  v.  Jones,  Younge,  252,  255.  4  White  v.  Jameson,  L.  R.  18  Eq.  303. 

1  Simpson  v.  Savage,  1  C.  B.  N.  S.  347;  3  6  Hawley  v.  Steele,  6  Ch.  D.  521,  526. 

("1  Where  the  lessee  of  a  ferrv  taken  by  mine  damages  on  behalf  of  himself  and  his 
eminent  domain,  claims  an  arbitration  to  deter-      lessor,  and  the  Act  provides  onlv  for  compensa- 

205 


*  212 


OF    PARTIES    TO    A    SUIT. 


The  rule  that  persons  claiming  joint  interests  in  an  estate  cannot 
sue  without  making  their  co-owners  parties,  applies  equally  whether 
the  subject-matter  of  the  suit  be  real  or  personal  property;  thus,  it  has 
been  said  that  where  a  legacy  is  given  to  two  jointly,  one  cannot  sue 
for  it  alone ;  though,  where  there  are  several  legacies,  each  may  sue  for 

his  own.6  And  so,  where  there  are  several  persons  interested  as 
*212    *  joint-tenants,1  or  tenants  in  common,2  in    money  secured  by 

mortgage,  they  must  all  be  made  parties  to  a  bill  to  foreclose 
such  mortgage.8  They  need  not,  however,  be  co-plaintiffs,  and  any 
one  of  them  may  bring  the  suit,  making  the  others  defendants.4 

It  has,  however,  been  determined  that  there  can  be  no  redemption  or 
foreclosure  unless  all  the  parties  interested  in  the  mortgage  money  are 
before  the  Court,  and  on  this  ground,  a  bill  by  a  person  entitled  in 
severalty  to  one-sixth  of  the  mortgage  money,  to  foreclose  one-sixth  of 
the  estate,  was  dismissed  with  costs.5  The  rule  thus  laid  down  is  now 
modified  by  the  provision  of  the  late  Act  enabling  trustees,  in  suits 
relating  to  real  or  personal  estate  vested  in  them,  to  represent  the  per- 


6  Haycock  v.  Haycock,  2  Ch.  Ca=.  124;  but 
see  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  42;  46  &  47  Vic.  c.  49, 
§  4,  Scbed.  So  where  a  legacy  is  given  to  A 
and  B  in  equal  moieties,  a  bill  will  lie  by  A 
for  his  moiety,  without  making  B  a  party  to 
the  suit.     Hughson  c.  Cookson,  3  V.  &  C.  578. 

1  This  was  so  decided  by  Lord  Thurlow,  in 
Lowe  v.  Morgan,  1  Bro.  C.  C.  368;  and  see 
Stansfield  v.  Hobson,  16  Beav.  190,  where  a 
mortgagee  had  assigned  the  money  secured  by 
the  mortgage  to  three  persons  as  joint-tenants. 
In  that  case  bis  Lordship  appears  to  have  laid 
a  stress  upon  the  circumstance  of  the  parties 
interested  in  the  money  being  joint-tenants ; 
from  which  it  has  been  inferred  that  a  tenant 
in  severalty  or  in  common  might  foreclose 
as  to  his  share,  without  making  the  other  per- 
sons interested  in  the  money  parties;  and  a 
decree  to  this  effect  was  actually  made  by  Lord 
Alvanley  M.  R.  in  a  case  where  trustees  of 
money  belonging  to  several  individuals  had 
laid  it  out  on  a  mortgage,  and  afterwards  one 
of  the  persons  entitled  to  part  of  the  mortgage 
money  filed  a  bill  against  the  mortgagor  and 
the  trustees  for  his  share  of  the  mortgage 
money,  or  a  foreclosure;  which  was  enter- 
tains d,  although  the  parties  interested  in  the 
rest  of  the  money  were  not  before  the  Court. 
Montgomerie  v.  Marquis  of  Bath,  3  Ves.  560. 
In  Mr.  Belt's  note  (1)  to  Lowe  v.  Morgan,  1 
Bro.  C.  C.  (Perkins's  ed.)  368,  he  submits,  that 


tion  to  the  lessor,  a  Court  of  Equity  has  no 
jurisdiction  to  stay  proceedings  so  taken  out  of 
Court,  because  the  use  of  the  lessor's  name  is 
unauthorized.  London  &  Blackwall  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Cro=s,  31  Ch.  D.  354,  distinguishing  North 
London  Ry.  Co.  v.  Great  Northern  Ry.  Co.  11 
Q.  B.  D.  30.  When  two  or  more  persons  join 
206 


the  decision  in  Montgomerie  v.  M.  of  B.,  uhi 
supra,  is  wrong.      See  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  201. 

2  Palmer  v.  Lord  Carlisle,  1  S.  &  S.  423; 
contra,  Montgomerie  v.  Marquis  of  Bath,  3 
Ves.  560;  see  Cochran  v.  Goodell,  131  Ma-s. 
464,  Tyson  v.  Applegate,  40  N.  J.  Eq.  305; 
Beebe  v.  Morris,  56  Ala.  525,  Bibb  r.  Hawley, 
59  Ala.  403;  Boyd  v.  Jones,  44  Ark.  314. 

3  See  Stucker  v.  Stucker,  3  J.  J.  Marsh. 
301;  Wing  v.  Davis,  7  Greenl.  31;  Palmer  v. 
Eari  of  Carlisle,  IS  &  S.  423;  Noyes  v. 
Sawyer,  3  Vt.  160;  Woodward  v.  Wood,  19 
Ala.  213.  But  where  one  joint  tenant  has 
mortgaged  his  interests,  the  other  tenants  are 
not  necessary  parties  to  a  hill  to  foreclose. 
Stephen  v.  Beall,  22  Wall.  329. 

4  Davenport  v.  James,  7  Hare,  249;  Luke  v. 
South  Kensington  Hotel  Co.  11  Ch.  D.  121 ;  7 
id.  789;  see  Palmer  v.  Mallet,  36  Ch.  D.  411; 
Messchaert  c.  Kennedy,  4  McCrary,  133. 

5  The  assignee  of  a  note  secured  by  mort- 
gage has  an  equitable  interest  in  the  mortgage, 
which  a  Court  of  Equity  will  uphold  and 
protect ;  and,  therefore,  when  a  bill  is  brought 
to  foreclose  or  redeem  the  mortgage  the 
assignee  should  be  made  a  party  to  the  suit. 
Stone  v.  Locke,  46  Maine,  445.  A  plaintiff  m 
an  attachment  suit  claiming  a  lien  on  a  mort- 
gage debt  thereby  is  a  necessary  party  defend- 
ant to  a  bill  to  foreclose  the  mortgage.  Pine 
v.  Shannon,  30  N.  J.  Eq.  501. 


as  plaintiffs  in  a  suit  to  restrain  a  nuisance 
if.  one  fails  in  his  proof,  the  other  may  still 
proceed.  Umfreville  ;•.  Johnson,  L.  R.  10  Ch. 
580.  The  lessors  and  lessees  of  separate  build- 
ings may  join  as  plaintiffs  to  enjoin  a  nuisance 
injuring  all  the  buildings.  Snyder  t\  Cabell, 
29  W.  Va.  48:  see  post,  p.  303,  and  note  (a). 


PERSONS   HAVING    CONCURRENT    INTERESTS    WITH    PLAINTIFF. 


213 


sons  beneficially  entitled,6  unless  the  Court  requires  such  persons  to  be 
parties;  and  the  Court  has,  accordingly,  in  a  redemption  suit,  dispensed 
with  some  of  the  beneficiaries,  though  it  appears  that  it  will  not  dis- 
pense with  all.7  In  a  foreclosure  suit,  however,  the  trustees  of  the 
debt,  under  an  assignment  for  the  benefit  of  creditors,  were  held  suffi- 
ciently to  represent  all  the  creditors.8  (a)  A  mortgagor  cannot  redeem 
the  mortgaged  estate  without  making  all  those  having  an  equal  right  to 
redeem  with  himself  parties  to  the  suit.9  Thus,10  where  two  estates  are 
mortgaged  to  the  same  person  for  securing  the  same  sum  of  money,  and 
afterwards  the  equity  of  redemption  of  one  estate  becomes  vested 
in  a  different  person  from  *  the  other,  the  owner  of  one  cannot  *  213 
redeem  his  part  separately.  The  mortgagee  is  entitled  to  insist 
that  the  whole  of  the  mortgaged  estate  shall  be  redeemed  together; 
and,  for  this  purpose,  that  all  the  persons  interested  in  the  several 
estates  or  mortgages  shall  be  made  parties  to  a  bill  seeking  an  account 
and  redemption.1 

The  rule  has  been  extended  to  cases  where  a  mortgage  has  been  of 
two  distinct  estates 2  to  the  same  mortgagee  for  securing  different  sums 
of  money ;  and  it  has  often  been  decided  that  a  mortgagee  of  two  sepa- 
rate estates,  upon  distinct  transactions,   from  the  same  mortgagor,   is 


6  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  80,  §  42,  r.  9.  See  R.  S. 
C.  Ord.  XVI.  7,  11. 

1  StansfHd  v.  Hobson,  16  Beav.  183.  See 
Mills  v.  Jennings,  13  Ch.  D.  639;  aff  d,  num. 
Jennings  v.  Jordan,  6  App.  Cas.  698. 

8  Morley  v.  Morley,  25  Beav.  253;  pee 
Thomas  v.  Dunning,  5  De  G.  &  S.  618; 
Knight  v.  Pocock,  24  Beav.  436;  4  Jur.  N.  S. 
197.    See  257,  n.  4. 

9  Chapman  r.  Hunt,  14  N.  J.  Eq.  149; 
Large  v.  Van  Doren,  id.  208,  Story,  Eq.  PI. 
§  201;  Mitford's  PI.  39,  164;  Bigefow  v.  Cas- 
sedy,  26  N.  J.  Eq.  557.  All  the  owners  of  the 
equity  of  redemption  should  be  parties  to  a  bill 
to  redeem.     Southard  v.  Sutler,  68  Maine,  575. 

A  mortgagor,  filing  his  bill  to  redeem,  may 
bring  before  the  Court  all  parties  who  might 
call  fur  redemption;  or  he  may  bring  his  bill 
against  the  last  mortgagee,  if  he  choose  to 
incur  the  risk  of  a  foreclosure  by  a  prior  mort- 
gagee during  its  pendency.  Stone  v.  Bartlett, 
46  Maine,  438,  443.  In  Piatt  v.  Squire,  12 
Met.  494,  it  was  held  that  one  of  two  joint 
assignees  of  a  second  mortgage  could  maintain 
a  bill,  in  his  individual  name,  to  redeem  the 
prior  mortgage,  without  joining  his  co-assignee. 
Dewey  J.    said:  "  The   plaintiff   has    a   legal 


(a)  See  Goodden  v.  Coles,  59  L.  T.  309; 
Griffith  v.  Pound,  45  Ch.  D.  553:  Francis  v. 
Harrison,  43  Ch.  D.  183;  Batterman  v. 
Albright,  122  N.  Y.  484;  West  v.  Miller,  125 
Ind.  70;  Foster  v.  Trowbridge,  44  Minn.  290; 
McCoy  v.  Bolev,  21  Fla.  803;  Flowers  v.  Bar- 
k-r,  7!)  Ala.  445;  Curtis  v.  Gooding,  99  In. I. 
4i;  Tinkler  v.  Swaynie,  71  Ind.  562;  Chicago 


interest,  as  assignee  of  that  mortgage,  although 
not  the  entire  interest.  His  redemption  will 
inure  lo  the  benefit  of  his  co-tenant.  He  can 
only  redeem  by  payment  of  all  claims  of  the 
defendant  under  the  prior  mortgage  to  the 
same  extent  as  wou'd  have  been  paid  if  the 
co-assignee  were  a  party  to  the  bill;  and  there- 
fore the  defendant  can  sustain  no  injur'-." 
See  S.  C.  Piatt  v.  Squire,  5  Cush.  553.  See, 
as  to  the  requisites  of  a  bill  to  enforce  the  right 
to  redeem,  Malony  v.  Rourke.  100  Mass.  190. 

ln  Lord  Cholmondeley  v.  Lord  Clinton,  2 
Jac.  &  W.  3,  134;  2  Mer.  171;  4  Bligh,  1. 

1  Bailey  v.  Myrick,  36  Maine,  50.  The 
same  rule  prevailed  in  Palk  v.  Lord  Clinton.  12 
Ves.  48,  which  differed  from  that  of  Lord 
Cholmondeley  v.  Lord  Clinton,  above  cited,  in 
the  circumstance,  only,  of  its  being  a  bill  by 
a  second  mortgagee  of  part  of  an  estate  to 
redeem  a  rirst  mortgage,  which  embraced 
the  whole  property.  Where  two  lots  have  been 
sold  undera  Chancery  sale  to  the  same  person, 
who  has  paid  the  purchase-money  of  one  l"t 
and  demands  title  See  McGoldrick  v.  Mc- 
Goldrick,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  541. 

-  In  England,  as  to  mortgages  made  since 
Jan.  1,  1882,  see  44  &  45  Vic.  c.  41.  §§  1  (1),  17. 


Land  Co.  r.  Peck,  112  111.  408;  Re  Chickering, 
56  Vt.  82;  Carpenter  v.  Cincinnati  R.  Co.  ''.J 
Ohio  St.  307;  Seibert  r.  Minneapolis  &c  R.Co. 
(Minn.)  20  L.  R  A.  535.  A  tenant  in  posse- 
sion under  the  mortgagor  is  a  necessary  party 
defendant  to  a  foreclosure  suit.  Richardson  v. 
Hadsall,  106  111.  476. 

207 


*214 


OF    PARTIES    TO    A    SUIT. 


entitled  to  hold  both  mortgages  till  the  amount  due  upon  both  is  dis- 
charged, even  against  the  purchaser  of  the  equity  of  redemption  of  one 
of  the  mortgaged  estates  without  notice,  whose  purchase  was  effected 
after  the  creation  of  the  mortgage  of  the  other  estate ; 3  so  that  the 
mortgages,  although  for  distinct  sums,  are  in  effect  for  one  sum.  Upon 
this  principle,  where  the  purchaser  of  the  equity  of  redemption  of  a 
mortgaged  estate  hied  his  bill  against  the  mortgagee,  to  redeem,  and 
the  defendant,  by  his  answer,  stated  a  subsequent  mortgage  made  to 
him,  by  the  same  mortgagor,  of  a  distinct  estate  for  a  distinct  debt,  it 
was  held  that  the  persons  interested  in  the  equity  of  redemption  of  the 
second  mortgage  were  necessary  parties  to  the  suit.4  And  this  rule 
prevails  although  one  mortgage  be  a  pledge  of  personalty  and  the  other 
a  mortgage  of  realty.6  It  does  not,  however,  hold  longer  than  while 
both  mortgages  continue  united  in  the  same  mortgagee;  so  that  if  a 
mortgagee,  having  two  distinct  mortgages  on  two  separate  estates, 
assigns  one  of  the  mortgages  to  a  third  person,  the  assignee  of  the 
asigned  mortgages  need  not  be  brought  before  the  Court  in  a  suit  to 

redeem  the  other.6  A  second  incumbrancer,  filing  a  bill  to  redeem 
*  214    a  prior  incumbrance,  must  bring  the  mortgagor,  *  as  well  as  the 

prior  incumbrancer  before  the  Court;1  but  he  may,  if  he  pleases, 
foreclose  the  mortgagor  and  a  third  mortgagee,  without  bringing  the 
first  mortgagee  before  the  Court,  because  by  so  doing  he  merely  puts 
himself  in  the  place  of  the  mortgagor  and  subsequent  mortgagee,  and 
leaves  the  first  mortgagee  in  the  situation  in  which  he  sbood  before; 2 


8  See  Mills  v.  Jennings,  13  Ch.  D.  639, 
646,  aff'd  nom.  Jennings  v.  Jordan,  6  App.  Cas. 
698.  See  also  Crack  nail  v.  Jan  son,  11 
Ch.  D.  1;  Cummins  v.  Fletcher,  14  Ch.  D. 
699;  Chesworth  v.  Hunt,  5  C  P.  D.  266;  Be 
Raggett,  Ex  parte  Williams,  16  Ch.  D.  117; 
Harter  v.  Colman,  19  Ch.  D.  630;  Andrews  v. 
City  Permanent  Benefit  Building  Society,  44 
L.  T.  641 ;  and  for  earlier  cases,  see  Purefoy  v. 
Purefoy,  1  Vern.  28;  Margrave  v.  Le  Hook,  2 
Vern.  207. 

4  Ireson  v.  Denn,  2  Cox,  425  ;  Mills  v.  Jen- 
nings, supra. 

5  Jones  v.  Smith,  2  Ves.  Jr.  372,  reversed 
by  House  of  Lords,  see  6  Ves.  229,  n.;  see 
also  Walts  v.  Symes,  1  De  G.  M.  &  G.  240; 
16  Sim.  640;  fassell  v.  Smith,  2  De  G.  &  S. 
713;  4  Jur.  N.  S.  1090;  Vint  v.  Padget,  id. 
1122;  2  De  G.  &  J.  611;  Selby  v.  Pomfret,  1 
J.  &  H.  336;  3  De  G.  F.  &  J.  595;  7  Jur. 
N.  S.  835,  860;  Beevor  v.  Luck,  L.  R.  4  Eq. 
537;  Mills  v.  Jennings,  13  Ch.  D.  639;  aff'd 
nom.  Jennings  v.  Jordan,  6  App.  Cas.  698; 
Harter  v.  Colman,  19  Ch  D.  630:  Cummins  v. 
Fletcher,  14  Ch.  D.  699;  44  &  45  Vic.  c.  41. 

6  Willie  v.  Lugg,  2  Eden,  78. 

l  Thompson  v.  Baskerville,  3  Ch.  Rep.  215; 
Farmer  v.  Curtis,  2  Sim.  466  ;   and  see  Hunter 


v.  Macklew,  5  Hare,  238;  Holt  r.  Mill,  2  Vern. 
278;  Marsh  v.  Lee,  2  Vent.  337.  The  natural 
decree  is,  that  the  second  mortgagee  shall 
redeem  the  first  mortgagee,  and  that  the  mort- 
gagor shall  redeem  him  or  be  foreclosed,  (a) 
Fell  v.  Brown,  2  Bro.  C.  C.  276  ;  Palk  r.  Lord 
Clinton,  12  Ves.  48;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §§  84,  18G, 
195;  Hallock  v.  Smith,  *4  John.  Ch.  649;  4 
Kent,  186.  In  a  suit  for  the  foreclosure 
of  a  mortgage  of  real  estate,  claimed  as  a 
homestead,  the  wife,  being  a  necessary  party 
to  a  full  adjustment  of  the  controversy, 
should  be  allowed  to  intervene.  Sargent 
v.  Wilson,  5  Cal.  501.  So  the  wife  should 
be  made  a  part}'  to  a  bill  to  foreclose  a 
mortgage  executed  by  her  and  her  husband. 
Johns  v.  Reardon,  3  Md.  Ch.  57.  In  a  bill  to 
redeem  by  a  widow,  who  is  entitled  to  dower 
in  her  husband's  lands,  subject  to  a  mortgage 
executed  in  his  lifetime,  in  which  she  joined  to 
release  dower,  she  may  join  as  a  co-defendant 
to  the  mortgagee,  one  who,  after  the  execution 
of  the  mortgage,  purchased  her  husband's 
interest  in  the  land.  McCabe  v.  Bellowes,  1 
Allen,  269. 

2  Richards  v.  Cooper,  5  Beav.  304;  Lord 
Hollis's  case,  cited  3  Ch.  Rep.  86;  Rose  v. 
Page,  2  Sim.  471 ;    Brisco  v.  Kenrick,  1  C.  P. 


(a)  In  Hallett  v.  Furze,  31  Ch.  D.  312,  it 
was  held  that,  in  a  suit  by  a  second  mortgagee 
to  redeem  the  first  mortgagee  and  to  foreclose 

208 


the  mortgagor,  the  proper  form  of  decree  is, 
that,  in  default  of  the  plaintiff  redeeming,  the 
suit  is  to  stand  dismissed  with  costs. 


PERSONS    HAVING    CONCURRENT    INTERESTS   WITH    PLAINTIFF. 


214 


and  if  in  such  a  case  he  makes  the  prior  mortgagee  a  party,  he  must 
offer  to  redeem  him.3  For  the  same  reason  a  third  mortgagee,  buying 
in  the  first,  need  not  make  the  second  mortgagee  a  party  to  a  bill 
to  foreclose  the  mortgagor; 4  and  similarly  it  is  unnecessary  to  make 
annuitants,  or  other  prior  incumbrancers,  parties  to  a  bill  by  creditors 
or  incumbrancers  for  the  sale 5  or  partition 6  of  an  estate ;  so  in  a  suit 
for  the  execution  of  a  trust,  by  those  claiming  the  ultimate  benefit  of 
the  trust  after  the  satisfaction  of  prior  charges,  it  is  not  necessary  to 
bring  before  the  Court  the  persons  claiming  the  benefit  of  such  prior 
charges ;  and  therefore,  to  a  bill  for  the  application  of  a  surplus  after 
payment  of  debts  or  legacies,  or  other  prior  incumbrances,  the  credi- 
tors, legatees,  or  incumbrancers  need  not  be  parties.7  (b) 


Coop.  temp.  Cott.  371 ;  and  see  Arnold  v.  Bain- 
brigge,  2  De  G.  F.  &  J.  92;  Audsley  v. 
Horn,  26  Beav.  195;    1  De  G.  F.  &  J.  226; 

4  Jur.  N.  S.  1267;  6  id.  205;  see  Moore  v. 
Morton,  W.  N.  (1886)  196;  Person  v.  Merrick, 

5  Wis.  231 ;  Wright  v.  Bundy,  11  Ind.  398. 

3  Gordon  v.  Horsfall,  5  Moore,  393;  11  Jur. 
569;  see  Crenver  Mining  Co.  v.  Willyams,  35 
Beav.  353 ;  Australasia  Nat.  Bank  v.  United 
Hand-in-Hand  &c.  Co.  4  App.  Cas.  391. 

4  The  rule  seems  to  be  that,  although  prior 
and  subsequent  incumbrancers  are  proper, 
they  are  not  indispensable  parties.  Ante,  194, 
note  6.  A  second  mortgagee  may  file  a  bill  of 
foreclosure  against  the  mortgagor  and  third 
mortgagee,  without  making  the  first  mortgagee 
a  party,  Rose  v.  Page,  2  Sim.  471;  or  against 
the  mortgagor  alone,  White  v.  Holman,  32 
Ark.  753.  So  a  bill  may  be  filed  to  obtain 
payment  of  an  annuity  charged  on  land,  with- 
out making  the  prior  annuitants  parties.  Dela- 
bere  v.  Norwood,  3  Swanst.  144,  note.  So,  to 
a  bill  of  fort-closure,  prior  judgment  creditors 
are  not  indispensable  parties.  Rundell  p. 
Marquis  of  Donegal,  1  Hogan,  308;  Post  v. 
Mackall,  3  B'and,  495;  Wakeman  v.  Grover, 
4  Paige,  23.  Nor,  if  made  parties,  are  their 
rights  affected  where  their  lien  is  not  assailed 
in  the  bill.  Farmers'  Natl.  Bk.  v.  Lloyd,  30 
N.J.  Eq.  442;  Frost  v.  Koon,  30  N.  Y.  428. 
So  of  prior  encumbrancers  upon  realty  which 
the  bill  seeks  to  subject  to  the  debts  of  the 
deceased  owner.  Parker  v.  Fuller,  1  R.  &  M. 
656.  So  of  subsequent  encumbrancers,  Need- 
ier v.  Deeble,  1  Ch.  Cas.  199;  Rosecarrick  v. 
Barton,  1  Ch.  Cas.  217;  Greshold  v.  Marsham, 
2  Ch.  Cas.  171 ;  Cockes  v.  Sherman,  2  Freem. 
13 ;  S.  C.  3  Ch.  Rep.  83  ;  Lomax  v.  Hide,  2 
Vern.  185;  Draper  v.  Jennings,  2  Vern.  518; 
Godfrey  v.  Chadwell,  id.  001  ;  Morret  v.  Wes- 
terne,  id.  663;  Carroll  v.  Kershner,  47  Md. 
262;  Leonard  v.  Groome,  id.  499.  In  view 
of   some   of   these  decisions,    which   he   cites, 


and  after  commenting  on  the  language  of 
Marshall  C.  J.  in  Finley  v.  Bank  of  United 
States,  11  Wheat.  306,  Mr.  Justice  Curtis 
says:  "We  consider  the  true  rule  to  be, 
that  where  it  is  the  object  of  the  bill  to  pro- 
cure a  sale  of  the  land,  and  the  prior  encum- 
brancer holds  the  legal  title,  and  his  debt 
is  payable,  it  is  proper  to  make  him  a  party 
in  order  that  a  sale  ma}'  be  made  of  the 
whole  title.  In  this  sense,  and  for  this  pur- 
pose, he  may  he  correctly  said  to  be  a  neces- 
sary party,  that  is,  necessary  to  such  a 
decree.  But  it  is  in  the  power  of  the  Court 
to  order  a  sale  subject  to  the  prior  encum- 
brances. Hagan  v.  Walker,  14  How.  37.  And 
see  Young  v.  Montgomery  &  Eufuula  R.  Co.  2 
Woods,  606;  Western  Ins.  Co.  v.  Eagle  Fire 
Ins.  Co.  1  Paige,  284.  The  same  rules  apply  to 
a  bill  by  a  judgment  creditor  to  reach  the  in- 
terest of  the  debtor  in  the  mortgaged  property. 
Hudnit  o.  Nash,  16  N.  J.  Eq.  550;  Cloud  v. 
Hamilton,  3  Yerg.  81;  Stark  v.  Cheathem,  3 
Tenn.  Ch.  300.  On  the  strength  of  the  early 
English  cases  above  cited,  it  has  been  held  in 
Tennessee  that  neither  the  creditors  of  the 
mortgagor,  nor  purchasers  from  him,  nor  prior 
mortgagees,  nor  subsequent  mortgagees,  are 
absolutely  necessary  parties  to  a  bill  of  fore- 
closure by  sale  of  the  mortgaged  premises,  or 
the  enforcement  of  a  vendor's  lien.  Minis  v. 
Minis,  1  Humph.  425;  Rowan  v.  Mercer,  10 
Humph.  363;  Fletcher  v.  Coleman,  2  Head, 
388;  Wilkes  v.  Smith,  4  Heisk.  86.  But  a  prior 
mortgagee  is  a  proper  party  where  there  is  sub- 
stantial doubt  as  to  the  amount  of  the  prior 
mortgage  debt,  or  to  have  an  account  of  rents  if 
he  has  been  in  possession.  Jerome  r.  McCarter, 
94  U.  S.  736;  Trulock  v.  Robey,  15  Sim.  265; 
Hays  v.  Cornelius,  3  Tenn.  Ch.461. 

5  See  Rose  v.  Page,  2  Sim.  472;   Parker  v. 
Fuller,  1  R.  &  M.  656. 

6  Hixon  v.  Eastwood,  W.  N.  (1868)  13. 

7  Ld.  Red.  175.     Upon  a  bill   to  foreclose, 


(b)  When  there  is  doubt  as  to  the  amounts  due 
prior  incumbrancers,  or  as  to  the  property  sub- 
ject to  their  claims,  or  when  the  bill  prays  for  a 
vol.  i.  — 14 


sale   of   the   entire   estate,  they  are,  it   sepm«, 
necessary  parties.     See  Jerome  v.  McCarter.  94 
U.   S.  734 ;  Wabash  &c.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Central 
209 


215 


OF   PARTIES   TO    A    SUIT. 


*  215  *  Under  the  provisions  of  the  late  Act  above  referred  to  with 
regard  to  trustees  representing  their  cestui  que  trusts,1  it  has  been 
held  that  when  the  mortgaged  estate  was  vested  in  trustees,  who  also, 
as  executors  of  a  will  or  otherwise,  were  the  persons  who  would  be  in 
possession  of  the  funds  for  payment  of  the  mortgage  debt,  they  might 
properly  represent  the  beneficiaries,2  but  that  when  this  was  not  the 
case,  the  cestui  que  trusts,  or  some  of  them,  must  be  before  the  Court.8  (a) 
When  the  mortgagor  has  become  bankrupt,  he  is  not  a  necessary 
party  to  a  suit  for  foreclosure,  even  if  the  assignees  disclaim.4  (b) 


the  mortgagor  is  ordinarily  a  necessary  party: 
Kunkel  v.  Markell,  26  Md.  407;  Hallock  v. 
Smith,  4  John.  Ch.  449;  Farmer  v.  Curtis,  2 
Sim.  46G  ;  Worthington  v.  Lee,  2  Bland,  678; 
and  his  heir,  or  devisee,  if  he  be  dead;  McGown 
r.  Yorks,  6  John.  Ch.  460.  So  is  the  purchaser 
of  the  mortgaged  lands,  if  in  possession.  Noyes 
v.  Hall,  97  U.  S.  68.  But  the  mortgagor  is  not  a 
necessary  party,  if  he  has  sold  and  conveyed  the 
mortgaged  premises  to  a  third  person:  Parker 
v.  Small,  58  Ind.  349;  Williams  v.  Smith,  49 
Maine,  564:  nor  if  his  equity  of  redemption  has 
been  sold  in  invitum ;  though,  if  made  a  party 
in  such  case,  he  may  set  up  the  defence  of 
usury:  Andrews  v.  Stelle,  22  N.  J.  Eq.  478. 
And  a  decree  of  foreclosure  against  a  mortgagor 
will  not  affect. his  grantee  who  is  not  made  a 
party;  but  equity  will  not  enforce  the  right 
to  redeem  in  favor  of  the  grantee  against  a 
superior  equity,  or  where  its  enforcement  would 
be  inequitable.  Mulvey  v.  Gibbons,  87  111. 
367.  After  the  mortgagor  has  sold  the  premises, 
he  cannot  maintain  a  bill  to  redeem.    Phillips  v. 


Trust  Co.  22  Fed.  Rep.  138;  Olyphant  v.  St. 
Louis  Ore  &  Steel  Co.  23  id.  465  ;  Holly 
Mamif.  Co.  v.  New  Chester  Water  Co.  48  id. 
879  ;  Sutherland  v.  Lake  Canal  Co.  9  N.  B.  R. 
298;  Lockman  v.  Reilly,  95  N.  Y.  64;  Emigrant 
Industrial  S.  Bank  v.  Goldman,  75  N.  Y.  127; 
Metropolitan  Trust  Co.  v.  Tonawanda  &c.  R. 
Co.  18  Abb.  N.  Cas.  368;  Harwell  v.  Lehman, 
72  Ala.  344:  Hinson  v.  Adrian,  86  N.  C.  61 ; 
Warner  v.  DeWitt  County  Bank,  4  III.  App. 
305;  Stratton  v.  Reisdorpn  (Neb.),  53  N.  W. 
136;  Broward  v.  Hoeg,  16  Fla.  370;  Walter  v. 
Riehl.  38  Md.  211;  Harris  v.  Hooper,  50  Md. 
537;  Warren  r.  Burton,  9  S.  C.  197.  A  prior 
mortgagee,  thus  joined,  may  by  cross-bill 
protect  and  enforce  his  mortgage.  White  v. 
Bartlett,  14  Neb.  320;  Osb  me  v.  Barge,  30 
Fed.  Rep.  805;  First  National  Bank  v.  Salem 
Capitol  F.  M.  Co.  12  Sawyer,  485.  Subsequent 
incumbrancers  should  be  joined.  Douthit  v. 
Hipp,  23  S.  C.  205;  Hensley  v.  Whiffin,  54 
Iow:i,  555  ;  De  Lashmutt  v.  Sell  wood,  10 
Oregon,  319;  Pardee  r.  Steward,  37  Hun,  259  ; 
Sichler  v.  Look,  93  Cal.  600:  Allen  v.  Wood- 
ruff, 90  111.  11.  After  the  bill  is  filed,  subse- 
210 


Leavitt,  54  Maine,  405-      And  see,  where  the 
mortgagee  has  sold,  infrn,  260,  n.  5,  277. 

1  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  42;  see  46  &  47  Vic. 
c.  49,  §  4,  Sched. 

2  Hanman  v.  Riley,  9  Hare  App.  40;  Sale  v. 
Kitson,  3  De  G.  M.  &  G.  119;  17  Jur.  170;  10 
Hare,  App.  50;  Wilkins  v.  Reeves,  3  W.  R. 
305;  L.  R.  3  Eq.  494,  V.  C.  W.;  Marriott  v. 
Kirkham,  3  Giff.  536 ;  8  Jur.  N.  S.  379.  So  in 
redemption  suits  as  to  trustees  in  whom  the 
equity  of  redemption  is  vested.  Mills  v.  Jen- 
nings, 13  Ch.  D.  639,  aff'd,  nom.  Jennings  v. 
Jordan,  6  App.  Cas.  698.  Trustees  may  also 
represent  their  cestui  que  trusts  in  partition 
actions.  Goodrich  v.  Marsh,  W.  N.  (1878) 
186;  Simpson  v.  Denny,  10  Ch.  I).  28. 

3  Goldsmith  v  Stonehewer,  9  Hare,  App.  38; 
17  Jur.  199 ;  Young  v.  Ward,  10  Hare,  App.  58; 
Cropper  v.  Mellersh,  1  Jur.  N.  S.  299,  V.  C.  S.; 
and  see  Siffken  v.  Davis,  Kay,  App.  21 ;  Wilkins 
v.  Reeves,  supra  ;  Tuder  v.  Morris.  1  Sm.  &  G. 
503;  Watters  v.  Jones,  6  Jur.  N.  S.  530,  V.  C  S. 

4  Collins  v.  Shirley,  1  R.  &  M.  638;  Kerrick 


quent  incumbrancers  may  become  parties  by 
petition.  Leveridge  v.  Marsh,  30  N.  J.  Eq. 
59. 

{a)  See  Re  Mitchell,  Wavell  v.  Mitchell,  65 
L.  T.  851;  W.  N.  (1892)  11.  "An  insolvent 
trustee  is  not  a  sufficient  party  to  a  suit,  so  that 
the  cestui  que  trust  may  be  bound."  Per  North 
J.  in  Aylward  v.  Lewis,  [1891]  2  Ch.  81.  Hence 
a  mortgagee  who  is  a  trustee  and  has  become 
bankrupt,  cannot,  as  defendant  to  a  foreclosure 
suit  by  a  prior  mortgagee,  properly  represent 
his  cestui  que  trusts,  who  are  necessary  parties, 
under  the  English  practice,  notwithstanding 
rule  8  of  R.  S.  C.  1883,  Ord.  XVI.  Francis  v. 
Harrison,  43  Ch.  D.  183.  Recovery  of  money 
paid  by  a  mortgagor  to  a  trust  mortgagee, 
under  a  mistake  of  fact,  and  by  the  latter 
handed  over  to  his  cestui  que  trust,  is  to  be 
sought  from  such  mortgagee.  King  v.  Stewart, 
66  L.  T.  339.  The  trustee  under  a  railroad 
income  mortgage  is  a  necessary  party  to  a  suit 
against  the  railroad  for  an  accounting  and 
injunction.  Barry  v.  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry. 
Co.  22  Fed.  Rep.  631. 

(b)  Such  assignees  are  not  necessary  parties 


PERSONS    HAVING   CONCURRENT    INTERESTS   WITH    PLAINTIFF.      *  216 


The  same  principle  which  calls  for  the  presence  of  all  persons  having 
an  interest  in  the  equity  of  redemption,  in  the  case  of  bills  to  redeem  a 
mortgage,  requires  that  where  a  mortgagee  seeks  to  foreclose  the  mort- 
gagor, he  should  bring  before  the  Court  all  persons  claiming  an  interest 
in  the  mortgage ; 5  therefore  a  derivative  mortgagee  must  make  the 
original  mortgagee,  or,  if  dead,  his  representative,  a  party  to  a  bill 
against  the  mortgagor  for  foreclosure.6 

If,  however,  a  mortgagee  has  assigned  or  conveyed  away  from  him- 
self, not  only  the  money  due  on  the  mortgage,  but  also  the  mortgaged 
premises,  the  assignee  may,  as  we  have  seen,  foreclose  without  making 
the  original  mortgagee  a  party ; 7  and  upon  the  same  principle, 
*  where  a  mortgagee  has  devised  his  interest  in  the  mortgage  in  *  216 
such  a  manner  as  to  pass  not  only  the  mortgage  money  but  the 
estate  mortgaged,  the  devisee  alone  may  foreclose  without  making  the 
heir-at-law  of  the  original  mortgagee  a  party,1  unless  he  claims  to  have 
the  will  established,2  in  which  case  he  must  be  made  a  defendant, 
because  it  has  been  held  that  a  devisee  and  heir  cannot  join  in  the  same 
suit,  even  upon  an  allegation  that  they  have  agreed  to  divide  the  matter 
in  question  between  them.8 

The  rule  which  requires  that  all  persons  having  concurrent  interests 
with  the  plaintiff  should  be  parties  to  the  bill,  applies  to  all  cases  in 
which  an  account  is  sought  against  a  defendant,  (a)     One  person  cannot 


v.  Saffery,  7  Sim.  317;  see  also  Cash  v.  Belcher, 

I  Hare,"  310;  6  Jur.  190;  Ford  v.  White,  16 
Beav.  120.  But  see  Singleton  v.  Cox.  4  Hare, 
326. 

5  See  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  199;  4  Kent,  186; 
Western  Reserve  Bank  v.  Potter,  1  Clarke, 
432;  Mercantile  Trust  Co.  v.  Portland  &  0.  R. 
Co.  10  Fed.  Rep.  604 ;  Ruckman  p.  Stephens, 

II  id.  793  (husband);  Dickinson  v.  Lamoille 
Co.  Nat.  Bank,  12  id.  747  (attaching  creditor); 
Chew  v.  Hyman,  7  id.  7;  Cook  v.  Hilliard,  9  id. 
4.  Where  a  tenant  in  common  of  an  equity  of 
redemption  has  not  been  made  a  party  to  fore- 
closure proceedings,  his  subsequent  written  con- 
sent to  be  made  and  treated  as  a  party,  and  to 
execute  a  release  of  his  interest  to  the  purchaser 
under  the  foreclosure,  is  not  equivalent  to  being 
actually  a  party.  Walbridge  v.  English,  28  N. 
J.  Kq.  266.    So  of  the  assignee  of  an  interest 


in  mortgaged  premises.  Kelly  v.  Israel,  11 
Paige,  147. 

6  Hobart  C   Abbot,  2  P.  Wms.  643. 

1  Miller  v.  Henderson,  10  N.  J.  Eq.  320, 
194.  A  mortgagee  of  land  who  has  assigned 
his  interest  in  the  mortgage  since  the  breach  of 
the  condition  may  be  included  as  a  defendant  in 
a  bill  to  redeem.  Doody  v.  Pierce,  9  Allen,  141. 
In  a  bill  to  foreclose  a  mortgage  on  a  railroad 
by  the  trustee,  and  holders  of  the  bonds,  who 
only  hold  them  as  collateral  security  for  less 
than  the  amount  of  the  bonds,  the  assignor  is  a 
necessary  party.  Ackerson  v.  Lodi  Branch  R. 
Co.  28  N.  J.  Eq.  542. 

1  Renvoize  v  Cooper,  6  Mad.  371;  Graham 
v.  Carter,  2  Hen.  &  M.  6. 

2  Lewis  v.  Nangle,  2  Ves.  631. 

3  Cholmondeley  v.  Clinton,  1  T.  &  R.  104, 
116. 


to  foreclosure  proceedings  instituted  prior  to 
the  adjudication  in  bankruptcy,  although,  if 
desired,  they  may  become  parties  on  their  own 
petition.  Oliver  v.  Cunningham,  6  Fed.  Rep. 
60;  see  Dendel  v.  Sutton,  20  id.  787. 

(a)  Beneficiaries,  having  separate  interests 
in  a  trust  fund,  may  join  as  plaintiffs  in  a  bill 
against  the  trustee  for  an  account  as  to  their 
respective  interests.  Norrisfl.  Hassler,  22  Fed. 
Rep.  401.  So,  beneficiaries  undera  will,  having 
common  grounds  of  relief,  though  owning  in 
severalty,  may  join  as  plaintiffs  in  a  bill  for  the 
removal  of  a  trustee.  Gart.-ide  v.  Gartside 
(Mo.),   20   S.   W.   Rep.  669.      As  to  joining 


legatees  as  parties  in  Equity,  see  also  Me  Arthur 
r.  Scott,  113  U.  S.  340;  Drake  v.  Delliker,  24 
Fed.  Rep.  527;  Union  M.  E.  Church  v.  Wilkin- 
son, 36  N.  J.  Eq.  141 ;  Applebee  v.  Duke,  21  N. 
Y.  S.  890;  McNeill  v.  Masterson,  79  Texas,  670  ; 
Pennsylvania  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bauerle  (III.),  33  N. 
E.  Rep.  166;  Johnson  v.  Meyer  (Ark.),  16  S. 
W.  Rep.  123.  Distributees,  who  sue  to  recover 
assets,  instead  of  the  administrator,  may  main- 
tain their  suit,  if  answer  is  filed,  and.  there 
being  no  debts,  all  the  parties  in  interest  are 
made  parties.  Smith  v.  Gooch,  6  Lea  (Teiin.), 
536.  As  to  heirs  a*  parties,  and  those  claiming 
under  them,  see  McCauley  v.  Six,  34  Ark.  379 ; 

211 


216 


OF   PARTIES   TO   A    SUIT. 


exhibit  a  bill  against  an  accounting  party  without  bringing  before  the 
Court  all  persons  who  are  interested  in  having  the  account  taken,  or  in 
the  result  of  it;  otherwise,  the  defendant  might  be  harassed  by  as 
many  suits  as  there  are  parties  interested  in  the  account.4  Thus,  to  a 
suit  by  the  assignee  for  an  account  of  a  share  of  the  profits  arising 
from  the  working  of  a  patent,  the  other  assignees  must  be  parties ; 5 
and  to  a  suit  for  a  partnership  account,  or  for  a  share  of  a  partnership 
adventure,  it  is  in  general  necessary  that  all  persons  having  shares  in 
the  same  adventure  should  be  parties.6  A  surviving  partner  may,  how- 
ever, unless  there  are  special  circumstances  in  the  case,  sue  a  debtor  to 
the  firm  for  an  account  without  making  the  personal  representatives  of 
the  deceased  partner  parties  to  the  suit;7  and  similarly  a  residuary 
legatee,  seeking  an  account  and  share  of  the  residue,  must  make  par- 
ties all   other  persons   interested  in  that  residue:8  either  active  par- 


4  MeCabe  v.  Bellowes,  1  Allen,  269,  270; 
New  England  &c.  Bank.  v.  Newport  Steam 
Factory,  6  R.  I.  154.  See  Buie  v.  Mechanics' 
Building  Association,  74  N.  C.  117  ;  Fisher  v. 
Hubbell.  65  Barb.  74. 

5  Bergmann  v.  McMillan,  W.  N.  (1881)  39. 

6  Ireton  v.  Lewis,  Rep.  temp.  Finch, 96  ;  Mof- 
fatt  v.  Farquharson,  2  Uro.  C.  C.  338,  and  Mr. 
Bell's  note  ( 1 ).  Yet  they  may,  if  very  numerous, 
be  made  quasi  parties  by  the  plaintiff  suing  on 
behalf  of  himself  and  on  their  behalf.  Good  v. 
Blewitt.  13  Ves.  397;  and  see  Hills  v.  Nash,  1 
Phil.  594;  10  Jur.  148;  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  XVI.  9; 
Cullen  v.  Duke  of  Queensberry,  1  Bro.  P.  C. 
396;  1  Bro.  C.  C.  101,  and  Mr.  Belt's  note; 
Dozier  v  Edwards,  3  Litt.  72;  Story,  Eq.  PI. 
§  166;  Story,  Partn.  §  449;  Collyer,  Partu. 
(Perkins's  ed.)  §  361;  Wells  v.  Strange,  5  Ga. 
22;  Mudgett  ?'.  Gager,  52  Maine,  541.  See 
Parsons  v.  Howard,  2  Woods,  1 ;  Pacific  R.  Co. 
v.  Atlantic  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.  20  Fed.  Rep.  277. 
When  a  bill  in  Equity,  brought  by  one  of  four 
partners  against  one  only  of  the  other  three,  for 
an  account,  &c,  alleges  that  the  other  two  are 
not  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court,  that  all 
the  others  have  received  their  full  share  of  the 
partnership  effects,  and  that  the  defendant  has 
received  much  more  than  his  share,  and  the 
plaintiff  much  less,  a  demurrer  to  the  bill,  for 
non-joinder  of  the  other  partners  as  defendants, 
will  not  be  sustained.  Towle  v.  Pierce.  12  Met. 
329  ;  see  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  78  ;  Vose  F.  Philbrook, 


Theurer  v.  Brogan,  41  Ark.  88;  Price  v. 
Sanders,  39  Ark.  306;  Tinkler  v.  Swaynie,  71 
Ind.  562;  Dayton  v.  Dayton,  7  111.  App.  136; 
Ryder  B.  Topping,  15  id.  216;  Bonny  v.  Bonny, 
36  id.  129;  Seymour  v.  Edwards,  31  id.  50; 
Walters  v.  Walters,  132  111.  467  ;  Hunt  v.  Van 
Derveer,  43  N.  J.  Eq.  414;  Lonvall  ».  Gridley, 
70  Cal.  507;  Weinreich  v.  Weinreich,  18  Mo. 
App.  364;  Mellen  o.  Banning,  61  Hun,  627; 
212 


3  Storv,  335;  Lawrence  v.  Rokes,  53  Mnine, 
110,  116;  Mallow  v.  Hinde,  12  Wheat.  193; 
Fuller  v.  Benjamin,  23  Maine,  255;  Mudgett  v. 
Gager,  52  Maine,  541. 

Representatives  of  a  deceased  partner  should 
be  made  parties  to  a  bill  to  dissolve  a  partner- 
ship, and  the  bill  may  be  amended  for  that 
purpose.  Buchard  v.  Boyce,  21  Ga.  6.  So 
the  administrator  and  heirs  of  a  deceased 
partner  are  necessary  parties  to  a  bill  filed  by 
a  surviving  partner  to  administer  lands  bought 
with  partnership  funds.  Whitney  v.  Cotton, 
53  Miss.  689.  But  the  surviving  partner  may 
sell  and  convey  firm  realty,  and  the  title  to 
the  purehaser  will  be  good,  whether  the  sale 
be  required  to  pay  debts  or  not.  Solomon  v. 
Fitzgerald,  7  Heisk.  552.  To  a  claim  seeking 
payment  of  a  partnership  debt  out  of  the  assets 
of  a  deceased  partner,  the  surviving  partner  is 
a  necessary  party.  Hills  v.  M'Rae,  15  Jur. 
766;  5  Eng.  Law  &  Eq.  233.  So  the  heirs  of 
a  deceased  partner  must  be  parties  when  a  sale 
of  real  estate  is  sought  for  the  payment  of  firm 
debts.  Pugh  v.  Currie,  5  Ala.  446;  Lang  v. 
Waring,  25  Ala.  625 ;  Andrews  v.  Brown,  21 
Ala.  437. 

7  Haig  v.  Gray,  3  De  G.  &  S.  741. 

8  Parsons  v.  Neville,  3  Bro.  C.  C.  365.  In 
Cockburn  v.  Thompson,  16  Ves.  328,  Lord 
Eldon  said,  this  admits  of  exception,  where  it 
is  not  necessary  or  inconvenient.  See  R.  S  C 
Ord.  XVI.  9,  li.    Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  89,  and  notes, 


Kingsbury  v.  Flowers,  65  Ala.  479;  Gibbs  v. 
Hodge,  id.  366;  Sawyers  v.  Baker,  66  Ala. 
292;  Spencer?'.  Lee,  19  W.  Va.  179;  Simmons 
v.  Ingram,  60  Miss.  886;  Dwyer  v.  Olivari 
(Texas),  16  S.  W.  Rep.  800;  Brundige  v.  Ruth- 
erford, 57  Texas,  22;  Anderson  v.  Northrop 
(Fla.),  12  So.  Rep.  318;  McDonnell  v.  Eat'>n, 
18  Fed.  Rep.  710;  Reed  v.  Reed,  31  id.  49; 
Temple  v.  Scott,  143  111.  290. 


PERSONS    HAVING    CONCURRENT   INTERESTS   WITH   PLAINTIFF. 


217 


ties  by  making  them  plaintiffs  or  *  defendants  to  the  bill,  or  *217 
passive  parties  by  serving  them  with  notice  of  the  decree.1  (a) 
And  so,  where  a  moiety  of  a  residue  was  given  to  one  of  the  defendants 
for  life,  and,  upon  her  decease,  to  such  persons  as  she  should  appoint, 
and,  in  default  of  appointment,  to  certain  other  persons  for  life,  it  was 
held  that  the  other  persons,  although  their  interests  depended  upon 
such  a  remote  contingency,  ought  to  be  before  the  Court.2 

Upon  the  same  principle  it  is,  that  in  suits  by  next  of  kin  against  a 
personal  representative  for  an  account,  the  Court  requires  that  all  the 
next  of  kin  should  be  parties  to  the  suit,8  in  the  same  manner  as  in 
the  case  of  residuary  legatees;  either  as  plaintiffs  or  defendants,  or  by 
being  served  with  notice  of  the  decree.4  It  is,  however,  to  be  observed 
that  in  all 5  cases  where  the  parties  claim  under  a  general  description, 


§§  203,  204;  Pritehard  v.  Hicks,  1  Paige,  253; 
Sheppard  v.  Starke,  3  Mimf.  29;  Brown  v. 
Kicketts,  3  John.  Ch.  533;  Davoue  v.  Fanning, 
4  John.  Ch.  199;  West  v.  Randall,  2  Mason, 
181.  190-199;  Huson  v.  MeKenzie,  1  Dev.  Eq. 
463;  Arendell  v.  Blackwell,  id.  354;  Bethel  v. 
Wilson,  1  Dev.  &  Bat.  Eq.  810.  In  Brown  v. 
Ricketts,  3  John.  Ch.  553,  Mr.  Chancellor  Kent 
seems  to  have  thought  that  all  the  residuary 
legatees  should  be  technically  parties  by  name. 
So  in  Davoue  v.  Fanning,  4  John.  Ch.  199.  It 
has,  however,  been  intimated  and  maintained 
in  other  cases  that  a  residuary  legatee  might 
sue  in  behalf  of  himself  and  all  others,  without 
making  them  technically  parties.  See  Kettle 
v.  Crary.  1  Paige,  417,  419,  420,  and  note; 
Ross  v.  Crary,  1  Paige,  416;  Hallett  v.  Hallett, 
2  Paige,  19,  20;  Egbert  v.  Woods,  3  Paige, 
517.  Hide  1,  adopted  in  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86, 
provides  that  "any  residuary  legatee  or  next 
of  kin  may,  without  serving  the  remaining 
residuary  legatees  or  next  of  kin,  have  a  de- 
cree for  the  administration  of  the  personal 
estate  of  a  deceased  person." 

1  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  42,  rr.  1,  8.  As  to 
effect  of  a  judgment  in  wilful  default,  where 
tenants  for  life  are  only  served  with  notice  of 
the  decree,  see  Whitney  v.  Smith,  I..  R.  4  Ch. 
513. 

2  Sherrit  v.  Birch,  3  Bro.  C.  C.  229  (Per- 
kins's ed.  note);  Davies  v.  Davies,  21  L.  J.  Ch. 


(a)  A  partnership  being  terminated  by  one 
member's  death,  that  member's  executor  can 
in  general  maintain  a  bill  to  recover  partner- 
ship assets  only  when  the  surviving  partner 
refuses  to  sue  or  to  join  in  the  suit.  See  Kirby 
v.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.  8  Fed.  Rep.  462; 
14  id.  261.  Partners  who  have  made  an  assign- 
ment may  join  as  co-plaintiffs  with  their  as- 
signee to  enforce  a  trust,  when  there  will  be  a 
surplus  for  distribution  among  them  after  the 
firm  liabilities  are  discharged.  McCampbell  v. 
Brown.  48  Fed.  Rep.  795.     As  to  joining  part- 


(N.  S.)  543;  11  Eng.  Law  &  Eq.  199  ;  Lennghan 
v.  Smith,  2  Phil.  301;  11  Jur.  503;  but  not 
when  the  share  has  been  ascertained  and  in- 
vested. Smith  v.  Snow,  3  Mad.  10;  Hares  v. 
Stringer,  15  Beav.  206;  see  also  Grace  v. 
Terrington,  1  Coll.  3.  A  contingent  interest 
depending  on  the  event  of  a  suit  is  not  such 
an  interest  as  to  make  the  person  having  it  a 
necessary  party.  Barbour  v.  Whitlock,  4  Mon- 
roe, 180;  see  Reid  v.  Vanderheyden,  5  Cowen, 
719;  United  States  v.  Gillespie,  8  Fed.  Rep.  140. 

3  See  Hawkins  v.  Hawkins,  1  Hare,  543, 
546;  6  Jur.  638,  explaining  Caldecott  v.  Calde- 
cott,  C.&  P.  183;  5  Jur.  212;  and  see  Shuttle- 
worth  v.  Howarth,  C.  &  P.  230;  5  Jur.  499; 
Noland  v.  Turner,  5  J.  J.  Marsh.  179;  West  v. 
Randall,  2  Mason,  181;  Kellar  v.  Beelor,  5 
Monroe,  573;  Oldham  v.  Collins,  4  J.  J.  Marsh. 
50;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  89,  and  cases  cited;  see 
also  rule  1  in  preceding  note  1. 

4  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  42.  rr.  1,  8;  see  now 
46  &  47  Vic.  c.  49,  §  4,  Sched. 

5  Where  one  of  the  next  of  kin  of  an  in- 
testate, who  died  in  India,  procured  letters  of 
administration  to  his  effects  here,  it  was  held 
that  he  might  sue  the  person  who  had  taken 
out  an  Indian  administration,  and  had  after- 
wards come  to  this  country,  without  making 
the  rest  of  the  next  of  kin  parties.  Sandilands 
i'.  Innes,  3  Sim.  264;  but  see  Story,  Eq.  PI. 
§  179;  Story,  Conf.  Laws,  §§  513,  514. 


ners  or  their  representatives  as  parties  in  Equity, 
see  also  BIyth  r.  Fladgate,  63  L.  T.  N.  S.  546, 
557;  Bower  v.  Soctfte\  17  id.  490;  Re  McRae, 
25  Ch.  D.  19;  Re  Hodgson,  31  Ch.  I).  177;  Re 
Barnard,  33  Ch.  D.  447;  Kendall  v.  Hamilton, 
3C.  P.  D.  403;  Bank  v.  Carrollton  Railroad, 
11  Wall.  624;  Kilbourn  v.  Sunderland,  130  U.  S. 
505;  Robinson  v.  Hintrager,  36  Fed.  Rep.  752; 
Goldman  v.  Page,  59  Miss.  404:  Fowle  v. 
Torrey,  131  Mass.  289;  Mechanics'  Bank  v. 
Landauer,  68  Wis.  44;  Jenness  v.  Smith,  58 
Mich.  280. 

213 


*  218  OF   PARTIES   TO    A    SUIT. 

or  of  being  some  of  a  class  of  persons  entitled,  the  Court  would  not 
formerly  make  a  decree  without  being  first  satisfied  that  all  the  indi- 
viduals of  the  class,  or  who  came  under  the  general  description,  were 
before  it.  For  this  purpose  the  Court,  in  cases  of  this  description, 
before  directing  an  account,  or  other  relief  prayed  by  the  bill,  referred 
it  to  one  of  the  Masters  to  inquire  who  the  individuals  of  the  class,  or 
answering  the  general  description,  were;  and  then,  if  it  turned  out  that 
any  of  them  were  not  before  the  Court,  the  plaintiff  must  file  a  supple- 
mental bill,  for  the  purpose  of  bringing  them  in  before  the  cause 
*218  *  was  finally  heard.1  And  according  to  Sir  James  Wigram  V.  C, 
in  an  administration  suit,  in  which  inquiries  are  necessary  to 
ascertain  who  are  the  parties  beneficially  interested  in  the  estate,  it  is 
irregular  to  direct  the  accounts  to  be  taken  until  after  the  inquiries 
have  been  made,  and  the  Master  has  made  his  report.  But  where  the 
parties  interested  are  the  children  of  a  party  to  the  suit,  or  are  persons 
of  a  class  in  such  circumstances  that  the  Court  may  be  reasonably  sat- 
isfied, at  the  hearing,  that  all  parties  beneficially  interested  are  parties 
to  the  record,  the  Court  may,  at  the  time  of  directing  the  inquiries, 
also  order  that,  if  the  Master  shall  find  that  all  the  persons  beneficially 
interested  are  parties  to  the  suit,  he  do  then  proceed  to  take  the 
account;  this  is,  however,  an  irregularity,  and  the  Court  will  not  make 
the  order  in  that  form,  unless  it  be  reasonably  clear  that  all  the  persons 
interested  are  parties.2  Under  the  later  practice  of  the  Court,  how- 
ever, it  being  no  longer  necessary  to  make  all  the  residuary  legatees  or 
next  of  kin  parties  for  the  purpose  of  the  decree,  although  it  is  usual 
still  to  direct  such  an  inquiry  as  above  mentioned,  yet  it  should  not  in 
terms  be  made  preliminary  to  taking  the  accounts,  in  order  that  the 
Judge's  discretion  to  proceed  in  the  absence  of  the  parties  may  not  be 
fettered.3 

In  like  manner  as  in  the  case  of  residuary  legatees  and  next  of  kin, 
one  legatee  interested  in  a  legacy  charged  upon  real  estate,  one  of  the 
persons  interested  in  the  proceeds  of  real  estate  directed  to  be  sold,  or 
one  residuary  devisee  or  heir,  or  one  of  several  cestui  que  trusts  under  a 
deed  or  instrument  may  have  a  decree  for  the  administration  of  the 
estate  or  execution  of  the  trust  without  making  the  others  of  the  class 
parties  in  the  first  instance;  though  they  must  be  served  with  notice  of 
the  decree; 4  and  any  cestui  que  trust  who  has  concurred  in  a  breach  of 

1  But  see  Waite  v.  Templer,  1  S.  &  S.  319;  may  sue  on  behalf  of  himself  and  of  all  persons 

Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  90,  and  notes.   But  one  of  sev-  having  the  same  interest." 
eral  of  the  next  of  kin  of  an  intestate,  entitled  2  Baker  v.   Harwood,   1  Hare,  327;  6  Jur. 

to   distribution,    may  sue  for  his   distributive  553;  see  also  Hawkins   v.  Hawkins,   id.  638; 

share  without   making   the  other   distributees  1  Hare,  543:  6  Jur.  638;  Say  v.  Creed,  3  Hare, 

parties,  if  the  latter  are  unknown,  or  cannot  455;  8  Jur.  893;  Phillipson  r.  Gatty,  6  Hare, 

he  found,  and  that  fact  is  charged  in  the  bill.  26:    12  Jur.  430. 

Ibid.    In  such  case  the  bill  may  properly  be  filed  3  2  Seton,927;  Cons.  Ord.  XXXV.  18;  as  to 

on  behalf  of  the  plaintiff,  and  also  of  all  the  evidence  necessary  to  support  such  an  inquiry, 

other  persons  who  may  be  entitled  as  distribu-  see  Miller  v.  Priddon,  1  M'N.  &  G.  687. 
tees.   Biid.   Rule  5,  adopted  in  15  &  16  Vice.  86,  *  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  42,  rr.  2,  3,  8;  R. 

provides  that  "  In  all  cases  of  suits  for  the  pro-  C.   Ord.   XVI.   11;   Maclpod  r.   Annesley, 

tection  of  property  pending  litigation,  and  in  Beav.  600;  James  v.  James,  9  Hare  App.  80. 
all  cases  in  the  nature  of  trusts,  any  person 

214 


PERSONS    HAVING    CONCURRENT    INTERESTS    WITH    PLAINTIFF.      *  219 

trust  must  be  a  party  to  a  suit  to  make  a  trustee  liable  for  the  loss 
occasioned  thereby.5 

The  rule  that  all  persons  interested  in  an  account  should  be  made 
parties  to  a  suit  against  the  accounting  party,  will  not  apply  where  it 
appears  that  some  of  the  parties  interested  in  such  account  have  been 
accounted  with  and  paid.  Thus,  in  the  case  of  a  bill  by  an  infant 
cestui  que  trust  coming  of  age,  for  his  share  of  a  fund,  an  account  will 
be  ordered  without  requiring  the  other  cestui  que  trusts,  who  have 
come  of  age  *  and  have  received  their  shares,  to  be  before  the  *  219 
Court.1  In  the  case  of  a  partnership,  where  a  bill  was  filed 
against  factors  by  the  persons  interested  in  one  moiety  of  a  cargo  of 
tobacco,  for  a  discovery  and  account  as  to  that  moiety,  without  making 
the  person  interested  in  the  other  moiety  a  party,  and  it  appeared  that 
the  defendants  had  distinguished  in  their  accounts  between  him  and  the 
plaintiffs,  and  had  divided  the  funds,  and  kept  separate  accounts,  the 
Court  held  that  the  owner  of  the  other  moiety  was  not  a  necessary 
party  to  the  suit.2  And  where  a  partner  had  agreed  to  give  a  moiety 
of  his  share  in  the  concern  to  a  third  person,  it  was  held  that  an 
account  might  be  taken  between  him  and  the  third  person  without  mak- 
ing his  partners  parties.8  So  to  a  bill  by  a  person  entitled  to  a  certain 
aliquot  portion  of  an  ascertained  sum  in  the  hands  of  trustees,  the 
co-cestui  que  trusts  are  not  necessary  parties.4  In  some  cases  where  a 
party  having  a  joint  interest  with  the  plaintiffs  in  the  taking  of  an 
account  has  been  abroad,  the  cause  will  be  allowed  to  go  on  without 
him:5  thus,  in  the  Exchequer,  where  a  bill  was  filed  by  some  of  the 
children  of  a  freeman  of  London,  who  was  dead,  for  an  account  and 
division  of  his  personal  estate,  and  it  appeared  that  one  of  the  children 
was  beyond  sea,  the  Court  was  moved  that  they  might  hear  the  cause 
without  him,  and  that  if  it  appeared  that  he  had  any  right,  he  might 
come  before  the  deputy  remembrancer  on  the  account;  and  though  no 
precedent  was  produced  of  such  an  order,  the  Court  gave  liberty  to  hear 
the  case  without  him.6 

5  Jesse  v.  Bennett,  8  De  G.  M.  &  G.  609 ;  »  Brown  v.  De  Tastet,  Jac.  284 ;  see  also 

2  Jur.  N.  S.  1125;  Williams  v.  Allen,  29  Beav.  Bray  v.  Fromont,  6  Mad.  5;  Casselsu.  Stewart, 

292.  6  App.  Cas.  64. 

i  DWolf  v.  D'Wolf,  4  R.  I.  450.     So  where  *  Perry  v.  Knott,  5   Beav.   293;   Smith  v. 

the  division  of  an  estate  in  pursuance  of  a  will  Snow,  3  Mad.  10;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §§  207,  212; 

is  not  to  be  made  at  one  and  the  same  time,  but  Hares  v.  Stringer,  15  Beav.  206;  Lenaghan  r. 

at  the  several  periods  when  any  one  or  more  Smith,  2  Phil.  301;   11  Jur.  503;   Hunt  p.  Pea- 

of  the  legatees  shall  separate  from  the  testator's  cock,  6  Hare,  361 ;  11  Jur.  555. 

family,  it  is  not  necessary  that  all  the  legatees  5  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §§  78-89,  and  cases  cited; 

be  made  parties  to  each  suit  in  Chancery  for  Milligan  v.  Milledge,  3  Cranch,  220;  West  v. 

a  division;  but  only  those  entitled  to  partici-  Randall,  2  Mason,   196;  Weymouth  v.  Boyer, 

pate  in  the  division  then  in  question.    Branch  1  Sumner's  Ves.  416,  note  (r),  and  cases  cited; 

v.  Booker,  3  Munf.   43.     So  where  it  appeared  Towle  v.  Pierce,  12  Met.  329;    Story,  Eq.  PL 

that  some  of  the  legatees  had  obtained  decrees,  §78;   Vose  v.  Philbrook,  3  Story,   335;   ante, 

in  another  suit,  for  their  portions,  it  was  proper  216,  note;   Lawrence  v.  Rokes,  53  Maine,  110; 

to  dismiss  the  bill  as  to  them,  they  having  been  Mudgett  v.  Gager,  52  Maine,  541  ;   Palmer  v. 

made  defendants.     Moore    v.    Beauchamp,    5  Stevens,  100  Mass.  461. 

Dana,  71.  6  Rogers  v.  Linton,  Bunb.  200. 

2  Weymouth  v.  Boyer,  1  Ves.  Jr.  416 ;  see 
also  Anon.  2  Eq.  Cas.Abr.  166,  pi.  7  ;  Hills  v. 
Nash,  1  Phil.  594,  597;  10  Jur.  148. 

215 


221 


OF   PARTIES   TO    A    SUIT. 


It  seems  to  be  doubtful  whether  a  trustee  of  an  estate  can  be  called 
upon  by  a  purchaser  of  a  portion  of  the  estate,  sold  by  the  beneficiaries 
to  different  persons,  to  convey  to  him  the  legal  estate  in  such  portion, 
without  bringing  all   the  other  persons  interested  in  the  same  estate 

before  the  Court.7 
*  220        *  It  is  a  general  rule,  arising  out  of  the  preceding  principles, 

admitting  of  very  few  exceptions,  that  a  trustee  cannot,  under 
ordinary  circumstances,  institute  proceedings  in  Equity  relating  to  the 
trust  property,  without  making  the  cestui  que  trusts  parties  to  the  pro- 
ceedings.1 Thus,  where  a  bill  is  filed  by  trustees  for  sale,  against  a 
purchaser,  for  a  specific  performance  of  the  contract,  the  cestui  que 
trusts  of  the  purchase-money  must  be  parties  unless  there  is  a  clause 
in  the  trust  deed  declaring  the  receipt  of  the  trustees  to  be  a  sufficient 
discharge,  which  is  considered  as  a  declaration  by  the  author  of  the 

trust  that  the  receipt  of  the  persons  beneficially  interested  in 
*221    the  produce  of  the  sale  shall  not  be  necessary;2  and  *  where  a 

bill   was   filed    by   certain    persons,    describing    themselves   as 


7  In  Goodson  v.  Ellison,  3  Russ,  583,  593, 
596,  the  persons  beneficially  interested  in  an 
estate  vested  in  trustees  had,  many  years  before 
the  commencement  of  the  suit,  proceeded  to 
sell  the  entirety  in  various  lots,  one  of  which 
was  purchased  by  the  plaintiff,  and  all  the  per- 
sons beneficially  interested  joined  in  conveying 
it  to  him.  The  trustee,  however,  did  not  join, 
and  upon  his  death  the  legal  estate  became 
vested  in  the  defendants,  upon  whose  refusal 
to  convey  without  the  sanction  of  the  Court, 
the  bill  was  filed,  and  a  decree  for  a  convey- 
ance by  the  defendants  was  pronounced  by 
Lord  Gifford  M.  R.,  who  directed  that  they 
should  pay  the  costs  of  the  suit.  Upon  appeal, 
however,  to  Lord  Eldon,  his  Lordship  expressed 
considerable  doubts  whether  a  trustee  could  be 
called  upon  to  divest  himself  of  a  trust  by  con- 
veying different  parcels  of  the  trust  property 
at  different  times,  and  whether  it  was  not  there- 
fore necessary  to  have  all  the  other  cestui  que 
trusts  before  the  Court;  but  upon  re-argument 
the  Lord  Chancellor  stated  that  he  thought 
there  were  parties  enough  before  the  Court  to 
enable  him  to  make  a  decree,  but  as  it  was  the 
cace  of  an  old  trust,  he  thought  the  Court  was 
bound  to  inquire  into  the  facts,  and  that  the 
trustees  had  a  right  to  have  the  conveyance 
settled  in  the  Master's  office. 

1  Kirk  v.  Clark,  Prec.  Ch.  275;  Large  v. 
Van  Doren,  14  N.  J.  Eq.  208;  Phillipson  v. 
Gatty,  6  Hare,  26  ;  12  Jur.  430 ;  see,  however, 
Alexander  v.  Cana,  1  De  G.  &  S.  415.  A  mere 
nominal  trustee  cannot  bring  a  suit,  in  his  own 
name,  without  joining  his  cestui  que  trusts  with 
him.  Stilwell  v.  M'Neely,  1  Green,  Ch.  205; 
Schenck  v.  Ellingwood,  3  Edw.  Ch.  175;  Helm 
v.  Hardin,  2  B.  Mon.  232:  Malin  v.  Malin, 
2  .John.  Ch.  238 ;  Fish  v.  Howland,  1  Paige,  20  ; 
Bifield  v.  Tavlor,  1  B^atty,  93 ;   Story,  Eq.  PI. 

216 


§§  207,  209;  Busney  v.  Spear,  17  Ga.  223; 
Hall  v.  Harris,  11  Texas,  300;  Woodward  v. 
Wood,  19  Ala.  213;  Richards  v.  Richards,  9 
Gray,  313.  Where  a  bill  in  Equity  to  enforce 
the  specific  performance  of  a  contract  involves 
the  title  of  the  cestui  que  trusts  to  the  property 
in  dispute,  or  where  they  are  interested  not 
only  in  the  fund  or  estate  respecting  which 
the  question  at  issue  has  arisen,  but  also  in 
that  question  itself,  they  are  necessary  parties. 
Van  Doren  v.  Robinson,  16  N.  J.  Eq.  256. 
And  the  cestui  que  trusts  should  be  joined 
with  the  trustee  in  a  suit  for  the  recov- 
ery of  the  trust  property:  Elmer  v.  Loper,  25 
N.J.  Eq.  475;  and  are  necessary  parties  to  a 
bill  by  their  trustee  for  foreclosure:  Allen  v. 
Roll,  id.  163  ;  but  the  holders  of  bonds  secured 
are  not  :  Williamson  v.  New  Jersey  Southern 
R.  Co.  id.  13.  Nor  is  it  necessary  that  all  the 
creditors  secured  by  a  trust  assignment  should 
be  made  parties  to  a  suit  by  the  trustee  to  sell 
land  for  the  payment  of  the  debts.  Robinson 
v.  Robinson,  11  Bush,  174. 

Rule  4,  adopted  in  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  pro- 
vided that  "any  one  of  several  cestui  que  trusts 
under  any  deed  or  instrument  may,  without 
serving  any  other  of  such  cestui  que  trusts, 
have  a  decree  for  the  execution  of  the  trusts 
of  the  deed  or  instrument  ;  "  see  M'Leod 
v.  Annesley,  16  Beav.  C07;  Jones  v.  James, 
9  Hare.  App.  80.  The  cestui  que  trusts  are  not 
necessary  parties  to  a  suit  in  which  a  mortgage 
for  their  benefit  is  brought  in  question;  their 
trustees  are  the  proper  parties  to  represent 
them.  New  Jersey  &c.  Co.  v.  Ames,  12  N.  J. 
Eq.  507;  Ashton  v.  Atlantic  Bank,  3  Allen, 
219,  220;  Shaw  v.  Norfolk  County  R.  R.  Co.  5 
Gray,  170,  171;  Wright  r.  Bundy,  4  Ind.  398. 
2  Per  Sir  J.  Leach  V.  C,  Calverley  v. 
Phelp,  6  Mad.  232. 


PERSONS    HAVING    CONCURRENT    INTERESTS   WITH    PLAINTIFF.        *  221 

trustees  for  a  society  consisting  of  a  great  number  of  persons,  for  the 
specific  performance  of  an  agreement  entered  into  by  themselves  for  the 
benefit  of  the  society,  and  a  demurrer  was  put  in  because  the  members 
of  the  society  were  not  parties  to  the  suit,  upon  the  argument  of  which 
it  was  insisted  that  a  trustee  could  not  file  a  bill  respecting  the  trust 
property  without  making  the  cestui  que  tmst  a  party,  and  that, 
although  the  members  of  the  society  were  too  numerous  to  make  all  of 
them  parties,  the  bill  ought  to  have  been  filed  by  some  of  them  on 
behalf  of  themselves  and  the  others,  and  that  it  did  not  appear  by  the 
bill  that  the  plaintiffs  were  even  members  of  the  society,  the  demurrer 
was  upon  these  grounds  allowed.1  So,  if  a  mortgagee  dies,  and  his 
heir  files  a  bill  of  foreclosure,  the  executor  of  the  mortgagee  must  be  a 
party,2  because,  although  at  Law  the  legal  right  to  the  estate  is  in  the 
heir,  yet  in  Equity  he  is  a  trustee  for  the  executor,  who  is  the  person 
entitled  to  the  mortgage  money ; 3  and  for  this  reason,  where  the  heir 
of  the  mortgagee  had  foreclosed  the  mortgagor  without  making  the 
executor  of  the  mortgagee  a  party,  and  a  bill  was  filed  by  the  executor 
against  the  heir,  the  land  was  decreed  to  the  executor.4  It  seems, 
however,  that  although  the  personal  representative  is  the  person 
entitled  to  receive  the  money,  the  heir  has  a  right  to  say  that  he  will 
pay  off  the  mortgage  to  the  executor,  and  take  the  benefit  of  the  fore- 
closure himself; 6  and  for  this  reason,  as  well  as  that  before  stated,  the 
heir  of  a  mortgagee  is  a  necessary  party  to  a  bill  of  foreclosure  by  the 
personal  representative,6  unless  the  mortgagee  has  devised  the  mort- 
gaged estate,  in  which  case,  as  we  have  seen,  his  heir  is  not  a  necessary 
party  to  a  bill  by  the  devisee  to  foreclose  the  equity  of  redemption.7 

There  are,  however,  instances  in  which,  under  peculiar  circumstances, 
trustees  are  allowed  to  maintain  a  suit  without  their  cestui  que  trusts; 
as  in  the  case  of  trustees  under  a  deed,  by  which  estates  are  vested 
in  them  upon  trust  to  sell  and  to  apply  the  proceeds  amongst  credi- 
tors or  others,  with  a  clause  declaring  the  receipt  of  the  trustees  to 


1  Douglas  v.  Horsfall,  2  S.  &  S.  184.  4  Qobe  v.  Carlisle,  cited  2  Vera.  66. 

2  See  Graham  v.  Carter,  2  Hen.  &  M.  6;  5  Clerkson  v.  Bowyer,  2  Vera.  66.  As  to 
Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  200;  Wood  v.  Holland  (Ark.),  mortgages  made  after  Jan.  1,  1882,  see  44  &  45 
21  S.  W.  Rep.  223.     A  mortgage  executed  to  Vic.  c.  41,  §§  1  (1),  30. 

persons  in  an  official  capacity  may  be  foreclosed  6  Davis  v.  Hemingway,    29  Vt.   438.     The 

by  their  successors  in  office  in  their  own  names,  heirs  of  a  deceased  mortgagee  cannot,  however, 

as  equitable  assignees.     Iglehart  ».  Bierce,  86  sustain  a  bill  for  foreclosure,  but   it  must  be 

'**'  l');i-  brought  in  the  name  of  the  executor  or  admin- 

3  Freake  v.  Horsey,  Nels.  93;  2  Freem.  180,  istrator.  Roath  v.  Smith,  5  Conn.  133.  And 
8.  C.j  1  Ch.  Cas.  51,  S.  C;  2  Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  77,  the  heir  is  a  necessary  party  to  a  bill  filed  by 
S.C. ;  Dexter  v.  Arnold,  1  Sumner,  113;  Com.  the  personal  representative*  of  the  vendor  to 
Dig.  tit.  Chan.  4  A.  9;  Demarest  v.  Wyn-  enforce  the  lien  for  unpaid  purchase-money,  if 
koop,  3  John.  Ch.  145;  Scott  v.  Macfarland,  the  legal  title  has  not  been  made  to  the  pur- 
13  Mass.  309;  Graces.  Hunt,  Cooke  (Tenn.),  chaser.  Mott  v.  Carter,  26  Graft.  127;  see 
344;  Jones  v.  Kirkpatrick,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  698  ;  McKay  v.  Wakefield,  63  Ind.  27.  So  if  the 
Denn  v.  Spinning,  1  Halst.  471;  Marsh  v.  Aus-  bill  be  to  enjoin  a  sale  of  land  by  a  trustee,  on 
tin,  I  Allen,  235;  Plummer  v.  Doughty,  78  the  ground  that  the  trust  debt  was  paid  by  the 
Maine,  341;  Citizen's  National  Bank  v.  Day-  debtor  in  his  lift  time.  Stewart  v.  Jackson,  8 
ton,  116  111.  257.    See  White  v.  Secor,  58  Iowa,  W.  Va.  29. 

533;  Scott  v.  Streatham,  W.  N.  (1891)  153  ^  Renvoize  v.  Cooper,  6  Mad.  371. 

217 


*  000 


OF    PARTIES   TO    A    SUIT. 


*222  be  a  good  discharge  to  the  *  purchasers.1  (a)  By  the  30th  Order 
of  August,  1841,  in  all  suits  concerning  real  estate  which  is 
vested  in  trustees  by  devise,  when  such  trustees  are  competent  to  sell 
and  give  discharges  for  the  proceeds  of  the  sale,  and  for  the  rents  and 
profits  of  the  estate,  such  trustees  shall  represent  the  persons  bene- 
ficially interested  in  the  estate,  or  the  proceeds,  or  the  rents  and  profits, 
in  the  same  manner,  and  to  the  same  extent,  as  the  executors  or  admin- 
istrators in  suits  concerning  personal  estate  represent  the  persons 
beneficially  interested  in  such  personal  estate;  and  in  such  cases  it 
shall  not  be  necessary  to  make  the  persons  beneficially  interested  in 
such  real  estate,  or  rents  and  profits,   parties  to  the  suit.2    But  the 


1  See  Calverly  v.  Phelp,  6  Mad.  229;  as 
to  foreclosure  in  such  cases,  see  post,  S.  C. 
Where  it  appears  on  the  face  of  the  contract 
that  it  was  the  intent  of  the  parties  to  exclude 
the  cestui  que  trust  from  the  necessity  of  taking 
any  part  in  the  transaction  relating  to  the  man- 
agement of  the  trust,  the  cestui  que  trust  is  not 
a  necessary  party.  Bifield  v.  Taylor,  1  Beatty, 
91 ;  S.  C."  1  Moll.  192.  So  where  a  bill  "is 
brought  by  the  trustee  to  obtain  possession  of 
the  trust  propert}',  and  the  cestui  que  tintst  has 
no  interest  in  the  possession.  Furguson  v.  Ap- 
plenhite,  10  Sm.  &  M.  301;  Ashton  v.  Atlantic 
Bank,  3  Allen,  219,  220.  A  trustee  may  main- 
tain a  bill  to  redeem  a  mortgage,  made  by  him- 
self, of  the  trust  estate,  without  making  his 
cestui  que  trust  a  party.  Boyden  v.  Partridge, 
2  Gray,  190. 

Where  a  mortgage  deed  of  land  has  been 
executed  to  a  trustee  to  secure  the  payment  of 
debts  to  sundry  persons,  the  trustee  may  main- 
tain a  bill  to  foreclose,  without  making  the 
cestui  que  trusts  parties.  Swift  v.  Stebbins,  4 
Stew.  &  P.  467 ;  Shaw  v.  Norfolk  County  R. 
R.  Co.  5  Gray,  170,  171. 

A  conveyance  in  trust  may  be  cancelled  by  a 
decree  in  Equity,  though  the  cestui  que  trusts 
be  not  made  parties.  Campbell  r.  Watson,  8 
Ohio,  500. 

In  a  suit  affecting  a  fund  held  in  trust  for  a 
mother  for  life,  and  then  to  go  to  her  children, 
the  trustee  and  mother  sufficiently  represent 
the  fund  to  prevent  an  objection  for  want  of 
parties  prevailing  at  the  hearing.  Sweet  v. 
Parker,  22  N.  J.  Eq.  453. 

2  This  rule  has  been  adopted  by  the  Su- 
preme Court  of  the  United  States.  Equity 
Rule,  49.  But  it  has  been  abrogated  in  Eng- 
land by  Cons.  Ord.,  Prel.  Ord.  r.  1;  the  cases 
which  it  was  intended  to  meet  being  included 
in  the  more  comprehensive  enactments  of  15  & 


(a)  When  a  specific  equity  of  redemption  is 
devised  or  conve3'ed  to  a  trustee  to  be  con- 
verted into  money  at  a  future  day  and  divided, 
after  paying  the  incumbrance,  between  speci- 
fied persons,  they  have  a  vested  equitable  in- 

218 


16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  42,  r.  9,  whereby  it  is  provided 
that  in  all  suits  concerning  real  or  personal 
estate  which  is  vested  in  trustees  under  a  will, 
settlement,  or  otherwise,  such  trustees  shall  rep- 
resent the  persons  beneficially  interested  un- 
der the  trust,  in  the  same  manner,  and  to  the 
same  extent,  as  the  executors  or  administra- 
tors in  suits  concerning  personal  estate  repre- 
sent the  persons  beneficially  interested  in  such 
personal  estate,  and  in  such  cases  it  shall  not 
be  necessary  to  make  the  persons  beneficially 
interested  under  the  trust  parties  to  the  suit, 
but  the  Court  may,  upon  consideration  of  the 
matter,  on  the  hearing,  if  it  shall  so  think  fit, 
order  such  persons  or  any  of  them  to  be  made 
parties.  This  rule  is  retrospective,  and  applies 
to  all  suits,  as  well  as  redemption  and  foreclos- 
ure suits.  Fowler  v.  Boyldon,  9  Hare  App.  78; 
Goldsmid  v.  Stonehewer,  id.  38;  17  Jur.  199; 
White  v.  Chitty,  14  W.  R.  366;  L.  R.  1  Eq. 
372,  V.  C.  W.  "See  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  XVI.  7,  11; 
15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  42,  r.  9;  R.  S.  C.  Ord. 
III.  4,  and  App.  A.  Pt.  II.  §  1,  VIII. ;  Goodrich 
v.  Marsh,  W.  N.  (1878)  186.  In  an  adminis- 
tration suit  the  trustees  of  settled  shares  suffi- 
ciently represent  their  cestui  que  trusts.  Den- 
sein  v.  Elworthy,  9  Hare,  App.  42.  And  so,  in 
a  suit  to  obtain  a  declaration  of  forfeiture,  an 
unascertained  class  taking  on  the  forfeiture 
are  sufficiently  represented  by  the  trustees. 
White  V-  Chitty,  supra.  So  where  the  suit 
was  for  sale  and  partition  by  testamentary 
trustees.  Stace  v.  Gage,  8  Ch.  D.  451.  See 
Simpson  v.  Denny,  10  Ch.  D.  28.  It  has  also 
been  held  that  executors  with  a  power  of  sale, 
and  also  devisees  in  trust  subject  to  payments 
of  debts,  are  trustees  within  the  rule.  Shaw  v. 
Hardingham,  2  W.  R.  657,  M.  R.;  Smith  v. 
Andrews,  4  W.  R.  353,  V.  C.  K.;  but  that  an 
executor  with  only  an  implied  power  of  sale 
is  not.     Bolton  v.  Stannard,  4  Jur.  N.   S.  576, 


terest,  and  are  necessary  parties  to  a  suit  for 
the  foreclosure  of  the  mortgage.  United  States 
Trust  Co.  v.  Roche,  116  N.  Y.  120,  130;  Kirk- 
patrick  v.  Corning,  38  N.  J.  Eq.  234. 


PERSONS    HAVING    CONCURRENT   INTERESTS   WITH    PLAINTIFF.       *  223 

Court  may  upon  consideration  of  the  matter  on  the  hearing,  if  it  shall 
so  think  tit,  order  such  persons  to  be  made  parties.  This  order 
applies,  *not  only  to  suits  by  persons  claiming  adversely  against  *223 
the  estate,  but  also  to  suits  by  some  of  the  persons  beneficially 
interested,  seeking  relief  in  respect  of  alleged  misconduct  of  the 
trustees;  and  in  such  cases  it  renders  it  unnecessary  that  persons  hav- 
ing charges  on  the  estate  should  be  parties.1  It  is  necessary,  however, 
that  the  trustees  who  are  empowered  to  give  discharges  should  them- 
selves be  entitled  to  the  legal  estate;  otherwise  the  order  does  not 
apply,  and  the  cestui  que  trusts  must  be  made  parties  to  the  suit.2 
In  cases,  also,  where  the  interest  of  the  cestui  que  trusts  is  collateral 
to  the  rights  between  the  plaintiff  and  the  defendant,  a  person  standing 
in  the  place  of  trustee  has  been  allowed  to  maintain  a  suit  respecting 
the  trust  property,  without  making  the  persons  for  whom  he  is  trustee 
parties ;  thus  the  pawnee  of  a  chattel  or  his  representative  may  main- 
tain a  suit  for  the  chattel  without  making  the  pawner  a  party.8  And 
so  where  a  bill  was  brought  for  an  account,  and  for  the  delivery  of  a 
strong-box,  in  which  were  found  jewels,  and  a  note  in  these  words: 
"Jewels  belonging  to  the  Duke  of  Devonshire,"  in  the  hands  of  Mr. 
Saville,  whose  representative  the  plaintiff  was,  and  in  whose  posses- 
sion they  had  been  for  fifty  years,  and  an  objection  was  taken  that  the 
Duke's  representative  ought  to  have  been  a  party,  it  was  held  that  the 
plaintiff  might  sustain  the  suit  without  him.4  And  upon  the  same  prin- 
ciple, where  one  of  two  trustees  had  been  prevailed  upon  by  his  co- 
trustee to  transfer  the  trust  fund  into  his  name  alone,  and  the  co-trustee 
afterwards  sold  the  stock  and  received  the  produce,  and  never  replaced 
it;  upon  a  bill  filed  by  the  trustee  against  his  co-trustee  to  compel  him 
to  replace  the  stock,  a  demurrer,  put  in  on  the  ground  that  the  cestui 
que  trusts   of   the   fund  were  not   made  parties,   was   overruled   upon 

M.  R.;  see,  however,  22  &  23  Vic.  c.  35,  §§  14,  on  the  one  hand,  and  a  stranger  on  the  other. 

16.     The  rule  does  not  apply  when  the  cestui  Hamond  v.  Walker,   3  Jur.  N.   S.   G86,  V.  C. 

que  trusts  have  concurred  in   breaches  of  trust.  W. ;  Payne  t'.  Parker,  L.  R.  1  Cli.  327;  12  Jur. 

Jesse  p.  Bennett,  6  De  G.  M.  &  G.  609;  2  Jur.  N.  S   221,  L.  JJ. 

N.  S.  1125.     And  where  an  estate  is  sold  under  J  Osborne  v.  Foreman,  2  Hare,  656  ;  8  Jur. 

a  decree  of  the  Court,  as  a  general  rule  (with  55;  Ward  v.  Rassett,  5  Hare,  179;  see  also,  upon 

a  possible  exception  in  some  cases  of  extreme  the  construction  of  this  order,  Cox  v.  Barnard, 

difficulty)  the  Court  will,  in  the  exercise  of  its  5  Hare,  253;  Lloyd  r.  Smith,  13  Sim.  457;  7 

discretion,  require  all  the  persons  interested  in  Jur.  400;   Miller  v.  Huddlestone,  13  Sim.  4ti7; 

the  proceeds  to  be  parties  to  the  suit,  or  to  be  7  Jur.  504;  Reeve  r.  Richer,  1  De  G.  &  S.  624; 

served  with  notice  of  the  decree,  in  order  to  11  Jur.  960;  Jones  v.  How,  7  Hare.  270;  14  Jur. 

secure  a   proper  and  advantageous  sale,   and  145;  Chamberlain  r.  Thacker,  13  Jur.  785;  14 

protect  the  title  of  purchasers  from  being  open  Jur.  190. 

to   inquiry  or   impeachment.      Doody  v.  Hig-  2  Turner  v.  Hind,  12  Sim.  414.     It  seems 

gins,  9  Hare  App.  32 ;  2  K    &  J.  729;  Pigott  doubtful  whether  the  order  applies  to  the  case 

r.  Pigott,  2  N.  R.  14,  V.  C.  W.    And  wherever  of  a  bill  of  foreclosure  of  freeholds  devised  in 

the  trustees' personal  interest  may  prevent  them  trust   for  sale.     Wilton   v.   Jones,  2  Y.  &  C. 

from  protecting  the   interest  of  the  cestui  que  244. 

trusts,  the   Court   will    require    the   cestui  que  3  See  rmfe.  p.  200,  note  («).     Or  by  making 

trusts,  or  some  of  them,  to  be  made  parties.  him    a   defendant.     Michigan    State    Rank    v. 

Read  r.  Prest.  1  K.  &  J.  183.    Trustees  cannot,  Gardner.  3  Gray,  305. 

however,  represent  some  of  the  cestui  que  trusts  4  Saville    v.    Tancred,   1   Ves.    Sr.    101;   3 

in  any  contention  inter  se.  but  only  where  the  Swanst.  141,  n.     See  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  221. 
contention  is  between  all  the  cestui  que  trusts 

219 


*  224 


OF    PARTIES   TO    A    SUIT. 


argument.5  And  where  a  trustee  filed  a  bill  to  foreclose  a  mort- 
*  224    gage,  it  being  a  breach  of  trust  to  have  lent  the  money  *  upon 

such  a  security,  the  cestui  que  trusts,  who  had  never  authorized 
or  adopted  the  mortgage,  were  held  unnecessary  parties.1  If,  however, 
the  cestui  que  trusts  have  concurred  in  the  breach  of  trust,  one  trustee 
cannot  sue  his  co-trustee  without  making  them  parties.2  (a) 

The  personal  representative  in  all  cases  represents  the  personal  estate 
of  the  deceased,  and  is  entitled  to  sue  for  it  without  making  the  residu- 
ary legatees,  or  any  other  persons  interested  in  it,  parties.8  In  every 
case  an  executor,  though  a  bare  trustee,  and  though  there  be  a  residu- 
ary legatee,  is  entitled  to  sue  for  the  personal  estate  in  Equity  as  well 
as  at  Law,  unless  the  cestui  que  trusts  will  oppose  it.4  Where,  however, 
there  has  been  a  great  lapse  of  time  since  the  death  of  the  testator,  and 
it  seems  doubtful  who  are  the  persons  beneficially  interested  under  his 
will,  the  Court  will  not,  as  of  course,  order  payment  to  a  personal 
representative  of  funds  recovered  in  the  cause,  but  may  direct  them  to 
be  paid  into  Court.5 


5  Franco  v.  Franco,  3  Ves.  77 ;  Bridget  v. 
Hames,  1  Coll.  72;  May  v.  Selby,  1  Y.  &  C. 
235;  6  Jur.  52;  Horsley  «.  Fawcett,  11  Beav. 
565;  Peake  v.  Ledger,  8  Hare,  313;  4  De  G. 
&  S.  137  (which  was  the  case  of  executors); 
Biynard  v.  Woolley,  20  Beav.  583;  Blyth  v. 
Fladgate,  [1891]  1  Ch.  337,  366;  see  Chancellor 
v.  Morecraft,  11  Beav.  262;  and  see  Bridget ». 
Hames,  1  Coll.  72;  see  also  Butler  v.  Butler,  5 
Ch.  D.  554;  S.  C.  on  appeal,  7  Ch.  D.  116, 
where  ir,  was  held  that  one  trustee  could  not 
maintain  a  bill  against  a  co-trustee  for  realizing 
the  trust  fund  by  sale  of  the  property  in  which 
it  is  invested,  without  bringing  the  cestui  que 
trusts  before  the  Court.  See  alsoLuke  v.  South 
Kensington  Hotel  Co.  7  Ch.  D.  789;  11  id.  121; 
Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  213,  and  a  discussion  of  this 
subject  in  the  note;  Cunningham  v.  Pell,  5 
Paige,  607.  If  the  object  of  the  bill  of  a  trustee 
be  to  recover  the  fund  with  a  view  to  its  admin- 
istration by  the  Court,  the  parties  interested 
must  be  represented.  But  if  it  merely  seeks  to 
recover  the  trust  moneys,  the  beneficiaries  are 
not  necessary  parties.  Carey  v.  Brown,  92  U. 
S.  171;  Adams  v.  Bradley,  6  Mich  346;  Potts 
r.  Thames  Haven  and  Dock  Co.  15  Jur.  1004;  7 
Eng.  L.  &  E.  262.  And  the  objection  of  the 
want  of  parties  must  be  made  either  by  de- 
murrer or  plea.  Carey  v.  Brown,  92  U.  S.  173. 
If  a  trustee  has  fraudulently  or  improperly 
parted  with  trust  property,  the  cestui  que  trust 
mav  proceed  against  the  trustee  alone,  to  com- 
pel satisfaction  for  the  breach  of  trust,  or  he 
may  at  his  election  join  the  assignee  also,  if  he 
were  a  party  to  the  fraud,  or  if  he  seeks  redress 


against  him.  Bailey  v.  Ingles,  2  Paige,  278; 
West  v.  Randall,  2  Mason,  197;  Franco  v. 
Franco,  3  Sumner's  Ves.  75,  note  (ft). 

1  Allen  o.  Knight,  5  Hare,  272,  277  ;  10  Jur. 
943. 

2  Jesse  v.  Bennett,  6  De  G.  &  G.  609 ;  2 
Jur.  N.  S  1125. 

3  See  Miles  v.  Davis,  19  Miss.  408;  R.  S  C. 
Ord.  XVI.  7,  11  ;  III.  4;  App.  A,  Pt.  II.  §§  I., 
Vin.  Where  a  woman  by  her  will  gave  all  her 
personal  estate  to  her  bastard  child,  and  made 
B  and  C  her  executors,  and  died;  and  within 
a  short  time  after  the  bastard  died  intestate ; 
upon  a  bill  filed  by  the  execu'or  against  a  per- 
son in  whose  hands  the  property  of  the  mother 
was,  praying  for  an  account,  the  defendant 
demurred,  because  the  representative  of  the 
bastard  and  the  Attorney-General  were  not  par- 
ties; and  the  demurrer  was  overruled,  it  being 
held  that  the  executor  was  legally  entitled  to 
the  estate  of  his  testatrix;  and  though  this  may 
be  in  trust  for  another,  yet  as  the  executor  has 
the  legal  title,  he  can  give  a  good  discharge  to 
the  defendant.  Jones  v.  Goodchild,  3  P.  Wms. 
33;  see  also  Peake  v.  Ledger,  8  Hare,  313; 
Smith  v.  Bolden,  33  Beav.  262. 

4  3  P.  W.  48.  As  he  has  the  legal  title,  his 
charge  to  the  defendant  is  valid,  though  ap- 
pointed by  a  foreign  Court.  Eames  v.  Hacon, 
16  Ch.  D.  407,  where  the  foreign  letters  had  been 
resealed  in  England.  See  S.  C  18  Ch.  D.  347, 
353. 

s  Lov  v.  Duckett,  Cr.  &  Ph.  305 ;  Ex  parte 
Ram,  3  M  &  C.  25  ;  1  Jur.  668 ;  Re  Malony.  1 
J.  &  H.  249;  Orrok  v.  Binney,  Jac.  523,  Pen- 


(a)  There  is  no  liability  on  the  part  of  the 
estate  of  a  deceased  trustee,  who  left  the  trust 
funds  in  a  proper  state  of  investment  at  his 
death,  for  a  breach  of  trust  subsequently  com- 
mitted. Re  Palk,  41  W.  R.  28;  W.  N  "(1892) 
220 


112.  But  a  new  trustee,  who  after  his  appoint- 
ment participates  in  the  trustees'  breach  of 
trust,  becomes  liable  with  them.  Ricker  v. 
Alsop,  27  Fed.  Rep.  251. 


PERSONS    HAVING    CONCURRENT   INTERESTS    WITH    PLAINTIFF.       *  225 

So,  also,  assignees  of  bankrupts  or  insolvent  debtors  may  either 
maintain  or  defend  suits  relating  to  the  estates  vested  in  them  as  such 
assignees,  without  the  creditors  for  whom  they  are  trustees  being  made 
parties  to  the  suit.6  (//)  Nor  is  it  necessary,  in  such  case,  that  the 
bankrupt  or  insolvent,  though  interested  in  the  residue,  *  should  *22o 
be  before  the  Court,1  though,  from  a  decision  in  Vernon's 
Reports,  it  appears  to  have  been  formerly  considered  necessary  in  suits 
by  assignees  to  have  the  bankrupt  before  the  Court.2  Where,  however, 
creditors,  instead  of  seeking  relief  under  the  Commission,  proceed  at 
Law  against  the  bankrupt,  the  bankrupt  may  file  a  bill  of  discovery  in 
aid  of  his  defence  at  Law,  and  for  an  injunction;  and  where  there  are 
complicated  accounts,  he  may  pray  to  have  them  taken,  and  to  have 
the  balance  due  to  him  from  the  defendants  set  off  against  the  demand 
of  the  creditors,  without  making  his  assignees  parties,8  but  he  cannot 
ray  to  have  the  balance  paid  to  him,  because  that  belongs  to  his  assignees. 

The  rule  that,  where  the  person  by  law  entitled  to  represent  the  per- 
sonal estate  is  the  party  suing,  legatees  or  other  persons  interested  in 
the  estate  need  not  be  parties,  does  not  extend  to  the  case  of  a  residuary 
legatee  or  one  of  the  next  of  kin  suing  for  his  share  of  the  residue,  or  of 
one  legatee  interested  in  a  legacy  charged  on  real  estate,  or  one  person 
interested  in  the  proceeds  of  real  estate  directed  to  be  sold,  in  which 
case,  as  we  have  seen,  it  is  generally  necessary  that  all  the  members 
of  the  class  should  be  made  parties  to  the  suit,  either  as  plaintiffs  or 
defendants,  or  by  being  served  with  notice  of  the  decree,4  although 
where  the  number  of  the  class  is  great,  one  may  be  allowed  to  sue  on 
behalf  of  the  others.5  And  where  legacies  are  charged  upon  real 
estates,  it  will  not,  in  general,  be  sufficient  to  bring  the  executors 
before  the  Court,  for,  except  in  cases  coming  within  the  30th  Order  of 

nington  v  Buckley,  6  Hare,  451,  459  ;   11  Jur.  Wire  Rope  Co.  W.  N.  (1868)  296  ;  17  VV.  R. 

468  ;  Edwards  v.  Harvey,  9  Jur.  N.  S.  453;  11  155,  V.  C.  M.  ;  L.  R.  7  Eq.  267. 

W.  R.  330,  M.  B. ;  Peacock  v.  Saggers,  4  Ue  2  Sliarpe  v.  Gamon,  2  Vern.  32;  1  Eq.  Cas. 

G.  F.  &  J   406;  Samson  v.  Samson,  18  W.  R.  Abr.  72,  pi.  7,  S.  C. 

530;   lie  Ashmead,  L.  R.  8  Ch.  113;   and   see  3  I.owndes  v.  Taylor,  1  Mad.  423. 

Adams  v.  Barry,  2  Coll.  285,  where  the  Court  4  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  42,  rr.  1.8;  and  see  R. 

required   the   residuary  legatee  to  be  made  a  S.  C.  Ord.   XVI.  7,  9;  post,  Chap.   VII.  §  2, 

party.  Proceedinr/s  by  Service  of  Notice  of  the  Decree. 

6  Spragg  v.    Binkes,   5  Ves.    587.     An   as-  5  Harvey  v.  Harvey,  4  Beav.  215,  220;  see 

signce  in  bankruptcy  may  maintain  a  suit  to  also  Smart  c.  Bradstock,  7  Beav.  500;  Bateman 

set  aside   a  conveyance   by   the   bankrupt   in  v.  Margerison,  6  Hare,  496,  499;  but  see  Jones 

fraud  of  creditors.     Re  Gurney,  7   Biss.  414;  v.  Howe,  7  Hare,  267;  14  Jur.  145;  see  also 

Cady  ?;.  Whaling,  id.  430;  Johnson  v.  Helm-  Doody  v.  Higgins,  9  Hare  App.  32,  particularly 

staedter,  30  N.  J.  Eq.  124.  the  observations  of  Sir  George  Turner  V.  ('.  at 

l  De   Golls   v.  Ward,    3   P.   Wins.    311.  in  p.  38,  Gould  v.  Hayes,  19  Ala.   438.     All  the 

nutis;  Kaye  v.  Fosbrooke,  8  Sim.  28  ,   Dyson  v.  distributees  are  necessary  parties  to  a  bill  for 

Hornby,  7   De  G.  M.  &  G.  1.     Similarly  the  distribution.     Hawkins  v.  Craig,  1  B.  Mon.  27; 

debtor  is  not  a  necessary  party  to  suits  by  or  Osborne  v.  Taylor,  12  Grutt.  117;  but  see  Moore 

against  trustees  of  a  deed  duly  registered  under  v.  Gleaton,  23  Ga.  142;    Keeler   v.  Keeler,  11 

former  bankrupt  law:  Fenton  v.  Queen's  Ferry  N.  J.Eq.  458. 


(6)  To  a  bill  by  an  assignee  in  bankruptcy  of  the  assigned  estate,  should  be  parties,  if  it  is 

against  the  assignee  under  a  voluntary  assign-  desired  to  recover  from  them.    Liuder  v.  Lewis, 

ment,  to  set  it  aside,  intervening  execution  ere-  4  Fed.  Rep.  318. 
ditors,  who  have  received  part  of  the  proceeds 

221 


226 


OF   PARTIES   TO    A   SUIT. 


August,  1841,  above  mentioned,  all  the  other  legatees  must  be  parties ; 6 
it  seems,  however,  that  trustees  of  a  real  estate  for  payment  of  debts 
have  been  allowed,  before  that  order,  to  sue  without  bringing  before  the 

Court  the  creditors  or  legatees  for  whom  they  are  trustees; 7  but 
*  226    *  it  is  apprehended   that,   in  such  cases,  the   Court  would  now 

generally  allow  the  trustees  under  the  ninth  rule  above  referred 
to,  to  represent  the  creditors.1  And  now  one  of  several  cestui  que 
trusts,  under  any  deed  or  instrument,  may  be  a  plaintiff  or  defendant, 
as  representative  of  his  class,  in  a  suit  for  the  execution  of  the  trusts 
of  the  deed  or  instrument,  the  others  of  the  class  being  served  with 
notice  of  the  decree ; 2  but  any  cestui  que  trusts  who  have  concurred  in 
the  breach  of  trust  must  be  parties  to  a  suit  to  make  a  trustee  liable  for 
the  loss  occasioned  thereby.3 

Although,  in  ordinary  cases,  the  executor  represents  the  whole  per- 
sonal estate,  and  no  legatee  need  be  a  party,  the  appointees  under  the 
will  of  a  feme  covert  are  in  a  different  situation,  and  must  be  made 
parties;4  therefore,  where  the  administrator  with  the  will  annexed  of 
a  married  woman,  filed  a  bill,  praying  that  the  defendants  might  pay 
over  to  him  a  sum  of  money,  as  to  which  a  testamentary  appointment 
had  been  executed  by  the  testatrix,  by  virtue  of  a  power  in  her  mar- 
riage settlement,  without  making  the  appointees  parties,  the  case  was 
ordered  to  stand  over,  with  leave  for  the  plaintiff  to  amend  by  bringing 
the  appointees  before  the  Court.5  It  is  apprehended,  however,  that  the 
Court  would  not  now  require  the  cestui  que  trusts  to  be  parties  in  such 
a  case.6  Where  the  appointees  were  very  numerous,  and  the  bill  was 
filed  by  some  of  them  on  behalf  of  themselves  and  the  others,  the 
Court  dispensed  with  the  general  rule  which  required  them  all  to  be 


6  Morse  v.  Sadler,  1  Cox,  352;  Hallett  ?;. 
Hallett.  2  Paige,  15;  Todd  v.  Sterrett,  6  J.  J. 
Marsh.  432;  Howland  v.  Fish,  1  Paige,  20.  In 
this  last  case  the  Court  remark:  "In  Morse 
v.  Sadler,  1  Cox,  352,  the  Master  of  the  Rolls 
decided  that  every  legatee,  whose  legacy  was 
charged  on  the  real  estate,  must  be  a  party  to 
the  bill.  It  is  true  that  case  was  overruled  by 
Chancellor  Kent  in  Brown  v.  Ricketts,  3  John. 
Ch.  553,  where  it  was  held  that  one  legatee 
might  file  a  bill  in  favor  of  himself  and  all 
others,  who  might  choose  to  come  in  under  the 
decree.  But  even  then  Chancellor  Kent  con- 
siders it  necessary  that  the  bill  should  state 
the  fact  that  it  is  filed  in  behalf  of  the  plaintiff 
and  all  others,  &c.  The  reason  of  the  rule 
seems  to  be,  that  the  defendants  may  not  be 
charged  with  a  double  defence." 

7  Ld.  Red.  174;  see,  however,  Harrison  v. 
Stewardson,  2  Hare,  530;  Thomas  v.  Dunning, 
5  De  G.  &  S.  618.  Executors  suing  for  lega- 
cies charged  upon  land  after  the  estate  has  been 
settled  must  join  the  legatees  as  complainants 
with  them.  Cool  v.  Higgins,  25  N.  J.  Eq. 
117. 

>  Morley    v.   Morley,    25    Beav.   253.      In 
Knight  v.  Pocock,  24  Beav.  136;  4  Jur.  N.  S. 
222 


197,  it  was  held  that  trustees  did  not  represent 
creditors  who  had  not  acceded  to  the  deed. 
And  see,  on  this  point,  Johns  v.  James,  8  Ch. 
D.  744;  Re  Sanders,  47  L.  J.  Ch   667. 

2  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  42,  rr.  4,  6;  M'Leod 
v.  Annesley,  16  Beav.  600;  Jones  v.  James, 
9  Hare  App.  80  ;  and  see  post,  Chap.  III. 
§  2,  Proceedings  by  Service  of  Notice  of  the 
Decree. 

3  Jesse  v.  Bennett,  6  De  G.  M.  &  G.  609; 
2  Jur.  N.  S.  1125;  Williams  v.  Allen,  29  Beav. 
292.  One  of  several  cestui  que  trusts  cannot, 
on  an  allegation  that  the  trustees  refused  to 
take  proceedings,  maintain  a  suit  against  a 
debtor  to  the  trust.  The  remedy  is  by  a  general 
bill  for  the  execution  of  the  trust,  and  the  ap- 
pointment of  a  receiver  to  sue.  Sharpe  e.  San 
Paulo  By.  G..  L.  R  8  Ch  597;  Meldrum  v. 
Scorer,  56  L.  T   471. 

4  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  204,  and  note. 

s  Court  v.  Jeffery,  1  S.  &  S.  105;  but  see 
Owens  v.  Dickenson,  ante,  pp.  186,  187. 

6  Musters  v.  Wright,  2  De  G.  &  S.  777;  and 
see  Sewell  v.  Ashley,  3  De  G.  M.  &  G.  933;  Re 
Newberv,  Allcroft  v.  Farnan,  10  W.  R.  378,  V. 
C.  K. ;  Re  Hoskins,  5  Ch.  D.  229;  6  Ch.  D.  281. 


PERSONS    HAVING    CONCURRENT   INTERESTS    WITH    PLAINTIFF.        *  227 

parties.7  Where  a  bill  was  filed  by  one  of  four  children,  who  were 
appointees  of  their  mother,  to  set  aside  the  appointment  on  account  of 
the  unfairness  of  the  distribution,  it  was  held  that  all  the  other  children 
who  were  appointees  need  not  be  parties,  because  they  might  go  in 
before  the  Master.8 

Where  there  are  more  than  one  executor  or  administrator,  they  must 
all  be  parties  to  the  suit,  though  one  of  them  be  an  infant.9  Where, 
however,  one  executor  of  several  has  alone  proved,  he  may 
*sue  without  making  the  other  executors  parties,  although  they  *227 
have  not  renounced.1  And  where  a  person  devises  that  his 
executors  shall  sell  his  land,  and  leaves  two  executors  who  renounce, 
and  administration  is  granted  to  A,  who  brings  a  bill  against  the  heir 
to  compel  a  sale,  the  renouncing  executors,  in  whom  the  power  of 
sale  collateral  to  the  executorship  was  vested,  ought  not,  it  seems,  to  be 
made  parties.2  It  is  not,  however,  necessary  that  the  executors  or 
administrators  should  be  all  co-plaintiffs;  for  it  is  sufficient  that  all 
parties  interested  should  be  before  the  Court,  either  as  plaintiffs  or 
defendants;3  and,  therefore,  one  executor  may  sue  without  his  co- 
executor  joining,   if  the  co-executor  be  made  a  defendant.4 

The  rale  that  all  persons  claiming  concurrent  interests  with  the 
plaintiff  are  necessary  parties,  equally  applies  whether  the  interest  be 
in  possession,  remainder,  or  reversion;  and  upon  this  principle  it  is 
held,  that  in  all  cases  in  which  an  estate  is  claimed  by  a  person  deriv- 
ing title  under  a  settlement,  made  either  by  deed  or  will,  it  is  necessary 
to  make  all  the  persons  claiming  under  such  settlement  parties  to  the 
suit,  down  to  the  person  entitled  to  the  first  vested  estate  of  inheri- 
tance, either  in  fee  or  in  tail,  inclusive.5  And  where  A  was  tenant  for 
years,  with  remainder  to  B  for  life,  with  remainder  to  C  in  fee,  and 

1  Manning  v.  Thesiger,  1  S.  &  S.  106  ;  Story,  77;  Vickers  v.  Bell,  4  De  G.  J.  &  S.  271,  283 ; 

Eq.  PI.  §  217.  10  Jur.  N.  S.  376;  Re  Lovett,  3  Ch.   D.   198; 

8  Craker  v.  Parrott,  2  Ch.  Cas.  228.         ,  and  see  2  Wins.  Exors.  1875;  Add.  Cont.  1050. 

9  Oifley  v.  Jenney,  3  Ch.  Rep.  92  ;  2  Wms.  But  an  executor,  though  he  has  not  proved  the 
Exors.  1875  ;  Cramer  v.  Morton,  2  Moll.  108;  will,  is  a  necessary  party  defendant  to  a  suit  to 
see  Latch  v.  Latch,  L.  R.  10  Ch.  461.  Rule  6,  carry  the  trusts  of  the  will  into  execution, 
adopted  in  15  &  16  Vic.  c  86,  provided  that  Ferguson  v.  Ferguson,  1  Hayes  &  J.  300;  Yates 
"any  executor,  administrator,  or  trustee  may  v.  Compton,  2  P.  W.  308;  Cramer  p.  Morton, 
obtain  a  decree  against  any  legatee,  next  of  2  Moll.  108;  Thompson  v.  Graham,  1  Paige, 
kin,  or  ctstui  que  trust,  for  the  administration  384;  see  Judson  v.  Gibbons,  5  Wend.  224. 

of  the  estate,  or  the  execution  of  the  trusts."  -  Yates  v.  Compton,  2  P.  Wms.  308. 

1  Davies  v.   Williams,    I  Sim.  5;  Dyson  v.  3  Wilkins  v.  Fry,  1  Mer.  244,  262. 

Morris,  1  Hare,  413.  Rinehart  v.  Riuehart.  15  *  Blount  v.  Burrow,  3  Bro   C.  C.  90;  Smith 

N  J.  Eq    144;  Marsh  v.  Oliver,  14   N.  J.    Eq.  v.  Lawreiice.il  Paige,  208;  Lucas  v.  Scale,  2 

262.      It  will  be  seen  on  referring  to  the  report  Atk.  56;  McGregor  v.  McGregor,  35  N.  Y.  218; 

of  the  case  of  Davies  v.  Williams,  supra,  that  Ransom  v.  Geer,  30  N.  J.  Eq.  249;  see  Dane  v. 

Sir  John  Leach  V.  C   is  reported  to  have  said:  Allen,  1    Green,  Ch.  288.    It   appears   to  have 

'Where  one   executor  has   alone  proved,   he  been   at  first  doubted   whether  a  co-executor 

may  sue  in  Equity,  as  well  as  at  Law,  without  refusing  to  join  as  co-plaintiff  was  entitled  to 

naming  the   others  as   parties;"  but   in  Cum-  his  costs.     3  Bro.  C.  C  90. 
mins    o.  Cummins,   3  Jo.    &    Eat.  92,  Ld.  St.  5  Kinch  v.  Finch,  2  Ves.  Sr.  492;  Sohier  ». 

Leonards,  then    Lord    Chancellor   of  Ireland,  Williams,  1  Curtis,  479;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  144, 

speaking  of  this  case,  said:  "  This  may  he  do  as  note.  Where  the  first  tenant  in  tail  was  a  lunatic, 

to  suits  in   Equity,  but  certainly  it  is  not  the  the  person  entitled  to  the  next  estate  of  inherit- 

case  as  to  actions  at  Lmw."    And  see  Hensloe's  ance  was   held   a  proper  party.     Singleton  v. 

Case,  3  Rep.  366;  Kilby  v.  Stanton,  2  Y.  &  J.  Hopkins,  1  Jur.  N.  S.  1199. 

223 


*  228  OF   PARTIES   TO    A    SUIT. 

B  brought  a  bill  against  A  for  an  injunction  to  restrain  his  commit- 
ting waste,  it  was  held  that  the  remaindei-man,  or  the  reversioner  in 
fee,  ought  to  be  before  the  Court.6  It  will  be  borne  in  mind,  however, 
that  where  the  property  is  vested  in  trustees  under  a  deed  or  will,  the 
trustees  now  generally  represent  all  the  cestui  que  trusts."1 

It  is  not  necessary  in  such  cases  to  bring  before  the  Court  any 

*  228    *  person  entitled  in  remainder  or  reversion  after  the  first  vested 

estate  of  inheritance,  because  such  person  is  considered  sufficient 
to  support  all  those  who  are  in  remainder  behind  him.1  And  if  there 
be  a  tenant  for  life,  remainder  to  his  first  son  in  tail,  remainder  over, 
and  the  tenant  for  life  is  brought  before  the  Court  before  he  has  issue, 
the  contingent  remainder-men  are  bound.2  All  persons  entitled  to 
intermediate  estates,  prior  to  the  first  vested  estate  of  inheritance, 
should,  however,  be  before  the  Court.  Thus,  where  a  marriage  settle- 
ment was  made  of  lands  on  the  husband  for  life,  remainder  to  the  wife 
for  life,  with  divers  remainders  over,  and  a  bill  was  brought  by  the 
husband,  in  order  to  have  the  opinion  of  the  Court  whether  a  certain 
parcel  of  land  was  not  intended  to  be  included  in  the  settlement,  and 
the  wife  was  not  a  party,  the  case  was  ordered  to  stand  over,  in 
order  that  she  might  be  made  a  party,  as,  if  a  decree  should  be  made 
against  the  husband,  it  would  not  bind  her.8  So,  where  a  bill  was 
brought  by  a  son,  who  was  remainder-man  in  tail  under  a  settlement, 
against  his  father,  who  was  tenant  for  life  under  the  same  settlement, 
to  have  the  title-deeds  brought  into  Court  that  they  might  be  forthcom- 
ing for  the  benefit  of  all  parties  interested,  and  objections  were  taken 
for  want  of  parties,  one  of  which  was,  that  a  daughter  of  the  defend- 
ant, who  was  interested  in  a  trust  term  for  years,  prior  to  the  limitation 
to  the  plaintiff,  was  not  before  the  Court,  the  objection  was  held  good.4 
Another  objection  in  this  case  was,  because  certain  annuitants  of  the 
son,  upon  his  reversion  after  the  death  of  his  father,  were  not  parties, 
and  Lord  Hardwicke  held,  that  he  could  not  make  the  order  prayed 
until  the  annuitants  were  first  heard,  and  that  consequently  the  objec- 
tion must  be  allowed.5  From  this  it  would  seem,  that  although  a 
remainder-man  in  tail  may  maintain  a  suit  without  bringing  the  per- 
sons entitled  to  subsequent  remainders  before  the  Court,  yet  if  he  has 
charged  or  incumbered  his  estate  in  remainder,  the  persons  interested 
in  such  charge  or  incumbrance  must  be  parties;  and  it  is  held,  that  a 
person  claiming   under  a  limitation  by  way  of   executory  devise,  not 

6  By  Lord    King,  in    Mollineux   ?•.  Powell,  v.  Barnard.  1  Tenn.  Ch.  304;  Brevoort  v.  Bre- 

cited  3  P.  Wins.  268,  n.;  but  see  1   Dick.  197,  voort,  70  N.  Y.  136.     And  see  where  the  estate 

198,  and  Eden  on  Injunctions,  163;  Story,  Eq.  is  subject  to  a  contingency,  infra,  266,  note  4. 
PI.  §  159.  2  Per  Lord  Kedesdale,  in  Giffard  v.  Hort,  1 

1  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  42,  r.  9.    See  R  S.  C.  Sch.  &  Lef.  408 ;  and  see  aiso,  as  to  tenants  for 

Ord.  XVI.  7.  life  representing  persons  contingently  entitled 

1  Anon.  2  Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  166,  pi.  8;  Lloyd  v.  in  remainder,  in  a  suit  as  to  personalty,  Fowler 

Johnes,  9  Ves.  37,  55;  Beiolev  v.  Carter,  L.  R.  o.  James,  1  C.  P.  Coop,  temp  Cott.  290 ;  1  Phil. 

4  Ch.  230;  Eagle   Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Cammet,  2  803;  and  see  Roberts  t?.  Roberts,  2  Phil.  534;  12 

Edw.  Ch.  127;  Baker  v.  Baker,  1  Rich.  Eq.  392;  Jur.  148;  2  De  G.  &  S.  29. 
Bofil  v.  Fisher,  3  Rich   Eq.  1;  Ex  parte  Dodd,  8  Herring  v.  Yeo,  1  Atk.  290. 

Phil.  Eq.  (N.  C.)  97;   Freeman    v.  Freeman,  9  *  Pyncent  v.  Pyncent,  3  Atk.  571. 

Heisk.  306;  Parker  v.  Peters,  6  Rep.  347;  Gray  5  Ibid. 

224 


PERSONS    HAVING    CONCURRENT    INTERESTS    WITH    PLAINTIFF.        *  230 

subject  to  any  preceding  estate  of  inheritance  by  which  it  may 

be  defeated,  *inust  be  a  party  to  a  suit  in  which  his  rights  are    *229 

involved;  1  but  executory  devisees  not  in  esse  may  be  bound  by 

a  decree  against  the  first  estate  of  inheritance. 

Where  the  intermediate  estate  is  contingent,  and  the  person  to  take 
is  not  ascertained,  it  is  sufficient  to  have  before  the  Court  the  trustees, 
if  any,  to  support  the  contingent  remainder,  together  with  the  first 
person  in  esse  entitled  to  the  first  vested  estate  of  inheritance.2 

If  a  person  entitled  to  an  interest  prior  in  limitation  to  any  estate 
of  inheritance  before  the  Court,  should  be  born  pending  the  suit,  that 
person  must  be  brought  before  the  Court  by  supplemental  bill ;  3  and  if 
the  first  tenant  in  tail  is  plaintiff  and  dies  without  issue  before  the 
termination  of  the  suit,  the  next  remainder-man  in  tail,  although  he 
claims  by  new  limitation,  and  not  through  the  first  plaintiff  as  his 
issue,  is  entitled  to  continue  the  suit  by  supplemental  bill,  and  to 
have  the  benefit  of  the  evidence  and  proceedings  therein;4  and  so 
where  a  tenant  in  tail  who  is  a  defendant  dies,5  or  his  interest  is  post- 
poned by  the  birth  of  a  tenant  in  tail  entitled  under  prior  limitations,6  («) 
the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  carry  on  the  proceedings,  on  bringing  the 
person  who  has  become  the  first  tenant  in  tail  before  the  Court. 

In  all  the  preceding  cases  the  rights  of  the  several  parties  to  the 
subject-matter  in  litigation  were  consistent  with  each  other,  and 
*were  the  result  of  the  same  state  of  facts,  so  that  the  same  *230 
evidence  which  would  establish  those  facts  would  establish  the 
rights  of  all  the  parties  to  maintain  the  litigation.  It  is,  therefore, 
required  that  all  the  parties  so  deriving  their  right  of  litigation  from 
the  same  facts,  should,  subject  to  the  exceptions  which  we  have  noticed, 

1  Ld-  Red.  174.  of  litigation  was  settled  upon  Baron  Clinton  for 

2  Lord  Cholmondeley  v.  Lord  Clinton,  2  J.  &  life,  and,  after  remainders  to  his  children 
W.  1,  133;  4  Bligh,  1 ;  2  Mer.  171 ;  see  Sohier  (who  were  unborn)  and  their  heirs  in  tail,  upon 
v.  Williams,  1  Curtis,  479;  Nodine  v.  Green-  the  person  who  should  then  be  entitled  to  claim 
field,  7  Paige,  544.  Trustees  to  support  con-  as  Baron  Clinton  in  tail,  with  ultimate  remain- 
tingent  remainders  are  now  no  longer  neces-  der  to  the  existing  Lord  Clinton  in  fit-,  it  was 
sary;  8  &  9  Vic  c.  10G,  §  8;  40&41  Vic.  c.  33.  objected  that  the  person  presumptively  entitled 
Lord  Hardwicke,  in  Hopkins  v.  Hopkins,  1  Atk.  to  the  barony,  ought  to  have  been  a  party;  but 
690  (but  as  to  the  report  of  this  case,  see  2  J.  Sir  William  Grant  M.  R.  overruled  the  objec- 
&  W.  18, 192),  states  the  practice  upon  this  point  tion  upon  the  ground  above  stated. 

thus:  "If  there  are  ever  so  many  contingent  3  Ld.  Red.  174,  and  see  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  L. 

limitations  of  a  trust,  it  is  an  established  rule,  4  Lloyd  v.  Johnes,  9  Ves.  37,  58. 

that  it  is  sufficient  to  bring  the  trustees  before  5  Cress  well  r.  Bateman,  6  W.  R.  206  220 

the  Court,  together  with  him  in  whom  the  first  V.  C.  K.;  Reg.  Lib.  1857,  A.  424. 

remainder  of   the  inheritance  is  vested  ;    and  6  Egremont   v.  Thompson,  L.  R.  4  Ch.  448, 

they  that  may  come  after  will  be  hound   by  L   C.     See  Auster  v.  Haines.  L.  R.  4  Ch.  445, 

the  decree,  though  not  in  esse,  unless  there  be  n.;    Browne   v.    Huggins,    W.    N.    (1875)   59; 

fraud  or  collusion  between  the  trustees  and  the  Occleston  »    Fullalove,  id.  92;  32  L.  T.  N.  S. 

first  person  in  whom  the  inheritance  is  vested."  421;    Scruby    v.   Payne,  W.   N.   (1870)  227; 

Tons,  in  Lord  Cholmondeley  v.  Lord  Clinton,  Capps  v.  Capps,  L.  R.  4  Ch.  1,  12. 

supra,  in  which  the  estate  which  was  the  subject 


(a)  See  Powell  v.  Phillips,  24  L.  T.  N.  S.  order  to  revive.  Askew  v.  Rooth,  44  L.  J.  Ch. 
128:  Scott  v  Duncombe,  L.  R.  9  Eq.fi64,  over-  200.  In  England,  the  infant  should  now  be 
ruling  Grnnwell  v.  Garner,  L.  R  8  Eq.  355.  brought  in  by  the  common  order  .under  R.  S.  C. 
In  Equity,  the  infant  must  be  brought  in  by  a  1883,  Ord.  XVII. .  rule  4.  Peter  v.  Thomas- 
supplemental    bill,    and   not  by   the    common  Peter,  20  Ch.  D.  181. 

vol.  i. —  15  225 


*230 


OF    PARTIES    TO    A    SUIT. 


be  brought  before  the  Court,  in  order  that  such  their  rights  may  be 
simultaneously  disposed  of.  Where,  however,  the  claims  of  the  several 
persons  to  the  subject-matter  of  the  suit  do  not  arise  out  of  the  same 
state  of  circumstances  but  can  only  be  supported  upon  grounds  which 
are  inconsistent  with  each  other,  so  that,  if  the  grounds  upon  which 
the  plaintiff  supports  his  claim  be  correct,  the  case  relied  upon  by  the 
other  parties  claiming  the  same  thing  cannot  be  supported,  then  such 
other  parties  need  not  be  brought  before  the  Court.1  And  according  to 
the  original  practice  of  the  Court  of  Chancery,  if  persons  having  incon- 
sistent titles,  as,  for  instance,  the  devisee  and  heir-at-law,  were  joined 
as  co-plaintiffs,  there  was  a  misjoinder  and  no  relief  could  be  granted, 
and  the  suit  had  to  be  dismissed;2  though  afterwards  the  Court  of 
Chancery  was  enabled  to  grant  relief  notwithstanding  such  a  mis- 
joinder.3 Now,  according  to  the  practice  of  the  High  Court  of  Justice 
in  England,  all  persons  may  be  joined  as  plaintiffs  in  whom  the  right 
to  any  relief  claimed  is  alleged  to  exist,  whether  jointly,  severally,  or 
in  the  alternative,  and  judgment  may  be  given  for  such  one  or  more 
of  the  plaintiffs  as  may  be  found  entitled  to  relief,  for  such  relief  as  he 
or  they  maybe  entitled  to  without  any  amendment;  but  the  defendant  is 
in  every  case  entitled  to  any  costs  occasioned  by  joining  a  plaintiff  who 
is  found  not  entitled  to  relief,4  and  no  action  will  be  defeated  by  rea- 
son of  the  misjoinder  of  parties,  and  the  Court  may  deal  with  the 
matter  in  controversy  so  far  as  regards  the  rights  and  interests  of  the 
parties  before  it,  or  may  strike  out  or  add  parties.5 

In  suits  for  specific  performance,  it  is  a  general  rule,  that  none  but 
parties  to  the  contract  are  necessary  parties  to  the  suit; 6  (a)  and  a  mere 


1  For  application  of  this  principle  to  suits 
for  tithes  by  impropriator  or  vicar,  see  William- 
son v.  Lonsdale,  Dan.  Ex.  171;  9  Price,  187; 
Williams  v.  Price,  Dan.  13;  4  Price,  15G  ;  Carte 
v.  Ball,  3  Atk.  500;  Petch  v.  Dalton,  Scacc. 
Jan.  1819,  cited  1J.  &  W.  515;  Daws  ».  Benn, 
id.  513;  Jac.  95;  Baily  v.  Worrall,  Bunb.  115; 
Cook  v.  Blunt,  2  Sim.  417;  Wing  v.  Morrell, 
M'Cl.  &  Y.  625;  Tooth  v.  Dean  of  Canterbury, 
3  Sim.  49;  Wing  v.  Morrell,  M'Cl.  &  Y.  625; 
Pierson  v.  David,  1  Clarke  (Iowa),  23. 

2  Lord  Cholmondeley  v.  Lord  Clinton,  2  J. 
&  W.  1,  135;  4  Bligh,  1;  Sugd.  Law  Prop.  61, 
74;  S.  C.  T.  &  R.  107,  115;  see  also  Att.-Gen. 
v.  Tarrington,  Hardres,  219;  Fulham  v.  M'Car- 
thy,  1  H.  L.  Cas.  703;  12  Jur.  755;  Bill  v. 
Cureton,  2  M.  &  K.  503,  512;  Saumarez  v. 
Saumarez,  4  M.  &  C.  336;  Robertson  v.  South- 
gate,  6  Hare,  536  :  but  see  Greggs  ?'.  Staplee,  2 
De  G.  &  S.  572,  588;  13  Jur.  29;  Jopp  v.  Wood, 
2  De  G.  J.  &  S.  323;  Newcomb  r.  Horton,  18 


Wis.  566;  Crocker  v.  Craig,  46  Maine,  "327; 
Fletcher  v.  Holmes,  40  Maine,  364  ;  Gates  v. 
Boomer,  17  Wis.  455.  So  persons  liable  to 
account  to  each  other  could  not  be  co-plaintiffs. 
See  Jacob  v.  Lucas,  1  Beav.  436,  443 ;  Griffith 
v.  Vanheythuysen,  9  Hare,  85;  15  Jur.  421. 
The  objection  for  misjoinder  appears  not  to 
apply  to  a  sole  plaintiff  uniting  in  himself  two 
conflicting  interests.  Miles  v.  Durnford.  2  De 
G.  M.  &  G.  641;  Carter  v.  Sanders,  2  Drew. 
248;  Foulkes  v.  Davies,  L.  R.  7  Eq.  42. 

3  See  p.  234,  post. 

i  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  XVI.  1.  Respecting  alter- 
native defences,  suits  on  behalf  of  corporations, 
and  class  suits  under  the  present  English  prac- 
tice, see  the  6th  Eng.  ed.  of  this  work,  Vol.  I. 
pp.  195-202. 

s  R.  S.  C  Ord.  XVI.  13. 

6  Tasker  v.  Small,  3  M.  &  C.  63,  69 ;  1  Jur. 
936;  Wood  v.  White,  4  M.  &  C.  460;  Robert- 
son  v.   Great  Western   Ry.  Co.  10  Sim.  314; 


(a)  See  Washburn  &  Moen  Manuf.  Co.  v. 
Chicago  G.  W.  F.  Co.  109  111.  71;  Moulton  v. 
Chaffee,  22  Fed.  Rep.  26;  Hubbard  v.  Johnson, 
77  Maine,  139  ;  McKay  v.  Broad,  70  Ala.  377; 
Behr  r.  Willard,  11  Neb.  601.  Written  instru- 
ments are  reformed  in  equity  only  between  the 
original  parties  and  those  claiming  under  them 

226 


in  privity,  including  purchasers  from  them  with 
notice.  Cross  v.  Bean,  81  Maine,  525.  In  a 
suit  to  reform  a  declaration  of  trust  as  to  one  of 
separate  interests,  those  only  are  necessary  par- 
ties who  are  concerned  in  that  interest. 
v.  Waterman,  85  Cal.  488. 


Ward 


PERSONS    HAYING    CONCURRENT    INTERESTS    WITH    PLAINTIFF.       *  231 


stranger  claiming  under  an  adverse  title  should  not  be  made  a  party  to 
such  a  suit,7  although  a  person  claiming  by  virtue  of  an  antecedent 
agreement  is  a  proper  party  to  a  suit  by  a  purchaser  for  specific  per- 
formance, and  to  have  the  right  to  the  purchase-money  ascer- 
tained.8 Where,  however,  there  are  other  persons  so  *  inter-  *231 
ested  in  the  subject-matter  of  the  contract  that  their  concurrence 
is  necessary  for  the  completion  of  the  title,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  vendor 
to  bring  them  forward,  to  assist  in  giving  effect  to  his  contract.1  As 
plaintiffs,  they  have  no  right  to  sue;  and  if  such  persons  are  infants, 
and  it  were  attempted,  by  making  them  co-plaintiffs  with  the  vendor, 
to  bind  their  rights  by  a  decree,  the  fact  of  their  being  so  made  parties 
would  be  a  fatal  objection  to  the  suit;  and  whether  the  point  was  or 
was  not  raised  by  the  other  parties  the  Court  would  refuse  to  pronounce 
a  decree.2  In  some  cases,  where,  subsequently  to  the  contract,  another 
person  has  acquired  an  interest  under  the  vendor,  with  notice  of  the 
rights  of  the  purchaser,  the  latter  has,  in  a  suit  for  specific  perform- 
ance, been  allowed  to  join  such  person  with  the  vendor  as  a  defendant 
to  the  suit;3  and  where  the  vendor  has  parted  with  the  possession,  he 
must  join  the  lessee  of  the  purchaser  as  defendant  to  a  suit  for  specific 
performance,  and  a  declaration  of  his  lien  for  unpaid  purchase-money. 4(a) 


Humphreys  v.  Ho] lis,  .lac.  73;  Paterson  v. 
Long,  5  Beav.  186;  Peacock  v.  Fenson,  11  Beav. 
355;  12  .lur.  951;  Petre  v.  Duncombe,  7  Hare, 
24;  De  Hoghton  v.  Money,  L  R.  2  Ch.  164, 
170,  L.  JJ. ;  Bishop  of  Winchester  v.  Mid  Hants 
Ry.  Co.  L.  R.  5  En,.  17,  V.  C.  S.;  Aberaman 
Iron  Works  Co.  v.  Wickens,  L.  R.  4  Ch.  101, 
L.  C;  Fen  wick  v.  Bulman,  L.  R.  9  Eq.  165, 
V.  C.  S.J  Lumley  v.  Timms,  21  W.  R.  319, 
494;  W.  N.  (1873)70;  Treleaven  v.  Brav,  1 
Ch.  D.  176,  45  L.  J.  Ch.  113;  Harry  r.  Davey, 
2  Ch.  D.  721.  See  38  &  30 Vic.  c.  87,  §  93 ;  see, 
however,  Daking  v.  Whimper,  26  Beav.  588; 
see  Morgan  v.  Morgan,  2  Wheat.  290;  Lord  n. 
Underdunck,  1  Sandf.  Ch.  46;  Hoover  v.  Don- 
ally,  3  Hen.  &  M.  316;  Preston  v.  Walsh,  10 
Ved.  Rep.  315.     Infra,  279,  n.  1. 

V  Tasker  v.  Small,  3  M.  &  C.  03,  69;  1  .Tur. 
936;  De  Hoghton  v.  Money,  L.  R.  2  Ch.  164, 
170,  L.  JJ.  But  see  Carter  v.  Mills,  30  Miss. 
432,  cited  infra. 

8  West  Midland  Ry.  Co.  v.  Nixon,  1  H.  &  M. 


176 ;  and  see  Chadwick  v.  Maden,  9  Hare  188; 
Burr  v.  Wimbledon  Local  Board  (No.  1),  56  L. 
T.  329;  35  W.  R.  404. 

i  Wood  v.  White,  4  M.  &  C.  460,  483; 
Chadwick  v.  Maden,  9  Hare,  188. 

2  Wood  n.  White,  4  M.  &  C.  460,  483.  See 
Williams  v.  Leech,  28  Penn.  St.  SJ;  Burger  v. 
Potter,  32  111.  66. 

3  Spence  r.  Hogg,  1  Coll.  225;  Collett  r. 
Hover,  1  Coll.  227;  but  see  Cutts  v.  Thodey,  13 
Sim.  206;  6  Jur.  1027;  and  1  Coll.  212,  n.  (a), 
223  n.;  see  also  Leuty  v.  Hillas,  2  De  G.  & 
J.  110;  4  Jur.  N.  S.  1106;  and  see  R.  S.  C. 
Ord.  XVI.  1.  In  a  suit  for  the  specific  perform- 
ance of  a  contract  to  convey  land,  a  person 
nut  made  a  party,  who  claims  a  superior  title 
to  the  land  in  question  under  the  party  of 
whom  performance  is  sought,  may  come  in  and 
assert  his  rights;  as  a  decree  might  affect  them 
injuriously  by  casting  a  cloud'  upon  his  title. 
Carter  v.  Mills,  30  Miss.  432. 

4  Bishop  of  Winchester  v.  Md.  Hants  Ry.  Co. 


(a)  So  a  railway  company,  which  works 
the  line  of  another  company  under  legislative 
authority,  is  a  necessary  party  to  a  bill  for 
specific  performance  tiled  by  an  unpaid  vendor 
against  the  latter  company,  and  must  bear  its 
own  costs  of  suit.  Goodford  v.  Stonehouse  & 
N.  Ry.  Co.,  38  L.  J.  Ch.  307;  Marling  r. 
Stonehouse  &  N.  Ry.  Co.,  id.  306.  A  third 
person  to  whom  a  vendor,  after  signing  a  con- 
tract to  convey  land,  has  transferred  it,  should 
be  a  party  with  the  vendor  to  a  bill  for  a 
specific  execution  of  the  con'ract;  and  so  if 
the   vendor  h  :s  made  a  new  contract  to  sell. 


Babb  r  Lindley,  23  Kansas,  478.  4^0.  The 
heirs-at-law  of  the  obligor  in  a  bond  for  till.' 
are  necessary  parties  to  a  bill  brought  by  his 
personal  representative  to  subject  the  land  to 
payment  of  the  purchase-money  in  order  that  a 
judicial  sale  of  the  land  may  be  effectual. 
Grubb  v.  Loekabill,  100  N.  C.  267.  A  unila- 
teral agreement  for  land  may  be  enforced  in 
equity  by  the  party  who  has  not  signed  it. 
Miller  v.  Cameron,  45  N.  J.  Eq.  95;  Caskad- 
don  v.  Kennedy,  40  id.  259;  see  Woodruff  v. 
Woodruff,  44  id.  349. 

227 


232 


OF    PARTIES    TO    A    SUIT. 


Formerly  it  was  the  invariable  practice  of  Courts  of  Equity  to  require 
the  heir-at-law  to  be  a  party  to  a  suit  in  all  cases  where  the  trusts  of 
a  will  of  real  estate  were  sought  to  be  executed.  This  practice  arose 
from  the  peculiar  principle  adopted  by  Courts  of  Equity  in  cases  of 
wills  relating  to  real  estate;  namely,  that  they  would  not  carry  into 
effect  a  will  of  real  estate,  until  the  due  execution  had  been  either 
admitted  by  the  heir  or  proved  against  him.  For  this  purpose,  it  was 
necessary  that  the  heir  should  be  made  an  adverse  party.  The  case  of 
an  heir-at-law  was,  therefore,  an  exception  to  the  rule  above  laid  down, 
that  persons  claiming  under  titles  inconsistent  with  those  of  the  plain- 
tiff, need  not  be  made  parties  to  the  suit.  This  exception  has  now 
been  in  a  great  measure  abolished  by  the  31st  Order  of 
*232  August,  1841. 5  Before  this  Order,  it  was  necessary  in  *  suits  for 
the  administration  of  real  assets  under  3  &  4  Will.  IV.  c.  104, 
that  the  heir-at-law,  as  well  as  the  devisee,  should  be  a  party ; l  and 
where  the  suit  was  brought  against  the  devisee,  under  the  Statute  of 
Fraudulent  Devises,2  the  heir-at-law  was  a  necessary  party.3 

Although,  however,  the  heir-at-law  was  a  necessary  party  to  suits 
instituted  for  the  purpose  of  making  devised  estates  applicable  to  the 
payment  of  debts,  he  was  not  a  necessary  party  to  suits  instituted  by 
creditors  claiming  under  a  deed  whereby  estates  had  been  conveyed  to 
trustees  to  sell  for  payment  of  debts,  unless  he  was  entitled  to  the 
surplus  of  the  money  arising  from  the  sale.4 

Even  before  the  last-mentioned  Order,  there  were  some  cases  in 
which  the  Court  would  direct  the  execution  of  the  trusts  of  a  will, 
where  the  heir-at-law  was  not  a  party ;  thus,  where  a  trustee  had  been 


L.  R.  5  Eq.   17,  V.  C.  S. ;    and   see   Att.-Gen. 

v.  Sittingbourne  &  Sheerness  Ry.  Co.  35  Beav. 
2G8,  271;  L.  R.  1  Eq.  636.  630;  Goodford  v. 
Storehouse  &  Nailsworth  Ry.  Co.  W.  N. 
(1869)  67;  17  W.  R.  515,  V.  C.  M.;  Marling 
v.  Stonehouse  &  Nailsworth  Ry.  Co.  W.  N. 
(1869)  60;  17  W.  R.  484,  V.  C.  j'.  To  a  bill  for 
the  specific  execution  of  a  contract  for  the  sale 
of  land  made  by  the  complainant  as  president  of 
a  manufacturing  company,  for  the  benefit  of  the 
company  and  relating  to  its  hinds,  the  company 
is  a  necessary  party.  Nichols  v.  Williams,  22 
N.  .1.  Eq.  63.  So,  to  a  bill  filed  by  the  pur- 
■  chaser.  at  execution  sale,  of  the  interest  of  a 
•vendee  in  land,  against  the  original  ven  lor,  for 
specific  performance,  the  vendee  is  a  necessary 
'party.  Alexander  v.  Hoffman,  70  111.  114. 
And  to  a  bill  against  the  vendor  to  cancel  the 
•contract,  a  person  interested  in  the  subject- 
matter  of  sale  and  entitled  to  half  the  pur- 
chase-money, is  a  necessary  party.  Atki  ;s  r. 
Billings  72  111.  597.  And  the  assignee  in 
bankruptcy  of  a  claimant  of  real  estate  is  a 
necessary  pi  ry  to  a  bill  seeking  to  affect  the 
title  to  the  realty.  Harris  v.  Cornell,  80  111. 
54.  And  see,  as  to  a  bill  for  the  enforcement 
of  vendor's  lien  for  purchase-money,  infra, 
1653.  note  6. 

5  This   Order  provided,    "that  in   suits  to 

228 


execute  the  trusts  of  a  will,  it  shall  not  be  neces- 
sary to  make  the  heir-at-law  a  party:  but  the 
plaintiff  shall  be  at  liberty  to  make  him  a  party 
when  he  desires  to  have  the  w  11  established 
against  him."  Cons.  Ord.  VII.  1.  This 
Order  has  been  adopted  in  the  Equity  Rules  of 
the  United  States  Supreme  Court.     Rule  50. 

1  Brown  v.  Weatherby,  10  Sim.  125:  now 
it  is  so  no  longer:  Weeks  v.  Evans,  7  Sim. 
546;  Bridges  v.  Hinxman,  16  Sim.  71;  Good- 
child  v.  Terrett,  5  Bea"  398;  Burch  v.  Coney, 
14  Jur.  1009,  V.  C.  K.  6.;  Shakels  v.  Richard- 
son, 2  Coll.  31. 

2  3  &  4  W.  &  M.  c.  14. 

3  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  163.  Where  the  real 
estate  of  the  deceased  party  is  by  statute  made 
assets  for  the  payment  of  debts,  it  is  unneces- 
sary to  make  the  heir  or  devisee  of  the  estate 
a  party  to  the  suit  for  the  administration  of 
the  assets.  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  163,  and  note; 
Ex  parte  Rulluff,  1  Mass.  240;  Grignon  v. 
Astor,  2  How.  U.  S.  319,  338;  but  see  Gladson 
v.  Whitney,  9  Iowa,  267;  and  Frazier  v. 
Pankey,  1  Swan,  "5  (where  the  contrary  was 
held);" Chew  v.  Hyman,  10  Biss.  240. 

4  To  a  bill  to  change  a  legacy  on  land  of  a 
married  woman,  she  is  a  necessary  party. 
Lewis  v.  Darling,  16  Peters,  1. 


PERSONS    HAVING    CONCURRENT    INTERESTS    WITH    PLAINTIFF.       *  234 

dead  several  years,  and  freehold  lands  subject  to  the  trust  had  been 
quietly  enjoyed  under  the  will,  a  sale  was  decreed  without  the  heir  being 
a  party.5  So,  where  the  heir-at-law  was  abroad,  or  could  not  be  found, 
or  made  default  at  the  hearing,  the  trusts  of  a  will  have  been  executed 
in  his  absence,  but  without  a  declaration  that  the  will  was  well  proved ; 6 
and  even  upon  some  occasions  the  Court  has,  upon  due  proof  of  the 
execution  of  the  will  and  of  the  sanity  of  the  testator,  declared  the 
will  well  proved  in  the  absence  of  the  heir.7 

As  there  is  no  provision  in  the  Order 8  to  make  evidence  of  the  execu- 
tion of  the  will  and  the  sanity  of  the  testator,  taken  in  the  absence  of 
the  heir-at-law,  admissible  against  him  or  any  one  claiming  under 
him,  the  Court  still  continues  unable,  by  decree  in  his  absence,  to 
insure  the  title  against  his  rights.9  As  the  Order  provides  for  the 
execution  of  the  trusts  of  a  will  in  the  absence  of  the  heir,  and  also 
gives  liberty  to  make  him  a  party,  where  it  is  sought  to  have  the  will 
established  against  him,  it  seems  scarcely  probable  that,  under 
any  circumstances,  the  old  *  practice,  of  declaring  a  will  well  *233 
proved  in  the  absence  of  the  heir  will  be  continued.1  It  was 
formerly  the  practice,  where  the  heir-at-law  could  not  be  found,  to 
make  the  Attorney-General  a  party  to  a  bill  for  carrying  the  trusts  of 
a  devise  of  real  estates  into  execution,  on  the  supposition  that  the 
escheat  is  in  the  Crown,  if  the  will  set  up  by  the  bill  should  be  subject 
to  impeachment.  If  any  person  should  claim  the  escheat  against  the 
Crown,  that  person  may  be  a  necessary  party.2 

*  The  consequences  of  a  misjoinder  of  plaintiffs,  such  as  above  *  234 
considered,  are  no  longer  the  same  as  formerly,  for  then  the  bill 
would  have  been  dismissed;  whereas  later,  the  Court  was  empowered 
to  grant  such  relief  as  the  circumstances  of  the  case  required,  to  direct 
such  amendments  as  it  thought  fit,  and  to  treat  any  of  the  plaintiffs  as 
defendants.1 

5  Harris  v.  Ingledew,  3  P.  Wins.  92,  94,  Vanderpoel     v.   Van    Valkenburgh,   2   Selden 

6  French  r.  Baron,  1  Dick.  138;  2  Atk.  (X.  Y.),  190.  So  all  the  legatees  are  indis- 
120;  Stokes  v.  Taylor,  1  Dick.  349;  Cator  v.  pensable  parlies  in  such  a  case.  MeMaken 
Butler,  2  Dick.  438;    Braithwaite  v.  Robinson,  v.  McMaken,  18  Ala.  576. 

ib.  439,  n.;    Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  87=     On  a  bill  by  2  Ld.  Red.  172.     The  objection  as  to  j  lining 

an  executor  against  a  devisee,  of  land  charged  inconsistent   claims   does   not   apply   where   a 

with  the  payment  of  debts,  for  an  account  of  sole  plaintiff  unites  in  himself  two  conflicting 

the  trust  fund,  the  creditors  are  not  indispen-  interests.     Miles  v.  D  urn  ford,  2  De  G.  M.  & 

sable  parties  to  the  suit.      Potter  v.  Gardner,  12  G.    641;    Carter    v.    Sanders,    2    Drew.    248; 

Wheat.  498.  Foulkes  v.  Davies,  L.  R.  7   Eq.  42,  V.  C.  G. 

i  Banister  v.  Way,  2  Dick    599;    vide  ace.  But  see  Coleman  i\  Pinkard,  2   Humph.  185; 

Williams   v,    Whinyates,   2    Bro.    C.   C.  39:);  Moody  v.    Fry,    3   Humph.    507;     Gilliam   v. 

Seton,  224,  et  seq. ;  Ld.  Red.  173,  Spence,  G  Humph.  163.      And  it  is  not  permis- 

8  Cons.  Ord.  VII.  1.  sible  fur  a  complainant  to  unite  in  his  bill  two 

9  Ld.  Red  172.  A  will  may  now  be  es-  inconsistent  causes  for  equitable  relief.  W.l- 
tablished  in  England  against  the  heir  in  the  kinson  >:  Dobbie,  12  B latch.  2.(8;  Boslev  v. 
Probate  Court;  see  20  &  21  Vic.  c.  77,  §§  61,  Philips,  3  Tenn.  Ch.  649.  Infra,  313,  li.  8. 
C2;  Seton,  226;  see/>o.«/,  chap,  on  Evidence.  A   bill  cannot  be  filed  against   the  heirs   and 

1  All  the  devisees  are  held  to  be  necessary  devisees  jointly,  for  satisfaction   of  a   debt   of 

parties  to  a  bill  to  set  aside  a  will;  the  execu-  the   deceased.      Schermerhorn   v.    Barhydt,    9 

tor,   unless  he  has  refused  to  act,  should  also  Paige,  28. 

be  made   a    party.      Vancleave    i>.    Beam,    2  x  15  &  16  Vic.   c.  86,  §  49.     For  cases  of 

Dana,  15")  ;    see  Hunt   v.  Acre,   28  Ala.  580;  misjoinder  since    the    Act,    see    Clements    v. 

229 


235 


OF    r ARTIES    TO    A    SUIT. 


*f> 


*  Persons  claiming  under  different  titles  may  proper!}'  he 
joined  as  plaintiffs  in  the  same  suit,  where  their  titles  are  not 
inconsistent  with  each  other.1  Thus,  all  the  creditors  of  a  deceased 
debtor,  although  they  claim  under  distinct  titles,  may  be  joined  as 
co-plaintiffs  in  the  same  suit,  to  administer  the  assets  of  the  debtor,2 
although  it  is  not  necessary  that  they  should  be  so  joined,  as  one 
creditor  may  sue  for  his  debt  against  the  personal  estate,  without 
bringing  the  other  creditors  before  the  Court.3  The  joining  of  several 
creditors  in  the  same  suit  is  frequently  productive  of  great  incon- 
venience and  delay,  and  therefore  one  or  more  of  the  creditors  are 
allowed  to  file  a  bill  on  behalf  of  themselves  and  the  others  for  an 
account  and  application  of  the  estate  of  a  deceased  debtor;  the  decree 
being  made  applicable  to  all  the  creditors,  the  others  may  come  in 
under  it  and  obtain  satisfaction  for  their  demands  as  well  as  the  plain- 
tiffs; and  if  they  decline  to  do  so,  they  will  be  excluded  from  the  benefit 
of  the  decree,  although  bound  by  acts  clone  under  its  authority.4  It  is 
matter  rather  of  convenience  than  indulgence,  to  permit  such  a  suit  by 
a  few  on  behalf  of  all  the  creditors,  as  it  tends  to  prevent  several  suits 
by  several  creditors,  which  might  be  highly  inconvenient  in  the  admin- 
istration of  assets,  as  well  as  burdensome  to  the  fund  to  be  adminis- 
tered ;  for  if  a  bill  be  brought  by  a  single  creditor  for  his  own  debt,  he 
may,  as  at  Law,  gain  a  preference  by  the  judgment  in  his  favor  over 
the  other  creditors  in  the  same  degree,  who  may  not  have  used  equal 
diligence.5 


Bowes.  1  Drew.  684;  Evans  v.  Coventry,  3 
Drew.  75;  2  Jur.  N.  S.  557;  5  De  G.  M.  & 
G.  911;  Beeehing  r.  Lloyd,  3  Drew.  227; 
Williams  r.  Salmond,  2  K.  &  J.  463;  2  Jur. 
N.  S.  251  ;  Stupart  v.  Arrowsmith,  3  Sm.  & 
G.  170:  Barton  v.  Barton,  3  K.  &  J.  512;  3 
Jur.  N.  S.  838;  Carter  v.  Sanders,  2  Drew. 
248;  Hallows  r.  Fernie,  L.  R.  3  Ch.  467; 
I,.  B.  3  Eq.  520,  and  see  post,  Chap.  V.  §  4, 
Joinder  of  Ctninteres'ed  Parties. 

1  Conro  v.  Port  Henry  Iron  Co.,  12  Barb. 
27;  Merchants'  Bank  v.  Stevenson,  5  Allen, 
402.  403. 

2  See  Crosby  v.  Wicliffe,  7  B.  Mon.  120; 
Cheshire  Iron  Works  v.  Gay,  3  Gray,  534, 
535. 

a  Anon.  3  Atk.  572;  Peacock  v.  Monk, 
1  Ves.  127,  131.  A  creditor's  bill  under 
Ma—.  I'uli.  Stats,  c.  151,  §  2,  may  lie  brought 
by  one  creditor  for  himself  alone.  Silloway 
;-.  Columbian  Ins.  Co.  8  Gray,  199;  see 
Crompton  v.  Anthony,  13  Allen,  33,  36.  37; 
Barry  v.  Abb  >tt,  100  Mass.  390.  And  where 
new  parties  come  in  under  a  creditor's  bill, 
their  names  need  not  be  interlined.  Hazard 
r.  Durant,  9  R.  I.  002.  To  enable  a  creditor  to 
question  a  conveyance  of  his  debtor  on  the 
ground  of  fraud,  he  must  show  a  lien  by  judg- 
ment or  otherwise.  Davis  v.  Dean,  20  X.  J. 
Eq.  436;  Bi^elow  o.  Mairee,  27  N.  J.  Eq.  392; 
Tennent  r.  Battey,  18  Kan.  324.     And  that  he 

230 


is  a  bonnftde  creditor.  Townsend  v.  Tuttle,  28 
N.  J.  Eq.  449.  And  the  right  to  file  the  bill 
will  be  lost  by  the  expiration  of  the  lien  by 
efflux  of  time.  Fleming  v.  Grafton,  54  Miss. 
79.  But  the  creditors  of  a  deceased  debtor, 
who  have  exhausted  their  remedy  at  Law 
against  the  estate,  although  they  have  not 
obtained  judgments  on  their  claims,  mav  file 
such  a  bill.  Haston  i\  Castner,  23  N.  J.  Eq. 
536;  Shurts  v.  Howell,  30  id.  418.  And  the 
assignee  of  a  demand  has  an  equally  good  right 
with  the  original  creditor  to  maintain  a  credi- 
tor's suit.  Cook  v.  Ligon,  54  Miss.  652.  And 
see,  for  cases  in  which  Chancery  entertains  a 
creditor's  bill.  Fleming  v.  Grafton,  54  Miss.  79; 
Morgan  v.  Coyne,  7  Neb.  429.  In  Tennessee, 
by  statute,  the  bill  may  be  filed  without  the 
recovery  of  judgment.  Spencer  v.  Armstrong, 
12  Heisk.  707. 

*  Ld.  Red.  100;  see  48th  of  the  Equity  Rules 
of  the  U.  S.  Courts. 

5  Ld.  Red.  100;  Ridgely  v.  Bond,  18  Md. 
433;  see  Atr.  Gen.  v.  Cornthwaite,  2  Cox,  45; 
where  it  was  admitted  at  the  bar  that  in  a  sin- 
gle creditor's  suit  the  Court  does  not  direct  a 
general  account  of  the  testator's  debts,  but  only 
an  account  of  the  personal  estate  ami  of  that 
particular  debt,  which  is  ordered  to  be  paid  in 
a  course  of  administration;  and  all  debts  of  a 
higher  or  equal  nature  may  be  paid  by  the  ex- 
ecutor, and  allowed  him  in  his  discharge.     See 


PERSONS    HAVING   CONCURRENT   INTERESTS    WITH    PLAINTIFF. 


236 


In  suits  by  one  creditor,  on  behalf  of  himself  and  the  others, 
for  *  administration  of  the  estate  of  a  deceased  debtor,  the  defend-    *  236 
ant  may,  at  any  time  before  decree,  have  the  bill  dismissed  on 
payment  of  the  plaintiff's  debt  and  all  the  costs  of  the  suit.1 

In  suits  of  this  nature,  the  plaintiff  cannot  waive  an  account  against 
the  estate  of  a  deceased  administrator  of  the  debtor.2 

If  the  debt  of  the  plaintiff  be  admitted  or  proved,  and  the  executor 
or  administrator  admits  assets,  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  at  the  hearing 
to  an  immediate  decree  for  payment,  and  not  a  mere  order  for  an 
account; 3  but  an  admission  by  the  executor  that  he  had  paid  the 
legacies  given  by  the  testator's  will,  is  not  an  admission  of  assets  for 
the  payment  of  the  plaintiff's  debt,  so  as  to  entitle  him  to  such  an 
immediate  decree.4  (a) 

One  creditor  may  also  sue,  where  the  demand  is  against  the  real 
assets;5  but  although  one  creditor  may  file  a  bill  on  his  own  behalf 
alone,  for  administration  of  the  personal  estate,  he  cannot  have  a 
decree  for  administration  of  the  real  estate,  unless  he  sues  on  behalf  of 
himself  and  all  the  other  creditors.6  (b) 


Gray  v.  Chiswell,  9  Ves.  123;  Story,  Eq.  PI. 
§§  90-102;  1  Story,  Eq.  Jur.  §§  540-550;  Brooks 
v.  Reynolds,  1  Bro.  C.  C.  (Perkins's  ed.)  18  J, 
note  (2),  180,  note  (5),  and  cases  cited;  Pax- 
ton  v.  Douglas,  8  Sumner's  Ves.  520;  Thomp- 
son v.  Brown,  4  John.  Ch.  610;  Shephard  v. 
Guernsey,  9  Paige,  3-37;  Ram  on  Assets,  c.  21, 
§  1,  p.  2:)2 ;  Rush  v.  Higgs,  4  Sumner's  Ves. 
638,  note  (a),  and  cases  cited;  Hallett  v.  Hal- 
lett,  2  Paige,  15;  Lloyd  r.  Loaring,  G  Sumner's 
Ves.  773,  note  («);  West  v.  Randall,  2  Mason, 
181;  Lucas  v.  Bank  of  Darien,  2  Stewart,  280; 
New  London  Bank  v.  Lee,  11  Conn.  112;  Bal- 
Jentine  o.  Beall,  3  Scam.  20G;  Coe  v.  Beckwith, 
31  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  339;  Hazen  v.  Durling,  1 
Green  Ch.  133.  But  single  creditor  suits  are 
much  out  of  use,  2  Seton,  808. 

1  Pemberton  v.  Pophain,  1  Beav.  316;  2  Jur. 
1009;  Holden  v.  Kynaston,  2  Beav.  204;  Man- 
ton  v.  Roe,  14  Sim.  353;  post,  Chap.  XIX.,  §  1, 
Dismissinr/  /Jills.  As  to  costs,  see  cases  above 
referred  to,  and  Penny  v.  Beavan,  7  Hare,  133; 
12  Jur.  93G. 

2  Wadeson  t>.  Rudge,  1  C.  P.  Coop.  temn. 
Cott.  369;  but  see  Symes  v.  Glynn,  and  Pease  v. 
Cheesbrough,  cited  2  Seton,  881,  882;  id.  885. 
See  Woodfin  v.  Anderson,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  331. 

3  Woodgate  v.  Field,  2  Hare,  211:  0  Jur. 
871;  see  also  Owens  v.  Dickenson,  C.  &  P.  48, 


(a)  With  reference  to  the  payment  of  one 
legacy  being  an  admission  of  assets  for  every 
other  legatee,  "  the  tendency  of  modern  deci- 
sions has  been  to  deal  fairly  and  justly  with 
these  cases,  and  not  by  a  mere  unintentional 
admission  of  assets  by  executors  to  subject 
them  to  liabilities  which  they  have  never  con- 


56;  4  Jur.  1151;  Field  v.  Titmus,  1  Sim.  N.  S. 
218;  15  Jur.  121.  For  form  of  decree  for  pay- 
ment, see  2  Seton,  803,  No.  4,  804,  No.  5. 

4  Savage  v.  Lane,  6  Hare,  32;  Field  v.  Tit- 
mus, 1  Sim.  N.  S.  218;  15  Jur.  121;  Hutton  v. 
Rossiter,  7  De  G.  M.  &  G.  9. 

5  Leigh  v.  Thomas,  2  Ves.  Sr.  312,  313. 

6  Bedford  v.  Leigh,  2  Dick.  707;  Mav  v. 
Selby,  1  Y.  &  C.  C.  C.  235;  6  Jur.  52;  Blair 
v.  Ormond,  1  De  G.  &  S.  428;  11  Jur.  665; 
Ponsford  v.  Hartley,  2  J.  &  H.  736  ;  2  Seton, 
806;  Johnson  v.  Compton,  4  Sim.  47.  The 
writ  of  summons  or  statement  of  claim  should 
state  or  show  that  the  suit  is  on  behalf  of  the 
plaintiff  and  all  other  creditors.  Worraker  v. 
Pryer,  2  Ch.  D.  109,  overruling  Cooper  v.  Blis- 
set",  1  Ch.  D.  691;  Adcock  v.  Peters,  W.  N. 
(1876)  139;  Re  Royle,  5  Ch.  D.  540;  Re  Vin- 
cent, W.  N.  (1877)  249;  26  W.  R.  94;  Eyre  v. 
Cox,  24  W.  R.  317.  See  form  of  contingent 
prayer,  in  a  bill  by  one  creditor,  Tomlin  v. 
Tomlin,  1  Hare,  236.  In  such  cases  leave  to 
amend  will  generally  be  given  at  the  hearing; 
see  cases  above  cited.  After  decree  in  a  single 
creditor's  suit,  an  account  was  taken  of  the  real 
estate;  the  bill  being  taken  as  a  bill  on  behalf 
of  all  the  creditors;  Woods  P.  Sowerbv,  14  W. 
R.  9,  V.  C.  W.;  see  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  161,  note. 
Although  one  incumbrancer  cannot  sue  without 


templafed  or  meant  to  undertake.  You  have 
to  examine  the  facts  of  the  case,  and  to  deal 
with  it  fairly  and  properly."  Per  Hall  V.  C. 
in  Morewood  v.  Currey.  28  W.  R.  213. 

(b)  In  an  ordinary  decree  in  a  creditor's  suit 
the  decree  is  not  treated  as  conclusively  estab- 
lishing the  plaintiff's  debt.     Cardell  v.  Ilawke, 

231 


237 


OF   PARTIES   TO    A    SUIT. 


*237        *  Again  in  the  case  of  creditors  under  a  trust  deed  for  pay- 


making  other  incumbrancers  parties,  yet  it  has 
been  held  that  this  is  cured  by  a  decree  direct- 
ing an  account  to  be  taken  of  all  the  mortgages 
and  incumbrances  affecting  the  estate.  See 
Viu.  Ab.  tit.  Party  (B),  ca.  51.  Where  a  bill 
lias  been  tiled  by  a  single  bond  creditor  to 
establish  his  claim  against  the  real  estate  of  his 
deceased  debtor,  the  Court  has  permitted  it  to 
be  amended  by  making  it  a  bill  "on  behalf  of 
himself  and  of  the  other  specialty  creditors." 


L.  R.  6  Eq.  464.  If  other  creditors  become  co- 
plaintiffs  and  a  receiver  is  appointed  in  the  case, 
the  creditor  who  filed  the  bill  cannot  afterwards 
discontinue  it  without  such  other  creditors' 
assent.  Belmont  Nail  Co.  v.  Columbia  Iron 
&  Steel  Co.  46  Fed.  Rep.  336.  The  plaintiff 
creditor  is  not  required  to  give  notice  of 
his  bill  to  other  creditors,  and  their  assent 
thereto  is  not  necessary.  Thompson  v.  Lake, 
19  Nev.  103;  Rome  Bank  v.  Haselton,  15  Lea 
(Tenn.),  216;  see  Livesay  v.  Feamster,  21  W. 
Va  83;  Norris  v.  Bean,  17  id.  605.  A  creditor 
who  fails  to  come  in  seasonably  is  cut  off. 
Thompson  r.  Reno  Savings  Bank,  19  Nev.  291. 
Properly,  the  case  should  be  referred  to  a  mas- 
ter to  give  to  all  the  creditors  an  opportunity 
to  come  in.  Johnson  v.  Waters,  111  U.  S.  640; 
Bilmyer  v.  Sherman,  23  W.  Va.  656;  John-ton 
v.  Markle  Paper  Co.  (Penn.)  25  Atl.  Rep.  885. 
A  decree  will  be  made  f  >r  no  greater  amount 
than  is  necessary  to  satisfy  the  claims  of  the 
creditors  who  join  in  the  bill,  or  those  inter- 
vening before  final  decree.  George  v.  St. 
Louis  Cable  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  44  Fed.  Rep.  117; 
Bouton  v.  Dement,  123  111.  142;  Ford  v.  Rosen- 
thal. 74  Texas,  28.  Preferred  creditors  are  not 
necessary  parties  to  a  bill  to  set  aside  a  trust 
deed  unless  adversely  interested.  Hancock  v. 
Wooten,  107  N.  C.  9;  Preston  v.  Carter,  80 
Texas,  388;  Hudson  v.  Eisenmayer  Milling  Co. 
79  Texas,  401.  All  the  creditors  are  not  neces- 
sary parties  to  a  bill  brought  by  one  creditor 
to  enforce  the  trust  of  an  assignment.  Wil- 
helin  v.  Byles  60  Mich.  561.  In  general,  the 
creditors  who  have  legal  claims  must  first  obtain 
a  judgment  at  law.  Smith  r.  Hurst,  10  Hare, 
30;  M'Dermutt  v.  Strong,  4  John.  Ch.  687; 
Cates  v.  Allen,  149  U.  S.  451,  457;  Wiggin  v. 
Heywood,  118  Mass.  514;  Carver  v.  Peck,  131 
Mass.  291;  Miller  o.  Davidson  (3  Gilman,  518), 
44  Am.  Dec.  715.  note;  Massey  V.  Gorton  (12 
Minn.  145),  90  id.  287,  note;  see  Tower  Manuf. 
Co.  r.  Thompson,  90  Ala.  129;  Gibson  v.  Trow- 
bridge "Furniture  Co.  93  Ala.  579;  Gorrell  v. 
Gates,  79  Iowa.  632;  Vicksburg  &c.  R.  Co.  v. 
Phillips.  64  Miss.  108.  All  the  creditors  in 
whose  behalf  the  suit  is  brought  by  a  judgment 
creditor  need  not  be  judgment  creditors.  State 
r.  Foot.  27  S.  C.  340.  See  Claflin  v.  Gordon, 
39  Hun,  54.      A  municipal  corporation  may  be 

232 


Johnson  v.  Compton,  vbi  supra.  Where  a 
judgment  creditor  files  a  bill  to  obtain  aid  in 
enforcing  the  payment  of  his  judgment  at  Law, 
it  is  no  ground  of  demurrer  that  other  creditors, 
not  in  equal  degree,  are  not  made  parties  to  the 
bill.  Way  v.  Bragaw,  16  N.  J.  Eq.  213,  216, 
217;  Edgell  r.  Haywood,  3  Atk.  357;  see  Clark- 
son  v.  Depeyster,  3  Paige,  320;  Parmelee  v. 
Egan,  7  Paige,  610;  Grosvenor  v.  Allen,  9 
Paige,  74;  Farnham  v.  Campbell,  10  Paige,  5'J8. 


defendant  to  a  creditor's  bill.  Hinsdale  D.  G. 
Co.  v.  Til  ley,  10  Biss.  572.  The  claims  of  all 
the  suing  creditors  need  not  be  absolutely  due. 
Be  Hargreaves,  44  Ch.  D.  236,  241;  M  ison  v. 
Pomeroy,  151  Mass.  164,  168.  But  a  plaintiff, 
suing  for  himself  and  all  other  creditors,  must 
show  that  he  was  himself  a  creditor  when  the 
deed,  which  he  seeks  to  assail,  was  made.  Hor- 
bach  v  Hill,  112  U.  S.  144.  When  the  bill  is 
filed  by  one  individual  of  a  numerous  class  in 
his  own  right,  the  Court  will  generally  at  the 
the  hearing  allow  it  to  be  amended  so  as  to 
make  such  individual  sue  on  behalf  of  himself 
and  the  rest  of  the  c'ass.  Richmond  v.  Irons, 
121  U.S.  27,  51;  William-  v.  Jones,  23  Mo. 
App.  131.  As  to  equitable  trustee  process, 
brought  by  a  single  creditor  for  his  own  ben- 
efit, as  distinguished  from  a  creditor's  bill,  see 
Phrenix  Ins.  Co.  v.  Abbott,  127  Ma*«.  558  , 
Chapman  v.  Banker  &  Tradesman  Pub.  Co. 
128  Mass.  478;  Rau  v.  Von  Zedlitz,  132  Mass. 
164;  Maxwell  v.  Cochran,  136  Mass.  73;  Squire 
v.  Lincoln,  137  Mass.  399.  As  to  the  transfer 
of  garnishment  proceedings  to  equity,  see  Lock- 
ett  v.  Rumbough.  40  Fed.  Rep.  523.  As  to 
the  statute  of  limitations,  the  rights  of  a  cred- 
itor, who  becomes  a  party  to  a  bill  already 
filed,  depend  upon  the  time  when  the  bill  was 
filed,  and  not  the  time  when  he  became  a  party. 
Richmond  v.  Irons,  121  U.  S.  27,  reversing 
S.  C.  27  Fed.  Rep.  591;  Be  Chickering,  56  Vt. 
82.  All  matters  relating  to  creditors'  bill 
depend  in  great  measure  upon  local  statutes 
and  practice.  See,  e.  g.,  Flash  v.  Wilkerson, 
22  Fed.  Rep.  689.  Equity  takes  equal  jurisdic- 
tion of  fraudulent  transfers  of  personal  and  of 
real  property.  Sobernheimer  r.  Wheeler,  45 
N.  J.  Eq.  614.  A  creditor's  bill  lies  in  a  Fed- 
eral Court  upon  a  judgment  obtained  in  a  differ- 
ent State  from  that  in  which  such  court  is 
sitting.  Stutz  v.  Handley,  139  U.  S.  417;  41 
Fed.  Rep.  537;  Merchants'  Nat.  Bank  v.  Chat- 
tanooga Construction  Co.  53  id.  314.  When  a 
plaintiff  aims  to  be  subrogated  to  the  rights  of 
creditors,  they  must  be  made  parties  to  the 
suit  brought  for  that  purpose.  Harris  v.  Wat- 
son, 56  Ark.  574.  A  creditor  does  not  become 
an  executor  de  son  tort  by  obtaining  payment 
of  his  claim  from  an  executor  de  son  tort.  Hur- 
sell  v.  Bird,  65  L.  T.  709. 


PERSONS    HAVING    CONCURRENT    INTERESTS    WITH    PLAINTIFF. 


238 


nient  of  debts,  a  few  have  been  permitted  to  sue  on  behalf  of  them- 
selves and  the  other  creditors  named  in  the  deed,  for  the  execution 
of  the  trusts,  although  one  creditor  could  nut,  in  that  case,  have  sued 
for  his  single  demand,  without  bringing  the  other  creditors  before  the 
Court.1  And  where  the  trust  fund  was  to  be  distributed  amongst  the 
joint  and  separate  creditors  of  the  firm,  a  bill  of  this  description  was 
permitted  by  a  separate  creditor  only,  on  behalf  of  himself  and  the 
other  joint  and  separate  creditors.2  («) 

In  suits  fur  marshalling  assets,  simple-contract  creditors  must  be 
joined  as  plaintiffs,  as  well  as  creditors  by  specialty;  for,  upon  a  bill 
by  specialty  creditors  only,  the  decree  would  be  merely  for  the  payment 
of  the  debts  out  of  the  personal  estate,  and,  if  that  should  not  prove 
sufficient  for  the  purpose,  for  the  sale  and  application  of  the  real 
estate.  The  right  to  call  for  such  an  arrangement  of  the  property  as 
will  throw  those  who  have  debts  payable  out  of  both  descriptions  of 
estate  upon  the  real  estate,  in  order  that  the  personalty  may  be  left 
clear  for  those  whose  demands  are  only  payable  out  of  the  personal 
estate,  belongs  to  the  simple-contract  creditors,  who  have  an  equity 
either  to  compel  the  payment  of  the  specialty  debts  out  of  the  real 
estate,  or  else  to  stand  in  the  place  of  the  specialty  creditors,  as 
against  the  real  estate,  for  so  much  of  the  personal  estate  as  they  shall 
exhaust.  It  is  proper,  therefore,  in  bills  of  this  nature,  to  file 
them  in  the  names  of  a  specialty  *  creditor  and  of  a  creditor  by    *  238 


i  Cnrry  v.  Trist,  Ld.  Red.  167;  Murphy 
v.  Jackson,  5  Jones  Eq.  (N.  C.)  11;  see,  how- 
ever, Harrison  V.  Stewardson,  2  Hare,  538, 
where  Sir  J.  Wigram  V.  C.  decided  that 
twenty  creditors  interested  in  a  real  estate 
were  not  so  large  a  number  that  the  Court 
would,  on  the  ground  of  inconvenience  alone, 
allow  a  few  of  them  to  represent  the  others, 
and  dispense  with  such  ot'iers  as  parties,  in  a 
suit  to  recover  the  estate  against  the  whole 
body  of  creditors.  See  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §§  150, 
207;  Bainbridge  v.  Burton,  2  Beav.  539, 
Johnson  v.  Candage,  31  Maine,  28;  Bryant 
v.  Russell,  23  Pick.  508  ;  Stevenson  v. 
Austin,  3  Met.  474.  In  case  of  an  assign- 
ment for  the  benefit  of  creditors,  all  the  cred- 
itors should  be  joined  in  a  bill  to  compel  a 
distribution  of  the  fund,  but  one  creditor 
alone  may  maintain  a  bill  for  a  violation  of  the 
trust  injurious  to  himself  separately.  Dim- 
mock  v.  Bixby,  20  Pick.  308.  When  creditors 
claim  under  a  deed  of  trust  for  the  payment 
of  debts,  they  need  not  make  as  parties  to  their 
bill  those  who  are  in  a  posterior  class  to  them- 


(a)  Where  in  a  suit  brought  for  general  ad- 
ministration by  a  separate  creditor,  on  behalf 
of  himself  and  all  other  creditors  of  one  de- 
ceased member  of  a  firm  of  traders,  the  peneral 
estate,  when  realized,  proved  sufficient  to  pay 
his  class  in  full,  but  insufficient  to  fully  pay  the 


selves,  but  they  must  make,  as  parties,  all  who 
are  in  their  own  class.  Patton  v.  Bencini,  6 
Ired.  Eq.  201.  No  decree  for  the  distribution 
of  a  fund  in  Court  can  be  made,  until  all  p?r- 
sons  interested  are  made  parties.  De  La  Vergne 
v.  Evertson,  1  Puge,  181;  Greene  v.  Sisson,  2 
Curtis,  C.  C.  171.  All  the  distributees  are 
necessary  parties  to  a  bill  for  distribution. 
Hawkins  v.  Craig,  1  B.  Mon.  27.  All  persons 
interested  in  the  trust  estate  ought  to  be  joined 
in  a  suit  for  its  administration.  Elam  v.  Gar- 
rard, 25  Ga.  557;  High  v.  Worley,  32  Ala. 
70!*;  U'Wolf  v.  DWolf,  4  R.  I.  450;  Gould  v. 
Hayes,  19  Ala.  438;  Keeler  v.  Keeler,  11  N. 
J.  Eq.  458. 

Creditors  of  a  testator  may  intervene  by 
petition,  and  be  made  parties  to  a  suit  by  the 
legatees  and  devisee3,  brought  for  the  purpose 
of  falsifying  the  accounts  of  the  executor. 
Smith  I'.Britton,  2  P.  &  H.  (Va.)  124. 

*  Weld  v.  Bonham,  2  S.  &  S.  91;  and  see 
Richardson  v.  Hastings,  7  Beav.  323 ;  Smart  v. 
Bradstock,  7  Beav.  500. 


deceased's  joint  creditors,  the  plaintiff  was  held 
entitled  to  costs  from  the  estate  as  between 
solicitor  and  client.  Re  McRea,  Norden  v. 
McRea,  32  Ch.  D.  613;  see  Re  Flynn,  Guy  v. 
McCarthy,  17  L.  R.  Ir.  457 

233 


*239 


OF   PARTIES   TO    A    SUIT. 


simple  contract,  on  behalf  of  themselves  and  of  all  others  the  spe- 
cialty and  simple-contract  creditors.1 

By  analogy  to  the  case  of  creditors,  a  legatee  is  permitted  to  sue  on 
behalf  of  himself  and  the  other  legatees ;  because,  as  he  might  sue  for 
his  own  legacy  only,  a  suit  by  one  on  behalf  of  all  the  legatees  has 
the  same  tendency  to  prevent  inconvenience  and  expense,  as  a  suit  by 
one  creditor  on  behalf  of  all  creditors  of  the  same  fund.2  (a)  For  the 
same  reason,  where  it  has  been  sought  to  apply  personal  estate  amongst 
next  of  kin,  or  amongst  persons  claiming  as  legatees  under  a  general 
description,  and  it  may  be  uncertain  who  are  the  persons  answering 
that  description,  bills  have  been  admitted  by  one  claimant  on  behalf  of 
himself  and  of  others  equally  interested.3 

So,  also,  in  the  case  of  appointees  under  the  will  of  a  married  woman, 
made  in  pursuance  of  a  power,  where  they  were  very  numerous,  a  bill 
was  permitted  by  some  in  behalf  of  all.4 

The  right  of  a  few  persons  to  represent  the  class  is  not  confined  to 
creditors  and  legatees;5  and  the  necessity  of  the  case  has  induced  the 
Court,  especially  of  late  years,  frequently  to  depart  from  the  general 
rule  in  cases  where  a  strict  adherence  to  it  would  probably  amount  to 
a  denial  of  justice,  and  to  allow  a  few  persons  to  sue  on  behalf  of  great 
numbers  having  the  same  interest; 6  thus,  some  of  the  proprietors  of  a 
trading  undertaking,  where  the  shares  had  been  split  or  divided  into 
eight  hundred,  were  permitted  to  maintain  a  suit  on  behalf  of  them- 
selves and  others,  for  an  account  against  some  of  their  co-partners, 
without  bringing  the  whole  before  the  Court,7  "because  it  would  have 
been  impracticable  to  make  them  all  parties  by  name,  and  there  would 
be  continual  abatement  by  death  and  otherwise,  and  no  coming  at  justice, 
if  they  were  to  be  made  parties ; "  and  in  case  of  a  trade  partner- 
*239  ship  of  more  than  twenty-five  persons  formed  *  before  the  7  &  8 
Vic.  c.  110,  and  registered  under  §  58  of  that  Act,  but  not  other- 


1  By  the  32  &  33  Vic.  c.  4G,  it  is  enacted 
that  in  the  administration  of  the  estate  of  any 
person  dying  on  or  after  the  1st  Jan.  1870,  no 
debt  shah  be  entitled  to  preference  merely  be- 
cause it  is  a  specialty  debt,  but  all  the  creditors 
shall  be  treated  as  standing  in  equal  degrees, 
and  be  paid  accordingly  out  of  the  assets, 
whether  leiral  or  equitable. 

2  Ld.  Red.  167;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  104;  Brown 
v.  Picketts,  3  John.  Ch.  553;  Fish  v.  Howland, 
1  Paige.  20.  23;  Kettle  P.  Ovary.  1  Paige,  417; 
note;  Hallett  v.  Hallett,  2  Paige,  20,  21. 

3  Ld.  Red.  169;  Smith  r.  Leathart,  20  L.  J. 
Ch.  202.  V.  C.  K.  B.;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  105;  see 
now  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  42,  r.  1. 

*  Manning  v.  Thesiger,  1  S.  &  S.  106. 

5  See  per  Ld.  Eldon,  in  Lloyd  r.  Loaring,  6 
Ves.  779. 

6  Ld   Red.  169;  Story,  Eq.Pl.  §  94,  et  seq., 


and  the  cases  cited  in  notes;  West  v.  Randall, 
2  Mason,  192-196 ;  Wendell  v.  Van  Rensselaer, 
1  John.  Ch.  349 ;  Hallett  v.  Hallett,  2  Paige, 
18-20;  Cullen  v.  Duke  of  Queensberry,  1  Bro. 
C  C.  (Perkins's  ed.)  101,  and  Mr.  Belt's  notes; 
Moffats  v  Farquharson,  2  id.  338,  note  (1); 
Llovd  v.  Loaring.  6  Sumner's  Ves.  773,  note 
(a),  and  cases  cited;  Kelner  v.  Baxter,  L.  R.  2 
C.  P.  174,  187;  Willis  v.  Henderson,  4  Scam. 
20;  Mann  v.  Butler,  2  Barb  Ch.  362;  Per 
Foster  J.  in  Williston  v.  Michigan  S.  &  X.  R. 
R.  Co.  13  Allen,  406;  Peabody  v.  Flint,  6 
Allen,  52 ;  Mason  v  York  &  Cumberland  R. 
R.  Co.  52  Maine,  107-109;  March  r.  Eastern 
R.  R.  Co.  40  X.  H.  566;  Smith  v.  Swormstedt, 
16  How.  U.  S.  288:  48th  of  the  Equity  Rules 
of  the  United  States  Courts. 

7  Chancev  v.  May,  Prec.  Ch.  592. 


(n)  Legatees,  who  claim  only  their  separate 
legacies,  are  not  necessary  parties  to  a  bill  by 
one  legatee  against  the  executor  and  the  re- 

234 


ceiver  of  a  bank  to  reach  the  testator's  property 
held  by  the  bank.  Bellows  v.  Sowles,  52  Fed. 
Rep.  528. 


PERSONS    HAVING    CONCURRENT    INTERESTS    WITH    PLAINTIFF.       *  240 

wise  registered,  some  members  were  allowed  to  sue  on  behalf  of  them- 
selves and  other  members  to  restrain  a  nuisance;  *  and,  where  all  the 
inhabitants  of  a  parish  had  rights  of  common  under  a  trust,  a  suit  by 
one,  on  behalf  of  himself  and  the  other  inhabitants,  was  admitted ; 2  and 
a  freeholder  and  copyholder  of  a  manor  may  sue  on  behalf  of  himself 
and  all  other  the  freehold  and  copyhold  tenants,  to  have  their  rights  of 
common  ascertained,  notwithstanding  the  rights  of  each  freeholder  are 
separate  and  distinct  from  those  of  the  copyholders ; 3  but  although  one 
copyholder  may  sue  on  behalf  of  himself  and  the  other  copyholders  to 
have  the  rights  of  common  ascertained,  he  cannot  sue  on  behalf  of  him- 
self alone  for  that  purpose.4  So,  also,  one  owner  of  lands  in  a  township 
has  been  permitted  to  sue  on  behalf  of  himself  and  the  others  to  estab- 
lish a  contributory  modus  for  all  the  lands  there.5  Upon  the  same 
principle,  a  bill  was  allowed  by  the  captain  of  a  privateer  on  behalf  of 
himself  and  of  all  other  the  mariners  and  persons  who  had  signed  cer- 
tain articles  of  agreement  with  the  owners,  for  an  account  and  distri- 
bution of  the  prizes  made  by  the  ship.0  And  in  Lloyd  v.  Louring,"1  Lord 
Eldon  expressed  his  opinion,  that  some  of  the  members  of  a  lodge  of 
Freemasons,  or  of  one  of  the  inns  of  court,  or  of  any  other  numerous  body 
of  persons,  might  sustain  a  suit  on  behalf  of  themselves  and  the  others, 
for  the  delivery  up  of  a  chattel  in  which  they  were  all  interested. 

The  practice  of  permitting  a  few  to  sue  for  all  similarly  interested  has 
also  been  extended  to  other  cases,  chiefly  in  consecpience  of  the  great 
increase  in  the  number  of  Joint-Stock  Companies,  and  trading  associa- 
tions, in  which  large  classes  of  persons  are  jointly  interested.8  In 
Walworth  v.  Holt,9  where  a  bill  was  filed  by  the  plaintiffs  on  behalf  of 
themselves  and  all  other  shareholders  and  partners  of  the  Imperial 
Bank  of  England,  except  those  who  were  made  defendants,  *  pray-  *  240 
ing  the  assistance  of  the  Court  in  the  realization  of  the  assets 
of  the  company,  and  in  the  payment  of  its  debts,  and  that  for  that 
purpose  a  receiver  might  be  appointed,  and  authorized  to  sue  for  calls 
unpaid  and  other  debts  due  to  the  company  in  the  name  of  the  regis- 
tered officer,  who  was  one  of  the  defendants,  a  demurrer,  objecting  1st, 

i  Womersley  v.  Merritt,  L.  R.  4  Eq.  695,  V.  4  Phillips  v.  Hudson,  L.  R.  2  Ch.  243,  L.  C; 

CM.  Commissioners  of  Sewers  v.  Glasse,   L.    R.   7 

-  Blackham  v.  Warden  and  Society  of  Sut-  Ch.  450;  20  W.  R.  108. 
ton  Coldrield,  1  Ch.  Cas.  269;  see  Goodman  v.  5  Chaytor  v.  Trinity  College,  3  Anst.  841; 
Saltash,  7  App.  Cas.  633;  5  C.  P.  1).  446;  7  Q.  Story,  Eq.  Jnr.  §  121,  and  cases  cited. 
B.  1).  100.  It  has  been  doubted  whether  the  6  Good  v.  Blewitt,  13  Ves.  3'.)7.  In  that 
Attorney-General  ought  not  to  have  been  a  case  the  bill  was  originally  filed  by  the  cap- 
party  to  the  first  of  these  suits.  See  Ld.  Red.  tain  in  his  own  right,  but  was  allowed  to  be 
141);  and  see  Att.-Gen.  v.  Heelis,  2  S.  &  S.  amended  by  introducing  the  words,  "on  be- 
67;  but  see  Att-Gen.  v.  Moses,  2  Mad.  -204 ;  half  of  himself,"  &c.,  13  Ves.  398;  see  West*. 
Re  Christ-Church  Inclosure  Act,  38  Ch.  D.  Randall,  2  Mason,  193, 194;  Story, Eq  PI.  §98. 
520,  531;  35id.  355.  As  to  inhabitants  becoming  "  0  Ves.  773,  770;  see  Sumner's  ed.  note  (a). 
incorporated  by  a  Crown  grant  and  suing  as  a  8  Beatty  v.  Kurtz.  2  Peters,  500:  Smith  v. 
corporation,  see  Willingale  v  Maitland,  L.  R.  3  Swomestedt,  10  How.  U.  S.  288;  Whitney  p. 
Eq.  103;  Chilton  v.  London,  7  Ch.  I). 735.  743.  Mayo.  15  III.  251;  Putnam  v.  Sweet,  1  Chanel. 

3  Smith  v.  Earl  Brownlow,  L.  R.  9  Eq.  241,  (Wis.)  2.80;  Morgm  n.   Mew  York  and  Albany 

M.  R.;  see  Warrick  v.  Queen's  College,  Ox-  R.  R.  Co.  10  Paige,  200.     The  practice  has  also 

ford,  L.  R.  6  Ch.  710;  L.  R.  10  Eq.  105;  Betts  been  adopted  bv  the  High  Court  of  Justice.    It 

v.  Thompson,   L.   R.  6  Ch.   732,    734,    n.;    18  S.  C.  1883,  Ord\  XVI.  0. 

W.  R.  1008;    1  Seton,  217.  8  4  jr.  &  C.  635. 

235 


241 


OF   PARTIES   TO    A    SUIT. 


That  it  was  not  the  practice  of  the  Court  to  interfere  between  partners, 
except  upon  a  hill  praying  a  dissolution;  and  2dly,  That  all  the  parties 
interested  in  the  concern  were  necessary  parties  to  the  bill,  was  over- 
ruled by  Lord  Cottenham,  who  observed;1  "As  I  have  said  upon  other 
occasions,2  I  think  it  the  duty  of  this  Court  to  adapt  its  practice  and 
course  of  proceeding  to  the  existing  state  of  society,  and  not  by  too 
strict  an  adherence  to  forms  and  rules,  established  under  different  cir- 
cumstances, to  decline  to  administer  justice,  and  to  enforce  rights  for 
which  there  is  no  other  remedy.  This  has  always  been  the  principle 
of  this  Court,  though  not  at  all  times  sufficiently  attended  to.  It  is 
the  ground  upon  which  the  Court  has,  in  many  cases,  dispensed  with 
the  presence  of  parties  who  would,  according  to  the  general  practice, 
have  been  necessary  parties."  3 

In  Mozley  v.  Alston,*  Lord  Cottenham  said,  that  this  form  of  suit  is 
"subject  to  this  restriction:  that  the  relief  which  is  prayed  must  be  one 
in  which  the  parties  whom  the  plaintiff  professes  to  represent,  have  all 
of  them  an  interest  identical  with  his  own;  for  if  what  is  asked  may 
by  possibility  be  injurious  to  any  of  them,  those  parties  must  be  made 
defendants ;  because  each  and  every  of  them  may  have  a  case  to 
*  241  make,  adverse  to  the  interests  of  the  parties  *  suing.  If,  indeed, 
they  are  so  numerous  that  it  is  impossible  to  make  them  all 
defendants,  that  is  a  state  of  things  for  which  no  remedy  has  yet  been 
provided."  If,  however,  such  persons  are  so  numerous  that  it  is  impos- 
sible to  make  them  parties,  it  is  apprehended  that,  according  to  the 
present  practice,  the  Court  will,  in  such  cases,  permit  the  suit  to  pro- 
ceed, upon  one  or  several  of  such  parties  having  interests  not  identical 
with  the  plaintiff,  or  of  each  class  of  them,  if  there  are  several  classes, 
being  made  defendant  to  represent  the  others;  unless  indeed  the  object 
of  the  suit  is  to  have  the  partnership  or  company  dissolved.1 

The  fact  of  a  company  being  incorporated  by  Act  of  Parliament  does 
not  appear  necessarily  to  prevent  individual  members  of  the  corporation 
suing  on  behalf  of  themselves  and  the  other  members  of  the  company. 
In  Foss  v.  Harbottle,2  Sir  J.  Wigram  V.  C:  observed,  "Corporations  of 

i  Richardson  v.  Larpent,  2  Y.  &  C.  C.  C.  507, 
514:  7  Jur.  691  ;  Pare  v.  Clegg,  29  Beav.  589, 
602;  7  Jur.  N.  S.  1136;  Bromley  v.  Williams. 
32  Beav.  177  ;  9  Jur.  N.  S.  240 ;  Hoole  v.  Great 
Western  Ry.  Co.  L.  R.  3  Ch.  202,  273,  L.  JJ.  ; 


559 ; 


i   Ibid. 

2  See  Mare  v.    Malachy,  1   M.   &  C. 
Taylor  v.  Salmon,  4  M.  &C.  134, 141. 

3  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §§  76,  96,  115,  115  a,  115  b; 
West  v.  Randall,  2  Mason,  181;  Colt  v.  Lesnier. 
9  Cowen,  320,  330;  Deeks  v.  Stanbope,  14  Sim. 
57;  Collyer  Partn.  (Perkins's  ed.)  361,  in  note; 
Taylor  v.  Salmon,  4  M.  &  C.  134.  141.  Repre- 
sentatives of  a  deceased  partner  should  be 
made  parties  to  a  bill  to  dissolve  a  partner- 
ship, and  the  bill  may  be  amended  for  that 
purpose.     Buchard  v.  Boyce,  21  Ga.  6. 

4  1  Phil.  71)0,  708;  11  Jur.  315;  Moseley  v 
Cressey's  Co.  L.  R.  1  Eq.  405  ;  12  Jur  N.  S  46, 
V.  C.  W. ;  see  also  Milligan  v.  Mitchell,  3  M. 
&  C.  72;  1  Jur.  888;  Hichens  v.  Congreve,  4 
Puss.  562,  574;  Gordon  v.  Pym,  3  Hare,  223, 
227  ;  Apperly  v.  Page,  1  Phil.  779,  785  ;  1 1  Jur. 
271 ;  Richardson  r.  Hastings,  7  Heav.  323,  326  ; 
11  Beav.  17;  8  Jur.  72;  Beeching  v.  Lloyd,  3 
Drew.  227  ;  Moor  v.  Veazie,  32  Maine,  355. 

23G 


Cramer  v.  Bird,  L.  R.  6  Eq.  143,  148;  Picker- 
ing v.  Williams,  15  W.  R.  218,  V.  C.  S.  ;  see, 
however,  Carlisle  v.  South  Eastern  Ry.  Co.  1 
M'N.  &  G.  689,  699  ;  14  Jur.  535  ;  Fawcett  0. 
Lawrie,  1  Dr.  &  S.  192,  203  ;  as  to  making  the 
Corporation  a  defendant  in  its  corporate  char- 
acter, see  Bagshaw  v.  Eastern  Union  Ry.  Co. 
7  Hare,  114;  13  Jur.  602;  2  M'N.  &  G.  389; 
14  Jur.  491;  Simpson  v.  Westminster  Palace 
Hotel  Co.  8  H.  L.  Cas.  712;  6  Jur.  N.  S.  985; 
2  D.  F.  &  J.  141:  Russell  v.  Wakefield  Water- 
works Co.  L.  R.  20  Eq.  481;  ante,  p.  26. 

2  2  Hare,  491 ;  see  also  Preston  v.  Grand 
Collier  Dock  Co.  11  Sim.  327,  344;  S.  C.  nnm. 
Preston  v.  Guyon,  5  Jur.  146;  Bagshaw  v 
Eastern  Union  Ry.  Co.  and  Carlisle  v.  South 


PERSONS    HAVING    CONCURRENT    INTERESTS   WITH    PLAINTIFF.      *  242 


this  kind  are  in  truth  little  more  than  private  partnerships;  and  in 
cases  which  may  easily  be  suggested,  it  would  be  too  much  to  hold, 
that  a  society  of  private  persons  associated  together  in  undertakings, 
which,  though  certainly  beneficial  to  the  public,  are  nevertheless  mat- 
ters of  private  property,  are  to  be  deprived  of  their  civil  rights,  inter 
se,  because,  in  order  to  make  their  common  objects  more  attainable,  the 
Crown  or  the  legislature  may  have  conferred  upon  them  the  benefit  of 
a  corporate  character.  If  a  case  should  arise  of  injury  to  a  corporation 
by  some  of  its  members,  for  which  no  adecpiate  remedy  remained, 
except  that  of  a  suit  by  individual  corporators  in  their  private  charac- 
ters, and  asking  in  such  a  character  the  protection  of  those  rights  to 
which  in  their  corporate  capacity  they  were  entitled;  I  cannot  but 
think  that  the  principle  so  forcibly  laid  down  by  Lord  Cottenham  in 
Walworth  v.  Holt,3  and  other  cases,  would  apply,  and  the 
*  claims  of  justice  would  be  found  superior  to  any  difficulties  *242 
arising  out  of  technical  rules,  respecting  the  mode  in  which 
corporations  are  required  to  sue."1  In  this  case  the  Vice  Chancellor 
allowed  a  demurrer,  on  the  ground  that,  upon  the  bill,  there  was  noth- 
ing to  prevent  the  company  from  obtaining  redress  in  its  corporate 
character,  and  that,  therefore,  the  plaintiffs  could  not  sue  in  a  form  of 
pleading  which  assumed  the  practical  dissolution  of  the  corporation.2  (a) 


Eastern  Ry.  Co.  ubi  supra ;  Graham  v.  Birken- 
head Ry.  Co.  2  M'N.  &  G.  146,  156;  U  Jur. 
494;  Colman  v.  Eastern  Counties  Ry.  Co.  10 
Beav.  1,  12;  11  Jur.  74;  Salomons  v.  Laing,  12 
Beav.  339;  14  Jur.  279;  Fraser  v.  Whalley,  2 
H.  &  M.  10;  East  Pant  Du  Co.  v.  Merry  weather, 
10  Jur.  N.  S.  1231;  13  W.  R.  316,  V.  C.  W. ; 
2  H  &  M.  254;  Moseley  v.  Cressey's  Co.  L.  R. 
1  Eq.  405;  12  Jur.  N.  S.  46,  V.  C.  W. ;  Hoole 
fl.'Great  Western  Ry.  Co.  L.  R.  3  Ch.  262,  L. 
JJ.;  Bloxam  v.  Metropolitan  Ry.  Co.  L.  R.  3 
Ch.  337,  L.  C;  Atwool  v.  Merryweather,  L.  R. 
5  Eq.  464.  n.  (3),  V.  C.  W.;  Clinch  v.  Finan- 
cial Co.  L.  R.  5  Eq.  450,  V.  C.  W. ;  affirmed, 
L  R,  4  Ch.  117,  L.  C.  &  L.  JJ.;  Cramer  «7. 
Bird,  L.  R.  6  Eq.  143,  M.  R.;  Kernaghan  v. 
Williams,  L.  R.  6  Eq.  228,  M.  R.;  Dent  v.  Lon- 
don Tramways  Co.  16  Ch.  I).  344;  Mason  v. 
Harris,  11  Ch.  I).  97;  Salisbury  v.  Metro- 
politan Ry.  Co.  W.  N.  (1869)  52,  \V.  N.  (1870) 
70;  18  W.  R.  484,  V.  C.  J.;  ib.,  W.  N.  (1870) 
74,  L.J.  G.;  id.  182,  V.C.  J.;  18  W  R.974,  V. 
C.  J. ;  Sweny  v.  Smith,  L.  R.  7  Eq.  324,  M.  R. 
A  suit  in  the  company's  name  may  be  ordered 
to  stand  over  until  a  meeting  of  the  company 
determines  the  use  of  its  name  Pender  v. 
Lushington,  6Ch.  D.70.  See  Exeter  &  Crediton 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Buller,  5  Rail.  Cas.  211 ;  East  Pant  du 
United  L.  M.  Co.  v.  Merryweather,  2  H.  &  M. 


254;  2Lind.  Part.  599,  1248;  Wandsworth  &c. 
Co.  v.  Wright,  18  \V.  1!.  728;  Oystermouth 
Ry.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Morris,  W.  N.  (1876)  129,  192; 
Harben  v.  Phillips,  23  Ch.  D.  14,  29;  Turner  v. 
Moy,  32  L.  T.  N.  S.  56. 
s  4  M.  &  C.  035. 

1  One  stockholder  of  a  manufacturing  cor- 
poration cannot  alone  maintain  a  bill  in  Equity 
to  compel  the  execution  of  a  trust,  by  persons 
who  have  taken  a  conveyance  of  the  company's 
property  in  trust  to  pay  its  debts,  because  he 
stands  in  the  same  right  with  all  the  other 
stockholders,  who  have  a  common  interest  with 
him  in  enforcing  the  trust,  and  all  of  whom 
should  be  made  parties,  if  not  too  numerous,  or, 
if  too  numerous,  the  bill  should  be  brought  by- 
some  in  bthalf  of  all,  so  that  the  rights  of  all 
may  be  duly  adjudicated  in  the  final  decree. 
Heath  v.  Ellis,  12  Cush.  601;  Allen  p.  Curtis, 
26  Conn.  450.  Where  the  plaintiff  sued  on 
behalf  of  himself  and  others,  it  was  held,  that 
the  defendant,  after  answering  to  the  merits  of 
the  bill,  could  not  object  that  the  plaintiff  had  no 
right  to  bring  his  bill  in  that  form.  Messervey 
v.  Barelli,  2  Hill  Ch.  567 ;  see  ante,  pp.  26,  144, 
notes. 

2  See  also  Mozley  v.  Alston,  1  Phil.  790, 
797  ;  Lord  v.  Copper  Miners'  Co.  2  Phil.  740, 
749;   Yetts  v.  Norfolk   Ry.   Co.   3    De   G.   & 


(a)  If  a  shareholder  sues  the  directors  in  the 
company's  name  for  misapplication  of  its  funds, 
and  a  large  majority  of  the  shareholders  vote 
against  the   use  of  the   company's   name,   on 


being  stricken  out  as  plaintiff,  it  may  bo  added 
as  a  defendant  by  amendment.  Silber  Light 
Co.  v.  Silber,  12  Ch.  D.  717. 

237 


*243 


OF    PARTIES    TO    A    SUIT. 


In  order  to  enable  a  plaintiff  to  sue  on  behalf  of  himself  and  others 
who  stand  in  the  same  relation  with  him  to  the  subject  of  the  suit,  it 
is  generally  necessary  that  it  should  appear  that  the  relief  sought  by 
him  is  beneficial  to  those  whom  he  undertakes  to  represent.8  Where  it 
does  not  appear  that  all  the  persons  intended  to  be  represented  are 
necessarily  interested  in  obtaining  the  relief  sought,  such  a  suit  cannot 
be  maintained;  4  and  a  plaintiff  cannot  sue  on  behalf  of  himself  and  all 
the  other  members  of  a  company,  and  also  seek  to  establish  a  demand 
against  the  company.5  Where  three  of  the  subscribers  to  a  loan  of 
money  to  a  foreign  State  filed  a  bill  on  behalf  of  themselves  and  all 
other  subscribers  to  that  loan,  to  rescind  the  contracts  of  subscription, 
and  to  have  the  subscription  moneys  returned,  it  was  held,  that  the 
plaintiffs  were  not  entitled,  in  that  case,  to  represent  all  the  other 
subscribers,  because  it  did  not  necessarily  follow  that  every  subscriber 
should,  like  them,  wish  to  retire  from  the  speculation,  and  every  indi- 
vidual must,  in  that  respect,  judge  for  himself.6  Upon  the  same  prin- 
ciple, one  of  the  inhabitants  of  a  district,  who  claims  a  right  to  be 
served  with  water  by  a  public  company,  cannot  sue  on  behalf  of  himself 

and  the  other  inhabitants,  to  compel  that  company  to  supply 
*243    water  *to   the    district   upon   particular   terms;    because,  what 

might  be  reasonable  with  respect  to  one,  might  not  be  so  with 
regard  to  the  others.1  This  form  of  suit  cannot  be  adopted  where  each 
of  the  class  on  behalf  of  whom  it  is  instituted  has  a  separate  demand 
in  Equity : 2  and,  therefore,  a  suit  by  a  shareholder  in  a  joint-stock 
company,  on  behalf  of  himself  and  the  other  shareholders,  seeking 
relief  from  the  shares,  and  the  return  of  the  deposits,  on  the  ground  of 
fraud  or  misrepresentation  in  the  prospectus,  cannot  be  maintained;  for 
the  case  of  each  person  who  has  been  deceived  is  peculiar  to  himself, 
and  must  depend  upon  its  own  circumstances.8  Neither  can  this  form 
of  suit  be  adopted  where  the  act  complained  of  is  voidable  and  capable 
of  confirmation  by  the  members  of  the  company,  nor  where  it  is  a  mere 
matter  of  internal  regulation,4  nor,  except  under  special  circumstances, 


S.  293 ;  13  Jur.  240 ;  Macdougall  v.  Gardner, 
1  Ch.  D.  14;  L.  R.  20  Eq.  303;  Pender  v. 
Lushington,  6  Ch.  D.  70;  Duekett  v.  Gover,  6 
Ch.  D.  82  ;  ante,  p.  26. 

8  Gray  v.  Chaplin,  2  S.  &  S.  207,  272;  Att.- 
Gen.  v.  Heelis,  2  S.  &  S.  07,  75 ;  Colman  v. 
Eastern  Counties  Ry.  Co.  10  Beav.  1,  13  ;  Car- 
lisle V.  South  Eastern  Ry.  Co.  1  M'N.  &  G.080, 
698  ;  14  Jur.  535  ;  Mullock  v.  Jenkins,  14  Beav. 
628;  Williams  v.  Salmond,  2  K.  &  J.  403;  2 
Jur.  N.  S.  251 ;  Moseley  v.  Cressey's  Co.  L.  R. 
1  Eq.  405  ;  12  Jur.  N.  S.  46,  V.  C  W. 

4  Van  Sandau  v.  Moore,  1  Russ.  441,  465 ; 
Lovell  v.  Andrew,  15  Sim.  581,  584;  11  Jur. 
485;  Bainbridge  v.  Burton,  2  .Beav.  536. 

s  Thomas  o.  Hobler,  4  De  G.  F.  &  J.  199 ;  8 
Jur.  X.  S.  125. 

6  Jones  r.  Garcia  Del  Rio.  T.  &  R.  297,  300. 

i  Weale  p.  West  Middlesex  Waterworks, 
1  J.  &  W.  358,  370  ;  see  Beaumont  r.  Meredith, 

238 


3  V.  &  B.   181  ;  Story,  Eq.   PI.    §§   120,    123, 
125. 

2  Jones  v.  Garcia  Del  Rio,  T.  &  R.  297,  300; 
Blain  v.  Agar,  1  Sim.  37,  43 ;  2  Sim.  289  ; 
Croskey  v.  Bank  of  Wales,  4  Giff.  314;  9 
Jur.  N.  S.  595;  Hallows  r.  Fernie,  L.  R.  3  Ch. 
407,  L.  C;  Turquand  v.  Marshall,  L.  R.  6  Eq. 
112,  M.  R. 

3  Croskey  v.  Bank  of  Wales,  4  Giff.  314; 
9  Jur.  N.  S.  595  ;  Hallows  v.  Fernie,  L.  R. 
3  Ch.  407,  L.  C. 

4  Foss  v.  Harbottle,  2  Hare,  461  ;  Mozley 
v.  Alston,  1  Phil.  790;  11  Jur.  315;  Lord  r. 
Copper  Miners'  Co.  2  Phil.  740;  12  Jur.  1059  ; 
Yetts  v.  Norfolk  Ry.  Co.  3  De  G.  &  S.  293  ;  13 
Jur.  249;  Browne  0.  Monmouthshire  Ry.  Co. 
13  Beav.  32 ;  Stevens  v.  South  Devon  Ry.  Co. 
9  Hare,  313;  Macdougall  v.  Jersey  Imperial 
Hotel  Co.  2  H.  &  M.  528 ;  Clinch  v.  Financial 
Co.  L.  R.  5  Eq.  451,  482,  affirmed  L.  R.  4  Ch. 


PERSONS    HAVING    CONCURRENT   INTERESTS   WITH   PLAINTIFF. 


243 


where  a  corporate  body  of  which  the  plaintiff  is  a  member  is  capable  of 
bringing  the  action.5  Where  the  object  sought  is  such  that  a  suit  of 
this  nature  may  be  instituted,  it  may  be  maintained,  although  a  majority 
of  the  class  on  behalf  of  whom  it  is  instituted  disapprove  of  it.6  (a) 


117  :  Lambert  v.  Northern  Ry.  of  Buenos  Ayres, 
18  W.  R.  180;  Pickering  v.  Stephenson,  L.  R. 
14  Eq.  322.  For  exception  1  circumstances  un- 
der which  such  a  bill  was  permitted,  see  ante, 
26,  n.  1 ;  Atwool  v.  Merryweather,  L.  R.  5  Eq. 
401,  n.  (3).     As  to   the  necessary  allegations 


in  such  a  case,  see  Morris  v.   Morris,  W.  N. 
(1877)  G. 

5  See    1    Dan.   Ch.   Prac.    (6th    Eng.    ed.) 
pp.  199-201. 

6  Bromley   v.  Smith,   1    Sim.   8;    Small   v. 
Attwood,  Youngc,  407,  45G;    6  CI.  &  F.  232; 


(a)  It  is  within  the  discretion  of  the  Court  to 
entertain  a  bill  brought  by  one  person  on  behalf 
of  himself  and  all  others  who  have  a  similar 
interest  and  may  become  parties  thereto.  Com- 
missioners of  Sewers  v.  Gellatly,  3  Ch.  D.  610, 
Warrick  v.  Queen's  College,  L.  R.  6  Ch.  716. 
L.  R.  10  Eq.  105;  Betts  v.  Thompson,  L.  R.  6  Ch. 
732;  Smith  v.  Brownlow,  L.  R.  9  Eq.  241;  Tur- 
ner v.  Moy,  32  L.  T.  N.  S.  56;  Norwich  r. 
Brown,  48  id.  898;  Turquand  v.  Marshall,  L  R. 
6  Eq.  112,  134;  Russell  r.  Wakefield  Water 
Works  Co.  L.  R.  20  Eq.  474;  Libby  v.  Norris, 
142  Mass.  246;  Birmingham  v.  Gallagher,  112 
Mass.  190;  Bengley  v.  Wheeler,  45  Mich.  493  ; 
Durburow  v.  Niehoff,  37  III.  App.  403;  Railroad 
Co.  v.  Orr,  T8  Wall.  471;  Gibson  v.  American 
Loan  &  T.  Co.  58  Hun,  443 ;  Carey  v.  Brown, 
58  Cal.  180;  Manning  v.  Kle;n,  11  Penn.  Co. 
Ct.  525.  In  such  case,  if  the  plaintiff's  indi- 
vidual interest  is  trivial  in  amount,  and  it 
appears  that  he  knows,  or  can  readily  ascertain 
the  names  and  addresses  of  all  the  parties 
in  interest,  a  majority  of  whom  are  within  the 
jurisdiction  or  near  at  hand,  a  demurrer  for  lack 
of  proper  parties  will  be  sustained.  Smith  v. 
Williams,  116  Mass.  510;  Wye  Valley  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Hawes,  16  Ch.  D.  489.  Representative  suits 
are  adopted  under  the  Judicature  Acts  in  Eng- 
land ;  but  it  is  doubtful  whether  several  such 
suits  would  be  allowed  to  proceed.  McHenry 
v.  Lewis,  21  Ch.  D.  202,  207;  22  id.  397.  Those 
on  whose  behalf  the  suit  is  brought  are  quasi 
parties,  and  may  be  heard  to  protect  their 
interests.  Fidelity  T.  &  S.  V.  Co.  v.  Mobile 
Street  Ry.  Co.  53  Fed.  Rep.  850 ;  ante,  p.  216, 
note.  In  the  Federal  Courts,  Equity  Rules  47, 
48,  allowing  class  suits,  expressly  reserve  the 
rights  of  absent  parties.  See  Coann  v.  Atlanta 
Cotton  Factory  Co.  14  Fed.  Rep.  4. 

Certain  persons  of  a  class  are  also  sometimes 
authorized  by  the  Court  to  defend  for  all  having 
the  same  interest;  but.  in  such  case,  the  former 
cannot  consent  to  judgment  against  the  latter; 
Rees  v.  Richmond,  02  L.  T.  427;  and  in  a  fore- 
closure suit,  where  two  persons  had  obtained  an 
order  in  Chambers  to  defend  for  all  having 
a  like  interest  in  the  equity  of  redemption,  it 
was  held  that  a  foreclosure  order  could  only  be 


made  when  all  the  persons  interested  in  the 
equity  of  redemption  were  parties  to  the  suit. 
Griffith  v.  Pound,  45  Ch.  D.  553;  see  May  v. 
Newton,  34  Ch.  D.  347.  In  Fraser  v.  Cooper, 
Hall,  &  Co.  21  Ch.  D.  718,  in  a  suit  by  a  bond- 
holder on  behalf  cf  himself  and  all  other 
bondholders  except  the  defendant,  a  dissentii.g 
bondholder  was  added  as  a  defendant  upon"  his 
own  application. 

In  bills  for  instructions  some  of  the  parties 
in  interest  may  likewise  represent  those  of  the 
same  class,  especially  when  the  rights  of  the 
latter  are  contingent.  Hills  v.  Barnard,  152 
Mass.  67;  Hills  v.  Putnam,  id.  123;  see  fur- 
ther, as  to  parties  having  vested  or  uncertain 
interests,  Peacock  v.  Colling,  54  L.  J.  Ch.  743 ; 
Gordon  v.  Green,  113  Mass.  259;  Sears  v. 
Hardy,  120  Mass.  524;  Jewett  v.  Tucker,  139 
Mass.  566;  Yarrington  v.  Robinson,  141  Mass. 
450;  Lomerson  v.  Vroom,  42  N.  J.  Eq.  290; 
Kirkpatnck  v.  Corning,  38  N.  J.  Eq.  234; 
Houston  v.  Levy,  44  N.  J.  Eq.  6;  Read  v.  Pat- 
terson, id.  211;  Deegan  v.  Capner,  id.  339; 
Gayle  v.  Johnson,  80  Ala.  395;  Fitzgibbon 
v.  Barry,  78  Va.  755.  See  Romaine  v.  Hen- 
drickson.  24  N.  J.  Eq.  231;  Hill  v.  Smith,  32 
N.  J.  Eq.  473;  McLennan  v.  Johnson,  60  111. 
306;  Craig  v.  Smith,  94  111.  469;  Green  v. 
Grant,  143  111.  61;  Overly  v.  Tipton,  08  Ind. 
410;  Norris  v.  Leman,  28  W.  Va.  336. 

Under  a  bill  or  petition  brought  by  one  on 
behalf  of  all  of  a  class,  those  only  can  come  in 
and  share  who  could  maintain  separate  suits. 
Parmelee  v.  Kgan,  7  I'aLe,  610;  Cooke  v. 
Smith,  3  Sandf.  Ch.  333;  see  Pfohl  r.  Simpson, 
74  N.  Y.  137.  As  to  costs  on  appeal  in  these 
cases,  see  Cornwall  v.  Saurin,  17  L.  R.  Ir.  595. 
One  who  sues  in  Equity  for  many  having 
a  common  interest  in  a  trust  fund  or  property 
will  be  ordered  reimbursed  his  expenses  in  the 
suit  from  the  property  or  by  a  proportional  con- 
tribution from  those  who  accept  his  labors. 
Davis  v.  Bay  State  League  (Mass.).  33  N.  E. 
Rep.  591.  An  allegation  at  the  commencement 
of  a  complaint  in  a  creditor's  suit  that  the 
plaintiffs  sue  "on  behalf  of  themselves  and  of  .ill 
other  creditors  who  may  be  similarly  situated  ' 
is  sufficient  although  that  allegation  does  not 

239 


214 


OF   PARTIES   TO    A    SUIT. 


Where  the  object  of  the  suit  is  the  dissolution  of  a  partnership,  all 
the  partners  should  be  parties  to  the  suit,  and  a  suit  by  one  partner  on 
behalf  of  himself  and  others  cannot,  except,  it  would  seem,  under 
special  circumstances,  be  maintained.7  In  cases  of  joint-stock  com- 
panies, the  difficulties  attending  a  suit  for  winding  up  their  affairs 
have  led  to  the  introduction  of  a  special  mode  of  so  doing.8 

Where  the  object  of  the  suit  is  to  restrain  the  commission  of  acts 

which  are  ultra  vires,  or  such   that  they  cannot  be  confirmed  by  the 

members  of  a  corporation,  any  one  member  may  sue  on  behalf  of 

*  244    himself  and  the  other  members  to  restrain  them ; 9  but  it  is  *  not 

necessary  for  him  to  adopt  that  form  of  suit,  and  he  may  sue  in 

his  own  name.1 

In  suits  of  this  nature,  the  plaintiff,  as  he  acts  upon  his  own  mere 
motion,  and  at  his  own  expense,  retains  (as  in  other  cases)  the  absolute 
dominion  of  the  suit  until  decree,  and  may  dismiss  the  bill  at  his  pleas- 
ure; after  decree,  however,  he  cannot  by  his  conduct  deprive  other 
persons  of  the  same  class  of  the  benefit  of  the  decree,  if  they  think  fit 
to  prosecute  it.2  A  director  of  a  company  may  sue  in  his  own  name  to 
restrain  his  co-directors  from  wrongfully  excluding  him  from  acting  as 
a  director.3 

One  of  the  objections  which  has  been  suggested  to  framing  suits  in 
this  manner  is,  that  if  the  bill  is  dismissed  with  costs,  other  members 


and  see  William  v.  Salmond,  2  K.  &  J.  463;  2 
Jur.  N.  S.  251;  Kernaghan  v.  Williams,  L.  R. 
6  Eq.  228,  M.  R. 

'  Long  v.  Yonge,  2  Sim.  369,  385;  Beau- 
mont v.  Meredith,  3  V.  &  B.  180;  Abraham 
v.  Hannay,  13  Sim.  581;  Deeks  v.  Stanhope, 
14  Sim.  57;  8  Jur.  349;  Wilson  v.  Stanhope, 
2  Coll.  629;  10  Jur.  421;  Richardson  v.  Lar- 
pent,  2  Y.  &  C.  C.  C.  507  ;  7  Jur.  691;  Richard- 
son v.  Hastings,  7  Beav.  301;  11  Beav.  17; 
8  Jur.  72;  Van  Sandau  r.  Moore,  1  Russ.  441, 
456;  Cooper  v.  Webb,  15  Sim.  454,  463;  on 
appeal,  11  Jur.  443;  Apperly  v.  Page,  1  Phil. 
779,  785;  11  Beav  271;  Harvey  v.  Bignold,  8 
Beav.  343,  345.  But  see  Lindley,  Part.  878, 
881;  Cockburn  v.  Thompson,  16  Ves.  321,  325. 
8  The  Companies  Act,  1862  (25  &  26  Vic. 
c.  89),  Part  IV. 

9  Hodgkinson  v.  National  Live  Stock  Ins.  Co. 
26  Beav.' 473;  5  Jur.  X.  S.  478 ;  4  De  G.  &  J.  422; 
5  Jur.  N.  S.  969;  Lyde  v.  Eastern  Bengal  Ry. 
Co.  36  Beav.  10;  Bloxam  v.  Metropolitan  Ry. 
Co.  L.  R.  3  Ch.  337,  L.  C:  Clinch  v.  Financial 
Co.  L.  R.  5  Eq.  450,  V.  C.  W. ;  affirmed,  L.  R. 
4  Ch.  117,  L.  C.  &  L.  J.L;  Kernaghan  v.  Wil- 
liams, L.  R.  6  Eq.  228,  M.  R.  ;  Gray  v. 
Lewis,  L.  R.  8  Eq.  526,  V.  C.  M.;  ante,  26.  n. 
As  to  allegations  in  suits  to  restrain  acts  ultra 
vires,  see  Mills  v.  Northern  Railway  of' Buenos 
AyresCo.  L.  R.  5  Ch.  621;  Russell  r.  Wake- 
field Waterworks  Co.  L.  R.  20  Eq.  474. 


anpear  in  the  title  of   the  complaint.     Cochran 
v.  American  Opera  Co.  20  Abb.  X.  C.  114.    As 

240 


i  Hoole  v.  Great  Western  Ry.  Co.  L.  R.  3 
Ch.  262,  L.  JJ. 

2  See  post,  Chap.  XIX.,  Dismissing  Bills; 
Handford  v.  Storie,  2  S.  &  S.  196;  York  v. 
White,  10  Jur.  168,  M.  R.;  Armstrongs.  Storer, 
9  Beav.  277;  see  also  Brown  v.  Lake,  2  Coll. 
620;  Johnson  v.  Hammersley,  24  Beav.  498; 
Whittington  v.  Edwards,  7  W.  R.  72,  L.  C; 
Inchley  v.  Alsop,  7  Jur.  X.  S.  1181;  9  W.  R. 
649,  M.  R.;  Hubbell  t\  Warren,  8  Allen,  173, 
177;  Updike  v.  Doyle,  7  R.  I.  446,  402;  Collins 
v.  Taylor,  3  Green  Ch.  163.  But  in  Atlas  Bank 
v.  Nahant  Bank,  33  Pick.  480,  492,  Shaw  C.  J. 
said:  "The  plaintiffs  having  once  instituted 
the  proceedings  as  a  statute  remedy  for  them- 
selves and  others,  they  go  on  afterwards  for  the 
benefit  of  all  parties  concerned,  and  the  original 
plaintiffs  have  no  power  to  discontinue  any 
more  than  a  petitioning  creditor  could  discon- 
tinue the  proceedings  under  a  commission  of 
bankruptcy."  Later  it  was  enacted  by  statute 
in  Massachusetts  that  after  a  suit  in  Equity  to 
enforce  the  liability  of  stockholders  or  officers 
of  manufacturing  corporations,  shall  have  been 
commenced,  it  shall  not  be  competent  for  the 
plaintiff  to  dismiss  the  same  without  order  of 
Court,  and  such  notice  to  other  creditors  as  the 
Court  may  deem  reasonable  under  the  circum- 
stances.   Stat.  1862.  c.  218,  §  8  (since  repealed). 

s  Pulbrook  v.  Richmond  Cons.  M.  Co.  9 
Ch.  O.  610 ;    Harben  v.  Phillips,  23  Ch.  D.  14. 


to  joinder    of    plaintiffs   in   such   a    bill,   see 
Doherty  v.  Holiday  (Ind.),  32  N.  E.  Rep.  315. 


PERSONS   HAVING    CONCURRENT   INTERESTS   WITH    PLAINTIFF.      *  245 

of  the  partnership  or  company  may  still  file  another  bill  for  the  same 
object:  but  it  is  said,  that  where  a  company  had  authorized  some  of  its 
members  to  enter  into  obligations  for  it,  and  they  then  came  to  the 
Court  for  relief  against  third  parties,  in  the  name  and  for  the  benefit  of 
all,  and  the  Court  dismissed  the  suit,  the  Court  would  not,  it  seems, 
allow  other  members  to  prosecute  another  suit  for  the  same  object.4 

In  adopting  this  form  of  suit,  care  should  be  taken  in  selecting  the 
plaintiff;  for  as,  on  the  one  hand,  a  plaintiff,  who  has  a  right  to  com- 
plain of  an  act  done  to  a  numerous  society  of  which  he  is  a  member,  is 
entitled  effectually  to  sue  on  behalf  of  himself  and  all  others  similarly 
interested,  though  no  other  may  wish  to  sue;  so,  although  there  are  a 
hundred  who  wish  to  institute  a  suit  and  are  entitled  to  sue,  still,  if 
they  sue  by  a  plaintiff  only,  who  has  personally  precluded  himself  from 
suing,  the  suit  cannot  proceed.5  A  plaintiff  thus  suing  must  be  a  bona 
fide  shareholder,  and  sue  bona  fide  for  the  benefit  of  the  company; 
therefore,  if  a  *  director  in  another  company  takes  shares  for  the  *  245 
purpose  of  filing  a  bill,  and  is  indemnified  by  the  other  com- 
pany, the  bill  will  be  dismissed.1 

In  all  cases  of  suits  for  the  protection  of  property  pending  litigation, 
and  in  all  cases  in  the  nature  of  waste,  one  person  may  sue  on  behalf 
of  himself  and  of  all  persons  having  the  same  interest.2 

In  all  cases,  where  one  or  a  few  individuals  of  a  large  number  insti- 
tute a  suit  on  behalf  of  themselves  and  the  others,  they  must  so  describe 
themselves  in  the  bill;  otherwise  a  demurrer  or  plea  for  want  of  par- 
ties will  lie.8  And  the  Court  is  bound  to  ascertain,  by  strict  proof, 
that  the  parties  by  whom  the  bill  is  filed  have  the  interests  which  they 
say  they  have.4 


4  Barker  v.  Walters,  8  Beav.  97;  9  Jur.  73. 

5  Per  I,.  J.  Knight  Bruce,  Burt  r.  British 
Nation  Life  Ass.  Assn.  4  De  G.  &  J.  158,  174; 
Hubbell  v.  Warren,  8  Allen,  173,  177.  See,  as 
to  requiring  security  for  costs  from  a  plaintiff 
in  such  a  suit  who  is  insolvent,  Tredwell  v. 
Byrch,  1  Y.  &  C.  Ex.  476. 

1  Forrest  v.  Manchester,  &c.  Ry.  Co.  30 
Beav.  40;  7  Jur.  N.  S.  749;  ib.  887;  4  De  G.  & 
J.  120;  see  also,  Colman  v.  Eastern  Counties 
Ry.  Co.  10  Beav.  1;  11  Jur.  74;  Bloxam  v. 
Metropolitan  Ry.  Co.  L.  R.  3  Ch.  337,  L.  C; 
Salisbury  v.  Metropolitan  Ry.  Co.  W.  N.  (1869) 
52,  V.  C.  J.     See  note  (a),  p.  26,  ante. 

a  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  42,  r.  5;  and  see 
Ackroyd  v.  Briggs,  14  W.  R.  25,  V.  C.  S. 

8  March  v.  Eastern  R.  R.  Co  40  N.  H.  566. 
In  a  bill  m  Equity  brought  by  an  adminis- 
trator of  an  insolvent  estate,  to  obtain  a  recon- 
veyance of  land  alleged  to  have  been  conveyed 
by  the  intestate.,  without  consideration,  to  de- 
fraud his  creditors,  it  must  be  alleged  in  the 
bill  that  the  suit  is  instituted  for  the  benefit  of 
all  the  creditors  of  the  estate.  Crocker  v.  Craig, 
46  Maine,  327;  Fletcher  v.  Holmes,  40  Maine, 
364 ;  Boxy  v.  McKay,  4  Sneed.  286.     Where  a 

vol.  i. —  16 


part  of  a  ship's  crew  appointed  two  of  their 
number  to  be  agents,  and  a  bill  was  filed  by 
such  agents  in  their  own  name,  and  not  on  be- 
half of  themselves  and  the  others,  a  demurrer 
was  allowed  for  not  having  made  the  whole 
crew  parties.  Leigh  v.  Thomas,  2  Ves.  312. 
See  now,  Worraker  v.  Pryer,  2  Ch.  D.  109; 
De  Hart  v.  Stevenson.  1  Q.  B.  D.  313;  Eyre  v. 
Cox,  24  W.  R.  317;  Woods  v.  Sowerby,  14  W. 
R.  9:  Re  Royle,  Fryer  v.  Royle,  5  Ch.  D.  540; 
Adcock  v.  Peters,  W.  N.  (1876)  139;  Re  Vin- 
cent, Parham  v.  Vincent,  W.  N.  (1877)  249;  26 
W.  R.  94;  Richardson  v.  Leake,  W.  N.  (1879) 
181.  So  where  a  bill  was  filed  by  three  partners 
in  a  numerous  trading  company,  against  the 
members  of  the  committee  for  managing  the 
trading  concerns  of  the  company,  it  was  dis- 
missed, because  it  was  not  filed  bj'the  plaintiffs 
"on  behalf  of  themselves  and  the  other  parties, 
not  members  of  the  committee."  Baldwin  v. 
Lawrence,  2  S.  &  S.  18;  and  see  Douglass  u. 
Horsfall,  2  S.  &  S.  184. 

*  Clay  v.  Rufford,  8  Hare,  281,  288;  14  Jur. 
803;  and  see  Smith  v.  Leathhart,  20  L.J.  Ch. 
202,  V.  C.  K.  B.  A  suit  instituted  by  a  plain- 
tiff having  only  a  nominal  interest  on  behalf  of 

241 


*246 


OF   PARTIES   TO    A    SUIT. 


The  Court  will  generally  at  the  hearing  allow  a  bill,  which  has  origi- 
nally been  hied  by  one  individual  of  a  numerous  class  in  his  own  right, 
to  be  amended,  so  as  to  make  such  individual  sue  on  behalf  of  himself, 
and  the  rest  of  the  class.6 


*  246    *  Section  II.  —  Of  Necessary  Parties  to  a  Suit,  in  respect  of  their 
Interest  in  resisting  the  Demands  of  the  Plaintiff.1 

A  person  may  be  affected  by  the  demands  of  the  plaintiff  in  a  suit, 
either  immediately  or  consequentially.'2  Where  a  person  is  in  the  actual 
enjoyment  of  the  subject-matter,  or  has  an  interest  in  it,  either  in  pos- 
session or  expectancy,  which  is  likely  either  to  be  defeated  or  dimin- 
ished by  the  plaintiff's  claims,  he  has  an  immediate  interest  in  resisting 
the  demand,  and  all  persons  who  have  such  immediate  interests  are 
necessary  parties  to  the  suit;  but  there  may  be  other  persons  who, 
though  not  immediately  interested  in  resisting  the  plaintiff's  demands, 
are  yet  liable  to  be  affected  by  them  consequentially,  because  the  suc- 
cess of  the  plaintiff  against  the  defendants  who  are  immediately  inter- 
ested, may  give  those  defendants  a  right  to  proceed  against  them,  for  the 
purpose  of  compelling  them  to  make  compensation,  either  in  the  whole 
or  in  part,  for  the  loss  sustained.  The  persons  who  are  consequentially 
liable  to  be  affected  by  the  suit,  must  frequently  also  be  parties  to  it. 
The  question,  therefore,  of  who  are  necessary  parties  to  a  suit-in  respect 
of  their  interest  in  resisting  the  plaintiff's  demands,  resolves  itself  into 
two;  namely,  Who  are  necessary  parties,  first,  in  respect  of  their 
immediate  interest  ?  and  secondly,  in  respect  of  their  consequential 
interest  ? 

The  reader's  attention  will  be  first  directed  to  the  question,  who  are 
necessary  parties  to  a  suit,  in  respect  of  their  immediate  interest  in 
resisting  the  plaintiff's  demand.  Where  parties  are  thus  spoken  of  as 
having  an  interest  in  the  question,  it  is  not  intended  to  confine  the 
definition  to  those  only  who  are  beneficially  interested,  but  it  is  to  be 
considered  as  extending  to  all  persons  who  have  any  estate,  either 
legal  or  equitable,  in  the  subject-matter,  whether  such  estate  be  benefi- 
cial to  themselves  or  not.3 


a  body  of  shareholders,  not  for  the  benefit 
of  the  plaintiff,  but  for  improper  purposes,  at 
the  instigation  of  another  person,  who  indem- 
nities the  plaintiff  against  the  costs  of  the  suit, 
will  be  treated  as  an  imposition  on  the  Court, 
and  the  bill  will  be  ordered  to  be  taken  off  the 
file.  Robson  v.  Dodds,  L.  R.  8  Eq.  301 ;  see 
Seaton  v.  Grant,  L.  R.  2  Ch.  459. 

5  Lloyd  v.  Loaring,  6  Ves.  779  ;  see  also 
Milligan  v.  Mitchell,  1  M.  &  C.  433  ;  Gwatkin 
v.  Campbell,  1  Jur.  N.  S.  131,  V.  C.  W.;  Reese 
River  Silver  Mining  Co.  v.  Atwell,  L.  R.  7  Eq. 
347,  M.  R. ;  and  post,  on  Amending  Bills.  If 
a  bill  is  brought  in  behalf  of  the  plaintiff  and 
such  others  having  a  like  interest  as  may  come 
in  to  prosecute  the  suit,  and  no  others  come  in, 
the  plaintiff  has  the  control  of  the  suit  for  him- 

242 


self  alone,  and,  in  cxler  to  maintain  his  bill,  he 
must  show  that  he  is  himself  entitled  to  equi- 
table relief.  Hubbell  v.  Warren,  8  Allen,  173. 
As  to  the  conclusiveness  of  the  decree  in  these 
cases,  see  Att.-Gen.  v.  Birmingham,  15  Ch.  D. 
423;  Robinson  ».  Dhuleep  Singh,  11  Ch.  D. 
798;  Watson  v.  Cave,  17  Ch.  D.  19. 

1  See  ante,  notes  to  pp.  190,  191,  and  Equity 
Rules  22  &  48  of  the  United  States  Courts. 

2  A  town  must  be  a  party  to  a  bill  in  Equity 
to  restrain  its  treasurer  from  paying  out  money 
voted  at  legal  meetings  of  the  town  for  illegal 
purposes.  Allen  v.  Turner,  11  Gray,  436;  see 
Clark  r.  Ward  well,  55  Maine,  61. 

3  In  a  suit  seeking  to  reform  a  deed,  the 
holder  of  an  equity  of  redemption  not  barred 
by  lapse  of  time,  under  a  mortgage  not  fore- 


PERSONS    RESISTING    PLAINTIFF  S    DEMANDS. 


248 


*  Under  this  definition  are  included  all  persons  who  fill  the  *  247 
character  of  trustees  of  the  property  in  dispute.1  But  where  the 
trustee  is  a  mere  bare  trustee,  without  any  legal  estate  vested  in  him, 
he  need  not,  in  general,  be  made  a  party.  A  broker  or  agent,  signing  a 
contract  in  his  own  name  for  the  purchase  or  sale  of  property,  is  not 
a  necessary  party  to  a  bill  for  specific  performance  of  such  contract 
against  his  principal.2  And  so,  where  a  person  having  no  interest  in 
the  matter  joins  with  another  who  has,  in  a  contract  for  sale,  as  where 
a  man  having  gone  through  a  fictitious  ceremony  of  marriage  with  a 
woman,  joins  with  her,  as  her  husband,  in  an  agreement  to  sell  her 
property,  he  is  not  a  necessary  party  to  a  suit  to  enforce  the  contract.3 

Where,  however,  any  estate  is  vested  in  a  trustee,  or,  where,  although 
the  trustee  has  no  estate,  the  circumstances  are  such  that  in  the  event 
of  the  plaintiff  succeeding  in  his  suit,  the  defendant  may  have  a  demand 
over  against  him,  he  is  a  necessary  party.4 

A  trustee,  who  is  named  in  a  will,  but  has  never  acted,  and  has 
released  all  his  interest  to  his  co-trustee,  ought  not  to  be  made  a  party 
to  a  bill  to  set  aside  the  will  on  the  ground  of  fraud.5 

Where  a  trustee  has  assigned  his  interest  in  the  trust-estate  to  an- 
other, it  is  necessary  to  have,  not  only  the  trustee  who  has  assigned, 
but  the  assignee  before  the  Court.6     It  is  improper,  however,  to 
make  the  agent  of  a  trustee  a  party ; 7  and  a  person  who  *  had    *  248 


close  I.  is  a  party  in  interest,  and  must  be  noti- 
fied; and  so  also  of  the  grantor  and  grantee  in 
the  d  ed  sought  to  be  reformed.  Pierce  v- 
Faunce,  47  Maine,  507. 

Where  A  contracts  to  convey  land  to  B,  but 
actually  conveys  the  land  to  C,  both  A  and  U 
are  proper  parties  to  a  bill  tiled  by  B  for  spe- 
cific performance.  Daily  v.  Litchfield,  10  Mich. 
29.  In  a  suit  to  set  aside  a  deed  for  fraud 
against  creditors,  both  the  grantor  and  grantee 
are  necessary  parties.  Lovejoy  v.  Irelan,  17 
Md.  525;  ante,  p.  231,  n.  4. 

If  the  trustee  in  an  assignment  to  secure  a 
note  dies,  the  maker  of  the  trust  and  note  is  a 
necessary  party  to  a  bill  for  the  appointment  of 
a  new  trustee.  Holden  v.  Stickney,  2  McAr. 
141;  Maxwell  v.  Finnie,  6  Coldw.  434;  Ed- 
inondson  v.  Harris,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  437. 

i  See  44  &  45  Vic.  c.  41,  §  30. 

2  Kingsley  v.  Young,  Coop.  Eq.  PI.  42,  see 
antt ,  p  196,  n.;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  231 ;  Lang  v. 
Brown,  21)  Ga.  628 ;  see  Miller  v.  Whittaker,  23 
111.  453. 

8  Sturge  v.  Starr,  2  M.  &  K.  195. 

^  See  McKinley  v.  Irvine,  13  Ala.  681; 
Cassiday  v.  McDaniel,  8  B.  Mon.  519;  Morrow 
v.  Lawrence,  7  Wis.  574.  Thus,  in  Jones  v. 
Jones,  3  Atk.  110,  where  a  plaintiff  sought  to 
set  aside  a  lease  on.  the  ground  of  forgery, 
without  bringing  before  the  Court  the  trustees 
who  were  parties  to  the  lease,  and  to  whom  the 
fraud  was  imputed,  the  objection  for  want  of 
parties  was  allowed,  because  if  the  plaintiff 
prevailed,  the  defendant  might  have  a  remedy 


over  against  the  trustees.  Upon  the  same  piiii- 
ciplej  where  the  trustees  of  real  estates  had 
conveyed  them  over  to  purchasers,  it  was  deter- 
mined, that  on  a  bill  by  the  cestui  que  trusts 
against  the  purchasers  to  set  aside  the  con- 
veyance, the  trustees  were  necessary  parties. 
Harrison  v.  Pryse,  Barnard.  324.  Where  a  bill 
alleged  a  fraudulent  combination  between  the 
maker  of  a  deed  of  trust  and  one  of  the  trustees 
therein  named,  and  it  was  sought  to  set  aside  a 
preference  given  to  such  trustee,  it  was  held 
that  the  maker  of  the  deed  as  well  as  the  trustee 
should  be  made  a  party.  Murphy  v.  Jackson, 
5  Jones,  Eq.  (N.  C.)  11. 

5  Richardson  v.  Hiilbert,  1  Anst.  65. 

6  Burt  v.  Dennett,  2  Bro.  C.  C.  225,  Perkins's 
ed.  note  (a);  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  209;  Bailey  v. 
Inglee,  2  Paige,  278.  If  the  trustee  has  as- 
signed his  trust  absolutely,  the  assignee  should 
be  made  a  party  in  his  stead,  and  the  trustee 
need  not  be  made  a  party,  unless  the  assignment 
is  a  breach  of  trust.  Story,  Eq.  PL  §§  211, 
215,  214;  Bromley  v.  Holland,  7  Sumner's  Ves. 
3,  and  note  (c);  5  id.  610;  Munch  v.  Cockerel  I, 
8  Sim.  219.  But  if  the  bill  is  brought  to  re- 
move the  trustee,  and  recover  from  a  stranger 
property  improperly  sold  by  the  trustee,  it  is 
not  a  case  id'  misjoinder.  Whitman  r.  A.ber- 
natby,  33  Ala.  154;  see  Webber  v.  Taylor,  5 
Jones,  Eq.  (N.  C.)  36.  And  the  trustee  is, 
in  such  case,  a  necessary  party.  Cowdry  v. 
Cheshire,  75  N.  C.  285. 

1  Att.-Gen.i\  Earl  of  Chesterfield,  18  Beav. 
596;  18  Jur.  686;  Maw  v.  Pearson,  28  Beav.  196; 

243 


*249 


OF    PARTIES    TO    A    SUIT. 


assumed  to  act  as  a  trustee,  though  not  duly  appointed,  was  held  to  bo 
an  agent  for  this  purpose.1 

According  to  the  original  practice  of  the  Court  of  Chancery  it  was 
generally  necessary,  where  there  were  more  trustees  than  one,  that  they 
should  all  be  parties,  if  amenable  to  the  process  of  the  Court; 2  but  this 
rule  was,  in  some  respects,  modified  by  a  General  Order  of  the  Court,3 
enabling  a  plaintiff  who  had  a  joint  and  several  demand  against  several 
persons,  to  proceed  against  one  or  more  of  the  several  persons  liable, 
without  making  the  others  parties;  and  even  before  this  order,  in  some 
cases  where  there  were  merely  accounting  parties,  one  might  be  sued 
for  an  account  of  his  own  receipts  and  payments,  without  bringing  the 
others  before  the  Court.4  Where  a  cestui  que  trust  seeks  a  general 
account,  he   must  bring  all  the   accounting  parties  before  the  Court, 

notwithstanding  the  order.5 
*249        *The  rule  which  requires  the  trustees  of  property  in  litigation 

to  be  brought  before  the  Court,  renders  necessary  the  presence 
of  the  committees  of  the  estates  of  idiots  and  lunatics  in  suits  against 
the  idiots  or  lunatics  committed  to  their  care;1  because  they  are  the 
trustees  of  such  estates.  Upon  the  same  ground,  the  assignees  of 
bankrupts  or  insolvents  are  necessary  parties  to  suits  relating  to  the 
property  of  such  bankrupts  or  insolvents.2 

For  the  like  reason,  wherever  a  demand  is  sought  to  be  satisfied  out 
of  the  personal  estate  of  a  deceased  person,  it  is  necessary  to  make  the 


and  see  Robertson  V.  Armstrong.  28  Reav.  123; 
see,  however,  Att.-Gen.  r.  Leicester,  7  Reav. 
176,  170.    Rut  see  Hardy  v.  Caley,  33  Reav.  365. 

1  Ling  v.  Colraan,  10  Reav.  373. 

2  16  Vin.  Ab.  Party,  R.  257,  PI.  68. 

3  Cons.  Ord.  VII.  2.  See  R.  S.  C.  1883, 
Ord.  XVI.  3. 

4  Lady  Selyard  v.  Executors  of  Harris,  1 
Eq.  <;is.  Ahr.  74,  pi.  20;  but  see  Munch  r.  Cock- 
erel], 8  Sim.  219 :  Story,  Eq.  PI  §  214,  note. 
Thus,  where  a  bill  was  filed  against  the  repre- 
sentative  of  one  of  several  trustees  who  were 
dead,  for  an  account  of  the  receipts  and  pay- 
ments of  his  testator,  who  alone  managed  the 
trust,  an  objection  that  the  representatives  of 
the  other  trustees  were  not  before  the  Court, 
was  overruled;  because  the  plaintiff  insisted 
only  upon  having  an  account  of  the  receipts 
and  disbursements  of  the  trustee,  whose 
representative  was  before  the  Court,  and  not 
of  any  joint  receipts  or  transactions  by  him 
with  the  other  trustees.  See  Story,  Eq.  PI. 
$§  -207  a,  212,  213.  214,  and  notes;  Fleming  v. 
(iilmer,  35  Ala.  62.  So,  where  a  bill  was  tiled 
by  a  creditor  against  the  representatives  of  R 
and  C  as  two  trustees  of  estates  conveyed  in 
(rust  to  pay  debts,  for  an  account  of  the  pro- 
duce of  the  sales,  and  payment  of  their  debts; 
ami  the  representaiives  of  R  alleged  by  their 
answer,  that  not  only  C  but  I)  also  were 
trustees,  and  that  I)  bad  acted  in  the  trust, 
although  they  did  not  know  whether  he  had 

244 


received  any  of  the  produce,  Lord  Kenyon 
M.  R.,  and  afterwards  Lord  Arden  M.  R.,  held 
D  to  be  an  unnecessary  party.  The  reporter 
of  this  case  adds  a  query,  because  at  the  bar 
the  general  opinion  was  that  D's  representa- 
tives ought  to  have  been  parties,  nor  could  one 
creditor  suing  waive,  on  behalf  of  absent 
parties  in  joint  interest  with  himself,  the 
benefit  or  possible  benefit  of  any  part  of  the 
trust  fund.  Routh  v.  Kinder,  3  Swanst.  144, 
n.,  from  Lord  Colchester's  MSS.;  but  see  id. 
145.  n.  This  query  seems  to  be  in  accordance 
with  the  principles  laid  down  in  Williams 
v.  Williams  9  Mod.  299;  see  also  Wadeson  v. 
Rudge,  1  0.  P.  Coop.  temp.  Cott.  369;  but  see 
Masters  v.  Rarnes,  2  Y.  &  C.  C.  C.  616;  7 
Jur.  1167  ;  and  Symes  v.  Glynn,  and  Pease  r. 
Cheesbrough,  cited  2  Seton,  881,  883. 

5  Coppard  v.  Allen,  10  Jur.  N.  S.  622;  12 
W    R.  943,  L.  JJ. ;  2  De  G.  J.  &  S.  173. 

1  Ld.  Red.  30.  It  seems  that  upon  a  bill 
for  the  recovery  of  a  debt,  due  from  a  drunk- 
ard, against  his  committee,  the  drunkard  is  a 
proper,  though  not  a  necessary  party.  Beach 
D.  Bradley,  8  Paige,  146. 

2  See  Storm  v.  Davenport,  1  Sandf.  (N.  Y.) 
Ch.  135;  Milliard,  Bank.  &  Ins.  383,  384: 
Mor.n  v.  Hays,  1  John.  Ch.  339:  Sells  r. 
Hubbell,  2  John.  Ch.  394;  Springer  r  Van- 
derpool,  4  Edw.  Ch.  362;  Rotts  v.  Patton,  1U 
B.  Mon.  452. 


PERSONS    RESISTING    PLAINTIFF  S    DEMANDS. 


250 


personal  representative  a  party  to  the  suit,  (a)  Thus  although,  as  wo 
have  seen,  a  creditor  or  a  legatee  may  bring  a  bill  against  a  debtor  to 
the  testator's  estate  upon  the  ground  of  collusion  between  him  and  the 
executor,3  yet  in  all  cases  of  this  description,  the  personal  representa- 
tive must  be  before  the  Court.4  80,  where  to  a  bill  for  an  account  of 
the  estate  of  a  person  deceased,  and  to  have  the  same  applied  to  satisfy 
a  debt  alleged  to  be  due  from  him  to  the  plaintiff,  the  defendants 
pleaded  that  they  were  not  executors  or  administrators  of  the  party 
whose  estate  was  sought  to  be  charged,  nor  so  stated  by  the  bill,  and 
demurred,  for  that  the  executors  or  the  administrators  were  the  proper 
parties  to  contest  the  debt,  who  might  probably  prove  that  it  had  been 
discharged,  the  Court  allowed  both  the  plea  and  demurrer,  but  gave  the 
plaintiff  leave  to  amend  his  bill  as  he  might  be  advised; 5  but  to  a  suit 
concerning  a  specific  legacy,  the  executor  is  no  longer  a  necessary  party 
after  he  has  assented  to  the  bequest;  thus  where  a  bill  was  filed  by  the 
reversioner  against  the  legatee  of  a  term,  praying  that  the  lease  might 
be  declared  void,  and  the  defendant  insisted  that  if  the  lease  was  set 
aside,  the  plaintiff  ought  to  pay  the  money  expended  by  the  testator  in 
the  improvement  of  the  premises,  the  executor  of  the  testator,  who  had 
assented  to  the  bequest,  was  not  considered  a  necessary  party  to  the 
suit.6  And  where  an  executor  had  been  outlawed,  and  a  witness 
proved  that  *he  had  inquired  after  but  could  not  find  him,  it  was  *  L'DO 
thought  to  be  a  full  answer  to  the  objection,  that  he  was  not  a 
party  to  a  suit  which  had  been  instituted  by  a  creditor  of  the  deceased 
testator  against  the  residuary  legatee.1 

Moreover,  in  some  cases,  where  the  fund,  the  subject  of  the  suit,  has 
been  ascertained  and  appropriated,  the  Court  has  dispensed  with  the 
appearance  of  the  personal  representative  of  the  testator,  by  whose  will 


8  Aft. -Gen.  v.  Wynne.  Mos.  126;  See  nn'e, 
p.  195;  post,  c.  6,  §  4,  and  notes  to  the  point, 
"  Legatee  or  creditor  cannot  sue  debtor  to 
testator's  estate." 

4  See  Postlethwaite  v.  Howes,  3  Clarke 
(Iowa),  305.  lint  the  heirs  need  not  be  made 
parties  to  a  suit  relating  exclusively  to  the 
personalty.  Galphin  v.  M'Kinncy.  1  McCord, 
Ch.  280.  Hut  it  is  otherwise  in  regard  to  a 
suit  respecting  real  estate.  Kennedy  r.  Ken- 
nedy, 2  Ala.  571;  Smith  v.  West,  5  Lift.  48; 
Carr?\  Callaghan,  3  Litt.  305.  And  to  a  bill 
against  an  administrator,  to  charge  the  estate 
with  an  annual  payment,  to  preserve  the  res- 
idue, the  distributees  of  the  estate  are  neces- 


sary parties.  Coheen  v.  Gordon,  1  Hill,  Ch. 
51. 

5  Griffith  v.  Bateman,  Rep.  temp.  Finch. 
334;  Rumney  v.  Mead.  id.  303;  Att.-Gen. 
r.  Twisden,  id.  33G,  337;  and  see  Att.-Gen.  v. 
Wynne,  Mos.  126.  For  a  case  where  under 
special  circumstances  the  executors  of  the 
settlor  of  a  trust  fund  would  be  necessary 
parties  to  a  suit  for  administering  it,  see  Judg- 
ment of  Sir  J.  Wigram  V.  C.  in  Gaunt  v.  John- 
son. 7  Hare.  154,  150;  12  Jur.  1007. 

8  Malpas  v.  Ackland,  3  Rus«.  273,  277: 
and  see  Smith  v.  Brooksbank,  7  Sim.  18,  21: 
Moor  v.  Blagrave,  1  Ch.  Cas.  277. 

i  Heath  v.  Percival,  1  P.  Wms.  684. 


(")  This  applies  where  it  is  sought  to 
establish  a  title  to  the  personal  estate  of  a 
-I'd  person.  Dowdeswell  v.  Dowdeswell, 
!l  Ch.  D.  294.  As  to  joining  executors  and 
administrators,  see  also  Brown  v.  Walker,  108 
N.  C.  387:  Keenan  v.  Keenan,  58  Hun,  005; 
Kingsbury  v.  Flowers.  65  Ala.  470;  Bromley 
v.  Mitchell,  155  Mass.  509;   Danner  v.  Danner, 


30  N.  J.  Eq.  67;  Jones  v.  Smith,  55  Texas 
383.  When  a  loss  results  from  a  breach  of 
tru*t  by  the  ancestor  as  executor,  his  heir  at 
law  is  a  proper  party  to  a  suit  on  that  ground 
against  the  ancestor's  legal  representative. 
McCartin  V.  Trephagen,  43  N.  .1.  Eq.  323; 
Dorsheimer  r.  Rorback,  23  id.  40;  see  Graves 
v.  Pinchback,  47  Ark.  470. 

245 


*250 


OF    PARTIES    TO    A    SUIT. 


the  fund  was  bequeathed.2  And  where  the  estate  has  been  distributed 
under  the  decree  of  the  Court,3  or  after  the  issue  of  advertisements 
under  the  22  &  23  Vic.  c.  35,  §  29, 4  the  personal  representative  is  not  a 
necessary  party  to  a  suit  to  establish  a  claim  against  the  estate. 

The  rule  which  requires  the  executor  to  be  before  the  Court  in  all 
cases  relating  to  the  personal  estate  of  a  testator,  extends  to  an  execu- 
tor durante  minore  cetate,  even  though  the  actual  executor  has  attained 
twenty -one,  and  has  obtained  probate  thereon,8  unless  he  has  received 
all  the  testator's  personal  estate  from  the  hands  of  the  executor  durante 
minore  mtate. 

The  personal  representative  required  is  one  appointed  in  England; 
and  where  a  testator  appointed  persons  residing  in  India  and  Scotland 
his  executors,  and  the  will  was  not  proved  in  England,  but  the  plain- 
tiff, a  creditor,  tiled  a  bill  against  the  agent  of  the  executors,  to  whom 
money  had  been  remitted,  praying  an  account  and  payment  of  the 
money  into  Court  for  security,  a  demurrer,  because  no  personal  repre- 
sentative of  the  testator  resident  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court 
was  a  party,  was  allowed.6  So,  where  an  executor  proved  the  will  of 
his  testator  in  India,  and  afterwards  came  to  this  country,  where  a  suit 
was  instituted  against  him  for  an  account  of  an  unadministered  part  of 
the  testator's  estate,  which  had  been  remitted  to  him  from  India  by  his 
co-executor  there,  it  was  held  necessary  that  a  personal  representative 
should  be  constituted  in  England,  and  made  a  party  to  the  suit.7 


2  Arthur  v.  Hughes,  4  Beav.  500;  Beasley 
v.  Kenyon,  5  Beav.  544;  Bond  v.  Graham,  1 
Hare,  484,  6  Jur.  620;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  214. 
See  Hunter  v.  Young,  4  Ex.  D.  256. 

3  Farrell  v.  Smith,  2  B.  &  R.  3:57;  see  also 
Poolev  v.  Ray,  1  P.  Wins.  355;  Brooks  v. 
Reynolds,  1  Bro.  C.  C  182;  2  Dick.  COS; 
Douglas  v.  Clay,  1  Dick.  393;  Kenyon  v. 
Worthington,  2  Dick.  688. 

*  Clegg  r.  Rowland,  L.  R.  3  Eq.  368,  V.  C. 
M.;  see  2  Dan.  Ch.  Prac.  (6th  Eng.  ed.)  995; 
Re  Bowden,  45  Ch.  D.  444;  Re  Frewen,  60  L. 
T.  953. 

5  Glass  v.  Oxenham,  2  Atk.  121. 

6  Lowe  v.  Farlie,  2  Mad.  101;  see  also 
Logan  v.  Fairlie,  2  S.  &  S.  284;  Story,  Conf. 
Laws,  §§  513,  514,  514  a.  and  notes;  Story,  Eq. 
PI.  §  179,  and  cases  cited;  Ashmead  v.  Colhy, 
26  Conn.  287;  Christian  v.  Devereux,  12  Sim. 
264;  Partington  v.  Att.-Gen.  L.  R.  4  II.  L. 
101;  Re  Commercial  Bank  of  India  and  the 
Tiast,  L.  R.  5  Ch.  31,  and  see  Eames  v.  Hacon, 
16  Ch.  D.  407,  where  the  letters  had  been  resealed 
in  England.     See  S.  C.  18  Ch.  D.  347. 

7  Bond  v.  Graham,  1  Hare,  482;  Tyler  v. 
"Bell,  2  M.  &  C.  89,  105;  but  see  Anderson  v. 
'Caunter,  2  M.  &  K.  763,  and  see  the  observa- 
tion of  Lord  Cottenham  on  this  case,  2  M.  & 
'C.  110.    For  the  method  of  obtaining  limited 

or  special  administration  where  the  executor  is 
abroad,  see  ante,  pp.  197,  198.  Some  of  the 
American  Courts  have  gone  so  far  as  to  hold, 

246 


that  a  foreign  executor  or  administrator,  com- 
ing here,  having  received  assets  in  the  foreign 
country,  is  liable  to  be  sued  here,  and  to  account 
for  such  assets,  notwithstanding  he  has  taken 
out  no  new  letters  of  administration  here,  nor  has 
the  estate  been  positively  settled  in  the  foreign 
State.  Sweanngen  v.  Pendleton,  4  Serg.  &  R. 
389,  392;  Evans  v.  Tatem,  9  Serg.  &  R.  252, 
259;  Bryan  v.  McGee,  2  Wash.  C.  C  337; 
Campbell  v.  Tousey,  7  Cowen,  64;  see  al^o 
Dowdale's  case,  6  Coke,  47;  Julian  v.  Reynolds, 
8  Ala.  680.  He  is  charged  as  a  trustee  who 
has  brought  the  assets  within  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  Court.  MeNamara  v.  Dwyer,  7  Paige, 
239;  Brownlee  v.  Lockwood,  20  N.  J.  Eq.  255 ; 
Tunstall  v.  Pollard,  11  Leigh,  1;  Moore  v. 
Hood,  9  Rich.  Eq.  317 ;  Allsup  v.  Allsup,  10 
Yerg.  283;  Patton  v.  Overton,  8  Hum.  192; 
Beeler  v.  Dunn,  3  Head,  90 ;  Dillard  v.  Harris, 
2  Tenn,  Ch.  196.  The  doctrine  of  the  text  is 
sustained  by  Whart.  Conf.  Laws,§  616;  Story, 
Conf.  Laws,  §  514  b,  and  notes;  Boston  v. 
Boylston,  2  Mass.  384;  Goodwin  v.  Jones,  3 
Mass.  514;  Davis  v.  Estey,  8  Pick.  475; 
Dawes  v.  Head,  3  Pick.  128;  Doolittle  v. 
Lewis  7  John.  Ch.  45,  47;  McRea  ».  McRea, 
11  La.  571;  Att.-Gen  v.  Bouwens,  4  M.  &  W. 
171.  In  Campbell  r.  Wallace,  10  Gray,  162, 
it  was  held,  that  there  was  no  Equity  jurisdic- 
tion in  Massachusetts  to  enforce  a  trust  arising 
under  the  will  of  a  foreigner,  which  has  been 
proved  and  allowed  in  a  foreign  country  only, 


PERSONS   RESISTING    PLAINTIFF'S    DEMANDS. 


251 


♦Where  an  administration  was  disputed  in  the  Ecclesiastical  *251 
Court,  the  Court  of  Chancery  would  entertain  a  suit  for  a 
receiver  to  protect  the  property  till  the  question  in  the  Ecclesiastical 
Court  was  decided,  although  an  administration  pendente  lite  might  be 
obtained  in  the  Ecclesiastical  Court.1  In  such  cases,  the  rule  requiring 
a  representative  to  be  before  the  Court  must  be  dispensed  with,  there 
being  no  person  sustaining  that  character  in  existence.2  And  where  a 
party  entitled  to  administer  refuses  to  take  out  administration  himself, 
and  prevents  any  one  else  from  doing  so,  he  will  not  be  allowed  to 
object  to  a  suit  being  proceeded  with,  because  a  personal  representative 
is  not  before  the  Court.8 


and  no  certified  copy  of  which  has  been  filed  in 
the  Probate  Court  of  that  State.  See  Campbell 
v.  Sheldon,  13  Pick.  8.  In  Skitter  v.  Carroll,  2 
Sandf.  Ch.  573,  it  was  held  that,  in  a  case, 
where  there  are  real  assets  of  the  estate  of  a 
deceased  person  within  its  jurisdiction,  although 
no  administration  had  been  taken  within  the 
State,  a  Court  of  Equity  will  not  hesitate  to 
administer  them;  and  the  foreign  executors 
may  be  made  parties  to  the  suit  instituted  for 
that  purpose.  See  Scruggs  v.  Driver,  31  Ala. 
274. 

1  Atkinson  v.  Ilenshaw,  2  V.  &  B.  85  ;  Ball 
v  Oliver,  ib.  96;  see  also  Watkins  v.  Brent,  1 
M.  &  C.  97,  102;  Whitworth  v.  Whyddon,  2 
M'N.  &  G.  52;  14  Jur.  142;  dimming  v. 
Fraser,  28  Beav.  614  ;  Dimes  v.  Steinberg,  2 
Sin.  &  G.  75.  Now,  however,  it  is  appre- 
hended that  the  Court  would  require  a  special 
case  to  be  made  for  its  interference,  pending 
proceedings  in  the  Probate  Court;  that  Court 
having  power  to  appoint  an  administrator  pen- 
dente lite,  with  full  powers,  and  also  to  nomi- 
nate, him  receiver  of  the  rents  of  real  estate. 
20  &  21  Vic.  c.  77,  §§  70,  71,  73;  Vercy  v. 
Duprez,  L.  R.  6  Eq.  329,  V.  C.  M.;  Tich- 
borne  v.  Tichborne,  L.  R.  1  P.  &  D.  730; 
Hitchin  v.  Burks,  W.  N.  (1870)  190;  18  W. 
R  1015;  lor  an  instance  in  Chancery  since 
this  Act,  see  Williams  v.  Att.-Gen.  M.  R.  8 
May.  1801,    Seton,  1003. 

2  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  91.  The  Court,  can,  how- 
ever, appoint  a  nominee  of  its  own  to  represent 
the  estate.     15  &  16  Vic.  c.86,  §  44. 

3  Thus,  in  D'Aranda  v.  Whittinghnm,  Mos. 
84  (see,  however,  Penny  v.  Watts,  2  Phil. 
149),  where  the  heir  of  an  obligor  demurred  to  a 
bill  by  an  obligee,  because  the  administrator  of 
the  obligor  was  not  a  party,  the  demurrer  was 
overruled,  because  it  appeared  that  he  would 
not  administer  himself,  and  had  opposed  the 
plaintiff  in  taking  out  administration  as  the 
principal  creditor  ;  and  in  a  case  where  the  per- 
son entitled  by  law  to  administration  did  not 
take  it  out,  but  acted  as  if  she  had,  recefc  ing 
and  paying  away  the  intestate's  property,  an 
objection   for  want  of  parties,  on  the  ground 


that  there  was  no  administrator  before  the 
Court,  was  overruled.  Cleland  v.  Cleland, 
Prec.  Ch.  64.  In  Creasor  v.  Robinson,  14 
Beav.  589,  15  Jur.  1049,  however,  the  Court 
declined  to  follow  the  case  last  referred  to; 
and  refused  to  make  an  order  for  an  account 
against  an  administrator  de  son  tort,  unless  a 
legal  personal  representative  duly  constituted 
was  a  party.  See  also  Cooke  v.  Gettings,  21 
Beav.  497;  Beardmore  v.  Gregory,  2  H.  &  M. 
491 ;  11  Jur.  N.  S.  363.  Where  there  were 
four  executors,  one  of  whom  alone  proved 
and  acted,  and  a  bill  was  brought  against  that 
one,  and  he  in  his  answer  confessed  that  he 
had  alone  proved  the  will  and  acted  in  the 
executorship,  and  that  the  others  never  inter- 
meddled therein,  it  was  said  to  be  good. 
Brown  v.  Pitman,  Gilb.  Eq.  75;  10  Vin.  Ab. 
tit.  Parties,  B.  PI.  19;  Cramer  ».  Morton,  2 
Moll.  108;  Clifton  v.  Haig,  4  Desaus.  330.  In 
that  case,  however,  if  the  executor  who  had 
proved  had  died,  it  would  not  have  been  suffi- 
cient to  have  brought  his  executor  before  the 
Court,  because  he  would  not  have  represented 
the  original  testator;  the  other  executors  would 
still  have  had  a  right  to  prove,  even  though 
they  had  renounced  probate.  Arnold  v.  Blen- 
cowe,  1  Cox,  420.  It  may  be  doubted  whether 
this  is  now  so.  See  20  &  21  Vic.  c.  77,  §  79; 
and  21  &  22  Vic.  c  95,  §  16.  The  record, 
therefore,  would  not  have  been  complete  with- 
out a  new  representative  of  the  original  testa- 
tor. The  general  order  enabling  a  plaintiff  to 
proceed  against  one  or  more  persons  severally 
liable  (Cons.  Ord.  VII.  2)  does  not  apply  to  a 
general  administration  suit.  Hall  0.  Austin,  2 
Coll.  570;  10  Jur.  452.  As  to  proceedings 
upon  the  death  of  an  executor  or  administrator, 
see  1  Wins.  Exors.  258-260,  47*;  Twvford  p. 
Trail,  7  Sim.  02;  Barr  v.  Carter,  2  Cox.  429; 
A".  Gaynor'a  Goods,  L.  R.  1  P.  &  M.  723;  Re 
(lav  and  Tetley,  16  Ch.  D.  3;  Crossley  V. 
Glasgow  Life  Ass.  Society,  4  Ch.  D.  421;  Re 
Bayne's  Goods,  1  Sw.  &  Tr.  132;  Re  Smith's 
Goods,  3  Curt.  31 ;  Arnold  r.  Blencowe,  1  <  !ox, 
420;  Chalon  V.  Webster,  W.  N.  (1873)  189;  20 
&  21  Vic.  c.  77,  §  79;  21  &  22  Vic.  c.  95,  §  16. 

247 


*  253  OF    PARTIES   TO    A    SUIT. 

*2o2  *  Where  there  are  several  executors  or  administrators,  and 
general  administration  is  sought,  or  is  necessary  to  the  relief 
claimed,1  they  must  all  be  mafle  parties,  even  though  one  of  them  be  an 
infant.  2  This  rule  may  be  dispensed  with,  if  any  of  them  are  not 
amenable  to  the  process  of  the  Court,3  or  if  they  have  stood  out  pro- 
cess to  a  sequestration;  and  if  an  executor  has  not  proved  he  need  not 
be  a  party,4  unless  he  has  acted  as  executor.6  Wherever  an  executor 
has  actually  administered,  he  must  be  made  a  party,  although  he  has 
released  and  disclaimed.6  But  where  a  plaintiff  filed  a  bill  against  one 
of  two  executors,  and  alleged  in  his  bill  that  he  knew  not  who  was  the 
other  executor,  and  prayed  that  the  defendant  might  discover  who  he 
was  and  where  he  lived,  a  demurrer  for  want  of  parties  was  overruled.7 
And  where  one  of  two  joint  executors  is  abroad,  an  account  may  be 
decreed  of  his  own  receipts  and  payments.8 

The  cases  do  not  seem  to  afford  a  very  clear  answer  to  the  question, 
under  what  circumstances,  in  a  suit  to  administer  the  assets  of  a 
deceased  testator  or  intestate,  the  plaintiff  ought  to  join,  with  the 
existing  personal  representatives,  such  parties  as  fill  the  position  of 
administrators  or  executors  of  a  former  representative  of  the  origi- 
*253  nal  estate.9  It  is  conceived,  however,  that  the  practice  in  *this 
respect  is  now  settled;  namely,  to  make  the  personal  representa- 
tives of  a  deceased  executor  parties,  where  he  had  received  assets  of 
the  testator  for  which  he  has  not  accounted  with  the  surviving  executor, 
and  in  respect  of  which  it  is  sought  to  charge  his  estate;  but  where 
this  is  not  the  case,  to  introduce  into  the  bill  an  allegation  that  the 
deceased  executor  fully  accounted  with  the  survivor,  and  that  nothing 
is  due  from  his  estate  to  the  estate  of  the  testator,  and  not  to  make  his 


As  to  the  effect  of  one  executor  being  also  a  v.  Morris,   1  Hare,  413,  421;   6  Jur.  297;  see 

residuary  legatee,  see  Latch  v.  Latch,  L.   R.  10  21  &  22  Vic.  c.  95,  §  16,  and  supra,  p.  251,  n.  3. 
Ch.  464;  see  R.  S.  C.  1883,  Ord.   XVI.  11 ;  15  5  The  plaintiff  may  make  him  a  party,  if  he 

&  16  Vic.  c.  80,  §  42.     An  executor  cannot  act,  has  acted  as  executor.    Vickers  v.  Bell,  4  De  G. 

according  to   the  decisions   of  several   of  the  J.  &  S.  274;  10  Jur.  N.  S.  376,  L.  JJ.    Where 

States,  until  he  has  qualified  according  to  law.  a  bill  seeks  discovery  and  relief  only  agaii^t  the 

Monroe  v.  James,  4  Munf.  194;  Martin  v.  Peck,  acts  of  one  of  the  executors  of  an  estate,  it  is  not 

2  Yerg.  298 ;  3  Redf.  Wills,  21.  necessary  to  make  the  other  executor  a  party  in 

1  Hall  r.  Austin,  2  Coll.  570;  10  Jur.  452.  the  first  instance.     But,  it  seems,  a  co-executor 

2  Scurry  v.  Morse,  9  Mod.  89;  Offley  v.  may  be  made  a  party,  during  the  progress  of 
Jenney,  3  Ch.  Rep.  92;  Hamp  v.  Robinson,  3  the  suit,  if  it  shall  prove  to  be  expedient  or 
Pe  G.  J.  &  S.  97.  necessary.     Footman  v.  Pray,  R.  M.   Charlt. 

8  Cowslad  v.  Cely,  Prec.  Ch.  83 ;  but  if  they  291.     See  ante,  pp.  247,  248. 
are  all  out  of  the  jurisdiction,  an  administrator  6  Smithby  v.  Hinton,  1  Vern.  31. 

durante  absentia  must  be  appointed.     Donald  "'  Bowyer  v.  Covert,  1  Vern.  95;  Story,  Eq. 

v.  Bather,  16  Beav.  26.     Such  an  administrator  PI.  §  92;  see  Willis  v.  Henderson,  4  Scam.  20. 
may  be  sued  by  the  persons  interested  in  the  es-  8  Cowslad  v.  Cely,  Prec.  in  Ch.  83 ;  Clifton 

tate.    Chambers  v.  Bicknell,  2  Hare,  536.     See  v.  Haig,  4  Desaus.  330. 

Webb  v.  Kirby,7  De  G.  M.  &  G..376;  3  Jur.  9  William?  v.  Williams,  9  Mod.  299;  Phelps 

N.  S.  73.    So,  also,  if  the  letters  are  granted  to  v.  Sproule,  4  Sim.  318,  321;  Holland  v.  Prior,  1 

the  attorney  of  the  person  entitled  to  the  grant.  M.  &  K  237;  Masters  v.  Barnes,  2  Y.  &  C.  C. 

Ibid.;  Re  Dewell,  Edgar  v.  Reynolds,  4  Drew.  C.  616;  7  Jur.  1167;  Ling  v.  Colman,  10  Beav. 

269;  4  Jur.  N.  S.  399.  370;  Clark  v.  Webb,  16  Sim.  161 ;  12  Jur.  615; 

4  Went.  Off.   Ex.   95;    Brown   v.   Pitman,  Story,   Eq.  PI.  §  170,  note,  §  382;   Quince  v. 

Gilb.  Eq.  R.  75;   16  Vin.  Ab.  Party  B.  251,  pi.  Quince,   1  Murph.  160;  Hagan  v.  Walker,  14 

19;  Stickland  v.  Stickland,  12  Sim."  463;  Dyson  How.  (C.  S.)  29. 

248 


PERSONS    RESISTING    PLAINTIFF'S    DEMANDS.  *  254 

representatives  parties.1  The  fact  of  such  deceased  executor  having  died 
insolvent,  or  without  having  received  assets,  would  in  all  cases  probably 
prevent  his  executors  being  proper  parties.2 

If  a  bill  is  filed  against  a  married  woman  as  an  executrix  or  adminis- 
tratrix, her  husband  must  formerly  have  been  a  party,3  unless  he 
lias  abjured  the  realm;4  or  she  has  obtained  a  protection  order,  or  is 
judicially  separated.5  An  injunction  has,  however,  been  granted  to 
restrain  a  wife,  executrix,  from  getting  in  the  assets,  her  husband  being 
in  the  West  Indies,  and  not  amenable  to  the  process  of  the  Court,  on 
the  ground,  that  if  she  wasted  the  assets,  or  refused  to  pay,  a  creditor 
could  have  no  remedy,  inasmuch  as  her  husband  must  be  joined  as  a 
party  to  the  suit  against  her.6 

Where  a  bill  had  been  filed  for  an  account  of  the  testator's  estate, 
and  it  was  objected  that  one  of  the  executors  was  not  a  party,  he  was 
ordered  to  be  introduced  into  the  decree  then  made,  as  a  party,  and 
decreed  to  account  before  the  Master,  without  putting  off  the  cause  to 
add  parties ; 7  but  this  can  only  be  done  where  the  person  appears,  and 
submits  to  be  bound  as  if  originally  a  party.8 

Where  a  power  of  sale  is  given,  by  a  will,  to  executors,  and  they 
renounce  probate,  they  will  not  be  considered  necessary  parties  to  the 
suit.  Thus,  where  a  testator  had  devised  that  his  executors  should  sell 
his  land,  and  be  possessed  of  the  money  arising  from  the  sale  upon  cer- 
tain trusts  mentioned  in  his  will,  and  made  B  and  C  his  executors, 
who  renounced;  whereupon  administration,  with  the  will  annexed,  was 
granted  to  one  of  the  plaintiffs,  upon  a  bill  brought  by  the  cestui 
que  trust  of  the  purchase-money,  *  under  the  will,  against  the  *254 
heir,  to  compel  him  to  join  in  a  sale  of  the  lands;  it  was  objected 
that  there  wanted  parties,  in  regard  that  the  executors  ought  to  have 
been  made  defendants,  for  notwithstanding  they  had  renounced,  yet  the 
power  of  sale  continued  in  them,  and  the  objection  was  overruled,  there 
being  only  a  power  and  no  estate  devised  to  them.1  The  authority  of 
this  decision  has,  however,  been  doubted  on  the  ground  that  where  a 
power  is  given  to  executors  they  may  exercise  it,  although  they  renounce 
probate  of  the  will ; 2  and  it  seems  that  in  all  such  cases  the  question  is, 


1  See  Whittington  v.  Gooding,  10  Hare  App.  6  Taylor  v.  Allen,  2  Atk.  213. 

29;  Pease  v.  Cheesbrough,  Seton,  115.     Rut  see  "'  Pitt   v.   Brewster,  1   Dick.  37.     It  is  pre- 

Hamp  v.  Robinson,  3  De  G.  J.  &  S.  97;  and  see  sumed  that  he  appeared,  and  consented  to  this 

Montgomery  v.  Floyd,  18  L.  T.  N.  S.  847,  V.  order.     See    Footman  v.  Fray,   R.   M.  Charlt. 

C.  M.,  where  the  representatives  of  a  deceased  271,  cited  in  note,  ante,  p.  252.     As  to  the  hus- 

executor  were  held  not  to  be  necessary  parties,  band   of   an   accounting    party,   see   Sapte   v. 

though  there  was  no  such  allegation.    For  form  Ward,  1  Coll.  24. 

of  decree,  where  plaintiff  does  not,  by  his  bill,  8  geton,  1116*. 

seek  to  charge  a  deceased  co-executor's  estate,  l  Yates  v.  Compton,  2  P.  Wms.  308;  see 

see  2  Seton,  881,  No.  6.  Ferebee  v.  Proctor,  2  Dev.  &  Bat.  439;  S.  ('.  2 

2  See  Wills  v.  Dunn,  5  Graft.  384  ;  Synies  v.  Dev.  &  Bat.  Eq.  496  ;  Jackson  v.  Scauber,  7 
Glynn,  2  Seton,  883.  Cowen,  187;  Peck  v.  Henderson,  7  Yerger,  18; 

3  See  now  44  &  45  Vic.  c.  75,  §  18.  Champlin  v.  Parish,  3  Edw.  Ch.  581. 

4  Ld.  Red.  30.  2  gug.  Pow.  118,  880  ;  2  Prest.  on  Abst.  204; 

5  20  &  21  Vic.  c.85,  §§  21,  25.  20;  and  see  1  Wins.  Exors.  290,  291.  In  Keates  v.  Bur- 
Bathe  v.  Bank  of  England,  4  K.  &  J.  564;  4  ton,  14  Yes.  434.  437,  referred  to  by  Lord  St. 
Jur.  N.  S.  505;  21  &  22  Vic.  c.  108,  §  7.  Leonards  (which  was  a  case  of  a  discretionary 

249 


255 


OF   PARTIES   TO    A    SUIT. 


whether  the  confidence  is  reposed  in  the  persons  named,  or  in  the  per- 
sons who,  de  facto,  fill  the  given  office.8  (a) 

The  executor  or  the  administrator  of  a  deceased  person  being  the 
person  constituted  by  law  to  represent  the  personal  property  of  that 
person,  and  to  answer  all  demands  upon  it,  it  is  sufficient,  where  the 
object  of  a  suit  is  to  charge  such  personal  estate  with  a  demand,  to 
bring  the  executor  or  administrator  before  the  Court; 4  thus,  in  a  bill  to 
be  relieved  touching  a  lease  for  years,  or  other  personal  duty  against 
executors,   it  is  not  necessary,  though  the  executors  be  executors  in 

trust,  to  make  the  cestui  que  trusts,  or  the  residuary  legatees, 
*255    parties.5  (b)    And  so,  where  a  bill  was  filed  *  against  an  executor, 

to  compel  the  transfer  of  a  sum  of  stock  belonging  to  his  testa- 
trix, and  the  executor,  by  his  answer,  stated  that  the  residuary  legatees 
claimed  the  stock,  an  objection  for  want  of  parties  was  held  to  be 
untenable.1 


power  given  by  a  testator  over  the  application 
of  the  interest  of  a  money  fund  to  his  trus- 
tees and  executors,  one  of  whom  died,  and  the 
other  renounced),  Sir  William  Grant  M.  R. 
remarked,  "  that  the  power  is  given  to  the  ex- 
ecutors, but  they  have  not  exercised  it,  and  they 
have  renounced  the  only  character  in  which  it 
was  competent  to  them  to  exercise  it;"  see 
1  Wms.  Exors.  156;  and  in  Earl  Granville  v. 
M'Xeill,  7  Hare,  156;  13  Jur.  253,  where  it  was 
held,  that  the  two  executors  who  hr.d  proved, 
could  exercise  a  power  of  appointment  given  to 
their  testator,  his  executors,  administrators,  and 
assignees,  although  a  third  executor,  who  had 
renounced,  was  also  named  in  the  will,  Sir 
James  Wigram  Y.  C.  said,  "  I  have  referred 
to  Sir  Edward  Sugden's  book  on  Powers,  but 
find  nothing  to  make  me  doubt  the  sufficiency 
of  the  appointment." 

3  Ibid. 

*  Ld.  Red.  165;  Micklethwaite  v.  Winstan- 


ley,  13  W.  R.  210,  L.  JJ. ;  Eames  v.  Hacon,  16 
Ch.  D.  407;  18  Ch.  D.  347;  see  Neale  v.  Hag- 
thorp.  3  Bland,  551 ;  Wilkinson  v.  Perrin,  7 
Munroe,  217  ;  Galphin  v.  M'Kinney,  1  M'Cord 
Ch.  294;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  140,  and  note ;  Prichard 
v.  Hicks,  1  Paige.  270;  Kinlock  v.  Meyer,  1 
Speer,  S.  C.  Eq.  428;  Black  well  v.  Blackwell, 
33  Ala.  57. 

5  Anon.  1  Vern.  261 ;  1  Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  73,  pi. 
13;  Lawson  v.  Barker,  1  Bro.  C.  C.  303  ;  Love 
v.  Jacomb,  ibid.;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §§  104,  140,  in 
notes;  Wiser  v.  Blachly,  1  John.  Ch.  437; 
Dandridge  v.  Washington,  2  Peters,  377. 

i  Brown  v.  Dowthwaite,l  Mad.  446;  and 

see  Jones  v.  How,  7  Hare,   267  ;  12  Jur.  227. 

As  to  adding  parties,  see  R.  S.  C.  Ord.XVI. 

§§  7,  13.     If  the  defendant  executor's  duty  is 

inconsistent  with  his  duty  as  such,  leave  may 

be  granted  to  another  to  appear  in   his  name. 

Samuel  v.  Samuel,  12  Ch.  D.  152;  26  W.  R. 

750. 


(a)  In  the  recent  case  of  Crawford  v.  Forshaw 
(1891),  2  Ch.  261,  reversing  S.  C.  43  Ch.  D. 
643.  where  a  testator  having  appointed  three 
persons  executor,  and  given  the  residue  of  his 
estate  to  certain  charities  or  others  as  "  my  ex- 
ecutors herein  named  may  select,  to  be  divided 
in  such  proportions  as  the}'  may  approve  of," 
two  of  them  proved  the  will,  and  the  third 
renounced  probate,  it  was  held  that  the  latter 
could  not  act  in  selecting  the  charities  and  dis- 
tributing the  residue;  and  that  the  two  who  had 
proved  could  exercise  the  power  alone. 

(b)  The  executor  is  the  representative  of  all 
persons  interested  upon  a  bill  which  is  filed  for 
the  recovery  of  a  general  legacy,  and  does  not 
involve  the  construction  of  the  residuary  clause 
of  the  will  in  which  residuary  legatees  are  only 
consequentially  interested.  Davison  v.  Rake, 
45  X.  J.  Eq.  767.  The  personal  representative 
is   usually  a  necessary  party  only  when    the 

250 


assets  in  his  hands  are  liable  to  be  affected  by 
the  decree.  Houston  v.  Blackman,  66  Ala.  559 ; 
Coffee  v.  Norwood,  81  Ala.  512.  See  Lowry  v. 
Jackson,  27  S.  C.  318;  Gardner  v.  Kelso,  80 
Ala.  407;  Cox  v.  Roome,  36  X.  J.  Eq.  317: 
Griffin  v.  Spence,  69  Ala.  393;  see  post,  p.  319. 
In  general,  the  refusal  of  a  legal  personal  repre- 
sentative to  sue  for  uncollected  assets  does  not 
authorize  a  residuary  legatee  or  next  of  kin  to 
sue  him  and  the  debtor  to  the  estate  Yeatman 
t\  Yeatman,  7  Ch.  D.  210.  But,  under  special 
circumstances,  a  cestui  que  trust  may  properly 
bring  suit  when  the  trustee  refuses  to  sue,  mak- 
ing the  other  cestui  que  trusts  defendants  to 
guard  against  a  multiplicity  of  suits.  Meldrum 
v.  Scorer,  56  L.  T.  471.  A  partnership  creditor 
cannot  sue  for  the  administration  of  a  deceased 
partner's  estate  without  joining  the  surviving 
partner  as  a  defendant,  even  when  the  latter  is 
insolvent.     Re  McRae.  25  Ch.  D.  19. 


PERSONS   RESISTING    PLAINTIFF  S    DEMANDS. 


*256 


In  like  manner,  where  a  testator  gave  different  legacies  to  three  per- 
sons, and  they  were  to  abate  or  increase  according  to  the  amount  of  the 
personal  estate ;  to  a  bill  against  the  executor  by  one  legatee,  the  execu- 
tor pleaded  that  the  other  legatees  ought  to  be  parties,  because  the 
account  made  with  the  plaintiff  would  not  conclude  them,  and  he  should 
be  put  to  several  accounts  and  double  proof  and  charge,  the  plea  was 
overruled.2  It  seems,  however,  that  where  a  person  has  a  specific  lien 
upon  the  property  in  dispute,  he  must  be  brought  before  the  Court.8 
And  so  where  a  husband  had  specifically  disposed  of  his  wife's  para- 
phernalia to  other  persons;  on  a  bill  by  the  wife  against  the  executor 
for  a  delivery  of  them  to  her,  the  specific  legatees  were  considered 
necessary  parties.4  (a) 

The  assignees  of  a  bankrupt  or  insolvent  debtor  are  also,  as  has  been 
before  stated,  the  proper  parties  to  represent  the  estates  vested  in  them 
under  the  bankruptcy  or  insolvency;  and  therefore,  in  all  cases  where 
claims  are  sought  to  be  established  against  the  estate  of  a  bankrupt  or 
an  insolvent  debtor,  it  is  necessary  to  bring  only  the  assignees  before 
the  Court,  and  the  bankrupt  or  insolvent  himself,  or  his  creditors,  are 
improper  parties.5  Thus  it  has  been  held,  that  a  bankrupt  is  not  a 
necessary  party  to  a  bill  of  foreclosure  against  his  assignees.6  Where, 
however,  fraud  and  collusion  are  charged  between  the  bankrupt  and  his 
assignees,  the  bankrupt  may  be  made  a  party,  and  he  cannot 
demur,  although  *  relief  be  prayed  against  him.  Thus,  where  a  *256 
creditor,  having  obtained  execution  against  the  effects  of  his 
debtor,  filed  a  bill  against  the  debtor,  against  whom  a  commission  of 


2  Haycock  v.  Haycock,  2  Ch.  Cas.  124 ;  Jen- 
nings v.  Paterson,  15  Beav.  28.  There  may, 
however,  be  cases  where  pecuniary  legatees  are 
proper  parties;  as  where  there  is  a  question  of 
ademption.  Marquis  of  Hertford  v.  Count  de 
Zichi,  3  Beav.  11,  15. 

3  Upon  this  ground  where  a  bill  was  brought 
by  the  specific  legatee  of  a  mortgagee  against 
the  representative  of  the  mortgagor,  for  fore- 
closure, and  the  defendant  pleaded  a  settled 
account  with  the  executors  of  the  mortgagee, 
and  a  release,  Lord  Hardwicke  said,  that  he 
could  not  see  how  the  private  account  between 
the  executor  of  the  mortgagee  and  the  debtor 
could  discharge  the  lien  on  the  land.  Langley 
V.  Karl  of  Oxford,  Amb.  17  ;  but  see  Serjeant 
Hill's  note  of  this  case,  in  Blunt's  edition  of 
Ambler,  App.  C.  p  795;  Reg.  Lib.  B.  1747,  fol. 
300.  The  bill  in  that  case  was  afterwards  dis- 
missed.    Reg.  Lib.  B.  1747,  fo.  300. 


4  Northey  v.  Northey,  2  Atk.  77.  So,  to  a 
bill  by  the  widow  of  an  intestate  against  the 
administrator,  to  recover  her  share  of  the  estate, 
all  the  distributees  of  the  intestate  should  be 
made  parties.     Chinn  r.  Caldwell,  4  Bibb.  543. 

5  Collet  v.  Wollaston,  3  Bro.  C.  C.  228; 
Hilliard,  Bank  &  Ins.  383,  384;  Sells  v.  Hub- 

.  bell,  2  John.  Ch.  394;  Springers.  Vanderpool, 
4  Edw.  Ch.  3G2.  On  a  bill  filed  by  a  receiver 
for  the  creditors  and  stockholders  of  a  corpora- 
tion, it  is  not  necessary  to  make  the  creditors 
and  stockholders  parties.  Mann  v.  Bruce,  1 
Halst.  Ch.  (N.  J.)  413. 

6  Adams  v.  Holbrooke,  Har.  Ch.  P.  30; 
Bainbridge  v.  Pinhorn,  1  Buck,  135;  Lloyd  v. 
Lander,  5  Mad.  282,  288;  see  Dendel  v  Sutton, 
20  Fed.  Rep.  787;  New  Orleans  N.  B.  Ass,  v. 
Le  Breton,  14  Fed.  Rep.  646. 


(n)  Upon  a  bill,  under  a  statute,  to  contest 
the  validity  of  a  will,  all  the  legatees  and  devi- 
sees in  the  will  are  necessary  parties.  Brown 
r.  Riggin,  94  111.  560.  So  in  a  suit  to  enforce  a 
trust  created  by  will,  all  the  beneficiaries  were 
held  proper  parties,  although  some  of  them  had 
no  interest  in  such  relief  as  related  to  accounting 
for  rents  collected.  Goodwin  v.  Goodwin,  69 
Mo.  617.     So  where  one  residuary  legatee  sues 


for  his  share  of  the  residue,  all  the  others  are  ne- 
cessary parties.  Leavy  v.  Leavy,  22  Hun,  499. 
Assignees  of  legatees  have  also  the  right  to  be 
parties  to  a  creditor's  bill  against  the  estate 
upon  the  removal  of  the  executor  and  appoint- 
ment of  a  receiver.  Fraser  v.  Charleston.  13 
S.  C  533.  As  to  parties  in  suits  for  construc- 
tion of  wills,  see  Morse  v.  Lyman,  64  Vt.  167{ 
Penn  Ins.  Co.  v   Bauerle,  143  111.  459. 

251 


*256 


OF    PARTIES    TO    A    SUIT. 


bankrupt  had  issued,  and  the  persons  claiming  as  assignees  under  the 
commission,  charging  that  the  commission  was  a  contrivance  to  defeat 
the  plaintiff's  execution,  and  that  the  debtor  having,  by  permission  of 
the  plaintiff,  possessed  part  of  the  goods  which  had  been  taken  in  exe- 
cution for  the  purpose  of  sale,  instead  of  paying  the  produce  to  the 
plaintiff,  had  paid  it  to  his  assignees :  a  demurrer  by  the  alleged  bank- 
rupt, because  he  had  no  interest  and  might  be  examined  as  a  witness, 
was  overruled.1 

Subject  to  certain  exceptions  and  statutory  relaxations,2  the  rule 
formerly  was  that  all  cestui  que  trusts  were  necessary  parties  to  suits 
against  their  trustees,  by  which  their  rights  were  likely  to  be  affected.8 
Thus,  on  a  bill  for  redemption,  where  the  defendant  in  his  answer  set 
forth  that  he  was  a  trustee  for  A,  an  objection  was  made  at  the  hear- 
ing, that  the  cestui  que  trust  should  have  been  made  a  party;  and 
because  it  was  disclosed  in  the  answer,  and  the  plaintiff  might  have 
amended,  the  bill  was  dismissed.4     So  in  a  bill  against  the  heir  of  a 


1  King  v.  Martin,  2  Ves.  Jr.  641,  cited  Ld. 
Red.  102.  But  the  bankrupt  is  not  a  necessary 
party  to  a  bill  by  his  assignee  to  set  aside  as 
fraudulent  a  conveyance  of  property  made  by 
the  bankrupt.  Burlington  v.  Harvey,  95  U.  S. 
99;  Weise  v.  Wardle,  L.  R.  19  Eq.  171.  In  a 
bill  to  set  aside  a  conveyance  as  made  without 
consideration,  and  in  fraud  of  creditors,  the 
alleged  fraudulent  grantor  is  a  necessary  de- 
fendant in  the  bill.  Gaylords  v.  Kelshaw.  1 
Wall.  81.  But  it  has  been  held  that  a  fraudu- 
lent grantor,  or  his  representative  or  heir,  is  not 
a  necessary  party  to  a  creditor's  bill  to  set  aside 
a  fraudulent  conveyance.  Taylor  v.  Webb,  54 
Miss.  36,  citing  Smith  v.  Grim,  26  Penn.  St.  95; 
Dockray  v.  Mason,  48  Maine,  178;  Merry  v. 
Freemon,  44  Mo.  518;  Creed  v.  Railway,  22 
Wis.  260.  (a)  Nor,  after  execution  sale,  need 
he  be  made  a  party  to  a  bill  by  the  purchaser  to 
have  the  title  quieted  and  divested  out  of  the 
fraudulent  grantee.  Laughton  v.  Harden,  68 
Maine,  208.  The  reason  is,  in  both  cases,  that 
he  has  no  further  interest  in  the  property. 

2  See  note  4,  below. 

3  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §§  192,  190,  207;  Helm  v. 
Hardin,  2  B-  Mon.  202;  Hewett  v.  Adams,  50 
Maine,  271,  281 ;  Van  Doren  v.  Robinson,  16 
N.  J.  Eq.  256;  demons  v.  Elder,  9  Iowa,  272. 

(a)  The  weight  of  authority  supports  the  cited 
case  of  Gaylords  v.  Kelshaw.  See  Lawrence  v. 
Bank  of  the  Republic,  35  N.  Y.  320;  Miller  v. 
Hall,  70  N.  Y.  250;  Hubbell  v.  Merchants' 
Bank,  72  Hun,  200;  Coffey  v.  Norwood.  81  Ala. 
512;  Sides  v.  Scharff,  93  Ala.  106;  Dunn  v. 
Wolf,  81  Iowa,  688:  Blanc  v.  Paymaster  Min- 
ing Co.  95  Cal.  524 :  Raynorw.  Mintzer,  67  Cal. 
159  :  Salter  v.  Kreuger,  65  Wis.  217;  Lovejoy  v. 
Irelan,  17  Md.  525:  Black  v.  Bordelon,  38  La. 
Ann.  696;  .Johnson  v.  Christian,  128  U.  S.  374; 
Judson  v.  Courier  Co.  25  Fed.  Rep.  705;  Chaffin 
V.  Hull,  39  id.  887;  Pullman  v.  Stebbins,  51  id. 


In  a  suit  by  a  trustee  to  establish  and  main- 
tain the  title  intrusted  to  him  against  an  adverse 
claim,  by  a  bill,  he  must  make  the  cestui  que 
trust  a  party.  Blake  v.  Allman,  5  Jones  Eq. 
(N.  C.)  407*. 

Upon  a  bill  by  one  cestui  que  trust  against 
the  trustee,  showing  that  the  defendant  holds 
a  certain  sum  of  money  for  the  plaintiff  and 
another  person,  and  that  each  is  entitled  to  an 
aliquot  part  of  the  fund,  and  the  trust  not  denied, 
the  other  person  is  not  a  necessary  party. 
Hubbard  v.  Burrell,  41  Wis.  365. 

4  Whistler  v.  Webb.  Bunb.  53;  Beals  v. 
Cobb,  51  Maine,  349,  350:  Story,  Eq.  Fl.  §207; 
Davis  v.  Hemingway,  2D  Vt.  438;  see  Crease  v. 
Babcock,  10  Met.  525;  Carpenter  v.  Robinson,  1 
Holmes,  67 ;  James  v.  Atlantic  D.  Co.  3  Cliff.  622. 
Where  mortgaged  real  property  is  conveyed  in 
trust  for  the  benefit  of  children,  both  those  in 
being  and  those  to  be  born,  all  children  in  esse 
at  the  time  of  filing  a  bill  of  foreclosure  of  the 
mortgage  should  be  made  parties.  Otherwise, 
the  decree  of  foreclosure  does  not  take  away 
their  right  to  redeem.  A  decree  in  such  a  case 
against  the  trustee  alone  does  not  bind  the  cestui 
que  trusts.  Clark  »>.  Rej'burn,  8  Wall.  318.  In 
England,  in  suits  concerning  real  or  personal 
property,  which  is  vested  in  trustees,  such  trus- 

10;  Chadbourne  o.  Coe,  id.  479;  Williamson  v. 
Selden  (Minn.),  54  N.  W.  Rep.  1055,  1056; 
Paton  v.  Langley,  50  Mich.  428;  Matthews  v. 
Lloyd,  89  Ky.  625 ;  Lemmon  v.  Dunn,  61  Miss. 
210;  Roberts  V.  Chamberlain,  30  Kansas,  677; 
Hill  v.  Lewis,  45  Kansas,  162;  Dailey  v.  Kinsler, 
31  Neb.  340;  Dameron  v.  Jameson,  71  Mo.  97. 
In  Taylor  v.  Webb,  ubi  supra,  the  proceeding 
■was  treated  as  in  rem.  In  Whittemore  v.  Cowell, 
7  Allen,  446,  a  bona  fide  mortgagee  of  land  from 
a  fraudulent  grantee  was  held  to  be  a  proper 
party  to  a  bill  to  set  aside  the  mortgagor's  title, 
although  the  mortgage  debt  was  not  yet  due. 


PERSONS    RESISTING    PLAINTIFF  S    DEMANDS. 


*  257 


mortgagee  to  redeem,  the  personal  representative  must  be  a  party, 
because  be  is  the  person  entitled  to  the  mortgage  money,  and  the  heir 
is  only  a  trustee  of  the  legal  estate  for  him.5 

In  some  cases,  however,  where  the  cestui  que  trusts  are  very  numer- 
ous, the  necessity  of  bringing  them  all  before  the  Court  has 
*been  dispensed  with.1  Formerly,  the  general  rule,  in  cases  *257 
where  real  estates  were  either  devised  or  settled  upon  trusts  for 
payment  of  debts  or  legacies,  was,  that  if  the  persons  to  be  benefited 
by  the  produce  of  the  estate  were  either  named  or  sufficiently  indicated, 
then  that  they  must  be  all  parties  to  any  suit  affecting  the  estate;  if, 
however,  the  bill  alleged  their  great  number  as  a  reason  for  not  making 
them  all  parties,  and  if  the  Court  were  satisfied  that  the  absentees  were 
sufficiently  represented  by  those  who  were  made  parties  to  the  record, 
the  presence  of  all  the  persons  interested  would  be  dispensed  with; 2  and 
upon  the  same  principle,  where  the  trusts  were  for  the  payment  of 
debts  or  legacies  generally,  the  trustees  alone  were  allowed  to  sustain 
the  suit,  either  as  plaintiffs  or  defendants,  without  bringing  before  the 
Court  the  creditors  or  legatees  for  whom  they  were  trustees ; 3  and  now 
it  is  conceived  that  the  Court  would,  in  such  cases,  generally  allow  the 
suit  to  proceed  without  any  of  the  cestui  que  trusts  being  made  parties, 
considering  their  interests  to  be  sufficiently  represented  by  the  trustees ;  4 


tees  represent  the  persons  beneficially  interested, 
in  the  same  manner,  and  to  the  s.uiie  extent,  as 
the  executors  or  administrators  in  suits  concern- 
ing personal  estate  represent  the  per  ons  bene- 
ficially interested  in  such  personal  estate;  and 
in  such  cases  it  is  not  necessary  to  make  the 
persons  beneficially  interested  parties  to  the 
suit ;  1 5  &  10  Vic.  c.  86,  §  42,  r.  9 ,  see  ante,  p.  222, 
note  2;  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  XVI.  7,  13;  Lovesy  v. 
Smith,  15  Ch.  D.  655. 

5  See  Guthrie  r.  Morrell,  6  Ired.  Eq.  13. 

1  See  post,  p.  21)0.  Thus,  where  upon  a  bill 
brought  against  an  assignee  of  a  lease  to  compel 
him  to  pay  the  rent,  and  perform  the  covenants, 
it  appeared  that  the  assignment  was  upon  trust 
for  such  as  should  buy  the  shares,  the  whole 
being  divided  into  900  shares;  and  an  objection 
was  taken  because  the  shareholders  were  not 
parties;  the  objection  was  overrul  d,  as  the 
assignees,  by  dividing  the  shares,  had  made  it 
impracticable  to  have  them  all  before  the  Court. 
City  of  London  v.  Richmond,  9  Vern.  421. 
N.  B.  In  that  case  the  original  lessee  was  con- 
sidered a  necessary  party.     Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  1 18. 

2  Holland  v.  Baker.  3  Hare,  68;  6  Jur.  1011 ; 
Harrison  v.  Stewardson,  2  Hare, 530;  see  Storv, 
Eq  PI.  §  150;  Johnson©.  Candage,  31  Maine,  28. 

3  Ld.  Red.  174;  see  Stevenson  v.  Austin,  3 
Met.  474,  480.  "  Under  some  circumstances," 
says  Waite  C.  J.,  "a  trustee  may  represent  his 
beneficiaries  in  all  things  relating  to  their  com- 
mon interest  in  the  trust  property.  He  may  be 
invested  with  such  powers,  and  subjected  to 
such  obligations,  that  those  for  whom  he  holds 
will  be  bound  bv  what  is  done  bv  him.     The 


difficulty  lies  in  ascertaining  whether  he  occu- 
pies such  a  position,  not  in  determining  its 
effect  if  he  does.  If  he  has  been  made  such  a 
representative,  it  is  well  settled  that  his  benefi- 
ciaries are  not  necessary  parties  to  a  suit  by 
him  against  a  stranger  to  enforce  the  trust . 
Shaw  v.  Norfolk  R.  Co.  5  Gray,  171;  Bifield  v. 
Taylor,  1  Beat.  91 ;  Campbell  v.  R.  R.  Co.  1 
Woods,  376;  Ashton  r.  Atlantic  Bank,  3  Allen, 
220;  or  to  one  by  a  stranger  against  him  to 
defeat  it  in  whole  or  in  part:  Rogers  r.  Rogers, 
3  Paige,  379  ;  Wakeman  v.  Grover,  4  Paige,  34; 
Winslow  v.  M.  &  P  R.  Co.  4  Minn.  317  ;  Camp- 
bell v.  Watson,  8  Ohio,  500.  In  such  cases, 
the  trustee  is  in  Court  for  and  on  behalf  of 
the  beneficiaries;  and  they,  though  not  parties, 
are  bound  by  the  judgment,  unless  it  is  im- 
peached for  fraud  or  collusion  between  him  and 
the  adverse  party.'"  Kerrison  v.  Stewart,  93 
U.  S.  160.  In  that  case,  the  trust  assignment 
was  for  the  benefit  of  creditors  in  the  usual 
form,  with  power  in  the  trustee,  on  default  of 
payment  of  the  debts  secured,  to  sell  for  cash, 
or  on  time,  and  apply  the  proceeds  pro  rata  in 
satisfaction  of  the  debts,  and  it  was  held  that  a 
decree,  in  a  suit  by  third  persons  against  the 
trustee,  setting  aside  the  trust  conveyance  as 
fraudulent,  was  binding  upon  the  creditors 
secured,  although  not  parties  to  the  suit  in 
which  the  decree  was  rendered.  And  see 
Pindall  v.  Trever,  30  Ark.  249;  Ward  r.  Hol- 
lins,  14  Md.  158.     Ante,  220,  note  1. 

*  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  42,  r.  9,  Morley  v. 
Morley,  25  Beav.  253;  and  see  Knight  v.  Po- 
cock,  24  Beav.  436. 


258 


OF    PARTIES    TO    A    SUIT. 


except  where  it  might  require  some  of  the  cestui  que  trusts  to  be  parties, 
in  order  to  secure  the  application  of  the  trust  money.5  Trustees  will 
also  represent  their  cestui  que  trusts  in  partition  suits.0 

We  have  already  seen,  that  the  30th  Order  of  August,  1841,  did  not 
apply  to  cases  where  a  mortgagee  sought  to  foreclose  the  equity  of 
redemption  of  estates  vested  in  trustees,7  but  that  under  the  rule  of  the 
late  Act  above  referred  to,  where  the  trustees  are  the  persons  who 
would  be  in  possession  of  funds  to  redeem,  they  may  properly  represent 
their  cestui  que  trusts;8  though,  when  this  is  not  the  case,  the  cestui 
que  trusts,  or  some  of  them,  ought  to  be  parties.9  (a) 

Formerly,  in  such  cases,  the  cestui  que  trusts  were  necessary  parties; 10 

but  to  a  suit  for  the  execution  of  a  trust  by  or  against  those  claim - 
*258    ing  the  ultimate  benefit  of  such  trust,  after  the  satisfaction  *of 

prior  charges,  it  was  not  necessary  to  bring  before  the  Court  the 
persons  claiming  the  benefit  of  such  prior  charges;  and,  therefore,  to  a 
bill  for  application  of  a  surplus,  after  payment  of  debts  and  legacies, 
or  other  incumbrances,  the  creditors,  legatees,  or  other  incumbrancers, 
need  not  be  made  parties.  And  persons  having  demands  prior  to  the 
creation  of  such  a  trust,  might  enforce  these  demands  against  the 
trustees,  without  bringing  before  the  Court  the  persons  interested  under 
the  trust,  if  the  absolute  disposition  of  the  property  was  vested  in  the 
trustees.  But  if  the  trustees  had  no  such  power  of  disposition,  as  in 
the  case  of  trustees  to  convey  to  certain  uses,  the  persons  claiming  the 
benefit  of  the  trust  must  also  be  parties.  Persons  having  specific 
charges  on  the  trust  property  were  also  necessary  parties;  but  this 
would  not  extend  to  a  general  trust  for  creditors  or  others,  whose 
demands  were  not  specified  in  the  creation  of  the  trust,  as  their  num- 
ber, as  well  as  the  difficulty  of  ascertaining  who  ma}T  answer  a  general 
description,  might  greatly  embarrass  a  prior  claim  against  a  trust 
property.1 


5  Stansfield  v.  Hobson,  16  Beav.  189. 

6  Goodrich  v.  Marsh,  W.  N.  (1878)  186; 
Simpson  v.  Denny,  10  Ch.  D.  28;  Stace  v.  Gage, 
8Ch.  D.  451. 

7  See  Wilton  v.  Jones,  2  Y.  &  C  244. 

8  Hanman  v.  Riley,  9  Hare  App.  40;  Sale 
r.  Kitson,  3  De  G.  M.  &  G.  119;  17  Jur.  170; 
ante,  p.  215. 

9  Goldsmid  v.  Stonehewer,  17  Jur  199;  9 
Hare  App.  38;  Davis  v.  Hemingway,  29  Vt. 
438;  ante,  p.  215. 

i"  Osbourn  r.  Fallows,  1  R.  &  M.  741 :  Cal 
verley  v.  Phelp,  6  Mad.  229 ;  Faithful  v.  Hunt,  3 
Anst.  751;  Newton  v.  Earl  of  Egmont,  4  Sim. 
574,  584;  5  Sim.  130,  135,  Coles  v.  Forrest,  10 


(a)  By  the  present  English  practice,  under 
Order  XVI.  rule  7,  in  a  suit  for  redemption, 
trustees  of  an  equity  of  redemption  sufficiently 
represent  the  trust  estate,  either  as  plaintiffs  or 
defendants,  where  no  direction  to  the  contrary 
is  made  by  the  Court.  Jennings  v.  Jordon,  6 
App.  Cas.  698:  S.  C.  nom.  Mills  v.  Jennings,  13 

251 


Beav.  552,  557;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §§  206,  207;  ante, 
p  222. 

i  Ld.  Red.  175;  Story.  Eq.  PI.  §  216.  Thus 
where  a  plaintiff  claiming  an  annuity  charged 
upon  an  estate  which  had  subsequently  been 
demised  to  trustees  for  the  benefit  of  such  of 
the  grantee's  creditors  as  should  execute  the 
conveyance,  filed  a  bill,  against  the  grantor 
and  the  trustees,  and  one  of  the  creditors  who 
had  executed  the  deed,  and  who  had  obtained 
a  decree  in  an  original  suit,  instituted  by  him 
on  behalf  of  himself  and  all  other  the  creditors 
under  the  trust  deed,  praying  an  account  of 
what  was  due  to  him,  and  that  the  priorities  of 
himself  and  the  other  creditors  might  be  ascer- 


Ch.  D.  639.  If,  however,  the  trustee  is  bank- 
rupt, the  cestui  que  trusts  are  necessary  parties. 
Francis  v.  Harrison,  43  Ch.  D.  183.  A  trustee 
who  unreasonably  delays  to  sue  should  be  made 
a  defendant  to  a  bill  filed  by  the  beneficiaries 
to  accomplish  the  d'esired  result.  Billings  v. 
Aspen  Mining  &  S.  Co.  52  Fed.  Rep.  250. 


PERSONS    RESISTING    PLAINTIFF  S    DEMANDS. 


259 


Where,  however,  the  demands  and  names  of  the  creditors,  although 
not  actually  specified  at  the  time  of  the  creation  of  the  trust,  were  sub- 
sequently ascertained  by  their  signing  a  schedule  to  the  conveyance, 
they  became  necessary  parties.2 

Where  the  money  secured  by  a  mortgage  was  subject  to  a  trust,  a 
mortgagor,  or  any  person  claiming  under  him,  seeking  to  redeem  the 
mortgage,  must  make  all  persons  claiming  an  interest  in  the 
*  mortgage  money  parties  to  the  suit.1  And  in  general  it  is  *259 
laid  down  as  a  rule,  that  there  could  be  no  foreclosure  nor 
redemption  unless  all  the  parties  entitled  to  the  mortgage  money  are 
before  the  Court.2  (a)  Therefore,  where  a  mortgagee  had  assigned  the 
mortgage  upon  certain  trusts  for  the  benefit  of  his  family,  the  mort- 
gagee, the  trustees,  and  the  cestui  que  trusts,  were  considered  necessary 
parties  to  a  bill  to  redeem.3  And  so  where  a  mortgage  term  had  been 
bequeathed  to  trustees,  upon  trust,  to  sell  and  apply  the  produce  among 
the  testator's  twelve  children  and  a  grandchild  nominatim ;  it  was 
held,  that  all  the  cestui  que  trusts,  interested  in  the  produce  of  the 
term,  were  necessary  parties,  although  they  were  numerous,  and  the 
property  small,  and  although  the  trustees  had  power  to  give  a  discharge 
to  purchasers.4    Now,  however,  it  has  been  held,  that  in  a  redemption 


tained,  and  that  he  might  redeem  the  securities 
which  were  prior  to  his  own,  and  have  the 
benetit  of  the  decree  as  to  that  part  of  the  de- 
mand for  which  he  should  not  be  entitled  to 
priority  over  the  trust  deed ;  it  was  held  that 
all  the  creditors  who  had  executed  the  trust 
deed  were  necessary  parties;  and  that,  as  it 
was  stated  in  the  bill  that  several  of  the  credi- 
tors had  executed  the  deed,  and  only  one  was 
made  a  part}',  the  defect  appeared  sufficiently 
on  the  bill  to  entitle  the  defendant  to  take  ad- 
vantage of  it  by  demurrer.  Sir  L.  S1  adwell, 
V.  C,  in  Newton  v.  Earl  of  Egmont,  4  Sim.  574; 
5  Sim.  130;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §§  133,  149.  One 
creditor  secured  in  a  deed  of  trust,  cannot 
maintain  a  bill  for  an  account  of  the  fund  with- 
out making  all  creditors  who  are  preferred,  and 
all  in  the  same  class  with  him,  parties.  Murphy 
v.  Jackson,  5  Jones  Eq.  (N.  C.)  11. 

2  Ibid. 

1  Thus,  where  it  appeared  that  the  parties 
against  whom  the  redemption  was  prayed  were 
trustees  for  a  woman  and  her  children,  it  was 
held  that  the  cestui  que  trusts  were  necessary 
parties  to  the  suit,  although  under  the  peculiar 


circumstances  of  the  case,  and  to  avoid  delay 
and  expense,  he  recommended  that  a  petition 
should  be  presented  on  their  behalf,  praying 
that  their  interests  might  be  protected,  and 
directed  the  cause  to  stand  over  for  that  pur- 
pose. Drew  v.  Harman,  5  Price,  319 ;  Story, 
Eq.  PI.  §§  192,  208.  Followed  in  Birdsong  v. 
Birdsong,  2  Head,  289  ;  and  Saylors  v.  Saviors, 
3  Heisk.  533. 

2  Palmer  v.  Earl  of  Carlisle,  1  S.  &  S.  423 ; 
Story,  Eq.  PI.  182,  et  seq.;  Large  v.  Van  Doren, 
14  N.J.  Eq.  208;  Beals  i>.  Cobb,  51  Maine, 
348;  Osbourn  v.  Fallows,  1  R.  &  M.  741; 
McCall  v.  Yard,  9  N.  J.  Eq.  358;  S.  C.  11  id. 
58.  And  see  Gould  v.  Wheeler,  28  N.  J.  Eq. 
541;  Beach  v.  Mosgrove,  16  Fed.  Rep.  305.  In 
bills  of  foreclosure,  this  ordinarily  includes  the 
heir,  or  devisee,  or  assignee,  and  personal  rep- 
resentatives of  the  mortgagor,  and  also  the 
tenants  for  life  and  the  remainder-man,  for  they 
all  may  be  interested  in  the  right  of  redemp- 
tion, or  in  taking  the  accounts.     4  Kent,  185. 

s  Wetherell  v.  Collins,  3  Mad.  255;  Story, 
Eq.  PI.  §  192. 

4  Osbourn  v.  Fallows,  1  R.  &  M.  741. 


(a)  A  mortgagor  who  has  absolutely  con- 
veyed his  equity  of  redemption,  and  against 
whom  no  personal  claim  is  made,  is  nota  neces- 
sary party  to  a  bill  of  foreclosure.  See  Brown 
v.  Stead,  5  Sim.  535;  Giffard  v.  Hort,  1  Sch.  & 
Lefr.  386  ;  Steele  v.  Maunder,  1  Coll.  535  ; 
Slade  v.  Rigg,  3  Hare,  35  ;  Blount  v.  Winter- 
ton,  1  Harris.  Ch,  Pr.  by  Newl.  29  (1808); 
Adams  v.  Holbrook,  id.  30;  Avres  v.  Wis  wall, 
112  U.  S.   137;    Shaw  v.   Hoadley,  8  Blackf. 


105;  Swift  v.  Edson,  5  Conn.  531;  Miner  v. 
Smith,  53  Vt.  551;  Daugherty  v.  Deardorf,  107 
Ind.  527  ;  Scarry  v.  Eldridge,  63  Ind.  44  ; 
Martin  v.  Morris,  62  Wis.  418  ;  Robbins  v. 
Arnold,  11  111.  App.  434;  Johnson  v.  Foster, 
68  Iowa,  140;  Tutwiler  v.  Dunlap,  71  Ala.  136. 
Two  tenants  in  common  who  have  made  a 
mortgage,  must  both  be  parties  to  a  suit  for  re- 
demption.    Bolton  v.  Salmon,  [1891]  2  Ch.  48. 

255 


*2G0 


OF    PARTIES    TO    A    SUIT. 


suit,  where  the  mortgage  money  is  vested  in  trustees,  the  trustees 
represent  the  cestui  que  trusts  sufficiently  to  protect  the  mortgagor; 
but  that  some  of  the  cestui  que  trusts  ought  also  to  be  parties,  in  order 
to  secure  the  due  application  of  the  trust  property.5 

It  was  said  by  Lord  Hardwicke,  that  where  a  mortgagee,  who  has  a 
plain  redeemable  interest,  makes  several  conveyances  upon  trust,  in 
order  to  entangle  the  affair,  and  to  render  it  difficult  for  a  mortgagor, 
or  his  representatives,  to  redeem,  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  plaintiff 
should  trace  out  all  the  persons  who  have  an  interest  in  such  trust,  to 
make  them  parties;  the  persons  having  the  legal  state,  however,  must 
be  before  the  Court,  and  where  a  mortgagee  in  fee  has  made  an  abso- 
lute conveyance  with  several  limitations  and  remainders  over,  the 
decree  cannot  be  complete  without  bringing  before  the  Court,  at 
*260  least  the  first  tenant  in  tail,  and  those  having  *  intermediate 
estates.1  It  seems  that  where  a  mortgage  is  forfeited,  and  the 
mortgagee  exercises  the  legal  rights  he  has  acquired  by  disposing  of, 
or  incumbering  the  estate,  and  the  mortgagor  comes  for  the  redemption, 
which  a  Court  of  Equity  gives  him,  it  must  be  upon  the  terms  of 
indemnifying  the  mortgagee  from  all  costs  arising  out  of  his  legal  acts; 
and  upon  this  principle,2- the  mortgagor  was  ordered  to  pay  the  costs  of 
the  trustees  and  cestui  que  trust,  who  were  necessarily  brought  before 
the  Court  in  consequence  of  the  assignment  of  the  mortgagee. 

Where  there  has  been  an  assignment  of  a  mortgage,8  even  though  it 
was  made  without  the  previous  authority  of  the  mortgagor,  or  his 
declaration  that  so  much  is  due,  the  assignee  is  the  only  necessary 
party;4  and  he  can  claim  nothing  under  the  assignment  but  what  is 


5  Stansfield  v.  Hobson,  16  Beav.  189;  see, 
however,  Morley  v.  Morley,  25  Beav.  253;  and 
Emmet  v.  Tottenham,  10  Jur.  N.  S.  1090  ;  S. 
C.  nom.  Tottenham  v.  Emmet,  13  W.  R.  123; 
14  id.  3,  where  a  person  interested  in  part  of 
the  mortgage  was  held  not  to  be  a  necessary 
partv. 

i'  Yates  v.  Hamly,  2  Atk.  238;  Story,  Eq. 
Pl.§§  144-146, 194,"  198. 

2*  Wetherell  v.  Collins,  3  Mad.  255. 

3  The  assignee  of  a  mortgage,  who  has 
parted  with  all  his  interest,  and  has  never 
made  himself  liable  for  rents  and  profits, 
should  not  be  made  a  party  to  a  bill  to  re- 
deem the  premises,  unless  he  is  charged  with 
fraud  or  collusion,  or  a  discovery  is  sought 
from  him.  Williams  v.  Smith,  49  Maine,  564. 
But  the  mortgagee  is  a  necessary  party  to  a 
suit  to  reform  a  mortgage  deed,  brought  by  a 
purchaser  at  a  sale  by  the  mortgagee.  Haley 
v.  Bagley,  37  Mo.  363. 

4  Chambers  v.  Goldwin,  9  Ves.  269.  See 
contra,  Anon.,  in  the  Duchy,  2  Eq.  Cas.  Abr. 
5!i4,  pi.  3.  Where  a  mortgage  has  been  abso- 
lutely assigned,  it  is  not  necessary  to  make  the 
mortgagee  a  party  to  a  bill  brought  by  the 
mortgagor  to  redeem.  Whitney  v.  M'Kinney, 
7   John.  Ch.  144;  Beals   v.  Cobb,    51  Maine, 

256 


348.  But  where  the  mortgagee  has  merely 
given  to  another  a  quitclaim  deed  of  the  mort- 
gaged premises,  without  assigning  the  mortgage 
debt,  he  must  be  made  a  party  to  such  a  bill. 
Beals  v.  Cobb,  itbi  supra.  So  a  mortgagee  of 
land  who  has  assigned  his  interest  in  the  mort- 
gage since  the  breach  of  the  condition,  may  be 
included  as  a  defendant  in  a  bill  to  redeem; 
especially  if  it  appears  that  he  is  interested  in 
the  taking  of  the  account.  Doody  v.  Pierce,  9 
Allen,  141.  And  a  mortgagee  who  has  assigned 
the  mortgage  and  guaranteed  the  debt  is  a 
proper  party  in  a  suit  to  foreclose  the  mortgage, 
and  a  personal  decree  may  be  made  against 
him  for  any  deficiency.  Jarman  v.  Wiswall,  24 
N.  J.  Eq.  267.  Where  a  mortgage  was  as- 
signed to  secure  a  loan  made  to  the  assignor, 
the  assignor  was  held  to  be  a  necessary  party 
in  a  suit  commenced  by  the  assignee,  to  fore- 
close the  mortgage,  although  the  assignment 
was  absolute  in  terms,  and  expressed  the  pay- 
ment of  a  full  consideration.  Kettle  v.  Van 
Dyck,  1  Sandf.  (N.  Y.)76;  Brown  v.  Johnson, 
53  Maine,  246;  Hobart  v.  Andrews,  21  Pick. 
527;  ante,  198,  note.  Where  a  mortgagor  has 
assigned  all  his  interest  in  the  estate  mort- 
gaged, he  is  not  a  necessary  party  to  a  bill  in 
Equity  to  redeem  by  the  assignee.    Bailey  v. 


PERSONS    RESISTING    PLAINTIFF'S    DEMANDS.  *  261 

actually  due  as  between  the  mortgagor  and  the  mortgagee.5  Where  the 
mortgagor  is  a  party  to  the  assignment,  then  it  is  in  fact  a  new  mortgage 
between  the  mortgagor  and  the  assignee,  and  of  course  the  original 
mortgagee  is  not  a  necessary  party  to  a  bill  to  redeem.  A  mortgagor, 
however,  cannot  be  bound  by  any  transaction  which  may  take  place 
between  a  mortgagee  and  his  assignee  without  his  privity.  If,  there- 
fore, the  mortgagee  has  been  in  possession  before  assignment,  and  has 
received  more  on  account  of  the  rents  and  profits  than  the  princi- 
pal and  interest  due  upon  the  *  mortgage,  and  a  bill  is  filed  by  *261 
the  mortgagor  against  the  assignee  to  have  an  account  of  the  over- 
plus, he  may  make  the  mortgagee  a  party  to  the  bill,  because  he  is 
clearly  accountable  for  the  surplus  rents  and  profits  received  by  him- 
self.1 It  seems,  however,2  that  even  in  that  case  the  assignee  only 
would  be  sufficient,  because,  having  contracted  to  stand  in  the  place  of 
the  original  mortgagee,  he  has  rendered  himself  liable  to  have  the 
account  taken  from  beginning  to  end,  and  must  be  answerable  for  the 
result.  Where  there  have  been  several  mesne  assignments,  the  person 
to  whom  the  last  has  been  made  is  the  only  necessary  party  to  a 
redemption  suit.3 

Where,  however,  there  are  several  derivative  mortgages,  if  the  last 
mortgagee  seeks  to  foreclose  the  mortgagor,  he  must  make  all  the 
intermediate  mortgagees  parties,  because  they  are  all  interested  in  the 
account.4 

The  rules  regulating  the  practice  of  the  Court  as  to  cestui  que  trusts 
being  parties  to  suits  relating  to  trust  property,  apply  also  to  resulting 
trusts.  Thus,  where  there  is  a  grant  or  devise  of  a  real  estate,  either 
by  deed  or  will,  and  the  whole  equitable  interest  is  not  thereby  granted 
or  devised,  there  being  a  resulting  trust  for  the  grantor  or  his  heir,5  it 
will  be  necessary,  in  a  suit  relating  to  that  estate,  to  bring  the  grantor 
or  his  heir  before  the  Court. 

So,  in  cases  of  charities,  where  a  private  founder  has  appointed  no 
visitor,  his  heir-at-law  is  considered  a  necessary  party  to  an  informa- 
tion for  the  regulation  of  the  charity,  because  in  such  case  the  heir-at- 
law  of  a  private  founder  is  considered  as  the  visitor.     But  in  a  case  of 

Myrick,  36  Maine,  50;  Williams   v.  Smith,  49  deem,  if  lie  has  never  received  any  rents  and 

Maine,  564;   Hilton   v.  Lothrop,  46  Maine,  21)7.  profits;  nor,  it  seems,  if  he  lias. 

Ante,  p.  214,  n.  4.  -  See  Chambers  v.  Goldwin,  9  Ves.  268. 

5  Chambers  v.   Goldwin,    9   Ves.   265;   see  '■'■  Chambers   v.  Goldwin,  9  Ves.  268;  Story, 

Matthews  t>.  Walwyn,   4   Sumner's  Ves.  118,  Eq.  PI.  §  189;    Bryant  v.  Erskine,  55  Maine, 

note  (»);    Mainland   v.    Upjohn,   41    Ch.    D.  153,  158;  Lennon  v.  Porter,  2  Gray,  473;  Hill 

126.  v.  Adams,  2  Atk.  39;  Bishop  of  Winchester  V. 

1  Bealsr.  Cobb,  51  Maine,  348,  350;  Story,  Bearor,  3  Ves.  315,  316:  ante,  p.  194. 
Eq.  PI.   §190;  Bryant   v.   Erskine,   55  Maine,  4  Hobart  v.  Abbot,  2  P.  Wms    693;  ante, 

153,  158.     All  persons  who  have  been  so  con-  p.  194,  and  notes;   210,  and   notes;  Kettle   v. 

ncctfcl  with  the  mortgages  of  a  railroad  sought  Van  Dyck,  1  Sandf.  (X.  V.)  76;  Story,  Eq.  PI. 

to  be  redeemed,  as  to   render  them  liable  for  §  191;  Stone  v.  Bartlett,  46  Maine,  438. 
income  under  it,  should  be  made  parties  de-  5  Ripley  e.   Waterworth,  7    Sumner's  Ves. 

fendant.     Kennebec  and  Portland  R.  K.  Co.  v.  42"),    Perkins's   note    (c),    and    cases    cited;  2 

Portland  and  Kennebec  R.  R.  Co.  54  Maine,  Story,  Eq.  Jur.  §  1196,  et  seq..  and  notes ;  Scott 

173;  but  see   Lennon   v    Porter,   2  Gray,  473,  v.  Fenhoulett,  1  Bro.  C.  C.  (Perkins's  ed.)  70, 

where  it  was  held  that  a  mesne  assignee  of  the  note  (a), 
mortgage  is  not  a  proper  party  to  a  bill  to  re- 

vol.  i.  — 17  257 


*  262  OF    PARTIES   TO    A    SUIT. 

this  description  the  Court  refused  to  dismiss  the  information  because 
of  his  absence,  and  directed  an  inquiry  for  him  to  be  made  by  the 
Master;6  and  so,  in  the  case  of  a  charity,  wherever  it  is  doubtful 
whether  the  heir  is  disinherited  or  not,  he  must  be  a  party.7 

In  a  suit  to  restrain  the  continuance  of  a  nuisance  on  land  by  a  mere 

licensee  thereof,  the  person   having  control  thereof   must  be  made  a 

defendant; 8  and  where  the  sole  object  of  the  suit  is  for  an  injunction  to 

restrain  future  acts  and  not  for  damages  for  past  injuries,  such  person 

is  the  only  necessary  party.9 

*  262        *  Wherever  a  real  estate  is  to  be  recovered,  or  a  right  is  sought 

to  be  established,  or  a  charge  raised  against  real  estate,  it  is 
necessary  that  the  person  or  persons  entitled  to  the  inheritance  should 
be  before  the  Court.1  Upon  this  principle  it  is,  that  in  a  bill  by  a 
specialty  creditor,  to  obtain  payment  of  his  demand  out  of  the  real 
estate  of  his  debtor,  the  devisee  or  heir,  as  well  as  the  executor,  is  a 
necessary  party.2  Where,  however,  the  arrears  of  an  annuity,  charged 
upon  real  estate,  are  sought  to  be  recovered,  if  the  arrears  are  such 
only  as  were  due  in  the  lifetime  of  the  ancestor,  it  will  be  sufficient  to 
make  his  personal  representative  a  party;  but  for  any  arrears  after  his 
death,  the  devisee  or  heir  must  be  a  party.3 

The  same  rule  applies  to  all  cases  where  proceedings  are  instituted 
in  order  to  establish  a  right  against  a  person  having  a  limited  estate  in 
land  or  other  hereditaments;  and  it  is,  in  such  cases,  always  held 
necessary  to  have  the  owner  of  the  inheritance  before  the  Court.  Thus, 
where  a  bill  was  filed  to  establish  a  custom  binding  the  occupiers  of 
certain  lands  within  a  parish,  it  was  held  that  the  owners  of  the  inheri- 
tance must  be  parties.4  And  so,  where  a  man  prefers  a  bill  to  establish 
a  modus  against  a  lessee  of  an  impropriator,  he  must  make  the  owner 
of  the  impropriation  a  party.5  So,  where  a  bill  was  filed  to  establish  a 
modus  against  an  ecclesiastical  rector  or  a  dean  and  chapter,  as  impro- 
priators, the  ordinary  and  patron  were  considered  necessary  parties.6 

In  order  to  make  the  owner  of  the  inheritance  a  necessary  party,  the 
object  of  the  suit  must  be  to  bind  the  inheritance;  if  that  is  not  the 


6  Att.-Gen.  v.  Gaunt,  3  Swan«t.  148.  n.  2  But  where  the  bill  is  filed  by  the  creditors 

'  Att.-Gen.  r.  Green,  2  Bro.  C.  C.  495;  see  for  the  purpose  of  making  their  debts  out  of 

ante,  p.  229;  Order  XXXI.  August,  1841;  see  real  estate  specifically  charged  by  the  testator 

Storv,  Eq.  PI.  §  180.  with  the  payment  of  them,  the  heirs-at-Iaw  are 

B  Whiter.  Jameson,  L.R.  18 Eq.  303, M.E.;  not  necessary  parties.     Smith   r.   Wycuff,    11 

Broder  v.  Saillard,  2  Ch.  D.  692,  M.  R. ;  Harris  Paige,  49.    But  in  such  a  case,  all  the  creditors, 

v.  James,  45  L.  J.  Q.  B.  545;  Hawley*.  Steele,  whose  debts  are  charged  upon  the  land,  should 

G  Ch.  D.  521,  M.  R.;  House   Property    Co.  v.  be  made  parties  if  they  are  named  in  the  will, 

H.  P.  Horse  Nail  Co.  29  Ch.  D.  190;  Reinhardt  and  whose  debts  are  still  due.     Ibid. 
r.  Mentasti,  42  Ch.  D.  685.  3  Weston  v.  Bowes,  9  Mod.  309;  Story,  Eq. 

9  Walker  v.  Brewster,  L.  R.  5  Eq.  25,  V.  C,  PI.  §  181. 
W. ;  see  also  Saxby  v.  Manchester  &  S.  Ry.  4  Spendler  v.  Potter,  Bunb.  181. 

Co.  L.  R.  4  C.  P.  198;  Adair  v.  Young,  12  Ch.  5  Glanvil  v.  Trelawney,  Bunb.  70. 

D.  13;  Upmann  r.  Forrester,  24  Ch.  D.  231.  6  Gordon  r.  Simpkinson,  11  Ves.  509;  Cook 

i  See  New  England,  &c.  Bank   v.  Newport  v.  Butt,    6    Mad.    53;  Hales  v.  Pomfret,  Dan. 

Steam  Factory,  6  R.  I.  154;  Sibley  v.  Simon-  142;  De  Whelpdale  v.  Milburn,  5  Price,  485. 
ton,  20  Fed.  Rep.  784;  Chewett  v.  Moran,   17 
id.  820 ;  Springfield  r.  Hurst,  15  id.  307. 
258 


PERSONS    RESISTING    PLAINTIFF'S    DEMANDS.  *  26-4 

case,  and  the  relief  sought  is  merely  against  the  present  incumbent, 
the  owner  of  the  inheritance,  if  made  a  party,  may  demur.7 

In  a  suit  for  a  *  specific  performance  of  an  agreement  respect-    *  263 
ing  the  boundaries  of  two  provinces  in  America,  it  was  considered 
unnecessary  to  make  the  planters,  tenants,  or  inhabitants  within  the 
districts,  parties  to  the  suit.1 

And  in  general,  it  may  be  stated  as  a  rule,  that  occupying  tenants 
under  leases,  or  other  persons  claiming  under  the  possession  of  a  party 
whose  title  to  real  property  is  disputed,  are  not  necessary  parties.  If, 
however,  the  existence  of  such  rights  is  suggested  at  the  hearing,  the 
decree  is  expressly  made  without  prejudice  to  those  rights,  or  otherwise 
qualified  according  to  circumstances.  If,  therefore,  it  is  intended  to 
conclude  such  rights  by  the  same  suit,  the  persons  claiming  them  must 
be  made  parties  to  it;  and  where  the  right  is  of  a  higher  nature,  as  a 
mortgage,  the  person  claiming  should  usually  be  made  a  party.2  And 
where  a  tenant  in  common  had  demised  his  undivided  share  for  a  long 
term  of  years,  the  lessee  was  held  to  be  a  necessary  party  to  a  bill  for 
a  partition,  because  he  must  join  in  the  conveyance,  and  his  lessor  was 
ordered  to  pay  his  costs.3 

The  same  principle  which  renders  it  necessary  that  the  owner  of  the 
inheritance  should  be  before  the  Court,  in  all  cases  in  which  a  right  is 
to  be  established  against  the  inheritance,  requires  that,  in  cases  where 
there  is  a  dispute  as  to  whether  land  in  the  occupation  of  a  defendant 
is  freehold  or  copyhold,  the  lord  of  the  manor  should  be  a  party. 
Thus,  where  a  plaintiff,  by  his  bill,  pretended  a  title  to  certain  lands 
as  freehold,  which  lands  the  defendant  claimed  to  hold  by  copy  of 
Court  roll  to  him  and  his  heirs,  and  prayed  in  aid  the  lord  of  the 
manor,  but,  nevertheless,  the  plaintiff  *  served  the  defendant  *2Gi 
with  process  to  rejoin,  without  making  the  lord  of  the  manor  a 
party;  it  was  ordered,  that  the  plaintiff  should  proceed  no  more  against 
the  defendant  before  he  should  have  called  the  lord  in  process.1 

For  a  similar  reason  it  is  held,  that  where  a  bill  is  brought  for  the 
surrender  of  a  copyhold  for  lives,  the  lord  must  be  made  a  party; 
because,  when  the  surrender  is  made,  the  estate  is  in  the  lord,  and  he 

"  Williamson  v.  Lord  Lonsdale,  Dan.   Ex.  yet,   though  different,  the  boundaries  of  these 

171;  Markham  v.  Smith,  11   Price,   120;  and  manors  may  be  settled  in  suits  between  the  lords 

see  further,  as  to  suits  relating  to  tithes,  Day  v.  of  these  manors,  without  making  the    tenants 

Drake,  3  Sim.  64,  82;  Petch  v.  Dalton,  8  Price,  parties,  oj  may  be  settled  by  agreement,  which 

9;  Lealhes  v.  Newit,  8  Price,  562;  Rennett  v.  this  Court  will  decree,  without  making  the  ten- 

Skeffington,  4  Price,  143;  Tooth  r.  The  Dean  ants  parties;  though  in  case  of  fraud,  collusion, 

and  Chapter  of  Canterbury,  3  Sim.  49;  Cuth-  or  prejudice  to  the  tenants,  they  will   not  b: 

bcrt  t>.  Westwood,  Gill).  Eq.  Rep.  230  ;   10  Yin.  bound." 

Ab.  Party,  R.  255,  PI.  58.  2  Ld.  Red.  175. 

i  Penn  r.  Lord  Baltimore,  1  Yes.  Sr.  444,  3  Cornish  v.  Gest.   2  Cox,  27.     A  landlord 

44'J.    The  object  ion  taken  was  upon  the  ground  cannot  maintain  a  bill  in  Equity  to   suppress 

that  their  privileges,  and  the  tenure  and  law  a   nuisance  caused  to   his   property  before    lie 

by  which  they  held,  might  not  be  altered  with-  demised  it,  and  continued  afterwards,  without 

oat  their  consent;  but   Lord  Hardwicke  over-  joining  his  tenant  as  a  co-plaintiff.    In  Graham 

ruled  the  objection,  saying,  ,;  Consider  to  what  v.  Duniull,  5  Met.  118. 

this  objection  goes;  in  lower  instances,  in  the  l  Cited  in  Lucas  v.  Arnold,  Cary,  Rep.  81; 

case  of  manors  and  honors  in   England,  which  16  Yin.  Ab.  tit.  Party,  1$.  253;  PI.  46. 
have  different  customs  and  bv-laws  frequently, 

259 


265 


OF    PARTIES    TO    A    SUIT. 


is  under  no  obligation  to  regrant  it,  but  it  is  otherwise  in  the  case  of 
copyholders  of  inheritance,  there  the  lord  need  not  be  a  party. 

The  rule,  that  wherever  the  inheritance  of  real  estate  is  the  subject- 
matter  of  the  suit,  the  first  person  in  being  who  is  entitled  to  an  estate 
of  inheritance  in  the  property,  and  all  others  having  intermediate 
interests,  must  be  defendants,  prevails  equally  in  the  case  of  adverse 
interests,  as  in  that  of  concurrent  interests  with  the  plaintiffs.2  Thus 
it  is  necessary,  in  order  to  obtain  a  complete  decree  of  foreclosure,  in 
cases  where  the  equity  of  redemption  is  the  subject  of  an  entail,  that 
the  first  tenant  in  tail  of  the  equity  of  redemption  should  be  before  the 
Court,3  and  in  all  cases  the  person  having  the  first  vested  estate  of 
inheritance,  and  all  persons  having  prior  interests,  must  be  parties;4 
and  the  same  rule  applies  to  all  cases  where  a  right  is  to  be  established, 
or  a  charge  raised  against  real  estates  which  are  the  subject  of  settle- 
ment. A  plaintiff,  however,  has  no  right  to  bring  persons  in  the  situa- 
tion of  remainder-men  before  the  Court  in  order  to  bind  their  rights, 
upon  a  discussion  whether  a  prior  remainder-man,  under  whom  he 
claims,  had  a  title  or  not,  merely  to  clear  his  own  title  as  between 
*265  him  and  a  *  purchaser.1  The  owner  of  the  first  estate  of  inherit- 
ance is  sufficient  to  support  the  estate,  not  only  of  himself,  but 
of  everybody  in  remainder  behind  him ; 2  therefore,  where  a  tenant  in 
tail  is  before  the  Court,  all  subsequent  remainder-men  are  considered 
unnecessary  parties.  This  is  by  analogy  to  the  rule  at  Law,  accord- 
ing to  which  a  recovery  in  which  a  remainder-man  in  tail  was  vouched, 


2  See  ante,  pp.  219,  220,  and  cases  cited. 

3  Reynoldson  v.  Perkins,  Amb.  5G4;  Story, 
Eq.  PI."  §§  144,  198;  and  see  Pendleton  v. 
Rooth,  1  Giff.  35;  5  Jur.  N.  S.  840. 

4  Sntton  v.  Stone,  2  Atk.  101.  It  appears 
to  have  been  held  formerly,  that  a  decree  of 
foreclosure  against  a  tenant  for  life  would  bar 
a  remainder-man,  Roscarrick  v.  Barton,  1  Ch. 
Gas.  217;  but  it  may  be  doubted  whether,  in 
this  ciise,  it  was  intended  to  lay  down  such 
rule.     If  the  mortgage  consists  of  a  reversion 

■  or  remainder,  subject  to  an  estate  for  life,  it 
may  be  foreclosed  ;  but  the  estate  of  the  tenant 
for  life  would  not  be  affected,  and  he  would 
have  no  interest  in  the  foreclosure.     Penniman 

.v.  Hollis,  13  Mass.  429. 

1  In  Pelham  v.  Gregory,  1  Eden,  518;  5  Bro. 
P.  C.  435,  the  question  arose  on  the  title  to  cer- 
tain leasehold  estates,  which  were  limited  in 
remainder,  after  limitations  to  the  Duke  of  New- 
castle and  his  sons,  to  the  first  and  other  sons 
of  Mr.  Henry  Pelham  in  tail,  and  to  which  the 
p'aintiff,  Lady  Catherine  Pelham,  claimed  to 
be  absolutely  entiled  on  the  death  of  the  Duke, 

-as  administratrix  to  Thomas  Pelham,  the  son 
of  Mr.  Henry  Pelham,  the  first  tenant  in  tail 
who  had  come  into  being.  The  plaintiff,  in 
order  to  have  this  question  decided  against 
Lord  Vane  and  Lord  Darlington,  who  were 
subsequent  remainder-men  in  tail,  contracted 
•to  sell  the   estate,  subject  to  the  Duke's  life- 

260 


estate,  and  to  the  coniingency  of  his  having 
sons,  to  the  defendant  Gregory,  and  brought  a 
bill  against  him  for  a  specific  performance,  to 
which  she  made  Lord  Vane  and  Lord  Dar- 
lington parlies.  Lord  Northington  dismissed 
the  bill  with  respect  to  Lord  Vane  and  Lord 
Darlington,  upon  the  ground,  as  expressed  in 
his  decree,  "that  they  being  remainder-men 
after  the  death  of  the  Duke  of  Newcastle,  if  he 
should  die  without  issue,  their  claims  were  not 
within  his  cognizance  to  determine,  and  the 
plaintiff  had  no  right  to  bring  them  into  dis- 
cusMon  in  a  Court  of  Equity."  From  this 
decree  there  was  an  appeal  to  the  House  of 
Lords,  and  although  they  decreed  Gregory  to 
perform  his  contract,  they  affirmed  the  dis- 
missal against  Lord  Vane  and  Lord  Darlington. 
3  Bro.  P.  C.  ed.  Toml.  204.  In  Devonsher  v. 
Newenham,  2  Sch.  &  Lef.  210,  Lord  Redesdale 
says  of  this  decision,  "  I  take  this  to  be  a  de- 
cisive authority,  and  if  the  books  were  searched, 
I  have  no  doubt  many  other  cases  might  be 
found  where  bills  have  been  dismissed  on  this 
ground." 

2  Reynoldson  v.  Perkins,  Amb.  504.  This 
mle  does  not  apply  to  a  Scotch  entail.  Fordyce 
v.  Bridges,  2  Phil*.  497,  506;  2  C.  P.  Coop.  t. 
Cott.  326,  334;  and  as  to  the  effect  of  a  decree 
against  an  infant  tenant  in  tail,  see  S.  C.  in 
the  Court  below.     10  Beav.  101 ;  10  Jur.  1020. 


PERSONS    RESISTING    PLAINTIFF'S    DEMANDS.  *  266 

might  bar  all  remainders  behind.3  Where  it  is  doubtful  whether  a 
particular  party  has  an  estate  tail  or  not,  the  person  who  lias  the  first 
undoubted  vested  estate  of  inheritance  should  be  a  party;4  and  so, 
where  the  first  tenant  in  tail  was  a  lunatic,  the  remainder-man  was  held 
to  be  a  proper  party.5 

It  is  necessary,  however,  in  cases  of  this  sort,  not  only  that 
he  *  who  has  the  first  estate  of  inheritance  should  be  before  the  *  206 
Court,  but  that  the  intermediate  remainder-men  for  life  should 
be  parties.1  The  same  rule  will,  as  we  have  seen  before,  apply,  where 
the  intermediate  estate  is  contingent  or  executory,  provided  the  person 
to  take  is  ascertained;  although,  where  the  person  to  take  is  not  ascer- 
tained, it  is  sufficient  to  have  before  the  Court  the  trustees,  if  any,  to 
support  the  contingent  remainders,  and  the  person  in  esse  entitled  to 
the  first  vested  estate  of  inheritance.2  Executory  devises  to  persons 
not  in  being  may,  in  like  manner,  be  bound  by  a  decree  against  a  vested 
estate  of  inheritance;  but  a  person  claiming  under  limitations  by  way 
of  executory  devise,  not  subject  to  any  preceding  vested  estate  of 
inheritance  by  which  it  may  be  defeated,  must  be  a  party  to  a  bill 
affecting  his  right; 3  and  in  general,  where  a  person  is  seised  in  fee  of 
an  estate,  having  that  seisin  liable  to  be  defeated  by  a  shifting  use, 
conditional  limitation,  or  executory  devise,  the  inheritance  is  not 
represented  merely  by  the  person  who  has  the  fee  liable  to  be  defeated; 
but  the  persons  claiming  in  contingency,  upon  the  defeat  of  the  estate 
in  fee,  should  also  be  parties.4 

If  after  a  cause  has  proceeded  a  certain  length,  an  intermediate 
remainder-man  comes  into  being,  he  must  be  brought  before  the  Court 
by  supplemental  bill; 5  and  so,  if  the  first  tenant  in  tail,  who  is  made  a 
party,  dies  without  issue  before  the  termination  of  the  suit,  the  next 
tenant  in  tail  should  be  made  a  party  by  means  of  a  supplemental  bill 
or  order.6  It  seems  also  clear,  that  if  a  tenant  in  tail  is  plaintiff  in  a 
suit,  and  dies  without  issue,  the  next  remainder-man  in  tail,  although 
he  claims  by  new  limitation,  and  not  through  the  first  plaintiff  as  his 
issue,  is  entitled  to  continue  the  suit  of  the  former  tenant  in  tail  by 
supplemental  bill,  and  to  have  the  benefit  of  the  evidence  and  pro- 
ceedings in  that  suit.7 

s  Per  Lord   Eldon,    in    Lloyd  v.  Johnes,  9  4;  Sherrit  v.  Birch.  3  Bro.  C.  C.  229;    Willi- 

Ves.  64;  see  also   Giffard   v.  Hort,    1  Sch.  &  man  v.   Holmes,  4  Rich.  Eq.  476;   Jackson  v. 

Lef.   386;  Story,  Eq.  PL  §§   144,  145.     Ante,  Edwards,  7    Paige,    399;    Ferrisa  v.   Lewis.  2 

2>8,n    1.  Tenn.  Ch.  29:5.     And   see   ante,   228,    note  1, 

4  Powell  Morf.  975,  a.  where  the  remainder  is  vested. 

5  Singleton  v.  Hopkins,  1  Jur.  N.  S.  1199,  5  I.d.  Red.  174;  per  Lord  Eldon,  in  Lloyd 
V.  C.  S.  v    Johnes,   9  Yes.    59;    15  &   16   Vic.   c.  86. 

1  Per  Lord  Eldon,  in  Gore  v.  Stacpoole,  1  §  52 ;  Fullerton  v.  Martin,  1  Drew.  239 :  Pickford 
Dow,  18,  32;  4  Kent,  180;  Penniman  v.  llollis,  v.  Brown,  1  K.  &  J.  613;  Jehhr.  Tugwell,  29 
13  Mass.  429.  Beav.4Sl;  Egremont  >■  Thompson,  L.  R.  4  Ch. 

2  Lord  Cholmondeley  v.  Lord  Clinton,  2  448;  Williams  fl.Llanelly  Rail  way  &  Dock  Co. 
J.  &  W.  7,  and  133;  Hopkins  v.  Hopkins.  1  L.  R  10  Eq.  401;  Askew  r.  Booth,  44  L.  J.  Ch. 
Atk.590.     Now  trustees  to  support  contingent  200;  R.S.C  Ord.L.3.4. 

remainders  are  unnecessary.   8  &  9  Vic.  c.  106,  ,;  I  iresswell  '•.  Bateman.  fi  W.  R.  220,  V.  O.K. 

§  8;  40  &  41  Vic.  c.  33.     '  "  Lloyd  v.  Johnes, 9  Ves.  59;   Story,  Eq.  PI 

3  I.d.  Red.  174.  §§   144,    146,   and    notes;  Dendy   v.    bendy,    5 

4  Uoodessv.  Williams,  2  Y.  &  C.  598;  7  Jur.  W.  R.  221,  V.  C.  W.;  Williams  r.  William--, 
1123;  Pells  v.  Browne,  1  Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  187,  pi.  9  W.  R.  290,  V.  C.  K. ;  Ward  v.  Shak, -halt,  ? 

201 


*  267  OF    PARTIES    TO    A    SUIT. 

The  general  rule  requiring  all  persons  interested  in  resisting  the 
plaintiff's  demands  to  be  brought  before  the  Court  as  defendants,  in 
order  to  give  them  an  opportunity  of  litigating  the  claim  set  up,  would 
render  it  imperative,  wherever  more  than  one  person  was  liable 
*267  to  contribute  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  plaintiff's  claim,  *that 
they  should  all  be  made  parties  to  the  suit.1  This  was,  how- 
ever, materially  modified  by  the  32d  Order  of  August,  1841, 2  which 
provides  that,  in  all  cases  in  which  the  plaintiff  has  a  joint  and  several 
demand  against  several  persons,  either  as  principals  or  sureties,  it  shall 
not  be  necessary  to  bring  before  the  Court,  as  parties  to  a  suit  concern- 
ing such  demand,  all  the  persons  liable  thereto,  but  the  plaintiff  may 
proceed  against  one  or  more  of  the  persons  severally  liable. 

It  is  necessary  briefly  to  state  the  practice  previous  to  this  Order, 
inasmuch  as  it  still  applies  to  cases  not  brought  precisely  within  its 
terms.  In  Madox  v.  Jackson*  Lord  Hardwicke  said:  "The  general 
rule  of  the  Court  to  be  sure  is,  where  a  debt  is  joint  and  several,  the 
plaintiff  must  bring  each  of  the  debtors  before  the  Court,  because  they 
are  entitled  to  the  assistance  of  each  other  in  taking  the  account. 
Another  reason  is,  that  the  debtors  are  entitled  to  a  contribution, 
where  one  pays  more  than  his  share  of  the  debt: 4  a  further  reason  is, 
if  there  are  different  funds,  as  where  the  debt  is  a  specialty,  and  he 
might  at  Law  sue  either  the  heir  or  executor  for  satisfaction,  he  must 
make  both  parties,  as  he  may  come  in  the  last  place  upon  the  real 
assets ; 5  but  there  are  exceptions  to  this,  and  the  exception  to  the  first 
rule  is,  that  if  some  of  the  obligors  are  only  sureties,  there  is  no  pre- 
tence for  the  principal  in  the  bond  to  sajT,  that  the  creditor  ought  to 
bring  the  surety  before  the  Court,  unless  lie  has  paid  the  debt.'-6  By 
the  terms  of  the  Order,  no  distinction  is  made  between  principals  and 
sureties,  so  that  it  would  appear  that  the  plaintiff  might  file  his  bill 
against  one  or  more  of  the  sureties,  without  making  the  principal  a 
party  to  the  suit.  Where,  however,  one  of  two  sureties  who  had  joined 
the  principal  debtor  in  a  bond,  hied  a  bill  to  set  aside  the  transaction 
on  the  ground  of  fraud,  and  prayed  an  account  of  the  payments  made  in 
respect  of  the  bond,  Lord  Langdale  M.  R.  held,  that  notwithstanding 
the  order,  the  principal  debtor  and  co-surety  were  necessary  parties.7 
And  in  Tinkus  v.  Peters,9  where  the  plaintiff  alleged  that  he  had 
accepted  bills  of  exchange  without  consideration,  and  that  he  had  been 
sued  upon  them,  and  by  his  bill  prayed  relief  against  the  drawer  and 

.Tnr.  X.    S.  1227;  10  W.    R.  6,  V.  O.  K. :    pee,  of   Berwick,  on  Tweed    V.    Murray,  7   De    G. 

In  v,       r.  Lowe  r.  Watson,  I    Sm.  &  G.   12');  M.  &  G.  497;  3  Jur.  N.  S.  1. 

Jackson  r.  Ward.  1  Giff.  30;  5  Jur.  X.  S.  782:  4  Erickson  v.  Nesmith,  46  N.  H.  371. 

Irving  v.  Pearson,  18  L.  T.  N.  S.  283;  Hills  v.  5  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  169. 

Springett,  L.  R   5  Eq.  123.  6  Ibid.;   see  Grassmann  v.  Bonn,  30  N.  J. 

1  Jackson  v.  Rawlins.  2  Ve.fn.  195:  Erick-  Eq.  490;  Dunham  r.  Ramsey,  37  id.  388. 

son    v.    Nesmith,    46    N.    H.    371;    Hartley    v.  "  Allen  v.  Houlden,  6   Beav.   148;   and  see 

Russell.  40  X.  H.  109:    see  Ferrer  v.  Barrett.  4  aNo  Lloyd  r.  Smith,  13  Sim.  457:  7  Jur.  400; 

Eq.  (X.  C.)  4r..-):  Hart  v.  Coffee,  id.  321;  Pierson  v.  Barclay,  2  De  G.  &  S.  746.     One  of 

Young  v.  Lyons,  8  Gill,  102.  the  makers  of  a  joint  and  several  promissory 

2  Con-.  Ord.  VII.  2:  and  see  R.  S.  C.  1883,  note  might  be  sued  without  the  others.  Mc- 
Ord.XVI  3.5;Llovdi\T>immark,7Ch.  D.398.  Intyre  v.  Connell,  1  Sim.  X.  S.  225,  241. 

s  3  Atk.  400:  Bland   r.  Winter,   1    S    &   S.  8  5  Beav.  253,  200:  6  Jur.  431. 

240;  Collins  v.  Criffi'h,  2  I*.  Wins.  313;  Mayor 

262 


PERSONS    RESISTING    PLAINTIFF'S    DEMANDS.  *  269 

the  holder,  without  making  a  person  to  whom  the  drawer  had 
indorsed  *  the  bill  a  party,  Lord   Langdale  held,  that  as  there    *268 
was  an  allegation  that  the  holder  of  the  bills  was  a  trustee  as 
well  for  the  drawer  as  also  for  the  indorsee,  such  intervening  indorsee 
was  a  necessary  party  to  the  suit.       . 

Before  this  order,  all  trustees  implicated  in  a  breach  of  trust  were 
held  necessary  parties  to  a  suit  complaining  of  the  breach  of  trust;  1 
but  since  the  Order  it  has  been  held,  that  where  a  breach  of  trust  has 
been  committed  by  several  trustees,  the  cestui  que  trusts  may  proceed 
against  one  trustee  in  the  absence  of  the  others.2  But  it  must  not  be 
supposed  that,  in  every  case  in  which  a  breach  of  trust  has  been  com- 
mitted, the  cestui  que  trusts  can  arbitrarily  select  any  one  trustee 
and  charge  him  as  for  a  breach  of  trust,  whatever  the  nature  of  the 
complaint  might  be,  for  "  all  the  trustees  are,  prima  facie,  necessary 
parties  to  a  suit  complaining  of  a  breach  of  trust,  although  execution 
might  be  taken  out  against  one  only."  3 

No  clear  principle  is  laid  down  determining  when  all  the  trustees  are 
necessary  parties,  and  when  one  may  be  proceeded  against  without  the 
others.  The  Court  appear.s  rather  to  have  exercised  a  discretion,  and 
to  have  been  guided  by  what,  under  the  circumstances,  the  justice  of 
the  case  required.4  Tt  seems,  however,  that  all  the  trustees  should  be 
parties  where  the  general  administration  of  the  estate  is  sought;5  and 
where  accounts  of  the  trust  fund  have  to  be  taken ; 6  and  it 
*  has  been  held,  that  where  one  trustee  files  a  bill  against  a  co-  *  269 
trustee  who  has  been  guilty  of  a  breach  of  trust  in  which  some 
of  the  cestui  que  trusts  have  concurred,  they  are  necessary  parties  not- 
withstanding the  Order.1  So,  also,  in  a  suit  for  the  recovery  of  a 
partnership  debt,  against  the  executors  of  a  deceased  partner,  the  sur- 
viving partner  is  a  necessary  party.2     Where  the  plaintiff  has  made 

1  Walkers.  Symonds,  3  Swanst.  75;  C.  P.  trustee  only,  I  cannot  think  tliis  Order  would 
Coop.  509-512,  574;  Munch  v.  Cockerell,  8  Sim.  entitle  the  plaintiff  to  sue  the  trustee  who  had 
219,  2:51;  C.  P.  Coop,  78,  n.  (rf);  Perry  v.  not  acted,  separately  from  the  other."  Citing 
Knott,  4  Beav.  179,  181.  Walker  v.  Symonds,  3  Swan>t.  75;    Munch  v. 

2  Perry  v.  Knott,  5  Beav.  293  ;  Kellaway  v.  Cockerell,  8  Sim.  219,  231 ;  C.  P.  Coop.  78,  n., 
Johnson, *5   Beav.  319;  G  Jur.  751;    Att-Gen.  509,674. 

r.  Corp.  of  Leicester,  7  Beav.  176;  Strong  v.  4  For  cases  in  which   all  the  trustees  were 

Strong,  18  Beav.  408;  Att-Gen.  v.  Pearson,  2  required  to  be  parties,  see  Shipton  0.  Rawlins, 

Coll.  581;  10  Jur.  651;  Norria  v.  Wright,  14  4  Hare,  619 :  Fowler  e.  Reynal,  2  De  G.  &  S. 

Beav.  310;  Wilson  v.  Rhodes,  8  Ch.   D.  777;  749:  13  Jur.  650.  n. ;  and  see  Reporter's  note, 

see  also  MGachen  v.  Dew,  15  Beav.  84.    As  to  24  Beav.  99;    Lewin  v.  Allen,  8  W.  R.  C03, 

the  cestui  <jiie  trusts'  right  to  join,  as  parties,  V.  C.  W. 

Btrangers  aiding  in   the   breach  of    trust,   see  s  Hall  v.  Austin,  2  Coll.  570;   10  Jur.  452; 

Lund  d.  Blanehard,  4  Hare,  9.  Biggs  r.  Penn,  4  Hare.  469;  9  Jur.  368;  Chan- 

3  Sir  .lames  Wigram  V.  C.  in  Shipton  v.  cellor  v.  Morecraft,  11  Beav.  262;  Penny  v. 
Rawlins,  4  Hare,  623,  who  also  said:    "Take  Penny,  9  Hare,  39;  15  Jur.  445. 

for   example  the  case  of  one  of  two  trustees  6  Devaynes  v.   Robinson,    24  Beav.  86;   3 

acting   alone,  and  receiving   the  whole   trust  Jur   N   S.  707;  Coppard  v.  Allen,  10  Jur.  N  S. 

moneys,  and  investing  them  in  his  own  name;  622;    12  W.  R.  943,  L.  J.T. ;    2  De  G.  J.  &  S. 

that  might  be  a  breach  of  trust  per  se  ;  for  the  173;  and  see  Fletcher  v.  Gibbon,  23  Beav.  212. 

cestui  que   trusts  had  a   right  to  require  each  '  Jesse  v.    Bennett,   6    De   G.    M'N.    &  G. 

trustee  to  have  a  hold  upon  the  trust  fund;  and,  609;  2  Jur.  N.  S.  1125  ;   Williams  v.  Allen.  29 

if  a  loss  resulted,  the  non-acting  trustee  might  Beav.  -2'J-2 ;  Roberts  p.  Tunstall,  4  Hare,  261. 

be  liable  for  it.     But  if  the  fund  were  safe,  2  Hills  v.  M'Rae,  9  Hare,  297  ,  15  Jur.  766; 

though  irregularly  standing  in  the  name  of  the  and  see  Thorpe  v.  Jackson,  2  V.  >\-  <  '•  Ex.  553; 

'Mo 


*269 


OF    PARTIES    TO    A    SUIT. 


several  persons  jointly  liable  parties,  lie  cannot  afterwards  waive  the 
relief  against  some,  and  take  a  decree  at  the  hearing  against  others.3 

The  Order  does  not  apply  to  any  case  where  the  demand  is  not  joint 
and  several;  and,  therefore,  where  there  is  only  a  joint  demand,  the 
old  practice  continues,  and  all  the  persons  liable  must  be  made  par- 
ties.4 Thus,  if  there  be  a  demand  against  a  partnership  firm,  all  the 
persons  constituting  that  firm  must  be  before  the  Court;  and  if  any  of 
them  are  dead,  the  representatives  of  the  deceased  partners  must  be 
likewise  made  parties.5  And  where  a  bill  was  filed  by  the  captain  of 
a  ship,  against  the  personal  representative  of  the  survivor  of  two  part- 
ners, who  were  joint  owners  of  the  ship,  for  an  account  and  satisfaction 
of  his  demand,   it  was  held  that   the  suit  was  defective,  because  the 


see  also  Vyse  v.  Foster,  L.  R.  8  Ch.  309;  L.  R. 
7  H.  L,  318;  St.  Aubyn  v.  Smart,  L.  R.  5  Eq. 
183;  L.  R.  3  Ch.  646.  As  to  new  partners,  see 
Spartali  v.  Constantionide,  20  W.  R.  823. 

3  Fussell  v.  Elwin,  7  Hare,  29;  13  Jur.  333; 
London  Gaslight  Co.  v.  Spottiswoode,  14  Beav. 
264.  The  rule  is  otherwise  where  the  defend- 
ants are  severally  liable.  See  Lloyd  v.  Dim- 
niock,  7  Ch.  D.  398.  And  now,  as  to  joining- 
all  persons  jointly  liable,  see  Kendall  v.  Hamil- 
ton, 4  App.  Cas.  504 ;  28  W.  R.  97.  (a) 

4  See  now  R.  S.  C.  1883,  Ord.  XVI.  9. 

5  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §§  166-168;  Moffat  V.  Far- 
quharson,  2  Bro.  C.  C.  (Perkins's  ed.)  338,  and 
notes;  Story  Parln.  §  449;  1  Story,  Eq.  Jur 
§406;  Cox  D.Stephens,  9  Jur.  N.  S.  1144; 
11  W.  R.  929,  V.  C.  K.  ;  and  see  Atkinson  v. 
Mackreth,  L.  R.  2  Eq.  570,  M.  R.,  where  a  de- 
faulting   partner    had    absconded.       But    see 


(a)  See  Cambefort  v.  Chapman.  19  Q.  B.  D. 
229;  White  v.  Kennedy,  23  W.  Va  221.  In 
Hoare  v.  Niblett,  [1891]  I  Q.  B.  781 ,  04  L.  T. 
659,  the  case  of  Kendall  v.  Hamilton  was 
distinguished,  and  it  was  held  that  a  mar- 
ried woman  contracting  in  respect  of  her 
separate  estate  is  within  the  rule  that  a  judg- 
ment against  one  joint  contractor  bars  an 
action  against  the  others.  See  Hammond  v. 
Schofield,  [1891]  1  Q.  B.  453;  7  T.  L.  R.  300. 
An  exception  to  this  rule  also  exists  in  cases 
of  partnership,  a  surviving  partner,  or  the 
estate  of  a  deceased  partner,  being  still  liable 
to  partnership  creditors.  He  Hodgson,  Beckett 
r.  Ramsdale,  31  Ch.  D.  177 ;  see  Re  Barnard, 
Edwards  v.  Barnard,  32  Ch.  D.  447.  The 
rights  of  a  surety  against  his  principal  are  not 
precisely  the  same  as  those  of  a  creditor,  and 
the  fact  that  a  creditor  has  recovered  judgment 
against  one  partner,  does  not  take  away  the 
righ's  of  a  surety  for  one  partner  as  against 
t  e  other  partner.  Badeley  v.  Consolidated 
Bank,  34  Ch  D.  536;  38  Ch.  D.  238.  Liability 
arising  from  a  breach  of  trust  is  nut  joint 
merely,    but    joint    and    several.      Wilson   v. 

2G4 


Plumer  v.  Gregory,  L.  R.  18  Eq.  621,  where  it 
is  considered  as  settled,  if  the  liability  be  joint 
and  several,  that  any  of  the  parties  may  be 
sued  without  joining  the  others,  and  Atkinson 
v.  Mackreth  is  held  to  have  proceeded  on  its 
special  circumstances.  In  case  of  a  dormant 
partner,  the  plaintiff  has  his  election  to  make 
him  defendant  or  not.  Hawley  v.  Cramer,  4 
Cowen,  717;  Goble  v .  Gale,  7  Blackf.218;  Coll- 
yer,  Partn.  (Perkins's  ed.)  §  391  in  note. 
Where  the  sole  design  of  the  bill  is  to  have  the 
ind  vidual  property  of  one  partner,  alleged  to 
have  been  fraudulently  conveyed  away  by  him, 
applied  in  satisfaction  of  a  judgment  against 
the  firm,  another  partner,  from  whom  no  dis- 
covery is  sought,  and  against  whom  no  relief  is 
prayed,  is  neither  a  necessary  nor  a  proper 
party.  Randolph  v.  Daly,  16  N.  J.  Eq.  313; 
see  ante,  p.  217,  note. 


Moore,  1  Myl.  &  K.  126,  337;  Blyth  v.  Flad- 
gate,  63  L.  T.  546,  553.  An  "agent,"  so  sign- 
ing, who  has  no  principal,  is  alone  liable.  Kel- 
ner  v.  Baxter,  L.  R.  2  C.  P.  174.  The  liability 
of  stockholders  upon  unpaid  subscriptions  for 
stock,  when  sued  by  a  creditor  of  their  cor- 
poration to  collect  an  unsatisfied  judgment,  is 
several,  and  they  need  not  all  be  defendants. 
Hatch  v.  Dana,  101  U.  S.  205;  Baines  v.  Bab- 
cock  (Cal.),  30  Pac.  776;  Baines  v.  Babcock 
(Cal.),  27  id.  674,  Baines  v.  Story,  id.  676.  So 
of  their  costs,  Burnap  v.  Haskins  Steam  En- 
gine Co.  127  Mass.  586.  For  such  torts  as  the 
violation  of  a  trademark,  involving  misfeasance, 
servants  are  liable  jointly  and  severally  with 
their  employers.  Estes  v.  Worthington,  30 
Fed.  Rep.  465;  see  Gudger  v.  Western  N.  C. 
R.  Co.  21  id.  81  As  to  the  liability  of  officers 
and  agents  of  a  corporation  for  its  infringement 
of  a  patent,  see  United  Nickel  Co.  v.  Worth- 
ington. 13  Fed.  Rep.  392;  Tyier  v.  Galloway, 
id.  477;  Seimens  v.  Sellers,  16  id.  856;  Smith 
v  Standard  L.  M.  Co.  19  id.  826;  Eagle  Mauuf 
Co   c.  Miller,  41  id.  351. 


PERSONS   RESISTING    PLAINTIFF'S    DEMANDS.  *  270 

representatives  of  the  other  partner,  who  might  be  interested  in  the 
account,  were  not  before  the  Court;  although,  as  the  demand  would 
have  survived  at  Law,  the  case  there  might  have  been  different.6 

Although,  even  before  the  32d  Order  of  August,  1841, 7  it  was  not 
generally  necessary,  in  a  suit  against  the  principal,  to  make  the  surety 
a  party,  yet,  where  a  person  had  executed  a  conveyance,  or  created  a 
charge  upon  his  own  estate,  as  a  collateral  security  for  another,  he 
became  a  necessary  party  to  a  suit  against  the  principal. 
*Thus,  in  the  case  of  a  mortgage  by  a  principal  of  one  estate  *270 
and  by  the  surety  of  another,  as  a  collateral  security,  a  bill  of 
foreclosure  against  the  principal  cannot  be  sustained,  because  the  other 
had  a  right  to  redeem,  and  be  present  at  the  account,  to  prevent  the 
burden  ultimately  falling  upon  his  own  estate,  or  at  least  falling  upon 
it  to  a  larger  amount  than  the  other  estate  might  be  deficient  to  satisfy.1 
Where,  however,  the  surety  merely  enters  into  a  personal  covenant  as 
surety  for  the  principal,  but  does  not  convey  any  estate  or  interest  to 
the  mortgagee,  he  will  not  be  a  necessary  party,  unless  the  surety  has 
paid  part  of  the  debt; 2  and  where  a  son,  having  a  general  power  of 
appointment  over  an  estate,  in  the  event  of  his  surviving  his  father, 
joined  with  two  other  persons  as  his  sureties,  in  a  covenant  to  pay  an 
annuity  to  the  plaintiff,  and  also  covenanted  that  he  would  create  a 
term  in  the  estate  if  he  survived  his  father,  and  upon  the  death  of  his 
father  a  bill  was  filed  by  the  plaintiff  against  the  son  and  other  parties 
interested  in  the  estate,  to  have  the  arrears  of  his  annuity  raised  and 
paid,  it  was  held  upon  demurrer  that  the  sureties  were  not  necessary 
parties.8 

Upon  a  bill  by  one  surety  against  another,  for  contribution,  it  was 
held,  that  the  executor  of  a  third  surety  who  is  dead  ought  to  be  a 
party,  though  he  died  insolvent.4  In  that  case,  the  principal  had  given 
a  counter-bond  of  indemnity  to  the  plaintiff,  who  had  taken  him  in 
execution  upon  it,  and  he  had  been  discharged  by  an  Insolvent  Act; 

6  Pierson    v.  Robinson,  3  Swanst,    139    n. ;  Compton,  2  Y   &  C.  Ex.  457,  461;    Gedve  v. 

Scholefield  v.  Heafield,  7  Sim.  667;  Story,  Eq.  Matson.  25  Beav.  310. 
PI.  §    194  ;  Wells  v.  Strange,  5   Ga.  22.     So  a  Gedye  v.  Matson,  25  Beav.  310. 

where  a  bill  is  brought  to  recover  a  debt  against  s  Newton  v.  Karl  of  Egmont,  4  Sim.  574  581. 

the   estate   of  a   deceased    partner,  the   other  4  Hole  v.  Harrison,  Finch,  15.    So  the  pr.n- 

partnera    are    proper    and    necessary   parties.  cipal  debtor  must  be  made  a  partv      Trescott 

Vose  v.  Philbrook,  3  Story,  335.     So  to  a  bill  „.   Smith,    1    M'Cord  Ch.   301.     AH   persons 

seeking  relief   from  the  estate  of  a  deceased  interested  should  be  made  parties  in  such  a 

stockholder,   all   the   living   stockholders    and  case.      Moore   v.   Moberlv.    7    B     Mon     295 

representatives  of  deceased  stockholders,  liable  Those,  however,  need  not  be  made  parties  who 

to  the  debt,  must,  as  interested  in  the  account  have  removed  bevond  the  jurisdiction  of  the 

to  be  taken,  be  made  parties  defendant.     New  Court.     McKenna  v   George,  2  Rich.   Eq.  15; 

England  &c.  Bank  v.  Newport  Steam  Factory,  ante,  191,  245,  and  note.     Where  a  surety  seeks 

V    '  .        .     ,       ,  to  nave   his  debt  paid  to  the  creditor  out  of 

J   Nns  order  has  been  adopted  in  the  Equity  some  specified  fund,  or  bv  some  partv  other  than 

Rules   of  the   I  nited   States    Supreme  Court.  himself,  such  creditor  is  a  necessary  partv  to 

Equity  Rul  ■,  51 ;  see  Genl.  Ord.  VII.  r.  2.  the  bill.     But  the  creditor  is  not  a  necessary 

i  Stokes  v.  Clendon,  cited  2  Bro.  C.  C.  275,  partv,  where  the  surety  has  paid  the  debt,  and 

notis,  edit.  Belt,  3  Swanst.  150,  n.,  where  the  is  seeking  to  be  reimbursed  bv  the  principal  or 

surety  had  conveyed  his  own  estate  by  way  of  c^-suretv.     Murphy  r.  Jackson,  5  .Jones,  Eq 

security  to  the  mortgagee  ;   see  also  Payne  v.  (N.  C.)  11. 

265 


*272 


OF    PARTIES    TO    A    SUIT. 


and  though  he  appears  not  to  have  been  made  a  party,  yet  no  objection 
was  taken ; 5  and  it  seems  from  this  circumstance,  and  also  from  the 
case  of  Lawson  v.  Wright,6  that  if  the  principal  is  clearly  insolvent, 
and  can  be  proved  to  be  so  (as  by  his  having  taken  advantage  of  an 
Act  for  the  Relief  of  Insolvent  Debtors)  he  need  not  be  a  party  to  the 

suit.7  It  will,  however,  be  necessary  if  the  principal  be  not  a 
*271    *  party  that  the  fact  of  his  insolvency  should  be  proved;  whereas 

if  he  be  a  party  to  the  suit  such  proof  will  be  unnecessary.1 
Where  the  fact  of  the  insolvency  of  one  of  the  sureties  was  clear,  and 
admitted  by  the  answers,  Lord  Hardwicke  held,  that  there  was  no 
necessity  to  bring  his  representatives  before  the  Court.2  It  seems,  how- 
ever, that  the  plaintiff  has  his  election,  whether  he  will  bring  the 
insolvent  co-obligor  or  his  representative  before  the  Court  or  not.3 
And  in  all  cases  coming  under  the  32d  Order,4  the  plaintiff  has  the 
option  to  sue  all  the  persons  jointly  and  severally  liable,  if  he  shall 
think  fit.  Independently  of  this  order,  a  plaintiff  is  allowed,  in  a  case 
where  there  are  several  persons  who  are  each  liable  to  account  for  his 
own  receipts,  to  file  a  bill  against  one  or  more  of  them  for  an  account  of 
their  own  receipts  and  payments,  without  making  the  others  parties.6 

The  same  rule  has,  it  appears,  been  adopted,  where  there  are  joint 
factors,  and  one  of  them  is  out  of  the  jurisdiction.6     And  where  it  did 

not  appear  that  the  parties  were  out  of  the  jurisdiction,  the 
*  272    Court  permitted  the  representatives  of  one  of  several  *  trustees, 

who  were  dead,  to  be  sued  for  an  account  of  the  receipts  and 
disbursements   of  his  testator,   who  alone  managed  the  trust,   without 


5  Hole  v.  Harrison,  Finch,  15. 

6  1  Cox,  27G.  See  Cox  v.  Stephens,  9  Jur. 
N.  S.  1144;  11  W.  R.  929, 

7  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  169;  see  1  Story,  Eq.  Jur. 
§§  494,  490;  Long  v.  Dupuy,  1  Dana,  104; 
Young  v.  Lyons,  8  Gill,  162;  Montague  v. 
Turpin,  8  Grattan,  453;  Watts  v.  Gayle,  20  Ala. 
817.  It  is  not  sufficient  in  such  a  case  merely 
to  allege  the  insolvency  of  the  principal.  Roane 
v.  Pickett,  2  Eng.  510.  Where  one  of  several 
judgment  debtors  is  wholly  irresponsible  and 
destitute  of  property,  he  need  not  be  made  a 
party  to  a  judgment  creditor's  bill.  Williams 
v.  Hubbard,  1  Mich.  44(3.  Where  a  bill  in 
Equity  is  brought  against  any  of  the  stock- 
holders of  a  corporation  to  compel  them  to  pay 
a  debt  of  the  corporation  for  which  they  are 
individually  liable,  the  general  rule  is,  that  all 
persons  liable  to  contribute  should  be  made  par- 
ties to  the  bill.  But  this  is  a  rule  of  conveni- 
ence, and  not  of  necessity ;  and  where  certain 
of  the  stockholders  within  the  jurisdiction  are 
insolvent,  the  plaintiff  may  have  his  decree 
against  such  as  are  solvent  for  his  whole  debt, 
each  paying  such  proportion  of  the  whole  debt 
as  his  stock  bears  to  the  whole  amount  of  stock 
owned  by  the  solvent  stockholders,  over  whom 
the  Court  has  acquired  jurisdiction.  Erickson 
v.  Nesmith,  46  N.  H.  371. 

1  In  Hole  v.  Harrison,  Rep.  temp.  Finch,  15, 

266 


the  insolvency  of  the  principal  was  apparent 
from  the  fact  of  his  having  taken  advantage  of 
the  Insolvent  Act;  but  it  is  presumed  that  the 
insolvency  of  the  co-security  was  not  so  capable 
of  proof,  and  that  it  was  upon  that  ground  held 
necessary  to  have  his  personal  representative 
before  the  Court,  in  order  to  take  an  account  of 
his  estate. 

2  Madox  v.  Jackson,  3  Atk.  406. 

3  Haywood  r.  Ovey,  6  Mad.  113;  Hitchman 
v.  Stewart,  3  Drew.  271;  1  Jur.  N.  S.  839;  Ex 
parte  Bishop,  15  Ch.  D.  400;  see  Clagett  v. 
Worthmgton,  3  Gill,  83. 

4  Genl.  Ord.  VII.  r.  2;  R.  S.  C.  1883,  Ord. 
XVI.  §  3. 

5  Thus,  where  a  residuary  legatee  brought 
his  bill  against  one  of  two  executors,  without 
his  co-executor,  who  was  abroad,  to  have  an 
account  of  his  own  receipts  and  payments,  the 
Lord  Chancellor  said,  "  The  cause  shall  go  on, 
and  if  upon  the  account  anything  appear  diffi- 
cult, the  Court  will  take  care  of  it;  the  reason 
is  the  same  here  as  in  the  case  of  joint  factors, 
and  the  issuing  out  of  process  in  this  case  is 
purely  matter  of  form."  Cowslad  v.  Cely,  Prec. 
in  Ch.  83;  1  Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  73,  pi.  18";  2  Eq. 
Cas.  Abr.  165,  pi.  3,  S.  C. ;  but  see  Devaynes 
v,  Robinson,  24  Beav.  98;  3  Jur.  N.  S.  707. 

e  Ibid. 


PERSONS    RESISTING    PLAINTIFF'S    DEMANDS.  *  272 

bringing  the  representatives  of  the  other  trustees  before  the  Court.1 
Now,  under  the  32d  Order  of  August,  1841, 2  it  is  not  always  necessary 
to  make  all  the  persons  committing  a  breach  of  trust  parties  to  a  suit 
instituted  for  redress  of  the  wrong.3 

The  rule,  that  all  the  parties  liable  to  a  demand  should  be  before  the 
Court,  was  a  rule  of  convenience,  to  prevent  further  suits  for  a  contri- 
bution, and  not  a  rule  of  necessity;  and  therefore  might  be  dispensed 
with,  especially  where  the  parties  were  many,  and  the  delays  might  be 
multiplied  and  continued.4  Thus,  where  there  were  a  great  number  of 
obligors,  and  many  of  them  were  dead,  some  leaving  assets  and  others 
leaving  none,  the  Court  proceeded  to  a  decree,  though  all  of  them  were 
not  before  it.5  («) 

The  general  rule,  requiring  the  presence  of  all  parties  interested  in 
resisting  the  plaintiff's  demand,  has  also  been  dispensed  with  in  a 
variety  of  cases,  where  the  parties  were  numerous,  and  the  ends  of  jus- 
tice could  be  answered  by  a  sufficient  number  being  before  the  Court 
to  represent  the  rights  of  all.6  Thus,  where  A  agreed  with  B  and  C 
to  pave  the  streets  of  a  parish,  and  B  and  C,  on  behalf  of  themselves 
and  the  rest  of  the  parish,  agreed  to  pay  A,  and  the  agreement  was 
lodged  in  the  hands  of  1>,  it  was  held,  that  A  should  have  his  remedy 
against  B  and  C,  and  that  they  must  resort  to  the  rest  of  the  parish.7  So 
where  a  bill  was  filed  by  a  tradesman  against  the  committee  of  a  volun- 
tary society  called  "The  Ladies'  Club,"  for  money  expended  and  work 
done  under  a  contract  entered  into  by  the  defendants,  on  behalf  of 
themselves  and  the  other  subscribers,  and  it  was  objected  that  all  the 
members  who  had  subscribed  should  be  parties,  the  objection  was  over- 
ruled, and  a  decree  made  for  the  plaintiff.8 

1  Lady  Sclyard  i\  Executors  of  Harris,  1  Eq.  6  The  like  doctrine  applies  to  cases  where 

Cas.  Alir.  74,  pi,  20.  there  are  many  persons  defendants,  belonging 

-  Gen.  Or.l.  VII.  r.  2;  R.  S.  C.  18S3,  Ord.  to   voluntary  associations,  against    whom    the 

XVI.  5,  9.  suit   is   brought,  as   to  eases  where  the  hill  is 

3  Kellaway  v.  Johnson,  5  Beav.  319;  6  Jur.  brought  by  some  proprietors  as  plaintiffs  on  be- 
7">1  :  Perry  v.  Knott,  5  Beav.  293;  and  see  half  of  all.  Story,  Eq.  PL  116,  et  seq. ;  Wood  v. 
Shipton  ».  Rawlins,  4  Hare,  622;  Hall  v.  Austin,  Dummer,  3  Mason,  315-319,  321,  322;  Stimson 

2  Coll   570;  10  Jur.  452.  v.  Lewis,  36  Vt.  91,  94;  Gorman  v.  Russell,  14 

4  Darwent  v.  Walton,  2  Atk.  510;  Anon.  2  Cal.  531;  see  Whitney  r.  Mayo,  J.5  111.  251. 
Eq.  ( 'as.  Abr.  166,  pi.  97;  Story,  Eq.  Jur.  §§78,  So  where  the  creditors  of  an  insolvent  debtor, 
82;  Erickson  v.  Nesmith.  40  N.  11.  371,  374-  who  has  assigned  his  property  for  the  payment 
377;  Stimson  v.  Lewis,  36  Vt.  91,  93.  of  his  debts,  are  numerous,  and  some  of  them 

5  Lady  Cranbourne  v.  Crispe,  Finch,  105;  1  not  within  the  Commonwealth,  it  is  not  neces- 
Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  70;  see  48th  Equity  Hiileof  United  sary  that  they  should  be  made  parties  to  a  bill 
Slate-  Supreme  Court  ;  Wilson  v.  Church,  '.»  <  !h.  ill  Equity  which  concerns  his  assets  ;  he  and  his 
I).  :>'y2 ;  Commissioners  of  Sewera  o.  Gellatly,  assignees  only  need  he  made  parties.    Steven- 

3  t'h.  1).  010,  615;  Same  v.  Glasse,  L.  R.  7  Ch.  son  v.  Austin,  3  Met.  474;  Wakeman  v.  Grover, 
456;  L.  R.  19  Eq.  134;  Mayor  of  York  v.  Pil-  4  Paige,  23;  see  Dias  v.  Bouchand,  10  Paige, 
kinton,  1  Atk.  482;  Powell  v.  Knight,  7  Beav.  445;  Johnson  v.  Candage,  31  Maine,  28;  Duval] 
444,  449;  Hervey  y.  Beckwith,  2  II.  &  M.  429;  D.  Speed,  1  Md.  Ch.  229. 

Williams  v.  Dunn,  W.  N.  (1868)  212;  Thomas  '  Meriel  v.   Wymondsold,   Hard.  205;   see 

r.  Dunning,  5  De  G.  &  S   618;  see  cases,  ante,      also  Anon.  2  Eq.  ('as.  Abr.  166,  pi.  7. 

p.  241.  «  Cullen   r.    Duke   of  Queensberry,  1   Bro, 


(a)  It  is  not  usual  in  a  representative  suit  to      party  and  thereby  made  liable  to  costs.     Cony- 
allow  a  person  fairly  represented  to  attend  sub-      beare  v.  Lewis,  48  L.  T.  527. 
sequent  proceedings,  unless  he   is  joined  as  a 

267 


*  274  OF    PARTIES    TO    A    SUIT. 

The  same  rule  was  acted  upon  by  Sir  Thomas  Plumer  M.  E., 
*273  *in  a  bill  for  the  specific  performauce  of  an  agreement  for  a 
lease,  against  the  treasurer  and  directors  of  a  Joint-Stock  Com- 
pany established  by  Act  of  Parliament,  who  had  purchased  the  fee  of 
the  premises  from  the  party  who  had  entered  into  the  agreement, 
although  the  rest  of  the  proprietors,  whose  concurrence  in  the  convey- 
ance would  be  necessary,  were  not  before  the  Court.1  The  Master  of 
the  Rolls  there  concluded  that  although  the  bill  required  an  act  to  be 
done  by  parties  who  were  absent,  yet,  as  they  were  so  numerous  that 
they  could  not  be  brought  before  the  Court,  he  would  go  as  far  as  he 
could  to  bind  their  right,  and  made  a  decree  declaring  the  plaintiffs 
entitled  to  a  specific  performance,  and  restraining  the  treasurer  of  the 
company  from  bringing  any  action  to  disturb  the  plaintiffs  in  their 
possession.2 

In  the  preceding  cases,  the  decision  was  upon  the  ground 
*274  *that,  if  the  plaintiff  succeeded  in  his  demands  against  the  indi- 
viduals sued,  they  would  not  be  injured,  as  they  had  a  remedy 
over  against  the  others  for  a  contribution,  which,  under  their  own 
regulations,  they  might  enforce,  although  the  enforcement  of  it,  on  the 
part  of  the  plaintiffs  against  so  numerous  a  body,  would  be  nearly 
impossible.1  There  are,  however,  other  cases  in  which  suits  are  per- 
mitted to  proceed  against  a  few,  of  many  individuals  of  a  certain  class, 
without  bringing  the  rest  before  the  Court,  although  their  interests 
may  in  some,  degree  be.  affected  by  the  decision,  as  in  the  case  of  bills 
of  peace  brought  to  establish  a  general  legal  right  against  a  great  many 
distinct  individuals.2     Thus,  for  instance,  a  bill  may  be  brought  by  a 

C.  C.  101  (Perkins's  ed.),  and  notes ;  1  Bio.  P.  C.  the  acting  members  of  the  committee  are  all 

396   S.  C.  on  appeal.  liable,  though  some  of  them  may  not  have  been 

i  Meux  v.  Maltbv,  2  Swanst.  277;  Parsons  v.  present  at  all   the  meetings  which  have  taken 

Spooner,  5  Hare,  102;    10  Jur.  423;   and  see  place  respecting  the  contract.     In  that  case,  the 

Douglass  v.  Horsfall,  2  S.  &  S.  184.      The  fol-  defendants  were  all  the  acting  commissioners, 

lowing  cases  illustrate  the  mode  of  pleading  in  under  a  Navigation  Act,  and  the  plaintiff  had 

actions  bv  and  against  Joint-Stock  Companies,  been  employed  on  their  behalf,  and  it  appeared 

and  will  be  useful  in  framing  suits  in  Equity.  that    the  orders   had    been  given    at   different 

Stewart  v.  Dunn.  12  M.&W.  655;  Davidson  v.  meetings  by  such  of   the   defendants   as  were 

Coopi  r.  11M.  &W.  778;  Smith  »\  Golds  worthy,  present   at    these   meetings;   but   none  of   the 

4  Q.  B.  430.     In  a  bill  against  an  unincorpor-  defendants  were  present  at  all  the  meetings,  or 

ated  banking  company,  the  members  of  which  joined  in  all  the  orders,  but  every  one  of  them 

are  numerous,  and,  in" part,  unknown,  it  is  not  were   present   at  some   of  the   meetings,  and 

necessary  to  bring  all  the  stockholders  before  joined  in  making  some  of  the  orders;  and  one 

tin   ( lourt,  before  a  decree  can  be  made.  Maude-  of  the  questions  in  the  cause  was,  whether  all 

ville  V.  Rices,  2  Peters,  482;  see  Van  Vechten  the  acting  commissioners  were  liable  on  account 

v.  Terry,  2  John.    Cli.   197;   Shaw  v.  Norfolk  of  all  the  orders,  or  only  as  to  those  which  they 

County  R.  R.  Co.  5  Gray,  170, 171;  Erickson  r.  had  respectively  signed.     Upon  this  point  the 

Nesmith,  4  Alien,  233;  Hartley  v.  Russell,  40  Court  was  of  opinion  that  all  the  acting  com- 

jj    H.109.  m issioners  were  liable  in  toto.     Every  one  who 

2  2  Swanst.  286:  and  see  ib.  287.  and  the  comes  in  afterwards  approves  the  former  acts; 

cases  there  cited;  Thornton  v.  Hightower,  17  and  if  anyone  of  the  commissioners  who  had 

Ga.  L:  but  see  McBride  v.  Lindsay,  16  Jur.  535;  acted  before  disapproved  the  subsequent  acts, 

11  Eng.    Law  &   Eq.  249.      From  the  case  of  he  might  have  gone  to  a  future  meeting  and 

Horsley  o.  Bell,  cited  in  the  above  case  of  the  protested  against  them. 

Ladies'  Club  (see  Amb.  770,  and  1   Bro.  C.  C.  1  See   48th    Equity   Rule   of  United  States 

101,  n. ;  and  see  Att.-Gen.  >•  Brown,  1  Swanst.  Supreme  Court. 

265),  it  appears  that,  in  cases  of  this  description,  2  It  is  not  a  sufficient  objection  to  a  bill  by 

268 


PERSONS    RESISTING    PLAINTIFF  S    DEMANDS. 


274 


person  having  a  right  at  Law  to  demand  service  from  the  individuals  of 
a  large  district  to  his  mill,  for  the  purpose  of  establishing  that  right. 
And  the  corporation  of  London  has  been  allowed  to  exhibit  a  bill  for 
the  purpose  of  establishing  their  right  to  a  duty,  and  to  bring  only  a 
few  persons  before  the  Court,  who  dealt  in  those  things  on  which  the 
duty  was  claimed.3  And  so  bills  are  frequently  entertained  by  lords  of 
manors  against  some  of  the  tenants,  on  a  question  of  common  affecting 
them  all;  and  a  parson  may  maintain  a  bill  for  tithes  against  a  few  of 
the  occupiers  within  the  parish  although  they  set  up  a  modus  to  which 
the  whole  are  jointly  liable.4 


creditors  against  a  corporation  and  its  debtors 
to  compel  the  collection  by  the  corporation  of 
what  is  due  to  it,  and  the  payment  of  the  debt 
it  owes,  that  all  the  creditors  or  stockholders 
are  not  joined.  If  necessary,  the  Court  may, 
at  the  suggestion  of  either  party  that  the  cor- 
poration is  insolvent,  administer  its  assets  by  a 
receiver,  and  thus  collect  all  the  subscriptions 
or  debts  to  the  corporation.  Ogilvie  v.  Knox 
Ins.  Co.  22  How.  U.  S.  380;  S.  C.  2  Black, 
U.  S.  539.  And  the  stockholders  who  are  called 
upon  by  such  bill  to  pay  the  balances  due  on 
their  several  subscriptions  to  the  stock  of  the 
company,  cannot  be  allowed  to  defend  them- 
selves by  an  allegation  that  their  subscriptions 
were  obtained  by  fraud  and  misrepresentation 
of  the  agent  of  the  company.  Ogilvie  v.  Knox 
Ins.  Co.  22  How.  U.  S.  380;  Upton  v.  Tribil- 
cock,  91  U.  S.  45. 

3  City  of  London  v.  Perkins,  4  Bro.  P.  C. 
158;  Sheffield  Waterworks  v.  Yeonians,  L.  R. 
2  Ch.  8. 

4  Hardcastle  v.  Smithson,  3  Atk.  246.  The 
principle  upon  which  the  Courts  have  acted  in 
those  cases  has  been  very  clearly  laid  down  by 
Lord  Eldon  in  Adair  v.  New  River  Co.  11  Ves. 
429:  see  Story,  Eq.  PL  §  116,  et  seq.;  ante, 
p.  272,  273,  note.  In  that  case,  a  bill  was  filed 
by  a  person  entitled,  under  the  Crown,  to  a 
rent  reserved  out  of  a  moiety  of  the  profits  of 
the  New  River  Company,  to  which  moiety  the 
Crown  was  entitled  under  the  original  charter 
of  that  company,  but  had  subsequently  granted 
it  to  Sir  John  Middleton,  the  original  projector, 
reserving  the  rent  in  question.  By  a  variety 
of  mesne  assignments,  the  King's  moiety  of  the 
profits  had  become  vested  in  a  hundred  per- 
sons, or  upwards;  and  the  bill  was  filed  against 
the  company  and  eight  of  those  persons  for  an 
account,  and  it  charged,  that  there  was  not 
any  tangible  or  corporeal  property  upon  which 
the  plaintiff  could  distrain,  and  that  the  parties 
were  so  numerous,  and  thus  liable  to  so  many 
fluctuations,  that  it  was  impossible,  if  the  plain- 
tiff could  discover  them,  to  bring  them  all 
before  the  Court,  and  that  these  impediments 
were  not  occasioned  by  the  plaintiff  or  thoae 
under  whom  he  claimed,  but  by  the  defendants, 
'lo  this  bill  an  objection  was  taken  for  want  of 


parties,  because  all  the  persons  interested  in  the 
King's  share  were  not  before  the  Court ;  but 
Lord  Eldon  said,  that  there  was  no  doubt  that  it 
is  generally  the  rule  that  wherever  a  rent  charge 
is  granted,  all  persons  who  have  to  litigate 
any  title  with  regard  to  that  rent  charge,  or 
with  each  other,  as  being  liable  to  pay  the 
whole  or  to  contribute  amongst  themselves, 
must  be  brought  before  the  Court;  see  1  Eq. 
Cas.  Abr.  72;  but  that  it  was  a  very  different 
consideration  whether  it  was  possible  to  hold, 
that  the  rule  should  be  applied  to  an  extent 
destroying  the  very  purpose  for  which  it  was 
established,  namely,  that  it  should  prevail 
where  it  is  actually  impracticable  to  bring  all 
the  parties,  or  where  it  is  attended  with  incon- 
venience almost  amounting  to  that,  as  well  as 
where  it  can  be  brought  without  inconvenience. 
It  must  depend  upon  the  circumstances  of  each 
case.  His  Lordship  also  said,  that  there  were 
authorities  to  show  that,  where  it  is  impracti- 
cable, the  rule  shall  not  be  pressed;  and  in  such 
a  ease  as  the  one  before  him,  the  King's  share 
being  split  into  such  a  number  that  it  was  im- 
practicable to  goon  with  a  record  attempting 
to  bring  all  parties  having  interest  in  the  sub- 
ject to  be  charged,  he  should  hesitate  to  deter- 
mine, that  a  person  having  a  demand  upon 
the  whole  or  every  part  of  the  moiety,  does 
not  do  enough  if  he  brings  all  whom  he  can 
bring.  His  Lordship  then  goes  cm  to  say, 
"  There  is  one  class  of  cases  very  important 
upon  this  subject,  namely,  where  a  person  hav- 
ing at  Law  a  general  right  to  demand  service 
from  the  individuals  of  a  large  district,  to  his 
mill  for  instance,  may  sue  thus  in  Equity:  his 
demand  is  upon  every  individual  not  to  grind 
corn  for  their  own  subsistence,  except  at  his 
mill ;  to  bring  actions  against  any  individual 
for  subtracting  that  service  is  regarded  as  per- 
fectly impracticable;  therefore,  a  bill  is  filed 
to  establish  that  right,  and  it  is  not  necessary 
to  bring  all  the  individuals.  Why  ?  Not  that 
it  is  inexpedient,  but  that  it  is  impracticable 
to  bring  them  all.  See  48th  Equity  Rule  of 
the  U.  S.  Supreme  Court.  The  Court,  there- 
fore, has  required  so  many  that  it  can  be  justly 
said  they  will  fairly  and  honestly  try  the  legal 
right  between  themselves,  all  other  persons  in- 

269 


*  277  OF    PARTIES    TO    A    SUIT. 

*  27G        *  As  a  general  rule,  wherever  a  rent-charge  has  been  granted, 

all  persons  whose  estates  are  liable  must  be  brought  before  the 
Court  in  a  suit  to  enforce  it.1  This  rule,  however,  is  liable  to  an 
exception  in  the  case  of  charities,  which  are  considered  entitled  to 
greater  indulgence  in  matters  of  pleading  and  practice  than  ordinary 
parties,  and  in  such  cases  it  seems  that  it  is  not  necessary  that  all  the 
terre-tenants  should  be  brought  before  the  Court,  because  every  part 
of  the  land  was  liable,  and  the  charity  ought  not  to  be  put  to  this 
difficulty.2 

The  rule  that  one  having  a  general  right  to  demand  service  from 
many  individuals  may  proceed  against  a  fair  proportion  as  representa- 
tives applies  only  to  cases  where  there  is  one  general  right  in  all  the 
parties  concerned ; 3  that  is,  where  the  character  of  all  the  parties,  so  far 
as  the  right  is  concerned,  is  homogeneous,  as  in  the  case  in  suits  to 
establish  a  modus,  or  a  right  of  suit  to  a  mill;  and,  notwithstanding 
the  inconvenience  arising  from  numerous  parties,  there  are  some  cases 
in  which  they  cannot  be  dispensed  with,  as  in  the  case  of  a  bill  filed  to 
have  the  benefit  of  a  charge  on  an  estate,  in  which  case  all  persons  must 
be  made  parties  who  claim  an  interest  in  such  estate.  Thus,  where 
estates  had  been  conveyed  to  trustees,  in  trust  for  such  creditors  of  the 
grantor  as  should  execute  the  conveyance,  and  one  incumbrancer,  some 
of  whose  incumbrances  were  prior  and  some  subsequent  to  the  trust 
deed,  filed  a  bill  praying  that  his  rights  and  interests  under  his  securi- 
ties might  be  established,  and  the  priorities  of  himself  and  the  other 
incumbrancers  declared;  and  alleging  that  the  deed  was  executed  by 
thirty  creditors  of  the  grantor,  and  amongst  others  by  two  individuals 
who  were  named  as  defendants,  and  charging  that  such  creditors  were 
too  numerous  to  be  all  made  parties  to  the  suit,  and  that  he  was  igno- 
rant of  the  priorities  and  interests  of  such  parties  and  of  their  residences, 
and  whether  they  were  living  or  dead,  save  as  to  the  two  who  were 

named;  a  plea  by  some  of  the  defendants,  setting  out  the  names 

*  277    *  and  residences  of  the  persons  who  had  executed  the  deed,  and 

alleging  that  they  were  living,  and  necessary  parties  to  the  suit, 
was  allowed.1 

tevested,  and  the  plaintiff  ;  and  when  the  legal  it    should    be   established,   of    a    contribution 

right  is  so  established  at  Law,  the  remedy  in  towards  its  discharge  among  themselves.  Story, 

Equity  is  very  simple:    merely  a  bill  stating  Eq.    PI.   §§   133,    162;    Coleman  v.  Barnes,  5 

that  the  right  has  been  established  in  such  a  Allen,  87-i;    Skeel  v.  Spraker,   8  Paige,   182; 

proceeding;  and  upon  that  ground,  a  Court  of  Myers   r.  United  Guaranty,  &c.  Co.  7  De  G. 

Equity  will  give  the  plaintiff  relief  against  the  M.  &  G.  112. 

defendants  in  the  second  suit,  only  represented  2  Att.-Gen.  v.  Jackson,  11  Ves.  367;  Att- 

by  those  in  the  first.     I  feel  a  strong  inclina-  Gen.    v.    Shelly.   1   Salk.    163;    Att.-Gen.   v. 

tion  that  a  decree  of  the  same  nature  may  be  Wyburgh,  1  P.  Wms.  599;    and  see  Att.-Gen. 

made  in  this  case."      See  ace.  Biscoe  v.  The  v.  Jackson,  11  Ves.  365;    Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  93; 

Undertakers  of  the  Land  Bank,  cited  in  Cuth-  Att.-Gen.  v.  Naylor,  1  H.  &  M.  809;  10  Jur. 

bert  v.  Westwood,  Yin.  Ah.  tit.  Party,  B.  255,  N.  S.  231. 
PI.  58;  see  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  116,  et  seq.  8  See  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §§  120,  130,  et  seq. 

1  Adair  v.  New  River  Co.  supra.     All  per-  1  Newton  v.  Earl  Egniont,  5  Sim.  130;  and 

sons  who  are  affected  by  a  common  charge  or  see  Harrison  v.  Stewardson,  2  Hare,  530;  and 

burden  must  be  made  parties,  not  only  for  the  Holland  v.  Baker,  3  Hare,  68;  Story,  Eq.  PI. 

purpose   of    ascertaining  and    contesting    the  §  130,  et  seq. 
right  or  title  to  it,  but  abo  for  the  purpose,  if 

270 


PERSONS    RESISTING    PLAINTIFFS    DEMANDS. 


278 


In  suits  for  establishing  charges  upon  estates,  the  general  and  almost 
universal  practice  of  the  Court  is  that  all  persons  entitled  to  incum- 
brances, subsequent  to  the  plaintiff's  charge,  should  be  made  parties  to 
the  suit.  Thus,  in  the  case  of  a  bill  to  foreclose  a  mortgage,  all  per- 
sons, who  have  incumbrances  upon  the  estate  posterior  in  point  of  time 
to  the  plaintiff's  mortgage,  should  be  made  defendants; 2  for  although, 
if  some  of  the  incumbrancers  are  not  made  parties  to  a  bill  of  fore- 
closure, the  plaintiff  may,  notwithstanding,  foreclose  such  of  the  de- 
fendants as  he  has  brought  before  the  Court;  8  yet  such  a  decree  will 
not  bind  the  other  incumbrancers  who  are  not  parties,  even  though  the 
mortgagee  at  the  time  of  foreclosure  4  had  no  notice  of  the  exist- 
ence of  such  *  incumbrancers.1     And  so,   to  a  suit  by  a  vendor    *278 


2  But  see  Smith  v.  Chapman,  4  Conn.  344; 
Wilson  v.  Hayward,  6  Fla.  171.  See  ante, 
p.  214,  notes  2  and  4.  Judgment  creditors  since 
July  29, 1864,  who  have  not  issued  execution,  are 
not  necessary  parties.  Earl  of  Cork  v.  Russell, 
L.  R.  13  Eq.  210;  see  also  Mildred  v.  Austin, 
L.  R.  8  Eq.  220;  Re  Bailey,  W.  N.  (1809)  43; 
17  W.  R.  395.  As  to  making  judgment  credit- 
ors under  1  &  2  Vic.  c.  110,  parties,  see  liolle- 
stpn  v.  Morton,  1  Dr.  &  War.  171  ;  Gover- 
nors of  Grey-Coat  Hospital  v.  Westminster 
Imp.  Com'rs,  1  De  G.  &  J.  531;  3  Jur.  N  S. 
1188;  Knight  v.  Pocock.  24  Beav.  436;  4  Jur. 
N.  S.  197 ;  Harrison  v.  Pennell,  id.  682;  and 
under  23  &  24  Vic.  c.  38,  see  Wallis  v.  Morris, 
10  Jur.  N.  S.  741;  12  W.  R.  997.  To  a  bill 
to  foreclose,  an  adverse  claimant  is  not  a  neces- 
sary party,  and  the  bill  which  should  make 
him  a  party  would  be  open  to  the  objection 
of  multifariousness  and  misjoinder.  Dial  v. 
Reynolds,  96  U.  S.  340;  Corning  v.  Smith,  6 
N.  Y.  82  ;  Lange  v.  Jones,  5  Leigh,  192. 
Infra,  p.  339,  note.  Neither  adverse  claimants, 
nor  remainder-men  who  have  not  joined  in  the 
mortgage,  are  necessary  parties  to  a  bill  to 
foreclose.  Wilkins  v.  Kirkbride,  27  N.  J. 
Eq.  93. 

3  Draper  v.  Lord  Clarendon,  2  Vern.  518  ; 
Audslcy  v.  Horn,  26  Beav.  195;  1  De  G.  F.  & 
J.  226;  4  Jur.  N.  S.  1267. 

4  Lomax  v.  Hide,  2  Vern.  185  ;  Godfrey  v. 
Chadwell,  id.  601;  1  Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  318,  pi.  7, 
S.  C. ;  Morret  v.  Westerne,  2  Vern.  663  ;  1  Eq. 
Cas.  Abr.  164,  pi.  7,  S.  C. ;  Haines  v.  Beach,  3 
John.  Ch.  459,  Lyon  v.  Sandford,  5  Conn. 
544;  Renwick  v.  Macomb,  1  Hopk.  277. 

1  This  rule  may  at  first  appear  inconsistent 
w  th  the  usual  principles  of  a  Court  of  Equity, 
but  the  justice  of  it  is  clearly  shown  in  Lord 
Nottingham's  judgment  in  Sherman  v.  Cox,  3 
Ch.  Rep.  83  [46] ;  S.  C.  Coekes  v  Sherman, 
2  Freem  14,  where  he  says,  "Although  there 
be  a  great  mischief  on  one  hand  that  a  mort- 
gagee, after  a  decree  against  the  mortgagor  to 
foreclose  him  of  his  equity  of  redemption,  shall 
Dever  know  when  to  be  at  rest,  for  if  there,  be 


any  other  incumbrances,  he  is  still  liable  to  an 
account,  yet  the  inconvenience  is  far  greater  on 
the  other  side;  for  if  a  mortgagee  that  is  a 
stranger  to  this  decree  should  be  concluded,  lie 
would  be  absolutely  without  remedy,  and  lose 
his  whole  money,  when,  perhaps,  a  decree  may 
be  huddled  up  purposely  to  cheat  him,  and  in 
the  mean  time  (he  being  paid  his  interest)  may 
be  lulled  asleep  and  think  nothing  of  it  ; 
whereas,  on  the  other  hand,  there  is  no  preju- 
dice but  being  liable  to  the  trouble  of  an  ac- 
count, and  if  so  be  that  were  stated  bona  Jitle 
between  the  mortgagor  and  mortgagee  in  the 
suit  wherein  the  decree  was  obtained,  that  shall 
be  no  more  ravelled  into,  but  for  so  long  shall 
stand  untouched."  What  is  here  said  by  the 
Lord  Chancellor  on  the  subject  of  the  account, 
as  well  as  the  case  of  Needier  v.  Deeble,  1  (  h. 
Cas.  209,  appears  to  be  at  variance  with  the  de- 
cision in  Morret  17.  Westerne,  supra.  It  Minis 
to  be  in  consequence  of  the  rule  above  laid 
down,  that  the  practice  prevails  of  introducing 
an  interrogatory  into  a  bill  of  foreclosure, 
inquiring  whether  there  arc  any  and  what 
incumbrances  affecting  the  estate  besides  that 
of  the  'plaintiff,  in  order  that,  if  the  answer 
states  any,  the  owners  of  such  incumbrances  be 
made  parties.  Story,  Eq.  PL  §  193,  note.  See 
an/e,  214,  notes  5  and  7.  Upon  the  same 
ground  Lord  Alvanely  M.  R.,  in  Bishop  of 
Winchester  v.  Beavor,  3  Ves.  314,  ordered  a 
bill  of  foreclosure  to  stand  over  for  the  purpose 
of  making  a  judgment  creditor  a  party.  From 
the  marginal  note  to  that  case,  a  doubt  appears 
to  arise  as  to  whether  the  Master  of  the  Rolls 
intended  to  adopt  the  general  rule,  that  all 
incumbrancers  must  be  parties  to  a  bill  of  tore- 
closure;  but  the  decision  rests  upon  the  rule 
of  practice  already  stated,  and  it  cannot,  after 
that  decision,  be  doubted  that  all  incumbran- 
cers whose  liens  appear  upon  the  answer,  must 
b  ■  made  parties,  and  if  that  answer  be  a  suffi- 
cient one  and  true,  it  must,  according  to  the 
practice  in  drawing  bills  just  stated,  appear 
upon  the  answer  who  such  incumbrancers  are. 
At  all  events,  it  is  evident,  from  the  cases  of 

271 


*  279  OF   PARTIES   TO   A    SUIT. 

to  establish  his  lien  for  unpaid  purchase-money,  all  the  persons  inter- 
ested in  the  property  who  are  subsequent  in  date  to  him,  and  who  are  to 
be  foreclosed  by  him,  must  be  made  parties.2 

The  rule  which  requires  incumbrancers  to  be  brought  before  the  Court, 
in  suits  to  establish  a  charge,  extends  to  cases  in  which  the  subject  of 
the  litigation  has  been  sold,  or  charged,  subsequently  to  the  date  of  the 
plaintiff's  claim,  whether  such  sale  or  charge  has  been  by  legal  instru- 
ment, or  only  by  agreement,  or  whether  it  extends  to  the  whole  or  only 
partial  interests.  Therefore,  where  an  estate  had  been  sold  in  lots  sub- 
ject to  an  equitable  charge  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff,  it  was  held  that 
all  the  purchasers  were  necessary  parties  to  a  bill  by  him  to  realize  his 
security.3  And  where  a  bill  was  filed  by  a  lessee,  to  compel  a  landlord 
to  give  his  license  to  the  assignment  of  a  lease  to  a  purchaser,  on  the 
ground  that  he  had  by  certain  acts  waived  the  right  to  withhold  it,  which 
had  been  reserved  to  him  by  the  original  lease,  the  purchaser  was  held 
to  be  a  necessary  party.4  And  so,  if  a  man  contracts  with  another  for 
the  purchase  of  an  estate,  and  afterwards,  before  conveyance,  enters  into 
a  covenant  with  a  third  person,  that  the  vendor  shall  convey  the  estate  to 
such  third  person,  the  vendor,  if  he  has  notice  of  the  subsequent  con- 
tract, cannot  with  safety  convey  the  estate  to  the  vendee  without  the 
concurrence  of  the  third  person,  who  in  that  case  will  be  a  necessary 
party  to  a  bill  by  the  purchaser  against  the  vendor  for  a  specific  per- 
formance. But  if  A  contracts  with  B  to  convey  to  him  an  estate, 
and  B  enters  into  a  sub-contract  with  C,  that  he,  B,  will  convey  to 
him  the  same  estate,  then,  if  B  files  a  bill  against  A,  C  will  not  be 

a  necessary  party,  because  A  is,  in  that  case,  in  no  manner 
*279    *  affected  by  the  sub-contract,  which  his  conveyance  to  B  would 

rather  promote  than  injure.1  Where,  however,  the  original  pur- 
chaser has  agreed  to  share  with  other  persons  the  profits  to  be  made 
by  the  resale,  such  persons,  whether  necessary  or  not,  are  proper  par- 
ties to  a  suit  by  the  sub-purchaser  against  the  original  purchaser  to 

Lnmax  r.  Hide,  Godfrey  v.  Chadwell,  Morret  1  v.  Walford,    4   Russ.    372;    see  also 

v.  Westerne,   just  referred  to,   that    if  a  niort-  Alexander  v  Cana,  1  De  G.  &  S.  415;  Chad- 

gagee  wishes  to  obtain  an  undisputed  right  to  wick  v.   Maden.  9   Hare,   188;  Hacker  v.  Mid 

an"estate  by   foreclosure,  he  must  make  all  in-  Kent  Ky.  Co    11  Jur.  X.  S.  634,  V.  C.  S,     See 

cumbrancers  upon  the  estate,  of   whose   liens  Dyer  i\    Pulteney,    Darn.    160;    McCreight  v. 

he    has  notice  (whether    appearing    upon    the  Foster,  L.  R.  5  Cli.  604;  S-  C    worn,   Shaw  v. 

answer  or  not),  parties  to  his  suit.     Rolleston  Foster,  L.   R.  5  H.    L.  321.     Where  the  owner 

V.  Morton,  1  Dr.  &  W.  171.  of  land  agrees   in  writing  to  convey   it   to  an- 

2  Att.-Gen.  v.  Sittingbourne  &  Sheerness  other,  and  afterwards  conveys  it  to  a  different 
Rv.  Co.  35  Beav.  208,  271;  L.  R.  1  Eq.  036,  person,  with  notice  of  the  prior  agreement,  the 
639;  Bishop  of  Winchester  v.  Mid  Hants  Ry.  latter  will  hold  the  title  as  trustee  of  the  first 
Co.  L.  R.  5  Eq.  17;  Drax  v.  Somerset  &  Dor-  purchaser;  and  in  a  bill  by  such  first  purchaser 
set  Rv.  Co.   38  L.  J.  Ch.  232.  to  enforce  specific  performance,  the  second  pur- 

3  peto  v.  Hammond,  29  Beav.  91.  So,  if  a  chaser  is  a  necessary  party.  Stone  v.  Buck- 
sub-vendee  die.  his  personal  representative  and  ner,  12  Sm.  &.  M.  72.  So  if  the  first  pur- 
heirs  should  be  made  parties  to  a  bill  by  the  chaser's  interest  be  sold  at  execution  sale,  such 
original  vendor  to  enforce  his  lien  for  the  pur-  first  purchaser  is  a  necessary  party  to  a  bill  by 
chase-money.  Lewis  v.  Hawkins,  23  Wall.  the  buyer  under  the  execution  against  the  ori- 
119.     See  ante.  p.  214.  n.  4.  filial  vendor  for  specific    performance.     Alex- 

*  Maule  r.  Duke  of  Beaufort.  1   Russ.  349       ander  v.  Hoffman,  70  111.  114. 
See  Sear  v.  House  Property  &  Inv.  Co.  16  Ch. 
D.  387. 

272 


PERSONS    RESISTING    PLAINTIFF'S    DEMANDS. 


279 


rescind  the  contract  and  obtain  the  return  of  sums  paid  on  account  of 
the  purchase-money.2  (a)  And  where  a  bill  was  filed  by  creditors  to  set 
aside  a  purchase  on  the  ground  of  fraud,  and  it  appeared  that  the  pur- 
chaser had,  since  his  purchase,  executed  a  mortgage  of  the  estate,  the 
mortgagee  was  considered  a  necessary  party.3  But  where,  since  his 
purchase  judgments  had  been  entered  up  against  the  purchaser,  the 
judgment  creditors  were  held  to  be  unnecessary  parties  to  a  bill  for 
specific  performance.4 

The  rule  which  requires  all  subsequent  incumbrancers  to  be  parties 
extends  only  to  cases  in  which  the  subsequent  charges  or  incumbrances 
are  specific;  and  we  have  before  seen,  that  in  most  cases  where  estates 
have  been  conveyed  to  trustees  to  pay  debts  or  legacies,  the  trustees 
may  sustain  suits  respecting  the  trust  property,  without  those  claiming 
under  the  trust  being  parties  to  them.5  It  is  also  unnecessary  that  per- 
sons having  prior  mortgages  or  incumbrances  should  be  parties,  because 
they  have  the  same  lien  upon  the  estate  after  a  decree  as  they  had 
before; 6  for  this  reason,  in  a  bill  for  a  partition,  a  mortgagee  upon  the 
whole  estate  is  not  a  necessary  party,  though  a  mortgagee  of  one  of  the 
undivided  portions  would  be.7  And  so,  where  a  bill  was  brought  by  a 
mortgagee  against  a  mortgagor,  praying  a  sale  of  the  mortgaged  estate, 
persons  who  had  annuities  prior  to  the  mortgage  were  held  unnecessary 
parties,  and  although  they  appeared  at  the  hearing,  and  consented  to  a 
sale,  the  bill  was  dismissed  as  to  them  with  costs,  as  the  estate  must  be 
sold  subject  to  their  annuities.8  Probably  upon  the  same  principle,  it 
was  held  that  a  third  mortgagee  buying  in  the  first  need  not  make  a 
second  mortgagee  a  party,9  otherwise  it  is  not  easy  to  reconcile  this  case 


2  Aberaman  Ironworks  v.  Wickens,  L.  R. 
4  Ch.  101;  and  see  Fcnwick  v.  Bulman,  L.  R. 
9Eq.  165;  ante,  p.  130. 

3  Copis  r.  Middleton,  2  Mad.  410.  So,  if 
sales  have  been  made,  tbe  purchasers  should  be 
made  parties.  Free  v.  Buckingham,  57  N.  H. 
95;  Hopkins  v.  Roseclare  Land  Co.  72  111.  373. 
If  the  bill  be  to  set  aside  a  judicial  sale,  the 
persons  at  whose  instance  the  sale  was  made 
are  necessary  parties.  Wilson  v.  Bellows,  30 
N.  .1.  Eq.  282.  So  where,  in  such  a  case,  it 
appears  that  the  debtor  charged  with  the  fraud- 
ulent conveyance  is  dead,  his  administrator 
should  be  made  a  party.  Coates  v.  Day,  9  Mo. 
315.  Whether  the  debtor  himself,  if  living, 
should  be  made  a  party,  see  Wright  v.  Cor- 
nelius, 10  Mo.  174. 

'  lVtiv  v.  Duncombe.  7  Hare,  24. 

5  Ld.  Red.  175. 

6  Rose  v.  Page,  2  Sim. 471 ;  Hogan  v. Walker, 
14  How.  U.  S.  37  ;   Wilson  v.  Biscoe,  6  Eng.  41. 


(t)  In  suits  for  specific  performance  between 
vendor  and  purchaser,  the  general  rule  is  that 
they  are  the  only  necessary  parties  to  the  suit. 
See  ante,  i>  231.  and  n.  (a).  But  a  third  per- 
son who  holds  a  part  or  the  whole  of  the  land 
vol.  i.  — 18 


1  Swan  v.  Swan,  8  Price,  518;  Whitton  v. 
Whitton,  38  N.  H.  134,  135.  But  in  Harwood 
v.  Kirby,  1  Paige,  409,  it  was  held,  that  an 
incumbrancer,  upon  the  share  of  one  tenant  in 
common,  cannot  be  made  a  party  to  a  bill  for 
partition,  and  the  partition  does  not  affect  his 
rights;  but  his  incumbrance  continues  upon  the 
share  setoff  to  the  party  who  created  the  lien; 
see  Sebring  <•.  Mersereau,  1  Hopk.  501;  Hall  v. 
Morris  13  Bush,  :!±2.  And  the  fact  that  one 
tenant  in  common  has  mortgaged  bis  interest 
to  the  other  will  not  prevent  a  partition,  no 
entry  or  foreclosure  having  taken  place.  Green 
v.  Arnold,  11  R.  I.  364.  The  holder  of  a  judg- 
ment against  one  tenant  in  common  should  be 
made  a  party.  Metcalf  v.  Hoopingardner,  45 
Iowa,  510. 

8  Delabere  v.  Norwood,  3  Swanst.  144,  n.j 
Hogan  v.  Walker,  14  How.  U.  S.  37. 

9  Lord  Hollis'  case,  cited  3  Ch.  Rep.  86. 


agreed  to  be  conveyed  by  an  indivisible  con- 
tract may  be  a  necessary  party.  Barry  v. 
Barry,  64  Miss.  709:  Meek  o.  Spracher,  87 
Va.  162:  Gentry  v.  Gentry,  id.  478. 

273 


281 


OF   PARTIES   TO    A    SUIT. 


with  the  other  principles  which  have  been  laid  down.     It  cannot  be 

supposed  that  it  was  meant  to  be  decided  that  a  third  mortgagee 

*280    buying  in  the  first  mortgige,  could  by  that  *  process  acquire  the 

right  to  foreclose  the  second,  without  bringing  him  before  the 

Court,  and  giving  him  an  opportunity  to  redeem. 

Whenever  a  mortgagee  is  made  a  party  to  a  suit  by  the  mortgagor  or 
those  claiming  under  him,  he  is  entitled  to  be  redeemed;  *  and,  there- 
fore, unless  a  second  mortgagee  or  other  incumbrancer  is  prepared  to 
redeem  him,  he  will  be  an  improper  party  to  a  suit  by  such  mortgagee 
or  incumbrancer,  where  the  object  is  merely  to  foreclose  the  equity  of 
redemption.2  A  second  incumbrancer,  however,  may  file  a  bill  to 
redeem  the  first,  without  making  a  subsequent  incumbrancer  a  party; 
and  if  he  brings  him  before  the  Court  for  the  mere  purpose  of  hav- 
ing his  incumbrance  postponed,  and  not  to  foreclose  him,  the  bill  will 
be  dismissed  against  him  with  costs.3  But  a  bill  for  redemption  cannot 
be  sustained  by  a  party  having  a  partial  interest  in  the  equity  of 
redemption,  in  the  absence  of  the  other  parties  interested  in  it.4 

Incumbrancers  or  purchasers  becoming  such  after  a  bill  has  been  filed 

and  served,5  (a)  and  registered  as  a  lis  pendens,6  will  be  bound  by  the 

decree,  and  need  not  be  made  parties,  whether  the  plaintiff  has  notice 

of  them  or  not;  for  an  alienation  pending  a  suit   is   void,    or 

*281    rather  voidable.7     *If,  therefore,   after  a  bill  filed  by  the  first 


i  Drew  r.  O'Hara,  2  B.  &  B.  562,  n.; 
Cholmley  v.  Countess  of  Oxford,  2  Atk.  267. 

2  See  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  186,  et  seq. 

3  Shepherd  v.  Gwinnett,  3  Swanst.  151,  n. ; 
see  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  193,  and  notes. 

4  Henley  v.  Stone,  3  Beav.  355;  see  Chap- 
pell  v.  Rees,  1  De  G.  M.  &  G.  393;  16  Jur 
415;  Jennings  v.  Jordan,  6  App.  Cas.  698,  704; 
Southard  o.  Sutton,  68  Maine,  575;  Rowell  v. 
Jewett,  69  Maine,  293;  Williams  v.  Stewart, 
25  Minn.  516;  Ward  0.  Seymour,  51  Vt.  320. 
An  otter  to  redeem  is  not  necessary  in  a  bill  by 
a  judgment  creditor  against  trustees  and  mort- 
gagees to  establish  his  charge,  and  for  payment 
out  of  rents.  Jefferys  v.  Dickson,  L.  K.  1  Ch. 
183;  12  Jur.  X.  S.  281. 

5  puwell  r.  Wright,  7  Beav.  444;  Humble 
v.  Shore,  3  Hare,  119;  Macleod  v.  Annesley,  16 
Beav.  600  ;  Price  t^Price,  35  Ch.  D.  297;  see, 
however,  Drew  v.  Earl  of  Norbury,  3  Jo.  & 
Lat.  267;  Sugd.V.  &  P.  543,  758. 

6  2  &  3  Vie.  c.  11,  §  7.  See  f  .rther,  as  to 
registering  the  suit  as  a  lis  pendens,  18  &  19 
Vic.  c.  15,  §  6 ;  23  &  24  Vic.  c.  115,  §  2;  30  & 
31  Vic.  c.  47,  §  2;  42  &  43  Vic.  78,  §§  4-6; 
Pask's  Prac.  12,  80;  K.  S.  C.  1883,  Old.  LXI. 
22  (Ord.  Dec,  1879,  rr.  6,  7;  Ord.  April,  1880, 
r.  47) :  Clutton  v.  Lee,  7  Ch.  D.  541,  n. ;  24  W.  R. 
607;  Pooley  v.  Bosanquet,  7  Ch.  D.  541 ;  Jervis 


r.  Berridge,  W.  X.  (1874)  195;  23  W.  R.  43; 
Plant  r.  Pearman,  W.  X.  (1872)  15  ;  20  W.  R. 
314;  Whitney  v.  Smith,  M.  R.  April  27,  1870  ; 
Ecclesiastical  Com'rs  v.  Marshall,  M.  R.  July 
14,  1870.  And  as  to  the  doctrine  of  Us  pendens 
independently  of  statute,  see  Sugd.  V.  &  P. 
758;  Shelford's  R.  P.  Acts,  604;  Dart,  V.  &  P. 
852,  863,  872  ;  and  since  the  act,  2  &  3  Vic.  c. 
11,  see  id.;  Bellamy  v.  Sabine,  1  De  G.  &  J. 
566;  3  Jur.  X.  S.  943;  Tyler  v.  Thomas,  25 
Beav.  47  :  Xortcliffe  v.  Warburton,  id.  352, 
824;  4  De  G.  F.  &  J.  449;  Berry  v.  Gibbons, 
L.  R.  8  Ch.  747. 

•  Walker  v.  Smalwood,  2  Amb.  676;  Gaskell 
v.  Durdin,  2  B.  &  B.  167;  Moore  v.  McXamara, 
1  B.  &  B.  309;  Garth  v.  Ward.  2  Atk.  174; 
Metcalfe  v.  Pulvertoft,  2  V.  &  B.  207;  and  see 
Massy  v.  Batwell,  4  Dr.  &  War.  68;  Long  v. 
Bowring,  10  Jur.  X.  S.  668;  12  W.  R.  972, 
M.  R.;  Patch  v.  Ward,  L.  R.  3  Ch.  203.  Gen- 
erally speaking,  an  assignee  under  a  voluntary 
assignment,  pendente  lite,  need  not  be  made  a 
party  to  a  bill,  or  be  brought  before  the  Court; 
for  every  person  purchasing  pendente  lite  is 
treated  as  a  purchaser  with  notice,  and  is  subject 
to  all  the  equities  of  the  persons  under  whom  he 
claims  in  privity.  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §§  156,  351; 
1  Story,  Eq.  Jur.  §  406;  Sedgwick  v.  Cleve- 
land, 7  Paige,  287 ;  Van  Hook  v.  Throckmorton, 


(a)  Lis  pendens  applies  only  to  suits  that      appearance.     Allison  v.  Drake,  145  111.  500;  see 
proceed  to   a  final  decree,  and  not  to  those  in      cases  cited  ante,  p.  2,  note  (n). 
which  the  bill  is  dismissed  without  service  or 

274 


PERSONS    RESISTING    PLAINTIFF  S   DEMANDS. 


281 


mortgagee  to  foreclose,  the  mortgagor  confesses  a  judgment,  exe- 
cutes a  second  mortgage,  or  assigns  the  equity  of  redemption,  the  plain- 
tiff need  not  make  the  incumbrancer,  mortgagee,  or  assignee  parties, 
for  they  will  be  bound  by  the  suit;  and  can  only  have  the  benefit 
of  a  title  so  gained,  by  filing  an  original  bill  in  the  nature  of  a  cross- 
bill, to  redeem  the  mortgaged  property,1  and  where  a  purchaser  took 
an  exception  to  a  title,  because  two  mortgagees,  who  became  such  after 
the  bill  was  filed,  were  not  parties  to  the  foreclosure,  the  exception 
was  overruled  with  costs;2  and  it  has  been  held,  that  where  one  of 
several  plaintiffs  assigned  his  equitable  interest  pendente  lite,  the  suit 
might  be  heard  as  if  there  had  been  no  such  assignment.3  Where, 
however,  a  sole  plaintiff  assigned  all  his  equitable  interest  absolutely,4 
and  where  all  the  adult  plaintiffs  assigned  their  equitable  interest  by 


8  Paige,  33;  Cook  v.  Mancius,  5  John.  Ch.  93; 
Murray  v.  Ballou,  1  John.  Ch.  577,  581,  Mur- 
ray v.  Lylburn,  2  John.  Ch.  441,  445;  2  Story, 
Eq.  Jur.  §  908;  Hoxie  v.  Carr,  1  Sumner.  173; 
Branden  t\  Cahiness,  10  Ala.  155;  Lawrence  v. 
Lane,  4  Gilman,  354,  Kern  v.  Hazlerigg,  11 
Ind.  443;  Boulden  v.  Lanahan,  29  Md.  200.  It 
is,  however,  otherwise  where  the  assignment  is 
by  operation  of  law,  as  in  cases  of  bankruptcy, 
or  assignments  under  the  insolvent  acts.  Sedg- 
wick i\  Cleveland,  7  Paige,  288;  Deas  v. 
Thome,  3  John.  543;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  342, 
not-,  §  351,  note;  Storm  v.  Davenport,  1 
Sandf.  Ch.  135;  Williams  v.  Winans,  20  N.  J. 
Eq  394.  And  an  assignee  under  a  voluntary 
assignment  may  be  made  a  party,  when 
desirable,  at  the  election  of  the  plaintiff. 
Story.  Eq.  PI.  156,  and  cases  in  note;  see 
Longworth  v.  Taylor,  1  McLean,  395. 

See,  as  to  the  general  doctrine  of  lis  pendens, 
among  recent  cases,  Bellamy  v  Sabine,  1  De  G. 
&  J.  50(1,  3  Jur.  N.  S.  943;  Tyler  v.  Thomas, 
25  Beav.  47;  Nortcliffe  v.  Warburton,  4  De  G. 
F.  &  J.  439 ;  Edwards  v.  Banksmith,  35  Ga. 
213,  Dudley  v.  Witter.  46  Ala.  664  ,  Wickliffe 
r  Breckenndge,  1  Bush,  427;  Sugd.  V.  &  P. 
759 ;  Dart,  V.  &  P.  863, 872  877.  The  lis  /'<  nd<  ns 
commences  with  the  service  of  process  after  bill 
filed.  Anon.  1  Vern.  319,  Harden  r  Bucklin,  9 
Paige,  512;  Watlington  v.  Howley,  1  Des.  170, 
note;  Haughwort  r.  Murphy,  22  N.J.  Eq.  531  ; 
Allen  v.  Poole,  54  Miss.  323  In  Harmon  r. 
Byram,  11  W.  Va.  511,  521,  where  the  process 
was  served  before  the  tiling  of  the  bill,  the  lis 
pendens  was  held  to  begin  from,  or  relate  back 
to,  the  service  of  the  subpoena.  It  does  not 
extend  beyond  the  territorial  limits  of  the  State 
in  which  the  suit  is  pending:  Shelton  v.  John- 
son. 4  Sneed,  672;  and  requires  for  its  operation 
that  the  property  be  distinctly  identified,  and 
necessarily  involved  in  the  litigation:  Lewis  v. 
Mew.  1  Strob.  Eq.  180;  Leitch  v.  Wells.  4S  N 
Y.  585;  Cockrill  v.  Manev,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  49; 
Allen  v.  Poole,  54  Miss.  323.     It  does  not  apply 


to  negotiable  securities.  County  of  Warren  v. 
Marcy,  97  U.  S.  96. 

The  alienation  of  property  pending  the  liti- 
gation will,  ordinarily,  have  no  effect  on  the 
litigation.  Kino  v.  Rudkin,  6  Ch.  D.  160; 
Kami  o.  Baird,  Phil.  Eq.  (N.  C.)  317;  Sumner 
v.  Waugh,  50  111.  531;  Truitt  v.  Truitt,  38  Ind. 
16;  Sheridan  v.  Andrews,  49  N.  Y.  478.  An 
assignment  by  the  defendant  of  his  interest  in 
the  subject-matter  of  a  pending  suit  does  not 
defeat  the  suit,  nor  in  any  way  affect  it,  the 
assignee  being  bound  by  what  is  done  against 
his  assignor  Williams  v.  Winans,  20  N.  J. 
Eq.  392.  So,  of  an  assignment  by  the  com- 
plainant. Gheen  v.  Osborne,  11  Ileisk.  61 ; 
Wills  v.  Whitniore,  1  Leg.  Rep.  222.  So, 
where  a  railroad  company  consolidates  pending 
litigation  with  a  defendant  company.  Pullau 
v.  Cmn.  &c.  R.  Co.  4  Biss.  35.  So,  where  the 
creditor  of  a  litigant  acquires  a  lien  by  attach- 
ment pending  the  litigation.  Dodge  v.  Fuller, 
28  N.J  Eq.  578.  The  assignee  may  either  come 
in  by  supplemental  bill  and  assume  the  burden 
of  litigation  in  his  own  name,  or  act  in  the 
name  of  his  assignor.  Ex  parte  Railroad  Co. 
95  U.  S.  221;  Tilton  v.  Cofield,  93  U.  S.  163. 
His  rights,  as  distinct  from  those  of  his  assignor, 
will  date  from  the  tiling  of  his  bill.  Trabue  v. 
Bankhead,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  412;  Glenn  v.  Doyle, 
3  Tenn.  Ch.  324.  And  see  infra,  p.  400,  n. ; 
p.  1516,  n. 

A  purchaser  of  land  by  metes  and  bounds 
from  a  party  to  a  partition  suit  cannot  inter- 
vene in  that  suit.  Griffin  v.  Wilson,  39  Texas, 
213. 

1  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  351 ;  Mitford,  Eq.  PI.  73; 
Lambert  o.  Lambert,  52  Maine,  544. 

-  Bishop  of  Winchester  v.  Paine,  11  Ves. 
197. 

3  Fades  v.  Harris,  1  Y.  &  C.  230:  Story. 
Eq.  Jur.  §  156;  ante,  199,  and  note,  and  cases 
cited  to  this  point  of  assignments  p>  nd(  nte  lite  ; 
2  Story,  Eq.  Jur.  §  908. 

4  Johnson  v.  Thomas,  11  Beav.  501. 

275 


l82 


OF    PARTIES    TO    A    SUIT. 


way  of  mortgage,5  the  assignees  were  held  necessary  parties.  But  in 
casts  where  a  change  in  the  ownership  of  the  legal  estate  takes  place 
pending  the  suit,  by  alienation  or  otherwise,  the  new  owner  must  be 
brought  before  the  Court  in  some  shape  or  other,  in  order  that  he  may 
execute  a  conveyance  of  the  legal  estate.6 

If  a  person,  pendente  lite,  takes  an  assignment  of  the  interest  of  one 
of  the  parties  to  the  suit,  he  may  if  he  pleases  make  himself  a  party  to 
the  suit  by  supplemental  bill;7  but  he  cannot  by  petition  pray  to  be 
admitted  to  take  a  part  as  a  party  defendant;  8  all  that  the  Court  will 
do  is  to  make  an  order  that  the  assignor  shall  not  take  the  property  out 
of  Court  without  notice.9  (a) 

We  now  come  to  the  consideration  of  those  cases  in  which  it  is  neces- 
sary  to  make  persons  defendants,  not  because  their  rights  may  be  di- 
rectly affected  by  the  decree,  if  obtained,  but  because,  in  the  event  of  the 
plaintiff  succeeding  in  his  object  against  the  principal  defend- 
*282  ant,  that  defendant  will  thereby  acquire  *a  right  to  call  upon 
them  either  to  reimburse  him  the  whole  or  part  of  the  plaintiff's 
demand,  or  to  do  some  act  towards  reinstating  the  defendant  in  the  sit- 
uation he  would  have  been  in  but  for  the  success  of  the  plaintiff's 
claim.  In  such  cases,  in  order  to  avoid  a  multiplicity  of  suits,  the 
persons  so  consequentially  liable  to  be  affected  by  the  decree  should 
be  before  the  Court  in  the  first  instance,  in  order  that  their  liabilities 
may  be  adjudicated  upon  and  settled  by  one  proceeding.1     Therefore, 


5  Solomon  v.  Solomon.  13  Sim.  51G;  Vibart 
v.  Vibart,  L.  II   6  Eq.  251. 

s  Daly  v.  Kelly,  4  Dow,  435;  Bishop  of 
Winchester  v.  Paine,  supra;  Story,  Eq.  PI. 
§  351 . 

'  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  351;  Mitford,  Eq.  PI.  73; 
sec  Steele  v.  Taylor,  1  Minn.  274. 

8  See  Lawrence  v.  Lane,  4  Oilman,  354; 
Cook  v.  Mancius,  5  John.  Ch.  8!).  Carow  r. 
Mowatt,  1  Ed.  Ch.  9;  Steele  v. Taylor,  1  Minn. 
274.  But  it  seems  he  may  be  made  a  party  by 
the  express  consent  of  the  plaintiff.  Steele  r. 
Taylor,  supra.  A  person  who  has  acquired, 
pending  a  suit  to  enforce  liens,  one  or  more  of 
those  liens,  may  be  heard,  on  motion  or  peti- 
tion, to  ask  an  application  of  surplus  moneys  to 
his  claim,  provided  his  title  is  not  disputed, 
otherwise  a  bill  may  be  necessary.  Thornton 
v.  Fairfax,  20  Gratt,  669.  See,  more  fully  on 
this  point,  infra,  p.  287,  n.  2,  and  p.  1516,  n. 

9  Foster  v.  Deacon,  6  Mad.  59;  Story,  Eq. 
PI.  §  342,  and  notes,  §  348;  Sedgwick  v.  Cleve- 
land, 7  Paige,  290;  Deas  v.  Thome,  3  John. 
544:  see,  however,  Brandon  ?>.  Brandon,  3  X.  R. 
2X7.  V.  C.  K.,  where  a  supplemental  order  was 
made  to  bring  before  the  Court  mortgagees  of 


shares  after  decree;  and  Toosey  r.  Burchell, 
Jac.  159,  where,  on  petition,  the  Court  ordered 
that  the  purchaser  should  be  at  liberty  to  attend 
inquiries  ill  the  Master's  office,  and  have  notice 
of  all  proceedings,  on  paying  the  incidental 
costs.  The  Court  will  usually  now,  on  sum- 
mons, give  the  purchaser  liberty  to  attend  the 
proceedings  at  his  own  expense. 

i  Story,  Eq.  PL  §  173,  et  seq  .,  §  180  ;  Wiser 
v.  Blachly.  1  John.  Ch.  437;  Erickson  v.  Nes- 
mith,  46  N.  H.  371,  374;  Hadley  v.  Russell, 
40  N.  H  109;  New  England.  &c.  Bank  v. 
Newport  Steam  Factory.  6  R.  I.  154;  see 
Shotwell  v.  Taliaferro,  25  Miss.  105.  They 
should  at  least  be  served  witii  notice  of  the 
defendants'  claim  to  relief  as  against  them. 
R.  S.  C.  Orel  XVI.  17-21 ;  post,  §  5.  In  a  suit 
against  the  representatives  of  a  deceased  part- 
ner to  recover  a  partnership  debt,  in  which  the 
insolvency  of  the  surviving  partner  is  stated, 
he  is.  nevertheless,  a  proper  party  as  to  the 
othei  defendants,  who  cannot  demur  to  the  bill 
for  misjoinder,  on  account  of  the  joinder  of 
such  survivor.  Butts  v.  Genung,  5  Paige.  254; 
ante,  p.  269,  n.  6. 


(a)  See/Jos,,  p.  287,  note  ("):  Davis  p.  Sul- 
livan. 33  N  J.  Eq.  569:  Sutherland  r.  Straw.  2 
led.  Rep  277.  A  covenant  by  a  retiring  part- 
ner not  to  trad",  act,  or  deal  so  as  to  directly  or 

270 


indirectly  affect  the  continuing  partners  i-  per- 
sonal to  them,  and  cannot  be  sued  upon  by  their 
assignees.     Davies  v.  Davies,  36  Ch.  D.  359. 


PERSONS   RESISTING    PLAINTIFF'S    DEMANDS.  *  283 

where  a  defendant  in  his  answer  insisted  that  he  was  entitled  to  be 
reimbursed  by  A  what  he  might  be  decreed  to  pay  to  the  plaintiff,  and 
therefore  that  A  was  a  necessary  party,  the  Court,  at  the  hearing, 
directed  the  cause  to  stand  over,  with  liberty  to  the  plaintiff  to  amend 
by  adding  parties.2  And  so,  where  an  heir-at-law  brought  a  bill  against 
a  widow,  to  compel  her  to  abide  by  her  election,  and  to  take  a  legacy 
in  lieu  of  dower,  it  was  held  that  the  personal  representative  was  a 
necessary  party;  because,  in  the  event  of  the  plaintiff's  succeeding,  she 
was  entitled  to  satisfaction  for  her  legacy,  out  of  the  personal  estate; 
and  the  plaintiff  had  leave  to  amend,  by  making  the  executor  a  party.3 

Upon  the  same  principle,  in  suits  by  specialty  creditors  for  satisfac- 
tion of  their  demands  out  of  the  real  estate  of  a  person  deceased,  the 
personal  as  well  as  the  real  representative  must  be  brought  before 
the  Court;4  because  the  personal  estate,  being  the  primary  fund  for 
the  payment  of  debts,  ought  to  go  in  ease  of  the  land,5  and  the  heir 
has  a  right  to  insist  that  it  shall  be  exhausted  for  that  purpose  before 
the  realty  is  charged;  so  that,  if  a  decree  were  to  be  made  in  the  first 
instance  against  the  heir,  he  would  be  entitled  to  hie  a  bill  against  the 
personal  representative  to  reimburse  himself.6  The  Court,  therefore, 
in  order  to  avoid  a  multiplicity  of  suits,  requires  both  the  executor  and 
heir  to  be  before  it,  in  order  that  it  may,  in  the  first  instance,  do  com- 
plete justice,  by  decreeing  the  executor  to  pay  the  debt,  as  far  as  the 
personal  assets  will  extend;  the  rest  to  be  made  good  by  the  heir  out 
of  the  real  assets.7  Upon  this  principle  it  was,  that  where  a 
man  covenanted  for  himself  and  his  heirs  that  a  *  jointure  house  *  283 
should  remain  to  the  uses  in  a  settlement,  and  the  jointress 
brought  a  bill  against  the  heir  to  compel  him  to  rebuild  and  finish  the 
jointure  house,  and  to  make  satisfaction  for  the  damage  which  she  had 
sustained  for  want  of  the  use  thereof,  Lord  Talbot  allowed  a  demurrer, 
on  the  ground  that  the  executor  ought  to  be  a  party ;  because  the  Court 
would  not,  in  the  first  instance,  decree  against  the  heir  to  perforin  his 
covenant,  and  then  put  the  heir  upon  another  bill  against  the  personal 
representative  to  reimburse  himself  out  of  the  personal  assets.1 

A  bill  for  the  discovery  of  real  assets  might,  however,  it  seems,  be 
brought  against  the  heir,  in  order  to  preserve  a  debt,  without  making 
the  administrator  a  party,  where  it  is  suggested  that  the  representation 
is  contested  in  the  Ecclesiastical  Court;2  and  where  the  heir  of  an 
obligor  would  not  himself  administer,  and  had  opposed  the  plaintiff, 
who  was  a  principal  creditor,  in  taking  out  administration,  a  demurrer 
by  him,  because  the  administrator  was  not  a  party,  was  overruled.8 

Where  the  nature  of  the  relief  prayed  is  such  that  the  heir-at-law 
has  no  remedy  over  against  the  personal  estate,  the  personal  represen- 

2  Greenwood  v.  Atkinson,  5  Sim.  419:  see  '  Knight  ?\  Knight,  3  P.  Wins.  333:  St»ry, 
also  Green  r.  Poole,  5  Bro.  P.  C.  Ed.  Toml.  F.q.  PI.  §  173,  el  set/. ;  see  Cosby  v.  Wickliffe, 
504.  7  B.  Mon.  120;  Galton  v.  Hancock.  2  Atk.  434. 

3  Lesquire  r.  Lesquire,  Rep.  t.  Finch,  134;  »  Knight  v.  Knight,  3  P.  Wms.  333;  and 
see  also  Wilkinson  v.  Fowkes,  9  Hare,  193.  see  Bressenden  v.  Decreets,  2  Ch.  Cas.  197. 

•>  Madox  v.  Jackson,  3  Atk.  406.  2  Plunket  v.  Penson,  2  Atk.  51 ;  Story,  Eq 

6  Galton  p. Hancock,  2  Atk.  434.  PL  §  91;  see  ante,  p.  252. 

6  Knight  v.  Knight,  3  1'.  Wins.  333.  8  D'Aranda  v.  Whittingham,  Mos.  84. 

L'77 


284 


OF    PARTIES    TO    A    SUIT. 


tative  is  an  unnecessary  party:  thus,  in  the  case  of  a  bill  filed  by  a 
mortgagee  against  the  heir  of  a  mortgagor,  to  foreclose,  the  executor  of 
the  mortgagor  is  an  unnecessary  party,  because  in  such  a  case  the  mort- 
gagee has  a  right  to  the  land  pledged,  and  is  not  in  any  way  bound  to 
intermeddle  with  the  personal  estate,  or  to  run  into  an  account  thereof; 
and  if  the  heir  would  have  the  benefit  of  any  payment  made  by  the 
mortgagor  or  his  executor,  he  must  prove  it.4  And  it  makes  no  differ- 
ence if  the  mortgage  be  by  demise  for  a  term  of  years,  provided  the 
mortgagor  was  seized  in  fee :  in  such  case  the  executor  is  an  unnecessary 
party,  and  if  made  one,  the  bill,  as  against  him,  will  be  dismissed  with 
costs.5  And  where  a  term  of  a  thousand  years  had  been  granted,  but 
conditioned  to  sink  and  be  extinguished  upon  payment  of  an  annuity 
for  forty-two  years,  and  at  the  expiration  of  the  time  a  bill  was  brought 
by  the  heir  of  the  grantor  for  a  surrender  of  the  residue  of  the  term,  it 
was  held  that  the  personal  representative  of  the  grantor  need  not  be  a 
party.6  (a) 

Where,  however,  the  mortgagee  mixes  together  his  characters 
*284  of  *  mortgagee  and  general  creditor,  and  seeks  relief  beyond  that 
to  which  his  position  of  mortgagee  by  itself  would  strictly  entitle 
him,  then  the  personal  representative  of  the  mortgagor  must  be  a  party 
to  the  bill,  and  there  must  be  an  account  of  the  personal  estate.  The 
doubt  which  formerly  existed  whether,  when  the  mortgaged  estate  is 
insufficient  to  satisfy  the  amount  charged  upon  it,  and  the  personalty 
is  also  inadequate  to  pay  all  the  debts,  the  mortgagee  was  entitled  to 
prove  against  the  personalty  for  the  whole  of  his  debt,  or  only  for  the 
residue,  after  deducting  what  he  has  received  from  his  security,1  has 


4  Duncombe  v.  Hansley,  3  P.  Wins.  333,  n.; 
Fell  v.  Brown,  2  Bro.  C.  C.  279;  Story,  Eq.  PI. 
§§  196,  200;  Gary  r.  May,  16  Ohio,  66;  High 
v.  Batte,  10  Yerg.  188;  Edwards  r.  Edwards, 
5  Heisk.  123;  Harris  v.  Vaughn,  2  Tenn.  Ch. 
48-1. 

6  Bradshaw  v.  Outran*,  13  Ves.  234.  If 
the  mortgage  was  of  a  chattel  interest,  of 
course  the  executor,  and  not  the  heir,   would 


(a)  See  Law*.  Philby,  56  L.  T.  230,  522; 
Ridings  v.  -Johnson,  128  U.  S.  212;  Mendenhall 
v.  Hall,  134  U.  S.  559;  Avegno  v.  Schmidt,  113 
U.S.  293;  Shields  v.  Shiff,  124  U.  S.  351; 
Mercantile  Trust  Co.  v.  Missouri  &c.  Ry.  Co. 
41  Fed.  Rep.  8;  Hays  i\  Humphreys,  37  id. 
283;  Coffin  v.  Chattanooga  W.  &  P.  Co.  44  id. 
533;  Stanley  r.  Mather,  31  id.  860;  Middle- 
town  S.  Bank  v.  Bacharach,  46  Conn.  513; 
Bayly  v.  Muehe,  65  Cal.  345;  Rcnshaw  r. 
Taylor,  7  Oregon,  315;  Van  Schaak  r.  Saun- 
ders, 32  Hun,  515.  When  an  absolute  convey- 
ance is  foreclosed  as  a  mortgage,  the  proper 
parties  are  usually  the  grantor  and  grantee 
and  their  privies;  but  a  subsequent  purchaser 
at  a  sale  for  unpaid  taxes  may  also  be  made 
defendant.  Lyon  v.  Powell,  78  Ala.  351.  When 
the  estate  is  liable  on  the  mortgage    note   for 

278 


be  the  proper  party;  and  if  freehold  and  lease- 
hold estates  are  both  comprised  in  the  same 
mortgage,  both  the  heir  and  the  executor  will 
be  necessary  parties  to  a  bill  of  foreclosure. 
Robins?-.  Hodgson,  Rolls,  15  Feb.,  1794. 

o  Baniprield  v.  Vaughan,  Rep.  temp.  Finch, 
104. 

i  Mason  v.  Bogg,  2  M.  &  C.  443;  1  Jur.  330; 
Greenwood  v.  Taylor,  1  R.  &  M.  185;  Green- 


a  deficiency,  after  exhausting  the  mortgaged 
property,  the  administrator  of  the  deceased 
mortgagor  is  a  proper  party  to  a  suit  for  fore- 
closure. Hodgdon  v.  Heidman,  68  Iowa,  645. 
See  Munn  v.  Marsh,  38  N.  J.  Eq.  410;  Love- 
ring  v.  King,  97  Ind.  130;  Aylward  r.  Lewis, 
[1891]  2  Ch.  81;  Hill  v.  Townley,  45  Minn 
167;  United  Security  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Vandegrift 
(N.  J.).  26  Atl.  Rep  985.  The  administrator 
of  a  deceased  heir-at-law  of  the  deceased  mort- 
gagor is  not  a  proper  party  to  a  foreclosure  suit. 
Trapier  v.  Waldo,  16  S.  C.  276.  An  assignee 
of  a  prior  mechanic's  lien  is  a  necessary  party. 
Atkins  v.  Volmer,  21  Fed.  Rep.  697.  An  ad- 
ministrator is  not  a  necessary  party  to  a  bill 
filed  by  an  attorney  to  enforce  a  specific  lien 
on  land  for  professional  services.  McCamy  v. 
Key,  3  Lea  (Tenn.),  247. 


PERSONS    RESISTING    PLAINTIFF  S    DEMANDS. 


285 


now  been  removed  by  the  decision  of  Lord  Cottenham,  in  Mason  v. 
Bogy,*  where  it  was  determined  that  a  mortgagee  may  prove  for  the 
whole  debt,  and  then  realize  his  security,  and  afterwards  take  a  dividend 
on  the  whole  debt;  provided,  of  course,  that  the  amount  of  the  dividend 
is  not  more  than  the  unpaid  balance.3  In  suits  of  this  description,  the 
Court  will  decree  a  sale  of  the  estate,4  and  not  a  foreclosure,  which  is 
the  relief  to  which  a  mortgagee  is  ordinarily  entitled  upon  a  bill 
filed  by  him,  without  *  reference  to  his  rights  as  a  general  credi-  *285 
tor.1     Where  the  bill  is  filed  to  redeem  a  mortgage  against  the 


wood  r.  Firth,  2  Hare,  241,  n. ;  Tipping  v. 
Power,  1  Hare,  405;  Dexter  v.  Arnold,  1  Sum- 
ner, 109  ;  Marshall  v.  McAravey,  3  Dr.  & 
"War.  232  ;  Mersey  Steel  Co.  V.  Naylor,  9 
Q.  B.  1).  662.  A  mortgagee,  who  has  entered 
for  condition  broken,  may  have  an  action  on  the 
bond,  and  he  will  recover  the  difference  be- 
tween the  value  of  the  land  and  the  amount 
of  the  principal  and  interest  on  the  bond. 
Anion-  v.  Fairbanks,  3  Mass.  562;  Newall  r. 
Wright,  3  Mass.  150;  4  Kent  (11th  ed.),  184; 
Tooke  p.  Hartley,  2  Bro.  C.  C  (Perkins's  ed.) 
120.  127,  and  notes;  Perry  v.  Barker,  8  Sum- 
ner's Ves.  527,  Perkins's  note  (it),  and  cases 
cited;  Hatch  v.  White,  2  Gall.  152;  Globe 
Ins.  Co.  v.  Lansing,  5  Cowen,  380,  Omaly 
t\  Owen,  3  Mason,  474;  Lansing  v.  Goelet,  9 
Cowen,  346;  Lowell  v.  Leland,  3  Vt.  5S1 ; 
Callum  v.  Emanuel,  1  Ala.  N.  S.  23.  The 
value  of  the  land  may  be  ascertained  either 
by  a  sale,  or  by  estimate,  and  proof  of  the 
value  of  the  property  mortgaged.  See  4  Kent 
(11th  ed),  182;  Tooke  v.  Hartley,  2  Bro.  C. 
C.  (Perkins's  ed.)  126,  127,  and  notes;  Hodge 
o.  Holmes,  10  Pick.  380,  381;  Amory  v. 
Fairbanks,  3  Mass.  562;  Newall  v.  Wright, 
3  Mass.  150;  Briggs  V.  Richmond,  10  Pick. 
396,  West  v.  Chamberlain,  8  Pick.  336;  Hart 
P.  Ten  Eyck,  2  John.  Ch  62;  Wiley  v.  Angel, 
1  Clarke,  217;  Suffern  v.  Johnson,  1  Paige, 
450;  Downing  v.  Palmateer,  1  Monroe,  66; 
M'Gee  v.  Davie,  4  J.  J.  Marsh  70;  Bank  of 
Ogdensburg  v.  Arnold,  5  Paige.  38. 

2  2  M.  &  C.  443;  1  Jur.  330;  Armstrong 
V.  Storer,  14  Beav.  535,  538;  Tuckley  v. 
Thompson,  1  J.  &  H.  126,  130;  Rhodes  r. 
Moxhay,  10  W.  R.  103,  V.  C.  S.;  Dighton 
v.  Withers,  31  Beav.  423;  Kellock's  case, 
L.  R.  3  Ch.  769.  The  former  rule  was  abol- 
ished as  to  persons  dying  after  Nov.  1,  1875, 
by  38  &  •:'.)  Vic  c  77,  §  10.     See  2  Seton,  826. 

8  The  rule  is  settled  otherwise  in  Massa- 
chusetts,  where  it  is  held  that  the  mortgagee 
could  not  prove  for  his  whole  debt  and  yet 
retain  his  mortgage,  and  that  if  he  does  prove 
his  whole  debt,  and  accept  a  dividend  on  his 
whole  debt,  he  thereby  waives  his  mortgage. 
Amory  v.  Francis,  16  Mass.  308;  Hooker  v. 
Ohnstead,  0  Pick.  481;  Towle  v.  Bannister, 
16  Pick.    255;   Middlesex    Bank   v.  Minot,  4 


Met.  325;  Farnum  v.  Boutelle,  13  Met.  159. 
If  the  mortgagee  elects  to  retain  his  security, 
its  value  must  be  ascertained  and  deducted, 
and  he  can  only  prove  the  remainder.  Haver- 
hill Loan  Fund  Association  v.  Cronin,  4  Allen, 
141,  144.  So  in  Tennessee  the  mortgagee  is 
entitled  to  his  security  and  to  a  pro  rata 
division  with  other  creditors  for  the  balance 
of  debt.     Fields  v.  Wheatley,  1  Sneed,  351. 

4  Daniell  p.  Skip  with,  2  Bro.  C.  C.  155;  see 
also  Christophers  v.  Sparke,  2  J.  &  W.  223,  229; 
King  v.  Smith,  2  Hare,  239,  242;  7  Jur.  694; 
2  Seton,  824,  No.  4,  825,  et  seq.;  2  Story, 
Eq.  Jur.  §§  1025-1027.  It  is  not  a  matter  of 
course,  on  a  bill  for  foreclosure  a  d  sale,  to 
order  the  whole  of  the  mortgaged  premises  to 
be  sold.  Under  certain  circumstances  no  more 
will  be  sold  than  enough  to  pay  the  debt  and 
costs.  Delabigarre  v.  Bush,  2  John.  490;  Suf- 
fern v.  Johnson,  1  Paige,  450;  Brinkerhoff  v. 
Thalhimer,  2  John.  Ch.  486.  And  see,  as  to 
sale  when  the  debt  is  payable  by  instalments, 
or  only  the  interest  in  arrears,  Howell  v.  West- 
ern R.  Co.  94  U.  S.  466;  Cod  wise  v.  Taylor, 
4  Sneed,  346  ;  Grattan  v.  Wiggins,  23  Cal.  16; 
Mott  O.  Shreve,  25  N.  J.  Eq.  438;  Cox  r. 
Wheeler,  7  Paige,  248;  Huffard  v.  Gottberg, 
54  Mo.  271;  Olcott  v.  Bynum,  17  Wall.  45; 
McLean  v.  Presley,  56  Ala.  211.  The  premises 
may  be  sold,  either  together  or  in  parcels,  as 
will  be  best  calculated  to  produce  the  highest 
sum.  Suffern  i\  Johnson,  1  Paige,  450;  Camp- 
bell v.  Macomb,  4  John.  Ch.  534. 

1  The  cases  in  which  a  mortgagee  may 
have  a  sale  instead  of  a  foreclosure,  are,  — 
1,  where  the  estate  is  deficient  to  pay  the 
incumbrance;  2,  where  the  mortgage  is  of  a 
dry  reversion;  3,  where  the  mortgagee  dies 
and  the  equity  of  redemption  descends  upon 
an  infant ;  4,  where  the  mortgage  is  of  an 
advowson;  5,  where  the  mortgagor  becomes 
a  bankrupt;  and  6,  where  a  mortgage  is  of 
an  estate  in  Ireland.  See  2  Story,  Eq.  Jur. 
§  1026.  It  was  enacted  by  15  &  16  Vic  c.  86, 
§  48,  that  "it  shall  be  lawful  for  the  Court 
in  any  suit  for  the  foreclosure  of  the  equity 
of  redemption  in  any  mortgaged  property, 
upon  the  request  of  the  mortgagee,  or  of 
any  subsequent  incumbrancer,  or  of  the 
mortgagor,     or    any   person    claiming    under 

279 


*  286  OF    PARTIES    TO    A    SUIT. 

heir  of  a  mortgagee,2  the  personal  representative  must  also  be  made 
a  party  to  the  suit,3  because,  although  the  mortgagee  upon  paying  the 
principal  money  and  interest  has  a  right  to  a  reconveyance  from  the 
heir,  yet  the  heir  is  not  entitled  to  receive  the  money;  and  if  it  were 
paid  to  him,  the  personal  representative  would  have  a  right  to  sue  him 
for  it.4 

Where  a  man  contracts  for  the  purchase  of  an  estate,  and  dies 
intestate  as  to  the  estate  contracted  for,  before  the  completion  of  the 
contract,  the  vendor  has  a  right  to  file  a  bill  against  his  personal  repre- 
sentative for  payment  of  the  purchase-money;  but  if  he  does,  he  must 
make  the  heir-at-law  a  party,  because  the  heir  is  the  person  entitled  to 
the  estate.  For  the  same  reason,  where  the  vendee,  after  the  cause  was 
at  issue,  died,  having  devised  the  estate  which  was  the  subject  of  the 
suit  to  infant  children,  and  the  plaintiff  revived  against  the  personal 
representatives  only,  it  was  held  that  the  infant  devisees  were  neces- 
sary parties,  and  the  suit  was  ordered  to  stand  over,  in  order  that  they 
might  be  brought  before  the  Court.5  And  upon  the  same  principle,  if  a 
vendor  were  to  file  a  bill  against  the  heir  or  devisee,  the  heir  or  devisee 
would  have  a  right  to  insist  upon  the  personal  representative  being 
brought  before  the  Court,  when  the  purchase-money  is,  in  the  first 
instance,  payable  out  of  the  personal  estate.6  But  where  a  bill  stated 
that  an  estate,  purchased  in  the  defendant's  name,  was  so  purchased  in 
trust  for  the  plaintiff's  ancestor  who  paid  the  purchase-money, 

*  28G    and  prayed  a  reconveyance,  *  a  demurrer,  on  the  ground  that  the 

executor  of  the  ancestor  was  not  a  party,  was  overruled;  because, 
the  purchase-money  having  been  paid,  it  was  quite  clear  that  no  decree 
could  have  been  made  against  the  personal  representative.1 

Upon  the  same  principle,  formerly,  the  Courts  in  the  case  of  sureties, 
and  of  joint  obligors  in  a  bond,  compelled  all  who  were  bound,  or 
their  representatives,  to  be  before  the  Court,  in  order  to  avoid  the 
multiplicity  of  suits  which  would  be  occasioned  if  one  or  more  were  to 

them  respectively,  to  direct  a  sale  (see  Hurst  can  v.  Wickliffe,   4  Scam.  452;  See  House  v. 

r.  Hurst,  16  Beav.  372;  Wayn  v.  Lewis,  1  Dm.  Dexter,  9  Mich.  246. 

487)  of  such  property,  instead  of  a  foreclosure  6  See  Story,  Eq.  PI   §  177:  Cocke  v.  Evans, 

of  such  equity  of   redemption,  on  such  terms  9  Yerger,  287.     Upon  a  bill  for  the  rescission 

as  the  Court  mav  think  fit  to  direct,  and  if  the  of  a  contract  for  land,  for  defect  of  title  in  the 

Court  should  so  think  fit,  without  previously  vendor,  the  heirs  of  the  vendee  must  be  made 

determining  the  priorities  of  incumbrances,  or  parties.     Huston  v.  Noble,  4  J.  J.  Marsh.  136; 

giving  the  usual  or  any  time  to  redeem."  see  Harding  v.  Handy,  11  Wheat.  104. 

2  As  to  those  dying  after  Dec.  31,  1881,  see  *  Astley  v.  Fountain,  Rep.  temp.  Finch,  4. 
44  &  45  Vic.  c.  41,"§§  1  (1),  25  (2),  30,34.  See  Roberts  v.  Marchant,  1  Hare,  547;  1  Phil- 

3  Dexter  v.  Arnold,  1  Sumner,  109;  Hilton  370.  As  to  those  dying  after  Dec.  31, 1881,  see  44 
v.  Lothrop,  46  Maine,  297,  299.  &  45  Vic.  c.  41.     The  vendor  becomes  a  trustee 

4  Ante,  p.  193.  ioT  the  purchaser  on  the  hitter's  acceptance  of 

5  Townsend  v.  Champernowne,  9  Price,  130;  title.  Lysaght  v.  Edwards,  2  Ch.  D.  499  ;  He 
see  Cox  v.  Sprode,  2  Bibb,  376 ;  Fisher  v.  Kay,  Thomas,  34  Ch.  D.  166.  As  to  the  property  out  of 
2  Bibb,  434;  Huston  v.  M'Clarty,  3  Litt.  274;  which  urpaid  purchase  money  is  payable,  and 
Morgan  v.  Morgan,  2  Wheat.  90;  Story,  Eq.  as  to  vendor's  lien,  see  Mackreth  v.  Symmons, 
PI.  §§  160,  177;  Champion  v.  Brown,  6  John.  1  W.  &  T.  L.  C.  and  notes;  17  &  18  Xw.  c. 
Ch.  402.  To  a  bill  to  enforce  specific  perform-  113  ;  Hood  v.  Hood.  5  W.  R.  747 ;  3  Jur.  X.  S. 
anceof  a  contract  for  the  sale  of  land  made  by  684;  Solomon  v.  Solomon.  12  W.  R.  540;  10 
a  person  who  has  deceased,  all  the  heirs  of  such  Jur.  X.  S  331 :  30  &  31  Vic.  c.  69  ;  Re  \\  orms- 
deceased  person  should  be  made  parties.    Dun-  ley,  4  Ch.  D.  065;  40  &  41  Vic.  c.  34. 

280 


OF    OBJECTIONS    FOR    WANT    OF    PARTIES. 


*28^ 


be  sued  without  the  others,  and  left  to  seek  contribution  from  their 
co-sureties,  or  co-obligors  in  other  proceedings;  but  we  have  seen  that, 
in  this  respect,  the  32d  Order  of  August,  1841,  has  altered  the 
practice.2 

Section  III.  —  Of  Objections  for  want  of  Parties. 

Having  endeavored  in  the  preceding  sections  of  this  chapter  to  point 
out  who  ought  to  be  made  parties  to  a  suit,  the  next  step  is  to  show 
in  what  manner  any  defect  arising  from  the  omission  of  proper  parties, 
or  the  joinder  of  improper  parties,  can  be  remedied  or  taken  advan- 
tage of.3 

No  persons  are  considered  as  parties  to  a  suit,  except  the  plaintiffs 
and  persons  against  whom  the  bill  prays  either  the  writ  of  subpceha,  or 
that  upon  being  served  with  a  copy  of  the  bill  they  may  be  bound  by 
the  proceedings  in  the  cause;4  but  the  mere  naming  a  person  as  a 
defendant  does  not  make  him  a  party.5 

*  A  defect  of  parties  in  a  suit  may  be  taken  advantage  of  either  *  287 
by  demurrer,  plea,  answer,1  or  at  the  hearing.2  (a) 


2  See  ante,  p.  267 ;  Gen.  Ord.  VII.  2. 

8  See  ante,  p.  280,  note  4. 

4  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  44;  Walker  v.  Hallett,  1 
Ala.  379;  Lucas  v.  Bank  of  Darien,  2  Stewart, 
280;  Lylew.  Bradford,  7  Monroe,  113;  Huston 
r.  M'Clarty,  3  Litt.  274;  De  Wolf  v.  Mallett,  3 
Dana,  214;  Taylor  v.  Bate,  4  Monroe,  267.  In 
New  York  parties  may  be  treated  as  defendants, 
by  a  clear  statement  in  the  bill  to  that  effect, 
without  praying  the  subpoena.  The  reason  given 
is  that,  in  that  State,  the  subpoena  is  issued  of 
course,  and  that  a  formal  prayer  is  unnecessary 
to  entitle  the  plaintiff  to  process.  Brasher  v. 
Cortlandt,  2  John.  Ch.  245;  Elmendorf  v.  De- 
lancy,  1  Hopk.  555;  Verplanck  v.  Mercant. 
Ins.  Co.  2  Paige,  438.  But  unless  the  plaintiff, 
either  in  the  prayer  for  process  or  by  allegation 
in  the  bill,  designates  those  who  are  made  de- 
fendants, the  omission  is  fatal,  Elmendorf  v. 
Delancy,  1  Hopk.  555;  and  they  only  are  par- 
ties defendant  against  whom  process  is  prayed, 
or  who  are  specifically  named  and  described  as 
defendants.  Talmage  v.  Pell,  9  Paige,  410; 
Lucas  v.  Bank  of  Darien,  2  Stewart,  280;  Green 
v.  McKenney,  6  J.  J.  Marsh.  193;  Moore  v. 
Anderson,  1  Ired.  Ch.  411;  Harris  v.  Carter,  3 
Stewart,  233.  Where  a  minor,  a  necessary 
part}',  was  not  named  in  the  bill,  he  cannot  be 
considered,  a  defendant,  although  an  answer  is 
filed  for  him  by  his  guardian  ad  litem.  Dixon 
v.  Donaldson,  6  J.  J.  Marsh.  575. 


(a)  See  post,  p.  559,  notes.  A  misjoinder  of 
parties,  not  appearing  on  the  face  of  a  petition 
or  complaint,  cannot  be  raised  by  a  general 
demurrer  to  the  evidence.  Crenshaw  v.  Ullman 
(Mo.),  20  S.  W.  Rep.  1077.     In  England,  any 


s  Windsor  p.  Windsor,  2  Dick.  707;  Carey 
v.  Hillhouse,  5  Ga.  251;  Cassiday  v  McDaniel, 
8  B.  Mon.  519.  To  make  him  such,  process 
must  be  issued  and  served  upon  him.  Bond  v. 
Hendricks,  1  A.  Iv.  Marsh.  594;  Whiter.  Park, 
5  J.  J.  Marsh.  603;  Estill  v.  Clay,  2  A.  K. 
Marsh.  497;  Huston  V.  M'Clarty,  3  Litt.  274; 
Archibald  v.  Means,  5  Ired.  Eq.  230.  Nor  is  a 
person  made  a  party  by  the  bill  asking  that  he 
be  made  a  defendant  in  a  future  contingency. 
Doherty  i\  Stevenson,  1  Tenn.  Ch.  518;  infra, 
390,  n.3. 

i  See  Clark  v.  Long,  4  Rand.  451;  Story, 
Eq.  PI.  §  236.  Where  the  defect  of  want  of 
parties  is  formal,  or  technical  merely,  the  ob- 
jection must  be  made  by  demurrer,  plea,  or 
answer.  Post  let  hwaite  v.  Howes,  3  Clarke 
(Iowa),  365;  Storj-  v.  Livingston,  13  Peters, 
359;  Sayles  v.  Tibbitts,  5  R.  I.  79;  Kean  r. 
Johnson'  9  N.  J.  Eq.  401;  Smith  v.  Mitchell,  6 
Ga.  458.  So  where  a  party  omits  to  object, 
either  by  demurrer,  plea,  or  answer,  for  want  of 
parties  who  are  only  necessary  to  protect  him- 
self, the  Court  may  refuse  to  sustain  the  objec- 
tion at  the  hearing.  Dias  v.  Bouchard,  10 
Paige,  445;  Lorillard  v.  Coster,  5  Paige,  172; 
Lainhart  v.  Reilly,  3  Desaus.  570;  Gilbert  /•. 
Sutliff,  3  Ohio  St.  129;  Cutler  v.  Tuttle,  19  ST. 
J.  Eq.  549,  556. 

-  When  it  is  manifest  that  a  decree  will  have 
the  effect  of  depriving  third   parties    of   their 


defendant  may  now  apply  to  have  necessary 
paities  added.  See  Werdermann  v.  Societe* 
Generate  d' Electricity  19  Ch.  D.  246;  30  W.  R. 
33;  Sheehan  v.  Great  Eastern  Ry.  Co.  16  Ch. 
D.  59;  Abouloff  v.  Oppenheimer,"  10  Q.  B.  D 
281 


287 


OP    PARTIES    TO    A    SUIT. 


Whenever  the  deficiency  of  parties  appears  on  the  face  of  a  bill,  the 


legal  rights,  it  is  incumbent  on  the  Court  to 
notice  the  fact  at  the  hearing,  and  cause  them 
to  be  brought  in ;  and  the  proper  course,  in  such 
case,  is  to  order  the  cause  to  stand  over  to  en- 
able the  plaintiff  to  bring  such  necessary  par- 
ties before  the  Court.  Shaver  v.  Brainard,  29 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  25;  Clark  v.  Long,  4  Rand.  401; 
Hussey  v.  Dole,  24  Maine,  20;  Cannon  v. 
Norton,  14  Vt.  178;  Miller  v.  M'Crea,  7  Paige, 
452;  Felch  v.  Hooper,  20  Maine,  159;  Nash  v. 
Smith,  6  Conn.  421;  Bugbee  V.  Sargent,  23 
Maine,  269;  Lord  v.  Underdunck,  1  Sandf.  Ch. 
146;  Postlethwaite  v.  Howes,  3  Clarke  (Iowa), 
365;  Prentice  v.  Kimball,  19  111.  320;  Morse  v. 
Machias  Water  Power  Co.  42  Maine,  119 ;  Per 
Wayne  J.  in  Lewis  v.  Darling,  16  How.  U.  S. 
1,  8,  9;  Winnipiseogee  Lake  Co.  V.  Worster,  29 
N.  H.  433;  Miller  v.  Whittier,  33  Maine,  521; 
Davis  v.  Rogers,  33  Maine,  222;  Webber  v.  Tay- 
lor, 5  Jones,  Eq.  (N.  C.)  36 ;  Hoe  v.  Wilson,  9 
Wall.  501;  Woodward  v.  Wood,  19  Ala.  213. 
See  Simms  v.  Richardson,  32  Ark.  297. 

This  course  will  be  adopted  where  it  is  found 
that  an  effectual  decree  cannot  be  made,  bind- 
ing upon  all  persons  in  interest,  for  want  of 
proper  parties,  although  the  objection  has  not 
been  raised  by  either  party.  O'Brien  v.  Heeney, 
2  Edw.  Ch.  242;  Herrington  v.  Hubbard,  1 
Scam.  569;  McMaken  v.  McMaken,  18  Ala. 
576;  Goodman  v.  Barbour,  16  Ala.  625;  Boor- 
aem  v.  Wells,  19  N.  J.  Eq.  87,  95;  Brown  v. 
Johnson,  53  Maine,  251;  Beals  v.  Cobb,  51 
Maine,  348,  351;  Pierce  v.  Faunce,  47  Maine, 
507,  513;  Hoe  v.  Wilson,  ubi  supra.  A  bill 
should  not  be  dismissed  for  want  of  necessary 
parties,  as  they  can  either  come  in  voluntarily, 


295;  post,  p.  293.  But  a  person  cannot  be 
added  as  a  plaintiff  without  his  consent  in  writ- 
ing, even  though  he  is  indemnified  against  costs. 
Tryon  v.  National  Provident  Inst.  16  Q.  B.  D. 
678. 

In  general,  a  third  person  cannot  be  made 
a  defendant  on  his  own  application  to  a  bill 
which  seeks  relief  in  personam,  or  maintain  a 
petition  to  require  the  plaintiff  to  join  him  as 
co-plaintiff.  Drake  v.  Goodridge,  6  Blatch.  152 ; 
Coleman  V.Martin,  id.  119;  Comfort  v.  McTeer, 
7  Lea,  652;  see  Krippendorf  v.  Hyde,  110  U.  S. 
276.  Upon  a  creditors'  bill,  which  is  to  some 
extent  in  rem,  a  creditor  may  be  admitted  as  a 
party  by  order  of  Court  on  his  own  application, 
and,  being  so  admitted,  he  has  such  a  right  of 
control  over  the  suit,  that,  as  to  him,  and  with- 
out his  consent,  the  original  plaintiff  cannot 
dismiss  it.  Piedmont  tS:e.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Maury, 
75  Va.  508:  Taylor  v.  Webb,  54  Miss.  36.  It 
has,  however,  been  held  that  an  interested  per- 
son, who  is  not  joined,  may  be  made  a  party 
by  amendment  on  his  own  motion  or  petition. 

282 


or  may  be  summoned  in.  Potter  v.  Holden,  31 
Conn.  385;  Thomas  v.  Adams,  30  111.  37.  But 
if  after  objection  is  made  for  want  of  necessary 
parties,  the  plaintiff  neglects  or  refuses  to  bring 
them  before  the  Court,  the  bill  will  be  dismissed. 
Singleton  v.  Gayle,  8  Porter,  270;  Hunt  v. 
Wickliffe,  2  Porter,  201;  BaileY  v.  Myrick,  36 
Maine,  50,  54;  see  Mass.  St.  1802,  c.  218,  §  9. 
But  sucli  dismissal  should  be  without  prejudice. 
Huston  v.  M'Clarty,  3  Litt.  274;  Royce  v.  Tar- 
rant, 6  J.  J.  Marsh.  567;  Caldwell  v.  Hawkins, 
1  Litt.  212;  Hack  with  v.  Damron,  1  Monroe, 
239;  Van  Epps  v.  Van  Deusen,  4  Paige,  64; 
Payne  v.  Richardson,  7  J.  J.  Marsh.  240;  Har- 
ris v.  Carter,  3  Stewart,  233.  So  a  bill  must 
be  dismissed,  when  persons,  who  are  necessary 
parties,  refuse  to  appear,  and  the  Court  has  no 
power  to  reach  them  by  its  process,  and  com- 
pel them  to  become  parties:  Picquet  v.  Swan, 
5  Mason,  561:  but  without  prejudice.  Ibid.; 
ante,  p.  149,  n.  1. 

A  motion  to  be  admitted  as  a  defendant  to  a 
suit  is  irregular.  Harrison  v.  Morton,  4  Hen. 
&M.  483;  Morris  v.  Barclay,  2  J.  J.  Marsh. 
374;  Smith  v.  Britton,  2  P.  &  H.  (Va.)  124; 
Phillips  v.  Wesson,  16  Ga.  137. 

No  such  practice  is  known  in  Equity  as 
making  a  person  a  defendant  to  a  suit  upon  his 
own  application,  over  the  objection  of  the  com- 
plainant. Shields  v.  Barrow,  17  How.  145; 
Coleman  v.  Martin,  6  Blatchf.  119;  Drake  v. 
Goodrich,  6  Blatch  151;  Stretch  v.  Stretch,  2 
Tenn.  Ch.  140;  Carow  v.  Mowatt,  1  Edw.  Ch. 
9;  Searles  v.  Jacksonville  R.  Co.  2  Woods, 
621 :  Anderson  v.  Jacksonville,  R  Co.  2  Woods, 
628.     But  a  person  may  be  made  a  party  de- 


Scott  v.  Mansfield  &c.  R.  Co.  2  Flippin,  15; 
Neale  v.  Utz,  75  Va.  480.  But  the  assignee  of 
an  insolvent  defendant  corporation,  which  lias 
been  dissolved,  cannot  without  the  plaintiff's 
consent,  petition  to  become  a  defendant  for  the 
sole  purpose  of  having  an  injunction  dissolved; 
his  proper  course  being  to  obtain  a  rule  by 
motion  or  petition,  to  have  the  injunction  dis- 
solved unless  the  plaintiff  shall  revive  the  suit 
against  the  assignee  within  a  certain  time. 
Chester  v.  Life  Ass.  4  Fed.  Rep.  557.  A  third 
person,  who  has  no  privity  with  the  plaintiff,  is 
not  entitled  to  intervene  because  of  a  contin- 
gent liability  to  answer  over  to  the  defendant. 
Omaha  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Beeson  (Neb.),  54  N.  W. 
Rep.  557.  Leave  of  Court  is  always  necessary 
to  entitle  third  persons  to  intervene.  Fowler  v. 
Lewis,  30  W.  Va.  112;  Smith  v.  Gale,  144  U.  S. 
509.  A  suit  in  Equity  does  not  lie  to  compel 
another  to  bring  a  suit,  Att.-Gen.  v.  Dorking 
Guardians,  20  Ch.  D.  595;  Charles  v.  Finchley 
Local  Board,  23  Ch.  D.  767  ;  or  for  a  third  per- 
son's use.     Kelhim  v.  Saver,  30  W.  Va.  198. 


OF    OBJECTIONS    FOR    WANT    OF    PARTIES. 


*288 


want  of  proper  parties  is  a  cause  of  demurrer.8  There  appears  to  be 
some  doubt  whether  a  demurrer  of  this  nature  can  be  partial,  and 
whether  it  must  not  extend  to  the  whole  bill.  In  East  India  Company 
v.  Coles*  Lord  Thurlow  was  inclined  to  think  that  there  could  not 
be  a  partial  demurrer  *  for  want  of  parties ;  but  upon  Mr.  *  288 
Mitford  mentioning  some  cases,1  wherein  such  partial  demurrers 
had  been  allowed,  the  case  was  ordered  to  stand  over  to  the  next  day  of 
demurrers:  in  the  mean  time,  however,  the  plaintiff's  counsel,  thinking 
it  better  for  his  client,  amended  the  bill. 

If  a  sufficient  reason  for  not  bringing  a  necessary  party  before  the 
Court  is  suggested  by  the  bill,2  —  as,  if  the  bill  seeks  a  discovery  of  the 
persons  interested  in  the  matter  in  question,  for  the  purpose  of  making 
them  parties,  and  charges  that  they  are  unknown  to  the  plaintiff,  —  a 
demurrer  for  want  of  the  necessary  parties  will  not  hold.3  Upon  the 
same  principle,  where  it  was  stated  in  a  bill  that  the  defendant,  who 
was  next  of  kin  of  an  intestate,  had  refused  to  take  out  letters  of 
administration,  and  that  the  plaintiff  had  applied  to  the  Prerogative 
Court  for  administration,  but  having  been  opposed  by  the  defendant, 
was  denied  administration,  because  he  could  not  prove  that  the  intestate 
had  left  bona  notabilia ;  and  that  he  had  afterwards  applied  to  the 
Consistory  Court  of  Bath  and  Wells,  where  he  likewise  failed,  because 
he  could  not  prove  that  the  intestate  had  died  in  the  diocese ;  and  that 


fendant  by  express  consent  of  the  plaintiff. 
St( ele  w.Taylor,  1  Minn.  274;  Hergel  »  Lajten- 
berger,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  251.  It  has  been  done 
where  no  objection  was  made.  Galveston  R. 
Co.  v.  Cowdrey,  11  Wall.  459,  464;  Banks  v. 
Banks,  2  Cold  w.  548;  Wileon  v.  I'.ihYr,  7  Coldw. 
33;  Myers  v.  Fenn,  5  Wall.  205.  And  it  has 
been  suggested  that  where  a  corporation  will 
not  resist  a  legal  demand,  the  stockholders  may 
be  permitted  to  come  in  and  defend  by  answer; 
but  it  is  added,  ''The  remedy  is  an  extreme 
one,  and  should  be  admitted  by  the  Court  with 
hesitation  and  caution."  Bronson  v.  La  Crosse 
R.  Co.  2  Wall.  302.  Where  the  bill  is  filed  by 
some  of  a  class  for  themselves  and  all  others  of 
that  class,  it  is  of  course  to  allow  the  latter  to 
intervene  by  petition:  Ogilvie  v.  Knox  Ins. Co. 
2  Black,  539;  S.  C.  22  How.  380;  Carter  v. 
New  Orleans,  19  Fed.  Rep.  659;  but  with 
proper  restrictions:  Forbes  v.  Memphis  &c.  R. 
Co.  2  Woods,  323.  And  when  they  are  thus 
made  parties,  they  have  the  right  of  appeal. 
Ex  parte  Jordan,  94  U.  S.  248.  In  New  Jersey, 
by  statute,  a  person  may  be  made  defendant  in 
certain  cases  by  petition.  Rev.  Ch.  §  41,  Con- 
rad  v.  Mullison,  24  N.  J.  Eq.  65;  Hewitt  v. 
Montclair,  25  id.  100;  S.  C.  27  id.  479;  Dodge 
V.  Fuller,  28  id.  578.  See  ante,  p.  281,  n.  8.  and 
infra,  p.  1516,  n.  See  also  ante,  p.  259,  n.  1,  as 
to  trustees  and  beneficiaries. 

8  Mitchell  v.  Lenox,  2  Paige,  281;  Robin- 
son v.  Smith,  3  Paige,  222;  Crane  v.  Deming, 
7  Conn.  387;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  541;  White  v. 


Curtis,  2  Gray,  472;  Neely  v.  Anderson,  2 
Stmbh.  Eq.  262.  And  in  such  case,  if  the 
detect  is  merely  formal  the  objection  should 
be  taken  by  demurrer.     Chapman  r.  Hamilton, 

19  Ala.  121;  Allen  v.  Turner,  11  Gray,  436; 
Schwoerer  r.  Boylston  Market  Association,  99 
Mass.  295. 

4  3  Swanst.  142,  n. ;  see  also  Lumsden  v. 
Fraser,  1  M.  &  C.  589,  602. 

1  Astley  i'.  Fountain,  Finch,  4;  Attwood  v. 
Hawkins,  Finch,  113;  Bressenden  v.  Decreets, 
2Ch.  Cas.  197;  Hamp  v.  Robinson.  3  De  G. 
J.  &  S.  109;  Rowsell  V.  Morris,  L.  R.  17  Eq. 

20  M.  R. 

-  In  White  V.  Curtis,  2  Gray,  467,  it  was 
held  that  the  omission  to  join,  as  a  defendant 
in  a  bill,  the  administrator  of  fine  whose  death 
is  alleged  in  the  bill,  cannot  be  taken  advan- 
tage of  by  demurrer,  when  it  does  not  appear 
by  the  bill  that  there  is  any  such  administrator. 
It  does  not  appear  to  have  been  regarded,  in 
this  case,  as  necessary,  that  any  reason  should 
be  stated  why  the  administrator  was  not  ap- 
pointed. But  the  Court  stated  that  the  neces- 
sity or  propriety  of  introducing  the  administrator 
was  not  apparent  from  the  averments  in  the 
bill. 

3  Ld.  Red.  180;  Towle  v.  Pierce,  12  Me!. 
328;  see  Gilman  v.  Cairnes,  1  Breese,  124;  Coe 
r.  Beckwith.  31  Barb.  339;  Davis  r  Hooper,  33 
Miss.  173;  De  Wolf  v.  De  Wolf,  4  R.  I.  450; 
Bailey  v.  Morgan,  13  Texas,  342. 

283 


*  289  OF    PARTIES    TO    A    SUIT. 

the  defendant  had  refused  to  discover  where  the  intestate  had  died;  a 
demurrer  for  want  of  proper  parties,  because  the  personal  representa- 
tive of  the  intestate  was  not  before  the  Court,  was  overruled.4 

A  demurrer  for  want  of  parties  must  show  who  are  the  proper  par- 
ties; not  indeed  by  name,  for  that  might  be  impossible;  5  but  in  such  a 
manner  as  to  point  out  to  the  plaintiff  the  objection  to  his  bill,  so  as  to 
enable  him  to  amend  by  adding  the  necessary  persons.6  Some  doubt 
has  been  thrown  upon  the  correctness  of  this  rule  by  the  case  of 
*289  Pyle  v.  Price,1  where  Lord  Eldon  said  "that  *  beside  the  objec- 
tion which  had  been  mentioned  at  the  bar,  to  the  rule  which 
required  the  party  to  be  stated,  it  might  appear  that  the  plaintiff  knows 
the  party,"  and  then  observed,  "Perhaps  there  is  not  a  general  rule 
either  way."  But  this  observation  appears  not  to  shake  the  rule  as  to 
the  necessity  of  pointing  out  who  the  necessary  party  is,  but  merely 
to  refer  to  the  observation  made  at  the  bar,  that  there  was  no  rule 
requiring  a  demurrer  to  state  the  parties,  that  is,  hy  name,  as  it  might 
be  out  of  the  power  of  the  defendant  to  do  so;  and  not  to  refer  to  the 
necessity  of  calling  the  plaintiff's  attention  to  the  description  or  char- 
acter of  the  party  required,  in  order  to  enable  him  to  amend  his  bill, 
without  putting  him  to  the  expense  of  bringing  his  demurrer  on  for 
argument,  which  he  might  otherwise  be  obliged  to  do,  in  order  to  ascer- 
tain who  the  party  required  by  the  defendant  is. 

Where  a  demurrer  for  want  of  parties  is  allowed,  the  cause  is  not 
considered  so  much  out  of  Court  but  that  the  plaintiff  may  afterwards 
have  leave  to  amend,  by  bringing  the  necessary  parties  before  the 
Court.1  And  where  the  addition  of  the  party  would  render  the  bill 
multifarious,  the  plaintiff  will  be  allowed  to  amend  generally.2  And 
where  the  demurrer  has  been  ore  tenus,  such  leave  will  be  granted  to 
him  without  his  paying  the  costs  of  the  demurrer;  though,  if  he  seeks, 
under  such  circumstances,  to  amend  more  extensively  than  by  merely 
adding  parties,  he  must  pay  the  defendant  the  cost  of  the  demurrer.3 

Upon  the  allowance,  however,  of  a  demurrer  for  want  of  parties,  the 
plaintiff  is  not  entitled  as  of  course  to  an  order  for  leave  to  amend. 
When  it  is  said  that  a  bill  is  never  dismissed  for  want  of  parties,4  noth- 

•»  rVAranda  v.  Whittingham,  Mos.  84.  tion  of  Poole,  4  M.  &  C.  17,  32;  2  Jur.   034, 

5  Tourton  v.  Flower,  3  P.  Wms.  3GU ;  Cham-  1080;  Kendall  v.  Hamilton,  -4  App.  Cas.  504, 
bers  r.  Wright,  52  Ala.  444.  515,  54:2. 

6  Ld.  Keel.  181;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Jackson,  11  *  Brcssenden  v.  Decreets,  2  Ch.  Cas.  197; 
Ves.  309;  Lund  ».  Blanshard,  4  Hare,  23;  and  see  also  Lloyd  v.  Loaring,  G  Ves.  773;  Story, 
see  Pratt  ».  Keith,  10  Jur.  N.  S.  305;  12  W.  It.  Eq.  PI.  §  543,  and  note,  in  which  is  a  form  of 
394,  V.  C.  K.,  where  the  defendant  was  al-  demurrer  for  want  of  necessary  parties.  Allen 
lowed,  by  demurrer  ore  tenus,    to  specify  the  v.  Turner,  11  Gray,  436. 

parties.    "Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  541,  and  notes;*  Mc-  2  Lumsden  v.  Eraser,  1  M.   &  C.  589,  602; 

Elwain   v.   Willis,    3   Paige,    505;   Lindley   v.  Att.-Gen.  ».  Merchant  Tailors'  Co.  1  M.  &  K. 

Cravens,  2  Blackf.  426;  Jamesons.  Deshields,  189,  194. 

3  Gratt.  4:  Chapman  v.  Hamilton,  19  Ala.  121;  3  Newton  v.  Lord  Egmont,  4  Sim.  585. 

Hightower   v.   Mustian,  8  Ga.  506;  Neely  v.  4  But  see  ante,  287,  note,  to  this  point,  and 

Anderson,  2  Strobh.  Eq.  202;  see  Harrison  v.  Nash  v.  Smith,  6  Conn.  422.    The  bill  is  some- 

Rowan,  4  Wash   C.  C.  202;  Arundell  v.  Black-  times  dismissed  for  want  of  proper  parties,  but 

well.   Dev.    Eq.    354;    Greenleaf   v.   Queen,    1  without  prejudice   to   the   plaintiff's    right    to 

Peters.  138.  bring  a  new  suit.     Miller  v.  M'Crea.  7  Paij^e, 

1  6  Ves.  781:   and  see.  Att.-Gen.  v.  Corpora-  452;  Huston  v.  M'Clarty,  3  Litt.  274;  Steele  v. 
284 


OF    OBJECTIONS    FOR    WANT    OF    PARTIES. 


290 


ing  more  is  meant  than  that  a  plaintiff,  who  would  be  entitled  to  relief 
if  proper  parties  were  before  the  Court,  shall  not  have  his  bill  dismissed 
for  want  of  them,  but  shall  have  an  opportunity  afforded  of  bringing 
them  before  the  Court; 5  but  if,  at  the  hearing,  the  Court  sees  that  the 
plaintiff  can  have  no  relief  under  any  circumstances,  it  is  not  bound  to 
let  the  cause  stand  over  that  the  plaintiff  may  add  parties  to  such  a 
record.6 

*  If  the  defect  of  parties  is  not  apparent  upon  the  face  of  the  *  290 
bill,  the  defect  may  be  brought  before  the  Court  by  plea,  which 
must  aver  the  matter  necessary  to  show  it.1  A  plea  for  want  of  proper 
parties  is  a  plea  in  bar,  and  goes  to  the  whole  bill,  as  well  to  the  dis- 
covery as  to  the  relief,  where  relief  is  prayed;2  though  the  want  of 
parties  is  no  objection  to  a  bill  for  discovery  merely.8 

Where  a  sufficient  reason  to  excuse  the  defect  is  suggested  by  the 
bill,4  as  where  a  personal  representative  is  a  necessary  party,  and  the 
bill  states  that  the  representation  is  in  contest  in  the  Ecclesiastical 
Court;5  or  where  the  party  is  resident  out  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
Court,  and  the  bill  charges  that  fact;  6  or  where  the  bill  seeks  a  dis- 
covery of  the  necessary  parties,7  a  plea  for  want  of  parties  will  not, 
any  more  than  a  demurrer  for  the  same  cause,  be  allowed,  unless  the 
defendant  controverts  the  excuse  made  by  the  bill,  by  pleading  matter 
to  show  it  false.8  Thus,  in  the  first  instance  above  put,  if  before  the 
tiling  of  the  bill  the  contest  in  the  Ecclesiastical  Court  had  been  deter- 
mined, and  administration  granted,  and  the  defendant  had  showed  this 
by  his  plea,  the  objection  for  want  of  parties  would  not  in  strictness 
have  been  good. 

Upon  arguing  a  plea  of  this  kind,  the  Court,  instead  of  allowing  it, 
generally  gives  the  plaintiff  leave  to  amend  the  bill,  upon  payment  of 


Lewis,  1  Monroe,  49;  Royse  v.  Tenant,  6  J.  J. 
Marsh.  567;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  541 ;  post,  293- 
295,  note;  ante,  note  to  p.  287. 

5  See  Potter  v.  Holden,  31  Conn.  385  ; 
Thomas  v.  Adams,  30  111.  37;  ante,  287,  no  e. 

6  Tvler  v.  Bell,  2  M.  &  C.  110;  see  Story, 
Eq.  PI.  §  541,  and  note;  Russell  v.  Clarke,  7 
Craneh,  69,  90;  Lund  v.  Blanshard,  4  Hare,  9, 
23;  1  ('.  1'.  Coop.  temp.  Cott.39;  Lister  v.  Mea- 
dowcroft,  id.  372. 

i  I.d.  Red.  280;  Hamm  v.  Stevens,  1  Vera. 
110;  2  Atk.51;  Robinson  v.  Smith,  3  Paige, 
222;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  230;  Gamble  v.  Johnson, 
9  Mo.  605. 

-  Plunkett  v.  Penson,  2  Atk.51;  Hamm  v. 
Stevens,  1  Vera.  110. 

3  Sangosa  v.  East  India  Co.  2  Eq.  Cas.  Abr. 
171),  i>l.  28. 

4  Gil  man  v.  Cairns,  Breese,  124. 

5  Plunkett  V.  Penson,  2  Atk.  51  ;  Carey  r. 
Hoxey,  1 1  Ga.  045.  But  in  order  to  make  the 
pendency  of  litigation,  touching  the  represen- 
tation <if  a  deceased  party,  a  good  excuse,  the 
Court  must  he  fully  advised  of  the  nature  and 
condition  of  the  litigation,  by  the  allegations  in 


the  bill  or  by  proofs.     Carey  ».  Hoxey,  supra  ; 
see  Martin  v.  McBryde,  3  lied.  Ch.  531. 

6  Cowslad  v.  Cely,  Prec.  Ch.  81;  Darwent 
r.  Walton,  2  Atk.  510:  Miliigan  v.  Milledge, 
3  Craneh,  220;  Martin  v.  McBryde,  3  [red.  Ch. 
531;  Parkman  v.  Aicardi,  34  Ala.  393;  Mallow 
v.  Ilinde,  12  Wheat.  193;  Spivey  v.  Jenkins,  1 
Ired.  Ch.  126:  Ashmead  v.  Colby,  26  Conn. 
287;  Carey  v.  Hoxey,  11  Ga.  645;  West  ». 
Smith,  s  How.  C  S.  409;  Erickson  p.Nesmith, 
46  N.  H.  371;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  7S :  Adams  o. 
Stevens,  49  Maine,  362;  see  Mdodie  r.  Ban- 
nister, 17  Jur.  520,  19  Eng.  Law  &  Eq.  81. 
But  the  Court  will  not  proceed  to  take  an 
account  in  the  absence  of  a  necessary  party, 
though  he  is  out  of  the  jurisdiction.  Hogan  v. 
Walker,  14  How.  U.  S.  46;  Wilson  B.  City 
Bank,  3  Sumner,  422;  Greene  v.  Sisson,  2  Cur- 
tis ('.  C.  170.  177:  see  Shields  v.  Barrow,  17 
How.  U.  S.  130:  Story,  Eq.  PL  §  78;  Towle  v. 
Pierce,  12  Met.  332;  ante,  150,  151,216,217, 
note;  260,  note:  Lawrence  ».  Pokes,  53  Maine, 
110;  Mudgett  v.  Gather,  52  Maine,  511. 

7  Bowyer  v.  Covert,  1  Vein.  95. 

8  Ld.  Red.  281. 

285 


*  291  OF   PARTIES   TO    A   SUIT. 

costs :  a  liberty  which  he  may  also  obtain  after  allowance  of  the  plea, 
according  to  the  common  course  of  the  Court;  for  the  suit  is  not  deter- 
mined by  the  allowance  of  a  plea.9 

The  defendant  may  also  by  his  answer  object  that  the  bill  is  defective 
for  want  of  parties,  in  which  case  the  plaintiff  is  now,  under  the 

*  291    39th  Order,10  of  August,  1841,  within  fourteen  days  after  *  answer 

filed,  at  liberty  to  set  down  the  cause  for  argument  upon  that 
objection  alone.  If  he  does  so,  the  objection  is  argued,  the  plaintiff 
commencing.  After  the  argument,  the  Court  makes  an  order,  declaring 
its  opinion  upon  the  record  as  it  then  stands ;  but  the  objection  cannot 
finally  be  disposed  of  until  the  hearing,  because  it  is  impossible  at  the 
beginning  of  a  cause  to  declare  who  will  be  necessary  parties  at  the 
end.1  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  plaintiff  does  not  set  down  the  cause 
upon  the  objection  for  want  of  parties,  he  subjects  himself  to  the 
penalty,  that  he  will  not  at  the  hearing  be  entitled,  as  of  course,  to  an 
order  to  amend  by  adding  parties :  he  would  still,  however,  be  at  liberty 
to  make  out  a  special  case  for  the  exercise  of  the  discretion  of  the  Court 
in  his  favor,  and  the  Court  would  then  have  to  decide  whether  his  bill 
should  be  dismissed  for  want  of  parties,  or  retained  with  liberty  either 
to  amend,2  or  to  file  a  supplemental  bill  for  the  purpose  of  bringing  the 
proper  parties  before  the  Court.  The  Order  only  allows  fourteen  days 
after  answer  for  the  plaintiff  to  set  down  his  cause  upon  the  objection 
for  want  of  parties ;  but  the  Vice  Chancellor  of  England  has  decided 
that  this  only  means  that  the  cause  may  be  set  down  within  this  period 
as  a  matter  of  course,  but  that  afterwards  the  leave  of  the  Court  may  be 
obtained.3  Previously  to  the  Orders  of  1841,  when  an  objection  for 
want  of  parties  was  taken  at  the  hearing,  the  rule  with  respect  to  costs 
was,  that  if  the  objection  for  want  of  parties  had  been  taken  by  the 
defendant's  answer,  or  if  it  arose  upon  a  statement  of  the  bill,  then  the 
liberty  to  amend  or  file  a  supplemental  bill  was  not  given  to  the  plain- 
tiff, except  upon  the  terms  of  his  paying  to  the  defendant  the  costs  of 
the  day;  but  if  the  objection  depended  upon  a  fact  within  the  defend- 

9  T.d.  R-d.  281;  onte,  p.  287,  note;  Harrison  are  now  no  longer  so;  and  secondly,  because 

r.  Rowan,  4  Wash.  C.  C.  202;    Story,  Eq.  PI.  the  Court  is  now  enabled  to  make  a  decree  be- 

§§  885,  886,  and  note,  in  which  is  inserted  the  tween  the  parties  before  it,  although  there  are 

rules  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  other  parties  not  before  it  who  are  interested  in 

on  the  subject  of  amendments,  adopted  January  the  question  to  be  determined.     15  &  1G  Vic. 

term    1842.  c.  86,  §  51;  see  also  Cons.  Ord.  XXIII.  11;  and 

io  This  39th  Order  is  now  abolished  in  Eng-  see  Meddowcroft  v.  Campbell,   13  Beav.  184; 

land  by  the  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,   §  4:5,  whereby  see  also  May  v.  Selby,  1  Y.  &  C.  C.  C.  235,  238; 

the  practice  in  existence  before  18*41  is  restored.  6  Jur.  52;  Faulkner  v.  Daniel,  3  Hare,  199,  213; 

See  Moodie  v.  Bannister,  17  Jur.  520,  V.  C.  K.  Daubuz  v.  Peel,  1  C.  P.  Coop.  temp.  Gott. 365; 

No  costs  are  given  where  the  defect  arises  from  Maybery  v.  Brooking,  7  De  G.  M.  &  G.  673;  2 

an  event  occurring  after  the  cause  is  at  issue.  Jur.  X.  S.  76 ;  Feltham  v.  Clark,  1  De  G.  &  S. 

See   Fussell  v.  Elwin,  7  Hare,  29  ;  13  Jur.  333.  207.     Assignees   of  a  bankrupt  were  directed 

For  form  of  order  on  cause  standing  over  with  to  be  served  with  a  copy  of  a  decree  made  in 

leave  to   amend   on   payment   of  costs  of  the  their  absence.  Dorsett  v.  Dorsett,  8  Jur.  N.  S. 

dav,  see  Seton,  1113,  No.  1.    Under  the  present  146,  147. 

practice  of  the  Court  in  England,  objections  for  >  Bradstock  r.  Whatley,  6  Beav.  451. 

want  of  parties  are  of  comparatively  rare  occur-  2  39th  Order,  Aug.,  1841,  and  S.  C;   Has- 

rence;  in  the  first  place,  because  in  many  cases  kell  v.  Hilton,  30  Maine,  421. 

persons  who  were  formerly  necessary  parties  3  Cockburn  v.  Thompson,  13  Sim.  188. 

286 


OF    OBJECTIONS    FOR    WANT    OF    PARTIES.  *  292 

ant's  knowledge,  and  was  not  raised  by  his  answer,  the  order  would 
be  made  without  payment  of  costs  of  the  day.4 

*  The  recent  Orders  do  not  appear  directly  to  have  affected  this  *  292 
rule  concerning  costs  in  such  cases,  but  the  40th  Order,  of  August, 
1841,  provides,  that  if  the  defendant  shall  at  the  hearing  of  a  cause 
object  that  a  suit  is  defective  for  want  of  parties,  not  having  by  plea  or 
answer  taken  the  objection,  and  therein  specified  by  name  or  descrip- 
tion the  parties  to  whom  the  objection  applies,  the  Court,  if  it  shall 
think  fit,  may  make  a  decree  saving  the  rights  of  the  absent  parties.1 

The  discretion  given  to  the  Court  by  this  Order  will  only  be  exer- 
cised in  cases  where  the  rights  of  the  absent  party  can  be  protected  by 
the  decree  as  if  he  were  present;  or  at  all  events  where  the  rights  can- 
not be  prejudiced  by  a  decree  made  in  their  absence.2  Consequently, 
in  a  suit  for  the  execution  of  a  trust  created  for  the  benefit  of  creditors, 
against  the  trustees,  Sir  James  Wigram  V.  C.  refused  to  make  a  decree 
in  the  absence  of  the  person  who  created  the  trust,  or  his  personal 
representative.3 

The  Court  will  not,  at  the  hearing,  give  leave  to  the  plaintiff  to 
amend  by  adding  parties,  if  by  so  doing  the  nature  of  the  case  made  by 
the  bill  will  be  changed;  4  an  order  was  however  made  at  the  hearing, 
that  the  plaintiffs  should  be  at  liberty  to  amend  their  bill  by  adding 
parties,  as  they  should  be  advised,  or  by  showing  why  they  were  unable 
to  bring  the  proper  parties  before  the  Court.5 

The  proper  time  for  taking  an  objection  for  want  of  parties  is  upon 
opening  the  pleadings,  and  before  the  merits  are  discussed: 6  but  it  fre- 
quently happens  that  after  a  cause  has  been  heard,  the  Court  has  felt 
itself  compelled  to  let  it  stand  over  for  the  purpose  of  amendment.7 

4  Mitchell  v.  Bailey.  3  Mad.  61;  Furze  v.  *  Deniston  v.  Little,  2  Sch.  &  Lef.  11,  n.; 

Sharwood,  5  M.  &  C.96;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Hill,  3  and   see  Watts  v.  Hyde,  2  Phil.  406,  411;  11 

M.  &  C.  247;    Mason  v.   Franklin,  1  Y.  &  C.  Jur.  979;  2  Coll.  368 ;" see  post,  p.  404;  Bellamy 

242;  Kinvan  v.  Daniel,  7  Hare,  347,  351;  Per-  v.  Sabine,  2  Phil.  425,  427. 
kin  v.  Bradley,  1   Hare,  219,  where  notice  of  5  Milligan  v.  Mitchell,  1  M.  &  C.  511. 

disclaimer  had  been  given  to  the  objecting  de-  6  Jones  v.   Jones,  3  Atk.  Ill ;  Alderson  v. 

fendant :  as  to  the  amount  of  costs,  see  35th  Harris,  12  Ala.  580;  Van  Doren  v.  Robinson, 

Ord.  1828;  Genl.  Ord.  XL.  22:  Seton,  1117;  16  N.  J.  Eq.  256. 

see  Colt  v.  Lasnier,  3  Cowen,  320;  Story,  Eq.  "i  Jones  v.  Jones,  3  Atk.  Ill;  ante,  p.  287, 

PI.  §  541.      When  the  objection  is  taken   by  note.     An  objection  for  want  of  parties  may  be 

demurrer,  and  sustained,  the  defendant  will  be  taken  on  the  hearing,  and  is  usually  made  upon 

entitled  to  his  costs;  but  when  it  is  taken  at  the  opening  the  pleadings.     Ibid.;  Holdsworth  r. 

hearing  only,  the  defendant  is  usually  not  enti-  Holdsworth,  2  Dick.  799;   and  see  Magdalen 

tied  to  his  costs.     Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  541.  College  e.  Sibthorp,  1   Ross.  154;  see  Felch  v. 

i  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  236,  note.    The  same  rule  Eooper,  20   Maine,  163,  164;  Hussey  r.  Dole, 

lias  been  adopted  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  24  Maine,  20 ;    New   London   Bank   v.   Lee,  11 

United  States,  53d  Equity  Rule  of  the  U.  S.  Conn.  112:  Winnipiseogee  Lake  Co.  r.  Wors- 

Supreme  Court,  January  term,  1842.     See  Cly-  ter,  29  N.  II.  4:13;  Clark  o.  Long,  4  Rand.  451; 

mer  v.  James,  Halst.  Dig.  168;  post,  294,  295,  Miller  v.  M'Can,  7  Paige,  452;  Cabeen  v.  Gor- 

note;  Greene  v.  Sisson,  2  Curtis,  C.  C.  171,  177.  don,  1  Hill,  Ch.  53;    R.  Owing's  case,  1  Bland, 

2  See  Greene  v.  Sisson,  2  Curtis,  C.  C.  171,  2.')2;  Robinson  v.  Smith,  3  Paige,  222;  Mitchell 
177;  Wilson  v.  City  Bank,  3  Sumner,  422;  v.  Lennox,  2  Paige,  281;  Evans  v.  Chism,  18 
Hogan  o.  Walker,  14  How.  (U.  S.)  36;  McCall  Maine,  223;  Clifton  v.  Haig,  4  Desaus.  331. 
v.  Yard,  9  N.  J.  Eq.  358.  As  to  costs  in  such  case,  see  Cox  v.  Stephens, 

3  Kimber  v.  Ensworth,  1  Hare,  293,  295;  6  9  Jur.  N.  S.  1144;  11  W.  R.  929;  Rowsell  v. 
Jur.  165;  see  also  May*.  Selby,  1  Y.  &  C.  237;  Morris,  L.  R.  17  Eq.  20;  Lydall  v.  Martinson, 
and  Faulkner  v.  Daniel,  3  Hare,  199.  5  Ch.  D.  780;  Dowdeswell   v.  Dowdeswell,  \\ . 

287 


*293 


OP   PARTIES    TO    A    SUIT. 


*  293  *  The  objection  for  want  of  parties  ouglxt  to  proceed  from  a 
defendant;  for  it  has  been  decided  that  the  plaintiff  bringing  his 
cause  to  a  hearing  without  proper  parties,  cannot  put  it  off  without  the 
consent  of  the  defendant.1  Cases  of  exception  may  occur,  where,  for 
instance,  the  plaintiff  was  not  aware  of  the  existence  of  persons  whose 
claims  could  touch  the  interests  of  those  who  were  upon  the  record; 
but  that  ought  to  be  clearly  established;  and  the  plaintiff  ought  to 
apply  as  soon  as  he  has  obtained  that  knowledge.2 

A  plaintiff  may  at  the  hearing  obviate  an  objection  for  want  of  a 
particular  party,  by  waiving  the  relief  he  is  entitled  to  against  such 
party; 8  and  where  the  evident  consequence  of  the  establishment  of  the 
rights  asserted  by  the  bill  might  be  the  giving  to  the  plaintiff  a  claim 
against  persons  who  are  not  parties,  the  plaintiff  by  waiving  that  claim 
may  avoid  the  necessity  of  making  those  persons  parties.4  This,  how- 
ever, cannot  be  done  to  the  prejudice  of  others.5 

In  some  cases,  the  defect  of  parties  has  been  cured  at  the  hearing  by 
the  undertaking  of  the  plaintiff  to  give  full  effect  to  the  utmost  rights 
which  the  absent  party  could  have  claimed;  those  rights  being  such  as 
could  not  affect  the  interest  of  the  defendants.  Thus,  where  a  bill  was 
filed  to  set  aside  a  release  which  had  been  executed  in  pursuance  of  a 
family  arrangement,  in  consequence  of  which  a  sum  of  stock  was 
invested  in  the  names  of  trustees  for  the  benefit  of  the  plaintiff's  wife 
and  unborn  children,  which  benefit  would  be  lost  if  the  release  was  set 
aside,  the  trustees  of  the  settlement  were  held   necessary  parties,  in 


N.  (1877)  228.  In  Ferguson  v.  Fisk,  28  Conn. 
511,  it  was  held,  that  no  objection  for  want  of 
parties  could  be  made  after  a  hearing  on  the 
merits,  either  before  the  Court  or  its  Commit- 
tee. See  Chipman  v.  City  of  Hartford,  21 
Conn.  48;};  New  London  Bank  r.  Lee,  11 
Conn.  120.  The  ordinary  course  in  Chancery, 
where  a  want  of  proper  parties  appears  at  the 
hearing,  is  for  the  cause  to  stand  over  in  order 
that  they  may  be  added.  Colt  v.  Lasnier,  3 
Cowen,  320.  When  the  objection  is  only  made 
at  the  hearing,  it  will  not  avail,  unless  the 
Court  is  unable  to  proceed  to  a  decree  between 
the  parties.  Swan  v.  Clark.  .36  Iowa,  560; 
Wallace  v.  Homes,  5  Fish.  Pat.  Cas.  15;  Freight 
Money  of  Monadnock,  5  Ben.  357;  Smith  v. 
Bartholomew,  42  Yt.  356;  Vaiden  v.  Stubble- 
tield,  28  Gratt.  153. 

1  Lines  v.  Jackson,  16  Ves.  356;  1  Bligh, 
104;  for  the  circumstances  under  which  the  de- 
fendant must  support  his  objection  by  evi- 
dence, see  Campbell  ».  Dickens,  4  Y.  &  C. 
17;  Barker  v.  Rail-on,  11  L.  J.  N.  S.  372.  The 
objection  of  misjoinder  of  parties,  as  defend- 
ants in  a  bill,  is  a  mere  personal  privilege,  and 
consequently  those  only  can  demur  for  that 
cause  who  are  improperly  joined.  Gartland  v. 
Nunn,  0  Eng.  720;  infra,  302,  n.  4. 

-  [lines  ».  Jackson,  supra;  see  Thompson  v. 
Poeble.  6  Dana,  302. 

3  Pawlet  r.  Bishop  of  Lincoln,  2  Atk.  296. 


4  Ld.  Red.  179;  Story,  Eq.  PL  §§  127,  129, 
213,  214,  228.  So,  in  some  cases,  when  all  the 
parties  are  not  before  the  Court,  the  merits,  as 
between  those  parties  who  are  before  the  Court, 
may  be  decided  at  their  request.  See  Wick- 
liffe  v.  Clay,  1  Dana,  103.  If  the  Court  can 
make  a  decree,  at  the  hearing,  which  will  do 
entire  justice  to  all  the  parties,  and  not  preju- 
dice their  rights,  notwithstanding  the  non- 
joinder or  misjoinder  of  some,  an  objection  on 
that  account  will  not  be  allowed  to  prevail. 
White  v.  Delschneider,  1  Oregon,  254. 

5  Ld.  Red.  180;  Dart  v.  Palmer,  1  Barb.Ch. 
92.  If  the  case  made  by  the  bill  entitles  the 
plaintiff  to- particular  relief  against  the  defend- 
ant, and  would  also  entitle  him  to  further  re- 
lief were  the  necessary  parties  before  the  Court, 
and  the  prayer  of  the  bill  specifically  asks  for 
the  more  extended  relief,  to  which  the  plaintiff 
is  not  entitled  in  consequence  of  the  defect  of 
parties,  the  defendant  may  demur  to  the  whole 
bill  for  want  of  parties.  Dart  v.  Palmer,  1 
Barb.  Ch.  92.  A  Court  can  make  no  decree  in 
an  Equity  suit,  in  which  the  interests  of  a  per- 
son not  a  party  are  so  involved  that  complete 
justice  cannot  be  done  between  the  parties  to 
the  suit,  without  affecting  the  rights  of  the 
person,  not  a  party,  whose  interests  are  so  in- 
volved. Shields  v.  Barrow,  17  How.  U.  S. 
130;  ante,  p.  149,  n.  1. 


OF    OBJECTIONS    FOR    WANT   OF   PARTIES. 


294 


order  to  assert  the  right  of  the  children ;  but  upon  the  plaintiff's 
counsel  undertaking  that  all  the  moneys  to  be  recovered  *  by  the    *  294 
suit  should  be  settled  upon  the  same  trusts  for  the  benefit  of  the 
plaintiff's  wife  and  children,  the  cause  was  permitted  to  proceed  with- 
out the  trustees,  and  ultimately,  upon  the  undertaking  of  the  plaintiff, 
the  plaintiffs  were  declared  not  bound  by  the  release.1 

As  a  decree  made  in  the  absence  of  proper  parties  may  be  reversed, 
and  at  all  events  will  not  bind  those  who  are  absent  or  those  claiming 
under  them,2  great  care  should  be  taken  to  have  the  necessary  parties 
before  the  Court  at  the  hearing;3  because,  as  we  have  seen  before,  the 
plaintiff  cannot  then  apply  for  leave  to  add  parties  without  the  consent 
of  the  defendant. 

The  most  usual  way  of  adding  parties  is  by  amendment  of  the  origi- 
nal bill,  though  sometimes  it  is  done  by  supplemental  bill  or  order, 
and  the  Court  will  suffer  the  plaintiff  to  amend  his  bill  by  adding  par- 
ties at  any  time  before  the  hearing;  but  if  the  amendment  is  made  after 
the  expiration  of  the  time  for  giving  notice  for  the  cross-examination 
of  witnesses,  the  evidence  cannot  be  read  against  the  new  parties.4 


1  Harvey  v.  Cooke,  4  Russ.  35;  and  see 
Walker  v.  Jefferies,  1  Hare,  296,  and  341,  356  ; 
Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  220. 

2"Prac.  Reg.  299;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  236; 
Whiting  v.  Bank  of  U.  S.  13  Peters,  14; 
Spring  v.  Jenkins,  1  Ired.  Eq.  128;  Shields  v. 
Barrow,  17  How.  U.  S.  130;  Stat.  U.  S.  Feb. 
28,  1839,  5  Stats,  at  Urge,  321 ;  47th  Equity 
Rule  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States. 
See  ante,  p.  191,  note,  and  p  149,  n.  1.  See 
also  U .  S.  Rev.  Stats.  §  737,  et  seq. 

3  For  cases  in  which  the  defect  of  parties 
has  been  remedied  by  the  voluntary  appearance 
at  the  hearing,  see  ante,  153  ;  Joy  v.  Wirtz,  1 
Wash.  C.  C.  517. 

4  Goodwin  v.  Goodwin,  3  Atk.  370  ;  Pratt 
v.  Barker,  1  Sim.  1.  See  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  XVI. 
16 ;  post,  p.  405.  A  person  in  interest,  who  has 
never  appeared,  or  been  cited  to  appear,  may, 
upon  motion,  and  without  a  supplemental  bill, 
at  the  hearing  upon  bill,  answer,  and  proof,  be 
summoned  in  and  made  a  party.  Miller  v. 
Whittier,  32  Maine,  521.  Where  new  parties 
are  added  in  a  case  after  the  testimony  is 
taken,  the  cause  should  be  heard  on  bill  and 
answer  as  to  such  new  defendants.  Smith  t'. 
Baldwin,  4  Har.  &  J.  331. 

Courts  of  Equity  will  not  dismiss  bills  abso- 
lutely for  want  of  proper  parties,  the  plaintiff 
showing  enough  to  give  color  to  his  claim  for 
relief  against  the  parties  not  before  the  Court. 
In  such  case  the  Court  may  properly  give  the 
plaintiff  leave  to  amend,  and  make  the  proper 
parties.  Allen  v.  Smith,  1  Leigh,  331;  Hutchin- 
son v.  Reed,  1  Hoff.  Ch.  316;  Hayden  v.  Mar- 
maduke,  19  Miss.  403  ;  Franklin  v.  Franklin, 
2  Swan  (Tenn.),  521  ;  Potter  v.  Holden,  31 
Conn.  385;   Thomas  v.  Adams,  30  111.  37.     If 

VOL.    I.  —  19 


the  objection  of  the  want  of  the  proper  parties 
is  taken  by  plea  or  demurrer,  it  is  a  matter  of 
course  to  dismiss  the  plaintiff's  bill  upon  the 
allowance  of  a  plea  or  demurrer,  unless  the 
plaintiff  takes  issue  on  the  plea,  or  obtains 
leave  to  amend  on  the  usual  terms.  Van  Epps 
v.  Van  Deusen,  4  Paige,  64,  76.  If  the  defend- 
ant makes  no  objection  for  want  of  proper 
parties,  either  by  plea,  answer,  or  demurrer, 
and  raises  that  objection  for  the  first  time  at 
the  hearing,  the  bill  should  not  be  dismissed, 
where  the  defect  can  be  remedied  by  an 
amendment  or  a  supplemental  bill,  provided 
the  plaintiff  elects  to  bring  the  proper  parties 
before  the  Court  within  a  reasonable  time.  lb. 
p.  76;  Harder  v.  Harder,  2  Sandf  Ch.  17; 
Peterson  v.  Poignard,  6  R.  Mon.  570.  The 
only  exception  to  the  rule  arises  where  it  ap- 
pears that  the  necessary  parties  have  been  left 
out  of  the  bill  by  the  fraud  or  bad  faith  of  the 
plaintiff.  See  Rowland  v.  Gannan,  1  J.  J. 
Marsh.  76;  Parberry  v.  Coram,  3  Bibb,  108; 
Cabeen  v.  Gordon,  1  Hill  (S.  C),  Ch.  53; 
Hutchinson  v.  Reed,  1  Hoff.  Ch.  320;  Clifton 
r.  Ilaig,  4  Desaus.  331 ;  New  London  Bank  v. 
Lee,  11  Conn.  112;  Malin  v.  Malin,  2  John.Ch. 
338  ;  Nash  r.  Smith,  6  Conn.  422  ;  Rogers  v. 
Rogers,  1  Hopk.  515:  S.  C.  1  Paige,  188;  S.  C. 
2  Paige,  467;  Bland  v.  Wyatt,  1  Ben.  &  M. 
43;  Sears  v.  Powell,  5  John.  Ch.  259  ;  Bowen 
v.  Idley,  6  Paige,  46;  Ensworth  v.  Lambert, 
4  John.  Ch.  605;  Smith  v.  Turrentine,  8  Ired. 
Eq.  185. 

If  the  bill  is  dismissed  for  want  of  the 
proper  parties,  it  should  not,  where  it  has 
equity,  be  dismissed  absolutely,  but  without 
prejudice  to  the  ri^ht  of  the  plaintiff  in  any 
future  litigation.     See  Craig  v.  Barbour,  2  J. 

289 


295 


OF   PARTIFS   TO    A   SUIT. 


*  295  *  An  order  to  amend  by  adding  parties  allows  of  the  introduction 
of  apt  words  to  charge  them;  but  it  seems  that  the  plaintiff,  if 
it  is  necessary,  should  apply  for  liberty  to  add  allegations  applicable  to 
the  case  of  the  proposed  new  parties,  as  this  is  not  included  in  the 
liberty  to  amend  by  adding  parties; *  and  under  an  order  giving  liberty 
to  add  parties  by  amendment  or  supplemental  bill,  a  plaintiff  may  do 
both.2  A  plaintiff  is  not  obliged,  in  adding  parties  by  amendment,  to 
make  them  defendants;  he  may,  if  he  pleases,  apply  for  leave  to  make 
them  co-plaintiffs,  and  he  has  been  permitted  to  do  so  by  special  motion 
after  the  defendants  have  answered  the  original  bill.3  It  is  to  be 
observed,  however,  that  after  answer,  the  addition  of  a  co-plaintiff  is 
not  a  matter  of  course ;  and  that,  in  such  case,  the  granting  or  refusing 
of  an  order  to  amend  by  adding  parties  as  plaintiffs,  is  in  the  discretion 
of  the  Court.4 


Section  IV.  —  Of  the  Joinder  of  Parties  who  have  no  Interest 

in  the  Suit. 

It  has  been  before  stated,  that  no  one  should  be  made  a  party  to  a 
suit  against  whom,  if  brought  to  a  hearing,  there  can  be  no  decree; 5  (a) 


J.  Marsh.  220  ;  Thompson  v.  Clay,  3  Monroe, 
361;  Van  Epps  v.  Van  Deusen,  4  Paige,  76; 
Miller  v.  M'Can,  7  Paige,  452  ;  Huston  v. 
M'Ciarty,  3  Litt.  274  ;  Steele  v.  Lewis,  1 
Monroe,  49;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  236;  West  v. 
Randall,  2  Mason,  181;  Mechanics'  Bank  of 
Alexandria  v.  Setons,  1  Peters,  306  ;  Hunt  v. 
Wickliffe,  8  Peters,  215;  Patrick  r.  White,  6 
B  Mon.  330;  ante,  287,  note;  Jameson  v. 
Deshields,  3  Gratt.  4;  Kirkpatrick  r.  Buford, 
21  Ark.  268.  But  if  the  plaintiff  shows  no 
right  to  relief  against  the  parties  before  the 
Court,  and  his  bill  is  dismissed,  the  Appellate 
Court  will  not  reverse  the  decree  to  enable  him 
to  introduce  new  parties,  and  thereby  make  a 
new  case  upon  the  merits.  Jameson  v.  De- 
shields,  3  Gratt.  4.  Under  the  present  English 
practice,  limiting  the  number  of  parties  neces- 
sary to  a  decree,  Rule  7  provides,  that  in  the 
cases  falling  within  the  regulations  of  the  six 
preceding  rules,  "the  Court,  if  it  shall  see  fit, 
may  require  any  other  person  or  persons  to  be 
made  a  part}-  or  parties  to  the  suit,  and  may, 
if  it  shall  see  fit,  give  the  conduct  of  the  suit  to 
such  person  as  it  may  deem  proper,  and  may 
make  such  order,  in  any  particular  case,  as  it 
may  deem  just  for  placing  the  defendant  on  the 
record  on  the  same  footing,  in  regard  to  costs, 


(a)  See  Saunders  r.  Saunders,  3  Drew.  387; 
1  Jur.  N.  S.  1008.  A  sheriff  is  not  usually  a  ne- 
cessary party  to  a  suit  in  which  his  official  acts, 
such  as  sales  upon  execution,  are  in  litigation. 
See  North  v.  Peters,  138  U.  S.  271;  Sioux  City 
&c.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Chicago  &c.  By.  Co.  27  Fed.  Rep. 
290 


as  other  parties  having  a  common  interest  with 
him  in  the  matters  in  question." 

i  Hand.  77:  Palk  /■.  Lord  Clinton,  12  Ves. 
48;  Mason  v.  Franklin,  1  Y.  &  C.  239,  242; 
Gibson  v.  Ingo,  5  Hare,  156  ;  Bateman  r.  Mar- 
gerison,  6  Hare,  496,  502;  and  cases  referred 
to,  1  C.  P.  Coop.  temp.  Cott.  35-37;  Barlow  v. 
M' Murray,  L.  R.  2  Eq.  420.  When  the  plain- 
tiff is  allowed  to  amend  on  account  of  the  want 
of  proper  parties,  he  possesses  the  incidental 
right  to  amend  by  charging  all  such  matters, 
as  constitute  the  equity  of  his  case,  against  the 
new  party.  Stephens  v.  Frost,  2  Y.  &  C.  297.  If 
a  necessary  party  be  added  to  a  bill,  it  is  to 
him  as  an  original  bill,  and  he  is  entitled  to  the 
same  time  to  plead,  answer,  &c,  as  an  original 
defendant.  Hoxey  v.  Carey,  12  Ga.  534;  Van 
Leonard  v.  Stocks,  id.  546;  see  McDougald  r. 
Dougherty,  14  Ga.  674. 

2  Minn  r.  Stant,  15  Beav.  129 

3  Hichens  v.  Congreve,  1  Sim.  500;  see 
Milligan  v.  Mitchell,  1  M.  &  C.  433,  442,  443; 
Miller  r.  M'Can,  7  Paige,  451. 

4  The  practice  relating  to  the  addition  of  par- 
ties by  amendment  is  treated  of  in  the  chapter 
concerning  "  The  Amending  of  Bills." 

5  De  Golls  v.  Ward.  3  P.  Wms.  311,  n.  1 ; 
Todd  r.  Sterrett,  6  J.  J.  Marsh.  432.     It  is  a 


770;  Meinhard  v.  Youngblood,  37  S.  C.  223; 
Dodson  v.  Lomax,  113  Mo.  555;  Colorado 
Manuf.  Co.  r.  McDonald,  15  Col.  516;  Butler  v. 
Clark,  21  N.  Y.  S.  415;  National  Park  Bank  v. 
Goddard,  131  N.  Y.  494;  Edney  v.  King,  4  Ired. 
Eq.  465,   Shrader  v.  Walker,  8  Ala.  244;    Jar- 


OF   THE   JOINDER    OF    PARTIES. 


296 


thus,  an  agent  for  the  purchase  of  an  estate,  is  not  a  *  necessary  *29G 
party  to  a  bill 1  against  his  employer  for  a  specific  performance, 
although  he  signed  the  memorandum  for  the  purchase  in  his  own 
name; 2  and  so  a  residuary  legatee  need  not  be  made  a  party  to  a  bill 
against  an  executor  for  a  debt  or  legacy;  and  for  the  same  reason  in  a 
bill  brought  by  or  against  the  assignees  of  a  bankrupt  or  insolvent  in 
respect  of  the  property  vested  in  them,  under  the  bankruptcy  or  insol- 
vency, the  bankrupt  or  insolvent  should  not  be  a  party; 3  and  to  a  suit 
to  ascertain  the  property  in  a  certain  share  in  a  banking  company,  liti- 
gated between  two  claimants,  the  company  is  not  a  necessary  party.4 
Upon  the  same  principle,  persons  who  are  mere  witnesses,  and  may  be 
examined  as  such,  ought  not  to  be  made  defendants; s  even  though  the 
object  of  the  bill  is  to  obtain  a  discovery  in  aid  of  an  action  at  Law  in 
which  their  discovery  would  be  more  effectual  than  their  examination.6 
This  rule  is,  however,  liable  to  exceptions;  thus,  in  cases  where, 
under  certain  circumstances,  a  discovery  upon  oath  is  desirable  from 
individual  members  of  a  corporation  aggregate,  or  from  the  officers  of  a 
corporation,  such  members  or  officers  may  be  made  defendants.7 


good  ground  of  demurrer  to  the  whole  bill,  that 
a  person  who  has  no  interest  in  the  suit,  and 
has  no  equity  against  the  defendant,  is  improp- 
erly joined  as  a  party  plaintiff.  Clarkson  v.  De 
Peyster,  3  Paige,  336;  Little  r.  Buie,  5  Jones, 
Eq".  (N.  C.)  10;  King  v.  Galloway,  id.  128;  see 
Wright  v.  Santa  Clara  Mining  Association,  12 
Md.  443;  Westfall  v.  Scott,  20  Ga.  233.  A  bill 
for  contribution  by  one  stockholder  of  a  manu- 
facturing corporation,  who  has  paid  debts  of 
the  corporation  under  legal  process,  is  open  to  a 
demurrer,  by  a  defendant  who  did  not  appear 
ever  to  have  been  a  stockholder  in  the  corpora- 
tion. Heath  v.  Ellis,  12  Gush.  601,  604.  One 
defendant  cannot  object  that  another  defendant, 
having  no  interest  in  the  subject-matter  of  the 
suit,  is  improperly  made  a  party.  Cherry  v. 
Monro,  2  Barb.  Ch.  618:  infra,  p.  302,  n.  4. 

1  Garr  v.  Bright,  1  Barb.  Ch.  157;  Lyon  v. 
Tevis,  8  Clarke  (Iowa),  79:  Avers  v.  Wright, 
8  Ired.  Eq.  229;  see  Allin  r.  Hall,  1  A.  K. 
Marsh.  527;  Orkey  v.  Bend,  3  Edw.  Ch.  482; 
Jones  v.  Hart,  1  Hen.  &  M.  470;  Davis  v. 
Simpson,  5  Har.  &  J.  147.  If  an  agent,  sell- 
ing land,  binds  himself  individually,  he  should 
be  a  party  to  a  suit  touching  the  sale.  Alex- 
ander v.  Lee,  3  A.  K.  Marsh.  484. 

A  private  agent,  or  a  public  officer  having 
process  in  his  hands  which  is  sought  to  be  en- 
joined, or  a  ministerial  officer,  such  as  a  clerk 
of  Court,  ought  not  to  be  made  a  defendant; 
and  if  so  made  may  demur,  and  no  decree  can 
be  taken  against  him  even  for  co=ts.  Boyd 
p.  Vanderkemp,   1  Barb.   Ch.  273;  Holmes  v. 


Chester,  26  N.  J.  Eq.  79;  Lackey  v.  Curtis,  6 
Ired.  Eq.  199;  Hext  v.  Walker,  5  Rich.  Eq.  5; 
Blanton  v.  Hall.  2  Heisk.  423;  Montgomery  v. 
Whitworth,  1  Tenn.  Ch.  174;  Blooinstein  v. 
Brien,  2  id.  778.  It  is  otherwise  where  the 
officer,  a  clerk,  has  the  legal  title  to  the  note  in 
controversy.  Rice  v.  Hunt,  12  Heisk.  344.  Or 
where  the  officer,  a  sheriff,  has  by  levy  acquired 
title  to  the  personal  property  in  dispute.  Buck- 
ner  v.  Abrahams,  3  Tenn.  Ch.  346  ;  Oil  Run 
Co.  v.  Gale,  6  W.  Va.  525. 

2  Kingley  v.  Young,  Coop.  Eq.  PI.  42. 

3  See  ante,  p.  256,  n.  1. 

4  Scawin  o.  Scawin,  1  Y.  &  C  68. 

5  Plummer  v.  May,  1  Ves.  426;  How  v. 
Best,  5  Mad.  19;  Footman  v.  Pray,  R.  M. 
Charlt.  291;  Fenton  v.  Hughes,  7  Sumner's 
Yes.  287,  Perkins's  note  ("),  and  cases  cited; 
Newman  r.  Godfrey,  2  Bro.  C.  C.  (Perkins's 
ed.)  332;  Reeves  v.  Adams,  2  Dev.  Ch.  192; 
Yates  v.  Monroe,  13  111.  212. 

6  Fenton  v.  Hughes,  7  Ves.  288;  see  next 
preceding  note,  and  ante,  p.  145,  note. 

7  See  nnte,  145;  Fenton  v.  Hughes,  7  Sum- 
ner's Ves.  287,  Perkins's  note  ("),  and  cases 
cited  to  this  point;  Kennebec  and  Portland 
R.  R.  Co.  o.  Portland  and  Kennebec  R.  II.  Co. 
54  Maine,  184.  With  respect  to  this  exception, 
Lord  Eldon  here  observed  that  "  the  principle 
upon  which  the  rule  has  been  adopted  is  very 
singular;  it  originated  with  Lord  Talbot  (Wych 
v.  Meal.  3  P.  Wms.  210;  see  United  Srntes  V. 
Wagner.  L.  R.  2  Ch.  582,  587;  S.  C.  L.  R.  '• 
Eq.  724;  Prioleau  v.  United  States,  L.  R.  2  Eq 


man  v.  Saunders,  64  N.  C.  367;  but  see  Burpee 
v.  Smith,  Walk.  Ch.  327;  Brooks  v.  Lewis,  13 
N.  J.  Eq.  214;  Hassell  u.  Van  Houten,  39  id. 
113 ;  Beaird  v.  Foreman,  Breese,  303.    The  com- 


missioner who  sold  land  under  order  of  Court, 
and  received  the  purchase  money,  is  not  a  neces- 
sary party  to  a  suit  to  impeach  a  decree.  Gil- 
bert r.  James,  86  N.  C.  244. 

291 


298 


OF   PARTIES   TO    A    SUIT. 


*  297        *  Other  persons  are  mentioned  by  Lord   Eldon  as  affording 

exceptions  to  the  rule  before  laid  down,  that  mere  witnesses  can- 
not be  made  parties  to  a  suit,  namely,  agents  to  sell,  auctioneers,  &c,  who 
have  been  made  defendants  without  objection:1  his  Lordship,  however, 
appears  to  have  thought  that  the  practice  of  making  such  persons  par- 
ties arose  originally  from  their  having  some  interest,  such  as  holding 
deposits,  which  might  entitle  the  plaintiff  to  relief  against  them;  and 
it  has  been  since  held,  that  an  agent  who  bids  at  an  auction  for  an 
estate,  and  signs  the  memorandum  in  his  own  name  for  the  purchase, 
need  not  be  made  a  co-defendant  with  his  employer  to  a  bill  for  the 
specific  performance  of  such  agreement.2  In  Dummer  v.  Corporation 
of  Chippenham,*  Lord  Eldon  also  mentions,  as  cases  of  exception  to 
the  general  rule  above  referred  to,  those  of  arbitrators  and  attorneys. 
With  respect  to  arbitrators,  however,  it  is  a  rule,  that  in  general  an 
arbitrator  cannot  be  made  a  party  to  a  bill  for  the  purpose  of  impeach- 
ing an  award,  and  that,  if  he  is,  he  may  demur  to  the  bill,  as  well  to 
the  discovery  as  to  the  relief.4  In  some  cases,  nevertheless,  where  an 
award  has  been  impeached  on  the  ground  of  gross  misconduct  in  the 
arbitrators,  and  they  have  been  made  parties  to  the  suit,  the  Court  has 
gone  so  far  as  to  order  them  to  pay  the  costs.5  In  such  cases,  Lord 
Eedesdale  considers  it  probable  that  a  demurrer  to  the  bill  would  not 
have  been  allowed; 6  and  in  Lord  Lonsdale  v.  Littledale,"1  a  demurrer 
by  an  arbitrator  to  a  bill  of  this  nature  was  in  fact  overruled;  though 

not  expressly  upon  the  ground  of  the  impropriety  of  making  an 

*  298    arbitrator  a  party,  but  because  the  bill  charged  certain  *  specific 

acts  which  showed  combination  or  collusion  between  him  and 
one  of  the  parties,  and  made  him  the  agent  for  such  party,  and  which 
the  Court  therefore  thought  required  an  answer.1    But  although  arbi- 


659),  who  reasoned  thus  upon  it :  that  you  can- 
not have  a  satisfactory  answer  from  a  corpora- 
tion, therefore,  you  make  the  secretary  a  party, 
and  get  from  him  the  discovery  you  cannot  be 
sure  of  having  from  them ;  and  it  is  added,  that 
the  answer  of  the  secretary  may  enable  you  to 
get  better  information."  "The  first  of  these 
principles,"  continues  his  Lordship,  "is  ex- 
tremely questionable,  if  it  were  now  to  be  con- 
sidered for  the  first  time;  and  as  to  the  latter, 
it  is  very  singular  to  make  a  person  a  defend- 
ant in  order  to  enable  yourself  to  deal  better, 
and  with  more  success,  with  those  whom  you 
have  a  right  to  put  upon  the  record ;  but  this 
practice  has  so  universally  obtained  without  ob- 
jection, that  it  must  be  considered  established." 
A  suit,  to  restrain  the  misappropriation  of  a  fund 
held  by  a  corporation  in  trust,  cannot  be  main- 
tained against  the  trustees  appointed  by  the 
corporation  to  hold  and  manage  the  fund,  with- 
out making  the  corporation  a  party.  Tibballs 
v.  Bidwell,  1  Gray,  399.  To  obtain  the  specific 
performance  of  a  contract  with  a  corporation  for 
the  sale  of  real  estate,  the  trustee  who  holds 
the  legal  title  to  the  land  should  be  made  a  co- 
defendant.    Morrow  v.  Lawrence,  7  Wis.  574. 

292 


i  Ibid.  ;  Gartland  v.  Nunn,  6  Eng.  720;  see 
ante,  p.  193,  n.  Where  one  of  two  partners, 
after  a  dissolution,  consigned  property  to  an 
agent  for  sale,  the  proceeds  to  be  applied  to  the 
payment  of  a  partnership  debt,  in  a  bill  against 
the  agent  by  the  other  partner,  the  partner  by 
whom  the  consignment  was  made,  having  be- 
come insolvent,  he  and  his  assignee  were  prop- 
erly made  defendants.  Bartlett  v.  Parks,  1  Cush. 
82.  Wilde  J.  said  that  the  insolvent  partner, 
"  if  not  interested,  may  well  be  made  a  party  for 
the  purpose  of  discovery,  as  to  all  acts  done  by 
him  before  his  insolvency,  and  the  assignment 
of  his  property,"  p.  86. 

2  Coop.  Eq.  PI.  42. 

3  14  Ves.  252. 

*  Steward  v.  East  India  Co.  2  Vern.  380; 
Ld.  Red.  162;  Story,  Eq.  PL  §  231. 

6  Chicot  v.  Lequesne,  2  "Ves.  Sr.  315;  Lin- 
good  v.  Croueher,  2  Atk.  395,  950;  see  Hamil- 
ton o.  Bankin.  3  De  G.  &  S.  782;  15  Jur.  70; 
Story,  Eq.  PL  §  232,  and  notes. 

«  Ld.  Red.  162. 

*  2  Ves  Jr.  451. 

1  2  Story,  Eq    Jur.  §  1500,  and  cases  cited. 


OF   THE    JOINDER   OF   PARTIES. 


*298 


trators  may  be  made  parties  to  a  bill  to  set  aside  their  award,  they  are 
not  bound  to  answer  as  to  their  motives  in  miking  the  award,  and  they 
may  plead  to  that  part  of  the  bill  in  bar  of  such  discovery; 2  but  it  is 
incumbent  upon  them,  if  they  are  charged  with  corruption  and  partial- 
ity, to  support  their  plea  by  showing  themselves  incorrupt  and  impar- 
tial, or  otherwise  the  Court  will  give  a  remedy  against  them  by  making 
them  pay  costs.8 

From  the  preceding  cases  it  may  be  collected,  that  arbitrators  can 
only  be  made  parties  to  a  suit  where  it  is  intended  to  fix  them  with  the 
payment  of  costs  in  consequence  of  their  corrupt  or  fraudulent  behavior; 
and  in  such  cases  it  is  apprehended  that  the  bill  ought  specifically  to 
pray  that  relief  against  them. 

The  same  rule  also  applies  to  the  case  of  attorneys,  who  can  only  be 
made  parties  to  a  suit  in  cases  where  they  have  so  involved  themselves 
in  fraud  that  a  Court  of  Equity,  although  it  can  give  no  other  relief 
against  them,  will  order  them  to  pay  the  costs.4  Thus,  where  a  solici- 
tor assisted  his  client  in  obtaining  a  fraudulent  release  from  another, 
he  was  held  to  be  properly  made  a  party,  and  liable  to  costs  if  his 
principal  was  not  solvent.5  (a) 

The  same  rule  applies  to  any  other  person  acting  in  the  capacity  of 
agent  in  a  fraudulent  transaction,  as  well  as  to  an  attorney  or  solicitor; 6 
and  it  was  said  by  Sir  James  Wigram  V.  C.  in  Marshall  v.  Sladden,1  that, 


2  Anon.  3  Atk.  644;  Padley  v.  Lincoln 
Waterworks  Co.  2  McN.  &  G.  68;  14  Jur.  299; 
Ponsford  v.  Swaine,  1  J.  &  H.  433. 

3  Lingood  v.  Croucher,  supra. 

4  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  232;  Lyon  v.  Tevis,  8 
Clarke  (Iowa),  99;  Rice  v.  Hunt,  12  Heisk. 
345. 

6  Bowles  v.  Stewart,  1  Sch.  &  Lef.  227; 
and  see  Baker  v.  Loader,  L.  R.  16  Eq.  49.  A 
solicitor  who  had  intermeddled  with  a  trust 
was  held  a  proper  party.  Hardy  v.  Caley,  33 
Beav.  365.  See  Harries  v.  Rees,  \V.  N. 
(1867)  251;  16  W.  R.  91,  as  to  a  solicitor's 
liability  for  his  client's  breach  of  trust. 

6  Bulkeley  v.  Dunbar,  1  Anst.  37;  Story,  Eq. 
PI.  §  838;  Gartland  v.  Nunn,  6  Eng.  720.     But 


where  a  judgment  debtor  seeks  relief  against 
the  judgment,  in  Equity,  the  attorneys  of  the 
plaintiff  in  the  judgment  ought  not  to  be  made 
patties,  no  fraud  being  charged  upon  them,  or 
relief  sought  as  to  them.  Kenan  v.  Miller,  2 
Kelly,  325.  In  a  case,  however,  where  a  per- 
son is  charged  with  fraudulently  procuring  the 
execution  of  a  will  in  favor  of  an  infant,  such 
person  is  a  proper  part}'  to  a  bill  filed  for  the 
purpose  of  setting  aside  such  will,  although  he 
has  no  interest;  and  he  may  be  liable  to  costs. 
Brady  v.  McCosker,  1  Comst.  214. 

'  7  Hare,  428,  442;  14  Jur.  106;  Reynell  v. 
Sprye,  8  Hare,  222,  271;  1  D.  M.  &  G.  660; 
Innes  v.  Mitchell,  4  Drew.  57,  141;  3  Jur.  N.  S. 
756;  1  De  G.  &  J.  423. 


(«)  See  Kelly  v.  Jackson,  13  Ir.  Eq.  129. 
If  a  solicitor  or  agent,  who  is  made  a  co-de- 
fendant, took  no  part  in  the  misrepresentation 
charged,  the  suit  will  be  dismissed  as  against 
him.  Mathias  v.  Yetts,  46  L.  T.  497;  see 
Smith  t>.  Green,  37  Fed.  Rep.  424.  In  Burstall 
i».  Keyfus,  26  Ch.  D.  35,  it  was  held  vexatious 
to  join,  as  parties,  solicitors  or  others,  who 
might  properly  be  witnesses,  and  against  whom 
no  relief  was  sought  except  payment  of  costs  or 
discovery.  A  solicitor  whose  carelessness  in 
drafting  a  marringe  settlement  causes  litigation 
in  Equity,  will  not  be  required  to  pay  the  costs 
thereof,  the  remedy  being  at  Law  in  an  action 
for  professional  negligence.  Clark  v.  Gird- 
wood,  7  Ch.  D.  9.    See  also  Baker  v.  Loader, 


L.  R.  16  Eq.  49;  Phosphate  Sewage  Co.  v.  Hart- 
mont,  5  Ch.  D.  394,  443;  Re  Spencer,  51  L.  J. 
Ch.  271;  Amos  v.  Heme  Bay  P.  Co.  54  L.  T. 
264;  Smith  v.  Green,  37  Fed.  Rep.  424;  Hopson 
v.  Harrell,  56  Miss.  202.  Solicitors  cannot  be 
made  liable  as  constructive  trustees  unless  they 
are  brought  within  the  doctrine  with  reference 
to  other  strangers,  who  are  not  themselves 
trustees,  but  are  liable  in  certain  cases  to  be 
made  to  account  as  if  they  were  trustees.  Re 
Blundell,  Blundell  v.  Blundell,  40  Ch.  I).  370, 
381;  Staniar  v.  Evans,  34  Ch.  D.  470,  478;  Re 
Vernon,  Ewens,  &  Co.  33  Ch.  D.  402;  32  Ch. 
D.  165;  Re  Spencer,  51  L.  J.  Ch.  271;  Moore 
v.  Knight,  [1891]  1  Ch.  547. 

293 


*  299  OP   PARTIES   TO    A    SUIT. 

"as  far  as  his  researches  had  gone,  the  Court  had  never  made  a  decree 
against  a  mere  agent  except  upon  the  ground  of  fraud."  (b)  If,  in  such 
cases,  an  attorney  or  agent  is  made  a  party,  the  bill  must  pray  that  he 
may  pay  the  costs,  and  must  distinctly  allege  the  circumstances  consti- 
tuting the  fraud,  and  that  the  defendant  was  a  party  concerned,  and  had  a 
knowledge  of  the  fraudulent  intention;  8  otherwise  a  demurrer  will  lie. 
The  practice  of  making  attorneys  and  agents  defendants  for  the  purpose 

of  charging  them  with  costs  will  not  however  be  encouraged.9 
♦299  *In  Texierv.  The  Margravine  of  Anspach,1  one  of  the  ques- 
tions before  the  Court  was,  whether  a  married  woman  could  be 
made  a  party  to  a  suit  on  the  allegation,  that  in  certain  contracts  which 
were  the  subject  of  litigation  she  had  acted  as  the  agent  of  her  hus- 
band, and  that  she  had  vouchers  in  her  possession  the  discovery  of 
which  might  assist  the  plaintiff  in  his  case.  The  bill,  which  did  not 
pray  any  relief  against  the  wife,  had  been  demurred  to;  and  Lord  Eldon 
allowed  the  demurrer  on  the  ground  that  she  was  merely  made  a  defend- 
ant for  the  purpose  of  discovery,  and  that  no  relief  was  prayed  against 
her,  saying,  "  I  give  no  judgment  as  to  what  would  have  been  the  effect 
if  the  bill  had  prayed  a  delivery  to  the  plaintiff  of  those  vouchers  which 
are  charged  to  be  in  the  hands  of  the  wife;  it  is,  however,  simply,  as 
far  as  relief  goes,  a  bill  against  the  husband  only,  and  against  the  wife 
a  bill  for  discovery  only.  The  consequence  is  that,  independent  of  her 
character  as  wife,  the  case  must  be  considered  as  one  of  those  in  which 
the  Court  does  sometimes  allow  persons  to  be  made  parties  against 
whom  no  relief  is  prayed,  and  the  only  case  of  that  kind  is  that  of  the 
agent  of  a  corporation." 

Generally  speaking  and  prima  facie,2  it  is  not  necessary  to  make  an 
attorney  a  party  to  a  bill  seeking  a  discovery  and  production  of  title 
deeds,  merely  because  he  has  them  in  his  custody;3  because  the  posses- 
sion of  the  attorney  is  the  possession  of  his  client;  but  cases  may  arise 
to  render  such  a  proceeding  advisable,  as  if  he  withholds  the  deeds  in 
his  possession,  and  will  not  deliver  them  to  his  client  on  his  applying 
for  them.4 

8  Kelly  v.  Rogers,  Uur.  N.  S.514,  V.C.W.;  »  15  Ves.  164. 

Gilbert  v.  Lewis.  1  De  G.  J.  &  S.  39,  49,  50;  9  2  Fenwiek   v.    Reed,  1  Mer.  123;   see  ante, 

Jur.   N.  S.   187;   and  see  Attwood  v.   Small,  p.  247. 

6   CI.   &   Fin.   352;  Att.-Gen.  v.   Bermondsey  8  Wakeman  v.  Bailey,  3  Barb.  Ch.  482. 

Vestry,  23  Ch.   D.  60;  Sugd.  Law  Prop.  630,  *  1  Smith,  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  677,  678. 

6;32_   *  Where  the  plaintiff  wishes  to  obtain  the  custody 

9  Barnes  t\  Addy,  L.  R.  9  Ch.  244 ;  see  Re  of  books  and  papers  in  possession  of  a  third  per- 
Lewis  24  Ch.  D.  339.  son,  the  proper  course  is  to  make  such  third 

(b)  An  agent  who  has  committed  or  threat-  also  Rollins  Inv.  Co.  v.  George,  48  Fed.  Rep. 

ened  to  commit  a  tort  on  his  principal's  behalf  776;  Shaver  r.  Lawrence  County,  44  Ark.  314. 

is  a  proper  but  not  a  necessary  party  to  a  suit  When  sued   for  infringing  letters-patent,  ofti- 

against  his  principal,  there  being  no  agency  in  cers  of  a  corporation  cannot  maintain  the  plea 

torts.     Heugh  v.  Earl  of  Abergavenny,  W.  N.  that  their  acts  were  solely  the  acts  of  the  de- 

(1874)  193;  Nobel's  Explosive  Co.  V.  Jones,  49  fendant  corporation,  performed  by  them  as  its 

L.  J.  Ch.  726.     Water  commissioners  of  a  city  agents.     Ibid  ;  Cahoone  Bamet  Manuf.  Co.  v. 

are  not  necessarv  parties  to  a  suit  to  remove  a  Rubber  &  Celluloid  Harness  Co.  45  Fed.  Kep. 

cloud   on  title, 'which   thev  have  created   by  582;  see  Lyndon  National  Bank  r.  Wells  River 

illegal  assessment.     Carpenter  r.  Hoboken,  33  Manuf.  Co.  7  id.  750:  Coe  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R. 

N.  J.  Eq.  27.     As  to  agents  as   parties,   see  Co.  3  id.  775. 

294 


OF   THE   JOINDER   OF   PARTIES.  *  300 

Where  a  person  who  has  no  interest  in  the  subject-matter  of  the  suit, 
and  against  whom  no  relief  is  prayed,  is  made  a  party  to  a  suit  for  the 
mere  purpose  of  discovery,  the  proper  course  for  him  to  adopt,  if  he 
wishes  to  avoid  the  discovery,  is  to  demur.'0  If,  however,  the  bill 
states  that  the  defendant  has  or  claims  an  interest,  a  demurrer,  which 
admits  the  bill  to  be  true,  will  not  of  course  hold,  though  the  defendant 
has  no  interest,  and  he  can  then  only  avoid  answering  the  bill  by  plea 
or  disclaimer.6 

*  The  question  whether  a  party  who  is  a  mere  witness  can  by  *  300 
answer  protect  himself  from  the  discovery  required,  appears  to 
have  given  rise  to  some  difference  of  opinion.  In  Cookson  v.  Ellison,1 
the  plaintiff  made  a  person  defendant  who  was  merely  a  witness,  and 
might  have  been  examined  as  such,  and  therefore  should  have  demurred 
to  the  bill.  Instead  of  demurring,  however,  the  defendant  put  in  an 
answer,  which,  not  having  satisfied  the  plaintiff  as  to  one  interrogatory, 
an  exception  was  taken,  and  the  Master  reported  the  answer  sufficient; 
but  upon  the  case  coining  before  Lord  Thurlow  upon  exception  to  the 
Master's  report,  his  Lordship  held,  that  as  the  defendant  had  submitted 
to  answer,  he  was  bound  to  answer  fully.  In  a  subsequent  case  of 
Newman  v.  Godfrey,*  however,  Lord  Kenyon  M.  R.  appears  to  have 
entertained  a  different  opinion.  In  that  case  the  defendant,  who  was  a 
mere  clerk,  was  alleged  in  the  bill  to  be  a  party  interested  in  the  prop- 
erty in  litigation,  and  in  support  of  such  allegation  various  statements 
were  made,  showing  in  what  manner  his  interest  arose:  he  put  in  an 
answer  denying  all  the  statements  upon  which  the  allegation  of  his 
being  interested  was  founded,  and  disclaiming  all  personal  interest  in 
the  subject-matter;  and  to  this  answer  exceptions  were  taken  by  the 
plaintiff,  because  the  defendant  had  not  answered  the  subsequent  parts 
of  the  bill,  which  exceptions  were  disallowed  by  the  Master;  and  upon 
the  question  coming  on  before  Lord  Kenyon,  upon  exceptions  to  the 
Master's  reports,  he  thought  the  Master  was  right  in  disallowing  the 
exceptions,  because  the  defendant  had  reduced  himself  to  a  mere  wit- 
ness by  denying  his  interest  and  disclaiming,  so  that,  even  supposing 
he  had  an  interest,  he  could  not,  having  disclaimed,  have  availed  him- 
self of  it.  These  contradictory  decisions  have  been  remarked  upon  by 
Lord  Eldon  in  two  subsequent  cases; 3  and  his  Lordship's  observations 
in  those  cases  have  been  considered,  as  approving  of  Lord  Thurlow's 
decisions  in  Cookson  v.  Ellison.*  Nothing,  however,  can  be  collected 
from  what  Lord  Eldon  said  in  either  of  these  cases,  as  indicating  an 
opinion  either  one  way  or  the  other;  and,  at  the  period  when  they  were 
before  him,  the  doctrine  that  a  party  answering  must  answer  fully  does 

person  a  party  defendant.    Morley  v.  Green,  11  plaintiff  to  dismiss  the  bill  against  him,  and  he 

Paige,  240.     So  if  the  principal  be  beyond  the  may  incur  censure  if   he  brings  the  suit  to  a 

iurisdiction   of    the  Court,    and   no   discovery  hearing  without  doing  this.    Wright  v.  Barlow, 

can  be  compelled  from  him.     Ballin  v.  Ferst,  15  Jur.  1149;  8  En<*.  Law  &  Eq.  125. 

55  Ga.  546.  '  2  Bro.  C.  C.  252. 

s  Ed.  Red.  189.  2  2  Bro.  C.  C.  332. 

6  Ibid.;    Plummer    v.   May,    1   Ves.    426.  3  penton  r.  Hughes,  7  Ves.  288;  Baker  V. 

Where  a  suit  becomes   useless   against  a  par-  Mellish,  11  Ves.  75.  76. 

ticular  defendant,  it  is  a  laudable  course  for  the  4  2  Bro.  C  C.  252. 

295 


*302 


OF    PARTIES    TO    A    SUIT. 


not  appear  to  have  been  so  strictly  adhered  to  as  it  has  been  subse- 
quently; 6  but  that  doctrine  is  now  well  established,  and,  it  is  conceived, 

includes  the  case  above  discussed.6 
*301  *  When  a  plaintiff  finds  that  he  has  made  unnecessary  parties 
to  his  bill,  he  may  either  dismiss  his  bill  as  against  them,  or 
apply  to  the  Court  for  leave  to  amend  his  bill  by  striking  out  their 
names;  in  either  case,  however,  the  order  will,  if  the  defendants  have 
appeared,  only  be  made  on  payment  of  their  costs ; 1  because,  by  strik- 
ing them  out  as  defendants,  the  plaintiff  deprives  them  of  the  oppor- 
tunity of  applying  for  their  costs  at  the  hearing.2 

The  preceding  observations,  with  regard  to  the  joinder  in  the  suit  of 
persons  who  have  no  interest,  beneficial  or  otherwise,  in  the  subject- 
matter,  refer  to  cases  where  they  are  made  parties  defendants.  The 
rule,  however,  that  persons  who  have  no  interest  in  the  litigation,  can- 
not be  joined  in  a  suit  with  those  who  have,  applies  equally  to  prevent 
their  being  joined  as  co-plaintiffs.3 

Where  persons  having  at  the  time  a  joint  interest  file  an  original 
bill,  and  afterwards  one  of  the  co-plaintiffs  parts  with  his  interest,  such 
co-plaintiff  may  afterwards  join  in  a  supplemental  bill  filed  for  the  pur- 
pose of  bringing  additional  matter  before  the  Court;  because,  although 
he  may  have  parted  with  his  interest  in  the  subject-matter,  he  is  still 
interested  in  the  suit  in  respect  of  his  liability  to  costs.4 

The  common  case  of  joining  an  auctioneer  and  the  vendor  in 
*302     a  bill  against  a  purchaser,  is  no  exception  *  to  the  rule  above  re- 
ferred to,  because  the  auctioneer  has  an  interest  in  the  contract, 
and  may  bring  an  action  upon  it ;  he  is  also  interested  in  being  protected 
from   the  legal   liability  which  he  has  incurred   in  an  action  by  the 


5  See  Dolder  v.  Lord  Hunting-field,  11  Ves. 
283;  Faulder  v.  Stuart,  id.  296;  Shaw  v.  Ching, 
id.  303,  and  post,  Answer;  see  a  discussion  of 
this  subject  in  Wigram,  Discovery,  pi.  148, 149, 
&c.  p.  86,  87,  et  seq. 

6  Lancaster  v.  Evors,  I  Phil.  349;  8  Jur. 
133;  Swinborne  v.  Nelson,  16  Beav.  416;  Great- 
Luxemburg  Ky.  Co.  v.  Magnay.  23  Beav.  646; 
4  Jur.  N.  S.  839 ;  Keade  v.  Woodroffe,  24  Beav. 
421.  See  Elmer  v.  Creasy,  L.  R.  9  Ch.  69; 
Saul  v.  Browne,  id.  364;  Great  Western  Col- 
liery Co.  v.  Tucker,  L.  R.  9  Ch.  376,  qualifying 
while  purporting  to  follow  the  rule.  But  see 
French  v.  Rainey,  2  Tenn".  Ch.  640,  where  the 
authorities,  pro  and  con,  are  cited  and  reviewed. 
Infra,  p.  720. 

1  Covenhoven  v.  Shuler,  2  Paige,  122;  see 
Wright  v.  Barlow,  15  Jur.  1149;  8  Eng.  Law 
&  Eq.  125;  Manning  v.  Gloucester,  6  Pick.  6, 
17,  18;  D-.ina  v.  Valentine,  5  Met.  12,  13. 

2  Wilkinson  v.  Belsher,  2  Bro.  C.  C.  272. 

3  Mayor   and    Aldermen    of    Colchester    v. 

,  1   P.  Wms.  595;  Troughton  v.  Gettey,  1 

Dick.  382;  Cuff  v.  Platell,  4  Russ.  242;  Make- 
peace v  Haythorne,  4  Russ.  244;  King  of 
Spain  r.  Machado,4  Russ.  225;  Page  v.  Town- 
send,  5  Sim.  395  ;  Glyn  v.  Soares,  3  M.  &  K. 

296 


450,  468;  Griggs  v.  Staplee,  2  De  G.  &  S.  572; 
13  Jur.  29;  Griffith  v.  Vanheythuysen,  9  Hare, 
85;  15  Jur.  421;  Story,  Eq."  PI.  §§  390,  509, 
544,  551;  Clarkson  v.  De  Peyster,  3  Paige, 
336  ;  Clason  v.  Lawrence,  3  Ed.  Ch.  48. 

4  Thus,  where  a  bill  was  tiled  in  the  Ex- 
chequer by  certain  persons  on  behalf  of  them- 
selves and  other  members  of  a  Joint-Stock 
Company,  to  which  an  answer  was  put  in  and 
a  decree  made,  setting  aside  certain  contracts 
between  the  plaintiffs  and  the  defendant,  and 
directing  various  accounts  and  inquiries,  and 
afterwards  a  supplemental  bill  was  filed  in  the 
name  of  the  same  plaintiffs  against  the  same 
defendant,  seeking  amongst  other  things  a  lien 
on  a  part  of  the  purchase-money,  which  had 
been  paid  to  the  defendant,  to  which  a  plea  was 
put  in  by  the  defendant  on  the  ground  that  one 
of  the  plaintiffs  in  the  supplemental  bill  had, 
previously  to  the  filing  of  it,  parted  with  all  his 
interest  in  the  partnership,  &c,  Lord  Lynd- 
hurst  C.  B.  overruled  the  plea,  being  of  opinion 
that  the  supplemental  bill  was  nothing  more 
than  a  continuation  of  the  original  bill,  and  his 
Lordship's  decision  was  afterwards  confirmed 
by  Lord  Abinger  C.  B.  upon  a  rehearing. 
Small  o.  Attwood,  1  Y.  &  C.  39. 


OF   THE    JOINDER   OF   PARTIES. 


303 


purchaser  to  recover  the  deposit.1  Nor  does  the  circumstance  of  the 
assignor  and  the  assignee  of  a  chose  in  action  being  capable  of  suing 
together  constitute  an  exception,  because,  although  the  assignor  has 
parted  with  his  beneficial  interest  in  the  subject-matter,  he  still  is 
interested  as  the  owner  of  the  legal  estate.2 

If  the  fact  of  one  of  the  plaintiffs  having  no  interest  in  the  suit  ap- 
pears on  the  bill,  advantage  must  be  taken  of  it  by  demurrer.3  If  the 
fact  does  not  appear  upon  the  bill,  it  may  be  brought  forward  by  plea ;  4 
and  where,  at  the  hearing,  the  claim  of  one  of  two  co-plaintiffs  failed 
entirely,  while  that  of  the  other  succeeded,  the  Vice  Chancellor  of 
England  dismissed  the  bill  as  against  both  plaintiffs,  but  without  preju- 
dice to  the  right  of  the  one  who  had  succeeded  to  file  a  new  bill.5 

Upon  a  similar  principle,  in  cases  where  all  the  plaintiffs  have  an 
interest  in  the  subject  of  the  suit,  but  their  interests  are  distinct 
*  and  several,  they  will  not  be  allowed  to  sue  together  as  co-    *  303 
plaintiffs  ; *  thus,  where  a  bill  was  filed  by  five  several  occupiers 

i  See  ante,  p.  195,  note  («).     But  in  a  suit      v.  Berry,  3  Tenn.  Ch.  154;  Gartland  v.  Nunn,  6 


Equity  by  a  purchaser  for  relief  against  a 
sale  at  auction,  in  which  the  auctioneer  used 
fraud  to  enhance  the  price,  it  was  held,  that 
it  was  not  necessary  to  make  the  auctioneer 
a  party.  Veazie  v.  Williams,  8  How.  (U.  S.) 
134.  But  if  the  auctioneer  is  made  a  part}'  he 
cannot  demur,  in  such  a  case,  on  the  ground 
that  he  is  a  mere  witness.  Schmidt  v.  Dietericht, 

1  Edw.  Ch.  119. 

2  Ryan  v.  Anderson,  3  Mad.  174;  see  Story, 
Eq.  PI.  §  153,  and  notes;  ante,  p.  198,  et  seq., and 
notes. 

3  Cuff  w.  Platell,  4  Russ.  242;  King  of  Spain 
r.  Machado,  4  Russ.  225;  l'age  v.  Townsend, 
5  Sim.  395;  Delondre  v.  Shaw,  2  Sim.  237; 
Story.  Eq.  PI.  §§  541-544;  Bowie  v.  Minter,  2 
Ala.  406;  Talmage  v.  Pell,  9  Paige,  410;  Gos- 
sett  v.  Kent,  19  Ark.  602. 

4  Makepeace  v.  Haythorne,  4  Russ.  244; 
Doyle  v.  Muntz,  5  Hare.  509;  10  Jur.  914.  In 
Watertown  v.  Cowen,  4  Paige,  510,  it  was  held 
too  late  to  take  a  mere  formal  objection  of  this 
kind  for  the  first  time  at  the  hearing.  See 
Dickinson  v.  Davis,  2  Leigh,  401;  Sheppard  v. 
Starke,  3  Munf.  29;  Mayo  o.  Murchie,  id.  358; 
Story,  Fxj.  PL  §§  232.  236,  509,  544;  Harder  v. 
Harder,  2  Sandf.  Ch.  17;  Bowman  v.  Burnley, 

2  McLean,  376;  Story  v.  Livingston,  13  Peters, 
359;  Bowie  r.  Minter,  2  Ala.  406;  Schwoerer, 
v.  Boylston  Market  Association,  99  Mass.  295, 
2;(7.  If  the  misjoinder  is  of  parties  plaintiffs, 
all  the  defendants  may  demur;  such  a  mis- 
joinder is  a  proper  ground  of  objection.  Cam- 
in  eyer  v.  United  German  Lutheran  Churches,  2 
Sandf.  Ch.  186;  Christian  D.Crocker,  25  Ark. 
327.  If  the  misjoinder  is  of  parties  as  defend- 
ants, those  only  can  demur  who  are  improp- 
erly joined.  Toulmin  ».  Hamilton,  7  Ala.  362. 
Cherry  v.  Monro,  2  Barb.  Ch.  618;  Great  West- 
ern Compound  Co.  v.  Etna  Ins.  Co.  40  Wis. 
373;  Christian  v.  Crocker,  25  Ark.  327;  Payne 


Eng.  720;  Miller  v.  Jamison.  24  N.  J.  Eq.  41; 
Warthen  ?'.  Brantley,  34  Miss.  571;  infra, 
337,  n.  3.  But  if  a  person  is  improperly  joined 
as  a  defendant,  who  is  without  the  jurisdiction, 
and  is  therefore  a  party  only  by  virtue  of  the 
usual  prayer  of  process,  such  misjoinder  will 
not  affect  the  cause;  for  until  he  has  appeared 
and  acted,  no  decree  can  be  had  against  him. 
And  in  cases  of  misjoinder  of  plaintiffs,  the  ob- 
jection ought  to  be  taken  by  demurrer;  for  if 
not  so  taken,  and  the  Court  proceeds  to  a  hear- 
ing on  the  merits,  it  will  be  disregarded,  at 
least  if  it  does  not  materially  affect  the  pro- 
priety of  the  decree.  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  544, 
and  notes. 

5  Cowley  v.  Cowley,  9  Sim.  229;  Padwick  v. 
Piatt,  11  Beav.  503;  Pulham  v.  McCarthy,  1 
H  L.  Cas.  703;  see  also  Blair  v.  Bromley,  5 
Hare,  542,  553;  2  Phil.  354,  Moore  v.  Moore, 
17  Ala.  631.  It  seems,  however,  that  in  gen- 
eral an  objection  of  this  kind,  if  not  raised  upon 
the  pleadings,  will  not  be  allowed  at  the  hear- 
ing. Eades  v.  Harris,  2  Y.  &  C.  230;  Raffety 
v.  King.  1  Keen,  601;  Cashell  v.  Kelly,  2  Dr. 
&  W.  181;  Louis  v.  Meek,  2  Greene  (Iowa), 
55;  Murray  v.  Hay,  1  Barb.  Ch.  59.  But  the 
Court  may  in  its  discretion,  and  under  circum- 
stances, in  such  a  case,  dismiss  the  bill  as  to 
all  the  plaintiffs,  or  only  as  to  those  who  are 
improperly  joined.  Myers  v.  Earrington,  18 
Ohio,  72.  Where  a  person  is  made  a  co-plain- 
tiff improperly,  without  his  privity  or  consent, 
the  proper  motion  is  that  his  name  be  stricken 
out,  not  that  the  bill  be  dismissed,  even  as 
to  him.  So.  Life  Ins.  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Lanier,  5 
Ela.  110.  It  seems  the  objection  of  misjoinderof 
plaintiffs  cannot  be  taken  on  a  rehearing.  Fow- 
ler v.  Reynal,  3  M'N.  &  G.  500,  511;  15  Jur. 
1019,  1021. 

1  Hudson  v.  Maddison.  12  Sim.  416;  5  Jur. 
1194;    and   see  Powell   v.  Cockerell,   4  Hare, 

297 


303 


OF    PARTIES    TO    A    SUIT. 


of  houses  in  a  town,  to  restrain  the  erection  of  a  steam-engine,  alleging 
that  it  would  be  a  nuisance  to  each  of  them,  the  Vice  Chancellor  of 
England  dissolved  an  injunction  obtained  in  the  suit,2  upon  the  ground 
that  each  occupier  had  a  distinct  right  of  suit,  and  therefore  that  they 
could  not  sue  as  co-plaintiffs.3  (a) 


557,  562,  10  Jur.  243,  where  the  objection  was 
disallowed ;  and  Miles  v.  Dumford,  2  Sim. 
N.  S.  234,  21  L.  J.  Ch.  6G7,  L.  JJ.,  where  the 
plaintiff  filed  a  bill  in  two  characters,  in  one  of 
which  he  could  not  sue.  See  infra,  313,  n.  8. 
For  a  case  since  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  see  Beech- 
ing  v.  Lloyd,  3  Drew.  227.  See.  Merrill  v. 
Lake,  16  Ohio,  373;  Ohio  r.  Ellis,  10  Ohio, 
456;  Poynes  v.  Creagh,  2  Irish  Eq.  190;  Beaty 
v.  Judy,  1  Dana,  103;  Boyd  v.  Hoyt,  5  Paige 
65;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §§  279," 530,  531*;  Yeaton  v. 
Lenox,  8  Peters,  123 ;  Harrison  v.  Hogg,  2 
Ves.  Jr.  323.  328;  Brinkerhoff  v.  Brown,  6 
John.  Ch.  139,  150-153;  Clarkson  v.  De  Pey- 
ster.  3  Paige,  320;  Lentilhon  v.  Moffat,  1  Edw. 
Ch.  451 ;  Hallett  v.  Hallett,  2  Paige,  15;  Egbert 
v.  Woods,  3  Paige,  517;  Van  Cleef  v.  Sickles, 
5    Paige,    505;    Baily  v.  Bruton,  8   Wendell, 


(a)  The  later  decisions  follow  Murray  v. 
Hay,  cited  in  the  note,  allowing  joinder  of 
plaintiffs  to  restrain  a  common  nuisance,  in 
preference  to  Hudson  v.  Maddisc.n.  See  Cadi- 
gan  v.  Brown,  120  Mass.  493;  Smith  v.  Smith, 
148  Mass.  1;  Nash  v.  New  England  Life  Ins. 
Co.  127  Mass.  91;  Mitchell  v.  Thome,  134 
N.  Y.  536:  Brady  v.  Weeks,  3  Barb.  157; 
Emery  v.  Erskine,  66  Barb.  9;  Peck  v.  Elder, 
3  Sandf.  126;  Hinchman  v.  Paterson  Railroad 
Co.  17  N.  J.  Eq.  75;  Morris  &  Essex  Railroad 
Co.  v.  Prudden,  20  id.  530;  Demarest  v.  Hard- 
ham,  34  id.  46;  Rowbotham  v.  Jones,  47  id. 
337;  48  id.  311;  Rafferty  v.  Central  Traction 
Co.  (Penn.)  23  Atl.  Rep.  884;  29  W.  N.  C. 
542;  Sullivan  v.  Phillips,  110  Ind.  320;  Tate 
v.  Ohio  &  M.  R.  Co.  10  Ind.  174 ;  71  Am  Dec. 
309,  and  note;  Upington  v.  Oviatt,  24  Ohio  St. 
232;  Pollock  v.  Lester,  11  Hare,  266,  274: 
Unifreville  v.  Johnson,  L.  R.  10  Ch.  580,  note; 
Robinson  v.  Baugh,  31  Mich.  290  ;  Middleton 
V.  Flat  River  Co.  27  Mich.  533;  Taylor  v.  Bay 
City  Street  Railway  Co.  80  Mich.  77;  Pettibone 
v.  Hamilton,  40  Wis.  402;  Atchison  Street  Ry. 
Co.  o.  Nave,  38  Kansas,  744  ;  Keys  v.  Mathes,  id. 
212;  Jeffers  v.  Forbes,  28  Kansas,  174;  Bridger 
v.  Thrasher,  22  Fla.  383;  Grant  v.  Schmidt, 
22  Minn.  1;  Schultz  v.  Winter,  7  Nev.  130; 
Fogg  v.  Nevada  C.  O.  Ry.  Co.  20  Nev.  429. 

The  following  decisions  are  of  interest  in 
this  connection.  Persons  induced  to  subscribe 
for  stock  by  fraudulent  representations  in  a 
prospectus  have  a  common  interest  and  may 
join,  for  the  benefit  of  all  so  deceived,  as  plain- 
tiffs in  a  suit  to  set  aside  their  subscriptions. 
Bosher    v.  Richmond   &   H.    L.   Co.  (Va.)  16 

298 


339;  Kay  v.  Jones,  7  J.  J.  Marsh  37;  Burlin- 
game  v.  Hobbs,  12  Gray,  367,  372;  Emans  v. 
Emans,  13  N.  J.  Eq.  205. 

2  Hudson  v.  Maddison,  12  Sim.  416. 

3  But  it  has  been  held  that  two  or  more  per- 
sons, having  separate  and  distinct  tenements 
which  are  injured  or  rendered  uninhabitable  by 
a  common  nuisance,  or  which  are  rendered  less 
valuable  by  a  private  nuisance,  which  is  a  com- 
mon injury  to  the  tenements  of  both,  may  join 
in  a  suit  to  restrain  such  nuisance.  Murray  v. 
Hay,  1  Barb.  Ch.  59;  Putnam  v.  Sweet,  1 
Chand.  (Wis.)  286;  Pettibone  v.  Hamilton,  40 
Wis.  402.  The  Court  exercises  a  sound  dis- 
cretion, without  adhering  to  an  inflexible  rule, 
in  determining  whether  there  has  been  a  mis- 
joinder of  parties  in  Equity. 


S.  E.  Rep.  360.  But  different  depositors  in  a 
bank,  who  are  deceived  by  its  managers,  can- 
not join  as  co-plaintiffs  to  obtain  restitution 
from  them.  Chester  v.  Halliard,  36  N.  J.  Eq. 
313;  and  see  Hallows  v.  Femie.  L.  R.  3  Ch. 
467;  L.  R.  3  Eq.  520;  ante,  p.  26,  note  (a). 
Different  tax-payers,  complaining  of  the  same 
illegality,  and  statinga  case  for  equitable  relief, 
may,  it  seems,  join  as  plaintiffs  when  they 
have  the  same  grounds  for  relief.  Union 
Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cheyenne,  113  U.  S.  516; 
Cutting  i'.  Gilbert,  5  Blatch.  259;  Kerr  v.  Lan- 
sing, 17  Mich.  34;  Gallowaj'  v.  Jenkins,  63 
N.  C.  147;  Johnson  v.  Drummond,  20  Gratt. 
419;  Williams  v.  Grant  County  Court,  26  W. 
Va.  488;  53  Am.  Rep.  94;  Webster  v.  Har- 
winton,  32  Conn.  131.  Several  mill-owners  or 
riparian  proprietors  may  join  as  plaintiffs  to 
restrain  the  diversion  or  pollution  of  a  water- 
course. Greene  v.  Canny,  137  Mass.  64;  Ballou 
v.  Hopkinton,  4  Gray,  328;  Churchill  c.  Lauer, 
84  Cal.  233;  Cornwell  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Swift,  89 
Mich.  503;  Sullivan  v.  Phillips,  110  Ind.  320; 
Reid  v.  Gifford,  Hopk.  Ch.  416.  In  regulating 
common  rights,  Equity  may  in  one  suit  deter- 
mine and  apportion  the  respective  rights  of 
persons  entitled  to  a  common  use,  in  order  to 
protect  the  rights  of  each.  Wright  v.  Howard, 
1  Sim.  &  Stu.  190;  Arthur  v.  Case,  1  Paige, 
447;  Gardner  v.  Newburgh,  2  John.  Ch.  165, 
Olmstead  v.  Loomis,  9  N.  Y.  423;  Mason  v. 
Ho  vie,  56  Conn.  255;  Burnham  v.  Kempton, 
44  N.  H.  78;  Fuller  ».  Daniels,  63  N.  H.  395; 
Allan!  v.  Carleton,  64  N.  H.  24;  Bemis  v. 
Upham,  13  Pick.  171;  Ulbricht  v.  Eufaula 
Water  Co.  86  Ala.  587;  Frey  v.  Lowden,  70  Cal. 


OF    THE    JOINDER    OF    PARTIES. 


304 


Later,  however,  the  consequences  of  a  misjoinder  were  by  no  means 
so  serious  as  formerly;  for.  by  the  Chancery  Amendment  Act  of  1852, 
it  was  provided  that  "  no  suit  in  the  said  Court  shall  be  dismissed  by 
reason  only  of  the  misjoinder  of  persons  as  plaintiffs  therein,  but  when- 
ever it  shall  appear  to  the  Court  that,  notwithstanding  the  conflict  of 
interests  in  the  co-plaintiffs,  or  the  want  of  interest  in  some  of  the 
plaintiffs,  or  the  existence  of  some  ground  of  defence  affecting  some  or 
one  of  the  plaintiffs,  the  plaintiffs,  or  some  or  one  of  them,  are  or  is 
entitled  to  relief,  the  Court  shall  have  power  to  grant  such  relief,  and  to 
modify  its  decree,  according  to  the  special  circumstances  of  the  case, 
and  for  that  purpose  to  direct  such  amendments,  if  any,  as  may  be 
necessary,  and  at  the  hearing,  before  such  amendments  are  made,  to 
treat  any  one  or  more  of  the  plaintiffs  as  if  he  or  they  was  or  were  a 
defendant  or  defendants  in  the  suit,  and  the  remaining  or  other  plaintiff 
or  plaintiffs  was  or  were  the  only  plaintiff  or  plaintiffs  on  the  record  ; 
and  where  there  is  misjoinder  of  plaintiffs,  and  the  plaintiff  having  an 
interest  shall  have  died,  leaving  a  plaintiff  on  the  record  without  an 
interest,  the  Court  may,  at  the  hearing  of  the  cause,  order  the  cause  to 
stand  revived  as  may  appear  just,  and  proceed  to  the  decision  of  the 
cause,  if  it  shall  see  fit,  and  give  such  directions,  as  to  costs  or  otherwise, 
as  may  appear  just  and  expedient." 4 

The  provision  of  the  Act  is  imperative,  and  does  not  leave  it  to  the 
discretion  of  the  Court  whether  to  dismiss  the  bill  or  not.5 

*  The  Act  applies  to  the  case  where  a  plaintiff  sues  on  behalf  *  304 
of  himself  and  the  others  of  a  class ; 1  thus,  where  a  bill  was  filed 


4  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  49. 

5  Clements  v.  Bowes,  1  Drew.  684;  see  also, 
for  cases  of  misjoinder  since  the  Act,  Carter 
v.  Sanders,  2  Drew.  248;  Upton  v.  Vanner, 
10W.  R.  99,  V.  C.  K.;  Burdick  v.  Garrick, 
L.  R.  5  Ch.  233.  In  Barton  v.  Barton,  3  K.  & 
J.  512,  3  Jur.  N.  S.  8i>8,  the  bill  was  not  dis- 
missed for  misjoinder,  but  for  want  of  interest 
in   the  plaintiffs ;    and   the  marginal   note    in 


550;  Patten  Paper  Co.  v.  Kaukauna  Water 
Power  Co.  70  Wis.  659;  Webb  v.  Portland 
Manuf.  Co.  3  Sumner,  198;  McConnaughty  v. 
Pennover,  43  Fed.  Rep.  339.  So  two  or  more 
creditors  may  join  as  plaintiffs  in  Equity  to  set 
aside  a  fraudulent  conveyance  of  their  common 
debtor.  Tower  Manuf.  Co.  r.  Thompson,  90 
Ala.  129;  Gibson  r.  Trowbridge  F.  Co.  93  Ala. 
579;  Sheldon  »  Keokuk  N.  L.  P.  Co.  10  Biss. 
470;  Boniar  r.  Means,  37  S.  C.  520;  Cohen  V. 
Wolff  (Ga.),  17  S.  E.  Rep.  1029;  Sherman  v. 
American  Stove  Co.  8")  Mich.  169.  Different 
creditors  having  different  claims  against,  but 
a  common  interest  in,  the  same  property  may 
join  as  plaintiffs  in  one  suit  where  there  is  a 
common  liability  on  the  part  of  the  defendants. 
Pfohl  v.  Simpson,  74  N.  Y.  137.  A  single 
award,  made  on  the  joint  submission  of  several 


3  K.  &  J.  512  appears  to  be  incorrect  in  this 
respect. 

1  Clements  v.  Bowes,  1  Drew.  634;  and  see 
Williams  v.  Page,  24  Beav,  669;  4  Jur.  N.  S. 
102;  Evans  v.  Coventry,  5  DeG.  M.  &,  G.  911; 
2  Jur  N.  S.  557;  see  also  Stupart  v.  Arrow- 
smith,  3  Sin.  &  G.  176;  Williams  v.  Salmond, 
2  K.  &  J.  463;  2  Jur.  N.  S.  251,  Gwatkiu  v. 
Campbell,  1  Jur.  N.  S.  131,  V   C.  \V. 


fire  insurance  companies  interested  in  one  loss, 
may  be  set  aside  upon  their  joint  bill.  Hartford 
Fire  Ins  Co.  v.  Bonner  Mercantile  Co.  44  Fed. 
Rep.  151. 

Plaintiffs  whose  claims  nre  distinct,  antago- 
nistic, or  different  in  kind,  cannot  join  in  one 
bill.  Ward  v.  Sittincbourne  Ry.  Co.  L.  R.  9 
Ch.  488;  McMurray  v.  Van  Gilder,  56  Iowa,  605; 
Powell  v.  Dayton  &c.  R.  Co.  13  Oregon,  446 : 
Hartford  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bonner  M.  Co.  44 
Fed.  Rep.  151;  I/ingdon  V.  Branch,  37  id.  449; 
Woodruff  r.  Young.  43  Mich.  548;  Barham  v. 
Hostetter,  67  Cal.  272.  See  Hazard  v.  Dillon, 
34  Fed.  Ren.  485:  Summerlin  r.  Fronterina  S. 
M.  Co.  41  id.  249;  Osborne  p.  Wisconsin  Cen- 
tral R.  Co.  43  id.  824:  Walker  r.  Powers,  104 
U.  S.  245;  Stebbins  v.  St.  Anne,  116  U.  S.  386. 

299 


*  304  OF   PARTIES   TO    A    SUIT. 

by  one  member  of  a  company  on  behalf  of  himself  and  all  others,  ex- 
cept the  defendants,  praying  an  account  of  the  receipts  and  payments 
of  the  defendants  on  behalf  of  the  company,  and  payment  of  what 
should  be  found  due  to  the  plaintiff,  and  it  appeared  that  there  were 
circumstances  which  made  the  interest  of  some  of  the  persons  purport- 
ing to  be  represented  by  the  plaintiff  different  from  his,  it  was  held, 
that  the  Court  could,  under  the  above-mentioned  section,  treat  the  ab- 
sent plaintiffs  as  defendants,  and  determine  whether  a  decree  should  be 
made;  and,  accordingly,  the  Court  decreed  an  account  giving  liberty 
to  some  of  the  shareholders  whose  interest  differed  from  the  plaintiff's 
to  attend  the  proceedings  in  chambers.'2 

It  has  been  held,  that  a  misjoinder  of  plaintiffs  is  now  no  objection  to 
a  motion  for  an  injunction  and  receiver,  to  protect  property  in  danger 
of  being  lost  pending  litigation.3 

2  Clements  v.  Bowes,  1  Drew.  634. 

3  Evans  v.  Coventry,  5  De  G.  M.  &  G.  911;  2  Jur.  N.  S.  557. 

300 


*  CHAPTER   VI. 


*305 


THE   BILL. 

Section  I.  —  The  Different  Sorts  of  Bills. 

A  suit  in  equity  is  generally  commenced,  on  behalf  of  a  subject, 
by  preferring  what  is  termed  a  bill ; 1  and  that  if  commenced  by  the 
Attorney-General  on  behalf  of  the  Crown,  or  of  those  partaking  of  its 
prerogatives,  or  under  its  protection,  the  suit  is  instituted  by  informa- 
tion.2 The  form  of  this  bill  and  information  is  now  regulated  by  statute 
and  by  the  orders  of  the  Court,  but  the  mode  of  commencing  proceedings 
in  Chancery  has  been  by  bill  since  the  earliest  times.8 

Bills  relating  to  matters  which  have  not  previously  been  brought  be- 
fore the  consideration  of  the  Court,  are  called  original  bills,  and  form 
the  foundation  of  most  of  the  proceedings  before  what  is  termed  the 
extraordinary  or  equitable  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  of  Chancery.4  The 
same  form  of  instituting  a  suit  is  also  in  use  in  all  other  equitable  juris- 
dictions in  the  kingdom  except  the  county  courts. 

Besides  original  bills,  there  are  other  bills  in  use  in  Courts  of  Equity, 
which  were  formerly  always,  and  are  still  sometimes,  necessary  to  be 
preferred,  for  the  purpose  of  supplying  any  defects  which  may  exist  in 
the  form  of  the  original  bill,  or  may  have  been  produced  by  events  sub- 
sequent to  the  filing  of  it.  Bills  of  this  description  are  called 
bills  which  are  not  original.  Sometimes  a  *  person,  not  a  *  306 
party  to  the  original  suit,  seeks  to  bring  the  proceedings  and 
decree  in  the  original  suit  before  the  Court,  for  the  purpose  either  of 
obtaining  the  benefit  of  it,  or  of  procuring  the  reversal  of  the  decision 


1  Ante,  p.  2.  Under  the  Judicature  Actand 
Orders  of  Court  based  thereon,  the  defendant 
may  waive  any  statement  of  claim  bjr  the 
plaintiff.  But,  if  he  fail  so  to  do,  the  plaintiff 
must,  within  the  time  prescribed,  deliver  to  the 
defendant  a  statement  of  his  complaint,  and 
of  the  relief  or  remedy  to  which  he  claims  to 
be  entitled.  And  the  defendant  shall,  in  like 
manner,  deliver  to  the  plaintiff  a  statement  of 
his  defence,  set-off  or  counter-claim,  and  ihe 
plaintiff  shall  deliver  a  statement  of  his  reply. 
The  rules  prescribed  for  the  form  of  these 
statements  are  substantially  those  which  are 
laid  down  for  correct  Chancery  pleading,  ex- 
cept in  requiring  the  statements  to  be  divided 
into  paragraphs,  numbered  consecutively.  Mor- 
gan's Acts  and  Orders,  487;  Cons.   Ord.  XIX. 


See  Belknap  v.  Stone,  1  Allen,  572.  Ante, 
p.  2,  n.  6.  The  jurisdiction  of  the  Mass.  Su- 
preme Judicial  Court  is  exclusive  over  all 
act  inns  in  which  relief  in  Equity  is  prayed  for. 
The  prayer  for  relief  gives  jurisdiction  of  the 
action,  and  therefore  no  affidavit  for  that  pur- 
pose is  necessary.  Its  character  is  that  of  a  suit 
in  Equity.  Stockbridge  Iron  Co.  v.  Cone  Iron 
Works,  99  Mass.  468 ;  see  Irvine  v.  Gregory,  13 
Gray,  215;  Stat.  Mass.  1865,  c.  179.  §2.  By 
Statute  in  Maine  a  bill  in  Equity  may  be 
inserted  in  a  writ  to  be  served  as  other  writs. 
Stephenson  p.  Davis,  56  Maine,  73,  76. 

2  Ante,  p.  2. 

s  Ld.  Red.  8. 

4  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §§  16,  22. 

301 


*  307  THE   BILL. 

which  has  been  made  in  it.  The  bill  which  he  prefers  for  this  purpose 
is  styled  a  bill  in  the  nature  of  an  original  bill.1 

Original  bills  are  further  divided  usually  into  :  (1)  Original  bills  pray- 
ing relief;  and  (2)   Original  bills  not  praying  relief.2 

Original  bills  praying  relief  are  again  subdivided  into  three  heads  : 

(1)  Original  bills  praying  the  decree  of  the  Court  touching  some  right 
claimed  by  the  person  exhibiting  the  bill,  in  opposition  to  rights  claimed 
by  the  person  against  whom  the  bill  is  exhibited ;  (2)  Bills  of  inter- 
pleader ;  and  (3)  Certiorari  bills.3  Original  bills  not  praying  relief  are 
of  two  kinds  :    (1)  Bills  to  perpetuate  the  testimony  of  witnesses;  and 

(2)  Bills  of  discovery.4  The  simplicity  of  modern  proceedings,  however, 
renders  the  foregoing  subdivision  of  bills  in  Chancery  comparatively 
unimportant. 

As  original  bills  of  the  first  kind  are  those  most  usually  exhibited, 
the  reader's  attention  will,  in  this  chapter,  be  principally  directed  to 
them.  The  other  descriptions  of  bills  will  be  more  particularly  consid- 
ered when  we  come  to  treat  of  the  practice  of  the  Court  applicable  to 
the  particular  suits  of  which  they  are  the  foundation.  Bills  which  are 
not  original,  or  which  are  merely  in  the  nature  of  original  bills,  will  be 
separately  considered  in  a  future  part  of  the  work ;  but  simple  and 
economical  modes  of  supplying  the  defects  of  original  bills  have  been 
provided,  which  will  be  stated  in  the  proper  place,5  and  which  have 
rendered  bills  which  are  not  original  of  rare  occurrence. 


Section  II.  —  The  Authority  to  file  the  Bill. 

The  first  step  to  be  taken  by  a  party  who  proposes  to  institute  a  suit 
in  Chancery,  unless  he  intends  to  conduct  the  suit  in  person,  is  to  author- 
ize a  solicitor  practising  in  the  Court  to  commence  and  conduct  it  on 

his.  behalf.  It  does  not  seem  to  be  necessary  that  such  authorit}r 
*  307    should  be  in  writing,6  *  but  a  solicitor  should,  before  he  commences 

a  suit,  be  in  possession  of  some  written  authority  for  that  purpose, 
as  if  he  is  not,  the  onus  of  the  proof  of  authority  will  be  cast  on  him,1 
and  in  the  absence  of  a  written  retainer,  he  may  be  held  to  have  been 
acting  without  authority.2     The  retainer   should  of  course  come  from 

1  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §§  16,20,  21,  l  Pinner  v.  Knights,  6  Beav.  174;  Hood  v. 

2  Ld.  Red.  34,  37,  51;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §§  17-  Phillips,  id.  176;  Maries  v.  Maries,  23  L.  J.  Ch. 
19.  154,  V.  C.  W.    See  Wiggins  v.  Peppin,  2  B,av. 

3  Ld.  Red.  34,  37,  48,  50.  403;  and  see  Re  Hincks,  W.  N.  (1867)  291,  as 

4  Ld.  Red.  51,  53,  54.  to  written  evidence  of  alleged  recalling  of  the 

5  Post,  Chap.  XXXIII. ;  and  see  15  and  16  revocation  of  a  retainer. 

Vic.  c.  86,  §§  52.  53.  -  Wright   n.  Castle.  3  Mer.  12;  Crossley  v. 

6  Lord  r.  Kellett,  2  M.  &  K.  1.  As  torevo-  Crowther,  9  Hare,  384;  Bird  v.  Harris,  W.  N. 
ration  of  the  authority,  see  Freeman  v.  Fairlie,  (1880)  106;  29  W.  R.  45;  W.  N.  (1881)  5.  As 
8  L.  J.  Ch.  44,  V.  C.  E.  For  the  authority  re-  to  retainer  by  a  corporation  under  its  common 
quired  in  the  case  of  a  bill  by  a  public  company,  seal,  see  Arnold  v.  Mayor  of  Poole,  4  M.  &  G. 
see  East  Pant  Mining  Co.  r.  Merry  weather,  10  860;  and  see  Eley  v  Positive  Ass.  Co.  1  Ex. 
Jur.  N.  S.  1231 ;  13  W.  R.  216,  V.  C.  W. ;  2  H.  D.  20,  88  ;  Faviell  v.  Eastern  Counties  By.  Co. 
&  M.  254;  Exeter  &  Crediton  Ry.  Co.  v.  Bui-  2  Ex.  344;  17  L.  J.  Ex.  297;  Thames  Haven 
ler,  5  Railway  Cas.  211.  For  forms  of  authority  Co.  v.  Hall,  5  M.  &  G.  274,  287 ;  Reg.  v.  Cum- 
to  sue  or  defend,  see  Vol.  III.  berland  Justices,  5  D.  &  L.  431,  n. ;  17  L.  J.  (Q. 

302 


AUTHORITY   TO    FILE    THE    BILL. 


307 


the  party  to  the  suit,  or  from  a  person  duly  authorized  to  give  it  on  his 
behalf.8  A  retainer  to  act  for  a  firm  should  come  from  each  member, 
except  when  some  of  the  partners  are  expressly  or  impliedly  authorized 
to  retain  for  the  others,  and  in  such  case  a  retainer  from  them  would  be 
sufficient.4 

In  order  to  warrant  a  solicitor  in  filing  a  bill,  the  authority,  be  it  in 
writing  or  by  parol,  ought  to  be  special ;  and  it  has  been  held  that  a 
general  authority  to  act  as  solicitor  for  a  person,  will  not  be  sufficient 
to  warrant  his  commencing  a  suit  on  his  behalf  : 5  although,  under  a  gen- 
eral authority,  a  solicitor  may  defend  a  suit  for  his  client.6  When  a 
solicitor  acts  without  authority,  he  will  in  general  be  ordered  to  pay  the 
costs  occasioned  thereby.7  (a) 

The  rule  which  requires  a  solicitor  to  be  specially  authorized  to  com- 
mence a  suit  on  behalf  of  his  client,  applies  as  well  to  cases  where  the 
party  sues  as  a  co-plaintiff,8  as  to  cases  where  he. sues  alone;  and  even 
to  cases  where  his  name  is  merely  made  use  of  pro  forma.9  As  we  have 
already  seen,  before  the  name  of  any  person  is  used  in  any  suit  as  next 
friend  of  any  infant,  married  woman,10  or  other  party,  or  as  relator  in 
any  information,  such  person  must  sign  a  written  authority  to  the 
solicitor  for  that  purpose,  and  such  authority  must  be  filed  with  the  bill 
or  information.11 


B.)  102:  25  &  26  Vic.  c.  89;  30  &  31  Vic.  c.  131, 
§  37  (2),  (3). 

3  Pickford  v.  Ervington,  4  Dowl.  453.  As 
to  cestui  que  trusts  retaining  on  behalf  of  their 
trustee,  see  Heinrich  v.  Sutton,  L.  R.  6  Cli. 
220. 

4  See  Hambridge  o.  De  la  Croupe,  3  C.  B.  742. 
See  generally  Cordery  on  Solicitors,  cc.  3,  5; 
Pulling  on  Attorneys,  c.  3. 

5  Wilson  v.  Wilson,  1  J.  &  W.  457;  see 
also  Dundas  v.  Dutens,  1  Ves.  Jr.  196,  200;  2 
Cox,  235,  241;  Bligh  v.  Tredgett,  5  De  G.  & 
S.  74;  15  Jur.  1101;  Bewley  v.  Seymour,  14 
.Tur.  213,  V.  C.  E.;  Re Manby,  3  Jur.  N.  S. 
259;  S.  C.  nom.  Norton  v.  Cooper,  3  Sm.  &  G. 
375;  Fenton  v.  Queen's  Ferry  W.  R.  Co.  L.  R. 
7  Eq.  267;  Re  Gray,  20  L.  T.  N.  S.  730;  and 
see  Solley  v  Wood,  16  Beav.  370,  where  an 
authority  given  to  a  country  solicitor  was  held 
sufficient  to  warrant  his  town  agent  in  tiling  a 
bill.     Seel  Chit.  Arch.  86. 

«  Wright  v.  Castle,  3  Mer.  12. 

7  Re  Savage,  15  Ch.  D.  557,  M.  R. 

8  Where  a  suit  is  commenced  in  the  names 
of  several  persons  by  their  solicitor,  the  Court 
will  not  inquire  whether  such  suit  was  author- 
ized by  all,  unless  some  of  them  object  to  the 
proceedings,  or  the  adverse  party  shows  affirm- 


atively that  the  suit  is  commenced  and  carried 
on  in  the  names  of  some  of  the  parties  without 
authority.  Bank  Commissioners  v.  Bank  of 
Buffalo,*6  Paige,  497. 

9  In  Wilson  v.  Wilson,  1  J.  &  W.  458,  Lord 
Eldon  said :"  I  cannot  agree  that  making  a 
person  a  plain!  iff  is  only  pro  forma,  and  I  am 
disposed  to  go  a  great  way  in  such  cases;  for 
it  is  too  much  for  solicitors  to  take  upon  them- 
selves to  make  persons  parties  to  suits  without 
a  clear  authority;  there  are  very  great  mis- 
chiefs arising  f  oni  it." 

10  See  Rogers  v.  Hor-n,  26  W.  R.  432. 

11  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  11;  ante,  pp.  13,  68, 
110  ;  see  now  R.  S.  C.  1883,  Ord.  XVI.  20.  In 
a  pressing  case,  an  information  was  allowed  to 
be  filed  without  the  authority,  on  the  undertak- 
ing of  the  solicitor  to  tile  it  the  next  day.  Att.- 
Gen.  v.  Murray,  13  W.  R.  65,  V.  C.  K.  As  to 
the  liability  of  a  person  whose  name  is  used  as 
next  friend  without  authority,  whether  origi- 
nally or  in  the  place  of  one  deceased,  see  Bligh 
v.  Tredgett,  5  De  G.  &  S.  74;  15  Jur.  1101; 
Ward  v.  Ward,  6  Beav.  251.  See  now  New- 
biggin-by-the-Sea  Gas  Co.  v.  Armstrong,  13 
Ch.  D.  310;  Swann  v.  Swann,  W.  N.  (1880) 
191;  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  VII.  1. 


(«)  The  mere  fact  of  employing  a  solicitor 
does  not  make  him  an  agent  to  bind  the  person 
employing  him,  at  all  times,  to  anything  that 
he  may  say,  or  by  receiving  notices  or  informa- 
tion. Whittingstall  v  King,  46  L.T.  520;  Saf- 
fron Waldeu  S.  R.  B.  Society  v.  Rayner,  14  Ch. 


D.  406;  10  id.  696.  But  a  solicitor,  who  is  em- 
ployed as  to  a  particular  property  or  transaction, 
appears  to  have  a  general  authority  to  enter  into 
negotiations  on  his  principal's  behalf.  See  Hes- 
ter v.  Hester,  34  Ch.  D.  607,  616;  Re  Kellock, 
56  L.  T.  887. 

303 


*  308  THE   BILL. 

If  a  solicitor  files  a  bill  in  the  name  of  a  person  without  having  a 

proper  authority  for  so  doing,  such  person,  if  he  wishes  to  get  rid  of  the 

suit,  and  is  the  sole  plaintiff,  should  move  that  the  bill  may  be  taken  off  the 

file 12  or  dismissed,13  or  that  further  proceedings  be  stayed  (b) ;  and 

*  308    that  the  solicitor  may  be  ordered  to  pay  to  the  defendants  *  their 

costs  of  the  suit,  and  may  be  also  ordered  to  pay  the  plaintiff's  costs 
of  the  application,  and  his  incidental  expenses,  as  between  solicitor  and 
client.1  The  same  course  should  be  pursued  where  there  are  several 
plaintiffs,  and  all  repudiate  the  suit.  But  where  one  or  more  of  sev- 
eral plaintiffs  desire  to  withdraw  from  the  suit,  they  should  move  that 
their  names  may  be  struck  out  of  the  bill,  and  that  the  solicitor  who  has 
iui:iuthorizedly  used  their  names  may  be  ordered  to  pay  their  costs  of 
the  suit,  and  the  costs  of  the  application.2  This  application  can  only  be 
made  by  the  persons  whose  names  have  been  so  used.3 

The  motion  in  either  case  must  be  supported  by  an  affidavit  of  the 
respective  applicants  themselves,  that  the  bill  has  been  filed  without 
any  authority  from  them.4  To  avoid  the  effect  of  such  an  application, 
the  solicitor  against  whom  it  is  made  must  show  distinctly,  upon  affida- 
vit, that  he  had  a  special  authority  from  the  party  moving  to  institute 
the  suit ;  and  it  will  not  be  sufficient  to  assert  generally,  in  opposition 
to  the  plaintiff's  affidavit,  that  authority  had  been  given.5  Notice  of  the 
intended  motion  must  be  given  to  the  solicitor  who  filed  the  bill ;  and 
where  one  or  more,  but  not  all,  of  the  plaintiffs  move,  notice  must  also 
be  served  on  the  co-plaintiffs,  and  on  the  defendants,6  whose  costs  of 
appearance  are  usually  ordered  to  be  paid  by  the  solicitor,  if  the  motion 
succeeds.7  Where  the  sole  plaintiff  applies,  service  on  the  defendants  is 
unnecessary,  at    least   before  decree ;    and  in  one  case  their   costs   of 

12  Jerdein  v.  Bright,  10  W.  R.  380,  V.  C.  W. ;  3  Duckett  v.  Gover,  25  W.  R.  554;  W.  N. 
Palmer  v.  Walesbv,  L.  R.  3  Ch.  732;  Davies  v.  (1877)  80;  but  see  Schjott  v.  Schjott,  19  Ch. 
Davies,  18  L.  T.  N.  S.  701.  D.  94. 

13  Wright  v.   Castle,   3  Mer.  12;    Allen  v.  4  For  form  of  affidavit,  see  Vol.  III. 

Bone,  4   Beav.    493;  Crossley  v.   Crowther,  9  5  In   Wright  v.  Castle,  3  Mer.  12,  the  affi- 

Hare,  384;  Atkinson  v.  Abbott,  3  Drew.  251.  davit  of  the  plaintiff  was  met  by  another  on  the 

1  Wright  v.  Castle,  3  Mer.  12  ;  Palmer  v.  part  of  the  solicitor,  stating  that  an  action  had 
Walesbv,  L.  R.  3  Ch.  732;  and  see  the  order  in  been  brought  by  the  defendant  against  the 
Allen  v.  Bone,  Seton,  852,  No.  1.  For  form  of  plaintiff,  on  certain  promissory  notes:  to  re- 
notice  of  motion,  see  Vol.  III.  strain  proceedings  in  which  action  the  bill  had 

2  Tabbernor  v.  Tabbernor,  2  Keen,  679.  For  been  filed,  although  not  by  the  express  direc- 
the  order  in  that  case,  see  1  Seton,  635,  No.  2;  tions  of  the  plaintiff,  yet  in  the  course  of  busi- 
and  see  Wilson  v.  Wilson,  1J.  &  W.  457;  Kep-  ness,  and  by  virtue  of  a  general  authority,  as 
pell  v.  Bailey,  2  M.  &  K.  548;  Pinner  v.  the  plaintiff's  solicitor;  but  Lord  Eldon  did  not 
Knights,  6  Beav.   174;    Hood  v.  Phillips,  id.  consider  such  authority  sufficient. 

176;    see  also  Malins  v.  Greenway,   10  Beav.  6  See    Newbiggin-by-the-Sea     Gas    Co.   v. 

564;   12  Jur.   66,  319,  where   a  solicitor  was  Armstrong,  13  Ch.  D.  310. 

onhred  to  pay  the  costs  of  unauthorized  pro-  ~>  Tabbernor   v.    Tabbernor,    2   Keen,    679 ; 

ceedings  in  the  Master's  office,  on  behalf  of  1  Seton.  635;  Hood  v.  Phillips,  6  Beav.  176; 

creditors.      For  form  of  notice  of  motion,  see  Pinner  v  Knights,  id.  174. 

Vol,  III. 


(b)  In  Nurse  v.  Durnford,  13  Ch.  D.  764,  the  without  payment  of  costs.     See  also  Reynolds 

common-law  practice  was    approved   and    fol-  v  Howell,  L.  R,  8  Q.  B.  398;  Boswell  v.  Coaks, 

Laved,  by  which  the  plaintiff  in  such  case  is  57  L.  J.  Ch.  101. 
entitled  to  an  order   to    stay  the  proceedings 

304 


AUTHORITY   TO    FILE   THE   BILL.  *  310 

appearing,  where  improperly  served,  had  to  be  borne  by  the  plaintiff 
personally.8 

The  motion  should  be  made  as  soon  as  possible  after  the  plaintiff  has 
become  acquainted  with  the  fact  of  the  suit  having  been  instituted  in 
his  name ;  for,  although,  as  between  him  and  the  solicitor,  the 
mere  fact  of  the  plaintiff  having  neglected  to  move  that  *his  *  309 
name  should  be  struck  out  from  the  record  will  not  exonerate 
the  solicitor ; *  yet,  as  between  the  plaintiff  and  the  other  parties,  the 
Court,  if  there  has  been  delay  on  his  part  in  making  such  application, 
will  not  generally  dismiss  the  bill,  but  will  so  frame  the  order  as  not  to 
prejudice  any  of  the  parties  to  the  cause.2  This  applies  more  especially 
to  cases  where  the  person  whose  name  has  been  used  without  due  author- 
ity is  co-plaintiff  with  others  ;  for  it  can  scarcely  happen,  where  he  is  sole 
plaintiff,  that  defendants  should  have  an  interest  in  resisting  an  applica- 
tion to  dismiss  the  bill  with  costs  (except  indeed  after  decree)  :  but  where 
he  is  co-plaintiff,  it  frequently  happens  that  dismissing  the  bill  would 
interfere  with  the  interest  of  the  other  plaintiffs,  or  diminish  the  security 
of  the  defendants  for  costs ;  in  such  cases  the  motion  will  usually  be 
saved  to  the  hearing,  and  then  the  solicitor  will  be  ordered  to  pay  all 
the  costs  and  expenses  of  the  party  whose  name  has  been  used  without 
authority.3  The  solicitor  has  further  been  ordered  to  pay  to  the  defend- 
ants the  difference  between  taxed  costs  and  their  costs  and  expenses.4 

Where  a  co-plaintiff  was  not  apprised  that  his  name  had  been  made  use 
of  without  his  authority  till  after  the  bill  had  been  dismissed  with  costs, 
and  he  was  served  with  a,  subpoena  to  pay  them,  Lord  Eldon,  upon  motion, 
ordered  the  solicitor  to  pay  to  the  defendant  the  costs,  which  had  been 
ordered  to  be  paid  by  the  plaintiffs  to  the  defendant ;  and  also  to  pay  to 
the  plaintiff  who  made  the  application  his  costs  of  the  application,  as 
between  solicitor  and  client.5  By  the  order  there  made  the  solicitor  was 
ordered  to  pay  the  whole  costs  to  be  paid  by  all  the  plaintiffs  to  the 
defendants ;  but  he  was  to  be  at  liberty  to  make  any  application  as  to 
those  costs,  as  against  the  other  plaintiffs,  as  he  should  be  advised.6 

In  certain  cases  it  is  necessary,  before  a  suit  is  commenced,  to  obtain 
the  sanction  of  the  Court  to  its  institution.     The  cases  in  which  this  is 
most  usually  done   are   those  in  which  the  suit   contemplated 
*  is  for  the  benefit  of  an  estate  which  is  already  the  subject  of  a     *  310 

8  Jerdein  ».  Bright,  10  W.  R.  380,  V.  C.  W.  5  Wade  v.  Stanlev,  U.  &  W.  674. 

i  Hall  v.  Laver,  1  Hare,  571;  5  Jur.  241;  6  S.  C.  Reg.  Lib.  B.  1819,  fol.  1835.  For 
see  also  Burge  v.  Brulton,  2  Hare,  373;  7  Jur.  other  cases  where  a  plaintiff,  or  a  next  friend, 
088,  as  to  the  lien  of  a  solicitor  upon  a  fund  re-  has  applied  to  he  relieved  from  orders  for  pay- 
covered  in  the  cause.  Delay  in  making  the  ment  by  them  of  money  or  costs,  without  their 
application  may  he  held  evidence  of  a  ratifica-  knowledge  of  the  suit,  see  Hood  v.  Phillips,  G 
tion  of  the  solicitor's  act.  See  Reynolds  v.  Beav.  170;  Ward  r.  Ward,  id.  251;  Bligfa  r, 
Howell,  L.  R.  8  Q.  B.  398.  Tredgett,  5  De  G.  &  S.  74  ;    15  Jur.  1101;    Re 

2  Titterton  v.  Osborne,  1  Dick.  350;  and  see  Manby,  3  Jur.  N.  S.  259;  S.  C  nom.  Norton  V. 
Tarbuck  v-  Tarhuck,  6  Beav.  134;  Pinner  v.  Cooper,  3  Sm.  &  G.  375.  In  Hall  r.  Bennett, 
Knights,  id.  174;  Hood  v.  Phillips,  id.  176;  2S.&  S.  78,  where  the  bill  had  been  dismissed 
Bligh  v.  Tredgett,  5  De  G.  &  S.  74;  15  Jur.  w-ith  costs  for  want  of  prosecution,  the  plain- 
1101;  and  see  Re  Savage,  15  Ch.  D.  557.  tiff's  solicitor  was  ordered  to  pay  the  defend- 

3  See  Dundas  v.  Dutens,  2  Cox,  235,  241  ;  ant's  costs,  the  plaintiff  having  absconded  be- 
1  Yes.  Jr.  196.  fore  s-uit,  and  never  authorized  or  sanctioned  it. 

*  Ibid.  1  Ves.  Jr.  200. 

vol.  i. —20  305 


311 


THE   BILL. 


proceeding  in  Court,  and  the  expenses  of  which  are  to  be  paid  out  of 
such  estate.1  In  these  cases  the  Court  would  not  formerly  direct  tho 
institution  of  such  a  suit  upon  motion,  although  supported  by  affida- 
vits, without  previously  referring  it  to  the  Master  to  inquire  whether  it 
would  be  for  the  benefit  of  the  parties  at  whose  joint  expense  it  was 
to  be :  unless  the  other  parties  interested,  being  of  age,  and  competent 
to  consent,  chose  to  waive  such  reference.2  Now,  however,  the  proper 
mode  of  application  for  orders  of  this  description  is  by  summons  at 
Chambers,3  supported  by  affidavit  or  other  evidence  of  the  facts  from 
which  the  Judge  can  determine  whether  the  proposed  suit  is  proper  to 
be  instituted :  and  the  opinion  of  an  Equity  barrister,  in  actual  practice, 
is  usually  required,  that  there  is  a  good  ground  of  suit. 

In  the  same  manner,  where  the  property  of  an  infant  is  the  subject  of 
a  suit  already  depending,  and  it  becomes  necessary  that  another  suit 
should  be  instituted  on  behalf  of  the  infant,  it  is  usual,  before  any  steps 
are  taken  in  it,  to  obtain  in  Chambers,  on  summons,4  an  order  sanctioning 
such  contemplated  proceedings  as  being  for  the  benefit  of  the  infant.  Yet 
such  order  can  only  be  made  where  the  property  of  the  infant  is  already 
subject  to  the  control  and  disposition  of  the  Court  in  another  suit ;  and 
that  in  ordinary  cases,  where  a  person  commences  an  original  proceeding 
on  behalf  of  an  infant  as  his  next  friend,  he  is  considered  as  taking  upon 
himself  the  whole  responsibility  of  it ;  nor  will  the  Court,  either  before  or 
after  the  commencement  of  the  proceeding,  direct  an  inquiry  whether 
it  will  be  for  the  infant's  benefit,  at  the  instance  of  the  next  friend 
himself  (unless  in  cases  where  there  are  two  or  more  suits  brought 
*  311  by  different  next  friends  for  the  same  object)  :  although,  we  *  have 
seen,  it  will  sometimes  do  so  at  the  instance  of  other  parties.1 

It  has  been  before  stated,  that  the  committee  of  the  estate  of  an  idiot 
or  lunatic  ought,  previously  to  instituting  a  suit  on  his  behalf,  to  obtain 
the  sanction  of  the  Lord  Chancellor  or  Lords  Justices  to  the  proceed- 
ing ; 2  and  that  in  the  case  of  suits  by  the  assignees  of  bankrupts,  it  is 
necessary,  previously  to  instituting  the  suit,  to  procure  the  sanction  of 
the  Court  of  Bankruptcy.8  And  in  like  manner,  before  a  suit  can  be 
instituted  on  behalf  of  a  charity,  unless  by  the  Attorney-General,  the 
sanction  of  the  Charity  Commissioners  must  be  obtained.4 

In  all  the  above-mentioned  cases,  in  which  it  is  stated  to  be  right, 
previously  to  the  institution  of  a  suit,  to  obtain  the  proper  sanction,  the 
omission  to  obtain  such  sanction  is  not  a  ground  upon  which  a  defend- 
ant to  the  suit  can  object  to  its  proceeding.5 

1  Thus,whe-ethereisasuit  pendingfor  thead-      purpose,   application   should   be   made   to  the 


ministration  of  assets,  and  it  becomes  necessary, 
in  order  to  pet  iti  the  estate,  that  a  suit  should  be 
instituted  against  adebtor  totlie estate, it  is  usual 
for  the  personal  representative,  previously  to 
tiling  a  bill,  to  apply,  in  the  administration  suit, 
for  the  leave  of  the  Court  to  exhibit  a  bill  for  that 
purpose.  And  so  where  a  suit  has  been  instituted 
for  winding  up  partnership  accounts  upon  a  dis- 
solution, and  a  receiver  has  been  appointed  to  col- 
lect the  outstanding  effects,  if  it  is  necessary,  in 
order  to  recover  a  debt  due  to  the  partnership, 
that  the  receiver  should  institute  a  suit  for  that 

306 


Court,  on  the  part  of  some  of  the  parties,  that 
the  receiver  may  be  at  liberty  to  tile  the  neces- 
sary bill  in  the  names  of  the  partners. 

2  Musgrave  v.  Medex,  3  V.  &  B.  167. 

3  For  forms  of  summons,  see  Vol.  III. 
*  Ibid.     See  ante,  p.  80. 

i  Ante,  pp.  71,  80. 

2  Ante,  p.  85. 

3  Ante,  p.  65. 

4  16  &  17  Vic.  c.  137,  §  17;    see  post,  Chap. 
XLV.  §  2,  Charitable  Trusts  Acts. 

5  Having  regard  to  the  words  of  the  17th 


BY   WHOM    PREPARED. 


312 


Section  III.  —  By  whom  Prepared. 

The  solicitor  being  duly  authorized,  the  next  step  in  the  institution 
of  a  suit  is  to  have  the  bill  properly  prepared.  The  duty  of  drawing 
the  bill  ought,  strictly,  to  be  performed  by  the  solicitor,  who  is  allowed 
a  fee  for  so  doing ; 6  but  as  the  rules  of  Court  require  that  the 
draft  should  be  signed  by  counsel,7  and  as  *  much  of  the  success  *  312 
of  the  suit  may  depend  upon  the  manner  in  which  the  bill  is 
framed,  it  has  been  found  more  convenient  in  practice  that  the  bill 
should  be  prepared  as  well  as  signed  by  counsel ;  and  accordingly, 
except  in  particular  cases,  instead  of  the  draft  of  the  bill  being  pre- 
pared by  the  solicitor,  and  laid  before  counsel  for  his  perusal  and  sig- 
nature, the  instructions  to  prepare  the  bill  are  generally,  in  the  first 
instance,  laid  before  the  counsel,  who  prepares  the  draft  from  those 
instructions,  and  afterwards  affixes  his  signature  to  it.1  If  neither  the 
draft  of  the  bill  nor  the  print  or  engrossment  of  it  be  signed  by  counsel 
before  the  bill  is  filed,  or  the  hand  be  counterfeit  or  disowned,  the  bill 


section  of  the  Charitable  Trusts  Act  above  re- 
ferred to,  it  would  seem  doubtful  whether  the 
want  of  sanction  would  not  be  an  objection 
which  a  defendant  might  take  to  the  suit's  pro- 
ceeding. See  Braund  v.  Earl  of  Devon,  L.  R. 
3  Ch.  800:  In  re  Lister's  Hospital,  6  De  G.  M. 
&  G.  104;  Holme  v.  Guy,  5  Ch.  D.  901;  Att.- 
Gen.  v.  Dean  &  Canons  of  Manchester,  28  Ch. 
D.  590  ;  W.  N.  (1881)  100.  See  Hodgson  v. 
Forster,  \V.  N.  (1877)  74. 

6  Regul.  to  Ord.  9d  Sched. 

1  Cons.  Ord.  VIII.  1,  2;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §§  47, 
269  ;  1  Smith,  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  106  ;  Ayck- 
bourn,  Ch.  Pr.  (Loud.  ed.  1844)  5,6;  Coop.  Eq. 
PI.  18;  Davis  v.  Davis,  19  N.  .1.  Eq.  180;  Wright 
v.  Wright,  4  Halst.  Ch.  (N.  J.)  153;  Chancery 
Rule  1  of  New  Jersey,  15  N.  J.  Eq.  513; 
Hatch  v.  Eustaphieve,  1  Clarke,  63;  see  Bel- 
knap v.  Stone,  1  Allen,  572,  574;  Burns  v. 
Lynde,  6  Allen,  305.  The  signing  on  the  back 
of  the  bill  is  sufficient.  Dwighte.  Humphreys, 
3  McLean,  104.  The  24th  Equity  Rule  of  the 
U.  S.  Supreme  Court  expressly  requires  the 
signature  of  c  unsel  to  the  bill.  Where  a  cor- 
poration is  plaintiff,  the  bill,  if  not  a  sworn  one, 
is  drawn  in  the  name  of  the  corporation,  by  its 
chartered  title,  and  signed  by  counsel.  In  cases 
where  the  bill  is  to  be  sworn  to,  it  should  be 
signed  by  the  officer  making  the  oath.  1  Hoff. 
Ch.  Pr.  96;  1  Barbour,  Ch.  Pr.  44;  Dickin- 
son's Ch.  Pr.  103,  note.  The  bill  need  not  be 
under  the  corporate  seal,  but  is  vouched  for  by 
signature  of  the  solicitor,  (<i)  whose  authority 
need  not  be  exhibited.  George's  Creek  Co.  v. 
Detmold,  1  Md.  Ch.  371.  A  plaintiff  who  man- 
ages his  cause  in  person  must  sign  the  bill, 
which  need  not  then  be  signed  by  counsel.    See 


1  Hoff.  Ch.  Pr.  97.  The  rules  include  informa- 
tions, see  Prel.  Ord.  10  (4).  The  signature  of 
the  Attorney-General  is  required  to  an  infor- 
mation, and  to  an  amendment  of  it,  in  addition 
to  the  signature  of  the  counsel  who  settles  the 
draft.  In  Attorney-General  v.  Fellows,  1  J.  & 
W.  254,  an  amended  information  was  thus 
ordered  to  be  taken  off  the  file,  though  the 
Attorney-General  had  signed  the  original  in- 
formation. For  forms  of  notice  of  motion  in 
such  case,  see  Vol   III. 

1  The  bill  must  be  signed  by  counsel.  The 
mere  signature  of  counsel  by  another  person  is 
not  a  compliance  with  the  rule,  either  in  spirit 
or  letter.  Counsel,  before  annexing  his  name 
to  a  bill,  should  have  perused  it,  or  been  in- 
formed of  its  contents  in  such  manner  as  would 
satisfy  him  that  he  might  certify  that  the  bill 
stated  a  case  in  which  the  plaintiff  might  be 
entitled  to  relief,  set  forth  w.th  so  much  regard 
to  the  essential  rules  of  pleading,  and  praying 
relief  in  such  manner  as  to  entitle  it  to  the  con- 
sideration of  the  Court.  Per  Chancellor  Za- 
briskie,  in  Davis  v.  Davis,  19  N.  J.  Eq.  180,  181; 
but  the  signature  by  counsel  in  the  firm  name 
will  be  good.  Hampton  v.  Coddington.  28  N. 
J.  Eq.  557.  And  the  signing  on  the  back  of  the 
bill  is  sufficient.  Dwight  B.  Humphreys,  2 
McLean,  104.  See  Rule  24  of  the  Equity 
Rules  of  the  U.  S.  Supreme  Court.  In  Mich  - 
gan,  where  all  solicitors  are  also  counsel,  a  bill 
signed  by  a  solicitor  is  not  demurrable  for  want 
of  the  signature  of  counsel.  Henry  v.  Gregory, 
29  Mich.  68.  The  lawyer  who  signs  pleadings 
in  ( lhancery  usually  designates  himself  as  solici- 
tor. 1  Hicks's  Man.  Ch.  Pr.  46 ;  see  Puterb. 
Ch.  Pr.  59  ;  infra,  p  732. 


(a)  So  of  a  bill   brought   by  a  municipal  corporation. 
(W.  Va.)  20  L.  R.  A.  161. 


Moundsville  v.  Ohio  River  R.  Co. 


307 


*  313  THE   BILL. 

will  be  dismissed  on  the  defendant's  demurrer  or  motion.2  Thus,  a 
demurrer  has  been  allowed  to  an  amended  bill,  because  the  name  of 
counsel  did  not  appear  to  the  bill ; 8  and  if,  upon  inspection  of  the  record 
or  an  office  copy,  the  name  of  counsel  does  not  appear  subscribed  to  the 
bill,  the  Court  will,  of  its  own  accord,  order  it  to  be  taken  off  the  file.4  (a) 
The  usual  course,  however,  in  such  a  case,  appears  to  be  for  the 
defendant  to  move  that  the  bill  may  be  taken  off  the  file,  and  that  the 
costs  may  be  paid  by  the  plaintiff.5  If,  upon  such  a  motion,  any  doubt 
arises  whether  the  draft  of  the  bill  was  signed  by  counsel  or  not,  the 
Court  may  direct  an  inquiry  into  the  fact ;  and  if  it  appears  that  it  was 
not  signed  by  counsel,  the  bill  will  be  ordered  to  be  taken  off  the  file, 
and  the  plaintiff  directed  to  pay  the  defendant  his  costs.6  A  motion  to 
take  the  bill  off  the  file,  with  costs,  may  also  be  made  where  the  draft 
has  been  altered  after  it  was  signed  by  counsel.7 

*  313        *  Where  the  same  counsel  who  signed  the  draft  of  the  original 

bill  amends  his  former  draft,  which  has  his  signature,  it  is  not 
necessary  that  he  should  sign  the  draft  again,  as  the  signature  will  be 
applied  as  well  to  the  amendment  as  to  the  former  draft;  nor  is  it 
necessary  that  there  should  be  a  second  signature  to  the  record.  But  if 
the  amendments  are  made  by  another  counsel,  then  it  is  necessary  that 
there  should  be  a  second  signature.1  The  usual  practice,  however,  is  for 
counsel  in  all  cases  to  re-sign  the  draft,  whenever  he  amends  it.2 

By  one  of  the  orders  of  the  Court,  it  is  ordered  that  no  counsel  shall 
sign  any  bill,  answer,  or  other  pleading,  unless  it  be  drawn,  or  at  least 
perused,  by  himself,  before  it  is  signed;  and  that  counsel  shall  take 
care  that  deeds,  writings,  or  records  be  not  unnecessarily  set  out  therein, 
in  hcec  verba;  but  that  so  much  of  them  only  as  is  pertinent  and  material  be 
set  out  or  stated,  or  the  effect  and  substance  of  so  much  of  them  only  as  is 
pertinent  and  material  be  given,  as  counsel  may  deem  advisable,  without 
needless  prolixity  ;  and  that  no  scandalous  matter  be  inserted  therein.3 

2  Davis  v.  Davis,  19  N.  J.  Eq.  180  ;  Carey  »  Troup  v.  Ricardo,  13  W.  R.  147,  L.  C. 
r.  Hatch,  2  Edw.  Ch.  190.  It  cannot  be  signed  Where  it  appeared  that  a  solicitor  had  forged  a 
afterwards  without  an  order  of  Court.  Part-  counsel's  name  to  a  pleading,  he  was  fined  £20, 
ridge  v.  Jackson,  2  Edw.  Ch.  520.  The  want  and  committed  till  the  fine  was  paid;  the  party 
of  the  signature  of  counsel  is  a  defect  which  for  whom  he  acted  was  also  fined  £100.  Whit- 
requires  an  amendment.  Wright  v.  Wright,  4  lock  v.  Harriot,  1  Dick.  16;  and  see  Bull  v. 
Halst.  Ch.  (N.  J.)  153.  Griffin,  2Anst.  563. 

a  Kirklev  v.  Burton,  5  Mad.  378.  »  Webster*.  Threlfall,  1  S.  &  S.  135 ;  Braith- 

*  French  v.  Dear,  5  Ves.  547,  550.     Where  waite's  Pr.  304;   see,  however.  Burch   v.  Rich, 

the  plaintiff  di- covers,  before  appearance,  that  1  R.  &  M.  156,  158. 

counsel's  name  has  been  omitted  to  the  bill  as  *  Where  the  amendments   proposed  to  be 

filed,  he  should  obtain  an  order  of  course,  on  made  in  the  bill  are  merely  of  clerical  errors 

motion  or  petition,  to  amend,  and  then  add  the  in  names,  dates,  or  sums,  and  such  errors  are 

name  to  the  bill.     As  to  an  omission  to  print  specified  in  the  order  authorizing  the  amend- 

the  signature,   see  Coppeard    v.  Mayhew,  22  ments,  the  signature  of  counsel  to  such  amend- 

L.  J.  Ch.  408   M.  R.  ments  is  not  required.      Braithwaite's  Pr.  304. 

'  5  For  form  of  notice  of  motion,  see  Vol.  III.  3  Cons.  Ord.  VIII.  2;  Davis  v.  Davis,  19  N. 

6  Dillon  v.  Francis,  1  Dick.  68;  Pitt  v.  Mack-  J.  Eq.  180, 181 ;  Hood  r.  Irwin,  4  John.  Ch.  437; 

lew,  1  S.  &  S.  136,  n.  24th.  26th,  and  27th  Equity  Rules  of  the  U.  S. 

(a)  See  Burns  v.  Lvnde,  6  Allen,  305;  Pope  514;  Eveland   v.    Stephenson,    45   Mich.   394; 

r.  Salamanca  Oil  Co.  "l  15  Mass.  286;  Roach  r.  Bachman  v.  Einhorn,  12  Phila.  391.     If  a  bill, 

Hilling,  5  Cranch.  O.  C.  637;  Stinson  v.  Hil-  brought  by  ten  persons,  is  signed  by  only  two  of 

drup,  8  Biss.  376 ;  Secor  r.  Singleton,  9  Fed.  them,  it  is  the  bill  of  the  latter  only.     Chap- 

Rep.809 ;  Litton  v.  Arinstead,  9  Baxter  (Tenu.),  man  v.  Banker  &  T.  Pub.  Co.  128  Mass.  478. 
308 


MATTER   OF   THE   BILL. 


313 


Section  IV.  —  The  Matter  of  the  Bill. 

An  original  bill  in  Chancery  is  in  the  nature  of  a  declaration  at  Com- 
mon Law,  or  of  a  libel  and  allegation  in  the  Spiritual  Courts.4  (a)     It 


Supreme  Court,  stated  post,  Vol.  III.  See,  for 
casesof  prolixity,  under  t lie  Judicature  Act  and 
the  New  Rules,  Davy  v.  Garrett,  7  Ch.  D.  473 ; 


(n)  As  to  the  statement  of  claim  under  the 
present  English  practice,  see  1  Dan.  Ch.  Prac. 
(•5th  Eng.  ed.)  400,  1  Seton  on  Judgments  (5th 
ed.),  30. 

In  America  the  Code  Procedure,  which  now 
prevails  in  a  majority  of  the  States,  which  is 
largely  equitable,  and  upon  which  the  present 
English  system,  established  in  1873,  and  in 
operation  since  Nov.  1,  1875,  appears  to  be 
partly  based,  abolishes  forms  of  actions,  allows 
the  facts  to  be  stated  in  ordinary  and  concise 
language,  and  legal  or  equitable  relief,  or  both, 
to  be  obtained  in  the  same  suit.  See  Townsend 
r.  Bogert,  126  N.  Y.  370;  Sternberger  v.  Mc- 
Govern,  56  N.  Y.  12;  Porous  Plaster  Co.  v.  Sea- 
bury,  43  Hun,  611;  Sullivan  v.  Iron  Silver  M. 
Co.  109  U.  S.  550;  Naumberg  v.  Hyatt,  24  Fed. 
Rep.  808;  Gilpin  County  Mining  Co.  v.  Drake, 
8  Col.  586;  Home  Ins.  Co.  v.  Atchison  &c.  R. 
Co.  (Col.)  34  Pac.  Rep.  281;  Rogers  v.  Duhart, 
97  Cal.  500 ;  Wilcox  v.  Saunders,  4  Neb.  587 ;  25 
Am.  L.  Rev.  523;  19  Albany  L.  J.  292;  1  So. 
L.  Rev.  N.  S.  459;  2  N.  Y.  State  Bar  Ass.  130, 
150.  As  to  changing  an  action  at  Law  into  a  suit 
in  Equity  by  amendment  in  other  States,  see 
post,  p.  403,  note  ('/).  The  vital  distinctions  be- 
tween Law  and  Equity  are  not  thereby  affected, 
and  the  rules  of  Equity  as  to  parties,  relief,  &c. 
remain  unchanged.  Basey  v.  Gallagher,  20 
Wall  670;  Whittenton  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Memphis 
&  O.  R.  P.  Co.  19  Fed.  Rep.  273;  Gudger  v: 
Western  N.  C.  R.  Co.  21  id.  81;  Reubens  v 
Joel,  13  N.  Y.  488,  494;  Mowry  v.  Hill,  11  Wis. 
146;  Truman  p.  McCollum,  20  Wis  360;  Smith 
r.  Rowe,  4  Cal.  6;  Schroers  v.  Fisk,  10  Col. 
599;  Leitendorfer  v.  King,  7  Col.  436;  Brad- 
bury v.  Butler,  1  Col.  App.  410.  433 ;  Roper 
Lumber  Co.  v.  Wallace.  93  N.  C.  22;  Chapman 
v.  Lipscomb,  18  S.  C.222;  Allen  v.  Winstandlv, 
(Ind.),  34  N.  E.  Rep.  699. 

Under  the  Code  Procedure  facts  are  to  be 
stated  according  to  their  legal  effect,  and  a  fact 
re<ulting  from  other  facts,  not  merely  supply- 
'tig  evidence  thereof,  but  being  matter  of  sub- 
stance, should  be  stated.  Rochester  R.  Co.  r. 
Robinson,  133  N.  Y.  242;  Burkett  ».  Griffith, 
90  Cal.  532.  If  the  complaint  clearly  sets  out  a 
cause  of  action,  the  Court  may  grant  any  relief 
embraced  in  the  issues.  Hurlbutt  v.  N.  W. 
Spaulding  Saw  Co.  93  Cal.  55.  A  complaint 
is  not  demurrable  because  the  proper  form  of 
relief  is  not  demanded.     Phenix  Nat.  Bank  v. 


Knowles  v.  Roberts,  38  Ch.  D.  263;  Ormerod  v 
Todmorden  Mill  Co.  8  Q.  B.  D.  664. 
4  3  Bl.  Com.  442;  Gilb.  For.  Rom.  44. 


Cleveland  Co.  34  N.  Y.  State  Rep.  498 ;  see 
Bell  v.  Gittere,  30  id.  219;  Baker  v.  Mo.  Pac. 
Ry.  34  Mo.  App.  98;  Neilson  v.  Fry,  16  Ohio 
St.  552.  Averments  should  be  specific ;  but 
reasonable  certainty  only  is  required  in  any 
Code  pleading,  and  a  valid  defence,  though 
pleaded  defectively,  will  not  be  ignored. 
Tehama  County  r.  Bryan,  68  Cal.  57;  Brown 
v.  Weldon,  71  Cal.  393;  Clay  r.  Edgerton,  19 
Ohio  St.  549;  West  v.  Tylor,  2  Coldw.  (Tenn.) 
96;  Nashville  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Conk,  11  Ueisk. 
575 ;  Saunders  v.  Soutter,  126  N.  Y.  193.  And 
such  a  construction  will  be  given  as  will  sus- 
tain the  pleading.  Sylvis  v.  Sylvis,  11  Col. 
319.  If  a  complaint  is  not  objected  to  by 
demurrer  on  the  ground  of  uncertainty,  the 
objection  cannot  be  urged  upon  appeal.  Sal- 
lield  v.  Sutter  County  Land  Imp.  Co.  94  Cal. 
546.  The  remedy,  when  the  complaint  or 
other  pleading  is  uncertain  and  indefinite  upon 
its  face,  is  by  amendment,  which  may  be 
required  by  the  Court.  N.  Y.  Code  of  Civil 
Proc.  §  546;  Blake  v.  Barnes,  30  N.  Y.  State 
Rep.  299.  In  California  ambiguity  and  uncer- 
tainty are  treated  as  separate  grounds  of 
demurrer.  White  v.  Allatt,  87  Cal.  245;  Wil- 
hoit  r.  Cunningham,  id.  453.  Mere  surplus- 
age in  a  complaint  does  not  make  it  insufficient. 
Demartin  v.  Albeit,  68  Cal.  277.  A  defective 
complaint  may  be  cured  by  an  answer  which 
supplies  the  omissions.  Schenck  v.  Hartford 
Five  Ins.  Co.  71  Cal.  28:  Rogers  v.  New  York 
&  T.  Land  Co.  (N.  Y.)  32  N.  E.  Rep.  27.  In 
Wisconsin  a  general  demurrer  lies  to  a  com- 
plaint which  imperfectly  states  a  cause  of  action 
in  Equity,  but  alleges  facts  which,  of  them- 
selves, might  constitute  a  cause  of  action  at 
Law.  Denner  o.  Chicago  &c.  Ry.  Co.  57  Wis. 
218.  And  an  action  upon  a  legal  demand  is  not 
in  Equity  when,  in  addition  to  the  money  judg- 
ment, the  complaint  prays  for  such  further 
relief  as  may  be  equitable.  Bailey  r.  /Etna 
Ins.  Co.  77  Wis.  336;  see  Hagan  v.  Patterson, 
10  Rush.  441. 

The  D.  S.  Statute  a*  to  conforming  to  State 
practice,  and  U.  S.  Rev.  Stats.  §  914,  provid- 
ing that  the  forms  of  pleading  in  the  Federal 
Courts  shall  be  the  same  as  those  employed  in 
the  same  action  in  the  State  Courts,  do  not 
apply  to  Equity  suits  in  the  Federal  Conn-. 
which  have  one  uniform  system  throughout  the 
United  States,   and  do  not  permit   legal   and 

309 


314 


THE   BILL. 


was,  in  its  origin,  nothing  but  a  petition  to  the  King,  which,  after  being 
presented,  was  referred  to  the  Lord  Chancellor,  as  the  keeper  of  his 
conscience ; 5  and  a  bill  still  continues  to  be  framed  in  the  nature  and 
style  of  a  petition ;  though  it  is  now,  in  the  first  instance,  generally  ad- 
dressed to  the  Lord  Chancellor,  Lord  Keeper,  or  Lords  Commissioners 
for  the  custody  of  the  Great  Seal.6 

■\Yhere  a  bill  prays  the  decree  of  the  Court,  touching  rights  claimed 
by  the  person  exhibiting  it,  in  opposition  to  rights  claimed  by  the  per- 
son against  whom  it  is  exhibited,  it  must  contain  a  statement  showing 
the  rights  of  the  plaintiff  or  person  exhibiting  the  bill,  by  whom  and 
in  what  manner  he  is  injured,  or  in  what  he  wants  the  assistance 
*  314    of  the  Court;7  and  in  all  cases  the  bill  must  *  contain,  as  con- 


5  See  1  Spenee,  Eq.  Jur.  335,  et  seq. ;  1  Ld. 
Camp.  Chancellors,  Intro,  id.  266,  342. 

6  Coop.  Eq.  PI.  3. 

7  It  should  contain  every  averment  neces- 
sary to  entitle  the  plaintiff  to  be  entertained 
in  a  Court  of  Equity  Vanbibber  v.  Beirne,  6 
W-iVa.  168.  See  post,  "Stating  Part,*"  in  this 
chapter,  infra,  p.  360.  A  bill  may  be  drawn 
with  a  double  aspect;  so  that,  if  one  ground 
fail,  the  plaintiff  may  rely  upon  another.     Mc- 


equitahle  claims  to  be  joined  in  the  same  suit. 
Livingston  v.  Story,  9  Pet.  632;  Bennett  v. 
Butterworth,  11  How.  669,  Fenn  v.  Holme,  21 
How.  481 ;  Thompson  v.  Railroad  Cos.,  6  Wall. 
134;  Northern  Pacific  R.  Co.  v.  Paine,  119 
U.  S.  561;  Quincy  v.  Steel,  120  U.  S.  241; 
Payne  v.  Hook,  7  Wall.  430  ;  Leighton  v.  Young, 
52  Fed.  Rep.  439;  18  L.  R.  A.  266,  and  note; 
Gudger  v.  Western  N.  C.  R.  Co.  21  Fed.  Rep. 
81:  Nickerson  v.  Atchison  &c.  R.  Co.  30  id.  85; 
Fle-cher  v.  New  Orleans  R.  Co.  20  id.  345;  Staf- 
ford Nat.  Bank  r.  Sprague.  8  id.  377;  Doe  v. 
Roe,  31  id.  97;  Gamewell  Fire  Alarm  Tel.  Co.  v. 
Mayor,  id.  312;  Union  Bank  v.  Crine,  33  id.  809. 
The  practice  of  these  Courts  is  regulated  by  the 
Acts  cf  Congress  and  the  Equity  rules  of  1842, 
which  were  made  under  the  authority  of  an 
Act  of  Congress.  Gaines  v.  New  Orleans,  27 
Fed.  Rep.  411;  United  States  v.  American  Bell 
Tel.  Co.  29  id.  17.  Where  no  change  has  been 
made  by  Congress,  the  test  of  an  adequate 
remedy  at  law  is  that  which  existed  when  the 
Judiciary  Act  of  1789  was  adopted.  MeConihay 
r.  Wright,  121  U.  S.  201.  The  Federal  Courts 
retain  Equity  jurisdiction  in  States  having  no 
Equity  Courts.  Ridings  v.  Johnson,  128  U.  S. 
212.  Sitting  as  Courts  of  Equity,  they  may 
administer  any  right  of  an  equitable  nature 
given  by  State  statutes.  Aspen  Mining  & 
S.  Co.  v.  Rucker,  28  Fed.' Rep.  220;  Jaffrey  v. 
Brown,  29  id.  476;  Bernheim  v.  Bernheim, 
30  id.  885;  Clapp  v.  Dittman,  21  id.  15;  Flash 
r.  Wilkerson,  22  id.  689;  Banigan  v.  Worcester, 
30  id.  392;  Fechheimer  v.  Baum,  37  id.  167; 
Borland  o.  Haven,  id.  394.  In  such  cases,  they 
may  follow  the  State  practice  as  near  as  pos- 

310 


Connell  r.  McConnell.  11  Vt.  290;  Murphy  v. 
Clark,  1  Sm.  &  M.  221;  Baines  v.  McGee^  id. 
208;  Ligan  v.  Henderson,  1  Bland,  236;  Mills 
v.  Metculf,  1  A.  K.  Marsh.  477;  Barnett  v. 
Wroods,  2  Jones,  Eq.  (N.  C.)  198.  A  bill  framed 
with  a  double  aspect  must  be  consistent  with 
itself.  Hart  v.  McKeese,  AValker,  Ch.  417; 
Wilkinson  v.  Dobbie,  12  Blatch.  298;  Bosley 
v.  Philips,  3  Tenn.  Ch.  649;  ante,  p.  233,  n.  2. 


sible,  retaining  separate  forms  of  actions. 
Rosenbaum  v.  Council  Bluffs  Ins.  Co.  37  Fed. 
Rep.  7.  The  construction,  by  the  highest 
State  Court,  of  a  State  statute  from  which  the 
Equity  jurisdiction  of  the  Federal  Court  is 
derived,  binds  the  latter  Court.  Beebe  v. 
Louisville  &c.  R.  Co.  39  Fed.  Rep.  481.  See 
ante,  p.  60,  n.  (a).  As  to  rules  of  property,  see 
Taylor  v.  Life  Ass'n,  13  Fed.  Rep.  493.  Except 
in  cases  of  removal,  a  U.  S.  Circuit  Court  has 
no  revisory  power  over  the  State  Courts  of 
Equity.  Sharp  v.  Whiteside,  19  Fed.  Rep.  156. 
This  uniformity  of  Equity  procedure  in  the 
Federal  Courts  prevails  in  cases  removed  from 
the  State  Courts.  Hunton  v.  Equitable  Life 
Assurance  Society.  45  Fed.  Rep.  661.  A  suit 
brought  in  a  Code  State,  if  equitable  in  its 
nature,  is  placed  upon  the  Equity  side  of  the 
Federal  Calendar,  and  governed  by  the  Equity 
rules.  Duncan  v.  Greenwalt,  10  Fed.  Rep.  800; 
Kenton  Furnace  R.  &  M.  Co.  v.  McAlpin,  5  id. 
737;  Stafford  Nat.  Bank  v.  Sprague,  8  id.  377. 
In  such  cases  a  recast  of  the  pleadings  is  neces- 
sary at  times,  in  order  that  what  is  properly  a 
case  at  Law  may  be  tried  upon  the  Law  side,  and 
matters  involved  in  the  same  suit  originally,  but 
requiring  equitable  relief,  may  be  tried  upon 
the  Equity  side.  See  Benedict  v.  Williams, 
10  Fed.  Rep.  208;  Whittendon  Manuf.  Co.  v. 
Memphis  &  O.  R.  P.  Co.  19  id.  273;  Perkins??. 
Hendryx,  23  id.  418:  Phelps  v.  Elliott,  26  id. 
881;  Lacroix  v.  Lyons,  27  id.  403;  Schneider 
v.  Foote,  id.  581.  Thus  a  cross-bill  must,  upon 
removal  to  the  Federal  Court,  take  the  place  of 
a  counter-claim.  Brande  v.  Gilchrist,  18  Fed. 
Rep.  815. 


MATTER    OF    THE    BILL. 


315 


cisely  as  may  be,  a  narrative  of  the  material  facts,  matters,  and  cir- 
cumstances on  which  the  plaintiff  relies,1  and  must  pray  specifically 
for  the  relief  the  plaintiff  may  conceive  himself  entitled  to,  and  also  for 
general  relief.2  This  statement  and  prayer  form  the  substance  and 
essence  of  every  bill ; 3  and  before  entering  more  in  detail  into  the  con- 
sideration of  the  form  of  a  bill,  the  readers  attention  should  first  be 
drawn  to  certain  general  rules  and  principles  by  which  persons  framing 
bills  ought  to  be  guided  in  the  performance  of  their  task. 

Every  bill  must  show  clearly  that  the  plaintiff  has  a  right  to  the  thing 
demanded,  or  such  an  interest  in  the  subject-matter  4  as  gives  him  a  right 
to  institute  a  suit  concerning  it;6  and  if  such  a  right  or  interest 
is  not  shown  by  the  bill,  the  defendant  may  demur.6  (a)     *  Thus,    *  315 


1  Mass.  Pub.  Stats,  c.  151,  §  7;  Mass.  Ch. 
Pr  rule  4  ;  Boynton  v.  Barstow,  38  Maine, 
577.  As  to  the  remedy  for  verboseness  in  a 
bill,  see  Williams  p.  Sexton,  19  Wis.  42. 

*  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  10. 

3  An  application  to  the  Court  for  relief  in 
Equity,  which  does  not  contain  a  prayer  for 
process  to  be  served  on  the  defendant,  or 
conclude  with  a  general  interrogator}',  may 
be  regarded  as  a  bill  ;  and,  if  properly 
amended,  relief  may  be  granted  upon  it. 
Belknap  v.  Stone,  1  Allen,  572. 

4  A  bill  for  the  foreclosure  of  a  chattel 
mortgage  should  show  of  what  the  property 
consists,  the  mortgagor's  title  or  claim  of  title 
to  it,  and  that  it  is  within  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  Court.  Chapman  v.  Hunt,  14  N.  J.  Eq. 
149,  152.  An  assertion  by  the  bill  of  a  claim 
against  the  defendant  by  way  of  inference 
arising  out  of  a  recital  of  the  finding  of  the 
Master  under  an  order  of  reference  on  ex  parte 
proceedings  by  the  complainant  on  petition,  is 
insufficient.  Search  v.  Search,  27  N.  J.  Eq.  137. 
See  infra,  p.  3(30. 

5  l.d.  Ked.  154;  and  see  Jerdein  v.  Bright, 
2  J.  &  H.  325;  Nokes  v.  Fish,  3  Drew.  735; 
Columbine  v.  Chichester,  2  Phil.  27;  1  C.  P. 
Coop.  temp.  Cott.  295;  10  Jur.  626;  Grand  U. 
Order  r.  Merklin,  65  Md.  579  ;  Kennebec  &  Port- 
land K.  R.  Co.  v.  Portland  &  Kennebec  R.  R.  Co. 
54  Maine,  173,  185;Cruger«.  Haliday,  11  Paige, 
314;  Bailey  v.  Ryder,  10  N.  Y.  363;  Walthall 


(a)  Barr  v.  Clayton,  29  W.  Va.  256;  Carter 
v.  Carter,  82  Va.  624;  Keyser  r.  Renner,  87  Va. 
249:  past,  p.  556.  As  to  pleading  facts  estab- 
lishing a  donatio  causa  mortis,  see  Townsend  r. 
Paiton,  45  L.  T.  755.  The  fact  that  the  plain- 
tiff has  assigned  his  interest  may  be  objected  to 
at  the  hearing.  Crocker  v.  Rogers,  58  Maine, 
339.  The  bill  is  demurrable  if  it  fails  to  bdow 
a  right  to  sue  in  the  plaintiff,  or  the  defendant's 
liability  to  be  sued  upon  the  alleged  cause  of 
suit.  Car'er  v.  Carter,  82  Va.  624;  Bridger  v. 
Thrasher,  22  Fla.  383 ;  Emerson  v.  Walker  Town- 
ship, 63  Mich.  483  ;  Saver  v.  Devore,  99  Mo.  437 ; 


v.  Rives,  34  Ala.  91.  It  is  a  fundamental  rule 
in  all  cases  of  bills  in  Equity,  that  they  must 
state  a  case  within  the  appropriate  jurisdiction  of 
a  Court  of  Equity.  Chase  v.  Palmer,  25  Maine, 
341 ;  May  v.  Parker,  12  Pick.  34;  Stephenson  v. 
Davis,  56  Maine,  73,  74.  In  all  bills  in  Equity, 
in  the  Courts  of  the  United  States,  the  citizen- 
ship should  appear  on  the  face  of  the  bill  to 
entitle  the  Court  to  take  jurisdiction;  otherwise 
the  bill  will  be  dismissed.  Dodge  v.  Perkins,  4 
Mason,  435;  Bingham  t.  Cabot,  3  Dal  I.  382; 
Jackson  p.  Ashton,  8  Peters,  148 ;  Vose  v.  Phil- 
brook,  3  Story,  335;  see  Louisville  and  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Stetson,  2  How.  U.  S.  497. 

A  party  will  be  precluded  from  relief  in 
Equity  who  has  made  false  and  fraudulent 
representations  about  a  part  of  ihe  property  in- 
volved in  a  transaction,  from  the  consequences 
of  which  he  sought  equitable  relief,  and  it  is 
impossible  to  separate  that  part  from  other  prop- 
erty involved.  Kitchen  p.  Rayburn,  19  Wall. 
254.  So,  the  Court  will  not  entertain  a  bill 
against  an  agent  for  the  value  of  a  bond  placed 
in  his  hands  for  collection,  which  at  the  time 
was  known  by  both  parties  to  have  been  stolen. 
Kirk  r.  Morrow,  6  Heisk.  445.  Nor  a  bill  by  a 
pe  son  who  has  borrowed  money  of  a  bank  on 
a  loan  forbidden  by  law  to  have  the  securities 
cancelled,  and  restraining  the  bank  from  nego- 
tiating them.  Elder  t\  First  National  Bank,  12 
Kansas,  238. 

6  Ld.  Red.  154. 


Rough  v.  Simmons,  65  Cal.  227.  Every  bill  in 
Equity  must  be  certain,  definite,  and  consistent. 
See,  under  different  circumstances,  these  prin- 
cipl  s  applied  in  Metropolitan  Bank  v.  Offord, 
L.  R.  10  Eq.  398;  Parley's  Park  S.  M.  Co.  c. 
Kerr,  130  U.  S.  256;  Brooks  v.  O'Hara,  8  Fed. 
Rep.  529;  Lichtenauer  v.  Cheney,  id.  876; 
Socola  v.  Grant,  15  id.  487;  Leo  v.  Union  Paci- 
fic Ry.  Co.  19  id.  283;  Partee  v.  Thomas.  11 
id.  769;  Price  v.  Coleman,  21  id.  357;  Hazard 
v.  Griswold,  id.  178;  Baltimore  &c.  IJ.  Co.  v. 
Adams'  Express  Co.  22  id.  404;  Goldsmith  v. 
Gilliland,  id.  865;  Brokaw  v.  Brokaw,  41  N.  J. 

311 


*  315 


THE    BILL. 


where  a  plaintiff  claims  under  a  will,  and  it  appears  upon  the  con- 
struction of  the  instrument  that  he  has  no  title,  a  demurrer  will  be 
allowed.1  It  is  much  to  be  wished  that,  in  cases  of  this  description, 
where  the  right  of  the  plaintiff  in  the  subject-matter  of  the  suit  depends 
upon  a  simple  point,  such  as  that  of  the  construction  of  a  will,  the  prac- 
tice of  demurring  to  the  bill  were  more  frequently  resorted  to,  as  by- 
such  means  considerable  expense  might  frequently  be  saved ;  for  if  it 


1  Brownsword  v.  Edwards,  2  Ves.  Sr.  243, 
2+7;  iind  see  Mortimer  v.  Hartley,  3  De  G.  & 
S.  316;  Evans  v.  Evans,  18  Jur.  666,  L.  JJ.; 
Cochrane  v.  Willis,  10  Jur.  N.  S.  162,  L.  JJ. ; 
Collingwood  v.  Russell,  10  Jur.  N.  S.  1062;  13 
W.  K.  63,  L.  JJ.;  Lautour  v.  Att.-Gen.ll  Jur. 
N.  S.  43;  13  W.  R.  305,  L.  JJ.  In  the  tirst  case 
here  referred  to,  Lord  Hardwicke  is  reported  to 
have  said,  upon  the  argument  of  a  demurrer, 
that  if  the  Court  had  not  been  satisfied,  and 
had,  therefore,  been  desirous  that  the  matter 
should  be  more  fully  debated  at  a  deliberate 


Eq.  215;  Rice  v.  Merrimack  Hosiery  Co.  56 
N.  H.  114;  Norris  v.  McLam,  104  N.  C.  159; 
Campbell  v.  Powers,  139  111.  128;  Shea  v. 
Knoxville  &c.  R.  Co.  6  Baxter  (Tenn.),  277; 
Seely  v.  Hills,  49  Wis.  473;  Torrent  v.  Rogers, 
39  Mich.  52;  Foster  v.  Hill,  55  Mich.  540; 
Highstone  v.  Franks,  93  Mich.  52;  Fulwider 
t».  Ingels,  87  Ind.  414;  Oliver  v.  Look,  77 
Maine,  585;  Rowell  v.  Jewett.  71  Maine,  408; 
Hyre  v.  Lambert,  37  \V.  Va.  26  ;  Nation  v. 
Cameron,  2  Dak.  347.  A  bill  in  one  jurisdic- 
tion cannot  be  made  certain  by  reference  to  a 
previous  bill  in  another  jurisdiction.  Mercan- 
tile Trust  Co.  t.  Kanawha  &  O.  Ry.  Co.  39 
Fed.  Rep.  337;  Nalle  v.  Austin  (Texas),  21  S. 
W.  Rep.  375.  The  sufficiency  of  a  pleading 
cannot  be  as  effectually  questioned  by  objecting 
to  evidence  under  it,  or  after  a  hearing,  as  upon 
demurrer.  Citizens'  Street  Ry.  Co.  v.  Spalir 
(Ind.),  33  N.  E.  Rep.  446;  Soper  v.  Manning 
(Mass.))  id.  516.  Upon  a  bill  for  infringement 
of  letters  patent,  want  of  novelty,  or  of  patent- 
able invention,  may  be  questioned  by  demurrer, 
when  obvious  upon  the  bill.  Brown  r.  Piper, 
91  U.  S.  37;  Dick  v.  Oil  Well  Supplv  Co.  25 
Fed.  Rep.  105;  Kaolatype  Engraving  Co.  v. 
Hoke,  30  id.  444;  Bottle  Seal  Co.  v.  De  La 
Vergne  B.  &  S  Co.  47  id.  59;  Cornell  v.  Green, 
43  id.  105;  United  States  C.  S.  Co.  v.  American 
C.  I.  Co.  53  id.  818;  Goebel  v.  American  Ry. 
S.  Co.  55  id.  825;  see  Quirolo  v.  Ardito,  1  id. 
610.  Such  want  of  novelty,  when  set  up  in 
the  answer  to  a  bill  for  infringement,  is  to  be 
proved  by  the  defendant.  Bidder  r.  Bridges, 
29  Ch.  D".  29,  40;  see  Grier  v.  Wilt,  120  U.  S. 
410;  Meyers  r.  Busby,  32  Fed.  Rep.  670.  In 
a  suit  for  infringing  a  patent  general  averments 
as  to  the  invention  are  sufficient,  and  if  profert 
of  the  patent  is  made,  its  title  only  need  be 

312 


hearing,  the  demurrer  would  have  been  over- 
rule'!, without  prejudice  to  the  defendant's  in- 
sisting on  the  same  matter  by  way  of  answer; 
but  in  a  note  to  his  treatise,  Lord  Redesdale 
observes  that  "perhaps  this  declaration  felt 
from  the  Court  rather  incautiously;  as  a  dry 
question  upon  the  construction  of  a  will  may 
be  as  deliberately  determined  upon  argument 
of  a  demurrer,  as  at  the  hearing  of  a  cause  in 
the  ordinary  course,  and  the  difference  in  ex- 
pense to  the  parties  may  be  considerable."  Ld. 
Red.  154,  n.  (/>). 


set  ont  in  the  bill.  McMillin  v.  St.  Louis  & 
M.  V.  T.  Co.  18  Fed.  Rep.  260.  In  such  a 
bill,  the  absence  of  an  averment  that  the  in- 
vention had  not  been  previously  patented  or 
described  in  publications,  here  or  abroad,  is  a 
defect  of  form,  to  be  reached  by  special  de- 
murrer. Hanlon  v.  Primrose,  56  Fed.  Rep.  600. 
A  bill  which  alleges  infringement  generally  by 
several  defendants  is  sufficient  without  alleging 
a  joint  infringement.  Indurated  Fibre  I.  Co. 
v.  Grace,  52  Fed.  Rep.  124.  As  to  the  form  and 
matter  of  bills  relating  to  letters-patent,  see 
McCoy  v.  Nelson,  121  U.  S.  484;  Williams  v. 
Rome,  2  Fed.  Rep.  702;  Putnam  v.  Hollender, 
6  id.  882;  Fischer  v.  O'Shaugnessey,  id.  92; 
Fischer  v.  Hayes,  id.  76;  National  Manuf.  Co. 
v.  Meyers,  7  id.  355;  Still  v.  Reading,  9  id.  40; 
Atwood  v.  Portland  Co.  10  id.  283;  Jones  v. 
Barker,  11  id.  597;  Adams  v.  Meyn.se,  12  id. 
440;  Gamewell  Fire-Alarm  Tel.  Co.  v.  Brook- 
lyn, 14  id.  255;  Pelham  v.  Edelmeyer,  15  id. 
202;  Concord  v.  Norton,  16  id.  477;  Allis  v. 
Stowell,  id.  783;  15  id.  242;  McMillan  v.  St. 
Louis  &c.  Co.  18  id.  280;  M'Kay  ».  Smith,  29 
id.  295  ;  Kaolatype  Engraving  Co.  v.  Hoke,  30 
id.  444;  Kittle  v.  De  Graaf,  id.  689;  Wise  v. 
Grand  Ave.  R.  Co.  33  id.  277;  Blessings.  John 
Traseser  S.  C.  Works,  34  id.  753;  American 
BellTel.  Co.  v.  Southern  Tel.  Co.  id.  803;  Stirrat 
v.  Excelsior  Manuf.  Co.  44  id.  122;  American 
R.  P.  Co.  v.  Knopp,  id.  609;  Wirt  v.  Hicks,  46 
id.  71 ;  Bottle  Seal  Co.  v.  De  La  Vergne  B.  & 
S.  Co.  47  id.  59;  Nathan  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Craig, 
id.  522;  Coop  v.  Dr.  Savage  P.  D.  Institute,  id. 
899;  Ovennan  Wheel  Co.  v.  Elliott  Hickory 
Cycle  Co  49  id.  859;  American  Solid  Leather 
Button  Co.  *.  Empire  State  Nail  Co.  50  id.  929; 
Electrolibration  Co.  v.  Jackson,  52  id.  773; 
Krick  v.  Jansen,  id.  823. 


MATTER   OF   THE   BILL.  *  316 

appears  at  the  hearing  that  the  party  filing  the  bill  is  not  right  in  the 
construction  he  puts  upon  the  instrument,  the  bill  must  be  dismissed, 
which,  if  the  plaintiff's  bill  had  been  demurred  to  in  the  first  instance, 
would  have  been  the  result,  without  the  additional  expense  caused  by 
the  other  proceedings.2  The  bill,  or  statement  of  claim,  need  not,  how- 
ever, contain  a  specific  allegation  of  the  grounds  for  relief,  it  being  suffi- 
cient if  the  grounds  can  be  reasonably  deduced  from  the  facts  stated.8 

The  rule  that  a  plaintiff  should  show  by  his  bill  an  interest  in  the 
subject-matter  of  the  suit,  applies  not  to  one  plaintiff  only,  but  to  all 
the  plaintiffs  ;  and  if  several  persons  joined  in  filing  a  bill,  and  it 
appeared  that  one  of  them  had  no  interest,  the  bill  was  formerly  open 
to  demurrer ; 4  though  it  appeared  that  all  the  other  plaintiffs  had  an 
interest  in  the  matter,  and  a  right  to  institute  a  suit  concern- 
ing it.  This,  as  we  have  seen,  is  no  longer  so ;  but  *  the  Court  *  316 
may  make  such  order,  on  the  hearing,  as  justice  requires.1  It 
must  not,  however,  be  supposed  that  it  is  not  still  important  to  avoid 
joining  a  plaintiff  who  has  no  interest  in  the  bill. 

The  plaintiff  must  not  only  show  an  interest  in  the  subject-matter,  but 
it  must  be  an  actual  existing  interest ;  a  mere  possibility,  or  even  proba- 
bility, of  a  future  title  will  not  be  sufficient  to  sustain  a  bill.2  Therefore, 
where  a  plaintiff,  claiming  as  a  devisee  in  the  will  of  a  person  who  was 
living,  but  a  lunatic,  brought  a  bill  to  perpetuate  the  testimony  of 
witnesses  to  the  will,  against  the  presumptive  heir-at-law,8  and  where 
persons,  who  would  have  been  entitled  to  the  personal  estate  of  a  lunatic, 
if  he  had  been  then  dead  intestate,  as  his  next  of  kin,  supposing  him 
legitimate,  brought  a  bill  in  the  lifetime  of  the  lunatic  to  perpetuate  the 
testimony  of  witnesses  to  his  legitimacy,  against  the  Attorney-General, 
as  supporting  the  rights  of  the  Crown,4  demurrers  were  allowed.5  Upon 
the  same  principle,  a  bill  cannot  be  sustained  by  a  purchaser  from  a  con- 
tingent remainderman  of  his  interest  in  the  property,  against  a  tenant 

2  But  where  the  defendant  allows  the  cause  1  15  &  16  Vic  c.  86,  §  49;  R.  S.  C.  Ord. 
to  be  brought  to  a  hearing  in  such  a  case,  the      XVI.  13;  ante,  p.  303. 

practice   is  to  dismiss  the  bill   without   costs.  2  Ld.  Red.  156;  and  see  observations  of  Lord 

Hill  v.  Reardon,  2  S.  &  S.  431,  439;  Jones  v.  Cottenham,  in  Finden  r.  Stephens,  2  Phil.  148; 

Davids,  4  Russ.  278;  Hollingsworth  v.  Shake-  1  C.  P.  Coop,  329;  10  Jur.  1019;  Davis  r.  Angel,' 

shaft,  14  Beav.  492;  Webb  v.  England,  29  Beav.  31    Beav.  223;  4  De  G.  F.  &  J.  524;  8  Jur.  x! 

44;  7  Jur.  N.  S.  153;  Ernest  r.  Wise,  9  Jur.  X.  S.  709,  1024;  Showell  v.  Winkup,  60  L.  T.  389; 

S.  145;  11  W.  R.  206,  V.  C.  K.;  Nesbitt  v.  Ber-  Richards  v.  Butler,  62  id.  867. 

ridge,  4  De  G.  J.  &  S.  45;  9  Jur.  X.  S.  1045;  3  Sackvill  r.  Ayleworth,  1  Vern.  105;  1  Eq. 

11  W.    R.  446,  M.  R.;   Godfrey  v.  Tucker,  3  Cas.  Abr.  234,  pi.  3  ;  see  also  2  Prax.  Aim.  Cur. 

Beav.  280;  9  Jur.  X.  S.  1188;  12  W.  R.  33,  M.  Can.  500,  where  the  form  of  demurrer  is  set  out. 

R.;  and  see  Sanders  v.  Benson,  4  Beav.  350,  See  also  In  re  Tayleur.  6  Ch.  D.  410. 

357-  4  Smith  v.  Att.-Gen.  cited  Ld.  Red.  157;  1 

3  See  Knox  v.  Gye,  15  W.  R.  628,  L.  C.  Vern.  105,  n.,  ed.  Raithby;  6  Ves.  255,  260;  15 

4  Seethe  Mayorand  Aldermen  of  Colchester  Ves.  136. 

"■ '  !  P-  Wms.  595:  Troughton  v.  Gettey,  1  5  The  parties  in  these  cases  had  no  interest 

Dick.  382;  Cuff  v.  Platell,  4  Russ.  242;  Make-  which  could  be  the  subject  of  a  suit,  and  sus- 

peacev.  Haythorne,  4  Russ.  244;  King  of  Spain  taiued   no  character   under   which  they  could 

v.  Machado,  4  Russ.  225;   Delondre  v.  Shaw,  2  afterwards  sue;  and  therefore  the  evidence,  if 

Sim.  237;  Page  v.  Townsend,  5  Sim.  395;  St.>ry,  taken,  would  have  been  wholly  nugatorv.     See 

Eq.  PI.  §§  509,  541,  544;  Clarkson  v.  De  Pey-  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  301,  and  cases  cited;  2  Storv, 

ster,  3  Paige,  336;  Manning  v.  Gloucester,  6  Eq.  Jur.  §  1511;  Dursleyr.  Berkley,  6  Sumner's 

Pick-  6-  Ves.  251,  and  notes. 

313 


317 


THE   BILL. 


for  life,  for  inspection  of  title  deeds  ;  although  a  bill  would  lie  for  that 
purpose  by  a  person  entitled  to  a  vested  remainder.6  So  a  demurrer  for. 
want  of  interest  to  a  suit  brought  by  persons  claiming  to  be  members  of 
a  class,  which  was  to  be  ascertained  on  the  happening  of  a  future  con- 
tingent event,  was  allowed.7  (a).  But  it  must  not  be  supposed  that 
contingent  remainder-men  can,  in  no  case,  be  plaintiffs  ;  for  in  many 
cases  (such  as  suits  for  the  administration  of,  or  to  secure,  the  trust  prop- 
erty to  which  they  are  contingently  entitled),  such  persons  may  properly 
be  plaintiffs ; 8  and  orders  have  been  made  at  the  suit  of  such  persons, 
for  the  payment  of  trust  funds  into  Court.9 

A  bill  tiled  by  a  tenant  in  tail  in  remainder,  and  his  children,  to 
perpetuate  testimony  to  the  marriage  of  the  tenant  in  tail,  could  not  be 
supported,  because  the  father,  being  tenant  in  tail  in  remainder,  could 
have  no  interest  whatever  in  proving  the  fact  of  his  own  mar- 
*  317  riage,  *  the  remainder  in  tail  being  vested  in  him  ;  and  the  other 
plaintiffs  (the  children)  are  neither  tenants  in  tail  nor  remainder- 
men in  tail,  but  the  issue  of  a  person  who  was  de  facto  and  dejure  tenant 
in  remainder  in  tail,  having  the  whole  interest  in  him  ;  and,  consequently, 
the  children  have  no  interest  in  them,  in  respect  of  which  they  can 
maintain  their  bill.1  Upon  the  same  principle,  where  the  dignity  of 
Earl  was  entailed  upon  an  individual  who'  died,  leaving  two  sons,  the 
eldest  of  whom  inherited  the  dignity,  a  demurrer  to  a  bill  filed  by  his 
eldest  son,  in  his  lifetime,  against  the  second  son  of  the  first  Earl,  and 
the  Attorney-General,  to  perpetuate  testimony  as  to  his  father's  marriage, 
was  allowed.2 

Where  the  plaintiff  does  not  show  an  existing  interest  by  his  bill,  the 
disclaimer  or  waiver  of  one  defendant  in  his  favor  will  not  sustain  the 
bill  against  the  other  defendants.3 

Where,  however,  a  party  has  an  interest,  it  is  perfectly  immaterial 
how  minute  the  interest  may  be,4  or  how  distant  the  possibility  of  the 
possession  of  that  minute  interest,  if  it  is  a  present  interest.5  A  present 
interest,  the  enjoyment  of  which  may  depend  upon  the  most  remote  and 
improbable  contingency,  is,  nevertheless,  a  present  estate ;  and,  as  in 


6  Noel  v.  Ward,  1  Mad.  322,  329 ;  and  see 
Davis  v.  Earl  of  Dysart,  20  Beav.  405:  1  Jur. 
N.  S.  743,  and  cases  there  cited,  for  instances 
of  vested  remaindermen. 

t  Clowes  v.  Hilliard,  4  Ch.  D.  413. 

8  Roberts  v.  Roberts,  2  De  G.  &  S.  29;  2 
Phil.  534;  12  Jur.  148. 

9  Bartlett  v.  Bartlett,  4  Hare,  631 ;  Marryatt 
v.  Marryatt,  2  W.  R.  576;  Governesses'  Benevo- 
lent Institution  r.  Rusbridger,  18  Beav.  467; 
Robertson  v.  Scott,  W.  N.  (1866)  144;  14  L.  T. 
N.  S.  187 ;  but  see  Ross  v.  Ross,  12  Beav.  89 ; 


Bromley   v.    Kelly,   18  W.    R.  374;    Pryse   v. 
Pryse,  L   R.  15  Eq.  86,  92. 

"l  Allan  v.  Allan,  15  Ves.  130,  135. 

2  Earl  of  Belfast  v.  Chichester,  2  J.  &  W. 
439,  449,  452. 

3  Griffith  v.  Ricketts,  7  Hare,  305;  14  Jur. 
166,  325;  Hollingsworth  v.  Shakeshaft,  14 
Beav.   492. 

*  See  Seaton  v.  Grant,  L.  R.  2  Ch.  459,  463, 
465. 

5  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  301. 


(a)  See  also  Fussel  v.  Downing,  27  Ch.  D. 
237;  Re  Parsons,  Stockley  v.  Parsons,  45 
Ch.  D.  51.  One  of  a  class  designated  as  en- 
titled to  a  trust  fund  upon  tlie  happening  of 
one  or  more  contingencies  can  maintain  a  suit 

314 


to  protect  the  fund,  if,  at  the  time,  the  maxi- 
mum number  of  the  class  is  ascertained,  although 
it  is  still  uncertain  whether  he  will  ultimately 
be  one  of  the  class.  Peacock  v.  Colling,  54 
L.  J.  Ch.  743;  33  W.  R.  528. 


MATTER    OF    THE    BILL. 


318 


the  case  upon  Lord  Berkeley's  will,8  though  the  interest  may,  with  refer- 
ence to  the  chance,  be  worth  nothing,  yet  it  is  in  contemplation  of  law  an 
estate  and  interest,  upon  which  a  bill  may  be  supported.7  If,  however, 
the  plaintiff's  interest  is  such  that  it  may  be  barred  or  defeated  by  the 
act  of  the  defendant,  he  cannot  support  the  bill ;  as  in  the  case  of  a 
remainderman  filing  a  bill  to  perpetuate  testimony  against  a  tenant  in 
tail ; 8  to  such  a  bill,  it  seems,  the  tenant  in  tail  might  demur,  upon  the 
ground  that  he  may  at  any  time  bar  the  entail,  and  thus  deprive  the 
plaintiff  of  his  interest.9 

A  plaintiff  must  not  only  show  in  his  bill  an  interest  in  the  subject- 
matter,  but  he  must  make  it  appear  that  he  has  a  proper  title  to 
institute  a  suit  concerning  it ; 10  for  *a  person  may  have  an  inter-    *  318 
est  in  the  subject-matter,  and  yet,  for  want  of  compliance  with 
some  requisite  forms,  he  may  not  be  entitled  to  institute  a  suit  relating 
to  it.1 

Formerly,  it  was  necessary  to  allege  that  the  will  was  proved  in  the 
proper  Ecclesiastical  Court,  though  it  was  not  necessary  to  mention  in 
what  Court ; 2  and  this  still  applies  to  all  wills  proved  before  Jan.  11, 
1858 : 8  but  since  that  date,  it  is  sufficient  simply  to  allege  that  the  will 
has  been  proved,  though  in  practice  it  is  usual  to  allege  that  it  has  been 
proved  in  the  Court  of  Probate,  or  that  it  has  been  duly  proved.  For- 
merly questions  often  arose,  whether  the  will  had  been  proved  in  the 
proper  Court ;  4  whether,  for  instance,  a  prerogative  probate  was  neces- 
sary ; 6  but  these  questions  were  removed  by  the  constitution  of  the 
Court  of  Probate,  except  as  to  wills  proved  before  Jan.  11,  1858.6 

If  an  executor,  before  probate,  files  a  bill,  alleging  that  he  has  proved 
the  will,  such  allegation  will  obviate  a  demurrer ; 7  he  must,  however, 


6  Lord  Dursley  v.  Fitzhardinge,  6  Ves. 
251. 

7  Per  Lord  Eldon,  in  Allan  v.  Allan,  15  Ves. 
135;  see  also  Davis  v.  Angel,  31  Beav.  223;  4 
De  G.  F.  &  J.  524;  8  Jur.  N.  S.  709,  1U24; 
2  Story,  Eq.  Jur.  §  1511. 

8  See  Lord  Dursley  r.  Fitzhardinge,  6  Ves. 
262;  see,  however,  Butcher  v.  Jackson,  14  Sim. 
444,  455. 

y  It  would  be  a  fruitless  exercise  of  power 
to  entertain  a  bill  to  perpetuate  evidence  in  such 
a  case.     Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  301. 

10  Ld.  Red.  155.  It  is  not  essential  that  the 
plaintiff's  title  should  be  explicitly  averred.  It 
is  sufficient  that  it  may  fairly  be  inferred  from 
the  facts  stated.  Webber  v.  Gage,  39  N.  H. 
182;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  730;  Clapp  v.  Shephard, 
23  Pick.  228. 

1  Thus  the  executor  of  a  deceased  person 
has  an  interest  in  all  the  personal  property-  of 
his  tesfator;  but,  till  he  ha*  proved  the  will,  he 
cannot  assert  his  right  in  a  Court  of  justice;  if, 
therefore,  a  man  files  a  bill  as  executor,  and 
does  not  state  in  it  that  he  has  proved  the  will, 
the  bill  will  be  liable  to  demurrer.  Humphreys 
v.  Ingledon,  1  P.  Wins.  752;  Story,  Eq.  PI. 
§625;   Champion  v    Parish,  3  Edw.  Ch.  581 


It  seems,  however,  that  an  executor  may,  pend- 
ing an  application  for  probate,  file  a  bill  to  pro- 
tect the  estate,  by  obtaining  an  injunction  or 
otherwise;  although  he  alleges  in  the  bill  that 
he  has  not  yet  obtained  probate.  Newton  r. 
Metropolitan  Ry.  Co.  1  Dr.  &  Sm.  583;  8  Jur. 
N.  S.  738;  see  Rawliigs  v.  Lambert,  1  J.  & 
H.458;  Steer  v.  Steer,  13  W.  R.  225,  V.  C.  K.; 
2  Dr.  &  Sm.  311;  Overington  r.  Ward,  34 
Beav.  175;  Blackett  v.  Blackett,  W.  N.  (1871) 
65;  19  VV.  R.  559;  but  see  Spencer  v.  Shaw, 
W.  N.  (1875)  115;  and  also ptat,  Chap.  XXXIX. 
§  1,  as  to  obtaining  receivers  pending  litigation 
as  to  probate. 

2  Humphreys  r.  InRledon,  1  P.  Wins.  752. 

3  20  &  21  Vic.  c.  77.  See  3  Jur.  N.  S.  Pt. 
II.  479. 

4  Tourton  r.  Flower,  3  P.  Wms.  369,  370; 
but  see  Jossaunie  v.  Abbot,  15  Sim.  127. 

5  Thomas  r.  Davies,  12  Ves.  417;  Challnor 
r.  Murliall,  f,  Ves.  118;  Newman  v.  Hodgson, 
7  V.s.  409;  Metcalfe  r.  Metcalfe,  1  Keen,  74, 
79;  McMahon  v.  Rawlings,  16  Sim.  429. 

c  20  &  21  Vic.  c.  77,   §  1;   Ord.  in  Council 
of  2d  Dec,  1857;  3  Jur.  N.  S.  Pt.  II.  479. 
7  Humphreys  v.  Ingledon,  1  P.  Wms.  752 

315 


319 


THE    BILL. 


prove  the  will  before  the  hearing  of  the  cause,  and  then  the  probate 
will  be  sufficient  to  support  the  bill,  although  it  bears  date  subsequently 
to  the  filing  of  it.8  (a)     In  like  manner,  a  plaintiff  may  file  a  bill  as 

administrator  before  he  has  taken  out  letters  of  administration, 
*319    and  it  will  be  sufficient  to  have  them  at  the  hearing.9      *  But, 

although  an  executor  or  administrator  may,  before  probate  or 
administration  granted,  file  a  bill  relating  to  the  property  of  the 
deceased,  and  such  bill  will  not,  on  that  account,  be  demurrable,  pro- 
vided the  granting  of  probate  or  of  letters  of  administration  be  alleged 
in  the  bill,  yet  a  defendant  may,  by  plea,  take  advantage  of  the  fact  not 
being  as  stated  in  the  bill.1 

Although  an  executor,  filing  a  bill  before  probate,  must,  unless  it  is 
filed  for  protection  of  the  estate,  allege  in  it  that  he  has  proved  the 
will,  it  is  not  necessary  that  in  a  bill  against  au  executor  such  a  state- 
ment should  be  made  ;  for  if  executors  elect  to  act,  they  are  liable  to  be 
sued  before  probate,  and  cannot  afterwards  renounce.2  It  also  seems, 
that  if  a  party  entitled  by  law  to  take  out  administration  to  a  deceased 
person,  does  not  do  so,  but  acts  as  if  he  were  administrator,  and  receives 
and  disposes  of  the  property,  he  will  be  liable  to  account  as  adminis- 
trator ;  but  in  both  cases  it  is  necessary  to  have  a  duly  constituted  legal 
personal  representative  before  the  Court.3 

If  it  appears  to  the  Court  that  the  probate,  or  the  letters  of  adminis- 
tration, bear  a  stamp  applicable  to  a  less  sum  than  that  which  is  sought 
to  be  recovered  in  the  cause,  no  decree  can  be  obtained  until  the  defect 
has  been  remedied,  and  the  party  can  show  that  he  represents  the  estate 
to  an  amount  sufficient  to  cover  his  claim.4 


8  Humphreys  v.  Humphreys,  3  P.  Wins. 
349. 

9  Fell  v.  Lutwidge,  2  Atk.  120;  Barn.  320  ; 
Humphreys  v.  Humphreys,  3  P.  Wins.  351; 
Horner  i\  Horner,  23  L.*J.  Ch.  10,  V.  C.  K.; 
see  L'all  v.  Ewing,  1  Blackf.  301;  Langdon  v. 
Potter,  11  Mass.  313;  Savage  v.  Merriam,  1 
Blackf.  176;  Caller  v.  Dade,  Minor,  20;  Axers 
v.  Musselman,  2  Brown,  115. 

i  Thus,  in  Simons  0.  Milman,  2  Sim.  241, 
where  letters  of  administration  had  been  granted 
to  the  defendant  under  the  idea  that  the  de- 
ceased had  died  intestate,  whereas,  in  fact,  he 
had  made  a  will  and  appointed  the  plaintiff  his 
executor,  who,  before  probate,  tiled  a  bill  lor 
the  purpose  of  recovering  part  of  the  assets  of 
the  testator  from  the  defendant,  alleging  that 
probate  of  the  will  had  been  granted  to  him,  to 
which  bill  the  defendant  put  in  a  plea  stating 
that  such  was  not  the  fact,  Sir  Lancelot  Shad- 
well  V.  C.  allowed  the  plea.  See  also  Story, 
Eq.  PI.  §  727;  Belloat  v.  Morse,  2  Hayw.  157; 
Tempest  v.  Lord  Camovs,  35  Beav.  201 ;  1  W. 
N.  16 ;  14  W.  R.  326,  M.  R.     See  also  R.  S.  C. 


Ord.  1883,  XIX.  11;  Re  Lovett,  Ambler  v. 
Lindsay,  3  Ch.  D.  198;  Uowdeswell  v.  Dowdes- 
well,  9  Ch.  D.  294;  Seton,818;  and  Rowsell  v. 
Morris,  L.  R.  17  Eq.  20  (dissenting  from  Rayner 
v.  Koehler,  L.  R.  14  Eq.  262,  and  Coote  v. 
Whittington,  L.  R.  16  Eq.  534);  M'Allister  v. 
M'Allister,  11  L.  R.  Ir.  533. 

2  Blewitt  v.  Blewitt,  Younge,  541;  Cleland 
v.  Cleland,  Prec.  Ch.  64;  see  Story,  Eq.  PI. 
§91. 

3  Creasor  v.  Robinson,  14  Beav.  589;  15  Jur. 
1049,  and  the  cases  there  referred  to;  Cary  v. 
Hills,  L.  R.  15  Eq.  79;  Beardmore  v.  Gregory, 
2  H.  &  M.  491;  11  Jur.  N.  S.  363;  see  also 
Cooke  v.  Gittings.  21  Beav.  497;  Hill  v.  Curtis, 
L.  R.  1  Eq.  90;  12  Jur.  N.  S.  4;  and  the  cases 
(contra)  in  notes  1,  2,  above. 

4  Jones  v.  Howells,  2  Hare,  342,  353;  Chris- 
tian v.  Devereux,  12  Sim.  264,  273;  Howard  v. 
Prince,  10  Beav.  312,  314  ;  and  see  Killock  v. 
Gregg,  cited  2  Hare,  346,  354;  Harper  r.  Raven- 
hill.  Taml.  145;  Roberts  v.  Madocks,  16  Sim. 
55;  Smith  v.  Creagh,  Batty,  384;  Nail  v.  Pun- 
ter, 5  Sim.  563.    By  44  &  45  Vic.  c.  12,  §  30, 


(n)  Tn  Maughan  v.  Blake,  L.  R.  3  Ch.  32,      add  the  legal  personal  representative  as  a  co- 
where  probate  was  refused  to  the  plaintiff,  who      plaintiff, 
was  beneficially  interested,  she  was  allowed  to 

316 


MATTER    OF    THE    BILL. 


320 


Where  it  appears  that,  in  order  to  complete  the  plaintiff's  title  to  the 
subject  of  the  suit  or  to  the  relief  he  seeks,  some  preliminary  act  is 
necessary  to  be  done,  the  performance  of  such  preliminary  act  should  be 
averred  in  the  bill,  and  the  mere  allegation  that  the  title  is  com- 
plete, without  such  averment,  will  not  be  *  sufficient.1  *  320 

When  a  plaintiff  claims  as  heir-at-law,  it  was  formerly  considered 
that  he  must  state  in  his  bill  how  his  title  arose ; a  but  it  is  now  settled, 
chat  an  allegation  that  he  is  heir  is  sufficient.3  (a)  There  may,  however,  be 
cases  where  a  plaintiff  claims  by  mediate  and  not  by  immediate  descent,4 
or  where  the  facts  in  the  pedigree  are  facts  to  be  relied  on  as  facts  to 
establish  the  plaintiff's  title,5  in  which  the  pedigree  should  be  stated  in 
order  that  the  pleading  should  not  be  embarrassing,6  and  that  surprise 
may  be  prevented  and  those  facts  stated  which  will  show  the  case  which 
has  to  be  met.7 

Where  there  is  a  privity  existing  between  the  plaintiff  and  defendant, 
independently  of  the  plaintiff's  title,  which  gives  the  plaintiff  a  right  to 
maintain  his  suit,  it  is  not  necessary  to  state  the  plaintiff's  title  fully.8 

49  j 


probates  and  letters  of  administration  are  to  bear 
a  certificate  that  the  affidavit  of  property  has 
been  did}- stamped.  If  an  administrator  durante 
minore  estate  brings  a  suit,  he  must  aver  in  his 
bill  or  statement  of  claim  that  the  infant  is  still 
under  age.  1  Wins,  on  Ex'tors,  491;  see  Re 
Cope,  Cope  v.  Cope,  16  Ch.  D.  49. 

1  Thus,  where  a  plaintiff  claimed  as  a  share- 
holder by  purchase,  of  certain  shares  in  a  Joint- 
Stock  Company  or  Association,  alleging  in  his 
bill  that  he  had  purchased  such  shares  for  a 
valuable  consideration,  and  had  ever  since  held 
the  same,  but  it  appeared  in  another  part  of  the 
bill,  that  by  the  rules  of  the  company  or  asso- 
ciation, no  transfer  of  shares  could  be  valid  in 
Law  or  Equity  unless  the  purchaser  was  ap- 
proved by  a  board  of  directors,  and  signed  an 
instrument  binding  him  to  observe  the  regula- 
tions: Lord  Brougham  allowed  a  demurrer,  on 
the  ground  that  the  performance  of  the  rule 
above  pointed  out  was  a  condition  precedent, 
and  ought  to  have  been  averred  upon  the  bill, 
and  that  the  allegation  of  the  plaintiff  having 
purchased  the  shares  and  being  a  shareholder, 
although  admitted  by  the  demurrer,  was  not 
sufficient  to  cure  the  defect.  Walburn  r.  In- 
gilby,  1  M.  &  K.  CI,  77 ;  see  also  Morris  ?■. 
Kelly,  1  J.  &  W.  481  ;  Colburn  v.  Duncombe, 
9  Sim.  151,  154;  2  Jur.  654;  Richardson  v. 
Gilbert,  1  Sim.  N.  S.  336;  15  Jur.  389;  Story, 
Eq.  PI.  §§  257,  257  a,  258,  and  Cassell  v.  Stiff, 
2  K.  &  J.  279,  as  to  the  title  to  be  shown  to 
copyright.  As  to  averring  performance  of  con- 
ditions precedent,  see  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  76,  §  57; 


(a)  As  to  alleging  rights  in  a  burial  lot  with- 
out averring  the  intestacy  of  the  plaintiff's  an- 
cestor, see  Mitchell  v.  Thome,  134  N.  Y.  536; 
10  N.  Y.  Sup.  682.  As  to  personal  property, 
on  which  the  plaintiff  has  levied,  and  which  he 


36  &  37  Vic.  c.  66,  §  76;   46  &  47  Vic. 
R.  S.  C.  1883,  Ord.  XIX.  14. 

'2  Lord  Digby  v.  Meech,  Bunb.  195;  Baker 
v.  Harwood,  7  Sim.  373. 

3  Evelyn  v.  Evelyn,  W.  N.  (1880)  62 ;  28  W. 
R.  531;  Kettlewell  v.  Barstow,  17  W.  R.  276;  W. 
N.  (1869)  6;  and  see  Barrs  v.  Fewkes,  10  Jur. 
N.  S.  466;  12  W.  Ii.  666,  V.  C.  W.;  Delorne 
v.  Hollingsworth,  1  Cox,  421,  422;  Ford  v. 
Peering,  1  Ves.  Jr.  72. 

*  See  Stephens  on  Pleading  (3d  ed.)  310. 

5  See  Philipps  r.  Philipps,  4  Q.  B.  D.  127, 
134. 

6  See  post,  p.  347. 

7  See  Philipps  v.  Philipps,  4  Q.  B.  D.  134, 
138. 

8  Thus,  where  a  plaintiff's  claim  against  the 
defendant  arises  under  a  deed  or  other  instru- 
ment, executed  by  the  defendant  himself,  or  by 
those  under  whom  he  claims,  which  recites,  or 
is  necessarily  founded  upon,  the  existence,  in 
the  plaintiff,  of  the  right  which  he  asserts,  it  is 
sufficient  to  allege  the  execution  of  the  deed  by 
the  parties.  In  like  manner,  in  the  case  of  a 
bill,  by  a  mortgagor  in  fee,  against  a  mortgagee, 
to  redeem  the  mortgage,  it  is  sufficient  merely 
to  state  the  mortgage  deed,  without  alleging 
that  the  mortgagor  was  seised  in  fee;  or  if  the 
mortgagor  has  only  a  derivative  title,  it  is  not 
necessary  to  show  the  commencement  o/  such 
derivative  title,  or  its  continuance;  because  the 
right  of  the  plaintiff  to  redeem,  as  against  the 
defendant,  does  not  depend  upon  the  title  under 
which  he  claims,  but  upon  the  proviso  for  re- 


alleges was  fraudulently  conveyed,  the  bill  is 
demurrable  if  it  does  not  aver  that  the  goods 
levied  on  and  conveyed  were  the  same.  Stod- 
dard v.  McLane,  56  Mich.  11. 

317 


*321 


THE    BILL. 


Where  a  man  employs  another  as  his  bailiff  or  agent,  to  receive  his 
rents,  the  right  to  call  upon  the  bailiff  or  agent  for  an  account  does  not 
depend  upon  the  title  of  the  employer  to  the  rents,  but  to  the 
*  321  privity  existing  between  *  him  and  his  bailiff  or  agent ;  the 
employer  may,  therefore,  maintain  a  bill  for  an  account,  without 
showing  any  title  to  the  rents  in  question. 

Where,  however,  the  plaintiff's  right  does  not  depend  upon  any  par- 
ticular privity  between  him  and  the  defendant,  existing  independently 
of  his  general  title  to  the  thing  claimed,  there  it  will  be  necessary  to 
show  his  title  in  the  bill.1 

In  like  manner,  where  a  plaintiff  in  a  bill  for  specific  performance 
intends  to  rely  on  a  waiver  of  title  by  the  defendant,  it  is  not  sufficient 
to  allege  upon  his  pleadings  the  facts  constituting  the  waiver :  he  must 
show  how  he  means  to  use  the  facts,  by  alleging  that  the  title  has  been 
waived  thereby.2 

The  same  precision  which  is  required  in  stating  the  case  of  a  plaintiff, 
is  not  necessary  in  showing  the  interests  of  the  defendant  against  whom 
the  relief  is  sought ; 3  because  a  plaintiff  cannot  always  be  supposed  to 
be  cognizant  of  the  nature  of  a  defendant's  interest,  and  the  bill  must 
frequently  proceed  with  a  view  to  obtain  a  discovery  of  it.4  And  even 
where  it  is  evident,  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  that  a  plaintiff  must  be 
cognizant  of  the  defendant's  title,  and  sets  out  the  same  informally,  yet, 
if  he  alleges  enough  to  show  that  the  defendant  has  an  interest,  it  will 
be  sufficient.8 

In  all  cases,  however,  a  bill  must  show  that  a  defendant  is  in  seme 
way    liable   to    the    plaintiff's    demand,6   or   that  he   has    some   inter- 


demption  in  the  mortgage  deed.  Upon  the 
same  principle,  where  a  defendant  holds  under 
a  lease  from  the  plaintiff,  the  plaintiff  need  not 
set  out  his  title  to  the  reversion  ;  the  fact  of  the 
defendant  having  accepted  a  lease  from  the 
plaintiff  being  sufficient  to  preclude  his  disput- 
ing the  title  under  which  he  holds.  If  the 
plaintiff  claims  under  a  derivative  title  from 
the  mortgagor,  or  lessor,  he  must,  as  in  other 
cases,  show  how  he  makes  out  his  title. 

i  See  Humphreys  v.  Tate,  4  led.  Eq.  220; 
Smith  i\  Turner,  id.  433;  Peck  r.  Mallows,  10 
N.  Y.  509;  State  v.  Black  River  Phosphate  Co. 
27  Ha.  276.  Thus,  where  a  bill  is  tiled  by  the 
lessee  of  a  lay  impropriator  against  an  occu- 
pier, for  an  account  of  tithes,  there  the  right  of 
the  plaintiff  to  the  account  depends  solely  upon 
his  title:  he  must,  therefore,  deduce  his  title 
regularly,  and  show  not  only  the  existence  of 
the  lease,  but  that  the  person  from  whom  it  is 
derived  had  the  fee.  Penny  v.  Hoper,  Bunb. 
115;  Burwell  v.  Coates,  id.  129.  See  R.  S.  C. 
Ord.  XXVII.  1;  Philipps  v.  Philipps,  4  Q.  B. 
D.  127- 

2  Clive  v.  Beaumont,  1  De  G.  &  S.  397;  13 
Jur  22fi,  pout,  p.  372.  As  to  averring  a  license 
to  a*~ign,  in  such  a  suit,  see  Smith  v.  Capron, 
7  Hare,  185:  14  Jur.  686. 

318 


3  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  255;  Morgan  v.  Smith,  11 
111.  194.  In  suits  for  libel  and  slander  the  very 
words  must  be  alleged.  Harris  v.  VVarre,  4  C. 
P.  D.  125. 

4  Thus,  where  in  a  suit  by  a  lessee  for  years, 
for  a  partition,  the  plaintiff,  after  stating  his  own 
right  to  one  undivided  tenth  part,  with  preci- 
sion, had  alleged  that  the  defendant  was  seised 
in  fee-simple  of,  or  otherwise  well  entitled  to, 
seven  other  tenth  parts,  a  demurrer,  on  the 
ground  that  the  plaintiff  had  not  set  out  the 
defendant's  title  with  sufficient  certainty,  was 
overruled.  Baring  v.  Nash,  1  V.  &  B.  551,  552  ; 
and  see  Ponsford  v.  Hanke}-,  3  De  G.  F.  &  J. 
544;  7  Jur.  N.  S.  929. 

5  Thus,  where  in  a  suit  to  redeem  a  mort- 
gage, the  conveyance  was  so  stated  that  it  did 
not  show  that  any  legal  estate  had  passed  to  the 
defendant,  a  demurrer  was  overruled;  because 
the  defendant  could  not  be  permitted  to  dispute 
his  own  tille,  which  was  admitted  by  the  plain- 
tiff to  be  good.  Roberts  v.  Clayton,  3  Anst. 
715  And  where  a  defendant  was  sued  as  heir- 
at-law,  it  was  held  to  be  necessary  to  state  how 
he  became  heir.  Denham  v.  Stephenson,  Salk, 
355. 

6  Ld.  Red.  163. 


MATTER   OF   THE   BILL.  *  323 

est  in   the   subject   of  the  suit : 7  otherwise  it  will  be  liable  to     *  322 
*  demurrer.1 

Although  it  is  generally  necessary  to  show  that  the  plaintiff  has 
some  claim  against  a  defendant,  or  that  a  defendant  has  some  interest 
in  the  subject  matter  in  litigation,  yet  there  are  some  exceptional  cases 
in  which  a  bill  may  be  sustained  against  defendants  who  have  no  interest 
in  the  subject,  and  who  are  not  in  any  manner  liable  to  the  demands  of 
the  plaintiff.  The  cases  alluded  to  are  those  which  have  been  before 
referred  to,  of  the  members  or  officers  of  a  corporation  aggregate,  who, 
as  we  have  seen,  may  be  made  parties  to  a  suit  against  the  corporation 
for  the  purposes  of  discovery,  and  arbitrators,  solicitors,  or  agents  :  and 
it  will  be  seen,  upon  reference  to  what  has  been  before  stated  upon  this 
subject,2  that  the  right  to  make  them  parties  is  confined  to  cases  where 
relief  is,  in  fact,  prayed  against  them,  namely,  where  they  are  impli- 
cated in  fraud  or  collusion,  and  it  is  specifically  asked  that  they  may 
pay  the  costs ;  or  where  they  are  the  holders  of  a  particular  instrument, 
which  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  have  delivered  up.3 

A  bill  must  not  only  show  that  the  defendant  is  liable  to  the  plain- 
tiff's demands,  or  has  some  interest  in  the  subject-matter,  but  it  must 
also  show  that  there  is  such  a  privity  between  him  and  the  plaintiff 
as  gives  the  plaintiff  a  right  to  sue  him  ; 4  (a)  for  it  is  frequently 
the  case  that  a  plaintiff  has  an  interest  in  the  subject-matter  *  of  *323 
the  suit  which  may  be  in  the  hands  of  a  defendant,  and  yet,  for 
want  of  a  proper  privity  between  them,  the  plaintiff  may  not  be  the 
person  entitled  to  call  upon  the  defendant  to  answer  his  demand.  Thus, 
although  a  principal  is  entitled  to  an  account  against  his  agent,  the 
persons  for  whom  the  principal  is  a  trustee  are  not  so  entitled,  and 
where  a  suit  was  instituted  by  them  against  the  trustee  and  his  agent 
for  an  account,  a  demurrer  by  the  agent  was  allowed.1 

7  Ld.  Red   160;  Plumbe  v.  Plumbe  4  Y.  &  Story,  Eq.   PI.   §§  255,   256,  257.      Upon   the 

C.  Ex.  345,  350;  Ponsford  ».  Hankey,  3  De  G.  same  principle,  where,  in  a  bill  against  A  and 

F.&  J.  544;  7  Jur.  N.  S.  929;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  B,  the   plaintiff  stated   a  circumstance   which 

§262,  ttseq.;  Humphreys  i-.Tate,  4  Ired.  Eq.220.  was  material   in  order  to  charge    B,  not  as  a 

1  Thus,   where  a  bill  was  brought   by  the  fact,  but  as  an   allegation  made  by  A,  a  de- 
obligee  in  a  bond,  against  the  heir  of  the  obligor,  murrer  by  B  was  allowed.     Whiter.  Pmale,  22 
alleging  that  the  heir,  havingassets  by  descent,  Bnav.  72;  Clark  v.  Lord  Rivers,  L.  R.  5  Eq.  91, 
ought  to  satisfy  the  bond,  a  demurrer  was  al-  95-97. 
lowed,  because  the  plaintiff  had  not  expressly  2  Ante,  pp.  297-299. 
alleged  in  the  bill  that  the  heir  was  bound  in  3  Avte,  p.  298. 

the  bond;  although  it  was  alleged  that  the  heir  *  Ld.  Red.  158;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §§  178,  227, 

ought  to  pay  the  debt.     Crosseing  v.  Honor,  1  514;  Longr.  Majestre,  1  John.  Ch.  305;  Elmslie 

Vein.  180.    So,  where  a  bill  was  brought  against  v.  M'Anlay,  3  Bro.  C.  C.  (Perkins's  ed.)  624, 

an  assignee,  touching  a  breach  of  covenant  in  a  note  (1),  627,  note  ("),  and  cases  cited;  Eden 

lease,  and  the  covenant,  as  stated,  appeared  to  Injunct.  (2d  Am.  ed.),  354,  and  cases  in  note  («)• 

be  collateral,  and  not  running  with   the  land,  See  also  Forbes  v.  Preston,  14  W.  R  217;  Earle 

and  did  not,  therefore,  bind  assignees,  and  was  v.  Sidebottom,   37  L.  J.  Ch.  503.     As  to  the 

not  stated  by  the  bill  expressly  to  bind  assign-  privity  between  first  and  second   mortgagees, 

ees,  a  demurrer  by  the  assignee  was  allowed.  see  Hoole  v.  Smith,  17  Ch.  D.  434 

Lord  Uxbridge  v.  Staveland,   1  Ves.  Sr.  56;  »  Att.-Gen.tf.  Earl  of  Chesterfield,  18  Beav. 

(a)   A  third  person,  who  is  not  named  as  a  U.  57:  see  Clarke  v.  Birley,  41  Ch.  D.  422;  nnte, 

partv  to  the  contract,  in  order  to  sue  either  of  pp.  192.  287,  notes;  McClaskev  r.  O'Brien,  16 

the  contracting  parties  in  Equity,  must  possess  W.  Va.  791 ;  McCoy  v.  Allen,  id.  724;  Dunumt 

an  actual  beneficial  right  as  a  cestui  que  trust,  v.  Fry,  12  Fed.  Rep.  21. 


under  the  contract.     Gaudy  v.  Gandy,  30  Ch. 


319 


324 


THE    BILL. 


Yet,  in  cases  of  collusion  between  the  debtor  and  executor,  or  of  the 
insolvency  of  the  executor,  bills  by  creditors  or  residuary  legatees  against 
debtors  to  a  testator's  estate,  have  been  entertained  ; 2  and  in  a  suit  by  uni- 
versal legatees  under  a  will,  for  an  account  against  a  debtor  to  the  testa- 
tor's estate,  an  account  was  under  the  circumstances  directed,8  although 

collusion  was  not  established  between  the  debtor  and  the  personal 
*  324    representative,  and  there  was  no  *  evidence  of   insolvency  on  the 

part  of  the  personal  representative,  or  of  his  refusal  to  sue  for 
the  debt,  other  than  his  omission  to  institute  proceedings  for  a  con- 
siderable period.1 

It  seems  also,  that  when  persons  other  than  the  personal  representa- 
tive of  the  testator  have  possessed  specific  assets  of  the  testator,  such 
persons  may  be  made  parties  to  a  suit  by  a  creditor.2  So  also,  where 
it  is  desirable  to  have  the  account  of  the  personal  estate  entire,  a  cred- 
itor may  make  the  surviving  partner  of  a  deceased  debtor  a  defendant 


596;  18  Jur.  686;  Maw  v.  Pearson,  28  Beav. 
196:  Seton,  463,  790.  See  further  illustrations 
in  Re  Empress  Engineering  Co.  16  Ch.  D.  125; 
Halifax  J.  S.  Banking  Co.  v.  Sowerby  Bridge 
T.  H.  Co.  W.  N.  (1881)  65;  Re  Spencer,  id. 
170;  Re  Jackson,  40  Ch.  D.  495.  So,  though 
an  unsatisfied  legatee  has  an  interest  in  the 
estate  of  his  testator,  and  a  right  to  have  it 
applied  in  a  due  course  of  administration,  yet 
he  has  no  right  to  institute  a  suit  against  the 
debtors  to  his  testator's  estate,  for  the  purpose 
of  compelling  them  to  pay  their  debts  in  satis- 
faction of  his  legacy;  for  there  is  no  privity 
between  the  legatee  and  the  debtors,  who  are 
answerable  only  to  the  personal  representative 
of  the  testator.  Bickley  v.  Dorrington,  cited  Ld. 
Red.  158,  n.  (h)\  Bnrii.  32;  6  Ves.  749;  Monk 
r.  Pom  fret,  cited  Ld.  Red.  158,  n.  (h);  Walker 
v.  Walker,  20  W.  R.  162.  Upon  the  same 
principle,  where  a  bill  was  filed  by  the  credi- 
tors of  a  person  who  was  one  of  the  residuary 
legatees  of  a  testator,  against  the  personal 
representative,  for  an  account  of  his  personal 
estate,  it  was  held  to  be  impossible  to  maintain 
such  a  bill.  Elmslie  r.  M'Aulay,  3  Bro.  C.  C 
624,  626.  And  so,  where  a  creditor  of  a  tes- 
tator, who  had  previously  been  a  bankrupt, 
and  had  obtained  his  certificate,  brought  a  bill 
against  the  executor  for  at:  account,  and  made 
the  assignees  under  the  testator's  bankruptcy 
parties,  for  the  purpose  of  compelling  them  to 
account  to  the  executor  for  the  surplus  of  the 
bankrupt's  estate,  a  demurrer  by  the  assignees 
was  allowed.  Utterson  r.  Mair,  4  Bro.  C.  C. 
270,  276:  2  Ves.  Jr.  95,  97;  6  Ves.  749:  Bickley 
v.  Dorrington.  cited  Ld.  Red.  158,  n.  (h);  Barn. 
32;  6  Ves.  749. 

2  Utterson  v.  Mair,  4  Bro.  C.  C.  270.  276; 
see  also  Doran  v.  Simpson,  4  Ves.  651,  665; 
Alsager  v.  Rowley,  6  Ves.  748;  Troughton  r. 
Binkes,  id.  573,  575;  BennVld  v.  Solomons,  9 
Ves.  86;  Burrowes  v.  Gore,  6  H.  L.  Cas.  907; 

320 


4  Jur.  X.  S.  1245;  Jerdein  v.  Bright,  2  J.  &  H. 
325,  where  the  bill  was  filed  against  the  trustee 
of  a  creditor's  deed,  and  a  purchaser  from  him. 
See  also  Morley  v.  White,  L.  R.  8  Ch.  731; 
Bouck  v.  Bouck,  L.  R.  2  Eq.  19;  Ld.  Red.  158, 
159;  Elmslie  v.  M'Aulay,  3  Bro.  C.  C.  (.Per- 
kins's ed.)  627,  n.  (a);  Mason  v.  Spurlock,  4 
Baxt.  554.  A  special  case  must  be  made  out 
to  authorize  a  bill  by  a  creditor  against  an 
administrator  of  the  deceased  debtor,  and  a 
third  person  having  assets  of  the  deceased,  to 
subject  those  assets  to  the  payment  of  his  debt; 
it  is  not,  however,  necessary  to  charge  collusion 
between  the  defendants;  it  is  enough  that  the 
third  person  holds  all  the  property  of  the 
deceased  under  a  secret  trust  in  fraud  of  cred- 
itors; insists  on  retaining  the  property  to  his 
own  use,  and  that  the  administrator  has  not 
proceeded  against  him  for  the  space  of  about 
two  years,  and  resists  the  bill  by  reiving  on  the 
Statute  of  Limitations.  Hagan  v.  Walker,  14 
How.  (U.  S  )  29,  34,  35;  Long  v.  Majestre,  1 
John.  Ch.  306;  see  Harrison  v.  Righter,  11 
N.  J.  Eq.  389;  Goble  v.  Andruss,  1  Green  Ch. 
66.  A  single  creditor  of  an  insolvent  estate 
cannot  sustain  a  bill  against  a  debtor  of  such 
estate  without  joining  other  parties.  Isaacs  v. 
Clark.  13  Vt.  657. 

3  Barker  v.  Birch,  1  De  G.  &  S.  376;  11  Jur. 
881. 

i  See  Bolton  v.  Powell,  14  Beav.  27fr;  2  De 
G.  M.  &  G.  1 :  16  Jur.  24;  Saunders  v.  Druce, 
3  Drew.  140. 

2  Xewland  v.  Champion,  1  Ves.  Sr.  105;  2 
Coll.  46;  and  see  Consett  v.  Bell,  1  Y.  & 
C.  C.  C.  569;  6  Jur.  869.  A  creditor  who  has 
taken  possession  of  the  books  of  account  and 
vouchers  of  a  testator,  and  has  proceeded  to 
collect  his  debts,  would  seem  to  be  a  proper 
party  to  an  administration  suit.  Earl  Vane  v. 
Rigdon,  18  W.  R.  308;  but  see  S.  C.  on  appeal, 
18' W.  R.  1092. 


MATTER   OF   THE   BILL. 


324 


to  his  bill,  though  no  fraud  or  collusion  is  alleged ; 8  and  it  seems  that  a 
joint  creditor  may  maintain  a  suit  against  the  representatives  of  a 
deceased  partner,  for  satisfaction  of  his  entire  demand  out  of  the 
assets,  although  the  surviving  partner  is  not  alleged  to  be  insolvent, 
and  is  made  a  party  to  the  bill.4  So  also,  residuary  legatees  may  sus- 
tain a  bill  for  an  account  against  the  executor  and  surviving  partners  of 
the  testator,5  though  collusion  between  the  executor  and  the  surviving 
partners  is  neither  charged  nor  proved;  6  but  it  must  be  shown  that  the 
executors  have  neglected  their  duty  of  themselves  suing.7  A  mere  re- 
fusal by  a  legal  personal  representative  to  sue  for  the  recovery  of  out- 
standing assets  will  not,  in  the  absence  of  special  circumstances,  justify 
a  residuary  legatee  or  next  of  kin  in  suing  the  legal  personal  representa- 
tive and  the  alleged  debtor  to  the  estate.8 

Where  it  is  necessary  to  allege  fraud  or  collusion,  a  general  allegation 
of  it  in  the  bill  will  not  be  sufficient  to  shut  out  a  demurrer  ;  but  the  facts 
upon  which  such  allegation  is  founded  must  be  stated,  as  there  is  great 
inconvenience  in  joining  issue  upon  such  a  general  charge,  without  giv- 
ing the  defendant  a  hint  of  any  fact  from  which  it  is  to  be  inferred.9  (a) 


3  Newland  v.  Champion,  1  Ves.  Sr.  105; 
see  also  Gedge  v.  Traill,  1  R.  &  M.  281,  n.; 
Long  v.  Majestre,  1  John.  Ch.  305;  Harrison  v. 
Righter,  11  N.  J.  Eq.  389. 

4  Wilkinson  v.  Henderson,  1  M.  &  K.  582, 
588;  Hills  v.  M'Rae,  9  Hare,  297;  15  Jur.  766; 
Bower  v.  Soctfte-  des  AfWteurs,  17  L.  T.  N.  S. 
490;  Re  McRae,  25  Ch.  D.  16;  Story,  Eq.  PI. 
§§  167,  178. 

s  Bowsherr.  Watkins,  1  R.  &  M.  277,  283; 
see  also  Law  v.  Law,  2  Coll.  41 ;  9  Jur.  745;  on 
appeal,  11  Jur.  463;  Travis  v.  Milne,  9  Hare, 
141;  Stainton  v.  Carron  Co.  18  Beav.  146;  and 
see  Davies  v.  Davies,  2  Keen,  534.  and  the 
observations  of  Lord  Langdale,  p.  539,  on 
Bowsher  v.  Watkins.  But  see  Taylor  v.  Taylor, 
W.  N.  (1873)  58;  28  L.  T.  N.  S.189. 

«  See  Collyer,  Partn.  §  366. 

7  Stainton  v.  Carron  Co.  and  Travis  v.  Milne, 
ubi  supra.  Where  an  executrix  neglected  to 
defend  a  suit,  leave  was  given  to  the  plaintiff, 
in  a  suit  for  the  administration  of  the  estate,  to 
do  so  in  her  name.  Olding  v.  Poulter,  23  Beav. 
143;  and  see  Packington  v.  Benbow,  5  W.  R. 
670. 

8  Yeatman  v.  Yeatman,  7  Ch.  D.  210.  As 
to  privity  between  purchasers  of  different  parts 
of  an  estate,  see  Muster  v.  Hansard,  4  Ch.  D. 
718;  Renals  v.  Cowlishaw,  9  Ch.  D.  125;  11 
Ch.  D.  866;  Taite  v.  Gosling,  id.  273;  Gaskin 
V.  Balls,  13  Ch.  D.  324;  and  see  Mann  r. 
Stephens,  15  Sim.  377;  Coles  v.  Sims,  Kay,  56; 
5  De  G.  M.  &  G.  1;  18  Jur.  683;  Western 
v.  Macdermott,  L.  R.  2  Ch.  72;  Keates  t>  Lyon, 
L.  R.  4  Ch.  218;  Chitty  e.  Bray,  W.  N.  (1883) 


98;  Spicer  v.  Martin,  14  App.  Cas.  12;  Shep- 
pard  v.  Gilmore,  57  L.  J.  Ch.  6;  Clegg  v. 
Hands,  44  Ch.  D.  503. 

9  Wallingford  v.  Mutual  Society,  5  App. 
Cas.  685;  Benfield  v.  Solomons,  9  Ves.  86; 
Munlay  v.  Knight,  3  Hare,  497,  and  cases 
cited  in  note,  p.  501;  8  Jur.  904;  Bothoinley  v. 
Squire,  1  Jur.  N.  S.  694,  V.  C.  K.;  Moss  v. 
Bainbrigge,  3  Jur.  N.  S.  58, V.  C.  W. ;  Gilbert 
v.  Lewis,  1  De  G.  J.  &  S.  38,  49,  50;  9  Jur. 
N.  S.  187;  Webster  v.  Power,  L.  R.  2  P.  C.  69; 
Ringgold  v.  Stone,  20  Ark.  526;  Bryan  v. 
Spruill,  4  Jones,  Eq.  (N.  C.)  27;  Farnam  v. 
Brooks,  9  Pick.  212;  Bull  v.  Bull  2  Root,  476; 
Elston  v.  Blanchard,  2  Scam.  420;  Moore  v. 
Greene,  19  How.  U.  S.  69;  Small  v.  Boudinot, 
Boudinot  v.  Small,  9  N.  J.  Eq.  381;  De  Louis 
v.  Meek,  2  Greene  (Iowa),  55  ;  Weatherspoon 
v.  Carmichael,  6  Ired.  Eq.  143;  Frazer  v.  Hoyt, 
2  Strobh.  Eq.  250;  Harding  v.  Handy,  11 
Wheat.  103.  If  fraud  is  relied  upon,  it  must 
be  substantially  charged  in  the  bill.  Crocker 
v.  Higgins,  7  Conn.  342  ;  Hogan  r.  Burnett,  37 
Miss.  617;  Howell  v.  Sebring.  14  N.  J.  Eq.  84, 
90;  Parsons  v.  Heston,  11  id.  150;  Grove  ». 
Rentch,  26  Md.  367,  377.  In  Other  v.  Smurth- 
waite,  L.  R.  5  Eq.  437,  441.  Sir  W.  Page  Wood 
V.  O.  (Lord  Hatherley)  said.:  '•  On  behalf  of 
the  plaintiff  it  is  said  that  he  is  not  bound 
to  let  the  defendants  know  beforehand,  or  give 
them  any  chance  of  knowing  beforehand,  what 
he  contemplates  proving.  But  if  there  be  any 
one  tiling  more  contrary  to  the  course  of  our 
proceedings  in  Equity  than  another,  it  is  the 
taking  an  opponent  by  surprise.     If  I  were  to 


(a)  It  is  also  in  general  required  in  practice 
that  the  material  facts  of  conduct,  negligence, 

VOL.    I.  —  21 


acquiescence,    or     encouragement    should    be 
pleaded.     See  Evans  v.  Bicknell,  6  Ves.  174; 

321 


325 


THE   BILL. 


c325        *With  reference  to  the  subject  of  privity  between  the  plain- 
tiff and  defendant,  it  is  to  be  observed,  that  the  employment  of 


find  the  defendant  taken  by  surprise,  I  should 
certainly  direct  the  case  to  stand  over,  in  order 
that  he  might  have  an  opportunity  of  meeting 
the  case  made  against  him.  Although  it  is 
fraud  that  is  charged,  fraud  must  be  distinctly 
charged  and  properly  proved.  So  far  from  its 
being  the  principle  that  a  defendant  is  to  be 
allowed  to  be  taken  by  surprise,  and,  without 
any  preparation,  is  to  be  called  upon  to  meet 
something  which  a  witness  may  assert,  nothing 


Jackson  v.  Cator,  5  Ves.  688;  Powell  v.  Thomas, 
G  Hare,  300;  Rochdale  Canal  Co.  v.  King, 
2  Sim.  N.  S.  78;  Thornton  v.  Ramsden,  4  Gift'. 
519;  L.  R.  1  H.  L.  129;  Bankart  v.  Tennant, 
L.  R.  10  Eq.  141 :  Williams  v.  Earl  of  Jersey, 
Cr.  &  Ph.  91,  98:  Willinott  v.  Barber,  15  Ch. 
D.  96;  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  XIX.  4,  18;  15  &  16  Vic. 
c.  86,  §  10.  The  other  part}-  ma}'  of  course 
administer  interrogatories  in  order  to  ascertain 
the  material  facts  as  to  a  general  allegation. 
Saunders  v.  Jones,  7  Ch.  D.  435;  Lyon  v. 
Tweddell,  13  Ch.  D.  375 ;  see  Benbow  v.  Low, 
16  Ch.  D.  93;  Bolckow  v.  Fisher,  10  Q.  B.  D. 
161.  Under  the  Code  system,  however,  a  gen- 
eral allegation  of  negligence  is  held  good 
against  a  general  demurrer.  Gulf  Col.  &  S.  F. 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Washington,  4  IT.  S.  App.  121,  125. 
Notice,  when  necessary  to  found  a  right  against 
the  defendant,  must  be  charged  directly.  De 
Tastet  r.  Tavernier,  1  Keen,  161;  Blair  v.  St. 
Louis,  H.  &  K.  R.  Co.  27  Fed.  Rep.  176.  No- 
tice alleged  to  a  vendor  may  be  proved  by  notice 
to  his  authorized  agent,  though  the  agency  is 
not  pleaded.  Marshall  v.  Gilman  (Minn.),  53 
N.  W.  Rep.  811.  In  defending  against  a  charge 
of  laches,  a  general  allegation  of  ignorance  at 
one  time  and  knowledge  at  another  is  of  no 
effect.  Credit  Co.  v.  Arkansas  Central  R.  Co. 
15  Fed.  Rep.  46.  General  allegations  in  an 
answer  that  the  pollution  of  a  natural  stream 
is  reasonable,  natural,  and  proper,  and  consistent 
with  the  owner's  rights,  amount  only  to  legal 
conclusions.  Kellogg  v.  New  Britain,  62  Conn. 
232.  Intention,  when  material,  should  be  al- 
leged as  a  fact,  and,  when  so  alleged,  it  must 
he  denied  by  the  answer.  Wilcox  r.  Davis,  4 
Minn.  197;  Riley  v.  Carter,  76  Md.  581 ;  Piatt  v. 
Mead,  9  Fed.  Rep.  91.  Hence  a  fraudulent  in- 
tent must  be  alleged  as  a  fact.  Davy  v.  Garrett, 
7  Ch.  D.  473,  489;  Palmer  v.  Locke,  15  Ch.  D. 
294 ;  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  XIX.  25.  A  general  allega- 
tion of  unearned  profits  resulting  from  a  breach 
of  contract,  without  details,  and  of  a  speculative 
nature,  is  insufficient  upon  a  general  demurrer. 
Johnson  v.  Cherokee  Land  Co.  82  Texas,  338. 
But  insufficient  and  defective  statements  in  the 
bill  are  often  cured  by  the  allegations  of  the 
answer.     Brewis  v.  Lawson,  76  Va.  36. 

322 


is  more  settled  than  the  doctrine  that  when  you 
charge  fraud  you  must  state  the  facts  upon 
which  you  allege  fraud,  and  prove  them 
strictly."  See  McLane  v.  Manning,  2  Wins. 
(N.  C.)  No.  1  (Eq.),  60;  Webster  v.  Power, 
L.  R.  2  P.  C.  69,  81:  Sharpe  v.  San  Paolo 
Ry.  Co.  8  Ch.  597;  Fort  v.  Orndorf,  7  Heisk. 
167;  Winham  v.  Crutcher,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  536; 
Castle  v.  Bader,  23  Cal.  75;  Symonds  v.  City 
Bank,  34  W.  R.  364. 


General  allegations  of  fraud  are  insufficient 
in  both  civil  and  criminal  pleading.  People  v. 
McKenna,  81  Cal.  158;  post,  p.  328.  The  rule 
is  constantly  applied  in  Equity  practice.  See 
cases  above  cited:  Wallingford  ».  Mutual 
Society,  5  App.  Cas.  685  ;  Lawrence  v.  Norreys, 
15  App.  Cas.  210;  Bastow  v.  Bradshaw,  8 
L.  R.  Ir.  30;  Kingston  v.  Corker,  29  id.  364; 
Van  Weel  v.  Winston,  115  U.  S.  228;  Hazard 
v.  Griswold,  21  Fed.  Rep.  178;  Lafayette  Co. 
v.  Neely,  id.  738;  Linn  v.  Green,  17  id.  407; 
Smith  v.  Wood,  42  N.  J.  Eq.  563;  Herberts. 
Herbert  (N.  J.).  20  Atl.  290;  Merrill  r.  Wash- 
burn, 83  Maine,  189;  Barteau  v.  Barteau,  45 
Minn.  132;  Nichols  r.  Rogers,  139  Mass.  146. 
And  also  under  the  Code  Procedure :  Fast  St. 
Louis  C.  R.  Co.  v.  People,  119  III.  182;  Sals- 
bury  v.  Falk,  28  111.  App.  297;  Clodfelter  v. 
Hulett,  72  Ind.  137;  Penny  v.  Jackson,  85  Ala. 
67;  McHan  v.  Ord  way,  76  Ala.  347;  State  v. 
Williams,  39  Kansas,  517;  Norris  v.  Scott 
(Ind.),  32  N.  E.  Rep.  103;  McMahon  v.  Rooney, 
93  Mich.  390;  Williams  v.  First  Presby't  Soci- 
ety, 1  Ohio  St.  478;  Cosgrove  v.  Fisk,  90  Cal. 
75;  Brooks  v.  Hamilton,  15  Minn.  26;  Jackson 
v.  Reeve,  44  Ark.  496;  Aultman  v.  Steinan,  8 
Neb.  109,  113;  Southern  Marble  Co.  v.  Stegall 
(Ga.),  15  S.  E.  Rep.  806;  Bowden  v.  Crow 
(Texas),  21  S.  W.  Rep.  612;  Robinson  v.  Dolores 
Land  Co.  2  Col.  App.  17.  Evidence  of  the  al- 
leged fraud  is  not  admissible  when  the  facts 
are  not  pleaded.  Symonds  v.  City  Bank,  34 
W.  R.  364;  Burris  v.  Adams,  96  Cal.  664. 

This,  being  a  rule  of  pleading  only,  does 
not  prevent  discovery  so  as  to  enable  the  plain- 
tiff to  plead  the  fraud  in  detail.  Leitch  v. 
Abbott,  31  Ch.  D.  374.  And  for  the  same 
reason  the  objection  cannot  be  first  raised  in 
the  midst  of  a  hearing  on  the  merits.  Hubbard 
v.  McNaughton,  43  Mich.  220.  A  plea,  which 
sets  up  fraud  in  defence,  must  state  the  facts 
constituting  the  fraud.  Mobile  Savings  Bank 
v.  Board  of  Supervisors,  22  Fed.  Rep.  580. 
An  allegation  that  certain  acts,  which  weie 
not  in  themselves  wrongful, violated  an  act  of 
Congress,  and  were  in  fraud  of  the  plaintiff, 
being  merely  a  legal  conclusion,  is  not  a 
sufficient  statement  of  fraud  by  the  defendant: 


MATTER    OF   THE   BILL. 


326 


agents  or  brokers  in  a  transaction  does  not  interfere  with  the  privity 
between  the  principals,  so  as  to  deprive  them  of  their  right  to  sue  each 
other  immediately.1 

A  bill  must  not  only  show  that  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  or  interested 
in  the  subject-matter  of  the  litigation,  and  is  clothed  with  such  a  char- 
acter as  entitles  him  to  maintain  the  suit,  and  that  the  defendant  is  also 
liable  to  the  relief  sought  against  him,  or  is  in  some  manner  interested 
in  the  dispute,  and  that  there  is  such  a  privity  between  him  and  the 
plaintiff  as  gives  the  plaintiff  a  title  to  sue  him,  but  it  must  also  pray 
the  Court  to  grant  the  proper  relief  suited  to  the  case,  as  made 
by  the  bill ; 2  and  if,  for  *  any  reason  founded  on  the  substance     *  326 


1  Thus,  where  a  principal  transmits  goods  to 
a  factor,  he  may  sue  the  person  who  buys  of 
the  factor;  and  where  a  bill  was  brought  by 
some  merchants  against  the  defendant,  to  dis- 
cover what  quantity  of  straw  hats  he  had  pur- 
chased of  their  agents,  and  for  payment  to  them, 
and  not  to  the  agents,  a  demurrer  was  over- 
ruled. Lissett  v.  Reave.  2  Atk.  394.  So, 
where  a  merchant,  acting  upon  a  del  credere 
commission,  became  bankrupt,  having  sold 
goods  of  his  principals  for  which  he  had  not 
paid  them,  and,  shortly  before  his  bankruptcy, 
drew  bills  on  the  vendees,  which  he  delivered 
to  some  of  his  own  creditors  to  discharge  their 
demands,  they  knowing  his  insolvency,  a  suit 
by  the  principals  against  the  persons  who  had 
received  the  bills,  for  an  account  and  payment 
of  the  produce,  was  sustained.  Neuman  v. 
Godfrey,  cited  Ld.  Red.  160;  S.  C.  nom.  New- 
man v.  Godfrey,  2  Bro.  C.  C.  332;  Leverick  v. 
Meigs,  1  Cowen,  645,  663,664,  665;  ante,  p.  195, 
notes.  Ordinnrily,  the  principal  cannot  avail 
himself,  by  suit  in  his  own  name,  of  a  written 
contract,  made  between  his  agent  and  a  third 
person,  in  the  name  of  the  agent;  for  it  is 
treated  as  a  contract  merely  between  the  par- 
ties named  in  it,  although  the  agent  is  known 
to  be  acting  in  that  character.  United  States 
o.  Parmele,  1  Paine,  C.  C.  252;  Clark  v.  Wil- 
son, 3  Wash.  C.  C.  560;  Newcomb  v.  Clark,  1 


Kelly  v.  Wallace,  14  Minn.  236.  So  general 
allegations  of  feebleness  and  undue  influence 
are  insufficient  without  the  facts.  Jackson  v. 
Rowell,  87  Ala.  685. 

It  may,  however,  be  sufficient  to  allege  that 
a  specific  act  was  fraudulently  done,  or  that  it 
was  fraudulent,  without  averring  how  it  was 
done.  Zimmerman  v.  Willard,  114  111.  364; 
National  Union  Bank  v.  Reed,  27  Abb.  N.  ('as. 
5.  Fraud  may  be  inferred  from  circumstances, 
but,  when  alleged,  it  must  be  clearly  proved. 
Gruber  v.  Baker,  20  Nev.  453;  see  Davy  v. 
Garrett,  7  Ch.  D.  473,  489;  Palmer  v.  Locke, 
15  Ch.  D.  294,  300.  In  cases  of  agency,  or 
other  confidential  relations,  the  plaintiff  may 
be  entitled  to  discovery  upon  interrogatories  in 
order  to  enable    him  to   give   particulars   and 


Denio,  226;  Finney  v.  Bedford  Com.  Ins.  Co. 
8  Met.  348,  Harp  v.  Osgood,  2  Hill,  216.  There 
are,  however,  exceptions  to  this  rule,  as  well 
established  as  the  rule  itself;  as  in  the  case  of  a 
written  contract  by  a  factor  in  his  own  name 
for  the  purchase  or  sale  of  goods  for  his  princi- 
pal. So  in  case  of  a  policy  of  insurance  pro- 
cured by  an  agent  in  his  own  name  for  the 
benefit  of  his  principal,  the  agent  as  well  as  the 
principal,  may  sue  thereon.  Brewster  v.  Lunt, 
8  La.  296. 

*  Story,  Eq.  Pi.  §§  40-42.  The  prayer  of  a 
bill  in  Chancery  is  always  an  essential  part, 
and  without  its  insertion  no  decree  can  be  ren 
dered  for  a  plaintiff.  Driver  v.  Tatner,  5 
Porter,  10;  see  Smith  v.  Smith,  4  Rand.  95; 
see  also  post,  "  The  Prayer  for  Relief,"  in 
this  chapter.  If  the  plaintiff  prays  for  relief 
in  a  certain  capacity,  this  will  be  a  test  of  the 
ground  on  which  he  seeks  the  aid  of  the  Court. 
Sayles  v.  Tibbitts,  5  R.  I.  79.  If  the  allega- 
tions of  a  bill  refer  to  the  condition  of  things 
at  the  time  the  bill  is  filed,  the  relief  afforded 
must  be  limited  to  that  state  of  facts.  Win- 
nipi^eogee  Lake  Company  r.  Young,  40  N.  H. 
420.  Under  a  bill  alleging  that  all  of  the 
defendants  had  an  interest  in  the  land  sub- 
ject to  the  plaintiff's  claim,  and  praying  re- 
lief against  all,  the  bill  may  be  dismissed  as 
to    part    of    the    defendants,  and  relief  given 


details  of  the  frauds  which  he  alleges  generallv. 
See  Leitchv.  Abbott,  31  Ch.  D.  374.  Altera 
trial  upon  a  plea  or  answer  which  contains 
a  general  allegation  of  fraud,  without  exception 
being  taken  to  its  sufficiency,  or  objection  made 
to  the  evidence  introduced  under  it,  it  is  too  late 
to  object  that  the  circumstances  arc  not  stated. 
King  p.  Davis,  34  Cal.  106;  Reese  r.  Kinkead, 
20  Nev.  65.  Under  the  N.  Y.  Code  of  Civil 
Procedure,  §  549,  subd.  4,  providing  that  a 
cause  of  action  on  contract  fraudulently  con- 
tracted, is  an  action  on  the  case  as  to  pleadings 
and  remedies,  having  the  -ontract  as  one  only 
of  its  facts,  the  allegations  showing  the  fraud, 
which  is  a  necessary  element,  cannot  be  stricken 
out  on  motion  as  redundant  and  irrelevant. 
Rowe  v.  Patterson,  16  Jones  &  S.  (N.  Y.)  249. 

323 


*  326  THE   BILL. 

of  the  case  cas  stated  in  the  bill,  the  plaintiff  is  not  entitled  to  the  re- 
lief he  prays,  either  in  the  whole  or  in  part,  the  defendant  may  demur. 
In  some  of  the  most  ancient  bills,  as  appears  by  the  records,  the 
plaintiff  does  not  expressly  ask  any  relief,  nor  any  process,  but  prays 
the  Chancellor  to  send  for  the  defendant  and  to  examine  him ;  in  others, 
where  relief  is  prayed,  the  prayer  of  process  is  various  :  sometimes  a 
habeas  corpus  cum  causa,  sometimes  a  subpoena,  and  sometimes  other 
writs.1  Afterwards,  the  bill  appears  to  have  assumed  a  more  regular 
form,  and  not  only  to  have  prayed  the  subpoena  of  the  Court,  but  also 
suitable  relief  adapted  to  the  case  contained  in  the  statement ; 2  which 
is  the  general  form  of  all  bills  in  modern  use,  except  that,  since  the 
late  Act,  the  prayer  for  subpoena  is  omitted.  But  although  it  was  the 
general  practice,  previously  to  the  late  Act,  in  all  cases  where  relief  was 
sought,  to  specify  particularly  the  nature  of  such  relief,  yet  it  seems 
that  such  special  prayer  was  not  absolutely  necessary,  and  that  praying 
general  relief  was  sufficient ; 8  and  Lord  Eldon  said 4  that  he  had  seen  % 
bill  with  a  simple  prayer  that  the  defendant  might  answer  all  the  matters 
aforesaid,  and  then  the  general  prayer  for  relief. 

By  the  Act  to  amend  the  practice  of  the  Court  of  Chancery  it  was 
provided,  that  the  plaintiff  shall  pray  specifically  for  the  relief  which  he 
may  conceive  himself  entitled  to,  and  also  for  general  relief.5 

The  requisites  above  set  out  are  necessary  in  every  bill  which  is  filed 
in  the  Court  of  Equity  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  relief.  There  are 
other  requisites  appertaining  to  bills  adapted  to  particular  purposes, 
which  will  be  hereafter  pointed  out,  as  well  as  those  distinctive  prop- 
erties which  belong  to  bills  not  filed  for  the  purposes  of  relief.  But 
besides  those  points  which  are  generally  necessary  to  be  attended  to  in 
the  frame  of  all  bills,  as  each  case  must  depend  upon  its  own  particular 
circumstances,  matters  must  be  introduced  into  every  bill  which  will 
occasion  it  to  differ  from  others,  but  which  it  is  impossible  to  reduce 
under  any  general  rules,  and  must  be  left  to  the  discretion  of  the  drafts- 
man. Care,  however,  must  be  taken  in  framing  the  bill  that  everything 
which  is  intended  to  be  proved  be  stated  upon  the  face  of  it;  other- 
wise, evidence  cannot  be  admitted  to  prove  it.6     This  is  required,  in 

against  the  residue.      Brooks    v.   Carpentier,  Farrington,  id.  239,  241;    Ashton  v.  Atlantic 

53  Cal.  287.  Bank,  3  Allen,  217;  Howell  v.  Sebring,  14  N.  J. 

i  Jud.   Auth.  M.  R.  91,  92;  see  1  Spence,  Eq.  84,  90;  Badger  v.  Badger,  2  Wall.  87.     No 

Eq.  Jur.  368,  et  seq.  facts  are  properly  in  issue,  unless  charged  in 

2  Jud.  Auth.  M.  R.  91,  92;  see  1  Spence,  the  bill;  and  of  course  no  proofs  can  generally  be 
Eq.  Jur.  368,  et  seq.  offered  of  facts  not  in  the  bill;  nor  can  relief  be 

3  Cook  v.  Martyn,  2  Atk.  3;  Grimes  v.  granted  for  matters  not  charged,  although  they 
French    id.  141.  may  be  apparent  from  other  parts  of  the  plead - 

4  Partridge  v.  Haycraft,  11  Ves.  574.  ings  and  evidence;  for  the  Court  pronounces  its 

5  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  10.  decision  secundum  allegata  et.  probata.      Story, 

6  Gordon  i>.  Gordon,' 3  Swanst.472;  Philipps  Eq.  PI.  §  257;  Crocket  v.  Lee,  7  Wheat.  522; 
v.  Philipps,  4  Q.  B.D.  127;  Miller  v.  Cotten,  5  Jackson  v.  Ashton,  11  Peters,  229;  James  v. 
Ga.  341;  Parker  v.  Beavans,  19  Texas,  406;  McKernon,  6  John.  564;  Barraque  v.  Manual.  2 
B.iilev  ».  Rvder,  10  N.  Y.  363;  Rowan  v.  Eng.  516;  Tripp  v.  Vincent,  2  Barb.  Ch.  614 ; 
Bowles,  21  III.  17;  Laud  v.  Cowan,  19  Ala.  297;  Browning  v.  Pratt,  2  Dev.  Eq.  49;  Sheratz  v. 
Chaffin  v.  Kimball,  23  111.  36;  Camden  and  Nicodemus,  7  Yerg.  13;  Austin  v.  Ramsey,  3 
Amboy  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Stewart,  19  N.  J.  Eq.  343;  Tenn.  Ch.  118.  A  trustee  is  not  to  be  held  for 
Hewett  r.  A(lain«,  50  Maine,  271,  276;  Lovell  v.  any    neglect  or  breach  of  duty  which  is  not 

324 


MATTER   OF   THE   BILL. 


328 


♦order  that  the  defendant    may  be  aware   of  what  the  nature     *327 
of  the  case  to  be  made  against  him  is.1     Not  only  will  it  be  im- 
possible to  introduce  evidence  as  to  facts  which  are  not  put  in  issue  by 
the  bill,  but  even  an  inquiry  will  not  be  directed,  unless  ground  for  such 
inquiry  is  laid  in  the  pleadings.2 

*  Where  the  bill  sets  up  a  case  of  actual  fraud,  and  makes  that  *  328 
the  ground  prayer  for  relief,  the  plaintiff  is  not,  in  general,  en- 
titled to  a  decree  by  establishing  some  one  or  more  of  the  facts,  quite 
independent  of  fraud,  but  which  might  of  themselves  create  a  case  under 
a  distinct  head  of  Equity  from  that  which  would  be  applicable  to  the  case 
of  fraud  originally  stated.1  (a)     It   is   not  open  to  the  plaintiff,  if  he 


charged  in  the  bill.  Page  v.  Olcott,  28  Vt.  465. 
But  the  plaintiff  need  not,  and  indeed  should 
not,  state  in  the  bill  any  matters  of  which  the 
Court  is  bound  judicially  to  take  notice,  or  is 
supposed  to  possess  full  knowledge.  See  Story, 
Eq.  PI.  §  24;  1  Greenl.  Ev.  §§  4,  5,  6.  In 
a  bill  to  restrain  an  infringement  of  a  patent, 
an  express  averment  of  the  novelty  of  the 
invention  protected  by  the  patent  is  not  neces- 
sarv.  Amory  v.  Brown,  L.  R  8  Eq.  663; 
Harris  v.  Rothwell,  35  Ch.  D.  416,  427.  The 
allegation  of  the  grant  and  production  of  the 
letters-patent  throw  upon  the  defendant  the  onus 
of  disputing  the  novelty.  It  is  no  longer  neces- 
sary to  charge  the  evidence  relied  on,  except 
for  the  purpose  of  procuring  admissions.  Per 
Sir  W.  P.  Wood  V.  C.  in  Mansell  v.  Feeney,  2 
J.  &  H.  313,  318.  Where,  however,  the  ques- 
tion turns  upon  a  particular  fact  not  specifically 
alleged  in  the  bill,  and  which  the  defendant  has 
not  had  the  opportunity  of  denying,  it  seems 
that  the  Court  will  direct  an  inquiry  as  to  such 
fact.  Weston  v.  Empire  Assurance  Co.  L.  R.  6 
Eq.  23.  A  bill  should  not  set  out  the  evidence, 
whether  oral  or  written,  by  which  the  facts  are 
to  be  proved.  Camden  and  Amboy  R.  Co.  v. 
Stewart,  19  N.  J.  Eq  343  ;  Winebrenner  v. 
Colder,  43  Penn.  St.  244. 

i  See  Hall  v.  Maltby,  6  Price,  240,  259; 
Powys  v.  Mansfield,  6  Sim.  565;  and  see  Mon- 
tesquieu v.  Sandys,  18  Ves.  302,  314,  where  a 
bill  was  filed  to  set  aside  a  contract  entered  into 
by  an  attorney  for  the  purchase  of  a  reversion- 
ary interest  from  his  client,  on  the  ground  of 
fraud  and  misrepresentation,  but  the  evidence 
adduced  in  support  of  the  allegation  of  fraud 
was  deemed  not  to  substantiate  the  case  as  laid 
in  the  bill,  although  it  disclosed  a  transaction 
which  would  have  raised  a  question  of  consider- 
able importance  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff,  if  it  had 
been  properly  represented  upon  the  pleadings; 
yet  as  it  had  not  been  stated  in  the  bill,  Lord 
Eldon  declined  to  give  relief  upon  circumstances 
which  were  not  made  a  ground  of  complaint 
upon  the  record.     As  to  alleging  wilful  neglect 


or  default  on  the  part  of  a  trustee,  see  Sleight 
v.  Lawson,  3  K.  &  J.  293;  Massey  v.  Massey,  2 
J.  &  H.  728;  Mayer  v.  Murray,  8  Ch.  D.  4*24; 
and  see  King  r.  Corke,  1  Ch.  D.  57 ;  Mozeley 
v.  Cowie.  47  L.  .1.  Ch.  271;  Barber  v.  Mackrefl, 
12  Ch.  D.  534;  Re  Symons,  21  Ch.  D.  757; 
Smith  v.  Armitage,  24  Ch.  D.  727 ;  R.  S.  C. 
1883,  App.  C.  §  2,  No.  2.  As  to  mortgagees 
and  creditors  in  possession,  see  2  Fisher  on 
Mortgages,  943 ;  Lord  Kensington  v.  Bouverie, 
7  Ue  G.  M.  &  G.  134,  156;  7  H.  L.  Cas.  557;  19 
Beav.  39;  Mayer  r.  Murray,  sujyra. 

*  Holloway  v.  Millard,  1  Mad.  414,  421; 
Scarf  v.  Soufby,  1  M'N.  &  G.  364,  375;  see, 
however,  Baker  v.  Bradley,  7  De  G.  M.  &  G. 
597;  2  Sm.  &  G.  531;  1  Jur.  N.  S.  489;  2  id. 
99;  and  see,  for  cases  where  inquiries  have  been 
directed  on  suggestions  in  answer,  M'Mahou 
v.  Burchell,  2  Phil.  127,  132;  Barrett  v.  Stock- 
ton and  Darlington  Ry.  Co.  1  H.  L.  Cas.  34;  11 
CI.  &  r'.  590.  As  to  pleading  a  stated  or  settled 
account  with  particulars,  see  R.  S.  C.  1883, 
Ord.  XX.  8.  Thus,  where  a  bill  was  filed  for 
a  foreclosure,  and  a  motion  was  made  for  a 
reference  to  the  Master,  under  the  7th  Geo.  II. 
c.  20,  to  inquire  into  the  amount  due  upon  the 
mortgage,  and  it  was  insisted  that  the  Master 
ought  to  be  directed  to  take  an  account  of  the 
costs  incurred  by  the  plaintiff  in  certain  pro- 
ceedings in  an  ejectment  at  Law  which  were 
not  alluded  to  in  the  bill,  the  Court  held  that  no 
such  inquiry  could  be  directed,  but  gave  the 
plaintiff  leave  to  amend  his  bill  in  that  respect. 
Millard  v.  Magor,  3  Mad.  433. 

i  Price  v.  Berrington,  3  M'N.  &  G.  486 ;  15  Jur. 
999;  Macquire  v.  O'Reilly,  3  Jo.  &  Lat.  224; 
Ferraby  r.  Hobson,  2  Phil.  235,  258;  Glascott  v. 
Lang,  id.  310,  322 ;  Wilde  v.  Gibson,  1 H.  L.  Caa. 
605  :  2  Y.  &  C.  Ch.  542;  Sugd.  Law  Prop.  632; 
Baker  v.  Bradley,  ubi  supra  ;  Burdett  v.  Hay,  4 
De  G.  J.  &  S.  41 ;  9  Jur.  N.  S.  1260;  Archbold  v. 
Commissioners,  2  H.  L.  Cas.  440.  400;  Harrison 
r.  Guest,  8  id.  481 ;  6  De  G.  M.  &  G.  424 ;  Eyre  v. 
Potter,  15  How.  42;  Hoyt  ».  Hoyt,  27  N.  J.  Eq. 
399;  Stucky  v.  Stuck}',  30  id.  546;  Tillinghast 


(a)  See  Thomson  v.  Eastwood,  2  App.  Cas. 
215;  Connecticut  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Kavanagh, 


[1892]  A.  C.  473;  Fry  v.  Lane,  40  Ch.  D.  312; 
Tabor  v.  Cunningham,  24  W.  R.  153;  Britton 

325 


*328 


THE   BILL. 


fails  in  making  out  a  case  of  fraud,  to  pick  out  facts  which  might,  if  not 
put  forward  as  proofs  of  fraud,  have  warranted  him  in  asking,  and  the 
Court  in  granting,  relief.2  But  where  after  striking  out  the  charge  of 
fraud,  there  are  sufficient  grounds  for  relief  stated  and  proved,  and  the 
charge  of  fraud  is  only  subsidiary,  it  is  only  a  matter  affecting  costs.8 
Where  material  allegations  of  fraud  are  proved,  relief  may  be  granted 
though  other  allegations  of  fraud  are  not  proved.4 

Independently  of  the  qualities  which  have  been  above  pointed  out  as 
necessary  to  bills  in  general,  it  is  requisite  that  the  object  for  which 
a  bill  is  brought  should  not  be  beneath  the  dignity  of  the  Court :  for 
the  Court  of  Chancery  will  not  entertain  a  suit  where  the  subject-mat- 
ter of  the  litigation  is  under  the  value  of  £  10  ; 5  except  in  cases  of 


v.  Champlin,  4  R.  I.  173;  Mount  Vernon  Bank 
v.  Stone,  2  R.  1. 129 ;  Masterson  v.  Finnegan,  id. 
316.  The  rule  applies  only  where  actual  or 
moral,  as  distinguished  from  constructive  fraud, 
is  charged;  but  it  is  sufficient  that  such  actual 
or  moral  fraud  is  substantially  charged,  whether 
the  word  Iraudulent  be  used  or  not.  Tilling- 
hast  v.  Champlin,  ubi  supra  ;  Aldrich  v  Wil- 
cox, 10  R.  I.  405;  see  Joliffe  v.  Baker,  11  Q.  B. 
D.  255;  Grove  v  Rentch,  26  Md.  367,  377.  And 
see  for  exceptions  where  other  matters  are  al- 
leged to  give  the  Court  jurisdiction,  infra, 
p.  382,  n.  The  facts  and  circumstances  of  the 
alleged  fraud  should  be  set  forth.  Castle  v. 
Bader,  23  Cal.  75. 

2  Hickson  v.  Lombard,  L.  R.  1  H.  L.  324. 

3  London  Chartered  Bank  ».  Lempriere, 
L.  R.  4  P.  C.  572;  and  see  Hilliard  v.  Eiffe, 
L.  R.  7  H.  L.  39. 

*  Moxon  v.  Payne,  L.  R.  8  Ch.  881. 

6  The  true  ground  of  this  rule  is,  that  the 
entertainment  of  suits  of  small  value  has  a 
tendency,  not  only  to  promote  expensive  and 
mischievous  litigation,  but  also  to  consume  the 
time  of  the  Court  in  unimportant  and  frivolous 
controversies,  to  the  manifest  injury  of  other 
suitors,  and  to  the  subversion  of  the  public 
policy  of  the  land.  Moore  r.  Lyttle,  4  John. 
Ch.  185;  Swedesborough  Church  v.  Shivers,  16 
N.  J.  Eq.  453,  458.     This  rule  seems  to  have 


v.  Brewster,  2  Fed.  Rep.  160;  Duff  v.  First 
National  Bank.  13  id.  65;  Babbitt  r.  Dotten, 
14  id.  19;  Spies  v.  Chicago  &  E.  I.  R.  Co.  40 
id.  34.  The  jurisdiction  of  Equity  in  matters 
of  fraud,  misrepres'  ntation,  and  concealment, 
is  not  dependent  on  discovery.  Jones  v.  Bolles, 
9  Wall.  364;  Mann  v.  Appel",  31  Fed.  Rep.  378; 
Lafayette  Co.  v.  Neely,  21  id.  738.  General 
allegations  of  fraud  do  not,  it  seems,  bar  a 
right  to  discovery.  Leitch  v.  Abbott,  31  Ch. 
D.  374 ;  see  Sachs  v.  Speilman,  37  Ch.  D.  295. 
An  amendment  at  the  trial  is  not.  as  a  rule, 
allowed  for  the  purpose  of  raising  a  charge 
of  fraud  after  the  case  has  been  started  in- 
dependentlv  of  fraud.     Hendriks  v.  Montagu, 

326 


been  of  great  antiquity  in  the  Court  of  Chan- 
cery. See  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  501,  and  cases 
cited.  A  similar  rule,  it  is  apprehended,  pre- 
vails in  the  Courts  of  Equity  in  America,  so 
far  as  they  have  been  called  upon  to  express 
any  opinion  on  the  subject.  Story,  Eq.  PI. 
§  502;  see  Williams  v.  Berry,  3  Stew.  &  P. 
284.  It  was  formerly  held  in  New  York  that 
the  Court  of  Chancery  would  not  take  cogni- 
zance of  a  case  where  the  amount  in  controversy 
was  below  .£10  sterling.  Moore  v.  Lyttle,  4 
John.  Ch.  185;  Fullerton  r.  Jackson,  5  John. 
Ch.  276.  The  amount  was  afterwards  increased 
in  that  State  by  statute  to  the  sum  of  one 
hundred  dollars;  2  Rev.  Stats.  New  York,  173, 
§  37;  see  Vredenburg  v.  Johnson,  1  Hopk.  112; 
Mitchell  v.  Tighe,  1  Hopk.  119;  Smets  v.  Wil- 
liams, 4  Paige,  364.  No  such  statute  exists  in 
Massachusetts,  but  a  similar  principle  is  ap- 
plied. Cummings  v.  Barrett,  10  Cush.  190. 
The  value  of  the  matter  in  dispute  should 
appear  by  the  record.  Watson  v.  Wells,  5 
Conn.  468.  But  a  bill  for  the  specific  perform- 
ance of  a  contract  to  convey  land  need  not 
contain  an  averment  that  the  value  of  the 
land  exceeds  $100.  Church  v.  Ide,  1  Clarke, 
494.  The  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  does  not, 
however,  depend  upon  the  amount  that  may 
ultimately  be  found  due  to  the  plaintiff,  but 
upon  the  claim  stated  by  him.     Bradt  v.  Kirk- 


17  Ch.  D.  642.  If  the  bill  shows  fraud  and 
wronjr,  and  also  inadvertence  and  mistake 
which  alone  are  proved,  the  bill  may  be  sus- 
tained, although  the  fraud  and  wrong  are  not 
fully  established.  Williams  v.  United  States, 
138  U.  S.  514.  In  the  Federal  Courts  the  old 
jurisdiction  of  the  English  Chancery  in  cases 
of  fraud  and  mistake,  which  was  gradually 
encroached  upon  by  the  Law  Courts,  is  not  ex- 
ercised, and  a  bill  in  Equity  cannot  there  be 
maintained  for  damages  when  a  like  amount 
can  be  recovered  in  an  action  of  tort  or  for 
money  had  and  received.  Parkersburg  v. 
Brown,  106  U.  S.  487;  Litchfield  v.  Ballou,  114 
U.  S.  190  ;  Patou  v.  Majors,  46  Fed.  Rep.  210. 


MATTER    OF    THE    BILL. 


*329 


charities,6  *  or  of  fraud,1  or  of  bills  to  establish  a  general  right,  *  329 
as  in  the  case  of  tithes,2  or  other  special  circumstances.8  (a)  It  is 
said  that  the  Court  will  not  entertain  a  bill  for  land  under  the  yearly- 
value  of  40s. ; 4  but  instances  occur  in  the  books  where  bills  have  been 
entertained  for  the  recovery  of  ancient  quit-rents,  though  very  small, 
namely,  2s.  or  3s.  per  annum.5  It  seems,  that  if  a  bill  is  brought  for  a 
demand  which,  by  the  rule  of  the  Court,  cannot  be  sued  for,  the  defend- 
ant may  either  demur  to  it,  on  the  ground  that  the  plaintiff's  demand,  if 
true,  is  not  sufficient  for  the  Court  to  ground  a  decree  upon,6  or  he  may 
(which  is  the  most  usual  course)  move  to  have  the  bill  dismissed,  as 
below  the  dignity  of  the  Court.7  But  even  if  the  defendant  should  take 
neither  of  these  courses,  yet,  when  the  cause  comes  to  a  hearing,  if  it 
appears  that,  on  account  taken,  the  balance  due  to  the  plaintiff  will  not 
amount  to  the  sum  of  £10,  the  Court  will  dismiss  the  bill.8 


patrick,  7  Paige,  62;  Whitecotton  v.  Simpson, 
4  J.  J.  Marsh.  12;  Judd  v.  Bushnell,  7  Conn. 
205;  Skinner  v.  Bailey,  7  Conn.  496;  Wheat 
v.  Griffin,  4  Day,  419;  Douw  v.  Sheldon, 
2  Paige,  323;  Bailey  v.  Burton,  8  Wend.  395. 
These  provisions  seem  to  apply,  however,  only 
to  cases  of  bills  for  relief,  and  not  to  cases  of 
bills  for  discovery  merely.  Goldey  v.  Beeker, 
1  Edw.  Ch.  271;  Schroeppel  v.  Redfield,  5 
Paige,  245.  In  New  York  the  limitation  to  the 
amount  in  controversy  was  abolished  by  con- 
struction of  the  Constitution  of  1846,  and  the 
Code  of  Procedure.  Sarsfield  v.  Van  Vaughner, 
15  Abb.  Pr.  65. 

6  Parrot  v.  Paulet,  Cary,  103 ;  Anon.  1  Eq. 
Cas.  Abr.  75.  margin. 

i  Bunb.  17,  n. 

2  Griffith  v.  Lewis,  2  Bro.  P.  C.  ed.  Toml. 
407.  If  a  suit  have  no  other  object  than  the 
mere  recovery  of  a  sum  of  $1.75,  the  bill  will 
be  dismissed;  but  if  it  seeks  to  establish  a 
right  of  a  permanent  and  valuable  nature,  it 
tails  within  the  recognized  exceptions  to  the 
general  principle,  and  the  Court  will  maintain 
jurisdiction.  Swedesborough  Church  v.  Shiv- 
ers, 16  N.  J.  Eq.  453,  458;  Story,  Eq.  PI. 
§§  500,501. 

»  Cons.   Ord.  IX.   1.     In  Seaton  v.    Grant, 


(a)  Allen  v.  Demarest,  41  N.  J.  Eq.  162,  and 
note;  Wartman  v.  Swindell,  25  Atl.  Rep.  356; 
Treadwetl  v.  Patterson,  51  Cal.  637;  Lufkin  v. 
Galveston,  73  Texas,  340.  The  rule  and  the 
amount  remain  unchanged  in  England.  West- 
bury  on-Severn  Rural  Sanitary  Authority  v. 
Meredith,  30  Ch.  D.  387;  Cooper  v.  Crabtree, 
20  Ch.  D.  589.  The  amount  in  different  States, 
usually  $100,  though  less  in  some  jurisdic- 
tions, is  fixed  by  statute  or  thf  practice  of  the 
Courts.  See  Cummings  v.  Barrett,  10  Cush. 
186;  Smith  v.  Williams,  116  Mas*.  510;  Chap- 
man t».  Banker  &  Tradesman  Pub.  Co.  128 
Mass.  478;  Gale  v.  Nickerson,  151  Mass.  428; 
Mass.  St.  of  1884,  c.  285,  §  1;  Dix  v.  Briggs,  9 


L.  R.  2  Ch.  459,  463,  Lord  Justice  Turner  said  : 
"  Another  objection  that  has  been  taken  is  the 
insignificance  of  the  plaintiff's  interest  in  the 
subject-matter  of  the  suit.  He  is,  however, 
suing  on  behalf  of  himself  and  the  other  share- 
holders of  the  company,  and  I  am  not  prepared 
to  say  that  the  ordinary  rule  as  to  suits  for 
a  subject  matter  of  less  value  than  .£10,  applies 
to  a  case  of  this  kind." 

4  1  Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  75,  margin;  Almy  v. 
Pycroft,  Cary,  103. 

5  Cocks  v.  Foley,  1  Vern.  359. 

6  Fox  v.  Frost,  Rep.  temp.  Finch,  253. 

1  Mos.  47,  356;  Bunb.  17;  Swedesborough 
Church  v.  Shivers,  16  N.  J.  Eq.  453,  457. 

8  Coop.  Eq.  PI.  166;  Swedesborough  Church 
v.  Shivers,  16  N.  J.  Eq.  453,  457;  McNew  r. 
Toby,  6  Humph.  27.  Thus,  where,  upon  a  bill 
being  brought  relating  to  tithes,  it  was  clearly 
admitted  that  the  plaintiff  had  a  right  to  some 
tithes  of  the  defendant,  but  the  tithe*  which 
were  due  appeared  to  be  only  of  the  value  of 
£5,  Lord  Harcourt  dismissed  the  bill  at  the 
hearing.  Cited  2  Atk.  253.  In  Brace  v.  Tay- 
lor, 2  Atk.  253,  a  similar  objection  was  taken 
at  the  hearing,  and  allowed.  But  in  Beckett  v. 
Bilbrough,'8  Hare,  188,  14  .Tur.  238,  the  suit 
was  held  to  be  sustainable,  although  the  sum 


Paige,  595;  Newell  v.  Burbank,  4  Edw.  Ch  536; 
Steinbaeh  v.  Hill,  25  Mich.  78;  Wood  0.  Wood, 
3  Ala.  756;  Carr  v.  Inglehart,  3  Ohio  St.  457; 
Church  v.  Ide,  Clarke  Ch.  494.  When  the 
whole  amount  sued  for  exceeds  the  limit,  but  is 
to  be  disposed  of  under  separate  issues,  none  of 
which  involves  so  much,  the  bill  cannot  be 
maintained.  Wallace  r.  Sortor,  52  Mich.  159; 
Schulenberg-Boeckeler  Lumber  Co  t\  Hay- 
ward,  20  Fed.  Rep.  422;  Massa  v.  Cutting,  30 
id.  1.  In  patent  suits  an  injunction  may 
be  granted  although  the  infringement  is  so 
small  that  it  does  not  place  the  plaintiff's  busi- 
ness in  serious  danger.  Carter  v.  Wollschlager, 
53  Fed.  Rep.  573. 

327 


330 


THE   BILL. 


*  330  *  The  Court  will  not  permit  a  bill  to  be  brought  for  part  of  a  mat- 
ter only,1  so  as  to  expose  a  defendant  to  be  harassed  by  repeated 
litigations  concerning  the  same  thing ;  it,  therefore,  as  a  general  rule,  re- 
quires that  every  bill  shall  be  so  framed  as  to  afford  ground  for  such  a  deci- 
sion upon  the  whole  matter,  at  one  and  the  same  time,  as  may,  as  far  as 
possible,  prevent  future  litigation  concerning  it.  It  is  upon  this  principle 
that  the  Court  acts,  in  requiring  in  every  case,  with  such  exceptions  as  we 
have  noticed  above,  the  presence,  either  as  plaintiffs  or  defendants,  of  all 
parties  interested  in  the  object  of  the  suit.  And  upon  the  same  princi- 
ple, it  will  not  allow  a  plaintiff  who  has  two  distinct  claims  upon  the 
same  defendant,  or  to  which  the  same  defendant  may  eventually  prove 
liable,  to  bring  separate  bills  for  each  particular  claim,  or  to  bring  a  bill 
for  one  and  omit  the  other,  so  as  to  leave  the  other  to  be  the  subject  of 
future  litigation.2 


recovered  was  only  £9,  on  the  ground  that 
the  plaintiff,  when  he  tiled  his  bill,  must  have 
been  justified  in  supposing  that  a  larger  sum 
would  be  recovered  ;  and  the  defendant,  who 
knew  the  amount,  had  not  given  any  informa- 
tion respecting  it.  "  If  it  appears  on  the  face 
of  the  bill  tl/at  the  matter  in  dispute,  exclusive 
of  costs,  does  not  exceed  the  amount  to  which 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  is  limited,  the 
defendant  may  either  demur,  or  move  to  have 
the  bill  dismissed  with  costs;  or  if  it  does  not 
appear  on  the  face  of  the  bill,  it  may  be  pleaded 
in  bar  of  the  suit."  Smets  v.  Williams,  4 
Paige,  364;  McElwain  v.  Willis,  3  Paige,  505; 
S.  C.  on  appeal,  9  Wend.  548;  Schrccppel  v. 
Redfield,  5  Paige.  245;  Bradt  v.  Kirkpatrick, 
7  Paige,  62.  By  "  exclusive  of  costs,"  above, 
is  meant  the  costs  of  the  suit  in  Chancery. 
Van  Tyne  v.  Bunce,  1  Edw.  Ch.  583.  In 
Smith  v.  Matthews,  M.  R.,  2  July,  1859,  the 
usual  decree  was  made  to  administer  real  and 
personal  estate  on  a  bill  by  a  creditor,  suing 
on  behalf  of  all  the  creditors  of  the  deceased 
debtor;  though  his  individual  debt,  as  alleged 
in  the  bill,  was  under  .£5. 

i  Ld.  Red-  183.  Thus,  in  Purefoy  v.  Pure- 
foy,  1  Vern.  29,  where  an  heir,  by  his  bill, 
prayed  an  account  against  a  trustee  of  two 
several  estates,  that  were  conveyed  to  him  for 
several  and  distinct  debts,  and  afterwards 
would  have  had  his  bill  dismissed  as  to  one  of 
the  estates,  and  have  had  the  account  taken  as 
to  the  other  only,  the  Court  decided  that  an 
entire  account  should  be  taken  of  both  estates; 
"  for  that  it  is  allowed  as  a  good  cause  of  de- 
murrer in  this  Court,  that  a  bill  is  brought  for 
part  of  a  matter  only,  which  is  proper  for  one 
entire  account,  because  the  plaintiff  shall  not 
split  causes  and  make  a  multiplicity  of  suits." 
And  so,  where  there  are  two  mortgages,  and 
more  money  has  been  lent  upon  one  of  them 
than  the  estate  is  worth,  the  heir  of  the  mort- 
gagor cannot  elect  to  redeem  one  and  leave  the 
heavier   mortgage    unredeemed,  but  shall   be 

328* 


competled  to  take  both.  Ibid. ;  Margrave  v.  Le 
Hooke,  2  Vern.  207.  Upon  the  same  principle 
it  is  held,  that  "where  there  is  a  debt  secured 
by  mortgage,  and  also  a  bond  debt,  when  the 
heir  of  the  mortgagor  comes  to  redeem,  he 
shall  not  redeem  the  mortgage  without  paying 
the  bond  debt  too,  in  case  the  heir  be  bound." 
Shuttleworth  v.  Laycock,  1  Vern.  245;  Anon. 
2  Ch.  Cas.  164;  and  see  Jones  v.  Smith,  2  Ves. 
Jr.  376;  see  also  EIvy  v.  Norwood,  5  De  G. 
&  S.  240;  16  Jur.  493;  Sinclair  v.  Jackson, 
17  Beav.  405;  Fisher  on  Mortgage,  381;  2 
Story,  Eq.  Jur.  §  1023,  note;  Jones  v.  Smith, 
2  Sumner's  Ves.  372,  n.  (c),  and  cases  cited; 
Lee  ».  Stone,  1  Gill  &  J.  1.  The  ground  of 
this  rule  is  the  prevention  of  circuity  of  remedy; 
for,  as  the  bond  of  the  ancestor,  where  the  heir 
is  bound,  becomes,  upon  the  death  of  such  an- 
cestor, the  heir's  own  debt,  and  is  payable  out 
of  the  real  estate  descended,  it  is  but  reason- 
able that,  where  the  heir  comes  to  redeem  the 
estate  by  payment  of  the  principal  money  and 
interest,  he  should  at  the  same  time  be  called 
upon  to  pay  off  the  bond;  as,  otherwise,  the 
obligee  would  be  driven  to  Sue  him  for  the  re- 
covery of  the  bond,  which  in  the  result  might 
be  payable  out  of  the  same  pioperty  that  the 
heir  has  redeemed. 

2  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  287.  So,  at  Law,  a 
plaintiff  cannot  split  an  entire  cause  of  action, 
so  as  to  maintain  two  suits  upon  it,  without  the 
defendant's  consent.  If  he  attempts  so  to  do, 
a  recovery  in  the  first  suit,  though  for  less  than 
the  whole  demand,  is  a  bar  to  the  second.  In- 
graham  v.  Hall,  11  Serg.  &  R.  78;  Crips  v. 
Talvande,  4  M'Cord,  20;  Smith  v.  Jones,  15 
John.  229;  Willard  v.  Sperry,  16  John.  121; 
Avery  v.  Fitch,  4  Conn.  362;  Vance  v.  Lan- 
caster, 3  Hayw  130;  Colvin  v.  Corwin,  15 
Wend.  557;  Strike's  case,  1  Bland,  95;  James 
v.  Lawrence,  7  Har.  &  J.  73 ;  Stevens  v.  Lock- 
wood,  13  Wend.  644;  see  also  Guernsey  v. 
Carver,  8  Wend.  492,  and  the  remarks  upon  it 
in  Badger  v.  Titcomb,  15  Pick.  415.    In  this 


MATTER   OF   THE   BILL.  *  333 

*  The  rule  that  the  Court  will  not  entertain  a  suit  for  part  of  a  *  331 
matter  must  be  understood  as  subject  to  this  limitation,  namely: 
that  the  whole  matter  is  capable  of  being  immediately  disposed  of ; x 
for  if  the  situation  of  the  property  in  dispute  is  such  that  no  immediate 
decision  upon  the  whole  matter  can  be  come  to,  the  Court  will  frequently 
lend  its  assistance  to  the  extent  which  the  actual  state  of  the  case,  as  it 
exists  at  the  time  of  filing  the  bill,  will  warrant.  Upon  this  principle 
Courts  of  Equity  permit  bills  for  the  preservation  of  evidence  in  perpet- 
uam  ret  memoriam  ;  which  it  does  upon  the  ground  that,  from  the  circum- 
stances of  the  parties,  the  case  cannot  be  immediately  the  subject  of 
judicial  investigation  :  and  if  it  should  appear  upon  the  bill  that  the  mat- 
ter to  which  the  required  testimony  is  alleged  to  relate  can  be  immediately 
decided  upon,  and  that  the  witnesses  are  resident  in  England,  a  demurrer 
would  hold.2  The  Court  proceeds  upon  the  same  principle  when  it  acts  as 
ancillary  to  the  jurisdiction  of  other  Courts,  by  permitting  suits  for  the 
preservation  of  property  pending  litigation  in  such  Courts ;  or  by  removing 
the  impediments  to  a  fair  litigation  before  tribunals  of  ordinary  jurisdic- 
tion. In  all  these  cases,  it  is  no  ground  of  objection  to  a  bill  that  it 
embraces  only  part  of  the  matter,  and  that  the  residue  is,  or  may  be,  the 
subject  of  litigation  elsewhere.  The  preservation  of  the  property,  or  the 
removal  of  the  impediments,  is  all  that  the  Court  of  Equity  can  effect ;  the 
bill,  therefore,  in  seeking  this  description  of  relief,  seeks  the  whole  relief 
which,  in  such  cases,  a  Court  of  Equity  can  give  ;  but  if  a  bill,  pray- 
ing only  this  description  of  relief,  should  disclose  a  case  in  *  which  *  332 
a  Court  of  Equity  is  capable  of  taking  upon  itself  the  whole  deci- 
sion of  the  question,  —  in  such  a  case,  it  is  apprehended,  the  bill  would 
be  defective  in  not  seeking  the  relief  which  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to. 

With  reference  to  this  part  of  the  subject  may  be  noticed  the  much 
litigated  question,  to  what  extent  a  person  engaged  in  trade  in  copartner- 
ship can  have  relief  in  Equity  against  his  partners,  without  praying  a 
dissolution  of  the  partnership ;  upon  this  point  the  decisions  were 
very  conflicting.1     *  It  is  conceived  that  it  is  now  settled   that,    *  333 

last  case  it  was  said  that  "as  the  law  is,  we  lution  of  partnership  has  not  taken  place,  and 

think  it  cannot  be  maintained,  that  a  running  is  not  asked  for;  although,  ordinarily,  they  are 

account  for  goods  sold  and  delivered,  money  not  inclined  to  decree  an  account,  unless  under 

loaned,  or  money  had  and  received,  at  different  special  circumstances,  if  there  is  not  an  actual 

times,  will  constitute  an  entire  demand,  unless  or  contemplated  dissolution,    so   that   all    the 

there  is  some  agreement  to  that  effect,  or  some  affairs  of  the  partnership  may  be  wound  up." 

usage  or  course  of  dealing  from  which  such  an  See  also  the  cases  cited  in  the  note  at  the  place 

agreement  or  understanding  may  be  inferred."  above  cited,  and  Waters  v.  Taylor,   15  Sum- 

1  The  principle  is  well  established  that  a  ner's  Ves.  10,  note  (6),  and  cases  cited;  Judd  v. 
contract  to  do  several  things  at  several  times,  Wilson,  6  Vt.  185;  I  Smith,  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am. 
is  divisible  in  its  nature;  and  that  an  action  ed.)89;  Collyer,  Partn.  (Perkins's  ed.)  §§  299, 
will  lie  for  the  breach  of  any  one  of  the  stipu-  300,  1128  to  1133.  In  Forman  v.  Homfrny,  2 
lations,  each  of  these  stipulations  being  con-  V.  &  B.  329,  and  note  (and  see  Marshall  v. 
sidered  as  a  separate  contract.  Badger  v.  Colman,  2  J.  &  W.  266;  Lindley,  Partn.  752), 
Titcomb,  15  Pick.  414.  Lord  Eldon  said  he  did   not  recollect   an  in- 

2  Ld.  Red.  150;  see  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  303,  stance  of  a  bill  filed  by  one  partner  against 
and  note;  Moodalay  v.  Morton,  1  Bro.  C.  C.  another,  praying  the  account  merely,  and  not  a 
(Perkins's  ed.)  469,  and  notes;  post,  Chap,  dissolution,  proceeding  on  the  foundation  that 
XXXIV.  §  4,  Bills  to  perpetuate  Testimony.  the  partnership  was  to  continue;    and  observed 

1  In  1  Story,  Eq.  Jur.  §  671,  Mr.  Justice  upon  the  inconvenience  that  would  result  if  a 
Story  says:  ''Courts  of  Equity  may,  perhaps,  partner  could  come  here  for  an  account  merely, 
interpose  and  decree  an  account  where  a  disso-      pending  the  partnership,  as  there  seems  to  be 

329 


333 


THE   BILL. 


where  the  general  accounts  of  the  partnership  are  sought,  the  bill  must 
pray  for  a  dissolution,  except  in  special  cases ;  but  that  there  are  cases 
in  which  the  Court  will  interpose,  to  support  as  well  as  to  dissolve  a 
partnership :  as  by  appointing  a  receiver,  where  the  conduct  of  the 
defendant  is  such  as  to  endanger  the  existence  of  the  partnership  con- 
cern.2 The  Court  will  not  allow  an  improper  advantage  to  be  taken 
of  a  rule  designed  for  the  advantage  of  all  parties.  It  will  not  take  the 
management  of  a  going  concern  into  its  own  hands ;  and  if  it  cannot 
usefully  interfere  in  any  other  manner,  it  will  only  interfere  for  the 
purpose  of  winding  up  the  concern.3  («) 


nothing  to  prevent  his  coming  annually;  and 
in  Loseonibe  v.  Russell,  4  Sim.  8,  Sir  Lancelot 
Shadwell  V.  C.  allowed  a  demurrer  to  a  bill 
praying  the  account  of  a  partnership,  because 
it  did  not  pray  for  a  dissolution.  In  Harrison 
v.  Armitage,  4  Mad.  143,  however,  a  contrary 
opinion  was  expressed  by  Sir  John  Leach  V. 
C. ;  and  in  Richards  v.  Davies  (2  K.  &  M.  347; 
and  see  Wallworth  v.  Holt,  4  M.  &  C.  639, 
ante,  pp.  234,  235),  which  was  a  bill  by  one 
partner  against  another,  praying  for  an  account 
of  what  was  due  to  the  plaintiff  respecting  past 
partnership  transactions,  and  that  the  partner- 
ship might  be  carried  on  under  the  decree  of 
the  Court,  his  Honor  decreed  an  account  of 
past  partnership  transactions,  but  said  that  he 
could  make  no  order  for  carrying  on  the  part- 
nership concerns,  unless  with  a  view  to  a  disso- 
lution. In  pronouncing  his  judgment  upon 
that  case,  the  learned  Judge  observed,  that  a 
partner,  during  the  partnership,  has  no  relief 
at  Law  for  moneys  due  to  him  on  partnership 
account ;  and  that,  if  a  Court  of  Equity  refuses 
him  relief,  he  is  wholly  without  remedy:  which 
woidd  be  contrary  to  the  plain  principles  of 
justice,  and  cannot  be  the  doctrine  of  Equity. 
With  respect  to  the  objection  that  the  defend- 
ant might  be  vexed  by  a  new  bill,  whenever 
new  profits  accrued,  his  Honor  said:  "What 
right  has  the  defendant  to  complain  of  such 
new  bill,  if  he  repeats  the  injustice  of  with- 
holding what  is  due  to  the  plaintiff?  Would 
not  the  same  objection  lie  in  a  suit  for  tithes, 
which  accrue  de  anno  in  annum  ?  "  It  is  to  be 
observed,  that  in  Chappie  v.  Cadell,  1  Jac.  537, 
although  cited  in  argument  in  Richards  v. 
Davies,  and  referred  to  by  the  reporters  as 
authority  for  the  position  that  a  decree  may  be 
made  for  partnership  accouuts  without  the  bill 


(a)  A  suit  lies  in  Equity  to  restrain  the 
breach  of  a  partnership  covenant,  although  the 
plaintiff  does  not  pray  for  a  dissolution.  Wat- 
ney  v.  Trist,  45  L.  J.'ch.  412.  The  rule  not  to 
interfere  between  partners  or  associates  in  mat- 
ters of  merely  internal  regulation  or  disci- 
pline is  also  illustrated  in  cases  of  clubs;  the 
only  questions  entertained  in  such  cases  by  a 
Court  of   Equity  being,  —  first,  whether    the 

330 


having  prayed  a  dissolution,  the  principal  ob- 
ject of  the  suit  was  to  have  a  declaration  as  to 
the  effect  of  a  sale  of  shares  in  a  partnership 
undertaking  (the  Globe  newspaper);  and  that 
the  account  of  the  profits  which  was  decreed 
was  merely  the  consequence  of  the  declaration 
of  the  Court  upon  that  point.  The  same  obser- 
vation applies  to  Knowlesv.  Haughton,  11  Ves. 
168  (also  referred  to  in  Richards  v.  Davies,  2 
R.  &  M.  347),  where  the  bill  was  filed  to  estab- 
lish a  partnership  in  certain  transactions,  and 
the  sole  question  in  the  case  was,  partnership  or 
no  partnership;  and  the  Court,  being  of  opinion 
that  a  partnership  did  exist  in  part  of  the  trans- 
actions referred  to,  as  a  necessary  consequence 
decreed  an  account  of  these  transactions.  In 
Roberts  v.  Eberhardt,  Kay,  148,  158,  Sir  W. 
P.  Wood  V.  C.  said:  "It  is  certainly  not  the 
ordinary  practice  of  this  Court  to  direct  an  ac- 
count between  partners,  except  upon  a  bill  for 
the  dissolution  of  the  partnership  concern.  It 
is  true  that  it  is  not  now  necessary  to  ask  for 
a  dissolution  in  every  case  in  which  relief 
is  sought  respecting  partnership  affairs;  but  I 
apprehend  that  when  a  bill  seeks  an  account, 
that  is  one  of  the  cases  in  which  a  dissolution 
must  be  prayed  ;  unless  some  special  ground 
is  raised  the  general  accounts  cannot  be  taken, 
without  asking  for  the  dissolution  of  the  firm." 

2  Fairthorne  v.  Weston,  3  Hare,  387,  391; 
8  Jur.  353;  Hall  v.  Hall,  3  M'N.  &  G.  79,  83; 
15  Jur.  363,  and  cases  cited  in  note  to  S.  C.  12 
Beav.  419;  Bailey  v.  Birkenhead  Ry.  Co.  id. 
433,  440;  6  Rail.  Cas.  256;  14  Jur.  119; 
Featherstone  v.  Cooke.  L.  K.  16  Eq  298;  2 
Seton,  1202;  Elmslie  v.  Beresford,  W.  N.  (1873) 
152  ;  Cropper  v.  Coburn,  2  Curtis,  C.  C.  465, 
473;  Williamson  v.  Haycock,  11  Iowa.  40. 

3  Lind.  Part.  895. 


rules  of  the  club  have  been  observed;  second, 
whether  anything  has  been  done  contrary  to 
natural  justice;  and,  third,  whether  the  de- 
cision complained  of  hus  been  arrived  at  bona 
fide.  See  Baird  v.  Wells,  44  Ch.  D  661,  670  ; 
Fisher  v.  Keane,  11  Ch.  D.  353  ;  Dawkins  v. 
Antrobus,  17  Ch.  D.  628;  Russell  v.  Russell,  14 
Ch.  D.  471 ;  Lambert  v.  Addison,  46  L.  T.  20. 


MATTER    OF    THE    BILL. 


*334 


In  endeavoring  to  avoid  the  error  of  making  a  bill  not  suffi- 
ciently *  extensive  to  answer  the  purpose  of  complete  justice,  *334 
care  must  be  taken  not  to  run  into  the  opposite  defect,  namely, 
that  of  attempting  to  embrace  in  it  too  many  objects  ;  for  it  is  a  rule  in 
Equity,  that  two  or  more  distinct  subjects  cannot  be  embraced  in  the 
same  suit.  TheToffence  against  this  rule  is  termed  multifariousness,  and 
will  render  a  bill  liable  to  a  demurrer.1  (a) 


1  "  By  multifariousness  in  a  bill,"  says  Mr. 
Justice  Story,  ''  is  meant  the  improperly  join- 
ing, in  one  bill,  distinct  and  independent  mat- 
ters, and  thereby  confounding  them;  as,  for 
exainpie,  the  uniting  in  one  bill  of  several  mat- 
ters perfectly  distinct  and  unconnected,  against 
one  defendant,  or  the  demand  of  several  mat- 
ters of  a  distinct  and  independent  nature 
against  several  defendants  in  the  same  bill." 
Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  271 ;  West  i:  Randall,  2  Mason, 
201;  Fellows  0.  Fellows,  4  Cowen,  082;  Brink- 
enhoffu.  Brown,  6  John.  Ch.  139;  Bedsole  t\ 
Monroe,  5  Ired.  Eq.  313;  Richardson  v  M'Kin- 
son,  Litt.  Sel.  Cas.  320;  Jackson  v.  Forrest,  2 
Barb.  Cli.  576;  Ryan  v.  Shawneetown,  14  111. 
20;  Metcalf  v.  Cady,  8  Allen,  587;  Warren  v. 
Warren,  56  Maine,  360;  Newland  !?.  Rogers,  3 
Barb.  Ch.  432;  Kennebec  and  Portland  It.  Co. 
v.  Portland  &  Kennebec  It.  Co.  54  Maine, 
173;  Crane  v.  Fairchild,  14  N.  J  Eq.  76.  To 
render  a  bill  multifarious,  it  must  contain 
several  yood  distinct  (/rounds  of  suit  in  Equity, 
which  cannot  properly  be  joined  in  one  suit. 
Many  v.  Beekman  Iron  Co.  9  Paige,  188;  Mc- 
Cabe  v.  Bellows,  1  Allen,  269;  Varick  v.  Smith, 
5  Paige,  137  ;  Pleasant  v.  Glasscock,  1  Sm.  & 
M.  Ch.  17;  Richards  v.  Pierce,  52  Main.',  562. 
A  bill  asking  for  an  injunction  to  restrain 
waste,  and  also  an  account  for  rent  due,  is  de- 
murrable on  the  ground  of  multifariousness. 
Reed  v.  Reed,  N.  J.  Eq.  248,  250.  If  a  joint 
claim  against  two  or  more  defendants  is  im- 
properly joined  in  the  same  bill,  with  a  sepa- 
rate claim  against  one  of  the  defendants  only, 
in  which  the  other  defendants  have  no  interest, 
and  which  is  wholly  unconnected  with  the 
claim  against  them,  all  or  either  of  the  defend- 
ants may  demur  to  the  bill  for  multifariousness. 
Swift  v.  Eckford,  6  Paige,  22;  Boyd  v.  Hoyt, 
5  Paige,  65;  Richards  v.  Pierce,  52  Maine,  562. 
But  a  bill  is  not  multifarious  which  is  filed  by 
a  stockholder  against  the  corporation,  its  direc- 
tors and  treasurer,  alleging  various  fraudulent 
transactions  between  the  directors  as  a  board, 
certain  directors,  and  the  treasurer,  and  seek- 
ing a  recovery  of  the  gains  thereby  made. 
Lewis  v.  St.  Albans  Iron  Works,  50  Vt.  477. 
And  see  Sturgeon  v.  Burrall,  1  III.  App.  537. 
A  bill  against  one  for  a  claim  against  him  in 


his  individual  character,  and  another  claim 
against  him  as  heir  for  the  debt  of  his  ancestor, 
may  be  objected  to  for  multifariousness.  Bryan 
v.  Blvthe,  4  Blackf.  249;  see  Robinson  v.  Guild, 
12  Met.  323.  So  a  bill  is  multifarious  which 
mixes  up  independent  claims  made  by  the 
plaintiff  in  his  own  right,  with  others  made  by 
him  as  administrator.  Carter  v.  Treadwell,  3 
Story,  25,  51,  52.  A  bill  tiled  by  an  adminis- 
trator, in  conjunction  with  the  heirs  and  dis- 
tributees of  the  intestate,  to  recover  personal 
property  in  the  hands  of  the  defendant,  and  to 
divide  and  distribute  it,  is  multifarious.  Thur- 
man  v.  Shelton,  10  Yerger,  383. 

"The  conclusion,"  says  Mr.  Justice  Story, 
"  to  which  a  close  survey  of  all  the  authorities 
will  conduct  us,  seems  to  be,  that  there  is  not 
any  positive,  inflexible  rule,  as  to  what,  in  the 
sense  of  Courts  of  Equity,  constitutes  multifa- 
riousness, which  is  fatal  to  a  suit  on  demurrer." 
Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  539;  Oliver  v.  Piatt,  3  How. 
U.  S.  333,  411,  412  ;  Per  Wilde  J.  in  Robin- 
son v.  Guild,  12  Met.  323,  328;  McLean  r.  La- 
fayette Bank,  3  McLean,  415.  For  a  survey  of 
the  positions  and  doctrines  held  by  Courts  of 
Equity  on  this  subject  in  different  cases,  see 
Story,  Eq.  PI.  §§  271  289,  530,  540;  Bugbee  v. 
Sargent,  23  Maine,  269;  Robinson  v.  Cross,  22 
Conn.  587;  Warren  p.  Warren,  56  Maine,  360; 
Kennebec  and  Portland  R.  Co.  v.  Portland  and 
Kennebec  R.  Co.  54  Maine,  173  ;  Abbot  v. 
Johnson,  32  N.  H.  9;  Chase  v.  Searls,  45  N.  H. 
511,  519;  Camp  v.  Mills,  6  Jones  Eq.  (N.  C.) 
274.  The  recent  cases  show  an  increasing 
tendency  to  consider  the  objection  of  multi- 
fariousness as  addressed  to  the  discretion  of 
the  Court.  Where  all  the  plaintiffs  have  a 
common  interest  in  the  whole  of  the  matter 
comprised  in  the  bill,  the  objection  of  multi- 
fariousness set  up  by  defendants  who  are  con- 
cerned only  in  a  portion  of  the  subject-matter, 
is  a  question  of  discretion  to  be  determined 
upon  considerations  of  convenience  with  regard 
to  the  circumstances  of  each  particular  case. 
Coates  v.  Legard,  L.  R.  19  Eq.  56.  And  see 
Pointon  v.  Pointon,  L.  R.  12  Eq.  547;  House 
v.  Mullen,  22  Wall.  43;  Warren  v.  Warren,  52 
Maine,  360:  Woodward  v.  Hall,  2  Tenn.  Ch. 
164.     So,  where  a  p'aintiff  has  two  causes  of 


(«)  Multifariousness  arising  from  the  union      by  the  following  decisions:  A  matter  cannot  be 
of  distinct  matters  in  the  same  bill  is  illustrated      joined  in  the  bill  in  which  some  of  the  plaintiffs 

331 


*334 


THE   BILL. 


According  to  Lord  Cottenham,  it  is  impossible,  upon  the  authorities, 
to  lay  down  any  general  rule  as  to  what  constitutes  multifariousness, 


action,   each   furnishing  the   foundation   of  a 
separate  suit,  one  the  natural  outgrowth  of  the 
other,    or  growing  out   of   the   same   subject- 
matter,  where  all  the  defendants  have  some  in- 
terest in  every  question  raised  on  the  record, 
and  the  suit  has  a  single  object,  they  may  be 
properly  joined.     Ferry  v.  Laible,  27  N.  J.  Eq. 
146.     So  a  bill  is  net  multifarious  which  asks  a 
declaration  of   title   in   favor  of    plaintiffs  as 
cestui  que  trusts  to  half  the  property  and  for 
partition,  or  because  the  plaintiff  is  not  entitled 
to   the   relief    asked    against    one    defendant. 
Darling  v.  Hammer,  20  N.  J.  Eq.  220.     So  a 
bill  is  not  multifarious  which  alleges  that  two 
separate  patents  owned  by  plaintiff  have  been 
infringed  by  the  defendant.     Gillespie  v.  Cum- 
mings,  3  Sweeny,  259;    Hornum  Patent  Man. 
Co.  v.  Brooklyn" City  R.  Co.  7  Rep.  295,  U.  S. 
C.  C.  N.  Y.     So,  where  the  bill  is  filed  for  the 
settlement  of  several  commercial  partnerships 
of  which  the  complainants  and  defendants  were 
members.    Miller  v.  Harris,  1  Tenn.  Leg.  Rep. 
157.     Nor  does  the  objection  lie  where  there  is 
a  common   liability  in  the  defendants,  and  a 
common,  although  not  co-extensive  interest  in 
the  plaintiffs.     Fiery  v.  Emmert,  36  Md.  464. 
Nor  where  the  bill  is  upon  homogeneous  mat- 
ters, and  does  not  pray  for  multifarious  relief, 
although  the  case  stated  might  support  such  a 
prayer.(6)     Dick  v.  Dick,   1   Hogan,  290;  Ar- 
nold v.  Arnold,  9  R.  I.  397.     And  see  Judson 
r.  TN.ulmin,  9   Ala.   662;    Davis   v.   Miller,   4 
Jones  Eq.  447.     So,  a  bill  by  a  husband  and 
wife  for  the  same  premises,  based  upon  a  parol 
agreement   with    the    husband   and   a  written 
agreement  with  the  wife,  although  demurrable 
perhaps  upon  the  ground  of  misjoinder,  is  not 
subject   to   the   objection   of   multifariousness. 
Green  v.  Richards,  23  N.  J.  Eq.  32.     A  credi- 
tor's bill   against  the   debtor's    executor  and 
another,  alleging  a  devastavit,  and  the   insol- 
vency of  the  executor,  and  for  an  account,  is 
not   multifarious   because  it  also  seeks  to  set 
aside   a  conveyance   by   the   executor  of  the 
debtor's  realty  to  one  of  the  defendants.    Rags- 
dale  v.  Holmes,  1  S.  C.  91.     And  an  alternative 
prayer  does  not  necessarily  make  a  bill  multi- 


farious.     Kilgour  v.  N.  O-  Gas  Light  Co.  2 
Woods,  144.     The  joinder  of  several  property 
owners  in  a  bill  to  restrain  a  tax  assessment 
does  not  render   it  bad   for   multifariousness. 
Mount  Carbon  Coal  Co.  v.  Blanchard,  54  111. 
240.     But  see  Howell  v.  City  of  Buffalo,  2  Abb. 
App.  Dec.  412.     Nor  does  the  joinder  of  sev- 
eral  owners   of    adjoining  tracts   of    land   to 
restrain  separate  assessments  for  the  construc- 
tion of  a  road.     Robbins  v.  Sand  Creek  T.  Co. 
34  End.  461.     See  also  Price  v.  Minot,  107  Mass. 
63;  Eddy  v.  Caprin,  4  R.  I.  397;  Taylor  r.  King, 
32  Mich.  42;   Richardson  v.  Brooks,  53  Miss. 
500;  Douglas  v.  Wal  bridge,  38  Wis.  179 ;  Jones 
v.  Foster,  50  Miss.  47;    Winsor  r.  Bailey,  55 
N.  II.  218;   Free  v.  Buckingham,  57  N.  H.  95. 
When  the  bill   is  by  an  heir  for  partition, 
and  for  an  injunction  against  the  executor  re- 
straining him  from  waste,  and  also  asks  that 
the  widow  be  required  to  give  security  for  the 
complainant's  share  of  the  fund  in  her  hands,  it 
is  open  to  the  objection   of  multifariousness. 
Burnett  v.  Lester,  53  111.  325.    And  so  is  a  bill 
which  joins  several  defendants,  some  of  whom 
are  liable  to  one  plaintiff  only,  some  to  another, 
and  some  of  whom  are  responsible,  if  at  all,  for 
independe  t  violations  of  a  statute.     Sheriff  v. 
Oil  Co.  7  Phila.  4.     So,  where  a  person  is  made 
a  defendant  upon  a  case  with  a  large  portion  of 
which  he  has  no  connection.    Waller  v.  Taylor, 
42  Ala  297.     And  see,  for  further  instances  of 
multifariousness,  Kinsey  v.  Howard,  47  Ala. 
236;  Hardin  v.  Swoope,  47  Ala.  273:  Dorsey  v. 
Lake,  46  Miss.  109;  Roberts  v.  Starke,  47  Miss. 
257.     And  for  a  case  both  of  multifariousness 
and  misjoinder,  Haines  v.  Carpenter,  1  Woods, 
262. 

The  objection  of  multifariousness  will  not  be 
regarded  unless  it  appear  on  the  face  of  the 
bill:  Edwards  v.  Sartor,  1  S.  C.  266;  nor  en- 
tertained if  only  made  at  the  hearing :  Cousens 
v.  Rose,  L.  R.  12  Eq.  366 ;  Green  v.  Richards,  23 
N.  J.  Eq.  32.  Sanborn  v.  Adair,  27  id.  425. 

In  Tennessee  it  is  provided  by  statute  that 
the  uniting  in  one  bill,  against  one  defend- 
ant, of  several  matters  of  Equity,  distinct  and 
unconnected,    is   not  multifariousness  :    Code, 


have  no   interest.     See   Hazard   v.  Dillon.  34      245;   Stebbins   v.   St.  Anne,   116   TJ.    S.   386; 
Fed.   Rep.  485;   Walker  v.  Powers,  104  U.  S.      Hartford  Fire  Ins.  Co.   v.   Bonner  M.  Co.  44 


(b)  See  also  Waller  o.  Shannon,  53  Miss.  500; 
Kennebec  Railroad  v.  Portland  Railroad,  54 
Maine,  173;  Free  v.  Buckingham,  57  N.  H.  95; 
Williams  v.  Neel,  10  Rich.  Eq.  (S.  C.)  338  ; 
Arnold  v.  Arnold,  11  W.  Va.  455;  Hayes's  Ap- 
peal, 123  Penn.  St.  110;  Reckefus  v.  Lyon,  69 
Md.  589;  Shafer  v.  O'Rrien,  31  W.  Va.  601; 
Shaffer  v.  Fettv,  30  id.  267 ;   Yates  v.  Law,  86 

332 


Va.  117;  Thomas  v.  Sellman,  87  Va.  683; 
Western  Land  Co.  v.  Guinault,  37  Fed.  Rep. 
523:  Heyer  v.  Bromberg,  74  Ala.  524;  McEvoy 
v.  Leonard  (Ala.),  8  So.  40:  Harland  v.  Per- 
son, 93  Ala.  542;  Williams  v.  Wheaton,  86  Ga. 
223:  Storrs  i\  Wallace,  54  Mich.  112;  Deans 
v.  Wilcoxon,  25  Fla.  980. 


MATTER   OF   THE   BILL. 


*334 


which  can  be  made  universally  applicable.     The  cases  upon  the  subject 
are  extremely  various ;  and  the  Court,  in  deciding  them,  seems  to  have 

§  4327  ;  that  the  objection  is  no  ground  for  dis-  a  decree  saving  rights,  or  grant  leave  to  amend : 

missing   the   bill,   unless  made  by  motion   to  §  4337;  and  that,  if  a  demurrer  on  that  ground 

dismiss  or  demurrer:  §4325;  that  if  made  at  is  sustained,  the  Court  may  direct  separate  bills 

the  hearing,  the  Court  may  proceed  to  render  without  new  process :  §  4326. 


Fed.  Rep.  151.  Or  in  respect  to  which  the 
plaintiffs'  interests  are  antagonistic.  Walker  v. 
Powers,  104  U.  S-  245.  If  all  the  plaintiffs  have 
a  common  interest  as  a  class,  and  all  the  de- 
fendants have  a  common  liability,  the  rights 
and  liability  of  the  parties  on  either  side  need 
not  be  the  same  in  extent.  Hale  v .  Nashua  & 
L.  R.  Co.  60  N.  H.  533 ;  Graham  o.  Dahlonega 
G.  M.  Co.  71  Ga.  296;  City  Bank  v.  Bartlett, 
id.  797.  Even  when  the  necessary  parties  to 
the  bill  are  the  same  in  any  aspect,  it  is  mul- 
tifarious if  their  attitudes  and  interests  are 
clearly  at  variance.  McDonnell  v.  Eaton,  18 
Fed.  Rep.  710. 

A  stockholder  suing  for  his  corporation  can- 
not join  causes  of  action  accruing  to  himself 
personally  with  causes  belonging  to  the  com- 
pany. Whitney  v.  Fairbanks,  54  Fed.  Rep. 
985.  As  to  multifariousness  in  bills  against 
officers  or  stockholders  of  a  corporation,  see 
Winsor  o.  Bailev,  55  N.  H.  218;  Tutwiler  v. 
Tuskaloosa  Coal  Co.  89  Ala  391 ;  American  Re- 
frigerating &c.  Co.  v.  Linn,  93  Ala.  610;  Burns 
v.  Beck  Co.  83  Ga.  471;  Lewis  v.  St.  Albans 
Iron  Works,  50  Vt.  477;  Deaderick  v.  Wilson, 
8  Baxter  (Tenn.),  108;  Brewer  v.  Boston  The- 
atre, 104  Mass.  378;  Cambridge  Water  Works 
v.  Somerville  Dyeing  Co.  14  Gray,  193  ;  Pope  v. 
Leonard,  115  Mass.  286;  Pope  v.  Salamanca 
Oil  Co.  id.  286,  290;  Bane  National  Bank  v. 
Hingham  Manuf.  Co.  127  Mass.  563. 

The  fact  that  the  plaintiff  sues  as  assignee 
of  one  of  the  parties  in  interest,  and  as  guardian 
of  another,  is  not  necessarily  a  valid  objection 
upon  a  bill  to  reach  the  funds  of  an  estate.  Hen- 
derson v.  Sherman,  47  Mich.  267.  A  bill  for  an 
accounting  between  partners  is  not  multifarious 
when  it  relates  to  the  affairs  of  different  part- 
nerships of  which  the  parties  are  the  sole  mem- 
bers. Lewis  v.  Loper,  47  Fed.  Rep.  259;  Miller 
V.  Harris,  9  Baxter  (Tenn.),  101;  see  Jefferson 
v.  Gaines,  7  id.  368;  Sanderson  v.  Sanderson, 
17  Fla.  820;  Nulton  v.  Isaacs,  30  Gratt.  726. 
Infringements  upon  different  correlative  patents 
by  a  machine  which  affects  them  all,  may  be 
m  ule  the  subject  of  a  single  suit  in  Equity.  Lil- 
liendahl  v.  Detwiller,  18  Fed.  Rep.  176;  Barney 
v.  Peck,  16  id.  413;  Nellisr.  Pennock  Manuf.  Co. 
13  id.  451;  see  Gamewell  Fire  Alarm  Tel.  Co. 
v.  Chillicothe,  7  id.  351;  Hayes  v.  Dayton,  8 
id.  702;  Putnam  v.  Hollender,  6  id.  882".  Such 
a  bill  is  multifarious,  when  brought  for  the  in- 
fringement of  several  patents,  if  it  does  not 
allege  conjoint  use  or  capacity  therefor.   Shickle 


v.  South  St.  Louis  Foundry  Co.  21  Fed.  Rep. 
105;  Griffith  v.  Segar,  29  id.  707;  Barney  v. 
Peck,  16  id.  413;  Lilliendahl  v.  Detwiller,  18 
id.  176;  Consolidated  E.  L.  Co.  v.  Brush-Swan 
E.  L.  Co.  20  id.  502.  See  also,  as  to  patents, 
United  States  v.  American  Bell  Telephone  Co. 
128  U.  S.  315;  32  Fed.  Rep.  591;  Stonemetz 
Printers'  M.  Co.  v.  Brown  Folding  M.  Co.  46 
Fed.  Rep.  72  ;  Thomas  Huston  El.  Co.  v. 
Sperry  El.  Co.  id.  75. 

A  bill  to  foreclose  four  mortgages  of  differ- 
ent dates,  made  by  the  same  mortgagor  and 
owned  by  the  plaintiff,  is  not  multifarious  if 
personal  judgment  is  asked  only  against  the 
former,  though  the  mortgages  contain  different 
exceptions  in  favor  of  different  grantees  and 
lessees.  In  such  case,  the  mortgagor  cannot 
demur  for  misjoinder  of  claims,  as  there  is  no 
such  misjoinder  as  against  him,  the  rule  here 
being  the  same  as  in  the  case  of  defendants 
misjoined.  Torrent  v.  Hamilton,  95  Mich.,  159; 
54  N.  W.  Rep.  634.  If  a  bill  to  set  aside  fraudu- 
lent conveyances  joins  as  defendants  the  fraudu- 
lent grantees,  who  claim  different  parts  of  the 
debtor's  property,  it  is  not  multifarious.  Col- 
lins v.  Stix  (Ala.),  11  So.  380.  See  Rinehart 
v  Long,  95  Mo.  396.  See  Bunford  v.  Steele, 
80  Ala.  147;  Field  v.  Holzman,  93  Ind.  205; 
Bobb  v.  Bobb,  8  Mo.  App.  257.  This  is  the 
rule  also  upon  a  bill  in  Equity  filed  in  the 
Federal  Courts  by  an  assignee  in  bankruptcy. 
Gaines  v.  Mausseaux,  1  Woods,  118;  Jones  v. 
Slauson,  33  Fed.  Rep.  632;  Dodge  v.  Briggs, 
27  id.  160;  Potts  v.  Hahn,  32  id.  660.  A  bill 
which  prays  for  the  settlement  of  a  disputed 
legal  title  to  land,  and  also  for  a  partition 
thereof,  is  multifarious.  Chapin  v.  Sears,  18 
Fed.  Rep.  814:  Simpson  v.  Wallace,  83  N.  C. 
477;  Bullock  v.  Knox  (Ala.),  11  So.  339;  Belt 
v.  Bowie,  65  Md.  350;  Hayes's  Appeal,  123 
Penn.  St.  110.  But  a  bill  for  partition  of  dis- 
tinct tracts  held  by  different  claimants,  and  for 
the  annulment  of  forged  deeds  thereof,  is  not 
multifarious.  Baird  v.  Jackson.  98  111.  78.  So 
a  bill  founded  upon  an  equitable  demand  is  not 
multifarious  when  it  also  contains  a  demand 
purely  legal.  Smith  v.  Patton,  12  W.  Va.  54; 
see  Jones  v.  Reid,  id.  350;  Fougeres  v.  Mur- 
barger,  44  Fed.  Rep.  292.  Irrelevant  allega- 
tions as  to  other  suits  may  be  rejected  in 
determining  whether  separate  causes  of  suit 
are  stated.  Wickersham  v.  Crittenden,  93 
Cal.  17.  Under  the  Codes,  separate  statements 
made  in  one  complaint  of  different  causes  of 

333 


334 


THE   BILL. 


considered   what  was   convenient  in  particular   cases,   rather   than  to 
have  attempted  to  lay  down  an  absolute  rule.2     The  only  way  of  recon- 


-  See  Carroll  r.  Roosevelt,  4  Edw.  Ch.  211; 
Emans  v.  Emails,  14  N.  J.  Eq.  118, 119;  Bowers 
v.  Keeseeher,  9  Iowa,  422.  The  substance  of 
the  rules  on  the  subject  of  multifariousness 
appears  to  be,  that  each  case  is  to  be  governed 
by  its  own  circum  tances,  and  must  be  left  in  a 
great  measure  to  the  sound  discretion  of  the 
Court. (r)  Clegg  o.  Varnell,  18  Texas,  294; 
Gaines  r  Chew,  2  How.  (U.  S.)  619;  Oliver  v. 
Piatt,  3  id.  333;  Butler  v.  Spann,  27  Miss.  234; 


action  which  are  not  complete  in  themselves, 
but  are  confounded  together,  are  bad  for  du- 
plicity. N.  Y.  Code  of  Civil  Proc.  §  546;  Mc- 
Kenzie  r.  Fox,  29  X.  Y.  St.  Rep.  106;  New- 
combe  v.  Chicago  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  28  id.  716. 

Only  one  cause  of  action  is  stated  when 
relief  is  sought  which  is  merely  auxiliary  to 
the  principal  relief.  Turner  v.  Conant,  18  Abb. 
N.  Cas.  160.  A  prayer,  in  a  foreclosure  sui% 
for  the  reformation  of  the  mortgage  is  merely 
incidental  and  does  not  create  a  separable  con- 
troversy within  the  U.  S.  Stat,  of  1875,  c.  137. 
Winchell  v.  Coney,  27  Fed.  Rep.  482.  Such 
different  relief  as  specific  performance  of  an 
agreement  to  convey  real  estate,  and  judgment 
for  the  balance  due  in  cash,  may  be  granted 
upon  a  contract  which  is  an  entirety.  Mann  v. 
Higgins,  83  Cal.  206;  Henry  v.  McKittrick,  42 
Kansas,  485.  And  when  breaches  of  the  same 
instrument  may  be  conveniently  considered 
together,  entire   relief  may  be  given,   though 


(c)  See  also  Graves  r.  Corbin,  132  U.  S  571, 
586;  Walker  v.  Powers,  104  U.  S.  245;  Mills  r. 
Hurd,  32  Fed.  Rep.  127;  Hayes  v.  Dayton,  8 
id.  702;  Bolles  v.  Bolles,  44  N.  J.  Eq.  385; 
Cocks  v.  Varney,  42  id.  514;  Conover  v.  Sealy, 
45  id.  589;  Van  Houten  v.  Van  Winkle,  46  id. 
380;  Emans  v.  Emans,  14  id.  114;  Sanborn  t\ 
Dwinell,  135  Mass.  236;  Lenz  v.  I'rescott,  144 
Mass.  505;  Keith  v.  Keith,  143  Mass.  262; 
Eastman  v.  Savings  Bank,  58  N.  H.  421 ;  Page 
v.  Whidden,  59  N.  H.  507;  Patten  Paper  Co. 
r.  Kaukauna  Waterpower  Co.  70  WTis.  659; 
Neal  v.  Rathell,  70  Md.  592:  Comstock  v.  Rav- 
ford,  1  S.  &  M.  (Mi's.)  102;  40  Am.  Dec.  102, 
and  note;  Harland  ».  Person,  93  Ala.  273;  Dew- 
berry v.  Shannon,  59  Ga.  311. 

(d)  The  prayers  of  the  bill  do  not  themselves 
make  it  multifarious,  but  may  be  considered  in 
connection  with  the  stating  part,  and  the  gen- 
eral scope  and  purpose  of  the  bill,  in  determin- 
ing this  question.  Bagot  v.  Easton,  7  Ch.  D. 
1;  Child  v.  Stenning,  id.  413;  C'ark  v.  Rivers, 
L.  R.  5  Eq.  91 ;  Shields  v.  Barrow,  17  How. 
130;  Wilkinson  v.  Dobbie.  12  Blatch.  298;  Kil- 
gour  v.  New  Or'eans  G.  L.  Co.  2  Woods,  144; 
Beatty  v.  Hincklev,  1  Fed.  Rep.  385;  Equitable 

334.' 


Marshall  v.  Means,  12  Ga.  61;  Kennebec  and 
Portland  R.  Co.  v.  Portland  and  Kennebec  R. 
Co.  52  Maine,  173,  182 ;  Chase  v.  Searls,  45 
N.  H.  520;  Abbot  v.  Johnson,  32  N.  H.  26; 
Warren  v.  Warren,  56  Maine,  368;  People  v. 
Morrill,  26  Cal.  336;  Bartee  v.  Tompkins,  4 
Sneed,  623.  To  determine  whether  a  bill  is 
multifarious,  regard  must  be  had  to  the  stating 
part  of  the  bill,  and  not  to  the  prayer  alone. (//) 
Hammond  v.  Michigan  Bank,  Walker  Ch.  214. 


some  of  them,  taken  separately,  are  not  ground 
for  relief  in  Equity.  Pacific  R.  Co.  p.  Atlantic 
&  P.  R.  Co.  20  Fed.  Rep.  277.  The  objection 
of  multifariousness  fails  if  the  grounds  of  suit 
are  not  different,  or  if  each  ground  is  insuf- 
ficient to  sustain  a  bill.  Brown  v.  Guarantee 
Trust  Co.  128  U.  S.  403;  Bedsole  v.  Monroe,  5 
Ired.  Eq.  313;  Larkins  v.  Biddle,  21  Ala.  252; 
Robinson  v.  Cross,  22  Conn.  171;  Nail  v.  Mob- 
ley,  9  Ga.  278;  Ellis  v.  No.  Pacific  R.  Co.  77 
Wis.  114;  Dunphy  r.  Traveller  Newspaper 
Association,  146  Mass.  495;  Hurd  v.  Ascher- 
man,  117  111.  501;  Mahler  v.  Schmidt,  43  Hun, 
512.  Also  when  two  distinct  matters  are  joined 
only  one  of  which  is  well  pleaded.  Westlake 
v.  Farrow,  34  S.  C.  270.  Other  cases  relating 
to  the  union  of  different  matters  are:  Price  v, 
Coleman,  21  Fed.  Rep.  357;  Norris  v.  Haggin, 
28  id.  275;  Hyman  v.  Wheeler,  33  id.  629; 
Mills  r.  Hurd,  32  id.  127;  Potts  r.  Hahn,  id. 
660;  Gordon  v.  St.  Paul  H.  Works,  23  id.  147; 


Life  Ass.  Society  v.  Patterson,  id.  126;  Mills  v. 
Hurd,  32  id.  127;  Wells  v.  Partridge,  31  N.  J. 
Eq.  362;  Arnold  r.  Arnold,  9  R.  I.  397;  Tread- 
we  1  v.  Brown,  44  N.  H.  551 ;  Canton  v.  McGraw, 
67  Md.  583;  Lvons  v.  McCurdy,  90  Ala.  497; 
Colstrum  v.  Minneapolis  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  31 
Minn.  367;  McGuffeyr.  McCain  find.),  30  X.  E. 
Rep.  296;  Cleland  r.  Casgrain.  92  Mich.  139; 
Collins  v.  Knight,  3  Tenn.  Ch.  183;  Micou  v. 
Ashurst,  55  Ala.  607:  Fields  r.  Helms,  70  Ala. 
460:  Korne  v.  Korne,  30  W.  Va.  ];  Shaffer  v. 
Petty,  id.  248;  Carskadon  v.  Minke,  26  id.  729; 
Love  v.  Keowne,  58  Tex.  191.  So  under  the 
Codes.  Cahoon  v.  Utica  Bank,  7  N.  Y.  486; 
Wickersham  V.  Crittenden,  93  Cal.  17;  Guern- 
sey r.  American  Ins.  Co.  17  Minn.  104;  Globe 
Insr.  Co.  v.  Boyle,  21  Ohio  St.  120;  Hawse  v. 
Moody.  14  Fla.  59;  Turner  v.  Pierce.  34  Wis. 
658.  Allegations  in  the  bill,  which  are  in- 
tended to  anticipate  the  defence,  do  not  make 
the  bill  multifarions.  Munson  v.  Bowen,  80 
Cal.  57;  Ware  v.  Curry,  67  Ala.  274.  But 
under  the  Codes,  a  complaint  anticipating  an 
expected  defence  is  liable  to  special  demurrer. 
Munson  r,  Bowen,  80  Cal.  572. 


MATTER    OF    THE    BILL. 


335 


ciling  the  *  authorities  upon  the  subject  is  by  adverting  to  the 
fact  that  although  the  books  speak  generally  of  demurrers  for 


335 


United  State?  v.  Curtner,  26  id.  296;  United 
States  v.  Pratt  Coal  Co.  18  id.  708;  Lewis  v. 
Loper,  47  id.  259,  681 ;  Chase  v.  Cannon,  id. 
674;  First  Natl.  Bank  v.  Moore,  48  id.  799; 
Whitney  v.  Fairbanks,  54  id.  985;  Baltimore 
&  0.  TV1.  Co.  v.  Interstate  Tel.  Co.  id.  50; 
Fatten  v.  Glatz,  56  id.  367;  Cocks  v.  Yarney, 
42  N.  J.  Eq.  514;  Ferry  v.  Laible,  27  id.  146, 
150;  Vreeland  v.  Vreeland,  49  id.  822;  Cleland 
v.  Casgrain,  92  Mich.  139;  Lenz  v.  Prescott,  144 
Mass.  505;  Dunphy  v.  Traveller  Newspaper 
Association,  146  Mass.  495;  Keith  v.  Keith, 
143  Mass.  262 ;  White  v.  Bigelow,  154  Mass. 
593;  Kicker  v.  Brooks,  155  Mass.  400;  Warren 
v.  Warren,  52  Maine,  560;  De  Wolf  v.  A.  &  W. 
Sprague  Manuf.  Co.  49  Conn.  282;  Rippe  v. 
Stogdill,  61  Wis.  38;  Withers  v.  Sims,  80  Va. 
651;  Lindley  v.  Kussell,  16  Mo.  App.  217; 
Swepson  v.  Exchange  &  D.  Bank,  9  Lea 
(Tenn.),  713;  Woodward  v.  Hall,  2  Teun.  Ch. 
164:  Fiery  v.  Emmert,  36  Md.  464;  Belt  v. 
Bowie,  65  Md.  353;  Canton  v.  McGraw,  67 
Md.  583;  Heggie  v.  Hill,  95  N.  C.  303;  Winter 
o.  Smith,  45  Ark.  549;  Ashley  v.  Little  Rock, 
56  id.  391;  Outland  r.  Outland  (N.  C),  18 
S.  E.  Rep.  72;  Mobile  Savings  Bank  r.  Burke, 
94  Ala.  125;  Tipton  v.  Wortham,  93  Ala.  321; 
American  R.  &  C.  Co.  v.  Linn,  id.  610;  East 
v.  East,  80  Ala.  199  ;  Bohman  v.  Lohman,  74 
Ala.  507;  Seals  v.  Pheiffer,  77  Ala.  278; 
Bayzor  v.  Adams,  80  Ala.  239;  Dickerson  v. 
Winslow  (Ala.),  11  So.  Rep.  918;  Hutchinson 
c-  Mershon  ( Va.),  10  S.  E.  Rep.  874  ;  Wells  v. 
Sewell's  Point  Guano  Co.  (Va.)  17  id.  2;  Buf- 
falo v.  Pocahontas,  85  Va.  222;  Brown  v.  Buck- 
ner,  86  Va.  612;  Commonwealth  v.  Drake,  81 
Va.  305;  Stewart  v.  Stewart,  27  W.  Va.  167, 
Crumlish  v.  Shenandoah  V.  R.  Co.  28  id.  623; 
Shaffer  v.  Fetty,  30  id.  248;  Ryder  v.  Topping, 
15  111.  App.  216;  Columbus  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hum- 
phries, 64  Miss.  258;  Barry  v.  Barry,  id.  70.) ; 
Robinson  v.  Springfield  Co.  21  Fla.  203;  Wylly 
A.  Trustees  v.  Sanford,  17  Fla.  162;  Smith  v. 
McLain,  11  W.  Va.  654;  Miller  t>.  Baltimore 
C  M.  Co.  52  Md.  642;  Stephens  v.  White- 
head, 75  Ga.  294;  Austin  v.  Raiford,  61  Ga. 
125;  Farmer  v.  Rogers,  88  Ga.  162;  Millers. 
Baltimore  C.  M.  Co.  52  Md.  642;  Suber  v. 
Allen,  13  S.  C.  317;  Taylor  v.  Smith,  54 
Miss.  50.  In  England  different  causes  of  suit 
may  now  be  joined  by  leave  of  Court.  See 
Read  v.  Woiton,  [1893]"  2  Ch.  171. 

As  to  misjoinder  of  plaintiffs,  see  ante, 
p.  303,  n.  ('().  In  general,  if  two  persons  join 
as  plaintiffs  in  a  suit  in  equity,  both  must  be 
entitled  to  relief;  and  if  they  seek  to  enforce  a 
joint  claim,  and  also  a  claim  in  which  one  of 
them  has  no  interest,  the  bill  is  multifarious. 
Mcb.le  Savings  Bank  v.  Burke,  94  Ala.  125. 


As  to  the  misjoinder  of  different  defendants 
upon  distinct  and  independent  matters,  see 
Grant  v.  Phoenix  Life  Ins.  Co.  121  U.  S.  105; 
Central  Pacilic  R.  Co.  v.  Dyer,  1  Sawyer,  641; 
Patterson  v.  Kellogg,  53  Conn.  38;  Robinson 
v.  RobiDson,  73  Maine,  170;  Metcalf  v.  Cady, 
8  Allen,  587;  Sapp  v.  Phelps,  92  111.  588; 
Johnson  v.  Parkinson,  62  Ala.  456;  Clay  v. 
Gurley,  id.  14;  Petty  e.  Fogle,  6  W.  Va.  497; 
Stephens  v.  Whitehead,  75  Ga.  294;  Mackall  v. 
West,  67  Ga.  278;  Morgan  v.  Shepherd,  69  Ga. 
308;  Junkins  v.  Lovelace,  72  Ala.  303;  Cramer 
r.  Watson,  73  Ala.  127.  All  the  defendants 
must  have  some  interest  in  the  controversy. 
Marshall  v.  Gilliard,  14  L.  T.  N.  S.618;  Mayer 
v.  Denver  &c.  R.  Co.  38  Fed.  Rep.  197;  Meyers 
v.  Scott,  50  Hun,  603:  Sawyer  v.  Noble,  55 
Maine,  227;  Oliva  v.  Bunaforza,  31  N.  J.  Eq. 
395  ;  Henninger  r.  Heald  (N.  J.  Ch.).  26  Atl. 
Rep.  449  ;  Brian  v.  Thomas,  63  Md.  476 ;  Kings- 
bury v.  Flowers,  65  Ala.  479;  Hill  v.  Hill,  79 
Va.  592;  Tate  v.  Ohio  &  Miss.  R.  Co.  10  Ind. 
174;  71  Am.  Dec.  309,  and  note.  But  each 
defendant  need  not  have  an  interest  in  the 
whole  matter  in  controversy.  State  v.  Brown, 
58  Miss.  835;  Graves  v.  Corbin,  132  U.  S.  571, 
586;  First  Nat.  Bank  r.  Moore,  48  Fed.  Rep. 
799.  And  if  each  defendant's  interest  relates 
to  any  relief  obtainable  by  the  plaintiff,  their 
several  interests  need  not  be  harmonious  as 
between  themselves.  Hyman  v.  Wheeler,  33 
Fed.  Rep.  629;  Sims  v.  Adams,  78  Ala.  395; 
Rogers  v.  Blackwell,  49  Mich.  192.  Two  per- 
sons owning  in  severalty  parts  of  a  private 
burial  ground  may  be  joined  as  defendants  in 
a  bill  to  restrain  interments  therein  as  a  nui- 
sance. Kingsbury  v.  Flowers,  65  Ala.  479. 
Fraudulent  mortgages  executed  at  the  same 
time  by  t lie  debtor  to  different  mortgagees,  and 
his  collusive  assignment  for  creditors  at  an- 
other time,  may  form  the  subject  of  a  single 
bill,  when  the  single  aim  is  a  fraudulent  dis- 
position of  his  property  to  defeat  the  plaintiff's 
claim.  State  v.  Foot,27  S.  C.  340.  See  Pull- 
man v.  Stebbins,  51  Fed.  Rep.  10.  Intent  or 
a  common  purpose  may  thus  be  a  test  of  mul- 
tifariousness. See  also  No.  Pac.  R.  Co.  r. 
Walker,  47  Fed.  Rep  681;  Whitfield  0.  Evans, 
56  Miss.  488;  Donovan  v.  Dunning,  69  Mo. 
436.  Porter  r.  Young,  85  Va.  49;  Miller  v. 
Harris,  9  Baxter  (Tenn.),  101;  Almond  v. 
Wilson,  75  Va.  613;  Russell  »•.  Garrett,  75 
Ala.  348;  Bates  v.  Plonsky,  62  How.  Pr.  429; 
Bobb  f.  Bobb,  76  Mo.  419;  Baird  V.  Jackson, 
98  III.  78.  So  a  common  right  or  a  common 
interest,  as  in  the  case  of  the  obstruction  or 
pollution  of  a  stream  by  different  riparian 
owners,  will  warrant  joining  them  as  defend- 
ants in  Equity.     See   Bucclengh    v.  Cowan,  5 

335 


*336 


THE   BILL. 


multifariousness,  yet  in  truth  such  demurrers  may  be  divided  into  two 
distinct  kinds.  Frequently  the  objection  raised,  though  termed  multifa- 
riousness, is  in  fact  more  properly  misjoinder ; 1  that  is  to  say,  the  cases 
or  claims  united  in  the  bill  are  of  so  different  a  character,  that  the  Court 
will  not  permit  them  to  be  litigated  in  one  record.2  It  may  be  that  the 
plaintiffs  and  defendants  are  parties  to  the  whole  of  the  transactions 
which  form  the  subject  of  the  suit,  and  nevertheless  those  transactions 
may  be  so  dissimilar  that  the  Court  will  not  allow  them  to  be  joined 
together,  but  will  require  distinct  records.  But  what  is  more  familiarly 
understood  by  the  term  multifariousness,  as  applied  to  a  bill,  is  where  a 
party  is  able  to  say  he  is  brought  as  a  defendant  upon  a  record,  with  a 
large  portion  of  which  he  has  no  connection  whatever.8  Thus  where 
a  bill  was  exhibited  by  trustees  under  a  trust  for  sale,  against  several 
persons  who  were  the  purchasers  of  the  trust  estates,  which  had  been 
sold  to  them  by  auction  in  different  lots,  Sir  Thomas  Plumer  V.  C. 
allowed  a  demurrer,  which  had  been  put  in  by  one  of  the  defendants, 
on  the  ground  that  the  bill  was  multifarious.4  In  a  subsequent  case, 
where  an  information  and  bill  were  filed  for  the  purpose  of  setting  aside 
leases,  granted  by  the  same  trustees  at  different  times  to  different  per- 
sons, the  same  learned  Judge  held,  that  if  the  case  had  been  free 
*  336  from  other  objections  it  would  have  been  *  liable  to  the  charge  of 
multifariousness.1  The  same  principle  was  afterward  acted  upon 
by  Lord  Eldon  in  Salvidge  v.  Hyde,2  where  a  bill  had  been  filed  for  an 
account  of  a  testator's  estate,  and  also  to  set  aside  certain  sales  which 


i  Bv  the  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  49,  ante,  p. 
303,  objections  for  misjoinder  of  plaintiffs  are 
abolished;  but  this  section  applies  to  misjoinder 
of  parties,  and  not  to  the  misjoinder  of  subjects 
mentioned  in  the  text. 

2  Emans  r.  Emans,  14  N.  J.  Eq.  114,  118. 

3  Campbell  v.  Mackay,  1  M.&C.  618;  Crow 
v.  Cross,  7  Jur.  N.  S.  1298,  V.  C.  S. ;  see  Tur- 
ner v.  Baptist  Missionary  Union,  5  McLean, 
344;  Swayze  v  Swayze,  9  N.  J.  Eq.  273;  New 
England  &c.  Bank  v.  Newport  Steam  Factory, 
6  R.  I.  154. 

4  His  Honor  said:  "This  Court  is  always 
averse  to  a  multiplicity  of  suits,  but  certainly 
a  defendant  has  a  right  to  insist  that  he  is  not 
bound  to  answer  a  bill  containing  several  dis- 
tinct and  separate   matters,    relating  to   indi- 


Macph.  214;  Crossley  v.  Lightowler,  L.  R.  3 
Eq.  279;  Thorpe  v.  Brumfitt,  L.  R.  8  Ch.  650; 
Woodruff  v.  North  Bloomfield  Gravel  Mining 
Co.  8  Sawyer,  628;  9  id.  441;  Chipman  v. 
Palmer,  77  N.  Y.  56;  Lockwood  Co.  v.  Law- 
rence, 77  Maine,  297 ;  Blaisdell  v.  Stephens,  14 
Nev.  17. 

Where  distinct  matters  and  charges  are 
joined  against  a  single  defendant  or  the  same 
defendants,  the  Court  may  treat  the  bill  as 
multifarious  or  not  in  its  discretion.  Burstall  r. 
Bey f us,  26  Ch.  D.  35;  Emans  v.  Emans,  14  N.  J. 
Eq.  114;    Dyer  v.   Cranston  Print  Works  Co. 

336 


viduals  with  whom  he  has  no  concern." 
Brookes  v.  Lord  Whitworth,  1  Mad.  86,  89;  see 
also  Rayner  v.  Julian,  2  Dick.  677  ;  5  Mad. 
144,  n.  The  marginal  note  to  2  Dick.  677  is 
wrong;  and  see  Rump  v.  Greenhill,  20  Beav. 
512;  1  Jur.  N.  S.  123;  Abervstwith  &c.  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Piercy.  12  W.  R.  1000,"v.  C.  W. ;  2  H.  & 
M.  602;  Bent  v.  Yardley,  4  N.  R.  50,  V.  C  W.; 
Bouck  v.  Bouck,  L.  R*.  2  Eq.  19,  M.  R. ;  35 
Beav.  643;  Crane  v.  Fairchild,  14  N.J.  Eq. 
76;  Metcalf  v.  Cady,  8  Allen,  587;  Robinson  v. 
Cross,  22  Conn.  171. 

i  Att.-Gen.  v.  Moses,  2  Mad.  294.  305. 

2  Jac.  151,  153;  and  see  Lund  v.  Blanshard, 
4  Hare,  9,  19;  Thomas  v.  Rees,  1  Jur.  N.  S. 
197,  M.  R.;  Norris  v.  Jackson,  1  J.  &  H.  319; 
7  Jur.  N.  S.  540. 


(R.  I.)  24  Atl.  Rep.  827 ;  Walker  v.  Powers,  104 
U.S.  245;  Stafford  Bank  i\  Sprague,  19  Blatch. 
529;  United  States  v.  Cartner,  26  Fed.  Rep. 
296;  Singer  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Springfield  Foundry 
Co.  34  id.  393 ;  Stafford  Nat.  Bank  v.  Sprague, 
8  id.  377;  Duff  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  13  id.  65; 
Johnson  v.  Powers,  13  id.  315;  Burford  v. 
Steele,  80  Ala.  147  ;  Clary  v.  Haines,  61  Ga. 
520;  Goodwin  v.  Goodwin,  69  Mo.  617;  Stuart 
v.  Blair,  8  Baxter  (Tenn.),  141;  Bauknight  v. 
Sloan,  17  Fla.  284;  Hickey  v.  Chicago  &  W.I. 
R.  Co.  6  III.  App.  172. 


MATTER   OF   THE   BILL.  *  337 

had  been  made  by  the  executor  and  trustee  to  himself  and  another  per- 
son of  the  name  of  Laying.  In  allowing,  on  appeal,  a  demurrer  put  in 
by  Laying,  which  had  been  overruled  by  Sir  John  Leach  V.  C.,3  the 
Lord  Chancellor  said  that  "  when  there  are  trustees  to  sell,  and  a  bill  is 
filed  against  them,  it  is  not  usual  to  make  the  purchasers  parties,  but  to 
state  the  contracts  and  pray  an  inquiry."  *  His  Lordship,  however, 
added  that  "  there  may  be  cases  which  cannot  be  delayed  till  those  in- 
quiries can  be  made,  on  account  of  injury  that  may  be  done  in  the  mean 
time." 

Although  the  administration  of  the  estates  of  two  different  persons 
cannot,  in  general,  be  joined  in  the  same  suit,  where  the  parties  inter- 
ested in  such  estates  are  different,  yet,  where  the  same  parties  claim  the 
benefit  of  both  estates,  and  they  are  so  connected  that  the  account  of 
one  cannot  be  taken  without  the  other,  the  joinder  of  them  in  the  same 
suit  is  not  multifarious.6 

*This  observation  leads  to  a  distinction,  pointed  out  by  Lord  *  SIT 
Eldon  in  Salvidge  v.  Hyde,1  and  which  has  perhaps  been  extended 
by  later  cases.  The  bill  in  that  case  was  filed  by  persons  interested  under 
a  will,  and  by  creditors  of  a  testator,  to  set  aside  two  contracts,  one  of 
which  had  been  entered  into  by  the  trustees  for  sale  of  an  estate  to  one 
of  their  own  number,  and  the  other  for  the  sale  of  another  estate  to  the 
defendant  Laying;  and  Lord  Eldon,  although  he  thought  that  the  object 
of  setting  aside  the  contract  entered  into  with  Laying  could  not  be  em- 
braced in  a  bill  to  set  aside  the  contract  entered  into  with  the  trustee, 
yet  held,  that  if  the  trustee  had  purchased  for  himself,  and  then  Laying 
had  bought  the  same  estate  of  him,  the  case  would  have  been  different.2 

From  this  it  may  be  inferred,  that  an  objection  for  multifariousness 
will  not  be  allowed,  where  the  person  making  the  objection  has  united 
his  case  with  that  of  another  defendant,  against  whom  the  suit  is  entire 

3  5  Mad.  138,  146.     Sir  John  Leach,  in  pro-  Bouck  v.  Bouck,  L.  R.  2  Eq.  19;  35  Beav.  (543  ; 

nouncing   judgment  upon   this  demurrer,  ob-  and  see  Margetts  r.  Perks,  12  W.  R.  517,  M. 

served,    with     reference   to    multifariousness,  R. ;  Marshall  v.  Gilliard,  1  \V.  N.  255;  12  Jur. 

that,  "  in  order  to  determine  whether  a  suit  is  N.  S.  483,  V.  C.  S.;  Earle  c.  Sidebottom,  37 

multifarious,   or  in  other  words  contains  dis-  L.  J.  Ch.  503;  Pyrah  v.  Woodcock,  19  W.  R, 

tinct  matters,  the  inquiry  is  not  whether  each  463.     As  to  the  joinder  of  distinct  causes  of 

defendant  is  connected  with  every  branch  of  action  under  the  present  English  practice,  see 

the  cause,  but  whether  the  plaintiff's  bill  seeks  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  XVII.  1-9. 

relief  in  respect  of  matters  which  are  in  their  4  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  274. 

nature  separate  and  distinct.  If  the  object  of  5  Campbell  v.  Mackay,  1  M.  &  C.  603,  623; 
the  suit  be  single,  but  it  happens  that  different  Lewis  r.  Edmund,  6  Sim.  251,  254;  Rump  v. 
persons  have  separate  interests  in  distinct  ques-  Greenhill,  20  Beav.  512;  1  Jur.  N.  S.  123; 
tions  which  arise  out  of  that  single  object,  it  Att.-Gen.  t\  Cradock,  3  M.  &  C  85,  93;  1  Jur. 
necessarily  follows  that  such  different  persons  556;  Young  r.  Hodges,  10  Hare,  158;  Carter©, 
must  be  brought  before  the  Court,  in  order  that  Balfour,  19  Ala.  814.  The  estates  of  two  per- 
the  suit  may  conclude  the  whole  subject."  sons  who  are  joint  debtors  may  be  administered 
There  is  no  "doubt  that,  in  the  above  observa-  in  the  same  suit.  Woods  v.  Sowerhy,  14  \V.  R. 
tion,  the  learned  Judge  stated  the  principle  9,  V.  C.  W.  So,  where  a  bill  is  riled  for  a  set- 
correctly;  though,  in  his  application  of  it,  he  tlement  of  several  commercial  partnerships,  of 
went,  in  the  opinion  of  Lord  Eldon,  too  far.  which  the  complainants  and  defendants  were 
See  Turner  i\  Robinson,  1  S.  &  S.  313,  315;  members,  the  bill  is  not  multifarious.  Miller 
S.  C.  nnm.  Turner  v.  Doubleday,  6  Mad.  94;  v.  Harris,  1  Tenn.  Leg.  Rep.  157. 
Dunn  v.  Dunn,  2  Sim.  329;  Marcos  v.  Pebrer,  '  Jac.  151. 
3  Sim.  466;  Jerdein  v.  Bright, 2  J.  &  H.  325;  2  Salvidge  v.  Hyde,  Jac.  153. 
vol.  i.  — 22  337 


338 


THE    BILL. 


and  incapable  of  being  separated.3  And  so,  where  the  plaintiffs  had 
appointed  A,  B,  and  C  their  foreign  agents,  and  A  had  retired,  where- 
upon the  plaintiffs  had  appointed  B,  C,  and  D  their  agents,  and  then 
filed  a  bill  for  an  account  of  the  two  agencies,  and  A,  the  retiring  party, 
demurred  for  multifariousness,  Lord  Langdale  M.  B.,4  not  finding,  upon 
perusal  of  the  bill,  such  allegations  as  appeared  to  render  it  necessary 
to  continue,  as  parties  to  the  suit,  the  different  persons  parties  to 
the  transactions,  allowed  the  demurrer.6  Where  the  case  against  one 
defendant  was  so  entire  as  to  be  incapable  of  being  prosecuted  in  sev- 
eral suits,  but  yet  another  defendant  was  a  necessary  party  in  respect 
of  a  portion  only  of  that  case,  it  was  decided,  that  such  other  defend- 
ant could  not  object  to  the  suit  on  the  ground  of  multifariousness.6 
And  in  Campbell  v.  Mackay,1  Lord  Cottenhain  held,  that  where 
*  338  the  plaintiffs  *  have  a  common  interest  against  all  the  defend- 
ants in  a  suit  as  to  one  or  more  of  the  questions  raised  by  it,  so 
as  to  make  them  all  necessary  parties  for  the  purpose  of  enforcing  that 
common  interest,  the  circumstance  of  some  of  the  defendants  being  sub- 
ject to  distinct  liabilities,  in  respect  to  different  branches  of  the  subject- 
matter,  will  not  render  the  bill  multifarious.1 


3  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  278,  a,  and  note.  Nor  can 
a  defendant  demur  for  multifariousness  on  the 
ground  of  the  joinder  of  another  defendant, 
who  does  not  object.  Warthen  v.  Brantley,  5 
Ga.  571 ;  Whitbeck  v.  Edgar,  2  Barb.  Ch.  106; 
Miller  v.  Jamison,  21  N.  J.  Eq.  41.  Ante,  p. 
302,ii.4. 

4  Benson  v.  Hadfield,  5  Beav.  546,  553.  He 
first  said:  "I  can  very  well  conceive  a  case 
properly  stated,  in  which  it  would  be  quite 
necessary,  and  it  may  ultimately  be  quite  neces- 
sary in  this  case,  to  continue  any  person  who 
was  a  partner  in  one  of  those  agency  firms,  a 
part}-  to  the  cause  by  which  the  accounts  are 
to  be  taken." 

6  See  Warthen  v.  Brantley,  5  Ga.  571. 

6  Att.-Gen.  v.  Poole,  4  M.  &  C.  17,  31;  2 
Jur.  1080;  8  01.  &  Fin.  409,  nom.  Parr  v.  Att.- 
Gen.;  see  also  Inman  v.  Wearing,  3  De  G.  & 
S.  729,  which  was  a  case  of  foreclosure  of  three 
distinct  estates,  and  a  prayer  to  set  aside  a 
sale  by  a  prior  mortgagee  of  one  of  them,  as 
improvident. 

'  1  M.  &  C.  603;  and  see  Att.-Gen.  v.  Cra- 
dock,  3  M.  &  C.  85,  95;  1  Jur.  556:  Walsham 
v.  Stainton,  9  Jur.  N.  S.  1261;  12  W.  K.  63, 
L.  JJ. ;  1  De  G.  J.  &  S.  678.  overruling  S.  C. 
1  H.  &  M.  323;  Hamp  v.  Robinson,  3  De  G.  J. 
&  S.  97. 

1  Where  the  purpose  of  the  bill  was  to  enable 
the  plaintiff  to  obtain  satisfaction  of  a  judgment 
at  I. aw  out  of  the  property  of  his  debtor,  one  of 
the  defendants,  and  to  this  end  the  plaintiff 
sought  to  remove  out  of  his  way  certain  fraud- 
ulent conveyances  and  incumbrances,  and  to 
bring  within  the  reach  of  his  judgment  equi- 
table interests  which  were  not  the  subjects  of 

338 


execution  at  Law,  it  was  held  to  be  no  objec- 
tion that  one  or  more  of  the  defendants,  to  whom 
parts  of  the  property  hud  been  fraudulently  con- 
veyed, had  nothing  to  do  with  other  fraudulent 
transactions.  Way  v.  Bragaw,  16  N.  J.  Eq. 
213,  216;  Randolph  v.  Daly,  id.  313;  see  Boyd 
v.  Ho}'t,  5  Paige,  78 ;  Brinkerhoff  v.  Brown,  4 
John.  Ch.  671;  Fellows  v.  Fellows,  4  Cowen, 
682;  15  Am.  Dec.  412,  and  note;  Story,  Eq.  PI. 
§  271,  b  ;  Hicks  v.  Campbell,  19  N.  j".  Eq.  183; 
Coleman  v.  Barnes,  5  Allen,  374;  Cuyler  v. 
Moreland,  6  Paige,  273;  Richards  v.  Pierce,  52 
Maine,  560;  Chase  v.  Searls,  45  N.  H.  511,  519, 
et  seq. ;  Morton  v.  Weil,  33  Barb.  30;  Johnson 
v.  Brown,  2  Humph.  327;  Fogg  v.  Rogers,  2 
Coldw.  290;  Hughes  v.  Tennison,  3  Tenn.  Ch. 
641.  So,  where  the  bill  was  by  four  children 
to  set  aside  six  deeds  of  property  made  by  their 
father  at  one  time  to  six  other  children,  on  the 
ground  of  undue  influence  and  mental  incom- 
petency. Arnold  v.  Arnold,  11  W.  Va.  449. 
So,  where  the  bill  is  by  children  against  their 
father,  his  judgment  creditor,  and  a  purchaser 
under  the  judgment,  setting  up  a  resulting  trust 
in  the  property  sold.  Taylor  v.  Smith,  54  Miss. 
50.  So,  where  the  bill  is  to  set  aside  a  will  as 
fraudulently  procured  against  a  second  wife 
and  her  children.  Winsor  v.  Pettis,  11  R.  I. 
506.  And  see  Prevost  v.  Gorrell,  7  Rep.  296, 
U.  S.  C.  C.  Pa. 

The  facts  in  Campbell  v.  Mackay  were  as  fol- 
lows :  Sir  James  Campbell,  by  a  deed  of  settle- 
ment executed  on  his  marriage  with  Lady  D.  L. 
Campbell,  had  vested  a  fund  in  two  trustees,  A 
and  B,  upon  trust  for  his  wife  for  life,  and  after 
her  decease  in  trust  for  the  sons  of  the  marriage 
who  should  attain  the  age  of  twenty-one  years, 


MATTER    OF    THE    BILL. 


*339 


*  Where  the  right  of  a  person  to  call  upon  the  Court  for  spe-  *  339 
cine  relief  against  another  is  so  incumbered  that  he  cannot  assert 
his  own  right  till  he  has  got  rid  of  that  incumbrance,  he  cannot  include 
the  object  of  getting  rid  of  the  incumbrance  in  a  suit  for  the  specific  re- 
lief which,  but  for  that  incumbrance,  he  would  be  entitled  to;  and  if  he 
attempt  to  do  so  by  the  same  suit,  his  bill  will  be  multifarious.  Thus,  a 
suit  brought  for  specific  performance  should  not  be  mixed  up  with  a 
prayer  for  relief  against  other  persons  claiming  an  interest  in  the  estate  ; 
and  if  there  is  a  title  in  other  persons  which  the  plaintiff  is  bound  to  get 
in,  he  should  file  a  bill  for  specific  performance  only,  and  should  fortify 
the  defect  in  his  title  by  such  means  as  he  can,  so  as  to  be  enabled  to 
complete  it  by  the  time  when  the  contract  will  have  to  be  enforced.1 

The  principle  which  renders  it  improper  to  mix  up,  in  the  same  bill, 
demands  against  different  persons  arising  out  of  distinct  transactions, 
renders  it  improper  to  include  in  one  suit  separate  infringements  of  the 
same  patent  by  different  defendants  ; 2  and  for  the  same  reason,  where 


and  daughters  who  should  attain  twenty-one 
years  or  marry  ;  with  a  proviso  that  the  persons 
to  be  appointed  guardians  of  the  children  by 
his  will,  together  with  the  trustees  of  the  set- 
tlement, should  have  authority  to  apply  the 
interest,  and  also,  in  certain  cases,  part  of  the 
capital,  of  the  children's  presumptive  shares, 
towards  their  maintenance  and  advancement 
during  their  respective  minorities.  By  a  second 
deed,  executed  after  marriage,  Sir  James  Camp- 
bell vested  another  fund  in  two  other  trustees, 
C  and  L),  but  upon  similar  trusts  to  those  of 
the  firs  settlement;  and  by  his  will,  after 
making  some  specific  bequests  to  hi*  wife,  he 
bequeathed  his  property  to  A,  B,  and  (',  upon 
certain  trusts  for  the  benefit  of  his  children, 
and  appointed  A,  B,  and  C  his  executors  and 
guardians  ot  his  infant  children,  in  conjunction 
with  their  mother.  After  the  death  of  Sir  James 
Campbell,  Lady  D.  L.  Campbell,  the  wife, 
together  with  the  children  of  the  marriage,  filed 
a  bill  against  A,  B,  C,  and  D,  for  the  accounts 
and  administration  of  the  property  comprised 
in  the  two  deeds  and  will,  to  which  bill  «  joint 
demurrer  was  put  in  by  A,  B,  and  C,  on  the 
ground  of  multifariousness.  The  demurrer  was, 
however,  overruled,  upon  argument,  by  Sir 
Lancelot  Shadwell  V.  C,  and  afterwards  by 
Lord  Cottenham  upon  appeal;  his  Lordship 
being  of  opinion  that  the  result  of  the  prin- 
ciples to  he  extracted  from  the  cases  was.  that 
where  there  is  a  common  liability  and  a  com- 
mon interest,  the  common  liability  being  in  the 
defendants,  and  the  common  interest  in  the 
plaintiffs,  different  grounds  of  property  maybe 
united  in  the  same  record.  See  1  M.  &  C.  623. 
A  bill  is  not  multifarious  which  unites  sev- 
eral matters  distinct  in  themselves,  but  which 
together  make  up  the  plaintiff's  equity, and  are 
necessary  to  complete  relief;  nor,  on  the  ground 


of  misjoinder  of  several  plaintiffs,  where  either 
of  them  would  not  be  entitled  to  proceed  sepa- 
rately for  relief  without  making  the  others 
defendants.  Hicks  v.  Campbell,  19  N.  J.  Eq. 
183  ;  Kennebec  and  Portland  R  R.  Co.  v.  Port- 
land and  Kennebec  R.  R.  Co.  54  Maine,  173; 
see  Coleman  e.  Barnes,  5  Allen,  374 ;  Skeel  v. 
Spraker,  8  Paige,  182;  Myers  v.  United  Guar- 
antee &c.  Co.  7  De  G.  M.  &  G.  112. 

1  Mole  i'.  Smith,  Jac.  494;  Mason  v.  Frank- 
lin, 1  Y.  &  C.  C.  C.  239,  241:  see  also  Whaley 
v.  Dawson,  2  Sch.  &  Lef.  367  ;  and  ante,  p.  230, 
231 ;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  272;  Whitten  v.  Whitten, 
36  N.  H.  326.  So  a  bill  by  a  mortgagee  against 
the  mortgagor  and  an  adverse  claimant  of  the 
land  would  be  multifarious.  Banks  v.  Walker, 
2  Sandf.  Ch.  344;  Dial  v.  Reynolds,  96  U.  S. 
340;  Eagle  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Lent,  6  Paige,  635; 
Corning  v.  Smith,  6  N.  Y.  82;  Wilkins  v.  Kirk- 
bride,  27  N.  J.  Eq.  93;  Farmers'  Loan  Co.  v. 
San  Diego  Street  Car  Co.  40  Fed.  Rep.  105; 
California  &c.  Co.  v.  Cheney  El.  Light  Co.  56  id. 
257:  McComb  v.  Spangler,  71  Cal.  423;  Croghan 
v.  Minor,  53  Cal.  15;  ante,  p.  277,  n.  2.  A  bill 
alleging  that  the  plaintiff  and  one  of  the  defend- 
ants were  copartners,  and  praying  for  a  settle- 
ment of  the  copartnership  concerns,  and  alleging 
a  fraudulent  sale  of  all  the  property  of  the  firm 
by  the  said  defendant  to  a  third  party,  who  whs 
the  other  defendant,  and  praying  that  such  sale 
may  be  declared  void,  is  bad  for  multifarious- 
ness.    Sawyer  v.  Noble,  55  Maine,  227. 

2  The  plaintiff  should  not,  however,  file  an 
unnecessary  number  of  bills;  if  he  does,  the 
Court  will  consolidate  the  suits,  or  make  some 
equivalent  order.  See  Foxwell.t'.  Webster.  4 
De  G.  J.  &  S.  77,  83;  10  Jur.  N.  S.  137;  12 
W.  R.  186,  L.  C;  2  Dr.  &  Sm.  250;  9  Jur.  N. 
S.  1189;  1  Seton,  347,  No.  8;  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  LI. 
4;  see  infra,  p.  797,  n. 

339 


341 


THE    BILL. 


a  copyright  has  been  infringed,  bills  must  be  filed  against  each  book- 
seller taking  spurious  copies  for  sale.3     And  so,  joint  and  sepa- 

*  340    rate  demands  cannot  be  united  in  the  same  bill ; 4  *  and  although 

the  defendants  may  be  liable  in  respect  of  every  one  of  the  de- 
mands made  by  the  bill,  yet  they  may  be  of  so  dissimilar  a  character 
as  to  render  it  improper  to  include  them  all  in  one  suit.  The  objection, 
in  these  cases,  is  more  strictly  called  misjoinder,  and  has  been  before 

alluded  to.1 

*  341        *  This  objection  will  only  apply  where  a  plaintiff  claims  several 


s  Dilly  v.  Doig,  2  Ves.  Jr.  486;  Story,  Eq. 
PI.  §  277,  278. 

4  Harrison  v.  Hogg,  2  Ves.  Jr.  323 ;  Swift  v. 
Eckford,  6  Paige,  22;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §§  271, 
279;  McLellan  v.  Osborne,  51  Maine,  118,  120; 
Enians  v.  Emans,  13  N.  J.  Eq.  205.  Thus  a 
bill  praying  for  an  account  of  two  distinct  firms, 
made  up,  in  part,  of  the  same  persons,  was  held 
bad  for  multifariousness.  Griffin  v.  Merrill,  10 
Md.  264.  So  where  three  persons  had  succes- 
sively withdrawn  from  a  firm,  reducing  the 
number  from  five  to  two,  a  bill  praying  for  an 
account  and  settlement  of  the  partnership  con- 
cerns for  the  whole  time,  was  held  to  be  bad 
for  multifariousness,  and  was  dismissed.  White 
v.  White,  5  Gill,  359.  So  a  prayer  in  a  bill  by 
one  of  several  part-owners  of  a  vessel  against 
other  part-owners,  who  became  such  at  several 
different  times,  for  an  account,  during  that 
period  of  time  when  all  were  owners,  was  held 
correct;  if  the  prayer  was  not  thus  limited,  the 
bill  would  be  bad  for  multifariousness.  McLel- 
lan v.  Osborne,  51  Maine,  118;  see  Latting  v. 
Latting,  4  Sandf.  Ch.  31;  as  to  suing  co-execu- 
tors, separately  liable,  for  contribution,  see 
Singleton  v.  Se'lwyn,  9  Jur.  N.  S.  1149;  12  W. 
R.  98,  V.  0.  W. ;  Micklethwait  v.  Winstanley, 
13  W.  R.  210,  L.  JJ. 

1  In  the  quotation  from  Lord  Cottenham's 
judgment  in  Campbell  v.  Mackay.  where  his 
Lordship  observes  that  the  distinction  I  etween 
misjoinder  and  multifariousness  is  clearly  ex- 
hibited in  the  case  of  Ward  v.  The  Duke  of 
Northumberland,  2  Anst.  469,  476;  see  Emans 
v.  Enians,  13  N.  J.  Eq.  205,  207;  Boyd  v.  Hoyt, 
5  Paige,  79.  "  In  that  case,''  said  his  Lordship, 
"the  plaintiff  had  been  tenant  of  a  colliery 
under  the  preceding  Duke  of  Northumberland, 
and  continued  also  to  be  tenant  under  his  son 
and  successor,  the  then  Duke:  and  l>e  filed  a 
bill  against  the  then  Duke  and  Lord  Beverley, 
who  were  the  executors  of  their  father,  seeking 
relief  against  them  in  respect  of  transactions, 
part  of  which  took  place  in  the  lifetime  of  the 
former  Duke,  and  part  between  the  plaintiff 
and  the  then  Duke  sifter  his  father's  decease. 
To  this  bill  the  defendants  put  in  separate  de- 
murrers, and  the  forms  of  the  two  demurrers, 
which  were  very  different,  clearly  illustrate 
the  distinction  above  adverted  to.    The  Duke 

340 


could  not  say  there  was  any  portion  of  the  bill 
with  which  he  was  not  necessarily  connected ; 
because  he  was  interested  in  one  part  of  it  as 
owner  of  the  mine,  in  the  other  as  represent- 
ing his  father.     But  his  defence  was,  that  it 
was  improper   to   join   in    one    record   a  case 
against  him  as  representative  of  his  father,  and 
a  case  against  him  arising  out  of  transactions 
in  which  he  was  personally  concerned.     (See 
Latting  i'.  Latting,  4  Sandf.  Ch.  31;  Van  Mater 
v.  Sickler,  9  N.  J.  Eq.  483.)     The  form  of  his 
demurrer   was    that   there   was    an    improper 
joinder    of   the    subject-matters    of  the    suit. 
Lord  Beverley's  demurrer   again    was   totally 
different:  it    was  in    the   usual  form  of  a  de- 
murrer  for    multifariousness,   and    proceeded 
on  the  ground  that,  by  including  transactions 
which  occurred  between  the  plaintiff  and  the 
other  defendant  with  transactions  between  the 
plaintiff  and  the  late  Duke  (with  the  latter  of 
which  only  Lord  Beverley  could  have  any  con- 
cern), the  bill  was  drawn  to   an    unnecessary 
length,  and   the    demurring  party  exposed  to 
improper  and  useless  expense.     (See  Turner  v. 
Amer.   Bapt.  Miss.  Union,    5    McLean,   344.) 
Both  demurrers  were  allowed,  and  both,  it  may 
be  said,  in  a  sense,  for  multifariousness;  but 
it  is  obvious  that  the  real  objection    was  very 
different  in    the   two   cases.      In    Harrison  v. 
Hogg,  2  Ves.   Jr.    323,  328,  which   was   also 
more  properly  a  case  of  misjoinder,  the  plain- 
tiffs endeavored  to   unite  in  one  record  a  de- 
mand in   which  all   the   plaintiffs  jointly  had 
an  interest,  with  a  demand  in  which  only  one 
of  them    had   an  interest;    and  the  demurrer 
was  allowed  upon  the  ground  that  the  subject- 
matters  were    such  as,  in  the   opinion  of   the 
Court,  ought    not,  according  to  the    rules  of 
pleading,  to  be  included  in  one  suit.     (Story, 
Eq.  PI.  §  279;  Boyd  v.  Hoyt,  5  Paige,  65;  Lar- 
kins  v.  Biddle,  21   Ala.  252;  Emans  v.  Emans, 
13  N.  J.  Eq.  205.)    In  Saxton  v.  Davis  (18  Ves. 
72,  80),  the  suit  prayed  an  account  against  the 
representatives  of  a  bankrupt's  assignees,  and 
against  Davis,  a  person  who  claimed  through 
those  assignees,  and  also  against  a  person  who 
had    been    his  assignee   under   the    Insolvent 
Debtors'  Act;  and  there  also  the  bill  was  held 
to  be  bad  for  multifariousness."      1   M.  &  C. 
619  j  Story,  Eq.  PL  §§  276,  285,  530. 


MATTER    OF   THE   BILL. 


342 


matters  of  different  natures  by  the  same  bill;  and  that  where  one 
general  right  only  is  claimed  by  the  bill,  though  the  defendants  have 
separate  and  distinct  interests,  a  demurrer  will  not  hold.1  As  where  a 
person,  claiming  a  general  right  to  the  sole  fishery  of  a  river,  files  a  bill 
against  a  number  of  persons  claiming  several  rights  in  the  fishery,  as 
lords  of  manors,  occupiers  of  lands  or  otherwise  ; 2  so,  in  a  bill  for  duties, 
the  city  of  London  was  permitted  to  bring  several  of  the  persons  before 
the  Court,  who  dealt  in  those  things  whereof  the  duty  was  claimed,  to 
establish  the  plaintiff's  right  to  it;8  and  where  the  lord  of  a  manor  filed 
a  bill  against  more  than  thirty  tenants  of  the  manor,  freeholders,  copy- 
holders, and  leaseholders,  who  owed  rents  to  the  lord,  but  had  confused 
the  boundaries  of  their  several  tenements,  praying  a  commission  to 
ascertain  the  boundaries,  and  it  was  objected,  at  a  hearing,  that 
the  suit  was  improper,  as  it  brought  before  the  Court  *  many  par-  *  342 
ties  having  distinct  interests,  it  was  answered  that  the  lord 
claimed  one  general  right,  for  the  assertion  of  which  it  was  necessary  to 
ascertain  the  several  tenements  ;  and  a  decree  was  made  accordingly.1 
Upon  the  same  principle  it  is,  that  one  suit  is  entertained  for  tithes 
against  several  parishioners.  Suits  of  this  kind,  however,  must  all  be 
for  objects  of  the  same  nature ;  and  if  a  bill  is  filed  against  several 
defendants  for  objects  of  a  different  nature,  although  the  plaintiff  claims 
them  all  in  the  same  character,  it  will  be  multifarious  ; 2  thus,  if  a  par- 
son should  prefer  a  bill  against  several  persons,  as  to  some  for  tithes  and 
as  to  others  for  glebe,  it  would  be  improper ;  and  so,  if  the  lord  of  a 
manor  should  prefer  one  bill  against  divers  tenants  for  several  distinct 


l  Ld.  Red.  182;  Bowers  v.  Keesecher,  9  Iowa, 
422;  Dimmock  v.  Bixby,  20  Pick.  368;  Sears 
v.  Carrier,  4  Allen,  341;  Tucker  v.  Tucker,  29 
Miss.  350;  Chase  v.  Searles,  45  N.  H.  519; 
Bugbee  v.  Sargent,  23  Maine,  269;  Warren 
v.  Warren,  56  Maine,  367;  Foss  v.  Haynes,  31 
Maine,  81;  Fellows  v.  Fellows,  4  Cowen,  682; 
Richards  v.  Pierce,  52  Maine,  562;  People  v. 
Morrill,  26  Cal.  336;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  278,  note; 
Murray  v.  Hay,  1  Barb.  Ch.  59;  Mix  v.  Hotch- 
kiss,  14  Conn.  32;  Booth  v.  Stamper,  10  Ga. 
109,  Nail  v.  Mobley,  9  Ga.  278;  Winslow  v. 
Dousman,  18  Wis.  456;  see  Watson  v.  Cox,  1 
Ired.  Eq.  389;  Stuart  v.  Colter,  4  Rand.  74  ; 
Newland  v.  Rogers,  3  Barb.  Ch.  432;  Robert- 
son v.  Stevens,  1  Ired.  Ch.  247;  Walkup  v. 
Zehring,  13  Iowa,  306 ;  Delafield  r.  Anderson, 
7  Sm.  &  M.  630;  Allen  v.  Montgomery  R.  R. 
Co.  11  Ala.  437;  Scrimeger  v.  Buchannon,  3 
A.  K.  Marsh.  219;  Parish  v.  Sloan,  3  Ired. 
Ch.  607;  Vaun  v.  Hargett,  2  Dev.  &  Bat.  Ch. 
31.  Nor  will  the  objection  of  multifariousness 
prevail  where  the  interests  of  the  several  plain- 
tiffs, though  distinct  and  upon  distinct  convey- 
ances, are  yet  of  a  similar  nature  against  the 
same  defendants,  and  in  relation  to  the  same 
subject-matter,  and  the  relief  prayed  is  in 
character  the  same  to  all.  Kunkel  v.  Markell, 
26  Md.  390,  409 ;  see  Thomas  v.  Doub,  8  Gill, 
7  ;  Young  v.  Lyons,  8  Gill,  166;   Williams  v. 


West,  2  Md.  198 ;  Peters  v.  Van  Lear,  4  Gill, 
263,  264.  But  a  bill  is  held  bad  for  multifa- 
riousness, where  it  is  brought  against  several 
defendants,  seeking  redress  for  injuries  arising 
out  of  transactions  with  them  separately,  at 
different  times,  and  relating  to  different  sub- 
jects. Coe  v.  Turner,  5  Conn.  86;  Marselis  v. 
Morris  Canal  &c.  1  Saxton  (N.  ■) .),  31 ;  Meacham 
v.  Williams,  9  Ala.  842;  Colburn  v.  B  rough  ton, 
9  Ala.  351;  Hungerford  v.  Cashing,  8  Wis. 
332.  Unconnected  demands  against  different 
estates  cannot  be  united  in  the  same  bill, 
though  the  defendant  is  executor  of  both. 
Daniel  v.  Morrison,  6  Dana,  186  ;  Kay  V.  Jones, 
7  .1.  J.  Marsh.  37;  see  McCartney  v.  Calhoun, 
11  Ala.  110. 

2  Mayor  of  York  9.  Pilkington,  1  Atk.  282. 
cited  Ld.  Red.  182;  Smith  v.  Enrl  Hrownlow, 
L.  R.  9  Eq.  241;  R.  S.  C  Ord.  XVI.  3,  4; 
Chase  v.  Searles,  45  N.  H.  511,  521. 

3  City  of  London  v.  Perkins,  3  Bro.  P.  C.  ed. 
Toml.  602. 

i  Magdalen  Coll.  v.  Athill,  cited  Ld.  Red. 
183;  and  see  Brown  v.  Wales,  L.  R.  15  Eq.  142, 
V.  C.  B. 

2  West  v.  Randall,  2  Mason,  181;  Cam 
bridge  Water  Works  v.  Somerville  Dyeing 
&c.  Co.  14  Gray,  193;  Swift  v.  Eckford,  6 
Paige,  22. 

341 


343 


THE   BILL. 


matters  and  causes,  such  as  common  waste,  several  piscary,  &c,  this 
would  be  wrong :  though  the  foundation  of  the  suit,  namely,  the  mauor, 
be  an  entire  thing.3 

Lord  Redesdale  appears  to  confine  the  meaning  of  multifariousness  to 
cases  where  a  plaintiff  demands  several  matters  of  different  natures  of  sev- 
eral defendants  by  the  same  bill.4  Where,  however,  an  informa- 
*  343  tion  5  against  *  a  company  stated  that  there  was  a  charity  for  the 
benefit  of  young  men  being  free  of  the  Company,  and  then  alleged 
that  divers  other  bequests  had  been  made  to  the  company  for  the  purpose  of 
mnking  loans  to  young  men  for  their  advancement  in  business  or  life,  and 
prayed  that  the  first  mentioned  charity,  and  all  other  (if  any)  like  gifts  and 
bequests  to  the  company  might  be  established,  and  that  the  due  perform- 
ance of  the  charitable  trusts  might  be  enforced  for  the  future,  a  demurrer 
put  in  to  the  information,  because  it  was  exhibited  for  several  and  distinct 
matters  which  ought  not  to  be  joined  together  in  one  information,  was 
allowed.1  Here,  however,  there  was  nothing  in  the  information  to  show 
that  the  character  of  the  bequests  was  homogeneous,  and  the  judge  held 
that  if  there  had  been  any  allegation  to  show  that  they  were  of  that 
character,  although  there  might  be  minute  differences  between  the 
bequests,  they  might  all  have  been  comprised  in  the  same  information.2 


8  Berke  v.  Harris,  Hardres,  337. 

4  Ld.  Red.  181. 

5  Att.-Gen  v.  Goldsmiths'  Co.  5  Sim.  670, 
675.  Sir  Lancelot  Shad  well  V.  C.  here  said: 
"I  apprehend  that,  besides  what  Lord  Redes- 
dale has  laid  down  upon  the  subject,  there  is 
a  rule  arising  out  of  the  constant  practice  of 
the  Court,  that  it  is  not  competent,  where  A  is 
sole  plaintiff  and  B  is  sole  defendant,  for  A  to 
unite  in  his  bill  against  B  all  sorts  of  matters 
wherein  they  may  be  mutually  concerned.  (See 
Story,  Eq.  PI.  280;  Bryan  r.  Blythe,  4  Blackf. 
249;  White  v.  Curtis.  2  Gray,  467 ;  Davoue  v. 
Fanning.  4  John.  Cb.  204;  Carnvchael  v.  Bow- 
der,  3  How.  (Miss.)  252;  Robertson  r.  Stevens, 
1  Ired.  Eq.  247;  Story.  Eq.  PI.  §  282;  Lynch 
v.  Johnson,  2  Litt.  104.)  If  such  a  mode  of  pro- 
ceeding were  allowed,  we  should  have  A  filing 
a  bill  against  B,  praying  to  foreclose  one  mort- 
gage, and  in  Ihe  same  bill  praying  to  redeem 
another,  and  asking  many  other  kinHs  of  relief 
with  respect  to  many  other  subjects  of  com- 
plaint." See  Att.-Gen.  v.  Carmarthen,  G.  Coop. 
30;  Att.-Gen.  v.  St.  Cross  Hospital,  17  Beav. 
435;  Hughes  v.  Cook,  34  Beav.  407;  Att.-Gen. 
v.  Karl  of  Durham.  46  L.  T.  16:  see  Story,  Eq. 
PI.  §§  531,  532,  533;  Kent  v.  Lee.2  Sandf.  Ch. 
105.  A  bill  is  multifarious  which  seeks  to  re- 
deem a  mortgage  of  an  entire  estate,  and  a 
subsequent  mortgage  by  one  tenant  in  common 
of  his  share  in  a  part  of  the  estate.  White  v. 
Curtis,  2  Gray.  467.  But  a  bill  is  not  neces- 
sarily multifarious,  by  reason  of  its  seeking  to 
redeem  two  distinct  mortgages  of  different  par- 
cels of  real  estate,  or  by  reason  of  its  seeking 

342 


specific  performance  of  distinct  contracts  relat- 
ing to  different  parcels  of  real  estate.  Robin- 
son v.  Guild,  12  Met.  323;  see  Price  r.  Minot, 
107  Mass.  63;  and  Holman  v.  Bank  of  Norfolk, 
12  Ala.  369.  Nor  where  it  seeks  to  foreclose  a 
mortgage  of  land,  and  to  redeem  a  prior  mort- 
gage of  one  of  the  tracts  held  by  one  of  the 
defendants.  Bell  r.  Woodward,  42  N.  H.  181. 
A  bill  for  a  general  account  and  settlement  of  a 
copartnership  may  embrace  every  object  neces- 
sary to  the  complete  adjustment  of  the  concern, 
without  being  objectionable  for  multifarious- 
ness. Wells  v.  Strange,  5  Ga.  22;  see  Kent  v. 
Lee,  2  Sandf.  Ch.  105;  Tomlinson  v.  Claywell, 
4  Jones  Eq.  (N.  C.)  317.  Debt  and  detinue 
may  be  joined,  and  for  a  similar  reason,  a  claim 
for  a  specific  tract  of  land,  and  for  a  sum  of 
money,  the  parties  being  the  same,  may  be 
united  in  the  same  suit  in  Chancery.  Whitney 
v.  Whitney,  5  Dana.  329. 

i  See  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §§  532,  533. 

2  See  5  Sim.  676.  Thus,  in  Att.-Gen.  v< 
Merchant  Tailors'  Co.  5  Sim.  288,  where  the 
information  prayed  the  establishment  or  regu- 
lation of  a  great  number  of  different  charitable 
gifts,  which  were  stated  in  the  information  to 
have  been  made  to  the  company,  by  way  of 
bequest  or  otherwise,  on  trust  to  lend  out  the 
same  to  freemen  of  the  company,  or  upon  some 
other  like  or  corresponding  trust,  for  the  benefit 
and  advancement  of  freemen  in  trade  or  busi- 
ness, the  number  of  charities  in  respect  of 
which  the  relief  was  sought  by  the  information 
was  eight;  but  as  they  were  to  be  applied 
mainly  and  substantially  for  the  same  objects, 


MATTER    OF    THE    BILL. 


*344 


It  thus  appears  that  a  plaintiff  cannot  join  in  his  bill,  even  against  the 
same  defendant,  matters  of  different  natures,  although  arising  out  of  the 
same  transaction  ;  yet,  when  the  matters  are  homogeneous  in  their  char- 
acter, the  introduction  of  them  into  the  same  bill  will  not  be 
multifarious;  and  *  it  is  to  be  observed  that  this  distinction  will  *  344 
not  be  affected  by  the  circumstance  of  the  plaintiff  claiming  the 
same  thing  under  distinct  titles,  and  that  the  statement  of  such  different 
titles  in  the  same  bill  will  not  render  it  multifarious.1  Thus,  where  a 
bill  was  filed  for  tithes  by  the  rector  of  a  parish  in  London,  in  which  the 
title  was  laid  under  a  decree  made  pursuant  to  the  37th  Hen.  VIII.  c.  12, 
by  which  payment  of  tithes  was  decreed  in  London  at  the  rate  of  2s.  9d. 
iu  the  pound  on  the  rents,  with  a  charge  that,  in  case  such  decree  should 
not  be  deemed  binding,  the  plaintiff  was  entitled  to  a  similar  payment, 
under  a  previous  decree,  made  in  the  year  1535,  and  confirmed  by  the 
same  Act ;  and  in  case  neither  of  the  said  decrees  were  binding,  the  bill 
charged  that  the  plaintiff  was  entitled,  by  ancient  usage  and  custom  from 
time  immemorial,  to  certain  dues  and  oblations  calculated  according 
to  rent  at  2s.  9d.  in  the  pound :  a  demurrer  for  multifariousness  was 
overruled.2 

As  a  bill  by  the  same  plaintiff  against  the  same  defendant  for  different 
matters  would  be  considered  multifarious,  so,  a  fortiori,  would  a  bill  by 
several  plaintiffs,  demanding  distinct  matters,  against  the  same  defend- 
ants.3    Thus,  if  an  estate  is  sold  in  lots  to  different  purchasers,  the 

v.  Portland  and  Kennebec  R.  R.  Co.  54  Maine, 
173.  A  bill  brought  by  an  insurance  company, 
praying  that  a  policy  of  insurance,  which  has 
been  obtained  from  them  by  fraud,  may  be  de- 
livered up  to  be  cancelled,  and  also  that  a 
commission  may  issue  for  the  examination  of 
witnesses,  is  not  multifarious.  Commercial 
Mut,  Ins.  Co.  v.  McLoon,  14  Allen,  351. 

2  Owen  v.  Nodin,  M'Lel.  238;  13  Price, 
478;  and  see  Boyd  v.  Moyle,  2  Coll.  316,  323; 
where  a  bill  to  restrain  two  actions  relating  to 
the  same  matter  was  held  not  to  be  multifa- 
rious: see  also  Davis  v.  Cripps,  2  Y.&C.  C.C. 
430,  434. 

3  Jones  v.  Garcia  del  Rio,  T.  &  R.  297,  301; 
see  Finley  v.  Harrison,  5  J.  J.  Marsh.  158;  Kay 
v.  Jones,  7  J.  J.  Marsh.  37;  Allen  v.  Miller,  4 
Jones  Eq.  (N.  C.)  146;  Mix  t>.  Hotchkiss,  14 
Conn.  32;  Kennedy  v.  Kennedy,  2  Ala.  571; 
Armstrong  v.  Athens  Co.  10  Ohio,  235;  Ohio  v. 
Ellis,  10  Ohio,  456;  Marshall  v.  Means,  12  Ga. 
61 ;  Ayers  v.  Wright,  8  Ired.  Eq.  229.  But  a 
widow  who  is  administratix  of  her  husband's 
estate,  and  brings  a  bill  in  Equity  to  redeem 
real  estate  mortgaged  by  him,  does  not  make 
the  bill  multifarious,  by  therein  claiming  to 
maintain  her  suit  in  both  capacities.  Robinson 
v.  Guild,  12  Met.  323;  see  Fairly  v.  Priest,  3 
Jones  Eq.  (N.  C.)  21.  One  tax-payer  of  a 
school  district  cannot  sue  in  behalf  of  himself 
and  of  the  other  tax-payers  of  the  district,  to 
restrain  the  sale  of  their  real  estate  for  the  pur- 
pose of  collecting  a  delinquent  tax  assessed  to 

343 


and  it  appeared  upon  the  information  that, 
owing  to  the  minuteness  of  the  sums,  each  of 
them  could  not  be  administered  as  the  donors 
pointed  out,  Sir  Lancelot  Shadwell  V.  C. 
thought  that  the  Court  ought,  at  the  hear- 
ing, to  deal  with  them  conjointly,  and  that 
the  information  was  not  multifarious.  On 
appeal,  Lord  Brougham  concurred  with  this 
decision,  as  to  seven  of  the  charities,  and  gave 
leave  to  amend  the  bill  by  adding  parties  or 
waiving  relief  as  to  the  eighth.  1  M.  &  K. 
18:),  192.  It  is  no  objection  to  a  bill  in  Equity 
praying  for  the  specific  performance  of  an  agree- 
ment to  convey  land,  that  it  also  alleges  that 
the  defendant  purchased  the  land  as  the  plain- 
tiff's agent,  and  with  his  money,  and  therefore 
holds  it  in  trust  for  the  plaintiff.  Gerrish  v. 
Towne,  3  Gray,  82. 

1  Neither  is  a  bill  multifarious  where  its 
allegations  all  relate  to  one  transaction,  between 
th^  same  parties,  to  one  and  the  same  subject- 
matter  and  the  same  injury,  although  it  may 
pray  for  two  different  methods  of  relief  against 
that  injury.  Wells  v.  Bridgeport  &c.  Co  30 
Conn.  316.  Nor  is  a  bill  multifarious  because 
several  grounds  are  set  out  to  show  the  plain- 
tiff's right  to  the  relief  sought.  Cauleyr.  I^aw- 
son,  5  Jones  Eq.  (N.  C.)  132. 

Where  the  transactions  charged  are  parts  of 
a  series  of  acts,  all  tending  to  defeat  the  plain- 
tiff's remedy  at  law,  they  may  properly  be 
united  .in  the  same  bill.  Randolph  v.  Daly,  16 
N.  J.  Eq.  313,  Kennebec  &  Portland  R.  R.  Co. 


*  346  THE    BILL. 

purchasers  cannot  join  in  exhibiting  one  bill  against  the  vendoi  for  a 

specific  performance  ;  for  each  party's  case  would  be  distinct,  and  there 

must  be  a  distinct  bill  upon  each  contract.4     Upon  the  same  prin- 

*  345     ciple,  where  the  heir  *  and  next  of  kin  of  an  intestate,  who  was 

an  infant,  was  joined  with  his  sister,  who  was  the  other  next  of 
kin,  as  plaintiff  in  a  bill  against  the  widow,  who  had  taken  out  admin- 
istration to  the  intestate's  effects,  and  had  also  taken  possession  of  the 
real  estate,  as  guardian  to  the  infant  heir,  for  an  account  both  of  the 
real  and  personal  estate,  a  demurrer  for  multifariousness  was  allowed 
on  the  ground  that  the  interests  in  the  real  and  personal  estate  were 
distinct  from  each  other.1  But  a  bill  does  not  become  multifarious 
because  all  the  plaintiffs  are  not  interested  to  an  equal  extent ;  thus, 
where  a  bill  was  filed  by  a  woman  and  her  children  to  compel  the 
delivery  up  of  a  deed,  by  which  the  defendant  had  made  a  provision 
for  the  woman  (with  whom  he  had  cohabited),  and  her  children,  and 
which  had  been  executed  in  pursuance  of  an  agreement,  whereby  he 
was  bound,  besides  the  execution  of  the  deed,  to  pay  to  the  woman  an 
annuity  for  her  life,  an  account  of  which  was  also  sought  by  the  bill ; 
and  it  was  objected,  upon  demurrer,  that  the  bill  was  multifarious, 
because,  besides  seeking  the  performance  of  the  agreement  under  which 
the  mother  alone  was  entitled,  it  joined  to  that  the  claim  for  the  deed, 
in  which  she  was  interested  jointly  with  her  children ;  it  was  held  that, 
the  whole  case  of  the  mother  being  properly  the  subject  of  one  bill,  the 
suit  did  not  become  multifarious  because  all  the  plaintiffs  were  not 
interested  to  an  equal  extent.2 

And  so,  where  several  persons  claim  under  one  general  right,  they 
may  file  one  bill  for  the  establishment  of  that  right,  without  incurring 

the  risk  of  a  demurrer  for  multifariousness,  although  the  title  of 

*  346  each  plaintiff  may  be  distinct ;  3  thus,4  *  where  the  freehold  ten- 
pay  certain  judgments  against  the  district,  and  cancelled,  the  notes  being  all  made  by  the  plain- 
to  have  the  judgments  declared  void,  on  the  tiff,  and  payable  to  the  same  party,  is  not  multi- 
ground  that  they  were  obtained  on  illegal  and  farious,  for  joining  as  respondents  the  several 
void  school  orders,  &c.  Each  tax-payer  desiring  persons  holding  these  notes.  Garrett  r.Missis- 
the  relief  sought,  must  bring  his  several  action,  sippi  &  Ala.  R.  R.  Co.  1  Freeman  Ch.  70;  see 
Newcomb  v.  Horton,  18  Wis.  566.  Sears  v.  Carrier,  4  Allen,  339;  Bailee  v.  Tomp- 

*  Hargreaves  v.  Wright,  10  Hare  App.  56;  kins,4Sneed  (Tenn.),  623;  Halsteadtf.  Shepard, 

Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  272,  and  notes:  and  see  Hudson  23  Ala.  558;  Martin  v.  Martin,  13  Miss.  36. 
».  Ma'ddison,  12  Sim.  416.418  (ante,  p.  303.  n.  i  Dunn  v.  Dunn,  2  Sim.  329;  Maud  i>.  Aek- 

(n),  which  was  the  case  of  a  bill  by  several  per-  lorn,  id.    331;    Exeter  College  r.  Rowland,   6 

sons  to  restrain  a  nuisance ;  see,however, Pollock  Mad.  94;  see,  however,  Sanders  v.  Kelsey,  10 

p.  Lester.  11  Hare,  266,  where  it  was  held  that,  Jur.  833,  V.  C.  E.;  Innes  v.  Mitchell,  4  Drew, 

in  a  similar  case,  it  was   no   misjoinder,  and  57;  3  Jur.  N.  S.  756;  Thomas  v.  Rees,  1  Jur. 

wns  within  the  provisions  of  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  N.  S.  197,  M.  R.;  Allen  r.  Miller,  4  Jones  Eq. 

§  49      But  where  an  administrator  has  collu-  (N.  C.)  146. 

sively  sold  separate  lots  to  separate  purchasers  2  Knye  v.  Moore,  1  S.  &  S.  61,  64.     See 

at  the  same  sale,  a  bill  against  all  the  purchasers  observations  on  this  case  in  Dunn  v.  Dunn,  2 

is  not  multifarious.     Forniquet  v.  Forstall,  34  Sim.  331;  Commissioners  of  Sewers  r.  Glasse, 

Miss.  87;  see  Coleman  v.  Barnes,  5  Allen,  374;  L.  R.  7  Ch.  456;  L.  R.   19  Eq.  134;  1  Seton, 

Tucker  t.   Tucker,  29   Miss.    350;   Gaines    v.  216;  Fiery  v.  Emmert,  36  Md.  464. 
Chew,  2  How.  (U.  S)  619;  Williams  v.  Neel,  10  3  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  279  a;  Shields  r.  Thomas, 

Rich.  Eq.  338;  Bray  r.  Thatcher,  28  Miss.  129.  18  How.  (U.  S.)  253.     Where  a  bill  in  Equity, 

A  bill  to  have  certain  notes  delivered  up  and  by  several  plaintiffs,  to  enjoin  a  nuisance,  con- 


*  Powell  v.  The  Earl  of  Powis,  1  Y.  &  J.  159;  see  Cornwell  v.  Lee,  14  Conn.  524. 
344 


MATTER    OF    THE    BILL. 


346 


ants  of  a  lordship  having  rights  of  common  over  certain  lands,  the 
lord  approved  parts  of  the  common  lands  and  granted  them  to  other 
persons,  but  the  tenants  prostrated  the  fences,  upon  which  actions  of 
trespass  were  brought  against  them,  and  they  filed  a  bill  in  the  Court  of 
Exchequer,  in  the  nature  of  a  bill  of  peace,  against  the  lord  and  his 
grantees,  to  be  quieted  in  the  enjoyment  of  their  commonable  rights,  a 
general  demurrer  was  overruled,  the  Court  being  of  opinion,  that  the 
objection  that  the  plaintiffs  might  each  have  a  right  to  make  a  separate 
defence  to  the  actions  at  Law,  was  not  valid,  as  there  was  one  general 
question  to  be  settled,  which  pervaded  the  whole. 

The  proper  way  in  which  to  take  advantage  of  multifariousness  in  a 
bill  is  by  demurrer ; 1  and  it  is  too  late  to  object  to  a  suit,  on  that  ground, 
at  the  hearing.2  It  seems,  however,  from  the  report  of  the  judgment  of 
Sir  John  Leach  M.  K.  in  Greenwood  v.  Churchill ,8  that  the  objection  may 
be  taken  by  answer,4  and  that  though  the  defendants  are  precluded  from 


tained  also  a  prayer  for  an  account  and  com- 
pensation for  the  damage  to  each  complainant 
respectively,  it  was  held,  that  multifarious  re- 
lief could  not  be  granted  as  prayed  for;  but 
that  the  objection  might  be  obviated  by  strik- 
ing out  the  prayer  for  an  nccount  of  the  damage 
to  the  plaintiffs  respectively.  Murray  v.  Hay, 
1  Barb.  Ch.  59  ;  Brady  v.  Weeks,  3  Barb.  (S.  C.) 
157.  So  in  other  cases,  where  all  the  plaintiffs 
are  interested  in  the  principal  matter  stated  in 
the  bill,  but  the  bill  states  a  distinct  ground 
for  the  interference  of  Equity,  which  concerns 
only  one  of  the  plaintiffs,  if  there  is  no  praver 
for  relief  touching  this  latter  matter,  the  bill  is 
not  multifarious.  Judson  v.  Toulmin,  9  Ala. 
662;  Davis  v.  Miller,  4  Jones  Eq.  (N.  C.)  447; 
ante,  p.  334,  n.  1. 

1  For  form  of  demurrer,  see  Vol.  III.  Under 
the  present  English  practice,  the  objection  of 
uniting  too  many  causes  of  action  in  one  suit  is 
not  taken  by  demurrer,  but  by  application  for 
separate  trials.  See  Cox  v.  Barker,  3  Ch.  D. 
359;  Bagot  v.  Easton,  7  Ch.  D.  1;  Howell  v. 
West,  \V.  N.  (1879)  90;  Dessilla  v.  Schunck, 
W.  N.  (1880)  96;  R.  S. C.  Ord.  XVII. 8,  9;  XX. 

2  Ward  v.  Cooke,  5  Mad.  122;  Wynne  ». 
Callander,  1  Russ.  293,  296;  Powell  v.  Cock- 
erel 1,  4  Hare,  557,  562;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  284  a; 
Green  v.  Richards,  23  N.  J.  Eq.  32;  Ann  in  v. 
Annin,  24  id.  184  ;  Sanborn  r.  Adair,  27  id.  425; 
Cousens  v.  Rose,  I,.  R.  12  Eq.  366.  Upon 
demurrer  for  multifariousness,  a  portion  of  the 
bill  asking  relief  which  it  is  not  in  the  power  of 
the  Court  to  grant  may  be  disregarded,  and  the 
residue  of  the  bill,  if  unobjectionable,  sustained. 
Snavely  v.  Harkrader,  29  Gratt.  112.  It  is 
held,  in  the  following  cases,  that  advantage 
must  be  taken  of  multifariousness  by  demurrer. 
Bryan  v.  Blythe,  4  Blackf.  249:  Grove  v.  Fresh, 
9  Gill  &  J.  281;  Thurman  v.  Shelton,  10  Yer- 
ger,  383 ;  I.uckett  v.  White,  10  Gill  &  J.  480 ; 
Bell    v.  Woodward,  42  N.  H.   181,  189;  see 


Avery  v.  Kellogg,  11  Conn.  562;  Moreau  v. 
Saffarans,  3  Sneed  (Tenn.),  595;  Redmond  v. 
Dana,  3  Bosw.  (N.  Y.)  615.  Filing  an  answer 
and  going  into  an  examination  of  testimony  as 
to  the  merits  of  the  whole  matter  in  contro- 
versy is  a  waiver  of  the  objection.  Gibbs  v. 
Clagett,  2  Gill  &  J.  14;  but  see  Murdock  v. 
Ratcliff,  7  Ohio,  119;  Nelson  v.  Hill,  5  How. 
(U.  S.)  127;  Wellborn  v.  Tiller,  10  Ala.  305; 
Veghte  v.  Raritan  Water  Power  Co.  19  N.  J. 
Eq.  142,  144,  145.  In  Oliver  v.  Piatt,  3  How. 
(U  S  )  333,  412,  it  was  held,  that  the  objection 
of  multifariousness  cannot,  as  a  matter  of  right, 
be  taken  by  the  parties  except  on  demurrer, 
plea,  or  answer;  if  not  so  taken,  it  must  be 
regarded  as  waived.  Wilson  v.  Lynt,  30  Barb. 
(X.  Y.)  124;  Abbot  v.  Johnson,  "32  N.  H.  9. 
A  demurrer  to  a  bill  for  multifariousness  goes 
to  the  whole  bill.  Boyd  v.  Hoyt,  5  Paige,  65; 
Mcintosh  v.  Alexander,  16  Ala.  87;  White  v. 
White,  5  Gill,  359.  To  a  bill  to  foreclose  a 
mortgage  of  land,  and  to  redeem  a  prior  mort- 
gage of  one  of  the  tracts,  held  by  one  of  the 
defendants,  a  plea  was  filed  that  the  plaintiff's 
mortgage  did  not  cover  the  tract  which  was 
sought  to  be  redeemed,  and  the  bill  was  there- 
fore multifarious.  It  was  held  that  the  facts, 
if  well  pleaded  and  established  by  the  proof, 
showed  the  hill  to  be  defective  on  the  ground 
of  multifariousness.  Bell  v.  Woodward,  42 
N.  H.  181. 

a  1  M.  &  K.  559.  When  the  objection  is  pre- 
sented by  answer,  the  Court  has  discretionary 
power  on  the  hearing  to  sustain  or  disregard  the 
objection.     Labadie  v.  Hewitt,  85  111.  341. 

*  Bell  v.  Woodward,  42  N.  H.  181,  189; 
Abbot  v.  Johnson,  32  N.  H.  9.  To  sustain  a 
demurrer  to  a  bill  for  multifariousness  against 
several  defendants,  it  is  not  necessary  that  the 
defendant  demurring  should  so  far  answer  the 
bill  as  to  deny  the  ordinary  general  charge  of 
combination.    Emans  v.  Emans,  14  N   J.  Eq. 

345 


*347 


THE   BILL. 


raising  the  objection  at  the  hearing,  the  Court  itself  will  take  the  objec- 
tion, if  it  thinks  fit  to  do  so,  with  a  view  to  the  order  and  regularity  of 

its  proceedings.6 
*  347  *  Great  care  must  be  taken,  in  framing  a  bill,  that  it  does  not 
contain  statements  or  charges  which  are  scandalous  or  imperti- 
nent;1 for  if  it  does  it  may  be  objected  to  by  the  defendant.2  Any 
proceeding  before  the  Court  may  be  objected  to  for  scandal  or  imperti- 
nence, and  the  scandalous  matter  expunged,  with  costs  to  the  party 
aggrieved.8 

Scandal  consists  in  the  allegation  of  anything  which  is  unbecoming 
the  dignity  of  the  Court  to  hear,  or  is  contrary  to  good  manners,  or  which 
charges  some  person  with  a  crime  not  necessary  to  be  shown  in  the 
cause  ;4  to  which  may  be  added,  that  any  unnecessary  allegation,  bearing 
cruelly  upon  the  moral  character  of  an  individual,  is  also  scandalous.6 

There  are  many  cases,  however,  in  which  the  words  in  the  record, 
though  apparently  very  scandalous,  are  yet,  if  material  to  the  matter  in 
dispute,  and  tending  to  a  discovery  of  the  point  in  question,  not  con- 
sidered as  scandalous : 6  for  a  man  may  be  stated  on  the  record  to  be 


205,  207;  see  Brookes  v.  Whitworth,  1  Mad.  86; 
Salvidge  v.  Hyde,  5  Mad.  138. 

5  Greenwood  v.  Churchill,  1  M  &  K.  557; 
Ohio  v.  Ellis,  10  Ohio,  456.  Where  the  defend- 
ant omits  to  demur  for  multifariousness,  the 
Court  may,  sun  sponte,  take  the  objection  and 
dismiss  the  bill;  but  the  Court  should  not  in- 
terfere in  this  way  when  the  trouble  and  expense 
by  reason  of  multifariousness  might  have  been 
saved  by  a  demurrer.  Chew  v.  Bank  of  Balti- 
more, 14  Md.  299;  Oliver  v.  Piatt,  3  How.  U.  S. 
333,  412;  Ohio  v.  Ellis,  10  Ohio,  456;  Hickman 
v.  Cooke,  3  Humph.  640;  Swayze  v.  Swayze,  9 
N.  J.  Eq.  273;  Rockwell  r.  Morgan,  13  N.  J. 
Eq.  384,  386;  Wales  v.  Newbould,  9  Mich.  45; 
Einans  v.  Emans,  14  N.  J.  Eq.  114.  But,  as 
stated  in  note  above,  the  objection  of  multi- 
fariousness, when  apparent  on  the  face  of  the 
bill,  can,  in  general,  be  taken  only  by  demurrer; 
and  in  such  case  is  waived  by  not  demurring  to 
the  bill;  but,  if  it  be  not  apparent  upon  the  bill, 
it  is  open  to  the  defendant  on  his  plea,  or  his 
answer  made  expressly  for  the  purpose  of  tak- 
ing advantage  of  it.  Bell  ».  Woodward,  42 
N.  H.  181;  Veghte  v.  Raritan  Water  Power 
Co.  19  N.  J.  Eq.  142, 145,  per  Chancellor  Zabris- 
kie;  see  Wilson  v.  Lynt,  30  Bart..  (N.  T.)  124; 
Avery  v.  Kellogg,  11  Conn.  562;  Cuyler  v. 
Moreiand,  6  Paige,  273;  Luckett  v.  White,  10 
Gill  &  J.  480;  Thurman  v.  Shelton,  10  Yerger, 
383;  Buffalow  v.  Buffalow,  2  Ired.  Ch.  113; 
Grove  v.  Fresh,  9  Gill  &  J.  280;  Gibbs  v. 
Cloyett,  2  Gill  &  J.  14;  Bryan  v.  Blythe,  4 
Blackf.  249;  Veghte  v.  Raritan  Water  Power 
Co.  19  N.  J.  Eq.  142.  And  where  the  bill 
se's  forth  two  distinct  and  independent  grounds 
of  complaint,  the  objection  of  multifarious- 
ness  is   obviated    by  the   removal   of  one   of 

346 


those  grounds  by  the  defendant  after  the  ril- 
ing of  the  bill  and  before  answer.  Whitney 
v.  Union  Railway  Co.  11  Gray,  359;  Commer- 
cial Mut.  Ins.  Co.  v.  McLoon,  14  Allen,  351 ; 
McCabe  v.  Bellows,  1  Allen,  269. 

i  See  26th  Equity  Rule  of  United  States 
Courts,  post,  p.  336,  note,  Ap. 

2  Cons.  Ord.  VIII.  2;  XVI.  21;  XXXV.  60; 
R.  S.  C.  Ord.  XXVII.  1;  Marriott  v.  Marriott, 
26  W.  R.  416;  W.  N.  (1878)  57.  For  form  of 
order,  see  2  Seton.  1633,  No.  6. 

3  Erskine  v.  Garthshore,  18  Ves.  114;  Ex 
parte  Le  Heup,  id.  221,  223 ;  Harris  r.  Jenkins, 
22  Ch.  D.  481;  Doe  v.  Green,  2  Paige,  349; 
Soniers  v.  Torrey,  5  Paige,  64;  Powell  r.  Kane, 
5  Paige,  265;  Camden  and  Amboy  H.  R.  Co.  v. 
Stewart,  19  N.  J.  Eq.  343,  346.  But  the  bill 
cannot  be  referred  for  impertinence  after  an- 
swer, nor  even  after  submitting  to  answer,  as 
by  praying  time.  Anon.  2  Ves.  631 ;  Ferrar  r. 
Ferrar,  1  Dick.  173;  Anon.  5  Ves.  656;  Jones 
v.  Spencer.  2  Tenn.  Ch.  776. 

4  Wyatt's  P.  R.  383. 

5  Per  Lord  Eldon,  in  Ex  parte  Simpson,  15 
Ves.  476;  and  see  Coffin  v.  Cooper,  6  Ves.  514; 
Atwool  v.  Ferrier,  W.  N.  (1866)  276;  14  W. 
R.  1014,  V.  C.  W.;  Christie  v.  Christie,  L.  R. 
8  Ch.  499.  Facts  not  material  to  the  decision 
are  impertinent,  and,  if  reproachful,  are  scanda- 
lous.    Woods  v.  Morrell,  1  John.  Ch.  103. 

6  Nothing  can  be  scandalous  which  is  rele- 
vant. Fisher  v.  Owen,  8  Ch.  D.  645,  653; 
Cleaves  v.  Morrow,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  592;  Goodrich 
v.  Rodney,  1  Minn.  195.  Thus  a  statement  in 
an  answer,  introduced  to  show  the  temper  with 
which  a  bill  is  filed,  and  the  oppressive  course 
pursued  by  the  plaintiff,  is  not  scandalous  or 
impertinent,  inasmuch  us  it  may  have  an  effect 


MATTER    OF   THE    BILL.  *  348 

guilty  of  a  very  notorious  fraud,  or  a  very  scandalous  action,  as  in  the 
case  of  a  brokerage  bond,  given  before  marriage,  to  draw  in  a 
poor  woman  to  marry ;  or  where  a  *  man  falsely  represents  him-  *  348 
self  to  have  a  great  estate,  when  in  fact  he  is  a  bankrupt;  or 
where  one  man  is  personated  for  another ;  or  in  the  case  of  a  common 
cheat,  gamester,  or  sharper  about  the  town :  in  these,  and  many  other 
instances,  the  allegations  may  appear  to  be  very  scandalous,  and  not  fit 
to  remain  on  the  records  of  the  Court ;  and  yet,  perhaps,  without  having 
an  answer  to  them,  the  party  may  lose  his  right ;  the  Court,  therefore, 
always  judges  whether,  though  matter  be  prima  facie  scandalous,  it  is 
or  is  not  of  absolute  necessity  to  state  it ;  and  if  it  materially  tends 
to  the  point  in  question,1  and  is  become  a  necessary  part  of  the  cause, 
and  material  to  the  defence  of  either  party,  the  Court  never  looks  upon 
this  to  be  scandalous.2  Were  it  otherwise,  it  would  be  laying  down  a 
rule  that  all  charges  of  fraud  are  scandalous  :  which  would  be  danger- 
ous.8 If,  therefore,  a  bill  is  filed  by  a  cestui  que  trust  for  the  purpose  of 
removing  a  trustee,  it  is  not  scandalous  or  impertinent  to  challenge 
every  act  of  the  trustee  as  misconduct,  or  to  impute  to  him  corrupt  or 
improper  motives,  in  the  execution  of  the  trust,  or  to  allege  that  his 
conduct  is  the  vindictive  consequence  of  some  act  on  the  part  of  the 
cestui  que  trust,  or  of  some  change  in  his  situation.4  In  such  case,  how- 
ever, it  would  be  impertinent,  and  might  be  scandalous,  to  state  any 
circumstance  as  evidence  of  general  malice  or  personal  hostility,  without 
connecting  such  circumstance  with  the  acts  of  the  trustee  which  are 
complained  of:  because  the  fact  of  the  trustee  entertaining  general  mal- 
ice or  hostility  against  the  plaintiff,  affords  no  necessary  or  legal  infer- 
ence that  his  conduct  in  any  particular  instance  results  from  such 
motive. 

Under  a  general  charge  of  immorality,  evidence  of  particular  instances 
of  misconduct  may  be  introduced.5  Where,  therefore,  such  evidence  can 
be  made  use  of  under  the  general  charge,  the  specific  instances  should 
not,  if  it  can  be  avoided,  be  introduced  into  the  bill ;  thus,  it  is  improper, 
in  a  suit  which  is  founded  upon  the  want  of  chastity  in  a  particular 
individual,  as  in  cases  of  bills  to  set  aside  securities  given  turbi  con- 
sideratione,  to  charge  particular  instances  of  levity  which  might  affect 
the  character  of  strangers,  and  to  till  the  record  with  private  scandal : 

on  the  costs.     Desplaces  v.  Goris,  1  Edw.  Ch.  W.    N.   (1806)  67,   V.   C.  S  ;    12    .Tur.  N.  S. 

350.     So  it  has   been  held,  that    an  executor,  156,  V    C.  S  ;  Rubery  v.  Grant,  L.  R.  13  Eq. 

who  is  called  to  account,  is  not  subject  to  an  443;  Pearse  v.   Pearse,  W.  N.  (1873)   '202;    22 

exception    for   scandal  and    impertinence,    for  W.  R.  69  ;  Cracknall  r.  Janson,  11  Ch.   D.  1. 
saying  in  his  answer  that  some  of  the  property  2  Gilb.  For    Rom.   207;    see  Millington    v. 

is  withheld  from  him  under  a  forged  deed  pos-  Lorinir,  6  Q-  B.  D.  190. 
sessed  by  the  plaintiff  ;  for  his  silence  might  8  Fenhoulet  r.  Pa-savant,  2  Ves.  Sr.  24. 

prejudice  him  afterwards.     Jolly  v.  Carter,   2  4  Farl   of  Portsmouth    v.    Fellows,    5   Mad. 

Edw.  Ch.  209;   see  Somers  v.  Torrev,  5  Paige,  450;   and  see  Anon.  1  M.  &  C  78;  Lord  St. 

54;  Kees  v.  Evans.  Chancery,  N.  Y.  Jan.  25,  John   ».   Lady   St.   John,  11    Ves.    526,    539; 

1841,  cited  1   Smith,  Ch,  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  567,  Reeves   v.  Baker,   13  Beav.  436;  see  Blake  v. 

note  (6).  Albion  Life  Ass.  Co.  24  W.  R.  677. 

i  Everett  v.  Prythergch,  12  Sim.  365,  367;  s  See  Moores  v.  Moores,  16  N.  J.  Eq.  275, 

B.  v.  W.  31  Beav.  342;  S.  C.  nom.   A.  v.  B.  277.  As  to  allegations  of  fraud,  see  ante,  p.  324. 
8  Jur.  N.  S.  1141;  Edmunds  v.  Lord  Brougham, 

347 


*  319 


THE    BILL. 


because  evidence  of  those  particular  instances  may  be  given  under  the 

general  charge.6 
*349        *From  what  has  been  said  before,  it  may  be  collected  that, 

although  nothing  relevant  can  be  scandalous,  matter  in  a  bill 
may  be  impertinent  without  being  scandalous.1  Impertinences  are  de- 
scribed by  Lord  Chief  Baron  Gilbert  to  be,  "  where  the  records  of  the 
Court  are  stuffed  with  long  recitals,  or  with  long  digressions  of  matter 
of  fact,  which  are  altogether  unnecessary  and  totally  immaterial  to  the 
matter  in  question :  as  where  a  deed  is  unnecessarily  set  forth  in  hcec 
verba."  2  («) 


6  Whaley  v.  Norton,  1  Vera.  483 ;  Clarke  v. 
Periam,  2  Atk.  333,  337;  Duncan  v.  Vereker, 
W.  N.  (1876)  64. 

i  Fenhoulet  v.  Passavant,  2  Ves.  Sr.  24; 
Goodrich  v.  Rodney.  1  Minn.  195;  Hood  8. 
Inman,  4  John.  Ch.  437  Impertinence  is  the 
introduction  of  any  matters  into  a  bill,  answer, 
or  other  pleading  or  proceeding  in  a  suit,  which 
are  not  properly  before  the  Court  for  decision 
at  any  particular  stage  of  the  suit.  Wood  v. 
Mann,  1  Sumner,  506,  578.  The  best  test  to 
ascertain  whether  matter  be  impertinent,  is  to 
try  whether  the  subject  of  the  allegation  could 
be  put  in  issue,  and  would  be  matter  proper  to 
be  given  in  evidence  between  the  parties. 
Woods  v.  Morrell,  1  John.  Ch.  103;  Spaulding 
r.  Farwell,  62  Maine,  319;  Mrzena  v.  Brucker, 
3  Tenn.  Ch.  161.  The  Court  will  not,  because 
there  are  here  and  there  a  few  unnecessary 
words,  treat  them  as  impertinent.  Hawley  v. 
Wolverton,  5  Paige,  522.  Del  Pont  v.  Tastet, 
1  Turn.  &  R.  486.  So  in  an  answer.   Gleaves  v. 


Morrow,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  592.  Infra,  p.  759.  And 
the  introduction  of  scandalous  and  impertinent 
matter  in  a  bill  will  not  justify  similar  matter 
in  the  answer,  though  introduced  to  meet  the 
allegations  of  the  bill.  Langdon  v.  Pickering, 
19  Maine,  214.  But  see  contra,  Mclntyre  v. 
Ogden,  24  N.Y.  Supr.  Ct.  604.  A  bill  may 
contain  matter  which  is  imper  inent,  without 
the  matter  being  scandalous;  but  if,  in  a  tech- 
nical sense,  it  is  scandalous,  it  must  be  imperti- 
nent. An  exception  for  impertinence  will  be 
overruled  if  the  expunging  the  matter  excepted 
to  will  leave  the  residue  of  the  clause  which  is 
not  covered  by  the  exception,  either  false  or 
wholly  unintelligible.  M'Intyre  v.  Trustees  of 
Union  College,  6  Paige,  239. 

2  Gi'b  For.  Rom.  209;  and  see  Norway  v. 
Rowe,  1  Mer.  135;  Lowe  v.  Williams,  2  S.  &  S. 
574;  Bally  i>.  Williams,  1  M'L.  &  Y.  334; 
Slack  v.  Evans,  7  Price,  278,  n.;  Gompertz  v. 
Best,  1  Y.  &  C.  Ex.  114,  117 ;  Byde  v.  Master- 
man,  C.  &  P.  265,  271;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Rickards, 


(a)  In  case  of  doubt,  the  presumption  is  in 
favor  of  the  pertinency  of  the  matters  alleged. 
Leslie  v.  Leslie  (N.  J.),  24  Atl.  1029.  But 
alternative  pleading  is  not  necessarily  embar- 
rassing or  multifarious,  and  a  party  is  at  liberty 
to  aver  facts  of  a  different  nature,  which  will 
equally  support  his  case  and  entitle  him  to  the 
same  relief.  Fisher  v.  Moog,  39  Fed.  Rep. 
665,  668;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  254;  Proskauer  v. 
People's  S.  Bank,  77  Ala.  257;  Rapier  v.  Gulf 
City  Paper  Co.  69  Ala.  476 ;  see  Be  Morgan, 
35  Ch.  D.  492.  The  test  of  impertinent  matter 
is  whether  it  can  be  put  in  issue,  and  is  admis- 
sible in  evidence.  See  Woods  v.  Morrell,  1 
John.  Ch.  103;  Miller  v.  Buchanan,  5  Fed. 
Rep.  366;  Wilkinson  v.  Dodd,  42  N.  J.  Eq. 
234;  40  id.  123;  Dodd  v.  Wilkinson,  42  id. 
647;  41  id.  566;  Kirkpatrick  v.  Corning,  40  id. 
241 ;  39  id  22;  Christie  v.  Christie,  L.  R.  8  Ch. 
503.  Pleadings  are  not  necessarily  embarrass- 
ing because  inconsistent.  Be  Morgan,  35  Ch. 
D.  492;  see  Tomkinson  r.  Southeastern  Ry.  57 
L.  T.  N.  S.  358;  Brooking  v.  Maudslay,  6  Asp. 

348 


M.  C  13.  Successive  acts  of  fraud  averred  in 
the  bill,  if  dependent  upon  each  other,  and 
admissible  in  evidence,  will  not  be  stricken  out 
as  irrelevant.  Kirkpatrick  v.  Corning,  supra. 
In  general,  a  pleader  is  at  liberty  to  set  forth 
additional  cumulative  facts  which  do  not  vary 
but  strengthen  and  intensify  the  grounds  of 
relief  to  which  he  has  already  pleaded  the 
facts.  Noble  i\  Moses.  81  Ala.  530;  Tippin  v. 
Coleman,  59  Miss.  641 ;  see  Merrill  v.  Merrill, 
53  Wis.  522.  Allegations  of  the  defendant's 
usual  course  of  conduct  may  be  stricken  out, 
when  thev  are  merely  evidence.  Blake  v 
Albion  Life  Ass.  Society,  35  L.  T.  N.  S.  269. 
Nor  do  merely  redundant  averments  make  the 
bill  multifarious.  Morris  v.  Morris,  65  Ala. 
443;  Sample  v.  Sample,  34  Kansas,  73.  Objec- 
tions to  the  bill  for  immateriality  and  lack  of 
pertinency  are  to  be  made  by  exception,  and 
not  by  demurrer.  Stirrat  v.  Excelsior  Manuf. 
Co.  44  Fed  Rep.  142;  Sronemetz  P.  M.  Co.  r. 
Brown  F.  M.  Co.  46  id.  72;  Wells  v.  Oregon 
Ry.  &  Nav.  Co.  15  id.561 ;  8  Sawyer,  600. 


MATTER   OF   THE   BILL. 


*350 


It  is  to  be  observed  that  neither  scandal  nor  impertinence,  however 
gross  it  may  be,  is  a  ground  of  demurrer  ;  it  being  a  maxim  of 
pleading  that  utile  per  Inutile  non  vitiatur.3  Where,  however,  *  there  *  350 
is  scandal  in  a  bill,  the  defendant  is  entitled  to  have  the  record 
purified  by  expunging  the  scandalous  matter  ;  and  it  was  formerly  the 
same  with  reference  to  impertinent  matter.1  In  order  that  this  might 
be  done,  the  course  formerly  was  for  the  defendant  to  move  the  Court 
for  an  order  to  have  the  bill  referred  to  a  Master  to  report  whether  it 
was  scandalous  or  impertinent.  This  reference  was  obtained  of  course, 
and  being  general,  without  specifying  the  particular  passages  objected 
to,2  obviously  precluded  the  party  whose  pleading  was  alleged  to  be 
scandalous  and  impertinent,  from  exercising  any  judgment  upon  the 
subject,  much  less  from  submitting  to  have  the  objectionable  passages 
expunged.  To  remedy  this  it  was  provided,  by  a  General  Order  of  the 
Court,  that  no  order  should  be  made  for  referring  any  pleading,  or 
other  matter  for  scandal  or  impertinence,  uuless  exceptions  were  taken 
in  writing  to  the  particular  passages  complained  of.8 


6  Bear.  444,  449;  1  Phil.  383,  386;  S.  C.  iwm. 
Rickards  v.  Att.-Gen.  12  CI.  &  F.  30;  Allfrey 
v.  Allfrey,  14  Beav.  235;  Goodrich  v.  Rodney, 
1  Minn.  195;  Camden  and  Amboy  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Stewart,  19  N.  J.  Eq.  343.  All  matters  not 
material  to  the  suit,  or  if  material  which  are 
not  in  issue,  or  which,  if  both  material  and  in 
issue,  are  set  forth  with  great  and  unnecessary 
prolixity,  constitute  impertinence.  A  bill  in 
Chancery,  like  a  declaration  at  Law,  should 
confine  its  statements  to  such  facts  as  are 
proper  to  show  that  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to 
relief,  and  which,  if  proved,  will  entitle  him  to 
relief;  and  should  not  set  out  the  evidence, 
whether  oral  or  written,  by  which  the  facts  are 
to  be  proved.  Camden  and  Amboy  R.  R.  Co. 
v.  Stewart,  19  N.  J.  Eq.  343,  346;  21  id. 
484,  491.  "A  prolix  setting  forth  of  pertinent 
matter  is  itself  impertinent."  Per  Lord  Eldon 
in  Slack  v.  Evans,  1  Price,  278,  note.  In  the 
U.  S.  Courts  it  is  required  that  every  bill  shall 
be  expressed  in  as  brief  and  succinct  terms  as 
it  reasonably  can  be,  and  shall  contain  no  un- 
necessary recitals  of  deeds,  documents,  con- 
tracts, or  other  instruments,  in  luec  verba,  or 
any  other  impertinent  matter,  or  any  scandal- 
ous matter  not  relevant  to  the  suit.  If  it  does, 
it  may  on  exceptions  be  referred  to  a  Master 
by  any  Judge  of  the  Court  for  impertinence  or 
scandal,  and  if  so  found  by  him,  the  matter 
shall  be  expunged  at  the  expense  of  the  plain- 
tiff, anil  he  shall  pay  to  the  defendant  all  his 
costs  in  the  suit  up  to  that  time,  unless  the 
Court  or  a  Judge  thereof  shall  otherwise  order. 
If  the  Master  shall  report  that  the  bill  is  not 
scandalous  or  impertinent,  the  defendant  shall 
be  entitled  to  all  costs  occasioned  by  the  refer- 
ence.    Equity  Rule,  26. 

In  New  Hampshire  "every  bill  and  answer 


shall  be  expressed  as  concisely  as  may  be,  and 
no  deed,  will,  agreement,  or  other  writing  shall 
be  set  forth  at  length,  or  annexed  to  any  bill 
or  answer,  but  so  much  of  either  as  is  material, 
and  no  more,  shall  be  inserted."  Rule  of  Chan- 
cery 4,  38  N.  H.  606.  "  The  idle  repetitions, 
'  3'our  orator  further  complains,'  'your  orator 
further  showeth  to  your  Honors,'  and  the  like, 
in  bills;  and  'this  defendant,  further  answer- 
ing, saith,'  and  the  like,  in  answers,  shall  be 
omitted.  Where  the  names  of  parties  are 
omitted,  they  shall  be  referred  to  as  plaintiffs 
or  defendants."     Rule  of  Chancery  of  N.  H.  7. 

3  See  Broom's  Maxims,  602;  Story,  Eq.  PL 
§269. 

i  See  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  XXVII.  1,  and  Costs, 
Sched.,  r.  18;  Marsh  v.  Mayor  of  Pontefract, 
W.  N.  (1876)  7;  Herring  v.  Bischoffsheim,  id. 
77;  Cashin  v.  Cradock,  3  Ch.  D.  376;  Davy  v. 
Garrett,  7  Ch.  D.  473. 

2  Harr.  by  Newl.  43;  1  T.  &  V.  519. 

3  38th  Ord.  May,  1845;  Sand.  Ord.  998, 
afterwards  the  23d  Ord.,  Nov.,  1850,  was  sub- 
stituted. 12  Beav.  xxvii.  The  ground  of  this 
Older  is  substantially  covered  by  the  27th 
Equity  Rule  of  the  United  States  Courts.  Ex- 
ceptions for  scandal  or  impertinence  must  point 
out  the  exceptional  matter  with  sufficient  cer- 
tainty to  enable  the  adverse  party  and  the  offi- 
cers of  the  Court  to  ascertain  what  particular 
parts  of  the  pleading  or  proceeding  are  to  be 
stricken  out,  if  the  exceptions  are  allowed. 
Whitmarsh  v.  Campbell,  1  Paige,  645:  Frank- 
lin 0.  Keeler,  4  Paige,  382;  see  also  German  V. 
Machin,  6  Paige,  288.  In  Maine,  exceptions 
for  scandal  and  impertinence  may  be  taken 
within  twenty  days  after  service  of  the  bill. 
Chancery  Rule  5. 

349 


*  351 


THE   BILL. 


The  practice  of  excepting  to  bills,  answers,  and  other  proceedings 
for  impertinence  has  been  abolished;4  the  Court  may,  however,  direct 
the  costs  occasioned  by  any  impertinent  matter  introduced  into  any 
proceeding  to  be  paid  by  the  party  introducing  the  same,  upon  appli- 
cation being  made  to  the  Court  for  that  purpose  ; 5  such  application  to 
be  made  at  the  time  when  the  Court  disposes  of  the  costs  of  the  cause 
or  matter,  and  not  at  any  other  time.6  The  Court  may  also,  without 
any  application  being  made,  declare  that  any  pleading,  petition,  or  affi- 
davit, is  improper  or  of  unnecessary  length,  or  may  direct  the  taxing 
master  to  distinguish  what  part  thereof  is  improper,  or  of  unnecessary 
length ; 7  and  in  like  manner  the  Judge  may  disallow  impertinent 
*  351  or  unnecessary  matter  in  proceedings  in  Chambers.8  In  *  the  first 
case,  the  Court  may  deal  with  the  costs  as  may  be  just; 1  and  in 
the  second,  the  costs  occasioned  in  respect  of  the  matter  so  disallowed  to 
the  other  party  are  to  be  paid  by  the  party  on  whose  behalf  the  proceed- 
ing was  brought  in,  and  his  own  costs  in  respect  thereof  disallowed.2 
Exceptions  may  still  be  taken  to  pleadings,  and  other  matters  depending 
before  the  Court,  for  scandal ;  they  must  be  in  writing,  and  signed  by 
counsel,3  and  describe  the  particular  passages  alleged  to  be  scandalous.4 
It  appears  to  have  been  formerly  the  opinion  that,  in  cases  of  scandal, 
"  the  Court  itself  was  concerned  to  keep  its  records  clean,  and  without 
dirt  or  scandal  appearing  thereou." 6  Any  party  to  the  cause  may  file 
exceptions  for  scandal ; 6  hence  a  defendant  not  served  with  the  bill  may 
appear  gratis,  and  file  exceptions  for  scandal ; 7  and  one  defendant  may 
file  exceptions  for  scandal  in  a  co-defendant's  answer.8 


4  By  the  settled  practice  in  New  Jersey, 
exceptions  will  lie  for  impertinence  in  a  bill, 
answer,  or  other  pleading,  and  in  interroga- 
tories, depositions,  or  affidavits  in  any  suit. 
Camden  and  Amboy  R.  R-  Co.  v.  Stewart,  19 
N.  J.  Eq.  343;  21  id.  484.  But  the  rule  to 
file  exceptions  and  refer  them  to  a  Master  is 
for  the  relief  of  the  Court,  and  they  may  be 
heard  at  his  option  directly  by  the  Chancellor. 
Ibid.  So,  in  Tennessee,  exceptions  lie  for  im- 
pertinence in  pleadings  and  evidence.  Code, 
§  4401 ;  Johnson  v.  Tucker,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  244. 
Objections  to  evidence  for  impertinence  alone 
are  usually  ordered  to  stand  over  until  the 
hearing.  White  v.  Fussell,  19  Ves.  113;  Os- 
mond v.  Tindall,  Jac.  625;  Middlemas  v.  Wil- 
son, L.  R.  10  Ch.  230;  Jones  v.  Spencer,  2 
Tenn.  Ch.  776. 

5  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  17;  see  Dufour  v. 
Sigell,  4  De  G.  M.  &  G.  520,  526. 

6  Cons.  Ord.  XL.  11. 

1  Cons.  Ord.  XL.  9.  As  to  this  order,  see 
Moore  v.  Smith,  14  Beav.  396;  Mayor  of  Ber- 
wick t\  Murray,  7  De  G.  M.  &  G.  497;  3  Jur. 
N.  S.  1,  5;  Re  Farrington,  33  Beav.  346;  and 
for  form  of  Order  thereunder,  see  Seton,  89, 
No.  17. 

8  Cons.  Ord.  XL.  10. 

i  Cons.  Ord.  XL.  9.  As  to  this  order,  see 
Moore  v.  Smith.  14  Beav.  396;  Mayor  of  Ber- 

350 


wick  v.  Murray.  7  De  G.  M.  &  G.  497;  3  Jur. 
N.  S.  1,  5.  For  form  of  order  thereunder,  see 
Seton.  89.  No.  17.  See  now  R.  S.  C.  1883.  Ord. 
XIX.  2,  27;  Re  Wormsley,  W.  N.  (1878)  193. 

2  Cons.  Ord.  XL.  10. 

8  Cons.  Ord.  XVI.  2  ;  and  see  Ord.VIII.  1,  2. 

4  Cons.  Ord.  XVI.  2.  For  form  of  excep- 
tions, see  Vol.  III. 

5  2  P.  Wms.  312,  Arg.;  Campbell  v.  Taul, 
3  Yerg.  564.  Lord  Eldon  said  that,  with  refer- 
ence to  the  subject  of  scandal  in  proceedings, 
either  in  causes  or  in  bankruptcy,  he  did  not 
think  that  any  application  by  any  person  was 
necessary ;  and  that  the  Court  ought  to  take 
care  that,  either  in  a  suit  or  in  a  proceeding  in 
bankruptcy,  allegations  bearing  cruelly  upon 
the  moral  character  of  individuals,  and  not 
reievant  to  the  subject,  should  not  be  put  upon 
the  record.  Ex  parte  Simpson,  15  Ves.  476, 
477;  Cracknall  v.  Janson,.  11  Ch.  D.  1;  see 
Finney  v.  Godfrey,  W.  N.  (1869)  252 ;  Rouls- 
ton  v.  Ralston,  13  Phila.  175.  As  to  scandal  in 
a  proceeding  under  the  summary  jurisdiction, 
see  Re  Gornall,  1  Beav.  226;  Be  Wills,  9  Jur. 
N.  S.  1225;  12  W.  R.  97. 

6  Coffin  v.  Cooper,  6  Ves.  514;  13  &  14  Vic. 
c.  35,  §  27;  Cons.  Ord.  XVI.  2. 

7  Fell  v.  Christ's  College,  Cambridge,  2  Bro. 
C.  C.  279. 

8  Coffin  v.  Cooper,  6  Ves.  514. 


MATTER   OF   THE   BILL. 


352 


There  was  formerly  some  doubt  whether,  under  any  circumstances, 
a  person  not  a  party  to  the  cause  could  except  to  any  record  for 
scandal.9 

*  It  has  been  decided,  under  the  former  practice,  that  in  the  case  *  352 
of  exceptions  for  impertinence,  an  exception  cannot  be  partially 
allowed ;  and  therefore,  if  part  of  an  exception  be  good,  and  the  rest 
bad,  the  whole  exception  must  be  overruled.1  It  has  not,  it  is  believed, 
ever  been  so  held  as  to  exceptions  for  scandal;  and  if  the  question 
should  arise,  it  is  conceived  that  the  practice  with  reference  to  excep- 
tions for  impertinence  would  not  be  followed. 

Exceptions  must  be  written  on  paper  of  the  same  description  and  size 
as  that  on  which  bills  are  printed,2  and  be  indorsed  with  the  name  and 
place  of  business  of  the  solicitor  and  of  his  agent,  if  any,8  or  with  the 
name  and  place  of  residence  of  the  party  acting  in  person,4  by  whom 
they  are  filed.5  The  exceptions  must  be  filed  at  the  Record  and  Writ 
Clerks'  Office,6  and  notice  of  the  filing  thereof  be  given,  on  the  same  day, 
to  the  solicitor  for  the  opposite  party,  or  to  the  party  himself  if  he  acts 
in  person ; 7  but  if  the  notice  is  not  given  at  the  proper  time,  the  party 
will  be  relieved  from  the  irregularity  on  payment  of  costs.8  No  time  is 
limited  within  which  exceptions  for  scandal  must  be  filed.  The  party 
whose  pleading  is  excepted  to  takes  an  office  copy  of  the  exceptions.9 


9  Ibid.:  Anon.  4  Mad.  252;  see  5  Beav.  86. 
In  Willi  mis  v.  Douglas,  5  Beav.  82,  85;  6  Jur. 
37'J,  the  authorities  upon  the  subject  were 
brought  before  Lord  Langdale  M.  H.,  who  had 
to  decide  upon  the  question  whether  a  person 
not  being  a  party  to  the  cause,  who  alleged  that 
the  bill  contained  matter  at  the  same  time  im- 
pertinent as  between  the  parties  and  scandalous 
as  against  him,  was,  of  course,  and  without 
leave,  entitled  to  file  exceptions  for  scandal  with 
a  view  to  have  the  scandalous  and  impertinent 
matter  expunged.  (See  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  270.) 
His  Lordship  said  :  "There  is  but  little  author- 
ity on  the  subject;  but  from  the  terms  in  which 
Lord  Macon's  order  is  expressed,  from  the  dict'i 
of  Lord  Eldon,  expressed  in  a  manner  to  ^how 
that  he  had  considered  the  subject,  and  from 
the  apparent  necessity  of  the  case,  there  being, 
as  I  conceive,  no  other  way  of  doing  effectual 
justice  to  an  injured  party,  it  would  seem  that 
the  Court  must  have  jurisdiction  and  authority 
to  expunge  scandal  from  t he  record,  at  the  in- 
stance of  a  person  who  may  not  be  a  party  to 
the  cause."  His  Lordship,  however,  thought 
that  a  person  not  a  party  to  the  record  could 
not  adopt  this  proceeding  without  special  leave; 
and  he  therefore  discharged  the  order  then  in 
question,  on  the  ground  of  its  having  been 
obtained  ex  parte.  From  this  case  it  would 
appear  that  a  stranger  to  the  suit  can,  if  the 
circumstances  justify  it,  ob'ain  the  leave  of  the 
Court  to  except  to  a  record  for  scandal. 

1  Wagstaff  v.  Bryan,  1  R.  &  M.  30;  Tench  p. 
Cheese,  1  Beav   571,  575,  and  reporter's  note, 


ibid.;  Byde  v.  Masterman,  C.  &  P.  205,  272  ;  5 
Jur.  643;  Desplaces  v.  Goris,  1  Edw.  Ch.  353. 
The  Court,  in  cases  of  impertinence,  ought,  be- 
fore expunging  the  matter  alleged  to  be  imperti- 
nent, to  be  especially  clear  that  it  is  such  as 
ought  to  be  struck  out  of  the  record,  for  the 
reason  that  the  error  on  one  side  is  irremediable, 
on  the  i-ther  not.  See  Davis  v.  Cripps,  2  Y.  & 
C.  (N.  R.)  443;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  267  ;  Johnson 
v.  Tucker,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  344. 

2  Ord.  March  6,  1860,  r.  16.  The  paper 
must  be  cream-wove,  machine-drawn,  foolscap, 
folio  paper,  19  lbs.  per  mill  ream,  and  have  an 
inner  margin  about  three  quarters  of  an  inch 
wide,  and  an  outer  margin  about  two  inches 
and  a  half  wide.     Cons.  Ord.  IX.  3. 

3  Cons,  Ord.  III.  2. 

4  Cons.  Ord.  III.  5. 

5  For  form,  see  Vol.  III. 

6  Cons.  Ord.  XVI.  3.  No  fee  is  payable  on 
filing. 

7  Cons.  Ord.  XVI.  3.  The  notice  must  be 
served  before  seven  o'clock  in  the  evening,  ex- 
cept on  Saturday,  when  it  must  be  served  be- 
fore two  in  the  afternoon  ;  or  the  service  will  be 
deemed  to  have  been  made  on  the  following 
day,  or  on  Monday,  as  the  case  may  be.  Cons. 
Ord.  XXXVII.  2.  For  form  of  notice,  see 
Vol.  HI. 

8  Bradstock  v.  Whatley,  6  Beav.  61 :  Lowe 
v.  Williams,  12  Beav.  482;  and  see  Lord  Suf- 
field  v.  Bond,  10  Beav.  146,  153. 

9  Cons  Ord.  XXXVI.  1. 

351 


*  353  THE   BILL. 

Exceptions  for  scandal  must  be  set  down  for  hearing  before  the  Court,10 
within  six  days  after  the  filing  thereof,  exclusive  of  vacations  ;  u 

*  353    otherwise  they  will  be  considered  as  abandoned,  and  *  the  person 

by  whom  such  exceptions  were  filed  must  pay  to  the  opposite 
party  such  costs  as  may  have  been  incurred  by  such  party,  in  respect  of 
such  exceptions.1  It  is  presumed  that,  in  such  case,  by  analogy  to  the 
practice  where  a  demurrer  or  plea,  though  filed,  is  not  set  down  for 
argument,2  the  opposite  party  may  obtain  an  order  of  course,  on  motion, 
or  on  petition  at  the  Rolls,  for  the  taxation  of  the  costs  of  the  exceptions, 
and  for  payment  thereof  by  the  excepting  party. 

The  exceptions  must  be  set  down  to  be  heard  before  the  Judge  to 
whose  Court  the  cause  is  attached.8  The  Registrar's  Clerk,  at  the  order 
of  course  seat,  will  set  down  the  exceptions,  on  production  to  him  by  the 
solicitor  of  the  party  filing  them  of  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerks'  certifi- 
cate of  the  filing  of  the  exceptions,  indorsed  by  the  solicitor  with  a 
request  for  that  purpose.4  The  exceptions  will  then  be  put  in  the  paper 
of  such  Judge,  for  hearing  on  an  early  day,  and  on  the  day  on  which  the 
exceptions  are  so  set  down,  notice  thereof  must  be  served  on  the  party 
whose  pleading  or  other  matter  is  excepted  to  ;  otherwise  the  exceptions 
will  be  deemed  not  set  down.6 

Exceptions  will  not  be  allowed  to  stand  over  to  an  indefinite  period.6 

As  this  is  the.  first  occasion  upon  which  it  has  been  necessary  to  refer 
to  the  time  allowed  in  procedure,  it  will  be  convenient  to  state  here  some 
general  rules  concerning  the  manner  in  which  such  periods  are  to  be 
computed. 

Where  any  limited  time,  from  or  after  any  date  or  event,  is  appointed 
or  allowed  for  doing  any  act  or  taking  any  proceeding,  and  such  time  is 
not  limited  by  hours,  the  computation  of  such  limited  time  is  not  to 
include  the  day  of  such  date,  or  of  the  happening  of  such  event,  but  is  to 
commence  at  the  beginning  of  the  next  following  day ;  and  the  act  or 
proceeding  is  to  be  done  or  taken  at  the  latest  on  the  last  day  of  such 
limited  time,  according  to  such  computation.7 

Where  the  time  for  doing  any  act  or  taking  any  proceeding  is  limited 
by  months,  not  expressed  to  be  calendar  months,  such  time  is  to  be 
computed  by  lunar  months  of  twenty-eight  days  each.8 

1°  13  &  14  Vic.  c.  35,  §  27.  March,  1860,  rr.  1,  5.     For  form  of  request,  see 

11  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.  13  (2).  Vol.  III. 

1  Cons.  Ord.  XVI.  20.  Similar  provisions  5  Cons.  Ord.  XVI.  10.  The  notice  must  be 
are  made  for  securing  an  earlv  decision  of  ex-  given  as  directed  by  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.  2; 
ceptions  for  scandal  or  impertinence,  in  the  ante,  p.  352,  n.  7.  For  form  of  notice,  see 
27th  Equity   Rule  of    the    U.  S.    Courts.      It  Vol.  III. 

seems   that'  the    partv  whose  pleading  is  ex-  6  Cons.  Ord.  XXI.   13.     For  further  nifor- 

cepted  to  may,  if  he  desires  it,  obtain  an  order  mation  as  to  exceptions,  see  post,  Chap.  XVII. 

of  course  to  set  the  exceptions  down  before  the  §  4,  Exceptions  to  Answers. 

expiration  of  the  six  davs.     Coyle  v.  Alleyne,  7  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.  9.     When  any  mat- 

14  Beav.  171.  *er  °*   proceeding  or  practice   is  required  by 

2  See  Cons.  Ord.  XIV.  14,  15,  17;  Seton,  statute  or  rule  of  Court  to  be  within  a  certain 
1257;  and  post,  Chap.  XIV.  §  4,  Demurrers;  number  of  days,  the  first  day,  or  terminus  a 
and  Chap.  XV.'  §  4.  Pleas.  For  forms  of  mo-  quo,  is  excluded.  Thorne  v.  Mosher,  20  N.  J. 
tion  paper  and  petition,  see  Vol.  III.  Eq.  257.     And  see  Jones  v.  Planters'   Bank,  5 

8  Cons.  Ord.  VI.  4.  Humph.  619;  Elder  v.  Bradley,  2  Sneed,  251. 

*  Cons.    Ord.   XVI.    10;    Reg.   Regul.,   15  «  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.  10. 

352 


MATTER    OF   THE   BILL. 


*354 


*  Where  the  time  for  doing  any  act  or  taking  any  proceeding  *  354 
expires  on  a  Sunday  or  other  day  on  which  the  offices  are  closed, 
and  by  reason  thereof  such  act  or  proceeding  cannot  be  done  or  taken 
on  that  day,  such  act  or  proceeding  is,  as  far  as  regards  the  time  of 
doing  or  taking  the  same,  to  be  held  to  be  duly  done  or  taken,  if  done 
or  taken  on  the  day  on  which  the  offices  shall  next  open  ; *  and  where 
any  time  limited  is  less  than  six  days,  Sundays  and  other  days  on  which 
the  offices  are  closed  (except  Monday  and  Tuesday  in  Easter  week)  are 
not  to  be  reckoned.2 

Exceptions  for  scandal  may  be  taken  at  any  stage  of  the  proceedings.8  (a) 


i  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.  12.  Feuchtwanger 
v.  McCool,  29  N.  J.  Eq.  151. 

2  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.  11. 

3  Ellison  o.  Burgess,  2  P.  Wms.  312,  n.; 
Anon.  5  Ves.  656;  Fenhoulet  v.  Passavant,  2 
Ves.  Sr.  24;  Anon.  id.  631;  Barnes  v.  Saxby, 
3  Swanst.  232,  n.;  Everett  v.  Prythergch,  12 
Sim.  363;  Booth  v.  Smith,  5  Sim.  639;  Anon. 
5  Sumner's  Ves.  656,  and  cases  cited  in  note. 
In  Lad}-  Abergavenny  v.  Lady  Abergavenny, 
2   P.  Wms.  311  (see  also  Jones  v.  Langham, 


(a)  Useless  or  impertinent  words  employed 
here  and  there  in  a  pleading  may  be  remedied  in 
the  adjustment  of  costs.  United  States  v.  Mc- 
Laughlin, 24  Fed.  Rep.  823.  But  if  the  entire  suit 
is  improper,  frivolous,  or  vexatious,  the  Court 
has  an  inherent  jurisdiction  to  stay  it,  as  well 
as  to  strike  out  any  defence  or  other  pleadings, 
or  the  answers  to  inerrogatories,  which  have 
like  faults  and  are  an  abuse  of  its  procedure. 
Reichel  v.  Magrath,  14  App.  Cas.  665 ;  Metro- 
politan Bank  v.  Pooley,  10  id.  210;  Lyell  v. 
Kennedy,  33  W.  R.  44;  8  App.  Cas.  217;  Law- 
ranie  v.  Norreys,  15  App.  Cas.  210;  39  Ch. 
D.  213;  Watson  v.  Rodwell,  3  Ch.  D.  380; 
Gude  r.  Mumford,  2  Y.  &  Col.  445,  448;  Hag- 
gard v.  Pelicier  Freres,  [1892]  A.  C.  61;  Adams 
P.Adams,  [18!»2]  1  Ch.  369;  Pearse  f.  Pearse, 
29  L.  T.  N.  S.  453;  Kellaway  v.  Bury,  66  L.  T. 
599;  Lumb  i>.  Beaumont,  49  L.  T.772;  Wil- 
mott  v.  Freehold  H.  P.  Co  (No.  1),  51  L.  T. 
552;  Boddingtonw.  Rees,  52  L.  T.  209.  Fendall 
v.  O'Connell  (No.  1),  id.  538:  Brooking  v. 
Maudslay,  55  L.  T.  343 ;  Jenkins  v.  Rees,  33 
W.  R.  929;  Batthyany  v.  Walford,  32  W.  R. 
379;  Blair  v.  Cordner,  36  W.  R.  64;  William- 
son v  M'Clintock,  30  L.  R.  Ir.  436;  Beatty  v. 
Leacy,  16  id.  132;  Kenmare  v.  Casey,  12  id. 
374;  Bourketf.  Nicol,  id.  415;  Wheeler  v.  United 
Kingdom  Tel.  Co.  13  Q.  B.  I).  597;  Davis  v. 
James,  26  Ch.  D.  778  ;  Hill  v.  Hart-Davis,  id. 
470;  Shafto  v.  Bolchow,  34  Ch.  D.  725;  Mutrie 
v.  Binney,  35  Ch.  I).  614;  Knowles  v.  Roberts, 
38  Ch.  D.  263;  Mittens  v.  Foreman,  58  L.  J. 
Q.  B.  40 ;  Allhusen  v.  Labouchere,  3  Q.  B.  D. 
654;  Htinnin^s  v.  Williamson,  10  id.  459; 
Willis  v.  Beatichamp,  IIP.  D.  59;    Oregonian 

VOL.   I.  —  23 


Bunb.  53),  Lord  King  discharged  an  order 
obtained  for  referring  a  bill  for  scandal  after 
answer;  intimating  that  it  should  be  observed 
as  a  rule,  for  the  future,  not  to  refer  a  bill  for 
scandal  after  the  defendant  had  submitted  to 
answer  it;  but  his  Lordship's  determination 
to  alter  the  old  practice  of  the  Court  in  this 
respect  does  not  appear  to  have  been  adhered 
to.  Anon.  2  Ves.  Sr.  631;  Anon.  5  Ves.  656  ; 
see  also  Woodward  v.  Astley,  Bunb.  304; 
Everett  i>.  Prythergch,  12  Sim.  363. 


Ry.  Co.  v.  Oregon  Ry.  &Nav.  Co.  22  Fed.  Rep. 
245 ;  Ecaubert  v.  Appeton,  47  Fed.  Rep.  893 ; 
Wehle  v.  Loewy,  21  N.  Y.  S.  1027  ;  1  Seton  on 
Judgments  (5th  ed.),  33.  This  includes,  as  an 
abuse  of  the  Court's  process,  proceedings  in  a 
suit  instituted  without  authority  in  a  third 
party's  name.  London  &  Blackwall  Ry.  v. 
Cross,  31  Ch.  D.  354.  Entries  even  in  a  bill  of 
costs,  which  contain  scandalous  matter,  may  be 
struck  out.  Rt  Miller,  54  L.  J.  Ch.  205.  Plead- 
ings which  are  clearly  trifling  are  a  contempt 
of  Court.  Lord  u.  Thornton,  2  Bulst.  67;  Coxe 
v.  Phillips,  Lee,  temp.  Hardwicke,  237;  People 
v.  Berry,  17  Col.  322.  Any  action  may  be 
stayed  as  vexatious  when  it  is  apparent  that  no 
relief  can  be  had  at  the  trial.  Barrett  v.  Day, 
43  Ch.  D.  435;  see  Republic  of  Peru  v.  Peru- 
vian Guano  Co.  36  Ch.  D.  489.  In  Grepe  r. 
Loam,  37  Ch.  D.  168,  after  repeated  applica- 
tions to  impeach  a  judgment,  the  Court  of 
Appeal  by  order  prohibited  any  further  applica- 
tion without  leave  of  Court.  As  to  taxing  the 
costs  of  vexatious  or  unnecessary  proceedings, 
see  Garrard  v.  Edge,  44  Ch.  D.  224.  Equity  has 
jurisdiction,  if  payment  of  costs  is  vexatiouslv 
withheld,  to  stay  proceedings  until  such  costs 
are  paid.  lie  Wickham,  35  Ch.  D.  272.  The 
same  principles  are  in  general  applied  under 
the  Code  Procedure.  Wayland  v.  Tysen,  45 
N.  Y.  281;  Strong  v.  Sproul,  53  N.  Y.  497; 
Rogers  v.  Vosburgh,  87  N.  Y.  228;  Warner  ». 
United  States  Land  Co.  53  Hun,  312;  Roomer?. 
Nicholson,  8  Abb.  Pr.  N.  S.  343;  Butterfleld  v. 
Maoomber,  22  How.  Pr.  150;  Patrick  v.  Mc- 
Manus,  4  Col.  65;  Walpolef.  Cooper,  7  Blackf. 
100  ;  Clark  v.  Jeffersonville  &c.  R.  Co.  44  Ind. 
353 


355 


THE    BILL. 


Upon  the  production  of  an  order  allowing  exceptions  for  scandal,  it  is 
the  duty  of  the  officer,  having  the  custody  or  charge  of  the  pleading  or 
other  matter,  to  expunge  such  parts  thereof  as  the  Court  has  held  to 
be  scandalous ; 4  and  when  he  has  so  done,  he  usually  writes  a  memo- 
randum in  the  margin  of  the  document,  opposite  the  expunged  pas- 
sages, to  the  effect  that  the  same  have  been  expunged  pursuant  to 
order,  adding  its  date,  and  signs  the  memorandum.  If  an  office  copy 
of  the  document  has  been  taken  at  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerks' 
Office,  it  will  be  amended,  without  fee,  on  being  left  there  for  that 
purpose.5 

Where  a  bill  had  been  held  scandalous,  the  Court  refused  to  hear 
a  motion  for  an  injunction  until  the  scandalous  matter  had  been 
expunged.6 

Where  scandalous  matter  has  been  introduced  into  any  proceedings 
at  Chambers,  any  party  wishing  to  complain  of  it  should  take  out  a 
summons  for  the  Judge  to  examine  such  matter ;    and,  if  scandalous, 

the  Judge  may  cause  it  to  be  expunged.7 
*  355        *  As  a  general  rule,  the  costs  occasioned  by  scandalous  matter, 
and  of  the  application  to  have  it  expunged,  follow  the  decision, 
but  they  should  be  asked  for  when  the  application  is  heard.1 


*  Cons.  Ord.  XVI.  21.  No  fee  is  payable. 
For  cases  where  scandalous  or  irrelevant  docu- 
ments have  been  ordered  to  be  taken  off  the 
file,  see,  by  consent,  Tremaine  v.  Tremaine, 
1  Vera.  189;  Jewin  v.  Taylor,  6  Beav.  120; 
Walton  v.  Broadbent,  3  Hare,  33-1;  Clifton  v. 
Bentall,  9  Beav.  105;  Makepeace  v.  Komieux, 
8  W.  R.  687,  V.  C.  K.;  and  without  consent, 
Goddard  v.  Parr.  24  L.  J.  Ch.  783;  3  \V.  R. 
633,  V.  C  K.;  Kernick  v  Keinick,  12  W.  R. 
335,  V.  C.  W.;  and  for  costs  in  such  cases, 
see  Ex  parte  Simpson,  15  Ves.  476. 


248;  Lowe  v.  Thompson,  86  Ind.  503;  Martin 
v.  Weil,  8  Wis.  220;  Cottrill  v.  Cramer,  40  Wis. 
555 ;  Crane  Bros.  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Morse,  49  Wis. 
368;  State  v.  St.  Louis  &c.  Ry.  Co.  29  Mo. 
App.  301.  An  allegation,  upon  information  and 
belief,  of  matters  which  should  be  averred  pos- 
itively, is  evasive  and  frivolous.  Milwaukee  v. 
Sullivan,  25  Wis.  666. 

An  answer  which  denies  lack  of  knowledge 
and  information  respecting  matters  of  which 
the  defendant  has  knowledge  or  can  inform 
himself,  as  where  they  appear  of  record,  may 
be  stricken  out  as  frivolous.  Lawrence  v.  Derby, 
24  How.  Pr.  133;  Bennett  v.  Leeds  Manuf. 
Co.  110  N.  Y.  150;  Webb  v.  Foster,  45  N.  Y. 
Snpr.  Ct.  311;  Hathaway  r.  Baldwin,  17  Wis. 
616;  see  People  v.  McCumber  (18  N.  Y.  315), 
72  Am.  Dec.  315  and  515.  In  New  Jerse3T,  the 
general  issue,  though  accompanied  by  the  stat- 
utory affidavit,  may  be  stricken  out  as  a  sham 
plea!  Coykendall  r.  Robinson,  39  N.  J.  L.  98. 
But  this  will  not  be  done  when  a  prima  facie 

354 


5  Braithwaite's  Pr.  132. 

6  Davenport  v.  Davenport,  6  Mad.  251 ;  and 
seeCoyle  v.  Alleyne,  14  Beav.  171. 

1  Cons.  Ord.  XXXV.  60.  For  form  of  sum- 
mons, see  Vol.  III. 

l  Muscott  v.  Halhed,  4  Bro.  C.  C.  222;  Jodd- 
rell  v.  Joddrell,  12  Beav.  216.  See  Hewitson 
v.  Sherwin,  L.  R.  10  Eq.  53;  Kevan  r.  Craw- 
ford, 6  Ch.  D.  29.  The  costs  are  taxed  as 
between  party  and  party.  Edmunds  v.  Lord 
Brougham,  W.  N.  (1866)  93,  V.  C.  S. 


defence  is  shown.  Clark  v.  Turnbull,  47  N.  J. 
L.  265.  In  New  York  the  remedy  in  such  case 
is  by  demurrer  to  the  answer.  Hubbard  v. 
Gorham,  38  Hun,  162  ;  Whitehall  Lumber  Co. 
v.  Edmans,  4  N.  Y.  Sup.  721.  In  that  State 
the  denials  of  a  verified  answer  cannot  be 
stricken  out  as  sham.  Fellows  v.  Muller,  87 
N.  Y.  Supr.  Ct.  137;  Barnes  v.  West,  16  Hun, 
68.  Nor  can  the  sufficiency  of  a  counter-claim 
set  up  in  an  answer  be  tried  by  a  summary 
motion  to  strike  out  as  irrelevant.  Walter 
v.  Fowler,  85  N.  Y.  621.  Allegations  in  an 
answer,  giving  explanations  of  or  reasons  for 
the  facts  as  alleged  by  the  plaintiff,  are  not 
necessarily  irrelevant,  even  though  such  rea- 
sons are  bad.  Tomkinson  v.  South  Eastern 
Ry.  Co.  57  L.  T.  358.  Matter  which  requires 
elaborate  argument  to  show  its  irrelevancy, 
should  be  allowed  to  stand,  so  that  the  evidence 
may  be  received  or  rejected  by  the  trial  Court, 
as  it  deems  best.  Gaylord  v.  Beardsley,  54  N. 
Y.  State  Rep.  234. 


FORM   OP   THE   BILL.  *  356 


Section  V.  —  The  Form  of  the  Bill. 

Having  thus  endeavored  to  point  out  the  matter  of  which  a  bill  in 
Equity  ought  to  consist,  it  remains  to  direct  the  reader's  attention  to 
the  form. 

The  form  of  an  original  bill  commonly  used,  previously  to  the  late 
Act,  according  to  the  analysis  of  Lord  Redesdale,2  consisted  of  nine 
parts :  some  of  which,  however,  were  not  essential,  and  might  be  used 
or  not  at  the  discretion  of  the  person  who  prepared  it.3  These  nine 
parts  were  as  follows  :  — 

1.  The  address  to  the  person  or  persons  holding  the  Great  Seal. 

2.  The  names  and  addresses  of  the  parties  complainant. 

3.  The  statement  of  the  plaintiff's  case,  commonly  called  the  stating 
part. 

4.  The  charge  that  the  defendant  unlawfully  confederated  with  others 
to  deprive  the  plaintiff  of  his  right. 

5.  The  allegation  that  the  defendants  intend  to  set  up  a  particular 
sort  of  defence,  the  reply  to  which  the  plaintiff  anticipates  by  alleging 
certain  facts  which  will  defeat  such  defence.  This  was  usually  termed 
the  charging  part,  from  the  circumstance  that  the  plaintiff's  allegations 
were  usually  introduced  by  way  of  charge,  instead  of  statement. 

6.  The  statement  that  the  plaintiff  has  no  remedy  without  the 
assistance  of  a  Court  of  Equity  :  which  was  termed  the  averment  of 
jurisdiction. 

7.  The  interrogating  part,  in  which  the  stating  and  charging  part 
were  converted  into  interrogatories,  for  the  purpose  of  eliciting  from 
the  defendant  a  circumstantial  discovery,  upon  oath,  of  the  truth  or 
falsehood  of  the  matters  stated  and  charged. 

8.  The  prayer  of  relief  adapted  to  the  circumstances  of  the  case. 

9.  The  prayer  that  process  might  issue,  requiring  the  defendant 

to  appear  and  answer  the  bill ;  to  which  sometimes  was  *  added  *  356 
a  prayer  for  a  provisional  writ,  such  as  an  injunction  or  a  ne  exeat 
regno,  for  the  purpose  of  restraining  some  proceedings  on  the  part  of 
the  defendant,  or  of  preventing  his  going  out  of  the  jurisdiction  till  he 
had  answered  the  bill.  And  as  against  some  of  the  defendants,  this 
part  sometimes  contained  a  prayer  that  such  parties  might,  upon  being 
served  with  a  copy  of  the  bill,  be  bound  by  all  the  proceedings  in  the 
cause.1 

The  form  of  a  bill  has,  however,  been  materially  altered  by  the 
Chancery  Amendment  Act  of  1852,  by  which,  as  we  have  seen,2  it  is 

2  Ld.  Red.  42.     The  character  of  a  pleading  Ins.  Co.  1  Tenn.  Ch.  312;  Arnold  v.  Movers, 

is  determined  by  the  averments   it  contains,  1  Lea,  308. 

and  not  by  the  name  given  it,  and   therefore  8  Ld.  Red.  47. 

a  paper  styled  a  "supplemental  petition"  may  i  This  is  still  so.     Cons.  Ord.  X.  11  ;    see 

be  treated  as  an  amended  petition.     Cincinnati  pott,  Chap.  VII.  §  1,  Service  of  a  Copy  of  the 

v.  Cameron,  8  Cent.  L.  J.  17,  Sup.  Com.  Court  Bill  on  Formal  Defendants. 

of  Ohio;  see  also  Northman  v.  Liverpool  &c.  2  Ante,  p.  313. 

355 


357 


THE   BILL. 


enacted  that  every  bill  "  should  contain,  as  concisely  as  may  be,  a  nar- 
rative of  the  material  facts,  matters,  and  circumstances,  on  which  the 
plaintiff  relies :  such  narrative  being  divided  into  paragraphs,  numbered 
consecutively :  and  each  paragraph  containing,  as  nearly  as  may  be,  a 
separate  and  distinct  statement  or  allegation,8  and  shall  pray  specifically 
for  the  relief  which  the  plaintiff  may  conceive  himself  entitled  to,  and 
also  for  general  relief."  4 

A  bill,  as  ordinarily  framed,  may  now  be  said  to  consist  of  the  first, 
second,  third,  and  eighth  parts  above  enumerated  only ;  the  charging 
part  is,  indeed,  still  occasionally  inserted,  but  it  is  rather  as  part  of  the 
narrative  than  as  a  separate  part,  and  the  allegations  are,  by  most 
draftsmen,  introduced  as  statements,  and  not  by  way  of  charge ;  so  that 
practically  this  part  may  now  be  considered  as  included  in  the  stating 
part.5  The  averment  of  jurisdiction  is  also  still  sometimes  inserted,  but 
it  may  also,  when  inserted,  be  considered  as  a  portion  of  the  stating 
part.  The  fourth  part,  or  charge  of  confederacy,  gradually  became 
disused,  and  is  now  universally  omitted ;  the  seventh,  or  interrogating 
part,  is  now  omitted  by  express  enactment ; 6  and  the  ninth  part,  or 
prayer  for  process,  is  also  omitted  :  the  writ  of  subpoena  to  appear  and 
answer  the  bill  having  been  abolished.7  The  prayer  for  an  injunction, 
or  a  ne  exeat  regno,  or  that  certain  formal  parties  may  be  bound  upon 
being  served  with  a  copy  of  the  bill,  is  inserted  when  it  forms  part  of  the 
relief  adapted  to  the  circumstances  of  the  case;    but  then  it  properly 

forms  a  portion  of  the  eighth  part.8 
*  357       *  The  attention  of  the  reader  will,  therefore,  be  confined  to  the 

four  parts  above  enumerated,  as  the  distinct  parts  of  which  a  bill 
now  consists. 


1.   Address  of  the  Bill. 

Every  bill  must  be  addressed  to  the  person  or  persons  who  have  the 
actual  custody  of  the  Great  Seal  at  the  time  of  its  being  filed  ; 1  unless 


8  See  Statutes  of  Iowa,  Revision  of  I860,  Pt. 
3,  c.  122,  §2875,  §  9,  p.  510. 

4  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  10;  and  see  form  of 
bill,  as  given  by  Cons.  Ord.  IX.  2,  and  Sched. 
A.,  post,  Vol.  III.  The  present  form  of  bill 
appears  to  be  a  return  to  the  more  ancient 
form ;  see  Partridge  v.  Haycraft,  11  Ves.  574. 
The  fact  that  the  frame  of  a  bill  is  unusual, 
and  without  a  precedent,  does  not  alone  consti- 
tute an  objection  to  the  relief  sought,  if  it  can 
be  supported  upon  principle.  Yauger  v.  Skin- 
ner, H  N.  J.  Eq.  389,  395. 

5  See  Mansell  v.  Feeney,  2  J.  &  H.  313, 
318. 

6  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86.  §  10;  see  Wilson  r. 
Hammonds,  L.  R.  8  Eq.  323. 

1  Ibid.  §  2. 

8  Every   bill    is   intituled  "in  Chancery," 


(a)  The  Mass.  Act  of  1883,  c.  223,  §  10,  pro- 
vides:—  "In  a  suit  in  Equity  in  the  Supreme 

356 


marked  with  the  name  of  the  Judge  before 
whom  it  is  intended  to  be  set  down,  and 
headed  with  the  names  of  the  parties  as  plain- 
tiffs and  defendants;  see  post,  §  7,  Printing 
and  ^filing  the  Bill. 

i  In  the  United  States  the  address  of  the 
bill  is  to  the  Court  from  which  it  seeks  relief, 
by  its  appropriate  and  technical  description, 
and  the  address  must  be  varied  according!}'. 
Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  26.  In  the  U.  S.  Circuit 
Courts  bills  are  addressed,  "  To  the  Judges  of 
the  Circuit  Court  of  the  United  States  for  the 
District  of,"  &c.  U.  S.  Court  Equity  Rule  20  ; 
Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  26;  see  Sterrick  v.  Pugsley,  1 
Flippin,  350.  In  Massachusetts  and  Maine  the 
bill  is  addressed,  "  To  the  Honorable  the  Jus- 
tices of  the  Supreme  Judicial  Court."  (a)  In 
New  Hampshire,  the  address  is:   "R ss. 


Judicial  or  Superior  Court,  the  bill  need  not 
contain  any  address  to  the  Court,  or  the  usual 


FORM    OF   THE   BILL. 


357 


the  seals  are  in  the  Queen's  own  hand,  in  which  case  the  bill  must  be 
addressed,  "  To  the  Queen's  Most  Excellent  Majesty,  in  her  High  Court  of 
Chancery"  2  (b) 

If  the  Lord  Chancellor  or  Lord  Keeper  himself  be  a  party,  the  bill 


To  the  Supreme  Judicial  Court."  Chancery 
Rule  2.  In  New  Jersey',  "To  the  Honorable 
A  0  Z,  Chancellor  of  the  State  of  New  Jer- 
se}'."     In  Vermont,  "To  the  Honorable  A  B, 


Chancellor  of  the  First  (or  Second,  &c.)  Judi- 
cial Circuit."     See  Code  of  Tenn.  §  -4312. 

2  West.  Srmb.   194,   b.     For  forms  of  ad- 
dress, see  Vol.  III. 


commencement,  or  any  prayer  for  an  answer, 
for  general  relief,  or  for  process,  and  the  an- 
swer need  not  contain  any  saving  of  exceptions 
to  the  bill,  or  any  prayer  to  be  dismissed,  or 
for  costs,  and  a  demurrer  or  plea  need  not  con- 
tain any  protestation  or  concluding  prayer,  and 
the  omission  thereof  shall  not  affect  the  rights 
of  the  parties  respectively.  The  bill,  except 
when  it  is  actually  inserted  in  a  writ,  shall  be 
entitled  in  the  proper  Court,  and  with  the  full 
title  of  the  cause  containing  the  names  and 
descriptions  of  all  the  parties.  Bills,  answers, 
petitions,  and  other  pleadings  may  be  signed 
by  the  party  or  his  attorney,  and  shall  not  re- 
quire any  other  signature.  An  answer  to  a  bill 
shall  not  be  sworn  to  or  under  seal,  except  in 
cases  of  bills  filed  for  discovery  only.  The 
forms  in  the  schedule  hereto  illustrate  the  ap- 
plication of  the  provisions  of  this  section." 

(b)  The  caption  is  not  properly  part  of  the 
bill,  and  facts  there  alleged,  as  "  to  the  use 
of,"  are  not  admitted  by  a  demurrer.  Jackson 
v.  Ashton,  8  Peters,  148;  Spalding  v.  Dodge, 
6  Mackey,  289.  The  complaint  itself,  and  not 
its  caption,  determines  the  capacity  in  which  a 
partv  is  sued.  Burling  v.  Tompkins,  77  Cal. 
257;  see  Wise  v.  Williams,  72  Cal.  544.  Add- 
ing'^ corporation"  to  the  defendant's  name 
in  the  caption  of  a  complaint  is  not  a  sufficient 
averment  that  it  is  a  corporation.  Miller  v. 
Pine  Mining  Co.  (Idaho)  31  Pac.  Rep.  803. 
In  the  Federal  Courts  a  person  cannot  be  made 
a  defendant  by  giving  him  a  fictitious  name  in 
the  introduction  of  the  bill  and  in  the  prayer 
for  process.  Kentucky  S.  M.  Co.  v.  Day,  2 
Sawyer,  468;  Carlsbad  v.  Tibbetts,  51  Fed. 
Rep.  852;  see  United  States  v.  Pratt  Coal  & 
Coke  Co.  18  id.  708. 

In  early  times  applications  for  redress  or 
assistance,  especially  against  the  violence  and 
the  "combination  and  confederacy"  of  great 
men,  not  remediable  at  law,  were  addressed  to 
the  King  alone,  or  to  him  in  Council  or  in  Par- 
liament. "  Petitions  to  the  King  alone,  and 
answered  by  him,  occurred  long  after  the  reijen 
of  Richard  II.;"  and  until  the  end  of  Wol- 
sey's  chancellorship,  the  Chancellor,  to  whom 
these  petitions  came  to  be  referred,  was 
usually  an  ecclesiastic,  versed  in  the  civil  and 
the  canon  law.      See  Kerb's  Equitable  Juris- 


diction of  the  Court  of  Chancery  (Cambridge 
Prize  Essay  for  1889),  pp.  16,  94;  Scrutton's 
Roman  Law  in  England,  153,  162;  1  Camp- 
bell's Chancellors  (5th  ed.),  9,  142;  Gilbert's 
Chancery,  10;  1  Story,  Eq.  Jur.  §  44,  et  seq.  ; 
Oman's  Byzantine  Empire,  112;  Conway  Rob- 
inson's Hist,  of  the  High  Court  of  Chancery, 
vol.  i.  Introd.  Mr.  Kerly  (pp.  62,  63)  cites 
early  bills,  of  which  the  following,  of  the  time 
of  Richard  II.,  is,  in  its  address  to  the  Chancel- 
lor and  its  prayer,  typical,  like  the  maxims 
of  Equity,  of  the  ecclesiastical  influence  upon 
Equity  in  its  inception:  "To  the  very  honor- 
able and  very  reverent  Father  in  God,  the 
Archbishop  of  York  and  Chance'lorof  England, 
Robert  Briddecote  showethand  grievously  com- 
plaineth  of  John  Forster.  That  whereas  the 
said  Robert  was  going,"  &c.  (The  facts  are 
then  informally  recited.)  "  May  it  please  you 
for  love  of  the  Almighty  to  examine  the  said 
John  on  this  matter,  and  to  investigate  his 
cause,  thus  to  do  and  moreover  to  apply  remedy 
and  right  to  the  taid  suppliant  for  God  and  in 
work  of  Charity."  "  Modern  Equity  "  is  some- 
times said  to  be  crystallized  and  distinct  from 
that  which  preceded  it ;  but  its  doctrines  are, 
in  the  words  of  Sir  George  Jessel  M.  R.  in 
Knatchbull  v.  Hallett,  13  Ch.  D  696,  710,  "  pro- 
gressive, refined,  and  improved."  and  the  high- 
est authorities  regard  its  principles  as  never 
changing,  though  capable  of  new  adaptations. 
Thus,  in  a  recent  case  in  the  House  of  Lords 
(Ewins  v.  Orr  Ewing,  9  App.  Cas.  34,  40), 
Lord  Selborne  said:  "The  Courts  of  Equity 
in  England  are,  and  always  have  been,  Courts 
of  conscience,  operating  in  personam,  and 
not  in  rem.''''  So  in  Thomson  v.  Eastwood, 
2  App.  Cas.  215,  233,  the  opinion  of  Lord 
Cairns  L.  C.  holds  a  trustee,  not  proved  to 
be  chargeable  with  personal  fraud,  liable  for 
denying,  unconscionably  and  upon  untenable 
grounds,  his  beneficiary's  title  to  trust  money, 
and  thus  postponing  full  payment.  The  mode 
of  proof  in  Equity  by  requiring  an  adversary's 
examination  under  oath  for  the  purpose  of  ob- 
taining admissions  or  confessions,  and  by  the 
private  and  written  examination  of  the  wit- 
nesses before  trial,  evidently  originated  after 
the  time  of  Justinian.  See  Langdell,  Eq.  PL 
(2d  ed.)  §  3. 

357 


*357 


THE   BILL. 


must,  in  like  manner,  be  addressed  to  the  Queen ; 8  but  in  all  other 
cases,  including  a  case  where  the  Master  of  the  Rolls  is  a  party,4  the 
bill  must  be  directed  to  the  Lord  Chancellor,  or  other  person  having  the 
custody  of  the  Great  Seal. 

Upon  every  change  in  the  custody  of  the  Great  Seal,  or  alteration  in 
the  style  of  the  person  holding  it,  notice  of  the  form  in  which  bills  are 
to  be  addressed  is  put  up  in  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerks'  Office. 

2.  Names  and  Addresses  of  the  Plaintiffs. 

It  is  not  only  necessary  that  the  names  of  the  several  plaintiffs  in  a 
bill  should  be  correctly  stated,  but  the  description  and  place  of  abode 
of  each  plaintiff  must  be  set  out,  in  order  that  the  Court  and  the  de- 
fendants may  know  where  to  resort  to  compel  obedience  to  any  order  or 
process  of  the  Court,  and  particularly  for  the  payment  of  any  costs 
which  may  be  awarded  against  the  plaintiffs,  or  to  punish  any  improper 
conduct  in  the  course  of  the  suit.8 


8  4  Yin.  Ab.  385;  Leg.  .Tud.  in  Ch.  44, 
258;  Jud.  Auth.  M.  K.  179,  182;  Ld.  Red.  7  ; 
Coop.  Eq.  PI.  23.  Braithwaite's  Pr.  20.  In 
1  Prax.  Aim.  Cur.  Can.  463  is  a  precedent  of 
a  bill  b}r  Ld.  Ch.  Jefferies,  addressed  to  the 
King's  Most  Excellent  Majesty,  and  praying 
his  Majesty  to  grant  the  usual  process  of  sub- 
poena; and  in  vol.  ii.  of  the  same  book,  310,  is 
to  be  found  an  answer  to  the  same  bill.  The 
final  decree  in  such  cases  is,  "  By  the  Queen's 
Most  Excellent  Majesty,  in  her  High  Court  >f 
Chancery"  and  is  signed  by  her.  Leg.  Jud. 
in  Ch.  254,  256.  In  Lord  Keeper  V.  Wyld,  1 
Vern.  139,  where  Lord  Keeper  Guilford  and 
others  were  plaintiffs,  the  Master  of  the  Rolls 
and  one  of  the  Chief  Justices  sat  to  decide  the 
cause.     Coop.  Eq.  PI.  23. 

4  See  Leg.  Jud.  in  Ch.  44,  where  it  is  stated 
that  in  the  bundle  of  Chancery  parchments  in 
the  To-ver,  there  is  a  bill  by  Moreton,  Keeper 
of  the  Rolls,  directed  to  the  Right  Rev.  Father 
in  God,  Robert,  Bishop  of  Bath  and  Wells. 
Coop.  Eq.  PI.  2-3,  note. 

6  Ld.  Red.  42:  and  see  as  to  what  is  a 
sufficient  description,  Griffith  v.  Ricketts,  5 
Hare,  195;  Sibbering  v.  Earl  of  Balcarras,  1 
De  G.  &  S.  683;  12  Jur.  108.  In  the  United 
States  Courts,  even-  bill  in  the  introductory 
part  thereof  shall  contain  the  names,  places 
of  abode,   and  citizenship,  of  all  the  parties, 


(c)  In  the  Federal  Courts  a  corporation  is 
regarded  as  a  citizen  of  the  State  by  which  it  is 
created.  It  is  not  sufficient  to  aver  that  it  is  a 
"citizen."  or  "is  doing  business  in  "  a  particular 
State.  Lafayette  Ins.  Co.  r. French,  18  How. 404; 
Lonergan  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  55  Fed.  Rep 
550;  Muller  v  Dows,  94  U.  S.  444;  National 
S.  S.  Co.  v.  Tugman,  106  U.  S.  118 ;  Kansas 
358 


plaintiffs,  and  defendants,  by  and  against 
whom    the    bill    is   brought.      Thus:    "A   B, 

of ,    and   a   citizen  of  the    State   of , 

brings   this,    his    bill,    against  C    D,    of , 

and  a  citizen  of  the  State  of ,  and  E  F, 

of ,   and   a  citizen  of  the   State   of . 

And,"  &i.  Equity  Rule  20.  See  Story, 
Eq.  PI.  §  26;  Dodge  v.  Perkins,  4  Mason, 
435.  It  is  indispensable,  in  all  cases  where 
the  right  to  bring  the  suit  in  the  Courts  of  the 
United  States  is  founded  on  the  fact  that  the 
plaintiffs  and  defendants  are  citizens  of  differ- 
ent States,  to  allege  that  fact  distinctly  in  the 
bill.  See  Bingham  r.  Cabot,  3  Dall.  382;  Jack- 
son v.  Ashton,  8  Peters,  148.  In  New  Hamp- 
shire "every  bill  in  the  introductory  part  shall 
contain  the  names,  places  of  abode,  and  proper 
description  of  all  the  parties,  plaintiffs  and 
defendants,  by  and  against  whom  the  bill  is 
brought.  The  firm  in  substance  shall  be  as 
follows:  'A  B,  of,  &c,  complains  against  C  D, 
of,  &c,  and  E  F,  of,  &c,  and  says,'  "  &c. 
Chancery  Rule  2,  38  N.  H.  605.  A  demurrer 
will  be  sustained  to  a  bill  in  Equity  where  one 
of  the  parties  is  stated  to  be  a  private  corpora- 
tion, if  it  is  not  described  in  substance  as  a  cor- 
poration established  by  law  in  some  State,  and 
transacting  its  business  in  some  place,  but  the 
defect  may  be  amended.  Winnipiseogee  Lake 
Co.  v.  Young,  40  N.  H.  420.  (c)     An  objection, 


Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Atchison,  112  U.  S.  414:  Wis- 
consin r.  Pelican  Ins  Co.  127  U.  S.  265;  Brock 
r.  North  Western  Fuel  Co.  130  U.  S.  341;  Ever- 
hart  v.  Huntsville  College,  120  U.  S.  223.  Such 
citizenship  is  not  affected  when  the  corporation 
does  business  in  different  States.  Myers  v.  Mur- 
ray, 43  Fed.  Rep.  695.  A  consolidated  corpora- 
tion may  be  a  citizen  of  the  various  States  by 


FORM    OF   THE   BILL. 


359 


*  It  seems  that  a  demurrer  will  lie  to  a  bill  which  does  not  state  *  358 
the  place  of  abode  of  the  plaintiff ; *  and  that  if  the  bill  describes 
the  plaintiff  as  residing  at  a  wrong  place,  the  fact  may  be  taken  advan- 
tage of  by  plea :  though  a  defendant  cannot  put  in  such  a  plea,  after  a 
demurrer,  upon  the  same  ground,  has  been  overruled,  without  leave  f>i 
the  Court.2 

The  modern  practice,  however,  in  such  cases,  is  not  to  demur,  or 
plead  to  the  bill,  but  to  apply  by  special  motion  or  summons,8  on  notice 
to  the  plaintiff,  that  he  may  give  security  for  costs,  and  that  in 
the  mean  time  proceedings  in  the  suit  may  be  stayed.4  *  It  is  *  359 
presumed,  however,  from  analogy  to  the  practice  where  there  are 
several  plaintiffs,  one  only  of  whom  is  resident  abroad,1  that  the  Court 
would  not  require  such  plaintiffs  as  are  not  properly  described  to  give 
security. 

Where  a  bill  is  filed  on  behalf  of  an  infant,  or  person  of  unsound 
mind  not  so  found,  it  is  not  necessary  or  usual  to  describe  the  plaintiff 
by  his  place  of  abode ;  2  because  an  infant  or  person  of  unsound  mind 
is  not  responsible  either  for  costs  or  for  the  conduct  of  the  suit ;  the 
description  and  place  of  abode  of  the  next  friend  must,  however,  be  set 
out.3     In  the  case  of  a  married  woman  suing  by  her  next  friend,  it  is 


raised  by  demurrer,  to  a  bill  filed  by  a  corpora- 
tion, that  it  does  not  aver  that  the  complainant 
is  a  corporation,  is  an  objection  of  form  which 
cannot  be  raised  under  a  general  demurrer  for 
want  of  equity,  and  the  averment  is,  moreover, 
unnecessary.  German  Reformed  Church  v.  Von 
Puechelstein,  27  N.  J.  Eq.  30. 

1  Winnipiseogee  Lake  Co.  v.  Worster,  29 
N.  H.  443;  Winnipiseogee  Lake  Co.  v.  Young, 
40  N.  H.  420. 

2  Rowley  v.  Eccles,  1  S.  &  S.  511;  Smith  v. 
Smith,  Kay  App.  22.  In  Bainbrigge  p.  Orton, 
20  Beav.  28,  however.  Sir  John  Romilly  M.  R. 
appears  to  have  doubted  whether  such  a  plea  can 
be  maintained;  and  if  such  a  plea  is  bad,  so,  it 
is  apprehended,  would  a  demurrer  be,  where  no 
address  is  stated.  It  is  to  be  observed  thai,  in 
Rowley  «.  Eccles,  the  demurrer  was  overruled, 
and  in  Smith  v.  Smith,  the  plea  disallowed. 
See,  however,  Sibbering  v.  Earl  of  Balcarras, 
ubi  supra. 

3  Tynte  v.  Hodge,  2  J.  &  H.  692. 

4  Sandys  v.  Long,  2  M.  &  K.  487;  see  also 
Bailey  v.  Gundry,  1  Keen,  53;  Campbell  v. 
Andrews,  12  Sim.  578;  Bainbrigge  v.  Orton, 
20  Beav.  28:  Hutchinson  v.  Swift,  13  W.  R. 
532,  L.  JJ. ;  Howe  v.  Harvey,  8  Paige,  73.  For 
forms  of  notice  of  motion  and  summons,  see 
Vol.  III.  In  Simpson  v.  Burton,  1  Beav.  556, 
Lord  Langdale  M.  R.  said:  "There  can  be  no 


doubt  that  it  is  the  duty  of  a  plaintiff  to  state 
his  place  of  residence,  truly  and  accurately,  at 
the  time  he  files  his  bill ;  and  if,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  avoiding  all  access  to  him,  he  wilfully 
misrepresents  his  residence,  he  will  be  ordered 
to  give  security  for  costs.  I  do  not  think  the 
rule  extends  to  a  case  where  he  has  done  so  in- 
nocently, and  from  mere  error."  It  is  to  be 
observed  that,  in  this  case,  all  the  plaintiffs 
were  incorrectly  described  in  the  bill;  but  there 
does  not  appear  to  be  any  decision  upon  the 
point,  where  there  are  several  plaintiffs,  one  or 
more  of  whom  are  correctly  described,  and  the 
rest  not  so.  See  also  Watts  v.  Kelly,  6  W.  R.  206, 
V.  C.  W.;  Smith  v.  Cornfoot,  1  De  G.  &  S.  684 ; 
12.1ur.  260;  Griffith  v.  Ricketts,  5  Hare,  195; 
Player  v.  And  rson,  15  Sim.  104:  Manby  v. 
Bewicke,  8  De  G.  M.  &  G.  468;  2  Jur.  N.  S. 
671;  Kerr».  Gillespie,  7  Beav.  269;  Knight  v. 
Corv,  9  Jur.  N.  S.  491;  11  W.  R.  254,  V.  C. 
W.;  Dick  v.  Munder,  11  Jur.  N.  S.  819;  13 
W.  R.  1013,  M.  R.,  where  the  plaintiff  was 
allowed  to  amend,  instead  of  giving  security. 

1  See  ante,  p.  28. 

2  Braithwaite's  Pr.  25;  see  forms  in  Vol.  III. 

8  This  is  not  altered  by  the  change  in  prac- 
tice, which  requires  a  written  authority  from 
the  next  friend  to  be  filed  with  the  bill.  Major 
V.  Arnott,  2  Jur.  N.  S.  80,  V.  C.  K.  See  ante, 
pp.  69, 110. 


which  the  consolidated  corporations  were  char- 
tered. Fitzgerald  v.  Missouri  Pacific  Ry.  Co. 
45  Fed.  Rep.  815;  see  Cohn  v.  Louisville,  N.  O. 


&  T.  R.  Co.  39  id.  227.     The  latter  may  still 
retain  their  original  citizenship.     Paul  r.  Baltic 
more  &  O.  &  C.  R.  Co.  44  Fed.  Rep.  513. 
359 


360 


THE    BILL. 


usual,  but  not  essential,  to  set  out  the  address  of  the  married  woman, 
but  the  address  of  the  next  friend  must  be  stated ; 4  and  where  a  married 
woman  sues  as  a,  feme  sole,  that  fact  must  be  stated  in  this  part  of  the  bill. 

The  address  of  a  peer  of  the  realm  or  of  a  corporate  body,  suing  as 
plaintiff,  need  not  be  stated  in  the  bill.5 

A  plaintiff  in  a  cross-bill  is  not  required  to  give  security  for  costs  on 
the  ground  of  insufficient  description  of  residence.6 

The  defendant  should  apply  that  the  plaintiff  may  give  security  for 
costs  as  soon  as  he  becomes  aware  of  the  fact  that  the  plaintiff's  address 
is  incorrectly  stated  in  the  bill ;  and  if  the  defendant  takes  any  active 
steps  in  the  cause  after  he  becomes  so  aware,  and  before  applying,  it 
will  be  a  waiver  of  his  right  to  security.7 

The  Order,8  by  which  the  penal  sum  in  the  bond  to  be  given  by  the 
plaintiff  by  way  of  security  for  costs  is  increased  from  £40  to  £100,  only 
speaks  of  cases  where  the  plaintiff  is  out  of  the  jurisdiction.  It  has, 
however,  been  decided  that  it  applies  to  the  case  now  under  considera- 
tion, and  to  all  other  cases  where  security  for  costs  is  required.9 

Where  a  plaintiff  sues  as  executor  or  administrator,  it  is  not  necessary 
so  to  describe  himself  in  this  part  of  the  bill  :  though,  as  we  have  seen 
before,  it  is  necessary  that  it  should  appear  in  the  stating  part  that 
he  has  duly  proved  the  will  or  obtained  administration,  as  the  case 

may  be.10 
*  360  *  Where  a  plaintiff  sues  on  behalf  of  himself  and  of  others  of  a 
similar  class,  it  should  be  so  stated  in  this  part  of  the  bill ;  and 
the  omission  of  such  a  statement  will,  in  many  cases,  render  a  bill 
liable  to  objection  for  want  of  parties,1  and  in  other  cases  will  deprive 
the  plaintiff  of  his  right  to  the  whole  of  the  relief  which  he  seeks  to 
obtain.  Thus,  in  the  case  of  a  single-bond  creditor  suing  for  satisfac- 
tion of  his  debt  out  of  the  personal  and  real  estate  of  his  debtor,  and 
not  stating  that  he  sues  "  on  behalf  of  himself  and  the  other  specialty 
creditors,"  he  can  only  have  a  decree  for  satisfaction  out  of  the  personal 
estate  in  a  due  course  of  administration,  and  not  for  satisfaction  out  of 
the  real  estate.2 


4  Braithwaite's  Pr.  21,25.  If  the  next  friend 
of  a  plaintiff  be  undescribed  in  the  bill,  he  may, 
on  special  application  by  motion  or  summons, 
be  ordered  to  give  security  for  costs.  See  Kerr 
v.  Gillespie,  and  Watts  v.  Kelly,  vbi  supra. 
For  forms  of  notice  of  motion  and  summons, 
see  Vol.  III. 

5  Braithwaite's  Pr.  25. 

6  Wild  v.  Murray,  18  Jur.  892,  V.  C.  W.; 
see  also  Vincent  v.  Hunter,  5  Hare.  320;  Wat- 
teeu  v.  Billam,  3  De  G.  &  S.  516;  14  Jur.  165; 
Sloggett  v.  Viant,  13  Sim.  187. 

7  Swanzy  r.  Swanzy,  4  K.  &  J.  237;  4  Jur. 
N.  S.  1013;  see  Redondo  v.  Chaytor,  4  Q.  B. 
D.  453.  456. 

»  Cons.  Ord.  XL.  6. 

9  Bailev  v.  Gundry,  1  Keen,  53,  57 ;  but  see 
Atkins  u.'Cook,  3  Jur.  N.  S.  283,  V.  C  K. ; 
Partington  v.  Reynolds,  6  W.  R.  307,  V.  C.  K., 

360 


where  it  was  held  that,  in  the  case  of  a  peti- 
tion, £40  is  the  proper  amount.  For  more 
on  the  subject  of  security  for  costs,  see  antef 
pp.  27—37. 

m  Ante,  pp.  318,  319. 

i  Ante,  p.  237. 

2  Bedford  v.  Leigh,  2  Dick.  707;  May  v. 
Selby.  1  Y.  &  C.  C.  C.  235;  Connolly  v.  M'Der- 
mott,  3  Jo.  &  Lat.  260;  Ponsford  v.  Hartley,  2 
J.  &H.  736;  Johnson  v.  Compton,  4  Sim.  47; 
ante,  p.  235.  If,  however,  a  defect  of  this  de- 
scription appear  at  the  hearing,  the  Court  will 
allow  the  case  to  stand  over,  with  liberty  to 
the  plaintiff  to  amend,  ibid.;  Biscoe  v.  Waring, 
Rolls,  7  Aug.,  1835,  MS.;  Cosby  v.  Wickliffe, 
7  B.  Mon.  120.  Or  the  bill  may  be  ordered  to  be 
taken  as  a  bill  on  behalf  of  the  other  creditors. 
Woods  v.  Sowerby,  14  W.  R.  9,  V.  C.  W. 


FORM    OF   THE    BILL. 


360 


3.  Stating  Part. 

With  respect  to  the  manner  in  which  the  plaintiff's  case  should  be 
presented  to  the  Court,  it  is  to  be  observed,  that  whatever  is  essential 
to  his  rights  and  is  necessarily  within  his  knowledge,  ought  to  be  alleged 
positively  as  a  fact.3  {a)  It  is  not  a  sufficient  averment  of  a  fact,  in  a 
bill,  to  state  that  a  plaintiff  "  is  so  informed,"  4  (//)  or  that  one  defend- 
ant alleges,  and  the  plaintiff  believes,  a  statement  to  be  true ; 6  nor  is  an 
allegation  that  the  defendant  sets  up  certain  pretences,  followed  by  a 
charge  that  the  contrary  of  such  pretences  is  the  truth,  a  sufficient  alle- 
gation or  averment  of  facts  which  make  up  the  counter  statement.6 

The  claims  of  a  defendant  may  be  stated  in  general  terms,  and  if  a 
matter  essential  to  the  determination  of  the  plaintiff's  claim  is  charged 
to  rest  within  the  knowledge  of  a  defendant,  or  must  of  necessity  be 
within  his  knowledge,  and  is  consequently  the  subject  of  a  part  of  the 
discovery  sought,  a  precise  allegation  is  not  required.7 


3  Ld.  Red.  41;  Darthez  v.  Clemens,  6  Beav. 
165,  169;  Munday  v.  Knight,  3  Hare,  497,  502; 
Pad  wick  v.  Hurst,  18  Beav.  575;  18  Jur.  763; 
Bainbrigge  v.  Moss,  3  Jur.  N.  S.  58,  V.  C.  W.; 
Duckworth  v.  Duckworth,  35  Ala.  70;  Moran 
v.  Palmer,  13  Mich.  367 ;  Mclntyre  v.  Wright, 
6  Paige,  239;  Rice  v.  Hosiery  Co.  56  N.  H. 
114.  An  assertion  of  a  claim  by  way  of  in- 
ference from  a  recital  of  a  Master's  finding  on  an 
ex  parte,  petition  of  complainant,  is  insufficient. 
Search  v.  Search,  27  N.  J.  Eq.  137.  A  for- 
tiori, where  there  is  no  averment  of  title  at  all. 
Phillips  v.  Schooley,  27  N.  J.  Eq.  410.  An 
allegation  in  a  bill  that  the  plaintiff  "  has  been 
informed  and  believes,  and  therefore  avers," 
is  a  sufficiently  positive  averment.  Wells  v. 
Bridgeport  &c.  Co.  30  Conn.  316.  The  pleader 
should  aver  the  fact  on  his  information  and 
belief,  and  not  his  information  and  belief  that 
the  fact  exists.     Nix  v.  Winter,  35  Ala.  309. 

4  Lord  Uxbridge  v.  Staveland,  I  Ves.  Sr. 
56  ;  Lucas  v.  Oliver,  34  Ala.  626  ;  Cameron  v. 
Abbott,  30  Ala.  46;  Jones  v.  Cowles,  26  Ala. 
612.  Quinn  v.  Leake,  1  Tenn.  Ch.  71.  Such 
an  averment  simply  puts   in   issue   the  com- 


plainant's information  and  belief,  not  the  truth 
or  falsehood  of  the  facts  about  which  he  is 
informeii.     Ex  parte  Reid,  50  Ala.  439. 

5  Egremont  v.  Cowell,  5  Beav.  620,  622; 
Hodgson  v.  Espinasse,  10  Beav.  473;  Nix  v. 
Winter,  35  Ala.  309. 

6  Flint  v.  Field,  2  Anst.  543:  Houghton  v. 
Reynolds,  2  Hare,  267;  7  Jur.  414;  see  White 
v.  Smale,  22  Beav.  72;  Clark  v.  Lord  Rivers, 
L.  R.  5  Eq.  91. 

7  Ld.  Red.  42;  Philipps  v.  Philipps,  4  Q  B. 
D.  127;  Aikin  v.  Ballard,  Rice  Eq.  13;  Story, 
Eq.  PI.  §  255.  It  may  be  stated  upon  informa- 
tion and  belief  followed  by  the  averment  that  he, 
therefore,  cha  ges  the  fact  to  be  true.  Camp- 
bell v.  Paris  &c.  R.  Co.  71  111.  611.  A  bill  in 
Equity,  brought  by  a  partner  against  his  copart- 
ner, for  an  account,  &c,  wherein  it  is  averred 
that  the  defendant  has  all  the  partnership  books 
and  papers  in  his  possession,  or  under  his  con- 
trol, and  refuses  to  permit  the  plaintiff  to  ex- 
amine them,  need  not  contain  such  certainty 
and  particularity  of  statement  as  would  be  held 
necessary  if  the  plaintiff  had  access  to  those 
books  and  papers.     Towle   v.  Pierce,  12  Met. 


(a)  The  stating  part  of  a  bill  in  Equity 
should  contain  even-  averment  necessary  to  en- 
title the  plaintiff  to  the  relief  asked,  as  such 
averment  cannot  be  supplied  by  inference  or 
by  reference  to  other  parts  of  the  bill.  Thomp- 
son's Appeal,  126  I'enn.  St.  367.  The  stating 
part  and  the  prayer  for  relief  are  now  generally 
treated  as  the  essential  parts  of  the  bill.  See. 
Comstock  v.  Herron,  45  Fed.  Rep.  660;  Clark 
v.  Harwood,  8  How.  Pr.  470;  McCulla  v. 
Beadleston,  17  R.  I.  20,  25;  Stevens  v.  Hayden, 
129  Mass.  328. 

(b)  The  allegations  of  the  bill  must  be  direct 


and  positive,  and  not  merely  upon  information 
and  belief,  the  latter  only  and  not  the  facts 
stated  being  admitted  by  a  demurrer  in  such 
case.  Lucas  v.  Oliver,  34  Ala.  626;  Cameron  v. 
Abbott,  30  AIm.  416;  Ewingv.  Duncan,  81  Texas, 
230;  Walton  v.  Westwood,  73  111.  125;  Leaven- 
worth v.  Pepper,  32  Fed.  Rep.  718.  But  aver- 
ments of  fact,  "as  the  plaintiff  is  informed  and 
believes,"  or  the  statement  that  "the  plaintiff 
has  been  informed  and  believes,  and  therefore 
avers,"  are  sufficient.  Ibid. ;  Campbell  v.  Paris 
Railroad  Co.  71  111.  611. 

361 


362 


THE   BILL. 


*  301        *  In  general,  however,  a  plaintiff  must  state  upon  his  bill  a  case 

upon  which,  if  admitted  by  the  answer,  or  proved  at  the  hearing, 
the  Court  could  make  a  decree ; 1  and  therefore,  where  a  bill  was  filed 
to  restrain  a  defendant  from  setting  up  outstanding  terms,  in  bar  of  the 
plaintiff's  right  at  Law,  not  stating  that  there  were  any  outstanding 
terms  or  estates,  but  merely  alleging  that  the  defendant  threatened  to  set 

up  some  outstanding  term,  or  other  legal  estate,  a  demurrer  was 

*  362    allowed  on  the  *  ground  that  the  bill  ought  to  have  stated  what 

the  outstanding  term  or  estate  was.1 


329;  Crockett  v.  Lee,  7  Wheat.  522;  Knox  v. 
Smith,  4  How.  U.  S.  298;  Capel  v.  McCollum, 
27  Ala.  461;  Miller  »;.  Thatcher,  9  Texas,  482; 
Jones  v.  Brinker,  20  Miss.  87 ;  see  Vanner  v. 
Frost,  39  L.  J.  Ch.  626. 

i  See  Chilton  v.  London,  7  Ch.  D.  735;  Perry 
v.  Carr,   41  N.  H.  371.     Care  must  be  taken 
that  every  averment  necessary  to  entitle  the 
plaintiff  to  the  relief  prayed  for,  should  be  con- 
tained in  the  stating  part  of  the  bill.     Whiter. 
Yaw,  7  Vt.  357 ;  Kunkel  v.   Markell,  26  Md. 
408.     This  part  of  the  bill  should  be  full  and 
accurate,  for  if  a  plea  is  put  in,  the  validity  of 
the  plea  will  be  decided  with  reference  to  the 
stating  part  of  the  bill,  and  not  with  reference 
to  the  interrogatory  part  if  it  varies  from  it. 
Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  27;  see  Macnamara  v.  Sweet- 
man,  1  Hogan,  29;  Mechanics'  Bank  v.  Levy, 
3  Paige,  606:  Coles  v.  Buchanan,  3  Ired.  Ch. 
374.     Where  the  stating  part  does  not  show  the 
equity  of  the  plaintiff's  case,  the  defect  cannot 
be  supplied  by  inference,  or  by  reference  to 
averments  in  other  parts  of  the  bill.     Wright 
v.  Dame,  22  Pick.  55;  see  to  the  same  point, 
Harrison  v.  Nixon,  9  Peters,  503;  Shepard  v. 
Shepard,  6  Conn.  57;  Duckworth  v.  Duckworth, 
35  Ala.  70;  Mason  v.  Foster,  3  J.   J.  Marsh. 
284;  Lecraftu.  Dempsey,  15  Wend.  83;  Ynncy 
o.  Fenwick,  4  Hen.  &  M.  423;  Mitchell  v.  Mau- 
pin,  3  Monroe,  88;  Crocker  e.  Higgins,  7  Conn. 
342;  Hobart  v.  Frisbie,  5  Conn.  592;  Blake  v. 
Hinkle,  10  Yerger,  218;  Taliaferro  v.  Foot,  3 
Leigh,  58;  Hood  v.  Inman,  4  John.  Ch.  437; 
Chambers  v.  Chalmers,  4  Gill  &  J.  420;  Estep 
r.  Watkins,  1  Bland,  486;  Townshend  i\  Dun- 
can, 2  Bland,  45;  Watkins  v.  Stockett,  6  Harr. 
&  J.  445 ;  Timms  v.  Shannon,  19  Md.  312.    The 
stating  part  of  a  bill  cannot  be  enlarged  by  the 
terms  of   the  prayer  for  relief.      Bushnell   v. 
Avery,  121  Mass.  148.     But  a  statement  in  the 
form  of  a  charge  intended  as  an  averment  is 
sufficient    on    demurrer.     Johnson    v.    Helm- 
staedter,  30  N.  J.  Eq.  124.     The  plaintiff  will 
not  be  permitted  to  offer  or  require  evidence  of 
any  material  fact  not  distinctly  stated  in  the 
premises.    See  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §§  28,  257;  Rowan 
v.  Bowles,  21  III.  17;  Sprigg  v.  Albin,  6  J.  J. 
Marsh.  158;  Skinner  v.  Bailey,  7  Conn.  496. 
He  cannot  recover  on  a  case  different  from 
that  alleged.     Sanborn   v.   Kittredge,  20  Vt. 

362 


632;  Gibson  v.  Carson,  3  Ala.  421;  Harding  v. 
Handy,  11  Wheat.  103;  Jackson  v.  Ashton,  11 
Peters  229.  Neither  allegations  without  proof, 
nor  proof  without  allegations,  nor  allegations 
and  proof  which  do  not  substantially  corre- 
spond, will  entitle  complainant  to  relief,  unless 
the  defect  be  remedied  by  amendment.  Alex- 
ander r.  Taylor,  56  Ala.  60.  And  see  Floyd  o. 
Ritter,  56  Ala.  356  ;  Meadors  v.  Askew,  id.  584 ; 
Lehigh  &e.  R  Co.  v.  McFarlan,  30  N.J.  Eq. 
180;  South  Park  Com'rs  v.  Kerr,  13  Fed.  Rep. 
502.  A  general  statement  or  charge,  however, 
of  the  matter-of-fact,  is  sufficient;  and  it  is  not 
necessary  to  charge  minutely  all  the  circum- 
stances which  may  conduce  to  prove  the  general 
charge ;  for  these  circumstances  are  properly 
matters  of  evidence,  which  need  not  be  charged 
in  order  to  let  them  in  as  proofs.  Nesmith  v. 
Calvert,  1  Wood.  &  M.  34;  Lovell  v.  Farring- 
ton,  50  Maine,  239;  Rogers  v.  Ward,  8  Allen, 
387.  On  the  other  hand,  the  charge  may  be 
substantially  made  by  stating  the  facts  from 
which  the  fraud  or  mistake  would  be  necessarily 
implied.  Courts  of  Equity  derive  their  juris- 
diction from  the  facts  alleged,  not  from  the 
terms  used  in  setting  them  out.  Grove  v. 
Rentch,  26  Md.  367,  377;  see  further  to  these 
points  Dilly  v.  Heckrott.  8  Gill  &  J.  171 ;  Morri- 
son v.  Hart,  2  Bibb.  4;  Lemaster  v.  Burkhart,  2 
Bibb,  26 ;  Buck  v.  McCaughtry,  5  Monroe,  220; 
Bank  of  United  States  v.  Shultz,  3  Ohio,  62; 
Anthony  v.  Leftwich,  3  Rand.  263 ;  Boone  ?'. 
Chiles,  10  Peters,  177;  Jackson  v.  Cartwright, 

5  Munf.  314;  Aikin  v.  Ballard,  Rice  Eq.  13; 
Bishop  v.  Bishop,  13  Ala.  475 ;  White  v.  Yaw, 
7  Vt.  357 ;  Camden  and  Amboy  R.  Co.  v. 
Stewart,  19  N.  J.  Eq.  ,343.  But  where  the 
facts  stated  in  the  bill  are  disproved,  or  are 
defectively  stated,  relief  may  be  granted  upon 
the  facts  stated  in  the  answer.  Maury  v.  Lewis, 
10  Yerger,  115;  Rose  v.  Mynatt,  7  Yerger,  30; 
M'Laughlin  v.  Daniel,  8  Dana,  184;  Dealty  v. 
Murphy,  3  A.  K.  Marsh.  474;  but  see  Thomas 
v.  Warner,  15  Vt.  110  ;  West  v.  Hall,  3  Harr. 

6  J.  221 ;  Edwards  v.  Massey,  1  Hawks.  359. 
And  see  as  to  variance,  post,  pp.  860,  861. 

i  Stansbury  v.  Arkwright,  6  Sim.  481,  485; 
see  also  Jones  v.  Jones,  3  Mer.  161,  175 ;  Barber 
v.  Hunter,  cited  id.  170,  173 ;  Frietas  v.  Dos 
Sandos,  1  Y.  &  J.  574.    If  the  bill  founds  the 


FORM    OF   THE   BILL.  *  363 

Although  the  rules  of  pleading  in  Courts  of  Equity,  especially  in  the 
case  of  bills,  are  not  so  strict  as  those  adopted  in  Courts  of  Law,  yet,  in 
framing  pleadings  in  Equity,  the  draftsman  will  do  well  to  adhere  as 
closely  as  he  can  to  the  general  rules  of  Common  Law  pleadings,  when- 
ever such  rules  are  applicable,2  since,  the  stated  forms  of  description 
and  allegation  adopted  in  pleadings  at  Law  having  all  been  duly  debated 
under  every  possible  consideration,  settled  upon  solemn  deliberation,  and 
established  by  long  usage,  experience  has  shown  them  to  be  preferable 
to  all  others  for  conveying  distinct  and  clear  notions  of  the  subject  to  be 
submitted  to  the  Court.  Hence,  as  at  Law,  if  a  man  intends  to  allege  a 
title  in  himself  to  the  inheritance  or  freehold  of  lands  or  tenements  in 
possession,  he  ought  regularly  to  say  that  he  is  seised ;  or,  if  he  allege 
possession  of  a  term  of  years,  or  other  chattel  real,  that  he  is  possessed  ; 3 
if  he  allege  seisin  of  things  manurable,  as  of  lands,  tenements,  rents,  &c, 
he  should  say  that  he  was  seised  in  his  demesne,  as  of  fee ;  and  if  of 
things  not  manurable,  as  of  an  advowson,  he  should  allege  that  he  is 
seised  as  of  fee  and  right,  omitting  the  words  in  his  demesne,*  so  that 
there  seems  to  be  no  reason  why  the  same  forms  of  expression  should 
not  be  equally  proper  in  stating  the  same  estates  in  Equity.  It  is, 
indeed,  the  general  practice,  in  all  well-drawn  pleadings,  to  insert  them, 
although  they  are  frequently  accompanied  with  other  words,  which  are 
sometimes  added  by  way  of  enlarging  their  meaning,  and  of  extending 
them  to  other  than  mere  legal  estates.  Thus,  in  stating  a  seisin  in  fee, 
the  words,  "or  otherwise  well  entitled  to  "  are  frequently  added  ;  although 
it  would  seem  that,  except  in  respect  of  equitable  interests,  the  addition 
of  these  words  would  be  incorrect,  and  might  render  the  allegation  too 
uncertain.5 

In  recommending  the  use,  in  pleadings  in  Equity,  of  such  technical 
expressions  as  have  been  adopted  in  pleadings  at  Common 
*  Law,  it  is  not  intended  to  suggest  that  the  use  of  any  particular  *  363 
form  of  words  is  absolutely  necessary,  or  that  the  same  thing 
may  not  be  expressed  in  any  terms  which  the  draftsman  may  select  as 
proper  to  convey  his  meaning,  provided  they  are  adequate  for  that  pur- 
pose.1 All  that  is  contended  for  is,  that  where  it  is  intended  to  express 
things  for  which  adequate  legal  or  technical  expressions  have  been 
adopted  in  pleadings  at  Law,  the  use  of  such  expressions  will  be  desir- 
able, as  best  conducing  to  brevity  and  clearness.2 

Thus,  it  is  a  rule  in  pleading,  at  Common  Law,  that  the  nature  of  a 
conveyance  or  alienation  should  be  stated  according  to  its  legal  effect, 

right  against  the  defendant  upon  the  fact  of  Heath  v.  Crealock,  L.  R.  10  Ch.  22;    L.  R.  18 

Lis  having  notice,  it  should  charge  such  notice  Eq.  215;  Re  Horton,  51  L.  T.  420. 

directly;  otherwise  it  is  not  matter  in  issue  on  !  See  Kidglv  v.  Bond,  18  Md.  433;  Bolgiano 

wuich  the  Court  can  act.     Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  203,  v.  Cooke,  19  Md.  375;  Grove  v.  Rentch,  20  Md. 

and  cases  in  note.  367,  377. 

2  See  Camden  &  Amboy  R.  Co.  v.  Stewart,  2  When  a  common-law  liability  is  limited 
19  N.  J.  Eq.  343,  346.  by  statute,  the  fact  that  the  case  falls  within 

3  Stephen  on  PI.  233,  242;  Whitworth  Eq.  the  limitation  need  not  be  pleaded.  Stephen 
Prec.  162,  n.,  e t  seq.  on    PI.  (7th  ed.)  255,  309;  Chitty  on  PI.  378; 

4  Ibid.  see  Matthew  v.  Whittle,   13  Ch.  D.  811;  pout, 
6  Baring  v.  Nash,  1  V.  &  B.  551;  and  see     p.  367. 

363 


364 


THE   BILL. 


rather  than  its  form  of  words ; 8  and  this  is  in  substance  enjoined  by 
the  General  Order,4  which  directs  "  that  deeds,  writings,  or  records  be 
not  unnecessarily  set  out  in  pleadings  in  lime  verba,  but  that  so  much  of 
them  only  as  is  pertinent  and  material  be  set  out  or  stated,  or  the  effect 
and  substance  of  so  much  of  these  only  as  is  pertinent  and  material  be 
given,  as  counsel  may  deem  advisable,  without  needless  prolixitj^." 6 

Cases,  however,  may  arise  in  which  it  is  convenient  to  state  written 
documents  in  their  very  words.     Thus,  wherever  any  question  in  the 
cause  is  likely  to  turn  upon  the  precise  words  of  the  instrument,  as 
where  it  is  sought  to  establish  a  particular  construction  of  a  will  which 
is  informally  or  inartificially  worded,  the  words  which  are  the  subject  of 
the  discussion  ought  to  be  accurately  set  out,  in  order  more  specifically 
to  point  the  attention  of  the  Court  to  them.     Indeed,  wherever  informal 
instruments  are  insisted  on,  upon  the  construction  of  which  any  diffi- 
culty is  likely  to  arise,  as  is  frequently  the  case  in  agreements 
*364    *  reduced  to  writing  by  persons  who  have  not  been  profession- 
ally educated,  or  which  are  insisted  on  as  resulting  from  a  written 
correspondence,  the  written  instruments  relied  on,  or  at  least  the  mate- 
rial parts  of  them,  should  be  set  out  in  hcec  verba.     So  also,  in  bills  filed 
for  the  purpose  of  carrying  into  effect  written  articles,  upon  the  con- 
struction of  which,  although  they  are  formally  drawn,  questions  are 
likely  to  arise,  such  articles,  or  so  much  of  them  as  is  likely  to  give  rise 
to  questions,   should  be   accurately  stated.      In  many  cases,  also,  the 
expressions  of  an  instrument  or  writing  are  such  that  any  attempt  to 
state  their  substance,  without  introducing  the  very  words  in  which  they 
are  expressed,  would  be  ineffectual :  in  such  cases,  also,  it  is  best  that 
they  should  be  set  forth ;  and  where  an  agreement  is  to  be  deduced  from 
correspondence,  it  is  often  convenient  to  set  out,  in  their  very  words,  the 
material  parts  of  the  correspondence,  so  that  the  question  may  be  deter- 
mined upon  a  demurrer,  without  putting  the  parties  to  the  expense  and 
delay  of  a  trial.1     In  the  case  of  a  document  in  a  foreign  language,  set 
out  in  the  pleading,  it  is  not  necessary  to  append  a  translation  of  such 
document.2 

According  to  the  old  practice  of  the  Court,  when  a  plaintiff  wished  to 
obtain  from  a  defendant  an  admission  as  to  a  particular  deed  or  instru- 
ment in  his,  the  plaintiff's  own  possession,  it  was  usual  to  leave  the  deed 
or  other  instrument  in  the  hands  of  the  plaintiff's  clerk  in  Court,  and, 


3  Stephen  on  PI.  237;  see  1  Chi'ty  PL  (9th 
Am.  ed.)  305  ;  Andrews  V.  William*,  11  Conn. 
326:  Morris  v.  Fort,  2  M'Cord,  398;  Lent  v. 
Padelford,  10  Mass.  230;  Hopkins  v.  Young, 
11  Ma«s.  307;  Walsh  v.  Gilmer,  3  Harr.  &  J. 
407;  Grannis  v.  Clark,  6  Cowen,  36;  Ridgley  ». 
Rig<T»,  4  Harr.  &  J.  363;  Silver  v.  Kendrick,  2 
N.  H.  160;  Osborne  v.  Lawrence,  9  Wend.  135; 
Crocker  v.  Whitney,  10  Mass.  320;  Goodrich  v. 
Rodney,  1  Minn.  195. 

*  Cons.  Ord.  VIII.  2.  See  R.  S.  C.  Ord. 
XIX.  21;  Philipps  v.  Philipps,  4  Q.  B.  D.  127; 
Pauneefo-t  r.  Lord  Lincoln,  1  Dick.  362. 

6  See  26th  U.  S.  Equity  Rule;  Goodrich  v. 

364 


Rodney,  1  Minn.  195;  Rule  49  of  New  Jersey 
Revised  Chancery  Rules;  Camden  and  Amboy 
R.  Co.  v.  Stewart,  19  N.  J.  Eq.  343. 

1  Hussey  v.  Home  Payne,  4  App.  Cas.  311, 
316;  see  Wylson  v.  Dunn",  34  Ch.  D.  569;  Bris- 
tol &c.  Co.V.  Maggs,  44  Ch.  D.  616;  Bellamy 
v.  Debenham,  45  Ch.  D.  481:  Eadie  v.  Addison, 
52  L.  J.  Ch.  80;  Bertel  v.  Neveux,  39  L.  T. 
257;  Wood  v.  Aylward,  57  L.  T.  54;  May  p. 
Thomson,  20  Ch.  D.  705;  Greer  v.  Laws,  56 
Texas,  37;  post,  p.  565. 

2  Cassoux  v.  Great  Luxembourg  Ry.  Co.  17 
W.  R.  646,  V.  C.  J. 


FORM    OF   THE   BILL. 


'365 


having  stated  that  fact  in  the  bill,  to  pray  that  the  defendant  might 
inspect  it,  and  after  inspection  answer  the  interrogatories  applicable  to 
the  subject.8  This  practice,  however,  has  been  for  a  long  time  discon- 
tinued ;  and  it  is  now  considered  sufficient  to  state  upon  the  bill  the  date, 
parties'  names,  and  substance  of  the  deed  or  instrument  relied  upon  by 
the  plaintiff,  and  then,  by  interrogatory,  to  require  the  defendant  to  set 
forth  whether  a  deed,  of  the  nature  of  that  set  forth,  was  not  duly  exe- 
cuted by  and  between  the  parties  stated,  or  some,  or  one,  or  which  of 
them,  and  whether  the  deed  does  not  bear  the  date,  and  is  not  to  the  pur- 
port or  effect  before  set  out,  or  of  some,  and  what  other  date,  or  to  some, 
and  what  other  purport  and  effect.  This  form  of  statement  and  inter- 
rogatory is  calculated  to  draw  from  the  defendant  either  an  admission  or 
denial  of  the  deed,  and  of  all  knowledge  of  it,  or  of  its  execution,  date, 
and  contents ;  or  else  a  statement  of  the  defendant's  knowledge  or  belief 
of  the  parties  by  whom  it  was  executed,  and  of  its  date,  tenor,  and  effect. 

It  is  a  rule  in  pleading,  that  where  the  nature  of  a  conveyance 
is  such  that  it  would,  at  Common  Law,  *  be  valid  without  deed  or  *  365 
writing,  no  deed  or  writing  need  be  averred,  though  such  docu- 
ment may  in  fact  exist ;  but  where  the  nature  of  the  conveyance  requires, 
at  Common  Law,  a  deed  or  other  written  instrument,  such  instrument 
must  be  alleged.1  The  same  rule  has,  it  would  seem,  been  adopted  with 
respect  to  pleadings  in  Equity ;  thus,  in  stating  a  conveyance  by  bargain 
and  sale,  it  is  not  essential  to  state  that  it  was  enrolled  ;  for  though  such 
a  process  is  rendered  necessary  by  statute,  it  was  not  so  at  Common  Law.2 

In  a  bill  for  specific  performance  of  an  agreement  relating  to  land,  it 
is,  however,  necessary  to  allege  that  the  agreement  is  in  writing ; 8  (a) 
otherwise   the  bill  will  be  demurrable :  but  it  is  not  necessary  to  allege 


8  Per  Lord  Eldon,  in  Princess  of  Wales  v. 
Earl  of  Liverpool,  1  Swanst.  123;  see  Kenned v 
v.  Wakefield,  39  L.  J.  Ch.  827.  Maps,  plans, 
trademarks,  &c,  may,  however,  still  be  de- 
posited at  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerks'  Office, 
and  referred  to  in  the  bill.  Braithwaite's 
Pr.  25. 

1  Stephen  on  PI.  238,  287,  288;  and  see 
Futcher  v.  Futcher,  29  W.  R.  884. 

2  See  Harrison  v.  Hogg,  2  Ves.  Jr.  327, 
where  it  is  alleged  that  a  mortgagee  "  by  his 
assignment  in  writing  on  said  deed,  sealed 
with  his  seal  "  (date  and  consideration  stated), 
"conveyed  and  assigned  to  the  plaintiff  all  his 
right,  title,  and  interest,  in  the  same,  together 
with  the  debt  secured  thereby,  and  all  his 
claims  in  and  to  the  mortgage,  all  which  will 
more  fully  appear  by  said  deed  and  assignment 
when  produced  in  Court  ;  "  it  was  held  suffi- 
cient, on  demurrer,  although  there  was  no  alle- 
gation  in   the    bill    that   the   assignment  was 


(a)  Although  a  partnership  in  land  may  be 
proved  by  parol,  yet  an  agreement  for  dissolu- 
tion of  such  a  partnership  should  be  expressed 
in  writing  when  the  party  sought  to  be  charged 


acknowledged  and  recorded.      Lovell  v.  Far- 
rington,  50  Maine,  239. 

3  Redding  v.  Wilkes,  3  Bro.  C.  C.  400; 
Barkworth  v.  Young,  4  Drew.  1;  Wood  v. 
Midgeley,  5  De  G.  M.  &  G.  41;  2  Sm.  &.  G. 
115;  see  Piercy  v.  Adams,  22  Ga.  109.  But 
the  Statute  of  Frauds  did  not  alter  the  forms 
of  pleading  either  at  Law  or  in  Equity,  and 
therefore,  if  the  bill  do  not  show  that  the  con- 
tract is  in  parol,  it  will  be  presumed  to  be  in 
writing,  and  a  demurrer  will  not  lie;  aliter, 
where  the  bill  shows  a  contract  by  parol.  Cozine 
v.  Graham,  2  Paige,  177;  Champlin  v.  Parrish, 
11  Paige,  405;  Switzer  v.  Skiles,  3  Gilman,  529; 
Dudley  p.  Bachelder,  53  Maine,  403;  Macev 
v.  Childress,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  442;  infra,  p.  561, 
n.  2;  p.  055,  n.  9.  Part-performance  of  a  con- 
tract within  the  Statute  of  Frauds  must,  in  order 
to  entitle  a  party  to  relief,  be  expressly  stated  in 
the  bill.  See  Meach  v.  Stone,  1  D.  Chip.  182. 
As  to  the  effect  of  part-performance,  and  what 


is  to  assign  or  part  with  an  interest  in  land. 
Gray  v.  Smith,  43  Ch.  D.  208;  see  Young  v. 
Wheeler,  34  Fed.  Rep.  98;  Bates  v.  Babcock, 
95  Cal.  479. 

365 


366 


THE    BILL. 


that  it  has  been  signed ; 4  because,  from  the  statement  that  it  is  in  writ- 
ing, it  is  necessarily  to  be  inferred  that  it  has  been  signed.5 

Where  an  agreement  relied  upon  in  a  bill  is  to  be  collected  from  the  let- 
ters between  the  parties,  the  letters  may,  as  above  mentioned,  be  stated  in 
the  bill,  either  as  constituting  the  alleged  agreement,  or  as  evidence  of  an 
alleged  parol  agreement.  In  the  first  case,  the  defendant  may  insist  that 
they  do  not  make  out  a  concluded  agreement,  and  that  no  intrinsic  evi- 
dence can  be  received ;  in  the  latter,  he  may  plead  the  Statute  of  Frauds.6(6) 
Upon  the  same  principle,  although  stamping  is,  by  sundry  Acts 
*  366    of  Parliament,  rendered  necessary  to  the  *  validity  of  a  variety  of 


will  amount  to  a  part-performance,  sufficient 
to  take  a  case  out  of  the  statute,  see  Whit- 
church o.  Beavis,  2  Bro.  C.  C.  (Perkins's  ed.) 
566,  note  (a),  and  cases  cited ;  Wrhitebread  v. 
Brockhurst,  1  id.  404,  and  cases  cited  in  notes; 
2  Story,  Eq.  Jur.  §§  759-767;  Newton  v. 
Swasey,  8  N.  H.  9.  A  trust  need  not  be  al- 
leged to  be  in  writing,  but  it  is  sufficient  if  the 
trust  is  proved  by  writing  at  the  hearing;  see 
Davies  v.  Otty,  33  Beav.  540 ;  2  De  G.  J.  &  S. 
238  ;  and  see  Forstert'.  Hale,  3  Ves.  696;  Ran- 
dall v.  Morgan,  12  Ves.  74,  and  comp.  the  4th 
and  7th  sections  of  Stat,  of  Frauds.  Peasley  v. 
Barney,  1  D.  Chip.  333;  see  Coquillard  v.  Suy- 
dam,  8  Blackf.  24. 

4  Rist  v.  Hobson,  1  S.  &  S.  543  ;  Coles  v. 


Boone,  10  Paige,  535 ;  Ontario  Bank  v.  Root,  3 
Paige,  478;  Hobart  v.  Andrews,  21  Pick.  534; 
Richards  v.  Richards,  9  Gray,  314;  Sterm  p. 
Drinker,  2  E.  D.  Smith  (N.Y.),  401;  Nelson 
v.  Dubois,  13  John.  177;  Cleaves  v.  Foss,  4 
Greenl.  1;  Wallis  v.  Frazier,  2  Nott  &  McC. 
180.  Where  the  agreement  had  been  entered 
into  by  an  agent  for  the  plaintiff,  an  allegation 
that  the  plaintiff  has  been  informed  by  his 
agent  that  a  written  agreement  was  executed, 
followed  by  statements  of  the  agreement,  will 
be  sufficient.  Heard  v.  Pilley,  L.  R.  4  Ch. 
548. 

5  Barkworth  t>.  Young,  ubi  supra. 

6  Birce  v.  Bletchley,  6  Mad.  17;  Skinner  v. 
M'Douall,  2  De  G.  &  S.  265;  ante,  p.  364. 


(//)  Though  the  Statute  of  Frauds  must  be 
pleaded,  it  is  not  necessary  to  plead  a  particu- 
lar section;  but  if  one  section  is  pleaded  by  way 
of  defence,  the  defendant  cannot  avail  himself 
of  another  section  by  amendment.  James  v. 
Smith,  [1891]  1  Ch.  384;  affirmed  on  the  facts, 
63  L.  T.  524.  Under  §  17  of  the  Statute  of 
Frauds  the  note  or  memorandum  of  the  con- 
tract, in  order  to  be  available  in  a  suit  thereon 
relating  to  goods,  must  have  been  in  existence 
when  the  suit  was  commenced.  Lucas  v. 
Dixon,  22  Q.  B.  D.  357.  Part  acceptance  un- 
der this  statute  must  be  with  the  intention  to 
perform  the  whole  contract.  Atherton  v.  New- 
hall,  123  Mass.  141.  But,  as  this  statute  af- 
fects only  the  remedy,  part  acceptance  may  sat- 
isfy the  statute,  though  made  after  the  rest  of 
the  goods  are  destroyed  by  fire  in  the  seller's 
possession.  Townsend  U.  Hargraves,  118  Mass. 
325.  In  England  a  defence  founded  on  the 
Statute  of  Frauds  cannot  be  raised  by  demurrer, 
since  the  Judicature  Acts.  Catling  v.  King, 
5  Ch.  D.  660;  Morgan  v.  Worthington,  38  L. 
T.  443;  post,  p.  561.  Such  defence,  if  clearly 
appearing  upon  the  face  of  the  bill,  may  be 
taken  by  demurrer;  but,  as  the  bill  may  not 
show  that  the  statute  does  not  apply,  such  de- 
fence is  usually  raised  by  plea  or  answer.  See 
Wood  v.  Midgley,  5  De  G.  M.  &  G.  41;  2 
Smale  &  G.  115;    Miles  v.  New  Zealand  A.  E. 

366 


Co.  54  L.  J.  Ch.  1035;  Cozine  v.  Graham,  2 
Paige,  177;  Walker  v.  Locke,  5  Cush.  90; 
Campbell  v.  Brown,  129  Mass.  23;  Ahrend  v. 
Odiorne,  118  Mass.  261;  Slater  v.  Smith,  117 
Mass.  96 ;  Farnham  v.  Clements,  51  Maine, 
426;  Pohl  v.  Pontier,  21  N.  Y.  S.  634;  Hunt  v. 
Hayt,  10  Col.  278;  Macey  v.  Childress,  2  Tenn. 
Ch."  438;  Cranston  v.  Smith,  6  R.  I.  231; 
Switzer  v.  Skiles,  3  Gilm.  (111.)  529.  An  an- 
swer which  admits  an  alleged  oral  contract  for 
the  snle  of  land,  must  also  set  up  the  statute ; 
but  if  it  denies  the  agreement,  the  plaintiff 
must  establish  its  validity.  Barrett  r.  McAllis- 
ter, 33  W.  Va.  738.  A  bill  is  not  demurrable 
because  it  does  not  allege  that  an  agreement 
within  the  statute  is  in  writing.  Speyer  v. 
Desjardins  (111.),  32  N.  E.  Rep.  283;  see  Stein- 
berg v.  Tyler,  22  N.  Y.  S.  178;  Sanborn  v. 
Rogers,  33  Fed.  Rep.  851.  But  allegations  in 
a  bill  to  enforce  an  express  trust  in  lands,  which 
clearly  imply  that  the  declaration  of  trust  was 
not  in  writing,  justify  a  demurrer.  Campbell 
v.  Brown,  129  Mass.  23.  A  verbal  agreempnt 
for  an  easement  may  be  enforced  where  there 
has  been  part  performance,  whether  it  is  or 
is  not  within  §  4  of  the  Statute  of  Frauds. 
McManus  v.  Cooke,  35  Ch.  I).  681.  In  Eng- 
land, since  the  Judicature  Acts,  in  any  case 
where  the  Statute  of  Frauds  is  not  a  bar,  the 
Court  may  in  the  same  suit  rectify  a  written 


FORM    OF   THE    BILL.  *  367 

instruments,  it  is  not  necessary,  nor  is  it  even  usual,  in  pleadings,  to  aver 
that  such  instruments  have  been  duly  stamped. 

It  is  to  be  observed,  also,  that  the  rule  of  pleading  above  referred  to 
applies  only  to  cases  in  which  the  necessity  for  a  conveyance  or  agree- 
ment being  in  writing,  is  superadded  by  statute  to  things  which  at  Com- 
mon Law  might  have  been  by  parol ;  but  where  a  thing  is  originally 
created  by  Act  of  Parliament,  and  required  to  be  in  writing,  it  must 
then  be  stated,  with  all  the  circumstances  required  by  the  Act.  Thus, 
it  was  necessary  to  allege  that  a  devise  of  lands  (which  at  Com  mem 
Law  is  not  valid,  and  was  first  authorized  by  the  statutes  32  Hen.  VIII. 
c.  1,  and  34  Hen.  VIII.  c.  5.)  had  been  made  in  writing,  which  is  the 
only  form  in  which  those  statutes  authorize  it  to  be  made.1 

It  seems,  however,  that  it  is  sufficient,  under  the  Wills  Act,2  to  allege 
that  a  will  has  been  duly  made,  or  duly  made  in  writing ;  and  that  it  is  not 
necessary  to  allege  the  signature  and  attestation,  as  required  by  the  Act.3 

Some  doubt  appears  to  be  entertained  whether,  in  suits  under  the 
8  Geo.  II.  c.  13,  and  7  Geo.  III.  c.  38,4  by  which  the  property  in  certain 
prints  was  vested  in  the  inventors  for  a  certain  number  of  years  from 
the  day  of  publishing,  it  is  necessary  to  state  that  the  name  of  the 
engraver  and  date  of  the  print  have  been  engraved  on  the  print  as 
required  by  the  first-mentioned  Act.5 

*  It  has  been  before  stated  that  it  is  a  rule  in  pleading,  that  when-  *  367 
ever  at  Common  Law  a  written  instrument  was  not  necessary  to 
complete  a  conveyance,  it  is  not  necessary  in  pleading  to  aver  it,  although 
such  an  instrument  has  been  rendered  necessary  by  statute,  and  has  been 
executed.  The  converse  of  this  is  also  a  rule,  so  that,  whenever  a  deed 
in  writing  is  necessary  by  Common  Law,  it  must  be  shown  in  pleading  : 
therefore,  if  a  conveyance   by  way  of  grant  be  pleaded,  a  deed  must  be 

1  Stephen  on  PI.  239.  name  was  not  inscribed;  observing,  that   the 

2  7  Will.  IV.  &  1  Vic.  c.  26.  interest  was  vested  by  the  statute,  and  that  the 

3  Hyde  v.  Edwards,  12  Beav.  160;  13  Jur.  757.  Common   Law  gave  the  remedy.     Roworth  v. 

*  These  Acts  are  amended  and  explained  Wilkes,  1  Camp.  94.  On  the  other  hand,  it 
by  17  Geo.  III.  c.  57;  6  &  7  Will.  IV.  c.  59,  appears  to  have  been  taken  for  granted  by  the 
Ir. ;  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  12;  see  Phillips  on  Copy-  Court  of  King's  Bench,  in  the  case  of  Tliomp- 
right,  c.  8.  son  v.  Symonds  (5  T.  R.  41),  though  it  became 

5  In  Blackwell  8.  Harper  (2  Atk.  93.  95,  unnecessary  to  decide  the  point,  that  both  the 
Barn.  210,  213),  Lord  Hardwicke  was  of  (.pinion  name  and  the  date  should  appear ;  and  in  Har- 
that  the  clause  in  the  Act  was  only  directory,  rison  v.  Hogg  (2  Ves.  Jr.  327),  Lord  Alvanley 
and  that  the  property  was  vested  absolutely  M.  R.  stated  that  he  inclined  to  differ  from 
in  the  engraver,  so  as  to  entitle  him  to  sue,  Lord  Hardwicke,  and  that  it  was  his  opinion 
although  the  day  of  publication  was  not  men-  that  the  insertion  of  the  name  and  date  was 
tioned,  and  compared  it  to  the  clause  under  the  essential  to  the  plaintiff's  right.  The  Copy- 
Statute  of  Anne  (8  Anne,  c.  19,  repealed  by  5  &  right  Act  of  5  &  6  Vic.  c.  45,  as  to  books,  has 
6  Vic.  c.  45),  which  required  entry  at  Stationers'  been  held  to  include  engravings  in  books  ;  so 
Hall;  upon  the  construction  of  which  it  had  been  that  the  provisions  of  8  Geo.  II.  c.  13,  need 
determined  that  the  property  vests,  although  not,  in  such  case,  be  complied  with.  Bogue 
the  direction  had  not  been  complied  with.  v.  Houlston,  5  De  G.  &  S.  267;  16  Jur.  372. 
Lord  Ellenborough  also  held,  at  nisi  priits  Under  this  Act,  however,  payment  for  an 
(Beckford  v.  Hood,  7  T.  R.  620,  and  see  Buller  article  written  for  a  periodical  must  be  alleged. 
>•  Walker,  cited  2  Atk.  94),  that  an  action  Richardson  v.  Gilbert,  1  Sim.  N".  S.  336;  15 
might  be  maintained,  although  the  proprietor's  Jur.  389;  but  see  Phillips  on  Copyright,  176. 


agreement,  upon  parol  proof  of  mistake,  and      cificallv  performed.     Olley  t>.  Fisher,  34  Ch. 
then  order  such  rectified  agreement  to  be  spe-      D.  367. 

367 


368 


THE   BILL. 


alleged;  because  matters  that   "lie  in  grant,"   according  to  the  legal 
phrase,  can  pass  by  deed  only.1 

In  stating  deeds  or  other  written  instruments  in  a  bill,  it  is  usual 
to  refer  to  the  instrument  itself,  in  some  such  words  as  the  follow- 
ing, namely,  "as  by  the  said  indenture,  when  ■produced,  will  appear." 
The  effect  of  such  a  reference  is  to  make  the  whole  document  referred  to 
part  of  the  record.  It  is  to  be  observed,  that  it  does  not  make  it  evi- 
dence :  in  order  to  make  a  document  evidence,  it  must,  if  not  admitted, 
be  proved  in  the  usual  way ;  but  the  effect  of  referring  to  it  is  to  enable 
the  plaintiff  to  rely  upon  every  part  of  the  instrument,  and  to  prevent 
his  being  precluded  from  availing  himself,  at  the  hearing,2  of  any  por- 
tion, either  of  its  recital  or  operative  part,  which  may  not  be  inserted  in 
the  bill,  or  which  may  be  inaccurately  set  out.  Thus,  it  seems  that  a 
plaintiff  may,  by  his  bill,  state  simply  the  date  and  general  purport  of 

any  particular  deed  or  instrument  under  which  he  claims,  and 
*  368    that  such  statement,  provided  it  is  accompanied  by  *  a  reference 

to  the  deed  itself,  will  be  sufficient.1  It  is  always  necessary,  in 
drawing  bills,  to  state  the  case  of  the  plaintiff  clearly,  though  succinctly, 
upon  the  record ;  and  in  doing  this,  care  should  be  taken  to  set  out  pre- 
cisely those  deeds  which  are  relied  upon,  and  those  parts  of  the  deeds 
which  are  most  important  to  the  case.2  (a) 

Although  the  same  precision  of  statement  is  not  required  in  bills  in 

Adams,  29  Ark.  346;  City  of  Los  Angeles  ». 
Signoret,  50  Cal.  298.  But  see  Howard  Man. 
Co.  v.  Water  Lot  Co.  53  Ga.  689.  See  also 
Moses  v.  Brodie,  1  Tenn.  Ch.  397. 

1  See  Pauncefort  v.  Lord  Lincoln,  1  Dick. 


i  Stephen  on  PI.  239.  In  Henning  v.  Willis 
(3  Wood,  29,  2  E.  &  Y.  188),  where  the  plaintiff 
filed  a  bill  for  tithes,  and  set  up  by  way  of  title 
a  parol  demise  by  the  impropriator  for  one  year, 
the  defendant  demurred  for  want  of  title  in  the 
plaintiff,  and  the  plaintiff  submitted  to  the  de- 
murrer. Lpon  the  same  ground,  in  Jackson  v. 
Benson  (M'Clel.  62 ;  13  Price,  131 ),  where  the  bill 
prayed  an  account  of  tithes,  and  merely  stated 
that  the  impropriate  rector  demised  the  tithes 
to  him,  a  demurrer,  put  in  by  the  defendant, 
was  considered  to  be  well  founded;  and  in 
Williams  v.  Jones  (Younge,  252  ;  see  ante, 
p.  211),  the  same  objection  was  taken  at  the 
hearing,  and  would  have  prevailed,  had  it  not 
appeared  that  the  impropriators  had  originally 
been  made  parties  to  the  suit,  but  had  been 
dismissed  in  consequence  of  their  having  dis- 
claimed all  interest  in  the  tithes  in  question. 

2  But  on  the  argument  of  a  demurrer,  he 
cannot  avail  himself  of  the  portion  not  set  out. 
Harmer  ».  Gooding,  3  De  G.  &  S.  407,  410; 
Cuddon  ».  Tite,  1  Giff.  395;  4  Jur.  X.  S.  579. 

Exhibits  are  no  part  of  the  pleiding,  and  a 
defect  in  matter  of  substance  cannot  be  supplied 
by  reference  to  an  exhibit  attached  to,  and 
made  a  part   of,    the   complaint.     Stilwell   v. 


362,  where  the  plaintiff's  claims  were  founded 
on  a  variety  of  deeds,  wills,  and  other  instru- 
ments, but  to  avoid  expense,  or  for  some  other 
purpose,  the  dates  and  general  purport  onlv  of 
such  instruments  were  stated  in  the  bill,  with 
reference  to  them.  This  manner  of  stating  the 
ca-e  was  not  apparently  considered  as  a  ground 
of  objection  to  the  bill ;  but  when  the  cause  was 
brought  to  a  hearing,  Sir  Thomas  Clarke  M. 
R.  referred  it  to  the  Master  to  state  the  rights 
claimed  by  the  plaintiff  under  the  several  instru- 
ments mentioned  in  the  bill,  and  reserved  costs 
and  further  directions  until  after  the  report,  and 
the  cause  was  afterwards  heard,  and  a  decree 
made,  on  the  report,  which  stated  the  instru- 
ments. It  is  obvious  that  the  method  of  stating 
the  plaintiff's  title  adopted  in  this  case  was  one 
of  great  inconvenience;  and  although  it  has 
been  referred  to  here,  it  is  by  no  means  from  a 
wish  to  recommend  its  adoption  as  a  precedent. 
2  Martin  v.  McBryde,  3  Ired.  Eq.  531;  King 
v.  Trice,  id.  568. 


(n)  Questions  of  variance,  as  whether  a 
written  instrument  not  annexed  to  the  bill  is 
correctly  set  out  therein,  cannot  be  raised  by 
demurrer.  Bromberg  v.  Heyet,  69  Ala.  22  A 
po-ition  for  specific  performance  should  allege 
the  material  parts  or  effect  of  the  contract,  and 

368 


not  merely  refer  to  it  as  an  exhibit.  Guada- 
lupe County  v.  Johnston  (Texas),  20  S.  W.  Rep. 
833.  A  bill  which  does  not  set  forth  a  copy  or 
the  terms  of  a  written  instrument  which  is  vital 
to  the  plaintiff's  claim  is  demurrable.  Marshall 
v.  Turnbull,  34  Fed.  Rep.  827. 


FORM    OF   THE   BILL. 


369 


Equity  as  in  pleadings  at  Law,  yet  it  is  absolutely  necessary  that  such 
a  degree  of  certainty  should  be  adopted  as  may  serve  to  give  the  defend- 
ant full  information  of  the  case  which  he  is  called  upon  to  meet.8  In 
several  cases,  demurrers  have  been  allowed  to  bills  on  the  ground  of  the 
vagueness  and  uncertainty  of  their  statements.4  Upon  the  same 
principle,  a  mere  allegation  that  the  *  defendant  is  a  trustee  for  *  309 
the  plaintiff,  not  supported  by  the  facts  stated,  will  not  prevent  a 
demurrer; * (a)  and  so  a  statement  that  a  defendant  claimed  an  interest 
as  purchaser  under  an  alleged  agreement,  but  that  such  agreement,  if 
an}',  had  been  long  since  abandoned  and  waived,  was  held  insufficient  to 
prevent  a  demurrer  by  that  defendant.2  However,  where  in  a  bill  for 
specific  performance  of  an  agreement  to  take  an  assignment  of  a  lease, 
the  plaintiff  stated  a  covenant  in  the  lease  not  to  assign  without  license 
of  the  lessor,  and  did  not  aver  that  the  plaintiff  had  or  could  obtain  such 


3  See  Kunkel  v.  Markell,  26  Md.  408;  Droul- 
lard  v.  Baxter,  1  Scam.  192;  Rogers  v.  Ward, 
8  Allen,  387;  Chapman  v.  Hunt,  14  N.  J.  Eq. 
149;  White  v.  Empire  Ass.  Co.  L.  R.  6  Eq.  23; 
Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  240,  etseq.  General  certainty 
is  sufficient  in  pleadings  in  Equity.  Story, 
Eq.  PI.  §  253;  ante,  360-362,  notes;  Prescott  v. 
Everts,  4  Wis.  314;  Paterson  &  Hud.  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Jersey  City,  9  N.  J.  Eq.  434;  Randolph 
v.  Daly,  16  N.  J.  Eq.  313,  318;  O'Hare  v.  Down- 
ing, 130  Mass.  16.  Less  certainty  is  required 
where  the  object  of  the  bill  is  the  discovery  of 
material  facts  alleged  to  be  entirely  in  the  de- 
fendant's knowledge.  Watson  v.  Murray,  23 
N  J.  Eq.  257.  In  Cresset  v.  Mitton  (1  Ves.  Jr. 
450;  3  Bro.  C.  C.  482;  and  see  Philipps  r. 
Philipps,  4  Q.  B.  D.  127;  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  XIX.  4, 
18;  XXVII.  1),  Lord  Thurlow  said,  "Special 
pleading  depends  upon  the  good  sense  of  the 
thing,  and  so  does  pleading  here  ;  and  though 
pleadings  in  this  Court  run  into  a  great  deal  of 


(«)  Wilson  v.  Polk  County,  112  Mo.  126. 
The  statement  that  one  is  "owner"'  may  be  a 
mere  general  claim,  not  admitted  by  a  demurrer. 
O'Keefe  c.  Cannon,  52  Fed.  Rep.  898;  Ratcliff 
v.  Stretch,  130  Ind.  282;  see  Ely  v.  New  Mexico 
&  A.  R.  Co.  129  U.  S.  291. "  The  ownership 
should  be  alleged  as  existing  when  the  bill  was 
tiled.  Krick  v.  Jansen,  52  Fed.  Rep.  823.  So, 
the  allegation  that  one  is  "  heir"  is  insufficient; 
the  chain  of  title  should  be  shown.  Palmer  v. 
Palmer,  [1892]  1  Q.  B.  319. 

A  general  allegation  of  "irreparable  injury" 
in  an  injunction  bill  is  insufficient.  Cresap  v. 
Kemble,  26  W.  Va.  603;  Farland  t>.  Wood,  35 
id.  458  ;  Mead  v.  Stirling,  62  Conn.  586;  Wil- 
lingham  v.  King,  23  Fla.  478.  Insolvency,  as  a 
jurisdictional  fact,  should  not  be  merely  averred, 
but  the  facts  and  circumstances  must  be  alleged. 
Atlantic'Trust  Co.  v.  Cons.  El.  Storage  Co.  49 
N.  J.  Eq.  402;  see  Dunsback  t>.  Collar,  95  Mich. 
611.  An  allegation  in  a  complaint  that  a  person 
"agreed"  to  do  a  thing,  sufficiently  imports 
that  lie  agreed  in  writing,  if  a  writing  is  neces- 
sary to  the  validity  of  the  agreement.    Jenkin- 

vol  l — 24 


unnecessary  verbiage,  yet  there  must  be  some- 
thing substantial ;  "  and  in  Lord  Redesdale's 
Treatise  (p.  41)  it  is  said  that  the  rights  of  the 
several  parties,  the  injury  comphiined  of,  and 
every  other  necessary  circumstance,  as  time, 
place,  niiinner,  or  other  incidents,  ought  to  be 
plainly,  yet  succinctly,  alleged. 

*  Wormald  v.  De  Lisle,  3  Beav.  18;  Boyd 
v.  Moyle,  2  Coll.  316,  323;  Kelly  v.  Rogers,  1 
Jur.  N.  S.  514,  V.  C.  W.;  see  also  Vernon  v. 
Vernon,  2  M.  &  C.  145,  171;  Reed  v.  O'Brien, 
7  Beav.  32,  37, 39  ;  Darthez  v.  Clemens,  6  Beav. 
165,  169;  Parker  v.  Nickson,  4  Giff.  306;  9  Jur. 
N.  S.  196;  Aff'd  id.  451 ;  1  De  G.  J.  &  S.  177 ; 
Carew  v.  Johnston,  2  Sell.  &  Lef.  280;  but  see 
Chouteau  v.  Rice,  1  Minn.  106. 

i  Jackson  v.  The  North  Wales  Ry.  Co.  6 
Rail.  Cas.  112;  13  Jur.  69;  Steedman  c.  Marsh, 
2  Jur.  N.  S.  391,  V.  C  W.;  Murray  v.  Lord 
Clarendon,  L.  R.  9  Eq.  11. 

2  Hodgson  v.  Espinasse,  10  Beav.  473,  477. 


son  v.  Vermillion  (S.  D.),  52  N.  W.  Rep.  1066. 
So  a  general  allegation  of  performance  of  an 
agreement  may  be  insufficient.  Short  r.  Kieffer, 
142  III.  258.  So  also  "wrongfully  "  may  be  a 
mere  legal  conclusion.  Wallaces.  Railroad  Co. 
34  S.  C.  62.  And  so  of  the  words  "  falsely 
and  fraudulently."  Wrights.  Bourdon,  50  Vt. 
494. 

A  bill  which  relies  upon  inferences  and  suspi- 
cions, and  is  so  vague  that  a  decree  could  not 
be  framed  upon  it,  if  it  were  taken  pro  confi  iso, 
is  demurrable.  Huntington  v.  Saunders,  14 
Fed.  Rep.  907.  So  if  it  does  not  distinctly 
show  a  right  to  equitable  relief.  Dwight  v. 
Smith.  20  Blatch.  210.  Or  if  the  allegations  of 
fact  do  not  accord  with  the  specific  relief  which 
is  sought.  Edson  v.  Girvan.  29  Hun.  422.  A 
bill  which  alleges  that  a  certain  Court  entered 
a  "pretended  decree,"  as  to  which  no  evidence 
is  put  in,  admits  a  valid  decree.  Bowman  v. 
Ash,  143  111.  649.  Outstanding  equities  of 
strangers,  which  are  immaterial  as  between  the 
parties  to  the  suit,  need  not  be  set  forth.  Hoi* 
comb  v.  Mosher,  50  Mich.  252. 

369 


370 


THE   BILL. 


a  license,  there  being  no  statement  of  a  proviso  for  re-entry  on  default, 
the  Court  overruled  the  demurrer,  and,  at  the  hearing,  directed  a  refer- 
ence to  inquire  whether  the  plaintiff  could  make  a  good  title.3 

Where  time  is  material,4  it  ought  to  be  alleged  with  such  a  degree  of 
accuracy  as  may  prevent  any  possibility  of  doubt  as  to  the  period  in- 
tended to  be  defined.6  Thus,  in  prescribing  for  a  modus  in  a  bill,  it  is 
necessary  that  a  time  for  the  payment  of  it  should 'be  mentioned; 6  and, 
formerly,  it  appears  to  have  been  considered,  that  not  only  the  day  of 
payment  should  be  mentioned,  but  that  laying  the  day  of  payment  on  or 
about  a  particular  day  was  too  uncertain.7  In  ordinary  cases,  however, 
the  laying  of  an  event  on  or  about  a  certain  day  of  a  certain  month  or 
year,  is  a  sufficient  specification  of  time.  In  the  case  of  Leigh  v.  Leigh  8 
the  bill  prayed  that  the  defendant  might  be  restrained  from  setting  up  a 

term  of  five  hundred  years,  in  bar  of  an  action  of  ejectment  which  the 
*  370    plaintiff  had  brought  against  the  present  *  possessor,  and  alleged 

that  the  plaintiff's  title  accrued  on  the  death  of  an  individual 
named,  which  happened  on  or  about  the  2d  July,  1806.  The  defendant 
demurred,  on  the  ground  that  the  period  alleged  in  the  bill,  as  the  time 
of  the  death  of  the  individual  named,  was  more  than  twenty  years  (the 
period  required  by  the  Stat.  3  &  4  Will.  IV.  c.  27,  §§  2,  24,  to  bar  suits) 
before  the  filing  of  the  bill,  which  took  place  in  1834.  When  the  demur- 
rer was  first  argued,  Sir  Lancelot  Shadwell  V.  C.  was  of  opinion  that 
the  words,  "  on  or  about  the  2d  July,  1806,"  did  not  fix  any  precise  date, 
and  that  it  might  mean  many  years  before  or  many  years  after  that 
time ;  and  overruled  the  demurrer.  Upon  appeal,  however,  the  Lords 
Commissioner,  Pepys  and  Bosanquet,  reversed  the  decision,  being  of 
opinion,  that,  from  the  known  and  accepted  use  of  the  expression,  "  on 
or  about,"  in  all  the  ordinary  transactions  of  life,  it  was  sufficiently 
definite  for  all  the  purposes  of  demurrer,  and  did  satisfactorily  set  out 
the  fact  that  the  person  named  died  in  the  year  1806.  * 


8  Smith  v.  Capron,  7  Hare,  185. 

4  On  the  subject  of  the  materiality  of  time, 
see  Seton  v.  Slade,  7  Sumner's  Ves.  265,  Per- 
kins's note;  Marquis  of  Hertford  v.  Boore,  5  id. 
719,  note  («),  and  cases  cited  ;  2  Story,  Eq.  Jur. 
§  776,  and  notes;  Richmond  v.  Gray,  3  Allen, 
25. 

In  Equity,  time  is  often  regarded  as  not  of 
the  essence  of  a  contract.  Snowman  v.  Har- 
ford, 55  Maine,  197 ;  Hull  v.  Noble,  40  Maine, 
459 ;  Rogers  v.  Saunders,  1G  Maine,  92.  But 
where  it  is  of  the  essence,  it  will  be  insisted  on 
as  well  in  Equity  as  at  Law.  Merritt  v.  Brown, 
19  N.  J.  Eq.  293.  It  is  of  the  essence  of  a  con- 
tract, either  when,  from  the  nature  or  subject- 
matter  of  the  contract,  it  is  material  that  it 
should  be  performed  at  the  time,  or  when  the 
contract,  by  express  stipulations,  makes  it  of 
the  essence,  and  releases  the  other  party  upon 
failure  to  comply  within  the  time.  Fry  Specif. 
Perf.  §§  711,  713;  Benedick  v.  Lynch,  1  John. 
Ch.  370  ;  Wells  r.  Smith,  7  Paige,  22;  Grigg 
v.  Landis,  19  N.  J.  Eq.  353,  354;  Pickering  v. 
Pickering,  38  N.  H.  400 ;  Pennock  v.  Ela,  189, 

370 


191.  In  all  cases  of  an  agreement  to  convey 
lands,  where  the  value  of  the  property  con- 
cerned has  materially  changed,  or  where  great 
financial  changes  have  materially  altered  the 
relative  value  of  money  and  land,  time  will  be 
considered  material,  and  a  party  will  not  be 
allowed  to  lie  by  until  the  change  sets  in  his 
favor,  and  then  ask  for  specific  performance. 
Young  v.  Rath  bone,  16  N.  J.  Eq.  224. 

5  See  Saum  v.  Stingley,   3   Clarke   (Iowa), 
514. 

6  Goddard   v.  Keeble,   Bunb.  105;  Phillips 
v.  Symes,  id.  171. 

'Blacket  v.  Finney,  Bunb.  198. 

8  Before  the  Lords  Commissioners,  Aug.  6 
and  8,  1835. 

1  See  also  Richards  v.  Evans,  1  Ves.  Sr. 
39;  Roberts  v.  Williams,  12  East,  33;  see  as  to 
words  "shortly  after,"  Baker  v.  Wetton,  14 
Sim.  426  ;  9  Jur.  98  ;  as  to  words  "soon  after," 
Edsell  v.  Buchman,  4  Bro.  C.  C.  254;  and  as  to 
the  words  "  more  or  less,"  see  Cross  v.  Eglice, 
2  B.  &  Ad.  106. 
.    With   respect   to  the    certainty  required  in 


FORM    OF   THE   BILL. 


371 


*  The  principle  which  requires  a  sufficient  degree  of  certainty  in  *  371 
the  statement  of  a  bill,  is  further  illustrated  in  the  case  of  Stans- 
bunj  v.  Arkwright,1  before  referred  to,  where  a  bill  to  restrain  a  defend- 
ant from  setting  up  outstanding  terms,  in  bar  to  the  plaintiff's  claim  at 
Law,  was  held  to  be  demurrable,  on  the  ground  that  it  did  not  allege 
what  sort  of  term  or  estate  was  outstanding. 

The  rule  which  requires  a  plaintiff  to  employ  such  a  degree  of  cer- 
tainty in  setting  out  his  case  as  may  enable  the  defendant  to  ascertain 
the  precise  grounds  upon  which  it  is  based,  applies  to  all  cases  in  which 
a  person  seeks  relief  upon  a  general  allegation  of  error,  without  specify- 
ing particulars.2  A  plaintiff  seeking  to  surcharge  and  falsify  a  settled 
account  must  specify  in  his  statement  of  claim  at  least  one  important 
error,  and  must  also  allege  generally  that  there  are  other  errors  even 
though  the  settlement  of  the  account  is  expressed  to  be,  "  errors  excepted," 
which  is  the  usual  form  observed  in  settling  accounts.8  A  person  seek- 
ing to  open  a  settled  account  must  specify  in  his  claim  either  errors  of 


setting  out  the  other  incidents  in  the  plaintiffs 
case,  the  following  eases  wili  serve  to  show 
what  degree  of  it  is  required  under  the  circum- 
stances to  which  they  refer.  In  the  case  of 
Cresset  v.  Mitton  (3  Bro.  C.  C.  481 ;  1  Ves.  Jr. 
449),  before  alluded  to,  a  bill  had  been  filed  to 
perpetuate  testimony  to  a  right  of  common  and 
of  way,  and  it  stated  "  that  the  tenants,  owners, 
and  occupiers  of  the  said  lands,  messuages, 
tenements,  and  hereditaments,  in  right  there- 
of or  otherwise,  have,  from  time  whereof  the 
memory  of  man  is  not  to  the  contrary,  had, 
and  of  right  ought  to  have,"  &c.  To  this  bill  a 
demurrer  was  put  in,  one  of  the  grounds  for 
which  was,  that  it  was  not  stated  as  to  what 
messuages  in  particular  the  rights  of  common 
and  of  way  were  claimed;  and,  in  allowing  the 
demurrer,  Lord  Thurlow  said,  "You  have  not 
stated  whether  the  right  of  way  and  common 
is  appurtenant  and  appendant  to  the  land,  that 
you  hold ;  and  you  state  it  loosely  that  you  have 
such  right  as  belonging  to  your  estate,  or  other- 
wise, so  that  your  bill  is  to  have  a  commission 
to  try  any  right  of  common  and  way  whatever." 
The  same  doctrine  appears  to  have  been  held 
by  Lord  Keeper  North,  in  Gell  v.  Hay  ward,  1 
Vern.  312,  who,  upon  a  bill  to  perpetuate  the 
testimony  of  witnesses  touching  a  right  of  way, 
held,  that  in  such  a  bill  the  way  ought  to  be 
laid  exactly  per  et  trans,  as  in  a  declaration  at 
Law.  And  so,  in  Ryves  v.  Ryves,  3  Ves.  343, 
where  a  bill  was  riled  for  a  discovery  of  title- 
deeds,  relating  to  lands  in  the  possession  of  the 
defendant,  and  for  the  delivery  of  the  posses- 
sion of  such  lands  to  the  plaintiff,  upon  a  loose 
allegation  that,  under  some  deeds  in  the  custody 
of  the  defendants,  the  plaintiff  was  entitled  to 
some  interest  in  estates  in  their  possession,  but 
without  stating  what  the  deeds  were,  or  what  the 
property  was  to  which  they  applied,  a  demurrer 
was  allowed.     See  Loker  v.  Rolle,  3  Ves.  4; 


Eiist  India  Co.  v.  Henchman,  1  Ves.  Jr.  287, 
290;  and  see  Houghton  v.  Reynolds,  2  Hare, 
264;  7  Jur.  414;  Munday  V.  Knight,  3  Hare, 
497,  and  Reporter's  note,  id.  501;  S.  C.  8  Jur. 
904;  Hawkins  v.  Hawkins,  VV.  N.  (1872)  153. 
In  modus  suits,  see  Scott  v.  Allgood,  3  Gwil. 
1369;  1  Anst.  16;  Atkyns  v.  Lord  Willoughby, 
3  Gwil.  1412;  Baker  v.  Athill,  3  Gwil.  1423; 
2  Anst.  491. 

1  6  Sim.  481,  485  ;  see  Hamp  v.  Robinsr.n,  3 
De  G.  J.  &  S.  97. 

a  Taylor  v.  Haylin,  2  Bro.  C.  C.  310;  1  Cox, 
435;  Johnson  v.  Curtis,  3  Bro.  C.  C.  266;  Cock- 
rell  v.  Gurley,  26  Ala.  405;  Prestidge  v.  Pendle- 
ton, 24  Miss.  80;  Caton  v.  Willis,  5  Ired.  Eq. 
335;  Prescott  v.  Everts,  4  Wis.  314;  Dennis  v. 
Dennis,  15  Md.  73;  Meshaw  v.  Meshaw,  2  Md. 
Ch.  12;  Walton  v.  Cody,  1  Wis.  420;  Connors 
v.  Connors,  4  Wis.  112;  Badger  r.  Badger,  2 
Wall.  87 ;  Threldkeld  r.  Dobbins,  45  Ga.  144. 

3  Davies  v.  Spurling,  Tarn.  199,  211;  Law- 
less v.  Mansfield,  1  D.  &  War.  557;  Gething  o. 
Keighley,  9  Ch.  D.  547,  550;  and  see  Johnson 
v.  Curtis,  3  Bro.  C  C.  266;  Parkinson  v.  Han- 
bury,  L.  R.  2  H.  L.  1;  2  De  G.  J.  &  S.  450; 
Cnthbert  v.  Edinborough,  21  VV.  R.  98;  Wal- 
Hngford  r.  Mutual  Society,  5  App.  Cas.  685; 
Whyte  v.  Ahrens,  26  Ch.  D.  717;  1  Story,  Eq. 
Jur.*§§  523,  527;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §§  251,  800; 
Calvit  v.  Markham,  3  How.  (Miss.)  343  ;  Mebane 
v.  Mebane,  1  Ind.  Eq.  403;  De  Montmorency 
v.  Devereux,  1  Dru.  &  W.  119;  Leaycraft  v. 
Dempsey,  15  Wend.  83;  Baker  v.  Biddle,  1 
Bald.  394,  418;  Bainbridge  v.  Wilcocks,  id. 
536,  540;  Consequa  v.  Fanning,  3  John.  Ch. 
587;  S.  C.  17  John.  511;  Taylor  v.  Haylin,  2 
Bro.  C.  C.  (Perkins's  ed.)  311,  note  (a),  and 
cases  cited  ;  Brownell  v.  Brownell,  2  id.  63, 
note  (a) ;  Preston  v.  Stuart,  29  Gratt.  289 ;  but 
see  Shugart  v.  Thompson,  10  Leigh,  434. 

371 


*372 


THE    BILL. 


considerable  extent  both  in  number  and  amount,4  or  at  least  one  impor- 
tant error  of  a  fraudulent  nature.5  Where  a  plaintiff  files  a  bill  for  a 
general  account,  and  the  defendant  sets  forth  a  stated  one,  the  plaintiff 
must  either  by  amendment  of  his  bill,6  or  it  seems  by  his  reply,7  allege 
grounds  for  impeaching  the  account,  because  a  stated  account  is  prima 
facie  a  bar  till  the  particular  errors  in  it  are  assigned.  Upon  the  same 
ground  it  has  been  held,  that  an  award  is  a  bar  to  a  bill  brought  for  any 
of  the  matters  intended  to  be  bound  by  it ;  and  that  if  a  bill  is  filed  to 
set  aside  the  award  as  not  being  final,  the  specific  objections  to  it  must 
be  stated  upon  the  bill.8 

It  is  to  be  remarked,  that  in  most  of  the  cases  above  cited, 
*  372  the  *  question  has  come  before  the  Court  upon  demurrer,  which 
seems  to  be  the  proper  way  in  which  a  defendant  ought  to  take 
the  objection  that  a  bill  is  deficient  in  certainty;  if  he  neglects  to  do 
so,  it  seems  that  he  cannot  avail  himself  of  the  objection  at  the 
hearing.1 

Conclusions  of  law  should  not  in  general  be  averred ;  but  where  cer- 
tain facts  are  stated  from  which  it  is  intended  to  draw  a  conclusion  of 
law,  the  bill  ought  to  be  so  framed  as  to  give  notice  to  the  defendant  of 
the  plaintiff's  intention  to  insist  on  such  conclusion  ;  otherwise,  he  may 
not  be  allowed  to  do  so.  Thus,  in  a  bill  for  specific  performance  of  an 
agreement  to  sell  a  leasehold,  the  plaintiff  was  not  allowed  to  insist  that 
the  defendant  had  waived  his  right  to  inquire  into  the  landlord's  title, 
because,  although  he  had  stated  in  his  bill  facts  from  which  the  waiver 
might  be  inferred,  he  had  not  alleged  the  waiver.2  (a) 


4.  Charge  of  Confederacy. 

It  was  formerly  customary  in  almost  every  bill  to  introduce  a  general 
charge  of  confederacy  against  the  defendants.3     There  is  no  such  state- 


4  Williamson  v.  Barbour,  9  Ch.D.  529,  M.  R. 

5  Taylor  v.  Haylin,  2  Bro.  C.  C.  310;  Miller 
v.  Craig,  6  Beav*  433;  Pitt  v.  Clay,  id.  503; 
Allfrey  v.  Allfrey,  1  M'N.  &  G.87;  Coleman  v. 
Mellersh,  2  id.  309;  Gething  v.  Keighley,  9  Ch. 
D.  547;  and  as  to  alleging  fraud  in  such  cases, 
see  Wallingford  v.  Mutual  Society,  5  App.  Cas. 
685. 

6  See  R.  S.  C.  App.  C.  No.  9,  n.;  Hoyt  v. 
Clarkson  (Or.),  31  Pac.  198 ;  Dawson  v.  Dawson, 
1  Atk.  1;  Brown  v.  Vandyke,  4  Halst.  Ch. 
(N.  J.)  795;  McClelland  v.  West,  70  Penn.  St. 
183.  This  rule  supposes  that  an  account  has 
been  given  by  the  defendant.  Vandyke  v. 
Brown,  4  Halst.  Ch.  (N.  J.)  657.  As  to  what 
is  a  sufficient  allegation  of  an  account  stated, 
McFarland  v.  Gutter,  1  Mon.  T.  383;  Bouslog 
v.  Garrett,  39  Ind.  338.  And  what  is  an  account 
stated,  Stanton  v.  Jerome,  54  N.  Y.  480.     As 


(a)  A  waiver  should  in  general  be  pleaded, 
if  relied  upon;  but  a  waiver  of  an  incidental 
requirement,  not  affecting  the  merits,  ma)'  be 
proved,  although  not  pleaded.    Pioneer  Manuf. 

372 


to  what  are  settled  accounts,  see  Croft  v.  Gra- 
ham, 5  Giff.  1 ;  2  De  G.  J.  &  S.  155.  And  see, 
as  to  how  far  stated  accounts  are  binding  on 
the  party  making  them,  Schletter  v.  Smith, 
34  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  17;  White  v.  Campbell,  21 
Mich.  463.  The  defendant  in  an  action  on  an 
account  stated  may  plead  and  prove  that  the 
whole  claim  was  founded  upon  an  illegal  trans- 
action. Dunbar  v.  Johnson,  108  Mass.  119.  As 
to  the  allegations  in  a  claim  against  a  husband 
for  his  wife's  antenuptial  debts,  see  Matthews 
v.  Whittle,  13  Ch.  D.  811;  37  &  38  Vic.  c.  50. 

1  See  Hall  v.  Eve,  4  Ch.  D.  341. 
8  Routh  v.  Peach,  2  Anst.  519. 

i  Carew  v.  Johnston,  2  Sch.  &  Lef.  280. 

2  Clive  v.  Beaumont,  1  De  G.  &  S.  397;  13 
Jur.  226;  Gaston  v.  Frankum,  2  De  G.  &  S. 
561;  16  Jur.  507;  ante,  p.  321. 

3  See  Barton,  33,  note  (1);  Cooper,  Eq.  P). 


Co.  v.  Phoenix  Ass.  Co.  110  N.  C.  176.  Delay 
or  inaction  does  not  constitute  a  waiver,  although 
it  may  be  evidence  thereof.  Selwyn  v.  Garfit, 
38  Ch.  D.  273,  284. 


FORM    OF   THE    BILL.  *  373 

merit  in  the  model  of  a  bill  given  by  the  General  Orders,  and  it  is 
scarcely  necessary  to  say  that  such  a  charge  would  now,  except  under 
very  special  circumstances,  be  deemed  idle  and  impertinent. 

5.   Charging  Part} 

It  was  formerly  the  practice  of  pleaders  in  Equity  to  state  the  plain- 
tiff's case  in  the  bill  very  concisely,  and  then  if  any  matter  was  intro- 
duced into  the  defendant's  plea  or  answer  which  made  it  necessary 
for  the  plaintiff  to  put  in  issue,  on  his  part,  some  additional 
*  fact  in  avoidance  of  such  new  matter,  such  new  fact  was  placed  *  373 
upon  the  record  by  means  of  a  special  replication.  In  order  to 
avoid  the  inconvenience,  delay,  and  unnecessary  length  of  pleading,  aris- 
ing from  this  course  of  proceeding,  the  practice  grew  up  when  the  plain- 
tiff was  aware  at  the  time  of  filing  his  bill  of  any  defence  which  might 
be  made  to  it,  and  had  any  matter  to  allege  which  might  avoid  the 
effect  of  such  defence,  to  insert  an  allegation  that  the  defendants  pre- 
tend, or  set  up  such  and  such  allegations  by  way  of  defence,  and  then  to 
aver  the  matter  used  to  avoid  it  in  the  form  of  charge.  This  was  com- 
monly called  the  charging  part  of  the  bill,  and  its  introduction  into 
practice,  in  all  probability,  led  to  the  discontinuance  of  special  replica- 
tions, by  enabling  the  plaintiff  to  state  his  case,  and  to  bring  forward  the 
matter  to  be  alleged  in  reply  to  the  defence  at  the  same  time,  and  that 
without  making  any  admission  on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff,  of  the  truth 
of  the  defendant's  case.  Thus,  if  a  bill  were  filed  on  any  equitable 
ground,  by  an  heir  who  apprehended  his  ancestor  had  made  a  will,  he 
might  state  his  title  as  heir,  and  alleging  the  will  by  way  of  pretence  o:\ 
the  part  of  the  defendants  claiming  under  it,  make  it  a  part  of  his  case 
without  admitting  it. 

Such  was  the  origin  of  what  was  called  the  charging  part  in  a  bill, 
and  there  is  no  doubt  that  in  many  cases  it  is  still  convenient,  and  may 
be  made  the  means  of  enabling  the  plaintiff  to  state  his  answer  to  some 
anticipated   defence,  or   to  guard  his  statement  by   allegations  which 

10;  1  Hoff.  Ch   Pr.  41.     The  general  charge  of  defraud  the  plaintiff.      By  the  7th  Chancery 

fraudulent  combination,  &c,  is  not  sufficie  tto  Rule  in  Massachusetts,  it  is  provided,  that  the 

charge  fraud;  there  must  be  a  specific  allega-  common  charge  of  fraud  or  combination  shall 

tion  of  fraud,  stating  the  facts.    Lewis  v.  Lewis,  be  omitted,  except  in  cases  where  it  is  intended 

9  Mo.  18-J ;  but  see  Farnham  v.  Brooks,  9  Pick.  to  charge  fraud  and  combination  specifically. 

212,219.    Although  the  charye  of  confederacy  See  Adams   r.    Porter.   1  Ciish.    170.     And  in 

is  now  usually,  but  not  invariably,  inserted  in  New  Hampshire,  it  is  held  that  the  allegation 

bills,  yet  it  is  treated  as  mere  surplusage;  so  of  confederacy  is  not  essential,  except  where  it 

much  so,  that  it  is  said  that  the  general  charge  is  intended  to  charge  fraud  and  combination 

of  combination  need  not  be  (although  it  usually  specifically.     Stone  v.  Anderson,  26  N.  H.  506. 

is)  denied  or  responded  to  in  the  answer,  when  And  by  rule  of  Court  in  that  State,  the  charge 

charged  in  the  bill;  for  it  is  mere  impertinence,  of  confederacy  may  be  omitted.     Ch.  Rid.-  3; 

Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  29.     By  the  21st  Equity  Rule  38  N.  H.  605.  Appx.      In    Maine  it  must  lie 

of  the  Supreme  Court  of   the  United    States,  omitted.     Ch.  Rule  1.  37  Maine,  581. 

January    term,  1842,  it  is  provided    that    the  4  The  form  of  such  a  charge  is  given  in  Van 

plaintiff  shall  be  at  liberty  to  omit  at  his  option  Heythuysen's  Equity  Draftsman,  p.  5,  and  in 

the  part  which  is  usually  called  the  common  Barton,   p.  34;  Story,  Eq.   PI    §§  31,  33,  and 

confedency  clause  of  the  bill,  averring  a  con-  notes.     As  to  unconnected  charges,  see  Thomp- 

federacy  between  the  defendants  to  injure  or  son  v.  Moxev,  47  N.  J.  Eq.  538. 

373 


374 


THE   BILL. 


could  not  conveniently  be  inserted  in  the  text.  The  model  of  a  bill,1 
it  will  be  observed,  contains  no  charging  part,  and  such  a  mode  of  state- 
ment can  never  be  said  to  be  absolutely  necessary  ; 2  but  there  are 
cases  where  it  may  still  be  useful,  though  the  comparative  simplicity 
of  modern  pleading  will  diminish  most   materially  the  occasions   for 

its  use.8 
*  374        *  Bills  used  formerly  to  contain  a  precise  averment  of  juris- 
diction in  the  Court.     This  is  now  obsolete,  and  was  never  ab- 
solutely requisite.1 


6.  Interrogating  Part. 

The  interrogating  part  of  a  bill  was  an  almost  invariable  accompani- 
ment to  a  bill,  until  the  statutes  amending  the  practice  of  the  Court 
of  Chancery,2  by  which  it  was  enacted,  "that  the  bill  of  complaint  shall 


i  Vol.  ill. 

2  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §§  32,  32  a,  33,  and  note. 
By  the  Equity  Rules  of  the  U.  S.  Supreme 
Court  the  plaintiff  is  at  liberty  to  omit,  at  his 
option,  what  is  commonly  called  the  charging 
part  of  the  bill,  setting  forth  the  matters  of  ex- 
cuses which  the  defendant  is  supposed  to  intend 
to  set  up,  by  way  of  defence  to  the  bill.  And 
the  plaintiff  may,  in  the  narrative  or  stating 
part  of  his  bill,  state  and  avoid,  by  counter 
averments,  at  his  option,  any  matter  or  thing 
which  he  supposes  will  be  insisted  upon  by  the 
defendant,  by  way  of  defence  or  excuse,  to  the 
case  made  by  the  plaintiff  for  relief.  Rule  21. 
So  in  New  Hampshire.  Ch.  Rule  3,  38  N.  H. 
605. 

Chancery  Rule  7  in  Massachusetts  provides 
that  the  plaintiff,  when  his  case  requires  it,  may 
allege  by  way  of  charge,  any  particular  fact, 
for  the  purpose  of  putting  it  in  issue. 

3  See  Aiken  v.  Ballard,  Rice,  Eq.  13;  M'Crea 
v.  Purmort,  16  Wend.  460;  Hawley  v.  Wolver- 
ton,  5  Paige,  522  ;  Mechanics'  Bank  v.  Levy, 
3  Paige,  606;  Stafford  v.  Brown.  4  Paige.  88; 
Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  31;  Parker  v.  Carter,  4  Munf. 
273 ;  1  Hoff.  Cli.  Pr.  42.  If  the  plaintiff  wishes 
to  obtain  a  discovery  of  facts  to  anticipate  and 
rebut  the  defence  which  may  be  set  up  by  the 
defendant,  he  should,  in  the  charging  part  of 
the  bill,  state  the  anticipated  defence  as  a  pre- 
tence of  the  defendant,  and  then  charge  the 
real  facts  to  lay  a  foundation  for  the  discov- 
ery which  is  sought.  Stafford  v.  Brown,  4 
Paige,  88. 

"Another  very  important  rule,"  says  Mr. 
Justice  Story,  "  as  to  the  frame  of  hills,  seems 
now  established  in  England ;  and  tint  is,  if 
the  bill  means  to  rely  upon  any  confessions, 
conversations,  or  admissions  of  the  defendant, 
either  written  or  oral,  as  proof  of  any  fact 
charged  in  the  bill  (as,  for  example,  of  fraud), 

374 


the  bill  must  expressly  charge  what  such  con- 
fessions, conversations,  or  admissions  are,  and 
to  whom  made ;  otherwise  no  evidence  thereof 
will  be  admitted  at  the  hearing."  "Whether 
the  like  rule  will  be  allowed  to  prevail  in 
America,  may  be  deemed  open  to  much  doubt." 
See  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  265  a,  and  the  cases  cited 
in  notes,  for  a  more  full  statement  of  the  rule 
and  the  reasons  of  it.  In  Smith  v.  Burnham, 
2  Sumner,  612,  it  was  held  that  the  confessions, 
admissions,  and  conversations  of  the  defend- 
ant need  not  be  expressly  charged  in  a  bill  in 
Equity,  in  order  to  entitle  the  plaintiff  to  use 
them  in  proof  of  facts  charged,  and  in  issue 
therein.     See  Bishop  v.  Bishop,  13  Ala.  475. 

If  the  bill  is  sworn  to,  it  is  perjury  for  the 
plaintiff  knowingly  to  make  a  false  charge  or 
averment  in  the  charging,  as  much  as  if  he 
makes  a  false  statement  in  the  stating  part. 
Smith  p.  Clark,  4  Paige,  368. 

i  See  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  34;  Botsford  v.  Burr, 
11  Conn.  369."  By  the  21st  Equity  Rule  of  the 
U.  S.  Supreme  Court,  January  term,  1842,  the 
plaintiff,  in  his  bill,  shall  be  at  liberty  to  omit, 
at  his  option,  what  is  commonly  called  the  juris- 
diction clause  of  the  bill,  viz.,  "that  the  acts 
complained  of  are  contrary  to  Equity,"  &c. 
So  in  New  Hampshire.  Ch.  Rule  3,  38  N.  H. 
605,  Appx.  In  all  bills  in  Equity  in  the  Courts 
of  the  United  States,  the  citizenship  should  ap- 
pear on  the  face  of  the  bill,  to  entitle  the  Court 
to  take  jurisdiction;  otherwise  the  bill  will  be 
dismissed.  Dodge  v.  Perkins,  4  Mason,  435; 
Bingham  v.  Cabot,  3  Dall.  382;  Jackson  v. 
Ashton,  8  Peters,  148;  Vose  r.  Philbrook,  3 
Story,  335;  see  Louisville  and  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Stetson,  2  How.  (U.  S)  497;  Winnipiseogee 
Lake  Co.  v.  Worster,  29  N.  H.  433,  443,  444. 
For  a  form  of  the  averment  of  jurisdiction,  see 
Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  34,  in  note. 

2  A  bill  which  wholly  omits  the  interroga- 


FORM    OF   THE    BILL. 


377 


not  contain  any  interrogatories  for  the  examination  of  the  defend- 
ant." 8  *  It  was  always  the  rule  that  the  interrogatories  must  in  all    *  377 


tory  part,  is  said  to  be  defective  in  Shedd  v. 
Gartield,  5  Vt.  39.  But  it  is  not  regarded  as 
absolutely  necessary  by  Mr.  Justice  Story,  Eq. 
PI.  §  38,  though  often  highly  useful  to  sift  the 
conscience  of  the  defendant,  and  almost  uni- 
versal in  practice.  Ibid.  See  also  Eberly  v. 
Gross,  21  Penn.  251.  By  Ch.  Rule  7  in  Massa- 
chusetts, the  plaintiff,  when  his  case  requires 
it,  may  propose  specific  interrogatories.  See 
Belknap  v.  Stone,  1  Allen,  572.  In  New  Hamp- 
shire, "  the  prayer  for  an  answer  and  for  an- 
swers to  interrogatories,  except  where  the 
plaintiff  relies  on  the  discovery  of  the  defend- 
ant, may  be  omitted."  Ch.  Rule  3,  38  N.  H. 
605,  Appx.  In  Maine,  "a  general  interroga- 
tory only  shall  be  introduced,  and  it  shall  be 
sufficient  to  require  a  full  answer  to  all  the  mat- 
ters alleged."  Rule  1,  37  Maine,  581,  Appx. 
As  to  what  is,  or  amounts  to,  the  general  inter- 
rogatory, see  Ames  v.  King,  9  Allen,  258. 

Interrogatories  appended  to  the  bill,  based 
on  the  statements  therein  made,  will  be  re- 
garded as  incorporated  in  the  bill.  Romaine  v. 
Hendrickson,  24  N.  J.  Eq.  231. 

3  Ante,  p.  319.  By  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  80,  §  12, 
it  was  enacted,  that  "  within  a  time  to  be  limited 
by  a  General  Order  of  the  Lord  Chancellor  in 
that  behalf,  the  plaintiff  in  any  suit  in  the  said 
Court  commenced  by  bill  may,  if  he  requires 
an  answer  from  any  defendant  thereto,  rile  in 
the  Record  Office  of  the  said  Court  interroga- 
tories for  the  examination  of  the  defendant 
or  defendants,  or  such  of  them  from  whom  he 
shall  require  an  answer,  and  deliver  to  the  de- 
fendant or  defendan's  so  required  to  answer,  or 
to  his  or  their  solicitor,  a  copy  of  such  inter- 
rogatories, or  of  such  of  them  as  shall  be  appli- 
cable to  the  particular  defendant  or  defend- 
ants; and  no  defendant  shall  be  called  upon  or 
required  to  put  in  any  answer  to  a  bill  unless 
interrogatories  shall  have  been  so  filed,  and  a 
cop3'  thereof  delivered  to  him  or  his  solicitor, 
within  the  time  so  to  be  limited,  or  within  such 
further  time  as  the  Court  shall  think  fit  to  di- 
rect." It  is  sufficient  if  the  interrogatories  are 
left  at  the  solicitor's  office  without  being  deliv- 
ered to  him  personally.  Bowen  v.  Price,  2  De 
G.  M.  &  G.  899. 

By  the  15th  and  following  General  Orders  of 
the  7th  of  August,  1852,  it  was  directed  that:  — 

"The  interrogatories  for  the  examination  of 
the  defendant  to  a  bill  may  be  in  a  form  simi- 
lar to  the  form  set  out  in  Schedule  (C.)  to  these 
Orders,  with  such  variations  as  the  nature 
and  circumstances  of  each  particular  case  may 
require. 

"  In  cases  in  which  the  plaintiff  requires  an 
answer  to  any  bill  from  any  defendant  or  de- 
fendants   thereto,  the    interrogatories   for   the 


examination  of  such  defendant  or  defendants 
are  to  be  filed  within  eight  days  after  the  time 
limited  for  the  appearance  of  such  defendant  or 
defendants. 

"  If  the  defendant  appear  in  person,  or  by 
his  own  solicitor,  within  the  time  limited  for 
that  purpose  by  the  rules  of  the  Court,  the 
plaintiff  is,  within  eight  days  after  the  time 
allowed  for  such  appearance,  to  deliver  to  the 
defendant  or  defendants  so  required  to  answer, 
or  to  his  or  their  solicitor  or  solicitors,  a  copy 
of  the  interrogatories  so  filed  as  aforesaid,  or  of 
such  of  them  as  the  particular  defendant  or 
defendants  shall  be  required  to  answer.  And 
the  copy  so  to  be  delivered  is  to  be  examined 
with  the  original,  and  the  number  of  folios 
counted  by  the  Clerks  of  Records  and  Writs, 
who,  on  finding  that  such  copy  is  duly  stamped 
and  properly  written,  are  to  mark  the  same  as 
an  office  copy. 

"If  any  defendant  to  a  suit  commenced  by 
bill  do  not  appear  in  person,  or  by  his  own  soli- 
citor, within  the  time  allowed  for  that  purpose 
by  the  rules  of  the  Court,  and  the  plaintiff  has 
filed  interrogatories  for  his  examination,  the 
plaintiff  may  deliver  a  copy  of  such  interroga- 
tories so  examined  and  marked  as  aforesaid, 
to  the  defendant,  at  any  time  after  the  time 
allowed  to  such  defendant  to  appear,  and  before 
his  appearance  in  person  or  by  his  own  solici- 
tor; or  the  plaintiff  may  deliver  a  copy  of  such 
interrogatories,  so  examined  and  marked  as 
aforesaid,  to  the  defendant  or  his  solicitor,  after 
the  appearance  of  such  defendant  in  person  or 
by  his  own  solicitor,  but  within  eight  days  after 
such  appearance. 

"  A  defendant  required  to  answer  a  bill  must 
put  in  his  plea,  answer,  or  demurrer  thereto, 
not  demurring  alone,  within  fourteen  days  from 
the  delivery  to  him  or  his  solicitor  of  a  copy  of 
the  interrogatories  which  he  is  required  to  an- 
swer; but  the  Court  shall  have  full  power  to 
enlarge  the  time,  from  time  to  time,  upon  ap- 
plication being  made  to  the  Court  for  that 
purpose. 

"After  the  time  allowed  by  Order  16,  for 
filing  interrogatories  for  the  examination  of  any 
defendant,  no  interrogatories  are  to  be  filed  for 
the  examination  of  such  defendant,  without 
special  leave  of  the  Court  to  be  applied  for 
upon  notice  of  motion." 

The  form  of   interrogatories  referred  to  in 
the  15th  Order  is  as  follows  :  — 
"  In  Chancery. 

John  Lee' Plaintiff. 

James  Styles  ) 

and  >- Defendants. 

Henry  Jones  ) 

375 


377 


THE    BILL. 


cases  be   confined   to   the  substantive   charge  or   allegation,  and   that 
the  plaintiff  cannot  extend  his  interrogatories  in  such  a  manner  as  to 


Interrogatories  for  the  Examination  of  the 

Above-named  Defendants  in  answer  to 

the  Plaintiff's  Bill  of  Complaint. 

"  1.  Does  not  the  defendant  Henry  Jones 
claim  to  have  some  charge  upon  the  farm  and 
premises  comprised  in  the  indenture  of  mortgage 
of  the  first  of  May,  one  thousand  eight  hundred 
and  fifty,  in  the  plaintiff's  bill  mentioned? 

"2.  What  are  the  particulars  of  such  charge, 
if  any ;  the  date,  nature,  and  short  effect  of  the 
security,  and  what  is  due  thereon? 

"3.  Are  there  or  is  there  any  other  mort- 
gages or  mortgage,  charges  or  charge,  incum- 
brances or  incumbrance,  in  any  and  what  man- 
ner affecting  the  aforesaid  premises,  or  any  part 
thereof  V 

"4.  Set  forth  the  particulars  of  such  mort- 
gages or  mortgage,  charges  or  charge,  incum- 
brances or  incumbrance;  the  date,  nature,  and 
short  effect  of  the  security;  what  is  now  due 
thereon;  and  who  is  or  are  entitled  thereto 
respectively ;  and  when  and  by  whom,  and  in 
what  manner,  every  such  mortgage,  charge,  or 
incumbrance  was  created. 

"  The  defendant  James  Styles  is  required  to 
answer  all  these  interrogatories. 

"The  defendant  Henry  Jones  is  required  to 
answer  the  interrogatories  numbered  1  and  2. 
"  Y.  Y." 
(name  of  counsel.) 

The  form  of  interrogatories  given  is  so  pre- 
cise that  it  is  scarcely  necessary  to  refer  to  the 
former  practice  on  the  subject.  Of  course  a 
defendant  is  not  bound  to  answer  anything  in 
the  bill  to  which  he  is  not  precisely  interrogated. 
Under  Massachusetts  Ch.  Rule  4,  when  the  case 
requires  it,  the  plaintiff  may  propose  specific 
interrogatories.  Rule  8  provides  that  the  defend- 
ant shall  be  required  to  answer  fully,  directly, 
and  particularly  to  every  material  allegation  in 
the  bill,  as  if  he  had  been  thereto  particularly 
interrogated.  See  Methodist  Episcopal  Church 
v.  Jaques,  1  John.  Ch.  65.  The  practice  in  New 
Hampshire  conforms  with  the  above  rule  in 
Massachusetts.  Miles  v.  Miles,  27  N.  H.  440. 
And  such  is  understood  to  be  the  practice  where 
there  is  no  rule  on  the  subject.  Id.  445;  see 
Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  38;  Hagthorp  v.  Hook,  1  Gill 
&  J.  270;  Salmon  0.  Claggett,  3  Bland,  125. 
The  general  interrogatory  is  in  substance  as 
follows;  viz.:  "That  the  defendant  may  full 
answer  make,  to  all  and  singular  the  premises, 
fully  and  particularly,  as  though  the  same  were 
repeated  and  he  specially  interrogated,"  &c. 
See  Ames  p.  King,  9  Allen,  258.  By  the  former 
English  practice  the  interrogatories,  which  each 

376 


defendant  was  required  to  answer,  were  specified 
in  a  note  at  the  toot  of  the  bill,  and  such  is  the 
rule  adopted  by  the  U.  S.  Supreme  Court.    41st 
Equity  Rule,  Jan.  Term,  1842;  Story,  Eq.  PI. 
§  847,  note.     The  98th,  41st,  42d,  43d,  and  44th 
of  said  Equity  Rules  declare  "that  it  shall  not 
hereafter  be  necessary  to  interrogate  a  defend- 
ant specially  and  particularly  upon  any  state- 
ment in  the  bill,  unless  the  plaintiff  desires  to  do 
so  to  obtain  a  discovery;"  in  which  case  "the 
interrogatories  contained    in  the  interrogating 
part  of  the  bill  shall  be  divided  as  conveniently 
as  may  be  from  each  other,  and  numbered  con- 
secutively, 1,  2,  3,  &c,  and  the  interrogatories 
which  each  defendant  is  required  to  answer  shall 
be  specified  in  a  note  at  the  foot  of  the  bill,  in  the 
form  and  to  the  effect  following :  that  is  to  say, 
the  defendant  (A  B)  is  required  to  answer  the 
interrogatories  numbered  respectively  1,  2,  3, 
&c. ;  and  the  office  copy  of  the  bill  taken  by 
each  defendant  shall  not  contain  any  interrog- 
atories, except  those  which  such  defendant  is 
so  required  to  answer,  unless  such  defendant 
shall  require  to  be  furnished  with  a  copy  of  the 
whole  bill." — "The  note  at  the  foot  of  the 
bill,  specifying  the  interrogatories  which  each 
defendant  is  required  to  answer,  shall  be  con- 
sidered and  treated  as  part  of  the  bill,  and  the 
addition  of  any  such  note  to  the  bill,  or  any 
alteration  in  or  addition  to  such  note  after  the 
bill  is  filed,  shall  be  considered  and  treated  as 
an  amendment  of  the  bill." —  "  Instead  of  the 
words  of  the  bill  now  in  use,  preceding  the  in- 
terrogating part  thereof,  and  beginning  with  the 
words,  'To  the  end,  therefore,'  there  shall  here- 
after be  used  words  in  the  form  and  to  the  effect 
following:  'To  the  end,  therefore,  that  the  said 
defendants  may,  if  they  can,  show  why  3'our 
orator  (the  plaintiff)  should  not  have  the  relief 
hereby  prayed,  and  may,   upon  their  several 
and  respective  corporal  oaths,  and  according  to 
the  best  and  utmost  of  their  several  knowledge, 
remembrance,  information,  and  belief,  full,  true, 
direct,  and  perfect  answer  make  to  such  of  the 
several    interrogatories    hereinafter    numbered 
and  set  forth,  as  by  the  note  hereunder  written 
they  are  respectively  required  to  answer;  that 
is  to  say,   1.  Whether,  &c;  2.  Whether,  &c*  " 
—  "A  defendant  shall  be  at  liberty,  by  answer, 
to  decline  answering  any  interrogatory  or  part 
of  an  interrogatory,  from  answering  which  he 
might  have  protected  himself  by  demurrer;  and 
he  shall  be  at  liberty  so  to  decline,  notwith- 
standing he  shall  answer  other  parts  of  the  bill, 
from  which  he  might  have  protected  himself  by 
demurrer."     These  rules  are  borrowed  from  the 
former  English  Rules   in  Chancery  upon  the 
same  subject.     Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  847,  note. 


FORM    OF   THE    BILL. 


378 


compel  a  discovery  of  a  distinct  matter  not  included  in  the  allegation 
or  charge ; 1  and  there  is  nothing  in  the  present  Orders  to  affect  that 
principle. 


7.  The  Prayer  for  Relief. 

The  prayer  for  relief  is  generally  divided  into  two  parts,  namely,  the 
prayer  for  specific  relief,  and  the  prayer  for  general  relief.'2 

*  Although  there  is  no  doubt  but  that  a  mere  prayer  for  general  *  378 
relief  was  formerly,  in  most  cases,  sufficient  to  enable  the  plaintiff 
to  obtain  such  a  decree  as  his  case  entitled  him  to,1  yet  it  was  the  usual 
practice  to  precede  the  request  for  relief  generally,  by  a  statement  of  the 
specific  nature  of  the  decree  which  the  plaintiff  considered  himself  enti- 
tled to,  under  the  circumstances  of  his  case  ;  and  now,  the  plaintiff  must 
specifically  pray  for  the  relief  to  which  he  may  conceive  himself  enti- 


1  James  v.  M'Kemon,  6  John.  543 ;  Wood- 
cock v.  Bennet,  1  Cowen,  734;  Mechanics' 
Bank  v.  Levy,  3  Paige,  606 ;  Consequa  v.  Fan- 
ning, 3  John.  Ch.  596;  Kisor  v.  Stancifer, 
Wright,  323.  But  a  variety  of  questions  may 
be  founded  on  a  single  charge,  if  they  are  rele- 
vant to  it.  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  37.  It  may  be 
noticed  here,  that  in  Att.-Gen.  v.  Whonvood, 

1  Ves.  524,  where  interrogatories  in  a  bill  were 
directed  to  particular  facts,  which  were  not 
charged  in  the  preceding  part,  and  the  de- 
fendant, though  not  bound  to  answer  them,  did 
so,  and  the  answer  was  replied  to,  Lord  Hard- 
wicke  held  that  the  informality  in  the  manner 
of  charging  was  supplied  by  the  answer,  and 
that  the  facts  were  properly  put  in  issue;  "  for 
a  matter  may  be  put  in  issue  by  the  answer  as 
well  as  by  the  bill,  and,  if  replied  to,  either 
party  may  examine  as  to  it."  1  Ves.  538 ;  Story, 
Eq.  PI.  §  36. 

2  The  latter  can  never  be  properly  and 
safely  omitted ;  because,  if  the  plaintiff  should 
mistake  the  relief  to  which  he  is  entitled,  in 
his  special  prayer,  the  Court  may  yet  afford 
him  the  relief  to  which  he  has  a  right,  under 
the  prayer  of  general  relief,  provided  it  is  such 
relief  as  is  agreeable  to  the  case  made  by  the 
bill.  Ld.  Red.  39,  45;  Coop.  Eq.  PI.  13,  14; 
English  v.  Foxall,  2  Peters,  595;  Colton  v.  Ross, 

2  Paige,  396;  Driver  v.  Fortner,  5  Porter,  10; 
Thoniason  v.  Smithson,  7  Porter,  144;  Peck  v. 
Peck,  9  Yerger,  301 ;  Isaacs  v.  Steel,  3  Scam. 
104;  Strange  v.  Watson,  11  Ala.  324;  Jordan 
v.Clarke,  16  N.  J.  Eq.  243;  Simplot  )•.  Sim- 
plot,  14  Iowa,  449;  Wilson  r.  Horr,  15  Iowa, 
489;  Espinola  v.  Blasco,  15  La.  Ann.  426; 
Vandant  v.  Allmon,  23  III.  30;  Graham  v. 
Berryman,  19  N.  J.  Eq.  29,  34;  Read  v.  Cramer, 
1  Green  Ch.  277;  Landis  v.  Olds,  9  Minn.  90; 
Lee  v.  Boutwell,  44  Texas,  151.  Relief  not 
specifically  prayed  is  within  the  general  relief. 
Beaumont  v.  Boultbee,  5  Sumner's  Ves.  485. 


If  there  is  no  prayer  for  general  relief,  then  if 
the  plaintiff  should  mistake  the  relief  to  which 
he  is  entitled,  no  other  relief  can  be  granted  to 
him,  and  his  suit  must  fail,  — at  least  unless  an 
amendment  of  the  prayer  is  obtained.  Driver 
v.  Fortner,  5  Porter,  10;  Morrison  v.  Bowman, 
29  Cal.  337;  Thomason  r.  Smithson,  7  Porter, 
144;  Peck  v.  Peck,  9  Yerger,  301;  Halsted  v. 
Meeker,  18  N.  J.  Eq.  136,  139.  For  a  form 
of  prayer  for  relief  in  a  bill,  see  Story,  Eq. 
PI.  §  40,  note,  41,  note.  If  a  cause  is  properly 
brought  for  relief  which  Equity  can  give,  the 
Court  will,  under  the  prayer  for  general  relief, 
grant  other  relief  appropriate  to  the  facts,  al- 
though such  relief  could  be  had  at  Law.  Bul- 
lock v.  Adams,  20  N.  J.  Eq.  367.  And  the 
general  prayer  will  enable  the  Court  to  grant 
any  specific  relief  to  which  the  complainant 
may  appear  entitled.  McGlothlin  v.  Hemery, 
44  Mo.  350;  Kirksey  v.  Means,  42  Ala.  426; 
Moore  r.  Mitchell,  2  Woods,  483.  And  if  the 
facts  be  all  stated  upon  which  the  right  to  spe- 
cific relief  arises,  that  relief  will  be  granted, 
although  the  bill  be  not  framed  with  a  view  to 
it.  McNairy  v.  Eastland,  10  Yerger,  310.  So, 
where  relief  is  granted  on  the  statements  of  the 
answer.     Shannon  v.  Erwin,  11  Heisk.  337. 

In  a  bill  between  partners,  a  prayer  that  the 
defendant  may  be  held  to  render  an  account  of 
all  moneys  and  effects  of  the  firm  received  by 
him,  and  of  all  other  matters  relating  to  the 
concern,  is  equivalent  to  a  prayer  for  general 
relief.     Miller V.  Lord,  11  Pick.  11. 

In  Indiana,  the  Court  will  grant  any  relief 
called  for  by  the  case,  and  the  issue  made,  with- 
out regard  to  the  prayer.  Hunter  v.  McCov, 
14  Ind.  528. 

1  Cook  v.  Martyn,  2  Atk.  2,  3;  Grimes  v. 
French,  id.  141;  Partridge  v.  Haycroft,  11 
Ves.  570,  574;  Wilkinson  v.  Beaf,  4  Mad. 
408. 

377 


378 


THE    BILL. 


tied,  as  well  as  for  general  relief ; 2  and  where  he  is  entitled  to  no  other 
relief  against  any  defendant,  he  must  pray  for  costs  ; 3  with  the  one 
exception,  that  he  may  make  the  servant  of  a  corporation  a  defendant, 
for  the  purpose  of  discovery.4  (a) 

This  part  of  the  bill,  therefore,  should  contain  an  accurate  specification 
of  the  matters  to  be  decreed,  and,  in  complicated  cases,  the  framing  of  it 
requires  great  care  and  attention  :  for,  although  where  the  prayer  does  not 
extend  to  embrace  all  the  relief  to  which  the  plaintiff  may  at  the  hearing 
show  a  right,  the  deficient  relief  may  be  supplied  under  the  general  prayer, 


2  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  8G,  §  10;  see  form  of  bill, 
Vol.  III. 

s  Beadles  v.  Burch,  10  Sim.  332,  337;  4 
Jur.  189;  Bowles  v.  Stewart,  1  Sch.  &  Lef. 
227. 


4  Diimmer  v.  Chippenham,  14  Ves.  245;  Le 
Texier  i\  Margravine  of  Anspach,  15  Ves.  164; 
Ld.  Red.  188;  ante,  pp.  142,  143,  296,  322. 


(a)  In  the  absence  of  a  general  prayer,  the 
relief  specially  prayed  can  alone  be  granted. 
Mundy's  Landing  Co.  v.  Hardin  (Ky.),  20  S. 
W.  Hep.  385;  Johnson  v.  Mantz,  70  Iowa,  710; 
Laird  v.  Boyle,  2  Wis.  431.  The  relief  granted 
under  the  general  prayer  must  always  be  con- 
sistent with  the  manifest  purpose  of  the  bill. 
Drexel  v.  Berney,  16  Fed.  R*-p.  522;  Buerk  v. 
Imhaeuser,  8  id.  457;  Dudley  v.  Congregation, 
138  NT.  Y.  451;  Rogers  v.  N.  Y.  &  T.  L.  Co. 
134  N.  Y.  197;  Moritz  v.  Splitt,  55  Wis.  441; 
Walton  v.  Perkins,  28  Minn.  413;  Harder  v. 
Wright,  70  Iowa,  42;  American  E.  Co.  v. 
Fuller,  83  Iowa,  599;  Machinists'  National 
Bank  v.  Field,  126  Mass.  345;  Pickens  v. 
Knisely,  29  W.  Va.  1;  Kornegay  v.  Carrowav, 
2  Dev.  Eq.  403;  Cummings  v.  Cummings,  75 
Cal.  434.  As  to  the  relief  granted  under  the 
general  prayer  in  bills  for  specific  performance, 
see  Stevens  v.  Guppy,  3  Russ.  171,  185;  Bul- 
lock v.  Adams,  20  N.  J.  Eq.  367;  Powell  v. 
Young,  45  Md.  494;  Kirksey  v.  Means,  42  Ala. 
426  ;  Hart  v.  Granger,  1  Conn.  154,  168  ;  Shen- 
andoah Valley  R.  Co.  v.  Dunlop,  86  Va.  346. 
In  bills  relating  to  mortgages,  see  Dayton  r. 
Dayton,  68  Mich.  437;  and  see  Sonsmith  ». 
The  J.  P.  Donaldson,  21  Fed.  Rep.  671 ;  Patrick 
v.  Isenhart,  20  id.  339;  Lindsey  v.  Western  Mu- 
tual Aid  Society  (Iowa),  50  N.  W.  Rep.  29;  Lam- 
s'>n  v.  Drake,  105  Mass.  564;  Nolen  v.  Woods, 
12  Lea  (Tenn.),  615;  Tatum  v.  Walker,  77  Ala. 
563.  As  to  this  prayer  in  patent  cases,  see  Wil- 
limantic  Thread  Co.  v.  Clark  Thread  Co  27  Fed. 
Rep.  865;  Brooks  v.  Miller,  28  id.  615;  Kirk 
v.  Du  Bois,  id.  460;  Emerson  v.  Sims,  6  Fisher's 
Pat.  Cas.  281.  An  account  of  copyright  profits 
may  be  decreed  under  the  general  prayer.  Gil- 
more  v.  Anderson,  38  Fed.  Rep.  846.  So,  under 
it,  upon  a  bill  to  set  aside  a  fraudulent  convey- 
ance of  land,  a  decree  may  be  made  that  if  the 
amount  found  due  is  not  paid,  the  land  may 
be  sold  by  a  master.  Davidson  v.  Burke  (III.), 
32  N.  E.  Rep.  514.     So,  under  this  praver  and 

378 


without  a  special  prayer  therefor,  a  written  in- 
strument may  be  cancelled:  Roche  v.  Morgell, 
2  Sch.  &  Lef{  721,  729;  Prewit  v.  Graves,  5  J. 
J.  Marsh.  114,  125;  Bolware  v.  Craig,  6  Lit. 
(Ky.)  407;  see  Crow  v.  Owensboro  &  N.  R.  Co. 
82  Kj\  134;  or  a  sale  be  set  aside:  Raper  v. 
Sanders,  21  Gratt.  60;  or  an  account  be  ordered: 
Galloway  v.  Galloway,  58  Tenn.  328.  So,  un- 
der this  prayer,  and  to  prevent  a  multiplicity 
of  suits,  upon  a  bill  to  restrain  a  trespass,  dam- 
ages may  be  awarded  for  injury  from  the 
trespass  prior  to  the  injunction.  Winslow  v. 
Nayson,  113  Mass.  411;  Whipple  v.  Fair 
Haven,  63  Vt.  221.  Other  decisions  showing 
the  scope  of  the  prayer  for  general  relief  are: 
Texas  v.  Hardenberg,  10  Wall.  68;  Hay  ward 
v.  National  Bank,  96  U.  S.  611;  Jones  v.  Van 
Doren,  130  U.  S.  684;  Mackall  v.  Casilear,  137 
U.  S.  556,  564;  Curry  v.  Lloyd,  22  Fed.  Rep. 
258;  Fisher  ».  Moog,  39  id  665;  Chicago  &c.  R. 
Co.??.  Macomb,  2  id.  18;  Supervisors  v.  Mineral 
Point  R.  Co.  24  Wis.  93;  Chalmers  v.  Cham- 
bers, 6  H.  &  J.  29;  Morgan  v.  Meuth,  60 
Mich.  238;  Tarbell  V.  Durant,  61  Vt.  516; 
Busby  v.  Littlefield,  31  N.  H.  193  ;  Burnett  v. 
Boyd,  60  Miss.  627;  Barkwell  v.  Swan,  69 
Miss.  907;  Phillips  v.  Royal  Niagara  Hotel  Co. 
25  Grant  Ch.  (Can.)  358;  Slater  v.  Canada 
Central  R.  W.  Co.  id.  363;  Pingree  v.  Coffin, 
12  Gray,  288,  305;  Thompson  v.  Hey  wood,  129 
Mass.  401;  Brown  v.  Miner,  128  111.  148;  Cloud 
v.  Whiteman,  2  Del.  Ch.  23;  25  Am.  L.  Reg. 
253;  Carter  v.  Ingraham,  43  Ala.  78;  Gonzales 
v.  Hukil,  49  Ala.  260;  Gibson  v.  McConnick, 
10  Gill  &  J.  65;  Anderson  v.  De  Soer,  6  Gratt. 
363;  Matthias  v.  Warrington  (Va.),  16  S.  E. 
Rep.  662;  Evans  v.  Schafer,  119  Ind.  49,  Dodd 
v.  Benthal,  4  Heisk.  601;  Hall  v.  Pierce,  4  W. 
Va.  107;  Primm  v.  Raboteau,  56  Mo.  407; 
Flanders  v.  Chamberlain,  24  Mich.  305;  Rigg 
v.  Hancock,  36  N.  J.  Eq.  42;  Hoppock  v.  Cray 
(N.  J.),  21  Atl.  Rep.  624. 


FORM    OF   THE   BILL. 


379 


yet  such  relief  must  be  consistent  with  that  specifically  prayed,  as  well  as 
with  the  case  made  by  the  bill ;  for  the  Court  will  not  suffer  a  defendant 
to  be  taken  by  surprise,  and  permit  a  plaintiff  to  neglect  and  pass  over 
the  prayer  he  has  made,  and  take  another  decree,  even  though  it  be 
according  to  the  case  made  by  his  bill.5  *  Thus,  where  a  bill  was  *  379 
filed  against  a  woman  to  compel  her  to  elect  between  the  provision 
made  for  her  by  a  will,  and  that  to  which  she  was  entitled  under  a 
settlement,  and  the  case  made  by  the  bill  was  solely  calculated  to  call 
upon  her  to  elect,  it  was  held  that  a  declaration  that  she  had  elected,  so 
as  to  conclude  her,  could  not  be  maintained  under  the  prayer  for  general 
relief,  being  inconsistent  both  with  the  case  made  by  the  bill,  and  with 
the  specific  prayer  that  she  should  make  her  election.1  And  so,  where  a 
bill 2  was  filed  by  a  person  in  the  character  of  mortgagee,  praying  a  sale 
under  a  trust,  to  which  it  appeared  he  was  not  entitled,  he  was  not 
permitted,  under  the  general  prayer,  to  take  a  decree  that  the  defend- 
ant might  redeem  or  be  foreclosed,  although  it  was  the  relief  which 
properly  belonged  to  his  case.8    And  in  like  manner,  where  a  bill  was 


6  Landis  v.  Olds,  9  Minn.  90;  see  Arring- 
ton  v.  Liscom  (34  Cal.  365),  94  Am.  Dec.  722. 
A  particular  prayer  for  relief,  although  very 
proper  and  convenient,  is  not  essential,  since 
under  a  general  prayer  for  relief  a  plaintiff  may 
pray  at  the  bar  a  specific  relief  not  particularly 
prayed  for  in  the  bill,  if  otherwise  entitled  to 
the  same.  Wilkinson  v.  Beal,  4  Mad.  408; 
Cook  v.  Martyn,  2  Atk.  2;  Grimes  v.  French,  2 
Atk.  141;  Colton  v.  Ross,  2  Paige,  396;  Lloyd 
v.  Brewster,  4  Paige,  537 ;  Lingan  v.  Hender- 
son, 1  Bland,  252;  Driver  v.  Forner,  5  Porter, 
10;  Peck  v.  Peck,  9  Yerger,  301;  Wilkin  v. 
Wilkin,  1  John.  Ch.  Ill;  Cook  v.  Mancius,  5 
John.  Ch.  89;  Brown  v.  McDonald,  1  Hill, 
302;  Marine  and  Fire  Ins.  &c.  v.  Early,  R.  M. 
Charlt.  279  ;  Repplier  v.  Buck,  5  B.  Mon.  96, 
98;  Thomas  v.  Hite,  id.  593.  The  relief  given 
under  the  general  prayer  must  be  agreeable  to 
the  case  made  by  the  bill.  Chalmers  v.  Cham- 
bers, 6  Harr.  &  J.  29;  Hobson  v.  M' Arthur,  16 
Peters,  182;  Read  v.  Cramer,  1  Green  Ch.  277; 
F -anklin  v.  Osgood,  14  John.  527 ;  English  v. 
Foxall,  2  Peters,  595;  Kibler  v.  Whiteman,  2 
Har.  401;  Pennock  v.  Ela,  41  N.  H  189,  192; 
Cassady  v.  Woodbury,  13  Iowa,  113.  For  the 
Court  will  grant  such  relief  only  as  the  c:ise 
stated  will  justify,  and  will  not  ordinarily  be 
so  indulgent  as  to  permit  a  bill  framed  for 
one  purpose  to  answer  another,  especially  if 
the  defendant  may  be  surprised  or  prejudiced 
thereby.  And  where  there  is  no  obstruction  to 
the  particular  relief  prayed,  the  plaintiff  can- 
not abandon  that,  and  ask  a  different  decree 
under  the  general  prayer.  Allen  v.  Coffman, 
1  Bibb,  469;  Pillow  v.  Pillow,  5  Yerger,  420; 
Thomason  v.  Smithson,  7  Porter,  144;  Foster  v. 
Cooke.  1  Hawks,  509 ;  Chalmers  v.  Chambers, 
6  Har.  &  J.  29;  Gibson  v.  M'Cormic,  10  Gill 
&  J.  66;   Townsend   v.  Duncan,  2  Bland,  45; 


King  v.  Rossett,  2  Y.  &  J.  33 ;  see  Baily  v. 
Benton,  8  Wend.  339;  1  Hoff.  Ch.  Pr.  49,  and 
note;  Pleasants  v.  Glasscock,  1  Sm.  &  M.  Ch. 
17.  See  Hayward  v.  National  Bank,  96  U.  S. 
615. 

In  Treadwell  v.  Brown,  44  X.  H.  551,  it  was 
held,  that,  under  the  prayer  for  general  relief, 
the  plaintiff  may  have  such  relief  as  he  is 
entitled  to,  without  regard  to  any  defect  in  the 
prayer  for  special  relief,  26  Law  Rep.  48; 
Franklin  v.  Greene,  2  Allen,  519  ;  Danforth  v. 
Smith,  23  Vt.  247;  provided  it  does  not  con- 
flict with  that  specifically  prayed  for.  Stone  v. 
Anderson,  26  N.  H.  506;  Hilleary  v.  Hurdle, 
6  Gill,  105.  Where  the  bill  sets  forth  two 
grounds  for  relief,  and  prays  for  special  relief 
on  one  ground,  and  also  for  general  relief,  but 
the  parties  are  not  sufficient  for  any  other  than 
the  special  relief,  the  bill  is  not  bad  for  mul- 
tifariousness, but  the  special  relief  will  be 
granted.  Mayne  v.  Griswold,  3  Sandf.  (N.  Y.) 
463. 

In  a  foreclosure  suit,  if  the  mortgage  is  for- 
feited, and  the  plaintiff  entitled  to  a  decree  of 
foreclosure  at  the  time  of  the  commencement 
of  the  suit,  a  decree  for  the  whole  amount  due 
upon  the  mortgage,  whether  it  becomes  due 
before  or  after  the  filing-  of  the  bill,  is  strictly 
within  the  prayer  for  relief,  and  such  as  the 
case  stated  will  ju^tifv.  Jordan  r.  Clarke,  16 
N.  J.  Eq.  243. 

1  Soden  v.  Soden,  cited  by  Lord  Eldon  in 
Hiern  v.  Mill,  13  Ves.  119. 

2  Palk  v.  Lord  Clinton,  12  Yes.  48,  57;  see 
also  Jones  v.  Jones,  3  Atk.  110.  Ill;  Chapman 
v.  Chapman,  13  Beav.  308;  15  Jur.  265;  John- 
son »>  Fesenmeyer,  25  Beav.  88,  96 ;  3  De  G. 
&  J.  13;  Story," Eq.  PI.  §  42. 

3  A  bill  was  filed  to  have  a  mortffajje  deed 
recorded,  which   had   been   omitted   to   be  re- 

379 


380 


THE   BILL. 


*  380  brought  for  an  *  annuity  or  rent-charge  under  a  will,  the  plaintiff 
was  not  permitted  to  drop  the  demand  for  the  annuity,  and  insist 
upon  the  land  itself.1  Upon  the  same  principle,  where  a  vendor  filed  a 
bill  for  a  specific  performance  against  a  purchaser,  who  had  been  in 
possession,  under  the  contract,  for  several  years,  but  failed  to  establish 
his  right  in  consequence  of  a  defect  in  his  title,  the  Court  refused,  under 
the  prayer  for  general  relief,  to  direct  an  account  of  the  rents  and  profits 
against  the  purchaser,  although  he  had  stated  by  his  answer  that  he  was 
willing  to  pay  a  fair  rent.2  And  so,  where  a  bill  was  filed  for  the  specific 
performance  of  a  written  agreement,  and  parol  evidence  was  read  to 
prove  a  variation  from  it,  the  bill  was  dismissed  with  costs,  the  plain- 
tiff not  being  allowed  to  resort  to  the  substantial  agreement  proved  on 
the  part  of  the  defendant.3  (a) 

The  rule,  with  regard  to  the  nature  of  the  relief  which  a  plaintiff  may 
have  under  the  prayer  for  general  relief,  was  laid  down  by  Lord  Eldon, 
who,  in  Hiem  v.  Mill,*  said  that,  as  to  this  point,  "  the  rule  is,  that  if 


corded  within  six  months,  in  which  was  a  gen- 
eral prayer  for  relief.  A  decree  of  sale  of  the 
mortgaged  premises  was  held  not  to  be  within 
the  relief  prayed  by  the  bill.  Chalmers  v. 
Chambers,  6  Harr.  &  J.  29  ;  see  Chambers  v. 
Chalmers,  4  Gill  &  J.  420. 

i  Grimes  v.  French,  2  Atk.  141. 

2  Williams  r.  Shaw,  3  Russ.  178  n. 

3  Legal  t.  Miller,  2  Ves.  Sr.  299;  see  also 
Mortimer  v.  Orchard,  2  Ves.  Jr.  243 ;  Legh  r. 
Haverfield,  5  Ves.  452,  457;  Hanbury  v.  Litch- 
field, 2  M.  &  K.  629,  633.  Although,  in  such  a 
case, the  plaintiff  cannot  have  a  decree  for  a  dif- 
ferent agreement  from  that  set  up  by  his  bill,  the 
defendant  may  have  a  decree  on  the  agreement, 
such  as  he  has  proved  it  to  be.    Fife  v.  Clay- 


(n)  It  depends  upon  the  circumstances  of 
each  case  whether  a  parol  variation  from  the 
terms  of  a  written  agreement  is  to  defeat  a 
specific  performance.  See  Mundy  v.  Jolliffe,  5 
Myl.  &  Cr.  167;  London  &  Birmingham  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Winter,  Cr.  &  Ph.  57.  In  Smith  V. 
Wheatcroft,  9  Ch.  D.  223,  where  the  defendant 
pleaded,  in  defence  to  a  suit  for  specific  per- 
formance, that  the  document  stated  by  the 
plaintiff  did  not  contain  the  true  terms  of  the 
purchase,  but  did  not  state  what  the  true  terms 
were,  and  produced  a  written  agreement  showing 
different  terms  from  those  stated  by  the  plain- 
tiff, the  plaintiff  amended  his  statement  of 
claim,  but  still  claimed  specific  performance  of 
the  contract  stated  originally.  It  was  held 
that  the  plaintiffs  request  at  the  trial  for  spe- 
cific performance,  with  a  variation  according  to 
the  terms  of  the  agreement  produced  by  the 
defendant,  should  be  granted,  upon  the  ground 
that  the  defendant  did  not,  in  his  answer,  set 
forth  the  terms  of  the  agreement  as  he  claimed 
it  to  be,  and  did  not  submit  to  perform  such 

380 


ton,  13  Ves.  546;  1  C.  P.  Coop.  temp.  Cott.  351. 
The  old  course  required  a  cross-bill,  but  the 
practice  now  is  to  decree  a  specific  performance 
at  the  instance  of  the  defendant,  upon  the  offer 
by  the  plaintiff  in  his  bill  to  perform  the  agree- 
ment specifically  on  his  part.  Ibid.  See  also 
Gwynn  r.  Lethbrigge,  14  Ves.  585.  In  suits 
for  tithes  it  seems  that  the  plaintiff,  though 
failing  in  establishing  his  right  to  tithes  in 
kind,  may  yet  have  a  decree  for  a  modus  ad- 
mitted by  the  defendant's  answer.  Cart  v. 
Ball,  1  Ves.  Sr.  3. 

4  13  Ves.  114;  see  also  Brown  v.  Sewell,  11 
Hare,  49,  more  fully  reported  on  this  point,  17 
Jur  708;  Brooks  v.  Boucher,  3  N.  R.  279,  M. 
R.,  where  relief  was  granted  under  the  general 


agreement.  In  Jeffery  v.  Stephens  (6  Jur.  N. 
S.  947,  8  W.  R.  427),  the  plaintiff,  having 
always  repudiated  the  terms  of  the  agreement 
set  up  by  the  defendant,  was  held  not  entitled 
to  have  it  specifically  performed.  See  Wil- 
liams v.  Jones,  36  W.  R.  573;  Thompson  v. 
Hawley,  14  Oregon,  199;  Creigh  v.  Boggs,  19 
W,  R."  240;  Hewlett  v.  Miller,  63  Cal.  185; 
Boardman  v.  Davidson,  7  Abb.  Pr.  N.  S.  439. 
Specific  performance  of  a  modified  written  con- 
tract may  thus  be  decreed  without  a  cross-bill. 
See  Redtield  v.  Gleason,  61  Vt.  220.  In  Buck 
v.  Dowley,  16  Gray,  555,  the  answer  set  up  an 
agreement  which  differed  from  that  stated  in 
the  bill,  and  averred  performance  of  this  agree- 
ment, and  it  was  held  that  the  plaintiff  could 
not  avail  himself  of  this  agreement  without 
amending  his  bill  so  as  to  state  it.  As  to  ob- 
taining damages,  in  the  alternative,  upon  a  bill 
for  specific  performance,  see  Milkman  v.  Ord- 
way,  106  Mass.  232;  Eastman  v.  Simpson,  139 
Mass.  348.  See  also  Glass  V.  Hurlbert,  102 
Mass.  24. 


FORM   OF   THE    BTLL.  *  381 

the  bill  contains  charges,  putting  facts  in  issue  that  are  material,  the 
plaintiff  is  entitled  to  the  relief  which  those  facts  will  sustain,  under  the 
general  prayer ;  but  he  cannot  desert  specific  relief  prayed,  and  under 
tne  general  prayer  ask  specific  relief  of  another  description,  unless  the 
facts  and  circumstances  charged  by  the  bill  will,  consistently  with  the 
rules  of  the  Court,  maintain  that  relief."  5  In  that  case,  a  bill  had  been 
filed  by  an  equitable  mortgagee  against  the  mortgagor,  and  a  person  who 
had  purchased  from  him  with  notice  of  the  incumbrance,  and  it  prayed 
an  account,  and  in  default  of  payment  a  conveyance  of  the  estate  ;  and 
although  it  charged  the  purchaser  with  notice,  it  did  not  pray  any 
specific  relief  against  him  individually.  *  Lord  Eldon,  however,  *  381 
thought  that  the  relief  asked  against  him  at  the  hearing  was  con- 
sistent with  the  case  made  by  the  bill,  and  accordingly  decreed  an  account 
to  be  taken  of  what  was  due  to  the  plaintiff  by  the  mortgagor ;  to  be  paid 
by  the  purchaser,  who  was  to  have  his  election  to  pay  the  money  and 
keep  the  estate.1  So,  where  a  bill  was  filed  against  two  trustees,  alle- 
ging that  only  one  of  them  had  acted  in  the  trusts,  and  praying  relief 
against  that  trustee  only,  to  which  the  two  trustees  put  in  an  answer 
admitting  that  they  had  both  acted  in  the  trusts,  a  decree  was  made  against 
the  two,  charging  them  both  with  the  loss  occasioned  by  the  breach  of 
trust.2  In  order  to  entitle  a  plaintiff  to  a  decree,  under  the  general 
prayer,  different  from  that  specifically  prayed,  the  allegations  relied 
upon  must  not  only  be  such  as  to  afford  a  ground  for  the  relief 
sought,  but  they  must  have  been  introduced  into  the  bill  for  the  pur- 
pose of  showing  a  claim  to  relief,  and  not  for  the  mere  purpose  of  cor- 
roborating the  plaintiff's  right  to  the  specific  relief  prayed  :  otherwise, 
the  Court  would  take  the  defendant  by  surprise,  which  is  contrary  to  its 
principles.8  Therefore,  where  a  vendor  filed  a  bill  for  a  specific  per- 
formance, but,  owing  to  his  not  being  able  to  make  out  a  title  to  some 

prayer;   and  Hill  v.  Great  Northern  Ry.  Co.  5  there  being  no  specific  prayer  for  that  purpose. 

De  G.  M.  &  G.  66;   18  Jur.  685,  where  it  was  Lord  Redesdale,  in  delivering  his  opinion  in  the 

refused.  House  of  Lords  upon  the  point,  said:    "It  has 

5  See  Cassady  v.  Woodbury,  13  Iowa,  113;  been  objected  that  the  bill  does  not  state  the 

Hall  v.  Fowlkes,  9  Heisk.  745;    Lee  v.  Cone,  4  release,  and  pray  that  it  may  be  set  aside.     It 

Coldw.  392;   Miller  v.  Jamison,  24  N.  J.  Eq.  seems  doub'ful  whether  the  release  has  been 

41;  Shannon  r.  Erwin,  11  Heisk.  337.  put  in  issue  by  the  bill;  but  whether  it  is  so  or 

1  13  Ves.  114,  123.  not,  if  the  release  appears  to  be  founded  on  a 

2  Taylor  v.  Tabrum,  6  Sim.  281.  vicious  consideration,  it  is  in  itself  void,  and 
8  See  the  remarks  of  Sir   W.  Page  Wood  the  Court  need  not  set  it  aside,  but  may  act  as 

V.  C.  (Lord  Hatherley)  in  Other  v.  Smurth-  if  it  did  not  exist.  The  bill  prays  the  general 
waite,  L.  R.  5  Eq.  437,  441 ,  quoted  'intr,  p.  307,  account,  and  all  the  relief  necessary  for  the  pur- 
note;  Landis  v.  Olds,  9  Minn.  90.  See  also  pose  of  obtaining  that  account.  This  prayer  is 
Roche  v.  Morgell,  2  Sch.  &  Lef.  721,  729,  where  sufficient.  It  never  was  thought  of  that  a  bill 
the  bill  stated  various  dealings  between  the  for  an  account  of  fraudulent  dealings  must 
plaintiff  and  defendant,  imputing  fraud  and  specially  pray  that  every  bond,  every  instru- 
unfair  dealing,  and  various  usurious  charges,  ment  taken  by  the  defendant  without  suffi- 
overcharges,  and  mistakes,  in  accounts  deliv-  cient  consideration,  should  be  set  aside.  The 
ered,  and  prayed  a  discovery  of  the  several  prayer  for  general  relief  is  sufficient  for  the 
transactions,  and  a  general  account,  and  al>o  purpose;  and  upon  that  prayer,  the  Court  may 
general  relief.  To  this  bill  the  defendant  give  every  relief  consistent  with  the  case  made 
pleaded  a  release  made  by  the  plaintiff;  and  a  by  the  bill,  and  continually  does  give  relief  in 
question  arose,  whether,  if  the  release  appeared  the  manner  specifically  prayed  by  the  bill,  and 
to  be  founded  on  a  vicious  consideration,  and  sought  for  only  by  the  prayer  for  general 
was  in  itself  void,  the  Court  could  set  it  aside,  relief." 

381 


382 


THE   BILL. 


part  of  the  property,  was  unable  to  obtain  a  decree  for  that  purpose,  it 
was  held  that  he  could  not,  under  the  prayer  for  general  relief,  obtain 
an  inquiry  into  the  management  of  the  property  during  the  time  it  was 
in  the  vendee's  possession,  although  the  bill  did  contain  charges  of 
mismanagement;  which,  however,  had  been  introduced,  not  with  the 
view  to  obtain  compensation,  but  to  establish  the  fact  of  acceptance  of 

the  title  by  the  defendant.4 
*  382  *  The  rule,  that  the  Court  will  only  grant  such  relief  as  the  plain- 
tiff is  entitled  to,  upon  the  case  made  by  the  bill,  is  most  strictly 
enforced  in  those  cases  where  the  plaintiff  relies  upon  fraud.  Accord- 
ingly, where  the  plaintiff  has  rested  his  case  in  the  bill  upon  imputations 
of  direct  personal  misrepresentation  and  fraud,  he  cannot  be  permitted 
to  support  it  upon  any  other  ground  ; 1  but  if  other  matters  be  alleged 
in  the  bill,  which  will  give  the  Court  jurisdiction  as  the  foundation  of 
a  decree,  the  proper  course  is  to  dismiss  only  so  much  of  the  bill  as 
relates  to  the  case  of  fraud,  and  to  give  so  much  relief  as  under  the 
circumstances  the  plaintiff  may  be  entitled  to.2  If  the  plaintiff  has 
rested  the  case  for  relief  solely  on  the  ground  of  fraud,  he  cannot,  if  he 
fails  in  establishing  fraud,  pick  out,  from  the  allegations  in  his  plead- 
ings, facts  which  might,  if  not  put  forward  as  proofs  of  fraud,  have  war- 
ranted the  plaintiff  in  asking,  and  the  Court  in  granting,  relief.3 

The  Court  will  not,  in  general,  at  the  original  trial  of  the  suit,  decree 
interest  upon  a  balance,  unless  where  it  is  specifically  asked  for  by  the 
bill.4  Where,  however,  from  peculiar  circumstances,  interest  was  not 
properly  due  at  the  time  the  bill  was  filed,  and  a  right  to  interest  has 
subsequently  accrued,  the  Court  has  directed  interest  to  be  computed, 
although  there  was  no  prayer  to  that  effect  in  the  bill.5     Thus,  inter- 


4  Stevens  v.  Guppy,  3  Russ.  171, 185;  see 
also  Ferraby  v.  Hobson,  2  Phil.  255,  257; 
Chapman  v.  Chapman,  13  Beav.  308;  15  Jur. 
2G5.  So  where  a  bill  was  filed  for  the  specific 
execution  of  a  contract  for  the  purchase  of  land 
alleged  to  be  evidenced  by  a  written  memoran- 
dum, and  that  allegation  was  not  sustained  by 
the  proof,  it  was  held  that  the  plaintiff  could 
not,  under  the  prayer  for  general  relief,  obtain 
compensation  for  improvements  upon  the  lands. 
Smith  v.  Smith,  1  Ired.  Eq.  83.  On  a  bill  to 
rescind  a  contract,  the  Court  cannot,  decree  a 
specific  execution.  Rochester  v.  Anderson, 
Litt.  Sel.  Cas.  146. 

i  Wilde  v.  Gibson,  1  H.  L.  Cas.  605;  Glas- 
cott  v.  Lang,  2  Phil.  310,  322;  Parr  v.  Jewell,  1 
K.  &  J.  671;  Luff  v.  Lord,  11  Jur.  N.  S.  50, 
L.  C;  Eyre  v.  Potter,  5  How.  342;  Hoyt  v. 
Hoyt,  27  N.  J.  Eq.  399;  ante,  p.  328,  n.  1.  The 
use  of  the  word  "fraud"  does  not  bring  the 
case  within  this  rule,  unless  the  case  alleged  is 
one  of  fraud  properly  so  called.  Marshall  ». 
Sladden,  7  Hare,  428,  443;  14  Jur.  106,  109; 
M'Calmont  v.  Rankin,  8  Hare,  116;  14  Jur. 
475.     See  ante,  p.  324,  n.  9. 

2  Archbold  v.  Commissioners  of  Charitable 
Bequests  for  Ireland,  2  H.  L.  Cas.  440,  459; 
382 


Harrison  v.  Guest,  6  De  G.  M  &  G.  424,  438;  2 
Jur.  N.  S.  911 ;  see  also  Traill  v.  Baring,  4  De  G. 
J.  &  S.  318;  4  Giff.  485.  In  Read  v.  Cramer,  1 
Green  Ch.  277,  a  bill  was  filed  for  relief  on  the 
ground  of  fraud,  and  relief  was  granted  on  the 
ground  of  mistake.  And  see  London  Chartered 
Bank  of  Australia  v.  Lempriere,  L.  R.  4  P.  C. 
572;  Hilliard  v.  Eiffe,  L.  R.  7  H.  L.  39;  Voor- 
hees  v.  Bonesteel,  16  Wall.  16;  Martin  v.  Lutke- 
witte,  50  Mo.  58. 

3  Hickson  v.  Lombard,  L.  R.  1  H.  L.  324; 
Tabor  v.  Cunningham,  24  W.  R.  153. 

4  Weymouth  v.  Boyer,  1  Ves.  Jr.  416,  426. 
6  Turner  v.  Turner,"  1  J.  &  W.  39,  53,  and 

see  Hollingsworth  v.  Shakeshaft,  14  Beav.  492; 
Davenport  v.  Stafford,  id.  319,  334;  2  De  G  M. 
&  G.  901;  Johnson  v.  Prendergast,  28  Beav. 
480;  see  also  Lloyd  v.  Jones,  12  Sim.  491;  Fry 
v.  Fry,  10  Jur.  N.  S.  983,  V.  C.  S.;  Chugg  v. 
Chugg,  W.  N.  (1874)  185  ;  and  post,  Chap. 
XXX.,  Further  Consideration.  See  Smith  v. 
Smith,  4  John.  Ch.  448;  Benzein  v.  Robinett,  2 
Dev.  Eq.  67;  Smith  v.  Godbold.  4  Strobh.  Eq. 
186;  Lee  v.  Pindle,  12  Gill  &  J.  288;  Burts  v. 
Beard,  11  Heisk.  472;  Shepard  v.  Akers,  2 
Tenn.  Ch.  627;  infra,  p.  1368,  note. 


FORM    OF   THE    BILL.  *  384 

est  has,  by   order  on  *  further  directions,  been  directed   to  be    *  383 
computed  upon  the  balance  in  executors'   hands,  although  not 
prayed  by  the  bill :  because,  at  the  time  the  bill  was  filed,  there  did  not 
appear  to  have  been  any  money  in  their  hands,  and  the  bill  could  not 
advert  to  those  circumstances  which  arose  subsequently,  (a) 

Upon  the  principle  that  the  Court  will  not  grant  a  different  relief  from 
that  prayed  by  the  bill,  it  has  been  held  that  where  a  bill  merely  prayed 
a  commission  to  examine  witnesses  abroad,  in  aid  of  an  action  at  Law, 
the  Court  could  not  grant  a  motion  that  the  plaintiff  might  be  at  liberty 
to  examine  one  of  the  witnesses;  who  had  come  to  this  country  and  was 
about  to  go  away  again,  de  bene  esse,  but  said  that  the  bill  might  be 
amended  for  that  purpose.1 

But  although  the  Court  will  not,  under  the  general  prayer,  grant  a 
different  relief  from  that  specifically  prayed  by  the  bill,  yet,  where  it 
appears  that  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  relief,  although  it  be  different 
from  that  which  he  has  specifically  claimed,  it  will  sometimes  allow  the 
cause  to  stand  over,  with  liberty  to  the  plaintiff  to  amend  his  bill,2  and 
if  it  appears  that,  in  order  to  enable  the  Court  to  grant  the  relief  which 
may  properly  be  given,  such  as  a  foreclosure  of  a  mortgage,  it  is  neces- 
sary to  bring  an  additional  party  before  the  Court,  the  plaintiff  may  be 
given  leave  to  amend  his  bill  by  adding  parties  and  praying  such  relief 
as  he  may  be  advised.8 

The  instances,  however,  in  which  this  will  be  done  are  confined  to 
those  where  it  appears,  from  the  case  made  by  the  bill,  that  the  plain- 
tiff is  entitled  to  relief,  although  different  from  that  sought 
*by  the  specific  prayer:  where  the  object  of  the  proposed  amend-  *  384 
ment  is  to  make  a  new  case,  it  will  not  be  permitted.  Thus, 
where  a  bill  was  filed  for  the  specific  performance  of  an  agreement  for  a 
lease  to  the  plaintiff  alone,  and  it  was  stated,  by  the  defendant's  answer, 
that  the  agreement  had  been  to  let  to  the  plaintiff  and  another  person 
jointly,  but  the  plaintiff  nevertheless  replied  to  the  answer,  and  pro- 
ceeded to  establish  a  case  of  letting  to  himself  alone,  in  which  he  failed, 
Lord  Redesdale,  upon  application  being  made  to  him  to  let  the  cause 

1  Atkins  v.  Palmer,  5  Mad.  19.  ground  that  the  answer  put  in  was  applicable  to 

2  See  Pennock  v.  Ela,  41  N.  H.  189.  Where  the  specific  relief  already  prayed;  but,  after 
the  facts  set  forth  in  the  bill  would  not  author-  much  discussion,  Lord  Rosslyn  determined  that 
ize  other  relief  than  that  specially  prayed  for,  it  was  competent  to  the  plaintiff  to  amend  by 
the  prayer  will  not  be  amended.  Hulsted  v.  adding  the  additional  prayer.  Beaumont  v. 
Meeker,  18  N.  J.  Eq.  136,  139.  Where,  after  Boultbee,  5  Ves.  485,  495;  7  Ves.  599,  on  a  re- 
publication had  passed,  the  relief  prayed  for  hearing  by  Lord  Eldon;  stated  on  this  point, 
specifically  was  thought  not  to  be  that  to  which  arg.  in  Palk  v.  Lord  Clinton,  12  Ves.  63;  see 
the  plaintiff  was  entitled,  he  therefore  applied  also  Cook  v.  Martyn,  2  Atk.  2. 

for  liberty  to  amend,  by  adding  an  additional  8  Palk  v.  Lord  Clinton,  12  Ves.  48,  64,  66. 

prayer  for  relief,  which  was  resisted  upon  the 


(<7)  Under  the  Act  3  &  4  Will.  IV.  c.  42,  the  prayer  for  general  relief  in  a  bill  in  Equity, 
§  28,  requiring  a  demand  of  interest  to  be  in  interest  may  be  decreed  against  a  trustee  when 
writing,  a  claim  of  interest  first  made  in  the  justly  allowable.  Glenn  v.  Cockey,  16  Md. 
writ  is  not  sufficient.  Rhvmney  Railway  ?'.  446;  see  also  Blogg  v.  Johnson,  L.  R.  2  Ch.  229. 
Rhvmney  Iron  Co.  25  Q.  B.  D.146.     Under 

383 


385 


THE    BILL. 


stand  over,  with  liberty  to  the  plaintiff  to  amend,  by  adding  the  other 
lessee  as  a  party,  said  that  such  a  proceeding  would  be  extremely  im- 
proper; it  was  not  like  letting  a  case  stand  over  to  add  a  party  against 
whom  a  decree  in  a  plain  case  could  be  made,  but  for  the  purpose  of 
making  a  new  case ;  for  a  new  case  it  would  be  if  founded  on  a  new 
agreement.1  In  that  case,  his  Lordship  stated  that  the  ordinary  practice, 
where  a  party  has  mistaken  his  case,  and  brings  the  cause  to  a  hearing 
under  such  mistake,  is  to  dismiss  the  bill,  without  prejudice  to  a  new 
bill.2 

In  the  case  of  infants,  the  rule  that  the  specific  relief  must  be  such  as 
the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  from  the  nature  of  the  case  made  by  the  bill, 
is,  it  seems,  relaxed ;  and  an  infant  plaintiff  may  have  a  decree  upon  any 
matter  arising  upon  the  state  of  his  case,  though  he  has  not  particularly 
mentioned  or  insisted  upon  it,  or  prayed  it  by  his  bill.8 

In  cases  of  charities,  likewise,  the  Court  will  give  the  proper  direc- 
tions, without  any  regard  to  the  propriety  or  impropriety  in  the  prayer 
of  the  information.4 

It  sometimes  happens  that  the  plaintiff,  or  those  who  advise  him,  are 
not  certain  of  his  title  to  the  specific  relief  he  wishes  to  pray  for ;  and 
in  such  case  it  is  not  unusual  so  to  frame  the  prayer  that,  if  one  species 
of  relief  sought  is  denied,  another  may  be  granted.  Bills  with  a  prayer 
of  this  description,  framed  in  the  alternative,  are  called  bills  with 
*  385     a  double   aspect.5     But  it  seems  that  the   alternative   *  prayer 


i  Deniston  v.  Little,  2  Sch.  &  Lef.  11,  n.; 
Watts  v.  Hyde,  2  Phil.  406;  2  Col.  368;  see  also 
Griggs  v.  Staplee,  2  De  G.  &  S.  572;  13  Jur. 
29;  Phelps  v.  Prothero.  2  De  G.  &  S.  274;  12 
Jur.  733.  Such  leave  to  amend  will  not  be 
given  under  the  present  English  practice. 
Newby  v.  Shurp,  8  Ch.  D.  39;  but  see  Budding 
v.  Murdock,  1  Ch.  D.  42;  King  v.  Corke,  id.  57; 
Roe  v.  Davies,  2  Ch.  D.  729;  Mozley  v.  Cowie, 
26  W.  R.  854;  and  for  order,  see  S.  C.  2  Seton, 
1523,  No.  12;  Green  v.  Sevin,  13  Ch.  D.  589, 
595;  Laird  v.  Briggs,  19  Ch.  D.  22;  16  id.  440; 
Nobel's  Explosives  Co.  v.  Jones,  17  Ch.  D.  721. 

2  This  practice  was  adopted  by  the  same 
judge  in  Lindsay  v.  Lynch,  2  Sch.  &  Lef.  Land 
is  in  accordance  with  the  decree  of  Sir  William 
Grant  M.  R.  in  Woollman  v.  Hearn,7  Ves.  211, 
222,  and  has  been  subsequently  followed  by 
Lord  Lyndhurst,  in  Stevens  v.  Guppy,  3  Russ. 
171,  186. 

8  Stapilton  v.  Stapilton,l  Atk.  6;  2  White  & 
T.  L.  C.  920;  see  ante,  p.  77. 

4  Att.-Gen.  v.  Jeanes,  1  Atk.  355;  see  ante, 
p.  14. 

6  Bennet  v.  Vade,  2  Atk.  325;  Ld.  Red.  39; 
and  see  Evans  v.  Buck,  W.  N.  (1876)  305;  25 
W.  R.  392;  Bagot  v.  Easton,  7  Ch.  D.  1 ;  Story, 
Eq.  PI.  §  40.  There  is  no  inconsistency  in  the 
alternative  claim  to  rescind  an  agreement  nf 
partnership  because  of  misrepresentation,  and  if 
this  cannot  be  done,  for  a  dissolution  of  the  part- 
nership and  settlement  thereof.     Bagot  v.  Eas- 

384 


ton,  7  Ch.  D.  1.  An  alternative  prayer  does  not 
render  a  bill  multifarious.  Kilgour  v.  New 
Orleans  Gas  Light  Co.  2  Woods,  144.  If  the 
plaintiff  doubts  his  title  to  the  relief  he  wishes 
to  pray,  the  bill  should  be  framed  with  a  double 
aspect;  so  that,  if  the  Court  should  decide 
against  him  in  one  view  of  the  case,  it  may  yet 
afford  him  assistance  in  another.  Colron  v. 
Ross,  2  Paige,  396;  Lloyd  v.  Brewster,  4  Paige, 
537;  Cooper,  Eq.  PI.  14;  M'Connell  v.  M'Con 
nell,  11  Vt.  290;  Strange  v.  Watson,  11  Ala. 
324;  Gerrish  v.  Towne,  3  Gray.  86,  87;  Murphy 
v.  Clark,  1  Sm.  &  M.  Ch.  22 1 ;  Stein  v.  Kobert- 
so,  30  Ala.  286;  Walker  v.  Devereaux,  4  Paige, 
229;  Foster  v.  Cook,  1  Hawks,  509;  Lingan  v. 
Henderson,  1  Bland,  252;  Pleasants  v.  Glass- 
cock, 1  Sm.  &  M.  17,  24,  25:  Kibler  v.  White- 
man,  2  Harr.  401 ;  Foulkes  v.  Davies,  L.  R.  7 
Eq.  42.  The  alternative  case  stated  must,  how- 
ever, be  the  foundation  for  precisely  the  same 
relief.  When  the  prayer  of  a  bill  is  that  the 
Court  will  set  aside  a  contract  on  the  ground  of 
fraud,  the  plaintiff  cannot  amend  by  substitut- 
ing a  prayer  that  the  Court  would  either  set 
it  aside  on  the  ground  of  fraud,  or,  if  it  was 
valid,  would  enforce  its  specific  performance. 
Shields  v.  Barrow,  17  How.  (U.  S.)  130;  see 
Pensenneau  v.  Pensenneau,  22  Miss  27. 

See,  as  to  the  limitations  which  apply  to  a 
bill  with  a  double  aspect,  Lloj'd  v.  Brewster, 
4  Paige,  537;  Wilkinson  v.  Dobbie,  12  Blatch. 
298,  302;  Collins  v.  Knight,  3  Tenn.  Ch.  183; 


FORM    OF   THE    BILL. 


*385 


must  not  be  founded  on  inconsistent  titles  ;  thus,  a  plaintiff  cannot 
assert  a  will  to  be  invalid,  and  at  the  same  time  claim  to  take  a  benefit 
on  the  assumption  of  its  validity.1 

It  is  a  principle  of  Equity  that  a  person  seeking  relief  must  himself 
do  what  is  equitable  ; 2  it  is  therefore  required,  in  some  cases,  that  a 
plaintiff  should,  by  his  bill,  offer  to  do  whatever  the  Court  may  consider 
necessary  to  be  done  on  his  part  towards  making  the  decree  which  he 
seeks  just  and  equitable  with  regard  to  the  other  parties  to  the  suit. 
Upon  this  principle,  where  a  bill  is  filed  to  compel  the  specific  perform- 
ance of  a  contract  by  a  defendant,  the  plaintiff  ought  by  his  bill  to  sub- 
mit to  perform  the  contract  on  his  part ;  and  it  is  to  be  observed,  that 
the  effect  of  such  submission  will  be  to  entitle  a  defendant  to  a  decree, 
even  though  the  plaintiff  should  not  be  able  to  make  out  his  own  title  to 
relief,  in  the  form  prayed  by  his  bill.3  (a) 


Terry  v.  Rosell.  32  Ark.  478,  492;  Polhemus  v. 
Emson,  29  N.  J.  Eq.  583;  Micou  v.  Ashurst,  55 
Ala.  607. 

A  prayer,  assigning  several  reasons  for  vacat- 
ing a  deed,  is  considered  as  so  many  separate 
prayers,  and  if  one  reason  be  valid,  it  is  error 
to  reject  the  whole  prayer.  American  Exchange 
Bank  v.  Inloes,  7  Md.  380.  In  New  York,  legal 
redress  and  equitable  relief  may  be  demanded 
in  the  same  complaint;  and  either,  or  both,  if 
the  circumstances  of  the  case  permit,  may  be 
afforded  b}'  the  Court.  New  York  Ice  Co.  v. 
N.  W.  Ins.  Co.  23  N.  Y.  357;  but  in  order  to 
entitle  a  party  to  one  or  the  other,  he  must  ask 
it  specifically  in  his  complaint.  Stevenson  v. 
Buxton.  15  Abb.  Pr.  355. 

i  Wright  v.  Wilkin,  4  De  G.  &  J.  141;  see 
also  Rawlings  v.  Lambert,  1  J.  &  H.  458;  Marsh 
v.  Keith,  1  Dr.  &  S.  342;  6  Jur.  N.  S.  1182; 
Thomas  v.  Hobler,  4  De  G.  F.  &  J.  199;  8  Jur. 


(a)  The  usual  course  is  to  either  grant  or 
refuse  the  prayer  of  the  bill.  See,  e.g.,  Goose 
v.  Bedford,  21  W.  K.  449,  where  Lord  Selborne 
L.  C.  overruled  the  Master  of  the  Rolls  and  fol- 
lowed the  prayer  in  the  bill.  See  also  Wood- 
ruff v.  North  Bloomfield  G.  M.  Co.  18  Fed.  Rep. 
753.  An  offer  to  restore  land  exchanged  by 
fraud  may  be  made  in  the  bill,  and  under  the 
general  prayer,  if  part  of  the  land  has  passed 
to  an  innocent  purchaser,  the  Court  may  de- 
cree a  partial  rescission,  payment  in  money  of 
the  price  of  the  land,  as  estimated  in  the 
exchange,  anil  make  such  payment,  until  made, 
a  lien  upon  the  land  still  held  by  the  defrauding 
party.  Hopkins  v.  Snedaker,  71  111.  449.  The 
Court  has,  however,  the  power,  as  stated  in  the 
text,  to  require  a  plaintiff  to  do  equity  as  con- 
ditional to  granting  the  desired  relief;  and  fail- 
ure to  show,  in  a  bill  or  complaint  to  rescind  a 
contract,  an  offer  by  the  plaintiff  to  do  equity 
before  suit  brought,  if  it  contains  an  offer  to 
submit  to  the  Court's  order  in  that  respect, does 

vol.  i.  -  25 


N.  S.  125,  L.  C. ;  Lett  v.  Parry.  1  H  &  M.  517; 
Onions  r.  Cohen,  13  W.  R.  426,  V.  C.  W.; 
Davies  v.  Otty,  2  De  G.  J.  &  S.  238  ;  Mullins  v. 
Hussey,  15  W.  R.  656.  Nor  file  a  bill  asking 
the  cancellation  of  a  mortgage,  or  to  redeem. 
Micou  ?'.  Ashurst,  55  Ala.  607.  Alternative 
relief  cannot  be  prayed  against  one  defendant 
in  case  relief  cannot  be  obtained  against  another 
defendant.  Clark  v.  Lord  Rivers,  L.  R.  5  Eq. 
91.  But  see  now,  under  Judicature  Act  and 
Rules  of  Court  of  1875,  Child  v.  Stenning,  7 
Ch.  D.  413  ;  5  Ch.  D.  695. 

2  Bates  v.  Wheeler,  1  Scam.  54  ;  Cooper  v. 
Brown,  2  M'Lean,  495;  Dougherty  v.  Hump- 
son,  2  Blackf.  273. 

3  Fife  v.  Clayton,  13  Ves.  546;  1  C.  P.  Coop, 
temp.  Cott.  351 ;  Green  v.  Covillaud,  10  Cal.  317; 
McKleroy  v.  Tulane,  34  Ala.  78;  Bell  v.  Thomp- 
son, id.  633;  Oliver  v.  Palmer,  11  Gill  &  J. 
426;  Hatcher  v.  Hatcher,  1  McMullan  Ch.311. 


not  necessarily  make  it  demurrable.  Shuee  v. 
Shuee,  100  Ind.  477.  See  al'o  Jervis  v.  Ber- 
ridge,  L.  R.  8  Ch.  351;  Kinney  v.  Cons'd  Va. 
M.  Co.  4  Sawyer,  382:  American  Wine  Co.  v. 
Brasher,  13  Fed.  Rep.  595;  Des  Moines  &  M. 
R.  Co.  v.  Alley,  16  id.  732  ;  Long  v.  McGregor, 
65  Miss.  70 ;  American  PYeehold  L.  &  M.  Co. 
v.  Jefferson,  69  Miss.  770;  Hinckley  v.  l'listtr 
(Wis.),  53  N.  W.  Rep.  21 ;  Hartley  v.  Matthews 
(Ala.)  11  So.  452;  New  England"  M.  S.  Co.  v. 
Powell  (Ala.),  12  So.  55;  Mclver  v.  Clarke.  69 
Miss.  408;  Mortgage  Co.  v.  Jefferson,  id.  770. 
A  bill  or  petition  for  specific  performance  is 
usually  sufficient  if  it  offers  performance  of  all 
conditions,  though  no  legal  tender  is  made. 
See  Pomeroy  v.  Fullerton  (Mo.),  21  S.  W.  Rep. 
19;  Mankel  v.  Belscamper  (Wis.),  54  N.  W. 
Rep.  500.  In  Thomas  v.  Beals,  154  Mass.  51, 
which  was  a  bill  to  set  aside  a  collusive  sale, 
Holmes  J.  said:  "A  bill  in  Equity  is  not  like 
an  action  at  law,  brought  on  the  footing  of  a 
rescission  previously  completed  ;  for  instance,  to 

385 


386 


THE   BILL. 


Upon  the  same  principle,  it  was  formerly  required  that  a  bill  for  an 
account  should  contain  an  offer  on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff  to  pay  the 
balance,  if  found  against  him ;  but  it  seems  that  such  an  offer  is  not  now- 
considered  necessary.4  And  so,  where  a  surety  brought  an  action  upon 
an  indemnity  bond  against  his  principal,  to  recover  moneys  which  he 
had  been  compelled  to  pay  on  his  account,   and   the   principal   filed  a 

bill  in  Equity  for  an  injunction,  and  to  have  the  bond  delivered 
*  386    up  to  be  cancelled,  suggesting   *  fraud,  but  without  offering  to 

indemnify  the  defendant,  the  Court  of  Exchequer  thought  that 
the  want  of  an  offer  in  the  bill  to  make  satisfaction  was  fatal  to  the 
bill,  and  allowed  a  demurrer,  which  had  been  put  in  by  the  defendant.1 

In  like  manner,  a  mortgagor  cannot  make  a  mortgagee  a  party  to  a 
bill  in  respect  of  his  mortgage  estate,  without  offering  to  redeem  him ; 2 
and  upon  the  same  ground,  where  a  contract  is  rendered  void  by  a  statute, 
a  bill  to  set  aside  such  contract  should  contain  an  offer  on  the  part  of  the 
plaintiff  to  pay  to  the  defendant  what  is  justly  due  to  him.  Thus,  where 
a  bill  was  filed,  praying  that  an  instrument  or  security  given  for  a 
usurious  consideration  (and  void  under  the  usury  laws  then  in  force) 
might  be  delivered  up  to  be  cancelled,  the  only  terms  upon  which  a 
Court  of  Equity  would  interfere  were  those  of  the  plaintiff  paying  to 
the  defendant  what  was  bona  fide  due  to  him  ; 3  and  where  the  plaintiff 


4  Columbian  Government  v.  Rothschild,  1 
Sim.  94,  103;  Clarke  v.  Tipping,  4  Beav.  588, 
593;  Barker  v.  Walters,  8  Beav.  92,  96;  Toul- 
min  v.  Reid,  14  Beav.  499.  505  ;  Inman  v.  Wear- 
ing, 3  De  G.  &  S.  729,  733;  Wells  v.  Strange, 
5  Ga.  22. 

i  Godbolt  v.  Watts,  2  Anst.  543. 

2  Dalton  v.  Hayter,  7  Beav.  313,  319;  Inman 
v.  Wearing,  3  De  G.  &  S.  729;  Att.-Gen.  v. 
Hardv,  1  Sim.  N.  S.  338,  355;  15  Jur.  441; 
Knebell  v.  White,  2  Y.  &  C.  Ex.  15,  20.  If 
the  bill  does  not  contain  an  offer  to  account, 


and  the  decree  does  not  direct  the  plaintiff  to 
pay  what  may  be  due  to  the  defendant,  the 
Court  cannot  at  the  further  hearing  make  such 
an  order.  Hollis  v.  Bulpett,  13  W.  R.  492, 
V.  C.  K. 

3  It  is  against  conscience  that  the  borrower 
should  have  full  relief,  and  at  the  same  time 
pocket  the  money,  which  may  have  been  granted 
at  his  own  mere  solicitation.  He  who  seeks 
equity  at  the  hands  of  a  Court  of  Equity,  may 
well  be  required  to  do  equity.  1  Story,  Eq.  Jur. 
§  301.  Fonb.  Eq.  B.  1,  c.  1,  §  3,  note  (A);  Jordon 


replevy  a  horse  which  was  obtained  by  a  fraud- 
ulent exchange,  and  to  which  the  plaintiff  has 
no  right  unless  he  has  restored  what  he  has  re- 
ceived. Thayer  v.  Turner,  8  Met.  550.  The 
foundation  of  this  bill  is  that  the  rescission  is 
not  complete,  and  it  asks  the  aid  of  the  Court 
to  make  it  so.  It  is  objected  that  at  least  the 
bill  ought  to  offer  restitution.  We  are  aware 
that  in  many  cases  an  offer  to  do  Equity  has 
been  held  necessary.  But  in  the  case  at  bar 
the  Court  has  power  to  impose  equitable  con- 
ditions upon  the  relief  granted  the  plaintiffs. 
And  it  is  hardly,  if  at  all,  conceivable  that  this 
decree  in  any  event  could  be  for  the  relief  of 
the  defendant  alone  against  the  plaintiffs,  as  in 
the  case  of  an  account,  where,  nevertheless,  an 
offer  is  no  longer  necessary.  Goldthwait  v. 
Day,  149  Mass.  185.  The  plaintiffs,  by  seeking 
to  set  aside  the  conveyance,  have  elected  to 
adopt  all  the  consequences  of  rescission."  See 
also  Nelson  v.  Ferdinand,  111  Mass.  300;  East- 

386 


man  v.  Plumer,  4G  N  H.  464;  Ewinsr.  Gordon, 
49  N.  H.  444;  Merriam  v.  Goodlett  (Neb.).  54 
N.  W.  Rep.  686;  Bateson  v.  Choate,  85  Texas, 
239. 

Respecting  the  rule  that  the  plaintiff  must 
do  equity,  Wigram  V.  C.  observes  that  a  part\* 
"does  not  by  becoming  plaintiff  in  Equity 
give  up  any  of  his  rights,  or  submit  those  rights 
to  the  arbitrary  disposition  of  the  Court.  He 
submits  only  to  give  the  defendant  his  rights 
in  respect  of  the  subject-matter  of  the  suit, 
on  condition  of  the  plaintiff  obtaining  his 
own.  ...  As  a  general  proposition,  a  plaintiff 
will  never,  in  that  character,  be  compelled  to 
give  a  defendant  anything  but  what  the  defend- 
ant might,  as  a  plaintiff,  enforce,  provided  a 
cause  of  suit  arose."  Hanson  v.  Keating,  4 
Hare,  1.  See  also  Gibson  v.  Goldsmid,  5  De  G. 
M.  &  G  757.  In  a  bill  for  redemption  the 
offer  to  redeem  is  essential.  Emerson  v.  Atkin- 
son (Mass.),  34  N.  E.  Rep.  516. 


FORM    OF    THE    BILL. 


587 


did  not  offer  to  do  so  by  his  bill,  a  demurrer  was  allowed.4  It  seems 
that  there  is  no  difference,  in  this  respect,  between  a  cross-bill  and  an 
original  bill.5  The  course  of  proceeding  in  bankruptcy,  however,  differs 
from  that  in  Courts  of  Equity,  for  the  rule  in  bankruptcy  is  that  a  debt 
made  void  by  statute  is  void  altogether,  and  cannot  be  proved,  because 
the  creditor,  has  no  legal  remedy  by  which  he  can  recover ;  and  unless 
the  assignees  and  creditors  voluntarily  consent  to  the  payment  of  what 
is  really  due,  neither  the  Court  of  Bankruptcy,  nor  the  Lord  Chancellor 
or  Lords  Justices,  have  power  to  order  it :  and  applications  of  this  nature 
have  frequently  been  refused.6  Where  the  plaintiff  was  unable  to  fulfil 
an  offer  upon  which  the  decree  had  been  founded,  the  suit  was  dismissed, 
but  without  prejudice  to  any  future  proceedings  which  the  plaintiff 
might  think  fit  to  take.7 

It  is  a  rule  in  Equity  that  no  person  can  be  compelled  to  make  a 
discovery  which  may  expose  him  to  a  penalty,  or  to  anything 
*in  the  nature  of  a  forfeiture.  As,  however,  the  plaintiff  is,  in  *  387 
many  cases,  himself  the  only  person  who  would  benefit  by  the 
penalty  or  forfeiture,  he  may,  if  he  pleases  to  waive  that  benefit,  have  the 
discovery  he  seeks.1  The  effect  of  the  waiver,  in  such  cases,  is  to  entitle 
the  defendant  (in  case  the  plaintiff  should  proceed,  upon  the  discovery 
which  he  has  elicited  by  his  bill,  to  enforce  the  penalty  or  forfeiture) 
to  apply  for  an  injunction  ;  which  he  could  not  do  without  such  an  ex- 
press waiver.2  (a)  It  is  usual  to  insert  this  waiver  in  the  prayer  of  the 
bill,  and  if  it  is  omitted  the  bill  will  be  liable  to  demurrer.3 


r.  Trumbo,  6  Gill  &  J.  103;  Crawford  v.  Harvey, 
1  Biackf.  382;  M'Daniells  v.  Barnum,  5  Vt. 
279;  Fanning  v.  Dunham,  5  John.  Ch.  142, 
143,  144;  Campbell  v.  Morrison,  7  Paige,  158; 
J ud d  v.  Seaver,  8  Paige,  548;  Cole  v.  Savage, 
1  Clarke,  482.  A  Court  of  Equity  will  not  aid 
a  plea  of  usury,  at  Law,  by  compelling  a  dis- 
covery, unless  the  debtor,  in  his  bill,  tenders 
the  sum  actually  borrowed.  Tupper  v.  Powell, 
1  John.  Cb.439;  Rogers  v.  Rathbun,  id.  367. 
So  the  Court  will  not  allow  an  answer  to  be 
amended  for  the  purpose  of  setting  up  the  de- 
fence of  usury,  unless  the  defendant  consents 
to  pay  the  amount  actually  due.  Fulton  Bank 
V.  Beach,  1  Paige,  429. 

4  Mason  v.  Gardiner,  4  Bro.  C.  C.  436;  Scott 
■r.  Nesbit,  2  Bro.  C.  C.  641,  649;  2  Cox,  183; 

Whitmore  v.  Francis,  8  Price,  616. 

5  Mason  ».  Gardiner,  4  Bro.  C.  C.  ed.  Belt, 
438,  n.;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  630. 

6  Ex  parte  Thompson,  1  Atk.  125;  Ex  parte 
Skip,  2  Ves.  Sr.  489;  Ex  parte  Mather.  3  Ves. 
373;  Ex  parte  Scrivener,  3  V.  &  B.  14;  Arch- 
bold's  Bankruptcy,  110. 

i  Langton  v.  Waite,  L.  R.  4  Ch.  402.     And 


(a)  A  breach  of  covenant  resulting  in  a  for- 
feiture may  be  waived  by  the  pleadings.  Evans 
V.  Davis,  10  Ch.  D.  747.  Equity  always  leans 
against  lessors  seeking  to  enforce  a  forfeiture  of 
the  lease.     Henderson   v.   Carbondale  Coal  & 


see  where  the  bill  is  filed  after  judgment  at 
Law  for  a  reduction  of  the  usury,  Chester  v. 
Apperson,  4  Heisk.  639,  653. 

1  Tn  Mason  v.  Lake,  2  Bro.  P.  C.  ed.  Toml. 
495,  497,  leave  appears  to  have  been  given  to 
amend  a  bill,  by  waiving  penalties  and  forfei- 
tures, after  a  demurrer  upon  that  ground  al- 
lowed. See  United  States  v.  McRae,  L.  R. 
4  Eq.  327,  333,  338-340;  L.  R.  3  Ch.  79;  King 
of  Two  Sicilies  v.  Wilcox,  1  Sim.  N.  S.  301; 
15  Jur.  214;  Att.-Gen.  r.  Vincent,  Bunb.  192. 

2  Lord  Uxbridge  v.  S'.aveland,  1  Ve=.  Sr. 
56:  and  see  Sup.  Ct.  of  Jud.  Act,  1873  (36  & 
37  Vic.  c.  66),  §  24  (5). 

3  Upon  this  ground,  where  an  information 
was  filed  by  the  Attorney-General  to  discover 
copyhold  lands,  and  what  timber  had  been  cut 
down  and  waste  committed,  and  the  defendant 
demurred,  because,  although  the  discovery 
would  have  exposed  the  defendant  to  a  for- 
feiture of  the  place  wasted  and  treble  damages, 
the  Attorney-General  had  not  waived  the  for- 
feitures, the  demurrer  was  allowed.  Att-Gen. 
v.  Vincent,  Bunb.  182.  (b)  And  so  it  has  been 
held,  that  a  demurrer  will   lie  to  a  bill   by  re- 


Coke  Co.  140  U.  S.  25.  One  who  seeks  to  en- 
force a  forfeiture  must  be  free  from  blame. 
Wilson  v.  Bird,  28  N.  J.  Eq.  352. 

(b)  A  forfeiture  may,  it  seems,  be  waived  by 
the  Crown  as  well  as  bv  private  individuals,  and 

387 


388 


THE   BILL. 


It  seems  that  if  a  plaintiff  has  made  a  gratuitous  offer  by  his  bill,  he 
cannot  afterwards  withdraw  it ; 4  but  it  is  in  the  discretion  of  the  Court 
whether  or  not  to  enforce  it.6 

Where  no  account,  payment,  conveyance,  or  other   direct   relief  is 

sought  against  a  party  to  a  suit,  who  is  not  an  infant,  this  por- 

*  388    tion  *  of  the  bill  may  also  contain  a  prayer  that  such  party,  upon 

being  served  with  a  copy  of  the  bill,  may  be  bound  by  all  the 

proceedings  in  the  cause.1 

For  the  purpose  of  preserving  the  property  in  dispute  pending  a  suit, 
or  to  prevent  evasion  of  justice,  the  Court  either  makes  a  special  order 
on  the  subject,  or  issues  a  provisional  writ,  such  as  the  writ  of  injunc- 
tion to  restrain  the  defendant  from  proceeding  at  Common  Law  against 
the  plaintiff,  or  from  committing  waste,  or  doing  any  injurious  act ;  the 
writ  of  ne  exeat  regno,  to  restrain  the  defendant  from  avoiding  the  plain- 
tiff's demands  by  quitting  the  kingdom  ;  or  other  writ  of  a  similar  nature. 
When  a  bill  seeks  to  obtain  the  special  order  of  the  Court,  or  a  provi- 
sional writ  for  any  of  these  purposes,  a  prayer  for  the  order  or  particular 
writ  which  the  case  requires  should  be  inserted,  and  the  bill  is  then  com- 
monly named  from  the  writ  so  prayed,  —  as  an  injunction  bill,  or  a  bill 
for  a  writ  of  ne  exeat  regno.2 

As  a  general  rule,  the  Court  will  not  grant  an  injunction,  unless  ex- 
pressly prayed  by  the  bill.3  A  prayer  for  general  relief  will  not  be 
sufficient  to  authorize  it : 4  for,  as  against  the  general  words,  the  defend- 
ant might  make  a  different  case  than  he  would  against  a  prayer  for  an 
injunction.5  It  seems,  however,  that  there  are  exceptions  to  this  rule, 
and  that,  in  some  cases,  the  Court  will  grant  an  injunction,  though  not 
prayed  for.6  (a) 


versioner,  for  a  discovery  of  an  assignment  of 
a  lease  without  license,  if  it  does  not  expressly 
waive  tlie  forfeiture.  Lord  Uxbridge  v.  Stavi- 
land,  1  Ves.  Sr.  56.  Upon  the  same  principle 
if  a  rector  or  impropriator,  or  a  vicar,  file  a 
bill  for  tithes,  he  must  waive  the  penalty  of  the 
treble  value,  to  which  he  is  entitled  by  the  Stat- 
ute of  2  &  3  Edward  VI. ;  otherwise  his  bill 
will  be  liable  to  demurrer.  Ld.  Red.  195;  Anon. 
1  Vera.  60.  It  seems,  however,  that  if  the  bill 
pray  an  account  of  the  single  value  of  the  tithes 
only,  such  a  prayer  will  amount  to  an  implied 
waiver  of  the  treble  value,  and  that  an  injunction 
may  be  granted  against  suing  for  the  penalty 
of  the  treble  value,  as  well  as  upon  this  im- 
plied waiver  as  upon  the  most  express.  Wools  v. 
Walley,  1  Anst.  100.  It  is  to  be  observed,  also, 
that  if  the  executor  or  administrator  of  a  par- 
son bring  a  bill  for  tithes,  he  need  not  offer  to 
accept  the  single  value,  as  the  Statute  of  Ed- 
ward VI.  does  not  give  to  such  persons  a  rij^ht 
to  the  treble  value.  Anon.  1  Vera.  60  ;  see 
also  Att.-Gen.  v.  Vincent,  ubi  supra. 


4  Pelly  v.  Wathen,  7  Hare,  371;  14  Jur. 
9,  13  ;  Potter  v.  Waller,  2  De  G.  &  S.  410, 
420;  Kendall  v.  Marsters,  2  De  G.  F.  &  J.  200 ; 
see  Ba^nall  v.  Carlton,  6  Ch.  D.371,  400. 

5  Knight  v.  Bowyer,  2  De  G.  &  J.  421,  447; 
23  Beav.  609. 

i  Cons.  Ord.  X.  11;  see  post,  Chap.  VII.  §  1. 

2  Ld.  Red.  46. 

3  Savory  v.  Dyer,  Amb.  70  ;  Walker  v. 
Devereaux,  4  Paige,  248;  Lewiston  Falls 
Manuf.  Co.  v.  Franklin  Co.  54  Maine,  402. 

4  Wright  v.  Atkyns,  1  V.  &  B.  313,  314. 

5  Savory  v.  Dyer,  ubi  supra.  In  cases  where 
the  writ  of  injunction  is  sought,  it  should  not 
only  be  included  in  the  prayer  for  relief,  but 
also  in  the  prayer  for  process.  Wood  v.  Bra- 
dell,  3  Sim.  273;  Union  Bank  v.  Kerr,  2  Md. 
Ch.  460. 

6  Blomfield  v.  Eyre,  8  Beav.  250,  259.  And 
the  bill  may  be  amended  by  adding  the  neces- 
sary prayer.  Jacob  v.  Hall,  12  Ves.  458;  Wood 
v.  Beadell,  3  Sim.  273. 


such  waiver  may  be  proved  by  similar  evidence, 
as  by  the  continued  acceptance  of  the  Crown 
rent.    Lord  Midleton  v.  Power,  19  L.  R.  Ir.  1. 

388 


(a)  The  prayer  for  an  injunction  should  be 
inserted  in  the  prayer  for  process  as  well  as  in 
the  prayer  for  relief.    Wood  v.  Beadell,  3  Sim. 


FORM    OF   THE    BILL. 


389 


It  is  to  be  observed,  that  the  rule  not  to  grant  an  injunction,  unless 
specially  prayed,  applies  only  to  cases  where  it  is  required,  provision- 
ally, until  the  hearing ;  but  that  after  decree,  the  court  will  interpose 
by  injunction,  although  it  is  not  asked  for  by  the  bill.7 

Where  an  injunction  is  sought,  not  as  a  provisional  remedy  merely, 
but  as  a  continued  protection  to  the  rights  of  the  plaintiff,  the  prayer 
of  the  bill  must  be  framed  accordingly.8 

The  prayer  for  ne  exeat  regno  resembles  mutatis  mutandis,  that  for  an 
injunction.9  But,  though  it  is  usual,  it  is  not  necessary  that  the 
bill  should  pray  the  writ,  as  the  intention  to  go  abroad  may  *  arise  *  389 
in  the  progress  of  the  cause  :  and  if,  when  the  bill  is  filed,  the 
defendant  does  not  intend  to  leave  the  kingdom,  it  would  be  highly  im- 
proper to  pray  the  writ ;  as  a  groundless  suggestion  that  the  defendant 
means  to  abscond  would  press  too  harshly,  and  would  also  operate  to 
create  the  very  mischief  which  the  Court,  in  permitting  the  motion  for 
it  to  be  made  without  notice,  means  to  prevent.1  (a)  Where,  however, 
the  plaintiff  knew,  at  the  time  of  the  filing  of  the  bill,  that  the  defend- 
ant was  going  abroad,  Sir  Lancelot  Shadwell  V.  C.  refused2  to  grant  a 
writ  of  ne  exeat  regno,  because  not  prayed  for  by  the  bill.8 

In  addition  to  the  particulars  already  mentioned  as  necessary  parts  of 
a  bill,  the  bill  should  also,  in  the  heading,  be  expressed  to  be  between  the 
intended  plaintiffs  and  defendants;  the  names  of  the  defendants  should 
be  repeated  at  the  end,  as  defendants  to  the  bill ; 4  and  a  note  should  be 
appended  of  the  name  and  address  of  the  plaintiff's  solicitor  and  agent, 
or  of  the  plaintiff's  name  and  place  of  abode,  where  he  sues  in  person.5 


7  Wright  v.  Atkyns,  ubi  supra  ;  Paxton  V. 
Douglas,  8  Ves.  520;  Jackson  v.  Leaf,  1  J.  & 
W.  229,  232;  Clarke  v.  Earl  of  Ormond,  .lac. 
122;  Reynell  v.  Sprye,  1  De  G.  II.  &  G.  600, 
690;  and  see  post,  Chap.  XXXVI.  Injunctions. 

8  Ld.  Red.  47;  and  see  post,  Chap.  XXXVI. 
§  3.  But  the  omission  of  the  proper  prayer 
is  matter  of  form,  and  may  be  amended  at  the 
hearing.  African  Methodist  Episcopal  Church 
v.  Conover,  27  N.  J.  Eq.  157.  And  perhaps  a 
final  injunction  may  be  obtained  under  the 
prayer  for  general  relief.  Walker  v.  Devereaux, 
4  Paige,  229,  248. 

9  Upon  the  same  bill,  a  ne  exeat,  as  well 
as  an  injunction,  may  be  granted.  Bryson  v. 
Petty,  1  Bland,  182. 

1  Collinson  v.  ,  18  Ves.  353;  Moore   v. 

Hudson,  6  Mad.  218;  Barned  v.  Laing,  13  Sim. 


255;  6Jur.  1050;  7  Jur.  383;  Howkinsu.  How- 
kins,  1  Dr.  &  S.  75;  6  Jur.  N.  S.  490. 

2  Sharp  v.  Taylor,  11  Sim.  50;  and  see  re- 
marks on  that  case  in  Barned  v.  Laing,  ubi  supra. 

a  Ld.  Red.  46,  47;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  43,  and 
notes ;  see  Darley  v.  Nicholson,  1  Dr.  &  War. 
66;  2  Dr.  &  War.  86;  1  Con.  &  L.  207,  for  the 
principles  upon  which  the  Court  acts  in  grant- 
ing writs  of  ne  exeat  regno  ;  and  see  post,  Chap. 
XXXVIII.   Writ  of  Ne  Exeat. 

4  The  words  "  out  of  the  jurisdiction,"  or 
"  to  be  bound  upon  service  of  a  copy  of  the 
bill,"  should  be  added  after  the  name  of  a  de- 
fendant who  is  abroad,  or  who  is  merelj'  a 
formal  party. 

5  Cons.  Ord.  IX.  2,  and  Sched.  A.;  see  also 
Cons.  Ord.  III.  2,3,  5,  an&post,  p.  397.  For 
forms,  see  Vol.  III. 


273 ;  Lewiston  Falls  Manuf .  Co.  v.  Franklin  Co. 
54  Maine,  402;  Willett  v.  Woodbams,  1  111. 
App.  411;  see  Union  Bunk  v.  Kerr,  2  Md.  Ch. 
460.  Under  the  prayer  for  an  ad  interim  in- 
junction, the  Court  may  at  the  hearing  make 
such  injunction  perpetual,  when  there  is  clearly 
to  be  no  further  order  in  the  cnse.  Wilmington 
M.  Co.  v.  Allen,  95  III.  288,  297;  see  Chicago, 
St.  L.  &  N.  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Macomb,  2  Fed.  Rep.  18. 
(«)  The   writ  of   ne    exeat  regno   may   be 


granted  under  the  prayer  for  general  relief. 
Lewis  v.  Shainwald,  7  Sawyer,  403;  Shainwald 
v.  Lewis,  46  Fed.  Rep.  839  ;  Durham  v.  Jack- 
son, 1  Paige,  629.  A  Court  of  Equity  will  re- 
fuse to  issue  this  writ  upon  a  legal  demand. 
Drover  v.  Beyer,  L.  R.  13  Ch.  249.  In  New 
Jersey  the  writ  of  ne  exeat  may  now  be  granted 
on  affidavits  before  suit  pending  in  Court  be- 
tween the  parties.  Clark  v.  Clark  (N.  J.),  26 
Atl.  Rep.  1012. 

389 


390 


THE   BILL. 


The  branch  of  the  Court  to  which  the  cause  is  to  be  attached,  must  also 
be  marked  on  the  bill,  previous  to  its  being  filed.6 

8.  Prayer  for  Process.1 

The  next  part  of  the  bill  consists  of  the  prayer  for  process.8  It  has 
before  been  stated  that  where  no  account,  payment,  conveyance,  or  other 
direct  relief  is  sought  against  a  party  to  a  suit,  who  is  not  an  infant,  the 
plaintiff  is  now  enabled,  if  he  thinks  fit,  to  pray  by  his  bill  that  such  a 
party,  upon  being  served  with  a  copy  of  the  bill,  may  be  bound  by  all 
the  proceedings  in  the  cause : 9  but  with  respect  to  all  other  defendants 

the  process  prayed,  in  ordinary  cases,  is  a  writ  of  subpoena  ;  and 
*  390    this  part  of  the  prayer  is  *  commonly  as  follows  :  "  May  it  please 

your  Lordship,  the  premises  considered,  to  grant  unto  your  orator 
his  Majesty's  most  gracious  writ  [or  writs]  of  subpcena,  to  be  directed  to 

the  said  ,  and  to  the  rest  of  the  confederates,  when  discovered, 

thereby  commanding  them,  and  every  of  them,  at  a  certain  day,  and 
under  a  pain  therein  to  be  limited,  personally 1  to  be  and  appear  before 
your  Lordship  in  this  honorable  Court ;  and  then  and  there,  full,  true, 
direct,  and  perfect  answer  make  to  all  and  singular  the  premises ;  and 
further  to  stand  to,  perform,  and  abide  such  further  order,  direction,  and 
decree  therein,  as  to  your  Lordship  shall  seem  meet.  And  your  orator 
shall  ever  pray,"  &c?  (a) 

It  is  to  be  observed  that  the  above  words  are  not  usually  inserted  in 
the  draft  by  the  draftsman  who  prepares  the  bill,  although  they  must 
be  added  when  the  bill  is  engrossed.  The  draftsman,  however,  gener- 
ally writes  a  direction,  in  the  margin  of  the  draft,  for  the  insertion  of 


6  Cons.  Ord.  VI.  1;  see  post,  p.  397;  and 
form  of  bill,  Vol.  III. 

7  The  bill  used  to  conclude  in  England  with 
an  elaborate  prayer  for  process;  but  all  that  is 
now  required  in  the  present  English  practice  is, 
that  the  names  of  the  defendants  should  be  set 
forth,  and  a  note  appended  with  the  names  of 
the  solicitors  for  the  plaintiff.  In  New  Hamp- 
shire, the  prayer  for  process,  unless  some  spe- 
cial process  or  order  shall  be  required,  may  be 
omitted.     Ch.  Rule  3,  38  N.  H.  605.     The  want 


(a)  A  rule  which  requires  the  pra.ver  for 
process  to  identify  the  parties  does  not  make 
a  bill  fatally  defective  if  it  is  omitted,  when 
the  complaint  shows  who  the  defendants  are. 
Sheridan  v.  Cameron,  65  Mich.  680 ;  see  Ander- 
son v.  Wilson,  100  Ind.  402:  Howe  v.  Robins, 
36  N.  J.  Eq.  19;  Alley  v.  Quinter.  4  McArthur 
(D.  C.)i  390.  But  in  the  Federal  Courts  it  is 
a  fatal  defect,  under  Equity  Rule  23,  to  omit 
from  the  prayer  for  process  the  names  of  de- 
fendants {riven  in  the  introductory  part  of  the 
bill.  Goebel  v.  American  Railway  Supply  Co. 
55  Fed.  Rep.  825;  see  Carlsbad  v.  Tibbetts,  51 
390 


of  a  prayer  for  process  renders  the  bill  defective 
in  New  Jersey.  Wright  v.  Wright,  4  Halst.  Ch. 
(N.  J.)  153;  see  Segee  v.  Thomas,  3  Blatch.  11. 

8  See  Belknap  v.  Stone,  1  Allen,  572. 

9  Order,  23d  August,  1841. 

1  In  the  case  of  a  corporation  a  proper  form 
would  omit  the  word  "personally,"  and  after 
the  word  "  appear."  in  this  line,  insert  "  accord- 
ing to  law."     1  Hoff.  Ch.  53. 

2  Hinde,  17. 


id.  852.  If  a  person  is  properly  charged  as  exec- 
utor, devisee  or  assignee,  in  the  bill,  he  need  not 
be  so  styled  in  the  prayer  for  process.  White 
v.  Davis,  48  N.  J.  Eq.  22;  see  Plaut  v.  Plaut, 
44  id.  18;  Evans  v.  Evans,  23  id.  71;  Ransom 
v.  Geer,  30  id.  249.  But  the  mere  recital  in  a 
bill  again«t  a  corporation  that  a  certain  person 
is  its  president  does  not  make  him  a  party. 
Peters  v.  Neely,  16  Lea.  275.  A  person  named 
in  the  summons  and  in  the  prayer  of  the  bill,  and 
served  with  process,  but  as  to  whom  the  bill  con- 
tains no  allegations,  is  not  a  party.  Chapman 
v.  Pittsburgh  &  S.  R.  Co.  18  W.  Va.  184. 


FORM    OF   THE   BILL. 


*391 


this  prayer,  specifying  the  names  of  the  persons  against  whom  process 
is  to  be  prayed ;  and  care  must  be  taken  in  so  doing  to  insert  the  names 
of  all  the  persons  who  are  intended  to  be  made  defendants  ;  because  it 
has  been  held  that  the  mere  naming  of  a  party  in  a  bill,  without  pray- 
ing process  against  him  as  a  defendant,  is  not  to  be  considered  as 
making  him  a  party,8  even  where  he  is  out  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
Court.4 

*  If  the  defendant  be  a  peer  of  the  realm,  or  entitled  to  the  priv-  *  391 
ilege  of  peerage,  he  has  a  right,  before  a  subpoena  is  issued  against 
him,  to  be  informed,  by  letter  from  the  Lord  Chancellor,  of  the  bill  hav- 
ing been  filed  ;  this  letter  is  called  a  letter  missive,  and  must  be  accompa- 
nied by  a  copy  of  the  bill.  In  consequence  of  this  privilege  of  peerage, 
the  practice  is,  that  in  all  cases  where  peers  are  defendants,  the  usual 
prayer  for  process  is  preceded  by  a  prayer  for  a  letter  missive,  in  the  fol- 
lowing words :   "  May  it  please  your  Lordship  to  grant  unto  your  orator 

your  Lordship's  letter  missive,  to  be  directed  to  the  said  Earl  of , 

directing  him  to  appear  and  answer  your  orator's  said  bill,  or  in  default 
thereof,  his  Majesty's  most  gracious  writ  of  subpoena"  &C.1 


3  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  44.  A  person  whom  the 
bill  prays  to  be  made  a  party,  does  not  there- 
by become  a  party;  to  make  him  such,  process 
must  be  issued  and  served  upon  him.  Bond  v. 
Hendricks,  1  A.  K.  Marsh.  594;  see  Huston  v. 
M'CIarty,  3  Litt.  274;  Verplanck  v.  Merc.  Ins. 
Co.  2  Paige,  438;  Lyle  v.  Bradford,  7  Monroe, 
113;  Windsor  v.  Windsor,  2  Dick.  707;  Fawkes 
v.  Pratt,  1  P.  W.  593;  Hoyle  v.  Moore,  4  Ired. 
Eq.  175;  Doherty  v.  Stevenson,  1  Tenn.  Ch. 
518.  And  if  it  is  sought  to  sue  a  party  as  an 
individual  and  in  a  representative  capacity,  the 
bill  should  state  the  facts,  and  pray  process 
against  the  defendant  in  both  capacities;  other- 
wise he  will  be  held  to  be  a  party  only  in  the 
character  in  which  process  was  prayed  against 
him.  Carter  v.  Ingraham,  43  Ala.  78.  A  de- 
murrer will  lie  to  a  bill  containing  no  prayer 
for  process.  Wright  v.  Wright,  4  Halst.  Ch. 
143.  But  not  a  general  demurrer.  Boon  v. 
Pierpont,  28  N.  J.  Eq.  7.  By  the  former  prac- 
tice in  New  York,  parties  might  be  treated  as 
defendants,  by  a  clear  statement  in  the  bill  to 
that  effect,  without  praying  the  subpoena.  The 
reason  given  was,  that  in  that  State  the  subpoena 
was  issued  of  course,  and  that  a  formal  prayer 
was  unnecessary  to  entitle  the  plaintiff  to  pro- 
cess. Brasher  v.  Van  Cortlandt,  2  John.  Ch. 
245;  Elmendorf  v.  Delancy,  1  Hopk.  555;  ante, 
p.  286,  notes  4  and  5. 

4  Windsor  v.  Windsor,  2  Dick.  707.  Some 
doubt  appears  to  have  been  thrown  upon  this 
proposition  by  the  opinion  of  Sir  J.  Leach  V. 
C.  in  Haddoch  v.  Thomlinson,  2  S.  &  S.  219, 
in  which  his  Honor  said  that  where  a  party 
interested  in  the  subject  of  a  suit  is  charged  by 
the  Hill  to  be  out  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court, 
but  is  not  named  in  the  prayer  for  process,  the 
omission  will  not  render  the  record  defective; 


although  it  is  usual  and  convenient  that  process 
should  be  prayed  against  them,  in  order  that  if 
they  come  within  the  jurisdiction,  process  may 
issue  against  them  without  amending  the  bill. 
In  a  subsequent  case,  however,  Sir  C.  Pepys 
M.  R. — after  referring  to  a  manuscript  report 
of  another  case  before  Sir  J.  Leach  (Manos  v. 
De  Tastet),  in  which  that  learned  Judge  had 
said  that  it  was  not  enough  to  state  that  per- 
sons who,  in  respect  of  interest,  were  necessary 
parties,  were  out  of  the  jurisdiction,  but  that 
the  bill  must  go  on  to  pray  process  against 
them  —  said  that  he  was  of  opinion  that  the 
principle  of  the  manuscript  case  ought  to  be 
followed,  and  therefore  allowed  a  demurrer 
which  had  been  taken  ore  tenus  for  want  of  a 
necessary  party,  who  had  been  charged  to  be 
out  of  the  jurisdiction,  but  against  whom  no 
process  had  been  prayed  when  he  should  come 
within  it.  Taylor  v.  Fisher,  Roll's  Sittings  after 
Hil.  Term,  1835,  MS. ;  see  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  44, 
and  note;  Mitford,  Eq.  PI.  by  Jeremy,  165; 
Milligan  v.  Milledge,  3  Cranch,  220;  Lavihart 
v.  Reilly,  3  Desaus.  590.  See  the  22d  and  23d 
Equity  Rule  of  the  U.  S.  Supreme  Court,  Jan. 
term.  1842.  stated  post,  Vol.  III.  Provision  is 
made  for  service  of  notice  on  defendants  resid- 
ing out  of  the  Commonwealth,  in  the  Mass.  Ch. 
Rules,  Rule  5. 

1  Hinde,  18.  In  the  case  of  corporations  ag- 
gregate, the  process  of  subpoena  is  the  same  as 
in  ordinary  cases;  but  the  bill  sometimes  prays, 
that  in  case  of  their  default  to  appear  and  an- 
swer the  bill,  the  writ  of  distringas  may  issue 
to  compel  them  to  do  so.  Coop.  Eq.  PI.  16,  17; 
Harvey  v.  East  India  Co.  2  Vern.  396;  London 
Joint  Stock  Bank  t\  Mayor  of  London,  1  C  P. 
D.  1,  11;  1  Harris.  Ch.  Pr.  149;  Story,  Eq.  PL 
§44. 

391 


392 


THE   BILL. 


When  the  Attorney-General  is  made  a  defendant  to  a  suit,  as  he  is 
always  supposed  to  be  in  Court,  the  bill  does  not  pray  any  subpoena 
against  him,  but  merely  that,  upon  being  attended  with  a  copy  of  the 
bill,  he  may  appear  and  put  in  an  answer  thereto.2 


*392     *  Section  VI. 


In  what  Cases  the  Bill  must  be  accompanied 
by  an  Affidavit. 


There  are  certain  cases  in  which  it  is  necessary  that  the  bill  should  be 
accompanied  by  an  affidavit,  to  be  filed  with  it,  and  in  which  the  omis- 
sion of  such  accompaniment  will  render  the  bill  liable  to  demurrer.1  (a) 
Thus,  when  a  bill  is  filed  to  obtain  the  benefit  of  an  instrument  upon 
which  an  action  at  Law  would  lie,  upon  the  ground  that  it  is  lost,  and 
that  the  plaintiff  in  Equity  cannot  therefore  have  any  relief  at  Law,  the 
Court  requires  that  the  bill  should  be  accompanied  by  an  affidavit  of  the 
loss  of  the  instrument.2  If,  however,  the  objection  is  not  taken  by 
demurrer,  but  the  cause  proceeds  to  a  hearing,  and  the  answer  of  the 
defendant  admits  the  loss  or  destruction  of  the  instrument,  then  the 
Court  has  jurisdiction,  and  the  objection  for  want  of  the  affidavit  will  be 
overruled.3  So,  in  suits  for  the  discovery  of  deeds  and  writings,  and 
for  relief  founded  upon  such  instruments,  if  the  relief  prayed  be  such  as 
might  be  obtained  at  Law,  on  the  production  of  deeds  or  writings,  the 
plaintiff  must  annex  to  his  bill  an  affidavit  that  they  are  not  in  his  cus- 
tody or  power,  and  that  he  knows  not  where  they  are,  unless  they  are  in 
the  hands  of  the  defendant.4 


2  Ld.  Red.  46. 

1  Where  no  preliminary  order  is  required  it 
is  not  generally  necessary  that  bills  should  be 
sworn  to,  although  the  answer  under  oath  is 
not  waived.  Atwater  v.  Kinman,  Harring.  Ch. 
243;  Jerome  v.  Jerome,  5  Conn.  352.  A  bill  in 
Equity  to  redeem  mortgaged  premises  need  not 
be  verified  by  affidavit.  Hilton  v.  Lothrop,  46 
Maine,  297;  Dinsmore  v.  Crossman,  53  Maine, 
441.  A  bill  need  not  be  sworn  to  in  Massa- 
chusetts. Burns  v.  Lynde,  6  Allen,  306.  In 
North  Carolina,  ''an  affidavit  of  the  truth  of 
the  matters  contained  in  his  bill  "  was  neces- 
sary to  give  jurisdiction  (o  the  Court  of  Equity, 
under  the  Statute  (Rev.  Code,  c.  7),  and  the 
want  of  such  affidavit  was  a  good  ground  for  a 
general  demurrer.  Barringer  v.  Andrews,  5 
Jones  Eq.  (N.  C.)  348.  There  is  no  rule  in  the 
Circuit  Court  for  Massachusetts,  requiring  an 
oath  to  be  filed  with  the  bill.  Woodworth  v. 
Edwards,  3  Wood.  &  M.  120. 

2  Ld.  Red.  124;  Walmsley  v.  Child,  1  Ves. 
Sr.  341 ;  Wright  v.  Lord  Maidstone,  1  K.  &  J. 


(a)  As  a  rule,  a  plaintiff  is  allowed,  in  a 
Court  of  Equity,  "  to  state  his  case  in  the  first 
instance  without  in  any  way  verifying  it  by 
oath;  and  the  Court  ought  to  be  slow,  as  I  con- 
ceive, when  a  plaintiff  bonafidt  brings  forward 

392 


701;  1  Jur.  N.  S.  1013;  Whitchurch  v.  Golding, 
2  P.  Wms.  541;  March  v.  Davison,  9  Paige, 
580;  Stacy  v.  Pearson,  3  Rich.  Eq.  148;  Parson 
v.  Wilson,  2  Tenn.260;  Pennington  v.  Governor, 
1  Blackf.  78;  Taliaferro  v.  Foote,  3  Leigh,  58; 
Peart  v.  Taylor,  2  Bibb,  556;  Story,  Eq.  PL 
§  288;  Ld.  Red.  123,  224;  Livingston  v.  Livings- 
ton, 4  John.  Ch.  294;  Le  Roy  v.  Veeder,  1  John. 
Ch.  417;  Munday  v.  Shatzell,  Litt.  Sel.  Cas. 
373;  Lynch  v.  Willard,  6  John.  Ch.  342.  346. 
For  the  reason  of  the  rule,  see  post,  pp.  394,  -395, 
notes.  In  Thornton  v.  Stewart,  7  Leigh,  128,  it 
was  held  that,  although  regularly  an  affidavit 
of  the  loss  of  the  bond,  &c,  ought  to  be  filed 
with  a  bill  for  relief  upon  a  lost  bond,  yet  if 
such  affidavit  is  not  so  filed,  but  is  filed  after- 
wards in  the  progress  of  the  cause,  this  is  suffi- 
cient. See  Cabell  v.  Megginson,  6  Munf.  202; 
Jerome  v.  Jerome,  5  Conn.  352;  Bennett  v. 
Waller,  23  111.  97. 

3  Crosse  v.  Bedingfieid,  12  Sim.  35;  5  Jur. 
836;  Bennett  v.  Waller,  23  111.  97. 

4  M'Elwee  v.  Sutton,  1  Hill  Ch.  33;  Story, 


a  case,  in  shutting  him  out  from  stating  it.  and 
from  trying  it  in  the  manner  provided  by  law." 
Per  Stirling  J.  in  Lawrauce  v.  Norreys,  39  Ch. 
D.  213,  225. 


WHEN   BILL   MUST   BE    ACCOMPANIED    BY    AFFIDAVIT. 


*394 


But  a  bill  for  a  discovery  merely,  or  which  only  prays  the  delivery 
of  deeds  or  writings,  or  equitable  relief  grounded  upon  them, 
does  *  not  require  such  an  affidavit.1  It  has  been  held  that  an  *  393 
affidavit  is  also  unnecessary  in  the  case  of  a  bill  for  discovery 
of  an  instrument  which  has  been  fraudulently  cancelled  by  the  defend- 
ant, and  to  have  another  deed  executed ;  for,  in  such  a  case,  if  the 
plaintiff  had  the  cancelled  instrument  in  his  hands  he  could  make  no 
use  of  it  at  Law,  and,  indeed,  the  relief  prayed  is  such  as  a  Court  of 
Equity  only  can  give.2 

Another  case,  in  which  it  was  required  that  the  bill  should  be  accom- 
panied by  an  affidavit,  was,  where  a  bill  was  filed  under  the  Stat.  53 
Geo.  III.  c.  159,  which  was  passed  for  the  purpose  of  limiting  the 
responsibility  of  ship-owners  in  certain  cases.  This  Act  is 
*  expressly  repealed  by  the  17  &  18  Vic.  c.  120,  §  4 ;  and  as  *  394 
the  Acts  now  in  force  x  for  the  above  purpose  contain  no  provision 
similar  to  that  contained  in  the  Act  of  Geo.  III.  with  reference  to  an 
affidavit  accompanying  the  bill,  it  is  to  be  assumed  that  such  an  affidavit 
is  no  longer  necessary. 

Even  in  cases  in  which  the  legislature  has  expressly  directed  that  the 
affidavit  should  be  "  annexed  to  the  bill,"  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  affi- 
davit should  be  sworn  at  the  same  time  as  the  bill  is  filed ;  but  it  is  the 
usual  practice,  in  all  cases  in  which  an  affidavit  is  necessary,  to  have  it 
sworn  a  day  or  two  before  the  bill  is  filed.2 


Eq.  PI.  §§  288,  313;  Findleyr.  Hinde,  1  Peters, 
244;  Livingston  v.  Livingst  >n,  4  John.  Ch.294; 
Campbell  v.  Sheldon,  13  Pick.  8,  18-20,  per 
Shaw  C.  J.  For  form  of  affidavit,  see  Vol.  III., 
and  for  form  of  demurrer,  for  want  of  it,  see 

2  Van  Hey.  76  . 

i  Ld.  Red.  54;  see  1  Ves.  Sr.  341,  344; 
Whitchurch  v.  Golding,  2  P.  Wins.  541;  Anon. 

3  Atk.  17;  Dormer  v.  Fortescue,  id.  132;  Caton 
V.  Coles,  L.  R.  1  Eq.  581;  M'Elwee  v.  Sutton, 
1  Hill  Ch.  33;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  288.  Where 
the  subject-matter  of  the  writing  is  properly 
cognizable  in  Equity,  an  affidavit  of  the  loss  is 
not  necessary.  Peart  v.  Taylor,  2  Bibb,  566; 
Ld  Red.  124 ;  Laight  v.  Morgan,  1  Caines's  Cas. 
345;  S.  C.  1  John.  Ch.  9;  Campbell  v.  Sheldon, 
13  Pick.  18-20. 

2  King  v.  King,  Mos.  192;  and  see  Ld.  Red. 
124.  In  Root  ham  v.  Dawson,  Anst.  859,  the 
authority  of  King  o.  King  appears  to  have  been 
questioned,  and  a  different  decision  come  to. 
In  that  case,  the  bill  was  filed  for  the  discovery 
of  the  contents  of  a  bond  which  had  been  given 
to  the  plaintiffs,  as  parish  officers,  as  an  in- 
demnification for  the  expense  of  a  bastard  child, 
and  which  was  alleged  in  the  bill  to  have  been 
defaced  and  cancelled  by  tearing  off  the  signa- 
ture of  the  obligor,  so  that  the  bond  was  no 
longer  in  force;  the  bill  also  prayed  an  account 
and  payment  of  what  was  due  on  the  bond,  as 
well  as  the  execution  of  a  new  one  for  the 
future  indemnification  of  the  trustees.  To  this 
bill    the   defendant  demurred:    "for  that  the 


plaintiffs  ought,  according  to  the  rules  of  the 
Court,  to  have  made  an  affidavit  of  the  bond 
being  defaced  and  avoided  as  stated  in  the  bill ;  " 
and  the  demurrer  was  allowed.  It  is  to  be  ob- 
served, that  the  L.  C.  B.  Macdonald,  in  his 
judgment,  appears  to  have  proceeded  upon  the 
ground  that  the  plaintiffs  had  not  confined 
themselves  to  seeking  a  discovery  and  re-exe- 
cution of  the  bond,  but  had  gone  on  to  pray 
for  payment  of  the  sum  already  due;  though, 
certainly,  that  distinction  does  not  appear  to 
have  been  recognized  by  the  learned  Baron 
Thompson,  who  delivered  his  opinion  upon  the 
occasion.  It  is,  however,  submitted  that  the 
reason  given  for  the  decision  in  King  v.  King  is 
quite  satisfacton-:  for,  as  the  ground  for  the 
interference  of  a  Court  of  Equity  in  such  a  case 
is  not  the  loss,  but  the  cancellation  of  the  in- 
strument, so  as  to  render  it  impossible  to  use  it 
at  Law,  no  relief  will  be  granted  by  the  Court 
until  it  is  satisfied  that  the  cancellation  has 
taken  place,  by  the  production  of  the  cancelled 
instrument;  whereas,  in  the  case  of  the  loss  of 
a  document,  the  Court  has,  in  general,  no  means 
of  satisfying  itself  that  the  document  has  been 
lost  but  the  assertion  of  the  party  himself; 
which  it  consequently  requires  should  be  made 
upon  oath. 

1  "The  Merchant  Shipping  Act,  1854"  (17 
&  18  Vic.  c.  104),  Part  IX.  §§  504,  514;  "  The 
Merchant  Shipping  Amendment  Act,  1862 " 
(25  &  26  Vic.  c.  63),  §  64. 

*  Walker  v.  Fletcher,  1  Phil.  115;  12  Sim 

393 


*394 


THE    BILL. 


The  other  cases,  in  which  bills  are  required  to  be  accompanied  by  an 
affidavit,  may  be  mentioned  here,  although  they  do  not  come  within  the 
description  of  bills  which  are  now  the  subject  of  discussion.  These  are: 
bills  for  the  purpose  of  perpetuating  the  testimony  of  witnesses,  where, 
from  circumstances,  such  as  the  age  or  infirmity  of  witnesses,  or  their 
intention  of  leaving  the  country,  it  is  probable  the  plaintiff  would  lose 
the  benefit  of  their  testimony :  in  which  case,  an  affidavit  of  the  circum- 
stances, by  means  of  which  the  testimony  may  probably  be  lost,  must  be 
annexed  to  the  bill ; 3  and  bills  of  interpleader,  which  also,  to  avoid  a 
demurrer,  must  be  accompanied  by  an  affidavit  by  the  plaintiff  that  there 
is  no  collusion  between  him  and  any  of  the  parties.4 


420,  422;  6  Jur.  4;  but  see  Francome  v.  Fran- 
come,  13  W.  R.  355,  L.  C. ;  11  Jur.  N.  S.  123. 
The  affidavit  is  usually,  but  need  not  be,  at- 
tached to  the  bill.  Jones  v.  Shepherd,  29  Beav. 
293  ;  7  Jur.  N.  S.  250.  Affirmed  by  L.  C,  7 
Jur.  N.  S.  228 ;  sub  nom.  Shepherd  v.  Jones, 
3  De  G.  F.  &  J.  56.  It  may  be  made  an  ex- 
hibit to  the  bill.  See  forms  of  affidavit  in 
Vol.  III. 

3  Ld.  Red.  150;  Phillips  v.  Carew,  1  P. 
Wins.  116;  Laight  v.  Morgan,  1  Caines's  Cas- 
344;  S.  C.  1  John.  Ch.  429;  Story,  Eq.  PI. 
§§  3U4,  309.  ■  The  reason  given  for  requiring 
the  affidavit  is,  that  the  proceeding  has  a  tend- 
ency to  change  the  jurisdiction  of  the  subject- 
matter  from  a  Court  of  Law  to  a  Court  of 
Equity.  Ld.  Red.  150,  151 ;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  309. 
"This  reason,"  says  Mr.  Justice  Story,  "is 
perhaps  not  quite  satisfactory."  —  "A  better 
ground  would  seem  to  be  that  the  bill  has  a 
tendency  to  create  delaj's,  and  may  be  used  as 
an  instrument  unduly  to  retard  the  trial;  and, 
therefore,  an  affidavit,  that  the  bill  is  well 
founded,  is  required.  The  affidavit  should  be 
positive  as  to  the  material  facts."  Story,  Eq. 
PI.  §  309;  and  see  post,  Chap.  XXXIV.  §  4, 
Bills  to  Perpetuate  Testimony.  For  form  of 
demurrer  for  want  of  such  affidavit,  2  Van  Hey. 
78. 

4  Ld.  Red.  49;  Bignold  v.  Audland,  11  Sim. 
23;  Hamilton  v.  Marks,  5  De  G.  &  S.  638.  In 
Larabrie  v.  Brown.  1  De  G.  &  J.  204;  23  Beav. 
607,  leave  was  given  to  file  an  interpleader  bill 
quantum  valent,  on  affidavit  of  the  plaintiffs' 
solicitor,  the  plaintiffs  being  abroad,  and  time 
pressing;  but  the  affidavit  of  the  plaintiffs  was 
afterwards,  by  leave  of  the  Court,  fib-d  and  an- 
nexed to  the  bill  nunc  pro  tunc.  Braithwaite's 
Pr.  27.  Where  there  were  several  plaintiffs 
residing  in  distant  places,  leave  was  given,  on 
a  like  affidavit,  and  an  injunction  granted  for 
a  limited  time,  on  an  undertaking  to  file  the 
usual  affidavit.  Nelson  w.  Barter,  10  Jur.  N.  S. 
611 ;  12  W.  R.  857,  V.  C.  W. ;  2  II.  &  M.  334; 
and  see  post,  Chap.  XXXIV.  §  3,  Bills  of  Inter- 
pleader ;  see  Wood  v.  Lyme,  4  De  G.  &  S. 
16;  Edrington  v.  Allsbrooks,  21  Texas,  186; 
Eden  Inj.  (2d  Am.  ed. )  401,  402 ;  Shaw  v.  Coster, 

394 


8  Paige,  339;  Tobin  v.  Wilson,  3  J.  J.  Marsh. 
67;  Manksv.  Holroyd,  1  Cowen,  691;  Ld.  Red. 
143.  Such  an  affidavit  is  not  necessary  in  Con- 
necticut. Nash  v.  Smith,  6  Conn.  421 ;  see 
Jerome  v.  Jerome,  5  Conn.  352.  For  form  of 
affidavit,  see  Vol.  III.  For  form  of  demurrer 
for  want  of  such  an  affidavit,  Willis,  442;  Equity 
Drafts  (2d  Am.  ed.),  77. 

A  bill  pra)'ing  for  an  injunction,  generally 
requires  a  special  affidavit  to  support  it.  Eden 
Inj.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  380,  381;  1  Barb.  Ch.  Pr.43, 
44,617;  1  Hoff.  Ch.  Pr.  78;  Hatch  v.  Eustap- 
hieve,  1  Clarke  (N.  Y.),  63;  Hammersley  v. 
Wyckoff,  8  Paige,  72;  Holdrege  v.  Gwynne,  18 
N.  J.  Eq.  26,  32 ;  Perkins  v.  Collins,  2  Green 
Ch.  482 ;  Bogert  v.  Haight,  9  Paige,  297 ;  see 
Wood  worth  v.  Edwards,  3  Wood.  &  M.  120. 
It  ma}'  be  verified  by  an  attorney.  Edrington 
v.  Allsbrooks,  21  Texas,  186;  Youngblood  v. 
Schamp,  15  N.  J.  Eq.  42. 

An  affidavit  of  a  person  other  than  the  plain- 
tiff, that  "each  and  every  allegation  contained 
in  the  bill  are  true  so  far  as  they  are  known  to 
him  personally,  and  so  far  as  he  has  heard  he 
believes  them  to  be  true,"  is  insufficient  to  sus- 
tain an  injunction.  Chesapeake  &c.  R.  Co.  v. 
Huse,  5  W.  Va.  579.  And  so  is  the  oath  of  an 
attorney  that  statements  "  are  true  when  made 
on  his  own  knowledge,  and  when  made  upon 
information  of  others  he  believes  them  to  be 
true,"  where  it  does  not  appear  from  the  bill  or 
petition  that  any  of  the  statements  were  made 
upon  the  knowledge  of  the  affiant  or  information 
of  others.  Pullen  v.  Baker,  41  Texas,  419.  And 
see  Smith  v.  Republic  Life  Ins.  Co.  2  Tenn. 
Ch.  631.  If,  however,  the  bill  has  been  actually 
sworn  to,  the  injunction  will  not  be  dissolved 
because  the  Master  has  omitted  to  sign  the 
jurat.  Capner  v.  President  &c.  of  Flemington 
Co.  2  Green  Ch.  467. 

In  Maine,  "  bills  of  discover}',  and  those 
praying  for  an  injunction,  must  be  verified 
by  oath."  Ch.  Rule  1,  37  Maine,  581.  This 
rule  relates  to  the  pure  and  simple  bill  of  dis- 
covery. Dinsmore  v.  Crossman,  53  Maine, 441; 
Hilton  v.  Lothrop,  46  Maine,  297.  , 

Where  the  facts,  on  which  the  claim  for  an 
injunction  is  made,  are  not  within  the  knowl- 


WHEN    BILL   MUST   BE    ACCOMPANIED    BY   AFFIDAVIT. 


396 


*  It  is  to  be  observed  that,  in  cases  of  this  nature,  advantage  *  395 
can  only  be  taken  of  the  omission  of  an  affidavit,  by  demurrer ; 
and  where  a  plaintiff,  instead  of  demurring  on  this  ground  in  the  first 
instance,  put  in  a  plea  to  the  whole  bill,  which  was  overruled,  he  was 
not  allowed  to  demur,  ore  tenus,  on  the  ground  that  the  necessary 
affidavit  was  not  annexed.1 

■*  If  there  are  several  plaintiffs,  all  must  join  in  the  affidavit,  *  396 
unless  a  satisfactory  explanation  be  given  for  their  non-joinder.1 
If  a  corporation  is  plaintiff,  the  affidavit  may  be  made  by  the  secretary 
or  other  responsible  officer.  The  affidavit  may  be  written  or  printed  ; 
and  a  copy  of  it,  but  not  necessarily  an  office  copy,  should  be  sealed  at 
the  Record  and  Writ  Clerks'  Office,  and  annexed  to  each  copy  of  the  bill 
sealed  there  for  service,2  and  served  therewith. 


edge  of  the  plaintiff,  he  should  state  the  facts 
in  his  bill  as  upon  his  information  and  belief, 
and  annex  the  affidavit  of  the  person  from 
whom  he  obtained  the  information,  or  some 
other  person  who  can  swear  positively  to  the 
truth  of  the  material  allegations  in  the  bill. 
Campbell  v.  Morrison,  7  Paige,  157;  Bank  of 
Orleans  v.  Skinner,  9  Paige,  305.  But  in  bills 
charging  fraud,  and  praying  a  discovery,  or 
in  any  case,  where,  in  the  nature  of  things, 
positive  proof  cannot  be  expected,  the  additional 
verification  may  be  dispensed  with,  and  the 
injunction  may  issue  on  the  affidavit  of  the 
plaintiff  founded  on  belief  alone.  Youngblood 
v.  Suhamp,  15  N.  J.  Eq  42,  43;  Att.-Gen. 
v.  Bank  of  Columbia,  1  Paige,  511;  Campbell 
v.  Morrison,  7  Paige,  157.  In  New  Jersey,  the 
affidavits  of  the  plaintiff,  made  after  filing  the 
bill,  are  not  competent  to  be  read  upon  a  motion 
for  an  injunction  and  the  appointment  of  re- 
ceivers. Such  affidavits  should  be  subjoined 
to  the  bill,  and  filed  with  it.  Brandred  v.  Pat- 
erson  Machine  Shop,  3  Green  Ch.  21)4,  309.  In 
Delaware,  a  creditor's  bill  must  contain  the 
averments  required  by  the  109th  Rule,  and 
those  averments  must  be  sworn  to  in  the  jurat. 
Clark  v.  Davis,  Harring.  Ch.  227. 

When  a  writ  of  ne  exeat  regno  is  asked  for, 
an  affidavit  is  necessary  as  a  foundation  for 
obtaining  it.  Rice  v.  Hale,  5  Cush.  238;  Porter 
v.  Spencer,  2  John.  Ch.  169 ;  Seymour  v.  Hazard, 
1  John.  Ch.  1;  Thome  v.  Halsey,  7  John.  Ch. 
191;  Gernoe  v.  Boecaline,  2  Wash.  C.  C.  130; 
Gilbert  v.  Colt,  1  Hopk.  500;  Mattocks  .v.  Tre- 
maine,  3  John.  Ch.  75. 

When  a  corporation  aggregate  is  plaintiff, 
the  bill,  from  the  necessity  of  the  case,  must  lie 
verified  by  some  officer  or  agent  of  the  corpora- 
tion, and  the  bill  should  be  signed  by  the  officer 
making  the  oath.  Bank  of  Orleans  v.  Skinner, 
9  Paige,  305;  Youngblood  v.  Schamp,  15  N.  J. 
Eq.  42,  43.  See  Tulloch  v.  Belleville  P.  &  S. 
Works  (Col.),  31  Pac.  Rep.  229.  And  the  oath  of 
the  agent  or  attorney,  verifying  the  bill,  should 


state  that  the  agent  has  read  the  bill,  or  heard  it 
read,  and  knows  the  contents  thereof,  and  that 
the  same  is  true  of  his  own  knowledge,  except  as 
to  the  matters  which  are  therein  stated  to  be  on 
the  information  and  belief  of  the  plaintiff,  and 
that  as  to  those  matters  the  deponent  believes  it 
to  be  true.  Bank  of  Orleans  v.  Skinner,  9  Paige, 
305;  Justices  v.  Cosby,  5  Jones  Eq.  (N.  C.) 
254.  Where  it  is  necessary  that  a  bill  should 
be  sworn  to  for  the  purpose  of  calling  for  an 
answer  on  oath,  it  is  not  necessary  that  the 
allegations  of  the  bill,  verified  by  oath  merely 
for  that  purpose,  should  be  sworn  to  positively. 
It  is  sufficient  that  the  person  verifying  the  bill 
swears  to  his  belief  of  the  charges  contained  in 
it.  Veeder  v.  Moritz,  9  Paige,  371 ;  Triebert  v. 
Burgess,  11  Md.  452. 

An  affidavit  to  a  bill,  quia  timet,  stating 
that  the  facts  in  the  bill  relating  to  the  plain- 
tiff's own  acts  are  true,  and  those  relating  to 
others,  he  believes  to  be  true,  is  sufficient.  Col- 
lins v.  Barksdale,  23  Ga.  602.  And  generally, 
in  all  bills  which  are  to  be  verified  by  affidavit, 
as  well  as  in  answers  and  petitions,  the  several 
matters  stated,  charged,  averred,  admitted,  or 
denied,  are  required  to  be  stated  positively,  or 
upon  information  and  belief  only,  according  to 
the  fact.  Marsh  v.  Marsh,  16  N.  J.  Eq.  396, 
397. 

i  Hook  v.  Dorman,  1  S  &  S.  227,  231 ;  Crosse 
v.  Bedingfield,  12  Sim.  35;  5  Jur.  836  ;  Allen  V. 
State  Bank,  1  Dev.  &  Batt.  Eq.  6;  Findley  v. 
Hind,  1  Peters,  244;  Woodworth  V.  Edwards,  3 
Wood.  &  M.  120  For  the  form  of  demurrer  in 
such  cases,  see  Willis,  431.  The  affidavit  may 
be  amended  by  leave  of  the  Court.  Hamilton 
i'.  Marks,  5  De  G.  &  S.  638 

1  Braithwaite"s  Pr.  27,  and  Gibbs  v.  Gibbs, 
there  cited :  and  for  form  of  affidavit  in  that 
case,  see  Vol.  III. 

2  Braithwaite's  Pr.  27.  No  fee  is  pavable 
on  filing  an  affidavit  with,  or  annexed  to,  a 
bill.    Ibid. 

395 


*397 


THE   BILL. 


Section  VII.  —  Printing  and  Filing  the  BUI. 

After  a  bill  has  been  drawn  or  perused,  and  signed  by  counsel,  it  must 
(except  in  the  cases  mentioned  below)  be  printed  on  cream- wove,  machine- 
drawn,  foolscap  folio  paper,  nineteen  pounds  per  mill  ream,  in  pica  type, 
leaded,  with  an  inner  margin  about  three  quarters  of  an  inch  wide,  and 
an  outer  margin  about  two  inches  and  a  half  wide.3  Dates  and  sums, 
occurring  in  the  bill,  are  to  be  expressed  by  figures.4 

Where  a  bill  prays  a  writ  of  injunction,5  or  ne  exeat  regno,  or  is  filed 
for  the  purpose  of  making  an  infant  a  ward  of  Court,  but  in  no  other 
cases,6  a  written  bill  may  be  filed,  upon  the  undertaking  of  the  plaintiff, 
or  his  solicitor,7  to  file  a  printed  copy  within  fourteen  days.8  Written 
bills  must  be  written  upon  paper  of  the  same  description  and  size  as  that 
on  which  bills  are  printed;9  and  the  costs  of  a  written  bill  will  not  be 
allowed,  unless  specially  directed  by  the  Court  in  disposing  of  the  costs 
of  the  cause.10 

If  the  printed  bill  be  not  duly  filed,  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerk  is  to 
take  the  written  copy  off  the  file  ;  u  and  the  plaintiff  or  his  solici- 
*  397  tor,  who  has  personally  undertaken  to  file  such  printed  copy  *  is 
to  pay  to  the  defendant  all  his  costs  of  the  suit,  such  costs  to  be 
taxed  and  recoverable  without  further  order ;  and  the  certificate  of  the 
Eecord  and  Writ  Clerk  of  the  non-filing  of  the  printed  bill  is  to  be  suffi- 
cient authority  to  the  taxing  master  to  tax  the  costs.1 

The  Court  has  a  discretionary  power,  in  a  proper  case,  to  allow  the 
written  bill  to  be  restored  and  a  printed  bill  to  be  filed  after  the  expira- 
tion of  the  fourteen  days,2  on  an  application,  by  motion,  to  the  Judge  to 
whose  Court  the  cause  is  attached.  If  none  of  the  defendants  has 
entered  an  appearance,  the  application  may,  it  is  conceived,  be  made  ex 
parte :  otherwise,  notice  of  the  motion  must  be  served  on  such  of  them 


8  15  &16  Vice.  86,  §1,  but  see  §9;  Cons. 
Ord.  IX.  3.  It  is  the  business  of  the  plaintiff  to 
get  the  bill  printed,  by  such  printer  as  he  may 
select.  The  proof  of  the  bill  should  be  very 
carefully  examined  and  corrected  (for  which  a 
fee  of  2d.  per  folio  is  allowed  by  the  Regul.  to 
Ord.  2d  Sch  ),  as  no  bill  will  be  filed  as  a 
printed  bill,  unless  alterations  (if  any)  are  made 
in  type.  Braithwaite's  Pr.  25.  But  a  printed 
bill  with  written  alterations  may  be  filed  as  a 
written  bill,  where  a  written  bill  could  be  filed. 
Ibid.  Some  directions  as  to  the  manner  in 
which  the  proof  should  be  corrected  will  be 
found  in  Vol.  III. 

4  Cons.  Ord.  IX.  3. 

6  Falkland  Islands  Co.  v.  Lafone,  3  W.  R. 
561.  L.  JJ. 

6  Yate  v.  Lighthead,  16  Jur.  964,  V.  C.  T. 

7  For  form  of  undertaking,  see  Vol.  III. 
The  undertaking  may  be  either  indorsed  on  the 
copy  bill  intended  to  be  filed,  or  be  written  on 
a  separate  paper,  to  be  filed  therewith.  Braith- 
waite's Pr.  23. 

s  15  &  16  Vic.  c  86,  §  6.     The  printed  copy 

396 


must,  of  course,  be  a  copy  of  the  written  bill  as 
it  stands  at  the  time  the  printed  copy  is  filed. 
Braithwaite's  Pr.  24.     The  written  and  printed 
copies  will  remain  together  on  the  file.     Ibid. 
9  Ord.  6  March.  1860,  r.  16. 

10  Cons.  Ord.  XL.  18;  see  Fit  v.  Burial  Board 
of  Islington.  2  W.  R.  584,  V.  C  W.  Costs  of 
written  bill  allowed  on  subsequent  application; 
direction  having  been  accidentally  omitted;  but 
without  costs  of  application.  Hewitt  v.  White, 
12  Jur.  X.  S.  46  ;  14  W.  R.  220,  V.  C.  K. 

11  The  practice  of  the  office  is  to  take  the 
written  bill  off  the  file  on  the  fifteenth  day,  but 
it  is  not  destroyed.     Braithwaite's  Pr.  24. 

1  Cons.  Ord.  IX.  4.  When  proceedings  were 
stayed,  however,  the  written  bill  was  ordered 
to  be  retained  on  the  file.  Lord  Abingdon  v. 
Thornhill.  3  \V.  R.  615,  V.  C.  W".  And  so 
where,  after  an  interim  order,  the  suit  was  ar- 
ranged.    Garland  v.  Riordan,  33  Beav.  448. 

2  Ferrand  v.  Bradford,  8  De  G.  M.  &  G.  93; 
2  Jur.  N.  S.  360 ;  affirming  21  Beav.  422;  2 
Jur.  N.  S.  175. 


PRINTING   AND   FILING   THE  BILL.  *  398 

as  have  appeared,8  and  be  supported  by  an  affidavit  accounting  for  the 
delay ; 4  and  the  defendants  will  be  entitled  to  their  costs  of  appearing  on 
the  motion.5 

If  a  printed  bill  be  filed,  and  there  is  a  discrepancy  between  it  and  the 
written  bill,  the  defendant  may  move,  on  notice,  that  both  bills  be  taken 
off  the  file.6 

The  solicitor,  or  the  plaintiff  suing  in  person,  must  cause  to  be  printed 
or  written  upon  the  bill  his  name  and  place  of  business,  or  residence,  and 
also,  if  his  place  of  business  (or  residence)  shall  be  more  than  three  miles 
from  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerks'  Office,  another  proper  place,  to  be 
called  his  address  for  service  (which  must  not  be  more  than  three  miles 
from  that  office),  where  writs,  notices,  orders,  summonses,  and  other 
written  communications  may  be  left  for  him ;  and  where  any  such  solici- 
tor shall  only  be  the  agent  of  any  other  solicitor,  he  must  add  to  his  own 
name  or  firm  and  place  of  business  the  name  or  firm  and  place  of  business 
of  the  principal  solicitor.7 

Every  original  bill 8  must,  at  the  .option  of  the  plaintiff,  be  distinctly 
marked,  at  or  near  the  top  or  upper  part  thereof,  either  with  the  words 
"Lord  Chancellor,"  or  with  the  words  "  Master  of  the  Rolls  ;  "  and  if 
with  the  words  "Lord  Chancellor,"  then  also  with  the  name  of  one  of 
the  Vice  Chancellors,  at  the  plaintiff's  option  ;  and  the  Record  and  Writ 
Clerks  are  not  to  file  any  bill  which  is  not  marked  as  above.9 

*  When  the  bill  has  been  marked  with  the  name  of  a  Judge,  the  *  398 
cause  is  attached  to  his  Court  ;x  and  except  in  the  case  of  orders 
made  in  vacation,2  or  of  orders  of  course,3  all  further  proceedings  in  the 
cause,4  and  rehearings  otherwise  than  by  way  of  appeal,  must  be  had 
before  him,  unless  the  cause  or  proceeding  is  removed  from  his  Court  by 
any  special  order  of  the  Lord  Chancellor,  or  the  Lords  Justices.6 

An  order  for  the  transfer  of  a  cause  from  one  branch  of  the  Court  to 
another  will  be  made,  whenever  there  is  a  probability  of  convenience 

8  Moss  v.  Syers,  9  Jur.  N.  S.  1219;  11  W.  R.  2  Cons.  Ord.  VI  11 ;  see  Man  o.  Rickets,  9 

1047,  V.  C.  K. "  Beav.  4  ;  Holloway  v.  Phillips,   17   Jur.  875, 

*  For  form  of  order,  see  Seton,  1242,  No.  1.  V.  C.  W. ;  Price  r.  Gardner,  1  Jur.  N.  S.  975, 
An  indorsement,  signed  by  the   Registrar,  on  V.  C.  W.  ;  Bean  v.  Griffiths,  id.  1045,  V.  C.  W. ; 
the  printed  bill  intended   to  be  filed,  is  suffi-  Warrick  v.  Queen's  College,  L.  R.  3  Ch.  815. 
cient.  without  drawing  up  a  formal  order,  where  3  Cons.  Ord.  VI.  9;  13  &  14  Vic.  c.  35,  §  29; 
no  direction   as   to   costs   is  given;   see   Bank  Magan  v.  Magan,  16  Jur.  587,  V. C. K. 

of  Hindustan  v.  Hodgson,   1864,  H.,  No.  275;  *  But  see  Cons.  Ord.  XXXV.  59. 

Bank  of  Hindustan  v.  Robinson,  1864,  H.,  No.  6  Cons.  Ord.  VI.  5;  see  Earl  of  Shrewsbury 

272.     For  forms  of  motion  paper,  and  notice  of  v.  Trappes,  2  De  G.   F.  &  J.  172;  Fox  well  v. 

motion,  see  Vol.  III.  Bostock,  12  W.  R.  723,  L.  C.     Upon  any  Vice- 

6  Moss  v.  Syers,  ubi  supra.  Chancellor   ceasing   to  hold  office,  the  cause, 

6  Falkland  Islands  Co.  i\  Lafone,  3  W.  R.  unless  removed  by  any  special  order  of  the 
561,  L.  JJ.  For  form  of  notice  of  motion,  see  Lord  Chancellor,  or  Lords  Justices,  is  thence- 
Vol.  III.  forward  attached  to  the  Court  of  his  successor. 

7  Cons.  Ord.  III.  2,  5.  For  forms,  see  Cons.  Ord.  VI.  7.  As  to  the  power  of  a  Judge 
Vol.  III.  to  make  an  order  affecting  a  fund  standing  to 

8  The  word  "  bill  "  includes  "  information."  the  credit  of  a  cause  attached  to  another  branch 
Cons.  Ord.  Prel.  Ord.  10  (4).  of  the  Court,  see   Wright  v.   Irving,   10   Sim 

9  Cons.  Ord.  VI.  1.  The  Judge's  name  may  625;  Bryson  r.  Warwick  Canal  Co.  18  Jur. 
be  added  in  writing  to  a  printed  bill,  if  inad-  893,  V.  C.  W.;  Weeding  v.  Weeding,  1  J.  & 
vertentlv  omitted.     Braithwaite's  Pr.  25.  H.  424. 


l  Cons.  Ord.  VI.  1. 


397 


399 


THE    BILL. 


from  so  doing.6  The  order  is  made  upon  motion,7  with  notice  ; 8  but  the 
consent  of  the  Judges,  from  whom  and  to  whom  the  cause  is  to  be  trans- 
ferred, and  the  leave  of  the  Lord  Chancellor,  or  the  Lords  Justices,  to 
give  notice  of  the  motion,  must  be  first  obtained :  the  consent  and  leave 
are  usually  given  as  a  matter  of  course,  on  the  ex  parte  application  of 
counsel.3  If  leave  is  given,  the  motion  will  be  placed  in  the  Court  paper 
for  the  day  appointed  for  the  hearing.10  If  one  of  the  causes  is  attached 
to  the  Rolls  Court,  the  order  of  transfer  must  be  made  by  the  Master  of 
the  Rolls,  as  well  as  the  Lord  Chancellor  or  the  Lords  Justices.11  The 
order  of  transfer,  when  passed  and  entered,  should  be  left  with  the 
Record  and  Writ  Clerk,  for  entry  in  his  cause  book.12 

The  copy  of  the  bill  being  thus  prepared,  it  is  delivered  to  the  Clerk 

of  Records  and  Writs,  who  thereupon  writes  thereon  the  date  on  which 

it  is  brought  into  his  office,  numbers  it,  and  receives  it  into  his 

*  399    custody.     The  bill  is  then  said  to  be  filed,  and  of  record ;  *  but 

before  this  process  is  completed  it  is  not  of  any  effect  in  Court.1 

If  the  bill  has  been  inadvertently  filed  without  the  signature  of  coun- 
sel, an  order  as  of  course  may  be  obtained,  on  motion  or  petition,  giving 


6  Curlewis  v.  Whidborne,  10  W.  R.  261,  L. 
,TJ.;  Sidebottom  i>.  Sidebottom,  14  W.  R.  507, 
L.  JJ.;  see  ante,  p.  70;  and  post,  Chap.  XIX. 
§  1,  Dismissing  Bills. 

7  For  forms  of  notice  of  motion,  see  Vol. 
III. 

8  Bond  v.  Barnes,  2  De  G.  F.  &  J.  387. 

9  For  form  of  motion  paper,  see  Vol.  III. 

10  As  to  service  of  the  notice  of  motion  and 
the  hearing,  see  post,  Chap.  XXXV.  §  2,  Mo- 
tions. The  party  giving  the  notice  must  be 
provided,  at  the  hearing,  with  copies  of  it  for 
the  use  of  the  Court. 

n  See  5  Vic.  c.  5,  §  30;  Seton,  1268;  and 
ante,  p.  70,  note.  For  forms  of  order  for  the 
transfer  of  causes,  see  Seton,  1268,  Nos.  1-4. 
The  retransfer  of  a  cause  which  has  been  trans- 
ferred under  a  General  Order  is  obtained  in  the 
manner  above  explained.  As  to  such  retransfer, 
see  Sidebottom  v.  Sidebottom,  7  W.  R.  104,  L. 
C;  Tiffin  v.  Parker,  12  W.  R.  698,  L.  C;  Piatt 
v.  Walter,  L.  R.  1  Ch.  471,  L.  JJ.;  Pietroni  v. 
Transatlantic  Co.  14  W.  R.  783,  L.  C. ;  Whit- 
taker  v.  Fox,  ibid.;  Betts  v.  Rimmel,  ibid. 
Semble,  the  order  is  in  the  nature  of  an  order 
nisi,  and  notice  of  the  application  need  not  be 
given.  Wilson  v.  Gray,  ibid.  For  form  of 
order  for  retransfer,  see  Seton,  1269.  No.  5. 
The  order  in  such  case  can  only  be  made  by 
the  Lord  Chancellor,  or  Lords  Justices.  Ibid. 
For  form  of  notice  of  motion,  see  Vol.  III. 

12  Braithwaite's  Pr.  566. 

i  Cons.  Ord.  I.  35,  45,  48;  Cons.  Ord.  VIII. 
3.  The  fee  on  filing  the  bill  is  20s.  higher 
scale,  and  10s.  lower  scale;  and  is  paid  by 
Chancery  Fee  Fund  Stamps,  affixed  to  the  bill. 
Where  a  written  bill  has  been  filed,  no  fee  is 
pavable  on  filing  the  printed  bill.     Jones  v. 

398 


Batten,  9  Hare  App.  57;  2  De  G.  M.  &  G.  111. 
As  to  using  several  stamps,  see  Brain  v.  Brain, 
9  Hare  App.  90,  and  Cons.  Ord.  XXXIX.  7. 
As  to  printing  and  delivery  of  pleadings  under 
the  present  English  Practice,  see  1  Dan.  Ch. 
Prac.  (6th  Eng.  ed.)  389,  390,  435. 

In  Massachusetts  (Ch.  Rule  2)  the  plaintiff 
must  file  his  bill  before  or  at  the  time  of  taking 
out  the  subpoena ;  and  no  injunction  or  other 
proceeding  shall  be  ordered  until  the  bill  is 
filed,  unless  for  good  cause  shown.  In  Ver- 
mont, no  injunction  shall  be  issued  in  anj-  case 
until  the  bill  shall  have  been  filed.  Gen.  Stats. 
c.  29,  §§  55,  56;  Howe  v.  VVillard,  40  Vt.  654. 
The  cause  is,  in  fact,  pending  in  the  Court  from 
the  time  the  Chancellor  makes  the  order  for 
issuing  the  injunction.  Howe  t\  Willard, 
supra. 

A  suit  in  Equity  is  commenced,  it  seems, 
when  the  bill  is  filed.  McLin  v.  McNamara,  2 
Dev.  &  Bat.  Ch.  82;  Aston  v.  Gallowwy,  3  Ired. 
Ch.  126;  ante,  p.  2,  n.  (a). 

By  Chancery  Rule  40,  in  New  Jersey,  the 
Clerk  of  the  Court  of  Chancery  is  required  to 
keep  in  his  office  a  docket  in  which  he  shall 
enter  the  titles  of  all  suits  brought  in  the  Court, 
and  a  memorandum  of  every  paper  filed  in  the 
same,  under  the  title  of  the  suit,  with  the  time 
of  filing  and  the  name  of  the  solicitor  of  each 
party,  and  also  an  alphabetical  index  to  the 
same;  and  the  said  docket  shall  be,  at  all 
proper  hours,  accessible  to  the  bar.  By  the 
16th  Equity  Rule  of  the  U.  S.  Courts,  upon  the 
return  of  the  suhpcena.  as  served  and  executed 
upon  any  defendant,  the  clerk  shall  enter  the 
suit  upon  his  docket  as  pending  in  the  Court, 
and  shall  state  the  time  of  the  entry. 


PRINTING    AND    FILING   THE   BILL.  *  400 

leave  to  amend  by  adding  such  signature ; 2  but  any  defendant  who  has 
appeared  may,  before  such  amendment  is  made,  take  advantage  of  the 
irregularity  by  demurrer,  or  by  special  motion  to  take  the  bill  off  the 
file.3 

The  copy  of  an  information  intended  to  be  filed  must:  bear  the  signa- 
ture of  the  Attorney-General.4  To  obtain  this,  a  copy  of  the  draft  is  left 
with  him,  together  with  a  certificate  of  the  counsel  who  settled  it,  that 
it  is  proper  for  his  sanction,  and  also  a  certificate  of  the  solicitor  for  the 
relator  that  he  is  a  proper  person  to  be  relator,  and  is  able  to  pay  costs ; 5 
and  if  the  Attorney-General  approves  of  the  draft,  he  will  then,  on  the 
copy  to  be  filed  being  left  with  him,  together  with  a  certificate  that  it  is 
a  true  copy  of  the  draft  as  settled  by  counsel,6  affix  his  signature  thereto. 
The  information,  so  signed,  is  then  filed,  in  the  same  manner  as  a  bill. 

The  bill  being  thus  filed,  the  defendant  is  entitled,  after  appearance, 
to  demand  from  the  plaintiff  any  number  of  printed  copies  not  exceeding 
ten,7  on  payment  for  the  same  at  the  rate  of  one  half-penny  per  folio 8  of 
seventy-two  words.9 

A  bill  may  be  ordered  to  be  taken  from  the  files  if  vexatious  ;  as  where 
it  was  filed  after  four  previous  bills  for  substantially  the  same  matter 
had  been  successfully  demurred  to.10  'So,  if  it  is  illusory,  the  plaintiff 
being  indemnified  by,  and  being  the  puppet  of,  some  other  person 
who  has  instituted  the  suit  for  the  purpose  of  annoyance  and 
vexation.11 

*  The  2  &  3  Vic.  c.  11,  §  7,  provides  that  no  lis  pendens  shall  *  400 
bind  a  purchaser  or  mortgagee  without  express  notice  thereof, 
unless  and  until  a  memorandum  or  minute  1  containing  the  name  and 
the  usual  or  last-known  place  of  abode,  and  the  title,  trade,  or  profession 
of  the  person  whose  estate  is  intended  to  be  affected  thereby,  and  the 
Court  of  Equity,  and  the  title  of  the  cause  or  information,  and  the  day 
when  the  bill  or  information  was  filed,  shall  be  left  with  the  Senior 
Master  of  the  Court  of  Common  Pleas  ;  who  is  required  by  the  Act 
forthwith  to  enter  the  same  in  a  book,  provided  for  that  purpose,  in 
alphabetical  order,  by  the  name  of  the  person  whose  estate  is  intended  to 
be  affected  by  such  lis  pendens? 

The  memorandum  or  minute,  containing  the  particulars  required  by 
the  Act,  must,  by  the  regulations  of  the  office,  be  on  parchment,  and  a 


2  Braithwaite's  Pr.  23;  and  see  Coppeard  v.  ll  Robson  v.  Dodd,  L.  R.  8  Eq.  301  ;    but  see 

Mayhew,  22  L.  J.  Ch.  408,  M.  R.  Fisher  v.  London  Offices  Co.  \V.  N.  (1870),  113, 

»  Ante,  p.  312.  M.  R. 

4  Braithwaite's  Pr.  25.  1  For  form  of  memorandum,  see  Vol.  III. 

5  For  forms  of  these  certificates,  see   Vol.  2  As  to  the  doctrine  of  lis  pendens,  inde- 
III.  pendently  of  the  Act,  see  Sugd.  V.  &  P.  758, 

5  Ibid.                   •  and   cases  cited;    Shelford's  R.   P.  Acts,  534; 

7  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  7;  Cons.  Ord.  IX.  5.  and  since  the  Act,  ibid.;  Bellamy  v.  Sabine,  1 
For  form  of  application,  see  Vol.  III.  De  G.  &  J.  566;   3  Jur.  N.   S.  943:  Tyler  r. 

8  Cons.  Ord.  XL.  19.  Thomas,  25  Beav.  47;  Nortcliffe  v.  Warburton, 
«  ReRul.  to  Ord.  IV.  4.  8  Jur.  N.  S.  353,  V.  C  S. ;  id.  854,  L.  C. :  4  De 

1°  Mortlock  v.  Mortlock,  20  L.  T.  N.  S.  773,  G.  F.  &  J.  449.    And  see  ante,  p.  280,  notes 

V.  C.  S. ;  but  see  Seaton  v.  Grant,  L.  R.  2  Ch.  5  and  7. 
459,  464. 

399 


401 


THE   BILL. 


separate  memorandum  is  required  for  every  defendant  or  other  person  in 
whose  name  the  registry  is  proposed  to  be  made.3 

The  plaintiff's  solicitor,  or  other  person  leaving  this  memorandum  with 
the  Senior  Master,  is  required  to  sign  an  admission  of  having  left  it,  and 
to  take  a  receipt  for  it.4 

The  Act  above  cited  also  provides  that  such  lis  pendens  shall,  after  the 
expiration  of  five  years  from  the  date  of  the  entry  thereof,  be  null  and 
void  against  lands,  tenements,  and  other  hereditaments,  as  to  purchasers, 
mortgagees,  or  creditors,  unless  a  like  memorandum  or  minute  as  was 
required  in  the  first  instance  is  again  left  with  the  Senior  Master  within 
five  years  before  the  execution  of  the  conveyance,  settlement,  mortgage, 
lease,  or  other  deed  or  instrument  vesting  or  transferring  the  legal  or 
equitable  right,  title,  estate,  or  interest  in  or  to  any  purchaser,  or  mortga- 
gee for  valuable  consideration,  or,  as  to  creditors,  within  five  years  before 
the  right  of  such  creditors  accrued;  and  so  toties  quotiesat  the  expira- 
tion of  every  succeeding  five  years ; 5  and  the  Senior  Master  is  forth- 
with to  re-enter  the  same,  in  like  manner  as  the  same  was  originally 
entered.6 

Formerly,  no  provision  was  made  by  statute  for  the  discharge 
*401  of  a  lis  pendens  ;7  but  by  the  23  &  24  Vic.  c.  115,  §2,  *  it  was 
enacted,  that  the  Senior  Master,  upon  the  filing  with  him  of  an 
acknowledgment  by  the  plaintiff  in  the  form  or  to  the  effect  therein 
mentioned,1  shall  be  at  liberty  to  enter  a  satisfaction  or  discharge  as  to 
any  registered  pending  suit  or  Us  pendens ;  and  he  may  issue  certificates 
of  the  entry  of  any  satisfaction  or  discharge.2  The  practice  which  pre- 
vailed prior  to  this  Act,  and  which  may  still  be  resorted  to,  for  the 
purpose  of  getting  the  registry  of  a  lis  pendens  discharged,  is  to  obtain 
an  order  in  the  cause,  as  of  course,  at  the  Rolls,  on  a  petition  presented 
by  the  plaintiff,3  or  by  a  defendant  or  other  person  interested,  with  the 
consent  of  the  plaintiff's  solicitor  subscribed  to  the  petition  ; 4  or,  where 
the  plaintiff  will  not  consent,  by  a  special  petition  or  summons  6  in  the 
cause,  which  must  be  served  on  the  plaintiff's  solicitor,  and  be  supported 
by  evidence  showing  that  the  purposes  for  which  the  suit  was  registered 
have  been  satisfied.  This  order  is  filed  with  the  Senior  Master ;  and  the 
person  leaving  it  is  required  to  sign  an  admission  of  having  left  it,  and 
to  take  a  receipt  for  it.     The  officer  will  thereupon  enter  on  the  register 


3  Pack's  Pr.  12. 

4  [bid.  A  fee  of  2s.  6rf.  is  payable  for  each 
entry.     2  &  .3  Vic.  c.  11,  §  7. 

5  By  the  18  &  19  Vic.  c.  15,  §  6,  it  is  suffi- 
cient if  the  memorandum  is  left  with  the  Senior 
Master,  for  re-registry  of  judgments,  decrees, 
orders,  or  rules,  within  five  years  before  the 
execution  of  the  conveyance,  &c,  or,  as  to 
creditors,  within  five  years  before  their  rights 
accrued ;  although  more  than  five  years  have 
elapsed  since  the  last  previous  registration 
before  such  memorandum  is  left;  and  so  toties 
qnoties  upon  every  re-registry.  As  to  whether 
tni<  provision  applies  ti>  a  lis  pendens,  see  2  & 
3  Vic.  c.  11.  §  7:  Sugd.  V.  &  P.  543. 

400 


6  2  &  3  Vic.  c.  11,  §§  4,  7.  For  each  re- 
entry the  fee  is  Is. ;  see  §§  4,  7.  For  form  of 
memorandum  to  be  used  on  a  re-registry,  see 
Vol.  III. 

7  Pask's  Pr.  117. 

1  For  the  form  of  such  acknowledgment, 
see  Vol.  III. 

2  The  fee  for  entering  satisfaclion  is  2s. 
6<f.,  and  for  the  certificate,  Is.  23  &  24  Vic.  c. 
115,  §  2. 

8  For  form  of  petition,  see  Vol.  III.;  and 
for  form  of  order,  see  Pask's  Pr.  123. 

4  For  form  of  consent,  see  Vol.  I  [I. 

5  Fowler  r.  Liles,  V.  C.  S.,  in  Chambers,  15 
June,  1855,  Reg.  Lib.  A.  1037. 


AMENDING    THE   BILL. 


401 


a  memorandum  of  the  date  of  the  order,  and  affix  thereto  a  stamp,  bear- 
ing the  word  "  satisfied." 6 


Section  VIII.  —  Amending  the  Bill. 

When  a  plaintiff  has  preferred  his  bill,  and  is  advised  that  the  same 
does  not  contain  such  material  facts,  or  make  all  such  persons  parties, 
as  are  necessary  to  enable  the  Court  to  do  complete  justice,  he  may  alter 
it,  by  inserting  new  matter,7  or  by  adding  such  persons  as  shall  be 
deemed  necessary  parties ;  or  in  case  the  original  bill  shall  be  found  to 
contain  matter  not  relevant,  or  no  longer  necessary  to  the  plaintiffs  case, 
or  to  name  as  parties  persons  who  may  be  dispensed  with,  the  same  may 
be  struck  out:  the  original  bill,  thus  added  to  or  altered,  is  termed  an 
amended  bill.8 


6  See  Pask's  Pr.  117. 

7  If  at  the  time  of  filing  the  bill  the  plaintiff 
had  no  title  to  the  relief  prayed,  he  cannot 
make  out  a  title  by  introducing  by  amendment 
facts  which  have  subsequently  occurred.  Att.- 
Gen.  p.  Portreeve  of  Avon,  11  W.  R.  1051,  L. 
JJ.;  see  also  Godfrey  v.  Tucker,  33  Beav.  280; 
9  Jur.  N.  S.  1188;  cases  cited,  33  Beav.  285,  n.; 
Beardmore  v.  Gregory,  2  H.  &  M.  491;  11  Jur- 
N.  S.  363;  Evans  v.  Bagshaw,  L.  R.  8  Eq. 
469;  affirmed,  L.  R.  5  Ch.  340;  Ward  v. 
Booth,  L.  R.  14  Eq.  195.  Contra,  Talbot  v. 
Lord  Radnor,  3  M.  &  K.  252 ;  Dell  v.  Griffits, 
16  W.  R.  30. 

8  Hinde,  21.  A  written  bill  may  be  thus 
amended,  as  well  as  a  printed  bill ;  see  Mc- 
Dougald  r.  Williford,  14  Ga.  665;  post,  pp.  411- 
413,  note,  and  Rules  of  the  Courts  of  the  United 
States,  Massachusetts,  and  New  Hampshire, 
there  stated.  Amendments  can  only  be  grant- 
ed where  the  bill  is  defective  in  parties,  or  in 
prayer  for  relief,  or  in  the  omission  or  mistake 
of  a  fact  or  circumstance  connected  with  the  sub- 
stance, but  not  forming  the  substance  itself, 
nor  repugnant  thereto.  The  latter  part  of  this 
principle  applies  to  all  pleadings  in  Equity, 
as  well  as  to  bills.  Verplanck  v.  Mercantile 
Ins.  Co.  1  Edw.  Ch.  46;  Lyon  v.  Tallmadge,  1 
John.  Ch.  184;  Rogers  v.  Rogers,  1  Paige,  424; 
Bowen  v.  Cross,  4  John.  Ch.  375;  Renwick  v. 
Wilson,  6  John.  Ch.  81 ;  Belknap  v.  Stone,  1 
Allen,  572;  Carey  v.  Smith,  11  Ga.  539;  Lar- 
kins  v.  Biddle,  21  Ala.  252.  Being  regarded 
only  with  reference  to  the  furtherance  of  jus- 
tice, amendments,  as  a  general  rule,  are  in  the 
discretion  of  the  Court,  especially  in  matters 
of  mere  form.  Smith  v.  Babcock,  3  Sumner, 
410;  Garlick  v.  Strong,  3  Paige,  440;  McEI- 
wain  v.  Willis,  id.  505;  Howell  v.  Sebring,  14 
N.  J.  Eq.  84.  Amendments  are,  therefore, 
always  allowed  with  great  liberality,  until  the 
proofs  are  closed  (Cock  v.  Evans,  9  Yerger,  287), 
except  where  the  bill  is  upon  oath.  Cock  v. 
Evans,  ubi    supra ;     Cunningham   v.    Pell,   6 

vol.  i.  —  26 


Paige,  655.  In  case  the  bill  is  upon  oath,  there 
is  greater  caution  exercised  in  reference  to 
amendments.  Ibid.;  Verplanck  v.  Merct.  Ins. 
Co.  1  Edw.  Ch.  46;  Swift  v.  Eckford,  6  Paige, 
22;  Lloyd  v.  Brewster,  4  Paige,  538;  Parker  v. 
Grant,  1  John.  Ch.  434;  Rogers  t\  Rogers,  1 
Paige,  424;  Whitmarsh  v.  Campbell,  2  Paige, 
67.  So  where  the  object  of  the  amendment  is 
to  let  in  new  facts  or  defences,  there  is  greater 
reluctance  on  the  part  of  the  Court  to  allow  the 
amendment  where  it  depends  upon  parol  proof, 
than  where  it  depends  on  written  instruments 
omitted  by  accident  or  mistake.  Smith  v. 
Babcock,  3  Sumner,  410;  Calloway  v.  Dobson, 

1  Brock.  119.  And  the  Court  will  not  allow 
amendments  by  inserting  facts  known  to  the 
pi  i  in  tiff  at  the  time  of  filing  his  bill,  unless 
some  excuse  is  given  for  the  omission.  Whit- 
marsh p.  Campbell,  2  Paige,  67;  Prescott  v. 
Hubbell,  1  Hill  Ch.  217.  Nor  where  the  mat- 
ter of  the  proposed  amendment  might  with 
reasonable  diligence  have  been  inserted  in  the 
Original  bill.     North  Amer.  Coal  Co.  v.  Dyett, 

2  Edw.  Ch.  115. 

When  a  plaintiff  wishes  to  amend  a  sworn 
bill,  he  must  state  the  proposed  amendments 
distinctly,  so  that  the  Court  can  see  that  they 
are  merely  in  addition  to  the  original  hill,  and 
not  inconsistent  therewith.  He  must  also  swear 
to  the  truth  of  the  proposed  amendments,  and 
render  a  valid  excuse  for  not  incorporating 
them  in  the  original  bill ;  and  the  application  to 
amend  must  be  made  as  soon  as  the  necessity 
for  such  amendment  is  discovered.  Rogers  v. 
Rogers,  1  Paige,  424;  Whitmarsh  r.  Campbell, 
2  Paige,  67;  Verplanck  v.  Merct.  Ins.  Co.  1 
Edw.  Ch.  46;  Altree  v.  Horden,  3  Lond.  Jurist, 
81.  As  to  the  stage  of  the  cause  at  which  ap- 
plications for  leave  to  amend  should  be  made 
and  acted  upon,  see  Hewett »:.  Adams,  50  Maine, 
271;  Clark  v.  Society  in  Keene,  46  N.  H.  272, 
and  cases  cited;  Codington  v.  Mott,  14  N.  J. 
Eq.  430;  infra,  p.  424.  The  Chancery  Division 
in  England  has  now  apparently  larger  power  to 

401 


402 


THE    BILL. 


*  402  *  But,  although  it  is  the  practice  to  call  a  bill  thus  altered 
an  amended  bill,  the  amendment  is  in  fact  esteemed  but  as  a 
continuation  of  the  original  bill,  and  as  forming  part  of  it ;  for  both  the 
original  and  amended  bill  constitute  but  one  record ; 1  so  much  so,  that 
where  an  original  bill  is  fully  answered,  and  amendments  are  afterwards 
made,  to  which  the  defendant  does  not  answer,  the  whole  record  may  be 
taken,  pro  confesso,  generally,2  and  an  order  to  take  the  bill  pro  confesso 
as  to  the  amendments  only  will  be  irregular.3  (a)    An  amended  bill  must 


authorize  amendments  than  the  former  Court  of 
Chancery.  See  Budding  v.  Murdoch,  1  Ch.  D. 
42;  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  XXVIII.  2-7;  1  Dan.  Ch. 
Prac  (6th  Eng.  ed.)  391-400,  4-37-443;  but  see 
Re  St.  Nazaire  Co.  12  Ch.  D.  88.  92;  Newby 
v.  Sliarpe,  8  Ch.  D.  39;  Laird  v.  Briggs,  16  Ch. 
D.  440;  19  id.  22. 

i  Verer.  Glynn,  2  Dick.  441 ;  Hoytfl.  Smith, 
28  Conn.  466;  Ilurd  v.  Everett,  1  Paige,  124; 
Walsh  v.  Smyth,  3  Bland,  9,  20;  O'Grady  v. 
Barry,  1  Irish  Eq.  56;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §§  332, 
885;  Carey  v.  Smith,  11  Ga.  539.  Equitable 
Life  Assurance  Society  »>■  Laird,  24  N.  J.  Eq. 
319;  Wilson  v.  Beadle,  2  Head,  572;  Bradley 
v.  Dibrell,  3  Heisk.  522;  Seay  v.  Ferguson,  1 
Tenn.  Ch.  291;  Hix  v.  Gosling,  1  Lea,  560. 

2  Jopling  v.  Stuart,  4  Ves.  619.  Where  the 
plaintiff  amends  his  bill  after  answer,  if  a  further 


(a)  See  Re  Taylor's  Estate,  22  Ch.  D.  495; 
Bourne  v.  Coulter,  53  L.  J.  Ch.  699;  Preston 
Corp.  v.  Fullwood  Local  Board,  34  W.  R.  200; 
1  Seton  on  Judgments  (5th  ed.),  38;  Nellis  v. 
Pennock  Manuf.  Co.  38  Fed.  Rep.  379;  Metro- 
politan Nat.  Bank  v.  St.  Louis  Dispatch  Co.  id. 
57;  Hamilton  v.  Southern  Nevada  M.  Co.  33  id. 
562;  Phelps  v.  Elliott,  26  id.  881;  Stanford  v. 
Murphy,  63  Ga.  410;  Cross  v.  Bean,  81  Maine, 
525;  Gilpatrick  v.  Glidden,  82  Maine,  201 ;  Rob- 
inson v.  Missisquoi  R.  Co.  59  Vt.  426;  Smith 
v.  Hadley,  64  N.  H.  97;  New  York  Fire  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Tooker,  35  N.  J.  Eq.  408;  Angell  v.  Penn. 
R.  Co.  37  id.  92;  Bolman  v.  Lohman,  74  Ala. 
507;  Morton  v.  New  Orleans  &c.  Ry.  Co.  79 
Ala.  590;  Conner?;.  Smith,  88  Ala.  300;  Ward 
v.  Whitfield,  64  Miss.  754;  Binkert  v.  Wabash 
Ry.  Co.  98  III.  205;  Bradish  v.  Grant,  119  111. 
606;  Gage  v.  Brown,  125  111.  522;  Bishop  v. 
Wood,  59  Ind.  253;  Frey  v.  Owens,  27  Neb. 
862;  Crumlish  v.  Shenandoah  Vall-y  R.  Co.  28 
W.  Va.  623.  The  allowance  of  an  amended 
pleading  is  an  adjudication  that  proper  diligence 
was  used  in  discovering  the  new  facts  pleaded. 
Adams  County  v.  Burlington  &  M.  R.  R.  Co. 
55  Iowa,  94.  The  filing  of  an  amendment 
waives  error  of  ruling  upon  the  original  bill. 
Bell  v.  Waudby  (Wash.),  31  Pac.  R-p.  18.  A 
decree  of  itself  cannot  operate  to  change,  elimi- 
nate, or  amend  the  pleadings;  and  although  the 
Court  may  suggest  or  direct  an  amendment,  the 
election  still  remains  with  the  party  to  amend  or 

402 


answer  of  the  amended  bill  becomes  necessary, 
and  is  not  waived,  the  defendant  must  put  in  a 
further  answer  to  the  amendment;  or  the  plain- 
tiff will  be  entitled  to  an  order  taking  the  whole 
bill,  as  amended,  as  confessed.  Trust  &  Fire 
Ins.  Co.  v.  Jenkins,  8  Paige,  589;  see  Thomas 
v.  Visitors  of  Frederick  Co.  School,  7  Gill  &  J. 
369;  Cowman  v.  Lovett,  10  Paige,  559;  Tedder 
v.  Stiles,  16  Ga.  1. 

3  Bacon  v.  Griffith,  4  Ves.  619,  note;  S.  C. 
2  Dick.  473;  Lea  v.  Vanbibber,  6  Humph.  18. 
But  the  plaintiff  may  limit  his  pro  confesso. 
Abergavenny  v.  Abergavenny,  2  Eq.  Cas.  Abr. 
178;  Weaver  v.  Livingstone,  Hopk.  Ch.  493; 
Smith  v.  St.  Louis  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.  2  Tenn. 
Ch.  605;  and  see  Landon  v.  Ready,  1  S.  & 
S.  44. 


not.  Caldwell  v.  King,  76  Ala.  149.  Leave 
may  be  granted  to  amend  nunc  pro  tunc, 
when  necessary  to  accomplish  justice.  Boren 
v.  Billington,  82  Texas,  137;  Owen  v.  Bank- 
head,  82  Ala.  399.  If  the  Court  did  not  have 
jurisdiction  when  the  bill  was  filed,  jurisdiction 
cannot  be  conferred  by  an  amendment.  Livey 
v.  Winton,  30  W.  Va.  554. 

The  amendment,  when  allowed,  takes  effect 
as  of  the  filing  of  the  original  bill,  if  no  injustice 
is  done  thereby  to  the  defendant.  White  v.  Soto, 
82  Cal.  654;  Miller  v.  Cook,  135  111.  190;  Jones 
v.  McPhillips,  82  Ala.  102.  If  the  amendment 
recasts  and  restates  the  original  pleading,  and 
is  intended  as  a  substitute  therefor,  the  original 
pleading  is  to  be  disregarded,  except  as  evi- 
dence. Smith  q.  Wigton,  35  Neb.  460;  Shipley 
v.  Reasoner  (Iowa),  54  N.  W.  Rep.  470.  The 
amendment  may  by  reference  incorporate  the 
averments  of  the  original  pleading,  even  though 
such  pleading  has  been  stricken  from  the  files 
prior  to  the  amendment.  Mahaska  County 
State  Bank  v.  Christ  (Iowa),  54  N.  W.  Rep. 
450. 

The  allowance  of  amendments  is  always 
discretionary  with  the  Court,  and  its  decision 
thereon  is  not  reviewable.  Chapman  v.  Barney, 
129  U.  S.  677.  As  to  the  considerations  influen- 
cing such  discretion,  see  Tildesley  v.  Harper, 
10  Ch.  D.  393;  Cropper  v.  Smith,  26  Ch.  D. 
700,  710;  Hardin  v.  Boyd,  113  U.  S.  756,  761; 
Noonau  v.  Caledonia  Gold  M.  Co.  121  U.  S. 


AMENDING   THE    BILL. 


403 


therefore,  in  all  cases,  be  addressed  to  the  same  Lord  Chancellor,  Lord 
Keeper,  or  Lords  Commissioners,  to  whom  the  original  bill  was  addressed, 
although  a  change  has  taken  place  in  the  custody  of  the  Great  Seal  be- 
tween the  times  of  filing  the  original  bill  and  the  amendment.4  Lut  so 
far  as  the  pendency  of  a  suit  can  affect  either  the  parties  to  it,  or 
strangers,  matter  brought  into  a  bill  by  amendment  will  not  *  have  *  403 
relation  to  the  time  of  filing  the  original  bill,  but  the  suit  will  be 
so  far  considered  as  pendent  only  from  the  time  of  the  amendment.1 

Where  there  is  a  bill  and  cross-bill,  and  the  plaintiff  in  the  original 
suit  amends  his  bill  before  answer,  he  will  lose  his  priority  of  suit,  and 
his  right  to  have  an  answer  before  he  is  called  upon  to  answer  the  cross- 
bill.2 

Amendments  to  a  bill  are  of  two  sorts :  those  which  relate  to  parties, 
and  those  which  affect  the  substance  of  the  case.8  Under  a  common 
order  to  amend  as  the  plaintiff  may  be  advised,  the  plaintiff  may,  before 
a  defendant  has  appeared  to  the  bill,  strike  out  the  name  of  such  defend- 
ant, or  the  name  of  a  co-plaintiff,  or  add  plaintiffs  or  defendants ; 4  after 
appearance,  the  plaintiff,  under  such  an  order,  may,  it  seems,  before 
answer,  add  the  names  of  plaintiffs  or  defendants,  but  he  cannot  strike 
out  the  names  of  plaintiffs  or  defendants ;  and  under  a  common  order  to 
amend  by  adding  parties,  the  plaintiff  cannot,  after  answer,  alter  his  bill, 
by  putting  in  the  names  of  other  persons  as  co-plaintiffs  with  himself,5 
or  after  appearance  by  striking  out  the  names  as  plaintiffs  of  any  persons 
filling  that  character  upon  the  original  record ; 6  nor  can  he  introduce  any 


4  If  the  description  of  the  plaintiff,  or  his 
next  friend,  is  not  the  same  as  when  the  bill 
was  filed,  the  new  description  should  appear  in 
the  amended  bill.  Kerr  v.  Gillespie,  7  Beav. 
269,  271 ;  8  Jur.  50 ;  but  the  name  of  his  solici- 
tor cannot  be  altered,  unless  an  order  to  change 
the  solicitor  has  been  obtained.  Braithwaite's 
Pr.  299. 

i  Ld.  Red.  330;  Long  v.  Burton,  2  Atk. 
218;  Lillard  v.  Porter,  2  Head,  177;  Miller  v. 
Taylor,  6  Heisk.  465. 

2  Steward  v.  Roe,  2  P.  Wms.  434;  Johnson 
v.  Freer,  2  Cox,  371;  Noel  v.  King,  2  Mad.  392; 
and  see  post.  Chap.  XXXIV.  §  1,  Cross  Bills. 
But  if  the  plaintiff  amends  his  bill  before  he 
knows  of  the  filing  of  the  cross-bill,  he  does  not 
lose  his  priority.  Gray  v.  Haig,  13  Beav.  65. 
The  rule  stated  in  the  text  applies,  it  is  con- 
ceived, to  a  concise  statement,  which,  under  15 
&  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  19,  may  be  substituted  for  a 
cross-bill.  See  Mertens  v.  Haigh,  1  J.  &  H. 
231;  6  Jur.  N.  S.  1288. 


393;  Richmond  v.  Irons,  id.  27;  United  States 
v.  American  Bell  Tel.  Co.  39  Fed.  Rep.  716; 
Fearey  v.  Hayes,  44  N.  J.  Fq.  425;  Perry  v. 
Perry,  65  Maine,  399.  An  amendment  will  not 
be  allowed  which  contradicts  the  party's  own 
testimony.  Chlein  v.  Kahat,  72  Iowa,  291. 
(a)  In  Massachusetts  and  Maine  an  action 


8  By  statute  in  Massachusetts,  amendments 
may  be  allowed  by  changing  suits  at  Law  into 
proceedings  in  Equity,  or  proceedings  in  Equity 
into  suits  at  Law,  if  the  same  be  necessary  to 
enable  the  plaintiff  to  sustain  his  action  for 
the  cause  for  which  it  was  intended  to  be 
brought,  (a)  Stat.  1865,  c.  179,  §  1 ;  see  Williston 
v.  Mich.  South.  &  North.  Ind.  K.  R.  Co.  13 
Allen,  400,  406.  And  the  statute  was  held  to 
apply  to  a  suit  pending  at  its  passage.  George 
v.  Reed,  101  Mass.  378. 

*  See  Braithwaite's  Pr.  300. 

6  Lock  v.  Bagley,  W.  N.  (1866)  65,  M.  R.; 
but  see  Hichens  v.  Congreve,  1  Sim.  500;  see 
also  Milligan  v.  Mitchell,  1  M.  &  C.  433,  442; 
see  1  C.  P.  Coop.  temp.  Cott.  35;  Story,  Eq. 
PI.  §  541,  note;  Miller  v.  McCan,  7  Paige, 451. 

6  Fellowes  v.  Deere,  3  Beav.  353;  Sloggett 
v.  Collins,  13  Sim.  456;  7  Jur.  639  ;  see  Mason 
v.  York  &  Cumb.  R.  R.  Co.  52  Maine,  107. 


at  Law  may  now  be  changed  by  amendment  into 
a  suit  in  Equity.  Mass.  Stat,  of  1883,  c  223; 
the  recent  Maine  Statute  is  printed  in  47  Alb. 
L.  J.  359.  In  Wisconsin  an  action  at  Law  can- 
not be  changed  by  amendment  into  one  in 
Equity.     Fischer  v.  Laack,  76  Wis.  313. 

403 


404 


THE   BILL. 


allegation,  against  the  original   defendants,  which  is  not  necessary  to 
explain  the  amendment.7 

In  some  cases,  special  orders  may,  however,  be  obtained  for  the  pur- 
pose of  altering  the  co-plaintiffs  ;  but  as  a  diminution  of  the  number  of 
plaintiffs  has  the  effect  of  lessening  the  defendant's  security  for  costs, 
an  order  will  not  be  made  to  strike  out  the  names  of  plaintiffs  without 
the  Court  also  providing,  at  the  same  time,  that  security  for  the  costs 
of  the   suit   shall   be   given,8   unless  such  security  be   waived   by  the 

defendants.9 
*  404        *  It  must  not  be  considered  as  a  matter  of  course  to  obtain  an 

order  to  strike  out  the  name  of  a  person  who  has  once  been  made 
a  plaintiff  in  a  cause,  even  upon  the  terms  of  giving  security  for  costs. 
Where  an  application  was  made,  by  a  number  of  relators  named  in  an 
information,  to  strike  out  the  names  of  several  of  themselves,  Lord  Cot- 
tenham,  in  refusing  the  motion,  observed  : 1  "It  cannot  be  justly  said, 
that  all  that  the  relators  have  to  establish  in  support  of  such  an  application 
is,  that  the  defendants  will  not  be  prejudiced  by  such  an  alteration  ;  they 
must  show  that  justice  will  not  be  done,  or  that  the  suit  cannot  be 
so  conveniently  prosecuted,  unless  the  alteration  is  made.  I  cannot  give 
them  such  an  advantage  as  they  ask,  and  permit  them  to  alter  the  record, 
merely  because  they  may  have  a  different  wish  at  one  time  from  that 
which  they   may  have    at  another  time,  which    may  be  the  result  of 


7  Gibson  v.  Ingo,  5  Hare,  156;  11  Jur.  555; 
Barlow  v.  M'Murray,  L.  R.  2  Eq.  420;  12  Jur. 
N.  S.  519,  V.  C.  S. 

8  For  form  of  order,  see  Seton,  1253,  No.  7; 
Sweeny  v.  Hull,  Sausse  &  S.  662. 

9  In  Brown  v.  Sawer,  3  Beav.  598 ;  5  Jur. 
500,  one  of  two  co-plaintiffs,  who  had  author- 
ized the  institution  of  the  suit,  refused  to  pro- 
ceed in  it ;  and  a  motion  was  made,  on  behalf 
of  the  other  co-plaintiff,  that  she  might  be  at 
liberty  to  amend  the  bill  by  striking  out  the 
name  of  the  co-plaintiff  who  had  refused  to 
proceed,  and  by  making  him  a  defendant,  and 
that  he  might  be  ordered  to  pay  the  costs  occa- 
sioned by  such  amendment,  and  also  the  costs  of 
giving  any  security  for  costs  which  the  defend- 
ants or  any  of  them  might  be  declared  entitled 
to  in  consequence  of  such  amendment,  and  inci- 
dental thereto,  and  also  the  costs  of  ar.d  incident 
to  that  application,  to  be  taxed  as  betwef  n  soli- 
citor and  client.  Lord  Langdale  M.  R.  in  giving 
judgment  upon  the  motion,  said:  "The  suit 
cannot  be  prosecuted  unless  the  alteration  is 
made,  and  therefore  justice  will  not  be  done 
unless  the  alteration  is  made.  I  think,  there- 
fore, that  this  order  must  be  made,  but  on  such 
terms  as  will  be  just  towards  the  defendants, 
and  by  securing  the  costs  of  suit  already  in- 
curred; and  the  co-plaintiff  having,  by  revoking 
the  authority,  made  this  application  necessary, 
ought  therefore  to  pay  the  costs."  It  is  within 
the  discretion  of  the  Court  to  permit  a  bill  to 
be  amended,   hy  substituting  the  name   of   a 

404 


new  for  the  original  plaintiff,  even  after  answer 
filed;  but  it  must  be  upon  the  payment  of  all 
the  costs,  up  to  the  time  of  the  amendment,  as 
well  as  of  the  amendment  itself.  Jennings  v. 
Springs,  1  Bailey  Eq.  181;  Winthrop  v.  Farrar, 
11  Allen,  398.  So  an  amendment  may  be  al- 
lowed even  after  a  hearing  on  bill,  answer, 
and  proofs.  Clark  v.  Society  in  Keene,  46  N.  H. 
272;  Codington  v.  Mott,  14  N.  J.  Eq.  430.  The 
Court  may  impose  other  conditions  of  amend- 
ments besides  the  payment  of  costs.  Bellows 
v.  Stone,  14  N.  H.  175;  Be  wen  t.  Idley,  6  Paige, 
53;  Clark  r.  Society  in  Keene,  46  N.  H.  275. 
See  Motteux  v.  Mackreth,  1  Ves.  Jr.  142 ;  Lloyd 
r.  Maheam,  6  Ves.  145;  Witts  r.  Campbell,  12 
Ves.  493;  Holkirk  v.  Holkirk,4  Mad.  50;  Small 
v.  Attwood,  Younge,  407;  Fellowes  r.  Deere,  3 
Beav.  353;  Hart  v.  Tulk,  6  Hare,  611,  613; 
Bather  v.  Kearsley,  7  Beav.  545;  M'Leod  v. 
Lyttleton,  1  Drew.  36;  Drake  v.  Symes,  7  Jur. 
N.  S.  399,  L.  JJ. ;  3  De  G.  F.  &  J.  491;  Hewett 
v.  Adams,  50  Maine,  271.  As  to  the  course 
where,  after  a  decree,  the  solicitor  of  the  plain- 
tiffs ceases  to  practice,  and  one  of  them  refuses 
to  concur  with  the  rest  in  appointing  a  successor, 
see  Butlin  v.  Arnold,  1H.&  M.  715.  And  for 
the  practice  where  a  co-plaintiff  refuses  to  pro- 
ceed after  cause  is  at  issue,  see  Miller  v.  Smith, 
3  Beav.  598,  n.  (a).  For  form  of  notice  of  mo- 
tion in  such  case,  see  Vol.  III. 

i  Att.-Gen.  v.  Cooper,  3  M.  &  C.  258,  261; 
1  Jur.  790. 


AMENDING   THE   BILL. 


405 


mere  caprice."  Where  it  appeared 2  that  the  association  *  of  a  cestui   *  405 
que  trust  and  trustee  as  co-plaintiffs  on  the  record  might  mate- 
rially injure  the  interests  of  the  former,  leave  was  given  to  amend  the 
record  by  striking  out  the  name  of  the  trustee  as  plaintiff,  and  making 
him  a  defendant. 

Leave  may  also  be  obtained  to  amend  a  bill  by  the  addition  of  persons 
as  co-plaintiffs.1  (a)  After  answer,  however,  the  addition  of  a  co-plaintiff 
is  not  a  matter  of  course,  but  is  discretionary  in  the  Court ;  and  it  would 
appear  that  where  a  plaintiff  applies,  after  answer,  for  leave  to  amend 
his  bill,  by  adding  a  co-plaintiff,  he  must,  in  support  of  his  application, 
show  that  the  person  proposed  to  be  added  is  willing  to  become  a  co- 
plaintiff.2  An  order  for  leave  to  amend  b}r  adding  a  plaintiff  after  repli- 
cation has  been  refused,  where  the  plaintiff  has  been  guilty  of  letches* 

A  bill  of  discovery  cannot  be  amended  by  adding  parties  as  plaintiffs. 
This  was  held  by  Lord  Eldon,  where  a  bill  had  been  filed  by  cestui  que 
trusts,  in  aid  of  an  ejectment  at  Law,  and  the  defendant  pleaded  facts  to 
show  that  the  legal  estate  was  in  the  trustees.4  The  difficulty  in  the  case 
was,  however,  got  over  by  the  plaintiffs  consenting  to  the  allowance  of 
the  plea,  and  moving  to  amend  by  inserting  a  statement  to  show  that  the 
legal  estate  was  in  trustees,  and  that  a  count  had  been  introduced  in  the 
declaration  in  ejectment  on  the  demise  of  the  trustees. 

An  order  made  at  the  hearing  for  leave  to  amend,  by  adding  parties, 


2  Hall  v.  Lack,  2  Y.  &  C.  C.  C.  631 ;  see  also 
Plunket  v.  Joice,  2  Sch.  &  Lef.  159  ;ante,  p.  72; 
Jones  v.  Rose,  4  Hare,  52  (where  leave  was 
given  to  strike  out  "on  behalf  of  themselves 
and  all  the  other  shareholders"  );  Hartf.  Tulk, 
6  Hare,  612;  Drake  v.  Symes,  7  Jur.  N.  S.  399, 
L.  JJ.;  3  DeG.  F.  &  J."  491. 

i  Maughan  v.  Blake,  L.  R.  3  Ch.  32 ;  Win- 
throp  v.  Farrar,  11  Allen,  398. 

2  Governors  of  Lucton  Free  School  v.  Smith, 
M'Lel.  17,  19;  Loch  v.  Bagley,  W.  N.  (1866) 
65,  M.  R.     And  the  addition  of  a  co-plaintiff, 


(a)  As  to  the  addition  of  plaintiffs  under  the 
present  English  practice,  see  Clowes  v.  Hilliard, 
4  Ch.  D.  413;  New  Westminster  Brewery  v. 
Hannah,  W.  N.  (1876)215;  W.N.  (1877)* 35; 
Lemon  v.  Yorkshire  Waggon  Co.  29  W.  R.  467; 
Ayscough  v.  Bullar,  41  Ch.  D.  341 ;  Van  Gel- 
der  v.  Sowerby  Bridge  Flour  Society,  44  Ch.  D. 
374  ;  Emden  p.  Carte,  17  Ch.  D.  169,1 73 ;  House 
Property  &  Inv.  Co.  v.  H.  P.  Horse  Nail  Co. 
29  Ch.  D.  190;  Walcott  v.  Lyons,  id.  584;  Res- 
ley  v.  Besley,  37  Ch.  D.  648;  Showell  v.  Win- 
kup,  60  L.  T.  389;  In  re  Colbeck,  Hall  v. 
Colbeck,  36  W.  R.  259;  Jackson  r.  Kriiger,  54 
L.  J.  Q.  B.  446 ;  Cupples  v  Strahan,  29  L.  R. 
Ir.  120.  A  person  cannot  be  added  as  plaintiff 
without  his  written  consent,  even  though  he  is 
indemnified  against  costs.  Tryon  v.  National 
Prov.  Inst.  16  Q.  B.  D.  678.  Suits  commenced 
in  the  name  of  a  wrong  plaintiff  or  by  misjoin- 
der of  plaintiffs,  may  be  amended.     R.  S.  C. 


in  such  case,  will  not  be  allowed  when  the  effect 
would  be  to  introduce  a  new  plaintiff  with  a  new 
case.  Peek  v.  Earl  Spencer,  L.  R.  5  Ch.  548; 
18  W.  R.  558.  But  see  De  Greiff  v.  Wilson,  30 
N.  J.  Eq.  435,  where,  after  hearing,  the  cause 
was  directed  to  stand  over,  for  further  proof, 
with  leave  to  the  complainant  to  amend  by 
making  a  partner  co-complainant. 

3  Milward  v.  Oldtield,  4  Price,  325. 

4  Lord  Cholmondelev  v.  Lord  Clinton,  2  Mer. 
71,  74. 


Ord.  XVI.;  Lovesy  v.  Smith,  15  Ch.  D.  655; 
Emden  v.  Carte,  supra. 

The  ward's  name  may  by  amendment  be 
substituted  as  plaintiff  in  a  bill  in  Equity 
brought  by  the  guardian.  Lombard  r.  Morse, 
155  Mass.  136.  If  the  bill  shows  that  the  plain- 
tiff's interest  has  been  assigned,  an  amended 
bill  cannot  be  filed  in  the  assignee's  name. 
Keyser  v.  Renner,  87  Va.  249. 

As  to  change  of  pirties,  see  also  1  Dan.  Ch. 
Prac.  (6th  Eng.  ed.)  197;  1  Seton  on  Judgments 
(5th  ed.),  38 ;  Hawkins  v.  Blake,  108  U.  S.  422: 
Richmond  t\  Irons,  121  U.  S.  27;  Imperial 
Refining  Co.  v  Wyman,  38  Fed.  Rep.  574; 
Lorwall  v.  Gridley,  70  Cal.  507.  An  amend- 
ment of  a  complaint  which  is  merely  formal 
does  not  require  service  on  a  defendant  who 
has  not  appeared  in  the  suit.  White  r.  Hin- 
ton  (Wvnm.),  30  Pac.  Rep.  953;  see  Smith  v. 
Woodfolk,  115  U.  S.  143. 

405 


*  106 


THE   BILL. 


will  not  authorize  the  introduction  of  co-plaintiffs ; 5  but  the  Court  will 
sometimes  allow  a  bill,  which  has  originally  been  filed  by  one  individual 
of  a  numerous  class,  in  his  own  right,  to  stand  over  at  the  hearing,  for  the 
purpose  of  being  amended  by  the  introduction  of  the  words,  on  behalf  of 
himself,  and  all  others  of  the  class.  Thus,  where  a  demurrer  was  allowed, 
because  the  parties  affected  to  sue  in  a  corporate  capacity,  leave  was  given 
to  amend,  by  making  them  sue  in  their  individual  rights  as  members  of 
a  copartnership,  on  behalf  of  themselves  and  others.6 

It  has  been  said  that  the  Court  will,  at  any  time  before  the  hearing, 

suffer  parties  to  be  added  by  amendment,  upon  a  proper  case 
*  406    being  shown  ; 7  and  that  even  after  a  decree,  and  before  it  *  has 

been  enrolled,  persons  interested  may,  by  petition,  be  made  par- 
ties and  let  into  it,  if  their  right  be  interwoven  with  the  other  plaintiffs, 
and  settled  (in  general)  by  the  decree ;  they  paying  the  plaintiffs  a  pro- 
portionable part  of  the  charges  of  the  suit.1  (a) 


6  Milligan  v.  Mitchell,  1  M.  &  C.  433,  442; 
Miller  v.  McCan,  7  Paige,  451;  see  Noyes  v. 
Sawyer,  3  Vt.  160 ;  Arendel  e.  Blackwell,  1  Dev. 
Ch.  354. 

6  Lloyd  v.  Loaring,  6  Ves.  773,  778;  see 
also  Ait. -Gen.  v.  Newcombe, -14  Ves.  1,  6; 
Good  v.  Blewitt,  13  Ves.  397,  401;  and  ante, 
pp.  238,  242;  Womersley  v.  Merritt,  L.  R.  4Eq. 
695;  Keese  River  Silver  Mining  Co.  v.  Atwell, 
L.  R.  7  Eq.  347;  Maughan  v.  Blake,  L.  R.  3 
Ch.  32. 

7  Goodwin  v.  Goodwin,  3  Atk.  370;  see 
Forbes  v.  S'evens,  10  Jur.  N.  S.  861,  V.  C.  W. ; 
4  N.  R.  386,  L.  JJ.;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  887; 
Cooper,  Eq.  PI.  333;  Ld.  Red.  325:  Hutchin- 
son v.  Reed,  1  Hoff.  Ch.  316;  Gordon  v.  Hol- 
land, 3  Ired.  Ch  362;  Codington  v.  Mott,  14 
N.  J.  Eq.  430;  Park  v.  Ballentine,  6  Blackf. 
223.  In  respect  to  amendments  as  to  parties, 
Courts  are  more  liberal  than  in  respect  to  other 
amendments.  A  Court  of  Equity  will  not  dis- 
miss a  bill  absolutely,  for  want  of  proper  par- 
ties, if  the  plaintiff  shows  enough  to  give  color 
to  his  claim  for  relief  against  the  parties  not 
before  the  Court.  Allen  r.  Smith,  1  Leigh, 
331;  see  ante,  p.  294,  note;  Thorn  v  Germand, 
4  John.  Ch.  363;  Pleasants  v.  Logan,  4  Hen.  & 
M.  489.  Upon  a  creditor's  bill  against  an 
insolvent  corporation  for  a  receiver,  &c,  the 


(a)  The  following  authorities  illustrate  the 
present  English  practice.  The  plaintiff  may  now 
obtain  leave  to  amend  by  striking  out  the  names 
of  defendants  improperly  joined.  R.  S.  C.  1883; 
Ord.  XVI.  3,  13,  14;  2  Seton,  1520  ;  Wymertf. 
Dodds,  11  Ch.  D.  436;  Hurst  v.  Hurst,  21  Ch.  D. 
278,  289;  Wilkinson  v.  Belcher,  2  Bro.  C.  C. 
272.  Such  defendants  may  also  apply  by  sum- 
mons to  have  their  names  struck  out.  Wilson 
v.  Church,  9  Ch.  D.  552;  Vallance  v.  Birming- 
ham &c.  Inv.  Co.  2  Ch.  D.  369.  See  further,  1 
Dan.  Ch.  Prac.  (6th  Eng.  ed.)  259,  §  4.  Proper 
parties  defendant  may  be  added  at  any  stage  of 

406 


plaintiff  may  pray  a  discovery  of  the  stock- 
holders liable,  and  having  obtained  it  may 
amend  his  bill  by  making  such  stockholders 
parties.  Morgan  i>.  New  York  &  Albany  R. 
Co.  10  Paige,  290;  see  McDougald  v.  Dough- 
erty. 14  Ga.  674 ;  Hewett  v.  Adams,  50  Maine, 
271;  McLellan  v.  Osborne,  51  Maine,  118. 

1  Wyatt's  P.  R.  301.  And  see  the  proper 
practice  upon  allowing  a  person  to  come  in, 
on  petition,  and  be  made  a  plaintiff  in  a  pend- 
ing suit.  Aylesworth  v.  Brown,  31  Ind.  270. 
But,  except  fn  such  cases,  there  is  no  prac- 
tice which  will  authorize  the  Court  upon  the 
application  of  persons  not  parties  to  a  suit, 
to  compel  the  plaintiffs  to  make  such  persons 
co-plaintiffs.  Drake  v.  Goodridge,  6  Blatch. 
151.  And  see  ante,  p.  287.  Mere  formal  amend- 
ments, such  as  the  introduction  of  new  parties, 
or  amendments  to  the  prayer  of  the  bill,  to  meet 
the  exigency  of  the  case,  will  be  made  up  to, 
and  at,  the  final  hearing.  Codington  r.  Mott, 
14  N.  J.  Eq.  430;  see  Philhower  v.  Tod,  11 
N.  J.  Eq.  54,  312;  Buckley  v.  Cross,  Saxton, 
504;  Mavor  r.  Dry,  2  S.  &  S.  113;  Henry  v. 
Brown,  4  Halst.  Ch.  245;  Rodgers  v.  Rodgers, 
1  Paige,  424;  Whitmarsh  v.  Campbell,  2  Paige, 
67;  Verplanck  v.  Merct.  Ins.  Co.  1  Edw.  Ch. 
46;  Pratt  v.  Bacon,  10  Pick.  123. 


the  proceedings  before  final  judgment.  Att.- 
Gen.  v.  Birmingham,  15  Ch.  D.  423 ;  Att.-Gen. 
v.  Birmingham  Drainage  Board,  17  Ch.  D.  685; 
Marquis  of  Londonderry  v.  Rhoswydol  Lead  M. 
Co  W.  N.  (1879)  136;  "Edwards  v.  Lowther,  24 
W.  R  434;  45  L.J.  C.  P.  417;  Byrne  v.  Brown, 
22  Q.  B.  D.  657  ;  Pilley  v.  Robinson,  20  Q.  B. 
D.  155;  Proctor  v.  Cheshire  City  Council,  W.N. 
(1891)  24;  see  Edison  &  S.  Electric  Light  Co. 
v.  Holland,  41  Ch.  D.  28;  Moser  v.  Marsden, 
[1892]  1  Ch.  487  ;  Strauss  v.  Goldschmidt 
(No.  2),  8  T.  L.  R.  309,  512.  Even  though 
new  alternative  relief  is  claimed  against  the 


AMENDING    THE    BILL. 


407 


If  parties  are  added  after  the  expiration  of  the  time  for  giving  notice 
of  the  cross-examination  of  the  witnesses,  the  evidence  of  such  wit- 
nesses cannot  be  read  against  the  parties  so  added.2 

It  is  not  within  the  province  of  this  work  to  point  out  the  cases  in 
which  amendments  may  become  requisite  for  the  purpose  of  altering 
the  case  upon  the  record  as  against  the  defendants  already  before  the 
Court,  or  to  what  extent  they  may  be  made.  It  is  to  be  observed, 
however,  that  the  rule  which  formerly  existed,  that  a  plaintiff  ought  not 
to  introduce  facts,  by  amendment,  which  have  occurred  since  the 
filing  of    the  original  bill,3  has  been  abolished;  *and  the  facts    *407 


2  Pratt  v.  Barker,  1  Sim.  1,  5  ;  James  v. 
James,  4  Beav.  578  ;  Quantock  v.  Bullen,  5 
Mad.  81.  After  the  witnesses  in  a  cause  have 
been  examined,  and  the  proofs  closed,  no 
amendment  of  the  bill  is  allowed,  except  in 
matters  of  mere  form,  unless  under  very  special 
circumstances.  Bowen  v.  Idley,  6  Paige,  407  ; 
Clark  v.  Society  in  Keene,  46  N.  H.  272;  Tilton 
v.  Tilton,  9  N.  H.  394;  Bellows  v.  Stone,  14 
N.  H.  175;  Doe  v.  Doe,  37  N.  H.  268;  see 
Wilbur  v.  Collier,  1  Clark,  315;  Shephard  v. 
Merrill,  3  John.  Ch.  423  ;  Smith  v.  Burnham, 
4  Harr.  &  J.  331;  Stewart  v.  Duvall,  7  Gill  & 
J.  180 ;  Ross  v.  Carpenter,  6  McLean,  382. 

3  See  Longworth  v.  Taylor,  1  McLean,  514. 
Amendments  to  a  bill  are  always  con-idered  as 
forming  a  part  of  the  original  bill.  They  refer 
to  the  time  of  filing  the  bill;  and  the  defendant 
cannot  be  required  to  answer  anything  which 
has  arisen  since  that  time.  Hurd  v.  Everett, 
1  Paige,  124;  Walsh  v.  Smyth,  3  Bland,  9,  20; 
O'Grady  v.  Barry,  1  Irish  Eq.  56.  Unless, 
indeed,  the  defendant  has  not  put  in  his  answer, 
in  which  case  the  bill  may  be  amended  by  add- 
ing supplemental  matter.  Candler  v.  Pettit, 
1  Paige,  168;  Ogden  v.  Gibbons,  Halst.  (N.  J.) 


added  defendant.  Child  v.  Stenning,  5  Ch.  D. 
695.  After  judgment,  a  fresh  suit  must  be 
brought  against  such  party,  if  not  previously 
added.  This  suit  is  sometimes  in  the  nature  of 
a  supplemental  bill.  Att.-Gen.  v.  Birmingham, 
supra  ;  Vigers  v.  Lord  Audley,  9  Sim.  72 ;  Com- 
missioners of  Sewers  v.  Gellatley,  3  Ch.  D. 
610.  See  Long  v.  Crossley,  13  Ch.  I).  388; 
Broder  v.  Saillard,  2  Ch.  D.  692;  Re  Mason, 
W.N.  (1883)  147;  Heard  v.  Borgwardt,  id. 
173.  As  to  the  manner  of  now  making  the 
application  to  change  defendants,  see  R.  S.  C. 
Ord.  XVI.  13-16;  Sheehan  v.  Great  Eastern 
Ry.  Co.  16  Ch.  D.  59  ;  cases  supra  ;  Tildesley 
v.  Harper,  3  Ch.  D.  277;  Austen  v.  Bird,  W.  N. 
(1881)  129 ;  Wilson  v.  Balcarres  B.  S.  Co  ,  [1893] 
1  Q.  B.  422.  As  to  adding  defendants  on  their 
own  application,  see  1  Dan.  Ch.  Prac.  (6th 
Eng.  ed.)  268;  Debenture  Co.  v.  De  Murrietta, 
8  T.  L.  R.  496.  As  to  third  party  notice  under 
the  English  practice,  see  1  Dan.  Ch.  Prac.  (6th 
Eng.  ed.)  272;    R.  S.  C.  1883,  Ord.  XVI.  19, 


Dig.  172.  Consequently  an  original  bill  cannot 
be  amended  by  incorporating  therein  anything 
which  arose  subsequently  to  the  commencing 
of  the  suit.  This  should  be  stated  in  a  sup- 
plemental bill.  Stafford  v.  Howlett,  1  Paige, 
200;  Saunders  v.  Frost,  5  Pick.  276;  see  San- 
born v.  Sanborn,  7  Gray,  142.  Generally,  a 
mistake  in  the  bill  in  the  statement  of  a  lact 
should  be  corrected  by  an  amendment,  and  not 
by  a  right  statement  of  the  fact  in  a  supple- 
mental bill.  Strickland  v.  Strickland,  12  Sim. 
253;  Stafford  v.  Howlett,  1  Paige,  200. 

When  the  cause  has  proceeded  so  far  that 
an  amendment  cannot  be  made,  or  if  material 
facts  have  occurred  subsequently  to  the  com- 
mencing of  the  suit,  the  Court  will  give  the 
plaintiff  leave  to  file  a  supplemental  bill.  And 
where  such  leave  is  given,  the  Court  will  per- 
mit other  matters  to  be  introduced  into  the 
supplemental  bill,  which  might  have  been 
incorporated  in  the  original  bill  by  way  of 
amendment.  Stafford  v.  Howlett,  1  Paige,  200; 
see  Verplanck  w.  Merct.  Ins.  Co.  1  Edw.  4<i  ; 
Pinch  v.  Anthony,  10  Allen,  470. 

Cases,  however,  do  sometimes  occur  where 
the   introduction,  by   amendment,   of    matters 


52,  53;  Re  Willson,  Att.-Gen.  v.  Woodhall,  45 
Ch.  D.  266 ;  Blore  v.  Ashby,  42  Ch.  D.  682.  A 
person  so  brought  in  and  appearing  may  have 
discovery  from  the  plaintiff.  McAllister  v. 
Bishop  of  Rochester,  5  C.  P.  D.  194.  His  costs 
may  be  ordered  paid  by  the  person  bringing 
him  in.  Dawson  v.  Shepherd,  28  W.  R.  805; 
see  Yorkshire  Waggon  Co.  v.  Newport  Coal 
Co.  5  Q.  B.  D.  268  ;  R.  S.  C.  1883,  XVI.  54. 
He  may  also  be  ordered  to  pay  the  plaintiff's 
costs  (Piller  v.  Roberts,  21  Ch.  D.  198),  or  those 
of  an  unsuccessful  defendant.  Hornby  V.  <  !ard- 
well,  8  Q.  B.  D.  329.  As  to  service  of  such 
notice  out  of  the  jurisdiction,  see  Dubout  v. 
Macpherson,  23  Q.  B.  D.  340.  The  Court  in  its 
discretion  may  decline  to  give  directions  for 
the  trial  of  questions  between  a  defendant  and 
the  third  party,  and  in  such  case  the  third 
party  should  be  dismissed.  Piller  v.  Roberts, 
stipra  ;  Schneider  v.  Batt,  30  W.  R.  420;  Corrie 
r.  Allen.  W.  N.  (1883)  65;  Bell  v.  Von  Dadels- 
zen,  id.  208;  The  Bianca,  8  P.  D.  91. 
407 


407 


THE   BILL. 


and  circumstances  occurring  after  the  institution  of  a  suit  may  be 
introduced  into  the  bill  by  amendment,  if  the  cause  is  otherwise  in  a 
state  in  which  an  amendment  may  be  made/  and  if  not,  they  may  be 
added  by  supplemental  statement.2  (a) 

Where  an  answer  of  a  defendant  states  facts  which  are  material  to 
the  plaintiff's  case,  but  which  have  not  been  stated  in  the  bill,  it  is  not 
necessary  that  the  plaintiff,  in  order  to  avail  himself  of  them  at  the 
hearing,  should  introduce  such  facts  into  his  bill  by  amendment,  although 
perhaps  the  most  convenient  course  would  be  to  do  so.8    Where,  there- 


winch  have  occurred  since  the  date  of  the 
original  bill  will  be  permitted  by  the  Court ; 
thus,  where  the  plaintiff  has  an  inchoate  right 
at  the  time  of  preparing  his  original  bill,  which 
merely  requires  some  formal  act  to  render  his 
title  perfect,  and  such  formal  act  is  not  com- 
pleted until  afterwards,  the  introduction  of  that 
fact  by  amendment  will  be  permitted.  The 
case  of  an  executor  filing  a  bill  before  probate, 
and  afterwards  obtaining  probate,  is  an  instance 
of  this  kind.  Humphreys  v.  Humphreys,  3 
IV  Wins.  -348;  Bradford  v.  Felder,  2  M'Cord 
Ch.  170;  Billout  v.  Morse,  2  Hayw.  175;  Butler 
v.  Butler,  4  Litt.  201;  Blackwell  v.  Blackwell, 
3:>  Ala.  57.  A  bill  was  amended  so  as  to  charge 
that  an  infant  defendant  had  attained  her  full 
age,  thereby  to  compel  her  to  answer  as  an 
adult.     Kipp  v.  Hanna,  2  Bland,  26. 

i  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §§  52,  53;  for  repeal 
provisions,  see  44  &  45  Vic.  c.  59,  §  3,  Sched. 
and  see  pout,  pp.  1508,  1530.  See  Tudway  r. 
Jone*,  1  K.  &  J.  691 ;  Forbes  v.  Stevens,  ubi 
supra;  and  see  Att.-Gen.  v.  Portreeve  of  Avon, 
3  De  G.  J.  &  S.  637 ;  11  W.  R.  1050,  1051, 
L.  JJ.;  Godfrey  v.  Tucker,  33  Beav.  280;  9 
Jur.  N.  S.  818;  Beardmore  v.  Gregory,  2 
H.  &  M.  491;  11  Jur.  N.  S.  363;  and  cases 
cited,  33  Beav.  283,  n.;  Foulkes  v.  Davies, 
L.  R.  7  Eq.  42,  46;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Cambridge 
Consumers'  Gas  Co.  L.  Ii.  4  Ch.  71.     See  also 


O)  Nichols  p.  Rogers,  139  Mass.  146;  Kil- 
linger  v.  Hartman,  21  Neb.  297.  In  Reay  v. 
Eaynor,  19  Fed.  Rep.  308,  311,  for  infringing 
a  patent,  which  expired  after  the  bill  was  filed, 
an  amendment  was  allowed,  alleging  reissue 
thereof.  An  amendment  in  ejectment,  which 
in  effect  substituted  an  equitable  title  for  an 
alleged  legal  one,  was  allowed  at  the  trial  in 
Feehan  v.  Mandeville,  28  L.  R.  Ir.  90.  As  to 
facts  introduced  by  amendment  which  occurred 
after  the  bill  was  filed,  the  amended  bill  is 
really  a  supplemental  bill.  See  Jones  v.  Mc- 
Phillips,  82  Ala.  102;  Luft  v.  Gossrau,  31  111. 
App.  530;  Reyburn  v.  Mitchell,  106  Mo.  365; 
Randall  v.  Christianson,  84  Iowa,  501;  Mer- 
chants' Bank  v.  Masonic  Hall  Trustees,  65 
Ga.  603.  The  heirs  or  executor  of  a  deceased 
defendant  are  not  properly  brought  in  by 
amending  the  bill;  vet  the  amendment  being 

408 


Bolton  v.  Ridsdale,  2  W.  R.  488;  Evans  v. 
Bagshaw,  L.  R.  8  Eq.  469;  Ward  v.  Booth, 
L.  R.  14  Eq.  195;  Talbot  v.  Radnor,  3  M.  &  K. 
252;  Dale  v.  Griffith,  16  W.  R.  30;  Heath  v. 
Lewis,  2  W.  R  641. 

2  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §§  52,53;  for  repeal 
provisions,  see  44  &  45  Vic.  c.  59,  §  3,  Sched. 
and  see  post,  pp.  1508,  1530.  See  Rogers  r. 
Solomons,  17  Ga.  598;  Cons.  Ord.  XXXII.  2; 
and  see  post,  Chap.  XXXIIL,  Revivor  and 
Supplement.  An  abatement  cannot  be  thus 
remedied.  Commerell  v.  Hall,  2  Drew.  194; 
S.  C.  nom.  Commerell  v.  Bell,  18  Jur.  141; 
Williams  v.  Jackson,  5  Jur.  N.  S.  264;  7  W.  R. 
104,  V.  C.  W.;  Webbt?.  Wardle,  11  Jur.  N.  S. 
278,  V.  C.  K.  See  Joint  Stock  Discount  Co. 
v.  Brown,  L.  R.  8  Eq.  376.  In  cases  where  the 
Act  (15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86)  did  not  apply,  an- 
other suit  had  to  be  instituted  as  under  the 
previous  practice.  Dean  &  Chapter  of  Ely  v. 
Edwards,  22  L.  J.  Ch  629;  Hills  v.  Springett, 
L.  R.  5  Eq.  123;  Bates  v.  Bates,  L.  R.  13  Eq. 
138. 

3  Attwood  v. ,  1  Russ.  353,  361 ;  Maury 

v.  Lewis,  10  Yerger,  115;  Rose  v.  Mynatt,  7 
Yerger,  30  ;  but  see  Thomas  v.  Warner,  15  Vt. 
110;  Duponti  v.  Massy,  4  Wash.  C.  C.  128. 
But  where  it  is  important  to  the  plaintiff  that 
facts  disclosed  in  the  answer  should  be  further 
inquired  into,  or  avoided  hy  some  further  state- 


served  upon  them,  they  may  be  affected  with 
notice  and  the  cause  be  treated  as  revived 
against  them.  Floyd  v.  Ritter,  65  Ala.  501;  see 
Tatum  v.  Walker,  77  Ala.  563;  Maynard  v. 
Tilden,  28  Fed.  Rep.  688;  Frese  v.  Bachof,  14 
Blateh.  432.  In  Harvey  v.  Lord,  11  Biss.  144, 
a  pending  bill  was  amended  so  as  to  bring  it 
within  a  statute  enacted  after  the  bill  was  filed 
and  granting  enlarged  powers  to  the  Court.  In 
DeLacy  v.  Hurst,  83  Ga.  223,  an  old  bill  was 
amended  so  as  to  conform  to  the  new  procedure 
prescribed  by  statute.  In  Richmond  v.  Irons, 
121  U.  S.  27,  a  judgment  creditor's  bill  against 
an  insolvent  national  bank  was  allowed  to  be 
amended  by  joining  all  its  stockholders  as 
defendants  and  setting  up  their  individual 
liability  under  a  statute  which  went  into  effect 
after  the  filing  of  the  original  bill. 


AMENDING    THE    BILL.  *  408 

fore,  it  is  important  to  the  plaintiff  that  a  fact  disclosed  in  the  answer 
should  be  further  inquired  into,  or  avoided  by  some  further  statement, 
the  practice  is  ofteu  resorted  to  of  introducing  such  fact  from  the 
answer  of  the  defendant  into  the  bill ;  and  where  a  plaintiff,  not  being 
satisfied  with  the  answer,  amended  his  bill,  stating,  by  way  of  pretence, 
a  quotation  from  the  answer,  and  negativing  it,  and  insisted  that  the 
facts  would  appear  differently  if  the  defendant  would  look  into  his 
accounts,  the  matter  so  introduced  was  held  not  impertinent.4 

Great  latitude  is  allowed  to  a  plaintiff  in  making  amendments, 
*  and  the  Court  has  even  gone  to  the  extent  of  permitting  a  bill  *  408 
to  be  converted  into  an  information  ; 1  it  has  also  been  held, 
where  a  plaintiff  filed  a  bill,  stating  an  agreement,  and  the  defendant 
by  his  answer  admitted  that  there  was  an  agreement,  but  different  from 
that  stated  by  the  plaintiff,  that  the  plaintiff  might  amend  his  bill, 
abandoning  his  first  agreement,  and  praying  for  a  decree  according  to 
that  admitted  by  the  defendant.2  In  that  case,  however,  the  amend- 
ment was  permitted,  because  the  bill  in  its  original  form  might  have 
been  prepared  under  a  mistake  or  misconception  of  counsel,3  and  the 
plaintiff,  having  afterwards  discovered  the  error,  was  allowed  by  the 
Court  to  abandon  his  original  case,  and  insist  upon  the  one  alleged  by 
the  defendant ;  but  the  Court  will  not  carry  its  liberality  further,  and 
permit  a  plaintiff  to  amend  his  bill,  so  that  he  may  continue  to  insist 
upon  the  agreement  originally  stated,  and  if  he  fails  in  that,  to  get  the 
benefit  of  the  one  admitted  by  the  defendant.  Upon  this  principle, 
where  the  original  bill  prayed  the  specific  performance  of  an  agreement, 
and  the  defendant  denied  the  agreement  as  stated  in  the  bill,  but  admitted 
a  different  one,  whereupon  the  plaintiff  amended  his  bill,  continuing  to 
insist  on  the  original  agreement,  and  praying  in  the  alternative,  if  not 
entitled  to  that,  to  have  the  execution  of  the  admitted  agreement,  Lord 
Redesdale  dismissed  the  bill  with  costs,  but  without  prejudice  to  any 
bill  the  plaintiff  might  be  advised  to  file,  to  obtain  a  performance  of  the 
admitted  agreement.4 

ment,  such  facts  may  be  introduced  into  the  of  order  in  which  case,  see  2  Seton  (4th  ed.), 

bill  from  the  answer  of  the  defendant,  by  way  1529,  note.    See  Ward  v.  Sheffield,  19  Q.  B.  D. 

of  amendment.     Seelye  v.  Boehm,  2  Mad.  176;  22,  28. 

Spencer  v.  Van  Duzen,  1  Paige.  555.    But  no  2  Per  Ld.  Redesdale,  Lindsay  v.  Lynch,  2 

admission  in  an  answer  can,  under  any  circum-  Sch.   &   Lef.  9;  Harris    t>.    Knickerbocker,    5 

stances,  lay  a  foundation  for  relief  under  any  Wend.   638;    S.   C.    1   Paige,   209.     This   has 

specific  head  of  Equity,  unless  it  be  substan-  been  allowed,  even  after  a  hearing  on  the  bill, 

tially  set  forth  in  the  bill.     Jackson  v.  Ashton,  answer,  and  evidence.     Bellows  v.  Stone,  14 

11  Peters,  229.     The  bill  should  be  amended  so  N.  H.  175. 

as  to  state  the  contract  set  up  in  the  answer,  if  3  see  McElwain  v.  Willis,  3  Paige,  505. 

that  is  to  be  relied  upon  for  a  decree.     Byrne  *  Lindsay  v.  Lynch,  2  Sch.  &  Lef.   1  ;  see 

v.  Romaine,  2   Edw.  Ch.  445.      But   it   is   not  also  Woollam  r.  Hearn,  7  Ves.  211,222;  and 

necessary  or  proper  to  amend  the  bill  for  the  Deniston  v.  Little,  2  Sch.  &  Lef.  11,   n.   (a). 

purpose    of    traversing  defensive    averments  An  amended  bill  will  not  be  allowed  where  the 

brought  forward  by  the  answer.  Lanier  r.  Hill,  relief  sought  is  inconsistent  with  that  of   the 

30  Ala.  111.  original  bill.     Lloyd  v.  Brewster,  4  Paige,  537; 

4  Seelye  v.  Boehm,  2  Mad.  176,  180.  Coleman  v.  Pinka'rd,  2  Humph.  185;  Bosley  '". 

1  President  of  St.  Mary  Magdalen  v.  Sib-  Phillips.  3  Tenn.  Ch.  649;  Linn  v.  Carson*  32 

thorp,  1  Russ.   154.      The  Attorney-General's  Gratt.  170.     Repugnancy  or  inconsistency  be- 

consent  should  be  obtained.     Caldwell  v.  Pag-  tween  original  and  amended  bills,  although  in 

ham  Harbour  Rec.  Co.  2  Ch.  D.  221;  for  form  the  alternative,  is  good  ground  for  not  allow- 

409 


*409 


THE   BILL. 


It  seems  that,  as  a  general  rule,  the  Court  will  not  permit  a  bill,  filed 

for  the  mere  purpose  of  discovery,  to  be  converted  into  one  for  relief, 

by  the  addition  of  a  prayer  for  relief,6  though  it  has  been  allowed  in 

some  cases ; 6  and  it  seems  7  that  a  bill  for  relief  cannot  be  con- 

*  409    verted  into  a  bill  for  discovery  by  striking  out  *  the  prayer.1 

Any  amendment  of  a  bill,  however  trivial  and  unimportant, 
authorizes  a  defendant,  though  not  required  to  answer,  to  put  in  an  answer, 
making  an  entirely  new  defence,  and  contradicting  his  former  answer.2 
An  amendment  of  the  bill  does  not,  however,  enable  a  defendant  who  has 
answered  the  original  bill  to  demur  to  an  amended  bill  upon  any  cause 
of  demurrer  to  which  the  original  bill  was  open,8  unless  the  nature  of 
the  case  made  by  the  bill  has  been  changed  by  the  amendments.4 

No  alteration  can  be  made  in  any  pleading,  or  other  matter,  after  it 
has  been  filed,  and  by  that  means  become  a  record  of  the  Court,  with- 
out the  sanction  of  an  Order.6  Orders  for  leave  to  amend  bills,  may, 
subject  to  the  rules  and  regulations  hereafter  pointed  out,  be  obtained 
at  any  period  of  the  cause,  previously  to  the  hearing.6  (a) 

Ray   v.  Womble,  56 


ing   an   amended    bill. 
Ala.  32. 

6  Butterworth  v.  Bailey,  15  Ves.  358,  361; 
Jackson  v.  Strong,  M'Lel.  245;  Parker  v.  Ford, 
1  Coll.  506. 

6  Hildyard  v.  Cressy,  3  Atk.  303;  Crow  v. 
Tyrell,  2  Mad  397,  409 ;  Lousada  v.  Templer,  2 
Russ.  561,  565 ;  Severn  v.  Fletcher,  5  Sim.  457 ; 
see  Lyell  v.  Kennedy,  8  App.  Cas.  225. 

t  An  application  to  the  Court  in  Massachu- 
setts, for  relief  in  Equitj',  which  does  not  con- 
tain a  prayer  for  process  to  be  served  on  the 
defendant,  or  conclude  with  the  general  inter- 
rogatory as  required  by  the  Rules  for  Practice 
in  Chancery  in  that  State,  may  be  regarded  as 
a  bill ;  and  if  properly  amended,  relief  may 
be  granted  on  it.  Belknap  v.  Stone,  1  Allen, 
572;  see  Wright  v.  Wright,  4  Halst.  Ch.  (N. 
J.)  143. 

i  Thus,  in  Lord  Cholmondeley  v.  Lord  Clin- 
ton, 2  V.  &  B.  113,  where  the  defendants, 
having  answered  the  bill,  obtained  an  order  for 
the  plaintiff  to  elect  whether  he  would  proceed 
at  Law  or  in  Equity,  whereupon  the  plaintiff 
elected  to  proceed  at  Law,  and  moved  to  dis- 
miss his  bill  as  far  as  it  sought  relief,  and  to 
amend  the  record  by  striking  out  the  prayer 


in  by  the  defendant  after  the  order  was  made. 
2  V.  &  B.  114,  n.  (a);  see  ante,  p.  402.  note. 

2  Miller  v.  Whittaker,  33  111.  386;  Trust  & 
Fire  Insurance  Co.  v.  Jenkins,  8  Paige,  589; 
Bowen  v.  Idley,  6  Paige,  46;  see  Bosanquet  v. 
Marsham,  4  Sim.  573;  Richardson  v.  Richard- 
son, 5  Paige,  58;  Dillon  v.  Davis,  3  Tenn.  Ch. 
394;  Thomas  v.  Visitors  of  Frederick  Co.  School, 
7  Gill  &  J.  369,  in  which  case  an  additional 
answer  to  an  amended  bill  was  ordered  to  be 
taken  off  the  file,  because  not  filed  with  leave. 
In  Bolton  v.  Bolton,  29t  June,  1831,  MSS., 
ex  relatione  Beames,  Sir  Lancelot  Shadwell  V. 
C.  on  the  ground  stilted  in  the  text,  refused, 
with  costs,  a  motion  to  take  an  answer  to  an 
amended  bill  off  the  file;  although  it  was  filed 
nearly  three  years  after  the  bill  had  been 
amended,  and  eight  years  after  the  original  an- 
swer,and  contradicted  the  original  answer,  intro- 
ducing no  less  than  four  new  issues  or  defences. 

3  Att.-Gen.  v.  Cooper,  8  Hare,  166;  see  also 
Wyllie  v.  El  lice,  6  Hare,  505.  For  case  prior 
to  37  Ord.  Aug.,  1841  (now  Ord.  XIV.  9).  see 
Ellice  v.  Goodson,  3  M.  &  C.  653,  661 ;  2  Jur. 
249.  Nor  to  put  in  a  plea  in  the  nature  of  a 
plea  puis  darrein  continuance,  to  the  effect 
that  since  he  put  in  his  answer  to  the  original 


for  relief,  the  motion  was  refused:  Lord  Eldon    .bill  he  had  removed  the  obstacle,  which   pre- 


being  of  opinion  that  the  better  course  for 
the  plaintiff  would  be  to  dismiss  his  bill,  and 
file  another  for  discovery  only;  which  was  ac- 
cordingly done.  2  Mer.  71.  In  the  above  case, 
Gurish  v.  Donovan,  2  Atk.  166,  was  cited  in 
argument  in  support  of  the  motion;  but  upon 
reference  to  the  Registrar's  book,  it  appeared 
that  the  order  for  striking  out  the  prayer  was 
made  by  consent,  and  that  an  answer  was  put 


vented  proceedings  at  Law,  and  authorized  the 
filing  of  the  bill.  Morley  v.  White.  L.  R.  8 
Ch.  731.  The  rule  is  now  otherwise  under  the 
Judicature  Act.  Powell  v.  Jewesbury,  9  Ch. 
D.  34.     See  infra,  p.  780. 

<  Cresy  v.  Bevan,  13  Sim.  354. 

5  See  Thomas  v.  Visitors  of  Frederick  Co. 
School,  7  Gill  &  J.  369. 

6  See   Luce   v.  Graham ,  4  John.  Ch.  170 ; 


(a)  See  Brown  v.  White,  16  Fed.  Rep.  900. 
An  amendment  regularly  made  under  Equity 

410 


Rule   29   cannot  be   avoided  by   a  motion   to 
strike  fivm  the  record  the  order  by  which  it 


AMENDING   THE   BILL. 


411 


An  order  for  leave  to  amend  a  bill  may  be  obtained  at  any  time 
before  answer,  upon  motion  or  petition  without  notice ; 7  and  for 
*  the  purpose  of  adding  parties  only,  an  order  for  leave  to  amend  *  410 
may  be  obtained  in  like  manner  at  any  time  before  the  cause  is 
set  down  for  hearing ; x  but,  as  we  have  seen,  if  the  order  is  obtained 
after  the  time  for  giving  notice  of  the  cross-examination  of  the  witnesses, 
the  evidence  cannot  be  read  against  the  parties  so  added.2 

An  order  for  leave  to  amend  a  bill,  only  for  the  purpose  of  rectifying 
some  clerical  error  in  names,  dates,  or  sums  may  be  obtained  at  any 
time  upon  motion  or  petition  without  notice.3  The  order  should  specify 
the  errors  which  are  to  be  corrected. 

*  If  a  demurrer  to  the  whole  bill  is  not  set  down  for  argument  *  411 
within  twelve  days,  or  a  demurrer  to  part  of  the  bill  within  three 


Hunt  v.  Holland,  3  Paige,  78.  A  plaintiff  who 
is  in  contempt  may  obtain  an  order  to  amend 
his  bill.    Chatterton  v.  Thomas,  36  L.  J.  Ch.  592. 

7  Cons.  Oi'd.  IX.  8.  As  many  orders  as  may 
be  required  may  thus  be  obtained,  and  if  inter- 
rogatories have  been  filed,  and  it  is  necessary 
to  amend  them,  the  order  may  give  leave  to  do 
so.  Braithwaite's  Pr.  319 ;  see  form  of  order, 
Seton,  1252,  No.  2.  See  the  U.  S.  Equity  Rules, 
Nos.  28-30  (  post,  Vol.  III.)  ;  Story,  Eq.  PI. 
§  886,  note. 

By  the  Mass.  Ch.  Rules  the  plaintiff  may 
amend  his  bill  at  any  time  before  answer,  plea, 
or  demurrer,  filed,  of  course,  and  without  pay- 
ment of  costs;  but  if  the  defendant's  appear- 
ance shall  have  been  entered,  the  plaintiff  shall, 
at  his  own  expense,  furnish  the  defendant  with 
a  certified  copy  of  the  amended  bill.  No 
amendment,  however,  shall  be  allowed,  as  of 
course,  to  a  bill  which  has  been  sworn  to  by 
the  party.  If  the  defendant  demurs  to  the  bill 
for  want  of  parties,  or  other  defect,  which  does 
not  go  to  the  equity  of  the  whole  bill,  the  plain- 
tiff may  amend  at  any  time  before  the  de- 
murrer is  set  down  for  argument,  or  within 
fourteen  days  after  the  demurrer  is  fih'd,  and 
notice  thereof  given  to  him,  upon  the  payment 
of  a  term  fee.  Rules  20,  21.  And  upon  the 
coming  in  of  the  answer,  if  the  plaintiff  shall 
find  it  necessary  to  amend  his  bill,  in  order  to 
meet  the  case  made  by  the  answer,  he  may  do 
so,  by  furnishing  to  the  defendant  a  certified 
copy  of  the  amendment.  Rule  22.  See  Ger- 
rish  v.  Black,  99  Mass.  315.  In  Maine,  see  Ch. 
Rule  3,  37  Maine,  581. 

In  New  Hampshire,  amendments  may  be 
made  to  the  bill,  answer,  or  pleadings,  in  proper 
cases,  upon  the  order  of  the  Judge  in  vacation, 
and  upon  such  terms  as  he  may  impose ;  the 
amendments  being  subject,  however,  to  the 
order  of  the  Court.  Rule  18  of  Chancery 
Practice,  38  N.  H.  608. 


In  Tennessee  the  bill  may  be  amended  before 
copy  issued,  and  afterwards  in  small  matters 
not  affecting  the  merits,  without  costs,  and  be- 
fore defence  made  in  material  points,  upon  pav- 
ing the  costs  of  a  copy  of  the  amendment.  In 
all  other  cases,  amendments  can  only  be  made 
by  leave  of  the  Chancellor  in  open  Court. 
Code,  §§  4332-4335.  It  is  of  course  to  allow 
the  plaintiff  to  amend  his  bill  upon  defence 
made  either  by  plea  or  answer;  amendments 
after  replication,  or  the  setting  of  a  plea  or  de- 
murrer for  hearing,  will  be  on  terms.  Mount 
Olivet  Cemetery  v.  Budeke,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  480. 

1  Ante,  pp.  293,  294;  Goodwin  v.  Goodwin, 
3  Atk.  370;  Brattle  v.  Waterman,  4  Sim.  125; 
Bryan  v.  Wastell,  Kay  App.47;  Gill  v.  Rayner, 
1  K.  &  J.  395;  see,  however,  Hitchcock  v. 
Jacques,  9  Beav.  192. 

2  Ante,  pp.  293,  294,  405.  Quantock  v.  Bul- 
len,  5  Mad.  81;  Pratt  r.  Barker,  1  Sim.  1,  5; 
James  v.  James,  4  Beav.  578. 

3  Cons.  Ord.  IX.  9  The  signature  of  coun- 
sel is  not  required  to  an  amendment  of  this  de- 
scription; but  such  an  amendment  will  render 
inoperative  an  order  to  take  a  bill  pro  conftsso  ; 
Weightman  v.  Powell,  2  De  G.  &  S.  570;  see, 
however,  Cheeseborough  v.  Wright,  28  Beav. 
173.  As  to  the  necessity  of  reserving  the  bill 
after  such  an  amendment,  see  Barnes  v.  Uidg- 
way,  1  Sm.  &  G.  Ap.  18.  The  defendant  may, 
where  he  apprehends  danger  from  a  clerical 
mistake,  in  stating  a  deed  or  other  instrument, 
in  a  bill,  have  the  bill  amended  so  as  to  iden- 
tify the  instrument  on  which  the  suit  is  brought, 
and  prevent  a  second  suit  on  the  same.  Onta- 
rio Bank  v.  Sehermerhorn.  10  Paige,  109.  A 
mere  clerical  error  may  be  amended  in  a  bill, 
even  after  final  decree.  Donnelly  v.  Ewart,  3 
Rich.  Eq.  18.  For  forms  of  motion  paper  and 
petition,  see  Vol.  III. 


was  permitted.  Lichtenauer  v.  Cheney,  8  Fed. 
Rep.  876.  The  U.  S.  Circuit  Court,  upon  an 
Equity  appeal  from  the  District  Court,  can  al- 


low an  amendment  of  substance. 
Moody,  9  Fed.  Rep.  673. 

411 


Warren  a 


412 


THE   BILL. 


weeks,  after  filing  the  same,  the  plaintiff  must,  within  such  respective 
times,  serve  an  order,  which  ma}7"  be  obtained  on  motion  or  petition  of 
course,  for  leave  to  amend  the  bill :  otherwise,  the  demurrer  will  be 
held  sufficient.1  (a) 

If  a  plea  to  the  whole  or  a  part  of  a  bill  is  not  set  down  for  argument 
within  three  weeks  after  the  filing  thereof,  the  plaintiff  must  within  that 
time  serve  an  order,  which  may  be  obtained  on  motion  or  petition  of 
course,  for  leave  to  amend  the  bill,  or  undertake  in  writing  to  reply  to 
the  plea ;  otherwise  the  plea  will  be  held  good.2 

Where  a  demurrer  has  been  overruled,  it  is  irregular  to  obtain  an 
order  of  course  to  amend  pending  an  appeal ;  and  in  such  a  case  the 
order  was  discharged  with  costs,  and  the  amendments  expunged.3 

In  like  manner,  it  is  irregular  to  obtain  an  order  of  course  to  amend, 
pending  an  inquiry  which  of  two  suits  is  most  for  an  infant's  benefit.4 

If,  at  the  time  the  order  for  amendment  is  made,  none  of  the  defend- 
ants have  appeared,  the  plaintiff  may  amend  without  payment  of  any 
costs.6  If  any  of  the  defendants  have  appeared,  but  have  not  answered, 
or,  having  answered,  the  plaintiff  requires  no  further  answer  from  them, 
the  plaintiff  may  amend  without  payment  of  any  costs  to  them ;  but 
the  plaintiff  must  pay  20s.  to  each  defendant,  or  set  of  defendants, 
who  have  answered,  and  from  whom  the  plaintiff  requires  a  further 
answer.6 

Where  no  further  answer  is  required,  the  order  should  contain  a 
recital  to  that  effect ;  otherwise  it  is  irregular.7 

It  is  now  proposed  to  consider  the  circumstances  under  which  a  bill 
may  be  amended  after  answer.8  Where  there  is  a  sole  defendant,  or 
where,  there  being  several  defendants,  they  all  join  in  the  same 
*  412  answer,  the  plaintiff  may,  after  answer  and  before  *  replication 
or  undertaking  to  reply,  obtain  one  order  of  course  for  leave  to 
amend  the  bill,  at  any  time  within  four  weeks  after  the  answer  is  to  be 
deemed  or  is  held  to  be  sufficient ; x  and  where  there  are  several  defend- 


i  Cons.  Ord.  XIV.  14, 15.  As  to  the  effect 
of  holding  a  demurrer  sufficient,  see  post,  Chap. 
XIV.  §  5.  For  forms  of  motion  paper  and  pe- 
tition, see  Vol.  III. 

2  Cons.  Ord.  XIV.  17.  As  to  the  effect  of 
holding  a  plea  sufficient,  see  post,  Chap.  XV. 
§  5.  And  see  Campbell  v.  Joyce,  L.  R.  2  Eq. 
377,  V.  C.  W. ;  Kittlewell  v.  Barstow,  L.  R.  10 
Eq.  210.  For  forms  of  motion  paper  and  peti- 
tion, see  Vol.  III. 

3  Ainslie  v.  Sims,  17  Beav.  174. 

*  Fletcher  v.  Moore,  11  Beav.  617;  13  Jur. 
1063. 

5  Saunders  v.  Frost,  5  Pick.  259;  Droullard 
V.  Baxter,  1  Scam.  191;  Rule  20,  Mass.  Chan- 
cery, ante,  p.  410,  note. 


6  Ante.  p.  410,  note. 

'  Buddington  v.  Woodley,  9  Sim.  380;  2 
Jur.  917;  Breeze  v.  English,  2  Hare,  638. 

8  See  Droullard  v.  Baxter,  1  Scam.  191; 
Rules  29  and  30  of  the  Equity  Rules  of  the  U.  S. 
Supreme  Court;  Rules  20  and  22  of  the  Rules 
for  Chancery  Practice  in  Massachusetts,  ante, 
p.  409,  n.  7. 

1  Cons.  Ord.  IX.  10  The  four  weeks  ex- 
pire at  twelve  o'clock  at  night  on  the  last  day. 
Preston  v.  Collett,  20  L.  J.  Ch.  228.  Before 
replication,  the  order  to  amend  is  of  course. 
Buckley  v.  Corse,  Saxton,  504;  Vernon  v.  Cue, 
1  Dick.  358;  Jennings  v.  Pearce,  1  Ves.  Jr. 
447;  Renwick  v.  Wilson,  6  John.  Ch.  85; 
Mount  Olivet  Cemetery  Co.  v.  Budeke,  2  Tenn. 


(a)  Under  the  Codes,  it  is  within  the  Court's 
discretion  to  refuse  to  allow  a  pleading  to  be 
amended,  after  a  demurrer  thereto  is  sustained. 
Daley  v.  Russ,  86  Cal.  114;  Buckley  v.  Howe, 
id.  596.    In  such  case,  the  bill  will  be  dismissed 

412 


if  the  defect  is  not  amendable  or  the  plaintiff 
declines  to  amend.  Wheaton  v.  Atlantic  Pow- 
der Co.  41  Mich.  719;  McKay  v.  McKay,  28 
W.  Va.  514;  Mercantile  Bank  v.  Carpenter,  101 
U.  S.  567. 


AMENDING   THE   BILL.  *  413 

ants  who  do  not  join  in  the  same  answer,  the  plaintiff  (if  not  precluded 
from  amending,  or  limited  as  to  the  time  of  amending  by  some  former 
order),  may,  alter  answer,  and  before  replication  or  undertaking  to  reply, 
at  any  time  within  four  weeks  after  the  last  of  the  answers  required  to 
be  put  in  is  to  be  deemed  or  is  held  to  be  sufficient,  obtain  one  order  of 
course,  for  leave  to  amend  his  bill.2  An  order  of  course  cannot,  however, 
be  obtained,  in  either  of  these  cases,  after  any  defendant,  being  entitled 
to  move,  has  served  a  notice  of  motion  to  dismiss  the  bill  for  want  of 
prosecution.3 

A  voluntary  answer  is  deemed  sufficient  as  soon  as  it  is  put  in;  and 
therefore,  in  that  case,  the  period  of  four  weeks  commences  to  run  as 
soon  as  it  is  filed.4 

In  computing  the  period  for  obtaining  orders  for  leave  to  amend  bills, 
the  times  of  vacation  are  not  to  be  reckoned.5 

It  will  be  convenient  here  to  state  the  different  times  of  vacation. 
The  vacations  observed  in  the  several  offices  of  the  Court,  except  in  the 
office  of  the  Accountant-General,  are  four  in  every  year  :  namely,  the 
Easter  Vacation,  the  Whitsun  Vacation,  the  Long  Vacation,  and  the 
Christmas  Vacation.  (1)  The  Easter  Vacation  commences  and  termi- 
nates on  such  days  as  the  Lord  Chancellor  every  year  specially  directs. 
(2)  The  Whitsun  Vacation  commences  on  the  third  day  after  Easter 
Term,  and  terminates  on  the  second  day  before  Trinity  Term  in  every 
year.  (3)  The  Long  Vacation  commences  on  the  10th  day  of  August  and 
terminates  on  the  28th  day  of  October  in  every  year.  (4)  The  Christmas 
Vacation  commences  on  the  24th  day  of  December  in  every  year,  and 
terminates  on  the  6th  day  of  the  following  month  of  January.6 

The  vacations  in  the  office  of  the  Accountant-General  are  the  same 
as  in  the  other  offices,  except  as  to  the  Long  Vacation,  which  com- 
mences and  terminates  on  such  days  as  the  Lord  Chancellor  every  year 
directs.7 

The  days  of  the  commencement  and  termination  of  each  vaca- 
tion *  are  included  in  and  reckoned  part  of  such  vacation.1     And    *  413 
the  Lord  Chancellor  may  from  time  to  time,  by  special  order, 
direct  any  of  the  vacations  to  commence  and  terminate  on  days  different 
from  the  fixed  days  before  mentioned.2 

When  the  bill  has  been  once  amended  after  answer,  under  an  order 
of  course,  the  plaintiff  is  not,  except  for  the  purpose  of  rectifying  cler- 

Ch.  480.     And  without  prejudice  to  an  injunc-  6  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.  13  (1);  and  see  post, 

tion  or  other  order.     Lanning  i>.  Heath,  25  N.  p.  420. 

J.   Eq.  425;  Harvey  v.  Hall.  L.  R.  11  Eq.  31.  6  Cons.  Ord.  V.  4  (1-4).     The  duties  of  the 

And  it  is  also  a  motion  of  course  to  re-amend  Vacation  Judge  commence  as  each  Court  rises, 

upon    the    coming    in   of    the    answer    to    an  although  the  vacation  may  not   have  actually 

amended  bill.    Dunn  v.  Ferrior,  L.  R.  8  Eq.  248.  commenced.     Francis  v.   Browne,  8  .lur.  N.  S. 

2  Cons.  Ord.  IX.  11.     To  avoid  a  notice  to  785;  10  W.  R.  811,  L.C.;  see  Cons.  Ord.  VI. 

dismiss,  the  order  of  course  under  rr.  10,  11,  11,  as  to  power  of  one  Judge  to  act  for  another 

must  also  be  served;   see  Cons.  Ord.  XXXIII.  during  vacation. 
10  (1).     Cons.  Ord.  IX.  11,  applies  to  bills  of  7  Cons.  Ord.  V.  5. 

discovery.     Peile  v.  Stoddart,  11  Beav.  591.  1  Cons.  Ord.  V.  4  (5). 

8  Cons.  Ord.  IX.  12  ;  nee  post,  p.  416,  n.  4.  2  Cons.  Ord.  V.  6. 

4  Rogers  v  Frver,  2  W.  R.  67 ;  2  Eq.  Rep. 
253,  V.  C.  K. 

413 


414 


THE   BILL. 


ical  errors  in  names,  dates,  or  sums,8  or  of  adding  parties,4  entitled  to 
another  order  of  course,  giving  him  leave  to  amend  his  bill ; 5  and  this 
applies,  notwithstanding  that  some  of  the  defendants  may  answer  sub- 
sequently to  the  date  of  the  amendment,6  and  that  those  defendants  who 
have  already  answered  consent  to  the  application  for  the  order.7 

For  the  purpose  of  determining  whether  an  order  of  course  to  amend 
can  be  obtained,  an  answer  held  to  be  insufficient,  or  the  insufficiency 
of  which  is  admitted  by  the  defendant,  must  be  considered  as  no  answer ; 
and,  consequently,  an  order  to  amend  after  such  insufficient  answer,  or 
after  a  demurrer  or  plea  overruled,8  is  of  course,  and  does  not  preclude 
the  plaintiff  from  obtaining  a  further  order  of  course  for  the  amendment 
of  his  bill,  after  a  sufficient  answer  has  been  put  in.9  It  must,  however, 
be  recollected  that  an  answer  is  deemed  sufficient  until  it  has  been  held 
insufficient ; 10  and,  further,  that  an  amendment  of  the  bill,  made  previ- 
ously to  the  answer  being  held  insufficient,  operates  as  an  admission  of 
the  sufficiency  of  the  answer;  consequently,  however  insufficient  an 
answer  may  be  in  fact,  an  amendment  of  the  bill  before  it  is  held  insuffi- 
cient, will  have  the  effect  of  preventing  any  f urthur  order  to  amend  from 
being  obtained,  as  of  course. 

After  exceptions  for  insufficiency  have  been  submitted  to,  or  allowed, 
the  plaintiff  may  obtain  an  order,  as  of  course,  on  motion  or  petition,11 
that  he  may  be  at  liberty  to  amend  his  bill,  and  that  the  defendant  may 
answer  the  amendments  and  exceptions  together.12  If  the  bill 
*  414  has  been  already  amended  under  such  *  an  order,  and  exceptions 
are  taken  to  the  answer  to  the  amended  bill  and  are  submitted 
to  or  allowed,  the  plaintiff  may  have  a  further  order,  as  of  course  to 
amend,  and  that  the  defendant  may  answer  the  amendments  and  excep- 
tions together.1  If,  however,  the  defendant  can  put  in  his  further 
answer,  before  he  is  served  with  the  order  to  answer  the  amendments 


8  Cons.  Ord.  IX.  9;  ante,  p.  410. 

*  Ante,  pp.  294,  405,  406,  409. 

s  Cons.  Ord.  IX.  13. 

6  Att.-Gen.  v.  Nethercoat,  2  M.  &  C.  604;  1 
Jur.  635;  Duncombe  v.  Lewis,  10  Beav.  273; 
Winthrop  v.  Murray,  7  Hare,  150.  See  Whar- 
ton v.  Swann,  2  M.  &  K.  362. 

I  Bainbrigge  v.  Baddeley,  12  Beav,  152;  13 
Jur  997. 

8  But  pending  an  appeal,  an  order  of  course, 
after  a  demurrer  overruled,  is  irregular.  Ainslie 
v.  Sims,  17  Beav.  174. 

9  Mendizabel  v.  Hullett,  1  R.  &  M.  324; 
Bird  r.  Hustler,  ib.  325;  Chase  v.  Dunham,  1 
Paige,  572. 

i°  See  Sibbald  v.  Lowrie,  2  K.  &  J.  277,  n.; 
Lafone  v.  Falkland  Islands  Co.  2  K.  &  J.  276. 

II  For  forms  of  motion  paper  and  petition,  see 
Vol.  III. 

12  Mayne  v.  Hochin,  1  Dick.  255  ;  Adney  v. 
Flood,  1  Mad.  449;  Dipper  v.  Durant,  3  Mer. 
465;  see  Renwick  v.  Wilson,  6  John.  Ch.  81; 
M'Mechen  v.  Story,  1  Bland,  184;  Barnes  v. 
Dickinson,   Dev.   Eq.  326 ;  Read  v.  Consequa, 

414 


4  Wash.  C.  C.  174.  In  Massachusetts,  upon 
the  coming  in  of  the  answer,  if  the  plaintiff 
shall  find  it  necessary  to  amend  his  bill,  in 
order  to  meet  the  case  made  by  the  answer,  he 
may  do  so  by  furnishing  to  the  defendant  a  cer- 
tified copy  of  the  amendment ;  and  the  plaintiff 
may  also,  at  the  same  time,  except  to  the  de- 
fendant's answer  to  the  bill,  as  orginally  filed. 
And  in  such  case,  if  the  defendant  shall  submit 
to  answer  further,  or  shall  be  ordered  to  answer 
further,  he  shall  answer  the  amendments  of  the 
bill,  and  shall  furnish  a  sufficient  answer  to  the 
bill  as  originally  filed  at  the  same  time.  Mass. 
Ch.  Rule  22.  See  Gerrish  v.  Black,  99  Mass. 
315;  ante,  p.  410,  note.  Under  the  general  rule 
allowing  the  plaintiff  to  amend,  upon  an  insuf- 
ficient answer,  he  cannot  amend  by  leaving  out 
the  name  of  the  defendant,  and  thus  discontinue 
the  suit  against  him,  without  costs.  Chase  v. 
Dunham,  1  Paiffe,  572;  see  Wilkinson  v.  Belsher, 
2  Bro.  C.  C.  272. 

1  Mendizabel  o.  Hullett,  1  R.  &  M.  324;  Bird 
v.  Hustler,  id.  325. 


AMENDING    THE    BILL.  *  415 

and  exceptions  together,  the  plaintiff  will  lose  the  benefit  of  such  order, 
and  the  defendant  may  move,  on  notice,  to  discharge  it  for  irregularity.2 
Where  the  plaintiff  did  not  amend  his  bill  within  the  period  allowed  for 
that  purpose,  it  was  held,  that  a  second  order  of  course  for  leave  to 
amend  was  irregular.8 

All  the  applications  to  amend  hitherto  considered  are  of  course,  and 
require  no  notice.  They  are  usually  obtained  on  a  petition  of  course  at 
the  Rolls ;  but  they  may  also  be  made  on  motion  of  course,  in  the  Court 
of  the  Judge  to  whose  Court  the  cause  is  attached.4 

In  all  cases,  other  than  those  above  pointed  out  in  which  an  order 
may  be  obtained  as  of  course,  the  plaintiff  must,  if  he  desires  to  amend 
his  bill  after  answer,  make  a  special  application  to  the  Judge  for  leave 
to  do  so.  This  application  is  made  by  summons  at  Chambers.6  The 
summons  must  be  served  on  the  solicitors  for  all  the  defendants  who 
have  appeared  to  the  bill.  The  Judge,  at  the  time  of  making  the  order, 
usually  disposes  of  the  costs  of  the  application.6 

If  this  .special  application  is  made  within  the  period  of  four  weeks 
from  the  time  when  the  answer,  or  last  of  the  answers,  required  to  be 
put  in  is  to  be  deemed  or  is  held  to  be  sufficient,  it  will  not  be  granted 
without  an  affidavit  to  the  effect,  (1)  that  the  draft  of  the  proposed 
amendments  has  been  settled,  approved,  and  signed  by  counsel ;  and 
(2),  that  such  amendment  is  not  intended  for  the  purpose  of  delay  or  vex- 
ation, but  because  the  same  is  considered  to  be  material  for  the 
case  of  the  plaintiff.7  *  Such  affidavit  must  be  made  either  by  *  415 
the  plaintiff  and  his  solicitor,  or  by  the  solicitor  alone,  in  case 
the  plaintiff,  from  being  abroad  or  otherwise,  is  unable  to  join  therein.1 
The  affidavit  of  the  solicitor's  clerk  is  not  sufficient,  although  the  facts 
be  within  his  knowledge ;  and  where  the  facts  are  within  his  knowledge 
only,  the  Court  requires  an  affidavit  from  him,  as  well  as  the  solicitor.2 

In  the  case  of  an  information,  the  affidavit  may  be  made  by  the  solicitor 
of  the  informant,8  or  by  the  solicitor  of  the  relators  only.4  So,  also,  if 
a  corporation  is  plaintiff,  an  affidavit  by  the  solicitor  of  the  corporation 
is  sufficient.6    Where  there  are  several  co-plaintiffs,  only  one  need  join 

2  Mayne  v.  Hochin,   1  Dick.  255;  Bethune  t  Cons  Orel.  IX.  14.     This  order  applies  in 

»\  Bateman,  id.  296;  Knox  v.  Symmonds.  1  Ves.  the  case  of  an  application   to  re-amend,  after 

Jr.  87,  88;  Paty  v.  Simpson,  2  Cox,  392;  Part-  answer,  a  bill  which  has  been  amended  after 

ridge  v.  Haycraft,  11  Ves.  570,  578;  Pariente  v.  answer  under  an  order  of  course.     Masterman 

Bensusan,  13  Sim.  522;  7  Jur.  618;  Hemming  v.  Midland  Ry.  20  L.  J.  Ch.  23;  Mcintosh  v. 

v.  Dingwall,  8  Beav.  102.     For  form  of  notice  Great  Western  Ry.  Co    20  L.  J.  Ch.  550;  for 

of  motion,  see  Vol.  III.  form  of  affidavit,  see  Vol.  III. 

s  Dolly  r.Challin.U  Beav.  61;  and  see  Wat-  i  Cons  Ord.  IX.  16;  Att.-Gen.  v.  London, 

son  o.  Life,  1  M'N.  &  G.  104;  13  Jur.  479.  13  Beav.  313.     As  to  cross-examination  upon 

4  Cons.  Ord.  VI.  5.  And  see  post,  Chap.  the  affidavit,  see  Catholic  Pub.  Co.  r.  Wyman, 
XXXV.  §   1,    Interlocutory   Applications    and  ]1  W.  R.  399,  V.  C.  W. 

Orders.     For  forms  of  motion  paper  and  peti-  2  Christ's  Hospital  v.  Grainger,  1  Phil.  634, 

tions,  see  Vol.  III.  639 ;  10  Jur.  37. 

5  15  &  16  Vice.  80,  §§  26,  27;  Cons.  Ord.  8  Att.-Gen.  v.  London,  ubi supra. 
XXXV.  2.    For  form  of  summons,  see  Vol.  III.  4  Att.-Gen.  v.  Wakeman,  15  Sim.   358;  10 

«  See  23  Ord.  Dec,  1833 ;  Sand.  Ord.  781 ;      Jur.  559. 
Beav.  Ord.  51;  Cons.  Ord.  XXXV.  61.     And  6  Christ's  Hospital  v.  Grainger,  ubi  supra. 

see  as  to  costs  of  amendments  generally,  Cons. 
Ord.  XL.  7,  8. 

415 


*416 


THE   BILL. 


in  the  affidavit ;  and  where  the  sole  plaintiff  is  an  infant,  the  affidavit 
should  be  made  by  the  next  friend  and  the  solicitor. 

After  the  plaintiff  has  filed  or  undertaken  to  file  replication,  or  after 
the  expiration  of  four  weeks  from  the  time  when  the  answer,  or  the  last 
of  the  answers  required  to  be  put  in,  is  to  be  deemed,  or  is  held  to  be 
sufficient,  a  special  order  for  leave  to  amend  will  not  be  granted  without 
a  further  affidavit  showing  that  the  matter  of  the  proposed  amendment 
is  material,  and  could  not,  with  reasonable  diligence,  have  been  sooner 
introduced  into  the  bill.6  The  affidavit  must  also  show  the  nature  of  the 
proposed  amendments,  in  order  that  the  Judge  may  decide  as  to  their 
materiality,7  and  must  state  the  facts,  so  as  to  enable  the  Judge  to 
determine  whether  reasonable  diligence  has  been  used.8 

If  the  plaintiff  amends  his  bill  after  answer  by  adding  parties,  the 
period  of  four  weeks  will  still  be  reckoned  from  the  time  when  the  an- 
swer, or  the  last  of  the  answers  required  to  be  put  in  to  the  original 

bill,  is  to  be  deemed,  or  is  held  to  be  sufficient.9 
*  416        *  The  rules  laid  down  in  the  General  Orders,  as  to  obtaining 

orders  of  course  to  amend,  do  not  appear  to  have  been  framed 
with  a  view  to  meet  those  cases  where  no  answer  is  required,  and  none 
is  put  in ;  consequently,  it  has  been  held,  that  it  was  not  irregular  to 
obtain  an  order  of  course  to  amend  after  the  plaintiff  had  served  a 
notice  of  motion  for  a  decree,  and  the  defendant  had  filed  his  affidavits 
in  opposition  to  such  motion.1  It  would  seem,  that  if  the  motion  had 
been  set  down  for  hearing,  an  order  of  course  would  have  been  irreg- 
ular.2 It  is  conceived  that,  after  replication  has  been  filed,  or  the 
plaintiff  has  undertaken  to  file  it,  an  order  of  course  to  amend  cannot 
be  obtained,  even  where  no  answer  has  been  required  or  put  in ; s  and 
where  a  defendant,  being  entitled  to  move,  has  served  a  notice  of  motion 
to  dismiss  for  want  of  prosecution,  the  plaintiff  can  in  no  case  obtain  an 
order  of  course  to  amend ; 4  but  the  limits  above  pointed  out  appear  to 


6  Cons.  Ord.  IX.  15;  Thorn  v.  Germand,  4 
John.  Ch.  363.  If  the  plaintiff  files  amplica- 
tion to  the  answer  after  he  is  apprised  of  the 
necessity  of  an  amendment  to  his  bill,  he  pre- 
cludes himself  from  making  such  amendment. 
Vermilyea  v.  Odell,  4  Paige,  121.  The  applica- 
tion to  amend  should  be  made  as  soon  as  the 
necessity  for  an  amendment  is  discovered. 
Rogers  v.  Rogers,  1  Paige,  424;  Piatt  v.  Squire, 
5  Cush.  557;  Codington  »'.  Mott,  14  N.  J.  Eq. 
430;  Howell  v.  Lebring,  id.  84,  90;  for  form  of 
affidavit,  see  Vol.  III. 

'  Phillips  v.  Goding,  1  Hare,  40;  5  Jur. 
1105;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Fishmongers'  Co.  4  M.  &  C. 
1,  8;  C.  P.  Coop.  385;  Stuart  v.  Lloyd,  3  M'N. 
&G.  181;  15  Jur.  411;  Collett  v.  Preston,  3 
M'N.  &  G.  432,  438;  15  Jur.  975;  Brown  v. 
Ricketts,  2  John.  Ch.  425.  And  see  as  to  suf- 
ficiency of  affidavit,  Att.-Gen.  v.  London,  13 
Beav.  313.  In  Payne  v.  Little,  14  Jur.  358,  the 
M.  R.  held  that  it  was  sufficient  if  some  of 
the  proposed  amendments  were  mentioned  in 
the  affidavit.    Price  v.  Salusbury,  32  Beav.  446; 

416 


Hemming  v.  Maddick,  L.  R.  9  Eq.  175;  L.  R.  7 
Ch.  395. 

8  Stuart  t;.  Lloyd,  and  Collett  v.  Preston,  ubi 
supra.  Although  reasonable  diligence  cannot 
be  thus  shown,  the  application  must  be  made  to 
the  Judge  y  summons.  As  to  the  power  of  the 
Court,  and  Judge  at  Chambers,  to  enlarge  the 
time  for  doing  any  act,  or  taking  any  proceed- 
ing, see  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.  17,  18;  Potts  v. 
Whit  more,  10  Beav.  179. 

9  Bertolacci    e.  Johnstone,  2  Hare,   632;  8 

Jur.  751. 

i  Gill  v.  Rayner,  1  K.  &  J.  395 ;  and  see 

ante,  pp.  411,  412. 

2  Ibid.  Goodwin  v.  Goodwin,  3  Atk.  370. 
A  motion  for  a  decree  would  for  this  purpose, 
it  is  apprehended,  be  considered  a  hearing  of 
the  cause. 

3  Cons.  Ord.  IX.  15. 

*  Cons.  Ord.  IX.  12;  but  if  the  notice  be  with- 
drawn, matters  will  be  remitted  to  their  former 
condition.  Briggs  v.  Beale,  12  W.  R.  934,  V. 
C.  W. 


AMENDING    THE   BILL.  *  417 

be  the  only  restraints  on  the  right  of  the  plaintiff  to  obtain  an  order  of 
course  to  amend,  where  no  answer  is  put  in. 

After  the  evidence  is  closed,  the  bill  cannot  be  amended  in  any  other 
respect  than  by  adding  parties  ;  and  no  new  allegation  can  be  introduced, 
or  material  fact  put  in  issue,  which  was  not  so  before.6  And  where  a 
plaintiff  by  a  false  suggestion  that  the  cause  was  at  issue  only,  had  ob- 
tained an  order  for  liberty  to  amend  his  bill,  by  the  addition  of  a  prayer 
which  had  been  accidentally  omitted,  the  order  was  discharged,  upon  the 
application  of  the  defendant  at  the  opening  of  the  cause,  when  it  came 
on  for  hearing.6 

It  is  said 7  that,  after  publication  has  passed  (that  is,  after  the  evi- 
dence is  closed),  there  is  no  instance  of  a  plaintiff  obtaining  an  order  to 
amend,  without  withdrawing  his  replication.  The  observation,  however, 
appears  to  be  a  mere  dictum,  and  it  certainly  cannot  apply  to  cases  where 
the  amendment  is  merely  by  adding  parties.  Lord  Thurlow  once  inti- 
mated an  opinion,8  that  after  a  decree  had  been  made,  passed,  and 
entered,  without  bringing  before  the  Court  a  personal  representative 
who  had  become  so  after  the  bill  was  filed,  he  might  be  added  by  amend- 
ment, and  that  a  motion  for  the  purpose  would  be  regular,  provided 
it  was  only  for  the  purpose  of  making  him  a  witness  to  *  what  *  417 
was  done  in  the  Master's  office ;  but  that,  if  there  was  anything 
in  the  decree  affecting  him  in  the  way  of  an  order  to  pay,  such  an  order 
would  be  out  of  the  power  of  the  Court. 

Where  it  is  intended  to  amend  a  bill,  after  replication  filed,  by  the 
addition  of  new  facts  or  charges,  the  proper  course  is  to  apply  for  leave 
to  withdraw  the  replication  and  amend ;  and  it  seems  that  an  order  of 
this  description  may  be  obtained,  upon  an  application  in  Chambers,  sup- 
ported by  the  affidavits  required  by  the  General  Orders  above  referred 
to,1  at  any  time  before  the  closing  of  the  evidence.2  (a)  The  order  may 
be  made  without  prejudice  to  the  evidence  already  gone  into  being  used.8 

Sometimes  the  Court,  at  the  hearing,  will  order  a  cause  to  stand  over, 
with  liberty  to  the  plaintiff  to  perfect  his  case  by  amendment,  upon  his 
paying  the  costs  of  the  day.4  (b)     Thus,  as  we  have  seen,  if,  at  the  hear- 

6  Goodwin  v.  Goodwin,  3  Atk.  370  ;  Milligan  Champneys  v.  Buchan,  3  Drew.  5;   see  Thorn 

v.  Mitchell,  1  M.  &  C.  433,  442;  Thompson  v.  v.  Germand,  4  John.  Ch.  363  ;    Story.  Eq.  PI. 

Judge,  2  Drew.  414;  Horton  v.  Brocklehurst,  §  887;  Blaisdell  v.  Stevens,  16  Vt.  179;  Brown 

29    Beav.   503;    Forbes    v.   Stevens,    10   Jur.  v.  Ricketts,  2  John.  Ch.  425. 

N.  S.  861,  V.  C.  W.;  but  see  S.  C.  4  N.  R.  386,  8  Ricardo  v.  Cooper,  cited  Seton,  1253. 

k-  JJ-  4  This  may  be  done,  when  the  cause  is  heard 

«  Harding  v.  Cox,  3  Atk.  583.  on  motion  for  decree.     Thomas  v.  Bernard,  7 

">  1  Atk.  51.  W.  R.  271,  V.  C.  K. ;  Budding  v.  Murdoch,  1 

8  Habergham  v.  Vincent,  1  Ves.  Jr.  68;  see,  Ch.  D.  42;   King  v.  Corke,   id.  57.     And   see 

however,  1  C.  P.  Coop.  temp.  Cott.  40,  n.  where   the   pleadings   are   evasive,   which   are 

1  For  form  of  summons,  see  Vol.  III.  sought  to  be  amended,  Tildeslev  v.  Harner,  10 

2  Horton   v.   Brocklehurst,   29    Beav.    503;  Ch.  D.  393,  overruling  S.  C.  7  Ch.  D.  403. 


(a)  Such  an  order  will  not  be  ma^e  after  the  727;  see  Mozeley  r.  Cowie,  47  id.  271.  It  will 
evidence  is  closed.  Godbold  v.  Ellis,  23  W.  not  be  granted  when  the  other  party  will  be 
**•  333.  seriously  damnified  by  the   amendment.     Til- 

(b)  Such  liberty  to  amend  does  not  carry  desley  v.  Harper,  10  Ch.  D.  393;  Claparede  v. 
with  it  liberty  to  go  into  further  evidence.  Commercial  Union  Ass'n,  32  W.  R.  151;  Traf- 
Nobel's  Explosive  Co.  r.  Jones,  49  L.J.  Ch.  726,  ford  v.  Blanc,  53  L.  T.  498.     The  question  ot 

vol.  i.  — 27  417 


*418 


THE   BILL. 


ing,  the  record  appears  to  be  defective  for  want  of  proper  parties,  the 
Court  will  allow  the  cause  to  stand  over,  for  the  plaintiff  to  amend  his 
bill  by  adding  parties ; 5  or,  where  the  parties  are  too  numerous  to  be 
brought  before  the  Court,  to  alter  the  form  of  the  bill,  by  making  it  a 
bill  by  the  plaintiffs,  on  behalf  of  themselves  and  all  others  of  the  same 
class.6  This  practice  is  not  confined  to  amendment,  by  adding  parties  : 
it  will  be  extended  to  permit  the  plaintiff  to  show  why  he  cannot  bring 
the  necessary  parties  before  the  Court.7  And  if  the  record  is  defective 
by  reason  of  a  misjoinder  of  plaintiffs,  the  Court  may  direct  such  amend- 
ments as  may  be  necessary,  in  order  to  grant  such  relief  as  any  of  the 
plaintiffs  may  be  entitled  to,  and  at  the  hearing,  before  such  amendments 
are  made,  treat  any  of  the  plaintiffs  as  if  he  were  a  defendant.8  And  so, 
as  we  have  seen,9  the  Court  will  sometimes,  at  the  hearing,  permit  the 
prayer  of  the  bill  to  be  amended,10  so  as  to  make  it  more  consistent  with 
the  case  made  by  the  plaintiff  than  the  one  he  has  already  introduced. 

And  where  a  plaintiff  had  amended  his  bill,  and  by  accident  had 
*  418    omitted  to  insert  in  the  *  amended  bill  the  prayer  for  relief, 

although  it  was  in  the  original  bill,  the  Court  put  off  the  cause, 


»  Ante,  pp.  290,  291 ;  and  see  Leyland  v. 
Levland,  10  W.  R.  149,  V.  C.  K.  ;  Story,  Eq. 
PI."  §891. 

G  Ante,  p.  244;  and  see  Gwatkin  v.  Camp- 
bell, 1  Jur.  N.  S.  131,  V.  C.  W. 

t  Milligan  v.  Mitchell,  1  M.  &  C.  511,  515. 
Gibson  v.  Ingo,  5  Hare,  156. 

8  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  49 ;  ante,  p  303 ; 
and  see  Lee  v.  Blackstone,  Seton,  1113,  No.  2. 

9  Ante,  p.  383. 

10  Clifton  v.  H:iig,  4  Desaus.  330,  cited,  post, 
419,  in  note;  Lyon  v.  Tallmadge,  1  John.  Ch. 
184.     If  a  formal  charge  of  fraud  were  neces- 


costs  may  be  reserved,  if  the  plaintiff  is  not 
ordered  to  pay  them.  Att.-Gen.  v.  Cambridge 
Consumers'  Gas  Co.  L.  R.  6  Eq.  282,  308  ;  L.  R. 
4Ch.  71 ;  Breckton  v.  Russell,  19  L.  T.  N.  S.  81. 
The  Court  in  its  discretion  may,  at  the  hearing, 
or  thereafter,  permit  the  plaintiff's  case  to  be 
perfected  by  amendment,  but  it  will  not  then 
permit  him  to  substitute  a  new  case.  See  King 
v.  Corke,  1  Ch.  D.  57;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Birming- 
ham, 15  Ch.  D.  423;  Edevain  v.  Cohen.  41  Ch. 
D.  563,  aff'd  38  W.  R.  177 ;  Lowther  v.  Heaver, 
id.  248  ;  59  L.  T.  631;  Riding  v.  Hawkins,  14 
P.  D.  56;  Re  Trufort,  34  W.  R.  56;  Re  White 
Star  C.  G.  M  Co.  48  L.  T.  815;  Underwood  v. 
Gerber,  37  Fed.  Rep.  796;  Ogden  v.  Thornton, 
30  N".  J.  Eq.  569;  Foster  v.  Knowles,  42  id. 
226 ;  Fearey  v.  Hayes,  44  id.  425 ;  Jones  v. 
Davenport,  45  id.  77 ;  Mears  v.  Dole,  135  Ma9S. 
508;  Jeffries  v.  Jeffries,  66  Mich.  216;  Dodson 
v.  McKelvey,  93  Mich. 263;  Steinriede  v.  Tegge 
(Ky.),  14  S.  W~.  Rep.  357;  Hibernia  S.  &  L. 
Society??.  Jones.  89  Cal.  507;  Link  v.  Jarvis 
(Cal.),  33Pac.  Rep.  206;  Conn.  M.  Life  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Smith  (Mo.),  22  S.  W.  Rep.  623;   Hen- 

418 


sary,  but  had  been  omitted,  the  Court  would 
grant  leave  to  amend  even  at  the  hearing. 
Wamburzee  v.  Kennedy,  4  Desaus.  480.  But 
after  a  defendant  has  put  in  his  answer  on  oath, 
the  plaintiff  cannot  amend  his  bill  and  include 
in  such  amendment  a  waiver  of  the  answer  of 
the  defendant  on  oath,  so  as  to  deprive  him  of 
the  benefit  of  his  answer  to  the  amendments, 
so  far  as  it  may  be  responsive  to  the  bill.  Bur- 
ras  v.  Loker,  4  Paige,  227;  Bingham  v.  Yeo- 
mans,  10  Cush.  58;  Chace  v.  Holmes,  2  Gray, 
314;  Ch.  Rule  8,  of  Mass. 


dersnn  v.  Meyers  (La.),  13  So.  Rep.  191;  Look- 
out Bank  v.  Susong,  90  Tenn.  590;  Ward  v. 
Parlin,  30  Neb.  376;  American  Bible  Society  v. 
Price,  115  111.  623;  Campbell  v.  Powers,  37  111. 
App.  308;  139  111.128;  Sawyer  v.  Campbell, 
130  III.  186;  Harrigan  v.  Bacon,  57  Vt.  644; 
Smith  i'.  Sherman,  52  Mich.  637  ;  Alexander 
v.  Taylor,  56  Ala.  60  ;  Dougherty  v.  Murphy, 
10  Phila.  509;  Shorthill  v.  Ferguson,  47  Iowa, 
284;  Clough  v.  Adams,  71  id.  17;  Church  v. 
Holcomb,  45  Mich.  29;  Burtons.  Schildbach, 
id.  504;  Furman  v.  North,  4  Baxter,  296; 
Kelly  v.  Kershaw  (Utah),  14  Pac.  Rep.  804  ; 
Jones  v.  Wadsworth,  11  Phila.  239;  Brown  r. 
Rogers,  20  Neb.  547;  Gwynn  v.  Butler,  17 
Col.  114.  In  the  Federal  Courts,  amendments 
may  be  made  as  late  as  elsewhere,  and  the 
Equity  Rules  on  the  subject  do  not  apply  when 
the  case  has  been  heard.  See  Neale  v.  Neales, 
9  Wall.  1;  Battler.  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  10  Blatch. 
417 ;  Lichtenauer  v.  Cheney,  3  McCrary,  119 ; 
Collinson  r.  Jackson,  14  Fed.  Rep.  305  ;  Mills 
v.  Scott,  43  id.  452;  Henry  v.  Travellers'  Ins. 
Co.  45  id.  299;  Claflin  v.  Bennett,  51  id.  693. 


AMENDING    THE    BILL. 


418 


in  order  that  the  plaintiff  might  have  an  opportunity  to  re-amend  his  bill 
by  inserting  it.1 

Usually,  amendments  are  allowed  at  the  hearing  only  for  the  purpose 
of  making  the  record  complete  as  to  parties,  or  adapting  the  prayer  to 
the  case  made  by  the  bill.2  Upon  the  question  of  allowing  amendments 
for  other  purposes  at  the  hearing,  it  has  been  observed : 8  "It  is  impos- 
sible to  lay  down  any  general  rule ;  all  depends  upon  the  circumstances  ; 
but.  speaking  generally,  I  should  say  that  leave  should  be  given  where 
the  matters  proposed  to  be  introduced  are  connected  with  the  matters  in 
issue,  but  should  be  refused  where  it  is  not  so." 4  (a)    Thus,  where  a  mat- 


1  Harding  v.  Cox,  3  Atk.  583. 

2  Watts  v.  Hyde,  2  Phil.  406,  411;  11  Jur. 
979;  and  see  Bellamy  v.  Sabine,  2  Phil.  425, 
447. 

8  Per  Sir  George  Turner  L.  J.  in  Lord  Darn- 
ley  v.  London,  Chatham,  and  Dover  Rv.  Co. 
9  Jur.  N.  S.  452,  453;  11  W.  R.  388^  391; 
1  De  G.  J.  &  S.  204,  219,  220;  and  see  Gossop 
v.  Wright,  9  Jur.  N.  S.  592;  11  W.  R.  632,  V. 
C.  K. 

4  In  Walker  v.  Armstrong,  8  De  G.  M.  & 
G.  531 ;  2  Jur.  N.  S.  959,  however,  the  L.  JJ. 
allowed  a  bill  to  be  amended  at  the  hearing,  by 
raising  an  entirely  new  case,  namely,  the  recti- 
fication of  a  deed.  See  also  Budding  p.  Mur- 
doch, 1  Ch.  D.  42.    See  for  instances  of  nmend- 


(a)  An  amendment  will  not  be  allowed  to 
create  a  new  case  or  ground  of  suit  uncon- 
nected with  the  matters  in  issue,  against  the 
same  or  new  parties.  See  Clark  v.  Wray,  31 
Ch.  D.  08;  Rushbrooke  v.  Farley,  54  L.  J."  Ch. 
1079;  Blenkhorn  v.  Penrose,  43  L.  T.  668; 
Clarke  v.  Yorke,  47  L.  T.  381;  Richmond  v. 
Irons,  121  U.  S.  27;  Jones  v.  Van  Doren.  130 
U.  S.  684;  Oglesby  v.  Attrill,  14  Fed.  Rep.  214; 
Imperial  Refining  Co.  v.  Wyman,  38  id.  574; 
New  Mexico  Land  Co.  v.  Elkins,  20  id.  545; 
Nichols  V.  Scranton  Steel  Co.  137  N.  Y.  471; 
Pickens  v.  Knisely,  29  W.  Va.  1 ;  Seborn  v.  Beck- 
with,  30  W.Va.  774;  Thompson  v.  Corrie,  57  Md. 
197  ;  Hart  v.  Henderson,  66  Ga.  568;  De  Lacy 
v.  Hurst,  83  Ga.  223;  Halcomb  v.  Kelly,  57 
Texas,  618;  Marshall  v.  Olds,  86  Ala.  296; 
Johnson  v.  Durner,  88  Ala.  580;  Seals  v.  Pheif- 
fer,  81  Ala.  518;  Ward  v.  Patton,  75  Ala.  207; 
Alabama  Warehouse  Co.  v.  Jones,  62  Ala.  550; 
Hawkins  v.  Pearson  (Ala.),  11  So.  Rep.  304; 
Jones  v.  Reese,  65  Ala.  134;  Smith  v.  Coleman, 
59  Ala.  200;  Planters'  Ins.  Co.  v.  Selma  Sav- 
ings Bank,  63  Ala.  585;  Drew  v.  Beard,  107 
Mass.  64;  Hogan  v.  McFarland,  6  Baxter,  104; 
Tappan  v.  Western  &  A.  R.  Co.  3  Lea  (Tenn.), 
106;  Hampton  v.  Quayle,  12  R.  I.  508;  National 
Bank  of  Commerce  v.  Smith,  17  R.  I.  244; 
Miles  v.  Strong,  60  Conn.  393;  Livingston  v. 
Hayes,  43  Mich.  129;  McMann  v.  Wescott, 
47   Mich.    177  ;    Clough  v.  Adams,  71   Iowa, 


ment  at  the  hearing,  Neale  v.  Neales,  9  Wall. 
1;  Armstrong  t;.  Ross,  20  N.  J.  Eq.  109;  Elmer 
v.  Loper,  25  id.  475;  Ogden  v.  Thornton.  30  N. 
J.  Eq.  569;  Hewitt  v.  Dement,  57  111.  500; 
Drew  v.  Beard,  107  Mass.  64 ;  Rhea  v.  Puryear, 
26  Ark.  344;  Perkins  v.  Hays,  Cooke,  189; 
Coffman  v.  Langston,  21  Graft.  263.  After 
hearing.  Hampton  v.  Nicholson,  23  N.  J.  Eq. 
423.  And.  in  a  peculiar  case,  after  decree.  The 
Tremole  Patent,  23  Wall.  518.  Amendment 
will  be  allowed  after  the  trial  of  an  issue. 
Powell  v.  Mayo,  26  N.  J.  Eq.  120.  See,  how- 
ever, Clews  v.  Brunswick  R.  Co.  50  Ga.  522; 
Curtis  v.  Goodenow,  24  Mich.  18 ;  Munch  v. 
Shabell,  37  Mich.  166. 


17;  Randall  v.  Christianson  (Iowa),  51  N.  W. 
Rep.  253  ;  Clements  v.  Lampkin,  34  Ark. 
598;  Brooks  v.  Spann,  63  Miss.  198;  Hardie 
?'.  Bulger,  66  Miss.  577;  Kennerty  v.  Etiwau 
Phosphate  Co.  21  S.  C.  226.  This  objection 
may  be  waived  by  filing  an  answer.  Wit- 
kowski  v.  Hern,  82  Cal.  604.  So  there  cannot 
be  an  entire  change  of  defendants  by  amend- 
ment. Hall  v.  School  District  No.  i,  36  Mo. 
App.  21;  Western  Ry.  v.  McCall,  89  Ala.  375; 
Howes  v.  Patterson,  76  Ga.  089.  But  a  bill 
may  be  amended  by  substituting  a  defendant 
for  the  plaintiff  when  the  latter  has  no  interest. 
Smith  v.  Hadley,  64  N.  H.  97.  Under  the 
Codes,  the  Court  may,  in  its  discretion,  allow, 
upon  just  terms,  an  amendment  which  states  a 
different  ground  of  suit,  if  the  original  plead- 
ing shows  a  good  cause  of  suit.  Reagan  t>. 
Evans  (Texas),  21  S.  W.  Rep.  427;  Hit  in-  v. 
Dayton,  22  N.  Y.  S.  154.  An  amendment  to  a 
bill  which  merely  anticipates  the  defence  is  not 
demurrable  as  stating  a  new  and  different  case. 
Brooks  v.  Spann,  63  Miss.  198. 

The  proposed  amendment  must  also  be  con- 
sistent with  the  original  bill,  especially  when 
the  bill  is  required  to  be  sworn  to,  as  in  injunc- 
tion bills.  Rogers  ?'.  Rogers,  1  Paige,  424;  Og- 
den v.  Moore,  95  Mich.  290;  54  N.  W.  Rep.  899; 
Hill  v.  Hill,  53  Vt.  578;  Shenandoah  Valley  R. 
Co.  v.  Griffith,  76  Va.  913.  In  Georgia,  a  sworn 
bill  may  be  amended  in  its  praver  and  bv  adding 

'419 


418 


THE    BILL. 


ter  has  not  been  put  in  issue  with  sufficient  precision,  the  Court  has, 
upon  hearing  the  cause,  given  the  plaintiff  liberty  to  amend  the  bill  for 
the  purpose  of  making  the  necessary  alteration.5 

Wherever  improper  submissions  have  been  made  in  a  bill  on  behalf 
of  infants,  the  Court  will,  at  the  hearing,  order  that  the  bill  shall  be 
amended,  by  striking  out  the  submission.6     Upon  the  same  principle, 


6  Ld.  Red.  326;  Filkin  v.  Hill,  4  Bro.  P.  C. 
ed.  Toml.  640;  nam.  Hill  v.  Eyre,  1  De  G.  J. 
&  S.  217,  218,  220;  and  see  observations  of 
L.  J.  Turner  on  this  case,  in  Lord  Darnley  v. 
London,  Chatham,  and  Dover  Ry.  Co.  9  Jur. 
N.  S.  452;  11  W.  R.  391;  see  "also  Watts  v. 
Lord  Eglinton,  1  C.  P.  Coop.  temp.  Cott.  423; 
Knox  v.  Gye,  9  Jur.  N.  S.  1277,  V.  C.  W. ;  12 
W.  R.  1125,  L.  JJ.;  Forbes  v.  Stevens,  10  Jur. 
N.  S.  861,  V.  C.  W".;  4  N.  R.  386,  L.  JJ.; 
Firth  v.  Kidley,  id.  415,  L.  JJ.;   Hume  v.  Po- 


a  new  plaintiff,  without  swearing  to  the  amend- 
ment. Livingston  v.  Marshall,  82  Ga.  281 ; 
Shannon  v.  Fechheimer,  76  Ga.  86.  If  a  ma- 
terial amendment  to  a  complaint  is  not  veri- 
fied, the  complaint  may  be  treated  as  unverified. 
Brown  v.  Rhinehart,"  112  N.  C.  772,  775.  If 
an  amendment  is  stricken  out  for  inconsist- 
ency, a  second  amendment,  though  inconsistent 
with  the  first,  may  be  allowed,  if  consistent 
•with  the  original  bill.  Seals  v.  Pheiffer,  81 
Ala.  518.  Amendments  will  be  rejected  when 
it  is  clear  that  they  will  prove  ineffectual  or 
immaterial.  See  Yorkshire  Ry.  Wagon  Co.  v. 
Maclure,  19  Ch.  D.  478,  489;  Hicks  v.  Oliver, 
17  Fed.  Rep.  539;  Steinhauser  v.  Spraul  (Mo.), 
21  S.  W.  Rep,  515;  or  when  they  aim  to  add 
improper  parties.  Tyler  v.  Galloway,  13  Fed. 
Rep.  477.  The  right  to  amend  may  be  lost  by 
laches.  Kurtz  v.  Spence,  36  Ch.  D.  770;  Jones 
v  Welling,  16  Fed.  Rep.  655 ;  Dederick  v.  Farqu- 
har,  39  id.  346;  Bauers's  Estate,  13  Phila.  391; 
Picquet  v.  Augusta,  64  Ga.  516.  Fre«h  claims, 
barred  by  limitation  since  the  writ  was  issued, 
cannot  be  set  up  by  amendment.  Weldon  v. 
Neal,  19  Q.  B.  D.  394;  Steward  v.  North  Met. 
Tramways  Co.  16  id.  178,  556 ;  Judson  v.  Courier 
Co.  25  Fed.  Rep.  705;  Sanger  v.  Newton,  134 
Mass.  308 ;  Bray  v.  Creekmore,  109  N.  C.  49 ;  Gar- 
lington  v.  Copeland,  32  S.  C.  57,  601  ;  Winston 
v.  Mitchell,  93  Ala.  554;  Adams  v.  Phillips,  75 
Ala.  461;  Green  v.  Tippah  County  Supervisors, 
58  Miss.  337.  Thus,  the  plaintiff,  suing  as 
assignee,  cannot  amend  by  adding  the  assignor 
as  a  party  to  entitle  him  to  sue,  thereby  taking 
away  from  the  defendant  the  defence  of  the 
Statute  of  Limitations  by  which  the  remedy 
was  barred  between  the  date  of  the  writ  and 
the  application  to  amend.  Hudson  v.  Ferny- 
hough,  61  L.  T.  722;  see  also  Wood  v.  Met'n 
Life  Ins.  Co.  (Mich.)  56  N.  W.  Rep.  8 ;  Par- 
420 


cock,  L.  R.  1  Eq.  662;  12  Jur.  N.  S.  223,  V. 
C.  S. ;  Trappes  v.  Meredith,  L.  R.  9  Eq.  229; 
L.  R.  10  Eq.  604 ;  L.  R.  7  Ch.  248 ;  see  Conal- 
ley  v.  Peck,  3  Cal.  75;  McDougald  v.  Willi- 
ford,  14  Ga.  665;  Midmer  v.  Midmer,  26  N.  J. 
Eq.  299.  For  form  of  orders  to  amend  at  the 
hearing,  see  Seton,  1113,  Nos.  1,  2;  and  see  id. 
1114-1116. 

6  Serle  v.  St.  Eloy,  2  P.  Wras.  386,   ante, 
p.  77. 


sons  Water  Co.  v.  Hill  (Kansas).  26  Pac.  Rep. 
412. 

If  the  amended  bill  merely  varies  the  allega- 
tions as  to  the  same  matters  which  are  already 
within  the  lis  pendens,  the  statute  still  ceases  to 
run  after  the  time  of  filing  the  original  bill. 
Winston  v.  Mitchell,  93  Ala.  554;  see  Rich- 
mond v.  Irons,  121  U.  S.  27.  An  amendment 
to  a  bill  for  redemption,  where  the  facts  author- 
ized a  redemption,  though  the  period  therefor 
had  passed,  was  permitted  in  Burgess  v.  Graf- 
fam,  10  Fed.  Rep.  216;  see  Hibernia  Co.  v. 
Jones,  89  Cal.  507.  The  fact  that  the  amend- 
ment was  not  made  until  the  statutory  period 
had  expired  is  not  fatal,  when  the  answer  recites 
and  admits  the  facts  averred  in  the  amendment 
which  takes  the  case  out  of  the  statute.  John- 
son v.  Waters,  111  U.  S.  640. 

The  addition  or  striking  out  of  one  plaintiff's 
name  does  not  create  a  different  cause  of  action. 
Wyman  v.  Wilcox,  63  Vt.  487;  Metz  v.  Wood, 
39  111.  App.  131.  But  a  complete  change  of 
parties  plaintiff  has  that  effect  and  will  not  be 
allowed  by  amendment.  Clements  v.  Green- 
well,  40  Mo.  App.  589;  Liebmann  v.  McGraw, 
3  Wash.  St.  320;  see  Murphy  v.  Gibbs,  107 
N.  C.  303. 

Allegations  of  an  amended  bill  or  complaint 
are  admitted,  if  not  denied  by  the  amended 
answer.  Putnam  v.  Lyon  (Col.),  32  Pac.  Rep. 
492.  An  amended  statement  of  claim  will  not 
be  stricken  out,  when  the  defendant  has  al- 
ready answered  to  the  same  cause  of  action,  on 
the  ground  that  it  shows  no  reasonable  cause  of 
suit.  Jenkins  v.  Rees,  33  W.  R.  929.  A  neces- 
sary but  omitted  allegation,  as  to  which  the 
hearing  is  had  as  if  it  were  not  omitted,  may, 
in  New  York,  be  amended  on  appeal  without 
being  remanded.  Bowland  v.  Sprauls,  21  N. 
Y.  S.  895. 


AMENDING   THE   BILL. 


*419 


where  an  infant  heir-at-law  had  been  made  a  co-plaintiff,  Lord  Redes- 
dale  ordered  the  cause  to  stand  over,  with  liberty  to  the  plaintiff  to 
amend  his  bill,  by  making  the  heir-at-law  a  defendant;7  and  where 
a  matter  has  not  been  put,  by  the  bill,  properly  in  issue,  to  the  pre- 
judice of  an  infant,  the  Court  has  generally  ordered  the  bill  to  be 
amended.8 

The  Court  has  even  gone  to  the  extent  of  allowing  the  plaintiffs,  at 
the  hearing  of  an  appeal,  to  amend  their  bill,  by  converting  it  from  a 
bill  into  an  information  and  bill,  or  information  only.9 

*But,  although  the  Court  will  sometimes,  at  the  hearing,  allow  *  419 
the  cause  to  stand  over,  with  liberty  for  the  plaintiff  to  amend 
his  bill,  the  plaintiff  ought  to  be  careful,  before  the  cause  comes  on,  to 
have  the  record  in  a  proper  state,  so  as  to  enable  the  Court  to  make  a 
complete  decree :  for  the  plaintiff  himself  cannot,  when  the  cause  comes 
on  for  hearing  (unless  under  particular  circumstances,  or  with  the  con- 
sent of  the  defendant),  obtain  leave  to  amend  his  bill,  even  upon  the 
usual  terms  of  paying  the  costs  of  the  day ; *  and  if  a  decree  were  to  be 
obtained  upon  pleadings  which  are  defective  in  a  material  point,  it  would 
afterwards  be  liable  to  be  set  aside  for  error.2 

It  frequently  happens  that,  upon  the  argument  of  a  demurrer,  the 
Court,  where  the  ground  for  demurrer  can  be  removed  by  amendment, 
has,  in  order  to  avoid  putting  the  plaintiff  to  the  expense  of  filing  a  new 
bill  instead  of  deciding  upon  the  demurrer,  given  the  plaintiff  liberty 
to  amend  his  bill,  on  payment  of  the  costs  incurred  by  the  defendant; 3 
because,  after  a  demurrer  allowed  to  the  whole  bill,  the  bill  is  so  com- 
pletely out  of  Court  that  no  amendment  can  take  place  : 4  and  where  the 


1  Plunket  v.  Joice,  2  Sch.  &  Lef.  159. 

«  Ld.  Red.  327. 

9  President  of  St.  Mary  Magdalen  College 
v.  Sibthorp,  1  Russ.  154;  ante,  p.  12.  Leave 
will  be  granted  to  amend  in  the  Court  of 
Appeals,  if  it  there  be  found  necessary,  in 
order  to  let  in  the  whole  merits  of  the  case. 
Lenoir  v.  Winn,  4  Desaus.  65;  Rodgers  v. 
Jones,  1  M'Cord  Ch.  226;  MeKim  v.  Odom, 
3  Bland,  407 ;  Drummond  v.  Magruder,  9 
Cranch,  122  ;  Lewis  v.  Darling,  16  Howard, 
U.  S.  1.  If  the  record  shows  substance  by 
which  to  amend.  Darlington's  Appeal,  86 
Penn.  St.  512;  Edmund's  Appeal,  68  id.  24; 
Kuhl  v.  Martin,  29  N.  J.  Eq  586;  Thurmand 
v.  Clark,  47  Ga.  500.  But  not  upon  facts  out- 
side of  the  record,  brought  forward  by  affidavit 
or  petition.  Fogg  v.  Union  Bank,  4  Baxt.  418. 
a  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Tennessee 
recognized  and  repeated  in  MiKinlev  t».  Sherry, 
at  Jackson,  in  April,  1879.  See  also  Black  v. 
Delaware  &c.  Canal  Co.  24  N.  J.  Eq.  455, 
482.  A  petition  in  Chancery  in  Connecticut 
can  be  amended  after  the  facts  in  the  case  have 
been  found  by  a  committee.  Camp  v.  Waring, 
25  Conn.  520. 

1  Leave    may    be    granted    to    amend    the 
prayer  of    the   bill   after  hearing.     Clifton  v. 


Haig,  4  Desaus.  330.  If  a  formal  charge  of 
fraud  were  necessary,  but  had  been  omitted, 
the  Court  would  give  leave  to  amend  even 
at  the  hearing.  Wamburzee  v.  Kennedy,  4 
Desaus.  480. 

2  Wyatt's  P.  R.  299.  As  to  obtaining  leave 
to  amend  at  the  hearing  of  an  interlocutory 
application,  see  Barnett  v.  Noble,  1  J.  &  W. 
227;  Pare  v.  Clegg,  7.  Jur.  N.  S.  1136;  9 
W.  R.  216,  M.  R. 

8  See  Marshall  v.  Lovelass,  Cam.  &  Nor. 
239,  264;  Benzien  v.  Lovelass,  id.  520;  Holli- 
day  v.  Riordon,  12  Ga.  417.  After  a  special 
demurrer  to  a  bill,  the  plaintiff  may  have  leave 
to  amend,  on  payment  of  costs.  Rose  v.  King, 
4  Hen.  &  Munf.  475.  So  where  a  mere  formal 
objection  to  a  bill  was  made  by  demurrer  ore 
tenia,  the  plaintiff  was  permitted  to  amend. 
Garlick  v.  Strong,  3  Paige,  440.  So  also  upon 
the  allowance  of  a  demurrer  for  want  of  equity, 
upon  the  ground  of  a  formal  defect  in  the 
bill.  M'EIwain  v.  Willis,  3  Paige,  505;  Hunt 
v.  Rousmaniere,  2  Mason,  342;  Beauchamp  v. 
Gibbs,  1  Bibb,  483.  See  also  Mass.  Ch.  Rule 
21. 

*  Lord  Coningsby  v.  Jekyll,  2  P.  Wms.  300; 
2  Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  59,  pi.  3;  Smith  v.  Barnes, 
1  Dick.  67;  see  also  Mason  t\  Lake.  2  Bro.  P.  C. 

421 


*420  THE   BILL. 

demurrer  is  for  want  of  parties,  the  Court,  in  general,  annexes  to  the 
order  allowing  the  demurrer  a  direction  that  the  plaintiff  shall  be  at 
liberty  to  amend  his  bill  by  adding  parties  thereto.5  Where,  previously 
to  the  filing  of  a  general  demurrer,  a  notice  of  motion  for  an  injunction 
had  been  served,  leave  was  given,  on  allowing  the  demurrer,  to  amend 
within  ten  days,  without  prejudice  to  the  notice  of  motion.6 

The  Court,  in  allowing  a  plea,  frequently  gives  leave  to  amend  ; 7 
*  420  *  it  must  not,  however,  be  understood  that  this  is  by  any  means 
a  matter  of  course,  even  where  the  plea  covers  only  part  of  the 
bill.1  Leave  to  amend  has  also  been  given  where  a  plea  was  overruled, 
with  leave  to  plead  de  novo.2'  After  the  allowance  of  a  plea  an  order  for 
leave  to  amend  the  bill  is  special ;  and,  on  the  application  for  it,  the 
plaintiff  must  specify  the  amendment  he  intends  to  make.8 

It  may  be  observed  in  this  place,  that  where  a  plea  for  want  of  parties 
was  put  in  to  a  bill  of  discovery,  which  had  been  filed  in  aid  of  an  eject- 
ment at  Law,  on  the  ground  that  the  trustees  in  whom  the  legal  estate 
was  vested  were  not  co-plaintiffs  with  the  cestui  que  trusts,  and  upon 
argument  a  case  was  directed  for  the  opinion  of  a  Court  of  Law,  but  the 
parties  not  being  able  to  agree  upon  the  case,  the  plaintiffs  moved  for 
leave  to  amend  the  bill  by  adding  the  trustees  as  co-plaintiffs,  Lord 
Eldon  refused  the  motion,  as  being  irregular  while  the  judgment  on  the 
plea  was  pending.4  Afterwards,  however,  upon  the  plaintiffs  moving 
that  the  Vice-Chancellor's  order,  directing  the  case  to  be  stated,  might 
be  discharged,  and  that  the  plaintiffs  might  be  at  liberty  to  amend  their 
bill,  by  the  introduction  of  facts  to  show  that  the  legal  estate  was  in  the 
trustees,  and  that  there  was  a  count  in  the  declaration  in  ejectment  on 
the  demise  of  such  trustees,  the  Lord  Chancellor  made  such  an  order 
but   upon   condition   of   the   plaintiffs    consenting    to   the    plea  being 

allowed.5 

It  seems  that,  where  a  plea  has  been  replied  to,  the  plaintiff  may,  in 
some  cases,  have  leave  to  withdraw  his  replication  and  amend,  but  that 
such  leave  is  not  a  matter  of  course,  and  can  only  be  obtained  on  a 
special  application  ; 6  and,  therefore,  where  an  order  to  withdraw  replica- 
tion to  a  plea,  and  to  amend,  was  obtained  on  a  motion  of  course,  it  was 

ed.  Toml.  495,  497;    Bressenden   v.  Decreets,  without  costs,   of    plea  of  defendant's  bank- 

2  Ch.  Cas.  197;  Lloyd  v.  Loaring,  6  Ves.  773,  ruptcy.     Jones  v.  Bums,  33  Beav.  362;  10  Jur. 

779.     A  different  rule  prevails   in  Massachu-  N.  S.  119. 

setts.      Merchants'    Bank   of   Newburyport  v.  »  Taylor  v.  Shaw,  2  S.  &  S.   12;  Neck  v. 

Stevenoon  7  Allen,  491 ;  see  post,  note  to  section,  Gains,  1  De  G.  &  S.  223 ;  11  Jur.  763 ;  see  also 

"  Of  the  Effect  of  allowing  Demurrers."  Cons.  Ord.  XIV.  16;  and  post,  Chap.  XV.  §  5, 

G  And  this  is   the  proper  decree.     Gray  v.  Pleas. 

Hays.  7  Humph.  588.     As  to  the  time  allowed  2  Chadwick  v.  Broadwood,  3   Beav.  316;  5 

to   amend,   where  a  demurrer  or  plea  to   the  Jur.  359. 

whole   or  part  of   a  bill   is  not  set  down,  see  3  Taylor   v.  Shaw.  2  S.  &  S.  12 ;  Neck  v. 

Con«   Ord    XIV.  14,  15.  17;  <mte.  p.  373.  Gains.  1  De  G.  &  S.  223;  11  Jur.  763. 

6  Rawlings  v.   Lambert,    1   J.   &    H.    458;  *  Lord    Cholmondeley   v.    Lord  Clinton,  2 

Harding  v.  Tingey,  10  Jur.  N.  S.  872;  12  W.  Mer.  71. 

R.  703  V.  C.  K.  5  Ibid.  74. 

1  Ld.  Red.  281  :  Dovle  r.  Muntz,  5  Hare,  6  Carleton  v.  L'Estrange,  T.  &  R.  23;  Bar- 

509,  518;  10  Jur.  914;  Tudway  v.  Jones,  1  K.  nett  v.  Grafton,  8  Sim.  72;  and  see  Cons.  Ord. 

&  J.  691;  and  see  Barnett  v.  Grafton,  8  Sim.  XIV.  18. 
72.    Leave  to  amend  given  after  allowance, 
422 


AMENDING   THE   BILL.  *  421 

discharged  for  irregularity,  and  the  amended  bill  was  ordered  to  be  taken 
off  the  file.7 

After  the  plaintiff  has  obtained  an  order  to  amend,  he  has,  in  all  cases 
in  which  no  other  time  is  limited  by  such  order,  fourteen  days 
after  the  date  of  the  order,  within  which  he  may  amend  his  *  bill.1  *  421 
If  he  does  not  amend  within  the  time  limited,  or  within  the  four- 
teen days,  the  order  becomes  void,  and  the  cause,  as  to  dismissal,  stands 
in  the  same  situation  as  if  such  order  had  not  been  made.2  The  fact  of 
the  plaintiff  not  making  his  amendment  within  this  period  will  not,  how- 
ever, preclude  him  from  obtaining  another  similar  order  of  course  to 
amend,  upon  the  same  terms,  if  the  original  order  was  obtained  before 
any  answer  was  put  in.8 

If  the  plaintiff  is  unable  to  amend  the  bill  within  the  time  limited  by 
the  order  to  amend,  or,  if  no  time  is  thereby  limited,  within  the  fourteen 
days,  he  should  apply  by  summons,  before  the  time  has  expired,  for  an 
enlargement  of  the  time.4  The  summons  must  be  served  on  all  the 
defendants  who  have  appeared  to  the  bill ;  and  the  order  is  drawn  up 
at  Chambers.6 

In  a  proper  case,  an  order  may  also  be  obtained,  on  a  summons  served 
in  like  manner,6  to  enlarge  the  time  allowed  by  the  General  Orders  of 
the  Court,  to  obtain  an  order  to  amend.7  The  order  is  drawn  up  at 
Chambers.8  The  usual  course,  however,  is  to  obtain  the  common  order 
within  due  time,  and  then  to  apply,  before  the  fourteen  days  have  ex- 
pired, for  an  extension  of  time  to  amend  under  it. 

In  computing  the  time  for  amending  the  bill,  the  times  of  vacation  are 
not  to  be  reckoned : 9  if  therefore  the  time  would  expire  in  vacation,  and 
it  is  intended  to  deprive  the  plaintiff  of  this  advantage,  the  order  should 
be  so  framed  as  to  direct  the  amendment  to  be  made  on  or  before  some 
specified  day. 

When  an  order  to  amend  has  been  irregularly  made,  the  defendant 
may  move  on  notice  to  discharge  it : 10  it  will,  however,  be  considered  as 

1  Carleton  v.  L'Estrange,  ubi  supra  ;  Metro-  ever,  where  the  plaintiff  had  excepted.  Dolly  v. 

politan  Bank  v.  Offord,  L.  R.  10  Eq.  398.     It  Challin,  11  Beav.  61.      The  service  of  an  order 

has   been   held  that,   as  Rule  29  of  the  U.  S.  to  amend  does  not  prevent  the  defendant  from 

Circuit  Court  makes  no  provision  for  amending  filing  his  answer.     Mackerell  v.  Fisher,  14  Sim. 

a  bill  after  issue  joined  and  depositions  taken,  604;  9  Jur.  574. 

it  is  to  be  construed  as  prohibiting  it,  at  least  *  Cons.     Ord.     IX.    17,    24;     Cons.     Ord. 

except  under  very  special  circumstances.     Ross  XXXIII.  11 ;  Dolly  v.  Chtillin,  ubi  supra  ;  Bain- 

v.  Carpenter,  6  McLean,  382 ;  but  see  ante,  p.  418,  brigge  v.  Baddeley,  12  Beav.  152,  154 ;    13  Jur. 

n.  4.  997.     For  form  of  summons,  see  Vol.  III. 

1  Cons.  Ord.  IX.  17.     This  order  applies  to  6  For  form  of  order,  see  Vol.  III. 
all   orders    to    amend,    whether  of   course   or  6  Ibid. 

special.    See  Cridland  v.  Lord    de    Mauley,    2  7  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.  17,  18;  see  Potts  v. 

De  G.  &  S.  560;  12  Jur.   1015;  Armistead  v.  Whitmore,  10  Beav.  177,  179. 

Durham,    11   Beav.   428;  13   Jur.  330;    Bain-  8  For  a  form,  see  Vol.  III. 

brigge  v.  Baddeley,  12  Beav.  152 ;  13  Jur.  997.  »  Cons.    Ord.  XXXVII.    13    (1);    R.  S.  C. 

These  cases  were  decided  on  the  former  orders;  LVII.   5.      For  times  of    vacation,    see    ante, 

in  the  existing  orders,  the   words   have   been  p.  412. 

somewhat    altered,    apparently   to    meet    this  10  Potts  v  Whitmore,  10  Beav.  177;  Horsley 

question.     For  a  case  on  the  present  orders,  see  v.    Fawcett,  id.   191;  Peile   v.  Stoddart,    11  id. 

Tampier  v.  Ingle,  1  N.  R.  159,  V.  C.  K.  591;    Bainbrigge  v.   Baddeley,   12    Beav.  152; 

2  Cons.  Ord.  IX.  24.  Bennett  V.  Honeywood,  1  W.  R.  490,  V.  C.  K. 

3  Nicholson  v.  Peile,  2  Beav.  497;  see,  how-  For  form  of  notice  of  motion,  see  Vol.  III. 

423 


*422 


THE    BILL. 


valid  until  it  has  been  discharged ;  u  and  the  irregularity  will  be  waived 

if  the  defendant  accept  costs  under  it.12 
*  422         *  An  order  to  amend,  whether  of  course  or  special,  should  be 
served,  without  delay,  on  such  of  the  defendants  as  have  appeared 
to  the  bill,  either  in  person  or  by  their  solicitors:  as  the  order  only 
operates  from  the  time  of  service.1 

If  the  amendments  extend,  in  any  one  place,  to  180  words,  or  two 
folios,2  or  if  the  bill  has  been  so  often  amended  that  the  amendment  to 
be  inserted  cannot  be  interlined  on  the  record,  or  is  so  considerable  as 
to  blot  or  deface  it,  a  reprint  of  the  bill  will  be  necessary.3 

The  draft  of  the  amended  bill  is  settled  and  signed  by  counsel ;  *  and 
in  addition  to  the  signature  of  counsel,  the  draft  of  an  amended  infor- 
mation, or  the  reprint,  if  there  be  one,  must  be  signed  by  the  Attorney- 
General  : 5  otherwise,  the  defendant  may  move  that  it  be  taken  off  the 
file.6  Before  signing  the  amended  information,  the  Attorney-General 
requires  a  certificate  from  the  counsel  who  settled  it  that  the  amend- 
ments are  proper  for  his  sanction.7  The  same  rules,  as  regards  reprint- 
ing, apply  to  informations  as  to  bills. 

If  a  reprint  of  the  bill  is  not  required,  the  Kecord  and  Writ  Clerk 
will  insert  the  amendments  in  the  record,  on  the  draft  amended  bill, 
signed  by  counsel,  being  left  with  him,  together  with  the  order  directing 


n  Blake  v.  Blake,  7  Beav.  514;  Chuck  v. 
Cremer,  2  Phil.  113:  C.  P.  Coop.  temp.  Cott. 
338  ;   see  R.  S.  C.  LIX. 

12  Tarleton  v.  Dyer,  1  R.  &  M.  1,  6;  King  of 
Spain  v.  Hullett,  id.  7,  n.;  see  also  Kendall  v. 
Beckett,  1  Russ.  152 ;  Bramston  v.  Carter, 
2  Sim.  458. 

i  Price  t>.  Webb,  2  Hare,  515;  Vanderbeck 
v.  Perry,  30  N.  J.  Eq.  81. 

2  A  folio  for  this  purpose  is  ninety  words. 
Braithwaite's  Pr.  305,  n. 

3  Cons.  Ord.  IX.  18 ;  Stone  v.  Davies,  3 
De  G.  M.  &  G.  240;  17  Jur.  585.  A  bill  can- 
not be  amended  by  partly  printed  and  partly 
written  alterations.  Naylor  v.  Wright,  7  De  G. 
M.  &  G.  403;  3  Jur.  N.  S.  95.  As  to  bills 
filed  before  2d  November,  1852,  the  old  prac- 
tice as  to  amending  them  continues.  Cons. 
Ord.  IX.  23.  Reprint  required  where  the 
amendments,  although  under  two  folios  in  any 
one  place,  would  have  rendered  the  bill  very 
difficult  to  read;  the  Clerks  of  Records  and 
Writs  have  a  discretion.     John  v.  Lloyd.  L.  R. 

1  Ch.  64;  11  Jur.  N.  S.  898.  In  Pierce  v. 
West,  3  Wash.  C.  C.  354,  it  is  held,  that  the 
amendment  should  be  by  a  separate  bill,  and 
not  by  interlining  the  original  bill.  So  in 
Walsh  v.  Smyth,  3  Bland,  9,  21.  This,  however, 
is  not  the  practice  in  all  cases.  See  Luce  v. 
Graham,  4  John.   Ch.    170;  Willis   v.   Evans, 

2  B.  &  B.  225 ;  State  Bank  v.  Reeder,  Halst. 
N.  J.  Dig.  172.  By  these  cases  it  appears  that 
if  there  be  not  much  new  matter  to  be  intro- 
duced, it  is  to  be  done  by  interpolation;  but  if 
much,  it  is  to  be  done  on  another  engrossment, 

424 


to  be  annexed  to  the  bill,  in  order  to  preserve 
the  record  from  being  defaced.  The  plaintiff 
may,  however,  set  forth  in  the  amended  bill  all 
the  charges  of  the  original  bill.  Fitzpatrick  v. 
Power,  1  Hogan,  24;  but  see  Walsh  r.  Smyth, 
3  Bland.  9,  21;  Luce  v.  Graham,  4  John.  Ch. 
170;  Willis  v.  Evans,  2  B.  &  B.  225.  In  Walsh 
v.  Smyth,  ubi  supra,  it  was  held  that  the 
original  bill  should  be  recited  in  the  amended 
bill  no  further  than  is  necessary  to  iniroduce 
the  amendments,  so  as  to  avoid  impertinency. 
See  also  Luce  v.  Graham,  ubi  supra  ;  Benning- 
ton Iron  Co  v.  Campbell,  2  Paige,  159;  Pierce 
r.  West,  3  Wash.  C.  C.  354.  When  amend- 
ments are  made  to  a  bill,  if  the  plaintiff  file  or 
serve  an  entire  new  bill,  incorporating  therein 
as  well  the  original  matter  as  the  amendments, 
he  must  distinctly  designate  the  amendments 
in  the  new  bill.  Bennington  Iron  Co.  v.  Camp- 
bell, 2  Paige,  159;  See  also  Hunt  v.  Holland, 
3  Paige,  82;  Luce  v.  Graham,  4  John.  Ch.  170. 
Where,  after  a  hearing,  a  bill  was  amended,  in 
order  to  bring  in  a  new  party,  but  no  new  fact 
was  stated,  it  was  held  unnecessary  to  serve 
process  anew  upon  the  defendant.  Longworth 
v.  Taylor,  1  McLean,  514. 

4  Ante,  p.  312;  Cons.  Ord.  VIII.  1,2;  see 
Kirkley  v.  Burton,  5  Mad.  378.  The  amend- 
ments should  be  carefully  distinguished. 
Braithwaite's  Pr.  304. 

5  Braithwaite's  Pr.  25,  309. 

6  Att.-Gen.  v.  Fellows,  1  J.  &  W.  254; 
for  forms  of  notice  of  motion,  see  Vol    III. 

1  For  form  of  certificate,  see  Vol.  III. 


AMENDING   THE   BILL.  *  423 

the  amendments,  and  a  prcecipe  ; 8  and  the  draft  and  order  will  be  after- 
wards returned  on  application.     Where  a  reprint  is  necessary, 
the  amended  bill  must  be  printed  and  filed  *  in  the  manner  before     *  41'3 
explained  in  treating  of  original  bills ; *  and  a  like  fee  is  payable 
on  filing  the  amended  bill.2     The  order  to  amend  must  be  produced  at 
the  time  the  reprint  is  filed. 

The  record  of  the  bill,  when  amended,  is  marked  with  the  date  of  the 
order,  and  the  day  on  which  the  amendment  is  made ;  8  an  entry  of 
the  amendment,  and  of  the  date  of  making  it,  and  of  the  order,  is  made 
in  the  Kecord  and  Writ  Clerks'  book ;  and  the  amended  bill  is  deemed 
to  be  filed  at  and  from  the  date  of  making  the  amendment.4 

The  like  course  is  pursued  where  the  bill  requires  to  be  re-amended.5 
Where  the  order  to  amend  is  made  upon  payment  of  costs,  or  where, 
by  the  course  of  the  Court,  fixed  costs  are  payable  on  amendment,6  such 
costs  should  be  paid  or  tendered  before  any  further  proceedings  are 
had : 7  (a)  otherwise,  the  defendant  may  apply  to  the  Court  to  stay  such 
proceedings  until  the  plaintiff  has  fulfilled  the  condition,  by  making  the 
required  payment ; 8  and  if  default  is  made  in  the  payment  of  the  costs, 
the  action  may  be  dismissed  with  costs. 9  The  sum  of  20s.  being 
frequently  very  inadequate  to  remunerate  the  defendant  for  the  expense 
incurred  by  the  plaintiff  amending  his  bill,  it  has  been  provided  by  the 
General  Orders  of  the  Court,  that  where  a  plaintiff  is  directed  to  pay  to 
the  defendant  the  costs  of  the  suit,  the  costs  occasioned  to  a  defendant 
by  any  amendment  of  the  bill  shall  be  deemed  to  be  part  of  such  de- 
fendant's costs  in  the  cause  (except  as  to  any  amendment  which  may 
have  been  made  by  special  leave  of  the  Court,  or  which  shall  appear  to 
have  been  rendered  necessary  by  the  default  of  such  defendant)  ;  but 
there  shall  be  deducted  from  such  costs  any  sum  which  may  have  been 
paid  by  the  plaintiff,  according  to  the  course  of  the  Court,  at  the  time  of 
any  amendment ; 10  and  that  where,  upon  taxation,  a  plaintiff  who  has 


8  For  a  form,  see  Vol.  III.     The  fee  is  10s.  «  Ante,  p.  411. 

Braithwaite's  Pr.  305.  7  See  Thomas  v.  Taylor,  14  \V.  R.  493,  L.  JJ. 

1  Ante,  p.  396,  et  seq. ;  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  8.  8  Breeze  v.  English,  2  Hare,  638.     The  costs 

2  Hegul.  to  Ord.  Sched.  IV.;  Braithwaite's  of  a  demurrer   prepared,  but   not   filed,  at  the 
Pr.  305.  time  of  amending  the  bill,  will  be  costs  in  the 

3  Thus:    Amended day  of ,186 — ,  cause.     Bainbrigge  v.  Moss,  3  K.  &  J.  62;  3 

by  order  dated day  of ,  186 — .  Jur.  N.  S.  107.     The  costs  are  usually  paid  at 

4  Cons.  Ord.  IX.  19.  the  time  the  order  to  amend  is  served. 

3  A  plaintiff  who  has  amended  his  bill  by  '■>  White  v.  Bromige,  26  W.  K.  312;  for  or- 

special  leave  may  obtain  an  order  of  course  to  ders,  see  2  Seton,  1539,  1540,  1542. 

re-amend  upon  the  answer  to  the  amended  bill  10  Cons.  Ord.  XL.  7. 
coming  in.     Dunn  v.  Ferrior,  L.  K.  8  Eq.  248; 
ante,  p.  412,  n.  1. 


(a)  By  the  present  English  practice,  a  mo-  are  paid,  is  irregular,  the  proper  course  being 

tion  by  a  defendant,  who  wishes  to   treat  an  to  apply,  within  eight  days,  that  the  amend- 

amendment  by   the    plaintiff  as   an   abandon-  ment  be  disallowed,  or  allowed  upon  terms  as 

inent  of  the  suit,  and  the  commencement  of  a  to  costs,  under  the  Rules  of  1883,  Ord  XXVIII. 

new  one,  that  the  plaintiff  be  ordered  to  pay  Rules  4,  13.     Bourne  v.  Coulter,  53  L.  J.  Ch. 

his  costs  to  the  time  of  the  amendment,  and  199,  treating   Blackmore  v.   Edwards,   W.  N. 

that  all  proceedings  be  staved  until  such  costs  (1879)  175,  as  superseded  by  Rule  13. 

425 


*424 


THE   BILL. 


obtained  a  decree  with  costs,  is  not  allowed  the  costs  of  any  amendment 
of  the  bill  upon  the  ground  of  its  having  been  unnecessarily  made,  the 
defendant's  costs,  occasioned  by  such  amendment,  shall  be  taxed,  and 
the  amount  thereof  deducted  from  the  costs  to  be  paid  by  the  defendant 
to  the  plaintiff.11 

If  the  plaintiff  amends  his  bill  after  he  has  obtained  an  injunction, 
it  is  usual,  although  not  indispensable,  for  the  order  giving 
*424  *him  liberty  to  amend,  to  be  expressed  to  be  "without  prejudice 
to  the  injunction  ; "  and  the  order  of  course  to  amend  may  be 
obtained  in  this  form.1  Where,  however,  an  injunction  had  been  ob- 
tained until  answer  or  further  order,  in  a  suit  by  a  sole  plaintiff,  it  was 
held  that  the  injunction  was  dissolved  by  adding  a  co-plaintiff,  under  an 
order  to  amend  in  which  those  words  were  not  inserted.2 

A  writ  of  ne  exeat  regno  is  not  lost  by  a  subsequent  amendment  of  the 
bill';  it  is,  therefore,  unnecessary  that  the  order  should  be  expressed  to 
be  without  prejudice  to  the  writ.3 

Where  a  motion  for  an  injunction  had  been,  by  arrangement,  turned 
into  a  motion  for  decree,  times  being  fixed  for  the  filing  of  affidavits  on 
both  sides,  and  the  defendant  undertaking  not  to  do  certain  specified 
acts  until  the  hearing,  it  was  held  that  the  plaintiff,  by  amending  his  bill 
after  the  time  fixed  for  filing  his  affidavits,  broke  the  terms  of  the 
arrangement,  and  the  defendant  was  accordingly  discharged  from  his 
undertaking.4 

If  the  plaintiff  amends  his  bill  after  he  has  given  a  notice  of  a  motion 


11  Cons.  Ord.  XL.  8. 

i  Mason  v.  Murray,  2  Dick.  536;  Warbur- 
ton  v.  London  and  Blackwall  Ry.  Co.  2  Beav. 
253;  Woodroffe  v.  Daniel,  9  Sim.  410;  see  Ken- 
nedy v.  Lewis,  14  Jur.  166;  Seton,  873,  V.  C. 
K.  B. ;  see  also  Ferrand  v.  Hamer,  4  M.  &  C. 
143,  145;  3  Jur.  236  ;  Pratt  v.  Archer,  1S.&S. 
433;  Pickering  v.  Hansom,  2  Sim.  488;  Ren- 
wick  v.  Wilson,  6  John.  Ch.  81;  Avers  v.  Val- 
entine, 2  Edw.  Ch.  451;  Lanning  v.  Heath,  25 
N.  J.  Eq.  425.  An  injunction  bill  will  not  be 
amended  unless  the  proposed  amendments  are 
distinctly  stated  to  the  Court,  and  verified  by 
the  oath  of  the  plaintiff;  nor  unless  a  sufficient 
excuse  is  rendered  for  not  incorporating  them 
in  the  original  bill.  Rogers  v.  Rogers,  1  Paige, 
424;  Carey  v.  Smith,  11  Ga.  539;  see  West  v. 
Coke,  1  Murphy,  191.  In  Massachusetts,  by 
Ch.  Rule  20,  "  no  amendments  shall  be  allowed, 
as  of  course,  to  a  bill  which  has  been  sworn  to 
by  the  party."  And  so,  generally,  where  the 
bill  is  upon  oath,  there  is  greater  caution  exer- 
cised in  reference  to  amendments.  Cock  v. 
Evans,  9  Yertrer,  287  ;  Verplanck  v  Merct.  Ins. 
Co.  1  Edw.  Ch.  46 ;  Swift  i>.  Eckford,  6  Paige, 
22;  Lloyd  v.  Brewster,  4  Paige,  538;  Parker  v. 
Grant,  1  John.  Ch.  434;  Rogers  r.  Rogers,  1 
Paige,  424;  WThitmarsh  v.  Campbell,  2  Paige, 
67.  And  the  Court  may  require  the  amend- 
ments to  any  sworn  bill  to  be  themselves  sworn 
to.    Semmes  v.  Boykin,  27  Ga.  47;  see  Latham 

426 


v.  Wiswall,  2  Ired.  Ch.  294  ;  McDougald  v. 
Dougherty,  11  Ga.  570.  The  amendments 
made  to  a  sworn  bill  must  be  consistent  with 
the  original  bill ;  and  they  must  be  made  with- 
out striking  out  any  part  of  the  original  bill, 
but  by  introducing  a  supplemental  statement. 
Verplanck  v.  Merct.  Ins.  Co.  1  Edw.  Ch.  46; 
Carey  v.  Smith,  11  Ga  539;  Rogers  v.  Rogers, 
1  Paige,  424;  Whitmarsh  v.  Campbell.  2  Paige, 
67.  An  application  to  strike  an  allegation  from 
a  sworn  bill,  or  to  make  alterations  in  it,  should 
be  accompanied  with  affidavits  to  show  how  the 
mistake  occurred.  North  River  Bank  v.  Rogers, 
8  Paige,  648;  Whitmarsh  v.  Campbell,  1  Paige, 
67;  Everett  v.  Winn,  1  Sm.  &  M.  67.  And  the 
truth  of  the  matter  proposed  as  an  amendment 
should  be  sworn  to  in  addition  to  the  jurat  upon 
the  petition  for  leave  to  amend.  Rogers  v.  De 
Forest,  3  Edw.  Ch.  171.  But  no  alteration 
should  be  made  in  the  original  bill  on  file, 
but  the  amended  bill  must  be  engrossed  anew, 
and  annexed  to  the  original.  Layton  v.  Ivans, 
1  Green  Ch.  387;  ante,  pp.  401,  402,  note. 

2  Att.-Gen.  v.  Marsh,  16  Sim.  572;  13  Jur. 
317  ;  and  see  Sharp  v.  Ashton,  3  V.  &  B.  144; 
King  v.  Turner,  6  Mad.  255;  and  post,  Chap. 
XXXVI.  §  2,  Injunctions. 

3  Grant  v.  Grant,  5  Russ.  189;  see  post, 
Chap.  XXXVIII.  §  4,  Ne  Exeat  Regno. 

*  Clarke  v.  Clark,  13  W.  R.  133,  V.  C.  W. 


AMENDING   THE    BILL. 


426 


for  an  injunction,5  or  for  a  receiver,6  he  thereby  waives  the  notice, 
and  must  pay  the  defendant's  costs  of  the  motion.7    *  Where,  after    *  425 
notice  of  motion  for  an  injunction  had  been  served,  a    general 
demurrer  to  the  bill  was  allowed,  leave  was  given  to  amend,  without 
prejudice  to  the  notice  of  motion.1 

Where  a  defendant  is  in  contempt  for  want  of  answer,  the  plaintiff 
will,  if  he  amend  his  bill,  be  considered  to  have,  by  his  own  act,  purged 
the  defendant's  contempt ; 2  but  where  a  defendant  has  been  brought  to 
the  bar  of  the  Court  for  his  contempt  in  not  answering,  and  refuses  or 
neglects  to  answer  (not  being  idiot,  lunatic,  or  of  unsound  mind),  the 
Court  may,  upon  motion  or  petition,  of  which  due  notice  has  been  given 
personally  to  the  defendant,  authorize  the  plaintiff  to  amend  his  bill, 
without  such  amendment  operating  as  a  discharge  of  the  contempt,  or 
rendering  it  necessary  to  proceed  with  the  process  of  contempt  de  novo.z 

The  amendment  of  the  bill,  even  for  the  purpose  of  rectifying  a  cleri- 
cal error,  renders  a  previous  order  to  take  the  bill  pro  confesso  inopera- 
tive,4—  unless  the  amendment  was  made  in  pursuance  of  an  order 
obtained  under  the  Act  last  referred  to. 

If  the  plaintiff  takes  advantage  of  an  order  to  amend,  so  as  entirely 
to  change  his  case,  and  to  make  the  bill  a  perfectly  new  one,5  or  if  the 
amendments  introduced  into  the  bill  are  not,  in  other  respects,  warranted 
by  the  order  to  amend,  the  defendant  may  move,  on  notice  to  the  plain- 
tiff, that  the  amended  bill  may  be  taken  off  the  file,  or  that  the  amend- 
ments may  be  struck  out,  and  the  record  restored  to  its  original  state  ; 
and  that  the  plaintiff  may  be  ordered  to  pay  the  defendant's  costs  occa- 
sioned by  the  amendment,  and  of  and  consequent  on  the  applica- 
tion, or  to  place  *  the  defendant  in  the  same  position  with  regard    *  426 


6  Martin  v.  Fust,  8  Sim.  199;   Gouthwaite 

v.  Kippon,  1  Beav.  54  ;    Monvpennv  v.  , 

1  W.  K.  99,  V.  C.  K. 

6  Smith  v.  Dixon,  12  W.  R.  934,  V.  C.  S. 
For  the  present  English  practice,  see  1  Dan.  Ch. 
Prac.  (6th  Eng.  ed.)  327-331. 

7  Monypenny  0. ,  ubi  supra  ;  London  and 

Blackwall  Ry.  Co.  v.  Limehouse  Board  of  Works, 
3  K.  &  J.  123;  Smith  v.  Dixon,  ubi  supra. 

1  Rawlings  v  Lambert,  1  J.  &  H.  458:  and 
see  Harding  v.  Tingey,  10  Jur.  N.  S.  872;  12 
W.  R.  703,  V.  C.  K. 

a  Ball  v.  Etches,  1  R.  &  M.  324;  Gray  v. 
Campbell,  id.  323. 

3  11  Geo.  IV.  &1  Will.  IV.  c.  36,  §15,  r.  10; 
and  see  post,  Chap.  X.,  Process  to  compel,  and 
in  Default  of  A  nswer. 

4  Weightman  v.  Powell,  2  De  G.  &  S.  570; 
12  Jur  958.  The  effect  of  filing  an  amended 
and  supplemental  bill  is  to  vacate  a  pro  confesso, 
and  to  admit  the  defendant  to  answer  also  the 
original  bill.  Gibson  v.  Rees,  50  111.  383.  And 
a  bill  substituted  for  an  original  bill  must  con- 
tain all  the  material  allegations  necessary  to 
justify  the  relief  sought  without  reference  to  the 
original.     Klein  v.  Horine.  47  111.  430. 

5  A  party  under  the  privilege  of  amending, 


shall  not  introduce  matter  which  would  con- 
stitute a  new  bill.  Verplanck  v.  Merct.  Ins. 
Co.  1  Edw.  Ch.  46  ;  Crabb  v.  Thomas,  25  Ala. 
212;  Lambert  v.  Jones,  2  P.  &  H.  144;  Shields 
v.  Barrow,  17  How.  (U.  S.)  130;  Fenno  v.  Coul- 
ter, 14  Ark.  39:  Carey  v.  Smith,  11  Ga.  539; 
Snead  v.  McCoull,  12  How.  (U.  S  )  407;  Hew- 
ett  v.  Adams,  50  Maine,  271,  278.  After  a 
decision  upon  a  plea  to  the  jurisdiction,  that 
a  bill  in  Equity  between  members  of  a  manu- 
facturing corporation  cannot  be  sustained,  the 
Court  will  not  grant  the  plaintiff  leave  to  amend, 
by  averring  that  the  corporation  hnd  been  dis- 
solved;  this  being  in  effect  to  make  a  new  and 
distinct  case.  Pratt  v.  Bacon,  10  Pick.  123. 
Nor  will  the  Court,  where  a  vendee  of  land  has 
brought  a  bill  for  a  rescission  of  the  contract, 
permit  him  to  change  the  prayer  of  his  bill  and 
claim  a  specific  execution  thereof.  Shields  V. 
Barrow,  17  How.  (U.  S.)  130;  Williams  v. 
Starke,  2  B.  Mon.  196. 197.  A  second  mortgagee 
of  land  brought  a  bill  against  the  first  mort- 
gagee, to  redeem  the  first  mortgage,  and  the 
Court  postponed  the  plaintiff's  mortgage,  on 
account  of  misrepresentations  made  by  him,  so 
as  to  let  in  and  give  priority  to  a  subsequent 
mortgage  of  a  part  of  the   same   land   to  the 

427 


427 


THE   BILL. 


to  costs  that  he  would  have  been  in  if  the  plaintiff,  instead  of  amend- 
ing, bad  dismissed  his  original  bill  with  costs,  and  filed  a  new  one.1 
Thus,  where  a  plaintiff  originally  filed  his  bill  against  the  defendant 
as  his  bailiff  or  agent,  in  respect  of  certain  farms,  praying  an  account 
against  him  upon  that  footing,  and  afterwards,  upon  an  issue  being 
directed  to  try  whether  the  plaintiff  was  or  was  not  a  mortgagee  of  such 
farms,  and  the  jury  finding  that  he  was,  the  plaintiff  amended  his  bill 
by  stating  the  mortgage,  and  converting  his  former  prayer  for  relief  into 
a  prayer  for  a  foreclosure,  —  upon  the  defendant's  moving  that  the 
amended  bill  might  be  taken  off  the  file,  Lord  Eldon  held  that  the  de- 
fendant was  entitled  to  all  the  costs  sustained  by  him,  beyond  what  he 
would  have  been  put  to  if  the  bill  had  been  originally  a  bill  for  a  fore- 
closure, and  made  an  order  accordingly ;  although,  as  the  amended  bill 
had  been  set  down  for  hearing,  he  did  not  go  the  length  of  ordering  it  to 
be  taken  off  the  file.2 

Upon  the  same  principle,  where  a  plaintiff  takes  advantage  of  an  order 
to  amend,  to  strike  out  a  portion  of  his  bill :  though  he  does  not  alter 
the  nature  of  it,  yet,  if  expenses  have  been  occasioned  to  the  defendant 
by  the  part  which  has  been  struck  out,  which,  in  consequence  of  its 
having  been  so  struck  out,  could  not  be  awarded  to  him  at  the  hearing, 
the  Court  will,  upon  motion,  with  notice,  order  such  costs  to  be 
*  427     taxed  and  paid  to  the  defendant.2     *  Where,  however,  a  bill  was 


defendant;  the  Court  refused  to  grant  leave 
to  the  plaintiff  to  amend  his  bill  for  the  pur- 
pose of  enabling  him  to  proceed  under  it  for 
the  redemption  of  such  subsequent  mortgage. 
Piatt  v.  Squire,  5  Cush.  551.  See  Sanborn 
v.  Sanborn,  7  Gray,  142:  Lambert  v.  Jones,  2 
P.  &  H.  144.  But  in  some  cases  it  has  been 
held,  that  a  plaintiff  who  has  filed  a  bill  for 
specific  performance  of  a  contract  mav,  under 
circumstances,  amend  his  bill  and  pray  for  a 
rescission  of  the  contract,  and  for  such  other 
relief  as  he  may  be  entitled  to.  Parrill  v. 
McKinley,  9  Gratt.  1 ;  Codington  v.  Mott,  14 
N.  J.  Eq.  430;  Hewett  v.  Adams,  50  Maine, 
271.     And  see  ante,  p.  418. 

i  Bullock  v.  Perkins,  1  Dick.  110,  112; 
Dent  v.  Wardel,  id.  339;  Smith  v.  Smith,  G. 
Coop.  141;  Mayor  v.  Dry,  2  S.  &  S.  113,  116; 
Att.-Gen.  v.  Cooper,  3  M.  &  C.  258,  262;  1  Jur. 
790;  Mounsey  v.  Burnham,  1  Hare,  15,  -22; 
Allen  v.  Spring,  22  Beav.  615;  Thomas  v.  Ber- 
nard, 7  W.  R.  271,  V.  C.  K. ;  Eagle  v.  Le  Breton, 
cited  Seton,  1254;  and  see  Ainslie  v.  Sims,  17 
Beav.  174;  Parker  v.  Nickson,  4  Giff.  311;  9 
Jur.  N.  S.  864;  Barlow  v.  M' Murray,  L.  R.  2 
Eq.  420.  424;  12  Jur.  N.  S.  519,  V.  C."  S;  Lloyd 
v.  Brewster,  4  Paige,  638;  Steele  r.  Midland 
Ry.  Co.  W.  N.  (1869)  51;  R.  S.  C.  Ord. 
XXVII.  1.  For  form  of  order  see  Seton,  1253, 
No.  10;  and  for  forms  of  notice  of  motion,  see 
Vol.  III. 

2  Smith  v.  Smith,  ubi  supra  ;  and  see  Mayor 
v.  Drv,  and  Parker  v.  Nickson,  ubi  supra  ;  see, 

428 


however,  Allen  v.  Spring,  ubi  supra,  where  such 
a  motion  was  refused;  and  it  seems  it  will  only 
be  granted,  where  the  case  made  is  entirely 
new.  Thomas  v.  Bernard,  ubi  supra.  The  de- 
fendant should  not  enter  into  evidence,  as  to 
any  charges  struck  out  by  amendment.  Stew- 
art v.  Stewart.  22  Beav.  393.  See  Whelan  v. 
Sullivan,  102  Mass.  204,  where  the  plaintiff 
was  not  allowed  to  amend  without  the  pay- 
ment of  such  costs  as  would  make  the  result 
equivalent  to  dismissing  the  bill,  and  com- 
mencing de  novo,  and,  therefore,  the  bill  was 
dismissed  without  prejudice. 

3  For  form  of  notice  of  motion,  see  Vol.  III. 
Where  a  plaintiff  filed  a  bill  which  was  of  great 
length,  and  prayed  relief  in  a  variety  of  mat- 
ters, to  which  the  defendants  put  in  answers, 
which  were  also  of  great  length,  after  which 
the  plaintiff,  by  virtue  of  a  common  order  to 
amend,  amended  his  bill  and  filed  a  new  en- 
grossment, which  was  very  short,  and  confined 
to  one  only  of  the  objects  of  relief  prayed  by 
the  original  bill  :  upon  the  defendants  moving 
that  the  order  to  amend  might  be  discharge!, 
and  the  bill  dismissed  with  costs,  or  that  the 
plaintiff  might  pay  to  them  the  costs  of  putting 
in  their  answer  to  so  much  of  the  original  bill 
as  did  not  relate  to  the  relief  prayed  by  the 
amended  bill,  Lord  Northington  directed  that 
the  order  for  amending  the  bill  should  stand, 
but  that  the  plaintiff  should  pay  to  the  defend- 
ants the  further  sum  of  five  pounds,  beyond 
the  sum  of  twenty  shillings  mentioned  in  the 


AMENDING   THE    BILL.  *  427 

filed  for  a  foreclosure  of  a  mortgage  and  for  a  transfer  of  a  sum  of 
stock,  and,  on  the  answer  being  filed,  disclosures  were  made  which 
rendered  it  advisable  to  amend  the  bill  by  striking  out  all  that  related 
to  the  mortgage,  whereby  nearly  one  half  of  the  bill  and  answer  was 
rendered  useless,  Sir  Lancelot  Shadwell  V.  C.  refused  to  order,  on 
motion,  the  plaintiff  to  pay  the  defendant's  costs  occasioned  by  the 
amendment,  as  it  appeared  that  the  amendment  was  made  under  the 
advice  of  counsel,  and  not  for  the  purpose  of  vexation  or  oppression.1 

The  fact  of  an  irregular  amendment  having  been  made,  under  a  com- 
mon order  to  amend,  will  not  be  a  sufficient  reason  for  ordering  the  bill 
to  be  taken  off  the  file,  if  the  record  can  be  restored  to  the  state  in  which 
it  was  before  such  irregular  amendment  was  made.2 

order.     Dent  v.  Wardel,  1  Dick.  339;  see  Ker-  that,  at  the  hearing,  the  costs  of  those  parts  of 

not  v.  Critchley,  W.  N.  (1807)  252;   Finch  v.  the  bill  which  had  been  abandoned  by  the  plain- 

Westrope,  L.  R  12  Eq.  24;  R.  S.  C.  1883,  Ord.  tiff  might  be  awarded  to  the  defendant.     Bul- 

LXV.  27  (31),  (32).    And  where  a  cause,  at  the  lock  v.  Perkins,  1  Dick.  110;  and  see  Strickland 

hearing,  was  ordered  to  stand  over,  with  liberty  v.  Strickland,  3  Beav.  242 ;  Leather  Cloth  Co.  v. 

to  the  plaintiff  to  amend  by  adding  parties,  and  Bressey,  3  Giff .  474,  494 ;  8  Jur.  N.  S.  425,  429. 
the  plaintiff  took  advantage  of  that  order  to  J  Monck  v.  Earl  of  Tankerville,  10  Sim. 284; 

strike  out  several   charges  which   had   neces-  3  Jur.  1167;  see  Blackmore  v.  Edwards,  W.  N. 

sarily  led  the  defendant  into  the  examination  (1879)  175  ;  Att.-Gen.  v.   Tomline,   5  Ch.  D. 

of  witnesses,   and   to  add   others,   the   Court,  750,  769. 

upon  motion,  ordered  that  part  of  the  amend-  2  Att.-Gen.  v.  Cooper,  3  M.  &  C.  258,  262; 

ment  to  be  discharged,  and  the  plaintiff's  bill  1  Jur.  790 ;  and  see  Ainslie  v.  Sims,  17  Beav. 

to  be  restored  to  what  it  was  before,  —  in  order  174. 

429 


[The  proceedings  under  this  chapter  are  statutory,  and  according  to  the  former 
practice  in  England  only.] 

*428  *  CHAPTER  VII. 

PROCESS  BY  SERVICE  OF  A   COPY  OP  THE  BILL  ON   FORMAL  DEPENDANTS, 
AND  PROCEEDINGS  BY  SERVICE  OF  NOTICE  OF  THE   DECREE. 

Section  I.  —  Process  by  Service  of  a  Copy  of  the  Bill  on  Formal 

Defendants. 

As  soon  as  the  bill  has  been  filed,  the  plaintiff  may  proceed  to  bring 
before  the  Court  the  proposed  defendants  to  the  suit.  We  have  seen, 
however,  that  the  plaintiff  is  enabled,  as  against  certain  formal  parties, 
to  dispense  with  the  ordinary  process  of  the  Court,  upon  serving  them 
with  a  copy  of  the  bill  under  the  General  Order,1  and,  thereupon,  in  the 
event  of  their  not  voluntarily  appearing  after  such  service,  to  proceed, 
without  further  attention  to  their  rights  or  interests  ;  and  that,  in  cer- 
tain other  cases,  the  plaintiff  may  file  his  bill,  and  obtain  a  decree 
against  some  or  one  of  the  persons  who  were  formerly  necessary  parties, 
upon  serving  the  others  with  notice  of  the  decree  that  has  been  made.'- 
It  will  be  convenient,  therefore,  to  consider,  in  the  first  place,  the  mode 
of  proceeding  where  parties  are  served  with  copies  of  the  bill  under  the 
General  Order,  or  with  notice  of  the  decree,  and  then  the  ordinary  pro- 
cess against  other  defendants. 

Where  no  account,  payment,  conveyance,  or  other  direct  relief  is 
sought  against  a  party  to  a  suit,  it  is  not  necessary  for  the  plaintiff  to 
require  such  party,  not  being  an  infant,  to  appear  to  the  bill ;  but  the 
plaintiff  may  serve  such  party,  not  being  an  infant,  with  a  copy  of  the 
bill,  whether  the  same  be  an  original,  or  amended,  or  supplemental  bill,3 
without  any  indorsement  requiring  such  party  to  appear  thereto ;  and 
such  bill,  as  against  such  party,  must  pray  that  such  party,  upon  being 
served  with  a  copy  of  the  bill,  may  be  bound  by  all  the  proceedings  in 
the  cause.4  But  the  plaintiff  may,  nevertheless,  require  a  party  against 
whom  no  account,  payment,  conveyance,  or  other  direct  relief  is 
*  429  sought,  to  appear  to  the  bill,  *  and  may  prosecute  the  suit  against 
such  party  in  the  ordinary  way,  if  he  shall  think  fit.1 

1  Cons.  Ord.  X.  11 ;  ante.  Chap.  V.,  Parties.  *  For  form  of  prayer,  see  Vol.  III. 

2  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  42:  ante.  Chap.  V.,  *  Cons.  Ord.  IX.  11.  The  54th  Equity 
Parties.  As  to  the  present  English  practice,  Rule  of  the  United  States  Courts  is  similar.  As 
see  1  Dan.  Ch.  Prac.  (6th  Eng.  ed.)  269,  §  5.  to  the  effect  of  this  order  between  co-defend- 

«  This  includes  a  bill  of  revivor  and  sup-      ants,  see  Boyd  v.  Moyle,  2  Coll.  316.  321,  323. 
plement.    Walcot  v.  Walcot,  10  Beav.  20. 
4.30 


SERVICE   OF   COPY   OF   BILL   ON    FORMAL   DEFENDANTS.  *  430 

This  Order  does  not  authorize  service  of  the  copy  of  the  bill  on  a 
defendant  out  of  the  jurisdiction  ; a  and  if  a  party  served  die's  before  the 
hearing,  his  personal  representative  cannot  be  brought  before  the  Court 
by  order  of  revivor,  but  an  original  bill  must  be  filed  against  him.8 

If  the  bill  is  amended  after  service,  a  copy  of  the  amended  bill  must 
also  be  served ; 4  and  if  a  bill  of  revivor  and  supplement,  or  a  supple- 
mental bill  is  filed,  it  must  be  served  also;6  and  so,  it  is  conceived, 
must  a  supplemental  statement. 

A  plaintiff,  availing  himself  of  the  course  of  proceeding  introduced 
by  this  Order,  must  serve  a  plain,  unstamped,  and  unsealed  copy  of  the 
bill,6  without  any  indorsement  thereon  requiring  the  party  to  appear 
thereto,  upon  each  of-  the  defendants  to  be  served,  either  personally,  or 
by  leaving  the  same  with  his  servant  or  some  member  of  his  family  at 
his  dwelling-house  or  usual  place  of  abode.7 

In  the  case  of  a  husband  and  wife,  where  the  suit  does  not  relate  to 
the  separate  estate  of  the  wife,8  service  upon  the  husband  alone  is  suffi- 
cient ; 9  but  where  it  relates  to  her  separate  estate,  or  they  are  living 
apart,  a  copy  must  be  served  upon  or  for  each.10 

The  service  must  be  within  twelve  weeks  from  the  filing  of  the  bill,11 
unless  the  Court  shall  give  leave  to  make  such  service  after  that  time.12 
Such  leave  must  be  applied  for  by  motion,  without  notice,13  and  the 
application  must  be  supported  by  affidavits  explaining  the  cause  of  the 
delay.14     It  seems  that  substituted  service  will  not  be  ordered.15 

Where  a  plaintiff  serves  a  defendant  with  a  copy  of  the  bill  under 
this  Order,  he  must  cause  a  memorandum  of  such  service,16 
*  and  of  the  time  when  it  was  effected,  to  be  entered  in  the  *  430 
Kecord  and  Writ  Clerks'  Office.  An  order  authorizing  such  entry 
to  be  made  is  necessary,  and  may  be  obtained  on  motion,1  without  notice, 
upon  the  Court  being  satisfied  of  a  copy  of  the  bill  having  been  served, 
and  of  the  time  when  the  service  was  made.2 

2  Lorton  v.  Kingston,  2  M'N.  &  G.  139.  9  Kent  v.  Jacobs,  5  Beav.  48. 
This  case  was  before  the  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  but          10  Braithwaite'9  Pr.  516. 

it  would  appear  still  to  apply;    power  to  serve  n  Cons.  Ord.  X.  17. 

the  bill  out  of  the  jurisdiction  being  confined  to  12  Cons.  Ord.  X.  17,  18;  Horry  v.  Calder,  7 

the  copy  served  under  that  Act.   See  Penlbld  v.  Beav.   585;   Bell   v.  Hastings,  id.   592.      The 

Kelly,  12  W.  R.  286,  V.  C.  K.  defendant  need  not  be  served  with  the  order 

3  Hardy  v.  Hull,  14  Sim.  21;  8  Jur.  609.  enlarging  the  time.  Fenton  v.  Clayton,  15 
The  reason  is,  that  he  has  not  appeared;  see  Sim.  82.  Where  a  formal  defendant  came 
also  Crowfoot  v.  Mander.  9  Sim.  396;  Eding-  within  the  jurisdiction  after  decree,  and  after 
ton  v.  Banham,  2  Coll.  619;  Bland  v.  Davison,  the  twelve  weeks,  leave  was  refused.  I'enfold 
21  Beav.  312.  v.  Kelly,  12  W.  R.  286.  V.  C.  K. 

*  Cons.  Ord.  X.  11;  Anon.  1  De  G.  &  S.  «  Cons.  Ord.  X.   18.    For  form  of  motion 

321;   Vincent    v.  Watts,  3   M'N.   &   G.   248;  paper,  see  Vol.  III. 

Braithwaite's  Pr.  515.  "  See  Horry  v.  Calder,  7  Beav.  585;  Bell  v. 

5  Cons.  Ord.  X.  11;  Walcot  v.  Walcot,  10  Hastings,  id.  592. 

Beav.  20.  is  Thomas  v.  Selby,  9  Beav.  194. 

6  Where  a  printed  bill  has   been  filed,   a  18  For  form  of  memorandum,  see  Vol.  III. 
printed  copy  will  of  course  be  served.  1  For  form  of  motion  paper,  see  Vol.  III. 

7  Braithwaite's  Pr.  31;  Cons.  Ord.  X.  1;  the  2  Cons.  Old.  X.  12.  Memorandum  of  ser- 
member  of  the  family  should  be  an  inmate  of  vice  ordered  to  be  entered  on  defendant's  ac- 
the  defendant's  house.  Edgson  v.  Edgson,  3  knowledgment  of  having  received  the  bill  by 
De  G.  &  S.  629.  post.      Burton   v.    Shaw,  10  L.  T.  N.  S.  292, 

8  Salmon  v.  Green,  8  Beav.  457.  V.  C.  W. 

431 


*  431      FORMAL  DEFENDANTS.  —  NOTICE  OF  THE  DECREE. 

There  have  been  several  cases  concerning  the  extent  of  information 
demanded  by  the  Court,  upon  motions  of  this  description :  but  the  result 
seems  to  be,  that  no  further  proof  is  absolutely  necessary  than  what  is 
pointed  out  by  the  Order  itself,  namely,  proof  by  affidavit,  first,  that  due 
service  has  been  effected  upon  each  of  the  defendants  of  a  copy  of  the 
bill,  sworn  to  be  a  true  copy  of  the  bill  itself ;  secondly,  of  the  time  and 
place  when  and  where  such  service  was  made,  so  that  the  Court  may 
know  that  it  has  been  effected  within  the  jurisdiction.8  Where  a  party 
served  with  a  copy  of  the  bill  had  subsequently  appeared,  it  was  con- 
sidered an  admission  of  due  service,  and  no  further  evidence  was  re- 
quired ; 4  and  in  such  a  case,  a  memorandum  of  service  need  not  be 
entered.5  Proof  has,  in  some  cases,  been  required  that  the  person  upon 
whom  such  service  was  made  was  not  an  infant,  and  that  the  bill  did 
not  pray  an  account,  payment,  conveyance,  or  other  direct  relief  against 
such  person ; 6  but  the  terms  of  the  Order  do  not  seem  to  render  it 
necessary  that  these  facts  should  be  established  upon  the  motion,  and 
the  later  cases  are  against  the  necessity  for  giving  proof  of  them.7 

The  plaintiff  would  seem  to  take  the  Order  at  his  own  risk ;  and  if 
the  case  be  one  in  which  he  is  not  entitled  to  proceed  in  this  manner, 
the  whole  process  would  be  nugatory,  and  the  defendant  would  not  be 
bound  by  any  of  the  proceedings  in  the  cause.8 

Where  the  defendant,  who  had  been  served,  was  misnamed  in  the  bill, 
leave  was  given  to  enter  the  memorandum,  on  production  of  an  affidavit 
showing  that  the  person  served  was  the  same  person  as  the  person  re- 
ferred to  in  the  memorandum  of  service ; 9  and  where  the  copy  of  the 
bill  had  been  served  after  the  expiration  of  the  twelve  weeks, 

*  431    without  an  order  enlarging  the  time  being  obtained,  *  leave  was 

given  to  enter  a  memorandum  of  service,  on  the  defendant  served 
appearing  and  consenting.1 

The  Order2  merely  confers  upon  the  plaintiff  the  privilege  of  adopting 
this  course ;  but  it  is  not  obligatory  upon  him,  and  he  may,  if  he  thinks 
fit,  compel  such  parties  to  appear,  and  in  other  respects  prosecute  his 
suit  against  them  in  the  ordinary  manner.  The  costs  occasioned  by  such 
a  course  must,  however,  be  paid  by  the  plaintiff,  unless  the  Court  shall 
otherwise  direct.8 

The  question  to  what  parties  the  Order  applies  has  frequently  arisen  ; 
but  it  is  not  possible  to  deduce  from  the  cases  any  clear  rule  upon  the 

3  Warren  v.  Postlethwaite,  1  Coll.  171;  8  Hare,  508;  8  Jur.  1024;  Jones  v.  Skipwith, 
.Tur.  282;  and  see  Haigh  v.  Dixon,  1  Y.  &  8  Beav.  127.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the 
C.  C.  C.  180.  For  form  of  affidavit,  see  Vol.  Court  would  now  act,  as  to  the  question  of  the 
HI.         .  prayer,  on  an  inspection  of  a  print  of  the  bill; 

4  Maude  v.  Copeland,  1  Coll.  505.  as  it  appears  it  would  have  done  on  an  inspec- 

5  Att.-Gen.  v.  Donnington  Hospital,  12  tion  of  an  office  copy  in  Davis  v.  Prout,  5  Beav. 
Beav.  551.  102,  if  one  had  been  in  Court. 

6  Goodwin  v.  Bell,  1  Y.  &  C.  C.  C  181;  8  Marke  v.  Locke,  2  Y.  &  C.  C.  C.  500.  506; 
Haigh  v.    Dixon,   id.  180;   Davis  v.  Prout,  5  Boreham  v.  Bignall,  4  Hare.  633 ;  7  Jur.  528. 
Beav.  102.                                                                         9  Witham  v.  Salvin,  16  Jur.  420,  M.  R. 

i  Sherwood  v.  Rivers,  2  Y.  &  C.  C.  C.  166;  »  Tugwell  v.  Hooper,  10  Beav.  19. 

7  Jur.  78;  Mawhood  v.   Labouchere,   12  Sim.  2  Cons.  Ord.  X.  11. 

362;  Anon.  1  Hare,  317,  n.;  Welch  v.  Welch,  3  Cons.  Ord.  XL.  16;   Abram  v.  Ward,  6 

id.  593;  6  Jur.  599;  Hudson  v.  Dungworth,  3  Hare,  165,  170. 
432 


SERVICE   OP   COPY   OF   BILL    ON    FORMAL   DEFENDANTS.  *  432 

subject ;  though  it  appears  that  it  is  not,  in  general,  considered  as 
applicable,  where  the  interest  of  the  defendant  is  adverse  to  that  of  the 
plaintiff,  even  though  no  further  relief  is  sought  against  the  defendant 
than  the  binding  of  his  rights  by  a  decree.  The  alterations  in  the 
practice  of  the  Court 4  have  rendered  proceedings  under  the  Order  we 
are  now  considering  of  comparatively  rare  occurrence,  and  it  is  not, 
therefore,  desirable  to  refer  in  detail  to  the  cases  which  have  occurred  ; 
but  they  are  collected  in  the  note.8  It  may  be  mentioned,  however,  that 
it  has  been  held,  that  the  Order  does  not  apply  to  the  Attorney-Gen- 
eral ; 6  and  it  seems  that  it  does  not  apply  to  a  person  of  unsound  mind.7 

If  the  motion  for  leave  to  enter  a  memorandum  of  service  be  granted, 
the  Order  made  upon  the  motion  must  be  drawn  up,  passed,  and  entered, 
and  should  then  be  left  with  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerk  in  whose  divi- 
sion the  cause  is.8  The  memorandum  is  then  entered  by  him  in  his 
cause  book,  and  the  Order  is  returned  to  the  solicitor,  with  an  indorse- 
ment upon  it  to  show  that  the  memorandum  has  been  entered.9  The 
Order  should  be  kept  for  the  purpose  of  production  at  the  hearing  of 
the  cause,10  and  on  bespeaking  the  decree  or  order,11  and  at  any  other 
period  of  the  cause  when  the  regularity  of  the  service  and  the  entry  of 
the  memorandum  are  required  to  be  established.  The  memorandum 
must  be  entered  before  a  certificate  to  set  down  the  cause  can  be 
granted ; 12  and  a  certificate  that  no  appearance  has  been  entered 
by  the  defendant  *must  be  left  with  the  Registrar,  on  bespeak-  *432 
ing  the  decree  or  order  made  at  the  hearing,1  when  the  defendant 
has  not  appeared. 

A  party  so  served  with  a  copy  of  the  bill,  may,  if  he  desires  the  suit  to 
be  prosecuted  against  himself  in  the  ordinary  way,  enter  an  appearance 
for  himself  in  the  common  form : 2  and  in  such  case  the  plaintiff  must 
proceed  against  such  defendant  in  the  ordinary  way ;  but  the  costs  occa- 
sioned thereby  must  be  paid  by  the  party  so  appearing,  unless  the  Court 
shall  otherwise  direct.8  A  party  so  served  may  also,  if  he  is  desirous 
of  being  served  with  a  notice  of  the  proceedings  in  the  cause,  but  not  of 
otherwise  having  the  suit  prosecuted  against  himself,  enter  a  special 
appearance  in  the  following  form:  "A  B  appears  to  the  bill  for  the 
purpose  of  being  served  with  notice  of  all  proceedings  therein."  In  this 
case,  he  must  be  served  with  notice  of  all  proceedings  in  the  cause,  and 
he  is  entitled  to  appear  upon  them,  but  he  will  have  to  pay  the  costs 
occasioned  thereby,  unless  the  Court  shall  otherwise  direct.4    The  notice 

*  Ante,  Chap.  V.  Parties.  6  Christopher  v.  Cleghorn,  8  Beav.  314. 

5  Marke  v.  Locke,  2  Y.  &  C.  C.  C.  500;  1  Pemberton  r.  Langmore,  id.  166. 

Lloyd  v.  Lloyd,  1  id.  181;  6  Jur.  162;   Dun-  8  For  form  of  order,  see  Seton,  1244,  No.  3. 

combe  o.  Levy,  5  Hare,  232,  236;  11  Jur.  262;  9  Braithwaite's  Pr.  516;  no  fee  is  payable, 

Davis  v.  Davis,  4  Hare,  389,391;   Powell  «.  id.  517.     For  form  of  indorsement,  see  Vol.  III. 

Cockerell,  id.  557;  Abram  v.  Ward,  ubi  supra  ;  w  Carter  v.  Bentall,  12  L.  J.  Ch.  369,  M.  R. 

Clarke  v.  Tipping,  9  Beav.  284,  292;  Johnson  v.  "  Reg.  Regul.  15  March,  1860,  r.  24. 

Tucker,  15  Sim.  485;  11  Jur.  382;  Barklay  v.  12  Braithwaite's  Pr.  516. 

Lord  Reay,  2  Hare,  306,  309;  Knight  v.  Caw-  i  Reg.  Regul.  15  March,  1860,  r.  24. 

thron,  1  De  G.  &  S.  714;  12  Jur.  33;  Adams  v.  a  Sen  post.  Chap.  XIII.  Appearance. 

Paynter,  1  Coll.  530,  532;  8  Jur.  1063;  Gaunt  a  Cons.  Ord.  X.  14. 

v.  Johnson,  7  Hare,  154:   12  Jur.  1067;  Lew-  *  Cons.  Ord.  X.  15. 
ellin  v.  Cobbold,  17  Jur.  1111,  V.  C.  S. 

vol.  i  —28  433 


*  433      FORMAL  DEPENDANTS.  —  NOTICE  OF  THE  DECREE. 

to  be  given  under  this  rule  must  give  the  defendant  the  same  length  of 
notice  as  if  he  were  proceeded  against  in  the  ordinary  way.5 

Such  common  or  special  appearances  may  be  entered  within  twelve 
days  after  service  of  a  copy  of  the  bill ;  but  they  cannot  be  entered  after- 
wards without  leave  of  the  Court,  to  be  obtained  on  notice  to  the  plain- 
tiff ;  and  terms  may  be  imposed  by  the  Court  on  such  an  application.6 

If  the  defendant  does  not  enter  an  appearance  within  twelve  days, 
the  plaintiff  may  proceed  in  the  cause  as  if  the  person  served  were  not 
a  party ;  and  the  defendant  will  be  bound  by  all  the  proceedings,  in  the 
same  manner  as  if  he  had  appeared  and  answered ; 7  and  if  he  appears, 
after  the  expiration  of  the  twelve  days,  he  will  be  bound  by  all  pro- 
ceedings prior  to  such  appearance.8  An  application  for  leave  to  enter 
an  appearance,  without  being  bound  by  prior  proceedings,  has  been 
refused.9 


Section  II. — Proceedings  by  Service  of  Notice  of  the  Decree. 

The  practice  of  serving,  with  notice  of  the  decree,  persons  who 
are  not  named  as  parties  on  the  record,  was  introduced  by  the  42d 

section  of  the  Chancery  Amendment  Act  of  1852.10  Under  the 
*  433    *  provisions  of  that  section  :    (1)  Any  residuary  legatee  or  next 

of  kin  may,  without  serving  the  remaining  residuary  legatees  or 
next  of  kin,  have  a  decree  for  the  administration  of  the  personal  estate 
of  a  deceased  person.1  (2)  Any  legatee  interested  in  a  legacy  charged 
upon  real  estate,  and  any  person  interested  in  the  proceeds  of  real  estate 
directed  to  be  sold,  may,  without  serving  any  other  legatee  or  person 
interested  in  the  proceeds  of  the  estate,  have  a  decree  for  the  adminis- 
tration of  the  estate  of  a  deceased  person.2  (3)  Any  residuary  devisee 
or  heir  may,  without  serving  any  co-residuary  devisee  or  co-heir,  have 
the  like  decree.3  (4)  Any  one  of  several  cestui  que  trusts  under  any 
deed  or  instrument  may,  without  serving  any  other  of  such  cestui  que 
trusts,  have  a  decree  for  the  execution  of  the  trusts  of  the  deed  or  instru- 
ment.4 (5)  In  all  cases  of  suits  for  the  protection  of  property  pending 
litigation,  and  in  all  cases  in  the  nature  of  waste,  one  person  may  sue 
on  behalf  of  himself  and  of  all  persons  having  the  same  interest.5 
(6)  Any  executor,  administrator,  or  trustee  may  obtain  a  decree  against 

5  Wilton  v.  Rumball,  14  Sim.  56 ;  8  Jur.  236.  »  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  42,  r.  1 ;  ante,  pp.  217, 

6  Cons.  Ord.  X.  16;  Rigby  r.  Strangways,  234,  237,  238.  Where  a  residuary  legatee,  who 
10  Jur.  998,  V.  C.  E.  For  form  of  order  in  had  been  served  with  notice  of  the  decree,  set- 
such  case,  see  Seton,  1249,  No.  5 ;  and  for  form  tied  her  interest,  the  notice  was  directed  to  be 
of  notice  of  motion,  see  Vol.  III.  re-served  on  the  trustee.     White  v.  Steward,  35 

1  Cons.  Ord.  X.  13;  Powell  v.  Cockerell,  4  Beav.  304;  W.  N.  (1866)  83,   M.  R.      See  Re 

Hare,  557,  565.  Braithwaite,  21  Ch.  D.  121 ;  Day  v.  Batty,  id. 

8  Cons.  Ord.  X.  16.  830;  Burstall  v.  Fearon,  24  Ch.  D.  126. 

9  Boreham  v.  Bignall,  4  Hare,  633.  2  Rule  2;  ante,  pp.  218,  225. 
1°  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86.      The  English  practice          8  Rule  3;  ante,  p.  218. 

is  now  modified  by  R.  S.  C.  1883,  Ord.  XVI.  *  Rule  4;  ante,  p.  226. 

11,  33-44;  46  &  47  Vic.  c.  49,  §  4,  Sched.     See  «  Rule  5;  ante,  p.  244. 

1  Dan.  Ch.  Prac.  (6th  Eng.  ed.)  275,  §  6 ;   2  id. 
996-1002. 

434 


SERVICE   OF   NOTICE   OF   THE    DECREE.  *  434 

any  one  legatee,  next  of  kin,  or  cestui  que  trust  for  the  administration  of 
the  estate,  or  the  execution  of  the  trusts.6  In  all  the  above  cases,  the 
persons  who,  according  to  the  former  practice  of  the  Court,  were  neces- 
sary parties,  may  be  served  with  notice  of  the  decree ;  and  after  such 
notice  shall  be  bound  by  the  proceedings,  in  the  same  manner  as  if  they 
had  been  originally  made  parties  to  the  suit.7 

The  notice  of  the  decree  must  be  served  personally,  unless  otherwise 
directed ;  and  where  a  husband  and  wife  have  to  be  served,  the  notice 
must  be  served  on  each,  personally,  notwithstanding  that  the  suit  does 
not  relate  to  the  wife's  separate  estate,  and  that  they  are  residing 
together;  but  the  Court  or  Judge  will,  on  a  proper  case  being  made, 
dispense  with  personal  service.8 

Unlike  the  course  of  proceeding  by  service  of  a  copy  of  the  bill  under 
the  General  Order,  referred  to  in  the  preceding  section,  the  process 
by  service  of  notice  of  the  decree  applies  to  infants,  *  persons  of  *  434 
unsound  mind  not  so  found  by  inquisition,  and  persons  out  of  the 
jurisdiction;1  but  in  the  case  of  infants,  or  persons  of  unsound  mind 
not  so  found  by  inquisition,  the  notice  is  to  be  served  upon  such  person 
and  in  such  manner  as  the  Judge  shall  direct ; 2  and  an  order  is  neces- 
sary for  leave  to  serve  a  person  out  of  the  jurisdiction.3 

The  application  for  the  direction  of  the  Judge,  as  to  the  manner  of 
serving  notice  of  the  decree  on  infants,  and  persons  of  unsound  mind 
not  so  found  by  inquisition,  should  be  made  by  summons  ex  parte;* 
and  must  be  supported  by  affidavit  showing,  as  far  as  the  applicant  is 
able,  (1)  with  respect  to  infants  :  The  ages  of  the  infants  ;  whether 
they  have  any  parents  or  testamentary  guardians,  or  guardians  appointed 
by  the  Court  of  Chancery ;  where,  and  under  whose  care,  the  infants  are 
residing ;  at  whose  expense  they  are  maintained,  and,  in  case  they  have 
no  father  or  guardian,  who  are  their  nearest  relations  ;  and  that  the 
parents,  guardians,  relations,  or  persons  on  whom  it  is  proposed  to  serve 
the  notice,  have  no  interest  in  the  matters  in  question,  or,  if  they  have, 
the  nature  of  such  interest,  and  that  it  is  not  adverse  to  the  interest  of 
the  infants.  (2)  With  respect  to  persons  of  unsound  mind  not  found  so 
by  inquisition :  Where,  and  under  whose  care,  such  persons  are  residing, 
and  at  whose  expense  they  are  maintained ;  who  are  their  nearest  rela- 


6  Rule  6;  ante,  p.  226.  See  Latch  v.  Latch,  notice  of  the  decree  on  any  other  persons  than 
L.  R.  10  Ch.  464.  In  all  the  above  cases  the  those  specified  in  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  42;  Colyer 
Court,  if  it  shall  see  fit,  may  require  any  other  v.  Colyer,  9  Jur.  N.  S.  294,  V.  C.  K. ;  and  see 
person  to  be  made  a  party  to  the  suit,  and  may  Knight  v.  Pocock,  24  Beav.  436 ;  4  Jur  N.  S. 
give  the  conduct  of  the  suit  to  such  person  as  197;  Foster  v.  Foster,  L.  R.  3  Ch.  330;  Re 
it  may  deem  proper,  and  may  make  such  order  Berkeley,  L.  R.  19  Eq.  467. 

in  any  particular  case  as  it  may  deem  just  for  8  Braithwaite's  Pr.  520,  521. 

placing  the  defendant  on  the  record  on  the  same  1  Chalmers  v.  Laurie,  10  Hare  App.  27;  1 

footing  in  regard  to  costs  as  other  parties  having  W.  R.  265;  Clarke  v.  Clarke,  9  Hare  App.  13, 

a  common  interest,  with  him  in  the  matters  in  marginal  note;  1  W.  R.  48;  Strong  v.  Moore, 

question.     Rule  7.     By  Rule  9,  trustees  repre-  22  L.  J.  Ch.  917,  M.  R. 

sent  beneficiaries  in  certain  cases;  see  ante,  pp.  2  Cons.  Ord.  VII.  5. 

212,  222,  228,  256,  257.  8  See  Strong  v.  Moore,  ubi  supra. 

7  Rule  8;  ante,  pp.  190,  191,  217,  218,  225  «  For  forms  of  summons,  see  Vol.  III. 
It  is  improper  to  serve,  under  these  provisions, 

435 


*  435      FORMAL  DEFENDANTS.  —  NOTICE  OF  THE  DECREE. 

tions ;  and  that  such  relations,  or  persons,  upon  whom  it  is  proposed  to 
serve  the  notice,  have  no  interest  in  the  matters  in  question,  or,  if  they 
have,  the  nature  of  such  interest,  and  that  it  is  not  adverse  to  the  inter- 
est of  the  persons  of  unsound  mind.6 

The  order  on  the  summons  is  drawn  up  by  the  Registrar ;  and  the 
service  must  be  effected  in  strict  accordance  with  the  directions  con- 
tained in  the  order  ;  and  copy  of  such  order  must  also  be  served,  at  the 
time  of  serving  the  notice  of  the  decree.6 

An  order  to  serve  notice  of  a  decree  on  a  person  out  of  the  jurisdic- 
tion may  be  obtained  on  an  ex  parte  summons,  supported  by  affidavit 
showing  the  nature  of  his  interest  in  the  suit,  and  the  place  or  country 
where  he  is  supposed  to  be  residing.7 

The  Judge  in  Chambers  will  not,  in  general,  in  the   first   instance, 

direct  upon  whom  the  notice  of  the  decree  is  to  be  served  ; 8  but  he  will 

entertain  an  application  to  dispense  with  the  service  upon  any  person  as 

to  whom  it  appears  that,  from  absence,  or  other  sufficient  cause, 

*  435    it  ought  to  be  dispensed  with,  or  cannot  *  be  made ; x  or  to  sub- 

stitute service,  or  give  notice  by  advertisement  or  otherwise,  in 
lieu  of  such  service.2  The  party  having  the  prosecution  of  the  decree 
should,  therefore,  in  the  first  place,  consider  what  persons  not  named 
on  the  record  ought,  under  the  provisions  of  the  Chancery  Amendment 
Act  of  1852,3  to  be  served  with  notice  of  the  decree.  On  this  subject, 
he  is  referred  to  the  former  part  of  this  treatise.4  He  should  then  con- 
sider whether  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  and  the  nature  of  their 
interest  in  the  suit,  are  such  as  will  justify  an  application  to  the  Judge 
to  dispense  with  service  on  any  of  them ;  or  to  sanction  some  special 
mode  of  service  :  as,  on  one  or  more  for  all  the  members  of  a  class,  or 
by  public  advertisement,  or  through  the  post,  or  on  a  substitute.  An 
application  of  this  description  to  the  Judge  is  usually  required  to  be 
made  by  an  ex  parte  summons,6  supported  by  evidence  of  the  facts  on 
which  it  is  founded ;  and  where  a  special  mode  of  service  is  directed, 
an  order  is  ordinarily  drawn  up  by  the  Registrar,  which  will  contain  a 
direction  that  a  copy  of  it  shall  be  served  with  the  notice.  Where  ser- 
vice is  dispensed  with,  an  order  to  that  effect  is  not  usually  drawn  up  ;  6 
but  the  fact  is  stated  in  the  Chief  Clerk's  certificate  of  the  result  of  the 
proceedings. 

If  service  through  the  post  is  sanctioned,  and  no  special  directions  are 
given  as  to  the  mode  of  authenticating  such  service,  it  seems  advisable 
to  enclose  the  notice  in  a  letter  addressed  to  the  person  to  be  served,7 
and  to  request  him  to  acknowledge,  through  the  post,  the  receipt  of  the 
notice ;  and  it  would  be  well  to  enclose  a  form  of  acknowledgment  for 

6  Regul.  8  Aup.,  1857,  r.  7;  for  forms  of  2  Cons.  Ord.  XXXV.  18;  for  form  of  sum- 
affidavit,  see  Vol.  III.  mons  in  such  cnse,  see  Vol.  III. 

6  Braithwaite's  Pr.  523;  see  Seton,  1212.  3  15  &  i6  Vic.  c.  86,  §  42,  rr.  1-8. 

1  For  forms  of  summons,  and  affidavit  in  *  See  ante,  pp.  210-218,  225,  226,  244. 

support,  see  Vol.  III.  5  For  a  form,  see  Vol.  III. 

8  See,  however,  De  Balinhard  v.  Bullock.  9  6  But  is  sometimes,-  see  Gavin  v.  Osborne, 

Hare  App.  13 ;  see  Greaves  v.  Smith,  22  W.  R.  cited  2  Seton,  1642. 
388;  2  Dan.  Ch.  Prac.  (6th  Eng.  ed.)  998.  7  For  form  of  letter,  see  Vol.  III. 

1  Ibid.;  Cons.  Ord.  XXXV.  18. 

436 


SERVICE  OF  NOTICE  OP  THE  DECREE.  *  436 

signature.8     The  service,  in  this  case,  will  be  deemed  to  have  been 
effected  at  the  date  of  the  letter  of  acknowledgment.9 

The  Judge  will,  usually,  proceed  to  give  his  directions  as  to  the  man- 
ner in  which  the  decree  is  to  be  prosecuted,  notwithstanding  evidence  is 
not  adduced  to  satisfy  him  that  all  proper  parties  have  been  served 
with  notice.10  Indeed,  it  not  unfrequently  happens,  that  the  persons  to 
be  served  cannot  be  known  till  some  of  the  inquiries  under  the  decree 
have  been  prosecuted  at  Chambers  :  as  where  the  members  constituting 
a  class  of  residuary  legatees,  or  next  of  kin,  have  to  be  ascertained  ; 
and  by  directions  being  obtained  for  insertion  of  advertisements  for 
creditors  and  other  claimants  to  come  in,  and  for  the  accounts  to  be 
brought  in,  and  the  inquiries  answered,  before  these  class  inqui- 
ries are  entered  *upou,  much  time  in  prosecuting  the  decree  *  436 
may  be  saved,  without  prejudicing  persons  who  may  be  subse- 
quently served  with  notice  of  the  decree,  and  obtain  orders  to  attend 
the  proceedings. 

The  notice  of  the  decree  must  be  entitled  in  the  cause ;  and  a  memo- 
randum must  be  indorsed  thereon,  giving  the  person  served  notice  that 
from  the  time  of  service  he  will  be  bound  by  the  proceedings  in  the 
cause,  in  the  same  manner  as  if  he  had  been  originally  made  a  party ; 
and  that  he  may,  by  an  order  of  course,  have  liberty  to  attend  the  pro- 
ceedings, and  may,  within  one  month  after  service,  apply  to  the  Court  to 
add  to  the  decree.1 

Service  of  a  copy  of  the  decree  is  regarded  as  service  of  notice  of  the 
decree ;  but  the  copy  must  be  indorsed  in  like  manner  as  a  notice.2 

When  any  party  has  been  served  with  notice  of  a  decree,  a  memo- 
randum of  service  must,  upon  proof  by  affidavit  that  the  service  has 
been  duly  effected,  be  entered  in  the  office  of  the  Clerks  of  Records  and 
Writs.3 

When  it  appears  by  the  affidavit  that  the  service  has  not  been  effected 
in  accordance  with  the  ordinary  practice  in  these  cases,  and  the  Record 
and  Writ  Clerk  refuses,  in  consequence,  to  enter  a  memorandum  of  ser- 
vice thereon,  the  plaintiff  may  instruct  counsel  to  apply  to  the  Court  ex 
parte,  for  its  sanction  to  the  memorandum  being  entered;  or  where  direc- 
tions for  the  service  have  been  given  at  Chambers,  or  the  service  is 
required  for  the  purpose  of  proceedings  pending  there,  the  application 
should  be  made  at  Chambers,  ex  parte,  by  the  solicitor,  without  sum- 
mons. The  sanction,  if  given,  is  evidenced  by  an  indorsement  on  the 
affidavit  to  the  following  effect :  "  Let  the  memorandum  of  service  be 
entered  on  this  affidavit ;  "  and  such  indorsement  is  signed  by  the  Regis- 
trar in  Court,  or  by  the  Chief  Clerk  at  Chambers,  as  the  case  may  be, 


8  For  forms  of  acknowledgment  and  affidavit  2  Braithwaite's  Pr.  519. 

of  service,  see  Vol.  III.     For  order  of  service  3  Cons.  Ord.  XXIII.  19.  An  office  copy  of  the 

abroad  by  post,  see  St.  John  c.  Harrison,  Reg.  affidavit,  together  with  the  prcecipe  to  enter  the 

Lib.  B  2269.  memorandum,  and  any  exhibits  or  orders  con- 

9  Braithwaite's  Pr.  522.  nected  with  the  affidavit  of  service,  are  required 
10  See  Cons.  Ord.  XXXV.  16.  to  be  left  at  the  office  for  examination,  but  will 

1  Cons.  Ord.  XXIII.  20;  for  forms  of  notice  be  returned  to  the  solicitor.     For  forms  of  pr<x- 

and  indorsement,  see  Vol.  III.  cipe  and  affidavits,  see  Vol.  III. 

437 


*  437      FORMAL  DEFENDANTS.  —  NOTICE  OF  THE  DECREE. 

and  will  be  acted  on  by  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerk,  without  a  formal 
order  being  drawn  up.4 

The  Record  and  Writ  Clerk  will  give  a  certificate  of  the  entry  of  the 
memorandum  of  service  ;  6  and  a  copy  of  such  certificate,  certified  by 
the  solicitor,  is  to  be  left  at  the  Chambers  of  the  Judge  to  whose  Court 
the  cause  is  attached.6 

The  party  served  may  apply,  within  one  month  after  service,  for 
leave  to  add  to  the  decree.7      Such  application  is  usually  made 

*  437    *  by  summons  ; 1  which  must  be  served  on  the  solicitors  of  all 

parties  to  the  cause,  and  of  all  persons  who  have  obtained  orders 
to  attend.  The  party  served  may  also  obtain  an  order  of  course,2  upon 
petition  at  the  Rolls,  or  on  motion,3  for  liberty  to  attend  all  proceedings 
under  the  decree.4 

Infants,  and  persons  of  unsound  mind  not  so  found,  attend  the  pro- 
ceedings by  their  guardians  ad  litem,  who  are  appointed  in  the  same 
manner  as  guardians  ad  litem  to  answer  and  defend  suits ; 6  and  the 
Judge  may,  at  any  time  during  proceedings  in  Chambers,  under  any 
decree  or  order,  require  a  guardian  ad  litem  to  be  appointed  for  any  in- 
fant, or  person  of  unsound  mind  not  so  found  by  inquisition,  who  has 
been  served  with  notice  of  such  decree  or  order.6 

Where  a  person  served  with  notice  of  the  decree  obtains  an  order  for 
leave  to  attend  the  proceedings,  no  other  evidence  of  service  of  the 
notice  on  him  will  be  required ;  the  Judge  must,  however,  be  satisfied  of 
his  identity  with  the  person  on  whom  the  notice  ought  to  have  been  served- 

A  copy  of  every  order  for  leave  to  attend  proceedings  should  be 
served  on  the  solicitors  of  all  parties  in  the  cause,  and  of  all  persons 
who  have  leave  to  attend  the  proceedings  ;  and  a  copy,  certified  by  the 
solicitor  to  be  a  true  copy,7  should  be  left  at  the  Judge's  Chambers.8 

No  appearance  is  to  be  entered  at  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerks'  Office 
by  a  person  served  with  notice  of  the  decree ;  nor  is  it  necessary  that 
any  order  he  may  obtain  to  attend  the  proceedings  should  be  produced 
or  entered  there.9  The  practitioner  will,  therefore,  be  unable  to  ascer- 
tain from  the  books  of  that  office  what  parties  have,  by  obtaining  orders 
to  attend  the  proceedings,  entitled  themselves  to  be  treated  as  quasi  ^v- 

4  See  Braithwaite's  Pr.  521;  and  Re  New-  1642,  No.  4.  The  solicitor  should  be  author- 
bold,  there  cited ;  Lloyd  v.  Cross,  W.  N.  (1871)  ized  in  writing.  See  Bird  v.  Harris,  29  W.  R.  45. 
101.  8  For  forms   of  petition  and  motion  paper, 

5  The  fee  is  4s.    Regul.  to  Order,  Sched.  4.  see  Vol.  III. 

For  form  of  certificate,  see  Vol.  III.  4  The  order  can  only  be  obtained  by  those 

6  8th  Regulation,  8  Aug.,  1857.  For  form  of  persons  who,  under  the  former  practice,  were 
certificate   see  Vol.  III.  necessary  parties  to  the  suit.     Colyer  t>.  Col- 

7  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  42,  r.  8;  Cons.  Ord.  yer,  9  Jur.  N.  S.  294;  11  W.  R.  355,  V.  C.  K. 
XXXIII.  18;  the  month  is  lunar,  Cons.  Ord.  See  Lloyd  v.  Cross,  W.  N.  (1871)  101;  Day 
XXXVII.  10.  Where  the  party  to  be  served  is  v.  Batty,  21  Ch.  D.  830;  2  Dan.  Ch.  Prac.  (6th 
out  of  the  jurisdiction,  an  enlarged  time  may  be  Eng.  ed.)  1000. 

given;  see  Strong  r.  Moore,  22  L.  J.  Ch.917,  5  Cons.  Ord.  VII.  6.    See  ante,  pp.  160,  176; 

M.  R.    Semble,  the  Attorney-General  may  apply  and  for  forms  of  motion  paper  and  petition,  see 

to  add  to  the  decree  after  the  month.   Johnstone  Vol.  III. 

v.  Hamilton,  3  Giff.  30;   11  Jur.   N.   S.  777,  6  Cons  Ord.  VII.  7. 

V.  C.  S.  7  For  form  of  certificate,  see  Vol.  III. 

1  For  form  of  summons,  see  Vol.  III.  8  Regul.  8  Aug.,  1857.  r.  8. 

2  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  42,  r.  8  ;  2  Seton,  9  Braithwaite's  Pr.  525. 

438 


SERVICE   OF   NOTICE   OF   THE   DECREE. 


438 


ties  to  the  suit.  He  must  seek  this  information  by  search  in  the  books 
kept  at  the  entering  seat  in  the  Registrar's  office,  at  the  Report  office,  and 
in  the  Secretary's  office  at  the  Rolls,  for  the  entry  of  orders,  and  at  the 
Chambers  of  the  Judge  :  or  by  inquiring  of  the  parties  in  the  cause,  what 
orders  for  leave  to  attend  have  been  served  on  them. 

If  the  party  served  attends,  without  obtaining  an  order  giving  him 
leave,  he  will  not  be  allowed  his  costs  of  such  attendance, 
*  without  a  special  order  for  that  purpose ; 1  and  it  is  to  be  ob-  *  438 
served,  that  the  order  giving  a  party  served  with  notice  of  the 
decree  liberty  to  attend,  does  not  specify  at  whose  costs  he  is  to  attend, 
but  his  costs  are  dealt  with  at  the  hearing  of  the  cause  on  further  con- 
sideration ;  and  it  is  conceived  that,  where  the  Court  is  of  opinion  that 
the  interest  of  the  party  in  question  is  sufficiently  protected  by  the  par- 
ties named  on  the  record,  or  who  have  already  obtained  leave  to  attend 
the  proceedings,  it  will  refuse  to  allow  him  any  costs.2 

A  person  who  has  been  served  with  notice  of  the  decree,  and  who  has 
obtained  leave  to  attend  the  proceedings,  may,  if  aggrieved  by  any  order 
in  the  suit,  present  a  petition  of  rehearing  in  the  usual  manner,3  but  if 
he  is  unable  to  raise  the  question  on  the  pleadings,  the  proper  course  for 
him  to  pursue  is  to  move,  on  notice,  for  leave  to  file  a  bill,  which  would 
be  in  the  nature  of  a  bill  of  review.4 

The  effect  of  service  of  notice  of  the  decree  appears  to  be  to  put 
the  persons  served  on  the  same  footing  as  if  they  were  defendants ; 
they  cannot  be  treated  as  co-plaintiffs,  and  no  inquiries  can  be  directed 
for  their  benefit,  which  could  not  have  been  directed  as  between 
co-defendants.5 


i  Cons.  Ord.  XL.  28;  see  Sharp  v.  Lush,  10 
Ch.  D.  468 ;  Re  Marshall,  W.  N.  (1879)  12. 

2  See  Cons.  Ord.  XXXV.  20;  2  Seton,  1642; 
Stevenson  v.  Abington,  11  W.  R.  936,  M.  R.; 
Re  Taylor,  Daubney  v.  Leake,  L.  R.  1  Eq.  495, 
M.  R  ;  35  Beav.  311 ;  Hubbard  v.  Latham,  35  L. 
J.  Ch.  402;  14  W.  R.  553,  V.  C.  K. ;  Wragg 
r.  M.-rley,  14  W.  R.  949,  V.  C.  \V. ;  Bland  v. 
Daniell,  W.  N.  (1867)  169;  Bellew  v.  Bellew, 
W.  N.  (1868)  253;  Lewis  v.  Matthews,  17  W. 
R.  841,  as  to  classes  of  parties  appearing  by 
different  solicitors  ;  and  see  Bennett  v.  Wood,  7 
Sim.  522;  Hutchinson  v.  Freeman,  4  M.  &  C. 
490;  3  Jur.  694;  Shuttleworth  v.  Howarth,  4 
M.  &  C.  492;  5  Jur.  2  ;  C.  &  P.  228,  where 
persons  intervening,  who  were  not  made  parties 


because  they  belonged  to  a  very  numerous  class, 
were  allowed  the  same  costs  as  if  they  had  been 
made  parties  to  the  suit. 

3  Ellison  v.  Thomas,  1  De  G.  J.  &  S.  13;  see 
post,  Chap.  XXXII.  §  2,  Rehearings  and  Ap- 
peals In  the  Cotivt  of  Chancery. 

*  Kidd  v.  Cheyne,  18  Jur.  348,  V.  C.  W. ; 
see  post,  Chap.  XXXIV.  §  5,  Bills  of  Review; 
Flower  v.  Lloyd,  6  Ch.  D.  297  ;  Laming  v.  Gee, 
10  Ch.  D.  715;  Widgery  v.  Tepper,  7  Ch.  D. 
423  ;  Burstall  v.  Fearon,24  Ch.  D.  126. 

5  Whitney  v.  Smith,  L.  R.  4  Ch.  513.  See 
Re  Rees,  15  Ch.  D.  490  ;  Walker  v.  Seligmann, 
L.  R.  12  Eq.  152;  Latch  v  Latch,  L.  R.  10  Ch. 
464. 

439 


439 


♦CHAPTER  VIII. 


PROCESS    TO    COMPEL,   AND    PROCEEDINGS   IN    DEFAULT    OP,    APPEARANCE. 

Section  I.  —  Service  of  the  Copy  of  the  Bill. 

Formerly,  when  the  bill  wg,s  filed,  the  ordinary  course  of  proceeding 
against  the  defendants  was  to  sue  out  and  serve  a  writ  of  subpoena.1 


1  The  former  English  practice  of  compelling 
the  appearance  of  the  defendant  by  issuing  and 
serving  a  writ  of  subpoena  is  still  adhered  to  in 
the  Circuit  Courts  of  the  United  States,  and  in 
Massachusetts  and  some  other  State  Courts. 
Under  this  practice  the  first  step  usually  is,  to 
sue  out  and  serve  a  subpoena,  which  is  a  writ 
issuing  out  of  the  Court,  and  directed  to  the 
party  himself,  commanding  him  to  appear  (ac- 
cording to  the  old  form  of  the  writ),  under 
a  certain  penalty  therein  expressed  {subpoena 
centum  libravum),  and  answer  to  the  matters 
alleged  against  him. 

It  is  to  be  observed,  that  the  writ  of  subpoena 
differs  from  the  other  writs  of  process,  in  being 
directed  to  the  party  himself,  whereas  the  sub- 
sequent writs  or  orders  are  directed,  not  to  the 
party  himself,  but  to  certain  ministerial  officers, 
commanding  them  to  take  certain  proceedings 
against  the  defendant,  calculated  to  enforce  his 
obedience. 

It  would  seem,  according  to  the  American 
practice,  that  the  bill  ought  in  all  cases  to  be 
tiled  before  or  at  the  time  of  issuing  the  subpoena . 
1  Hoff.  Ch.  Pr.  101,  note;  ante,  p.  399,  notes; 
Ch.  Rule  2  of  Massachusetts;  Rule  11  of  the 
Equity  Rules  of  the  U.  S.  Courts;  Howe  r. 
Willard,  40  Vt.  654;  see  ante,  p.  280,  notes. 
See  also  Equity  Rules  7  and  12  for  the  U.  S. 
Courts,  past,  Vol.  III. 

By  Chancery  Rule  51,  in  New  Jersey,  the 
names  of  all  the  defendants  in  the  same  cause 
shall  be  inserted  in  one  subpoena,  unless  the 
defendants  reside  in  different  counties,  in  which 
case  the  names  of  all  those  who  reside  in  the 
same  county  shall  be  inserted  in  the  same  sub- 
poena  ;  by  Rule  52,  copies  of  tickets  served  with 
the  subpoena  upon  the  defendants  shall  be  an- 
nexed to  and  returned  with  the  subpoena.  Dick. 
Ch.  Pr.  13. 

In  Massachusetts,  the  subpoena  on  bills  in 
Equity  shall  be  issued  from  the  Clerk's  office 
either  in  term  time  or  in  vacation  upon  a  bill 
there  filed,  shall  bear  teste  of  the  first  Justice 
of  t.he  Court,  who  is  not  a  party  to  the  suit,  and 

440 


shall  be  under  the  seal  of  the  Court,  and  signed 
by  the  Clerk.  Pub.  Stats,  c.  161,  §  22.  The 
process  shall  be  made  returnable  at  the  next 
succeeding  term,  or  at  any  intermediate  rule 
day,  at  the  election  of  the  party  who  takes  it 
out.     Ch.  Rule  4. 

In  Maine,  "  a  subpoena  in  the  form  prescribed 
shall  issue  on  the  filing  of  the  bill  with  the 
Clerk ;  and  it  may  be  made  returnable  on  a  day 
certain  in  or  out  of  term  time."     Ch.  Rule  2. 

In  Connecticut,  to  a  bill  in  Chancery  against 
defendants  residing  in  that  State,  a  citation, 
signed  by  a  magistrate,  must  be  annexed,  which 
must  be  served  upon  the  defendants  at  least 
twelve  days  before  the  sitting  of  the  Court  to 
which  the  bill  is  preferred.  Central  Manuf. 
Co.  r.  Hartshorne,  3  Conn.  199. 

In  New  Hampshire,  see  Rules  11-13, 15;  38 
N.  H.  607,  and  form.  Ibid.  614. 

In  Tennessee,  the  defendants  are  brought 
before  the  Court  by  summons  and  copy  bill 
served  by  the  sheriff  by  reading  them  to  the 
defendants,  the  latter  being  each  entitled  to 
call  for  a  copy  of  the  bill  to  be  taxed  in  the 
costs.  Code,  §  4340,  et  seq.,  as  modified  bv 
1877,  c.  45. 

In  Maine,  the  subpoena  is  directed  to  the 
sheriffs  of  the  counties  or  their  deputies,  with  a 
command  to  summon  the  defendant  to  appear 
according  to  the  directions  of  the  subpoena,  to 
answer  to  the  plaintiff  in  a  bill  in  Equity,  and 
to  enter  an  appearance  thereto  by  himself  or  his 
attorney.  The  sheriffs  are  also  ordered  to  make 
due  return  of  their  proceedings.  For  form, 
see  37  Maine,  594,  595.  When  the  bill  is  not 
inserted  in  a  writ  of  attachment,  a  subpana  in 
the  form  prescribed  shall  issue  on  the  filing  of 
the  bill  with  the  Clerk,  and  be  served  by  copy, 
accompanied  by  a  copy  of  the  bill.  Rule  2,  37 
Maine,  581.  In  Maine,  the  bill  may  be  inserted 
in  a  writ  of  attachment,  and  when  so  inserted, 
in  addition  to  the  service  required  by  law,  a 
copy  shall  be  left  with  each  defendant,  or  at  his 
last  and  usual  place  of  abode,  or  he  will  not  be 
required  to  file  his  answer  within  sixty  days. 


SERVICE    OF    THE    COPY    OF    THE    BILL. 


*441 


This  has,  however,  as  we  have  seen,  been  abolished  ; 2  *  and,  *  440 
instead,  the  defendants  are  to  be  served  with  a  printed  copy  of 
the  bill,1  properly  stamped  by  one  of  the  Clerks  of  Records  *  and  *  441 
writs  indicating  the  date  of  the  filing  of  the  bill,1  and  with  an 
indorsement  thereon,2  directing  the  defendant  to  cause  an  appearance 
to  be  entered  for  him  within  eight  days;3  to  which  is  added  the  fol- 
lowing note :  "  If  you  fail  to  comply  with  the  above  directions,  the 
plaintiff  may  enter  an  appearance  for  you,  and  you  will  be  liable  to  be 
arrested  and  imprisoned,  and  to  have  a  decree  made  against  you  in 
your  absence."  4 

The  indorsement  need  not  be  printed ; 5  and  may  be  partly  printed  and 
partly  written : 6  and  such  variations  may  be  made  therein  as  circum- 
stances may  require.7     Consequently,  when  the  defendant  to  be  served 


Rule  2,  37  Maine,  581 ;  see  Stephenson  v.  Davis, 
56  Maine,  73,  76. 

In  Massachusetts,  a  bill  or  petition  in  an 
Equity  suit  may  be  inserted  in  an  original  writ 
of  summons,  or  of  summons  and  attachment, 
and  shall  be  returnable  at  the  terms  of  the 
Court  as  established  in  the  several  counties,  or 
on  the  rule  days  established  by  the  Court.  Pub. 
Stats,  c.  151,  §  5;  ante,  p.  305,  note.  See  form, 
Ch.  Rule  1. 

When  a  party  is  charged  in  a  bill  in  the  capa- 
city in  which  he  is  liable,  as  executor,  &c,  it 
is  not  ground  of  demurrer,  that  the  subpcena 
was  issued  to  him  generally,  not  sfating  the 
capacity  in  which  he  is  sued.  Walton  v.  Her- 
bert, 3  Green  Ch.  73. 

On  the  filing  of  a  bill  in  Equity  in  the  U.  S. 
Supreme  Court  by  the  State  of  Florida  against 
the  State  of  Georgia,  the  Court  directed  that 
process  of  subpoena  issue  against  "The  State 
of  Georgia.  Florida  v.  Georgia,  11  How.  U.  S. 
293. 

The  statute  prohibiting  the  service  of  civil 
process  in  the  city  of  New  York  on  the  days  of 
charter  elections,  does  not  apply  to  a  subpcena 
and  injunction  issued  out  of  the  Court  of 
Chancery.  Wheeler  v.  Bartlett,  1  Edw.  Ch. 
323. 

The  issuing  of  a  subpana,  in  New  Jersey, 
except  in  cases  to  stay  waste,  before- the  filing 
of  the  bill,  is  irregular,  and  if  promptly  brought 
to  the  notice  of  the  Court,  the  subpcena,  on 
motion  for  that  purpose,  will  be  set  aside  as 
illegally  issued;  but  the  irregularity  is  purely 
technical,  and  is  waived  by  an  appearance. 
Crowell  v.  Botsford,  16  N.  J.  Eq.  458.  And  a 
mistake  in  antedating  a  subpcena,  when  in  fact 
it  was  not  issued  before  the  filing  of  the  bill, 
may  be  corrected.  Dinsmore  v.  Westcott,  25 
N.  J.  Eq.  302. 

In  Vermont  it  has  been  held  that  a  failure  to 
have  service  made  of  the  original  subpcena  with 
the  bill  and  injunction,  seasonably  for  the  term 
to  which  the  subpcena  was  made  returnable, 
does  not  operate  a  discontinuance  of  the  pro- 


ceedings, so  that  the  order  of  the  Chancellor,  and 
the  injunction  issued  in  pursuance  of  it,  become 
vacated  and  void.  Suing  time  having  expired 
before  service  could  be  made,  the  plaintiff  had 
the  right  to  another  subpmna  returnable  to  the 
next  term.  Howe  v.  Willard,  40  Vt.  654.  See 
to  the  same  effect,  Ford  v.  Bartlett,  59  Tenn. 
(3  Baxt.)  20.  And  where  the  process  issued 
several  years  after  the  bill  was  filed.  Stern  v. 
Ledden,*4  Bibb,  178. 

2  Except  as  to  bills  tiled  on  or  before  Nov. 
1,  1452;  Cons.  Ord.  XXVIII.  10. 

i  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  2-5.  As  to  service  of 
writ  of  summons  or  of  notice  under  the  present 
English  practice,  see  1  Dan.  Ch.  Prac.  (6th 
Eng.  ed.)  p.  333,  §  8;  1  Seton  on  Judgments 
(5th  ed.).  9.  In  Yeatman  v.  Mousley,  2  De  G.  M. 
&  G.  220;  16  Jur.  1004,  a  bill  was  ordered  to  be 
filed,  although  a  mistaken  transposition  of  the 
names  of  one  of  the  parties  had  been  corrected 
in  ink;  and  see  Barnes  v.  Ridgway,  1  Sm.  & 
G.  App.  18;  but  now,  no  bill  will  be  filed,  as  a 
printed  bill,  unless  all  alterations  are  made 
in  type.  Braithwaite's  Pr.  25;  ante,  p.  396, 
n.  3. 

1  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  3  (now  superseded,  see 
post,  p.  904,  n.).  For  a  case  where  the  defend- 
ant was  served  with  an  unstamped  copy,  see 
Hutton  v.  Smith,  24  L.  J.  Ch.  147,  V.  C.  W. 
As  to  service  of  unstamped  copies  on  formal 
parties,  see  ante,  p.  429. 

2  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  3,  and  Sched.,  as 
varied  bv  Cons.  Ord.  IX.  2;  and  see  forms  in 
Vol.  HI. 

8  A  defendant  may,  however,  appear  gra- 
tis, before  service  on  him  of  a  copy  of  the  bill; 
see  post,  Chap.  XIII.,  Appearance. 

4  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  Sched.,  as  varied  by 
Cons.  Ord.  IX.  2. 

6  Sharpe  v.  Blondeau,  cited  9  Hare  App. 
27. 

6  Braithwaite's  Pr.  30. 

'  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  3;  Chatfield  v.  Berch- 
toldt,  9  Hare  App.  28. 

441 


*  442        COMPELLING    APPEARANCE.  —  PROCEEDINGS   IN    DEFAULT. 

is  out  of  the  jurisdiction,  the  time  specially  fixed  by  the  Court  for  him 
to  appear  should  be  inserted  in  the  indorsement,  instead  of  "  eight 
days."  8  In  such  a  case,  the  time  fixed  for  him  to  plead,  answer,  or 
demurr,  not  demurring  alone,  should  also  be  inserted  in  the  indorse- 
ment, if  the  plaintiff  intends  to  serve  him  with  interrogatories.9 

When  the  defendant  is  a  corporation  aggregate,  the  words,  "  you  will  be 
liable  to  have  your  lands  and  tenements,  goods  and  chattels,  distrained 
upon,  and  other  proceedings  taken  against  you,"  are  substituted  for  the 
words,  "  you  will  be  liable  to  be  arrested  and  imprisoned.10 

Where  the  Attorney-General  is  served  with  a  bill,  there  should  be  no 
indorsement  upon  it.11 

*  442        *  All  peers  of  the  three  kingdoms,  with  or  without  a  seat  in 

the  Upper  House,1  provided  they  are  not  members  of  the  House 
of  Commons,2  and  the  widows  and  dowagers  of  the  temporal  lords,3  are 
entitled,  before  they  are  served  with  an  indorsed  copy  of  the  bill,  to  be 
informed  by  a  communication  from  the  Lord  Chancellor,  termed  a  letter 
missive,  of  the  fact  of  the  bill  having  been  filed.  To  obtain  this  letter 
missive,  a  petition  for  that  purpose  to  the  Lord  Chancellor  must  be  left 
with  his  Lordship's  secretary  :  who  will  thereupon  prepare  the  letter 
missive,4  obtain  his  Lordship's  signature  thereto,  and  deliver  it  out  to 
the  plaintiff's  solicitor. 

Where  a  written  bill  is  filed,  a  written  copy,  stamped  and  indorsed  as 
before  explained,  may  be  served  on  any  defendant;  and  such  service  will 
have  the  same  effect  as  the  service  of  a  printed  copy.8 

The  indorsement  must  be  tested  as  of  the  day  on  which  the  copy  of 
the  bill  is  stamped  for  service ;  and  at  the  time  it  is  presented  for  the 
purpose  of  being  stamped,  a  prcecipe  must  be  filled  up,  and  filed  with  the 
proper  officer.6 

If  the  copy  of  the  bill  is  to  be  stamped  for  service  in  pursuance  of  any 
special  order,  such  order  must  be  produced  at  the  same  time.  The  copy 
of  the  bill  may  be  altered  and  re-stamped  at  any  time  before  service,  on 
another  prcecipe  being  left  with  the  proper  officer.7 

When  the  copies  of  the  bill  have  been  stamped  and  indorsed,  in  the 
manner  above  pointed  out,  the  next  step  is  to  serve  each  of  the  defend- 
ants with  one  of  such  copies.  This,  unless  the  Court  directs  some  other 
mode  of  service,  is  effected   by  serving  such  copy  on  each  defendant  per- 

8  Ibid.;  Sharpe  v.  Blondeau,  9  Hare  App.  5  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  6;  see  R.  S.  C  1883, 
27;  Baynes  »'.  Ridge,  id.;  1  W.  R.  99.                      Ord.  XII.  30. 

9  For  forms,  see  Vol.  III.  6  Each  copy  stamped  for  service  must  bear 

10  Braithwaite's  Pr.  29,  n.  As  to  the  form  a  5s.  Chancery  fee  fund  stamp  if  on  the  higher 
of  the  indorsement,  where  the  defendant  is  a  scale,  and  a  Is.  stamp  if  on  the  lower  scale, 
peer,  see  post,  p.  445.  Regul.  to  Ord.  Sched.  4.     One  prcecipe  is  sufli- 

11  Braithwaite's  Pr.  31.  cient  for  any  number  of  copies.     For  forms  of 

1  Robinson  v.  Lord  Rokeby,  8  Ves.  601.  prcecipe,  see  Vol.  III. 

2  Ibid.  7  Braithwaite's  Pr.  32.  No  fee  is  payable 
8  Harr.  by  Newl.  101.  for  restamping  the  copy,  unless,  as  it  would 
4  A  fee  of  20s.  higher  scale,  and  5s.  lower  seem,  the  application  is  made  after  the  expira- 

scale,  is  payable  in  Chancery  fee  fund  stamps,  tion  of  twelve  weeks  from  the  date  of  the  in- 

on  each  letter  missive;  Regul.  to  Ord.  Sched.  dorsement.    Cons.  Ord.  XXVIII.  5,  9;   15  & 

4.    For  forms  of  petition  and  letter  missive,  see  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §§4,5;    Braithwaite's  Pr.  32; 

Vol.  HI.  Braithwaite's  Manual,  190. 

442 


SERVICE   OP   THE    COPY   OF   THE   BILL. 


444 


son  ally,  or  by  leaving  the  same  with  his  servant,  or  some  member  of  his 
family,8  at  his  dwelling-house  or  usual  place  of  abode ;  and  has  the  same 
effect  as  the  service  of  a  subpoena  formerly  had.9 

When  an  affidavit  has  been  filed  with  the  bill,  a  copy  of  such  affidavit, 
but  not  necessarily  an  office  copy,  should  be  sealed  at  the  Record  and 
Writ  Clerks'  Office,  and  annexed  to,  and  served  with,  each  copy  of  the 
bill  sealed  there  for  service.10. 

*  Service  on  a  Sunday  is  not  good  service.1     Service  of  a  copy    *  443 
of  the  bill  is  either  ordinary  or  extraordinary.      Ordinary  service 
requires  no  leave  from  the  Court ;  extraordinary  service  requires  a  special 
order  of  the  Court  to  render  it  valid,  and  is  not  used  except  under  spe- 
cial circumstances,  when  the  ordinary  service  cannot  be  effected. 

When  the  copy  is  left  at  the  dwelling-house,  it  is  necessary  that  it 
should  be  the  place  where  the  defendant  actually  resides ; 2  and  the  mere 
leaving  the  copy  at  a  defendant's  ordinary  place  of  business,  if 
he  does  not  reside  there,  will  not  be  good  service  ; 8  and  *  there-    *  444 


8  The  member  of  the  family  should  be  an 
inmate  of  the  house.  Edgson  v.  Edgson,  3  De 
G.  &  S.  629. 

9  Cons.  Ord.  X.  1  ;  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86, 
§§  4,  5. 

1"  Ante,  pp.  395,  396. 

1  Macreth  v.  Nicholson,  19  Ves.  367;  see 
Taylor  v.  Phillips,  3  East,  155;  1  Chitty's  Arch. 
232  ;  29  Car.  II.  c.  7,  §  6.  A  subpoena  return- 
able on  Sunday  is  irregular,  and  will  not 
warrant  the  issuing  of  an  attachment  for  diso- 
bedience thereof,  as  no  Court  can  be  held  on 
that  day  for  any  purpose.  Gould  v.  Spencer, 
5  Paige,  541. 

2  Service  on  the  Deputy-Governor  of  a 
prison  was  held  to  be  due  service  on  a  defend- 
ant, a  prisoner  there.  Newenham  p.  Pember- 
ton,  2  Coll.  54;  9  Jur.  637. 

In  the  U.  S.  Courts,  as  to  the  service  of  sub- 
poenas, see  Equity  Rules  13-15,  post,  Vol.  III. 

In  Massachusetts,  "if  a  party  shall  not  be 
found,  a  copy  of  the  subpxna  may  be  left  at  his 
usual  place  of  abode;  and,  the  truth  of  the  case 
being  returned  by  the  officer,  if  it  shall  be  made 
to  appear  to  the  Court  that  the  party  has  actual 
notice  of  the  suit,  no  other  service  shall  be  re- 
quired ;  otherwise,  such  notice  shall  be  given 
as  the  Court  shall  order."  Rule  4,  of  the  Rules 
of  Practice  in  Chancery. 

In  some  States  the  subpoena  may  be  served 
by  any  person;  as  in  Maryland,  Hove  ».  Penn, 
1  Bland,  29;  Taylor  v.  Go>don,  id.  132;  so  in 
New  Jersey,  West  v.  Smith,  1  Green  Ch.  309; 
but  the  service,  if  made  by  any  person  other 
than  a  legal  officer,  must  be  proved.  Hoye  v. 
Penn,  1  Bland,  29. 

In  Vermont,  service  of  a  subpoena  cannot  be 
made  by  an  indifferent  person  not  named  in  it. 
Allyn  v.  Davis,  10  Vt.  547;  Burlington  Bank 
v.  Cottin,  11  Vt.  106.  As  to  Kentucky,  see 
Trabue  v.  Holt,  2  Bibb,  393  ;  Barnett  v.  "Mont- 


gomery, 6  Mon.  327.  In  New  Hampshire, 
where  a  private  person  may  make  service  of 
process  by  copy,  he  may  himself  certify  and 
swear  to  the  copy.  Stone  v.  Anderson,  25 
N.  H.  221. 

The  service  of  a  subpoena  must  be  within  the 
jurisdiction,  otherwise  it  is  irregular.  Dunn  v. 
Dunn,  4  Paige,  425;  Creed  v.  Bryne,  1  Hogan, 
79 ;  Johnson  v.  Nagle,  1  Molloy,  243 ;  Haw- 
kins v.  Hale,  1  Beav.  73;  Erickson  v.  Smith, 
46  N.  H.  375.  But  the  defendant  may  volun- 
tarily appear  or  stipulate  in  writing  to  accept 
out  of  the  jurisdiction  a  service  as  regular. 
Dunn  v.  Dunn,  ubi  supra  ;  Picquet  v.  Swan,  5 
Mason,  561;  see  Henderson  v.  Hopper,  Halst. 
Dig.  170.  In  Tennessee,  where  service  of  a 
subpoena  has  been  made  upon  one  material  de- 
fendant in  the  proper  district  or  county,  a 
[counterpart]  subpoena  may  be  served  upon  any 
other  defendant  out  of  t:ie  county  or  district, 
but  within  the  State.  University  v.  Cambrel- 
ing,  6  Yerger,  79;  Code,  §  4306  ;  Moore  v.  Gen- 
nett,  2  Tenn.  Ch.    375. 

In  Pratt  v.  Bank  of  Windsor,  Hairing.  Ch. 
254,  it  was  held,  that  the  service  of  a  subpoena 
upon  a  defendant  out  of  the  State  is  irregular,, 
In  Picquet  v.  Swan,  5  Mason,  561,  the  plaintiff 
obtained  an  order,  appointing  a  commissioner 
to  make  service  on  one  of  two  defendants  in 
Paris,  and  to  take  his  answer  to  the  bill.  See 
the  mode  of  proceeding,  id.  p.  562.  But  the 
defendant  having  refused  to  appear,  the  cause 
was,  on  motion  of  the  other  defendants,  ordered 
to  stand  dismissed,  unless  the  plaintiff  pro- 
cured the  appearance  and  answer  of  the  defend- 
ant within  a  given  time.  Id.  571.  See  infra, 
p.  449,  n.  6. 

8  See  Smith  v.  Parke,  2  Paige,  298;   Dyett 

v.  N.  A.  Coal  Co.  20  Wend.  570;   Johnston  v. 

Macconnell,  3  Bibb,  1.     A  copy  of  the  subpoena 

left  at  the  residence  of  a  partv  domiciled  in  the 

"443 


*  444        COMPELLING    APPEARANCE.  —  PROCEEDINGS    IN    DEFAULT. 


fore,  where,  under  the  old  practice,  a  subpoena,  returnable  immedi- 
ately,1 was  moved  for  upon  affidavit  stating  that  the  defendant  lived  at 
Epsom,  but  that  he  had  chambers  in  the  Temple  and  resided  there,  Lord 
Thurlow  said,  that  as  it  did  not  appear  that  his  place  of  abode  was  in 
the  Temple,  he  could  not  make  the  order.2  Where,  however,  a  member 
of  the  House  of  Commons,  having  a  house  at  Southampton  and  no  town 
residence,  was  served  with  a  subpoena,  returnable  immediately,  at  a 
friend's  house  in  London,  with  whom  he  was  upon  a  visit,  and  for 
default  of  appearance  a  sequestration  had  been  awarded,  Lord  Thurlow 
refused  to  set  aside  the  sequestration  for  irregularity :  saying,  that  he 
could  not  suppose  that  the  defendant,  a  Member  of  Parliament,  during 
the  session  of  Parliament  had  no  town  residence,  or  that  the  residence 
above  stated  should  not  be  taken  as  a  residence  quoad  the  defendant, 
whose  duty  it  was  to  attend,  and  who  actually  did  attend,  the  House.8 
And  so,  where  a  letter  missive,  and  subsequently  a  subpoena,  had  been 
served  at  the  town  residence  of  a  peer  during  the  sitting  of  Parliament, 
Lord  Thurlow  appears  to  have  been  of  opinion  that  it  was  good  ; 4  and 
where  a  letter  missive,  and  afterwards  a  subpoena,  had  been  served  at 
the  town  residence  of  a  peer,  who  at  the  time  was  abroad,  and  afterwards 
an  order  nisi  for  a  sequestration  was  issued,  a  motion  to  discharge  the 
order  nisi  was  refused.5 

Ordinary  service  upon  an  infant  defendant,  or  upon  a  defendant  of 
weak  or  unsound  mind,  not  so  found  by  inquisition,  is  effected  in  the 
same  manner  as  upon  an  adult.6 


State,  and  temporarily  absent  therefrom,  is 
sufficient  unless  it  is  made  to  appear  that  he 
has  been  surprised.  Southern  Steam  Packet 
Co.  v.  Roger,  1  Cheeves,  48.  Where  the  de- 
fendant has  no  family,  but  boards  or  makes  it 
his  home  in  the  family  of  another,  the  subpoena 
to  appear  and  answer  may,  in  his  absence  from 
home,  be  served  upon  either  of  the  heads  of  the 
family,  at  such  place  of  his  abode,  although  he 
has  no  wife  or  servant.  But  to  make  such 
service  regular,  the  place  of  service  must  be  his 
actual  place  of  residence  at  the  time,  and  his 
absence  therefrom  must  be  merely  temporary. 
People  i'.  Craft,  7  Paige,  325 ;  see  Bickford  v. 
Skewes,  9  Sim.  428;  Wagner  v.  Blanchet,  27 
N.  J.  Eq.  387.  The  personal  service  of  a  sub- 
poena on  a  defendant,  who  is  confined  in  the 
State's  prison  for  a  term  of  years,  is  regular. 
Phelps  v.  Phelps,  7  Paige,  500.  So  where  the 
service  of  the  subpoena  was  made  on  the  keeper 
of  the  State's  prison  instead  of  on  the  defend- 
ant, who  was  confined  therein.  Johnson  v. 
Johnson,  Walker  Ch.  309.  For  service  on  a 
defendant  under  criminal  sentence  see  further, 
Newenham  v.  Pemberton,  2  Coll.  54.  The 
return  to  a  subpoena  against  A  and  B  was  as 
follows:  "Executed  on  A,  —  B  not  found;" 
and  this  was  held  insufficient  to  found  a  decree. 
Pegg  v.  Capp,  9  Blackf.  275.  And  see  where 
the  subpoena  was  blank  as  to  the  return  day. 
Arden  v.  Waldon,  1  Edw.  Ch.  631.    In  Illi- 

444 


nois,  where  a  summons  in  Chancery  is  served 
by  leaving  it  at  the  residence  of  the  defend- 
ant, the  return  must  show  that  it  was  left  with 
some  person  who  was  a  member  of  the  defend- 
ant's family.  Townsend  v.  Griggs,  2  Scam. 
365. 

i  See  Hinde,  78. 

2  v.  Shaw,  Hinde,  92;  see  McPherson 

v.  Horsel,  13  N.  J.  Eq.  35. 

3  East  India  Co.  v.  Rumbold,  Hil.  Term 
1781,  cited  Hinde,  92. 

4  Att.-Gen.  v.  Earl  of  Stamford,  2  Dick. 
744. 

6  Thomas  v.  Earl  of  Jersey,  2  M.  &  K.  398; 
and  see  Davidson  v.  Marchioness  of  Hastings, 
2  Keen,  509,  513. 

6  See  Ord.  VII.  3;  R.  S.  C.  Old.  IX.  4,  5;  2 
Seton,  1624,  Nos.  6,  7;  Thorn  v.  Smith,  W.  N. 
(1879)  81;  27  W.  R.  617;  see  Fore  Street  Ware- 
house Co.  v.  Durrant,  10  Q.  B.  D.  471.  In 
Morgan  v.  Jones,  4  W.  R.  381,  V.  C.  W  ,  sub- 
stituted service  on  the  medical  officer  or  keeper 
of  an  asylum  in  which  a  lunatic  was  con- 
fined, was  refused;  personal  service  if  practica- 
ble being  held  necessary;  and  see  Anon.  2  Jur. 
N.  S.  324,  V.  C.  W. ;  Rodgers  r.  Ellison,  Meigs, 
90.  But  substituted  service  has  been  allowed 
when  shown  to  be  dangerous  to  the  patient. 
Raine  v.  Wilson,  L.  R.  16  Eq.  576;  Speak  v. 
Metcalf,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  214;  ante,  p.  177,  n.  6. 

Upon  a  bill  against  a  lunatic  in  the  custody 


SERVICE    OF    THE    COPY    OF    THE    BILL. 


445 


*  When  a  husband  and  wife  are  both  defendants,  ordinary  *  445 
service  upon  the  husband  alone  is  sufficient ;  *  and  process  of  con- 
tempt may  issue  against  him  alone  for  his  wife's  default.2  But  if  they 
are  living  apart,  each  should  be  served.8  If  the  husband  is  abroad,  or 
cannot  be  served,  and  the  subject-matter  of  the  suit  arises,  in  right  of 
the  wife,  the  plaintiff  may  obtain,  on  an  ex  parte  motion,  supported  by 
affidavit,  an  order  that  service  upon  her  may  be  deemed  good  service.4 
Service  on  her  alone,  in  the  usual  manner,  will  then  be  sufficient ; 6  but  no 
compulsory  process  can  be  issued  against  her,  grounded  on  such  service, 
without  a  previous  order  of  the  Court.6 

If  a  corporation  aggregate  be  a  defendant,  the  copy  of  the  bill  may  be 
served  upon  any  one  of  its  members,  or,  in  the  case  of  a  public  company, 
upon  the  public  officer  appointed  to  be  sued  on  its  behalf,  or  if  there  be 
no  such  officer,  upon  the  chairman,  manager,  or  secretary,  either  per- 
sonally or  at  the  office  of  the  company.7  (a)     Provision  is  also  made,  by 


of  a  committee,  service  of  process  upon  the 
committee  is  sufficient.  Cates  v.  Woodson,  2 
Dana,  455. 

Process  ought  to  be  served  personally  on 
infants.  Massie  v.  Donaldson,  8  Ohio,  377; 
Jones  v.  Mason,  N.  C.  Term  K.  J  25.  In  the 
presence  of,  or  with  notice  to,  the  natural  or 
legal  guardian,  or  other  person  having  the  con- 
trol of  the  infant.  Cooper  v.  Green,  2  Add.  Ec. 
454;  1  Hoff.  Ch.  Pr.  107.  But  service  of  a 
subpoena  on  the  father  of  a  minor  defendant,  if 
within  the  jurisdiction,  was  held  sufficient,  al- 
though the  minor  resided  out  of  the  jurisdiction. 
Kirwan  v.  Kirwan,  1  Hogan,  264;  see  1  Barb. 
Ch.  Pr.  51,  52;  Bank  of  Ontario  v.  Strong,  2 
Paige,  301.  So  on  the  surviving  parent,  whether 
the  minor  is  more  or  less  than  fourteen  yeais  of 
age.  Sanders  v.  Godley,  23  Ala.  473.  But 
when  the  parent  and  child  are  both  parties,  a 
service  on  the  parent  alone  is  not  sufficient  to 
bring  the  infant  before  the  Court.  The  subpoena 
should  be  served  on  the  parent  for  the  infant, 
and  this  should  appear  by  the  officer's  return. 
Hodges  v.  Wise,  16  Ala.  509. 

In  Tennessee  the  general  guardian  of  an 
infant  represents  the  person  and  estate  of  his 
ward,  and  the  infant  is  well  brought  before  the 
Court  by  service  of  process  on  such  guardian, 
even  where  the  bill  is  filed  to  subject  lands 
descended  to  the  payment  of  the  ancestor's 
debt.  Britain  v.  Cowen,  5  Humph.  315.  And 
see  Cowen  v.  Anderson,  7  Coldw.  291 ;  Scott  v. 
Porter,  April  Term  1879,  at  Jackson. 

Where  a  bill  has  been  served  on  an  infant, 
there  is  no  necessity  for  serving  the  same  again 
on  the  guardian  ad  litem  after  he  is  appointed. 
Jones  v.  Drake,  2  Hayw.  237. 

1  See  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  IX.  3;  Leavitt  v.  Cruger, 
1  Paige,  421. 


2  Gee  v.  Cottle,  3  M.  &  C.  180.  The  affi- 
davit of  service  should  state  that  the  service 
was  made  on  the  husband  and  wife,  by  serving 
the  husband.  Steel  v.  Parsons,  8  Jur.  641,  V. 
C.  K.  B.  For  an  order,  giving  leave  to  serve 
husband  and  wife  separately  out  of  the  juris- 
diction, the  fact  of  the  marriage  being  in  dis- 
pute, see  Longworth  v.  Bellamy,  cited  2  Seton, 
1622. 

3  See  Whitley  v.  Honeywell,  24  W.  R.  851. 

4  For  form  of  order,  see  2  Set'n,  1623,  No. 
5,  1624,  No.  6;  and  for  forms  of  motion  paper 
and  affidavit,  see  Vol.  III. 

5  Bell  v.  Hyde,  Prec.  Ch.  328;  Dubois  v. 
Hole,  2  Vern.  613;  Bunyan  v.  Mortimer,  6 
Mad.  278;  and  see  Pemberton  v.  M'Gill,  1  Jur 
N.  S.  1045,  V.  C.  W.;  see  Dyett  N.  A.  Coal 
Co.  20  Wend.  570. 

6  Graham  v.  Fitch.  2  De  G.  &  S.  246;  12 
Jur.  833;  and  see  ante,  p.  183.  As  to  substi- 
tuted service  upon  the  wife  for  her  husband,  see 
Carwardine  v.  Wishlade,  15  Jur.  913  (a  fore- 
closure suit);  and  see  Palmer  v.  Palmer,  2 
Seton,  1622.  Where  the  plaintiff  seeks  relief 
out  of  the  separate  estate  of  the  wife,  the  sub- 
poena must  be  served  on  her  personally,  and  she 
may  put  in  a  separate  answer;  the  husband  in 
such  case  being  considered  only  a  nominal 
party.  Leavitt  v.  Cruger,  1  Paige.  422 ;  Fergu- 
son v.  Smith,  2  John.  Ch.  139.  In  New  Jersey, 
in  cases  where  husband  and  wife  are  made  de- 
fendants, and  he  only  is  served  with  process  of 
subpoena,  the  wife  being  out  of  the  State,  an 
order  of  publication  shall  be  taken  against  her, 
unless  an  appearance  be  entered  for  her.  Chan- 
cery Rule,  23. 

7  Braithwaite's  Pr.  33.  A  colonial  govern- 
ment is  not  a  corporation  for  this  purpose. 
Sloman  v.  Governor  of  New  Zealand,  1  C.  P. 


(a)  In  England,  service  of  a  writ  of  sum- 
mons on  the  head  officer  of  a  foreign  corpora- 


tion at  its  place  of  business  in  that  country  is 
now  good  service  on  the  corporation.     Haggin 

445 


*  446        COMPELLING    APPEARANCE.  —  PROCEEDINGS   IN   DEFAULT. 


various  public  Acts,  respecting  the  mode  in  which  documents  may  be 
served  on  a  company.8 

If  the  defendant  be  entitled  to  the  privilege  of  peerage,  it  has  pre- 
viously been  stated  that  he  has  a  right  to  a  letter  missive,  before  an 
indorsed  copy  of  the  bill  is  served  upon  him.9  This  letter  mis- 
*  446  sive,  with  a  copy  of  the  petition  for  the  same,  and  with  *  an 
unindorsed  copy  of  the  bill,  must  be  served  in  the  same  manner 
as  a  copy  of  the  bill  in  ordinary  cases.  If  the  peer  does  not  enter  his 
appearance  within  eight  days,  the  plaintiff  must  serve  him  with  a  copy 
of  the  bill  indorsed  in  the  usual  form  :  except  that  the  words,  "  you  will 
be  liable  to  have  your  estate  sequestered,  and  other  proceedings  taken 
against  you,"  must  be  substituted  for  the  words,  "  you  will  be  liable  to 
be  arrested  and  imprisoned."  * 

The  Attorney-General  used  not  to  be  served  with  a  subpoena,  but  with  a 
copy  of  the  bill.2  Hence,  now  the  practice  with  respect  to  the  Attorney- 
General  will  be  the  same  as  with  respect  to  other  defendants. 

If  the  plaintiff  amends  his  bill,  he  must  serve  a  copy  of  the  amended 
bill  on  all  the  defendants,3  or,  if  they  have  appeared,  on  their  solici- 
tors ; 4  or,  where  they  have  appeared  in  person,  at  the  place  named  for 
service ; 5  and  the  copy  served  must  be  stamped  by  the  Kecord  and  Writ 
Clerk,  so  as  to  indicate  the  filing  of  the  amended  bill,  and  the  date  of 


D.  563.  The  subpcena,  in  case  of  a  corporation, 
is  usually  served  on  the  president  cashier,  secre- 
tary, or  other  principal  officer.  I  Barb.  Ch. 
Pr.  52.  Service  on  private  corporators  is  no 
service  on  the  corporation.  De  Wolf  v.  Mallett, 
3  Dana,  214.  Where  the  business  of  a  company 
had  practically  ceased,  but  the  company  had 
never  been  dissolved,  service  was  ordered  on 
the  late  chairman  and  secretary.  Gaskell  v. 
Chambers,  26  Beav.  252;  5  Jur.  N.  S.  52. 

s  See8&9  Vice.  16,  §  135;  id.  c.  18,  §134; 
id.  c  20,  §  138;  25  &  26  Vic.  c  89,  §§  62.  63; 
R.  S.  C.  1883,  Ord.  IX.  7,  8;  see  46  &  47  Vic. 
c  49.  Respecting  the  present  English  practice, 
see  1  Dan.  Ch.  Prac.  (6th  Eng.  ed.)  335. 

9  Robinson  v.  Lord  Rokeby,  8  Ves.  601; 
Vigers  ».  Lord  Audley,  9  Sim.  409;  ante,  p.  442; 
Braithwaite's  Pr.  29,  n. 

1  Braithwaite's  Pr.  29,  n. 

2  Lord  Red.  39.  Where  the  United  States 
or  a  State  is  interested,  the  District  Attorney  or 
the  Attorney-General  must  be  served  with  a 
copy  of  the  bill.  If  he  omits  to  enter  an  ap- 
pearance, an  order  may  be  obtained  on  petition, 
that  he  appear  within  a  certain  time,  or  the  bill 
be  taken  as  confessed.  1  HofF.  Ch.  Pr.  108. 
In  Grayson  V.  Virginia,  3  Dall.  320,  it  was  held 
that  when  process  at  Common  Law  or  in  Equity 
shall  issue  against  a  State,  the  same  shall  be 
served  upon  the  Governor  or  chief  executive 


officer,  and  the  Attorney-General  of  such  State. 
Rules  of  U.  S.  Supreme  Court,  December  Term, 
1858,  No.  5. 

In  New  Jersey  v.  New  York,  3  Peters,  461, 
it  was  held  that  where  the  bill  is  brought  by 
one  State  against  another,  the  subpcena  must  be 
served  upon  the  Governor  and  Attorney-Gen- 
eral of  the  defendant  State,  and  a  service  on 
the  Governor  nlone,  there  being  no  appearance 
entered  for  the  defendants,  will  not  authorize 
the  Court  to  proceed.  See  Huger  v.  South 
Carolina,  3  Dall.  339. 

3  Cons.  Ord.  IX.  20.  See  1  Dan.  Ch.  Prac 
(6th  Eng.  ed.)  336.  The  copy  may  be  partly 
printed  and  partly  written,  if  the  amendment 
is  not  made  by  a  reprint.     Ibid. 

4  Cons.  Ord.  IX.  21.  It  is  sufficient  to 
serve  one  copy  on  each  solicitor,  notwithstand- 
ing he  may  be  concerned  for  several  defendants. 
Where,  however,  a  solicitor  is  properly  con- 
cerned as  solicitor  for  one  defendant,  and  as 
agent  for  another,  two  copies  should  be  served. 
Braithwaite's  Pr.  308;  and  id.  n.  Service  on 
the  solicitor  is  sufficient,  although  the  defendant 
is  outof  the  jurisdiction.  Zulueta  v.  Vincent,  3 
McN.  &  G.  246,  overruling  Marquis  of  Hertford 
v.  Suisse,  13  Sim.  489,  and  Sewell  r.  Gadden, 
1  De  G.  &  S.  126. 

6  Cons.  Ord.  IX.  22. 


v.  Comptoir  d'Escompte  de  Paris,  23  Q.  B.  D. 
519.  This  does  not  apply  to  a  foreign  partner- 
ship, Russell  v.  Cambefort,  id.  526;  although 
service  on  one  of  its  members  within  the  juris- 

446 


diction  is  good  service  on  all  the  partners. 
Shepherd  v.  Hirsh,  Pritchard,  &  Co.,  45  Ch.  D. 
231.  See  Grant  v.  Auderson,  [1892]  1  Q.  B. 
108;  65  L.  T.  619. 


SERVICE   OF   THE   COPY   OP   THE    BILL. 


447 


the  filing.  Where  the  plaintiff  requires  an  answer  to  the  amended  bill, 
the  copy  served  should  be  indorsed  in  the  same  manner  as  the  copy  of  an 
original  bill :  otherwise,  the  copy  served  should  be  without  indorsement.6 
It  is,  of  course,  to  be  understood,  that  as  to  defendants  added  by  amend- 
ment, the  bill  is  to  be  treated  as  an  original  bill. 

Where  the  plaintiff  is  unable  to  effect  ordinary  service  upon  a  defend- 
ant, in  the  manner  above  mentioned,  the  Court  will,  iu  many  cases, 
permit  service  to  be  effected  upon  the  defendant  himself  out  of  the  juris- 
diction, or  to  be  substituted  upon  his  agent  within  the  jurisdiction.  It 
was  expressly  enacted  by  the  English  statute,  that  the  Court  shall  be  at 
liberty  to  direct  substituted  service  of  the  bill,  as  it  shall  think 
fit; 7  but  it  seems  that  this  enactment  *  does  not  extend  the  juris-  *  447 
diction  previously  exercised  by  the  Court  in  this  respect.1  (a) 

Where  a  bill  is  filed  to  restrain  an  action  at  law,  and  the  defendant 
(the  plaintiff  in  the  action)  is  out  of  the  jurisdiction,  or  cannot  be  found,2 
the  Court  will  allow  substituted  service  on  the  attorney  employed  by  him 
to  conduct  the  proceedings  at  law,  on  an  affidavit  proving  those  facts.8 

Substituted  service  of  the  copy  of  a  cross-bill,  upon  the  solicitor  who 
filed  the  original  bill,  will  not  be  ordered  ;  but  the  Court  will,  in  such  a 
case,  stay  the  proceedings  in  the  original  cause  until  the  defendants  have 
entered  an  appearance.4 


«  Barn-  v.  Croskey,  2  J.  &  H.  130. 

1  15  &  16  "Vic.  c.  86,  §  5;  and  see  4  &  5 
Will.  IV.  c.  82,  §  2,  post,  p.  449,  n.  8. 

i  See  Bones  v.  Angier,  18  Jur.  1050,  V.  C. 
W. ;  and  see  Cons.  Ord.  X.  2.  In  Hope  v.  Hope, 
4  De  G.  M.  &  G.  328,  342;  19  Beav.  237,  Lord 
Cranworth  C.  says,  that,  where  there  is  an  agent 
in  this  country  managing  all  the  affairs  of  a 
defendant  who  is  abroad,  and  regularly  com- 
municating with  him  upon  his  affairs,  or  where 
he  has  an  agent  here  specially  managing  the 
particular  matter  involved  in  the  suit,  the 
Court  has  felt  that  it  might  safely  allow  service 
upon  the  agent  to  be  deemed  good  service  upon 
the  person  abroad:  because  the  inference  was 
irresistible,  that  service  so  made  was  service  on 
a  person  either  impliedly  authorized  to  accept 
that  particular  service,  or  who  certainly  would 
communicate  the  process  so  served  to  the  party 
who  was  not  in  this  country  to  receive  it  him- 
self. The  object  of  all  service  was  of  course 
only  to  give  notice  to  the  party  on  whom  it  was 
made,  so  that  he  might  be  made  aware  of,  and 
able  to  resist,  that  which  was  sought  against 
him;  and  when  that  had  been  substantially 
done,  so  that  the  Court  might  feel   perfectly 


confident  that  service  had  reached  him,  every- 
thing had  been  done  that  was  required.  See 
Wolverhampton  &  Staffordshire  Banking  Co.  v. 
Bond.  W.  N.  (1881),  6  ;  29  W.  R.  599.  Where 
a  bill  was  filed  against  a  firm,  one  member  of 
which  was  resident  abroad,  substituted  service 
on  the  members  in  England  was  directed.  Hen- 
derson v.  Campbell,  13  W.  R.  704,  L.  JJ. 

2  Sergison  v.  Beavan,  9  Hare  App.  29,  marg. , 
16  Jur.  1111,  V.  C.  S. ;  Hamond  v.  Walker,  3 
Jur.  N.  S.  686,  V.  C.  W.;  and  see  Seton,  877; 
Anderson  v.  Lewis,  3  Bro.  C.  C.  429 ;  5  Sim. 
505;  Baillie  v.  Blanchet,  10  L.  T.  N.  S.  365, 

V.  c.  w. 

3  The  merits  need  not  now  be  shown  by  affi- 
davit.    Sergison  v.  Beavan,  ubi  supra. 

*  Anderson  v.  Lewis,  ubi  supra  ;  and  Gardi- 
ner v.  Mason,  4  Bro.  C.  C  478;  5  Sim.  506;  and 
see  Waterton  v.  Croft,  5  Sim.  502,  507.  But 
substituted  service  is  permitted  in  the  United 
States  Courts  in  cross-causes  and  injunction  bills 
to  stay  proceedings  at  law  in  the  same  Court. 
Hitner  v.  Suckley,  2  Wash.  C  C.  465;  Ward  v. 
Sebring,  4  Wash.  C.  C.  472;  Dunn  v.  Clarke,  8 
Pet.  1 ;  Schenck  v.  Peay,  1  Woolw.  175. 


(a)  Substituted  service  duly  effected  is  equiv- 
alent in  all  respects  to  personal  service.  Watt  v. 
Barnett,  3  Q.  B.  D.  363 ;  Re  Urquhart,  24  id.  723. 
But  the  Court's  jurisdiction  is  not  extended 
by  provisions  authorizing  service  of  process 
abroad,  which  is  not  a  power  inherent  in  the 
Court.  Cookey  v.  Anderson,  31  Beav.  452 ;  1  De 
G.  J.  &  S.  363.  Hence  there  is  no  jurisdiction  to 


give  leave  to  serve  notices  of  orders  and  other 
proceedings  in  the  winding-up  of  a  company  on 
persons  residing  abroad.  Re  Anglo-African  S. 
S.  Co.  32  Ch.  D.  348;  see  Re  Nathan  Newman 
&  Co.  35  Ch.  D.  1.  So  the  Court  cannot  order 
service  of  an  originating  summons  out  of  the 
jurisdiction.  Re  Busfield,  32  Ch.  D.  123;  Du- 
bout  &  Co.  v.  Macpherson,  23  Q.  B.  D.  340. 

447 


*  448        COMPELLING    APPEARANCE.  —  PROCEEDINGS   IN   DEFAULT. 

In  Hobhouse  v.  Courtney,5  the  cases  and  authorities  upon  the  subject 
of  substituted  service  upon  an  agent  were  reviewed.  There,  the  defend- 
ant, who  was  out  of  the  jurisdiction,  had  given  special  authority  to  a 
person  within  the  jurisdiction  to  act  as  his  agent,  with  respect  to 
*448  the  property  which  was  the  subject  of  the  *  suit;  and  the  Court 
ordered  service  on  that  person  to  be  good  service  upon  the  defend- 
ant. An  application  of  a  similar  kind  made  in  the  case  of  Webb  v. 
Salmon,1  was  refused  upon  the  ground,  that  the  persons  upon  whom 
the  substituted  service  was  sought  to  be  effected  were  not  agents  in  the 
matter  of  the  suit  when  the  correspondence  with  the  plaintiff's  solicitor 
commenced,  and  that  they  refused  to  accept  the  agency  ;  there  was  not, 
therefore,  that  appointment  of  them  as  the  solicitors  or  agents  of  the 
defendant,  which,  in  the  case  of  Hobhouse  v.  Courtney,  was  assumed  to  be 
necessary.  The  Vice-Chancellor  also  observed,  that  he  was  not  prepared 
to  go  beyond  that  case.  In  Cooper  v.  Wood,2  substituted  service  was 
ordered  on  a  person  who  had  acted  as  the  solicitor  of  the  absent  defendant, 
in  the  subject  of  the  mortgage  to  which  the  suit  related,  and  who,  there 
was  reason  to  believe,  was  in  communication  with  the  defendant.  And 
in  Weymouth  v.  Lambert,8  substituted  service  was  ordered  in  a  creditors' 
suit,  on  one  who,  acting  as  the  attorney  of  the  executor  and  general 
devisee  and  legatee,  resident  in  India,  had  obtained  administration  here, 
and  had  entered  into  receipt  of  the  rents  of  the  real  estate ;  and  where 
an  infant  had  been  taken  out  of  the  jurisdiction  for  the  express  purpose 
of  preventing  his  being  served  personally,  it  was  ordered,  that  service 
upon  the  solicitor  and  Six  Clerk  of  the  parents  should  be  good  as  against 
the  infant.4  It  is  to  be  observed,  however,  that  the  principle,  as  laid  down 
in  Hope  v.  Hope,6  seems  to  go  beyond  the  case  of  Hobhouse  v.  Courtney. 

5  12  Sim.  140,  157;  6  Jur.  28;  approved  and  3  3  Beav.  333;  and  see  Howkins  v.  Bennett, 

acted  on  in  Murray  v.  Vipart,  1  Phil.  521;  9  1  Giff.  215;  6  Jur.  N.  S.  948;  and  the  cases 

Jur.  173;  and  see  Bankier  v.  Poole,  3  De  G.  &  cited  in  the  note  to  Skejrg  v.  Simpson,  2  De  G. 

S.  375;  13  Jur.  800;  Hurst  v.  Hurst,  1  De  G.  &  S.  454,  456;  and  as  to  service  of  bill,  or  order 

&  S.  694;  12  Jur.  152;  Hornby  v.  Holmes,  4  of  revivor,  see  Norton  v.  Hepworth,  1  M'N.  & 

Hare,  306;  9  Jur.  225,  796;  Bones  v.  Angier,  G.  54;  13  Jur.  244;  Hart  r.  Tulk,  6  Hare,  618; 

18  Jur.  1050;  2  W.  R.  609;  Dicker  v.  Clarke,  Forster  v.  Menzies,  16  Beav.  568;  17  Jur.  657; 

9  Jur.   N.  S.  636;  11  W.  R.  635,   V.  C.  K.;  S.   C.   nom.  Foster  v.  Menzies,  10  Hare  App. 

Barker  v.   Piele,   11   W.   R.  658,    V.  C.   K.;  ^36  n.,  71;  Watts  v.  Hughes,  8  W.  R.  292. 

Jackson  v.  Shanks,  13  W.  R.  287,  V.  C.  W.;  4  Lane  v.  Hardwicke,  5  Beav.  222. 

Gauther  v.  Meinertzhaagen,  1  W.  N.  48,  V.  C.  8  4  De  G.  M.  &  G.  328;  19  Beav.  237.    And 

W. ;  Brown  v.  Crowe,  ib.  80,  V.  C.  W. ;  Jones  v.  see,  in  case  of  partners,  Carrington  v.  Cantillon, 

Cargill,  11  L.  T.  N.  S.  566;  but  see  Rickcord  i>.  Bunb.   107;    Coles  v.   Gurney,   1    Mad.    187; 

Nedriff.  2  Mer.  458.  Kinder  v.   Forbes,   1    Beav.  503;  Atkinson  v. 

1  3  Hare,  251,  255;  nnd  see  Asiatic  Banking  Mackreth,  W.  N.  (1867)  41.  In  a  suit  against 
Co.  v.  Anderson,  13  L.  T.  N.  S.  272;  Furber  v.  a  foreign  State.  Smith  v.  Weguelin,  W.  N. 
King  (No.  1),  23  W.  R.  535.  (1867)  273.     As  to  substituted  service  in  the 

2  5  Beav.  391;  and  see  Heald  v.  Hay,  9  VV.  case  of  absconding  defendants,  see  Cook  v. 
R.  369,  V.  C.  S.;  Hope  v.  Carnegie,  L.  R.  1  Dey,  2  Ch.  D.  218;  Crane  v.  Jullion,  ib.  220; 
Eq.  126,  V.  C.  S.;  Kees  v.  Braidley,  22  L.T.N.  Whitehaven  Bank  v.  Thompson,  W.  N.  (1877) 
S.  470;  Ridsdale  Allanlee  v.  Great  Western  Ry.  45,  and  2  Seton,  1623;  Wolverhampton  & 
Co.  W.  N.  (1869),  269;  2  Seton,  1622.  No.  2;  Staffordshire  Banking  Co.  v.  Bond,  W.  N. 
Dymond  t>.  Croft,  3  Ch.  D.  512.  Substituted  (1881)  6;  29  W.  R  599;  Mullows  v.  Bannister, 
service  has  also  been  ordered  on  the  defendants'  W.  N.  (1882),  183;  S.  C.  nom.  Mellows  v. 
London  agent  and  solicitor  in  another  suit  which  Bannister,  31  W.  R.  238;  Coulburn  v.  Carshaw, 
was  ended.  Anderson  v.  Lewis,  3  Bro.  C.  C.  32  W.  R.  33;  Hamilton  v.  Davies,  W.  N. 
505;  Gardiner  v.  Mason,  4  id.  478;  5  Sim.  506;  (1880),  82;  R.  S.  C.  1883,  Ord.  XI. 

and  see  Waterton  v.  Croft,  5  Sim.  502,  507. 
448 


SERVICE   OF   THE    COPY    OF   THE    BILL.  *  449 

The  Court,  in  the  exercise  of  its  discretion,  has  by  special  order  per- 
mitted various  other  modes  of  substituted  service  to  be  adopted.  Thus, 
service  at  the  last  place  of  abode  of  the  defendant's  wife  has  been  or- 
dered to  be  good  service.6  So,  service  by  sending  the  document  under 
cover  to  the  person  to  whom  the  defendant  had  directed  his  letters  to  be 
sent,  has  been  permitted.7  Again,  in  the  case  of  infants,  substituted  ser- 
vice upon  the  mother,  in  one  case,8  and  upon  the  father-in-law  in  another,9 
was  ordered  to  be  good  service ;  and  where  the  infant  was  taken  out  of 
the  jurisdiction  by  his  parents  in  order  to  prevent  personal  service, 
service  on  the  parents'  solicitor  was  directed  to  be  good  service  on  the 
infant.10 

*  Whenever  an  order  is  made  for  substituted  service,  such  order  *  449 
must  be  served  at  the  same  time  that  the  bill  is  served,  and  it 
must  be  stated  in  the  order  that  it  is  to  be  served ; *  care  must  also  be 
taken  that  the  service  is  effected  in  strict  accordance  with  the  terms  of 
the  order,  and  it  will  then  have  the  same  effect  as  ordinary  service.2  The 
application  for  the  order  is  made  by  an  ex  parte  motion,  or  summons ; 3 
and  must  be  supported  by  an  affidavit  showing  what  efforts  have  been 
made  to  serve  the  defendant,  that  all  practicable  means  of  doing  so  have 
been  exhausted,4  that  no  appearance  has  been  entered,  and  how  the 
substituted  service  is  proposed  to  be  effected.5 

It  would  seem  that  the  Court  had  no  authority,  under  its  original 
jurisdiction,  to  serve  process  upon  any  defendant,  whether  a  natural 
born  subject  or  not,  who  was  residing  out  of  the  territorial  limits  of  its 
jurisdiction,  unless,  indeed,  the  defendant  was  shown  to  have  absconded 
to  avoid  such  service.6     Such  power  has,  however,  been  conferred  on  it 


«  Pulteney  v.  Shelton,  5  Ves.  147;  and  see  11  W.  R.  868,  M.  R.  ;  but  see  Dicker  v.  Clarke, 

Manchester  "and  Stafford  Ry.  Co.  v.  How.  17  11  W.  R.  765,  V.  C.  K. 

Jur.  617,  V.  C    \V. ;  15  &16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  5,  8  Reed  v.  Barton,  4  W.  R.  793,  V.  C.  W.  ; 

ante,  p.  445.  Re  Boyer,  3  Jur.  N.  S.  930;  see  1  Dan.  Ch! 

7  Hunt  v.  Lever,  5  Ves.  147;  but  see  Gather-  Prac.  (6th  Eng.  ed.)  339.  For  form  of  motion 
cole  v.  Wilkinson,  1   De  G.  &  S.  681;  11  Jur.  paper,  see  Vol.  III. 

1096.     As  to  service  by  advertisement,  see  2  4  Firth  v.  Bush,  9  Jur.  N.  S.  431;  11  W.  R. 

Seton,   1623;  Capes  v.  Brewer,  W.    N.  (1875)  611,  V.  C.  K.;  and   see   Barker  v.  Piele,    ll 

193;  24  W.  R.  40;  Waters  v.  Waters,  24  W.  R.  W.  R.  658,  V.  C.  K.;  Brooker  v.  Smith,  4  L.  T. 

90;  Whitley  v.  Honeywell,  id.  851;  Raphael  v.  N.  S.  545 ;  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  X. 

Ongley.  34  L.  T.  124;  O'Sheehy  v.  O'Sheehy,  5  For  form  of  affidavit,  see  Vol.  III. 

31  L.  T.  367;  2  Seton,  1622,  No.  2;  R.  S.  C.  6  Per   Lord    Westbury,   L.   C,  Cookney  v. 

Ord.  1880,  Sch.  H.  19.  Anderson,  1  De  G.  J.  &S.  365,  382;  31  Beav. 

8  Baker  v.  Holmes,  1  Dick.  18;  and  see  Gar-  452;  and  see  Foley  v.  Maillardet,  1  De  G.  J. 
num  v.  Marshal,  ib.  77;  S.  C.  nom.  Smith  v.  &  S.  389;  10  Jur.  N.  S.  161;  Samuel  v.  Rogers, 
Marshall,  2  Atk.  70;  Clark  v.  Waters,  V.  C  S.  1  De  G.  J.  &  S.  396;  Norris  v.  Cotterill,  5 
cited,  1  Smith'3  Pr.  378;  Hope  v.  Carnegie,  N.  R.  215,  V.  C.  W.  See  now  R.  S.  C.  Ord. 
L.  R.  1  Eq.  126,  V.  C.  S.;  and  see  in  case  of  XL  4,  6;  Bree  v.  Marescaux,  7  Q.  B.  D.  434  ; 
petitions,  Re   Blackwood,  W.  N.  (1867),  114.  Re  E'ger,   Eager  V,  Johnstone,  22  Ch.  D.  86; 

9  Thompson  v.  Jones,  8  Ves.  141.  See  ante,  Lenders  v.  Anderson,  12  Q.  B.  D.  50  ;  Speller 
444,  n.  6.  v.  Bristol  Steam  Nav.  Co.  13  id.  96;  Shearman 

10  Lane  v.  Hurdwicke,  5  Beav.  222;  see  Hope  v.  Findley,  22  W.  R.   122.     Where  leave  was 

v.  Hope,  supra.  given  to  serve  process  out  of  the  jurisdiction, 

1  Jones  v.  Brandon,  2  Jur.  N.  S.  437,  the  service  was  useless  urless  the  defendant 
V.  C.  W.  For  form,  see  2  Seton,  1622,  Nos.  entered  an  appearance,  for  no  subsequent  pro- 
1-3,  No.  4.  ceeding  could  be  based  upon  it.     Cookney  v. 

2  Wilcoxon  v.  Wilkins,  9  Jur.  N.  S.  742;  Anderson,  31   Beav.  452,  468;  1  De  G.  J.  &  S. 

vol.  i.  —  29  449 


*  449        COMPELLING   APPEARANCE.  —  PROCEEDINGS   IN   DEFAULT. 


by  statute,  in  all  cases  in  which  a  suit  has  been  instituted  concerning 
lands,  tenements,  or  hereditaments  situate  in  England  or  Wales,  or 
concerning  any  charge,  lien,  judgment,  or  incumbrance  thereon,  or  con- 
cerning any  money  vested  in  any  Government  or  other  public  stock, 
or  public  shares  in  public  companies  or  concerns,7  or  the  dividends  or 
produce  thereof.8 


363;  and  see  note  to  Shaw  v.  Lindsay,  18  Ves. 
(2d  ed.)  490;  Fernandez  v.  Corbin,  2  Sim.  544; 
Davidson  v.  Marchioness  of  Hastings,  2  Keen, 
509,  616;  Whitmore  v.  Ryan,  4  Hare,  612,  615; 
10  Jur.  368. 

See  Flower  v.  Baker,  3  Mason,  251;  Wil- 
son v.  Graham,  4  Wash.  C.  C.  53;  Dunn  v. 
Dunn,  4  Paige,  425;  Moore  v.  Gennett,  2  Tenn. 
Ch.  375.     Ante,  443,  n.  2. 

7  See  Official  Manager  of  the  National 
Association  v.  Carstairs,  9  Jur.  N.  S.  955;  11 
W.  R.  866,  M.  R.  See  R..yal  Mail  Packet  Co. 
v.  Braham,  2  App.  Cas.  381;  Ingate  v.  Lloyd 
Austriaco,  4  C.  B.  N.  S.  704;  Scott  v.  Royal 
Wax  Candle  Co.  1  Q.  B.  D.  404. 

8  2  &  3  Will.  IV.  c.  33,  §  1;  4  &  5  Will. 
IV.  c.  82,  §  1.  By  the  statutes  it  is  enacted  : 
First,  that  in  any  such  suit,  upon  special 
motion,  the  Court  may  order  and  direct  that 
service  in  any  part  of  Great  Britain,  or  Ireland, 
or  in  the  Isle  of  Man,  shall  be  deemed  good 
service  upon  the  defendants,  on  such  terms,  in 
such  manner,  and  at  such  time  as  to  the  Court 
shall  seem  reasonable.  2  &  3  Will.  IV.  c.  33, 
§  1.  This  Act  extends  to  Scotland.  Cameron 
v.  Cameron,  2  M.  &  K.  289,  292;  limes  v. 
Mitchell,  4  Drew.  141;  1  De  G.  &  J.  423; 
Maclean  v.  Dawson,  4  De  G.  &  J.  150;  5  Jur. 
N.  S.  063;  and  see,  for  cases  under  this  Act, 
Hasluck  v.  Stewart,  6  Sim.  321 ;  Anderson  v. 
Stather,  10  Jur.  383,  L.  C.  ;  Turner  t.  Sowden, 
12  W.  R.  522,  V.  C.  K.,  where  service  on  an 
infant  was  allowed.  Suits  commenced  by 
summons  are  within  the  Acts.  Cohen  v.  Alcan, 
1  De  G.  J.  &  S.  398 ;  10  Jur.  N.  S.  531,  over- 
ruling  Lester  v.  Bond,  1  Dr.  &  S.  392;  7  Jur. 
N.  S.  538.  Secondly,  that  in  any  such  suit  of 
the  same  description,  in  case  the  defendant  or 
defendants  shall  appear  by  affidavit  to  be 
resident  in  any  specified  place  out  of  the 
United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland, 
the  Court  may,  upon  open  motion  of  any  of 
the  complainants  in  any  such  suit,  founded 
upon  an  affidavit  or  affidavits,  and  such  other 
documents  as  may  be  applicable  for  the  pur- 
pose of  ascertaining  the  residence  of  the  party, 
and  the  particulars  material  to  identify  such 
part}'  and  his  residence,  and  also  specifying  the 
means  whereby  such  service  may  be  authenti- 
cated, and  especially  whether  there  are  any 
British  officers,  civil  or  military,  appointed  by 
or  serving  under  her  Majesty,  residing  at  or 
near  such  place,  order  that  service  of  the  bill 
upon  the  partv,  in  manner  by  the  order  directed, 

450 


or  in  case  where  the  Court  ma}'  deem  fit,  upon 
the  receiver,  steward,  or  other  person  receiving 
'or  remitting  the  rents  of  the  lands  or  premises, 
if  any,  in  the  suit  mentioned,  returnable  at 
such  time  as  the  said  Court  shall  direct,  shall 
be  deemed  good  service  upon  such  party.  4  &  5 
Will.  IV.  c.  82,  §  2  ;  see,  for  cases  under  this 
Act,  Godson  v.  Cook,  7  Sim.  519 ;  Parker  r. 
Lloyd,  5  Sim.  508,  510;  Dodd  v.  Webber,  2 
Beav.  502;  Green  v.  Pledyer,  3  Hare,  165,  163; 
Cox  v.  Bannister,  8  W.  R".  206,  M.  R.;  Official 
Manager  v.  Carstairs,  9  Jur.  N.  S.  955 ;  11 
W.  R.  866,  M.  R.  The  Acts  provided  for  the 
service  of  the  subpoena  to  appear  to  and  answer 
the  bill;  but  now,  a  properly  stamped  and 
indorsed  copy  of  the  bill  must  be  served.  15 
&  16  Vic.  c.  86  §  3,  ante,  pp.  439-441.  Thirdly, 
that  if  it  shall  be  made  to  appear  by  affidavit 
that  any  defendant,  in  any  such  suit,  cannot 
by  reasonable  diligence  be  personally  served 
with  the  bill,  or  that,  upon  inquiry,  at  his 
usual  place  of  abode,  he  could  not  be  found,  so 
as  to  be  served  with  such  process,  and  that 
there  is  just  ground  for  believing  that  such 
defendant  secretes  or  withdraws  himself,  so  as 
to  avoid  being  served  with  the  process  of  the 
Court,  then  and  in  all  such  cases,  the  Court 
may  order  that  the  service  of  the  bill  shall  be 
substituted  in  such  manner  as  the  Court  shall 
think  reasonable,  and  direct  by  such  order. 
4  &  5  Will.  IV.  c.  82,  §  2 ;  and  see  15  &  16 
Vic.  c.  86,  §  5;  ante,  p.  446  ;  11  Geo.  IV.  &  1 
Will.  IV.  c.  36,  §§  3,  9;  Cons.  Ord.  X.6;  post, 
pp.  456-459.  -There  is  also  a  General  Order  of 
the  Court  which  provides,  that  where  a  defend- 
ant in  any  suit  is  out  of  the  jurisdiction,  the 
Court  may,  upon  application,  supported  by  such 
evidence  as  shall  satisfy  the  Court  in  what 
place  or  country  such  defendant  is  or  nfty 
probably  be  found,  order  that  a  copy  of  the  bill 
under  the  stat.  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  3,  and,  if 
an  answer  is  required,  a  copy  of  the  interroga- 
tories may  be  served  on  such  defendant  in 
such  place  or  country,  or  within  such  limits,  as 
the  Court  shall  think  fit  to  direct;  and  that 
such  order  shall  limit  a  time  after  such  service 
within  which  such  defendant  is  to  appear  to  the 
bill:  such  time  to  depend  on  the  place  or 
country  within  which  the  copy  of  the  bill  is  to 
be  served  ;  and  where  an  answer  is  required 
such  order  shall  also  limit  a  time  within  which 
such  defendant  is  to  plead,  answer,  or  demur, 
or  obtain  from  the  Court  further  time  to  make 
his  defence  to  the  bill ;  and  that  at  the  time 


SERVICE    OF   THE   COPY    OF   THE   BILL. 


452 


♦Where  it  is  sought  to  serve  the  bill  out  of  the  jurisdiction,     *451 
it  is  usual,  and  in  most  cases  desirable,   to  apply  for   leave  to 
serve  interrogatories  to  the  bill  at  the  same  time  ; x  indeed,  if  it  should  be 
necessary  to  take  the  bill  pro  confesso  against  the  defendant  out  of  the 
jurisdiction,  it  cannot  be  done  unless  interrogatories  have  been  served.2 

The  application  for  leave  to  effect  service  out  of  the  jurisdiction,  is 
made  by  an  ex  parte  motion,  or  by  summons  at  Chambers.8  The  affidavits 
in  support  must  show  the  place  of  residence  at  the  time  the  application 
is  made,  or  as  near  thereto  as  is  practicable ; 4  and  an  affidavit  showing 
that  the  defendant  was  resident  at  Calais,  seven  weeks  previously  to  the 
application,  was  held  insufficient;5  but  the  affidavit  need  not,  it  seems, 
show  more  than  the  country  in  which  the  defendant  resides.6 

*  It  is  not  necessary  to  show,  by  affidavit,  that  the  circumstances     *452 
are  such  as  to  warrant  the  order.1     The  Court  may  look  at  the 
pleadings  for  that  purpose  ; 2  and,  if  necessary,  may  go  into  the  merits  of 
the  case  ;  it  being  always  in  the  discretion  of  the  Court  whether  to  grant  or 
refuse  the  application  ; 3  but  it  acts  on  &  prima  facie  case  being  made  out.4 

2  Post,  Chap.  XI.  Taking  Bills  pro  confesso. 

3  For  form  of  order,  see  2  Seton,  1623,  No. 
4;  and  for  forms  of  motion  paper  and  sum- 
mons, see  Vol.  HI.  Leave  of  Court  or  a  Judge, 
is  necessary.     R.  S.  C.  Ord.  XI.  2. 

4  Preston  v.  Dickinson,  9  Jur.  919;  7  Beav. 
582,  n. 

*  Fieske  v.  Buller,  7  Beav.  581. 

6  Blenkinsopp  v.  Blenkinsopp,  8  Beav.  612; 
2  Phil.  1 :  C.  P.  Coop.  temp.  Cott.  20;  Preston  v. 
Dickinson,  ubi  supra;  Biddulph  v.  Lord  Camovs, 
7  Beav.  580;  10  Jur.  485.  For  form  of  affidavits, 
see  Vol.  III. 

1  See  now  2  Seton,  1621;  R.  S.  C.  Ord. 
XI.  1  a;  Great  Australian  Gold  M.  Co.  v. 
Martin,   5   Ch.    D.    1:    Woods  v.   M'Innes,    4 

C.  P.  D.  67  ;  Casey  v.  Arnott,  1  id.  24 ;  Fowler 
v.  Barstow,  20  Ch.  D.  240;  Harris  v.  Fleming, 
13  Ch.  D.  208;  1  Dan.  Ch.  Prac.  (6th  Eng. 
ed.)  341. 

2  Blenkinsopp  v.  Blenkinsopp,  ubi  supra  ; 
Maclean  v.  Dawson,  4  De  G.  &  J.  150;  5  Jur. 
N.  S.  663;  Official  Manager  of  National  As- 
sociation v.  Carstairs,  9  Jur.  N.  S.955;  11  W. 
R.  866,  M.  R.;  Steele  v.  Stuart,  1  II.  &  M. 
793;  10  Jur.  N.  S.  15;  Foley  V.  Maillardet, 
1  De  G.  J.  &  S.  389;  10  Jur.  N.  S.  161 ;  Ha- 
warden  r.  Dun  lop,  2  Dr.  &  S.  155;  Norris  v. 
Cotterill,  5  N.  R.  215,  V.  C.  W. 

3  Lewis  o.  Baldwin,  11  Beav.  153,  158; 
Whitmore  v.  Ryan,  4  Hare,  612,  617;  10  Jur. 
368;  Innes  v.  Mitchell,  4  Drew.  141;  3  Jur. 
N.  S.  991;  1  De  G.  &  J.  423;  Cook  v.  Wood,  7 
W.  R.  424,  V.  C.  K. ;  Maclean  v.  Dawson,  27 
Beav.  25:  4  De  G.  &  J.  150;  5  Jur.  N.  S.  663; 
Societe  G£ne>ale  v.  Dreyfus  Brothers,  29  Ch. 

D.  239. 

4  Maclean  v.  Dawson,  ubi  supra  ;  Meiklan  v. 
Campbell,  24  Beav.  100.  The  plaintiff  takes 
the  order  at  his  own  risk.  Brooks  v.  Morison, 
32  Beav.  652. 

451 


when  such  copy  of  the  bill  shall  be  served,  the 
plaintiff  shall  also  cause  the  defendant  to  be 
served  with  a  copy  of  the  order  giving  the 
plaintiff  leave  to  serve  such  copy  of  the  bill. 
Cons.  Ord.  X.  7  (1),  (2),  (3).  The  "above  Acts  of 
Parliament  apply  to  suits  of  a  particular  kind, 
and  fetter  the  exercise  of  the  privilege  by 
certain  restrictions;  but  the  language  of  the 
above  General  Order  applies  to  suits  of  all 
descriptions,  and  in  some  respects  dispenses 
■with  the  provisions  which  the  Legislature  had 
required.  It  was  formerly  considered,  that  the 
General  Order  enabled  the  Court  to  direct 
service  on  a  defendant  who  had  neither  a 
domicile  nor  property  within  the  jurisdiction, 
and  in  any  suit  whatever.  This  interpretation 
of  the  General  Order  was  acted  upon  for  a 
long  series  of  years;  Whitmore  v.  Ryan,  4  Hare, 
612,617;  10Jur.368;  Blenkinsopp* v.  Blenkin- 
sopp, 2  Phil.  1  ;  1  C.  P.  Coop.  temp.  Cott.  20; 
8  Beav.  612;  Steele  v.  Stuart,  1  H.  &  M.  713, 
796;  10  Jur.  N.  S.  15;  Curtiss  v.  Grant, 9  Jur. 
N.  S.  766,  M.  R.;  but  later  it  was  overruled,  on 
the  ground  that  the  General  Order  only  applies 
to  the  cases  within  the  Acts  above  referred  to; 
and  it  has  been  held,  that  the  statutes  3  &  4 
Vic.  c.  94;  5  Vic.  c.  6,  §  29;  15  &  16  Vic. 
c.  86,  §  63,  enabling  the  Court  to  make  altera- 
tions in  forms  and  mode  of  proceeding,  do  not 
empower  the  Court  to  sanction  the  service 
of  the  bill  out  of  the  jurisdiction,  except  in 
cases  within  the  Acts.  Cooknev  v.  Anderson, 
1  DeG.  J.  &S.  365;  9  Jur.  N.S.  736;  Foley 
t\  Maillardet,  1  De  G.  J.  &  S.  389;  10  Jur. 
N.  S.  161;  Samuel  v.  Rogers,  1  De  G.  J.  &  S. 
396;  Norris  v.  Cotterill,  5  N.  R.  215.  V.  C.  W.; 
but  see  contra,  Drummond  v.  Drummond.  L. 
R.  2  Eq.  335;  affirmed,  L.  R.  2  Ch.  32;  Cory 
v.  Jacobsen,  W.  N.  (1866)  290,  V.  C.  K. 

1  Leaman  v.  Brown,  7  W.  R.  322,  V.  C.  K.; 
see  post,  Chap.  IX.,  Interrogatories. 


*  453        COMPELLING    APPEARANCE.  —  PROCEEDINGS   IN   DEFAULT. 

Leave  may  be  granted  to  serve  infants,5  and  persons  of  unsound  mind.6 
out  of  the  jurisdiction  ;  and  upon  such  service,  guardians  ad  litem  will 
be  appointed ;  and  a  husband  out  of  the  jurisdiction  may  be  served  for 
himself  and  his  wife.7  Where  the  fact  of  the  marriage  is  in  dispute, 
leave  will  be  granted  to  serve  them  separately.8  Where  a  father  and  his 
infant  children  were  living  together  out  of  the  jurisdiction,  it  was  held, 
that  a  separate  copy  must  be  served  on  each.9 

The  order  giving  leave  to  make  the  service  out  of  the  jurisdiction  must 
be  served  with  the  copy  of  the  bill ; 10  and  this  requirement  is  expressed 
in  the  order  itself.11  If  no  directions  to  the  contrary  are  given  by  the 
order,  the  service  should  be  effected  by  serving  the  copy  of  the  bill  and 
a  copy  of  the  order  on  the  defendant  personally,  or  by  leaving  the  same 
with  his  servant,  or  some  member  of  his  family,  at  his  dwelling-house  or 
usual  place  of  abode,12  within  the  limits  defined  by  the  order.  The  order 
fixes  the  times  after  service  of  the  bill  within  which  the  defendant  is  to 
appear,  and  also,  if  an  answer  is  required,  the  time  after  service  of  the 
interrogatories  within  which  the  defendant  is  to  plead,  answer,  or  demur, 
not  demurring  alone,  or  obtain  from  the  Court  further  time  to  make  his 
defence  to  the  bill ; 13  but  it  is  not  necessary  to  fix  any  time  for  his 
demurring  alone  ;  such  time  being  the  same  as  in  cases  where  the 
defendant  is  served  within  the  jurisdiction.14 

These  times  are  fixed  by  the  Registrar ;  and,  as  a  general  rule, 
*453  *  twice  the  time  it  ordinarily  takes  to  reach  the  place  where  the 
defendant  is  residing  is  allowed  for  appearing,  and  twice  that 
time  for  answering.1  The  times  so  fixed  should  be  inserted  in  the 
indorsement  on  the  bill,  instead  of  the  time  inserted  there  when  the 
bill  is  to  be  served  within  the  jurisdiction.2 

Where  a  defendant  has  been  served  out  of  the  jurisdiction  under  this 
order,  he  cannot  be  attached  for  want  of  appearance,  upon  his  coming 
within  the  jurisdiction.3 

A  defendant,  on  being  served  with  the  bill,  may  enter  an  appearance 
at  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerks'  Office,4  whereupon  the  suit  will  be  pros- 
ecuted against  him  in  the  ordinary  way  ;  or  he  may  move,  on  notice  to 
the  plaintiff,  to  set  aside  such  service  for  irregularity.6   Before,  however, 

5  Anderson  v.  Stather,  10  Jur.  383;  L.  C.  "  Brown  v.  Stanton,  7  Beav.  582;  Preston 
Turner  v.  Sowden,  12  W.  R.  522;  13  W.  R.  v.  Dickinson,  ib.  n. ;  Blenkinsopp  t>.  Blenkin- 
66;  10  Jur.  N.  S.  1122,  V.  C.  K.;  S.  C.  nom.  sopp,  8  Beav.  612;  Griining  v.  Prioleau,  10 
Turner  v.  Snowden,  2  Dr.  &  Sm.  256.  Jur.  N.  S.  60;  12  W.  R.  141,  M.  R. ;    33  Beav. 

6  Biddulph  v.  Lord  Camoys,  7  Beav.  580;  10  221. 

Jur.  485.  l  Seton,    1245;    Chatfield   v.  Berchtoldt,   9 

1  Jones  v.  Geddes,  9  Jur.  1002,  V.  C.  E. ;  Hare  App.  28. 
Steele  v.  Plomer,  2  Phil.  782,  n. ;  1  MN.  &  G.  2  Baynes  v.  Ridge,  9  Hare  App.  27;  1  W.  R. 

83.  99  ;  Chatfield  v.  Berchtoldt,  ubi  supra  ;  Sharpe 

8  Longworth  v.  Bellamy,  M.  R.  cited  Seton,  v.  Blondeau,  1  W.  R.  100,  V.  C.  K.,  cited  9 
1245.  Hare  App.  27.     For  form  of  indorsement,  see 

9  Jones  j>.  Geddes,  ubi  supra.  Vol.  III. 

1°  Cons.  Ord.  X.  7  (3);  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  XL  4.  s  Hackwood  v.  Lockerby,  7  De  G.  M.  &  G. 

M  For  form,  see  2  Seton,  1623.  238;   and  see  Penfold  v.  Kelly,  12  W.  R.  286, 

12  Cons.  Ord.  X.  1;  Braithwaite's  Pr.  33.  V.  C.  K. 

18  Ibid. ;  Ord.  X.  7  (2).    The  interrogatories  *  See  post,  Chap.  XIIL,  Appearance. 

mav  be  served  with  the  bill.    Leaman  v.  Brown,  6  Maclean   v.   Dawson,  27  Beav.  25;  4'De 

7  W.  R.  322.  V.  C.  K.  G.  &  J.  150;  5  Jur.  N.  S.  663;  Official  Man- 
452 


SERVICE  OF  THE  COPY  OF  THE  BILL.  *  454 

he  can  so  move,  he  must  enter  what  is  called  a  conditional  appearance, 
with  the  Registrar.6 

Where  the  plaintiff  has  introduced  into  the  bill  statements,  as  to  the 
subject-matter  of  the  suit,  that  bring  it  within  the  Acts  authorizing  ser- 
vice out  of  the  jurisdiction,  the  defendant  may,  on  the  motion  to  discharge 
the  order,  read  affidavits  disproving  such  statements.7 

All  orders,  writs,  and  other  proceedings  upon  which  process  of  con- 
tempt may  afterwards  be  issued,  require,  in  general,  what  is  called 
personal  service.8  The  same  strictness  is  not,  however,  necessary  for 
the  service  of  notice  of  ordinary  proceedings  in  the  cause  ;  and  it  will 
be  convenient  here  to  state  the  manner  in  which  service  of  such  pro- 
ceedings is  effected. 

Every  solicitor  of  a  party  suing  or  defending  by  a  solicitor  must  cause 
to  be  written  or  printed  upon  every  writ  or  summons  which  he  sues  out, 
and  upon  every  bill,9  demurrer,  plea,  answer,  or  other  pleading 
or  proceeding,  and  all  exceptions  which  he  may  leave  *  with  the  *  454 
Clerks  of  Record  and  Writs  to  be  filed,  and  upon  all  instructions 
which  he  may  give  to  them  for  any  appearance  or  other  purpose,  his  name 
or  firm,  and  place  of  business,  and  also  (if  his  place  of  business  shall  be 
more  than  three  miles  from  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerks'  Office)  another 
proper  place  (to  be  called  his  address  for  service),  which  shall  not  be 
more  than  three  miles  from  that  office,  where  writs,  notices,  orders, 
summonses,  warrants,  and  other  documents,  proceedings,  and  written 
communications  may  be  left  for  him.  And  where  any  such  solicitor 
shall  only  be  the  agent  of  any  other  solicitor,  he  must  add  to  his  own 
name  or  firm,  and  place  of  business,  the  name  or  firm,  and  place  of  busi- 
ness, of  the  principal  solicitor.1 

A  party  suing  or  defending  by  a  solicitor  is  not  at  liberty  to  change 
his  solicitor,  in  any  cause  or  matter,  without  an  order  of  the  Court  for 
that  purpose  ;  which  may  be  obtained  by  motion  or  petition  as  of  course  ;  2 
and  until  such  order  is  obtained  and  served,  and  notice  thereof  given  to 

ager  of   National  Association   v.   Carstairs,    9  see  Index,  Appearance  ;  for  form  of  order  and 

Jur.  N.  S.  955;  11  W.  K.  866,  M.  R. ;   Foley  appearance,   see  Seton,    1249,   No.  6;   and  for 

v.  Maillardet,  10  Jur.  N.  S.  34;  id.  161  ;   1  De  form  of  motion  paper,  see  Vol.  III. 
G.  J.  &  S-  389 ;   Steele  v.  Smart,  1  H.  &  M.  ^  Foley  v.  Maillardet,  1  De  G.  J.  &  S.  389  ; 

793;   10  Jur.  N.  S.  15;   see  Braithwaite's  Pr.  10  Jur.  N.  S.  161;  and  see  Official  Manager  of 

321,  and  for  forms  of  notice  of  motion,  and  affi-  National  Association  v.  Carstairs,  9  Jur.  N.  S. 

davit  in  support,  see  Vol.  III.     For  the  present  955,  11  W.  R.  866,  M.  R. 

English  practice,  see  1  Dan.   Ch.    Prac.   (6th  8  In  such  cases,  personal  service  is,  however, 

Eng.  ed.)  342,  344.  sometimes  dispensed  with.    Rider  v.  Kidder,  12 

6  Mackreth    v.    Nicholson,    19    Ves.    367;  Ves.  202  ;  De  Manneville  v.  De  Manneville,  id. 

Davidson  v.  Marchioness  of  Hastings,  2  Keen,  203;  see  post,  p.  1685. 

509;  Johnson   v.  Barnes,  1   De  G.   &  S.  129;  9  This  includes  an  information.     Prel.  Ord. 

Lewis  v.  Baldwin,  11  Beav.  153,  154;    Maclean  X.  (4). 

v.  Dawson,  ubi  supi-a  ;  Foley  v.  Maillardet,  ubi  l  Cons.  Ord.  III.  2;  and  see  ante,  p.  397. 

supra  ;  but  see  Betts  v.  Barton,  3  Jur.  N.  S.  154,  2  The  application  is  almost  invariably  made 

V.  C.  W.    The  appearance  is  entered  under  an  by  petition;   see  post,  Chap.  XLIV.,  Solicitors. 

order,  which  is  obtained  on  an  ex  parte  motion,  The  application  should  not  be  made  as  of  course( 

or  on  petition  of  course  at  the  Rolls.     By  the  when   the  plaintiff  in  a  creditor's  suit,  whose 

order  the  defendant  must,  by  his  counsel,  sub-  debt  is  small,  sells  his  debt  after  decree.     Top- 

mit  to  any  process  which  the  Court  may  direct  ping  v.  Searson,  2  H.  &  M.  205.     For  forms  of 

to  issue  against  him  on  the  appearance.     For  motion  paper  and  petition,  see  Vol.  III. 
the  mode  of  entering  a  conditional  appearance, 

453 


*  455        COMPELLING    APPEARANCE.  —  PROCEEDINGS   IN   DEFAULT. 

the  Clerk  of  Records  and  Writs,  the  former  solicitor  is  considered  the 
solicitor  of  the  party.8 

Where  a  party  sues  or  defends  by  a  solicitor,  and  no  address  for 
service  of  such  solicitor  has  been  written  or  printed,  pursuant  to  the 
directions  of  the  General  Order,4  all  writs,  notices,  orders,  summonses, 
warrants,  and  other  documents,  proceedings,  and  written  communica- 
tions, not  requiring  personal  service  upon  the  party  to  be  affected 
thereby,  are,  unless  the  Court  shall  otherwise  direct,  to  be  deemed 
sufficiently  served  upon  the  party,  if  served  upon  his  solicitor,  at  his 
place  of  business;  but  if  an  address  for  service  of  such  solicitor  shall 
have  been  written  or  printed  as  aforesaid,  then  all  such  writs,  notices, 
orders,  summonses,  warrants,  and  other  documents,  proceedings,  and 
written  communications,  are  to  be  deemed  sufficiently  served  upon  such 
party,  if  left  for  his  solicitor,  at  such  address  for  service.5 

Every  party  suing  or  defending  in  person,  must  cause  to  be  writ- 

*  455    ten  or  printed  upon  every  writ  which  he  sues  out,  and  upon  *  every 

bill,1  demurrer,  plea,  answer,  or  other  pleading  or  proceeding,  and 
all  exceptions,  which  he  may  leave  with  the  Clerks  of  Records  and  Writs 
to  be  filed,  and  upon  all  instructions  which  he  may  give  to  them  for  any 
appearance  or  other  purpose,  his  name  and  place  of  residence,  and  also 
(if  his  place  of  residence  shall  be  more  than  three  miles  from  the  Record 
and  Writ  Clerks'  Office),  another  proper  place  (to  be  called  his  address 
for  service),  which  shall  not  be  more  than  three  miles  from  that  office, 
where  writs,  notices,  orders,  summonses,  warrants,  and  other  documents, 
proceedings,  and  written  communications  may  be  left  for  him.2 

Where  a  party  sues  or  defends  in  person,  and  no  address  for  service 
of  such  party  has  been  written  or  printed,  pursuant  to  the  direction  of 
the  General  Order,8  or  where  a  party  has  ceased  to  have  a  solicitor,  all 
writs,  notices,  orders,  summonses,  warrants,  and  other  documents,  pro- 
ceedings, and  written  communications,  not  requiring  personal  service 
upon  the  party  to  be  affected  thereby,  are,  unless  the  Court  shall  other- 
wise direct,  to  be  deemed  to  be  sufficiently  served  upon  such  party,  if 
served  upon  him  personally  or  at  his   place  of   residence ;  but  if  an 

s  Cons.   Orel.  III.  3;  Davidson  v.  Leslie,  9  5  Cons.  Ord.  III.  4.     Service,  in  a  supple- 

Beav.  104;  Wright  v.  King,  ib.  161.     This  or-  mental  suit,  upon  the  solicitor  in  the  original 

<ler  was  held  not  to  apply  where  the  suit  was  suit,    has   been   held   good    service.     Scott   v. 

at  an  end,  and  a  petition  was  presented  by  a  Wheeler,  13  Beav.  239;  see  also  Hart  v.  Tulk, 

new  solicitor  for  payment  out  of  a  fund  carried  6  Hare,  618;  Norton  v.  Hempworth,  1  M'N.  & 

to  a  separate  account.     Waddilove  v.  Taylor,  G.  54;  13  Jur.  244;  Bligh  v.  Tredgett,  5  De  G. 

12  Jur.  598,  V.  C.  W.     Where  there  has  been  &  S.  74;    15  Jur.  1101. 

any  special  contract  as  to  employment  of  solici-  J  This  includes  an  information.     Prel.  Ord. 

tor,  the  order  to  chmge  is  not  of  course.     Jen-  X.  (4). 

kins  v.  Bryant,  3  Drew.  70;  Richards  v.  Scar-  2  Cons.  Ord.  III.  5;    see  Price  v.  Webb,  2 

borough  Market  Co.  17  Beav.  83.     And   see,  Hare, 511,  513;  Johnson  v.  Barnes,  1  De  G.  &  S. 

as  to  this  order,  Ward  v.  Swift,  6  Hare,  309,  129;   11  Jur.  261.    Where  the  solicitor  for  any 

311.     Service  of  notice  of  motion  at  solicitor's  party,  or  any  party  suing  or  defending  in  person, 

address  for  service  held  sufficient,  although  the  changes  his   residence  or  address   for  service, 

office  was  untenanted ;  the  solicitor  having  ab-  notice  thereof  should  be  given  to  the  Clerk  of 

sconded,  and  the  party  being  out  of  the  juris-  Records  and  Writs,  and  also  to  each  solicitor 

diction.     Reuben  v.  Thompson,  16  Jur.  1008,  concerned  in  the  cause.     Braithwaite's  Pr.  10. 

V.  C.  T.  For  form  of  notice,  see  Vol.  III. 

*  Cons.  Ord.  III.  2.  8  Cons.  Ord.  III.  5. 

454 


WHERE   NO    SERVICE   OF   COPY   OF   BILL   CAN   BE    EFFECTED.    *  456 

address  for  service  of  such  party  shall  have  been  written  or  printed  as 
aforesaid,  then  all  such  writs,  notices,  orders,  summonses,  warrants,  and 
other  documents,  proceedings,  and  written  communications,  shall  be 
deemed  sufficiently  served  upon  such  party,  if  left  for  him  at  such  address 
for  service.4 

Where  the  solicitor  of  a  party  dies,  the  other  side  may  sue  out  a  sub- 
poena against  him  to  name  a  new  solicitor ; 5  and  it  seems  that  substituted 
service  of  this  subpoena  will  be  ordered,  in  a  proper  case.6 

Service  of  all  writs,  notices,  summonses,  orders,  warrants,  documents, 
and  other  proceedings,  not  requiring  personal  service7  upon  the  party 
to  be  affected  thereby,  is  to  be  made  before  seven  o'clock  in  the  evening; 
except  on.  Saturday,  when  it  is  to  be  made  before  two  o'clock  in  the 
afternoon ;  and  if  made  after  seven  o'clock  in  the  evening  on  any  day 
except  Saturday,  the  service  is  to  be  deemed  as  made  on  the  fol- 
lowing day ;  and  if  made  after  two  *  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  on  *  456 
Saturday,  the  service  is  to  be  deemed  as  made  on  the  following 
Monday.1 

Where  a  person  who  is  not  a  party  appears  in  any  proceeding,  either 
before  the  Court  or  in  Chambers,  service  upon  the  solicitor  in  London, 
by  whom  such  party  appears,  whether  such  solicitor  act  as  principal  or 
agent,  is  to  be  deemed  good  service,  except  in  matters  of  contempt 
requiring  personal  service.2 

The  plaintiff  is,  without  special  leave  of  the  Court,  at  liberty  to  serve 
any  notice  of  motion,  or  other  notice,  or  any  petition  or  summons,  per- 
sonally, or  at  the  dwelling-house  or  office  of  any  defendant,  who,  having 
been  duly  served  with  a  copy  of  the  bill,  has  not  caused  an  appearance 
to  be  entered  within  the  time  limited  for  that  purpose  ; 8  but  such  service 
cannot  be  made  out  of  the  jurisdiction  without  special  leave.4 

Section  II.  —  Proceedings  where  no  Service  of  a  Copy  of  the   Bill  can 

be  effected. 

In  the  event  of  the  plaintiff  not  being  able,  by  any  of  the  means  pre- 
viously mentioned,  to  effect  a  due  service  of  the  copy  of  the  bill  upon 
the  defendant,  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  have  the  bill  taken  pro  eonfesso, 
without  either  appearance  by,  or  service  of  the  copy  of  the  bill  upon,  the 

4  Cons.  Ord.  III.  6.  language  to  a  person    serving   the  process  or 

5  Katcliff  v.  Roper,  1  P.  Wins.  420;  Gibson  orders  of  the  Court,  or  used  scandalous  or  con- 
v.  Ingo,  2  Phil.  402:  12  Jur.  105;  Ward  v.  temptuous  words  against  the  Court  or  the  pro- 
Swift,  6  Hare,  309,  311;  Wyatt's  Pr.  411;  Ord.  cess  thereof,  was  liable  to  be  committed,  upon 
III.  (1);  Braithwaite's  Pr.  264,  265;  and  see  motion,  on  notice  to  the  person  so  offending. 
Butlin  v.  Arnold,  1  H.  &  M.  715.  For  form  of  See  Price  v.  Hutchison,  L.  R.  9  Eq.  534. 
subpcena,  see  Ord.  Sched.  E.,  No.  5;  and  Vol.  2  Cons.  Ord.  III.  7;  Jennings  v.  Devey,  4 
HI.  Jur.  858,  V.  C.  E.     With  respect  to  the  service 

6  Gibson  v.  Ingo,  ubi  supra;  Dean  v.  Leth-  of  a  summons,  zee  post,  Chap.  XXIX.,  Procetd- 
bridge,  26  Beav.  397.  ings  at  Chambers. 

7  Documents  requiring  personal  service  may  8  Cons.  Ord.  III.  8. 

be  served  at  any  hour  of  the  day  (on  weekdays),  *  Green  v.  Pledger,  3  Hare,   165,  168.     As 

and  at  any  place  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  to  serving  notices  out  of  the  jurisdiction,  see 

Court.     Braithwaite's  Pr.  12.  Davidson  v.  Marchioness  of  Hastings,  2  Keen, 

1  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.  2.     By  Cons.  Ord.  509,  516;    Hawarden  v.  Dunlop,  2  Dr.  &  Sm, 

XLII.  2,  any  one  who  used  violence  or  abusive  155;  Kavenagh  v.  Wall,  18  L.  T.  N.  S.  18. 

455 


*  457   COMPELLING  APPEARANCE.  —  PROCEEDINGS  IN  DEFAULT. 

defendant.  In  order  that  the  plaintiff  may  pursue  this  course,  he  must 
be  able  to  satisfy  the  Court  by  affidavit,  that  the  defendant  is  beyond 
the  seas,  or  that  upon  inquiry  at  his  usual  place  of  abode  he  could  not 
be  found,  so  as  to  be  served  with  process ;  and  there  is  just  ground  to 
believe  that  he  is  gone  out  of  the  realm,  or  otherwise  absconded,  to 
avoid  being  served  with  the  process  of  the  Court.5  And  if  the  affidavit 
shows  the  defendant  to  be  beyond  the  seas,  the  plaintiff  must  also  prove, 
by  affidavit,  that  the  defendant  has  been  in  England  within  two  years 
next  before  the  bill  was  filed.6 

Upon  ex  parte  motion  supported  by  such  affidavit,7  the  Court  may 
make  an  order,  directing  and  appointing  such  defendant  to  appear 

*  457    at  a  certain  day  therein  to  be  named ;  and  a  copy  of  such  *  order 

must  within  fourteen  days  after  it  was  made,  be  inserted  in  the 
"  London  Gazette,"  *  and  affixed  to  the  door  of  the  parish  church  of  the 
parish  where  such  defendant  made  his  usual  abode  within  thirty  days 
next  before  such  his  absenting;  and  a  copy  of  such  order  must  also, 
within  the  time  aforesaid,  be  posted  up  in  some  public  place  at  the 
Koyal  Exchange,  in  London ;  and  if  the  defendant  do  not  appear  within 
the  time  limited  by  such  order,  or  within  such  further  time  as  the  Court 
shall  appoint,  then,  on  proof  made  of  such  publication  of  such  order  as 
aforesaid,  the  Court,  being  satisfied  of  the  truth  thereof,  may  order  the 
plaintiff's  bill  to  be  taken  pro  eo?ifesso.2 


5  11  Geo.  IV.  &  1  Will.  IV.  c.  36,  §  3.  See 
now  1  Seton  on  Judgments  (5th  ed.),  11,  17. 

6  Ibid.  §  9;  and  see  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86, 
§4. 

1  For  forms  of  motion  paper  and  affidavit, 
see  Vol.  III. 

i  7  Will.  IV.  &  1  Vic.  c.  45,  §  2;  Braith- 
waite's  Pr.  292.  293. 

2  11  Geo.  IV.  &  1  Will.  IV.  c.  36,  §  3.  For 
forms  of  orders  under  this  Act,  see  Kingsford 
v.  Poile,  cited  Seton,  1249. 

In  Massachusetts,  as  to  defendants  residing 
out  of  the  Commonwealth,  see  Ch.  Rule  5, 
104  Mass.  500. 

In  Vermont,  when  the  defendant  is  out  of 
the  State,  so  that  a  subpoena  cannot  be  served 
upon  him,  the  plaintiff  may  file  his  bill  in  the 
office  of  the  clerk  of  the  Court,  and  obtain  an 
order  of  publication.  Genl.  Stats,  of  Vt.  c.  29, 
§  21;  Howe  v.  Willard,  40  Vt.  654,659. 

There  are,  undoubtedly,  provisions  made  in 
other  States  for  giving  notice  to  non-resident 
defendants,  and  taking  bills  as  confessed 
against  them  upon  their  non-appearance.  In 
New  York,  see  1  Barb.Ch.  Pr.  92-96;  Jermain 
v.  Langdon,  8  Paige,  41;  Everts  v.  Beeker,  id. 
506;  Corning  v  Baxter,  6  Paige,  178  ;  see  Con- 
necticut Central  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Hartshorne,  3 
Conn.  198 ;   Code  of  Tennessee,  §§  4311,  4352. 

Non-resident  infants  defendants  must  have 
notice  given  them  of  the  pendency  of  a  suit 
against  them  by  publication,  as  in  the  case  of 
adults.    Walker  i>.  Hallet,  1  Ala.  379  ;  Dun- 

456 


ning  v.  Stanton,  9  Porter,  513;  Coster  v.  Bank 
of  Georgia,  24  Ala.  37;  Sturges  v.  Longworth, 
1  Ohio  St.  544. 

In  New  York,  where  there  is  an  infant  ab- 
sentee, the  course  under  the  statute  must  be 
pursued ;  and  on  the  expiration  of  the  time 
fixed  for  his  appearance,  if  no  one  applies  in 
his  behalf,  the  plaintiff  may  move,  as  in  ordi- 
nary cases,  for  a  guardian  ad  litem.  Ontario 
Bank  v.  Strong,  2  Paige,  301.  Proceedings 
may  also  be  had  under  the  statute  by  publica- 
tion, where  the  infant  is  concealed.  Mortimer 
v.  Copsey,  1  Hoff.  Ch.  Pr.  194.  And  the  Court 
has  directed  the  same  course  to  be  pursued 
where  the  defendant  wa's  a  resident  of  another 
State,  and  a  lunatic.     Otis  v.  Wells,  id.  194. 

The  statutes  authorizing  proceedings  against 
absent  defendants  and  unknown  heirs,  upon 
constructive  notice  of  publication,  must  be 
strictly  pursued.  Brown  v.  Wood,  6  J.  J. 
Marsh.  11, 14 ;  Hunt  v.  Wickliffe,  2  Peters,  201 ; 
Lingan  v.  Henderson,  1  Bland,  236;  Miller  v. 
Hall,  3  Monroe,  242;  Tevis  v.  Richardson,  7 
Monroe,  654;  see  Karr  v.  Karr,  19  N.  J.  Eq. 
427;  Oram  v.  Dennison,  13  id.  438;  Boswell  v. 
Otis,  9  How.  336;  Ferriss  v.  Lewis,  2  Tenn. 
Ch.  291. 

Where  the  statute  directs  an  order  o(  pub- 
lication to  be  certified  by  the  printer  in  whose 
paper  the  order  has  been  published,  a  certificate 
must  be  made  by  the  printer  or  proprietor,  and 
not  by  a  mere  editor.  Brown  v.  Wood,  6  J.  J. 
Marsh.  11,  19;   Butler  v.  Cooper,   id.  27,  30; 


WHERE   NO    SERVICE   OF   COPY    OF   BILL   CAN    BE   EFFECTED. 


459 


*The  6th  rule  of  the  10th  Order  applied  to  the  same  circum-    *458 
stances  as  the  provisions  of  the  Act  last  stated ;  the  affidavits 
which  the  *order  requires  are  very   nearly  the  same   as  those    *  459 


Brodie  v.  Skelton,  6  Eng.  120;  Sprague  v. 
Sprague,  7  J.  J.  Marsh.  331.  A  certificate  of 
publication  must  show  when,  and  in  what 
paper  the  order  was  published.  Hopkins  v. 
Claybrook,  5  J.  J.  Marsh.  234;  see  Swift  v. 
Stebbins,  4  Stew.  &  Port.  84.  Where  an  order 
of  publication  has  not  been  returned,  an  entry 
on  the  record  that  it  was  proved  to  have  been 
duly  executed,  is  insufficient  evidence  of  publi- 
cation to  authorize  the  rendition  of  a  decree. 
Green  v.  M'Kinney,  6  J.  J.  Marsh.  193,  197; 
but  see  contra,  Swift  v.  Stebbins,  4  Stew.  & 
Port.  447.  It  is  not  sufficient  that  an  order  of 
publication  is  had  in  a  Chancery  cause  ;  proof 
of  the  publication  must  also  be  made.  Moore 
v.  Wright,  4  Stew.  &  Port.  84.  The  proceed- 
ing by  publication  on  the  ground  that  the  de- 
fendant does  not  reside  in  the  State,  does  not 
apply  to  those,  such  as  mariners,  who  are  tem- 
porarily absent  in  their  vocation.  M'Kim  v. 
Odom,  3  Bland,  407;  Wash  v.  Heard,  27  Miss. 
400.  Publication  of  notice,  as  in  the  case  of  a 
non-resident  defendant,  is  of  no  effect  what- 
ever ,  if  the  defendant  in  fact  be  not  a  non- 
resident. Snowden  v.  Snowden,  1  Bland,  550; 
see' Jermain  v.  Langdon,  8  Paige,  41;  Everts  v. 
Beeker,  8  Paige,  506. 

In  Alabama,  notice  to  absent  defendants 
must  be  published  on  the  court-house  door  as 
well  as  in  the  newspaper.  Batre  v.  Auze,  5 
Ala.  173.  So  in  Virginia,  Myrick  v.  Adams, 
4  Munf.  366.  So  in  Mississippi,  Zecharie  v. 
Bowers,  3  Smedes  &  M.  641. 

In  Kentucky,  by  Act  of  Feb.  2,  1837,  a  warn- 
ing order  and  traverse  were  substituted  for 
publication  of  notice  against  non-resident  de- 
fendants. Stump  v.  Beatty,  8  Dana,  14.  A 
warning  order  is  constructive  notice  to  a  non- 
resident of  the  pendency  of  the  suit.  Chiles  v. 
Boon,  3  B.  Mon.  82. 

In  New  Jersey,  where  any  of  the  defend- 
ants reside  in  the  State,  and  are  served  with 
process,  it  is  not  necessary,  unless  under  special 
circumstances,  that  the  order  for  the  appear- 
ance of  absent  defendants  should  be  published 
in  any  newspaper  out  of  the  State.  Foreign 
publication  is  required  only  where  all  of  the 
defendants  reside  out  of  the  State.  Wetmore 
t\  Dyer,  1  Green  Ch.  386;  Oram  v.  Dennison, 
13  N.J.  Eq.  438.  See  where  substituted  ser- 
vice by  publication  was  held  good,  although 
the  defendant  was  a  resident  of  the  State, 
Equitable  Life  Assurance  Society  v.  Laird,  24 
N.  J.  Eq.  319. 

A  decree  against  non-resident  defendants 
upon  whom  process  has  not  been  served,  or 
proof  of  publication  made,  is  erroneous.  Gale 
v.  Clark,  4  Bibb,  415.     But  a  decree  regularly 


made  against  absent  defendants  will  not  be 
set  aside  of  course,  on  their  coming  in  and  an- 
swering, nor  unless  the  justice  of  the  case 
requires  it.  Dunlap  v.  M'Elvoy,  3  Litt.  269; 
see  Pile  o.  McBratney,  15  111.  314. 

In  New  York,  where  a  defendant  is  pro- 
ceeded against  as  an  absentee,  he  is  entitled  of 
course  without  an  affidavit  of  merits,  at  any 
time  before  a  sale  under  the  decree,  to  come 
in  and  make  his  defence,  if  he  has  any,  upon 
payment  of  such  cost  as  the  Court  may  deem 
reasonable.  Jermain  v.  Langdon,  8  Paige,  41; 
Evarts  v.  Beeker,  8  Paige,  506. 

In  such  a  case  it  is  not  necessary  to  vacate 
the  decree  in  the  first  instance;  the  decree  may 
be  permitted  to  stand  until  the  validity  of  the 
defendant's  defence  is  ascertained,  and  pro- 
ceedings for  this  purpose  may  be  had  in  the 
same  manner  as  if  the  decree  had  been  opened 
or  vacated.     Jermain  v.  Langdon,  ubi  supra. 

Where  a  defendant,  who  has  a  fixed  and 
notorious  domicile  within  the  State,  is  pro- 
ceeded against  as  an  absentee,  it  is  irregular, 
and  if  he  applies  the  first  opportunity  after  he 
has  notice  of  the  proceedings  against  him  and 
before  a  sa'e  under  the  decree,  he  will  be  let  in 
to  defend  of  course,  and  without  costs.  Jer- 
main v.  Langdon,  8  Paige,  41;  Evarts  v.  Beeker, 
id.  506. 

In  order  to  obtain  a  decree  against  a  non- 
resident defendant  who  does  not  appear,  and 
who  has  not  been  personally  served  with  pro- 
cess, the  report  of  a  Master  as  to  the  truth  of 
the  allegations  contained  in  the  bill  is  neces- 
sary.    Corning  v.  Baxter,  6  Paige,  178. 

In  Erickson  v.  Nesmith,  46  N.  H.  371,  377, 
Sargent  J.  said:  "Where  no  attachment  of 
property  has  been  made  within  the  jurisdiction, 
and  where  the  Court  can  make  no  actual  ser- 
vice of  process,  and  where  the  party  residing 
in  another  State  refuses  to  submit  to  the  juris- 
diction of  the  Court,  we  know  of  no  way  to  ac- 
quire such  jurisdiction  over  the  person.  A 
statute  could  not  give  it  any  more  than  a  rule 
of  Court.  The  legislature  have  no  more  juris- 
diction to  make  laws  for  tl»e  inhabitants  of  other 
States,  while  remHining  there,  than  the  Court 
has  to  execute  them  upon  such  inhabitants." 
See  Jermain  v.  Langdon,  8  Paige,  41 ;  Evarts  v. 
Beeker,  8  Paige,  506;  Bissell  v.  Briggs,  9  Mass. 
468;  Rangley  v.  Webster,  11  N.  H.  299,  and 
cases  cited.  This  subject  was  considered  by 
the  U.  S.  Supreme  Court  in  Baldwin  v.  Hale, 
1  Wall.  232,  and  Baldwin  v.  Bank  of  Newbury, 
id.  234;  Pennoyer  v.  Neff,  95  U.  S.  714;  and 
see  Bank  v.  Butler,  45  N.  H.  236,  239;  Ste- 
phenson v.  Davis,  56  Maine,  75,  76;  Spurr  v. 
Scoville,  3Cush.  578;  ante,  p.  149,  note. 

457 


*  460   COMPELLING  APPEARANCE.  —  PROCEEDINGS  IN  DEFAULT. 

necessary  under  the  Act;  but  the  order  only  enables  the  plaintiff  to 
obtain  an  appearance  to  be  entered  for  the  defendant,  and  does  not, 
like  the  Act,  authorize  the  bill  to  be  taken  pro  confesso  at  once.  The 
order,  however,  dispenses  with  the  necessity  of  having  the  notice 
posted  up  at  the  Royal  Exchange,  or  affixed  to  the  door  of  the  parish 
church.  It  is  as  follows  :  "  Where  the  Court  is  satisfied,  by  sufficient 
evidence,  that  any  defendant  has  been  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
Court,  at  some  time,  not  more  than  two  years *  before  the  bill  was  filed, 
and  that  such  defendant  is  beyond  the  seas,  or  that  upon  inquiry  at  his 
usual  place  of  abode  (if  he  had  any),  or  at  any  other  place  or  places 
where,  at  the  time  when  the  bill  was  filed,  he  might  probably  have  been 
met  with,  he  could  not  be  found,  so  as  to  be  served  with  a  copy  of  the 
bill  under  the  statute  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  3,  and  that,  in  either  case, 
there  is  just  ground  to  believe  that  such  defendant  has  gone  out  of  the 
realm,2  or  otherwise  absconded  to  avoid  being  served  with  such  copy 
of  the  bill  or  with  other  process,3  the  Court  may  order  that  such  defend- 
ant do  appear  at  a  certain  day,  to  be  named  in  the  order ;  and  a  copy 
of  such  order,  together  with  a  notice  to  the  effect  set  forth  at  the  end  of 
this  rule,  may,  within  fourteen  days  after  such  order  made,  be  inserted 
in  the  '  London  Gazette,'  and  be  otherwise  published  as  the  Court  shall 
direct ;  and  where  the  defendant  does  not  appear  within  the  time  limited 
by  such  order,  or  within  such  further  time  as  the  Court  may  appoint, 
there,  on  proof  made  of  such  publication  of  the  said  order,  the  Court 
may  order  an  appearance  to  be  entered  for  the  defendant,  on  the  appli- 
cation of  the  plaintiff." 

The  notice  referred  to  in  the  rule  is  in  the  following  terms :  Notice. 
"A.  B.,  take  notice,  that  if  you  do  not  appear  pursuant  to  the  above 
order,  the  plaintiff  may  enter  an  appearance  for  you,  and  the  Court 
may  afterwards  grant  to  the  plaintiff  such  relief  as  he  may  appear  to 
be  entitled  to  on  his  own  showing."  4 

Application  under  the  General  Order  is  made  by  an  ex  parte  motion,6 
supported  by  an  affidavit  or  affidavits,  which  should  follow  the  language 
of  the  General  Order  as  far  as  possible.6  One  calendar  month  from  the 
date  of  the  order  is  generally  limited  as  the  time  for  appearance ;  the 
limitation  of  time  within  which  the  advertisements  of  the  order  in  any 
newspapers,  other  than  the  "  London  Gazette,"  are  to  be  inserted, 

*  460    is  optional ;  and  they  all  may  be  *directed  to  be  inserted  within 

fourteen  days.1     The  subsequent  order  is  also  made  upon  an  ex 
parte  motion,2  supported  by  the  production  of  the  Gazette,  and  any 

1  Thiirlow  v.  Treeby,  27  Beav.  624.  5  For  form  of  motion  paper,  see  Vol.  III. 

2  It  is  not  necessary  to  show  that  he  has  6  for  form  of  affidavit,  see  Vol.  III. 
absconded  to  avoid  service   in   the   particular  x  Seton,  1248,  1249.     If  the  advertisements 
suit.     Barton  v.  Whitcombe,  16  Beav.  205;  17  cannot   be   inserted  within  fourteen  days,  the 
Jur.  81;  Allen  v.  Loder,  15  Jur.  420,  V.  C.  Court  will  extend  the  time.     Dicker  v.  Clarke, 
Ld.  C.  11  W.  R.  870,  V.  C.  K.     As  to  the  propriety  of 

3  Cope  ».  Russell,  2  Phil.  404;  12  Jur.  105;  limiting,  by  the  order,  a  time  to  answer,  see 
and  see  Crosse  v.  Crosse,  6  Jur.  N.  S.  366;  Braithwaite's  Pr.  3:16,  n. 

8  W.  R.  338,  V.  C.  K.  2  Hawkins   v.   Gathercole,    3d    Nov.    1851, 

4  Cons.  Ord.  X.  6.  For  form  of  order,  see  cited  1  Smith's  Pr.  380.  For  form  of  motion 
Seton,  1248,  No.  3.  paper,  see  Vol.  III. 

458 


WHERE   THE   COPY   OP   THE   BILL   HAS    BEEN   SERVED.  *  4G1 

newspapers  in  which  the  former  order  has  been  inserted,  and  of  the 
Eecord  and  Writ  Clerk's  certificate  that  no  appearance  has  been 
entered. 


Section  III. — Proceedings  by  the  Plaintiff,  where  service  of  the  Copy 
of  the  Bill  has  been  effected. 

If  the  defendant  (not  being  an  infant,  or  a  person  of  unsound  mind) 
neglects  to  appear,  within  the  time  mentioned  in  the  indorsement 
thereon,  to  a  bill  which  has  been  duly  served  on  him  within  the  juris- 
diction of  the  Court,  an  appearance  may  be  entered  for  him  on  the 
application  of  the  plaintiff;3  or  the  plaintiff  may  (though  this  is  now 
an  unusual  course)4  compel  him,  by  attachment  or  other  process,  to 
appear. 

Where  the  bill  has  been  served  out  of  the  jurisdiction,  and  the 
defendant  has  not  entered  an  appearance  within  the  time  allowed  by 
the  special  order  under  which  the  service  was  effected,  an  ex  parte 
application,  by  motion  for  leave  to  enter  an  appearance  for  him,  must 
be  made  by  the  plaintiff.5  The  application  must  be  supported  by  an 
affidavit  of  due  service  of  the  copy  of  the  bill  and  copy  of  the  order, 
and  by  the  Eecord  and  Writ  Clerk's  certificate  of  no  appearance  having 
been  entered  by  the  defendant ; 6  and  the  Court  may  proceed  on  such 
service  as  if  duly  made  within  the  jurisdiction.7 

If  the  bill  has  been  served  within  the  jurisdiction,  it  is  provided  by 
the  General  Order,8  that  where  any  defendant,  not  appearing  to  be  an 
infant  or  a  person  of  weak  or  unsound  mind  unable  of  himself  to  defend 
the  suit,9  is,  when  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court,  duly  served  with 
a  copy  of  the  bill  under  the  statute  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  3,  and  refuses 
or  neglects  to  appear  thereto  within  eight  days  after  such  service,  the 
plaintiff  may,  after  the  expiration  of  such  eight  days,10  and  within 
three  weeks n  from  the  time  of  such  *  service,  apply  to  the  *  461 
Kecord  and  Writ  Clerk  to  enter  an  appearance  for  such  defend- 
ant; and  no  appearance  having  been  entered,  the  Eecord  and  Writ 
Clerk  is  to  enter  such  appearance  accordingly,  upon  being  satisfied,  by 
affidavit,  that  the  copy  of  the  bill  was  duly  served.     And  after  the  expi- 

8  Cons.  Ord.  X.  3,4.     As  to  proceedings  in  see  Seton,  1248,  No.  2:  and  for  form  of  affi- 

default  of  appearance  under  the  present  English  davit,  see  Vol.  III. 

practice,  see  1  Dan.  Ch.  Prac.  (Gth  Eng.  ed.)  M&5  Will.  IV.  c.  82,  §  1. 

356,  Sect.  II.     A  formal  entry  of   appearance  8  Cons.  Ord.  X.  4. 

has.  throughout  the  United  States,  ceased  to  be  9  An  appearance  by  the  plaintiff  for  a  per- 

important,  because  service  on  a  defendant  of  sen  thus  incapacitated  is  irregular  and  of  no 

notice  to  appear  is  made  equivalent  to  actual  validity.     Cons.  Ord.  X.  5;  Leese  v.  Knight,  8 

appearance.      Sweeny    v.   Coffin,    1   Dill.   75;  Jur.  N.  S.  1006;  10  W.  R.  711,  V.  C.  K. 

Fowlkes  v.  Webber,  8  Humph.  530;  Pugsley  v.  ln  The   day   of    service   is   excluded   in   the 

Freedman's  Sav.  &  Tr.  Co.  2  Tenn.  Ch.  138.  computation    of    the    eight    days    and     three 

See  infra,  p.  536.  weeks.     15   &    16   Vic.   c.  86,    Sched.;   Cons. 

*  Hackwood  v.  Lockerby,  7  De  G.  M.  &  G.  Ord.  XXXVII.  9. 

238;  and  see  post,  p.  462.  u  Where  the    plaintiff  accidentally  omitted 

5  For  form  of  motion  paper,  see  Vol.  III.  to   enter  the   appearance,  the  Court  extended 

6  4  &  5  Will.  IV.  c.  82,  §  1 ;  Cons.  Ord.  X.  the  time.  Clarkson  r.  Eldridge,  8  W.  R.  466, 
7  (4).    For  form  of  order  to  enter  appearance,  V.  C.  K. 

459 


*  462   COMPELLING  APPEARANCE.  —  PROCEEDINGS  IN  DEFAULT. 

ration  of  such  three  weeks,  or  after  the  time  allowed  to  such  defendant 
for  appearing  has  expired,  in  any  case  in  which  the  Record  and  Writ 
Clerk  is  not  thereby  required  to  enter  such  appearance,  the  plaintiff 
may  apply  to  the  Court  for  leave  to  enter  such  appearance  for  such 
defendant ;  and  the  Court,  being  satisfied  that  the  copy  of  the  bill  was 
duly  served,  and  that  no  appearance  has  been  entered  for  such  defend- 
ant, may,  if  it  so  thinks  fit,  order  the  same  accordingly. 

Service  of  an  amended  bill,  on  the  solicitor  of  a  defendant,  who  has. 
appeared  to  the  original  bill,1  is  due  service  within  the  meaning  of  the 
General  Order  above  referred  to,  whether  the  defendant,  at  the  time  of 
such  service  is,  or  is  not,  within  the  jurisdiction;2  and  the  order  applies 
where  an  order  to  revive  has  been  served  on  a  new  defendant ; 3  it  also 
applies  where  substituted  service  has  been  effected,  under  an  order 
obtained  for  that  purpose.4 

An  application  for  leave  to  enter  an  appearance,  where  the  three 
weeks  have  expired,  or  the  bill  has  not  in  the  opinion  of  the  Eecord 
and  Writ  Clerk  been  duly  served,  may  be  made  by  ex  parte  motion  to 
the  Court,  or  by  ex  parte  summons  at  Chambers,  supported,  in  either 
case,  by  an  affidavit  of  service,5  and  by  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerk's 
certificate  that  no  appearance  has  been  entered  by  the  defendant;  this 
certificate  should  bear  even  date  with  the  application,  but  should  be 
bespoken  the  day  before.6  The  order  is  drawn  up  by  the  Registrar.7 
If  any  delay  in  making  the  application  is  not  satisfactorily  explained, 
the  Court  or  Judge  may  require  notice  of  the  motion  to  be  given  to  the 
defendant,  or  the  bill  to  be  re-served ; 8  and  in  such  a  case,  an  order  has 
been  made  giving  leave  to  enter  an  appearance  at  the  expiration 

*  462    of  ten  days  unless  the  defendant  *  appeared  in  the  mean  time,  on 

the  plaintiff  undertaking  to  serve  the  defendant  with  the  order 
within  six  days.1 

Where  a  bill  was  filed  against  an  officer  of  the  Crown,  who  refused  to 
enter  an  appearance,  on  the  ground  that  the  Court  had  no  jurisdiction 
to  entertain  the  suit,  leave  was  given  to  enter  an  appearance  for  him.2 

An  appearance  by  the  plaintiff  for  the  defendant  is  entered  by  fill- 

1  Under  Cons.  Ord.  IX.  21;  seeare^f,  p.  447.  6  Braithwaite's  Pr.  334.     A  fee  of  is.,  by  a 

2  Zulueta  v.  Vinent,  3  M'N.  &  G.  246;  15  Chai  eery  fee  fund  stamp,  is  payable;  Regul. 
Jur.  277,  overruling   Marquis  of   Hertford  v.      to  Ord.  Sched.  4. 

Suisse,  13   Sim.  489;   9  Jur.  1001;   Sewell  v.  1  For  form,  see  Seton.  1247,  No.  1. 

Godden,  1   De  G.  &  S.   126;  11  Jur.  260;  and  «  Radford  v.   Roberts,   2   Hare.  96:   6  Jur. 

see  Steele  v.  Gordon,  3  W.  R.  158,  V.  C.  K.  1080;  Morgan  v.  Morgan,  1  Col.  228;  Edmonds 

As   to  appearance   to    an    amended    bill,    see  v.  Nichol,  6  Beav.  334;  Bradstock  v.  Whatly,  7 

Index,    Appearance;    and    Chap.    XIII.    Ap-  Beav.  346;  Totty  v.  Ingleby,  id.  591;  Walker 

ptarance;  and  also  Braithwaite's  Manual.  159.  v.  Hurst,  13  Sim.  490;  9  Jur.  1002;  Devenish  v. 

3  Forster  v.  Menzies,  16  Beav.  568;  17  Jur.  Devenish,  7  Jur.  841,  L.  C;  Bointon  v.  Parkin- 
657;  Cross  v.  Thomas,  16  Beav.  592;  17  Jur.  son,  id.  367,  V.  C.  K.  B.;  and  see  Burton  r. 
336.     It  is  not,  however,  usual,  in  practice,  for  Tebbutt,  1  W.  N.  208,  V.  C.  S. 

the  plaintiff  to  enter  an  appearance,  by  default,  1  Husham  v.  Dixon,  1  Y.  &  C.  C.  C.  203; 

in  such  a  case.  and  see  cases,  id.  n. 

4  Wilcoxon  v.  Wilkins,  9  Jur.  N.  S.  742;  11  2  Felkin  v.  Lord  Herbert,  1  Dr.  &  S.  608;  8 
W.  R  868,  M.  R.;  but  see  Dicker  v.  Clarke,  11  Jur.  8  N.  S.  90. 

W.  R.  765,  V.  C.  K. 

5  For  forms  of  motion  paper,  summons,  and 
affidavit,  see  Vol.  III. 

460 


WHERE   THE   COPY   OF   THE   BILL    HAS   BEEN   SERVED.  *  463 

ing  up  a  prcecipe,3  and  leaving  the  same  with  the  Kecord  and  Writ 
Clerk,  together  with  an  office  copy  of  the  affidavit  of  service,4  or,  if 
special  leave  has  been  obtained,  the  order  authorizing  the  appearance 
to  be  entered.  Any  number  of  defendants  may  be  included  in  one 
prcecipe.6  The  plaintiff  need  not  give  notice  of  having  entered  the 
appearance.6 

If,  however,  the  plaintiff  does  not  choose  himself  to  enter  an  appear- 
ance for  the  defendant,  it  was  formerly  competent  for  him  to  proceed, 
as  of  course,  to  compel  the  defendant,  by  attachment,  to  appear ; T  but 
this  cannot  now  be  done  without  a  special  order  of  the  Court,8  and  the 
practice  is  virtually  abolished.9 

As,  however,  the  practice  of  compelling  appearance  by  attachment  is 
not  absolutely  abolished,  it  will  be  convenient  here  to  state  the  mode  of 
prosecuting  a  contempt.  A  suitor  prosecuting  a  contempt  must  use 
his  best  endeavor  to  procure  each  process  to  be  duly  served  and  exe- 
cuted upon  the  party  prosecuted ;  otherwise  he  will  lose  the  benefit  of 
the  process  returned,  and  have  to  pay  the  costs : 10  he  must  not  make 
out  process  into  a  county  in  which  he  knows  that  the  party  prosecuted 
is  not ; u  but  he  may  abandon  any  unexecuted  process  he  has  issued, 
and  issue  fresh  process,  if  otherwise  in  a  position  so  to  do.12 

*  It  seems  that  in  ordinary  cases  a  plaintiff  may,  at  the  same  *  463 
time,  sue  out  two  or  more  attachments  against  the  same  defend- 
ant into  different  counties,  but  only  one  of  them  must  be  executed ; 
otherwise  the  party  would  be  liable  to  an  action.  Thus,  where  a  defend- 
ant being  in  contempt,  the  plaintiff  sued  an  attachment  into  Kent,  and 
another  into  London,  and  arrested  the  defendant  upon  each :  upon 
this  being  shown  to  the  Court,  costs  were  ordered  to  be  taxed  by  the 
Master,  for  the  irregularity  and  vexation ;  but,  in  regard  that  the  plain- 
tiff was  poor,  the  Court,  upon  his  motion,  ordered  the  costs  to  be  paid 
the  defendant,  out  of  a  sum  of  £600  decreed  to  the  plaintiff,  and  resting 
in  Court,  and  the  defendant  was  set  at  liberty,  without  entering  his 

8  For  form,  see  Vol.  III.  orders  of  the  Court  is  by  attachment.     Matter 

*  For  form,  see  Vol.  III.  As  to  the  costs  of  of  O'Reillys,  2  Hogan,  20.  It  always  rests  in 
such  appearance,  see  Cons.  Ord.  XL.  15;  and  as  the  sound  discretion  of  the  Court,  whether  the 
to  a  subsequent  appearance  by  the  defendant,  rule  for  an  attachment  shall  be  absolute  or  nisi, 
see  Cons.  Ord.  X.  9,  post,  p.  479.  though  the  latter  is  the  usual  and  safer  course. 

5  Braithwaite's  Pr.  325.    The  following  fees      Matter  of  Vanderbilt,  4  John.  Ch.  58. 

are  payable,  in  Chancery  fee  fund  stamps,  on  8  Cons.  Ord.  X.  10.     The  application  will 

entering  appearances:  if  not  more  than  three  be  refused,  unless  the  plaintiff  can  show  a  suffi- 

defendants,  7*.,-  if  more  than   three,  and   not  cient  reason  for  adopting  this  course  of  proceed- 

exceeding  six  defendants,  14s.  ,•  and  the  same  ing.     Hackwood  v.  Lockerby,  7  De  G.  M.  &  G. 

proportion  for  every  like  number  of  defendants.  238. 

Regul.  to  Ord.  Sched.  4.     In  this  computation,  9  Per  V.    C.    Kindersley,    Felkin    V.  Lord 

husband  nnd  wife  are  regarded  as  one  person.  Herbert,  1  Dr.  &  S.  608;  8  Jur.  N.  S.  90. 

Braithwaite's  Pr.  325.  lf)  Cons.  Ord.  XXX.  1. 

6  Braithwaite's  Pr.  337.  If  the  appearance  »  Boschetti  v.  Power,  8  Beav.  180,  184; 
is,  by  mistake,  entered  by  the  plaintiff's  solici-  Zulueta  v.  Vinent,  15  Beav.  273;  16  Jur.  631; 
tor,  as  if  concerned  for  the  defendant,  it  may  see,  however,  Hodgson  v.  Hodgson.  23  Beav. 
be  withdrawn  and  entered  as  by  the  plaintiff.  604. 

See  ibid.;  and  post,  Chap.  XIII.  Appearance.  12  Andrews  v.  Walton,  1  Phil.  619;  Braith- 

1  Mussina  v.  Bartlett,  8  Porter,  277.    The      waite's  Pr.  147. 
general  mode  of  compelling  obedience  to  the 

461 


464 


COMPELLING    APPEARANCE.  —  PROCEEDINGS   IN    DEFAULT. 


appearance  with  the  Registrar,  —  for  the  Court  said,  none  should  take 
advantage  of  his  wrong.1 

An  attachment  should  be  directed  to  the  sheriff  or  other  officer  of 
the  county  or  jurisdiction  wherein  the  party,  against  whom  the  writ  is 
issued,  is  likely  to  be  found.2  If  the  defendant  resides  in  the  county 
palatine  of  Lancaster  or  of  Durham,  the  attachment  must  be  directed  to 
the  Chancellor  of  the  county  palatine,  or  his  deputy,  commanding  him 
to  issue  his  mandamus  to  the  sheriff  of  the  county  to  attach  the  party ; 8 
and  to  enforce  obedience,  it  is  necessary  to  obtain  an  order  upon  the 
Chancellor  to  return  the  writ,  and  afterwards  an  order  upon  the  sheriff 
to  return  the  mandamus.4  Where  the  defendant  is  in  a  city  or  town 
that  is  a  county  in  itself,  the  writ  must  be  directed  to  the  sheriff  of  the 
county  of  the  city  or  town ; 5  and  if  the  party  is  already  in  prison,  the 
writ  must,  nevertheless,  be  directed  to  the  sheriff,   who  will  lodge  it 

with  the  keeper  or  jailer,  as  a  detainer  against  such  party.6 
*  464        *  A  writ  of  attachment  is  made  out  by  the  solicitor  or  party 

prosecuting  the  contempt,1  who  must  indorse  the  name  and  place 


1  Wyatt's  Pr.  48. 

2  Braithwaite's  Pr.  158.  In  London,  where 
there  are  two  sheriffs,  if  one  of  them  is  an  inter- 
ested party,  the  writ  should  be  directed  to  the 
other;  and  where  both,  or  the  sole  sheriff  in 
other  cases,  are  interested,  it  should  be  directed 
to  the  coroner.  Ibid.  151.  For  forms  of  direc- 
tions of  writs,  see  Vol.  III. 

3  Braithwaite's  Pr.  159  ;  and  see  form  in 
Vol.  III. 

*  See  past,  p.  470. 

5  Since  the  18  &  19  Vic.  c.  48,  such  process 
as  would  otherwise  have  been  directed  to  the 
Lord  Warden  of  the  Cinque  Ports,  is  directed 
to  the  Sheriff  of  Kent. 

6  Trotter  v.  Trotter,  Jac.  533:  and  zee  post, 
p.  466.  For  forms  of  directions  of  writs,  see 
Vol.  III.  According  to  the  old  practice  of  the 
Court,  an  attachment,  as  well  as  all  other  pro- 
cess of  contempt,  must  have  been  made  return- 
able in  term  time ;  and  it  was  also  requisite, 
where  it  was  intended  to  proceed  to  a  sequestra- 
tion, or  to  take  a  bill  pro  confesso,  that  there 
should  be  fifteen  days  between  the  teste  (or 
date)  and  the  return  of  the  writ;  unless  the 
defendant  lived  within  ten  miles  of  London,  in 
which  case  an  order  might  be  obtained,  by 
motion  or  petition  of  course,  to  make  the  sev- 
eral processes  returnable  immediately.  Hinde, 
100.  With  the  view,  however,  to  save  the  ex- 
pense of  the  order  for  a  writ  returnable  imme- 
diately, in  n  town  cause,  and  also  to  get  rid  of 
the  delay  in  the  process  occasioned  by  that 
proceeding,  it  is  provided  by  the  11  Geo.  IV. 
&  1  Will.  IV.  c.  36,  §  15,  Rule  3,  "that  the 
party  prosecuting  any  contempt  shall  be  at  lib- 
erty, without  order,  to  sue  forth  the  several  writs 
in  process  of  contempt,  returnable  immediately, 
in  case  the  party  in  contempt  resides  or  is  in 
London,  or  within  twenty  miles  thereof;  and 

462 


that,  in  other  cases,  the  party  prosecuting  a 
contempt  shall  be  at  liberty,  without  order,  to 
sue  forth  such  several  writs,  returnable  in  vaca- 
tion, provided  that  there  be  fifteen  days  be- 
tween the  teste  and  the  return  of  each  of  such 
writs."  Braithwaite's  Manual,  199;  VVroe  v. 
Clayton,  16  Sim.  183;  12  Jur.  321 ;  Seton,  1231. 
The  effect  of  this  provision  is  to  extend  the 
pnwerof  issuing  attachments,  and  other  process, 
returnable  in  vacation,  to  all  cases;  with  the 
restriction,  that  where  the  party  resides  above 
twenty  miles  from  London,  there  shall  be  fif- 
teen days  between  the  teste  and  the  return ;  and 
to  permit  such  process  to  be  issued  without  a 
previous  order  to  that  effect.  Where  an  attach- 
ment is  issued  not  returnable  immediately,  but 
of  which  the  return  must  take  place  in  term 
time,  it  must  still,  as  before,  be  made  return- 
able on  a  general  return  day;  thus,  when  the 
last  of  the  fifteen  days  required  by  the  above 
rule  of  the  11  Geo.  IV.  &  1  Will*  IV.  c.  36, 
falls  in  term  time,  the  attachment  must  be 
mad-'  returnable  on  one  of  the  general  return 
days  of  the  term  occurring  after  the  expiration 
of  the  fifteen  days.  Seton,  1231 ;  Braithwaite's 
Pr.  153.  For  list  of  general  return  days,  see 
Vol.  III.  It  was  formerly  considered  that  an 
attachment  could  not  have  a  longer  return  than 
the  last  return  of  the  term  following  that  in 
which  it  was  tested ;  if  made  returnable  "  imme- 
diately," it  was  only  in  force  until  such  last 
return  of  the  following  term;  and  if  executed 
afterwards,  its  execution  was  liable  to  be  dis- 
charged for  irregularity;  but  it  appears  that 
there  is  now  no  such  rule  in  practice.  Wroev. 
Clayton.  16  Sim.  183;  12  Jur.  331. 

i  Cons.  Ord.  III.  1.  This  writ  must  be 
either  written  or  printed  on  parchment;  and 
should  have  a  left-hand  margin  of  sufficient 
width  to  admit  of  the  stamp,  and  the  official 


WHERE   THE    COPY   OF   THE   BILL    HAS    BEEN   SERVED.  *  465 

of  business  or  residence,  and  address  for  service,  if  any,  thereon,  as  in 
the  case  of  other  proceedings.2  (a) 

The  form  of  the  writ  is  in  all  cases  the  same ;  but  it  must  bear  an 
indorsement,  stating  the  particular  nature  of  the  contempt  in  respect  of 
which  it  is  issued.3  The  names  of  three,  but  not  more,  persons  can 
be  inserted  in  one  writ.  The  writ  must  be  tested  on  the  day  on 
which  it  is  issued ;  it  is  sealed  at  the  Record  and  Writ  *  Clerks'  *  465 
Office  ;  and  the  seal  will  be  affixed,  on  the  Clerk  of  Records  and 
Writs  being  satisfied  that  the  writ  is  correct  in  form,  and  that  the  per- 
son presenting  the  same  is,  according  to  the  course  and  practice  of  the 
Court,  entitled  to  sue  out  the  same.1  The  attachment  is  considered  as 
sealed  the  first  moment  of  the  day  on  which  it  issues.2 

Before  the  writ  will  be  sealed,  a  prcecipe,  stating  the  nature  of  the 
contempt  in  respect  of  which  it  is  issued,  must  be  entered  with  the 
Registrar,  and  left  at  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerks'  Office.  In  order  to 
enter  the  prcecipe,  two  copies  of  it  are  prepared  ;  and  upon  one  being 
left  with  the  Clerk  at  the  entering  seat,  in  the  Registrar's  Office,  the 
other  will  be  marked  by  him  as  entered;  and  the  latter  copy  must  be 
filed  with  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerk  at  the  time  the  writ  is  sealed.8 

The  manner  in  which  both  original  and  amended  bills  are  filed  has 
before  been  stated ; 4  and  under  no  circumstances  can  an  attachment  be 
issued  for  want  of  appearance  or  answer,  unless  the  bill  be  regularly 
filed.6 

A  writ  of  attachment,  for  want  of  appearance,  is  indorsed,  "  By  the 
Court :  For  not  appearing  at  the  suit  of  A  B,  complainant,"  or  as  the 
case  may  be ; 6  and  it  will  be  sealed  at  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerks' 
Office,  upon  production  of  the  order  authorizing  the  issue  of  the  writ ; 7  if 
it  appears  to  the  Clerk  of  Records  and  Writs  that  no  appearance  has  been 
entered  for  the  defendant.8  Before  the  writ  is  sealed,  a  prcecipe  must 
be  entered  with  the  Registrar,  and  left  in  the  manner  before  explained.9 

It  is  particularly  requisite  that  the  rule,  that  a  suitor  prosecuting  a 
contempt,  shall  use  his  best  endeavor  to  procure  process  to  be  duly 
served,10  should  be  attended  to  in  cases  where  it  is  intended  to  proceed 
to  take  a  bill  pro  confesso,  against  a  defendant  in  contempt  for  want  of 
an  answer :  for,  by  the  General  Orders,  it  is  necessary  that  the  plaintiff 
should  have  exerted  due  diligence  to  procure  the  execution  of  the  writ 
of  attachment,  in  order  that  he  may  proceed,  under  these  Orders,  against 

seal ;  the  writ  must  be  stamped  with  a  Chancery  *  Ante,  pp.  398,  399,  422. 

fee  fund  stamp  of  5s.     Regul.  toOrd.  Sehed.  4;  5  Leman  v.  Newnham,   1  Ves.   Sr.   51,53; 

Braithwaite's  Pr.  133.  Belt's  Sup.  42;  Adamson  v.  Blackslock,  1  S. 

2  Cons.  Ord.  III.  2.  5;  ante,  pp.  453-455.  &  S.  118. 

3  Braithwaite's  Pr.  159.      For  forms  of  in-  6  For  forms  of  indorsements,  see  Vol.  III. 
dorsements,  see  Vol.  III.  7  Cons.  Ord.  X.  10;  ante,  p.  462. 

1  Cons.  Ord.  I.  37.  8  Braithwaite's  Pr.  161. 

2  Stephens  v.  Neale,  1  Mad.  550.  «  Smith  v.   Thompson,   4  Mad.  179,   ante, 
8  Smith  v.  Thompson,  4  Mad.  179;  Cons.      p.  465.     For  form  of  prcecipe,  see  Vol.  III. 

Ord.  I.  18;  Braithwaite's  Pr.  161.     For  forms  1°  Cons.  Ord.  XXX.  1. 

of  prcecipe,  see  Vol.  III. 

(a).  An  application  for  leave  to  issue  a  writ  that  an  order  leading  to  imprisonment  must  be 
of  attachment  may  be  made  in  Chambers,  and  made  by  the  Judge  personallv.  Davis  v.  Gal- 
may  be  dealt  with  by  the  Chief  Clerk,  except      move,  40  Ch.  D.  355;  39  id.  322. 

4G3 


*  466        COMPELLING   APPEARANCE.  —  PROCEEDINGS   IN    DEFAULT. 

the   defendant  as  having  absconded.11     And  if  the  plaintiff   does  not 

proceed   under   the   last-mentioned   Orders,   then,    for   the   purpose   of 

obtaining  a  writ  of  sequestration,  immediately  upon  the  return 

*  466    by  the  sheriff  of  non  *  est  inventus  to  the  attachment,  an  affidavit 

must  be  made,  that  "  due  diligence  was  used  to  ascertain  where 
such  defendant  was  at  the  time  of  issuing  the  writ,  and  in  endeavoring 
to  apprehend  him  under  the  same,  and  that  the  person  suing  forth  such 
writ  verily  believed,  at  the  time  of  suing  forth  the  same,  that  such 
defendant  was  in  the  county  into  which  such  writ  was  issued." l 

The  first  thing  to  be  done,  after  an  attachment  has  been  issued,  is  to 
deliver  it  to  the  sheriff  or  other  officer  to  whom  it  is  directed ;  and 
although  it  is  directed  to  the  sheriff,  it  may  be  delivered  to  the  under- 
sheriff,  by  whom  all  the  duties  of  the  sheriff  which  do  not  require  his 
personal  presence  are  usually  executed,  or  to  the  deputy-sheriff.2  The 
sheriff  or  other  officer  to  whom  any  writ  is  directed  or  delivered  ought, 
with  all  speed  and  secrecy,  to  execute  such  writ ; 8  and  neither  he  nor  his 
officers  can  dispute  the  authority  of  the  Court  out  of  which  it  issues ; 
but  he  or  his  officers  are,  at  their  peril,  to  execute  the  same,  according  to 
the  command  of  such  writ.4 

If  the  defendant  is  already  in  custody,  either  upon  a  criminal  sen- 
tence or  civil  process,  no  further  arrest  is  necessary;  but  the  sheriff 
must  give  notice  of  the  attachment  to  the  keeper  or  jailer  in  whose 
custody  the  defendant  is.5 

Although  all  writs  and  processes  are  ordinarily  directed  to  the  sheriffs, 
yet  they  never  execute  the  same  themselves,  but  the  under-sheriffs 
usually  make  out  their  warrants  to  their  bailiffs  or  officers  for  the  execu- 
tion of  such  writs  ; 6  and  it  is  the  duty  of  such  bailiffs  or  other  officers 
to  execute  such  warrants  according  to  their  directions.  These  warrants 
must  be  made  according  to  the  nature  of  the  writ,  and  contain  the  sub- 
stance thereof,  and  be  made  out  in  the  high  sheriff's  name,  and  under 
the  seal  of  office.7 

The  warrant  must  be  had  before  the  arrest;  or  the  arrest  will  be 
illegal,  and  the  party  aggrieved  may  have  his  action  for  false  imprison- 
ment, and  the  Court  will  direct  the  bail-bond  to  be  cancelled.8  The  war- 
rant must  be  :  "  So  that  I  may  have  his  body  before  the  Queen,  in  her 
Court  of  Chancery." 

n  Cons.  Ord.  XXII.  2.    Where  the  defend-  Sheriffs  of  London,  is  left  at  the  Secondary's 

ant  is  out  of  the  jurisdiction  the  attachment  Office,  Basinghall  Street;   and  if  to  the  Sheriff 

need  not  be  issued;  see  Butler  v.  Matthews,  19  of  Middlesex,  it  is  left  at  his  office  in  Red  Lion 

Beav.  549 ;  Hodgson  v.  Hodgson,  23  Beav.  604.  Square. 
In  other  cases  an  affidavit  of  due  diligence  to  8  Impey,  Off.  Sheriff,  45. 

execute  the  attachment  must  be  made.  4  Ibid.  33. 

i  Cons.  Ord.  XII.  6.  5  See  ante,  p.  463. 

2  Impey,  Off.  Sheriff,  36.     By  3  &  4  Will.  6  Impey,    Off.    Sheriff,  59;    Chitty's   Arch. 

IV.  c.  42,  §   20,  the  sheriff  of  each  county  is  609.     For  form  of  warrant,  see  Chitty's  Forms, 

required  to  name  a  deputy  in  London  for  the  350. 

receipt  of  writs,  granting  warrants,  making  re-  7  Impey,   Off.   Sheriff,   59.      As   to   special 

turns,  and  accepting  of  rules  and  orders  touch-  bailiffs,  see  Chitty's  Arch.  16,  609. 
ing  the  execution  of  process.    A  delivery  of  a  8  4  Bac.  Abr.  500 ;  Hall  v.  Roche,  8  T.  R. 

writ  to  this  deputy  is  a  delivery  to  the  sheriff.  187;  Chitty's  Arch.  610. 
Chitty's  Arch.  16.    A  writ,  if  directed  to  the 

464 


WHERE   THE   COPY   OF   THE   BILL    HAS   BEEN   SERVED.  *  468 

The  bailiff  or  officer  to  whom  the  warrant  is  directed  and 
delivered  ought,  with  all  speed  and  secrecy,  to  execute  the  same  *  ac-  *  467 
cording  as  it  commands  him  ;  and  he  is  bound  to  pursue  the  effect 
of  his  warrant.1  The  bailiff  of  a  hundred  may  execute  a  writ  out  of 
the  hundred  where  he  is  bailiff ;  for  he  is  bailiff  all  the  county  over : 2 
it  must,  however,  be  within  the  county ;  for  the  sheriff's  bailiwick  extends 
no  further.3  It  seems  that  an  arrest  may  be  by  the  authority  of  the 
bailiff,  though  his  be  not  the  hand  that  arrests,  nor  in  sight,  nor  within 
any  precise  distance  of  the  defendant :  it  is  sufficient  that  he  is  arrested.4 

An  arrest  on  a  Sunday  is  absolutely  void.6  If,  however,  a  defendant 
arrested  on  a  Saturday  escapes,  he  may  be  retaken  on  a  Sunday  ;  for  that 
is  not  in  execution  of  the  process,  but  a  continuance  of  the  former  im- 
prisonment.6 And  it  is  said  that  a  person  may  be  arrested  on  a  Sunday 
on  the  Lord  Chancellor's  warrant,  or  an  order  of  commitment  for 
contempt ;  for  he  is  considered  as  in  custody  from  the  time  of  making 
the  order,  and  the  warrant  is  directed  to  the  jailer  as  in  the  nature  of 
an  escape  warrant,7  under  which  it  has  been  held  that  a  defendant  may 
be  retaken  on  the  Lord's-day.8 

The  bailiff  or  other  person  to  whom  the  execution  of  the  process  has 
been  intrusted  must,  as  soon  as  he  has  executed  the  warrant,  return  it, 
together  with  his  answer  to  the  same,  to  the  sheriff ;  so  that  he  may  be 
ready  to  certify  to  the  Court  how,  and  in  what  manner,  the  warrant  has 
been  executed,  when  called  upon.9 

No  arrest  can  take  place  under  an  attachment  after  the  day  of  the 
return  of  the  writ ; 10  and  if  the  return  is  allowed  to  expire  before  any- 
thing is  done  upon  the  writ,  the  plaintiff  must  sue  out  another  attach- 
ment, but  will,  in  such  case,  be  allowed  the  costs  of  only  one  writ.11 
This,  however,  must  be  understood  as  applying  only  to  cases  where  the 
first  writ  has  not  been  delivered  to  the  sheriff ;  for  after  delivery  to  the 
sheriff,  the  duty  of  executing  it  lies  upon  him,  and  he  must  make  his 
return  to  the  Court  accordingly. 

A  sheriff  or  other  officer  employed  to  make  an  arrest  under  an 
*  attachment  cannot  justify  breaking  doors  in  executing  the  pro-    *468 
cess ; x  and  although  the  arrest  is  by  a  bailiff  or  other  officer,  it  is 
considered  as  the  act  of  the  sheriff,  who  makes  his  return  accordingly. 

i  Impey,  Off.  Sheriff,  45.  8  Impey,  Off.  Sheriff,  61. 

2  Ibid.  46.  9  Impey,  Off.  Sheriff,  46. 

3  Hammond    v.  Taylor,  3  B.  &  Aid.  408;  1°  Ibid.  59. 

Chitty's  Arch.  612.  u  Harr.   by  Newl.  118.     If  the  sheriff  does 

4  Watch  v.  Archer,  Cowp.  65;  Chittv's  not  receive  the  attachment  in  time  to  arrest  the 
Arch.  610.  defendant  and  bring  him  into  the  Court  on  the 

5  29  Car.  II.  c.  7,  §  6;  Chittv's  Arch.  611.  return  day,  at  the  place  where  the  attachment 

6  Impey,  Off.  Sheriff.  61;  Chitty's  Arch.  is  returnable,  he  should  not  arrest  him  thereon, 
611,  n.  (d);  id.  691.  but  should  return  the  process  tanle.     Stafford 

7  Ex  parte  Whitchurch,  1  Atk.  55;  see  v.  Brown,  4  Paige,  360.  Where  the  sheriff 
1  Anne,  Stat.  2,  c.  6,  §  1 ;  and  5  Anne,  c.  9,  §  3,  neglected  to  serve  an  attachment,  until  it  was 
which  enables  the  Judge  of  any  Court  out  of  too  late  for  the  defendant  to  appear  at  the  time 
which  process  has  issued,  by  virtue  of  which  a  and  place  where  it  was  returnable,  the  Court 
party  has  been  committed  to  prison  and  escapes  set  aside  the  arrest  of  the  defendant  thereon, 
therefrom,  to  issue  a  warrant  for  his  reappre-  Ibid. 

hension;   and  see  Bac.  Ab.  tit.  Escape,  E.  3;  *  See  Chitty's  Arch.  613. 

Chitty's  Arch.  608,  etseq. 

vol.  i. —30  465 


*  469         COMPELLING    APPEARANCE.  —  PROCEEDINGS   IN    DEFAULT. 

If  the  defendant  is  taken  on  an  attachment  for  want  of  appearance  or 
answer,  he  must  either  go  to  prison  for  safe  custody,  or  put  in  bail  to 
the  sheriff ;  for  the  intent  of  the  arrest  being  only  to  compel  an  appear- 
ance in  Court  at  the  return  of  the  writ,  or  an  answer  to  the  interrogatories, 
that  purpose  is  equally  answered,  whether  the  sheriff  detains  his  person, 
or  takes  sufficient  security  for  his  appearance  or  answer.2  The  sheriff 
may,  however,  if  he  pleases,  let  the  defendant  go  at  large  without  any 
sureties  :  but  that  is  at  his  own  peril ;  for,  after  once  taking  him,  the 
sheriff  is  bound  to  keep  him  safely,  so  as  to  be  forthcoming  in  Court.8 

The  method  of  putting  in  bail  to  the  sheriff  is  by  entering  into  a  bond 
or  obligation,  with  one  or  more  sureties,  to  insure  the  defendant's 
appearance  at  the  return  of  the  writ :  which  obligation  is  called  a  bail- 
bond.4  The  Statute  23  Hen.  VI.  c.  9,  having  prescribed  in  what  cases 
the  sheriff  may  take  a  bail-bond  in  actions  emanating  from  Courts  of 
Law,  and  prohibited  the  taking  a  bond  in  all  other  cases,  a  doubt 
appears  to  have  been  raised  whether  the  sheriff  has  or  has  not  a  right  to 
take  a  bail-bond  upon  attachments  issuing  out  of  the  Court  of  Chancery. 
But  this  question  has  been  set  at  rest  by  a  decision 6  which  determines 
that  a  sheriff  may  take  a  bail-bond  on  an  attachment  out  of  Chancery, 
but  that  he  is  not  compellable  to  do  so ;  and  that  whether  a  bail-bond 
shall  be  taken  or  not  is  in  the  discretion  of  the  sheriff,  as  regulated  by 
the  practice  of  that  Court.  The  consequence  is,  that  an  action  at  law 
will  not  lie  against  the  sheriff,  under  the  above-mentioned  statute,  for 
refusing  to  take  bail  from  a  defendant,  arrested  under  an  attachment 
issuing  out  of  the  Court  of  Chancery.6 

The  practice  of  the  Court,  however,  seems  to  be,  that  where  a  party 

is  taken  upon  an  attachment  for  a  contempt,  he  may,  when  the  contempt 

is  of  a  bailable  nature,  on  payment  of  the  costs,  which  are  13s.  8d., 

*  4G9    be  admitted  to  bail,  by  entering  into  a  bail-bond  *  to  the  plaintiff, 

to  the  amount  of  £40  himself,  with  two  sureties  in  £20  each,  to 
appear  or  answer,  as  the  case  may  be,  at  the  return  of  the  writ.1 

It  is  to  be  observed,  however,  that  a  contempt  in  not  paying  costs,  or  in 
not  obeying  a  decree  or  order,  is  not  of  a  bailable  nature ;  and  that  the 
sheriff  cannot  take  bail  to  an  attachment  issued  on  that  account.2 

2  3  Bla.  Com.  290.  writ,  and  that  he  will  not  depart  thence  without 

8  Ibid.  leave  of  the  Court.     Chancery  Rule  133. 

*  Ibid.      Where   an   attachment   is   in   the  In  Tennessee,  the  proceedings  by  attachment 

nature  of  mesne  process,  the  sheriff  may  take  to  compel  an  answer  are  regulated  by  statute, 

bail  for  the  party's  appearance;  and  on  a  re-  Code,  §  4360,  et  seq. ;  Ch.  Rule  7. 

turn  cepi,  the  sheriff  may  be  ordered  to  bring  5  Morris  v.  Hayward,  6  Taunt.  569;  and  see 

in  the  body;   or  he  may  sue  on  the  bail-bond.  Lewis  r.  Morland,  2  B.  &  Aid.  56;  Chitty's 

Binney's  case,  2  Bland,  99 ;  Deakins's  case,  id.  Arch.  1709. 

39g.  6  Studd  v.  Acton,  1  H.  Bla.  468. 

In  New  Jersey,  when  an  attachment  for  a  1  Hinde,  106. 

contempt  shall  be  served,  the  defendant  shall  2  Anon.  Prec.  Ch.  331 ;  Cowdray  v.  Cross, 

be  retained  in  custody  thereon,  to  answer  the  24  Beav.  445.     The  liability  of  the  sheriff  for 

exigency   of    the   writ,    until    the   return  day  an  escape  is  the  loss  actually  sustained;  and 

thereof,  unless   he    shall,    with    one    sufficient  the    Court    of    Chancery    will    ascertain    the 

suretv,  at  least,  give  bond,  in  the  penal  sum  of  amount.     Moore  v.  Moore,  25  Beav.  8;  4  Jur. 

five  hundred  dollars  to  the  plaintiff,  conditioned  N.   S.  250;   see  also  Sugden  v.  Hull,  28  Beav. 

for  his  appearance  on   the   return-day  of  the  263. 
attachment,  according  to  the  command  of  such 

466 


WHERE   THE    COPY    OF   THE    BILL    HAS   BEEN    SERVED.  *  470 

Where  a  sheriff,  having  taken  a  defendant  into  custody  upon  an 
attachment,  takes  bail  for  his  appearance,  he  may  assign  the  bail-bond  to 
the  plaintiff;  3  who,  if  the  defendant  neglects  to  appear,  or  to  put  in  an 
answer,  may  put  the  bail-bond  in  suit  against  him.  If  the  attachment 
be  for  not  answering,  the  plaintiff  may  also  have  a  messenger  into  the 
county  where  the  defendant  lives,  to  arrest  the  defendant,  and  bring  up 
his  person  to  the  Court,  —  which  is  the  more  effectual  way  of  proceed- 
ing.4 This,  however,  will  not  preclude  him  from  bringing  an  action,  at 
the  same  time,  upon  the  bail-bond,  against  the  defendant  and  his  sure- 
ties :  otherwise,  the  giving  a  bail-bond  would  be  quite  useless  ; 5  and  it  is 
to  be  observed,  that  if  an  action  is  brought  on  the  bail-bond,  the  defend- 
ant cannot  obtain  an  order  to  restrain  the  plaintiff  from  proceeding  in  it, 
without  first  clearing  his  contempt.6 

All  processes  against  any  person,  directed  to  the  sheriff,  ought  to  be 
duly  and  truly  executed,  and  returned  into  the  Courts  out  of  which  they 
issued ; 7  and  all  returns,  although  made  by  the  under-sheriff,  yet  must 
be  made  in  the  name  of  the  high-sheriff,  and  his  name  must  be  put 
thereto,  or  the  return  is  void.8  The  sheriff  must  also  return  truly,  and 
not  contrary  to  the  record  ;  if  he  does,  he  falsifies  all  his  proceedings.9 
If  the  sheriff  takes  the  party  to  jail,  he  should  lose  no  time  in  so  doing ; 
as  otherwise  the  time  may  expire  within  which  the  plaintiff  is  bound  to 
bring  up  the  defendant  to  answer  his  contempt.10 

The  return  ought  to  be  made  before  or  upon  the  day  of  return  named 
in  the  writ,  if  a  day  certain  is  named ;  but  if  the  writ  be  returnable  on 
a  return  day  not  certain,  the  sheriff  need  not  return  it  till  the  quarto 
post.11  An  attachment  returnable  "immediately"  should  be  returned  as 
soon  as  it  is  executed ;  but  it  is  in  force  till  the  last  return  of 
the  term  following  the  teste.1'2  If  executed  after  *  that  time,  it  is  *  470 
liable  to  be  discharged  for  irregularity.  The  party  prosecuting 
the  contempt,  however,  is  at  liberty  to  call  upon  the  sheriff,  by  an  order, 
for  his  return  to  an  attachment  returnable  immediately,  on  the  fifth  day 
after  it  is  put  into  the  sheriff's  hands.1 

If  the  sheriff  or  other  officer  does  not  make  his  return  of  the  writ 
directed  to  him,  the  Court  may  amerce  him.2  The  amercements  are  com- 
monly £5,  and  are  to  be  levied  by  being  estreated  into  the  Exchequer, 
•or  by  process,  out  of  the  Petty  Bag,  to  the  succeeding  sheriff,  to  levy  and 
pay  them  into  the  Hanaper ;  but  it  is  usual  to  give  the  sheriff  a  day  for 
that  purpose ;  and  if  he  do  not  by  that  time  return  the  writ,  the  Court 
will  set  the  amercement.8 

The  general  course  of  proceeding,  however,  to  obtain  or  compel  the 

8  Anon.  2  Atk.  507.  in  Chancery  may  be  impeached.     Leftwick  v. 

4  Ibid.;    Cowdray  v.  Cross,  24  Beav.  445.  Hamilton.  9  Heisk.  310. 

This  cannot  be  done  where  the  attachment  is  to  10  11  Geo.  IV.  &  1  Will.  IV.  c.  36,  §  15,  r.  4; 

compel  appearance.     Cons.  Ord.  X.  10.  Ord.  XII.  3. 

6  Beddall  v.  Page,  2  Sim.  224.  "  Makepeice  v.  Dillon,   Fort.   363;   Impey, 

6  1  Turn.  &  Ven.  115.  Off.  Sheriff,  333;  Braithwaite's  Pr.  289. 

7  Impey,  Off.  Sheriff.  333.  W  Seton,  1231;  Braithwaite's  Manual,  199. 

8  Impey,  Off.   Sheriff,  334;   Chitty's  Arch.  i  Braithwaite's  Pr.  289. 
619.  2  Gj]b.  Form.  Rom.  70. 

9  Ibid.    An  officer's  return  in  a  proceeding  8  Harr.  by  Newl.  118. 

467 


*  471    COMPELLING  APPEARANCE.  —  PROCEEDINGS  IN  DEFAULT. 

sheriff  to  return  an  attachment  is  as  follows :  The  party  prosecuting  the 
contempt  applies,  in  the  first  instance,  to  the  under-sheriff,  or  deputy- 
sheriff,4  to  make  a  return  to  the  writ,  and  either  to  file  it  at  the  Record 
and  Writ  Clerks'  Office,  or  to  hand  it  to  the  applicant.5  If  the  return  is 
not  made,  the  party  obtains  an  order  of  course,  on  motion,  or  petition  at 
the  Rolls,  directing  the  sheriff  forthwith  to  make  the  return.6  This 
order  is  served  on  either  the  sheriff,  under-sheriff,  or  deputy-sheriff ; 7 
and  if  it  be  not  obeyed,  the  party  obtains,  on  ex  parte  motion,  an  order 
nisi,  that  the  sheriff  do,  in  six  days  after  personal  notice  of  the  order, 
return  the  writ,  or,  in  default,  stand  committed.6  This  order  is  served 
personally  on  the  sheriff;  and  should  the  return  still  be  withheld,  an 
order  absolute  may  be  obtained,  on  ex  parte  motion,  supported  by  affi- 
davit of  service  of  the  order  nisi,  and  of  no  return.6  Where,  however, 
the  first  order  limits  a  time  for  the  sheriff  to  return  the  writ  upon  per- 
sonal service  of  the  order,  it  seems  that  he  may  be  attached :  in  which 
case  two  subsequent  orders  are  unnecessary.8 

Where  an  attachment  has  been  issued  to  the  Chancellor  of  the  county 

palatine  of  Lancaster  or  Durham,  and  he  omits  to  return  the  writ,  a 

peremptory  order,  which  is  obtainable  on  motion  or  petition  of  course, 

must  be  made  upon  him 9  to  return  it  within  a  certain  number  of 

*  471    days  after  service  of  the  order  :  upon  which,  if  *  he  returns  "  that 

he  hath  sent  his  mandate  to  the  sheriff,  who  hath  not  returned  the 
same,"  another  peremptory  order  may  be  obtained,  in  like  manner,  to 
the  sheriff,  commanding  him,  within  a  certain  number  of  days  after  ser- 
vice of  the  order  upon  his  under-sheriff,  to  return  the  mandate.1 

Upon  an  attachment,  there  are  three  ordinary  returns:  (1)  If  the 
defendant  cannot  be  arrested,  the  sheriff  returns :  "  The  within-named 
A  B  is  not  found  in  my  bailiwick ;  " 2  this  is  termed  a  non  est  inventus, 
and  upon  this  return,  further  process  of  contempt  is  grounded.  (2)  If 
the  defendant  is  arrested,  but  the  sheriff  either  accepts  bail  for  his  ap- 
pearance or  keeps  him  in  his  own  custody,  he  returns :  "  I  have  attached 
the  within-named  A  B,  as  within  I  am  commanded,  whose  body  I  have 
ready  ; "  this  is  called  a  cepi  corpus}  (3)  If  the  sheriff  arrests  the  de- 
fendant, and  lodges  him  in  jail,  or,  finding  him  there,  lodges  a  detainer 
against  him,  he  returns :  "  I  have  attached  the  within-named  A  B, 
whose  body  remains  in  Her  Majesty's  jail  for  my  county  of ,  under* 

4  Ante,  p.  466.  day.     People  v.  Wheeler,  7  Paige,  433.    For 

5  Braithw:ijte's  Pr.  289.  forms  of  order,  see  Seton,  1230,  Nos.  1-3;  and 
«  Seton,    1231.     In    New  York,    the   officer      for  forms  of  motion  paper,  petition,  and  affi- 

executinfj  the  attachment  must  return  the  same  davit,  see  Vol.  III. 

by   the  return  day  specified   therein,  without  7  Ante,  p.  466,  n.  2. 

any  previous  order  for  the  purpose.     In  case  of  8  Seton,  1231;  Cons.  Ord.  XXIII.  10. 

default,   an    attachment  may   forthwith   issue  9  But  where  the  order  was  erroneously  made 

against  the  officer;   which  will  not  be  bailable,  on  the  sheriff,  it  was  held  that  the  sheriff  must 

People   v.   Elmer,  3   Paige,  85.     Rut  he   may  obey  or  move  to  discharge  it;  Sugden  v.  Hull, 

return  the  same  at  any  time  during  the  actual  28  Beav.  263. 

sitting  of  the  Court  on  the  return  day  thereof,  2  Clough  v.  Cross,  2  Dick.  555,  558. 

unless  he  is  specially  directed  by  the"  Court  to  2  A  return   that  a  defendant  is   not  to  be 

return  it  immediately.     It  is  therefore  irregu-  found,  is  bad.     5  Dowl.  451. 

lar  to  take  out  an  attachment  against  him  ex  8  Braithwaite's  Pr.  272. 

parte  during  the  sittings  of  the  Court  on  that 

468 


WHERE    THE   COPY   OP   THE   BILL    HAS   BEEN    SERVED.  *  472 

my  custody  "  (or  as  the  case  may  be).4  Either  of  the  two  last- mentioned 
returns,  when  made,  puts  an  end  to  all  the  ordinary  process ; 5  unless  the 
defendant  afterwards  escapes  or  absconds, —  for  in  that  case  the  sergeant- 
at-arms  may  be  sent,  for  the  purpose  of  grounding  a  sequestration.6 

If  the  writ  is  directed  to  the  Chancellor  of  Lancaster,  commanding 
him  to  issue  his  mandate  to  his  sheriff  to  attach  the  party,  the  return  is, 
that  he  has  issued  his  mandate  according  to  the  terms  of  the  writ,  and 
that  the  sheriff  has  made  the  return  to  him  of  non  est  inventus,  or  as  the 
case  may  be. 

The  costs  of  an  attachment  issued,  but  not  executed,  are  lis.  2d. ;  if 
executed,  13s.  8d. ;  and  if  issued  against  more  than  one  party,  2s.  6d.  is 
payable  for  each  additional  party.7 

When  the  sheriff  returns  non  est  inventus,  the  plaintiff  may,  after  the 
return  day  named  in  the  attachment  already  issued,  issue  other  attach- 
ments, for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  the  arrest  of  the  defendant ;  but  as 
he  cannot  obtain  an  order  for  a  messenger,  or  for  the  sergeant-at-arms,3 
and  consequently  cannot  have  a  writ  of  sequestration,  to  compel  appear- 
ance, there  does  not  seem  to  be  any  case  in  which  it  will  be  for  the 
plaintiff's  interest  to  continue  a  compulsory  process,  after  a  return  of 
non  est  inventus. 

When  the  sheriff  attached  the  party,   and   took   bail   for   him,   the 
old  practice  was  for  the  plaintiff  to  move  for  a  messenger  to  bring 
*  up  the  defendant ;  but  now,,  a  messenger  cannot  be  obtained  to    *  472 
compel  appearance ; a  and  it  would  consequently  seem  that,  upon 
such  return,  the  plaintiff  has  no  other  course  open  to  him,  except  to 
enter  an  appearance  for  the  defendant.2 

When  the  sheriff  actually  arrests  the  defendant,  and  sends  him  to 
prison  for  want  of  appearance,  the  plaintiff  cannot  bring  him  to  the  bar 
of  the  Court ;  and  the  only  course  that  appears  to  be  open  to  him  is  to 
enter  an  appearance  for  the  defendant  under  the  General  Order ; 8  the 
provisions  of  the  Act  of  11  Geo.  IV.  &  1  Will.  IV.,4  enabling  the  plaintiff 
to  enter  an  appearance  for  the  defendant,  in  such  a  case,  being  obsolete 
in  practice,  though  not  expressly  repealed.5 

The  result,  therefore,  in  every  case  where  the  plaintiff  prosecutes  the 
contempt  for  not  appearing  against  the  defendant,  seems  to  be,  that,  if 
the  defendant  does  not  appear,  the  plaintiff  has  no  other  course  than  to 
enter  an  appearance  for  him :  and  as  the  defendant  cannot  be  brought 
to  the  bar  of  the  Court,  he  will,  if  arrested,  be  entitled  to  claim  and 
obtain  his  discharge  at  the  expiration  of  thirty  days  from  the  time  of 
his  being  actually  in  custody  or  detained ;  or,  if  the  last  of  thirty  days 
shall  happen  out  of  term,  then,  at  the  expiration  of  the  first  four  days 
of  the  ensuing  term  ;  and  the  plaintiff  must  bear  the  costs  of  the  pro- 

«  Ibid.  281.  2  Cons.  Ord.  X.  4;  Braithwaite's  Pr.  161. 

6  Frederick  v.  David,  1  Vern.  344;   Hinde,  »  Cons.  Ord.  X.  4;   and  see  Cons.  Ord.  X. 

100.  10;  Braithwaite's  Pr.  280,  284;  and  ante,  p.  460. 

6  See  Hook  v.  Ross,  1  Hen.  &  M.  319,  320.  *  Cap.  36,  §  11;  and  §  15,  r.  13. 

7  Brown  v.  Lee,  11  Bear.  379;  Braithwaite's  6  Braithwaite's  Pr.  279;  and  see  Fortescue 
Pr-  154.  v.  Hallett,  3  Jur.  N.  S.  806,  V.  C.  K. 


8  Cons.  Ord.  X.  10. 
l  Ibid. 


469 


*473         COMPELLING    APPEARANCE.  —  PROCEEDINGS   IN   DEFAULT. 

cess  of  contempt.6  The  consequence  is,  that,  in  practice,  an  attachment 
for  want  of  appearance  is  very  seldom  issued,  —  the  plaintiff,  almost  in- 
variably, on  the  time  for  the  defendant  appearing  having  elapsed,  at 
once  taking  the  course  of  entering  an  appearance  for  him,  under  the 
General  Order.7 

Section  IV.  —  Against  Particular  Defendants. 

Having  now  considered  the  mode  of  compelling  the  appearance  of  a 
defendant  upon  whom  service  has  been  effected,  and  who  is  not  entitled 
to  any  particular  privilege,  or  under  any  peculiar  disability,  the  next 
point  is,  in  what  manner  the  appearance  of  persons  so  privileged  or  dis- 
abled can  be  obtained. 

In  the  first  place,  if  the  Attorney-General,  upon  being  served  with  a 
copy  of  the  bill,  does  not  appear,  no  personal  process  issues  against  him 
to  compel  him  so  to  do  ;  but  if  he  will  not  appear,  it  seems  that  it  would 

be  considered  as  a  nihil  dicit.8 
*  473  *  If  the  defendant  claim  the  privilege  of  peerage,  and  do  not 
enter  an  appearance  upon  being  served,  in  the  manner  before  ex- 
plained, with  a  letter  missive  and  copies  of  the  petition  and  bill,1  he 
must  be  served  with  an  indorsed  copy  of  the  bill ;  and  if  he  do  not  then 
appear,  an  appearance  may  be  entered  for  him,  as  in  the  case  of  an  ordi- 
nary defendant,  on  an  affidavit  of  both  such  services  ; 2  and  the  same 
may  be  done  for  a  member  of  Parliament  who  has  been  served  with  a 
copy  of  the  bill,  and  has  neglected  to  appear  himself.3 

The  mode  of  proceeding  in  these  cases  was  formerly  by  sequestra- 
tion;4 and  it  seems  that  this  course  is  still  open  to  the  plaintiff,  if  he 
thinks  fit  to  adopt  it. 

In  order  to  obtain  a  sequestration  against  a  peer  of  the  realm,  or 
bishOp,  an  affidavit  must  be  made  of  the  service  of  the  letter  missive, 
and  of  the  copy  of  the  petition  upon  which  it  has  issued,  and  also  of  the 
service  of  a  plain  and  of  an  indorsed  copy  of  the  bill.5  Where  the  pro- 
cess is  required  against  a  member  of  the  Commons'  House  of  Parliament, 
the  affidavit  need  only  verify  the  service  of  the  copy  of  the  bill.6  An  ex 
parte  motion 7  must  then  be  made  for  a  sequestration  against  the  defend- 
ant's real  and  personal  estate,  —  which  the  Court  orders  nisi,  that  is, 
unless  the  defendant  shall,  within  eight  days  after  personal  service  of 
the  order,  show  unto  the  Court  good  cause  to  the  contrary.8  The  de- 
fendant must  be  served  personally  with  this  order,  and  if  he  persist  in 
refusing  to  appear,  then  an  affidavit  of  service  must  be  made,  and  coun- 

6  11  Geo.  IV.  &  1  Will.  IV.  c.  36,  §  15,  r.  5;  4  Formerly,  if  a  peer  of  the  realm  appeared 
Braithwaite's  Pr.  279,  280.  and  did   not  answer,  an  attachment  lay;  but 

7  Cons.  Ord.  X.  4.  now,  by  order  of  Parliament,  no  process  lies 

8  Barclay  v.  Russell,  2  Dick.  729.    As  to  the  but  a  sequestration.     Hinde,  131. 
course,  where  he  neglects  to  answer,  see  post,  5  For  form  of  affidavit,  see  Vol.  III. 
Chap.  X.  §  2.  6  Ibid. 

1  Ante,  p.  440.  1  For  form  of  motion  paper,  see  Vol.  III. 

2  For  form  of  affidavit,  see  Vol.  III.  8  Hinde,  81. 
«  Braithwaite's  Pr.  29,  n.,  337;  Cons.  Ord. 

X.  4;  ante,  pp.  444,  460,  461. 
470 


AGAINST    PARTICULAR   DEFENDANTS.  *  474 

sel  instructed  to  move  to  make  the  order  absolute.9  It  is  to  be  observed, 
that  where  an  order  nisi  for  a  sequestration  against  a  peer  or  member  of 
the  House  of  Commons,  for  want  of  an  answer,  has  been  obtained,  it  is 
good  cause  to  show  against  making  such  order  nisi  absolute,  that  the  an- 
swer has  been  put  in  ;  but  if  exceptions  have  been  taken  to  the  answer, 
the  time  for  showing  cause  will  be  enlarged,  until  it  shall  appear  whether 
the  answer  is  insufficient  or  not.10 

Personal  service  of  the  order  nisi  may  be  dispensed  with  in  cases 
where  the  privileged  defendant  keeps  within  his  own  house,  or  is 
*  surrounded  by  his  servants  to  avoid  service,  or  where  the  party  *  474 
serving  the  process  is  denied  access,  and  it  is  very  difficult  and 
almost  impossible  to  serve  the  order  personally.  But  to  dispense  with 
personal  service,  it  is  necessary  to  apply  to  the  Court  for  leave  to  sub- 
stitute a  service  in  lieu  of  it,  —  grounding  such  application  upon  a  proper 
affidavit  of  the  particular  circumstances  of  the  case  ;  and  the  Court  will, 
on  such  application,  exercise  a  discretion,  and  make  the  order,  if  the 
facts  stated  in  the  affidavit  are  strong  enough  to  warrant  such  a  pro- 
ceeding.1 Thus,  where  a  peer  defendant  avoided  the  service  of  an  order 
nisi  for  a  sequestration,  the  Court  of  Exchequer  made  an  order  that 
service  thereof  upon  his  clerk  in  Court,  and  at  his  dwelling-house,  or,  if 
no  person  should  be  met  with  there,  by  fixing  a  copy  of  the  order  on  the 
door,  should  be  good  service.2 

It  seems  that  the  same  course  of  proceeding  in  suing  out  and  issuing 
the  sequestration  is  observed,  where  it  is  sought  against  an  officer  of 
the  Court,  as  in  the  case  of  peers ; 8  with  the  exception,  that  the  affida- 
vit upon  which  the  order  nisi  is  applied  for  must  be  confined  to  the 
service  of  the  bill,  there  being  no  letter  missive,  as  in  the  case  of  a  peer. 

The  form  of  the  sequestration  issued  against  peers  and  other  privi- 
leged persons  is  nearly  the  same  as  that  issued  in  cases  of  contempt  by 
ordinary  persons,  with  the  exception  that  it  recites  the  order  nisi,  and 
the  order  for  making  it  absolute.4 


9  Hinde,  81.  For  form  of  affidavit  of  service,  against  Lord  Jersey;  upon  which  a  letter  mis- 
and  motion  paper,  see  Vol.  III.  sive,  with  a  copy  of  the  bill,  was  served  on  the 

10  Butler  v.  Kashfield,  3  Atk.  740.  From  the  defendant,  by  leaving  it  with  one  of  his  female 
observation  of  the  reporter,  appended  to  this  servants  at  his  residence  in  Berkeley-square, 
case,  it  may  be  inferred  that  upon  the  authority  His  Lordship  was  then  abroad.  On  his  neglect- 
of  what  the  Registrar  had  said  in  Lord  Clif-  ing  to  appear  to  the  letter  missive,  a  subpcena 
ford's  case,  2  P.  Wms.  385,  Lord  Hardwicke  was  served  in  the  same  way ;  and  upon  his 
had  allowed  the  cause  shown,  as  being  the  non-appearance  to  that,  an  order  nisi  for  a 
course  of  the  Court;  but  upon  reference  to  the  sequestration  was  issued:  when,  upon  inquiry 
Registrar's  book,  where  the  order  is  entered  at  his  lordship's  house,  it  appeared  that  he  was 
under  the  title  of  Butler  v.  Rashleigh,  it  ap-  still  abroad.  Thereupon,  on  an  affidavit  being 
pears  that  the  time  for  showing  cause  was  en-  made  of  these  facts,  Sir  Lancelot  Shadwell 
larged  till  the  next  seal.  Reg.  Lib.  1750,  A.  V.  C.  directed  that  service  of  the  sequestration 
495,  (o).  nisi  at   his  Lordship's  town   house  should    be 

1  Hinde,  81.  For  form  of  motion  paper,  see  good  service;  and  upon  a  motion  to  discharge 
Vol.  III.  the  V.  C.'s  orders,  Lord  Brougham  refused  the 

2  Mackenzie  v.  Marquis  of  Powis,  19  May,  motion.  See  Att.-Gen.  v.  Earl  of  Stamford, 
1739;  1  Fowl.  Ex.  Pr.  173.    In  Thomas  v.  Lord  2  Dick.  744. 

Jersey,  2  M.  &  K.  398   (and  see  Sheffield  v.  3  Corbyn  v.  Birch.  2  Dick.  635. 

Duchess  of  Buckingham,  Reg.  Lib.  1740,  fol.  4  For  form  of  writ,  see  Vol.  III. 
15,  26;  2  De  G.  &  S.  456,  n.),  a  bill  was  filed 

471 


*  475        COMPELLING   APPEARANCE.  —  PROCEEDINGS  IN   DEFAULT. 

When  the  order  for  making  the  sequestration  absolute  is  drawn  up, 

passed,  and  entered,  the  plaintiff's  solicitor  must  make  out  the  writ  of 

sequestration.5     The  Court  will  not  discharge  the  writ  till  the 

*  475    party  has  appeared,  and  paid  the  costs  of  the  process ;  when  *  he 

has  done  so,  he  may  move  to  discharge  the  sequestration,  upon 
notice  to  the  adverse  party  if  it  be  executed.1 

Upon  the  return  of  the  sequestration  against  a  defendant  having 
privilege  of  Parliament,  the  Court  may,  on  the  motion  or  other  applica- 
tion of  the  plaintiff,  give  him  leave  to  enter  an  appearance  for  the 
defendant  under  the  Stat.  11  Geo.  IV.  &  1  Will.  IV. ;  2  and  such  pro- 
ceedings may  thereupon  be  had  as  if  the  defendant  had  actually  ap- 
peared ; 3  but  this  course  of  proceeding  is,  in  practice,  superseded  by  the 
General  Order.4 

In  the  case  of  infants  and  persons  of  unsound  mind  not  so  found  by 
iuquisition,  it  is  provided  by  the  General  Order,  that  "  where,  upon 
default  made  by  a  defendant  in  not  appearing  to  or  not  answering  a 
bill,  it  appears  to  the  Court  that  such  defendant  is  an  infant,  or  a  per- 
son of  weak  or  unsound  mind  not  so  found  by  inquisition,  so  that  he 
is  unable  of  himself  to  defend  the  suit,  the  Court  may,  upon  the  ap- 
plication of  the  plaintiff,  order  that  one  of  the  solicitors  of  the  Court  be 
assigned  guardian  of  such  defendant,  by  whom  he  may  appear  to  and 
answer,  or  may  appear  to  or  answer  the  bill  and  defend  the  suit.5  But 
no  such  order  shall  be  made  unless  it  appears  to  the  Court,  on  the 
hearing  of  such  application,  that  a  copy  of  the  bill  was  duly  served  in 
manner  provided  by  the  Stat.  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  and  that  notice  of 
such  application  was,  after  the  expiration  of  the  time  allowed  for  ap- 
pearing to  or  for  answering  the  bill,  and  at  least  six  clear  days 6  before 
the  day  in  such  notice  named  for  hearing  the  application,  served  upon 
or  left  at  the  dwelling-house  of  the  person  with  whom  or  under  whose 
care  such  defendant  was  at  the  time  of  serving  such  copy  of  the  bill, 
and  also  (in  the  case  of  such  defendant  being  an  infant  not  residing 
with  or  under  the  care  of  his  father  or  guardian)  served  upon  or  left  at 
the  dwelling-house  of  the  father  or  guardian  of  such  infant;7  unless 
the  Court,  at  the  time  of  hearing  such  application,  shall  dispense  with 
such  last-mentioned  service."  8  The  plaintiff  may,  however,  obtain  an 
order,  appointing  a  guardian  of  an  infant,  although  no  default  has  been 
made  in  appearing  or  answering.9 

With  reference  to  the  service  of  the  notice  in  the  case  of  infants,  it 

6  Cons.  Ord.  III.  1.  *70  J  **  ^UT-  ^5'  Frazer  v.  Thompson,  1  Gfff. 

1  Hinde,   80;  and   see  post,  Chap.    XXVI-  337;  4  De  G.  &  J.  659;  Robinson  r.  Aston,  9 
§  7,  Enforcing  Decrees  and  Orders.  J«r.  224,  V.  C.  K.  B.;  and  see  ante,  p.  162, 

2  11  Geo.  IV.  &  1  Will.  IV.  c.  36,  §  12.  n.  10. 

3  ibid.  6  Sundays  are  included;  see  Cons.  Ord. 
*  Cons'.  Ord.  X.  4.  XXXVII.  11;  and  see  Brewster  v.  Thorpe,  11 
5  It  has  been  usual   to   order  the  solicitor      Jur.  6,  V.  C.  E. 

to  the  Suitors'  Fund  to  act  upon  occasions  of  '  For  form  of  affidavit  of  service,  see  Vol. 

this  kind  ;  see  Thomas  v.  Thomas,  7  Beav.  47  ;  III. 

Sheprard  v.  Harris,  10  Jur.  24,  V.  C.  K.  B. ;  8  Cons.  Ord.  VII.  3.     For  form  of  order,  see 

ante,  p.  162.    As  to  the  costs  of  the  solicitor  to  Seton,  1251;  and  for  form  of  notice  of  motion, 

the  Suitors'  Fund,  where  so  appointed,  see  Ord.  see  Vol.  III. 

XL.  4;  and  Harris  r.  Hamlvn,  3  De  G.  &  S.  »  Bentley  v.  Robinson,  9  Hare  App.  76. 

472 


AGAINST   PARTICULAR   DEFENDANTS.  *  476 

has  been  held  that,  where  the  infants'  father  was  dead,  service 
*at  the  house  of  their  mother  and  step-father  was  sufficient ; 1  so  *  476 
also,  service  on  the  head  of  a  college,  of  which  the  infant  was  an 
undergraduate,  was  held  sufficient,  where  the  plaintiff  could  not  learn 
where  the  infant's  parents  lived ; 2  and  the  general  rule  is,  that  notice 
should  be  served  at  the  dwelling-house  of  the  person  in  whose  care  the 
infant  is.8 

Where  the  infant  has  appeared,  service  on  the  solicitor  who  entered 
the  appearance  is  sufficient.4 

In  the  case  of  persons  of  unsound  mind  not  so  found  by  inquisition, 
the  Court  requires  to  be  satisfied  that  no  relative  will  undertake  his 
defence,  before  appointing  the  solicitor  to  the  Suitors'  Fee  Fund ; 5 
and  where  the  defendant's  family  concur  in  applying  for  the  appoint- 
ment of  some  other  person,  whose  fitness  is  shown  by  affidavit,  the 
Court  will  appoint  him.6 

Any  appearance  entered  at  the  instance  of  the  plaintiff,  for  a  defend- 
ant, who,  at  the  time  of  the  entry  thereof,  is  an  infant  or  a  person  of 
weak  or  unsound  mind,  unable  of  himself  to  defend  the  suit,  is  irregu- 
lar and  of  no  validity.7 

If  a  married  woman  is  made  defendant  jointly  with  her  husband,  and 
no  appearance  for  her  Is  duly  entered  by  him  or  her,8  the  plaintiff  may, 
within  three  weeks  after  service,  enter  an  appearance  for  her,  as  of 
course  upon  an  affidavit  of  service  of  the  bill  on  the  husband;9  or  where 
no  order  has  been  obtained  by  her  to  defend  separately,10  the  plaintiff 
may  apply  to  the  Court,  on  notice  to  the  husband,  for  leave  to  issue  an 
attachment  against  him;11  and  where  the  husband  is  plaintiff  in  the 
suit,  he  may,  if  no  appearance  has  been  duly  entered  for  her.  enter  such 
appearance,  as  of  course,  within  three  weeks  after  service  of  the  bill 
on  her,  on  an  affidavit  of  such  service ; 9  or  he  may  apply  to  the  Court, 
by  motion,  on  notice  to  her,  for  leave  to  issue  an  attachment  against  her.11 

1  Hitch  v.  Wells,  8  Beav.  576;  and  see  v.  Lord  Camoys,  9  Beav.  548;  McKeverakin  v. 
Lane  v.  Hardwicke,  5  Beav.  222;  Thompson  v.  Cort,  7  Beav.  347;  Biddulph  v.  Dayrell,  15  L.J. 
Jones.  8  Ves.  141.  (N.  S.)  Ch.  320. 

2  Christie  v.  Cameron,  2  Jur.  N.  S.  635,  6  Charlton  v.  West,  3  De  G.  F.  &  J.  156;  7 
v-  C.  W.  Jur.  N.  S.  614;  Bonfield  v.  Grant,  11  W.  R. 

3  Taylor  v.  Ansley,  9  Jur.  1055,  V.  C.  K.  275,  M.  R. 

B.;  and  an    affidavit    not    showing  that   this  t  Cons.  Ord.  X.  5;  see  Leese  v.  Knight,  8 

had   been   done   was   held   insufficient,  S.  C.  ;  Jur.  N.  S.  1006 ;    10  W.  R.  711,  V.  C.  K.     As 

O'Brien  v.   Maitland,    10  W.   R.   275,  L.   C. ;  to  appointing  guardians   ad  litem  of  infants 

Lambert  v.  Turner,  id.  335,  V.  C.  K.;  Turner  and  persons  of  unsound  mind,  see  ante,  pp.  160, 

v.  Sowdon,   10  Jur.    N.  S.    1122;  13    W.    R.  161,176. 

66,  V.  C.  K. ;  S.  C.  nom.  Turner  v.  Snowdon,  8  Cons.  Ord.   X.   3;    Steele  v.   Plomer,   1 

2  Dr.  &  Sm.  265;  see  as  to  service  of  notice,  M'N.  &  G.  83;  2  Phil.  782,  n.;  13  Jur.  177; 

where  infant  out  of  the  jurisdiction,  aw<e,  pp.  162,  Travers    v.    Buckley,   1  Ves.   Sr.    384,    386; 

452.    Where  service  could  not  be  effected  on  1  Dick.   138;  Braithwaite's  Pr.  321,   and  see 

an   infant   whose    interest   was   mer  ly   rever-  ante,  pp.  179-182. 

sionary,  the  bill  was  ordered  to  be  amended  by  9  Cons.  Ord.  X.  4;  Steele  v.   Plomer,   ubi 

striking  out  his  name  as  a  defendant.  Black-  supra  ;  Braithwaite's  Pr.  337.     For  the  practice, 

more  v.  Howett,  30  L.  J.  101.  and  as  to  applications  where  the  three  weeks 

4  Cookson  v.  Lee,  15  Sim.  302;  Bentley  v.  have  expired,  see  ante,  pp.  460-462;  and  for 
Robinson,  9  Hare  App.  76;  Ward  v.  Longsden,  forms  of  affidavit  and  prcecipe,  see  Vol.  III. 
id.  26.    And  the  same  rule  doubtless  applies  to  10  Ante,  p.  181. 

persons  of  unsound  mind  not  so  found.  "  Ante,  p.  182;  Cons.  Ord.  X.  10;  see  Leavitt 

5  Moore   v.  Platel,  7  Beav.  583,  Biddulph      v.  Cruger,  1  Paige,  421.     For  the  practice,  sea 

473 


477 


COMPELLING    APPEARANCE.  —  PROCEEDINGS   IN   DEFAULT. 


*  477  *  If  a  corporation  aggregate  is  defendant,  and  due  service  of 
the  bill  has  been  effected  upon  it,  then,  upon  affidavit  of  such 
service,  an  appearance  may  be  entered  for  the  defendant  by  the  plain- 
tiff;1 or  a  writ  of  distringas,2  instead  of  the  writ  of  attachment,  may, 
by  leave  of  the  Court,  be  issued 8  by  the  plaintiff,  directed  to  the  sheriff, 
or  other  officer  having  jurisdiction  in  the  district  of  the  corporation, 
commanding  him  to  distrain  the  lands  and  tenements,  goods  and  chat- 
tels, of  the  corporation,  so  that  it  may  not  possess  them  till  the  Court 
shall  make  other  order  to  the  contrary,  and  that  in  the  mean  time  he 
(the  sheriff)  do  answer  for  what  he  so  distrains :  so  that  the  defendant 
may  be  compelled  to  appear  in  Chancery,  on  the  return  of  the  writ,  and 
answer  the  contempt.4  (ii)  If  to  this  writ  the  sheriff  returns  nulla  bona, 
an  alias  distringas,  which  is  a  writ  commanding  the  sheriff  again  to  dis- 
train the  lands  and  tenements,  goods  and  chattels,  of  the  corporation, 
may  be  sued  out ;  and  if  he  returns  nulla  bona  to  this  also,  a  pluries  dis- 
tringas, to  the  like  purport,  may  be  issued.5 

Each  such  writ  must  be  prepared  by  the  solicitor  ;  a  praecipe  in  dupli- 
cate must  be  produced  to  the  entering  clerk  in  the  Registrar's  office,  — 
who  will  retain  one  copy,  and  mark  the  other  as  entered  as  before 
explained ; 6  and  the  writ  will  thereupon  be  sealed  by  the  Record  and 
Writ  Clerk,  upon  the  entered  praecipe  being  filed  with  him.7  Upon 
sealing  the  alias  or  pluries  writ,  the  previous  writ,  with  the  sheriff's 
return,  must  be  filed  or  produced  to  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerk.8 

The  return  days  to  be  inserted  in  these  writs  are  the  same  as  in  the 
case  of  an  attachment.9 

If  the  sheriff  returns  "  issues  "  10  to  the  first  n  or  second  distringas, 
or  "  issues  "  or  nulla  bona  to  the  third,  an  order  nisi  for  a  commission 
of  sequestration  may  be  obtained  against  the  corporation,  on  an  ex  parte 
motion  by  the  plaintiff ;  and  upon  proof  of  due  service  of  such  order, 
and  of  continued  default,  such  order  will  be  made  absolute,  on  a  like 
motion.12 


ante,  pp.  462.  564;  and  for  forms  of  notice  of 
motion, praecipe,  attachment,  and  indorsement, 
see  Vol.  Ill 

i  Cons.  Ord.  X.  4;  Braithwaite's  Pr.  337. 
For  forms  of  affidavit  and  praecipe,  see  Vol. 
III. 

2  McKim  v.  Odom,  3  Bland,  407,  426; 
An^ell  &  Ames  Corp.  §  667,  el  seq.  In  Jones 
i\  Boston  Mill  Corp.  4  Pick.  511,  it  was  said 
by  Parker  C.  J.  that  the  Supreme  Court  of 
Massachusetts,  as  a  Court  of  Equity,  had  au- 
thority to  issue  such  processes  against  cor- 
porations as  may  be  issued  by  the  English 
Chancery  Court,  as  distringas,  sequestration, 
&c.  And  see  Holland  v.  Cruft,  20  Pick.  321 ; 
Grew  o.  Breed,  12  Met.  363. 

3  It  is  conceived  that  the  writ  would   not 


now  be  issued  without   special  order;  and  see 
Cons.  Ord.  X.  10. 
*  Hinde,  140,  142. 

5  Seton,  1227,  1261 ;  Braithwaite's  Pr.  194- 

6  Ante,  p.  465. 

7  A  fee  of  5s.  is  payable  on  sealing  each 
writ.  Regul.  to  Ord.  Sched.  4.  For  forms  of 
these  writs  and  praecipe,  see  Vol.  III. 

8  Braithwaite's  Pr.  194. 

9  Ante,  p.  464. 

10  If  the  corporation  has  property,  the  sheriff 
usually  levies  40s.  under  the  first  writ,  £4 
under  the  second,  and  the  whole  property  of 
the  corporation  under  the  third.     Hinde,  140. 

11  See  Lowton  v.  Mayor  &c.  of  Colchester, 
3  Mer.  546,  n.;  Seton,  1227. 

12  Seton,   1227;    Braithwaite's    Manual,    61; 


(a)  A  distringas  "  does  not  act  as  an  injunc- 
tion, but  he  (the  person  interested)  has  to  have 
notice  if  any  one  wishes  to  transfer  the  fund, 
and  unless  he  then  moves  within  a  certain  time, 

474 


the  distringas  is  gone."  Hence  a  legatee,  who 
puts  a  distringas  on  shares  of  stock,  does  not 
accept  the  shares  so  that  he  cannot  afterwards 
disclaim.     Hobbs  r.  Wayet,  36  Ch.  D.  256. 


AGAINST    PARTICULAR   DEFENDANTS.  *  479 

*  The  commission  is  usually  directed  to  four  or  more  persons,1  *  478 
named  by  the  plaintiff,  directing  them,  or  any  three  or  two  of 
them,  to  sequester  the  rents  and  profits  of  the  real  estate,  and  the  goods 
and  chattels  and  personal  estate  of  the  corporation,  until  they  shall 
appear  to  the  plaintiff's  bill,  or  the  Court  make  further  order  to  the  con- 
trary. The  commission  is  prepared  by  the  plaintiff's  solicitor,  and  will 
be  issued  by  the  Eecord  and  Writ  Clerk,  upon  filing  with  him  a  praecipe, 
and  producing  the  order  directing  the  commission  to  issue.2 

The  return  to  a  writ  of  sequestration  is  indorsed  thereon ; 8  and  upon 
such  return  being  made,  the  party  prosecuting  the  contempt,  if  he 
wishes  to  have  another  sequestration,  or  any  further  or  other  remedy, 
must  apply,  specially,  to  the  Court.4  It  is  not  the  practice  to  file  the 
return.5 

A  sequestration  cannot  be  discharged  till  the  corporation  have  per- 
formed what  they  are  enjoined  to  do,  and  paid  the  costs  of  the  several 
writs  of  distringas,  and  of  the  sequestration,  including  the  commissioner's 
fees ;  but  upon  their  doing  this,  they  may,  upon  motion,  get  the  seques- 
tration discharged.6 

By  one  or  other  of  these  forms  of  process,  appearance  may,  in  almost 
all  cases,  be  compelled,  after  service  of  the  copy  of  the  bill  has  been 
effected ;  but  as  the  plaintiff  can  himself  enter  an  appearance  for  the 
defendant,  that,  as  has  been  already  observed,7  is  the  course  which  is 
usually  adopted  in  practice ;  and  it  is  rarely  found  desirable  to  carry 
out  process  of  compelling  appearance. 

Moreover,  the  plaintiff  may  proceed  in  the  suit,  by  delivering  a 
copy  of  his  interrogatories  to  a  defendant  who  has  made  default  in 
appearing.8 

The  affidavits  filed  for  the  purpose  of  proving  the  service  of  a  copy 
of  a  bill  upon  any  defendant  must  state  when,  where,  and  how  the 
same  was  served,  and  by  whom  such  service  was  effected.9 

The  plaintiff  having  duly  caused  an  appearance  to  be  entered  for  any 
defendant,  is  entitled,  as  against  the  same  defendant,  to  the  costs  of 
and  incident  to  entering  such  appearance,  whatever  may  be  the  event 
of  the  suit;  and  such  costs  are  to  be  added  to  any  costs  which  the 
plaintiff  may  be  entitled  to  receive  from  such  defendant,  or  be 
set  off  against  any  costs  which  he  may  be  ordered  *  to  pay  to  *  479 
such  dfifendant ;  but  payment  thereof  is  not  to  be  otherwise 
enforced  without  the  leave  of  the  Court.1 

for  form  of  order,  see  Seton,  1261,  No.  7;  and  see  *  Braithwaite's  Pr.  291. 

post,  Chap.  XXVI.  §  7,  Enforcing  Decrees  and  6  Goldsmith    v.   Goldsmith,    5    Hare,    123, 

Orders.   For  forms  of  motion  paper,  see  Vol.  III.  129;  lO.Iur.  561. 

1  It  is  not  essential  that  the  commissioners  6  Harr.  Dv  Newl.  150;  Hinde,  143. 
should  be  professional  persons.                                       7  Ante,  pp.  460,  472.  ' 

2  Braithwaite's  Pr.  240.     The  writ  must  be  8  Cons.  Ord.  XI.  5;  see  post,  p.  438. 
engrossed  on  parchment,  and  bear  a  20s.  stamp.           9  Cons.  Ord.  X.  8  ;  Davis  v.  Hole,  1  Y.  & 
Regul.  to  Ord.  Sched.  4.    For  forms  of  prcecipe,  C.  C.  C.  440;  6  Jur.  335. 

commission,  and  indorsement,  see  Vol.  III.  l  Cons.  Ord.  XL.  15.' 

8  For   form    of    a   return   nulla    bona,   see 
Vol.  III. 

475 


*  479        COMPELLING    APPEARANCE.  —  PROCEEDINGS   IN    DEFAULT. 

The  defendant,  on  the  other  hand,  notwithstanding  an  appearance 
may  have  been  entered  for  him  by  the  plaintiff,  may  afterwards  enter 
an  appearance  for  himself  in  the  ordinary  way  ; 2  but  such  appearance, 
by  such  defendant,  is  not  to  affect  any  proceeding  duly  taken  or  any 
right  acquired  by  the  plaintiff,  under  or  after  the  appearance  entered 
by  him,  or  prejudice  the  plaintiff's  right  to  be  allowed  the  costs  of  the 
first  appearance.8  A  defendant  cannot,  however,  take  any  proceeding 
in  a  cause  until  he  has  himself  entered  an  appearance,  notwithstanding 
the  plaintiff  has  entered  one  for  him. 

2  See  post,  Chap.  XIII.  Appearance.  *  Cons.  Ord.  X.  9. 

476 


*  CHAPTER   IX.  *480 

INTERROGATORIES    FOR   THE   EXAMINATION    OP   THE   DEFENDANTS    IN 
ANSWER   TO    THE   BILL. 

Formerly,  as  we  have  already  seen,  a  bill  in  Chancery  contained  an 
interrogating  part,  preceding  the  prayer,  which  consisted  of  a  repeti- 
tion of  the  stating  and  charging  parts  of  the  bill,  in  the  form  of  ques- 
tions to  be  answered  by  the  defendants.  This,  as  has  been  before 
observed,  is  by  the  late  Act  of  Parliament  directed  to  be  omitted  from 
the  bill ; x  but  if  the  plaintiff  desires  to  obtain  discovery  or  admission 
from  any  defendant,  he  may  file  interrogatories  for  the  examination  of 
such  defendant,  within  eight  days  from  the  time  limited  for  the  defend- 
ant's appearance.2  If  the  defendant  appears  within  the  time  limited, 
the  plaintiff  must  deliver  an  office  copy  of  the  interrogatories  to  the 
defendant  or  his  solicitor  within  eight  days  after  such  time  ; 8  but  if  the 
defendant  does  not  appear  within  the  time  allowed,  the  plaintiff  may 
deliver  the  interrogatories  at  any  time  after  the  time  allowed  has  ex- 
pired, but  before  the  appearance  of  the  defendant,  or  within  eight  days 
after  his  appearance.4 

The  interrogatories  must  be  filed  within  the  time  limited  by  the  Gen- 
eral Orders,  notwithstanding  that  a  demurrer  may  be  pending.5 

If  the  plaintiff  allows  the  time  for  filing  interrogatories  to  expire  be- 
fore he  has  filed  them,  he  cannot  tile  them  without  special  leave, 
to  be  applied  for  in  Court  on  motion,  with  notice,  or  in  *  Cham-    *  481 
bers  on  summons.1     In  practice,  the  application  is  usually  made 
on  summons  in  Chambers  ; 2  and,  as  a  general  rule,  the  plaintiff  will 

1  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  10;  ante,  p.  356.  Where,   under  the  old  practice,  the  inter- 

2  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  12;  Cons.  Ord.  XI.  rogatories  were  annexed  to  the  bill,  they  were 
2.  This  order  applies  to  amended,  as  well  as  regarded  as  incorporated  in  it.  Romaine  v. 
original  bills.     A  defendant  need  not  appear  Hendrickson,  24  N.  J.  Eq.  231. 

to   an  amended  bill    unless  he    is  required  to  8  Cons.  Ord.  XI.  4.     If  a  copy  is  left  at  the 

answer  it ;  and  the  intention  of  the  plaintiff  to  office  of  the  solicitor  by  whom  the  defendant  has 

call  for  an  answer  is  indicated  by  service  of  a  entered  an  appearance,  it  is  sufficient.     Bowen 

duly  sealed  and  indorsed  copy  of  the  amended  v.   Price,   2    I)e   G.    M.   &    G.  899,    reversing 

bill  ;  see  Braithwaite's  Pr.  328;  Braithwaite's  1  Drew.  307.    The  service  is  effected  in  the  same 

Manual,  159.     The  interrogatories  may  be  filed  manner  as  that  of  other  documents  which  do  not 

with  the  bill :  Braithwaite's  Pr.  38;  and  a  sealed  require  personal  service  ;  see  ante,  p.  455. 
copy  may  be  served  at  the  same  time  as  a  copy  *  Cons.  Ord.  XI.  5. 

of  the  bill.     Leaman  v.  Brown,  7  W.  R.  322,  5  Harding  v.  Tingey,  10  Jur.  N.  S.  873, 

V.  C.  K.  ;  but  in  such  case,  the  full  time  for  V.  C.  K. 

appearing  and  for  an?werin£,  namely,  thirty-  !  Cons.  Ord.  XI.  3;  see  for  applications  of 

six  days,  must  be  allowed  to  expire  before  the  this  sort,  Empson  v.  Bowley.2  S.  &  G.  App.  3; 

attachment  for  not  answering  can  be  sealed.  Denis  v.  Rochussen,  4  Jur.  N.  S.298,  V.  C.  W.; 

Braithwaite's   Manual,   184;   and   see  Cheese-  Dakins  ».  Garratt,   id.  579,  V.  C.  K.     As  to 

borough   v.  Wright,  28  Beav.  173;   see  Pub.  filing  separate  sets,  see  post,  p.  485. 
Stats.  Mass.  c.  151,  §§  7,  8.  2  Braithwaite's  Pr.  36. 

477 


*  482         INTERROGATORIES   FOR   EXAMINATION    OF    DEFENDANTS. 

have  to  pay  the  costs.8     If  the  application  is  made  before  the  time  has 
expired,  it  should  be  that  the  time  may  be  extended. 

In  like  manner,  interrogatories  cannot,  without  a  special  order,  be 
delivered  after  the  time  limited  for  so  doing  has  expired ;  but  leave  to 
deliver  them  after  the  time  has  elapsed,  or  for  further  time  so  to  do 
where  it  has  not,  may  in  a  proper  case  be  obtained  on  summons  at 
Chambers.4 

The  notice  of  motion  or  summons  must  be  served  on  the  defendants 
whom  it  is  intended  to  interrogate,  and  who  have  appeared.  The 
order,  if  made  on  motion,  is  drawn  up  by  the  Registrar ;  if  made  on 
summons,  it  is  drawn  up  in  Chambers  ;  and  where  it  extends  the  time 
to  file,  or  gives  leave  to  file  interrogatories,  it  must  be  produced  to  the 
Record  and  Writ  Clerk,  at  the  time  the  interrogatories  are  presented 
for  filing.5 

Where  the  defendant  is  out  of  the  jurisdiction,  the  Court  upon  ap- 
plication, supported  by  such  evidence  as  shall  satisfy  the  Court  in 
what  place  or  country  such  defendant  is,  or  may  probably  be  found,  may 
order  that  a  copy  of  the  interrogatories  may  be  served  on  such  defend- 
ant in  such  place  or  country,  or  within  such  limits,  as  the  Court  shall 
think  fit  to  direct :  and  such  order  must  limit  a  time  within  which  the 
defendant  is  to  plead,  answer,  or  demur,  or  obtain  from  the  Court 
further  time  to  make  his  defence  to  the  bill.6  The  application  is  made 
by  ex  •parte  motion  or  summons,  supported  by  affidavit.7  The  copies  of 
the  bill  and  interrogatories  may  be  served  together;8  and  therefore 
one  application  embracing  both  objects  is  ordinarily  made.9 

If  the  interrogatories  cannot  be  served  on  a  defendant,  within  the 
jurisdiction,  in  the  ordinary  way,  an  ex  parte  application  for  leave  to 
substitute  service  may  be  made  by  motion,  supported  by  affidavit,  as  in 
the  case  of  an  application  to  substitute  service  of  a  copy  of  the  bill.10 

Where  the  plaintiff  in  an  original  suit  had  neglected  to  file  his  inter- 
rogatories  within  the  time  limited,  the  plaintiff  in  a  cross-suit, 
*  482    *  by  being  the  first  to  file  interrogatories,  was  held  entitled  to 
have  his  bill  answered  first.1 

The  interrogatories  are  settled  and  signed  by  counsel ; 2  and  are  re- 
quired to  be  divided  into  paragraphs,  and  numbered  in  the  form  given 
in  the  General  Orders,  and  the  interrogatories  which  each  defendant  is 
required  to  answer  must  be  specified  in  a  note  at  the  end.8 

8  Dakins  v.   Garratt,  4  Jur.  N.  S.  579,  V.  ift  Ante,  p.  449.     For  form  of  motion  paper, 

C.  K.     For  forms  of  notice  of  motion  and  sum-  see  Vol.  III. 

mons,  see  Vol.  Ill  1  Garwood  v.  Curteis,  10  Jur.  N.  S.  199;  12 

4  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.  17;  see  Garwood  v.  W.  R.  509,  V.  C.  W. 

Curteis,  10  Jur.  N.  S.  199;  12  W.  R.  509,  V.  C.  2  Interrogatories  are  not  specified  in  Cons. 

W. ;    Bignold  v.  Cobbold,  11  Jur.  N.  S.  152,  Ord.  VIII.  1,  among  the  documents  requiring 

V.  C.  S.     For  form  of  order,  see  Seton,  1243,  counsel's  signature;  but  the  form  of  interroga- 

No.  3;  and  for  form  of  summons,  see  Vol.  III.  tories  in  Ord.  Sched.  B.  assumes  that  the  name 

5  Braithwaite's  Pr.  36.  of  counsel  will  be  attached.     As  to  the  Chief 

6  Cons.  Ord.  X.  7  (1),  (2);  ante,  p.  452.  Clerk's  power  to  pass  upon  the  relevancy  of  in- 

7  For  forms  of  motion  paper,  summons,  and  terrogatories,  see  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  XXI.  r.  1 ; 
affidavit,  see  Vol.  III.  Swabey  v.  Dovey,  32  Ch.  D.  352;   Martin  v. 

8  Leaman  v.  Brown,  7  W.  R.  322,  V.  C.  K.  Spicer,  id.  592. 

»  See  ante,  p.  451.  3  Cons.  Ord.  XL  1,  and  Sched.  B.     For 

478 


INTERROGATORIES    FOR   EXAMINATION    OF   DEFENDANTS.         *  483 

Where  a  written  bill  is  allowed  to  be  filed,  on  an  undertaking  that  a 
printed  bill  shall  be  afterwards  filed,4  interrogatories  may  be  filed  before 
the  filing  of  the  printed  bill.5 

Interrogatories  are  filed  at  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerks'  Office  ; 6  and 
they  must  be  written  on  paper  of  the  same  description  and  size  as  that 
on  which  bills  are  printed  ; 7  and  be  intituled  in  the  cause,  so  as  to  be 
in  strict  agreement  with  the  names  of  the  parties  as  they  appear  in  the 
bill,  at  the  time  the  interrogatories  are  filed.8 

The  copies  for  service  are  prepared  by  the  plaintiff's  solicitor,  but 
must  be  examined  with  the  original,  and  the  number  of  folios  counted, 
by  the  Clerks  of  Records  and  Writs,  who,  if  the  copies  are  duly 
stamped  and  properly  written,  will  mark  them  as  office  copies.9  The 
copy  for  service  on  any  defendant  should  only  contain  the  interroga- 
tories which  such  defendant  is  required  to  answer.10  If  the  copies  are 
intended  to  be  served  before  appearance,  a  copy  must  be  served  on 
each  defendant,  in  like  manner  as  the  copy  of  the  bill  is  required  to  be 
served ;  u  but  if  served  after  appearance,  it  is  sufficient  to  serve  one 
copy  on  each  solicitor  by  whom  an  appearance  has  been  entered,  not- 
withstanding he  may  have  appeared  for  more  than  one  defendant.12 

The  interrogatories  to  be  filed,  and  each  copy  for  service,  must  be 
indorsed  with  the  name  and  place  of  business  of  the  plaintiff's  solici- 
tor, and  of  his  agent,  if  any  ;   or  with  the  name  and  place  of 
*  residence  of  the  plaintiff,   where  he  acts  in  person  ;   and,  in    *  483 
either- case,  with  the  address  for  service,  if  any.1 

Under  the  former  practice  it  was  held,  that  as  the  object  of  the  inter- 
rogatories  was  to  compel  an  answer  to  such  facts  only  as  were  material 
to  the  plaintiff's  case,  it  was  necessary  that  every  interrogatory  should 
be  founded  upon  statements  made  in  the  former  part  of  the  bill ;  there- 
fore, if  there  was  nothing  in  the  prior  part  of  the  bill  to  warrant  an 
interrogatory,  the  defendant  was  not  compellable  to  answer  it.2  This 
practice  was  considered  necessary  for  the  preservation  of  form  and 
order  in  the  pleadings,  and  particularly  to  keep  the  answer  to  the  mat- 
ters put  in  issue  by  the  bill ; 8  and  it  is  conceived  that  this  practice  still 
continues.  But  a  variety  of  questions  may  be  founded  on  a  single  alle- 
gation, if  they  are  relevant  to  it ;   thus,    if   a  bill  is  filed  against  an 

forms  of  interrogatories,  see  Vol.  III.  and  foot-  The  stamp  is  impressed  on,  or  affixed  to,  such 

note.  copy.     A  prcecipe  is  required  to    be  left;   for 

4  See  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  6;  ante,  p.  396.  form,  see  Vol.  III. 

6  Lambert  v.  Lomas,  9  Hare  App.  29;    18  10  Cons.  Ord.  XI.  4. 

Jur.  1008.  u  See  Cons.  Ord.  X.  1;  ante,  p.  442. 

6  Cons.  Ord.  I.  35.     No  fee  is  payable  for  12  Braithwaite's  Pr.  37;  but  if  he  appears  as 

filing.     Braithwaite's  Pr.  35.  properly  concerned  for  one  defendant,  and  as 

1  Cons.  Ord.  6  March,  1660,  r.  16;  as  to  such  agent  for  another,  two  copies  should  be  served; 

paper,  see  ante,  p  396.     Dates  and  sums  may  see  id.  308,  n.     Any  copy  sealed  for  delivery, 

be  expressed  by  figures.  may  be  re-sealed,  at  any  time  before  delivery, 

8  Braithwaite's  Pr.  35.  and  without  further  fee. 

9  Cons.  Ord.  XI.  4.     The  copies  for  service  x  Cons.  Ord.  III.  2,  5;  ante,  pp.  397,  453, 
are  usually  written  on  brief  paper.     A  fee  of  454.     For  form  of  indorsement,  see  Vol.  III. 
5s.  higher  scale,  or  Is.  lower  scale,  is  payable,  2  Att.-Gen.  v.  Whorwood,  1  Ves.  Sr.  534, 
in   Chancery  Fee    Fund   stamps,  on   marking  538. 

each  office  copv.     Regul.  to  Ord.  Sched.  4.  8  Ld.  Red.  45. 

479 


*484  INTERROGATORIES    FOR   EXAMINATION    OF   DEFENDANTS. 

executor  for  an  account  of  the  personal  estate  of  his  testator:  upon  the 
single  allegation  that  he  has  proved  the  will,  may  be  founded  every 
inquiry  which  may  be  necessary  to  ascertain  the  amount  of  the  estate, 
its  value,  the  disposition  made  of  it,  the  situation  of  any  part  remaining 
undisposed  of,  the  debts  of  the  testator,  and  any  other  circumstance 
leading  to  the  account  required.4 

It  is  to  be  observed,  however,  that  the  interrogatories  must,  in  all 
cases,  be  confined  to  the  substantive  case  made  by  the  bill,  and 
*  484  that  the  plaintiff  cannot  extend  his  interrogatories  in  *  such  a 
manner  as  to  compel  a  discovery  of  a  distinct  matter,  not  in- 
cluded in  that  case ;  and  therefore,  where  a  bill  prayed  a  discovery 
in  aid  of  an  action  at  Law  under  the  Stock  Jobbing  Act,1  as  to  an 
advance,  by  the  plaintiff  to  the  defendant,  of  a  sum  of  money  without 
legal  consideration,  which  it  was  alleged  in  the  bill  was  advanced  as  the 
premium  for  liberty  "to  put  upon,  deliver,  or  refuse  stock,"  and  in 
consideration  of  certain  contracts  relating  to  stock,  which  were  void 
under  that  Act,  and  the  defendant  denied,  by  his  answer,  that  the  plain- 
tiff did  advance  or  pay  to  the  defendant  the  sum  mentioned,  or  any 
other  sum,  as  the  premium,  &c.  (as  charged  in  the  bill),  to  which 
answer  an  exception  was  taken,  because  the  defendant  had  not  nega- 
tived the  receipt  of  the  money  in  every  way  which  had  been  suggested 
in  the  interrogatory,  Lord  Eldon  overruled  the  exception,  because  the 
interrogatory  pointed  at  a  case  within  the  fifth  and  eighth  sections  of 
the  Act,  in  respect  of  which  no  bill  of  discovery  was  given  by  the  Act, 
whereas  the  allegations  in  the  bill  related  to  cases  within  the  first  section 
of  the  Act,  in  respect  of  which  a  right  to  file  a  bill  of  discovery  was 
given  by  the  second  section.2 

In  Attorney-General  v.  Whorwood,*  where  interrogatories  in  a  bill  were 
directed  to  particular  facts  which  were  not  charged  in  the  preceding 
part,  and  the  defendant,  though  not  bound  to  answer  them,  did  so,  and 
the  answer  was  replied  to,  Lord  Hardwicke  held  that  the  informality 
in  the  manner  of  charging  was  supplied  by  the  answer,  and  that  the 
facts  were  properly  put  in  issue ;  "  for  a  matter  may  be  put  in  issue  by 
the  answer  as  well  as  by  the  bill,  and,  if  replied  to,  either  party  may 
examine  to  it."4 

Although,  upon  the  authority  of  the  cases  above  cited,  it  appears  that 

■»  Ld.  Red.  45.    In  Faulder  v.  Stuart,  11  Ves.  general  charge  enabled  you  to  put  all  questions 

296,  301  (see  also  Muckleston  t'.  Brown,  6  Ves.  upon  it  that  are  material  to  make  out  whether  it 

52,  62),  a  defendant  declined,  by  his  answer,  was  paid;  and  it  is  not  necessary  to  load  (he 

to  set  forth  the  particulars  of  a  certain  consid-  bill,  by  adding  to  the  general  charge,  that  it 

eration,  which    it  was  alleged   in  the   bill  the  was  not  paid,  that  so  it  would  appear,  if  the 

defendant  pretended  was  paid  by  him  for  the  defendant  would  set  forth  when,  where,  &c. 

purchase  of  a  share  in  a  newspaper,  which  was  The  old  rule  was,  that  making  that  substantive 

the  subject  of  the  litigation.     Lord  Eldon,  upon  charge,  you  may,  in  the  latter  part  of  the  bill, 

the  question  of  the  sufficiency  of  the  answer  being  ask  all  questions  that  go  to  prove  or  disprove 

argued  before  him,  said:  "  It  all  depends  upon  the  truth  of  the  fact  so  stated." 
this,—  whether  there  is  such  a  charge  in  the  bill,  1  7  Geo.  II.  c.  8,  repealed  by  23  &  24  Vic. 

astothe  payment  of  the  consideration,  asentitles  c.  28. 

the  plaintiff  to  an  answer,  not  only  whether  it  2  Bullock  v.  Richardson,  11  Ves.  373,  375. 

was  paid,  but  as  to  all  the  circumstances,  when,  8  1  Ves.  Sr.  534. 

where,  &c.     I  have  always  understood  that  a  4  Id.  538. 

480 


INTERROGATORIES    FOR   EXAMINATION    OF   DEFENDANTS.  *  485 

a  plaintiff  might  formerly  ask  all  questions  necessary  to  make  out  a 
general  allegation  in  the  bill,  yet,  in  point  of  fact,  it  was  the  common 
practice  to  make  the  interrogating  part  an  exact  echo  of  the  stating  and 
charging  part  of  the  bill.  Now,  however,  this  practice  is  not  so  strictly 
adhered  to ;  for  modern  bills,  being  so  much  more  concise  than  bills 
formerly  were,  it  is  often  necessary  or  desirable,  in  the  interrogatories, 
to  inquire  after  particulars  included  in  a  general  allegation  in  the  bill. 
And  it  would  seem  that,  to  some  extent  at  least,  the  old  rule  requiring 
an  allegation  in  the  bill,  as  a  foundation  of  the  interrogatories,  has  been 
relaxed ;  for  it  has  been  held,  that  a  defendant  may  be  interrogated 
as  to  books  and  papers  in  his  possession,  relating  to  the  matters 
in  *  question  in  the  suit,  although  there  is  no  allegation  in  the  *  485 
bill  that  he  has  any.1  (a)  This,  it  is  conceived,  would  scarcely 
have  been  allowed  under  the  former  practice.  It  has  also  been  deter- 
mined that,  under  the  new  pra  ;tice,  it  is  not  necessary  to  introduce  in 
the  bill  allegations  suggesting  imaginary  facts,  in  order  to  found  an  inter- 
rogatory ;  thus,  when  a  bill  alleged  the  existence  of  a  mortgage,  known 
to  the  plaintiff,  but  did  not  allege  that  there  were  others,  an  interroga- 
tory whether  there  were  others  was  allowed.2 

Interrogatories  to  an  amended  bill  should,  in  the  case  of  original 
defendants  from  whom  an  answer  is  required,  be  confined  to  the  parts 
added  by  the  amendment,  if  the  amendment  is  made  after  answer,  or 
after  the  expiration  of  the  time  within  which  the  plaintiff  might  have 
filed  interrogatories  to  the  original  bill.3  Where,  however,  in  such  a 
case,  it  is  desired  to  interrogate  the  original  defendants  beyond  the 
amendments,  a  special  application  for  leave  so  to  do  must  be  made  by 
motion  or  summons.4  In  the  case  of  new  defendants,  added  by  the 
amendments,  the  interrogatories  may  extend  to  the  whole  bill,  the  bill 
being,  as  to  them,  an  original  bill ;  but  a  new  set  of  interrogatories 
must  be  filed,  as  the  old  interrogatories,  if  any,  cannot  be  amended  as 

*  Perry  v.  Turpin,   Kay    App.  49;    18  Jur.  2  Marsh  v.  Keith,  1  Dr.  &  Sm.  342;  6  Jur. 

594;    Parkinson  v.  Chambers,  1   K.  &  J.  72;  N.   8.  1182  ;   and  see   Hudson  v.   Grenfell,  3 

Mansell  v.  Feeney,  2  J.  &  H.  313,  318;  but  the  Giff.  388;  8  Jur.  N.  S.  878;    Piffard  v.  Beeby, 

Court  discourages  exceptions  to  the  answer,  on  L.  R.  1  Eq.  623:  12  Jur.  N.  S.  117,  V.  C.  K." 
the  ground  that  the  interrogatory  as  to  books  3  Wich  v.  Parker,  22  Beav.  59;  2  Jur.  N.  S. 

and   papers  is  not  sufficiently  answered,   such  582;  Denis  v.  Rochussen.  4  Jur.  N.  S.  298,  V. 

discovery  being  now  obtainable  in  Chambers,  C.  W. ;  Drake  v.  Symes,  2  De  G.  F.  &  J.  81; 

under  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §   18;  see  Law  v.  Southampton  Steamboat  Co.  v.  Rawlins,  10  Jur. 

London   Indisputable   Co.   10   Hare  App.  20  ;  N.  S.  118,  M.  R.;  12  W.  R.  285. 
Barnard  v.  Hunter,  1  Jur.  N.  S   1065,  V.  C.  S. ;  *  See  Denis  v.  Rochussen,  and  Southampton 

Rochdale  Canal  Co.  v.  King,  9  Hare  App.  49,  Steamboat  Co.  v.  Rawlins,  ubi  supra;  see  also 

note;    Kidger  v.  Worswick,  5  Jur.  N.  S.  37.  Att.-Gen.  v.  Rees,  12  Beav.  50,  54. 
Interrogatories  as  to  particular  documents  must, 
however,  be  answered.     Catt  v.  Tourle,  18  W. 
R.  966. 


(a)  A  general    roving  interrogatory   as   to  307.    See  Morris  v.  Edwards,  15  App.  Cas.  309; 

documents  in  his  possession  cannot  be  admin-  23  Q.  B.  D.  287;  Nicholl  v.  Wheeler   17  Q.  B. 

istered  to  a  defendant  after  he  has  once  made  a  D.  101;  Newall  v.  Telegraph  Construction  Co. 

sufficient  affidavit  of  documents,  when  the  effect  L.  R.  2  Eq.  756;  M'Garel  v.  Moon,  L.  R.  10 

will  be  to  compel  him  to  make  a  further  affidavit  Eq.  22. 
•s  to  documents.     Hall  v.  Truman,  29  Ch.  D. 

vol.  i.  — 31  481 


486 


INTERROGATORIES    FOR    EXAMINATION    OF   DEFENDANTS. 


to  the  new  defendants.5  Where  the  plaintiff,  having  amended  his  bill 
after  answer,  filed  interrogatories  to  the  whole  bill,  they  were,  on  the 
application  of  the  original  defendants,  ordered  to  be  taken  off  the  file ; 
but  leave  was  given  to  file  new  interrogatories  confined  to  the  amend- 
ments : 6  and  where,  after  a  defendant  had  put  in  a  voluntary  answer, 
the  plaintiff  amended  his  bill,  it  was  held  that  he  could  only  require 
an  answer  from  such  defendant  to  the  amendments.7  A  second  set  of 
interrogatories  to  the  same  bill  may,  if  the  time  for  filing  interrogato- 
ries has  not  expired,  be  filed,  without  order,  as  against  defendants  who 
were  not  previously  interrogated:  for  instance,  if  the  plaintiff  files 
interrogatories  for  the  examination  of  two  or  more  of  several 
*486  defendants,  and  afterwards  desires  to  interrogate  *the  other 
defendants  to  the  same  bill,  he  may  file  a  second  set  of  inter- 
rogatories for  the  examination  of  such  other  defendants.1  If  the  time 
has  expired,  an  order  giving  leave  to  file  the  second  set  of  interroga- 
tories is  necessary. 

If  the  interrogatories  first  filed  have  not  been  answered  by  any  defend- 
ant, the  plaintiff  may,  under  an  order,  amend  such  interrogatories,  so 
as  to  require  an  answer  from  such  other  defendants  ;  but  the  order  to 
amend  must  express  the  object,  and  the  defendant  as  against  whom  the 
interrogatories  were  first  filed,  must  be  served  with  a  copy  of  the  inter- 
rogatories as  amended.2  And,  generally,  interrogatories  may  be  amended 
under  an  order  as  of  course,  to  be  obtained  on  motion,  or  on  petition  at 
the  Rolls,  at  any  time  before  an  answer  is  put  in.3  (a) 

If  the  plaintiff  desires  to  waive  an  answer  from  the  defendant,  for 
whose  examination  interrogatories  have  been  filed,  but  who  has  not  an- 
swered them,  he  may,  at  any  time  before  filing  replication,  or  setting 
down  the  cause  for  hearing,  obtain  as  of  course,  on  motion,  or  on  peti- 
tion at  the  Rolls,  an  order  to  amend  the  interrogatories,  by  striking  out. 
so  much  of  the  heading,  and  of  the  note  at  the  foot  thereof,  as  requires 
an  answer  from  such  defendant : 4  but  if  he  has  been  served  with  a  copy 
of  the  interrogatories,  his  consent  should  be  obtained :  service  of  the 
interrogatories,  as  so  amended,  upon  co-defendants  who  have  answered 
is  unnecessary. 

When  an  order  for  leave  to  amend  the  interrogatories  cannot,  under 
the  ordinary  practice,  be  obtained  as  of  course,  the  application  for  it 


5  Braithwaite's  Pr.  310. 

6  Drake  v.  Symes,  2  De  G  F.  &  J.  81.  For 
form  of  notice  of  motion  in  such  case,  see  Vol. 
III. 

t  Denis  v.  Rochussen,  4  Jur.  N.  S.  298,  Y. 
C.  W".;  Wich  v.  Parker,  22  Beav.  59;  2  Jur. 
N.  S.  582;  and  see  post,  Chap.  XVII.  §  4, 
Exceptions  to  Answer. 

i  Braithwaite's  Pr.  35. 

2  Ibid.;  Braithwaite's  Manual,  183. 

3  Braithwaite's  Pr.  309.     For  form  of  order 


(a)  If  the  bill  is  amended  after  exceptions 
for  insufficiency  to  an  answer  are  allowed,  the 
plaintiff,  on  such  amendment,  may  serve  the  de- 

482 


on  motion,  see  Seton,  1252,  No.  2;  and  for 
forms  of  motion  paper  and  petition,  see  Vol. 
III. 

*  Braithwaite's  Pr.  310,  311.  Where  the 
interrogatories  do  not  extend  to  other  defend- 
ants, the  application  should  be  to  take  them 
off  the  file.  And  this  application  may  be  ex 
parte.  Stephens  v.  Louch,  W.  N.  (1868)  144; 
Hammond  v.  Hammond,  18  L.  T.  N.  S.  553. 
For  forms  of  motion  paper  and  petition,  see 
Vol.  III. 


fendant  with  amended  interrogatories. 
v.  Kilmorey,  L.  R.  11  Eq.  425. 


Newry 


INTERROGATORIES   FOR   EXAMINATION   OP   DEFENDANTS.         *  487 

must  be  made  on  summons  at  Chambers;  if,  however,  the  defendants 
will  consent,  it  may  be  obtained  on  petition  of  course  at  the  Rolls.5 

Amendments  of  interrogatories  are  settled  and  signed  by  counsel ; 
and  the  amendment  is  made  in  the  same  manner  as  in  the  case  of  bills.6 
Thus,  if  the  amendments  exceed  two  folios  of  ninety  words  in  any  one 
place,  a  new  engrossment  of  the  interrogatories  must  be  made  and  filed ; 
in  other  cases,  the  amendments  will  be  made  by  the  Record  and  Writ 
Clerk,  on  the  draft,  signed  by  counsel,  and  the  order  to  amend,  being  left 
with  him.7 

An  office  copy  of  the  interrogatories,  as  amended,  must  be  served  on 
each  defendant  who  is  required  to  answer  them,  or  on  his  solici- 
tor, if  he  has  appeared  by  one.  The  service  is  effected  in  *  the  *  487 
same  manner  as  service  of  the  copy  of  the  original  interrogato- 
ries. A  copy  of  the  former  interrogatories,  which,  though  stamped  for 
service,  has  not  actually  been  served  when  they  are  amended,  may  be 
amended,  re-examined,  and  restamped  at  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerks' 
Office  for  service,  without  further  fee,  on  a  'praecipe,  for  that  purpose 
being  left  there.1 

Where  the  interrogatories  are  amended,  each  defendant  previously 
served  has  his  full  time  for  answering  again,  from  the  date  of  the  serv- 
ice of  the  copy  of  the  amended  interrogatories.2 

The  costs  of  preparing  interrogatories,  which  have  not  been  filed  in 
consequence  of  admissions  being  subsequently  entered  into  between  the 
parties,  will  be  allowed  on  taxations  as  between  party  and  party.8 


5  See  Braithwaite's  Pr   310. 

6  Ante,  p.  422. 

T  Braithwaite's  Pr.  311.    No  fee  is  payable 
on  amending  interrogatories.     Ibid. 

1  Ibid.    For  form  of  praecipe,  see  Vol.  III. 


2  Braithwaite's  Pr.  311.     As  to  the  time 
allowed  to  answer,  see  post,  p.  488. 

3  Davies  v.  Marshall,  1  Dr.  &  S.  564;  7  Jur. 
N.  S.  669. 

483 


*488  *  CHAPTER  X. 

PROCESS   TO    COMPEL,   AND   PROCEEDINGS   IN   DEFAULT   OF   ANSWER. 
Section  I.  —  Against  Defendants  not  privileged,  nor  subject  to  Disability. 

Where  the  plaintiff  requires  the  defendant  to  put  in  an  answer  to  the 
bill,  whether  original  or  amended,  he  must,  as  we  have  seen,  rile  inter- 
rogatories for  his  examination ;  and  the  defendant  must  put  in  his  plea, 
answer,  or  demurrer,  not  demurring  alone,  within  twenty-eight  days 
from  the  delivery  to  him  or  his  solicitor  of  a  copy  of  the  interrogatories 
which  he  is  required  to  answer : 1  but  where,  using  due  diligence,  he  is 
unable  to  put  in  his  answer  within  the  time  allowed,  the  Judge,  on  suffi- 
cient cause  being  shown,  may  enlarge  the  time,  as  often  as  he  deems 
right,  on  such  (if  any)  terms  as  to  the  Judge  seem  just.2 

If  the  defendant  does  not  answer  within  the  time  allowed,  and 
procures  no  enlargement  of  the  time,  he  is  subject  to  the  following 
liabilities  :  — 

1.  An  attachment  may  be  issued  against  him.8 

2.  He  may  be  committed  to  prison,  and  brought  to  the  bar  of  the 
Court. 

3.  The  plaintiff  may  file  a  traversing  note,  or  proceed  to  have  the  bill 

taken  pro  confesso  agaiust  him.4 
*  489        *  It  may  be  remarked,  that  if  the  plaintiff  has  to  give  security 

for  costs,  the  day  on  which  the  order  to  give  security  is  served, 
and  the  time  thenceforward  until  and  including  the  day  on  which  such 
security  is  given,  are  not  to  be  reckoned  in  the  computation  of  the  time 1 
allowed  the  defendant  for  answering. 

Where  the  defendant  thus  becomes  liable  to  be  attached,  the  plain- 

1  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.  4.  4  This  is  the  express  provision  of  Art.  13 

2  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVIF.  8.  The  application  of  the  16th  Order  of  May,  1845;  Sand.  Ord. 
for  further  time  to  answer  is  made  on  sum-  983;  7  Beav.  xxiii.;  1  Phil,  lxviii.;  but  is 
mons  in  Chambers;  see  post,  Chap.  XVII.  §  3,  omitted  in  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVIII.  4,  corre- 
Ansivers.  sponding  to  that  Art.,  though  retained  in  Ord. 

3  See  Matter  of  Vanderbilt,  4  John.  Ch.  58.  XXXVII.  6,  corresponding  to  Art.  15  of  the 
If  the  plaintiff  makes  oath  that  a  discovery  is  16th  Ord.  This  appears  to  be  an  acciden'al 
necessary,  he  is  entitled  to  an  order  that  the  omission;  but  it  is  clear  that  the  consequences, 
defendant  answer  the  bill  or  be  attached;  and  though  not  expressed  in  the  General  Order,  of 
the  Court  will  not,  in  that  stage  of  the  cause,  a  defendant  msiking  default  in  answering,  re- 
inquire  whether  a  discovery  is  necessary.  Staf-  main  the  same  as  before;  see  Cons.  Ord.  XII., 
ford  v.  Brown,  4  Paige,  360.  Aj mbpcena  return-  XIII.,  and  XXII.  For  table  of  process  for 
able  on  Sunday  is  irregular,  and  will  not  warrant  want  of  answer,  see  Seton,  1267. 

the  issuing  of  an  attachment  for  disobedience  *  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.  14. 

thereof,  as  no  Court  can  he  held  on  that  day  for 
anv  purpose.    Gould  v.  Spencer,  5  Paige,  541. 

484 


AGAINST   UNPRIVILEGED    DEFENDANTS.  *  490 

tiff's  solicitor  may  prepare  a  writ  of  attachment ; a  the  indorsement  of 
which  states  it  to  be  for  not  answering.8  To  procure  the  sealing  of  this 
writ,  an  affidavit  of  the  service  or  delivery  of  the  interrogatories  must 
be  produced  to  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerk;4  and  a  praecipe  must  be 
entered  and  left  in  the  usual  manner.8  The  writ  must  be  directed  to 
the  sheriff  or  other  proper  officer,  and  lodged  with  the  under-sheriff, 
deputy-sheriff,  or  other  proper  person,  as  before  explained.s  If  the 
defendant  is  in  prison,  the  writ  must  be  lodged  with  the  keeper  as  a 
detainer.7 

When  there  is  just  reason  to  believe  that  any  defendant  means  to 
abscond  before  answering  the  bill,  the  Court  may,  on  the  ex  parte  appli- 
cation of  the  plaintiff,  at  any  time  after  an  appearance  has  been  entered 
for  him  by  the  plaintiff,  order  an  attachment  for  want  of  answer  to 
issue  against  him ;  and  such  attachment  is  to  be  made  returnable  at 
such  time  as  the  Court  directs.8  Such  application  should  be  made  by 
motion,  supported  by  affidavit  of  the  grounds  for  believing  that  the 
defendant  means  to  abscond  before  answering,  and  by  the  Record  and 
Writ  Clerks'  certificate  of  an  appearance  having  been  entered  by  the 
plaintiff.9 

It  is  customary  for  the  plaintiff's  solicitor  to  write  to  the  defendant's 
solicitor,  calling  for  an  answer,  before  the  attachment  is  issued.  The 
effect  of  such  a  letter  is,  that  the  plaintiff  on  whose  behalf  it  is  given, 
precludes  himself  from  issuing  the  attachment,  until  the  defendant  has 
had  a  reasonable  time,  either  to  put  in  his  answer,  or  to  obtain  an 
order  for  further  time  so  to  do.10 

An  order  for  further  time  cannot  in  strictness  be  granted  after  an 
attachment ;  moreover,  the  writ  is  considered  to  issue  the  first  moment 
of  the  day  on  which  it  is  sealed  and  tested.11  An  attachment 
*  is  therefore  regular,  and  not  to  be  set  aside,  if  sealed  before  an  *  490 
order  for  further  time  has  been  obtained.1  When  an  attachment 
has  been  issued,  but  has  not  been  executed  at  the  time  an  application 
for  further  time  is  heard,  the  plaintiff  may  consent  to  an  order  for 
further  time  being  made,  on  the  condition  that  the  attachment  is  not 
to  be  thereby  prejudiced;  but  such  condition  should  appear  by  the  order. 

2  See  ante,  p.  464.  7  See  ante,  p.  466. 

8  For  forms  of  attachment  and  indorsement,  8  Cons.    Ord.    XII.    1.    The   difference   be- 

see  Vol.  III.  tween  the  common  attachment  for  failing  to 

4  Braithwaite's    Pr.    164.     An    attachment  answer,  which  is  here  considered,  and  an  ex- 
will  be  issued  on  an  affidavit  that  the  defend-  traordinary  or  special  attachment  for  contempt, 
ant's  solicitor  has  admitted  the  delivery  to  him  is  noted  in  Hazard  v.  Durant,  11  R.  I.  195. 
of  the  interrogatories.     Sidebottom  v.  Adkins,  9  For  forms  of  affidavit  and  motion  paper, 
4  Jur.  N.  S.  942,  V.  C.  S.     If  no  appearance  see  Vol.  III. 

has  been  entered,  an  affidavit  of  the  service  of  10  Barritt   v.   Barritt,   3   Swanst.    395,   396; 

the  bill  is  also  necessary.     Braithwaite's   Pr.  Taylor   v.    Fisher,    6   Sim.   566.     These  cases 

165;   and   if   the   defendant   has   obtained   an  were  before  the  abolition  of  the   Six  Clerks; 

order  enlarging  the  time  to  answer,  it  should  but  solicitors  have  adopted  the  practice, 
be  shown  by  the  affidavit,  or  by  an  office  copy  :l  Stephens   v.   Neale,   1    Mad.    550;    Petty 

of  the  order,  that  such  time  has  elapsed.     Ibid.  v.  Lonsdale,  4  M.  &  C.  545,  548  ;  3  Jur.  1186. 
164.     For  form  of  affidavit,  see  Vol.  III.  l  Kirkpatrick  v.  Meers,  2  Sim.  16;   Taylor 

6  Ante,  p.  465.     For  form  of  praecipe,  see  v.  Fisher,  6  Sim.  566.     No  service  of  an  order 

Vol.  III.  for  time  is  now  necessary.    2  Smith's  Pr.  131. 

6  Ante,  p.  466. 

485 


*  491  COMPELLING    ANSWER.  —  PROCEEDINGS   IN   DEFAULT. 

The  sheriff  may  either  return  cepi  corpus,  attached  and  in  prison,  or 
non  est  inventus  ; 2  and  it  will  be  convenient  to  consider,  separately,  the 
course  to  be  adopted  by  the  plaintiff,  in  respect  of  each  one  of  such 
returns. 

First:  If  the  sheriff  attach  the  defendant,  and,  taking  bail,  return 
accordingly,3  the  plaintiff  is  entitled,  as  of  course,  to  move,  upon  pro- 
duction of  the  sheriff's  return,  for  an  order  that  the  messenger  attending 
the  Court  may  apprehend  the  defendant,  and  bring  him  to  the  bar  of 
the  Court.4  The  order,  when  drawn  up,  is  delivered  by  the  Registrar 
to  the  messenger,  who  thereupon  procures  the  Lord  Chancellor's  war- 
rant to  apprehend  the  defendant,  and  proceed  to  execute  the  same.  If 
there  is  a  vacancy  in  the  office  of  messenger,  the  Sergeant-at-Arms  will 
be  ordered  to  bring  up  the  defendant.8 

If  the  plaintiff  adopt  this  course,  and  the  defendant  is  taken  into 
custody  by  the  messenger,  the  plaintiff  must  take  care  that  the  defend- 
ant be  brought  to  the  bar  of  the  Court  by  the  messenger,  within  ten 
days  after  he  was  so  taken  into  custody,  and  within  thirty  days  after 
his  arrest  by  the  sheriff : 6  otherwise  the  defendant  is  entitled  to  his  dis- 
charge, without  payment  of  the  costs  of  the  contempt,  —  which,  in  such 
case,  are  to  be  paid  by  the  plaintiff.7  But  where  such  defendant  does 
not  put  in  his  answer  within  eight  days  after  such  discharge,  the  plain- 
tiff may  cause  a  new  attachment  to  be  issued  against  him  for  want  of 
his  answer.8 

If  the  messenger  finds  the  defendant  in  prison,  he  lodges  the  order 
and  warrant  with  the  keeper,  as  a  detainer,  and  makes  his  return  accord- 
ingly ;  whereupon  the  plaintiff  may  cause  the  defendant  to  be  brought 
to  the  bar,  under  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus.9 

Where  the  messenger  is  unable  to  find  the  defendant,  he  makes  a 
return  to  that  effect ;  and  the  plaintiff  may  then  obtain  an  order  for  the 
Sergeant-at-arms  to  apprehend  the  defendant. 

Secondly :  If  the  sheriff  arrest  the  defendant,  and  commit  him 

*  491    *  to  prison,  or  detain  him  if  already  in  prison,  and  return  accord- 

ingly,1 the  plaintiff  is  entitled,  upon  production  of  the  return, 
to  an  order  for  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus  cum  causis  directed  to  the  keeper 
of  the  prison,  or  other  officer  in  whose  custody  the  defendant  is,  com- 
manding him  to  bring  the  defendant  to  the  bar  of  the  Court.2  This 
order  will  be  made  on  petition  or  motion,  as  of  course.8  The  writ  will 
be  sealed  at  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerks'  Office,  on  production  of  the 
order,  and  must  be  made  returnable  on  a  day  certain.     Usually  one  of 

2  For  an  explanation  of  these  several  returns,  »  The  practice  here  stated  will  also  apply  to 

see  ante,  pp.  470,  471 ;  and  as  to  enforcing  a  a  case  where  the  keeper  of  a  prison,  in  which 

return,  see  id.  p.  470.  the  defendant  is  confined,  certifies  that  the  de- 

8  As  to  bail,  see  ante,  p.  468.  fendant  is  in  his  custody. 

*  For  form  of  order,  see  Seton,  1260,  No.  2;  2  For  form  of  order,  see  Seton,  1262,  No.  8. 

and  for  form  of  motion  paper,  see  Vol.  III.  The  plaintiff,  instead  of  adopting  this  course, 

5  Macnab  v.  Mensal,  2  Sim.  16.  may  serve  notice  of  motion,  under  Cons.  Ord, 

6  See  post,  p.  491.  XXII.  r.  1,  to  take  the  bill  pro  confesso,  as  here- 

7  Cons.  Ord.  XII.  2.  after  explained;  see  post,  p.  519. 

8  Ibid.  8  For  forms  of  petition  and  motion  paper, 
»  See  post,  p.  493.  see  Vol.  III. 

486 


AGAINST   UNPRIVILEGED    DEFENDANTS.  *  492 

the  days  appointed  for  hearing  motions  is  named ;  but  if  the  plaintiff  is 
limited  in  time,  another  day  may  be  fixed.4 

The  defendant  must  be  brought  to  the  bar  of  the  Court  within  thirty 
days  after  he  is  lodged  or  detained  in  prison  under  the  attachment,  or 
he  will  be  entitled  to  his  discharge,  without  paying  the  costs  of  con- 
tempt; which  in  such  case  will  have  to  be  paid  by  the  plaintiff.6  But 
the  plaintiff  may,  at  the  expiration  of  eight  days  after  such  discharge, 
issue  fresh  process,  if  the  answer  be  not  tiled  in  the  mean  time.6  Dur- 
ing vacation,  the  prisoner  may  be  brought  up  to  the  private  house  of 
the  Judge.7 

In  either  of  these  cases,  whether  the  defendant  be  brought  to  the  bar 
of  the  Court  by  the  messenger,  or  upon  habeas  corpus  by  the  officer  in 
whose  custody  he  is,  the  defendant,  if  he  persists  in  his  contempt,  will, 
upon  motion  of  course  by  the  plaintiff,  be  turned  over  to  Whitecross 
Street  Prison ; 8  or  remanded  to  that  prison,  if  already  imprisoned  or 
detained  there.9  The  plaintiff  may  then  either  press  for  an  answer,  or 
proceed  to  take  the  bill^»ro  confesso  against  the  defendant.10 

If  the  plaintiff  determines  to  press  for  an  answer,  he  should  move  for 
an  order  that  the  defendant  may  remain  in  custody  until  he  has 
answered  the  bill.11  Notice  of  the  motion  should  be  served  *  on  *  492 
the  defendant ; l  and  the  order  will  be  made,  if  the  Court  is 
satisfied  that  justice  cannot  be  done  to  the  plaintiff  without  an  answer 
to  the  interrogatories  from  the  defendant  himself ;  and  the  order  will 
not  prejudice  the  plaintiff's  rights  to  take  the  bill  pro  confesso.2 

If  the  plaintiff  determines  to  proceed  to  take  the  bill  pro  confesso 
against  the  defendant,  he  must  obtain  an  order  for  a  writ  of  habeas  cor- 
pus, directed  to  the  keeper  of  the  prison,  commanding  him  to  bring  the 
defendant  to  the  bar  of  the  Court.  This  order  is  made  on  petition  or 
motion  as  of  course,  supported  by  the  order  handing  over  or  remand- 
ing the  defendant  back  to  the  prison,  and  the  keeper's  certificate  of  his 
being  in  custody  there.8  The  application  for  the  writ  may  be  made  as 
soon  as  the  defendant  is  ordered  to  be  committed  or  remanded  back  to 


4  Braithwaite's  Pr.  224,  225  ;  and  see  post,  Court,  file  an  answer  in  the  name  of  the  defend- 
p.  492,  n.  7.  When  the  writ  has  been  duly  ant,  under  11  Geo.  IV.  &  1  Will.  IV.  c.  36,  §  15, 
executed  and  returned,  it  should  be  filed  in  r.  11;  see  post,  p.  472.  But  this  course  is  prac- 
the  Record  and  Writ  Clerks'  Office.  Oldfield  tically  abolished,  as  the  plaintiff  may  file  a 
v.  Cobbett,  2  Phil.  289.  For  forms  of  writ,  traversing  note ;  see  post  p.  513. 
indorsement,  and  prmcipe,  see  Vol.  III.  n  For  form  of  order,  see  Seton,  1264,  No.  14. 

5  Cons.  Ord.  XII.  3.  1  Aveling  v.   Martin,  17   Jur.  271,   L.  JJ., 

6  Ibid.  Vacations  will  be  reckoned  in  com-  overruling  Maitland  0.  Rodger,  14  Sim.  92; 
puling  the  thirty  days.  Fortescue  v.  Hallett,  8  Jur.  371.  For  form  of  notice  of  motion,  see 
3  Jur.  N.  S.  806,  V.  C.  K.,  where  it  was  held  Vol.  III. 

that  the  Stat.  11  Geo.  IV.  &  1  Will.  IV.  c.  36,  2  n  Geo.  IV.  &1  Will.  IV.  c.  36,  §  15,r.l2; 

§  15,  r.  5,  which  allowed  the  plaintiff  till  the  Braithwaite's  Pr.  270;  Maitland  v.  Rodger,  ubi 

fourth  day  of  the  ensuing  term,  if  the  thirty  svprn  ;  Potts  v.  Whitmore,   8  Beav.  317.     If 

days  expire  in  vacation,  is  superseded  by  the  the  defendant  does  not  appear  on  the  motion, 

General  Order;  see  also  Flower  v.  Bright,  2  J.  an  affidavit  of  service  of  the  notice   must  be 

&  H.  590.  produced  in  Court;  for  form  of  affidavit,  see 

"  Clark  v.  Clark,  1  Phil.  116.  Vol   III. 

8  For  form  of  order,  see  Seton,  1262,  No.  10.  8  For  forms  of  order,  see  Seton,  1263,  Nos. 

9  Ibid.     No.  12.  11  &  12;  and  for  forms  of  petition  and  motion, 
10  The  plaintiff  may  also,  with  leave  of  the  see  Vol.  III. 

487 


*  493  COMPELLING    ANSWER.  —  PROCEEDINGS   IN    DEFAULT.    . 

prison  ; 4  but  there  must  be  at  least  twenty-eight  days  between  the  day 
on  which  the  defendant  was  committed  or  remanded  back,  and  the 
return  of  the  writ.5  The  writ  will  be  sealed  at  the  Record  and  Writ 
Clerks'  Office,  on  production  of  the  order.6  On  the  return  of  the  writ, 
the  defendant  is  brought  to  the  bar  of  the  Court;  and  if  he  persists  in 
his  contempt,  he  will  be  remanded  to  prison,  to  remain  there  till  he 
answer  the  bill  and  clear  his  contempt ;  and  the  bill  will  be  ordered  to 
be  taken  pro  confesso  against  him  at  the  hearing  of  the  cause.7 

It  should,  however,  be  mentioned  here,  that  although  the  practice 
above  stated  may  still  be  adopted,  the  General  Orders  have  given  the 
plaintiff  an  easier  mode  of  obtaining  an  order  to  have  the  bill  taken 
pro  confesso,  in  the  event  of  the  attachment  being  executed  upon  the 
defendant.8 

If  the  plaintiff  resorts  to  the  practice  above  stated,  no  time  should 
be  lost  in  these  proceedings ;  for,  unless  the  plaintiff,  within  six  weeks 
after  the  expiration  of  two  calendar  months  from  the  time  the  defend- 
ant  was   lodged  or   detained  in  prison,  under  the   attachment, 

*  493   obtain  the  order  that  the  defendant  remain  *  in  custody  until 

answer  or  further  order,  or  that  the  bill  be  taken  pro  confesso, 
the  defendant  is  entitled  (upon  application  to  the  Court)  to  be  dis- 
charged, without  payment  of  any  costs,  unless  the  Court  see  good 
cause  to  detain  him  in  custody.1  Where,  however,  the  plaintiff  can 
show  that  an  answer  is  necessary,  the  Court  may  refuse  to  discharge 
the  defendant,  although  the  plaintiff  has  neglected  to  obtain  an  order 
to  detain  him  in  custody.2 

If  the  defendant,  upon  the  return  being  made  to  the  attachment  by 
the  sheriff,  be  in  jail  under  sentence  for  a  misdemeanor,  he  may  be 
brought  up  before  the  Court  by  habeas  corpus  in  the  manner  before 
explained;3  and  thereupon  he  will  be  turned  over  pro  forma  to  White- 
cross  Street  Prison,  though  actually  carried  back  to  the  prison  from 
whence  he  came.  Thereupon,  a  second  writ  of  habeas  corpus  issues, 
similar  in  all  respects  to  that  before  mentioned,  except  in  being  directed 
to  the  jailer  or  keeper  of  the  prison  to  which  the  defendant  has  been 
carried  back.  Upon  the  return  thereof,  the  defendant  is  brought  into 
Court  and  remanded  to  the  prison  from  whence  he  came,  without  being 
turned  over  again  to  Whitecross  Street  Prison ;  and  the  bill  may  be 
taken  pro  confesso,  in  the  same  manner  in  all  respects  as  if  the  defendant 
had  been  all  along  in  the  custody  of  the  keeper  of  the  latter  prison.4 

4  Simpson  v.  Barton,  13  L.  J.  (N.  S.)  Ch.  79,  order  directing  the  former  writ  to  issue.   Braith- 

j^j    r  waite's  Pr.  224. 

6  11  Geo.  IV.  &  1  Will.  IV.  c.  36,  §  15,  r.  2.  »  Cons   Old.  XXII.  1.     As  to  taking  bills 

6  Brai  hwaite's  Pr.  224,  225.     For  forms  of  pro  confesso,  see  post,  Chap.  XI. 

writ,  indorsement,  and  prmcipe,  see  Vol.  III.;  »  11  Geo.  IV.  &  1  Will.  IV.  c.  36,    §  15, 

and  see  ante,  p.  491.  r.  13.     The  two  months  and  six  weeks  run  in 

-  For  forms  of  order,  see  Seton,  1266,  Nos.  vacation.     Simmons  v.  Wood,  2  Hare,  644. 

5  &  6.     Where,  from  pressure  of  business  or  2  Potts  v.  Whitmore,  8  Beav.  317. 

other  causes,  the  matter  is  not  heard,  the  Court  3  Ante,  p.  491. 

mav  direct  a   new  writ   of    habeas  corpus  to  *  11  Geo.  IV.  &  1  Will.  IV.  c.  36,  §  15  r.  4; 

issue  without  payment  of  any  fee;  see  Cons.  5  &  6  Vic.  c.  22,  §  7;  25  &  26  V1C.  c.  104,  §  2; 

Ord.  XXX.  3.     The  direction,  in  such  case,  is  Braithwaite's  Pr.  283. 
sigued  by  the  Registrar,  and  indorsed  on  the 
488 


AGAINST   UNPRIVILEGED    DEFENDANTS.  *  494 

Should  it  turn  out  that  the  defendant  is  under  sentence  for  felony, 
there  is  apparently  no  power  in  the  Court  to  order  his  removal  until  the 
expiration  of  the  sentence  ; 6  and  consequently,  in  such  a  case,  it  seems 
that,  previously  to  the  General  Order  above  referred  to,6  no  order  to 
take  the  bill  pro  confesso  could  have  been  obtained,  nor  could  any  answer 
have  been  enforced  as  against  a  defendant  in  such  a  position. 

There  seems  to  have  been  some  difference  of  opinion  among  the 
Judges,  whether  the  13th  rule  of  the  statute  confers  upon  the  defendant 
so  absolute  a  right  to  his  discharge  that  it  cannot  be  waived  by  any  act 
done  by  him  either  previously  or  subsequent  to  the  expiration  of  the 
period  specified.7 

*  Thirdly:    If  the  sheriff  is  unable  to  attach  the  defendant,     *494 
and  return  accordingly,  there  are  different  modes  whereby,  under 
different  circumstances,  the  plaintiff  may  proceed  to  take  the  bill  pro 
confesso. 

If  an  affidavit  can  be  made,  that  due  diligence  was  used  to  ascertain 
where  such  defendant  was  at  the  time  of  issuing  such  writ,  and  in  en- 
deavoring to  apprehend  him  under  the  same,  and  that  the  person  suing 
forth  such  writ  verily  believed,  at  the  time  of  suing  forth  the  same, 
that  such  defendant  was  in  the  county  into  which  such  writ  was  issued, 
then,  upon  ex  parte  motion,  supported  by  such  an  affidavit,  and  the 
sheriff's  return,  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  a  writ  of  sequestration.1  But 
the  affidavit  must  be  precisely  in  the  words,  or  at  least  go  to  the  full 
extent,  of  the  language  just  mentioned ;  and  hence  it  is  often  impossible, 
from  the  conduct  of  the  defendant,  to  frame  an  affidavit  in  the  proper 
terms.2 

Where  such  an  affidavit  can  be  made,  another  course  for  the  plaintiff 
to  adopt  is,  upon  the  sheriff  returning  non  est  inventus,  to  move,  as  of 
course,  upon  such  affidavit,  for  the  Sergeant-at-Arms  to  apprehend  the 
defendant.3  If  the  Sergeant-at-Arms  arrest  the  defendant,  he  must 
bring  him  to  the  bar  of  the  Court  within  ten  days  thereafter.  If  he  find 
him  in  prison,  he  lodges  the  order  and  warrant  with  the  keeper  as  a 

6  Rogers  v.  Kirkpatrick,  3  Ves.  573.  Ball,  4  Beav.  101,  a  defendant  obtaining  leave 

6  Cons.  Ord.  XXII.  1.  to  answer,  subsequent  to  the  period  when  he 

7  In  Williams  v.  Newlon,  11  Sim.  45,  Sir  becomes  entitled  to  his  discharge,  has  still  a 
Lancelot  Shadwell  V.  C.  decided,  that  an  an-  right  to  the  benefit  of  the  statute, — which  right 
swer  put  in  by  a  prisoner,  when  entitled  to  his  he  has  neither  power  nor  capacity  to  waive. 
discharge,  inasmuch  as  it  prevents  the  plaintiff  1  Cons.  Ord.  XII.  6;  Braithwaite's  Pr.  287; 
from  having  the  bill  taken  pro  confesso,  de-  see  Seton,  1260,  No.  1;  and  for  forms  of  atfi- 
prives  the  defendant  of  the  right  conferred  davit,  motion  paper,  writ  of  sequestration,  and 
upon  him  by  the  statute,  of  being  discharged  pracipe,  see  Vol.  III.  A  sequestration  will 
without  payment  of  the  costs  of  the  contempt;  not  be  issued  on  an  attachment  returned  before 
and  in  Woodward  v.  Conebeer  (2  Hare,  506  ;  8  the  return  day.  Martin  r.  Kerridge,  3  P.  W. 
Jur.  642),  Sir  James  Wigram  V.  C.  was  of  opin-  241 ;  Re  Brown,  16  VV.  R.  962. 

ion   that  an   application    for   time   to   answer,  2  Storer  v.  Great  Western  Ry.  Co.  1  Y.  &C. 

made  by  the  defendant  prior  to  being  entitled  C.  C.  180. 

to   his  discharge,    and   the   acceptance  of  the  8  11  Geo.  IV.  &  1  Will.  IV.  c.  36,  §  15,  r.  1; 

time  thereupon  given,  prevented  the  operation  Braithwaite's  Pr.  286  ;  but  see  Seton,  1260,  No. 

ot  the  statute,  and  placed  the  defendant  in  the  1.    The  order  must  be  delivered  to  the  Sergeant, 

the  situation  he  would  have  been  in  had  its  or  his  deputy,  by  the  Registrar.     Ord.  XXX.  2 

provisions  never  been   enacted;   whereas,   ac-  For  form  of  motion  paper,  see  Vol.  III. 
cording  to  Lord  Lanydale  M.  R.   in  Haynes  v. 

489 


*496 


COMPELLING    ANSWER.  —  PROCEEDINGS   IN   DEFAULT. 


detainer,  and  returns  accordingly ;  then  the  same  course,  with  respect  to 
bringing  the  defendant  to  the  bar  of  the  Court,  must  be  pursued,  as  if 
the  defendant  had  been  apprehended  by  the  messenger,  and  within  the 
same  time.4  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  Sergeant-at-Arms  return  that  the 
defendant  cannot  be  found,  so  as  to  be  apprehended,  then,  upon  motion 
of  course,  supported  by  production  of  such  return,  the  plaintiff  is  entitled 
to  an  order  for  a  writ  of  sequestration.5 

In  either  of   the  above   cases,  that  is,   whether   the  writ  of 

*  495     sequestration  *  is  ordered  upon  motion,  supported  by  the  affidavit 

mentioned  above,  or  upon  a  return  of  non  est  inventus  by  the 
Sergeant-at-Arms,  it  would  seem  that  the  plaintiff  may  at  once  obtain 
an  order  to  take  the  bill  pro  confesso ;  which  is  granted  on  motion  of 
course. 

According  to  the  old  practice  of  the  Court,  independent  of  recent 
statutes  and  orders,  an  order  to  have  the  bill  taken  pro  confesso  was  of 
course,  upon  the  issuing  of  the  writ  of  sequestration,  even  though  it  was 
not  executed.1  In  consequence  of  this  rule,  it  does  not  seem  that  it  ever 
has  been  the  ordinary  practice  to  execute  writs  of  sequestration  upon 
mesne  jjrocess  ;  and  an  opinion  appears  at  one  time  to  have  prevailed,  that 
such  an  execution  was  irregular.2 

In  fact,  the  practice  appears  to  be  that  a  plaintiff,  upon  obtaining 
a  sequestration   against   a   defendant   for  want   of   an   answer, 

*  496    *  has  an  option  whether  he  will  proceed  to  take  the  bill  pro  con- 

fesso, or  to  compel  an  answer.  If  the  circumstances  of  the  case 
are  such  that  justice  can  be  obtained  by  taking  the  bill  pro  confesso,  he 
ought  not  to  cause  the  sequestration  to  be  executed ;  but  if  his  case  is 


*  Storer  v.  Great  Western  Ry.  Co.  1  Y.  &  C. 
C.  C.  180;  Braithwaite's  Pr.  286  ;  ante,  pp.  491, 
492. 

5  Braithwaite's  Pr.  287.  The  return  is  filed 
at  the  Report  Office.  For  form  of  order,  see 
Selon,  1261,  No.  4;  and  for  form  of  motion 
paper,  see  Vol.  III. 

i  Wyatt's  Pr.  352;  Harr.  by  Newl.  146. 

2  The  opinion  seems  to  have  arisen  in  eon- 
sequence  of  what  was  said  by  Sir  Thomas 
Clarke  M.  R.  (misprinted  "  Sewell,"  in  1  Dick. 
335)  in  Heather  v.  Waterman,  1  Dick.  335, 
and  Vaughan  r.  Williams,  id.  354,  where  he 
expressed  an  opinion  that  when  a  bill  had 
been  taken  pro  confesso,  on  a  sequestration  for 
want  of  an  answer,  the  execution  of  the  seques- 
tration was  unnecessary  and  improper.  These 
cases  appear  to  have  been  cited  by  Mr.  Dickens, 
the  Registrar,  in  the  notes  handed  up  by  him 
to  the  Lords  Commissioners  of  the  Great  Seal, 
in  Rowley  v.  Ridley,  2  Dick.  622,  in  support  of 
the  distinction  taken  by  him  between  seques- 
tration in  mesne  process  and  for  a  duty,  namely, 
that  a  sequestration  in  mesne  process  ought  not 
to  be  executed;  but  upon  reference  to  those 
cases,  it  appears  that  they  go  no  further  than 
to  show  that,  when  the  plaintiff  intends  to 
proceed   to    have   the  bill  taken  pro  conftsso 

490 


against  the  defendant,  the  execution  of  the 
sequestration  is  unnecessary,  and  therefore  im- 
proper: because,  the  object  of  executing  the 
sequestration  being  merely  to  compel  an  an- 
swer from  the  defendant,  the  same  purpose  is 
effected  by  taking  the  bill  pro  conftsso  against 
him  (by  which  process  the  plaintiff  obtains  the 
same  decree  that  he  would  have  been  entitled 
to  had  the  defendant  put  in  his  answer  and 
admitted  the  whole  case  made  by  the  bill); 
and  this  being  accomplished,  the  process  drops 
as  a  matter  of  course,  and  the  sequestrators 
become  accountable,  not  to  the  plaintiff  or  the 
Court,  but  to  the  defendant.  It  appears  from 
the  statement  of  this  case  by  Lord  Redes- 
dale,  then  the  Solicitor-General,  in  Simmonds 
v.  Lord  Kinnaird,  4  Ves.  735,  739,  that  the 
case  is  erroneously  reported;  and  in  the  note 
of  the  same  case,  in  3  Swanst.  306,  n.  (6),  Lord 
Thurlow  is  reported  to  have  said  that  he  could 
see  no  foundation,  either  in  the  reason  of  the 
thing,  or  in  the  history  of  the  Court,  for  sup- 
posing that  a  sequestration  to  compel  an  appear- 
ance or  answer  should  not  be  executed.  See 
also  Goldsmith  v.  Goldsmith,  5  Hare,  126,  127; 
10  Jur.  561,  from  which  case  it  appears  that 
sequestration  will  be  executed  in  a  proper  case. 


AGAINST   PARTICULAR    DEFENDANTS.  *  497 

such  that  an  answer  from  the  defendant  is  necessary,  he  may.  It  should 
be  observed,  however,  that  the  cases  in  which  a  plaintiff  can  have  occasion 
to  compel  an  answer  from  a  defendant,  instead  of  taking  the  bill  pro 
confesso  against  him,  are  comparatively  few,  and  are  in  general  confined 
to  bills  of  discovery,  where  the  answer  is  wanted  to  be  read  at  Law,  or  to 
obtain  some  admission  from  him  on  which  to  found  some  application  to 
the  Court;  and  that,  unless  in  such  cases,  the  proper  course  to  adopt 
is  that  of  taking  the  bill  pro  confesso.  For  these  reasons,  the  writ  of 
sequestration  is  very  rarely  executed,  upon  mesne  jtrocess  ;  and  it  will  be 
more  convenient  to  treat  of  the  practice  upon  the  execution  of  a  writ 
of  sequestration  hereafter,  in  the  section  concerning  the  proceedings  to 
enforce  decrees.1 

If  the  plaintiff  desires  to  take  the  bill  pro  confesso  against  a  defendant 
who  has  not  been  arrested  on  the  attachment,  or  by  the  Sergeant-at- 
Arms,  his  better  course  is  to  proceed  as  against  an  absconding  defendant, 
under  the  General  Order  on  the  subject  of  taking  the  bills  pro  confesso  : 2 
which  will  be  considered  in  the  next  chapter.8 

Section  II.  —  Against  Particular  Defendants. 

The  course  which  has  been  stated,  in  the  preceding  section,  is  appli- 
cable to  the  case  of  an  ordinary  defendant,  not  possessed  of  any  partic- 
ular privilege,  and  not  subject  to  any  disability.  It  remains  to  consider 
the  practice  to  be  adopted,  for  the  purpose  of  compelling  an  answer  from 
defendants  of  particular  descriptions. 

First:  If  the  defendant  is  privileged  from  arrest,  either  by  right  of 
peerage,  or  as  a  member  of  Parliament,  and  the  bill  is  for  relief :  as  soon 
as  the  time  for  answering  has  expired,  the  plaintiff,  instead  of  issuing 
an  attachment,  may  move,  as  of  course,  for  a  sequestration  nisi,  on  an 
affidavit  of  the  delivery  of  the  interrogatories,  and  the  Eecord  and  Writ 
Clerk's  certificate  that  no  answer  thereto  has  been  put  in.4  The  order 
must  be  served  personally  upon  the  defendant ;  and  at  the  expiration  of 
the  time  limited  in  such  order  nisi  for  showing  cause,5  the  plaintiff  may 
move,  as  of  course,  to  make  the  order  absolute,  upon  proof  by 
affidavit  of  service  of  the  *  order  nisi,  and  by  the  Kecord  and  *497 
Writ  Clerk's  certificate  that  no  answer  lias  been  filed,  and  the 
Eegistrar's  certificate  that  no  cause  has  been  shown.1 

Upon  the  order  for  the  sequestration  being  made  absolute,  the  plaintiff 
is  entitled  2  to  have  the  bill  taken  pro  confesso,  as  in  the  case  of  unprivi- 
leged parties  against  whom  sequestration  has  issued.8 

If,  however,  the  bill  is  for  discovery,4  it  is  not  necessary  for  the  plain- 

1  Pott,  Chap.  XXVI.  §  7.  derbilt,  4  John.  Ch.  58.     For  form  of  order,  see 

2  Cons.  Ord.  XXII.  Seton,  1261,  No.  6;  and  for  forms  of  motion 
8  Pott,  p.  518,  et  seq.  paper  and  affidavit,  see  Vol.  III. 

4  For  form  of  order,  see  Seton,  1261,  No.  5;  2  Jones  v.  Davis,  17  Ves.  368;  Logan  v. 
and  for  forms  of  motion  paper  and  affidavits,      Grant.  1  Mad.  620. 

see  Vol.  III.  3  See  ante,  pp.  494,  495;   and  see  Braith- 

5  As  to  showing  cause,  seeMagan  i>.  Magan,      waite's  Pr.  297. 

16  Jur.  587,  V.  C.  K.  *  Jones  v.  Davis,  ubi  supra;  and  see  post, 

i  Braithwaite's  Pr.  297;  see  Matter  Van-      Chap.  XXXIV.  §  2,  Bills  of  Discovery. 

491 


*498 


COMPELLING    ANSWER. 


PROCEEDINGS   IN    DEFAULT. 


tiff  to  obtain  a  sequestration ;  but  after  the  time  for  answering  has 
expired,  and  an  appearance  has  been  entered  by  the  defendant,  or  by  the 
plaintiff  on  his  default,6  the  plaintiff  may  apply  at  once  to  have  the  bill 
taken  pro  confesso,6  and  thereupon  the  Court  is  empowered  to  make  an 
order,  that  the  bill  be  so  taken,  unless  the  defendant  shall,  within  eight 
days  after  being  served  with  the  order,  show  good  cause  to  the  contrary.7 
The  order  is  obtained  on  ex  parte  motion,  supported  by  an  affidavit  of 
the  delivery  of  the  interrogatories,  and  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerk's 
certificate  of  default ; 8  and  the  order  will  be  confirmed,  in  like  manner 
as  an  order  for  a  sequestration  is  made  absolute.9  When  such  order  has 
been  pronounced,  the  bill,  or  an  examined  copy  thereof,  may  be  taken 
and  read  in  any  Court  of  Law  or  Equity  as  evidence  of  the  same  facts, 
and  on  behalf  of  the  same  parties,  as  could  an  answer  admitting  the 
contents  of  the  bill.10 

Where  the  Attorney-General,  being  a  defendant  to  a  suit,  fails  to 
answer  within  a  reasonable  time,  an  order  may  be  obtained  that  he  put 
in  his  answer  within  a  week  after  service  thereof;  or  in  default,  that,  as 
against  him,  the  bill  may  be  taken  pro  confesso.11 

In  the  case  of  a  corporation  aggregate,  not  answering  within  the 
time  limited,  the  plaintiff  may  issue  the  same  writs  of  distringas  suc- 
cessively, and  in  the  same  manner  as  it  is  before  stated  may  be  done 
to  compel  appearance ; 12  and  should  the  corporation  stand  out 
*  498  *  process  till  the  order  absolute  for  sequestration  issue,  then  the 
plaintiff,  upon  obtaining  such  order,  may  move,  as  of  course,  to 
have  the  bill  taken  pro  confesso.1 

Upon  default  made  in  answering  by  an  infant  defendant,  or  by  a  de- 
fendant of  weak  or  unsound  mind  not  so  found  by  inquisition,  the  Court 
will,  upon  the  special  motion  of  the  plaintiff,  order  a  solicitor  to  be 
assigned  guardian,  by  wrhom  such  defendant  may  answer  the  bill  and 
defend  the  suit.2  The  practice  as  to  this  motion,  and  the  affidavit  re- 
quired in  support  of  it,  are  similar  to  the  practice,  before  explained,  in 
the  case  of  default  in  appearance.8     Even  when  the  infant  is  a  married 


5  Either  under  11  Geo.  IV.  &  1  Will.  IV. 
c.  36,  §  12,  or  Cons.  Ord.  X.  4-7,  it  would  seem. 
Braithwaite's  Pr.  298. 

6  See  O'Brien  v.  Manders,  2  Irish  Eq.  39; 
Wilson  v.  Shawe,  Craw.  &  Dix,  62;  Stafford 
v.  Burn,  4  Paige,  560. 

If  a  defendant,  after  appearing,  will  not 
answer,  the  bill  will  be  taken  pro  confesso. 
Caines  v.  Fisher,  1  John.  Ch.  8.  And  where 
the  bill  is  for  relief  only,  and  states  sufficient 
ground,  the  process  for  contempt  to  compel  an 
answer  is  not  necessary.  Ibid.  In  New  Jersey, 
a  decree  pro  confesso  may  be  taken  at  any  time, 
after  the  time  limited  for  the  defendant  to  plead, 
answer,  or  demur,  has  expired.  It  may  be 
taken  without  notice,  and  of  course,  unless  it 
appear  that  some  prejudice  will  thereby  accrue 
to  the  adverse  party.  Oakley  t\  O'Neill,  1 
Green  Ch.  287;  see  Nesbit  v.  St.  Patrick's 
Church,  9  N.  J.  Eq.  76.  So  in  Tennessee  Code, 
§  4369;  Anonymous,  1  Tenn.  Ch.  2. 
492 


7  11  Geo.  IV.  &  1  Will.  IV.  c.  36,  §  13. 

8  For  forms  of  motion  paper  and  affidavit, 
see  Vol.  III. 

9  Ante.  pp.  496,  497. 

i°  11  Geo.  IV.  and  1  Will.  IV.  c.  36,  §  14. 

ii  Groom  v.  Att.-Gen.  9  Sim.  325.  Now, 
however,  it  is  unusual  to  ask  for  any  answer 
from  the  Attorney-General.  For  form  of  mo- 
tion paper,  see  Vol.  III. 

i2  See  ante,  p.  477;  McKim  v.  Odom,  3 
Bland,  407.  426. 

i  Braithwaite's  Pr.  297.  Angell  &  Ames, 
Corp.  §  667,  et  seq.  For  form  of  order,  see 
Seton,  1266,  No.  4;  and  for  form  of  motion 
paper,  see  Vol.  III. 

2  Cons.  Ord.  VII.  3. 

3  Ante,  p.  475.  Where  the  infant  had 
appeared,  service  of  the  notice  of  motion  on 
the  solicitor  who  had  entered  the  appearance 
was  held  sufficient.  Cookson  v.  Lee,  15  Sun. 
302.     In  Bentley  r.  Robinson,  9  Hare  App.  76, 


AGAINST   PARTICULAR   DEFENDANTS.  *  499 

woman,  a  guardian  must  be  appointed  to  put  in  an  answer  on  her  behalf.4 
As  we  have  seen,  however,  no  answer  should  now  be  required  from  an 
infant  defendant. 

In  general,  when  a  husband  and  wife  are  made  defendants  to  a  cause, 
and  no  special  order  has  been  made  with  respect  to  the  plaintiff's  right 
to  demand  an  answer,  or  affecting  the  liabilities  of  either  husband  or 
wife  for  not  duly  answering,  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  have  their  joint 
answer,  within  the  ordinary  period  after  service  of  the  interrogatories  ; 
and  in  default  of  such  joint  answer  being  put  in,  the  husband  alone  in- 
curs all  the  ordinary  consequences  of  contempt.6  Their  respective  rights 
and  liabilities  are,  however,  often  varied  upon  the  application,  either  of 
the  plaintiff,  or  of  the  husband,  or  the  wife  ;  aDd  the  circumstances 
under  which  such  an  application  may  be  made  to  the  Court,  and  the 
course  of  practice  in  relation  thereto,  have  been  fully  explained  in  a 
former  part  of  this  treatise.6 

When  a  husband  is  willing  to  answer  jointly,  it  must  not  be  supposed 
that  the  wife  is  bound  to  acquiesce  in  any  answer  the  husband 
may  please  to  put  in  ;  nor  is  the  husband  justified  in  *  using  *  499 
menaces,  to  constrain  her  consent  to  an  answer  contrary  to  her 
belief:  for  such  conduct,  a  husband  is  punishable  as  for  a  contempt,  and 
the  wife,  thus  conscientiously  dissenting,  may,  upon  application  to  the 
Court,  obtain  an  order  to  answer  separately.1 

The  separate  answer  of  a  married  woman  cannot  (except  where  her 
husband  is  a  plaintiff)  2  be  filed  without  a  previous  order  for  that  pur- 
pose ; 8  nor  can  she  be  viewed  as  a  substantial  party  to  the  suit,  until 
such  order  be  obtained  ;  and  she  is  entitled  to  compute  the  full  time 
for  answering  from  the  date  of  the  order  allowing  her  to  answer  sepa- 
rately, without  regard  to  any  orders  for  time  previously  granted  to  her 
husband.4 

Where  an  order  for  a  married  woman  to  answer  separately  has  been 
obtained,  the  plaintiff  may  proceed  to  compel  an  answer  by  attachment ; 
and  this  right  would  seem  to  exist  in  the  plaintiff,  whatever  be  the  object 
of  the  suit,  whether  relating  to  the  separate  estate  of  the  wife  or  not.6 

a  guardian  was  appointed  for  an  infant  not  in  13   N.  J.  Eq.  45.      If  the  wife  be  absent,  the 

default,  on  the  application  of  the  plaintiff;  no  husband  may  obtain  time  to  issue  a  commission 

answer  being  required.     Where  the  infant  has  to  obtain  the  wife's  oath  to  the  answer,  and  if 

already  appeared  by  a  guardian  ad  litem,  the  she  refuse  to  answer,  the  bill  may  be   taken 

guardian  may  be  proceeded  against  in  the  same  pro  confesso  against   her.     Leavitt  v.  Cruger, 

manner  as  other  persons,  to  compel  an  answer.  1  Paige,  422;   Ferguson  v.  Smith,  2  J'>hn.  Ch. 

See  also  Wood  v.   Logsden,  9  Hare  App.  26;  139.     But   in    New  Jersey,  if  the  husband  be 

1  Hoff.  Ch.  Pr.  182.  served,  and  the  wife  be  out  of  the  State,  it  is 

4  Coleman  v.  Northcote,  2  Hare,  147,  and  necessary  to  have  an  order  of  publication  against 
cases  cited,  id.  148,  n.;  7  Jur.  528;  and  see  her,  unless  the  husband  appear  for  her.  Halst. 
ante,  pn.  163,  183.  Dig.  170-174;  Chancery  Rule  23 

5  Gee  v.  Cottle,  3  M.  &  C.  180;  Steele  v.  »  Ex  parte  Halsam,  2  Atk.  50;  ante,  p.  181. 
Plomer,  2  Phil.  782,  n.  (a) ;   1  M'N.  &  G.  83;  2  Ante,  p.  182. 

better  reported  13  Jur.  177;  see  Metier  v.  Met-  8  Garey  v.  Whittingham,  1  S.  &  S.  163;  but 

ler,  19  N.  J.  Eq.  457;   Bird  r.  Davis,  14  N.  J.  no  such  order  is  necessary  whenever  the  wife  is 

Eq.  477.     The  plaintiff  may  stipulate  to  receive  to  be  considered  as  a  feme  sole;  ante,  p.  178. 
the  joint  answer  sworn  to  by  the  husband  alone.  4  Jackson  v.  Haworth,  1  S.  &  S.  161,  ante, 

Leavitt  v.  Cruger,  1  Paige,  422.  p.  183. 

8  Ante,  pp.  180,  181;  see  Collard  v.  Smith,  6  Dubois  v.   Hole,   2  Vern.  613;   and  see 

493 


*  500  COMPELLING    ANSWER.  —  PROCEEDINGS   IN   DEFAULT. 

The  attachment  will  not,  however,  be  issued  without  an  order ;  which 
may  be  obtained  on  an  ex  parte  motion,6  where  the  order  to  answer 
separately  has  been  obtained  by  the  married  woman,  but  where  it  has 
been  obtained  by  the  plaintiff,  or  the  husband,  notice  of  the  motion 
should,  it  seems,  be  given  to  her.7 

Where  the  husband  is  positively  unable  to  conform  to  the  ordinary 
practice  of  putting  in  a  joint  answer,  an  order  will  be  granted,  upon  his 
application,  for  him  to  answer  separately,  and  he  is  then  exonerated 
from  all  liability  for  his  wife's  default ; 8  but  the  motion  for  this  purpose 
should  be  made  before  he  is  in  contempt,  as  the  Court  will  not,  after  he 
has  made  default,  give  him  an  indulgence  to  the  prejudice  of  the  plain- 
tiff's interests.9  To  support  such  an  application,  the  husband  must 
show,  by  his  own  affidavit,  that  his  wife  lives  apart,  and  that  he  has  no 
influence  over  her,  or  otherwise  prove  his  inability  to  answer  for  her.10 
Notice  of  the  motion  should  be  given  to  the  plaintiff,  and  also  to  the 
wife.11     It  seems,  too,  that  the  order  ought  to  direct  the  wife  to 

*  500     answer  separately,  *  as  well  as  the  husband :  otherwise  the  plain- 

tiff may  have  to  apply  again,  before  he  can  bring  the  wife  before 
the  Court. 

In  all  cases  where  the  husband  wishes  to  answer  separately,  an  order 
to  that  effect  ought  in  strictness  to  be  obtained,  before  his  answer  is  put 
in.  There  are  cases,  however,  where  he  has  answered  separately  with- 
out order,  and  then  applied  to  the  Court  that  he  might  not  be  liable  to 
process,  on  account  of  his  wife's  default  in  answering ;  and  the  applica- 
tion being  made  before  any  notice  of  the  irregularity  in  filing  the  an- 
swer, the  Court  has  made  the  order.1  But  such  a  course  is  irregular, 
and,  upon  motion  of  the  plaintiff,  the  separate  answer  of  the  husband 
will  be  ordered  to  be  taken  off  the  file.2 

If  the  impossibility  of  obtaining  a  joint  answer  arises,  not  from  the 
refusal  of  the  wife,  but  from  the  lunacy  of  the  husband,  an  order  for 
the  wife  to  answer  separately  will  be  made,  upon  a  like  application  of 
the  plaintiff.8  In  such  a  case,  however,  as  well  as  in  other  cases  where 
it  appears  to  the  Court  that  the  defendant  is  a  person  of  weak  or  un- 
sound mind,  not  found  such  by  inquisition,  the  Court  may,  upon  the 
application  of  the  plaintiff,  appoint  one  of  the  solicitors  of  the  Court 

Ottway  v.   Wing,    12    Sim.    90;    Travers    v.  Braithwaite's  Pr.  165;  see  Leavitt  v.  Cruger, 

Bucklv,  1  Ves.  Sr.  384,  386;  1  Dick.  138;  Kipp  1  Paige,  422. 

v.  Hanna,  2  Bland,  26.  9  Gee  *.   Cottle,  3  M.  &  C.  18C >,  182; ante, 

6  Thicknesse  v.  Aeton,  15  Jur.  1052,  V.  C.  T. ;  p.  498.     For  form  of  affidavit,  see  \  ol.  III. 
Home  v.  Patrick,  30  Beav.  405;  8  Jur.  N.  S.  lft  Barry  v.  Cane,  3  Mad.  472;  ante,  pp.  177, 
351;  Bull*.  Withev,9Jur.  N.  S.  595,  V.  C.S.;  457. 

see  Hope  v.  Carnegie,   L.  R.  7  Eq.  254,  263.  »  Banyan  9.  Mortimer,  6  Mad    2,8;  Garey 

For  forms  of  motion  paper  and  affidavit,  see  v.  Whittingham,  ubi  supra,    ror  form  of  notice 

y0j   jjj  of  motion,  see  Vol.  III. 

7  Graham  9.  Fitch,  2  De  G.  &  S.  246;  12  '-  Barry  v.  Cane,  ubi  supra ;  Pavie  v.  Acourt, 
Jur.  833;  contra,  Tavlor  v.  Tavlor,  12  Beav.  1  Dick.  13;  ante,  p.  180. 

271-  and  see  Bushell  9.  Bushell,  1  S.  &  S.  164;  2  Gee  v.  Cottle,  ubi  supra  ;  and  see  Nichols 

and  cases  cited  12  Beav.  271,  n.     For  form  of  9.  Ward,  2  M'N.  &  G.  140 ;   ante,  p.  177.     For 

order  see  Seton,  1256,  No.  7;  and  for  forms  of  form  of  notice  of  motion,  see  Vol.  III. 

notice  of  motion  and  affidavits,  see  Vol.  III.  8  Estcourt  v.  Ewington,  9  Sim.  252;  2  Jur. 

8  Garev  v.  Whittingham,  1  S.  &  S.  163;  414. 

'  494 


AGAINST   PARTICULAR    DEFENDANTS.  *  501 

guardian  of  the  defendant,  by  whom  he  may  appear  to  and  answer  the 
bill : 4  but,  in  such  a  case,  no  answer  shall  be  required. 

It  now  remains  to  be  considered  in  what  manner  the  Statutes  and 
General  Orders  protect  a  defendant  unable,  from  poverty,  to  put  in  an 
answer  ;  and  prevent  a  party,  under  such  circumstances,  being  uselessly 
detained  in  custody. 

If  a  defendant  is  brought  up  in  custody  for  want  of  his  answer,5  and 
makes  oath  in  Court 6  that  he  is  unable,  by  reason  of  poverty,  to  employ 
a  solicitor  to  put  in  his  answer,  the  Court,  if  not  satisfied  of  the  truth  of 
that  allegation,  may  direct  an  inquiry  as  to  the  truth  thereof ; 7  and  may 
appoint  a  solicitor  to  conduct  such  inquiry  on  the  behalf  of  such  defend- 
ant ;  and  if  it  is  ascertained,  by  means  of  such  inquiry,  or  if  the  Court 
is  satisfied  without  such  inquiry,8  that  such  defendant  is  unable,  by 
reason  of  poverty,  to  employ  a  solicitor  to  put  in  his  answer,  the  Court 
may  assign  a  solicitor  and  counsel  for  such  defendant,  to  enable 
him  to  put  in  *  his  answer.1  It  would  seem,  that  the  application  *  501 
must  be  made  by  the  defendant,  and  not  by  the  plaintiff.2 

When  an  inquiry  is  thus  directed,  an  order  to  that  effect  is  drawn 
up  ; 3  a  certified  copy  of  it  is  left  at  the  chambers  of  the  Judge  to  whose 
Court  the  cause  is  attached ;  and  a  summons  to  proceed  on  the  inquiry 
is  thereupon  taken  out,4  and  served  on  the  plaintiff's  solicitor.  On  the 
return  of  the  summons,  an  affidavit  by  the  defendant  of  his  poverty,  or 
other  evidence  thereof,  is  adduced  on  his  behalf  ; 6  the  plaintiff's  counter 
evidence,  if  any,  is  heard ;  and  the  Chief  Clerk  makes  his  certificate  of 
the  result  of  the  inquiry ;  which  is  afterwards  completed  in  the  ordi- 
nary way.6 

If  the  certificate  is  in  favor  of  the  defendant,  he  may  apply,  by  ex 
parte  motion,  that  a  counsel  and  a  solicitor  may  be  assigned  him  to  put 
in  his  answer,  and  defend  the  suit,  in  forma  pauperis.1  The  counsel 
and  solicitor  to  the  Suitors'  Fund  are  usually  assigned  him.  The  order 
may  also  direct  a  habeas  corpus  to  issue,  to  bring  up  the  defendant  for 

4  Cons.  Ord.  VII.  3;  ante,  pp.  176,  475.  A  Garrod  v.  Holdeti,  4  Beav.  245.  These  cases 
female  defendant,  unmarried,  above  sixty  years  were,  however,  decided  on  the  6th  Rule  of  11 
of  age,  who  had  been  deaf  and  dumb  from  her  Geo.  IV.  &  1  Will.  IV.  c.  36,  §  15.  In  Bavly 
infancy,  was  admitted  to  appearand  defend  by  v.  Bayly,  11  Beav.  256,  it  was  held,  that  the 
guardian.  Markle  v.  Markle,  4  John.  Ch.  168.  7th  Rule  applied  to  a  defendant  defending  in 
Where  a  lunatic  has  appeared  by  Committee,  a  representative  character,  after  a  successful 
the  practice  to  compel  an  answer  by  committee  inquiry  under  the  6th. 

is  the  same  as  in  case  of  other  persons.     1  Hoff.  3  For  form  of  order,  see  Seton,1273,  No.  12; 

Ch.  Pr.  182.  and  for  form  of  order,  without  inquiry,  id.  1272, 

5  Ante,  pp.  490,  491.  No.  11. 

6  The  oath  is  administered  by  the  Regis-  4  For  form  of  summons,  see  Vol.  III.  By 
trar;  see  11  Geo.  IV.  &  1  Will.  IV.  c.  36,  Cons.  Ord.  XII.  5,  notice  in  writing  of  the 
§  15,  r.  6.  order,  and  of  every  summons  to  proceed  thereon, 

7  Pending  the  inquiry,  it  seems  that  time  must  be  served  on  the  solicitor  to  the  Suitors' 
does  not  run  against  the   plaintiff.      Potts  v.  Fund. 

Whitmore,  8  Beav.  317,  319.  6  See  Williams  v.  Parkinson,  5  Sim.  74,  75. 

8  Davies  v.  Nixon,  11  W.  R.  62,  V.  C.  K.  «  See  post,  Chap.  XXIX.  Proceedings  in  the 
1  Cons  Ord.  XII.  4;  and  see  11  Geo.  IV.  &      Judge's  Chambers.     The  solicitor  to  the  Suitors' 

1  Will.  IV.  c.  36,  §  15,  r.  6;  see  also  23  &  24  Fund  usually  conducts  the  inquiry  on  behalf  of 

Vic.  c.  149,  §  4,  which  is  in  nearly  the  same  the  defendant. 

words  as  Cons.  Ord.  XII.  4.  7  For  form  of  motion  paper,  see  Vol.  III. 

*  See  Watkin  v.  Parker,  1  M.  &  C.  370; 

495 


*  502  COMPELLING    ANSWER.  —  PROCEEDINGS   IN   DEFAULT. 

the  purpose  of  taking  the  bill  pro  confesso,  in  the  event  of  the  answer 
not  being  put  in  in  the  mean  time.8  When  the  answer  has  been  put  in, 
the  defendant  may  apply,  on  motion,  supported  by  the  Record  and  Writ 
Clerk's  certificate  of  the  answer  being  filed,  that  he  may  be  discharged 
out  of  custody  as  to  his  contempt  in  not  answering,  and  that  the  plain- 
tiff's costs  of  such  contempt  may  be  paid  out  of  the  Suitors'  Fund.9 

Where,  however,  the  defendant,  though  the  certificate  is  in  his  favor, 

neglects  to  apply  for  the  assignment  of  counsel  and  a  solicitor,10  or 

where  the  Chief  Clerk  certifies  that  the  defendant  is  not  too  poor  to  put 

in  his  answer,  or  where,  by  reason  of  the  obstinacy  of  the  defendant  in 

withholding  information  as  to  his  means,  the  inquiry  has  failed,11 

*  502    the  plaintiff  may  move  ex  parte  n  *  for  a  habeas  corpus  to  bring 

the  defendant  to  the  bar ; x  and  on  his  being  brought  up,  may 
apply  to  have  the  bill  taken  pro  confesso;  and  an  order  may  be  made 
accordingly,  in  the  manner  before  explained.2 

In  order  to  prevent  the  possibility  of  any  prisoner  being  suffered  to 
remain  in  neglected  imprisonment,  without  reaping  the  benefit  of  the 
provisions  above  mentioned,  for  the  relief  of  defendants  whose  only 
reason  for  non-compliance  with  the  rules  of  the  Court  is  poverty,  it  is 
enacted  that,  in  the  last  week  of  each  of  the  months  of  January,  April, 
July,  and  October  in  every  year,  the  solicitor  to  the  Suitors'  Fund  for 
the  time  being,  or  some  other  officer  of  the  Court  of  Chancery  to  be  ap- 
pointed by  the  Lord  Chancellor  from  time  to  time,  shall  visit  White- 
cross  Street  Prison,8  and  examine  the  prisoners  confined  there  for 
contempt,  and  shall  report  his  opinion  on  their  respective  cases  to  the 
Lord  Chancellor ;  and  thereupon  the  Lord  Chancellor  may,  if  he  thinks 
fit,  assign  a  solicitor  to  any  such  prisoner,  not  only  for  defending  him  in 
forma  pauperis,  but  generally  for  taking  such  steps  on  his  behalf  as  the 
nature  of  the  case  may  require ;  and  make  all  or  any  such  orders  as  the 
Lord  Chancellor  was  empowered  to  make,  after  the  like  report  of  a  Mas- 
ter, under  the  seventh  rule  of  the  11  Geo.  IV.  &  1  Will.  IV.  c.  36,  §  15.4 

It  is  further  enacted,  that  when  any  person  shall  be  committed  to  any 
prison,  other  than  Whitecross  Street  Prison,5  under  any  writ  or  order  of 
the  Court  of  Chancery,  the  jailer  or  keeper  of  the  prison  in  which  such 
person  is  confined  shall,  within  fourteen  days  after  such  person  shall 

8  Welford  v.  Daniel],  9  Sim.  652.  8  Substituted  for  the  Queen's  Prison,  by  25 

9  For  form  of  order,  see  Seton,  1273,  No.  15;  &  26  Vic.  c.  104,  §  2;  Holloway  Prison  lias 
and  for  form  of  motion  paper,  see  Vol.  III.  By  since  been  substituted,  under  the  same  Act,  §  12. 
Cons.  Ord.  XII.  5,  notice  in  writing  of  the  *  23  &  24  Vic.  c.  149,  §  2.  For  form  of 
application  must  be  served  oh  the  solicitor  of  order,  see  2  Seton  (3d  ed.),  1272,  No.  9;  and 
the  Suitors' Fund,  two  clear  days  at  least  before  see  id.  1274,  No.  16.  The  solicitor  to  the 
it  is  intended  to  be  made.  Suitors'  Fund  is  usually  assigned  the  solicitor  ; 

w  Tattershall  r.  Crampton,  cited  Seton,  1273.  and  the  counsel  to  that  fund  is  usually  assigned 

ii  Williams  v.  Parkinson,  5  Sim.  74.  the  defendant's  counsel.     The  order  may  also 

12  For  form  of  order,  see  Seton,  1273,  No.  14;  be  made  by  the  Lords  Justices.     23  &  24  Vic. 

and  for  form  of  motion  paper,  see  Vol.  III.  c.  149,  §  13;  and  it  may  be  obtained  on  motion 

i  As  to  the  mode  of  issuing  the  writ,  see  of  course.     Layton  v.  Mortimore,  2  De  G.  F. 

ante,  p.  491;  and  for  forms  of  the  writ,  indorse-  &  J.  353;  and  see  ante,  p.  154. 

ment,  and pracipe,  see  Vol.  III.  6  See  23  &  24  Vic.  c.  149,  §  2. 

2  Bull  v.  Falkner,  11  Jur.  235,  V.  C  K.  B. 

Fnr  form  of  order  in  such  case,  see  Seton,  1273, 

No.  14;  and  see  ante,  p.  492. 

496 


AGAINST   PARTICULAR   DEFENDANTS.  *  503 

have  been  in  the  custody  of  such  jailer  or  keeper,  make  a  report  to  the 
Lord  Chancellor,  containing  the  name  and  description  of  such  prisoner, 
with  the  cause  and  date  of  his  commitment,  and  a  copy  of  the  writ  or 
order  under  which  he  was  committed ;  and  if  such  prisoner  makes  oath, 
before  one  of  the  visiting  justices  of  such  jail,  or  a  commissioner  for 
taking  oaths  in  the  Court  of  Chancery,  that  he  is  unable  by  reason  of 
poverty  to  employ  a  solicitor,  the  report  shall  contain  a  statement  to 
that  effect ;  and  that  thereupon  the  Lord  Chancellor  may  direct  the 
solicitor  to  the  Suitors'  Fund  to  ascertain  the  truth  of  such  state- 
ment, and  if  true  to  take  such  *  steps,  on  behalf  of  any  such  *  503 
prisoner,  as  the  nature  of  the  case  may  require ;  and  the  Lord 
Chancellor  may  thereupon,  if  he  shall  see  fit,  make  such  order  or  orders 
as  he  is  empowered  to  make  under  the  second  section  of  the  above  Act.1 

By  the  seventh  rule  of  the  11  Geo.  IV.  &  1  Will.  IV.  c.  36,  §  15,  the 
Court  is  authorized  to  order  that  the  costs  of  the  contempt  of  any  such 
prisoner  shall  be  paid  out  of  the  Suitors'  Fund,2  and  that  any  such 
prisoner,  having  previously  done  such  acts  as  the  Court  shall  direct, 
shall  be  discharged  out  of  custody  ;  but,  if  any  such  defendant  become 
entitled  to  any  funds  out  of  the  cause,  the  same  are  to  be  applied,  under 
the  direction  of  the  Court,  in  the  first  instance  to  the  reimbursement  of 
the  Suitors'  Fund.8  Applications  to  the  Court  under  these  provisions 
must  be  made  to  the  Lord  Chancellor  or  Lords  Justices  ; 4  and  as  they 
are  entirely  framed  for  the  relief  of  defendants,  no  such  order  can  be 
made  on  the  application  of  the  plaintiff.5 

It  is  also  provided,  that  the  solicitor  to  the  Suitors'  Fund,  or  other 
officer  visiting  the  prison,  may  examine  the  prisoners  and  all  other  per- 
sons whom  he  may  think  proper,  upon  oath,  and  administer  an  oath  or 
oaths  to  any  such  prisoner  and  other  persons  accordingly,  and  cause  any 
officers,  clerks,  and  ministers  of  any  Court  of  Law  or  Equity  to  bring 
and  produce  upon  oath  before  him  any  records,  orders,  books,  papers,  or 
other  writings  belonging  to  the  said  Courts,  or  to  any  of  the  officers 
within  the  same,  as  such  officers.6 

If  it  appears  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  Court,  that  any  prisoner  is  an 
idiot,  lunatic,  or  of  unsound  mind,  the  Court  may  appoint  a  guardian  to 
put  in  his  answer  and  discharge  the  defendant :  providing  for  the  costs 
as  shall  seem  just :  and  if  the  Court  shall  see  fit,  the  defence  may  be 
made  by  such  guardian  in  forma  pauperis.'' 

1  23  &  24  Vic.  c.  149,  §  5.  The  like  order  (3d  ed.),  1273,  Nos.  15.  16.  In  Ward  v.  Wood- 
assigning  a  solicitor  and  counsel  may  be  made  cock,  5  L.  T.  N.  S.  81f>,  L.  C,  an  order  for 
in  this  case  as  under  §  4,  ante,  pp.  500,  501;  payment  of  the  plaintiff's  costs  of  defendant's 
and  by  the  Lords  Justices,  as  well  as  by  the  contempt,  in  disobeying  an  injunction,  was 
Lord  Chancellor.    23  &  24  Vic.  c.  149,  "§  13.  refused.     See  32  &  33  Vic.  c.  91,  §  13. 

For  form  of  order  under  §  5.  see  Seton,  1272,  4  23  &  24  Vic.  c.  149,  §  13. 

No.  10.  5  Watkin  v.  Parker,  1  M.  &  C.  370;  Garrod 

2  And  this  may  be  done  when  the  defendant  v.  Holden,  4  Beav.  245 ;  ante,  pp.  500,  501,  note, 
is  an  executor.     Bavlv  v.  Bayly,  11  Beav.  256.  See  Hall  v.  Hall,  L.  R.  11  Eq.  290. 

8  See  also  23  &  24  Vic.  c.  149,  §  6,  which  6  23  &  24  Vic.  c.  149,  §  3. 

contains   similar   provisions  as    to  costs,    and  7  H  Geo.  IV.  &  1  Will.  IV.  c.  36,  §  15,  r.  9. 

provides  also  that  any  costs  to  which  the  de-  As  to  the  appointment  of  guardians  ad  litem, 

fendant  mav  become  entitled  in  the  suit  or  pro-  and  as  to  defending  in  forma  pauperiz,  see  ante, 

r,eedin<js,  shall  be  paid  into  the  Suitors'  Fund.  pp.  154,  155,  176. 
lor  orders  under  these  sections,  see  2    Seton 

vol.  i. —  32  497 


*  505  COMPELLING    ANSWER.  —  PROCEEDINGS   IN    DEFAULT. 

The  above  provisions   prevent  the  possibility  of  a  defendant  being 

detained  in  custody  in  consequence  of  his  not  being  able,  by  reason  of 

poverty,  or  of  insanity  or  imbecility  of  mind,  to  put  in  his  answer 

*  504    in  the  ordinary  way.     But  it  frequently  happens  *  that  a  defend- 

ant is  obstinate,  and  refuses  either  to  appear  or  to  put  in  his 
answer,  although  he  has  not  the  excuse  of  poverty  or  want  of  intellect 
to  justify  his  refusal.  In  such  cases  the  plaintiff  may  obtain  justice  in 
one  or  other  of  the  modes  above  pointed  out. 


Section  III.  —  Effect  of  a  Contempt  upon  the  Proceedings  in  the  Cause. 

Besides  the  personal  and  pecuniary  inconvenience  to  which  a  party 
subjects  himself  by  a  contempt  of  the  ordinary  process  of  the  Court,  he 
places  himself  in  this  further  predicament ;  viz.,  that  of  not  being  in  a 
situation  to  be  heard,  in  any  application  which  he  may  be  desirous  of 
making  to  the  Court.1  Lord  Chief  Baron  Gilbert  lays  it  down,  that 
"upon  this  head  it  is  to  be  observed,  as  a  general  rule,  that  the  con- 
temnor,  who  is  in  contempt,  is  never  to  be  heard,  by  motion  or  otherwise, 
till  he  has  cleared  his  contempt,  and  paid  the  costs  :  as,  for  example,  if 
he  comes  to  move  for  any  thing,  or  desires  any  favor  of  the  Court."  2 

But  where,  after  a  petition  had  stood  over  at  the  request  of  the 
respondent's  counsel,  for  his  convenience,  the  petitioner  incurred  a 
contempt,  which  had  not  been  cleared  when  the  petition  came  on  again, 
it  was  held,  that  the  petitioner  was,  nevertheless,  entitled  to  be 
*505  heard  ;8  and  a  party  who  was  in  contempt  for  *  non-payment  of 
costs,  was  not  thereby  prevented  from  moving  for  leave  to  defend 
in  forma  pauperis} 

The  rule,  that  a  party  in  contempt  cannot  move  till  he  has  cleared  his 
contempt,  is,  in  practice,  confined  to  cases  where  such  party  comes  for- 

1  Where  a  party  is  in  contempt,  the  Court  party  in  contempt  may  move  by  counsel  to  set 

will    not   grant  an   application    in    his   favor,  aside  the  order  against  him;   for  every  other 

which  is  not  a  matter  of  strict  right,  until  he  purpose  he  must  appear  in  vinculis.     Odell  v. 

has  purged  his  contempt.    Johnson  v.  Pinney,  Hart,  1  Moll.  492;   see  Lane  v.  Ellzey,  4  Hen. 

1    Paige,  466;   Rogers   v.   Paterson,    4   Paige,  &  M.  504. 

450;  Ellingwood  v.  Stevenson,  4  Sandf.  Ch.  2  Gilb.  For.  Rom.  102;  Vowles  v.  Young, 
366.  He  will  not  be  allowed  to  contradict  the  9  Ves.  172,  173.  Thus,  in  Lord  Wenman  v. 
allegations  in  the  bill,  or  bring  forward  any  Osbaldiston,  2  Bro.  P.  C.  ed.  Toml.  276;  2  Eq. 
defence,  or  allege  any  new  fact.  Mussina  v.  Cas.  Abr.  222,  pi.  1,  where  a  defendant,  being 
Bartlett,  8  Porter,  277;  Savior  v.  Mockbie,  9  in  contempt  for  not  putting  in  his  examination 
Iowa,  209.  Nor  is  he  allowed  to  appear  and  pursuant  to  an  order,  to  avoid  a  sequestration 
contest  the  plaintiff's  demand,  before  the  Clerk  moved  the  Court  that,  upon  his  undertaking  to 
and  Master,  to  whom  the  bill  may  be  referred  pay  in  a  week's  time  what  should  appear  to  be 
to  take  an  account;  but  the  inhibition  can  at  due  to  the  plaintiff,  all  further  process  of  con- 
any  time  be  removed  by  filing  a  full  and  com-  tempt  should  be  stayed,  the  Court  declined 
plete  answer.  Mussina  v.  Bartlett,  8  Porter,  making  any  order  upon  the  motion,  but  directed 
277;  see  Rutherford  v.  Metcalf,  5  Hayw.  58.  the  appellant  to  clear  his  contempt,  and  then 
A  defendant,  against  whom  there  is  prima  move;  and  this  determination  of  the  Court 
facie  evidence  of  being  guilty  of  a  breach  of  was  affirmed  by  the  House  of  Lords,  upon 
an  injunction,  cannot  be  heard  upon  a  motion  appeal. 

to  discharge  a  ne  exeat  against  him  in  the  same  3  Bristowe  v.  Needham,2  Phil.  190 ;  1  C.  P. 

cause,  until  he  has  purged  himself  of  the  con-  Coop.  temp.  Cott.  286. 
tempt.    Evans  v.  Van  Hall,  1  Clarke,  223.    A  l  Oldfield  v.  Cobbett,  1  Phil.  613,  614 

498 


EFFECT   OF   A    CONTEMPT    UPON    PROCEEDINGS   IN   CAUSE. 


505 


ward  voluntarily,  and  asks  for  an  indulgence ;  and,  therefore,  a  defendant 
cannot  object  to  a  cause  being  heard  because  the  plaintiff  is  in  contempt.8 
So  a  defendant  in  contempt  is  entitled  to  production  of  documents.8 

In  like  manner  it  has  been  held  that  a  mortgagor  defendant  to  a  bill 
of  foreclosure,  who  is  in  contempt,  could  not  move,  under  the  7  Geo.  II. 
c.  20,  for  a  reference  to  take  an  account  of  the  principal  and  interest  due 
upon  the  mortgage.4  And  so,  where  a  party  in  contempt  had  applied  for 
and  obtained  the  costs  of  an  abandoned  motion,  under  Lord  Eldon's 
order,5  the  order  was  discharged  upon  motion.6 

So  also,  where  a  motion  had  been  refused  with  costs,  it  was  held,  that 
the  motion  could  not  be  renewed,  though  on  different  grounds,  until  the 
costs  had  been  paid. 7  (a) 

The  rule  that  a  party  cannot  move  till  he  has  cleared  his  contempt,  is 
confined  to  proceedings  in  the  same  cause ;  and  a  party  in  contempt  for 
non-obedience  to  an  order  in  one  cause,  will  not  be  thereby  prevented 
from  making  an  application  to  the  Court  in  another  cause  relating  to  a 
distinct  matter,  although  the  parties  to  such  other  cause  may  be  the 
same ; 8  and  this  privilege  has  been  carried  to  the  extent  of  allowing  a 
defendant,  in  each  of  two  creditors'  suits,  for  the  administration  of  the 
same  estate,  to  move  in  one  of  them,  in  which  he  was  not  in  contempt,  to 
stay  proceedings  in  the  other,  in  which  he  was.9 

The  general  rule  of  the  Court  that  parties  must  clear  their  contempt 
before  they  can  be  heard,  must  not  be  understood  as  preventing  their 
making  application  to  the  Court  to  discharge,  on  the  ground  of  irregular- 
ity, the  order  by  their  non-obedience  to  which  their  contempt  has  been 
incurred ;  therefore,  where  a  defendant,  in  custody  for  a  contempt  in  not 


2  Ricketts  v.  Mornington,  7  Sim.  200;  and 
see  the  cases  on  this  subject  collected  in  1  C.  P. 
Coop.  temp.  Cott.  208;  see  also  Futvoye  v. 
Kennard,  2  Giff.  110;  Fry  v.  Ernest,  9  Jur. 
N.  S.  1151 ;  12  VV.  R.  97,  V.  C.  W.;  Story  v. 
Official  Manager,  2  N.  R.  351,  V.  C.  W.;  Howe 
v.  Grey,  W.  N.  (18G7)  141.  A  plaintiff  in  con- 
tempt is  entitled  to  prosecute  his  suit,  and  to 
make  use  of  the  process  of  the  Court  for  that 
purpose.  Wilson  v.  Bates,  3  M.  &  C.  197,  204. 
He  mny  obtain  an  order  to  amend  his  bill. 
Chatterton  v.  Thomas,  36  L.  J.  Ch.  592.  So  a 
defendant  in  contempt  is  entitled  to  take  any 
measure  necessary  for  his  defence.  Fry  v. 
Ernest,  12  W.  R.  97.  He  is  also  entitled  to 
appeal.     Hazard  p.  Durant,  11  R.  I.  195. 

3  Haldane  v.  Eckford,  L.  R.  7  Eq.  425;  see 
also  Wilson  v.  Bates,  3  M.  &  C.  197,  204;  9 
Sim.  54;  Fry  v.  Ernest,  9  Jur.  N.  S.  1151;  12 
W.  R.  97. 


4  Hewitt  v.  M'C*rtney,  13  Ves.  560. 
6  Gen.  Ord.  5  Aug.,  i818;    Sand.  Ord.  706; 
Beav.  Ord.  3,  now  Cons.  Ord.  XL.  23. 

6  Ellis  v.  Walmsley,  4  L.  J.  Ch.  69;  S.  C. 
nom.  Ellice  v.  Walmsley,  1  C.  P.  Coop.  temp. 
Cott.  207,  where  the  cases  are  collected  as  to 
the  proceedings,  for  his  own  advantage,  which 
a  party  in  contempt  cannot  take. 

7  Oldtield  v.  Cobbett,  12  Beav.  91,  95;  and 
see  Foley  v.  Smith,  12  Beav.  154;  Davey  v. 
Durrant,  2  De  G.  &  J.  506;  24  Beav.  411;  4 
Jur.  N.  S.  398. 

8  Clark  v.  Dew,  1  R.  &  M.  103,  107;  Gom- 
pertz  v.  Best,  1  Y.  &  C.  Ex.  619;  Taylor  v. 
Taylor,  1  M'N.  &  G.  397,  409;  12  Beav.  220, 
228;  Frv  v.  Ernest,  9  Jur.  N.  S.  1151;  12  W". 
R.  97,  V.  C.  W. 

9  Turner  v.  Dorgan,  12  Sim.  504;  6  Jur.  356; 
Morrison  t\  Morrison,  4  Hare,  590;  9  Jur.  103; 
1  C.  P.  Coop.  temp.  Cott.  215,  217. 


(a)  The  general  rule  is  that  a  motion,  which 
has  been  refused  with  costs,  cannot  be  renewed 
until  such  costs  have  been  paid.  Morton  v. 
Palmer,  9  Q.  B.  D  89;  ante,  p.  39,  n.  (b). 
Further  proceedings  in  the  plaintiff's  suit  mav 
be  stayed  until  he  has  complied  with  an  order 
for  the  payment  of  the  costs  of  an  interlocutory 
motion,  if  his  conduct  iu  withholding  them  is 


vexatious.  Re  Wickham,  35  Ch.  D.  272. 
Although  imprisonment  for  non-payment  of 
costs  is  now  abolished  in  England,  a  person 
may,  it  seems,  be  none  the  less  in  contempt  for 
such  non-payment.  Ibid.  274.  As  to  ex  parte 
motion  for  discharge,  see  Re  Evans  [1893], 
W.  N.  32. 

499 


507 


COMPELLING   ANSWER.  —  PROCEEDINGS   IN   DEFAULT. 


obeying  an  order  to  pay  in  money,  applied  to  the  Court  to  discharge  him 
out  of  custody,  on  the  ground  of  irregularity  in  the  order  (it  having 

*  506    been  made  pending  an  abatement  of  the  suit),  he  *  was  not  only 

heard,  but  the  order  for  his  discharge  was  made  ;  though,  under  the 
circumstances,  without  costs.1  In  such  cases,  in  making  his  application, 
the  party  in  contempt  ought  to  confine  his  motion  to  the  object  of  getting 
rid  of  the  order  of  which  he  complains  ;  and  if  he  embraces  other  matters 
in  his  notice  of  motion,  he  will  not  be  allowed  to  go  into  such  other  mat- 
ters till  he  has  shown  that  the  order  upon  which  his  contempt  has  been 
incurred  was  irregular.2 

A  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  sue  out  an  attachment  against  a  defendant 
for  want  of  answer,  although  he  is  himself  in  custody  for  a  contempt  in 
non-payment  of  costs  to  him.8 

The  circumstance  of  a  party  being  in  contempt  will  not  prevent  his 
being  heard  in  opposition  to  any  special  application  which  the  other  side 
may  make,  upon  notice  duly  served  upon  him.4  So  also,  where  there  is 
any  irregularity  in  the  prosecution  of  the  decree  or  order  obtained  under 
the  contempt,  a  party  in  contempt  may  be  heard  to  obtain  redress.6 

Although  a  party  cannot  move  until  he  has  cleared  his  contempt,  yet 
he  may  give  notice  of  his  motion  before  he  has  done  so ; 6  and  a  party  to 
whom  costs  are  awarded,  may  proceed  in  the  taxation,  notwithstanding 
he  may  be  in  contempt.7 

Although  a  defendant,  not  appearing  or  answering  within  the  regular 
time,  is  frequently  said  to  be  in  contempt,  yet  it  does  not  seem  that  the 
contempt  is  actually  incurred  until  the  writ  enforcing  obedience  to  the 
orders  of  the  Court  has  beeu  sealed.8 

*  507        *  It  seems  that  a  party  in  contempt  can  apply  for  the  purpose 

of  removing  scandal  from  the  records  of  the  Court.1    Although  it 


1  Wilson  v.  Metcalfe,  MSS.  In  matters  of 
contempt,  exceptions  may  be  taken  on  the  ques- 
tion of  jurisdiction,  where  it  is  distinctly  raised 
and  adjudicated  upon  as  matter  of  law.  An- 
droscoggin and  Kennebec  R.  Co.  v.  Andros- 
coggin R.  Co.  49  Maine,  392. 

2  Ibid.;  1  C.  P.  Coop.  temp.  Cott.  216;  4 
Hare,  595. 

8  Wilson  v.  Bates,  9  Sim.  54;  3  M.  &  C. 
197,  204;  2  Jur.  107,  319;  and  see  1  C.  P.  Coop, 
temp.  Cott.  220,  where  the  cases  are  collected 
as  to  the  proceedings,  for  his  own  udvantage, 
which  a  party  in  contempt  may  take.  And  see 
Freese  v.  Swayze,  26  N.  J.  Eq.  437.  See  ante, 
p.  505,  n.  2. 

4  Where  a  plaintiff  had  obtained,  from  a 
Vice-Chancellor,  an  order  for  payment  of  a 
sum  of  money  into  Court,  against  a  defendant 
who  was  in  contempt,  the  Lord  Chancellor 
allowed  him  to  move  to  discharge  that  order, 
on  the  ground  that  it  was  a  rehearing  of  the 
original  application.  Parker  v.  Dawson,  5  L. 
J.  Ch.  108;  see  also  Ex  parte  Chadwick,  15 
Jur.  597,  V.  C.  K.  B. ;  Reeve  v.  Hodson,  10 
Hare  App  41;  Bickford  v.  Skewes,  10  Sim. 
500 


193,   196;    S.  C.  nom.  Bickford  v.  Skeves,   3 
Jur.  818;  Futvoye  v.  Kennard,  2  Giff.  110. 

5  King  v.  Bryant,  3  M.  &  C.  191,  195;  2 
Jur.  106. 

6  Chuck  v.  Cremer,  1  C.  P.  Coop.  temp. 
Cott.  247. 

7  Newton  v.  Ricketts,  11  Beav.  67. 

8  Thus,  after  the  regular  time  for  answering 
has  expired,  provided  no  attachment  has  issued 
against  a  defendant,  he  may  file  a  joint  de- 
murrer and  answer:  East  India  Co  v.  Hench- 
man, 3  Bro.  C.  C.  372  ;  Sowerby  v.  Warder,  2 
Cox,  268,  which,  had  process  actually  com- 
menced, might  have  been  taken  off  the  file  for 
irregularity.  Curzon  v.  De  la  Zouch,  1  Swanst 
185;  1  Wils.  C.  C.  469;  see  also  Att.-Gen.  v. 
Shield,  11  Beav.  441,  where  it  was  held  that 
taking  an  office  copy  of  the  answer  was  not  a 
waiver  of  the  objection.  But  if  the  plaintiff 
retain  the  office  copy  till  the  time  for  excepting 
to  the  answer  for  insufficiency  has  elapsed,  the 
contempt  will  be  waived.  Herrett  v.  Reynolds, 
2  Giff.  409 ;  6  Jur.  N.  S.  880. 

i  Everett  v.  Prythergch,  12  Sim.  363;  Cat- 
tell  v.   Simons,  5  Beav.  396;  Ayck.  Ch.  Pr. 


HOW   CONTEMPTS    CLEARED,   WAIVED,    OR   DISCHARGED.  *  508 

has  been  held 2  that  a  plaintiff  in  contempt  is  not  precluded  from  avail- 
ing himself  of  the  ordinary  process  to  enforce  an  answer,  it  appears  that 
the  fact  of  his  being  in  contempt  may  be  made  the  ground  of  a  special 
application  by  the  defendant  to  stay  proceedings  in  the  cause,  until  such 
contempt  has  been  cleared  ;3  and  if  he  persists  in  his  contempt,  his  suit 
may,  it  seems,  be  dismissed.4  And  in  general,  whenever  a  party  in  con- 
tempt is  entitled  to  be  heard,  there  exists  a  right  of  appeal,  and  applica- 
tions may  be  made  with  immediate  reference  to  the  motion  upon  which 
he  is  so  privileged  to  be  heard,  or  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  evidence 
in  support  of  it.8 


Section  IV.  —  In  what  Manner  Contempts  in  Process  may  be  cleared, 
waived,  or  discharged* 

An  ordinary  contempt  in  process,  as  it  is  a  matter  merely  between 
the  parties,  may  be  cleared  by  the  contemnor  doing  the  act,  by  the  non- 
performance of  which  the  contempt  was  incurred,  and  paying  to  the 
other  party  the  costs  he  has  occasioned  by  his  contumacy. 

Where  process  has  been  issued  against  a  defendant  in  contempt  for 
want  of  appearance  or  answer,  but  has  not  been  executed,  the  defendant 
should  enter  his  appearance  or  put  in  his  answer,  and  pay  or  tender  to 
the  plaintiffs  solicitor  the  costs  of  the  contempt,  if  the  amount  of  such 
costs  can  be  liquidated,  —  as  in  the  case  of  an  attachment;7  but  if  the 
amount  of  the  costs  cannot  be  ascertained,  he  should  tender  such  a  sum 
as  will  cover  their  probable  amount.8  If  the  plaintiffs  solicitor  accept 
the  costs  so  tendered,  it  will  be  at  the  plaintiffs  own  risk  if  he  after- 
wards puts  the  process  into  execution.  If  his  solicitor  refuse  to  accept 
the  costs  when  tendered,  it  is  necessary,  in  order  that  the  defendant  may, 
upon  payment  or  tender  of  the  plaintiff's  costs  of  the  contempt,  be  dis- 
charged from  his  contempt,  that  he  should  obtain  an  order  for 
that  purpose  :  *  otherwise,  the  contempt  will  continue.1  An  order  *  508 
of  this  nature  is  made  on  motion  of  course,  or  on  petition  of  course 
at  the  Rolls,2  upon  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerk's  certificate  of  the  defend- 
ant's appearance  or  answer.3 

(Lond.  ed.  1844)  197,  198;  1  Smith  Ch.  Pr.  6  See  Lowe  v.  Blake,  3  Desaus.  2G9;   Snell- 

(2d  Am.  ed)  569,  570;   Howard  v.  Newman,  1  ing  v.  Watrous,  2  Paige,  314. 

Moll.  221.  7  Wilkin   v.  Nainby,  4   Hare,  473,  475;    10 

2  By  Lord  Cottenham,  in  Wilson  v.  Bates,  Jur.  735.     The  amount  payable  to  clear  a  con- 

3  M.  &  C.  197,  204;  2  Jur.  319  (see  also  Bick-  tempt,  on  an  attachment  executed,  is  135.  8'/.: 

ford  v.  Skewes,  ubi  supra).  Brown  v.  Lee,  11  Beav.  379;    if  not  executed, 

8  Bradbury  v.   Shawe,    14  Jur.  1042,  V.  C.  lis.  2d.:   Braithwaite's   Pr.  154;   and  2s.  6<i. 

K.  B. ;    Futvoye   v.  Kennard,  ubi  supra.     For  extra  for  each  additional  defendant.     Ibid, 
form  of  notice   of  motion   in   such  case,   see  3  Wilkin  v.  Nainby,  ubi  supra ;  Broughton 

Vol-  HI-  v.  Martyn,  4  Bro.  C.  C.  296. 

4  Republic   of    Liberia  v.   Imperial    Bank,  i  Green  v.  Thomson,  1  S.  &  S.  121. 

L.  R.  16  Eq.  179;   L.  R.  9  Ch.  569;  S.  C.  nom.  2  y0T  forms  0{  motion  paper  and  petition, 

Republic  of  Liberia  v.  Roye,  1  App.  Cas.  139;  see  Vol.  III. 

see  also  2  Seton,  1540;  but  see  Gould  v.  Twine,  3  Green  v.  Thomson,  and  Wilkin  v.  Nainby, 

W.  N.  (1874)  68  ;  22  W.  R.  398.  ubi  supra. 

5  Cattell  v.  Simons,  ubi  supra ;   Hazard  ». 
Durant,  11  R.  I.  195. 

501 


509 


COMPELLING    ANSWER.  —  PROCEEDINGS    IN   DEFAULT. 


Where  the  process  has  been  carried  into  effect,  and  the  defendant  is  in 
actual  custody,  he  cannot  be  discharged  without  an  order,  which  must  be 
obtained  in  a  similar  manner,4  and  which  will  direct  the  defendant  to  be 
discharged,  upon  payment  or  tender  of  the  costs  of  the  contempt.5  These 
costs  are  either  fixed  or  taxed  costs, 6  according  to  the  stage  which  the 
contempt  process  has  reached :  thus,  if  the  defendant  has  merely  been 
arrested  on  the  attachment,  the  costs,  as  we  have  seen,7  are  of  a  fixed 
amount ;  but  if  he  has  been  brought  up  by  the  messenger,  or  upon  habeas 
corpus,  or  by  the  Sergeant-at-Arms,8  he  is  liable  to  pay  taxed  costs.9  (a) 
If  the  parties  can  agree  upou  the  amount,  the  defendant  should  pay  it ; 
but  if  they  cannot,  he  should  tender  to  the  plaintiff  such  a  sum  as  will 
cover  the  amount  which  will  probably  be  allowed  on  taxation. 

It  would  appear,  moreover,  that  strictly  in  all  cases  of  contempt  (ex- 
cept where,  the  defendant  not  being  in  custody,  the  plaintiff  is  willing  to 
accept  the  answer  and  the  costs  tendered)  the  defendant  ought,  upon 
filing  an  answer,  to  obtain  an  order  for  his  discharge,  on  payment  or 
tender  of  costs  ;  as,  otherwise,  the  plaintiff  may  move  to  have  the  answer 
taken  off  the  file  for  irregularity.10 

Where  process  of  contempt  has  been  issued  against  a  defendant  for 
want  of  an  answer,  he  is  entitled  to  be  discharged  from  his  contempt 
immediately  upon  his  putting  in  an  answer,  and  paying  or  tendering  the 
costs  of  his  contempt ;  and  the  Court  will  not  detain  him  in  custody  till 
the  sufficiency  of  his  answer  has  been  decided  upon,11  unless  he  has 
already  put  in  three  answers,  which  have  been  found  insufficient.12  If, 
however,  the  plaintiff  takes  exceptions  to  the  answer,  and  the  answer  is 
held  insufficient,  he  will  be  entitled  to  resume  the  process  of  contempt 
where  it  left  off;13  and  so  he  will  where  the  defendant  submits  to 
answer  the  exceptions.14  Nor  will  the  acceptance  of  costs  be  con- 
*  509  sidered  *  as  a  waiver  of  the  contempt  by  the  plaintiff ;  for  where 
a  defendant,  in  contempt  for  want  of  answer,  obtains,  upon  filing 
his  answer,  the  common  order  to  be  discharged  as  to  his  contempt,  on 


4  Gray  v.  Campbell,  1  R.  &  M.  323;  Ed- 
monson v.  Heyton,  2  Y.  &  C.  Ex.  3;  Symons 
v.  De  Barros,  M.  R..  June  21,  1870,  Rolls  Lib. 
Rut  a  defendant  in  contempt  for  want  of  an- 
swer, cannot  file  an  answer  and  demurrer.  Cur- 
zon  v.  De  la  Zouch,  1  Swanst.  185,  193;  Vigers 
v.  Lord  Audley,  2  M.  &  C.  49,  52 ;  1  Jur.  51  ; 
Att.-Gen.  v.  Shield,  11  Beav.  441,  446.  For 
forms  of  motion  paper  and  petition,  see  Vol. 
III. 

5  For  form  of  order,  see  2  Seton,  1593, 
No.  1. 

6  Abud  v.  Riches,  2  Ch.  D.  528;  see  1  Dan. 
Ch.  Prac.  (6th  Eng.  ed.)  901. 

1  Ante,  p.  466.  n.  (m). 

8  Ante,  pp.  448,  449,  452. 

9  Wilkin  v.  Nainbv,  4  Hare,  473,  475;   10 


Jur.  735;  Braithwaite's  Pr.  154.  See  Jackson 
v.  Mawby,  1  Ch.  D.  86;  S.  v.  L.  W.  N.  (1876) 
220:  S.  C.  nom.  Re  M.  46  L.  J.  Ch.  24. 

W  Haynes  v.  Ball,  5  Beav.  140 ;  Wilkin  v. 
Nainby,  ubi  supra ;  Coyle  v.  Alleyne,  16  Beav. 
548. 

ii  Dupont  v.  Ward,  1  Dick.  133 ;  Child  v. 
Brabson,  2  Ves.  Sr.  110;  Boehm  v.  De  Tastet, 
1  V.  &  B.  324,  327. 

12  Bailey  v.  Bailey,  11  Ves.  151. 

13  Anon.  2  P.  Wms.  481;  Wallop  v  Brown, 
4  Bro.  C.  C.  212,  223  ;  Bromfield  v.  Chichester, 
1  Dick.  379 ;  Bailey  v.  Bailey,  and  Boehm  v.  De 
Tastet,  ubi  supra ;  Coulson  v.  Graham,  1  V.  & 
B.  331 ;   Taylor  v.  Salmon,  3  M.  &  C.  109. 

"  Waters  v.  Taylor,  16  Ves.  417. 


(a)  Apart  from  statute,  counsel  fees  cannot 
be  imposed  as  a  punishment  upon  a  person  ad- 

502 


judged  to  be  in  contempt.     O'Rourke  v.  Cleve- 
land, 49  N.  J.  Eq.  577. 


HOW    CONTEMPTS    CLEARED,   WAIVED,    OR   DISCHARGED.  *  510 

payment  or  tender  of  the  costs  thereof,  or  the  plaintiff  accepts  the  costs 
without  order,  the  plaintiff  cannot  be  compelled,  in  case  the  answer  is 
insufficient,  to  recommence  the  process  of  contempt  against  the  defend- 
ant, but  is  at  liberty  to  take  up  the  process  at  the  point  to  which  he  had 
before  proceeded.1 

But  although  a  plaintiff  does  not  now,  by  accepting  the  costs  from  a 
defendant  upon  his  putting  in  an  answer,  forfeit  his  right  to  recommence 
the  process  of  contempt  at  the  point  where  it  left  off,  yet  if,  after  answer 
put  in,  he  accepts  the  answer,  or  takes  a  step  in  the  cause,  he  waives  the 
contempt  and  cannot  renew  the  process,  or  take  any  other  advantage  of  it. 
Thus,  if  a  plaintiff  reply  to  the  answer,2  or  move  upon  an  admission  con- 
tained in  it,8  he  waives  the  contempt ;  and  so,  where  a  messenger  had  been 
ordered,  upon  a  return  of  cepi  corpus,  and  in  the  mean  time  the  defendant 
filed  his  answer,  which  the  plaintiff  accepted,  and  then  applied  for  his 
costs  by  motion,  it  was  held  that  the  acceptance  of  the  answer  precluded 
him  from  his  right  to  costs.4  And  where  a  defendant,  who  was  in  con- 
tempt, put  in  an  answer,  without  paying  or  tendering  the  costs,  and  the 
plaintiff  replied  to  the  answer,  but  did  not  proceed  with  the  cause  for 
three  terms,  whereupon  the  defendant  moved  to  dismiss  the  bill  for  want 
of  prosecution,  upon  the  plaintiff's  objecting  that  the  defendant  could 
not  make  the  motion,  in  consequence  of  his  being  still  in  contempt,  Lord 
Eldon  held  that  the  contempt  was  gone,  and  that  the  defendant  was  in  a 
situation  to  make  the  motion.5  It  has  been  held,  however,  that  the  mere 
fact  of  the  plaintiff  bespeaking  a  copy  of  the  answer,  does  not  operate  as 
a  waiver  of  the  contempt.6 

Where  the  plaintiff  accepted  the  answer,  without  insisting  upon  the 
costs  of  the  contempt,  Lord  Eldon  held  that  the  plaintiff  had  not  thereby 
given  up  his  right  to  the  costs,  as  costs  in  the  cause,  but  had  only  waived 
his  right  to  enforce  them  by  means  of  the  process  of  contempt.7 

And  where  a  defendant,  in  contempt  for  want  of  an  answer,  had  put 
in  three  insufficient  answers,  and,  pending  a  reference  of  the  fourth,  put- 
in  a  fifth  answer,  which  was  accepted  by  the  plaintiff,  a  motion 
that  the  *  defendant  pay  the  costs  of  the  contempt,  and  of  the    *  510 
four  insufficient  answers,  was  denied.1 

1  Cons.  Ord.  XII.  7.  taxation  as  between  party  and  party,  the  costs 

2  Haynes  v.  Ball,  5  Beav.  140.  of  the  contempt,  even  where  there  is  a  decree 
8  Hoskins  v.  Lloyd,  1  S.&  S.  393;  Chuck  v.      for  the  plaintiff  with  costs,  will  not  be  allowed 

Cremer,  1  C.  P.  Coop.  temp.  Cott.  247;  and  see  him  as  costs  in  the  cause.     Att.-Gen.  v.  Lord 

Woodward  v.  Twinaine,  9  Sim.  301;  14  Jur.  Carrington,  6  Beav.  454,  460.     In  Livingstone 

20;    Herrett  v.  Reynolds,  2  Giff.  409;  6  Jur.  V.   Cooke,  9   Sim.   468    (but   see    Symonda   v. 

N.  S.  880;  ante,  p.  506,  n.  9.  Duchess  of  Cumberland,  2  Cox,  411),  Sir  Lance- 

*  Smith  v.  Blofield,  2  V.  &  B.  100.  lot  Shadwell  V.  C.  decided  that  a  mere  order 

5  Anon.  15  Ves.   174 ;   and  the  practice   is  to  amend  the  bill  did  not  operate  as  a  waiver 

the  same,  whether  the  defendant    be  actually  of  the  contempt:  upon  the  ground  that  it  cre- 

in  custody  or  not.     Oldfield  v.  Cobbett,  1  Phil.  ates  no  obstacle  to  the  defendant  putting  in  his 

557.  answer;    it  was   admitted,    however,    that   an 

«  Woodward   v.  Twinaine,   and   Herrett  v.  order  to  amend,  and  for  the  defendant  to  an- 

Reynolds,  ubi  supra.  swer  the  exceptions  at  the  same   time,    does 

7  Anon.  15  Ves.  174;  see  also  Smith  v.  Bio-  operate  as  a  waiver  of  the  contempt,  as  it  pre- 

field,  ubi  supra.  vents  the  defendant  from  putting  in  his  answer. 

1  Const  v.  Ebers,  1  Mad.  530,  531.    It  seems,  Where  the  defendant  has  been  brought  to  the 

however,   that  according    to   the   practice,    in  bar  of  the  Court  for  his  contempt,  and  refuses 

503 


511 


COMPELLING    ANSWER.  —  PROCEEDINGS   IN   DEFAULT. 


Any  step  taken  in  the  cause  must,  in  order  that  it  may  have  the  effect 
of  a  waiver  of  contempt,  be  in  the  cause  itself  in  which  the  contempt  has 
been  incurred;  therefore,  where  a  plaintiff  was  in  contempt  for  non- 
payment of  costs,  the  filing  of  a  cross-bill  by  the  defendant  was  held  not 
to  be  a  waiver  of  the  contempt  by  the  defendant,  so  as  to  permit  the 
plaintiff  to  make  a  motion  in  his  own  cause.2 

Where  any  of  the  processes  of  contempt  before  referred  to  have  been 

irregularly  issued,  the  defendant  should  apply  to  the  Court  on 

*  511    motion,  and  notice  to  the  plaintiff,3  supported  by  affidavit,  to  *  set 

them  aside  or  discharge  them  with  costs ;  and  we  have  seen  that 

the  circumstance  of  his  being  in  contempt  will  not  preclude  his  making 

such  an  application.1 

Where  a  sole  plaintiff  died,  leaving  a  sole  defendant  in  custody  for 
contempt,  he  was  ordered  to  be  discharged  from  prison,  on  his  own 
motion,  supported  by  affidavit  proving  these  facts.2 

The  Court  will  not  permit  the  regularity  of  its  process  to  be  decided 
upon  by  any  other  tribunal.3 


to  answer,  it  is  provided,  by  the  11  Geo.  IV.  & 
1  Will.  IV.  c.  36,  §  15,  r.  10,  that  the  Court 
may,  upon  motion  or  petition,  of  which  due 
notice  must  be  given  personally  to  the  defend- 
ant, authorize  the  plaintiff  to  amend  his  bill, 
without  such  amendment  operating  as  a  dis- 
charge of  the  contempt,  or  rendering  it  neces- 
sary to  proceed  with  the  process  of  contempt  de 
novo :  but  after  such  amendment,  the  plaintiff 
may  proceed  to  take  the  amended  bill  pro  con- 
fesso,  in  the  same  manner  as  if  it  had  not  been 
amended,  provided,  that  if  the  defendant  de- 
sires to  answer  the  amended  bill,  the  Court  shall 
allow  him  such  time  as  seems  just  for  that  pur- 
pose; but  if  he  shall  not  put  in  a  sufficient 
answer  within  the  time  limited,  the  process  for 
taking  the  bill  pro  confesso  may  be  resumed 
and  carried  on.  See  ante,  p.  386.  It  is  pre- 
sumed the  application  cannot  he  made  by  sum- 
mons, notwithstanding  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  80,  §  26. 
For  form  of  notice  of  motion,  see  Vol.  III.  It 
would  appear,  that  an  order  to  discharge  a  de- 
fendant in  custody  for  a  contempt,  upon  the 
plaintiffs  amending  his  bill,  where  the  amend- 
ment is  not  made  under  the  above  statute,  may 
he  obtained  ex  parte,  and  without  payment  of 
costs.  Gray  v.  Campbell,  1E.&  M.  323;  Ball 
v.  Etches,  id.  324. 

2  Gompertz  r.  Best,  1  Y.  &  C  Ex.  619;  and 
see  ante,  p.  464. 

3  For  form  of  notice  of  motion,  see  Vol.  III. 
i  Ante,  p.  506. 

2  Terrell  v.  Souch,  4  Hare,  535. 

3  In  Frowd  v.  Lawrence,  1  J.  &  W.  655, 
where  a  defendant,  who  had  been  taken  into 
custody  upon  an  attachment  which  was  irregu- 
larly issued,  obtained  an  order  to  discharge  the 
attachment  with  costs,  and  afterwards  com- 
menced an  action  against  the  plaintiff  and  the 

504 


sheriff,  for  false  imprisonment,  and  another 
action  against  the  plaintiff  for  maliciously  suing 
out  the  attachment,  Lord  Eldon,  upon  the 
authority  of  Bailey  v.  Devereux  (1  Vern.  269; 

I  J.  &  W.  660  n  )  and  May  v.  Hook  (1  J.  & 
W.  663,  n. ;  cited  2  Dick.  619),  made  an  order 
for  an  injunction  to  restrain  the  defendant  from 
proceeding  with  his  actions  at  Law.  His  Lord- 
ship, however,  held  that,  by  such  an  injunction, 
the  Court  does  not  intend  that  the  persons  con- 
cerned in  issuing  the  attachment  are  not  to 
make  the  party  satisfaction,  but  only  that  it 
should  not  be  done  by  an  action  at  Law;  be- 
cause "  it  is  impossible,  from  the  nature  of  the 
thing,  that  they  can  try  the  regularity  of  an 
attachment  in  a  Court  of  Law  :  "  and  he  there- 
fore ordered  that  the  injunction  should  be 
without  prejudice  to  any  application  that  the 
defendant  might  be  advised  to  make  for  com- 
pensation, or  for  the  costs  at  Law.  The  same 
principle  was  afterwards  acted  upon  by  Lord 
Lyndhu'-st,  in  Ex  parte  Clarke,  1  R.  &  M. 
563,  570;  and  see  Moore  v.  Moore,  25  Beav.  8; 
4  Jur.  N.  S.  250;  Walker  r.  Micklethwait,  1 
Dr.  &  S.  49;  Arrowsmith  v.  Hill,  2  Phil.  609, 
612  ;  Ex  parte  Van  Sandau,  1  Phil.  445,  448, 
n.;  9  Jur.  193;  Hutton  r.  Smith,  3  W.  R.  154; 
24  L.  J.  Ch.  147;  Whitehead  v.  Lynes,  34 
Beav.  161;  11  Jur.  N.  S.  74;  on  appeal,  12  L. 
T.  N.  S.  332;  Goucher  v.  Clayton,  14  id.  494; 
Fielden  v.  Northern  Ry.  of  B.  A.  Co.  W.  N. 
(1867)  218.  It  seems,  however,  that  leave  will 
be  given  to  bring  an  action  for  the  damages 
suffered  by  the  irregular  process,  if  the  Court 
considers  that  the  question  can  be  better  ad- 
judicated upon  at  Law.     AVhitehead  v.  Lynes, 

II  Jur.  N.  S.  74;  13  W.  R.  306,  M.  R.;  34 
Beav.  161;  and  on  appeal,  12  L.  T.  N.  S.  332, 
L.  C 


HOW   CONTEMPTS   CLEARED,    WAIVED,    OR    DISCHARGED.  *  512 

Where  the  irregularity  in  the  process  was  occasioned  by  one  of  the 
Registrars  of  the  Court  not  entering  the  attachment,  although  he  or  his 
agent  had  received  the  usual  fee  for  so  doing,  the  Court  ordered  4  the 
Master  to  tax  the  defendant's  costs  out  of  pocket,  and  directed  that 
they  should  be  paid  by  the  plaintiff,  who  was  reported  to  have  been 
guilty  of  the  irregularity,  but  that  they  should  be  paid  over  to 
the  plaintiff  by  the  Registrar ;  after  this  the  Registrar  *  died,  and  *  512 
the  costs  having  been  taxed  at  £58,  the  matter  came  on  again 
upon  petition,  when  the  Court  being  of  opinion  that,  as  the  Registrar 
had  received  his  fee,  his  omitting  to  enter  the  attachment  was  a  breach 
of  contract,  and  not  a  mere  personal  neglect,  made  an  order  for  payment, 
by  the  administratrix,  out  of  the  Registrar's  assets ;  and  there  being  no 
one  in  Court  to  admit  assets  for  her,  it  was  ordered  that  she  should  be 
examined  as  to  assets. 

If  a  party  wishes  to  discharge  a  process  for  irregularity,  he  must 
make  his  application  before  he  complies  with  it :  otherwise,  he  will  be 
considered  as  waiving  the  irregularity.1  Thus,  where  a  defendant  has 
been  taken  upon  process  of  contempt  for  non-appearance,  he  must  not 
enter  his  appearance  in  the  ordinary  way  :  otherwise,  his  appearance 
will  cure  the  defect;  he  must,  however,  submit  himself  to  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  Court,  in  such  a  manner  that,  if  his  objection  is  held  invalid, 
the  plaintiff  shall  not  be  deprived  of  the  benefit  of  his  process.2  The 
Court,  therefore,  before  the  Orders  of  August,  1841,  required  the  defend- 
ant, before  moving  to  discharge  the  attachment,  to  enter  a  conditional 
appearance  with  the  Registrar ; 8  the  effect  of  which  was,  to  enable  the 
plaintiff,  in  case  the  Court  should  decide  that  the  process  had  been  regu- 
larly issued,  to  send  the  Sergeant-at-Arms  at  once,  without  any  inter- 
vening proceeding ;  but  the  7th  of  those  Orders 4  provided,  that  no 
order  should  thereafter  be  made  for  the  Sergeant-at-Arms  to  take  the 
body  of  a  defendant,  to  compel  appearance. 

It  is  to  be  observed,  that  a  subsequent  appearance  by  a  party  cannot 
be  construed  to  have  a  relation  back,  so  as  to  bring  him  into  contempt 
for  disobeying  a  writ  or  other  process  issued  before  his  waiver  of  the 
informality  had  made  the  process  valid  against  him  ;  and  therefore, 
where  an  attachment  was  issued  against  a  defendant  for  non-appearance 
to  a  subpoena,  which  had  been  issued  against  him,  and  in  which  he  was 

4  James  v.  Phillips,  2  P.  Wms.  657.    As  to  appearance  is  entered,  see  post,  p.  536;  and  see 

the  responsibility  of  public  officers,  see  Tobin  Seton,  1*2-19. 

v.  The  Queen,  16  C.  B.  N.  S.  310;  10  Jur.  N.  3  Davidson  v.  Marchioness  of  Hastings,   2 

S.  1029.  Keen,  509. 

i  Anon.  3  Atk.  567;  Floyd  v.  Nangle,  id.  *  Later,  Cons.  Ord.  X.  10.  In  Price  v.  Webb, 
569;  Bound  v.  Wells,  3  Mad.  434;  Robinson  v.  2  Hare,  511  (and  see  Braithwaite's  Pr.  321,  and 
Nash,  1  Anst.  76.  post,  p.  536),  Sir  James  Wigram  V.  C.  directed 
In  pleading,  a  positive  step  on  the  basis  of  that  the  order  for  liberty  to  enter  the  condi- 
the  regularity  of  a  previous  pleading,  waives  tional  appearance  should  be  made,  upon  the 
any  irregularity  therein.  Seifreid  v.  People's  consent  of  the  defendant  to  submit  to  any  pro- 
Bank,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  17;  Fulton  Bank  v.  Beach,  cess  which  the  Court  might  direct  to  be  issued 
2  Paige,  307;  S.  C.  6  Wend.  36;  Steele  v.  against  him,  for  want  of  appearance,  in  case  the 
Plomer,  2  Phil.  780 ;  Seifreid  v.  People's  Bank,  subpoena,  should  not  be  set  aside  for  irregularity. 
1  Baxter,  200.  For  form  of  order,  see  2  Seton,  1626,  No.  1. 


1  For  the  manner  in  which   a  conditional 


505 


514 


COMPELLING    ANSWER. 


PROCEEDINGS   IN   DEFAULT. 


described  by  a  wrong  name,  it  was  held,  by  the  Court  of  Exchequer, 
that  his  appearance  for  the  purpose  of  discharging  the  attachment 
would   not  relate  back,  so  as  to  cure  the  defect  in   the  subpoena,  and 

bring  him  into  contempt  for  not  appearing  in  time.6 
*  513        *  It  should  be  noticed  also,  that  the  principle  of  waiver  applies 

only  to  an  irregular,  and  not  to  an  erroneous  order ;  and  there- 
fore, where  an  order  had  been  made  that  service  upon  the  attorney 
should  be  good  service,  and  service  was  accordingly  effected  upon  the 
attorney,  who  thereupon  entered  an  appearance,  but  it  was  found,  after- 
wards, that  the  affidavit  upon  which  the  order  for  substituted  service 
had  been  made  was  insufficient,  the  order  and  all  the  subsequent  pro- 
ceedings were,  on  the  defendant's  motion,  ordered  to  be  set  aside,  on 
the  ground  that  the  original  order  was  erroneous,  and  not  irregular ; 
and  that,  being  erroneous,  the  defect  was  not  cured  by  the  subsequent 
appearance  of  the  party.1 


Section  V.  —  Process  by  filing   a   Traversing  Answer,   or   Traversing 

Note.2 

Having  considered  the  various  means  which  the  practice  of  the  Court 
affords  for  the  purpose  of  compelling  an  answer  from  the  defendant, 
it  remains  to  state  particular  cases  in  which  the  plaintiff  may  himself, 
if  he  thinks  fit,  file  an  answer  for  a  defaulting  defendant,  or  a  "  trav- 
ersing note,"  which  has  the  effect  of  an  answer. 

Where  the  defendant  is  not  required  to,  and  does  not  answer,  the 
plaintiff's  bill,  he  is  to  be  considered  to  have  traversed  the  case  made 
by  the  bill  ;8  it  is  only  in  those  cases,  therefore,  in  which  the  defendant 
has  been  required  to  answer,  and  is  in  default,  that  the  plaintiff  can  file 

an  answer  for  him,  or  a  traversing  note.4 
*  514        *  The  application  must  be  supported  by  production  of  the  con- 
tempt orders,  the  keeper's  certificate  of  the  defendant  being  in 


6  Robinson  v.  Nash,  1  Anst.  76;  see  Green- 
ing v.  Greening,  1  Beav.  121;  Haynes  v.  Ball,  4 
Beav.  101;  Needham  v.  Needham,  1  Phil.  640. 

i  Levi  v.  Ward,  1  S.  &  S.  334;  see  Whit- 
tington  v.  Edwards,  3  De  G.  &  J.  243. 

2  See  Stump  ».  Beatty,  8  Dana,  14;  Chiles 
v.  Boon,  3  B.  Mon.  82. 

3  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86.  §  26.  Issue  is  to  be 
joined  in  such  case,  by  filing  replication.  Cons. 
Ord.  XVII.  1;  or  the  cause  maybe  set  down 
to  be  heard  on  motion  for  decree,  see  post, 
p.  516;  but  not  on  bill  and  answer.  Braith- 
waite's  Pr.  70. 

*  Heath  v.  Lewis,  17  Jur.1000,  M.  R.;  Cons. 
Ord.  XVII.  1;  and  post,  Chap.  XXI.  Replica- 
tion. By  the  11  Geo.  IV.  and  1  Will.  IV.  c. 
36,  §  15,  rule  11,  it  is  enacted  "that  in  every 
case  where  the  defendant  has  been  brought  to 
the  bar  of  the  Court,  to  answer  his  contempt 
for  not  answering,  and  shall  refuse  or  neglect  to 
answer  within  the  next  twenty-one  days,  the 
506 


plaintiff  shall  be  at  liberty,  with  the  leave  of 
the  Court,  upon  ten  days'  previous  notice  to  the 
defendant,  after  the  expiration  of  such  twenty- 
one  days,  unless  good  cause  be  shown  to  the 
contrary,  instead  of  proceeding  to  have  the  bill 
taken  pro  confesso,  to  put  in  such  an  answer  to 
the  bill  as  hereinafter  is  mentioned,  in  the  name 
of  the  defendant,  without  oath  or  signature;  and 
thereupon  the  suit  shall  proceed,  in  the  same 
manner  as  if  such  answer  were  really  the  an- 
swer of  the  defendant,  with  which  the  plaintiff 
was  satisfied;  and  the  costs  of  the  contempt, 
and  of  putting  in  such  answer,  may  be  provided 
for  in  like  manner  as  if  the  defendant  himself 
had  put  in  such  answer;  and  such  answer,  be- 
sides the  formal  parts  thereof,  shall  be  to  the 
following  effect:  that  the  defendant  leaves  the 
plaintiff  to  make  such  proofs  of  the  several 
matters  in  the  bill  alleged,  as  he  shall  be  able, 
or  be  advised,  and  submits  his  interests  to  the 
Court.''     For  form  of  first-mentioned  order,  see 


PROCESS   BY   TRAVERSING    ANSWER,    OR   TRAVERSING   NOTE.      *  515 

custody,  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerk's  certificate  of  no  answer  having 
been  filed,  and  an  affidavit  of  service  of  the  notice  of  motion. 

The  practice  under  this  rule  is  not  of  so  much  importance  as  it  was 
formerly;  because  the  plaintiff  has  now  a  remedy  of  a  similar  kind, 
though  more  generally  applicable :  for  after  the  expiration  of  the  time 
allowed  to  a  defendant  to  plead,  answer,  or  demur  (not  demurring  alone) 
to  any  original  or  supplemental  bill,  or  bill  amended  before  answer,  which 
he  has  been  required  to  answer,  if  such  defendant  has  not  filed  any  plea, 
answer,  or  demurrer,  the  plaintiff  .may  file  a  note  at  the  Record  and 
Writ  Clerk's  Office,  to  the  following  effect :  "  The  plaintiff  intends  to 
proceed  with  his  cause,  as  if  the  defendant  had  filed  an  answer,  travers- 
ing the  case  made  by  the  bill."  1  In  the  case  of  a  bill  amended  after 
answer,  upon  the  like  default,  he  may  file  a  note  to  the  following  effect: 
"The  plaintiff  intends  to  proceed  with  his  cause,  as  if  the  defendant 
had  filed  an  answer,  traversing  the  allegations  introduced  into  the  bill 
by  amendment."  2  And,  after  the  expiration  of  the  time  allowed  to  a 
defendant  to  put  in  his  further  answer  to  any  bill,  the  plaintiff  (if  such 
defendant  shall  not  have  put  in  any  further  answer)  may  file  a  note  to 
the  following  effect :  "The  plaintiff  intends  to  proceed  with  his  cause 
as  if  the  defendant  had  filed  a  further  answer,  traversing  the  allegations 
in  the  bill  whereon  the  exceptions  are  founded."  8 

When  a  copy  of  the  traversing  note  has  been  duly  served,  it  has  the 
same  effect  "as  if  the  defendant  against  whom  such  note  is  filed  had 
filed  a  full  answer  or  further  answer,  traversing  the  whole  bill,  or  those 
parts  of  the  bill  to  which  the  note  relates,  on  the  day  on  which  the  note 
was  filed."  4 

When  a  traversing  note  has  been  filed,  a  copy  thereof  must  be 
served  upon  the  defendant  against  whom  the  same  is  filed,  in  the 
manner  directed  for  the  service  of  documents  not  requiring  personal 
service.5 

*  The  rule  last  referred  to  applies  only  to  cases  where  the  de-  *  515 
fendant  has  appeared  by  a  solicitor,  or  personally  ;  and  not  to 
cases  where  the  plaintiff  has  entered  an  appearance  for  him.1  It  has 
been  held,  however,  that  in  such  a  case  the  Court  can,  under  its  general 
jurisdiction,  make  a  special  order  for  service  of  the  traversing  note  on 
the  defendant.2 

The  application  should  be  made  ex  parte,  and  be  supported  by  an 
affidavit  of  service  of  the  bill  and  interrogatories,  and  by  the  Record 
and  Writ  Clerk's  certificate  that  the  plaintiff  has  appeared  for  the 

Seton,  1264,  No.  13;  and  for  form  of  notice  of  respect  of  notice,  as  an  answer,  and  as  within  the 

motion  under  such  order,  see  Vol.  III.  operation  of  Cons.  Ord.  III.  9;  so  that  the  copy 

1  Cons.  Ord.  XIII.  1.  should,  if  possible,  be  served  on  the  day  on 

2  Cons.  Ord.  XIII.  2.  which  the  note  is  filed.     Braithwaite's  Manual, 
8  Cons.  Ord.  XIII.  3.  144 :  Veal's  Pr.  24. 

*  Cons.  Ord.  XIII.  6;  but  it  has  not  the  1  Anon.  11  Jur.  28  L.  C;  Braithwaite's 
same  effect,  for  the  purpose  of  evidence,  as  an  Pr.  G8. 

answer  on  oath.    Martin  v.  Norman,  2  Hare,  2  Moss  v.  Buckley,  2  Phil.  628;  12  Jur.  487; 

596,  598.  and  for  the  order  in  that  case,  see  Seton,  1246, 

5  Cons.  Ord. XIII.  5;  III.  4,  6;  ante,  pp.454,  No.  10;  and  see  Laurie  v.  Burn,  6  Hare,  308; 

455.    No  time  is  limited  within  which  the  note  12  Jur.  598;  Horlock  v.  Wilson,  12  Beav.  545; 

is  to  be  served ;  but  it  is  in  practice  treated,  in  see  also  Scott  v.  Wheeler,  13  Beav.  239. 


50 


516 


COMPELLING    ANSWER.  —  PROCEEDINGS   IN   DEFAULT. 


defendant,  and  has  filed  the  traversing  note.  It  seems  usual,  though 
not  essential,  to  prove  by  affidavit  that  the  defendant  is  within  the 
jurisdiction.8 

In  a  proper  case,  the  Court  will  order  substituted  service  of  the  trav- 
ersing note,4  on  application  by  ex  parte  motion,  supported  by  the  affida- 
vit and  certificates  above  mentioned ; 5  but  leave  to  serve  the  note  on  a 
defendant  out  of  the  jurisdiction  will  not  be  given.6 

A  traversing  note  is  to  be  intituled  in  the  cause,7  and  written  on  paper 
of  the  same  description  and  size  as  that  on  which  bills  are  printed.8  It 
may  be  underwritten  or  indorsed  with  the  name  and  place  of  business 
of  the  plaintiff's  solicitor,  and  of  his  agent,  if  any,  or  with  the  name 
and  place  of  residence  of  the  plaintiff,  where  he  acts  in  person ;  and,  in 
either  case,  with  the  address  for  service,  if  any.9  The  names  of  several 
defendants  may  be  included  in  one  traversing  note,  notwithstanding  that 
they  have  appeared  by  separate  solicitors.10 

After  service  of  a  copy  of  the  traversing  note,  the  defendant  cannot 
plead,  answer,  or  demur  to  the  bill,  or  put  in  any  further  answer 
thereto,  without  the  special  leave  of  the  Court ;  and  the  cause  is  to 
stand  in  the  same  situation  as  if  such  defendant  had  filed  a  full 
answer  or  further  answer  to  the  bill,  on  the  day  on  which  the  note 
was  filed.11 

Where  the  plaintiff  filed  a  traversing  note,  knowing  that  the  de- 
fendant's answer  was  sworn,  though  not  filed,  the  traversing 
*  516  *  note  was  ordered  to  be  taken  off  the  file,  upon  payment  of 
costs  by  the  defendant.1 

Where  a  defendant  wishes  to  put  in  a  plea,  answer,  or  demurrer,  or  a 
further  answer,  after  a  traversing  note  has  been  filed,  he  should  apply, 
on  motion,  with  notice  to  the  plaintiff,  for  leave  so  to  do,  and  for  that 
purpose  that  the  note  may  be  taken  off  the  file.  The  order  will  only 
be  made  on  payment  of  costs  by  the  defendant.2  The  application  should 
be  supported  by  an  affidavit  explaining  the  delay,  and  that  the  defend- 
ant is  advised  to  put  in  the  proposed  defence. 

It  seems  that  a  traversing  note  cannot  be  filed  in  the  case  of  an  infant 
defendant ; 8  but  inasmuch  as  it  is  only  necessary  to  file  it,  in  those  cases 
in  which  an  answer  has  been  required,  and  none  put  in,  a  case  could 
scarcely  now  arise  in  practice,  in  which  it  could  be  desired  to  file  a 
traversing  note  against  an  infant  defendant :  no  answer  being  usually 
required  in  such  a  case.     Where  a  married  woman  is  co-defendant  with 


3  For  forms  of  motion  paper  and  affidavit, 
see  Vol.  III. 

4  Wallis  v.  Darby,  6  Hare,  618;  Scott  v. 
Wheeler,  ubi  supra ;  Hunt  v.  Niblett,  25  Beav. 
124;  4  Jur.  N.  S.  444. 

5  For  forms  of  motion  paper  and  affidavit, 
see  Vol.  III. 

6  Anderson  v.  Stather,  11  Jur.  96,  V.  C.  K. 
B.  But  see,  contra,  Martigny  v.  Smith,  18 
W.  R.  108. 

7  For  forms  of  traversing  notes,  see  Vol. 
III. 

508 


8  Cons.  Ord.  6  Mar.,  1860,  r.  16.  As  to  such 
paper,  see  Cons.  Ord.  IX.  3;  ante,  p.  361. 

9  Cons.  Ord.  III.  2,  5;  ante,  pp.  453,  454. 
No  fee  is  payable  on  filing  a  traversing  note. 
Braithwaite's  Pr.  67. 

w  Ibid. 

li  Cons.  Ord.  XIII.  7. 

1  Rigby  v.  Rigby,  6  Beav.  265. 

2  Towne  r.  Bonnin,  1  De  G.  &  S.  128;  11 
Jur.  261.  For  form  of  notice  of  motion,  see 
Vol.  III. 

8  Emery  v.  Newson,  10  Sim.  564. 


PROCESS   BY   TRAVERSING    ANSWER,   OR   TRAVERSING   NOTE.     *  516 

her  husband,  a  traversing  note  cannot  be  filed  against  her  separately, 
unless  an  order  for  her  to  answer  separately  has  been  obtained. 

Due  service  of  the  traversing  note  must  be  proved  against  the  defend- 
ant at  the  hearing,  if  he  does  not  appear.4 

Where  a  demurrer  or  plea  to  the  whole  bill  is  overruled,  the  plaintiff, 
if  he  does  not  require  an  answer,  may  immediately  file  his  note,  in  man- 
ner above  pointed  out,  as  the  case  may  require,  and  with  the  same 
effect ;  unless  the  Court,  upon  overruling  such  demurrer  or  plea,  gives 
time  to  the  defendant  to  plead,  answer,  or  demur ;  and  in  such  case,  if 
the  defendant  does  not  file  any  plea,  answer,  or  demurrer,  within  the 
time  so  allowed  by  the  Court,  the  plaintiff,  if  he  does  not  then  require 
an  answer,  may,  on  the  expiration  of  such  time,  file  such  note.5 

When  a  traversing  note  has  once  been  filed,  the  plaintiff  cannot 
without  notice  to  the  parties  affected  by  it,  obtain  an  order  to  take  it 
off  the  file.6 

The  tiling  of  a  traversing  note  does  not  prevent  a  cause  being  heard 
on  motion  for  decree ;  but,  for  that  purpose,  the  traversing  note  is 
equivalent  to  an  answer.7 

4  Evans  v.  Williams,  6  Beav.  118;  and  see  7  Maniere  v.  Leicester,  5  De  G.  M.  &  G.  75; 

Reg.  Regul.  15  March,  I860,  r.  25.  For  form  18  Jur.  320.  As  to  motions  to  dismiss  for  want 
of  affidavit  of  service  of  a  traversing  note,  see  of  prosecution,  where  a  traversing  note  has  been 
Vol.  III.  filed,  see  Cons.  Ord.  XXXIII.  10. 

6  Cons.  Ord.  XIII.  4. 

6  Simmons  v.  Wood.  5  Beav.  390.     For  form 
of  notice  of  motion  in  such  case,  see  Vol.  III. 

509 


517 


*  CHAPTER  XI. 


TAKING  BILLS   PRO   CONFESSO. 


Section  I.  —  Preliminary  Order. 

In  preceding  chapters,  the  reader's  attention  has  been  drawn  to  the 
method  which  the  Court  adopts  to  compel  a  refractory  defendant  to 
appear  to,  and  answer  the  bill.  By  means  of  the  process  there  pointed 
out,  the  plaintiff  may,  if  the  defendant  is  not  a  privileged  person,  take 
his  body  as  a  security  for  his  obedience;  or  if  he  be  a  privileged  per- 
son, or  manages  to  keep  out  of  the  way  so  successfully  as  to  avoid  an 
arrest,  the  plaintiff  may  proceed  to  compel  his  submission,  by  taking 
from  him  the  enjoyment  of  his  property  and  effects,  until  he  submits. 
It  is  obvious,  however,  that  in  a  Court  of  Equity,  where  the  nature  of 
the  relief  to  be  granted  frequently  depends  upon  the  discovery  to  be 
elicited  from  a  defendant  by  his  answer,  the  mere  taking  a  party  into 
custody,  or  sequestrating  his  property,  cannot  always  answer  the  object 
of  doing  that  justice  to  the  plaintiff  which  it  is  the  business  of  Equity 
to  secure.  The  Court  has,  therefore,  adopted  a  method  of  rendering  its 
process  effectual,  by  treating  the  defendant's  contumacy  as  an  admission 
of  the  plaintiff's  case,  and  by  making  an  order  that  the  facts  of  the  bill 
shall  be  considered  as  true,  and  decreeing  against  the  defendant  accord- 
ing to  the  equity  arising  upon  the  case  stated  by  the  plaintiff,  (a)  This 
proceeding  is  termed  taking  a  bill  jaro  confesso.1 


l  A  rule  for  an  answer  where  process  has  not 
been  rightly  served,  and  a  decree  pro  confesso, 


for  want  of  an  answer,  are  irregular, 
well  v.  Cleaveland,  3  McLean,  283. 


Tread- 


(n)  A  decree  pro  confesso,  which  admits  the 
truth  of  the  bill,  is  not  a  decree  as  of  course 
according  to  the  prayer  of  the  bill  or  the  plain- 
tiff's wish,  but,  at  least  in  the  Federal  Courts,  is 
to  be  denned  by  the  Court,  according  to  what 
should  be  decreed  upon  the  properly  averred 
allegations  of  the  bill,  assumed  to  be  true;  and 
while  such  decree  is  unrevoked,  the  defendant 
cannot  set  up  anything  in  opposition  thereto 
either  in  the  Court  which  made  the  decree,  or  on 
appeal.  Thomson  v.  Wooster,  114  U.  S.  104; 
Dobson  v.  Hartford  Carpet  Co.  id.  439 ;  Andrews 
v.  Cole,  20  Fed.  Rep.  410;  Waue;h  v.  Schlenk, 
23  111.  App.  433 ;  Cramer  r.  Bode.  24  111.  App.  219; 
see  Dotterer  v.  Freeman,  88  Ga.  479.  The  Federal 
Equity  Rules,  18,  19,  which  govern  the  taking 
of  bills  pro  confesso,  were  amended  in  1878.  97 
U.  S.  viii. :  post,  p.  2379.  Upon  a  bill  which  is 
fatahv  defective,  even   though   it   contains  a 

510 


prayer  for  general  relief,  the  plaintiff  cannot 
have  relief  even  when  the  defendant  suffers 
decree  pro  confesso.  Lancaster  Mills  v.  Mer- 
chants' Cotton-press  Co.  89  Tenn.  1 ;  McMahon 
v.  Rooney,  93  Mich.  390.  When  the  plaintiff's 
demand  is  uncertain,  and  his  allegations  are 
indefinite,  proofs  must  be  supplied  in  order  that 
a  proper  decree  may  be  made.  Welsh  v.  Solen- 
berger,  85  Va  441.  If  such  proofs,  required  by 
the  Court  in  its  discretion,  are  not  supplied,  the 
bill  may,  it  seems,  be  dismissed.  Hoffman  v. 
Schoyer,  143  III.  598.  After  an  order  that  the 
bill  be  taken  pro  confesso,  the  defendant,  even 
if  he  has  appeared,  need  not  be  notified  of  an 
application,  made  in  open  Court,  for  final  decree. 
Austin  v.  Riley,  55  Fed.  Rep.  833. 

The  defendant  has.  however,  such  an  in- 
terest in  the  form  of  the  decree,  after  the  bill 
is  taken  for  confessed,  as  entitles  him  to  appeal: 


PRELIMINARY    ORDER. 


518 


It  seems  that  this  practice  is  not  of  very  ancient  standing,  and  that 
the  custom  formerly  was  to  put  the  plaintiff  to  make  proof  of  the  sub- 
stance of  his  bill ; 2  but  the  course  of  taking  the  bill  pro  confesso 
has  now,  for  some  time,  been  the  established  practice  of  *the  *518 
Court.1  And  this  practice  has  been  very  materially  extended 
and  facilitated  by  Acts  of  Parliament  and  General  Orders  of  the  Court. 
Considerable  difference  formerly  existed  in  the  practice  of  taking  bills 
pro  confesso,  in  cases  where  the  defendant  was  in  custody,  and  in  those 
where  he  was  not ;  but  the  General  Orders  have  so  far  assimilated  the 
practice  in  the  two  cases,  that  it  will  be  most  convenient  to  state  the 
general  rules  applicable  to  all  cases  in  which  a  bill  is  taken  pro  confesso : 
remarking  any  peculiarities  resulting  from  the  particular  circumstances 
in  which  a  defendant  may  be  placed. 

Where  a  decree  is  intended  to  be  sought  against  a  defendant,  by 
taking  the  bill  pro  confesso,  an  order  for  that  purpose  must  be  obtained 
upon  motion,  of  which  notice  must  be  given ; 2  and  then  the  cause  must 
be  set  down  to  be  heard ; 8  and  it  cannot  be  heard  on  the  same  day  on 
which  the  order  to  have  it  taken  pro  confesso  is  made.4 


2  See  Rose  v.  Woodruff,  4  John.  Ch.  547, 
548;  post,  526,  note;  Pierson  v.  David,  4  Iowa, 
410;  Johnson  v.  Donnell,  15  III.  97;  Corradine 
v.  O'Connor,  21  Ala.  573;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Carver, 
12  Ired.  (N.  C.)  231;  Smith  v.  Trimble,  27  111. 
152;  Stephens  v.  Bichnell,  id.  444.  The  defend- 
ant may,  in  such  case,  without  demurring,  take 
advantage  of  any  matter  which  would  be  a 
good  cause  of  demurrer.  Wilson  v.  Waterman, 
6  Rich.  Eq.  (S.  C.)  255. 

i  Hawkins  v.  Crook,  2  P.  Wms.  556;  John- 
son v.  Desmineere,  1  Vern.  223;  Gibson  v. 
Sceven^ton,  ib.  247.  In  New  Hampshire,  if  the 
delendant,  having  received  due  notice,  shall 
neglect  to  enter  his  appearance  at  the  return 
term,  or  shall  neglect  to  deliver  to  the  plain- 
tiff's solicitor  his  plea,  answer,  or  demurrer, 
within  two  calendar  months  after  service  of  the 


bill,  the  bill  may  be  taken  pro  confesso,  and  a 
decree  entered  accordingly.  Ch.  Rule  16,  38 
N.  H.  608.  See  Rule  18  o"f  the  Equity  Rules  of 
the  U.  S.  Court,  post,  Vol.  III.  See  infra,  p.  525, 
note.  See  Code  of  Tennessee,  §§  436'J,  4371,  as 
to  pro  confesso  orders ;  Stone  v.  Duncan,  1  Head, 
103.  A  pro  confesso  order  can  only  be  taken 
when  strictly  in  accordance  with  law  and  the 
rules  of  practice.  Lanum  v.  Steel,  10  Humph.  280. 

2  Cons.  Ord.  XXII.  1;  11  Geo.  IV.  &  1 
Will.  IV.  c.  36,  §§  3,  15;  and  see  Collins  v. 
Collyer,  3  Beav.  600:  Brown  v.  Home,  8  Beav. 
607.  For  forms  of  order,  see  Seton,  1265-1267, 
Nos.  1-7;  and  for  forms  of  notice  of  motion,  see 
Vol.  III. 

3  See  Pendleton  r.  Evans,  4  Wash.  C.  C.  335; 
Rose  v.  Woodruff,  4  John.  Ch.  547.  An  order 
to  take  a  bill^ro  confesso,  unless  the  defendant 


4  Cons.  Ord.  XXII.  6;  Brown  v.  Home,  ubi  su])ra. 


Blanchard  v.  Cooke,  144  Mass.  207,  218;  see 
Garvin  v.  Watkins,  29  Fla.  151;  Non-Magnetic 
Watch  Co.  v.  Association  Horlogere  Suisse,  45 
Fed.  Rep.  210.  As  to  third  parties  intervening 
after  decree  pro  confesso,  see  Farmers'  Loan  & 
T.  Co.  v.  Texas  Western  Ry.  Co.  32  Fed.  Rep. 
359.  After  such  decree,  the  defendant  is  en- 
titled to  notice  of  a  material  amendment  of  the 
bill.  McClenny  v.  Ward,  80  Ala.  243;  Fogg  v. 
Merrill,  74  Maine,  523.  See  Belt  V.  Bowie,  65 
Md.  350;  Paine  v.  Slocum,  56  Vt.  504;  Smith  v. 
Brittenham,  88  III.  291. 

An  interlocutory  decree  taken  pro  confesso, 
which  declares  a  patent  valid,  grants  an  injunc- 
tion, and  makes  a  reference  to  a  Master  for  an 
accounting,  is  still  in  the  Court's  control  and  is 


not  appealable.  Roemer  v.  Neumann,  26  Fed. 
Rep.  332.  Objections  which  must  be  raised  by 
demurrer,  or  promptly,  such  as  an  adequate 
remedy  at  law  or  multifariousness,  will  not  avail 
to  reverse  a  decree  pro  confesso.  Brown  v.  Lake 
Superior  Iron  Co.  134  U.  S.  530;  Gilmore  v. 
Sapp,  100  111.  297.  The  omission  to  enter  a 
formal  order  that  the  bill  be  taken  pro  confesso 
does  not  invalidate  the  final  decree.  Linder  v. 
Lewis,  1  Fed.  Rep.  378;  see  Allen  v.  New  York, 
7  id.  483.  A  decree  entered  upon  a  bill  taken 
pro  confesso  which  recites  that  all  the  defend- 
ants were  served  with  process,  is  conclusive,  if 
the  record  shows  nothing  to  the  contrary.  Moore 
v  Green  (Va.),  17  S-  E.  Rep.  872.  See  Kopper 
v.  Dyer,  59  Vt.  477;  Holly  v.  Bass,  63  Ala.  337. 
511 


*519 


TAKING    BILLS   PRO    CONFESSO. 


Where  the  defendant  is  beyond  seas,  or  has  absconded  to  avoid  being 
served,  and  it  is  intended  to  proceed  to  have  the  bill  taken  pro  confesso, 
without  any  appearance  having  been  entered  by  him,  or  on  his  behalf, 
the  proceedings  must  be  taken  under  the  Stat.  11  Geo.  IV.  &  1  Will. 
IV.  c.  36,  §  3.5  The  mode  prescribed  by  that  Act  must  be  strictly  com- 
plied with  ; 6  and  it  seems  that  the  Act  applies  to  all  cases  where  a  party 
goes  abroad,  to  avoid  process.7 

It  has  already  been  observed,  that  the  General  Order,  ena- 
*  519  bling  *  a  plaintiff  to  enter  an  appearance  for  an  absconding  de- 
fendant,1 applies  to  the  same  circumstances  as  those  provided  for 
by  the  Act ;  and  although  it  seems  that  this  order  has  not  superseded 
the  Act,2  it  is  undoubtedly  the  usual  practice,  in  all  cases  where  it  is 
intended  to  take  a  bill  pro  confesso  against  a  defendant,  to  enter  an  ap- 
pearance for  him,  and  to  proceed  under  the  provisions  of  the  General 
Order. 

Where  any  defendant,  whether  within  or  not  within  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  Court,  does  not  put  in  his  answer  in  due  time  after  appearance 
entered  by  or  for  him,8  and  the  plaintiff  is  unable,  with  due  diligence,4 
to  procure  a  writ  of  attachment,  or  any  subsequent  process  for  want  of 
answer,  to  be  executed  against  such  defendant,  by  reason  of  his  being 
out  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court,  or  being  concealed,  or  for  any  other 
cause,  then  such  defendant  is,  for  the  purpose  of  enabling  the  plaintiff 
to  obtain  an  order  to  take  the  bill  pro  confesso,  to  be  deemed  to  have 
absconded  to  avoid,  or  to  have  refused  to  obey,  the  process  of  the  Court.6 
And  where  any  defendant  who,  under  the  last  mentioned  rule,  may  be 
deemed  to  have  absconded  to  avoid,  or  to  have  refused  to  obey,  the 
process  of  the  Court,  appears  in  person  or  by  his  own  solicitor,  the  plain- 


answers  it  by  a  day  given,  cannot  be  antici- 
pated, and  a  decree  pro  confesso  passed  in  anti- 
cipation of  such  day.  Fitzhugh  v.  McPherson, 
9  Gill  &  J.  52. 

It  is  error  to  take  a  bill  pro  confesso  against 
several  defendants,  when  process  has  been 
served  only  upon  one.  Robertson  v.  Crawford, 
1  A.  K.  Marsh.  449.  As  to  what  service  of  the 
subpoena  is  necessary  before  a  bill  can  be  taken 
as  confessed,  see  Sawyer  v.  Sawyer,  3  Paige, 
263;  Sullivant  v.  Weaver,  10  Ohio,  275;  Tread- 
well  v.  Cleaveland,  3  McLean,  283. 

6  See  ante,  pp.  456,  457. 

6  Short  v.  Downer,  2  Cox,  84 ;  see  Baker  v. 
Keen,  4  Sim.  498,  where  the  proceedings  are 
set  out  in  detail. 

7  Mawer  v.  Mawer,  1  Cox,  104;  1  Bro.  C.  C. 
388;  Henderson  v.  Meggs,  2  Bro.  C.  C.  127; 
James  v.  Dore,  1  Dick.  63.  Mass.  Ch.  Rule  5 
provides  for  notice  to  defendants  in  Equity 
sui's,  who  reside  out  of  the  Commonwealth,  and 
the  method  to  be  pursued  to  entitle  the  plain- 
tiff in  such  cases  to  obtain  an  order  to  have  his 
bill  taken  for  confessed.  In  Maine,  where  the 
rights  of  a  defendant  in  Equity,  who  resides 
out  of  the  State,  and  has  had  notice  of  the  suit, 

512 


but  does  not  appear  and  answer,  will  not  be 
prejudiced  by  the  decree,  the  bill  may  be 
taken  pro  confesso  as  to  him.  Adams  v. 
Stevens,  49  Maine,  362  ;  see  Evarts  v.  Beeker, 
8  Paige,  506;  Christy  v.  Christy,  6  Paige,  170. 
i  Cons.  Ord.  X.  6;  ante,  p.  459. 

2  Wilkin  v.  Nainby,  4  Hare,  476;  10  Jur. 
735;  Dresser  v.  Morton,  1  C.  P.  Coop.  temp.  Cott. 
376  ;  see,  however,  Fortescue  v.  Hallett,  3  Jur. 
N.  S.  806;  5  W.  R.  747,  V.  C.  K. 

3  Where  a  defendant  had  been  duly  served 
with  the  bill  and  interrogatories,  but  did  not 
appear  or  answer,  and  withdrew  himself  be- 
yond the  .jurisdiction,  the  Court  ordered  notice 
to  be  given  to  him,  that  unless  an  answer  was 
put  in  within  fourteen  days  from  the  service  of 
the  notice,  an  appearance  would  be  entered  for 
him,  and  proceedings  taken  to  have  the 
bill  taken  pro  confesso.  Grover  &  Baker  Sew- 
ing Machine  Co.  v.  Millard,  8  Jur.  N.  S.  713, 
V.  C.  W.  See  Hale  v.  Continental  Life  Ins. 
Co.  20  Fed   Rep.  344. 

4  Cons.  Ord.  XXII.  2.  The  sheriff's  officer 
mu«t  swear  that  he  has  used  due  diligence. 
Yearslev  v.  Budgett,  11  Beav.  144. 

6  Cons.  Ord.  XXII.  2. 


PRELIMINARY   ORDER.  *  520 

tiff  may  serve  upon  such  defendant  or  his  solicitor  a  notice,  that  on  a 
day  in  such  notice  named  (being  not  less  than  fourteen  days  after  the 
service  of  such  notice),  the  Court  will  be  moved  that  the  bill  may  be 
taken  pro  confesso  against  such  defendant ; 6  and  the  plaintiff  must,  upon 
the  hearing  of  such  motion,  satisfy  the  Court  that  such  defendant  ought, 
under  the  provisions  of  the  last-mentioned  rule,  to  be  deemed  to  have 
absconded  to  avoid,  or  to  have  refused  to  obey,  the  process  of  the  Court ; 
and  the  Court,  if  so  satisfied,  and  if  an  answer  has  not  been  filed,  may, 
if  it  so  think  fit,  order  the  bill  to  be  taken  pro  confesso  against  such 
defendant,  either  immediately,  or  at  such  time,  or  upon  such  further 
notice  as,  under  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  the  Court  may  think 
proper. 7 

*The   last-mentioned  rule  gives  the  Court  a  discretion   as  to    *520 
ordering  a  bill  to  be  taken  pro  confesso ;  and  in  the  exercise  of 
this  discretion,  the  Court  refused  to  make  the  order,  where  the  defendant 
had  always  been  resident  abroad,  and  had  not  absconded,  and  there  was 
no  evidence  of  his  refusal  to  obey  the  order  of  the  Court.1 

Where  any  defendant  who,  under  the  above-mentioned  rule,  may  be 
deemed  to  have  absconded  to  avoid,  or  to  have  refused  to  obey,  the 
process  of  the  Court,  has  had  an  appearance  entered  for  him  by  the  plain- 
tiff,2 and  does  not  afterwards  appear  in  person  or  by  his  own  solicitor, 
the  plaintiff  may  cause  to  be  inserted  in  the  London  Gazette,  a  notice, 
that  on  a  day  in  such  notice  named 8  (being  not  less  than  four  weeks 
after  the  first  insertion  of  such  notice  in  the  London  Gazette),  the 
Court  will  be  moved  that  the  bill  may  be  taken  pro  confesso  against  such 
defendant;  and  the  plaintiff  must,  upon  the  hearing  of  such  motion, 
satisfy  the  Court  that  such  defendant  ought,  under  the  provisions  of  the 
above-mentioned  rule,  to  be  deemed  to  have  absconded  to  avoid,  or  to 
have  refused  to  obey,  the  process  of  the  Court ;  and  that  such  notice  of 
motion  has  been  inserted  in  the  London  Gazette,  at  least  once  in  every 
entire  week,  reckoned  from  Sunday  morning  to  Saturday  evening,  which 
shall  have  elapsed  between  the  time  of  the  first  insertion  thereof,  and 
the  time  for  which  the  notice  is  given  ;  and  the  Court,  if  so  satisfied,  and 
if  an  answer  has  not  been  filed,  may,  if  it  so  thinks  fit,  order  the  bill  to 

6  For  form  of  notice,   see  Vol.  III.     Short  adverse  party.     Oakley  v.  O'Neill,  1  Green  Ch. 

notice  of  motion  allowed,  where  a  defendant,  287;  see  Nesbit  v.  St.  Patrick's  Church,  9  N.  J. 

who  had  obtained  further  time,  refused  to  put  Eq.  76.     For  form  of  order  to  take  the  bill  pro 

in  his  answer,  and  an  attachment  could  not  confesso  in  this  case,  see  Seton,  1265,  No.  2. 
be  executed   against   him.      Wedderburne    p.  J  Zulueta  V.  Vinent,  15  Beav.  272:   16  .Tur. 

Thomas,  10  Jur.  N.  S.  92.  V.  C.  W.  631 :  see,  however,  Hele   v.  Ogle,  2  Hare,  623, 

i  Cons.  Ord.  XXII.  3.     If  a  defendant,  after  under  1st  Order  of  April,  1842,  Sand.  Old.  196  ; 

appearing,  will  not  answer,  the  bill  will  be  taken  Beav.  Ord.  195. 

pro  confesso.     Caines  v.  Fisher,  1  John.  Ch.  8.  2  Under  Cons.  Ord.  X.  4,  6,  or  7;  see  ante, 

And  where  the  bill  is  for  relief  only,  and  states  pp.  459,  460. 

sufficient  ground,  the  process  for  contempt  to  3  Which  may  be  any  day  in  term;  but  must, 

compel  an  answer  is  not  necessary.     Caines  v.  it  is  presumed,  be  on  a  seal  day  out  of  term. 

Fisher,  supra.     In  New  Jersey,  a  decree  pro  Chaffers  v.  Baker,  5  De  G.  M.  &G.  482;  1  Jur. 

confesso  may  be  taken   at  any  time  after  the  N.  S.  32      In  Millar  v.  F.lwin,  25  Beav.  674;  4 

time   limited   for    the  defendant  to  plead,  an-  Jur.  N.  S.  600,  however,  it  seems  that  the  ad- 

swer,  or  demur  has  expired.      It  may  be  taken  vertisement  was  for  a  day  out  of  term,  which, 

without  notice,  and,  of  course,  unless  it  appear  at  the  time  the  advertisement  was  issued,  could 

that  some  prejudice  will  thereby  accrue  to  the  not  have  been  known  to  be  a  seal  day. 

vol.  i. — 33  513 


*521 


TAKING    BILLS   PRO   CONFESSO. 


be  taken  pro  confesso  against  such  defendant,  either  immediately,  or  at 
such  time,  or  upon  such  further  notice,  as  under  the  circumstances  of  the 
case  the  Court  may  think  proper.4 

It  seems  that,  where  it  is  intended  to  take  the  bill  pro  confesso  under 
the  foregoing  rules,  interrogatories  must  have  been  filed ; 5  but  where 
the  defendant  has  absconded,  or  cannot  be  found,  the  delivery  may  be 

dispensed  with.6 
*  521        *  Where  the  defendant  is  out  of  the  jurisdiction,  it  is  not  neces- 
sary to  issue  an  attachment,  in  order  to  take  the  bill  pro  confesso 
against  him  under  these  rules.1 

The  plaintiff  having  advertised,  in  the  Gazette,  his  notice  of  motion 
to  take  the  bill  pro  confesso,  may  save  it  on  the  day  mentioned  in  the 
advertisement,  until  next  motion  day,  without  mentioning  such  saving 
expressly  to  the  Court.2  And  where  the  advertisement  gave  six  weeks' 
notice,  instead  of  four,  it  was  held,  that  the  insertion  of  the  advertise- 
ment for  the  first  four  of  the  six  weeks  was  sufficient.3 

Upon  the  motion,  the  plaintiff  must  show,  by  affidavit,  that  proper 
inquiries  have  been  made  after  the  defendant,  and  the  means  which  the 
deponent  had  of  knowing  the  parties,  and  the  facts  to  which  he  deposes,4 
and  that  the  case  is  within  the  rules  above  referred  to.5  Thus,  it  must 
appear  by  affidavit 6  that  interrogatories  have  been  filed,  and  also  deliv- 
ered where  delivery  is  necessary  ;  that  due  diligence  has  been  used  to 
execute  the  attachment  or  other  process  for  want  of  answer,  where 
process  has  issued  ; 7  and  that  notice  of  the  motion  has  been  served  on 
the  defendant  or  his  solicitor ;  or,  if  not  so  served,  the  Gazettes  contain- 
ing the  notice  must  be  produced.8  The  sheriff's  return  to  the  process,  if 
issued,  is  also  required  ;  and  also  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerk's  certificate 
that  the  defendant  has  not  put  in  his  answer ;  and  if  the  plaintiff  has 
entered  an  appearance  for  the  defendant,  that  fact  should  appear  by  the 
certificate.9 

If  the  defendant  puts  in  his  answer,  after  service  of  the  notice  of 


*  Cons.  Ord.  XXII.  4.  For  form  of  order, 
see  Seton,  1205,  No.  3.  Where  the  defendant 
has  absconded,  it  must  be  shown  that  he  cannot 
be  found  at  the  time  of  making  the  application. 
Wilkinson  v.  Turner,  14  W.  R.  813,  M.  R. 

5  Buttler  v.  Mathews,  19  Beav.  549. 

6  Anon.,  4  Jur.  N.  S.  583,  V.  C.  W.;  S.  C. 
nrnn.  Baker  v.  Dean,  6  W.  R.  719;  Buttler  v. 
Mathews,  19  Beav.  549 ;  Anthony  v.  Cowper, 
11  Jur.  N.S.73;  13  W.  R.  286,  M.  R.;  34  Beav. 
77.  Sometimes  the  filing  of  the  interrogatories 
h;is  been  directed  to  be  advertised;  see  Anon., 
nbi  supra  ;  but  this  does  not  seem  to  be  neces- 
sarv.  Anthony  v.  Cowper,  ubi  supra  ;  Darlow  r. 
Sinnock.  1  YV.  N.  154,  V.  C.  K. ;  S.  C  nom. 
Darlow  v.  Simlock,  14  W.  R.  383. 

1  Buttler  v.  Mathews,  19  Beav.  549,  and 
cases  there  referred  to;  Hodgson  v.  Hodgson. 
23  Beav.  604 ;  Braithwaite's  Pr.  295 ;  and  see 
Anon.,  9  L.  T.  N.  S.  674,  M.  R.,  for  practice 

514 


where  there  is  delay  between  the  making  and 
drawing  up  of  the  order. 

2  Torr  v.  Torr,  John.  660.  Where,  for 
want  of  business,  the  Court  did  not  sit  on  the 
day  in  term  mentioned  in  the  notice,  the  motion 
was  permitted  to  be  made  on  the  succeeding 
dav.  Postlethwaite  v.  Travers,  1  N.  R.  354, 
V.  C.  S.  dub. 

3  Millar  v.  Elwin,  25  Beav.  674;  4  Jur.  N.  S. 
600. 

4  Harrison  v.  Stewardson,  2  Hare,  533,  534, 
n.;  see  also  Anstey  v.  Hobson,  2  W.  R.  46, 
V.  C.  S.;  Robson  v.  Earl  of  Devon,  ib.  485, 
V  C.  S. 

6  Cons.  Ord.  XXII.  2,  3. 

»  For  form  of  affidavit,  see  Vol.  HI. 

7  Yearsley  v.  Bodgett,  11  Beav.  144;  ante, 
p.  519.  n.  4. 

8  See  Seton,  1265,  Nos.  2,  3. 

9  Ibid. 


PRELIMINARY   ORDER.  *  522 

motion,  but  before  the  motion  has  been  brought  on,  it  may  be  brought 
on  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  the  costs.10 

In  determining  the  question,  whether  the  bill  should  be  ordered  to  be 
taken  pro  confesso  "  immediately,"  or  at  some  future  time,  or  upon  some 
further  notice,  the  Court  is  guided  by  the  circumstances  of  the  case ; 
but,  in  general,  it  does  not  direct  the  bill  to  be  taken  pro  confesso  imme- 
diately.11 

Where  a  cause  had  been  set  down  to  be  heard  pro  confesso,  and  had 
been  struck   out,  in  consequence  of  the  absence   of   counsel,  it 
*  was  permitted  to  be  restored  to  the  paper,  on  the  application    *  522 
of  the  plaintiff  alone.1 

It  is  to  be  observed,  generally,  that,  in  proceeding  to  take  a  bill  pro 
confesso,  the  greatest  care  must  be  taken  to  bring  the  case  strictly  within 
the  General  Orders  ; 2  and  all  formalities  must  be  scrupulously  complied 
with.  Thus,  an  advertisement  in  the  Gazette,  which  omitted  the  defend- 
ant's name  as  a  party  to  the  cause,  although  the  notice  was  addressed  to 
him,  and  stated  that  application  would  be  made  to  have  the  bill  taken 
pro  confesso  against  him,  was  held  insufficient.8 

And  so,  after  an  order  to  take  the  bill  pro  confesso  has  been  obtained, 
the  bill  cannot  be  amended,  even  to  the  extent  of  correcting  a  clerical 
error,  without  vitiating  the  proceedings,  and  rendering  the  order  useless.4 
If,  however,  a  defendant,  who  has  been  brought  to  the  bar  of  the  Court 
for  his  contempt  in  not  answering,  refuses  or  neglects  to  answer  (not 
being  idiot,  lunatic,  or  of  unsound  mind),  the  Court  may,  upon  motion 
or  petition,  of  which  due  notice  must  be  given  personally  to  the  defend- 
ant, authorize  the  plaintiff  to  amend  his  bill  without  such  amendment 
operating  as  a  discharge  of  the  contempt,  or  rendering  it  necessary  to 
proceed  with  the  process  of  contempt  de  novo  ;  and  after  such  amend- 
ment, the  plaintiff  may  proceed  to  take  the  amended  bill  pro  confesso,  in 
the  same  manner  as  if  it  had  not  been  amended.5 

We  have  .before  seen,  that  where  a  defendant  is  in  actual  custody  for 
contempt  in  not  putting  in  his  answer,  it  is  incumbent  upon  the  plain- 
tiff not  to  detain  the  defendant  in  prison  beyond  a  certain  limited  time, 
without  bringing  him  to  the  bar  of  the  Court.6  If,  however,  the  plain- 
tiff determines  at  once  to  take  the  bill  pro  confesso,  he  need  not  bring 
the  defendant  to  the  bar  ;  but  may,  upon  the  execution  of  an  attach- 
ment for  want  of  answer,  or  at  any  time  within  three  weeks  afterwards, 
serve  the  defendant  with  a  notice  of  motion,  to  be  made  on  some  day 
not  less  than  three  weeks  after  the  day  of  such  service,  that  the  bill  may 
be  taken  pro  confesso  against  him ;    and  the  Court  may  thereupon  order 


1°  Spooner  i\  Payne,  2  De  G.  &  S.  439,  4 15 
12  Jtir.  G42. 

i'-  Courage  v.  Wardell,  4  Hare,  481 ;  9  Jur 
1055. 

i  Harvey  v.  Renon,  12  Jur.  445,  V.  C.  K.  B 

2  Buttler  v.  Mathews,  19  Beav.  549. 

3  Jones  v.  Brandon,  3  Jur.  N.  S.  1146,  V 
C.  W. 

*  Weightman  v.  Powell,  2  De  G.  &  S.  570;  6  Ante,  pp.  490,  491. 

12  Jur.  958.    And  if  a  bill  is  materially  amended 


where  the  defendant  has  failed  to  appear,  a 
decree  pro  confesso  taken  on  the  same  day,  and 
without  serving  new  process,  is  irregular,  and 
a  sufficient  ground  for  opening  the  decree 
founded  thereon,  and  granting  a  rehearing. 
Harris  t\  Deitrich,  29  Mich.  366. 

6  11  Geo.   IV.  &  1  Will.  IV.  c.  36,  §  15, 
10,  ante,  pp.  425,  510. 


515 


*523 


TAKING   BILLS   PRO    CONFESSO. 


the  bill  to  be  taken  pro  confesso  against  him.7  The  motion  must  be  sup- 
ported by  the  sheriff 's  return  to  the  attachment,  the  Record  and  Writ 
Clerk's  certificate  that  the  defendant  has  not  put  in  his  answer,  and  an 

affidavit  of  service  of  the  notice  of  motion.8 
*  523  *  As  before  stated,1  a  sequestration  is  the  first  compulsory 
process  which  issues  against  a  peer  or  member  of  Parliament. 
Upon  the  order  for  the  issuing  of  the  writ  being  made  absolute,  then, 
by  the  original  practice  of  the  Court,  if  the  defendant  persists  in  his 
contempt,  an  order  to  have  the  bill  taken  pro  confesso  may  be  obtained, 
upon  motion  of  course.2  In  the  case,  however,  of  a  bill  for  discovery, 
upon  the  expiration  of  the  time  for  answering,  an  order  nisi  to  take  the 
bill  pro  confesso  may  be  obtained  at  once,  where  the  defendant  is  in  con- 
tempt for  want  of  answer,  without  any  order  for  a  writ  of  sequestration ; 
and  such  order  will  be  made  absolute,  unless  the  defendant  shows  good 
cause  to  the  contrary,  as  before  explained.3 

In  like  manner,  in  the  case  of  corporations  aggregate,  after  an  order 
absolute  for  a  sequestration  has  been  made,  the  plaintiff  may  obtain, 
upon  motion  of  course,  an  order  to  take  the  bill  pro  confesso  against  the 
corporation.4 

Although  no  compulsory  process  issues  against  the  Attorne}T-General, 
we  have  seen  that  an  order  may  be  obtained,  on  ex  parte  motion,  for  him 
to  put  in  his  answer,  within  a  certain  time,  or  that  the  bill  shall  be  taken 
pro  confesso.5 

Where  a  husband  and  wife  are  defendants  to  a  bill,  the  husband  is, 
as  we  have  seen,6  liable  to  process  for  want  of  a  joint  answer,  unless  he 
obtains  an  order  to  answer  separately ;  and  the  bill  may  be  taken  pro 
confesso  against  him,  as  against  any  other  defendant.7  Where  the  decree 
sought  to  be  obtained  affects  the  wife's  inheritance,  and  the  husband 
does  not  answer,  it  seems  doubtful  how  far  such  a  decree  can  be  had 
against  the  wife.8 

The  preliminary  order  for  taking  the  bill  pro  confesso,  having  been 
obtained  by  one  or  other  of  these  means,  it  remains  only  to  be  observed, 
that  the  mere  putting  in  an  answer  by  the  defendant,  will  not  be  a  suffi- 
cient ground  for  moving  to  set  it  aside  ; 9  and  where,  upon  that  ground, 
a  motion  was  made  to  discharge  an  order  for  taking  a  bill  pro  confesso, 
it  was  refused  with  costs.10 


t  Cons.  Ord.  XXII.  1.  For  form  of  order, 
see  Seton,  1265,  No.  1 ;  and  for  form  of  notice 
of  motion,  see  Vol.  III.  The  times  of  vacation 
are  reckoned  in  the  three  weeks,  at  the  ex- 
piration of  which  the  motion  may  be  made. 
Kitchin  v.  Hughes,  11  Jur.  N.  S.'902;  14  W. 
R.  93,  V.  C.  K. 

8  For  form  of  affidavit,  see  Vol.  III. 

i  See  ante,  pp.  473,  496. 

2  Lord  Wellesley  v.  Earl  of  Mornington, 
cited  Seton,  1256.  For  form  of  order,  see  id. 
No.  4;  and  for  form  of  motion  paper,  see 
Vol.  III. 

a  Ante,  p.  496;  11  Geo.  IV.  &  1  Will.  IV. 
c.  36.  §§  12,  13.     For  form,  see  Vol.  HI. 

4  Ante,  p.  497;  Brickwood  v.  Harvey,  8  Sim. 

516 


201;  2  Jur.  297;  Braithwaite's  Pr.  297.  For 
form  of  order,  see  Seton,  1266,  No.  4;  and  for 
form  of  motion  paper,  see  Vol.  III. 

5  Ante,  p.  497;  Peto  v.  Att.-Gen.  1  Y.  &  J. 
509 ;  Groom  v.  Att.-Gen.  9  Sim.  325.  For  form 
of  notice  of  motion,  see  Vol.  III. 

6  Ante,  pp.  180,  498. 

"  Gee  v.  Cottle,  3  M.  &  C.  180;  and  see  Bil- 
ton  v.  Bennett,  4  Sim.  17. 

8  Ante,  p.  185;  and  see  Alexander  v.  Os- 
borne, 11  Jur.  444,  L.  C. 

9  Carter  v.  Torrance,  11  Ga.  654;  Hunter  v. 
Robbins,  21  Ala.  585;  James  v.  Cresswicke,  7 
Sim.  143. 

i°  Williams  v.  Thompson,  2  Bro.  C.  C  280; 
1  Cox,  413. 


PRELIMINARY    ORDER.  *  525 

Notwithstanding  that,  at  one  time,  there  seems  to  have  been  some 
doubt  upon  the  subject,11  it  is  now  clearly  settled  that,  for 
*  the  purpose  of  having  the  bill  taken  pro  confesso,  an  insufficient  *  524 
answer  is  to  be  treated  as  no  answer,  and  that  the  whole  bill  is 
taken  pro  confesso,  in  the  same  manner  as  it  is  where  no  answer  at  all 
has  been  put  in.1  And  so  also,  where  a  husband  and  wife  are  defend- 
ants, and  the  husband  puts  in  an  answer  without  his  wife  joining  in  it, 
and  without  an  order  to  warrant  such  a  proceeding,  the  Court  treats  the 
answer  as  a  nullity,  and  will  make  an  order  for  taking  the  bill  pro  con- 
fesso.2 It  has  likewise  been  held,  that  where,  after  a  full  answer,  a  bill 
has  been  amended,  and  the  amended  bill  is  not  answered,  the  plaintiff 
is  entitled  to  an  order  to  have  the  bill  taken  pro  confesso  generally : 3 
and  where  an  order  was  made  for  the  clerk  in  Court  to  attend  with  the 
record  of  the  bill,  in  order  to  have  it  taken  pro  confesso,  as  to  the  amend- 
ments only,  Lord  Apsley  discharged  the  order :  being  of  opinion,  that 
the  original  and  amended  bills  were  one  record,  and  that  the  amend- 
ments not  being  answered,  the  record  was  not  answered.4 

If  the  plaintiff  receives  the  costs  of  the  contempt,  or  accepts  the  an- 
swer, by  taking  a  copy  of  it  or  otherwise,  or  takes  exceptions  to  it,  he 
will  waive  the  process  ;  the  reason  of  which  is,  that  he  cannot,  after  an 
answer  is  actually  filed,  have  a  decree  pro  confesso  without,  in  the  first 
instance,  moving  to  take  the  answer  off  the  file,  which  he  cannot  do  after 
any  of  the  above-mentioned  acts.5 

But  although  the  mere  gratuitously  putting  in  an  answer  will  not  be 
sufficient  to  discharge  the  order  for  taking  a  bill  pro  confesso,  yet, 
wherever  an  order  of  this  nature  has  been  made,  and  the  defendant 
comes  in  upon  any  reasonable  ground  of  indulgence,  and  pays  the  costs, 
the  Court  will  attend  to  his  application,  unless  the  delay  has  been 
extravagantly  long.6  (a)     It  is  not,  however,  a  *  matter  of  course    *525 

11  Hawkins  v.  Crooke,  2  P.Wins.  356;  2  Eq.  13  N.  J.  Eq.  43,   45;  Allen  v.  Smith,  id.   45; 

Cas.  Abr.  178.  pi.  4.  ante,  p.  182.    Where  a  joint  answer  by  husband 

1  Davis  v.  Davis,  2  Atk.  24;  Turner  v.  Tur-  and  wife  is  put  in,  it  must  be  sworn  to  by  both, 
ner,  cited  4  Ves.  619;  Dangerh'eld  t>.  Claiborne,  If  not  so  sworn  to,  and  no  valid  defence  is  set 
3  Hen.  &  M.  17;  Caines  v.  Fisher,  1  John.  Ch.  up  therein,  it  will,  on  motion,  be  taken  off  the 
8;  Clason  v.  Morris,  10  John.  524;  Buckingham  tiles  for  irregularity,  and  the  bill  be  taken  as 
v.  Peddicord,  2  Bland.  447;  Mayer  v.  Tyson,  1  confessed.  New  York  Chem.  Co.  v.  Flowers,  6 
Bland.  500.  A  bill,  answered  in  part  only,  Paige,  654;  Collard  v.  Smith,  13  N.  J.  Eq.  43. 
may  be  taken  as  confessed  in  other  parts  not  So  where  an  answer  is  not  signed  bv  the  de- 
answered.  Weaver  v.  Livingston,  Hopk.  493  ;  fendant,  although  an  answer  on  oath  is  waived. 
Pegg  r.    Davis,  2    Blackf.   184;   Smith  v.  St.  Dennison  v.  Bas;-ford,  7  Paige,  370. 

Louis  Mutual  Life  Ins.   Co.,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  605.  3  Jopling    v.  Stuart,   4  Ves.  619;  Trust  & 

The  result  of  the  authorities  is,  as  stated  in  the  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Jenkins,  8  Paige,  589;  Turner 

case  last  cited,  that  while  the  plaintiff  may  take  v.  Turner,  1  Dick.  316;   Lea  v.  Vanbibber,   6 

the  whole  bill  for  confessed,  he  may  also,  if  he  Humph.  18. 

prefers,  limit  the  pro  confesso  to  that  part  of  the  *  Bacon  v.  Griffith,  4  Ves.  619,  n.;  S.  C.  2 

bill  not  answered.  Dick.  473. 

2  Bilton  v.  Bennett,  4  Sim.  17;  Leavitt  v.  6  Sidgier  v.  Tyte,  11  Ves.  202;  Coyle  v. 
Cruger,  1  Paige,  421  ;   see  New  York  Chem.  Alleyne,  16  Beav.  548. 

Co.  v.  Flowers,  6  Paige,  654;  Collard  v.  Smith,  6  Williams  v.  Thompson,  2  Bro.  C.  C.  280; 


(a)  A  decree  by  confession,  regularly   ob-  and  of  which  he  has  been  deprived   through 

tained,  may  be  opened  upon  petition,  even  after  surprise,   accident,  or  mistake.     Mutual  Life 

enrolment,  to  enable  a  defendant  to   make   a  Ins.  Co.  v.  Sturges,  32  N.J.  Eq.  678;  33  id. 

meritorious  defence,  which  has  not  been  heard,  328. 

517 


525 


TAKING    BILLS    PRO    CONFESSO. 


to  discharge  the  order  for  taking  the  bill  pro  confesso  ;  and  the  Court, 
before  doing  so,  will  require  to  see  the  answer  proposed  to  be  put  in,  in 
order  that  it  may  form  a  judgment  as  to  the  propriety  of  it,  and  will 
not  put  the  plaintiff  to  the  peril  of  having  just  such  an  answer  as  the 
defendant  shall  think  proper  to  give.1 

If  a  defendant  is  in  custody  for  want  of  his  answer,  and  is  willing  to 
submit  to  have  the  bill  taken  pro  confesso  against  him,  he  may  apply  to 
the  Court,  upon  motion  with  notice  to  be  served  on  the  plaintiff,2  to  be 
discharged  out  of  custody  ;  and  thereupon  the  Court  may  order  the  bill 
to  be  taken  pro  confesso  against  such  defendant,  and  may  order  him  to 
be  discharged  out  of  custody  upon  such  terms  as  appear  to  be  just :  un- 
less it  appears  from  the  nature  of  the  plaintiff's  case,  or  otherwise  to 
the  satisfaction  of  the  Court,  that  justice  cannot  be  done  to  the  plaintiff 
without  discovery,  or  further  discovery,  from  such  defendant.8 


1  Cox.  413;  see  Robertson  v.  Miller,  2  Green 
Ch.  451,  453,  454  ;  Wooster  v.  Woodhull,  1 
John.  Ch.  541;  Parker  v.  Grant,  1  John.  Ch. 
630;  Emery  v.  Downing,  13  N.J.  Eq.  59;  Oram 
v.  Dennison,  id.  438.  But  even  after  a  decree 
pro  confesso,  order  of  reference,  and  report  of 
Master,  the  decree  will  be  opened,  and  the 
defendant  let  in  to  answer,  if  the  equity  of  the 
case  requires  such  relaxation  of  the  rules  of 
the  Court.  Williamson  v.  Sykes,  13  N.  J.  Eq. 
382. 

By  the  practice  in  New  Jersey,  the  defend- 
ant's application  for  this  purpose,  may  be  made 
either  by  petition  properly  verified,  or  upon 
motion  sustained  by  affidavit.  The  former 
mode  is  more  usual  and  formal,  but  either  may 
be  resorted  to.  Emery  v.  Downing,  13  N.  J. 
Eq.  60. 

1  Hearne  v.  Ogilvie,  11  Ves.  77;  Emery  v. 
Downing,  13  N.  J.  Eq.  59.  See  Pittman  v. 
McClellan,  55  Miss.  299.  A  decree  pro  confesso 
will  not  be  set  aside  to  allow  a  plea  to  be  filed. 
Bank  of  St.  Mary  v.  St.  John,  25  Ala.  566. 

2  For  form  of  notice  of  motion,  see  Vol.  III. 
s  Cons.  Ord.  XXII.  5;  see  also  11  Geo.  IV. 

&  1  Will.  IV.  c.  36,  §  15,  r.  12,  and  the  19th 
Equity  Rule  of  the  U.  S.  Courts;  for  a  case 
where  the  Court  thought  that  justice  required 
that  discovery  should  be  obtained  from  the 
defendant,  see  Maitland  t>  Rodger,  14  Sim.  92; 
8  Jur.  371.     See  ante,  p.  518,  n.  1. 

The  bill  being  taken  pro  confesso  against 
a  defendant  does  not  preclude  him  from  dis- 
puting the  amount  of  the  plaintiff's  demand 
in  the  Master's  office.  Clayton  r.  Chichester, 
Craw.  &  Dix,  13;  Pendleton  v.  Evans,  4  Wash 
C.  C.  391.  But  the  plaintiff  is  not  in  such  case 
bound  to  prove  the  contract  stated  in  the  bill. 
Douglass  v.  Evans,  1  Tenn.  18.  The  allega- 
tions in  the  bill  are  thereby  impliedly  admitted, 
and  the  Court  may  decree  thereupon.  Baltzel 
v.  Hall,  1  Litt.  98;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Carver,  12  Ired. 
231 ;  Harman  v.  Campbell,  30  111.  25.  But  the 
518 


neglect  of  a  defendant  to  answer  a  bill,  upon 
which  a  decree  pro  confesso  is  passed,  amounts 
to  an  admission  only  of  the  allegations  in  the 
bill.  Robinson  v.  Townsend,  3  Gill  &  J.  413. 
If  the  charge  in  the  bill  be  not  stated  with  suffi- 
cient certainty,  the  plaintiff  cannot,  even  after 
a  decree  pro  confesso,  have  a  final  decree,  unless 
he  establish  his  demand  by  satisfactory  evi- 
dence. Pegg  v.  Davis,  2  Blackf.  281;  see  Piatt 
v.  Judson,  3  Blackf.  237 :  Atkins  v.  Faulkner, 
11  Iowa,  326.  So  upon  a  bill  taken  pro  con- 
fesso, and  an  order  of  reference  thereupon  to  a 
Master,  such  allegations  of  the  bill  as  are  dis- 
tinct and  positive  are  to  be  taken  as  true, 
without  proof.  But  not  such  as  are  indefinite. 
Williams  v.  Corwin,  Hopk.  471 ;  Piatt  v.  Jud- 
son, 3  Blackf.  235;  Atkins  v.  Faulkner,  ubi 
supra  ;  but  see  Singletons.  Gale,  8  Porter,  270; 
Wilkins  v.  Wilkins,  4  Porter,  245,  where  it  is 
said,  that  before  a  decree  is  pronounced  on  a 
bill  pro  confesso,  the  Court  must  be  satisfied  by 
sufficient  evidence,  of  the  justice  of  the  plain- 
tiff's demand.  See  also  Levert  v.  Redwood,  9 
Porter,  80.  Infra,  p.  531,  note.  In  an  anonymous 
case,  4  Hen.  &  M.  476,  it  was  held,  that  on  a 
bill  taken  pro  confesso,  a  plaintiff  cannot  obtain 
a  final  decree  without  filing  his  documents,  and 
proving  his  case;  see,  however,  the  quart  upon 
this  point  in  Coleman  v.  Lyi  e,  4  Rand.  454.  In 
Larkin  v.  Mann,  2  Paige,  27,  it  was  held,  that 
if  a  bill  be  taken  pro  confesso,  the  proof  of  the 
plaintiff's  title  may  be  made  before  a  Master, 
on  reference.  But  if  an  issue  of  fact  is  joined 
in  the  cause,  the  plaintiff  may  make  the  neces- 
sary proof  and  produce  the  abstract  of  the  con- 
veyances, before  the  examiner.  In  Pendleton 
v.  Evans,  4  Wash.  C.  C.  391,  it  was  held,  that 
if  a  bill,  being  for  the  balance  of  an  account,  is 
taken  pro  confesso,  the  amount  must  be  referred 
to  a  Master.  The  decree  is  always  nisi.  See 
Robertson  v.  Miller,  2  Green  Ch.  451 ;  post,  p.  531, 
note. 

Where  a  bill  against  heirs  does  not  allege 


HEARING,    DECREE,    AND   SUBSEQUENT   PROCEEDINGS. 


527 


Section  II.  —  Hearing,  Decree,  mid  Subsequent  Proceedings. 

The  preliminary  order  having  been  obtained,  the  next  subject  for  in- 
vestigation is  the  manner  in  which  the  cause  is  heard,  and  the  decree 
perfected. 

*  A  defendant,  against  whom  an  order  to  take  a  bill  pro  con-    *  526 
fesso  is  made,  is  at  liberty  to  appear  at  the  hearing  of  the  cause ; 
and  if  he  waives  all  objection  to  the  order,  but  not  otherwise,  he  may  be 
heard  to  argue  the  case  upon  the  merits,  as  stated  in  the  bill.1 

At  the  hearing  of  the  cause,  the  Court,  upon  reading  the  bill,  and 
taking  it  to  be  true,  will  make  such  decree  as  seems  just;2  and  in  the 
case  of  any  defendant  who  has  appeared  at  the  hearing,  and  waived  all 
objection  to  the  order  to  take  the  bill  pro  confesso,  or  against  whom  the 
order  has  been  made  after  appearance  by  himself  or  his  own  solicitor  or 
upon  notice  served  upon  him,  or  after  the  execution  of  a  writ  of  attach- 
ment against  him,  the  decree  is  to  be  absolute.8 

Formerly,  it  was  necessary  that  the  Record  itself  should  actually  be  pro- 
duced and  read  in  Court,  and  the  Clerk  of  Records  and  Writs  attended 
in  Court  with  the  record  for  that  purpose  ;  now,  however,  the  bill  may  be 
read  at  the  hearing  from  a  printed  copy  (or,  where  amended,  without  a 
reprint,  a  partly  written  and  partly  printed  copy)  stamped  with  a  proper 
stamp,  by  one  of  the  Clerks  of  Records  and  Writs,  indicating  the  date  of 
the  tiling  of  such  bill  (and  of  the  amendment,  when  amended),  without 
the  attendance  of  the  Clerk  of  Records  aud  Writs.4 


that  any  estate  has  descended,  taking  it  pro 
confesso  will  not  amount  to  a  confession  that 
any  has.     Carneal  v.  Day,  2  Litt.  397. 

Where,  to  a  bill  against  resident  and  non- 
resident defendants,  the  resident  defendants 
answer,  denying  all  the  equity  of  the  bill, 
and  it  is  taken  pro  confesso  against  the  others, 
without  proof,  no  decree  can  be  taken,  even 
against  the  latter.  Cunningham  v.  Steele,  1 
Litt.  58.  Infra,  p.  532.  note.  If  a  bill  is  taken 
pro  confesso  against  a  defendant,  who  is  absent 
from  the  State,  he  may,  under  the  statute  of 
New  York,  come  in  after  thedecree  and  answer 
and  defend  the  suit.  Davoue  v.  Fanning,  4 
John.  Ch.  199.  A  decree  is  erroneous,  if  taken 
against  infants,  by  default,  without  proof, 
though  there  be  a  guardian  adlitmi.  Massie 
v.  Donaldson,  8  Ohio,  377  ;  see  Carneal  v. 
Sthreshley,  1  A.  K.  Marsh.  471;  Chaffin  v. 
Kimball,  23  111.  26.  For  forms  of  decree  when 
bill  is  taken  pro  confesso,  see  Brown  v.  Home, 
8  Beav.  610;  Seton,  1128,  No.  1.  As  to  setting 
down  the  cause  for  hearing,  see  post,  Chap. 
XXIII. 

1  Cons.  Ord.  XXIT.  7;  Greaves  r.  Greaves, 
12  Beav.  422;  and  for  form  of  decree  in  that 
case,  see  Seton,  1128,  No.  2;  see  note  above. 

2  Cons.  Ord.  XXII.  8.    The  Court  will  only 


make  such  a  decree  as  it  would  have  made,  if 
the  defendant  had  appeared.  Brierly  v.  Ward, 
15  .lur.  277,  V.  C.  K.  B.,  which  wns  a  fore- 
closure suit;  see  Haynes  v.  Ball,  4  Beav.  103; 
Stanley  v.  Bond,  6  Beav.  421;  Simmonds  v. 
Palles.  2  Jo.  &  Lat.  489.  The  decree  on  default 
will  only  be  such  as  would  be  authorized  by 
the  state  of  the  pleadings,  had  there  been  no 
default.  Hardwiek  v.  Bassett,  25  Mich.  149; 
McDonald  v.  Mobile  Life  Ins.  Co.  56  Ala.  468. 
Infra,  p.  531,  note.  And  should  not  be  entered 
unless  the  plaintiff,  on  the  face  of  his  bill,  is 
entitled  to  equitable  relief.  Hazard  v.  Durant, 
11  R.  I.  195. 

A  pro  confsso  order  will  not  justify  a  per- 
sonal decree,  even  for  costs,  against  a  mere 
agent.  Boyd  v.  Vanderkemp,  1  Barb.  Ch.  287. 
Nor  against  an  officer  merely  having  process  in 
his  hands.  McGavock  o.  Elliott,  3  Yerg.  373. 
And  see  ante,  p.  298,  n.  7. 

3  Cons.  Ord.  XXII.  8;  Grover  &  Baker 
Sewing  Machine  Co.  v.  Millard,  8  Jur.  N.  S. 
713.  V.  C.  W".  Notice  of  an  order  pro  confesso 
must  be  given  before  final  decree.  Wamplerc. 
Wolfinger,  13  Md.  337. 

*  Cons.  Ord.  13  July,  1861.  No  fee  is  pay- 
able, on  stamping  the  copy. 

519 


*  528  TAKING    BILLS   PRO    CONFESSO. 

*  527        *  A  decree,  founded  on  a  bill  taken  pro  confesso,  is  to  be  passed 

and  entered  as  other  decrees  ; 1  and  thereupon  an  office  copy  of  it 
must  (unless  the  Court  dispenses  with  service  thereof)  be  served  on  the 
defendant  against  whom  the  order  to  take  the  bill  pro  confesso  was  made, 
or  his  solicitor  ;  and  where  the  decree  is  not  absolute,2  such  defendant, 
or  his  solicitor,  is  to  be  at  the  same  time  served  with  a  notice,  to  the 
effect,  that  if  such  defeudant  desires  permission  to  answer  the  plain- 
tiff's bill,  and  set  aside  the  decree,  application  for  that  purpose  must  be 
made  to  the  Court  within  the  time  specified  in  the  notice,  or  that,  other- 
wise, such  defendant  will  be  absolutely  excluded  from  making  any  such 
application.3 

If  such  notice  is  to  be  served  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court,  the 
time  therein  specified  for  such  application  to  be  made  by  the  defendant, 
is  three  weeks  after  service  of  such  notice  ;  but  where  such  notice  is  to 
be  served  out  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court,  such  time  is  to  be  specially 
appointed  by  the  Court,  on  the  ex  parte  application  of  the  plaintiff.4 

In  pronouncing  the  decree,  the  Court  may,  either  upon  the  case  stated 
in  the  bill,  or  upon  that  case,  and  a  petition  presented  by  the  plaintiff 
for  the  purpose,  as  the  case  may  require,  order  a  receiver  of  the  real  and 
personal  estate  of  the  defendant,  against  whom  the  bill  has  been  ordered 
to  be  taken  pro  confesso,  to  be  appointed,  with  the  usual  directions,  or 
direct  a  sequestration  of  such  real  and  personal  estate  to  be  issued,  and 
may  (if  it  appears  to  be  just)  direct  payment  to  be  made  out  of  such 
real  or  personal  estate  of  such  sum  of  money,  as  at  the  hearing,  or  any 
subsequent  stage  of  the  cause,  the  plaintiff  appears  to  be  entitled  to : 
provided  that,  unless  the  decree  be  absolute,  such  payment  is  not  to  be 
directed  without  security  being  given  by  the  plaintiff  for  restitution, 
in  case  the  Court  afterwards  thinks  fit  to  order  restitution  to  be  made.5 
But  no  proceeding  is  to  be  taken,  and  no  receiver  appointed  under  the 
decree,  nor  any  sequestrator,  under  any  sequestration  issued  in  pursuance 
thereof,  is  to  take  possession  of,  or  in  any  manner  intermeddle  with  any 
part  of  the  real  or  personal  estate  of  a  defendant,  and  no  other  process 
is  to  issue  to  compel  performance  of  the  decree,  without  leave  of  the 
Court,  to  be  obtained  on  motion,  with  notice  served  on  such  defendant, 

or  his  solicitor,  unless  the  Court  dispenses  with  such  service.6 
*  528        *  Any  defendant,  waiving  all  objection  to  the  order  to  take  the 

bill  pro  confesso,  and  submitting  to  pay  such  costs  as  the  Court 

i  Cons.  Ord.  XXII.  10.  5  Cons.  Ord.  XXII.  9;  see  Lett  v.  Randall, 

2  Cons.  Ord.  XXII.  8,  ubi  supra.     Decree  7  Jur.  1075;  Torr  v.  Torr,  John.  660. 
against  a  bare  trustee  made  absolute  in  the  first  6  Cons.  Ord.   XXII.  13.     The   motion,  of 

instance,  and  service  on  him  dispensed  with,  which  notice  is  to  be  thus  given,  is  not  for  the 

Leite  i\  Vicini.  12  W.  R.  897,  M.  R.  appointment  of  a  receiver  (which  may  be  done 

8  Cons.  Ord.  XXII.  11 ;  see  ante,  p.  524,  and  under  the  decree,  without  notice),  but  that  the 

note.     For  form  of  notice,  see  Vol.  III.  receiver  may  take  possession.     Dresser  v.  Mor- 

<  Cons.  Ord.  XXII.  12.     A  list  of  times  for  ton,  2  Phil.  285;  and  see   Brown  v.  Home,  10 

the  different  colonies,   and  foreign   countries,  Beav.  400,  where  leave  was  given  to  plaintiff, 

according  to  their  distance  from   England,  is  under  this  rule,  to  issue  process  of  contempt, 

kept  in  the  Registrar's  office;  and  the  proper  For  forms  of  order  under  this  rule,  see  Seton, 

time  is  inserted  by  the  Registrar  in  the  order,  1131,  1132,  Nos.  3,  4,  5  ;  and  for  forms  of  notice 

in  drawing  it  up.    For  form  of  order,  see  Seton,  of  motion,  see  Vol.  HI. 
1130,  No.  1;   and  for  forms  of  motion  paper, 
and  affidavit  in  support,  see  Vol.  III. 

520 


HEARING,  DECREE,  AND  SUBSEQUENT  PROCEEDINGS.     *  529 

may  direct,  may,  before  enrolment  of  the  decree,  have  the  cause  reheard, 
upon  the  merits  stated  in  the  bill :  the  petition  for  rehearing  being 
signed  by  counsel,  as  other  petitions  for  rehearing.1 

In  cases  where  a  decree  is  not  absolute  under  Rule  8,  the  Court  may 
order  the  same  to  be  made  absolute,  on  the  motion  of  the  plaintiff, 
made,  — 

1.  After  the  expiration  of  three  weeks  from  the  service  of  a  copy  of 
the  decree  on  a  defendant,  where  the  decree  has  been  served  within 
the  jurisdiction. 

2.  After  the  expiration  of  the  time  limited  by  the  notice  provided  for 
by  Rule  11,  where  the  decree  has  been  served  without  the  jurisdiction. 

3.  After  the  expiration  of  three  years  from  the  date  of  the  decree, 
where  a  defendant  has  not  been  served  with  a  copy  thereof.2 

And  such  order  may  be  made,  either  on  the  first  hearing  of  such 
motion,  or  on  the  expiration  of  any  further  time  which  the  Court  may, 
on  the  hearing  of  such  motion,  allow  to  the  defendant  for  presenting  a 
petition  for  leave  to  answer  the  bill.3 

Where  a  defendant  was  out  of  the  jurisdiction,  service  of  an  office 
copy  of  the  order,  limiting  the  time  within  which  he  might  apply  for 
leave  to  answer  the  bill,  and  set  aside  the  decree,  was  held  to  be  a 
sufficient  notice  under  the  rule  above  referred  to.4 

The  application  to  the  Court,  to  dispense  with  service  of  the  decree, 
should  be  made  after  the  expiration  of  the  three  years  mentioned  in 
Rule  15.5 

Where  proceedings  are  to  be  taken  in  Chambers  under  the  decree,  the 
defendant  must  be  served  with  the  summons  to  proceed  upon  the  decree, 
as  well  as  with  the  decree  ;  and  no  proceedings  ought  to  be  taken  in 
Chambers,  until  the  expiration  of  the  time  limited  for  setting  aside 
the  decree.6 

*  Where  the  decree  is  not  absolute  under  Rule  8,  and  has  not  *  529 
been  made  absolute  under  Rule  15,  and  a  defendant  has  a  case 
upon  merits  not  appearing  in  the  bill,  he  may  apply  to  the  Court  by 
petition,  stating  such  case,  and  submitting  to  such  terms  with  respect 
to  costs  and  otherwise,  as  the  Court  may  think  reasonable,  for  leave  to 
answer  the  bill ;  and  the  Court,  if  satisfied  that  such  case  is  proper  to 
be  submitted  to  the  judgment  of  the  Court,  may,  if  it  thinks  fit,  and 
upon  such  terms  as  seem  just,  vacate  the  enrolment   (if  any)  of  the 


1  Cons.  Ord.  XXII.  14.  And  seepost,  Chap.  Jar.  770,  M.  R. :  Benbow  v.  Davies,  12  Beav. 
XXXII.  Rehearinfjs  and  Appeals.  421 ;  and  see  Brierly  v.  Ward,  15  Jur.  277,  V. 

2  Cons.  Ord.  XXII.  15.  This  period  will  not  C.  K.  B.  These  cases  are,  it  is  conceived,  over- 
be  dispensed  with.  Darlow  v.  Sinnock,  W.  N.  ruled  bv  James  v.  Rice;  and  see  Thurgood  v. 
(1866)  154,  V.  C.  K.  Cane,  1*1  W.  R.  297,  M.  R. 

«  For  form  of  order,  see  Seton,  1130.  No.  2;  The  final  decree,  it  has  been  held,  may  be 

and  for  forms  of  motion  paper,  and  affidavit  in  made  in  a  foreclosure  suit,  although  the  decree 

support,  see  Vol.  III.  has  not  been  served  and  is  not  absolute.     Lon- 

*  Trilly  v.  Keefe,  16  Beav.  83;  16  Jur.  442.  don  Monetary  Advance  Co.  v.  Bean,  18  L.  T. 

5  Vaughan  v.  Rogers,  11  Beav.  165;  James  N.  S.  52. 
v.  Rice,  5  De  G.  M.  &  G.  461;  18  Jur.  818.     It  6  Golden  v.  Newton,  Johns,  720:    and  see 

was  dispensed  with  before  the  expiration  of  the  King  v    Bryant,  3  M.  &  C.  191,  196;  2  Jur. 

three  years,  however,  in  Kemp  v.   Latter,  16  106;  Merriman  v.  Goodman,  15  W.  R.  1132. 

521 


*  530  TAKING   BILLS   PRO   CONFESSO. 

decree,  and  permit  such  defendant  to  answer  the  bill ; 1  and  if  permis- 
sion be  given  to  put  in  an  answer,  leave  may  be  given  to  file  a  separate 
replication  to  such  answer;  and  issue  may  be  joined,  and  witnesses 
examined,  and  such  proceedings  had,  as  if  the  decree  had  not  been 
made,  and  no  proceedings  against  such  defendant  had  been  had  in  the 
cause.2 

The  rights  and  liabilities  of  any  plaintiff  or  defendant,  under  a  decree 
made  upon  a  bill  taken  pro  confesso,  extend  to  the  representatives  of  any 
deceased  plaintiff  or  defendant,  and  to  any  persons  claiming  under  any 
person  who  was  plaintiff  or  defendant  at  the  time  when  the  decree 
was  pronounced ;  and  with  reference  to  the  altered  state  of  parties,  and 
any  new  interests  acquired,  the  Court  may,  upon  motion  or  petition, 
served  in  such  manner,  and  supported  by  such  evidence  as,  under  the 
circumstances  of  the  case,  the  Court  deems  sufficient,  permit  any  party, 
or  the  representative  of  any  party,  to  file  such  bill,  or  adopt  such  pro- 
ceedings as  the  nature  and  circumstances  of  the  case  require,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  having  the  decree  (if  absolute)  duly  executed,  or  for  the  purpose 
of  having  the  matter  of  the  decree  (if  not  absolute)  duly  considered,  and 
the  rights  of  the  parties  duly  ascertained  and  determined.3 

The  Act  of  11  Geo.  IV.  &  1  Will.  IV.  c.  36,  is  not,  as  has  been  before 

observed,  repealed ; 4  and  although  the  general  practice  is,  in  all  cases 

where  bills  are  intended  to  be  taken  pro  confesso,  to  proceed  under  the 

General  Orders  which  have  been  above  referred  to,  yet,  special 

*  530    cases  may  still  occur  under  the  Act ; 5  *  but  they  will  probably  be 

so  rare  that  it  is  not  thought  desirable,  in  the  present  work,  to 
refer  to  the  provisions  of  the  Act  in  detail. 

It  may  be  observed  that,  under  the  Act,  a  decree  did  not  become  abso- 
lute against  a  defendant  who  was  out  of  the  realm,  or  had  absconded, 
and  had  never  been  served  with  a  copy  of  it,  until  the  expiration  of 
seven  years  from  the  date  of  the  decree  ; 1  whereas,  under  the  15th  Rule 
above  referred  to,  the  Court  may,  in  the  same  case,  order  the  decree 
to  become  absolute,  after  the  expiration  of  three  years  from  the  date  of 
the  decree.2 

The  provisions  of  the  statute  applied  only  to  cases  where  the  defend- 
ant absconded  to  avoid  being  served  with  process.3    In  cases  falling 

1  For  instances  of  decrees  pro  confesso,  or  craft,  6  W.  Va.  36;  Scales  V,  Nichols,  3  Hayw- 

final  decrees  thereon  being  set  aside,  and  de-  229. 

fendants  let  in  to  answer  on  proof  of  surprise,  2  Cons.  Ord.  XXII.  16.  In  Inglis  v.  Camp- 
see  Van  Deventer  v.  Stiger,  25  N.  J.  Eq.  224;  bell,  2  W.  R.  396,  V.  C.  K.,  which  was  a  fore- 
Miller  v.  Wright,  id.  340;  see  Woosterv.  Wood-  closure  suit,  permission  was  given  under  this 
hull,  1  John.  Ch.  539;  Parker  v.  Grant,  1  John,  rule,  on  payment  of  the  costs  of  the  application 
Ch.  630;  Williamson  v.  Sykes.  13  N.  J.  Eq.  and  of  the  suit. 
182;  Emery  v.  Downing,  id.  59,  60;  Oram  v.  8  Cons.  Ord.  XXII.  17. 
Dennison,  id.  438;  Robertson  v.  Miller,  2  Green  *  Ante,  p.  518;  Wilkin  r.  Nainby,  4  Hare, 
Ch.  451;  ante,  p.  524,  note.  476;  10  Jur.  735. 

Where  a  bill  has  been  taken  for  confessed  5  11  Geo.  IV.  &  1   Will.  IV.  c.  36,  §§  3-8 

and  set  for  hearing,  and  the  defendant,  by  leave  inclusive. 

of  Court,  files  an  answer  to  which  the  plaintiff  *  11  Geo.  IV.  &  1  Will.  IV.  c.  36,  §§  5,  8. 

replies,  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  have  the  cause  2  Cons.  Ord.  XXII.  15. 

heard  at  that  term  unless  the  defendant  show  8  Ante,  p.  518. 

good  cause  for  a  continuance.    Gardner  v.  Land- 

522 


HEARING,    DECREE,    AND    SUBSEQUENT    PROCEEDINGS.  *  531 

within  the  ordinary  course  of  the  Court,  unaffected  by  the  statute,  a 
decree  made,  upon  taking  a  bill  pro  confesso,  was  absolute  in  the  first 
instance,  and  no  day  was  given  for  showing  cause  against  it.4 

The  General  Order,  however,  applies,  as  we  have  seen,5  as  well  to 
suits  where  the  defendant  absconds,  as  to  other  cases  where  the  plain- 
tiff is  enabled  to  have  his  bill  taken  pro  confesso  for  want  of  answer.  It 
introduces,  as  we  have  seen,6  some  peculiarities  into  the  manner  of  pro- 
ceeding under  a  decree  obtained  by  the  bill  being  taken  pro  confesso  ; 
but,  in  all  other  respects,  a  decree  pro  confesso  is  executed  in  the  same 
manner  as  a  decree  made  upon  a  regular  hearing. 

With  respect  to  bills  for  discovery,  the  General  Order  does  not  make 
any  distinction  between  such  bills,  and  bills  for  relief ; 7  but  the  Stat. 
11  Geo.  IV.  &  1  Will.  IV.  c.  36,  gives  an  additional  facility  in  obtaining 
the  order  to  take  a  bill  for  discovery  pro  confesso,  as  against  a  person 
having  privilege  of  Parliament :  for,  in  the  case  of  a  bill  for  relief,  no 
order  to  take  the  bill  pro  confesso  can  be  obtained  against  a  privileged 
defendant,  until  the  writ  of  sequestration  has  issued ;  but  under  the 
13th  section  of  that  Act,  in  the  case  of  a  bill  for  discovery,  the  Court 
may,'  upon  the  application  of  the  plaintiff,  as  soon  as  the  time  for 
answering  has  expired,  although  no  sequestration  has  issued,  order  the 
bill  to  be  taken  pro  confesso,  unless  the  defendant  shall,  within  eight 
days  after  being  served  with  such  order,  show  good  cause  to  the  con- 
trary. With  this  exception,  there  does  not  seem  to  be  any  difference 
between  the  case  of  a  bill  for  discovery  and  one  for  relief,  so  far  as 
regards  the  practice  in  obtaining  an  order  to  take  the  bill  pro  confesso  ;  (a) 
but  after  the  preliminary  order  is  obtained,  there  does  not  seem 
to  be  *  any  necessity  for  a  further  hearing  of  the  cause,  unless  it  *  531 
is  rendered  necessary  by  the  General  Order.1 

After  the  order  has  been  pronounced  for  taking  a  bill  pro  confesso,  the 
bill,  or  an  examined  copy  thereof,  is  to  be  taken  and  read,  in  any  Court 
of  Law  or  Equity,  as  evidence  of  the  facts,  matters,  and  things  therein 
contained,  in  the  same  manner  as  if  such  facts,  matters,  and  things  had 
been  admitted  to  be  true,  by  the  answer  of  the  defendant  put  in  to  such 


4  Landon  r.  Ready,  1  S.  &  S.  44;  Ogilvie  v.  and  that  he  made  an  order  to  take  a  bill  pro 

Hearne,  13  Ves.  563;  Knight  v.  Young,  2  V.  confesso,  upon  this  construction  of  the  Act.    In 

&  B.  184.  the  case  before  him,  a  sequestration  had  issued, 

6  Ante,  p.  518.  so  that  by  the  ordinary  practice  of  the  Court, 

6  Ante,   pp.  525-528.  independent  of  the  statute,  the  plaintiff  was  en- 

7  See  Caines  v.  Fisher,  1  John.  Ch.  8.  titled  to  have  his  bill  taken  pro  confesso  (ante, 
1  Cons.  Ord.  XXII.  6.     In  Logan  v.  Grant,  p.  453),  consequently  there  was  no  occasion  for 

1  Mad.  626    ex  relatione,  Sir  Thomas  Plumer  any  decision  upon  the  statute.     The  words  of 

V.  C.  considered  that  the  45  Geo.  III.  c.  124,  the   13th  section  seem  clearly  applicable  only 

§  5  (repealed   by  11  Geo.  IV.  &  1  Will.  IV.  to  bilN  for  discovery;  and  this  is  the  construc- 

c.  36,  §  1),  which  is  identical  in  language  with  tion  which  was  put,  by  Lord  Eldon,  upon  the 

the   13th  section,   just  referred  to,  applied  to  5th  section  of  the  former  Act,  above  mentioned, 

bills  for  relief,  as  well  as  to  those  for  discovery,  Jones  v.  Davis,  17  Ves.  368. 


(a)  The  taking  of  a  bill  pro  confesso  is  ute,  bills  of  discovery  are  not  taken  pro  con- 
operative  only  in  Equity,  and  a  bill  for  relief  fesso,  but  this  does  not  apply  to  cross-bills, 
taken  pro  confesso  cannot  be  read  against  the  See  Langdell,  Eq.  1M.  (2d  ed.)  §  180;  Cory  v. 
defendant  in  a  court  of  Law.     Apart  from  stat-  Gertck  n,  2  Mad.  40,  43,  45. 

523 


*531 


TAKING    BILLS    PRO    CONFESSO. 


bill,2  and  such  bill,  so  taken  pro  confesso,  is  to  be  received  and  taken  in 
evidence  of  such  and  the  same  facts,  and  on  behalf  of  such  and  so  many 
persons,  as  the  answer  of  the  defendant  to  the  bill  could  and  might 
have  been  read  and  received  in  evidence  of,  in  case  such  answer  had 
been  put  in  by  the  defendant  thereto,  and  had  admitted  the  same  facts, 
matters,  and  circumstances,  as  in  such  bill  stated  and  set  forth ;  and 
in  like  manner,  every  other  bill  of  discovery  taken  pro  confesso,  under 
any  of  the  provisions  of  the  Act,  is  to  be  taken  and  read  in  evidence  of 
the  facts,  and  matters,  and  things  therein  contained,  to  the  extent  afore- 
said.3 It  may  be  observed  that  this  last  provision  for  making  the  bill 
evidence  is  not  confined  to  privileged  defendants,  but  it  applies  to  all 
cases  where  the  bill  is  taken  pro  confesso  under  the  provisions  of  the 
Act.  It  does  not  seem  that  there  is  any  direct  order  or  statute  by  which 
a  bill  taken  pro  confesso,  otherwise  than  under  the  Act,  is  made  evidence 
against  the  defendant.4 


2  See  Stafford  v.  Brown,  4  Paige,  360;  Atkins 
v.  Faulkner,  11  Iowa,  326;  ante,  p.  526,  note. 

3  11  Geo.  IV.  &  1  Will.  IV.  c.  36,  §  14. 

4  See  ante ,  p.  526,  note.  But  it  is  discretion- 
ary with  the  Court,  where  a  bill  is  taken  as 
confessed,  to  require  proof  of  all  or  any  portion 
of  the  allegations  in  the  bill;  Smith  v.  Trimble, 
27  111.  152;  Stephens  r.  Bichnell,  id.  444;  Forbes 
v.  Memphis  &c.  R.  Co.  2  Woods,  323;  Hazard 
v.  Durant,  11  R.  I.  195;  1  Memph.  L.  J.  266;  or 
the  Court  may  take  the  allegations  as  confessed, 
and  enter  the  decree  without  proof.  Harmon 
v.  Campbell,  30  111.  25.  But  it  is  open  to  the 
defendant  on  error  to  show  that  the  averments 
in  the  bill  do  not  justify  the  decree.  Gault  v. 
Hoagland.  25  111.  266.  A  decree  pro  confesso 
is  an  admission  only  of  the  facts  which  are  well 
pleaded,  and  cannot  aid  or  supplement  defec- 
tive averments,  such  as  the  averment  of  a  legal 
conclusion,  not  of  the  facts  necessary  to  sustain 
the  conclusion.  McDonald  v.  Mobile  Life  Ins. 
Co.  56  Ala.  468;  Winham  v.  Crutcher,  3  Tenn. 
Ch.  666;  ante,  pp.  525,  526,  notes. 

In  all  suits  for  the  foreclosure  or  satisfaction 
of  a  mortgage,  in  New  Jersey,  when  the  plain- 
tiff's bill  shall  be  ordered  to  be  taken  as  con- 
fessed, or  the  defendant  shall  make  default  at 
the  hearing,  and  the  whole  amount  of  the  debt 
intended  to  be  secured  by  the  mortgage  shall 
have  become  due,  no  order  of  reference  to  a 
Master  to  ascertain  and  report  the  sum  due  to 
the  plaintiff  shall  be  necessary,  unless  specially 
directed  by  the  Court ;  but  a  report  by  a  Master 
being  made  of  the  amount  due  upon  the  mort- 
gage, the  same,  if  no  cause  is  shown  to  the 
contrary,  shall  be  riled  of  course,  and  without 
any  motion  or  rule  for  that  purpose,  or  for  con- 
firmation, and  a  decree  made  accordingly.  So, 
in  all  cases,  where  the  plaintiff's  bill  shall  be 
taken  as  confessed  against  the  mortgagor,  and 
other  defendants  claiming  to  be  incumbrancers 
file  their  answer  or  answers  setting  up  said 
incumbrances,  if  the  order  of  priority  shall  not 

524 


appear,  upon  the  face  of  the  pleadings,  to  be 
disputed  by  the  parties,  either  plaintiff  or  de- 
fendant, and  the  amounts  respectively  claimed 
as  due  do  not  appear  to  be  denied,  and  a  report 
be  made  upon  an  order  of  relerence  to  a  Master, 
it  shall  not  be  necessary  to  enter  a  rule  nut  to 
confirm  the  report,  or  to  set  the  cause  down  for 
a  hearing  upon  it;  but  a  decree  final  maybe 
entered  thereon,  as  of  course,  upon  the  coming 
in  of  the  Master's  report.  N.  J.  Ch.  Rules, 
21,  23. 

A  decree  pro  confesso  taken  against  a  defend- 
ant is  an  admission  of  the  facts  stated  in  the 
bill,  and  entitles  the  complainant  to  relief  with- 
out further  proof.  Jones  v.  Beverley,  45  Ala. 
161;  Stone  v.  Duncan,  1  Head,  103;  Code  of 
Tenn.  §  4371.  And  the  cause  stands  for  hear- 
ing, in  Tennessee,  immediately  after  the  pro 
confesso  order.  Claybrook  v.  Wade,  7  Coldw. 
555. 

A  pro  confesso  decree  against  one  defendant 
will  not  justify  a  final  decree  against  that  de- 
fendant until  the  case  i*  disposed  of  as  to  the 
other  defendants,  and  if  a  co-defendant  jointly 
interested  answer  and  disprove  the  plaintiff's 
case,  the  bill  will  be  dismissed  as  to  all  of  the 
defendants.  Clason  v.  Morris,  10  John.  524; 
Lingan  v.  Henderson,  1  Bland.  236,  266;  Petty 
v.  Hannum,2  Humph.  102;  Cherry  ».  Clements, 
10  Humph.  552;  Hennessee  v.  Ford,  8  Humph. 
499;  Smith  v.  Cunningham,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  572; 
Aikin  v.  Harrington.  7  Eng.  391;  Frow  v.  De 
La  Vega,  15  Wall.  552. 

It  is  error,  it  seems,  on  a  pro  confesso  order, 
in  a  suit  to  enforce  a  vendor's  lien,  to  render  a 
final  decree  without  a  reference  to  the  Master 
to  compute  the  amount.  Freeman  v.  Ledbetter, 
43  Miss.  165.  But  where  a  decree  has  been 
rendered  against  adults  and  infants  on  a  pro 
confesso  order  without  proof,  and  is  reversed 
for  that  reason  as  to  the  infants,  the  decree  as 
to  the  adults  will  not  thereby  be  set  aside. 
Ingersull  v.  Ingersoll,  42  Miss.  155. 


*  CHAPTER  XII.  *533 

THE   DEFENCE   TO    A    SUIT. 

In  the  preceding  chapters,  the  attention  of  the  reader  has  been  prin- 
cipally directed  to  the  case  on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff,  the  method  of 
submitting  it  to  the  Court,  and  the  means  provided  by  the  practice  of 
the  Court  for  compelling  the  defendant  to  submit  himself  to  its  jurisdic- 
tion ;  or,  in  case  of  his  refusal,  of  depriving  him  of  the  benefit  of  his 
contumacy,  by  giving  to  the  plaintiff  the  relief  to  which  the  justice  of 
his  case  appears  to  entitle  him.  The  line  of  conduct  to  be  pursued  by 
a  defendant,  who  is  willing  to  submit  himself  to  the  authority  of  the 
Court,  and  to  abide  its  decision  upon  the  matter  in  litigation,  will  now 
be  considered. 

The  first  step  to  be  taken  by  or  on  behalf  of  a  defendant  who  intends 
to  defend  the  suit,  is  to  enter  an  appearance  within  the  proper  time,  at 
the  office  of  the  Clerks  of  Records  and  Writs.1  Unless  the  suit  is  de- 
fended by  the  defendant  in  person,  this  is  done  by  his  solicitor.  A  special 
authority  is  not  necessary  to  enable  a  solicitor  to  undertake  the  business  ; 
a  general  authority  to  act  as  solicitor  for  his  client  is  sufficient : 2  although 
a  solicitor  ought  not  to  take  upon  himself  to  enter  an  appearance  for  a 
defendant  without  some  authority  ;  and  where  a  solicitor,  without  any 
instruction,  had  caused  an  appearance  to  be  entered  for  an  infant  defend- 
ant, the  appearance  was  ordered  to  be  set  aside,  and  the  solicitor  to  pay 
the  costs.8  The  retainer  need  not  be  in  writing  ; 4  but  if  it  is  not,  and 
his  authority  is  afterwards  challenged,  the  solicitor  runs  a  risk  of  hav- 
ing to  pay  the  costs,  if  he  have  only  assertion  to  offer  against  assertion.5 

The  defendant  will  know  whether  or  not  an  appearance  is  required, 
by  the  copy  of  the  bill  with  which  he  is  served  :  if  it  bears  an  indorse- 
ment commanding  his  appearance,  he  must  appear ;  but  if  there  is  no 
such  indorsement,  his  appearance  is  not  required.6 

*  The  defendant  having  appeared  to  the  bill,  the   next  point    *  534 
for   consideration  in   the    ordinary  course  of   the  cause   is,    the 
nature  of  the  defence  to  be  put  in.1     It  was  formerly  incumbent  upon 

1  Ord.  I.  35 ;  see  infra,  p.  536.  The  entry  is  *  Lord  v.  Kellett,  2  II.  &  K.  1.  For  form  of 
now  made  at  the  Central  Office.    R.  S.  C.  Ord.      retainer,  see  Vol.  III. 

XH.  1.     For  the  present  English   practice,  see  6  Wiggins  v.  Peppin,  2  Beav.  403,  405. 

1  Dan.  Ch.  Prac.  (6th  Eng.  ed.),  443,  et  seq.  6  See  ante,  p.  446;  post,  p.  538. 

2  Wright  i>.  Castle,  3  Mer.  12;  ante,  p.  307.  1  In  Massachusetts,  "a  defence  in  Equity 
Appearance  entered  for  a  defendant,  by  one  shall  be  made  by  demurrer,  plea,  or  answer." 
not  a  solicitor  will  be  stricken  out.  Sparling  v.  Pub.  Stats,  c.  151,  §  10;  see  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  433, 
Brereton,  L.  R.  12  Eq.  64;  12  Jur.  N.  S.  330.  etseq.   In  Tennessee,  defence  is  inade  by  plea  in 

3  Richards  w.  Dadley,  Rolls,  sittings  after  abatement,  motion  to  dismiss,  demurrer,  plea  in 
Trinity  Term,  1887  ;  and  see  Leese  v.  Knight,  bar,  answer,  and  cross-bill.  Code.  §  4384.  And 
8  Jur.  N.  S.  1006;  10  W.  R.  711,  V.  C.  K.;  it  must  be  made  in  the  order  prescribed,  the 
see  Amer.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Oakley,  9  Paige,  496.  adoption  of  a  different  defence  being  a  waiver 

525 


*  535  THE    DEFENCE   TO    A    SUIT. 

a  defendant,  unless  he  pleaded  or  demurred  to  the  bill,  to  put  in  an 
answer  of  some  description  ;  but  now,  since  the  Chancery  Amended  Act 
of  1852,  unless  interrogatories  are  filed,  and  a  copy  of  them  duly  served 
on  him  or  his  solicitor,  the  defendant  is  not  obliged  to  put  in  an  answer.2 
He  may,  however,  put  one  in,  if  he  thinks  fit,  even  though  no  inter- 
rogatories are  served : 3  the  answer  in  such  case  being  called  voluntary.4 
The  propriety  of  putting  in  a  voluntary  answer  depends  upon  the  cir- 
cumstances of  each  case ;  and,  in  general,  where  the  defendant  relies 
upon  a  case  which  does  not  appear  upon  the  bill,  he  should  put  in  a 
voluntary  answer.  If  he  does  not  do  so,  he  will  be  considered  to  have 
traversed  the  case  made  by  the  bill.5  The  defendant  will,  therefore,  in 
general  have  to  see  whether  any  answer  is  called  for  from  him,  and  if 
not,  whether  the  circumstances  of  the  case  require  that  he  should  put 
in  a  voluntary  answer. 

It  may,  however,  happen  from  some  cause,  either  apparent  upon  the 
face  of  the  bill  itself,  or  capable  of  being  concisely  submitted  to  the 
Court,  that  the  plaintiff  is  not  entitled  to  the  relief  or  part  of  the  relief 
which  he  has  prayed  :  in  such  cases,  the  defendant  may,  according  as  his 
objection  goes  to  the  whole  or  to  part  of  the  relief,  submit  the  grounds 
upon  which  he  considers  the  plaintiff  not  entitled  to  what  he  seeks,  in  a 
concise  form  to  the  Court,  and  pray  the  judgment  of  the  Court  whether 
the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  the  relief  prayed  by  his  bill,  to  which  the  de- 
fendant objects.  This  species  of  defence,  if  the  objection  appears  upon 
the  face  of  the  bill  itself,  is  made  by  Demurrer  ;  6  but  if  it  depends  upon 
any  matter  not  in  the  bill,  it  must  be  submitted  to  the  Court  in  the  form 
of  a  Plea."1  If  the  defence  submitted  to  the  Court,  in  either  of  the  above 
forms,  is  admitted,  or  held  upon  argument  to  be  good,  the  effect  of  it,  if 
it  be  a  demurrer,  is  to  put  the  bill,  or  that  part  of  it  which  has  been 
demurred  to,  out  of  Court;  or,  if  it  be  a  plea,  to  limit  the  matter  in  dis- 
pute to  the  question  whether  the  point  raised  by  it  be  true  or  not :  in 
which  case,  if  the  defendant  succeeds  in  establishing  the  point  raised  by 
the  plea,  by  evidence  at  the  hearing,  the  bill,  so  far  as  it  is  covered  by 
the  plea,  will  be  dismissed.  If  the  demurrer  or  plea  be  held  upon  argu- 
ment to  be  bad,  the  effect  of  the  judgment  of  the  Court,  in  general,  is, 
that  the  defendant  must  defend  the  cause,  and  put  in  an  answer  to 

*  535    the  *  interrogatories,  if  any  have  been  served  :  he  may,  however, 

if  his  first  defence  has  been  by  demurrer,  be  admitted,  under  cer- 
tain circumstances,  to  dispute  the  right  of  the  plaintiff  to  the  relief 
prayed,  by  means  of  a  plea  ;  or  by  demurrer  less  extensive  than 
the   first. 

If  the  defendant  thinks  proper  to  relinquish  any  claim  he  may  have 
to  the  property  in  question  in  the  suit,  he  can  do  so  by  putting  in  a 
species  of  answer  called  a  Disclaimer ;  by  which  he  disclaims  all  inter- 
est in  the  matters  in  question  in  the  suit.1 

of  those  which  precede.    Cooke  v.  Richards,  6  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86.  §  26. 

11  Heisk.  711.  6  See  forms  of  demurrer,  Vol.  III. 

2  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86.  §  12.  7  See  forms  of  plea,  Vol.  III. 

3  Ibid.  §  13.  l  See  forms  of  disclaimer,  Vol.  III. 
*  See  forms  of  answers,  Vol.  III. 

526 


*  CHAPTER  XIII. 

APPEARANCE. 


536 


Appearance  is  the  process  by  which  a  person,  against  whom  a  suit 
has  been  commenced,  submits  himself  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court ; 
and,  subject  to  a  few  exceptions,1  he  will  not  be  permitted  to  take  any 
step  in  the  cause  until  an  appearance  has  been  entered  on  his  behalf.2 
Even  if  he  desires  to  object  to  the  regularity  of  the  proceeding  by  which 
the  plaintiff  has  sought  to  compel  his  appearance,  he  must  first  enter 
what  is  called  a  conditional  appearance.3  (a)     Where,  however,  a  defend- 


1  Thus,  a  defendant  may  before  appearance 
obtain  an  order  for  particulars,  under  r.  20  H.  T. 
1853.    See  also  R.  S.  C.  1883,  Ord.  VII.  1. 

2  Even  if  he  denies  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
Court.  Felkin  v.  Lord  Herbert,  1  Dr.  &  Sm. 
608;  8  Jur.  N.  S.  90.  A  person  may  enter  his 
appearance  specially  to  object  to  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  Court.  Rubber  Co.  v.  Goodyear,  9  Wall. 
807,  811 ;  Merrill  e.  Houghton,  51  N.  H.  61. 
Or  to  plead  in  abatement  to  an  attachment. 
Boon  o.  Rahl,  1  Heisk.  12.  In  Maine,  each 
defendant  shall  enter  his  appearance  on  the 
docket  on  the  return  day.  And  upon  proof  of 
neglect,  when  there  has  been  personal  notice, 
a  default  may  be  entered,  the  bill  be  taken 
a'  confessed,  and  a  decree  be  entered  accord- 
ingly. Ch.  Rule  4.  In  Massachusetts,  "  the 
day  of  appearance  shall  be  the  return  day  of 
the  writ  or  subpoena,  when  personal  service 
shall  be  made  on  the  defendant,  or  he  shall 
have  had  personal  notice  of  the  suit;  or  the 
return  day  of  any  order  issued  under  the 
fourth  or  fifth  rule,  when  no  personal  service 
shall  be  made.  And,  if  the  defendant  shall 
not  appear  and  file  his  answer,  plea,  or  demur- 
rer, within  one  month  after  the  day  of  appear- 
ance, the  plaintiff  may  enter  an  order  to  take 
his  bill  for  confessed  ;  and  the  matter  thereof 
may  be  decreed  accordingly  unless  good  cause 
be  shown  to  the  contrary."  Ch.  Rule  9.  See 
the  17th  Equity  Rule  of  the  U.  S.  Courts, post, 
Vol.  Ill;  Heyman  v.  Uhlman,  34  Fed.  Rep.  686. 

A  demurrer  to  the  bill,  signed  by  the 
Attorney-General  of  a  State,  is  a  sufficient 
appearance  by  such  State,  in  a  suit  brought 
against  it.  New  Jersey  v.  New  York,  6  Peters, 
323.  Where  a  defendant  puts  in  an  answer, 
which  is  read  in  Court,  by  consent  of  the 
opposite  counsel,  and  ordered  to  be  filed,  and  a 


decretal  order  is  made  thereon  in  favor  of  the 
defendants,  it  is  an  appearance  on  the  records 
of  the  Court  Livingston  v.  Gibbons,  4  John. 
Ch.  94. 

Filing  an  answer  by  counsel  is  an  appear- 
ance. Proudtit  v.  Pickett,  7  Coldw.  563.  So  is 
the  filing  of  an  agreement  by  solicitor  and 
making  an  application  thereon.  Pugsley  v. 
Freedman's  Savings  &  Tr.  Co.  2  Tenn.  Ch. 
130.  So  is  the  filing  of  a  petition  for  the 
removal  of  a  cause  from  the  Stnte  to  the 
Federal  Court.  Sweeny  v.  Coffin,  1  Dill.  75. 
Compare  Freidlander  v.  Pollock,  5  Coldw.  490. 

The  formal  entry  of  appearance  has, 
throughout  the  United  States,  ceased  to  be 
important,  because  service  of  process  on  a 
defendant  to  appear  is  made  equivalent  to 
actual  appearance.  Sweeny  v.  Coffin,  1  Dill. 
75;  Fowlkes  v.  Webber,  8  Humph.  530. 

8  Ante,  pp.  453,  512;  Robinson  v.  Nash,  1 
Anst.  76;  Anon.  3  Atk.  567;  Floyd  v.  Nangle, 
ib.  569;  Mackreth  v.  Nicholson,  19  Ves.  367; 
Bound  v.  Wells,  3  Mad.  434;  Davidson  r. 
Marchioness  of  Hastings,  2  Keen,  509;  Price 
t".  Webb,  2  Hure,  511  ;  Johnson  v.  Barnes,  1 
De  G.  &  S.  129;  11  Jur.  261;  Lewis  v.  Bald- 
win, 11  Beav.  154:  Maclean  v.  Dawson,  4  De 
G.  &  J.  150,  152;  5  Jur.  N.  S.  663  ;  National 
Assurance  Co.  v.  Carstairs,  9  Jur.  N.  S.  955, 
M.  R.;  Foley  v.  Maillardet,  1  De  G.  J.  &  S. 
389  ;  see  Ashley  v.  Taylor,  10  Ch.  D.  768  ; 
Tottenham  v.  Barry,  12  Ch.  D.  797  ;  Harris  r. 
Fleming,  13  Ch.  D.  208  ;  R.  S.  C.  1883,  Ord. 
XII.  30;  Hinde,  144;  Braithwaite's  Pr.  321. 
An  appearance  entered  with  the  Record  and 
Writ  Clerk  would  waive  the  irregularity. 
Braithwaite's  Pr.  321;  2  Seton,  1636;  and 
ante,  p.  512.  For  the  mode  in  which  a  con- 
ditional appearance  is  entered,  see  post,  p.  537. 


(a)  A  defendant  who  enters  a  general  ap- 
pearance cannot  thereafter  assail  the  service  of 
process.     Crabb  v.  Orth  (Ind.),  32  N.  E.  Rep. 


711;   Perkins  v.  Hendryx,  40  Fed.  Rep.  657 ; 
see   Clews   p.  Woodstock  Iron  Co.  44  id.  31; 
Johnson  v.  Waters,  111  TJ.  S.  640.    If  a  non- 
527 


537 


APPEARANCE. 


ant  had  appeared  by  counsel  at  the  hearing  of  a  motion,  and  by  the  order 
then  made  all  further  proceedings  were  stayed,  he  was  allowed  to  apply 
to  the  Court  for  the  purpose  of  having  the  order  carried  into  effect,  with- 
out having  entered  any  appearance.4 
*  537  *  An  ordinary  appearance  is  entered  in  the  Eecord  and  Writ 
Clerks'  Office.1  For  this  purpose,  a  prcecipe  (forms  of  which  may 
be  obtained  in  the  office)  must  be  filled  up  with  the  name  of  the  defend- 
ant, and  underwritten  with  the  name  and  place  of  business  of  his  solici- 
tor, and  of  the  agent  of  such  solicitor,  if  any,  or  with  the  name  and 
place  of  residence  of  the  defendant  where  he  enters  the  appearance  in 
person,  and,  in  either  case,  with  the  address  for  service,  if  any  ; 2  and  such 
praecipe  must  be  left  at  the  seat  of  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerk  to  whose 
division  the  cause  is  attached.8  An  appearance  by  a  defendant  served 
within  the  jurisdiction  should  be  entered  within  eight  days  after  service 
of  the  bill ;  it  will,  however,  be  accepted  at  the  Eecord  and  Writ  Clerks' 
Office  at  any  time  ;  and,  if  before  decree,  without  order.4 

*  Betts  v.  Barton,  3  Jur.  N.  S.  154,  V.  C.      ant,  and  defends  in   person,  is   concerned  for 
W.;  and  as  to  consent  in  Court  by  counsel,  see      co-defendants,  the  appearance  for  himself  must 


Brighouse  v.  Margetson,  35  Beav.  303. 

i  Cons.  Ord.  I.  35.  By  the  17th  Equity 
Rule  of  the  U.  S.  Courts,  the  appearance  of 
the  defendant,  either  personally  or  by  his  solici- 
tor, shall  be  entered  in  the  order  book  on  the 
day  thereof  by  the  clerk.  For  the  present  Eng- 
lish practice,  see  1  Dan.  Ch.  Prac.  (6th  Eng. 
ed.),  347  ;  Phillips  v.  Kearney,  58  L.  J.  Ch.  344. 

2  Cons.  Ord.  III.  2,  5;  see  R.  S.  C.  1833, 
Ord.  XII.  10. 

3  Any  number  of  defendants  may  be  in- 
cluded in  one  prcecipe ;  and  the  names  of  all 
the  defendants  so  included  must  be  set  forth, 
notwithstanding  the  same  solicitor  appears  for 
all.     Where  a  solicitor  who  is  himself  a  defend- 


be  entered  on  a  separate  praecipe,  unless  he  be 
in  the  same  interest  with  them.  Braithwaite's 
Pr.  325.  The  following  fees  are  payable,  in 
Chancery  Fee  Fund  stamps,  impressed  on  or 
affixed  to  the  prcecipe,  on  entering  an  appear- 
ance. If  not  more  than  three  defendants,  7*. ; 
if  more  than  three,  and  not  exceeding  six  de- 
fendants, 14s.;  and  the  same  proportion  for 
every  like  number  of  defendants.  Regul.  to 
Ord.  Sched.  4.  In  this  computation,  husband 
and  wife,  when  the}'  appear  jointly,  are  reck- 
oned as  one  person.  Braithwaite's  Pr.  325. 
For  forms  of  prcecipe,  see  Vol.  III. 

4  Cons.  Ord.  X.  3;  Braithwaite's  Pr.  328; 
and  see  Griining  v.  Prioleau,  10  Jur.  N.  S.  60  ; 


resident,  he  thereby  admits  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  Court,  even  though  such  appearance  is  for 
the  purpose  of  objecting  to  the  jurisdiction. 
Lackett  v.  Rumbauirh,  45  Fed.  Rep.  23;  State 
v.  District  Court  (Minn.),  53  N.  W.  Rep.  714; 
Yorke  v.  Yorke  (N.  D.),  55  id.  1095;  Prince  v. 
Gundaway,  157  Mass.  417 ;  Pace  v.  Potter,  85 
Texas,  473;  see  Sugg  v.  Thornton,  132  U.  S. 
524.  A  motion  by  the  defendant  for  further 
time  to  plead,  or  the  signing  and  filing  of  the 
replevin  bond  in  a  replevin  suit,  may  amount 
to  an  appearance  for  all  purposes.  State  v. 
Horner  (N.  J.),  25  Atl.  Rep.  386;  Cheatham  v. 
Morrison,  37  S.  C.  187.  So  a  motion  to  set 
aside  a  default  (McCormick  Harvesting  M.  Co. 
v.  Schneider  (Neb.),  54  N.  W.  Rep.  257);  or 
for  a  change  of  venue  (Baisley  v.  Baisley,  113 
Mo.  544);  or  an  agreement  for  a  continuance 
(Ibid.)  may  amount  to  a  general  appearance. 

The  proper  course  is  to  enter  a  special  ap- 
pearance limited  to  the  particular  purpose 
intended.  See  McGillin  v.  Claflin,  52  Fed. 
Rep.  657  ;  Reifsnider  v.  American  Imp.  P.  Co. 
45  id.  433;  Whittle  v.  Artis,  55  id.  919;  Mex- 
528 


ican  Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  Pinkney,  149  U.  S. 
194;  Toof  v.  Foley  (Iowa),  54  N.  W.  Rep.  59; 
1  Seton  on  Judgments  (5th  ed.),  23.  In  Eng- 
land, a  conditional  appearance  cannot  now  be 
entered  in  any  other  form  than  a  regular 
appearance.  Nelson  v.  Pastorino,  49  L.  T.  564. 
The  entry  of  a  decree  or  judgment  raises  a 
prima  facie  presumption  of  due  service  or 
appearance.  Hartley  v.  Boynton,  17  Fed.  Rep. 
873.  The  voluntary  appearance  and  answer  of 
a  non-resident  to  a  bill  in  Equity  does  not 
affect  his  status  as  a  non-resident  with  respect 
to  new  and  material  allegations  added  in  an 
amended  bill  afterwards  filed.  Conrad  v. 
Buck,  21  \V.  Va.  396.  In  the  Federal  Courts, 
the  acceptance  of  service,  being  equivalent  only 
to  personal  service,  does  not  waive  the  objection 
that  the  defendant  does  not  reside  in  the  dis- 
trict. United  States  v.  Loughrey,  43  Fed.  Rep. 
449;  see  Reinstadler  v.  Reeves,  33  id.  308; 
Foote  v.  Mass.  Benefit  Ass'n,  39  id.  23;  Levi  v. 
Evans,  57  id.  677;  Boynton  v.  Kneeseville  E. 
L.  Co.  25  N.  Y.  S.  741. 


APPEARANCE.  *  528 

A  conditional  appearance  is  entered  with  the  Registrar,  under  an  order 
giving  leave  to  enter  the  appearance.5  The  order  is  obtained  on  an  ex 
parte  motion  or  on  petition  of  course  at  the  Rolls ; 6  but  the  defendant 
must,  by  his  counsel,  consent  to  submit  to  any  process  which  may  be 
issued  against  him  on  such  appearance.7  The  appearance  is  entered  by 
the  defendant's  solicitor  attending  at  the  entering  seat  in  the  Registrar's 
office,  and  signing  an  entry  in  the  Registrar's  Book.  The  entry  will  be 
made  by  the  entering  clerk,  on  the  order  being  produced  to  him.8  If  the 
process  is  discharged  for  irregularity,  the  order  discharging  the  process 
should  also  discharge  the  appearance.9 

When  an  appearance  has  been  entered,  notice  of  it  must  be  given  on 
the  same  day  to  the  plaintiff's  solicitor,  or  to  the  plaintiff  if  he  acts  in 
person,10  before  two  o'clock  on  Saturday,  and  seven  o'clock  on  any  other 
day :  otherwise,  the  service  will  stand  for  Monday  in  the  one  case,  and 
in  the  other  for  the  next  day.11 

Where  a  husband  and  wife  are  defendants,  the  husband  should, 
*  under  ordinary  circumstances,  appear  for  both ;  and  he  will  be  *  538 
liable  to  process  of  contempt  for  the  non-appearance  of  his  wife, 
as  well  as  his  own.1  The  wife  may,  however,  in  all  cases,  without  any 
special  order,  enter  an  appearance  for  herself,2  and,  as  we  have  seen, 
the  plaintiff  is  entitled,  in  some  cases,  to  treat  her  as  a  feme  sole  in  this 
respect.3 

Appearances  are  entered  on  behalf  of  infants,  and  persons  of  un- 
sound mind,  in  their  own  names,  as  in  the  case  of  ordinary  defendants ; 
but  they  cannot  put  in  their  answers,  or  take  any  other  step  in  the 
cause,  until  guardians  ad  litem  have  been  appointed.4 

12  W.  R.  Ml,  M.  R.,  33  Beav.  221.     For  the  4  Braithwaite's  Pr.   322;  see  ante,  pp.  162, 

practice  as   to  entering  an   appearance    after  177;  and  see  Cons.  Ord.  VII.  3;  Cons.  Ord.  X. 

decree,  see  ante,  p.  151;  and  post,  p.  540.  5;  Leese  v.  Knight,  8  Jur.  N.  S.  1006;   10  \V. 

5  As  to  the  time  of  entering  a  conditional  R.  711,  V.  C.  K.  See  R.  S.  C.  1883,  XVI.  18. 
appearance,  see  ante,  pp.  453,  512,  537.  Infants  can  only  appear  and  answer  by  their 

6  For  form  of  motion  paper,  see  Vol.  III.  guardian  appointed  for  that  purpose.     And  it  is 

1  See  Price  c.  Webb,  2  Hare,  511.  erroneous  to  proceed  against  them  till  such  ap- 

8  For  forms  of  order  and  entry,  see  2  Seton,  pointment.  Irons  v.  Crist,  3  A.  K.  Marsh  143; 
1626,  No.  1 ;  and  see  ante,  p.  512.  Bradwell  t\  Weeks.   1   John.  Ch.   325.      It  is 

9  Johnson  v.  Barnes,  1  De  G.  &  S.  129, 131;  irregular,  after  appointment  of  a  guardian  for 
11  Jur.  261.  The  application  to  set  aside  the  an  infant,  to  take  the  bill  pro  confessn  against 
process  is  made  by  motion.  him,  for  want  of  an  appearance  or  of  answer. 

10  Cons.  Ord.  III.  9 ;  see  R.  S.  C.  1883,  Ord.  Carneal  v.  Streshley,  1  A.  K.  Marsh.  471-     A 

XII.   22;   an'e,    pp.453,   454.       For   form    of  decree  pro  confesso  cannot  be  taken  against  an 

notice,  see  Vol.  III.  jnfanfc     Wells  v.  Smith,  44  Miss.  296  ;  Mcllvoy 

ii  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.  2;  ante,  p.  455.  v.  Alsop,  45  Miss.  365.     See  Code  of  Tennes^ 

i  Where  a  bill  is  filed  against  husband  and  see,    §§    4371,   4372  ;    Kilcrease    r.    Blythe,   6 

wife,  the   husband  is   bound  to  enter  a  joint  Humph.  378,  390. 

appearance,  and  put  in  a  joint  answer  for  both.  A  partv  who  takes  a  copy  of  a  bill    filed 

Leavitt  v.  Cruger,  1  Paige,  421;  see  ante,  182,  against  him  as   committee   of   a   lunatic,  and 

note,  524.  note.  enters  his  appearance  without  his  addition  of 

2  Braithwaite's  Pr.  321;  Rudge  v.  Weedon,  committee,  &c,  cannot  afterwards,  after  suf- 
7  W.  R.  368  (n.).  V.  C.  K.  fering  the  plaintiff  to  go  on  to  a  final  decree, 

3  See  ante,  pp.  179,  181,  445,  476.  In  the  object  that  the  subpmna  was  against  him  in- 
English  practice,  husband  and  wife  t  ow  appear  dividually,  and  not  as  committee^  &c.  Brasher 
separately,  no  order  for  the  separate  appearance  v.  Cortlandt,  2  John.  Ch.  247. 

of  the  wife  being  necessary.     See  R.  S.  C.  1883, 
Ord.  IX.  3,  XVI.  16;  45  &  46  Vic.  c.  75,  §  1. 

vol.  i.  — 34  529 


539 


APPEARANCE. 


A  person  intending  to  defend  a  suit  in  forma  pauperis,  usually  enters 
an  appearance,  and  pays  the  fee,  before  he  petitions  for  the  order  to 
defend  in  forma  pauperis  ;  but  upon  procuring  an  indorsement,  by  the 
proper  officer,  upon  his  petition,  that  the  affidavit  as  to  poverty  has 
been  filed,  he  may  obtain  the  order  before  he  enters  his  appearance  :  in 
which  case,  on  production  of  the  order,  he  may  enter  his  appearance 
without  payment  of  the  fee.5 

An  appearance  to  a  bill  not  original  is  subject  to  the  same  regulations 
as  an  appearance  to  an  original  bill.6 

In  the  case  of  a  supplemental  statement,7  such  proceedings  by  way 
of  answer,  evidence,  and  otherwise  are  to  be  taken  upon  it  as  if  it  were 
embodied  in  a  supplemental  bill ; 8  and,  therefore,  an  indorsement  re- 
quiring appearance  must  be  made  on  a  supplemental  statement,  and  an 
appearance  entered  thereto.9 

No  appearance  is  necessary,  in  the  case  of  a  party  served  with  notice 
of  a  decree,  under  Rule  8  of  the  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  42.10 

Where  an  order  of  Revivor  or  supplemental  order  has  been  obtained,11 
the  practice  is  to  require  an  appearance  by  the  defendants  brought  before 
the  Court  by  such  order ;  but  not  to  require  any  new  appearance 
*  539  by  the  original  defendants.12  This  practice  seems  *  scarcely  con- 
sistent with  the  words  of  the  Act;  *  and  its  propriety  has  been 
doubted.2 

Where  the  plaintiff  amends  his  bill,  he  must,  as  we  have  seen,  serve 
the  defendants  with  a  copy  of  the  amended  bill ;  but  the  defendants,  if 
they  have  appeared  to  the  original  bill,  need  not  enter  any  appearance 
to  the  amended  bill :  unless  required  so  to  do  by  the  indorsement  on 
the  amended  bill.8 

Where  a  formal  defendant  is  served  with  a  copy  of  the  bill  under  the 
General  Order,4  he  may  appear  in  common  form,  at  any  time  within 
twelve  days  from  the  service  of  the  copy  of  the  bill : 5  or  he  may,  within 
the  same  time,  enter  a  special  appearance,  for  the  purpose  of  being 
served  with  notice  of  all  proceedings  in  the  suit.6  After  the  expiration 
of  the  twelve  days,  neither  the  common  nor  special  appearance  can  be 
entered,  without  an  order  for  that  purpose.7 


5  1  Turn.  &  Ven.  512;  Braithwaite's  Pr. 
322,  563.     For  form  of  petition,  see  Vol.  HI. 

6  Braithwaite's  Pr.  329. 

7  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86.  §  53. 

8  Cons.  Ord.  XXXIl!  2. 

9  Braithwaite's  Pr.  81,  331. 
1°  Ih.  323;  ante.  p.  437. 

11  Under  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  52;  see  post, 
Chap.  XXXIII.  Revivor,  nnd  Supplement. 

12  Braithwaite's  Pr.  331,  559;  Seton,  1171; 
Cross  v.  Thomas,  16  Beav.  592;  17  Jnr.  336; 
Forster  v.  Menzies,  17  Jur.  657;  10  Hare  App. 
36;  16  Beav  568;  Ward  v.  Cartwright,  10 
Hare  App.  73;  17  Jur.  781. 

1  See  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  25;  but  see 
Hanbury  v.  Ward,  18  Jur.  222,  V.  C.  S.;  Hall 
v.  Radcliffe,  2  J.  &  H.  765. 

2  See  1  Smith's  Pr.  805. 

530 


s  Cheesborough  v.  Wright,  28  Beav.  173  ; 
Barry  v.  Croskey  (No.  2),  2  J.  &  H.  130;  8  Jur. 
N.  S.  114;  Braithwaite's  Pr.  328;  Braithwaite's 
Manual,  159  ;  and  see  ante,  pp.  446,  533.  Where 
defendants  have  not  answered  the  original  bill, 
but  are  called  upon  by  an  amended  bill  simul- 
taneously to  answer  both,  it  is  not  necessary  to 
issue  a  new  mbpoma.  Fitzhugh  v.  McPherson, 
9  Gill  &  J.  1.  See  Cunningham  v.  Pell,  6 
Paige,  655;  Longworth  v.  Taylor,  1  McLean, 
514. 

4  Cons.  Ord.  X.  11. 

s  Cons.  Ord.  X.  14,  16;  ante,  p.  432. 

6  Cons.  Ord.  X.  15;  ante,  p.  432. 

1  Cons.  Ord.  X.  15,  16;  and  see  ante,  pp. 
432,  433,  for  the  practice  as  to  entering  a  com- 
mon or  special  appearance,  and  obtaining  an 
order  for  leave  so  to  do. 


APPEARANCE.  *  540 

A  defendant  may,  if  he  has  been  informed  of  a  bill  being  filed  against 
him,  enter  an  appearance,  or  cause  an  appearance  to  be  entered  for 
him,  without  waiting  to  be  served  with  the  copy  of  the  bill.8  This  is 
called  appearing  gratis,  and  is  generally  resorted  to  where  the  plaintiff 
has  served  some  only  of  the  defendants  with  the  bill,  and  a  defendant 
who  is  not  served  wishes  to  make  an  immediate  application  to  the  Court 
in  the  cause.9 

A  defendant  may,  likewise,  in  certain  cases,  appear  gratis  at  the  hear- 
ing, and  consent  to  be  bound  by  the  decree ; 10  but  where  a  person,  not 
a  party  to  the  suit,  who  was  interested  in  a  question,  appeared 
by  counsel,  and  submitted  to  be  bound  by  the  decision,  *  the  Court    *  540 
held,  that  he  could  not  be  heard  without  the  consent  of  the  other 
defendants.1 

After  decree,  an  appearance  cannot  be  entered  by  a  defendant  except 
by  leave  of  the  Court,  on  an  application  by  him  for  liberty  to  enter  such 
appearance,  and  attend  the  proceedings  :  the  defendant  submitting  to  be 
bound  by  the  decree  and  proceedings  already  had.  The  application  may 
be  made  by  petition  of  course,  if  the  plaintiff  will  consent ;  and  if  he 
will  not,  by  motion  or  summons,  as  before  explained.2 

If  an  appearance  has  been  entered  in  the  name  of  a  defendant  by 
mistake,  and  no  proceeding  has  been  subsequently  taken,  such  appear- 
ance maj  be  withdrawn,  at  the  request  of  the  party  who  entered  it, 
and  with  the  consent  of  the  plaintiff ;  but  if  any  proceeding  has  been 
taken,  a  special  order,  which  may  be  obtained  either  on  motion,  with 
notice,  or  on  summons  at  Chambers,  is  necessary.  If  it  is  only  desired 
to  alter  the  name  of  the  solicitor  who  has  entered  the  appearance,  the 
common  order  to  change  solicitors  is  sufficient.8 

If  the  defendant  does  not  enter  an  appearance  by  himself  or  his 
solicitor  within  the  time  limited  for  that  purpose,  the  plaintiff  may  enter 


8  In  Barkley  v.  Lord  Reay,  2  Hare,  309,  Sir  Sapte  v.  Ward,  1  Coll.  24;  see  form  of  order, 
James  Wigram  V.  C.  decided  that  a  defendant  id.  25  (n.);  Seton,  3. 

against  whom  it  is  prayed  that,  upon  service  of  l  Bozon  v.  Bolland,  1  R.  &  M.  69  ;  Att.-Gen. 

a  copy  of  the  bill,  he  may  be  bound  by  the  pro-  v.  Pearson,   7   Sim.  290;   Dyson  v.  Morris,  1 

ceedings  in    the  cause,   is   entitled   to   appear  Hare,   413;   6  Jur.  297;  Lewis  v.  Clewes,  10 

gratis,  either  before  or  after  service.  Hare  App.  62 ;  see  also  ante,  p.  153. 

9  Fell  v.  Christ's  College,  2  Bro.  C.  C.  279;  *  Braithwaite's  Pr.  323;  ante,  p.  153.  For 
Hume  v.  Babington,  1  Hogan,  8.  So  where  the  present  English  practice,  see  1  Dan. Ch.  Prac. 
the  subpaitui  is  regularly  served,  as  where  it  (6th  Eng.  ed.)  351.  In  Morgan  v.  Day,  V.  C. 
is  served  out  of  the  State,  the  defendant  may  S.  in  Chamb.  3  Feb.,  1865,  a  person  not  a  party 
voluntarily  appear.  Dunn  v.  Dunn,  4  Paige,  to  the  suit,  but  claiming  to  be  interested  under 
425;  see  Seebor  v.  Hess,  5  Paige,  85.  Wh<  re  the  will  of  the  testator,  was,  by  consent,  per- 
a  plaintiff  neglects  to  serve  a  subpama  on  a  mitted  to  enter  an  appearance,  find  defend  the 
defendant  in  a  bill  against  whom  an  injunc-  suit,  on  consenting  to  be  bound  by  the  decree, 
tion  has  been  granted  affecting  his  rights,  and  the  proceedings  had  thereunder,  as  if  she 
such  defendant  may  appear  voluntarily,  and  had  originally  been  made  a  defendant.  For 
apply  to  dissolve  the  injunction,  without  wait-  forms  of  petition,  notice  of  motion,  and  sinn- 
ing for  the  service  of  the  subpoena.     Waffle  v.  mon«,  see  Vol.  III. 

Vanderheyden,  8  Paige,  45;  see  Howe  v.  Wil-  s  Braithwaite's    Pr.   323,    324;    Martin    v. 

lard,  40  Vt.  654.     Or  he  may  demur.    Jones  v.  Patching,  id.  338  ;  1  Chit.  Arch.  247.    For  forms 

Fulghum,  3  Tenn.  Ch.  193.  of  request,  consent,  notice  of  motion,  and  sum- 

1°  Capel  v.   Butler,    2    S.   &  S.    457,  462;  mons,  see  Vol.  III.  See  A.  v.  B.W.N.  (1883)174. 

531 


541 


APPEARANCE. 


an  appearance  for  him  ;  *  and  as  an  attachment  to  compel  appearance 
cannot  now  be  issued  without  a  special  order  of  the  Court,  and  no 
order  will  be  made  for  a  messenger  or  Sergeant-at-arms  to  take  the 
body  of  a  defendant  for  the  purpose  of  compelling  his  appearance,5  it 
has,  as  we  have  seen,6  become  the  usual  practice  for  the  plaintiff  to 
enter  an  appearance  for  the  defendant,  in  default  of  such  appearance 
being  entered  by  the  defendant. 

An  appearance  which  has,  by  mistake,  been  entered  by  the  plaintiff, 
as  if  concerned  for  a  defendant,  may  be  withdrawn  with  the  consent  of 
the  defendant,  on  the  request  of  the  plaintiff's  solicitor,  if  the  applica- 
tion is  made  before  the  expiration  of  three  weeks  from  the  service  of 
the  copy  of  the  bill ;  but  if  the  defendant  will  not  consent,  or  the 
application  is  made  after  such  three  weeks,  an  order,  which  may  be 
obtained    on    motion   with    notice,   or   on    summons    at   Chambers,   is 

necessary.7 
*  541        *  We  have  before  seen,  that  a  defendant,  notwithstanding  an 

appearance  has  been  entered  for  him,  may  afterwards  appear  for 
himself  in  the  ordinary  way  :  but  that  such  appearance  is  not  to  affect 
any  proceeding  duly  taken,  or  any  right  acquired  by  the  plaintiff  under 
or  after  the  appearance  entered  by  him,  or  prejudice  the  plaintiff's  right 
to  be  allowed  the  costs  of  the  first  appearance ; 1  and  it  seems  that,  in 
practice,  wherever  an  appearance  for  a  defendant  has  been  entered  by 
the  plaintiff,  such  defendant  must,  nevertheless,  enter  an  appearance  for 
himself,  before  he  can  be  allowed  to  defend  the  suit.2 


*  Cons.  Old.  X.  3,  4,  ante,  pp.  460-462.  As 
to  proceedings  in  default  of  appearance  under 
the  present  English  practice,  see  1  Dan.  Ch. 
Prac.  (6th  Eng.  ed.)  356.  And  as  to  proceed- 
ings, after  appearance  and  before  pleadings,  on 
the  part  of  the  plaintiff  or  defendant,  see  Ibid. 
365,  c.  8. 

5  Cons.  Ord.  X.  10  ;  Hackwood  v.  Lockerby, 
7  De  G.  M.  &  G.  238. 

6  Ante,  pp.  460-462. 

7  Braithwaite's  Pr.  337,  338 :  and  Martin  v. 
Patching,  there  cited.  For  forms  of  request, 
consent,  notice  of  motion  and  summons,  see 
Vol.  III. 

532 


i  Cons.  Ord.  X.  9;  ante,  p.  479. 

2  Ante,  p.  479.  In  Groome  v.  Sporne,  M. 
R.  1863,  G.  No.  4,  a  motion  by  a  defendant, 
who  had  not  appeared  to  the  bill,  and  against 
whom  the  bill  had  been  taken  pro  confesso.  to 
set  aside  the  proceedings  for  irregularity,  was 
permitted  to  proceed,  on  his  entering  a  condi- 
tional appearance  with  the  Registrar,  and  under- 
taking, by  his  counsel,  to  enter  an  ordinary 
appearance;  which  was  afterwards  entered  ac- 
cordingly-, upon  the  Registrar's  minute,  without 
any  formal  order. 


♦CHAPTER  XIV. 

DEMURRERS. 


*542 


Section-  I.  —  The  general  Nature  of  Demurrers. 

Whenever  any  ground  of  defence  is  apparent  upon  the  bill  itself, 
either  from  the  matter  contained  in  it,  or  from  defect  in  its  frame, 
or  in  the  case  made  by  it,  the  appropriate  mode  of  defence  is  by 
demurrer.1  (a) 


1  Ld.  Red.  107;  see  Tappan  r.  Evans,  11 
N.  H.  311;  Harris  v.  Thomas,  1  Hen.  &  M.  18; 
Aldersnn  v.  Biggars,  4  Hen.  &  M.  470 ;  Mitchell 
v.  Lenox,  2  Paige,  280;  Brill  v.  Styles,  35  III. 
305;  Barry  v.  Abbott,  100  Mass.  398. 

In  Equity,  a  demurrer  is  only  a  mode  of  de- 
fence to  a  bill.  It  is  never  resorted  to  for  the 
purpose  of  settling  the  validity  of  a  plea  or 
answer.     Travers  v.  Ross,  14  N.  J.  Eq.  254; 


(")  Demurrers  are  now  in  form  abolished 
in  England.  For  the  present  English  practice, 
see  1  Dan.  Ch.  Prac.  (6th  Eng.  ed.)  449,  525, 
§  6;  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  XXV.  1-4;  Burstall  r.  Bey- 
fus,  26 Ch.  D.  35;  O'Brien  r.Tyssen,  28  Ch.  D. 
372;  Republic  of  Peru  v.  Peruvian  Guano  Co. 
36  Ch.  D.  489;  Re  Batthyny,  32  W.  R.  379; 
London,  Chatham  &  Dover  Ry .  v.  South-Eastern 
Ry.  53  L.  T.  109;  Grosvenor  v.  White,  61  L.T. 
663.  The  proceeding  is  now  by  motion  to  strike 
out  the  pleading.  See  Att.-Gen.  v.  London  & 
N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  [1892]  3  Ch.  274.  A  motion  to 
dissolve  an  injunction  for  want  of  equity  in  the 
bill  cannot  operate  as  a  demurrer,  but  all  amend- 
able defect  will  be  treated  as  amended.  Nathan 
v.  Tompkins,  82  Ala.  437.  A  motion  to  dis- 
miss for  want  of  equity  is  not  equivalent  to  a 
demurrer,  and  does  not  reach  amendable  defects 
in  the  bill.  Glover  c.  Heinbree,  82  Ala.  324; 
Harland  v.  Person,  93  Ala.  273.  When  the 
plaintiff  does  not  object,  a  Federal  Court  can 
determine,  upon  motion  to  dismiss,  a  question 
of  jurisdiction  or  of  personal  privilege  raised 
by  the  defendant.  Bicycle  Stepladder  Co.  v. 
Gordon,  57  Fed.  Rep.  529;  post,  p.  551, note  (/»): 
Miller-Magee  Co.  c.  Carpenter,  34  id.  433.  Lack 
of  definiteness  and  certainty  may  be  remedied 
by  motion  to  make  more  definite,  Crocker  v. 
Collins,  37  S.  C.  327;  Cheney  o.  Strauhe,  35 
Neb.  521 ;  First  National  Bank  v.  Smith  (Neb.), 
54  N.  W.  Rep.  254;  Evansville  R.  Co.  r. 
Maddux  (Ind.),  34  N.  E.  Rep.  511;  Garard  v. 
Garard  (Ind.),  id.  442;  Conroy  v.  Oregon  Con- 


Raymond  v.  Simonson,  7  Blackf.  79;  Thomas 
v.  Brathear,  4  Monroe,  65;  Cooper  Eq.  PI.  110: 
Stone  v.  Moore,  26  111.  165 ;  Edwards  v.  Drake, 
15  Fla.  66.  See  infra,  692,  n.  11.  If,  how- 
ever, the  parties  have  taken  no  exception  to  the 
mode  of  proceeding,  the  Court  will  dispose  of 
the  case  on  its  merits.  Barry  v.  Abbott,  100 
Mass.  398. 


struction  Co.  23  Fed.  Rep.  71;  Johnson  v.  Wil- 
cox &  Gibbs  S  M.  Co.  25  id.  373;  Gause  v. 
Knapp,  1  id.  292;  Neis  v.  Yocum.  16  id.  168, 
172;  Bostwick  v.  Van  Voorhis,  91  N.  Y.  353; 
or  for  particulars.  See  Blackie  v.  Osmaston, 
28  Ch.  D.  119;  Re  Anstice,  54  L.  J.  Ch.  1104; 
N.  Y.  Code  of  Civil  Proc,  §  53L;  Rafalsky  v. 
Boehm,  20  N.  Y.  S.  374.  Under  the  Codes  this 
objection  may  be  made  by  special  demurrer. 
Ibid. ;  Kirsch  r.  Derby,  96  Cal.  602.  A  demurrer 
to  evidence  in  an  Equity  case  has  apparently  the 
same  effect  as  in  a  Law  case.  Healey  v.  Simp- 
son, 113  Mo.  340;  Pickel  v.  Isgrigg,  6  Fed. 
Rep.  676. 

In  Equity,  a  demurrer  lies  only  to  the  bill, 
and  not  to  an  answer  or  plea.  See  above  note; 
Banks  r.  Manchester,  128  U.  S.  244;  Crouch 
v.  Kerr,  38  Fed.  Rep.  549;  Winters  v.  Claitor, 
54  Miss.  341;  Travers  v.  Ross,  14  N.  J.  Eq. 
254;  Edwards  v.  Drake,  15  Fla.  666.  Thus,  a 
bad  plea  should  be  set  down  for  argument  and 
not  demurred  to.  Reynolds  v.  Crawfordsville 
Bank,  112  U.  S.  405;  Wilkinson  o.  Bauerle,  41 
N.  J.  Eq.  635,  646;  Rouskulp  r.  Kershner,  49 
Md.  bW;  ]>nsf%  p.  694,  note.  Under  the  present 
English  practice,  the  plaintiff  may  demur  or 
present  legal  objections  to  the  whole  or  part 
of  either  a  statement  of  defence  or  a  counter- 
claim. 1  Dan.  Ch.  Prac.  (6th  Eng.  ed.)  539. 
The  whole  or  any  part  of  a  reply  or  subsequent 
pleading  may  also  be  demurred  to,  but  such  a 
demurrer  can  only  be  delivered  by  leave  of 
Court,   and  upon  such  terms  as  the  Court  or 

533 


543 


DEMURRERS. 


Demurrers  are  now  of  much  less  frequent  occurrence  than  formerly ; 
the  readiness  with  which  the  Court  gives  the  plaintiff  leave  to  amend 
his  bill  rendering  it  inexpedient  to  demur,  in  any  case,  where  the  defect 
in  the  bill  can  be  cured  by  amendment ; 2  but  where  the  question  raised 
by  the  bill  can  be  properly  determined  on  demurrer,  a  defendant,  by 
neglecting  to  demur,  injures  his  position  with  respect  to  the  costs  of  the 
suit.  Thus,  bills  dismissed  at  the  hearing,  have  often  been  dismissed 
without  costs,  on  the  ground  that  they  might  have  been  demurred  to  ;3 
or  the  defendant  has  only  been  allowed  the  same  costs  as  he  would 
have  received  if  he  had  demurred.4  The  defendant  is  not  justified  in 
neglecting  to  demur  to  the  bill,  because  it  contains  charges  of  fraud 
which  he  is  desirous  of  answering.5 

The   Court    sometimes   declines   to   decide    a   doubtful    question   of 

title   on    demurrer  :    in  which    case,  the  demurrer    will    be  overruled, 

without  prejudice  to  any  question.6    A  demurrer  may  also   be 

*  543    *  overruled,  with  liberty  to  the  defendant  to  insist  upon  the  same 

defence  by  answer,  if  the  allegations  of  the  bill  are  such  that  the 

case  ought  not  to  be  decided  without  an  answer  being  put  in.1 

A  demurrer  has  been  so  termed,  because  the  party  demurring  demo- 
ratur,  or  will  go  no  further  :  2  the  other  party  not  having  shown  suffi- 
cient matter  against  him  ;  and  it  is  in  substance  an  allegation  by  a 
defendant,  which,  admitting  the  matters  of  fact  stated  by  the  bill  to  be 
true,  shows  that,  as  they  are  therein  set  forth  they  are  insufficient  for 


2  As  to  the  expediency  of  demurring,  see 
Wigram  on  Disc.  158. 

8  .Jones  v.  Davids,  4  Russ.  277;  Hill  ». 
Reardon,  2  S.  &  S.  431,  439;  Hollingsworth  v. 
Shakeshaft,  14  Beav.  492;  Webb  v.  England, 
29  Beav.  44;  7  Jur.  N.  S.  153;  Ernest  D.Weiss, 
9  Jur.  N.  S.  145;  11  W.  R.  206,  V.  C.  K. ;  Nes- 
bitt  v.  Berridge,  9  Jur.  N.  S.  1044;  11  W.  R. 
44fi,  M.  R.;  but  see  Morocco  Co.  v.  Fry,  11  Jur. 
N.  S.  76,  78;  13  W.  R.  310,  312,  V.  C.  S. 

4  Godfrey  v.  Tucker,  9  Jur.  N.  S.  1188;  12 
W.  R.  33,  M.  R.;  33  Beav.  280. 

5  Xesbitt  v.  Berridge,  ubi  supra  ;  but  see  S. 
C.  before  L.  C.  10  Jur.  N.  S.  53;  12  W.  R. 
283. 

6  Brownsword  v.  Edwards,  2  Ves.  Sr.  243, 
247:  Mortimer  v.  Hartley,  3  De  G.  &  S.  316; 
Evans  v.  Evans,  18  Jur.  666,  L.  JJ. ;  Cochrane 
v.  Willi*,  10  Jur.  N.  S.  162,  L.  JJ.;  4  De  G.  J. 
&  S.  229;  Bloomstein  v.  Clees,  3  Tenn.  Ch. 
438;  Ld.  Red.  154,  n.  (p). 

i  Collingwood  v.  Russell,  13  W.  R.  63,  L. 
JJ. ;  10  Jur.  N.  S.  1062;  Lautour  v.  Att.-Gen. 


11  Jur.  N.  S.  48;  13  W.  R.  305,  L.  JJ.;  Baxen- 
dale  v.  Westminturn  R.  W.  Co.  8  Jur.  N.  S. 
1163,  L.  C. 

2  3  Bl.  Com.  314;  Tomlins  &  Burrill's  Law 
Diet.  Tit.  "Demurrer;"  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §441. 
A  demurrer  is  an  answer  in  law  to  the  bill, 
though  not,  in  a  technical  sense,  an  answer 
according  to  the  common  language  of  practice. 
New  Jersey  v.  New  York,  6  l'eters,  323.  There- 
fore, if,  on  setting  aside  an  order  pro  confesso, 
leave  be  given  to  answer,  the  defendant  can 
neither  plead  nor  demur  without  special  per- 
mission. Allen  v.  Baugus,  1  Swan,  444.  See 
the  32d  Equity  Rule  of  the  U.  S.  Courts, 
post,  p.  2383,  as  to  demurring  to  part  of  a  bill, 
and  answering  or  pleading  to  the  residue. 
Hayes  v.  Dayton,  8  Fed  Rep.  702;  Orendorf  v. 
Budlong,  12  id.  24;  Crescent  City  &c.  Co.  v. 
Butchers  &c.  Co.  id.  225;  Chicago,  St.  L.  & 
N.  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Macomb,  2  id.  18.  A  similar 
rule  has  been  adopted  in  Massachusetts.  Ch. 
Rule  10;  post,  p.  589,  n. 


.Tudpe  shall  think  fit.  Ibid.;  R.  S.  C.  Ord. 
XXIV.  2.  So,  under  the  Code  procedure,  a  de- 
murrer to  an  answer  is  proper,  especial ly  when 
the  answer  sets  up  a  counter-claim.  See  Roth- 
schild v.  Whitman,  132  N.  Y.  472;  Otis  r. 
Shants,  128  N.  Y.  45;  N.  Y.  Code  of  Civil 
Proc.  §  495;  Sheward  v.  Citizens'  Water  Co.  90 
Cal.  635;  Gilmore  v.  McClure  (Ind.),  33  N.  E. 
534 


Rep.  351;  Shealy  v.  Toole,  64  Ga.  59;  Smith  v. 
Danielly,  id.  554;  Ormsby  v.  Union  Pacific 
Ry.  Co.  4  Fed.  Rep.  170.  A  P^ea  ma}"  a^s0  ^e 
demurred  to.  Henley  v.  Henley,  93  Mo.  95; 
Corpening  v.  Worthington  (Ala.),  12  So.  Rep. 
426.  In  the  Federal  Courts  demurrers  to  an- 
swers in  Equity  are  not  sanctioned  by  the  rules. 
Crouch  v.  Kerr,  38  Fed.  Rep.  549. 


GENERAL   NATURE   OF   DEMURRERS. 


544 


the  plaintiff  to  proceed  upon,  or  to  oblige  the  defendant  to  answer ;  or 
that  for  some  reason  apparent  on  the  face  of  the  bill,  or  because  of  the 
omission  of  some  matter  which  ought  to  be  contained  therein,  or  for 
want  of  some  circumstance  which  ought  to  be  attendant  thereon,  the 
plaintiff  ought  not  to  be  allowed  to  proceed.  It,  therefore,  demands 
judgment  of  the  Court,  whether  the  defendant  shall  be  compelled  to 
make  any  further  or  other  answer  to  the  plaintiff 's  bill,  or  that  particu- 
lar part  of  it  to  which  the  demurrer  applies.8 

A  demurrer  will  lie  wherever  it  is  clear  that,  taking  the  charges  in 
the  bill  to  be  true,  the  bill  would  be  dismissed  at  the  hearing ; 4  but  it 
must  be  founded  on  this  :  that  it  is  an  absolute,  certain,  and  clear  prop- 
osition that  it  would  be  so  ; 5  (a)  for  if  it  is  a  case  of  circumstances,  in 
which  a  minute  variation  between  them  as  stated  by  the  bill,  and  those 
established  by  the  evidence,  may  either  incline  the  Court  to  modify  the 
relief  or  to  grant  no  relief  at  all,  the  Court,  although  it  sees  that  the 
granting  the  modified  relief  at  the  hearing  will  be  attended  with  con- 
siderable difficulty,  will  not  support  a  demurrer.6 

*  As  a  demurrer  proceeds  upon  the  ground  that,  admitting  the    *  544 
facts  stated  in  the  bill  to  be  true,  the  plaintiff  is  not  entitled  to  the 
relief  he  seeks,  it  is  held  that,  at  least  for  the  purpose  of  argument,  all 
the  matters  of  fact  which  are  stated  in  the  bill  are  admitted  by  the  de- 
murrer,1 and  cannot  be  disputed  in  arguing  the  question  whether  the 


8  Ld.  Red.  107. 

4  Utterson  v.  Mair,  2  Ves.  Jr.  95;  4  Bro.  C. 
C.  270;  Hovenden  v.  Lord  Annesley,  2  Sch.  & 
Lef.  607,  638 

6  Brooke  v.  Hewitt,  3  Ves.  253,  255;  Morri- 
son v.  Morrison,  4  Drew.  315. 

6  See  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §§  446,  447,  478;  Lube\ 
Eq.  PI.  338,  339,  340.  A  demurrer  to  a  bill 
must  be  founded  on  some  strong  point  of  law, 
which  goes  to  the  absolute  denial  of  the  relief 
sought,  and  not  on  circumstances  in  which  a 
minute  variation  may  incline  the  Court  either 
to  grant,  modify,  or  refuse  the  application. 
Verplanck  v.  Caines,  1  John.  Ch.  58.  Vail  v. 
Central  R.  Co.  23  N.  J.  Eq.  466;  Drummond  i>. 
Westervelt,  24  id.  30.  It  should  go  to  the  merits 
and  the  facts  on  which  the  relief  is  prayed. 
Roberdeau  v.  Rous,  1  Ark.  544;  Averill  v. 
Taylor,  5  How.  Pr.  478;  Beale  v.  Hayes,  5 
Sandf.  640;  Brien  v.  Buttorff,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  523; 
Payne  v.  Berry,  3  Tenn.  Ch.  154.  Where  a 
bill  was  filed  for  the  specific  performance  of  an 
agreement,  and  the  case  turned  upon  the  point, 
whether  the  facts  stated  amounted  to  a  perfect 
agreement,  Lord  Rosslyn  thought  that,  although 
the  circumstances,  as  stated  in  the  bill,  amount- 
ed more  to  a  treaty  than  a  complete  agreement, 
the  question  whether  it  was  an  agreement  or  not 


depended  much  upon  the  effect  of  the  evidence, 
and  therefore  overruled  the  demurrer.  Brooke 
v.  Hewitt,  ubi  supi-a  ,  Heffield  Waterworks  v. 
Yeomans,  L.  R.  2  Ch.  8;  see  Reeves  v.  Green- 
wich Tanning  Co.  2  H.  &  M.  54. 

i  East  India  Co.  v.  Henchman,  1  Ves.  Jr. 
289;  and  see  Nesbitt  v.  Berridge,  9  Jur.  N.  S. 
1044;  11  \V.  R.  446,  M.  R.;  Story,  Eq.  PL 
§  452;  Mills  v.  Brown,  2  Scam.  549;  Goble  ». 
Andruss,  1  Green  Ch.  66;  Niles  v.  Ander-on, 
5  How.  (Miss.)  365;  Green  v.  Robinson,  ib.  80; 
Smith  v.  Allen,  1  Saxton  (N.  J.).  43;  Wales 
v.  Bank  of  Michigan,  Harring.  Ch.  308.  Hut 
it  cannot  supply  defects  in  substance,  or  cure  a 
defective  statement  of  title.  Mills  o.  Brown, 
and  Goble  v.  Andruss,  ubi  supra. 

Where  a  cause  is  argued  upon  a  demurrer, 
and  plea  in  bar,  the  averments  in  the  plea,  for 
the  purpose  of  considering  their  legal  effect, 
must  be  taken  to  be  true.  York  Manuf.  Co.  v. 
Cutts,  18  Maine,  204.  A  demurrer  is  a  denial 
in  form  and  substance  of  the  plaintiff's  right 
to  have  his  case  considered  ill  a  Court  of  Equity, 
and  an  admission  of  all  its  allegations  that  are 
properly  pl>aded.  Gritting  v.  Gibb,  2  Black. 
(U.  S.)*519;  Roby  v.  Cossitt,  78  111.  638;  Croft 
v.  Thompson,  51  N.  II.  536;  Swan  v.  Castleman, 
4  Baxt.  257. 


(a)  See  Robertson  v.  Howard,  3  C.  P.  D. 
280;  Fawcusr.  Charlton,  10  Q.  B.  D.  516;  Iron 
Age  Pub.  Co.  v.  Western   Union  Tel.  Co.  83 

Ala.  498.     Thus  the  objection  that  a  defendant 
corporation  can  only  contract  under  seal  will 


not  be  considered  upon  demurrer  to  a  complaint 
which  does  not  show  that  such  corporation  could 
not  contract  by  parol.  Darrow  v.  H.  R.  Home 
Produce  Co.  57  Fed.  Pp.  463. 

535 


545 


DEMURRERS. 


defence  thereby  made  be  good  or  not ;  and  such  admission  extends  to 
the  whole  manner  and  form  in  which  it  is  there  stated.2 

Where  a  bill  professes  to  set  out  a  deed  inaccurately,  and  alleges,  as  a 
reason  for  so  setting  it  out,  that  it  is  in  the  possession  of  the  defendants, 
a  demurrer  to  the  bill  cannot  be  sustained,  although,  according  to  the 
terms  of  the  deed,  as  stated  by  the  plaintiff,  he  can  take  no  title 
*  545  under  it :  because  *  the  Court  will  not,  under  such  circumstances, 
bind  the  plaintiff  by  the  statement  he  has  made,  which  he  alleges 
to  be  inaccurate,  and  which  the  defendant,  therefore,  by  his  demurrer  ad- 
mits to  be  so.  In  a  case  of  this  description,  if  the  defendant  means  that 
the  Court  should  at  once  be  called  upon  to  determine  the  true  construc- 
tion of  the  deed,  he  should  plead  thereto  by  setting  out  the  deed,  or  so 
much  thereof  as  is  material.1 

On  a  demurrer,  ambiguous  statements  are  construed  adversely  to  the 
pleader  -r  but  a  defendant  is  not  entitled  to  press  the  principle  so  far,  as 
to  draw  any  inference  of  facts  he  pleases  which  may  happen  to  be  not 
inconsistent  with  the  averments  of  the  bill.2  (a) 

But  although  a  demurrer  confesses  the  matters  stated  in  the  bill  to  be 
true,  such  confession  is  confined  to  those  matters  which  are  well  pleaded ; 
i.  e.,  matters  of  fact.3    It  does  not,  therefore,  admit  any  matters  of  law 


2  Thus  where  a  bill  mis-stated  a  deed,  by 
alleging  that  it  contained  a  proviso  which  it  did 
not  contain,  upon  the  argument  of  a  demurrer  to 
the  bill,  the  defendant's  counsel  was  not  allowed 
to  refer  to  the  deed  itself,  for  the  purpose  of 
showing  the  incorrectness  of  the  manner  in 
which  it  was  set  out:  although  the  bill  con- 
tained a  reference  "  for  greater  certainty  as  to 
its  contents,  &c,"  to  the  deed,  as  being  in  the 
custody  of  the  defendants.  Lord  Cottenham 
here  said,  that  to  hold  otherwise  would  be  to 
give  the  defendants  an  advantage,  depending 
upon  the  accident  of  their  having  the  custody 
of  the  document  which  the  bill  purported  to  set 
out,  and  would  in  effect  be  to  decide  the  ques- 
tion raised  by  the  demurrer,  upon  matter  which 
was  dehors  the  record.  Campbell  v.  Maekay, 
1  M.  &  C.  603,  613;  Cuddon  v.  Tite.  1  (Jiff.  395. 
And  see  where  a  date  was  left  blank,  Watson 
it.  Byrd,  53  Mo.  480.  See  also  Re  Stringer,  6 
Ch.  D.  1,  16.  In  this  case,  the  object  of  refer- 
ring to  the  deed  was  to  contradict  a  statement 
in  the  bill:  and  where  the  object  is  to  support, 
and  not  contradict,  the  plaintiff's  case,  it  ap- 
pears that  the  Court  will  stdl  refuse  to  look 


(a)  Upon  demurrer,  the  allegations  of  the 
hill  are  construed  most  strongly  against  the 
pleader.  Birmingham  W.  &  E.  Co.  v.  Elyton 
Land  Co.  93  Ala.  549;  Lewis  v.  Mohr  (Ala.), 
11  So.  765;  Lawrence  v.  Traner,  136  111.  474; 
see  Arzbacher  v.  Mayer,  53  Wis.  380;  Kent  v. 
Owensboro  Bank,  91  Ky.  70;  People  v.  Wong 
Wang,  92  Cal.  277.  As  the  bill  must  contain 
allegations   showing    Equity   jurisdiction,    the 

536 


into  the  document.  Harmer  v.  Gooding,  3  De 
G.  &  S.  407,  410,  411 ;  13  Jur.  400,  402;  see, 
however,  Weld  r.  Bonham,  2  S.  &  S.  91;  and 
as  to  Acts  of  Parliament,  see  Wilson  v.  Stan- 
hope, 2  Coll.  629;  10  Jur.  421;  Apperlev  r. 
Page,  1  Phil.  779,  785,  11  .Jur.  271;  Bailey  v. 
Birkenhead  Junction  Ry.  12  Beav.  433,  443; 
14  Jur.  119,  122. 

1  Wright  v.  Plumptree,  3  Mad.  481,  490. 

2  Simpson  v.  Fogo,  1  J.  &  H.  18;  1  H .  & 
M.  195. 

3  Ford  r.  Peering,  1  Ves.  Jr.  72,  78;  Com- 
mercial Bank  of  Manchester  v.  Buckner  20 
How.  (U.  S.)  108;  Mills  v.  Brown,  2  Scam. 
549;  Goble  v.  Andruss,  1  Green  Ch.  66;  Niles 
r.  Anderson,  5  How.  (Miss.)  365;  Baker  r. 
Booker,  6  Price,  381 ;  Redmond  v.  Dickerson, 
9  N.J.  Eq.  507;  Paterson's  H.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Jersej-  City,  id.  434 ;  Lea  v.  Robeson,  12  Gray, 
280.  An  averment  in  a  bill  that  the  purchase- 
money  of  real  estate  sold  by  executors  was  not 
paid  to,  or  received  by  them  "as  executors," 
and  that  they  "as  executors"  received  no  con- 
sideration for  the  conveyance,  is  not  equivalent 
to  an  averment   that  no  consideration  was  in 


bill  is  demurrable,  if  it  fails  to  show  on  its  face 
that  existing  legal  remedies  are  not  plain  and 
adequate.  Porter  v.  Frenchman's  Bay  &c.  Co. 
84  Maine,  195;  Naudain  v.  Ormes,  1  McArthur 
(D.  C.),  1.  A  bill  for  the  specific  performance 
of  a  contract  to  deliver  bonds  is  demurrable  if 
it  fails  to  show  the  inadequacy  of  money  dam- 
ages at  law.    Angus  v.  Robinson,  62  Vt.  60. 


GENERAL    NATURE   OF    DEMURRERS. 


*546 


which  are  suggested  in  the  bill,  or  inferred  from  the  facts  stated ; 4  for, 
strictly  speaking,  arguments,  or  inferences,  or  matters  of  law,  ought  not 
to  be  stated  in  pleading,5  although  there  is  sometimes  occasion  to  make 
mention  of  them  for  the  convenience  or  intelligibility  of  the  matter  of 
fact,  (b)  Thus,  if  the  bill  avers  a  legal  inference  which  the  facts  stated 
therein  do  not  authorize,  the  demurrer,  although  it  is  held  to  confess  the 
facts  stated,  will  not  be  considered  as  admitting  the  inference  of  law  al- 
leged to  have  arisen  from  them.  An  inference  of  this  nature  is  called  a 
Repugnancy;  and  it  is  a  rule  in  pleading  that  a  demurrer  will  not  admit 
matters,  either  of  law  or  of  fact,  which  are  repugnant  to  each 
other,  (c)    Thus,  *  where  a  record  is  pleaded,  it  has  been  held,  that    *  546 


fact   paid.     Barnes   r.  Trenton  Gas  Light  Co. 
27  N.  J.  Eq.  33,  referring  to  the  text. 

4  Lea  v.  Robeson,  12  Gray,  280;  Bryan  v. 
Spruill,  4  Jones  Eq.  27;  Dike  v.  Greene,  4 
R.  I.  285.  Averments  as  to  the  meaning  of 
a  contract  set  out  by  the  bill,  or  exhibited  with 
it,  are  not  admitted  by  demurrer.  Dillon  v. 
Barnard,  21  Wall.  430;  Bonnell  v.  Griswold, 
68  N.  Y.  294.     So  averments  which  admit  of 


being  construed  as  conclusions  of  law  only, 
and  allegations  of  parol  agreements  incom- 
patible with,  and  incompetent  to  vary  written 
instruments  set  up,  do  not  stand  admitted.  Dil- 
lon v.  Barnard,  Holmes,  386. 

5  Merrill  v.  Plaintield,  45  N.  H.  126;  Murch 
v.  Concord  Railroad,  29  N.  H.  33;  Wootten  v. 
Burch,  2  Md.  Ch.  190. 


(6)  A  demurrer  does  not  admit  general 
allegations,  or  statements  or  conclusions  of  law, 
but  averments  complained  of  as  conclusions  of 
law  may  from  the  context  be  sufficient  as  state- 
ments of  fact.  Chicot  County  v.  Sherwood, 
148  U.  S.  529;  Kent  v.  Lake'  Superior  Ship 
Canal  Co.  144  U.  S.  75;  Pullman  Palace  Car 
Co.  v.  Missouri  P.  Ry.  Co.  11  Fed.  Rep.  634; 
Taylor  v.  Holmes,  14  id.  498  ;  Pettit  v.  Hope, 
2  id.  623;  Cornell  v.  Green,  43  id.  105:  Latail- 
lade  v.  Orena,  91  Cal.  565;  Ohm  v.  San  Fran- 
cisco, 92  Cal.  437;  Tompson  v.  Bank  of 
Redemption,  106  Mass.  128;  Pearson  v.  Tower, 
55  N.  H  36;  Partee  v.  Kortrecht,  54  Miss.  66; 
Stow  v.  Russell,  36  111.  18;  Funk  v.  Rentchler 
(Ind.),  33  N.  E.  Rep.  364;  Curtiss  v.  Living- 
ston, 36  Minn.  380;  Dickerson  v.  Winslow 
(Ala.),  11  So.  Rep.  918;  Wood  v.  King  Manuf. 
Co.  (Ark.)  21  S.  W.  Rep.  471;  Dillon  v.  Bar- 
nard, 21  Wall.  430;  Holmes,  386. 

A  demurrer  does  not  admit  general  allega- 
tions of  fraud,  but  only  the  facts  set  forth  and 
all  reasonable  inferences  therefrom.  Ante, 
p.  324,  note  (a);  United  States  v.  Des  Moines 
Nav.  Ry.Co.  142  U.S.  510.  Nor  does  it  admit  the 
construction  of  a  statute  or  written  instrument 
as  stated  in  the  bill,  or  that  a  parol  understand- 
ing, there  alleged  as  varying  a  written  instru- 
ment, is  competent  and  admissible  in  evidence. 
Pennie  v.  Reis,  132  U.  S.  464;  Dillon  v.  Bar- 
nard, 21  Wall.  430;  S.  C.  1  Holmes,  386;  Inter- 
state Land  Co.  v.  Maxwell  Land  Grant  Co. 
139  U.  S.  569;  Lea  v.  Robeson,  12  Gray,  280: 
National  Park  Bank  v.  Halle,  30  111.  App.  17. 
Matters  of  variance,  as  that  a  written  instru- 
ment is  not  correctly  set  out  in  the  bill,  cannot 


be  availed  of  on  demurrer.  Bromberg  v.  Heyer, 
69  Ala.  22.  So  matters,  like  statutes,  which 
are  judicially  noticed,  will  be  held,  upon  a 
demurrer,  to  prevail  over  facts  or  conclusions 
set  forth  in  the  bill.  Griffith  v.  Augusta  & 
K.  R.  Co.  72  Ga.  423.  Fraud  charged  in  a  bill, 
if  the  facts  are  not  set  forth,  is  a  conclusion  of 
law,  and  is  not  admitted  by  a  demurrer.  Fogg 
v.  Blair,  139  U.  S.  118;  Preston  v.  Smith,  26 
Fed.  Rep.  884;  Flewellen  v.  Crane,  58  Ala. 
627.  Allegations  in  the  bill  upon  information 
and  belief  are  held  to  be  admitted  by  a  demur- 
rer as  to  the  information  and  the  belief,  hut  not 
as  to  the  truth  of  the  information.  Walton  i>. 
Westwood,  73  111.  125;  see  Hyre  v.  Lambert, 
37  W.  Va.  26;  Messer  v.  Storer,  79  Maine,  512. 
As  a  demurrer  admits  only  facts  well  pleaded, 
it  does  not  ndmit  those  not  required  to  be 
alleged.  Sullivan  v.  Iron  S.  M.  Co.  109  IT.  S. 
550;  Cerveny  v.  Chicago  Daily  News  Co.  139 
111.  345;  People  r.  Cooper,  id.  461. 

(c)  If  the  objection  of  repugnancy  is  not 
raised  by  demurrer,  the  plaintiff  may  have 
appropriate  relief  under  either  aspect  of  the 
case.  American  Freehold  L.  M.  Co.  v.  Sewell 
92  Ala.  163,  173;  see  Caldwell  i".  Kins:,  76  Ala. 
149.  As  to  demurrers  for  repugnancy  or  incon- 
sistency, see  Friedman  v.  Fennell,  94  Ala.  570; 
Wingo  v.  Hardy,  id.  184;  Bynum  t\  F.wart, 
90  Tenn.  655;  Mayre  v.  Root,  27  Fla.  453; 
Lnngell  v.  Langell,  17  Oregon,  220.  Specific 
allegations,  in  order  to  control  the  general 
allegations  of  the  same  pleading,  must  be 
clearly  repugnant  thereto,  and  show  them  to  be 
untrue.    Warbritton  v.  Demorett,  129  Ind  346 

537 


*546 


DEMURRERS. 


a  demurrer  is  never  a  confession  of  a  thing  stated  in  the  bill,  repug- 
nant to  the  record.1 

There  are  some  facts  of  which  the  Court  is  said  to  take  judicial  notice  ; 
and  when  facts  are  averred  in  a  bill  which  are  contrary  to  any  fact 
of  which  the  Court  takes  judicial  notice,  the  Court  will  not  pay  any 
attention  to  the  averment.  The  Court  takes  judicial  notice  of  the  recog- 
nition of  foreign  States,2  and  will  also  take  judicial  or  official  notice  of  a 
war  in  which  this  country  is  engaged ;  but  not  of  a  war  between  foreign 
countries.3  The  Court  is  also  bound  to  notice  the  time  of  the  Queen's 
accession,  her  proclamations,  and  privileges  ;  the  time  and  place  of  holding 
Parliaments,  the  time  of  sessions  and  prorogation,  and  the  usual  course 
of  proceedings  ;  the  Ecclesiastical,  Civil,  and  Maritime  Laws ;  the  custo- 
mary course  of  descent,  in  Gavelkind  and  Borough  English  tenures ; 4 
the  course  of  the  Almanac  ; 6  the  division  of  England  into  counties, 
provinces,  and  dioceses  ; 6  (a)  the  meaning  of  English  words 7  and  terms  of 
art,  even  when  only  local  in  their  use ;  legal  weights  and  measures,  and 

i  Arundel  r.  Arundel,  Cro.  Jac.  12;  Com. 
Dig.  Pleader,  Q.  6 ;  Green  v.  Dodge,  6  Hare, 
80 ;  Mortimer  v.  Fraser,  30  Jan.  1837,  reported 
upon  another  point,  2  M.  &  C.  173.  So,  where 
a  bill  was  tiled  for  a  discovery,  and  for  an 
account  and  delivery  up  of  the  possession  of 
land,  on  the  ground  that  the  plaintiff  could  not 
describe  the  land  so  as  to  proceed  at  law,  by 
reason  of  the  defendants  having  got  possession 
of  the  title-deeds  and  mixed  the  boundaries, 
Lord  Rosslyn  allowed  a  demurrer,  because  the 
bill  was  a  mere  ejectment  bill ;  but  he  intimated 
that,  even  if  the  bill  had  been  for  a  discovery 
onlv,  it  could  not  have  been  sustained:  because 
the  averment,  that  the  plaintiff  could  not 
ascertain  the  lands,  was  contrary  to  the  facts 
disclosed  in  the  bill,  in  which  the  lands  were 
sufficiently  described.  Loker  v.  Rolle,  3  Ves. 
4,  7.  A  demurrer  does  not  admit  the  rhetoric. 
Day  v  Brownrigg,  10  Ch.  D.  294,  303. 


2  Taylor  v.  Barclay,  2  Sim.  213,  220,  ante, 
pp.  18.  19. 

3  Dolder  v.  Lord  Huntingfield,  11  Ves.  292, 
ante,  p.  54. 

4  Crosby  v.  Hetherington,  4  Man.  &  Gr. 
946. 

5  Mayor  of  Guildford  v.  Clark,  2  Vent. 
247. 

6  Courts  ex  officio  take  notice  of  the  civil 
divisions  of  the  State  created  by  public  laws, 
as  counties  and  towns,  and  of  its  great  geo- 
graphical features,  as  its  large  lakes,  rivers,  and 
mountains.  The  Winnipiseogee  Lake  Co.  v. 
Young,  40  X.  H.  420.  But  not  the  local  situa- 
tion, and  the  distance  of  different  places  in  a 
county  from  each  other.  Deybel's  case,  4  B. 
&  Aid.  243.  See  Cooke,  App.  1,  bottom  page 
385. 

7  Commonwealth  v.  Kneeland,  20  Pick. 
239. 


(a)  See  Bidder  v.  Bridges  (No.  2),  54  L.  T. 
529;  1  Greenl.  Evid.  (15th  ed.)  §§  4-6,479, 
and  notes:  12  Am.  &  Eng.  Encl.  of  Law,  156. 
Judicial  notice  is  also  taken  of  the  geographical 
positions  of,  and  general  names  applied  to,  such 
a  district  as  St.  Lawrence  shown  on  the  Admir- 
alty chart.  Birrell  v.  Dryer.  8  App.  Cas.  345. 
In  this  country  judicial  notice  is  taken,  for 
example,  of  the  boundaries  between  States; 
Thorson  v.  Peterson,  9  Fed.  Rep.  517;  Lathrop 
v.  Stewart,  5  McLean,  167;  and  that  a  city  or 
town  is  within  a  particular  Stite  and  county. 
People  v.  Wood,  131  N.  Y.  617;  Com'th  v. 
Desmond.  103  Mass.  445;  Smitha  v.  Flournoy, 
47  Ala.  345;  Cummings  v.  Stone,  13  Mich.  70. 
Such  notice  is  also  taken  of  well-known  facts 
of  nature,  such  as  the  ebb  and  flow  of  the  tide 
in  the  rivers  Thames  and  Mersey;  Whitney 
v.  Sauche,  11  La.  Ann.  432;  of  the  course  and 
navigability  of  prominent  rivers;  Hays  v. 
State,  8  Ind.  425;  Neaderhouser  i>.  State,  28 
538 


Ind.  257;  of  the  succession  of  the  seasons; 
Ross  r.  Boswell,  60  Ind.  235;  Tomlinson  v. 
Greenfield,  31  Ark.  557;  of  the  hours  of  sunrise 
and  sunset;  People  v.  Chee  Kee,  61  Cal.  404; 
59  Am.  Dec.  185;  Lake  Erie  &  W.  R.  Co.  v. 
Hatch,  6  Ohio  Cir.  Ct  230;  and  of  the  week- 
day on  which  a  specified  day  of  the  month 
falls.  First  Nat'!.  Bank  i:  Kingsley,  84  Maine, 
111;  Brennan  v.  Vogt  (Ala.1,  11  So".  893.  Judi- 
cial notice  is  not  taken  of  what  is  continued  in 
the  records  of  previous  suits,  but  the  material 
facts  must  be  recited  in  the  bill  to  be  available. 
Ramsey  v.  Temple.  3  Lea  (Tenn.),  252;  Ralphs 
v.  Hensler,  97  Cal.  296.  The  Federal  Courts 
take  judicial  no'ice  of  State  Statutes  and 
decisions.  Lamar  v.  Micou.  114  U.  S.  218; 
Fourth  Nat.  Bank  r.  Franklyn,  120  U.  S  747; 
Chicago  &  A.  R.  Ferry  Co.  v.  Wiggins  Ferry 
Co  119  U.  S.  615.  Foreign  Laws  must  be 
proved.  Liverpool  &  G.  W.  Steam  Co.  v. 
Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  129  U.  S.  397,  464. 


DIFFERENT   GROUNDS    OF    DEMURRER. 


547 


the  ordinary  measurement  of  time  ;  the  existence  and  course  of  pro- 
ceeding of  the  Superior  Courts  at  Westminster,  and  the  other  Courts  of 
General  Jurisdiction  : 8  such  as  the  Courts  of  the  counties  palatine,  &c. ; 
and  the  privileges  of  its  own  officers.9  Whenever  a  bill  avers  any  fact 
in  opposition  to  what  the  Court  is  so  officially  bound  to  notice,  such 
averment  will,  upon  the  principle  before  laid  down,  in  arguing  a  de- 
murrer to  the  bill,  be  considered  as  a  nullity.10 


Section  II.  —  The  Different  Grounds  of  Demurrer. 


*547 


A  demurrer  may  be  either  to  the  relief  prayed,  or,  if  discovery  is 
sought,  to  the  discovery  only,  or  to  both.  If  the  demurrer  is  good  to  the 
relief,  it  will  be  so  to  the  discovery  ; a  if,  therefore,  a  plaintiff  is  entitled 
to  the  discovery  alone,  and  goes  on  to  pray  relief,  a  general  demurrer  to 
the  whole  bill  will  be  good ; 2  (a)  and,  for  the  purposes  of  a  demurrer, 


8  Newell  v.  Newton,  10  Pick.  470;  Hawkes 
v.  Kennebeck,  7  Mass.  461;  Ripley  v.  Warren, 

2  Pick.  592;  Despau  v.  Swindler,  3  Martin 
(N.  S.),  705;  Jones  v.  Gale,  4  Martin,  635; 
Woods  v.  Fitz,  10  Martin,  196. 

9  Taylor  on  Evid.  Pt.  I.  II.;  Stephen  on  PI. 
269;  and  see  1  Chitty  on  PI.  236,  et  seq.,  where 
further  information  on  the  subject  is  to  be 
found :  see  also  1  Greenl.  Evid.  §§  4,  6;  Story, 
Eq    PI.  §  24. 

10  Courts  will  not,  ex  officio,  take  notice  of 
foreign  laws,  and  consequently  they  must,  when 
material,  be  stated  in  pleading.  Campion  v. 
Kille,  14  N.  J.  Eq.  229.  As  to  matters  of  com- 
mon knowledge,  see  Reg.  v.  Aspinall,  2 
Q.  B.  D.  48,  61. 

i  Ld.  Red.  183;  Loker  ».  Rollo,  3  Ves.  4,  7; 
Ryves  v.  Ryves,  id.  343,  347;  Muckleston  v. 
Brown,  6  Ves.  63;  Barker  v.  Dacie,  id.  686; 
Hodgkin  v.  Longden,  8  Ves.  3;  Williams  v. 
Steward,  3  Mer.  502;  Gordon  V.  Siinpkinson, 
11  Ves.  509;  Speer  v.  Crawter,  17  Ves.  216; 
Evan  t\  Corporation  of  Avon,  29  Beav.  144. 

2  Fry  v.  Penn,  2  Bro.  C.  C.  280;  Price  v. 
James,  2  Bro.  C.  C.  319;  Collis  v.  Swayne, 
4  Bro.  C.  C.  480;  Albretcht  v.  Sussman,  2 
V.  &  B.  328;  McMish  v.  Richardson,  12  Price, 
530:  Whyman  v.  Legh,  6  Price,  88;  see  Miller 
«•  Ford,  1  Saxton  (N.  J.),  360;  Coombs  v. 
Warren,   17   Maine,    404;    Sauza   v.    Belcher, 

3  Edw.  Ch.  117.      It  is  said    by  Mr.  Justice 


(a)  The  general  rule  is  that  a  bill  brought  for 
both  discovery  and  relief  cannot  be  maintained 
for  discovery  alone.  Preston  v.  Smith,  26  Fed. 
Rep.  884;  Buerk  v.  Imhaeuser,  8  id.  457;  Mc- 
Clanahan  v.  Davis,  8  How.  170;  Emery  v.  Bid- 
well,  140  Mass.  271.  And  if  such  a  bill,  when 
brought  substantially  for  relief,  fails  for  dis- 
covery, it  is  not  sufficient  for  relief.  Venner  v. 
Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  28  Fed.  Rep.  581; 
see  Virginia  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Hale,  93  Ala.  542. 
A  bill  for  discovery  is  usually  held  to  be  de- 
murrable, if  it  waives  an  answer  under  oath. 


Story,  in  note  to  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  412,  remark- 
ing on  the  rule  in  the  text,  that '•  the  rule 
formerly  adopted  in  England  was  different. 
It  was,  that  if  a  bill  was  for  discovery  and 
relief,  and  it  was  good  for  discovery  only,  a 
general  demurrer  to  the  whole  bill  was  bad; 
for  though  the  party  was  not  entitled  to  relief, 
he  was  not  to  be  prejudiced  for  having 
asked  too  much."  To  this  he  cites,  Brandon  v. 
Sands,  2  Ves.  Jr.  514;  Salter  v.  Scarborough, 
9  Ves.  75;  Att.-Gen.V  Brown.  1  Swanst.  294; 
Mitford,  Eq.  PI.  by  Jeremy,  183,  184.  "In  New 
York,"  the  same  learned  author  adds,  "the  old 
English  rule  is  adhered  to;  and  indeed  it  has 
much  to  commend  it."  See  Laight  r.  Morgan, 
1  John.  Cas.  429  ;  S.  C.  2  Caines's  Cas.  344  ; 
Le  Roy  v.  Veeder,  1  John.  Cas.  423;  Le  Roy 
v.  SerVis,  1  Caines's  Cas.  1;  S.  C.  2  id.  175; 
Kimberly  v.  Sells,  4  John.  Ch.  467  ;  Livingston 
v.  Livingston,  id.  496;  Higginbotham  ?•. 
Burnet,  5  id.  184.  The  proper  course  is  held,  in 
New  York,  to  be,  to  demur  to  the  relief  and  to 
answer  to  the  discovery.  Higginbotham  v. 
Burnet,  5  John.  Ch.  184.  The  same  doctrine 
was  affirmed  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
LTnited  States  in  Livingston  v.  Story,  9  Peters, 
632,  658,  where  Mr.  Justice  Thompson  said, 
"  And  if  any  part  of  the  bill  is  good,  and 
entitles  the  plaintiff  either  to  relief  or  to  dis- 
covery, a  demurrer  to  the  whole  bill  cannot  be 
sustained.     It  is  an  established  and  universal 


Ward  v.  Peck,  114  Mass.  121;  Badger  r.  Mc- 
Namara,  123  Mass.  117;  Harrington  v.  Har- 
rington, 15  R.  I.  341;  McCulIa  v.  Beadleston, 
17  R.  I.  20,26;  Huntington  v.  Saunders,  120 
U.  S.  78;  Manchester  Fire  Ass.  Co.  v.  Stock- 
ton C.  H.  &  A.  Works,  38  Fed.  Rep.  378.  In 
certain  States,  as,  for  instance,  in  Tennessee, 
the  bill  may  not  be  defective  in  such  case. 
See  Payne  v.  Berry,  3  Tenn.  Ch.  154.  In  Georgia, 
discovery  may  be  waived  by  amendment  at 
any  time  before  answer  filed.  Merchants'  Nat. 
Bank  v.  Trustees,  65  Ga.  603. 

539 


548 


DEMURRERS. 


a  prayer  for  general  relief  renders  the  bill  a  bill  for  relief.8  A 
*  548    prayer  will  not,  however,  convert  a  *  bill  into  one  for  relief,  if  it 

merely  prays  for  the  equitable  assistance  of  the  Court,  consequen- 
tial upon  the  prayer  for  discovery: *  such  as,  a  writ  of  injunction,  or  a 
commission  to  examine  witnesses  abroad,2  or  that  the  testimony  of  wit- 
nesses may  be  perpetuated,3  or  that  defendant  may  set  forth  a  list  of  deeds.4 
Notwithstanding  the  general  rule,  that  if  the  relief  prayed  is  unne- 
cessary or  improper,  the  defendant  may  cover  himself  by  a  general 
demurrer,  yet  this  will  not  preclude   the  defendant,  in  cases  where,  if 

rule  of  pleading  in  Chancery,  that  a  defendant      the  relief  prayed  for  by  the  bill  is  proper,  the 


may  meet  the  plaintiff's  bill  by  several  modes 
of  defence.  He  may  demur,  answer,  and  plead 
to  different  parts  of  the  bill;  so  that  if  a  bill 
for  discovery  and  relief  contains  proper  matter 
for  the  one  and  not  for  the  other,  the  defendant 
should  answer  the  proper,  and  demur  to  the 
improper,  matter.  But  if  he  demurs  to  the 
whole  bill,  the  demurrer  must  be  overruled;" 
see  post,  p.  584.  So  in  Wright  v.  Dame,  1  Met. 
241,  Mr.  Justice  Putnam,  delivering  the  opinion 
of  the  Court,  said,  "We  adopt  the  old  rule 
of  pleading  in  Equity,  that  on  a  general 
demurrer  to  the  whole  bill,  if  there  is  an}'  part, 
either  as  to  the  relief  or  discovery,  to  which 
the  defendant  ought  to  put  in  an  answer,  the 
demurrer,  being  entire,  ought  to  be  overruled." 
And  he  cites,  1  Harrison  Ch.  Pr.  (7th  ed.)  414; 
see  Higginbntham  v.  Burnet,  5  John.  Ch.  186; 
Conant  r.  Warren,  6  Gray,  562;  Brockway  v. 
Copp,  3  Paige,  539;  Sikes  v.  Truitt,  4  Jones 
Eq.  (N.  C)  361;  Atwill  v.  Ferrett,  2  Blatch. 
39;  Metier  v.  Metier,  18  N.  J.  Eq.  270; 
Metier  v.  Metier,  19  id.  457;  Banta  v.  Moore, 
15  id.  97;  Miller  v.  Ford,  Saxton  (N.  J.),  365  ; 
Holmes  v.  Holmes,  36  Vt.  525,  537.  "The 
defendant  should  answer  as  to  the  discovery, 
and  demur  as  to  the  relief."  Laight  v.  Morgan, 
1  John.  Cas.  434.  But  where  a  bill  seeks 
general  and  special  relief,  and  also  discovery, 
and  relief  is  the  principal  object,  and  discovery 
is  sought  merely  as  incidental  to  the  relief,  if 
the  plaintiff  shows  no  title  to  the  relief  sought, 
a  demurrer  lies  to  the  whole  bill.  Poole  v. 
Lloyd,  5  Met.  525  ;  see  Mitchell  v.  Green,  10 
Met.  101;  Walker  v.  Locke,  5  Cush.  90,  93; 
but  see  Holmes  v.  Holmes,  36  Vt.  525,  537.  A 
defendant  cannot  plead  or  answer,  and  demur 
both  to  the  whole  bill  or  to  the  same  part  of  a 
bill.  Clark  r.  Phelps,  6  John.  Ch.  214;  Beau- 
champ  v.  Gibbs,  1  Bibb,  481:  Robertson  v. 
Bingly,  1  M'CordCh.  352;  see  post,  p.  589,  note. 

8  Angell  v.  Westcombe,  6  Sim.  30 ;  Ambury 
r.  Jones,  Younge,  199 ;  James  v.  Herriott,  6 
Sim.  428;  Rose  v.  Gannell,  3  Atk.  439;  Baker 
v.  Bramah,  7  Sim.  17;  Southeastern  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Submarine  Telegraph  Co.  18  Beav.  429;  17 
Jur.  1044;  Allan  v.  Copeland,  8  Price,  522;  and 
see  post,  Chap.  XXXIV.  §  2,  Bills  of  Discovery. 

1  A  mere  bill  of  discovery  cannot  properly 
pray  for  relief.     Where  upon  the  facts  stated, 

540 


bill  is  something  more  than  a  mere  bill  of 
discovery.  Where  the  bill  is  for  discovery 
merely,  as  distinguished  from  a  bill  of  dis- 
covery and  relief,  an  injunction  to  stay  pro- 
ceedings in  a  suit  at  Law  for  which  the  discovery 
is  sought,  must,  according  to  the  practice  in 
New  Jersey,  be  dissolved,  the  Court  of  Chancery 
in  that  State  neVer  having  adopted  the  prin- 
ciple, that  because  its  jurisdiction  has  once 
rightfully  attached,  it  will  retain  the  cause,  as 
a  matter  of  right,  for  the  purposes  of  complete 
relief.  Little  v.  Cooper,  10  N.  J.  Eq.  273; 
Brown  v.  Edsall,  9  id.  256;  see  Pool  v.  Lloyd, 
5  Met.  525. 

And  in  a  bill  for  relief  and  discovery,  where 
the  subject-matter  of  the  relief  prayed  is  not 
one  which  appropriately  belongs  to  Equity 
jurisdiction,  the  prayer  for  discovery  in  aid  of 
that  suit  will  not  give  jurisdiction  to  a  Court 
of  Equity.  United  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hoppock,  28 
N.J.  Eq".  261. 

But  in  Holmes  v.  Holmes,  36  Vt.  525,  537, 
Poland  C.  J.  said,  "  The  rule,  as  we  understand 
it,  is,  that  when  a  bill  is  brought  seeking  both 
discovery  and  relief,  and  material  discovery  is 
elicited,  the  Court  will  proceed  to  grant  the 
proper  relief,  and  will  not  turn  the  plaintiff 
around  to  seek  relief  at  Law,  even  if  the  relief 
were  such  as  a  Court  of  Law  might  grant.  It 
may  not  be  universally  true  that  obtaining 
discovery  will  give  a  Court  of  Equity  jurisdic- 
tion to  grant  relief,  but  this  is  the  general  rule." 
And  it  has  often  been  held,  that  where  a  party 
has  a  just  title  to  come  into  Equity  for  a  dis- 
covery, and  obtains  it,  the  Court  will  go  on  and 
give  him  the  proper  relief;  and  not  turn  him 
round  to  the  expenses  and  inconveniences  of  a 
doubtful  suit  at  Law.  See  to  same  effect,  John- 
son v.  Cooper,  2  Yerg.  524;  Almony  v.  Hicks, 
3  Head,  39.  See  also  1  Story,  Eq.  Jur.  §  64 
k,  et  seq. ;  see  Lancy  r.  Kandlett,  80  Maine, 
169. 

2  Brandon  v.  Sands,  2  Ves.  Jr.  514;  Noble 
v.  Garland,  19  Ves.  376;  Lousada  v.  Templer, 
2  Russ.  561;  King  v.  Allen,  4  Mad.  247;  see 
also  Duke  of  Dorset  v.  Girdler,  Prec.  in  Ch.  532. 

8  Hall  v.  Hoddesdon,  2  P.  WTms.  162; 
Vaughan  v.  Fitzgerald,  1  Sch.  &  Lef.  316; 
Rose  v.  Gannell,  3  Atk.  439. 

*  Crow  v.  Tyrell,  2  Mad.  397,  408. 


DIFFERENT   GROUNDS   OF   DEMURRER.  *  549 

the  bill  had  been  for  a  discovery  only,  there  would  have  been  a  right  to 
such  discovery,  from  demurring  to  the  relief  only,  and  answering  as  to 
the  discovery,  or,  in  other  words,  giving  the  discovery  required.5 

The  converse  of  this  proposition,  however,  will  not  equally  hold :  for 
it  has  been  determined,  that  where  a  bill  prays  relief  as  well  as  discov- 
ery, the  defendant  cannot  demur  to  the  discovery  and  answer  to  the 
relief:  for  then  he  does  not  demur  to  the  thing  required,  but  to  the 
means  by  which  it  is  to  be  obtained.6 

There  are,  however,  some  exceptions  to  the  last-mentioned  rule  :  as 
where  the  discovery  sought  would  subject  the  defendant  to  punishment, 
or  to  a  penalty,  or  forfeiture  ;  or  is  immaterial  to  the  relief  prayed ;  or 
is  of  matters  which  have  been  communicated  under  the  seal  of 
professional  confidence  ;  or  which  relate  entirely  *  to  the  defend-  *  549 
ant's  title,  and  not  to  that  of  the  plaintiff.  In  cases  of  this  nature, 
the  Court  will  allow  a  defendant  to  protect  himself  by  demurrer  from  the 
particular  discovery  sought ;  though  it  will  not  protect  him  from  the 
relief  prayed,  if  the  plaintiff's  title  to  it  can  be  established  by  other  means 
than  the  discovery  of  the  defendant  himself.  Thus,  in  a  bill  to  inquire 
into  the  reality  of  deeds,  on  a  suggestion  of  forgery,  the  Court  has  enter- 
tained jurisdiction  of  the  cause,  though  it  does  not  oblige  the  party  to  a 
discovery,  and  has  directed  an  issue  to  try  whether  the  deeds  were  forged 
or  not.1 

It  is  proposed  now  to  consider :  first,  the  grounds  of  demurrer  to  the 
relief;  and  then  those  of  demurrer  to  the  discovery  only. 

Demurrers  to  the  relief  may  be  either :  To  the  jurisdiction ;  the  per- 
son ;  or  the  matter  of  the  bill,  either  in  its  substance  or  form. 

Demurrers  to  the  jurisdiction  are  either  on  the  ground :  I.  That  the 
case  made  by  the  bill  does  not  come  within  the  description  of  cases  in 
which  a  Court  of  Equity  assumes  the  power  of  decision ;  or,  II.  That 
the  subject-matter  is  within  the  jurisdiction  of  some  other  Court.2 

I.  It  would  be  a  task  far  exceeding  the  limits  of  this  work,  and  not 
strictly  within  its  object,  to  attempt  to  point  out  the  cases  in  which  a 
demurrer  will  hold  to  a  bill,  on  the  ground  that  the  case  made  by  it  does 
not  come  within  the  ordinary  cases  for  relief  in  a  Court  of  Equity.  It  is 
sufficient  to  direct  the  reader's  attention  to  Lord  Redesdale's  Treatise 
upon  Equity  Pleading;  8  and  to  observe,  that  if  the  case  made  by  the  bill 

«  Hodgkin  v.  Longden,  8  Ves.  2;  Todd  v.  Supreme  Court.     Equity  Rule  38;  Storv  En. 

Gee,  17  Ves.  273;  see  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  312  and  PI.  §  443. 

cases  in  note;    Brownell  v.  Curtis,  10  Paige,  i  Per  Lord   Hardwicke    in  Brownsword  v. 

2U-  Edwards,  2  Ves.  Sr.  246;   Att.-Gen.  v.  Sudell, 

6  Morgan  v.  Harris,  2  Rro.  C.  C.  121,  124;  Prec.  in  Ch.  214. 
Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  312,  in  note,  §§  441,  546 ;  2  a  demurrer  for  want  of  equitv  includes  a 
Brownell  v.  Curtis,  10  Paige,  214;  ante,  p.  547,  demurrer  for  want  of  jurisdiction.  "  Thompson 
note.  It  has  been  suggested  that  this  rule  v.  University  of  London,  33  L.J.  Ch.  625;  10 
may  possibly,  in  some  cases,  be  affected  by  .Tur.  N.  S.  669,  V.  C.  K.;  see  also  Barber  v. 
Cons.  Ord.  XIV.  8;  that  "  no  demurrer  or  plea  Barber.  4  Drew.  666;  5  Jur.  N.  S.  1197;  Cook- 
shall  be  held  bad,  and  overruled  upon  argu-  ney  v.  Anderson.  31  Beav.  452;  1  De  G.  J.  &  S. 
ment,  only  because  such  demurrer  or  plea  does  365;  8  Jur.  N.  S.  1220;  9  id.  736.  As  to  the 
not  cover  so  much  of  the  bill  as  it  might  by  form  of  demurrer  for  want  of  jurisdiction,  see 
Law  have  extended  to."  But  see  Dell  v.  Hale,  Barber  v.  Barber,  ubi  supra. 
2  Y.  &  C.  C.  C.  1;  6  Jur.  986;  and  post,  p.  3  And  see  Fonb.  on  Eq.;  Coop.  Eq.  PL; 
584.     This  rule  has  been  adopted   by  the  U.  S.  Story,  Eq.  Jur. ;  Story,  Eq.  PI. 

541 


*550 


DEMURRERS. 


appears  to  be  one  on  which  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  does  not  arise, 
a  demurrer  will  hold.4  A  demurrer  will  hold  equally,  where  the  defect 
arises  from  the  omission  of  matter  which  ought  to  be  contained  in  the 
bill,  or  of  some  circumstance  which  ought  to  be  attendant  thereon 
*  550  for  the  *  purpose  of  bringing  the  case  properly  within  the  juris- 
diction ;  as  where  it  appears  that  the  case  is  such  as  under  no 
circumstance  can  be  brought  within  the  ordinary  scope  of  a  Court  of 
Equity.1  Thus,  where  it  appears  on  the  face  of  the  bill  that  the  defend- 
ants were,  at  the  time  of  the  institution  of  the  suit,  resident  in  a  foreign 
country,  and  that  the  suit  does  not  relate  to  any  of  the  subjects  in  respect 
of  which  the  Court  is  warranted  in  exercising  jurisdiction  against  per- 
sons so  resident,  a  demurrer  for  want  of  equity  will  be  allowed.2 

II.  A  demurrer,  because  the  subject-matter  of  the  suit  is  within  the 
cognizance  of  some  other  Court,  may  be  on  the  ground  that  it  is  within 
the  jurisdiction  either :  1.  Of  a  Court  of  Common  Law ;  2.  Of  the  Courts 
of  Probate  or  Divorce  ;  3.  Of  the  Court  of  Admiralty  or  Commissioners 
of  Prize  ;  4.  Of  the  Court  of  Bankruptcy  ;  5.  Of  some  statutory  jurisdic- 
tion ;  or,  6.  Of  some  other  Court  of  Equity. 

1.  If  it  appears  by  the  bill  that  the  plaintiff  can  have  as  effectual 
and  complete  a  remedy  in  a  Court  of  Law  as  in  a  Court  of  Equity, 
and  that  such  remedy  is  clear  and  certain,  the  defendant  may  demur.3 

4  Stephenson  r.  Davis,  56  Maine,  73,  74.  75;  1  Ld.Red.  103;  see  Columbine  v. Chichester,  2 

Story,  Eq.  PI.  §§  466,  467;Mitford,  Eq.  PI.  by      Phil.  27;  1  C.  P. Coop.  temp.  Cott.  295.  For  forms 

of  demurrer  for  want  of  equity,  seepost,  Vol.  III. 

2  Cookney  v.  Anderson,  ubi  supra ;  and  see 
Foley  v.  Maillardet,  1  De  G.  J.  &  S.  389 :  Samuel 
v.  Rogers,  id.  396;  Fisher  v.  Charter  Oak  Life 
Ins.  Co.  67  How.  Pr.  191;  Harwell  v.  Lehman, 
72  Ala.  344;  and  ante,  pp.  449-451. 

3  Kemp  v.  Tucker,  L.  R.  8  Ch.  369;  Ld.  Red. 
123;  Coop.  Eq.  PI.  124;  Lynch  v.  Willard,  6 
John.  Ch.  342:  May  v.  Goodwin,  27  Ga.  352; 
Reed  v.  Bank  of  Newbury,  1  Paige,  215;  Bos- 
ley  v.  M'Kim,  7  Har.&  J*  160;  Reed  v.  Clarke, 
4  Monroe,  19;  N.  London  Bank  v.  Lee,  11 
Conn.  112;  Coombs  r.  Warren,  17  Maine,  404; 
Caldwell  v.  Knott,  10  Yerger,  209;  Hoare  v. 
Contencin,  1  Bro.  C.  C.  27,  29,  n.  (a);  Ham- 
mond v.  Messenger,  9  Sim.  327 ;  Bottorf  v.  Con- 
ner, 1  Blackf.  287;  Pierpont  v.  Fowle,  2  Wood. 
&  M.  23;  Smith  v.  Morehead,  6  Jones  Eq.  (N. 
C.)  360.  In  First  Cong.  Society  in  Raynham 
v.  Trustees  of  the  Fund,  &c,  in  Raynham,  23 
Pick.  148,  it  was  held,  that,  if  a  defendant  in  a 
suit  in  Equity  answers  and  submits  to  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  Court,  it  is  too  late  for  him 
to  object,  that  the  plaintiff  has  a  plain  and 
adequate  remedy  at  Law.  This  objection  should 
be  taken  at  the  earliest  opportunity  ;  and 
will  come  too  late  at  the  hearing.  Cutting  v. 
Dana,  25  N.  J.  Eq.  265;  Marsh  v.  Haywood,  6 
Humph.  210  ;  Lishey  v  Smith,  7  Humph. 
299.  Infra,  p.  555,  n.  2.  The  above  rule  must  be 
taken  with  the  qualification  that  it  is  competent 
for  the  Court  to  grant  the  relief  sought,  and 
that  it  has  jurisdiction  of  the  subject-matter: 


Jeremy,  110,  et  seq. ;  Blount  v.  Garen.  2  Hayw. 
88;  Livingston  v.  Livingston.  4  John.  Ch.  287. 
Where  a  bill  in  Equity  sets  forth  various 
claims,  and  the  defendant  files  a  general  de- 
murrer, the  demurrer  will  be  overruled  if  any 
of  the  claims  be  proper  for  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  Court  of  Equity.  Castleman  v.  Veitch,  3 
Rand.  598  ;  Kimberfy  v.  Sells,  3  John.  Ch.  467; 
Graves  v.  Downey,  3  Monroe,  356;  Blount  v. 
Garen,  3  Hayw.  88;  Morton  v.  Grenada  Acad- 
emies, 8  Sm.  &  M.  773.  A  demurrer  to  the 
whole  of  a  bill  containing  some  matters  reliev- 
able  and  others  not,  is  bad,  unless  the  bill  is 
multifarious.  Dimmock  v.  Bixby,  20  Pick. 
368.  In  order  to  sustain  a  demurrer  for  want 
of  jurisdiction  to  the  whole  of  a  bill,  it  must 
appear  that  no  substantial  and  essential  part  of 
the  complaint  is  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
Court.  Boston  Water  Power  Co.  v.  Boston  & 
Worcester  R.  R.  16  Pick.  512.  The  presump- 
tion, upon  demurrer,  is  against  the  pleader, 
because  he  is  presumed  to  state  his  case  in  the 
most  favorable  way  for  himself,  and,  therefore, 
if  he  has  left  anything  material  in  doubt,  it  is 
assumed  to  be  in  favor  of  the  other  party. 
Columbine  t\  Chichester,  2  Phil.  28;  Foss  v. 
Harbottle,  2  Hare,  502 ;  Durham  v.  Hyde  Park, 
75  III.  371.  The  rule  is  otherwise  in  Tennessee. 
Lincoln  r.  Purcell,  2  Head,  154;  Gray  v.  Hays, 
7  Humph.  590;  and  now  by  statute,  Hobbs  v. 
Memphis  R.  Co.  9  Heisk.  873.  But  not  where 
the  complainant's  demand  is  obviously  stale. 
French  r.  Dickey,  3  Tenn.  Ch.  302;  Smiley  v. 
Jones,  id.  317. 

542 


DIFFERENT   GROUNDS   OF   DEMURRER. 


*  551 


Thus,  where  a  bill  was  brought  by  the  executrix  of  an  *  attorney,  *  551 
for  money  due  from  the  defendant  for  business  done  as  an  attor- 
ney, the  Court  allowed  a  demurrer  to  the  relief :  because  the  remedy  was 
at  Law,  and  an  Act  of  Parliament  had  pointed  out  a  summary  method  of 
obtaining  it.1  And  where  the  plaintiff  had  contrived  to  purchase  goods 
for  export  to  America,  and,  after  the  ship  had  sailed  with  them,  it  was 
discovered  that  there  had  been  fraud  used  in  the  quantity  and  quality  of 
the  goods,  but  the  plaintiff,  being  threatened  with  an  action,  paid  the 
original  price  under  a  protest  that  he  would  seek  relief  in  Equity,  a 
demurrer  was  allowed  to  a  bill,  when  it  was  afterwards  brought  for  a 
discovery  and  account :  though  it  is  quite  clear  that,  if  the  plaintiff  had 
not  paid  the  money,  the  Court  would  have  granted  him  relief,  by  injunc- 
tion, against  the  threatened  action  for  the  price.2  Upon  the  same 
principle,  if  a  bill  is  filed  for  an  account,  where  the  subject  is  matter  of 
set-off,  and  capable  of  proof  at  Law,  it  may  be  demurred  to.8  (")     And 


Clark  v.  Flint,  22  Pick.  231;  Russell  v.  Loring, 
3  Allen,  125.  126;  Dearth  t>  Hide  and  Leather 
Natl.  Bk.  100  Mass.  540;  see  also  Ludlow  v. 
Simond,  2  Caines's  Cas.  40,  56;  Underhill  v. 
Van  (Jortlandt,  2  John.  Ch.  369;  McDonald 
v.  Crockett,  2  M'Cord  Ch.  135;  Grandin  v. 
Leroy,  2  Paige,  509;  Kobbi  v.  Underhill,  3 
Sandf.  Ch.  277;  Sperry  v.  Miller,  2  Barb.  Ch. 
632 :  Ohling  v.  Luitjens,  32  111.  23.  The  above 
objection  may  and  should  undoubtedly  be  taken 
by  demurrer,  when  it  appears  on  the  face  of 
the  bill;  but  when  a  disclosure  is  sought,  "  the 
Court  should  in  no  case,"  said  Mr.  Justice 
Woodbury,  "send  the  matter  to  Law  till  after 
the  answer  and  di-closure  are  completed  in 
Equity."  Foster  ».  Swasey,  2  Wood.  &  M. 
221  &  222;  see  Warner  v.  Daniels,  1  id.  110, 
111.  In  Parker  v.  Winnipiseogee,  &c.  Co.  2 
Black  (U.  S.),  715,  it  was  held  that  where  the 
plaintiff  has  a  clear  remedy  at  Law  his  bill 
may  be  dismissed  by  the  Judges  of  the  United 
States  Courts,  sua  sponte,  though  its  defects  are 
not  noticed  either  in  the  pleadings  or  arguments. 

But  in  New  York,  under  the  Code,  there  is 
no  longer  any  distinction  between  suits  at 
Law  and  in  Equity,  as  arising  from  the  form  of 
the  pleadings  or  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court. 
General  Mutual  Ins.  Co.  v.  Benson,  5  Duer 
(N.  Y.),  168. 

And  hence,  if  the  sufficiency  of  a  complaint, 
as  not  stating  facts  constituting  a  cause  of  ac- 


(n)  A  bill  in  Equity  for  discovery,  which 
discloses  a  case  of  equitable  cognizance,  such 
as  an  accounting,  is  not  demurrable  on  the 
ground  of  an  adequate  legal  remedy  because 
the  plaintiff  may  examine  the  defendant  as  a 
witness  in  a  law  court.  Wood  v.  Hudson 
(Ala.),  11  So.  530.  A  State  statute  which  pro- 
vides for  the  examination  of  the  adverse  party, 
as  if  under  cross-examination,  is  not  applicable 
to  suits  in  Equity  in  the  Federal  Courts.  Penn. 
R.  Co.  v.  Allegheny  R.  Co.  25  Fed.  Rep.  115 ; 


tion,  is  now  denied,  the  only  question  is,  whether, 
if  the  facts  stated  are  admitted,  the  plain- 
tiff is  entitled  to  the  relief  he  claims,  without 
reference  to  its  nature  as  legal  or  equitable. 
Id.;  see  also  Foster  v.  Watson,  16  B.  Mon. 
377.  In  Tennessee,  by  statute,  objections  to 
the  jurisdiction  must  be  taken  in  limine,  but 
this  has  been  held  to  mean  that  the  defendant 
thereby  waives  objection,  and  the  Court  will 
take  jurisdiction  in  all  cases  not  unfit  for  the 
investigation  of  Equity.  Stockley  V.  Rowley, 
2  Head,  493;  Starnes  v.  Newsom,  1  Term.  Ch. 
245.  affirmed  on  appeal. 

In  Frey  v.  Demarest,  16  N.  J.  Eq.  236,  238, 
Chancellor  Green  said,  "  The  Court  of  Chan- 
cery is  not  deprived  of  its  original  jurisdiction 
in  any  case,  either  by  the  operation  of  a  statute 
conferring  similar  jurisdiction  upon  the  com- 
mon-law Courts,  or  by  the  adoption  in  those 
Courts  of  the  principles  or  practice  of  Courts  of 
Equity."  And  see  to  same  effect,  Hoggat  v. 
McCrory,  1  Tenn.  8. 

i  Parry  v.  Owen,  3  Atk.  740:  Amb.  109. 
For  form  of  the  demurrer,  see  id. ;  Beames  on 
Costs,  376;  also  Maw  v.  Pearson,  28  Beav.  196. 

2  Kemp  v.  Pryor,  7  Ves.  237,  251. 

3  Dinwiddie  v.  Bailey,  6  Ves.  136,  141.  It 
is  a  difficult  question  to  determine,  when  there 
is  an  account  between  two  persons,  consisting 
of  items  cognizable  at  Law,  under  what  cir- 
cumstances a  concurrent  jurisdiction  in  Equity 


Dravo  v.  Favel,  id.  116.  The  question  of  want 
of  jurisdiction  in  a  Federal  Court,  if  apparent 
on  the  face  of  a  bill  or  petition,  may  be  raised 
by  demurrer.  Southern  Pacific  Co.  v.  Denton, 
146  U.  S.  202.  See  Carlsbad  v.  Tibbetts.  51 
Fed.  Rep  852.  The  objection  that  the  defend- 
ant is  not  an  inhabitant  cf  the  district  may  be 
raised  by  demurrer  or  by  motion  to  dismiss. 
Ibid.  Miller-Magee  Co.  v.  Carpenter,  34  Fed. 
Rep.  433;  see  ante,  p.  542,  n.  (a). 

543 


552 


DEMURRERS. 


so,  if  a  bill  is  filed  for  the  possession  of  land,  or  an  Ejectment 
*  552    *  Bill,  as  it  is  called,  it  may  be  demurred  to,  even  though  the  bill 

charges  the  defendants  to  have  got  the  title-deeds,  and  to  have 
mixed  the  boundaries,  and  prays  a  discovery,  possession,  and  account : 
for  the  plaintiff,  though  he  is  entitled  to  a  discovery,  has,  by  praying 
such  relief,  rendered  his  whole  bill  liable  to  demurrer.1 

It  is  to  be  recollected  that,  in  many  cases,  Courts  of  Equity  have 
assumed  a  concurrent  jurisdiction  with  Courts  of   Law,  as  in  cases  of 


exists;  for  cases  on  the  subject,  see  Foley  v. 
Hill,  1  Phil.  399,  403;  North  Eastern  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Martin.  2  Phil.  758.  763 :  South  Eastern  Ry. 
Co.  o.  Brogden,  3  M'N.  &  G.  8,16,  28;  Phillips 
v.  Phillips,  9  Hare,  471;  Navulshaw  v.  Brown- 
rigg,  2  De  G.  M.  &  G.  441;  Padwick  v.  Hurst, 
18Beav.  575;  Fluker  v.  Taylor,  3  Drew.  183; 
Croskey  v.  European  and  Am.  Shipping  Co. 
1  J.  &  H.  108;  Barry  v.  Stevens,  31  Beav.  258; 
Shepard  v.  Brown,  4  Giff.  208;  9  Jur.  N.  S. 
195;  Smith  r.  Leveaux,  2  De  G.  J.  &  S.  1; 
Hemings  v.  Pugh,  4  Giff.  456;  Makepeace  v. 
Rogers,  13  W.  R.  450,  V.  C.  S.;  11  Jur.  N.  S. 
215,  affirmed  by  L.  JJ.;  4  De  G.  J.  &  S.  649; 
Kernot  v.  Potter,  3  De  G.  F.  &  J.  447 ;  Ed- 
wards-Wood v.  Baldwin,  4  Giff.  613 ;  Dabbs  v. 
Nugent,  11  Jur.  N.  S.  943;  14  W.  R.  94,  V. 
C.  S.;  Flockton  v.  Peake,  10  L.  T.  N.  S.  173, 
L.  JJ.;  Hunter  v.  Belcher,  2  De  G.  J.  &  S.  194; 
Watford,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  London,  &c.  R.  Co.  L.  R. 
8  Eq.  231;  Southampton  Co.  v.  Southampton 
Board,  L.  R.  11  Eq.  254;  Moxon  v.  Bright,  L. 
R.  4  Ch.  292;  Burdick  v.  Garrick,  L.  R.  5  Ch. 
233.  It  has  been  held  that  the  Court  of  Chan- 
cery exercises  a  concurrent  jurisdiction  with 
Courts  of  Law  in  all  matters  of  account.  Dun- 
can v.  Lyon,  3  John.  Ch.  351,  361 ;  Ludlow  v. 
Simond.  2  Caines's  Cas.  1,  38,  52;  Post  v.  Kim- 
berly,  9  John.  470,  493;  Hawley  v.  Cramer,  4 
Cowen,  717;  Martin  v.  Spiers,  1  Hayw.  371; 
Stothart  v.  Burnet,  Cooke,  420;  Breckenridge 
v.  Brooks,  2  A.  K.  Marsh.  338;  Fowle  v.  Law- 
rason,  5  Peters,  495  ;  Cummings  v.  White,  4 
Blackf.  356;  Power  ».  Reeder,  9  Dana,  10; 
King  v.  Baldwin,  17  John.  384.  In  Massachu- 
setts, the  jurisdiction  in  Equity  over  accounts 
is  limited  to  those  accounts  of  which  the  nature 
is  such  that  they  cannot  be  conveniently  and 
properly  adjusted  and  settled  in  an  action  at 
law.  Pub.  Stats,  c.  151,  §  2,  cl.  10;  see  Locke  v. 
Bennett.  7  Cush.  445,  449;  Bartlett  v.  Parks,  1 
Cush.  82.  But  a  bill  will  lie  for  an  account  by 
a  person  interested  in  the  profits,  though  not  a 
partner.  Hallett  v.  Cumpton,  110  Mass.  32. 
But  to  sustain  a  bill  for  an  account,  there  must 
be  mutual  demands,  or  a  series  of  transactions 
on  one  side,  and  of  payments  on  the  other. 
Porter  o.  Spencer,  2  John.  Ch.  171.  Where  all 
the  items  of  account  are  on  one  side,  the  bill 
cannot  be  sustained;  Pearl  v.  Corp.  of  Nash- 
ville, 10  Yerger,  179;  unless  a  discovery  is 
sought  and   obtained   in  aid  of  the  account. 

544 


See  Pleasants  v.  Glasscock,  1  Sm.  &  M.  17. 
In  Taylor  v.  Tomkins,  2  Heisk.  89,  it  was  held 
that  a  bill  would  lie  against  the  executrix  of 
an  agent  for  an  account  of  goods  sold  on  com- 
mission, if  complicated,  or  if  there  were  em- 
barrassments in  making  proof,  though  the  items 
were  all  on  one  side.  But  in  Haywood  v. 
Hutchins,  65  N.  C.  574,  the  Court  refused  to 
take  jurisdiction  where  there  were  independent 
items  on  both  sides. 

In  New  Jersey,  the  concurrent  jurisdiction 
of  the  Court  of  Equity  with  the  Prerogative 
Courts  over  the  administration  of  the  estates  of 
deceased  persons,  extends  to  the  accounts  of 
executors  and  administrators,  and  to  the  claims 
of  creditors,  legatees,  and  next  of  kin.  Frey  v. 
Demarest,  16  N.  J.  Eq.  236,  238,  239.  But 
jurisdiction  in  matters  of  account  is  exercised 
only  where  some  special  cause  is  alleged,  as 
where  the  accounts  are  intricate,  or  discovery  is 
prayed,  or  some  other  ground  peculiar  to  Equity 
exists.  Jewett  v.  Bowman,  29  N.  J.  Eq.  174; 
compare  Seymour  v.  Long  Dock  Co.  20  id.  396. 

1  Loker  v.  Rolle,  3  Ves.  4,  7;  Ryves  v. 
Ryves,  id.  343;  Vice  v.  Thomaa,  4  Y.  &  C.  Ex. 
538;  Cooper,  Eq.  PI.  125;  Russell  v.  Clark,  7 
Cranch,  69,  89.  The  Court  will  not  try  the  \ 
legal  title  to  realty  at  the  instance  of  a  person 
out  of  possession.  Pryse  v.  Pryse,  L.  R.  15  Eq. 
86.  Nor  take  jurisdiction  of  a  bill  to  remove  a 
cloud  from  the  title  in  favor  of  a  person  out  of 
possession.  Orton  v.  Smith,  18  How.  263;  j 
Campbell  v.  Allen,  61  Mo.  581;  Elridge  v. 
Smith,  34  Vt.  484;  Peck  v.  Sexton,  41  Iowa, 
566 ;  Wing  v.  Sherrer,  77  111.  200.  But  if  there 
are  other  grounds  of  relief,  Equity  will  take 
jurisdiction,  although  the  defendant  be  in  pos- 
session. Moore  v.  Munn,  69  111.  591.  Sale  v. 
McLean,  29  Ark.  612.  And,  in  Tennessee,  it 
is  enough  that  there  is  a  cloud  upon  the  title  to 
give  Equity  jurisdiction,  although  the  defend- 
ant be  in  possession.  Almony  r.  Hicks,  3 
Head,  39.  It  is  the  duty  of  the  Court,  where  a 
bill  is  riled  to  recover  possession  of  land,  sun 
sponte,  to  refuse  jurisdiction,  although  the  ob- 
jection be  not  made  by  demurrer,  plea,  or 
answer.  Lewis  v.  Cocks,  23  Wall.  466.  There 
is  an  exception  in  favor  of  an  infant,  who  may 
treat  the  intruder  as  a  guardian  or  trustee,  and 
come  into  Equity.  Howard  v.  Earl  of  Shrews- 
bury, L.  R.  17  Eq.  378. 


DIFFERENT   GROUNDS   OF   DEMURRER. 


account,  partition,  and  assignment  of  dower ; 2  and  that,  where  an 
instrument  on  which  a  title  is  founded  is  lost,  or  fraudulently  sup- 
pressed or  withheld  from  the  party  claiming  under  it,  a  Court  of  Equity 
will  interfere  to  supply  the  defect  occasioned  by  the  accident  or  sup- 
pression, and  will  give  the  same  remedy  which  a  Court  of  Common 
Law  would  have  given,  if  the  instrument  had  been  forthcoming.3  In 
all  such  cases,  therefore,  a  demurrer,  because  the  subject-matter  of  the 
suit  is  within  the  jurisdiction  of  a  Court  of  Law,  will  not  hold.4 

Amongst  other  cases  in  which  Courts  of  Equity  and  Courts  of  Law 
entertain  a  concurrent  jurisdiction,  are  those  arising  upon  frauds  ;  there- 
fore, where  fraud  is  made  the  ground  for  the  interference  of  this  Court, 
a  demurrer  will  not  hold.5  (a)  There  is,  however,  one  case  in  which 
fraud  cannot  be  relieved  against  in  Equity,  though  a  discovery  may  be 
sought :  namely,  fraud  in  obtaining  a  will,  which,  if  of  real  estate, 
must  be  investigated  in  a  Court  of  Common  Law  or  the  Court  of  Pro- 
bate ; 6  and  if  of  personal  estate,  in  the  last-mentioned  Court.7 

Although  the  extension  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Courts  of  Common 
Law  has  prevented  the  necessity  of  resorting  to  the  Courts  of  Chan- 


2  Ld.  Red.  120,  123. 

3  Ed.  Red.  113;  Bromley  v.  Holland, 7  Sum- 
ner's Ves.  3,  and  n.  (d). 

4  Anderson  v.  Lewis,  1  Freeman,  206. 

5  But  Equity  will  not  in  all  cases  take  ju- 
risdiction where  there  has  been  fraud,  if  the 
remedy  at  Law  is  plain  and  adequate.  Miller 
v.  Scammon,  52  N.  H.  609. 

6  See  20  &  21  Vic.  c.  77,  §§  61-63. 

i  Kerrick  v.  Bransby,  7  Bro.  P.  C.  ed.  Toml. 
437;  Webb  v.  Claverden,  2  Atk.  424;  Bennet 
v.  Vade,  id.  324;  Anon.  3  Atk.  17;  Allen  v. 
Macpher^on,  1  Phil.  133,  143;  7  Jar.  49;  Affd. 
llJur.  785,  H.  L.;  Gingell  v.  Home,  9  Sim. 
539,  548;  Jones  v.  Gregory,  4  Giff.  408;  2  De  G. 


(a)  In  Massachusetts,  it  was  held,  before  full 
equity  powers  were  conferred  by  the  statute  of 
1877,  that  there  is  no  concurrent  jurisdiction  in 
that  State  in  cases  of  fraud  when  there  is  a  plain 
and  adequate  remedy  at  law.  Jones  v.  New- 
hall,  115  Mass.  244;  Suter  r.  Matthews,  id.  253; 
Ahrend  v.  Odiorne,  118  Mass.  201;  see  1  Story, 
Eq.  Jur.  (13th  ed.)  §  33,  n.  (6);  Patton  v. 
Glatz,  56  Fed.  Rep.  367 ;  Mortland  v.  Mortland 
(Pa.),  25  Atl.  Rep.  150;  Smith  v.  Griswold,  6 
Oregon,  440;  Youngblood  r.  Youngblood,  54 
Ala.  486;  Huff  v.  Ripley,  58  Ga.  11;  White  v. 
Boyee,  21  Fed.  Rep.  228;  Mann  ».  Appel,  31 
id.  378;  Rogers  v.  Rogers,  17  R.  I.  023.  But 
here,  as  elsewhere,  if  a  person  is  induced  to 
become  a  partner  by  false  representations  as  to 
the  firm's  business,  Equity  will  dissolve  the 
partnership  ab  initio,  ami  restrain  the  use  of  the 
firm  name  to  his  injury,  the  legal  remedy  being 
an  inadequate  protection.  Smith  v.  Everett, 
126  Mass.  304;  Oteri  v.  Scalzo,  145  U.  S.  578; 
Mycock  v.  Beatson,  13  Ch.  D.  384  ;  Newbig- 
ging  v.  Adam,  34  Ch.  D.  582.     So  even  in  the 

vol.  i.  —  35 


J.  &  S.  83  ;  9  Jur.  N.  S.  1171;  10  id.  59;  12  W. 
R.  193,  L.  JJ.;  and  see  Boyse  v.  Rossborough, 
Kay,  71 ;  3  De  G.  M.  &  G.  817  ;  18  Jur.  205;  6 
H.  L.  Cas.l;  3  Jur.N.  S.  373  ;  Gaines  v.  Chew.  2 
How.  U.  S.  619  ;  Tarver  o.  Tarver,  9  Peters,  180. 
A  Court  of  Equity  has  no  jurisdiction  to 
avoid  a  will,  or  set  aside  the  probate  on  the 
ground  of  fraud,  mistake,  or  forgery;  or  to  give 
relief  by  charging  an  executor,  a  legatee,  or 
devisee  with  a  trust  in  favor  of  a  person  alleged 
to  be  defrauded.  Broderick's  Will,  21  Wall. 
504 ;  Archer  v.  Meadows,  31  Wis.  167.  See  Gaines 
v.  Fuentes,  92  U.  S.  10;  Burrow  v.  Ragland, 
6  Humph.  481 ;  State  v.  Allen,  1  Tenn.  Ch.  42. 


absence  of  fraud,  Equity  can  restrain  the  use  of 
a  name  which  may  involve  the  plaintiff  in 
partnership  liabilities.  Id.;  Chatteris  r.  Isaac- 
son, 57  L.  T.  177;  Chappell  v.  Griffith,  53 
L.T.  459;  Thynne  v.  Shove,  45  Ch.  D.  577; 
Brass  Iron  Works  Co.  »\  Payne  (Ohio),  33  N.  E. 
Rep.  88. 

In  Massachusetts,  it  is  held,  since  the  above 
statute  of  1877,  that  the  right  to  bring  a  real  ac- 
tion does  not  now  exclude  the  concurrent  remedy 
in  Equity  to  declare  void  a  deed  which  is  void- 
able because  obtained  by  duress,  undue  influ- 
ence, or  fraud.  Billings  r.  Mann,  156  Mass.  203, 
By  tlve  Mass.  Pub.  Stats,  c.  151,  §  3,  a  concurrent 
remedy  is  given  in  Equity  to  creditors  to  reach 
and  apply  property  fraudulently  conveyed. 
Stratton  v.  Ilernon,  154  Mass.  310;  see  also 
Towle  v.  Janvrin,  61  N.  H.  605.  Id  Maine, 
under  a  similar  statute,  Equity  is  held  to  have 
jurisdiction,  although  the  property  may  also  be 
reached  by  attachment  and  execution.  Brown 
o.  J.  Wayland  Kimball  Co.  84  Maine,  492. 

545 


553 


DEMURRERS. 


eery,  in  many  cases  in  which  it  was  formerly  necessary  to  do  so,  yet  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  Court  of  Chancery  is  not  thereby  destroyed.8 
*553  *  2.  That  the  objection,  on  account  of  the  jurisdiction,  is  not 
confined  to  cases  cognizable  in  Courts  of  Law,  is  evident  from 
the  case  already  put  of  proceedings  instituted  to  set  aside  a  will  of 
personal  estate  on  the  ground  of  fraud,  which  can  only  be  done  in  the 
Court  of  Probate :  that  Court  having  exclusive  jurisdiction,  in  all 
cases  relating  to  wills  and  intestacies  of  persons  dying  possessed  of 
personal  property,  (a)  The  Court  of  Divorce  has  exclusive  jurisdiction 
of  the  rights  and  duties  arising  from  the  state  of  marriage  ;  but  it 
seems  that  the  Court  of  Chancery  will,  at  the  suit  of  the  wife  and  her 
trustees,  restrain  the  husband  from  breaking  the  covenants  of  a  separa- 
tion deed.1 

Formerly  it  was  held,  that  a  bill  of  discovery  could  not  be  filed  in  the 
Court  of  Chancery,  in  aid  of  proceedings  in  the  Ecclesiastical  Court ; 2 
but  it  seems  that  the  Court  of  Probate  does  not  possess  the  same  powers 
to  obtain  discovery  as  the  Ecclesiastical  Court  did ;  and  that  such  a  bill 
may  be  filed  in  aid  of  proceedings  in  the  Probate  Court.3 

8  Kemp  v.  Pryor,  7  Ves.  237,  2-19;  British 
Empire  Shipping  Co.  v.  Somes,  3  K.  &  J.  433; 
Athenaeum  Life  Ass.  Society  v.  Pooley,  3  De 
G.  &  J.  294,  299;  Oriental  Bank  v.  Nicholson, 
3  Jur.  N.  S.  857,  V.  C.  S. ;  Croskey  v.  European 
and  American  Steam  Shipping  Co.  1  J.  &  H. 
108;  Shepard  v.  Brown,  4  Giff.  208;  Frey  v. 
Demarest,  16  N.  J.  Eq.  236,  238;  Hoggat  v. 
McCrory,  1  Tenn.  8.  But  where  a  party  has, 
under  the  provisions  of  the  Common  Law  Pro- 
cedure Act,  1854  (17  &  18  Vic.  c.  125,  §§  83-86), 
pleaded  equitable  matter  in  the  action  at  Law, 
he  will  not  be  permitted  to  apply  subsequently 
to  the  Court  of  Chancer}'  on  the  same  grounds. 
Terrill  v.  Higgs,  1  De  G.  &  J.  388;  Walker  v. 


Micklethwaite,  1  Dr.  &  Sm.  49;  and  see  Evans 
v.  Bremridge,  2  K.  &  J.  174,  181;  8  De  G.  M. 
&  G.  100,  109 ;  Stewart  v.  Great  Western  Ry. 
Co.  2  Dr.  &  Sm.  438;  affirmed  2  De  G.  J.  &  S. 
319;  Waterlow  i\  Bacon,  L.  R.  2  Eq.  514. 

i  Hunt  r.  Hunt,  4  De  G.  F.  &  J.  221;  31 
Beav.  89;  Williams  v.  Bailey,  L.  R.  2  Eq.  731; 
Brown  v.  Brown,  L.  R.  7  Eq.  185;  see  also 
Wilson  v.  Wilson,  1  H.  L.  Cas.  538;  5  id.  40; 
Evans  v.  Carrington,  1  J.  &  H.  598;  2  De  G. 
F.  &  J.  481. 

2  Dunn  v.  Coates,  1  Atk.  288;  Anon.  2  Ves. 
Sr.  451. 

3  Fuller  v.  Ingram,  5  Jur.  N.  S.  510;  7  W. 
R.  302,  V.  C  W.     But  it-  seems  by  a  later 


(a)  A  Probate  Court's  jurisdiction  over  the 
subject-matter  is  an  adequate  remedy  to  exclude 
the  jurisdiction  of  Equity.  Batten  v.  Gedhye, 
41  Ch.  D.  507  ;  Joslin  v.  Wheeler,  62  N.  H.  169; 
Foster  v.  Foster,  134  Mass.  120  ;  Green  v. 
Creighton,  10  S.  &  M.  (Miss.),  159;  48  Am. 
Dec.  742,  and  note.  In  general,  the  probate 
jurisdiction  of  Equity  Courts  is  special  and 
limited,  being  in  aid  of  the  Probate  Courts 
where  their  powers  are  inadequate.  Bradford 
?'.  Young,  26  Ch.  D.  676;  Priestman  v.  Thomas, 
9  P.  D.  210 ;  Blackett  v.  Blackett,  51  L.  T.  427  ; 
Wood  fin  v.  Phoebus,  30  Fed.  Rep.  289;  Rich  v. 
Brav,  37  id.  273;  Wanneker  v.  Hitchcock,  38 
id.  383;  Everhart  v.  Everhart,  34  id.  82;  Ball  v. 
Tompkins,  41  id.  486;  Sowles  r.  First  Nat. 
Bank,  54  id.  564;  Blair  v.  Johnson,  64  Vt.  598  ; 
Angus  v.  Robinson,  62  Vt.  60;  Whitman  v. 
Fisher,  74  111.  147;  Heustis  v.  Johnson,  84  III. 
61 ;  see  Ellis  v.  Davis,  109  U.  S.  485.  A  Court 
of  Equity  has  no  jurisdiction  to  annul  adminis- 
tration proceedings  in  a  Probate  Court  on  the 
ground  of  fraud.     Simmons  v.  Saul,  138  U.  S. 

546 


439.  But,  apart  from  statute,  there  is  an  inher- 
ent jurisdiction  in  Courts  of  Equity  to  decree  a 
sale  of  a  deceased  person's  land  for  payment  of 
his  debts  upon  application  by  the  devisee  or 
personal  representative.  Smythe  v.  Henry,  41 
Fed.  Rep.  705;  see  Means  v.  Dowd,  128  U.  S. 
273;  Bryan  v.  Kales,  134  U.  S.  126.  In  Eng- 
land, though  the  Chancery  Division  may  have 
jurisdiction  to  recall  probate  of  a  will,  it  will 
not  usually  exercise  it  even  when  the  testator's 
estate  is  in  Court  in  a  proceeding  before  it. 
Bradford  v.  Young,  26  Ch.  D.  656.  But  Equity 
has  jurisdiction  to  declare  a  legacy  a  charge 
upon  land,  Hogan  v.  Kavanaugh,  138  N.  Y. 
417  ;  or  to  correct  a  clear  mistake  or  omission  in 
the  description  of  land  as  devised  by  will. 
Thomson  v.  Thomson  (Mo.),  21  S.  W.  Rep. 
1085,  1128.  The  Equity  jurisdiction  of  the  Fed- 
eral Courts  in  probate  matters  is  derived  from 
the  Federal  Constitution  and  statutes,  and  is 
therefore  not  dependent  upon  that  possessed  by 
the  State  Courts  or  created  by  State  statutes. 
Borer  v.  Chapman,  119  U.  S.  587. 


DIFFERENT    GROUNDS    OF    DEMURRER. 


*  554 


3.  If  the  Court  of  Admiralty,  or  Court  of  Prize,  is  competent  to 
decide  upon  the  subject-matter  of  the  suit,  a  demurrer  will  also  hold. 
Upon  this  principle,  the  Court  of  Chancery  refused  to  interfere,  by  grant- 
ing a  prohibition  against  a  monition  to  bring  in  property  which  had 
been  received  as  a  consignment  to  a  merchant,  —  Lord  Eldon  holding  that 
the  prize  jurisdiction  extends  to  the  question  whether  a  person  who 
received  and  sold  the  property,  received  it  as  consignee  for  a  valuable 
consideration,  or  as  a  prize  agent.4 

4.  The  Court  of  Bankruptcy  exercises  a  special  jurisdiction  defined 
by  statute  ; 5  and  any  bill  is  liable  to  demurrer,  the  subject-matter  of 
which  is  within  the  exclusive  jurisdiction  of  that  Court.6  If,  however, 
but  for  the  fact  of  bankruptcy,  the  suit  would  be  fit  to  be  entertained  in 
Equity,  the  jurisdiction  is  not  taken  away  by  reason  of  anything  coming 
within  the  bankruptcy  laws.7 

5.  Where  a  new  mode  of  proceeding  is  provided  by  statute,  and  the 
ordinary  mode  of  proceeding  by  bill  is,  either  expressly  or  impliedly, 
taken  away,  a  demurrer  will  lie.8  (b)  Thus,  a  demurrer  will  lie  to  a  bill 
to  set  aside  an  award  made  under  9  &  10  Will.  III.  c.  15,  — that 
statute  having  excluded  any  jurisdiction  to  interfere  with  *  the  *  554 
enforcement  of  the  award,  but  that  which  is  specially  provided 

by  the  statute.1 

6.  With  respect  to  the  objection,  that  some  other  Court  of  Equity  has 
the  proper  jurisdiction,2  it  is  to  be  observed  that  the  establishment  of 
Courts  of  Equity  has  obtained  throughout  the  whole  system  of  our  judi- 
cial polity,  and  that  most  of  the  inferior  branches  of  that  system  have 
their  peculiar  Courts  of  Equity,  —  the  Court  of  Chancery  assuming  a  gen- 
eral jurisdiction,  in  cases  not  within  the  bounds,  or  beyond  the  powers, 


decision  that  the  Court  of  Probate  possesses  as 
extensive  power  to  compel  discovery  as  the 
Court  of  Chancery.     L.  R.  1  1*.  &  D.  476. 

4  Case  of  the  Danish  ship  Nbysomhed,  7 
Ves.  593;  see  also  Castelli  v.  Cook,  7  Hare, 
89;  Jarvis  v.  Chandler,  T.  &  R.  319;  Sablicich 
v.  Russell,  L.  R.  2  Eq.  441  ;  and  see  24  &  25 
Vic.  c.  10,  Admiralty  Court  Act,  1801 ;  27  &28 
Vic.  c.  25,  Naval  Prize  Act,  1864. 

5  12  &  13  Vic.  c.  106;  17  &  18  Vic.  c.  119; 
24  &  25  Vic.  c.  134;  32  &  33  Vic.  c.  71. 

6  Saxton  v.  Davis,  18  Ves.  72,  82;  Preston  v. 
Wilson,  5  Hare,  185,  193;  Tarleton  v.  Hornby, 
1  Y.  &  C.  Ex.  172,  188;  Hutchinson  v.  Has- 
lam,  25  W.  R.  54;  Stone  v.  Thomas,  L.  R.  5  Ch. 
219;  Tenney  v.  Bell,  2  Ch.  D.  547;  see  ante, 
p.  61,  et  seq. 

7  Ellis  v.  Silber,  L.  R.  8  Ch.  83  ;  see  Eyre  v. 
Smith,  2  C.  P.  D.  435;  ex  parte  Brown,  11  Ch. 
D.  148;  ex  parte  Reynolds,  15  Q.  B.  D.  169; 
ante,  p.  61,  note. 

8  See  Parry  v.  Owen,  3  Atk.  740  ;  ante, 
p.  506;  Frey  v.  Demarest,  16  N.  J.  Eq.  236. 


1  Heming  v.  Swinnerton,  2  Phil.  79;  1  C.  P. 
Coop.  temp.  Cott.  388;  lOJur.  907;  Nicholls  v. 
Roe,  3  M.  &  K.  431,  442,  overruling  S.  C.  5  Sim. 
150;  Londonderry  and  Enniskillen  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Leishinan,  12  Beav.  423,429;  Grafham  v.  Turn- 
bull,  W.  N.  (1875)  91;  25  W.  R.  645;  Frick  v. 
Christian  County,  1  Fed.  Rep.  250.  As  to 
awards,  see  now  17  &  18  Vic.  c.  125,  §§  3,  5-17; 
and  as  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  of  Chan- 
cery over  awards,  see  Harding  v.  Wickham,  2 
J.  &  H.  676;  Smith  v  Whitmore,  10  Jur.  N.  S. 
65,  1190;  12  W.  R.  244,  V.  C.  W.;  13  W.  R.  2, 
L.  JJ.;  2  De  G.  J.  &  S.  297:  Wakefield  v. 
Llanelly  Ry.  and  Dock  Co.  3  De  G.  J.  &  S.  11 ; 
11  Jur.  N.  S  456;  34  Beav.  245;  Borneo  Co.  c. 
Robinson',  W.  N.  (1868)  26;  Parrott  v.  Shel- 
land,  id.  108;  16  W.  R.928;  and  see  Russell  on 
Arbitration;  Howe?'.  Nickerson,  14  Allen, 400; 
and  post,  Chap.  XV.  §  2,  Different  Grounds  of 
Pleas;  Ch.  XLV.  Statutory  Jurisdiction. 

2  See  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §490;  Ld.  Red.  125, 
126 ;  Mead  v.  Mcrritt,  2  Paige,  402. 


(l>)  If  the  statute  prescribes  no  form  of  action, 
the  jurisdiction  is  concurrent  at  Law  and  in 
Equity,  according  to  the  nature  of  the  relief 


appropriate  to  the  circumstances.  Marine  & 
R.  P.  &c.  Co.  v.  Bradley,  13  Fed.  Rep.  301; 
see  note,  p.  61,  ante. 

547 


*555 


DEMURRERS. 


of  inferior  jurisdictions.3  The  principal  of  the  inferior  jurisdictions  in 
England  which  have  such  cognizance  are  those  of  the  counties  palatine 
of  Lancaster  and  Durham,4  (a)  the  Courts  of  the  two  Universities  of 
Oxford  and  Cambridge,5  the  Courts  of  the  City  of  London,6  and  the 
Stannary  Courts  of  Devon  and  Cornwall,7  and  wherever  it  appears,  on 
the  face  of  the  bill,  that  any  of  these  Courts  has  the  proper  jurisdiction, 
either  immediately  or  by  way  of  appeal,  the  defendant  may  demur  to 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  of  Chancery.8  Demurrers  of  this  kind, 
however,  are  very  rare  ;  for  the  want  of  jurisdiction  can  hardly  be  ap- 
parent upon  the  face  of  the  bill,  at  least  so  conclusively  as  to  de- 
*  555  prive  the  Court  of  Chancery  of  cognizance  of  the  suit,  —  it  *  being 
a  rule  that,  where  a  Court  is  a  Superior  Court  of  general  jurisdic- 
tion, the  presumption  will  be  that  nothing  shall  be  intended  to  be  out  of 
its  jurisdiction  that  is  not  alleged  and  shown  to  be  so.1 


3  Ld.  Red.  151.  For  a  Tabular  View  of  all 
the  Courts  of  Equity  in  England  and  Wales, 
and  of  the  Courts  of  Appeal  therefrom,  see 
Trower  on  Debtor  and  Creditor,  474-485,  498. 

4  As  to  the  Court  of  Chancerv  of  Lancaster, 
see  13  &  14  Vic.  c.  43;  17  &  18  Vic.  c.  82;  36  & 
37  Vic.  c.  66,  §  18  (2).  By  the  6  &  7  Will.  IV. 
c.  19,  ante,  p  6,  the  palatine  jurisdiction  of  the 
county  of  Durham  was  separated  from  the 
bishopric,  and  transferred  to  the  Crown;  but 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  Courts  still  remains.  See 
Cox*s  Institutes,  584;  Trower,  480;  and  see  21 
&  22  Vic.  c.  45. 

5  See  3  Bla  Com.  83:  Geldard's  Civil  Law, 
153;  and  the  Oxford  University  Acts,  17  &  18 
Vic.  c.  81;  18  &  19  Vic.  c.  36;  *19  &  20  Vic.  c. 
31;  20  &  21  Vic.  c.  25:  23  &  24  Vic.  c.  23;  25 
&  26  Vic.  c  26;  and  Cambridge  University 
Act,  22  &  23  Vic.  c.  34,  and  Acts  cited. 

6  See  Pulling's  Customs  of  London,  c.  13. 
Formerly  the  county  palatine  of  Chester,  the 
principality  of  Wales,  and  the  Cinque  Ports 
had  Courts  of  equitable  jurisdiction.  Ld.  Red. 
151 :  see  mite,  p.  7;  11  Geo.  IV.  &  1  Will  IV. 
c.  70,  §  14;  18  &  19  Vic.  c.  48;  20  &  21  Vic. 
c.  1. 

7  It  was  formerly  held,  that  the  Stannary 
Courts  were  only  Courts  of  Law.  and  not  Courts 
both  of  Law  and  Equity.  Trelawney  ?•.  Wil- 
liams. 2  Vern.  483;  but  see  now6&  7  Will.  IV. 
c.  106;  2  &  3  Vic.  c.  58:  18  &  19  Vic.  c.  32; 
Procedure  in  the  Stannaries,  Introd.;  Trower, 
482;  Cox's  Institutes,  585. 

8  The  County  Courts  have  now  an  equitable 
jurisdiction.  Where,  to  a  bill  of  appeal  and 
review  of  a  decree  in  the  c  unty  palatine  of 
Lancaster,  the  defendant  demurred,  because 
on  the  face  of  the  bill  it  was  apparent  the 
Court  of  Chancerv  had  no  jurisdiction,  and  the 
demurrer  was  allowed.  Jennet  i>.  Bishopp,  1 
Vern.  184.     Bv  17  &  18  Vic.  c.  82,  the  Lords 


Justices  and  the  Chancellor  of  the  Duchy  are 
created  the  Court  of  Appeal  in  Chancery  for 
the  county  palatine;  and  see  13  &  14  Vic.  c.  43; 
Trower,  480;  Winstanley's  Prac.  c.  1. 

1  Per  Lord  Hardwicke,  in  Earl  of  Derby  v. 
Duke  of  Athol,  1  Ves.  Sr.  204.  Kilcrease  v. 
Blythe,  6  Humph.  378.  The  general  way  of 
objecting  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  is  bjr 
plea.  Ld.  Red.  152.  Bank  of  Bellows  Falls  v. 
Rut.  &  Bur.  R.  R.  Co.  28  Vt.  470;  Fremont  v. 
Merced  Mining  Co.  1  McAll.  267.  In  Rober- 
deau  v.  Rous,  1  Atk.  543  (see  1  Dan.  Ch. 
Prac.  6th  Eng.  ed.,  455,  532),  in  which  a  bill 
was  filed  for  delivery  of  possession  of  lands  in 
St.  Christopher's,  Lord  Hardwicke  held,  that 
the  objection  that  the  Court  had  no  jurisdiction 
over  land  in  that  island,  although  right  in  prin- 
ciple, was  irregularly  and  informally  taken  by 
demurrer,  and  should  have  been  pleaded.  Lord 
Redesdale,  however,  appears  to  have  been  of 
opinion  that  the  rule  that  an  objection  to  the 
jurisdict'on  should  be  pleaded,  and  not  be  taken 
by  demurrer,  can  only  be  considered  as  refer- 
ring to  cases  where  circumstances  may  give  the 
Chancery  jurisdiction,  and  not  to  cases  where 
no  circumstance  can  have  that  effect;  and  that, 
where  all  the  circumstances  which  would  be 
requisite  in  a  plea  to  show  that  the  Court  has 
no  jurisdiction  are  shown  in  the  bill,  a  demurrer 
will  lie.  Ld.  Red.  152,  153;  and  see  Edwards 
v.  Warden,  L.  R.  9  Ch.  495;  1  App.  Cas.  251. 
As  to  what  those  circumstances  are,  see  post. 
Chap.  XV.  §  2,  on  Pleas.  In  Henderson  v. 
Henderson,  3  Hare,  100,  110,  118,  a  demurrer 
was  allowed  on  the  ground  that  the  whole  of  the 
matters  were  in  question  between  the  parties, 
and  might  have  been  the  subject  of  adjudica- 
tion, in  a  previous  suit  before  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Newfoundland.  See  also  Mutrie  r. 
Rinney,  35  Ch.  D.  614;  Re  Henderson,  id.  704; 
Worman  v.  Worman,  43  Ch.  D.  296. 


(a)  A  Court  of  Countv  Palatine  has  still  the  old  Chancerv  jurisdiction  only. 
ley,  42  Ch.  D.  390. 

548 


Proctor  v.  Bav 


DIFFERENT   GROUNDS    OF    DEMURRER. 


.»> 


If  the  objection  on  the  ground  of  jurisdiction  is  not  taken  in  proper 
time,  namely,  either  by  demurrer  or  plea,  before,  the  defendant  enters 
into  his  defence  at  large,  the  Court  having  the  general  jurisdiction  will 
exercise  it,2  except  in  cases  where  no  circumstances  whatever  can  give 
the  Court  jurisdiction,  as  in  the  case  before  put,  of  a  bill  of  appeal  and 
review  from  a  decree  in  a  county  palatine  ;  in  which  case  the  Court  can- 
not entertain  the  suit,  even  though  the  defendant  does  not  object  to  its 
deciding  on  the  subject.3 

*  The  objections  arising  from  the  personal  disability  of  the  *  5oG 
plaintiff  have  been  already  discussed.1  All,  therefore,  that  need 
now  be  said  upon  the  subject  is,  that  if  any  of  these  incapacities  appear 
upon  the  face  of  the  bill,  the  defendant  may  demur.  If  the  incapacity 
is  such  only  as  prevents  the  party  from  suing  alone,  as  in  the  case  of  an 
infant,  an  idiot  or  a  lunatic,  or  a  married  woman,  if  no  next  friend  or 
committee  be  named  in  the  bill,  a  demurrer  will  lie.2 


2  Livingston  v.  Livingston,  4  John.  Ch. 
287;  Unclerhill  v.  Van  Cortlandt,  2  John.  Ch. 
369;  White  v.  Carpenter,  2  Paige,  217;  Bank 
of  Bellows  Fails  v.  Rut.  &  Bur.  R.  R.  Co.  28 
Vt.  470.  Generally,  an  objection  to  the  juris- 
diction cannot  be  taken  at  the  hearing.  Cutting 
v.  Dana,  25  X.  J.  Eq.  265;  Marsh  v.  Haywood, 
6  Humph  110;  Jones  v.  Keen,  115  Mass.  170; 
Wood  v.  Currey,  49  Cal.  359;  Creely  v.  Bay 
State  Brick  Co.  103  Mass.  514;  Massachusetts 
General  Hospital  r.  State  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.  4 
Gray.  227.  But  see  where  there  was  equity  in 
the  bill  but  abandoned  at  trial  term  Rose  v. 
West,  50  Ga.  474.  And  where  the  case  is  of 
controverted  legal  title.  Deery  r.  McClintock, 
31  Wi«.  195.  Where  the  want  of  jurisdiction 
appears  on  the  face  of  the  bill,  advantage  should 
be  taken  of  it  by  demurrer.  Nicholson  r  Pirn, 
5  Ohio  St.  25;  Kendrick  v.  Whitfield,  20  Ga. 
379;  post,  p.  630,  note  (a). 

In  Massachusetts  there  is  no  jurisdiction  in 
Equity  to  enforce  a  trust  arising  under  the  will 
of  a  foreigner,  which  has  been  proved  and  al- 
lowed in  a  foreign  country  only,  and  no  certi- 
fied copy  of  which  has  been  filed  in  the  Probate 
Court  there;  and  the  objection  is  properly  taken 
by  demurrer.  Campbell  v.  Wallace,  10  Gray, 
162;  Campbell  P.Sheldon,  13  Pick.  8;  May  v. 
Parker,  12  Pick.  34.  So  in  any  case  where 
there  is  no  sufficient  ground  shown  for  the  in- 
terference of  a  Court  of  Equity.  Foster  o. 
Swasey,  2  Wood.  &  M.  217;  Pierpont  r.  Fowle, 
id.  23;  Baker  v.  Biddle,  1  Bald.  C.  C.  411, 
412. 

In  Maine  it  is  said  that,  as  the  Court  has 
not  general  but  limited  jurisdiction  in  Equity, 
it  is  necessary  that  the  bill  should  show  upon 
its  face  that  the  Court  has  jurisdiction  of  the 
subject-matter  complained  of.  This  may  be  in- 
quired into  under  a  special  or  general  demurrer. 
Stephenson  v.  Davis,  56  Maine,  74. 

3  Ld.  Red.  153.     See  Starnes  v.  Newsom,  1 


Tenn.  Ch.  239,  affirmed  on  appeal.  In  all  bills 
in  Equity  in  the  United  States  Courts,  the 
citizenship  should  appear  on  the  face  of  the  bill 
to  entitle  the  Court  to  take  jurisdiction;  other- 
wise the  cause  will  be  dismissed.  Dodge  v. 
Perkins,  4  Mason,  435.  The  want  of  such  an 
averment  may  be  taken  advantage  of  by  de- 
murrer; Story,  Eq.  PI.  §492;  and  where  the 
want  of  jurisdiction  is  apparent  on  the  face  of 
the  proceedings,  from  a  defective  statement  of 
the  citizenship  of  the  different  parties,  it  is 
fatal  at  all  times,  and  may  be  insisted  on  bv 
way  of  motion  or  otherwise,  in  any  stage  of 
the  cause,  and  even  upon  appeal  Dodge  r. 
Perkins,  4  Mason,  437;  Bingham  v.  Cabot,  3 
Pall.  382;  Jackson  v.  Ashton.  8  Peters,  148; 
Hughes  v.  Jones,  2  Md.  Ch.  ITS:  Niles  V.  Wil- 
liams, 24  Conn.  279;  Ketch  urn  v.  Driggs,  6 
McLean,  13.  In  the  United  States  Courts,  if  it 
appear  on  the  hearing  that  there  is  no  case  of 
equitable  cognizance,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  Court, 
sua  sponte,  to  recognize  the  fact  and  give  it 
effect,  although  the  objection  be  not  made  by 
demurrer,  plea,  or  answer.  Lewis  v.  Cocks,  23 
Wall.  466;  Hipp  V.  Babin,  19  How.  278.  So  in 
Connecticut.  Iline  r.  New  Haven,  40  Conn. 
478. 

1  Ante,  Chap.  III.  This  objection  extends 
to  the  whole  bill  (Gilbert  r.  Lewis,  1  DeG.  J.  & 
S.  38),  and  advantage  may  be  taken  of  it.  as  well 
in  the  case  of  a  bill  for  discovery  merely,  as  in 
the  ense  of  a  bill  for  relief;  for  the  defendant, 
in  a  bill  for  discovery,  being  always  entitled  to 
costs,  after  a  full  answer,  as  a  matter  of  course, 
would  be  materially  injured  by  being  compelled 
to  answer  a  bill  by  persons  whose  property  is 
not  at  their  own  disposal,  and  who  are,  there- 
fore, incapable  of  paving  the  costs.  See  post, 
Chap.  XXXIV.  §2.  " 

'-2  Ante,  Chap.  HI.  §§  6,  7,  8.  A  married 
woman  may.  however,  under  certain  circum- 
stances, sue  without  a  next  friend,  and  an  idiot 

549 


557 


DEMURRERS. 


Demurrers  arising  upon  objections  applying  more  specifically  to  the 
matter  of  the  bill,  may  be  either :  I.  To  the  substance ;  or,  II.  To  the 
form  in  which  it  is  stated. 

I.  Demurrers  to  the  substance  are  :  1.  That  the  plaintiff  has  no  in- 
terest in  the  subject ;  2.  That  although  the  plaintiff  has  an  interest, 
yet  the  defendant  is  not  answerable  to  him,  but  to  some  other  person ; 
3.  That  the  defendant  has  no  interest;  4.  That  the  plaintiff  is  not  en- 
titled to  the  relief  which  he  has  prayed  ;  5.  That  the  value  of  the. sub- 
ject-matter is  beneath  the  dignity  of  the  Court ;  6.  That  the  bill  does 
not  embrace  the  whole  matter ;  7.  That  there  is  a  want  of  proper  par- 
ties ;  8.  That  the  bill  is  multifarious,  and  improperly  confounds  together 
distinct  demands  ;  9.  That  the  plaintiff's  remedy  is  barred  by  length  of 
time  ;  10.  The  Statute  of  Frauds ;  11.  That  it  appears  by  the  bill  that 
there  is  another  suit  depending  for  the  same  matter.8 

1.  In  a  former  section,  the  reader's  attention  has  been  directed  to 

the  necessity  of  showing  that  the  plaintiff  has  a  claim  to  the  thing 
*  557    demanded,  *  or  such  an  interest  in  the  subject  as  gives  him  a 
right  to  institute  a  suit  concerning  it.1  («) 

2,  3.  The  same  section  also  exhibits  the  nature  of  the  privity  which 
it  is  necessary  the  bill  should  aver  to  be  existing  between  the  plaintiff 
and  defendant,  and  the  application  of  the  rule  which  requires  that  the 
bill  should  show  that  the  defendant  has  an  interest  in  the  subject-matter 
of  the  suit.  It  also  points  out  the  exceptions  to  the  rule,  in  certain  cases 
in  which  persons,  who  have  no  interest  in  the  subject-matter,  may  be 
made  parties  for  the  purpose  of  eliciting  discovery  from  them,  and  in 
which  they  are  prevented  from  availing  themselves  of  a  demurrer,  to 
avoid  answering  the  bill.2 

4.  It  has  been  before  stated  8  as  one  of  the  requisites  to  a  bill,  that  it 
should  pray  proper  relief:  to  which  may  be  added,  that  if  for  any  reason 
founded  upon  the  substance  of  the  case,  as  stated  in  the  bill,  the  plain- 
tiff is  not  entitled  to  the  relief  he  prays,  the  defendant  may  demur. 
Many  of  the  grounds  of  demurrer,  already  mentioned,  may  perhaps  be 
referred  to  this  head  ;  and  in  every  instance,  if  the  case  stated  is  such 
that,  admitting  the  whole  bill  to  be  true,  the  Court  ought  not  to  give  the 


or  lunatic  by  his  next  friend,  without  a  com- 
mittee; see  ante,  pp.  82,  86,  111.  A  lunatic  must 
be  made  a  party,  though  his  committee  is  so,  or 
a  demurrer  lies.  Harrison  v.  Rowan,  4  Wash. 
C.  C  202.  But  on  a  demurrer  for  his  omis- 
sion, leave  will  be  granted  to  amend.  Berry  v. 
Rogers,  2  B.  Mon.  308. 

8  See  Davis  v.  Hall,  4  Jones  Eq.  403. 

i  Ante,  p.  314;  At  will  r.  Ferrett,  2  Blatch. 
39;  Haskell  v.  Hilton,  30  Maine,  419.;  Ld.  Red. 


(a)  In  Frost  v.  Spitley,  121  U.  S.  552,  it  was 
held  that  a  bill  to  remove  a  cloud  upon  the  title 
to  real  estate,  and  to  quiet  possession  thereof, 
can  only  be  maintained  upon  allegations  and 
proof  of  both  possession  and  legal  title  in  the 
plaintiff.     See  Rediu  v.  Branhan,  43  Minn.  283, 

550 


154.  158.  If,  of  several  plaintiffs,  some  have 
an  interest  in  the  matter  of  the  suit,  and  others 
have  no  interest  in  it,  but  are  merely  the  agents 
of  their  co-plaintiffs,  a  general  demurrer  to  the 
whole  bill  is  a  good  defence.  King  of  Spain  v. 
Machado,  4  Russ.  224;  and  see  Cuff  v.  Platett, 
id.  242;  Clarkson  v.  De  Peyster,  3  Paige,  339; 
Dias  r.  Bouchaud,  10  Paige,  445. 

2  Ante,  p.  322. 

3  Ante,  pp.  325,  377,  378. 


286;  Ricks  v.  Baskett,  68  Miss.  250.  In  Gage 
v.  Kaufman,  133  U.  S.  471.  the  allegation,  in  a 
bill  to  remove  clouds  from  title,  that  the  plain- 
tiff was  seised  in  fee-simple,  was  held  sufficient 
as  showing  possession. 


DIFFERENT   GROUNDS    OF   DEMURRER. 


*558 


plaintiff  the  relief  or  assistance  he  requires,  either  in  the  whole  or  in 
part,  the  defect  thus  appearing  on  the  face  of  the  bill  is  a  sufficient 
ground  of  demurrer.4 

The  question  upon  a  demurrer  of  this  nature  is,  frequently,  not 
whether,  upon  the  case  made  by  the  bill,  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  all 
the  relief  prayed,  but  whether  he  may,  under  the  prayer  for  general 
relief,  be  entitled  to  some  relief.5  The  question  how  far  the  defects  in 
the  relief  prayed  in  the  prayer  for  special  relief  may  be  supplied  under 
the  prayer  for  general  relief,  which  forms  part  of  every  bill,  has  been  be- 
fore discussed.6  Such  relief  must  be  consistent  with  the  special  prayer, 
as  well  as  with  the  case  made  by  the  bill. 

*  5.  Every  bill  must  be  for  a  matter  of  sufficient  value  :  other-  *  55S 
wise,  it  will  not  be  consistent  with  the  dignity  of  the  Court  to 
entertain  it.1  The  usual  method  of  taking  advantage  of  an  objection  of 
this  nature  is,  as  we  have  seen,2  by  motion  to  take  the  bill  off  the  file. 
There  is  no  doubt,  however,  that  if  the  objection  appears  upon  the  face 
of  the  bill,  a  demurrer,  upon  the  ground  of  inadequacy  of  value,  will  be 
held  good.3 

6.  A  bill  must  also  be  for  the  whole  matter.4  All  that  need  be  here 
said  is,  that  if  it  appears  by  the  bill  that  the  object  of  the  suit  does  not 
embrace  all  the  relief  which  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  have  against 
the  defendant,  under  the  same  representation  of  facts,  it  will  be  liable 
to  demurrer,  unless  it  comes  within  any  of  the  exceptions  before  pointed 
out.5 

7.  The  question  who  are  the  proper  parties  to  be  brought  before  the 


4  See  Rollins  v.  Forbes,  10  Cal.  299.  A  de- 
murrer for  want  of  equity  cannot  be  sustained 
unless  the  Court  is  satisfied  that  no  discovery 
or  proof  properly  called  for  by,  or  founded 
upon,  the  allegations  in  the  bill,  can  make  the 
subject-matter  of  the  suit  a  proper  case  for 
equitable  cognizance.  Bleeker  ».  Bingham,  3 
Paige,  240;  Morton  v.  Grenada  Academies,  8 
Sin.  &  M.  773;  Clark  v.  Davis,  Hairing.  Ch. 
227;  Dike  v.  Greene,  4  R.  I.  285;  Sprague  v. 
Rhodes,  4  id.  301. 

By  the  practice  in  Alabama,  where  a  defend- 
ant in  his  answer  has  demurred  to  the  bill  for 
want  of  equity,  he  has  a  right  to  make  amotion 
to  dismiss  on  that  ground,  at  least  before  the 
final  hearing.  Calhoun  v.  Powell,  42  Ala.  645. 
And  see  as  to  a  demurrer  in  answer  by  statute. 
Harding  v.  Egin,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  39.  On  a  motion 
to  dismiss  a  bill  for  want  of  equity,  all  amend- 
able defects  of  form  are  considered  as  amended. 
Cahala  v.  Monroe,  50  Ala.  303.  Such  a  motion  is 
allowed  in  Tennessee  by  statute.  Code,  §  4388; 
Quinn  v.  Leake,  1  Tenn.  Ch.  07. 

5  Ante,  p.  378;  Hartley  v.  Russell,  2  S.  &  S. 
244,  253.  A  demurrer  to  the  whole  bill  does 
not  lie  merely  because  the  prayer  for  relief  is  too 
broad.  Whitbeek  v.  Edgar,  2  Barb.  Ch.  100. 
Nor  does  a  demurrer  lie  to  a  prayer  for  inci- 
dental relief.     Miller  v.  Jamison,  24  N.  J.  Eq. 


41 ;  Payne  v.  Berry,  3  Tenn.  Ch.  154.  Nor  is 
it  a  ground  for  demurrer  that  the  plaintiff  does 
not  ask  for  the  proper  relief,  or  asks  for  incon- 
sistent relief.  Connor  v.  Board  of  Education, 
10  Minn.  439. 

6  Ante,  p.  378. 

i  Ante,  p.  328. 

2  Ante,  p.  329. 

3  Carr  i\  Inglehart,  3  Ohio  St.  457.  If  it 
appear  on  the  face  of  the  bill  that  the  matter  in 
dispute,  exclusive  of  costs,  does  not  exceed  the 
amount  to  which  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court 
is  limited,  the  defendant  may  either  demur,  or 
move  to  have  the  bill  dismissed  with  costs;  or, 
if  it  does  not  appear  on  the  face  of  the  bill,  it 
may  be  pleaded  in  bar  of  the  suit.  Smets  v. 
Williams,  4  Paige,  364;  McElwain  v.  Willis,  3 
Paige,  505;  9  Wend.  548;  Schrocppel  v.  Red- 
field,  5  Paige,  245;  Bradt  v.  Kirkpatrick,  7 
Paige,  62.  B\r  "exclusive  of  costs,"  is  meant 
the  costs  of  the  suit  in  Chancery.  Van  Tyne 
v.  Bunce,  1  Edw.  Ch.  583;  see  further,  Moore 
v.  Lyttle,  4  John.  Ch.  183;  Fullerton  V.  Jack- 
son, 5  id.  276;  Douw  v.  Sheldon,  2  Paige,  303; 
Vredenburg  v.  Johnson,  1  Hopk.  112;  Mitchell 
v.  Tighe,  1  Hopk.  119. 

4  Ante,  p.  330. 

5  Ante,  p.  330. 

551 


*559 


DEMURRERS. 


Court,  for  the  purpose  of  enabling  a  Court  of  Equity  to  do  complete  jus- 
tice, by  deciding  upon  and  settling  the  rights  of  all  persons  interested 
iu  the  subject  of  the  suit,  so  as  to  make  the  performance  of  the  order  of 
the  Court  perfectly  safe  to  those  who  are  compelled  to  obey  it,  and  to 
prevent  future  litigation,  has  been  before  fully  discussed.6  Wherever  a 
want  of  parties  appears  on  the  face  of  a  bill,  it  is  a  cause  of  demurrer,7 
unless  a  sufficient  reason  for  not  bringing  them  before  the  Court  is  sug- 
gested, or  unless  the  bill  seeks  a  discovery  of  the  persons  in- 
*  559  terested  *  in  the  matter  in  question,  for  the  purpose  of  making 
them  parties ; a  but  it  is  no  answer  to  a  demurrer  that  the  ad- 
dition of  the  party  would  render  the  bill  multifarious.2  In  conse- 
quence of  the  alterations  in  the  rules  of  the  Court  as  to  parties,  before 
pointed  out.  demurrers  for  want  of  parties  are  now  of  comparatively 
rare  occurrence.3  (a) 


6  Ante,  Chap.  V.;  Ld.  Red.  164,  et  seq. 

1  Ld.  Red.  180;  Story,  Eq.  PL  §  541 ;  Farn- 
ham  v.  Clements,  51  Maine,  426,  429;  Elinen- 
dorf  v.  Taylor,  10  Wheat.  152;  Crane  v.  Dem- 
ing,  7  Conn.  387 ;  Mitchell  v.  Lenox,  2  Paige, 
280;  Robinson  v.  Smith,  3  id.  222.  A  demurrer 
for  want  of  parties  must  show  who  are  the  proper 
parties;  not  indeed  byname, — for  that  might 
be  impossible,  — but  in  such  manner  as  to  point 
out  to  the  plaintiff  the  objection  to  his  bill,  and 
enable  him  to  amend  by  adding  the  proper  par- 
ties. Ld.  Red.  180,  181;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Poole,  4 
M.  &  C.  17;  Story,  Eq.  PL  §  543;  ante,  p.  288; 
Robinson  v.  Smith,  3  Paige,  222. 

It  has,  however,  been  held,  that  upon  a  de- 
murrer to  a  bill  for  want  of  equity,  the  objec- 
tion that  the  bill  is  defective  for  want  of  par- 
ties, may  well  be  taken.  Vernon  v.  Vernon,  in 
Chancery  (England),  Feb.,  1837,  cited  Story, 
Eq.  PL  §  543.  Aliter,  in  Georgia,  the  non- 
joinder of  parties  not  being  a  ground  for  a  gen- 
eral demurrer.  Hand  v.  Dexter,  41  Ga.  454. 
So  the  objection  may  be  taken  in  the  same 
way,  if  persons  are  improperly  made  plaintiffs. 
Gething  v.  Vigurs.  before  the  Vice-Chancellor 
of  England,  Nov.  1836,  cited  Story,  Eq.  PL  ubi 
supra.     See  Eagle  v.  Beard,  33  Ark.  497. 


(a)  Under  the  new  English  procedure  a  de- 
murrer does  not  lie  for  want  of  parties.  Wer- 
derman  v.  Society  Ge"ne>ale,  19  Ch.  D.  246; 
see  R.  S.  C.  1883,  Ord.  XXXIII.  ;  Pilley  v. 
Robinson,  20  Q.  B.  D.  155.  But  the  objection 
must  be  raised  promptly.  Sheehan  v.  Great 
Eastern  Ry.  Co.  16  Ch.  D.  59.  Generally  this 
defect,  when  apparent  on  the  face  of  the  bill,  is 
ground  for  demurrer.  Wilson  t\  Bellows,  30 
N.  J.  Eq.  282;  see  Oliva  v.  Bunaforza,  31  id. 
396.  But  not  for  a  general  demurrer.  Hughes 
v.  Hughes,  72  Ga.  173.  See  House  v.  Mullen, 
22  Wall.  42;  Chapman  v.  Forbes,  123  N.  Y. 
532;  Lusk  v.  Thatcher,  102  111.  60:  Hutchinson 
v.  Ayres,  117  III.  558 ;  Craft  v.  Russell,  07  Ala. 
552 


i  Ld.  Red.  180;  ante,  p.  288. 

2  Lumbsden  v.  Fraser,  1  M.  &  C.  589,  602; 
and  as  to  amending  in  such  cases,  see  S.  C  ; 
Att.-Gen.  v.  Merchant  Tailors'  Co.  1  M.  &  K. 
189,  191,  and  ante,  p.  289. 

3  For  forms  of  demurrers  for  want  of  parties, 
see  2  Van  Hey.  81 ;  and  jiost,  Vol.  III.  In  Way 
v.  Bragaw,  16  N.  J.  Eq.  213,  one  ground  of 
demurrer  was  that  the  bill  should  have  been 
for  the  benefit  of  all  the  creditors  of  the 
defendant  jointly  with  the  plaintiff.  The 
Chancellor  said:  "The  same  objection  was 
raised,  under  similar  circumstances,  in  Edgell 
v.  Haywood,  3  Atk.  357.  But  Lord  Hardwicke 
said:  'The  person  who  first  sues  has  an  advan- 
tage by  his  legal  diligence  in  all  cases.  The 
plaintiff,  by  his  judgment  and  execution  at  Law, 
and  by  his  diligence  in  this  Court,  has  obtained 
a  position  which  entitles  him  to  priority  over 
the  other  creditors  of  the  debtor.  He  does  not 
stand  in  the  attitude  of  a  plaintiff  in  an  ordinary 
creditor's  bill.  It  does  not  appear  that  there  is 
any  creditor  of  equal  degree  with  the  plain- 
tiff.' "  Clarkson  v.  De  Peyster,  3  Paige,  320; 
rarmelee  ».  Egan,  7  Paige,  610;  Grosvenor  v. 
Allen,  9  Paige.  74;  Farnham  v.  Campbell,  10 
Paige,  598. 


9;  Waters  v.  Perkins,  G5  Ga.  32  A  demurrer 
for  this  cause  should  name  or  clearly  indicate 
the  omitted  parties,  so  that  the  bill  may  be 
properly  amended.  Robinson  v.  Dix,  18  W. 
Va.  528;  Schwartz  v.  Wechler,  20  N.  Y.  S.  861. 
A  dismissal  of  the  bill  for  this  cause  should  be 
without  prejudice.  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §' 541.  De- 
feet  of  parties  is  waived  if  not  objected  to  by 
demurrer  or  answer,  except  when  strictly  indis- 
pensable parties  are  absent.  Smith  v.  Dorn, 
96  Cal.  73;  Harper  v.  Hendricks,  49  Kansas, 
718;  Hurd  v.  Simpson,  47  id.  245;  Hicks  v. 
Jackson,  85  Mo.  283;  Leucke  v.  Tredway,  45 
Mo.  App.  507;  McFadden  v.  Schill,  84  Texas, 
77.     Iu  the  Federal  Courts,  see  United  States  v. 


DIFFERENT   GROUNDS   OF    DEMURRER. 


*559 


8.  The  subject  of  multifariousness  has  been  already  discussed.4  A 
bill  is  demurrable  on  this  ground.  Such  a  demurrer  goes  to  the  whole 
bill,  and  it  is  not  necessary  to  specify  the  particular  parts  of  the  bill 
which  are  multifarious.8  (b) 

9.  In  determining  whether  the  length  of  time  which  has  elapsed  since 
the  plaintiff's  claim  arose  is  a  bar  to  the  relief  which  he  asks,  Courts  of 
Equity  have  considered  themselves  bound  by  the  Statute  of  Limitations, 
21  Jac.  I.  c.  16,  as  to  all  legal  titles  and  demands,  although  suits  in 
Equity  are  not  within  the  words  of  that  statute ; 6  and  as  to  all  equitable 
titles  and  demands,  they  act  in  analogy  to  the  statute.7  The  modern 
Statutes  of  Limitations  8  apply,  for  most  purposes,  to  suits  in  Equity,  as 
well  as  actions  at  Law.  The  objection  of  lapse  of  time  was  formerly 
considered   a   proper   ground  for  a  plea,9   and   not  for  a   demurrer ; 10 


4  Ante,  p.  333,  et  seq. ;  see  Story,  Eq.  PI. 
§§530-540;  Sheldon  v.  Keokuk  No.  Line  P. 
Co.  8  Fed.  Rep.  709;  Graves  v.  Fresh,  9  Gill  & 
J.  280;  Bryan  v.  Blythe,  4  Blackf.  331;  Coe  v. 
Turner,  5  Conn.  80;  Mulock  v.  Mulock,  1  Edw. 
14;  Thurman  v.  Shelton,  10  Yerger,  383;  Emans 
v.  Emans,  14  N.  J.  Eq.  114.  A  demurrer  to  a 
bill  for  multifariousness  should  be  taken  before 
the  ease  comes  to  the  Appellate  Court.  Well- 
born v.  Tiller,  10  Ala.  305. 

5  East  India  Co.  r.  Coles,  3  Swanst.  142,  n.; 
see  Dimmock  v.  Bixby,  20  Pick.  368;  Gibbs  v. 
Claggett,  2  Gill  &  J.  14;  Boyd  v.  Hoyt,  5 
Paige,  65;  White  v.  White,  5  Gill,  359."  For 
forms  of  demurrers  for  multifariousness,  see  2 
Van  Hey.  79,  80;  and  post,  Vol.  III. 

6  Hovenden  v.  Lord  Annesley,  2  Sch.  & 
Lef.  630,  631;  Hony  v.  Hony,  l's.  &  S.  568, 
580. 

7  See  Bond  v.  Hopkins,  1  Sch.  &  Lef.  428; 
Hovenden  v.  Lord  Annesley,  ubi  supra  ;  Stack- 
house  v.  Barnston,  10  Ves.  466;  Ex  parte  Dewd- 
ney,  15  Ves.  496;  Beckford  v.  Wade,  17  Ves. 


Gillespie,  6  Fed.  Rep.  803;  Perry  v.  Merchants' 
M.  Ins.  Co.  11  id.  478  ;  Adams"  v.  Howard,  22 
id.  656;  California  Electrical  Works  v.  Finck, 
47  id.  583.  The  objection,  if  not  raised  by  the 
pleadings,  will  not  be  considered  on  appeal. 
Melsheimer  v.  Hommel,  15  Col.  475;  Spicer  v. 
Taylor  (Texas),  21  S.  W.  Rep.  314.  In  North 
Carolina  the  joinder  of  unnecessary  parties  is 
surplusage,  and  not  a  fatal  defect.  McMillan 
v.  Baxley,  112  N.  C.  578. 

(b)  One  defendant  cannot  thus  demur  be- 
cause of  the  joinder  of  another  defendant  who 
makes  no  objection.  Bermes  v.  Frick,  38  N.  J. 
Eq.  88;  Ware  v.  Curry,  67  Ala.  274;  Sweet  ». 
Converse  88  Mich.  1.  The  objection  of  multi- 
fariousness must  be  specifically  indicated,  and 
cannot  be  urged  under  a  demurrer  for  want  of 
equity.  Ranger  r.  Champion  Cotton-Press  Co. 
52  Fed.  Rep.  611 ;  Jackson  v.  Glos,  144  111.  21. 
This  objection,  if  not  raised  before  the  cause 
goes  to  a  hearing,   is  deemed   waived,   unless 


96 ;  Lord  Cholmondeley  v.  Lord  Clinton,  2  J.  & 
W.  1,  161,  192. 

8  3  &  4  Will.  IV.  cc.  27,  42  ;  7  Will.  IV.  & 
1  Vic.  c  28;  19  &  20  Vic.  c.  97,  §§  9,  10,  11; 
23  &  24  Vic.  c.  38,  §  13;  see,  as  to  these  Acts, 
Sugd.  R.  P.  Stat.  chap.  i. 

rj  In  Gregor  v.  Molesworth,  2  Ves.  Sr.  109 
(see  also  Aggas  r.  Pickerell,  3  Atk.  225;  Delo- 
raine  v.  Browne,  3  Bro.  C.  C.  633,  646),  Lord 
Hardwicke  refused  to  allow  a  demurrer  of  this 
nature,  alleging  as  his  reason  that  several  ex- 
ceptions might  take  it  out  of  the  length  of  time, 
as  infancy,  or  coverture,  which  the  party  should 
have  the  advantage  of  showing,  but  which  can- 
not be  done  if  demurred  to.  This,  however,  can 
hardly  be  a  sufficient  reason  for  the  distinction 
in  this  case  between  a  plea  and  a  demurrer,  as 
the  plaintiff,  if  he  has  any  reason  to  allege  to 
take  his  case  out  of  the  bar,  arising  from  the 
length  of  time,  should  show  it  by  his  bill. 

10  If  the  lapse  of  the  period  of  limitation 
appears  with  certainty  on  the  face  of  the  bill, 
the    objection    may    be    taken    by    demurrer. 


the  Court  itself  considers  it  to  cause  too  great 
complexity;  in  which  case  it  may  dismiss  the 
bill  of  its  own  motion.  Hendrickson  v.  Wal- 
lace, 31  N.  J.  Eq.  604;  Dod  v.  Paul,  42  id.  154; 
Tullar  v.  Baxter,  59  Va.  467;  Beall  v.  Shaull, 
18  W.  Va.  258;  Labadie  v.  Hewitt,  85  111.  341; 
Thornton  v  Houtze,  91  111.  199;  Heffron  r. 
Gore,  40  111.  App.  257;  Wade  v.  Pulsifer,  54 
Vt.  45;  Snook  v.  Pearsall,95  Mich.  534;  Porter 
v.  Sherman  County  B.  Co.  (Neb.)  54  N.  W. 
Rep.  424.  In  the  Federal  Courts,  see  Rule  94; 
Converse  v.  Michigan  Diary  Co.  45  Fed.  Rep. 
18;  Western  Laud  &  Em.  Co.  v.  Guinault,  37 
id.  523;  Lewarne  v.  Mexican  Int.  Imp.  Co.  38 
id.  629 ;  Chaffin  v.  Hull,  39  id.  887.  The  Court 
may  thus  dismiss  a  bill  for  multifariousness 
even  after  a  demurrer  thereto  is  overruled. 
Wells  v.  Sewell's  Point  Guano  Co.  (Va.)  17 
S.  E.  Rep.  2.  The  party  objecting  for  multi- 
fariousness must  always  show  that  he  is  thereby 
injured.     Buerk  v.  Imhaeuser,  8  Fed.  Rep.  457- 

553 


560 


DEMURRERS. 


*  560    *  but  it  is  now  clearly  the  rule  of  the  Court  that  the   Statute 
of  Limitations,  or  objections  in  analogy  to  it,  upon  the  ground  of 
laches,  may  be  taken  advantage  of  by  way  of  demurrer,  as  well  as  by 
plea.1  (a) 


Deloraine  v.  Browne,  3  Bro.  C.  C  (Perkins's 
ed.)  6:53,  Mr.  Belt's  note  (1),  436,  Mr.  Eden's 
note  (7),  and  cases  cited;  Wisner  v.  Barnet, 
4  Wash.  C.  C.  631 ;  Dunlap  v.  Gibbs,  4  Yerger, 
94;  Foster  r.  Hodgson,  19  Ves.  180;  Hoare  v. 
Peck,  6  Sim.  51;  Hardy  v.  Reeves,  4  Sumner's 
Ves.  466,  note  (b) ;  Freak  e  v.  Cranfelt,  3  M.  & 
C.  499;  Tyson  v.  Pole,  3  Y.  &  C.  266:  Hum- 
bert v.  Rector  &c.  Trinity  Church,  7  Paige, 
195;  Van  Hook  v.  Whitlock,  id.  373;  S.  C.  24 
Wend.  587;  Cosier  v.  Murray,  5  John.  Ch.  521; 
Waller  v.  Demint,  1  Dana,  92;  See  M'Dowl  v. 
Charles,  6  John.  Ch.  132. 

1  Ld.  Red.  212,  n.;  Saunders  V.  Hord,  1 
Ch.  Rep.  184  ;  Jenner  v.  Tracey,  3  P.  Wins. 
287,  11.;  Hovenden  v.  Lord  Annesley,  2  Sch. 
&  Lef.  607,  637 ;  Foster  v.  Hodgson,  19  Ves. 
180;  Hoare  v.  Peck,  6  Sim.  51;  Bampton  v. 
Birchall,  5  Beav.  67,  76;  Prance  v.  Sympson, 
Kay,  678,  680;  Smith  v.  Fox,  6  Hare,  386,  391; 
Rolfe  v.  Gregory,  8  Jur.  N.  S.  606;  10  W.  R.  711, 
V.  C.  K. ;  see  Sleeinan  v.  Wilson,  L.  R.  13  Eq.  36; 
Hunham  v.  Llewellyn,  21  W.  R.  570,766;  W. 
N.  (1873)  136;  Marsh  v.  Oliver,  14  N.  J.  Eq. 
259;  Acherley  v.  Roe,  5  Sumner's  Ves.  565,  Per- 
kins's note  (Ij),  and  cases  cited,  573,  note  (a),  and 
cases  cited;  Stockhouse  v.  Barnston,  10  Sumner's 
Ves.  453,  Perkins's  notes  (c)  and  (c7),  and  cases 
cited ;  Hardy  v.  Reeves,  4  Sumner's  Ves.  465, 
notes  (a)  and  (b);  Pierson  v.  David,  1  Clarke 
(Iowa),  23;  Sublette  v.  Timiey,  9  Cal.  428; 
Bangs  v.  Hall,  2  Pick.  (2d  ed!)  372,  note  (1), 
and  cases  cited;  Harris  v.  Mills,  28  111.  44; 
Henry  County  v.  Winnebago  Draining  Co.  52 
111.  454;  McClung  0.  Sneed,  3  Head,  219;  Stout 
V.  Seabrook,  30  N.  J.  Eq.  187.  But  see  Wak- 
alee  v.  Davis,  25  W.  R.  60.  Even  in  cases  of 
partnership  account,  if  the  statute  has  run  since 
the  dissolution.  Noyes  v.  Crawley,  10  Ch.  D. 
31;  Dawkins  v.  Lord  Penrhyn,  6  Ch.  D.  318; 
4  App.  Cas.  51 ;  Knox  v.  Gye,  L.  R.  5  H.  L. 
656.  In  Massachusetts  the  Statute  of  Limita- 
tions operates,  in  cases  where  it  applies,  ex 
proprio  vigore,  in  Equity  as  well  as  at  Law. 
Farnam   v.   Brooks,  9   Pick.  243;  Johnson  v. 


(a)  As  Equity  follows  the  Law,  the  Statute  of 
Limitations  applies  in  Equity,  in  cases  free  from 
fraud,  not  by  analogy,  but  by  reason  of  the 
obedience  which  the  Equity  Courts  owe  to  that 
statute.  Gibbs  v.  Guild,  9  Q.  B.  D.  59,  64;  8 
id.  296 ;  Ecclesiastical  Com'rs  v.  North  Eastern 
Ry.  Co.  4  Ch.  D.  845,  859;  see  Knox  v.  Gye, 
L.  R.  5  H.  L.  656,  674;  Norris  v.  Haggin,  28 
Fed.  Rep.  275.  The  Equitj'  jurisdiction  can 
never  be  used  as  a  device  to  evade  the  bar  of  the 

554 


Ames,  11  Pick.  182;  Bowman  v.  Wathen,  1  How. 
(U.  S.)  189.  So  in  Pennsylvania.  Bickel's 
Appeal,  86  Penn.  St.  204.  In  Kentucky  the 
Statute  of  Limitations  is  a  bar  in  Equity. 
M'Dowell  v.  Heath,  3  A.  K.  Marsh.  223  ; 
Beckenridge  v.  Churchill,  3  J.  J.  Marsh.  15. 
It  seems,  however,  that  it  does  not  apply  in 
totidem  verbis,  but  has  been  adopted  as  reason- 
able and  consistent.  Crain  v.  Prather,  4  J.  J. 
Marsh.  77.  The  principles  of  the  Statute  of 
Limitations,  as  applied  to  suits  in  Equity,  are 
recognized  by  the  Revised  Statutes  of  New 
York.  Before  such  recognition,  they  received 
the  same  application.  Kane  v.  Bloodgood,  7 
John.  Ch.  90;  Stafford  v.  Bryan,  1  Paige,  239; 
Bertine  v.  Varian,  1  Edw.  Ch.  343;  see  2  Rev. 
Stat.  N.  Y.  301;  and  Van  Hook  v.  Whitlock,  3 
Paige,  409.  In  New  York,  aside  from  the 
Revised  Statutes,  the  bar  would  seem  to  oper- 
ate by  the  discretion  of  the  Court.  Murray  v. 
Coster,  20  John.  583;  Arden  v.  Arden,  1  John. 
Ch.  316.  See  the  same  doctrine  held  by  Elmen- 
dorf  v.  Taylor,  10  Wheat.  152;  Coulson  v.  Wal- 
ton, 9  Peters,  82.  In  Connecticut,  where  a 
delay  has  been  such  as  to  be  a  bar  at  Law,  it 
will  be  so  in  Equity.  Banks  v.  Judah,  8  Conn. 
145.  The  same  principle  exists  in  the  Courts 
of  the  United  States.  Miller  v.  MTntyre,  6 
Peters,  61.  In  Maine  the  Statute  of  Limita- 
tions operates  on  suits  in  Equity  as  well  as  on 
actions  at  Law.  Denny  v.  Gilman,  26  Maine, 
149,  154;  Chapman  V.  Butler,  22  Maine,  191. 
Whether  this  can  apply  to  cases  purely  of  equi- 
table jurisdiction,  see  Robinson  v.  Hook,  4  Ma- 
son, 150;  Kane  v.  Bloodgood,  7  John.  Ch.  90; 
Bigelow  v.  Bigelow,  6  Ohio,  97.  In  case  of  a 
direct  trust,  no  length  of  time  bars  the  claim 
between  the  trustee  and  cestui  que  trust.  Cook 
v.  Williams,  1  Green  Ch.  209;  Baker  v.  Whit- 
ing, 3  Sumner,  476;  Armstrong  v.  Campbell, 
3  Yerger,  201;  Overstreet  0.  Bate,  1  J.  J. 
Marsh.  370;  Trecothick  v.  Austin,  4  Mason, 
16,  and  other  cases  cited  in  Perkins's  note  (b) 
to  Acherley  v.  Roe,  5  Sumner's  Ves.  573. 


Statute  of  Limitations  at  Law.  Ela  v.  Ela,  158 
Mass.  54;  Agens  v.  Agens,  50  N.  J.  Eq.  566. 
Mere  delay,  short  of  the  statutory  period,  to 
enforce  a  purely  legal  right,  is  not  a  defence, 
even  when  it  would  be  sufficient  if  the  suit 
were  upon  equitable  grounds.  Three  Towns 
Banking  Co.  v.  Maddever,  27  Ch.  D.  523. 

Under  the  U.  S.  rules,  the  cause  which  pre- 
vents the  Statute  of  Limitations  from  running 
in  the  particular  case  must  be  stated  in  the  bill 


DIFFERENT   GROUNDS    OF    DEMURRER. 


560 


Where  there  is  no  positive  limitation  of  time,  the  question  whether 
the  Court  will  interfere  or  not  depends  upon  whether,  from  the  facts  of 


in  order  that  evidence  thereof  maybe  admitted. 
Boyd  v.  Wiley,  18  Fed.  Kep.  355;  see  Duff  v. 
First  National  Bank,  13  id.  65;  Pacitic  R.  Co. 
v.  Atlantic  &  P.  R.  Co.  20  id.  277;  also  Chris- 
tian v.  Stale  (Ind.),  34  N.  E.  Rep.  825.  The 
rule  that  State  Statutes  of  Limitation  are  to  be 
enforced  in  the  Federal  Courts  does  not,  by  the 
weight  of  authority,  apply  in  suits  for  the  in- 
fiingement  of  patents.  Brickill  v.  Baltimore, 
52  Fed.  Rep.  737;  McGinnis  r.  Erie  Count}',  45 
id.  91;  see  Johnston  v.  Roe,  1  Fed.  Rep.  692; 
Rugan  f.  Sabin,  53  F.  415. 

In  England  the  defence  of  the  Statute  of 
Limitations,  appearing  upon  the  face  of  the  bill, 
could  be  raised  in  Equity  by  demurrer,  certainly 
with  respect  to  real  estate.  Dawkins  v.  Pen- 
rhyn,  4  App.  Cas.  51;  6  Ch.  D.  318;  Noyes  v. 
Crawley,  10  Ch.  D.  31;  see  Allcard  ?».  Skinner, 
36  Ch.  D.  145,  186.  In  America  this  defence, 
clearly  appearing  upon  the  bill,  may  be  taken 
by  demurrer.  Lansdale  v.  Smith,  106  U.  S. 
391;  Retzer  v.  Wood,  109  U.  S.  185;  Speidel  v. 
Henrici,  120  U.S.  377;  Bryan  v.  Kales,  134 
U.  S.  126;  Underhill  v.  Mobile  Fire  D.  Ins.  Co. 
67  Ala.  45;  Doe  v.  Sanger,  78  Cal.  150;  Foggr. 
Price,  145  Mass.  513;  Caldwell  u.  Montgomery, 
8  Ga.  100;  Henry  County  v.  Winnebago  Drain- 
age Co.  52  111.  299,  454;  Bell  v.  Johnson,  111 
111.  374;  Wilhelm's  Appeal,  79  Penn.  St.  120. 

The  defence  of  laches,  lapse  of  time,  or  ac- 
quiescence, ma3r  also  be  taken  by  demurrer, 
when  appearing  upon  the  bill.  Rolfe  v.  Greg- 
ory, 31  L.  J.  Ch.  710;  S.  C.  10  W.  R.  711; 
Dossee  v.  Mookerjee,  7  Moo.  Ind.  App.  4;  Wol- 
lensak  v.  Reiher,  115  U.  S.  96;  Hoxsey  v.  New 
Jersey  M.  R.  Co.  33  N.  J.  Eq.  119 ;  Furlong  v. 
Riley,  103  111.  628;  Thompson  v.  Phoenix  Ins. 
Co.  25  Fed.  Rep.  296;  Van  Vleet  v.  Sledge,  45 
id.  743;  Hmchman  v.  Kelley,  54  id.  63.  The 
Court  maj'  also  raise  this  objection  of  its  own 
motion.  Taylor  v.  Holmes,  127  U.  S.  489; 
Norris  v.  Haggin,  136  U.  S.  386;  28  Fed.  Rep. 
275;  Marsh  v.  Whitmore,  21  Wall.  178,  185; 
Sullivan  v.  Portland  Railroad  Co.  94  U.  S.  806. 
When  the  legal  and  equitable  remedies  for  the 
same  cause  of  action  are  concurrent,  if  the  legal 
remedy  is  barred,  the  equitable  remedy  is  barred 
also.  Smith  v.  Wood,  42  N.J.  Eq.  563;  see 
Arnett  v.  Finney,  41  id.  147.  As  to  what  con- 
stitutes laches,  see  Ibid. ;  A'e  Metropolitan  Coal 
Consumers'  Ass'n,  [1892]  3  Ch.  1;  Dawson  v. 
Lepper,  29  L.  R.  Ir.  211;  Ware  v.  Galveston 
City  Co.  146  U.  S.  102;  Johnston  v.  Standard 
In.  Co.  148  U.  S.  360;  Young  v.  Clarendon 
Township,  132  U.  S.  340;  Moore  v.  Crawford, 
130  U.  S.  122;  Ruckman  v.  Cory,  129  U.  S. 
387;  United  States  v.  Beebe,  127  U.  S.  338;  17 
Fed.  Rep.  36;  United  States  v.  Tichenor,  12  id. 
415;  Graham  v.  Boston,  H.  &  E.  R.  Co.  14  id. 


753;  United  States  v.  Alexandria,  19  id.  609, 
614;  Underwood  v.  Dugan,  24  id.  74;  Pratt  v. 
California  Mining  Co.  id.  869;  Billings  v.  Aspen 
M.  &  S.  Co.  51  id.  338;  Naddo  v.  Bardon,  id. 
493;  Harding  v.  Durand,  138  111.  515;  Herbert 
v.  Herbert,  47  N.  J.  Eq.  11;  Morse  v.  Hill,  136 
Mass.  60;  Nudd  v.  Powers,  id.  273;  Cooker. 
Barrett,  155  Mass.  413  ;  Douglass  r.  Douglass, 
72  Mich.  86;  Whitridge  v.  Whitridge,  76  Md. 
54;  32  Am.  Law  Reg.  319.  Laches  may  be 
imputed  to  either  a  plaintiff  or  a  defendant  in 
Equity.  Brown  v.  Lake  Superior  Iron  Co.  134 
U.  S.  530.  The  defence  of  laches,  assigned  in  a 
demurrer,  is  not  waived  by  withdrawing  such 
demurrer.  Snow  v.  Boston  Blank  Book  Manuf. 
Co.  153  Mass.  456.  Laches  does  not  necessarily 
cease  upon  the  institution  of  a  suit,  which  must 
be  prosecuted  diligently.  Johnston  v.  Standard 
Min.  Co.  148  U.  S.  360;  Sebring  v.  Sebring,  43 
N.  J.  Eq.  59.  It  applies  against  the  govern- 
ment when  suing  with  respect  to  matters  of 
business.  United  States  v.  McElroy,  25  Fed. 
Rep.  804.  The  Federal  Courts  usually  follow 
by  analogy  State  Statutes  of  Limitation,  but 
they  will  not  permit  those  statutes  to  limit  their 
Equity  jurisdiction.  Tice  v.  School-district  No. 
18,  17  Fed.  Rep.  283;  Bisbee  v.  Evans,  id. 
474. 

In  cases  of  trusts,  where  the  trustee  has  con- 
cealed the  fa>  ts  from  the  cestui  que  trust,  Equity 
will  apply  the  doctrine  of  laches.  Where,  for 
thirty-six  years,  a  trustee  fraudulently  con- 
cealed a  trust  from  the  beneficiary,  the  Litter's 
delay,  during  six  months  after  he  received  the 
information,  to  bring  suit,  was  held  not  to  con- 
stitute laches.  Middaugh  v.  Fox,  135  111.  344; 
see  Re  Cross,  20  Ch.  D.  109 ;  Re  Burge,  57  L.  T. 
304;  Kennedy  v.  Winn,  80  Ala.  165.  The  cestui 
que  trust  must,  however,  set  forth  in  his  bill  the 
circumstances  and  the  impediments  to  an  earlier 
prosecution  of  his  demand.  Badger  r.  Badger, 
2  Wall.  87;  2  Cliff.  137,  154;  Richards  V.  Mac- 
kall,  124  U.  S.  183  ;  Wood  v.  Carpenter,  101  U. 
S.  135;  Teall  v.  Slaven,  14  Sawyer,  364;  Forbes 
v.  Overby,  4  Hughes,  441;  Barber  r.  Houston, 
14  L.  R.  Ir.  273;  18  id.  475.'  In  cases  of  con- 
structive trusts,  relief  must  be  sought  within  a 
reasonable  time.  Beckford  v.  Wade,  17  Yes. 
88;  Gwynne  v.  Gell,  20  L.  T.  N.  S.  508;  Small- 
combe's  case,  L.  R.  3  Eq.  769;  Chetham  v. 
Hoare,  L.  R.  9  Eq.  571;  Hendrickson  r.  Hen- 
drickson,  42  N.  J.  Eq.  657;  Le  Gendre  v. 
Byrnes,  44  id.  372;  Gillette  v.  Wiley,  126  111. 
310.  A  cestui  que  trust  is  not  precluded  from 
asserting  his  right  to  the  trust  fund,  when  col- 
lected, bj'  delay  in  enforcing  the  trustee's  per- 
sonal liability.  Ames  v.  Brooks,  143  Mass. 
344.  The  trustee  of  an  express  trust  cannot  set 
up  the  defence  of  laches  against  the  cestui  que 


*^61 


DEMURRERS. 


tlie  case,  the  Court  will  infer  acquiescence,  or  confirmation,  or  a  release. 

Such  inference  is  an  inference  of  fact,  and  not  an  inference  of 
*  561    law,  and  cannot  be  raised  on  demurrer  ; 2  *  because  a  defendant 

has  no  right  to  avail  himself,  by  demurrer,  of  an  inference  of 
fact  upon  matters  on  which  a  jury,  in  a  Court  of  Law,  or  the  Court  iu 
Equity,  would  collect  matter  of  fact  to  decide  their  verdict.1 

10.  The  non-compliance  with  the  requirements  of  the  Statute  of 
Frauds  may  also  be  a  ground  of  demurrer ;  for  there  can  be  no  doubt 
but  that  a  bill  may  contain  such  statements  as  to  entitle  a  defendant, 
by  general  demurrer,  to  take  advantage  of  the  want  of  signature  to  an 
agreement ;  because  it  might  appear  clear  that  the  plaintiff  was  not 
entitled  to  the  relief  he  asked.2     It  is,  however,  more  usual  to  plead 


2  Cuthbert  v.  Creasy,  6  Mad.  189 ;  Re  Ruth- 
erford, 14  Ch.  D.  687." 

1  Ld.  Red.  213.  A  demurrer  would  un- 
doubtedly lie  to  a  bill  for  the  redemption  of  a 
mortgage,  after  a  great  length  of  time  had 
elapsed,  if  the  bill  was  so  framed  as  to  present 
the  objection  without  any  attendant  circum- 
stances to  obviate  it.  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  503.  As 
to  the  length  of  time  which  will  bar  a  redemp- 
tion of  a  mortgage,  see  Acherley  v.  Roe,  5  Yes. 
573,  Perkins's  note  ("),  and  c~ses  cited;  Hardy 
r.  Reeves,  4  Ves.  466,  note  (a);  Trash  v.  White, 
3  Bro.  C.  C.  (Perkins's  ed.)  291,  note  («),  and 
cases  cited;  Phillips  v.  Sinclair,  20  Maine,  209. 
In  reference  to  the  length  of  time  which  will 
bar  a  bill  for  an  account,  see  Acherley  v.  Roe, 
5  Ves.  565,  Perkins's  note  (b),  and  cases  cited; 
Stackhouse  v.  Bamston,  10  id.  453,  note  (</), 
and  cases  cited. 

Laches  and  neglect  are  always  discounte- 
nanced in  Equity,  and  will  constitute  a  bar  to 
relief  even  where  there  has  been  fraud.  Brown 
v.  County  of  Buena  Vista.  95  U.  S.  157,  citing 
Smith  v.  Clay,  Amb.  645.  And  to  let  in  the 
defence  it  is  not  necessary  that  a  foundation 
should  be  laid  bv  averment  in  the  answer. 
Sullivan  v.  Portland  &c.  R.  Co.  94  U.  S.  806. 
Where  the  lapse  of  time  is  sufficient  to  raise 
the  presumption  of  the  payment  of  a  judgment 
on  which  the  bill  is  based,  a  demurrer  will  lie. 
Bird  v.  Inslee,  18  N.  J.  Eq.  363;  Harris  v. 
Vaughn,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  487.  And  although 
the  defence  of  the  Statute  of  Limitations  may 
be  made  by  demurrer,  plea,  or  answer,  it  must 
be  somewhere  set  up  in  the  pleadings,  or  it  will 
not  avail.  Ruckman  v.  Decker,  23  N.  J.  Eq. 
283;  Graham  v.  Nelson,  5  Humph.  605;  Merri- 
man  v.  Cannovan,  1  Leg.  Rep.  94.  But  if 
made  by  demurrer  which  is  overruled,  it  may 


trust,  unless  their  relation  has  become  adverse 
and  the  former  has  openly  denied  the  right  of 
the  cestui  que  trust.  Etting  r.  Marx,  4  Fed. 
Rep.  673;  Preston  v.  Walsh,  10  id.  315;  Speidel 
v.  Henrici,  15  id.  753;  Manaudes  ».  Mann,  22 

55G 


be  again  set  up  by  answer,  and  the  Court  will 
sustain  it  on  the  final  hearing,  if  of  opinion  that 
the  defence  should  have  been  allowed  on  de- 
murrer. Bolton  v.  Dickens,  2  Cent.  L.  J.  477, 
a  decision  of  Chancellor  Morgan  of  Memphis. 
And  the  defendant  may  avail  himself  of  the 
Statute  of  Limitations  by  demurrer,  as  well 
where  the  remedy  alone  is  barred,  leaving  the 
right  intact,  as  where  the  right  is  itself  extin- 
guished by  lapse  of  time.  Wyatt  v.  Luton,  10 
Heisk.  458. 

2  Per  Lord  Langdale  in  Field  v.  Hutchin- 
son, 1  Beav.  600:  3  Jur.  792;  see  also  Howard 
v.  Okeover,  3  Swanst.  421,  n.;  Barkworth  v. 
Young,  4  Drew.  1 :  Wood  r.  Midgley,  5  De  G. 
M.  &  G.  41;  Middlebrook  v.  Bromley,  9  Jur. 
N.  S.  614;  11  W.  R.  712,  Y.  C.  K. ;  Da  vies  r. 
Otty,  33  Beav.  540;  2  De  G.  J.  &  S.  238;  Heard 
i'.  Pilley,  L.  R.  4  Ch.  548;  Dolling  v.  Evans,  15 
W.  R.  394.  A  defence  founded  on  the  Statute 
of  Frauds  could  not,  under  the  Rules  of  Court 
of  1875,  Order  19,  Rule  23,  be  raised  by  demur- 
rer, but  it  was  to  be  set  up  as  an  affirmative 
defence.  Catling  v.  King,  5  Ch.  D.  660 ;  Clarke 
v.  Callow,  46  L.  J.  Ch.  53;  Futcher  v.  Callow, 
50  id.  735  ;  Futcher  v.  Futcher,  id.  735;  29  W. 
K.  884;  Shardlow  v.  Cotterill,  W.  N.  (1881)  2; 
ante,  p.  365,  note ;  Meach  v.  Stone,  1  D.  Chip. 
182.  In  a  suit  for  specific  performance  of  a 
contract  in  relation  to  land,  if  the  agreement 
appears  in  the  bill  to  be  oral,  and  no  facts  are 
alleged  to  take  the  case  out  of  the  Statute  of 
Frauds,  the  defendant  may  demur  to  the  bill. 
Cozine  v.  Graham,  2  Paige,  177  ;  Walker  v. 
Locke,  5  Cush.  90,  93;  Slack  v.  Black,  109 
Mass.  496;  Ahrend  v.  Odiome,  118  Mass.  268; 
Macey  v.  Childress,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  438.  But  if 
the  agreement  does  not  appear  in  the  bill  to  be 
oral,  the  proper  course  to  take  advantage  of  the 


Oregon,  525.  In  England,  see  the  Trustee  Acts 
(37  &  38  Vic.  c.  57,  §  8;  51  &  52  Vic.  c.  59,  §  8) ; 
Re  Swain,  [1891]  3  Ch.  233;  Re  Davis,  id.  119; 
Re  Barker,  [1892]  2  Ch.  491;  Re  Gurney,  Mason 
v.  Mercer,  [1893]  1  Ch.  590. 


DIFFERENT   GROUNDS   OF   DEMURRER. 


562 


this  statute,  as  it  is  seldom  that  the  bill  discloses  everything  necessary 
for  the  defence.8 

11.  If  it  appears,  by  the  bill,  that  another  suit  is  pending  relating  to 
the  same  matter,  a  defendant  may  demur.  Such  a  demurrer,  however, 
will  not  hold,  unless  it  appears,  by  the  bill,  that  the  suit  already  depend- 
ing will  afford  to  the  plaintiff  the  same  relief  as  he  would  have  been 
entitled  to  under  the  bill  which  is  the  subject  of  the  demurrer.4 

II.  The  grounds  upon  which  a  bill  may  be  demurred  to,  by  reason  of 
a  deficiency  in  matters  of  form,  are,  as  we  have  seen,  as  follows.5 
1.  Because  the  plaintiff's  place  of  abode  is  not  stated.6  *2.  Be-  *  5G2 
cause  the  facts  essential  to  the  plaintiff's  right,  and  within  his 
own  knowledge,  are  not  alleged  positively.1  3.  Because  the  bill  is 
deficient  in  certainty.2  4.  Because  the  plaintiff  does  not,  by  his  bill, 
offer  to  do  equity  where  the  rules  of  the  Court  require  that  he  should  do 
so ; 8  or  to  waive  penalties  or  forfeitures,  where  the  plaintiff  is  in  a 
situation  to  make  such  waiver.4  To  these  may  be  added  :  5.  The  want 
of  counsel's  signature  to  the  bill ; 6  and  6.  The  absence  of  the  proper 
affidavit,  in  those  cases  in  which  the  rules  of  the  Court  require  that  the 
plaintiff's  bill  should  be  accompanied  by  one.6 

The  grounds  of  demurrer  before  pointed  out  apply  to  the  relief  prayed 
by  the  bill,  and  not  to  the  discovery,  further  than  as  it  is  incidental  to 


Statute  of  Frauds  is  by  plea  or  answer.  Cran- 
ston v.  Smith,  6  R.  I.  231 ;  Dudley  v.  Bachelder, 
53  Maine,  403,  406.  If  it  is  stated  generally  in 
a  bill  that  an  agreement  or  contract  was  made, 
the  Court  will  presume  it  was  a  legal  contract 
until  the  contrary  appears ;  and  the  defendant 
must  either  plead  the  fact  that  it  was  not  in 
writing,  or  insist  upon  that  defence  in  his  answer. 
Dudley  v.  Bachelder,  53  Maine,  403,  406;  Farn- 
ham  v.  Clements,  51  Maine,  420;  ante,  p.  305, 
note;  infra,  p.  055,  note.  If  it  appears  that  the 
minds  of  contracting  parties  have  not  met,  this 
objection  may  be  taken  by  demurrer  or  at  the 
hearing.  Lewis  v.  Brass,  20  W.  R.  152;  Crossley 
v.  Maycock,  L.  R.  18  Eq.  180;  Hussey  v.  Home 
Payne,  4  App.  Cas.  311;  8  Ch.  D.  670;  1  Dan. 
Ch.  Prac.  (6th  Eng.  ed.)  535  ;  Williams  v. 
Brisco,  22  Ch.  D.  441 ;  Beresford  v.  Batthyany, 
W.  N.(1882)  84, 171.  Soabill  is  demurrableif 
conditions  precedent  appear  not  to  be  fulfilled 
in  law  or  fact.  Mnckay  v.  Dick,  6  App.  Cas. 
251;  Winn  v.  Bull,  7Ch.  D.  29;  Hudson  v. 
Buck,  id.  683;  Bolton  i\  Lambert,  41  Ch.  D. 
295;  Harvey  v.  Barnard's  Inn,  29  W.  R.  922; 
W.N.  (188*1)  133;  Hawkesworth  v.  Chaffey, 
55  L.  J.  Ch.  335;  Wood  t;.  Silcock,  50  L.  T.  251. 

3  See  ante,  p.  365,  note.  For  form  of  de- 
murrer, see  Vol.  III. 

4  Law  v.  Rigby,  4  Bro.  C.  C.  60,  63 ;  see 
also  Peareth  ».  Peareth,  John.  58;  Singleton 
r.  Selwyn,  9  Jur.  N.  S.  1149;  12  W.  R.  98, 
V.  C.  W.  As  to  demurrers  on  the  ground  of 
res  judicata,  see  Waine  v.  Crocker,  10  W.  R. 
204,  L.  JJ.;  3  De  G.  F.  &  J.  421;  Knight  v. 
Atkisson,2  Tenn.  Ch.  387;  Birmingham  Estates 


Co.  v.  Smith,  13  Ch.  D.  506:  Moss  v.  Anglo- 
Egvptian  Nav.  Co.  L.  R.  1  Ch.  108;  12  Jur. 
N.  S.  13. 

5  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §§  528,  529;  Ld.  Red.  206. 
A  demurrer  will  not  hold  to  an  irregularity  of 
practice  in  regard  to  the  bringing  or  tiling  of  a 
bill,  suggesting  matters  of  fact  which  do  not 
otherwise  appear  by  the  bill.  Tallmadge  v. 
Lovett,  3  Edw.  Ch.  563. 

6  Ante,  p.  357;  Winnipiseogee  Lake  Co.  r. 
Young,  40  N.  H.  42;  see  Howe  v.  Harvey,  8 
Paige,  73.  It  is  not  a  ground  of  demurrer  that 
the  plaintiff  omits  to  state  his  occupation  or 
addition.     Gove  v.  Pettis,  4  Sandf.  Ch.  403. 

1  Ante,  p.  630;  on  this  head,  see  Smith  r. 
Kay,  7  H.  L.  Cas.  750,  which  decided  that  the 
point  must  be  raised  on  demurrer. 

2  Ante,  pp.  368,  371,  372. 

3  Ante,  p.  385. 

*  Ante,  pp.  386,  387. 

5  Ante,  p.  312;  see  Graham  v.  Elmore,  Har- 
ring.  Ch.  265.  But  in  Gove  v.  Pettis,  4  Sandf. 
Ch.  403,  it  was  held  that  a  demurrer  could  not 
be  taken  for  an  omission  of  the  signature  of  the 
solicitor  or  counsel  to  the  bill,  but  that  it  is  a  fit 
subject  for  a  motion  to  take  the  bill  from  the 
files  of  the  Court. 

6  Id.  p.  360;  Gove  v.  Pettis,  4  Sandf.  Ch. 
403.  The  defendant  is  not  bound  to  look  be- 
yond the  copy  of  the  bill,  which  is  served  on 
his  solicitor;  and  if  that  does  not  contain  the 
requisite  affidavit  or  verification  to  give  the 
Court  jurisdiction  of  the  case,  he  may  demur 
to  the  bill  on  that  ground.  Lansing  v.  Pine, 
4  Paige,  364. 

557 


*5G3 


DEMURRERS. 


the  relief.7  It  has,  however,  been  stated 8  that  there  are  cases  in  which 
a  defendant  may  demur  to  the  discovery  sought  by  the  bill,  although 
such  demurrer  will  not  extend  to  preclude  the  plaintiff  from  having  the 
relief  prayed,  provided  he  can  establish  his  right  to  it  by  other  means 
than  a  discovery  from  the  defendant  himself. 

In  consequence  of  the  changes  which  have  taken  place  in  the  practice 
of  the  Court  of  Chancery,  demurrers  to  discovery  are  now  of  rare  occur- 
rence (the  objection  being  almost  always  taken  by  answer) ; 9  but  in 
determining  the  question  whether  a  party  is  bound  to  give  the  discovery 
sought  by  the  other  side,  the  Court  is  guided  by  the  same  rules  as  it 
formerly  acted  on  in  allowing  or  overruling  demurrers  to  discovery. 
These  rules  (which  we  shall  now  proceed  to  consider),  therefore,  still 
remain  of  importance. 

Demurrers  to  discovery  may  be  arranged  under  the  following  heads : 10 
I.  That  the  discovery  may  subject  the  defendant  to  pains  and  penalties, 
or  to  some  forfeiture,  or  something  in  the  nature  of  forfeiture.  II. 
That,  in  conscience,  the  defendant's  right  is  equal  to  the  plain- 
*  563  tiff's.  III.  That  the  discovery  sought  is  immaterial  *  to  the 
relief  prayed.  IV.  That  the  discovery  would  be  a  breach  of 
professional  confidence.  V.  That  the  discovery  relates  only  to  the 
defendant's  case.  VI.  That  a  third  party  has  an  interest  in  the  dis- 
covery, and  ought  not  to  be  prejudiced.  VII.  That  the  discovery 
might  be  injurious  to  public  interests. 

I.  We  have  before  seen,  that  in  cases  where  the  plaintiff  is  the  person 
who  is  entitled  to  the  advantage  of  the  penalty,  or  of  the  forfeiture,  to 
which  the  defendant  would  render  himself  liable  by  making  the  dis- 
covery sought,  he  may  obviate  a  demurrer  by  expressly  waiving  his 
right  to  the  penalty  or  forfeiture  in  his  bill : 1  the  effect  of  which  waiver 
is,  to  enable  the  defendant,  in  case  the  plaintiff  should  sue  him  for  the 
penalty,  or  endeavor  to  take  advantage  of  the  forfeiture,  to  apply  to  the 
Court  for  an  injunction  to  restrain  him  from  proceeding.2  But  where 
the  forfeiture  or  penalty  is  not  of  such  a  nature  that  the  plaintiff  can, 
by  waiver,  relieve  the  defendant  from  the  consequence  of  his  discovery, 
a  demurrer  will  hold ; 3  for  it  is  a  general  rule  that  no  one  is  bound  to 
answer  so  as  to  subject  himself  to  punishment,  in  whatever  manner  that 
punishment  may  arise,  or  whatever  may  be  the  nature  of  that  punish- 
ment, whether  it  arises  by  the  Ecclesiastical  Law,  or  by  the  law  of  the 
land.4    This  rule  is  not  confined  to  cases  in  which  the  discovery  must 


7  A  demurrer  will  be  allowed  to  a  bill  of 
discovery  in  aid  of  the  defence  to  a  suit  in  a 
foreign  Court.  Bent  v.  Young,  9  Sim.  180; 
but  see  contra,  Mitchell  v.  Smith,  1  Paige,  287; 
see  post,  Bills  of  Discovery,  (a) 

8  Ante.  p.  548;  see  Metier  v.  Metier,  18  X.  J. 
Eq.  270;  19  id.  457. 

9  Cons.  Ord.  XV.  4;  see  post,  Chap.  XVII., 
Answers,  and  see  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §§  10,  12. 


1°  For  form  of  demurrer  to  discovery,  see 
Vol.  III. 

i  Ante,  pp.  386,  387,  and  note. 

2  Ante,  p.  387. 

3  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  575;  March  v.  Davison, 
9  Paige,  580 ;  Ld.  Red.  194,  195 ;  2  Story,  Eq. 
Juf .  §  1494. 

*  Brownsword  v.  Edwards,  2  Ves.  Sr.  243, 
245;  Harrison  v.  Southcote,   1  Atk.  528,  539; 


(a)  The  rule  in  Bent  v.  Young  has  been  re- 
cently reconsidered  and  upheld  in  England. 
Dreyfus  v.  Peruvian  Guano  Co.  41  Ch.  D.  151; 
43  Ch.  D.  316.     In  America  the  general  course 

558 


of  decision  is  the  other  way.  Mitchell  v.  Smith, 
supra  ;  Burgess  v.  Smith.  2  Barb.  Ch.  276  ;  Post 
v.  Toledo  &c.  R.  Co.  144  Mass.  341. 


DIFFERENT    GROUNDS   OF   DEMURRER. 


564 


necessarily  subject  the  defendant  to  pains  and  penalties,  but  it  extends 
to  cases  where  it  may  do  so.5  If,  therefore,  a  bill  alleges  anything 
which,  if  confessed  by  the  answer,  may  subject  the  defendant  to  a 
criminal  prosecution,6  or  to  any  particular  penalties,  as  maintenance,7 
champerty,8  (a)  simony,9  or  subornation  of  perjury,10  the  defend- 
ant may   object   to  the  discovery.11  (6)     In  the  application   *  of    *  5G-L 


see  also  Parkhurst  v.  Lowten,  2  Swanst.  214; 
Hare  on  Discovery,  131,  132,  where  the  cases 
are  classed;  Brownell  r.  Curtis,  10  Paige,  213; 
Livingston  v.  Harris,  3  Paige,  528;  Patterson 
».  Patterson,  1  Hayw.  167;  Wolf  v.  Wolf,  2 
Har.  &  G.  382;  Lambert  v.  People,  9  Covven, 
578;  Northupt).  Hatch,  6  Conn.  361;  Leggettt. 
Postley,  2  Paige,  599 ;  T.'nited  States  r.  Twenty- 
Eight  Packages  &c,  Gilpin,  306;  Butler  v.  Cat- 
lin,  1  Root,  310;  Leigh  v,  Everhart,  4  Monroe, 
381 ;  Ocean  Ins.  Co.  v.  Field,  2  Story,  59 ;  Adams 
v.  Porter,  1  Cush.  170. 

But  a  party  is  bound  to  make  discovery,  al- 
though his  answer  may  subject  him  to  the  loss 
of  legal  interest.  Taylor  v.  Mitchell,  1  How. 
(Miss.)  596. 

5  Harrison  v.  Southcote,  1  Atk.  539. 

6  East  India  Co.  v.  Campbell,  1  Ves.  Sr.  246; 
Chetwynd  v.  Lindon,  2  Ves.  Sr.  450;  Cartwright 
v.  Green,  8  Ves.  405;  Claridge  v.  Hoare,  14  Ves. 
59,  65;  Maccalium  v.  Turton,  2  Y.  &  J.  183; 
Waters  v.  Earl  of  Shaftesbury,  12  Jur.  N.  S.  3; 
14  W.  R.  259,  V.  C.  S. 

7  Penrice  v.  Parker,  Rept.  temp.  Finch,  75; 
Sharp  v.  Carter,  3  P.  Wins.  375;  Wallis  v.  Duke 
of  Portland,  3  Ves.  494;  affirmed  by  H.  L.  id. 
761;  8  Bro.  P.  C.  161;  Mayor  of  London  v. 
Ainsley,  1  Anst.  158;  Scott  v.  Miller,  John. 
220,  328;  5  Jur.  N.  S.  858;  Harris  v.  Brisco, 
17  Q.  B.  D.  504. 

8  Hartley  v.  Russell,  2  S.  &  S.  244,  252. 
An  agreement  to  defray  the  expenses  of  a  suit 
in  which  he  has  no  interest  is  champertous. 
Hayney  v.  Coyne,  10  Heisk.  339.  But  an  at- 
torney's engagement  to  render  services  in  the 


(a)  "  An  assignment  pendente  lite  of  the  sub- 
ject of  a  suit  is  not  champerty  or  in  any  way 
illegal,  even  though  the  assignor  gives  the  as- 
sign a  power  of  attorney  to  sue  in  his  name, 
and  agrees  that  he  will  not  impede,  but  will 
assist  the  assign."  James  v.  Kerr,  40  Ch.  D. 
449,  457. 

(6)  Lamb  v.  Monster,  31  W.  R.  117;  Hun- 
nings  v.  Williamson,  10  Q.  B.  D.  459;  Dennison 
v.  Yost,  61  Md.  139.  A  witness  or  party  who 
objects,  on  this  ground,  to  answering  a  question 
which  is  innocent  in  form,  must  satisfy  the 
Court  that  it  is  reasonably  probable  that  the 
answer  will  criminate  him.  Ex  parte  Gilbert, 
3  M.  B.  C.  223;  Ex  parte  Reynolds,  20  Ch.  D. 
294;  Hayman  v.  Rugby  School,  L.  R.  18  Eq. 
28,  69;  Queen  v.  Ashwell,  16  Q.  B.  D.  190, 197; 


prosecution  of  a  suit,  in  consideration  of  receiv- 
ing a  share  of  the  property  recovered,  is  not. 
Duke  v.  Harper,  2  Mo.  App.  1;  S.  C.  on  appeal, 
66  Mo.  51.  And  see,  for  recent  rulings  on 
champerty,  Coughlin  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  &c.  R.  Co. 
71  N.  Y.  445;  Adye  v.  Hanna,  47  Iowa,  364; 
Schomp  v.  Schenk,  40  N.  J.  L.  195;  Kennedy 
v.  Brown,  13  C.  B.  N.  S.  677;  McPherson  v. 
Cox,  96  U.  S.  404;  Coondoou.  Mookerjee,  2  App. 
Cas.  186. 

9  Att.-Gen.  v.  Sudel,  Prec.  Ch.  214;  Park- 
hurst v.  Lowten,  1  Mer.  391,  401. 

10  Selby».Crew,2Anst.504;  Baker  r.Priteh- 
ard,  2  Atk.  389;  as  to  discovering  returns  made 
to  Income  Tax  Commissioners,  see  Mitchell  v. 
Koecker,  11  Beav.  380. 

11  In  Livingston  v.  Tompkins,  3  John.  Ch. 
452,  it  is  said  that  "there  are  numerous  cases 
establishing  the  rule  that  no  one  is  bound  to 
answer  so  as  to  subject  himself,  either  directly 
or  eventually,  to  a  forfeiture  or  penalty,  or  any- 
thing in  the  nature  of  a  forfeiture  or  penalty." 
See  the  cases  there  cited;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  583; 
Northup  v.  Hatch,  6  Conn.  361;  Skinner  v. 
Judson,  8  Conn.  528;  Wolf  v.  Wolf,  2  Ilarr.  & 
G.  382;  Livingston  v.  Harris,  3  Paige,  528; 
United  States  v.  Twenty-Eight  Packages,  Gil- 
pin, 306.  The  objection  by  the  defendants, 
who  were  officers  of  a  corporation,  that  a  dis- 
covery of  the  matters  stated  in  the  bill  may 
subject  the  corporation  to  a  forfeiture  of  its 
charter,  is  not  sufficient  to  support  a  general 
demurrer  to  the  relief  as  well  as  to  the  discovery 
sought  by  the  bill.  Robinson  v.  Smith,  3  Paige, 
222. 


Webb  v.  East,  5  Ex.  D.  23,  108;  Harvey  v. 
Lovekin,  10  P.  D.  122.  There  is  no  exemption 
if  the  Statute  of  Limitations  bars  a  prosecution 
for  the  penalty,  and  it  affirmatively  appears 
that  no  prosecution  is  then  pending.  Man- 
chester &  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Concord  R.  Co.  (N.  II.) 
9  L.  R.  A.  689;  Southern  Ry.  News  Co.  r.  Rus- 
sell (Ga.),  18  S.  E.  Rep.  40."  If  the  witness  is 
not  himself  guilty  of  the  offence,  he  cannot  on 
this  ground  refuse  to  produce  documents  before 
a  grand  jury.  Be  Peasley,  44  Fed.  Rep.  271. 
The  judge  in  his  discretion  may  require  an  oath 
that  the  answer  will  or  may  criminate  the  party. 
Post,  p.  569;  Hill  v.  Campbell,  L.  R  10  C.  P. 
222,  247;  Bowdon  v.  Allen,  39  L.  J.  C.  P.  217; 
The  Mary,  L.  R.  2  A.  &  E.  319.  Upon  a  peti- 
tion for  dissolution  of  marriage,  discovery  will 

559 


565 


DEMURRERS. 


this  principle  it  has  been  held,  that  a  married  woman  will  not  be  com- 
pelled to  answer  a  bill  which  would  subject  her  husband  to  a  charge  of 
felony.1 

It  is  not  necessary  to  the  validity  of  an  objection  of  this  nature,  that 
the  facts  inquired  after  should  have  an  immediate  tendency  to  criminate 
the  defendant ;  he  may  equally  object  to  answering  the  circumstances, 
though  they  have  not  such  an  immediate  tendency.2 

It  results  from  the  principle  above  laid  down,  that  a  defendant  is  not 
bound  to  make  any  discovery  which  may  tend  to  show  himself  to  have 
been  guilty  of  any  moral  turpitude,  which  may  expose  him  to  ecclesias- 
tical censure :  thus,  it  has  been  held,  that  a  defendant  is  not  bound  to 
discover  whether  a  child  was  born   out  of  lawful  wedlock  ; 3  nor  is  an 

unmarried  woman  bound  to  discover  whether  she  and  the  plaintiff 
*  565    cohabited  together.4    It  has  been  *  held,  however,  that  a  woman  is 

bound  to  discover  where  her  child  was  born,  though  it  might  tend 
to  show  the  child  to  be  an  alien.1  It  has  also  been  held,  that  though 
parties  may  demur  to  anything  which  may  expose  them  to  ecclesiastical 
censure,  a  defendant  cannot  protect  himself  from  discovery  whether  he 
has  or  has  not  a  legitimate  son  ; 2  and  the  objection  to  answering  upon 
the  ground  that  the  answer  might  show  a  defendant  to  be  guilty  of  moral 


i  Cartwright  v.  Green,  8  Ves.  405,  410 ;  ante, 
p.  184;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  519. 

2  East  India  Co.  v.  Campbell,  ubi  supra  ;  see 
also  Lee  v.  Read",  5  Beav.  381,  386.    In  Paxtou 
V.  Douglas,  19  Ves.  225,  227,  Lord  Eldon  said: 
"In  no  stage  of  the  proceedings  in  this  Court 
can  a  party  be  compelled  to  answer  any  ques- 
tion, accusing  himself,  or  any  one  in  a  series  of 
questions  that  has  a  tendency  to  that  effect;  the 
rule  in  these  cases  being,  that  he  is  at  liberty 
to  protect  himself  against  answering,  not  only 
the  direct  question,  whether  he  did  what  was 
illegal,  but  also  every  question  fairly  appearing 
to  be  put  with  the  view  of  drawing  from  him 
an  answer  containing   nothing  to   affect  him, 
except  as  it  is  one  link  in  a  chain  of  proof  that 
is  to  affect  him."     See  Maccallum  V.  Turtou, 
and  Claridge  v.  Hoare,  vbi  supra  ;  Thorpe  v. 
Macauley,  5  Mad.  218,  229.    A  defendant  will 
not  be  compelled  to  discover  that  which,  if  an- 
swered, would  tend  to  subject  him  to  a  penalty 
or  punishment,  or  which  might  lead  to  a  criminal 
accusation,  or  to  ecclesiastical  censure.    Thorpe 
v.  Macauley,  5  Mad.  229  :  Maccallum  v.  Turton, 
2  Y.  &  J.  138;  Leggett  v.  Postley,  2  Paige,  599; 
Patterson  v.  Patterson,  1  Hayw.  168 ;  Wolf  v. 
Wolf.  2  Harr.  &  G.  382;  MTntyre  v.  Mancius, 
15  John.  592;  Sloman  v.  Kelley,  3  Y.  &  C  573; 
Ocean  Ins.  Co.  v.  Fields,  2  Story,' 59;  Bishop  of 


London  v.  Fythche,  1  Bro.  C.  C.  (Perkins's  ed.) 
96,  and  note* ;  Adams  v.  Porter,  1  Cush.  170; 
Marsh  v.  Marsh,  16  N.  J.  Eq.  391,  397. 

In  case  of  witnesses,  it  is  said  that  "many 
links  frequently  compose  that  chain  of  testi- 
mony which  is  necessary  to  convict  an  indi- 
vidual of  a  crime,  but  no  witness  is  compellable 
to  furnish  any  one  of  them  against  himself." 
Marshall  C.  J.,  1  Burr's  Trial,  244;  The  People 
v.  Mather,  4  Wend.  229  ;  Southard  v.  Rexford,  6 
Cowen,  254;  Bellenger  v.  The  People,  8  Wend. 
595;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  553;  see  post,  p.  579,  n.  5. 

3  Att.-Gen.  v.  Duplessis,  Parker,  163.  As 
to  proof  of  non-access  and  how  far  parents  can 
bastardize  their  issue,  see  Anon.  v.  Anon.  22 
Beav.  481;  23  Be*v.  273;  Legge  v.  Edmonds, 
25  L.  J.  Oh.  125,  V.  C.  W.;  Plowes  v.  Bossey, 
2  Dr.  &  Sm.  145;  8  Jur.N.  S.  352;  Be  Kideout, 
L.  R.  10  Eq.  41 ;  Cannon  v.  Cannon,  7  Humph. 
410;  Burnaby  v.  Baillie,  42  Ch.  D.  282;  and 
other  cases  collected  in  Taylor  on  Evid  §  868. 

4  Franco  v.  Bolton,  3  Ves.  368,  371.372;  see 
on  this  subject  Benyon  v.  Nettleford,  3  M'N.  & 
G.  94,  and  the  cases  collected  in  the  note,  id. 
100. 

1  Att.-Gen.  v.  Duplessis,  ubi  supra ;  see 
Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  586  and  note. 

2  Finch  v.  Finch,  2  Ves.  Sr.  491,  493. 


not  be  required  from  a  party  for  the  purpose  of 
proving  such  party  guilty  of  adultery.  Redfern 
v.  Redfern,  [1891]  P.  139;  64  L.  T.  68;  7  T.  L. 
R.  157;  Branford  v.  Branford,  4  P.  D.  72.  The 
objection  that  an  accounting  sought  by  the  bill 

560 


may  produce  evidence  for  a  criminal  accusation 
does  not  prevent  the  trial  of  the  issues  in  Equity 
under  the  rules  of  evidence  in  civil  cases.  War- 
ren v.  Holbrook,  95  Mich.  185. 


DIFFERENT   GROUNDS   OF   DEMURRER. 


*  566 


turpitude,  appears  to  be  confined  to  those  cases  where  the  moral  tur- 
pitude is  of  such  a  nature  as  would  lay  the  party  open  to  proceedings  in 
the  Ecclesiastical  or  other  Courts.  In  other  cases,  a  defendant  is  bound 
to  answer  fully,  notwithstanding  his  answer  may  cast  a  very  great  degree 
of  reflection  on  his  moral  character,3  or  may  render  him  liable  for 
fraudulent  dealings.4 

Where  the  discovery  might  subject  a  defendant  to  penalties  to  which 
the  plaintiff  is  not  entitled,  and  which  he  consequently  cannot  waive, 
yet,  if  the  defendant  has  expressly  covenanted  not  to  plead  or  demur 
to  the  discovery  sought,  he  will  be  compelled  to  answer.5  (a)  And  where 
a  person,  by  his  own  agreement,  subjects  himself  to  a  payment,  in  the 
nature  of  a  penalty,  if  he  does  a  particular  act,  a  demurrer  to  a  discovery 
of  that  act  will  not  hold.6 

*  Upon  the  principle  that  the  Court  will  not  allow  a  man  to  *  566 
contradict  what  he  has,  either  by  his  actions  or  express  words, 
asserted,  it  has  been  held,  that  a  person  who  represents  himself  to  be  a 
broker  of  the  city  of  London,  and  is  employed  in  that  character,  cannot 
afterwards  protect  himself  from  discovery  on  the  ground  that  he  was  not 
licensed  to  act  as  broker,  and  that,  by  answering,  he  may  expose  himself 
to  penalties.1 

It  would  appear,  that  where  a  defendant  is  entitled  to  the  protec- 
tion of  the  Court  against  a  discovery,  tending  to  establish  a  criminal 
charge,  he  cannot  deprive  himself  of  the  benefit  of  it  by  any  agreement 
whatever.2 


3  Per  Lord  Eldon,  in  Parkhurst  v.  Lowten, 
1  Mer.  400.  A  party  may  be  compelled  to 
make  discovery  of  any  act  of  moral  turpitude, 
which  does  not  amount  to  a  public  offence  or 
an  indictable  crime.  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §§  595, 
506;  Hare,  Discov.  142;  Macauley  v.  Shackwell, 
1  Bligh,  N.  S.  121;  S.  C.  2  Russ.  550,  note; 
Glynn  v.  Houston,  1  Keen,  229. 

4  Gartside  v.  Outran^  3  Jur.  N.  S.  39,  V.  C. 
W.  Therefore,  where  a  defendant  demurred 
to  such  part  of  the  bill  as  sought  a  discovery 
from  her  as  to  a  conspiracy  or  attempt  to  set 
up  a  bastard  child,  which  she  pretended  to  have 
by  a  person  who  kept  her,  and  was  desirous  to 
have  a  child  by  her,  the  demurrer  was  over- 
ruled, because  the  conspiracy,  or  attempt  to  set 
up  the  bastard,  not  being  alleged  to  have  been 
for  the  purpose  of  defeating  the  heir,  was  not  of 
itself  an  offence.  Chetwynd  v.  Lindon,  2  Ves. 
Sr.  450. 

5  South  Sea  Co.  v.  Bumsted,  1  Eq.  Cas.  Abr. 
77,  pi.  16;  East  India  Co.  v.  Atkins,  cited  id.; 
1  Stra.  168;  Paxton  v.  Douglas,  16  Ves.  239. 


6  Ld.  Red.  195;  Morse  v.  Buckworth,  2  Vem. 
443;  East  India  Co.  r.  Neave,  5  Ves.  173,  185. 
Thus,  where  a  lessee  covenanted  not  to  dig 
loam,  with  a  proviso  that,  if  he  did,  he  should 
pay  to  the  lessor  205.  a  cart  load,  and  he  after- 
wards dug  great  quantities:  upon  a  bill  being 
filed  by  the  lessor  for  a  discovery  of  the  quanti- 
ties, waiving  any  possible  forfeiture,  a  demurrer 
by  the  lessee,  because  the  discovery  might  sub- 
ject him  to  a  payment  by  way  of  penalty,  was 
overruled.  Ld.  Red.  195.  Upon  the  same 
principle,  where  servants  to  a  company  bind 
themselves  to  pay  a  specified  sum,  in  case  of  a 
breach  of  the  regulations  of  their  service,  they 
cannot  protect  themselves  from  answering,  as  to 
breaches,  because  they  would  be  subject  to  a 
penalty.  African  Co.  v.  Parish,  2  Vern.  244; 
East  India  Co.  v.  Neave,  ubimpra. 

1  Green  v.  Weaver,  1  Sim.  404,  432;  Robin- 
son v.  Kitchin,  21  Beav.  365;  2  Jur.  N.  S.  57; 
id.  294;  8  De  G.  M.  &  G.  88;  see  Storv,  Eq. 
PI.  §  589;  State  v.  Maury,  2  Del.  Ch.  141. 

2  Lea  v.  Reed,  5  Beav.  381,  385.     This  ap- 


(«)  See  Hukill  v.  Guffey,  37  W.  Va.  425.  A 
Court  of  Equity  never  inflicts  a  penalty,  al- 
though it  often  relieves  therefrom.  Fletcher  v. 
New  Orleans  R.  Co.  20  Fed.  Rep.  345;  Trow 
City  D.  Co.  v.  Curtin,  36  id.  829;  Mactier  v. 
Osborn,  146  Mass.  399.  Bills  of  foreclosure, 
and  bills  for  an  account  of  property  retained  to 

vol.  i. —  36 


secure  the  purchase  money,  do  not  seek  to 
enforce  a  forfeiture.  Field  v.  Ashley,  79  Mich. 
231.  As  forfeitures  are  not  favored,  covenants 
in  a  lease  are  construed  against  the  party  who 
seeks  the  forfeiture.  Faylor  v.  Brice  (Ind.),  34 
N.  E.  Rep.  833.  Forfeitures  will  not  be  declared 
upon  implication.  Waterman  v.  Clark,58  Vt.  601. 

561 


*5G7 


DEMURRERS. 


The  rule  that  a  defendant  is  not  bound  to  answer,  in  cases  which  may 
subject  him  to  punishment  or  penalties,  appears  to  be  liable  to  modifi- 
cation, in  some  cases,  where  the  facts  charged  in  the  bill  would  amount 
to  conspiracy : 3  and  also,  in  certain  cases  where  the  defendants  would 
appear  to  be  guilty  of  fraud,  or  of  publishing  a  libel  which  might  be  the 
subject  of  indictment,4  as  in  the  cases  which  have  frequently  occurred 
in  the  Court  of  Exchequer,  in  which  it  was  the  practice  of  underwriters, 
where  policies  of  insurance  were  found  to  be  affected  with  gross  frauds 
to  bring  the  parties  into  Court,  and  compel  them  to  answer,  by  stating  in 
their  bills  frauds  which  would  have  been  indictable.? 

The  Legislature  has,  in  some  cases,  expressly  provided  that  parties 
to  transactions  rendered  illegal  by  statute,  shall  be  compelled  to  answer 
bills  in  Equity  for  the  discovery  of  such  transactions  ;  in  such  cases, 
of  course,  the  defendant  cannot  protect  himself  from  the  discovery 
required,  on  the  ground  that  it  will  render  him  liable  to  the  penalties 
imposed  by  the  statute  itself.6  Thus,  trustees  and  other  persons 
*  567  who  are  *  liable  to  a  criminal  prosecution  for  the  fraudulent  mis- 
application of  moneys  intrusted  to  them,  are,  nevertheless,  bound 
to  give  discovery,  in  answer  to  a  bill  in  Equity.1  So,  also,  a  person  in 
fringing  a  trade-mark,  though  liable  to  prosecution,  must  give  discovery 
in  Equity.2  (a) 

If  a  party  be  liable  to  a  penalty  or  forfeiture,  provided  he  is  sued 
within  a  limited  time,  and  the  suit  is  not  commenced  till  after  the  limi- 
tation has  expired,  the  defendant  will  be  bound  to  answer  fully,  even 
though,  by  so  doing,  he  may  expose  his  character  and  conduct  to  reflec- 
tion ; 3  and  it  seems,  that  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  an  answer,  if  the 


pears  to  be  confined  to  criminal  cases,  see 
observation  of  Sir  J.  Romilly  M.  R.  in  Robinson 
v.  Kitchin,  21  Beav.  3G5,  370. 

3  Dnmmer  v.  Chippenham,  14  Yes.  245.  251 ; 
see  also  Lord  Eldon's  observation  in  Mayor  of 
London  v.  Levy,  8  Ves.  404:  and  Hare  on  Disc. 
143. 

•»  See  Wilmot  v.  Maceabe,  4  Sim.  2G3;  Story, 
Eq.  PI  §  597.  In  March  v.  Davidson,  9  Paige, 
580,  Mr.  Chancellor  Walworth  held,  that  in  the 
case  of  libel,  the  defendant  could  not  be  com- 
pelled in  a  bill  of  discovery  to  discover  anything 
which  would  make  him  liable  to  an  indictment 
criminally;  but  he  was  compellable  to  discover 
other  facts  in  support  of  the  action,  which 
would  not  subject  him  to  a  criminal  prosecu- 
tion, or  to  a  penalty  or  forfeiture. 

5  See  Macaulav  v.  Shackell,  1  Bligh,  N. 
S.  96. 

6  See  post,  p.  579,  n.  4.     The   New  York 


(a)  See  now  4G  &  47  Yic.  c.  57,  §  58;  Saun- 
ders r.  Wiel,  [1892]  2  Q.  B.  18,  321:  Adams  v. 
Batley,  18  Q.  B.  D.  625.  Upon  a  bill  for  in- 
fringing the  plaintiff's  copyright,  a  demurrer 
lies  to  an  allegation  in  the  bill,  requiring  an 

562 


Revised  Statutes,  and  a  statute  passed  since, 
have  provisions  which  compel  a  defendant  to 
make  a  discovery  in  many  cases  where  criminal 
prosecutions  and  penalties  can  take  place  and 
be  executed.  Thus  the  defendant  must  answer 
to  a  gaming  transaction  at  the  suit  of  the  loser 
or  any  other  person.  1  Rev.  Stat.  664,  §  19. 
As  to  money  illegally  received  for  brokerage, 
id.  709,  §  4.  As  to  money  and  things  taken 
usurious!}',  id.  772,  §  6.  And  also  in  all  cases 
where  the  defendant  is  charged  with  being  a 
party  to  a  fraudulent  conveyance.  New  York 
Laws  of  1833,  p.  17.  In  all  these  cases,  how- 
ever, the  effect  of  the  discovery  is  specially 
limited,  by  statute,  to  the  object  of  the  civil 
proceedings,  in  regard  to  which  it  is  sought. 
Graham  on  Jurisdiction  493. 

i  24  &  25  Vic.  c.  96,  §§  75-86. 

2  25  &  26  Vic.  c.  88,  §  11. 

s  Parkhurst  r.  Lowten,  1  Mer.  400;  Story, 


answer,  as  to  the  number  of  copies  sold  and  on 
hand  of  the  pirated  work.  Chapman  V.  Ferry, 
12  Fed.  Rep.  693;  see  Adams  v.  Batley,  56  L.  T. 
770. 


1 


DIFFERENT    GROUNDS   OF   DEMURRER.  *  568 

liability  ceases  after  the  defence  has  been  put  in,  and  before  it  is  heard, 
even  though  there  was  a  liability  at  the  time  of  putting  in  his  defence. 
This  has  been  decided  upon  a  plea,4  and  upon  exceptions  to  an  answer  ; 5 
and  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  same  decision  would  be  come  to  upon 
demurrer. 

It  has  been  before  stated,  that  if  the  executor  or  administrator  of  a 
parson  bring  a  bill  for  tithes,  he  need  not  offer  to  accept  the  single 
value  : 6  the  reason  of  which  rule  is,  that  the  treble  value  is  not  given, 
by  the  statute,  to  the  representatives  ;  and  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the 
same  reason  will  be  valid  against  allowing  a  demurrer,  in  all  cases  where 
the  penalty  is  personal,  and  does  not  survive  to  the  representatives  of 
the  person  entitled  to  sue  for  it.7 

A  defendant  cannot  refuse  to  give  discovery  on  the  ground  that  it  will 
expose  him  to  penalties  in  a  foreign  country.8 

Some  of  the  cases  in  which  a  demurrer  will  lie  to  a  bill,  on  the  ground 
that  the  discovery  required  will  expose  the  defendant  to  a  forfeiture, 
have  been  before  referred  to,9  for  the  purpose  of  illustrating  the  prin- 
ciple, that  where  it  is  in  the  power  of  a  plaintiff  to  waive  such  forfeiture, 
his  omission  to  do  so  may  be  taken  advantage  of  by  demurrer.10  The 
bill,  however,  will  be  equally  liable  to  this  species  of  objection,  in  cases 
where  the  plaintiff  has  no  power  to  waive  the  effects  of  the  discovery, 
as  in  those  where  he  has  such  power,  and  omits  to  exercise  it ;  there- 
fore, where  the  discovery  sought  by  an  information  would  have 
subjected  the  *  defendants  to  a  quo  icarranto,  a  demurrer  was  *  568 
allowed.1 

The  principle,  that  a  defendant  is  not  bound  to  give  discovery  which 
will  expose  him  to  a  forfeiture,  applies  equally,  whether  the  forfeiture  is 
enforceable  in  Equity  or  at  Law.a 

The  rule  applies  only  to  cases  where  a  forfeiture,  or  something  in  the 
nature  of  a  forfeiture,  may  be  incurred:  where  the  discovery  sought 
merely  extends  to  the  performance  of  a  condition  upon  failure  in  which 

F.q.  PI.  §  598;  Skinner  v.  Judson,  8  Conn.  528;  had  taken  place,  in  which  it  was  alle-ed  <he 

but  see  Northup  v.  Hatch,  0  Conn.  361;  Lam-  had  married  without  consent  :  Lord  Hardwicke 

bert  v.  People,  9  Cowen,  528.  allowed  the  demurrer,  as  she  could  not  answer 

4  Trinity  House  r.  Burge,  2  Sim.  411.  to  the  marriage  without  showing,  at  the  same 

&  Williams  v.  Farrington,  3  Bro.  C.  C.  38.  time,  that  it  was  against  consent.    Chancey  v. 

6  Ante'  P-  387-  Fenhoulet,  2  Ves.  Sr.  265 ,  S.  C.  nom.  Chauncev 

7  See  Hare  011  Disc-  148-  V.  Tahourden,  2  Atk.  392;  see  also  Hambrook 

8  King  of  the  Two  Sicilies  v.  Wilcox,  1  Sim.  v.  Smith,  17  Sim.  209;  16  Jur.  144;  Cooke  r. 
N.  S.  301;  15  Jur.  214;  distinguished  in  United  Turner,  14  Sim.  218;  8  Jur.  703.  In  a  case  of 
States  r.  M'Rea,  L.  Ii.  4  Eq.  327;  L.  B.  3  Ch.  this  nature,  where  the  husband  and  wife  put  in 
79.     See  Republic  of  Peru  v.  Dreyfus,  38  Ch.  separate  answers,  under  an  order  for  that  pur- 

■  348-  pose,  and  the  husband,  by  his  answer,  admitted 

a   te'  PP'  38G'  :587'  the   marriage   without  consent,   but   the   wife 

Story,  Eq.  PI.  §§  580,  581;    Lansing  v.  omitted  to  do  so,  Lord  Talbot,  upon  exceptions 

Pine,  4  Paige,  309;  ante,  p.  387.  being  taken  to  her  answer,  said,  that  be  could 

i  Att.-Gen.  o.  Reynolds,  1  Eq.Cas.  Abr.  131,  not  reconcile  himself  to  compelling  a  wife  to 

pi.  10.     In  like  manner,  where  a  legacy  was  confess  that  by  which  she  might  forfeit  all  she 

given  to  a  woman,  on  her  marriage,  with  a  con-  had  in   the  world,  and   beld  the  answer  to  be 

dition,  that  if  she  married  without  the  consent  sufficient.     Wrotteslev  v.  Bendish,  3  P.  Wins. 

of  the  trustees  under  the  will,  the  legacy  was  236,  239;  ante,  p.  180*. 

to  be  forfeited,  and  a  bill  was  filed  against  the  2  Att.-Gen.  r.  Lucas,  2  Hare,  566. 

legatee  for  a  discovery  whether  any  marriage 

563 


in 


0 


DEMURRERS. 


a  limitation  over  is  to  take  effect,  the  defendant  cannot  protect  himself 
from  the  discovery.8  A  demurrer,  also,  will  not  prevail  where  the  dis- 
covery is  of  a  matter  which  shows  the  defendant  disqualified  from 
having  any  interest  or  title  :  as  whether  a  person  claiming  a  real  estate, 
under  a  devise,  be  an  alien,  and  consequently  incapable  of  taking  by 
purchase.4  A  distinction,  however,  appears  to  exist,  in  this  respect, 
between  incapacities  which  are  the  result  of  general  principles  of  Law, 
and  those  which  are  imposed  by  the  Legislature,  by  way  of  penalty  or 

forfeiture  ;  thus,  before  the  repeal  of  the  statutes  imposing  dis- 
*  569    abilities  upon  *  persons  professing  the  Popish  religion,1  it  was 

held,  that  a  defendant  was  not  obliged  to  discover  whether  he 
was  a  Papist  or  not.2  Upon  the  same  principle,  it  has  been  held,  that 
where  a  bill  sought  a  discovery  whether  a  clergyman  had  been  pre- 
sented to  a  second  living  which  avoided  the  first,  under  the  statute 
21  Hen.  VIII. ,  a  demurrer  to  the  discovery  of  that  fact  would  lie  : 
because  the  incapacity  of  holding  the  first  living,  incurred  by  the  accept- 
ance of  the  second,  was  in  the  nature  of  a  penalty  imposed  by  the 
statute.3 

A  defendant,  in  order  to  protect  himself  from  answering,  on  the 
ground  that  the  discovery  of  the  matters  inquired  after  would  expose,  or 
tend  to  expose  him  to  penalties,  must  state  upon  oath  his  belief  that 
such  would  be  the  case  :  a  submission  of  the  question  to  the  Court  is 
not  sufficient.4 

II.  If  a  defendant  has,  in  conscience,  a  right  equal  to  that  claimed 
by  a  person  filing  a  bill  against  him,  though  not  clothed  with  a  perfect 
legal  title,  a  Court  of  Equity  will  not  compel  him  to  make  any  discovery 
which  may  hazard  his  title,5  and  if  the  matter  appear  clearly  on  the 
face  of  the  bill,  a  demurrer  will  hold.6     The  most  obvious  case  is  that 

of  a  purchaser  for  a  valuable  consideration,  without  notice  of  the 
*570    plaintiff's  claim.7  («)     *  Upon  the  same  ground,  a  jointress  may, 


3  Thus,  where  a  husband,  by  will,  gave  sin 
estate  to  his  wife,  whilst  she  continued  his 
widow,  with  a  limitation  over  in  case  of  her  se- 
cond marriage,  and  the  remainder-man  brought 
a  bill  against  her,  in  which  he  sought  a  discov- 
ery of  her  second  marriage:  upon  the  defendant 
demurring  to  the  discovery,  as  subjecting  her 
to  a  forfeiture,  Lord  Talbot  overruled  the  de- 
murrer. Cited,  Chauncey  v.  Tahourden,  2  Atk. 
393;  Chancey  t\  Fenhoulet,  2  Ves.  Sr.  265; 
Lucas  v.  Evans,  3  Atk.  260;  Hambrook  r.  Smith, 
ubi  siiprn ;  see  contra,  Monnins  v.  Monnins,  2 
Ch.  Rep.  68;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  579,  note. 

4  Att.-Gen.  v.  Duplessis,  Parker,  144. 


1  11  &  12  Will.  III.  c,  4,  §  4. 

2  Smith  v.  Read,  1  Atk.  526;  Harrison  v. 
Southcote,  ib.  528;  2  Ves.  Sr.  389,  395. 

3  Boteler  v.  Allington,  3  Atk.  453,  458. 

*  Scott  v.  Miller  (No.  2),  John.  328;  5  Jur. 
N.  S.  858;  ante,  p.  563,  note  (b). 

5  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §§  603,  604  a;  Howell  v.  Ash- 
more,  9  N.  J.  Eq.  82. 

6  Ld.  Red.  199;  see  Glegg  v.  Legh,  4  Mad. 
193,  207. 

7  Ld.  Red.  199 ;  Jerrard  v.  Saunders,  2  Ves. 
Jr.  458 ;  see  Sweet  v.  Southcote,  2  Bro.  C.  C. 
66.  The  protection  which  Equity  throws 
around  an  innocent  purchaser,  applies  not  only 


(a)  See  Weeks  v.  Milwaukee  &c.  R.  Co. 
78  Wis.  501,  525 ;  Shropshire  v  Lyle,  31  Fed. 
Rep.  694;  Swett  v.  Stark,  id.  858.  The  de- 
fence of  purchase  for  value  without  notice 
may  be  raised  by  demurrer  when  it  appears 
upon  the  bill ;  otherwise,  the  defence,  being 
affirmative,  must  be  raised  by  plea  or  answer. 
Greaves  V.  Atkinson,  68  Miss.  598.     One  who 

564: 


takes  a  conveyance  for  a  previously  existing 
debt,  is  not  a  purchaser  for  value.  People's 
Savings  Bank  v.  Bates,  120  U.  S.  556;  Gest  v. 
Packwood,  34  Fed.  Rep.  368.  As  to  quit-claim 
deeds,  see  post,  p.  675,  note  (a).  Mere  rumors 
of  defects  in  title  are  not  notice  demanding  in- 
vestigation. Satterfield  v.  Malone,  35  Fed.  Rep. 
445. 


DIFFERENT   GROUNDS    OF    DEMURRER. 


570 


in  many  cases,  demur  to  a  bill  filed  against  her  for  a  discovery  of  her 
jointure  deed,  if  the  plaintiff  is  not  capable  of  confirming,  or  the  bill 
does  not  offer  to  confirm,  her  jointure,  and  the  facts  appear  sufficiently 
upon  the  face  of  the  bill :  though,  ordinarily,  advantage  is  taken  of  this 
defence  by  plea.1 

III.    A  defendant  is  not  compellable  to  discover  any  thing  immaterial 
to  the  relief  prayed  by  the  bill.2     Upon  this  ground,  upon  a  bill  filed  by 


to  bills  of  relief,  but  also  to  bills  of  discovery. 
2  Story,  Eq.  Jur.  §  1502.  Equity  will  not  take 
the  least  step  against  him  and  will  allow  him  to 
take  every  advantage  which  the  law  gives  him; 
for  there  is  nothing  which  can  attach  itself 
upon  his  conscience,  in  such  a  case,  in  favor  of 
an  adverse  claim.  Id.  §  1505;  1  id.  §  410  ; 
Wood  v.  Mann,  1  Sumner,  507;  McNeil  v. 
Magee,  5  Mason,  269;  Vattier  v.  Hinde,  7 
Peters,  252 ;  Fitzsimmons  v.  Ogden,  7  Cranch, 
2;  Boone  v.  Chile*,  10  Peters,  177;  Payne 
v.  Compton,  2  Y.  &  C.  457;  Story,  Eq.  PI. 
§  603;  Howell  v.  Ashmore,  9  N.  J.  Eq.  82. 
And  so  a  purchaser,  with  notice  from  an 
innocent  purchaser  without  notice,  is  entitled 
to  the  like  protection.  For  otherwise,  it  would 
happen  that  the  title  of  such  a  bona  fide 
purchaser  would  become  unmarketable  in  his 
hands.  2  Story,  Eq.  PI.  Jur.  §  150:3  a:  1  id. 
410,  and  cases  cited;  Varick  v.  Briggs,  G  Paige, 
323;  Bennett  v.  Walker,  1  West,  130;  Jackson 
v.  McChesney,  7  Cowen,  360 ;  Jackson  v. 
Henry,  10  John.  185;  Jackson  v.  Ewer,  8  John. 
573;  Demarest  v.  Wyncoop,  3  John.  147.  But 
where  a  bill  is  brought  for  discovery  and  to  set 
aside  a  mortgage,  which  the  plaintiff  alleges 
was  taken  by  the  defendant  with  intent  to 
defraud  the  plaintiff,  the  defendant  cannot,  by 
demurring  to  the  bill,  avoid  answering  and  dis- 
closing the  time  when  his  mortgage  was  exe- 
cuted, or  whether  he  claims  to  hold  the.  land  by 
virtue  of  it  ;  or  from  disclosing,  and,  if  in  his 
power,  producing  the  note  which  the  mortgage 
purports  to  secure;  or  from  stating  when,  where, 
and  in  whose  presence,  and  for  what,  the  note 
was  given  ;  or  from  whom  the  consideration  was 
received,  and  to  whom  paid.  Burns  p.  Hobbs, 
29  Maine,  273;  sen  post,  pp.  579,  580. 

In  Howell  v.  Ashmore,  9  N.  J.  Eq.  82, 
it  was  held  that  when  the  defendant  is  charged 
with  a  fraud,  and  that  he  has  procured  a 
title  fraudulently,  and  is  fraudulently  setting 
it  up  to  defeat  the  plaintiff,  the  Court  of  Chan- 
cery may  compel  such  fraud-doer  to  disclose 
the  fact  alleged  as  a  fraud,  and  all  the  circum- 
stances attending  it,  in  order  that  the  Court 
may  determine  whether  those  circumstances 
establish  the  fraud.  And  it  is  a  proper  object 
of  a  bill  of  discovery  to  ascertain,  in  a  case 
where  the  defendant's  title  can  prevail  only 
upon  the  ground  of  his  being  a  bona  fide  pur- 
chaser, without  notice  of  the  plaintiff's   title, 


whether  he  had  such  notice,  and  to  call  upon 
him  to  disclose  all  the  circumstances  which 
may  go  to  probe  his  conscience  upon  that  point. 
Howell  v.  Ashmore,  9  N.  J.  Eq.  82;  see  post, 
p.  531,  note. 

1  Ld.  Red.  199;  Chamberlain  v.  Knapp,  1 
Atk.  52;  Senhouse  v.  Earl,  2  Yes.  Sr.  450;  see 
also  Leech  v.  Trollop,  id.  662,  from  which  it 
appears,  that  a  widow  is  not  bound  to  discover 
her  jointure  deed,  by  her  answer  (even  where 
the  bill  offers  to  confirm  it)  till  the  confirmation 
has  been  effected;  see  post,  Chap.  XLII.,  Pro- 
duction of  Documents. 

2  Ld.  Red.  191;  Desborough  v.  Curlewis,  3 
Y.  &  Coll.  175;  AVood  v.  Hitchings,  3  Beav. 
504;  Kay  v.  Hargreaves,  14  L.  T.  N.  S.  281. 
The  plaintiff  in  a  bill  must  show  the  materiality 
of  the  discovery  sought.  It  is  the  language  of 
some  of  the  reported  cases,  that  a  party  seeking 
a  discovery  even  in  aid  of  a  suit  at  Law  must 
show  affirmatively,  in  his  bill,  that  the  right 
which  he  seeks  to  enforce  at  Law  cannot  be 
established  without  the  discovery  sought. 
Whitesides  v.  Lafferty,  9  Hump.  27;  Vaughan 
v.  Central  Pac.  R.  Co.,  4  Sawyer,  280.  But  the 
weight  of  authority  is  clearly  otherwise,  and 
limits  the  requirement  to  bills  which  seek  to 
give  jurisdiction  to  the  Court  to  grant  relief 
because  of  the  discovery.  March  r.  Davison, 
9  Paige,  580;  Metier  v.  Metier,  19  N.  J.  Eq. 
457;  Peck  v.  Ashley,  12  Met.  478;  Continental 
Ins.  Co.  v.  Webb,  54  Ala.  697.  And  in  the 
latter  class  of  cases,  where  jurisdiction  to  give 
relief  depends  on  discovery,  it  has  been  held 
that  the  bill  will  not  lie  against  a  corporation, 
which  answers  only  under  its  corporate  seal. 
Vaughan  v.  Central  Pac.  R.  Co.,  4  Sawyer, 
280.  The  contrary  was  held  by  Brown,  U.  S. 
Dist.  J.  in  Vaughan  v.  East  Tenn.  and  Va.  R. 
Co.  9  Chi.  Leg.  News,  255.  The  fact,  in  such 
cases,  that  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  the  dis- 
covery does  not,  necessarily,  entitle  him  also  to 
an  account;  but  where  the  case  is  complicated, 
or  where,  from  other  circumstances,  the  remedy 
at  Law  will  not  give  adequate  relief,  a  Court  of 
Equity  will  take  jurisdiction.  Magic  Ruffle  Co. 
v.  Elm  City  Co.,  14  Blatch.  109.  Where  the 
bill  seeks  relief  which  the  Court  has  no  power 
to  grant,  and  also  seeks  a  discovery,  the  defend- 
ant may  demur  to  the  whole  hill,  if  it  do  not 
aver  that  a  suit  at  Law  is  pending,  or  is  about 
to   be  brought,  in  which  a  discovery  may  be 

566 


571 


DEMURRERS. 


a  mortgagor  against  a  mortgagee  to  redeem,  and  seeking  a  discovery 
whether  the  mortgagee  was  a  trustee,  a  demurrer  to  the  discovery  was 
allowed :  for,  as  there  was  no  trust  declared  upon  the  mortgage  deed, 
it  was  immaterial  to  the  plaintiff  whether  there  was  any  trust  reposed 
in  the  defendant    or  not.3     But  in  general,  if  it  can  be  supposed  that 

the  discovery  may  in  any  way  be  material  to  the  plaintiff,  for 
*  571    *  the  purposes   of  the  suit,  the  defendant  will  be  compelled  to 

make  it ; *  thus,  where  a  bill  called  for  a  discovery  of  cases  laid 
before  counsel,  and  their  opinion,  Lord  Eldon  held,  that  the  plaintiff  had 
no  right  to  a  discovery  of  the  opinions  of  counsel,  but  only  of  the  cases.2 
And  now,  the  cases,  if  prepared  subsequently  to,  or  in  contemplation  of, 
the  litigation,  are  also  protected.3 

IV.  The  last  case  brings  us  to  the  consideration  of  those  causes  of 
demurrer  to  discovery,  which  are  the  consequence  of  the  privilege 
resulting  from  professional  confidence.4  The  privilege  conferred  by  this 
species  of  confidence  applies,  though  in  a  different  degree,  to  both  the 
adviser  and  the  client.5  The  application  of  the  rule,  with  regard  to  pro- 
fessional confidence,  to  discovery  required  from  the  client,  is  exemplified 
in  a  case  above  referred  to,6  in  which  Lord  Eldon,  as  we  have  seen, 
held,  that  if  the  demurrer  had  been  confined  to  the  discovery  of  the 
opinions,  it  would  have  been  good;  and  the  rule  has  since  been  extended 
to  exempt  a  defendant  from  the  discovery  of  the  case  itself,  and  to  all 
confidential  communications  which  have  passed  in  the  progress  of  the 
cause  itself,  and  with  reference  to  it  before  it  was  instituted ; 7  and  also 
to  letters  written  by  a  defendant  to  his  solicitor,  after  a  dispute  between 
him  and  the  plaintiff  had  arisen,  with  the  view  to  taking  the 'opinion  of 
counsel  upon  the  matter  in  question,  and  which  afterwards  became  the 


material.      Mitchell   v.    Green,   10  Met.   101; 
Pease  v.  Pease,  8  Met.  395. 

The  objection  of  immateriality  may  be  to 
the  whole  bill,  or  to  a  part  of  the  bill,  or  to  a 
part  only  of  the  interrogatories,  or  to  a  parti- 
cular defendant  only.  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  5G8; 
Hare  on  Diseov.  159-1 01.  For  form  of  a  de- 
murrer for  immaterality,  see  Story,  Eq.  PI. 
§  567  ;  Willis,  475. 

3  Harvey  v.  Morris,  Rep.  temp.  Finch,  21-1.  So, 
where  a  bill  was  filed  by  the  lord  of  a  borough, 
praying  a  discovery  whether  a  person  applying 
to  be  admitted  a  tenant  was  a  trustee  or  not,  a 
demurrer  was  allowed:  Lord  Montague  v.  Dud- 
man,  2  Yes.  Sr.  39G,  398;  and  where  a  bill  was 
brought  for  real  estate,  and  sought  discovery 
of  proceedings  in  the  Ecclesiastical  Court  upon 
a  grant  of  administration,  the  defendant  de- 
murred, successfully,  to  that  discovery.  Baker 
v.  Pritchard,  2  Atk.  388.  In  like  manner, 
where  a  bill  was  filed  to  establish  an  agreement 
entered  into  before  marriage,  by  which  a  sepa- 
rate estate  was  secured  to  the  defendant's  wife, 
and  praying  a  discover}'-  of  several  unkind- 
nesses  and  hardships  which  the  defendant,  as  it 
was  pretended,  had  used  towards  his  wife,  to 
make  her  recede  from  the  agreement,  and  the 

5G6 


defendant  demurred  to  the  discovery,  the  de- 
murrer was  allowed.  Hincks  r.  Xelthorpe,  1 
Vern.  204. 

i  Ld.  Red.  193. 

2  Richards  r.  Jackson,  18  Yes.  472. 

3  Post,  p.  573. 

4  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §§  599-602  ;  1  Greenl.  Ev. 
§  535  et  seq.,  and  cases  in  notes;  Gresley  Eq. ' 
Ev.  278-284;  Brown  r.  Pay  son,  6  X.  H.  443; 
Foster  v.  Hall,  12  Pick.  89;  Wright  v.  Mayo,  0 
Sumner's  Yes.  280  a,  and  notes;  Aiken  v.  Kil- 
burne,  27  Maine,  251;  Brazier  r.  Fortune,  10 
Ala.  51G ;  Beeson  v.  Beeson,  9  Barr,  279. 

5  See  also,  on  this  subject,  post,  Chap.  XLII., 
Production  of  Documents.  And  it  is  quite 
possible  that  the  client  may  be  compelled  to 
disclose  the  facts  when  his  professional  adviser 
would  be  bound  to  withhold  them.  Preston  r. 
Carr,  1  Y.  &  J.  175,  179;  Hare,  Discov.  174, 
175;  Greenlaw  p.  King,  1  Beav.  137. 

6  Richards  V.  Jackson,  supra. 

7  Garland  v.  Scott,  3  Sim.  396;  Bolton  v. 
Liverpool,  id.  4S7T  487;  1  M.  &  K.  88,  93; 
Hughes  v.  Biddulph,  4  Russ.  190;  Woods  r. 
Woods,  4  Hare,  83,  86;  Jenkyns  p.  Bushby.  L. 
R.  2  Eq.  547 ;  12  Jur.  X.  S.  558;  35  L.  J."  Ch. 
400,  V.  C.  K. 


DIFFERENT   GROUNDS    OF    DEMURRER. 


0V4 


subject  of  the  suit.8  The  rule  also  extends  to  all  observations,  notes, 
and  remarks  made  by  counsel  upon  their  briefs,  but  the  briefs  them- 
selves, so  far  as  they  are  copies  of  matter  otherwise  publici  juris,0  and 
counsel's  indorsement,  or  note  of  any  order  made  by  the  Court,10  (a)  are 
not  privileged. 

The  rule  has  been  adopted  out  of  regard  to  the  interests  of  justice, 
-which  cannot  be  upholden,  and  to  the  administration  of  justice,  which 
cannot  go  on,  without  the  aid  of  men  skilled  in  jurisprudence,  in  the 
practice  of  the  Courts,  and  in  those  matters  affecting  rights  and  obli- 
gations which  form  the  subject  of  all  judicial  proceedings.  If  the 
privilege  did  not  exist  at  all,  *  every  one  would  be  thrown  upon  *  572 
his  own  legal  resources  ;  deprived  of  all  professional  assistance, 
a  man  would  not  venture  to  consult  any  skilful  person,  or  would  only 
dare  to  tell  his  counsellor  half  his  case.1  Unless,  however,  the  com- 
munication has  a  direct  reference  to  the  subject  of  the  dispute,  the  party 
himself  has  no  privilege  :  he  is,  in  other  respects,  bound  to  disclose 
all  he  knows  and  believes  and  thinks  respecting  his  own  case ;  and  he 
must  disclose  the  cases  he  has  laid  before  counsel  for  their  opinion, 
unconnected  with  the  suit  itself.2 


8  Vent  v.  Pacey,  4  Russ.  193;  Greenough  v. 
Gaskell,  1  M.  &  K.  98,  101. 

9  Walsham  v.  Stainton,  2  H.  &  M.  1;  see 
re  Brown.  42  L.  T.  501 ;  Lyell  v.  Kennedy,  27 
Ch.  D.  1.26;  9  App.  Cas.  81. 

M  Nicholl  v.  Jones,  13  W.  R.  451.  V.  C.  W., 
2  II.  &  M.  588,  which  also  holds  that  the  notes 
of  a  shorthand  writer  by  one  of  the  parties  are 
not  privileged  so  far  as  they  merely  describe 
what  took  place  in  Court,  but  all  notes  or 
observation  thereon,  and  all  parts  thereof  which 
do  not  relate  to  the  proceedings  in  Court,  are 
privileged. 

1  Per  Lord  Brougham,  in  Greenough  v. 
Gaskell,  1  M.  &  K.  103.  The  client  as  well  as 
the  attorney  may  refuse  to  testify  to  what  was 
said  between  them  in  professional  confidence. 
State  o.  White,  19  Kan.  445. 

2  1  M.  &  K.  100,  101.  Sir  James  Wigram, 
V.  C,  thus  states  the  history  of  the  law  upon 
this  subject :  "  The  first  point  decided  upon 
this  subject  was,  that  communications  between 
solicitor  and  client  pending  litigation,  and  with 
reference  to  such  litigation,  were  privileged; 
upon  this  there  is  not  at  this  day  any  question. 
The  next  contest  was  upon  communications 
made  before  litigation,  but  in  contemplation  of, 
and  with  reference  to,  litigation  which  was 
expected  and  afterwards  arose;  and  it  was  held, 
that  the  privilege  extended  to  these  cases  also. 
A  third  question  then  arose,  with  regard  to 
communications  after  the  dispute  between  the 
parties,  followed  by  litigation,  but  not  in  con- 
templation of.  or  with  reference  to,  that  litiga- 


tion; and  these  communications  were  also  pro- 
tected. Bolton  r.  Liverpool,  3  Sim.  4G7,  487;  1 
M.  &  K.  88,  93;  Hughes  v.  Biddulph,  4  Russ. 
190;  Vent  v.  Pacey,  id.  193;  Clagett  v.  Phillips, 
2  Y.  &  C.  C.  C.  82,  86;  7  Jur.  31;  1  Greenl.  Ev. 
§  240;  Story.  Eq.Pl.  §  600 ;  Beltzhoover  v.  Black- 
stock,  3  Watts,  20;  Foster  v.  Hall,  12  Pick.  89, 
92,  98,  99.  A  fourth  point  which  appears  to  have 
called  for  decision,  was  the  title  of  a  defendant 
to  protect  from  discovery,  in  the  suit  of  one 
party,  cases  or  statements  of  fact  made  on  his 
behalf  by  or  for  his  solicitor  or  legal  adviser, 
on  the  subject-matter  in  question,  after  litiga- 
tion commenced  or  in  contemplation  of  litiga- 
tion, on  the  same  subject, with  other  persons, with 
the  view  of  asserting  the  same  right.  This  was 
the  case  of  Combe  v.  London,  1  Y.  &  C.  Ch. 
631,  650;  4  H.  L.  Cas.  1089;  see  also  Holmes 
v.  Baddeley,  1  Phil.  476,  480;  6  Beav.  521. 
The  question  in  suit  was  the  right  of  the  cor- 
poration to  certain  nietage  dues,  and  the  answer 
stated  that  other  persons  had  disputed  the  right 
of  the  corporation  to  metage,  and  that  they  had 
in  their  possession  cases  which  had  been  pre- 
pared with  a  view  to  the  assertion  of  their  rights 
against  each  other  parties,  in  contemplation  of 
litigation,  or  after  it  had  actually  commenced; 
Sir  J.  L.  Knight  Bruce  held  that  those  cases, 
relating  to  the  same  question,  but  having  re- 
ference to  disputes  with  other  persons,  were 
within  the  privilege;  and  I  perfectly  concur 
with  that  decision."  Lord  Walsingham  v. 
Goodricke,  3  Hare,  122. 
The  case  before  Sir   James    Wigram   was 


(a)  What  passes  in  open  Court  is  not  privi- 
leged, and  therefore  a  transcript  of  shorthand 
notes   of   proceedings   there  is  not  privileged. 


Rawstone  v.  Preston  Corporation,  30  Ch.  D. 
116:  re  Worswick,  38  Ch.  D.  370;  see  Learoyd 
v.  Halifax  Joint  Stock  B.  Co.  [1893]  1  Ch.  686. 

567 


574 


DEMURRERS. 


*  573      *  The  privilege  arising  from  professional  confidence,  as  it  respects 

the  legal  advisers,  is  of  a  more  extended  nature :  "  As  regards  them, 
it  does  not  appear  that  the  protection  is  qualified  by  any  reference 

*  574   to  proceedings  pending  or  in  contemplation.1  (a)   If,  touching  *  mat- 


a  bill  for  specific  performance  by  a  purchaser, 
and  during  the  treaty  for  the  sale  and  pur- 
chase of  the  estate,  but  before  any  dispute 
had  arisen,  the  defendant,  the  vendor,  from 
time  to  time  consulted  his  solicitor  on  the 
subject,  and  written  communications  passed  be- 
tween them.  A  question  arose,  upon  a  motion 
for  the  production  of  documents,  whether 
these  communications  were  privileged,  regard 
being  had  to  the  circumstance  that  they 
took  place  before  any  dispute  arose,  though 
with  reference  to  the  very  subject  in  respect  of 
which  that  dispute  had  since  arisen;  and  his 
Honor  decided,  chiefly  upon  the  authority  of 
Radcliffe  v.  Fursman,  2  Bro.  P.  C.  ed.  Toml. 
514  (and  see  Mornington  v.  Mornington,  2  J.  & 
H.  697),  that  such  communications  were  privi- 
leged, so  far  only  as  they  might  be  proved  to 
contain  legal  advice  or  opinions,  but  not  other- 
wise. See  observations  of  V.  C.  Wood  on 
Lord  Walsingham  v.  Goodricke,  in  Manser  v. 
Dix,  1  K.  &  J.  451,  453.  Radcliffe  v.  Fursman 
is  commonly  referred  to  as  a  leading  case,  upon 
the  extent  to  which  the  privilege  applies,  in 
protecting  cases  laid  before  counsel  for  their 
opinion.  The  defendant,  in  that  cause,  de- 
murred to  so  much  of  the  bill  as  required  him 
to  discover  an  alleged  case,  the  name  of  the 
counsel,  and  the  opinion  given  upon  it.  The 
demurrer  was  overruled  as  to  the  first  point, 
but  allowed  as  to  the  second  and  third,  by  Lord 
King,  and  the  decision  was  affirmed  in  the 
House  of  Lords.  This  decision  has  been  fre- 
quently mentioned  with  disapprobation  ;  but 
having  been  made  by  the  House  of  Lords,  its 
authority  is  recognized,  though  only  to  the 
extent  to  which  it  strictly  applies.  Lord 
Brougham,  in  commenting  upon  it,  observed: 
"  Even   by  the   report,  and  certainly  by  the 


(a)  See  also  Lyell  v.  Kennedy,  9  App.  Cas. 
81;  8  id.  217;  23  Ch.  D.  387;' 27  Ch.  D.  1 ; 
Mayor  of  Bristol  v.  Cox,  20  Ch.  D.  078; 
Roberts  v.  Oppenheim,  id.  732;  Lowden  v. 
Blakey,  23  Q.  B.  D.  332;  Re  Holloway,  12 
P.  D.  107;  Turton  v.  Barber,  L.  R.  17  Eq.  329; 
Wilson  v.  Northampton  Ry.  Co.  L.  R.  14  Eq. 
477.  See  Foster  v.  Hall,"  12  Pick.  89.  So 
communications  to  a  solicitor  with  reference 
to  anticipated  litigation  made  through  inter- 
mediate agents,  verbally  or  by  letter,  as  well  as 
communications  between  the  client  and  unpro- 
fessional agents  whom  he  employs  under  the 
advice  of  the  solicitor  for  the  purposes  of  the 
litigation,  are  privileged.     Anderson  v.  Bank 

568 


printed  cases,  which  I  have  examined,  together 
with  my  noble  and  learned  predecessor,  it  ap- 
pears plain,  that  the  record  did  not  show  any 
suit  to  have  been  instituted,  or  even  threatened, 
at  time  the  case  was  stated  for  the  opinion 
of  counsel;  and  the  decision  being  upon  the 
demurrer,  the  Court  had  no  right  to  know  any 
thing  which  the  record  did  not  disclose."  "  So 
far  this  decision  rules,  that  a  case  laid  before 
counsel  is  not  protected;  that  it  must  be  dis- 
closed. But  the  decision  does  not  rule  that 
disclosure  must  be  made  of  a  case  laid  before 
counsel  in  reference  to,  or  in  contemplation  of, 
or  pending  the  suit  or  action,  for  the  purposes 
of  which  the  production  is  sought."  See  Bol- 
ton v.  Liverpool,  1  M.  &  K.  95,  96;  C.  P.  O  op. 
temp.  Brough.  24,  25;  see  Nias  v.  Northern 
and  Eastern  Rj-.  Co.  3  M.  &  C.  355. 

1  Foster  v.  Hall,  12  Pick.  89,  93  et  set].; 
Wilson  v.  Troup,  7  John.  Ch.  25,  38,  39; 
Beltzhoover  v.  Blackstock,  3  Watts,  20  ;  March 
v.  Ludlum,  3  Sand.  Ch.  35;  Moore  v.  Bray,  10 
Penn.  St.  519;  Conn.  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Schaefer,  94  U.  S.  457;  Bigler  v.  Reyher,  43 
Ind.  112;  Carnes  v.  Piatt,  36  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct. 
360;  Lockhardv.  Brodie,  lTenn.  Ch.  384.  So, 
as  to  confidential  correspondence  between  a 
party,  or  his  predecessor  in  title,  and  their  re- 
spective solicitors.  Minet  v.  Morgan,  L.  R. 
8  Ch.  361.  And  a  bill  prepared  by  the  attorney 
on  his  client's  statements,  sworn  to  but  never 
filed,  is  privileged.  Burnham  v.  Roberts,  70 
111.  19;  see  Pearce  t\  Foster,  15  Q.  B.  D.  111. 
So  the  privilege  extends  to  all  that  passes 
between  client  and  attorney  in  the  course  and 
for  the  purpose  of  the  business.  Lengsfield  v. 
Richardson,  52  Miss.  443.  But  not  to  informa- 
tion in  reference  to  a  criminal  act.  People  v. 
Mahon,  1  Utah,  205. 


of  British  Columbia,  2  Ch.  D.  644;  Ross  V. 
Gibbs,  L.  R.  8  Eq.  522;  Hamilton  v.  Nott, 
L.  R.  16  Eq.  112;  Russell  v.  Jackson,  9  Hare, 
387;  Wheeler  v.  Le  Marchant,  17  Ch.  D.  675; 
Learoyd  v.  Halifax  Joint  S.  B.  Co.,  [1893] 
W.  N.  9;  Mayor  of  Bristol  v.  Cox,  26  Ch. 
D.  678;  Lowden  v.  Blakey,  23  Q.  B.  D.  332; 
Foakes  v.  Webb,  28  Ch.  D.  287;  Parr  v.  Lon- 
don, Chatham  &  Dover  Ry.  Co.  24  L.  T.  558; 
Yetter  v.  Schreiber,  53  J.  P.  39,  ])ost,  p.  577. 
In  the  Law  Courts,  see  Fenner  v.  London 
&  South  Eastern  Ry.  Co.  L.  R.  7  Q.  B.  767; 
English  v.  Tottie,  1  Q.  B.  D.  141;  Bullock  v. 
Corry,  3  id.  356;  Pearce  v.  Foster,  15  id.  114; 
Norden  v.  Defries,  8  id.  511;  Bursill  v.  Tanner, 


DIFFERENT    GROUNDS    OF    DEMURRER. 


*  5 


10 


ters  that  come  within  the  ordinary  scope  of  professional  employment, 
they  receive  a  communication  in  their  professional  capacity,  from  a  client, 
and  for  his  benefit,  in  the  transaction  of  las  business,  or,  which  amounts 
to  the  same  thing,  if  they  commit  to  paper,  in  the  course  of  their  employ- 
ment on  his  behalf,  matters  which  they  know  only  through  their  profes- 
sional relation  to  the  client,  they  are  not  only  justified  in  withholding 
such  matters,  but  bound  to  withhold  them  ;  and  will  not  be  compelled  to 
disclose  the  information,  or  produce  the  papers,  in  any  Court  of  Law  or 
Equity,  either  as  party  or  as  witness.  If  this  protection  were  confined 
to  cases  where  proceedings  had  commenced,  the  rule  would  exclude  the 
most  confidential,  and,  it  may  be,  the  most  important,  of  all  communica- 
tions :  those  made  with  a  view  of  being  prepared  either  for  instituting 
or  defending  a  suit,  up  to  the  instant  that  the  process  of  the  Court 
issued."  x 

Communications  to  a  solicitor  made,  not  by  his  client,  but  by  third 
parties,  and  information  acquired  by  such  solicitor  from  collateral 
sources,  are  not  privileged  from  disclosure,  even  though  such  communi- 
cations are  made  to,  and  information  acquired  by,  him  in  his  character  of 
solicitor,  and  solely  by  reason  of  his  filling  that  character.2 

*  Although  the  general  rule  is,  as  laid  down  in  the  above  case,    *  575 
that  a  counsel  or  solicitor  cannot  be  compelled,  at  the  instance  of 
a  third  party,  to  disclose  matters  which  have  come  to  his  knowledge  in  the 
conduct  of  professional  business  for  a  client,  even  though  such  business 


1  Per  Lord  Brougham,  in  Greenough  v. 
Gaskell,  1  M.  &  K.  101;  C.  P.  Coop.  temp. 
Brough.  98;  who  further  said:  "The  protection 
would  be  insufficient  if  it  only  included  com- 
munications more  or  less  connected  with  judicial 
proceedings  :  for  a  person  oftentimes  requires 
the  aid  of  professional  advice,  upon  the  sub- 
ject of  his  rights  and  liabilities,  with  no  refer- 
ence to  any  particular  litigation,  and  without 
any  other  reference  to  litigation  generally  than 
all  human  affairs  have,  in  so  far  as  every  trans- 
action may,  by  possibility,  become  the  subject 
of  judicial  inquiry.  It  would  be  most  mis- 
chievous, said  the  learned  Judges  in  the  Com- 
mon Pl^as,  in  Cromack  v.  Heathcote,  2  Brod.  & 
Bing.  6,  if  it  could  be  doubted  whether  or  not 
an  attorney,  consulted  upon  a  man's  title  to  an 
estate,  was  at  liberty  to  divulge  a  flaw."  In 
Herring  v.  Clobery,  1  Phil.  91  ;  G  Jur.  202,  a 
solicitor  being  examined  as  a  witness,  Lord 
Lyndhurst  said:  "Where  an  attorney  is  em- 
ployed by  a  client  professionally,  to  transact 
professional  business,  all  the  communications 
that  pass  between  the  client  and  the  attorney 


in  the  cause,  and  for  the  purpose  of  that  busi- 
ness, are  privileged  communications  :  and  the 
privilege  is  the  privilege  of  the  client,  and  not 
of  the  attorney."  See  also  Carpmael  v.  Fowis, 
1  Phil.  087,  692;  and  that  it  is  the  privilege  of 
the  client,  see  Re  Cameron's  Coalbrook,  &c. 
Ry.  Co.  25  Beav.  1,  4.  See  Story, Eq.  Fl.  §  000, 
and  note.  The  attorney  is  not  bound  to  pro- 
duce title-deeds,  or  other  documents,  left  with 
him  by  his  client  for  professional  advice.  Dover 
v.  Harrell,  58  Ga.  572.  Though  he  may  be 
examined  to  the  fact  of  their  existence,  in 
order  to  let  in  secondary  evidence  of  their  con- 
tents, which  must  be  from  some  other  source 
than  himself.  1  Greenl.  Ev.  §  2-41 ;  Wright  v. 
Mayer,  6  Ves.  280,  note  (n) ;  Bank  of  Utica 
v.  Mersereau,  3  Barb.  Ch.  528. 

2  Ford  v.  Tennant,  .32  Beav.  102;  and  see 
Gore  v.  Bowser,  5  De  G.  &  S.  30,  33 ;  S.  C. 
nom.  Gore  v.  Harris,  15  Jur.  1108;  Rundle  v. 
Foster,  13  Tenn.  Ch.  658  ;  Perkins  v.  Guy,  55 
Miss.  153;  Hebbard  v.  Haughian,  70  N.  Y.  54; 
State  v.  Mewherter,  4G  Iowa,  88. 


1G  Q.  B.  D.  1;  Woolley  v.  North  London  Ry. 
Co.  L.  R.  4  C.  P.  602;  Cossey  v.  London  & 
Brighton  Ry.  Co.  L.  R.  5  C.  P.  146;  Mahony 
V. '  Widows'  Assurance  Fund,  L.  R.  6  C.  P. 
252;  M'Corquodale  v.  Bell,  1  C.  P.  D.  471; 
Swansea  v.  Quirk,  5  C.  P.  D.  106;  Skinner 
v.  Great  Northern  Ry.  Co.  L.  R.  9  Ex.  298; 


London  &c.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Kirk,  51  L.  T.  599 : 
Worthington  v.  Dublin  &c.  Ry.  Co.  22  L.  R. 
Ir.  310;  Hawes  v.  State,  88  Ala.  37;  see  1  Seton 
on  Judgments  (5th  ed.),  82.  Equity  has  no 
jurisdiction  to  restrain  a  mercantile  agency 
from  supplying  information.  Raymond  v.  Rus- 
sell, 143  Mass.  295. 

569 


*576 


DEMURRERS. 


had  no  reference  to  legal  proceedings,  either  existing  or  in  contemplation  ; 
there  is  no  doubt  that  the  privilege  will  be  excluded,  where  the  communi- 
cation is  not  made  or  received  professionally,  and  in  the  usual  course  of 
business,1  and  during  the  existence  of  the  professional  relation.2  In  all  such 
cases,  the  matters  to  be  disclosed  cannot  be  said  to  be  matters  which  the 
professional  adviser  has  learnt  by  communication  with  his  client,  or  on 
his  client's  behalf,  or  as  matters  which  were  committed  to  him  in  his 
capacity  of  attorney,  or  which,  in  that  capacity  alone,  he  came  to  know.3 
And  so,  where  an  attorney  is,  as  it  were,  a  party  to  the  original  trans- 
action, as  if  he  be  the  attesting  witness  to  a  deed,  he  may  be  called  upon 
to  disclose  facts  relating  to  its  execution,  or  as  to  an  erasure  made  by 
himself  in  a  deed  or  will ; 4  if,  also,  he  was  present  when  his  client  was 
sworn  to  an  answer  in  Chancery,  he  may  be  called  upon  to  disclose  the 
fact; 5  and  if  he  has  been  employed  as  the  agent  of  a  party,  and  does  not 
gain  his  knowledge  of  the  facts,  as  to  which  the  discovery  is  required, 
merely  in  his  relation  of  attorney  to  his  client,  the  rule  will  not  apply  ; 
for,  in  such  cases,  there  was  no  professional  confidence,  and  he  stands  in 

the  same  situation  as  any  other  person.6 
*  576        *  The  privilege  will  also  be  excluded,  with  regard  to  communi- 
cations to  members    of  other  professions  than  the  Law :  it  has, 
therefore,  been  held  not  to  extend  to  clergymen  ;  1  nor  to  physicians  or 


i  Greenough  v.  Gaskell,  1  M.  &  K.  98,  104; 
Walker  v.  Wildman,  6  Mad.  47;  see  also  Des- 
borough  v.  Rawlins,  3  M.  &  C.  515;  2  Jur.  125; 
Smith  v.  Daniell,  L.  R.  18  Eq.  649;  Minet  v. 
Morgan,  L.  R.  8  Ch.  361.  And  the  privilege 
is  destroyed  if  the  information  is  subsequently 
communicated  to  the  solicitor  from  another 
source.  Lewis  v.  Pennington,  6  Jur.  N.  S. 
478:  8  W.  R.  465,  M.  R. 

2  Thus,  a  communication  made  to  an 
attorney  or  solicitor,  in  the  character  of  steward, 
either  before  the  attorney  or  solicitor  was 
employed  as  such,  Cutts  v.  Pickering,  1  Vent. 
197;  or  after  his  employment  has  ceased,  will 
not  be  protected  from  disclosure.  Wilson  v. 
Rastall,  4  T.  R.  753;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  602;  1 
Greenl.  Ev.  §  244;  and  so,  where  an  attorney 
had  been  consulted  by  a  friend,  because  he  was 
an  attorney,  yet  refused  to  act  as  such,  and 
was,  therefore,  applied  to  only  as  friend,  or 
where  the  matter  communicated  was  not  in  its 
nature  private,  and  could  in  no  sense  be  termed 
the  subject  of  a  confidential  disclosure.  Rex 
v.  Watkinson,  2  Stra.  1122.  If  a  party  has  been 
requested  to  act  as  solicitor,  and  the  communi- 
cation has  been  made,  under  the  impression 
that  the  request  has  been  acceded  to,  it  is 
privileged.     Smith  v.  Yell,  2  Curtis,  667. 

3  Greenough  v.  Gaskell,  1  M.  &  K.  98,  104. 

4  Sandford  v.  Remington,  2  Ves.  Jr.  189; 
Tavlor  on  Evid.  §§  857,  858;  1  Phil,  on  Evid. 
128. 

5  Doe  v.  Andrews,  2  Cowp.  846. 

6  Morgan  v.  Shaw,  4  Mad.  54,  56,  57;  see 

570 


also  Desborough  v.  Rawlins,  3  M.  &  C.  515; 
Williams  v.  Young,  4  Iowa,  140. 

The  person,  called  as  a  witness,  or  made 
defendant  to  a  bill,  must  have  learned  the 
matter  in  question  only  as  counsel,  or  attorney, 
or  solicitor,  and  not  in  any  other  way.  If, 
therefore,  he  were  a  party  to  the  transaction, 
and,  especially,  if  he  were  a  party  to  a  fraud 
(and  the  case  may  be  put  of  his  becoming  an 
informer,  after  being  engaged  in  a  conspiracy), 
that  is,  if  he  were  acting  for  himself,  although 
he  might  be  employed  for  another,  he  would 
not  be  protected  from  the  discover}';  for  in  such 
case  his  knowledge  would  not  be  acquired  solely 
by  his  being  employed  professionally.  Story, 
Eq.  PI.  §  601. 

An  attorney  may  be  compelled  to  disclose 
the  name  of  the  person  by  whom  he  was 
retained;  the  character  in  which  his  client  em- 
ployed him;  the  time  when  an  instrument  was 
executed,  or  put  into  iiis  hands,  but  not  its 
condition  and  appearance  at  that  time;  his 
client's  handwriting;  and  various  other  mat- 
ters, for  an  enumeration  of  which,  see  1  Greenl. 
Ev.  §  245. 

So  if  an  attorney  put  his  name  to  an  in- 
strument as  a  witness,  his  signature  binds  him 
to  disclose  all  that  passed  at  the  time,  respecting 
the  execution  of  the  instrument.  Bank  of  Utica 
r.  Mersereau,  3  Barb.  Ch.  528;  2  Sugd.  V.  &  P. 
(7th  Am.  ed.)  1063. 

1  Taylor  on  Evid.  §  838;  1  Greenl.  Ev. 
§  247;  Commonwealth  v.  Drake,  15  Mass.  161. 


DIFFERENT   GROUNDS    OF    DEMURRER. 


576 


medical  advisers  ; 2  (a)  nor  will  it  extend  to  mere  agents  or  stewards ; 3 
it,  however,  applies  to  scriveners  ; 4  and  also  to  counsel.5  It  has,  how- 
ever, been  held  that  it  does  not  extend  to  communications  made  to  per- 
sons acting  as  conveyancers,  who  are  neither  counsel  nor  solicitors.6     It 


2  Duchess  of  Kingston's  case,  11  Harg.  St. 
Tr.  212;  S.  C.  20  How.  St.  Tr.  572;  Greenough 
o.  Gaskell,  ubi  supra;  1  Greenl.  §  248,  note; 
Hewitt  v.  Prime,  21  Wend.  79. 

3  Vaillant  v.  Dodemead,  2  Atk.  521;  "Wil- 
son v.  Rastall,  4  T.  R.  753.  As  to  bankers  and 
clerks,  see  Loyd  v.  Freshfield,  2  Car.  &  P.  325. 

4  Harvey  v.  Clayton,  2  Swanst.  221,  n.  (a). 

5  Roth  well  v.  King,  2  Swanst.  221,  n.  (a); 
Spencer  v.  Luttrell,  and  Stanhope  v.  Nott,  id. 

The  privilege  of  clients  to  have  their  com- 
munications to  counsel  kept  secret  extends  in 
New  Hampshire  not  only  to  communications 
made  to  professional  men,  but  to  those  made  to 


(n)  The  Code  of  Civil  Procedure  of  Cali- 
fornia, §  1881  (and  see  same  of  New  York, 
§  834;  Mo.  Rev.  St.  §  4017,  &c),  extends  the 
privilege  to  statements  made  to  clergymen, 
priests,  and  physicians  in  the  course  of  their 
professional  duties.  See  Freel  v.  Market  St. 
Cable  Ry.  Co.  (Cal.),  31  Pac.  Rep.  730;  People 
v.  Harris,  137  N.  Y.  423;  People  v.  Sliney, 
id.  570.  In  New  York,  a  client  may  expressly 
waive  the  privilege,  and  his  request  to  an 
attorney  to  draw  his  will,  and  sign  it  as  an  at- 
testing witness,  amounts  to  such  waiver,  but  for 
probate  purposes  only.  Code,  §  836;  Re  Cole- 
man, 111  N.  Y.  220;  Loder  v.  Whelplev,  id. 
239;  Re  McCarthy,  20  N.  Y.  S.  581 ;  Re  Gagan, 

21  id.  350;  Mitchell's  ca<e,  12  Abb.  Prac. 
259;  Adreveno  v.  Mutual  Reserve  F.  L.  Ass. 
34  Fed.  Rep.  870.  The  privilege  is  personal  to 
the  client  and  cannot  be  claimed  by  his  adver- 
sary. Smith  v.  Wilson  (Texas),  20  S.  W.  Rep. 
1119.  Under  the  U.  S.  Rev.  Stats.  §  721,  the 
above  New  York  statute  binds  the  Federal 
Courts  sitting  within  the  State  in  Law  cases. 
Connecticut  Mut.  L.  I.  Co.  v.  Union  Trust  Co. 
112  U.  S.  250. 

The  person  consulted  must  be  actually  an 
attorney-at-law,  consulted  as  such,  and  not  as  a 
friend.  The  privilege  does  not  extend  to  a  clerk 
or  an  attorney  in  fact,  even  though  supposed  to 
be  an  attorney-at-law.  Goltra  r.  Wolcott, 
14  111.  89;  McLaughlin  y.  Gilmore,  1  111.  App. 
563;  Tyler  v.  Tyler,  126  111.  525;  Sample  v. 
Frost,  10  Iowa,  200;  Barnes  v.  Harris,  7  Cush. 
576;  Knight  v.  Sampson,  99  Muss.  30;  Patten 
v.  Moor,  29   N.  H.    163;   Holman   r.  Kimball, 

22  Vt.  555;  Schubkagel  ?•.  Dierstein,  131  Penn. 
St.  46.  The  privilege  does  not  extend  to  a 
solicitor  of  patents,  if  not  an  attorney-at-law. 
Brungger  v.  Smith,  49  Fed.  Rep.  124;  see 
Moseley  v.  Victoria  Rubber  Co.  (No.  1),  55 
L.  T.  482.  When  an  attorney  acts  for  two 
persons,  he  may  be  required  by  either  to  testify 


any  other  person  employed  to  manage  a  cause 
as  counsel.     Bean  v.  Quimby,  5  N.  II.  94. 

An  attorney,  who  in  his  professional  char- 
acter has  received  from  the  owner  of  property 
confidential  communications  on  the  subject  of 
a  transfer  of  it,  which  is  subsequently  made, 
cannot  be  examined,  against  the  consent  of  the 
grantee,  in  relation  to  such  communication. 
Fosters.  Hall,  12  Pick.  89. 

6  Thus,  in  the  South  Sea  Company  v.  Dolliffe, 
referred  to  in  Vaillant  v.  Dodemead,  2  Atk. 
525,  a  Mr.  Gambier,  who  had  settled  certain 
articles,  is  reported  to  have  demurred  to  the 
discovery  sought  from  him  as  to  the  alterations 


against  the  other,  though  their  communications 
to  him  are  privileged  wjth  respect  to  strangers. 
Re  Bauer,  79  Cal.  304;  Hanlon  v.  Doherty, 
109  Ind.  37;  see  Re  Postlethwaite,  35  Ch.  D. 
722;  see  also  Wrarde  v.  Warde,  3  M'N.  &  G. 
365;  1  Sim.  N.  S.  18;  Scranton  v.  Stewart,  52 
Ind.  68  (as  to  husbTud  and  wife).  The  attorney 
cannot  testify  as  to  a  privileged  communication 
made  in  the  presence  of  a  third  person.  Blount 
v.  Kimpton,  155  Mass.  378.  Information  ob- 
tained from  documents  submitted  for  counsel's 
inspection  or  custody  is  privileged.  Matthews 
v.  Hoagland,  48  N."  J.  Eq.  455.  See  Todd  v. 
Munson,  53  Conn.  580  ;  Hicks  v.  Blanchard,  60 
Vt.  073.  A  client's  address,  communicated  to  a 
solicitor  when  application  is  made  to  him  for  ad- 
vice, may  be  a  privileged  communication.  Ex 
parte  Official  Receiver,  60  L.  T.  109;  S.  C.  37 
W.  R.  223;  see  Bursill  v.  Tanner,  16  Q.  B.  D.  1 ; 
Marriott  v.  Chamberlain,  17  id.  154;  Proctor  v. 
Smiles,  55  L.  J.  Q.  B.  407,  527;  and  see  gen- 
erally, Moseley  v.  Victoria  Rubber  Co.  55 
L.  T.  482.  The  privilege  extends  to  communi- 
cations to  an  attorney  in  anticipation  of  em- 
ploying him,  but  before  he  is  actually  employed. 
See  Young  v.  State,  65  Ga.  525;  Nelson  v. 
Becker  (Minn.),  48  N.  W.  Rep.  962;  Samnion 
v.  Bennett,  8  T.  L.  R.  235.  Advice  by  an 
attorney-at-law,  for  which  no  compensation  is 
expected  or  received,  or  mere  conversation 
with  others  in  his  presence,  are  not  privileged 
communications.  Re  Monroe's  Will,  20  N.  Y.  S. 
82;  Hanson  v.  Bean  (Minn.),  53  N.  W.  Rep. 
871;  see  Peek  v.  Boone  (Ga),  36  Cent.  L.  J. 
411, and  note;  Hurlburt  v.  Hurlburt,  128  N.  Y. 
420;  Hughes  v.  Boone,  102  N.  C.  137.  In  the 
Federal  Courts  privileged  communications  be- 
tween attorney  and  client  do  not  depend  upon 
State  statutes.  Connecticut  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co. 
v.  Schaefer,  94  U.  S.  457;  Liggett  v.  Glenn,  51 
Fed.  Rep.  381. 

571 


577 


DEMURRERS. 


has  also  been  held  that  the  privilege  will  not  apply  to  one  who  has  been 
consulted  confidentially  as  an  attorney,  when  in  fact  he  was  not  one.7 

A  person  who  acts  as  an  interpreter, 8  or  agent,9  between  an  attorney 
and  his  client,  stands  in  the  same  situation  as  the  attorney ;  and  the  rule 
has  also  been  held  to  apply  to  the  clerk  of  the  counsel  or  solicitor  con- 
sulted ; 10  and  the  privilege  extends  to  the  representatives  of  the 
*  577  party  as  against  third  persons,  but  not  as  *  between  different  claim- 
ants under  him.1  The  privilege  extends  to  communications  with 
an  unprofessional  agent,  employed  to  collect  evidence  ; 2  and  also  to  com- 
munications with  a  Scotch  solicitor  and  law  agent  resident  in  England.3 

The  privilege  does  not  cease  upon  the  solicitor  afterwards  becoming 
interested  in  the  matters  in  question  in  the  suit;4  nor  upon  his  being 
struck  off  the  rolls.5 


in  those  articles,  on  the  ground  that  he  was 
counsel  for  the  com  pan}';  and  it  is  stated  that 
the  demurrer  was  overruled :  "  for  that  what  he 
knew  was  as  the  conveyancer  only."  2  Atk. 
525;  and  see  Turquand  v.  Knight,  2  M.  &  W. 
100,  as  to  certificated  conveyancers. 

7  Fountain  v.  Young,  6  Esp.  113 ;  but  see 
Calley  v.  Richards,  19  Beav.  401,  404.  The 
privilege  applies  only  to  licensed  attorneys. 
McLaughlin  v.  Gilmore,  1  111.  App.  563. 

8  Du  Barre  v.  Livette,  Peake,  N.  P.  C.  77, 
78,  explained  4  T.  R.  756;  see  Jackson  v. 
French,  3  Wend.  337;  Andrews  v.  Solomon, 
1  Peters  C.  C.  323;  Parker  v.  Carter,  4  Munf. 
273. 

9  Parkins  V.  Hawkshaw,  2  Stark.  N.  P. 
239;  Reid  v.  Langlois,  1  M'N.  &  G.  627,  638; 
14  Jur.  4G7,  470;  Russell  v.  Jackson,  9  Hare, 
387;  15  Jur.  1117;  Goodall  r.  Little,  1  Sim. 
N.  S.  155;  15  Jur.  303;  Hooper  v.  Gumm,  2 
J.  &  H.  602. 

"  Taylor  v.  Foster,  2  Car.  &  P.  195 ;  Foote 
v.  Hayne,  1  Car.  &  P.  545;  1  Ry.  &  M.  165; 
Foster  v.  Hall,  12  Pick.  93;  Jackson  v.  French, 
3  Wend.  337. 

1  Wigram  on  Disc.  82;  see  also  Parkhurst 
v.  Lowten,  1  Mer.  391,  402;  Russell  ».  Jackson, 
ubi  supra  ;  Gresley  v.  Mousley,  2  K.  &  J.  288  ; 
Tugwell  v.  Hooper,  10  Beav.  348,  350;  see 
1  Greenl.  Ev.  §  239. 

2  Steele  v.  Stewart,  1  Phil.  471,  475;  9  Jur. 
121;  Lafone  v.  Falkland  Island  Co.  4  K.  &  J. 
34;  Walsham  v.  Stainton,  2  H.  &  M.  1;  see 
also  Kerr  v.  Gillespie,  7  Beav.  572 ;  Simpson 
v.  Brown,  33  Beav.  482.  In  Ross  v.  Gibbs, 
L.  R.  8  Eq.  522,  it  was  held  generally  that 
communications  with  an  unprofessional  agent 
in  anticipation  of  litigation,  and  with  a  view 
to  the  prosecution  of.  or  defence  to,  a  claim  to 
the  matter  in  dispute,  are  privileged.  See  ante, 
p.  573,  n.  (a). 

3  Lawrence  v.  Campbell,  4  Drew.  485;  see 
also  Bunbury  v.  Bunbury,  2  Beav.  173.  176, 
whore  the  question  was  ns  to  an  opinion  by 
a  Dutch  counsel.     The  privilege  extends  to  all 

572 


letters  and  communications  between  the  solici- 
tors and  other  persons  written  or  made  for  the 
purposes  of  the  suit.  Churton  v.  Frewen,  2 
Dr.  &  Sm.  390.  But  see  Page  v.  Page,  17 
W.  R.  435. 

4  Chant  v.  Brown,  7  Hare,  79. 

6  Lord  Cholmondeley  v.  Lord  Clinton,  19 
Ves.  268.  The  propriety  of  the  distinction 
which  has  been  made  between  the  extent  of  the 
privilege,  as  it  affects  the  client  and  as  it  affects 
the  solicitor,  has  been  doubted,  ante,  p.  571, 
n.  LTpon  this  point,  Sir  J.  L.  Knight  Bruce 
V.  C.  said:  "I  confess  myself  at  a  loss  to 
perceive  any  substantial  reason,  in  point  of 
difference,  or  principle,  or  convenience,  between 
the  liability  of  the  client,  and  that  of  his 
counsel,  or  solicitor,  to  disclose  the  client's 
communications  made  in  confidence  profession- 
ally to  either."  Pearse  v.  Pearse,  1  De  G.  &  S. 
12,  2G.  And  upon  the  same  point,  Sir  R.  T. 
Kindersley  V.  C.  observed:  "If  I  could,  upon 
authority,  determine  the  abstract  point  which 
has  been  argued, — namely, whether  the  privilege 
of  the  client  is  as  extensive  as  that  of  the 
solicitor, —  I  should  be  glad  to  remove  the  anom- 
aly by  which  it  seems  that  where  the  solicitor 
is  interrogated,  and  objects,  because  it  would 
be  calling  on  him  to  divulge  matters  which 
passed  in  the  relation  of  solicitor  and  client, 
then  there  is  a  privilege  without  more:  whether 
such  matters. relate  to  an  actual  orcontemplated 
litigation  or  not;  and  yet,  if  the  same  ques- 
tions are  put  to  the  client,  then  when  his 
privilege  is  in  question,  he  is  to  be  told  that  he 
has  a  less  privilege  than  he  would  have  through 
his  solicitor,  if  the  latter  were  questioned.  So 
great  an  anomaly,  so  inconsistent  and  absurd  a 
rule,  I  should  be  glad  to  take  on  myself  to  say 
is  not  the  rule  of  this  Court,  and  that  there  is 
no  such  distinction.  When  Reid  v.  Langlois 
(1  M'N.  &  G.  627,  638)  was  cited  to  me,  it  did 
appear,  at  first  sight,  that  it  estab'ished  the 
broad  proposition  contended  for;  and  I  should 
certainly  have  followed  that  case  if  it  did  so; 
but  on  further  examination,  though  that  case 


DIFFERENT   GROUNDS    OF   DEMURRER. 


5 


I  5 


*The  more  recent  cases  upon  the  privilege,  as  it  affects  the  *578 
client,  are  very  numerous;  and  although  it  is  difficult,  if  not  im- 
possible, to  extract  any  clear  rules  from  them  as  to  the  extent  of  the 
privilege,  it  may  be  said'  that  their  tendency  is  to  make  the  rules  the 
same,  whether  the  discovery  is  sought  from  the  solicitor  or  client ; 1  and 
in  matters  of  title,  this  seems  to  have  been  decided.2 

There  does  not  seem  to  be  any  difference,  in  principle,  between  cases 
stated  for  opinion,  and  other  communications  of  matters  of  fact,  between 
a  client  and  his  professional  advisers.8 

The  privilege  is,  however,  confined  to  legal  advisers :  for  it  has  been 
held,  that  although  a  defendant  in  a  suit  cannot  be  compelled  to  dis- 
cover or  produce  letters  between  himself  and  his  solicitor,  subsequently 
to  the  institution  of  the  suit,  and  in  relation  thereto,  yet,  where  there 
are  more  defendants  than  one,  they  are  bound  to  discover  letters,  and 
copies  of  letters,  which  have  passed  between  them  with  reference  to  their 
defences.4 

Where  a  solicitor  is  party  to  a  fraud,  the  privilege  does  not  attach  to 
the  communications  with  him  upon  the  subject:  because  the  contriving 
of  a  fraud  is  not  part  of  his  duty  as  solicitor ; 5  and  ib  seems  that  it  is 
the  same  where  the  communications  are  with  a  view  to  effecting  any 
illegal  purpose.6  (a)     In  order,  however,  to  prevent  the  privilege  attach- 


does  not  establish  the  contrary,  yet  I  think  it 
was  not  the  intention  of  Lord  Cottenham  to 
lay  down  the  general  proposition:  that  point  he 
did  not  decide;  nor  do  the  cases  of  Pearse  v. 
Pearse,  1  De  G  &  S.  12,  11  Jur.  52,  and  Fol- 
lett  v.  Jefferyes,  1  Sim.  N.  S.  1,  15  Jur.  118, 
B'J  lay  it  down  as  to  enable  me  to  say  I  can 
follow  them.  If  that  point  is  to  be  decided,  it 
must  be  by  a  higher  authority  than  mine." 
Thompson  v.  Falk,  1  Drew.  21,  25. 

1  The  following  are  some  of  the  more  recent 
decisions:  Nias  v.  Northern  and  Eastern  Ry.  Co. 
3  M.  &  C.  355,  357:  2  Jur.  21)5;  Bunbury  v. 
Piimbury,  2  Beav.  173;  Flight  v.  Robinson,  8 
Beav.  22,  33:  8  Jur.  888;  Maden  v.  Veevers,  7 
Beav.  489  ;  Woods  ?>.  Woods,  4  Hare,  83;  Reece 
v.  Trye,  9  Beav.  310;  Pearse  v.  Pearse,  ubi  supra; 
Tugwell  v.  Hooper,  10  Beav.  348;  Penruddock 
i\  Hammond,  11  Beav.  59;  Beadon  v.  King,  17 
Sim.  34:  Reid  v.  Langlois,  and  Follett  v.  Jef- 
feryes, ubi  supra  ;  Warde  r.  Warde.3  M'N.  &  (1. 
365;  15  Jur.  759;  Balguy  v.  Broadhurst,  1  Sim. 
N.  S.  Ill;  14  Jur.  1105;  Hawkins  v.  Gather- 


cole,  1  Sim.  N.  S.  150;  15  Jur.  186;  Goodall  v. 
Little,  1  Sim.  N.  S.  155;  15  Jur.  309;  Thompson 
v.  Falk,  ubi  supra  ;  Bluck  v.  Galsworthy,  2  Giff. 
453;  Ford  v.  Tennant,  32  Beav.  1G2;  ante,  pp. 
570,  571,  notes. 

2  Manser  v.  Dix,  1 K.  &  J.  451;  1  Jur.  N.  S. 
466;  Pearse  v.  Pearse,  ubi  supra. 

3  Lord  Walsingham  o.  Goodricke,  3  Hare, 
122,  129 ;  Wilson  v.  Northampton  Ry.  Co.  L. 
R.  14  Eq.  477;  McFarlan  v.  Rolt,  L.  R.  14  Eq. 
580. 

4  Whitbread  ».  Gurney,  Younge,  541 :  Good- 
all  v.  Little,  ubi  supra  ;  Glvn  v.  Caulfield,  3  M'N. 
&  G.  463,  474;  15  Jur.  807;  Betts  v.  Menzies,  3 
Jur.  N.  S.  885;  5  W.  R.  767,  V.  C.  W.;  see 
also  Reynolds  v.  Godlee,  4  K.  &  J.  88;  Kears- 
ley  v.  Phillips,  10  Q.  B.  D.  36. 

'  s  Follett  v.  Jefferyes,  1  Sim.  N.  S.  1;  15  Jur. 
118;  Russell  v.  Jackson,  9  Hare,  387;  15  Jur. 
1117;  Gilbert  ».  Lewis,  1  De  G.  J.  &  S.  38,  49, 
50;  9  Jur.  N.  S.  187;  Feaver  v.  Williams,  11 
Jur.  X.  S.  902.  V.  C.  S. 

6  Russell  v.  Jackson,  ubi  supra. 


(a)  In  Reg.  v.  Cox,  14  Q.  B.  D.  153;  15  Cox 
C.  C.  611,  it  was  held  that  communications  by 
a  client  to  his  solicitor  before  the  commission 
of  a  crime,  for  the  purpose  of  being  guided  or 
aided  therein,  are  not  privileged.  In  Alexander 
v.  United  States,  138  U.  S.  353,  this  rule  was 
limited  to  cases  where  the  party  is  tried  for  the 
crime  in  furtherance  of  which  the  communica- 
tion is  made.  See  People  v.  Harris,  136  N.  Y. 
423 ;  Matthews  v.  Hoagland,  48  N.  J.  Eq.  455. 


In  equity,  when  the  relief  claimed  is  grounded 
on  fraud  participated  in  by  the  solicitor  who 
gave  advice,  the  act  complained  of  must,  on 
the  face  of  the  bill,  appear  to  be  a  fraud.  Rey- 
nelU.  Sprye,  10  B  av.  51 ;  11  id.  618;  Re  Postle- 
thwaite,  35  Ch.  D.  722;  see  Litchfield  v.  Jones 
(No.  2),  54  L.  J.  Ch.  207;  51  L.  T.  572;  Foakes 
v.  Webb,  28  Ch.  D.  287 ;  Jones  v.  Richards,  15  Q. 
B.  D.  439.  A  defendant,  deceived  by  counsel 
as  to  her  rights,  but  testifying  as  to  them,  can- 

573 


579 


DEMURRERS. 


ing,  the  bill  must  contain  allegations  specifically  connecting  the  solicitor 
with  the  fraud  or  illegal  act.7  Questions  concerning  privileged  com- 
munications arise  more  frequently  upon  applications  for  the  production 
of  documents    than  upon  demurrers  to  discovery;  and  the  subject  is, 

therefore,  more  fully  considered  under  that  title.8 
*  579        *V.  The  necessity  that  the   bill  should   show  that  a  certain 

degree  of  privity  exists  between  the  plaintiff  and  defendant,  in 
order  to  entitle  him  to  maintain  his  suit,  has  been  before  pointed  out ;  1 
and  it  has  been  stated,  that  the  want  of  such  privity  will  afford  a  ground 
for  demurrer  to  the  relief  prayed.  It  may  sometimes,  however,  happen 
that  a  plaintiff  may,  by  his  bill,  show  that,  supposing  the  facts  he  states 
are  true  (and  which,  as  we  have  seen,  are  admitted  by  every  demurrer), 
he  has  a  right  to  the  relief  he  prays,  and  yet  may  not  show  such  a  privity 
as  will  entitle  him  to  the  discovery  which  he  asks  for :  for  it  is  a  rule  of 
the  Court  that,  where  the  title  of  the  defendant  is  not  in  privity,  but 
inconsistent  with  the  title  made  by  the  plaintiff,  the  defendant  is  not 
bound  to  discover  the  evidence  of  the  title  under  which  he  claims.2 

The  principle  upon  which  these  cases  proceed  is  : 3  that  the  right  of  a 

t  Mornington  v.  Mornington,  2  J.  &  H.697;  the  defendant's  answer,  or  on   application   to 

Charlton  v.  Coombes,  4  Gift  372,  382;  9  Jur.  produce  documents  in  the  defendant's  posses- 

N.  S.  534.  s'on-     For  instances  in  which  this  rule  has  been 

8  See  post,    Chap.    XLII.    Production    of  acted  upon  where  the  objection  has  been  taken 


Documents. 

i  Ante,  p.  322. 

2  Ld.  Red.  190;  Stroud  v.  Deacon,  1  Ves. 
Sr.  37;  Buden  v.  Dore,  2  Ves.  Sr.  445;  Samp- 
son v.  Swettenham,  5  Mad.  16;  Tyler  v. 
Drayton,  2  S.  &  S.  309;  see  also  Stainton  v. 
Chadwick,  3  M'N.  &  G.  575,  582.  Thus,  where 
a  bill  was  filed  by  a  person  claiming  to  be  lord 
of  a  manor,  against  another  person  also  claim- 
ing to  be  lord  of  the  same  manor,  and  praying, 
amongst  other  things,  a  discovery  how  the 
defendant  derived  title  to  the  manor,  and  the 
defendant  demurred,  because  the  plaintiff  had 
shown  no  right  to  the  discovery,  the  demurrer 
was  allowed.  Ld.  Red.  190.  So,  where  a  bill 
■was  filed  by  one  claiming  to  be  the  heir,  ex  parte 
malerna,  against  another  claiming  to  be  heir,  ex 
parte  paterna,  and  the  bill  sought  a  discovery 
in  what  manner  the  claim  ex  parte  paterna  was 
made  out,  and  the  particulars  of  the  pedigree,  a 
demurrer  to  that  discovery  was  allowed.  Ivy 
v.  Kekewick,  2  Ves.  Jr.  679. 

3  This  principle  is  recognized  by  Lord 
Brougham,  in  Bolton  v.  Liverpool,  1  M.  &  K. 
88,  91 ;  see  also  Art. -Gen.  v.  London,  2  M'N.  & 
G.  247,  256,  and  bv  Lord  Abinger,  in  Bellwood 
r.  Wetherell,  1  Y.  &  C.  Ex.  211,  215.  It  is 
true  that  in  those  cases  the  question  did  not 
come  before  the  Court  upon  demurrer,  but  the 
rule  is  the  same  in  whatever  way  the  question 
may  be  raised:  on  demurrer,  on  exceptions  to 


by  demurrer,  see  Stroud  v.  Deacon,  1  Ves.  Sr. 
37;  Ivy  v.  Kekewick,  2  Ves.  Jr.  679;  Glegg  r. 
Legh,  4  Mad.  193;  Compton  v.  Earl  Grey,  1  Y. 
&  J.  154;  Wilson  v.  Forster,  Younge,  280;  Tooth 
v.  Dean  and  Chapter  of  Canterbury,  3  Sim.  49. 
61.  On  Application  to  Produce:  Princess  of 
Wales  v.  Earl  of  Liverpool,  1  Swanst.  114, 121; 
Micklethwait  v.  Moore,  3  Mer.  292;  Bligh  v. 
Benson,  7  Price,  205;  Tyler  v.  Drayton,  2  S.  & 
S.  309;  Sampson  v.  Swettenham,  5  Mad.  16;  2 
M.  &  K.  754,  n.  (6);  Firkins  v.  Low,  13  Pri. 
193;  Wilfon  v.  Forster,  M'Lel.  &  Y.  274;  Tom- 
lmson  v.  Lymer,  2  Sim.  489;  Shaftsbury  v.  Ar- 
rowsmith,  4  Ves.  66,  70;  Aston  v.  Lord  Exeter, 
6  Ves.  288;  Worsley  v.  Watson,  cited  id.  289; 
Bolton  v.  Liverpool,  1M.&K  88 ;  Wasney  v. 
Tempest,  9  Beav.  407;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Thompson, 
8  Hare,  106;  Manby  v.  Bewicke  (No.  3),  8  De 
G.  M.  &  G.  476 ;  Rumbold  r.  Forteath  (Xo.  2), 
3  K.  &  J.  748;  Hunt  v.  Elmes,  27  Beav.  62;  5 
Jur.  N.  S.  645;  Ferrier  v.  Atwool,  12  Jur.  N. 
S.  365;  14  W.  R.  597,  L.JJ.;  id.  582,  V.  C.  W.; 
Kennedy  v.  Wakefield,  39  L.  J.  Ch.  827;  Col- 
lins v.  Gresley,  2  Y.  &  J.  490.  On  Exceptions 
to  Answers  :  Buden  v.  Dore,  2  Ves.  Sr.  445 ; 
Stainton  v.  Chadwick,  3  M'N.  &  G.  375;  15 
Jur.  1139;  Ingilby  v.  Shafto,  ubi  supra;  Bethell 
v.  Casson,  1  H.  &  M.  806;  Bovill  r.  Smith,  L. 
R.  2  Eq.  459,  V.  C.  W. ;  Crossley  v.  Tomey,  2 
Ch.  D.  533. 


not  object  to  such  couns'l's  testifying  thereof. 
Hunt  v.  Blackburn,  128  U.  S.  464.  A  party 
cannot  protect  unprivileged  documents  by  de- 

574 


livering  them  to  counsel.  Edison  Electric  Light 
Co.  v.  United  States  Electric  Lighting  Co.  44 
Fed.  Rep.  294. 


DIFFERENT   GROUNDS    OF   DEMURRER. 


*580 


plaintiff  in  Equity  to  the  benefit  of  a  defendant's  oath  is  limited  to  a 
discovery  of  such  material  facts  as  relate  to  the  plaintiff's  case,  and  does 
not  extend  to  a  discovery  of  the  manner  in  which,  or  of  the  evidence  by 
means  of  which,  the  defendant's  case  is  to  be  established.4  (b) 

*  This  rule  will  not  extend  to  defeat  the  plaintiff  of  his  right  to    *  580 
discovery  from  the  defendant,  where  he  makes  a  case  in  his  bill 
which,  if  admitted,  would  disprove  the  truth  of,  or  otherwise  invalidate  the 


4  Wigram  on  Disc.  261;  Ingilby  v.  Shafto, 
33  B-av.  31 ;  9  Jur.  N.  S.  1141;  Daw  v.  Eley,  2 
II.  &  M.  725;  Hoffman  v.  Postill,  L.  R.  4  Ch. 

673.  So  where  the  discovery  is  such  as  might 
be  used  prejudicially  to  the  defendant  irrespec- 
tive of  the  suit.  Carver  v.  Leite,  L.  R.  7  Ch. 
90;  Moore  v.  Craven,  L.  R.  7  Ch.  94,  n. 

The  rule  of  the  English  Courts  of  Equity, 
that  the  plaintiff  in  a  bill  of  discovery  "shall 
only  have  a  discovery  of  what  is  necessary  to 
his  own  title,  and  shall  not  pry  into  the  title  of 
the  defendant"  (Coop.  Eq.  PI.  58),  is  held  not 
to  be  applicable  in  Massachusetts.  Adams  v. 
Porter,  1  Cush.  170,  175,  176.  "Our  whole 
system  of  inquiry,"  says  Mr.  Justice  Dewey  in 
the  above  case,  "  by  the  instrumentality  of  a 
legal  proceeding,  has  been  that  of  full  inquiry  as 
to  any  and  all  facts  that  may  impeach  the  right 
of  property  in  the  party  of  whom  the  inquiry  is 
made."     Instances  are  adduced   of  interroga- 


(b)  So  a  defendant's  interrogatories  will  in 
general  be  disallowed  if  they  inquire  into  the 
evidence  of  the  plaintiffs  title.  Garland  v. 
Oram,  7  T.  L.  R.  80;  see  Leslie  v.  Cave  (No.  2), 
50  L.  T.  332;  35  W.  R.  515 ;  Nicholl  v.  Wheeler, 
17  Q.  B.  D.  101;  McLean  v.  Jones,  66  L.  T. 
653;  8  T.  L.  R.  243,  314;  Eyre  v.  Rogers,  40 
W.  R.  137 ;  Norfolk  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Postal 
Tel.  Cable  Co.  88  Va.  932.  In  Eade  v.  Jacobs, 
3  Ex.  D.  335,  Cotton  L.  J.  said :  "  I  think  the 
plaintiff  is  entitled  to  a  discovery  of  the  facts 
upon  which  the  defendant  relies  to  establish  his 
case,  but  not  of  the  evidence  which  it  is  pro- 
posed to  adduce."  In  Bidder  v.  Bridges,  29 
Ch.  D.  29,  37,  Kay  J.  said  that  he  disap- 
proved of  this  statement  as  a  general  proposi- 
tion. See  Saunders  v.  Jones,  7  Ch.  D.  435; 
Fisher  v.  Owen,  8  Ch.  D.  645 ;  Benbow  v.  Low, 
10  Ch.  D.  93;  Lyon  r.  Tweddell,  13  Ch.  D. 
375;  Johns  v.  James,  id.  370;  Marriott  V. 
Chamberlain,  17  Q.  B.  D.  154;  Budden  V. 
Wilkinson,  41  XV.  R.  657;  Downier.  Nettleton, 
61  Conn.  593;  Norfolk  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Postal 
Tel.  Cable  Co.  88  Va.  932.  Under  the  N.  Y. 
Code  of  Civil  Proc.  §  803,  the  plaintiff  may  have 
discovery  and  inspection  of  a  document  set  up 
in  the  answer,  though  pertaining  to  the  defence 
and  not  a  part  of  the  plaintiff's  case.  Seligman 
V.  Real  Estate  Trust  Co.  20  Abb.  N.  Cas.  210. 

In  a  suit  for  the  recovery  of  land  the  plain- 
tiff is  entitled  to  discovery  as   to  all   matters 


tories  to  supposed  trustees  in  trustee  processes; 
to  persons  charged  with  embezzling  the  property 
of  deceased  persons ;  and  to  persons  charged 
with  having  fraudulently  received  the  property 
of  an  insolvent  debtor.  But  see  Wilson  v. 
WTebber,  2  Gray,  558,  in  which  the  English  rule 
is  distinctly  recognized;  and  the  case  of  Adams 
v.  Porter  is  not  referred  to ;  see  also  Haskell  v. 
Haskell,  3  Cush.  540,  542,  543;  Bellows  v. 
Stone,  18  N.  H.  405,  483,  484;  Story,  Eq.  PI. 
§§  572-574,  c ;  Shaftsbury  v.  Arrowsmith,  4 
Yes.  72,  Mr.  Hovenden's  note  (1);  Cullison  v. 
Bossom,  1  Md.  Ch.  95;  Howell  v.  Ashmore,  9 
N.  J.  Eq.  87,  88.  The  plaintiff  must  state  the 
facts  which  he  expects  to  establish  by  the  de- 
fendant's answer,  otherwise  he  cannot  have  a 
discovery,  merely  to  enable  him  to  judge 
whether  he  can  prevail  in  a  suit  at  Law.  Deas 
v.  Harvie,  2  Barb.  Ch.  448. 


relevant  to  his  own  and  not  to  the  defendant's 
case.  Lyell  v.  Kennedy,  8  App.  Cas.  217;  see 
Morris  v.  Edwards,  15  App.  Cas.  309;  23  Q.  B. 
D.  287.  This  rule  holds  good  under  the  Code 
system.  Shoe  &  Leather  Rep.  Ass'n  ».  Bailey, 
17  Jones  &  S.  385.  A  discovery,  useless  to  the 
plaintiff  for  a  hearing,  should  not  be  required, 
if  it  may  be  injurious  to  the  defendant  in  case 
the  plaintiff  fails  at  the  hearing.  Heugh  v. 
Garrett,  44  L.  J.Ch.  305.  So  discovery  will  be 
refused  when  it  is  not  relevant,  or  is  not  re- 
quired bonajtde  for  the  purpose  of  the  particular 
suit.  Meek  v.  Witherington,  67  L.  T.  122; 
Robinson  v.  Philadelphia  &  R.  R.  Co.  28  Fed. 
Rep.  340;  Roberts  v.  Walley,  14  id.  167;  post, 
p.  720,  notes.  Discovery  may  be  had  in  order 
to  enable  a  party  to  prepare  for  trial.  Congdon 
v.  Aylesworth,  10  R.  I.  281;  Arnold  v.  Paw- 
tuxet  V.  W.  Co.  19  L.  R.  A.  602. 

The  lights  of  a  defendant  who  files  inter- 
rogatories for  the  examination  of  the  plain- 
tiff, are,  it  seems,  somewhat  different,  since  the 
plaintiff,  in  answering  such  interrogatories,  is 
not  only  bound  to  answer  fully,  but  may  be 
required  to  answer  further  as  to  all  matters 
which,  tend  to  destroy  his  own  case,  though  not 
with  respect  to  matters  which  tend  to  support 
it.  See  id.;  Hoffmann  v.  Postill,  I..  B.  1  Ch. 
673;  Commissioners  of  Sewers  v.  Glasse,  L.  R. 
15  Eq.  302. 

575 


581 


DEMURRERS. 


defence  made,  to  the  bill ;  in  such  cases,  he  is  entitled  to  discovery  from 
the  defendant  of  all  which  may  enable  him  to  impeach  the  defendant's 
case ;  for  the  plaintiff  does  not  rest  on  a  mere  negative  of  the  defend- 
ant's case,  but  insists  upon  some  positive  ground  entitling  him  to  the 
assistance  of  the  Court,  such  as  fraud,  or  other  circumstances  of  equi- 
table cognizance,  to  a  discovery  of  which  no  objection  of  this  kind  can 
be  raised.1  • 

If  a  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  a  discovery  of  deeds  or  other  documents 
for  the  purpose  of  establishing  his  own  case,  his  right  to  such  discov- 
ery will  not  be  affected  by  the  circumstance  that  the  same  documents 
are  evidence  of  the  defendant's  case  also ; 2  and  if  a  defendant,  bound 
to  keep  distinct  accounts  for  another  party,  improperly  mixes  them 
with  his  own,  so  that  they  cannot  be  separated,  he  must  discover  the 

whole.3 
*581         *  VI.  The  circumstance  that  a  party  not  before  the  Court  has 

an  interest  in  a  document  which  a  defendant,  so  far  as  his  own 
interest  is  concerned,  is  bound  to  produce,  will,  in  some  cases,  deprive 
the  plaintiff  of  his  right  to  call  for  its  production,  at  least  in  the  absence 
of  the  third  party,  as  in  the  instance  of  a  person  being  a  trustee  only  for 
others.  Upon  this  principle,  a  mortgagee  cannot  be  compelled  to  show 
the  title  of  his  mortgagor,  unless  such  mortgagor  is  before  the  Court ; 1 
in  such  cases,  however,  a  demurrer,  for  want  of  proper  parties,  would 
be  the  proper  form  in  which  to  raise  the  objection,  where  the  bill  is  for 
relief  as  well  as  for  discovery.2  (a) 

VII.  Communications  which  come  within  a  certain  class  of  official 
correspondence  are  privileged  upon  the  ground  that  they  could  not  be 
made  the  subject  of  discovery  in  a  Court  of  Justice  without  injury  to 
the  public  interest.8  Where  the  question  was  whether  correspondence, 
between  the  Court  of  Directors  of  the  East  India  Company  and  the  Board 
of  Control,  came  within  the  limits  of  this  privilege,  it  was  decided  that  it 


1  Hare  on  Disc.  201;  Bellows  v.  Stone,  18 
N.  H.  465,  483-485 ;  Daw  v.  Eley,  2  H.  &  M. 
725.  And  in  answering  interrogatories  filed  by 
a  defendant  for  tlie  examination  of  the  plaintiff, 
under  the  English  practice,  the  general  rule 
sipplies,  that  he  who  is  bound  to  answer  must 
answer  fully.  Such  interrogatories  are  on  a 
different  footing  from  those  for  the  examination 
of  a  defendant  in  this  respect,  that  a  plaintiff  is 
not  entitled  to  a  discovery  of  the  defendant's 
case,  but  a  defendant  may  ask  any  questions 
tending  to  destroy  the  plaintiff's  claim.  Hoff- 
mann v.  Postill,  L.  R.  4  Ch.  673. 

2  Burrell  v.  Nicholson,  1  M.  &  K.  680; 
Wigram  on  Disc.  244;  Smith  v.  Beaufort,  1 
Hare,  507,  518;  1  Phil.  209,  218;  7  Jur.  1095; 


Combe  v.  London,  1  Y.  &  C.  C.  C.  631,  650; 
Earp  v.  Lloyd,  3  K.  &  J.  549. 

3  Freeman  v.  Fairlie,  3  Mer.  43;  Earl  of 
Salisbury  v.  Cecil,  1  Cox,  277;  Wigram  on 
Disc.  244;  Hare  on  Disc.  245;  and  see  post, 
Chap.  XLIL,  Production  of  Documents. 

1  Lambert  v.  Rogers,  2  Mer.  489;  see,  how- 
ever, Balls  v.  Margrave,  3  Beav.  448;  4  Beav. 
119;  Few  v.  Guppy,  13  Beav.  457;  Gough  r. 
Offley,  5  De  G.  &  S.  653 ;  Hercy  v.  Ferrers,  4 
Beav.  97;  and  post,  Chap.  XLIL,  Production 
of  Documents. 

2  See  ante,  pp.  278,  558. 

8  See  1  Greenl.  Ev.  §§  250,  251 ;  Bellows  v. 
Stone,  18  N.  H.  465,  485. 


(a)  So  there  is  no  jurisdiction  to  make  an 
order  which  amounts  to  requiring  the  produc- 
tion of  documen's  against  persons  not  parties 
to  the  suit,  and  not  strictly  ancillarv   to   the 

576 


examination  of  a  witness,  as  under  6  &  7  Vic. 
c.  82,  §  5.  Burchard  v.  Macfarlaiie,  [1891]  2 
Q.  B.  241. 


DIFFERENT   GROUNDS    OF    DEMURRER. 


582 


could  not  be  subject  to  be  communicated,  without  infringing  the  policy  of 
the  Act  of  Parliament,4  and  without  injury  to  the  public  interests.5  (h) 

The  above  are  the  principal  grounds  upon  which  a  defendant  may 
demur  to  the  discovery  sought  by  a  bill ;  although  the  plaintiff  may  be 
entitled  to  the  relief  prayed,  in  case  he  could  establish  his  right  to  it  by 
other  means  than  discovery  from  the  defendant,  on  those  points  as  to 
which  the  defendant  is  entitled  to  defend  himself  from  making  discov- 
ery. In  all  other  cases,  a  plaintiff,  if  entitled  to  relief,  is  entitled  to 
call  upon  the  defendant  to  make  a  full  discovery  of  all  matters  upon 
which  his  title  to  relief  is  founded.  It  does  not,  however,  very  often 
happen  that  these  grounds  affect  the  whole  of  the  discovery  sought ; 
in  such  cases,  the  defendant  must,  if  interrogated,  answer  all  those 
parts  of  the  bill,  the  answer  to  which  will  not  expose  him,  or  have  a 
tendency  to  expose  him,  to  the  inconveniences  before  enumerated.  A 
demurrer,  under  such  circumstances,  should  precisely  distinguish  each 
part  of  the  bill  demurred  to,  and  if  it  does  not  do  so,  it  will  be  over- 
ruled.6 

If  a  defendant  objects  to  a  particular  part  of  the  discovery, 
and  *  the  grounds  upon  which  he  may  demur  appear  clearly  on  *  582 
the  face  of  the  bill,  and  the  defendant  does  not  demur  to  the  dis- 
covery, but,  answering  to  the  rest  of  the  bill,  declines  answering  to  so 
much,  the  Court  will  not  compel  him  to  make  the  discovery ;  but,  in 
general,  unless  it  clearly  appears  by  the  bill  that  the  plaintiff  is  not 
entitled  to  the  discovery  he  requires,  or  that  the  defendant  ought  not  to 
be  compelled  to  make  it,  a  demurrer  to  the  discovery  will  not  hold,  and 
the  defendant,  unless  he  can  protect  himself  by  plea,  must  answer.1 

Any  irregularity  in  the  frame  of  a  bill  may  be  taken  advantage  of 
by  demurrer.2  Thus,  if  a  bill  is  brought  contrary  to  the  usual  course  of 
the  Court,  a  demurrer  will  hold.3 


4  3&4  Will.  IV.  c.  85. 

5  Smith  v.  East  India  Co.  1  Phil.  50,  55;  6 
Jur.  1 ;  see  also  Wadeer  v.  East  India  Co.  8 
De  G.  M.  &  G.  182;  29  Beav.  300. 

6  Chetwynd  v.  Lindon,  2  Ves.  Sr.  450; 
Devonsher  v.  Newenham,  2  Sch.  &  Lef.  199; 
Robinson  v.  Thompson,  2  V.  &  B.  118  :  Weather- 
head  v.  Blackburn,  id.  121,  124;  infra,  p.  589, 
n.  8. 

i  Ld.  Red.  200;  Cons.  Ord.  XV.  4;  post, 
p.  583. 

2  Ld.  Red.  206;  Bainbrigge  v.  Bnddeley,  9 
Beav.  538;  Ranger  v.  Great  Western  Rv.  Co. 


(b)  Hennessy  v.  Wright,  21  Q.  B.  D.  509  : 
Marks  v.  Bcyfus,  25  id.  494;  TheBellerophon.  44 
L.  J.  Adm.  6;  Humphrey  v.  Archibald,  28  Can. 
L.J.  57;  seel  Seton  on  Judgments  (5th  ed.), 
83.  This  rule  applies  also  in  a  suit  against  the 
agent  of  a  colonial  government,  which  is  not  a 
party  to  the  suit,  when  production  is  sought  of 
documents  which  are  its  property.  Wright  r. 
Mills,  62  L.  T.  558;  63  id.  180.  So.  a  defend- 
ant cannot  be  required,  without  the  consent  of 

vol.  I.  —  37 


13  Sim.  368;  7  Jur.  935;  Henderson  v.  Cook, 
4  Drew.  306. 

3  Ld.  Red.  206;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  643.  As 
where,  after  a  decree  directing  incumbrances  to 
be  paid  according  to  priority,  a  creditor  ob- 
tained an  assignment  of  an  old  mortgage,  and 
filed  a  bill  to  have  the  advantage  it  would  give 
him,  by  way  of  priority,  over  the  demands  of 
some  of  the  defendants,  a  demurrer  was  al- 
lowed (Wortley  v.  Birkhead,  3  Atk.  809):  it 
being,  in  effect,  a  bill  to  vary  a  decree,  and  yet 
neither  a  bill  of  review,  nor  a  bill  in  the  nature 
of  a  hill  of  review,  which  are  the  only  kinds  of 


the  government,  to  answer,  upon  a  bill  in  eqnitv 
or  by  interrogatories  at  law,  respecting  com- 
munications made  by  him  to  the  government. 
as  to  frauds  by  the  plaintiff  upon  the  revenue. 
Worthington  v.  Scribner,  109  Mass.  487.  Com- 
munications as  to  unissued  patents  between  the 
patent  office  and  applicants  are  not  privileged. 
Edison  Electric  Light  Co.  v.  United  States  Elec- 
tric Lighting  Co.  44  Fed.  Rep.  294. 

577 


583 


DEMURRERS. 


If  the  plaintiff  neglects  to  take  advantage  of  the  irregularity  by 
demurrer,  he  will  be  held  to  have  waived  the  objection,4  unless  he  has 
claimed  the  benefit  of  it  by  answer.5 

An  amended  bill  is  liable  to  have  the  same  objections  taken  to  it,  by 
demurrer,  as  an  original  bill ;  and  even  where  a  demurrer  to  the  origi- 
nal bill  has  been  overruled,  a  demurrer  to  an  amended  bill  has  been 
allowed;6  and  the  circumstance  of  the  amendment  being  of  the  most 
trifling  extent  will  not,  it  seems,  make  any  difference  ;  and  even  where 
the  bill  was  amended  by  the  addition  of  a  party  only,  the  demurrer  was 
held  to  be  regular.7  Where  the  defence  first  put  in  is  a  plea,  and 
*  583  the  bill  is  afterwards  amended,  the  amended  *  bill  may  still  be 
demurred  to.1  A  defendant,  however,  cannot,  in  general,  after 
he  has  answered  the  original  bill,  put  in  a  general  demurrer  to  the 
amended  bill :  because  the  answer  to  the  original  bill,  being  still  on  the 
record,  will,  in  fact,  overrule  the  demurrer.2  The  defendant  must,  in 
such  case,  confine  his  demurrer  to  the  matters  introduced  by  amend- 
ment. But  where  a  substantially  new  case  is  made  by  the  amended  bill, 
a  general  demurrer  will  lie.3 

A  defendant  may  demur  to  part  only  of  the  relief  or  discovery :  in 
which  case  it  is  called  a  partial  demurrer.4  Under  the  former  practice, 
a  defendant  demurring  to  part  of  the  bill  was  bound  to  answer  the 
rest;  and  when  interrogatories  have  been  served,  a  defendant  may  still 
answer  such  of  the  interrogatories  as  are  not  covered  by  the  demurrer ; 
but  where  no  interrogatories  have  been  served,  he  may  file  the  partial 
demurrer  without  coupling  any  answer  with  it.5     It  is  not,  however, 


bills  which  can  be  brought  to  effect  or  alter  a 
decree,  unless  the  decree  has  been  obtained  by 
fraud.  Ld.  Red.  20G ;  Lady  Granville  v.  Rams- 
den,  Bunb.  56.  Where,  however,  a  supplemen- 
tal bill  was  filed,  in  a  case  in  which,  according  to 
the  former  practice  of  the  Court,  a  supplemental 
bill  was  the  proper  course,  but  bjr  more  recent 
practice  the  same  object  had  been  accomplished 
by  petition,  Sir  John  Leach  V.  C  held,  that 
the  supplemental  bill  was  not  rendered  irregu- 
lar, although  the  circumstances  would  be  taken 
into  consideration  upon  the  question  of  costs. 
Davies  v.  Williams,  1  Sim.  5. 

4  Archbishop  of  York  v.  Stapleton,  2  Atk. 
136;  Banger  v.  Great  Western  Ry.  Co.  ubi 
tupra.  An  irregularity  in  pleading  is  waived 
by  going  to  issue  upon  the  merits,  as  where, 
pending  a  suit  for  the  infringement  of  a  patent, 
the  patent  was  surrendered  and  a  new  patent 
taken  out,  and  the  complainant  filed  a  supple- 
mental, instead  of  an  original  bill.  Ready  v. 
Scott.  23  Wall.  352,  365.  So  where  the  answer 
was  filed  as  a  cross-bill  without  any  warrant  of 
law.  Hubbard  r.  Turner,  2  M'Lean,  539.  So 
where  the  answer  was  filed  as  a  cross-bill  when 
an  original  bill  was  alone  proper.  Odom  v. 
Owen,  2  Baxt.  446;  Campbell  v.  Foster,  2  Tenn. 
Ch.  402.  So,  where  a  pre-requisite  to  the  filing 
of  an  answer  as  a  cross-bill  is  omitted.  Hull 
r  Fowlkes,  9  Heisk.  753. 
578 


5  Milligan  v.  Mitchell,  1  M.  &  C.  433,  542. 

6  Bancroft  v.  Wardour,  2  Bro.  C.  C.  66 ;  2 
Dick.  672;  1  Hoff.  Ch.  Pr.  216,  217;  Moore  v. 
Armstrong,  9  Porter,  697.  A  demurrer  will 
lie  where  the  title  alleged  in  an  amended  bill 
is  inconsistent  with  that  presented  by  the  origi- 
nal bill.     Winter  v.  Quarles,  43  Ala.  692. 

'  Bosanquet  v.  Marsha'm,  4  Sim.  573;  Ilorton 
v.  Thompson,  3  Tenn.  Ch.  575.  Infra,  p.  601, 
n.  6. 

1  Robertson  v.  Lord  Londonderry,  5  Sim. 
226. 

2  Atkinson  v.  Hanway,  1  Cox,  360;  see 
Ellice  v.  Goodson,  3  M.  &  C.  653,  658;  2  Jur. 
249;  Salkeld  v.  Phillips,  2  Y.  &  C.  Ex.  580; 
and  see  ante,  p.  409. 

3  Cresy  v.  Bevan,  13  Sim.  354;  see  Powell  p. 
Jewesbury,  9  Ch.  D.  34;  also  Powell  r.  Cock- 
erel!, 4  Hare,  565,  569;  Wyllie  v.  Ellice.  6  Ha.c, 
505.  510;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Cooper,  8  Hare,  166; 
ante,  p.  409. 

4  See  Emans  v.  Emans,  14  N.  J.  Eq.  114. 

s  Burton  r.  Robertson,  1J.  &  H.  38;  6  Jur. 
N.  S.  10U.  See  now  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  XXVIII. 
4,  10;  Watson  r.  Hawkins,  24  W.  R.  884.  The 
defendant  must,  however,  wait  till  the  expira- 
ration  of  the  time  for  filing  interrogatories. 
Rowe  v.  Tonkin,  L.  R.  1  Eq.  9;  11  Jur.  N.  S. 
849,  11.  R. 


DIFFERENT    GROUNDS    OF    DEMURRER. 


584 


necessary  that  the  defendant  should  adopt  the  form  of  a  partial 
demurrer,  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  himself  from  giving  discovery 
to  which  the  plaintiff  is  not  entitled  :  for  a  defendant  may  decline 
answering  any  interrogatory,  or  part  of  one,  from  answering  which  he 
might  have  protected  himself  by  demurrer,  notwithstanding  he  answers 
other  parts  of  such  interrogatory  or  interrogatories  from  which  lie  might 
have  protected  himself  by  demurrer,  or  other  part  of  the  bill  as  to  which 
he  was  not  interrogated.6  In  cases  in  which  it  is  still  thought  expedient 
to  adopt  the  defence  of  a  partial  demurrer  against  discovery,  this  rule 
does  not.  seem  to  affect  the  practice;  but  the  rule  which  directs  that 
no  demurrer  or  plea  shall  be  held  bad,  and  overruled  upon  argument, 
only  because  the  answer  of  the  defendant  extends  to  some  part  of 
the  same  matter  as  is  covered  by  such  demurrer  or  plea,7  is  important. 
And  we  have  before  "seen,  that  now  no  demurrer  or  plea  will  be  held 
bad,  and  overruled  upon  argument,  only  because  such  demurrer  or 
plea  does  not  cover  so  much  of  the  bill  as  it  might  by  law  have 
extended  to.8 

A  demurrer  cannot- be  good  in  part  and  bad  in  part;9  so  that 
*  if  a  demurrer  is  general  to  the  whole  bill,  and  there  is  any  part,    *  584 
either  as  to  the  relief  or  the  discovery,   to   which   the  defend- 
ant ought  to  put  in  an  answer,  the  demurrer,  being  entire,   must  be 
overruled.1 

Instances    are    certainly    mentioned   by    Lord   Redesdale,2  in    which 


6  Cons.  Ord.  XV.  4  ;  see  post,  Chap.  XVII. 
§  1,  on  Answers. 

7  Cons.  Ord.  XIV.  9;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Cooper, 
ubi  supra.  This  order  has  been  adopted  in  the 
Equity  Rules  of  the  U.  S.  Courts,  Rule  37. 

8  Ante,  p.  546,  n.  6;  post,  p.  617;  Cons.  Ord. 
XIV.  8. 

9  In  this  respect  there  is  a  difference  be- 
tween a  plea  and  a  demurrer.  Mayor,  &c,  of 
London  v.  Levy,  8  Yes.  40'} ;  Baker  v.  Mellish, 
11  Ves.  70. 

1  IVr  Lord  Hardwicke  in  Met  calf  v.  Hervev, 
1  Ves.  Sr.  218;  Earl  of  Suff  ,1k  v.  Green,  1  Atk. 
450;  Todd  v.  Gee,  17  Ves.  273,  277:  Att.-Gen. 
v.  Brown,  1  Swanst.  304.  A  demurrer  bad  in 
part  is  void  intoto,  Verplanck  v.  Caines,  1  John. 
Ch.  57;  Forbes  v.  Whitlock,  3  Edw.'  Ch.  44!; 
Fay  v.  Jones,  1  Head  (Tenn  ),  442;  Shed  v. 
Garfield,  5  Vt.  39;  Castleman  v.  Weitch,  3 
Rand.  598;  Kimberley  v.  Sells.  3  John.  Ch. 
467;  Graves  v.  Downey,  3  Monroe,  356;  Chase's 
case,  1  Bland,  217;  Blount  v.  Garen,  3  Havw. 
88;  Treadwell  v.  Brown,  44  N.  II.  551  ;  Metier 
v.  Metier,  18  N.  J.  Eq.  273;  19  id.  457;  Banta 
v.  Moore,  15  N.  J.  Eq.  97;  Mitchell  r.  Green, 
10  Met.  101  ;  ante.  p.  547,  n.;  but  see  Pope  r. 
Stan-bury,  2  Bibb,  484,  contra.  It  is  a  general 
rule  that  a  demurrer  cannot  be  good  as  to  a  part, 
which  it  covers,  and  bad  as  to  the  rest;  and 
therefore  it  must  stand  or  fall  altogether.  Hig- 
ginbotham  v.  Burnet,  5  John.  Ch.  184;  Burns 
v.  Hobdt,  29  Maine.  272,  277;  Marye  v.  Dyche, 
42  Miss.  347;  Reid  v.  Beall,  id.  472. 


But  in  Tennessee,  which  authorizes  an  appeal 
from  the  decree  of  the  Chancelloron  a  demurrer, 
the  Supreme  Court  has  sometimes  departed  from 
this  rule  with  a  view  to  narrow  the  subsequent 
litigation.  Fitzgerald  v.  Cummings,  1  Lea, 
232;  Riddle  v.  Mottley,  1  Lea,  468. 

A  demurrer  to  the  whole  of  a  bill,  containing 
some  matters  relievable  and  others  not,  is  had, 
unless  the  bill  is  multifarious.  Dimmock  v. 
Bixby,  20  Rick.  368;  McLaren  v.  Steapp,  1 
Kelly,  376;  Beach  v.  Beach,  11  Paige,  161; 
Stuyvesant  v.  Mayor,  &c,  of  New  York,  id. 
414;  Robinson  v.  Guild,  12  Me;.  323.  Where 
a  demurrer  to  a  bill  is  overruled,  because  it 
covers  too  much,  the  defendant  may,  on  excep- 
tion to  his  answer,  raise  the  question  of  the 
materiality  of  the  discovery.  Kuypers  v.  lief. 
Dutch  Church,  6  Paige,  570.  If  the  ground  of 
demurrer  assigned  as  to  all  of  the  plaintiffs  be 
bad  as  to  one,  the  demurrer  must  be  overruled. 
Gibson  o.  Jayne,  37  Miss.  164.  If  the  demurrer 
be  to  the  whole  bill  fur  want  of  proper  parties, 
and  there  are  sufficient  parties  to  the  proper 
part  of  the  bill,  which  is  independent  of  another 
pari  faulty  for  want  of  parties,  the  demurrer 
will  be  had.  Laughton  v.  Harden,  08  Maine, 
208. 

a  Ld.  Red.  214;  Rolt  v.  Lord  Somerville,  2 
Eq.  Cas.  Ab.  759,  pi.  8;  Radcliffe  v.  Fursman, 
2  Bro.  P.  C.  ed.  Toml.  514. 


579 


*  585  DEMURRERS. 

demurrers  have  been  allowed  in  part ;  but  whatever  may  have  formerly 
been  done,  the  practice  appears  to  be  now  more  strict :  though  some- 
times the  Court  has,  upon  overruling  a  demurrer,  given  the  defendant 
leave  to  put  in  a  less  extended  demurrer,  or  to  amend  and  narrow  the 
demurrer  already  filed.3  In  the  latter  case,  however,  the  application 
to  amend  ought  to  be  made  before  the  judgment  upon  the  demurrer,  as 
it  stands,  has  been  pronounced :  though,  even  where  that  has  been 
omitted,  the  Court  has,  after  the  demurrer  has  been  overruled,  upon  a 
proper  case  being  shown,  given  the  defendant  leave,  upon  motion,  to  put 
in  a  less  extended  demurrer  and  answer.4 

A  defendant  may  also  put  in  separate  demurrers  to  separate  and 
distinct  parts  of  a  bill,  for  separate  and  distinct  causes:5  for  the  same 
grounds  of  demurrer  frequently  will  not  apply  to  diffei'ent  parts  of  a 
bill,  though  the  whole  may  be  liable  to  demurrer ;  and  in  this  case,  one 
demurrer  may  be  overruled  upon  argument  and  another  allowed.6 

Although  a  demurrer  cannot  be  good  in  part  and  bad  in  part,  it  may 
be  good  as  to  one  of  the  defendants  demurring,  and  bad  as  to  others.7 


*  585  *  Section  III.  —  The  Form  of  Demurrers. 

A  demurrer  must  be  entitled  in  the  cause,  and  is  headed  "The 
demurrer  of  A  B  (or,  of  A  B  and  C  D),  one,  &c,  of  the  above-named 
defendants,  to  the  bill  of  complaint  of  the  above-named  plaintiff.'' 1  If 
it  be  accompanied  by  a  plea,  or  by  an  answer,  it  should  be  called  in  the 
title  "  the  demurrer  and  plea,"  or  "  demurrer  and  answer.1'  Where  it  is  to 
an  amended  bill,  it  need  not  be  expressed,  in  the  title,  to  be  a  demurrer 
to  the  original  and  amended  bill ;  but  a  demurrer  to  the  amended  bill 
will  be  sufficient.2 

As  a  demurrer  confesses  the  matters  of  fact  to  be  true,  as  stated  by 
the  opposite  party,  it  is  always  preceded  by  a  general  protestation 
against  the  truth  of  the  matters  contained  in  the  bill ; 3  a  practice  bor- 
rowed from  the  Common  Law,  and  probably  intended  to  avoid  conclu- 
sion in  another  suit,4  or  in  the  suit  in  which  the  demurrer  is  put  in,  in 
case  the  demurrer  should  be  overruled. 

After  the  protestation,  the  demurrer,  if  it  is  a  partial  demurrer  and 

3. Baker  v.  Mellish,  11  Ves.  68;    Glegg  v.  one,   against  whom  a  good  cause  of  action  is 

Lo^h,  4  Mad.  193,  207;  Thorpe  v.  Macaulay,  5  stated,  cannot  on  this  ground  demur.     N.  Y.  & 

Mad.  218.  N.  H.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Schuyler,  17  N.  Y.  592, 

4  Baker  v.  Mellish,  11  Ves.  72,  76.  J  For  the   present  English    practice,   see   1 

5  North  v.  Earl  of  Strafford,  3  P.  Wms.  Dan.  Ch.  Prac  (6th  Eng.  ed.)  538;  R.  S.  C. 
148;  Roberdeau  r.  Rous,  1  Atk.  544.  Ord.  XIX.  6;  XXL  1. 

6  North  r.  Earl  of  Strafford,  ubi  supra;  2  Smith  v.  Bryon,  3  Mad.  428:  Osborn  v. 
Little  v.  Archer,  1  Hogan,  55.  Jullion,  3  Drew.  552;  and  see  Granville  v.  Betts, 

7  London  r.  Levy,  ubi  supra;  Barstow  v.  17  Sim.  58.  For  forms  of  demurrer,  see  2  Van 
Smith,  Walk.  Ch.  394:  but  not  unless  it  is  in  Hey.  74-92;  and  post.  Vol.  III. 

form  a  "joint  and  several  demurrer;"  per  Sir  3  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §§  452,  457;  1  Smith  Ch. 
L.  Shadwell  V.  C.  in  Glascottt".  Copper  Miners'  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  209.     Protestations  in  demur- 
Co.  11  Sim.  305,  310  :  5  Jur.  264 ;  Dzialynski  v.  rers  are  required,   in   New  Hampshire,  to    be 
Jacksonville  Bank,  23  Fla.  346.     If  too  many  omitted  by  Ch.  Rule  6;  38  N.  H.  606. 
persons  are  joined  as  defendants  in  a  bill  in  4  Ld.  Red.  212. 
Equity,  there  being  no  misjoinder  of  subjects, 

580 


FORM    OF    DEMURRERS. 


*  580 


not  to  the  whole  bill,  must  proceed  distinctly  to  point  out  the  parts  of 
the  bill  to  which  it  is  intended  to  apply.5 

Although  a  demurrer,  in  the  form  above  stated,  namely,  "  to  all  the 
rest  of  the  bill  which  is  not  answered,"  would,  for  the  reasons  stated 
by  Lord  Redesdale,  be  a  bad  form  of  demurrer,  a  demurrer 
*  to  all  the  bill,  except  as  to  a  particular  specified  part,  would  *  586 
not  be  open  to  the  same  objection  ;  and  where  the  exception  ap- 
plies to  a  very  small  part  only  of  the  bill,  it  has  been  held  to  be  the 
proper  way  of  demurring.1  In  framing  such  a  demurrer,  however,  care 
must  be  taken  that  it  should  appear  distinctly,  by  the  demurrer  itself, 
what  part  of  the  bill  is  to  be  included  in  the  exception :  otherwise,  the 
demurrer  will  be  bad.2 

The  above  rule  also  applies  to  cases  where  there  are  two  or  more  dis- 
tinct demurrers  to  different  portions  of  the  bill ;  in  such  cases,  the  differ- 
ent portions  of  the  bill  to  be  covered  by  each  demurrer  must  be  distinctly 
pointed  out.  And  where  a  demurrer  is  put  in  to  such  parts  of  an  amended 
bill  as  have  been  introduced  by  the  amendments,  it  will  not  be  sufficient 
to  say  it  is  a  demurrer  to  the  amendments,  but  the  parts  must  be  specifi- 
cally pointed  out,  and  a  demurrer  to  so  much  of  the  amended  bill,  as  has 
not  been  answered  by  the  answer  to  the  original  bill,  will  be  bad.3 

A  demurrer  will  not  be  good  if  it  merely  says,  generally,  that  the  de- 
fendant demurs  to  the  bill;4  it  must  express  some  cause  of  demurrer, 
either  general  or  specific.5     A  defendant  is    said  to   demur   generally, 


5  The  rule,  as  to  this,  is  laid  down  by  Lord 
Redesdalc  in  Devonsher  v.  Newenha  n,  2  Sell. 
&  Lef.  199,  205:  ''that  where  a  defendant  demurs 
to  part,  and  answers  to  p'irt  of  a  bill,  the  Court 
is  not  to  be  put  to  the  trouble  of  looking  into 
the  bill  or  answer,  to  see  what  is  covered  by  the 
demurrer,  but  it  ought  to  be  expressed,  in  clear 
and  precise  terms,  what  it  is  the  party  refuses 
to  answer  (see  Atwill  v.  Ferrett,  2  Blatch.  39) ; 
and  I  cannot  agree  that  it  is  a  proper  way  of 
demurring  to  say  that  the  defendant  answers 
to  such  a  particular  fact,  and  demurs  to  all  the 
Test  of  a  bill :  the  defendant  ought  to  demur  to 
a  particular  part  of  the  bill,  specifying  it  pre- 
cisely." See  Chetwynd  v.  Lindon,  2  Vis.  Sr. 
450;  Salkeld  v.  Science,  id.  107 ;  Ban  es  v.  Tay- 
lor, 4  W.  R.  577,  V.  C.  K.;  Johnston  v.  John- 
ston, 2  Moll.  414:  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §§  457,458,  and 
notes;  Nash  v  Smith.  0  Conn.  421;  Clancy  v. 
Craine,  2  I  lev.  Eq.  363.  In  New  Hampshire 
the  form  of  a  demurrer  is  required  in  substance 
to  be:  "The  defendant  says  the  plaintiff  is 
not  entitled  upon  such  bill  to  the  relief  (or  dis- 
covery) prayed  for,  because,'1  &c.  Ch.  Rule  10, 
38  N.  H.  10. 

1  Hicks  v.  Raincock,  1  Cox,  40;  Howe  r. 
Puppa,  1  V.  &  B.  511. 

2  Robinson  v.  Thompson,  2  V.  &  B.  118; 
Weatherhead  v.  Blackburn,  id.  121;  Burch  v. 
Coney,  14  Jur.  1009,  V.  C.  K.  B.;  Osborn  v. 
Jullion,  3  Drew.  552;  Barnes  r.  Taylor,  4  \Y. 
R.  577.  V.  C.  K.;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §§  457,458; 
and  see  Burton  v.  Robertson,  1  J.  &  H.  38;  6 


Jur.  N.  S.  1014,  for  case  where  no  answer  had 
been  required. 

3  Mvnd  v.  Francis,  1  Anst.  5. 

4  Duffield  v.  Greaves.  Carey,  87;  Offeley  r. 
Morgan,  id.  107;  Peachie  v.  Twyecrosse,  id. 
113. 

5  Nash  v.  Smith,  6  Conn.  422;  see  Johnston 
v  Johnston,  2  Moll.  414;  Holland  v.  Kenosha 
County,  19  Wis.  247;  see  Bidder  v.  McLean, 
20  Ch.  D.  512.  He  may,  however,  in  cases 
where  he  demurs  either  to  the  jurisdiction  or  to 
the  substance,  state  specially  the  particular 
grounds  upon  which  he  founds  his  objection. 
And,  indeed,  some  of  the  grounds  of  demurrer, 
which  go  to  the  substance  of  the  bill,  require 
rather  a  particular  statement;  thus,  a  demurrer 
for  want  of  parties  must,  as  has  been  before 
slated,  show  who  are  the  necessary  parties,  in 
such  a  manner  as  to  point  out  to  the  plaintiff 
the  objection  to  his  bill,  so  as  to  enable  him 
tn  amend  by  adding  proper  parties  (see  ante, 
p.  JTSj;  and  in  the  ca*e  o'  a  demurrer  tor  multi- 
fariousness, a  mere  allegation  "  that  the  bill  is 
multifarious"  will  lie  informal:  it  should  state, 
as  the  ground  of  demurrer,  that  the  bill  mutes 
distinct  matters  upon  one  record,  and  show  the 
inconvenience  of  so  doing.  Rayner  V.  Julian, 
2  I  lick.  077;  5  Mad  144,  n.  (b):  Barber  r. 
Barber.  4  Drew.  666;  5  Jur.  N.  S.  1197.  A 
general  demurrer,  without  any  special  cause 
assigned,  has  the  effect  only  to  turn  the  inquiry 
upon  the  equities  of  the  bill.  Wellborn  v.  Tiller, 
10  Ala.  305. 

5S1 


*587 


DEMURRERS. 


when  he  demurs  to  the  jurisdiction,  or  to  the  substance  of  the  bill;  or 
specially,  when  he  demurs  on  the  ground  of  a  defect  in  form,  (a) 

Some  objections,  which  appear  to  be  merely  upon  matters  of  form, 

may  be  taken  advantage  of  under  general  demurrers,  for 
*  587    *  want  of  equity  :  *   thus,   it  has  been  before  stated  2  that  some 

bills  may  be  demurred  to  on  the  ground  that  they  are  not  accom- 
panied by  an  affidavit ;  that  objection,  however,  is  in  fact  an  objection 
to  the  equity,  because  the  cases  in  which  an  affidavit  is  required  are 
those  in  which  the  Court  has  no  jurisdiction,  unless  upon  the  supposi- 


i  In  Marsh  v.  Marsh,  16  N.  J.  Eq.  391,  397, 
it  is  said  that,  under  a  general  demurrer  for 
want  of  equity,  no  objection  for  want  of  form 
can  properly  be  raised.  And  this  is  repeated  in 
Miller  v.  Jamison,  24  N.  J.  Eq.  41.  Such  a 
demurrer  is  too  general  to  be  entitled  to  notice 


under  the  Ala.  Rev.  Code    §  3350.     Erwin  v. 
Reese,  54  Ala.  589. 

2  Ante,  p.  394.  A  demurrer  for  want  of 
equity  need  not  refer  to  the  allegations  of  the 
bill.  "  Middlebrook  v.  Bromley,  9  Jur.  N.  S. 
614,  615;  11  W.  R.  712,  V.  C.  K. 


(a)  A  defect  of  form  will  not  be  considered 
under  a  general  demurrer  for  want  of  equity; 
objections  to  form  must  be  special,  and  point  out 
the  defect  clearly  and  certainly.  See  Wilson  v. 
Hill,  46  N.  J.  Eq.  367;  Essex  Paper  Co.  v. 
Greacen,  45  id.  504;  Reading  v.  Stover,  32  id. 
32G;  Bidder  v.  McLean,  20  Ch.  D.  512;  Stewart 
r.  Flint,  57  Vt.  216;  Billings  v.  Mann,  156 
Mass.  203;  Eagle  v.  Beard,  33  Ark.  497;  Ward 
r.  Clay,  82  Cal.  502;  McCoy  v.  Boley,  21  Fla. 
803;  Rice  v.  Yakima  &  P.  C.  R.  Co.  4  Wash. 
St.  724;  Reese  v.  Reese,  89  Ga.  645;  Print-up 
v.  Kome  Land  Co.  90  Ga.  ISO;  James  v.  Atlanta 
Street  R.  Co.  id.  695.  Thus  the  omission  of  the 
defendants'  names  from  the  introductory  part  of 
the  bill,  or  from  the  praver  for  answer,  cannot 
be  taken  advantage  of  by  general  demurrer. 
Boon  r.  Pierpont,.  28  N.  J.  Eq.  7;  McCoy  v. 
Boley,  21  Fla.  803.  If  any  ground  for  equi- 
table relief  is  shown  by  the  bill,  it  is  sufficient 
upon  a  general  demurrer.  Socola  r.  Grant,  15 
Fed.  Rep.  487;  Merriam  v.  Hnlloway  Pub.  Co. 
43  id.  450;  United  States  v.  Southern  l'acific 
R.  Co.  40  id.  611;  Northern  Pacific  R.  Co. 
r.  Roberts,  42  id.  734;  Stephens  v.  Overstolz, 
43  id.  465;  Mercantile  Trust  Co.  v.  Rhode 
Island  II.  T.  Co.  36  id.  863;  Perry  v.  Little- 
field,  17  Blatch.272;  Shaw  v.  Chase,  77  Mich. 
436:  Darrah  v.  Boyce.  62  id.  480;  Quitman 
County  v.  Stritze,  69  Miss.  460;  Cartee  v. 
Spence,  24  S.  C.  550;  Lindsley  v.  Personette, 
35  X.  J.  Eq.  355;  Brewster  v.  Hatch.  10  Abb. 
X.  Cas.  400;  1'hcenix  Ins.  Co.  ».  Day,  4  Lea 
(I'cnn),  247:  Anderson  v.  Mullenix,  5  id.  287; 
Pinkum  v.  Eau  Claire,  81  Wis.  3,01;  Elam  ». 
Barnes,  110  X.-  C  73:  Marks  v.  Murphy,  76 
Ind.  534;  Shotts  r.  Boyd.  77  Ind.  223:  El 
Modello  C  M.  Co.  v.  Gato,  25  Fla.  880.  This 
includes  relief  under  an  alternative  prayer. 
Gaunt  v.  Froelich,24  111.  App.  303;  Gooch  v. 
Green,  102  111.  507;  Tillman  v.  Thomas.  87  Ala. 
321;  Lowe  v.  Burke,  79  Ga.  164;  Erie  Tel.  Co. 

582 


v.  Grimes,  82  Tex.  89.  A  special  demurrer  to 
part  of  the  bill  must  clearly  indicate  such  part. 
Chicago  St.  L.  &  N.  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Macomb,  2 
Fed.  Rep.  18.  A  demurrer  on  the  ground  that 
a  bill  does  not  state  facts  sufficient  to  constitute 
a  cause  of  suit  is  unknown  to  Equity  practice, 
amounting  at  most  to  a  general  demurrer  for 
want  of  equity,  which  does  not  lie  to  a  bill 
not  deficient  in  substance.  Nicholas  r.  Murray, 
5  Sawyer,  320:  see  Martin  V.  Martin,  74  Ind. 
207  ;  Denver  R.  L.  &C.  Co.  r.  Union  Pacific  Ry. 
Co.  34  Fed.  Rep.  386.  A  motion  to  dismiss  for 
want  of  equity  admits  the  facts  alleged  in  bill, 
and  should  be  granted  only  when  the  bill  can- 
not be  made  good  by  amendment.  Grimes  v. 
Grimes,  143  111.  550.  A  bill  clearly  framed  on 
one  insufficient  theory  is  bad  on  demurrer, 
though  the  facts  averred  may  be  sufficient  on  a 
different  theory.  Cottrell  v.  .Etna  Life  Ins. 
Co.  97  Ind.  311 ;  see  American  F.  L.  M.  Co.  v. 
Sewell,  92  Ala.  163.  But  a  special  prayer  for 
wrong  relief  does  not  necessarily  have  this  effect 
where  the  bill  also  contains  a  prayer  for  gen- 
eral relief.  Merchants'  Nat.  Bank  v.  Hogle,  25 
III.  App  543;  Holden  v.  Holden,  24  111.  App. 
106;  Silberberg  v.  Pearson,  75  Texas,  287. 

On  written  demurrer,  the  ground  assigned  is 
alone  considered,  and  demurring  for  a  wrong 
reason  waives  all  others.  Turner  Coal  Co.  r. 
Glover  (Ala.),  13  So.  Rep.  478.  A  demurrer, 
though  assigning  various  causes,  is  an  entirety, 
and  as  such  is  to  be  sustained  or  overruled. 
Canton  Warehouse  Co.  v.  Potts,  68  Miss.  637. 
A  joint  and  several  demurrer  by  husband  and 
wife  may  be  sustained  as  to  one  of  their,  and 
overruled  as  to  the  other.  Dzialynski  v.  Bank 
of  Jacksonville,  23  Fla.  346.  So  a  joint  de- 
murrer will  not  be  sustained  as  to  all  the  defend- 
ants, if  the  bill  is  good  as  to  some  of  them. 
Lancaster  v.  Roberts,  144  111.213;  see  Illinois 
Land  Co.  v.  Speyer,  138  111.  137;  Asevado  v. 
Orr  (Cal.),  34  Pac.  Rep.  777. 


FORM    OP   DEMURRERS.  *  588 

tion  that  the  fact  stated  in  the  affidavit  is  true  ;  and  the  Court  requires 
the  annexation  of  the  affidavit  to  the  bill,  for  the  purpose  of  verifying 
that  fact.  In  these  cases,  the  objection  may  be  made  either  in  the 
form  of  a  special  demurrer,  or  of  general  demurrer  for  want  of  equity  ; 
because  the  plaintiff,  by  his  bill,  does  not  bring  his  case  within  the 
description  of  cases  over  which  the  Court  exercises  jurisdiction.  Upon 
the  same  principle,  a  defendant  may  take  advantage,  by  general  de- 
murrer, of  the  omission  to  offer  to  do  equity,  in  cases  where  such  an 
offer  ought  to  be  made.3  The  objection  for  want  of  sufficient  positive- 
ness  in  the  plaintiff's  statement  of  facts  within  his  own  knowledge,  may 
also  be  taken  by  general  demurrer  ; 4  but  where  a  defendant  to  a  bill 
praying  relief,  demurs  to  the  discovery  only,  he  cannot  do  so  under  a 
general  demurrer  for  want  of  equity  :  he  must  make  it  the  subject  of 
special  demurrer  ; 5  and  so,  a  general  demurrer  does  not  include  a  de- 
murrer on  the  ground  that  the  bill  (being  a  bill  of  review)  does  not 
state  on  the  face  of  it  that  it  is  by  leave  of  the  Court ;  but  that  ground 
may  be  taken  ore  tenus.6 

Care  must  be  taken,  in  framing  a  demurrer,  that  it  is  made  to  rely 
only  upon  the  facts  stated  in  the  bill ;  otherwise  it  will  be  what  is 
termed  a  speaking  demurrer,  and  will  be  overruled.7  A  demur- 
rer for  that  it  appeared  *  on  the  bill  that  the  agreement,  therein  *  588 
alleged  to  have  been  entered  into,  is  not  in  writing  signed  by  the 
defendant,  is  not  a  speaking  demurrer.1  It  is  material  to  notice  that, 
in  order  to  constitute  a  speaking  demurrer,  the  fact  or  averment  intro- 
duced must  be  one  which  is  necessary  to  support  the  demurrer,  and  is 
not  found  in  the  bill : 2  the  introduction  of  immaterial  facts,  or  aver- 

3  Ante,  p.  385 ;  Inman  v.  Wearing,  3  De  G.  375,  that  "  the  case  of  Edsell  v.  Buchanan,  2 
&  S.  729.  Ves.  Jr.  83,  has  been  frequently  misunderstood. 

4  Ante,  pp.  360,  560.  The  demurrer  in  that  case  was  not  overruled  as 

5  Whittiugham  v.  Burgoyne,  3  Anst.  900,  a  speaking  demurrer  merely  on  account  of  a 
904;  Marsh  v.  Marsh,  16  N.  J.  Eq.  391,  397.  modest  suggestion  that  the  time,  stated  by  the 
And  the  demurrer  may  be  to  a  particular  inter-  complainant,  'about  the  year  1770,'  was  up- 
rogatorv,  as  where,  in  a  bill  for  divorce,  the  wards  of  twenty  years  before  the  filing  of  the 
defendant  is  called  upon  to  discover  whether,  bill;  but  it  was  because  that  suggestion,  from 
since  the  marriage,  she  has  committed  adultery.  the  manner  in  which  it  was  introduced  into  the 
Black  t\  Black,  20  N.  J.  Eq.  431.  demurrer,   was  in   the  nature  of    an  averment 

G  Henderson  v.  Cook.  4  Drew.  306.  that  the  defendant  had  been  in   possession  of 

"  Brownaword  v.  Edwards,  2  Ves.  Sr.  245;  the  mortgaged  premises  for  more  than  twenty 

Henderson  v.  Cook,  4   Drew.  306,  315.     Thus,  years.     And  the  fact  of  such   possession  was 

where  a  bill  was  filed  to  redeem  a  mortgage,  necessary  to  sustain  the  defence  set  up  on  the 

alleging  that  the  plaintiff's  ancestor  had  died  in  argument  of  the  demurrer:  which  defence  was, 

1770,  and  that,  soon  after,  the  defendant  took  that  the  plaintiff's  right  to  redeem  was  barred 

possession,  &c;  and  the  defendant  demurred,  by  the  lapse  of  time.      The   precise   time,   at 

and  for  cause  of  demurrer  showed,  that  it  ap-  which  the  defendant's  possession  commenced, 

peared  upon  the  face  of  the  bill,  that  from  the  not  appearing  from  the  bill  itself,  the  averment 

year  1770,  which  is  upwards  of  twenty  years  that  the  heir  of  the  mortgagee  had  been  in  pos- 

before  the  filing  of  the  bill,  the  defendant  has  session    'upwards  of  twenty  years  before  the 

been  in  possesion,  &c.,  Lord  Rosslyn  overruled  bill  filed,' should  have  been  brought  forward  by 

the  demurrer,  because  the  language  of  the  bill  plea,  or  answer,  and  not  by  demurrer.'' 

did  not  show  that  the  defendant  took  possession  '   Wood  i\  Midgley,  5  De  G.  M.  &  G.  41;  2 

in  the  year  1770,  but,  that  he  did  so,  could  only  Sm.  &  G.  115;  see  also  Jones  v.  Charlemont, 

be  collected  from  the  averment  in  the  demurrer.  12  Jur.  532;  V.  C.  E. 

Edsell  v.   Buchanan,   4  Bro.  C.  C.  254;  2  Ves.  2  Brooks  v.  Gibbons,  4  Paige,  374:  see  Kuy- 

Jr.  83.    It  is  said  in  Brooks  v.  Gibbons,  4  Paige,  pers  v.  Reformed  Dutch  Church,  6  Paige,  570; 

583 


589 


DEMURRERS. 


merits,  or  of  arguments,  is  improper ;    but  it  is  mere   surplusage,  and 
will  not  vitiate  the  demurrer.8 

A  defendant  is  not  limited  to  show  one  cause  of  demurrer  only  ;  he 
may  assign  as  many  causes  of  demurrer  as  he  pleases,  either  to  the 
whole  bill,  or  to  each  part  of  the  bill  demurred  to,  but  they  must  be 
stated  as  distinct  and  separate  causes  of  demurrer ; 4  and  if  any  one  of 
the  causes  of  demurrer  assigned  hold  good,  the  demurrer  will  be  allowed.5 
Where,  however,  two  or  more  causes  of  demurrer  are  shown  to  the  whole 
bill,  the  Court  will  treat  it  as  one  demurrer ;  and  if  one  of  the  causes  be 
considered  sufficient,  the  order  will  be  drawn  up,  as  upon  a  complete 
allowance  of  the  demurrer.6  A  defendant  may  also,  at  the  hearing  of 
his  demurrer,  orally  assign  another  cause  of  demurrer,  different  from,  or 
in  addition  to,  those  assigned  upon  the  record : 7  which,  if  valid,  will 
support  the  demurrer,  although  the  causes  of  demurrer  stated  in  the 
demurrer  itself  are  held  to  be  invalid.  This  oral  statement  of  a  cause 
of  demurrer  is  called  demurring  "  ore  tenus"  8  (a)  A  defendant  cannot 
demur  ore  tenus,  unless  there  is  a  demurrer  on  the  record ;  and  upon 
this  ground,  where  a  defendant  had  pleaded,  and,  upon  the  plea  being 
overruled,  offered  to  demur  ore  tenus,  for  want  of  parties,  he  was  not 
permitted  to  do  so  ; 9  neither  can  a  defendant  demur  ore  tenus 
*  589  for  the  same  cause  that  has  been  expressed  in  the  *  demurrer  on 
record,  and  overruled  -,1  nor  can  he,  after  a  demurrer  to  the  whole 


M'Comb  v.  Armstrong,  2  Moll.  295 ;  Story,  Eq. 
PI.  §  448;  Pendlebury  v.  Walker,  4  Y.  &  C. 
424;  1  Smith  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  206;  Tall- 
madge  v.  Lovett,  3  Edw.  Ch.  554;  Saxon  v. 
Barksdalc,  4  Desaus.  522. 

3  Cawthorn  v.  Chalie,  2  S.  &  S.  127;  Davies 
v.  Williams,  1  Sim.  5,  8. 

4  Barber  v.  Barber,  4  Drew.  666 ;  5  Jur.  N.  S. 
1197. 

6  Harrison  v.  Hogg,  2  Ves.  Jr.  323;  Jones 
v.  Frost,  3  Mad.  1,  9;  Jac.  466;  Coopers.  Earl 
Powis,  3  De  G.  &  S.  688. 

6  Wellesley  v.  Wellesley,  4  M.  &  C.  554, 
558;  4  Jur.  2;  see  also  Watts  v  Lord  Eglinton, 
1  C.  P.  Coop.  temp.  Cott.25,  27;  Gay  v.  Skeen 
(W.  Va  ),  15  S.  E.  Rep.  64. 

'  See  now  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  XXVIII.  2. 

8  Brinkerhoff  v.  Brown,  6  John.  Ch.  149; 
Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  464;  Wright  v.  Dame,  1  Met. 
237;*M'Dermot  v.   B  ois,  R.  M.  Charlt.  281; 


(a)  Want  of  equity  in  the  substance  of  the 
bill  may  be  thus  assigned.  Hastings  v.  Belden, 
55  Vt.  273.  So,  under  the  Code-  system,  the 
defendant  may,  on  a  demurrer  ore  tenus  to  a 
complaint  which  is  clearly  intended  as  a  com- 
plaint in  Equity,  object  that  there  is  an  ade- 
quate legal  remedy.  Stein  v.  Benedict,  83 
Wis.  003.  A  demurrer  ore  tenus  must  be  co- 
extensive with  the  bill.  Equitable  Life  Ass. 
Society  v.  Patterson,  1  Fed.  Rep.  126  J  Barrett 

584 


Daly  v.  Kirwan,  1  Ir.  Eq.  157;  see  Garlick  v. 
Strong,  3  Paige,  440;  Ch:ise  v.  Searle,  45  N.  H. 
512  ;   Sherry  v.  Smith,  72  Wis.  339. 

Under  a  general  demurrer  for  want  of  equity, 
a  demurrer  for  want  of  parties  may  be  made 
ore  tenus.  Robinson  v.  Smith,  3  Paige,  231 ; 
Garlick  v.  Strong,  3  Paige,  452;  Still  well  v. 
M'Neely,  1  Green  Ch.  305;  see  Pyle  v.  Price,  6 
Sumner's  Ves.  781;  Mr.  Hovenden's  note  (2); 
Ld.  Red.  217. 

9  DurdantD.  Redman,  1  Vera.  78;  Hook  v. 
Dorman,  1  S.  &  S.  227,  231;  Story,  Eq.  PL 
§  464. 

1  Bowman  v.  Lygon,  1  Anst.  1;  but  see 
Pratt  v.  Keith,  10  Jur.  N.  S.  305,  V.  C.  K.;  12 
W.  R.  394,  where  a  demurrer  on  the  record, 
that  there  were  not  proper  parties,  having  been 
overruled,  a  demurrer  ore  tenus,  describing  the 
necessary  parties,  was  allowed. 


v.  Doughty,  25  N.  J.  Eq.  379.  An  objection  for 
laches,  which  was  not  taken  in  the  demurrer 
filed,  nor  assigned  ore  tenus  before  a  single 
Judge,  is  not  open  at  the  argument  before  the 
full  Court.  Somerbyv.  Buntin,  118  Mass.  279. 
A  demurrer  ore  tenus  does  not  waive  any  ques- 
tion raised  by  a  formal  demurrer,  especially 
when  it  cannot  properly  raise  such  question. 
Stein  v.  Benedict,  83  Wis.  603. 


FORM    OP    DEMURRERS. 


*589 


bill,  demur  ore  tenus  as  to  part.2  It  seems,  however,  that  after  a  demur- 
rer to  part  of  the  bill  has  been  overruled,  the  defendant  may  demur  ore 
tenus  to  the  same  part.3 

It  is  to  be  noticed  that,  although  a  defendant  may,  either  upon  the 
record,  or  ore  tenus,  assign  as  many  causes  of  demurrer  as  he  pleases, 
such  causes  of  demurrer  must  be  co-extensive  with  the  demurrer  upon 
the  record :  therefore,  causes  of  demurrer,  which  apply  to  part  of  the 
bill  only,  cannot  be  joined  with  causes  of  demurrer  which  go  to  the 
whole  bill ;  *  for,  as  we  have  seen  before,  a  demurrer  cannot  be  good  in 
part  and  bad  in  part ;  which  would  be  the  case  if  a  demurrer,  professing 
to  go  to  the  whole  bill,  could  be  supported  by  the  allegation  of  a  ground 
of  demurrer  which  applies  to  part  only. 

The  consequence  of  demurring  ore  tenus,  as  regards  costs,  will  be  dis- 
cussed in  a  future  section.5 

The  demurrer,  having  assigned  the  cause  or  causes  of  demurrer,  then 
proceeds  to  demand  judgment  of  the  Court,  whether  the  defendant 
ought  to  be  compelled  to  put  in  any  further  or  other  answer  to  the  bill, 
or  to  such  part  thereof  as  is  specified  as  being  the  subject  of  demurrer  ; 
and  concludes  with  a  prayer,  that  the  defendant  may  be  dismissed  with 
his  reasonable  costs  in  that  behalf  sustained.6 

If  a  demurrer  is  to  part  of  the  bill  only,  the  answer,  if  any,  to  the 
remainder  usually  follows  the  statement  of  the  causes  of  demurrer,  and 
the  submission  to  the  judgment  of  the  Court  of  the  plaintiff's  right  to 
call  upon  the  defendant  to  make  further  or  other  answer.7 

It  was  formerly  an  invariable  rule,  that  an  answer  to  any  part 
of   a  bill  demurred   to   would   overrule   the    demurrer,8   even    though 


2  Shepherd  v.  Lloyd,  2  Y.  &  J.  490;  Harr. 
Ch.  227;  Barrett  v.  Doughty,  25  N.  J.  Eq.  380. 

3  Crouch  v.  Hiekin,  1  Keen,  385,  389;  see 
contra,  Shepherd  v.  Lloyd,  ubi  supra. 

4  Pitts  v.  Short,  17  Ves.  213,  216;  Metcalfe 
v.  Brown,  5  Price,  560;  Rump  v.  Greenhill,  20 
Beav.  512;  1  Jur.  N.  S.  123;  Henderson  v. 
Cook,  4  Drew.  306;  Gilbert  v.  Lewis,  1  De 
G.  J.  &  S.  38;  Thompson  v.  University  of 
London,  10  Jur.  N.  S.  669,  671;  33  L.  J.'ch. 
625,  V.  C.  K. 

5  See  post,  p.  549. 

6  See  form  in  Vol.  III. 

7  See  ante,  pp.  581,  584,  585. 

8  Tidd  v.  Clare,  2  Dick.  712;  Hester  v. 
Weston,  1  Vern.  463;  Roberts  v.  Clayton.  3 
Anst.  715;  see  Varick  i\  Smith,  5  Paige,  137; 
Red  Jacket  Tribe  v.  Hoff,  33  N.  J.  Eq.  441.  A 
demurrer  may  be  to  the  whole  bill  or  to  a  part 
only  of  the  bill;  and  the  defendant  may  there- 
fore demur  as  to  one  part,  plead  as  to  another 
part,  and  answer  to  the  rest  of  the  bill.  Story, 
Eq.  PI.  §  442;  Newton  v.  Thayer,  17  Pick.  132, 
133;  Pierpont  v.  Fowle,  2  Wood.  &  M.  23.  But 
a  defendant  cannot  plead  or  answer,  and  demur 
also,  to  the  whole  bill  or  to  the  same  part  of  a 
bill.  Clark  v.  Phelps,  6  John.  Ch.  214;  Beau- 
champ   v.    Gibbs,    1   Bibb,    481;    Robinson  v. 


Bingley,  1  M'Cord  Ch.  352;  Barbey's  Appeal, 
119  Penn.  St.  413.  If  the  defendant  demur  to 
the  whole  bill,  an  answer  to  a  part  thereof  is 
inconsistent;  and  the  demurrer  will  be  over- 
ruled. Pieri  v.  Shieldsboro',  42  Miss.  493.  For 
the  same  reason,  if  there  be  a  demurrer  to  a 
part  of  the  bill,  there  cannot  be  a  plea  or  an- 
swer to  the  same  part,  without  overruling  the 
demurrer.  Clark  v.  Phelps,  6  John.  Ch.  214; 
Souzer  ».  De  Meyer,  2  Paige,  574;  H.  K.  Chase's 
case,  1  Bland,  217;  Leacraft  v.  Dempsev,  4 
Paige,  124;  Spofford  v.  Manning,  0  Paige,  383; 
Miller  v.  Fasse,  1  Bailey  Eq.  187;  Jarvis  v. 
Palmer,  11  Paige,  650;  Kuypers  v.  Reformed 
Dutch  Church,  6  Paige,  570;  Chase's  case.  1 
Bland,  206;  Saxon  v.  Barksdale,  4  Desaus.  522; 
Bull  8.  Bell,  4  Wis.  54;  see  ante,  p.  547.  n.  2. 

In  Massachusetts,  "  the  defendant,  instead 
of  filing  a  formal  plea  or  demurrer,  may  insist 
on  any  special  matter  in  his  answer,  and  have 
the  same  benefit  therefrom  as  if  he  had  pleaded 
the  same  or  demurred  to  the  bill."  Ch.  Rule 
14;  see  Lovett  v.  Longmire,  14  Ark.  339.  The 
same  rule  (No.  10)  exists  in  New  Hampshire, 
38  N.  H.  607. 

By  the  rules  in  Chancery  cases  in  Maine, 
defendants  may  severally  demur  and  answer 
to  the  merits  of  the  bill  at  the  same  time.     Rule 

585 


*590 


DEMURRERS. 


*590  *  the  part  answered  was  immaterial.1  And  this  rule  was  carried 
so  far,  that  where  the  demurrer  did  not  in  form  extend  to  the  part 
answered,  yet,  if  the  principle  upon  which  the  demurrer  depended  was 
such  that  it  ought  to  have  extended  to  the  whole  bill,  then  the  answer  to 
such  part  overruled  the  demurrer.2  This  is  still  the  rule  of  the  Court, 
but  it  has  been  modified  to  this  extent :  that  the  Court  will  not  overrule 
a  demurrer,  merely  on  the  ground  that,  by  some  slip  or  mistake,  a  small 
or  im material  part  of  the  bill  is  covered  by  the  answer  or  plea  as  well  as 
the  demurrer.3  (a) 

For  information  as  to  the  nature  of  the  answer  (if  any)  to  be  put  in 
to  those  parts  of  the  bill  to  which  the  defendant  does  not  demur,  the 
reader  is  referred  to  the  chapter  on  Answers.4  If  the  plaintiff  conceives 
such  answer  to  be  insufficient,  he  may  except  to  it,  but  he  must  not  do 
so  before  the  demurrer  has  been  argued  : 5  otherwise,  he  will  admit  the 
demurrer  to  be  good.6  It  is  said,  however,  that  if  the  defendant  demurs 
to  the  relief  only,  and  answers  the  rest  of  the  bill,  the  plaintiff  may 
take  exceptions  to  the  answer  before  the  demurrer  is  argued.7    . 

A  demurrer  is  prepared,  and  must  be  signed,  by  counsel ; 8  but  it  is 
put  in  without  oath,  as  it  asserts  no  facts,  and  relies  merely  upon  matter 


6,  37  Maine,  582;  Hartshorn  v.  Eames,  31 
Maine,  97;  Smith  v.  Kelley,  56  Maine,  64,  65. 
So  in  Tennessee.  Code.  §  4319  ;  Harding  v. 
Egin,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  39. 

1  Ruspini  v.  Vickery,  cited  Ld.  Red.  211; 
Savage  v.  Smalebroke,  1  Vern.  90. 

2  Dawson  v.  Sadler,  1  S.  &  S.  542;  Sher- 
wood v.  Clark,  9  Price,  259;  Hester  v.  Weston, 
1  Vern.  463. 

s  Cons.  Ord.  XIV.  9;  ante,  p.  583;  Lowndes 
v.  Gnrnett  &  Moseley  Gold  Mining  Co.  1  J. 
&  H.  282;  Mansell  ».  Feeney,  id.  313;  Gilbert 
v.  Lewis,  1  De  G.  J.  &  S.  38;  9  Jur.  N.  S.  187; 
see  also  Jones  v.  Earl  of  Strafford,  3  P.  Wms. 
81. 

4  Post,  Chap.  XVII. 

5  London  Assurance  v.  East  India  Co.  3  P. 
Wms.  326. 


6  Ld.  Red.  317 ;  Boyd  v.  Mills,  13  Ves.  85, 
86.  If  necessary,  the  plaintiff  may  obtain  an 
extension  of  the  time  to  file  exceptions;  see 
post,  Chap.  XVII.  §  4. 

1  Ld.  Red.  317;  3  P.  Wms.  327,  n.  (c). 

8  Cons.  Ord.  VIII.  1;  Story,  Eq.  PL  §  461; 
Secor  v.  Singleton,  9  Fed.  Rep.  809.  Where  a 
solicitor  has  appeared  in  a  cause,  and  a  de- 
murrer is  filed,  signed  by  solicitors  who  have 
not  appeared,  the  demurrer  may  be  treated  as 
without  signature,  and  as  a  nullity.  Graham 
v.  Elmore,  Hairing.  Ch.  265.  In  Ernest  v. 
Partridge,  11  W.  R.  715,  V.  C.  W.,  the  costs  of 
advising  with  counsel  as  to  demurring  were 
allowed,  on  a  party  and  party  taxation,  the 
solicitor  having  thereby  spared  counsel  much 
trouble,  and  been  able  to  give  him  a  more 
moderate  fee  on  his  brief. 


(a)  In  jurisdictions  where  it  is  permitted 
to  incorporate  a  demurrer  in  the  answer,  the 
former  should  usually  be  first  heard,  in  order 
that  it  may  not  be  treated  as  waived.  See 
Wade  v.  Pulsifer,  54  Vt.  45  ;  Holt  v.  Daniel, 
61  Vt.  89;  Murphy  r.  Lincoln,  63  Vt.  278, post, 
p.  787;  Adams  v.  Howard,  9  Fed.  Rep.  347; 
La  Croix  v.  May,  15  id.  236;  Newman  v. 
Moody,  19  id.  858;  Higgins  v.  Hoppock,  20  X. 
T.  S.  380;  see  Reed  v.  Cumberland  Mutual 
Fire  Ins.  Co.  30  X.  J.  Eq.  140.  In  Michigan,  a 
separate  hearing  is  not  allowed  on  a  demurrer 
clause  in  the  answer.  Zabel  r.  Harshman,  68 
Mich.  270.  A  plea  which  is  accompanied  by  a 
demurrer  for  want  of  parties,  and  which  does 
not  set  forth  such  parties'  names,  but  simply 

586 


alleges  that  they  are  known  to  and  ascertain- 
able by  the  plaintiff  and  not  by  the  defendant, 
is  bad.  Dwight  v.  Central  Vermont  R.  Co.  20 
Blatch.  200;  see  Patrick  v.  Isenhart,  20  Fed. 
Rep.  339.  One  defendant's  demurrer  is  not 
overruled  by  a  co-defendant's  plea.  Dakin  v. 
Union  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  5  Fed.  Rep.  665.  A  de- 
murrer may  be  accompanied  by  a  plea  to  a  bill 
of  review  which  does  not  fairly  state  the  origi- 
nal decree.  Enochs  v.  Harrelson,  57  Miss.  465. 
A  demurrer  cannot  be  filed  after  answer,  unless 
the  latter  is  first  withdrawn.  Hall  v.  Turner, 
111  X.  C.  180,  182;  Heller  v.  Royal  Ins.  Co. 
151  Penn.  St.  101 ;  Newman  v.  Moody,  19  Fed. 
Rep.  858. 


FILING,    SETTING    DOWN,    AND    HEARING    DEMURRERS. 


591 


apparent  upon  the  face  of  the  bill ; 9  and  it  need  not  be  signed  by  the 
defendant.  (/>) 

*A  mere  clerical  error  in  a  demurrer  may  be  amended  ou  an    *  591 
ex  parte  order,  before  the  twelve  days  have  expired,1  or  at  the 
hearing.2 

Section  IV. — Filing,  setting  down,  and  hearing  Demurrers. 

After  the  draft  of  the  demurrer  has  been  settled  and  signed,  it  is 
copied  on  paper  of  the  same  description  and  size  as  that  on  which  bills 
are  printed,3  and  counsel's  signature  is  copied  at  the  foot ;  the  demurrer 
is  then  filed  at  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerks'  Office.4  The  name  and 
place  of  business  of  the  plaintiff's  solicitor,  and  of  his  agent,  if  any,  or 
the  name  and  place  of  residence  of  the  plaintiff,  where  he  acts  in  per- 
son, and,  in  either  case,  the  address  for  service,  if  any,  must  be  indorsed, 
as  upon  other  pleadings.5 

A  separate  demurrer,  by  a  married  woman,  must  have  an  order  to 
warrant  it ;  such  a  demurrer  ought  not,  therefore,  to  be  filed  till  an  order 
to  that  effect  has  been  procured.6  A  demurrer  cannot  be  filed  on  behalf 
of  an  infant,  or  a  person  of  unsound  mind  not  so  found  by  inquisition, 
until  a  guardian  ad  litem  has  been  appointed  ;  and  it  is  the  same  in  the 
case  of  a  lunatic,  when  his  committee  has  an  adverse  interest.  The  order 
appointing  the  guardian  must  be  produced  when  the  demurrer  is  presented 
for  filing.7 

A  defendant,  demurring  alone  to  any  bill,8  may  do  so  within  twelve 
days  after  his  appearance,  but  not  afterwards ; 9  the  day  of  his  appear- 
ance does  not  count.10     When  he  does  not   demur  alone,  he  has   the 


9  Ed.  Red.  208.  See  the  31st  Equity  Rule 
of  the  U.  S.  Courts,  post,  p.  2383;  Chicago,  St. 
L.  &  N.  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Macomb,  2  Fed.  Rep.  18. 

In  Massachusetts,  "a  demurrer  shall  be 
accompanied  with  a  certificate  that  it  is  not 
in'ended  for  delay."  Pub.  Sts.  c.  151.  §  10. 
But  this  provision  does  not  apply  to  a  statement 
in  the  nature  of  a  demurrer  for  want  of  equity, 
contained  in  an  answer  to  a  bill  in  Equity. 
Mill  River  Loan  Fund  Ass.  v.  Claflin,  9  Allen, 
101.     For  forms  of  demurrer,  see  Vol.  III. 

1  Richardson  r.  Hastings,  7  Beav.  58. 

2  Osborne  v.  Jullion,  3  Drew.  552.  For 
form  of  notice,  see  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  April,  1880, 
Sched.  B.  No.  18. 

3  Ord.  0  March,  1800,  r.  16;  and  Cons.  Ord. 
IX.  3,  ante,  p.  301.  A  joint  demurrer  and  an- 
swer must  be  printed  in  the  same  manner  as  an 
answer,  see  post,  Chap.  XVII.  §  3,  Printing 
Answers. 

4  Cons.  Ord.  I.  35.  No  fee  is  payable  on 
filing. 


(b)  In  the  Federal  Courts  a  demurrer  is  de- 
fective and  ineffectual  if  it  lacks  the  affidavit 
of  the  defendant  and  the  certificate  of  counsel 


5  Cons.  Ord.  III.  2.  5;  ante,  pp.  453,  454. 

6  Barron  v.  Grillard,  3  V.  &  B.  105;  Braith- 
waite's  Pr.  58;  except,  it  is  presumed,  in  those 
cases  where  a  married  woman  is  entitled  to 
defend  as  a  feme  sole;  see  ante,  pp.  178,  179  ; 
post,  p.  031. 

7  Braithwaite's  Pr.  58. 

8  Whether  original,  amended,  or  supple- 
mental.    Braithwaite's  Manual,  175. 

9  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.  3 ;  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86, 
§  13;  see  Sanderson  v.  Sanderson,  17  Fla.  820, 
834.  In  the  case  of  a  defendant  served  abroad, 
this  rule  so  far  overrules  Cons.  Ord.  X.  7  (2), 
as  to  limit  its  provisions  to  pleading,  answer- 
ing, or  demurring,  not  demurring  alone.  Grti- 
ning  v.  Prioleau,  10  Jur.  N.  S.  60;  12  W.  K. 
111.  M  I!.:  33  Beav.  221.  Demurrer  to  part  of 
the  bill,  without  answering  or  pleading  to  the 
rest,  cannot  be  tiled  before  expiration  of  the 
time  fur  tiling  interrogatories.  Rowe  v.  Ton- 
kin, I..  R.  1  Eq.  9:11  Jur.  N.  S.  84'.),  M.  R. 

W  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.  9. 


required  by  Equity  Pule  31.    Sheffield  Furnace 
Co.  v.  Witherow,  149  U.  S.  574. 

587 


*592 


DEMURRERS. 


same    time  as   he   has  for  answering.11     Time  for  demurring  runs   in 
vacation.12 

Where,  after   appearance  to  the  original   bill,  a  defendant  is 
*  592    *  served  with,  but  is  not  required  to  answer,  an  amended  bill,  a 
further  appearance  by  him  is  unnecessary.1 

The  Court,  under  the  former  practice,  would,  on  a  special  case  being 
made,  have  allowed  a  defendant  to  put  in  a  demurrer  to  the  whole  bill, 
after  the  time  for  demurring  alone  had  expired  ; 2  and  it  is  presumed 
that  this  would  be  allowed  under  the  present  practice,3  upon  the  delay 
being  satisfactorily  accounted  for,  and  upon  a  special  application  being 
made.4 

A  demurrer  will  not  be  received  at  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerks' 
Office,  after  twelve  days  from  the  entry  of  the  appearance,5  without  a 
special  order  enlarging  the  time,  or  giving  leave  to  file  it ;  and  if,  by 
inadvertence,  it  should  be  received,  it  will,  on  the  application  of  the 
plaintiff,  be  taken  off  the  file.6 

A  demurrer,  to  which  is  annexed  an  answer  to  any  material  part  of 
the  bill,  is  considered  an  answer  and  demurrer,  and  may  be  filed  within 
the  time  limited  for  pleading,  answering,  or  demurring,  not  demurring 
alone.7  (a) 

If  an  attachment  for  want  of  an  answer  has  been  issued  against  a 
defendant,  a  demurrer,  even  though  coupled  with  an  answer,  will  be 
irregular  :  and  in  such  case  the  proper  course  is  to  move  that  the  de- 
murrer and  answer  be  taken  off  the  file,  and  not  that  the  demurrer  be 
overruled;    and  taking  an  office  copy  does  not  waive  the  right.8     And 


11  Post,  Chap.  XVII.  §  3 ;  Cons.  Ord. 
XXX VI I.  4,  5.  As  the  time  for  demurring 
alone  runs  from  appearance,  and  that  for  an- 
swering, pleading,  or  demurring,  not  demurring 
alone,  from  the  service  of  the  interrogatories,  it 
seems  that,  by  delaying  appearance,  the  defend- 
ant may  obtain  a  longer  time  for  demurring 
alone  than  for  answering,  pleading,  or  demur- 
ring, not  demurring  alone.  See  Gruning  v. 
Prioleau,  ubi  supra. 
ia  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.  13. 

i  See  Braithwaite's  Manual,  175.  No  time 
was  fixed  for  his  demurring  alone  by  the  Gene- 
ral Orders;  but  it  is  customary,  in  such  case,  to 
file  the  demurrer  within  twelve  days  from  the 
service  of  the  copy  of  the  amended  bill.  It 
would  seem,  however,  that  he  is  entitled  to  de- 
mur within  twelve  days  after  the  expiration  of 
the  time  within  which  he  might  have  appeared, 
if  required  to  do  so:  that  is, within  twenty  days 
from  the  service  of  the  amended  bill.  Chees- 
boroueb  r.  Wright,  "28  Beav.  173. 

2  Bruce  v.  Allen,  1  Mad.  556;  see  also  Tay- 
lor «.  Milner.  10  Ves.  444;  Holder  v.  Lord  Hunt- 
ingfield,  11   Ves.   283,  2i)3;    see  Davenport  v. 


Sniffen,  1  Barb.  Ch.  223;  Lakensu.  Fielden,  11 
Paige,  644;  Bedell  v.  Bedell,  2  Barb.  Ch.  99  ;  1 
Smith  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  207,  208;  Burrall 
e.'Raineteaux,  2  Paige,  331 ;  2  Madd.  Ch.  Pr. 
(4th  Am.  ed.)  264,  265;  Kenrick  v.  Clayton,  2 
Bro.  C.  C.  (Perkins's  ed.)  214,  note  (£),  and 
cases  cited. 

3  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.  17;  see,  however, 
Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.  3. 

4  For  forms  of  summons  in  such  case,  see 
Vol.  III. 

5  Braithwaite's  Pr.  59. 

6  Dyson  v.  Benson,  G.  Coop.  110;  Cust  v. 
Boode,  1  S.  &  S.  21 ;  Burrall  v.  Raineteaux, 
2  l'ai.ne,  331. 

'i  Osborne  v.  Jullion,  3  Drew.  552;  see  also 
Ld.  Red.  208,  210;  Stephenton  v.  Gardiner, 
2  P.  Wm«.  286:  Tomkin  r.  Lethbridge,  9  Ves. 
17S:  Taylor  v.  Milner,  10  Ves.  444,  446;  Baker 
v.  Mellish,  11  Ves.  73;  White  ».  Howard.  2  De 
G.  &  S  223,  Read  v.  Barton,  3  K.  &  J.  166. 

s  Mellor  v.  Hall,  2  S.  &  S.  321;  Curzon  r. 
Lord  De  la  Zouch,  1  Swanst.  185,  193;  Att.- 
Gen.  v.  Shield,  11  Beav.  441;  Vigers  v.  Lord 
Audley,  2  M.  &  C.  49,  52;  Braithwaite's  Pr.  59. 


(a)  Under  Massachusetts  Ch.  Rule   22,   an  may  then  be  heard  on  the  bill  and  demurrer, 

answer  filed  with  a  demurrer  to  the  bill  may  be  without  the  demurrer  being  again  filed.     Hogg 

withdrawn  bv  leave  of  the  Court,  and  the  case  v.  Price,  145  Mass.  013. 

588 


FILING,   SETTING    DOWN,    AND    HEARING    DEMURRERS.  *  593 

so,  where  a  traversing  note  has  been  filed  and  served,  a  defendant  cannot 
demur  without  special  leave.9 

It  is  right  here  to  advert  to  the  distinction  in  practice  between 
taking  a  demurrer  and  answer  off  the  file,  and  simply  overrul- 
ing *  the  demurrer,  thereby  leaving  the  answer  on  the  file.  The  *  593 
former  course  appears  to  be  the  one  adopted,  in  all  cases  where 
there  has  been  an  irregularity  in  the  formal  parts  or  the  filing  of  the 
demurrer,  whether  it  be  accompanied  by  an  answer  or  not.1  The  latter 
course  is  adopted,  wherever  the  demurrer  has  been  properly  filed,  but 
the  Court  is  of  opinion  that  it  is  insufficient,  or  that  it  has  been  over- 
ruled by  the  answer. 

Where  a  demurrer'  has  been  taken  off  the  file  for  irregularity,  it 
ceases  to  be  a  record  of  the  Court,  and  the  defendant  may,  therefore, 
put  in  a  plea,  or  another  demurrer  (if  his  time  for  demurring  has  not 
expired),  as  if  no  demurrer  had  been  filed;  but  the  demurrer  is  not 
taken  off  the  file  by  the  mere  pronouncing  of  the  order ;  it  must  actually 
be  withdrawn  from  the  file.2  To  effect  this,  the  order,  when  drawn  up, 
should  be  carried  to  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerk  :  who  will  withdraw  the 
demurrer,  annexing  the  order  to  it.8 

Notice  of  filing  the  demurrer  must  be  served  on  the  plaintiff,  or  his 
solicitor,  on  the  day  on  which  it  is  filed,  before  seven  o'clock  in  the 
evening,  or,  if  on  a  Saturday,  before  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon.4 
Neglect  to  do  so  will  not,  however,  render  the  demurrer  inoperative ; 
but  the  time  allowed  to  the  opposite  party  for  taking  the  next  step  in 
the  cause  will  be  extended,  so  as  to  give  him  the  benefit  of  the  time  he 
would  otherwise  lose  by  the  delay  in  the  service.6 

Upon  the  demurrer  being  filed,  the  plaintiff  should  take  an  office 
copy  6  and  if  he  apprehends  that  the  demurrer  will  hold  good,  he  should 
either  obtain  an  order  to  dismiss  his  bill  with  costs,7  or  if  he  thinks  the 
defect  can  be  remedied  by  amendment,  he  may  obtain  an  order  of  course, 
on  motion  or  petition,  to  amend  his  bill,  in  the  usual  way,  upon  payment 
of  20s.  costs.8  This,  however,  can  only  be  done  before  the  demurrer 
has  been  set  down ;  afterwards  the  plaintiff  must  pay  the  defendant's 
taxed  costs  of  amending,  and  of  the  demurrer ; 9  and  must  make  a 
special  application,  by  summons,  for  leave  to  amend.10    The  20s.  cover 

9  Cons.  Ord.  XIII.  7;  see  ante,  p.  516.  Williams,  12  Beav.  482;  Jones  v.  Jones,  1  Jur. 

1  Leave  to  amend  the  title  of  a  joint  de-  N.  S.  863,  V.  C.  S.;  Lloyd  v.  Solicitors  and 
mnrrer  and  answer  has  been  given  on  the  General  Life  Ass.  Co.  3  W.  R.  040;  24  L.  J. 
hearing  of  a  motion  to  take  it  off  the  tile  for  Ch.  704,  V.  C.  W.;  see,  however,  Matthews  v. 
irregularity.  Osborne  v.  Jullion,  3  Drew.  552,  Chichester,  5  Hare,  207,  overruled  on  appeal. 
554.  id.  210. 

An  objection  to  the  time  of  riling  a  pleading  6  Braithwaite's  Pr.  401. 

must  be  taken  by  motion   to  strike  from  the  "  See  post,  Chap.  XIX.  §  1. 

files,  and  if  not  taken   in  that  mode  must  be  8  See  ante,  p.  411.      For  forms  of  motion 

deemed  waived.      Holley  v.  Younge,   27  Ala.  paper  and  petition,  see  Vol.  III. 
203;  Shaw  v.  Lindsey,  60  Ala.  344.  9  Warburton  v.  London  and  Black  wall  Ry. 

2  Cust  v.  Boode,  1  S.  &  S.  21.  Co.  2  Beav.  253;  Hearn  v.  Way,  fi  Beav.  3(58; 

3  Ibid.  Hoflick  v.  Reynolds,  9  W.  R.  398,  V.  C  K     If 

4  Cons.  Ord.  Ill  9;  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.  2;  he  neglects  to  amend  within  the  proper  time, 
ante,  pp.  454,  455.     For  form  of  notice,  see  the  hill  is  gone.     Id.  431. 

Vol.  III.  ift  Hoflick  r.  Reynolds,  ubi  supra.  For  form  of 

fi  Wright  v.  Angle,  6  Hare,  107;  Lowe  v.      summons,  see  Vol.  III. 

589 


*  594  DEMURRERS. 

*  594    *  all  the  costs  of  the  demurrer  ;  but  when  the  demurrer  has  been 

prepared,  though  not  actually  on  the  file,  before  the  amendment, 
the  costs  will  be  costs  in  the  cause.1 

It  was  formerly  necessary,  after  filing  a  demurrer,  to  enter  it  with 
the  Registrar.  This  need  not  now  be  done  ;  but  upon  the  filing  thereof 
by  the  defendant,  either  party  may  set  the  demurrer  down  for  argument 
immediately.'2 

Where  a  demurrer  to  the  whole  bill  is  not  set  down  for  argument 
within  twelve  days  after  the  filing  thereof,  and  where  a  demurrer  to  part 
of  a  bill  is  not  set  down  within  three  weeks  after  the  filing  thereof,  and 
the  plaintiff  does  not  within  such  twelve  days  or  three  weeks,  as  the 
case  may  be,  serve  an  order  for  leave  to  amend  fhe  bill,  the  demurrer 
will  be  held  sufficient  to  the  same  extent,  and  for  the  same  purposes,  and 
the  plaintiff  is  to  pay  to  the  demurring  party  the  same  costs,  as  in  the 
case  of  a  demurrer  to  the  whole,  or  part  of  a  bill,  as  the  case  may  be, 
allowed  upon  argument.3 

In  order  to  entitle  a  plaintiff  to  be  relieved  against  the  consequences 
of  not  setting  down  the  demurrer,  or  obtaining  an  order  to  amend,  within 
the  periods  fixed  by  the  General  Orders,  he  must  make  out  a  clear  case 
of  accident,  mistake,  or  surprise.4 

The  order  for  payment  of  the  costs  of  a  demurrer,  neglected  to  be  set 
down,  is  an  order  of  course,  and  may  be  obtained  on  petition  at  the 
Rolls,  or  on  motion.5 

The  times  of  vacation  are  not  reckoned  in  the  computation  of  time  for 
setting  down  demurrers.6 

As,  in  the  event  of  a  demurrer  not  being  set  down  for  argument 
within  the  limited  period,  the  defendant  derives  the  same  benefit  as  by 
its  allowance,  the  duty  is  cast  upon  the  plaintiff,  if  he  is  desirous  that 
it  should  be  submitted  to  the  judgment  of  the  Court,  of  having  it  set 
clown.7 

i  Bainbrigge  i\  Mos«,  3  K.  &  J.  G2;  3  Jur.  5  Jacobs  v.  Hooper,  1  W.  R.  6.    For  form 

N.  S.  107.  of  order,  see  Seton,  1257,  No.  11 ;  and  for  forms 

2  Cons.  Ord.  XIV.  11.  of  petition  and  motion  paper,  see  Vol.  III. 

3  Cons.  Ord.  XIV.  14,  15;  Matthews  v.  Chi-  6  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.  13  (3) 

Chester,  5  Hare,  207;  on  appeal,  id.  210;  HJur.  7  See  the  33d  Equity  Rule  of  the  U.   S. 

4S;  lieu,-.  Regul.  15  March,  1800,  r.  4.  Courts,  2)ost,   p.  2383.  (a)     Where  a  demurrer 

4  Knight  v.  Marjoribanks,  14  Sim.  108;  is  riled,  and  the  record  does  not  disclose  what 
decided,  however,  on  the  34th  Ord.  of  Aug.,  disposition  was  made  of  it,  and  an  answer  is 
1841;  Sand.  Ord.  884;  3  Beav.  xxii.;  Matthews  subsequently  filed,  upon  which  the  parties 
v.  Chichester,  11  Jur.  49,  L.  C;  deCded  proceed  to  a  hearing,  it  will  be  presumed  on 
on  the  46th  Ord.  of  May,  1845;  Sand.  Ord.  appeal  that  the  demurrer  was  abandoned. 
1000;  7  Beav.  xli.;  1  Phil,  lxxxvi.,  which  was  Basey  v.  Gallagher,  2  Wall.  670. 

similar;  overruling  S.  C.  5  Hare,  207. 


(a)  This  rule  changes,  in  the  Federal  Courts,  for  argument  under  Equity  Rule  38,  on  the  rule 

the   general  rule  as  to  pleas,  that  upon   issue  day  when  filed,   or  the  next  rule  day,  is   not 

taken  by  replication   to  a  plea,  the  sufficiency  ground  for  dismissing  the  bill,  where  all  days 

of  the  piea  is  admitted,  and  the  Court  may  now,  in  term  time  are  treated  as  rule  days.     Electro- 

upon  final  hearing,  do  at  least  what,  under  the  libration  Co.  v.  Jackson,  52  Fed.  Rep.  773.    As 

the  general  rule,  may  be  done  when  the  benefit  to  the  term  for  hearing  a  demurrer,  see  Barnett 

of  a  decree  is  saved  to  the  hearing.     Pearce  v.  v.  People's  Bank,  65  Ga.  51;  Old  Hickory  Dis- 

Rice,  142  U.  S.  28,  42.  tilling  Co.  v.  Bleyer,  74  Ga.  201. 

The  plaintiff's  failure  to  set  down  a  demurrer 
590 


FILING,    SETTING    DOWN,    AND    HEARING    DEMURRERS.  *  595 

The  party  wishing  to  set  down  a  demurrer  for  argument  must  obtain 
an  order  for  that  purpose.  Unless  specially  directed  by  an  order  of 
the  Lord  Chancellor  or  Lords  Justices,  the  demurrer  must  be  set 
down  to  be  heard  before  the  Judge  to  whose  Court  the  cause*  is  *595 
attached.1  If  the  cause  is  attached  to  the  Court  of  one  of  the 
Vice-Chancellors,  this  order  is  obtained  on  a  petition  of  course,  to  the 
Lord  Chancellor,  being  left  at  the  order  of  course  seat  in  the  Registrars' 
Office,  and  is  dated  the  day  the  petition  is  left;  and  the  demurrer  is  set 
down  by  the  order  of  course  Clerk  the  same  day.  If  the  cause  is 
attached  to  the  Rolls  Court,  the  order  is  obtained  on  a  petition  of 
course  to  the  Master  of  the  Rolls,  being  left  with  his  under-secretary  ; 
the  order  is  then  taken  by  the  solicitor  to  the  order  of  course  seat  in  the 
Registrars'  Office,  and  the  demurrer  will  be  set  down  by  the  order  of 
course  Clerk  on  the  day  the  order  is  left.2 

The  petition  must  state  to  what  Court  the  cause  is  attached,3  the  day 
when  the  demurrer  was  filed,  and  whether  it  be  to  the  whole,  or  part  of 
the  bill ;  and  be  subscribed  by  the  solicitor  ;  and,  if  presented  to  the 
Lord  Chancellor,  it  does  not  require  any  fiat  or  stamp.4 

If  by  inadvertence  the  demurrer  is  not  actually  set  down  on  the  day 
the  petition  or  order  is  left  at  the  Registrars'  Office,  it  will  nevertheless 
be  considered  to  have  been  set  down  on  that  day.5 

The  order  directs  the  demurrer  to  be  set  down  next  after  the  pleas, 
demurrers,  and  exceptions  to  answers  already  appointed  for  hearing; 
and  it  must  be  served  upon  the  solicitor  for  the  opposite  party,  at  least 
two  clear  days  before  the  day  appointed  for  hearing.6 

If  the  defendant  is  desirous  of  withdrawing  his  demurrer,  he  may  do 
so,  even  after  it  has  been  set  down,  on  payment  of  costs.7 

A  demurrer  is  not  usually  put  in  the  paper  for  hearing,  in  Vice-Chan- 
cellors' causes,  until  six  clear  days,  and  in  Rolls'  causes,  until  two  clear 
days  have  elapsed  since  it  was  set  down. 

Before  the  demurrer  is  heard,  two  printed  copies  of  the  bill  and  a 
copy  of  the  demurrer  must  be  left  with  the  train-bearer  of  the  Vice- 
Chancellor,  or,  in  a  Rolls'  cause,  with  either  the  under-secretary  or  train- 
bearer,  for  the  use  of  the  Court.8 

In  general,  the  Court  will  not  advance  a  demurrer  ;  9  in  cases, 
however,  of  bills  for  injunction,  as  an  injunction  will  not  usually 
be    granted    pending    a   demurrer,   the    Court  will,    upon    application, 

1  Cons.  Ord.  VI.  4.  obtained  on  petition  of  course;  for  form  of  pe- 

2  Cons.  Ord.  XXI.  9  ;  Reg.  Regul.  15 March,  tition,  see  Vol.  III.  For  order,  by  consent, 
1860,  rr.  1,  2,  3.  For  form  of  order,  see  Seton,  directing  demurrer  to  be  withdrawn,  and 
1257,  No.  10;  and  for  forms  of  petition,  see  extending  time  to  answer,  see  2  Seton,  1030, 
Vol.  III.  No_  10_ 

8  Cons-  0rd-  XIV-  '0.  s  if  ,his  ia  neglected,  the  solicitor  may  be 

4  Reg.  Regul.  15  March,  1800,  r.  3.  ordered  to  pay  costs.     Cons.    Ord.    XXI.    12. 

5  Egremont  v.  Cowell,  5  Beav.  017;  7  Jar.  Counsel's  brief  consists  of  copies  of  the  bill 
52,  and  demurrer.     In  Ernest  v   Partridge,  11  W. 

6  See  now  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  LVII.  0;  Davis  R.  715,  V.  C.  W.,  the  charge  for  observation 
v.  Whiffen,  22  VV.  R.  109.  was  disallowed,  on  a  partv  and  partv  taxation, 

7  Downes  r.  East  India  Co.  6  Ves.  586.      In  see  Morgan  &  Davey,  354. 
Rolls'  causes,  the  order  may,  by  consent,  be  8  Anon.  1  Mad  557. 

591 


59" 


DEMURRERS. 


*  596    *  where  the  matter  is  pressing,  order  the  demurrer  to  be  argued 

immediately,1  or  advanced  so  as  to  be  argued  with  the  motion  on 
an  injunction.2 

When  a  demurrer  is  called  on  for  hearing,  and  the' defendant  omits  to 
appear,  the  demurrer  will,  it  seems,  be  struck  out  of  the  paper,  unless 
the  plaintiff,  if  he  has  set  down  the  demurrer,  can  produce  an  affidavit  of 
service  upon  the  defendant  or  his  solicitor  of  the  order  to  set  it  down;  or, 
if  the  defendant  set  down  the  demurrer,  unless  the  plaintiff  can  produce 
an  affidavit  of  service  upon  himself  of  the  order  for  setting  down  the 
demurrer.3  If  the  plaintiff  can  produce  such  an  affidavit,  it  is  conceived 
that  the  demurrer  would  be  overruled,  as  in  the  case  of  a  plea.4  It  has 
been  held,  however,  that  in  such  a  case  the  demurrer  is  not  necessarily 
overruled,  but  the  plaintiff  must  be  heard  in  support  of  the  bill.5  When 
the  defendant  appears  and  the  plaintiff  does  not,  the  demurrer  will  also, 
it  seems,  be  struck  out  of  the  paper,  unless  the  defendant  can  produce 
an  affidavit  of  service  upon  himself  of  the  order  for  setting  down  the 
demurrer  ;  or  unless,  in  the  event  of  the  defendant  having  himself  set 
down  the  demurrer,  he  can  produce  an  affidavit  of  service  by  him  upon 
the  plaintiff  or  his  solicitor.6  On  the  production  of  such  an  affidavit,  in 
either  case,  the  defendant  may  have  the  demurrer  allowed  with  costs.7 

Where  a  demurrer  has  been  struck  out  of  the  paper,  a  fresh  order 
must  be  obtained  for  setting  it  down,  which  may  be  had  upon  petition  of 
course  as  before  explained,  provided  the  application  is  made  within  the 
time  allowed  to  set  down  the  demurrer.8  If  otherwise,  a  special  appli- 
cation for  leave  to  set  it  down  must  be  made. 

The  usual  course  of  proceeding,  when  the  demurrer  comes  on  for  hear- 
ing, and  all  parties  appear,  is  for  the  counsel,  in  support  of  the  demurrer 
to  be  first  heard,  next  the  plaintiff's  counsel,  and  then  the  leading  counsel 
for  the  demurring  party  replies.  In  hearing  a  demurrer,  the  argument 
is  strictly  confined  to  the  case  appearing  upon  the  record  ;  and  for  the 
purposes  of  the  argument,  the  matters  of  fact  stated  in  the  bill  are  ad- 
mitted to  be  true.9 

Where  it  has  appeared,  upon  the  hearing  of  a  demurrer  to  the 

*  597    *  whole  bill,  that  the  defendant  is  entitled  to  demur  to  some  part 

only,  the  Court  has  permitted  the  demurrer  to  be  amended,  so  as 
to  confine  it  to  the  parts  to  which  the  defendant  has  a  right  to  demur : 1 


1  Cousins  v.  Smith.  13  Yes.  164,  167;  .Tones 
v.  Taylor,  2  Mad.  181;  Const  v.  Harris,  T.  & 
R.  510,  n.;  London,  Chatham,  and  Dover  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Imperial  Mercantile  Credit  Association, 
L.  R.  3  Ch.  231 ;  and  see  post,  Chap.  XXXVI. 
§  2,  Injunctions.  Where  justice  requires  it,  an 
injunction  will  be  granted  pending  a  demurrer. 
Wardle  v.  Claxton,  9  Sim.  412. ' 

2  See  1  Seton,  175.  As  to  costs,  see  Anon. 
v.  Bridgewater  Canal,  9  Sim.  375. 

3  For  form  of  affidavit  of  service,  see  Vol.  III. 

4  Mazarredo  v.  Mai  (land,  2  Mad.  38.  For 
form  of  order  overruling  demurrer  on  non- 
appearance of  defendant,  see  2  Seton,  1630, 
No.  11. 

592 


5  Penfold  o.  Ramsbottom,  1  Swanst.  552; 
see  Memphis  &  V.  R.  Co.  v.  Owens,  60  Miss. 
227. 

6  On  an  appeal  from  an  order  allowing  a 
demurrer  to  the  whole  bill,  the  plaintiff  is 
entitled  to  begin.  Att.-Gen.  v.  Aspinall,  2  M. 
&C  613:  1  Keen,  513. 

7  Jennings  v.  Pearce,  1  Yes  Jr.  447. 

8  Ante,  p.  594;  Cons.  Ord.  XIY.  14,  15. 
See  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  XXVII.  6. 

9  Ante,  p.  543.  For  form  of  order  on  the 
hearing  of  a  demurrer,  see  Seton.  1258,  No.  12. 

1  Glegg  v.  Legh,  4  Mad.  193,  207. 


EFFECT    OF   ALLOWING    DEMURRERS. 


598 


in  such  cases,  however,  the  most  usual  course  is  to  overrule  the  de- 
murrer, and  to  give  the  defendant  leave  to  put  in  a  new  demurrer  to  such 
part  of  the  bill  as  he  may  be  advised.2 

Where  a  demurrer  is  ordered  to  stand  over,  it  must  be  for  a  definite 
period.8 


Section  V. —  The  Effect  of  allowing  Demurrers. 

Strictly  speaking,  upon  a  demurrer  to  the  whole  bill  being  allowed, 
the  bill  is  out  of  Court,  and  no  subsequent  proceeding  can  be  taken  in 
the  cause.4  The  Court  often,  however,  on  hearing  the  demurrer,  gives 
leave  to  amend,  and  there  are  cases  in  which  it  has  afterwards  permitted 
an  amendment  to  be  made  ; 5  and  it  seems  that,  even  after  a  bill  has  been 
dismissed  by  order,  it  has  been  considered  in  the  discretion  of  the  Court 
to  set  the  cause  on  foot  again.6  (b) 

Where  the  plaintiff,  after  a  demurrer  had  been  allowed,  improperly 
obtained  an  order  to  amend  his  bill,  and  the  defendant  demurred,  it  was 
held,  that  by  demurring  the  defendant  had  waived  the  irregularity,  and 
that  the  course  he  ought  to  have  taken  was,  to  apply  to  discharge  the 
order  to  amend  for  irregularity.7 

Although  the  effect  of  allowing  a  demurrer  to  the  whole  bill  is  to 
put  the  cause  out  of  Court,  the  allowance  of  a  partial  demurrer 
*  is  not  attended  with  such  a  consequence.    The  bill,  or  that  part  of    *  598 
it  which  was  not  covered  by  the  demurrer,  still  remains  in  Court, 
and  the  plaintiff  may  obtain  an  order  to  amend,  or  adopt  any  other  pro- 


2  Thorpe  v.  Macauley,  5  Mad.  218,  231.     In 
Marsh  v.  Marsh,  16  N.  J.  Eq.  391,   308,   the 
demurrer  was  overruled,  with  leave  to  amend 
by  stating  the  grounds  of  demurrer. 
"  8  Cons.  Ord"!  XXI.  13. 

4  Smith  v.  Barnes,  1  Dick.  07  ;  Watkina  v. 
Bush,  2  Dick.  701;  see  Cheuvete  v.  Mason,  4 
Greene  (Iowa),  231.  For  forms  of  orders  allow- 
ing demurrers,  see  2  Seton,  1028,  Nos.  4,  6.  An 
interlocutory  injunction  is,  ipso  facto,  dissolved 
by  the  sustaining  of  a  demurrer,  although 
leave  to  amend  the  bill  may  have  been  given. 
Schneider  v.  Lizardi,  9  Beav.  468  So  is  a 
special  injunction  by  amending  the  bill  by 
making  a  new  co-plaintiff.  Att.-Gen.  v.  Marsh, 
16  Sim.  572;  13  Jur.  317;  see  Commissioners 
of  Sewers  v.  Glasse,  W.  N".  (1871)  229:  20  W. 
R.  108. 

6  Lord  Coningsby  v.  Sir  J.   Jekyll,    2    P. 


Wms.  300;  Lloyd  v.  Loaring,  6  Ves.  773,  779. 
It  is  not  necessary  in  Massachusetts,  even 
where  a  demurrer  goes  to  the  equity  of  the 
whole  bill,  that  the  plaintiff  should  make  a 
motion  to  amend,  in  anticipation  of  an  adverse 
decision;  a  motion  to  amend  is  not  allowed  as  a 
matter  of  right.  See  Merchant's  Bank  of  Xcw- 
buryport  v.  Stevenson,  7  Allen,  489,  491.  By 
the  35th  Rule  of  the  U.  S.  Courts,  if  a  demurrer 
is  allowed,  the  Court  may  allow  the  plaintiff  to 
amend  his  bill  upon  reasonable  terms.  See 
post,  p.  2383;  Alexander  v.  Move,  38  Miss. 
640.  (a) 

6  Per  Lord  Eldon  in  Baker  v.  Mellish,  11 
Ves.  68,  72.  It  is  conceived  that  this  dictum 
would  not  be  followed,  unless  in  a  very  special 
case. 

7  Watkins  v.  Bush,  2  Dick.  701;  but  see  id. 
702,  n. 


(a)  The  Court  in  its  discretion  will  give  such 
leave  to  amend  only  when  necessary  to  do  jus- 
tice in  the  case.  Dowell  v.  Applegate,  8  Fed. 
Rep.  698.  Such  leave  to  amend  the  bill  does 
not  preclude  an  appeal.  Brasfield  v.  French, 
59  Miss.  632. 

('&)  A  bill  should  be  dismissed  on  demurrer 
only  when  the  defects  are  not  amendable,  or 

vol.  i.  —  38 


the  plaintiff  declines  to  amend.  Lamb  r. 
.Teffrev,  41  Mich.  719;  see  Bradford  v.  Bradford, 
66  Ala.  252.  In  Massachusetts,  an  order  which 
merely  sustains  a  demurrer  to  the  bill,  is  only 
an  interlocutory  decree,  and  doea  not  put  the 
case  out  of  court.  Parker  v.  Flagg,  127  Mass. 
28;  see  Davis  v.  Speiden,  3  McArthur  (D.  C), 
283. 

593 


*598 


DEMURRERS. 


ceedings  in  the  cause,  in  the  same  manner  that  he  might  have  done  had 
there  been  no  demurrer.1 

On  hearing  the  demurrer,  the  Court  will,  where  it  sees  that  the  defect 
pointed  out  by  the  demurrer  can  be  remedied  by  amendment,  and  sub- 
stantial justice  requires  it,  make  a  special  order  at  the  hearing  of  the 
demurrer,  adapted  to  the  circumstances  of  the  case ; 2  and  where  an 
order  was  made  allowing  the  demurrer,  and  giving  leave  to  amend,  and 
no  amendment  was  made  within  the  proper  time,  it  was  held  that  the 
bill  was  not  out  of  Court.3 

When  the  demurrer  is  allowed,  and  leave  is  given  to  amend,  there  is 
no  rule  that  the  defendant  is  to  have  his  costs  ;  but  they  are  in  the  dis- 
cretion of  the  Court.4 

Where,  upon  allowing  the  demurrer,  leave  is  given  to  the  plaintiff  to 
amend  his  bill,  (a)  he  is  not  thereby  prevented  from  appealing  against 
the  order ; 5  but  if  the  defendant  is  desirous  of  appealing  from  such 
order,  he  ought  to  apply  to  stay  the  amendment,  until  the  appeal  has 
been  disposed  of; 6  or,  at  any  rate,  he  ought  not  to  act  upon  the  order 
giving  the  plaintiff  leave  to  amend :  as,  for  instance,  by  demurring  to 
the  amended  bill. 

The  amendment  of  a  bill,  in  pursuance  of  an  order  made  upon  the 
hearing  of  a  demurrer,  if  made  before  the  defendant  answers,  will  not 
preclude  a  plaintiff  from  making  one  amendment  after  answer,  upon 
motion  of  course.7 

A  demurrer,  being  frequently  on  matter  of  form,  is  not,  in  general,  a 
bar  to  a  new  bill ;    but  if  the  Court,  on  demurrer,  has  clearly  decided 


i  Emans  v.  Emans,  14  N.  J.  Eq.  114,  120. 
The  allowance  of  a  demurrer  for  want  of  parties 
will  not  necessarily  prevent  the  plaintiff  from 
applying  to  the  Court  for  an  injunction  or 
receiver;  as  where  the  granting  of  the  injunc- 
tion and  receiver  would  be  for  the  benefit  of  the 
absent  parties,  Const  v.  Harris,  1  T.  &  R.  514; 
or  where  the  grant  would  not  affect  the  absent 
parties.  Hamp  v.  Robinson,  3  De  G.  J.  &  S. 
97,  109. 

2  Wellesley  ».  Wellesley,  4  M.  &  C.  554, 
558;  4  Jur.  2;  Schneider  v.  Lizardi,  9  Beav. 
461,  -108;  Rawlings  v.  Lamhert,  1  J.  &  H.  458; 
Huxham  ».  Llewellyn, W. N.  (1873)  136;  21 W. 
R.  766.  Leave  to  amend  is  not  given  as  a  mat- 
ter of  course.  Osborne  v.  Jullion,  3  Drew.  596; 
and  see  Watts  v.  Lord  Eglinton,  1  C.  P.  Coop, 
temp.  Cott.  29,  and  the  cases  there  collected; 
and  as  to  leave  to  amend  given  after  demurrer 
for  want  of  parties,  see  Tyler  v.  Bell,  2  M.  &  C. 
89,  104.  110,  and  the  cases  there  cited  :  1  .Tur. 
20.  See  also  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  XXVIII.  8,  9. 
For  form  of  order  giving  leave  to  amend,  see  2 
Seton,  1520,  No.  3;  1628,  Nos.  4,  5. 

3  Deeks  v.  Stanhope,  1  Jur.  N.  S.  413,  V.  C. 


K.;  see.  however,  Hoflick  v.  Reynolds,  9  W.  R. 
431,  V.  C.  K. :  and  Armistead  v.  Durham,  11 
Beav.  428  ;  13  Jur.  330. 

4  Schneider  v.  Lizardi,  ubi  supra;  Bothomley 
v.  Squires,  1  Jur.  N.  S.  694;  and  see  Harding 
v.  Tingey,  12  W.  R.  703;  10  Jur.  N.  S.  872. 
And  as  to  costs  in  these  cases,  see  also  Hodges 
v.  Hodges,  24  W.  R.  293;  White  v.  Bromige, 
W.  N.  (1878)  28;  26  W.  R.  312:  Kennedy  v. 
Edwards,  11  Jur.  N.  S.  153.  As  to  costs  upon 
separate  demurrers,  see  Walters  v.  Webb.  18 
W.  R.  86,  587:  Price  v.  Mayo,  W.  N.  (1873)  81; 
21  W.  R.  539.  In  New  Jersey,  the  Court  has 
no  discretionary  power  in  such  a  case.  The 
costs  are  fixed  by  the  Chancery  Act.  Hicks  v. 
Campbell.  19  N."  J.  Eq.  183,  187. 

5  Lidbetter  v.  Long,  4  M.  &  C.  286;  Davis 
v.  Chanter,  2  Phil.  545,  547. 

6  Wellesley  v.  Wellesley,  4  M.  &  C.  554,  556; 
4  Jur.  2;  and  see  Payne  v.  Dicker,  L.  R.  6  Ch. 
578. 

7  Pesheller  r.  Hammett,  3  Sim.  389;  Bain- 
brigge  v.  Baddeley,  12  Beav.  152;  13  Jur.  997; 
and  see  Cons.  Old.  IX.  13. 


(a)  If  the  plaintiff  does  so  amend,  he  cannot      murrer. 
afterwards  question   the   ruling  upon   the   de-      617. 

594 


Browne    v.    Browne,    17    Fla.    607, 


EFFECT    OF    ALLOWING    DEMURRERS. 


rm 


upon  the  merits  of  the  question  between  the  parties,  the  decision  may 
be  pleaded  in  another  suit.8 

Where  a  demurrer  to  the  whole  or  part  of  a  bill  is  allowed  upon 
*  argument,  the  plaintiff,  unless  the  Court  otherwise  directs,  is  to    *  599 
pay  to  the  demurring  party  the  costs  of  the  demurrer  ;  and  if  the 
demurrer  be  to  the  whole  bill,  the  costs  of  the  suit  also,1  including  the 
costs  of  a  motion  for  an   injunction,  or  other  motion    pending  in  the 
suit.2 

Where  any  grounds  of  demurrer  are  urged,  on  arguing  a  demurrer, 
beyond  the  grounds  therein  expressed,  and  those  grounds  which  are  so 
expressed  are  disallowed,  the  defendant  will  have  to  pay  the  same  costs 
as  if  the  demurrer  were  overruled,3  although  the  grounds  of  demurrer 
so  newly  urged  may  be  allowed.4 

In  general,  however,  where  the  demurrer,  ore  tenus,  has  been  allowed, 
and  the  Court  has  given  the  plaintiff  leave  to  amend  his  bill,  the  course 
of  the  Court  appears  to  be  to  make  him  liable  to  the  costs  of  the  demur- 
rer.5 The  rule  however,  with  respect  to  costs  upon  such  occasions,  is 
not  imperative,  and  the  Court  has  a  discretionary  power.6 

Where  a  demurrer  is  put  in  on  two  grounds,  as  to  one  of  which  it  suc- 
ceeds, but  fails  as  to  the  other,  no  costs  will  in  general  be  given.7 

Where  a  demurrer  to  a  bill  is  allowed,  and  afterwards  the  order  al- 
lowing it  is,  upon  re-argument,  reversed,  the  defendant,  if  he  has  received 
the  costs  from  the  plaintiff,  will  be  ordered  to  refund  them,  upon  appli- 
cation by  the  plaintiff; 8  and  so.  if  a  demurrer  has  been  overruled,  and 
the  order  is  reversed  upon  re-hearing,  the  plaintiff,  if  he  has  received 
costs  from  the  defendant,  must  refund  them. 

One  of  several  defendants  who  has  demurred  successfully,  is  entitled, 
as  of  right,  to  have  his  name  struck  out  of  the  record  ;  and  may  apply 
to  the  Court  by  motion  for  this  purpose.9 

mer  v.  Fraser,  2  M.  &  C.  173,  174;  M'lntyre  v. 
Connell,  1  Sim.  N.  S.  257,  258;  see  also  Lund 
v.  Blansliard,  4  Hare,  23 ;  Brown  v.  Douglas, 
11  Sim.  283;  Thompson  v.  University  of  Lon- 
don, 10  Jur.  N.  S.  669,  671;  33  L.  J.  Ch.  625, 
639,  V.  C.  K. ;  Ward  v.  Sittingbourne  &  Sheer- 
ness  i:.v.  Co.  L.  R.  9  Oh.  488,  495. 

5  Newton  v.  Lord  Egmont,  4  Sim.  574,  585. 

,;  ('cms.  Ord.  XIV.  1,  12.  Where  Sir  Lan- 
celot Shadwell  V.  C.  upon  allowing  a  demurrer 
ore  tenus,  for  want  of  parties,  ordered  the  de- 
fendant to  pay  the  costs  of  the  demurrer  on  the 
record,  although  he  had  given  the  plaintiff 
leave  to  amend  his  hill  generally,  Lord  Cotten- 
ham  refused  to  interfere.  Mortimer  v.  Fraser, 
2  M.  &  ('.  173. 

7  Benson  v.  Hadlield,  5  Beav.  546,  554;  and 
see  Allan  v.  Houlden,6  Beav.  148,  150;  Morgan 
&  Davey,  IS. 

8  Oats  v.  Chapman,  1  Ves.  Sr.  542  ;  S.  C.  2 
Ves   Sr.  100;  1  Dick.  148. 

»  Barry  v.  Croskey,  2  J.  &  H.  130:  8  Jur. 
N.  S.  10;  2  Seton,  1629.  For  form  of  notice  of 
motion,  see  Vol.  III. 

595 


8  Londonderry  (Lady)  v.  Baker,  3  Giff.  128; 
affirmed,  7  Jur.  X.  S.  811,  L.  JJ. ;  Oriental 
Steam  Co.  v.  Briggs,  8  Jur.  N.  S.  201,  204;  10 
W.  R.  125,  L.  C. 

1  Cons.  Ord.  XIV.  13;  see  Rule  35  of  the 
U,  S.  Courts.  For  cases  where  the  Court  di- 
rected otherwise,  see  Schneider  v.  Lizardi,  9 
Beav.  401,  408;  Bothomley  v.  Squires,  1  Jur. 
N.  S.  094,  V.  C.  K.;  Merchant  Taylors'  Co.  v. 
Att.-Gen.  L.  R.  11  Eq.  35;  L.  R.6  Ch.  512; 
Thompson  v.  Planet  Building  Society,  L.  R.  15 
Eq.  333,  354;  Fothergill  v.  Rowland"  22  W.  R, 
42;  Harrison  r.  Mexican  Rv.  Co.  L.  R.  19  Eq. 
358,  308:  Duckett  v.  Grover.  6  Ch.  D.  82;  Mor- 
gan &  Davey,  21.  For  precedent  of  a  bill  of 
costs  for  preparing  and  setting  down  a  demur- 
rer, see  id.  463. 

2  Gladstone  v.  Ottoman  Bank,  1  II.  &  M. 
505;  9  Jur.  N.  S.  246;  Morgan  &  Davey,  22. 

3  That  is  to  say,  the  costs  occasioned  by  the 
demurrer,  unless  the  Court  otherwise  directs  ; 
see  Cons.  Ord.  XIV.  12. 

4  Cons.  Ord.  XIV.  1;  Tourton  v.  Flower,  3 
P.  Wms.  371 ;  Wood  v.  Thompson,  2  Dick.  510; 
Att.-Gen.  v.  Brown,  1  Swanst.  265,  288;  Morti- 


601 


DEMURRERS. 


600 


*  Section  VI.  —  The  Effect  of  overruling  Demurrers. 


A  demurrer,  being  a  mute  thing,  cannot  be  ordered  to  stand  for  an 
answer.1 

After  a  demurrer  to  the  whole  bill  has  been  overruled,  a  second  de- 
murrer to  the  same  extent  cannot  be  allowed,  for  it  would  be  in  effect 
to  re-hear  the  case  on  the  first  demurrer :  as,  on  argument  of  a  demur- 
rer, any  cause  of  demurrer,  though  not  shown  in  the  demurrer  as  filed, 
may  be  alleged  at  the  bar,  and  if  good  will  support  the  demurrer.2  A 
demurrer,  however,  of  a  less  extensive  nature,  may,  in  some  cases,  be 
put  in ;  and  where  the  substance  of  a  demurrer  was  good,  but  informally 
pleaded,  liberty  was  given  to  take  it  off  the  file,  and  to  demur  again,  on 
payment  of  costs  ;  3  and  a  defendant  has  been  allowed  to  amend  his 
demurrer,  so  as  to  make  it  less  extensive.4 

A  second  demurrer,  however,  though  less  extended  than  the  first,  can- 
not, after  the  first  demurrer  has  been  overruled,  be  put  in  without  leave 
of  the  Court;  but  the  case  is  different  where  the  first  has  been  taken 
off  the  file  for  irregularity.  This  leave  is  generally  granted,  upon  hear- 
ing the  first  demurrer  ;  but  it  has  been  permitted  upon  a  subsequent 
application  by  motion. 

Although  a  defendant  cannot,  after  the  Court  has  overruled  his  de- 
murrer to  the  whole  bill,  again  avail  himself  of  the  same  method  of 
defence,  yet,  as  it  sometimes  happens  that  a  bill  which,  if  all  the  parts 
of  the  case  were  disclosed,  would  be  open  to  a  demurrer,  is  so  artfully 
drawn  as  to  avoid  showing  upon  the  face  of  it  any  ground  for  demur- 
ring, the  defendant  may,  in  such  case,  make  the  same  defence  by  plea : 
stating  the  facts  which  are  necessary  to  bring  the  case  truly  before 
Court.5  As  it  is,  however,  the  rule  of  the  Court  not  to  allow  two  dila- 
tories  without  leave,  or,  in  other  words,  as  the  defendant  is  only  per- 
mitted once  to  delay  his  answer  by  plea  or  demurrer,  without  leave  of 
the  Court,  he  must,  previously  to  filing  his  plea,  obtain  the  leave  of  the 
Court  to  do  so :  otherwise,  his  plea  may  be  taken  off  the  file.6 

From  what  has  been  said  it  results  that,  after  a  demurrer  to  the 
whole  bill  has  been  overruled,  the  defendant,  unless  he  obtains  leave  to 
put  in  a  demurrer  of  a  less  extended  nature,  or  a  plea  either  to  the 
whole  bill  or  to  some  part  of  it,  must,  if  required,  put  in  a  full 
*  601  answer  ;  and  the  Court,  on  overruling  the  demurrer,  *  will,  on 
the  application  of  the  defendant,  fix  a  time  for  his  so  doing ;  if 
no  time  is  fixed,  the  defendant  must  put  in  his  answer  within  the  usual 
time  (if  it  has  not  expired),  or  make  a  special  application,  by  summons, 
for  further  time.1  (a) 

may  be  amended,  on  an  ex  parte  order  before 
the  twelve  days  have  expired.  Richardson  v. 
Hastings,  7  Beav.  58. 

5  I.d.  Red.  216. 

6  Rowlev  v.  Eccles,  1  S.  &  S.  511,  512. 
i  Trim  v.  Baker,   1  S.  &  S.  469;  T.  &  R. 


i  Anon.  3  Atk.  530. 

2  Ld.  Red.  217. 

3  Devonsher  v.   Xewenham,  2  Sch.  &  Lef. 
199. 

*  Gleggr.  Legh.  4  Mad.  193,  207;  Thorpe  v. 
Macauley,  5  Mad.  218,  231.      A  clerical  error 


(a)  Fuller  v.  Knapp,  24  Fed.  Rep.  100.     As 
to  overruled  demurrers,  see  Barksdale  v.  Butler, 

596 


6  Lea  (Tenn.),  450;  Hitchcock  v.  Caruthers,  82 
Cal.  523;   Millan  v.  Hood  (Cal.),  30  Pac.  Rep. 


EFFECT    OF    OVERRULING    DEMURRERS. 


*601 


Where  the  demurrer  is  not  to  the  whole  bill,  and  is  accompanied  by 
an  answer,  the  plaintiff,  after  the  demurrer  is  overruled,  if  he  wishes 
for  a  further  answer,  must  except  to  the  answer  for  insufficiency  ;  and, 
therefore,  the  defendant  need  not  put  in  any  further  answer  until  after 
the  plaintiff  has  taken  exceptions  to  the  answer  already  put  in,  and  such 
exceptions  have  been  either  allowed  or  submitted  to.2  Generally,  the 
plaintiff  should  not  except  to  the  answer  until  the  demurrer  has  been 
decided  upon :  otherwise  he  admits  the  demurrer  to  be  good.3  Where, 
however,  the  defendant  demurs  to  the*  relief  only,  and  answers  as  to  the 
discovery,  the  plaintiff  may,  it  seems,  except  to  the  answer  before  the 
demurrer  is  heard.4 

Although,  generally,  where  the  plaintiff  amends  otherwise  than  by 
adding  parties,  he  loses  his  right  to  except  to  the  answer  for  insuffi- 
ciency, yet,  where  a  demurrer  has  been  overruled,  he  is  not,  by  amend- 
ing generally,  precluded  from  calling  for  an  answer  to  that  part  of  the 
interrogatories  covered  by  the  demurrer.5 

Where  a  demurrer  is  overruled,  and  the  plaintiff  amends  his  bill,  the 
defendant  is  not  precluded  from  appealing  against  the  order  overruling 


253;  Waterton  v.  Croft,  6  Sim.  431,  438;  see 
Atlantic  Ins.  Co.  v  Lemar,  10  Paige,  385;  Hen- 
derson v.  Dennison,  llixl.  152;  Fleece  v.  Russell, 
13  [11.  31;  Norch  Western  Bank  v.  Nelson,  1 
Graft.  108;  Sutton  v.  Gatewood,  6  Munf.  398; 
Lafavour  v.  Justice,  5  Blackf.  336;  Puterbaugh 
v.  Elliott,  22  111.  157;  Myers  v.  McGahagan,  26 
Fla.  303.  Where  a  demurrer  to  a  bill,  for  want 
of  equity,  is  overruled,  a  final  decree,  without 
giving  the  defendant  an  opportunity  to  deny 
the  allegations  in  the  bill,  is  erroneous.  Smith 
v.  Ballantyne,  10  Paige,  101;  Forrest  v.  Robin- 
son, 4  Porter,  44;  Bottorf  r.  Conner,  1  Blackf. 
287;  Cole  County  v.  Angney,  12  Mo.  132;  see 
Stewart  v.  Flint,  57  Vt.  216;  Bailey  v.  Holden, 
50  Vt.  14. 


In  Maine.  Walton  J.  in  Lambert  v.  Lambert, 
52  Maine,  544,  545,  remarked  that  the  overrul- 
ing of  a  demurrer  in  Equity  is  never  followed 
bv  a  decree  making  a  final  disposition  of  the 
case;  the  order  is  that  the  party  demurring  an- 
swer further.  And  he  added:  "'  The  entry  in  this 
case  should  be,  'Demurrer  to  civss-bill  over- 
ruled— further  answer  required.'  " 

2  Cotes  v.  Turner,  Bunb.  123;  and  see  Att- 
Gen.  v.  London.  12  Beav.  217;  see  Kuypers  v. 
Ref.  Dutch  Church,  6  Paige.  570. 

3  Ld.  Red.  317:  London  Assurance  '•.  Fast 
India  Co.  3  P.  Wins.  325;  Boyd  v.  Mills,  13 
Ves.  85. 

•*  Ld.  Red.  317;  3  P.  Wms.  327.  n.  (S). 

5  Taylor  v.  Bailey,3M.  &  C.677;  3  lur.308. 


1107;  Terre  Haute  &  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Sherwood, 
132  Ind.  129.  The  fact  that  a  motion  to  dis- 
solve  a  temporary  injunction  has  been  over- 
ruled does  not  prevent  the  defendant  from  de- 
murring to  the  bill  on  the  grounds  embraced 
in  the  motion.  Augusta  Nat.  Bank  v.  Printup, 
63  Ga.  570.  But  a  question  raised  by  an  over- 
ruled demurrer  cannot  be  again  raised  in  the 
answer.  Wilson  v.  Hall,  67  Ga.  53.  If  a  de- 
murrer is  erroneously  overruled,  the  error  is 
waived  by  tiling  a  subsequent  pleading.  Gulf. 
Colorado's  S.  F.  Ry.  Co  v.  Washington,  4  U.  s. 
App.  121;  Asbach  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q  R.  Co. 
(Iowa)  53  N.  W.  Re]).  00;  Spillane  >■■  Missouri 
Pac.  Ry.  Co.  Ill  Mo.  555;  West  v.  McMullan, 
112  Mo.  405;  but  see  Westminster  v.  Willard 
(Vt.).  26  Atl.  Rep.  952:  and  see  Bates  v.  Bab- 
cock,  95  Cal.  479.  Under  the  Code  system, 
where  a  demurrer  lies  to  an  answer,  the  filing 
of  an  amended  answer  waives  a  demurrer  to 
the  original  answer.  Sylvester  v.  Craig  (( !ol.  I, 
31  Pac.   Rep.  387.     In'  Hayes  v.   Dayton,  18 


P.latch.  420.  whore  the  defendant  filed  together 
an  answer  and  a  demurrer  to  the  wind'1  bill,  it 
was  held  that  by  going  to  argument  upon  the 
latter,  he  waived  the  objection  that  it  was 
waived  by  the  answer,  under  the  U.  S-  Equity 
Rules  32, 37.  In  Bruschke  v.  Der  Nord  Chicago 
Schuetzcn  Verein,  145  111.  433.  it  was  held  that, 
on  overruling  a  demurrer,  there  is  no  decree, 
but  an  order  is  made  requiring  the  defendant  to 
answer,  and,  if  he  does  not,  directing  the  bill 
to  be  taken  as  confessed,  and  that  such  order  is 
not  reviewable.  When  there  is  a  demurrer  to 
the  whole,  and  also  to  a  part  of  the  bill,  and 
the  latter  only  is  sustained,  the  decree  should 
dismiss  so  much  of  the  bill  as  seeks  relief  as  to 
the  matters  thus  adjudged  bad,  overrule  the 
demurrer  to  the  residue,  and  direct  the  defend- 
ant to  answer  thereto.  Giant  Powder  Co.  v. 
California  Powder  Works,  98  U.  S.  126;  se0 
Brandon  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Prime.  14  Blatch.  371; 
Canton  Warehouse  Co   V.  Potts,  68  Miss.  637. 

597 


602 


DEMURRERS. 


the  demurrer ; 6   but  after  the  defendant  has  served  the  plaintiff  with 
notice  of  the  appeal,  an  order  of  course  to  amend  the  bill  is  irregular, 

and  will  be  discharged  with  costs,  and  the  amendments  expunged.7 
*  602        *  After  a  demurrer  has  been  overruled,   and  notice  of  appeal 

given,  the    plaintiff  cannot  obtain  an  order  of   course  to  dismiss 
his  bill,  with  costs.1 

The  Court  will  often,  although  it  overrides  the  demurrer,  reserve  to 
the  defendant  the  right  of  raising  the  same  question  at  the  hearing  of 
the  cause ; 2  and  where  there  is  a  doubtful  question  on  a  title,  the  Court 
will  sometimes  overrule  the  demurrer,  without  prejudice  to  any  defence 
the  defendant  may  make  by  way  of  answer.3 

Where  any  demurrer  is  overruled,  the  defendant  is  to  pay  to  the 
plaintiff  the  taxed  costs  occasioned  thereby :  unless  the  Court  other- 
wise directs.4 


6  Jackson  v.  North  Wales  Ry,  Co.  13  Jur. 
69,  L.  C.  After  demurrer  to  a  bill  was  over- 
ruled, and  time  given  to  answer,  the  defendant 
was  allowed  to  demur  again  without  leave  first 
obtained,  on  the  plaintiff's  amending  his  bill 
by  joining  a  new  party  plaintiff.  Moore  v. 
Armstrong,  9  Porter.  697.  So  where  an  amend- 
ment is  made  to  a  bill  before  answer  filed,  even 
if  it  be  immaterial  and  trivial,  a  defendant  may 
demur,  tit  novo,  to  the  whole  bill;  the  defend- 
ant may  demur  to  the  amendment  at  any  time. 
Booth  v.  Stamper,  10  Ga.  109.  But  when  an 
answer  has  been  filed,  the  defendant  cannot, 
after  demurrer  made  and  decided,  demur  again 
to  the  whole  bill,  unless  the  amendment  is  ma- 
terial. Ibid. ;  ante,  p.  582,  n.  10.  Tor  forms  of 
orders  on  appeal,  see  2  Seton,  1600,  Nos.  2,  3. 

'  Ainslie  v.  Sims,  17  Beav.  174. 

i  Lewis  v.  Cooper,  10  Beav.  32;  S.  C.  nam. 
'Cooper  r.  Lewis,  2  Phil.  178,  181.  See  London 
&c.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Imperial  Mercantile  Credit  As- 
sociation, L.  R.  3  Ch.  231. 

2  Wilson  v.  Stanhope,  2  Coll.  629  ;  Jones  v. 
Sk'pworth,  9  Beav.  237;  Norman  v.  Stiby,  id. 
560,  566;  Earl  of  Shrewsbury  v.  North  Stafford- 
shire Ry.  Co.  9  Jur.  N.  S.  787;  11  W.  R.  742, 
T.  C.  K  ;  Baxendale  v.  West  Midland  Ry.  Co. 
8  Jur.  N.  S.  1163,  L.  C. 

3  Browmsword  v.  Edwards,  2  Ves.  Sr.  243, 
:247;  Mortimer  r.  Hartley,  3  De  G.  &  S.  316; 
.Evans  to.  Evans.  18  Jur.  666,  L.  J.L;  Cochrane 
p.  Willis,  4  De  G.  J.  &  S.  229;  10  Jur.  N.  S. 
162,  L.  J.L;  Collingwood  v.  Russell,  10  Jur. 
N  S.1062;  13W.R.63,  L.  J ,1. :  Thomas  v.  Tyler, 
3  Y.  &  Col.  2oa;  ante,  p.  542.  See  Lautour  v. 
Att.-Gen.  11  Jur.  N.S.  48;  13  W..R.305;  Reg. 
Lib.  1865,  B.  135  :  Bower  r.  Society \V.  N.  (1867) 
306;  W.  N.  (1868)  188.  Where  the  Court  be- 
low has  considered  that  the  question  raised  by 
the  bill  ought  not  to  be  decided  on  demurrer,  it 
seems  that  the  Court  of  Appeals  will  not  ordi- 
narily overrule  that  decision.  Sheffield  Water- 
works o.  Veomans,   L.  R.  2  Ch.  8.     The  order 

598 


is  not  an  interlocutory  order  as  respects  the 
time  for  appealing.  Trowel]  r.  Shenton.  8  Ch. 
D.  318,  321.     See  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  LVIII.  15. 

A  decree  overruling  a  demurrer  is  not  a  final 
decree,  and  pending  an  appeal  therefrom  the 
defendant  may  be  ordered  to  answer.  Forbes 
v.  Tuckerman,  115  Mass.  115. 

If  upon  a  critical  examination  of  the  facts  of 
a  bill  there  is  a  possibility  that  the  action  may 
be  sustained,  though  upon  a  different  ground 
from  that  assumed,  a  demurrer  to  the  whole  bill 
will  be  overruled.  Trafford  v.  Wilkinson,  3 
Tenn.  Ch.  449.  After  a  demurrer  has  been 
overruled,  the  bill  amended,  and  the  defendant 
has  answered  without  taking  in  his  answer  the 
objection  raised  by  the  demurrer,  the  defendant 
may  at  the  hearing  raise  the  same  objection. 
Johnasson  v.  Bonhote,  2  Ch.  D.  298.  And, 
generally,  the  Court  is  not  concluded,  on  final 
hearing,  from  looking  into  the  bill  upon  the 
points  of  an  overruled  demurrer.  Dormer  v. 
Fortescue,  2  Atk.  284;  Avery  v.  Holland,  2 
Overton,  469 ;  Bolton  v.  Dickens,  2  Cent.  L.  J. 
477;  Cronin  v.  Watkins,  1  Tenn.  Ch.  119.  Or 
of  an  overruled  motion  to  dismiss  the  bill  for 
want  of  equity.  Shaw  v.  Patterson,  2  Tenn. 
Ch.  171. 

4  Cons.  Ord.  XIV.  12;  see  Schneider  v.  Li- 
zardi,  9  Beav.  461,  468;  Bothomley  v.  Squires, 
1  Jur.  N.  S.  694;  V.  C.  K.;  Morgan  &  Davey, 
21.  As  to  the  costs:  where  a  demurrer  ore 
ttnus  is  allowed,  see  Cons.  Ord.  XIV.  1,  ante, 
p.  599 :  and  where  a  defendant  succeeds  on  one 
ground  and  fails  on  another,  see  mile,  p.  599- 
Costs  were  refused  where  the  bill  did  not  show 
that  relief  must  be  granted  at  the  hearing. 
Barber  v.  Barber,  4  Drew.  666;  5  Jur.  N.  S. 
1197.  See  Robinson  v.  India  Chartered  Bank. 
35  Beav.  79,  86:  L.  R.  1  Eq.  32;  Commins  v. 
Scott,  L.  R.  20  Eq.  11.  For  precedent  of  a  bill 
of  costs  where  demurrer  is  overruled,  see  Morgan 
&  Davey,  448.  666-672. 


EFFECT   OF    OVERRULING   DEMURRERS.  *  602 

Where  a  demurrer  to  the  whole  bill  is  overruled,  the  plaintiff,  if  he 
does  not  require  an  answer,  and  proposes  to  file  a  traversing  note,  may 
file  such  note  immediately,  unless  the  Court,  upon  overruling  such  de- 
murrer, gives  time  to  plead,  answer,  or  demur ;  and  in  such  case,  if  the 
defendant  files  no  plea,  answer,  or  demurrer  within  the  time  so  allowed 
by  the  Court,  the  plaintiff,  if  he  does  not  then  require  an  answer,  may, 
on  the  expiration  of  such  time,  file  such  note.5 

6  Cons.  Ord.  XIII.  4;  ante,  p.  516. 

599 


603 


♦CHAPTER   XY. 


PLEAS. 

Section  I. —  The  General  Nature  of  Pleas. 

A  demurrer  has  been  mentioned  to  be  the  proper  mode  of  defence  to 
a  bill,  when  any  objection  is  apparent  upon  the  bill  itself,  either  from 
matter  contained  in  it,  or  from  defect  in  its  frame,  or  in  the  case  made 
by  it.1  When  an  objection  to  the  bill  is  not  apparent  on  the  bill  itself. 
if  the  defendant  means  to  take  advantage  of  it,  he  ought  to  show  to  the 
Court  the  matter  which  creates  the  objection,  either  by  answer  or  by 
plea,  which  has  been  described  as  a  special  answer,  showing  or  relying 
upon  one  or  more  things  as  a  cause  why  the  suit  should  be  either  dis- 
missed, delayed,  or  barred.2  («)  The  object  of  a  plea  is  to  save  to  the 
parties  the  expense  of  going  into  evidence  at  large  ;  and  therefore,  where 
a  defendant  neglected  to  raise  his  defence  by  plea,  the  bill  has  been  dis- 
missed without  costs.3 

The  defence  proper  for  a  plea  is  such  as  reduces  the  cause,  or  some 

part  of  it,  to  a  single  point,  and  from  thence  creates  a  bar  to  the  suit, 

or  to  the  part  of  it  to  which  the  plea  applies.4      It  is  not,  however, 

necessary  that  it  should  consist  of  a  single  fact ;  for  though  a 

*  604    defence  offered  by  way  of  plea  consists  of  a  great  variety  *  of  cir- 


1  Ante.  v>.  542. 

2  Ld.  Red.  219;  Carroll  r.  "Waring,  3  Gill  & 
J.  491;  Heartt  r.  Corning,  3  Paige,  566  ;  Tappan 
r.  Evans.  11  X.  H.  311.  If  a  previous  demurrer 
by  the  defendant  has  been  overruled,  he  cannot 
plead  without  the  leave  of  the  Court.  Rowley 
v.  Eccles,  1  S.  &  S.  511.  ante.  p.  600. 

3  Sanders  v.  Benson.  4  Beav.  350,  357;  Jack- 
son r.  Ogg,  John.  397,  402:  Dwight  r.  Central 
Vermont  R.  Co.  20  Blatch.  200. 

4  Ld.  Red.  21'.'.  295;  Goodrich  v.  Pendleton, 
3  John.  Ch.  384  ;  Story.  Eq.  PI.  §  652;  Sims  r. 
Lyle,  4  Wash.  C.  C.  302.  304.  The  plea  must 
be  perfect  in  itself,  so  that  if  true  in  fact,  it  will 
put  an  end  to  the  cause.  Allen  v.  Randolph.  4 
John.  Ch.  693:  Drogheda  v.  Malone.  Finlay's 
Dig.  449.  If  the  plea  is  the  only  defence,  it 
must  allege  some  fact  which  is  an  entire  bar  to 
the  suit  or  some  substantive  part  of  it;  and,  if 


(a)  In  early  times  pleas  were  called  or  con- 
founded with  answers,  and  they  are  often  re- 

600 


defective  in  this  respect,  whether  true  or  false, 
the  plaintiff  should  move  to  set  it  aside  for  in- 
sufficiency. Xewton  r.  Thayer,  17  Pick.  129; 
Piatt  r.  Oliver,  1  McLean.  303:  Union  Branch 
R.  Co.  7-.  East  Tenn.  &  Georgia  R.  R.  Co.  14 
Ga.  327.  A  demurrer  is  never  resorted  to  for 
the  purpose  of  settling  the  validity  of  a  plea. 
Travers  r.  Ross,  14  N.  J.  Eq.  254  :  ante,  p.  542, 
n.  1 :  infra,  p.  692. 

A  mere  denial  of  a  substantive  fact  alleged 
in  the  b  11,  without  setting  up  new  matter,  and 
without  answering  as  to  collateral  fact*  charged 
a~  evidence,  is  not  a  good  plea.  Evans  v.  Harris, 
2  V.  &  B.  361 :  Bailey  r.  Le  Roy.  2  F.dw.  Ch. 
514;  Milligan  «  Milledge,  3  Cranch.  220.  Nor 
is  a  plea  of  matter  already  in  the  bill  rendering 
it  demurrable,  as  that  the  agreement  is  not  in 
writing,  when  the  bill  shows  it  to  be  in  parol. 
Black  r.  Black,  15  Ga.  445. 


ferred  to  as  "  special  answers."     See  LangdeK, 
Eq.  PI.  (2d.  ed.).  §  92;  post,  p.  690. 


GENERAL  NATURE  OF  PLEAS. 


604 


cumstances,  yet  if  they  all  tend  to  one  point,  the  plea  may  be  good  ; 1 
they  must,  however,  be  material.'2 

In  general,  a  plea  relies  upon  matters  not  apparent  on  the  bill,  and, 
in  effect,  suggests  that  the  plaintiff  has  omitted  a  fact  which,  if  stated, 
would  have  rendered  the  bill  demurrable  ; 3  and  in  most  cases,  where  a 
defendant  insists  upon  matter  by  plea  which  is  apparent  upon  the  face 
of  the  bill,  and  might  be  taken  advantage  of  by  demurrer,  the  plea  will 
not  hold.4  (a)  This  rule,  however,  as  will  be  seen  presently,  is  in  some 
cases  liable  to  exception. 

Where  a  plea  merely  states  matter  not  apparent  upon  the  bill,  and 
relies  upon  the  effect  of  such  matter  as  a  bar  to  the  plaintiff's  claim,  it 
is  called  an  affirmative  plea.  Such  pleas  usually  proceed  upon  the 
ground  that,  admitting  the  case  stated  by  the  bill  to  be  true,  the -matter 
suggested  by  the  plea  affords  a  sufficient  reason  why  the  plaintiff  should 
not  have  the  relief  he  prays,  or  the  discovery  which  he  seeks ;  and  when 
they  are  put  in,  the  Court,  in  order  to  save  expense  to  the  parties,  or 
to  protect  the  defendant  from  a  discovery  which  he  ought  not  to  make, 
instantly  decides  upon  the  validity  of  the  defence,  taking  the  plea,  and 
the  bill  so  far  as  it  is  not  contradicted  by  the  plea,  to  be  true.5 

Although  pleas  generally  consist  of  the  averment  of  some  new  fact, 
or  chain  of  facts,  not  apparent  upon  the  face  of  the  bill,  the  effect  of 
which  is,  not  to  deny  the  facts  of  the  bill,  but  admitting  them  pro  hoc 
vice  to  be  true,  to  destroy  their  effect,  there  are  cases  in  which  the  plea, 
instead  of  introducing  new  facts,  merely  relies  upon  a  denial  of  the 
truth  of  some  matter  stated  in  the  bill,  upon  which  the  plaintiff's  right 
depends.  A  plea  of  this  sort  is  called  a  negative  plea.6  It  seems,  for- 
merly, to  have  been  made  a  question  how  far  a  negative  plea  could  be 
good ; 7  and  where  a  bill  was  filed  by  an  individual  claiming  as  heir  to  a 


i  Fox  i'.  Yates,  24  Beav.  271 ;  Campbell  v. 
Beaufoy,  Johns.  320;  Saunders  v.  Druce,  3 
Drew.  140,  156;  and  for  the  plea  in  that  case, 
see  Drew.  Eq.  PI.  140,  and  id.  147,  n.;  Story, 
Eq.  PI.  §  652;  Rhode  Island  v.  Massachusetts, 
14  Peters,  21 1.  But  it  is  otherwise  where  the 
defence  consists  of  a  threat  variety  of  facts  and 
circumstances,  rendering  it  necessary  to  go  into 
the  examination  of  witnesses  at  large.  Loud 
t;.  Sergeant,  1  Edw.  Ch.  104;  Story,  Eq.  PL 
§§  053,  054. 

2  Andrews  v.  Lockwond,  2  Phil.  398;  15  Sim. 
153;  Bowyer  r.  Beamish,  2  Jo.  &  Lat.  228. 

8  Wigram  on  l>i-c  22,  n.  (e);  see  Andrews 
v.  Lockwond.  ubi  supra. 

4  Billing  v.  Flight,  1  Mad.  230,  236;  Black 


(a)  A  plea  which  avers  a  conclusion  of  law 
without  setting  forth  the  facts  leading  to  that 
conclusion,  is  had.  Farley  v.  Kittson,  120 
U.  S.  303;  McCloskey  v.  Barr,  38  Fed.  Rep. 
165;  Larimore  v.  Wells,  29  Ohio  St.  13.  Every 
plea  must  be  specific,  distinct,  and  complete  in 
itself.  United  States  v.  California  Land  Co. 
148  U.  S.  31;  7  U.  S.  App.  128,  177;  Gage  v. 


v.  Rlaek,  15  Ga.  445;  Phelps  v.  Garrow.  3  Edw. 
Ch.  139;  Varick  v.  Dodge,  9  Paige,  149. 

5  Ld.  Red.  295. 

6  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  551,  note,  §  057,  et  seq.  ; 
Wigram.  Discov.  (2d  ed.)  pp.  110-118.  This 
class  of  picas  has  two  peculiarities:  in  the  first 
place  it  relics  wholly  upon  matters  stated  in  the 
bill,  negativing  such  facts  as  are  material  to 
the  rights  of  the  plaintiff;  and  in  the  next  place 
it  requires  an  answer  to  be  filed,  which  is  sub- 
sidiary tn  the  piirpo«es  of  the  plea.  Story,  Eq. 
PI.  §  070:  sec  also  Cosine  ».  Graham,  2  Paige, 
177:  Robinson  v.  Smith.  3  Paige,  222:  Mitchell 
7-.  Lenox,  2  Paige,  280  ;  Smets  v.  Williams,  4 
Paige,  304. 

?  Ld.  Red.  230. 


Harbert,  145  111.  530:  Gage  v.  Smith.  142  III. 
191.     Under  the  Codes,  an  affirmative  defence 

set  up  in  the  answer  is  treated  as  a  separate 
plea.  Douglass  v.  Phenix  Ins.  Co.  138  N.  Y. 
209.  A  defendant  who  files  a  plea  to  the  entire 
bill  need  not  answer;  if  he  pleads  to  a  part 
only,  he  must  answer  to  the  remainder.  Graves 
v.  Blondell,  70  Maine,  190. 

G01 


605 


PLEAS. 


person  deceased,  and  the  defendant  pleaded  that  another  person  was 
heir,  and  that  the  plaintiff  was  not  heir  to  the  deceased,  Lord 
*  605  Thnrlow  overruled  *  the  plea,  on  the  ground  that  it  was  a  nega- 
tive plea;1  but  this  decision  was  afterwards  doubted,  by  the 
learned  Judge  himself,'2  when  pressed  by  the  necessary  consequence, 
that  any  person  falsely  alleging  a  title  in  himself,  might  compel  any 
other  person  to  make  a  discovery,  which  that  title,  if  true,  would  enable 
him  to  require,  however  injurious  to  the  person  thus  improperly  brought 
into  Court :  so  that  any  person  might,  by  alleging  a  title,  however  false, 
sustain  a  bill  in  Equity  against  any  person  for  anything,  so  far  as  to 
compel  an  answer.3  Since  that  time,  frequent  instances  have  occurred 
in  which  negative  pleas  have  been  allowed.  Thus,  where  to  a  bill 
praying  that  the  defendant  might  redeem  a  mortgage  or  be  foreclosed, 
the  defendant  pleaded  that  there  was  no  mortgage,  Lord  Eldon  allowed 
the  plea  (a)  ; 4  and  so,  where  a  bill  prayed  that  the  defendant  might  be 
restrained  from  setting  up  outstanding  terms  of  years  in  defence  to  an 
action  of  ejectment,  and  the  defendant  pleaded  that  there  were  no  out- 
standing terms,  the  plea  was  held  good ; 5  and  where  a  bill  prayed  an 
account  of  partnership  transactions,  a  negative  plea  that  there  was  no 
partnership  was  allowed.6  It  has  also  been  held  that  negative  matter 
ought  to  be  pleaded  negatively.7 

It  is  proper  here  to  mention  another  species  of  plea  which  often 
occurs  in  the  books,  and  is  not,  strictly  speaking,  either  a  plea  affirm- 
ing new  matter,  or  negativing  the  plaintiff's  title  as  alleged  in  the  bill, 
but  one  which  re-asserts  some  fact  stated  in  the  bill,  and  which  the  bill 
seeks  to  impeach,  and  denies  all  the  circumstances  which  the  plaintiff 
relies  upon  as  the  ground  upon  which  he  seeks  to  impeach  the  fact 
so  set  up.  {b)  Thus  where  a  bill  is  brought  to  impeach  a  decree,  on 
the  ground  of  fraud  used  in  obtaining  it,  the  decree  may  be  pleaded  in 
bar  of  the  suit,  with  averments  negativing  the  charges  of  fraud.8  Of 
the  same  nature  are  pleas  setting  up  the  award  itself,  to  a  bill  filed  for 
the  purpose  of  impeaching  it  on  the  ground  of  partiality  or  fraud  in  the 
arbitrators  ; 9  or  setting  up  stated  accounts  or  releases,  where  bills  have 


1  Newman  v.  Wallace,  2  Bro.  C.  C.  143, 
146;  Gunn  v.  Prior,  2  Dick.  657;  1  Cox,  197; 
Kinneslev  v.  Simpson,  Forrest.  85. 

2  Hall  v.  Noyes,  3  Bro.  C.  C.  483,  489. 

3  Ld.  Red.  231;  Jones  v.  Davis,  16  Ves.  262, 
264. 

4  Hitchens  v.  Lander,  G.  Coop.  34,  38. 

8  Armitager.  Wadsworth,  1  Mad.  189,  195; 
Dawson  v.  Pilling,  16  Sim.  203,  209;  12  Jur. 
388. 


(n)  One  who,  when  purchasing  land,  agrees 
to  assume  and  pay  a  mortgage  thereon,  cannot 
afterwards  question  its  validity.  Alt  v.  Ban- 
holzer,  36  Minn.  57. 

(b)  See  Garrett  v.  New  York  Transit  Co.  29 
Fed.  Rep.  129.  So  a  plea  may  be  good  which, 
adding  other  facts  to  those  stated  in  the  bill, 
arranges  them  together  as  one  complete  defence. 

602 


6  Drew  v.  Drew,  2  V.  &  B.  159, 161 ;  Sanders 
v.  King,  6  Mad.  61;  2  S.  &  S.  277;  Yorke  v. 
Fry,  6  Mad.  65;  Thring  v.  Edgar,  2  S.  &  S. 
274,  281;  Arnold  v.  Heaford,  1  M'Lel.  &  Y. 
330. 

i  Roberts  v.  Madocks,  16  Sim.  55,  57;  11 
Jur.  938. 

8  Ld.  Red.  239. 

9  Ibid.  260  ;  Tittenson  v.  Peat,  3  Atk  529. 


Missouri  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co. 
50  Fed.  Rep.  151 ;  Providence  Institution  v.  Barr, 
17  R.  I.  131.  But  it  is  not  sufficient  for  a  plea 
to  merely  allege  a  fact  which  contradicts  an 
allegation  of  the  bill.  McDonald  v.  Salem 
Capital  F.  M.  Co.  31  Fed.  Rep.  577;  see  Ar- 
mengaud  v.  Coudert,  23  Blatch.  484. 


GENERAL   NATURE   OF   PLEAS.  *  606 

been  filed  for  the  purpose  of  setting  them  aside.  Pleas  of  this  nature 
have  been  objected  to,  because  they  are  in  fact  exceptiones  ejusdem  rei 
cujus  petitur  dissolutio  ; 10  but  the  frame  of  a  bill  in  Equity,  in  such 
cases,  necessarily  produces  this  mode  of  pleading :  for,  in  the 
instance  above  alluded  to  of  a  plea  setting  up  the  decree  *  to  a  *  606 
bill  seeking  to  impeach  it,  it  is  obvious  that,  if  the  bill  had  stated 
the  title  under  which  the  plaintiff  claimed,  without  stating  the  decree 
under  which  the  defendant  claimed,  the  defendant  might  have  pleaded 
the  decree  alone  in  bar.  If  the  bill  had  stated  the  plaintiff's  title,  and 
also  stated  the  decree,  and  alleged  no  fact  to  impeach  it,  and  had  yet 
sought  relief  on  the  title  concluded  by  it,  the  defendant  might  have 
demurred ;  because,  upon  the  face  of  the  bill,  the  title  of  the  plaintiff 
would  have  appeared  to  be  so  concluded.  But  as,  by  the  forms  of 
pleading  in  Equity,  the  bill  may  set  out  the  title  of  the  plaintiff,  and, 
at  the  same  time,  state  the  decree  by  which,  if  not  impeached,  that  title 
would  be  concluded,  and  then  avoid  the  operation  of  the  decree,  by 
alleging  that  it  has  been  obtained  by  fraud,  if  the  defendant  could  not 
take  the  judgment  of  the  Court,  upon  the  conclusiveness  of  the  decree, 
by  plea,  upon  which  the  matter  by  which  that  decree  was  impeached 
would  alone  be  in  issue,  he  must  enter  into  the  same  defence  (by  evi- 
dence as  well  as  by  answer),  as  if  no  decree  had  been  made,  and  would 
be  involved  in  all  the  expense  and  vexation  of  a  second  litigation  on  the 
subject  of  a  former  suit,  which  the  decree,  if  unimpeached,  had  concluded. 
It  is  therefore,  permitted  to  him  to  avoid  entering  into  the  general  ques- 
tion of  the  plaintiff's  title,  as  if  it  had  not  been  affected  by  the  decree, 
by  meeting  the  case  made  by  the  plaintiff,  which  can  alone  give  him  a 
right  to  call  for  that  defence,  namely,  the  fact  of  fraud  in  obtaining  the 
decree :  which  he  does,  by  negative  averments  in  his  plea.1  It  seems  to 
have  been  the  opinion  of  Sir  James  Wigram  that,  in  these  cases,  a  nega- 
tive plea,  meeting  the  matter  suggested  in  the  bill,  to  avoid  the  effect  of 
the  bar  set  up,  would  alone  be  sufficient.2 

Any  matter  arising  between  the  bill  and  the  plea,  may  be  pleaded.3 
It  has  been  before  stated  that  this  can  be  done  where  the  bankruptcy 
of  a  plaintiff  or  of  a  defendant  occurs  after  the  bill  has  been  filed  ; 4  and. 
so  where  a  bill  was  filed  for  a  discovery  and  relief,  by  injunction  to 
restrain  the  defendant  from  setting  up  outstanding  terms  to  defeat  a 
writ  of  right,  and  since  the  filing  of  the  bill,  the  wj-it  of  right  had 
been  tried  and  determined  against  the  plaintiff,  a  plea  that  it  had  been 
so  tried  and  determined  was  allowed  to  be  a  good  plea.6  This  rule 
lias  been  adopted  from  analogy  to  proceedings  at  Common  Law,  where 
any  matter  which  arises  between  the  declaration  and  the  plea  may  be 
pleaded  in  bar.6   But  the  analogy,  in  this  respect,  between  Courts  of  Law 

1°  Pusey  v.  Desbouvrie,  3  P.  Wins.  315.  *  Ante,  p.  63;  Turner  V.  Robinson,  1  S.  &  S. 

1  Ld.  Red.  240,  242;  Bailey  v.  Adams,  G  3:  see  Taileton  v.  Hornby,  1  Y.  &  C.  Ex.  333, 
Ves.  580,  597;  Lloyd  v.  Smith,  1  Anst.  258;  336;  Lane  v.  Smith,  14  Beav.  49;  15  Jur.  735. 
Freeland  v.  Johnson,  id.  276.  6  Ea,.]  0f  Leicester  V.  Perrv,  1   Bro.  C.  C. 

2  Wigram  on  Disc.  pp.  185-189.  305;  see  Ld.  Red.  254 

3  Sergrove  v.  Mayhew,  2  M'N.  &  G.  97,  99;  «  Turner  v.  Robinson,  ubi  supra. 
14  Jur.  158;  De  Minekwitz  v.  Udney,  16  Ves. 

466,  468;  Payne  v.  Beech,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  708. 

603 


*608 


PLEAS. 


*  GOT    *and  Equity,  will  not  extend  further:    for  at  Law,  any  matter 

which  would  abate  the  suit,  or  operate  as  a  bar,  may,  until  the 
verdict  has  been  given,  be  offered  to  the  Court  by  a  plea,  termed  a  plea 
puis  darrein  continuance.1  In  Courts  of  Equity,  however,  such  a  plea 
does  not  seem  admissible,  but  the  effect  of  it  may  be  obtained  by  means 
of  a  cross-bill. - 

It  is  essential  to  observe  that,  whatever  the  nature  of  the  plea  may 
be,  whether  affirmative  or  negative,  or  of  the  anomalous  nature  above 
alluded  to,  the  matter  pleaded  must  reduce  the  issue  between  the  plain- 
tiff and  defendant  to  a  single  point.8  If  a  plea  is  double,  that  is,  ten- 
ders more  than  one  defence  as  the  results  of  the  facts  stated,  it  will  be 
bad.4  (a)  Thus,  a  plea  which  stated  that  the  plaintiffs,  who  claimed  as 
citizens  of  London,  never  were  resident  there,  or  paid  scot  and  lot,  and 
that  they  were  admitted  freemen  by  fraud  for  the  purpose,  of  enjoying 
the  exemption  claimed,  was  held  bad  ;  because  the  facts  that  the  plain- 
tiffs were  not  citizens  of  London,  and  that  they  were  admitted  by  fraud 
were  totally  inconsistent  with  each  other.5 

The  rule,  that  a  plea  must  reduce  the  defence  to  a  single  ground, 

must  be  understood  as  not  interfering  with  the  proposition  before  laid 

down,6  that  a  plea  may  consist  of  a  variety  of  facts  and  circumstances: 

all    that    it    requires    is,    that    those    facts   and   circumstances    should 

give,  as  their  result,  one  clear  ground7  upon  which   the  whole 

*  608    *  equity  of  the  bill  may  be  disposed  of. 


i  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  76,  §  69. 

2  Ld.  Red.  82;  see  Howe  v.  Wood,  1J.  &  W. 
315,  337;  Wood  r.  Rowe,  2  Bligh,  595;  Hayne 
v.  Hayne,  3  Ch.  Rep.  19;  Nels.  105;  Wright 
r.  Meek,  3  Iowa,  472;  Miller  v.  Fenton,  11 
Paige,  18;  Johnson  v.  Fitzhugh,  3  Barb.  Ch. 
360. 

3  Saltus  v.  Tobias,  1  John.  Ch.  214. 

4  Nobkissen  v.  Hastings,  2  Ves.  Jr.  84,  80; 
Jones  v.  Frost,  3  Mad.  1,  8;  Van  Hook  v. 
Whitlock,  3  Paige,  409.  Duplicity  in  one  and 
the  same  plea  is  a  vice  in  pleading  in  Equity,  as 
well  as  at  Law.  Moreton  v.  Harrison,  1  Bland. 
496;  see  Saltus  v.  Tobias,  7  John.  Ch.  214; 
Rhode  Island  v.  Massachusetts,  14  Peters,  211; 
Goodrich  v.  Pendleton,  3  John.  Ch.  336; 
Ridgeley  v.  Warfield,  1  Bland,  404;  Story,  Eq. 
PI.  §  653.  A  plea  is  not  rendered  double  by 
the  mere  insertion  therein  of  several  averments, 
that  are  necessary  to  exclude  conclusions  arising 
from  allegations  which  are  made  in  the  bill,  to 
anticipate  and  defeat  the  liar  which  might  be 
set  up  in  the  plea.  Bogardus  P.  Trinity  Church, 
4  Paige,  178. 

5  London  v.  Liverpool.  3  Anst.  738,  742.  So 
where  a  defendant  to  a  bill  for  the  specific  per- 


(a)  In  such  case,  the  proper  practice  appears 
to  be  to  allow  the  defendant  to  set  down  the 
plea  as  an  answer,  or  to  require  him  to  elect 
between   the   different  points  of   defence  con- 

604 


formance  of  an  agreement,  put  in  a  plea, 
insisting  upon  the  Statute  of  Frauds,  and 
another  defence,  Lord  Rosslyn  would  not  allow 
it,  as  it  was  a  double  defence,  and  directed  it  to 
stand  over  till  the  hearing.  Cooth  v.  Jackson, 
6  Ves.  12,  17:  Whitbread  v.  Brockhurst,  1  Bro. 
C.  C.  404,  418.  Loon  the  same  principle,  where 
a  bill  was  filed,  praying  a  reconveyance  of  four 
estates,  and  the  defendant  put  in  a  plea  whereby 
he  insisted  upon  a  fine  as  to  one,  and  averred 
that  the  estate  comprised  in  that  fine  was  the 
only  part  of  the  premises  in  the  bill  in  which 
he  claimed  an  interest,  Sir  Lancelot  Shadwell 
V.  C.  held  it  to  be  bad,  as  a  double  plea.  Wat- 
kins  v.  Stone,  2  Sim.  49,  52. 

6  Ante,  p.  603. 

7  Ritchie  r.  Aylwin,  15  Ves.  79,  82;  Rowe 
r.  Teed,  id.  372;  Strickland  v.  Strickland,  12 
Sim.  253,  259;  Fox  v.  Vates,  24  Ben  v.  271; 
Campbell  v.  Beanfoy,  Johns.  320;  Saunders 
v.  Druce,  3  Drew.  140,  156.  The  rule  upon 
this  subject,  and  the  reasons  upon  which  it  lias 
been  established,  are  thus  stated  by  Lord 
Thurlow,  in  Whitbread  v.  Brockhurst :  "  1 
cannot  agree  with  the  defendant's  counsel,  that 
any  two  facts  which  are  not  inconsistent  may  be 


tained  in  it.  See  Reissner  v.  Anness,  3  Ban  & 
Arden,  148;  see  Emma  Silver  M.  Co.  Lim'd  r. 
Emma  Silver  M.  Co.  of  New  York,  7  Fed. 
Rep.  401. 


GENERAL  NATURE  OF  PLEAS. 


009 


Although  the  general  rule  of  the  Court  is  not  to  allow  of  double 
pleading,  there  are  cases  in  which  the  rule  will  be  relaxed  :  as,  where 
great  inconvenience  would  be  sustained  by  the  necessity  of  setting  out 
long  accounts,  which  could  be  obviated,  if  the  defendant  were  to  be 
allowed  to  plead  several  matters,  (")  Cases  of  this  nature  may  occur 
where  a  bill  is  so  framed  that,  if  the  principal  case  made  by  it 
cannot  be  supported,  it  may  be  sustained  by  some  *  subsidiary  *  609 
matter,  which  has  been  introduced  for  the  purpose  of  maintaining 
the  suit.1  Thus,  where  a  bill  was  riled,2  by  simple  contract  creditors,  to 
charge  the  real  estates  of  a  deceased  debtor,  alleging,  first,  that  the 
testator,  by  his  will,  subjected  the  real  estates  to  the  payment  of  his 
debts ;  and,  secondly,  that  if  it  was  not  the  true  construction  of  his  will, 
then  his  real  estates  were  liable  under  the  47  Geo.  III.  sess..2,  e.  74,3 
he  having  been  a  trader  at  the  time  of  his  death,  an  order  was  made, 


pleaded  in  one  plea.  I  think  that  various  facts 
can  never  be  pleaded  in  one  plea,  unless  they 
are  all  conducive  to  a  single  point,  on  which 
the  defendant  rests  his  defence.  Thus,  many 
deeds  may  be  stated  in  a  plea,  if  they  all  tend 
to  establish  a  single  point  of  title;  so  in 
the  case  of  papacy.  Harrison  v.  Southcote,  1 
Atk.  528,  588.  In  the  present  case,  the  differ- 
ent matters  pleaded  do  not  conduce  to  one 
object.  The  plea  of  the  statute  is  of  itself  a  bar; 
but  the  plea,  that  the  agreement  was  not  per- 
formed, is  quite  distinct;  because,  whether  a 
part-performance  take  the  agreement  out  of  the 
statute,  or  be  considered  merely  as  a  fraud,  the 
point  of  equity  is  quite  distinct  from  the  agree- 
ment. It  is  a  plea  of  two  matters,  perfectly 
and  clearly  distinct;  of  two  things  which  fur- 
nish two  differ  nt  pleas  to  the  points  made  in 
the  bill.  The  reason  why  a  defendant  is  not 
permitted  to  plead  two  different  pleas  in  Equity, 
though  he  is  permitted  to  plead  them  at  Law, 
is  plain:  it  i-  because  at  Law  a  defendant  has 
no  opportunity,  as  he  has  here,  of  answering 
every  different  matter  stated  in  the  bill.  The 
reason  of  pleading  in  Equity  is,  that  it  tends 
to  the  forwarding  of  justice,  and  saves  great 
expense,  that  the  matter  should  be  taken  up 
shortly  upon  a  single  point;  but  that  end  is  so 
far  from  being  attained,  if  the  plea  puts  as 
much  in  issue  as  the  answer  could  do,  that  on 
the  contrary  it  increases  the  delay  and  expense. 
But  why,  it  may  be  asked,  should  not  the  de- 


(a)  Double  pleas  may  be  allowed  by  the 
Court  in  its  discretion,  where  they  do  not  lead 
to  diverse  issues.  Gormley  v.  Bunyan,  138  U.S. 
B23;  Carlyle  ».  Carlyle  Water  Co.  140  111.  445; 
Providence  Institution  p.  liarr,  17  R.  I.  131. 
Leave  of  Court  is  necessary  to  justify  separate 
pleas,  or  a  single  plea  which  sets  up  distinct 
matters  of  defence.  McCloskey  v.  Barr,  38 
Fed.  Rep.  165;  United  States  v.  American  Bell 
Telephone  Co.  30  id.   523 ;  Noyes  v.  Willard, 


fendant  be  permitted  to  bring  two  points,  on 
which  the  cause  depends,  to  issue  by  his  plea  ? 
The  answer  is  :  because,  if  two,  he  may  as 
well  bring  three  points  to  issue;  and  so  on,  till 
all  the  matters  in  the  bill  are  brought  to  issue 
upon  the  plea,  —  which  would  be  productive  of 
all  the  delay  and  inconvenience  which  plead- 
ing was  intended  to  remedy."  See  Sir  S. 
Romilly's  note  of  this  judgment,  1  Bro.  C.  C. 
416,  Belt's  ed.,  cited  2  V.  &  B.  153,  n.;  Noyes 
v.  Willard,  1  Woods,  187;  Benson  v.  Jones, 
1  Tenn.  Ch.  498.  Where  the  allegations  of  a 
plea,  being  taken  as  true,  do  not  make  out  a 
full  defence,  or  where  the  necessary  facts  are 
to  be  gathered  by  inference  alone,  the  plea 
cannot  be  sustained.  Meeker  v.  Marsh,  Saxton 
(N.  J.),  198.  See  Davison  v.  Johnson,  16 
N  J.  Eq.  112. 

1  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  657,  and  note:  Van  Hook 
v.  Whitlock,  3  Paige,  409;  Mitford,  Eq.  PI.  by 
Jeremy,  295,  note;  Didierr.  Davidson,  10  Paige, 
515.  Two  distinct  pleas  in  bar,  different  in 
their  nature,  as  a  plea  of  the  Statute  of  Limita- 
tions, and  a  discharge  under  the  Insolvent  Act, 
cannot  be  pleaded  together,  without  the  previous 
leave  of  the  Court.  Saltus  v.  Tobias,  7  John. 
Ch.  214. 

2  Gibson  v.  Whitehead,  4  Mad.  241,  246; 
Kay  r.  Marshall,  1  Keen,  190. 

3  Repealed  by  11  Geo.  IV.  &  1  Will.  IV. 
c.  47. 


1  Woods,  187.  Different  facts  and  circum- 
stance's, nil  tending  to  a  single  point,  ma)'  be 
included  in  one  plea.  Hazard  V.  Dnrant,  25 
fed.  lop.  26;  Harrison  r.  Farrington,  38  X.  J. 
Eq.  1,  358.  In  the  Federal  Courts,  a  demurrer 
to  the  whole  bill,  and  also  several  pleas,  will 
not  usually  be  permitted  at  the  same  time 
under  Equity  Rule  32.  United  States  Bell 
Telephone  Co.  supra. 

605 


*  610 


PLEAS. 


upon  motion,  that  the  defendant  might  be  at  liberty  to  plead :  first,  the 
will  of  the  testator,  for  the  purpose  of  showing  that  he  did  not  thereby 
charge  his  real  estates  with  the  payment  of  his  debts  ;  and,  secondly, 
that  he  was  not,  at  the  time  of  his  death,  a  trader  within  the  meaning  of 
the  Act.4  Although,  in  the  above  case,  the  necessity  for  a  double  plea 
arose  from  the  circumstance  of  there  being  a  sort  of  double  or  alternative 
claim  in  the  bill,  this  is  not  the  only  ground  upon  which  the  Court  acts 
in  allowing  double  pleas.  The  principle  upon  which  the  Court  proceeds, 
depends  very  much  upon  the  extraordinary  inconvenience  that  might 
arise,  if  the  defendant  were  not  allowed  to  take  this  course  ;  and  upon 
this  principle,  where  a  bill  was  filed  to  restrain  the  infringement  of  a 
patent,  and  for  an  account,  and  the  defendants  were  desirous  of  disputing 
the  validity  of  the  patent,  on  the  grounds  that,  so  far  as  the  invention 
was  new,  it  was  useless,  and  that,  so  far  as  it  was  useful,  it  was  not 
new,  Lord  Langdale  M.  R.  gave  the  defendant  leave  to  plead:  first, 
that  the  invention  was  not  useful ;  secondly,  that  it  was  not  new ; 5  and 
the  same  Judge  also  permitted  the  defendant,  in  an  ejectment  suit,  to 
plead :  first,  that  the  person  under  whom  the  plaintiff  claimed  was  not 
the  heir;  and,  secondly,  that  even  if  he  were  such  heir,  the  plaintiff's 
right  was  barred  by  the  Statute  of  Limitations.6 

Before  a  defendant  puts  in  a  double  plea,  he  must  obtain  an  order,  on 
motion,  with  notice,  of  which  he  will  have  to  pay  the  costs,  for  leave  to 
do  so  ; 7  and  such  a  plea,  if  filed  without  such  an  order,  is  irregular,  and 

liable  to  be  overruled.8 
*  610  *  With  reference  to  the  subject  of  multifarious  or  double  plead- 
ing, it  is  to  be  noticed  that,  where  the  facts  stated  in  the  plea 
are  sufficient  to  constitute  a  good  plea,  the  introduction  into  the  plea  of  a 
fact  which,  although  it  puts  in  issue  a  distinct  matter,  is  not  important 
to  the  validity  of  the  plea  itself,  will  not  vitiate  the  plea,1  Thus,  if  a 
defendant  pleads  a  release,  and  then  avers  that  it  has  been  acted  upon : 
the  release  being  of  itself  a  bar,  whether  it  has  been  acted  upon  or  not, 
the  further  allegation  that  it  has  been  acted  upon  is  unimportant,  and 
will  be  rejected  as  surplusage.2 

The  rule  that  a  defendant  cannot  plead  several  matters,  must  not  be 
understood  as  precluding  a  defendant  from  putting  in  several  pleas  to 
different  parts  of  the  same  bill :  it  merely  prohibits  his  pleading,  with- 


4  See  also  Hardman  v.  Ellames,  5  Sim.  640, 
645  ;  2  M.  &  K.  732;  C.  P.  Coop.  temp.  Brough. 
351. 

5  Kay  v.  Marshall,  1  Keen,  190,  192,  197. 

6  Bampton  v.  Birchall,  4  Beav.  558;  and 
see  observations  of  Sir  John  Romillv  M.  R.  in 
Young  v.  White,  17  Beav.  5:12,  540;  18  Jur. 
277. 

"  For  form  of  notice  of  motion,  see  Vol.  TIT. 

8  Kay  v.  Marshall,  ubl  supra;  Gibson  r. 
Whitehead,  4  Mad.  241.  245;  Hardman  v.  El- 
lames,  uhi  supra ;  Bampton  v.  Birchall,  ubi 
supra  ;  Salt  us  v.  Tobias,  7  John.  Ch.  214. 

1  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  663. 

2  Upon  this  ground,  where  a  plea  stated 
facts  which,  connected  with   the  statement  in 

606 


the  bill,  would  have  amounted  to  a  conspiracy 
to  prevent  a  prosecution  for  felony,  and  then 
averred  that  the  transactions  stated  in  the  bill 
related  to  a  fraudulent  embezzlement  by  a 
banker's  clerk,  and  suggested  that  the  dis- 
covery sought  might  subject  the  defendant  to 
pains  and  penalties,  it  was  objected  that  the 
plea  was  multifarious,  because,  in  addition  to 
the  statement  of  facts  amounting  to  a  con- 
spiracy, it  averred  that  the  transactions  related 
to  a  fraudulent  embezzlement;  Lord  Eldon, 
however,  overruled  the  objection,  saying  that 
he  should  press  a  harder  rule  in  Equity  than 
prevails  at  Law  by  holding  that  such  an  aver- 
ment made  a  plea  bad,  which  in  other  respects 
was  good.    Claridge  v.  Hoare,  14  Ves.  59,  G5. 


GENERAL   NATURE    OF   PLEAS.  *  611 

out  previous  leave,  a  double  defence  to  the  whole  bill,  or  to  the  same 
portion  of  it.  A  defendant  may  plead  different  matters  to  separate 
parts  of  the  same  bill,  in  the  same  manner  that,  as  we  have  seen,  a 
defendant  may  put  in  different  demurrers  to  different  portions  of  the 
bill.3  A  defendant  may,  in  like  manner,  plead  and  demur,  or  plead 
and  answer,  to  different  parts  of  the  same  bill,  provided  he  points  out, 
distinctly,  the  different  portions  of  the  bill  which  are  intended  to  be 
covered  by  the  plea,  the  demurrer,  and  the  answer ; 4  he  must,  likewise, 
where  he  puts  in  several  pleas  to  the  same  bill,  point  out  to  what  par- 
ticular part  of  the  bill  each  plea  is  applicable.  But,  although  the  gene- 
ral rule  is,  that  in  the  case  of  a  partial  plea,  a  defendant  must  specify 
distinctly  what  part  of  the  bill  he  pleads  to,  the  rule  which  has  been 
stated,  as  applicable  to  a  demurrer,  namely,  that  it  cannot  be  good  in 
part  and  bad  in  part,  is  not  applicable  with  the  same  strictness  to  a 
plea ;  for  it  has  been  repeatedly  decided,  that  a  plea  in  Equity 
may  be  bad  in  part  and  not  in  the  whole,  and  the  *  Court  will  *  611 
allow  it  to  so  much  of  the  bill  as  it  is  properly  applicable  to.1 

The  rule  that  a  plea  may  be  allowed  in  part  only,  is  to  be  understood 
with  reference  to  its  extent,  that  is,  to  the  quality  of  the  bill  covered 
by  it,  and  not  to  the  ground  of  defence  offered  by  it ;  and  if  any  part 
of  the  defence  made  by  the  plea  is  bad,  the  whole  must  be  overruled.2 
Thus,  if  a  defendant  pleads  a  fine  and  non-claim,  which  is  a  legal  bar, 
and  a  purchase  for  a  valuable  consideration  without  notice  of  the  plain- 
tiff's claim,  which  is  an  equitable  bar :  if  either  should  appear  not  to  be 
a  bar,  as  if  the  defendant  by  answer  should  admit  facts  amounting  to 
notice,  or  if  the  plea,  with  respect  to  either  part,  should  be  informal, 
the  whole  must  be  overruled.  There  'seems  to  be  no  case  in  which  the 
Court  has  separated  the  two  matters  pleaded,  and  allowed  one  as  a  bar, 
and  disallowed  the  other.3 

But,  although  it  is  the  office  of  a  plea  to  reduce  the  defence  to  a 
single  point,  it  is  necessary,  in  order  to  its  validity,  that  all  matters 
which  are  essential  to  bring  it  to  that  point,  should  be  stated  on  the 
face  of  the  plea,  so  that  the  Court  may  at  once  decide  whether  the  case 
which  the  plea  presents  to  the  Court  is  a  bar  to  the  case  made  by  the 
bill,  or  to  that  part  of  it  which  the  plea  seeks  to  cover.4  Thus,  if  a 
bill  is  brought  to  recover  the  possession  of  an  estate,  a  defendant  may, 
in  certain  cases,  protect  himself  by  a  plea :  stating  that  he  was  the  pur- 

8  Emmott  v.  Mitchell,  14  Sim.  432,  434;  9  of  Derby  v.  Duke  of  Athol,  1  Ves.  Sr.  203,  205; 

Jur.  170;  ante,  p.  584.  2  id.  337;  Bell   v.  Woodward,  42   N.   H.  193; 

4  He    may    not,   therefore,    simultaneously  Ld.  Chelmsford,  in    United  States  of  America 

plead  and  demur  to  the  whole  bill;  Lowndes  v.  v.  McRae,  L.  R.  3  Ch.  91,  92;  Story.  Eq.  PI. 

Garnett  &  Moseley  Gold  Mining  Co.  2  J.  &  II.  §§  692,  003:    French  v  Shotwell,  20  John.  668; 

282;  8  Jur.  N.  S.  694.  S.  C.  5  John.  Ch.  555;  Kirkpatrick  v.  White,  4 

1  Ld.  Red.  295;  Coop.  Eq.  PI.  230;   Beames  Wash.  C.  C.  595. 
on  Pleas,  45;  Earl  of  Suffolk  v.  Green,  1  Atk.  2  Ld   Red.  297;  Salmon  v.  Dean.  3  M'N.  & 

450;  Ouncalf  v.  Blake,  id.  52;  Huggina  v.  York  G.  344,  348;   14   Jur.  235;  and  see  Hewitt   v. 

Buildings  Co.  2  Atk.  44;  Dormer  v.  Fortescue,  Hewitt,  11   W.  R.  849,  V.  C.   K.;   see  Mad. 

id.  284;  Turner  v.  Mitchell,  1  Dick.  249;  Roche  Plank  Road  Co.  v.  Wat.  Plank  Road  <  !o.  r>  Wis. 

v.  Morgell,  2  Sch.  &  Lef.  721,  725;  Mayor  of  173  ;  Searight  v.  Payne,  1  Tenn.  Ch.  186. 
London  v.  Levy,  8  Ves.  403;  Harrison  v.  South-  3  Ld.  Red.  295. 

cote,  1  Atk.  528,  539;  2  Ves.  Sr.  389,  397;  Earl  *  Wesling  v.  Schrass,  33  N.  J.  Eq.  42. 

607 


612 


PLEAS. 


chaser  of  the  estate,  and  that  he  paid  a  valuable  consideration  for  it,  and 
that  he  had  not,  at  the  time  of  the  purchase,  any  notice  of  the  title  or 
claim  of  the  plaintiff  to  the  property.  This  is  called  "a  plea  of  pur- 
chase for  valuable  consideration,  without  notice,"  and  is,  if  true,  a  good 
bar  to  the  suit.  It  will  not,  however,  be  sufficient  merely  to  state,  by 
way  of  plea,  that  the  defendant  is  a  purchaser  for  a  valuable  consider- 
ation, without  notice ;  he  must  state  upon  the  plea,  that  the  person 
from  whom  he  purchased  had,  or  pretended  to  have,  such  an  interest 
in  the  property  as  entitled  him  to  convey  it  to  the  defendant ;  that  it 
was  conveyed  to  the  defendant  by  the  proper  mode  of  conveyance  ;  that 
a  valuable   consideration  was  paid  for  it  by  the   defendant ;    and  that 

the  defendant  had  no  notice  of  the  claim  of  the  plaintiff.  For  the 
*  612    coincidence  of  all  these  facts  is  *  necessary  to  constitute  a  good 

bar  in  Equity  to  a  suit  of  the  nature  alluded  to,1  and  the  omis- 
sion of  any  of  them  would  render  the  defence  invalid ;  because  the 
plaintiff  has  a  right,  by  replying  to  the  plea,  to  put  all  the  matters  con- 
tained in  it  in  issue,  and  by  that  means  to  compel  the  defendant  to 
support  them,  or  at  least  such  of  them  as  are  affirmatively  stated,  by 
evidence.  The  statements  of  these  necessary  facts,  in  a  plea,  are 
called  "  averments,"  and  the  necessity  of  their  introduction  points  out 
the  general  distinction  between  demurrers  and  pleas  ;  for,  if  the  fact 
necessary  to  constitute  a  good  plea  appears  sufficiently  upon  the  bill, 
so  as  to  exclude  the  necessity  of  averments,  the  bill  might,  in  most 
cases,  be  objected  to  by  demurrer.2 

Another  office  of  averments  in  a  plea  is,  to  exclude  intendments,  which 
would  otherwise  be  made  against  the  pleader ;  for,  if  there  is  any 
charge  in  the  bill  which  is  an  equitable  circumstance  in  favor  of  the 
plaintiff's  case  against  the  matter  pleaded,  such  as  fraud  or  notice  of 
title,  the  Court  will  intend  the  matters  so  charged  against  the  pleader, 
unless  they  are  met  by  averments  in  the  plea.3 

1  Id.  275;   Jackson  v.  Rowe,  4  Russ.  514,      against  a  tenant   for  life,    for   an  account  of 


52-3;  High  v.  Batte,  10  Verger,  335;  Donnell  v. 
King,  7  Leigh,  393;  Griffith  v.  Griffith,  1  Hoff. 
Ch.  153;  Malony  v.  Kernan,  2  Dru.  &  War.  31; 
Craig  v.  Leiper,  2  Yerger,  193.  Jewett  v.  Palmer. 
7  John.  Ch.  65;  Gallatian  v.  Cunningham,  8 
Cowen,  361;  Souzer  v.  De  Meyer,  2  Paige,  574; 
Drogheda  v.  Malone,  Finlay's  Dig.  449.  A 
plea,  setting  up  a  forfeiture,  by  breach  of  a  con- 
dition subsequent  for  the  payment  of  money,  in 
bar  of  a  suit  in  Equity  for  relief,  must  distinctly 
aver  laches  on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff.  Han- 
cock v.  Carlton,  6  Gray,  39. 

2  Bicknell  r.  Gouch,  3  Atk.  558;  Roberts  v. 
Hartley,  1  Bro.  C  C.  56 ;  Billings  v.  Flight,  1 
Mad.  230,  236;  Steff  ».  Andrews.  2  Mad.  6,  10. 
It  is  unnecessary  to  negative  facts  which,  if 
stated  in  the  bill,  would  have  defeated  the  plea. 
Ld.  Red.  299:  Forbes  v.  Skelton,  8  Sim.  335, 
345  ;  1  Jur.  117  ;  see  Story,  Eq.  PL  §  679,  et  seq., 
and  notes. 

3  Ld.  Red.  298;  Saunders  v.  Druce,  3  Drew. 
140,  161;  Drew.  Eq.  PL  146;  id.  147,  n.  Thus, 
where  a  bill  was  filed   by   a    remainder-man 

608 


timber  cut  upon  the  estate,  embracing  a  period 
of  many  more  than  six  years  previous  to  the 
filing  of  the  bill,  which  was  in  1824,  and  alle- 
ging that,  in  answer  to  certain  inquiries  which 
the  plaintiff  had  made  as  to  the  timber,  the  de- 
fendant had  furnished  certain  accounts,  from 
which  it  appeared  that,  since  the  year  1794 
down  to  the  year  1821,  certain  quantities  of 
timber  had  been  cut  in  each  year,  amounting  to 
sums  mentioned  in  the  bill,  and  the  defendant 
pleaded  the  Statute  of  Limitations  in  bar,  con- 
fining his  averments  only  to  the  date  of  the 
filing  of  the  bill :  the  Court  overruled  the  plea, 
because  it  held,  that  the  alleged  render  of  the 
accounts  in  the  bill,  bringing  the  accounts  down 
to  the  period  within  six  years  before  the  filing 
of  the  bill  (which  was  not  negatived  by  any 
averment  in  the  plea),  defeated  the  operation  of 
the  statute.  Hony  v.  Hony,  1  S.  &  S.  568, 
580.  To  have  constituted  a  good  plea  in  that 
case,  there  should  have  been  an  averment  that 
no  such  accounts  as  those  alleged  in  the  bill  had 
been  rendered. 


GENERAL    NATURE    OF    PLEAS.  *  614 

*  The  necessity  for  the  introduction  of  such  averments  into  a  *  613 
plea  is  obvious,  when  we  consider  that  a  plea,  for  the  purpose 
of  deciding  on  the  validity  of  it,  like  a  demurrer,  admits  all  the  facts 
stated  in  the  bill  to  be  true,  so  far  as  they  are  not  controverted  by 
the  plea; 1  so  that,  whenever  matters  of  fact  are  introduced  in  the  bill, 
which,  if  true,  would  destroy  the  effect  of  the  matter  pleaded,  the  plea  will 
be  overruled,  unless  such  matters  are  controverted  by  the  averments. 

From  what  has  been  said  above,  it  will  be  seen  that  averments  in 
pleas  may  naturally  be  divided  into  affirmative  and  negative  averments. 
Affirmative  averments  are  those  which  are  not  suggested  by  any  matter 
upon  the  face  of  the  bill  which  is  inconsistent  with  the  matter  pleaded, 
but  are  necessary  in  order  to  render  the  matter  pleaded  a  complete  bar. 
Thus,  if  a  stated  account  is  set  up  by  the  plea,  the  defendant  must  aver 
that  the  account  is  just  and  true,  to  the  best  of  his  knowledge  and 
belief ;  and  so,  in  the  instance  above  referred  to,  of  a  plea  of  purchase 
for  valuable  consideration  without  notice,  it  has  been  stated  that  the 
defendant  must  aver,  in  his  plea,  that  the  person  from  whom  he  pur- 
chased had,  or  pretended  to  have,  such  an  interest  as  entitled  him  to 
convey  the  estate  to  the  defendant ;  and  that  it  was  conveyed  to  the 
defendant  in  a  proper  manner ;  and  that  a  valuable  consideration  was 
paid  for  it;  and  that  the  defendant  had  no  notice  of  the  plaintiff's 
title :  the  concurrence  of  all  these  matters  being  requisite  to  constitute 
a  good  equitable  bar  to  the  plaintiff's  claim.2  It  may  be  objected  that 
the  last  matter  averred,  —  namely,  the  want  of  notice,  —  being  negative 
matter,  cannot  properly  be  called  an  affirmative  averment ;  but  it  is  not 
the  mere  fact  of  averring  affirmatively  or  negatively  which  constitutes 
the  distinction;  but  whether  the  matter  be  introduced  by  way  of  affir- 
mation of  the  defendant's  plea,  or  of  negation  of  such  of  the  plaintiff's 
statements  as  are  inconsistent  with  the  plea.  Thus,  the  very  fact  of 
want  of  notice,  in  a  plea  of  purchase  for  a  valuable  consideration,  may 
be  both  affirmatively  and  negatively  averred:  for,  if  the  bill  merely  sets 
out  the  plaintiff's  title,  and  does  not  charge  the  defendant  with  having 
any  notice  of  it,  the  want  of  notice  being  one  of  the  circumstances 
necessary  to  constitute  the  equitable  bar,  must  be  averred  in  the  plea : 
in  which  case,  according  to  the  distinction  above  pointed  out,  the  aver- 
ment is  affirmative.  And  so,  if  the  bill  actually  charges  the  defendant 
with  notice,  the  notice  must  be  equally  denied  by  averment;  in  which 
case  the  averment  will  be  a  negative  averment. 

*  A  negative  averment,  therefore,  is  that  species  of  averment  *  614 
which  is  made  use  of  to  contradict  any  statement  or  charge  in  the 
bill,  which,  if  uncontradicted,  would  be  to  do  away  with  the  effect  of  the 
matter  pleaded.  The  most  common  case  in  which  this  form  of  averment 
is  used  is,  where  notice  or  fraud  is  alleged  in  the  bill,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  obviating  some  anticipated  defence  which  may  be  set  up  by  the 
defendant.1 

1  Plunket  v.   Pcnson,   2   Atk.    51;    Roche  2  Ante,  p.  611;  Ld.  Red.  275. 

v.  Morgell,  2  Sch.  &  Lef.  721,  727;  McEwen  o.  i  See  Fish  v.  Miller,  5  Paige,  20.     In  Moa- 

Broadhead,  11  N.  J.  Eq.  131;  Davison  v.  John-  dows   r.    Duchess  of  Kingston,  Ld.  Red.   '277, 

son,  10  N.  J.  Eq.  113,  114.  n.;  Anib.  756,  761,  Lord  Bathnrst  seemed  to  be 
vol.  i.  — 39  GOD 


615 


PLEAS. 


This  brings  us  to  the  consideration  of  the  eases,  in  which  it  is  neces- 
sary that  a  plea  should  be  supported  by  an  answer.2  We  have  before 
seen,8  that  wherever  a  bill,  or  part  of  a  bill,  the  substantive  case  made 
by  which  may  be  met  by  a  plea,  brings  forward  facts  which,  if  true, 
would  destroy  the  effect  of  the  plea,  those  facts  must  be  negatived  by 
proper  averments  in  the  plea:  otherwise,  they  will  be  considered  as 
admitted,  and  so  deprive  the  defendant  of  the  benefit  of  his  defence.  A 
plea,  however,  cannot  be  excepted  to ;  and  as  it  is  not  necessary  that 
an  averment  in  a  plea  should  do  more  than  generally  deny  the  facts 
charged  in  the  bill,4  the  plaintiff  might,  if  it  were  not  possible  to  require 
an  answer  from  the  defendant,  in  addition  to  his  plea,  be  deprived  of 
the  indefeasible  right  which  he  has  to  examine  the  defendant  upon 
oath,  as  to  all  the  matters  of  fact  stated  in  the  bill  which  are  neces- 
sary to  support  his  case.5  To  obviate  this  result,  the  rule  under 
*  615  the  *old  practice  (where  an  answer  was  always  necessary),  was 
that  any  statement  or  charge  in  the  bill  affording  an  equitable,  cir- 
cumstance in  favor  of  the  plaintiff's  case  against  the  matter  pleaded 
(such  as  fraud  or  notice  of  title),  must  be  denied  by  way  of  answer.1 
In  general,  an  answer  in  support  of  a  plea  could  not  be  required  in  those 
cases  where  such  negative  averments  as  those  above  stated  were  not 
necessary  ;  where  the  defence  was  by  a  pure  plea,  —  that  is,  a  plea  merely 
suggesting  matter  in  avoidance  of  the  plaintiff's  right  to  sue,  as  stated 
in  the  bill,  —  an  answer  in  support  of  the  plea  was  not  required.2  In 
such  a  case,  the  defendant,  by  his  plea,  admitted  the  plaintiff's  case,  and. 


of  opinion  that  notice  and  fraud  were  to  be 
denied,  by  way  of  averment  in  the  plea,  in 
cases  only  where  the  denial  made  part  of  the 
equitable  defence,  as  in  the  cases  of  purchase 
for  valuable  consideration,  where  the  want  of 
notice  creates  the  equitable  bar:  but  in  Devie 
v.  Chester,  Ld.  Red.  277,  n.  (see  also  Hoare  v. 
Parker,  id.,  1  Pro.  C.  C  578,  580,  1  Cox, 
224,  228), a  decree  establishing  a  modus  having 
been  pleaded  to  a  bill  for  tithes,  in  which  the 
plaintiff  stated  that  the  defendant  set  up  the  de- 
cree as  a  bar  to  his  claim,  and  to  avoid  the  effect 
of  the  decree,  charged  that  it  had  been  obtained 
by  collusion,  and  stating  facts  tending  to  show 
collusion,  the  Lord  Chancellor  was  of  opinion 
that  the  defendants,  not  having  denied  the  col- 
lusion by  averments  in  the  plea,  although  they 
had  done  so  bj'  answer  in  support  of  the  plea, 
the  plea  was  bad  in  form,  and  he  overruled  it 
accordingly. 

2  See  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  681,  et  seq.,  and 
notes;  Sims  r.  Lyle,  4  Wash.  C.  C.  303,  304. 
In  Massachusetts,  by  Ch.  Rule  10,  "  in  any 
case  in  which  the  bill  charges  fraud  or  combi- 
nation, a  plea  to  such  part  must  be  accompa- 
nied with  an  answer  supporting  the  plea,  and 
explicitly  denying  the  fraud  or  combination, 
and  the  fact  on  which  the  charge  is  founded." 
So  under  32d  Equity  Rule  of  the  U.  S.  Courts 
(post,  p.  2383),  where  a  plea  is  such  that  an 
answer  is  required  to  support  it,  it  will  be  over- 

610 


ruled  unless  such  answer  is  put  in.     Hagthorp 
v.  Hook,  1  Gill  &  J.  270. 

3  Ante,  p.  612. 

4  Ld.  Red   274,  297. 

5  Wigram  on  Disc.  50.  Where  the  plaintiff 
waives  the  necessity  of  an  answer  being  put  in 
on  oath,  if  the  defendant  puts  in  a  plea  to  the 
bill,  he  need  not  support  it  by  answer.  Heartt 
v.  Corning,  3  Paige.  50(5. 

1  Ld.  Red.  2U8;  see,  as  to  answering  the 
statement  or  charge,  Denys  v.  Locock,  3  M.  & 
C  205,  234;  1  Ju'r.  605;  Chad  wick  v.  Broad- 
wood,  3  Beav.  530,  539;  5  Jur.  350;  Piatt  v. 
Oliver,  1  McLean,  205;  Bellows  r.  Stone,  8  X. 
H.  280.  If  a  bill  sets  forth  matter  which  may 
avoid  a  bar  to  the  suit,  it  must  be  particularly 
and  precisely  denied  in  the  answer.  New  Eng. 
Bank  v.  Lewis.  8  Pick.  113,  117;  Bogr.rdus  r. 
Trinity  Church.  4  Paige,  178;  Souzer  v.  De 
Meyer,  2  Paige,  574. 

A  plea  in  Equity  must  state  facts,  not  con- 
clusions; and  if  it  relies  on  matter  in  the  bill,  it 
must,  in  addition  to  the  averment  of  such  mat- 
ter, negative  the  material  facts  stated  in  avoid- 
ance, and  be  accompanied  by  an  answer  giving 
the  discovery  to  which  the  complainant  may  be 
entitled  in  regard  to  those  facts.  Greene  r. 
Harris,  11  R.I.  5;  Whitthorne  v.  St.  Louis 
Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.  3  Tenn.  Ch.  147. 

2  See  Wheeler  v.  Piper,  3  Jones  Eq.  (X.  C.J 
249. 


GENERAL    NATURE    OF    PLEAS.  *  61 6 

so  full  and  complete  was  the  admission  that  if,  after  argument,  issue 
was  joined  upon  the  truth  of  the  plea,  and  the  plea  found  false,  there 
was  an  end  of  the  dispute,  and  the  plaintiff  was  entitled  to  a  decree 
upon  the  implied  admission  of  his  case.3  Where,  however,  a  plea  was 
in  substance  negative,  though  in  form  affirmative,  it  was  held  that  it 
must  be  accompanied  by  an  answer  as  to  the  allegations,  which,  if  true, 
would  have  disproved  the  plea.4 

The  same  principle  also  required  that  a  negative  plea  should  be  sup- 
ported by  an  answer  in  those  cases  only  in  which  the  bill  stated  or 
charged  facts  by  way  of  evidence  of  the  plaintiff's  right.  It  was  re- 
quired in  those  cases,  because  the  plaintiff,  having  a  clear  right  in 
equity  to  a  discovery  of  all  matters  within  the  knowledge  of  a  defend- 
ant which  would  enable  him  to  support  his  case, 5  it  would  have  been 
against  that  principle  if  a  defendant  could,  by  merely  denying  the  exis- 
tence of  the  claim,  have  deprived  the  plaintiff  of  the  means  of  proving 
its  validity.6 

Under  the  later  practice,  if  no  interrogatories  were  filed,  the  defend- 
ant need  only  aver  the  facts  necessary  to  render  the  plea  a  complete 
equitable  bar  to  the  case  made  by  the  bill,  and  need  not  put  in  any  an- 
swer in  support  of  the  plea.  If  interrogatories  were  filed,  the  principles 
of  the  old  cases,  with  respect  to  an  answer  supporting  the  plea,  still  re- 
mained in  force. 

The  cases  in  which  it  is  necessary  that  a  plea  should  be  sup- 
ported *by  an  answer,  may  be  very  conveniently  divided  into:  *616 
1.  Those  where  the  plaintiff  admits  the  existence  of  a  legal  bar, 
and  alleges  some  equitable  circumstances  to  avoid  its  effect,  and  inter- 
rogates as  to  these  circumstances ;  and,  2.  Those  where  the  plaintiff 
does  not  admit  the  existence  of  any  legal  bar,  but  states  some  circum- 
stances which  may  be  true,  and  to  which  there  may  be  a  valid  ground 
of  plea,  together  with  other  circumstances  which  are  inconsistent  with 
the  substantial  validity  of  a  plea,  and  interrogates  as  to  such  circum- 
stances.1 

1.  With  respect  to  the  first  class  of  cases,  the  limits  to  which  the  plea 
and  answer  respectively  extend  are  plainly  marked,  and  create  no  diffi- 
culty. The  most  simple  cases  of  this  class  are  those  in  which  pleas 
are  put  in  to  bills  brought  to  impeach  a  decree,  on  the  ground  of  fraud 
used  in  obtaining  it ;  2  to  avoid  the  effect  of  a  judgment  by  a  Court  of 
ordinary  jurisdiction  ;  3  to  set  aside  a  release  ; 4  or  an  award ; 5  or  to 
open  a  stated  account.6     In  all  these  cases,  and  others  which  fall  under 

3  Wigram  on  Disc.  56;  Wood  v.  Strickland.  sufficient  It  must  be  supported  by  an  answer. 
2  V.  &  B.  158 ;  Brownsword  v.  Edwards,  2  Ves.  Inncs  r.  Evans,  3  Edw.  Ch.  454;  see  Everitt 
Sr.  2-13;  Webster  v.  Webster,  1  Sm.  &  G.  480;  v.  Watts,  id.  486;  Hall  v.  Noves,  3  Rro.  r.c. 
4  Do  G.  M.  &  <;.  437.  4s:;.  *88   „.;    Scifred  v.  People's  Bank,  1  Baxt 

4  Harland  v.  Emerson,  8  Bligh,  N.  S.  02.  200. 

5  Sanders  v.  King,  0  Mad.  61;  2  S.  &  S.  277;  '  Hare  on  Disc   30. 
Yorke  >■  Fry,  0  Mad.  65;  Thring  v.  Edijar.  2  S.           2  Ld.  Red.  243 

&  S.  274,  281 ;  Hardman  r.  Ellamcs,  5  Sim.G40,  3  ](\.  255. 

049;  2  M.  &  K.  732:  C.  P.  Coop.  temp.  Brough.  *  Id.  202. 

351 ;  see  Langdell,  Eq.  PI.  (2d  ed.)  §  103.  5  Id.  260. 

6  Story.  Eq.  I>1.  §§  670,  671,  681.     A  naked  6  Id.  259. 
negative   plea    denying    a   partnership   is   not 

611 


*  617  PLEAS. 

a  similar  principle,  the  bill  admits  the  existence  of  a  fa.t  which,  taken 
alone,  would  be  conclusive  against  the  plaintiff,  and  then  proceeds  to 
state  specific  grounds  why  it  should  not  have  that  effect ;  and  the  de- 
fendant, if  interrogated,  must  answer  the  interrogatories  as  to  these 
specific  grounds.7 

If  the  defendant  is  interrogated  as  to  the  equitable  circumstances 
stated  as  the  ground  for  relief,  it  makes  no  difference  whether  the  bill 
be  so  framed  that  the  bar  be  introduced  by  way  of  substantive  state- 
ment, and  the  equitable  circumstances  averred  for  the  purpose  of  afford- 
ing ground  for  relief,  in  setting  aside  the  bar  ;  or  whether  the  bar  be 
merely  suggested  as  a  pretence  set  up  by  the  defendant,  and  the  equi- 
table matter  be  introduced  to  avoid  its  effect.8  It  sometimes,  however, 
happens  that  the  plaintiff  introduces  the  fact  which  would  constitute 
the  bar,  in  the  form  of  a  pretence,  and  meets  it  by  naked  denial,  with- 
out interrogating  as  to  any  circumstances  which  might  disprove  it :  in 
such  cases  it  seems  that  the  defendant  should  merely  plead  the  fact, 
and  that  there  is  no  need  of  any  other  answer  than  the  averments  in 
the  plea.9 

2.  With  respect  to  the  second  class  of  cases  before  referred  to,  as 

those  in  which  it  is  necessary  that  a  plea  should  be  accompanied  by  an 

answer,  the  limits  to  which  the  plea  and  answer  are  to  extend  are  not  so 

easily  defined.     It  may,  however,  be  laid  down,  as  a  general  rule, 

*  617    that  where  no  ostensible  bar  is,  by  the  bill,  admitted  *to  exist, 

and  yet  the  defendant  wishes  to  plead  in  bar  to  the  bill,  he  must 
distinguish  those  facts  which,  if  true,  would  not  invalidate  or  disprove 
his  plea,  and  plead  to  the  relief  and  discovery  sought  as  to  them  ;  and 
then,  if  interrogated  as  to  the  facts  which,  if  true,  would  disprove  or  in- 
validate his  plea,  or  to  matters  which  are  specially  alleged  as  evidence  of 
such  facts,  he  must  answer  as  to  such  facts  and  matters.1 

In  former  times,  the  application  of  these  rules  was  a  matter  of  very 
considerable  difficulty,  in  consequence  of  the  Court  requiring  of  a  de- 
fendant the  greatest  accuracy  in  the  form  of  a  joint  plea  and  answer, 
and  treating  any  deviation  from  the  strict  practice  as  a  fatal  objection 
to  the  validity  of  such  a  defence.  In  the  first  place,  the  defendant  had 
to  make  it  distinctly  appear  to  what  part  of  the  bill  he  pleaded,  and  to 
what  part  he  answered.  Then,  if  it  appeared  to  the  Court  that  the 
plea  covered  more  of  the  bill  than  the  defendant  was  entitled  to  cover 
by  it,  it  was  overruled  ;  or,  on  the  other  hand,  if  the  answer  extended  to 
any  portion  of  the  bill  properly  covered  by  the  plea,  it  was  equally  liable 
to  be  overruled.2  (a)     The  result  of  this  extreme  strictness  was,   that 

1  Hare  on  Disc.  33.  17  Beav.  532:  18  Jur.  277;  Bewieke  r.  Graham, 

8  Roche  r.  Morgell,  2  Sch.  &  Lef.  721.  7  Q.  R.  D.  400;  Lyell  r.  Kennedy,  8  App.  Cas. 

9  Hare  on  Disc."  30.  217. 

i  Hare  on  Disc.  34:  and  see  Hunt  v.  Pen-  -  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  688,  and  notes.     If  the 

rice,  17  Beav.  525;  18  Jur.  4;  Young  v.  White,      defendant  answers  to  any  matters  covered  by 


(n)  The  answer  overrules  the  plea  when  both  v.  Sadlier,  12  Ir.  Eq.  136;  Kelly  o.  Jackson,  13 

cover  the  same  parts  of  the  bill.     Cheatham  r.  id.  120.     An  answer  in  support  of  a  plea  is  not 

Pearce,  89  Tenn.  668 ;  see  Piaue  v.  Young,  85  independent  thereof  as   a   defence.      Hart   r. 

Tenn.  263;  Noe  v.  Noe.  32  X.  J.  Eq.  469  ;  Grant  Sanderson,  16  Fla.  264.     Taylor  v.  Duncanson, 

v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  121  U.  S-  105;  Fitzmauriee  20  D.  C.  505. 
612 


GENERAL  NATURE  OF  PLEAS. 


618 


sometimes  in  cases  to  which  a  defence  by  plea  and  answer  was  strictly 
applicable,  the  bill  might  have  been  so  framed  as  to  render  it  practi- 
cally impossible  for  the  defendant  to  avail  himself  of  such  a  form  of 
pleading.3 

This  strict  operation  of  the  rules  of  pleading  has,  however,  been 
materially  modified:  for  now  it  is  provided  no  plea  is  to  be  held  bad 
and  overruled  upon  argument,  only  because  such  plea  does  not  cover  so 
much  of  the  bill  as  it  might  have  extended  to,  or  because  the  answer  of 
the  defendant  extends  to  some  part  of  the  same  matter  as  is  covered  by 
the  plea.4 

These  provisions  were  intended  to  meet  the  case  of  some  part 
of  *  the  same  ground  being  accidentally  covered  by  each  defence  ;  *  018 
and  do  not  justify  two  distinct  defences,  by  plea  and  answer ; 1 
nor  do  they  in  any  way  interfere  with  the  rule  which  renders  it  neces- 
sary that  the  plea  should  not  cover  a  greater  portion  of  the  bill  than  that 
to  which  the  defendant  is  strictly  entitled  to  apply  it.2  Consequently, 
it  is  still  incumbent  upon  the  pleader  to  distinguish  accurately  between 
the  parts  to  which  he  intends  to  plead,  and  those  to  which  he  intends  to 
answer. 

With  respect  to  affirmative  pleas,  the  difficulty  of  ascertaining  the 
part  of  the  bill  to  be  answered  is  not,  in  general,  very  great.  The  most 
simple  cases  of  this  sort  are  those  in  which  the  bill,  without  expressly 
admitting  or  suggesting  the  existence  of  a  legal  or  ecpiitable  bar,  either 
by  direct  statement  or  by  way  of  pretence,  introduces  and  interrogates 
as  to  facts  which  are  inconsistent  with  it,  obviously  for  the  purpose  of 
anticipating  and  avoiding  such  a  defence  if  set  up.  As,  where  a  plain- 
tiff, for  the  purpose  of  avoiding  the  effect  of  a  plea  of  the  Statute  of 
Limitations,  without  intimating  such  purpose,  states  and  interrogates  as 


his  plea,  he  overrules  the  plea.  Bolton  V.  Gard- 
ner, 3  Paige,  273 ;  Chase's  case,  1  Bland,  217; 
Ferguson  o.  O'Harra,  1  Peters  C.  C.  493;  Clark 
r.  Saginaw  City  Bank,  Harring.  Ch.  240.; 
Bangs  v.  Strong,  10  Paige,  11;  The  Bank  v. 
Dugan,  2  Bland,  254.  When  an  answer  con- 
tains more  than  is  strictly  applicable  to  the  sup- 
port of  the  plea,  it  overrules  the  plea.  Stearns 
v.  Page,  1  Story,  204.  If  the  defendant  an- 
swers as  to  those  matters,  which  by  his  plea  he 
has  declined  to  answer,  lie  overrules  the  ilea. 
Souzer  v.  De  Meyer,  2  Paige,  374;  see  Sims 
v.  Lyle,  4  Wash."  C.  C.  303;  Piatt  v.  Oliver, 
1  McLean,  295;  Robertston  v.  Binglev,  1  M'Cord 
Ch.  352;  Joyce  v.  Gunnels,  2  Rich.  Eq.  259; 
Bogardus  v.  Trinity  Church,  4  Paige,  178.  If 
an  answer  commences  as  an  answer  to  the 
whole  bill,  it  overrules  the  plea  or  demurrer  to 
any  particular  part  of  the  bill,  although  such 
part  is  not  in  fact  answered.  Leacraft  v.  I  inn- 
prey,  4  Paige,  124 ;  Summers  v.  Murray,  2  Edw. 
Ch.  205.  An  answer  which  is  broader  than  the 
plea,  in  that  it  denies  allegations  not  denied  bv 
the  plea,  overrules  the  plea.  Lewis  r.  Baird,  3 
McLean,  56.  So  when  there  is  a  plea  and  no  an- 
swer is  required  to  support  it  from  any  charges 


in  the  bill  requiring  a  discovery;  in  such  case 
an  answer  is  impertinent  and  overrules  the 
plea.     Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  088. 

Since  the  adoption  of  the  rule  that  a  defence 
which  could  be  made  by  plea  may  be  made  by 
answer,  the  answer  is,  in  such  case,  a  plea  sup- 
ported by  an  answer.  Greene  v.  Harris,  11 
R.  I.  5. 

3  l>enys  v.  Locock,  3  M.  &  C.  238;  1  Jur. 
605. 

*  Cons.  Ord.  XIV.  8,  9.  A  defendant  can- 
not, under  these  rules,  simultaneously  plead 
and  demur  to  the  whole  bill.  Lowndes  v.  Gar- 
netl  &  Moseley  Gold  Mining  Co.  2  J.  &  II.  282; 
S.Iur.  X.  S.  (194. 

1  See  Mans,  11  r.  Feeney,  2  J.  &  II.  313, 
when-,  tn  a  bill  for  the  accounts  of  an  alleged 
partnership,  a  plea  of  no  partner-hip,  accom- 
panied by  an  answer,  raising  the  defences  of 
laches  and  the  Statute  of  Limitations,  was  1:'  Id 
bad  for  duplicity.  See  also  Lowndes  v.  Gar- 
nett  &  Moseley  Cold  Mining  Co.  ubi  supra. 

-  Salmon  v.  Dean.  3  M'N.  &  G.  344.  348; 
14  Jur.  235;  Hewitt  v.  Hewitt.  11  W.  R.  849, 
V.  C.  K. 

013 


*  619 


PLEAS. 


to  circumstances  which  have  arisen  within  the  time  of  limitation,  by 
which  his  claim  has  been  admitted  or  revived  ;  in  such  cases,  a  plea  of 
the  Statute  of  Limitations  must  be  accompanied  by  an  answer  as  to  all 
such  circumstances  ; 3  otherwise,  such  circumstances  will  be  considered 
as  admitted,  and  will  have  the  effect  of  overruling  the  plea.  And  so, 
where  a  plaintiff,  in  order  to  avoid  the  effect  of  a  plea  of  purchase  for 
valuable  consideration,  without  notice,  states  aud  interrogates  as  to 
matters,  the  effect  of  which  would  be  to  show  that  the  defendant  had 
notice  of  the  plaintiff's  title,  the  defendant  must  accompany  his  plea  by 
an  answer  as  to  such  facts,  and  such  facts  shall  be  excepted  from  the 
plea.4 

The  same  rule  applies  to  all  cases  of  a  similar  description  ;  and  no 
distinction  appears  to  exist  between  cases  in  which  the  matter  in  avoid- 
ance of  the  anticipated  plea  is  stated  in  the  bill  by  way  of  pretence,  and 
those  in  which  it  occurs  in  the  statement.     Thus,  if  a  bill  be  filed  for 

the  specific  performance  of  an  agreement,  to  which,  if  not  in 
*  619    writing,  the  Statute  of  Frauds  would  be  a  bar,  it  *is  usual,  in 

order  to  avoid  a  demurrer,  to  state  the  agreement  to  be  in  writ- 
ing,1 and  to  found  an  interrogatory  on  such  statement,  and  then  it  is 
necessary  that  a  plea  of  the  statute  should  be  supported  by  an  answer 
denying  the  agreement  to  have  been  in  writing.2  (a)  And  where  sev- 
eral collateral  facts  are  stated  and  interrogated  to,  as  evidence  of  the 
agreement  having  been  in  writing,  those  collateral  facts  must  also  be 
answered.3 

It  is  true  that  in  all  the  above  cases,  the  bar  afforded  by  the  plea 
appears,  to  a  certain  extent,  to  have  been  anticipated  by  the  person  who 
framed  the  bill,  and  who,  therefore,  so  framed  it  as  to  avoid  the  bar,  if 
set  up ;  but  the  rule  applies  to  all  cases  where  the  interrogatories  are 
founded  on  matter  stated  in  the  bill,  which,  if  true,  would  negative  the 


3  Bayley  v.  Adams,  6  Ves.  586,  598.  A  plea 
of  the  Statute  of  Limitations  is  bad,  unless  ac- 
companied by  an  answer  supporting  it,  by  a 
particular  and  precise  denial  of  all  the  facts  and 
circumstances  charged  in  the  bill,  and  which  in 
Equity  may  avoid  the  statute.  Goodrich  v. 
Pendleton,  3  John.  Ch.  384;  Bloodgood  v.  Kane, 
8  Cowen,  360 ;  Lingan  v.  Henderson,  1  Bland, 
28-2;  Moreton  v.  Harrison,  id.  393;  Bolton  v. 
Gardner,  3  Paige,  273;  Foster  v.  Foster,  51  Vt. 
210. 

So  the  answer  must  deny  all  the  charges  in 
the  bill,  which  may  avoid  the  bar  by  showing 
a  new  promise.  Chapin  v.  Coleman,  11  Pick. 
331. 


(a)  So  a  plea,  which  sets  up  that  the  debt  in 
suit  was  a  promise  to  answer  for  another's  debt, 
must  deny  that  it  was  hi  writing.  Hunt  v. 
Johnson  (Ala.),  11  So.  Rep.  387.  A  plaintiff, 
who  in  his  pleadings  admits  an  agreement,  can- 
not object  that  it  is  for  an  interest  in  land  and 
should  be  in  writing,  "regii  v.  Garrett  (Mont.), 
31  Pac.  Rep.  72\;  post,  p.  (J5G.     Ttie  Statute  of 

014 


4  Lord  Portarlington  v.  Soulby,  6  Sim.  356. 

i  Whitchurch  v.  Bevis,  2  Bro.  C.  0.  559, 
566;  see  Walker  v.  Locke,  5  Cush.  90;  ante, 
p.  561,  n.  2. 

2  Id.  566;  see  also  Morison  v.  Tumour,  18 
Ves.  175,  182;  Spurrier  v.  Fitzgerald,  6  Ves. 
518,  555;  see  ante,  p.  365.  n.  (b).  Where  the 
defendant  in  a  suit  for  specific  performance 
pleads  the  Statute  of  Frauds,  and  answers,  ad- 
mitting the  contract,  the  answer  overrules  the 
plea.  Episcopal  Church  v.  Leroy.  Riley  Ch. 
156,  per  Johnson  Ch. ;  but  see  Ash  v.  Daggy, 
6  Ind.  259. 

a  Evans  v.  Harris,  2  V.  &  B.  361,  361. 


Frauds  must  be  pleaded  specially  when  the  case 
does  not  appear  by  the  complaint  to  be  within 
the  statute.  Crane  v.  Powell  (N.  Y.),  48  Alb. 
L.  J.  425;  see  ante,  p.  365,  n.  (6).  A  defendant 
trustee  cannot  avail  of  the  statute  to  cover  a 
fraudulent  act.  Ilaigh  v.  Kaye,  L.  R.  7  Ch. 
469. 


GENERAL  NATURE  OF  PLEAS.  *  620 

plea,  and  whether  such  matter  is  stated  incidentally,  or  in  anticipation 
of  any  expected  defence.4 

The  rule  that  allegations  which,  if  true,  would  disprove  the  plea,  must 
be  answered,  applies  to  pleas  which  are  negative  in  substance,  if  they  are 
affirmative  in  form.5 

In  the  case  of  negative  pleas  the  rule  is,  that  when  a  defendant  puts 
in  a  plea  which  has  the  effect  of  negativing  the  plaintiff's  title,  he  need 
not  accompany  it  by  an  answer,  as  to  any  of  the  facts  upon  which  that 
title  depends,  unless  discovery  is  specially  sought  by  the  bill,  and  he  is 
required  to  answer  interrogatories  as  to  such  facts.6  If,  however,  this  is 
done,  the  defendant  is  bound  to  accompany  his  plea  by  an  answer  as  to 
such  facts.7  The  correctness  of  this  rule  has  been  questioned; 8  but  it 
seems  to  be  now  established. 

Although  a  defendant,  pleading  a  negative  plea,  exonerates  himself 
from  answering  to  any  fact  to  which  the  plea  extends,  yet  as  the  plain- 
tiff is  entitled  to  discovery  from  the  defendant  of  all  matters  necessary 
to  support  his  case,  he  has,  consequently,  a  right  to  compel  the  defend- 
ant to  answer  specifically  to  all  the  facts  stated  in  his  bill,  to  which  he 
considers  it  necessary  to  require  an  answer,  in  order  to  enable  him  to 
make  out  his  claim  by  means  of  the  evidence  which  may  be  afforded  by 
the  defendant's  admission.9  Thus,  if  a  bill  were  to  be  filed,  alleg- 
ing a  partnership,  and  insisting  *  that  the  existence  of  such  part-  *  620 
nership  was  made  out  by  certain  documents,  or  by  settlements  of 
accounts  and  admissions,  it  would  not  be  sufficient  to  plead  to  such  a  bill 
a  mere  denial  of  the  existence  of  the  partnership  ; x  the  defendant  must 
go  further,  and  answer  as  to  all  the  circumstances  insisted  upon  as  evi- 
dence of  the  partnership.2 

In  cases  where  the  bill  alleges  that  the  defendant  has  admitted  the 
plaintiff's  title,  the  defendant,  if  he  puts  in  what  is  in  effect  a  plea  of  no 
title,  must,  if  interrogated,  answer  as  to  the  admission,  although  the 
plaintiff  does  not  require  discovery  of  it  "as  evidence"  of  his  title.3 

In  the  case  of  Thring  v.  Edgar*  the  plea  was  overruled  solely  upon 
the  ground  that  the  accompanying  answer  extended  to  facts  not  charged 

4  Crow  v.  Tyrrell,  2  Mad.  397  409 ;  Bailie  v.  the  principle  acted  upon  by  Sir  John  Leach 
Sibbald,  15  Ves.  185  :  Roche  v.  Morgell,  2  Sch.  V.  C.  in  Sanders  v.  King,  6~Mad.  61 ;  2  S.  &  S. 
&  Lef.  721  ;  Jones  v.  Davis,  16  Ves.  262,  265;  277  (see  also  Yorke  v.  Fry,  ubi  supra  ;  Storey  v. 
Hunt  v.  Penrice,  17  Btav.  525;  Young  v.  White,  Lennox,  1  M.  &  Cr.  525),  where  his  Honor  laid 
id.  532.  down  the  rule,  that  a  plea  which  negatived  the 

5  Harland  v.  Emerson,  8  Bligh.  N.  S.  62.  plaintiff's  title,  though  it  protected  a  defendant 

6  Thring  v.  Edgar,  2  S.  &  S.  274,  281.  generally  from  answer  and  discovery  as  to  the 

7  Sanders  v.  King,  6  Mad.  61  ;  2  S.  &  S.  subject  of  the  suit,  did  not  protect  him  from 
277;  Yorke  v.  Fry,  6  Mad.  65.  answer  and  discovery  as  to   such   matters    as 

8  See  cases  cited,  Wigram  on  Disc.  142.  were  specially  charged  as  evidence  of  the  plain- 

9  For  a  case  where  it  was  held  that  defend-  tiff's  title.  He  afterwards  repeated  the  same 
ant  need  not,  under  the  new  practice,  answer  as  rule,  in  Thring  v.  Edgar,  2  S.  &  S.  281,  and  it 
to  certain  facts,  because  they  cuild  not  be  made  was  acted  upon  both  by  Lord  Brougham  and 
use  of  as  evidence,  see  Young  v.  White,  17  Sir  Lancelot  Shadwell  V.  C.  in  Hardman  r. 
Beav.  532 ;  18  Jnr.  4,  277.  Ellames,  5  Sim.  640,  650;  2  M.  &  K.  732,  744; 

i  Evans  v.  Harris,  2  V.  &  B.  361,  364;  Har-  C.  P  Coop.  temp.  Brough.  351,  360;  see  Wilson 

ris  v.  Harris,  3  Hare,  450,   453;  8  Jur.  978;  v.  Hammond,  L.  R.  8  Eq.  323. 
Mansell  v.  Feeney,  2  J.  &  H.  313.  a  Harland  v   Emerson,  8  Bligh.  N.  S.  62. 

2  See  Innes    v.  Evans,  3    Edw.   Ch.   454;  4  2  S.  &  S.  281. 

Everitt  v.  Watts,  3  Edw.  Ch.  486.     This  was 

615 


*  621  PLEAS. 

as  evidence  to  rebut  the  matter  of  the  plea ;  but  it  appears  that  it  was 
also  objectionable,  in  that  the  plea  excepted  from  the  bill  the  only  alle- 
gation which  constituted  the  title  itself,  and  which  it  was  the  object  of 
the  plea  to  traverse.  This  objection  was  not  adverted  to  by  Sir  John 
Leach  V.  C.  in  his  judgment  on  the  case,  but  has  since  been  made  the 
subject  of  comment  by  Lord  Cottenham,  where  he  held  that  a  similar 

objection  was  fatal  to  the  validity  of  a  negative  plea.5 
*621        *  The  rule  in  Thring  v.  Edgar  is   applicable  only  to  those  facts 

which  are  covered  by  the  plea ;  and  with  respect  to  collateral 
facts,  or  facts  which  are  stated  in  the  bill,  as  occurring  since  the  title  of 
the  plaintiff  is  alleged  to  have  arisen,  the  defendant  is  bound  to  answer, 
if  interrogated,  as  to  them.  In  this  respect,  there  is  no  distinction  be- 
tween negative  pleas  and  pleas  of  any  other  description. 

We  now  come  to  the  consideration  of  the  cases  in  which  it  is  neces- 
sary that  a  plea  should  be  accompanied  by  an  answer,  as  to  deeds,  papers, 
and  other  documents  in  the  defendant's  possession,  custody,  or  power.1 
This  question  is  not  of  so  much  importance  as  it  formerly  was :  because 
it  is  no  longer  necessary  to  file  interrogatories,  in  order  to  obtain  a  dis- 
covery of  such  documents  ; 2  and  the  Court  has  expressed  its  determina- 
tion to  discourage,  as  much  as  possible,  exceptions  for  insufficiency  in 
answering  them.3  The  necessity  for  such  an  answer  must  generally 
depend  upon  the  nature  of  the  individual  case  ;  so  far,  however,  as  the 
subject  is  susceptible  of  a  reduction  into  rules,  the  following  are  those  by 
which  it  is  regulated. 

Where  a  bill  states  a  case  for  the  plaintiff,  and  interrogatories  are  filed, 
asking  whether  the  defendant  has  in  his  possession  documents  whereby 
the  matters  stated  in  the  bill  would  appear,  and  the  defendant  pleads  a 
pure  affirmative  plea,  not  denying  any  part  of  the  plaintiff's  case,  he  will 
not  be  required,  indeed  ought  not,  to  answer,  as  to  the  possession  of  the 
documents  :  because  the  documents,  being  only  charged  in  the  bill  to  be 
of  importance,  as  proving  the  plaintiff's  case,  which  the  defendant  by  his 

5  Denys  v.  Locock,  3  M.  &  C.  205,  233,  235;  is  a  mode  of  proceeding  which  leaves  the  record 
1  Jnr.  605.  The  equity  of  the  bill,  in  that  case,  in  a  state  which  renders  it  impossible  for  the 
depended  upon  an  alleged  promise:  the  object  Court  afterwards  to  deal  with  it."  "Now,  in 
of  the  negative  plea  was  to  deny  the  fact  that  point  of  tact,  the  bill  to  which  the  plea  pleads, 
this  alleged  promise  was  ever  made.  Upon  contains  no  allegation  of  promise  at  all;  and  the 
this  Lord  Cottenham  said:  "  The  plea  negatives  only  way  of  trying  how  that  would  operate,  is 
the  allegation  of  the  promise.  What  I  particu-  to  suppose  issue  to  be  taken  on  the  plea;  how 
larly  observe  upon  is,  that,  first,  it  takes  out  of  would  it  be  to  be  tried?  It  would  be  an  issue 
the  bill  the  allegation  of  the  promise,  and  then  taken  on  the  traverse  only;  on  the  negative  of 
denies  it.  Now  I  apprehend  tliatisnot  correct,  that  which  nobody  has  affirmed."  See  Lang- 
and  that  no  such  plea  can  be  supported.  A  dell,  Eq.  PI.  (2d  ed.),  §  103. 
negative  plea  is  a  mere  traverse;  it  differs  from  1  See  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  683. 
an  ordinary  plea,  inasmuch  as  the  ordinary  plea  2  Such  discovery  may  be  obtained  on  sum- 
admits  the  truth  of  the  bill,  but  states  some  mons  at,  Chambers;  see  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86, 
matter  dehors,  which  destroys  the  effect  of  the  §  18;  and  see  post,  Chap.  XLII.,  Production  oj 
allegation,  and  which,  assuming  Ihe  allegation  Documents. 

to  be  true,  would  be  a  defence."     "  A  negative  8  Kidger  v.  Worswick,  5  Jur.  N.  S.  37,  V. 

plea,  however,  is  a  mere  traverse  of  that  which  C.  W. :   Barnard  V.  Hunter.  1  Jur.  N.  S.  1065, 

constitutes  the  plaintiff's   title.     Now,  to  tra-  V.  C.  \V. ;  Law  v.  London  Indisputable  Society, 

verse  that  which  is  not  alleged  on  the  face  of  10  Hare  App.  20;  see  also  Eeade  v.  Woodrooffe, 

the  bill,  — to  take  out  of  the  bill  an  allegation,  24  Beav.  421. 
and  then  by  plea  to  negative  the  allegation,  — 

616 


GENERAL  NATURE  OF  PLEAS. 


623 


plea  does  not  controvert,  the  production  of  the  documents  would 

be  *  unnecessary.1  *  622 

Although  the  general  rule  is  that  an  interrogatory  asking  whether 
the  defendant  has  documents  in  his  possession  from  *  which  the  *  623 
matters  stated  in  the  bill  would  appear,  must  be  answered,  when- 
ever there  are  facts  stated  in  the  bill  which  are  inconsistent  with  the 
plea,  yet  it  does  not  apply  to  those  cases  where  the  bill  mis-states 
the  effect  of  deeds  which  form  the  substance  of  the  plea,  and  are  stated 
in  it.1 

Perhaps  the  best  course  which  a  pleader  can  pursue  in  cases  of  this 
description  is,  in  general,  to  consider  how  far  any  part  of  the  matter 
alleged  in  the  bill  partakes  of  the  nature  of  a  special  replication.-  If  the 
matter  charged  amounts  only  to  a  general  denial  of  the  facts  pleaded,  the 
discovery  is  not  necessary :  because  then  the  documents  sought  form 
part  of  the  defendant's  case  only,  and  when  the  cause  comes  to  be  heard 


1  Thus,  where  defendants  pleaded  the  Stat- 
ute of  Limitations,  but  did  not  answer  an  al- 
legation in  the  bill,  "that  they  had  in  their 
possession  books  and  documents  relating  to 
the  matters  aforesaid,  or  some  of  them,"  Sir 
Lancelot  Shadwell  V.  C.  held  that  an  objec- 
tion to  the  plea,  on  the  ground  of  the  omission 
of  such  an  answer,  could  not  be  sustained; 
he  thought  that  unless  the  allegation  in  the 
bill  had  gone  further,  and  had  averred 
that  by  the  documents,  or  some  of  them,  it 
would  appear  that  a  promise  had  been  given 
within  six  years,  the  mere  allegation  that  the 
defendants  had  in  their  possession  papers  relat- 
ing to  the  matters  aforesaid,  and  from  which,  if 
produced,  the  matters  aforesaid  would  appear, 
was  immaterial,  there  not  being  an}'  allegation 
in  the  bill  of  any  promise  having  been  made 
within  six  years;  and  that,  consequently,  it  was 
not  necessary  for  the  defendants  to  negative 
such  an  allegation,  either  by  averments  in  their 
plea,  or  by  answer  in  support  of  it.  Macgregor 
v.  East  India  Co.  2  Sim.  452,  455.  It  is  evi- 
dent, from  this  case,  that  if  the  bill  had  con- 
tained an}-  allegation  of  a  promise  within  six 
years,  the  Vice-Chancellor  would  have  held, 
that  the  charge  as  to  the  documents  ought  to 
have  been  answered  ;  and  it  may  be  laid  down  as 
a  rule,  that  wherever  the  bill  states  any  facts 
which  are  inconsistent  with  the  defendant's  plea, 
or  which  would  take  the  plaintiff's  case  out  of 
the  operation  of  it,  and  interrogatories  are  filed 
asking  whether  the  defendant  basin  his  posses- 
sion documents  relating  to  the  subject-matter  of 
the  suit,  it  will  then  be  necessary  to  accompany 
the  plea  by  a  discovery  of  the  documents  in  the 
defendant's  possession  :  for,  as  the  introduction 
of  such  matter  in  the  bill  renders  it  imperative 
on  the  defendant  to  accompany  his  piea  b_y  an 
answer  as  to  those  facts,  that  answer,  to  be  com- 
plete, must  extend  to  the  documents  inquired 
after:  because,  as  they  are  alleged  to  relate  to 


the  matters  before  mentioned, and  the  facts  which 
go  to  negative  the  defendant's  plea  are  amongst 
those  matters,  it  may  happen  that  the  docu- 
ments in  the  possession  of  the  defendant  will 
afford  important  evidence,  to  enable  the  plain- 
tiff to  avoid  the  effect  of  the  plea.  Thus,  where 
a  bill  was  tiled  by  persons  claiming  an  estate, 
as  heirs  of  A,  ex  jjurte  mater?ia,  and  the  de- 
fendant pleaded  that  another  person  was  the 
heir  of  A,  ex  parte  paterna,  the  Court  over- 
ruled the  plea,  because  it  did  not  answer  as  to 
a  correspondence,  by  which  it  was  charged  in 
the  bill  that  the  defendant  had  admitted  the 
plaintiff's  title.  Emerson  v.  Harland,  3  Sim. 
490,  492;  see  als  >  Hardman  v.  Ellames,  5  Sim. 
640.  650;  2  M.  &  K.  7:52,  744;  Harris  v.  Harris, 
3  Hare,  450,  455;  8  Jur.  978. 

1  Thus,  where  a  plaintiff  claimed  as  heiress- 
at-law  of  a  person  who  had  devised  real  estates 
to  various  persons  in  tail,  with  ultimate  remain- 
der to  his  own  right  heirs,  and  alleged,  by  her 
bill,  that  the  several  estates  tail  had  been  de- 
termined by  failure  of  issue,  and  that  no  valid 
recovery  had  been  suffered,  or,  if  it  had,  that 
the  property  had  been  so  settled  that  she,  the 
plaintiff,  was  still  entitled  as  right  heir  of  the 
original  testator,  and  that  it  would  so  appear  if 
the  defendant  would  produce  the  deeds  creating 
the  tenant  to  the  pracipe,  and  leading  or  de- 
claring the  uses  of  the  recovery  ;  and  the 
defendant  pleaded  the  recovery,  and  set  forth 
the  substance  of  the  deeds  making  the  tenant 
to  the  prcecipe,  and  leading  the  uses  of  the 
recovery,  under  which  it  was  apparent  that  the 
plaintiff  had  no  title:  the  plea  was  held  to  be 
good,  although  not  supported  by  an  answer  as 
to  the  deeds,  which  was  held  to  be  unnecessary, 
as  the  plea  was,  in  fact,  a  direct  denial  of  the 
averment  that  the  estate  was  so  settled  that  the 
plaintiff  was  entitled  to  it.  Plunkett  v.  Caven- 
dish, 1  R.  &  M.  713,  718. 

617 


*  624  PLEAS. 

on  the  truth  of  the  case,  as  put  in  issue  by  the  plea,  the  plaintiff  (his 
case  being  admitted  by  the  plea)  will  not  require  the  assistance  of  the 
documents  in  the  defendant's  possession  to  establish  his  right ;  and  the 
defendant  will  derive  no  benefit  from  his  plea,  unless  he  can  prove  it  to 
be  true.  If,  on  the  contrary,  the  charge  amounts  to  a  special  replication, 
that  is,  to  a  statement  of  facts,  which,  admitting  the  plea  to  be  true,  goes 
to  do  away  with  its  effect,  there  the  documents  required  may  be  important 
to  assist  the  plaintiff  in  making  out  his  own  case,  namely,  the  facts 
alleged  in  derogation  of  the  plea  :  in  such  cases,  therefore,  there  must  be 
a  discovery  as  to  those  documents,  if  required  by  the  plaintiff. 

With  respect  to  negative  pleas,  the  rule  may  be  stated  to  be  in  confor- 
mity with  the  principles  before  adverted  to :  namely,  that  if  a  plaintiff 
indicates,  by  his  interrogatories,  that  he  requires  an  answer  as  to 

*  624    documents  alleged  to  be  in  the  defendant's  possession,  *  in  proof 

of  his  titlet  the  defendant  must  make  the  discovery  ;  thus,  if  the 
interrogatories  ask  whether  the  defendant  has  in  his  possession  documents 
from  which  the  truth  of  the  matters  stated  in  the  bill  would  appear,  he 
must,  if  he  negatives  the  plaintiff's  title  by  his  plea,  accompany  his  plea 
by  an  answer  as  to  those  documents.1  The  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  a  dis- 
covery of  them,  in  order  to  enable  him,  in  the  language  of  Lord  Brougham, 
"  to  negative  the  negative  plea."  2  When,  on  the  other  hand,  the  inter- 
rogatories ask  whether  the  documents  are  in  the  possession  of  the  defend- 
ant, but  do  not  ask  whether  from  such  documents  the  truth  of  the  matters 
in  the  bill  would  appear,  then  it  is  presumed  that,  according  to  the  rule 
in  Thring  v.  Edgar?  they  ought  not  to  be  answered.4 

It  may  be  collected  from  the  preceding  observations,  that  an  answer  in 
support  of  a  plea  is  no  part  of  the  defence.5  The  defence  is  the  matter 
set  up  by  the  plea  ;  the  answer  is  that  evidence  which  the  plaintiff  has  a 
right  to  require  and  to  use,  to  invalidate  the  defence  made  by  the  plea ; 
and  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  make  use  of  it,  not  only  upon  the  hearing 
of  the  cause,  upon  the  issue  raised  by  the  plea,  after  the  plea  shall  have 
been  decided  to  be  a  good  bar  upon  argument,  but  upon  the  argument  of 
the  plea  itself,  before  any  evidence  can  be  given,6  for  the  purpose  of 
counterproving  the  plea,  by  reading  from  it  any  facts  or  admissions  which 
may  negative  the  matters  pleaded  or  averred  in  the  plea.7  The  answer, 
then,  being  no  part  of  the  defence,  but  only  what  the  plaintiff  has  a  right 
to  require  to  enable  him  to  avoid  that  defence,  it  follows  that  it  must  be 
full  and  clear,  otherwise  it  will  not  support  the  plea ;  for  the  Court  will 
intend  all  matters  alleged  in  the  bill,  to  which  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to 
require  an  answer,  to  be  against  the  pleader,  unless  they  are  fully  and 
clearly  denied.8  Thus,  if  a  bill  is  filed  to  set  aside  a  decree,  or  other 
instrument,  on  the  ground  of  fraud,  and  the  defendant  pleads  the  decree 

i  Mansell  v.  Feeney,  2  J.  &  H.  313.  6  Ld.  Red.  244,  n. 

2  Hardman  v.  Ellames.  2  M.  &  K.  744;  C  '  Hildyard  v.  Cressy,  3  Atk.  303;  Hony  v. 
P.  Coop.  temp.  Drouth.  360.  Hony,  1  S.  &  S.  5(58,  580. 

3  2  S.  &  S.  274,  281.  8  Ld.  Red.   298;    Hildyard   v.    Cressy,    ubi 

4  See,  however,  Rigby  v.  Rigby,  15  Sim.  90;  supra;  Gordon  v.  Shaw,  14  Sim.  393. 
10  Jur.  126. 

5  Ld.  Red.  244,  n.;   Greene  v.   Harris,  11 
R.  I.  5. 

618 


GENERAL   NATURE    OF   PLEAS.  *  G25 

or  instrument  sought  to  be  set  aside,  in  bar,  the  defendant  must  answer 
the  facts  of  fraud  alleged,  so  fully  as  to  leave  no  doubt  on  the  mind  of 
the  Court  that,  upon  that  answer,  if  not  controverted  by  evidence  on  the 
part  of  the  plaintiff,  the  fact  of  fraud  cannot  be  established.  If  the 
answer  should  not  be  full  in  all  material  points,  the  Court  will  presume 
that  the  fact  of  fraud  may  be  capable  of  proof  in  the  point  not  fully 
answered,  and  will,  therefore,  not  deem  the  answer  sufficient  to  support 
the  plea,  and  upon  that  ground  will  overrule  the  plea.9 

Although  an  answer  in  support  of  a  plea  is  required  to  be  full 
*and  clear,  yet,  if  the  equitable  matters  charged  are  fully  and  *  625 
clearly  denied,  it  may  be  sufficient  to  support  the  plea,  although 
all  the  circumstances  charged  in  the  bill  may  not  be  precisely  answered.1 
In  such  cases,  however,  the  plaintiff  is  not  precluded,  by  the  circumstance 
of  the  Court  having  held,  upon  the  argument  of  the  plea,  that  the  charges 
in  the  bill  are  sufficiently  denied  to  exclude  intendment  against  the  pleader, 
from  afterwards  excepting  to  the  sufficiency  of  the  answer,  in  any  point 
in  which  he  may  think  it  defective.2  He  may  also  obtain  leave  to  amend 
his  bill,  and  thereby  obtain  an  answer  to  any  matter  which  may  not  have 
been  so  extensively  stated  or  interrogated  to  as  the  case  would  warrant, 
or  to  which  he  may  apprehend  that  the  answer,  though  full  in  terms,  may 
have  been,  in  effect,  evasive.3 

The  cases  above  referred  to,  as  those  in  which  the  plea  must  be  accom- 
panied by  an  answer,  are  those  only  in  which  some  fact  or  matter  is 
stated  or  charged  by  the  bill,  which,  if  true,  would  have  the  effect  of 
overruling  the  plea.  There  are  cases,  however,  in  which,  even  though 
no  equitable  circumstances  are  alleged  in  the  bill,  to  defeat  the  bar  offered 
by  the  plea,  when,  in  fact,  a  pure  plea  may  be  pleaded,  yet  the  defendant 
may  support  his  plea  by  an  answer,  touching  matters  not  charged  in  the 
bill.4  Thus,  in  the  case  of  a  plea  of  purchase  for  valuable  consideration, 
a  defendant  may  deny  notice  in  his  answer,  as  well  as  in  his  plea,  because, 
by  so  doing,  he  does  not  put  anything  in  issue  which  he  would  cover  by 
his  plea  from  being  put  in  issue.5  A  defendant  may  also,  by  this  means, 
put  upon  the  record  any  fact  which  tends  to  corroborate  his  plea,  so  as 
to  enable  him  afterwards  to  prove  it.  An  answer  of  this  sort  is  termed 
an  answer  in  aid  or  in  subsidium  of  the  plea ; 6  and  differs  from  what  is 
usually  termed  an  answer  in  support  of  a  plea,  in  being  an  answer  which 
the  defendant  is  not  obliged  to  put  in,  for  the  purpose  of  avoiding  the 
effect  of  any  equitable  ground  which  may  be  alleged  in  the  bill,  for  avoid- 
ing the  bar  offered  by  the  plea. 


9  Ld.  Red.  244.  claim  of  the  plaintiff  for  relief.     Bogardus   v. 

1  Ibid.  -2!!!);  Walter  v.  Glanville,  5  Bro.  P.  C.  Trinity  Church,  4  Paige,  178,  197. 

ed.  Toml.  555;  S.  C.  nam.  Waters  v.  Glanville,  -  Ld.  Red.  299. 

Gilb.  Rep.  184.     The  only  way  of  testing  the  8  Ld.  Red.  245. 

sufficiency  of  an  answer  in  support  of  a  plea  is  4  lb.  299;   Beanies  on  Pleas,  37;  Forbes  v. 

to  consider  every  allegation  in  the  bill,  which  is  Skelton,  8  Sim.  335,  345  ;  1  Jur.  117. 

not  sufficiently  denied  by  the  answer,  as  true;  6  For.  Rom.  58. 

and  then  to  inquire,  whether  these  facts  being  6  Ibid, 
admitted,  the   plea   is  a   sufficient  bar  to  the 

G19 


627  PLEAS. 


Section  II.  —  The  Different  Grounds  of  Pleas. 

A.  plea  may  be  either  to  the  relief,  or  to  the  discovery,  or  to  both. 
If  it  is  a  good  plea   to  the   relief,   it  will   be  also  good  to  the 

*  626    *  discovery,1  in  the  same  manner  that  a  demurrer  which  is  valid 

as  to  the  relief  prayed,  is,  as  -has  been  already  mentioned,  good 
to  the  discovery  sought  by  the  bill.2  Where  the  question  was  raised  3 
whether  a  defendant,  pleading  to  the  relief,  could  nevertheless  give  the 
discovery  sought  by  the  bill,  without  overruling  his  plea,  Sir  John 
Leach  V.  C.  said  :  "  Admitting  that  a  defendant  may,  at  his  pleasure, 
answer  the  whole  bill,  though  he  pleads  to  the  relief,  it  does  not  follow 
from  thence  that  he  may  plead  to  the  relief  aud  part  of  the  discovery 
only,  and,  at  his  pleasure,  answer  the  rest  of  the  bill:  such  a  partial 
answer  can  serve  no  useful  purpose,  and  the  rule  applies  here,  that  he 
who  submits  to  answer  at  all,  must  answer  fully ;  "  unless  in  those  cases 
in  which,  as  will  be  hereafter  shown,  he  may  protect  himself  from  such 
discovery  by  plea  to  the  discovery. 

Pleas  in  Equity,  to  the  relief  prayed  by  the  bill,  have  usually  been 
ranged  under  the  heads  of  pleas :  To  the  jurisdiction  ;  To  the  person 
of  the  plaintiff  or  defendant;  and,  In  bar  of  the  suit.  This  arrange- 
ment is  the  one  recognized  by  Lord  Eedesdale  and  Sir  George  Cooper ; 4 
but  the  learned  author  of  the  "  Treatise  on  the  Elements  of  Pleas  in 
Equity  "  has  added  another  head  of  plea  to  those  before  enumerated  ; 
namely,  Pleas  to  the  bill.  It  appears  to  be  the  opinion  of  Mr.  Beanies, 
that  pleas  in  Equity  are  primarily  divisible  into  pleas  in  abatement, 
and  pleas  in  bar.  He  observes,  that,  "  in  a  work  on  pleading  at  Law, 
pleas  are  thus  described:  'Pleas  are 'of  two  sorts,  —  in  abatement  and 
in  bar  :  the  former  question  the  propriety  of  the  remedy,  or  legal  suffi- 
ciency of  the  process,  rather  than  deny  the  cause  of  action ;  the  latter 
dispute  the  very  cause  of  action  itself ; '  and  that  it  is  impossible  to  read 
this  passage  without  perceiving  how  perfectly  applicable  it  is  to  pleas 
in  Equity,  and  how  strongly  appropriate,  as  marking  the  distinction 
between  pleas  to  the  jurisdiction,  to  the  person,  and  the  bill,  and  pleas 
in  bar.  The  three  former  classes,  while  they  question  the  propriety  of 
the  particular  remedy  or  of  the  suit,  tacitly  concede  the  existence  of  a 
cause  of  suit ;  but  the  latter  dispute  the  very  cause  of  suit  itself.'1 5  It 
is,  however,  to  be  observed,  that  it  nowhere  appears  that  any  practi- 
cal consequence  results,  in  Equity,  from  the  distinction  between 

*  627    pleas  in  abatement  and  pleas  in  bar.6    *  In  the  following  observa- 

1  See  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  312;  Chapin  v.  Cole-      terms  confined  to  the  relief.     King  v.  Heming, 
man,  11  Pick.  331.     A  plea  maybe  bad  as  to      9  Sim.  59. 

the  relief,  but  good  as  to  the  discovery.    United  s  James  v.  Sadgrove,  1  S.  &  S.  4,  6. 

States  v.  McRae,  L.  R.  3  Ch.  79:     Where  the  *  Ld.  Red.  219  ;  Coop  Eq.  PI.  23G. 

defendant  wishes  to  avoid  a  full  discovery,  on  5  Rcames  on  Pleas.  .ri8. 

the  ground   that   there  is  a  fact  which  defeats  6  it  is  stated  in  Merrewether  v.  Hellish,  13 

the  plaintiff's  equity,  he   must  allege  such  fact  Ves.  435,  437,  that  Lord  Thtirlow  said  he  did 

by  plea.     Weisman    v.   Heron   Mining   Co.  4  not  know  what  a  p'ea  in  abatement  in  Equity 

Jones  Eq.  (N.  C.)  112.  was.     This   observation,  however,   must   have 

2  Ante,  p.  548;  but  in  order  that  a  plea  may  been   made  by  his  Lordship  with  reference  to 
be  good  to  the  discovery,   it  must  not  be  in  the  practical  results  of  such  a  distinction;  for 

620 


DIFFERENT    GROUNDS    OF    PLEAS.  *  627 

tions,  therefore,  the  distinction  of  pleas  into  pleas  in  abatement  and 
pleas  in  bar  will  not  be  further  noticed,  but  the  different  grounds  of 
pleas  will  be  offered  to  the  consideration  of  the  reader  according  to  the 
above-mentioned  arrangement.1  Before  we  proceed,  however,  to  a  more 
minute  discussion  of  pleas,  according  to  the  above  distribution,  it  will 
assist  the  reader  to  point  out  in  what  respect  pleas  of  each  class  differ 
from  those  of  the  other  classes,  and  this  will  be  done  as  briefly  as  pos- 
sible, in  the  words  of  the  learned  writer  himself  :  — 

I.  Those  pleas  which  are  commonly  termed  pleas  to  the  jurisdiction, 
do  not  proceed  to  the  length  of  disputing  the  right  of  the  plaintiff  in  the 
subject  of  the  suit,  or  allege  any  disability  on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff 
to  prosecute  the  suit ;  but  simply  assert  that  the  Court  of  Chancery  is 
not  the  proper  Court  to  take  cognizance  of  those  rights.2 

II.  Fleas  to  the  person  do  not  dispute  the  validity  of  the  rights 
which  are  made  the  subject  of  the  suit,  or  deny  that  the  Court  has 
jurisdiction  over  them ;  8  but  they  assert  that  the  plaintiff  is  incapa- 
citated to  sue,  or  that  the  defendant  is  not  the  person  who  ought  to  be  sued. 

III.  Those  pleas  in  Equity,  also,  which  Mr.  Beames  distinguishes  as 
pleas  to  the  bill,  "do  not  dispute  the  validity  of  the  right  made  the 
subject  of  the  suit,"  nor  contend  that  generally  the  Court  has  not  juris- 
diction over  it,  nor  do  they  allege  that  the  plaintiff  is  under  any  disa- 
bility to  sue,  or  that  the  defendant  ought  not  to  be  sued;  but  they 
assert  that  the  suit,  as  it  appears  on  the  record,  is  defective  to  answer 
the  purpose  of  complete  justice,  or  ought  not,  for  some  other  reason,  to 
proceed.'1  (a) 

IV.  Pleas  in  bar  may  be  distinguished  from  all  other  pleas,  as  they 
admit  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court,  and  do  not  dispute  the  ability  of 
the  plaintiff  to  sue,  and  the  liability  of  the  defendant  to  be  sued,  and 
tacitly  concede  that  there  are  none  of  those  objections  to  the  suit  which 
constitute  the  grounds  of  pleas  to  the  bill ;  but  yet  they  allege  matter, 
which,  if  true,  destroys  the  claim  made  by  the  suit,  and  by  showing 
that  the  right  made  the  subject  of  the  suit  has  no  existence,  or  that 
it  is  vested  in  the  defendant,  they  put  an  end  to  all  litigation  respect- 
ing it.5 

the  use  of  the  term  "plea  in  abatement,"  as  l  And  see  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  705. 

distinguished  from  a  plea  in  bar,  occurs  in  the  2  Bennies  on  Pleas,  55;  Story,  Eq.  l'l. 
Practical   Register,  326,  ed.  Wyatt,  and  many       §  706. 

other  books,  and  has  been  repeatedly  used  in  3  Heames,  56;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  706. 

the  same  manner  by  Lord  Thurlow  himself;  see  4  Beames,  59.  60;  Story,  Eq.  l'l.  §  706. 

Newman  v.  Wallfe.  2  Bro.  C.  C.  143;  Gun  v.  6  Beam»s,  62;  Story,  Eq.  PL  §  706. 
Prior,  1  Cox,  108;  2  Dick.  657;  see  also  Beames 
on  Pleas,  58,  notis. 

(a)  Where  there  is  a  defect  of  parties,  the  inson,  20  Q.  B.  D.  155;  Kendall  r.  Hamilton,  4 

plea  should  show  the  proper  parties,  by  name  App.  Cas   504;  Goldsmith  v.  Gilliland,  24  Fed. 

or  description,  especially  when  the  information  Rep.  154.     If  an  injunction  cannot  properly  be 

is  peculiarly  within  the  "defendant's  knowledge.  granted  without  the  addition  of  parties  defend- 

Att.-Gen.  i>.  Jackson,  11   Ves.   367,  369;  Att.-  ant,  the  Court,  even  in  the  absence  of  proper 

Gen.  v.  Wyburgh,  1  P.  Wins.  599;  Story,  Eq.  pleading's,  will    take   notice   of  the   fact,    and 

PI.  §  745;Case  r  Minot,  158  Mass.  577;  ante,  direct  the  cause  to  stand  over,  in  order  that  the 

pp.288,  558.    This  plea  is  a  plea  in  bar.    Howth  necessary  parties  may  be  added.   Case  v.  Minot, 

v.  Owens,  29  Fed.  Rep.  722.    See  Pilley  v.  Rob-  158  Mass.  577. 

621 


*  628  PLEAS. 

Having  thus  stated  the  leading  distinctions  between  the  different 
classes  of   pleas  above  pointed  out,  we  shall   proceed    to   consider  the 

particular  pleas  to  relief  under  each  head. 
*628        *I.  Pleas  to  the  jurisdiction,  as  we  have  seen,  do  not  dispute 

the  rights  of  the  plaintiff  in  the  subject  of  the  suit,  but  simply 
assert,  either  :  (1)  That  they  are  nut  tit  objects  of  cognizance  in  a  Court 
of  Equity  ;  or,  (2)  That  the  Court  of  Chancery  is  not  the  proper  Court 
to  take  cognizance  of  those  rights.  That  these  are  the  only  grounds  of 
plea  which  can  be  put  in  to  the  jurisdiction  seems  to  be  generally  ad- 
mitted :  for  it  is  clear,  that  a  plea  that  the  subject  of  the  suit  is  not  cog- 
nizable in  any  municipal  Court  of  justice  whatever,  could  not  prevail; 
because  such  a  plea  would  amount  to  nothing  more  than  that  the  subject 
of  the  suit  is  one  upon  which  no  action  or  suit  can  be  maintained,  which 
is,  in  effect,  a  plea  in  bar  —  not  a  plea  to  the  jurisdiction  of  a  particular 
Court,  but  of  all  Courts  :  which  would  be  absurd,  and  repugnant  in 
terms.1 

(1)  The  generality  of  cases  in  which  a  Court  of  Equity  has  no  jurisdic- 
tion, cannot  easily  be  so  disguised  in  a  bill  as  to  avoid  a  demurrer ;  but 
there  may  be  instances  to  the  contrary ;  and  in  such  cases,  a  plea  of  the 
matter  necessary  to  show  that  a  Court  of  Equity  has  no  jurisdiction,  will 
hold.2  Thus,  where  a  bill  was  filed  to  restrain  the  setting  up  outstand- 
ing terms  in  bar  to  an  action  of  ejectment,  a  plea  that  there  were  no 
outstanding  terms  was  allowed  ; 3  and  so,  it  is  presumed,  if  the  jurisdic- 
tion were  attempted  to  be  founded  on  the  loss  of  an  instrument,  a  plea 
showing  the  existence  of  the  instrument,  and  that  it  is  in  the  power  of 
the  plaintiff  to  obtain  the  production  of  it,  would  be  admissible.4 

(2)  A  plea  that  the  Court  of  Chancery  is  not  the  proper  Court  to  have 
cognizance  of  the  plaintiff's  case,  arises  principally  where  the  suit  is 
for  land  within  a  county  palatine ; 5  or  where  the  defendant  claims  the 
privileges  of  a  university  ;  6  or  other  particular  jurisdiction,  such  as 
that  of  the  Benchers  of  the  Inns  of  Court.7     Of  this  description,  also, 

i  Nabob  of  Arcnt  v.  East  India  to.  3  Bro.  PI.  §  721  ;  Livingston  r.  Story,  11  Peters,  351, 

C.  C.  292,  301;  S.C.  nom  Nabob  of  the  Carna-  393;   Harvey  v.  Tyler,  2  Wall.  328;  Dodge   o. 

tic   v.   East   India  Co.   1   Ves.  Jr.  371,  388;  2  Perkins.  4  Mason,  435:  see  Bank  of  Bellows 

id.  56;  Musfrrave  v.  Pulido,  5  App  Cas    102,  Falls  v.  Rut.  &  Bur.  R.  R.  Co.  28  Vt.  470. 

Story,  Yj\    PI   §  711.     In  case  of  a  bill  brought  2  Ed.  Red.  222. 

in  a  Court  of  Equitv  of  a  limited  jurisdiction,  3  Armitage  v.  Wadsworth,  1  Mad.  18!),  195. 

as  i,,  persons,  or  as  to  subject-matter,  if  the  bill  Dawson  v.  Pilling,  16  Sim.  203,  209;  12  Jur. 

should  nlleire  all  the  necessary  facts  to  establish  388. 


and  support  that  jurisdiction,  the  defendant  may 


Ed.    Red.  222.     See  R.   S.   C.  Ord.  XL; 


also  negative  the  existence  of  those  facts  bv  a  Preston  r.  Lamont,  1  Ex.  D.  361;  Great  Austra- 

plea  to  the  jurisdiction.     Storv.  Eq   PI.  §  720  lian  G.  M.  Co.  v.  Martin,  5  Ch.  D.  1;  Cresswell 

If.  in  the  Courts  of  the  United  States,  there  are  v.  Parker.  11   id.  601;  Tottenham  r.  Barry,  12 

distinct    averments  of    the   citizenship   of   the  id.  797;  Fowler  r.  Barstow,  20  id.  240. 

plaintiff,  and    of  that   of  the  defendant,  upon  5  lb.  223:  see  ante,  p.  554. 

the  record,  so  that  upon  the  face  of  the  bill  the  6  Ld.  Red.  224;  see  Temple  r.  Foster,  Cary, 

jurisdiction  attaches,  the  defendant,  if  he  means  65;    Cotton   >•.   Manering,   id.   73;    Draper  v. 

t.»  contest  the  alleged  citizenship,  must  do  it  by  Crowther,  2   Vent.  362;  Stephens  r.  Berry,  1 

a  plea  to  the  jurisdiction:  for  he  is  not  at  liberty  Tern.  212:    Pratt   v.    Taylor.   1    Ch.  Cas^.  237; 

to  put  the  citizenship  in  issue  by  a  general  an-  Anon.  id.  258;  Ginnett  r.  Wbittingham,  Id  Q. 

swer;  as  such  an  answer  admits  the  jurisdiction  B.  D.  761. 

of  the  Court  to  inquire  into  the  general  merits  7  Cunningham  v.  We^,  2  Bro.  C   C   241 ; 

of  the  suit,  and  put  them  in  issue.     Story,  Eq.  Neate  v.  Denman,  L.  R.  8  Eq.  127;  Manisty  v. 

622 


DIFFERENT    GROUNDS    OF    PLEAS. 


629 


is  a  plea  that  the  defendant  *  is  an  officer  of  another  Court  of   *  629 
competent  jurisdiction,  and   therefore  not  to  be  drawn  from  his 
duties  in  that  Court  for  the  purpose  of  defending  a  suit  in  another.1 

It  is  a  rule  that,  the  Court  of  Chancery  being  a  superior  Court  of  gen- 
eral jurisdiction,  nothing  shall  be  intended  to  be  out  of  its  jurisdiction 
which  is  not  shown  to  be  so.2  It  is  requisite,  therefore,  in  a  plea  to  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  Court,  both  to  allege  that  the  Court  has  not  jurisdic- 
tion, and  to  show  by  what  means  it  is  deprived  of  it.3  It  is  likewise 
necessary  to  show  what  Court  has  jurisdiction  ;  *  and  if  the  plea  omits 
to  set  forth  these  particulars,  it  is  bad  in  point  of  form.5 

It  is  also  a  rule,  that  a  plea  to  the  jurisdiction  must  show  that  the 
particular  jurisdiction,  alleged  to  be  entitled  to  the  exclusive  cognizance 
of  the  suit,  is  able  to  give  a  complete  remedy.6  A  plea,  therefore,  of 
privilege  of  the  University  of  Oxford,  to  a  bill  for  specific  performance 
of  an  agreement,  touching  lands  in  Middlesex,  was  overruled  :  because 
the  university  could  not  give  complete  relief.7  It  is  to  be  observed 
also,  that  if  a  suit  be  instituted  against  different  persons,  some  of  whom 
are  privileged  and  some  not,8  or  if  one  or  more  of  the  defendants  are 
not  amenable  to  the  particular  jurisdiction,9  a  plea  will  not  hold  ;  10  and 
so,  if  there  is  a  particular  jurisdiction,  and  yet  the  parties  to  litigate  any 
question  are  both  resident  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  of  Chan- 
cery,—  as  upon  a  bill  concerning  a  mortgage  of  the  Isle  of  Sark,  both 
mortgagee  and  mortgagor  residing  in  England,  —  the  Court  of  Chancery 
will  hold  jurisdiction  of  the  cause:  for  a  Court  of  Equity  agit  in  per- 
sonam,, and  may  give  effect  to  its  decree  by  constraining  the  person  or 
property  of  the  defendant  till  he  perform  it.11  (a) 


Kenealy,  W.  N.  (187G)  216;  24  W.  R.  918. 
For  the  plea  in  that  case,  see  Beames  on  Pleas, 
324. 

1  See  Gibson  r.  Whitacre.  2  Vern.  83. 

2  Ld.  Red.  224:  Earl  of  Derbv  v.  Duke  of 
Athol,  1  Ves.  Sr.  204;  2  Ves.  Sr.  357. 

3  Ld.  Red.  224;  Nabob  of  Arcot  o.  East 
India  Co.  3  Bro.  C.  C.  292.  301 ;  S.  C.  nom. 
Nabob  of  the  Carnatic  v.  East  India  Co.  1  Ves. 
Jr.  371,  388. 

4  Ld.  Red.  224;  Strode  v.  Little,  1  Vern.  59; 
Earl  of  Derby  v.  Duke~of  Athol,  1  Ves.  Sr. 
203;  1  Dick.  123:  and  see  Moor  v.  Somerset, 
Nels.  51;  Hendrick  v.  Wood,  9  W  R.  588; 
Maunder  v.  Lloyd,  2  J.  &  II.  7 IS;  Buenos 
Ayres  Ry.  Co.  v.  Northern  Rv.  Co.  2  Q.  B.  D. 
210. 

5  Ld.  Red.  224;  Foster  v.  Vassal!,  3  Atk.  587; 
Nabob  of  Arcot  v.  East  India  Co.  ubi  supra. 

6  Ld.  Red.  224:  Newdigate  v.  Johnson,  2 
Ch.  Cas.   170;   Wilkiis   v.   Shalcroft,  22  Vin. 


(n)  A  plea  to  the  jurisdiction  on  the  ground 
of  want  of  jurisdiction  generally  in  the  domestic 
Courts  need  nut  allege  the  existence  ofacompe- 
tent  Court  abroad.  Companhia  de  Mozambique 
V.  British  South  Africa  Co..  [1892]  2  Q.  B.  358, 
holding  also  that  a  suit  will  not  lie  in  the  High 


Abr.  10;  Green  v.  Rutherforth.  1  Ves.  Sr.  403, 
471 ;  see  1  Dan.  Ch.  Prac.  (6th*F.nff.  ed.)  455. 

7  Draper  v.  Crowther,  2  Vent.  362;  Stephens 
v.  Berry,  1  Vern.  212. 

8  White  v.  Lowfrher,  Cary,  55  ;  22  Vin.  Abr. 
9;  Fanshaw  v.  Fanshaw,  1  Vern.  246. 

9  Grigg's  case.  Hutton,  59;  4  Inst.  213; 
Hilton  ».  Lawson,  Cary,  48. 

1(1  Ld.  Red.  225:  Hendrick  v.  Wood,  9  W.  R. 
588,  V.  C.  W. ;  Central  Georgian  I.'.  Co.  v.  Mit- 
chell. 13  W.  R.  428,  V.  C.  W. ;  2  II.  &  M.  452 ; 
11  Jar.  N.  S.  j:,s. 

11  Ld.  Red.  225:  Toller  p.  Carteret,  2  Vern. 
494;  see  also  Earl  of  Derby  v.  Duke  of  Athol, 
ubi  supra  ;  Lord  Cranstown  v.  Johnston, ::  Ves. 
170.  182:  ami  see  Xorris  v.  Chambres,  29  Beav. 
246  :  7  Jur.  N  S.  59 ;  id.  689,  L.  C. ;  3  De.  G. 
F.  &  J.  583:  Paget  v.  Kde.  L.  R.  is  Eq.  lis. 
See  Norton  r.  Florence  Land  Co.  7  Ch.  D.  332; 
1  Dan.  Ch.  Prac   (6th  Eng.  ed.)  452. 


Court  to  decide  directly  the  title  to  land  abroad. 
but  that,  as  local  venue  was  abolished  by  the 
Judicature  Acts,  damages  may  be  recovered  for 
a  trespass  upon  land  abroad,  if  the  defendant  is 
within  the  jurisdiction.  See  Mercantile  Ins.  &c. 
Co.  v.  River  Plate  &c.  Co.,  [1892]  2  Ch.  303;  Re 

623 


630 


PLEAS. 


It  is  said,  that  one  plea  only  will  be  admitted  to  the  jurisdiction,  and 
that,  therefore,  if  the  defendant  plead  such  a  plea  as  is  not  sufficient 
in   its   nature,    or   plead  the    matter   insufficiently,   he  will  be   put  to 

answer.12 
*  630  *  We  have  before  seen  that  an  objection  on  the  ground  of  juris- 
diction must  be  taken  either  by  demurrer  or  plea,  before  answer : 
otherwise,  the  Court  will  entertain  the  suit,  although  the  defendant  may 
object  to  it  at  the  hearing,  unless  it  is  in  a  case  in  which  no  circumstance 
whatever  can  give  the  Court  jurisdiction.1  (a) 


12  Wyatt's  P.  R.  325. 
1  Ante,  p.  555.     The  plea  may  s'uow  more 


th:in  one  reason  why  the  Court  has  not  jurisdic- 
tion.    Blake  v.  Blake,  18  W.  R.  941. 


Hawthorne,  Graham  v.  Massey,  23  Ch.  D.  743; 
Whitaker  v.  Forbes,  L.  R.~  10  C.  P.  583. 
Later,  in  British  South  Africa  Co.  v.  Companhia 
de  Mozambique,  [1893]  A.  C.  602;  [1893]  W. 
N.  148,  it  was  held  that  the  Supreme  Court  of 
Judicature  has  no  jurisdiction  to  entertain  an 
action  to  recover  damages  for  trespass  to  land 
situate  abroad. 

In  England  the  rule  has  always  been  that 
a  suit  does  not  lie  to  recover  land  in  a  foreign 
countn' or  colony.  Re  Holmes,  2  J.  &  H.  527; 
8  Jur.  N.  S.  76;"  Blake  v.  Blake,  18  W.  R.  944 ; 
W.  N.  (1870)  174;  Whitaker  v.  Forbes,  1  C. 
P.  D.  51 ;  Norton  v.  Florence  Land  Co.  7 
Ch.  D.  332;  Moor  v.  Anglo-Italian  Bank,  10 
Ch.  D.  681 ;  Jenney  v.  Mackintosh,  33  Ch.  D. 
595  ;  see  Ewing  v.  Orr  Ewing,  9  App.  Cas.  34, 
40.  And  where  it  appeared  that  the  defendant 
could  be  sued  in  India  for  the  recovery  of  land 
there,  the  English  Court  refused  to  grant  in- 
spection of  documents  in  the  defendant's  posses- 
sion in  England  in  aid  of  such  proceedings 
Reiner  v.  Salisbury,  2  Ch.  D.  378;  post,  p.  1556. 

In  general  a  suit  will  not  lie  between  for- 
eigners transiently  in  the  country  as  to  property 
abroad.  Matthaei  v.  Galitzin,  L.  R.  18  Eq. 
340:  Doss  v.  Secretary,  L.  Pi.  19  Eq.  509.  See 
Lorway  v.  Lousada,  1  Lowell,  77;  Roberts  v. 
Knights,  7  Allen,  449  ;  7  Am.  Law  Rev.  417. 
The  Federal  Constitution  does  not  prohibit  the 
Equity  Courts  of  one  State  from  controlling,  in 
proper  ease=,  persons  within  their  jurisdiction 
in  the  prosecution  of  suits  in  other  States. 
Cole  ».  Cunningham,  133  U.  S.  107;  Pennoyer 
V.  Neff,  95  F.  S.  714;  Dehon  V.  Foster.  4  Allen, 
545;  Phelps  v.  McDonald,  99  U.  S  298,  308; 
Carver  v.  Peck,  131  Mass  291;  Cunningham 
r.  Butler,  142  Mass.  47;  Proctor  v.  National 
Bank  of  the  Republic.  152  Mass.  223  The 
Courts  of  one  State  will  not  decree  specific  per- 
formance of  a  contract,  by  which  a  domestic 
corporation  is  to  keep  open  ditches,  and  to  con- 
struct cattle  guards  on  the  plaintiffs  land  in 
another  State.  Port  Royal  Railroad  Co.  P. 
Hammond,  58  Ga.  523:  see  Joy  v.  St.  Louis, 
138  U.  S.  1,  47;  Union  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  P.  Chi- 
cago &c.  Rv.  Co.  51  Fed.  Rep."  309;  Topp  p. 
624 


White,  12  Heisk.  165;  Monnett  v.  Turpie,  132 
Ind.  482.  A  suit  for  the  specific  performance 
of  a  contract  for  land  may  be  brought  in  a  State 
or  country  other  than  that  in  which  the  land 
lies;  Davis  v.  Parker.  14  Allen,  94;  Brown  v. 
Desmond,  100  Mass.  267  ;  2  Kent  Com.  (12th 
ed.)  463,  n.  (d) ;  see  Potter  v.  Hollister,  45  N. 
J.  Eq.  508;  Cloud  r.  Greasley,  125  III.  313; 
Gibson  v.  Burgess,  82  Va.  650:  Seixas  v.  King, 
39  La.  Ann.  510.  Specific  performance  of  a  con- 
tract for  land  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
Court  will  not  be  decreed  against  an  absent 
non-resident.  Spurr  r.  Scoville,  3  Cush.  578. 
See  Felch  v.  Hooper,  119  Mass.  52;  Walling 
v.  Beers,  120  Mass.  548;  1  Story,  Eq.  Jur. 
(11th  ed.)  §  744,  and  notes.  A  preliminary 
injunction  may  he  granted  in  a  clear  case  to 
restrain  the  defendant  from  injury  to  land 
abroad.  See  Marshall  r.  Turnbull,  32  Fed. 
Rep.  124;  34  id.  827.  A  defendant  who  has 
appeared  and  has  been  enjoined  from  manu- 
facturing or  selling  articles  which  infringe  the 
plaintiff's  patent,  violates  the  injunction  by  a 
sale  of  such  articles  outside  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  Court.  Macauley  v.  White  Sewing  Ma- 
chine Co.  9  Fed.  Rep."  698. 

(a)  This  qualification  is  illustrated  by  Ex 
parte  Swinhanks,  11  Ch.  D.  525,  where  the 
Court  of  Bankruptcy  had  ample  jurisdiction  if 
it  chose  to  exercise  it,  and  by  Ex  parte  Eatough 
&  Co.  Lim'd,  42  L.  T.  95,  where  the  Court  of 
Bankruptcy  had  no  jurisdiction  whatever.  See 
al>o  Ex  parte  Butters,  14  Ch.  D.  265;  Gordon 
v.  James.  30  Ch.  D.  249. 

In  general,  when  a  Court  of  Equity  has  juris- 
diction of  the  subject-matter,the  defendant,  after 
the  plea  or  answer  is  riled,  cannot  raise,  as  a 
new  defence,  the  objection  that  the  legal  remedy 
is  plain,  adequate,  and  complete.  This  defence 
should  be  taken  by  demurrer,  when  apparent  on 
the  bill.  KilbournV  Sunderland,  130  U.  S.  505; 
Dederick  r.  Fox,  56  Fed.  Rep.  714:  Levi  r. 
Evans,  57  id.  677;  Ostrander  r.  Webber,  114 
N.  Y.  95  ;  Baron  v.  Korn,  127  N".  Y.  224;  Buffalo 
Stone  Co.  r.  Delaware  &c.  R.  Co  130  N.  Y.  152; 
Watts  v.  Adler,  id.  646;  Clark  v.  Flint,  22 
Pick.  231 ;    Raynham  Congregational  Society 


DIFFERENT   GROUNDS    OF   PLEAS. 


650 


II.  Pleas  to  the  person,  like  pleas  to  the  jurisdiction,  do  not  necessa- 
rily dispute  the  validity  of  the  rights  which  are  made  the  subject  of  the 


v.  Raynham    Fund,  23   Pick.  148;  Massachu- 
setts General  Hospital  v.  State  Assurance  Co. 
4  Gray,  227;  Russell   v.  Loring,  3  Allen,  121  : 
Dearth  v.  Hide  &  Leather  National  Bank,  100 
Mass.   540;    Page    v.    Young,  106   Mass.  313; 
Jones   v.    Keen,    115    Mass.    170;    Crocker   ». 
Dillon,  133  Mass.  01;  Parker  v.  Nickerson,  137 
Mass.  487;  Payson  v.  Lamson,  134  Mass.  593; 
Pittsburgh   Co.'s  Appeal.  123   Penn.    St.  250; 
Evans  H.Goodwin,  132  id.  136;  Kelley  y.Kelley, 
80  Wis.  486;  Newton  v.  Newton,  46  Minn.  33; 
Crump  v.  Ingersoll,  47  Minn.  17'J  ;  Kitcher^ide 
v.  Myers,  10  Oregon,  21,  Snowden  v.  Tyler.  21 
Neb.  199.     This  objection  cannot  be  raised  be- 
fore a  Master,  but  only  by  a  pleading  filed  in 
Court.    Smith  v.  Rock,  59  Vt.  232.    In  order 
to  avail  for  this  purpose,  the  legal  remedy  must 
be  neither  obscure  nor  doubtful.      Essex  Free- 
holders v.  Newark  City  Nat'l  Bank,  48  N.  J. 
Eq.    51.      See   Stone   v.  Thomas,  L.  R.  5   Ch. 
219.  The  bill  will  not  be  dismissed,  but  will  be 
retained  fur  the  assessment  of  damages,  when 
the  plaintiff  claims  equitable  relief  to  which  he 
shows  himself  entitled,  and  a  reason   for  deny- 
ing such  relief  arises  pending  the  suit.     Case 
v.  Minot,  158  Mass.  577.     But  the  defendant, 
after  filing  his  answer,  cannot  insert  a  plea  in 
the  nature  of  a  plea  puis  darrein  continuance 
to  the  effect  that,  after  answering,  he  removed 
the  obstacle  which  necessitated  resort  to  Equity. 
Morley  v.   White,  L.  R.  8  Ch.  731.     An  ade- 
quate remedy  at  Law,  excluding  the  jurisdiction 
of    Equity,  is  found   in   any   of  the   forms   of 
actions  or  proceedings  in  the  Law  Courts.     See 
Gaines  v.  Miller,  111  U.  S.  395;  Root  v.  Lake 
Shore  Ry.  Co.  105  U.  S.  207;  Smith  v.  Bourbon 
County,  127  U.  S.  105;  Smyth  v.  N.  O.  C.  &  B. 
Co.  141  U.  S.656 ;  Sultan  v.  Providence  Tool  Co. 
21  Blaich.  437;  Dumont  v.  Fry,  12  Fed.  Rep. 
21 ;  Hausineister  v  Porter,  21  id.  355;  Jenkins  v. 
Haiinan,  26   id.  657;  United   Lines  Tel.  Co.   v. 
Grant,  137   N.    Y.  7;  Sheppard    v.    Nixon,    43 
N.J.  Eq.  627;    Elizabethtown  Gas  Light  Co. 
v.  Green,  4G  id.  118;  Russell  v.  Barstow,  144 
Mass.   130;  Squire   v.  Hewlett.  141    Mass  597; 
Evans  v.  Lewis,  121   111.  478;  Bodman  v.  Lake 
Fork   Drainage    District,  132   111.439;    Burton 
v.  Gleason,   56  111.25;    McClanahan    v.  West, 
100   Mo.   309;    Gay    v.  Gilmore,    76    C.a.    725; 
Duff   v.  Duff,  71   Cal.513;    Pixley  v.  Roanoke 
Nav.  Co.  75  Va.  320;    McDonald  v.  Reiner,  22 
Fla.  198.     Also  in  the  Probate  Court'.     Batten 
v.  Gedhye,  41  Ch.  D.  507;  Foster  v.  Foster,  134 
Mass.  120;    Joslin    v.  Wheeler,  62    X    II.  169; 
Green  v.  Creighton,  10  S.  &  M.  (Miss.)  159;  48 
Am.  Dec.  742,  and  note.     See  ante,  p.  553,  note 
('<);  post,  p.  659.  note  (b).   Also  in  remedies  es- 
tablished by  statute,  but  not    in  new  statutory 
remedies  where  the  Equity  jurisdiction  is  already 

VOL     I.  —  40 


settled  upon  the  same  topic.  See  ante,  p.  60, 
note  (a):  Union  Passenger  Ry.  Co.  v.  Baltimore, 
71  Md.  238;  Witters  ».  Sowles,  32  Fed.  Rep. 
767;  Dehon  v.  Foster,  4  Allen,  547;  7  id.  17; 
Wood  v.  Westborough,  140  Mass.  403;  Sweeny 
v.  Williams,  36  N.  J.  Eq.  627. 

In  jurisdictions  where  Law  and  Equity  are 
distinct,  parties  cannot  by  stipulation  con- 
vert a  suit  in  Equity  into  an  action  at  Law 
or  vice  versa.  Indianapolis  Land  Trust  v. 
Hoffman,  57  Fed.  Rep.  333;  Jinks  v.  Banner 
Lodge,  139  Penn.  St.  414.  Under  the  Code 
Procedure,  where  legal  and  equitable  relief  is 
granted  under  one  complaint,  the  plaintiff,  in 
order  to  obtain  equitable  relief,  is  not  required 
to  show  that  there  is  no  adequate  remedy  at 
Law.  Ely  v.  New  Mexico  &  A.  R.  Co.  129 
U  S.  291.  The  21st  Rule  in  Equity  dispenses 
with  the  allegation  in  the  bill  that  the  plaintiff 
has  no  adequate  remedy  at  Law.  Gage  r. 
Kaufman,  133  U.  S.  471.  If  there  is  not  an 
adequate  remedy  on  the  Law  side  of  the  Federal 
Courts,  suit  may  be  brought  on  the  Equity  side, 
although  the  law  of  the  State  furnishes  a  com- 
plete remedy  in  the  State  Courts.  New  Orleans 
Nat.  Bank  v.  Bohne,  4  Woods,  74.  The  U.  S. 
Rev.  Stats.  §  723,  providing  that  suits  in  Equity 
shall  not  be  sustained  in  the  Federal  Courts  in 
any  case  where  a  plain,  adequate,  and  complete 
remedy  may  be  had  at  Law,  is  declaratory, 
and  deprives  these  Courts  of  equitable  rente- 
die*,  because  of  the  defendant's  constitutional 
right  to  a  jury  trial  at  Law,  only  where  the  legal 
remedy  is  as  complete  and  efficacious  as  that  in 
Equity.  Boyce  V  Grundy,  3  Pet.  210;  Hipp 
v.  Babin,  19  How.  271;  Lewis  v.  Cocks,  23 
Wall.  407;  Root  v.  Ry.  Co.  105  U.  S.  212; 
New  York  Co.  v.  Water  Co.  107  U.  S.  214:  Kil- 
lian  ».  Ebbmghaus,  110  U.  S.  573;  Buzard  o. 
Houston,  119  U.  S.  351;  Ridings  v.  Johnson, 
128  U.  S  212  ;  Payne  ».  Kansas  &c.  Ry.  Co. 
40  Fed.  Rep.  546;  Dahlman  r.  Jacobs,  15  id. 
863  ;  Dow  v.  Berry,  18  id.  121.  The  test  of  an 
adequate  remedy  at  Law  is  that  which  existed 
when  the  Judiciary  Act  of  1789  was  adopted, 
when  not  since  changed  by  Congress.  Mis- 
sissippi Mills  v.  Cohn,  150  U.  S.  202;  Missouri, 
K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Elliott,  56  Fed.  Rep.  772. 

If  the  suit  is  dismissed  for  want  of  jurisdic- 
tion, costs  are  disallowed,  at  least  in  the  Federal 
Courts,  because  of  lack  of  power.  Inglee  v. 
Coolidge.  2  Wheat.  363;  MTver  r.  Wattles.  9 
id.  650;  Strader  v.  Graham.  18  How.  602; 
Mayor  r.  Cooper,  6  Wall.  247;  Mead  v.  Piatt, 
21  Blatch.  435;  Agnew  v.  Dorman,  Taner, 
386:  United  States  v.  Treadwell,  15  Fed.  Repi 
532;  Cooper  v  New  Haven  Steamboat  Co.  18 
id.  588;  Abbey  v.  The  R  L.  Steven-.  22  How. 
Pr.  78.     The  U.  S.   Rev.  Stats.   §§   823,  983, 

625 


*630 


PLEAS. 


suit,  but  object  to  the  plaintiff's  ability  to  sue,  or  the  defendant's  liability 
to  be  sued,  respecting  them.2  They  are  generally  divided  into  such  as 
regard  the  person  of  the  plaintiff,  and  such  as  regard  the  person  of  the 
defendant,  (b) 

1.  Of  the  former  kind  are  pleas  of:  Alienage;3  Outlawry;4  Attain- 
der ; 5  Infancy  ;  Coverture  ;  Idiocy  or  lunacy  ;  Bankruptcy  ; 6  to  which 
ma}T  be  added,  Pleas  that  the  plaintiff  does  not  sustain  the  character  he 
assumes.7  All  the  above  grounds  of  objection  to  the  person  of  the 
plaintiff,  except  the  last,  have  been  before  discussed.8  With  respect  to 
the  last,  it  is  to  be  observed,  that  the  plea  may  either  deny  the  existence 
of  the  person  in  whose  behalf  the  bill  has  been  exhibited,  or  of  the 
character  in  which  the  plaintiff  affects  to  sue ;  or  it  may  show  that,  for 
some  reason  not  disclosed  in  the  bill,  the  title  under  which  the  plaintiff 
claims  never  vested  in  him.9     Thus,  a  plea  may  show,  that  the  alleged 


'2  Beames  on  Pleas,  99. 

3  A  plea  of  "alien  enemy"  is  sufficiently 
answered  by  a  treaty  of  peace  made  after  it  was 
filed;  and  there  is  no  need  fur  the  plaintiff  to 
reply  that  fact;  the  Court  is  bound  to  notice  it 
ex  officio.  Johnson  v.  Harrison,  Litt.  Sel.  Cas. 
226. 

4  As  to  the  plea  of  outlawry,  see  Aft. -Gen. 
v.  Kickards,  8  Beav.  380;  Taylor  v.  Wemyss, 
L.  K.  8  Eq.  512. 

5  33  &  34  Vic.  c.  23,  §  6,  makes  a  person 
convicted  of  treason  or  felony  incapable  of 
suing  in  Equity  until  he  has  undergone  his 
punishment  or  is  pardoned. 

6  See  1  Dan.  Ch.  Prac.  (6th  Eng.  ed.),  457. 


have  not  changed  this  rule.  Pentlars-e  v. 
Kirby,  20  Fed.  Rep.  898  If  the  defendant 
does  not  raise  the  objection  until  the  final  hear- 
ing  on  pleadings  and  proof,  the  bill  may  be 
dismissed  without  costs  to  him.  Gray  v.  Beck, 
6  Fed.  Rep.  595. 

When  at  the  trial  the  evidence  discloses  a 
plain  and  adequate  remedy  at  Law,  though  not 
apparent  upon  the  bill,  the  Court  should  decline 
further  to  proceed  in  Equity.  Dowell  v.  Mitch- 
ell, 105  U.  S.  430;  Denison  Paper  Manuf. 
Co.  v.  Robinson  Manuf.  Co.  74  Maine,  116; 
Gamage  r.  Harris,  79  Maine,  531.  The  Court 
may  raise  the  objection  of  its  own  motion, 
though  not  raised  by  the  pleadings  or  suggested 
by  counsel.  Ante,  p.  555,  note;  Parker  v. 
Winnipiseogee  Lake  Co.  2  Black,  545;  Thomp- 
son v.  Railroad  Co.  6  Wall.  134;  Oelrichs  v. 
Spain,  15  Wall.  211:  Sullivan  v.  Portland 
Railroad  Co.  94  U.  S.  806;  Tyler  v.  Savage,  143 
U.  S.  79.  97;  Franklin  Telegraph  Co.  v.  Har- 
rison. 145  U.  S.  459.  474;  Preteca  t>.  Maxwell 
Land  Grant  Co.  4  O.  S.  App.  326,  331;  Mills 
v.  Knapp,  39  Fed.  Rep.  592:  Vannerson  v. 
Leverett,  31  id.  376 ;  Curry  v.  McCauley,  20  id. 
583;  Spring  v.  Domestic  S.  M.  Co.  13  id.  446; 
Woodman  v.  Freeman,  25  Maine  561;  Xiles  r. 
Williams,  24  Conn.  279 ;    Hine  v.  New  Haven, 

G2G 


The  objection  that  the  plaintiff  is  bankrupt,  and 
his  assignee  not  a  p.irty,  should  be  taken  in 
limine  by  way  of  plea,  and  cannot  be  insisted 
on  to  avoid  exceptions  taken  by  the  plaintiff  to 
the  answer.  Kittredge  v.  Claremont  Bank,  3 
Story,  591. 

7*Story,  Eq.  PL  §  722,  et  seq. 

8  Ante,  Chap.  TIT.  Suits  by  Persons  under 
Disability.  For  forms  of  pleas  of  alien  enemy, 
see  Beanies  on  Fleas,  329;  2  Van  Hey.  94  ;  and 
of  outlawry,  and  bankruptcy,  and  of  plaintiff 
not  sustaining  his  assumed  character,  id.  96, 
104,  106. 

9  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  727. 


40  Conn.  478;  Edgett  v.  Douglass,  144  Penn. 
St.  95;  Derry  v.  Ross,  5  Col.  295;  Stout  v. 
Cook,  41  111.  447;  M<gee  v.  Mugee,  51  111. 
500;  Remington  v.  Foster,  42  Wis.  608;  Den- 
ner  v.  Chicago  &c.  Ry.  Co.  57  Wis.  218;  Tubb 
v.  Fort,  58  Ala.  277;  Hart  o.  Mallet,  2  Hayw. 
136;  Charleston  Ins.  Co.  v.  Potter,  3  Desaus. 
6;  Drury  v.  Conner,  1  Har.  &  G.  220;  Dun- 
nock  i».  Dunnock,  3  Md.  Ch.  140;  Gough  r. 
Crane,  id.  119;  Cummins  v.  White.  4  Blackf. 
356;  Woodman  v.  Freeman,  25  Maiie.  531; 
Humphreys  (-.Atlantic  MillingCo.  98  Mo.  542. 
(b)  The  defence  of  disability  should  be 
raised  by  demurrer  or  plea,  and  not  by  answer. 
Hoyt  r.  Hoyt,  58  Vt.  538;  Chicago  v.  Cam- 
eron, 22  HI.  App.  91;  see  Spillane  v.  Missouri 
Pacific  Ry.  Co.  (Mo.)  20  S.  W.  Rep.  293; 
Bush  v.  Linthicum,  59  Md.  344;  Oregonian 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Oregon  Ry.  Co.  10  Sawyer,  464 
The  plea  of  insanity  should  allege  inquisi- 
tion found,  or  the  appointment  of  a  committee. 
Dudgeon  r.  Watson,  23  Fed.  Rep.  161;  see 
Bateman  v.  Snoddy  (Ind.),  32  N.  E.  Rep.  327. 
A  plea  that  the  plaintiff  is  not  a  corporation 
or  citizen,  as  alleged  in  the  complaint,  is  ground 
for  a  separate  plea,  and  is  waived  if  other  de- 
fences are  also  pleaded.  Oregonian  Ry.  Co.  V. 
Oregon  Ry.  &  Nav.  Co.  27  Fed.  Rep.  277. 


DIFFERENT    GROUNDS    OF    PLEAS. 


*631 


plaintiff,  or  one  of  several  plaintiffs,  is  a  fictitious  person  ; 10  or  was  dead 
at  the  time  of  commencing  the  suit.11  So,  if  a  plaintiff  files  a  bill  stat- 
ing himself  to  sue  as  administrator  or  executor,  a  plea  that  he  is  not 
administrator  or  executor  will  be  good.1-  Where  a  plaintiff  entitled 
himself  as  administrator,  and  the  defendant  pleaded  that  the  supposed 
intestate  was  living,  the  plea  was  allowed.13  A  plea  that  the  plaintiff 
is  not  heir  to  the  person  under  whom  he  claims  as  heir,  has  also, 
as  we  have  seen,  been  considered  a  good  plea.14  *  In  like  manner,  *631 
a  plea  that  the  plaintiff  is  not  a  partner,  has  been  allowed  to  a  bill 
filed  by  a  person  claiming  in  that  character.1  Upon  the  same  principle, 
if,  from  any  circumstance  not  stated  in  the  bill,  it  can  be  shown  that 
nothing  ever  vested  in  the  plaintiff,  or  that  the  title  which  the  plaintiff 
had  has  been  transferred  to  another,  the  defendant  may  show  the  cir- 
cumstance by  way  of  plea. 

2.  Pleas  to  the  person  of  the  defendant  are  more  limited  than  those 
to  the  person  of  the  plaintiff;  for  it  is  a  rule  at  Law,  that  persons  who 
are  disabled  to  sue,  cannot  plead  their  own  disabilities,  when  they  are 
themselves  sued,  in  any  case  where  it  is  sought  to  compel  the  perform- 
ance of  a  duty  by  the  defendant.'2 

This  rule  will  not,  however,  apply  to  cases  where  the  proceeding  is  in 
rem,  and  the  disability  is  of  such  a  nature  that,  besides  the  personal  dis- 
qualification which  it  imposes,  the  interest  in  the  defendant's  property 
which  is  the  subject  of  the  suit  has  become  vested  in  another.3  Upon 
this  principle,  it  is  presumed  that  persons  outlawed  or  attainted  of  treason 
or  ftdony  may  state  their  outlawry  or  attainder  to  the  Court  by  way  of 
plea,  for  the  purpose  of  showing  that  whatever  interest  they  had  in  the 
property  is  vested  in  the  Crown  ; 4  in  the  same  manner  that  bankrupts 
may,  if  sued  respecting  property  which  has  become  vested  in  their 
assignees,  plead  their  bankruptcy,  whether  it  happened  before  or  after 
the    bill   was    filed,    in  abatement  of  the  suit.5     In  fact,    such  a  plea 


1°  Coop.  Eq.  PI.  249;  Com.  Dig.  Abatement, 
E.  16;  Bac.  Ab.  Abatement,  F. ;  1  Wils.  302; 
Gilb.  C.  P.  248. 

11  Coop.  Eq.  PI.  24!);  Bac.  Ab.  Abatement, 
L.:  Com.  Dig.  Abatement,  E.  17. 

12  Winn  v.  Fletcher,  1  Vern.  473;  Simons  r. 
Milman,  2  Sim.  241;  Fry  v.  Richardson,  10 
Sim.  475.  Such  a  plea,  however,  is  untenable, 
if  the  plaintiff  take  out  letters  of  administration 
before  the  hearing.  Horner  ».  Horner,  23  L.  J. 
Ch.  10,  V.  C.  K.;  see  also  ante,  p.  318. 

13  ()nl  v.  Huddleston,  2  Dick.  510,  512,  cited 
1  Cox,  198. 

"  Am, ,  pp.  604,  009;  see  Bourke  v.  Kelly,  1 
Hogan,  172;  Glnason  v.  Cook,  1  Hogan,  297; 
Story,  Eq.  I'!.  §727.  Formerly,  it  was  doubted 
whether  it  was  not  necessary,  in  such  cases,  to 
state  in  the  plea  who  was  the  heir-at-law  ;  but 
now  it  seems  that  such  a  statement  is  unneces- 
sary. Jones  v.  Davis,  10  Ves.  202.  204,  265. 
As  to  a  plea  that  the  plaintiff  is  not  the  son  of 
defendant,  see  Wilson  »;.  Hammonds,  L.  R.  8 
Eq.  323. 


1  Ante,  pp.  005,  620. 

2  Beanies  on  Pleas,  122. 

3  Turner  v.  Robinson,  1  S.  &  S.  3. 

4  Ante,  p.  156. 

5  Turner  v.  Robinson,  ubi  supra;  see  also 
Turner  v.  Nieholls,  10  Sim.  505:  Lane  v.  Smith, 
14  Beav.  49;  ante,  p.  158.  A  similar  rule 
applied,  in  the  case  of  insolvent  debtors  ;  see 
Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  732.  For  form  of  plea,  see 
Pepper  r.  Henzell.  2  II.  &  M.  486.  For  plea  of 
execution  of  trust  deed  registered  under  the 
Bankruptcy  Act  of  1801  (24  &  25  Vic.  c.  134), 
see  Metropolitan  Hank  v.  Offord,  L.  R.  10  Eq. 
398.  An  adjudication  in  a  foreign  country  may 
be  pleaded  to  an  action  brought  here  in  respect 
of  a  cause  of  action  arising  in  such  country,  see 
Smith  r.  Buchanan.  1  East,  0:  Potter  v.  Brown, 
5  East,  124:  Phillips  r.  Allen.  8  B  &  C.  477: 
Lewis  p.  Owen,  4  B.  &  Aid.  654.  For  form  of 
plea,  see  Sidaw  y  v.  Hay.  3  B  &  C.  12;  Frith 
v.  Wollaston,  7  Ex.  194.  As  to  'he  necessity 
of  the  parties  being  domiciled  in  the  foreign 
country,  see  Bartley  v.  Hodges,  1   B.  &  S.  375, 

027 


632 


PLEAS. 


amounts  to  no  more  than  a  plea  of  want  of  interest  in  the  subject-matter 
of  the  bill. 

The  rule,  that  a  person  who  is  under  disability  cannot  plead  his  own 
disqualification,  will  not  extend  to  cases  where  the  disqualification  is 
only  partial ;  thus,  it  seems  that  a  woman,  sued  as  a  feme  sole,  may 
plead  that  she  is  covert,6  and  that  her  husband  is  not  joined  as  a  party.7 

A  defendant  may  also  plead  that  he  is  not  the  person  he  is  alleged  to 
be,  or  does  not  sustain  the  character  he  is  stated  to  bear,  such  as  heir, 
executor,  or  administrator.8  He  may  likewise  show  that  he  is  not  sole 
heir,  executor,  or  administrator,  and  that  others  are  joined  with  him  in 
that  capacity  ; 9  such  a  plea,  however,  partakes  more  of  the  nature 
*  632  of  a  plea  for  want  of  parties  than  *  of  a  plea  to  a  person.  He 
may  also  plead  the  disability  of  a  co-defendant. 

If  a  defendant  has  not  that  interest  in  the  subject  of  a  suit  which  can 
make  him  liable  to  the  demands  of  the  plaintiff,  and  the  bill,  alleging 
that  he  has  or  claims  an  interest,  avoids  a  demurrer,  he  may  plead  the 
matter  necessary  to  show  that  he  has  no  interest.2  Thus,  where  a  wit- 
ness to  a  will  was  made  a  defendant  to  a  bill,  brought  by  an  heir-at-law 
to  discover  the  circumstances  attending  the  execution,  and  the  bill  con- 
tained a  charge  of  pretence  of  interest  by  the  defendant :  though  a  de- 
murrer for  want  of  interest  was  overruled,  because  it  admitted  the  truth 
of  the  charge  to  the  contrary  in  the  bill,  yet  the  Court  expressed  an 
opinion  that  the  defence  might  have  been  made  by  plea.3 

It  is  to  be  observed,  that  a  plea  of  want  of  interest  in  the  defendant 
is  proper  only  where  the  case  is  such  that  he  cannot  satisfy  the  suit  by 
general  disclaimer.'* 

III.  It  has  been  already  stated,5  that  the  object  of  pleas  to  the  bill 
is  to  show  that,  although  the  plaintiff  may  be  entitled  to  the  relief  he 
asks  against  the  defendant,  he  is  not  entitled  to  have  it  in  that  suit ;  or 
that  the  bill  as  framed  is  insufficient  to  answer  the  object.6 


S.  C.  nam.  Bartlett  v.  Hodges  8  Jur.  X.  S. 
52.  An  assignee's  rights  under  a  foreign  adju- 
dication are  recognized  in  the  English  Courts  as 
well  against  creditors  of  the  debtor  as  against 
the  debtor  himself.  See  Solomon  v.  Ross,  1  H. 
Bl  131,  n.:  Phillips  v.  Hunter.  2  H.  Bl.  402; 
Alivon  v.  Fmnival,  3  L.  J.  Ex.  241:  lit  Blith- 
man.  L.  R  2  Eq.  23:  He  Davidson.  L.  P..  15 
Eq.  383:  Semphill  r.  Queensland  Sheep  In\ . 
•  ...  39  I..  T.  737;  Levi  v.  Avers,  3  App.  Cas. 
• 

6  Beames  on  Pleas,  130:  Story.  Eq.  PI.  §  732. 
But  an  order  is.  it  seems,  necessary  to  ennMe 
her  to  put  in  the  plea  separate  from  her  hus- 
band. Hevgate  r.  Thompson.  L.  R.  8  Eq.  355; 
Higjrjnson'fl.  Wilson.  17  L.  J.  Ch.  22. 

"  Hancocks  v.  Lahlache,  3  C.  P.  D.  197. 

8  Ibid.;  Ld.  Red.  234;  Cooke  v.  Gittings,  21 


Beav.  497:  and  see  Jones  r.  Williams.  10  Jur. 
X.  S.  1068;  13  W.  R.  1,  V.  C.  S.;  Hinde  v. 
Skelton,  2  H.  &  M.  690;  Tempest  v.  Lord 
Camnvs,  W.  X.  (1866)  16:  14  W.  R.  327,  M. 
R. ;  Story.  Eq.  PI.  §  732.  For  forms  of  such 
plea,  see  2  Van  Hey.  95. 

s  Beames  on  Pleas,  130. 

i  Sergrove  >•.  Mayhew,  2  MX.  &  G.  97,  99; 
14  Jur.  158;  Taylor  r.  Wemyss,  L.  R.  8  Eq. 
512. 

•-  Ld.  Red.  235. 

3  Plummer  v.  May.  1  Ves.  Sr.  426:  Xutting 
r.  Hehdin.  14  Beav.  11:  see  also  Cartwright  v. 
Hat.lv.  3  Bro.  C.  C.  238;  1  Ves.  Jr.  292;  Story, 
Eq.  PI.  §  734. 

*  Ld.  Red.  235;  zee  post,  Chap.  XVI. 

s  Ante,  p.  627. 

6  See  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  735. 


(a)  As  to  the  effect  of  a  roreign  discharcr0  in      r.    La    Soci'ete   Industrielle,  25  Q.  B.  D.  399; 
bankruptcv  upon  a  dome-tic  contract,  see  Gibbs      Elli*  r.  M' Henry,  I,.  R.  6  C  P   228,  234. 

"  628 


DIFFERENT    GROUNDS    OF    PLEAS. 


633 


1.  Where  a  bill  seeks  relief,  a  defendant  may  plead  that  there  is 
another  suit  already  depending,  in  this  or  in  another  Court  of  Equity, 
for  the  same  matter.7  This  plea  corresponds  with  the  exceptio  litis  pen- 
dentis  of  the  civilians,  and  is  analogous  to  the  plea,  at  Common  Law, 
that  there  is  another  action  depending.8 

But,  although  it  is  necessary  that  the  first  suit  should  be  for  the  same 
matter  as  the  second,  the  second  suit  need  not  be  for  the  whole 
matter  embraced  by  the  first;  9  it  is,  however,  requisite  *  that  the  *  C33 
whole  effect  of  the  second  suit  should  be  attainable  in  the  first ;  1 
and  if  it  appears  upon  the  face  of  the  plea  that  this  is  not  the  case,  the 
Court  will  at  once  overrule  it.2  It  sometimes,  however,  happens  that 
the  second  bill  embraces  the  whole  subject  in  dispute  more  completely 
than  the  first :  in  such  cases,  the  practice  appears  to  be  to  dismiss  the 
first  bill  with  costs  and  to  direct  the  defendants  in  the  second  cause  to 
answer,  upon  being  paid  the  costs  of  a  plea  allowed,  which  puts  the  case 
upon  the  second  bill  in  the  same  situation  that  it  would  have  been  in  if 
the  first  bill  had  been  dismissed  before  the  filing  of  the  second.3 

A  plea  of  another  suit  depending  will  be  good,  whether  the  other  suit 
be  in  this  or  any  other  Court  of  Equity  in  England.4     It  will  not,. how- 


1  Ld.  Red.  246;  Coop.  Eq.  PI.  272;  Beanies 
on  Pleas,  134;  Cons.  Orel.  XIV.  6,  7;  see  also 
Long  v.  Stone,  9  Hare,  542;  Way  v.  Bragaw, 
16  X.J.  Eq.  213;  see  Johnson  v.  Bower,  4  Hen. 
&  M.  487;  Curd  v.  Lewis,  1  Dana,  302;  Cum- 
mins v.  Benuet,  8  Paige,  79;  Story,  Eq.  PI. 
§  737;  Matthews  v.  Roberts,  1  Green  Ch.  338; 
Cleveland  &c.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of  Erie,  27 
Penn.  St.  380;  Price  v.  Mallett,  2  Hayw.  244. 
It  is  a  former  bill  brought  by  the  same  plain- 
tiff, or  some  person  in  the  same  right,  which  is 
thus  pleadable.  Dumford  v.  Dumford,  Rep. 
temp.  Finch,  179;  Simpson  v.  Brewster,  9  Paige, 
245.  The  defendant  may  content  himself  with 
stating  the  pendency  aud  object  of  the  former 
suit,  and  averring  that  the  present  suit  was 
brought  for  the  same  matters;  Beameson  Pleas, 
330;  Eq.  Drafts.  Sb&;post,  Vol.  III.;  or  he  may 
omit  the  averment  that  the  suits  are  for  the 
same  subject-matter,  provided  he  sta'es  facts 
sufficient  to  show  that  they  are  so.  Flagg  v. 
Bonnel,  10  X.  J.  Eq.  82;  Davison  v.  Johnson, 
18  X.  J.  Eq.  114.  A  plea  of  another  suit  pend- 
ing should  be  taken  before  the  hearing,  and  it 
can  only  be  a  good  obj°ction,  when  the  first 
suit  is  between  all  the  same  parties,  and  a  full 
decree  can  be  therein  had.  Kartell  r.  Van 
Buren,  3  Edw.  Ch.  20:  see  post,  p.  635.  For 
form  of  such  pleas,  see  2  Van  Hey.  117;  Beanies 
on  Pleas,  330. 

As  to  plea  on  the  ground  of  splitting  of 
causes,  see  Ld.  Red.  221;  Dear  v.  Webster.  !•"> 
W.  R.  395;  W.  X.  (1867)  43  ;  ante,  p.  330, 
note. 

8  Beames  on  Pleas,  134. 

8  Moor  r.  Welr.li  Copper  Co.  1  Eq.  Cas.  Abr. 


39,  pi.  14;  Saunders  v.  Frost,  5  Pick.  275y276. 
See  Mann  v.  Richardson.  21  Pick.  259. 

i  Law  v.  Rigby,  4  Bro.  C.  C.  60,  63;  iFiekford 
r.  Hunter,  5  Sim.  122.  129;  Way  v.  Btogaw,  lti 
X  J.  Eq.  213,  218.  The  former  suit  need  not 
be  between  the  same  parties.  Green,  v.  Xeal, 
2  Heisk.  217.  But  its  equity  and  effect  should 
be  the  same.  Macey  v.  Childress,  2  Tenn. 
Ch.  24. 

-  Pickford  o.  Hunter,  ubl  supra. 

3  Crofts  v.  Wortley,  1  Ch  Cas.  241  ;  Ld.  Red. 
248. 

4  Cons.  O  d.  XIV.  0.  7;  Ld.  Red.  246; 
Behrens  v.  Sieveking,  2  M.  &  C.  602.  Upon 
issue  taken  to  the  pica  of  a  former-suit  pending 
in  another  Chancery  Court  of  the  same  State, 
the  plea  was  held  to  be  sustained  to  the  extent 
that  the  two  suits  were  for  the  same  matter  and 
the  same  object,  but  the  dismissal  of  the  bill  to 
that  extent  was  made  without  prejudice,  and 
with  leave,  if  the  former  suit  should  be  discon- 
tinued before  decree  (the  position  of  the  parties 
being  reversed  in  the  two  suits),  to  the  com- 
plainant to  tile  a  supplemental  bill  to  bring  the 
fact  before  the  Court,  and  for  the  same  relief. 
And  query,  whether  the  plea  is  good,  where  the 
complainants  are  not  the  same  in  both  suits, 
unless  it  shows  that  the  former  suit  has  pro- 
ceeded to  a  decree.  Moore  v.  Holt,  3  Tenn.  Ch. 
141.  See'  infra,  p.  •  ;•'!■">.  n.  8.  Where  two  Courts 
have  concurrent  jurisdiction,  the  fact  that  an 
appeal  lies  from  one  to  the  other  will  not 
authorize  a  proceeding  in  the  appellate  Court, 
pending  an  action  for  the  same  cause  in  the 
Court  below.  Cleveland  &c.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  City 
of  Erie  27  Penn.  St.  380. 

629 


633 


PLEAS. 


ever,  be  a  good  plea,  if  it  is  depending  in  a  Court  in  another  coun- 
try ;  8  («)  therefore,  such  a  plea  will  not  prevail  where  the  suit  already- 
pending  is  in  Ireland,6  or  in  the  colonies.7  Where  the  original  suit  has 
been  commenced  in  a  Court  of  inferior  jurisdiction,  the  plea  will  not  be 
good  if  the  defendant  has  avoided  the  effect  of  the  suit,  by  going  out  of 
the  jurisdiction  of  that  Court.8 

A  suit  depending  must,  to  afford  a  good  ground  for  a  plea  in  Equity, 
be  a  suit  in  a  Court  of  Equity  ; 9  and  therefore,  where  an  infant  legatee 
sued  an  executor  in  the  Ecclesiastical  Court,  and  afterwards  in  Chan- 
cery, it  was  held  that  the  suit  depending  in  the  Ecclesiastical  Court 


5  The  mere  pendency  of  a  suit  in  a  foreign 
Court,  or  in  a  Court  of  the  United  States,  can- 
not be  pleaded  in  abatement  or  in  bar  to  a  suit 
for  the  same  cause  in  a  State  Court.  Mitchell 
v.  Bunce,  2  Paige,  606;  Salmon  v.  Wooton,  9 
Dana,  423;  Hatch  v.  Spofford,  22  Conn.  495; 
overruling  Hart  v.  Granger,  1  Conn.  154;  see 
Low  v.  Mussey,  41  Vt.  393;  Brown  v.  Lexing- 
ton &  Danville  R.  R.  Co.  13  N.  J.  Eq.  191. 

The  pendency  of  a  suit  at  Law  in  another 
State  for  the  identical  object  and  purpose  is  no 
defence  to  a  bill  in  Equity,  and,  a  fortiori,  if 
the  suit  be  by  the  defendant  against  the  plain- 
tiff in  Equitv.  Fulton  r.  Golden,  25  N.  J.  Eq. 
353.  And  in  Tennessee,  an  attachment  bill  by 
a  creditor  may  be  prosecuted,  although  the 
plaintiff  is  at  the  same  time  prosecuting  a  suit 
in  the  Chancery  Court  of  another  State  for  the 
purpose  of  subjecting  property  of  the  debtor  to 
the  satisfaction  of  the  same  debt.  Lockwood  v. 
Nye,  2  Swan,  515. 

The  pendency  of  a  prior  suit  at  Law  in  a 
State  Court  is  not  a  bar  to  a  suit  in  a  Circuit 
Court  of  the  United  States,  or  in  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  District  of  Columbia,  by  the  same 
plaintiff  against  the  same  defendant  for  the 
same -cause  of  action.  Stanton  v.  Embrey,  93 
U.  S.  548.  Nor  is  the  pendency  of  a  prior  suit  in 
Equity  (Insurance  Co.  v.  Brune,  96  U.  S.  588); 
when  the  suit  is  on  the  same  claim.  Grider  v. 
Appcrson,  32  Ark.  332.  See  also  Loring  r. 
Marsh.  2  Cliff.  522;  Smith  v.  Lathrop,  44  Penn. 
St.  328;  Davis  v.  Morton,  4  Bush,  444.  And 
the  pendency  of  a  general  creditor's  bill  in  the 
State  Court  does  not  preclude  a  creditor,  who 
:is  no   party  thereto,   from   bringing  an  action 


(«)  The  cited  case  of  Lord  Dillon  v.  A  ha- 
res is  not  a  reliable  authority  under  the 
present  English  practice,  the  rule  now  being 
that,  as  the  forms  of  procedure  and  remedies 
may  differ  in  the  two  countries,  there  is  no 
presumption  that  more  than  one  suit  is  vex- 
atious, and  a  special  case  must  be  made  out, 
especially  in  suits  in  personam,  and  before  de- 
cree, to  induce  the  Court  to  interfere.  See 
McHenry  v.  Lewis,  22  Ch.  D.  397;  21  id.  202; 
Peruvian  Guano  Co.  v.  Bockwoldt,  23  Ch.  D. 
225;  Mutrie  v.  Binney,  35  id.  614;  The  Rein- 
G30 


in  a  United  States  Court  to  recover  judgment 
on  his  demands.  Parsons  v.  Greenville  Stc.  R. 
Co.  1  Hughes,  279.  But  the  pendency  of  a 
suit  in  a  State  Court  of  another  State,  in  which 
property  enough  to  satisfy  the  demand  has 
been  attached,  is  ground  for  the  abatement  of  a 
suit  in  the  Circuit  Court  of  the  United  States. 
Lawnnce  v.  Remington,  6  Biss.  44.  The  pend- 
ency of  a  suit  against  the  defendant  in  another 
State  cannot  be  pleaded  in  bar  or  in  abatement 
of  an  action  in  the  Courts  of  Illinois,  even  if  be- 
tween the  same  parties,  and  for  the  same  cause 
of  action.  Allen  v  Watt,  69  III.  655.  See  also 
Grider  r.  Apperson,  32  Ark.  332;  Cole  v.  F. it- 
craft,  47  Md.  312.  The  defence  is  only  avail- 
able in  the  last  suit,  not  in  the  first.  Ratzer  v. 
Ratzer,  2  Abb.  N.  Cas.  461.  It  is  a  plea  in 
abatement,  not  in  bar.  Sullings  v.  Goodyear 
Dental  Vulcanite  Co.  36  Mich.  313.  And  see 
Phosphate  Sewage  Co.  v.  Molleson,  1  App.  Cas. 
780,  where  a  stay  of  proceedings  in  Scotland 
was  refused  because  of  the  pendency  of  a  suit 
for  the  same  matter  in  England. 

0  Lord  Dillon  v.  Alvares,  4  Ves.  357,  359. 

1  Fo.-ter  ».  Vassall,  3  Atk.  587,  589;  see  also 
Bavlev  v.  Edwards,  3  Swanst.  703,  710.  See 
now  The  Mali  Ivo,  L.  R.  2  A.  &  E.  356;  The 
Catterina  Chiazzare,  1  P.  D.  368;  The  Delta, 
25  W.  R.  46;  Norton  v.  Florence  Land  Co.  7 
Ch.  D.  332;  Wilson  v.  Ferrand,  L.  R.  13  Eq. 
362;  Cox  v.  Mitchell,  7  C.  B.  N.  S.  55;  Alex- 
ander i*.  Adams,  16  L.  T.  384. 

8  Ld.  Red.  246. 

9  See  Way  v.  Bragaw,  16  N.  J.  Eq.  213; 
Fulton  v.  Golden,  25  id.  353. 


beck,  60  L.  T.  209  ;  The  Christiansborg,  10 
P.  D.  141;  Armstrong  v.  Armstrong.  [1892] 
P.  98;  Hyman  v.  Helm,  24  Ch.  D.  531.  See 
Lynch  v.  Hartford  Fire  Ins.  Co.  17  Fed.  Rep. 
627:  Harper  v.  O'Brien,  24  id.  145;  Scott  v. 
Rand,  118  Mass.  215;  Cole  v.  Flitcraft,  47  Md. 
312;  Paine  v.  Schenectady  Ins.  Co.  11  R.  I. 
411.  After  an  unsuccessful  plea  to  the  jurisdic- 
tion, the  defendant  may,  it  seems,  answer  to 
the  merits.  Battelle  r.  Yo^ngstown  Rolling 
Mill  Co.  10  Lea,  355. 


DIFFERENT   GROUNDS    OF    PLEAS. 


*  634 


could  not  be  pleaded  to  the  suit  in  Chancery  :  because  there  was  not  the 
same  security  for  an  infant's  advantage  in  the  Ecclesiastical  Court,  as  in 
Chancery.10 

*  It  appears  to  have  been  held  formerly,  that  if,  after  a  suit  *  634 
commenced  at  Commom  Law,  a  bill  should  be  exhibited  in  this 
Court,  to  be  relieved  for  the  same  matter,  the  dependency  of  the  action 
at  Law  might  be  admitted  as  a  good  plea,  and  the  defendant  would  not 
be  put  to  a  motion  for  an  election  or  dismission.1  The  practice  in  this 
respect,  has,  however,  undergone  a  material  alteration  ;  and  now,  if  a 
plaintiff  sues  a  defendant  at  the  same  time  and  for  the  same  cause  at 
Common  Law  and  in  Equity,  the  defendant  may,  after  full  answer  put 
in,  or,  in  case  no  answer  is  required,  after  the  expiration  of  the  time  for 
the  service  of  interrogatories,  obtain,  as  of  course,  on  motion  or  petition,2 
an  order  that  the  plaintiff  may  take  his  election  in  which  Court  he  will 
proceed ;  and  he  cannot  plead  the  pendency  of  the  suit  at  Common  Law, 
in  bar  of  the  suit  in  Equity.3 

It  is  stated  in  an  anonymous  case  in  Moseley,4  that  the  objection  that 
another  suit  is  depending  for  the  same  matter,  may,  in  the  Court  of 
Chancery,  be  taken  by  motion,  instead  of  plea ;  but  Lord  Eldon  has  said, 
that,  according  to  the  practice,  the  regular  way  of  obtaining  this  refer- 
ence is  by  plea.5  (a)     There  are  cases,  however,  in  which  the  Court  will 


w  Howell  v.  Waldron,  2  Ch.  Cas.  85. 
i  Beames's  Orders,  177;  Ld.  Red.  249. 

2  See  post,  Chap.  XIX.  §  4,  Election.  For 
forms  of  motion  paper  and  petition,  see  Vol.  III. 

3  See  post,  Chap.  XIX.  §4,  Election;  Ld. 
Red.  249;  Cons.  Old.  XLII.  5,  G,  7;  see  Story, 
Eq.  PI.  §§  741,  742  ;  Livingston  v.  Kane,  3  John. 
Ch.  224;  Sanger  v.  Wood,  id.  416;  Rogers  v. 
Vosburg,  4  id.  84;  Gibbs  v.  Parkinson,  4  Hen. 
&  M.  415.  Where  a  suit  is  pending  for  the 
same  cause  in  a  Court  of  Law,  all  that  the  de- 
fendant can  ask  is  an  order  putting  the  plain- 
tiff to  his  election  whether  he  will  proceed  at 
Law  or  in  Equity.  But  the  plaintiff  will  not  be 
put  to  his  election,  unless  the  suit  at  Law  is  for 
the  same  cause,  and  the  remedy  afforded  co-ex- 
tensive and  equally  beneficial  with  the  remedy 


in  Equity.  Way  v.  Bragaw,  16  N.  J.  Eq.  213; 
see  Conover  v.  Conover,  Saxton  (N.  J.),  409; 
Rogers  v.  Vosburg,  4  John.  Ch.  84;  1  Hoff.  Ch. 
Pr.  342;  Story,  Eq.  PL  §  742.  Where  the 
remedies  at  Law  and  in  Equity  are  inconsist- 
ent, any  decisive  act  of  the  party,  with  the 
knowledge  of  his  rights  and  of  the  facts,  deter- 
mines his  election.  Sanger  v.  Wood.  3  John. 
Ch.  416,  421.  So  if  he  neglects  to  make  his 
election  in  proper  time.  Conover  v.  Conover, 
1  Saxton  (N.  J.),  403,  409;  Rogers  v.  Vosburg, 
4  John.  Ch.  84.  He  need  not  make  his  election 
until  after  the  defendant  has  answered.  Con- 
over r.  Conover,  supra. 

4  P.  268. 

5  Murray  v.  Shadwell,  17  Ves.  353. 


(a)  This  defence  should  be  taken  by  plea 
and  not  by  answer.  Battell  i>.  Matot,  58  Vt. 
271 ;  Pierce  v.  Feagans,  39  Fed.  Rep.  587.  See 
Phosphate  Sewage  Co.  r.  Molleson,  1  App.  Cas. 
780;  Stephens  r.  Monongahela  Nat.  Bank,  111 
U.  S.  197  ;  Riley  v.  Lyons,  11  Hefck.  246;  Eaton 
v.  Eaton,  08  Mich.  158;  Cole  v.  ITitcraft.  47  Md. 
312.  The  plea  is  usually  referred  forthwith,  on 
motion,  to  a  Master  to  determine  whether  both 
suits  are  fur  the  same  matter.  Battell  V.  Ma- 
tot, 58  Vt.  271.  In  a  suit  in  Equity,  brought  Cur 
infringing  a  patent,  against  two  defendants,  a 
plea  of  another  suit  pending  between  the  same 
plaintiff  and  one  of  these  defendants,  which 
avers  that  the  other  is  only  that  defendant's 
agent,  does  not  make  the  alleged  principal  the 


only  true  defendant,  and  is  bad.  Estes  r. 
Worthington,  24  Blatcb.  343;  30  Fed.  Rep.  465. 
The  prior  suit  is  not  a  bar  when  the  later  suit 
is  broader  as  to  parties  and  subject-matter. 
Massachusetts  Mutual  L.  Ins.  Co.  ».  Chicago 
&  A.  R.  Co.  13  Fed.  Rep.  857;  Merchants"  Int'l 
S.  II.  Co.  o.  Lyon,  12  id.  63.  The  plea  of  pen- 
dency  of  another  suit  should  be  overruled  when 
the  defendant  necessitates  the  bringing  of  the 
second  suit,  and  to  avoid  the  law  of  the  Statute 
of  Limitations,  the  plaintiff  institutes  the  second 
before  dismissing  the  first.  N.  &  W.  R.  Co.  P. 
Nunnally,  88  Va.  546.  So  the  act  of  a  mort- 
gagee in  receiving  new  rents  opens  and  super- 
sedes a  former  order  of  redemption.  Tetrault 
r.  Labbe\  155  Mass.  497.  If  the  plaintiff  in  a 
631 


GSl 


PLEAS. 


interfere  to  restrain  a  second  suit  brought  against  the  defendant,  for  the 
game  matter,  upon  motion,  without  requiring  him  to  plead  the  pendency 
of  the  former  suit ;  as  in  the  case  of  two  or  more  suits,  instituted  en 
behalf  of  an  infant  for  the  same  matter :  in  such  case,  the  Court  will, 
as  we  have  seen,  upon  representation  of  the  fact,  immediately  direct 
an  inquiry  which  suit  is  most  for  the  infant's  benefit,  without  requiring 
the  defendant  to  plead  the  pendency  of  another  suit.6  It  is  to  be 
observed,  however,  that  in  the  case  of  suits  instituted  on  behalf  of  in- 
fants, the  reference  is  not  to  inquire  into  the  fact  of  two  or  more  suits 
having  been  instituted,  but  which  of  them  is  most  for  the  benefit  of 

the  infant. 
*  C35  *  In  the  case,  also,  of  creditors  suing  an  executor  or  administra- 
tor, after  a  decree  for  an  account  at  the  suit  of  other  creditors, 
the  Court  will,  upon  motion  by  the  defendant,  stay  the  proceedings  in 
the  second  cause,  without  requiring  him  to  plead  the  pendency  of  the 
first  suit ; J  but  both  courses  are  open  to  him,  and,  in  some  cases,  that  of 
a  plea  may  be  more  advantageous.2 

It  is  not  necessary  to  the  sufficiency  of  a  plea  of  this  nature,  that  the 
former  suit  should  be  precisely  between  the  same  parties  as  the  latter,3 
for,  if  a  man  institutes  a  suit,  and  afterwards  sells  part  of  the  property 


6  Ante,  p.  69. 

1  Post,  Chap.   XIX.   §  1,   Dismissing  Bills 
and  staying  Proceedings. 

2  Pickford  v.  Hunter,  5  Sim.  122;  see  Miers 


v.    Zanesville   &  Maysville    Turnpike   Co.  11 
Ohio,  273. 

s  See  Hartell  v.  Van  Buren,  3  Edw.  Ch.  20; 
Green  v.  Neal,  2  Heisk.  217. 


second  bill  in  Equity  does  not  seek  relief,  if  the 
first  hill  is  dismissed,  then,  on  the  first  bill  being 
dismissed,  the  second  is  rightly  dismissed  also, 
(lark  r.  Patterson,  158  Mass.  388.  It  is  valid 
defence  that  the  plaintiff  in  the  second  suit, 
as  defendant  in  a  pending  suit  against  him 
brought  by  the  present  defendant,  has  there 
pleaded  the  same  claim  in  set-off.  Pennsyl- 
vania R.  Co.  v.  Davenport  (Penn.),  25  Atl. 
Rep.  890.  A  pending  action  at  Law  for  the 
same  cause  excludes  the  jurisdiction  of  Equity 
if  complete.  Chase  v.  Chase  (N.  J.),  21  Atl. 
914.  The  pendency  of  a  suit  in  Equity  is  not 
in  general  ground  for  a  plea  in  abatement  to  an 
action  at  Law.  Mattel  v.  Conant,  150  Mass.  418. 
The  question  whether  a  Court  of  Equity  should 
exercise  jurisdiction,  or  leave  the  case  to  another 
tribunal,  may  be  raised  by  demurrer  when  the 
facts  appear  sufficiently  by  the  bill.  Martin  r. 
Powning,  L.  R.  4  Ch.  356;  Sears  v.  Carrier,  4 
Allen,  339;  Hurst  v.  Everett,  21  Fed.  Rep.  218; 
Curtis  V.  Piedmont  Co.  109  N.  C.  401;  see  Or- 
rell  r.  Busch,  L.  R.  5  Ch.  467;  Lucas  v.  Sig- 
gers,  L.  R.  7  Ch.  517.  The  plaintiff  will  not  be 
required  to  elect  between  suits  at  Law  and  in 
Equity  when  the  suit  at  Law  is  not  for  the  same 
cause,  and  the  remedy  at  Law  co-extensive  and 
equally  beneficial  with  the  remedy  in  Equity. 
Way  r.  Bragaw,  16  N.  J.  Eq.  213.  See  Tansey 
v.  McDonnell,  142  Mass.  220. 
632 


A  suit  at  Law  in  the  Federal  Courts  does  not 
preclude  a  suit  in  Equity  between  the  same  par- 
ties and  in  the  same  Court,  for  the  same  cause 
of  action,  if  the  controversy  is  of  equitable  cog- 
nizance. Thorne  v.  Towanda  Tanning  Co.  15 
Fed.  Rep.  289.  It  is  now  settled  that  the  pen- 
dency of  a  prior  suit  in  a  State  Court  is  not  a  bar 
to  a  suit  in  a  Circuit  Court  of  the  United  States, 
by  the  same  plaintiff  against  the  same  defendant 
for  the  same  cause  of  action.  See  Stanton  v.  Em- 
brey,  93  U.  S.  548;  Brooks  r.  Mills  County,  4  Dil- 
lon! 524 ;  Loring  v.  Marsh,  2  Cliff.  311, 322 ;  Pierce 
r.  Feagans,  39  Fed.  Rep.  587;  Radford  r.  Fol- 
som,  14  Fed.  Rep.  97;  Latham  v.  Chafee,  7  id. 
520;  Logan  v.  Greenlaw,  12  id.  10;  Crescent 
City  L.  S.  Co.  o.  Butchers'  U.  L.  S.  Co.  id.  225; 
Currie  v.  Lewiston,  15  id.  377  ;  Weaver  v. 
Field,  10  id.  22;  Martin  r.  Baldwin.  19  id.  340; 
Sharon  r.  Hill,  26  id.  337;  22  id.  28;  Hurst  v. 
Everett,  21  id.  218:  Liggett  v.  Glenn,  4  U.  S. 
App.  438;  51  Fed.  Rep.  381 ;  Dwight  v.  Central 
Vermont  R.  Co.  20  Blatcb.  200;  Griswold  r. 
Central  Vermont  R.  Co.  id.  212;  Oneida  County 
Bank  v.  Bonnev,  101  N.  Y.  173;  Hollister  v. 
Stewart,  111  N.  Y.  644;  Ruegger  v.  Indianapo- 
lis R.  Co.  103  111.  449;  Villavaso  v.  Barthet,  39 
La.  Ann.  247;  State  v.  New  Orleans  &c  R.  Co. 
42  La.  Ann.  11 ;  Gay  v.  Brierfield  Coal  &  I.  Co. 
94  Ala.  303. 


DIFFERENT   GROUNDS   OF   PLEAS.  *  63 J 

to  another,  who  files  an  original  bill  touching  the  part  so  purchased  by 
him,  a  plea  of  the  former  suit  depending  touching  the  whole  property 
will  hold,  although  filed  by  a  different  plaintiff.4  So,  where  one  part- 
owner  of  a  ship  filed  a  bill  against  the  ship's  husband  for  an  account, 
and  afterwards  the  same  part-owner  and  the  rest  of  the  owners  filed 
another  bill  for  the  same  purpose,  the  pendency  of  the  first  suit  was  held 
a  good  plea  to  the  last  ;5  for,  although  the  first  bill  was  insufficient  for 
want  of  parties,  yet,  by  the  second  bill,  the  defendant  was  doubly  vexed 
for  the  same  cause.  And  where  a  decree  has  been  made,  upon  a  bill 
brought  by  a  creditor  on  behalf  of  himself  and  all  other  creditors,  and 
another  creditor  comes  in,  to  take  the  benefit  of  the  decree  and  prove  his 
debt,  and  then  files  a  bill  on  behalf  of  himself  and  all  other  creditors, 
the  defendant  may  plead  the  pendency  of  the  former  suit :  for  a  person 
coming  in  under  a  decree  is  quasi  a  party.6  (a)  The  proper  way  for  a 
creditor  to  proceed,  if  the  plaintiff  in  such  original  suit  is  dilatory,  is  by 
application  to  the  Court  for  liberty  to  conduct  the  cause  himself.7 

It  has  been  said8  that  the  pendency  of  another  suit  for  the  same  object, 
in  a  Court  of  concurrent  jurisdiction,  could  not  be  pleaded  in  bar,  before 
a  decree  in  such  other  suit ;  this  observation,  however,  can  only  be  appli- 
cable to  creditors'  suits,  where,  as  in  the  case  last  put,  the  plaintiff  in 
the  second  suit  will  not  have  become  quasi  a  party  to  the  first  till  after 
the  decree.  In  other  cases,  all  that  seems  to  be  necesssary  to  a  plea  of 
this  nature  is,  that  there  should  be  a  suit  actually  pending  :  for  which 
purpose,  there  need  not  have  been  more  than  either  an  appearance,  or 
process  requiring  appearance.9  That  one  or  other  of  such  steps,  at  least, 
should  have  been  taken,  is,  however,  absolutely  necessary.10 

*  A  cross-bill,  although  between  the  same  parties  as  an  original  *  636 
suit,  cannot  be  met  by  a  plea  of  this  nature;  1  thus  it  has  been 
held  that,  after  a  bill  brought  in  the  Exchequer  to  foreclose  a  mortgage, 
the  defendant  may  bring  a  bill  in  the  Court  of  Chancery  to  redeem,  and 
the  pendency  of  the  former  suit  is  not  pleadable.2  And  it  seems  that 
such  a  plea  will  not  lie,  in  any  case  where  the  second  bill  was  not 
brought  on  the  same  right  as  the  first :  so  that  a  decree,  dismissing  the 
original  suit,  would  not  be  a  bar  to  a  new  proceeding  ; 3  We  have  seen, 

4  Ld.  Red.  248;  Moor  v.  Welsh  Copper  Co.  141;  Maccy  v.  Childress,  2  id.  20;  Mortimer  v. 
1  Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  39,  pi.  14;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  West,  1  Swanst.  359;  Gage  v.  Lord  Stafford.  1 
§  740.  Yes.  544  ;   Venning  v.  Loyd,  1   De  6.  F.  &  J. 

5  Durand  v.  Hutchinson,  Ld.  Red.  248.  207.     And  see  where  the  former  bill  is  by  the 

6  Neve  v.  Weston,  3  Atk.  557;  see  Ewing  v.  defendant  in  the  new  suit.  Neafie  0.  Neafie,  7 
Maury,  3  Lea  (Tenn.),  381.  John.  Ch.  4;   Fulton  v   Golden,  25  N.  J.  Eq. 

7  Ld.  Red.  249.  154. 

8  Per  Sir  John  Leach  V.  C.  in  IToulditch  ?•.  9  Ld.  Red.  246;  Anon.  1  Vern.  318. 
Marquis  of  Donnegal,  1   S.  &  S.  491.  492.     If  m  Moor  v.  Welsh   Copper  Co.   1   Eq.  Cas. 
the  bill  is  by  the  same  person,  the  plea  would  Abr.  39,  pi.  14. 

be  good.     Aliter,  if  by  a  different  person,  for  !  See  Story,  Eq.  Pi.  §  400. 

the   suit   might   not   be   brought    to   a  decree.  "  Lend    Newbury   v.    Wren,    1    Vern.    220; 

Rogers  v.  King,  8  Paige,  210;    Innes  v.  Lan-  Brandon  Man.  Co.  v.  Prime,  14  Blatchf.  371. 

sing,  7  Paige,  583;  Moore  v.  Holt,  3  Tenn.  Ch.  3  Thus,  where  a  plaintiff  mistook  his  right, 

(<-/)  The  decision  upon  the  questions  at  issue  enjoin  the  same  agreement,    if  there  was   no 

in  a  stockholder's  suit  to  prevent  his  corpora-  fraud  or  collusion  in  the  first  suit.     Willoughbv 

tion  from  consummating  an  agreement  is  con-  r.  Chicago  Junction  Railways  &c.  Co.  50  N.  J. 

slusive   of  a   bill   by   another    stockholder   to  Eq.  656. 

633 


*637 


PLEAS. 


that  a  suit  by  a  husband  and  wife,  against  the  trustees  of  the  wife's 
separate  property,  cannot  be  pleaded  in  bar  to  a  subsequent  suit  by  her 
and  her  next  friend  against  the  trustees  and  her  husband,  although 
the  relief  prayed  in  both  suits  is  the  same :  because  the  first  suit  is  con- 
sidered as  the  suit  of  the  husband  alone,  and  a  decree  of  dismission  in  it 
would  be  no  bar  to  the  wife.4 

From  what  has  been  before  said,  it  is  obvious  that  it  is  necessary  to 
the  validity  of  a  plea  of  a  former  suit  depending,  that  it  should  contain 
a  distinct  averment  that  the  second  suit  is  for  the  same  matter  as  the 
first ;  and,  therefore,  a  plea  which  did  not  expressly  aver  this,  though 
it  stated  matter  tending  to  show  it,  was  considered  as  bad  in  point  of 
form,  and  was  overruled  upon  argument.5  The  plea  must  also  aver, 
that  there  have  been  proceedings  in  the  suit:  as  appearance,  or  process 
requiring  appearance  at  the  least.6  It  seems  likewise  regular  to  aver, 
that  the  suit  is  still  depending : 7  though  it  has  been  held  that  a  posi 
tive  averment  of  that  fact  is  not  necessary.8     It  is,  however,  necessary 

that  the  time  when  the  suit  was  instituted  should  be  distinctly 
*  637    *  averred ;  and  where  a  plea  merely  stated  that  in  or  about  such 

a  year  the  plaintiff  filed  his  bill,' praying  the  like  account,  and 
the  same  relief  with  the  present,  Lord  Hardwicke  held  the  plea  to  be 
defective  in  form.1 

A  plea  of  a  former  suit  depending,  being  clearly  a  good  plea,  if  true, 
the  plaintiff,  if  he  dispute  the  truth  thereof,  should  not  set  it  down  for 
argument,  but  the  plaintiff  should,  on  motion  or  petition  of  course,2 
obtain  an  order  for  an  inquiry  as  to  the  truth  thereof.8  If  such  order, 
and  a  certificate  in  pursuance  thereof,  are  not  obtained  within  one  month 
after  the  filing  of  the  plea,  the  defendant  may  obtain,  as  of  course,  an 
order  to  dismiss  the  bill  with  costs.4    If,  instead  of  taking  this  course, 


and  being  the  executor  of  an  administrator, 
conceived  himself  to  be  the  personal  representa- 
tive of  a  deceased  person,  and  filed  a  bill  in 
that  capacity,  but  afterwards,  finding  that  he 
did  not  properly  sustain  the  character  he  had 
assumed,  obtained  letters  of  administration  r/e 
bonis  non,  and  filed  a  new  bill,  a  plea  of  the 
former  suit  depending  was  overruled  by  Lord 
Hardwicke.  Huggius  v.  York  Buildings  Co. 
2Atk.  44;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  739. 

4  Ante,  p.  108;  Reeve  v.  Dalby,  2  S.  &  S. 
464;  see  also  Stooke  v.  Vincent,  I  Coll.  527, 
529  ;  9  Jur.  99. 

5  Ld.  Red.  246;  Devie  r.  Lord  Brownlow,  2 
Dick.  611.  But  in  McEwen  v.  Broadhead,  11 
N.  J.  Eq.  131,  132.  the  Chancellor,  in  giving 
judgment,  said:  "But,  if  the  facts  slated  in 
the  plea  plainly  show  that  the  second  suit  is 
for  the  same  subject-matter  as  the  first,  I  can 
see  no  reason  why  it  should  be  held  necessary 
that  there  should  be  an  express  averment  to 
that  effect.  It.  would  be  accurate  and  correct 
pleading  to  make  the  averment,  but  accuracy 
may  demand  what  is  not  required  as  absolutely 
necessary.      The  Courts  are  not  as  much   in- 

034 


clined  to  regard  mere  technicality  in  pleading 
as  they  were  three  quarters  of  a  century  ago." 
And  he  held  that  a  plea  of  another  suit  pending 
might  be  good,  though  it  did  not  contain  that 
averment. 

6  Ld.  Red.  247. 

"i  Ld.  Red.  247. 

8  Urlin  v.  Hudson,  1  Vern.  332;  see  the 
forms  of  such  a  plea,  2  Van  Hey.  117; 
Beanies  on  Pleas,  330. 

1  Foster  v.  Vassall,  3  Atk.  587.  A  plea  of 
proceedings  in  another  Court  must  also  show 
that  the  object  is  the  same,  and  that  the  Court 
has  competent  jurisdiction,  and  that  the  result 
of  the  proceedings  therein  would  be  conclusive, 
so  as  to  bind  every  other  Court.  Behrens  v. 
Sieveking,  2  M.  &  C.  602,  603. 

2  For  forms  of  motion  paper  and  petition,  see 
Vol.  III.;  and  see  Leigh  v.  Turner,  14  W.  R. 
361,  M.  R. 

3  "The  correct  practice  is  a  reference  to  a 
Master."  McEwen  v.  Broadhead,  11  N.  J.  Eq. 
132. 

4  Cons.  Ord.  XIV.  6,  7.  If  the  defendant 
takes  the  objection  by  answer,  instead  of  plea, 


DIFFERENT   GROUNDS   OF,  PLEAS. 


638 


the  plaintiff  set  down  the  plea  for  argument,  it  is  considered  that  he 
admits  the  fact  that  a  former  suit  for  the  same  matter  is  depending,  and 
the  plea  must,  therefore,  be  allowed,  unless  it  is  defective  in  form.5  If, 
however,  the  plaintiff  considers  the  plea  defective  in  form,  he  may 
set  it  down  for  argument.6  Where,  however,  a  plaintiff,  after  a  plea 
of  another  suit  depending  to  part  of  the  bill,  and  an  answer  to  the 
rest,  without  moving  for  the  usual  reference,  replied  generally  to  the 
answer,  without  noticing  the  plea,  and  witnesses  were  examined  on  both 
sides,  and  the  cause  heard  and  decided  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff,  the 
defendant,  who  petitioned  for  a  rehearing,  was  held  to  have  waived 
his  plea,  and  was  not  allowed  to  avail  himself  of  the  objection  arising 
from  the  plaintiff's  irregularity.7 

If  the  result  of  an  inquiry  into  the  truth  of  the  plea  is,  that 
*  both  suits  are  for  the  same  matter,  the  plea  will  then  be  allowed  ;  *  638 
but  if  otherwise,  the  plea  will  be  overruled.  Where,  however,  it 
appeared  that  the  second  suit  embraced  more  objects  than  the  first,  a 
special  order  was,  as  we  have  seen,  made,  dismissing  the  first  bill  with 
costs,  and  directing  the  defendant  to  answer  the  second,  upon  being  paid 
his  costs,  as  upon  plea  allowed.1 

As  the  pendency  of  a  former  suit,  unless  admitted  by  the  plaintiff,  is 
made  the  immediate  subject  of  inquiry,  a  plea  of  this  kind  is  not  put  in 
upon  oath.2 

2.  A  plea  which  offers  any  matter  tending  to  show  that  the  bill,  as 
framed,  is  insufficient  to  answer  the  purposes  of  complete  justice,  must, 
it  is  evident,  be  ranked  amongst  pleas  to  the  bill ;  for  it  does  not,  in 
general,  dispute  the  right  of  the  plaintiff,  as  stated  in  the  record,  but 


it  seems  that  he  will  not  be  allowed  his  costs. 
although  the  inquiry  lie  answered  in  his  favor. 
Long  i'.  Storie,  9  Hare.  542;   Hi  Jur.  349. 

5  Ld.  Red.  247.  The  practice  mentioned  in 
the  text  is  based  upon  a  rule  of  Lord  Claren- 
don. Beames's  Orders,  176  ;  Jones  v.  Segueira, 
1  Phil.  83.  That  rule  has  not  been  followed  in 
the  United  States.  In  New  York,  the  practice 
was  regulated  by  an  order  of  Court.  1  Hoff. 
Ch.  Pr.  225.  In  New  Jersey,  by  statute.  Mc- 
Ewen  o.  Broad  head,  11  N.  J.  Eq.  132;  Matthews 
v.  Roberts,  1  Green  Ch.  338.  In  Tennessee,  by 
the  Code,  §4393;  Olwell  v  Montgomery,  1 
Tenn.  Ch.  183;  Green  v.  N.-al,  2  Heisk.  217; 
Macey  v.  Childress,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  23;  Allen  r. 
Allen",  3  Tenn.  Ch.  145. 

6  Tarleton  v.  Barnes,  2  Keen.  (132.  636.  In 
Jones  r.  Segueira,  1  Phil.  82;  6  Jur.  183,  where 
the  plaintiff,  instead  of  obtaining  an  inquiry  as 
to  the  truth  of  a  plea  of  this  kind,  tiled  a  repli- 
cation; whereupon,  the  defendant,  after  the 
expiration  of  a  month  from  the  filing  of  the 
plea,  moved  upon  notice,  that  the  bill  might  be 
dismissed  with  costs,  an  order  to  that  effect  was 
made  by  Lord  Lyndhurst  on  appeal,  who,  more 
over  was  of  opinion,  that  the  application  ought 
to  have  been  made  by  a  motion  of  course. 

Where,  upon  such  plea,   the  defendant  ob- 


tains the  Master's  report  in  favor  of  the  truth  of 
the  plea,  he  cannot  have  an  order  to  dismiss  the 
plaintiff's  bill  on  motion.  But  he  must  bring 
the  case  on  to  be  heard  upon  the  plea  and  the 
Master's  report,  to  enable  the  Court  to  decide 
upon  the  validity  of  the  plea.  Hart  v.  Phillips, 
9  Paige,  293. 

"  Lucas  r.  Holder,  1  Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  41,  pi.  3. 

1  Crofts  v.  Wortley,  1  Ch  Cas.  241  :  ante, 
pp.  632-634;  and  see  Leigh  v.  Turner,  14  W.  R. 
361,  M.  R. 

2  Urlin  v.  Hudson,  1  Vern.  332;  Ld.  Red. 
247.  It  is  not  very  distinctly  stated  in  the 
books  whether  the  rule  that  a  p'ea  of  this  na- 
ture need  not  be  upon  oath,  will  apply  where 
the  suit  already  pending  is  in  another  Court. 
The  reason  for  its  adoption  in  cases  where  the 
suit  is  in  the  Court  itself,  is  sufficiently  evident 
when  we  consider  that  the  pendency  of  it  must 
be  apparent  from  its  own  proceedings,  of  which 
the  Court  always  takes  notice,  without  further 
evidence;  but  with  respect  to  proceedings  in 
another  Court  (unless  they  are  in  the  state  of 
perfect  records,  which  can  hardly  be  the  case 
when  the  suit  is  still  pending),  the  fact  of  the 
pendency  of  the  suit  must  be  established  by 
evidence  upon  oath  in  the  usual  manner.  See 
post,  §  3,  Form  of  Pleas. 

635 


*  639  PLEAS. 

merely  offers  a  reason  why  the  suit  should  not  proceed  as  framed.  The 
only  reported  cases  of  pleas  of  this  description  are,  where  the  objection 
arises  from  want  of  sufficient  parties  to  the  bill.  There  can  be  no  doubt, 
however,  that  if  it  can  be  shown  to  the  Court  that  with  the  parties 
already  before  it,  the  suit  has  been  so  framed  as  to  be  insufficient  to 
answer  the  purpose  of  complete  justice,  a  plea  suggesting  the  facts 
necessary  to  make  such  a  case  would  prevail. 

The  question  of  necessary  parties  to  a  suit  has  been  before  so  fully 
discussed,  that  it  is  unnecessary  to  enter  any  further  into  it  in  this 
place.3  It  is  merely  requisite  to  remind  the  reader,  that  when  the 
defect  is  not  apparent  upon  the  face  of  the  bill,  it  may  be  pointed  out 
to  the  Court  by  plea :  the  peculiarities  arising  from  which  course  of 
proceeding  have  been  before  made  the  subject  of  inquiry.4 

IV.  Whatever  shows  that  there  is  no  right  which  can  be  made  the 
subject  of  suit,  or  whatever  is  a  complete  and  perpetual  bar  to  the  right 
sued  for,  may  constitute  the  subject  of  a  plea  in  bar ;  or,  as  it  is 
expressed  in  a  work  on  Pleadings  at  Law,  "  Whatever  destroys  the 
plaintiff's  suit,  and  disables  him  forever  from  recovering,  may  be 
pleaded  in  bar."  5 

Pleas  in  bar  are  usually  ranked  under  the  heads  of :  1.  Pleas  of 
Acts  of  Parliaments  ;  2.    Pleas  of  Matters  of  Eecord,  or  as  of 

*  639    *  Record,  in  the  Court  itself,  or  some  other  Court;    and  3.  Pleas 

of  Matters  in  pats.1 

1.  Any  statute,  public  or  private,  which  may  be  a  bar  to  the  demands 
of  the  plaintiff,  may  be  pleaded,  with  the  averments  necessary  to  bring 
the  case  of  the  defendant  within  the  statute,  and  to  avoid  any  equity 
which  may  be  set  up  against  the  bar  created  by  the  statute.2 

Amongst  other  statutes  which  may  be  thus  set  up  in  bar  of  the  plain- 
tiff's demands,  may  be  mentioned  the  various  statutes  which  have,  from 
time  to  time,  been  passed  for  the  limitation  of  the  time  within  which 
actions  or  suits  at  Law  may  be  commenced,  (a)    Pleas  of  this  description 

3  Ante,  Chap.  V.  Parties  to  a  Suit.  -  Ld    Red     274.      Semble,   defendant   may 

4  Ante,  p.  290.  have  the  benefit  of  a  statute  extinguishing  a 

5  Beameson  Pleas,  160,  citing  Lnw  on  PI.  40.  right,   without  pleading   it.      De   Beauvoir    v. 
l  Beames  on  Pleas,  160;  Coop.  Eq.  PI.  251;  Owen.  5  Exch.  166;  16  M.  &  W.  547;  Dawkins 

Story, Eq.  PI.  §749.     The  arrangement  adopted      o.  Penrhyn,  6  Ch.  D.  318;  4  App.  Cas.  51. 
by  Lord  Redesdale  is  somewhat  different;  see 
Ld.  Red.  236.     For  form  of  a  plea  in  bar,  see 
Vol.  III. 


(a)  A  plea  in  Equity  of  the  Statute  of  Limita-  405.  The  Statute  of  Limitations  may  be  set  up 
tions  is  a  pure  plea,  and  is  to  be  accompanied  by  answer  as  well  as  by  demurrer  in  foreclosure 
by  an  answer  only  when  the  defence  is  antici-  suits.  Highstone  v.  Franks,  93  Mich.  52;  see 
pated  and  met  by  the  bill.  West  Portland  H.  ante,  p.  559,  notes.  This  plea  is  personal. 
Asfn  v.  Lownsdale,  17  Fed.  Rep.  205.  In  Sanger  v.  Nightingale,  122  U.  S.  176. 
Equity  the  Court  may  permit  a  plea  of  this  A  plea  or  answer  which  sets  up  usury  as  a 
statute  to  be  put  in  after  an  answer  on  the  defence  must  show  specifically  in  what  the  usury 
merits.  See  Bartles  v.  Gibson,  17  Fed.  Rep.  consists.  Hoskins  v.  Cole,  34  111.  App.  541 :  see 
293.  But  it  is  only  in  an  extreme  case  that  post,  p.  657,  note.  A  general  allegation  of  usury 
such  plea  will  be  allowed  after  the  Master's  set  up  in  defence  is  insufficient.  Ibid.;  Good- 
report  is  in,  the  objection  not  being  raised  by  win  r.  Bishop,  145  111.  421.  In  the  Federal 
demurrer  or  answer.    Webb  v.  Fuller,  83  Maine,  Courts,  if  the  plaintiff  relies  upon  a  State  statute 

636 


DIFFERENT   GROUNDS   OF    PLEAS. 


*639 


are  called  Pleas  of  the  Statute  of  Limitations  ;  and  the  statute  which, 
until  recent  enactments,  afforded  the  most  ordinary  grounds  for  pleas 
of  this  sort,  was  the  21  Jac.  I.  c.  1G.3  By  that  Act,  §  1,  it  is  enacted 
that  all  writs  of  formedon  must  be  sued  out,  and  all  entries  into  lands 
by  persons  having  a  right  of  entry  must  be  made,  within  twenty  years 
next  after  the  title  to  the  person  suing  out  the  writ  or  making  the  entry 
accrued;  and,  by  §  3,  that  all  actions  upon  the  case  (otherwise  than 
for  slander),  or  for  account  (other  than  such  accounts  as  concern  the 
trade  of  merchandise,  between  merchants  and  merchants,  their  factors 
or  servants),  and  all  actions  for  trespass,  debt,  detinue,  replevin,  &c, 
and  the  action  of  trespass  quare  clausum  f regit,  must  be  commenced 
within  six  years  next  after  the  cause  of  such  action  or  suit,  and  not 
after.  This  statute,  although  its  provisions  apply  only  to  actions  or 
suits  at  Law,  has,  nevertheless,  been  considered  as  available  as  a  bar 
to  suits  in  Equity  for  analogous  purposes,  in  cases  where  they  were  not 
commenced  within  the  period  limited  by  the  Act.4 


s  See  also  9  Geo.  IV.  c.  14,  post,  p.  645. 
For  forms  of  pleas  under  this  statute,  see  2  Van 
Hey.  113,  114.  As  to  the  application  of  the 
statute  to  cases  of  mining  trespass,  see  Trotter 
v.  Maclean,  13  Ch.  P.  574. 

*  See  Ld.  Red.  273,  n.  (2);  Coop.  Eq.  PI. 
251;  Beanies  on  Pleas,  161;  Story,  Eq.  PL 
§  751.  The  rule  in  Courts  of  Equity  now  is, 
that  they  will  take  notice  of  the  Statute  of 
Limitations,  and  apply  it  in  the  same  manner  as 
Courts  of  Law.  Conoveru.  Conover,  1  Saxton 
(N.  J.),  403;  see  ante,  p.  559,  560,  and  notes; 
Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  751,  et  seq. ;  Miller  v.  Mclntire, 
G  Peters,  61;  Stackhouse  v.  Barnston,  10  Sum- 
ner's Ves.  453,  note  (e),  and  cases  cited ;  Towns- 
hend  v.  Townshend,  1  Bro.  C.  C.  (Perkins's 
ed.)  555,  note  ('/),  and  American  cases  cited; 
Watkins  v.  Harwood,  2  Gill  &  J.  307;  Carroll 
v.  Waring,  3  id.  401  ;  Harris  v.  Mills,  28  III. 
44  ;  Cameron  v.  San  Francisco,  68  Cal.  390. 
Where  a  plaintiff's  right  to  1  inds  had  accrued 
thirty  years  before  the  tiling  (if  the  bill,  the 
Court  allowed  a  plea  of  the  Statute  of  Limita- 
tions to  prevail,  the  plaintiff  having  been  so 
circumstanced  that,  although  he  could  not  bring 
an  ejectment,  he  might  have  brought  a  bill  in 
Equity.  And  so  it  has  been  held,  that  the 
statute  may  be  pleaded  to  a  bill  to  redeem  a 
mortgage,  if  the  mortgagee  had  been  in  posses- 
sion twenty  years.  Ld.  Red.  271,  272;  Coop. 
Eq.  PI.  251;  Beames  on  Pleas,  162;  Story.  Eq. 
PI.  757.  Now,  however,  the  statutes  properly 
applicable  to  lands,  rents,  redemption  of  mort- 
gages, &c,  are  the  3  &  4  Will.  IV.  c.  27;  7 
Will.  IV.  &  1  Vic.  c.  28;  and  see  post,  p.  598; 
Hardy  v.  Reeves,  4  Sumner's  Ves  466,  note 
(6),  and  cases  cited;  Story.  Eq.  PI.  §  757: 
Acherley   v.   Roe,  5  Sumner's   Ves.  573.  Per- 


kins's note  (a),  and  cases  cited;  Trash  v.  White, 
3  Bro.  C.  C.  (Perkins's  ed.)  291,  notes.  If  the 
mortgagee  gets  into  possession,  and  continues 
in  possession  twenty  years  without  any  acknowl- 
edgment of  the  mortgage  title,  the  mortgagor  is 
barred  of  his  redemption.  Gates  v.  Jacob,  1  B. 
Mon.  308;  Hatfield  v.  Montgomery,  2  Porter, 
58;  Phillips  v.  Sinclair,  20  Maine,  269;  De- 
marest  ».  Wynkoop,  3  John.  Ch.  129.  So  when 
the  statutory  period  necessary  to  bar  a  recovery 
at  Law  has  passed,  a  foreclosure  in  Equity  will 
be  barred.  Harris  v.  Mills,  28  III.  44.  But  an 
acknowledgment  of  the  mortgage  title  within 
twenty  years  before  filing  the  bill  for  redemp- 
tion or  for  foreclosure,  maintains  the  equity  of 
redemption,  or  the  right  to  foreclosure.  Hodle 
v.  Healey,  6  Mad  181;  Rayner  v.  Castlee,  id. 
274;  Cheever  V.  Perley,  11  Allen,  584.  As 
where  the  mortgagee  has  treated  it  as  a  mort- 
gage by  keeping  accounts,  and  in  other  ways. 
See  Glee  v.  Manhattan  Co.  1  Paige,  48;  Fenwick 
v.  Macey,  1  Dana,  279;  Hughes  v.  Kd wards,  9 
Wheat.  489;  Dexter  v.  Arnold,  3  Sumner.  152; 
Edsell  v.  Buchanan,  3  Bro.  C.  C.  (Perkins's 
ed.)  254,  256.  The  time  is  to  be  computed  from 
the  last  period  at  which  the  parties  treated  the 
transaction  as  a  mortgage.  Shepperd  v.  Mur- 
dock,  3  Murph.  218.  The  statute  may  also  be 
pleaded  to  a  bill  to  prevent  the  setting  up  of  an 
outstanding  term,  and  for  discovery  (Jeremy 
V.  Rest.  1  Sim.  373,  375);  and  to  a  bill  for  dis- 
covery  only  (Beames  on  Pleas,  275:  Gait  '•. 
Osbaldeston,  1  Russ.  158;  Mendizabel  v.  Ma- 
chado,  1  Sim.  68,  77;  Macgregor  v.  East  India 
Co.  2  Sun.  452.  455;  Scott  V.  Broadwood,  2 
Coll.  447.  456:  10  Jur.  214;  Wigram  on  Disc. 
35:  see  also  Ld.  Red.  269  ;  Dean  of  Westminster 
v.  Cross,  Bunb.  60;  Baillie  v.  Sibbard,  15  Ves. 


making  a  prima  facie  case  for  relief,  he  Kenzie,  90  Tenn.  167,  it  was  held  that  forgery 
should  plead  or  answer,  and  not  demur,  (irif-  may  be  pleaded  to  a  suit  upon  a  written  instru- 
fing  v.  Gibb,  2  Black,  519.     In  Powers  v.  Mc-      menl  without  a  formal  plea  of  nan  est  factum. 

637 


*  641 


PLEAS. 


*  640        *  The  statute  may  be  pleaded  to  a  bill  which  seeks  the  payment 

of  a  debt,  provided  such  debt  be  due  upon  simple  contract,  and 
operates  as  a  bar  to  discovery  as  to  when  the  debt  was  due.1  If, 
however,  the  bill  alleges  that  if  the  defendant  would  discover  books  and 
papers  in  his  possession,  the  plaintiff  would  thereby  be  enabled  to  show 
that  the  debt  became  due,  or  was  acknowledged  since  the  period  limited 
by  the  statute,  the  defendant  must,  if  interrogated,  give  discovery  as  to 
such  documents.2 

The  Statute  21  Jac.  I.  c.  16  may  also  be  pleaded  to  all  bills  for  account, 

except  where  the  account  relates  to  the  trade  of  merchandise  between 

merchants  :  which  species  of  account  is,  as  we  have  seen,  expressly 

*  641    excepted  out  of  the  statute.3     Thus,  where  one  had  *  received  the 

profits  of  an  infant's  estate,  (a)  and,  after  six  years  had  elapsed 
from  his  coming  of  age,  the  infant  brought  a  bill  for  an  account,  it  was 
held  that  this  statute  was  a  bar  to  such  suit,  as  it  would  be  to  an  action 
at  Common  Law  for  the  same  purpose.1  It  has  been  held  that  this 
statute  would  operate  as  a  bar,  where  the  accounts  ceased  six  years 
before  the  filing  of  the  bill.2  (b) 

185,  and  post,  Chap.  XXXIV.  §  2,  Bills  of 
Discovery);  though  it  was  formerly  considered 
that  the  latter  could  not  be  done.  Hindman  v. 
Taylor,  2  Bro.  C.  C.7,  10;  Scott  v.  Broadwood, 
2  Coll.  4-17;  Hamilton  v.  Wood,  3  Edw.  Ch.  106; 
see  the  remarks  upon  the  case  of  Hindman  p. 
Taylor,  cited  in  support  of  the  text,  in  Wigram 
on  Discov.  (1st  Am.  ed.)  pi.  66,  et  seq.,  p.  33, 
et  seq.,  where  the  learned  author  expresses  his 
dissent  from  the  judgment  of  Lord  Thurlow  in 
that  case,  and  cites  the  authorities  which  refer 
to  and  notice  it.     See  Mendizabel  v.  Machado, 

1  Sim.  68;  Macgregor  v.  East  India  Co.  2  Sim. 
452;  Cork  v.  Willock,  5  Mad.  331;  Story,  Eq. 
PI.  §821,  and  notes,  in  which  the  author  remarks 
that  the  reasoning  of  Mr.  Wigram,  dissenting 
from  Lord  Thurlow,  is  very  able. 

i  Ld.  Red.  269. 

2  Ante,  p.  618;  see  Bailey  v.  Adams,  6  Ves. 
586,  598. 

3  The  accounts  must  be  "  such  as  concern 
the  trade  of  merchandise,"  "  between  merchant 
and  merchant,  their  factors  and  servants.''  See 
W.  W.  Story,  Contracts,  702:  Blair  v.  Drew,  6 
N.  H.  235;  Codman  v.  Rodgers,  10  Pick.  118; 
Spring  v.  Gray,  5  Mason,  528;  S.  C.  6  Peters, 
151;  Coster  i>.  Murray,  5  John.  Ch.  522,  583, 
592,  599  ;  Price  v.  Upshaw,  2  Humph.  142. 
Unliquidated  accounts  between  merchants  in  the 
capacity  of  principal  and  factor  have  been  held 
to  be  within  the  exception.    Stiles  v.  Donaldson, 

2  Dall.  264  ;  S.  C.  2  Yates,  105.  The  exception 
of  merchants'  accounts  does  not  apply  to  stated 
accounts.      Toland  v.  Sprague,  12  Pet.  300. 


1  Lockey  ».  Lockey,  Prec.  in  Ch.  518.  See 
Knox  v.  Gye,  L.  R.  5  H.  L.  656.  Long  acqui- 
escence and  lapse  of  time  are,  by  analogy,  or  in 
obedience  to  the  Statute  of  Limitations,  a  bar 
to  a  bill  for  an  account.  Acherley  v.  Roe,  5 
Yes.  565;  Baker  v.  Biddle,  1  Bald.  394.418; 
Graham  v.  Torrance,  1  Ired.  Eq.  210;  Parks  v. 
Rucker,  5  Leigh,  149;  Ravner  v.  Pearsall,  3 
John.  Ch.  578;  Burton  *•.  Dickenson,  3  Yerger, 
112;  Drummond  v.  Duke  of  St.  Albans,  5  Ves. 
439,  note  (3) ;  Andrew  v.  Wrigley,  4  Bro.  C.  C. 
(Perkins's  ed.)  125,  138,  and  notes;  Spring  v. 
Gray,  5  Mason,  527,  528;  Sherwood  v.  Sutton, 
5  Mason,  143:  Lewis  v.  Marshall,  1  McLean, 
17;  Raymond  v.  Simonson,  4  Blackf.  83;  George 
v.  Johnson,  45  N.  H.  456;  Atwater  r.  Fowler,  1 
Edw.  Ch.  417;  see  also  Randolph  v.  Randolph,  1 
Hen.&M.  180;  Botifearw.  W.ynian,  1  M'Cord 
Ch.  161:  Cave  v.  Saunders,  2  A.  K.  Marsh.  64; 
Love  v.  White,  4  Hayw.  211;  Kingsland  r. 
Roberts.  2  Paige,  193  ;  Mooers  v.  White,  6 
John.  Oh.  360;  Ives  v.  Sumner,  1  Dev.  Eq. 
338;  Bertien  v.  Varian,  1  Edw.  343;  Farnum 
v.  Brooks,  9  Pick.  213.  Between  partners. 
Cowart  v.  Perrine,  18  N.  J.  Eq.  454;  George  v. 
Johnson,  45  N.  H.  456. 

Delay  in  suing,  which  results  in  loss  of  evi- 
dence, and  places  the  defendant  at  a  disadvan- 
tage, will  operate  to  bar  relief,  although  the 
time  allowed  by  the  Statute  of  Limitations  has 
not  yet  elapsed.  Lawrence  v.  Rokes,  61  Maine, 
38;  Harrison  v.  Gibson,  23  Graft.  212. 

2  Welford  »  Liddel,  2  Yes.  Sr.  400  ;  Craw- 
ford v.  Liddel,  cited  6  Ves.  582;  Jolliffe  v.  Pitt, 


(a)  The  same  rule  was  recently  applied  in 
Ela  v.  Ela.  158  Mass.  54,  upon  a  bill  in  Equity 
for  an  account  of  an  infant's  property  which 
states  a  case  showing  a  habilitv  in  trover,  but 
barred  bv  the  Statute  of  Limitations.     A  Court 

638 


of  Equity  is  bound  to  set  up  the  Statute  of 
Limitations  in  favor  of  an  infant  defendant 
when  clearly  applicable.  Ailing  v.  Allmg 
(N.  J.),  27  Atl.  Rep.  655. 

(b)  As  between  partners  seeking  an  account 


DIFFERENT    GROUNDS    OF    PLEAS. 


642 


It  has  been  doubted  whether  transactions  between  principal  and  agent 
came  within  the  exception  in  favor  of  merchants'  accounts.8  (c)  It  has 
been  decided  that  transactions  with  a  foreign  prince  and  his  govern- 
ment do  not  concern  the  trade  of  merchandise  within  this  statute  ;  4 
and  also  that  a  letter  of  attorney  from  a  merchant  to  authorize  the 
getting  in  of  debts  will  not  constitute  the  person  thereby  deputed  a 
merchant,  within  the  meaning  of  the  exception,5  which  has  been  con- 
sidered as  applying  only  to  merchants  trading  beyond  sea,  and  not  to 
inland  merchants.6  The  clause  relating  to  merchants'  accounts,  also,  is 
only  applicable  to  cases  where  there  are  mutual  accounts  and  reciprocal 
demands  between  two  persons,  and  is  inapplicable  to  accounts  between  a 
tradesman  and  his  customer;  and  it  has  been  determined  that,  in 
such  accounts,  and  in  all  *  others  where  the  items  are  all  on  one  *  G42 
side,  the  circumstance  of  the.  last  item  happening  to  be  within  six 
years,  does  not  draw  after  it  those  which  are  of  a  longer  standing.1  In 
such  cases,  the  proper  course  is  to  plead  the  statute  as  to  all  the  items 
which  are  within  the  statute,  and  answer  as  to  the  rest. 

The  Statute  of  Limitations,  21  Jac.  I.  c.  16,  cannot  be  pleaded  in  bar 
to  a  trust ; 2  and  upon  this  ground  it  was  held  that  a  demand  upon 
the  separate  estate  of  a  married  woman  was  not  barred :  because  all  the 
separate  estate  of  a,  feme  covert  is  a  trust.3  (a)     Upon  the  same  principle, 


2  Vera.  694;  Bridges  v.  Mitchell,  Gilb.  224; 
Bunb.  217;  Barber  v.  Barber,  18  Ves.  286;  Cos- 
ter v.  Murray,  5  John.  Ch.  522,  531 ;  Spring  v. 
Gray,  528;  S.  C.  6  Peters,  151;  Union  Bank  v. 
Knapp,  3  Pick.  36. 

But  in  Bass  v.  Bass,  6  Pick.  362,  it  was  held 
that  the  Statute  of  Limitations  conld  not  be 
pleaded  to  an  account  "concerning  the  trade  in 
merchandise  between  merchant  and  merchant," 
although  none  of  the  items  came  within  six 
years.  See  also  S.  C.  8  Pick.  187;  Mandeville 
v.  Wilson,  5  Cranch,  15;  Davis  v.  Smith,  4 
Greenl.  339;  M'Lellan  v.  Crofton,  6  Greenl.  308; 
Hancock  v.  Hancock,  18  Pick.  30. 

3  Jones  v.  Pengree,  6  Ves.  580,  582. 

4  Start  v.  Mellish,  2  Atk.  612. 

5  Ibid.  613. 

6  Sherman  v.  Withers,  1  Ch.  Cas.  152;  but 
see  Farrindon  v.  Lee,  1  Mod.  269;  2  Mod.  311; 
and  see  now  The  Mercantile  Law  Amendment 
Act,  1856  (19  &  20  Vic.  c.  97,  §  9). 

1  Coop.  Eq.  PI.  253  ;  Coster  v.  Murray,  5 


John.  Ch.  522;  Buntin  v.  Lagow,  1  Blackf. 
375;  Kimball  v.  Brown,  7  Wend.  322;  Ingram 
v.  Sherard,  17  Serg.  &  R.  347;  Gold  v.  Whit- 
comb,  14  Pick.  188;  Spring  v. Gray,  6  Pet.  151; 
Price  v.  Upshaw,  2  Humph.  142;  Craighead  v. 
Bank,  7  Yerg.  399. 

2  Hollis's  case,  2  Ventr.  345  ;  Sheldon  v. 
W.Idman,  1  Ch.  Cas.  26;  Freem.  156.  The 
Statute  of  Limitations  applies  to  all  that  class 
of  trusts  that  become  such  by  matter  of  evi- 
dence, but  not  to  express  trusts  or  trusts  over 
which  Equity  has  exclusive  jurisdiction. 
Shelby  v.  Shelby,  Cooke,  179;  Merriman  v. 
Cannovan,  1  Tenn.  Leg.  Rep.  94.  A  receiver 
is  a  trustee  for  all  parties,  Seagram  v.  Tuck, 
18  Ch.  D.  296;  as  a  mortgagee  is  not  always 
as  to  surplus  moneys  on  a  sale.  Banner  u, 
Berridge,  18  Ch.  I).  254:  see  Dooby  v.  Watson, 
39  Ch.  I).  178;  Firth  v.  Slingsby,  58  L.  T.  481; 
Re  Gregson,  36  Ch.  D.  223. 

3  Norton  v.  Turvill,  2  P.  Wins,  144. 


and  settlement  of  the  firm's  affairs,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  an  express  contract,  or  of  conduct  of 
the  parties  working  an  extension  of  the  time 
for  bringing  a  suit,  the  statute  begins  to  run  at 
tlie  dissolution  of  the  firm.  See  Knox  v.  Gye, 
L.  R.  5  H.  L.  656;  Noyes  v.  Crawlev,  10  Ch  l>. 
31:  Riddle  v.  Whitehall,  135  U.  S.  621,  636; 
Zed's  Appeal,  126  Penn.  St.  329;  Currier  v. 
Studley,  159  Mass.  17. 

(c)  It  is  now  settled  that  an  agent,  who 
stands  in  a  fiduciary  relation  to  his  principal, 
cannot  set  up  the  Statute  of  Limitations  in  bar 


of  a  suit  for  an  account  by  the  latter.  Burdick 
v.  Garri.k,  L.  R.  5  Ch.  233;  Re  Bell,  Lake  v. 
Bell,  34  Ch.  I).  462. 

('/)  The  decision  cited  for  this  statement 
(Norton  v.  Turvill)  is  explained  in  Re  Lady 
Hastings,  Hallett  v.  Hastings,  35  Ch.  D.  94, 
where  it  was  held  that  the  Statute  of  Limita- 
tions applies  to  a  married  woman's  debts  pay- 
able nut  of  her  separate  estate.  Sealso  Hodgson 
i'.  Williamson,  15  Ch.  D.  87;  Beck  ».  Pierce, 
23  Q.  B.  D.  316,  322. 

639 


*  643  PLEAS. 

it  is  held  that  where  a  debtor  creates,  by  his  will,  a  trust  or  charge  for 
the  payment  of  his  debts  out  of  real  estate,  such  a  trust  will  prevent 
the  statute  from  operating  upon  a  debt  not  barred  at  the  time  of  the 
creation  of  the  trust.4  The  rule  does  not  apply  to  a  trust  for  the  pay- 
ment of  debts  out  of  personal  estate  ; 6  and  it  seems  that  a  devise  for 
the  payment  of  debts  will  not  have  the  effect  of  reviving  debts  barred 
by  the  statute,  upon  the  death  of  the  devisor.6 

It  has  been  held,  that  although,  if  a  man  has  a  debt  due  to  him,  and 
has  made  no  demand  of  it  for  six  years,  he  is  barred  by  the  Statute  of 
Limitations,  yet  if  the  debtor,  after  the  six  years,  publishes  an  advertise- 
ment in  the  Gazette,  or  any  other  newspaper,  that  if  all  persons,  who 
have  any  debts  owing  to  them  from  him,  will  apply  to  such  a  place,  they 
will  be  paid,  the  operation  of  the  statute  will  be  defeated  ; 7  and  it  seems 
that  such  a  notice,  by  a  personal  representative,  would  have  the  same 
effect,  although  it  would  appear  that  an  advertisement  requesting  all 
persons,  having  claims  on  the  estate,  to  send  in  the  statements  of  their 
demands  prior  to  their  being  laid  before  a  particular  person,  by  whom 
the  persons  claiming  were  to  submit  them  to  be  examined,  would  not  take 
a  debt,  previously  barred,  out  of  the  operation  of  the  statute.8  (b) 

*  643    It  may  here  be  mentioned,  *  that  where  a  debt  had  become  barred 

by  the  statute  after  the  death  of  the  creditor,  it  was  held  to  be 
revived  b}r  the  debtor  proving  the  creditor's  will.1 

The  principle  of  the  rule,  that  the  creation  of  a  trust  for  the  benefit 
of  creditors  will  prevent  the  application  of  the  Statute  of  Limitations, 
extends  to  proceedings  in  bankruptcy  ;  and,  therefore,  it  was  deter- 
mined that,  after  a  commission  had  issued,  the  Statute  of  Limitations 
did  not  f)revail  against  the  creditor  of  a  bankrupt.'2  It  was  also  held, 
that  where  a  man  had  taken  advantage  of  the  Act  for  the  relief  of  insol- 
vent debtors,  the  statute  did  not  apply  ;  and  that,  where  a  person  who 
had  taken  the  benefit  of  the  Act  twice  had  died,  leaving  assets  more  than 

4  Burke  v.  Jones,  2  V.  &  B.  275;  Hughes  6  Burke  v.  Jones,  2  V.  &  B.  275,  291;  see 
r.  Wynne,  T.  &  R  307,  309;  Hargreaves  v.  also  Executors  of  Fergus  v.  Gore,  1  Sen.  &  Lef. 
Michell,  6  Mad.  326  ;  Rendell  v.  Carpenter,  107;  Stackhouse  v.  Bamston,  10  Ves.  453,  469; 
2  Y.  &  J.  484;  Scott  v.  Jones,  4  CI.  &  Fin.  382;  Ex  parte  Roffey,  19  Ves.  468,  470;  Stanton  v. 
S.  C.  Jones  v.  Scott,  1  R.  &  M.  255;  see  also  Knight,  1  Sim.  482.  See  Poole  v.  Poole,  L.  R. 
Freake  v.  Cranefeldt,  3  M.  &  C.  499;  2  Jur.  7  Ch.  17;  Thomson  v.  Eastwood,  2  App.  Cas. 
1080.     See  next  note.  215;  and  see  now  36  &  37  Vic.  c.  66;  37  &  38 

5  Jones  v.   Scott,  ubi  supra  ;    Lyon   v.  Col-  Vic.  c.  57,  §  10. 

ville,  1  Coll.  449;  Evans  v.  Tweedy,  1  Beav.  55,  "'  Andrews  v.  Brown,  Prec.  in  Ch.  385. 

58.     The  reason   is.  that  the  personal  estate  is  8  Jones  r.  Scott,  1  R.  &  M.  255;  4  CI.  &  Fin. 

already  liable  by  law  for  the  payment  of  debts.  382.     In  that  case,  however,  the  Court  did  not 

And,   for   the   same   reason,   where,  as    in  the  come  to  any  express  decision  upon  the  point: 

United  States,  the  realty  is  already  liable  for  though   Lord  Brougham  appears  to  have  inti- 

debts,  a  devise  for  the  payment   of  debts  will  mated  an  opinion  that  it  would.     1  R.  &  M. 

not  create  a  trust  which  will  prevent  the  run-  270;  but  see  3  M.  &  C  502. 

ning  of  the  statute.      Gardner  v.  Gardner,   3  *  Ingle  v.  Richards  (No.  2),  28  Beav.  366; 

Mason,   178;  Mines  v.  Spruill,  1  D.  &  B.  Eq.  6  Jur.  N.  S.  1178. 

101  :  Hubbard  v.  Epps,  1  Tenn.  Les.  Rep.  320;  2  Ex  parte  Koss,  2  Glyn  &  J.  46. 

Glenn  v.  Maguire,  3  Tenn.  Ch.  698;  Perry  on 

Trusts,  §  560. 

(b)  The  sending  in  of  his  claim  by  a  creditor   is  not  equivalent  to  bringing  suit.     Re  Ste- 
phens, 43  Ch.  D.  39. 
640 


DIFFERENT   GROUNDS    OF   PLEAS. 


643 


sufficient  to  pay  all  the  debts  contracted  after  his  second  insolvency, 
the  debts  scheduled  under  his  first  insolvency  were  not  barred  by  the 
statute.3 

A  decree  for  the  payment  of  debts,  under  a  creditor's  bill  for  the 
administration  of  assets,  is  also  considered  as  a  trust  for  the  benefit  of 
creditors,  and  will,  in  like  manner,  prevent  the  statute  from  barring  the 
demand  of  any  creditor  coming  in  under  the  decree  : 4  the  creditor's  de- 
mand, however,  must  not  have  been  barred  at  the  time  when  the  suit  was 
instituted ;  for,  if  the  creditor's  demand  would  have  been  barred  by  the 
statute  before  the  commencement  of  the  bill,  the  statute  may  be  set  up.8 
It  has  been  held  that  it  was  the  decree  only  which  created  the  trust, 
and  that  the  mere  circumstance  of  the  bill  having  been  filed,  although  it 
might  have  been  pending  six  years,  would  not  take  the  case  out  of  the 
statute  ; 6  but  according  to  the  later  decisions,  it  seems  that  the  filin°-  of 
the  bill  will  operate  by  itself  to  save  the  bar  of  the  statute,  though  the 
plaintiff,  by  delay  in  prosecuting  the  suit,  may  disentitle  himself  to 
relief.7  (a)  And  the  dismissal  of  the  bill  will  not  prevent  the  defendant, 
in  a  new  suit,  from  taking  the  benefit  of  the  statute.8  The  Statute  of 
Limitations  is  a  provision  of  the  Lex  Fori,  and  a  foreign  creditor  may 
bring  his  suit  within  the  period  prescribed  by  the  local  statute,  although 
barred  in  the  foreign  Courts.9 

It  may  be  here  noticed  that  in  the  administration  of  assets  under  a 
creditor's  bill,  executors  are  not  bound  to  plead  the  Statute  of  Limita- 
tions ; 10  and  that  the  executor  is  entitled,  in  such  a  suit,  to  retain  his 
own  debt  though  barred  by  the    statute.11  (b)     If  the  statute  has  not 


3  Barton  v.  Tattersall,  1  R.  &  M.  237;  see 
Re  Smith,  24  Ch.  D.  72. 

*  Sterndale  v.  Hankinson,  1  Sim.  393,  398; 
Foster  v.  M'Kenzie,  17  Beav.  414  ;  see  Re 
Greaves,  18  Ch.  D.  551;  King  v.  Malcott,  9 
Hare,  692. 

6  Shewen  v.  Vanderhorst,  1  R.  &  M.  347, 
352;  2  id.  75;  Updike  v.  Doyle,  7  R.  I.  446, 
460. 

6  Laker.  Hayes,  1  Atk.  281 ;  Anon.  2  Atk.  1. 

1  Coppin  r.  Gray,  1  Y.  &  C.  C.  C.  205  207; 
6  Jur.  312;  Purcel]  v.  Blennerliassett,  3  Jo.  & 
Lat.  24,  45;  Forsterr.  Thompson,  4  Dr.  &  War. 
303,  318;  HeJe  v.  Lord  Bexley,  20  Beav.  127; 
Manby  r.  Manby,  3  Ch.  D.  101;  see  Re 
Greaves,  18  Ch.  D.  551. 

8  Sterndale  v.  Hankinson,  ubi  supra. 

9  Harris  v.  Quine,  L.  R.  4  Q.  B.  653;  Finch 
v.  Finch,  W.  N.  (1876)241;  see  Mostyn  v.  Fab- 
rigas,  1  Smith,  L.  C.  652,  and  notes. 

10  Ex  parte  Dewdney,  15  Ves.  498:  Alston 
v.  Trollope,  L.  R.  2  Eq.  205,  M.  R.;  35  Beav. 
466;  Adams  v.  Waller,  35  L.  J.  Ch.  727;  Lord 


(a)  If  there  is  unreasonable  delav  in  taking 
out  or  serving  the  subpoena  after  the  bill  is  filed, 
the  bill  may  be  ordered  taken  from  the  files. 
See  cases  in  note  7  above;  Boyd  v.  Higginson, 

VOL.    I. 41 


Castleton  v.  Lord  Fanshaw,  1  Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  305, 
pi.  13,  Prec.  in  Ch.  99;  see  now  Re  Wenham, 
Hunt?'.  Wenham,  [1892]  3  Ch.  59. 

11  Stahlschmidt  v.  Lett,  1  Sm.&G.415;  Hill 
v.  Walker,  4  K.  &  J.  166.  In  Scott  v.  Han- 
cock, 13  Mass.  164,  it  is  said  to  be  settled  that 
an  administrator  is  not  bound  to  plead  the  gen- 
eral Statute  of  Limitations  in  bar  to  an  action 
on  a  debt  of  his  intestate.  So  in  Tennessee, 
although  the  heir  may,  to  protect  realty  des- 
cended. Pea  v.  Waggoner,  5  Havw.  1;  Brown 
v.  Porter,  7  Humph.  372.  And  if  there  are 
several  heirs,  one  may  plead  the  statute  in  pro- 
tection of  his  share,  while  the  others  do  not. 
Woodfin  V.  Anderson,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  331.  And 
see  Briffffs  v.  Wilson,  5  De  G.  M.  &  G.  12. 
note;  Ritter's  Appeal.  23  Penn.  St.  95;  Miller 
v.  Dorsey,  9  Md.  317.  But  see  contra,  Pa'ter- 
son  v.  Cohb,  4  Fla.  481.  See  also  West  r. 
Smi-h.  8  How.  (IT.  S.)  402,  412.  See  also 
Smith's  Estate,  1  Ashmead,  352;  but  see  the 
remarks  of  Rayley  J.  in  McCullock  v.  Dawes, 
9  Dowl.  &  Ryl.  40,  on  this  point. 


Flan.  &  Kel.  603;  Bancroft  v.  Sawin,  143  Mass. 
144. 

(b)  The  rule  that  an  executor  cannot  be  com- 
pelled  to   set   up   the   Statute    of    Limitations 

641 


*  644  PLEAS. 

*  644   been  taken  advantage  of  *  by  the  executors,  and  a  decree    for 

an  account  of  debts  has  been  pronounced,  the  statute  may  be  set 
up  in  the  course  of  the  proceedings,  as  well  by  a  creditor  or  legatee 
as  by  a  personal  representative,1  against  all  the  creditors  except  the 
plaintiff.2 

The  rule,  that  trusts  are  not  within  the  Statute  of  Limitations,  applies 
only  between  trustees  and  cestui  que  trusts,5  not  between  trustees  or 
cestui  que  trusts  and  third  persons  ;  and,  therefore,  it  has  been  held,  that 
where  an  executor,  or  administrator,  or  trustee  for  an  infant,  neglects 
to  sue  within  the  time,  the  Statute  of  Limitations  will  bind  the  infant, 
and  prevent  his  suing  the  debtor,4  although  it  would  not  prevent  the 
infant  from  suing  his  trustee  for  a  breach  of  trust;  and  so  it  has  been 
determined,  that  the  Statute  of  Limitations  will  bar  a  bill  for  an  account 
of  rent  of  land  held  of  trustees.5  The  rule  also  will  not  hold,  where 
the  claim  is  made  against  a  trustee  by  implication  ;  more  especially 
where  such  implication  is  raised  upon  a  doubtful  point.6  The  rule,  in 
fact,  can  only  be  taken  to  apply  to  those  cases  where  the  possession  of 
the  trustee  cannot  be  considered  as  adverse  to  that  of  the  cestui  que 
trust :  if  the  possession  of  the  trustee  is  adverse,  the  statute  may  be 
pleaded  ;  7(  thus,  it  was  held,  that  in  the  case  of  parceners  and  joint- 
tenants,  they  are  accountable  to  each  other,  without  regard  to  the 
length  of  time,  because  the  possession  of  one  being  the  possession  of 
all,  there  is  a  mutual  possession  between  them ;  but  it  is  otherwise  in 
the  case  of  tenants  in  common,  where  the  possession  of  one  may  be 
adverse  to  that  of  the  other.8  (a)  Where  the  trustee  could  not  have  set 
up  the  analogy  of  the  statute,  his  representative  cannot  do  so.9 

1  Shewen  v.  Vanderhorst,  ubi  supra;  Moo-  Ivey,  1  Yerger,  297;  Turners.  Debell.  2  A.  K. 
die  v.  Bannister,  4  Drew.  432;  5  Jur.  N.  S.  Marsh.  384;  Bigelow  v.  Bigelow,  6  Ham.  97; 
402;  Fuller  v.  Redman,  26  Beav.  614.  Kane  r.  Bloodgood,  7  John.  Ch.  90;  Farnum  r. 

2  Briggs  v.  Wilson,  5  De  G.  M.  &  G.  12;  Brooks,  9  Pick.  242-244;  Williams  v.  Watkins, 
Fuller  v.  Redman,  ubi  supra;  Adams  v.  Wal-  3  Peters,  51,  52;  Cowart  v.  Pernne,  18  N.  J. 
ler,  W.  N.  (1866)  200;  14  W.  R.  783;  Phillips  Eq.  454,  457;  Conover  t.  Conover,  Saxton,  403; 
r.  Beal,  32  Beav.  26.  And  as  to  the  Court  tak-  Wanmaker  v.  Van  Buskirk,  id.  685;  Allen  v. 
ing  the  objection,  see  Alston  r.  Trollope,  35  Woolley,  1  Green  Ch.  209;  Stark  v.  Hunton, 
Beav  466  ;  L.  R.  2  Eq.  205.  2  Green  Ch.  311.     See  now,  Supreme  Court  of 

3  In  case  of  a  direct   trust,   no   length   of  Judicature  Act,  1873,  L.  R.  8  Stat.  319. 

time  bars  the  claim  between  trustee  and  cestui  4  Wych  v.  East  India  Co.  3  P.  Wms.  309; 

que  trust.     Cook  p.  Williams,  1  Green  Ch.  209.  see  Ewing  v.  Shannahan  (Mo),  20  S.  W.  Rep. 

Baker  v.  Whiting,  3  Sumner,  476;  Armstrong  1065. 

v.  Campbell,  3  Yerger,  201;  Overstreet  v.  Bate,  5  Hercy  v.  Ballard,  4  Bro.  C.  C.  468. 

1  J.  J.  Marsh.  370;  Coster  r.  Murray,  5  John.  6  Townshend     r.   Townshend,   1  Cox,   28; 

Ch.  224 ;  Gist  v.  Cattel,  2  Desaus.  53*;  Thomas  1  Bro.  C.  C.  550,  554;  Warner  v.  Jacob,  20  Ch. 

r.  White,  3   Litt.    177;    Pinkerton   v.   Walker,  D.  220.     As  to  directors  of  a  company,  see  Be 

3  Hayw.  221;  Trecothick  v.  Austin,  4  Mason,  Exchange  Banking  Co.  21  Ch.  D.  519. 

16;  Terrill  v.  Marry,  4  Yerger,  104;    Wisner  7  Hovenden   v.   Lord   Annesley,  2   Sch.  & 

v.  Barnet,  4  Wash.  C.  C.  631;  Bryant  v.  Puck-  Lef.  633. 

ett,  3  Hayw.  252;  Fisher  v.  Tucker,  1  M'Cord  8  Prince  v.   Heylin,   1    Atk.   493;    Cox   p. 

Ch.   169;  Van  Rhyn  p.  Vincent,  id.  314:  De-  Dolman,  2  De  G.  M.  &  G.  592,  597. 

couche  v.   Savetier,  3  John.    Ch.   216;  Warn-  9  Brittlebank  v.  Goodwin,  L.  R.  5  Eq.  545  ; 

burzee  p.  Kennedy,  4  Desaus.  474;  Pinson  v.  Re  Burge,  57  L.  T.  364. 


against  just  debfs  applies  both  at  Law  and  in  such  a  debt,  he  commits  a  devastavit,  and  he 

Equity;  but  an  executor  or  administrator  can-  cannot  retain  such  debt  if  due  to  himself.     Re 

not  thus  deal  with  a  debt  which  cannot  be  en-  Rownson,  Field  v.  White,  29  Ch.  D.  358. 
forced  under  the  Statute  of  Frauds.     If  he  pavs  (a)  In  cases  of  partnership  any  claim  on 

642 


DIFFERENT   GROUNDS    OF   PLEAS. 


645 


*  Although  it  is  a  rule  in  Equity  that  no  length  of  time  will  bar  *  645 
a  fraud,  yet  a  transaction  cannot  be  impeached  on  the  ground  of 
fraud,  where  the  fact  of  its  having  been  committed  has  been  within  the 
knowledge  of  the  party  for  many  years  ; l  if,  therefore,  the  bill  states 
circumstances  of  fraud,  and  that  the  plaintiff  did  not  become  apprised  of 
them  till  after  the  period  limited  by  the  statute  had  expired,  a  plea  of 
the  Statute  of  Limitations  will  not  prevail,  unless  the  defendant  meets 
such  statement  by  an  averment  and  answer,  negativing  the  fraud,2  or  the 
fact  of  the  discovery  within  the  time  specified  in  the  bill.3  The  same 
rules  which  are  applied  by  Courts  of  Equity  to  cases  of  fraud,  will  also 
be  applied  to  cases  of  mistake ;  and  it  has  been  held,  where  there  has 
been  a  mistake,  that  the  statute  will  not  operate  till  after  the  expiration 
of  six  years  from  the  discovery  of  it.4  (a)  The  principle  upon  which  this 
rule  is  founded  is,  that  the  statute  runs  from  every  new  right  of  action 
or  suit  which  accrues  to  the  plaintiff,  and  that  the  discovery  of  the  fraud 
gives  to  the  plaintiff  a  new  right ;  but  if  he  does  not  proceed  within  the 
time  limited  by  the  statute  from  such  discovery,  he  will  be  barred.5   This 


i  Gould  r.  Gould,  3  Story,  516. 

2  See  Goodrich  p.  Pendleton,  2  John.  Ch. 
384. 

3  Hovenden  p.  Lord  Annesley,  ubi  supra  ; 
Blennerhassett  v.  Day,  2  Ball  &  B.  118;  Whal- 
ley  v.  Whalley,  3  Bligh,  1,  12;  1  Mer.  430; 
Blair  p.  Bromley,  2  Phil.  354,  360;  11  Jur. 
617;  5  Hare,  542;  Beaden  p.  King,  9  Hare, 
4D9;  see  Moore  p.  Knight,  [1891]  1  Ch.  547: 
Gibbs  p.  Guild,  8  Q.  B.  D.  296;  9  id.  59;  Arm- 
strong v.  Milburn,  54  L.  T.  247,  723;  Barber  v. 
Houston,  18  L.  R.  Ir.  475;  14  id.  273. 

In  cases  of  fraud  the  Statute  of  Limitations 
begins  to  run  from  the  time  of  the  discovery  of 
the  fraud.  See  Homer  v.  Fish,  1  Pick.  438; 
Wells  p.  Fish,  3  Pick.  74,  76  (2d  ed.);  Jones  v. 
Conoway,  4  Yeates,  109;  Sherwood  P.Sutton, 
5  Mason,  143;  Harsell  p.  Kelley.  2  M'Cord, 
426;  Bishop  p.  Little,  3  Greenl.  405;  Moreton 
r.  Chandler,  8  Greenl.  9;  Hamilton  p.  Shep- 
pard,  2  Murph.  115;  Payne  v.  Hathaway,  3  Vt. 
212;  2  Story,  Eq.  Jur.  §§  1521,  1521  a  ;  Shelby 
>:  Shelby,  Cooke,  183;  Pugh  p.  Bell,  1  J.  J. 
Marsh.  401;  Crane  v.  Prather,  4  id.  77;  Croft 
v.  Arthur,  3  Desaus.  323;  Wamburze  p.  Ken- 
nedy, 4  id.  474;  Hadix  v.  Davison,  3  Mon. 
40;  Cole  p.  M'Glathry,  9  Greenl.  131;  Shield 
v.   Anderson,   3    Leigh,   729  ;    Eigleburger   p. 


simple  contract  by  one  partner  against  the 
others,  after  dissolution,  is  prima  facie  barred 
at  the  end  of  the  statutory  period;  but  while  the 
partnership  continues,  claims  between  the  part- 
ners are  not  affected  by  the  statute.  See  Bar- 
ton p.  North  Staffordshire  Ry.  Co.  38  Ch.  D. 
458;  ante,  p.  641,  note  (6). 

(a)  Parties  may,  however,  be  estopped  by 
their  conduct  in  case  of  mistake.  Thus,  after 
money  is    paid    under    a    decree    based  on  a 


Kibler,  1  Hill  Ch.  121;  Haywood  B.  Marsh,  6 
Yerger,  60;  Lafferty  v.  Turley,  3  Sneed,  170; 
Pennock  p.  Freeman,  1  Watts,  401;  Bertine  v. 
Varian,  1  Edw.  Ch.  342;  Hunter  v.  Spotswood, 
1  Wash.  146  ;  Warner  e  Daniels,  1  Wood.  & 
M.  90;  Radcliff  p.  Rowley,  2  Barb.  Ch.  23; 
Baker  «.  Grundy,  1  Duvall  (Ky.),  281;  Gibson 
p.  Fifer,  21  Texas,  260;  Myers  c.  Hanlon,  12 
Rich.  (S.  C.)  Eq.  196;  Martin  p.  Martin,  35 
Ala.  560;  Longworth  p.  Hunt,  11  Ohio  St.  194; 
Smith  p.  Fly,  24  Texas,  345:  Smith  p.  Drake, 
23  N.  J.  Eq.  302.  But  the  bar  created  by  the 
Statute  of  Limitations  is  not  avoided  by  mere 
constructive  fraud.  Farnam  p.  Brooks,  9  Pick. 
212.  Nor  is  the  bar  avoided  by  a  fraud  which 
the  party  has  the  full  means  of  discover- 
ing. Farnam  p.  Brooks,  9  Pick.  212;  Cole  p. 
M*Glathry,  9  Greenl.  131;  Dodge  p.  Fssex 
Ins.  Co.  12  Gray,  65,  71;  Haynie  r.  Hall,  5 
Humph.  290. 

4  Brooksbank  p.  Smith,  2  Y.  &  C.  Ex.  58, 
60:  Dodge  p.  Essex  Ins.  Co.  12  Gray,  05.  71; 
Hough  p.  Richardson,  3  Story,  659;  Thomas 
p.  Marshall,  30  Ala.  504:  Gibson  p.  Filer,  21 
Texas,  200;  Smith  c.  Fly.  24  Texas,  345. 

5  Hovenden  p.  Lord  Annesley,  2  Sch.  &  Lef. 
636;  South  Sea  Co.  p.  Wymondseil,  3  P.  Wins. 
143. 


certain  construction  of  an  agreement,  a  suit 
cannot  be  maintained  to  rectify  the  agree- 
ment on  the  ground  that  such  construction  was 
contrary  to  the  intention  of  nil  parties.  Caird 
v.  Moss,  33  Ch.  1).  22.  In  Onward  Building 
Society  p.  Smithson,  [1893]  1  Ch.  1,  it  was 
questioned  whether  a  plea  of  fraud  by  a  de- 
fendant against  whom  an  estate  has  been  cre- 
ated by  estoppel,  is  well  answered  by  the  reply 
of  purchase  for  value  without  notice. 

643 


646 


PLEAS. 


rule,  which  appears  to  have  been  the  one  relied  upon  by  the  Courts  under 
the  old  Statute  of  Limitations,  21  Jac.  I.  c.  16,  has  been  distinctly  em- 
bodied in  the  Act  of  3  &  4  Will.  IV.  c.  27,  §  26.6 
*  646  *  Acting  upon  the  principle  above  laid  down,  that  the  period 
when  every  new  right  of  action  or  suit  accrues  to  the  party 
should  be  the  period  from  which  to  date  the  operation  of  the  statute, 
the  Courts  have  held  that  where  any  new  promise  or  any  acknowledg- 
ment has  been  given  by  the  debtor  to  the  creditor  or  his  agent,1  it  con- 
fers a  new  right  of  action  upon  the  creditor  ;  and  that,  therefore,  the 
time  within  which  the  creditor's  remedy  would  be  barred  must  be  reck- 
oned from  the  time  of  such  acknowledgment  or  promise  beiug  given.2 
Upon  this  principle  the  Courts  have  held  that  payment  of  any  part  of 
the  principal  or  interest,  within  the  period  limited,  is  a  sufficient  ac- 
knowledgment to  take  the  case  out  of  the  statute.3  So  they  have  held 
the  rendering  an  account,  or  an  offer  to  account,  to  be  sufficient  to  pre- 
vent the  bar.4 

Formerly,  the  Courts  acted  with  very  considerable  laxity  in  their 
decisions  upon  the  nature  of  the  acknowledgment  which,  in  the  case 
of  demands  arising  upon  simple  contracts,  would  be  sufficient  to  take 
them  out  of  the  Statute  of  Limitations,  which  laxity  gave  rise  to 
various  questions  as  to  the  proof  and  effect  of  acknowledgments  and 
promises,  offered  in  evidence,  for  the  purpose  of  taking  the  case  out 
of  the  operation  of  the  statute.  These  questions  have  now,  however, 
in  a  great  measure,  been  set  at  rest ;  for,  by  Lord  Tenterden's  Act, 
it  has  been  declared,  that,  in  actions  of  debt  or  upon  the  case,  grounded 
on  any  simple  contract,  no  acknowledgment  or  promise  by  words 
only  shall  be  deemed  sufficient  evidence  of  a  new  or  continuing  con- 
tract, whereby  to  take  any  case  out  of  the  operation  of  the  statute, 
21  Jac.  I.  c.  16,  or  to  deprive  any  party  of  the  benefit  thereof,  unless 
such  acknowledgment  or  promise  shall  be  made  or  contained  by  or  in 
some  writing,  to  be  signed  by  the  party  chargeable  thereby  ; 5  and  by 


6  So  in  Massachusetts,  where  the  fraud  is 
concealed  by  the  person  liable  to  the  action. 
Pub.  Stats,  c.  197,  §  14.  In  Maine  there  must 
be  proof  of  actual  fraud  and  concealment  by 
the  party  sought  to  be  charged.  Cole  v. 
M'Glathry,  9  Greenl.  131. 

i  Fuller  v.  Redman,  26  Beav.  614;  Bach- 
man  r.  Roller.  1  Leg.  Rep.  337. 

2  See  Bangs  v.  Hall,  2  Pick.  378;  Exeter 
Bank  v.  Sullivan,  6  N.  H.  135;  Whitney  v. 
BL'elow,  4  Pick.  110;  Porter  v.  Hill,  4  Green]. 
41 ;  Deshon  v.  Eaton,  4  Greenl.  413;  Russell  v. 
Copp,  5  X.  H.  154;  Bailey  v.  Crane,  21  Pick. 
324:  Illsley  v.  Jewett,  2  Met. -168.  Upon  this 
subject  of  the  revival  of  the  remedy  by  an 
acknowledgment  of  and  a  new  promise  to  pay 
the  debt,  see  Ex  parte  Dewdnev,  15  Sumner's 
Ves.  479,  note  ('/),  and  cases  cited;  Baillie  v. 
Sibbald,  id.  185,  note  (a). 

3  Hony  v.  Hony,  1  S.  &  S.  568,  580;  Briggs 
v.  Wilson,  17  Beav.  330;  and  see  Maber  v. 
Maber,  L.  R.  2   Ex.  153.     The   weight   of  au- 

644 


thority  seems  to  be  that  a  payment  before 
the  bar  of  the  statute  has  attached  will  take 
the  case  out  of  the  statute,  but  not  a  payment 
afterwards  without  more.  Steel  v.  Matthews, 
7  Yerg.  313;  Ellicott  U.Nichols,  7  Gill,  80; 
Schindel  r.  Gates,  6  Rep.  112;  6  Rich.  28;  6 
Ired.  341 ;  18  B.  Mon.  643.  But  in  Lock  v.  Wil- 
son, 9  Heisk.  784,  it  was  held  that  a  payment 
before  the  statute  had  run  would,  of  itself,  be 
no  more  efficacious  than  a  payment  afterwards. 

4  Earl  Pomfret  v.  Lord  Windsor,  2  Ves.  Sr. 
485;  and  see  Briggs  r.  Wilson,  5  De  G.  M. 
&G.  12. 

5  9  Geo.  IV.  c.  14,  §  1.  As  to  what  is  a 
sufficient  acknowledgment,  see  Lee  r.  Wilmot 
L.  R.  1  Ex.  364;  In  re  River  Steamer  Co. 
L.  R.  6  Ch.  822;  Bourdin  v.  Greenwood,  L.  R. 
13  Eq.  281;  Quincy  v.  Sharpe,  1  Ex.  D.  72; 
Skeet  v.  Lindsay,  2  Ex.  D.  314;  Curwen  r. 
Milburn,  42  Ch.  D.  424;  Green  v.  Humphreys, 
26  Ch.  I).  474;  Firth  v.  Slingsby,  58  L.  T.  481. 
It  is  also  declared,  by  the  same  section,  that 


DIFFERENT   GROUNDS   OF   PLEAS.  *  647 

the  Mercantile  Law  Amendment  Act,  1856, 6  an  acknowledgment  or 
promise  by  writing,  signed  by  the  duly  authorized  agent  of  the  party 
chargeable  thereby,  has,  with  reference  to  the  provisions  of  Lord  Ten- 
terden's  Act,  the  same  effect  as  if  such  writing  had  been  signed  by  the 
party  himself. 

*  Lord  Tenterden's  Act  does  not,  however,  alter  or  take  away  *  647 
or  lessen  the  effect  of  any  paymeut  of  any  principal  or  interest 
made  by  any  person  whatever  ;  so  that  the  payment  of  any  interest,  or 
any  part  of  the  principal,  within  the  period  limited  by  the  21  Jac.  I. 
c.  16,  §  3,  will  still  have  the  effect  of  taking  the  case  out  of  the  statute  ; 
but  by  the  14th  section  of  the  Mercantile  Law  Amendment  Act,  1856, 
it  is  enacted  that  no  co-contractor  or  co-debtor,  executor,  or  adminis- 
trator of  any  contractor  shall  lose  the  benefit  of  the  21  Jac.  I.  c.  16,  §  3, 
so  as  to  be  chargeable  in  respect,  or  by  reason  only,  of  payment  of  any 
principal,  interest,  or  other  money,  by  any  other  or  others  of  such  co- 
contractors  or  co-debtors,  executors,  or  administrators.1 

It  is  to  be  observed,  that  the  operation  of  Lord  Tenterden's  Act  is 
confined  to  cases  of  demands  arising  upon  simple  contracts  :  in  which 
cases  only  it  was  held,  before  the  passing  of  the  Act,  that  parol  promises 
or  undertakings  would  destroy  the  operation  of  the  Statute  21  Jac.  I. 
c.  16.  Where  the  cause  of  action  was  a  tort,  subsequent  acknowledg- 
ments were  held  nugatory ; 2  and  in  actions  arising  upon  specialty,  the 
statute  did  not  apply. 

The  Statute  21  Jac.  I.  c.  16  provides,  by  §  2,  that  if  any  person  entitled 
to  the  writs  therein  named,  or  who  shall  have  a  right  of  entry,  shall  be 
under  the  age  of  twenty-one  years,  feme  covert,  non  compos  mentis, 
imprisoned,  or  beyond  the  seas,3  such  person  or  his  heirs  may,  not- 
withstanding the  twenty  years,  by  the  preceding  section  limited  as  the 
period  within  which  such  writs  might  be  sued  out  or  entries  made, 
bring  his  action  or  make  his  entry,  as  he  might  have  done  before  the 
Act,  so  that  such  action  or  entry  was  brought  or  made  within  ten  years 
after  his  disqualification  ceased ;  and  by  §  7,  that  persons  under  any  of 
such  disqualifications  may  bring  the  several  actions  enumerated  in  the 
third  section,4  so  that  the  same  be  brought  within  the  time  before  lim- 
ited for  bringing  the  same  after  the  termination  of  the  disqualification  ; 

where  there  shall  be  two  or  more  joint  contract-  2  Arguendo,  Hony  v.  Hony,  1  S.  &   S.  568, 

ors,  or  executors  or  administrators  of  any  con-  578. 

tractor,  no  such  joint  contractors,  executor,  or  3  It  is  held  in  Ohio  that  the  term  "beyond 

administrator  shall  lose  the  benefit  of  the  21  Jac.  seas,"  in  their  statute  of  1804,  is  equivalent  to 

I.  c.  16, so  as  to  be  chargeable  in  respect  or  by  "without  the  limits  of  the  State."    Richardson 

reason  only  of  any  written  acknowledgment  or  *>•  Richardson,  6  Ohio,  125.     As  to  the  construc- 

promise  made  and  signed  by  any  other  or  others  tion  ■  f  this  term  in  the  statutes  of  other  States, 

of  them.     To  the  same  effect,  see  Pub.  Stats.  see  2  Stark.   Ev.  (5th  Am.  ed.)  485,  note  (3), 

Mass.  c.  197,  §  18,  et  seq.  tit.  Limitations.     In  Massachusetts  it  has  been 

6  19  &  20  Vic.  c.  97,  §  13.  decided  that  a  citizen  of    another  State,  who 

1  See   Seager  v.  Aston,  3  Jur.  N.   S.  481,  has  never  been  in  that  Commonwealth,  is  not 

V.   C.    S.      Section    14    is   not    retrospective.  a  person   "beyond   seas,  without   any  of   the 

Jackson   v.  Woolley,  8   El.  &  Bl.  778;    4  Jur.  United   States,"  and  therefore  not  within   the 

N.  S.  656;  and  see  Thompson    r.  Waithman,  3  saving  clause  in    the   Statute  of    Limitations. 

Drew.  628;   2  Jur.    N.    S.    1080;    Cockrill    v.  Stat.  1786,  c   52.  §4;  see  Pub.  Stats.  Mass.  c. 

Sparke,  3   F.   &   F.   150:9   Jur.    N.   S.   307;  197,  §§9, 11 ;  Whitney  r.  Goddard,  20  Pick.  304, 

Watson  v.  Woodman,  L.  R.  20  Eq.  721.  *  Ante,  p.  639. 

645 


*  648  PLEAS. 

but  now,  the  absence  beyond  the  seas,  or  the  imprisonment  of  a  creditor, 
does  not  entitle  him  to  any  time  within  which  to  bring  his  action  or  suit 
beyond  the  time  fixed  by  21  Jac.  I.  c.  16,  §  3.5 

*  648        *  Although  the  7th  section  of  the  21  Jac.  I.  c.  16,  provided,  as 

above  mentioned,  for  the  statute  not  attaching  where  the  plaintiff 
was  under  any  of  the  disabilities  therein  mentioned,  no  provision  was 
made  to  prevent  its  operating  as  a  bar,  during  the  time  the  debtor  might 
be  out  of  the  jurisdiction.  The  4  &  5  Anne,  c.  16,  §  19,  has,  however, 
remedied  that  defect,  and  the  creditor  has  under  it  the  same  privilege, 
where  the  debtor  is  beyond  the  seas,  as  he  had  by  the  Statute  of  James, 
where  he  was  beyond  the  seas  himself; *  but  no  part  of  the  United  King- 
dom of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  nor  the  Islands  of  Man,  Guernsey, 
Jersey,  Alderney,  and  Sark,  nor  any  islands  adjacent  to  any  of  them, 
being  part  of  the  Queen's  dominions,  is  to  be  deemed  to  be  beyond  seas 
within  the  meaning  of  the  last-mentioned  Act.2 

It  is  right  to  notice  here,  that  it  has  been  considered  that  the  21  Jac.  I. 
c.  16  will  not  be  a  good  plea  in  a  suit  against  an  executor  or  adminis- 
trator, where  he  has  not  proved  the  will,  or  administered ;  because 
no  laches  can  be  imputed  to  a  plaintiff  for  not  suing,  while  there  is 
no  executor  or  administrator  against  whom  he  can  bring  his  action : 3 
but  where  the  allegation  of  the  bill,  upon  a  fair  construction,  was,  that 
the  defendant  had  possessed  the  personal  estate,  and  therefore  might 
have  been  sued  as  executor  de  son  tort,  a  plea  of  the  Statute  of  Limita- 
tions, by  an  executor  who  had  not  taken  out  probate  till  some  years 
after  the  testator's  death,  was  allowed.4  And  it  may  be  laid  down  as 
a  general  rule,  that,  wherever  a  party  takes  by  assignment,  from 
another,  the  assignee  will  not  be  in  a  better  position  than  the  assignor  : 
and  therefore,  where  the  Statute  of  Limitations  might  have  been  pleaded 
against  the  assignor,  it  may  be  equally  so  against  the  assignee,  whether 
such  assignment   be   by  act   between   the    parties,  or    by  act  of  law.5 

It  is  to  be  remarked,  that  previously  to  the  passing  of  the  Statute 
3  &  4  Will.  IV.  c.  27,6  neither  the  21  Jac.  I.  c.  16,  nor  any  of  the  other 
statutes  for  the  limitation  of  actions,  applied  specifically  to  Courts  of 
Equity ;  though  those  Courts  have,  in  all  cases  where  legal  titles  and 
demands  were  the  subject  of  litigation,  held  themselves  bound  by  them, 
and,  in  respect  of  equitable  titles  and  demands,  have  been  influenced  in 

s  Mercantile    Law    Amendment    Act,  1856  8  Jolliffe  v.  Pitt,  2  Vern.  694;  1  Eq.  Cas.  Abr. 

(19  &  20  Vic.  c.  97),  §  10.      This  section    is  re-  305,  pi    11;  see  also  Lord  Eldon's  observations 

trospective.     Cornell  v.  Hudson,  8  EI.  &  Bl.  in  Webster  v.  Webster,  10  Ves.  93. 
429;  3  Jur.  N.    S.    1257;  Pardo  v.    Bingham,  *  Webster  v.  Webster,  ubi  supra  ;  Boat wright 

L.  R.  4  Ch.  735.  v.  Boatwright.  L.  R.  17  Eq.  71 ;  Story,  Eq.  PI. 

i  Sturt  v.  Mellish,   2  Atk.   612.      In  Gen.  §753:  Burditt  v.  Gew,  8  Pick.  108. 
Stats.  Mass.  c.  155,  §  9,  there  are  provisions  on  6  South  Sea  Co.  v.  Wymondsell,  3  P.  Wms. 

this  subject,  (a)  143. 

'2  Mercantile  Law  Amendment  Act,  1856  (19  6  Amended  by  7  Will.  IV.  &  1  Vic.  c.  28. 

&  20  Vic.  c.  97).  §  12.  This  section  is  not 
retrospective.  Flood  v.  Patterson,  29  Beav. 
295;  7  Jur.  N.  S.  324. 


{n)  Now  Pub.  Stats,  c.  197,  §11:  see  Whitton      Mass.  574;  128  Mass.  219;  Converse  v.  John- 
v.  Wass,  109  Mass.  40;  Mooar  v.  Harvey,  125      son,  146  Mass.  20. 

646 


DIFFERENT   GROUNDS   OF   PLEAS.  *  C49 

their  determination  by  analogy  to  them.7  The  first-mentioned 
statute  specifically  mentions  *  suits  in  Equity  amongst  the  actions  *  649 
and  suits  to  be  limited  by  its  operation:  it  does  not,  however, 
apply  to  any  suits  but  those  relating  to  real  property,  and  moneys  charged 
upon  land,  and  legacies.1  These  provisions  have  since  been  extended  by 
the  23  &  24  Vic.  c.  38 2  to  the  case  of  claims  on  the  personal  estates  of 
intestates,  and  further  provisions  have  been  made  by  the  Real  Property 
Limitation  Act,  1874.8  The  Statute  21  Jac.  I.  c.  16  may  therefore  still 
be  insisted  upon,  by  way  of  defence  in  all  cases  not  included  in  the  3  &  4 
Will.  IV.  c.  27,  23  &  24  Vic.  c.  38,  and  37  &  38  Vic.  c.  57,  in  which  it  might 
before  have  been  pleaded.4  (a) 

It  may  be  useful,  in  this  place,  to  point  out  the  cases  in  which  the 
Statute  of  Limitations  of  the  3  &  4  Will.  IV.  c.  27  operates  as  a  bar  to 
suits  in  Equity.  By  the  24th  section,  all  suits  in  Equity  are  barred,  as 
against  persons  claiming  any  land  or  rent  (within  the  meaning  of  the 
definitions  contained  in  the  first  section  of  the  Act),  unless  within  the 
period  during  which,  by  virtue  of  the  provisions  thereinbefore  contained, 
they  might  have  made  an  entry  or  distress,  or  brought  an  action  to 
recover  the  same  respectively,  if  they  had  been  entitled  at  Law  to  such 
estate,  interest,  or  right,  as  they  claim  in  Equity.  This  right,  however, 
in  the  case  of  an  express  trust,  it  is  declared,  by  the  25th  section,  shall 
be  deemed  not  to  have  accrued  against  the  trustee,  or  those  claiming 
through  him,  until  the  actual  conveyance  to  a  purchaser  for  valuable 
consideration.  It  is  also  decreed,  that  it  is  only  against  such  purchaser, 
and  any  one  claiming  through  him,  that  the  right  shall  then  be  deemed 
to  have  accrued :  so  that,  as  between  the  trustee  and  the  cestui  que  trust, 
the  law  remains  the  same  as  it  did  before  the  statute.5 

It  is  also  declared,  by  the  26th  section,  that,  in  every  case  of  con- 
cealed fraud,  the  right  to  bring  a  suit  in  Equity  for  the  recovery  of  any 
land  or  rent,  shall  be  deemed  to  have  accrued  at,  and  not  before,  the 
time  at  which  such  fraud  has,  or  with  reasonable  diligence  might  have 

7  See   ante,   p.  559;   see  Langdell,  Eq.  PI.  Yardley  v.  Holland,  L.  R.  20  Eq.  428;  Fowke 

(2.1  ed.)  §  127.  v.  Draycott,  29  Ch.  D.  996;  Re  Lake's  Trusts. 

1  See  §  40.  For  the  cases  on  this  section,  63  L.  T.  416.  In  cases  of  equitable  waste,  see 
see  Shelford  R.  P.  Acts,  248-262;  Sugd.  R.  P.  Dukeof  Leeds  v.  Earl  Amherst,  2  Phil.  117,  125; 
Acts,  120,  et  seq.  14  Lind.  357;  10  Jur.  956;  Duke  of  Northum- 

2  See  §  13.  berland  v.  Bowman,  56  L.  T.  773.  And  as  to  the 

3  37  &  38  Vic.  c.  57.  Act   generally,  Dixon    r.  Gay  fere   No.    1,    17 

4  For  a  collection  of  cases  on  the  21  Jac.  I.  Beav.  421;  Sugd.  R.  P.  Acts,  105;  see  Farnam 
c.  16,  and  9  Geo.  IV.  c.  14,  see  Shelford  R.  P.  v.  Brooks,  9  Pick.  212;  Cole  v.  M'Glathry,  9 
Acts,  265-292.  Greenl.  131 ;  ante,  p.  643,  note.     See  now  the 

5  For  the  cases  on  §§  24,  25,  see  Shelford  R.  Supreme  Court  of  Judicature  Act,  1873  (36  & 
P.  Acts,  211,  214,  222:  Sugd.  R.  P.  Acts,  93,  et  37  Vic.  c.  66),  §§  25  (2),  34;  Heath  v.  Pugh,  6 
seq.  ;  Dickenson  v.  Teasdale,  1  De  G.  J.  &  S.  Q.  B.  D.  345;  afl'd,  nom.  Pugh  v.  Heath,  7 
52;  9  Jur.  N.  S.  237;  Walters  v.  Webb,  L.  R.  App.  Cas.  235:  Sands  v.  Thompson,  22  Ch.  D, 
9  Eq.  83;  L.  R.  5Ch.531;  Pyrah  v.  Woodcock,  614.  As  to  the  statute  applying  to  land  not 
19  W.  R.  463;  Locking  v.  Parker,  L.  R.  8  Ch.  superflous,  see  Bobbett  v.  South  Eastern  Ry. 
30;   Browne   v.   Radford,  W.  N.  (1874)    124;  Co.  9  Q.  B.  D.  424. 


(a)  A  mere  constructive  trust  will  not  pre-  to  be  applicable  to  a  suit  against  a  surety  ns 
vent  §  8  of  this  statute  from  being  a  bar.  Re  well  as  to  one  against  the  mortgagor.  Re 
Davis,  [1891]  3  Ch.  119.     That  section  appears      Frisby,  Allison  v.  Fnsby,  43  Ch.  D.  106. 

647 


*  650  PLEAS. 

been  known  or  discovered.6  It  also  provides,  that  nothing  in  that  sec- 
tion shall  enable  any  owner  of  lands  or  rents  to  have  a  suit  in  Equity 
for  the  recovery  of  such  lands  or  rents,  or  for  setting  aside  any  convey- 
ance of  such  lands  or  rents,  on  account  of  fraud,  against  any  bona  fide 
purchaser  for  valuable  consideration  who  has  not  assisted  in  the  com- 
mission of  such  fraud,  and  who,  at  the  time  that  he  made  the 

*  650    purchase,  did  not  know,  *  and  had  no  reason  to  believe,  that  any 

such  fraud  had  been  committed ;  and  the  27th  section  saves  the 
jurisdiction  of  Courts  of  Equity  on  the  ground  of  acquiescence.1 

Previously  to  the  passing  of  the  Acts  now  under  consideration,  a  plea 
of  the  Statute  of  Limitations,  21  Jac.  I.  c.  16  was  held  to  be  a  good  bar 
to  a  bill  for  the  redemption  of  a  mortgage,  if  the  mortgagee  had  been 
in  possession  of  the  mortgaged  premises  upwards  of  twenty  years  ;  2  and, 
indeed,  as  we  have  already  seen,  demurrers  upon  that  ground  have  been 
allowed.8  The  Courts,  however,  permitted  the  redemption  of  mortgages, 
if,  at  any  time  within  the  period  of  twenty  years,  the  mortgagee  had 
acknowledged  that  the  estate  was  redeemable  property.  For  this  pur- 
pose, a  positive  acknowledgment  of  the  mortgage  was  not  required ;  but 
any  act  on  the  part  of  the  mortgagee,  or  of  any  one  claiming  under  him, 
tending  to  show  that  he  considered  the  mortgage  as  still  subsisting  (such 
as  the  keeping  of  accounts),  was  considered  as  sufficient  to  keep  alive 
the  interest  of  the  mortgagor ; 4  nor  was  it  necessary  that  the  acknowl- 
edgment should  have  been  made  to  the  mortgagor,  or  to  one  claiming 
under  him  :  any  act  by  which  the  existence  of  the  mortgage  was  admitted, 
even  in  transactions  with  a  third  party,  was  held  sufficient ;  5  and  so  has 
a  recital  in  a  will,  or  any  other  deliberate  instrument ;  6  and  even  a  parol 
acknowledgment,  provided  it  was  clear  and  unimpeachable,  and  made 
within  twenty  years,  has  been  permitted  to  take  the  case  out  of  the  bar 
created  by  the  statute.7  The  statute  3  &  4  Will.  IV.  c.  27,  §  28,  however, 
made  a  considerable  alteration  in  the  law,  in  this  respect,  by  enacting, 
that  where  a  mortgagee  shall  have  obtained  the  possession  or  receipt  of 
the  profits  of  any  land,  or  the  receipt  of  any  rent  comprised  in  his  mort- 
gage, the  mortgagor,  or  any  person  claiming  through  him,  shall  not  bring 
a  suit  to  redeem  the  mortgage,  but  within  twelve  years  next  after  the 
time  at  which  the  mortgagee  obtained  such  possession  or  receipt ;  unless, 
in  the  mean  time,  an  acknowledgment  of  the  title  of  the  mortgagor,  or 

6  Cole  v.  McGlathry,  9  Greenl.  131 ;  Ecclesi-  Sutton  v.  Sutton,  22  Ch.  D.  511;  Fearnside  v. 

astical  Commissioners  v.  North  Eastern  Ry.  Co.  Hint,  id.  579  ;  see  Be  Lake's  Trusts,  63  L.  T. 

4  Ch.  D.  845;  Knox  v.  Gye,  L.  R.  5  H.  L.  656;  416. 
Gibbs  v  Guild,  8  Q.  B.  D.  296;  9  id.  59;  ante,  3  Ante,  p.  560. 

p.  645,  note.  *  Edsell  v.  Buchanan,  4  Bro.  C.  C.  254,  256; 

i  For  the  cases  on  §§  26,  27,  see  Shelford,  R.  2  Ves.  Jr.  84. 
P.  Acts,  209-212;  Sugd.  R.  P.  Acts,  98;  Chet-  5  Hardy  v.  Reeves,  4  Ves.  466,  479;  Smart 

ham  v.  Hoare,  L.  R.  9  Eq.  571:  Vane  ».  Vane,  v.  Hunt,  cited  id   478. 

L.  R.  8  Ch.  383;  W.  N.  (1876)  271;  Browne  v.  6  Ord  v.  Smith,  2  Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  600,  pi.  27; 

Radford.  W.  N.  (1874)  124;  Willis  v.  Earl  Howe,  Perry  n.  Marston,  2  Rro.  C.  C.  397,  399;   Han- 

W.  N.  (1880)  165  ;  29  W.  R.  70.  sard  v.  Hardy,  18  Ves.  455,469;  Price*.  Copner, 

2  Ld.  Red.  271;  Coop.  Eq.  PI.  254;  Beames  1  S.  &  S  347,  355. 
on  Pleas,  162;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  757.     When  a  "  Rayner  v.  Oastler.  6  Mad.  274;  Whiting  v. 

mortgagor's  remedy  against  the  land  is  barred,  White,  2  Cox,  290,  295;  Perry  v.  Marston,  2 

the   remedy  on   the   covenant   is  also  barred.  Bro.  C.  C.  397,  399. 

648 


DIFFERENT   GROUNDS    OF   PLEAS.  *  651 

of  his  right  of  redemption,  shall  have  been  given  to  the  mortgagor,  or 
some  person  claiming  his  estate,  or  to  the  agent  of  such  mortgagor 
or  person,  in  writing,  signed  by  the  mortgagee  or  the  person  claiming 
through  him;  and  in  such  case,  no  such  suit  shall  be  brought  but 
within  twelve  years  *  next  after  the  time  at  which  such  acknowl-  *  651 
edgment,  or  the  last  of  such  acknowledgments,  if  more  than  one, 
was  given.1  So  that,  according  to  this  enactment,  no  acknowledgment 
will  take  a  suit  for  the  redemption  of  a  mortgage  out  of  the  operation 
of  the  Act,  unless  it  is  in  writing,  signed  by  the  mortgagee,  or  the  per- 
son claiming  through  him,  and  given  to  the  mortgagor  himself,  or  to  the 
person  claiming  the  estate,  or  the  agent  of  such  mortgagor  or  person.2 

The  same  section  further  enacts,  that  when  there  shall  be  more  than  one 
mortgagor,  or  more  than  one  person  claiming  through  the  mortgagor  or 
mortgagors,  the  acknowledgment,  if  given  to  any  of  such  mortgagors  or 
persons  or  his  or  their  agent,  shall  be  as  effectual  as  if  the  same  had  been 
given  to  all  of  them  ;  but  where  there  shall  be  more  than  one  mortgagee,  or 
more  than  one  person  claiming  the  estate  and  interest  of  the  mortgagee  or 
mortgagees,  such  acknowledgment,  signed  by  one  or  more  of  such  mort- 
gagees or  persons,  shall  be  effectual  only  as  against  the  party  or  parties 
signing  as  aforesaid,  and  the  person  or  persons  claiming  any  part  of  the 
mortgage  money,  or  land,  or  rent,  by,  from,  or  under  him  or  them,  and 
any  person  or  persons  entitled  to  any  estate  or  estates,  interest  or 
interests,  to  take  effect  after  or  in  defeasance  of  his  or  their  estate 
or  estates,  interest  or  interests  ; 8  and  shall  not  operate  to  give  to  a 
mortgagor  or  mortgagors  a  right  to  redeem  the  mortgage,  as  against  the 
person  or  persons  entitled  to  any  other  undivided  or  divided  part  of  the 
money,  or  land,  or  rent,  and  where  such  of  the  mortgagees  or  persons  as 
shall  have  given  an  acknowledgment  shall  be  entitled  to  a  divided  part 
of  the  land  or  rent  comprised  in  the  mortgage,  or  some  estate  or  interest 
therein,  and  not  to  any  ascertained  part  of  the  mortgage  money,  the 
mortgagor  or  mortgagors  shall  be  entitled  to  redeem  the  same  divided 
part  of  the  land  or  rent,  on  payment,  with  interest,  of  the  part  of  the 
mortgage  money  which  shall  bear  the  same  proportion  to  the  whole  of 
the  mortgage  money  as  the  value  of  such  divided  part  of  the  land  or 
rent  shall  bear  to  the  value  of  the  whole  of  the  land  or  rent  comprised 
in  the  mortgage.4 

1  See  37  &  38  Vic.  c.  57  §  7.  8  The  above  clause  renders  the  acknowledg- 

2  It  was  held  that  the  acknowledgment  ment  valid  after  twenty  vears,  not  only  against 
need  not  be  given  within  the  twentv  years  the  person  signing  the  same,  and  those  claiming 
named  in  the  Act  (now  repealed)  of  3&4  Will.  under,  or  in  privitv  with  him,  but  against  all 
IV.  c.  27,  §  28,  after  the  mortgagee  has  entered  others,  whether  claiming  bv  descent  or  pur- 
into  possession.  Stansfield  v.  Hobson,  3  De  G.  chase,  in  remainder  or  reversion ;  and  that  there 
M.  &  G.  620,  62(5;  16  Beav.  236;  since  overruled  is  no  saving  clause  in  the  Act  in  favor  of  per- 
by  Sanders  v.  Sanders,  19  Ch.  D.  373;  see  also  sons  under  disabilities,  such  as  infancy  cover- 
Pendleton  v.  Rooth,  1  Giff.  35  ;  5  Jur.  N.  S.  ture   &c  "  ' 

r:/pD«G;  F-  V-  8l!   6  Jur-  N-  S    182;  4<37  i  38  Vic-  c-  57-  §  7-     For  the  cases  on 

»uga.  K.  P.  Acts,  113,  as  to  effect  of  acknowl-  §  28,  see  Shelford.  R.  P.  Acts   212-218-  Sugd 

edgment  by  tenant  in  tail  and  heir  of  the  mort-  R.  P.  Acts,  111-118:  Richardson  v   lounge   L 

f^!'   r,See  f"rther  Markwick  *  Hardingham,  R.  10  Eq.  275;  L.  R.  6  Ch.  478:   Locking  r. 

15  Ch.  D.  339;  Re  Hobbs,  Hobbs  v.  Wade.  36  Parker,  L.  R.  8  Ch.  30;  Lvall  v.  Fluker    W    X 

Ch    D.  553.     For  form  of  plea  of  the  statute,  (1873)  208.     There  is  no  'saving  as  to  disabili- 

see  Lucas  v.  Dennison,  13  Sim.  584.  ties .  Forster  v.  Patterson,  17  Ch.  I).  132;  and  the 

649 


*652 


PLEAS. 


*  652       *  A  bill  of  foreclosure  is  a  suit  for  the  recovery  of  the  estate, 
and   not  of  the  money,  although  it  may  lead   to   the  payment 
thereof ;    and   that,  therefore,    §  40 l  of   the  above   statute   cannot   be 
pleaded  in  bar  to  such  a  suit.2 

Before  the  passing  of  the  3  &  4  Will.  IV.  c.  27,  it  had  been  repeatedly 
held,  that  the  Statute  of  Limitations  could  not  be  pleaded  to  fcu.ts  for 
the  recovery  of  legacies :  although  the  Court,  after  the  lapse  of  a  great 
time,  would,  under  certain  circumstances,  presume  payment.8  It  was, 
however,  provided,  by  §  42,4  that  no  interest  in  respect  of  any  legacy 


mortgagor's  possession  of  part  does  not  prevent 
the  statute  running  in  respect  of  the  other  part. 
Kinsman  r.  Rouse,  17  Ch.  D.  104.  See  also 
Topham  v.  Booth,  35  Ch.  D.  607;  Badeley  v. 
Consolidated  Bank,  34  Ch.  D.  536,  549 ;  38  id. 
238. 

1  Sect.  40  of  the  above  Act  limits  the  right  of 
the  mortgagee,  or  other  person  entitled  to  any 
money  secured  by  mortgage,  judgment,  or  lien, 
or  otherwise  charged  upon  or  payable  out  of 
any  land  or  rent,  at  Law  or  in  Equity,  or  to  any 
legacy,  bringing  any  action,  suit,  or  other  pro- 
ceeding to   recover  such   money,    but   within 
twenty    years   next  after  a   present   right  to 
receive   the   same  shall  have  accrued  to  some 
person  capable  of  giving  a  discharge   for   or 
release  of  the  same:  unless,  in  the  mean  time, 
some  part   of   the   principal   money,    or   some 
interest  thereon,  shall  have  been  paid,  or  some 
acknowledgment  of  the  right  thereto  shall  have 
been  given  in  writing,  signed  by  the  person  by 
whom  the  same  shall  be  payable  or  his  agent, 
to  the  person  entitled  thereto  or  his  agent;  in 
which  case,  no  such  action,  suit,  or  proceeding 
can  be  brought  but  within  twenty  years  after 
such  payment  or  acknowledgment,  or  the  last 
of  such  payments  or  acknowledgments,  if  more 
than  one  was  given.     See  Cheever  v.  Perley, 
11  Allen,  584.     Absence  beyond  the  seas,  and 
imprisonment  are  no  longer  disabilities  within 
this  section;  see  19  &  20  Vic.  c.  97,  §  10,  which 
is  retrospective.    Cornil!  v.  Hudson,  8  El.  &  Bl. 
429 ;  Pardo  v.  Bingham,  L.  R.  4  Ch.  735.    By  the 
23  &  24  Vic.  c.  38,  §  13,  a  provision  similar  to 
§  40  is  enacted  with  respect  to  the  case  of  claims 
on  the  personal  estate  of  intestates,  the  limita- 
tion being    twenty  years.     For   the   cases   on 
§  40,  see  Shelford,  R.  P.  Acts,  248-262 ;  Sugd.  R. 
P.  Acts,  119-151.     See  also  Cadbury  v.  Smith, 
L.  R.  9  Eq.  37;  Pearse  v.  Laing,  L.  R.  12  Eq. 
41  ;  Harlock  v.  Ashberry,  18  Ch.  D.  229;  19  id. 
539;  Newbould  v.  Smith,  29  Ch.  D.  882;  Hugill 
v.  Wilkinson,  38  Ch.  D.  480;  Lewin  v.  Wilson, 
11  App.  Cas.  639.     As  to  the  application  of  the 
statute  to  surplus  moneys  held  by  a  mortgagee 
after  sale,  see  Be  Alison,  Johnson  v.  Mounsey, 
11  Ch.  D.  284,  298;  Mayer  v.  Murray,  8  Ch.  D. 
424;  Talbot  r.  Frere,  9*  Ch.  D.  568;  Warner  v. 
Jacob,  20  Ch.  D.  220;  and  to  trusts  for  sale,  see 
[bid.;  Locking  r.  Parker,  siiprn  ;  Chapman  v. 
Corpe,  27  W.  R.  781;  41  L.  T.  22. 
650 


2  Wrixon  v.  Vize,  3  Dr.  &  War.  104,  120, 
121;  Harlock  v.  Ashberry,  supra;  Sugd.  R. 
P.  Acts,  121, 122;  see  cuntva,  Dearman  i\WTyche, 
9  Sim.  570,  582;  see  also  Searle  v.  Colt,  1  Y. 

6  C.  C.  C.  36;  Du  Vigier  «.  Lee,  2  Hare,  326, 
334;  7  Jur.  299;  Sinclair  v.  Jackson,  17  Beav. 
405;  Heath  v.  Pugh,  6  Q.  B.  D.  345;  7  App. 
Cas.  238.  The  weight  of  American  authority  is 
in  accord  with  the  text.  Bank  of  the  Metropolis 
v.  Guttschlick,  14  Pet.  19,  32;  Heyer  v.  Pruyn, 

7  Paige,  465;  Thayer  v.  Mann,  19  Pick.  535; 
Barned  v.  Barned,  21  N.  J.  Eq.  245;  Terry  v. 
Rosell,  32  Ark.  478;  Harris  v.  Vaughn,  2  Tenn. 
Ch.  483.  In  some  of  the  States,  a  mortgage  is 
treated  as  a  chose  in  action,  a  mere  security  for 
the  debt,  and  the  debt  being  barred,  the  lien  is 
also.  Anderson  r.  Baxter,  4  Oreg.  107;  With- 
erell  r.  Wiberg,  4  Sawyer,  232;  Newman  v.  De 
Lorimer,  19  Iowa,  244;  McMillan  v.  Richards, 
9  Cal.  409;  Bludworth  v.  Take,  33  Cal.  264; 
Moon  v.  Trask,  7  Wis.  512;  Russel  v.  Ely,  2 
Black,  576.  And  it  seems,  an  action  on  the 
mortgage  may  be  barred  although  the  debt  oe 
not.     Eubanks  v.  Leveridge,  4  Sawyer,  274. 

3  Anon.  Freeman.  22,  pi.  20;  Parker  v.  Ash, 
1  Vern.  256;  Fotherby  v.  Hartridge,  2  Vera. 
21 ;  Wood  v.  Briant,  2  Atk.  521;  Jones  v.  Tur- 
berville,  2  Ves.  Jr.  11,  13;  4  Bro.  C.  C.  115; 
cited  2  Ves.  Jr.  280;  Higgins  v.  Crawfurd,  id. 
571;  Sauzer  v.  De  Meyer,  2  Paige.  574;  Kane 
v.  Bloodgood,  7  John.  Ch.  90;  Andrews  r. 
Sparkhawk,  13  Pick.  393.  Though  the  Stat- 
ute of  Limitations  is  no  bar  to  a  legacy,  yet  the 
Court,  in  regard  to  very  stale  demands,  will 
adopt  the  provisions  of  the  statute,  in  the  exer- 
cise of  their  discretion.  Arden  v.  Arden,  1 
John.  Ch.  313;  see  Inby  r.-M'Crea,  4  Desaus. 
422:  Wilson  v.  Kilcannon,  4  Hayw.  185;  Lind- 
sav  r.  Lindsay,  1  Desaus.  151.  Or  disallow 
interest.  Thomson  v.  Eas-twood,  2  App.  Cas. 
215;  Laura  Jane  v.  Hagen.  10  Humph.  332. 
As  to  the  application  of  the  English  Act  to 
legacies  and  reversionary  interests,  see  Vincent 
v.  Going,  1  J.  &  L.  697;  Phillipo  v.  Munnings. 
2  M.  &  C.  309;  Wheeler  v.  Howell,  3  K.  &  J. 
198;  Smith  v.  Hill,  9  Ch.  D.  143;  Hickman  t. 
Upsall,  4  Ch.  D.  144  (hs  to  account  for  past 
rents);  and  see  Re  Stead.  2  Ch.  D.  713;  Mel- 
lersh  r.  Brown,  45  Ch.  D.  225. 

<  See  now  37  &  38  Vic.  c.  57,  §  8. 


DIFFERENT   GROUNDS    OF    PLEAS. 


653 


shall  be  recovered  but  within  six  years  next  after  the  same  shall  have 
become  due,  or  next  after  an  acknowledgment  of  the  same  shall  have 
been  given  to  the  person  entitled  thereto,  or  his  agent,  signed  by 
the  person  by  whom  the  same  was  payable,  or  his  *  agent.1  (a)  *  653 

The  Act  also  provides,  that  no  arrears  of  dower,  or  any  damages 
on  account  of  such  arrears,  shall  be  recovered  or  obtained  by  any  action 
or  suit,  for  a  longer  period  than  six  years  before  the  commencement  of 
such  action  or  suit,  and  that  no  arrears  of  rent  or  of  interest  in  respect 
of  any  sum  of  money  charged  upon  or  payable  out  of  any  land  or  rent, 
or  in  respect  of  any  legacy,  or  any  damages  in  respect  of  such  arrears  of 
rent  or  interest,  shall  be  recovered  by  any  distress,  action,  or  suit,  but 
within  six  years  next  after  the  same  respectively  shall  have  become 
due,  or  next  after  an  acknowledgment  of  the  same  in  writing  shall  have 
been  given  to  the  person  entitled  thereto,  or  his  agent,  by  the  person  by 
whom  the  same  was  payable  or  his  agent.2  It  is,  however,  provided, 
that  where  any  prior  mortgagee,  or  other  incumbrancer,  shall  have  been 
in  possession  of  any  land,  or  in  receipt  of  the  profits  thereof,  within  one 
year  next  before  an  action  or  suit  shall  be  brought  by  any  person 
entitled  to  a  subsequent  mortgage  or  other  incumbrance  on  the  same 
land,  the  person  entitled  to  such  subsequent  mortgage  or  incumbrance 
may  recover,  in  such  action  or  suit,  the  arrears  of  interest  which  shall 
have  become  due  during  the  whole  time  that  such  prior  mortgagee  or 
incumbrancer  was  in  such  possession  or  receipt  as  aforesaid,  although 
such  time  may  have  exceeded  the  term  of  six  years.8  It  has  been 
decided,  that  §  42  does  not  apply  to  a  case  where  the  relation  of  trustee 
and  cestui  que  trust  has  existed,  between  the  person  in  possession  of 
the   land,   and  the  parties  entitled   to  the  legacies  and  annuities.4    A 


1  In  Phillipo  v,  Munnings,  2  M.  &  C.  309, 
Lord  Cottenham  considered  it  clear  that  a  sum 
of  money,  which  had  been  bequeathed  by  a 
testator,  upon  certain  trusts,  and  which  was 
severed  from  the  personal  estate  by  the  exec- 
utor, for  the  purpose  of  those  trusts,  ceased  to 
bear  the  character  of  a  legacy,  and  assumed 
that  of  a  trust  fund,  as  soon  as  it  was  severed 
from  the  general  estate;  consequently,  he  de- 
cided, that  the  statute  did  not  bar  a  suit  to 
recover  the  fund  from  the  executor;  it  was 
doubted  whether  the  Act,  in  any  case,  ex- 
tended to  legacies  not  charged  upon  land.  See 
S  uzer  r.  De  Meyer,  2  Paige,  574.  But  it  was 
held  to  apply  to  legacies  payable  out  of  per- 
sonal estate.  Sheppard  v.  Duke.  9  Sim.  567, 
569;  3  Jur.  168;  and  see  Paget  v.  Foley.  2 
Bing.  N.  C.  679;  Re  Smith,  42  Ch.  D.  302; 
Eaines  v.  Lumley,  16  W.  R.  674. 

2  3  &  4  Will."  IV.  c.  27,  §§  41,  42.  Absence 
beyond  the  seas  or  imprisonment  is  no  longer  a 


disability  within  these  sections.     19  &  20  Vic. 
c.  97,  §  10;  ante,  p.  652. 

3  On  this  section,  see  Sinclair  v.  Jackson, 
17  Beav.  405;  Elvy  v.  Norwood,  5  De  G.  & 
Sm  240;  16  Jur.  493;  Greenway  v.  Bromfield, 
9  Hare,  201;  Bolding  v.  Lane,  3  Gift".  561;  8 
Jur.  N.  S.  407;  Re  Ashwell,  John.  112;  Pound 
v.  Bell,  30  Beav.  121;  7  Jur.  N.  S.  1183; 
Mason  v.  Broadbent,  33  Beav.  296;  Marshall 
v.  Smith,  5  Giff.  37 ;  10  Jur.  N.  S.  1174,  V.  C. 
S. ;  Edmunds  v.  Waugh,  L.  R.  i  Eq.  418;  12 
Jur.  N.  S.  326,  V.  C.  K. ;  Bowyer  v.  Wood- 
man, L.  R.3  Eq.  313;  Re  Stead,  2  Ch.  D.  713  : 
Re  Marshfield,  34  Ch.  D.  721;  and  see  Shel- 
ford,  R.  P.  Acts,  247-258;  Sugd.  R.  P.  Acts,  119, 
125,  136-151;  Smith  v.  Hill,  9  Ch.  D.  143. 

4  Young  v.  Lord  Waterpark.  13  Sim.  204: 
6  Jur.  656  ;  on  app.  10  Jur.  1 ;  Ward  v.  Arch, 
12  Sim.  472.  475;  Cox  v.  Dolman,  2  De  G.  M. 
&G.  592,  597:  Hunter  v.  Nockolds,  1  M'N.  & 
G.  640-650;   Snow  v.  Booth,  8  De  G.  M.  &  G. 


(a)  Section  42  does  not  affect  the  riffht  of  a  six  years'  arrears  of  interest.  Re  Marshfield, 
mortgagee,  who  has  sold  under  his  power  of  34  Ch.  D.  721;  Rt  Hancock,  67  L.  J.  Ch.  793. 
sale,  to  retain  out  of  the  proceeds  more  than 

651 


*  654  PLEAS. 

*  654    testator,  *  by  charging  his  estate  with  the  payment  of  an  annuity, 

does  not  make  the  devisee  a  trustee  for  the  annuitant,  so  as  to 
prevent  the  operation  of  the  statute.1 

Care  must  be  taken,  in  framing  a  plea  of  a  Statute  of  Limitations,  to 
set  up  the  proper  statute.2  Thus,  in  all  cases  where  the  suit  relates  to 
a  debt  or  money  due  upon  simple  contract,  or  an  account,  the  statute 
of  21  Jac.  I.  16,  should  be  pleaded ;  where  the  subject-matter  of  the  suit 
is  land  or  rent,  or  the  redemption  of  a  mortgage,  or  where  it  relates  to 
the  recovery  of  the  principal  money  secured  on  mortgage,  judgment,  or 
lien,  or  otherwise  charged  upon  or  payable  out  of  land  or  rent,  at  Law 
or  in  Equity,  or  to  the  payment  of  a  legacy,  the  3  &  4  Will.  IV.  c.  27, 
and  the  Real  Property  Limitation  Act,  1874,8  must  be  pleaded.  And 
these  statutes  must  also  be  the  ones  pleaded,  where  the  suit  is  for  the 
recovery  of  the  arrears  of  dower,  or  for  the  arrears  of  rent,  or  interest 
accrued  in  respect  of  any  charges  upon  land  or  rent,  or  in  respect  of 
any  legacy.4 

The  statute  of  3  &  4  Will.  IV.  c.  27  also  contains  provisions  for  the 
limitation  of  demands  by  ecclesiastical  or  eleemosynary  corporations 
sole,5  and  of  suits  for  enforcing  the  right  of  presentation  to  any  church, 
vicarage,  or  other  ecclesiastical  benefice ; 6  in  all  these  cases,  the  Act 
must  be  pleaded. 

A  plea  of  a  Statute  of  Limitations  must  contain  sufficient  affirmative 
averments  to  bring  the  case  within  the  statute  pleaded.7  Thus,  a  plea 
of  the  statute  21  Jac.  I.  c.  16,  to  a  bill  for  a  debt,  must  aver,  besides 
reciting  the  statute,  that  the  debt  accrued  more  than  six  years  before 
the  filing  of  the  bill ;  and  so,  where  a  demand  is  of  anything  executory, 
as  a  note  for  the  payment  of  an  annuity,  or  of  money  at  a  distant  period, 
or  by  instalments,  the  defendant  must  aver  that  the  cause  of  action  has 
not  accrued  within  six  years :  because  the  statute  bars  only  what  was 
actually  due  six  years  before  the  action  brought.8     It  does  not  appear, 

69;   2  K.   &  J.   132;    Lewis  v   Duncombe,  29  the  case  within  the  operation  of  the  statute;  and 

Beav.  175;   7  Jur.   N.  S.  695;    Shaw  v.  John-  to   insist  that  upon  these   facts  the    plaintiff's 

son,  1  Dr.  &  Sm.  412;   7  Jur.  N.  S.  1005;  see  right  or  remedy  is  at  an  end.     The  Court  will 

Balfour  v.  Cooper,  23  Ch.  D.  472.  then  judicially  take  notice  of  the  existence  of 

1  Francis  v.  Grover,  5  Hare,  39,  49;  10  Jur.  the  statute  and  declare  its  legal  effect  upon  the 
280;  and  see  Hargreaves  v.  Michell,  6  Mad.  case  as  made  by  the  pleadings.  Bogardus  r. 
326;  Jacquet  v.  Jacquet,  27  Beav.  332;  Thorn-  Trinity  Church,  4  Paige,  148,  197;  see  Salter 
son  v.  Eastwood,  2  App.  Cas.  215;   Cunning-  v.  Tobias.  3  Paige,  338. 

ham  v.  Foot,  3  id.  974.  3  37  &  38  Vic.  c.  57. 

2  Graham  v.  Nelson.  5  Humph.  605.   See  the  4  As  to  suits  in  respect  of  an  intestate's  per- 
form of  such  a  plea,  Willis,  562;  2  Eq.  Drafts.  sonal  estate,  see  23  &  24  Vic.  c.  38,  §  13.  («) 
113,  114.     In  setting  up  a  defence  under  a  pub-           5  Sect  29. 

lie  statute,  it  is  not  necessary,  either  in  a  Court  6  See's.  30-33.     For  the  cases  on  §§  29-33, 

of  Chancery  or  in   a  Court  of   Law,  that  the  see  Shelford,  R.  P.  Acts,  219-222;  Sugd.  R.  P. 

pleader    should    set  forth    the   statute   in    his  Acts,  152-154. 

plea,    or  that   he   should    allege  the  existence  7  See  Andrews  v.   Huckabee.  30  Ala.  143. 

of  a  statute  of  which   the  Court  is  judicially  For  forms  of  such  plea,  see  2  Van  Hey.  113, 

bound  to  take  notice.     It  is  sufficient  for  him  114. 

to  state  the  facts  which  are  necessary  to  bring  8  Ld.  Red.  271. 


(a)  The  operation  of  this  statute  is  retrospec-      Re  Johnson,  Sly  v.  Blake,  29  Ch.  D.  964;  ante, 
tive,  as  well  as  that  of  19  &  20  Vic.  c.  97,  §  10.      p.  652,  note. 

652 


DIFFERENT   GROUNDS    OF   PLEAS. 


655 


however,  that  a  particular  form  of  words  is  necessary  in  such  aver- 
ments,  provided,   those  made   use  of  are  sufficient    to    bring  the  case 
within  the  statute;  therefore,  where  the  plea,  instead  of  averring 
that  *  the  money  in  question  was  not  received  within  the  last  six    *  655 
years,  averred  that  no  cause  of    action  accrued  within  that  time, 
it  was  held  sufficient.1 

Whenever  any  matters  are  stated  in  the  bill  which  are  calculated  to 
take  the  case  out  of  the  statute,  these  must  be  met  by  negative  aver- 
ments.2 Thus,  if  the  bill  charges  fraud,  the  plea  must  deny  the  fraud,8 
or  aver  that  the  fraud,  if  any,  was  discovered  about  six  years  before 
the  filing  of  the  bill.4  So,  if  the  bill  alleges  that  the  fraud  was  not 
discovered  till  within  six  years  before  the  bill  was  filed,  the  plea  must 
aver  that  the  fraud,  if  any,  was  discovered  before  that  time.5  If,  more- 
over, the  defendant  is  interrogated  as  to  any  statements  in  the  bill 
which  allege  matter  ancillary  to,  or  afford  evidence  of  facts  directly 
negatived  by  the  plea,  such  statements  ought  to  be  met  by  an  answer  in 
support  of  the  plea.6  Where  no  answer  is  required,  the  defendant  has 
been  allowed  to  plead  the  statute  orally  at  the  hearing.7 

The  Statute  of  Frauds  8  may  be  pleaded  in  bar  to  a  suit  to  which 
the  provisions  of  that  Act  apply.9  Thus,  to  a  bill  for  a  discovery  and 
execution  of  a  trust,  the  statute,  with  an  averment  that  there  was  no 
declaration  of  the  trust  in  writing,  may  be  pleaded  :  10  though,  in  the 
case  cited,  the  plea  was  overruled  by  an  answer  admitting  in  effect  the 
trust.11  To  a  bill  for  the  specific  performance  of  an  agreement,  the  same 
statute,  with  an  averment  that  there  was  no  agreement  in  writing  signed 
by  the  parties,  has  also  been  pleaded.12     The  Statute  of  Frauds  may  also 


1  Sutton  v.  Lord  Scarborough,  9  Ves.  71, 
75;   but  see  Pull°n  v.  Snelus,  27  W.  R.  534. 

2  Ante,  pp.  605,  614. 

3  Bicknell  v.  Gough,  3  Atk.  558. 

*  Ld.  Red.  269  ;  South  Sea  Co.  v.  Wymond- 
sell,  3  P.  Wms.  143. 

5  Ibid.;  Ld.  Red.  269;  Sutton  v.  Lord  Scar- 
borough, 9  Ves.  71,  75. 

6  Dearman  v.  Wyche,  9  Sim.  570,  582; 
Foley  v.  Hill,  3  M.  &  C.  475,  480;  2  Jur.  440 ; 
see  Somerset  County  Bank  v.  Veghte,  42  N.  J. 
Eq.  39.  But  where  the  plea  sets  up  the  Stat- 
ute of  Limitations  in  defence,  it  is  not  necessary 
in  such  plea  to  deny  a  new  promise  within  six 
years,  unless  the  bill  alleges  such  promise  ; 
but  if  so  denied  in  the  plea  it  will  be  mere  sur- 
plusage. Davison  v.  Schermerhorn,  1  Barb. 
Ch.  480. 

7  Lincoln  t'.  Wright,  4  De  G.  &  J.  16 ;  5  Jur. 
N.  S.  1142;  Green  v.  Snead,  30  Beav.  231 ;  S.  C. 
nam.  Snead  v.  Green,  8  Jur.  N.  S  4,  M.  R.; 
but  see  Holding  v.  Barton,  1  Sm.  &  G.  App.  25. 

8  29  Car.  II.  c.  3. 

9  Ld.  Red.  265;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  761,  etseq.; 
Booth  v.  Turle,  L.  R.  16  Eq.  182  ;  Rossiter  v. 
Miller,  3  App.  Cas.  1124;  Oliver  v.  Hunting,  44 
Ch.  D.  205;  Cozine  v.  Graham,  2  Paige,  177; 
Meach  v.  Perry,   D.   Chip.   182;    Thornton  v. 


Henry,  2  Scam.  219:  Kinzie  v.  Penrose,  id. 
520.  The  defence  of  this  statute  must  be  in- 
sisted on  by  answer,  or  the  defendant  must  seft 
it  up  byway  of  plea;  he  cannot,  by  demurrer  to 
the  bill,  rely  on  the  Statute  of  Frauds,  unless  it 
clearly  appears,  on  the  face  of  the  bill,  that  the 
agreement  is  within  the  statute.  Switzer  v. 
Skiles,  3  Gilman,  529.  But  when  it  does  so 
appear  the  objection  may  be  taken  by  demur- 
rer. Walker  v.  Locke,  5  Cush.  90;  see  Dudley 
v.  Bachelder,  53  Maine,  403,  406 ;  Farnham  v. 
Clements,  51  Maine,  426;  Cranston  p.  Smith, 
6  R.  I.  231;  ante,  p.  561,  n.  2,  365.  n.  3.  See 
as  to  the  duty  of  a  personal  representative  to 
set  up  the  statute,  Re  Garratt,  W.  N.  (1870) 
106;  18  W.  R.  684.  For  forms  of  such  plea, 
see  2  Van  Hey.  107,  112. 

i°  Cottington  v.  Fletcher,  2  Atk.  155;  Ld. 
Red.  265. 

ii  Ld.  Red.  265,  see  Dean  v.  Dean,  9  N.  J. 
Eq.  425.  If  the  Court  can  execute  the  trust  from 
the  admissions  made  by  the  answer,  so  that  the 
plaintiff  is  not  under  the  necessity  of  resorting 
to  parol  proof  of  the  trust,  to  entitle  him  to 
relief,  such  admissions  will  exclude  the  defend- 
ant from  the  benefit  of  the  statute,  if  not  insisted 
on  in  the  answer.      Dean  v.  Dean,  ubi  supra. 

12  Ibid.  266  ;  Mussell  v.  Cooke,  Prec.  in  Ch. 

653 


'e  657  PLEAS. 

be  pleaded  to  a  bill  to  enforce  a  parol  variation  of  a  written 
*  606  contract,  unless  *  the  variation  is  such  as  amounts  to  a  mere 
waiver  of  a  term  in  the  agreement :  such  as  the  time  for  the 
commencement  of  a  lease.1 

A  plea  of  this  sort  must  contain  an  averment  that  there  was  no 
declaration  of  trust  or  agreement  in  writing,  duly  signed ; 2  and  where 
there  are  any  equitable  facts  alleged,  which  may  have  the  effect  of 
taking  the  case  out  of  the  operation  of  the  statute,  they  must  be  met 
by  negative  averments  in  the  plea,3  and  must  also,  if  interrogated  to,  be 
denied,  by  answer  in  support  of  the  plea.4  This  proposition  appears 
to  be  strictly  in  conformity  with  the  principles  before  laid  down,5  as 
well  as  with  the  existing  authorities.6 

With  respect  to  bills  relating  to  trusts,  where  there  is  no  declaration 
of  trust  in  writing,  it  seems  that  there  is  some  doubt  whether  the  rule 
which  has  been  applied  to  parol  agreements,  namely,  that,  although  the 
defendant  confesses  them  by  his  answer,  yet,  if  he  insists  on  the  pro- 
tection of  the  statute,  no  decree  can  be  made  merely  on  the  ground  of 
that  confession,  will  be  extended  to  the  confession  of  a  trust  by  answer. 
In  such  cases,  therefore,  the  safest  course  will  be  to  meet  the  case 
made  by  the  bill  by  a  plea  of  the  statute,  negativing  any  matter  charged 
by  the  bill  which  may  avoid  the  bar :  generally  by  way  of  averment  in 
the  plea,  and  particularly  and  precisely  by  way  of  answer  in  support  of 
the  plea,  if  discovery  is  required  as  to  such  matter.7 

It  should  be  added,  that  if  a  defendant,  in  an  answer,  admits  the 
agreement,  and  does  not  claim  the  benefit  of  the  statute,  he  will  be  con- 
sidered to  have  waived  it,  and  he  cannot  afterwards  be  allowed  to  in- 
sist upon  it,  although  he  claims  it  by  answer  to  the  bill,  when 
*657    amended.8     Where  no  answer  was  required,  *the  defendant  has 

533;  Child  v.  Godolphin,  1  Dick.  39,  42;  S.  C.  dered  it  impossible  now  to  sustain  ;  and  it  cannot 

nom.  Child  v.  Comber,  3  Swanst.  423,  n.;  Hawk-  be  denied  that  the  point  is  one  of  considerable 

i'is  v.  Holmes,  1  P.  Wms.  770;  Clerk  v.  Wright,  difficulty;  and  as  it  is  now  placed  beyond  all 

1  Atk.   12;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  671;    Stevens  v.  doubt  that  the  benefit  of  the  statute  may  be  had, 

Cooper,    1   John.   Ch.    425;    see   Maddison   v.  if  insisted  on  by  answer,  although  a  parol  agree- 

Alderson,  8  App.  Cas.  467.     For  form  of  such  ment  be   admitted,  there  can  be  little  use  in 

plea,  see  2  Van  Hey.  112.  pleading  it  in  bar:  at  least  to  bills  seeking  the 

1  Jordan  v.  Sawkins,  1  Ves.  Jr.  402.  That  specific  performance  of  a  contract.  See  Ld. 
the  absolute  beneficial  owner  under  a  trust  is  Red.  267;  Moore  0.  Edwards,  4  Ves.  23;  Cooth 
entitled  to  declare  it  under  §  7  of  the  statute,  v.  Jackson,  6  Ves.  17;  Blagden  v.  Bradbear,  12 
see  Kronheim  v.  Johnson,  7  Ch.  D.  60.  Ves.   466,  471;    Rowe  v.  Teed,    15  Ves.    375; 

2  Ld.  Red.  266.  Jackson  v.  Oglander,  2  H.  &  M.  465.    As  to 

3  As  to  negative  averments,  see  ante,  pp.  605,  the  mode  of  insisting  on  the  statute  by  answer, 
614;   Pullen  v.  Snelus,  27  VV.  R.  534.  see  Skinner  v.  M'Douall,  2  De  G.  &  Sm.  265; 

4  Coop.  Eq.  PI.  256;   Beames  on  Pleas,  172;  12  Jur.  741. 

and  for  form  of  such  plea,  see  2  Van  Hey.  107;  "  Ld.  Rd.  268;   see  Beames  on  Pleas,  179, 

see  also  Denys  v.  Locock,  3  M.  &  C.  205,  234 ;  et  seq. 

1  Jur.  605;   Dearman  v.  Wyche,  9  Sim.  570,  8  Beames  on  Pleas,  178.  and  notes;    Skin- 

582.  ner  r.  M'Douall,  2  De  G.  &  Sm.  265;   12  Jur. 

5  Ante,  pp.  613,  614.  741;   Baskett  v.  Cafe,  4  De   G.  &  Sm.  388; 

6  Yet  in  Lord  Redesdale's  treatise  (Ld.  Red.  Ridgway  r.  Wharton,  3  De  G.  M.  &  G.  677, 
268)  his  Lordship  mentions  it  as  a  position  691;  6  H.  L.  Cas.  238;  Jackson  v.  Oglander, 
which  was  formerly  considered  to  be  well  2  H.  &  M.  465.  It  is  now  settled  that  a  party 
founded,  but  which  the  decision  of  the  Court,  who  admits  a  parol  agreement  by  answer,  may 
in  one  case  (Whi'bread  v.  Bmrkhurst.  1  Bro.  nevertheless  have  the  benefit  of  the  statute,  if 
C.  C.  404,  416;  2  V.  &  B.  153,  n  )  had  ren-  he,  bv  his  answer,  pravs  the  benefit  of  it.    If 

654 


DIFFERENT   GROUNDS    OF   PLEAS.  *  658 

been  allowed  to  plead  the  statute  orally  at  the  hearing  ; '  and  if  the 
defendant  denies,  or  does  not  admit,  the  agreement,  the  plaintiff  must 
prove  that  it  can  be  enforced.2 

Before  quitting  the  subject  of  the  Statute  of  Frauds,  it  should  be 
observed  that  the  Court  will  not  allow  a  party  to  avail  himself  of  the 
Statute  of  Frauds  for  the  purpose  of  committing  a  fraud ; 3  and,  there- 
fore, where  a  mere  mortgage  was  contemplated,  and  an  absolute  convey- 
ance was  made  by  one,  with  the  intention  of  a  defeasance  being  executed 
by  another,  which  was  never  carried  into  effect,  the  Court  refused  to 
allow  a  defendant  to  avail  himself  of  the  Statute  of  Frauds,  to  protect 
him  in  the  enjoyment  of  the  estate  under  the  conveyance.4  And  so, 
where  an  heir-at-law  filed  a  bill  against  a  devisee,  alleging  that  the 
devise  was  upon  a  secret  trust,  for  a  charitable  purpose,  contrary  to  the 
Statute  9  Geo.  II.  c.  36,  a  plea  of  the  Statute  of  Frauds  was  overruled.5 
And  the  Court  will  never  permit  a  party  to  protect  himself,  by  a  plea 
of  the  statute,  from  discovering  whether  a  devise  was  obtained  or  pre- 
vented by  the  undertaking  of  the  devisee  or  heir  to  do  certain  acts  in 
favor  of  individuals.6 

It  is  to  be  observed  here,  that  sales  conducted  under  a  decree  or  order 
of  the  Court,  are  not  within  the  Statute  of  Frauds.7 

The  above  statutes,  namely,  those  for  the  limitation  of  actions  and 
suits,  and  for  the  prevention  of  frauds  and  perjuries,  have  been  the  sub- 
ject of  particular  attention  in  the  preceding  pages,  because  they  are 
those  which  are  most  frequently  pleaded ;  but  any  other  public  statute, 
which  may  be  a  bar  to  the  demands  of  the  plaintiff,  may  be  taken  advan- 
tage of  by  a  plea,  containing  the  averments  necessary  to  bring  the  case  of 
the  defendant  within  the  statute,  and'  to  avoid  any  equity  which 
may  be  set  up  against  the  bar  which  the  statute  creates.8    *  Thus,    *  658 

he  does  not  thus  insist  on  the  benefit  of  the  Bullen  &  Leake,  467.    As  to  the  present  Eng- 

statute,    he    must    be    taken   to    renounce    it.  lish  Practice,  see  R.  S.  C.  1883,  Ord.  XIX.  33. 
Woods  v.  Dike,  11  Ohio,  455;  2  Story,  Eq.  Jur.  3  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  767. 

§§755-758;    Flagg   v.   Mann,  2  Sumner,   528,  *  Dixon  v.  Parker,  2  Ves.  Sr.  219,  224:  and 

529;    May  v.  Sloan,  101  U.  S.  231;   Billingslea  see  Davies  v.  Otty,  35  Beav.  208;    Haight  v. 

v.  Ward,  33  Md.  48;  Newton  v.  Swasey,  8  N.  Kaye,  L.  R.  7  Ch".  469  ;    Booth  v.  Turle,  L.  R. 

H.  9;  Thompson  v.  Todd,  1  Peters,  C.  C.  388;  16  Eq.  182. 

Talbot  v.  Bowen,   1   Marsh.   437;    Rowton  v.  5  Stickland  t\  Aldridge,  9  Ves.  516. 

Rowton,  1  Hen.  &  M.  91;    Stearns  v.  Hubbard,  6  id.  519;  story,  Eq.  PI.  §  768;   Chamber- 

8  Greenl.  320;    Story,  Eq;  PI.  §  763;   Ontario  lain  v.  Ager,  2  V.  &  B.  259;  see  also  Burrow  v. 

Bank  r.  Root,  3  Paige,  478;  Cozine  r.  Graham,  Greenough,  3  Sumner's  Ves.  152,  note  (a);  1 

2  Paige,  177;  Thornton  v.  Henry,  2  Scam.  219;  Story,   Eq.  .lur.  §  256;  2  id.  §  781;  Gaullaher 

Moore  v.  Edwards,  4  Sumner's  Ves.  23,  note  v.  Gaullaher,  5  Watts,  200. 
(i);    Whitchurch  v.  Bevis,  2  Bro.  C.  C.  (Per-  7  Att.-Gen.  v.   Day,  1  Ves.   Sr.   218,   221; 

kins's   ed.)  566,    567,   note  (e);   Vanduyne    v.  Blagden  v.  Bradbear,  12  Ves.  466,  472.     So  of 

Vreeland,  12  N.  J.  Eq,  142;  S.  C.  11  N.  J.  Eq.  execution  sales.     Nichol  v.  Ridley,  5  Yerg.  63. 

370;    Dean   v.   Dean,  9   id.   425;   Ashmore  v.  And  see   Dromgoole  v.   Spence,  1  Memph.  L. 

Evans,  11  id.  151.  J.  159. 

1  Lincoln  v.  Wright,  4  De  G.  &  J.  16;  5  8  Ld,  Red.  274.  Of  this  nature  are  2  &  3 
Jur.  N.  S.  1142;  Snead  v.  Green,  8  Jur.  N.  S.  Will.  IV.  c.  71;  3  &  4  Will.  IV.  c.  42;  as  to  §  5 
4,  M.  R  ;  S.  C.  nom.  Green  v.  Snead,  30  Beav.  of  which  last  Act,  see  Moodie  v.  Bannister,  4 
231;  but  see  Holding  v.  Barton,  1  Sm.  &  G.  Drew.  432,  5  Jur.  N.  S.  402;  Roddam  r. 
App.  25;  Heys  v.  Ashley,  4  De  G.  J.  &  S.  34;  Morley,  1  De  G.  &  J.  1;  3  Jur.  N.  S.  449;  2 
ante  p.  619,  n.  (a).  id.  805;   2  K.  &    J.  336,  and  cases  collected  in 

2  Ridgway  v.  Wharton,  ubi  supra  ;  Fulcher  Shelford,  R.  P.  Acts,  262-264:  Sugd.  R.  P. 
v.  Fulcher,  29  W.  R.  884;  S.  P.  at  Law,  see  Acts,  149;  Dickinson  v.  Teasdale,  1  De  G.  J. 

655 


659 


PLEAS. 


the  Statute  32  Hen.  VIII.  c.  9,  against  buying  and  selling  pretended 
titles,  may  be  pleaded.1  So,  where  a  bill  was  filed  against  a  bank- 
rupt, in  respect  of  a  demand  occurring  before  his  bankruptcy,  the  5  Geo. 
II.  c.  30 2  was  pleaded,  and  the  plea  was  allowed.8 

A  private  or  local  statute  may  also  be  pleaded  in  the  same  manner ; 
thus,  to  a  bill  impeaching  a  sale  of  land  in  the  fens,  by  the  conservators 
under  the  statute  for  draining  the  fens,  the  defendant  pleaded  the  stat- 
ute, and  that  the  sale  was  made  within  and  according  to  the  statute, 
and  the  plea  was  allowed.4  It  is  to  be  observed,  that  a  plea  of  a  pri- 
vate Act  of  Parliament  must  state  the  Act,  or  at  least  so  much  of  it  as 
relates  to  the  matter  insisted  upon  ;  and  it  seems  that,  although  an  Act, 
which  is  in  its  nature  private  or  local,  contains  a  clause  directing  that 
it  shall  be  recognized  in  Courts  as  a  public  Act,  such  a  clause  will  not 
dispense  with  the  necessity  of  setting  the  Act  out.6 

A  plea  of  a  statute  must  be  put  in  upon  oath ;  for,  although  the  stat- 
ute itself  is  matter  of  record,  the  averments  necessary  to  bring  the  case 
within  it  are  matters  in  pais,  which  must  be  supported  by  the  oath  of 
the  party.6 

2.  We  come  now  to  the  consideration  of  those  pleas  in  bar  which 
consist  of  matters  recorded,  or  as  of  record  in  the  Court  itself,  or  some 

other  Court.7 
*659        *A  decree  or  order  of  the  Court,  by  which  the  rights  of  the 
parties  have  been  determined,  or  another  bill  for  the  same  matter 
dismissed,  may  be  pleaded  to  a  new  bill  for  the  same  matter; 1  and  this, 


&  S.  52  ;  9  Jur.  N.  S.  239;  Coope  v.  Cresswell, 
L.  R.  2  Ch.  112;  L.  R.  2  Eq.  121;  Pears  v. 
Laing.  L.  R.  12  Eq.  41;  Ashlin  v.  Lee,  23  W. 
R.  458;  W.  N.  (1875)  42.  In  regard  to  the  plea 
of  Usury,  see  New  Orleans,  G.  L  &  B.  Co.  v. 
lHidlev,  8  Paige,  452;  Dyer  v.  Lincoln,  11  Vt. 
300;  Lane  v.  Ellzey,  4  Hen.  &  M.  504;  S.  C.  6 
Rand.  661;  Chambers  v.  Chambers,  4  Gill  & 
J.  420;  Shed  v.  Garfield,  5  Vt.  39;  Vroom  v. 
Ditmas,  4  Paige,  526;  New  Jersey  Patent  Tan- 
ning Co.  v.  Turner,  14  N.  J.  Eq.  226,  229 ;  Cur- 
tis v.  Ma-ter,  11  Paige,  15;  Rowe  v.  Phillips, 
2  Sandf.  Ch.  14;  ante,  p.  639,  note  (a). 

i  Hitchins  v.  Lander,  G.  Coop.  34,  38;  see 
also  Wall  v.  Stubbs,  2  V.  &  B.  354,  357.  For 
form  of  plea  under  this  statute,  see  Beames  on 
Pleas,  333. 

2  Repealed  by  6  Geo.  IV.  c.  16;  see  now  12 
&  13  Vic.  c.  106;   24  &  25  Vic.  c.  134. 

3  De  Tastet  v.  Sharpe,  3  Mad.  51,  60.  For 
form  of  plea  of  Bankruptcy,  see  2  Van  Hey. 
96:  and  as  to  such  a  plea,  see  ante,  p.  631.  It 
ha*  also  been  held,  that  where  a  mortgagee 
of  an  advowson  appears  and  presents  to  the 
Church,  which  he  is  not  entitled  to  do  before 
foreclosure,  a  bill  by  the  mortgagor,  seeking  to 
compel  a  resignation,  must  be  brought  within 
six  months  after  the  death  of  the  late  incum- 
bent, —  being  the  period  within  which,  by  the 
Statute  of  Westminster  2  (13  Edw.  I.  c.  5),  a 
qnare  impedit  must  be  brought.     Gardiner  v. 

656 


Griffith,  2  P.  Wms.  404;    cited  Atk.  559;  see 
Jenkins  v.  Jones,  9  Q.  B.  D.  12S;  Kennedy  v. 
Lyell.  15  id.  491. 
"  •»  Brown  v.  Hammond,  2  Ch.  Cas.  249. 

5  Nabob  of  Arcot  v.  East  India  Co.  3  Bro. 
C.  C.  292, 308 ;  Nabob  of  the  Carnatic  v.  East  In- 
dia Co.  1  Ves.  Jr.  371,  393;  Bailey  v.  Birken- 
head Ry.  Co.  12  Beav.  433,  443;  14  Jur.  119; 
see  13  &  14  Vic.  c.  21. 

6  Wall  v.  Stubbs,  2  V.  &  B.  354,  357 ;  1 
Smith,  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  232. 

7  Ld.  Red.  236,  237.  If  a  former  decree  is 
relied  upon,  it  must  be  duly  pleaded.  Gallo- 
way v.  Hamilton,  1  Dana,  575;  Ferguson  v. 
Miller,  5  Ohio,  459.  Or  it  may  be  set  up  in 
the  answer.     White  v.  Bank  of  United  States, 

6  Ohio,  528;  S.  P.  Strader  v.  Byrd,  7  Ohio, 
184. 

i  Barker  v.  Belknap,  39  Vt.  168.  A  bill 
regularly  dismissed  upon  the  merits,  where  the 
matter  has  been  passed  upon,  and  the  dismissal 
is  not  without  prejudice,  may  be  pleaded  in 
bar  of  a  new  bill  for  the  same  matter.  Perine 
r.  Dunn,  4  John.  Ch.  142;  see  Neafie  v.  Neafie, 

7  John.  Ch.  1 ;  Story,  Fq.  PL  §  793;  Wilcox  v. 
Badger,  6  Ohio.  406;  French  v.  French,  8  Ohio, 
214;  Jenkins  v.  Eldredge,  3  Story,  299;  Davis 
v.  Hall.  4  Jones  Eq.  (N.  C.)  301;  Mickles  v. 
Thayer,  14  A'len,  121,  122;  Foote  v.  Gibbs,  1 
Gr:iy,  412;  post,  "  General  Nature  of  Decrees 
and  Orders."     And   such  a  dismissal   on   the 


DIFFERENT   GROUNDS   OF   PLEAS. 


659 


even  if  the  party  bringing  the  new  bill  were  an  infant  at  the  time  of  the 
former  decree :  for  a  decree  enrolled  can  only  be  altered  upon  a  bill  of 
review.2 

By  the  original  practice  of  the  Court,  a  decree  or  order  dismissing  a 
former  bill  for  the  same  matter  could  only  be  pleaded  in  bar  to  a  new 
bill,  where  the  dismission  had  been  upon  the  hearing  :  3  for  a  dismissal 
was  a  bar  only,  where  the  Court  had  determined  that  the  plaintiff  had  no 
title  to  the  relief  sought  by  his  bill,  (a)  It  was  not,  however,  necessary, 
in  order  to  entitle  a  defendant  to  plead  a  former  suit  and  decree  of  dis- 
missal, that  the  decree  should  have  been  made  upon  discussion  of  the 
merits :  if  the  dismissal  had  been  merely  for  want  of  evidence,  the 
decree  would  have  been  equally  a  bar  to  another  suit.4  Under  the  later 
practice,  if  the  plaintiff,  after  the  cause  is  set  down  to  be  heard,  causes 
the  bill  to  be  dismissed  on  his  own  application,  or  if  the  cause  is  called 
on  to  be  heard  in  Court,  and  the  plaintiff  makes  default,  and  by  reason 
thereof  the  bill  is  dismissed,  such  dismissal,  unless  the  Court  otherwise 
orders,  is  equivalent  to  a  dismissal  on  the  merits,  and  may  be  pleaded 
in  bar  to  another  suit  for  the  same  matter.5  Under  the  old  practice,  an 
order  dismissing  a  bill  upon  an  election  by  the  plaintiff  to  proceed  at 
Law,6  or  for  want  of  prosecution,7  was  not  a  bar  to  another  bill :  and  it 
does  not  seem  that,  in  these  cases,  the  Order  above  stated  has  affected 
the  practice,  (b) 


merits  may  be  taken  advantage  of  on  demurrer, 
if  the  fact  appear  on  the  face  of  the  bill. 
Knight  v.  Atkisson,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  384.  Such  a 
decree  is  conclusive  against  a  new  bill,  though 
rendered  in  another  State.  Low  v.  Mussey,  41 
Vt.  393;  see  Brown  v.  Lexington  and  Danville 
R.  R.  Co.  13  N.  J.  Eq.  191.  For  how  far  the 
dismissal  of  a  bill,  by  a  plaintiff  suing  on  be- 
half of  himself  and  others,  is  a  bar  to  another 
suit  by  persons  having  the  same  interest,  see 
Banker  v.  Walters,  8  Beav.  92,  97  ;  9  Jur.  73; 
and  ante,  pp.  239,  240.  One  assignee  of  a 
bankrupt  may  plead  the  allowance  of  a  demur- 
rer by  one  of  his  co-assignees  to  the  same  bill. 
Tarleton  v.  Hornby,  1  Y.  &  C.  Ex.  333,  336. 
A  decree  in  favor  of  the  validity  of  a  convey- 
ance, made  in  a  suit  between  the  grantor  and 
grantee,  will  not  bind  the  assignee  in  bank- 


fa)  In  Thrifts  v.  Fritz,  101  111.  457,  it  was 
held  that  the  objection  that  the  substance  of  an 
answer  was  adjudicated  at  a  former  term  of  the 
same  Court  should  not  be  made  by  exception, 
but  by  replication  or  plea. 

(6)  See  Edevain  v.  Cohen,  43  Ch.  D.  187; 
Magnus  v.  National  Bank,  58  L.  T.  617;  Durant 

0.  Essex  Co.  7  Wall.  107;  House  v.  Mullen,  22 
Wall.  42;  Badger  v.  Badger,  1  Cliff.  237;  Foote 
«.  (Jibbs,  1  Gray,  412;  Sayles  v.  Tibbitts,  5  R. 

1.  79.  The  dismissal  of  a  bill  in  Equity  for  a 
cause  not  involving  an  adjudication  upon  the 
merits,  as  for  want  of  jurisdiction,  or  of  prosecu- 
tion, or  that  the  plaintiff  has  an  adequate  remedy 

vol.  i.  —  42 


ruptcy  of  the  grantor,  upon  a  bill  filed  by  him 
to  set  aside  the  conveyance  for  fraud.  Humes 
v.  Scruggs,  94  U.  S.  22. 

2  Ld.  Red.  237. 

3  Id.  238. 

4  Jones  v.  Nixon,  Younge,  359;  ante,  p.  632. 

5  Cons.  Old.  XXIH.  13.  See  Cummins  v. 
Bennet,  8  Paige,  79;  Sears  v.  Jackson,  11  N. 
J.  Eq    45;  Burnbly  v.  Stainton.  24  Ala.  712. 

6  Countess  of  Plymouth  v.  Bladon,  2  Vern. 
32;  ante,  p.  633:  post,  Chap.  XIX.  §  4, 
Election. 

1  Ld.  Red.  238;  Brandlyn  v.  Ord,  1  Atk.  571. 
As  to  pleading  allowance  of  a  demurrer  to  a  suit 
for  the  same  matter,  see  Marchioness  of  Lon- 
donderry v.  Baker,  3  De  G.  F.  &  J.  701 ;  7  Jur. 
N.  S.  652,811;  3  Giff.  128. 


at  Law,  is  not  a  bar  to  a  subsequent  suit.  Smith 
v.  McNeal,  109  U.  S.  426;  Steam  Gauge  &  L. 
Co.  r.  Meyrose,  27  Fed.  Rep.  213;  Webster 
v.  Armstrong,  54  L.  J.  Q.  B.  236:  Hall  r.  Hall, 
48  L.  J.  P.  D.  &  Adm.  57;  Loeb  r.  Willis. 
100  N.  Y.  231,  235;  Reynolds  v.  Hennessy,  17 
R.  I.  169  ;  Foote  o.  Gibbs,  1  Gray,  412 ;  Kempton 
v.  Burgess,  136  Mass.  192:  Bardwell  o.  Baird.  60 
Miss.  ^rA;  Gage  v.  Ewing,  114  111.  15;  Pendle- 
ton v.  Dalton,  92  N.  C.  185  ;  Hallack  v.  Loft 
(Col.),  34  Pac.  Rep.  568;  The  decision  upon  a 
demurrer  is  not  conclusive  for  this  purpose. 
Jourolmon  r.  Mas^encill.  86  Tenn.  81  ;  Battle 
v.  Street,  85  Tenn.  282;  Dowell  v.  Mitchell,  105 

657 


660 


PLEAS. 


A  decree  cannot  be  pleaded  in  bar  of  a  new  bill,  unless  it  is  for  the 
same  matter  as  the  bill  to  which  it  is  pleaded  ; 8  therefore,  a  decree  in  a 

former  suit,  for  an  account  of  tithes,  could  not  have  been  pleaded 
*  660    to  a  bill  for  the  tithes  of  any  subsequent  year.9     It  *  must  also  be 

conclusive  of  the  rights  of  the  plaintiffs  in  the  bill  to  which  it  is 
pleaded,  or  of  those  under  whom  they  claim  ;  therefore,  a  decree  against 
a  mortgagor  and  order  of  foreclosure  enrolled,  will  not  be  deemed  a  bar 
to  a  bill  by  intervening  incumbrancers  to  redeem,  although  the  mort- 
gagee had  no  notice  of  their  incumbrancers.1  It  must  also  be  as  bene- 
ficial to  the  plaintiff  as  that  which  might  be  obtained  in  the  second  suit.2 


8  See  Neafie  v.  Neafie,  7  John.  Ch.  1;  Lyon 
v.  Tallmadge,  14  John.  501;  Menude  v.  Delaire, 
3  Desaus.  43. 

9  Minor  Canons  of  St.  Paul's  v.  Crickett, 
Wrightw.  30.  So  where  the  suit  was  upon  a 
similar,  but  not  the  same  demand,  the  first  suit 
being  on  coupons  of  county  bonds,  and  the  sec- 
ond upon  different  coupons  of  the  same  bonds. 
Cromwell  v.  County  of  Sac,  94  U.  S.  351. 
And  see  Russell  v.  Place,  94  U.  S.  606;   Stark 


U.  S.  430.  In  Wisconsin,  a  reviewable  order  of 
a  lower  Court  upon  a  demurrer  is  not  conclusive, 
while  a  decision  thereon  by  the  Supreme  Court 
is  conclusive.  Ellis  v.  Northern  Pacific  R.  Co. 
80  Wis.  459.  So  the  dismissal  of  a  bill  on  the 
ground  of  laches,  or  because  the  Statute  of  Lim- 
itations applies,  is  not  a  trial  upon  the  merits  so 
as  to  bar  a  second  bill  stating  facts  which  take 
the  case  out  of  the  statute.  Gilmer  v.  Morris, 
30  Fed.  Rep.  476.  In  England,  an  order  dis- 
missing, for  want  of  prosecution,  a  suit  in  which 
notice  of  trial  has  not  been  given,  is  not  a  bar 
to  another  suit.  Be  Orrell  General  Colliery  &c. 
Co.l2Ch.D.  681;  seel  Seton  on  Judgments (5th 
ed.)  118.  A  person's  right  to  use  force  to  remove 
an  obstruction  is  not  an  adequate  legal  remedy, 
excluding  relief  in  Equity  by  injunction,  Stam- 
ford v.  Stamford  Horse  R.  Co.  56  Conn.  381; 
nor  is  his  right  to  apply  to  town  authorities  to 
perform  their  statutory  duty  to  remove  nui- 
sances. Wheeler  v.  Bedford,  54  Conn.  244. 
An  objection  to  the  admission  of  any  evidence 
under  a  creditor's  bill  does  not  raise  the  ques- 
tion of  an  adequate  remedy  at  Law.  Pierstoff  v. 
Jorges  (Wis),  56  N.  W.  Rep.  735. 

In  the  Federal  Courts,  under  Equity  Rule 38, 
a  decree  dismissing  a  bill  is  only  conclusive 
when  there  has  been  a  hearing  upon  the  merits; 
and  even  then  the  former  decree  is  an  estoppel 
only  as  to  the  matters  directly  in  dispute. 
Keller  v.  Stolzenback,  20  Fed.  Rep.  47;  Oglesby 
v.  Attrill,  id.  570;  Radford  v.  Folsom,  3  id.  199*; 
Oliver  v.  Cunningham,  7  id.  689;  Hayner  v. 
Stanly,  13  id.  217;  Clark  v.  Blair.  14  id.  812; 
Spitley  v.  Frost,  15  id.  299 ;  Bartels  v.  Schnell, 
16  id.  341;  Tilton  v.  Barrel],  17  id.  59;  see 
Brooks  v.  0"Hara,  8  id.  529;  First  Nat.  Bank 
658 


v.   Starr,  94  U.   S.   645;   Boyd  r.  Alabama,  94 
U.  S.  645. 

1  Morret  v.  Westerne,  2  Vera.  663;  see  ante, 
p.  277  ;  Ld.  Red.  238;  and  see  Att.-Gen.  r. 
Sidney  Sussex  College,  Cambridge,  34  Bcav. 
654  ;  Davis  p.  Angel,  4  De  G.  F.  &  J.  531;  31 
Beav.  223. 

2  Pickl'ord  v.  Hunter,  5  Sim.  122,  129;  Rat- 
tenbury  v.  Fenton,  C.  P.  Coop.  temp.  Brough. 
60. 


v.  Bohne,  id.  115.  As  to  the  conclusiveness  of 
proceedings  at  Law  upon  a  subsequent  suit  in 
Equity,  see  First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Bohne,  supra  ; 
Price  v.  Dewey,  11  id.  104. 

The  doctrine  of  res  adjudicata  applies  only 
where  there  is  a  record.  Re  House,  28  Ch.  D. 
518.  In  order  to  determine  whether  the  same 
questions  were  at  issue,  the  Court  may  look  at 
the  pleadings  in  the  first  suit,  though  not  set 
forth.  Houstoun  v.  Sligo,  29  Ch.  D.  448.  So 
much  of  the  former  proceedings  89  show  the 
identity  of  the  issues  should  be  pleaded.  Jourol- 
mon  ??.  Massengill,  86  Tenn.  81.  See  Tekait 
Doorga  Persad  Singh  v.  Tekaitni  Doorga  Kon- 
wari.  L.  R.  5Ind.  App.  149;  Chicago  v  Cameron, 
22  III.  App.  91;  Cheney  v.  Patton,  134  III.  422; 
Aliny  p.  Daniels,  15  R.I.  312.  If  the  record  does 
not  show  the  cause  for  which  the  bill  was  dis- 
missed, it  may  be  shown  by  parol  evidence. 
Worman  v.  Worman,  43  Ch.  D.  296;  Munro  r. 
Meech,  94  Mich.  596;  Foye  v.  Patch,  132  Mass. 
105;  Jordan  v.  Seifert,  126  Mass.  25;  Butchers' 
Slaughtering  Ass'n  v.  Boston,  137  Mnss.  186. 
See  Leary  r.  Long,  131  U.  S.  App'x.  218;  Oyster 
v.  Oyster,  28  Fed.  Rep.  909;  Reilly  v.  Reilly, 
139  111.  180;  Henningerr.  Heald  (N.  J.).  26  Atl. 
Rep.  449;  Rosenthal  r.  McMann,  93  Cal.  505; 
Horton  «.  Bassett,  17  R.  I.  129;  Stewart  v. 
Chesapeake  &  O.  C.  Co.  1  Fed.  Rep.  361; 
Crandall  v.  Dare,  11  id.  902;  German-American 
Title  &  T.  Co.  v  Shallcross,  147  Penn.  St.  485; 
Flanders  ».  Hall,  159  Mass.  95.  But  it  is  only 
in  cases  of  ambiguity  that  an  opinion  accom- 
panying the  former  decree  will  govern.  New 
Orleans  M.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  New  Orleans,  14 
Fed.  Rep.  373. 


DIFFERENT   GROUNDS   OF   PLEAS.  *  661 

The  decree  must  also  be  in  its  nature  final,  or  afterwards  made  so  by 
order,  or  it  will  not  be  a  bar ; 3  therefore,  a  decree  for  an  account  of 
principal  and  interest  due  on  a  mortgage,  and  for  a  foreclosure  in  case 
of  non-payment,  cannot  be  pleaded  to  a  bill  to  redeem,  unless  there  has 
been  a  final  order  of  foreclosure.4  (a) 

A  plea  of  a  decree  founded  on  a  particular  deed,  which  it  is  the 
object  of  the  second  suit  to  set  aside,  on  the  ground  of  fraud  discovered 
since  the  decree  made,  would  not  be  good.5  If,  however,  a  bill  is 
brought  to  impeach  a  decree,  on  the  ground  of  fraud  used  in  obtaining 
it  (which  may  be  done  without  the  previous  leave  of  the  Court),  the 
decree  may  be  pleaded  in  bar  of  the  suit,  with  averments,  negativing 
the  charges  of  fraud,  and  (if  interrogated)  supported  by  an  answer  fully 
denying  them.6  It  is  presumed  also,  that,  even  in  the  case  last  put,  of 
a  bill  to  impeach  the  deed  upon  which  a  decree  has  been  founded,  a 
plea  of  the  decree  supported  by  similar  averments  and  answers,  would 
be  good. 

A  decree  must  be  signed  and  enrolled,  or  it  cannot  be  taken  advan- 
tage of  by  plea:7  though  it  may  be  insisted  upon  by  way  of  answer.8 
Although  a  decree  not  signed  and  enrolled  cannot  be  pleaded  directly 
in  bar  of  the  suit,  it  seems  that  it  may  be  pleaded  to  show  that  the  bill 
has  been  exhibited  contrary  to  the  usual  course  of  the  Court,  and  ought 
not,  therefore,  to  be  proceeded  upon  ; 9  for  if  the  decree  had  appeared 
upon  the  face  of  the  bill,  the  defendant  might  have  demurred;10  a 
decree  not  signed  and  enrolled  being  to  be  altered  only  upon  rehear- 
ing, as  a  decree  signed  and  enrolled  can  be  altered  only  upon  a  bill  of 
review.11 

*As  a  plea  of  this  kind  proceeds  upon  the  ground  that  the  *661 
same  matter  was  in  issue  in  the  former  suit,  and  as  every  plea 
that  is  set  up  as  a  bar  must  be  ad  idem,1  the  plea  should  set  forth  so 
much  of  the  former  bill  and  answer  as  will  suffice  to  show  that  the 
same  point  was  then  in  issue,  and  should  aver  that  the  allegations  as  to 
the  title  to  relief  were  the  same  in  the  second  bill  as  in  the  first ; 2  and, 
therefore,  where  the  defendant  pleaded  only  that  a  bill  was  brought  for 
an  account  and  a  decree  made,  Lord  Hardwicke  considered  the  plea  as 

3  Ld.  Red.  2-37  ;  see  Neafie  v.  Neafie,  7  John.  may  be  made  a  part  of  the  cause,  does  not  pre- 
Ch.  1;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  791.  sent  the  decree  ;   and  although  it  be  copied  in 

4  Senhouse  v.  Earl,  2  Ves.  Sr.  450.  the  transcript,  it  will  not  be  regarded.     Gallo- 

5  Wing  v.  Wing,  2  Eq.  Gas.  Abr.  71,  pi.  13.  way  r.  Hamilton,  1  Dana.  576. 

«  Ld.  Red.  239  ;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  794.  »  Ld.   Red.  239;  Kinsey  v.   Kinsev,  2  Ves. 

T  Anon.  3  Atk.  809;  S.  C.  nom.  Kinsey  v.  Sr.  577,  n. 

Kinsey,  2  Ves.  Sr.  577;  but  see  Pearse  v.  Dob-  10  Wortley  v.  Birkhead,  .3  Atk.  809:  2  Ves. 

inson,  L.  R.  1  Eq.  241 ;  L.  R.  .3  Ch.  1.  Sr.  571 ;  Lady  Granville  v.  Ramsden,  Bunb.  56. 

8  Ibid.;  Charles  v.  Rowley,  2  Bro.  P.  C.  ed.  "  Ld.  Red.  239. 

Tumi.  485;    Story,  Eq.  PI.   §  790;  Davoue  v.  >  Per  Lord  Hardwicke,  in  Child  v.  Gibson,  2 

Fanning,    4  John.   Ch.    199.      It  will   no    be  Atk.  603  ;  and  see  Moss  v.  Anglo-Egyptian  Nav. 

allowed  on  the  hearing  unless    set  up  in   the  Co.  L.  R.  1  Ch.  108;  12  Jur.  N.  S.  13,  L.  C. 

answer,  or  (if  enrolled)  pleaded.    Lyon  p.  Tall-  2  Marchioness  of  Londonderry  v.  Baker,  3 

madge,  14  John.  501.     A  prayer  in  the  answer  Giff.  128;  7  Jur.  N.  S.  652,  811 ;  3  De  G.  F.  & 

that  the  pleadings  and  proofs,  in  a  former  suit,  J.  701. 


(a)  The   remedy  for  error  in  a  decree  for      sought  in  the  Court  which  made  the  decree, 
foreclosure  or  sale  under  a  mongage  must  be      Kent  v.  Lake  Superior  Canal  Co.  144  U.  S.  75. 

6o9 


*  662  PLEAS. 

defective.8  Where  the  bill  seeks  to  impeach  the  decree  on  the  ground 
of  fraud,  the  alleged  fraud  must,  as  we  have  seen,  be  negatived  by- 
averments  in  the  plea,  supported  by  an  answer  fully  denying  the  cir- 
cumstances of  fraud  as  to  which  the  defendant  is  interrogated.4  But 
as  the  averments  negativing  the  charges  of  fraud  are  used  merely  to  put 
the  fact  of  fraud,  as  alleged  by  the  bill,  in  issue  by  the  plea,  they  may  be 
expressed  in  the  most  general  terms,  provided  such  terms  are  sufficient 
to  put  the  allegations  of  the  bill  fully  in  issue.  The  answer,  however, 
must  be  so  full  as  to  leave  no  doubt  on  the  mind  of  the  Court  that,  if  not 
controverted  by  evidence  on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff,  the  fact  of  fraud 
could  not  be  established.5 

In  the  case  of  a  plea  of  a  former  decree,  the  plaintiff  should  obtain 
an  order,  on  motion  or  petition  of  course  for  an  inquiry  as  to  the  truth 
thereof ; 6  and  if  the  fact  is  certified  to  be  true,  the  bill  will  be  dis- 
missed, unless  the  Court  should  otherwise  order.7  The  plaintiff  may, 
however,  apply  to  vary  the  certificate,  and  thus  bring  on  the  matter  to 
be  argued  before  the  Court.8  He  may  also,  if  he  conceives  the  plea  to 
be  defective  in  point  of  form  or  otherwise,  independently  of  the  mere 
truth  of  the  fact  pleaded,  set  the  plea  down  to  be  argued,  as  in  the  case 
of  pleas  in  general.9 

As  the  ground  of  defence  by  plea  of  a  decree  signed  and  enrolled  is, 
that  the  matter  has  been  already  decided,  a  decree  of  any  Court  of 
Equity,  in  its  nature  final,  or  made  so  by  subsequent  order,  may  be 

pleaded  in  bar  of  a  new  suit.10 
*  662        *A  plea  in  bar  of   matters  of  record,  or  matters  in  the  na- 
ture of  matters  of  record  in  some  Court,  not  being  a  Court  of 
Equity,  may  be :    (1)  Fine ;    (2)  Recovery ;    (3)  Judgment  at  Law,  or 
Sentence  of  some  other  Court. 

(1)  A  fine  is  a  record  of  the  Court  in  which  it  has  been  levied,  and 
if  levied  on  or  before  the  31st  of  December,  1833,1  is  equally  good  as 
a  bar  in  Equity  as  it  is  at  Common  Law,  provided  it  be  pleaded  with 
proper  averments.2  In  a  plea  in  Equity  of  a  fine  and  non-claim,  the 
same  strictness  is  required  as  at  Law  ;  therefore,  where  a  defendant, 
instead  of  averring  positively  that  the  party  levying  the  fine  was  actu- 

8  Child  ?-.  Gib«on,nbi  supra;  Bank  of  Michi-  8  Ld.  Red.  305. 

gan  v.  Williams,   Hairing.  Ch.  219;   Gates  v.  9  Ibid.     See  ante,  p.  637,  n.  5. 

Loftns,  4  Monroe,  439.  lft  Ld.   Red.  245 ;   Fitzgerald   v.  Fitzgerald, 

*  Ld.  Red.  239.  5  Bio.  P.  C.  ed.  Toml.  567;  see  also  Jones  v. 

6  Ld.  Red.  239 ;   see  ante,  p.  660.     Where  a  Nixon,  Younge,  359  ;  and  see  Cons.  Old.  XIV. 

bill   charged    misrepresentation,  coercion,   and  7,    and   ante,    p.    632,    as  to    plea   of   pending 

fraud  in  procuring  the  release  of  a  debt,  and  a  suit  in  another  Court  of  Equity.     See  Ferguson 

defendant  put  in  a  plea  and  answer,  find  in  his  v.    Miller,  5  Ham.    460;   Hughes   v.   Blake,   6 

plea   insisted   on   the   release   in    bar,   without  Wheat.  453. 

noticing  the  allegation  of  fraud,  though  in  the  1  See  3  &  4  Will.  IV.  c.  74,  §  2. 

answer  it  was  fully  met  and  denied,  it  was  held  2  Ld.  Red.  251;  Thynne  v.  Gary,  W.  Jones, 

that  the  plea  was  bad.     Allen  v.  Randolph,  4  416;    Salisbury?).  Batrgot,  1  Ch.  Gas.  278;   2 

John.  Ch.  693.  Swanst.  603,  610;  Watkins  v.  Stone,  2  S.  &  S. 

6  Cons.  Ord.  XIV.  6.  For  forms  of  motion  560,  573  ;  Story  v.  Lord  Windsor,  2  Atk.  630, 
and  petition,  see  Vol.  III.  632;  see  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  771,  et  seq.     For  form 

7  Ld.  Red.  305;   and  see  Jones  v.  Segueira,  of  such  plea,  see  2  Vau  Hey.  100. 
1  Phil.  82,  84;  6  Jur.  183:  Tarleton  v.  Barnes,  2 
Keen,  632,  635;  Morgan  v.  Morgan,  1  Atk.  53. 

660 


DIFFERENT   GROUNDS    OF    PLEAS.  *  663 

ally  seised,  averred  that  he  was  seised,  or  pretended  to  be  seised,  the 
plea  was  held  to  be  bad.3  A  plea  of  a  fine  and  non-claim  can  now  only 
be  made  use  of  where  the  fine  has  been  levied  on  or  before  the  31st  of 
December,  1833:  the  3  &  4  Will.  IV.  c.  74,  having  abolished  that  species 
of  assurance  from  that  date,  and  substituted,  in  its  stead,  a  more  simple 
form,  by  deed  enrolled  in  the  High  Court  of  Chancery,  within  six 
months  from  the  date  thereof;  and  such  deed  and  enrolment  may  now 
be  pleaded,  instead  of  a  fine. 

(2)  A  common  recovery  duly  suffered,  like  a  fine,  is  a  record  of  the 
Court  in  which  it  has  been  suffered ;  and  if  it  has  been  suffered  on  or 
previously  to  the  31st  of  December,  1833,  such  recovery  may  be  pleaded 
in  Equity,  as  well  as  at  Law,  if  the  estate  limited  to  the  plaintiff,  or 
under  which  he  claims,  is  thereby  barred.4  Since  the  Statute  3  &  4 
Will.  IV.  c.  74,  common  recoveries  can  be  no  longer  suffered ;  but  where 
an  estate  tail  has  been  barred,  by  the  execution  of  a  deed  enrolled  in 
the  Court  of  Chancery,  according  to  the  provisions  of  that  Act,  such  deed 
and  enrolment  may  be  shown  to  the  Court  by  plea,  instead  of  a  recovery. 
The  form  of  a  plea  of  a  recovery  appears  to  be  nearly  the  same  in  Equity 
as  at  Law.5 

(3)  The  judgment  of  a  Court  of  ordinary  jurisdiction,  is  also  a  matter 
of  record,  which  may,  in  general,  be  pleaded  in  bar  to  a  suit  in  Chancery, 
provided  such  judgment  has  finally  determined  the  rights  of  the 
parties.6  Thus,  a  judgment  of  a  Court  of  Common* Fleas  in  a  *663 
writ  of  right,1  or  a  verdict  and  judgment  entered  thereon  in  a 
Court  of  Common  Law,  have  been  held  to  be  a  good  bar  in  a  Court  of 
Equity  for  the  same  matter.2  So  it  seems,  that  a  plea  of  a  nonsuit,  of 
an  action  of  trover,  has  been  allowed  as  a  good  plea.3 

The  sentence  of  any  Court  may  be  a  proper  defence  by  way  of  plea. 

3  Story  v.  Lord  Windsor,  2  Atk.  630,  632;  Elliot,  Rep.  temp  Finch,  13;  Pitt  v.  Hill.  id. 
Dobson  v.  Leadbeater,  13  Ves.  230.  70;  Temple  v.  Lady  Baltinglass,  id.  275;  Wil- 

4  Ld.  Red.  253;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Sutton,  1  P.  Iiams  v.  Lee,  3  Atk.  223;  and  for  the  plea  in 
Wins.  753.  that  case,  see  Beanies  on  Pleas,  337.     For  the 

5  In  Att.-Gen.  v.  Sutton,  1  P.  Wms.  754;  .3  effect  of  a  judgment  at  Law,  when  given  in  evi- 
Bro.  P.  C.  ed.  Toml.  75  (see  Plunkett  v.  Caven-  dence  in  a  suit  in  Equitv,  see  Pearce  t\  Grav  2 
dish,  1  R.  &  M.  713,  718),  the  suffering  of  the  Y.  &  C.  C.  C.  322,  326':  Protheroe  r.  Forman, 
recovery  appears  to  have  been  averred  in  the  2  Swanst.  227,231;  Harrison  v.  Nettleship,  2 
following   form:    "That   Thomas   Sutton,   the  M.  &  K.  423,  425. 

testator's  nephew,  being  tenant  in  tail   by  the  3  Wilcox  v.  Sturt,  1  Vern.  77.     In  Behrens 

will,    had   suffered   a  common    recovery,   and  v.  Pauli,  1  Keen,  456,  463,  a  plea  that  a  verdict 

thereby  barred  the  charities."  and  judgment  in  the  Lord  Mayor's  Court  had 

6  Ld.  Red.  253;  see  Cammann  r.  Traphagan,  been  obtained  by  the  defendant  against  the 
Saxton  (N.J.)  28;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  778,  and  plaintiff,  on  the  same  matter  in  respect  of  which 
note;  Standish  v.  Parker,  2  Pick.  (2d  ed  )  22,  relief  was  sought  by  the  bill,  was  allowed  by 
and  notes,  1-3,  and  cases  cited;  Van  Wyeh  Lord  Langdale  M.  R.  on  the  ground  that  the 
v.  Seward,  1  Edw.  327.  A  judgment  on  the  Lord  Mayor's  Court  was  a  Court  of  competent 
merits,  which  will  bar  any  other  suit  at  Law  on  jurisdiction  to  decide  the  case:  and.  although 
the  same  cause  of  action,  will  also  bar  a  suit  in  the  decision  of  the  Master  of  the  Rolls  was 
Chancery  on  the  same  cause  of  action.  Hunt  afterwards  overruled  by  Lord  Cottenham.  in 
v.  Terril,  7  J.  J.  Marsh.  68,  70.  A  judgment  Behrens  v.  Sieveking,  2  M.  &  C.  602.  it  was 
on  either  a  special  verdict  or  on  demurrer  to  merely  upon  the  ground  of  an  informality 
evidence  has  this  effect.  Ibid.  See  ante,  p.  659,  in  the  plea,  in  not  showing  that  the  subject- 
n-  9-  matter  of  the  suit,  in  the  Lord  Mayor's  Court, 

1  Sidney  v.  Perry,  cited  Ld.  Red.  254.  was  the  same,  and  that  the  proceedings  were 

2  Wilcox  v.  Sturt,  1  Vern.  77;    Bluck  v.      taken  for  the  same  purpose. 

661 


*  6Q1  PLEAS. 

Thus,  it  seems  that  a  sentence  of  a  Court  of  Admiralty  will,  if  properly 
pleaded,  be  a  good  plea.4  And  so  may  a  sentence  of  a  Court  of  Probate  ; 
therefore,  a  will  and  probate,  even  in  the  common  form,  may  be  pleaded 
to  a  bill  by  persons  claiming  as  next  of  kin  to  a  person  supposed  to  have 
died  intestate.6  (a)  If  fraud  in  obtaining  the  will  is  alleged,  that  is  not 
a  sufficient  equitable  ground  to  impeach  a  probate  :  for  the  parties  may 
resort  to  the  Court  of  Probate,  which  is  competent  to  determine  the  ques- 
tion of  fraud,6  unless  indeed  the  case  be  one  in  which  the  fraud  has  not 
gone  to  the  whole  will,  but  only  to  some  particular  clause,  or  in  which  it 
has  been  practised  to  obtain  the  consent  of  the  next  of  kin  to  the 

*  664    probate  :  in  which  *  cases  the  Court  has  laid  hold  of  these  circum- 

stances to  declare  the  executor  a  trustee  for  the  next  of  kin.1 
Where  there  are  no  such  circumstances  in  the  case,  the  probate  of  the 
will  is  a  clear  bar  to  a  demand  of  personal  estate.2  And  where  a  testa- 
tor died  in  a  foreign  country,  and  left  no  goods  in  any  other  country, 
probate  of  his  will,  according  to  the  law  of  that  country,  was  determined 
to  be  a  sufficient  defence  against  an  administrator  appointed  in  Eng- 
land : 3  but  such  foreign  probate  will  not  do,  if  there  are  any  goods  in 
England  :  for  in  that  case  the  will  must  be  proved  there.4  So  also  a  de- 
cree of  the  Court  of  Chancery  in  Ireland,  after  a  verdict  upon  an  issue 
devisavit  vel  non,  does  not  determine  the  validity  or  invalidity  of  the 
will,  so  far  as  it  relates  to  lands  in  England,  and  cannot  be  pleaded  in 
bar  to  a  suit  here.6  It  is  not,  indeed,  necessary  in  every  case,  that  the 
Court  whose  sentence  is  pleaded  should  be  an  English  Court :  the  sen- 
tence of  a  foreign  Court  may  be  a  proper  defence  by  way  of  plea ;  but 
the  plea  must  show  that  the  Court  pronouncing  the  sentence  had  full 
jurisdiction  to  determine  the  rights  of  the  parties ; 6  that  the  subjects  in 
question,  and  the  issue,  were  the  same  :  that  the  cause  was  decided  on 

4  Parkinson  v.  Leeras,  cited  Ld.  Red.  257.  Gingell  V.  Home,  9  Sim.  539,  548;  Hindson  v. 

5  Jauncy  v.  Sealey,  1  Vera.  397;  Ld.  Red.  Weatherell,  5  De  G.  M.  &  G.  301;  18  Jur.  499; 
257;  see  also  Penvill  v.  Luscombe,  2  J.  &  W.  1  Sm.  &  G.  604;  Dimes  v.  Steinberg,  2  Sm.  & 
201,  203:  Barrs  v.  Jackson,  1  Phil.  582;  9  Jur.  G.  75. 

609;  1  Y.  &  C.  C.  C.  585,  596;  7  Jur.  54.  2  Ld.  Red.  258. 

6  Ld.  Red.  257;  Archer  v.  Mosse,  2  Vern.  8;  3  Jauncy  v.  Sealej-,  1  Vern.  397. 

Nelson  v.  Oldfield,  id.  76;  Att.-Gen.  p.  Ryder,  4  As  to  when  English  probate  is  necessary, 

2  Ch.  Cas.  178;  Plume  i\  Beale,  1  P.  Wins.  388;  see  Re  Commercial  Bank  Co.  L.  R.  5  Ch.314. 
Stephenton  r.  Gardiner,  2  P.  Wms.  286;  Bennet  5  Boyse  v.  Colclough,  1  K.  &  J.  124. 

»••.   Vade,  2  Atk.   324;  Kerrick  v.  Bransby,  7  6  Ld.  Red.  255;  Newland  v.   Horseman,  I 

Bro.  P.  C.  ed.  Toml.  437;  Meadows  v.  Duchess  Vern.  21 ;  2  Ch.  Cas.  74;  Burrows  v.  Jemineau, 

of  Kingston.  Amb.  756,761;  Griffiths  v.  Hamil-  Sel.  Cas.  in  Ch.69;  1  Dick.  48;  Gage  v.  Bulke- 

ton,  12  Ves.  298,  307;  Story.  Eq.  PI.  §  782.  ley,  3  Atk.  215;  White  v.  Hall,  12  Ves.  321, 

1  Ld.  Red.  257;  Barnesly  v.  Powel,  1  Ves.  324;  see  also  Henderson  v.  Henderson,  3  Hare, 

Sr.  284,  287;  Marriot  v.  Harriot,  1   Stra.  666;  100,  115;  Farquharson  v.  Seton,  5  Russ.  45.  63; 

Meadows  v.  Duchess  of  Kingston,  Amb.  762,  Marquis  of  Breadalbane  v.  Chandos,  2  M.  &  C. 

763;  Allen  v.  Macpherson,   1  Phil.   133.  143;  711,  732;  Story,  Confl.  Laws,  584-618. 


(a)  See  ante,  p.  553,  note  (a).     A  Court  of  general  rule,  recall  the  probate,  even  when  the 

Equity  accepts  the  probate  of  a  will  as  conclu-  testator's  estate  is  in  Court  in  a  proceeding  be- 

sive  with  respect  to  personal  property,  and  re-  fore  it.     Bradford   v.  Young,  26  Ch.  D.  656; 

sort  should  be  had  to  the  Probate  Court  to  recall  see  Pinney  v.  Hunt,  6  Ch.  D.  98;  Meluish 

the  probate,  if  desired.     Smart  v.  Tranter,  40  Milton,  3  id.  27;  ante,  pp.  553,  630,  notes. 
Ch.  D.  165.     The  Equity  Court  will  not,  as  a 

662 


DIFFERENT    GROUNDS    OF    PLEAS. 


665 


the  merits ;  and  that  the  sentence  pleaded  was  final,  and  not  an  inter- 
locutory proceeding.7 

Although  a  final  judgment  of  a  Court  of  competent  jurisdiction, 
whether  in  this  or  any  other  country,  will,  as  we  have  seen,  operate  as 
a  bar  to  a  claim  for  the  same  matter  in  a  Court  of  Equity,  yet  if,  from 
any  circumstance,  such  as  fraud,  mistake,  or  surprise,  it  is  against  con- 
science that  the  defendant  should  avail  himself  of  such  a  bar,  the  Court 
of  Equity  will  not  allow  it  to  prevail.8  Where,  however,  a  bill  for  that 
purpose  is  filed,  the  defendant  may  plead  the  judgment  in  bar,  negativ- 
ing by  averments,  and  (if  interrogated  as  to  them)  denying  by  answer, 
the  equitable  circumstances  alleged  in  the  bill,  upon  which  the  judgment 
is  sought  to  be  impeached,  (a) 

It  is  to  be  observed,  that  where  a  bill  itself  states  a  sentence  of 
another  Court,  without  alleging  any  equitable  matter  to  avoid  it, 
*  a  plea  of  that  sentence  will  not  hold ;  because  it  brings  for-  *  665 
ward  no  new  matter,  and  the  defendant  ought  to  have  demurred.1 
Where  a  bill  was  filed  by  an  executor,  who  had  assented  to  a  specific 
bequest,  to  set  aside  a  verdict  and  judgment  in  trover,  obtained  by  the 
specific  legatee,  on  the  ground  that  trover  would  not  lie  for  a  legacy, 
and  that  the  damages  given  by  the  jury  were  excessive,  and  the  de- 
fendant pleaded  the  verdict  and  judgment  in  bar,  the  plea  was  allowed  ; 2 
but  it  may  be  doubted  whether  the  defence  ought  not  to  have  been  by 
demurrer,  as  there  was  no  allegation  in  the  bill  requiring  averment  in 
support  of  the  plea.3     Upon  this  principle,  where  the  probate  of  a  will 


7  Gareias  v.  Ricardo,  14  Sim.  265,  271;  8 
Jur.  1037;  S.  C.  on  appeal,  nom.  Ricardo  v. 
Gareias,  12  CI.  &  Fin.  368;  9  Jur.  1019;  Samuda 
t).  Furtado,  3  Bro.  C.  C.  70,  72;  Ostell  v.  LePage, 
2  De  G.  M.  &  G.  892,  895  ;  5  De  G.  &  S.  95;  16 
Jur.  404;  Hunter  v.  Stewart,  4  De  G.  F.  &  J. 
168 :  8  Jur.  N.  S.  317  ;  see  also  Reimers  v. 
Druce,  23  Beav.  145:  3  Jur.  N.  S.  147. 

8  As  to  the  circumstances  which  will  be 
sufficient  to  impeach  a  verdict  and  judgment 
in  Equity,  see  Williams  v.  Lee,  3  Atk.  223; 
Samuda  v.  Furtado,  ubi  supra.  In  Oehsenbein 
v.  Papelier,  L.  R.  8  Ch.  695,  it  was  held  that 
fraud  was  a  good  defence  to  a  suit  at  Law  on  a 
foreign  judgment,  and,  therefore,  Equity  would 
not  interfere  by  injunction  with  the  suit.  See 
London  &  Prov.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Seymour,  L.  R. 


(a)  See  Concha  v.  Concha,  11  A  pp.  Cas.  541 ; 
29  Ch.  D.  268;  1  Dan.  Ch.  Prac.  (6th  Eng.  ed.) 
416,  499  ;  Mutrie  v.  Binney,  35  Ch.  D.  614  ;  Grant 
v.  Easton,  32  VV.  R.  124;  Trefz  v.  Knickerbocker 
Life  Ins.  Co. 8  Fed.  Rep.  177;  Moch  v.  Virginia 
Fire  Ins.  Co.  10  id.  696;  McMullen  v.  Richie,  41 
id.  502;  Hilton  v.  Guyot,  42  id.  249.  The  Eng- 
lish Courts  do  not  sit  to  hear  appeals  from 
foreign  tribunals,  even  when  their  decisions 
proceed  on  a  mistake  as  to  English  law,  but 
recourse  must  be  had  to  the  mode  of  appeal 
provided  in  the  foreign  country.     See  Rt  Tru- 


17  Eq.  85.  In  Davis  v.  Headley,  22  N.  J.  Eq. 
115,  ttie  decree  of  another  State,  sought  to  be 
enforced,  was  held  void  for  fraud.  See  also 
Winchester  v.  Jackson,  Cooke,  420;  S.  C.  3 
Hayw.  305.  And  see,  as  to  the  extent  to  which 
judgments  of  foreign  Courts  can  be  examined 
or  enforced  in  England,  Reimers  v.  Druce,  23 
Beav.  145;  Cammell  v.  Sewell,  3  H.  &  N.  617; 
5  H.  &  N.  728;  Simpson  v.  Fogo,  1  J.  &  H.  18; 
1  H.  &  M.  195;  Castrique  v.  Imri,  8  C.  B. 
N.  S.  1,  405;  Griffin  v.  Brady,  18  W.  R.  130; 
Duchess  of  Kingston's  case,  1  Smith  L.  C. 
754,  912. 

i  LI.  Red.  255;  Knight  v.  Atkisson,  2  Tenn. 
Ch.  384. 

2  Williams  r.  Lee,  3  Atk.  223. 

3  Ld.  Red.  255. 


fort,  36  Ch.  D.  600.  In  a  suit  upon  a  foreign 
judgment,  fraud  in  obtaining  it  is  a  good  de- 
fence, even  when  such  fraud  cannot  be  proved 
without  re-trying  the  questions  adjudicated 
upon  by  the  foreign  Court.  Vadala  v.  Lawes, 
25  Q.  B.  D.  310;  and  even  though  it  has 
been  decided  in  the  foreign  Court  that  no  fraud 
existed.  Abouloff  v.  Oppenheimer,  10  Q.  B.  D. 
295;  Re  Henderson,  35  Ch.  D.  704.  As  to 
foreign  confessed  judgments,  see  Grover  & 
Baker  S.  M.  Co.  v.  Radcliffe  (U.  S.),  30  Am. 
L.  Reg.  280,  and  note. 

663 


6Q6 


PLEAS. 


is  impeached  on  the  ground  of  fraud  used  in  obtaining  it,  the  defence 
should  be  by  demurrer :  because  fraud  not  being  a  sufficient  equitable 
ground  to  impeach  the  probate,4  the  mere  setting  up  of  a  probate, 
which  appears  upon  the  bill,  is  not  a  sufficient  averment  of  a  new  fact  to 
support  a  plea. 

3.  Fleas  in  bar  of  matter  in  pais  only  are,  principally  :  (1)  A  stated 
account  ;  (2)  A  release  ;  (3)  An  award  ;  (4)  An  agreement  ;  (5)  A 
title  founded,  either  on  adverse  possession,  or  on  a  will,  or  conveyance, 
or  other  instrument  affecting  the  right  of  the  parties ;  (6)  A  purchase 
for  valuable  consideration,  without  notice  of  the  plaintiff's  title. 

(1)  A  plea  of  a  stated  account  is  a  good  bar  to  a  bill  for  an  ac- 
count ; 5  for  there  is  no  rule  more  strictly  adhered  to  in  this  Court  than 
that,  when  a  defendant  sets  forth  a  stated  account,  he  shall  not  be  obliged 
to  go  upon  a  general  one.6 

In  order  to  support  a  plea  of  a  stated  account,  it  must  be  shown  to 
have  been  final ;  it  is  not  sufficient  to  allege  that  there  has  been  a  divi- 
dend made  between  the  parties,  which  implied  a  settlement;  for  a 
dividend  may  be  made  upon  a  supposition  that  the  estate  will  amount 
to  so  much,  but  may  be  still  subject  to  an  account  being  stated  after- 
wards.7 A  plea  of  a  stated  account  must  show  that  it  was  in  writing, 
and  likewise  the  balance  in  writing,  or  at  least  set  forth  what  the  bal- 
ance was.8  It  does  not,  however,  seem  to  be  necessary  to  aver, 
*  666  that  the  account  was  settled  between  the  *  parties  upon  a  minute 
investigation  of  items :  a  general  agreement  or  composition  will 
be  sufficient;1  nor  will  the  circumstance  of  the  account  appearing  to 
have  been  settled,  errors  excepted,  be  a  sufficient  ground  to  open  a  set- 
tled account,  unless  specific  errors  are  pointed  out  in  the  bill.2 

A  stated  account  will  not  operate  as  a  bar  to  discovery,  where  the 
plaintiff  is  entitled  to  such  discovery,  not  for  the  purpose  of  any  pro- 
ceeding between  him  and  the  defendant,  but  to  enable  him  to  protect 
himself  from  claims  by  other  people.3  (a)  A  general  release  of  all  de- 
mands, not  under  seal,  may  be  pleaded  as  a  stated  account.4 


*  Ante,  p.  612. 

5  Ld.  Red.  259;  Dawson  v.  Dawson,  1  Atk. 
1 ;  Chappedelaine  v.  Dechenaux,  4  Cranch,  306; 
see  the  form  of  a  plea  of  a  stated  account, 
Willis,  550.  What  will  constitute  a  stated 
account  in  the  sense  of  a  Court  of  Equity,  is  in 
some  measure  dependent  on  the  circumstances 
of  the  case.  1  Story,  Eq.  Jur.  §  526.  A  stated 
account  properly  exists  only  where  the  accounts 
have  been  examined,  and  the  balance  admitted 
as  the  true  balance  between  the  parties,  without 
having  been  paid.  When  the  balance  thus 
admitted  is  paid,  the  account  is  deemed  a  settled 
account.  Endo  v.  Caleham,  Younge,  .306 :  Capon 
v  Miles,  13  Price,  767;  Weedtf.  Small,  7  Paige, 
5T3  ;  1  Story.  Eq.  PI.  §  798. 


(a)  The  rule  is  that  specific  errors  must  be 
stated  in  order  to  open  a  settled  account ;  and  if 

664 


6  Sumner  v.  Thorpe,  2  Atk.  1 ;  Coop.  Eq. 
PI.  277;  see  also  Carmichael  v.  Carmichael,  2 
Phil.  101,  104;  10  Jur.  908;  1  Story,  Eq.  Jur. 
§^27. 

7  Dawson  v.  Dawson,  1  Atk.  1. 

8  Burk  v.  Brown,  2  Atk.  399. 

1  Sewell  v.  Bridge,  1  Ves.  Sr.  297;  Greene  v. 
Harris,  11  R.  I.  5. 

2  Taylor  v.  H  -ylin,  2  Bro.  C.  C.  310;  1  Cox, 
435;  Johnson  v.  Curtis,  3  Bro.  C.  C.266;  Ready 
v.  Munday,  1  Tenn.  Ch.  458. 

3  Clarke  v.  Earl  of  Ormonde,  Jac.  116. 
*  Gilb.  For.  Rom.  57. 


allegations  of  fraud  in  the  pleadings  are  insuffi- 
cient to  entitle  the  plaintiff  to  open  a  settled 


DIFFERENT   GROUNDS   OF    PLEAS. 


667 


It  is  not  essential,  in  order  to  the  validity  of  a  stated  account  as  a 
bar,  that  it  should  have  been  signed  by  the  parties ; 5  it  will  be  sufficient 
if  an  account  has  been  delivered  and  acquiesced  in  for  a  considerable 
length  of  time.6  The  mere  delivery  of  an  account  will  not  constitute 
a  stated  account,  without  some  evidence  of  acquiescence  which  may 
afford  sufficient  legal  presumption  of  a  settlement.7 

It  has  been  said  that  a  defendant,  pleading  a  stated  account,  must, 
whether  error  or  fraud  be  charged  or  not,  aver  that  the  stated  account  is 
just  and  true,  to  the  best  of  his  knowledge  and  belief  ;  8  but  it  is  not 
necessary  that  the  account  should  be  annexed  by  way  of  schedule  :  for 
the  plea  is  sufficient,  in  case  it  be  a  fair  account  between  the 
parties.9  *  Where,  however,  a  bill  impeaches  the  account,  and  *  667 
alleges  that  the  plaintiff  has  no  counterpart  of  it,  and  it  is  re- 
quired to  be  set  forth,  the  defendant  must  annex  a  copy  of  the  account 
to  his  answer  by  way  of  schedule,  so  that,  if  there  are  errors  upon  the 
face  of  it  the  plaintiff  may  have  an  opportunity  of  pointing  them  out.1 

The  delivery  up  of  vouchers  is  an  affirmation  that  the  account  be- 
tween the  parties  was  a  stated  one ;  and  where  such  a  transaction  has 
taken  place,  it  should  be  averred  in  the  plea.2 

The  effect  of  pleading  a  stated  account  to  a  mere  bill  for  an  account,  is 
to  compel  the  plaintiff  to  amend  his  bill,  and  to  charge  either  fraud  or 
particular  errors  ; 3  if  specific  errors  or  frauds  are  charged  in  the  bill,  for 
the  purpose  of  impeaching  the  account,  they  must  be  denied  by  aver- 


5  Story,  Eq.  Jur.  §  526. 

6  Thus,  where  there  have  been  mutual  deal- 
ings between  a  merchant  in  England  and  a 
merchant  beyond  sea,  and  an  account  is  trans- 
mitted by  one  to  the  other,  if  the  person  to 
whom  it  is  sent  keeps  it  by  him  for  a  length  of 
time  without  making  any  objection,  it  will  bind 
him,  and  prevent  him  opening  the  account 
afterwards.  Willis  v.  Jernegan,  2  Atk.  252; 
see  Powell  v.  Pacific  R.  R.  65  Mo.  658;  Murray 
v.  Toland,  3  John.  Ch.  569  ;  Freeland  v.  Heron, 
7  Cranch,  147  ;  1  Story,  Eq.  Jur.  §  526 ;  Conse- 
qua  v.  Fanning,  3  John.  Ch.  587  ;  Wilde  v. 
Jenkins,  4  Paige,  481.  In  regard  to  acquies- 
cence in  stated  accounts,  although  it  amounts  to 
an  admission  or  presumption  of  their  correct- 
ness, it  b}'  no  means  establishes  the  fact  of  their 
having  been  settled,  even  though  the  acquies- 
cence has  been  for  a  considerable  time.  There 
must  be  other  ingredients  in  the  case  to  justify 
the  conclusion  of  a  settlement.  1  Story,  Eq. 
Jur.  §  528 ;  Ld  Clancarty  v.  Latouche,  1  B.  & 
Beat.  428 ;  Irvine  v.  Young,  1  S.  &  S.  333. 

?  Irvine  v.  Young,  1  S.  &  S.  333.  It  has 
been  said  that,  among  merchants,  it  is  looked 
upon  as  an  allowance  of  an  account  current,  if 
the  merchant  who  receives  it  does  not  object  to 


account,  discovery  will  be  refused  until  such 
allegations  are  made  sufficient.  See  Parkinson 
v.  Hanbury,  L.  R.  2  H.  L.  1;  Whyte  v.  Ahrens, 


it  in  a  second  or  a  third  post  (Sherman  v.  Sher- 
man, 2  Vern.  276);  but  inTickel  v.  Short,  2  Ves. 
Sr.  239,  Lord  Hardwicke  said,  that  if  one  mer- 
chant sends  an  account  to  another  in  a  dif- 
ferent country,  on  which  a  balance  is  made 
due  to  himself,  and  the  other  keeps  it  by  him 
about  two  years  without  objection,  the  rule  of 
this  Court,  as  well  as  of  merchants,  is,  that  it  is 
considered  as  a  stated  account. 

8  Anon.  3  Atk.  70;  Daniels  v.  Taggart,  1 
Gill  &  J.  311;  Schwarz  v.  Wendell,  Harring. 
Ch.  395. 

s  Hankey  v.  Simpson,  3  Atk.  303.  See  now 
R.  S.  C.  1883,  Ord.  XXXI.  14  ;  and  see  Greene 
v.  Harris,  11  R.  I.  5. 

1  Hankey  v.  Simpson,  3  Atk.  303. 

2  Ld.  Red.  260;  Willis  v.  Jernegan,  2  Atk. 
252  ;  Clarke  v.  Earl  of  Ormonde,  Jac.  1 16.  But 
the  delivering  up  of  vouchers  on  a  settlement  of 
accounts,  is  not  necessary.  Meeker  v.  Marsh, 
Saxton  (N.  J.).  198. 

3  Ante,  p.  371;  Weed  v.  Smull,  7  Paige, 
573;  Brown  v.  Van  Dyke,  4  Halst.  Ch.  (N.J.) 
795.  In  England  it  seems  that  he  may  now 
allege  fraud  or  particular  error  in  his  reply. 
See  1  Dan.  Ch.  Prac.  (6th  Eng.  ed.)  484. 


26  Ch.  D.  717  ;  Leitch  v.  Abbott,  31  Ch.  D.  374; 
Sachs  v.  Speilman,  37  Ch.  D.  295;  Taylor  v. 
Duncanson,  20  D.  C.  505. 

665 


668 


PLEAS. 


meats  in  the  plea,  as  well  as  by  the  answer  in  support  of  the  plea,  if  the 
defendant  is  interrogated  as  to  them.4 

It  may  be  observed  here,  that  when  fraud  is  proved  to  have  taken 
place  in  a  settlement  of  account,  or  it  is  shown  that  the  account  contains 
errors  of  a  considerable  extent,  both  in  number  and  amount,  whether 
caused  by  mistake  or  fraud,  it  will  be  a  sufficient  ground  to  open  the 
whole  account ;  and  if  a  fiduciary  relation  existed  between  the  parties, 
the  Court  will  make  a  similar  order  if  such  account  is  shown  to  contain 
a  less  number  of  errors.5  An  account  has  been  opened  for  fraud,  though 
the  account  had  been  settled  for  twenty-three  years,  and  the  party  who 
was  guilty  of  the  fraud  was  dead.6  (a) 

Upon  the  same  principle,  where  an  account  has  been  settled  between 
an  attorney  and  his  client,  and  it  appears  upon  the  face  of  the  account 
that  the  attorney  has  not  given  that  credit,  and  produced  to  his  client 
that  state  of  his  affairs  which  he  was  entitled  to  have,  the  Court  will 
not  permit  such  an  account  to  stand.7     The  same  rule  will  apply  to  cases 

of  accounts  settled  between  principal  and  agent,8  guardian  and 
*  668    ward,9  and  trustee  and  cestui  que  trust.™    *  In  some  cases  where 

errors  or  mistakes  only  are  shown  to  exist  in  the  account,  the 
account  will  not  be  opened,  but  the  party  will  be  permitted  merely  to 
surcharge  and  falsify  it.1     And  where  in  a  partnership  suit  one  error 


*  See  Ld.  Red.  261 ;  Phelps  v.  Sproule,  1  M. 
&  K.  231,  236;  Parker  v.  Alcock,  1  Y.  &  J. 
432;  Chad  wick  v.  Broad  wood,  3  Beav.  530,  540; 

5  Jur.  359;  Greene  v.  Harris,  4  R.  I.  401 ;  S.  C. 
11  R.  I.  5,  where  the  authorities  are  fully  con- 
sidered. 

5  See  Williamson  v.  Barbour,  9  Ch.  D.  529; 
Barrow  v.  Rhinelander,  1  John.  Ch.  550;  Baker 
v.  Biddle,  1  Bald.  394;  Bainbridge  v.  Wilcocks, 
id.  536,  540.  A  running  account  closed  by  a 
bond  may  be  opened  by  a  Court  of  Equity  on 
the  ground  of  fraud.  Gray  v.  Washington, 
Cook,  321.  If  in  a  bill  of  Equity  to  open  a 
settled  account,  the  facts  alleged  and  proved 
should  show  fraud  actual  or  constructive,  in  the 
settlement,  the  plaintiff  will  be  entitled  to  re- 
lief, notwithstanding  the  bill  contains  no  direct 
averment  of  fraud.  Farnam  v.  Brooks,  9  Pick. 
212;  Bankhead  v.  Alloway,  6  Coldw.  56. 

6  Vernon  v.  Vawdry,  2  Atk.  119;  Botifeur 
v.  Weyman,  1  M'CordCh.  161. 

"  Matthews  v.  Wallwyn,  4  Ves.  118,  125; 
Middleditch  v.  Sharland,  5  Sumner's  Ves.  87, 
Perkins's  note  (<;),  and  cases  cited;  Hickson 
v.  Aylward,  3  Moll.  1 ;  Farnam  v.  Brooks, 
9  Pick.  212;  1  Story,  Eq.  Jur.  §  462,  and 
notes;  Pickering  v.  Pickering,  2  Beav.  31; 
Graham  v.  Davidson,  2  Dev.  &  Bat.  Eq. 
155 :    De    Montmorency    v.    Devereux,    Dru. 

6  W.  119. 

8  Beaumont  v.  Boultbee,  5  Ves.  485,  494; 


7  Ves.  599,  601;  11  Ves.  358;  Clarke  v.  Tip- 
ping, 9  Beav.  284,  287,  where  the  fact  appeared 
from  admissions  in  the  answer. 

9  Allfrey  v.  Allfrey,  10  Beav.  353,  357; 
11  Jur.  981;  1  M'N.  "&  G.  87,  93;  13  Jur. 
269;  Coleman  v.  Mellersh,  2  M'N.  &  G.  309, 
315;  and  see  Brownell  r.  Brownell,  2  Bro. 
C.  C.  62. 

10  Clarke  v.  Earl  of  Ormonde,  Jac.  116. 
As  between  trustee  and  cestui  que  trust,  the 
trustee  cannot  protect  himself  from  discovery 
of  the  vouchers,  S.  C. 

1  Vernon  v.  Vawdry,  2  Atk.  119;  Brown 
v.  Van  Dyke,  4  Halst.  Ch.  (N.  J.)  795.  The 
burden  of  showing  errors  is  on  him  who  re- 
ceives an  account  without  objection.  Baker 
v.  Biddle,  1  Bald.  394;  Bainbridge  v.  Wil- 
cocks, id.  536,  540;  Lock  v.  Armstrong,  2 
Dev.  &  Bat.  Eq.  147;  Wilde  v.  Jenkins,  4 
Paige,  481;  Murray  v.  Poland,  3  John.  Ch. 
569;  Honore  v.  Cohnesnel,  1  J.  J.  Marsh.  417; 
Troup  v.  Haight,  1  Hopk.  239.  In  the  case 
of  transactions  between  trustee  and  cestui  que 
trust,  or  guardian  and  ward  (Brownell  v. 
Brownell,  2  Bro.  C.  C.  62),  or  between  solicitor 
and  client  (Matthews  v.  Wallwyn,  4  Ves.  125), 
the  Court  allows  a  greater  latitude.  As  to 
opening  for  mistake  settled  accounts  between 
mortgagor  and  mortgagee,  see  Daniel  v.  Sin- 
clair, 6  App.  Cas.  181. 


(n)  In  re  Garnett,  Gandy  v.  Macaulay 
(No.  1),  33  Ch.  D.  1,  a  release  to  a  trustee  was 
set  aside  after  more  than  twenty  years,  and 
after  the  trustee's   death,  upon   the  plaintiff's 

666 


evidence  of  error  supported  by  the  terms  of 
the  deed;  and  it  was  held  unnecessary  to  prove 
fraud. 


DIFFERENT   GROUNDS    OF    PLEAS.  *  669 

of  £950  was  established  in  an  account  long  settled,  the  Court  refused  to 
open  the  whole  account,  there  being  no  fraud,  but  gave  liberty  to  sur- 
charge and  falsify.2  This  is  an  important  distinction  :  because,  where 
an  account  is  opened,  the  whole  of  it  may  be  unravelled,  and  the 
parties  will  not  be  bound  by  deductions  agreed  upon  between  them  on 
taking  the  former  account ;  8  but  where  a  party  has  liberty  to  surcharge 
and  falsify,  the  onus  proband  i  is  always  on  the  party  having  the  liberty  : 
for  the  Court  takes  it  as  a  stated  account  and  establishes  it ;  but  if  the 
party  can  show  an  omission  for  which  there  ought  to  be  credit,  it  will  be 
added  (which  is  a  surcharge),  or  if  any  wrong  charge  is  inserted  it  will 
be  deducted  (which  is  a  falsification).4  This,  however,  must  be  done  by 
proof  on  his  side.5  In  some  cases,  where  the  circumstances  would  justify 
opening  the  account,  the  Court  will  only  give  leave  to  surcharge  and 
falsify,  if  it  is  satisfied  that  it  will  in  that  manner  best  do  justice 
between  the  parties.6 

Although  a  party,  seeking  to  open  a  settled  account,  must  specify  the 
errors  he  insists  upon,7  it  is  not  necessary  that  he  should,  at  the  hearing, 
prove  all  the  errors  specified  in  his  bill.8  If  he  proves  some  of  them,  or 
even  one  important  error,  he  entitles  himself  to  a  decree,  giving  him 
liberty  to  surcharge  and   falsify.9 

When  parties  are  at  liberty  to  surcharge  and  falsify,  they  are  not  con- 
fined to  mere  errors  of  fact,  but  they  may  take  advantage  of  errors  in 
Law ; 10  and  where  one  party  is  allowed  to  surcharge  and  falsify,  the 
other  may  do  so  too.11 

*  It  is  to  be  remarked,  however,  that  although  an  admission  by  *  6G9 
the  defendant  in  the  answer  accompanying  his  plea,  of  an  error 
in  the  stated  account,  may  be  sufficient  evidence  to  induce  the  Court  to 
open  the  account,  the  mere  circumstance  that  the  defendant,  after  the 


2  Gething  v.  Keighley,  9  Ch.  D.  547,  550,  576;  Chappedelaine  v.  Dechenaux,  4  Cranch, 
holding  also  that  actual  knowledge  of  antece-  306;  Bullock  v.  Boyd, 2  Edw.  Ch.293;  Phillips 
dent  fraud,  by  an  agent  who  is  sued,  on  the  v.  Belden,  2  Edw.  Ch.  1;  Stoughton  t\  Lynch, 
part  of  one  who  subsequently  became  a  mem-  2  John.  Ch.  509. 

ber  of  the  plaintiff's  (principal's)  firm,  is  not  a  Where  no  fiduciary  relation  exists  between  the 

good  plea  in  bar  of  the  claim.  parties,  nor  any  great  inequality  in  their  mental 

3  Osborne  v.  Williams,  18  Ves.  379,  382.  or  business  capacity,  formal  settlements  closed 

4  Pit  v.  Cholmondeley,  2  Ves.  Sr.  565;  by  receipt  or  note  will  not  be  opened  except  for 
Heighington  v.  Grant,  1  Phil.  600.  For  an  fraud,  or  errors  clearly  established,  especially 
explanation  of  the  terms  surcharge  and  falsify,  after  the  destruction  of  vouchers  by  consent, 
see  1  Story,  Eq.  Jur.  §  525.  Patton  r.  Cone,  1   Lea,  14 ;  S.  C.  2  Tenn.  Leg. 

5  Ibid.  Rep.  171.     An  action  to  open  a  settlement  can- 

6  Allfrey  v.  Allfrey,  1  M'N.  &  G.  87,  94;  not  be  maintained  if  it  appear  that  the  plaintiff 
13  Jur.  269;  Gething  v.  Keighley,  9  Ch.  D.  was  aware,  at  the  time  he  made  the  settlement, 
547.  of  the  facts   on  which  he  bases  his  claim  to 

1  Ante,  p.   371.     A  general   charge  is   not  relief.     Quinlan  v.  Reiser,  66  Mo.  603.     And 

sufficient;  specific  errors  must  be  pointed  out.  see  Gage  v.  Parmele,  87  111.  329. 

Calvit    v.    Markham,    3    How.    (Miss.)    343;  8  Anon.  2  Freern.  62;    Chambers  v.  Gold- 

Mebane  v.  Mebane,  1  Ired.  Eq.  403;  Oe  Mont-  win,    5    Ves.    834,    837;  D.iwson    v.    Dawson, 

morency  v.  Devereux,  1  Dm.  &  W.  119;  Leay-  1  Atk.  1;  Drew  r.  Power,  1  Sch.  &  Lef.  192. 

craft   v.   Dempsey,    15    Wend.    83;    Baker  v.  9  Twogood  r.  Swanston,  6  Ves.  485;  Geth- 

Biddle,  1  Bald.  394,  418;  Bainbridge  v.  Wil-  ing  v.  Keighley,  9  Ch.  D.  547. 

cox,  id.  536,540;  Consequa  v.  Fanning,  3  John.  i»  Roberts  v.  Kuffin,  2  Atk.  112. 

Ch.  587;  S.  C.  17  John.  511;  Weed  v.  Small,  U  l  Mad.  Ch.  144. 
7   Paige,    573;   Hobart   v.   Andrews,  21    Pick. 

667 


*  669  PLEAS. 

account  was  settled,  confessed  that  there  was  an  error  in  the  account, 
and  before  suit  corrected  it  and  paid  over  the  amount,  is  not  a  ground 
upon  which  the  Court  will  make  such  a  decree.1 

(2)  If  the  plaintiff,  or  a  person  under  whom  he  claims,  has  released 
the  subject  of  his  demands,  the  defendant  may  plead  the  release  in  bar 
of  the  bill,2  whether  executed  before  or  after  the  filing  of  the  bill ; 8  and 
this  will  apply  to  a  bill  praying  that  the  release  may  be  set  aside  : 4 
in  which  case,  the  defendant  must  deny  the  equitable  circumstances 
charged  for  the  purpose  of  impeaching  the  release,  by  averments  in 
the  plea,  and  also  by  the  answer  in  support  of  the  plea,  if  interrogated 
as  to  them.5 

A  release,  however,  to  be  an  effectual  bar  to  an  account,  must  be 
under  seal :  otherwise  it  ought  to  be  pleaded  as  a  stated  account  only.6 
But  although  it  is  necessary  that  a  release,  when  insisted  upon  as  such, 
should  have  been  sealed  and  delivered,7  there  is  no  authority  for  saying 
that  it  must  have  been  signed.8  It  seems,  that  where  a  person  taken  in 
execution  on  a  judgment  has  been  discharged  by  his  creditor's  express 
order,  such  discharge,  being  a  release  of  the  debt,  may  be  pleaded  in  bar 
to  a  bill  to  have  satisfaction  of  the  judgment.9  (a) 

In  a  plea  of  release,  the  defendant  must  set  out  the  consideration 
upon  which  it  was  made  ;  for  every  release  must  be  founded  on  some 
consideration  :  otherwise  fraud  will  be  presumed.10  A  plea  of  a  release, 
therefore,  cannot  extend  to  the  discovery  of  the  consideration;  and 
if  that  is  impeached  by  the  bill,  the  plea  must  be  assisted  by  aver- 
ments, covering  the  ground   upon  which   the  consideration  is   so   im- 

i  Davis  v.  Spurting,  1E.&  M.  64,  67.  6  Ld.  Red.  263. 

2  Ld.  Red.  2(51;  Bower  v.  Swadlin,  1  Atk.  1  The  plea  should  state  that  the  release  was 

294;    Taunton  r.  Pcpler,  6  Mad.  166;  Clarke  under  seal;   but  this  does  not  seem  to  be  indis- 

v.  Earl  of  Ormonde,  Jac.  116;  Roche  v.  Mor-  pensable.     Phelps  v.  Sproule,  1  M.  &  K.  231, 

gell,  2  Sch.  &  Lef.  721.  236. 

s  Sergrove  v.  Mayhew,  2  M'N.  &  G.  97,  99;  8  Taunton  v.  Pepler,  6  Mad.  166. 

14  Jur.  158.  9  Beames  on  Pleas,  221 ;   Beatniff  v.  Gard- 

4  Ld.  Red.  263.  ner,  2  Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  73,  pi.  20.   But  not  to  a  bill 

5  Lloyd  v.  Smith,  1  Anst.  258;  Freeland  v.  to  enforce  a  mortgage  made  to  secure  the  debt. 
Johnsonj  id.  276;  Walter  v.  Glanville,  5  Bro.  Davis  v.  Battine,  4  Russ.  &  M.  76. 

P.  C.  ed.  Toml.  555;   Roche  v.  Morgell,  2  Sch.  10  Roche  v.  Morgell,  ubi   supra.     A  plea  of 

&  Lef.  727;  Sanders   v.  King,  6  Mad.  61,  64,  release  to  a  bill  for  an  account  is  insufficient, 

cited  2  S.  &  S.  277;  see  also  Parker  v.  Alcock,  unless  it  sets  out  by  way  of  averment  the  ac- 

1  Y.  &  J.  432.     See  McClane  v.  Shepherd,  21  counts  which  form  its  consideration.    Brooks  v. 

N.  J.  Eq.  76.  Sutton,  L.  R.  5  Eq.  361. 


(a)  A  plea  of  release  to  a  bill  for  an  account,  it  is  not  a  defence.  Steeds  v.  Steeds,  22  Q.  B. 
being  held  insufficient  for  not  setting  out  the  D.  537.  Pleas  which  set  up  an  affirmative  de- 
accounts,  was  ordered  to  stand  for  an  answer,  fence,  such  as  payment,  must,  upon  the  trial, 
with  liberty  to  except,  in  Brooks  v.  Sutton,  be  supported  by  a  preponderance  of  evidence. 
L.  R.  5  Eq.  361.  As  to  the  plea  of  accord  Perot  v.  Cooper,  17  Col.  80.  The  plea  of  pay- 
and  satisfaction,  see  Barclay  v.  Bank  of  New  ment  is  new  matter,  which  the  plaintiff  is 
South  Wales.  5  App.  Cas.  374;  Re  Branksea  required  to  answer  in  his  replication  or  reply, 
Island  Co.  1  Meg.  12.  Accord  and  satisfaction  and  cannot  anticipate  by  averring  in  his  bill 
is  a  valid  plea  to  a  suit  for  a  specialty  debt;  or  complaint  that  no  payments  have  been  made, 
but  if  made  with  only  one  of  two  obligees  of  a  Benicia  Agr.  Works  v.  Creighton,  21  Oregon, 
bond  (who  are  treated  prima  facie,  in  Equity,  495. 
as  tenants  in  common  and  not  as  joint  tenants), 

668 


DIFFERENT    GROUNDS    OF    PLEAS. 


671 


peached  : u  therefore,  where  there  was  a  bill  for  *  an  account  and  *  670 
a  discovery  of  dealings  between  the  parties,  to  which  a  release 
was  pleaded,  and  it  appeared  that  the  release  was  founded  on  an  account 
of  those  dealings  made  up,  Lord  Hardwicke  held  it  to  be  bad  ;  because 
it  extended  to  a  discovery  of  those  dealings,  and  of  the  account  so 
made  up.1 

(3)  An  award  may  be  pleaded  in  bar  to  a  bill,  which  seeks  to  dis- 
turb the  matter  submitted  to  arbitration.2  It  may  likewise  be  pleaded 
to  a  bill  to  set  aside  the  award  and  open  the  account ;  and  it  is  not  only 
a  good  defence  to  the  merits  of  the  case,  but  likewise  to  the  discovery 
sought  by  the  bill.3 

It  seems  doubtful  whether  an  award,  made  under  an  agreement,  entered 
into  after  the  bill  has  been  filed,  to  refer  the  matter  of  the  suit  to  arbi- 
tration, can  be  set  up  in  bar  to  the  bill  by  a  plea,  in  the  nature  of  a  plea 
puis  darrein,  continuance  at  Law;  the  object  in  view  can,  however,  be 
much  more  effectually  obtained  by  an  application  to  stay  proceedings 
in  the  cause.4 

Although  an  award  duly  made  will  be  a  good  plea  in  bar  to  a  bill,  for 
the  matters  concluded  by  it,  a  covenant  or  agreement  to  refer  disputes 
to  arbitration,  («)  as  it  cannot  be  made  the  subject  of  a  bill  for  a 
specific  performance,5  cannot  be  pleaded  in  bar  to  a  bill  *  brought    *  671 


ii  Ed.  Red.  261,  262.  Story.  Eq.  PI.  §§  796, 
797.  Where  the  consideration  for  a  release  is 
the  general  settlement  of  accounts,  and  such 
settlement  is  impeached  in  the  bill,  this  must 
be  met  by  a  plea,  and  be  supported  by  an  an- 
swer denying  the  imputations  charged  in  the 
bill.  Parker  v.  Alcock,  1  Y.  &  J.  432;  Fish  v. 
Miller,  5  Paige.  26  ;  Allen  v.  Randolph,  4  John. 
Ch.  693;  Bolton  v.  Gardner,  3  Paige,  273;  Peck 
v.  Burgess,  Walk.  Ch.  485. 

1  Salkeld  v.  Science,  2  Ves.  Sr.  107,  108; 
Roche  v.  M'Tgell.  ubi  supra.  In  Brown  v. 
Perkins  (1  Hare,  564,  569;  6  Jur.  727),  to  a  bill 
by  the  executors  of  a  deceased  partner,  for  an 
account  of  the  dealings  and  transactions  of  a 
partnership,  the  defendant  pleaded  a  parol 
agreement  between  himself  and  the  testator, 
to  the  effect  that  all  accounts  between  them 
should  be  waived.  Sir  James  Wigram  V.  C. 
seemed  to  be  of  opinion,  that  such  a  plea 
might  be  a  good  defence  to  a  bill  for  an  ac- 
count :  but  he  was  of  opinion,  upon  the  con- 
struction of  the  agreement  in  the  ease  before 
him,  that  it  must  be  understood  as  importing 
that  the  defendant  took  upon  himself  the 
liabilities  of  the  partnership;  and  he  held 
the  plea  bad,  because  it  was  not  supported  by 
negative  averments,  showing  that  the  plain- 
tiff's testator's  estate  was  discharged  from  all 
liability  in  respect  of  the  partnership. 


2  Tittenson  v.  Peat,  3  Atk.  529;  Farrington 
v.  Chute,  1  Vem.  72.  As  to  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  Court  over  awards,  see  Harding  v.  Wick- 
ham,  2  J.  &  H.  676;  Smith  v.  Whitmore,  10 
Jur.  N.  S.  65,  1190;  1  H.  &  M.  576;  2  De  G. 
J.  &  S.  297;  Wakefield  o.  Llanelly  Ry.  &  Dock 
Co.  3  De  G.  J.  &  S.  11  ;  11  Jur.  N.  S.  456; 
Borneo  Co.  v.  Robinson,  W.  N".  (1868)26;  Par- 
rott  v.  Shellard,  id.  186;  16  W.  R.  928;  ante, 
p.  605;  and  see  Rumbold  V.  Cow],  W.  N.  (1873) 
202;  Grafham  v.  Turnbull,  44  L  J.  Ch.  538. 
An  award  constitutes  no  valid  defence  unless  it 
clearly  appears  that  the  subject-matter  of  the 
suit  was  within  the  award.  Davison  v.  John- 
son, 16  N.  J.  Eq.  112. 

3  Ed.  Red.  260;  Tittenson  V.  Peat,  ubi  supra. 
*  Rowe  v.  Wood,  1  J.  &  W.  315,  334,  337; 

2  Bligh,  505;  see  also  Drvden  v.  Robinson,  2 
S.  &  S.  529,  the  marginal  note  of  which  case  is 
incorrect. 

5  Price  v.  Williams,  cited  6  Ves.  818;  Agar 
v.  Mack  lew,  2  S.  &  S.  418;  Earl  of  Mexbor- 
ough  i'.  Bower,  7  Beav.  127;  Tattersall  v. 
Groote,  2  B.  &  P.  131;  Copper  v.  Wells.  Sax- 
ton  (N.  J.),  10:  Darbey  v.  Whitaker,  4  Drew. 
134:  March  v.  Eastern  Railroad.  40  N.  H.  571; 
Smith  v.  Boston,  C.  &  M.  R.  R.  36  N.  H.  487; 
King  v.  Howard,  27  Miss.  21.  No  mere  agree- 
ment to  refer  a  controversy  to  arbitration  can 
oust  the  proper  Courts  of  justice  of  their  juris- 


(a)  Such  a  covenant  or  agreement  was  for- 
merly disfavored  as  an  attempt  to  oust  the  juris- 
diction of  the  Superior  Courts.     See  Scott  v. 


Avery,  5  H.  L.  Ca«.  811;  8  Ex.  487;  Collins  v. 
Locke,  4  App.  Cas.  674. 

669 


671 


PLEAS. 


in  consequence  of  such  differences  ; 1  and  where  a  bill  is  filed  in  respect 
of  matters  agreed  to  be  referred  to  arbitration,  the  proper  course  is  for 
the  defendant,  after  appearance,  but  before  plea  or  answer,  to  apply 
to  the  Court  to  stay  the  proceedings  in  the  suit.2  (b) 

If  the  award  is  impeached  upon  grounds  of  fraud,  corruption,  or 
mistake,  or  for  any  other  reason,  such  statements  must  be  denied  by 
averments  in  the  plea,  and  (if  interrogated  to)  by  answer  in  support 
of  it.3 

We  have  already  had  occasion  to  observe  that  arbitrators  may  be. 
made  parties  to  a  bill  to  set  aside  an  award  which  is  impeached  on  the 
ground  of  gross  misconduct  on  their  parts.4  In  such  a  case,  they  may 
plead  the  award  in  bar  of  all  that  part  of  the  bill  which  seeks  a  discov- 
ery of  their  motives  in  making  the  award ;  but  they  must,  if  charged 
with  corruption  or  partiality,  support  the  plea  by  averments,  denying 


diction  of  the  case.  Contee  v.  Dawson,  2  Bland, 
264;  see  also  Allegre  v.  Maryland  Ins.  Co.  6 
Har.  &  J.  408;  Randall  v.  Chesapeake  &c. 
Canal  Co.  1  Harring.  234;  Gray  v.  Wilson,  4 
Watts,  39;  Miles  v.  Stanley,  1  Miles,  418; 
Stone  v.  Dennis,  3  Porter,  231;  Tobey  v. 
County  of  Bristol,  3  Story,  800.  See  Milnes 
V.  Gery,  14  Ves.  400;  Greason  v.  Keteltas,  17 
N.  Y.  491;  Hopkins  v.  Gilman,  22  Wis.  476; 
Dawson  v.  Fitzgerald,  L.  R.9  Ex.  7;  1  Ex.  D. 
257;  Tscheider  r.  Biddle,  4  Dill.  55,  and  note, 
p.  64.  See  also,  under  the  Common  Law  Pro- 
cedure Act,  Cooke  o.  Cooke,  L.  R.  4  Eq.  77; 
Willesford  v.  Watson,  L.  R.  8  Ch.  473;  Law  v. 
Garrett,  8  Ch.  D.  26. 

1  Ld.  Red.  264;  Wellington  v.  Mackintosh, 
2  Atk.  569,  570;  Michell  v.  Harris,  4  Bro.  C.  C. 
311,  315;  2  Ves.  Jr.  129,  136;  Satterley  v. 
Robinson,  cited  4  Bro.  C.  C.  316,  n.;  Street  v. 
Rigby,  6  Ves.  815,  817,  overruling  Halfhide 
v.  Kenning,  2  Bro.  C.  C.  336;  and  see  Ranger 
v.  Great  Western  Ry.  Co.  5  H.  L.  Cas.  72  ;  18 
Jur.  795;  Scott  v.  Avery,  5  H.  L.  Cas.  811  ;  2 
Jur.  N.  S.  815;  Scott  v.  Liverpool,  1  Giff.  215; 

4  Jur.  N.  S.  402;  2  De  G.  &  J  324;  5  Jur. 
N.  S.  105;  Roper  v.  Lendon,  1  E.  &  E.  825;  5 
Jur.  N.  S.  491 ;  Horton  v.  Saver,  4  H.  &  N.  643 ; 

5  Jur.  N  S.  989;  Wood  v.  Robson,  W.N.  (1867) 
66;  15  W.  R.  756  ;  Cooke  v.  Cooke,  L.  R.  4  Eq. 
87;  Henrick  v.  Blair,  1  John.  Ch.  101 ;  Shepard 


17.  Merrill,  2  John.  Ch.  276;  Underbill  v.  Van 
Cortlandt,  2  John.  Ch.  339;  Bouck  v.  Wilber, 
4  John.  Ch.  405;  Tappin  v.  Heath,  1  Paige, 
293;  Campbell  v.  Western,  3  id.  124;  Fitzpat- 
rick  v  Smith,  1  Desaus.  245;  Atwyn  v.  Perk- 
ins, 3  Desaus.  297;  Sherman  v.  Beale,  1  Wash. 
11 ;  Pleasants  v.  Ross,  1  Wash.  156 ;  Morris  v. 
Ross,  2  Hen.  &  M.  171, 408 ;  Mitchell  v.  Harris, 
2  Sumner's  Ves.  129,  notes  (e)  and  (</),  and 
cases  cited;  Tobey  v.  County  of  Bristol,  3 
Story,  800.  819,  et  seq.  As  to  agreements  to 
refer  under  the  Railway  Companies  Arbitra- 
tion Act,  1859  (22  &  23  Vic.  c.  59),  see  Wat- 
ford &  R.  Ry.  Co.  0.  London  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co. 
L.  R.  8  Eq.  231;  Wolverhampton  &c.  Ry.  Co. 
v.  London  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  L.  R.  16  Eq.  433; 
Llanelly  Ry.  Co.  v.  London  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co. 
20  W.  R.  898.  (a) 

2  Common  Law  Procedure  Act,  1854  (17  & 
18  Vic.  125),  §  11;  see  Russell  v.  Russell,  14 
Ch.  D.  471;  post,  Chap.  XLV.  Statutory  Juris- 
diction. For  fcrm  of  notice  of  motion,  see 
Vol.  III. 

3  Ld.  Red.  261;  Coop.  Eq.  PL  280;  Story, 
Eq.  PL  §  803 ;  and  see  ante,  p.  614. 

4  Ante,  p.  297;  Padley  v.  Lincoln  Water- 
works Co.  2'M'N.  &  G.*68,  71;  14  Jur.  299; 
Ponsford  v.  Swaine,  1  J.  &  H.  433;  Malmes- 
bury  Ry.  Co.  v.  Budd,  2  Ch.  D.  113. 


(n)  Where  railway  companies  agree  to  sub- 
mit matters  in  dispute  to  arbitration,  under 
§§  4,  26,  of  this  Act,  the  Court  must  give  effect 
to  the  agreement  to  refer  if  insisted  on  by 
either  party,  but  it  is  not  deprived  of  its  juris- 
diction to  determine  the  matters  in  dispute  if 
neither  party  insists  on  an  arbitration.  Lon- 
don, Chatham,  &  Dover  Ry.  Co.  v.  South- 
Eastern  Ry.  Co  40  Ch.  D.  100. 

(b)  See  Compagnie  du  Senegal  v.  Woods, 
53  L.  J.  Ch.  166;  Minifie  o.  Railway  Passen- 
gers Ass.  Co.  44  L.  T.  552 ;  Viney  v.  Bignold, 

670 


20  Q.  B.  D.  172.  The  Court  will  not  exercise 
its  jurisdiction  to  restrain  a  party  from  proceed- 
ing to  arbitration,  where  it  sees  that  the  result 
of  the  arbitration  will  be  merely  futile  and  pro- 
ductive of  no  injury  to  the  party  complaining. 
Farrar  v.  Cooper,  44  Ch.  D.  323.  It  has  no 
jurisdiction  to  enjoin  a  person  from  proceeding 
with  an  arbitration  in  a  matter  beyond  the 
arbitration  agreement,  although  the  proceedings 
are  vexatious.  Wood  v.  Lillies,  61  L.  J.  Ch. 
158;  North  London  Ry.  Co.  v.  Great  Northern 
Ry.  Co.  11  Q.  B.  D.  30. 


DIFFERENT   GROUNDS   OF   PLEAS.  *  673 

such  charges,  and  showing  themselves  incorrupt  and  impartial,  and  (if 
interrogated)  they  must  also  deny  them  by  answer.5 

(4)  An  executory  agreement  is  a  cause  of  action  only,  and  cannot  be 
pleaded  in  bar  to  another  cause  of  action.6  Where  an  agreement  is  final, 
and  settles  the  whole  matter,  the  case  is  different,  and  it  may  be 

*  pleaded.1  An  agreement  to  put  an  end  to  a  suit  must  not  be  *  672 
final  only  as  between  the  parties  to  the  bill  to  which  it  is  pleaded, 

but  it  must  be  final  as  to  all  the  parties  to  the  suit  compromised  by  it. 
If,  therefore,  an  agreement  be  made  subsequent  to  the  filing  of  a  bill, 
between  the  parties  to  the  suit  and  other  parties,  for  the  purpose  of 
putting  an  end  to  the  proceedings  in  the  suit,  and  for  other  purposes,  it 
cannot  be  pleaded  in  bar  to  the  bill  b}r  one  of  the  parties  only  ;  at  all 
events,  if  it  is  so  pleaded,  it  must  contain  averments  that  all  the  con- 
ditions of  the  agreement  have  been  performed,  or  from  circumstances 
could  not  be  performed,  and  that  the  other  parties  not  joining  in  the 
plea  are  ready  to  perform  the  agreement ;  indeed,  all  the  circumstances 
by  which  such  an  agreement  is  affected  should  be  noticed  in  the  aver- 
ments. And  where  an  agreement  of  this  sort,  which  has  been  entered 
into  for  the  purpose  of  putting  an  end  to  a  suit,  contains  a  great  many 
stipulations  and  clauses  which  are  executory,  it  can  scarcely  be  consid- 
ered a  fit  subject  for  a  plea.'2 

(5)  If  the  defendant's  title  be  paramount  to  the  plaintiff's,  he  may 
plead  it  in  bar.8  A  plea  of  this  nature  is  called  a  plea  of  title  ;  and  a 
title  so  pleaded  will,  generally  speaking,  be  founded  either  on  a  long 
peaceable  possession  by  the  defendant,  and  those  under  whom  he  claims  ; 
on  a  will ;  or  on  a  conveyance.4 

Length  of  time  raises  a  presumption  against  claims  otherwise  most 
clearly  made  out,  and  therefore  an  undisturbed  possession  of  sixty  years 
or  more  is  a  good  subject  of  plea.5  If  a  title  is  so  stated  in  a  bill,  that 
there  appears  to  have  been  a  possession  adverse  to  it  of  about  twenty 
years,  without  any  allegation  of  disability,  the  defendant  may  demur ; 
but,  if  the  title  is  not  so  stated,  the  defendant  must  plead  the  facts 
necessary  to  show  the  existence  of  the  adverse  possession.6  A  mere 
general  allegation  that  there  have  been  disabilities  arising  from  infancy 
or  coverture,  will  not  be  sufficient.7 

In  a  plea  of  adverse  possession,  if  the  possession  is  derivative, 

*  and  has  not,  during  the  whole  time  covered  by  the  plea,  been    *  673 
in  the  defendant  himself,  the  plea  must  show  in  whom  the  posses- 
sion was,  at  the  time  when  the  plea  sets  it  up,  and  how  the  defendant 
deduces  his  possession  from  such  person  ;  and  if  the  adverse  possession 
is  to  be   inferred  from  circumstances  which  do  not  appear  upon  the 

Ante,  p.  297.  2  Wood  v.  Rowe,  Rowe  v.  Wood,  vbl  supra. 

6  Rowe  v.  Wood,  1J.  &  W.  315,  344 ;  Wood  8  Wvatt's  P.  R.  328;  Storv,  Eq.  PI.  §  811. 

v.  Rowe,  2  Bligh,  595.  4  Reames  on  Pleas.  247;  Story,  Eq.  Pi".  §  811. 

1  Where  an  administratrix,  who  was  a  de-  s  Wyatt's  P.  R.  328. 

fendant  in  a  bill  for  an  account  and  distribution,  6  Lord  Cholmondeley  v.  Lord  Clinton,  T.  & 

pleaded  an  inventory  duly  taken  and  approved,  R.  107,  118. 

and  an  agreement    founded   thereon,  the   plea  »  Rlewit  v.   Thomas,  2  Ves.  Jr.  669,  671; 

was  allowed.     Cocking  v.  Pratt,  1  Ves>.  Sr.400;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §§  814,  815. 


see  Belt's  Sup.  to  Ves.  187. 


671 


674 


PLEAS. 


bill,  the  defendant  must  state  clearly,  upon  the  face  of  his  plea,  the 
circumstances  on  which  he  means  to  rely  as  constituting  the  adverse 
possession.1 

A  will  may  also  be  pleaded  in  bar  to  a  bill  brought,  on  a  ground  of 
equity,  by  an  heir-at-law  against  a  devisee,  to  turn  the  devisee  out  of 
possession.2 

In  like  manner,  upon  a  bill  filed  by  an  heir  against  the  person  claim- 
ing under  a  conveyance  from  the  ancestor,  the  defendant  may  plead  the 
conveyance,  in  bar  of  the  suit ; 8  and  so,  where  a  bill  was  filed  by  per- 
sons claiming  under  a  will,  to  set  aside  a  conveyance  made  by  the 
testator,. on  the  ground  of  fraud,  and  the  defendant  pleaded  a  convey- 
ance by  the  testator,  before  the  date  of  his  will,  of  the  estate  which  the 
plaintiffs  claimed,  the  plea  was  allowed.4 

In  all  pleas  of  title,  whether  derived  under  a  will  or  a  deed,  if  the 
defendant  is  not  the  person  taking  immediately  under  the  will  or  deed, 
but  derives  his  title  through  others,  the  title  of  the  defendant  must  be 
deduced  from  the  person  immediately  taking,  by  proper  averments  in 
the  plea.  And  in  all  cases  it  is  necessary,  whether  the  title  be  derived 
from  adverse  possession,  or  from  a  will  or  conveyance,  to  show 
*  674  that  it  had  a  commencement  anterior  to  *  that  of  the  plaintiff's 
title,  as  shown  by  the  bill :  a  title  posterior  to  that  of  the  plain- 
tiff will  not  avail  as  a  plea,  unless  it  be  some  way  connected  with  the 
plaintiff's  title.1 

(6)  Where  a  conveyance  is  insisted  upon  by  plea,  as  an  adverse  title, 
it  must  bear  a  date  anterior  to  the  commencement  of  the  plaintiff's  title, 


i  Hardman  v.  Ellames,  2  M.  &  K.  732,  739, 
744;  C.  P.  Coop.  temp.  Brough.  351,  354;  see 
Jerard  v.  Stnders,  2  Ves.  Jr.  187. 

2  Ld.  Red.  263.  Thus,  where  a  bill  was 
brought  to  set  aside  a  will  on  account  of  fraud, 
on  a  suggestion  that  the  testator  was  rendered 
incapable  of  making  it,  by  being  perpetually 
in  Ii((Uor,  and  particularly  when  he  executed 
the  will,  and  likewise  for  a  receiver  to  be  ap- 
pointed, and  the  defendant  pleaded  the  will, 
and  that  it  was  duly  executed:  Lord  Hardwicke 
allowed  the  plea,  so  far  as  it  applied  to  that 
part  of  the  bill  which  sought  to  set  the  will 
aside,  because  "you  cannot,  in  this  Court,  set 
aside  a  will  for  fraud;"  but  he  would  not 
allow  it  as  to  the  receiver,  for  he  would  not  tie 
up  the  hands  of  the  Court,  in  case  it  should  be 
necessarv,  in  the  progress  of  the  suit  at  Law.  to 
have  a  receiver  appointed.  Anon.  3  Atk.  17  ; 
Storv,  Eq.  PL  §  812.  For  form  of  such  a  plea, 
see  Vol.  III.  Willis,  559.  A  will,  however, 
cannot  be  pleaded  to  a  bill  by  an  heir-at-law, 
praving  for  production  of  documents,  and  an 
injunction  to  restrain  the  defendants  from 
setting  up  legal  impediments,  in  an  action  of 
ejectment  commenced  by  him  against  them. 
Rumbold  v.  Forteath,  2  Jur.  N.  S.  686,  V.  C.  W. 

s  Ld.  Red.  263. 

*  Howe  v.  Duppa,  1V.&B.  511,  513;  Story, 
Eq.  PI.  §  812. 

672 


1  Thus,  where  a  bill  was  filed  by  one  claim- 
ing, either  as  heir  ex  parte  materna  of  the  per- 
son last  seised,  or  as  a  remainder-man  under 
the  limitations  of  a  prior  settlement,  charging 
that  the  person  last  seised  had  only  a  life- 
interest  in  the  property,  and  that  it  would  so 
appear  if  the  contents  of  a  certain  deed,  executed 
in  1730,  and  within  the  power  of  the  defendant, 
were  set  forth ;  and  the  defendant  pleaded  that, 
in  the  year  1766,  the  person  last  seised,  being 
tenant  in  tail  in  possession,  had  duly  suffered  a 
recovery  of  the  estates  in  question,  to  the  use 
of  himself  in  fee,  and  had  subsequently  devised 
them  to  the  defendant,  the  plea  was  overruled : 
because  the  defendant,  relying  upon  a  subse- 
quent title  which  he  had  not  connected  in  any 
way  with  the  ground  of  the  title  upon  which 
the  plaintiff  stood,  had  not  denied  that  title  or 
any  substantial  part  of  it,  or  the  possession  or 
existence  of  the  deed  of  1730.  Hungate  v.  Gas- 
coigne,  1  R.  &  M.  698  :  see  also  Jackson  v.  Rowe, 
4  Russ.  514,  523.  See  now  R.  S.  C.  1883.  Ord. 
XIX.  15;  Danford  v.  McAnulty,  6  Q.  B.  D. 
645;  8  App  Cas.  456.  See  also  as  to  estoppel 
and  priority,  Johnstone  v.  Cox,  19  Ch.  D.  17; 
Harpham  v.  Shacklock.  id.  207;  Re  Cooper, 
Cooper  v.  Vesey,  20  Ch.  D.  611;  Symons  v. 
Mulkem,  W.  N.  (1882)  94;  30  W.  R.  875; 
Taylor  v.  Russell,  59  L.  J.  Ch.  756. 


DIFFERENT   GROUNDS   OF   PLEAS. 


675 


as  shown  by  the  bill :  though  there  are  cases  in  which  a  conveyance 
may  be  insisted  upon,  posterior,  in  point  of  date,  to  the  plaintiff's  title.2 
In  such  cases,  however,  it  is  necessary  to  the  validity  of  the  plea,  that 
the  conveyance  should  have  been  for  a  valuable  consideration ;  and  that, 
at  the  time  it  was  perfected,  the  defendant,  or  the  person  to  whom  it 
was  made,  should  not  have  had  notice  of  the  plaintiff's  right.3  A  plea 
of  this  sort  is  called  "  a  plea  of  purchase  for  a  valuable  consideration, 
without  notice ; "  and  it  is  founded  on  this  principle  of  equity,  namely, 
that  where  the  defendant  has  an  equal  claim  to  the  protection  of  a 
Court  of  Equity  to  defend  his  possession,  as  the  plaintiff  has  to  the 
assistance  of  the  Court  to  assert  his  right,  the  Court  will  not  interpose 
on  either  side.4  (a) 

A    purchaser   with   notice,    from   a   purchaser    without    notice,    may 
shelter   himself  under  the  first  purchaser ; 6  but  notice,  whether 
actual  or  constructive,6  to   an   agent    *  is    notice    to   the    princi-    *  G75 


2  For  an  elaborate  review  of  the  cases  in 
which  this  defence  can  be  raised,  see  the  judg- 
ment of  Lord  Westbury  L.  C.  in  Phillips  v. 
Phillips,  4  De  G.  F.  &  J."  208;  8  Jur,  N.  S.  145. 

3  If  the  defendant  has  not  used  reasonable 
diligence  in  the  investigation  of  the  title,  the 
plea  is  no  defence.  Jackson  v.  Rowe,  2  S.  & 
S.  472,  475. 

4  I.d.  Red.  274.  Upon  this  principle  it  has 
been  held,  that  a  purchase  for  valuable  con- 
sideration, though  a  good  defence,  is  not  good 
as  a  ground  for  filing  a  cross-bill.  Patterson  v. 
Slaughter,  Amb.293  ;  High  v.  Batte,  10  Yerger, 
335  ;  Donnell  v.  King,  7  Leigh,  393  ;  Story,  Eq. 
PI.  §  805;  Jewett  v.  Palmer,  7  John.  Ch.  65; 
Gallatian  v.  Cunningham,  8  Cowen,  361;  Souzer 
v.  I)e  Meyer,  2  Paige,  574;  see  the  remarks  of 
Lord  Chancellor  Lifford  upon  this  plea,  in  Lord 
Drogheda  v.  Malone,  Finlay's  Dig.  449,  cited  in 
Mitford.  Eq.  PI.  (5th  Am.  ed.)  277,  note  (1). 
This  defence  must  be  raised  on  the  pleadings. 
Phillips  v.  Phillips.  3  Giff.  200;  7  Jur.  N.'s. 
1094;  8  id.  145;  10  W.  R.  236,  L.  C.  As  to  the 
distinction  between  this  plea  and  purchase  for 
value  as  protected  by  statute,  as,  e.g.,  the  13 
Eliz.  c.  5.  relating  to  fraudulent  conveyances, 
see  1  Dan.  Ch.  Prac.  (6th  Eng.  ed.)  490-494. 

s  Ld.  Red.  278;  Brandlyn  v.  Ord,  1  Atk. 
571;  Lowtherw.  Carlton,  2  Atk.  139,  242;  Cas. 
temp.  Talbot,  187;  Sweet  v.  Southeote.  2  Bro. 
C.  C.  66;  M'Queen   v.  Farquhar,  11  Ves.   478; 


(a)  See  Manners  t>.  Mew,  29  Ch  D.  725; 
Heath  v.  Crealock,  L.  R.  18  Eq.  215;  Ortigosa 
».  Brown,  47  L.  J.  Ch.  168;  Taylor  v.  Russell, 
59  L.  J  Ch.  756;  United  States  r.  California 
Land  Co.  148  U.  S.  31;  Hamilton  v.  Willi- 
ford,  90  Ga.  210;  Bowman  o.  Griffith,  35  Neb. 
361.  Such  a  purchaser,  if  his  title  is  im- 
pugned, may  get  in  any  outstanding  legal 
estate,  and  set  it  up  in  defence  to  any  eject- 
ment that  may  be  brought  against  him.  Gole- 
born  v.  Alcock,  2  Sim.  552.  559.  A  re.'tw  q>ie 
trust,  being  justified  in  reposing  confidence  in 
vol.  i.  — 43 


Hiern  v.  Mill,  13  Ves.  120;  and  see  Harrison  v. 
Forth,  Prec.  in  Chan.  51;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  808; 
Varick  v.  Briggs,  6  Paige,  329;  Bennett  v. 
Walker,  West,  130;  Jackson  v.  McChesney,  7 
Cowen,  360;  Bumpus  v.  Platner,  1  John.  Ch. 
213;  Demarest  v.  Wyukoop,  3  John.  Ch.  147; 
Jackson  v.  Henry,  10  John.  185;  Jackson  v. 
Given,  8  John.  573;  Alexander  v.  Pendleton,  8 
Cranch,  462;  1  Story,  Eq.  Jur.  §§  409,  410,  aud 
notes;  Hagthorp  v.  Hook,  1  Gill  &  J.  263; 
Curtis  v.  Lunn,  6  Munf.  42;  Griffith  v.  Griffith, 
1  Hoff.  Ch.  163;  Lacy  v.  Wilson,  4  Munf.  313': 
Lindsay  v.  Rankin,  4  Bibb,  482;  McNitt  v. 
Logan,  Lift.  Sel.  Cas.  69.  But  if  he  would 
avail  himself  of  the  want  of  notice  in  his  ven- 
dor, he  must  expressly  aver  that  ignorance 
in  pleading.  Galatian  v.  Erwin,  Hopk.  48; 
S.  C-  on  appeal,  8  Cowen,  361 ;  Griffith  v. 
Griffith,  1  Hoff.  Ch.  163;  Cummings  v.  Cole- 
man, 7  Rich.  Eq.  (S.  C)  509.  A  purchaser 
without  notice  from  one  who  has  fraudulently 
purchased,  is  not  affected  by  the  fraud.  Bum- 
pus  v.  Platner,  1  John.  Ch.  213;  Jackson  v 
Henry,  10  John.  185. 

6  As  to  constructive  notice,  see  Allen  v. 
Seckham,  11  Ch.  D.  790;  Saffron  W.  S.  B.  B. 
Society?;.  Rayner,  14  Ch.  D.  406;  10  id.  696; 
Patman  v.  garland,  17  Ch.  D.  353;  Maxfield  v. 
Burton,  L.  R.  17  Eq.  15  ;  Re  Morgan,  18  Ch.  I). 
93  :  Thornewell  r.  Johnson.  29  W.  R.  077  ; 
W.N.  (1881)  77;  Bozon  >'.  Williams,  3  V.  &  J. 


his  trustee  and  in  leaving  deeds  and  other 
proofs  of  property  in  his  possession,  will  not 
on  that  account  be  postponed  to  a  purchaser 
for  value  without  nofce  of  the  trust.  Shrop- 
shire U.  R.  &  C.  Co.  v.  Resr-  L.  R.  7  H.  L. 
496;  Bradley  v.  Riches,  9  Ch.  D.  189;  Re  Ver- 
non, 33  Ch.  D.  402;  Carritt  v.  Real  &  P.  A.  Co. 
42  Ch.  D.  263;  Re  Richards,  45  Ch.  I).  589. 
See  Cave  v.  Cave,  15  Ch.  D.  639;  Kettlewell  v. 
Watson,  21  Ch.  D.  685;  26  id.  501. 

Although  a  lien   may  be  kept  alive,  under 
some  circumstances,  in  favor  of  one  who  has 

673 


*675 


PLEAS. 


pal ; l  and  where  a  person  having  notice,  purchased  in  the  name  of  another 
who  had  no  notice,  and  knew  nothing  of  the  purchase,  but  afterwards 
approved  it,  and  without  notice  paid  the  purchase-money  and  procured 
a  conveyance,  the  person  first  contracting  was  considered,  from  the 
beginning,  as  the  agent  of  the  actual  purchaser,  who  was  therefore  held 
affected  with  notice.2 

A  settlement,  in  consideration  of  marriage,  is  equivalent  to  a  pur- 
chase for  a  valuable  consideration,  and  may  be  pleaded  in  the  same 
manner.8  If  a  settlement  is  made  after  marriage,  in  pursuance  of  an 
agreement  before  marriage,  the  agreement  as  well  as  the  settlement 
must  be  shown.4  A  widow,  defendant  to  a  suit  brought  by  any  person 
claiming  under  her  husband,  to  discover  her  title  to  lands  of  which  she 
is  in  possession  as  her  jointure,  may  plead  her  settlement  in  bar  to  any 
discovery,  unless  the  plaintiff  offers,  and  is  able  to  confirm  her  jointure ; 
but  a  plea  of  this  nature  must  set  forth  the  settlement,  and  the  lands 
comprised  in  it,  with  sufficient  certainty.5  (a) 


150;  Hewitt  v.  Loosemore,  9  Hare,  449;  Na- 
tional Provincial  Bank  v.  Jackson,  33  Ch.  D.  1 ; 
Hester  v.  Hester,  34  Ch.  D.  607;  Northern 
Counties  Ins.  Co.  v.  Whipp,  26  Ch.  D.  482; 
Union  Bank  v.  Kent,  39  Ch.  D.  238 ;  Farrand  v. 
Yorkshire  Banking  Co.  40  Ch.  D.  182. 

i  Ld.  Red.  278  ;  Brotherton  v.  Hatt,  2  Vern. 
574;  Le  Neve  r.  Le  Neve,  3  Atk.  646,  655; 
Maddox  v.  Maddox,  1  Ves.  Sr.  62;  Ashley  v. 
Baillie, 2  Ves.  Sr.  370;  Hiern  r.  Mill,  ubi supra  ; 
Mountford  v.  Scott,  3  Mad.  34,  39;  Kennedy  v. 
Green,  3  M.  &  K.  699;  Atterbury  v.  Wallis,  8 
De  G.  M.  &  G.  454;  2  Jur.  N.  S.  343;  Espin  v 
Pemberton,  3  De  G.  &  J.  547 ;  4  Drew.  333 :  5 
•J  in-.  N.  S.  55,  157 ;  Lloyd  v.  Attwood,  3  De  G. 


&  J.  614;  5  Jur.   N.  S.   1322;  Story,   Eq.  PI. 
§  808;  Griffith  v.  Griffith,  1  Hoff.  Ch.  153. 

2  Ld.  Red.  278 ;  Jennings  v.  Moore,  2  Vern. 
609;  Blenkarne  v.  Jennens,  2  Bro.  P.  C.  ed. 
Toml.  278;  see  Molony  v.  Kernan,  2  Dr.  & 
War.  31.  As  to  notice  of  a  non-registered 
annuity,  see  Greaves  v.  Tofield,  14  Ch.  D. 
563. 

3  Ld.  Red.  278;  Harding  v.  Hardrett,  Rep. 
temp.  Finch,  9  ;  Jackson  v.  Rowe,  ubi  supra . 
Even  to  the  extent  of  the  husband's  whole 
estate.     Herring  v.  Wickliam,  29  Gratt.  628. 

4  Ld.  Red.  279 ;  Lord  Keeper  v.  Wyld,  1 
Vern.  139. 

5  Ld.  Red.  279  ;  Petre  v.  Petre,  3  Atk.  511 ; 


paid  the  lien-holder,  even  when  the  latter  has 
satisfied  and  discharged  it  of  record,  yet  this 
will  not  be  done  to  the  prejudice  of  a  subse- 
quent buna  fide  purchaser  where  the  Equity  is 
a  latent  one.  Richards  v.  Griffith,  92  Cal.  493; 
see  Patty  v.  Middleton,  82  Texas,  586.  The  re- 
ceipt of  a  quit-claim  deed  does  not  of  itself  pre- 
vent one  from  becoming  a  bonnjide  purchaser. 
Moelle  v.  Sherwood,  148  U.  S.  21 ;  United  States 
v.  California  &c.  Land  Co.  id.  31 ;  see  Dunn  v. 
Rarnum,  51  Fed.  Rep.  355.  361;  Rosenbaum  v. 
Foss  (S.  D.),  56  N.  W.  Rep.  114. 

In  Ltd,  Coope  &  Co.  v.  Emmerson,  12  A.  C. 
300,  306  (S.  C.  33  Ch.  D.  323),  the  Earl  of 
Selborne  said:  "There  is  no  instance  of  any 
suit  competently  brought  in  the  Court  of  Chan- 
cery, for  relief  as  well  as  discovery,  in  which 
the  defence  of  purchaser  for  value  without 
notice  has  been  held  available  against  discov- 
ery incident  to  the  relief,  and  not  against  the 
relief  itself.  That  defence  was  never  admitted 
as  an  objection  to  particular  discovery;  it  went 
to  all  or  none." 

674 


The  defence  of  a  purchase  for  value  may  be 
raised  by  demurrer  where  the  facts  appear  in 
the  bill;  if  they  do  not  so  appear,  the  defence 
being  affirmative,  must  be  raised  by  plea  or 
answer.  Greaves  v.  Atkinson,  68  Miss.  598. 
It  cannot  be  raised  by  a  general  denial,  but 
must  be  affirmatively  pleaded,  and  the  pleader 
has  the  burden  of  proof.  Holdsworth  v.  Shan- 
non, 113  Mo.  508;  Bowman  v.  Griffith,  35  Neb. 
361.  The  defendant's  pleading  must  deny  notice, 
although  not  alleged  by  the  plaintiff.  Dailey  v. 
Kinsler,  35  Neb.  835.  A  plea  oji  this  ground 
must  state  the  amount  paid  in  traversable  form. 
Secombe  v.  Campbell,  18  Blatch.  108.  A  defend- 
ant may  insist  upon  a  bona  fide  purchase  for  value 
as  against  a  co-defendant  without  pleading  it 
specially  in  his  answer.  Norwood  r.  Norwood, 
36  S.  a  331. 

(a)  Sect.  5  of  13  Eliz.  c.  5  protects  a  pur- 
chaser for  value,  without  notice,  of  any  interest, 
either  legal  or  equitable,  under  the  deed  im- 
peached. Halifax  Joint  Stock  B.  Co.  v.  Gled- 
hill,  [1891]  1  Ch.  31. 


I 


DIFFERENT   GROUNDS   OF    PLEAS. 


*  676 


Some  doubt  was  entertained,  whether  a  plea  of  purchase  for  valu- 
able consideration  will  avail  against  a  legal  title,6  but  it  seems  now 
to  be  settled  that  there  are  cases  in  which  this  defence  may  be  so 
pleaded/  (b) 

*  The  rules  for  the  guidance  of  a  pleader  in  framing  pleas  of    *  676 
this  description  are  thus  clearly  and  succinctly  laid  down  by  Lord 
St.  Leonards,  namely  : *  — 

"  The  plea  must  state  the  deeds  of  purchase,  setting  forth  the  dates, 
parties,  and  contents  briefly,  and  the  time  of  their  execution : 2  for  that 
is  the  peremptory  matter  in  bar.3 

"  It  must  aver  that  the  vendor  was  seised,  or  pretended  to  be  seised, 


Pyncent  v.  Pyncent,  id.  571  ;  Senhouse  v.  Earl, 
2  Ves.  Sr.  450  ;  Leech  B.  Trollop,  id.  662. 

6  See  Sudden  on  Vendors  and  Purchasers 
(11th  Eng.  ed.),  pp.  1067-1072;  (7th  Am.  ed.) 
vol.  ii.  572-578. 

7  See  judgment  of  Lord  Westbury  L.  C.  in 
Phillips  v.  Phillips,  4  De  G.  F.  &  J.  208  ;  8  Jur. 
N.  S.  143;  Lord  St.  Leonards,  V.  &  P.  791,  796, 
where  this  case  is  reviewed ;  Bowen  v.  Evans, 
1  Jo.  &  Lat.  178,  263:  2  H.  L.  Cas.  257 ;  Joyce 
v.  De  Moleyns,  2  Jo.  &  Lat.  374;  Penny  v. 
Watts,  1  M'N.  &  G.  150;  2  De  G.  &  S.  501; 
Att.-Gen.  v.  Wilkins,  17  Beav.  285;  17  Jur. 
885;  Lane  r.  Jackson,  20  Beav.  535;  Colyer  v. 
Finch,  5  H.  L.  Cas.  920 ;  3  Jur.  N.  S.  25 ;  S.  C. 
nom.  Finch  v.  Shaw,  19  Beav.  500,  507;  18  Jur. 
935;  Greenslade  v.  Dare,  17  Beav.  502;  20 
Beav.  284;  1  Jur.  N.  S.  294;  Stackhouse  v. 
Countess  Jersey,  1  J.  &  H.  721;  7  Jur.  N.  S. 
353;  Gorara  v.  Parrott,  3  Jur.  N.  S.  1150;  Dart's 
V.  &  P.  832;  Wood  e.  Mann,  2  Sumner,  507. 
"The  point  of  doubt,"  says  Mr.  Justice  Story, 
"  has  been,  whether  the  defence  ought  to  apply 
to  a  case  where  the  plaintiff  founds  his  bill 
upon  a  legal  title,  seeking  to  support  it  by  a 
discovery,  and  the  defendant  relies  solely  on 
an  equitable  title  to  protect  himself  from  the 
discovery.  Upon  this  point  the  authorities  are 
at  variance;  but  upon  principle,  it  would  seem 
difficult  to  resist  the  reasoning  by  which  the 
doctrine,  that  the  purchaser  is,  in  such  a  case, 
entitled  to  protection,  is  supported."  Story, 
Eq.  PL  §  604  a;  see  3  Sugden  V.  &  P.  (7th 
Am  ed.)  1067,  et  seq.  Snelgrove  r.  Snelgrove, 
4  Desaus.  288,  where  this  point  is  fully  exam- 
ined, and  the  Chancellor  (Desaussure)  remarks: 
;i  It  should  be  remembered,  that  the  plea  pro- 


(b)  Prior  to  the  Judicature  Act  of  1873 
(36  &  37  Vic.  c.  66)  this  plea  was  not  available 
against  either  discovery  or  relief  claimed  in 
those  cases  in  which  the  Court  of  Chancery  had 
concurrent  jurisdiction  with  the  Law  Courts  upon 
legil  titles,  and  §  24,  sub-sect.  2  of  that  Act 
does  not  protect  a  defendant  who  objects  to 
producing  documents  of  title  alleged  to  be  ma- 


tects,  by  the  Court  refusing  to  aid  the  plaintiff 
in  setting  up  a  title.  Now,  when  the  title  at- 
tempted to  be  set  up  is  an  equitable  one,  it 
seems  very  reasonable  that  the  Court  should 
forbear  to  give  its  assistance  in  setting  up  such 
equitable  title  against  another  title  set  up  by  a 
fair  purchaser.  But  when  the  plaintiff  comes 
with  a  legal  title,  I  do  not  see  how  he  can  be 
refused  the  aid  of  the  Court."  See  also  Larrowe 
v.  Beame,  10  Ohio,  498. 

i  V.  &  P.  788-790.  This  subject  is  fully- 
discussed  in  Snelgrove  v.  Snelgrove,  4  Desaus. 
286;  Cardwell  v.  Cheatham,  2  Head  (Teim.), 
14.  The  same  explicitness  has  been  held  not  to 
be  necessary  in  setting  up  the  defence  of  bona 
Jide  purchase  for  a  valuable  consideration  with- 
out notice,  when  made  in  an  answer  as  in  a  plea. 
Servis  v.  Beatty,  32  Miss.  52.  Aliter,  in  Ten- 
nessee, Rhea  v.  Allison,  3  Head,  177. 

a  Qucere  this,  as  the  plaintiff  might  thereby 
be  enabled  to  proceed  against  the  defendant  at 
law;  see  Anon.  2  Ch.  Cas.  161.  In  Day  v. 
Arundel,  Hardre's.  510,  it  was  expressly  held, 
that  the  time  of  the  purchase  need  not  be  stated 
in  the  [ilea. 

3  See  Gilb.  For.  Rom.  58;  Aston  r.  Aston, 
3  Atk.  302;  Salkeld  v.  Science.  2  Ves.  Sr.  107; 
Harrison  v.  Southcott,  id.  389,  396;  and  see 
Wallwyn  p.  Lee,  9  Ves.  24,  and  the  plea  in  that 
case,  Beanies  on  Pleas,  341.  It  seems  that  the 
practice  formerly  was  to  extend  the  plea  to  the 
discovery  even  of  the  purchase  deeds;  and  in 
Watkins  e.  Hatchet,  1  Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  36,  pi.  3, 
although  the  purchaser  improvidentlv  offered  to 
produce  his  purchase  deeds,  yet  the  Court  would 
not  bind  him  to  do  so.  See  Hare  on  Dis.  67; 
R.  S.  C.  1883,  Ord.  XXI.  14. 


terial  to  the  plaintiff's  claim,  as  the  Court  n  whas, 
in  England,  complete  jurisdiction  over  the  whole 
suit.  Iud,  Coope  &  Co.  v.  Emmerson,  12  App. 
Cas.  300 ;  33  Ch.  D.  326.  In  Hunter  r.  Walters, 
L.  R.  11  Eq.  292,  it  was  held  that  this  plea  is  as 
available  to  the  purchaser  of  an  equitable  as  of 
a  legal  estate. 

675 


077 


PLE.VS. 


at  the  time  he  executed  the  conveyance.4  In  Carter  v.  Pritchard  6  it 
was  held  that  the  plea  of  a  purchase  without  notice  must  aver  the  de- 
fendant's belief  that  the  person  from  whom  he  purchased  was  seised  in 
fee.  If  it  be  charged  in  the  bill  that  the  vendor  was  only  tenant  for 
life,  or  tenant  in  tail,  and  a  discovery  of  the  title  be  prayed,  such  a 
discovery  cannot  be  covered,  unless  a  seisin  is  sworn  in  the  manner 
already  mentioned,  or  that  such  fines  and  recoveries  were  levied  and 
suffered  as  would  bar  an  entail  if  the  vendor  Was  tenant  in  tail ;  for  if  a 
purchase  by  lease  and  release  should  be  set  forth,  which  would 
*  677  pass  no  more  from  *the  tenant  in  tail  than  it  lawfully  may  pass, 
and  that  is  only  an  estate  for  the  life  of  the  tenant  in  tail,1  then 
there  is  no  bar  against  the  issue.2  Where,  however,  a  fine  was  pleaded, 
the  plea  must  have  averred  an  actual  seisin  of  a  freehold  in  the  vendor, 
and  not  that  he  was  seised,  or  pretended  to  be  seised.3 

"  If  the  conveyance  pleaded  be  of  an  estate  in  possession,  the  plea 
must  aver  that  the  vendor  was  in  possession  at  the  time  of  the  execu- 
tion of  the  conveyance.4  And  if  it  be  of  a  particular  estate,  and  not  in 
possession,  it  must  set  out  how  the  vendor  became  entitled  to  the  re- 
version.5 But,  although  a  bill  be  brought  by  an  heir,  the  plea  need 
not,  on  that  account,  aver  the  purchase  to  be  from  the  plaintiff's  an- 
cestor.6 

"  The  plea  must  also  distinctly  aver  that  the  consideration  money 
mentioned  in  the  deed  was  bona  fide  and  truly  paid,7  independently  of 
the  recital  of  the  purchase  deed : 8  for  if  the  money  be  not  paid,  the  plea 
will  be  overruled,9  as  the  purchaser  is  entitled  to  relief  against  payment 
of  it.  The  particular  consideration  must,  it  should  seem,  be  stated,10 
although  this  point  has  been  decided  otherwise.11  There  can,  however, 
be  no  objection  to  state  the  consideration  :  as,  if  it  be  valuable,  the  plea 


*  Story  v.  Lord  Windsor,  2  Atk.  630:  Head 
v.  Egerton,  3  P.  Wms.  279,  281;  and  see  Att- 
Gen.  v.  Backhouse,  17  Ves.  2'JO ;  Jackson  v. 
Rowe,  4  Russ  514,  523;  Beames  on  Pleas,  342; 
Craig  r.  Leiper,  2  Yerger,  193;  Lanesborough  v. 
Kilmaine,  2  Moll.  403;  Snelgrove  v.  Snelgrove, 
4  Desaus.  287. 

s  Michaelmas  Term,  12  Geo.  II.  1739,  2 
Vivian's  MS.  Kep.  90,  in  Lincoln's  Inn  Library; 
see  Jackson  r.  Rowe,  4  Russ   514,  519. 

1  This  is  the  doctrine  of  Littleton,  with  which, 
it  seems,  Gilbert  agreed;  but  since  Littleton's 
time  it  has  been  held,  that  the  releasee  has  a 
ba^e  fee,  determinable  by  the  entry  or  action  of 
the  issue;  see  Butler's  n.  1,  to  Co.  Litt.  331  a, 
stnd  the  authorities  there  referred  to.  But  now 
estates  tail  may  be  barred  by  deed.  3  &  4 
Will.  IV.  c.  74." 

2  Gilb.  For.  Rom.  57. 

3  Story  v.  Lord  Windsor,  2  Atk.  630;  and 
see  Page  r.  Lever,  2  Yes.  Jr.  450 ;  Dobson  v. 
Leadbeater,  13  Ves.  230,  233. 

4  Trevanian  v.  Mosse,  1  Vern.  246;  Strode 
v.  Blackhurne,  3  Ves.  222,  226  ;  Wallwyn  v. 
Lee,  9  Ves.  32;  Beames  on  Pleas,  342;  see  also 

C76 


Jackson  r.  Rowe,  4  Russ.  514,  519 ;  Ladj- 
Lanesborough  v.  Lord  Kilmaine,  2  Moll.  403; 
Ogilvie  v.  Jeaffreson,  2  Giff.  353;  6  Jur.  N.  S. 
970. 

5  Hughes  e.  Garth,  Amb.  421. 

6  Seymer  v.  Noswortln',  Freem.  128;  3  Ch. 
Rep.  40*;  Nels.  Rep.  135. 

7  More  v.  Mayhow,!  Ch.  Cas.  34;  Brereton 
v.  Gamul,  2  Atk.  241 ;  Molony  r.  Kernan,  2  Dr. 

6  War.  31 ;  Beames  on  Pleas,  344;  Story,  Eq. 
PL  §  805;  Jewett  v.  Palmer,  7  John.  Ch.  65; 
High  v.  Batte,  10  Yerger,  335;  Donnell  v.  King, 

7  Leigh,  393  ;  Snelgrove  v.  Snelgrove,  4  Desaus. 
286. 

8  Maitland  r.  Wilson,  3  Atk.  814;  2  Sugden 
V.  &  P.  (7th  Am.  ed.)  1069. 

9  Hardingham  v.  Nichols,  3  Atk.  304 ;  as  to 
necessity  of  proof,  see  Molony  v.  Kernan,  ubi 
supra  ;  Beames  on  Pleas,  344. 

10  Millard's  case,  Freem.  43;  Snag's  case, 
cited  ibid.;  and  see  Wagstaff  v.  Read,  2  Ch. 
Cas.  156;  High  v.  Batte,  10  Yerger,  335;  Donnell 
v.  King,  7  Leigh,  393. 

11  More  v.  Mayhow,  ubi  supra ;  Day  v 
Arundel,  Hardres,  510. 


DIFFERENT   GRuUNDS    OF    PLEAS. 


678 


will  not  be  invalidated  by  mere  inadequacy.12  The  question  is,  not 
whether  the  consideration  is  adequate,  but  whether  it  is  valuable  :  for  if 
it  be  such  a  consideration  as  will  not  be  deemed  fraudulent  within  the 
Statute  27th  Elizabeth,  or  is  not  merely  nominal,13  or  the  purchase  is 
such  a  one  as  would  hinder  a  puisne  purchaser  from  overturning  it,  it 
ought  not  to  be  impeached  in  Equity. 

"  The  plea  must  also  deny  notice  of  the  plaintiff's  title  or  claim,14 
previously  to  the  execution  of  the  deed  and  payment  of  the 
*  purchase-money ; 1  for,  till  then,  the  transaction  is  not  com-  *  678 
plete ;  and,  therefore,  if  the  purchaser  have  notice  previously  to 
that  time,  he  will  be  bound  by  it.  And  the  notice  so  denied  must  be 
notice  of  the  existence  of  the  plaintiff's  title,  and  not  merely  notice  of 
the  existence  of  a  person  who  would  claim  under  that  title.2  But  a 
denial  of  notice,  at  the  time  of  making  the  purchase  and  paying  the 
purchase-money,  is  good ; 8  and  notice  before  the  purchase  need  not  be 
denied :  because  notice  before  is  notice  at  the  time  of  the  purchase ; 4 
and  the  party  will,  in  such  case,  on  its  being  made  to  appear  that  he 
had  notice  before,  be  liable  to  be  convicted  of  perjury.5 

"  The  notice  must  be  positively,  and  not  evasively,  denied,6  and  must 
be  denied  whether  it  be  or  be  not  charged  by  the  bill/  If  particular 
instances  of  notice,  or  circumstances  of  fraud,  are  charged,  the  facts 
from  which  they  are  inferred  must  be  denied  as  specially  and  particu- 
larly as  charged.8  So,  if  the  bill  charges  that  the  purchaser  has  in  his 
possession  certain  papers  and  documents,  whence  it  will  appear  that  his 


12  Basset  v.  Nosworthy,  Rep.  temp.  Finch, 
102,  cited  Amb.  766;  2  White  &  T.  L.  C.  1; 
Mildinay  v.  Mildmay,  cited  ibid. ;  Bullock  v. 
Sadlier.'id.  763,  767. 

M  See  More  t\  Mnyhow,  1  Ch.  Cas.  34; 
Wagstaff  v.  Read.  2  Ch.  Cas.  156. 

14  Lady  Bodmin  v.  Vandenbendy,  1  Vern. 
179;  Anon.  2  Ventr.  361,  No.  2;  Cummings  v. 
Coleman,  7  Rich.  Eq.  (S.  C. )  509. 

1  More  v.  Mayhow,  ubi  supra ;  Story  v. 
Lord  Windsor,  2  Atk. 630;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Gower, 
2  Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  685,  pi.  11;  Beanies  on  Pleas, 
344;  Aiken  v.  Smith,  1  Sneed  (Tenn.).  304; 
Wilson  v.  Hillyer,  Saxton  (N.  J.),  63;  Story, 
Eq.  PI.  §  806;  Jewett  t>.  Palmer,  7  John.  Ch. 
65;  Gordon  v.  Rockafellow,  Halst.  Dig.  169; 
Pillow  v.  Shannon,  3  Yerger,  508;  Murray  ». 
Ballou,  1  John.  Ch.  566;  Frost  v.  Beekman,  id. 
288;  Heatley  v.  Finster,  2  John.  Ch.  158; 
Murray  v.  Finster,  id.  155 ;  M'Gahee  e.  Sneed, 
1  Dev".  &  Bat.  333;  De  Mott  v.  Starkey,  3 
Barb.  Ch.  403;  Boone  v.  Chiles,  10  Peters, 
177,  211,  212;  Williams  v.  Hollingsworth.  1 
Strobh.  Eq.  103;  Ellis  v.  Woods,  9  Rich.  Eq. 
(S  C.)  19. 

2  Kelsall  v.  Bennet,  1  Atk.  522,  which  has 
overruled  Brampton  v.  Barker,  cited  2  Vern. 
159. 

3  See  Snelgrove  v.  Snelgrove,  4  Desaus. 
287;  Murray  v.  Finster,  2  John.  Ch.  155, 
157. 


4  To  make  the  plea  of  bona  fide  purchaser 
without  notice  available,  the  notice  before  the 
whole  of  the  purchase-money  was  paid  and 
conveyance  received,  must  he  denied.  Natz  v. 
M'Pherson,  7  Monroe,  599;  Frost  v.  Beekman, 

1  John.  Ch.  298,  303;  Jewett  v.  Palmer,  7 
John.  65;  High  v.  Batte,  10  Yerger,  385. 

5  Jones  ».  Thomas,  3  P.  Wms.  243. 

6  Cason  v.  Round,  Prec.  in  Ch.  226;  and 
see  2  Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  682  (D.)  n.  (b). 

7  Aston  v.  Curzon,  and  Weston  v.  Berke- 
ley, 3  P.  Wms.  244,  n.  (F);  and  see  the  6th 
resolution  in  Brace  v.  Duchess  of  Marlborough, 

2  P.  Wms.  495;  Hughes  v.  Garner,  2  Y.  & 
C.  Ex.  328,  335;  Lowry  v.  Tew,  3  Barb.  Ch. 
407. 

8  Meder  r.  Birt,  Gilb.  Eq.  Rep.  185;  Rad- 
ford v.  Wilson,  3  Atk.  815;  and  see  Jerard  v. 
Sanders.  2  Ves.  Jr.  187:  4  Bro.  C.  C.  322,  325; 
6  Dow,  2:i0;  Folev  v.  Hill,  3  M.  &  C.  475.  4S1; 
2  Jur.  440;  see  R.  S.  C.  (1883)  Ord.  XIX.  22; 
Wilson  v.  Hillyer,  Saxton  (N.  J.),  63;  Den- 
ning v.  Smith,  3  John  Ch.  345;  Balcolm  v. 
N.  Y.  Life  Ins.  and  Trust  Co.  11  Paige,  454; 
Lowry  v.  Tew,  3  Barb.  Ch.  407;  Manhattan 
Co.  p.  Evertson,  6  Paige,  457;  Galatian  v.  Er- 
win,  Hopk.  48;  Pillow  v.  Shannon,  3  Yerger, 
508. 


677 


*  679  PLEAS. 

was  not  a  purchase  without  notice,  the  defendant  is  bound  to  support  his 
plea  by  an  answer  to  that  charge.9 

"  But  he  need  only  by  his  plea  deny  notice  generally,  unless  where 
facts  are  specially  charged  in  the  bill  as  evidence  of  notice.10 

"  Notice  must  also  be  denied  by  answer ; 10  for  that  is  matter  of 
fraud  and  cannot  be  covered  by  the  plea ; u  because  the  plaintiff 

*  679    *  must  have  an  opportunity  to  except  to  its  sufficiency  if  he  think 

fit ; *  but  it  must  also  be  denied  by  the  plea :  because,  otherwise, 
there  is  not  a  complete  plea  in  Court  on  which  the  plaintiff  may  take 
issue.2  Although  a  purchaser  omit  to  deny  notice  by  answer,  he  will  be 
allowed  to  put  in  the  point  of  notice  by  way  of  answer,8  and  the  omis- 
sion will  not  invalidate  his  plea,  if  it  is  denied  by  that.4  If  notice  is 
omitted  to  be  denied  by  the  plea,  and  the  plaintiff  reply  to  it,  the  de- 
fendant has  then  only  to  prove  his  purchase ;  and  it  is  not  material  if 
the  plaintiff  do  prove  notice,  as  he  has  waived  setting  down  the  plea  for 
argument ;  in  which  case  it  would  have  been  overuled.5  If,  however, 
a  bill  is  exhibited  against  a  purchaser,  and  he  plead  his  purchase,  and 
the  bill  is  therefore  dismissed,  a  new  bill  will  lie  charging  notice,  if  the 
point  of  notice  was  not  charged  in  the  former  bill,  or  examined  to  ;  and 
the  former  proceedings  cannot  be  pleaded  in  bar.6  But  if  notice  is 
neither  alleged  by  the  bill  nor  proved,  and  the  defendant  by  his  answer 
deny  notice,  an  inquiry  will  not  be  granted  for  the  purpose  of  affecting 
him  with  notice.7 

"  A  plea  of  a  purchase  for  valuable  consideration  without  notice,  will 
not  be  allowed  where  the  purchaser  might,  by  due  diligence,  have  ascer- 
tained the  real  state  of  the  title.8 

"If  a  purchaser's  plea  of  valuable  consideration  without  notice,  be 

9  Hardman  v.  Ellames,  5  Sim.  640,  650;   2  »  Anon.  2  Ch.  Cas.   161  ;  Price  v.  Price,  1 

M.  &  K.  732;  C.  P.  Coop.  temp.  Brough.  351;  Vern.  185;   Foley  v.  Hill,  3  M.  &  C.  475,  481; 

and  see  Gordon  v.  Shaw,  14  Sim.  393.  2  Jur.  440;  now  the  defendant  need  only  sup- 

"•  Pennington   v.  Beechey,  2   S.  &   S    282;  port  his  plea  by  answer,  if  interrogatories  are 

Thring  v.   Edgar,    id.   274,   281;    Beames   on  filed;   see  ante,  p.  615. 

Pleas,  348;  Griffith  v.  Griffith,  1  Hoff.  Ch.  163.  2  Harris  v.  Ingledew,  3   P.  Wms.  91,  94; 

This  rule  will  not,  however,  apply  to  an  answer  Meadows  v.  Duchess   of    Kingston,  Ld.   Red. 

in  support  of  a  plea,  unless  the  plea  is  nega-  376,  n.  (s);  Amb.  766;   Jones  v.  Jones,  3  Mer. 

live;  and  now  the  defendant  need  only  answer  161,  171. 
those   facts  to  which   he   is   interrogated;   see  8  Anon.  2  Ch.  Cas.  161. 

ante,  pp.  534,  615.  4  Coke  v.  Wilcocks,  Mos.  73. 

11  Care  must  be  taken  in  case  of  a  plea  of  a  5  Harris  v.   Ingledew,  vbi  supra;  Eyre  v. 

purchase  for  a  valuable  consideration  without  Dolphin,  2  Ball  &  B.  302. 
notice,  not  to  make  an  answer  to  any  state-  6  Williams  v.  Williams,  1  Ch.  Cas.  252. 

ments  in  the  bill  actually  and  p'operly  covered  7  Hardy  r.  Reeves, 5  Ves.  426,  432. 

by  the  plea;  for  notwithstanding  some  doubts  8  Jackson  v.  Rowe.  2  S.  &  S.  472,  475;  4 

formerly  entertained,  it  seems  now  established,  Russ.  514,  523;   Hamilton  v.  Lvster,  7  Ir.  Eq. 

that,  in  such  a  case,  if  the  defendant  answer  at  R.  560;    Maxfield   r.   Burton.  L.  R.  17   Eq.  15. 

all  to  the  matters  covered  by  the  plea,  he  must  If  a   party  means  to  defend   himself,  on   the 

answer    fully;   and  if  he  puts   in    a    general  ground,  that  he  was  a  bonajide  purchaser  for  a 

answer,  he  cannot  protect  himself  by   such  a  valuable  consideration  without  notice,  he  must 

defence  in  his  answer  from  answering  fully,  deny  the  fact  of  notice,  and  of  every  circum- 

Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  606.  and  note,  and  cases  cited,  stance  from  which  it  can  be  inferred.    Murray 

§  810,  note.    The  39th  Equity  Rule  of  the  U.  S.  v.  Rallou,  1  John.  Ch.  575 ;  Balcolm  v.  N.  Y. 

Courts  gives  to  such  a  person  the  right  to  pro-  Life  Ins.  &  Trust  Co.  11  Paige,  454. 
tect  himself  by  answer,  as  he  might  by  plea. 
Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  847   note,  §  846,  note. 
678 


DIFFERENT   GROUNDS    OF    PLEAS.  *  680 

falsified  by  a  verdict  at  Law,  and  thereupon  a  decree  is  made  against 
the  purchaser,  and  he  then  carries  an  appeal  to  the  House  of  Lords,  it 
will  be  dismissed,  and  the  decree  affirmed  without  further  inquiry."9 

A  plea  of  purchase  for  a  valuable  consideration  without  notice  pro- 
tects a  defendant  from  meeting  the  title  set  up  by  the  plaintiff ;  but  a 
plea  of  bare  title  only,  without  setting  forth  a  consideration,  is  not  suf- 
ficient for  that  purpose.10  It  also  protects  the  defendant  from 
the  discovery  of  deeds  and  writings,  except  of  the  purchase  *  deed  *  680 
which  is  pleaded.1  If  the  defendant  has  the  opportunity  of  rais- 
ing this  defence  by  his  answer,  and  does  not  do  so,  he  cannot  plead  it 
orally  at  the  hearing.2 

There  are  also  certain  cases  in  which  defects  in  the  form  of  the  bill 
maybe  taken  advantage  of  by  plea;  such  as  a  misdescription  of  the 
plaintiff's  residence,8  or  of  his  name.4  In  these  cases,  as  we  have  seen,8 
the  present  practice  is  to  move  that  the  plaintiff  may  give  security  for 
costs  ;  and  the  Court  will  not  encourage  pleas  of  this  nature.6 

All  the  grounds  of  pleas  above  enumerated  go  to  the  relief  prayed  by 
the  bill ;  and,  as  we  have  seen,  if  they  are  sufficient  to  protect  the  de- 
fendant from  the  relief  prayed,  they  will  also  serve  to  protect  him  from 
the  discovery  sought,  except  so  far  as  such  discovery  is  material  to  enable 
the  plaintiff  to  avoid  the  effect  of  the  matter  pleaded.  There  are,  how- 
ever, as  has  been  already  stated,  certain  cases  in  which,  though  the 
plaintiff  may  be  entitled  to  relief,  the  defendant  will  be  protected  from 
making,  either  the  whole,  or  some  part  of  the  discovery  sought  by  the 
bill ;  because  the  situation  in  which  he  is  placed  renders  it  improper  for 
a  Court  of  Equity  to  compel  discovery,  either  because  the  discovery  may 
subject  him  to  pains  and  penalties,  or  to  forfeiture,  or  something  in  the 
nature  of  a  forfeiture ; 7  or  because  it  would  betray  the  confidence  reposed 
in  him  as  a  legal  adviser,  or  as  an  arbitrator.  The  cases  in  which  these 
exemptions  from  discovery  can  be  insisted  upon  have  been  before  pointed 
out,  and  the  principles  upon  which  they  rest  discussed,  in  treating  of  de- 
murrers ;8  all  that  need,  therefore,  be  now  said  in  addition  is,  that  if  the 
facts  upon  which  the  defendant  rests  his  claim  to  exemption  from  the 
discovery  sought  do  not  appear  upon  the  bill,  they  may  be  presented  to 
the  Court  by  plea.  The  same  principles  apply  in  the  case  of  bills  for 
discovery  only.9 

It  has  been  already  stated,  that  a  defendant  may  not  only  answer  an 
amended  bill,  but  may  also  defend  himself  from  the  effect  of  the  amend- 

9  Lewis  v.  Fielding,  Colles'  P.  C.  361.  6  Bainbritr-re    v.   Orton,    nhi   supra.     As   to 

i"  Brereton  v.  Gamul,  2  Atk.  241.  pleading  illegality  or  impossibility  under  the 

»  Salkeld  v.  Science,  2  Ves.  Sr.  107;  Story,  present  English  Practice,  see  1  Dan.  Ob;  Prac. 

Eq.  PI.  §  809;   see  1  Story.  Eq.  Jur.  §  410,  and  (6th  Eng.  ed.)  503.      As  to  pleas  in  abatement, 

note;  Lube"  Eq.  PI.  245,  246.  see  id.  505.     As  to  joinder  of  defences,  see  id. 

2  Phillips  v.  Phillips,  4  De  G.  F.  &  J.  208;  506. 
8  Jur.  N.  S.  145;  10  W.  R.  236,  L.  C.;  3  Gift.  1  United  States  v.  M'Rae,  L.  R.  4  Eq.  327; 

200 ;  7  Jur.  N.  S.  1094.  S.  C.  L.  R.  3  Ch.  79 

«  Rowley  v.  Eccles,  1  S.  &  S.  511;  Smith  v.  8  Ante,  pp.  562,  570. 

Smith,  Kay  Ap.  22;   Bainbrigge  v.   Orton,  20  9  Balls  v.  Margrave,  3  Beav.  448.     For  form 

Ilea  v.  is.  0f  pjea  tnat  discovery  would  subject  defendant 

4  Cust  v.  Southee,  13  Beav.  435.  to  penalty,  see  Beames  on  Pleas,  339. 


5  Ante,  p.  358. 


679 


*  682  PLEAS. 

merits  by  a  demurrer  or  plea.10    Pleas  to  amended  bills  may  be  put  in 

upon  the  same  grounds  as  pleas  to  original  bills  ;  but  it  is  to  be  observed 

that,  if  a  defendant  has  answered  the  original  bill,  his  answer  may  be 

read  to  counterplead  his  plea  to  the  amended  bill ;  and  that  if, 

*  681    upon  so  reading  it,  it  should  appear  *  that  the  facts  stated  upon 

the  answer  to  the  original  bill  would  operate  to  avoid  the  defence 
made  by  the  plea  to  the  amended  bill,  the  plea  will  be  overruled.1  If  the 
defendant  answer  the  original  bill,  and  the  amendments  do  not  vary  the 
case  made  by  it,  he  cannot  plead  to  the  amended  bill.2  The  mere  fact, 
however,  that  the  answer  comprises  matters  retained  in  the  amended 
bill,  does  not  prevent  the  defendant  from  pleading  to  the  latter ; 8  and 
where  the  objection  for  want  of  parties  arose  again,  in  consequence 
of  an  amendment  of  the  bill,  a  second  plea  on  that  ground  has  been 
allowed.4 

Section  III.  —  Form  of  Pleas. 

A  plea  is  intituled  in  the  cause,  and  is  headed  as  follows  :  "  The  plea 
of  the  above-named  defendant  (or  of  A  B,  one  of  the  above-named 
defendants)  to  the  bill  of  complaint  of  the  above-named  plaintiff  (or 
plaintiffs)."  When  put  in  by  more  than  one  defendant,  the  heading 
runs  as  follows:  "The  joint  and  several  plea  of  the  above-named  de- 
fendants (or  of  A  B  and  C  D,  two  of  the  above-named  defendants)," 
&c,  &c.5  Where  it  is  the  plea  of  a  man  and  his  wife,  the  words  "  and 
several "  should  not  be  inserted ;  but  where  an  objection  was  taken  to 
a  plea  by  husband  and  wife,  on  the  ground  that  those  words  were  in- 
serted, Sir  John  Leach  V.  C.  considered  the  terra  "  several "  as  meaning 
nothing,  and  that,  being  mere  surplusage,  it  did  not  vitiate  the  plea.6  It 
may  be  observed,  that  where  a  plea  was  prepared  as  a  joint  plea  of  a 
husband  and  wife,  but  the  wife  refused  to  swear  to  it,  whereupon  the 
husband  put  in  the  plea,  and  applied  that  it  should  stand  for  himself, 
it  was  so  ordered.7  The  title  of  the  plea  must  agree  with  that  of  the 
cause  at  the  time  when  the  bill  is  filed. 

A  defendant  is  not  allowed  to  correct  or  alter  the  name  of  a  plaintiff, 
or  a  co-defendant ;  and  if  his  own  name  is  misspelt  in  the  bill,  the  title 
of  his  plea  must,  nevertheless,  agree  with  that  of  the  bill.  The  correc- 
tion should  be  made  in  the  heading,  thus :  "The  plea  of  the  above- 
named  defendant,  John  Jones  (in  the  bill  by  mistake  called  William 
Jones)."8  If  a  female  defendant  marries  subsequently  to  the 
♦682    filing  of  the  bill,  but  before  pleading,  the  plea  *  should,  unless 

in  Ante,  p.  582.  *  Henley  p.  Stone,  4  Beav.  389,  391. 

i  Ld.  Red.   299:   Hyliard   v.  White,  ibid.,  5  Braithwaite's  Pr.  61.     For  forms  of  pleas, 

Noel  v.  Ward,  1  Mad.  322,  330;   Hildyard  v.  see  Vol.  III.    For  the  present  English  Practice, 

Cressy,  3   Atk.   303.     As  to  form  of   pleas  to  see  1  Dan.  Ch.  Prac.  (6th  Eng.  ed.)  508. 

amended  bills,  see  Havnes  v.  Barton,  13  Jur.  6  Fitch  v.  Chapman,  2  S.  &  S   31 

480.  V.  0.  E.  7  Pa'"  v. ,  1  Ch.  Cas.  296;   S.  C  nom. 

2  Esdaile  v.  Molineux,  2  Coll.  636,  639;  10  Pavie  v.  Acourt,  1  Dick.  13;  see  ante,  pp.  180, 
Jur   852.  499 

3  Wyllie  v.  Ellice,  6  Hare.  505,  515 ;  Ellice  8  Braithwaite's  Pr.  44,  62. 
v.  Roupell  (No.  1),  32  Beav.  299  ;  9  Jur.  N.  S. 

530,  533. 

680 


FORM    OP   PLEAS.  *  683 

she  has  obtained  an  order  to  defend  the  suit  by  herself,  be  headed  thus  : 
"  The  plea  of  A.  B.  and  G.  his  wife,  lately,  and  in  the  bill  called  C.  D., 
spinster  (or,  widow,  as  the  case  may  be),  to  the  bill  of  complaint  of  the 
above-named  plaintiff."  1 

Where  a  plea  is  accompanied  by  an  answer,  it  must  be  headed  "  The 
plea  and  answer,"  or,  "  The  joint  plea  and  answer,"  or,  "The  joint  and 
several  plea  and  answer,"  according  to  the  circumstances. 

A  plea,  like  a  demurrer,  is  introduced  by  a  protestation  against  the  con- 
fession of  the  truth  of  any  matter  contained  in  the  bill.2 

The  extent  of  the  plea,  that  is,  whether  it  is  intended  to  cover  the 
whole  bill  or  a  part  of  it  only,  and  what  part  in  particular,  is  usually 
stated  in  the  next  place  ;  and  this,  as  before  observed,  must  be  clearly 
and  distinctly  shown.8  Formerly,  a  plea,  like  a  demurrer,  was  liable  to 
be  overruled,  if  the  answer  accompanying  it  extended  to  any  part  of  the 
bill  covered  by  the  plea ;  and  the  same,  if  not  a  greater  degree  of  accur- 
acy, was  required  of  the  pleader  in  applying  this  rule.  Now,  as  we  have 
seen,4  this  strict  practice  is  so  far  modified,  that  a  plea  is  no  longer 
liable  to  be  overruled  only  because  it  does  not  cover  so  much  of  the  bill 
as  it  might  by  law  have  extended  to,  or  only  because  the  answer  of  the 
defendant  extends  to  some  part  of  the  same  matter  as  is  covered  by  the 
plea.5 

The  matter  relied  upon  as  an  objection  to  the  suit  or  bill  generally 
follows,6  accompanied  by  such  averments  as  are  necessary  to  support  it ; 7 
and  where  a  plea  is  of  matter  which  shows  an  imperfection  in  the  frame 
of  the  suit,  it  should  point  out  in  what  that  imperfection  consists.  Where, 
for  instance,  a  plea  is  for  want  of  parties,  it  must  not  only  show  that 
there  is  a  deficiency  of  parties,  but  should  point  out  who  the 
parties  are  that  are  required.8  *  A  plea,  denying  a  negative  *  683 
allegation  in  a  bill,  has  also  been  held  to  be  informal.1 

The  general  requisites  of  a  plea  have  already  been  discussed  at  con- 

i  Braithwaite's  Pr.  46,  62.  5  (Jons.  Ord.  XIV.  8,  9;  see  ante,  p    540, 

2  Ld.  Red.  300.     The  reasons  for  the  intro-      note. 

duction  of  this  form  have  been  before  alluded  6  The  particular  facts  on  which  the  defend- 
to,  ante,  p.  581.  At  Common  Law,  pro-  ant  intends  to  rely  must  be  clearly  stated,  so 
testation  in  pleading  is  now  unnecessary.  that  the  plaintiff  may  know  what  case  he  has 
Protestations  in  pleas  are  not  allowed  in  New  to  meet.  Hardman  v.  Ellames,  2  M.  &  K. 
Hampshire.     Rule  6  of  Ch.  Pr.  38  N.  H.  606.  732,  739;  Coop.  temp.  Brough.  351,  355;  Whit- 

3  Ld.  Red.  294,  300;  M  it  ford  Eq.  PI.  by  thome  v.  St.  Louis  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.  3  Tenn. 
Jeremy  (5th  Am.  ed.),  300,  note  (1),  in  which  Ch.  147. 

the  editor  has  given  the  opinion  of  Chancellor  '  M,  Red.  300;  Story,  Eq.  PL  §  694; 
Walworth  upon  this  point,  as  pronounced  in  Mount  v.  Manhattan  Co.  41  N.  J.  Eq.  21 1. 
Leacraft  v.  Demprey,  4  Paige,  124.  If  an  8  Thus,  in  Merrewether  v.  Mellish,  13  Ves. 
answer  commences  as  an  answer  to  the  whole  435,  438,  where  a  defendant  pleaded  a  settle- 
bill,  it  overrules  a  plea  and  demurrer  to  any  ment,  for  the  purpose  of  showing  that  there 
particular  part  of  the  bill,  although  such  part  were  certain  parties  not  before  the  Court  who 
is  not  in  fact  answered.  Ibid. ;  Summers  v.  Mur-  were  interested  in  the  suit,  but  did  not  aver 
ray,  2  Kdw.  Ch.  205.  A  defendant  may  plead,  that  there  was  a  deficiency  of  parties,  or  that 
answer,  and  demur  to  the  same  bill;  but  these  the  persons  appearing  by  the  settlement  to  be 
several  defences  must  each  refer  to,  and  in  interested  were  necessary  parties,  the  plea  was 
terms  be  put  in  as  a  defence  to,  a  separate  and  held  to  be  informal,  and  leave  was  given  to 
distinct  part  of  the  bill.  Leaycraft  r.  Dempsey,  amend  it. 
4  Paige,  124 ;  ante,  pp.  610,  616.  i  Lakeman  v.  Agua  Fria  Gold  Mining  Co, 

4  Ante,  p.  617.  22  Beav.  76. 

681 


*684 


PLEAS. 


siderable  length  ;  it  is  unnecessary,  therefore,  now  to  allude  to  them 
further  than  to  remind  the  reader,  that  the  plea  must  be  founded  upon 
matter  not  apparent  upon  the  face  of  the  bill ; 2  must  reduce  the  case  to 
a  single  point,8  except  where  leave  has  been  obtained  to  plead  double  ; 4 
and  must  be  supported  by  proper  averments.5 

In  addition  to  the  above  requisites  it  may  be  added,  that  a  plea  must  be 
certain  ;  it  must  tender  issuable  matter,  the  truth  or  falsehood  of  which 
may  be  replied  to  or  put  in  issue ;  and  that,  not  in  the  form  of  general 
propositions,  but  specifically  and  distinctly.6 

A  plea  must  also  cover  the  whole  case  made  by  the  bill,  or  by  that 
part  of  it  which  the  plea  affects  to  cover  (a)  ;  otherwise  it  Avill  be  over- 
ruled.7 Thus,  where  a  bill  was  filed  for  a  foreclosure  of  a  messuage  and 
forty  acres  of  land,  and  the  defendant  pleaded  an  absolute  title  in  him- 
self to  certain  property  mentioned  in  the  deeds  by  which  he  deduced  his 
title,  consisting  of  a  messuage  and  tenement,  averring  that  they  were  the 
same  which  were  meant  by  the  bill,  the  Court  of  Exchequer  thought  the 
plea  could  not  be  considered  as  relating  to  the  forty  acres  of  land  men- 
tioned in  the  bill,  and  overruled  it.8 
*  684  *  With  respect  to  the  language  of  pleas,  the  reader's  attention 
is  recalled  to  the  observations  made  in  another  part  of  this  work ; * 
in  which,  in  the  framing  even  of  bills,  the  propriety  of  adhering  to  the 
known  technical  language  of  the  Courts,  in  all  cases  where  such  language 
is  applicable  to  the  case,  has  been  discussed.  It  only  remains  to  add, 
that  if  such  an  adherence  to  the  ancient  recognized  forms  of  pleading  is 
desirable  in  the  case  of  bills,  it  is  still  more  so  in  the  case  of  pleas,  in 
which,  as  has  been  before  stated,  there  must,  in  general,  be  the  same 
strictness,  at  least  in  matters  of  substance,  as  in  pleas  at  Law.2    It  may, 


2  Ante,  p.  603. 

3  Ante,  pp.  603,  607. 

4  Ante,  pp.  608,  609. 

5  Ante,  p.  611. 

6  Ld.  Red.  297,  298.  Where  a  plea  was  put 
in  by  the  East  India  Company,  to  a  bill  filed  by 
the  Nabob  of  Arcot,  in  which  they  stated,  that 
by  charters,  confirmed  by  Acts  of  Parliament, 
they  had  certain  powers  under  which  particular 
acts  were  done,  the  plea  was  overruled,  because 
it  did  not  set  forth  the  contents  of  those  char- 
ters and  Acts  of  Parliament.  Nabob  of  Arcot 
v.  East  India  Co.  3  Bro.  C.  C.  292,  308.  A  plea 
of  former  adjudication  in  Chancery  should  spe- 
cify the  issue  and  the  equities  decreed  upon, 
and  not  aver  a  mere  legal  conclusion.  Riley 
v.  Lyons,  11  Heisk.  246. 

"Ld.  Red.  294;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  693.  If 
there  is  any  matter  of  equity  in  the  bill  to 
which  the  plea  does  not  set  up  a  bar,  and 
which  is  not  denied  by  way  of  answer,  the  plea 
must  be  set  aside.  Piatt  v.  Oliver,  1  McLean, 
303.  If  the  plea  is  to  the  whole  bill,  but  does 
not  extend  to  or  cover  the  wh'de,  the  plea  is 
bad.     Bell  v.  Woodward,  42  N.  H.  192,  193. 


8  Wedlake  i».  Hutton,  3  Anst.  633.  So 
where,  to  a  bill  praying  a  reconveyance  of  four 
estates,  the  defendant  put  in  a  plea  of  a  fine 
and  non-claim  as  to  one,  averring  that  the 
estate  comprised  in  the  fine  was  the  only  part  of 
the  estates  comprised  in  the  bill  to  which  he 
had  claimed  a  right,  the  plea  was,  in  like  man- 
ner, overruled.  Watkins  v.  Stone,  2  Sim.  49, 
52.  So,  also,  where  a  bill  prayed  an  account  of 
rents  and  profits,  and  that  the  defendant  might 
be  restrained  from  setting  up  outstanding 
terms,  and  the  defendant  pleaded  that  there 
were  no  outstanding  terms,  the  plea  was  held 
bad,  because  it  left  part  of  the  case  untouched. 
Barker  v.  Ray,  5  Mad.  64;  see  also  Hook 
i'.  Dorman,  1  S.  &  S.  227,  230;  Hoare  r. 
Parker,  1  Cox,  224,  228;  1  Bro.  C.  C.  578,  580; 
Ld.  Red.  277.  n.  (s). 

i  Ante,  p.  362. 

2  See  Marselis  v.  Morris  Canal,  &c.  Sax- 
ton  (N.  J.),  31 ;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  658.  In  plead- 
ing matters  of  substance  the  same  strictness  is 
required  in  Equity  as  at  Law.  Burditt  v.  Grew, 
8  Pick.  108. 


(n)  A  plea  to  only   part  of  the  bill  must  clearly  show  to  what  part  it  relates. 
Counselman,  136  111.  191. 

682 


Snow  v. 


FORM    OF   PLEAS.  *  685 

however,  be  repeated  here,  that  although  the  use  in  pleadings  in  Equity 
of  such  technical  expressions  as  have  been  adopted  in  pleadings  at  Com- 
mon Law  is  desirable,  it  is  not  absolutely  necessary ;  and  that  the  same 
thing  may  be  expressed  in  any  terms  which  the  pleader  may  select 
as  proper  to  convey  his  meaning,  provided  they  are  adequate  to  the 
purpose.8 

All  the  facts,  however,  which  are  necessary  to  render  the  plea  a  com- 
plete equitable  bar  to  the  case  made  by  the  bill,  so  far  as  the  plea  extends, 
must  be  clearly  and  distinctly  averred,  in  order  that  the  plaintiff  may 
take  issue  upon  it ; 4  and  averments  in  general  ought  to  be  positive.5  In 
some  cases,  indeed,  a  defendant  has  been  permitted  to  aver  according  to 
the  best  of  his  knowledge  and  belief :  as  that  an  account  is  just  and 
true ; 6  and  in  all  cases  of  negative  averments,  and  of  averments  of  facts 
not  within  the  immediate  knowledge  of  the  defendant,  it  may  seem  im- 
proper to  require  a  positive  assertion.7  It  is,  however,  the  opinion  of 
Lord  Redesdale,  that  unless  the  averment  is  positive,  the  matter  in  issue 
appears  to  be,  not  the  fact  itself,  but  the  defendant's  belief  of  it ;  and 
that,  in  all  cases,  therefore,  averments  should  be  positive,  as  the 
conscience  of  the  defendant  is  saved  by  the  nature  of  the  oath  *  ad-  *  685 
miuistered  :  which  is,  that  so  much  of  the  plea  as  relates  to  his 
own  acts  is  true,  and  that  so  much  as  relates  to  the  acts  of  others  he  be- 
lieves to  be  true.1 

The  plea,  having  stated  the  facts  upon  which  it  is  founded,  commonly 
concludes  with  a  repetition,  that  the  matters  so  offered  are  relied  upon 
as  an  objection  or  bar  to  the  suit,  or  to  so  much  of  it  as  the  plea  extends 
to ;  and  then  prays  the  judgment  of  the  Court  whether  the  defendant 
ought  to  be  compelled  further  to  answer  the  bill,  or  such  part  as  is 
pleaded  to.2  It  does  not  appear  that  any  particular  form  of  conclusion 
is  necessary,  in  pleas  in  Equity.  Some  of  the  old  forms  of  pleas  to  the 
jurisdiction  conclude  by  praying  the  judgment  of  the  Court,  "whether 
it  will  hold  plea  upon,  and  enforce  the  defendant  to  answer  the  bill,  for 
the  cause  aforesaid ; "  whilst  other  precedents,  with  less  precision,  de- 
mand judgment  of  the  Court,  "whether  the  defendant  shall  be  com- 
pelled to  make  further  or  other  answer."  *  The  forms  of  pleas  in  Equity 
to  the  person  are  tolerably  uniform  in  concluding,  by  praying  judgment 
of  the  Court,  whether  the  defendant  shall  be  compelled  to  make  any 
further  answer  during  the  existence  of   the   disability  pleaded.4    The 

3  Ante,  pp.  362,  363.  5  Foster  v.  Vassall,  3  Atk.  5S7;  Story,  Eq. 

*  Ld.   Red.  298:  see  Newman  v.  Hutton,  3  PI.  §  662. 
Beav.  114,  117;  Overton  t\  Banister,  4  Beav.  6  Anon.  3  Atk.  70. 

205,  208.     The  plea  should  state  so  distinctly  to  1  Drew  t\  Drew,  2  V.  &  B.  159,  162;  Kirk- 

what  part  of  the  bill   it  is  intended  to  apply,  man  v.  Andrews,  4  Beav.  554,  557;  6  Jur.  139; 

that  the  Court  can  determine,  on  examination  see  also  Small  v.  Attwood,  1  Y.  &  C.  Ex.  39. 
of  the  bill,  what  parts  are  covered  by  it.     Davi-  1  Ld.  Red.  298;  Story,  Eq.  PL  §§  662,  664; 

son  v.  Schermerborn,  1  Barb.  Ch.  480.     Where  Bolton  v.    Gardner,  3   Paige,   273;    Heartt  v. 

the  plea  does  not  go  to  the  whole  bill,  it  must  Corning,  id.  566;  see  form  in  Vol.  III. 
clearly  point  to  the  part  of  discover}'  or  relief  2  Ld.  Red.  300. 

intended  to  be  covered  by  it,  but,  if  overruled  8  Beames  on  Pleas,  49. 

for  a  defect  in  this  particular,   the  defendant  4  Ibid, 

will  not  thereby  be  precluded  from  insisting 
upon  the  same  matter  in  his  answer  as  a  defence 
pro  tanto.     Jarvis  v .  Palmer,  11  Paige,  650. 

683 


*  686  PLEAS. 

precedents  of  pleas  in  bar,  generally,  conclude  with  pleading  the  matter 
set  up,  in  bar  of  the  discovery  and  relief,  or  of  the  discovery  (as  the  case 
may  be),  and  demand  judgment  of  the  Court,  whether  the  defendant  shall 
be  compelled  to  make  further  or  other  answer  to  the  bill,  praying  to 
be  dismissed  with  costs :  a  prayer  that  is  sometimes  added  and  some- 
times omitted.  They  do  not,  however,  always  state  that  the  matter  is 
pleaded  in  bar.6 

Where  a  plea  is  accompanied  by  an  answer,  the  answer  must  follow 
the  conclusion  of  the  plea.  If  the  answer  is  merely  to  support  the  plea, 
it  is  stated  to  be  made  for  that  purpose,  "  not  waiving  the  plea."  6  If 
the  plea  is  to  part  of  the  bill  only,  and  there  is  an  answer  to  the  rest, 
it  is  expressed  to  be  an  answer  to  so  much  of  the  bill  as  is  not  before 
pleaded  to,  and  is  preceded  by  the  same  protestation  against  waiver  of 
the  plea.7 

A  plea  must  be  signed  by  counsel ; 8  and  no  counsel  is  to  sign  any  plea, 

unless  he  has  drawn,  or  at  least  perused  the  same :  and  he  is  to  take  care 

that  documents  be  not  unnecessarily  set  out  therein  in  hcec  verba  ; 

*  686    and  that  no  scandalous  matter  be  inserted  *  therein.1     The  signa- 

ture of  counsel  is  usually  attached  to  the  draft  of  the  plea,  and 
copied  by  the  solicitor  onto  the  engrossment.  If  a  plea  has  been  inad- 
vertently filed  without  counsel's  name,  it  is  conceived  that,  as  in  the 
case  of  an  answer,  an  order  of  course  may  be  obtained  to  add  the 
same  to  the  engrossment.2 

If  the  plea  contain  any  impertinent  matter,8  or  is  of  an  improper  or 
unnecessary  length,  the  defendant  putting  it  in  may  be  ordered  to  pay 
the  costs  occasioned  thereby.4  (a)  The  application  for  the  costs  of  such 
impertinent  matter  is  to  be  made  at  the  time  when  the  Court  disposes  of 
the  costs  of  the  cause,  and  not  at  any  other  time.5 

If  the  plea  contain  any  scandalous  matter,6  exceptions  should  be 
taken  to  such  matter.  The  practice  on  such  exceptions  is  the  same  as 
in  the  case  of  exceptions  to  a  bill  for  scandal,  and  has  been  already 
described.7 

Where  the  matter  of  the  plea  appears  upon  record,  the  plea  is  put  in 
without  oath ;  but  where  the  matter  of  the  plea  does  not  so  appear  it 
must  be  upon  oath.8 

5  Beames  on  Pleas,  49.  8  As  to  impertinence,  see  ante,  p.  349. 

6  Ld.  Red.  300.  A  question  not  raised  by  4  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  17  ;  Cons.  Ord.  XL.  9. 
the  plea  cannot  be  raised  by  an  answer  in  sup-  5  Cons.  Ord.  XL.  11.  For  the  old  practice, 
port  of  the  plea.  Such  an  answer  forms  no  part  in  case  of  impertinence  in  a  plea,  see  Dixon  v. 
of  the  defence,  but  is  that  evidence  which  the  Olmius,  1  Cox,  412. 

plaintiff  has  a  right  to  require,  and  to  use  to  6  As  to  scandal,  see  ante,  p.  347. 

invalidate  the  defence  made  by  the  plea.    Such  7  Cons.  Ord.  XVI.  2,  3,  10;  ante,  pp.  349- 

answer  can  be  used  only  to  support  or  disprove  354. 

the  plea.     Andrews  v.  Brown,  3  Cush.  133;  Ld.  8  Cons.  Ord.  XIV.  2.     In  the  U.  S.  Courts 

Red.  199.  no  plea  shall  be  allowed  to  be  filed  to  a  bill,  un- 

1  Ld.  Red.  300:  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  695.  less  upon  a  certificate  of  counsel,  that  in  his 

8  Cons.  Ord.  VIII.  1.  opinion  it  is  well  founded  in  point  of  law,  and 

1  Cons.  Ord.  VIII.  2:  ante,  p.  313.  supported  by  the  affidavit  of  the  defendant,  that 

2  Braithwaite's  Pr.  48;  post,  p.  677.  it  is  not  interposed  for  delay,  and  that  it  is  true 

(a)  A  plea  is  bad  which  pleads  mntters  of  terial  fact  as  distinguished  from  evidence, 
evidence,  and  the  rule  that  fraud  must  be  spe-  Provincial  Bank  v.  Brocklebank,  26  L.  R.  Ir. 
daily   pleaded   applies  only  where  it  is  a  ma-      572,  580. 

6S4 


FORM    OF   PLEAS.  *  687 

In  consequence  of  this  rule,  if  the  matter  pleaded  is  purely  matter  of 
record,  or,  in  other  words,  which  may  be  proved  by  the  record,  the  oath 
of  the  party  is  not  necessary  ;  but  if  any  fact  in  pais  is  introduced  which 
would  require  to  be  proved  at  the  hearing,  the  plea  must  be  upon  oath.9 
Thus,  pleas  of  a  Statute  of  Limitations,  or  of  any  other  statute  which 
requires  averments  to  bring  the  defendant's  case  within  its  operation, 
must  be  upon  oath.  It  seems,  however,  that  a  mere  averment  of 
identity  will  *  not  render  it  necessary  that  a  plea  of  matter  of  *  687 
record  should  be  put  in  upon  oath  ;  therefore,  where  a  plea  of  the 
plaintiffs  conviction  for  forgery  was  put  in  without  oath,  Lord  Eldon 
held  it  sufficient,  although  there  was  an  averment  of  the  identity  of  the 
plaintiff; '  and  so  the  circumstances  of  a  plea  of  outlawry,  containing 
such  an  averment,  will  not  render  it  necessary  that  it  should  be  upon 
oath.2 

To  entitle  a  defendant  to  plead  any  matter  without  oath,  because  it  is 
matter  of  record,  it  must  have  been  properly  enrolled,  or  made  a  complete 
record  in  the  Court  out  of  which  it  comes.  Records  are  complete  for  this 
purpose  as  soon  as  they  are  delivered  into  the  Court,  and  there  fixed  as 
the  rolls  of  the  Court ;  but  before  they  are  so  fixed,  and  do  not  constitute 
a  perfect  record,  they  are  said  to  be  as  of  record  ;  and  although  they  may 
be  sufficient  in  the  Courts  themselves  to  which  they  belong,  as  ground  for 
ulterior  proceedings,  they  have  not  assumed  that  permanent  form  which 
gives  them  the  character  of  records.3  Thus,  a  judgment  at  Law,  signed 
by  the  proper  officer  of  the  Court  by  which  it  is  made,  is  a  sufficient 
foundation  for  the  issue  of  execution  by  the  same.  Court ;  but  as  it  is 
merely  the  instruction  for  a  future  judgment,  and  the  judgment  is  no 
record  until  it  is  actually  made  up,  it  is  not  a  complete  record,  and  is  not 
admissible  as  evidence  in  another  Court.4  So,  also,  in  the  Court  of 
Chancery,  a  bill  or  other  pleading,  which  has  been  duly  filed,  or  even  a 
decree,  though  passed  and  entered,  is  not  a  record  of  the  Court,  of  which 
a  copy  can  be  admissible  as  evidence  in  another  Court.  A  proceeding 
or  decree  does  not  become  a  record  till  it  has  been  signed  and  enrolled. 
When,  therefore,  it  is  said,  that  pleas  of  matters  of  record  may  be  put 

in  point  of  fact.     U.  S.  Equity  Rule,  31 ;  see  Salisbury  Manuf.  Co.  43  N.  H.  251 ;  Sfnrv.  Eq. 

Central  National    Bank   v.  Connecticut  M.  L.  PI.  §  696;  post,  p.  689,  note  (a).     A  plea,  if  not 

Ins.  Co.  104  U.  S.  54;  Wild  v.  Gladstone,  3  De  on  oath,  will  be  set  aside  on  motion.     Bassett  v. 

G.    &    Sm.    740.      The   rule    is   inflexible   in  Salisbury  Manuf.  Co.  43  N.  H.  249. 
Chancery  proceedings,  that  a  plea  of  matters  in  B  Where  a  defendant  pleaded  the  statute  32 

pais,  and  pleas  in  bar  of  matters  in  pais,  must  Henry    VIII.  c.    9,    against    selling   pretended 

be  filed  on  oath.      Dunn  v.  Keegin,  3  Scam,  titles,  with  the  necessary  averments  of  want  of 

297.     A  plea  must  be  verified  by  oath,  although  possession,  &c,  and  did  not  put  the  plea  in  upon 

the  plaintiff  has  expressly  waived  an  answer  oath,  it  was  ordered  to  be  taken  off  the  file,  be- 

from  the  defendant  on  oath.     Heartt  v.  Corning,  cause  the  plea,  although  it  set  out  a  statute,  was. 

3  Paige,  566;  Bassett  v.  Company,  43  N.  II.  in  substance,  m-itter  nt pais.     Wall  v.  Stubbs,  2 

251.     A  plea  is  not  evidence  in  behalf  of  the  V.  &  B.  354,  357. 

defendant,  as  to  the  facts  stated  in   it,  so  as  to  J  v.  Pavies.  19  Ves.  81,  83. 

require  the  testimony  of  more  than  one  witness  2  Aiite.  p.  56;  and  see  Prat  v.  Tavlor,  1  Ph. 

to  contradict  it;  even  where  it  negatives  a  ma-  Cas.  237,  as  to  plea  of  privilege  of  defendant,  as 

terial  averment  in  the  bill.     Heartt  v.  Coming,  scholar  of  the  University  of  Oxford. 

3  Paige,  569;  see  Sadler  r.  Gh.ver,  1   B.Mon.  8  2   Phillips  on    Evid.  2;   Taylor  on  Evid 

53;  1   Smith  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  231,  232;  §§  1378-1391,1407-1409. 

Carroll  v.  Waring,  3  Gill  &  J.  491;   Bassett  v.  *  Taylor  on  Evid.  §  1407. 

685 


*  688  PLEAS. 

in  without  oath,  it  must  be  understood  as  confined  to  those  matters  which 
are  of  record,  strictly  so  speaking,  and  which  require  no  other  evidence 
to  prove  them  than  what  the  Courts  are  in  the  habit  of  recognizing  upon 
inspection ; 5  such  as  exemplifications  under  the  Great  Seal  of  the  Court 
of  Chancery,  or  of  the  Court  out  of  which  it  comes.  Upon  this  principle 
it  is,  that  a  decree  of  dismissal,  signed  and  enrolled,  may  be  pleaded 
without  oath.  Upon  the  same  principle,  a  plea  of  outlawry,  or  of  ex- 
communication, may  be  put  in  without  oath  ;  and  so  may  a  plea  of  con- 
viction of  felony.6 

Matters  not  so  recorded  may  be  capable  of  proof  aliunde ;  but  if 

pleaded,  the  plea  must  be  accompanied  by  the  oath  of  the  party  :  unless, 

indeed,  they  consist  of   transactions  in  the  Court  itself,  which, 

*  688    *  although  they  have  not  been  solemnly  and  formally  enrolled, 

are  quasi  of  record.  Pleas  of  such  matters,  as  well  as  matters 
of  record,  may  be  put  in  without  oath  :  for,  as  the  Court  is  in  the  habit 
of  noticing  its  own  proceedings,  they  are  capable  of  proof  without  any 
other  evidence  than  the  production  of  the  proceeding  itself,  or  an  office 
copy  of  it,  signed  by  the  proper  officer.  Upon  this  principle  it  is,  that, 
when  a  plea  of  a  suit  already  depending  in  the  Court  of  Chancery  is 
put  in,  the  Court  does  not  require  that  it  should  be  upon  oath,  but  im- 
mediately directs  an  inquiry  into  the  existence  of  such  a  suit.1 

In  the  case  of  a  plea  of  outlawry,  the  record  must  be  pleaded  sub 
pede  sigilli ; 2  and  it  was  formerly  usual,  as  well  at  Law  as  in  Equity,  to 
annex  to  the  plea  a  copy  of  the  whole  record  of  outlawry,  duly  authen- 
ticated by  the  seal  of  the  Court  from  which  it  issued,  in  order  that  the 
Court  might  judge  immediately  of  the  truth  of  the  plea ; 8  but  it  was 
afterwards  the  practice  to  annex  the  capias  utlagatum  onl}',  under  the 
seal  of  the  Court,4  or  of  the  proper  office,  which  is,  in  fact,  the  seal  of 
the  Court.  And  where,  instead  of  a  copy  of  the  capias  utlagatum,  duly 
authenticated,  the  defendant  annexed  a  certificate,  under  the  seal  of 
the  Clerk  of  the  Outlawries,  the  plea  was  held  bad.5  But  it  seems  that 
since  the  14  &  15  Vic.  c.  99,  a  copy,  certified  by  the  proper  officer,  of 
the  sheriff's  return  to  the  writ  of  exigi  facias,  is  sufficient  evidence  of 
the  outlawry.6 

In  all  cases  where  a  plea  is  accompanied  by  an  answer,  it  must  be 
put  in  upon  oath.7  A  plea  by  a  peer,  or  a  person  having  privilege 
of  peerage,  must,  in  those  cases  where  an  oath  would  be  required  from 
persons  not  enjoying  the  privilege,  be  put  in  upon  attestation  of  honor. 
In  the  case  of  a  corporation  aggregate,  it  must  be  under  the  common 
seal ;  and  it  is  advisable,  though  not  indispensable,  that  the  affixing  of 
the  seal  should  be  attested  by  some  officer  of  the  corporation.8 

5  See  Wall  v.  Stubbs,  2  V.  &  B.  354,  357.  defect  arose  from  the  mistake  of  the  Clerk  of 

6  v.  Davies,  19  Ves.  81,  83.  the  Outlawries,  and  not  of  the  defendant.     See 

i  Cons.  Ord.  XIV.  6,  7;  Urlin  v.  Hudson,  1      Taylor  v.  Wemyss,  L.  R.  8  Eq.  512. 

Vern.  332,  nnte,  p.  661.  G  Anstruther  r.  Roberts,  4  W.  R.  349;  V.  C. 

2  Cons.  Ord.  XIV.  4.  K.;  and  see  Wmthrop  v.  Elderton,  15  Jur.  1028, 

3  Co.  Litt.  128  b.  V.  C.   K. :  nnte,  p.  55.     As  to  outlawries,  see 

4  6  Bac.  Ab.  67;  and  see  Fox  v.  Yates,  24  Chitty's  Arch.  1295-1305. 

Beav.  271.  ?  Jefferson  v.  Dawson,  2  Ch.  Cas.  208. 

5  Waters  v.  Mayhew,  1  S.  &  S.  220.  Leave  8  Braithwaite's  Pr.  53.  For  form  of  attests* 
was,  however,  given  to  amend  the  plea,  as  the      tion,  see  Vol.  III. 

686 


SWEARING,    FILING,   SETTING    DOWN,    AND    ARGUING   PLEAS.      *  689 

Where  a  plea  which  ought  to  be  upon  oath  is  put  in  without  one,  the 
irregularity  is  not  one  which  can  be  waived  by  the  plaintiff's  taking 
any  proceeding  upon  it ; 9  and  in  such  a  case,  the  plaintiff  should  move, 
upon  notice,  that  the  plea  may  be  taken  off  the  file.10  Where, 
however,  a  joint  and  several  plea  had  been  *  sworn  to  by  all  the  *  689 
defendants,  except  one  who  had  died,  the  Court  refused  to  order 
it  to  be  taken  off  the  file.1 


Section  IV.  —  Swearing,  Filing,    Setting   Down,  and  Arguing   Pleas. 

A  plea,  being  drawn  or  perused  and  settled  by  counsel,  must  be 
written  upon  paper  of  the  same  description  and  size  as  that  on  which 
bills  are  printed ;  2  and  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerks  may  refuse  to  file 
any  plea  in  which  there  is  any  knife  erasure,  or  which  is  so  blotted  as 
to  obliterate  any  word,  or  is  improperly  written,  or  so  altered  as  to  cause 
any  material  disfigurement;  or  in  which  there  is  any  interlineation: 
unless  the  person  before  whom  the  same  was  sworn  duly  authenticate 
such  interlineation  with  his  initials,  in  such  manner  as  to  show  that  such 
interlineation  was  made  before  the  plea  was  sworn,  and  so  as  to  mark 
the  extent  of  such  interlineation.3  A  joint  plea  and  answer  must  be 
printed  in  the  same  manner  as  answers  are  printed.4 

Where  a  defendant  puts  in  a  plea  on  oath,  or  attestation  of  honor,  it 
must  be  signed  by  him,  and  the  signature  be  affixed  or  acknowledged  in 
the  presence  of  the  person  before  whom  the  plea  is  sworn.5  Pleas  are 
sworn  and  taken  in  the  same  manner  as  answers.6  (a) 

A  plea  which  does  not  require  to  be  put  in  on  oath,  need  only  be 
signed  by  counsel;7  and  in  other  cases,  if  the  plaintiff  will  consent,  an 
order  may  be  obtained  as  of  course,  on  petition  at  the  Rolls,  to  file  the 
plea  without  oath  or  signature,  or  without  oath  only.8  If  the  order 
dispenses  with  the  oath  only,  the  defendant  must  sign  the  plea,  and  his 
signature  must  be  attested  by  some  person  competent  to  be  a  witness. 
The  order  must  be  produced  at  the  time  of  filing  the  plea.9 

The  plea  must  be  indorsed  with  the  name,  place  of  business  or  resi- 
dence, and  address  for  service,  if  any,  of  the  solicitor  or  party  filing  it, 

9  Wall  v.  Stubbs,  2  V.  &  B.  354,  358.  495  ;  see  also  Cope  v.  Parry,  1  Mad.  83 ;  Cooke 

l«  Wild  v.  Gladstone,  3  De  G.  &  S.  740;  v.  Westell,  id  265;  Doner.  Read,  2  V.  &  B. 

15  Jur.  713.     If  a  plea  is  not  verified  by  the  310. 

oath  of  the  defendant,  the  plaintiff  may  apply  2  Ord.   16  March,  1860,  r.  16;  Cons.  Ord. 

for  an  order  to  set  it  aside,  or  to  have  it  taken  IX.  3 ;  ante,  p.  396. 

off  the  files  of  the  Court;  but  he  cannot  make  8  Cons.  Ord.  I.  36. 

the  objection  upon  the  argument  of  the  plea.  4  See  post,  pp.  755,756. 

Heartt  v.  Corning,  3  Paige,   566;    Bassett  v.  6  Cons.  Ord.  XIV.  3. 

Salisbury  Manuf.  Co.  43  N.  H.  251;  1  New  6  See  post,  pp.  743,  et  seq. 

Ch.  P.  1*17.     For  form  of  notice  of  motion,  see  *  Cons.  Ord.  VIII.  1;  XIV.  3. 

Vol.  III.  8  For  form  of  petition,  see  Vol.  III. 

1  Att.-Gen.  v.  Cradock,  8  Sim.  466;  1  Jur.  9  Braithwaite's  Pr.  62,63. 


(a)  See  Toledo  Tie  &  L.  Co.  v.  Thomas,  33  ment  of  the  bill.  Farley  v.  Kittson,  120  TJ.  S. 
W.  Va.  566.  A  sworn  plea  is  not  evidence  for  303.  Seeante,  p.  686,  n.  8;  Lilienthal  t\  Wash- 
the  defendant  though  it  denies  a  material  aver-     burn,  4  Woods,  65. 

687 


*  691  PLEAS. 

in  the  same  manner  as  other  pleadings ; 10  and  it  is  filed  in  the  Record 

and  Writ  Clerks'  Office,11  without  any  other  formality  than  that  required 

for  filing  an  affidavit.12      Notice  of  the  filing  thereof  should  be 

*  690    given  to  the  solicitor  for  the  plaiutiff,  or  to  the  *  plaintiff  himself 

if  he  sues  in  person,  before  seven  o'clock  in  the  evening  of  the 
day  on  which  the  plea  is  filed,  or,  if  filed  on  a  Saturday,  before  two 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon  of  that  day.1  Neglect  to  give  the  notice  in  due 
time  will  not  render  the  plea  inoperative ;  but  the  time  allowed  to  the 
plaintiff  for  taking  the  next  step  in  the  cause  will  be  extended,  so  as 
to  give  him  the  benefit  of  the  time  he  would  otherwise  lose  by  the  delay 
in  the  service.2 

A  defendant  is  allowed  the  same  time  for  pleading  as  for  answering ; 
and  any  extension  of  the  time  must  be  applied  for  in  the  same  manner 
as  in  the  case  of  answers  ;  and,  generally,  the  rules  regulating  the 
swearing,  and  the  reception  and  filing  of  pleas  at  the  Record  and  Writ 
Clerks'  Office,  are  the  same  as  those  which  regulate  the  swearing, 
reception,  and  filing  of  answers.8 

Some  doubt  at  one  time  existed,  whether,  when  the  order  allowing 
further  time  in  terms  gave  the  defendant  further  time  to  answer  only, 
he  was  entitled  to  plead.4  There  have,  however,  been  several  cases  in 
which  it  has  been  decided,  that  a  plea  was  an  answer  within  the  mean- 
ing of  an  order  for  time  to  answer ; 5  and  it  has  been  held  that  if  it  is 
intended  to  limit  the  defendant  to  an  answer,  the  order  must  expressly 
declare  that  intention.6 

*  691        *  If  the  defendant  does  not  obtain  an  order  for  further  time, 

but  allows  an  attachment  to  issue,  there  does  not  seem  to  be  any 

10  Cons.  Ord.  III.  2,  5;  ante,  pp.  453,  454.  terwards,  the  defendant  filed  a  plea  under  the 

11  Cons.  Ord.  I.  35;  VIII.  3.  order  so  altered:  but  he  stated  that  his  judg- 

12  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  8>,  §  21.  ment  proceeded  entirely  on  the  circumstances 
i  Cons.  Ord.    III.  9;    XXXVII.    2;    ante,  of  the  individual  case. 

pp.  454,  455.  For  form  of  notice,  see  Vol.  III.  5  Kay  v.  Marshall,  1  Keen,  190;  Anon.,  2 
2  Wright  v.  Angle,  6  Hare,  107,  109;  Lowe  P.  Wms.  4G4  ;  Jones  v.  Earl  of  Strafford,  3 
v.  Williams,  12  Beav.  482;  .Jones  r.  Jones,  P.. Wms.  79,  81;  Roberts  v.  Hartley,  1  Bro. 
Uur.  X  S.Wj.  V.  C.  S. ;  Llovd  v.  Solicitors,  C  C.  56  ;  De  Minckwitz  v.  Udney,  16  Ves. 
and  General  Life  Assurance  Co.  3  W.  R.  640;  355;  Phillips  v.  Gibbons,  1  V.  &  B.  184;  Xew- 
24  L.  J.  Ch.  704,  V.  C.  W. ;  see,  however,  Mat-  man  v.  Wh  te,  16  Beav.  4;  Heartt  v.  Corning, 
thews  v.  Chichester,  5  Hare,  207,  overruled  on  3  Paige.  566.  The  filing  of  an  answer,  plea,  or 
appeal,  id.  210;  11  Jur.  49,  demurrer,  is  said  to  be  a  compliance  with  the 
a  See  post,  Chap.  XVII.  §  3,  Answers.  In  rule  to  answer,  in  Bracken  e.  Kennedy,  3  Scam. 
Massachusetts,  "the  defendant  may  at  any  564.  If  further  time  is  given  to  answer,  it  is 
time  before  the  bill  is  taken  for  confessed,  or  improper  to  file  a  demurrer  without  leave  of 
afterwards,  bv  leave  of  tl.e  Court,  demur,  ple^d,  the  Court.  Ibid.  Demurrer  to  part  is  not  a 
or  answer  to  "the  bill."  Ch.  Rule  10.  compliance  with  an  order  to  answer.  Kenrick 
4  Brooks  v.  Purton,  1  Y.  &  C.  C.  278  (see  r.  Clayton.  2  Bro.  C.C.  (Perkins's  ed.)214.  and 
also  Taylor  v.  Milner.  10  Ves.  444;  Newman  notes;  S.  C.  2  Dick.  685;  Lansdown  r.  Eldir- 
v.  White,  16  Beav.  4)  where  the  defendant's  ton,  8  Sumner's  Ves.  526,  note  (1),  and  cases 
application  to  the  Master  and  the  affidavits  in  cited.  Plea  under  an  order  for  time  to  answer 
supp  rt  of  it  had  reference  onlv  to  answering,  is  regular,  8  Sumner's  Ves.  526,  note  (1). 
Sir  J.  L.  Knight  Bruce  V.  C.  was  of  opinion  <*  Per  Lord  Cottenham  in  Hunter  v.  Nock- 
that  an  order  giving  leave  to  answer,  plead,  or  olds,  2  Phil.  540,  544;  12  Jur.  149,  reversing 
demur,  not  demurring  alone,  was  irregular,  S.  C,  6  Hare,  12;  11  Jur.  1006;  see  also  New- 
and  he  ordered  the  words  in  italics  to  be  struck  man  v.  White,  16  Beav.  4;  Hodges  v.  Hodges, 
out  from  the  order;  whereupon  his  Honor  2  Ch.  D.  112. 
directed  the  plea  to  be  taken  off  the  file  :  after- 

688 


SWEARING,   FILING,   SETTING    DOWN,    AND    ARGUING    PLEAS.      *  692 

objection  to  his  filing  a  plea ;  further  than  that  he  must,  as  in  the  case 
of  an  answer,  first  tender  the  costs  of  the  contempt.1  If,  however,  the 
defendant  is  in  contempt  for  want  of  an  answer,  and  an  order  has 
issued  for  the  Sergeant-at-Arras,  it  is  considered  irregular  to  file  a  plea.2 
After  service  of  a  traversing  note,  a  defendant  cannot  plead  to  the  bill, 
without  the  special  leave  of  the  Court.3 

An  office  copy  of  the  plea  is  taken  by  the  plaintiff ; 4  and  as  a  general 
rule,  he  can  take  no  step  in  the  cause  until  the  plea  has  been  disposed  of. 
Thus,  except  under  very  special  circumstances,  there  can  be  no  motion 
for  an  injunction  till  the  plea  has  been  argued.  The  Court  will,  how- 
ever, at  the  instance  of  the  plaintiff,  in  such  a  case,  expedite  the  hearing 
of  the  plea,  and  will  give  the  plaintiff  leave  to  move  on  the  same  day 
that  it  comes  on,  if  the  plea  should  be  overruled  upon  argument,  that  an 
injunction  may  issue.6 

So,  also,  if  a  defendant  pleads  to  part,  and  answers  to  the  residue  of 
the  bill,  the  plaintiff  cannot  except  to  the  answer  till  the  plea  has  been 
argued : 6  unless  in  cases  where  the  plea  is  confined  to  the  relief  prayed, 
and  the  defendant  professes  to  answer  as  to  the  whole  discovery  re- 
quired ;  in  such  cases,  it  seems  the  Court  will  not  require  the  plaintiff 
to  set  down  the  plea  before  he  excepts  to  the  answer  for  insufficiency.7 

The  rule  which  requires  a  plea  to  be  disposed  of  upon  argument, 
before  any  further  proceedings  are  had  in  the  cause,  applies  to  cases 
where  the  defendant,  as  well  as  to  cases  where  the  plaintiff,  seeks  to 
move  in  the  cause.  Thus,  if  a  defendant  plead  in  bar,  he  cannot  obtain 
an  order  for  the  plaintiff  to  make  his  election,  till  the  plea  has  been 
argued :  for  the  plea,  by  insisting  that  the  plaintiff  is  not  entitled  to  sue 
in  Equity,  denies  that  he  has  an  election ; 8  and  an  order  for  the  plaintiff 
to  make  his  election,  made  under  such  circumstances,  will,  on  motion,  be 
discharged  ;9  as  will  also  be  an  order  to  elect,  made  where  the  defend 
ant  has  pleaded  to  part,  and  answered  to  the  remainder  of  the  bill.10 

The  plaintiff  may,  within  three  weeks  after  the  filing  of  the 
*  plea,1  obtain,  on  motion  or  petition  as  of  course,2  an  order  to    *  692 
amend  his  bill.     The  petition  and  order  should  state  whether  the 
plea  has  or  has  not  been  set  down  for  argument : 3  in  the  former  case, 

i  Waters  v.  Chambers,  1  S.  &  S.  225;  San-  »  Pigot  v.  Stace,  2  Dick.  496;  Sidney  v. 

ders  v.  Murney,  ibid.;    Hamilton  v.  Hibbert,  Perry,  id.  602. 

2  S.  &  S.  225;  Mellor  v.  Hall,  id.  321,  322;  8  Anon.    Mos.    304;   and  see  post,   Chap. 

Foulkes  v.  Jones,  2  Beav.  274.  XIX.  §  4,   Election. 

2  Braithwaite's  Pr.  63.  9  Vaughan  o.  Welsh,  Mos.  210. 

3  Cons.  Ord.  XIII.  7;  ante,  p.  515.  10  Fisher  v.  Mee,  3  Mer.  45.  47. 

*  Braithwaite's  Pr.  491.  1  Cons.  Ord  XIV.  17.     The  vacations  are  not 

6  Humphreys   v.   Humphreys,  3   P.   Wms.  reckoned,  Ord.  XXXVII.  13  (3);  ante,  p.  641. 

395,  397;  Thompson  v.  Selby,  12  Sim.  100.  2  Ante,  p.  480.     For  forms  of  motion  paper 

6  Darnell    v.  Reyny,  1   Vern.  344;    Braith-  and  petition,  see  Vol.  III.     But  after  the  plea 

waite's  Pr.  127,  128.     Where  the  plaintiff  ex-  is  set  down,  the  application  to  amend  must  be 

cepts  to  the  answer  accompanying  a  plea,  be-  by  special  summons.     See  ante,  p.  593.  n.     For 

fore  the  argument  of  the  plea,  the  truth  of  the  a  form,  see  Vol.  III.     Any  irregularity  in  the 

plea  is  admitted.    Brownell  v.  Curtis,  10  Paige,  order  to  amend  will  be  waived  by  moving  to 

210;  and  see  Buchanan  v.  Hodgson,  11  Beav.  dismiss  for  want  of  prosecution.     Kettlewcll  r. 

368,  as  to  moving  for  production  of  documents,  Barstow,  L.  R.  10  Eq.  210. 

after  joint  plea  and  answer.  8  Jennings  v.  Pearce,  1  Ves.  Jr.  448;  Thorn  v. 


VOL.    I. 


44  689 


*  693  PLEAS. 

the  order  is  made  on  payment  of  the  taxed  costs,  and  in  the  latter,  of 
20s.  costs.4  This  course  should,  however,  only  be  adopted  when  the 
plaintiff  considers  the  plea  to  be  good ;  for  such  an  amendment  of  the 
bill  is  as  much  an  admission  of  the  validity  of  the  plea,  as  if  the  same 
had  been  allowed  on  argument.5 

If  the  plaintiff  dispute  the  validity  of  the  plea,  he  should  set  it  down 
for  argument.  There  are,  however,  certain  pleas  which  are  not  usually 
set  down  for  argument ;  these  are :  (1)  Pleas  of  Outlawry ;  (2)  Of  a 
former  suit  depending ;  (3)  Of  a  Decree  signed  or  enrolled.  The  first 
are  pleaded  sub  sigillof  so  that  the  truth  of  the  fact  is  ascertained  by 
the  form  of  pleading ;  and  the  suit  is  consequently  delayed  until  the 
disability  is  removed  :  and  when  removed,  the  defendant  must,  on  re- 
ceiving his  costs,  answer  the  bill  as  if  the  outlawry  had  not  existed.7 
Where,  however,  the  plaintiff  conceives  such  a  plea,  through  misplead- 
ing or  otherwise,  to  be  insufficient,  he  may  set  it  down  for  argument.8 
In  the  case  of  the  two  latter  kinds  of  pleas,  an  inquiry  will,  on  motion 
or  petition  of  course,  be  directed  into  the  truth  of  them.9  The  order 
for  this  inquiry  ought  to  be  obtained  by  the  plaintiff ; 10  unless  he  con- 
ceives the  plea  to  be  deficient  in  form,  in  which  case  he  may  set  it  down 
for  argument.11 

Formerly,  after  the  filing  of  a  plea,  it  was  necessary  to  enter  it  with 
the  Kegistrar,  but  now  this  need  not  be  done ;  and  upon  the  filing 
thereof,  either  party  is  at  liberty  to  set  the  same  down  for  argument 
immediately;12  and  it  is  irregular  to  set  the  same  down  after  three 
weeks  from  the  date  of  the  filing  thereof ;  but  the  times  of  vacation  are 
not  to  be  reckoned.13 

*  693        *  The  party  wishing  to    set  a  plea  down   for  argument  must, 

where  the  cause  is  attached  to  one  of  the  Vice-Chancellors'  Courts, 
present  a  petition  to  the  Lord  Chancellor,  or,  where  it  is  attached  to  the 
Rolls'  Court,  to  the  Master  of  the  Eolls,  praying  that  the  plea  may  be 
set  down.1  The  petition  which,  if  the  cause  is  attached  to  one  of  the 
Vice-Chancellors'  Courts,  does  not  require  any  fiat  from  the  Lord  Chan- 
cellor, nor  any  stamp,2  is  left  with  the  Registrar,  or  the  Secretary  of  the 
Master  of  the  Rolls,  as  the  case  may  be,8  and  must  state  the  name  of 

Germand,  4  John.  Ch.  363;  Brown  r.  Ricketts,  Simonson,    4    Blackf.   70;    nor  by  demurrer: 

2  John.  Ch.  425,  Travers  v.  Ross,   14   N.  J.  Eq.  254;   Stone  v. 

4  Jones  v.  Wattier,  4  Sim.  128;  Parker  v.  Moore,  26  111.  165.  See  ante,  p.  542,  n.  1.  But  a 
Alcock,  1  Y.  &  J.  195.  demurrer  to  a  plea,  where  no  objection  has  been 

5  See  Spencer  v.  Bryan,  9  Ves.  231.  made,  will  be  treated  as  a  mode  of  setting  the 

6  Cons.  Ord.  XIV.  4;  ante,  p.  688.  plea  for   hearing   in   its   sufficiency.     Witt   r. 
»  Cons.  Ord.  XIV.  5.  Ellis,  2  Coldw.  40;  Klepper  v.  Powell,  6  Hei.sk. 

8  Cons.  Ord.  XIV.  5;  Ld.  Red.  305;  see  506.  In  one  instance,  a  demurrer  to  a  plea  was 
also  Hunter  v.  Ayre,  23  Beav.  15:  Hunter  v.  held  to  reach  a  defect  in  the  bill.  Beard  v. 
Nockolds,   6   Hare,  459,   462 ;   Fox   v.   Yates,      Bowler,  2  Bond,  13. 

24  Beav.  271.  and  see  ante,  p.  56.  i2  Cons.  Ord.  XIV.  11. 

9  Ante,  pp.  637,  661.  For  form  of  order,  see  is  Neck  v.  Gains,  1  De  G.  &  S.  223;  11  Jur. 
Seton,  1259,  No.  16;  and  for  forms  of  motion      763;  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.  13  (3). 

paper  and  petition,  see  Vol.  III.  *  Cons.  Ord.  XXI.  9. 

10  Cons.  Ord.  XIV.  6;  ante,  pp.  637,  661.  2  Reg.  Regul.  15  March,  1860,  r.  3. 

11  Ante,  p.  637,  n.  6;  Ld.  Red.  305;  Thomas  «  Cons.  Ord.  XXI.  9.  For  form  of  order, 
v.  Brasher,  4  Monroe,  67.  The  sufficiency  of  see  Seton.  1257,  No.  10;  and  for  form  of  peti- 
a  plea  is  not  tested  by  exceptions:  Raymond  v.  f.ion,  see  Vol.  III. 

690 


SWEARING,   FILING,   SETTING    DOWN,   AND   ARGUING   PLEAS.      *  694 

the  Judge  to  whose  Court  the  cause  is  attached,4  the  day  when  the  plea 
was  filed,  aud  whether  it  is  to  the  whole  or  part  of  the  bill,  and  must 
be  subscribed  by  the  solicitor,  and  state  for  what  party  he  acts,  and  be 
dated  the  day  it  is  left.5  The  order  for  hearing  the  plea,  which  is  as  of 
course,  is  drawn  up  by  the  Registrar,  or  by  the  Secretary  at  the  Rolls, 
as  the  case  may  be.6  The  order  should  then  be  taken  to  the  Registrar's 
Clerk  at  the  order  of  course  seat,  and  he  will  set  the  plea  down  at  once  ; 7 
and  a  copy  of  the  order  should  also  be  served,  as  soon  as  possible,  on 
the  solicitor  of  the  opposite  party.8 

Unless  specially  directed  by  the  Lord  Chancellor,  or  the  Lords  Jus- 
tices, the  plea  must  be  set  down  before,  and  heard  by  the  Judge  to 
whose  Court  the  cause  is  attached.3  Previously  to  the  hearing,  two 
co>  *ies  of  the  bill  and  a  copy  of  the  plea  must  be  left  with  the  under 
secretary  or  the  train  bearer  at  the  Rolls,  or  with  the  train  bearer  of 
the  Vice-Chancellor,  as  the  case  may  be,  for  the  use  of  the  Court.10 
If  the  cause  is  attached  to  the  Rolls'  Court,  the  plea  will  not  be  put 
in  the  paper  until  two  clear  days :  if  to  one  of  the  Vice-Chancellors' 
Courts,  until  six  clear  days  after  it  has  been  set  down. 

If  the  defendant  does  not  think  he  will  be  able  to  maintain  his  plea 
on  argument,  he  should,  before  it  comes  on  for  hearing,  obtain  an  order 
for  leave  to  withdraw  it.11  The  order  will  be  granted  on  payment  of  the 
costs  occasioned  by  the  plea. 

The  parties  should  be  provided  with  office  copies  of  the  affidavits  of 
service  of,  and  of  being  served  with,  the  order  to  set  down  the  plea. 
If  the  plea  has  been  set  down  by  the  plaintiff,  and  the  defendant 
makes  default  at  the  hearing,  the  plea  will  be  overruled,  *  if  the  *  694 
plaintiff  can  produce  an  affidavit  of  service  on  the  defendant  of 
the  order  to  set  down  the  plea ; 1  if  he  cannot  produce  such  an  affidavit, 
it  will  be  struck  out  of  the  paper.  If  the  plaintiff  himself  makes  default, 
the  plea  will  be  allowed,  if  the  defendant  can  produce  an  affidavit  of 
having  been  served  with  the  order ;  or  will  be  struck  out  of  the  paper, 
if  he  cannot.2  Similar  rules,  mutatis  mutandis,  apply  to  the  case  of  pleas 
set  down  by  the  defendant.3 

On  the  argument  of  the  plea,  where  all  parties  appear,  counsel  for  the 
defendant  are  first  heard;  then  the  counsel  for  the  plaintiff;  and  lastly, 
the  leading  counsel  for  the  defendant  is  entitled  to  reply.4 

If,  when  the  plea  is  called  on  for  hearing,  the  plaintiff  declines  argu- 


4  Cons.  Ord.  XIV.  10.  n  for  form  of  order  to  withdraw  a  plea,  see 

6  Reg.  Regal.  15  March,  1860.  r.  3.  Seton,  1259,  No.  15;  and  for  form  of  petition 

«  Cons.  Ord.  XXI.  9.  for  that  purpose,  see  Vol.  III. 

T  Reg.  Regul.  15  March,  1860,  r.  1.  1  For    form    of    order    in    such    case,    see 

8  Braithwaite's  Pr.  65.  Seton,  1258,  No.  13;  and  for  form  of  affidavit, 

3  Cons.  Ord.  VI.  4.  see  Vol.  III. 

19  If  these  directions  as  to  papers  are   neg-  2  Where,  in  either  case,  the  plea  is  struck 

lected,  and    in   consequence   thereof   the   plea  out,  a  fresh  order  must  be  obtained  for  setting 

cannot  be  heard,  the  solicitor  may  be  ordered  it  down,  as  in  the  case  of  a  demurrer;  see  ante, 

to  pa3'  such  costs  as  the  Court  thinks  fit.    Cons.  p.  596. 

Ord.  XXI.  12.     The  M.  R.  requires  the  papers  3  Mazarredo  ».  Maitland,  2  Mad.  38. 

to  be  left  two  clear  days,  at  least,  before  the  4  Counsel's  brief  consists  of  copies  of  the  bill 

plea  comes  on  for  hearing.  and  plea. 

691 


695 


PLEAS. 


ing  it,  and  applies  for  leave  to  amend,  he  will,  in  general,  be  allowed 
to  do  so,  on  payment  of  the  costs.5 

A  plea,  when  set  down,  will  not  be  allowed  to  stand  over  for  an 
indefinite  period.6 

It  may  be  observed  here,  that  on  the  argument  of  a  plea,  the  allega- 
tions in  the  bill  may  be  taken  less  strongly  against  the  plaintiff  than 
th^y  would  be  on  a  demurrer.7 

If  a  plea  is  supported  by  an  answer,  upon  the  argument  of  the  plea 
the  answer  may  be  read  to  counterprove  the  plea;  and  if  the  defendant 
appears  not  to  have  sufficiently  supported  his  plea  by  his  answer,  the 
plea  must  be  overruled,  or  ordered  to  stand  for  an  answer  only.8  Where 
a  defendant  had  answered  to  an  original  bill,  which  was  afterwards 
amended,  whereupon  the  defendant  put  in  a  plea  to  the  amended  bill, 
the  plaintiff  was  permitted  to  read  the  answer  to  the  original  bill,  to 
counterprove  the  plea  to  the  amended  bill.9 

Upon  the  argument  of  a  plea,  every  fact  stated  in  the  bill,  and  not 
denied  by  the  averments  in  the  plea  and  by  the  answer  in  support  of 
the  plea,  must  be  taken  as  true.10  If  a  plea  be  set  down  for  argument 
by  the  plaintiff,  without  replying  to  it,  the  matter  contained  in  it  must 

be  considered  as  true.11  (a) 
*  695  *  A  plea  upon  argument  may  be  either  allowed  simply,  or  with 
leave  to  amend,  or  the  benefit  of  it  may  be  saved  to  the  hearing, 
or  it  may  be  ordered  to  stand  for  an  answer,  or  it  may  be  overruled.1 
The  consequence  of  each  of  such  judgments  will  be  considered  in  the 
ensuing  sections. 

If  the  plaintiff  conceives  the  plea  to  be  good,  though  not  true,  he 
should  reply  thereto,  and  take  issue  upon  it,  as  in  the  case  of  an  answer.* 


5»See  Jones  v.  Wattier,  4  Sim.  128;  see  also 
ante,  p.  420. 

6  Cons.  Ord.  XXI.  13. 

1  Rumbold  v.  Forteath,  2  Jur.  N.  S.  686, 

V.  c.  w. 

8  Ld.  Red.  303;  see  Kirby  v.  Taylor,  6  John. 
Ch.  242;  Souzer  v.  De  Meyer,  2  Paige,  574; 
Bogardus  v.  Trinity  Church.  4  Paige,  178  ; 
Leaycraft  v.  Dempsey,  id.  124,  126;  Kuypers 
v.  Dutch  Ref.  Church,  6  Paige.  570;  Story,  Eq. 
PI.  §  69!).  If  a  plea  accompanied  by  an  an- 
swer is  allowed,  the  answer  may  be  read  at  the 
hearing  of  the  cause  to  counterprove  the  plea. 
Souzer  v.  De  Meyer,  2  Paige,  574;  Bogardus  v. 


Trinity  Church,  4  Paige,  178;  Story,  Eq.  PI. 
§§  690,  699. 

9  Hildyard  v.  Cressy,  3  Atk.  303  ;  ante, 
p.  680. 

10  Bogardus  v.  Trinity  Church,  4  Paige,  178; 
Lawrence  v.  Pool,  2  Sandf.  S.  C.  540. 

ii  Galhigher  v.  Roberts,  1  Wash.  C.  C.  320; 
Rowley  v.  Williams,  5  Wis.  151;  Davison  v. 
Johnson,  16  N.  J.  Eq.  112. 

i  Ld.  Red.  301.  For  forms  of  orders  in  such 
cases,  see  Seton,  1258.  Nos.  12,  14. 

2  Ld.  Red.  301.  In  New  Jersev,  Chancellor 
Green,  in  Davison  v.  Johnson,  16  N.  J.  Eq.  112, 
113,  remarked  that,  when  the  cause  is  heard 


(a)  If  the  plaintiff  replies,  instead  of  setting 
the  plea  down  for  argument,  he  admits  its  va- 
liditv,  the  only  question  then  being  as  to  the 
truth  of  the  facts  alleged  in  the  plea.  Tomp- 
kins v.  Anthon,  4  Sandf.  Ch.  97;  Little  r.  Ste- 
phens, 82  Mich.  596:  Beals  v.  Illinois  &c.  R. 
Co.  1.33  U.  S.  290;  Bean  v.  Clark,  24  Blatch. 
264;  Cottle  ».  Krementz,  25  Fed.  Rep.  494; 
Wilson  v.  Wilson.  5  Ir.  Eq.  514.  In  the  Fed- 
eral Courts,  the  general  rule  that  a  replication 
to  a  plea  admits  its  sufficiency,  is  changed  by 
Equitv  Rule  33  ;  and  the  facts,  if  proved,  now 
692 


avail  the  defendant  only  so  far  as  in  Law  and 
Equitv  thev  ought  to  avail  him.  Pearce  v. 
Rice.  142  U.  S  28.  42.  If  he  sets  it  down  for 
argument,  he  admits,  the  truth  of  the  facts 
pleaded  therein,  and  objections  cannot  be  made 
to  its  regularity.  Wooster  v.  Muser,  20  Fed. 
Rep.  162  ;  Birdseye  v.  Heilner,  26  id.  147:  27  id. 
289  ;  Bu-  rell  v.  Hackley,  35  id.  833 ;  Kellner  V. 
Mutual  Life  Ins.  Co.  43  id.  623:  Rouskulp  r, 
Kershner,  49  Md.  516 ;  Foster  v.  Foster,  51  Vt. 
216;  Newton  v.  Thayer,  17  Pick.  129. 


SWEARING,    FILING,   SETTING    DOWN,   AND    ARGUING    PLEAS.      *  696 

He  should  not,  however,  reply  to  a  plea  of  the  dependency  of  a  former 
suit  for  the  same  matter.8 

If  the  plaintiff  reply  to  the  plea,  he  thereby  makes  as  full  an  admis- 
sion of  its  validity  as  if  it  had  been  allowed  upon  argument ;  so  that 
if  the  defendant,  at  the  hearing,  proves  his  plea  to  be  true,  the  bill 
must  be  dismissed.4  Therefore,  where  a  defendant,  in  a  plea  of  pur- 
chase for  a  valuable  consideration,  omitted  to  deny  notice,  and  the 
plaintiff  replied  to  it,  and  the  defendant,  at  the  hearing,  proved  the 
purchase  for  valuable  consideration,  it  was  held  that  the  bill  ought  to  be 
dismissed  ;  for  it  was  the  plaintiff's  own  fault  that  he  had  not  set  the 
plea  down  for  argument,  when  it  would  have  been  overruled.5  And  it 
seems  that  in  such  case  it  will  make  no  difference  if  the  plaintiff  should 
prove  notice  ;  for  all  that  is  required  of  a  defendant,  in  such  a  case,  is 
to  prove  his  plea,  which  he  does  by  proving  the  purchase,  and  the 
payment  of  the  consideration.5 

If  a  plea  to  the  whole  or  part  of  a  bill  is  not  set  down  for  argument 
within  three  weeks  after  the  filing  thereof  (exclusive  of  vacations),  and 
the  plaintiff  does  not  within  such  three  weeks  serve  an  order  for 
leave  to  amend  the  bill,  or  by  notice  in  writing  *  undertake  to  *  696 
reply  to  the  plea,  the  plea  is  to  be  held  good  to  the  same  extent, 
and  for  the  same  purposes,  as  in  the  case  of  a  plea  to  the  whole  or  part 
of  a  bill  allowed  upon  argument ; l  and  the  defendant  may  obtain  an 
order  as  of  course  for  the  plaintiff  to  pay  the  costs  of  the  plea,  and,  if 
the  plea  is  to  the  whole  bill,  the  costs  of  the  suit. 

Where  the  plea  is  to  the  whole  bill,  the  defendant  by  whom  it  was 
filed  may  at  any  time  after  the  expiration  of  the  three  weeks  obtain, 
as  of  course,  an  order  to  dismiss  the  bill.1     A   plea  to  the  whole  of  the 

upon    a   plea,   "  the   question    is   not    strictly  Michael,  2  Paige,  345 ;  6  Paige,  139.     Upon  a 

whether  the  plea  is  in  proper  form,  but  whether,  replication  to  a  plea,  nothing  is  in  issue  except 

in  the  language  of  the  statute, the  plea  be  good;  what  is  distinctly  averred  in  the  plea;  and  if 

that  is,  whether  upon  the  face  of  the  plea  it  that  is  established  at  the  hearing,  the  pica  is  a 

presents,  if  true,  a  valid  defence  to  the  action.  bar  to  so  much    of  the  bill  as  it  professes   to 

The    inquiry,  when  the   cause    is    heard    upon  cover.     Fish   v.   Miller,  5  Pai"-e,   26;  Cook  v. 

the  plea,  is  substantially  as  if   the  plaintiff  had  Mancius,  4  John.  Ch.  166.    The  replication  is 

demurred  to    the   plea.     The   question  is  not,  an    admission  of  the  sufficiency   of  the    facts 

whether  the  plea  is  true,  but  whether,  if  true,  pleaded,  as  a  bar,  if  true.     Hughes  r.  Blake  6 

it   is   a  good   defence.      This   is   the    obvious  Wheat.   472;    Bogaidus  v.  Trinity  Church,    4 

meaning  of  the  statute.     If  the  plaintiff  deems  Paige,  178;  Gernon  o.  Boccaline,  2  Wash.  C.  C. 

the  plea  bad,  the  case  goes  to  hearing  upon  the  199;  Fish  v.  Miller,  5  Paige,  26  ;   Rhode  Island 

plea.      If  he  conceives   the   plea   to   be  good,  r.  Massachusetts,  14  Peters,  210,  257;  Gallagher 

though  not  true,  he  takes  issue  upon    it,  and  v.  Roberts,  1  Wash.  C.C.  320.     And  this  with- 

proceeds,  as  in  case  of  an  answer."     "  The  sub-  out  reference  to  any  equity  arising  from  other 

ject  of  inquiry  is  not  the  mere  technical  form  facts   stated   in   the    bill.     Mvers   v.    Dorr,   13 

of  the  plea,  but  the  sufficiency  of  its  averments  Blatchf.  22;  Moore  r.  Holt,  3  Tenn.  Ch.  141. 
to  sustain  the  defence;  whether  it  is  good  both  5  Harris  v.  Ingledew,  3  P.  Wins.  94. 

in   form  and   in   substance;   whether,  namely,  1  Cons   Ord    XIV.   17;  Roberts  v.  Jones,  7 

assuming  all  the  facts  properly  set  out  in  the  Beav.  57.     As  to  an  irregular  amendment  after 

plea  to  be  true,  it  represents  a  valid  defence."  the  above  time,  see  Campbell  v.  Joyce,  L.  R.  2 

See  McEwen  t>.  Broadhead,  11  N.  J.  Eq.  129.  Eq.  377,  V.  C.  W.     See  the  38th  Equity  Rule 

3  Jones  v.  Segueira,  1  Phil.  82,  84;  6  Jur.  of  the  U.  S.  Courts,  post,  p.  2384.  In  Massa- 
183;  Cons.  Ord.  XIV.  6,  7;  ante,  pp.  637,  692.  chusetts,  "the  plaintiff  may  set  down  the  plea 

4  Daniels  v.  Taggart,  1  Gill  &  J.  311;  to  be  argued,  or  take  issue  on  the  plea,  within 
Meeker  v.  Marsh,  Saxton  (N.  J.),  198;  Ken-  fifteen  days  from  the  time  when  the  same  is 
nedy  v.  Creswell,  101  U.  S.  641;  Dows  v.  Mc-  filed;  and  if  he  fail  to  do  so,  a  decree  dismiss- 

693 


*  697  PLEAS. 

relief,  but  only  to  a  part  of  the  discovery,  is  not  a  plea  to  the  whole  bill 
within  the  meaning  of  this  rule.2 

If  the  plaintiff  undertakes  to  reply  to  a  plea  to  the  whole  bill,  he  is 
not,  without  the  special  leave  of  the  Court,  to  take  any  proceeding 
against  the  defendant  by  whom  the  plea  was  filed  till  after  replication  ; 8 
and  if  he  does  not  file  his  replication  within  four  weeks  after  the  date 
of  his  undertaking,  the  defendant  may  move,  upon  notice,  to  dismiss 
the  bill  for  want  of  prosecution.4 

The  times  of  vacation  are  not  reckoned  in  the  computation  of  the 
time  for  setting  down  pleas  : 6  and  if  the  time  expires  on  a  day  on  which 
the  offices  are  closed,  the  plea  may  be  set  down  on  the  day  on  which 
they  next  open.6 


Section  V.  —  Allowing  Pleas. 

If  a  plea  is  allowed  simply,  it  is  thereby  determined  to  be  a  full  bar 
to  so  much  of  the  bill  as  it  covers,  if  the  matter  pleaded,  with  the  aver- 
ments necessary  to  support  it,  be  true.7  If,  therefore,  a  plea  is  allowed 
upon  argument,  or  the  plaintiff  without  argument  thinks  it,  though  good 
in  form  and  substance,  not  true  in  point  of  fact,  he  may  take  issue  upon 

it,  and  proceed  to  disprove  the  facts  upon  which  it  is  endeav- 
♦697    ored  to  be  supported.8     This  he  does  *by  filing  a  replication,  in 

the  same  manner  that  he  would  do  if  the  defendant  had  simply 
put  in  an  answer  to  the  bill,  in  the  usual  way.1 

Where  the  defendant  pleads  the  pendency  of  another  suit,  the  plain- 
tiff ought  not  to  reply  to  the  plea,  even  if  he  disputes  the  fact,  but  he 
should,  on  motion  or  petition  of  course,  obtain  an  order  for  an  inquiry 
into  the  truth  thereof'2  This  order,  and  a  certificate  in  pursuance 
thereof,  should  be  obtained  within  one  month  from  the  filing  of  the 
plea :  otherwise,  the  defendant  may  obtain,  on  motion  or  petition  of 
course,  an  order  to  dismiss  the  bill  with  costs.3 

When  the  plaintiff  has  replied  to  a  plea,  its  validity  can  never  be 
questioned,  but  only  its  truth : 4  in  fact,  nothing  but  the  matters  con- 
tained in  the  plea,  as  to  so  much  of  the  bill  as  the  plea  covers,  is  in 

ing  the  bill,  with  costs,  may  be  entered  upon  8  Ld.  Red.  301;  Bassett  v.  Salisbury  Manuf. 

motion,  unless  good  cause  appear  to  the  con-  Co.  43  N.  H.  253. 

trary."     Equity  Rule  11.  1  See  post,  Chap.  XXI.  Replication  ;  United 

2"  Neck  v.  Gains,  1  De  G.  &  S.  223;  HJur.  States  r.  Dalles  Military  Road  Co.  140  U.  S. 

763.     For  forms  of  motion  paper  and  petition,  599,  617. 

see  Vol.  III.  2  For  forms  of  motion  paper  and  petition, 

8  Cons.  Ord.  XIV.  18.  see  Vol.  III.     But  see  ante,  p.  637,  note. 

*  Cons.  Ord.  XXXIII.  10  (2).     For  form  of  3  Cons.  Ord.  XIV,  6,  7;  ante,  pp.  637,  692; 

notice  of  motion,  see  Vol.  III.  Baker  r.  Bird,  2  Ves.  Jr.  672;  Jones  v.  Segueira, 

5  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.  13  (3).  1  Phil.  82;  6  Jur.  183;  Leigh  v.  Turner,  14  W. 

6  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.  12.  R-  361,  M.  R.     For  forms  of  motion  paper  and 
"  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  697;  Bassett  v.  Salisbury  petition,  see  Vol.  III. 

Manuf.  Co.  43  N.  H.  253.     A  plea  may  be  good  4  Parker  v.   Blythmore,    Prec.   in   Ch.   58; 

in  part  and  bad  in  part.     Lord  Chelmsford  in  2  Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  70,  pi.  6  ;    Punsany  v.  Shaw, 

United  States   ».  McRae,   L.  R.  3  Ch.  79,  91;  5  Bro.  P.  C.  ed.  Toml.  262.  267;  McEwen  v. 

ante,  p.  611,  and  cases  in  note.  Broadhead,  11  N.  J.  Eq.  131. 

694 


ALLOWING    PLEAS.  *  698 

issue  between  the  parties.5  If,  therefore,  issue  is  thus  taken  upon  the 
plea,  the  defendant  must  prove  the  facts  which  it  suggests : 6  if  he  fails 
in  this  proof,  so  that,  at  the  hearing,  the  plea  is  held  to  be  no  bar,  and 
the  plea  extends  to  the  discovery  sought  by  the  bill,  the  plaintiff  is 
not  to  lose  the  benefit  of  that  discovery,  but  the  Court  will  order  the 
defendant  to  answer  the  interrogatories  ; 7  but  if  the  defendant  proves 
the  truth  of  the  matter  pleaded,  the  suit,  so  far  as  the  plea  extends, 
is  barred,  even  though  the  plea  is  not  good,  either  in  point  of  form  or 
substance.8 

Although,  when  a  plea  has  been  replied  to,  the  matter  in  issue  is  the 
truth  of  the  plea  only,  which  must  be  proved  by  the  defendant,  this 
will  not  prevent  the  plaintiff,  if  he  chooses,  from  entering  into  evidence 
to  prove  the  whole  case  made  by  his  bill.9  It  can  scarcely,  however, 
be  imagined,  that  a  case  should  ever  arise,  in  which  such  a  course  of 
proceeding,  on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff,  would  be  advisable,  especially 
as  this  Court  will  not,  as  we  have  seen,  in  the  event  of  the  plea 
being  found  false,  deprive  the  *  plaintiff  of  any  advantage  which  *  698 
he  might  have  had  from  a  discovery  by  the  defendant,  if  an 
answer  had  been  originally  put  in. 

The  plaintiff  may,  however,  if  he  pleases,  go  into  evidence  to  dis- 
prove the  plea ;  and  if  he  has,  in  his  bill,  alleged  any  matter  which,  if 
true,  may  have  the  effect  of  avoiding  the  plea,  such  as  notice  of  fraud, 
he  may,  after  replying  to  the  plea,  enter  into  evidence  in  support  of  his 
allegation.  And  where  the  plea  introduces  matter  of  a  negative  nature, 
such  as  denial  of  notice,  or  fraud,  it  will  be  necessary  for  him,  in  case 
sufficient  to  show  the  existence  of  the  notice  or  fraud,  is  not  admitted 
by  the  answer  in  support  of  the  plea,  to  go  into  evidence  in  support  of 
the  affirmative  of  the  proposition.- 

When  a  plea  is  allowed,  it  is  C'  sidered  as  a  full  answer ;  and  an 
injunction  obtained  till  answer  will  be  dissolved,  upon  application,  as  a 
matter  of  course.2 

Where  a  plea  to  the  whole  or  part  of  a  bill  is  allowed,  upon  argu- 
ment, the  plaintiff,  unless  he  undertakes  to  reply  to  the  plea,  or  the 
Court  otherwise  directs,  is  to  pay  to  the  party  by  whom  the  plea  is  filed 
the  costs  of  the  plea,  and,  if  the  plea  is  to  the  whole  bill,  the  costs  of 
the  suit  also  ;  and  in  such  last-mentioned  case  the  order  allowing  the 
plea  is  to  direct  the  dismissal  of  the  bill.3     Formerly,  upon  the  allow- 

6  Ld.  Red.  302;   Fish  v.  Miller,  5  Paige,  26.  Fish  v.  Miller.  5  Paige,  20;   Bogardus  v.  Trin- 

6  Where  a  plea  contains  several  distinct  ity  Church.  4  Paige.  178;  Peay  r.  Duncan,  20 
averments  or  allegations  of  fact,  all  the  allega-  Ark.  85;  Flagg  v.  Bonnel.  10  N.  J.  Eq.  82; 
tions  must  be  supported  by  the  proofs,  or  the  Dowstf.  McMichael,  6  Paige,  144;  ante,  p.  695, 
plea  will  be  overruled  as  false.     Dnws  r.  Mc-  n.  4. 

Michael,  6  Paige,  1.19.     Upon  the  hearing  on  9  Ord  o.  Huddleston,  2  Dick.  510,  512. 

the  defendant's  plea,  evidence  previously  taken  >  Eyre  r.  Dolphin,  2  Ball  &  B.  303;  Saun- 

bj'  the  defendant  cannot  be  considered  by  the  ders  v.  Leslie,  id.  515. 

Court.     Hancock  v.  Carlton,  6  Gray,  39.  2  Phillips  v.  Langhorn,  1  Dick.  148.    But  the 

7  Ld.  Red.  302 ;  Brownsword  p.  Edwards.  allowance  of  the  plea  does  not  ip*o  facto  oper- 
2  Ves-  Sr.  247  ;  Wood  v.  Strickland,  2  V.  &  B.  ate  as  a  dissolution  of  the  injunction.  Ferrand 
158.  v.  Hamer,  4  M.  &  C.  143. 

8  Ld.  Red.  302;  Harris  v.  Ingledew,  3  P.  3  Cons.  Ord.  XIV.  16.  Plea  allowed  with- 
Wms.  94;    Daniels  v.  Taggart,  Gill  &  J.  311;  out  costs,  and  with  liberty  to  amf-nd  bill.  Jones 

695 


*  699  PLEAS. 

aiice  of  a  plea  to  .the  whole  bill,  if  the  plaintiff  undertook  to  reply  to  it, 
he  had  to  pay  the  costs  of  the  plea,  but  the  other  costs  of  the  suit  were 
reserved  ; 4  now,  it  would  appear  that,  in  the  same  circumstances,  both 
the  costs  of  the  plea  and  the  costs  of  the  suit  will  be  reserved,  unless 
the  Court  makes  a  special  order.5 

A  solicitor  will  not  be  allowed  to  act  oppressively,  by  putting  in  two 
pleas  of  the  same  nature  for  two  defendants ;  and  where  a  solicitor  set 
down  two  pleas  for  want  of  parties,  on  behalf  of  different  defendants, 
he  was  allowed  the  costs  of  one  only.6 

If  a  plea  is  allowed,  it  is  not  uncommon  to  give  leave  to  the  plaintiff 
to  amend  his  bill ;  especially  in  the  case  of  a  plea  for  want  of  parties.7 
It  must  not  be  understood  that  this  is  a  matter  of  course  ; 8  it  will,  how- 
ever, probably  be  done  more  frequently  now  than  formerly :  because, 
under  the  present  practice,  a  plaintiff  may  introduce  facts  or  circum- 
stances which  have  occurred  after  the  institution  of  the  suit,  by 

*  699    way  of  amendment,  into  his  bill,  if  *  the  cause  is  otherwise  in 

such  a  state  as  to  allow  of  amendment  being  made  therein.1 
After  the  allowance  of  a  plea,  an  order  for  leave  to  amend  the  bill  is 
special ;  and  on  the  application  for  it,  the  plaintiff  must  specify  the 
amendments  he  intends  to  make.2 

Where  the  plea  went  to  the  plaintiff's  right  to  sue,  and  was  allowed 
leave  to  amend  the  bill  was  given,  on  payment  of  the  costs  of  plea;8 
but  where  it  was  for  want  of  parties,  the  costs  were  reserved  to  the 
hearing  of  the  cause.4 

Section  VI.  —  Saving  the  Benefit  of  a  Plea  to  the  Hearing. 

It  sometimes  happens  that,  upon  the  argument  of  a  plea,  the  Court 
considers  that  although,  as  far  as  then  appears,  it  may  be  a  good 
defence,  yet  there  may  be  matter  disclosed  in  evidence  which,  suppos- 
ing the  matter  pleaded  to  be  strictly  true,  would  avoid  it ;  in  such  case, 
the  Court,  in  order  that  it  may  not  preclude  the  question  by  allowing  the 
plea,  directs  that  the  benefit  of  it  shall  be  saved  to  the  defendant  at 
the  hearing.5  The  effect  of  such  an  order  is  to  give  the  plaintiff  an 
opportunity  of  replying,  and  going  into  evidence,  without  overruling 
the  plea.6    When  the  benefit  of  the  plea  is  reserved  to  the  hearing,  the 

v.  Binns,   33  Beav.   362;  10  Jur.  N.  S.    119;  3  Tudway  r.  Jones,  vbi  mpra. 

Metropolitan  Bank  r.  Offord,  I..  R.  10  Eq.  398.  *  Doyle   v.   Muntz,    5   Hare,  509,    518;   10 

4  Fry  r.  Richardson,  10  Sim.  475.  Jur.  914. 

5  Young  v.  White,  17  Beav.  532;  18  Jur.  5  Ld.  Red.  303.  Thus  in  Heartt  t.  Corning, 
277.  3  Paige,  572.  a  plea  of  settled  partnership  ac- 

6  Tarbuck  v.  Woodcock,  3  Beav.  289.  count  was  held  to  be  well  pleaded ;  but  as  facts 

7  Ld.  Red.  281.  For  form  of  order  in  snch  might  be  disclosed  justifying  a  decree  to  sur- 
case,  see  Seton,  1258,  Xo.  12.  charge  and  falsify,  the  benefit  of  it  was  saved 

8  Ante,  pp.  290.  419.  until  the  hearing.     To  have  allowed  it,  simply, 

1  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  53;   see  Tudway  v.      would  have  made  it  a  conclusive  bar. 

Jones,  1  K.  &  J.  691,  where  snch  an  order  "was  6  See  Cooth  v.  Jackson,  6  Ves.  12, 18.    When 

made.  the  plea  covers  the  whole  bill,  the  effect  of  the 

2  Taylor  r.  Shaw,  2  S.  &  S.  12:  Neck  v.  order,  that  the  plea  stand  over  till  the  hearing, 
Gains,  i  De  G.  &  S.  223;  11  Jur.  763;  post,  saving  to  the  defendant  the  benefit  thereof,  is 
p.  730,  see  Tompkins  v.  Hollister,  60  Mich.  470.  that  the  defendant  shall  not  be  deprived  of  the 

696 


ORDERING  A  PLEA  TO  STAND  FOR  AN  ANSWER. 


700 


interrogatories  to  such  part  of  the  bill  as  is  covered  by  the  plea  need  not 
be  answered.7 

Unless  anything  is  said  in  the  order  in  such  cases  with  respect  to  the 
costs  of  the  plea,  they  must  abide  the  result  of  the  hearing  ;  the  order 
saving  the  benefit  of  the  plea  to  the  hearing  being,  in  fact,  nothing  more 
than  an  order  for  the  adjournment  of  the  discussion.8 


*  Section  VII. —  Ordering  a  Plea  to  stand  for  an  Answer.  *  700 

If,  upon  argument,  the  Court  considers  that  the  matter  offered  by 
way  of  plea  may  be  a  defence,  or  part  of  a  defence,  but  that  it  has  been 
informally  pleaded,  or  is  not  properly  supported  by  the  answer,  so  that 
the  truth  is  doubtful,  it  will,  in  such  case,  instead  of  overruling  the  plea, 
direct  it  to  stand  for  an  answer.1 

If  a  plea  is  ordered  to  stand  for  an  answer,  it  is  allowed  to  be  a  suf- 
ficient answer  to  so  much  of  the  bill  as  it  covers,  unless,  by  the  order, 
liberty  is  given  to  the  plaintiff  to  except ;  2(«)  and  where  a  defendant 
pleaded  to  the  whole  bill,  and,  on  arguing  the  plea,  it  was  ordered  to 
stand  for  an  answer,  without  saying,  one  way  or  the  other,  whether  the 
plaintiff  might  except,  the  plaintiff  was  not  allowed  to  except :  because, 
by  the  terms  "  for  an  answer,"  in  the  order,  a  sufficient  answer  is 
meant,  an  insufficient  answer  being  no  answer.3  It  is  to  be  observed, 
that  if  a  plea  is  to  part  only  of  the  bill,  and  is  accompanied  by  an 
answer  to  the  rest,  an  order  that  it  may  stand  for  an  answer,  without 

benefit  of  his  plea,  but  that  the  plaintiff  shall 
be  at  liberty  to  file  a  replication,  and  proceed 
to  the  proof  of  the  facts  in  reply  to  the  plea;  and 
on  such  hearing,  the  plea  is  to  be  taken,  prima 
facie,  a  good  bar  to  the  suit;  but  as  there  may 
possibly  be  circumstances,  which,  in  Equity, 
ought  to  preclude  the  defendant  from  relying 
upon  such  plea,  the  question  is  left  open  un- 
til such  hearing.  Hancock  v.  Carlton,  6  Gray, 
54:  Astley  v.  Fountaine,  Cas.  temp.  Finch,  4  ; 
Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  698;  1  Barb.  Ch.  I'r.  121, 
122;  Bassett  v.  Salisbury  Manuf.  Co.  43  N.  H. 
253,  254.  Neither  party  recovers  costs  on  the 
argument  of  a  plea  where  the  benefit  of  it  is 
saved  to  the  defendant  until  the  hearing.  Heartt 
v.  Corning,  3  Paige,  5G6. 

1  Gilb.  For.  Rom.  64. 

8  As  to  this,  Chief  Baron  Gilbert  observes: 
"  But  if  the  words  are  to  save  the  benefit  of  the 
plea  till  the  hearing,  no  other  use  could  ever 
be  found  by  these  words,  but  that  in  truth  it 
saves  the  defendant  paying  costs  for  the  over- 
ruling his  plea;  and,  therefore,  though  the 
Court  often  makes  use  of  these  words,  yet, 
when  the  plea  is  very  faulty,  or  naught,  though 
the  Court  often  saves  the  benefit  thereof  till  the 


hearing,  yet  the}'  declare  it  shall  not  avoid  the 
payment  of  costs."     Gilb.  For.  Rom.  94. 

1  Ld.  Red.  303 ;  Tempest  v.  Lord  Camoys, 
W.  N.  (1866)  16;  14  W.  R.  326,  M.  R. ;  Pearse 
v.  Dobinson,  L.  R.  1  Eq.  241.  V.  C.  K. ;  Rob- 
erts v.  Le  Hir,  29  L.  T  N.  S.  873;  Mills  v. 
Bally,  W.  N.  (1866)  348;  15  W.  R.  86,  V.  C. 
W.;  Orcutt  v.  Orms,  3  Paige,  461;  French  v. 
Shotwell,  5  John.  Ch.  555;  Bell  v.  Woodward, 
42  N.  H.  193,  196;  Jarvis  v.  Palmer,  11  Paige, 
650;  Souzer  v.  De  Meyer,  2  Paige,  574;  Leay- 
craft  v.  Dempsey,  4  Paige,  129;  Brooks  r.  Sut- 
ton, L.  R.  5  Eq.  361;  S.  C.  3  Ch.  1.  If  the 
plea  is  ordered  to  stand  for  an  answer,  it  is 
allowed  to  be  a  sufficient  answer  to  so  much  of 
the  bill  as  it  covers,  unless  by  the  order  liberty 
is  given  to  the  plaintiff  to  except.  Kirby  v. 
Taylor,  6  John.  Ch.  242;  Orcutt  v.  Onus,  3 
Paige,  459;  Goodrich  v.  Pendleton,  3  John. 
Ch.  394;  Meeker  r.  Marsh,  Saxton  (N.  J.), 
198.  In  Orcutt  v  Orms,  it  was  said,  by  Chan- 
cellor Walworth,  that  the  answer  will  be  con- 
sidered as  a  fidl  answer,  though  not  necessarily 
a  perfect  defence. 

2  Ibid.  304. 
8  Sellon  v.  Lewen,  3  P.  Wms.  239. 


(a)  By  the  U.  S.  Equity  Rule  34,  the  de- 
fendant is  to  have  leave  to  answer  when  his 
plea  or  demurrer  is  overruled.  See  Dalzell  v. 
Dueber  W.  C.  M.  Co.  149  U.  S.  315;  Matthews 


v.  Lalance  Manuf.  Co.  18  Blatch.  84 ;  Wooster  v. 
Blake.  7  Fed.  Rep.  816;  Phelps  v.  Elliott,  30 
id.  396. 

697 


*  701  PLEAS. 

giving  the  plaintiff  liberty  to  except,  will  not  preclude  the  plaintiff  from 
excepting  to  the  answer  to  that  part  of  the  bill  which  is  not  covered  by 
the  plea.4 

The  order  for  the  plea  to  stand  for  an  answer  is,  however,  frequently 

accompanied  with  a  direction  that  the  plaintiff  shall  be  at  liberty  to 

except ; 5  but  the  liberty  is  sometimes  qualified,  so  as  to  protect  the 

defendant  from  any  particular  discovery  which  he  ought  not  to  be  called 

upon  to  make.6 

*  701        *  When  a  plea  has  been  ordered  to  stand  for  an  answer,  with 

liberty  to  except,  the  plaintiff  must,  if  the  Court  does  not  fix  a 
time  within  which  he  is  to  except,  file  his  exceptions  within  six  weeks 
from  the  date  of  the  order :  otherwise  the  answer  will  be  deemed  suffi- 
cient.1 The  proceedings  upon  the  exceptions  are  the  same  as  those 
upon  exceptions  to  answers  in  general.2 

When  a  plea  is  ordered  to  stand  for  an  answer,  the  question  of  costs 
ought  to  be  decided  at  the  time  the  order  is  made,  and  a  subsequent 
application  for  them  has  been  refused.8  It  seems  that,  generally,  the 
defendant  is  ordered  to  pay  the  costs  of  the  plea : 4  though  they  have 
been  made  costs  in  the  cause.5 


Section  VIII.  —  Overruling  Pleas. 

If  th°,  Court,  upon  argument,  is  of  opinion  that  the  plea  cannot,  under 
any  circumstances,  be  made  use  of  as  a  defence,  it  is  simply  overruled, 
and  the  defendant  is  to  pay  to  the  plaintiff  the  taxed  costs  occasioned 
thereby,  unless  the  Court  otherwise  directs.6  The  plaintiff  may  also,  if 
the  plea  has  been  to  the  whole  bill,  and  the  defendant's  time  for  answer- 
ing the  bill  has  expired,  issue  an  attachment  for  want  of  an  answer,7 

4  Coke  v.  Wilcocks,  Mos.  73;  Ld.  Red.  304.  2  For  the  practice,  see  post,  Chap.  XVII.  §  4, 

8  See  Glover  v.  Weedon,  3  Jur.  N.  S.  903,  Exceptions  to  Answers. 

V.  C.  S.,  where  leave  to  amend  was  also  given;  3  Yarnall  v.  Rose,  2  Keen.  326. 

and  see  Seton,  1258,  No.  14.  4  Howling  v.  Butler,  2  Mad.  245;   Thomp- 

In   Dear  v.  Webster,  15  W.  R.  395,  where  son  ?•.  Wild,  5  Mad.  82,  83;  Mansell  v.  Feeney, 

the  plaintiff  did  not  desire  to  except,  leave  to  ubi  supra. 

put   in  a  further  answer  was  given  to  the  de-  5  Hunt    v.     Penrice,    17    Beav.     525;     18 

fendant.    And  see  Brien  v.  Jordan,  1  Tenn.  Ch.  Jur.  4. 

625,  where  leave  was  given  to  both  parties  to  6  Cons.  Ord.  XIV.  12.     See  Hubbell  v.  De 

apply,    the  one   to  make  further  answer,    the  Land,  11  Biss.  382. 

other  to  except.  7  Hinde,   224.     As    to  overruling  plea  as 

6  Ld.  Red.  304;  Alardes  r.  Campbel,  Bunb.  frivolous,  see  Bowman  v.  Marshall,  9  Paige, 
265;  Brereton  v.  Gamul,  2  Atk.  241;  Pusey  v.  78;  1  Barb.  Ch.  Pr.  123.  In  Massachusetts,  "  if 
Desbouvrie,  3  P.  Wins.  315,  322;  King  v.  Hoi-  a  plea  is  overruled,  no  other  plea  shall  be  re- 
combe,  4  Bro.  C.  C.  439,  440  ;  Bayley  v.  Adams,  ceived,  but  the  defendant  shall  proceed  to  answer 
6  Ves.  586,  599  ;  Pearse  v.  Dobinson,  L.  R.  1  the  plaintiff's  bill ;  and  if  he  shall  fail  to  do  so 
Eq.  241  ;  L.  R.  3  Ch.  1:  Sellon  v.  Lewen,  3  P.  within  one  month,  the  plaintiff  may  enter  an 
Wms.  239  ;  McCormick  v.  Chamberlin,  11  order  that  the  same,  or  so  much  thereof  as  is 
Paisje,  543-,  Bassett  v.  Salisbury  Manuf.  Co.  covered  by  the  plea,  be  taken  for  confessed;  and 
43  N.  H.  254;  Bell  v.  Woodward,  42  N.  H.  the  matter  thereof  may  be  decreed  accordingly, 
195   196.  unless  good   cause   appear  to  the    contrary." 

i  Cons.  Ord.  XVI.  6;   see  Esdaile  V.  Moly-  Equity  Rule  12.     In   Rule   13,  it  is  provided, 

neux,  2  Coll.  641.     A  less  time  is  frequently  that  "upon  a  plea  being  overruled,  oradjudged 

fixed;   see  Mansell  v.  Feeney,  2  J.  &  H.  313,  good,  the  party  prevailing  upon  the  question 

where  one  week  only  was  given.  shall  recover  full  costs  from  the  time  of  filing 

698 


OVERRULING    PLEAS.  *  702 

unless  the  defendant  has  obtained,  either  from  the  Court  at  the  hear- 
ing, or  from  the  Judge  at  Chambers,  an  extension  of  time  to  answer :  in 
which  case,  the  attachment  must  not  be  issued  till  the  extended  time  for 
answering  has  expired.  The  plaintiff  may  also,  if  he  does  not  require 
an  answer,  immediately  file  a  traversing  note,  unless  the  Court  has 
given  time  to  the  defendant  to  answer  :  in  which  case,  if  the  defendant 
does  not  file  his  answer  within  the  time  allowed,  the  plaintiff  may  file 
the  note  at  the  expiration  of  the  time.8 

The  effect  of  overruling  a  plea  is  to  impose  upon  the  defendant 
the  necessity  of  making  a  new  defence.     This  he  may  do,  *  either    *  702 
by  a  new  plea,  or  by  an  answer ;  and  the  proceedings  upon  the 
new  defence  will  be  the  same  as  if    it  had  been  originally  made.1  (a) 

It  is  said,  in  some  of  the  books  of  practice,  that  after  a  plea  has  been 
overruled,  a  new  defence  may  be  made  by  demurrer ;  and  such  a  de- 
murrer (which  was  upon  the  ground  that  the  discovery  would  subject 
the  defendant  to  pains  and  penalties)  has  been  permitted.2  This  oc- 
curred under  the  old  practice,  under  which,  provided  a  defendant  was 
not  in  contempt,  or  had  not  obtained  an  order  for  time,  he  might  have 
put  in  a  demurrer  at  any  time ;  but,  under  the  present  practice,  this 
would  be  nearly  impossible,  unless  by  special  leave  of  the  Court :  since 
twelve  days  only,  from  appearance,  are  allowed  to  a  defendant  to  demur 
alone  to  any  bill.3  A  demurrer  to  part  of  the  bill  may,  however,  still  be 
put  in,  in  cases  where  the  whole  time  allowed  by  the  orders  to  plead, 
answer,  or  demur,  not  demurring  alone,4  has  not  elapsed  at  the  time  of 
the  plea  being  overruled  ;  or  where  an  order  for  additional  time  for  the 
same  purpose  has  been  obtained.  But  under  an  order  for  time  to  answer 
alone,  such  a  defence  cannot,  it  is  apprehended,  be  put  in.5 

We  have  seen  before  that,  after  a  plea  has  been  overruled,  a  defendant 
cannot  demur  ore  tenns.6 

The  rule  with  regard  to  pleading  again,  must  be  understood  with  this 
qualification,  namely,  that  the  second  plea  must  not  be  upon  the  same 
ground  as  the  first ; 7  therefore,  it  is  held  that  only  one  plea  to  the  juris- 
diction can  be  allowed.8 

such  plen,  unless  the  Court  shall  otherwise  spe-  Hunter  v.  NnckolcU,  2   Phil.  540,  544;  12  Jur. 

cially  order."  149;  Ante,  p.  690. 
8  Cons.  Ord.  XIII.  4;  ante,  p.  515.  6  Ante,  p.  588. 

1  On  overruling  a  plea,  leave  was  given  to  7  Where  a  plea  has  been  overruled  on  the 
the  defendant  to  plead  de  novo,  and  to  plain-  merits,  the  same  matter  cannot  be  set  up  in  the 
tiff  to  amend  his  bill.  Chadwick  v.  Broadwood,  answer,  as  a  bar  to  the  suit,  without  the  special 
3  Beav.  316.  permission  of  the  Court.     Townshend  r.  Towns- 

By  the  Code  of   Tennessee,  §  4395,  upon  a  hend,  3  Paige,  413;  see  Goodrich  v.  Pendleton, 

plea  or  demurrer  overruled,  no  other  plea  or  4  John.  Ch.  549;  Coster  v.  Murray,  7  John.  Ch. 

demurrer  shall  be  received,  but  the  defendant  167;  Robertson  v.  Lubbock,  4  Sim    161;  Bush 

shall  answer  the  allegations  of  the  bill.  v.  Bush,  1  Strobh.  377;  Piatt  v.  Oliver,  1   Mc- 

2  East  India  Co.  v.  Campbell,  1  Ves.  Sr.  Lean,  295;  Ringgold  v.  Stone,  20  Ark.  526. 
246.  Pentlarge  v.  Pentlarge,  22  Fed.  Rep.  412. 

3  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.  3;  ante,  p.  591.  «  Wyatfs  P.  R.  325.  It  is  said,  in  the  same 
*  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.  4,  5.  work,  p.  330,  that  if  outlawry  or  other  matter 
5  Brooks  v.  Purton,  1  Y.  &  C.  C.  C.  278;      be  pleaded,  and  the  plea  is  overruled,  no  other 


(a)  The  defendant  should  be  allowed  a  rea-  ment  has  been  overruled,  appear  to  be  a  waiver 

sonable  time  to  answer.     Cunningham  r.  Camp-  of  the  plea.     Wilson  v.  Scruggs,  7  Lea  (Tenn.), 

bell,  3  Tenn.  Ch.  488.     Filing  an  answer  and  635. 
defending  upon  the  merits,  after  a  plea  in  abate- 

699 


703 


PLEAS. 


*  703     *  Section  IX.  —  Amending  Pleas,   and  Pleading  de  novo. 

It  sometimes  happens,  that  where  there  is  a  material  ground  of  de- 
fence disclosed  in  the  plea,  but  owing  to  some  evident  slip  or  mistake, 
the  plea  has  not  been  correctly  framed,  the  Court,  in  this  respect  fol- 
lowing the  Courts  of  Law,  will  exercise  a  discretion  in  allowing  the  plea 
to  be  amended.1  Thus  where  a  plea,  which  in  substance  showed  a  de- 
fect of  parties,  instead  of  stating  that  additional  parties  were  necessary 
and  naming  them,  prayed  judgment  whether  the  defendant  ought  to  be 
called  upon  for  further  answer,  Lord  Erskine,  upon  the  argument,  in- 
stead of  overruling  the  plea,  on  the  ground  of  informality,  gave  the 
defendant  leave  to  amend  it.2  And  so,  where  an  error  in  a  plea  of  out- 
lawry was  occasioned  by  the  Clerk  of  the  Outlawries,  who,  instead  of  a 
copy  of  the  record  of  the  outlawry,  or  of  the  capias  utlagatnm,  gave  a 
certificate  of  the  outlawry,  which  was  annexed  to  the  plea,  the  Court 
allowed  the  defendant  to  amend  his  plea,  by  annexing  to  it  a  copy  of 
the  exigent,  or  record  of  the  outlawry.3  And  so,  where  the  Court  of 
Exchequer  thought  that  the  negative  averments  in  a  plea  were  too  special 
and  precise,  the  same  matter  being  also  denied  by  the  answer  in  support 
of  the  plea,  they  gave  the  defendant  leave  to  amend  his  plea  by  striking 
out  the  special  averments.4  It  has,  however,  been  held,  that  leave  to 
amend  a  plea  should  not  be  given  when  it  is  supported  by  an  answer.5 
A  short  time  is  generally  limited,  within  which  the  amendment  must  be 
made,  (a) 


plea  shall  be  after  pleaded  :  but  the  defendant 
must  answer.  This,  however,  mu't  be  meant 
to  apply  to  other  pleas  of  the  same  matter;  see 
Rowley  v.  Eccles,  1  S.  &  S.  511,  513,  where  Sir 
John  L°ach  V.  C.  appears  to  have  held,  that 
after  a  plea  is  overruled,  a  defendant  cannot 
put  in  a  second  plea  without  leave  of  the  Court. 
Where,  to  a  bill  to  set  aside  an  agreement  and 
release,  stating  circumstances  of  fraud  and  du- 
ress, the  defendant  pleaded  the  agreement  and 
release  to  the  whole  bill,  without  denying  the 
fraud  and  duress,  and  the  plea  was,  upon  that 
ground,  overruled,  whereupon  the  defendant 
put  in  Another  plea,  insisting  upon  the  same 
release  as  a  bar  to  the  relief,  and  also  to  so 
much  of  the  discovery  as  related  to  transactions 
prior  to  the  agreement,  accompanied  by  an  an- 
swer as  to  the  circumstances  of  fraud  and  duress, 
this  was  held  to  be  irregular.  Freeland  r.  John- 
son, 1  Anst.  276;  2  Anst.  407. 

"There  is  no  rule  more  firmly  settled  than 
that  a  defendant  having  put  in  one  plea,  and 
that  plea  having  been  overruled,  cannot  put 
in  another  plea  without  special  leave  of  the 
Court."  Per  Malins  V.  C,  who  ordered  a  second 
plea  coupled  with  an  answer  to  be  taken  from 
the  file,  with  costs.  McKewan  v.  Sanderson, 
L.  R.  16  Eq.  316. 


1  Clayton  v.  Meadows,  2  Hare,  26;  Cooker. 
Cooke,  L.  R.  4  Eq.  77;  Beanies  on  Pleas,  321; 
see  Meeker  v.  Marsh,  Saxton  (N.  J.),  198; 
Newl.  Ch.  Pr.  121;  Leaycraft  i\  Dempsey,  4 
Paige,  126;  Bell  v.  Woodward,  42  N.  H.  181, 
196;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §§  894-896;  Smith  r.  Bab- 
cock,  3  Sumner,  583 ;  Newman  v.  Wallis,  2  Bro. 
C.  C.  (Perkins's  ed.)  147,  note  (c),  and  cases 
cited.  Amendments  are  in  the  discretion  of 
the  Court,  Smith  v.  Babcock,  3  Sumner,  583 ; 
but  their  discretion,  in  this  respect,  is  regulated 
by  rules  known  in  the  Courts.  Jefferson  v. 
Cullis,  4  Dana,  467. 

2  Merrewether  t\  Mellish,  13  Ves.  435;  Ser- 
grove  v.  Mayhew,  2  M.  &  G.  97,  99.  As  to 
amendment  of  the  statement  of  defence  under 
the  present  English  practice,  see  1  Dan.  Ch. 
Prac.  (6th  Eng.  ed.)  510. 

3  Waters  v.  Mayhew,  1  S.  &  S.  220,  224; 
ante,  p.  688. 

4  Pope  v.  Bish,  1  Anst.  59 ;  see  Edmundt-on 
v.  Hartley,  id.  97. 

5  Thompson  v.  Wild,  5  Mad.  82.  But  see 
Greene  v.  Harris,  11  R.  I.  5,  where  the  exact 
extent  of  the  decision  is  stated,  and  several 
authorities  are  cited  to  show  that  the  plea  and 
answer,  one  or  both,  have  frequently  been  al- 
lowed to  be  amended. 


(a)  As  the  plea  must  be  confined  to  a  sinrle  different    issues  will  not   usually   be   allowed, 

issue  unless  special  leave  is  obtained  to  pi<ad  especially  after  long  delay.     Giant  Powder  Co. 

double,  an  amendment  of  a  plea  so  as  to  raise  t'.  Safety  Nitro  Powder  Co.  19  Fed.  Rep.  509. 
700 


AMENDING    PLEAS,    AND    PLEADING    DE   NOVO. 


705 


It  has  also  happened,  that  where  a  plea  has  offered  a  substantial  de- 
fence, but  has  been  so  informally  pleaded  that  it  would  be  difficult  or 
impossible  to  amend  it,  the  Court,  instead  of  allowing  the  defendant  to 
amend  his  plea,  has  given  him  leave  to  withdraw  it  altogether,  and  plead 
de  novo  within  a  given  time.6 

*  Liberty  to  amend,  or  to  plead  de  novo,  however,  will  only  be    *  704 
granted  in  cases  where  there  is  an  apparent  good  ground  of  de- 
fence disclosed  by  the   plea,  but  owing  to  some  accident  or  mistake,  it 
has  been  informally  pleaded  :  where  a  substantial  ground  of  defence  has 
been  omitted,  such  permission  will  not  be  given.1 

Although,  where  the  error  is  very  palpable,  the  Court  will  give  the 
defendant  leave  to  amend  at  the  argument  of  the  plea,  the  most  usual 
course  is  for  the  defendant  to  move  subsequently  for  leave  to  amend  his 
plea.  This  form  of  proceeding  is  rendered  necessary  by  the  circum- 
stance, that  the  Court  always  requires  to  be  told  precisely  what  the 
amendment  is  to  be,  and  how  the  slip  happened,  before  it  will  allow  the 
amendment  to  take  place ;  and  this  must,  in  general,  be  done  by  affidavit 
in  support  of  the  motion.2 

With  respect  to  the  costs  to  be  paid  by  the  plaintiff,  upon  the 
*  allowance  of  an  amended  plea,1  it  has  been  decided  that  the  de-    *  705 
fendant  is  not  entitled  to  the  costs  of  correcting  his  own  mistake, 
but  he  is  entitled  to  the  costs  which  he  would  have  had,  if  the  plea 
which  was  allowed  had  been  the  plea  which  was  first  filed. 


6  Nobkissen  v.  Hastings,  2  Ves.  Jr  84,  87; 
4  Bro.  C.  C  253;  Watkins  v.  Stone,  2  S.  &  S. 
560,  573.  On  overruling  a  plea,  leave  was  given 
to  defendant  to  plead  de  novo,  and  plaintiff  to 
amend  his  bill.  Chadwick  v.  Broudwood,  3 
Beav.  316.  A  defendant  in  a  bill  of  revivor 
cannot  plead  to  the  original  bill  a  plea  which 
has  been  pleaded  by  the  original  defendant  and 
overruled.  Dows  V.  McMichael,  2  Paige,  245; 
Souzer  v.  De  Meyer,  id.  574;  but  if  a  plea  has 
been  put  in,  and  the  original  defendant  has  died 
before  argument,  the  defendant  to  a  bill  of  revi- 
vor may  plead  the  same  matter  de  novo.  1  Barb. 
Ch.  Pr*  125;  1  Hoff.  Ch.  Pr.  389;  1  Smith  Ch. 
Pr..(2d  Am.  ed.)229. 

1  Thus,  where  the  bill  sought  to  set  aside  an 
agreement  and  release,  stating  circumstances  of 
imposition  and  equitable  duress  in  obtaining 
them,  and  the  defendant  put  in  a  plea  of  the 
agreement  and  release  to  the  whole  bill,  without 
denying  the  fraud  or  duress,  either  by  aver- 
ments or  by  answer,  the  Court  of  Exchequer 
refused  to  give  the  defendant  leave  to  amend. 
Freeland  v.  Johnson,  1  Anst.  276:  2  Anst.  407, 
411;  and  see  Hewitt  v.  Hewitt,  11  VV.  R.  849, 
V.  C.  K. 

2  Newman  v.  Wallis,  2  Bro.  C.  C.  143,  147; 


Wyatt's  P.  R.  340;  Wood  v.  Strickland,  2  V. 
&  B.  150,  157;  Jackson  v.  Rowe,  4  Russ.  514, 
524.  In  Nabob  of  Arcot  v.  East  India  Company 
(3  Bro.  C.  C.  292.  300  ;  S.  C.  nom.  Nabob  of  the 
Carnatic  v.  East  India  Co.  1  Ves.  Jr.  371,388; 
2  id.  56),  Lord  Thurlow  refused  to  entertain  the 
question,  whether  the  plea  might  be  amended 
or  nut  upon  the  argument,  because  no  motion 
had  been  made  on  the  subject;  and  he  said  that 
he  should  expect  that,  whenever  such  a  motion 
should  be  made,  the  form  of  the  plea  intended 
to  be  put  in  should  be  laid  before  the  Court :  for 
amendments,  when  moved,  ought  to  be  stated, 
that  the  Court  may  see  whether  it  is  material 
that  the  cause  should  be  delayed  for  the  purpose 
of  admitting  them.  It  is  to  be  remarked,  that  at 
a  subsequent  period,  after  the  plea  in  the  above 
case  had  been  overruled,  the  defendants  applied 
by  motion  for  leave  to  amend  the  plea,  or  to 
plead  anew,  but  that  the  Lord  Chancellor  re- 
fused the  motion  on  the  ground  as  appears  from 
the  marginal  note  of  one  of  the  reporters,  that 
the  plea  had  been  amended  before.  1  Ves.  Jr. 
372,  393. 

1  Per  Sir  James  Wigram  V.  C.  in  Clayton  v. 
Meadows,  2  Hare,  26,  33. 

701 


*706  *  CHAPTER  XVI. 

DISCLAIMERS. 

A  disclaimer  is,  where  a  defendant  denies  that  he  has  or  claims  any- 
right  to  the  thing  in  demand  by  the  plaintiff's  bill,  and  disclaims,  that 
is  renounces,  all  claim  thereto.1 

It  has  been  before  stated,  that  where  a  person  who  has  no  interest  in 
the  subject-matter  of  the  suit,  and  against  whom  no  relief  is  prayed,  is 
made  a  party,  the  proper  course  for  him  to  adopt,  if  he  wishes  to  avoid 
the  discovery,  is  to  demur,  unless  the  bill  states  that  he  has  or  claims 
an  interest :  in  which  case,  as  a  demurrer,  which  admits  the  allegations 
in  the  bill  to  be  true,  will  not  of  course  hold,  he  should,  except  in  cases 
of  partial  discovery  (to  which,  as  will  be  presently  shown,  he  may 
object  by  answer),  avoid  putting  in  a  full  answer,  by  plea  or  disclaimer.2 
Therefore,  where,  instead  of  disclaiming  he  supported  the  plaintiff's  case, 
but  was  held  not  entitled  to  any  part  of  the  relief  given  to  the  plaintiff, 
he  was  left  to  bear  his  own  costs.3  . 

A  disclaimer,  however,  cannot  often  be  put  in  alone ;  for  although, 
if  a  plaintiff,  from  a  mistake,  makes  a  person  a  party  to  a  suit  who  is  in 
no  way  interested  in  or  liable  to  be  sued  touching  the  matters  in  question, 
a  simple  disclaimer  by  such  person  might  be  good,  yet,  as  it  is  possible 
that  the  defendant  may  have  had  an  interest  which  he  may  have  parted 
with,  the  plaintiff  has  a  right  to  require  an  answer,  sufficient  to  ascertain 
whether  that  is  the  fact  or  not ;  and  if  a  defendant  has  had  an  interest 
which  he  has  parted  with,  an  answer  may  also  be  necessary  to  enable  the 
plaintiff  to  make  the  proper  person  a  party,  instead  of  the  defendant.4 

A  defendant  cannot  shelter  himself  from  answering,  by  alleging  that 

he  has  no  interest  in  the  matter  of  the  suit,  in  cases  where,  though 

*  707    he  may  have  no  interest,  others  may  have  an  interest  in  it  *  against 

him  ;  he  cannot  disclaim  his  liability; l  (a)  therefore,  a  party  to.an 

1  Wyatt's  P.  R.  175;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  838,  under  the  statutory  jurisdiction,  divest  himself 
et  seq.;  Bentley  v.  Cowman,  6  Gill  &  J.  162.  of  an  estate  in   lands;  see  Re  Ellison,  2  Jur. 

A  disclaimer  can  only  extend  to  matters  in  N.  S.  62,  V.  C.  W.;    Foster  v.  Dawber,  1   Dr. 

issue  in  the  suit,  and  where  it  was  filed  in  a  &  Sm.  172. 

foreclosure   suit ;  it  was   held   that   it   did   not  3  Rackham  v.  Siddall,  1  M'N.  &  G.  607, 

operate  so  as  to  enlarge  the  estate  of  the  plain-  625. 

tiff.     Burrell  v.  Smith,  L.  R.  7  Eq.  399.  4  I-d.  Red.  318;  Oxenham  V.  Esdaile,  M'L. 

2  Ante,  p.  284.  A  defendant  may  also,  in  a  &  Y.  540 ;  Walters  v.  Northern  Coal  M.  Co. 
suit,  disclaim  by  his  counsel  at  the  bar.      Teed  1  W.  R.  383. 

t7.  Carruthers,  2  Y.  &  C.  C.  C.  31,  38;  6  Jur.  l  A   defendant   cannot  by  disclaiming  de- 

987.     It  seems   doubtful  whether  he  can   by      prive  the  plaintiff  of  the  right  to  require  a  full 
such  a  disclaimer,   in   the   case   of  a   petition      answer  from  him,  unless  it  is  evident  that  the 


(a)  His   disclaimer  will   be   ordered  to   be      answer.      Isham  v.  Miller,  44  N.  J.  Eq.  61; 
taken  from  his  files,  where  it  is  his  duty  to      Bromberg  v.  Heyer,  69  Ala.  22. 
702 


DISCLAIMERS.  *  708 

account  cannot,  by  disclaiming  an  interest  in  the  account,  protect  him- 
self, by  such  disclaimer,  from  setting  out  the  account.'2  Nor,  when  the 
bill  seeks  to  charge  the  defendant  with  the  costs  of  the  cause,  can  he,  by 
disclaiming  all  interest  in  the  subject  of  the  suit,  evade  giving  a  discovery 
of  those  facts  by  which  the  plaintiff  seeks  to  substantiate  his  charge.3 
So,  if  fraud  is  charged  against  the  defendant  seeking  to  disclaim,  and 
interrogatories  have  been  filed,  a  disclaimer  alone  is  insufficient,  and  an 
answer  must  be  given  to  the  imputed  fraud ; 4  and  it  seems  that,  in  such 
a  case,  although  no  personal  decree  can  in  general  be  made  against  a 
married  woman,  still  she  must  answer  fully ;  though  it  does  not  seem 
clear  how  far  her  answer  can  ultimately  be  used  as  evidence  against 
her.5 

It  is  to  be  observed  also,  that  a  disclaimer  by  one  defendant  cannot, 
in  any  case,  be  permitted  to  prejudice  the  plaintiff's  right  as  against  the 
others ;  and,  therefore,  where  a  bill  was  filed  against  the  lessees  of  tithes, 
under  a  parol  demise,  for  an  account,  and  the  lessor,  who  was  made  a 
defendant  thereto,  disclaimed,  the  disclaimer  of  the  lessor  was  not  per- 
mitted to  prejudice  the  rights  of  the  plaintiff  against  the  lessees,  and  a 
decree  was  made  against  them  ;  although  the  plaintiff  had,  upon  the 
disclaimer  coming  in,  himself  dismissed  the  bill  against  the  lessor 
with  costs.6  Where  a  defendant  claims  any  rights  against  his  co-de- 
fendants, though  not  against  the  plaintiff,  he  should  reserve  such 
rights  by  his  disclaimer;  for  if  his  disclaimer  is  absolute,  the  Court 
will  only  determine  the  rights  and  interests  of  the  other  parties  ;  and 
will  not  consider  any  question  which  may  arise  between  him  and  his 
co-defendants.7 

Though  a  disclaimer  is,  in  substance,  distinct  from  an  answer,  yet 
it  is,  in  point  of  form,  an  answer,  containing  simply  an  assertion  that 
the  defendant  disclaims  all  right  and  title  to  the  matter  in  demand  ;  (b) 
and  in  order  to  entitle  the  defendant  to  be  dismissed  with  costs,  the 
disclaimer  should  state  that  the  defendant  "does  not  and  never  did 
claim,  and  that  he  disclaims,  all  right  and  title  in  the  subject- 
matter  of  the  suit." 8  Lord  Redesdale  observes,  *  that  in  some  *  708 
instances,  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  a  simple  disclaimer  may 

defendant  should  not,  after  the  disclaimer,  be  6  Williams  v.  Jones,  Younge,  252,  255. 

continued   a  party  to   the  suit.     Ellsworth  v.  7  Jolly  v.  Arbuthnot,  4  De  G.  &  J.  224;    5 

Curtis,  10  Paige,  105.  Jur.  N.  S.  680;  26  Reav.  283  ;  5  Jur.  N.  S.  80. 

2  Glassington  v.  Thwaites,  2  Russ.  458,  462;  8  Vale  v.  Merideth,  18  Jur.  992,  V.  C.  W. 
De  Beauvoir  v.  Rhodes,  cited  3  M.  &  C.  643;  A  defendant  having  the  same  interest  as  the 
Dobree  v.  Nicholson,  22  L.  T.  N.  S.  775.  plaintiff,  should,  if  he  disapprove  of  the  suit, 

3  Graham  v.  Coape,  3  M.  &  C.  638,  643  ;  distinctly  repudiate  it :  otherwise,  the  bill  may 
9  Sim.  93,  103.  be  dismissed   as   against   him,    without   costs, 

*  Bulkeley  v.  Dunbar,  1  Anst.  37.  and  with   costs  as  against  the  other  defond- 

5  Whiting  v.  Rush,  2  Y.  &  C.  Ex.  546,  552;      ants.    Winthrop  v.  Murray,  14  Jur.  302,  V.  C. 

Pemberton  v.  M'Gill,  1  Jur.  N.  S.  1045,  V.  C.      Wigram. 

W.;   and  see  Silcock  v.  Roynon,  2  Y.  &  C.  C. 

C.  376;  7  Jur.  548;  and  ante,  p.  185. 

(6)  A    disclaimer    may   be    an   "answer"  plaintiff's  right,  and   a  denial  of  any  assertion 

within   the    meaning  of    an  order  of    court.  of  title  on  the  defendant's  part,  a  disclaimer  is 

Anon.  3  L.  J.  Ch.  94.      But  in  general,  being  not  regarded  as  an  answer  or  defensive  plea, 

merely  an  admission  upon   the  record  of  the  Herring  v.  Swain,  84  Texas,  523. 

703 


*  709  DISCLAIMERS. 

perhaps  be  sufficient,  but  that  the  forms  given  in  the  books  of  practice 
are  all  of  an  answer  and  disclaimer.1 

A  disclaimer  may,  by  order,  be  filed  without  oath,  but  not  without 
oath  and  signature.  The  order  is  obtained  on  motion  or  petition  of 
course.2  If  the  defendant  applies  by  motion,  the  consent  of  counsel  for 
the  plaintiff  is  necessary ;  and  if  the  defendant  petitions,  the  written 
consent  of  the  plaintiff  must  be  subscribed  thereto.3  Where  the  plaintiff 
applies,  whether  by  motion  or  petition,  no  consent  by  the  defendant  is 
required.4  The  application  by  a  defendant  is  usually,  if  not  invariably, 
made  by  petition.  Where  the  disclaimer  is  put  in  without  oath,  the 
signature  of  the  defendant  must  be  attested  by  some  person  competent 
to  be  a  witness.6 

The  disclaimer  must  be  signed  by  counsel ; 6  and  it  must  be  sworn, 
filed,  and  printed,  and  an  office  copy  taken  in  the  same  manner,  and 
within  the  same  time,  as  an  answer.7 

If  a  defendant  puts  in  a  disclaimer  where  he  ought  to  answer,  or 
accompanies  his  disclaimer  by  an  answer  which  is  considered  insufficient, 
the  plaintiff  may  take  the  opinion  of  the  Court  upon  its  sufficiency,  by 
taking  exceptions  to  it,  in  the  same  manner  as  to  an  answer.8  If,  how- 
ever, instead  of  applying  in  the  first  instance  to  the  Court,  by  motion, 
to  take  the  disclaimer  off  the  file,  the  plaintiff  delivers  exceptions,  he 
will  be  precluded  from  afterwards  moving  for  that  purpose.9 

Where  a  defendant  puts  in  a  general  disclaimer  to  the  whole  bill,  the 
plaintiff  ought  not  to  reply  to  it ; 10  for  then  the  defendant  may  go  into 
evidence  in  support  of  it.11  In  a  case  where  the  plaintiff  replied,  the 
defendant  was  allowed  to  have  his  costs  taxed  against  the  plaintiff  for 
vexation.12  It  is  otherwise,  however,  where  the  disclaimer  is  to  part, 
and  there  is  an  answer  or  plea  to  another  part  of  the  same  bill ;  in  such 
cases  there  may  be  a  replication  to  such  plea  or  answer.13 

*  709        *  The  course  to  be  pursued  by  the  plaintiff,  after  a  disclaimer 

to  the  whole  bill  has  been  filed,  is  either  to  dismiss  the  bill  as 
against  the  party  disclaiming  with  costs,  or  to  amend  it ;  or,  if  he 
thinks  the  defendant  is  not  entitled  to  his  costs,  he  may  set  the  cause 
down  upon  the  answer  and  disclaimer,  and  bring  the  defendant  to  a 
hearing.1 

1  Ld.  Red.  319;  see  forms  in  Vol.  III.  A  must  move  to  take  the  disclaimer  off  the  tiles, 
disclaimer  should  be  full  and  explicit  in  all  re-  and  he  cannot  except;  but  if  the  disclaimer  is 
spects.     Worthington  v.  Lee,  2  Bland,  678.  accompanied  by  an  insufficient  answer,  the  plain- 

2  For  form  of  order  on  motion,  see  Pawson  tiff  should  except  to  the  answer.  Ellsworth  v. 
v.  Smith,  cited  Seton,  1254.  Curtis.  10  Paige,  105. 

8  Braithwaite's   Pr.   47,    57.     For  forms   of  9  Glassington  v.  Thwaites,  ubi  supra,  461. 

motion  paper  and  petition,  see  Vol.  III.  ln  Spofford  v.  Manning,  2  Edw.  Ch.  350. 

4  Braithwaite's  Pr.  47,  57.  n  See  the  observations  of  Sir  John  Romilly 

5  Id.  48.    For  form  of  attestation,  see  Vol  III.  M.  R.  in  Ford  v.  Lord  Chesterfield,  16  Beav.  520. 

6  Cons.  Ord.  VIII.  1.  12  Williams  v.  Longfellow,  3  Atk.  582. 

7  See  post,    Chap.    XVII.   §   3,   Answers;  13  Ibid. 

Braithwaite's  Pr.  57,  491.  •  Cash  v.  Belcher,  1  Hare,  310,  313;  Bailey 

8  Glassington  v.  Thwaites,  2  Russ.  458.  463;  v.  Lambert,  5  Hare,  178;  10  Jur.  109;  Wigging- 
Bulkeley  v.  Dunbar,  1  Anst.  37;  Graham  v.  ton  v.  Pateman,  12  Jur.  89.  V.  C.  E.;  Wyatt's 
Coape,  3  M.  &  C.  638;  9  Sim.  96,  103.  But  it  P.  R.,  176;  Hinde,  209.  Where  the  defendant 
has  been  held  that  where  a  simple  disclaimer  is  disclaims  all  interest  in  the  subject-matter  of 
filed,  a  plaintiff  who  is  entitled  to  an  answer  controversy,  any  statements  made  by  him  not 

704 


DISCLAIMERS.  *  710 

Where  a  defendant  had  occasioned  the  suit,  in  consequence  of  a  claim 
to  the  fund  set  up  by  himself,  which  he  refused  to  release  or  to  verily, 
and  afterwards  put  in  a  disclaimer,  stating  in  his  answer  the  facts  upon 
which  he  had  supposed  himself  to  be  entitled,  as  a  ground  for  his  not 
being  ordered  to  pay  the  costs  of  the  suit,  which  were  prayed  against 
him,  in  consequence  of  which  the  plaintiff  examined  a  great  number  of 
witnesses  to  falsify  such  statement,  but  no  witnesses  were  examined 
by  the  defendant,  he  was  ordered  to  pay  the  whole  costs  of  the  suit,  as 
well  the  plaintiff's  costs  as  the  costs  which  the  plaintiff  was  ordered  to 
pay  to  the  co-defendants.2 

It  is  to  be  remarked,  that  a  defendant  cannot,  by  answer,  claim  that 
to  which,  by  his  disclaimer,  he  admits  he  has  no  right ;  and  if  a  dis- 
claimer and  answer  are  inconsistent,  the  matter  will  be  taken  most 
strongly  against  the  defendant  on  the  disclaimer.3 

If  a  defendant  puts  in  a  disclaimer,  and  afterwards  discovers  that  he 
had  an  interest,  which  he  was  not  apprised  of  at  the  time  he  disclaimed, 
the  Court  will,  upon  the  ground  of  ignorance  or  mistake,  permit  him  to 
make  his  claim.  It  will  not,  however,  allow  a  defendant  to  do  so  at  the 
hearing  of  the  cause ;  he  must,  in  order  to  get  rid  of  the  effect  of  his  dis- 
claimer, make  a  distinct  application,  supported  by  affidavit,  setting  forth 
the  facts  in  detail  on  which  he  founds  his  claim  to  such  an  indulgence ;  * 
and  it  seems  that  the  Court  will  expect  a  strong  case  to  be  made  out, 
before  it  will  grant  the  application.5 

If  the  defendant  takes  no  steps  to  get  rid  of  the  effect  of  the  dis- 
claimer, he  will  be  forever  barred ;   because  it  is  matter  of   record.6  (a) 

Questions  of  some  nicety  arise  in  suits  for  foreclosure,  and  in  other 
suits  of  a  similar  description,  for  establishing  equitable  claims  or  de- 
mands against  real  or  personal  estate,  as  to  the  right  to  costs  of 
persons  made  defendants  in  consequence  of  rights  or  interests  which 
they  might  have  in  the  estate,  subject  to  those  of  the  plaintiff,  so 
that  his  title  cannot  be  complete  without  their  co-operation,  *but  *710 
which  rights  or  interests  they  absolutely  disclaim.  When  a  de- 
fendant states  in  his  disclaimer  that  he  never  had,  and  never  claimed, 
any  right  or  interest  in  the  subject-matter  of  the  suit  at  or  after  the 
filing  of  the  bill,  he  is  entitled  to  be  dismissed  with  costs.1 

responsive  to  the  bill  are  irrelevant  and  imper-  1080,  M.  R. ;  Gabriel  v  Sturgis,  5  Hare,  07,  100  ; 

tinent.     Saltmarsh  v.  Hockett,  1  Lea,  215.  10  Jur.  215;  Teed  v.  Carruthors,  2  Y.  &  C.  C. 

2  Deacon  v.  Deacon,  7  Sim.  378,  382;  see  C.  31,  41;  6  Jur.  987;  Benbow  v.  Da  vies,  11 

Hutchinson  v.  Reed,  1  Hoff.  Ch.  315.  Beav.  309;  Glover  v.  Rogers,  11  Jur.  1000,  M. 

a  Ld.  Red.  320.  R.;  Hipgins  v.  Frankis,  15  Jur.  277,  V  C.  K. 

4  Sidden  v.  Lediard,  1  R.  &  M.  110;  see  B. ;  Vale  v.  Merideth,  18  Jur.  992,  V.  C.  W.; 
Ladbroke  v.  Bleaden,  16  Jur.  630.  Ford  v.  Lord  Chesterfield,  16  Beav    516,  520; 

5  Seton  v.  Slade,  7  Ves.  265,  267.  see  ennh-a,  Buchanan  v.  Green  way,  11    Beav. 

6  Wood  v.  Taylor,  3  W.  R.  321;  3  Eq.  Rep.  58.  Where  disclaiming  defendant,  a  satisfied 
513,  V.  C.  K.  judgment  creditor,  had  not  entered  up  satisfac- 

1  Silcock  v.  Roynon,  2  Y.  &  C.  C.  C.  376;  tion,  he  was  not  allowed  his  costs.  Thompson 
7  Jur.  548;  Hiorns  v.  Holtom,   16  Jur.    1077,      v.  Hudson,  34  Beav.  107.     For  forms  of  decree 


(a)  Hence  he   cannot   make   any  claim    in  v.  Campbell,  130  111.  186.     So  he  is  afterwards 

the  suit,  though  remaining  a  party.     Wood  i\  estopped  from  setting  up  title  to  property  which 

Taylor,  supra  ;   Colclough  v.  Bolger,  2  Molloy,  he  has  disclaimed.     Hansell  v.  Hansell,  44  La. 

455;  Hickson  v.  Mobley,  £0  Ga.  314:   Sawyer  Ann.  548. 

vol.  i.— 45  705 


710 


DISCLAIMERS. 


Where  a  defendant  simply  states  that  he  does  not  claim  any  right  or 
interest,  he  will  be  dismissed  without  costs ; 2  but  if,  before  bill  filed, 
he  offers  to  release  his  claim,  or,  after  bill  filed,  to  release  his  claim, 
and  consent  to  the  bill  being  dismissed,  as  against  him,  without  costs, 
he  will,  if  the  offer  be  refused,  and  the  plaintiff  still  retain  him  as  a 
party  to  the  record,  be  entitled  to  be  dismissed  with  his  costs,  incurred 
subsequently  to  the  offer.3  (a)  And  it  seems  that  the  plaintiff  is  bound 
to  bear  the  expense  of  the  release.4 

Where  the  plaintiff  stated  in  his  bill  that,  before  the  institution  of 
the  suit,  he  had  applied  to  the  defendant  to  release  his  claim,  but  the 
defendant  refused  to  do  so,  and  the  defendant  disclaimed  and  denied 
that  any  such  application  was  made  to  him,  and  stated  that  if  it  had 
been  made,  he  would  have  released  his  interest,  he  was  held  entitled 
to  his  costs.5  (b) 

It  may  be  here  observed,  that  in  questions  of  this  description,  there 
is  no  difference  between  the  right  of  an  assignee  in  bankruptcy  and 
that  of  the  party  whose  interest  he  represents.6 


against  disclaiming  defendants,  in  foreclosure 
suits,  see  Seton,  395. 

2  Cash  v.  Belcher,  1  Hare,  310,  312;  Tip- 
ping v.  Power,  id.  405;  Grigg  p.  Sturgis,  5 
Hare,  93,  96;  10  Jur.  133;  Ohrly  v.  Jenkins, 

1  De  G.  &  S.  543;  11  Jur.  1001;  Gibson  v. 
Nicol,  9  Beav.  403,406;  10  Jur.  419;  Ford 
v.  Lord  Chesterfield,  ubi  suprn;  Appleton  v. 
Sturgis,  10  W.  R.  312,  V.  C.  S. ;  Vale  v. 
Merideth,  ubi  supra  ;  Furber  p.  Furber,  30  Beav. 
523 ;  Durham  v.  Crackles,  8  Jur.  N.  S.  1174, 
V.  C  W. ;  Roberts  v.  Hughes,  L.  R.  6  Eq.  20. 
Where  the  defendant  was  not  content  simply 
to  disclaim,  but  put  in  an  answer  and  appeared 
for  the  purpose  of  claiming  his  costs,  it  was 
held  that  he  was  not  entitled  to  any  costs.  Max- 
well v.  Wightwick,  L.  R.  3  Eq.  210. 

3  Ford  v.  Lord  Chesterfield,  ubi  supra  ;  Lock 
v.  Lomas,  15  Jur.  162,  V.  O.  K.  B.;  Talbot  v. 
Kemshead,  4K.&  J.  93;  Bellamy  r.  Bricken- 
den,  id.  670;  Bradley  v.  Borlase,  7  W.  R.  125, 
V.  C.  K.;  Ward  r.Shakeshaft,  1  Dr.  &  Sm. 
269:  Dillon  v.  Ashwin,  10  Jur.  N.  S.  119;  12 
W.  R.  366,  V.  C.  K.;  Ridgway  v.  Kynnersley, 

2  H.  &  M.  565;  Howkins  v.  Bennet,  id.  567,  n.; 


(n)  See  Day  v.  Gudgen,  2  Ch.  D.  209 ;  Lewin 
v.  Jones,  53  L.  J.  Ch.  1011 ;  Clarke  v.  Toleman, 
42  id.  23. 

(b)  A  disclaimer,  operating  as  a  release,  must 
be  signed  by  the  defendant  like  a  release.     It 

706 


Fagg  v.  James,  id.  568,  n.:  Clarke  r.  Rawlins, 
W.  N.  (1866)  332,  V.  C.  W. ;  Maxwell  r. 
Wightwick,  id.  379,  V.  C.  W.;  but  seeGowing 
r.  Mowberry,  9  Jur.  N.  S.  844;  11  W.  R.  851, 
V.  C.  S.;  Davis  v.  Whitmore,  28  Beav.  617; 
6  Jur.  N.  S.  880. 

<  Furber  v.  Furber,  30  Beav.  523,  525. 

5  Gurney  v.  Jackson,  1  Sm.  &  G.  97;  17 
Jur.  204;  see,  however,  observations  of  the 
M.  R.  on  this  case,  in  Ford  r.  Lord  Chester- 
field, ubi  supra. 

6  Grigtc  v.  Sturgis,  5  Hare,  93,  96;  10  Jur. 
133;  see  also  Cash  v.  Belcher.  1  Hare,  310,  312  ; 
Appleby  v.  Duke,  1  Phil.  272,  275;  7  Jur.  985; 
Clarke  v.  Wilmot,  1  Phil.  276;  Staff urth  v. 
Pott,  2  De  G.  &  S.  571.  A  disclaiming  heir- 
at-law  is  in  the  same  position  as  any  other 
disclaiming  defendant.  Gray  v.  Adamson,  35 
Beav.  383.  Where  the  defendant  dies  after 
disclaimer,  the  plaintiff  cannot  revive  on  a 
question  of  disputed  costs.  Ridgway  t.  Kyn- 
nersley, 2  H.  &  M.  565.  And  see  as  to  costs 
of  a  disclaiming  defendant  paid  by  plaintiff  in 
an  administration  suit,  Jones  v.  Pickslay,  W. 
N.  (1888)  26. 


need  not  be  under  oath,  or  signed  by  counsel. 
Dickerson  v.  Hodges,  43  N.  J.  Eq.  45.  As  to 
treating  a  disclaimer  as  a  plea,  see  Edelin  v. 
Lyon  (D.  C),  21  Wash.  L.  Rep.  605. 


*  CHAPTER    XVII. 


711 


ANSWERS. 

Section  I.  —  General  Nature  of  Answers. 

The  answer  of  a  defendant  consists  of  such  statements,  material  to 
his  case,  as  he  may  think  it  necessary  or  advisable  to  set  forth  [as  de- 
fences to  the  plaintiff's  demand]  ; 1  and  of  his  answers  to  [the  discovery 
sought  by  the  bill]  ; 2  or,  if  he  has  put  in  a  demurrer  or  plea,  to  such 
discovery  as  relates  to  the  parts  of  the  bill  not  covered  by  the  demurrer 
or  plea.*  If  no  interrogatories  were  filed,  the  answer  was  called  a  volun- 
tary answer  under  the  new  system. 

This  twofold  character  of  an  answer  is  peculiar  to  pleadings  in 
Equity,  and  is  not  found  even  in  those  that  are  formed  on  the  same 
model  in  the  Civil  and  Ecclesiastical  Courts  ;  the  answer  which  the  de- 
fendant is  required  to  make,  upon  oath,  to  the  allegation  and  articles 
being,  in  those  Courts,  a  wholly  distinct  instrument  from  the  responsive 
allegation  which  contains  the  defence.4 

*  Although  an  answer  has,  in  general,  the  twofold  property  *  712 
above  stated,  it  is  seldom  possible,  in  framing  one,  to  keep  the 


i  See  now  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  14,  which 
confines  discovery  to  the  interrogatories  filed. 

2  Ld.  Red.  15, 16.  An  answer,  where  relief 
is  sought,  properly  consists  of  two  parts:  first 
of  the  defence  of  the  defendant  to  the  case 
made  by  the  bill;  and,  secondly,  of  the  ex- 
amination of  the  defendant  on  oath  as  to  the 
facts  charged  in  the  bill  of  which  discovery  is 
sought.  It  combines,  therefore,  two  proceed- 
ings which,  in  the  Civil  Law  and  Ecclesiastical 
Courts,  were  completely  separated.  In  the 
Civil  Law,  the  pleadings  were  made  up  before 
the  Praetor,  who  afterwards  assigned  to  the 
parties  judices,  and  it  was  before  these  lat- 
ter that  the  actor  (plaintiff)  propounded  his 
positions  in  the  Ubellus  articulattts,  to  which 
the  defendant  was  required  to  put  in  an 
answer,  in  the  nature  of  a  discovery,  Gilb. 
For.  Rom.  90.  In  the  Ecclesiastical  Courts  also, 
the  answer  to  the  interrogatories  for  discovery 
was  a  wholly  distinct  instrument  from  the 
responsive  allegation  to  the  libel  embodying 
the  defence.  Hare  on  Disc.  22-3.  In  a  bill  in 
Equity,  both  of  these  distinct  parts  are  united 
in  one  instrument.  And  this  ambiguity  in  the 
woid"  answer,"  importing,  as  it  does,  a  double 
sense  and  office,  has  sometimes,  says  Judge 
Story,  led  to  erroneous  decisions,  and  to  no 
small  confusion  of  language.     Story,  Eq.  PI. 


§  850;  Smith  v.  St.  Louis  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.  2 
Tenn.  Ch.  600;  Beech  v.  Haynes,  1  Tenn.  Ch. 
574. 

3  An  answer  is  the  most  usual  method  of 
defence  to  a  bill  in  Chancery.  It  may  be  put 
in  to  the  whole  bill,  or  to  such  parts  of  it  as 
are  not  covered  by  plea  or  demurrer.  As  it 
is  capable  of  embracing  more  circumstances 
than  a  plea,  it  may  for  t'  is  reason  be  used  with 
much  greater  propriety  in  cases  where  the  de- 
fendant is  not  anxious  to  prevent  a  discovery, 
although  the  plea  might  be  a  complete  bar. 
But  where,  by  introducing  additional  circum- 
stances, he  has  a  good  opportunity  of  exhibit- 
ing his  case  in  a  more  favorable  light,  the 
answer  is  the  best  modo  of  defence.  1  Barb. 
Ch.  Pr.  130;  see  Youle  v.  Richards,  Saxton 
(N.  J.),  534.  When  a  defendant  makes  his 
defence  by  answer,  he  must  set  up  all  the 
various  grounds  of  defence  upon  which  lie  in- 
tends to  rely.     Warren  v.  Warren,  30  Vt.  530. 

For  forms  of  answer,  see  Vol.  III. 

4  Hare  on  Disc.  223 ;  3  Bla.  Com.  100.  A 
defendant  cannot  pray  anything  in  his  answer 
but  to  be  dismissed  the  Court.  Millar  r.  Greg- 
ory, 16  X.  J.  Eq.  274;  infra,  p.  1550.  As  to 
counterclaim  and  set-off  under  the  present  Eng- 
lish practice,  tee  post,  p.  1548,  n. 

707 


*  713  .ANSWERS. 

parts  separate  from  each  other ;  though,  when  it  is  practicable  to  do  so, 
such  a  course  is  generally  desirable.  It  is,  however,  of  great  impor- 
tance to  the  pleader,  in  preparing  an  answer,  to  bear  in  mind  that, 
besides  answering  the  plaintiff's  case  as  made  by  the  bill,  he  should 
state  to  the  Court,  upon  the  answer,  all  the  circumstances  of  which 
the  defendant  intends  to  avail  himself  by  way  of  defence  ;  for  a  de- 
fendant ought  to  apprise  the  plaintiff,  by  his  answer,  of  the  nature 
of  the  case  he  intends  to  set  up,  and  that,  too,  in  a  clear,  unambig- 
uous manner ;  and,  in  strictness,  he  cannot  avail  himself  of  any  matter 
in  defence  which  is  not  stated  in  his  answer,  even  though  it  should 
appear  in  his  evidence.1  (a)  The  last-mentioned  rule  was  formerly, 
when  an  answer  was  required  in  every  case,  strictly  enforced.  Under 
the  present  practice,  however,  by  which,  if  the  defendant  has  not  been 
required  to  answer,  and  has  not  answered,  he  will  be  considered  to 
have  traversed  the  case  made  by  the  bill,2  the  rule  has  been  much 
relaxed  in  cases  where  no  answer  has  been  required,  and  none  has 
been  put  in. 

In  such  a  case,  the  defendant  has  been  permitted  to  set  up  the 
Statutes  of  Frauds,3  and  of  Limitations,4  by  his  evidence,  and  orally 
at  the  hearing,  and  not  been  compelled  to  put  in  a  voluntary  answer 
for  that  purpose.  Where,  however,  he  had  been  interrogated,  it  was 
held,  that  he  ought  to  have  set  up  the  defence  of  being  a  purchaser 
for  valuable  consideration  without  notice,  by  his  answer,  and  he  was 
not  allowed  to  raise  it  at  the  hearing.5  Where  the  facts  were  put  in 
issue  and  proved,  a  defence  was  allowed,  although  it  was  not  distinctly 
raised  on  the  pleadings.6 

A  defendant  is  not  bound  to  state,  upon  his  answer,  the  conclusions 
in  Law  which  he  intends  to  deduce  from  the  facts  he  has  set  out ; 7  that, 
as  has  been  before  stated,8  would  be  contrary  to  the  principles  of  good 
pleading.  Indeed,  the  most  correct  method  of  pleading  is,  merely  to 
state  the  facts  intended  to  be  proved,  and  to  leave  the  inference  of  Law 
to  be  drawn  from  them  upon  the  argument  of  the  case  ;  but  the  estab- 
lished  rule  is,  that  if  the  defendant  states  upon  his  answer  certain  facts 
as  evidence  of  a  particular  case,  which  he  represents  to  be  the  con- 
*  713  sequence  of  those  *  facts,  and  upon  which  he  rests  his  defence, 
he  will  not  be  permitted  afterwards  to  make  use  of  the  same  facts, 

1  Stanley  v.  Robinson.  1  R.  &  M.  527,  529;  Snead  v.  Green,  8  Jur.  N.  S.  4;  contra,  Holding 
Harrison  v.  Borwell,  10  Sim.  382;  4  Jur.  245  ;      v.  Barton.  1  Sm.  &  G.  App.  25. 

Hodgson  v.  Thornton.  1  Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  228,  pi.  5  Phillips    v.   Phillips,  3  Giff.  200;   7  Jur. 

5;   Burnham   v.  Dallin<r,    18   N.  J.  Eq.  132  ;  N.  S.  1094;  8  id.  145;  10  W.  R.  236,  L.  C. 
Moors  v.  Moors,  17  N.  H.  481.  6  Ormes  v.  Beadel,  2  De  G.  F.  &  J.  333 ;  6 

2  15  &  16  Vic.  e.  86,  §  26.  Jur.  N.  S.  1103,  1104. 

3  Lincoln  o.  Wright,  4  De  G.  &  J.  16;  5  Jur.  »  Ibid. 

N.  S.  1142;  Jackson  v.  Oglander,  2  H.  &  M.  8  Ante,  p.  371.     So  of  denials  of  legal  con- 

465,  elusions.     Gainer  v.  Russ,  20  Fla.  157. 

<  Green  v.  Snead,  30  Beav.  231 ;  S.  C.  nom. 


(a)  The  rule  that  objection  for  want  of  juris-  v.  Central  Bank.  7  111.  App.  426;  or  where  an 

diction  cannot  be  made  after  answer  d"es  not  adequate  le^al  remedy  is  insisted  upon  after  an 

apply  where  the  jurisdiction  depends  on  dis-  an«wer  is   withdrawn  by  leave.      Hindman  v. 

coven',  and  this  fails.     United  States  Ins.  Co.  Aledo,  6  111.  App.  436. 
708 


GENERAL  NATURE  OF  ANSWERS.  *  713 

for  the  purpose  of  establishing  a  different  defence  from  that  to  which, 
by  his  answer,  he  has  drawn  the  plaintiff's  attention.1 

A  defendant  may,  by  his  answer,  set  up  any  number  of  defences,  as 
the  consequence  of  the  same  state  of  facts,  which  his  case  will  allow,2 
or  the  ingenuity  of  his  legal  advisers  may  suggest ;  thus,  in  setting  up 
an  immemorial  payment  in  lieu  of  tithes,  a  defendant  has  been  allowed 
to  rely  upon  it,  either  as  a  modus,  or  as  a  composition  real  existing  from 
time  immemorial,  or  as  a  composition  undetermined  by  notice.8  In  none 
of  these  cases  were  any  facts  stated  in  the  answers  which  were  incon- 
sistent with  any  of  the  defences  set  up,  and  the  evidence  to  prove  them 
was,  in  either  case,  the  same. 

Although  a  defendant  may  be  permitted  to  set  up,  by  his  answer, 
several  defences  as  the  consequence  of  the  same  state  of  facts,  or  of 
facts  which  are  consistent  with  each  other,  a  defendant  cannot  insist 
upon  two  defences  which  are  inconsistent  with  each  other,  or  are  the 
consequence  of  inconsistent  facts.4  (a)  And,  in  the  application  of  this 
rule,  it  makes  no  difference  whether  the  inconsistent  defences  are  each 
substantially  relied  upon,  or  are  set  up  in  the  alternative ;  "  that  answer 
is  bad  which  either  contains  inconsistent  defences,  or  an  alternative  of 
inconsistent  defences."  5  Thus,  although  a  defendant,  in  a  tithe  suit, 
might  set  up  a  payment,  either  as  a  modus,  or  as  a  composition  real 
existing  from  time  immemorial,  he  could  not  set  up  the  same  payment, 
either  as  a  modus  or  as  a  composition  real  not  alleged  to  be  immemorial.6 

From  the  cases  just  cited  it  is  to  be  collected,  that  where  a  defendant 
sets  up,  by  his  answer,  two  inconsistent  defences,  the  result  will  be  to 
deprive  him  of  the  benefit  of  either,  and  to  entitle  the  plaintiff  to  a  de- 
cree.7 Sometimes,  indeed,  the  Court  will,  where,  from  redundant  expres- 
sions or  other  verbal  inaccuracy,  a  defence  has  been  rendered  inconsistent, 


1  Bennett  v.  Neale,  Wightw.  324.  the  bill,  and  set  up  distinct  defences,  so  they 

2  Story,  Eq.  PI,  §  851.     The  defendant  may  be   not  wholly  inconsistent    with  such  denial, 
set   up,    in   his   answer,   matters    which    have  Hopper  v.  Hopper,  11  Paige,  46. 

occurred  since  the  filing  of  the  bill.     Lyons  v.  5  Per  Alderson  B.  in  1  Y.  &  C.  Ex.  160. 

Brooks.  2  Edw.  Ch.  110.  6  jesUs  College  r.  Gibhs,  1  Y.  &  C.  Ex  145, 

3  Atkyns  v.  Lord  Willoughby  de  Brooke,  2  160 ;  and  see  Leech  v.  Bailey,  6  Price,  504. 
Anst.  397  ;  Atkins  v.  Hatton,  id.  386  ;  Wolley  *  But  see  Nagle   v.  Edwards,  3  Anst.  702, 
t'.  Brownhill,  M'Lel.  317;  Bishop  v.  Chichester,  and  the  observations  upon  that  case,  in  Jesus 
3  Gwill.  1316.  College  v.  Gibbs,  1Y.&C  Ex.  163. 

4  A  defendant  may  both  den}'  the  charges  in 


('()  Ozark  Land  Co.  v.  Leonard,  24  Fed.  Rep.  raque  v.  Siter,  4  English,  545;  Brown  v.  Brown, 
660;  Stone  v.  Moore,  26  111.  105;  Scanlan  v.  10  Yerger,  84;  Stevens  v.  Post,  12  N.  J.  Eq. 
Scanlan,  134  111.630;  Crowder  v.  Searcy,  103  408.  Soof  an  answer  under  oath  respecting  mat- 
Mo.  97.  Under  Texas  Rev.  Stats.  §  1262,  al-  ters  of  which  the  defendant,  it  is  evident,  could 
lowing  a  defendant  to  plead  as  many  distinct  not  know  personally.  Fryrear  v.  Lawrence,  5 
matters  of  law  or  fact  as  he  thinks  necessary,  his  Gilman,  325;  Lawrence  v.  Lawrence,  21  N.J. 
answer  may  embrace  a  general  demurrer.  Alii-  Eq.  317;  Riegel  v.  American  Life  Ins.  Co.  153 
ance  Milling  Co.  v.  Eaton,  23  S.W.  Rep.  455.  An  Penn.  St.  134;  Garrow  v.  Carpenter,  1  Porter, 
iinswer  in  Equity,  which  is  contradictory  or  im-  359.  If  no  exception  is  taken  on  account  of 
probable  in  itself,  does  not  require  two  witnesses  inconsistent  defences,  one  of  which  is  established 
to  overcome  it,  when  made  under  oath.  Post,  and  the  other  found  to  be  untrue,  a  decree  will 
p  846,  note;  East  India  Co  v.  Donald,  9  Ves.  not  be  reversed.  Scanlan  v.  Scanlan,  134  III 
275 ;  Cunningham  v.  Freeborn,  3  Paige,  557 ;  Bar-  630. 

709 


*  714  ANSWERS. 

though  evidently  not  intended  to  be  so,  either  reject  the  redun- 

*  714    dant  expressions  as  surplusage,8  or  direct  *  them  to  be  struck 

out ; *  such  indulgence,  however,  is  confined  to  cases  of  verbal 
inaccuracy  only,  which  would  not  have  embarrassed  the  plaintiff  in  the 
conduct  of  his  case. 

Although  a  defendant  cannot,  by  his  answer,  set  up,  in  opposition  to 
the  plaintiff's  title,  two  inconsistent  defences  in  the  alternative,  he  will 
not  be  precluded  from  denying  the  plaintiff's  general  title,  and  also  insist- 
ing that,  in  case  the  plaintiff  establishes  his  title,  he  is  precluded  from 
recovering  by  some  other  circumstance  which  would  equally  serve  to 
preclude  him,  or  any  other  person  in  whom  the  title  might  be  actually 
vested.  Thus,  in  a  tithe  suit,  the  defendant  might  have  denied  the 
plaintiff's  title  as  rector  or  vicar,  and  at  the  same  time  have  set  up  a 
modus.2 

In  stating  a  defendant's  case,  it  is  only  necessary  to  use  such  a  degree 
of  certainty  as  will  inform  the  plaintiff  of  the  nature  of  the  case  to  be 
made  against  him  ; 8  it  is  not  requisite  that  the  same  degree  of  accuracy 
should  be  observed  in  an  answer  as  is  required  in  a  bill. 

If  the  defence  which  can  be  made  to  a  bill  consists  of  a  variety  of 
circumstances,  so  that  it  is  not  proper  to  be  offered  by  way  of  plea,  or 
if  it  is  doubtful  whether  a  plea  will  hold,  the  defendant  may  set  forth 
the  whole  by  way  of  answer,  and  pray  the  same  benefit  of  so  much  as 
goes  in  bar,  as  if  it  had  been  pleaded  to  the  bill.4  Thus,  a  defendant 
insisting  upon  the  benefit  of  the  Statute  of  Limitations  by  way  of 
answer,  may,  at  the  hearing,  have  the  like  benefit  of  the  statute  as  if  he 
had  pleaded  it.5  (a)  So  also,  if  a  defendant  can  offer  a  matter  of  plea 
which  would  be  a  complete  bar,  but  has  no  reason  to  protect  himself 
from  any  discovery  sought  by  the  bill,  and  can  offer  circumstances 
which  he  conceives  to  be  favorable  to  his  case,  and  which  he  could  not 
offer  together  with  a  plea,  he  may  set  forth  the  whole  matter  in  the 
same  manner.6  Thus,  if  a  purchaser,  for  a  valuable  consideration,  clear 
of  all  charges  of  fraud  or  notice,  can   offer  additional  circumstances  in 

8  Ellis  v.  Saul,  1  Anst.  332,  341 ;   .Tenkinson  answer,  but  it  is  otherwise  with  the  defence  that 

v.  Royston.  5  Price,  495;  see  also  Uhthoff  v.  the   claim  is  stale,  which  may  be  insisted  ou 

Lord  Huntingfield  1  Price,  237.  without  a  foundation  by  averment  in  the  an- 

»  Jesus  College' v.  Gibbs,  1  Y.  &  C.  Ex.  145,  swer.     Sullivan  v.  Portland  &c.  R.  Co.  94  U.  S. 

ig-r  806.     And  see  as  to  effect  of  answer  insisting 

2  Carte  r   Ball,  3  Atk.  496,  499.  on  the  Statute  of  Frauds,  Jackson  v.  Oglander, 

8  See    Cummings  v.  Coleman,  7  Rich.  Eq.  2  H.  &  M.  465. 

(S.  C.)  509.  6  But  it  is  said  by  Mr.  Justice  Story,  that 

*  Ld   Red.  308.  "  it  is  very  far  from  being  generally  true,  as  is 

5  Norton  v.  Turvill,  2  P.  Wins.  144;  Ruck-  sometimes  alleged  in  the  books,  that  a  defend- 

man  v.   Decker,  23  N.  J.  Eq.  283.     The  same  ant  may,  by  answer,  avail  himself  of,  and  in- 

strictness  is  not  requisite  in  an  answer  to  a  bill  sist  upon,  every  ground  of  defence,  which  he 

in  Equity,  where  the  Statute  of  Limitations  is  could  use  by  way  of  demurrer,  or  of  plea,  to 

relied  on  as  a  defence,  as  in  a  plea.     Maury  the  bill."     Story,  Eq.    PI.  §   847,  and  notes; 

r.  Mason,  8  Porter,  213.     The  defence  of  the  Portarlington  v.  Soulby,  7  Sim.  28. 
Statute  of  Limitations  must  be  made  by  plea  or 


(a)  See  Pierce  ».McClellan,  93  111.  245.   The  Co.  153  Mass.  456;  or  at  the  hearing     Credit 

defence  of  laches  is  not  waived  by  withdrawing  Co.  v.  Arkansas  &c.  R.  Co.  15  Fed.   Rep.  46; 

a  demurrer,  but  may  be  afterwards  set  up  in  the  see  Green  v.  Terwilliger,  56  id.  384. 
answer,  Snow  r.  Boston    Blank-Book    Manuf. 

710 


GENERAL   NATURE   OP    ANSWERS.  *  715 

his  favor  which  he  cannot  set  forth  by  way  of  plea,  or  of  answer  to 
support  a  plea,  as  the  expending  a  considerable  sum  of  money  in  improve- 
ments with  the  knowledge  of  the  plaintiff,  it  may  be  more  prudeut  to 
set  out  the  whole  by  way  of  answer,  than  to  rely  on  the  single 
defence  *  by  way  of  plea ;  unless  it  is  material  to  prevent  dis-  *  715 
closure  of  any  circumstance  attending  his  title.1 

Where  the  same  benefit  has  been  claimed,  by  answer,  that  the  defend- 
ant would  have  been  entitled  to  if  he  had  demurred  to  the  bill,  or 
pleaded  the  matter,  alleged  in  his  answer,  in  bar,  it  is  only  at  the  hear- 
ing of  the  cause  that  any  such  benefit  can  be  insisted  upon  5  and  then 
the  defendant  will,  in  general,  be  entitled  to  all  the  same  advantage 
of  this  mode  of  defence  that  he  would  have  had  if  he  had  adopted 
the  more  concise  mode  of  defence,  by  demurring  or  pleading.2  In  the 
case,  however,  of  multifariousness,  if  the  defendant  does  not  take  the 
objection  in  limine,  the  Court,  considering  the  mischief  as  already 
incurred,  will  not,  except  in  a  special  case,  allow  it  to  prevail  at  the 
hearing :  although  it  may  protect  the  defendant  from  the  costs  incurred, 
if  it  should  appear  that  he  had  been  improperly  subjected  to  them.3  (a) 

We  now  come  to  the  consideration  of  the  manner  in  which  the  inter- 
rogatories (if  any)  must  be  answered. 

Under  the  old  practice  of  the  Court,  it  was  necessary  that  the  defend- 
ant should  answer  all  the  statements  and  charges  in  the  bill,  whether 
specially  interrogated  thereto  or  not ;  but  he  was  not  bound  to  answer 
any  interrogatories  which  were  not  founded  upon  the  statements  or 
charges  contained  in  the  bill:4  though,  if   he   did  so,  he   thereby  put 

1  Ld.  Red.  309.  See  Fuller  v.  Kuapp,  24  same.  Mechanics'  Bank  v.  Levy,  3  Paige,  60G; 
Fed.  Rep.  100.  A  party  setting  up  a  legal  Newhall  v.  Hobbs,  3  Cush.  274,  277.  The  gen- 
right,  in  his  answer  to  a  bill  in  Equity,  is  not  eral  interrogatory  or  request  in  a  bill  "that the 
bound  to  deny  notice  of  a  subsequent  lien  or  defendant  may  full  answer  make,  to  all  and 
interes',  unless  the  bill  alleges  notice.  King  singular  the  premises,  fully  and  particularly, 
v.  McVickar,  3  Sandf.  Ch.  l!)2.  as  though  the  same  were  repeated,  and  he  spe- 

2  Wray  c.  Hutchinson,  2  M.  &  K.  235,  238,  cially  interrogated,"  &c.,  is  sufficient  to  entitle 
242;  see  also  Milligan  r.  Mitchell,  1  M.  &  C.  the  plaintiff  to  a  full  disclosure  of  the  whole 
433,  447;  Mulloy  v.  Paul,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  155;  subject-matter  of  the  bill,  equally  as  if  he  had 
Hume  v  Commercial  Bank,  1  Lea,  220;  Water-  specially  interrogate'!  the  defendant  to  every 
man  v.  Buck,  63  Vt.  544.  fact  stated  in  the  bill,  with  all  the  material  cir- 

8  Benson  v.  Hadtield,  4  Hare,  32,  39;  Cashell  cumstancps.     Method.  Epis.  Church  r.  Jaque«, 

v.  Kelley,  2  Dr.  &  War.  181;  Raffety  r.  King,  1  John.  Ch.  65,  75,  76;  17  John.  548;  Neale  v. 

1  Keen,  601,  609;  and  see  ante,  p.  346.  Hagthorp,  3  Bland,  551.    Special  interrogatories 

4  Jerrard  v.  Saunders,  2  Ves.  Jr.  454,  458;  in  a  bill  seem  not  to  be  absolutely  necessary. 

Blaisdell  v.  Bowers,  40  Vt.  126.130;  Miller  v.  Story,  Eq.   PI.   §38;    Meth.   Epis.  Church    v. 

Saunders,  17  Ga.  92;  Grim  v.  Wheeler,  3  Edw.  Jaques,  1  John.  Ch.  65;  Gleaves  v.  Morrow,  2 

Ch.  334;   Mechanics'  Bank  v.  Levy,  3  Paige,  Tenn.  Ch.  597.     See  the  40th  Equity  Rule  ol 

606;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §§  36,  37.     It  is  sufficient,  the  U.  S.  Courts  (since  repealed),  post.  Vol.  Ill  : 

however,  if  the  interrogatory  is  founded  upon  "  A  defendant  shall  not  be  bound  to  answer  any 

a  statement  in  the  bill,  which  is  inserted  there-  statement  or  charge  in  the  bill,  unless  specially 

in  merel}'  as  evidence   in  support  of  the  main  and    particularly   interrogated    thereto,    ami    a 

charges.     Mechanics'    Bank  v.  Lew,  3   Paifje,  defendant  shall    not    be  bound  to  answer  any 

606.     Where  a  fact  is  stated  in  a  bill  bv  way  interrogatory  in  the  bill,  except  those  interrcg- 

of  recital    merely,  without  any    interrogatory  atones  which     such  defendant  is  required    to 

calling  for  an  answer,  as  to  that  fact,  the  defend-  answer,"  &c. 
ant  is  not  bound  either  to  admit  or  to  denv  the 


(a)  The  interrogatories  of  the  bill  must  be      cannot  orally  assign  reasons  for  not  answering 
met  by  the  defendant's  pleading;  his  counsel      them.     Slater  v.  Banwell,  50  Fed.  Rep.  150. 

711 


*  716  ANSWERS. 

them  in  issue.     Under  the  later  practice,  a  defendant  might  be  required 
to  answer  any  interrogatories  which  were  pertinent  to  the  case  made  by 

the  bill,  although  not  founded  on  specific  charges  or  statements 
*716    in  the  *  bill ; 1  but  he  was  not  bound  to  answer  any  statement  or 

charge  in  the  bill,  unless  specially  and  particularly  interrogated 
thereto;  nor  was  he  bound  to  answer  any  of  the  interrogatories  except 
those  which  he  was  required  to  answer.2  A  defendant  is  not,  however, 
prohibited  from  answering  any  statement,  charge,  or  interrogatory  which 
he  may  consider  it  necessary  to  his  defence  to  answer ;  and  he  is  left 
at  complete  liberty,  in  this  respect,  to  act  in  such  manner  as  may  be 
thought  advisable :  subject  to  the  restriction  that  if  he  answer  any  state- 
ment or  charge  in  the  bill  to  which  he  is  not  interrogated,  only  by 
stating  his  ignorance  of  the  matter  so  stated  or  charged,  such  answer 
will  be  deemed  impertinent.3 

The  plaintiff's  right  to  discovery  is  not  extended,  by  the  present 
practice;  so  that  all  the  objections  which  could  formerly  have  been 
urged  by  the  defendant,  to  protect  himself  from  a  discovery  of  any  por- 
tion of  the  matter  of  the  bill,  can  now  be  urged  against  a  discovery  of 
that  concerning  which  the  defendant  is  specially  interrogated ;  and 
there  have  always  existed  certain  special  reasons  upon  which  the 
defendant  might  object  to  the  discovery  sought  by  the  plaintiff :  either 
because  the  discovery  might  subject  him  to  pains  and  penalties,  or  to  a 
forfeiture,  or  to  something  in  the  nature  of  a  forfeiture  ; 4  or  because 
it  was  immaterial  to  the  relief  prayed  ; 5  or  because  it  might  lead  to  a 
disclosure  of  matter,  the  subject  of  professional  confidence  ; 6  or  of  the 
defendant's  own  title,  in  cases  where  there  is  not  a  sufficient  privity 
between  him  and  the  plaintiff  to  warrant  the  latter  in  requiring  a  dis- 
closure of  it.7  In  all  these  cases,  although,  as  we  have  seen,  the  defend- 
ant may  protect  himself  from  discovery  by  plea  or  demurrer,  yet  he 
has  always  been  permitted  to  decline,  by  his  answer,  giving  the  objec- 
tionable discovery,  and  to  state,  in  that  form,  the  grounds  upon  which 
he   claims  protection  ;    and  he   still  retains  the  same   privilege.8      He 

1  Ante,  p.  483;  Perry  t.  Turpin,  Kay  App.  6  Ante,  p.  570. 

49;  Mansellr.  Feeney,  2  J.  &  H.  313,  318;  Law  1  Ante,  p.  579;  and  see  Cooke  v.  Turner,  14 

v.  London  Indisputable  Society,  10  Hare  App.  Sim.  218,  221 ;  8  Jur.  703.     The  plaintiff  is  not 

20;  Barnard  v.  Hunter,  1  Jur.  N.  S.  10(55,  V.  entitled  to  discovery  of  the  defendant's  case; 

C.  S.;  Marsh  v.  Keith,  1  Dr.  &  Sm.  342;  Hud-  ante,  pp.  579,  580,  notes;  Hoffman  v.  Postil), 

son  v.  Grenfell,  3  Giff.  388;  8  Jur.  N.  S.  878;  L.  R.  4  Ch.  673.    Allegations  of  fraud  in  a  bill 

McGarrel  r.  Moon,  L.  R.  10  Eq.  22.  must  be  answered,  and  a  demurrer  to  a  bill,  con- 

2  Cons.  Ord.  XV.  3.  tainit'g  such    allegations    and   strong    circum- 
8  Cons.  Ord.  XV.  3;  see  Tread  well  r.  Cleave-  stances  of  equity,  must  be  overruled.   Burnley  v. 

land,  McLean,  283.     The  above  order  has  been  Jeffersonville,  3  McLean,  336.    Such  allegations 

adopted  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  must  be  denied  in  the  plea  as  well  as  in  the  an- 

States.     See  20th  Equity  Rule  of  the  United  swer.     Lewis  v.  Baird,  3  McLean,  56. 

States  Courts,  January  Term,  1842.  8  A  defendant  may  in  some  cases  answer  in 

4  Ante,  p.  562.     But  the  defendant  cannot  part,  and  by  his  answer  state  reasons  why  lie 

object  to  answer,   if    the  period   fixed  by  law  should   not  be  compelled  to  make  further  an- 

within  which   he  could  be  prosecuted   for  the  swer.     Hunt  r.   Gookin,  6  Vt.  462;  Adams  v. 

offence  or  the  forfeiture  has  elapsed  before  the  Fisher,  3  M.  &  C.  526;    Cuyler  v.  Bogi:rt,  3 

answer  is  filed.     Dwinal   v.  Smith,  25  Maine,  Paige,  168;  see  Weisman  .r.  Minine  Co.  4  Jones 

379;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  589;  ante,  pp.  584,  595,  Eq.  112. 

and  notes.  But  if  a  defendant  rest  himself  upon  a  fact, 

*  Ante,  p.  570.  as  an  objection  to  further  discovery,  it  ought  to 

712 


GENERAL   NATURE   OF   ANSWERS.  *  717 

must,  however,  swear  to   his   belief   in   the   validity   *  of   such    *  717 
grounds ; 1  and   the   Court   must  be   satisfied,  from  the   circum- 
stances of  the  case,  and  the  nature  of  the  discovery  which  he  is  called 
upon  to  give,  that  the  case  falls  within  the  above-mentioned  grounds 
of  objection.2  (a) 

The  principle  upon  which  the  Court  proceeds,  in  exempting  a  defend- 
ant from  a  discovery  under  any  of  the  above  circumstances,  has  been 
fully  discussed,  in  considering  the  grounds  upon  which  a  defendant, 
although  he  does  not  object  to  the  relief,  provided  the  plaintiff  makes 
out  a  case  which  may  entitle  him  to  it,  may  demur  to  the  discovery 
sought ;  it  is  only  necessary,  therefore,  to  repeat  in  this  place  what  has 
been  before  stated, —  that  if  a  defendant  objects  to  any  particular  dis- 
covery, upon  any  of  the  grounds  above  stated,  he  may,  even  though  the 
grounds  upon  which  he  may  object  appear  upon  the  bill,  decline  making 
such  discovery,  by  submission  in  his  answer.3 

It  may  be  observed  here,  that  the  only  difference  occasioned  by  this 
method  of  objecting  to  the  discovery  is,  that  if  the  objection  be  taken 
by  demurrer  or  plea,  the  validity  of  it  is  at  once  decided  by  the  Court, 
upon  argument  of  the  plea  or  demurrer;  whereas,  if  the  objection  be 
taken  by  answer,  the  validity  of  it  can  only  come  before  the  Court  in 
the  form  of  exceptions  to  the  answer,  which  is  certainly  a  more  cir- 
cuitous and  expensive  mode  of  trying  the  question  than  that  afforded 
by  demurring.  It  has,  however,  been  held,  that  where  the  ground  of 
objection  is,  that  the  discovery  would  render  the  defendant  liable  to 
pains  and  penalties,  the  proper  course  is  to  submit  the  point  by  answer: 
because,  by  demurring,  the  defendant  admits  the  facts  to  be  true.4 

It  is  a  general  rule,  that  the  defendant  is  only  required  to  answer  to 
those  points  which  are  necessary  to  enable  the  Court  to  make  a  decree 
against  him ; 5  and  the  objection  arising  from  want  of  materiality  is  one 
that  the  defendant  has  always  been  allowed  to  raise  by  answer.6 

be  such  a  fact,  as,  if  true,  would  at  once  be  a  12  W.  R.  561,  L.  J.T. ;  Ex  parte  Reynolds,  20 

clear,  decided,  and  inevitable  bar  to  the  plain-  Ch.  D.  294;  Lamb  v.  Munster,  10  Q.  B.  D.  110; 

tiff's  demand.     Me  hod.  Epis.  Church  v.  Jaques,  Taylor  on  Evid.  §  1311. 

1  John.  Ch.  65.     If  it  clearly  appears  that  the  »  Ante,  p.  582;  Ld.  Red.  200,  307. 

case  is  not  of  Equity  cognizance,  the  answer,  4  Honey  wood  v.  Sel  win,  3  Atk.  276;  see  Att.- 

required  only  for  the  purposes  of  the  particular  Gen.  v.  Lucas,  2  Hare,  566,  569;  7  Jur.  1080; 

suit,  would  avail  nothing,  and  is  not  necessary.  Earl  of  Lichfield  v.  Bond,  6  Beav.  88,  93;  7  Jur. 

Morton  v.  Grenada   Academies,  8   Sin.  &  M.  209. 

773.  5  Per  Sir  Thomas  Plumer  V.  C.  in  Agar  v. 

i  Scott  v.  Miller  (No   2),  John.  328;  5  Jur.  Regent's  Canal  Co.  G.  Coop.  212,  2U:  see  also 

N.  S.  858;  see  Balguy  v.  Broadhurst,  1   Sim.  Wood  v.  Hitchings,  3  Beav.  504,  510;   Moore 

N.  S.   Ill;  The  Mary,  L.  R.  2  A.  &  E.  319;  v.  Craven,  W.  N.  (1870)  13. 
Kennedy  v.  Lyell,  23  Ch.  D.  387;  27  Ch.  D.  1.  6  The  defendant  is  not  bound  to  answer  any 

2  Sidebottom  v.  Adkins,  3  Jur.  N.  S.  631;  5  allegations  in  the  plaintiff's  bill,  which  are  not 

W.  K.  743,  V.  C.  S.;  see  also  Reg.  v.  Boyes.  1  material  to   be   answered.     Utica   Ins.   Co.   v. 

B.  &  S.  311;  7  Jur.  N.  S.  1158;  Bunn  v.  Bunn,  Lynch,  3  Paige,  210;  Butler  v.  Cotting,  1  Root, 

(a)  It   is  not  the  practice  of   the  Court  of  he  is  not  a  party  to  the  suit.     See  ante,  p.  68, 

Chancery  to  allow  interrogatories  to  be  admin-  note  (a).     A  corporation,  though  not  compell- 

istered  to  infant  plaintiffs  or  defendants.   Mayor  ahle  to  answer  under  oath,  must  answer  fully. 

v.  Collins,  24  Q.  B.  D.  361;  Redfern  v.  Redfern,  Gamewell  Fire-Alarm  Tel.  Co.  v.  Mayor,  31 

[1891]  P.  139.     The  guardian  ad  litem  of  an  Fed.  Rep.  312. 
infant  cannot  be  required  to  give  discovery,  as 

713 


*  719  ANSWERS. 

*  718         *  The   application   of    this   rule    has   been    before   discussed, 

in  treating  of   demurrers  to  discovery,  on  the  ground   of    want 
of   materiality.1     It    may   not  be  useless,  however,  in   addition  to  the 
instances  already  referred  to,  to  mention  one  or  two  cases  where  the 
defendant's   right  to   exempt   himself   from  answering   to   such   parts 
of  the  bill  has  been  recognized  by  the  Court,  upon  exceptions.     Where 
a  bill  was  filed  by  a  person  claiming  under  the  limitations  of  a  set- 
tlement, to  set  aside  an  appointment,  by  which  his  title  was  defeated, 
on   the    ground   of    fraud,    and   upon   an   answer   being    put   in   deny- 
ing  the   fraud,   the    plaintiff    amended   his   bill,    by   inserting   certain 
inquiries  as   to   the   manner  in  which    the  appointment  was  attested, 
in  order  to  show  that  it  was  not  executed  in  the  manner  required  by  the 
settlement,  which  inquiries  the  defendant,  by  his  answer,  declined  an- 
swering, upon  the  question  coming  before  the  Court,  it  was  held  that 
the   defendant    was   not   bound  to  answer   the    interrogatories   in   the 
amended  bill ;  because  the  plaintiff,  having  by  his  bill  set  up  a  case  of 
fraud,  the  fact,  whether  the  appointment  was  executed  in  conformity 
with  the  power  or  not,  was  immaterial  to  the  case  so  set  up.2     Upon  the 
same  principle,  the  Court  holds  that,  where  a  bill  is  filed  by  a  creditor 
or  legatee,  or  other  person  claiming  a  definite  sum  out  of  the  personal 
estate  of  a  deceased  person,  against  an  executor  or  administrator,  if  the 
defendant  admits  assets  in  his  hands  sufficient  to  answer  the  plaintiff's 
demands,  he  need  not  set  out  an  account  of  the  estate,8  or  set  out  a 
schedule  of  the  documents  in  his  possession  relating  to  the  estate ; 4 
because  the  admission  by  the  defendant  that  he  has  assets  in  his  hands 
to  answer  the  plaintiff's  demands,  is  sufficient  to  give  the  plaintiff  all  the 
relief  he  can  require,  and  any  discovery  would  be  useless  and  irrelevant.5 
So,  also,  the  Court  refused  to  compel  discovery,  where  the  execu- 
*  719    tor  of  an  executor  admitted  assets  of  the  original  *  testator  came 
to  the  hands  of  his  testator ; *  and  so,  discovery  was  not  enforced 
where,  in  a  suit  by  the  holder  of  a  policy,  the  directors  of  an  insurance 
society  admitted  assets  sufficient  to  pay  the  claims  on  the  policy.2 

The  Court  will  not,  in  general,  allow  the  circumstance  of  a  plaintiff 
having  a  claim  upon  a  defendant,  to  be  used  for  the  purpose  of  enabling 

310;  Davis  r.  Mapes,  2  Paige,  105 ;  Hagthorp  of  the  parties.     A  certain  latitude  must  always 

r   Hook    1  Gill  &  J.  270;  Mechanics'  Bank  v.  be  allowed  in  seeking  discovery."     Sir  C.  J. 

Lew,  3  Paige,  656;  Hardeman  v.  Harris.  7  How.  Selwyn  L.  J.  in  Hoffmann  v.  Postill,  L  R.  4  Ch. 

(U.*S.)  726;  Hoffmann  e.  Postill,  L.  R.  4  Ch.  673,  678.     See  Bidder  v.  Bridges,  29  Ch.  D.  29. 

673.     But  see  Hogencamp  v.  Ackerman,  10  N.  1  Ante,  p.  570. 

J   En.  267 ;  Wootten  v.  Burch,  2  Md.  Ch.  Dec.  2  Codrington  v.  Codrington,  3  Sim.  519,  524. 

190.     A  defendant  cannot  be  called  upon  to  an-  a  Agar  r.  Regent's  Canal  Co.  ubi  supra. 

sweramere  arithmetical  proposition.    Mclntyre  *  Forbes  v.  Tanner,  9  Jur.  N.  S.  45o;  11  W. 

V.  Trustees  of  Union  College,  6  Paige,  239.     As  R.  414,  V.  C.  K.                            M     m        i  •„ 

to  this  point  of  materiality  and  the  tests  of  it,  5  Pullen  v.  Smith,  5  Ves.  21,  23.     To  a  bill 

see  Story   Eq.  PI.  §§  853.  853  a,  853  6,  853  c;  for  discovery   of  assets  and  relief,  an  answer 

Kuvpers  v.  Reformed  Dutch  Church,  6  Paige,  controverting  the  claim,  without  answering  as 

570*  to  the  assets,  is  insufficient.  Carneal  v.  v\  ilsor, 

"It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  it  is  almost  3  Litt.  80. 

impossible  for  the  Court,  in  a  preliminary  stage  »  Lander  r.  Weston,  13  Jur.  877,  V.  C.  E. 

of  the  proceedings,  to  determine  what  proposi-  2  Prichard  v.  Murray,  12  Jur.  616,  V.  C  E. 
tions  will  be  material  to  the  case  of  one  or  other 

714 


GENERAL  NATURE  OF  ANSWERS.  *  720 

the  plaintiff  to  investigate  all  the  private  affairs  of  the  defendant ; 8 
thus,  a  vendor,  in  a  bill  for  specific  performance,  cannot  interrogate  the 
vendee  as  to  his  property,4  even  though  the  bill  should  charge  that  the 
defendant  was  insolvent.5  In  order  to  entitle  a  plaintiff  to  an  answer 
to  such  an  inquiry,  he  must  show  some  specific  lien  upon  the  defend- 
ant's property,  and  pray  some  relief  respecting  it ; 6  and  the  Court  will 
not,  even  then,  compel  the  defendant  to  make  such  discovery,  where  the 
interest  which  the  plaintiff  may  have  in  it  is  very  remote  in  its  bearings 
upon  the  real  point  in  issue,  and  would  be  an  oppressive  inquisition.7 

The  above  cases,  and  those  before  cited,  point  out  in  what  instances 
the  defendant  may  decline  to  make  a  particular  discovery,  when  it  is 
irrelevant  to  the  general  scope  and  object  of  the  bill.  A  discovery  may, 
however,  be  material  to  the  plaintiff's  general  case,  if  made  by  one  of 
the  defendants,  which  would  be  wholly  irrelevant  if  made  by  another  : 
in  such  cases,  the  defendant  from  whom  the  discovery  would  be  imma- 
terial, is  not  obliged  to  make  it ;  and,  in  general,  a  defendant  is  only 
obliged  to  answer  such  of  the  interrogatories  as  are  necessary  to  en- 
able the  plaintiff  to  obtain  a  complete  decree  against  him  individually. 
Where,  however,  the  defendant  is  involved  in  the  whole  case,  and  in 
that  sense  relief  is  asked  against  him,  he  must  answer,  though  the 
interrogatory  might  seem  to  be  immaterial  to  the  relief  asked  against 
him.8 

With  reference  to  the  objection  of  immateriality,  it  must  be  under- 
stood that  the  defendant  is  only  required  to  answer  as  to  matters  which 
are  well  pleaded ;  that  is,  to  the  facts  stated  and  charged.  To  matters 
of  law,  or  inferences  of  law  drawn  from  the  facts,  he  need  not 
answer.9  Thus,  a  defendant  must  answer  *  whether  a  will,  exe-  *  720 
cuted  before  the  Wills  Act,1  was  published  by  the  testator  in  the 
presence  of  three  witnesses  :  but  he  need  not  answer  to  an  interrogatory 
requiring  him  to  say  whether  the  publication  was  such  as  by  law  is  re- 
quired to  pass  freeholds  by  devise.  Sometimes  a  defendant,  instead  of 
answering  such  interrogatories,  submits  the  point  to  the  judgment  of  the 
Court :  but  it  is  not  necessary  to  do  so. 

All  the  objections  to  discovery  that  have  hitherto  been  considered, 
are  of  a  kind  that  the  defendant  has  always  been  allowed  to  raise  by 
answer,  upon  the  principle  that  the  Court  does  not  oblige  a  defendant 
to  answer  such  questions,  even  when  the  right  to  relief  is  admitted  ;  but 
where  these  objections  do  not  apply,  it  must  be  remembered  that 
,l  there  is  no  principle  more  clearly  established  in  the  Court  than  this,  — 

3  See  Mayer  v.  Galluchat.  6  Rich.  Eq.  (S.  8  Marsh  v.  Keith,  1  Dr.  &  Sm.  342;  6  .Ttir. 

Q\  i.  N.  S.  1182.     On  the  subject  of  immateriality, 

*  Francis  v.  Wigzell,  1  Mad.  258,  260.  see  also  Bleckley  v.  Rvmer.  4  Drew.  248;  New- 

5  See  Small  v.  Attwood,  as  reported  ill  Wig-  ton  ?•.  Dimes,  3  Jur.  N.  S.  583,  V.  C.  W. 

ram  on  Disc.  168.  9  Story,   Eq.    PI.   §   846.      In    determining 

6  Francis  v.  Wigze'l,  ubi  supra  ;  Verdier  v.  whether  a  question  is  one  of  fact,  and,  tliere- 
Foster,  4  Rich.  Eq.  227;  Creswell  v.  Smith,  2  fore,  to  be  answered,  it  makes  no  difference 
Tenn.  Oh.  416.  t',at   ■'    's   as^ed    with   reference  to  a  written 

7  Wieram  on  Disc.  165  ;  Dos  Santos  v.  document.  Hoffmann  v.  Postill,  L.  R.  4  Ch. 
Frietas,  cited  ibid.;  Webster  v.  Threlfall,  2  S.  673. 

&  S    190,  193;  see  also  Janson  v.  Solarte,  2  Y.  U  Will.  IV.  &  1  Vic.  c.  26. 

&  C.  Kx.  132,  136. 

715 


*  720 


ANSWERS. 


that,  when. a  party  answers,  he  is  bound  to  answer  fully  ;  "  "and  for  this, 
among  other  reasons,  that  if  the  defence  which  a  party  sets  up  by  his  an- 
swer should  be  decided  against  him,  it  is  of  the  utmost  importance  that 
all  consequential  matters  which  are  material  for  the  purpose  of  the  de- 
cree, should  receive  an  answer."  2(a) 

This  rule  is  applicable  to  all  cases  where  the  defence  intended  to  be 
set  up  by  the  defendant  extends  to  the  entire  subject  of  the  suit :  such, 
for  instance,  as  that  the  plaintiff  has  no  right  to  equitable  relief  —  or 


2  Per  Lord  Lvndhurst,  in  Lancaster  v.  Evors, 
1  Phil.  351,  352;  8  Jur.  133;  Hare  on  Disc.  255, 
256;  Thorpe  v.  Macauley,  5  Mad.  218,  229; 
Faulder»>.  Stuart,  11  Ves.  2U6,  301 ;  Mazarredo 
v.  Maitland,  3  Mad.  66,  TO;  Swinbome  v.  Nel- 
son, 16  Beav.  416;  Potter  v.  Waller,  2  DeG.  & 
S.  410;  Ambler,  ed.  Blunt,  353,  (n);  Reade  v. 
Woodrooffe,  21  Beav.  421;  Leigh  v.  Birch,  32 
Beav.  399  ;  9  Jur.  N.  S.  1265;  Swabey  v.  Sutton, 
1  H.  &  M.  514;  9  Jur.  N.  S.  1321 ;  Phillips  v. 
Prevost,  4  John.  Ch.  205;  Whitney  v.  Belden,  1 
Edw.  Ch.  386;  Ogden  r.  Ogden/l  Bland,  288; 
Kuypers  v.  Ref.  Dutch  Church,  6  Paige,  570; 
Salmon  v.  Claggett,  3  Bland,  125;  Cuyler  v. 
Bogert,  3  Paige,  386;  Hagthorp  v.  Hook,  1  Gill 
&  J.  270;  Murray  v.  Coster,  4  Cowen,  640; 
Newhall  v.  Hobbs,  3  Cush.  274,  277  ;  Hill  v. 
Crary,  2  English,  536;  Utica  Ins  Co.  v.  Lynch, 
3  Paige,  210 ;  Mansfield  v.  Gambril,  1  Gill  &  J. 
503.  The  party  submitting  to  answer,  must 
answer  the  whole  of  the  statements  and  charges 
in  the  bill,  and  all  the  interrogatories  properly 
founded  upon  them,  at  least,  so  far  as  they  are 
necessary  to  enable  the  plaintiff  to  have  a  com- 
plete decree  against  him  in  case  he  succeeds  in 


(a)  See  Armstrong  v.  Crocker.  10  Gray,  269; 
Pace  v.  Bartles,  45  N.  J.  Eq.  371;  Anderson 
v.  Kissam  28  Fed.  Rep. 900;  Langdell,  Eq.  PI. 
(2d  ed.)  §  70.  When  the  discovery  sought  is 
vexatiously  minute,  exceptions  to  the  answer 
for  insufficiency  will  be  discouraged.  Elmer  v. 
Creasy,  L.  R.  9  Ch.  69  ;  West  of  England  Bank 
v.  Nickolls,  6Ch.  D.  613;  Grumbrecht  v.  Parry, 
49  L.  T.  570;  Dixon  v.  Frazer,  L.  R.2  Eq.  497; 
Shropshire  Union  Ry.  Co.  24  Ch.  D.  1 10.  Full 
accounts  of  an  extensive  business  or  partner- 
ship will  not  be  required,  whpn  clearly  oppres- 
sive or  irrelevant.  Wier  v.  Tucker,  L.  R.  14 
Eq.  25;  Heugh  r.  Garrett,  44  L.J.  Ch.  305; 
Ashworth  v.  Roberts,  45  Ch.  D.  623.  An 
answer  was  held  sufficient  where  a  further  and 
better  answer  could  not  be  given  without  dis- 
closing the  contents  of  privileged  reports  from 
the  defendants'  servants  which  the  defendants 
were  not  bound  to  disclose.  London,  Tilbury  & 
S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Kirk,  51  L.  T.  599 ;  see  Bolckowfl. 
Fisher.  10  Q.  B.  D.  161;  Rasbotham  v.  Shrop- 
shire Union  Rv.  Co.  24  Ch.  D  110;  Cayley  v. 
Sandycroft  Brick  Co.  33  W.  R.  577.  So  the  dis- 
closure of  hook*  or  correspondence  to  rivals  in 
trade  will  be  carefully  guarded.      Att.-Gen.  v. 

716 


the  suit.  Bank  of  Utica  v.  Messereau,  7  Paige, 
517  ;  Perkinson  t'.  Trousdale,  3  Scam.  380;  Bat- 
terson  v.  Ferguson,  1  Barb.  490;  Langdon  v. 
Goddard.  3  Story,  13.  The  above  is  the  gen- 
eral rule,  subject,  however,  to  the  exceptions 
named  in  the  text  and  in  the  notes  below. 

The  latest  decisions  on  this  difficult  point  of 
Chancery  practice  are  Elmer  v.  Creasy,  L.  R.  9 
Ch.  73;  Saull  v.  Browne,  L.  R.  9  Ch.  364;  Great 
Western  Colliery  Co.  v.  Tucker.  L.  R.  9  Ch. 
376;  French  v.  Rainey,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  640;  Pace 
v.  Bartles,  45  N.  J.  Eq.  371.  In  the  case  last 
cited  the  authorities  are  reviewed,  and  the  con- 
clusion reached,  that  the  operation  of  the  denial 
by  answer  of  the  plaintiffs  right  of  suit  is  to 
protect  the  defendant  from  the  discovery  sought 
so  far  as  it  is  consequential  to  the  final  relief 
sought,  but  not  from  the  discovery  necessary 
to  enable  the  plaintiff  to  prosecute  his  suit. 
Ante,  p.  300,  n.  6. 

In  answering  interrogatories  filed  by  a  de- 
fendant for  the  examination  of  the  plaintiff, 
the  general  rule  applies  that  he  who  is  boui.d 
to  answer  must  answer  full}'.  Hoffmann  v. 
Postill,  L.  R.  4  Ch.  673. 


North  Met.  Tramways  Co.  67  L.  T.  283 ;  Alex- 
ander  v.  Mortgage  Co.  47  Fed.  Rep.  131;  Rig- 
don  v.  Conley,  31  III.  App.  630;  Com'th  v. 
Perkins,  124  Penn.  St.  36;  see  ante,  p.  579, 
notes.  In  g.  neral,  as  stated  in  the  text,  con- 
sequential matters  must  be  disclosed,  when  there 
is  no  unnecessary  hardship.  Cases  in  note  2 
above;  Thompson  v.  Dunn,  L.  R.  5  Ch.  573; 
Saunders  r.  Jones,  7  Ch.  D.  435 ;  Lyon  v.  Twed- 
dell,  13  Ch.  D.  375 ;  Benbow  v.  Low,  16  Ch.  D. 
93;  Re  North  Australian  Territory  Co.  45  Ch. 
D.  87.  reversing  62  L.  T.  556  ;  Re  Sutcliffe,  50 
L.  J.  Ch.  574.  But  the  materiality  of  the  dis- 
covery will  always  be  considered  where  the 
discovery  is  such  as  the  plaintiff,  though  fail- 
ing at  the  hearing,  may  afterwards  use  in  a  way 
prejudicial  to  the  defendant  Ibid.  ;  Lea  v.  Sax- 
by,  32  L.  T.  N.  S.  723.  It  is  within  the  Court's 
discretion  to  postpone  the  desired  discovery 
until  such  a  stage  of  the  proceedings  as  will  de- 
termine the  necessity  of  requiring  it.  See  Fen- 
nessy  v.  Clark,  37  Ch.  D.  184  ;  Millar  v.  Harper, 
38  Ch.  D.  110;  Edelston  v.  Russell,  57  L.  T. 
927.  Respecting  the  vexatious  introduction  of 
interrogatories  into  particulars,  see  Lister  v. 
Thompson,  7  T.  L.  R.  107. 


GENERAL  NATURE  OF  ANSWERS. 


*721 


has  no  interest  in  the  subject  —  or  that  the  defendant  himself  has  no 
interest  in  the  subject  —  or  that  he  is  a  purchaser  for  a  valuable  con- 
sideration 8  —  that  the  bill  does  not  declare  a  purpose  for  which  Equity 
will  assume  jurisdiction  to  compel  discovery — or  that  the  plaintiff  is 
under  some  personal  disability,  by  which  he  is  incapacitated  from 
suing.4  In  all  these  *  cases,  a  defendant  who  does  not  avail  him-  *  721 
self  of  the  objection  to  answering,  either  by  demurrer  or  plea, 
but  submits  to  answer,  must  answer  fully.1  Nor  is  a  denial  of  the 
plaintiff's  title  a  reason  for  refusing  to  set  out  accounts  required  by 
the  interrogatories  ; 2  nor  a  denial  of  fraud  a  reason  for  refusing  to  dis- 
cover the  facts  which  are  alleged  to  show  it.3  In  some  cases,  however, 
where  it  has  appeared  that  the  discovery  was  not  necessary  to  enable 
the  plaintiff  to  obtain  a   decree,  and  where  the  information  could  be 


s  See  Cuyleri\Bogert,  3  Paige,  188;  Method. 
Epis.  Church  v.  Jaques,  1  John.  Ch.  65. 

*  Gilbert  v.  Lewis,  1  De  G.  J.  &  S.  38;  9 
Jur.  N.  S.  187. 

1  Hare  on  Disc.  256  :  Howe  v.  M'Kernan,  30 
Beav.  547;  Newhall  v.  Hobbs,  3  Cusli.  274,  277. 
The  general  rule  of  pleading  in  Chancery  is, 
that  the  defendant  cannot  by  answer  excuse 
himself  from  answering.  Bank  of  Utica  v. 
Messereau,  7  Paige,  517.  It  is  said  by  Mr. 
Justice  Story  to  be  far  from  universally  true,  as 
is  sometimes  alleged,  that  a  defendant  answer- 
ing can  take  every  ground  of  defence,  which  he 
might  insist  on  by  way  of  demurrer  or  plea  to 
the  bill.  Story,  Eq.  PL  §  847.  Thus,  although 
it  was  formerly  thought  otherwise,. it  is  now 
settled,  that  a  defendant  to  a  bill  for  discovery 
and  relief  must  avail  himself  of  the  protection 
of  being  a  bona  fide  purchaser  for  a  valuable 
consideration  without  notice,  by  way  of  plea, 
—  and  that  he  cannot  make  this  defence  by  an- 
swer, for,  if  he  answers  at  all,  he  must  answer 
fully.  Ibid,  and  note;  Portarlington  v.  Soulby, 
7  Sim.  28;  see,  however,  the  countervailing 
rule  of  the  U.  S.  Supreme  Court,  stated  in  note 
to  ante,  p.  715. 

There  are,  however,  a  few  admitted  excep- 
tions to  the  above  rule  that  a  defendant  can- 
not by  answer  excuse  himself  from  answering 
which  furnish  special  grounds  for  objecting  by 
answer  to  the  discovery  sought.  Some  of  these 
exceptions  will  be  found  in  the  text.  As, 
where  an  answer  would  tend  to  criminate  the 
defendant,  or  subject  him  to  a  penalty,  forfei- 
ture, or  punishment.  Rrockway  r.  Copp,  3 
Paige,  53!);  Skinner  c.  Judson,  8  Conn.  528; 
Livingston  v.  Harris,  3  Paige,  528;  Leggett  v. 
Postley,  2  Paige,  599.  So.  where  an  answer 
would  involve  a  violation  of  professional  con- 
fidence. Ante,  p.  570,  et  seq.,  and  notes,  p.  715, 
and  notes.  The  defendant  may  by  answer  refuse 
to  make  discovery  on  the  ground  of  immateri- 
ality of  the  fact  of  which  the  discovery  is  sought. 
Kuypers  v.  Ref.  Dutch  Church,  6  Paige,  570 ; 


Davis  v.  Mapes,  2  Paige,  105.  So,  the  defend- 
ant is  not  bound  to  answer  matters  which  are 
purely  scandalous,  or  impertinent,  or  irrelevant. 
Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  846.  The  Statute  of  Limita- 
tions and  lapse  of  time  may  be  relied  upon  as  a 
defence  by  answer,  as  well  as  by  plea  and  de- 
murrer. Id.  §  751;  Van  Hook  v.  Whitlock,  7 
Paige,  373;  Maury  /'.  Mason,  8  Porter,  213.  l-'or 
other  cases  in  which  exceptions  to  the  above 
rule  have  been  taken  and  sustained,  a.  d  the 
grounds  of  such  exceptions,  the  learned  reader 
is  referred  to  the  authorities,  in  which  they  are 
stated  and  explained.  French  v.  Shotwell,  6 
John.  Ch.  235  ;  Murray  v.  Coster,  4  Cowen,  641; 
Phillips  v.  Prevost,  4  John.  Ch.  205;  McDowl 
v.  Charles,  6  John.  Ch.  132;  Smith  v.  Fisher,  2 
Desaus.  275;  Morris  v.  Parker,  3  John.  Ch.  297; 
Hunt  v.  Gookin,  16  Vt.  462;  Desplaces  v.  Goris, 
1  Edw.  Ch.  352,  353;  Drew  o.  Drew,  2  V.  &  B. 
159.  The  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  an  answer  to 
every  fact  charged  in  the  bill,  the  admission  or 
proof  of  which  is  material  to  the  relief  sought, 
or  is  necessary  to  substantiate  his  proceedings 
and  make  them  regular.  Davis  v.  Mapes,  2 
Paige,  105. 

Where  suspicious  cirenmstances,  gross  fraud, 
and  collusion  are  charged  in  a  bill,  a  defendant 
will  be  held  to  a  strict  rule  in  answering.  Not 
only  his  motives,  but  bis  secret  designs,  his 
"  unuttered  thoughts,"  must  be  exposed.  Me- 
chanics' Bank  r.  Levy,  1  Edw.  Ch.  316. 

2  Dott  v.  Hoyes,  15  Sim.  372;  10  Jur.  628; 
Great  Luxembourg  Ry.  Co.  t>.  Magnay,  23 
Beav.  646;  Brookes  v.  Boucher,  8  Jur.  N.  S. 
639  ;  10  W.  R.  708,  V.  C.  W. ;  Leigh  r.  Birch, 
and  Swabey  v.  Sutton,  ubi  eupra;  Robson  v. 
Flight,  33  Beav.  268;  Thompson  v.  Dunn,  L.  R. 
5  Ch.  573  ;  see  Jacobs  v.  Goodman,  2  Cox.  282; 
Donegal  v.  Stewart,  3  Ves.  446;  Randal  v.  Head, 
Hardres,  188. 

8  Padley   V.    Lincoln    Water   Works   Co.  2 

M'N.  &G.68,  72;  14  Jur.  299; v.  Harrison, 

4  Mad.  252. 

717 


23 


ANSWERS. 


*  722    *  obtained  in  the  proceedings  under  the  decree,  a  full  answer  has 

not  been  enforced.1 
A  defendant  may,  however,  as  we  have  seen,2  by  answer  decline  an- 
swering any  interrogatory,  or  part  of  an  interrogatory,  from  answering 
which  he  might  formerly  have  protected  himself  by  demurrer ;  and  he 
may  so  decline,  notwithstanding  he  answers  other  parts  of  such  inter- 
rogatory, or  other  interrogatories  from  which  he  might  have  protected 
himself  by  demurrer,  or  other  parts  of  the  bill  as  to  which  he  is  not  in- 
terrogated ; 3  but  he  cannot  decline  answering  a  particular  interrogatory 
on  the  ground  that  the  whole  bill  is  demurrable  ; 4  nor  can  he  protect 
himself  from  discovery  by  raising  by  answer  a  defence  which  he  might 
have  pleaded.5  (a) 

A  defendant  must  answer  as  to  his  knowledge,  remembrance,  in- 

*  723    formation,  or  belief.6  Where,  however,  a  special  cause  is  shown,  *  so 


1  De  la  Rue  v.  Dickinson,  3  K.  &  J.  388; 
Swinburne  v.  Nelson,  refd.  to  id.  389;  16  Beav. 
416;  Clegg  v.  Edmonson,  3  Jur.  N.  S.  299, 
L.  JJ. ;  Great  Western  Colliery  Co.  v.  Tucker, 
L.  R.  9  Ch.  364;  French  v.  Rai'ney,  2  Tenn.  Ch. 
640.  Ante,  p.  720,  n.  2.  A  full  answer  has  also 
been  dispensed  with  where  the  discovery  is  not 
relevant  to  the  relief  sought,  as  where  the  bill 
■wns  for  a  partnership  account,  and  called  for  a 
discovery  as  to  an  item  recognized  in  the  articles 
of  partnership.  Wier  v.  Tucker,  L.  R.  14  Eq. 
25.  Or  where  the  bill  is  for  alternative  relief, 
and  the  discovery  relates  to  the  second  alterna- 
tive. Lett  v.  Parry,  1  H.  &  M.  517.  And  see 
Lockett  v.  Lockett,  L.  R.  4  Ch.  336.  But  a 
defendant  cannot  excuse  himself  from  answer- 
ing fully  on  the  ground  that  the  giving  the 
discovery  sought  would  anticipate  the  decree, 
such  discovery  being  the  same  as  that  which 
would  be  ordered  at  the  hearing  if  the  plaintiff 
obtained  a  decree.  Chichester  v.  Marquis  of 
Donegal,  L.  R.  4  Ch.  416. 

2  Ante,  p.  583. 

3  Cons.  Old.  XV.  4;  Padley  v.  Lincoln 
"Water  Works  Co.  2  M'N.  &  G.  68,  71 ;  14  Jur. 
299;  Baddeley  v.  Curwen,  2  Coll.  151,  155; 
Fairthorne  v.  Western,  3  Hare,  387,  391,  393; 
8  Jur.  353 ;  Molesworth  v.  Howard,  2  Coll.  145, 
151;  see,  however,  Tipping  v.  Clarke.  2  Hare, 
383,  392  ;  Drake  v.  Drake,  id.  647  ;  8  Jur.  642; 
Kaye  v.  Wall,  4  Hare,  127  ;  Ingilby  v.  Shafto, 
33  Beav.  31;  9  Jur.  N.  S.  114L  The  44th 
Equity  Rule  of  the  United  States  Courts  adopts 
in  terms  this  English  order,  and  the  39t!i  Equity 
Rule  of  the  United  States  Courts  proceeds  fur- 
ther. See  those  rules  infra,  pp.2384.  2385,  and 
Gaines  ».  Agnelly,  1  Woods,  238;  Samples  v. 
Bank,  id.  523. 

■»  Mason  v.  Wrakeman,  2  Phil.  516;  Fisher  v. 
Price,  11  Beav.  194,  199;  Marsh  v.  Keith,  1  Dr. 


&  Sm.  342,  350;  6  Jur.  N.  S.  1182;  Bates  v. 
Christ's  College,  Cambridge,  8  De  G.  M.  &  G. 
726;  3  Jur.  N.  S.  348,  L.  JJ.;  Leigh  v.  Birch, 
32  Beav.  399;  9  Jur.  N.  S   1265. 

5  Lancaster  r.  Evors,  1  Phil.  349,  351;  8  Jur. 
p.  133;  Swabeyt>.  Sutton,  1  H.  &  M.  514;  9  Jur. 
N.  S.  1321,  V.  C.  W.;  ante,  p.  720,  note. 

6  Tradesmen's  Bank  v.  Hyatt,  2  Edw.  Ch. 
195;  Bailey  v.  Wilson,  1  Dev.  &  Bat.  Eq.  187; 
Norton  v.  Warner,  3  Edw.  Ch.  106;  see  to  this 
point,  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  854,  et  seq. ;  Miles  v. 
Miles,  27  N.  H.  447;  see  Hall  v.  Wood,  1  Paige, 
404;  Sloan  r.  Little,  3  Paige,  103;  Pierson  v. 
Meaux,  3  A.  K.  Marsh  6;  Woods  v.  Morrell,  1 
John.  Ch.  103;  Devereaux  r.  Cooper,  11  Vt. 
103;  Pitts  v.  Hooper,  16  Ga.  442;  Dinsmore  r. 
Hazelton,  22  N.  H.  535;  Kittredge  v.  Clare- 
mont  Bank,  3  Story,  590 ;  Cleaves  v.  Morrow, 
2  Tenn.  Ch.  596  ;  Colburn  v.  Barrett,  21  Oregont 
27.  On  a  bill  filed  charging  usury,  an  answer 
that  the  defendant  does  not  remember  the  terms 
on  which  the  money  was  lent,  will  be  considered 
evasive,  and  tantamount  to  an  admission  of 
usury.  Scotts  v.  Hume,  Litt.  Sel.  Cas.  379. 
So,  where  the  bill  directly  charged  upon  the 
defendant  that  he  had  m  de  and  entered  into  a 
certain  agreement,  it  was  he'd  that  a  simple 
denial  by  the  defendant  in  his  answer  "accord- 
ing to  his  recollection  and  belief,"  was  insuffi- 
cient and  ought  to  be  treated  as  a  mere  evasion. 
Taylor  v.  Luther,  2  Sumner,  228.  But  where 
the  facts  are  such  that  it  is  probable  that 
the  defendant  cannot  recollect  them  so  as  to 
answer  more  positively,  a  denial  of  the  facts 
according  to  his  knowledge,  recollection,  and 
belief,  will  be  sufficient.  Hall  v.  Wood.  1 
Paige,  404;  see  also  Utica  Ins.  Co.  v.  Lynch,  3 
Paige,  210;  Brooks  v.  Byam,  1  Story,  29G. 
Whether  the  facts  are  charged  in  a  bill  as  be- 
ing the  acts  of  the  defendant,  or  within  his  own 


(a)  In  England,  since  the  Judicature  Acts, 
the  right  to  discovery  is  regulated  by  the  rules 
previously  existing  in  the  Court  of  Chancery. 

718 


Anderson  v.  Bank  of  British  Columbia,  2  Ch.  D 
644. 


GENERAL  NATURE  OF  ANSWERS. 


724 


positive  an  answer  may  be  dispensed  with  : 1  and  in  Hall  v.  Bodley,2 
it  is  said,  that  the  defendant  having  sworn  in  his  answer  that  he 
had  received  no  more  than  a  certain  sum  to  his  remembrance,  it  was 
allowed  to  be  a  good  answer.  As  to  facts  which  have  not  happened 
within  his  own  knowledge,  the  defendant  must  answer  as  to  his  infor- 
mation and  belief,  and  not  as  to  his  information  merely,  without  stat- 
ing any  belief  either  the  one  way  or  the  other.8  It  is  not,  however, 
necessary  to  make  use  of  the  precise  words,  "  as  to  his  information 
and  belief:  "  the  defendant  may  make  use  of  any  expressions  which  are 
tantamount  to  them  ;  thus,  to  say  that  the  defendant  cannot  answer  to 
facts  inquired  after,  as  to  his  belief  or  otherwise,  is  generally  consid- 
ered a  sufficient  denial  ; 4  for,  though  the  word  "  information  "  is  not 
used,  the  expression  "  belief  or  otherwise  "  is  held  to  include  it.5 

*  Where  defendants  have  in  their  power  the  means  of  acquiring    *  724 
the  information  necessary  to  enable  them  to  give  the  discovery 
called  for,  they  are  bound  to  make  use  of  such  means,  whatever  pains 
or  trouble  it  may  cost  them ; x  therefore,  where  defendants,  filling  the 


personal  knowledge,  he  is  bound  to  admit  or 
deny  the  facts  charged,  either  positively  or  ac- 
cording to  his  belief,  whether  they  occurred 
within  seven  years,  or  at  a  greater  distance  of 
time.  Sloan  v.  Little,  3  Paige,  103;  Hall  v. 
Wood,  1  Paige,  404. 
i  Wyatt's  P.  R.  13. 

2  1  Vern.  470;  and  see  Nelson  v.  Ponsford, 
4  Beav.  41,  43. 

3  Coop.  Fq.  PI.  314  ;   The  Holladay  Case, 
27  Fed.  Rep.  830. 

4  See  Hall  V.  Wood,  1  Paige,  404 ;  Sloan  v. 
Little,  3  Paige,  103;  Woods  v.  Morrell,  1  John. 
Ch.  103;  Bolton  v.  Gardner,  3  Paige,  273; 
Brooks  v.  Byam,  1  Story,  296;  Kittredge  v. 
Claremont  Bank,  3  Story,  590;  Kittredge  v. 
Claremont  Bank,  1  Wood.  &  M.  244;  King 
v.  Ray,  11  Paige,  235.  If  the  defendant  an- 
swers that  he  has  not  any  knowledge  or  infor- 
mation of  a  fact  charged  in  the  bill,  he  is  not 
bound  to  declare  his  belief  one  way  or  the 
other.  Morris  u.  Parker,  3  John.  Ch.  297.  If 
he  denies  all  knowledge  of  a  fact  charged  in 
the  bill,  but  admits  his  belief  as  to  the  fact 
charged,  it  is  not  necessary  for  him  to  deny 
any  information  on  the  subject.  Davis  v. 
Mapes,  2  Paige,  105.  But  if  he  has  any  infor- 
mation other  than  such  as  is  derived  from  the 
bill,  he  must  answer  as  to  such  information, 
and  as  to  his  belief  or  disbelief  of  the  facts 
charged.  Utica  Ins.  Co.  v.  Lynch,  3  Paige, 
210;  Devereaux  v.  Cooper,  11  Vt.  103.  It  is 
not  sufficient  to  answer  to  certain  specific  facts 
charged  in  the  bill,  "that  they  may  be  true, 
&c,  but  the  defendant  lias  no  knowledge  of, 
but  is  a  stringer  to  the  foregoing  facts,  and 
leaves  the  plaintiff  to  prove  the  same."  Smith 
v.  Lasher,  5  John.  Ch.  247.  Nor  is  it  sufficient 
to  say  that  "the  defendant  has  not  any  knowl- 
edge of  the  foregoing  facts,  but  from  the  state- 


ment thereof  in  the  bill."  Ibid.  Nor  is  a 
denial  by  a  defendant  "according  to  his  rec- 
ollection and  belief  "  sufficient,  where  the  fact 
is  directly  charged,  as  within  his  knowledge. 
Taylor  v~  Luther,  2  Sumner,  228.  But  an  alle- 
gation of  utter  and  entire  ignorance  as  to  the 
fact  is  sufficient.  Morris  v.  Parker,  3  John. 
Ch.  297;  Norton  v.  Warner,  3  Edw.  Ch.  105; 
see  Allen  v.  O' Donald,  28  Fed.  Rep.  17;  Berry 
v.  Sawyer,  19  id.  286;  Collins  v.  North  Side 
Pub  Co.  20  N.  Y.  S.  892. 

5  So  where  an  answer  was  in  this  form: 
"And  this  defendant  further  answering  saith, 
it  may  be  true  for  anything  he  knows  to  the 
contrary  that,"  and  after  going  through  the 
several  statements,  it  concluded  thus:  "but 
this  defend  int  is  an  utter  stranger  to  all  and 
every  such  matters,  and  cannot  form  any  belief 
concerning  the  same,"  Sir  John  Leach  V.  C. 
was  of  opinion,  that  the  defendant,  in  stating 
himself  to  be  an  utter  stranger  to  all  and  every 
the  matters  in  question,  did  answer  as  to  his 
information,  and  did,  in  effect,  deny  that  he 
had  any  information  respecting  them.  Am- 
hurst  v.  King,  2  S.  &  S.  183;  see  Utica  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Lynch,  3  Paige,  210.  It  may  be  col- 
lected from  this  case  that  a  defendant  cannot, 
by  merely  saying  "that  a  matter  may  be  true 
for  anything  he  knows  to  the  contrary,"  avoid 
stating  what  his  recollection,  information,  or  be- 
lief with  reference  to  it  is,  or  saying  that  he  has 
no  recollection  or  information,  or  that  he  can- 
not form  any  belief  at  all  concerning  it;  either 
in  these  words  or  in  equivalent  expressions. 

i  See  Taylor  r.  Rundell,  Cr.  &  P.  104,  113; 
5  Jur  1129;  Earl  of  Glengall  r.  Frazer,  2  Hare, 
99,103;  6  Jur.  1081;  Stuart  r.  Lord  Bute,  12  Sim. 
460;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Rees,  12  Beav.  50,  54;  M'ln- 
tosh  v.  Great  Western  Ky.  4  De  G.  &  Sm.  502; 
Inglessi  v.  Spartali,  29  Beav.  564;  Att.-Gen.  v. 

719 


*  725  ANSWERS. 

character  of  trustees,  are  called  upon  to  set  out  an  account,  they  cannot 
frame  their  answer  so  as  merely  to  give  a  sufficient  ground  for  an  ac- 
count ;  they  are  bound  to  give  the  best  account  they  can  by  their  answer : 
not  in  an  oppressive  way,  but  by  referring  to  books,  &c,  sufficiently 
to  make  them  parts  of  their  answer,  and  to  afford  the  plaintiff  an  oppor- 
tunity of  inspection,  in  order  that  he  may  be  able  to  ascertain  whether 
that  is  the  best  account  the  defendants  can  give.2 

Where,  however,  the  defendant  has,  since  the  filing  of  the  bill,  lost  his 
interest  in  the  suit,  and  has  no  longer  access  to  the  documents,  he  will 
not  be  required  to  refer  to  them.3 

Where  defendants  are  required  to  set  out  accounts,  they  may,  for  the 
purpose  of  rendering  their  schedules  less  burdensome,  instead  of  going 
too  much  into  particulars,  refer  to  the  original  accounts  in  their  posses- 
sion in  the  manner  above  stated  ; 4  but  when  it  is  said  that  a  defendant 
may  refer  to  accounts  in  his  possession,  it  must  not  be  understood  as 
authorizing  him  to  refer,  by  his  answer,  to  accounts  made  out  by  him- 
self for  the  purposes  of  the  case,  but  only  to  accounts  previously  in 
existence.6 

*  725       *  To  such  of  the  interrogatories  as  it  is  necessary  and  mate- 

rial for  the  defendant  to  answer,  he  must  speak  directly  and 
without  evasion  ; *  and  any  interrogatory  not  intended  to  be  admitted, 
ought  to  be  traversed  with  accuracy.2  Where  a  fact  is  alleged,  with 
divers  circumstances,  the  defendant  must  not  deny  or  traverse  it  lit- 
erally, as  it  is  alleged  in  the  bill ;  but  must  answer  the  point  of  sub- 
stance, positively  and  certainly.8     The  reference  in  the  answer  must 

Burgesses  of  East  Retford.  2  M.  &  K.  35,  40  ;  4  White  v.  Barker,  5  De  G.  &  S.  746;  17 

Whistler  v.  Wigney,  8  Price,  1;  and  see  post,  Jur.  174  ;    Major  v.  Arnott,  2  Jur.  N.  S.  387, 

Chap.  XLII.  Production  of  Documents ;  Story,  V.  C.  K.;  Drake  r.  Symes,  Johns.  647;  Telford 

Eq.  PI.  §856.  note;  Davis  v.  Mapes,  2  Paige,  v.  Ruskin,  1  Dr.  &  Sm.  148;  Christian  v.  Taylor, 

105;    Swift  v.  Swift,  13  Ga.   140;    Cleaves  v.  11   Sim.  401;   Bally  v.  Kenrick,  13  Price,  291 ; 

Morrow,    2  Tenn.  Ch.  577.     But  a  defendant  Lockett  v.  Lockett,  L.  R.  4  Ch.  336. 
ought  not  to  be  required  to  obtain  information  5  Telford    v.   Ruskin,   1    Dr.   &    Sm.    148; 

so  as  to  meet  the  plaintiff's  wishes,  and  thereby  arguendo  Alsager  v.  Johnson,  4  Ves.  224     If 

become  his  agent  to  procure  testimony.    Morris  the  bill  requires  the  defendant  to  state  an  ac- 

v.   Parker,  3  John.  Ch.  301.     In  Kittredge  v.  count  between  the  parties,  the  account  so  stated 

Claremont   Bank,   1  Wood.  &  M.  244,  Wood-  is  responsive  to  the  bill.      Bellows  r.  Stone,  18 

bury  J.  said,   that  the  officers,  answering  for  N.  H.  465.     Where  a  defendant,  having  stated 

the  bank  sued,  if  they  are  not  the  same  persons  an  account  in  his  answer,  dies  during  the  pend- 

who  were  in  office  at  the  time  of  the  transaction  ency  of  the  suit,  and  the  matters  involved  in  the 

inquired  about,  ought  to  go  not  only  to  the  account  are  of  long  standing,  if  there  is  evidence 

records,  books,  and  files,  for  information,  but  tending  to  support  the  account,  the  Court  may 

to  the  former  officers,  if  living,  and  ascertain,  direct  that  the  account  be  taken  as  prima  facie 

as  near  as  may  be,  the  truth  of  the  matters  evidence,  irrespective  of  the  question  whether 

about  which  they  are  interrogated.  it  is  responsive  to  the  bill.     Bellows  r.  Stone, 

2  White  V.  Williams,  8  Ves.  193,  194.     A  ubi  supra  ;  Chalmert'.  Bradley,  1  J.  &  W.  65. 
partner  bound  to  account  must  give  a  clear,  *  Ed.  Red.  309. 

distinct,  and  intelligible  statement  of  the  results  2  Patrick  v.  Blackwell,  17  Jur.  803,  V.  C. 
of  the  business,  referring  also  to  particular  bonks,  W.;  Earp  p.  Lloyd,  4  K.  &  J.  58. 
and  to  the  page,  if  necessary,  so  that  a  party  3  Cons.  Ord.  XV.  2;  Ld.  Red.  309;  Bally  v. 
entitled  thereto  may  inquire  into  and  investi-  Kenrick,  13  Price,  291;  Tipping  v.  Clarke,  2 
gate  its  correctness.  A  reference  to  the  books  Hare,  383,  390.  Thus,  if  a  defendant  is  inter- 
of  the  concern,  generally,  and  to  former  ac-  rogated  whether  he  has  in  his  possession,  dis- 
counts, is  not  sufficient.  Gordon  v.  Hammell,  tody,  or  power,  books,  papers,  or  writings,  a 
19  N.  J.  Eq.  216.  statement  in  his  answer  that  there  are  certain 

3  Ellwand  v.  M'Donnell,  8  Beav.  14.  books,  papers,  or  writings  in  the  West  Indies, 

720 


GENERAL  NATURE  OF  ANSWERS. 


726 


describe  the  books  or  documents  with  such  accuracy  as  to  enable  the 
plaintiff  to  move  for  their  production :  otherwise,  the  answer  will  be 
open  to  exceptions  for  insufficiency.4 

Where  a  defendant  stated  in  his  answer  that  he  had  not  certain  books, 
papers,  and  writings  in  his  possession,  custody,  or  power,  because  they 
were  coming  over  to  this  country,  Lord  Eldon  held  that  they  were  in 
bis  power,  and  that  the  defendant  ought  to  have  so  stated  in  his  answer.6 
Where  books,  papers,  or  writings  are  in  the  custody  or  hands  of  the  de- 
fendant's solicitor,  they  are  considered  to  be  in  the  defendant's  own  cus- 
tody or  power,  and  should  be  stated  to  be  so  in  his  answer. 

If  a  defendant  is  called  upon  to  set  out  a  deed  or  other  instrument, 
in  the  words  and  figures  thereof,  he  should  do  so,  or  give  some  reason 
for  not  complying  with  the  requisition:6  he  may,  however,  avoid  this 
by  admitting  that  he  has  the  deed  or  instrument  in  his  possession,  and 
offering  to  give  the  plaintiff  a  copy  of  it.7  Where  a  defendant  sets  out 
any  deed  or  other  instrument  in  his  answer,  whether  in  hcec  verba  or  by 
way  of  recital,  it  is  always  a  proper  precaution  to  crave  leave 
to  refer  to  it :  as,  by  so  doing,  *  the  defendant  makes  it  a  part  *  726 
of  his  answer,  and  relieves  himself  from  any  charge  in  ease  it 
should  be  erroneously  set  out.1 

If  the  defendant  deny  a  fact,  he  must  traverse  or  deny  it  directly, 
and  not  by  way  of  negative  pregnant 2  as,  for  example,  where  he  is 
interrogated  whether  he  has  received  a  sum  of  money,  he  must  deny  or 
traverse  that  he  has  received  that  sum  or  any  part  thereof,  or  else  set 
forth  what  part  he  has  received.3  (b) 

the  particulars  of  which  he  is  unable  to  set  forth, 
without  any  answer  as  to  the  fact  whether  they 
are  in  the  defendant's  possession,  custody,  or 
power,  will  be  insufficient:  for  if  the  defendant 
admits  the  books  and  writings  to  be  in  his 
possession,  custody,  or  power,  the  plaintiff  may 
call  upon  the  defendant  to  produce  them  ;  which 
the  Court  will  order  within  a  reasonable  time. 
Farqubarson  v.  Balfour,  T.  &  R.  190;  Smith  v. 
Northumberland,  1  Cox,  363. 

4  Ionian  0.  Whitley,  4  Beav.  548;  Phelps  v. 
Olive,  id.  549,  n.,  where  Lord  (Tottenham  M.  R. 
refused  to  order  production  of  documents  de- 
scribed as  "a  bundle  of  papers  marked  G." 

5  Farqubarson  v.  Balfour,  ubi  supra. 

6  Wyatt's  P.  R.  204.  As  to  the  cases  in  which 
it  may  be  prudent  to  set  out  documents  in  htzc 
verba,  see  ante,  p.  363. 

1  Hair,  by  Newl.  185. 
i  See  New  r.  Barne,  3  Sandf.  Ch.  191. 

2  High  p.  Batte,  10  Yerger,  385;  Robinson  v. 


Woodgate,  3  Edw.  Ch.  422:  King  e.  Ray,  11 
Paige,  235;  Walker  b.  Walker,  3  Kelly,"  302; 
Woods  r.  Morrell,  1  John.  Ch.  103;  Morris  v. 
Barker,  3  John,  Ch.  297;  Smith  c.  Lasher,  5 
John.  Ch.  247;  Pettit  v.  Candler,  3  Wend. 
618;  Thompson  v.  Mills,  4  Ired.  Eq.  390.  An 
answer  to  an  interrogator}-  must  be  positive 
and  direct,  and  not  argumentative.  New  Eng- 
land Bank  v.  Lewis,  8  Pick.  113,  119;  Maiming 
v.  Manning,  8  Ala.  138. 

A  denial  in  an  answer  that  defendant  "de- 
livered" a  specified  deed  goes  for  nothing  if 
the  answer  admit  facts  and  circumstances 
which  do  in  law  constitute  delivery.  Adams  v.. 
Adams,  21  Wall.  185.  (a)  So,  of  an  averment 
in  a  bill  that  :i  deed  was  not  delivered  to  and 
accepted  by  a  married  woman,  the  bill  showing 
on  its  face  that  the  married  woman  had  in  fact 
acted  under  the  deed.  Nichol  v.  County  of 
Davidson,  3  Tenn.  Ch.  547. 

3  Cons.  Ord.  XV.  2. 


(a)  So  a  denial  in  a  sworn  answer  of  actual 
intent  to  defraud  will  not  avoid  the  conse- 
quences of  an  act  which  in  effect  is  fraudu- 
lent. Newlove  v.  Callaghan,  86  Mich.  301; 
Hoboken  Savings  Bank  v.  Beckman,  33  N.  J. 
Eq.  53. 

(6)  If  the  bill  avers  an  account  stated,  and 
fraud  therein  in  anticipation  of  the  defence,  the 
vol.  i.  —  46 


answer  should  deny  the  fraud  as  well  as  state  the 
account  in  order  to  present  a  complete  defence. 
Harrison  r.  Farrington,  38  N.  J.  Eq.  1,358.  An 
account  stated,  to  be  availed  of,  must  be  pleaded 
as  such.  Oregon  Ry.  &  N.  Co.  r.  Swinburne,  22 
Oregon,  574.  A  general  denial,  in  place  of  the 
specific  denial  which  should  be  made,  may  be 
treated  as  an  admission,  in  the  present  English 

721 


727 


ANSWERS. 


Where  the  defendant  is  interrogated  as  to  particular  circumstances, 
a  general  denial  must  be  accompanied  by  an  answer  as  to  such  circum- 
stances :  4  for  although  it  is  true  that  the  general  answer  may  include 
in  it  an  answer  to  the  particular  inquiry,  yet  such  a  mode  of  answering 
might,  in  some  cases,  be  resorted  to,  in  order  to  escape  from  a  material 
discovery ; 5  and,  therefore,  a  general  denial  is  not  enough,  but  there 
must  be  an  answer  to  sifting  inquiries  upon  the  general  question.6(e)  But, 
although  the  Court  requires  that  all  the  particular  inquiries  should  be 
answered,  as  well  as  the  general  question,  it  will  be  no  objection  to  the 

answer  to  the  particular  interrogatory,   that  the   defendant  has 
*  727  not  answered  it  so  particularly  *  as  to  meet  it  in  all  its  terms, 

provided  it  is,  with  reference  to  the  object  of  the  bill,  fairly  and 
substantially  answered.1 

It  is,  however,  the  general  practice,  where  the  defendant  is  required 
to  set  forth  a  general  account,  or  to  answer  as  to  moneys  received,  or 
documents  in  his  possession,  to  set  forth  the  account  or  list  of  the 
sums  or  documents,  in  one  or  more  schedules  annexed  to  the  answer, 
which  the  defendant  prays  may  be  taken  as  part  of  his  answer ;  and 
such  practice  is  very  convenient,  and  in  many  cases  indispensable. 
The  defendant  must,  however,  be  careful  to  avoid  any  inconsistency 
between  the  body  of  the  answer  and  the  schedule ;  for  if  there  is  any, 
the  answer  will  be  insufficient,  and  the  defendant  may  be  required  to  put 
in  a  further  answer.2    The  defendant  may  also  resort  to  a  schedule  for 


*  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  852,  note.  But  a  general 
answer  of  denial  to  a  general  allegation  in  a  bill, 
without  specifying  the  tacts  upon  which  it  is 
founded,  is  sufficient.  Cowles  v.  Carter,  4  Ired. 
Eq.  (N.  C.)105. 

5  Wharton  v.  Wharton,  1  S.  &  S.  235;  Tip- 
ping v.  Clarke,  2  Hare,  383,  389;  Duke  of 
Brunswick  v.  Duke  of  Cambridge,  12  Beav. 
281;  Jodrell  t'.  Slaney,  10  Beav.  225;  Patrick 
v.  Blackwell,  17  Jur"  803,  V.  C.  W. ;  Earp  v. 
Lloyd,  4  K.  &  J.  58;  see  also  Anon.  2  Y.  &  C. 
Ex.  310;  Bridgewater  v.  De  Winton,  9  Jur.  N. 
S.  1270;  12  W.  R.  40,  V.  C.  K. 

6  Per  Lord  Eldon.  in  Mountford  v.  Taylor, 
6  Ves.  792;  see  St.  George  v.  St.  George,  19  L. 
R.  Ir.  225.  In  Hibbert  v.  Durant  (cited  in  Prout 
v.  Underwood,  2  Cox,  135;  Hepburn  r.  Durand, 
1  Bro.  C.  C.  503;  Ld.  Red.  310),  the  defendant 
was  interrogated  whether  he  had  not  received 
certain  sums  of  money,  specified  in  the  bill, 
in  the  character  of  a  ship's  husband;  in  his  an- 


practice.   See  1  Dan.  Ch.  Prac.  (6th  Eng.  ed.) 
381. 

(c)  Reed  v.  Cumberland  Iff.  F.  Ins.  Co.  36 
N.  J.  Eq.  146;  Place  v.  Providence,  12  R.  I.  1. 
In  Massachusetts,  since  the  Stat,  of  1883,  Ch. 
223,  §  10,  an  answer  to  a  creditor's  bill,  which 
asks  relief,  cannot  be  sworn  to,  and  discovery 
can  only  be  had  by  interrogatories  to  the  de- 
fendant, as  in  an  acton  at  Law.  Amy  v.  Man- 
ning, 149  Muss.  487.     An  answer  is  sufficient 

722 


swer,  he  swore  that  he  had  not  received  any 
sums  of  money  whatever,  except  those  set  forth 
in  the  schedule  to  his  answer,  in  which  schedule 
the  sums  specified  in  the  bill  were  not  comprised, 
but  he  did  not  otherwise  answer  the  interroga- 
tory. On  the  question  of  the  sufficiency  of  the 
answer,  Lord  Thurlow  said  that  a  man  could 
not  deny,  generally,  particular  charges  which 
tended  to  falsify  such  general  denial,  and 
therefore  held  the  answer  insufficient ;  and  it 
appears  by  a  note  of  the  reporter,  that  it  turned 
out  in  point  of  fact,  that  the  defendant  after- 
wards recollected  the  receipt  of  the  particular 
sums,  and  admitted  them  by  his  further 
answer. 

i  Bally  v.  Kenrick,  13  Price,  291 ;  see  also 
Reade  v.  Woodrooffe,  24  Beav.  421 ;  Lockett  v. 
Lockett.  L.  R.  4  Ch.  336. 

2  Bridgewater  v.  De  Wmton,  9  Jur.  N.  S. 
1270 ;  12  W.  R.  40,  V.  C.  K. 


which  is  as  specific  as  the  stating  part  of  the 
bill.  Buerk  v.  Imhaeuser,  20  Blatch.  274; 
Halsey  r.  Ball,  36  N.  J.  Eq.  161 ;  Wingo  v. 
Hardy,  94  Ala.  184,  191.  The  omission  of 
material  facts  in  the  bill  is  waived  by  an  an- 
swer which  sets  forth  those  ficts.  Cavender  v. 
Cavender,  114  U.  S.  464.  The  question  whether 
the  answer  is  sufficient  to  admit  evidence  under 
it  cannot  be  first  raised  on  appeal.  Upham  v. 
Draper,  157  Mass.  292. 


GENERAL  NATURE  OP  ANSWERS.  *  728 

the  purpose  of  showing  the  nature  of  his  own  case,  or  of  strengthening 
it :  even  though  there  is  nothing  in  the  interrogatories  which  may  ren- 
der a  schedule  necessary.3 

In  general,  a  defendant  must  be  careful  not  to  frame  his  schedule  in 
a  manner  which  may  be  burdensome  and  oppressive  to  the  plaintiff : 
otherwise,  it  will  be  considered  impertinent.4  Thus,  where  a  bill  was 
filed  for  an  account,  containing  the  following  interrogatory,  "  whether 
any  and  what  sum  of  money  was  due  from  the  house  of  A  to  the  house 
of  B,  and  how  the  defendant  made  out  the  same  ?  "  and  the  defendant, 
by  his  answer,  set  forth  a  long  schedule,  containing  an  account  of  all 
dealings  and  transactions  between  the  two  houses,  the  answer  was 
held  to  be  impertinent,  and  the  Court  said  the  defendant  ought  merely 
to  have  answered  that  such  a  sum  was  due,  and  that  it  was  due  upon 
the  balance  of  an  account.5  In  the  last  case,  although  there  was  an 
inquiry  how  the  defendant  made  out  that  there  was  a  balance,  there 
were  no  particular  inquiries  in  the  bill  as  to  the  items,  constituting  the 
account,  from  which  the  defendant  made  out  that  there  was  a  balance 
due  to  him ;  and  even  where  there  has  been  such  an  inquiry,  the  Court 
has  gone  the  length  of  saying,  that  a  schedule  containing  such  items 
will  be  impertinent,  if  the  items  are  set  out  with  a  minuteness  not  called 
for  by  the  nature  of  the  case.  Thus,  where  the  bill  called  upon  a  de- 
fendant to  set  forth  an  account  of  all  and  every  the  quantities  of  ore, 
metals,  and  minerals  dug  in  particular  mines,  and  the  full  value  thereof, 
and  the  costs  and  expenses  of  working  the  mines,  and  the  clear  prof- 
its made  thereby,  and  the  defendant  put  in  a  schedule  to  his 
*  answer,  comprising  3431  folios,  wherein  were  set  forth  all  the  *  728 
particular  items  of  every  tradesman's  bill  connected  with  the 
mines,  the  Court  held  the  schedule  to  be  impertinent.1  In  like  man- 
ner, it  seems  that  in  the  case  of  an  executor  called  upon  to  account  for 
his  disbursements,  it  is  not  necessary  to  set  out  every  separate  item.2 
It  is  difficult,  however,  to  point  out  any  precise  rules  with  regard  to 
what  will  be  considered  impertinent  in  a  schedule  ;  much  must  depend 
upon  the  nature  of  each  case,  and  the  purposes  for  which  the  dis- 
covery is  required.  The  cases  above  referred  to,  and  the  others  which 
may  be  found  in  the  books,  show,  however,  that  even  though  the 
plaintiff,  by  the  minuteness  of  his  inquiries,  in  some  measure  affords  an 
excuse  for  the  defendant  setting  forth  a  long  and  burdensome  schedule, 
the  Court  will  not,  unless  in  instances  in  which,  from  the  nature  of  the 
case,  great  minuteness   is    required,   permit   a   defendant   to   load   the 

8  Parker  v.  Fairlie,  T.  &  R.  362;  1  S.  &  S.  may  deposit  them    in  Court,  and  then   make 

295;  Lowe  v.  Williams,  2   S.   &  S.  574,576;  them  part  of  his  answer  as  so  deposited.     Att.- 

Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  856,  and  notes.     As  to  the  pro-  Gen.  v.  Edmunds,  15  W.  R.  138. 
duction  of  documents  and  papers,  and  the  proper  *  As  to  impertinence,  see  ante,  p.  326. 

mode  of  discovery  as  to  them,  see  Story,  Eq.  6  French  v.  Jacko,  1  Mer.  357,  n. 

PI.  §§  858-860,  a.  '  Norway  v.  Rowe,  1  Mer.  3-17,  356;  see  also 

If  the  answer  does  not  refer  to  the  schedule  M' Morris  v.  Elliot,  8  Price,  674;  Slack  v.  Evans, 

as   forming  part   of  it,  it  will   he  insufficient.  7   Price,  278,  n. ;  Alsager  v.  Johnson,  4  Vea. 

Bolders  v.  Saunders,  3  N.  R.  59.     A  defendant  217.  225;  Byde  v.  Masterman,  C.  &  P.  265,  272; 

will   not,   however,    be    permitted    to   refer  to  5  .lur.  643;  Marshall  v.  Mcllersh,  6  Beav.  558; 

printed  books  of  account,  and    parliamentary  Tench  v.  Cheese,  1  Beav.  571,  574;  3  Jur.  768. 
blue  books,  as  schedules  to  his  answer;  but  he  2  Norway  v.  Rowe,  ubi  supra. 

723 


728 


ANSWERS. 


record  with  useless  and  impertinent  matter,  even  though  the  introduc- 
tion of  such  matter  might  be  justified  by  the  terms  of  the  interroga- 
tories. On  the  other  hand,  it  is  to  be  observed,  that  the  Court  will  not, 
where  the  defendant,  in  complying  with  the  requisitions  in  the  bill,  has 
bona  fide  given  the  information  required,  though  in  a  manner  rather 
more  prolix  than  might  perhaps  be  necessary,  consider  the  answer  as 
impertinent  ;  for,  although  prolixity  sometimes  amounts  to  imperti- 
nence,3 whether  the  Court  will  deal  with  it  as  such  depends  very  much 
upon  the  degree  in  which  it  occurs.4  (a) 


3  Slack  v.  Evans,  ubi  supra. 

*  Gompertz  v.  Best,  1  Y.  &  C.  Ex.  114, 117. 
As  to  impertinence  in  an  answer,  see  Story,  Eq. 
PI.  §  863.  Impertinence  in  pleading  consists  in 
setting  forth  what  is  not  iiecessary  to  be  set 
forth;  as  stuffing  the  pleadings  with  useless 
recitals  and  long  digressions  about  immaterial 
matters.  Hood  v.  Inman,  4  John.  Ch.  437.  It 
was  said  by  Mr.  Chancellor  Kent,  in  Woods  v. 
Morrell.  1  John.  Ch.  103,  that,  perhaps  the  best 
rule  to  ascertain  whether  matter  be  impertinent, 
is  to  see  whether  the  subject  of  the  allegation 
could  be  put  in  issue,  or  be  give?i  in  evidence 
between  the  parties.  See  Spauldingv.  Farwell, 
62  Maine,  319,  where  the  rule  was  applied  to  an 
averment  in  an  answer  of  a  counter-claim  not 
connected  with  the  transaction  set  forth  in  the 
bill,  which  was  by  tenants  in  common  for  an 
account  of  the  earnings  of  a  vessel.  See  also 
Mrzena  v.  Brucker,  3  Tenn.  Ch.  161.  Where 
in  the  answer  to  a  bill  in  Equity,  an  allega- 
tion was  made  impeaching  the  bvnn  fidts,  and 
validity  of  a  codicil  to  a  will,  which  had  been 
already  approved  and  allowed  by  a  Couit  hav- 
ing competent  and  exclusive  jurisdiction  over 
the  probate  thereof,  it  was  ordered  that  the  alle- 
gitimi  be  expunged  as  being  impertinent  and 
immaterial.  Langdon  v.  Goddard,  3  Story,  13. 
In  reference  to  the  above  allegation,  Mr.  Justice 
Story  said,  "It  is  not  a  matter  which  can  be 
filed  in  controversy,  or  admitted  to  proof." 
Id.  23.  If  the  matter  of  an  answer  is  relevant, 
that  is,  if  it  can  have  any  influence  whatever  in 
the  decision  of  the  suit,  either  as  to  the  subject- 
matter  of  the  controversy,  the  particular  relief 
to  be  given,  or  as  to  the  cost,  it  is  not  imperti- 
nent. Van  Rensselaer  v.  Brice,  4  Paige,  174; 
Wood  v.  Mann,  1  Sumner,  579;  Price  v.  Tyson, 
3  Bland,  392.  Long  recitals,  stories,  conversa- 
tions, and  insinuations  tending  to  scandal,  are 
impertinent.  Woods  v.  Morrell,  1  John.  Ch. 
103;  Langdon  r>.  Goddard,  3  Story.  13.  A  short 
sentence  is  said  not  to  be  impertinent,  although 


(o)  Under  the  Codes,  an  objection  that  the  de- 
nials of  an  answer  are  imperfect,  and  do  not  con- 
form to  the  statute,  cannot  be  first  raised  in  the 
appellate  Court.  People  r.  Swift  (Cal.),  31  Pac. 
Rep.  16.  The  presumption  is  iu  favor  of  the 
pertinency   of  the   allegations  of   an   answer. 

724 


it  contains  no  fact  or  material  matter,  and  may 
be  inserted  in  an  answer  only  from  abundant 
caution.  A  statement  in  an  answer  introduced  to 
show  the  temper  with  which  a  bill  is  filed,  and  the 
offensive  course  pursued  by  the  plaintiff,  is  not 
impertinent;  it  may  have  an  effect  on  the  costs. 
Whatever  is  called  for  by  the  bill  or  will  be 
material  to  the  defence,  with  reference  to  the 
order  or  decree  that  may  be  made,  is  proper  to  be 
retained  in  an  answer.  Desplaces  v.  Goris,  1 
Edw.  Ch.  350;  Monroy  v.  Monroy,  id.  382;  Bally 
v.  Williams,  1  M'Clel.  &  Y.  334. 

An  exception  to  an  answer  for  impertinence 
will  be  overruled,  if  the  expunging  of  the  mat- 
ter excepted  to  will  leave  the  residue  of  the 
clause,  which  is  not  covered  by  the  exception, 
either  false  or  wholly  unintelligible.  M'Intyre 
r.  Trustees  of  Union  College,  6  Paige,  240. 
The  plaintiff  cannot  except  to  a  part  of  the  de- 
fendant's answer  as  impertinent,  which  refers  to 
and  explains  the  meaning  of  a  schedule  annexed 
to  such  answer,  without  also  excepting  to  the 
schedule  itself  as  impertinent.  Ibid.  If  a  bill 
against  executors  calls  specifically  and  particu- 
larly for  accounts  in  all  their  various  details,  a 
very  voluminous  schedule,  containing  a  copy 
from  the  books  of  account,  specifying  each  item 
of  debt  and  credit,  will  not  be  impertinent. 
Scudder  v.  Bogert,  1  Edw.  Ch.  372.  If  the 
pi  .int iff  put  impertinent  questions,  he  must  take 
the  answer  to  them,  though  it  be  impertinent. 
Woods  v.  Morrell,  1  John.  Ch.  103.  So  of  mat- 
ter responsive  to  irrelevant  matter  in  the  com- 
plaint. Mclntyre  v.  Ogden,  24  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct. 
604.  See,  however,  Langdon  v.  Pickering,  19 
Maine,  214.  Copies  of  receipts  taken  by  the 
defendant  for  moneys  paid  and  charged  in  ac- 
count and  making  an  immense  schedule  to  an 
answer,  are  impertinent.  Scudder  r.  Bogert,  1 
Edw.  Ch.  372.  An  executor  in  setting  forth  in 
his  answer  the  account  and  inventory  of  the 
estate  which  came  to  his  hands,  should  not  add 
copies  of  the  appraiser's  and  executor's  oaths, 


Leslie  v.  Leslie  50  N.  J.  Eq.  155.  Hence  mat- 
ter, which  is  not  clearly  irrelevant,  will  not  be 
ordered  expunged  from  an  answer.  Bush  v. 
Adams,  22  Fla.  177;  see  Reichel  v.  Magrath, 
14  App.  Cas.  665;  Crammer  v.  Atlantic  City, 
39  N.  J.  Eq.  76. 


FORM   OP   ANSWERS.  *  7o0 

*  In  answering  an  amended  bill,  the  defendant,  if  he  has  an-  *  729 
swered  the  original  bill,  should  answer  those  matters  only  which 
have  been  introduced  by  the  amendments.  In  fact,  the  answer  to  an 
amended  bill  constitutes,  together  with  the  answer  to  the  original  bill, 
but  one  record,1  in  the  same  manner  as  an  original  and  an  amended 
bill ;  hence,  it  is  impertinent  to  repeat,  in  the  answer  to  the  amended 
bill,  what  appears  upon  the  answer  to  the  original  bill,  unless  by  the 
repetition  the  defence  is  materially  varied.3 

Section  II.  —  Form  of  Answers. 

Two  or  more  persons  may  join  in  the  same  answer ;  and  where  their 
interests  are  the  same,  and  they  appear  by  the  same  solicitor,  they  ought 
to  do  so.8  The  Court  will  not,  however,  before  the  hearing,  and  at  a 
time  when  it  cannot  be  known  how  the  defence  should  be  conducted, 
visit  the  defendants  with  costs  as  a  penalty  for  not  joining  in  their 
answer ;  and  it  is  only  at  the  hearing,  when  all  danger  of  preju- 
dice to  the  parties  is  over,'  that  the  Court  *  will  make  any  order  *  730 
upon  the  subject.1  Where  the  same  solicitor  has  been  employed 
for  two  or  more  defendants,  and  separate  answers  have  been  filed,  or 
other  proceedings  had  by  or  for  two  or  more  of  such  defendants  sepa- 
rately, the  Taxing  Master  will  consider,  in  the  taxation  of  such  solici- 
tor's bill  of  costs  either  between  party  and  party,  or  between  solicitor 
and  client,  whether  such  separate  answers  or  other  proceedings  were 
necessary  or  proper ;  and  if  he  is  of  opinion  that  any  part  of  the  costs 
occasioned  thereby  has  been  unnecessarily  or  improperly  incurred,  the 
same  will  be  disallowed.2  No  general  rule  can  be  laid  down,  determin- 
ing when  defendants,  appearing  by  the  same  solicitor,  may  sever  in  their 

and  of  the  surrogate's  certificate.     Such  matter  x  Ld.  Red.  318;  Hildyard  v.  Cressy,  3  Atk. 

will  be  impertinent.    Jolly  v.  Carter,  2  Edw.  303. 

Ch.  209.  2  Smith  v.  Serle,  14  Ves.  415. 

An  exception  for  impertinence  must  be  sup-  3  Where  two  defendants  answer  jointly,  and 

ported  in  tola,  or  it  will  fail  altogether.     Wag-  one  speaks  positively  for  himself,  the  othtr  may, 

staff  v.  Bryan,  1  R.  &  M.  30;  Tench  v.  Cheese,  in  cases  where  he  is  not  charged  with  anything 

1  Beav.  571;  Van  Rensselaer  v.  Brice,  4  Paige,  upon  his  own  knowledge,  say  that  he  permed 

174.  the  answer  and  believes  it  to  be  true;  but  it  is 

When  an  exception  was  taken  to  the  juris-  Otherwise  where   the  defendant  answers  sepa- 

diction,  in   the  answer,  it  was  properly  struck  rately.     1  liar.   185,  ed.  Newl.     A  defendant 

out,  on  reference  to  a  Master,  for  impertinence.  may  sufficiently  answer  by  adopting  the  answer 

Wood  v.  Mann,  1  Sumner,  579;  but  see  Teague  of  his  co-defe  dant.     Binney's  case,  2  Bland, 

v.  Dendy,  2  M'Cord  Ch.  207,  210.     As  to  im-  99;  Warfield  v.  Banks,  11  Gill  &  J.  98.     Hut  an 

pertinence,  see  further,  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  883;  answer  simply  averring  that  the  facts  stated  in 

Jolly  v.  Carter,  2  Edw.  Ch.  209;    Somers   v.  a  paper,  purporting  to  be  the  answer  of  another 

Torrey,  5  Paige,  54.     As  to  scand  d   in  an  an-  defendant  in  the  cause,  "are  substantially  cor- 

swer,  see  Storj-,  Eq.  PI.  §§  801,  862.     As  in  a  rect  as  far  as  these  defendants  are  concerned," 

bill,  so    in    an    answer,  nothing  relevant   can  is  formally  and  substantially  defective.     Carr 

be  deemed  scandalous.      Sto«-y,  Eq.   PI.  §  802;  v.  Weld,  18  N.  J.  Eq.  41. 

Jolly  v.  Carter,  2  Edw.  Ch.  209.     Separate  ex-  1  Van  Sandau  v.  Moore,  1  Russ.  441.  454:  2 

ceptions  to  the  same  answer,  one  for  scandal  a'  d  S.  &  S.  509,  512;  and  see  Woods  v.  Woods,  5 

the  other  for  impertinence,  will  not  be  allowed.  Hare,  230:  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  869. 

as  nothing  in  a  pleading  can  be  considered  as  2  Cons.   Ord.  XL.   12;  Woods  ».  Woods,  5 

scandalous  which  is  not  also  impertinent.   M'ln-  Hare,  229,231.     See  the  62d  Equity  Rule  of 

tyre  «.  Trustees  of   Union  College,  6    Paige,  the  U.  S.  Courts,  post,  p.  2389. 
240.     See  infra,  p.  759. 


731 


ANSWERS. 


defence  ; 8  practically,  the  Taxing  Master  has  to  exercise  his  discretion 
in  each  particular  case. 

Where  defendants  have  a  joint  interest  only,  they  will  not,  in  general, 
be  allowed  to  sever  in  their  defence ;  and  there  are  many  cases  where 
only  one  set  of  costs  has  been  allowed  by  the  Court  to  two  defendants, 
whose  interest  was  so  far  joint  as  to  have  made  a  severance  of  their 
defence  unnecessary.  Thus,  trustees  will  not,  in  general,  be  allowed 
costs  consequent  upon  their  separate  defences,  unless  some  of  them 
have  a  beneficial  interest,  or  there  is  some  special  reason  for  their  sev- 
erance.4 So,  trustees  and  cestui  que  trusts,  if  they  have  no  conflicting 
interests,  will,  in  general,  be  only  allowed  one  set  of  costs.5  The  same 
principle  applies,  as  between  a  husband  and  his  wife,6  a  bankrupt  and 
his  assignees,6  and,  in  an  administration  suit,  between  an  assignor  and 
his  assignee.7  (a)  The  severance  will,  however,  be  justifiable  where  the 
suit  is  against  two  trustees,  one  of  whom  only  is  charged  with  a  breach 
of  trust ; 8  and,  in  some  cases,  where  they  reside  at  a  distance  from 
each  other.9 

Where  only  one  set  of  costs  is  allowed,  the  Court  does  not,  gener- 
ally, declare  to  whom  it  is  to  be  given ; 10  but  where  one  trustee 
*  731  *  only,  in  obedience  to  an  order,  paid  a  sum  of  money  into  Court, 
he  was  held  entitled  to  the  whole  of  the  costs.1 

If  the  defendants  are  permitted  to  sever,  they  will  be  allowed  the 
costs  of  Separate  counsel,  though  they  take  the  same  line  of  defence. 2(b) 

An  answer  must  now  be  divided  into  paragraphs,  numbered  consecu- 
tively, each  paragraph  containing,  as  nearly  as  may  be,  a  separate  and 
distinct  statement  or  allegation.3  It  must  not  refer  to  another  docu- 
ment, not  on  the  files  of  the  Court,  as  containing  the  statement  of  the 
defendant's  case.4 


3  Greedy  v.  Lavender,  11  Beav.  417,  420; 
Remnant  v.  Hood  (No.  2).  27  Beav.  613. 

4  Gaunt  v.  Taylor,  2  Beav  346;  4  Jur.  166; 
Dudceon  v.  Corky,  4  Dr.  &  War.  158;  Tarbuck 
v.  Woodcock.  3  Beav.  289;  Hodson  v.  Cash,  1 
Jur.  N.  S.  864,  V.  C.  W.;  Course  v.  Humphrey, 

26  Beav.  402;  5  Jur.  N.  S.  615 ;  Prince  v.  Hine, 

27  Beav.  345;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Wyville,  28  Beav. 
464;  and  see  Morgan  v.  Davey,  87;  and  post, 
Chap.  XXXI.  §  2,  Costs. 

6  Woods  v.  Woods,  ubi  supra  ;  Farr  v.  She- 
rtffe,  4  Hare,  528;  10  Jur.  630;  Remnant  v. 
Hood,  uhi  supra. 

6  Garey  v.  Whittingham,  5  Beav.  268,  270; 
6  Jur.  545. 

1  Remnant  v.  Hood  (No.  2),  27  Beav.  613; 
Greedy  v.  Lavender,  11  Beav.  417,  420. 

«  Webb  v.  Webb,  16  Sim.  55. 


(a)  In  partition  suits  there  is  no  fixed  rule, 
as  there  is  in  administration  suits,  that  only 
one  set  of  costs  will  be  allowed  in  respect  of 
each  share  of  the  property.  Belcher  v.  Wil- 
liams, 45  Ch.  D.  510. 

(6)  The  question  whether  the  defences  are 

726 


9  Aldridge  r.  Westbrook,  4  Beav.  212;  Wiles 
v.  Cooper,  9  Beav.  298;  Commins  v.  Brown- 
field,  3  Jur.  N.  S  657,  V.  C.  W. 

i°  Course  v.  Humphrey,  26  Beav.  402;  5  Jur. 
N.  S.  615;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Wyville,  28  Beav.  464. 

1  Prince  v.  Hine,  27  Beav.  345;  and  see 
Morgan  &  Davey,  87,  88. 

2  Bainbrigge  v.  Moss,  3  Jur.  N.  S.  107,  V. 
C  W. 

3  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  14  ;  Cons.  Ord.  XV.  1; 
see  forms  of  answers  in  Vol.  III. 

<  Falkland  Islands  Co.  v.  Lafone,  3  K.  &  J. 
267;  Wells  v  Stratton,  1  Tenn.  Ch.  328.  Docu- 
ments previously  deposited  in  Court  in  the 
cause  may,  however,  be  made  part  of  the  an- 
swer bv  referring  to  them  as  so  deposited.  Att.- 
Gen.  v.  Edmunds,  15  W.  R.  138. 


sufficiently  different  to  justify  appearance  by 
separate  counsel  is  not  one  for  the  Taxing 
Master's  discretion,  and  if  the  Court  is  of 
opinion  that  the  difference  of  defences  is  ma- 
terial,  it  may  remit  the  certificate  to  him.  Aget 
r.  Blaeklock&  Co.  56  L.  T  890. 


FORM    OP   ANSWERS.  *  732 

An  answer  must  be  intituled  in  the  cause,  so  as  to  agree  with  the 
names  of  the  parties  as  they  appear  in  the  bill,  at  the  time  the  answer 
is  filed.5  A  defendant  may  not  correct  or  alter  the  names  of  the  parties 
as  they  appear  in  the  bill ;  if  there  is  a  mistake  in  his  own  name,  he 
must  correct  it  in  the  part  following  the  title  of  the  cause,  thus : 
"  The  answer  of  John  Jones  (in  the  bill  by  mistake  called  William 
Jones)."  6 

An  answer  is  headed  ;  "  The  answer  of  A  B,  one  of  the  above-named 
defendants,  to  the  bill  of  complaint  of  the  above-named  plaintiff."  If 
the  bill  has  been  amended  after  answer,  the  heading  states  that  the  an- 
swer is  "  to  the  amended  bill  of  complaint  of  the  above-named  plain- 
tiff."7 If  two  or  more  defendants  join  in  the  same  answer,  it  is  headed, 
"  The  joint  and  several  answer  ;  "  but  if  it  be  the  answer  of  a  man  and 
his  wife,  it  is  headed,  "  The  joint  answer."  If  a  female  defendant  has 
married  since  the  filing  of  the  bill,  but  before  answering,  she  must  either 
obtain  an  order  for  leave  to  answer  separately,  or  answer  jointly  with 
her  husband,  who,  although  not  named  on  the  record  as  a  defendant, 
may  join  in  the  answer :  in  which  case,  the  answer  should  be  headed  : 
"  The  answer  of  A  B,  and  C  his  wife,  lately  and  in  the  bill  called  C  D, 
spinster  "  (or  widow,  as  the  case  may  be).8  The  answer  of  an  infant,  or 
other  person  answering  by  guardian,  or  of  an  idiot  or  lunatic  answering 
by  his  committee,  is  so  headed.9 

Any  defect  occurring  in  the  heading  of  an  answer,  so  that  it  does  not 
appear  distinctly  whose  answer  it  is,  or  to  what  bill  it  is  an  answer,  is 
a  ground  for  taking  it  off  the  file  for  irregularity.  Thus,  where  an 
answer  was  intituled  "the  joint  and  several  answer  of  A  B  and  C  D, 
defendants,  E  F  and  G  H,  complainants,"  omitting  the  words, 
"to  the  bill  of  complaint  of,"  it  was,  on  motion,  *  ordered  to  be  *  732 
taken  off  the  file  for  irregularity.1  So  also,  where  the  plaintiff 
was  misnamed  in  the  heading,  an  order  was  made  to  take  the  answer 
off  the  file,  and  for  process  of  contempt  to  issue ; 2  and  so,  where 
the  bill  was  filed  by  six  persons,  and  the  document  filed  purported  to  be 
an  answer  to  the  bill  of  five  only,  the  answer  was  ordered  to  be  taken 
off  the  file.3  If,  however,  it  is  clear  to  whose  bill  it  is  intended  to  be 
an  answer,  this  course  will  not  now  be  followed.4  The  notice  of  motion, 
in  such  a  case,  should  not  describe  the  document  as  the  answer  of 
A  B,  &c,  but  as  a  certain  paper  writing,  purporting  to  be  the  answer.5 
An  answer  with  a  defect  of  this  sort  in  the  title  is,  in  fact,  a  nullity, 
and  may  be  treated  as  such  ;  and  although  a  defendant  may,  if  he 
pleases,  apply  to  the  Court  for  leave  to  take  the  answer  off  the  file  and 

6  Braithwaite's  Pr.  44.  tel,  5  Jur.  1104;  Upton  v.  Sowten,  12  Sim.  45; 

6  Ibid. ;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Worcester  Corporation,      S.  C.  rami.  Upton  v.  Lowten,  5  Jur.  818. 

1  C.  P.  Coop.  temp.  Cott.  18.  8  Cope  v.  Parry,  1  Mad   8-3.      As  to  scandal 

7  Rigby  v.  Rigby,  9  Beav.  311,  313;  see  and  impertinence  in  the  heading  of  an  answer, 
forms  in  Vol.  III.  see  Peck  r.  Peck,  Mos.  45. 

»  Braithwaite's  Pr.  46.  4  Rabbeth  v.  Squire,  10   Hare  App.  3.     See 

9  For  forms  of    headings    of    answers,  see  Bowes  v.  Farrar,  L.  R.  14  Eq.  71,  where  cer- 

Vol.  III.  tain  words  of  the  prescribed  form  were  omitted, 

i  Pieters  v.  Thompson,  G.  Coop.  249.  5  see  11  Ves.  64.     For  form  of    notice  of 

2  GriflUhs   v.    Wood,    11    Ves.    62;    Fry    v.  motion,  see  Vol.  III. 


Mantell,  4  Beav.  485 ;    S.  C.  nom.  Fry  v.  Mar- 


727 


*  733  ANSWERS. 

re-swear  it,  it  is  not  necessary  that  he  should  do  so,  but  he  may  leave 
the  answer  upon  the  file,  and  put  in  another.6 

Where  an  answer  has  been  prepared  for  five  defendants,  it  cannot  be 
received  as  the  answer  of  two  only ; 7  and  where  such  an  answer  had 
been  filed,  it  was,  upon  the  motion  of  the  plaintiff,  ordered  to  be  taken 
off  the  file.*  In  an  earlier  case,  however,  before  the  same  Judge,  where 
a  joint  and  several  answer  included  in  the  title  the  names  of  persons 
who  refused  to  join  in  it,  the  answer  was  ordered  to  be  received  as  the 
answer  of  those  defendants  who  had  sworn  to  it,  without  striking  out 
the  names  of  those  who  had  not.9  And  an  answer,  which  had  been 
prepared  as  the  answer  of  several  defendants,  but  only  sworn  to  by 
some  of  them,  may,  by  special  order,  be  directed  to  be  filed  as  the 
answer  of  those  defendants  only  who  have  sworn  to  it ;  and  an  order 
may  be  subsequently  made,  that  a  defendant  who  has  not  sworn  to  it 
(he  being  out  of  the  jurisdiction  when  the  answer  was  filed)  be  sworn  to 
it  by  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerk,  without  the  answer  being  taken  off  the 
file,  and  that  such  answer,  when  so  sworn,  be  treated  as  the  joint  answer 
of  all  the  defendants  whose  answer  it  purports  to  be.10 

An  answer  must  be  signed  by  counsel ; u  and  no  counsel  is  to  sign 
any  answer  unless  he  has  perused  it;  and  he  must  take  care 
*733  *that  the  documents  are  not  unnecessarily  set  out  therein  in  hcec 
verba  ;  but  that  so  much  of  them  only  as  is  pertinent  and  mate- 
rial is  set  out  or  stated,  or  that  the  substance  of  so  much  of  them  only 
as  is  pertinent  and  material  be  given,  as  counsel  may  deem  advisable ; 
and  that  no  scandalous  matter 1  be  inserted  therein.2 

The  signature  of  counsel  is  usually  put  to  the  draft  of  the  answer, 
and  thence  copied  on  to  the  engrossment  or  print ;  and  if  not  affixed 
either  to  one  or  the  other,  the  plaintiff  may  apply,  by  motion,  with 
notice  to  the  defendant,  that  the  answer  may  be  taken  off  the  file  ; 3  but 

«  Griffiths  r.  Wood,  ubi  supra.  ants.     The  signature  mar  be  m  the  firm  name 

7  Harris  v.  James,  3  Bro.  C.  C  399;  Bin-  of  counsel.  Hampton  v.  Coddington,  28  N.  J. 
nev's  case,  2  Bland,  99;  Cook  v.  Dew?,  2  Tenn.  Eq.  557.  And  the  signature  of  a  solicitor  is 
Ch.  496.  sufficient  in  New  Jersey.      Freehold   Mutual 

8  Cooke  v.  Westall,  1  Mad.  265;  Bailey  Loan  Association  v.  Brown,  28  N.  J.  Eq.  42. 
Washing  Machine  Co.  v.  Young,  12  Blatchf.  In  Michigan.  Henry  v.  Gregory,  29  Mich.  68. 
199,  but  with  leave  to  the  defendants  who  had  In  Tennessee.  1  Hicks'  Man.  Ch.  Pr.  46,  133; 
signed  to  erase  the  names  of  the  others,  and  Stadler  v.  Hertz,  13  Lea,  315.  In  Illinois, 
file  the  answer  as  their  own  only.  Puterb.  Ch.  Pr.  59,  601.     And  see   Hatch  v. 

9  Done  r.  Read,  2  V.  &  B.  310;   see  also  Eustaphieve,  Clarke,  63;  ante,  p.  312,  n.  1. 
Young  v.  Clarksville  Man.  Co.27N.  J.  Eq.  67.  1  As  to  scandal,  see  ante,  p.  346. 

m  Lyons  t.  Read,  4  and   15  Nov.  1856,  cited  2  Cons   Ord.  VIII.  2. 

Braithwaite's  Pr.  51,  52;  and   see   Hayward  v.  3  See  Wall  v.  Stubbs,  ubi  supra.     A  party 

Roberts  (1857,   H.  152),  6    March,   1858,  and  has  a  right  to  suppose  that  the  pleading  serve  I 

Lane  r.  London  Bank  of  Scotland   (1864,   L.  on   him   is  a  correct  copy  of  that   filed;  and 

1-28),  16  March,  1865,  in  which  like  orders  were  where  the  copy  of  an  answer  contains  neith.  r 

made;  the  latter  on  petition  of  course,  by  con-  the  signature  of  solicitor  or  counsel,  nor  has  a 

sent  of  the  plaintiff.  jwrut,   the   plaintiff    may   apply   to   take    the 

ii  Cons.  Ord.  VIII.  1;  Wall  v.  Stubbs,  2  V.  answer  off  the  files  for  irregularity.    Littlejohn 

&  B.  358;  Brown  v.  Bruce,  2  Mer.  1;  Bishop  v.  Munn,  3  Paige,  280.    Where  the  answer  was 

v.  Willis,  5  Beav.  83,  n.;  out  see  Sears  v.  Hyer,  put  in  without  the  defendant's  signature,  it  was 

1  Paige,  483;    see  Barley  u.Pearson,  3  Atk.  ordered  to  be  taken  off  the  files  for  irregularity. 

439.     There  is  no  objection  to  the  same  conn-  Denison  v.  Bassford,  7  Paige,  370.      For  form 

sel  signing  the  separate  answers  of  co-defend-  of  notice  of  motion,  see  Vol.  III. 

728 


FORM    OP   ANSWERS.  *  734 

the  Court  will  not  direct  such  a  course  to  be  adopted  where  the  interest 
of  the  plaintiff  may  be  prejudiced  by  the  proceeding.4  Where,  by  in- 
advertence, an  answer  has  been  sworn  or  hied  without  the  name  of 
counsel  being  put  to  it,  and  the  plaintiff  has  not  served  a  notice  of  mo- 
tion to  take  the  answer  off  the  file  for  irregularity,  an  order  may  be 
obtained,  on  motion  of  course,  or  on  petition  of  course  at  the  liolls,  to 
amend  the  answer  by  adding  the  name.5 

An  answer  must,  also,  be  signed  by  the  defendant  or  defendants  put- 
ting it  in,6  unless  an  order  has  been  obtained  to  take  it  without  sig- 
nature.7 Where  an  answer  is  put  in  by  guardian  or  committee,  the 
signature  of  such  guardian  or  committee  is  alone  required  ;  and  if  such 
guardian  is  also  a  defendant,  and  puts  in  an  answer  in  that  character 
as  well  as  in  that  of  guardian,  he  need  only  affix  his  signature  to  the 
answer  once.8  It  is  prudent,  though  not  essential,  to  sign  each  sheet 
of  the  answer.  Where  there  are  any  schedules,  each  schedule 
should  be  signed  also.9  If  the  answer  is  put  in  upon  *oath,  the  *734 
signature  must  be  affixed,  or  acknowledged,  in  the  presence  of  the 
person  before  whom  it  is  sworn ; *  and  he  also  must  sign  each  schedule, 
as  well  as  the  jurat.2 

Sometimes  the  Court  has,  under  special  circumstances,  directed  an 
answer  to  be  received,  though  it  has  not  been  signed  by  the  defendant ; 
as,  where  a  defendant  went  abroad,  forgetting,  or  not  having  had  time, 
to  put  in  his  answer ; 3  and  where  a  defendant  had  gone  or  was  resident 
abroad,  and  had  given  a  general  power  of  attorney  to  defend  suits.4 
Where  an  answer  was  put  in  under  the  authority  of  a  power  of  attorney, 
the  Court  thought  it  better  to  take  the  answer  without  any  signature, 
than  that  the  person  to  whom  the  power  is  given  should  sign  it  in  the 


4  Bull  v.  Griffin,  2  Anst.  563.  Defendants  may  answer  jointly,  or  jointly 

5  Braithwaite's  Pr.  48;  and  see  H;irrison  v.  and  severally,  or  separately,  but  in  either  case 
Delmont,  1  Price,  103.  each  defendant  must   swear  to  his  answer,  or 

6  Ordo  curia,  2  Atk.  290 ;  Cook  v.  Dews,  2  it  will  be  no  answer  as  to  him.  Binney's  case,  2 
Tenn.  Ch.  496;  Denison  v.  Bassford,  7  Paige,  Bland,  99;  Cook  v.  Dews,  2  Tenn.  Ch".  496. 
370;  Cons.  Ord.  XV.  5;  see  Ch.  Rule  7  of  "  Fulton  Bank  v  Beach,  2  Paige,  306. 
Maine,  37  Maine,  583.  The  answer  must  be  The  answer  of  a  corporation  should  be 
signed  by  the  defendant,  though  the  oath  be  signed  by  the  principal  officer.  A  secretary,  or 
waived.  Denison  o.  Bassford,  7  Paige,  370;  cashier,  in  case  of  a  bank,  frequently  signs  it 
Kimball  v.  Ward,  Walk.  Ch.  439.  But  it  is  also.  1  Hoff.  Ch.  Pr.  239 ;  Supervisors  &c.  v. 
not  ne  essary  in  all  cases  that  an  individual  Mississippi  &c.  R.  R.  Co.  21  III.  338.  If  the 
defendant  should  write  his  own  name  to  an  name  of  the  corporation  is  written  to  the 
answer.  Supervisors  &c.  v.  Mississippi  &c.  answer,  and  there  is  nothing  to  show  that  it  is 
R.  R.  Co.  21  111.  338;  Hatch  v.  Eustaphieve,  unauthorized,  it  will  be  sufficient.  Lorrison  v. 
Clarke,  63.     And  the  signature  may  be  waived  Peoria  &c.  R.  Co.  77  111.  11. 

b}-  the  plaintiff;  and  the  filing  of  a  replication  8  Anon.  2  J.  &  W.  553. 

is   evidence  of  such  waiver  of  the   signature.  9  Braithwaite's  Pr.  45,  342,  n. 

Fulton  Bank  v.  Peach,  2  Paige,  306;    Collard  1  Cons.  Ord.  XV.  5. 

v.  Smith,  13  N.  J.  Eq.  43,  45.  "■  Braithwaite's  Pr.  342,  n.;    and  see  post, 

On  a  bill  against  husband  and  wif",  the  hus-  p.  746,  n. 

band  is  bound  to  enter  a  joint  appearance,  and  8  v.  Lake,  6  Ves.  171; v.  Gwillim, 

put  in   a  joint  answer,   unless   for    sufficient  id.   285;  10  Ves.   442;  Dumond    v.   Magee,   2 

reason,  as  that  the  wife  refuses  to  join  or  to  John.  Ch.  240. 

swear  to  a  plea,  he  is  permitted  by  the  Court  to  *  Bayley   v.    De    Walkiers,   10   Ves.    441; 

answer  separately.     Leavitt  v.  Cruger,  1  Paige,  Harding  t\  Harding,  12  Ves.  159. 

421  ,  Collard  v.  Smith,  13  N.  J.  Eq.  43,  44. 

729 


735 


ANSWERS. 


name  of  the  defendant ;  the  power  of  attorney  should  be  recited  in  any 
order  authorizing  the  answer  to  be  put  in  under  it.5 

The  signature  of  the  defendant  must  be  affixed  to  the  engrossment  or 
print,  and  not  to  the  draft :  the  object  in  requiring  it  being  to  identify 
the  instrument,  to  which  the  defendant  has  given  the  sanction  of  his 
oath,  for  the  purpose  of  rendering  a  conviction  for  perjury  more  easy.6 

Unless  the  Court  otherwise  directs,  the  answers  of  all  persons  (except 
persons  entitled  to  the  privilege  of  peerage,  or  corporations  aggregate) 
must  be  put  in  upon  the  oath  of  the  parties  putting  in  the  same,7 
*  735  where  they  are  not  exempted  from  taking  an  oath  by  *  any  statute 
in  that  behalf.1  Persons  entitled  to  the  privilege  of  peerage  an- 
swer upon  protestation  of  honor  ;  and  corporations  aggregate  put  in  their 
answer  under  their  common  seal.2    The  Secretary  of  State  for  India, 


5  Bayley  ».  De  Walkiers,  ubi  supra. 

6  Harr.'by  New].  170. 

7  An  answer  should  be  regularly  signed  and 
sworn  to.  Fulton  Bank  v.  Beach,  2  Paige, 
307;  S.  C.  6  Wend.  36;  Trumbull  v.  Gibbons, 
Halst.  Dig.  172;  Salmon  v.  Claggett,  3  Bland, 
125;  Rogers  v.  Cruger,  7  John.  Ch.  557;  Van 
Valtenburg  v.  Al berry,  10  Iowa,  264;  Story, 
Eq.  PI.  §  874;  Ch.  Rule  7 of  Maine.  This  rule 
in  .Maine  gives  the  substance  of  the  oath  to 
be  administered;  and  it  provides  that  the  cer- 
tificate of  the  magistrate  must  state  the  oath 
administered.     37  Maine,  583. 

"Answers,"  in  New  Hampshire,  "unless 
required  by  the  bill  to  be  under  oath,  need  not 
be  sworn  to,  and  they  will  then  be  regarded 
only  as  pleadings,  and  no  exception  for  in- 
sufficiency can  be  taken  thereto."  Rule  9  of 
Chancery  Practice.  See  Dorn  v.  Bayer,  16  Md. 
144;  Mahaney  v.  Lozier,  16  Md.  69;  Shepard 
v.  Ford,  10  Iowa,  502;  Blakemore  v.  Allen,  id. 
550. 

A  defendant  has  a  right  to  put  in  his  answer 
under  oath,  although  not  required  by  the  plain- 
tiff.    White  r.  Hampton,  9  Iowa,  181. 

See  59th  Equity  Rule  of  the  U.  S.  Courts, 
post,  p.  2389. 

In  New  Jersey  an  answer  must  be  sworn  to 
before  a  Master  of  the  Court  or  before  a  com- 
missioner authorized  for  that  purpose;  and  an 
answer  sworn  to  before  a  notary  public,  of  the 
State  of  Connecticut,  was  considered  irregular, 
as  filed  without  oath.  Trumbull  v.  Gibbons, 
supra.  In  Maryland,  an  answer  sworn  to  be- 
fore a  justice  of  the  peace,  in  another  State  or 
in  the  District  of  Columbia,  who  is  certified  to 
be  a  justice  of  the  peace  at  the  time,  is  received 
as  sufficient.  Chapline  v.  Beatty,  1  Bland, 
197;  Lingan  v.  Henderson,  id.  240;  Gibson  v. 
Tilton,  id.  352.  As  to  New  York,  see  1  Barb. 
Ch.  Pr.  145,  146.  As  to  New  Hampshire,  see 
Chancery  Rule  30,  38  N.  H.  611. 

A  defendant  prepared  an  answer  admitting 
the  allegations  of  the  plaintiff's  bill,  and  it  was 
certified  as  sworn  to;  but  the  person  certifying 

730 


did  not  style  himself  in  the  certificate  a  justice 
of  the  peace,  nor  was  he  otherwise  proved  to 
be  a  magistrate  empowered  to  administer 
oaths;  the  defendant  died,  and  this  paper  so 
certified  was  afterwards  filed  in  the  clerk's 
office,  and  it  was  held  not  to  be  the  answer  of 
the  party,  nor  evidence  in  the  cause.  Sitling- 
ton  v.  Brown,  7  Leigh.  271. 

i  See  Stat.  7  &  8  Will.  III.  c.  34,  §  1 ;  8  Geo. 
I.  c.  6,  §  1;  22  Geo.  II.  c.  30,  §  1;  id.  c.  46, 
§  36;  9  Geo.  IV.  c.  32,  §  1;  3&  4  Will.  IV. 
c.  49;  id.  c.  82;  1  &  2  Vic.  c.  77;  and  see  id. 
c.  105.  Parties  if  conscientiously  scrupulous 
of  taking  an  oath,  may,  in  lieu  thereof,  make 
solemn  affirmation  to  the  truth  of  the  facts 
stated  by  them  in  the  U.  S.  Courts.  Equity 
Rule  91.  So  in  Massachusetts,  and  other 
States,  either  by  statute  or  rule  of  Court.  It 
is  to  be  observed  that  an  affirmation  cannot  be 
taken  under  a  commission  authorizing  the 
commissioners  to  take  an  answer  upon  oath. 
Parke  v.  Christy,  1  Y.  &  J.  533. 

2  Cons.  Ord.  XV.  6.  The  answer  of  a  cor- 
poration is  put  in  without  oath,  under  the  cor- 
porate seal.  1  Hoff.  Ch.  Pr.  239;  see  Vermil- 
yea  v.  Fulton  Bank,  1  Paige,  37;  Fulton  Bank 
v.  N.  Y.  &  Sharon  Canal  Co.  id.  311;  Balti- 
more &  Ohio  R  R.  Co.  v.  City  of  Wheeling, 
13  Gratt.  40;  Haight  v.  Prop,  of  Morris  Aque- 
duct, 4  Wash.  C.  C.  601;  Champlin  v.  New 
York,  3  Paige,  573.  An  answer  of  a  corpora- 
tion, put  in  without  their  seal,  was  suppressed 
as  irregular,  in  Ransom  v.  Stonington  Savings 
Bank,  13  N.  J.  Eq.  212.  But  it  was  held  in  the 
same  case  that  the  corporation  may  adopt  and 
use  any  seal,  —  as  a  bit  of  paper  attached  by  a 
waifer,  — pro  line  vice.  Ibid.;  Mill  D:im  Foun- 
dry v.  Hovey,  21  Pick.  417.  If  the  seal  is 
dispensed  with,  it  should  be  by  leave  of  the 
Court  previously  obtained  and  for  good  cause 
shown.  Ransom  v.  Stonington  Savings  Bank, 
uhi  suprn.  The  plaintiff  cannot  compel  the 
officers,  even  those  who  have  signed  it,  to 
swear  to  it.  1  Hcff.  Ch.  Pr.  239;  Brumly  v. 
Westchester  Manuf .  So.  1  John.  Ch.  366 ;  see 


FORM    OF    ANSWERS. 


736 


and  the  Attorney-General,  respectively  sign,  but  do  not  swear  to  their 
answers  ;  and  such  answers  are  received  and  filed  without  an  order  dis- 
pensing with  the  oath.8 

The  oath,  when  administered  to  a  person  professing  the  Christian  re- 
ligion, is  upon  the  Holy  Evangelists.4  But  persons  who  do  not  believe 
the  Christian  oath  must,  out  of  necessity,  be  put  to  swear  according  to 
their  own  notion  of  an  oath : 5  therefore  a  Jew  may  be  sworn 
upon  the  Pentateuch  with  his  hat  on  ; 6  and  a  heathen  *  may  be  *  736 
sworn  in  the  manner  most  binding  on  his  conscience.1 

Sometimes  an  answer  is  put  in  without  oath,  or  without  oath  or  sig- 
nature, and  this  practice  is  frequently  resorted  to  in  amicable  suits ; 2 
such  an  answer,  however,  cannot  be  received,  unless  an  order  to  that 
effect  has  first  been  obtained.  This  order  may  be  obtained  upon 
motion,3  or  upon  petition  of  course  at  the  Rolls  ; 4  the  application  is 
usually  made  by  petition.  If  the  answer  is  to  be  put  in  without  oath, 
and  the  plaintiff  applies  for  the  order,  no  consent  is  necessary ;  but  if 
the  defendant  applies,  the  plaintiff's  solicitor  must  instruct  counsel  to 


Kittre  Ige  v.  Claremont  Bank,  1  Wood  &  M. 
244.  But  where  it  is  the  object  of  the  corpora- 
tion to  obtain  the  dissolution  of  a:i  injunction, 
it  is  necessary  to  have  the  answer  verified  by 
the  oath  of  some  of  the  corporators,  or  officers 
of  the  corporation,  who  are  acquainted  with  the 
facts;  as  the  injunction  cannot  be  dissolved  upon 
an  answer  without  oath,  denying  the  equity  of 
the  bill.  Fulton  Bank  v.  New  York  and  Sharon 
Canal  Co.  1  Paige,  311;  see  Hale  v.  Continental 
Life  Ins.  Co.  16  Fed.  Rep.  718. 

Individual  members  of  a  corporation  may  be 
called  upon  to  answer  to  a  bill  of  disi-overy 
under  oath;  but  in  that  case  the  individuals 
must  be  named  as  defendants  in  the  bill. 
Brumly  c.  Weschester  Manuf.  So.  1  John.  Ch. 
366;  Buford  v.  Rucker,  4  J.  J.  Marsh.  551; 
Vermilvea  v.  Fulton  Bank,  1  Paige,  37.  As  to 
making  officers  and  members  of  corporations 
parties  for  discovery,  see  ante,  p.  135,  notes.  The 
answer  of  a  corporation,  under  its  seal,  is  nothing 
more  than  a  pleading;  and  although  it  negatives 
the  bill,  will  not  warrant  the  dissolution  of  an 
injunction.  Griffin  v.  State  Bank,  17  Ala.  258, 
overruling  Hogan  v.  Branch  Bank  of  Decatur, 
10  Ala.  485.  A  foreign  corporation  cannot  be 
compelled  to  file  an  answer;  and  the  want  of 
an  answer  where  it  was  not  needed  for  the  pur- 
poses of  discovery,  was  held  no  good  objection 
on  a  motion  to  dissolve  an  injunction.  Bait.  & 
Ohio  R.  R.  Co.  v  Wheeling,  13  Gratt.  40. 

It  is  desirable,  though  not  essential,  that  the 
affixing  of  the  seal  should  be  attested  by  some 
official  of  the  corporation.  Braithwaite's  Pr. 
53.  For  forms  of  oath,  affirmation,  and  attes- 
tation, see  Vol.  III.  Coale  v.  Chase,  1  Bland, 
137;  Gibson  v.  Tilton,  1  Bland,  355. 

8  For  form  of  special  attestation  to  th»  signa- 
ture of  the  Secretary  of  State,  see  Vol.  III. 

4  Except   in  cases  within    the  Stat.  1  &  2, 


Vic.  c.  105,  post,  p.  746.  Where  that  Act  is  in- 
applicable, a  Christian,  in  making  oath,  holds 
the  book  in  his  right  hand,  the  hand  being  un- 
covered, and,  in  the  case  of  a  male  person,  the 
head  being  uncovered  also.  Braithwaite's  Pr. 
343;  same  on  oaths,  45. 

5  Omvchund  v.  Barker,  1  Atk.  21,  46;  see 
Att.-Gen.  v.  Bradlaugh,  14  Q.  B.  D.  667. 

6  Hinde,  228:  see  Tryatt  v.  Lindo,  3  Edw. 
Ch.  239.  But,  though  the  head  be  covered,  the 
right  hand  in  which  the  book  is  held  must 
be  uncovered.  A  Jew  may,  if  he  pleases,  be 
sworn  while  his  head  is  uncovered.  Braith- 
waite's Pr.  343. 

1  In  Ramkissenseat  v.  Barker,  1  Atk.  19, 
where  the  defendant  to  a  cross-bill  was  resi- 
dent in  the  East  Indies,  and  professed  the 
Gentoo  religion,  the  Court  directed  a  com- 
mission to  the  East  Indies,  and  empowered  the 
commissioners  to  administer  the  oath  in  the 
most  solemn  manner  as  in  their  discretion 
should  seem  meet,  and,  if  they  administered 
any  other  oath  than  the  Christian,  to  certify  to 
the  Court  what  was  done  by  them.  For  form 
of  jurat  in  the  case  of  a  Hindoo,  see  Braith- 
waite's Oaths,  64,  65. 

2  An  answer  may  by  consent  of  the  plaintiff 
be  received  without  being  sworn  to.  Contee  v. 
Dawson,  2  Bland,  264;  Billingslea  v.  Gilbert,  1 
Bland,  567;  see  Reed  P.  Warner,  5  Paige,  650. 
And  in  New  York  the  filing  of  a  replication  is 
evidence  of  such  consent.  Fulton  Bank  v. 
Beach,  2  Paige,  307.  But  it  is  otherwise  in 
New  Jersey;  Trumbull  v.  Gibbons,  HaNt.  Dig. 
172;  and  in  Maryland,  Nesbitt  v.  Del'am,  7 
Gill  &  J.  494. 

8  Hinde,  228. 

*  Braithwaite's  Pr.  47.  For  form  of  order  on 
motion,  see  Seton,  1254,  No.  2;  and  for  forms  of 
motion  paper  and  petition,  see  Vol.  III. 

731 


*737 


ANSWERS. 


consent  to  the  motion,  or  must  subscribe  his  own  consent  to  the 
petition,  as  the  case  may  be.5  If  *  the  answer  is  to  be  put  in 
without  oath  or  signature,  the  consent  of  the  party  not  applying 


5  Where  the  parties  agree  that  the  answer 
mav  be  received  without  oath  or  signature,  it 
is  of  course  for  the  Court  so  to  order.  Fulton 
Bank  r.  Beach.  2  Paige,  307;  S  C.  6  Wend.  36; 
Trumbull  r.  Gibbons,  Halst.  Dig.  172;  Bill- 
ingslea  c.  Gilbert,  1  Bland,  507. 

And  an  answer  without  oah  merely  puts  the 
cause  at  issue,  and  is  of  no  more  weight  as  evi- 
dence than  the  bill.  Guthrie  v.  Quinn,  43  Ala. 
561. 

In  Massachusetts,  the  rule  of  Court  is  that, 
"  when  a  bill  shall  be  filed  other  than  for  dis- 
covery only,  the  plaintiff  may  waive  the  neces- 
sity of  the  answer  being  made  on  the  oath  of 
the  defendant,  and,  in  such  cases,  the  answer 
may  be  made  without  oath,  and  shall  have  no 
other  or  greater  force  as  evidence  than  the  bill. 
No  exception  for  insufficiency  can  be  taken  to 
such  answer."  Rule  8.  (a)  Answers  in  New 
Hampshire  need  not  be  sworn  to  unless  an  oath 
is  required  by  the  bill;  if  not  sworn  to  they  will 
be  regarded  only  as  pleadings,  and  no  excep- 
tion f'>r  insufficiency  can  be  taken  thereto.  Rule 
9  of  Chancery  Practice;  38  N.  H.  606.  This 
provision,  authorizing  the  plaintiff  to  waive  an 
answer  on  oath  from  the  defendant,  introduced 
a  new  principle,  and  was  intended  to  leave  it 
optional  with  the  plaintiff  to  compel  a  discovery 
from  the  defendant  in  aid  of  the  suit,  or  to  waive 
the  oath  of  the  defendant,  if  the  plaintiff  was  un- 
willing to  rely  upon  his  honesty,  and  chose  to 
establish  his  claim  by  other  evidence  alone. 
He  must  waive  an  answer  on  oath  as  to  every 
point  of  the  bill,  or  to  no  part  thereof.  And 
after  the  defendant  has  put  in  an  answer  on 
oath  as  to  the  whole  or  any  part  of  the  bill,  it 
is  too  late  for  the  plaintiff  to  get  rid  of  the  con- 
sequences of  a  denial  upon  oath  of  all  or  any  of 
the  matters  of  the  bill.  An  amendment  in  that 
stage  of  the  suit,  waiving  an  answer  on  oath,  is 
irregular,  and  cannot  be  allowed.  If  the  plain- 
tiff is  unwilling  to  rely  upon  an  answer  on  oath 
to  the  amendments,  his  only  remedy  is  to  dis- 
miss the  bill  and  commence  a  new  suit,  in  which 
suit  he  can  waive  an  answer  on  oath.  Bunas  r. 
Looker.  4  Paige,  227:  1  Hoff.  Ch.  Pr.  234,  235; 
Rinsrham  ».  Yeomans,  10  Cush.  58;  Chace  v. 
Holmes,  2  Gray,  431. 

A  motion  to  dismiss  a  bill  for  want  of  equity 
on  its  face  is  not  the  proper  mode  of  testing  the 
question  whether  the  plaintiff  can  call  upon  the 
defendant  to  answer  a  part  of  the  bill  under 
oath,  and  waive  the  oath  as  to  another  part. 
Henderson  v.  Mathews,  1  Lea,  34;  S.  C  2  Leg. 
Rep.  181- 


The  plaintiff  who  has  waived  an  answer  on 
oath,  cannot  apply  to  have  the  answer  taken 
off  the  file  on  the  ground  that  the  defendant 
knows  it  to  be  wholly  untrue.  Denison  v. 
Bassford,  7  Paige,  370.  All  material  allega- 
tions of  the  bill  may  be  proved  as  if  they  had 
been  distinctly  put  in  issue  by  the  answer;  and, 
if  no  replication  is  filed,  the  matters  of  defence 
set  up  will  be  considered  as  admitted  by  the 
plaintiff,  as  in  the  case  of  a  sworn  answer.  1 
Hoff.  Ch.  Pr.  235.  Although  the  plaintiff  in 
an  injunction  bill  waive  an  answer  on  oath,  the 
defendant  may  file  it  on  oath  for  the  purpose  of 
moving  to  dissolve  the  injunction,  or  discharge 
a  we  exeat.  Dougrey  v.  Topping,  4  Paige,  94; 
Mahaney  v.  Lazier,  16  Md.  69.  In  such  case, 
the  unsworn  answer  is  no  evidence  on  which 
to  dissolve  an  injunction.  Rainey  v.  Rainey, 
35  Ala.  282;  Mahaney  v.  Lazier,  ubi  sujna. 
Where  the  defendants  are  not  jointly  interested 
in  respect  to  the  claim  made  against  them  by 
the  bill,  the  plaintiff  may  waive  an  answer  on 
oath  as  to  some  of  them  and  not  as  to  the  others. 
Bulkley  v.  Van  Wyck,  5  Paige,  536;  Morse  v. 
Uovey",  1  Barb.  Ch.  404;  S.  C.  1  Sandf.  Ch. 
187;  see  Stephenson  v.  Stephenson,  6  Paige, 
353. 

The  defendant  has  been  held  entitled  to  an- 
swer under  oath,  although  the  bill  waived  a 
sworn  answer.  White  v.  Hampton,  10  Iowa, 
238;  S.  C.  9  Iowa,  181. 

Although  where  an  answer  on  oath  is  waived, 
it  is  not  evidence  in  favor  of  the  defendant  for 
any  purpose  at  the  hearing,  even  when  actually 
sworn  to,  yet,  as  a  pleading,  the  plaintiff  may 
avail  himself  of  admissions  and  allegations 
made  therein,  which  establish  the  case  mnde 
by  his  bill;  Bartlett  v.  Gale,  4  Paige,  504; 
Moore  v.  Hunter,  1  Gilman,  317;  Miller  r 
Avery,  2  Barb.  Ch.  582;  Wilson  v.  Towle,  36 
N.  H.  129  ;  and  for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining 
what  points  are  at  issue.  Dorn  v.  Bayer,  16  Md. 
144;  Durfee  v.  McClurg,  6  Mich.  223 ;  Smith 
v.  Potter,  3  Wis.  432 ;  Union  Bank  of  George- 
town v.  Geary,  5  Peters,  99,  110,  112.  An 
answer  sworn  to  where  the  oath  is  waived  will 
be  treated  as  if  it  were  not  Stevens  v  Post,  12 
N.  J.  Eq.  408;  Hyer  v.  Little,  20  N.  J.  Eq.  443; 
Sweet  v.  Parker,  22  id.  453.  The  oath  in  such 
case  is  not  evidence  at  the  hearing.  Walker  v. 
Hill,  21  N.  J.  Eq.  191.  But  any  admissions 
made  are  operative  against  defendant.  Hyer 
v.  Little,  20  N.  J.  Eq.  443 ;  Symmes  v.  Strong, 
28  N.  J.  Eq.  131. 


(a)  See  now  Stat,  of  1883,  c.  223,  §  10,  stated  ante,  p.  357,  note  (a). 

732 


FORM    OF    ANSWERS. 


'37 


is  requisite.1  (a)  It  is  usual  for  the  plaintiff's  solicitor  to  require  to  see 
the  draft  or  a  copy  of  the  proposed  answer,  before  he  applies  or  consents 
to  the  defendant's  application,  in  order  that  he  may  be  satisfied  that  it 
is  sufficient : a  as  no  exceptions  can  be  taken  to  an  answer  put  in  without 
oath  or  signature,  or  attestation  of  honor.3  (b) 

If  the  answer  is  put  in  by  a  guardian  ad  litem,  or  committee,  the 
order  should  express  that  the  answer  is  to  be  put  in  without  the  oath  or 
signature  of  such  guardian  or  committee  ;  and  the  order  will  not  be 
acted  upon,  if  it  bears  date  antecedently  to  the  order  appointing  the 
guardian.4  So,  likewise,  an  order  to  file  the  separate  answer  of  a 
married  woman,  without  oath  or  signature,  will  not  be  acted  on,  if 
dated  previously  to  the  date  of  the  order  giving  her  leave  to  answer 
separately.5 

The  Court  will  not  permit  the  answer  of  a  defendant,  represented 
to  be  in  a  state  of  incapacity,  to  be  received  without  oath  or 
signature,    though   a   mere   trustee   and    without   interest  :    the  proper 


1  Braithwaite's  Pr.  47;  and  see v.  Lake, 

6  Ves    171; v.  Gwillim,  id.  285;  Bavley  v. 

De  Walkiers,  10  Ves.  441:  Codner  v.  Hersey, 
18  Ves.  468.  It  seems  that  if  the  plaintiff 
chooses  to  dispense  with  the  oath,  the  Court, 
upon  his  motion,  will  require  the  defendant  to 
answer  without  oath,  even  without  the  consent 
of  the  defendant.  Cooper,  Eq.  PI.  325;  Story, 
Ff|.  PI.  §  874.  But  in  all  such  cases  the  dispen- 
sation is  supposed  to  be  made  for  the  conven- 
ience of  the  defendant,  and  upon  his  expressed 
or  presumed  consent.  The  application  nun-  be 
made  on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff  or  of  the  de- 


(a)  Waiver  in  the  bill  of  an  answer  under 
oath  has  no  effec  ,  if  not  accepted  by  the  defend- 
ant, anil  does  not  deprive  an  answer  upon  oath 
of  its  ordinary  effect  as  evidence.  Clements  v. 
Moore,  6  Wall.  299;  Anmry  v.  Lawrence,  :j 
Cliff.  523,537;  Woodruff  p.  Dubuque  &c.  K. 
Co.  30  Fed.  Rep.  91;  Armstrong  v.  Scott,  3  G. 
Greene,  433;  Brown  v  Bulkley,  14  N.  J.  Eq. 
21)4.  300.  In  some  of  the  States,  as,  for  in- 
stance, in  New  York  and  New  Jersey,  a  change 
has  been  made  by  statute.  See  Congdon  v. 
Aylsworth,  16  R.  1.281;  Huntington  v.  Saun- 
ders, 120  U.  S.  78  Palton  v.  J.  M.  Brunswick 
&  Balke  Co.  23  Fla.  283:  Hall  v.  Claggett,  48 
Md.  223;  Major  v.  Ficklin,  85  Va.  732  ;  Ball 
t'.  Sawyer,  02  Vt.  307;  Throckmorton  v.  Throck- 
morton, 80  Va.  708;  Fisher  v.  Moog,  3!)  Fed. 
Rep.  005;  Bartlett  v.  Gale,  4  Paige.  503;  Moore 
v.  Hunter,  1  Gihnan,  317;  Babcock  r.  Smith, 
22  Pick.  61.  In  New  Hampshire  and  Maine, 
when  the  bill  does  not  call  for  an  answer  under 
oath,  the  answer,  though  upon  oath,  is  mere 
pleading,  and  not  evidence.  Winsor  p.  Bailey, 
55  N.  H.  218;  Ayer  v.  Messer,  59  N.  H.  279; 
Clay  v.  Towle,  78  Maine,  80.  The  plaintiff  can- 
not by  amendment  of  his  bill  waive  an  answer 
under  oath,  so  as  to  lessen  the  force  of  such  an 


fendant,  but  the  order  will  only  be  made  where 
both  parties  consent,  and  not  against  the  will  of 
either.  Brown  v.  Bulkley,  14  N.  J.  Eq.  306; 
Hinde,  228;  Codner  v  Hersey,  ubi  supra. 

2  Braithwaite's  Pr.  48. 

3  Hill  v.  Earl  of  Bute,  2  Fowl.  Ex.  Pr.  10 
McCormick  v.  Chamberlain,  11  Paige,  548 
Wallace  v.  Wallace,  Halst.  N.  J.  Dig.  173 
Sheppard  v.  Akers,  1  Tenn.  Ch.  326;  Smith  v 
St.  Louis  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.  2  Tenn.  Ch.  599 
See  infra,  p.  760. 

4  B  -aithwaite's  Pr.  47. 
*>  Ibid. 


answer  already  filed,  so  far  as  it  is  responsive 
to  the  amendment.  Walker  v.  Campbell,  5  Lea 
(Tenn.),  354.  The  oath  of  one  defendant  is 
usually  treated  as  sufficient  when  the  bill  is 
sworn  to  by  only  one  of  many  plaintiffs.  Ar- 
nold o.  Slaughter,  30  W.  Va.  589. 

In  the  Federal  Courts,  when  a  bill  for  an 
injunction  waives  an  answer  under  oath,  the 
answer  made  under  oath  and  denying  all  the 
equities  of  the  bill,  will,  under  Equity  Rule  41, 
as  amended,  have  at  the  hearing  only  the  force 
of  an  affidavit.  United  States  v.  Workingmen's 
A.  Council,  54  Fed.  Rep.  994;  see  Dravo  r. 
Fabel,  132  D.  S.  487;  Conley  r.  Nailer,  118 
U.  S.  127,  134;  Treadwell  v.  Lennig,  50  Fed. 
Rep.  872.  Admissions  in  an  answer,  the  oath 
to  which  is  waived,  are  evidence  against  the 
defendant.  Uhlmann  v.  Arnholt  &  S.  B.  Co. 
41  Fed.  Rep.  369.  Under  the  Codes  a  sworn 
answer  may  operate  as  an  affidavit  of  merits. 
Fulweiler  p.  Hog's  Back  Cons.  M.  Co.  83  Cal. 
120. 

•  (6)  Although  the  defendant's  failure  to  sign 
his  answer  is  fatal  on  a  motion  to  strike  it  from 
the  tile,  yet  this  defect  is  waived  by  filing  a 
replication.     Howes  v.  Downing,  72  Mich.  43. 

733 


*  739  ANSWERS. 

*  738    *  course,  in  such  case,  being  for  the  Court  to  appoint  a  guardian 

by  whom  the  defendant  may  answer.1 

The  method  of  dispensing  with  the  attestation  of  honor  of  a  peer  or 
peeress  putting  in  an  answer,  is,  mutatis  mutandis,  the  same  as  the 
method  adopted  for  dispensing  with  the  oath  of  a  commoner.2 

The  signature  to  an  answer  taken  without  oath  must  be  attested  by 
the  defendant's  solicitor,  or  by  some  person  competent  to  be  a  witness  : 
otherwise,  the  answer  cannot  be  filed.  The  attestation  is  written  on  the 
left-hand  side  of  the  signature.3 

An  answer  put  in  without  oath  or  attestation  of  honor  or  signature, 
and  accepted  without  either  of  those  sanctions,  gives  the  same  author- 
ity to  the  Court  to  look  to  the  circumstances  denied  or  admitted  in  the 
answer  so  put  in,  for  the  purpose  of  administering  civil  justice  between 
the  parties,  as  if  it  was  put  in  upon  attestation  of  honor  or  upon  oath.4 
No  exceptions,  however,  as  we  have  seen,  can  be  taken  to  an  answer  so 
put  in.5 

Section  III.  —  Swearing,  Filing,   and  Printing  Answers. 

A  defendant  required  to  answer  a  bill,  whether  original  or  amended, 
must  put  in  his  plea,  answer,  or  demurrer  thereto,  not  demurring  alone, 
within  twenty-eight  days  from  the  delivery  to  him,  or  his  solicitor,  of  a 
copy  of  the  interrogatories  which  he  is  required  to  answer.6  If  the 
plaintiff  amends  his  bill,  after  interrogatories  to  the  original  bill  have 
been  served,  but  before  answer,  the  twenty-eight  days  will  be  computed 
from  the  service  of  the  amended  or  new  interrogatories  ;  or  if  no  such 
interrogatories  are  served,  then  from  the  service  of  a  copy  of  the 
amended  bill.7  Where  a  defendant  is  required  to  answer  amendments 
and  exceptions  together,8  he  must  put  in  his  further  answer,  and  his 
answer  to  the  amendments  of  the  bill,  within  fourteen  days  after  he 
shall  have  been  served  with  interrogatories  for  his  examination,  in 
answer  to  the  amended  bill.9  If  he  does  not,  and  procures  no  en- 
largement of   the  time  allowed,  he  will  be  subject   to   the   following 

liabilities :  — 
*739        *  1.  An  attachment  may  be  issued  against  him.1 

2.  He  may  be  committed  to  prison,  and  brought  to  the  bar  of 
the  Court.1 

3.  The  plaintiff  may  file  a  traversing  note ;  or  proceed  to  take  the  bill 
pro  confesso  against  him.2 

1  Wilson  v.  Grace,  14  Ves.  172;  Matter  of  1  Braithwaite's  Manual,  156.  Wrhere  the 
Barber,  2  John.  Ch.  235;  and  see  Cons.  Ord.  defendant  is  served  abroad,  the  times  are  regu- 
VII.  3:  ante,  p   176.  lated  by  the  special  order  directing  such  service. 

2  Hinde,  228.  A?ite,  p.  452. 

8  Braithwaite's  Pr.   47,  48.      For  form   of  8  Ante,  p.  413 

attestation,  see  Vol.  III.  »  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.  6. 

4  Per  Lord  Eldon,  in  Curling  v.  Marquis  of  1  Ante,  Chap.  X.  §  1.  If  the  defendant  is  a 
Townshend,  19  Ves.  628,  630.  peer,  M.  P.,  corporation  aggregate,  or  non  com- 

5  Hill  v.  Earl  of  Bute,  2  Fowl.  Ex.  Pr.  10.  pos,  or  the  Attorney-General,  the  process  is  of 

6  Cons.  Ord  XXXVII. 4;  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86;  a  different  kind;«n<e.  Chap.  X.  §2. 

§  13:  ante,  p.  485.  2  Ibid.;  see  ante,  pp.  514,  518.      In   Mas- 

734 


SWEARING,    FILING,   AND    PRINTING    ANSWERS.  *  740 

If  the  defendant,  not  being  in  contempt,  submits  to  exceptions  to  his 
answer  for  insufficiency  before  they  are  set  down  for  hearing,  he  has 
fourteen  days  from  the  date  of  the  submission  within  which  he  must  put 
in  his  further  answer.3  If,  not  being  in  contempt,  he  submits  to  the 
exceptions  after  they  are  set  down  for  hearing,  or  the  Court  holds  his 
first  or  second  answer  to  be  insufficient,  he  must  put  in  his  further 
answer  within  such  time  as  the  Court  may  appoint.4  If  he  does  not 
answer  within  the  above  periods,  or  obtain  further  time  and  answer 
within  such  further  time,  the  plaintiff  may  sue  out  process  of  contempt 
against  him.5 

If  a  defendant  is  not  required  to  answer  a  bill,  he  may  put  in  a  plea, 
answer,  or  demurrer,  not  demurring  alone,  within  fourteen  days  after 
the  expiration  of  the  time  within  which  he  might  have  been  served  with 
interrogatories  for  his  examination,  in  answer  to  such  bill ; 6  but  not 
afterwards,  without  leave  of  the  Court.7  It  follows  from  these  rules, 
that  if  a  defendant,  served  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court,  appears 
within  the  time  limited,  he  has  thirty  days  from  the  service  of  the  bill;8 
or,  if  he  does  not  appear  within  the  time  limited,  twenty-two  days  from 
the  time  of  his  actual  appearance,9  within  which  he  may  put  in  a  volun- 
tary answer. 

If  the  plaintiff  amends  his  bill,  without  requiring  an  answer  to 
*the  amendments,  a  defendant  who  has  answered,  or  has  not  *  740 
been  required  to  answer  the  original  bill,  but  desires  to  answer 
the  amended  bill,  must  put  in  his  answer  thereto  within  fourteen  days 
after  the  expiration  of  the  time  within  which,  if  an  answer  had  been 
required,  he  might  have  been  served  with  interrogatories  for  his  exami- 
nation in  answer  to  such  amended  bill,  or  within  such  further  time  as 
the  Judge  may  allow  ;  in  this  case,  therefore,  the  defendant  has  thirty 
days,  from  the  service  of  the  amended  bill,  within  which  he  must  put  in 
his  voluntary  answer.1 

sachusetts,   "  if  the  defendant  shall  not  appear  plaintiff,  until  the  notice  is  regularly  disposed 

and  tile  his  answer,  plea,  or  demurrer,  within  of  by  the  Court.    Ormsby  v.  Palmer,  1  Hogan, 

one  month  after  the   day  of  appearance,  the  191;  see  Burrall  v.  Raineteaux,  2  Paige,  331; 

plaintiff  may  enter  an  order  to  take  his  bill  tor  Hunt  v.  Wallis,  6  Paige,  371;  Hurd  r.  Haines, 

confessed,  and  the  matter  thereof  shall  be  de-  9  Paige,  604.     After  an  order,  allowing  further 

creed    accordingly,    unless    good    cause    shall  time  to  answer,  it  is  irregular  for  the  defendant 

appear  to  the  contrary."     Ch.  Rule  9.  to  demur.     Davenport  v    Sniffen,  1  Barb.  223  ; 

As  to  the  course  of  practice  in  the  Court  of  Lakens   v.    Fielden,   11  Paige,  644;   Bedell   v. 

Chancer}-,  heretofore  existing  in  New  York,  in  Bedell,  2  Barb.  Ch.  99. 
regard  to  the  time  of  filing  answers,  and  appli-  3  Cons.  Ord.  XVI.  9. 

cations  for  the  extension  of  time,  see  1  Hoff.  Ch.  4  Cons.  Ord.  XVI.  14.     If  the  defendant  is 

Pr.  228;  1  Barb.  Ch.  I'r.  146,  147.     A  defendant  in  contempt,  on  the  allowance  of  exceptions,  he 

may,  on  moiion,  obtain  further  time  to  answer.  cannot  apply  for  further  time.      Wheat  v.  Gra- 

Carroll  v.  Parsons,  1   Bland,  125.     After  a  de-  ham,  5  Sim.  570. 
muiTir  overruled,  an  order  for  further  time  to  6  Cons.  Ord.  XVI.  15. 

answer  merely,  can  be  obtained  only  by  a  spe-  6  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.  5 

cial  application.     Trim  v.  Barker,  f.  &  R.  253.  *  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  13. 

After  a  plea  overruled,  an  order  for  further  time  8  Cons.  Ord.  X.  3;  XI.  5;  XXXVII.  5. 

to  answer,  obtained  as  of  course,  is  irregular.  9  Ibid. ;  Braithwaite's  Manual,  156. 

Ferrand  v.  Pelham,  T.  &  R.  404.     A  notice  of  an  i  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.  7;  Cheeseborough  v. 

application  for  time  to  answer,  and  an  affidavit  Wright,  28  Beav.  173;  Braithwaite's  Manual, 

tiled  in  support  of  it,  according  to  the   Irish  156;  see  post,  p.  777,  n. 
practice,  prevent  all  further  proceedings  by  the 

735 


741 


ANSWERS. 


Where  an  attachment  for  want  of  answer  has  been  executed  against  a 
defendant,  but  he  has  been  discharged  from  prison  or  from  the  custody 
of  the  Sergeant-at-Arms,  or  messenger,  because  he  was  not  brought  up  to 
the  bar  of  the  Court  within  the  proper  time,2  he  must  put  in  his  answer 
within  eight  days  after  such  discharge  ;  and  if  he  does  not  do  so,  a  new 
attachment  for  want  of  answer  may  be  issued  against  him.8 

After  a  traversing  note  has  been  filed  and  served,  a  defendant  cannot 
put  in  his  answer  without  special  leave  of  the  Court.4  In  such  a  case, 
the  defendant  should  move  to  take  the  traversing  note  off  the  file,  with 
leave  to  put  in  an  answer.5 

A  married  woman  answering  separately,  under  an  order,  has  the  full 
time  from  the  date  of  the  order  to  do  so.6 

The  day  on  which  an  order  that  the  plaintiff  do  give  security  for  costs 
is  served,  and  the  time  thenceforward,  until  and  including  the  day  on 
which  such  security  is  given,  are  not  reckoned  in  the  computation  of 
time  allowed  a  defendant  to  plead,  answer,  or  demur,  or  otherwise  make 
his  defence  to  the  suit.7 

If  a  defendant,  using  due  diligence,  is  unable  to  put  in  his  answer  to 
a  bill  within  the  time  allowed,  the  Judge,  on  sufficient  cause  being 
shown,  may,  as  often  as  he  shall  deem  right,  allow  to  such  defendant 
such  further  time,  and  on  such,  if  any,  terms  as  to  the  Judge  shall 
seem  just.8  (a) 

Applications  for  further  time  to  answer  are  made  by  summons 
*  741    at  *  Chambers ; 1   and  should  be  supported  by  affidavit,  that  due 
diligence  has  been  used,  and  that  further  time  is  necessary.2 


2  See  ante,  pp.  490,  494. 
8  Cons.  Ord.  XII.  2,  3. 

4  Cons.  Ord.  XIII.  7;  ante,  p.  515. 

5  Towne  v.  Bonnin,  1  De  G.  &  S.  128;  ante, 
p.  516.  For  form  of  notice  of  motion,  see 
Vol.  III. 

6  Ante,  p.  183;  Braithwaite's  Manual,  11, 
12;  Jackson  ».  Haworth,  1  S.  &  S.  161. 

7  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.  14. 

8  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.  8;  15  &  16  Vic.  c. 
86,  §  13.  Time  may  be  given,  where  the  de- 
fendant is  interrogated  as  to  a  document  in  the 
plaintiff's  possession,  until  a  limited  time  after 
the  document  is  produced.  Princess  of  Wales  v. 
Lord  Liverpool.  1  Swanst.  114,  123,  580;  Jones 
v.  Lewis,  2  S.  &  S.  242;  Taylor  v.  Heming,  4 
Beav.  235.  So,  time  will  be  granted  for  an- 
swering a  cross-bill  until  the  defendant  in  the 
original  bill  has  complied  with  an  order  for  the 
production  of  documents.  Holmes  v.  Baddeley, 
7  Beav.  69.  So,  in  a  cross-suit,  the  defendant 
may,  on  motion  of  course,  obtain  an  order  en- 
larging the  time  to  answer  for  a  limited  period 
after  the  defendant  to  the  original  suit  has 
put  in  his  answer.  Harris  v.  Harris.  T.  & 
R  165;  Noel  v.  King,  3  Mad.  183:  WMterton  v. 
Croft,  5  Sim.  502.     A  defendant  has  the  whole 


(a)  In  such  case,  cause  must  be  shown  for 
the  delay  in  answering,  if  excessive.  Central 
Trust  Co.  v.  Texas  &  St.  Louis  Ry.  Co.  23  Fed. 

736 


of  the  last  day  specified  in  the  order  to  answer, 
in  which  to  serve  his  answer.  Hoxie  v.  Scott, 
Clarke,  457.  And  after  the  time  of  answering 
has  expired,  the  defendant  may  serve  an  an- 
swer at  any  time  before  an  order  to  take  the  bill 
as  confessed  is  actually  entered  with  the  clerk. 
Ibid.  But  the  Court  may,  in  its  discretion,  re- 
ceive or  reject  an  answer  tiled  after  the  regular 
time  for  answering  has  passed,  and  the  motion 
for  leave  to  file  it  and  the  decision  should 
appear  in  the  record.  Lindsey  v.  Stevens,  5 
Dana,  185;  see  Scales  v.  Nichols,  3  Hayw.  230; 
Fisher  v.  Fisher,  4  Hen.  &  M.  484;  Daly  v. 
Duggan.  1  Ir.  Eq.  315;  Vassarr.  Hill,  1  Hayes, 
355  ;  see  Kehoe  v.  Carville  (Iowa),  51  N.  W. 
Rep.  166. 

After  pro  confesso  taken,  leave  to  file  an 
answer  will  only  be  granted  upon  good  cause 
shown.  Anonymous,  1  Tenn.  Ch.  2.  And  a 
sufficient  answer.  Emery  v.  Downing,  13  N.J. 
Eq.  59;  Lewis  v.  Simonton,  8  Humph.  185. 

i  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  8\  §  26.  Under  some 
special  circumstances  the  application  should  be 
made  to  the  Court.  Manchester  and  Sheffield 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Worksop  Board  of  Health,  2  K.  & 
J.  25.     For  forms  of  summons,  see  Vol.  III. 

2  Brown  v.  Lee,  11  Beav.  162  ;  12  Jur.  687; 

R^p.  846  ;  24  id.  151;  Mayes  v.  Hendry,  33  Ark. 
240. 


SWEARING,    FILING,    AND    PRINTING    ANSWERS.  *  742 

If  the  defendant  has  not  been  interrogated,  he  or  his  solicitor  must 
also  swear  that  he  is  advised  aiid  believes  that  it  is  necessary,  for  the 
purposes  of  his  defence,  that  he  should  put  in  an  answer,  and  that  the 
application  is  not  made  for  the  purpose  of  delay.8 

The  summons  must  be  served  on  the  solicitor  for  the  plaintiff  two  days 
before  the  return  thereof,  exclusive  of  Sunday,4  unless  a  shorter  return 
be  granted,  by  special  leave,  on  issuing  the  summons;  and  a  printed  copy 
of  the  bill,  and  the  interrogatories,  if  any,  to  be  answered,  must  be  pro- 
duced at  the  hearing  of  the  application.5  An  affidavit  in  opposition  to 
the  application  may  be  filed,  and  either  party  may  use  any  affidavit  pre- 
viously filed.  Notice  of  the  intention  to  use  an  affidavit  must,  however, 
be  given.6  If  the  plaintiff's  solicitor  is  not  in  attendance  when  the 
summons  is  called  on,  an  order  may  be  made  in  his  absence,  on  a  case 
for  further  time  being  shown,  and  subject  to  the  production  of  the  office 
copy  of  an  affidavit  of  service  on  him  of  the  summons.7  This  affidavit 
should,  in  strictness,  be  produced  to  the  Chief  or  Junior  Clerk,  before 
the  Chambers  close  on  the  day  the  application  is  heard. 

The  order  on  the  summons  is  drawn  up  in  Chambers,  and  must  be 
entered  at  the  entering  seat  in  the  Registrar's  Office.8 

The  written  consent  of  the  plaintiff's  solicitor  to  further  time  being 
given  will  be  acted  on  at  Chambers,  without  his  attendance;  but  care 
should  be  taken,  in  drawing  up  an  order  thereon,  that  the  terms  of  the 
consent  are  strictly  pursued ;  thus,  a  consent  to  further  time  "  to  an- 
swer "  will  not  justify  an  order  being  drawn  up  for  time  "  to  plead,  an- 
swer, or  demur."  9 

The  Judge  is  expressly  empowered  to  impose  terms  on  an  application 
for  further  time  : 10  and,  as  a  general  rule,  the  costs  of  the  first  applica- 
tion will  be  made  costs  in  the  cause,  but  those  of  subsequent  applications 
will  be  ordered  to  be  paid  by  the  defendant.  It  may  also  be  here 
observed,  that  if  any  person  who  has  obtained  *  any  decree  or  *  7-42 
order  upon  condition,  does  not  perform  or  comply  with  such  con- 
dition, he  will  be  considered  to  have  waived  or  abandoned  such  order, 
so  far  as  the  same  is  beneficial  to  himself ;  and  any  other  person  inter- 
ested in  the  matter  may,  on  breach  or  non-performance  of  the  condition, 
take  either  such  proceedings  as  the  order  may  in  such  case  warrant,  or 
such  proceedings  as  might  have  been  taken  if  no  such  order  had  been 
made,  unless  the  Court  otherwise  directs.1  Under  the  old  practice, 
when  a  defendant  obtained  further  time,  or  permission  for  any  other 
thing  upon  a  condition,  if  he  neglected  to  perforin  the  condition,  he  lost 

in  practice,   however,  further  time   is  usually  8  Cons.  Ord.  XXXV.  32:  Ord.  I.  18.     No 

granted,    on   the   first  application,  without  an  service  of  an  order  for  time  is  now  necessary, 

affidavit.     For  form  of  affidavit, see  Vol.  III.  2  Smith's  Pr.  181. 

3  For  form  of  affidavit,  see  Vol.  III.  9  Ante,  p.  690;  Newman  v.  White,  10  Beav. 

*  Cons.  Ord.  XXXV.  7;  XXXVII.  11.     The  4;  nnd  see  Hunter  v.  Nockolds,  2  Phil.  540;  6 

summons  must  be  served  before  two  o'clock  on  Hare,  12;  12  Jur.  149. 

a  Saturday,  and  before  seven  o'clock  on  any  ln  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.  8     See  on  this  point, 

other  day.     Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.  2.  Zulueta  v.  Vinenr,  15  Beav.  575;  see  also,  Lee 

5  Regulations,  8  Aug.  1857,  r.  2.  v.  Read,  5  Beav.  381,  386:  6  Jur.  1026;  23  Ord. 

6  Cons.  Ord.  XXXV.  27.  For  form  of  Dec.  1833;  Sand.  Ord.  781 ;  Beav.  Ord.  51  ; 
notice,  see  Vol.  III.  Cons.  Ord.  XXXV.  61. 

1  For  form  of  affidavit,  see  Vol.  III.  i  Cons.  Ord.  XXIII.  22. 

vol.  l.  — 47  737 


*  743  ANSWERS. 

all  benefit  of  the  permission ;  but  the  Court  could  not  compulsorily 
direct  the  performance  of  the  condition.2 

Where  the  application  for  further  time  came  on  in  open  Court,  and 
counsel  certified  that  he  required  further  time,  it  was  given.8  The 
necessity  of  the  defendant  being  enabled  to  state  his  own  defence,  as 
well  as  give  the  discovery  required  by  the  plaintiff,  will  be  taken  into 
consideration.4 

The  summons  for  further  time  to  put  in  the  answer  should  be  made 
returnable  before  the  expiration  of  the  time  which  the  defendant  already 
has  for  that  purpose : 5  for,  if  returnable  after  such  time,  an  attachment 
may  be  issued,  even  though  the  summons  has  been  served.6  An  attach- 
ment, however,  which  has  been  issued  after  the  hearing  of  an  application 
for  further  time,  and  pending  the  decision  upon  it,  is  irregular,  and  will 
be  discharged.7 

The  defendant  cannot,  in  strictness,  apply  for  further  time  after  an 
attachment  has  actually  been  issued  against  him,  for  he  is  then  in  con- 
tempt ; 8  but  where  an  application  in  such  case  is  entertained,  and  an 
extension  of  time  is  granted,  it  should  appear  by  the  order  that  it  is 
made  "  without  prejudice  to  the  attachment  issued  against  the  said  de- 
fendant for  want  of  answer." 

If  the  Court  grants  any  further  time  to  any  defendant  for  pleading, 
answering,  or  demurring  to  the  bill,  the  plaintiff's  right  to  move  for  a 
decree  is,  in  the  mean  time,  suspended.9 

The  answer  having  been  drawn,  or  perused  and  settled  by  counsel, 

must   be   written   bookwise,10  or    printed,11  on  paper  of   the  same  size 

and    description   as    that    on  which    bills    are    printed.12      Any 

*  743    *  schedules  or  documents  annexed  to  the  answer  must  be  written 

on  paper  of  the  same  kind  as  the  answer  itself.1  Dates  and 
sums  occurring  in  the  answer  should  be  expressed  by  figures,  instead  of 
words.2 

The  Clerk  of  Eecords  and  Writs  may  refuse  to  file  an  answer  in  which 
there  is  any  knife  erasure,  or  which  is  blotted  so  as  to  obliterate  any 
word,  or  which  is  improperly  written,  or  so  altered  as  to  cause  any 
material  disfigurement ;  or  in  which  there  is  any  interlineation  :  unless 
the  person  before  whom  the  answer  is  sworn  duly  authenticates  such 
interlineation  with  his  initials,  in  such  manner  as  to  show  that  it  was 

2  Henley  v.  Stone,  4  Beav.  392,  394;  Judd  v.  10  Ord.  6  March,  1860,  r.  1. 

Wartnabv,  -2  M.  &  K.  813,  816.  n  Ibid.  r.  5;  as  to  printing  answers,  see  post, 

3  Byn'g  v.  Clark,  13  Beav.  92.  pp.  755,  756. 

4  York  and  North  Midland  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hud-  18  As  to  such  paper,  see  Cons.  Ord.  IX.  3, 
son.  13  Beav.  69.  ante,  p.  361;  but  an  answer  not  so  written  has 

5  See  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.  18.  been    allowed    to   be   filed   under  special   cir- 

6  Braithwaite's  Pr.  56.  cumstances;  the  application  in  such  case  must 
1  Davis  v.  Tollemache,  2  Jur.  N.  S.  564,  V.      always    be    made    to    the   Court.     Harvey  v. 

C.  S.;  see  also  Taylor  v.  Fisher,  6  Sim.  566;  Bradley,  10  W.  R.  705,  M.  R. ;  Whale  v. 
Barritt  v.  Barritt,  3  Swanst.  395,  397.  Griffiths,  id.    571,    L.   JJ.;  Morris  v.   Honey- 

8  Wheat  v.  Graham,  5  Sim.  570,  decided  on      combe,  2  N.  R.  16,  V.  C.  W. 

the  8th  Ord.  of  3  April,  1828;  Sand.  Ord.  714;  >  Whale  v.  Griffiths,  ubi  supra;  under  special 

Beav.  Ord.  7.  circumstances,   schedules   not  so  written  were 

9  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  13 ;  seepost,  Chap.  XX.      allowed  to  be  filed  :  S.  C 

Motion  for  Decree.  2  Ord.  6  March,  1860  r.  3;  Cons.  Ord.  IX.  3. 

738 


SWEARING,    FILING,    AND    PRINTING    ANSWERS.  *  744 

made  before  the  answer  was  sworn,  and  so  to  mark  the  extent  of  such 
interlineation.3  Where  the  answer  is  sworn  before  one  of  the  Clerks  of 
Records  and  Writs,  and  is  thereupon  left  in  his  custody,  he  does  not 
usually  authenticate  the  interlineations  ;  4  and  where,  in  the  case  of  a 
joint  answer,  it  is  intended  to  have  it  sworn  by  some  of  the  defendants 
at  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerks'  Office,  and  by  others  elsewhere,  it  is  the 
practice  to  have  it  sworn  by  such  other  defendants  first :  if  this  is  not 
done,  and  the  answer  is  taken  away  from  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerks' 
Office  before  it  is  filed,  it  must  be  resworn  by  the  defendants  who  were 
sworn  to  it  at  that  office.5 

If,  after  the  answer  has  been  sworn,  there  is  discovered  any  defect 
in  the  formal  parts,  such  as  the  title  or  jurat,  or  any  unauthenticated 
alteration  or  interlineation,  the  answer  must  be  resworn,  unless  the 
plaintiff  will  consent  that  the  answer  be  filed  notwithstanding  such 
defect.6  The  consent  may  be  indorsed  by  the  plaintiff  or  his  solicitor 
on  the  answer  itself ;  or  an  order  of  course  may,  with  his  consent,  be 
obtained  at  the  Rolls,  on  a  petition  of  course  allowing  the  answer  to 
be  filed  ;  but  the  defect  must  be  specified  in  the  consent  or  order.7 
The  giving  such  consent  will  not  waive  the  right  to  except  to  the  answer 
for  scandal  or  insufficiency;  but  as  it  might  affect  an  indictment  for 
perjury,  the  plaintiff's  solicitor  should,  as  a  general  rule,  see  the  answer 
before  the  consent  is  given.8 

The  answer  must,  as  has  been  before  stated,9  unless  an  order  has 
been  obtained  to  file  it  without  oath,  or  without  oath  or  signature,  be 
signed  and  sworn  by  the  defendant.10  Under  the  old  practice, 
*  it  was  necessary,  where  the  answer  was  upon  oath,  and  was  in-  *  744 
tended  to  be  sworn  beyond  twenty  miles  from  London,  that  a 
commission  should  issue  for  the  purpose  of  taking  it.  Noav,  however, 
the  practice  of  issuing  commissions  to  take  pleas,  answers,  and  disclaim- 
ers, in  causes  pending  in  the  Court,  has  been  abolished  with  respect  to 
pleas,  answers,  and  disclaimers  taken  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
Court ;  and  any  such  plea,  answer,  or  disclaimer  may  be  filed  without 
any  further  or  other  formality  than  is  required  in  the  swearing  and  filing 
of  an  affidavit.1  (a) 

Where  the  answer  is  sworn  within  the  jurisdiction,  it  must,  if  taken 
in  London,  or  within  ten  miles  of  Lincoln's  Inn  Hall,  be  sworn  before  a 
Clerk  of  Records  and  Writs,2  the  Clerk  of  Enrolments  in  Chancery,2  or 

3  Cons.  Ord.  I.  36;  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  8G,  §  25.  o  Ante,  p.  734. 

*  Braithwaite's  Pr.  52.  i«  Ante,  pp.  734,  735,  and  notes.     For  New 

5  Ibid.;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Hudson,  9  Hare  App.  Hampshire,  see  38  N.  H.  611,  Ch.  Ride  30. 
63;  17  Jur.  205.  See  Equity  Rule  59  of  the  U.  S.  Courts,  post, 

6  See    Sittington    v.  Brown,   7  Leigh,  271;  p.  2389. 

ante,  p.  734,  n.  1  15  &  16  Vice.  86.  §  21.     The  form  of  oath 

7  Braithwaite's  Pr.  48;  but  see  Pilkington  v.  to  be  administered  to  the  defendant  is  not 
Himsworth,  1  Y  &  C.  Ex.  612.  For  forms  of  altered  by  this  enactment.  Att.-Gen.  v.  Hud- 
consent  and  petition,  see  Vol.  III.  son,  9  Hare  App.  63;  17  Jur.  205. 

8  Braithwaite's  Pr.  48.  2  Cons.  Ord.  I.  39. 


(a)  By  52  &  53  Vic.  c.  10,  the  enactments      oaths  being  appointed  by  the  Lord  Chancellor, 
relating    to   the   administration    of  oaths    are      See  al.-o  54  &  55  Vic.  c.  50. 
amended   and  consolidated,  commissioners  of 

739 


*  745  ANSWERS. 

a  London  Commissioner  to  administer  oaths  in  Chancery ; 8  and,  if 
taken  in  any  place  in  England  or  Wales,  ten  miles  or  more  from  Lin- 
coln's Inn  Hall,  before  a  Commissioner  to  administer  oaths  in  Chancery 
in  England.4  The  Commissioners  to  administer  oaths  in  Chancery  in 
London  and  England  are  appointed  by  the  Lord  Chancellor,  and  are,  in 
practice,  solicitors  of  ten  years'  standing.5  The  London  Commissioners 
have  power  to  administer  oaths  at  any  place  within  ten  miles  of  Lin- 
coln's Inn  Hall,6  and  the  Country  Commissioners  at  all  other  places  in 
England  and  Wales.7 

Where  the  answer  is  taken  in  Scotland,  Ireland,  the  Channel  Islands, 
the  Isle  of  Man,8  or  in  any  place  in  foreign  parts  under  the  dominion  of 
her  Majesty,9  it  may  be  sworn  before  any  Judge,  Court,  notary  public, 
or  person  legally  authorized  to  administer  oaths  in  such  country  or  place 
respectively;  and  the  Court  of  Chancery  will  take  judicial  notice  of  the 
seal  or  signature  of  such  Judge,  Court,  notary  public,  or  person  attached 
or  subscribed  to  the  answer.10     In  the  case  of  an  answer  taken 

*  745    in  the  Channel  *  Islands,  or  the  Isle  of  Man,1  or  in  Scotland  or 

Ireland,2  it  may  also  be  sworn  before  Commissioners  appointed 
by  the  Lord  Chancellor  to  act  in  such  places,  respectively. 

Where  the  answer  is  taken  in  any  place  out  of  the  dominions  of  her 
Majesty,  it  may  be  sworn  before  any  British  ambassador,  envoy,  minis- 
ter, charge  d'affaires,  or  secretary  of  legation  or  of  embassy,  exercising 
his  functions  in  any  foreign  country,  or  before  any  British  consul-general, 
or  consul,  vice-consul,8  acting  consul,  pro-consul,  or  consular  agent  ex- 
ercising his  functions  in  any  foreign  place,4  whose  seal  or  signature, 
affixed,  impressed,  or  subscribed  on  or  to  the  answer,  is  admissible  in 
evidence,  without  proof  of  such  seal  or  signature  being  the  seal  or  signa- 
ture of  the  person  whose  seal  or  signature  it  purports  to  be,  or  of  the 
official  character  of  such  person.6 

An  answer  may  also  be  sworn  abroad  before  Commissioners  specially 
appointed  for  that   purpose,  according  to  the  former   practice  of  the 
Court,  as  hereafter  explained.6 
.  If  the  defendant  is  an  invalid,  and  resident  at  any  place  within  ten 

3  10  &  17  Vic.  c.  78,  §  2;  see  Reg.  v.  Lord  7  16  &  17  Vic.  c.  78,  §§  1,  5;  Cons.  Ord.  IV. 
Truro,  56  L.  J.  Q.  B.  657.  8  See  16  &  17  Vic.  c.  78,  §  6. 

4  Id.  §  1:  Cons.  Ord.  IV.  The  following  9  For  a  list  of  these  places,  see  Braithwaite's 
fees  are  parable  to  the  person  taking  an  answer :  Oaths,  18-20;  and  post,  Vol.  III. 

before  an  officer  of  the  Court,  1*.  6^.,  payable  in  10  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86.  §  22.     This  section  is 

stamps,    but   nothing   for  marking    exhibits;  retrospective ;  Bateman  v.  Cook,  3  De  G.  M.  & 

before  a  London  commissioner.  1*.  6r7.,  and  Is.  G.  39;  and  see  Haggett  v.  Iniff,  5  De  G.  M.  & 

for  marking  each  exhibit;  and  before  a  country  G.  910;  1  Jur.  N.  S.  49;  Cooke  ».  Wilby,  25 

commissioner,  2s.  fid.,  and  1.?.  for  each  exhibit ;  Ch.  D.  769. 

16  &  17  Vic.  c.  78,  §  2;  Regul.  to  Ord.  Sched.  1  16  &  17  Vic.  c.  78,  §§  3,  6. 

2,  4.  2  6  &  7  Vic.  c.  82,  §  1. 

6  16  &  17  Vic.  c  78.     See  Ward  v.  Gamgee,  8  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  22. 

65  L.  T.  610  ;  7  T.  L.  R.   752;    Shrapnel    r.  4  6  Geo.  IV.  c.  87,  §  20;  18  &  19  Vic.  c.  42, 

Gamgee,  8  id.  9.     For  the  course  of  procedure  §  1.     These   Acts   do    not   mention    answers, 

to  obtain  such  appointment,  see  Braithwaite's  but  there  can.  it  is  conceived,  be  no  doubt  that 

Oaths,  4-11.  they  apply  to  them. 

6  16  &  17  Vic.  c.  78.  §  2:  Re  Record  and  5  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  22;  18  &  19  Vic.  c. 

Writ  Clerks.  3  De  G.  M.  &  G.  723;  18  Jur.  499;  42.  §  3. 

Hill  v.  Tollit.  3  De  G.  M.  &  G.  725,  n.  «  See  post,  pp.  747-752. 

740 


SWEARING,    FILING,   AND    PRINTING   ANSWERS.  *  746 

miles  from  Lincoln's  Inn  Hall,  one  of  the  Clerks  of  Eecords  and  Writs 
will,  upon  a  memorandum  in  writing  bespeaking  his  attendance  being 
left  with  him,  and  upon  his  necessary  expenses  being  paid,  attend  upon 
such  defendant,  for  the  purpose  of  taking  his  answer.7  It  is,  however, 
now  more  usual  to  procure  the  attendance  of  a  London  commissioner.8 

In  order  to  relieve  persons  in  prison  from  the  expense  of  procuring 
the  attendance  of  a  commissioner  to  take  their  answer  or  affidavit,  the 
Lord  Chancellor  may  appoint  the  Warden,  Keeper,  or  other  chief  officer 
of  every  prison  within  the  city  of  London  or  the  bills  of  mortality,  and 
their  deputies,  to  be  commissioners,  for  the  purpose  of  takiug  and 
receiving  such  affidavits  and  answers  as. any  person  or  persons,  within 
any  such  prison,  shall  be  willing  and  desirous  to  make,  and  for  no  other 
purpose.9 

The  jurat  to  an  answer  should  be  written,  either  at  the  end  of  the 
answer  or  of  the  schedule  thereto  ; 10  it  is  usually  placed  at  the  right- 
hand  corner  of  the  end  of  the  answer.11  It  may  be  written 
*  on  either  side  of  the  page,  or  on  the  margin ;  but  not  on  a  page  *  746 
upon  which  no  part  of  the  statements  in  the  answer  appears.  If 
there  are  many  defendants  who  are  sworn  together,  one  jurat  is  suffi- 
cient. If  the  defendants  are  sworn  at  different  times,  there  must  be 
separate  jurats  for  each  defendant,  or  each  set  of  defendants  swearing. 
The  jurat  must  correctly  express  the  time  when,  and  the  place  where, 
the  answer  is  sworn.1  The  defendant  must  sign  his  name,  or  put  his 
mark,  at  the  side  of  the  jurat  —  not  underneath  it;2  and  the  person 
before  whom  the  answer  is  sworn  must  sign  his  name  at  the  foot  thereof; 
to  which  must  be  added  his  full  official  character  and  description 3  —  not, 
necessarily,  however,  in  his  own  handwriting.  Any  schedule  should  be 
signed,  both  by  the  defendant  and  the  person  before  whom  the  answer 
is  sworn  3  The  oath  must  be  administered  in  a  reverent  manner,4  and, 
if  not  administered  in  the  usual  form,  the  authority  for  the  form  in 
which  it  is  administered  should  appear  in  the  jurat.5 

The  answer  of  a  person  entitled  to  the  privilege  of  peerage  is  taken 

7  Braithwaite's  Pr.  514.  The  memorandum  2  Anderson  v.  Stather,  9  Jur.  1085.  When 
must  bear  a  10s.  fee  fund  stamp ;  Regul.  to  Ord.  the  verification  of  an  answer  is  in  the  form  of 
Sched.  4.  Reasonable  payment  for  travelling  an  affidavit,  the  name  of  the  respondent  must  be 
expenses  will  be  allowed;  Braithwaite's  Oaths,  subscribed  at  the  foot  of  the  affidavit;  when 
27.     For  form  of  memorandum,  see  Vol.  III.  in  the  form  of  a  certificate  of  the  officer  who 

8  If  a  commissioner  attends  elsewhere  than  administered  the  oath,  the  name  of  the  re- 
at  his  own  office  to  administer  an  oath,  he  is  spondent  should  be  subscribed  to  the  answer, 
entitled  to  reasonable  payment  for  his  travel-  Pincers  v.  Robertson,  24  N.  J.  Eq.  348;  Hath- 
ling  expenses;  but  there  is  no  fixed  fee  for  his  away  v.  Scott,  11  Paige,  173. 

attendance.     Braithwaite's  Pr.  34'J.  3  Braithwaite's  Pr.  342.     This  has  been  held 

9  1  Will.  IV.  c.  36,  §  15,  r.  20;  16  &  17  Vic.  to  be  unnecessary,  where  the  answer  is  sworn 
c.  78,  §§  1,  5;  and  see  23  &  24  Vic.  c.  14!),  §  3;  before  the  Clerk  cf  Enrolments;  Wilton  ».  Clif- 
25  &  26  Vic.  c.  104;  and  ante,  pp.  501,  502.  ton,  2  Hare,  535;  7  Jur.  215;  and  is  omitted  by 

10  Braithwaite's  Pr.  342,  n.  (a).  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerks,    where   answers 

11  See  Wlielpley  v.  Van  Epps,  9  Paige,  332.  are  sworn  before  them. 

i  Ibid. ;  18  &  19  Vic.  c.  134,  §  15;  Ord.  IV.  *  Cons.  Ord.  XIX.  14. 

The  jurat  to  a  bill  is  not  rendered  defective  by  5  1  &  2  Vic.  c.  105;  see  Braithwaite's  Oaths 

the  absence  of  a  statement  of  the  county  where      in  Chan.  25;  and  forms,  post,  Vol.  III. 
the  bill  was  sworn  to.     Barnard  ?•.  Darling,  1 
Barb.  Ch.  218;  see  Smith,  Ch.  Pr.  (3d  ed.)  352. 

741 


*  747  ANSWERS. 

upon  his  protestation  of  honor;6  that  of  a  corporation  aggregate,  under 
their  common  seal ; 7  that  of  a  quaker,  Moravian,  ex-Quaker,  ex-Mora- 
vian, or  Separatist,  upon  his  solemn  affirmation.8 

If  the  defendant  be  blind  or  a  marksman,  the  answer  must  be  first 
truly,  distinctly,  and  audibly  read  over  to  him,  either  by  the  person 
before  whom  it  was  sworn  or  some  other  person  :  in  the  first  case,  it 
must  be  expressed  in  the  jurat  that  the  answer  was  so  read  over,  and 
that  the  signature  or  mark  of  the  defendant  was  affixed  in  the  presence 
of  the  person  taking  the  answer  ;  in  the  second  case,  such  other  person 
must  attest  the  signature  or  mark,  and  must  be  first  sworn  that  he  has 
so  read  over  the  answer,  and  that  the  signature  or  mark  was  made  in 
his  presence;  and  this  must  be  expressed  in  the  jurat.9 

In  the  case  of  a  foreigner,  not  sufficiently  versed  in  the  English  lan- 
guage to  answer  in  that  tongue,  and  desiring  to  answer  in  a  foreign  lan- 
guage, an  order  of  course  to  do  so  must  be  obtained,  on  motion, 

*  747    or  on  petition  at  the  Rolls.     The  answer  must  be  *  engrossed  on 

paper,  in  the  foreign  language  ;  and  the  defendant,  together  with 
an  interpreter,  must  then  attend  before  a  person  authorized  to  adminis- 
ter oaths  in  Chancery ;  the  interpreter  is  first  sworn  in  English  that  he 
well  understands  the  foreign  language  and  that  he  will  truly  interpret 
the  oath  about  to  be  administered  to  the  defendant ;  and  the  ordinary 
oath  is  next  administered  to  the  latter.1  The  defendant  must  previously 
sign  his  name  opposite  the  jurat ;  and  the  interpreter  should  do  the  same. 
Before  the  answer  can  be  filed,  it  is  necessary  to  obtain  an  order  of 
course,  either  on  motion,  or  on  petition  at  the  Rolls,2  appointing  the  in- 
terpreter or  another  person  to  make,  and  swear  to  the  truth  of,  a  transla- 
tion thereof,  and  directing  the  answer  to  be  filed,  with  such  translation 
annexed.3  The  translator  must  then  attend  with  the  answer,  translation, 
and  order  before  a  person  authorized  to  administer  oaths  in  Chancery, 
and  be  sworn  to  the  truth  of  the  translation  : 4  after  which,  the  answer 
and  translation  will  be  filed  at  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerks'  Office,  on 
production  of  the  order.5 

A  foreigner  may  also  answer  in  English,  although  ignorant  of  that 
language.6  No  order  to  do  so  is  necessary;  but  where  the  defendant  is 
not  sufficiently  versed  in  English  to  understand  the  language  of  the 
answer,  and  of  the  oath,  the  answer  must  be  interpreted  to  him  by  some 
person  skilled  in  a  language  understood  by  both ;  after  which,  both  must 
attend  before  a  person  authorized  to  administer  an  oath  in  Chancery. 
The  interpreter  must  first  be  sworn  that  he  well  understands  the  foreign 
language  ;    that   he  has  truly,  distinctly,  and  audibly  interpreted  the 

6  Cons.  Ord.  XV.  6;  ante,  pp.  734,  735 ;  see  Wilton  r.  Clifton.  2  Hare,  535;  7  Jur.  214.     For 

form.  Vol.  IH.  forms,  see  Vol.  III. 

"  Cor.s.  Ord.  XV.  0  ;  ante,  p.  735  and  note.  1  For  forms  of  oath  and  jurat,  see  Vol.  III. 

8  Cons.  Ord.  XV.  6  ;  and  statutes  cited  ante,  2  For  forms  of  motion  paper  and  petition, 
pp.  734,  735.    As  to  the  answer  of  the  Secretary  see  Vol.  III. 

of  State  for  India,  or  of  the  Attorney-General,  3  Simmonds  v.  Du  Barn?,  3  Bro.  C.  C.  263  ; 

see  ante,  p.  735.     For  forms,  see  Vol.  III.  Lord  Belmore  v.  Anderson,  4  Bro.  C.  C.  90. 

9  The  attestation  may  be  written  near  the  4  For  form  of  jurat,  see  Vol.  III. 
jurat.     Braithwaite's    Pr.    380,    396;   and   see  5  Braithwaite's  Pr.  45. 


6  Hayes  r.  Leguin,  1  Hogan,  274. 


742 


SWEARING,    FILING,   AND    PRINTING    ANSWERS.  *  748 

contents  of  the  answer  to  the  defendant ;  and  that  he  will  truly  inter- 
pret the  oath  about  to  be  administered  to  him ;  after  which,  the  ordinary 
oath  is  administered  to  the  defendant,  through  the  interpreter.7  The 
defendant  must,  and  the  interpreter  should,  first  sign  the  answer,  oppo- 
site the  jurat.8 

In  all  the  above  cases,  the  jurat  must  express  that  the  necessary  for- 
malities have  been  observed.9 

Formalities  of  a  similar  nature,  by  which  it  may  appear  that  the  de- 
fendant fully  understands  the  contents  of  his  answer  before  he  is  sworn 
to  it,  must  be  adopted  where  the  defendant  is  deaf,  or  deaf  and  dumb, 
and  in  every  like  case.10 

*  It  is  a  universal  principle,  in  all  Courts,  that  any  irregularity  *  748 
m  a  jurat  may,  unless  expressly  waived,  be  objected  to  in  any 
stage  of  a  cause.  This  does  not  depend  upon  any  objection  which  the 
parties  in  a  particular  cause  may  waive,  but  upon  the  general  rule  that 
the  document  itself  shall  not  be  brought  forward  at  all,  if  in  any  respect 
objectionable  with  reference  to  the  rules  of  the  Court ; *  and  therefore  a 
motion  to  take  an  answer  off  the  file,  on  the  ground  of  such  an  irregu- 
larity, was  allowed,  notwithstanding  the  plaintiff  had  taken  an  office 
copy  of  the  answer.2  If,  by  any  accident,  the  jurat  is  cancelled,  the 
answer  must  be  resworn,  and  a  new  jurat  added.3 

As  we  have  seen,  the  practice  of  issuing  commissions  for  the  purpose 
of  taking  answers  is  now  abolished,  in  all  cases  where  the  answer  is  to 
be  sworn  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court ;  4  and  the  various  enact- 
ments, under  which  answers  may  be  sworn  out  of  the  jurisdiction,  have 
been  considered  ;  5  but,  if  no  person  can  be  found  who  is  authorized, 
under  such  enactments,  to  administer  the  oath,  a  commission  under  the 
old  practice  is  still  necessary  ; 6  and  consequently,  the  mode  of  proceed- 
ing in  such  case  must  be  stated. 

7  St.  Katherine  Dock  Co.  v.  Mantzgu,  1  is  defective,  as  where  the  prothonotary  failed 
Coll.  94;  8  Jur.  237  ;  Braithwaite's  Pr.  45,  389.  to  state  that  he  was  Clerk  of  the  Court  in  which 
For  forms  of  oaths,  see  Vol.  III.  the  justice  presided,  the  answer  will  only  stand 

8  For  forms  of  jurats,  see  Vol.  III.  as  unsworn.     Chester  v.  Canfield,  1  Tenn.  Leg. 

9  Ibid.  Rep.  258.     But  it   is   sufficient   if   the  official 
10  Reynolds    v.    Jones,    Trin.   Term,    1818;      character  of   the  notary,  who  administers   the 

Braithwaite's  Pr.  383,  395;   see  Vol.  III.,  for  oath,  is  stated  in  the  body  of  the  jurat,  without 

forms   of  jurats.     In  a  case,  however,    which  being  annexed  to  the  signature.     Feuchtwanger 

occurred  iu  the  18th  Geo.  II.  (1745),  a  different  v.  McCool,  29  N.  J.  Eq.  151. 
course  appears  to  have  been  adopted  ;  for  there  2  Ibid.,  and  see  ante,  p.  743. 

the  Court,  on  motion  (the  defendant  being  deaf,  a  Att.-Gen.  v.  Hudson,  9  Hare  App.  63  ;  S. 

and  incapable  of  giving  instructions  for  his  an-  C.  nom.  Att.-Gen.  v.  Henderson,   17  Jur.  205; 

swer),  ordered   a  commission   for  taking   the  and  see  Att.-Gen.  v.  Donnington  Hospital,  17 

answer   to  issue  in  the  old  way  with  the  bill  Jur.  206,  V.  C.  W. 

annexed,  in  order  that  the  commissioners  them-  4  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  21;  ante,  p.  744 

selves    might    endeavor  to   take   the   answer.  5  Ante,  pp.  744,  745  ;  and  see  6  Geo.  IV.  c. 

Gregory  v.  Weaver,  2  Mad.  Prac.  363.  87,  §  20;  6  &  7  Vic.  c  82 ;  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86, 

1  Pilkington  v.  Himsworth,  1  Y.  &  C.  Ex.  §  22;  16  &  17  Vic.  c.  78,  §  6  ;  18  &  19  Vic.  c. 

612,  616 ;  see  Barnard  v.  Darling,  1  Barb.  Ch.  42,  §  1. 

218.     An  answer  without  authentication  of  the  c  When   the   defendant  is  absent  from  the 

jurat  by  the  signature  of  the  proper  officer  may  country,,  the  osith  to  his  answer  may  be  taken 

be  treated  as  no  answer.     Westerfield  v.  Bried,  under  a  commission.      Trumbull    v.   Gibbon, 

26  N.  J.  Eq.  357.     And  if  the  certificate  to  the  Halst.  Dig.  225  ;  Read  v.  Consequa.  4  Wash. 

official  character  of  a  justice  of  the  peace,  by  C.  C.  335;  Stotesbury  c.  Vail,  13  N.  J.  Eq.  390, 

whom  the  oath  is  administered  in  another  State,  394.     An  answer  by  a  defendant  beyond  sea, 

743 


749 


ANSWERS. 


A  commission  to  take  an  answer  abroad  will  only  be  issued  upon  an 
order ; 7  which  may  be  obtained,  as  of  course.8  on  motion  or  petition.9 
After  the  order  has  been  obtained,  the  defendant's  solicitor  must 
give  notice  in  writing  to  the  plaintiff's  solicitor,  to  furnish  him  with 
the  names  of  commissioners  to  see  the  answer  taken,  on  the  plaintiff's 

part.10 
*  749  *  The  plaintiff's  solicitor  thereupon,  if  he  intends  to  join  in  the 
commission,  should  send  the  names  of  two  or  more  commissioners 
to  the  defendant's  solicitor,  and  inform  him  to  which  of  them  the  de- 
fendant is  to  give  notice  of  executing  the  commission.  The  defendant 
adds  to  these  commissioners  the  names  of  two  or  more  on  his  own  part ;  l 
the  names  of  all  of  them,  or  of  the  four  agreed  upon,  are  inserted  in  the 
commission  :  the  defendant's  commissioners  being  placed  first  in  order.2 
Two  on  each  side  are  usually  named.3  If  the  plaintiff's  solicitor  omits 
to  give  his  commissioners'  names,  within  a  reasonable  time,  and  will 
not  consent  to  the  commission  being  directed  to  the  defendant's  com- 
missioners only,  it  seems  the  defendant  should  obtain  an  order  of  course 
on  motion,  or  on  petition  at  the  Rolls,4  requiring  the  plaintiff  to  name 
commissioners  within  two  days  after  notice  of  the  order,  or,  in  default, 
that  the  defendant  may  issue  the  commission  directed  to  his  own  com- 
missioners.5 The  order  must  be  served  on  the  plaintiff's  solicitor ;  and 
if,  within  the  time  prescribed,  the  plaintiff  does  not  furnish  commis- 
sioners' names,  the  commission  is  made  out  in  favor  of  the  defendant's 
commissioners  only. 

None  of  the  commissioners  need  be  professional  men  ;  and  it  has  been 
held  that  the  defendant's  own  solicitor  may  be  a  commissioner  to  take 
his  answer.6  (a)  It  is  no  objection  to  a  commissioner  that  he  is  under 
twenty-one  years  of  age,  provided  he  is  of  sufficient  age  to  take  an 
oath.7 

Care  must  be  taken  to  have  the  commission,  with  the  answer,  returned 
before  the  time  limited  for  filing  the  answer  has  expired.8 


must  be  taken  and  sworn  to  before  a  commis- 
sioner, under  a  dedimus  issued  by  the  Court  in 
which  the  case  is  pending,  directing  him  to 
administer  the  oath  in  the  most  solemn  forms 
observed  by  the  laws  and  usages  of  the  country 
where  the  answer  is  taken.  Read  v.  Consequa, 
4  Wash.  C.  C.  335.  In  New  York,  an  answer 
in  Equity  must,  if  made  by  a  person  out  of  the 
State,  be  sworn  to  before  a  judge  of  some  Court 
having  a  seal.  A  Master  extraordinary,  in  the 
English  Court  of  Chancery,  had  not  the  author- 
ity to  administer  such  oath.  Lahens  v.  Fielden, 
1  Barb.  22. 

'  Baron  de  Feucheres  v.  Dawes,  5  Beav.  144. 

8  Veal's  Pr.  52. 

9  For  forms  of  motion   paper  and  petition, 
see  Vol.  III. 

1°  For  form  of  notice,  see  Vol.  III. 


i  Hinde,  231;  1  Turn.  &  Ven.  542;  Cons. 
Ord.  III.  1. 

2  Veal's  Pr.  51. 

8  1  Turn.  &  Ven.  542;  Veal's  Pr.  51. 

4  For  forms  of  motion  paper,  and  petition, 
see  Vol.  III. 

5  Hinde,  229;  Harr.  by  Newl.  171;  1  Turn. 
&  Ven.  542. 

6  Bird  v.  Brancker,  2  S.  &  S.  186;  see 
contra,  as  to  swearing  affidavits  within  the 
jurisdiction  before  the  deponent's  own  solici- 
tor, or  his  clerk,  Re  Hogan,  3  Atk.  813; 
Hopkin  v.  Hopkin,  10  Hare  App.  2  ;  Wood  v. 
Harpur,  3  Beav.  290 ;  Foster  v.  Harvey  (1),  11 
W.  R.  899,  V.  C.  W. ;  3  N.  R.  98,  L.  JJ. ;  post, 
p.  892. 

1  Wyatt's  P.  R.  117. 

8  See  Hughes  v.  Williams,  5  Hare,  211.  Issu- 


(n)  The  Court  does  not  accept  an  affidavit 
sworn  before  a  solicitor  in   the  cause,  nor  his 
clerk,  although  he   may   be   a  commissioner. 
744 


Duke  of  Northumberland  v.  Todd,  7  Ch.  D. 
777,  780  ;  Bourke  v.  Davis,  44  Ch.  D.  110,  12G; 
see  post,  p.  892. 


SWEARING,    FILING,    AND    PRINTING    ANSWERS.  *  750 

The  commission  is  prepared  by  the  defendant's  solicitor,  and  is  sealed 
by  the  Clerk  of  Eecords  and  Writs,  upon  a  prcecipe  being  left  with 
him.9 

Where  the  defendant  is  entitled  to  the  privilege  of  peerage,  the 
words,  "  upon  his  protestation  of  honor,"  are  inserted  in  the  commis- 
sion, instead  of  the  words,  "  on  his  corporal  oath  upon  the  Holy  Evan- 
gelists." 10 

Where  the  defendant    is  a  Quaker,    Moravian,    Separatist,  or 
other  *  person  exempted  from  taking  an  oath  by  statute,  the  writ    *  750 
should  direct  the  commissioners  to  take  the  answer  on  his  solemn 
declaration  or  affirmation.1 

Where  the  defendant  is  a  Jew,  the  words,  "  upon  the  Holy  Evan- 
gelists," may  be  left  out  of  the  form  of  the  oath  mentioned  in  the 
commission. 

And  where  a  defendant  was  a  Gentoo,  and  the  answer  was  to  be 
taken  in  Calcutta,  the  commission  was  directed  to  be  in  a  special  form, 
authorizing  the  commissioners  to  administer  the  oath  in  the  most  solemn 
manner,  as  in  their  discretion  should  seem  meet ;  or,  if  they  should 
think  proper,  to  administer  another  oath,  certifying  to  the  Court  what 
they  did.2 

The  above  distinctions  in  the  form  of  commissions  are  necessary  to  be 
attended  to,  because  a  commission  to  take  an  answer  in  one  form  will 
not  authorize  the  commissioners''  taking  it  in  another ;  thus,  commis- 
sioners will  not,  under  an  authority  to  take  an  answer  upon  oath,  be 
empowered  to  take  the  affirmation  of  a  Quaker ;  and  where  it  appeared 
by  the  caption  of  the  answer  that  they  had  done  so,  the  answer  was 
ordered  to  be  taken  off  the  file.3 

The  commission  may  be  sent  to  some  professional  person  in  the 
foreign  country,  to  take  care  that  it  is  properly  executed.  Though  the 
foreign  country  be  at  war  with  this  country,  it  must  be  executed  there ; 
in  which  respect,  a  commission  to  take  an  answer  differs  from  a  com- 
mission to  examine  witnesses ;  which  it  seems  may  be  executed  at  the 
nearest  neutral  port.4  The  manner  of  executing  the  commission  is  as 
follows :  When  the  plaintiff  has  named  commissioners,  notice  in  writ- 
ing, of  the  time  and  place  of  executing  the  commission,  signed  by  two 
of  the  defendant's  commissioners,  must  be  served  upon  the  plaintiff's 
acting  commissioner,  six  days  before  the  day  appointed  for  executing 
the  commission.5  If  this  notice  be  given  on  a  Sunday,  the  commission 
may  be  executed  on  the  Saturday  following.6 

If  the  party  who  has  the  carriage  of  the  commission  gives  notice  of 

ing  the  commission   does  not,  per  se,  extend  ln  Ilinde,  239,  n.. 

the  time  for  answering;  and  therefore  the  plain-  1  See  statutes  cited,  ante,  pp.  734,  735,  n., 

tiff,  though  he  has  joined  in  the  commission,  and  form  of  commission,  Vol.  III. 

may  issue  an  attachment  for  want  of  answer,  -  Hamkissenseat  r.  Barker,  1  Atk.  19,  20; 

before  the  return  of  the  commission,  if  the  time  ante,  pp.  735,  7.36. 

for  answering  has  expired.     Boschetti  v.  Power,  8  Parke  v.  Christy,  1  Y.  &  J.  533. 

8  Beav.  180:  Hughes  v.  Williams,  ubi  mi/jra.  4 ?\  Romney,  Amb.  02. 

9  Cons.  Ord.  III.  1 ;  Ord.  I.  37  ;  for  forms  of  5  For  form  of  notice,  see  Vol.  III. 

prcecipe.    commission,    and     indorsement,    see  6  Wyalt's  P.  R.  115. 
Veal's  Pr.  52,  57  ;  and  post,  Vol.  III. 

745 


*  751  ANSWERS. 

executing  it,  but  neither  countermands  it  in  due  time  (as  three  or  four 
days  before  the  time,  or  as  the  distance  of  the  place  may  require),  nor 
executes  it  at  the  time,  the  court,  on  motion,  will  order  costs  to  be 
taxed  for  the  adverse  party's  attendance.7 

Where  the  plaintiff  has  not  named  commissioners,  no  notice  need  be 
given,  and   the    commission    may  be  executed   by   the   commissioners 
named  in  the  writ,  ex  y  arte. % 

*  751        *  On  the  day  appointed,  the  commissioners  are  to  meet,  and  if 

one  only  attends  on  each  side  it  will  be  sufficient ;  but  in  case 
none  of  the  plaintiff's  commissioners  attend,  the  defendant  must  have 
two  commissioners  present ;  because  no  fewer  than  two  can  take  his 
answer  and  return  the  writ.1 

It  seems,  that  where  there  is  a  joint  commission,  and  the  commis- 
sioners of  one  party  only  attend,  the  commissioners  in  attendance 
may,  after  waiting  till  six  o'clock  in  the  evening,  proceed  to  take  the 
answer.2 

When  the  commissioners  are  ready  to  proceed,  the  answer  or  plea, 
properly  written,  as  before  explained,3  is  produced  to  the  commissioners, 
and  the  defendant  attends  for  the  purpose  of  swearing  it ;  whereupon 
one  of  the  commissioners,  having  opened  the  commission,  interrogates 
the  defendant  in  the  following  manner : 4  "  Have  you  heard  this  your 
answer  read  ?  and  do  you  exhibit  it  as  your  answer  to  the  bill  of  com- 
plaint of  A  B  ?  "  upon  which,  the  defendant  answering  in  the  affirma- 
tive, the  commissioner  proceeds  to  administer  to  him  the  oath,  or 
affirmation,  or  attestation  of  honor  (as  the  case  may  be),  in  the  same 
form  as  when  the  answer  is  sworn  in  England.5 

It  is  said  that  commissioners  may  refuse  to  execute  the  commission, 
unless  they  are  allowed  to  read  the  answer ; 6  and  where  a  commission 
to  take  a  defendant's  answer  only  has  been  issued,  and  the  defendant 
tenders  a  demurrer  to  the  commissioners,  and  refuses  to  answer  upon 
oath,  they  must  return  such  his  refusal,  and  the  reason  thereof,  together 
with  the  demurrer,  and  leave  the  same  to  the  consideration  of  the 
Court.7 

Before  the  defendant  is  sworn,  as  above  stated,  he  must  sign  his 
answer  and  each  schedule  thereto,  in  the  presence  of  the  commission- 
ers ; 8  and  the  answer  thus  taken,  together  with  the  schedules  (if  there 
are  any),  are  to  be  annexed  to  the  commission,  and  the  commissioners 
must  then  write  and  sign  the  caption  at  the  foot  of  the  answer.9  Any 
alterations  made  in  the  answer  or  schedules,  previous  to  the  taking 
thereof,  must  be  authenticated  by  the  commissioners,  according  to  the 
practice  in  use  with  respect  to  affidavits.10 

7  Wvatt's  P.  R.  116.  •  6  Harr.  by  New].  176. 

6  Hinde,  234;  1  Turn.  &  Ven.  544.  "  Wvatt's  P.  R.  118. 

i  Wvatt's  P.  R.  116;  Hinde,  235;  1  Turn.  8  Cons.  Ord.  XV.  5.     Where  the  defendant 

&  Ven.  544.  is  blind,  or  deaf  and  dumb,  or  a  foreigner,  or  a 

2  Wvatt's  P.  R.  116;  see  Griggs  v.  Staplee,  marksman,  the  directions  before  given  in  these 
11  Jur.  020,  V.  C  K.  B.  respects  must  of  course  be  attended  to,  and  the 

3  Ante,  p.  743.  caption  varied  accord ingh-. 

4  Hinde,  235;  1  Turn.  &  Ven.  544.  9  For  form  of  caption,  see  Vol.  III. 

5  Ibid.  ;    ante,    p.    688.       For   forms,    see  10  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  25;  ante,  p.  743. 
Vol.   III. 

746 


SWEARING,    FILING.    AND    PRINTING    ANSWERS.  *  753 

This  caption  must  be  varied  according  to  the  nature  of  the  case  ; 
thus,  in  the  case  of  a  peer,  it  must  state  the  answer  to  have  been 

*  taken  "  upon  the  attestation  of  honor ; "  in  the  case  of  a  *  752 
Quaker  or  Moravian,  or  other  person  exempted  from   taking  an 

oath  by  statute,  it  must  be  expressed  to  have  been  taken  upon  the 
"  solemn  affirmation  ;  "  and  the  date  when,  and  the  place  where,  it  was 
taken  must  also  appear  in  the  caption.  Care  must  also  be  taken  to  ex- 
press correctly  whether  the  document  be  an  answer,  or  an  answer  coupled 
with  a  plea  or  demurrer.1  The  commissioners  should  also  be  particular, 
when  the  answer  is  by  two  or  more  defendants,  to  state  that  they  are  all 
sworn :  because,  where  the  caption  of  the  joint  and  several  answer  of 
two  defendants  expressed  only  that  it  was  sworn,  without  stating  that 
the  defendants  were  both  sworn,  the  answer  was  suppressed.2 

The  answer  and  schedules,  with  the  caption,  being  thus  annexed  to 
the  writ,  the  return  must  be  indorsed  upon  the  writ,  and  be  signed  by 
two  commissioners.8  All  these  documents  should  then  be  folded  to- 
gether, in  a  convenient  size  and  form,  and  bound  round  with  tape  or 
string,  —  at  the  crossings  of  which  the  seals  of  the  commissioners  should 
be  affixed ;  they  should  then  sign  their  names  in  the  vacent  spaces,  near 
their  respective  seals,  inclose  the  whole  in  an  envelope,  and  direct  and 
return  the  same  to  the  defendant's  solicitor  to  be  filed.  The  oath  of  a 
messenger  is  not  now  required.4 

By  the  old  practice  of  the  Court,  no  second  commission  could  be 
granted  without  the  special  order  of  the  Court,  upon  good  reason  to  in- 
duce the  same,  or  upon  the  plaintiff's  own  assent ; 5  and  it  does  not  appear 
that  any  alteration  has  been  made  in  this  respect.  If,  therefore,  a  com- 
missioner dies,  application  must  be  made  to  the  Court  for  a  new  com- 
mission :  preparatory  to  which,  it  seems  that  the  usual  course  is  for  the 
solicitor  to  name  two  more  commissioners,  one  of  whom  must  be  struck 
by  the  solicitor  of  the  adverse  party,  and  the  Court  must  then  be  moved 
for  a  new  commission,  with  the  new  commissioner  added  to  those  who 
are  living.5 

If,  by  the  fault  of  the  party  who  has  the  carriage  of  the  first  commis- 
sion, the  other  is  put  to  unnecessary  charges,  the  Court  will  order  his 
costs  to  be  taxed,  and,  upon  cause  shown,  direct  the  party  in  fault  to 
give  security  to  pay  them  before  he  has  a  second  commission  ;  and  if  he 
has  the  carriage  of  the  second  commission,  to  pay  the  costs  upon  that 
also,  if  he  again  fails.6 

After  an  answer  has  been  reported  insufficient,  no  new  commis- 
sion will  be  issued,  except  by  order  made  on  affidavit   showing 

*  some  good  reason,  and  payment  of  the  costs  of  the  insufficient    *  753 
answer.1     A  new  commission  may,  however,  be  issued,  upon  the 
consent   of   the    plaintiff's  solicitor,  which  is  seldom,   if  ever,  refused. 

It  seems  that,  if  the  return  of  a  commission  be  delayed,  it  may  be 
hastened  by  motion.     It  seems,  also,  that  an  attachment  and  other  pro- 

1  Hinde,  236  ;  1  Turn.  &  Ven.  545.  4  15  &  lfi  Vic.  c.  86,  §  25. 

2  Anon.  Mos.  2.38.  s  Wyatt's  P.  R.  115. 
8  Hinde,  236;  Turn.  &  Ven.  545.     For  form  <*  ibid.  116. 

of  return,  see  Vol.  III.  '  Beanies's  Ord.  183;  Harr.  by  Newl  202. 

747 


*  754  ANSWERS. 

cess  of  contempt  may  issue  against  the  commissioners,  for  not  returning 
the  commission  with  the  answer.2  Where,  however,  it  appeared  that 
the  omission  to  make  a  return  arose  from  the  circumstance  of  one  of  the 
plaintiff's  commissioners  refusing  to  join  with  one  of  the  defendant's, 
to  take  the  answer,  the  attachment  was  discharged,  upon  payment  of 
the  ordinary  fees,  and  a  new  commission  was  granted  to  different  com- 
missioners named  by  the  defendant.3 

Where  any  irregularity  has  taken  place  in  the  execution  of  a  commis- 
sion, the  proper  course  appears  to  be  to  move,  after  the  return,  that 
the  commission  and  answer  may  be  quashed,  or  that  the  answer  may 
be  taken  off  the  file. 

Where  the  friends  of  an  infant  wish  to  defend  the  suit  on  his  behalf, 
an  order  appointing  a  guardian  ad  litem  may,  as  we  have  seen,4  be  ob- 
tained on  motion  of  course,  or  on  petition  of  course  at  the  Rolls  ; 5  and 
where  the  defence  of  the  infant  is  by  an  answer  or  plea  requiring  to  be 
upon  oath,  the  plea  or  answer  must  be  sworn  to  by  the  guardian,6  unless 
an  order  has  been  obtained  to  take  it  without  oath.  The  guardian, 
however,  only  swears  to  his  belief  in  the  truth  of  the  defence  of  the 
infant.7  The  order  appointing  the  guardian  must  be  produced  at  the 
time  the  answer  is  sworn  ;  and  the  jurat  must  express  that  the  answer 
is  sworn  pursuant  to  it.8 

We  have  before  seen,  that  a  person  who  has  been  found  a  lunatic  by 
inquisition,  answers  by  his  committee,  and  that,  in  such  case,  it  is  not 
necessary  that  there  should  be  any  order  appointing  a  guardian,  unless 
there  be  a  conflict  of  interest  between  the  committee  and  the 
*  754  lunatic  :  in  which  case,  a  guardian  ad  litem  should  be  *  appointed,1 
A  person  of  weak  or  unsound  mind,2  not  so  found  by  inquisition, 
answers  by  his  guardian,  who  is  appointed  in  the  same  manner  as  the 
guardian  ad  litem  of  an  infant  defendant ;  8  and,  as  in  the  case  of  in- 
fants, the  guardian  only  sweai'S  to  his  belief  in  the  truth  of  the  defence, 
where  an  oath  is  required,4  and  the  order  appointing  the  guardian  must 
be  produced  at  the  time  the  answer  is  sworn ;  and  the  jurat  must 
express  that  the  answer  is  sworn  pursuant  to  it.5 

With  respect  to  married  women,  we  have  before  seen,6  that  where  a 
husband  and  wife  are  defendants  to  a  bill,  neither  of  them  can  regu- 

2  Wyatt's  P.  R.  116.  by   the  guardian   ad  litem.     Bulkley   v.  Van 

8  Ibid.  Wyck,  5  Paige,  536;  Stephenson  v.  Stephenson, 

*  Ante,  p.  160.  6  Paige,  353.     Ante,  169,  n.  2. 

5  In  the  U.  S.  Courts,  see  Equity  Rule  87>  7  Brakhwaite's  Pr.  393;  see  form  of  oath, 
post,  p.  2397.  Vol.  III. 

6  And  it  is  termed  his  answer,  and  not  that  8  Cons.  Ord.  VII.  4;  Braithwaite's  Pr.  393. 
of  the  infant.     Rogers  v.  Cruger,  7  John.  581 ;  For  form  of  Jurat,  see  Vol.  III. 

arid  the  infant  is  not  bound  by  it,  if  he  dissents  i  Ante,  p.  175. 

within  a  proper  time.    James  v.  James,  4  Paige,  2  Superannuated   persons,  on   proof  of  im- 

115;  Prutzman  v.  Pitesell,  3  Harr.  &  J.  77;  becility,  may  appear  and  answer  by  guardian. 

Mills  v.  Dennis,  3  John.  Ch.  367;  Winston  v.  Matter  of  Barber,  2  John.  Ch.  235;  see  Murkle 

Campbell,  4  Hen.  &  M.  777;  Mason  v.  Debow,  v.  Murkle,  4  John.  Ch.  168. 

2  Havw.  178.     Such  answer  cannot  be  read  3  Ante,  p.  176;  Braithwaite's  Pr.  393,  n. 

against  the  infant.     Stephenson  v   Stephenson,  4  For  form  of  oath,  see  Vol.  III. 

(J  Paige,  353.     Nor  is  it  evidence  in  his  favor,  5  For  form  of  jurat,  see  Vol.  III. 

though  it  be  responsive  to  the  bill  and  sworn  to  6  Ante,  pp.  180,  182. 

748 


SWEARING,    FILING,    AND    PRINTING    ANSWERS.  *  755 

larly  put  in  an  answer  without  the  other,  except  under  an  order  granted 
for  that  purpose.7  Where,  however,  the  wife  is  defendant  to  a  bill  filed 
by  her  husband,8  or  being  judicially  separated,  or  having  obtained  a 
protection  order,  is  sued  as  a  feme  sole,9  no  order  is  requisite.  Where  she 
answers  separately,  under  an  order,  her  time  for  answering  runs  from 
the  date  of  the  order.10  Where  the  answer  is  filed  under  such  an  order, 
the  jurat  should  state  that  the  answer  is  sworn  pursuant  to  the  order,11 
and  the  order  should  be  produced  at  the  time  the  answer  is  sworn  : 
otherwise,  the  order  must  be  produced  when  the  answer  is  presented 
for  filing.12 

Where  a  married  woman  is  an  infant,  her  answer  cannot  be  taken, 
either  jointly  or  separately,  until  a  guardian  has  been  assigned  to  her.13 

An  answer  is  filed  in  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerks'  Office,  in  the  same 
manner  as  an  affidavit ; u  and  is  not  considered  of  record  until  filed.15 
The  year,  letter,  and  number  by  which  the  cause  is  distinguished  in  the 
Record  and  Writ  Clerks'  Books,16  and  the  date  of  the  filing,  must  be 
written  or  printed  on  the  first  page.17 

The  name  and  place  of  business  or  residence,  as  the  case  may  be,  of 
the  solicitor  or  party  filing  the  answer,  and  his  address  for  service, 
if  any,  must  be  indorsed  thereon,  as  in  the  case  of  other  *  plead-    *755 
ings  and  proceedings.1     If  the  answer  is  put  in  without  oath  or 
signature,  the  order  must  be  produced  at  the  time  the  answer  is  pre- 
sented for  filing,  and  the  record  is  inscribed  "  Without  oath  (or,  without 

oath  or  signature,  as  the  case  may  be),  by  order  dated  the day  of 

." 2     Where  the  answer  is  put  in  by  a  guardian,   and  the  order 

appointing  the  guardian  has  not  been  previously  entered  at  the  Record 
and  Writ  Clerks'  Office,  it  must  also  be  produced  when  the  answer  is 
presented  for  filing. 

Unless  the  plaintiff  has  taken  some  step  which  prevents  its  reception, 
an  answer  will  be  filed  by  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerk,  after  the  expira- 
tion of  the  time  for  putting  it  in,  where  it  is  put  in  by  a  defendant  who 
has  been  required  to  answer  the  bill,  whether  original  or  amended,  or 
where,  the  plaintiff  having  amended  his  bill  without  requiring  an  answer, 
it  is  put  in  by  a  defendant  who  has  already  answered  or  pleaded  to  the 
bill.4    In  all  other  cases  an  answer  will  not  be  received,  after  the  expira- 

7  A  joint  answer  of  husband  and  wife  must  Eq.  43,  45;  Smallwood  v.  Lewin,  id.  123,  125; 
be  sworn  to  by  both,  unless  the  plaintiff  eon-  see  Leavitt  v.  Cruger,  1  Paige,  432;  Perine  v. 
sents  to  receive  such  answer  upon  the  oath  of      Swaine,  1  John.  Ch.  24. 

the  husband  only.    New  York  Chemical  Co.  v.  12  Rraithwaite's  Pr.  45.  397,  n. 

Flowers,  6   Paige,   654;    Leavitt   v.  Cruger,  1  13  Colman  v.  Northcote,  2  Hare,  147;  7  Jar. 

Paige,  422.  528.     For  petition  to  assign  guardian,  and  affi- 

8  Ante,  p.  179;  Earl  v.  Ferris,  19  Beav.  67;  davit  in  support,  see  Vol.  III. 

1  Jur.  N.  S.  5.  14  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §§  21,  25;  Cons.  Ord 

9  Ante,  p.  178.  I.  35. 

1°  Ante,  pp.  183,  740;  Jackson  v.  Haworth,  is  Cons.  Ord.  VIII.  3. 

1  S.  &  S.  161;  Rraithwaite's  Manual,  11,  12.  16  Cons.  Ord.  I.  48. 

11  If  not  so  verified,  the  answer  will  be  sup-  if  Cons.  Ord.  I.  45. 
pressed  for  irregularity.     Rut  the  irregularity  1  Cons.  Ord.  III.  2,  5;  ante,  pp.  453,  454. 

will  be  waived  by  the  plaintiff's  filing  a  repli-  2  Braithwaite's  Pr.  47. 

cation.     Fulton  Bank  v.  Beach,  2  Paige,  307;  8  Ibid. 

S.  C.  6  Wend.  36;  Collard  v.  Smith,  13  N.  J.  *  Ibid.  55, 

719 


*  756  '  ANSWERS. 

tion  of  the  time  within  which  it  ought  to  have  been  put  in,  except  under 
the  authority  of  an  order ;  which  must  be  produced  at  the  time  the 
answer  is  presented  for  filing.5  Such  order  must  be  applied  for  by 
summons.6 

As  an  answer  is  not  strictly  reputed  such  until  filed,7  it  ought  not  to 
be  filed  until  the  costs  of  contempt  for  not  answering,  if  incurred,  are 
paid.  It  is  frequently,  however,  the  practice  to  file  the  answer  before 
the  costs  of  contempt  have  been  paid,  and  in  such  case,  the  plaintiff 
must  be  careful  not  to  take  an  office  copy  of  the  answer,  or  do  any  other 
act  which  may  be  construed  into  an  acceptance  of  the  answer ;  for,  if  he 
does,  he  wall  waive  the  contempt.8  The  certificate  of  the  Record  and 
Writ  Clerk  is  conclusive  evidence  as  to  the  time  at  which  the  answer 
was  filed.9 

Notice  of  the  filing  of  the  answer  must  be  served  on  the  solicitor  of 
the  plaintiff,  or  on  the  plaintiff  himself  if  he  acts  in  person,  before  seven 
o'clock  in  the  evening  of  the  same  day  that  the  answer  is  filed ;  except 
on  Saturday,  when  it  must  be  served  before  two  o'clock  in  the  after- 
noon.10    The  omission  to  give  due  notice  of  having  filed  the  answer  will 
not,  however,  render  the  latter  inoperative ;  thus,  it  will  not  deprive  the 
defendant  of  his  right  to  move  to  dismiss  the  bill  for  want  of  prosecu- 
tion, at  the  expiration  of  the  period  allowed  for  that  purpose,  from 
*  756    the  date  of  filing  the  *  answer.1     It  would  seem  that,  in  such  a 
case,  the  time  allowed  the  plaintiff  for  taking  the  next  step  in  the 
cause  will,  on  his  motion,  be  extended,  so  as  to  give  him  the  benefit  of 
the  time  he  would  otherwise  have  lost  in  consequence  of  the  omission.2 
If  the  defendant  files  a  written  answer,  he  must,  at  the  time  he  does 
so,  leave  a  copy  thereof  (without  the  schedules,  if  any,  of  accounts  or 
documents).8     This  copy  will  then  be  examined  and  corrected  with  the 
answer  filed,  and  be  returned,  when  so  examined,  by  the  Clerks  of  Rec- 
ords and  Writs,  with  a  certificate  thereon  that  it  is  correct,  and  proper  to 
be  printed.4     The  certified  copy  is,  generally,  ready  for  the  defendant's 
solicitor  the  day  after  the  answer  is  filed  ;  and  the  Court  will  not  dis- 
pense with  the  printing  of  the  answer  merely  because  the  parties  to  the 
suit  are  poor,  and  to  save  expense.5 

5  Braithwaite's  Pr.  56.  »■  Solicitors'  Life  Assurance  Co.  3  W.  R.  6-10, 

6  For  form  of  summons,  see  Vol.  III.  V.  C.  W.;   see,  however,  Matthews  v.  Chiches- 
"  Cons.  Ord.  VIII.  3.     An  answer  to  a  bill      ter,  5  Hare,  207,  209;  overruled  on  appeal,  11 

in  Equity,  complete  in  every  respect,  cannot  be  Jur.  49,  L.  C. 

treated  as  an  answer,  until  the  party  has  filed  it.  3  Ord.  6  March,   I860,  r.  2.     A  copy  of  a 

Giles  v.  Eaton,  54  Maine,  186.     If  the  defendant  former  bill  for  the  same  matter  may  be  printed 

dies  before  tiling  his  answer,  it  cannot  be  filed  as  a  schedule.     Wright  v.  Wilkin,  9  Jur.  N.  S. 

by  his  solicitor  as  an  answer.     Giles  v.  Eaton,  195;  11  W.  R.  253,  V.  C.  K.     In  practice,  where 

ubi  supra.  the  schedule  to  an  answer  is  very  short,  it  is  not 

8  Ante,  p.  509.  unfrequently  printed  with  the  body  of  the  an- 

9  Beavan  v.  Burgess,  10  Jur.  63.  But  see  swer;  in  such  case,  the  fair  copy  should  of 
Montgomery  V.  Buck,  6  Humph.  416.  course  include  the  schedule. 

10  Cons.  Ord.  III.  9;  XXXVII.  2.  4  Ord.  6  March,   1860,   r.  2.     For  form  of 

1  Jones  v.  Jones,  1  Jur.  N.  S.  863;  3  W.  R.      certificate,  see  Vol.  III. 

638,  V.  C.  S.;   and  see  Lowe  V.  Williams,  12  6  Meux  v.   Watkins,  7  Jur.  N.  S.  704;   9 

Beav.  482,  484.  W.  R.  779,  V.  C  W. ;  but  the  answers  of  par- 

2  Wright  «.  Angle,  6  Hare,  107,109;  Lord  ties  suing  or  defending  in  forma  pauperis  are 
Suffieldtf.  Bond,  10  Beav.  146,  153;  Lowe  v.  excluded  from  the  orders  as  to  printing;  see 
Williams,  and  Jones  v.  Jones,  ubi  supra ;  Lloyd  Ord.  6  March,  1860,  r.  15,  post,  p.  758. 

750 


SWEARING,    FILING,    AND    PRINTING    ANSWERS.  *  757 

The  defendant  must  then  cause  his  answer  to  be  printed  from  such 
certified  copy,  on  paper  of  the  same  size  and  description,  and  in  the  same 
type,  style,  and  manner  on  and  in  which  bills  are  required  to  be  printed ; 6 
and,  before  the  expiration  of  four  days  from  the  filing  of  his  answer,  must 
leave  a  printed  copy  thereof  with  the  Clerks  of  Records  and  Writs,  with 
a  written  certificate  thereon  by  the  defendant's  solicitor,  or  by  the  de- 
fendant if  defending  in  person,7  that  such  print  is  a  true  copy  of  the 
copy  of  the  answer  so  certified  by  the  Clerk  of  Records  and  Writs  ;  and 
if  such  printed  copy  is  not  so  left,  the  defendant  will  be  subject  to  the 
same  liabilities  as  if  no  answer  had  been  filed.8 

Under  the  former  practice,  where  an  answer  taken  in  a  foreign  lan- 
guage was  filed  with  a  translation  annexed,  it  was  only  required  that  an 
office  copy  should  be  taken  of  the  translation.9  It  is  presumed,  there- 
fore, that  now,  a  fair  copy  of  the  translation  only  need  be  left,  and  that 
such  translation  only  need  be  printed. 

*  A  defendant  may,  however,  if  he  desires  it,  swear  and  file  a    *  757 
printed,  instead  of  a  written  answer  ; 1  although  this  course,  in 
consequence  of  the  inconveniences  attending  it,  is  rarely  adopted. 

On  receiving  notice  of  the  filing  of  the  answer,  the  plaintiff  should  de- 
mand in  writing,  from  the  defendant's  solicitor,  or  the  defendant  himself 
if  acting  in  person,2  an  official  and  certified  printed  copy  of  the  answer ; 
and  on  receiving  such  demand,  the  defendant  must  get  a  printed  copy 
of  the  answer  examined  by  the  Clerks  of  Records  and  Writs  with  the 
answer  as  filed,  and  stamp  such  copy  with  a  Chancery  stamp  for  5s.,  and 
the  Clerks  of  Records  and  Writs,  on  finding  that  such  copy  is  duly 
stamped  and  correct,  will  certify  thereon  that  the  same  is  a  correct  copy, 
and  mark  the  same  as  an  office  copy,3  on  a  prcecipe  being  left.4 

The  defendant  must  have  this  official  and  certified  printed  copy  of  the 
answer  ready  for  delivery  to  the  plaintiff,  at  any  time  after  the  expira- 
tion of  four  days  from  the  filing  of  the  answer,  and  within  forty-eight 
hours  after  the  receipt  of  the  demand  for  the  same  ;  5  and  must,  on  de- 
mand, deliver  it  to  the  plaintiff ;  who,  on  the  receipt  thereof,  is  to  pay 
the  defendant  the  amount  of  the  stamp  thereon,  and  at  the  rate  of  4oL 
per  folio  for  the  same.6 

The  Clerks  of  Records  and  Writs  are  not  to  certify  or  mark  any  printed 
copy  of  an  answer  which  has  any  alteration  or  interlineation  in  writing.7 
Where,  however,  some  very  slight  typographical  errors  had  been  so  cor- 
rected, they  were  directed  to  certify  the  official  copy,  and  to  alter  the  copy 
left  with  them,  so  as  to  agree  with  the  written  answer  on  the  file.8 

6  Ord.  6  March,  I860,  r.  3;  as  to  such  paper,  the  whole  might,  however,  be  taken,  if  desired, 
see  Cons.  Ord.  IX.  3,  ante,  p.  396;  see  also,  ante,      Ibid. 

p.  7-42.  l  Ord.  6  March,  1800,  r.  5. 

7  For  form  of  certificate,  see  ibid.  2  For  form  of  demand,  see  Vol.  III. 

8  Ord.  6  March,  1860,  r.  3;  Bloxam  v.  Chi-  8  Ord.  6  March,  1860,  rr.  4,  6.  For  form  of 
Chester,  11  Jur.  N.  S.  48;  13  W.  R.  285,  L.  JJ. ;  certificate,  see  Vol.  III. 

34  Beav.  76;  S.  C.  nom.  Bloxsome  v.  Chichester,  4  For  form  ofprwcipe,  see  Vol.  III. 

2  De  G.  J.  &  S.  444.     An  attachment,  for  not  5  Ord.  6  March,  1860,  r.  4. 

leaving  the  printed  copy,  is  usually  issued  in  6  Ibid.  r.  7. 

such  a  case.  '  Ord.  6  March,  1860,  r.  12. 

9  Braithwaite's  Pr.  491.     An  office  copy  of  8  Lee  v.  Dawson,  1  J.  &  H.  37. 

751 


*  758  ANSWERS. 

The  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  demand  and  receive  from  the  defendant  any- 
additional  number  (not  exceeding  ten)  of  printed  copies  of  the  answer, 
on  payment  for  the  same  at  the  rate  of  one  halfpenny  per  folio ; 9  and 
after  all  the  defendants  who  are  required  to  answer  have  filed  their 
answers,  a  co-defendant  is  entitled  to  demand  and  receive  from  any  other 
defendant,  any  number  of  printed  copies  (not  exceeding  six)  of  his  answer, 
on  payment  after  the  same  rate.10  It  may  be  here  mentioned,  that  before 
the  practice  of  printing  answers  was  introduced,  any  defendant  might 
take  an  office  copy  of  the  answer  of  a  co-defendant,  as  soon  as  he  had 
filed  his  own  answer,  or,  if  he  had  not  been  required  to  answer,  after 
the  expiration  of  the  time  within  which  he  might  have  put  in  a  volun- 
tary answer ;  n  but  it  is  presumed  the  former  practice  is  now 

*  758    *  abrogated,  and  that  no  defendant  can  require  to  be  furnished 

with  copies  of  a  co-defendant's  answer  till  all  the  defendants 
required  to  answer  have  answered,  and  till  the  time  allowed  the  others 
to  file  voluntary  answers  has  expired. 

Office  copies  of  schedules  to  answers  of  accounts  or  documents  con- 
tinue to  be  made  in  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerks'  Office.1  Where, 
however,  by  mistake  a  printed  schedule  has  been  attached  to  a  printed 
answer,  the  answer  was  allowed  to  be  filed,  and  a  printed  copy  of  the 
answer,  with  a  written  office  copy  of  the  schedule,  to  be  issued,  on  the 
solicitor  for  the  defendant  undertaking  not  to  charge  his  client  with 
the  costs  of  printing  the  schedule.2 

Where  a  plaintiff  is  required  to  answer  interrogatories,3  he  must  file 
his  answer  thereto,  and  get  it  printed,  and  furnish  printed  copies  thereof, 
in  the  same  manner  as  a  defendant  is  required  to  do  with  respect  to  his 
answer.4 

No  costs  will  be  allowed,  either  as  between  party  and  party,  or  as 
between  solicitor  and  client,  for  any  written  brief  of  an  answer,  unless 
the  Court  directs  the  allowance  thereof.6 

The  orders  of  the  6th  March,  1860,  do  not  apply  to  answers  filed  by 
defendants,  or  by  plaintiffs,  defending  or  suing  in  forma  pauperis,  except 
the  first  of  them,  which  directs  that  an  answer  is  to  be  written  on  paper, 
instead  of,  as  formerly,  on  parchment.6 

Section  IV.  —  Exceptions  to  Answers. 

If  the  plaintiff,  upon  an  examination  of  the  answer,  finds  that  it  con- 
tains scandalous  matter,  or  that  it  does  not  sufficiently  answer  the  [bill, 

9  Ord.  6  March,  1860,  r.  8;  and  see  Att-  Vic.  c.  86,  §  19,  and  is  a  substitute  for  a  cross- 
Gen,  v.  Etheridge,  11  W.  R.  927,  V.  C.  K.  bill  of  discovery  ;  zee  post,  Chap.  XXXIV.  §  1, 

10  Ord.  6  March,  1860,  r.  9.  Cross  Bills;  see  post,  Evidence,  Admissions; 

ii  Powysv.  Blagrave,  18  Jur.  462,  464;  2  Eq.  Pub.  Stats.  Mass.   c.  167  §49    et  seq. ;   Stat. 

Rep.  475,V.  C.  W.;  and  see  Braithwaite's  Pr.  Mass.  1862,  c.  40. 
491.  *  Ord.  6  March,  1860,  r.  11. 

i  Ord.  6  March,  1860,  r.  10.  6  Ord.  6  March,  I860,  r.  13.     As  to  the  fees 

2  Watt  v.  Watt,  8  Jur.  N.  S.  878;  10  W.  R.  to  which  solicitors  are  to  be  entitled,  in  the  case 
368,  V.  C.  W.  Where,  however,  the  schedule  of  printed  answers,  see  id.  r.  14,  and  Sched.; 
is  very  short,  it  is  often  printed  with  the  answer,  and  Att. -Gen.  v.  Etheridge,  11  W.  R.  927,  V. 
Ante,  p.  756,  n.  C.  K. ;  see  also  post,  Vol.  IN. 

3  This  practice  was  introduced  by  15  &  16  6  Ord.  6  March,  1860,  r.  15;  ante,  p.  756. 

752 


EXCEPTIONS   TO    ANSWERS. 


*759 


or,  under  the  later  practice,  the]   interrogatories,  he  may  file  ex- 
ceptions to  it.7     Exceptions  *  are  allegations  in  writing,  stating   *  759 
the  particular  points  or  matters  with  respect  to  which  the  plain- 
tiff considers  the  answer  scandalous,  or  those  interrogatories  to  which  he 
thinks  there  is  not  sufficient  answer  given. 

Formerly,  exceptions  could,  in  like  manner,  be  taken  for  imperti- 
nence;1 but  this  practice  has  been  abolished,  and  there  is  the  same 
remedy  for  impertinence  in  answers  as  for  impertinence  in  bills,  and 
other  proceedings.2  (a) 


1  Gleaves  v.  Morrow,  2  Term.  Ch.  597.  No 
demurrer  lies  to  an  answer  in  Equity.  Travers 
v.  Ross,  14  N.  J.  Eq.  254,  258;  Stone  v.  Moore, 
26  III.  165;  Bany  v.  Abbot,  100  Mass.  398; 
ante,  p.  542,  note.  Under  the  practice  in  New 
Hampshire,  Massachusetts,  and  some  other 
States,  an  answer  is  open  to  exceptions  which 
omits  to  notice  material  charges  in  the  bill, 
under  the  general  interrogatory,  although  no 
special  interrogator)'  is  thereto  directed.  Miles 
v.  Miles,  27  N.  H.  440;  Tucker  v.  Cheshire  R. 
R.  Co.  21  N.  H.  29;  ante,  pp.  376,  377,  note; 
Methodist  Epis.  Church  v.  Jaques,  1  John.  Ch. 
65;  Hagthorp  v.  Hook,  1  Gill  &  J.  270;  Salmon 
v.  Claggett,  3  Bland,  125;  Bank  of  Utiea  v. 
Messereau,  7  Paige,  517;  Parkinson  v.  Trous- 
dale, 3  Scam.  380;  Cuyler  v.  Bogert,  3  Paige, 
186;  see  Pitts  v.  Hooper,  16  Ga.  442;  Jordan 
v.  Jordan,  id.  446.  In  Maine,  "exceptions  to 
an  answer  should  be  drawn  and  signed  by 
counsel  and  filed  with  the  clerk,  and  notice 
thereof  given  within  thirty  days  after  the  an- 
swer is  tiled."  Ch.  Rule  8,  37  Maine,  583;  see 
Mass.  Ch.  Rule  17 ;  and  for  the  form  of  such  ex- 
ceptions, see  Langdon  v.  Goddard,  3  Story,  18, 
19 ;  Kittredge  v.  Claremont  Bank,  3  Story,  605- 
609. 

1  Langdon  v.  Goddard,  3  Story,  13;  Mason 


(a)  Exceptions  only  lie  to  an  insufficient  dis- 
covery, or  to  scandal  or  impertinence,  and  not 
to  new  matter  in  the  answer.  Adams  v.  Bridge- 
water  Iron  Co.  6  Fed.  Rep.  179;  Bower  Barff  R. 
I.  Co.  v.  Wells  R.  I.  Co.  43  id.  391;  Richardson 
v.  Donehoo,  16  W.  Va.  685.  Exceptions  for 
insufficiency  and  for  impertinence  are  held  to 
be  distinct.  The  Whistler,  13  Fed.  Rep.  295. 
They  do  not  lie  to  the  answer  of  a  corporation, 
the  Attorney-General,  or  infants.  United  States 
v.  McLaughlin,  24  Fed.  Rep.  823.  They  lie  in 
New  Jersey  for  insufficiency  to  an  answer,  oath 
to  which  has  been  waived.  Reed  v.  Cumber- 
land M.  F.  Ins.  Co.  36  N.  J.  Eq.  393.  In 
Illinois,  it  is  held  that  exceptions  will  not  lie  to 
an  unverified  answer.  Supervisors  v.  Miss.  & 
W.  R.  Co.  21  III.  366;  Goodwin  v.  Bishop  (111.), 
34  N.  E.  Rep.  47.  The  rule  that  exceptions  for 
insufficiency  are  limited  to  cases  requiring  dis- 
covery  from   the   defendant,   and   do  not    lie 

vol.  i.  — 48 


v.  Mason,  4  Hen.  &  M.  414;  Burr  v.  Burton, 
18  Ark.  215.  And  it  is  impertinent  in  an  an- 
swer, after  stating  the  facts  in  response  to  the 
bill,  to  give  a  summary,  occupying  several 
manuscript  pages,  of  supposed  errors  in  pre- 
vious proceedings,  with  reasons  and  authori- 
ties. Johnson  v.  Tucker,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  244.  But 
the  use  of  a  few  unnecessary  words,  although 
strictly  impertinent,  will  not  constitute  a  suffi- 
cient ground  for  exception.  Hawley  v.  Wolver- 
ton,  5  Paige,  522;  Gleaves  v.  Morrow,  2  Tenn. 
Ch.  592.  It  is  impertinent  to  set  up  in  an  an- 
swer an  independent  counter-claim.  Spaulding 
v.  Farwell,  62  Maine,  319;  Mrzena  v.  Brucker, 

3  Tenn.  Ch.  161.  And  the  introduction  of  scan- 
dalous and  impertinent  matter  in  a  bill  will  not 
justify  similar  matter  in  the  answer,  although 
introduced  to  meet  the  allegations  of  the  bill. 
Langdon  v.  Pickering,  19  Maine,  214.  See, 
however,  Woods  v.  Morrell,  1  John.  Ch.  103. 
Matter  in  an  answer  which  cannot  be  put  in 
issue,  or  given  in  evidence,  is  impertinent. 
Spaulding  v.  Farwell,  62  Maine,  319.  And 
see,  as  to  what  is  impertinence,  ante,  p.  349,  728, 

.  729,  notes.     See  also  note  6,  below. 

2  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  17;  Dufaur  v.  Sigel, 

4  De  G.  M.  &  G.  520. 


where  the  matter  of  such  discovery  is  of  record, 
does  not  apply  to  bills  for  relief.  McCIaskey 
v.  Barr,  40  Fed.  Rep.  559. 

Exceptions  to  an  answer  must  be  definite  and 
exact,  and  cannot  be  founded  on  general  ob- 
jections to  an  answer  part  of  which  is  clearly 
good.  Mutual  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Cokefair,  41 
N.  J.  Eq.  142;  Arnold  v.  Slaughter,  36  W.  Va. 
589.  The  defendant's  failure  to  answer  one  or 
more  interrogatories  in  the  bill,  or  the  suffi- 
ciency of  his  answer,  if  made,  should  be  brought 
up  by  exceptions  to  the  answer,  not  by  demur- 
rer or  motion.  Fuller  v.  Knapp,  24  Fed.  Rep. 
100;  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Macomb,  2  id.  18; 
Adams  r.  Bridgcwater  Iron  Co.  6  id.  179.  But 
after  exceptions  have  been  repeatedly  allowed 
for  this  cause,  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  take  the 
bill  as  confessed  as  to  the  questions  not  an- 
swered. Hale  v.  Continental  Life  Ins.  Co.  20 
Fed.  Rep.  344.    Each  exception  to  an  answer 

753 


760 


ANSWERS. 


The  nature  of  scandal  and  impertinence  in  pleadings  has  been,  before, 
so  fully  gone  into,  that  it  is  now  only  necessary  to  inform  the  reader 
that  the  same  rules  which  are  there  laid  down  for  distinguishing  scandal 
or  impertinence,  when  comprised  in  a  bill,  apply  to  pleadings  in  general, 
and  consequently  to  answers.8  The  practice  of  the  Court,  also,  with 
regard  to  exceptions  to  answers  on  account  of  scandal,  is  the  same, 
mutatis  mutandis,  as  that  already  described  with  respect  to  exceptions 
to  bills  on  the  same  grounds.4 

It  has  before  been  stated,  that  a  bill  may  be  excepted  to  for  scandal 
at  any  time.5  In  like  manner,  it  seems  that  there  is  no  precise  limit  to 
the  time  during  which  an  answer  may  be  excepted  to  for  scan. 
*  760  dal ; 6  and  therefore,  where  the  defendant  became  bankrupt  *  after 
putting  in  his  answer,  and  the  plaintiff,  before  the  assignees  were 
brought  before  the  Court,  obtained,  under  the  old  practice,  an  order  to 
refer  the  answer  for  scandal  and  impertinence,  the  order  was  held  to 
have  been  regularly  obtained.1 

If  a  plaintiff  conceives  an  answer  to  be  insufficient,  he  should  take 
exceptions  to  it ; 2  stating  such  parts  as  he  conceives  are  not  answered, 


3  Ante,  pp.  346-349. 

4  Ante,  pp.  351-353. 

5  Ante,  p.  354. 

6  Booth  v.  Smith,  5  Sim.  639 ;  Campbell  v. 
Taul,  3  Yerger,  563. 

Separate  exceptions  to  the  same  answer,  one 
for  scandal  and  the  other  for  impertinence,  will 
not  be  allowed,  as  nothing  in  the  pleading  can 
be  considered  as  scandalous  which  is  not  also 
impertinent.  M'Intyre  v.  Trustees  of  Union 
College,  6  Paige,  240.  An  exception  for  imper- 
tinence will  be  overruled,  if  the  expunging  of 
the  matter  excepted  to  will  leave  the  residue  of 
the  clause,  which  is  not  covered  by  the  excep- 
tion, either  false  or  wholly  unintelligible.  Ibid. ; 
see  Balcom  v.  New  York  Life  Ins.  &  Trust  Co. 
11  Paige,  454;  Norton  v.  Woods,  5  Paige,  260; 
Franklin  v.  Keeler,  4  Paige.  382  ;  Tucker  v. 
Cheshire  R.  R  Co.  21  N.  II.  36,  37.  The 
Court,  in  cases  of  impertinence,  ought,  before 
expunging  the  matter  alleged  to  be  imperti- 
nent, to  be  especially  clear  that  it  is  such 
as  ought  to  be  struck  out  of  the  record,  for 
this  reason,  that  the  error  on  one  side  is 
irremediable,  on  the  other  not.  See  Davis 
v.  Cripps,  2Y.  &  C.  (N.  R.)  443:  Woods  v. 
Morrell,  1  John.  Ch.  106.  See,  as  to  the  prac- 
tice, Johnson  v.  Tucker,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  244. 
Exceptions  for  scandal  or  impertinence  must 
describe  the  particular  passages  which  are 
alleged  to  be  scandalous  or  impertinent. 
Whitmarsh  v.  Campbell,  1  Paige,  645;  Frank- 
lin v.  Keeler,  4  Paige,  382.  An  exception  for 
impertinence  must  be  supported  in  toto,  or  it 


will  fail  altogether.  Tench  v.  Cheese,  1  Beav. 
571. 

If  the  matter  of  an  answer  is  relevant,  that 
is,  if  it  can  have  any  influence  whatever  in  the 
decision  of  the  suit  in  reference  to  any  point  to 
be  considered  in  it,  it  is  not  impertinent. 
Tucker  v.  Cheshire  K.  R.  Co.  21  N.  H.  38,  39; 
Van  Rensselaer  v.  Bruce.  4  Paige,  177 ;  Hawley 
v.  Wolverton,  5  Paige,  522. 

If  a  plaintiff  wishes  to  refer  an  answer 
for  insufficiency  as  well  as  for  impertinence, 
he  must  procure  the  reference  for  imperti- 
nence first;  for  it  has  been  decided,  that  a 
reference  for  impertinence  can  never  be  con- 
temporaneous with  exceptions  for  insuffi- 
ciency. Raphael  v.  Birdwood,  1  Swanst. 
229;  Livingston  v.  Livingston,  4  Paige,  111- 
But  by  the  practice  under  the  former  New 
York  Chancery  System,  exceptions  for  scan- 
dal or  impertinence,  and  exceptions  for  in- 
sufficiency, were  to  be  taken  at  the  same 
time  and  in  the  same  manner.  Livingston 
v.  Livingston,' 4  Paige,  111;  Woods  v.  Mor- 
rell, 1  John.  Ch.  103.  So  in  Tennessee,  John- 
son v.  Tucker,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  244.  After  a  refer- 
ence for  insufficiency,  or  any  other  step  taken 
in  the  cause,  an  answer  cannot  be  referred  for 

impertinence.  Pellew  V.  ,  6  Ves.  458.  arg.  ; 

Beavan  v.  Waterhouse,  2  Beav.  58;  Jones  v. 
Spencer,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  776:  but  it  may  be  for 
scandal.     Story,  Eq   PI.  §  876. 

i  Booth  v.  Smith,  5  Sim.  639. 

2  If  the  answer  is  evasive,  it  must  be  ex- 
cepted to;  all  defects  in  the  answer  must  be 


should  be  confined  to  one  question,  though  the 
interrogatories,  as  numbered,  contain  several 
questions;  an  exception  for  insufficiency  may 

754 


be  allowed  as  to  part  and  overruled  as  to  part 
Bennett  v.  Hamlin,  47  N.  J.  Eq.  326. 


EXCEPTIONS    TO    ANSWERS. 


760 


and  praying  that  the  defendant  may,  in  such  respect,  put  in  a  full 
answer.3  If,  however,  the  answer  is  one  which  accompanies  a  plea,  or' 
a  demurrer,  to  part  of  the  bill,  he  must,  unless  he  intends  to  admit 
the  validity  of  the  plea  or  demurrer,  wait  till  it  has  been  argued  :  for 
his  exceptions  would  operate  as  an  admission  of  its  validity.4  This 
rule,  however,  will  not,  as  we  have  seen,  apply  to  cases  where  the 
defendant  demurs,  or  pleads  to  the  relief  only,  and  not  to  the  discovery.5 
And  where  a  demurrer  and  answer  to  interrogatories  were  put  in,  and 
the  plaintiff,  mistaking  the  practice,  excepted  to  the  answer  before  he 
set  down  the  demurrer  for  argument,  he  was  permitted,  upon  payment 
of  costs,  to  withdraw  his  exceptions,  without  prejudice  to  his  filing  them 
again  after  the  argument  of  the  demurrer.6 


supplied  by  taking  exceptions.  Blaisdell  v. 
Stephens,  16  Vt.  179;  see  Travers  v.  Ross, 
N.  J.  Eq.  254.  The  Court  will  not  examine 
whether  an  answer  is  sufficient  or  not,  except 
after  a  reference  for  insufficiency.  Davis  v. 
Davis,  2  Atk.  24.  And,  therefore,  after  excep- 
tions overruled,  the  plaintiff  cannot  take  the 
bill  for  confessed  as  to  the  part  not  answered. 
Smith  v.  St.  Louis  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.  2  Tenn. 
Ch.  604. 

In  Massachusetts,  when  an  oath  is  waived, 
and  in  New  Hampshire  when  an  oath  is  not 
required,  to  an  answer,  no  exception  can  be 
taken  to  it  for  insufficiency.  Mass.  Ch.  Rule  8 ; 
Rule  9  in  New  Hampshire. 

An  answer  to  which  the  oath  of  the  defend- 
ant is  waived  cannot  be  excepted  to  for  insuffi- 
ciency; because  such  answers  are  not  evidence. 
1  Barb.  Ch.  Pr.  177;  Bartlett  v.  Gale,  4  Paige, 
504;  McCormick  v.  Chamberlin,  11  Paige,  543. 
Sheppard  v  Akers,  1  Tenn.  Ch.  326;  Smith  r. 
St.  Louis  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.  2  Tenn.  Ch.  599. 
It  is  otherwise  provided  in  New  Jersey  by  Stat- 
ute. Rev.  Chancer}-,  §  23;  Dick.  Ch.  Pr.  98, 
note.  Exceptions  will  not  lie  to  the  answer  of 
an  infant  for  insufficiency.  Ante,  p.  109,  n. 
Nor  to  the  answer  of  a  corporation,  see  Wallace 
)-.  Wallace,  Halst.  Dig.  173.  Nor  to  the  an- 
swer of  a  peer  upon  protestation  of  honor.  Hill 
r.  Earl  of  Bute,  2  Fowl.  Ex.  Pr.  11.  Nor  to 
the  answer  of  the  Attorney-General.  Davison 
v.  Att.-Gen.  5  Price,  398,  note.  Ante,  p.  737, 
n.  3. 

3  Where  the  interrogatories  are  substan- 
tially, though  not  technically,  answered,  ex- 
ceptions will  not  be  encouraged.  Read  v. 
Wnodrnoffe,  24  Beav.  421.  Exceptions  should 
not  now  be  taken  for  want  of  answer  to  the 
interrogatory  as  to  books  and  papers.  Law 
V.  London  Indisputable  Society,  10  Hare  App. 
20;  Barnard  v.  Hunter,  1  Jur!  N.  S.  1065,  V. 
C.  S  ;  Kidger  v.  Worswick,  5  Jur.  N.  S.  37, 
V.  C.  W. ;    Rochdale  Canal  Co.    v.  King,  15 


Beav.  11;  9  Hare  App.  note;  Piffard  v.  Beeby, 
L.  R.  1  Eq.  623;  see,  however,  Hudson  v. 
Grenfell,  3  Giff.  388;  8  Jur.  N.  S.  878.  An 
interrogator}*  as  to  particular  documents  must, 
however,  be  answered.  Catt  v.  Tourle,  18  W. 
R.  966.  (a)  Where,  by  the  rules  of  Court,  the 
particular  statements  which  a  defendant  is 
expected  to  answer  are  required  to  be  set  forth 
in  writing  at  the  foot  of  the  bill,  the  omission 
of  the  complainant  to  set  them  forth  will  pre- 
clude him  from  taking  advantage  of  the  failure 
of  the  defendant  to  answer.  Sprague  v.  Tyson, 
44  Ala.  338.  And  although  the  complainant's 
omission  is  a  good  ground  of  demurrer,  yet  if 
the  defendant  file  a  full  answer  with  a  demurrer 
for  that  cause,  and  go  to  hearing  on  the  answer 
and  an  agreed  statement  of  facts,  the  error  will 
be  waived.  Martin  r.  Hewitt,  44  Ala.  418.  If 
the  whole  answer  to  a  compound  interrogatory 
is  a  substantial  reply,  though  each  separate 
question  therein  may  not  be  separately  an- 
swered, the  answer  is  sufficient.  Mott  v.  Hall, 
41  Ga.  117.  An  exception  to  an  answer  for 
insufficiency  should  state  the  charges  in  the  bill, 
the  interrogatory  applicable  thereto,  to  which 
the  answer  is  responsive,  and  the  terms  of  the 
answer,  verbatim,  so  that  the  Court  may  see 
whether  it  is  sufficient  or  not.  Brooks  v.  Byam, 
Story,  296.  Exceptions  to  answers  for  insuf- 
ficiency can  only  be  sustained  where  some  ma- 
terial allegation,  charge,  or  interrogatory  in  the 
bill  is  not  fully  answered.  Where  the  matter  of 
the  bill  is  fully  answered,  and  the  defendant  sets 
up  new  matter  which  is  irrelevant,  and  forms 
no  sufficient  grounds  of  defence,  the  plaintiff 
may  except  to  the  answer  for  impertinence,  but 
he  cannot  except  to  it  for  insufficiency.  Staf- 
ford v.  Brown,  4  Paige,  88.  For  form  of 
exceptions,  see  Vol.  III. 

4  Ante,  pp.  589,  691. 

6  Ante,  pp.  590,  691. 

6  Boyd  v.  Mills,  13  Ves.  85;  Story,  Eq.  PI. 
§  866. 


(rc)  When  a  sufficient  affidavit  or  answer  as  allowed  to  deliver  an  interrogatory  as  to  some 
to  documents  has  been  made,  it  is  within  the  specific  document  or  documents.  Hall  v.  Tru- 
Court's  discretion  whether  the  plaintiff  will  be      man,  29  Ch.  D.  307. 

755 


*  762  ANSWERS. 

*  761        *  If   a  plea  or  demurrer  to  the  whole  bill  is  overruled,  the 

defendant  must,  if  interrogatories  have  been  filed,  answer,  with- 
out the  plaintiff  being  driven  to  except ;  but,  where  a  partial  plea  or 
demurrer  is  overruled,  the  plaintiff  must  except:  because  an  answer 
being  on  the  file,  the  defendant  is  not  bound  to  answer  further  till 
exceptions  have  been  taken.1  Where  the  plaintiff  had  not  excepted, 
and  the  defendant  put  in  a  further  answer,  leave  was  given  to  the 
plaintiff  to  file  exceptions  thereto,  although  he  had  filed  none  to  the 
original  answer.2 

A  plaintiff  may  also,  where  a  partial  demurrer  is  allowed,  except  to 
the  answer  to  such  of  the  interrogatories  as  are  not  covered  by  the 
demurrer ;  he  must  not,  however,  except  to  those  which  are  covered 
by  the  demurrer. 

In  the  case  also  of  a  plea,  which  is  accompanied  by  an  answer  to  the 
interrogatories,  the  plaintiff  may,  upon  the  allowance  of  the  plea,  except 
to  the  answer,  as  he  may  if  a  partial  plea  is  overruled ;  and  the  rule 
that  a  plaintiff  must  except  to  the  answer  as  insufficient,  applies  even 
where  the  plea  or  demurrer  is  accompanied  by  an  answer  as  to  a  single 
fact.3  Where  a  plea  is  ordered  to  stand  for  an  answer,  with  liberty  to 
except,  the  plaintiff  may  file  exceptions  to  the  answer,  or  to  that  part  of 
it  to  which  he  is,  by  the  order,  permitted  to  except;  but  where  the  plea 
is  ordered  to  stand  for  an  answer  without  liberty  to  except,  expressly 
given  by  the  order,  the  plaintiff  cannot  except.4 

A  plaintiff  cannot  except  to  an  answer  to  an  amended  bill,  on  the 
ground  that  the  defendant  has  not  answered  matters  inquired  after  in 
the  interrogatories  to  the  original  bill.5  Where,  after  a  defendant  had 
answered,  the  plaintiff  amended  his  bill,  by  stating  an  entirely  new 
case,  it  was  held  that  exceptions  would  lie,  although  some  of  the  inter- 
rogatories embraced  in  them  were  contained  in  the  original  bill.6 

*  762       *  And  so,  where  the  interrogatories  to  the  original  bill  required 

the  defendants  to  state  certain  particulars  as  to  some  goods 
alleged  to  have  been  purchased  by  the  defendants  (such  as,  the  per- 
sons from  whom,  and  by  whom,  and  at  what  price,  and  in  whose  pres- 
ence, they  were  purchased),  and  the  defendants  put  in  an  answer  in 
the  terras  of  the  interrogatories,  whereupon  the  plaintiff  amended  the 
bill,  and  the  defendants  availed  themselves  of  the  opportunity  afforded 
by  their  being  called  upon  to  answer  the  amended  bill,  to  state  that, 
since  putting  in  their  answer  to  the  original  bill,  they  recollected  that  a 

1  Ante,  pp.  600,  691;  see  Kuypers  v  Ref.  Master,  in  considering  the  exceptions  taken  by 
Dutch  Church,  6  Paige,  570,  571.  the  plaintiff  to  "  the  thing"  called  an  answer 

2  Att.-Gen.  v.  London,  12  Beav.  217,  219.  and  disclaimer  to  the  amended  bill,  should  be 
8  Cotes  v.  Turner,  Bunb.  123;  Story,  Eq.  PI.      at  liberty  to  allow  exceptions  as  to  matters,  not 

§  866.  answered  to,  contained    in   the   amended    bill, 

4  Ante,  p.  700.  notwithstanding  the  same  matters  were  stated 

5  Overy  v.  Leighton,  2  S.  &  S.  234;  Wich  v.  in  the  original  bill,  and  no  exceptions  were 
Parker,  22  Beav.  59;  2  Jur.  N.  S  582;  Denis  v.  taken  to  the  answer  to  the  original  bill. 
Rochussen,  4  Jur.  N.  S.  298,  V.  C.  W.  In  6  Mazarredo  v.  Maitland,  3  Mad.  66,  72; 
Glassington  r.  Thwaites,  2  Russ.  458,  464,  this  Partridge  v.  Haycraft,  11  Ves.  570,  581 ;  see 
rule  appears  to  have  been  departed  from;  but  also,  Kaye  v.  Wall,  4  Hare,  128;  Duncombe  v. 
the  circumstances  of  that  case  were  peculiar,  Davis,  1  Hare,  184,  193. 

and  the  Court  made  a  special  order  that   the 

756 


EXCEPTIONS   TO    ANSWERS.  *  763 

parcel  of  the  goods  inquired  after  had  been  purchased  of  an  individual 
not  named  in  the  former  answer,  but  without  stating  from  whom,  or  at 
what  price,  or  in  whose  presence,  the  same  had  been  purchased,  and  the 
plaintiff  excepted  to  the  answer  for  insufficiency,  in  not  setting  out  those 
circumstances  :  the  Court  of  Exchequer  was  of  opinion,  that  the  plaintiff 
ought  not  to  be  precluded,  by  the  general  rule  above  stated,  from  an 
opportunity  of  obtaining  a  sufficient  answer  as  to  the  point  excepted 
to :  but  held  that,  before  delivering  his  exceptions,  the  plaintiff  ought  to 
have  made  a  special  application  to  the  Court  for  leave  to  do  so.1 

The  reason  of  the  rule  that  a  plaintiff,  if  he  does  not  except  to  the 
answer  to  the  original  bill,  cannot  afterwards  except  to  the  answer  to 
an  amended  bill,  on  the  ground  that  the  defendant  has  not  answered 
matters  which  were  contained  in  the  original  bill,  is,  that,  by  amending 
his  bill,  the  plaintiff  has  admitted  the  answer  to  it  to  be  sufficient. 
Upon  the  same  ground  it  has  been  held,  that  where  a  plaintiff,  after 
excepting  to  an  answer,  amends  his  bill  without  waiting  for  the  decision 
upon  the  exceptions,  he  must  be  considered  as  having  waived  his  excep- 
tions.2 The  principle,  however,  will  not  be  applied  to  cases  in  which 
the  amendment  of  the  bill  extends  only  to  the  addition  of  another 
party,  requiring  no  answer  from  the  other  defendants  : 3  and  where  a 
plaintiff,  after  answer  to  the  original  bill,  changed  his  name,  and  then 
amended  his  bill  by  substituting  his  new  name  for  his  old  one,  and 
adding  another  defendant,  and  afterwards  took  exceptions  to  the  answer, 
a  motion  to  take  the  exceptions  off  the  file  was  refused.4 

Some  doubt  was  formerly  entertained,  whether  a  plaintiff  did  not,  by 
moving,  upon  admissions  in  an  answer,  either  for  payment  of  money 
into  Court,  or  for  the  production  of  papers,  waive  his  exceptions,  if 
already  taken,  or  his  right  to  except,  if  he  had  not  already  excepted ; 
and,  in  consequence  of  this  doubt,  a  practice  prevailed  of  making 
such  motions,  "without  prejudice."  In  *  Lane  v.  Paul,1  however,  *  703 
Lord  Langdale  M.  R.  decided  that  the  plaintiff's  right  to  except 
for  insufficiency  was  not  waived  by  his  moving  for  the  production  of 
documents,  and  that  it  was  not  material  that  the  notice  of  motion  should 
be  made  expressly  without  prejudice  to  the  right  to  except. 

Exceptions  to  an  answer  for  insufficiency  must  be  in  writing,2  and 
must  be  signed  by  counsel ; 3  and  if  they  do  not  appear  to  have  been 
so  signed,  they  may  be  ordered,  on  motion,  with  notice  to  the  plaintiff, 
to  be  taken  off  the  file,  even  though  the  defendant  has  taken  a  copy  of 
them,  and  the  plaintiff  has  set  them  down  for  hearing.4  They  must 
also  specify  that  the  answer  complained  of  was  an  answer  to  the  bill.5 

1  Irvine  v.  Viana,  M'Clel.  &  Y.  563.  no  positive  order  requiring  it.    Yates  v.  Hardy, 

2  De  la  Torre  v.  Bernales,  4  Mad.  396.  Jac.  223;  Story,  Kq.  PI.  §  804;  Mitford,  Eq.  PI. 
8  Taylor  v.  Wrench,  9  Ves.  315.  by  Jeremy,  313;  Hitchcock  v.  Rhodes,  42  N.  J. 
4  Miller  v.  Wheatley,  1  Sim.  296.  Eq.  495. 

1  3  Beav.  66,  69.  4  Yates  v.  Hardy,  Jac.  223.     For  form   of 

2  Beames,  78,  181 ;  Woods  v.  Morrell,  1  John.      notice  of  motion,  see  Vol.  III. 

Ch.  103.  5  Earl  of  Lichfield  v.  Bond,  5  Beav.  513,  514, 

3  Cons.  Ord  XVI.  1.  Exceptions  for  insuf-  6  Jur.  1076.  For  form  of  exceptions,  see 
ficiency,  as  well  as  those  for  impertinence,  must      Vol.  III. 


have  the  signature  of  counsel,  though  there  is 


757 


*764 


ANSWERS. 


They  are  intituled  in  the  cause,  and  care  must  be  taken  that  they  are 
properly  described  in  the  heading :  otherwise,  they  may  be  suppressed 
or  taken  off  the  file  for  irregularity.  Thus,  where,  exceptions  having 
been  allowed  to  an  answer,  the  plaintiff  obtained  the  usual  order,  that 
he  might  be  at  liberty  to  amend  his  bill,  and  that  the  defendant  might 
answer  the  amendments  and  exceptions  at  the  same  time,  and  amended 
his  bill,  whereupon  the  defendant  put  in  a  second  answer,  upon  which 
the  plaintiff  took  exceptions  to  the  second  answer,  and  described  them 
as  exceptions  to  the  further  answer  to  the  original  bill,  and  to  the 
answer  to  the  amended  bill,  the  exceptions  were  held  to  be  irregularly 
described,  and  were  ordered  to  be  taken  off  the  file  ;  because  new  excep- 
tions cannot  be  taken  to  a  further  answer  to  an  original  bill.6  The 
present  practice,  however,  in  such  a  case,  appears  to  be,  to  allow  the 
plaintiff  to  amend  on  payment  of  costs.7 

Formerly,  exceptions  for  insufficiency  appear  to  have  set  forth  the 
tenor  or  scope  of  the  bill,  and  the  substance  of  the  answer,  and  then  to 
have  proceeded  to  point  out  particularly  in  what  respect  the  answer 
was  considered  defective  ; 8  but,  according  to  the  modern  practice,  the 
tenor  of  the  bill  and  substance  of  the  answer  are  omitted,  and  the 
plaintiff  proceeds  at  once  to  point  out,  specifically,  the  interrogatories 
or  parts  of  the  interrogatories  which  are  unanswered,  by  sepa- 
*  764  rate  exceptions,  applicable  to  each  part.9  Thus,  *  where  sev- 
eral questions  are  comprised  in  one  numbered  interrogatory,  the 
unanswered  questions  only  should  be  included  in  the  exceptions ; *  and 
where  a  plaintiff  complains  that  a  particular  interrogatory  to  his  bill 
has  not  been  answered,  he  must  state  the  interrogatory  in  its  terms, 
and  not  throw  upon  the  Court  the  trouble  of  determining  whether  the 
expressions  of  the  exceptions  are  to  be  reconciled  with  the  interroga- 
tory.2 (a)  It  is  not,  however  necessary  that  the  exception  should  follow 
the  very  words  of  the  interrogatory,8  provided  that  it  plainly  points  out 
the  interrogatory  to  which  it  refers,4  and  does  not  vary  therefrom  in  any 
important  particular.5 


6  Williams  v.  Davies,  1  S.  &  S.  426;  and 
see  post,  pp.  709,  770. 

7  Earl  of  Lichfield  v.  Bond,  5  Beav.  513;  6 
Jur.  1076;  Bradstock  v.  Whntley,  6  Beav.  61. 

8  See  2  Prax.  Aim.  Curs.  Cane.  508,  et  seq. 

9  On  exceptions  fur  insufficiency,  the  par- 
ticular points  or  matters  in  the  bill  which  re- 
main unanswered,  or  which  are  imperfectly 
answered,  should  be  stated  in  the  exceptions. 
Stafford  v.  Brown,  4  Paige,  88  :  Mitford  Eq.  PI. 
by  Jeremy,  315;  Cooper,  Eq.  PI.  319;  Lube  Eq. 
PI.  87;  see  Dexter  v.  Arnold,  2  Sumner,  108. 
Material  and  necessary  matter  must  be  expli- 
citly met  in  an  answer;  but  exceptions,  founded 
on  verbal  criticisms,  slight  defects  and   omis- 


sions of  immaterial  matter,  will  be  invariably 
disallowed,  and  treated  as  vexatious.  Bagtiott 
v.  Henry,  1  Edw.  Ch.  7;  Gleaves  v.  Morrow,  2 
Tenn.  Ch.  592.     See  form  in  Vol.  III. 

i  Higginson  v.  Blockley,  1  Jur.  N.  S.  1104, 
V.  C.  K.;  see,  however.  Hambrook  v.  Smith,  17 
Sim.  209,  212;  16  Jur;  144;  Hoffmann  v.  Postill, 
L.  R.  4  Ch.  673,  681. 

2  Hodgson  v.  Butterfieid,  2  S.  &  S.  236. 

3  Brown  v.  Keating,  2  Beav.  581,  583;  4 
Jur.  477. 

4  Woodroffe  v.  Daniel,  10  Sim.  243. 

5  Duke  of  Brunswick  v.  Duke  of  Cambridge, 
12  Beav.  279,  280;  Esdaile  v.  Molyneaux,  1  De 
G.  &  S.  218;  Brown  v.  Keating,  ubi  supra. 


(a)  In  Zambaco  v.  Cassavetti,  38  L.  J.  Ch.  an  exception  to  the  answer  in  respect  to  such  an 

503,  it  was  held  that  the  ordinary  questions  in  interrogatory  need  not  specify  which  of  them  is 

an  interrogatory  asking  for  an  account  of  per-  not  answered. 
Bonal  estate  are  not  separate  ques'ions.  and  that 

758 


EXCEPTIONS   TO    ANSWERS.  *  765 

An  exception  for  insufficiency  may  be  allowed  as  to  part,  and  overruled 
as  to  part.6 

Care  must  be  taken,  in  drawing  exceptions,  that  no  mistakes  happen 
therein  ;  for,  after  they  have  been  delivered,  no  new  exception  can  reg- 
ularly be  added.7  Cases,  however,  have  occurred,  where  the  amend- 
ment of  exceptions  has  been  permitted  on  the  ground  of  mistake  ; 8  as 
where  the  plaintiff's  solicitor,  for  the  purpose  of  instructing  his  counsel 
in  drawing  the  exceptions,  sent  him  by  mistake  the  original  draft  of 
the  bill,  instead  of  another  draft  from  which  the  bill  was  engrossed, 
which  differed  materially,  and  the  mistake  was  not  discovered  till  it  was 
too  late  to  rectify  it.9 

In  the  case  of  several  defendants  answering  separately,  exceptions 
must  be  taken  to  each  answer  ; 10  and  if  a  defendant,  who  has  answered 
jointly  with  another  defendant,  dies,  exceptions  may  be  taken  to  the 
answer,  as  being  that  of  the  survivor  only.11 

The  exceptions,  after  they  have  been  drawn  or  perused,  and  signed 
by  counsel,  must  be  written  on  paper  of  the  same  description 
*  and  size  as  that  on  which  bills  are  printed.1  The  signature  of  *  765 
counsel  is  affixed  to  the  draft,  and  copied  on  to  the  engrossment.2 
The  exceptions  must  be  indorsed  with  the  name  and  place  of  business  of 
the  plaintiff's  solicitor,3  or  with  the  name  and  residence  of  the  plaintiff 
himself,  if  suing  in  person,"*  and  with  the  address  for  service,  if  any,  as 
in  the  case  of  other  proceedings  to  be  filed  at  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerks' 
Office.5  Formerly,  the  exceptions  were  only  delivered  to  the  clerk  in 
Court  of  the  opposite  party,  and  were  not  of  record ;  but  now  they  must 
be  filed  at  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerks'  Office,  and  notice  of  the  filing 
thereof  must,  on  the  same  day,  be  given  by  the  plaintiff  or  his  solicitor 
to  the  defendant's  solicitor,  or  to  the  defendant  himself,  where  he  acts 
in  person.6  If  the  plaintiff  does  not  give  due  notice,  the  exceptions  will 
not  be  rendered  invalid,  but  further  time  will  be  given  for  the  next  step, 
on  the  application  of  either  party,  on  payment  of  costs  by  the  plaintiff.7 

The  defendant  whose  answer  is  excepted  to,  should  take  an  office 
copy  of  the  exceptions.8 

6  Per  Lord  Hardwicke,  in  East  India  Co.  v.  10  Sydolph  v.  Monkston,  2  Dick.  609. 

Campbell,  1  Ves.  Sr.  247.     An  exception  bad  "  Lord  Herbert  v.  Pusey,  1  Dick.  255. 

in   part   is   not    necessarily    to   be   overruled.  l  Ord.  6  March,  1860,   r.  16.     As  to  such 

Hoffmann  v.  Postill,  L.  R.  4  Ch.  673;  see  Van  paper,  see  Cons.  Ord.  IX.  3,  ante,  p.  396. 

Rensselaer  v.  Brice,   4   Paige,   174;  Tucker  v.  2  Ante,  p.  312. 

Cheshire  R.  R.  Co.  21  N.  H.  37;  Mclntyre  v.  »  Cons.  Ord.  III.  2. 

Union   College,    6   Paige,    240;    Higginson   v.  4  Cons.  Ord.  III.  5. 

Blockley,  1  Jur.  N.  S.  1104.  5  Ante,  pp.  453,  454. 

'  Partridge-v.  Haycraft,  11  Ves.  575.  6  Cons.  Ord.  XVI.  3.     The  notice  must  be 

8  Dolder  v.  Bank  of  England,  10  Ves.  284.  served  before  seven  o'clock  in  the  evening,  ex- 
Tlie  application  may  be  made  by  summons,  cept  on  Saturday,  when  it  must  be  served  before 
which  must  be  served  on  the  solicitors  of  all  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  or  the  service  will 
the  defendants  affected  by  the  exceptions.  For  be  deemed  to  have  been  made  on  the  following 
form  of  summons,  see  Vol.  III.  day,  or  Monday,  as  the  case  may  be.     Cons. 

9  Bancroft  v.  Wentworth,  cited  10  Ves.  285,  Ord.  XXXVII.  2;  ante,  p.  455.  For  form  of 
note.     In  Northcote  v.  Northcote,  1  Dick.  22,  it  notice,  see  Vol.  III. 

is  stated  that  liberty  was  given  to  amend  excep-  "  Bradstock  v.  Whalley,  6  Beav.  61,  62;  see 

tions  after  arguing  them,  but  it  does  not  appear      also  Lowe  v.  Williams,  12  Beav.  482,  484. 
upon  what  ground  such  liberty  was  given.  8  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVI.  1. 

759 


*  766  ANSWERS. 

After  the  filing  of  a  defendant's  answer,  the  plaintiff  has  six  weeks 
within  which  he  may  file  exceptions  thereto  for  insufficiency ; 9  and  if  he 
does  not  file  them  within  six  weeks,  such  answer,  on  the  expiration  of  the 
six  weeks,  will  be  deemed  sufficient.10  Where  the  plaintiff  desires  to 
except  to  an  answer  filed  to  an  amended  bill,  to  which  the  plaintiff  has 
not  required  an  answer,  he  must  obtain  a  special  order  for  that  purpose 
within  fourteen  days  after  the  answer  is  filed.11 

By  the  original  practice  of  the  Court  the  plaintiff  might  obtain, 

*  766    *  as  of  course,  an  order  to  deliver  exceptions  nunc  pro  tunc  ;  but 

this  is  now  expressly  prohibited ; :  and  such  an  order  will  not 
now  be  made  even  by  consent.  If  necessary,  however,  a  special  order 
will  be  made,  that  the  plaintiff  may  be  at  liberty  to  file  exceptions,  not- 
withstanding the  time  for  filing  them  has  expired.2  The  application  for 
such  order  may  be  made  by  notice  of  motion,  or  by  summons  ; 3  and 
the  notice  or  summons  should  be  served  on  the  solicitors  of  those  de- 
fendants only  to  whose  answers  the  exceptions  are  to  be  filed.  By  con- 
sent, such  an  order  may  also  be  made,  on  petition,  as  of  course,  at  the 
Bolls.4  Further  time  to  file  exceptions  may  also  be  applied  for  by  sum- 
mons at  Chambers,5  which  must  be  served  on  the  solicitors  of  the 
defendants  to  whose  answers  exceptions  are  in  contemplation. 

If  a  plea  and  answer,  or  demurrer  and  answer,  have  been  filed,  and 
the  plea  or  demurrer  is  overruled,  the  time  for  excepting  to  the  answer 
for  insufficiency  is  six  weeks,  reckoned  from  the  day  on  which  the  plea 
or  demurrer  is  overruled.6 

If  a  plea  is  ordered  to  stand  for  an  answer,  with  liberty  to  except, 
and  no  time  is  fixed  within  which  the  exceptions  are  to  be  filed,  the  six 
weeks  for  filing  the  exceptions  will  be  reckoned  from  the  date  of  the 
order  directing  the  plea  to  stand  for  an  answer.7 

The  times  of  vacation  are  not  reckoned  in  the  computation  of  the  time 
allowed  for  filing  exceptions  for  insufficiency.8    No  exceptions  can  be 


9  See  the   61st  Equity   Rule  of   the  U.   S.  from  the  filing  of  the  answer,  and  not  from  the 

Courts,  post,  p.  2389.     See  also  the  17th  Mass.  acceptance  of  costs  of  a  contempt.    Nicklin  v. 

Ch.   Rule,  providing  that   "the  plaintiff  shall  Patten,    4    Beav.    126;    5   Jur.   547;    Coyle  v. 

reply,  or  file  exceptions,  or  set  down,  the  cause  Alleyne,  16  Beav.  548;  but  the  times  of  vacation 

for  hearing  on  the  bill  and  answer,  within  one  are  excluded.     Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.  13  (2). 
month  after  the  answer  is  required  to  be  filed;  1  Cons.  Ord.  XVI.  5. 

or  if  the  answer  be  tiled  before  it  is  required,  2  Biddulph  v.  Lord  Camoys,  9  Beav.  155; 

then  within  one  month  after  written  notice  of  see  American  Loan  &  Trust  Co.  v.  East&  West 

such   tiling;  and  if  he  fail  so  to  do,  a  decree  Ry.  Co.  40  Fed.  Rep.  384. 
may  be  entered  for  the  dismissal  of  the  bill  with  3  For  forms  of  notice  of  motion  and  sum- 

costs."     See  for  New  Hampshire,  38  N  H.  609,  mons,  see  Vol.  III. 
Rule  20;  for  Maine,  37  Maine,  583,  Rule  8.  4  For  form  of  petition,  see  Vol.  III. 

In  Tennessee,  exceptions  must  be  filed  with-  s  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVTI.  17;  and  see  Nicklin 

in  twenty  days  after  notice  of  answer   filed.  v.  Patten,  ubi  supra.     For  form  of  summons, 

Code,  §  4400;' Chancery  Rules,  rule  1,  §  5.  see  Vol.  III. 

i°  Cons.  Ord.  XXXIII.   12  (3).    In  New  6  Esdaile  v.  Molyneaux,  2  Coll.  614;  11  Jur. 

Hampshire,  exceptions  will  be  deemed  waived,  201. 

unless  allowed  and  delivered  to  the  defendant's  7  Ante,    p.  701.      Every   special   order  for 

solicitor  within  one  month  from  the  delivery  of  leave  to  except  should  specify  the  time  within 

the  answer,  or  unless  further  time  be  allowed  which  the  exceptions  are  to  be  filed, 
by  the  justice.     Ch.  Rule  20,  38  N.  H.  609.  8  Cons.  Old.  XXXVII.  13  (2);  but  see,  in 

11  Cons  Ord.  XVI.  6.     The  time  runs  strictly  cases  of  election,  Cons.  Ord.  XL1I. 

760 


EXCEPTIONS   TO    ANSWERS.  *  767 

taken  to  an  answer  for  insufficiency,  after  replication ; 9  in  some  cases, 
however,  the  Court  has,  on  special  application,  permitted  the  replica- 
tion to  be  withdrawn,  and  exceptions  to  be  then  filed.10  If  the  plaintiff 
files  replication,  or  serves  notice  of  motion  for  a  decree,  he  is  considered 
to  have  admitted  the  answer  to  be  sufficient,  and  cannot  compel  a  fur- 
ther answer,  even  though  the  first  has  been  found  insufficient.11 

The  defendant  may,  if  he  think  it  advisable,  submit  to  the  exceptions ; 
and  where  he  does  so  without  an  order  of  the  Court,  the  answer  will  be 
deemed  insufficient  from  the  date  of  the  submission.12  If  he  desires  to 
prevent  the  exceptions  being  set  down  for  hearing,  he  must  submit  to 
them  within  eight  days  after  the  filing  thereof.13  The  submission 
is  made  by  notice  to  the  plaintiff's  *  solicitor,  and  payment  of  20*-.  *  767 
costs  ; ]  and  where  a  defendant,  not  being  in  contempt,  submits 
before  the  exceptions  are  set  down  for  hearing,  he  has  fourteen  days 
from  the  date  of  the  submission  within  which  to  put  in  his  further 
answer ; 2  but  he  may  apply  for  further  time,  by  summons  at  Chambers,3 
which  must  be  served  on  the  plaintiff's  solicitor,  but  not  on  the  solicitor 
of  any  co-defendant.  If  the  defendant  does  not  answer  within  the  four- 
teen days,  or  obtain  further  time,  and  answer  within  such  further  time, 
the  plaintiff  may  sue  out  process  of  contempt  against  him.4 

Where  two  or  more  defendants  put  in  a  joint  and  several  answer, 
which  is  excepted  to  for  insufficiency,  and  one  or  more  of  them  submit 
to  the  exceptions,  the  others  may  have  them  argued.5 

If  the  defendant  does  not  submit  to  the  exceptions,  the  plaintiff  may 
set  them  down  for  hearing.6  The  exceptions  are  not,  however,  to  be 
set  down  before  the  expiration  of  eight  days  from  the  filing  thereof, 
unless,  in  a  case  of  election,  the  defendant  has,  by  notice  in  writing, 
required  the  plaintiff  to  set  them  down  within  four  days  from  the  ser- 
vice of  the  notice.7     The  exceptions  must  be  set  down  within  fourteen 


9  Cons.  Ord.  XVI.  7.  3  Cons.    Ord    XVI.  15;   XXXVII.    17,  18. 

10  Wyatt's  P.  R.  202.  For  form  of  summons,  see  Vol.  III. 

11  Boyse  v.  Cokell,  18  Jur.  770,  V.  C.  W.  4  Cons.  Ord.  XVI.  15.  In  New  Hampshire, 
i2  Cons.  Ord.  XVI.  18.  "  if  the  defendant,  on  notice  of  exceptions  to 
18  Ibid.  It  is  presumed  that,  in  a  proper  his  answer,  shall  deliver  to  the  plaintiff's  solid- 
case,  further  time  to  submit  may  be  obtained  tor,  before  the  day  appointed  for  the  hearing 
on  summons,  to  be  served  on  the  plaintiff's  thereon,  a  sufficient  answer,  the  same  shall  be 
solicitor;  see  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.  17;  and  see  received  without  costs.  If  the  exceptions  are 
Mayer  v.  Frith,  1859,  M.  164.  For  form  of  sustained,  the  defendant  shall  deliver  to  the 
summons,  see  Vol.  III.  plaintiff's  solicitor  a  full  and  complete  answer 

1  Braithwaite's  Pr.  129;  Cons.  Ord.  XL.  13.  thereto  within  one  month,  and  pay  such  costs 
For  form  of  submission,  see  Vol.  III.  as  the   justice  allowing  such  exceptions    shall 

2  Cons.  Ord.  XVI.  9.  See  the  63d  Equity  order ;  or  the  bill  shall  be  taken  pro  confesso  ; 
Rule  of  the  U.  S.  Courts,  post,  p.  2390.  In  but  if  the  plaintiff  so  elects,  he  may  move  for 
Tennessee,  the  exceptions  shall  be  set  for  hear-  process  of  contempt  to  compel  an  answer." 
ing  by  the  plaintiff  within  ten  days  after  they  Ch.  Rule  21,  38  N.  H.  609. 

are  tiled,  and  acted  on  by  him  immediately.  6  Hinde.  268;  Wyatt's  Pr.  204. 

Ch.  Rules,  rule  1,  §  5;    Code,  §  4402.     Appeal  6  13  &  14  Vic.  c.  35,  §  27. 

lies  to  the  Chancellor,  from  the  action  of  the  7  Cons.  Ord.  XVI.  11;  XLII.  6. 

Master.     Code  §§  4402,  4403,  4404:  Ch.  Rules, 

rule  1,  §  4;  Johnson  r.  Tucker,  2  Tenn.  Ch. 

246. 

761 


*  768  ANSWERS. 

days  from  the  filing  thereof ;  otherwise,  the  answer,  on  the  expiration 
of  such  fourteen  days,  will  be  deemed  sufficient.8 

The  Court  will,  however,  on  a  special  case  being  made,  allow  excep- 
tions to  be  set  down  for  hearing  after  the  expiration  of  the  fourteen 
days;9  and,  in  injunction  cases,  if  the  insufficiency  of  the  answer  is 
shown  as  a  cause  against  dissolving  the  injunction,  the  Court  will  direct 
the  exceptions  to  be  set  down  and  argued  instanter.10  Any  objection, 
on  the  ground  that  the  exceptions  were  not  set  down  in  proper  time, 
should  be  taken  when  they  come  on  for  hearing. 

*  7G8        *  The  times  of  vacation  are  not  reckoned  in  the  computation  of 

the  times  appointed  for  setting  down  exceptions  for  insufficiency, 
except  where  the  time  has  been  limited,  in  a  case  of  election,  in  conse- 
quence of  the  defendant  having,  by  notice  in  writing,  required  the  plain- 
tiff to  set  down  the  exceptions  within  four  days  from  the  service  of  the 
notice.1 

Exceptions  to  answers  for  insufficiency  are  set  down  to  be  heard 
before  the  judge  to  whose  Court  the  cause  is  attached,2  on  production 
to  the  Registrars'  clerk,  at  the  order  of  course  seat,  by  the  plaintiff,  of 
a  certificate  of  the  Clerk  of  Records  and  Writs  of  the  filing  of  such 
exceptions,  or  of  the  filing  of  a  further  answer.  The  plaintiff's  solicitor 
must  indorse  the  certificate,  with  a  request  that  the  exceptions  be  set 
down,  which  will  be  done  on  the  same  day  that  the  certificate  and 
request  are  produced  to  the  Registrars'  clerk.8  The  exceptions  will 
then  be  advanced,  and  put  in  the  paper  for  hearing  on  an  early  day  ;  and 
the  plaintiff's  solicitor  must,  on  the  same  day  on  which  the  exceptions 
are  set  down,  serve  notice  thereof  on  the  defendant :  otherwise,  the  ex- 
ceptions will  be  deemed  not  set  down.4 

Before  the  exceptions  come  on  to  be  heard,  the  solicitor  for  the  plain- 
tiff should  leave  with  the  Usher,  for  the  use  of  the  Court,  two  printed 
copies  of  the  bill  and  answer,  and  a  copy  of  the  exceptions,  and  of  the 
interrogatories  to  the  answers  to  which  the  exceptions  are  taken.5 

If  the  defendant  does  not  appear  at  the  hearing,  the  exceptions  will 
be  heard  ex  parte,  on  production  by  the  plaintiff  of  an  office  copy  of  an 
affidavit  of  service  on  the  defendant  of  the  notice  of  setting  down  the 
exceptions.6  If  the  plaintiff  does  not  appear,  the  exceptions  will  be 
overruled,  as  of  course,  with  costs,  on  production  by  the  defendant  of  an 

8  Cons.  Ord.  XVI.  12  ;  but  see  ante,  p.  768,  notice  of  the  time  and  place  at  which  the  same 
n.  (13);  see  61st  Equity  Rule  of  the  U.  S.  will  be  heard  before  such  justice,  being  season- 
Courts,  and  the  17th  Mass.  Ch.  Rule,  ante,  ably  given  to  the  defendant's  solicitor.  Ch. 
p.  765,  note.  Rule  20. 

9  See  Tuck  r.  Rayment,  9  Beav.  38;  Cons.  3  Cons.  Ord.  XVI.  10;  Reg.  Regul.  15  March, 
Ord.  XXXVII.  17.  I860,  rr.  1,  5.    For  form  of  request,  see  Vol.  III. 

i"  Hughes  v.  Thomas,  7  Beav.  584.  4  Cons.  Ord.  XVI.  10.     For  form  of  notice, 

i  Cpns.  Ord.  XXXVII.  13  (2);  XLII.  6.  see  Vol.  III. 

2  Cons.  Ord.  VI.  4.     Exceptions  to  a  de-  6  See   Davis   t».   Ea.l   of   Dysart,  4   W.  R. 

fendant's  answer  in    South   Carolina  may   be  41,  M.   R.;  and   Cons.   Ord.   XXI.  12.     Each 

heard   and   determined  by  the   Court  without  counsel  should  be  furnished  with  printed  copies 

the  intervention  of  a  Master.     Satterwhitf  v.  of  the  bill  and  answer,  and  brief  copies  of  the 

Davenport,  10  Rich.  Eq.  (S.  C)  305.     In  New  exceptions  and  interrogatories  above  mentioned. 

Hampshire,  exceptions  to   an  answer  may  be  6  For  form  of  affidavit,  see  Vol.  III. 
allowed   bv  a  justice,    a  copv   thereof  and   a 

"  762 


EXCEPTIONS   TO    ANSWERS.  *  769 

office  copy  of  an  affidavit  of  having  been  served  with  the  notice  of  set- 
ting down  the  exceptions.7  If  neither  side  appear,  the  exceptions  will 
be  struck  out  of  the  paper. 

Where  both  sides  appear,  the  plaintiff's  counsel  is  first  heard 
in  *  support  of  the  exceptions,  then  the  counsel  for  the  defend-    *  7G9 
ant ;  and  the  plaintiff's  counsel  is  entitled  to  a  reply.     The  Court 
will  then  dispose  of  the  exceptions,  by  overruling  or  allowing  them,  in 
whole  or  in  part.1 

No  exceptions  will  be  allowed  to  stand  over  for  an  indefinite  period  ; 2 
and  in  deciding  on  the  sufficiency  or  insufficiency  of  any  answer,  the 
relevancy  or  materiality  of  the  statement  or  question  referred  to  is  to 
be  taken  into  consideration.3  Either  party  has  a  right  to  the  judgment 
of  the  Court  upon  each  of  the  exceptions.4 

If,  upon  the  hearing  of  the  exceptions,  the  answer  is  held  sufficient, 
it  will  be  deemed  to  be  so  from  the  date  of  the  order  made  on  the 
hearing.5 

If  the  first  or  second  answer  is  held  to  be  insufficient,  or  the  defend- 
ant (not  being  in  contempt)  submits  to  answer  the  exceptions  after 
they  are  set  down  for  hearing,  the  Court  may  appoint  a  time  within 
which  the  defendant  must  put  in  his  further  answer  ; 6  and  if  the  defend- 
ant does  not  answer  within  the  time  so  appointed,  or  obtain  further 
time,7  and  answer  within  such  further  time,  the  plaintiff  may  sue  out 
process  of  contempt  against  him.8  A  defendant,  however,  who  is  in 
contempt  for  want  of  a  further  answer,  cannot  procure  an  enlargement 
of  the  time  for  putting  in  his  further  answer,9  unless  the  plaintiff  waives 
his  right  to  object  to  the  application  on  that  ground. 

If,  after  the  exceptions  have  been  allowed  or  submitted  to,  the  plain- 
tiff desires  to  amend  his  bill,  he  may,  on  petition  at  the  Eolls,10  obtain 
an  order,  as  of  course,  that  he  may  be  at  liberty  to  amend  his  bill,  and 
that  the  defendant  may  answer  the  amendments  and  exceptions  at 
the    same    time.11      The    defendant    must    then,    as    we    have    before 

1  Lumley  v.  Desborough,  17  W.  R.  5.  For  as  to  objections  on  the  ground  of  want  of  ma- 
form  of  order,  see  Seton,  1257,  No.  9;  and  for  teriality. 

form  of  affidavit,  see  Vol.  III.    In  Latouche  r.  *  Rowe  v.  Gudgeon,  1  V.  &  B.  331;  Agar 

Sampson,  cited  Seton,  1257,  it  was,  however,  v.  Gurney,  2  Mad.  389. 
held  that  the  exceptions  being  in  the  paper,  and  5  Cons.  Ord.  XVI.  18. 

the  defendant's  presence,  were  sufficient  proof  6  Cons.  Ord.  XVI.  14;  see  Manchester,  Shef- 

of  the  notice  having  been  served;  so  that  the  field,    and    Lincolnshire    Ry.   Co.    v.  Worksop 

affidavit  of   service  seems  to   be  unnecessary  Board  of  Health,  2  K.  &  J." 25. 
where  the  plaintiff  is  the  defaulter.  7  An  application  for  further  time   may  be 

i  For  form  of  order,  see  Seton,  1256,  No.  8.  made   at  Chambers  by  summons,  which  must 

As  to  the  effect  of  the  death  of  the  defendant  be  served  on  the  plaintiff's  solicitor.     For  form, 

pending  the  exceptions,  see  Pearse  v.  Dobinson,  see  Vol.  III. 

L.  R.   3  Ch.  8.     And  where,  on   argument   of  8  Cons.  Ord.  XIV.  15.    See  the  64th  Equity 

the  exceptions,  it   has  been  held  that  the  de-  Rule  of  the  U.  S.  Courts,  post,  p.  2390. 
fendant  is  bound  to  disclose  the  contents  of  a  «  Wheat  v.  Graham,  5  Sim.  570. 

deed,  an  order  for  its  production,  so  far  as  any  'n  For  form  of  petition,  see  Vol.  III. 

interest  is  given  thereby  to  the  plaintiff,  is  a  "  The  United  States  Circuit  Court  may.  for 

matter  of    course.     Chichester   v.    Marquis  of  the  purpose   of   avoiding  unnecessary  delays, 

Donegal,  18  W.  R.  427.  entertain  a  motion  to  amend  a  bill  in   Equity, 

Cons.  Ord.  XXI.  13.  at  the  same  time  that  exceptions  to  the  answer 

8  Cons.  Ord.  XVI.  4;  see  ante,  pp.  715-519,  are    filed,  and  may  require   the  defendants  to 

763 


*  771  ANSWERS. 

*  770    seen,12  put  in  his  further  answer,  and  his  answer  *  to  the  amend- 

ments, within  fourteen  days  after  service  of  the  interrogatories  to 
the  amended  bill.1  The  order  must  be  served  on  the  defendant's  solici- 
tor ;  and  if  the  defendant  can  put  in  his  further  answer  before  he  is 
served  with  the  order,  he  will  deprive  the  plaintiff  of  the  benefit  of  it, 
and  it  will  be  discharged  for  irregularity,2  notwithstanding  the  defend- 
ant has  notice  of  the  order  at  the  time  he  files  his  further  answer.8 

If,  after  exceptions  allowed  or  submitted  to,  the  defendant  puts  in  a 
second  or  third  answer  which  the  plaintiff  considers  insufficient,  he  may 
at  once  set  down  the  old  exceptions  for  hearing,4  and  give  notice 
thereof  to  the  defendant.5  If  the  plaintiff  does  not  set  down  the 
old  exceptions  within  fourteen  days  after  the  further  answer  has  been 
put  in,  it  will,  on  the  expiration  of  such  fourteen  days,  be  deemed 
sufficient.6 

The  plaintiff  must  state,  in  the  notice  of  setting  down  the  old  excep- 
tions, the  particular  exception  or  exceptions  to  which  he  requires  a  fur- 
ther answer ; 7  and  if  he  does  not  do  so,  he  may  be  ordered  to  pay  the 
costs  of  the  defendant's  appearing  to  object  on  account  of  the  irregularity 
of  the  notice.  Leave  will,  however,  be  given  to  the  plaintiff,  to  amend 
the  notice,  and  set  down  the  exceptions  again.8 

The  exceptions  so  set  down  come  on  for  argument  in  Court  as  before 
explained  ;  and  previously  thereto  the  Judge  should  be  furnished  with  a 
printed  copy  of  the  further  answer,  in  addition  to  the  former  papers. 

If  the  defendant  submits  to  the  old  exceptions,  which  have  been  set 
down  after  a  further  answer  has  been  put  in,  an  application  for  time  to 
put  in  a  further  answer  should  not  be  made  at  Chambers :  because,  by 
consenting  to  that  course,  the  plaintiff  might  be  held  to  have  waived 
the  exceptions  ;  but  the  exceptions  should  be  allowed  to  come  on  for 
hearing  before  the  Court,  and  a  time  will  then  be  fixed  within  which 
the  defendant  must  put  in  his  further  answer.9 

No  new  exceptions  can  be  taken  to  a  second  or  third  answer.  Where, 
however,  the  bill  has   been   amended,  and  an   answer  is  subse- 

*  771    quently  filed,  the  plaiutiff  may  file  new  exceptions,  specifying  *the 

interrogatories  to  the  amended  bill  which  he  does  not  think  suf- 
ficiently answered ;  but  such  new  exceptions  must  not  extend  to  any 
matter  which  was  contained  in  the  interrogatories  to  the  original  bill.1 

answer  the  amended  matter  and  the  exceptions  6  Cons.  Ord.  XVI.  13,  16. 

together.  Kittredge  v.  Claremont  Bank,  3  Storv,  7  Cons.    Ord.    XVI.    17.      See    notice    in 

590.  Vol.  III. 

12  jn(e  p.  738.  8  Tanner   ».    Strutton,    15   Jur.  457,  V.  C. 

1  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.  6;    see  Bennington  Ld.  C;  Thomas  v.  Hawlings,  28  Beav.  346. 
Iron  Co.  v.  Campbell,  2  Paige,  160.  9  Manchester,    Sheffield,   and    Lincolnshire 

2  Mayne  v.  Hochin,  1  Dick.  255 ;  Bethuen  Ry.  Co.  v.  Worksop  Board  of  Health,  2  K.  &  J. 
v.  Bateman,  id.  296;  Knox  V.  Symmonds,  1  Yes.  25.  It  would  seem,  however.that  the  plaintiff  and 
Jr.  87,  88;  Paty  v.  Simpson,  2  Cox,  392;  defendant  may  agree  that,  to  save  expense,  the 
Partridge  v.  Haycraft,  11  Yes.  570,  578;  Hem-  application  shall  be  made  by  summor  s  at  Cham- 
mine  v.  Dingwall,  8  Beav.  102.  bers;  in  which  case  the  order  should  state  that, 

s  Pariente  v.  Bensusan,  13  Sim.  522;  7  Jur.  by  consent,  the  exceptions  shall  not  be  deemed 

018.  to  be  waived  or  prejudiced. 

*  Cons.  Ord.  XVI.  13.  l  Partridge  v.  Haycraft,  11  Ves.  570,  581. 

6  For  form  of  notice,  see  Vol.  III. 

764 


EXCEPTIONS   TO    ANSWERS.  *  772 

Where  the  bill  has  been  amended,  the  plaintiff  must  go  before  the  Court 
upon  the  old  exceptions,  as  they  apply  to  the  original  bill,  and  upon 
new  exceptions  as  to  the  new  matter  introduced  by  the  amendments  ;  in 
such  case,  however,  he  may  have  the  judgment  of  the  Court  upon  the 
answer  to  the  amendments,  with  reference  to  such  parts  of  the  original 
bill  as  apply  to  them ;  and  if  the  original  words  apply  to  the  amend- 
ments, the  Court,  in  considering  whether  the  answer  is  sufficient  as  to 
the  amendments,  will  take  into  consideration  everything  in  the  amended 
bill  that  gives  a  construction  to  the  amendments.2 

The  proceedings  in  Court  upon  exceptions  to  a  second  or  third  answer 
for  insufficiency  are  precisely  the  same  as  those  upon  exceptions  to  a  first. 
The  Court,  however,  in  deciding  upon  the  exceptions,  will  not  look  at  the 
second  or  third  answer  only,  but  will  look  at  it  in  connection  with  the 
preceding  answer.8  If  the  Court,  upon  looking  into  the  answers  in  the 
manner  above  stated,  is  still  of  opinion  that  no  sufficient  answer  is  given 
to  the  matter  originally  excepted  to,  judgment  will  be  given  accordingly, 
and  the  exceptions  will  be  allowed. 

If  a  first  or  second  answer  is  held  insufficient,  the  Court  will,  as  we 
have  seen,  appoint  a  time  within  which  the  further  answer  must  be  put 
in ; 4  but  in  the  case  of  a  third  insufficient  answer,  this  is  unnecessary  ; 
for,  in  such  a  case,  the  Court  may  order  the  defendant  to  be  examined 
upon  interrogatories  to  the  point  as  to  which  it  is  held  to  be  insufficient, 
and  to  stand  committed  until  he  shall  have  perfectly  answered  the  inter- 
rogatories ;  and  the  defendant  must  pay  such  costs  as  the  Court  shall 
think  fit  to  award.5  After  a  third  answer  has  been  held  insufficient,  a 
fourth  answer  is  irregular,  and  will  be  ordered  to  be  taken  off  the  file.5 

If  the  defendant  is  ordered  to  stand  committed,  a  copy  of  the  order  of 
committal  must  be  delivered  to  the  Tipstaff  of  the  Court,  who  will 
proceed  to  arrest  the  defendant.  If  the  defendant  is  *  arrested,  *  772 
he  should,  in  strictness,  be  taken  to  Whitecross  Street  Prison  ; 1 
but  in  Farquharson  v.  Balfour*  the  defendant,  being  a  gentleman  ad- 
vanced in  years,  was,  by  the  order  of  the  Court,  allowed  to  remain  at  a 
hotel  in  the  neighborhood  of  Lincoln's  Inn,  in  the  custody  of  the  Tipstaff, 
till  his  examination  should  be  completed. 

If  a  defendant  should,  after  plea  overruled,  put  in  two  answers  which 
are  insufficient,  it  seems  the  plea  is  not  treated  as  an  answer,  and  he  will 
not  be  liable  to  the  consequences  of  a  third  insufficient  answer.8 

If  a  plaintiff,  having  obtained  the  order  that  the  defendant  be  exam- 

2  Partridge  v.  Hayeraft,  11  Ves.  581.  pean  &  American  Shipping  Co.  id.   514.     But 

3  Farquharson  v.  Balfour,  T.  &  K.  189.  see  Danell  v.   Page,  16  W.  R.  1080.      By  the 

4  Cons.  Old.  XVI.  14;  ante,  p.  709.  19th   Mass.  Ch.  Rule   upon   a  second   answer 
8  Cons.  Ord.  XVI.  19.     This  order  does  not  being    adjudged    insufficient,    costs    shall     he 

apply  to  a  third  insufficient  affidavit  as  to  docu-  doubled  by  the  Court :  and   the  defendant  may 

ments.     Harford  v.  Lloyd,  2  W.  R.  537,  V.  C.  be   examined   upon    interrogatories   and  coni- 

W.;   and  as  to  the  practice   in   the  case  of  an  mitted  until  he  shall  answer  them. 

insufficient  answer  to  interrogatories  exhibited  6  Liverpool  v.  Chippendall,  14  Jur.  301,  V. 

in  prosecuting  a  decree  at  Chambers,  see  Hay-  C.  E. 

■ward  v.  Hayward,  Kay  App.  31;  see  also  All-  i  25  &  20  Vic.  c.  104.  §  2. 

frey   v.    Allfrey,    12    Beav.    620;    Rishton    v.  2  See  T.  &:  R.  184.  l'tl,  193. 

Grissell.  14  W.  R.  578,  789;    Croskey  v.  Euro-  »  Clotworthy  v.  Mellish,  1  Ch.  Cas.  279. 

765 


*  773  ANSWERS. 

ined  upon  interrogatories,  means  to  exhibit  interrogatories,  he  must,  if 
the  defendant  is  in  custody,  do  so  immediately.4  The  interrogatories 
are  drawn  by  counsel,  but  must  be  settled  by  the  Judge  ; 5  care  being 
taken  that  they  go  directly  to  the  points  as  to  which  the  exceptions  are 
sustained ;  and  the  Judge  must  determine  whether  they  have  a  direct 
reference  to  those  points  or  not.6  The  subsequent  proceedings  would 
seem  to  be  as  follows :  The  interrogatories  having  been  settled  by  the 
Judge,  a  fair  copy  thereof  is  made  by  the  plaintiff,  on  paper  of  the  same 
description  and  size  as. that  on  which  bills  are  printed;7  and  the  signa- 
ture of  the  Judge's  Chief  Clerk  is  obtained  to  a  memorandum  of  allow- 
ance in  the  margin  thereof.8  The  copy  so  allowed  is  left  at  the  Judge's 
Chambers,  and  notice  thereof  is  given  to  the  defendant  by  the  plaintiff.9 
The  defendant  may  then  procure  a  copy  of  the  interrogatories  from  the 
Chambers ;  and  he  should  prepare  a  written  answer  thereto,10  and  ob- 
tain at  Chambers  an  appointment  to  proceed  thereon.  On  attending 
such  appointment,  the  defendant  will  be  examined  on  oath  by  the  Judge, 
who  will  compare  the  proposed  answer  with  the  interrogatories,  and 
determine  whether  or  not  it  is  sufficient.  If  the  proposed  answer,  or 
examination  as  it  is  called,  is  considered  insufficient  in  any  respect,  the 
defect  will  be  supplied  by  the  personal  examination  of  the  defendant  by 
the  Judge,  until  the  Judge  is  of  opinion  that  the  examination  is  suffi- 
cient. The  examination,  when  completed,  will  be  authenticated  by  the 
signature  of  the  Judge's  Chief  Clerk  ;  and  he  will  transmit  the  inter- 
rogatories and  examination  to  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerks'  Office, 

*  773    to  be  there  filed  ;  u  and  notice  of  the  filing  *  thereof  must  be  given 

by  the  defendant  to  the  plaintiff.1  The  defendant  is  entitled  to  be 
attended  b}^  his  counsel  at  his  examination,  but  the  plaintiff  is  not  entitled 
to  notice  of  the  defendant's  being  under  examination,  and  has  no  right  to 
attend.2 

The  defendant  having  passed  his  examination  to  the  satisfaction  of 
the  Judge,  may  apply  to  be  discharged  out  of  custody.  He  is  not,  how- 
ever, entitled  to  be  discharged  until  the  plaintiff  has  had  an  opportunity 
of  perusing  the  examination,  in  order  that  he  may  be  satisfied  that  it  is 
sufficient.8  The  plaintiff  has  also  a  right,  before  the  defendant  is  dis- 
charged, to  see  all  the  documents  mentioned  in  the  schedules,  or  referred 
to  in  the  examination,  if  they  are  so  mentioned  or  referred  to  that,  in 
the  case  of  an  answer,  they  would  have  made  part  of  the  answer.4 

The  application  for  the  discharge  of  the  defendant  from  custody  is 
made  on  motion,  notice  of  which  must  be  given  to  the  plaintiff ; 5  and  the 


4  Farquharson  v.  Balfour,  T.  &  R.  184,  191.  u  See  Cons.  Ord.  XXXV.  31.      The  exami- 

5  See  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  80,  §  26;  Haywanl  v.  nation  does  not  require  the  signature  of  counsel: 
Hayward,  Kay  App.  31.     For  form  of  interrog-  Braithwaite's  Pr.  45. 

atories,  see  Vol.  III.  1  For  form  of  notice,  see  Vol.  III. 

6  Farquharson  v.  Balfour,  T.  &  R.  203.  2  Farquharson  v.  Balfour.  T.  &  R.  202,  203; 

7  Ord.  6  Mar.  1860,  r.  16.     As  to  such  paper,  see  Hayward  v.  Hayward.  Kay  App.  31. 
see  Cons.  Ord.  IX.  3;  ante,  p.  396.  3  Farquharson  v.  Balfour,  T.  &  R.  201. 

8  For  form  of  memorandum,  see  Vol.  III.  4  Ibid.  202. 

9  For  form  of  notice,  see  Vol.  III.  5  For  form  of  notice,  see  Vol.  III. 
10  For  the  formal  parts,  see  Vol.  III. 

766 


EXCEPTIONS   TO    ANSWERS.  *  M  4 

order  will  be  made  upon  payment  of  the  costs,  charges,  and  expenses 
occasioned  to  the  plaintiff  by  the  insufficient  answer.6 

Where  the  defendant  submits  to  exceptions  for  insufficiency  which 
have  not  been  set  down  for  hearing,  he  must  pay  to  the  plaintiff  20s. 
costs;  and  where  a  plaintiff  obtains  a  decree  with  costs,  the  costs 
occasioned  to  the  plaintiff  by  the  insufficiency  of  the  answer  of  any 
defendant,  who  has  submitted  to  exceptions  for  insufficiency,  will  be 
deemed  to  be  part  of  the  plaintiff's  costs  in  the  cause ;  such  sum  being 
deducted  therefrom  as  shall  have  been  paid  by  the  defendant,  upon  the 
exceptions  to  the  said  answer  being  submitted  to.7  It  must  be  recol- 
lected, however,  that  this  rule  will  only  apply  where  the  question  of 
the  extra  costs  has  not  been  disposed  of  by  the  Court  in  the  course 
of  the  suit.8 

Under  the  old  practice  of  the  Court,  if  the  answer  was  reported 
insufficient,  the  defendant  was,  if  it  was  a  first  answer,  to  pay  40s. 
costs,  when  the  answer  was  put  in  by  the  defendant  in  person,  but  if 
put  in  by  commission,  50s.  ;  if  it  was  a  second  answer,  the  defendant 
was  to  pay  60s.  costs;  upon  the  third  answer,  80s.  costs,  and  upon  the 
fourth  answer,  £o,9  with  the  costs  of  the  contempt,  if  the  plaintiff 
availed  himself  of  the  right  of  commitment.10  It  seems  that  the  pres- 
ent practice  is  to  tax  the  costs  of  exceptions,  an.d  they  are  considered 
to  be  in  the  discretion  of  the  Court.11  Where,  however,  the  excep- 
tions are  allowed,  the  costs  will,  in  *  general,  be  ordered  to  follow  *  774 
the  decision ;  because  the  defendant  can  always  prevent  the  costs, 
or  the  greater  part  of  them,  by  submitting  to  the  exceptions.1  Where 
the  exceptions  are  overruled,  the  costs  will  also,  in  general,  be  directed 
to  follow  the  decision.2  If  they  are  partially  allowed,  and  partially  over- 
ruled, the  costs  of  those  allowed  will  be  ordered  to  be  set  off  against 
those  overruled.3  If  no  direction  as  to  the  costs  is  given,  they  will,  under 
the  present  practice,  be  costs  in  the  cause.4 

Application  must  be  made  for  the  costs  on  the  hearing  of  the  excep- 
tions ; 5  and  where  the  exceptions  are  allowed,  the  costs  may  be  ordered 
to  be  paid  immediately.6  Where  a  married  woman,  living  separate  from 
her  husband,  filed  an  insufficient  separate  answer,  leave  was  given  to  the 
plaintiff  to  apply  for  part  of  the  costs  out  of  any  sums  which  might  come 
to  her,  on  account  of  her  separate  estate,  as  the  order  could  not  be  per- 
sonally enforced  against  her.7 

6  T.  &  R.  200.  Worham,  32  Beav.  69 ;  Bridgewater  v.  DeWin- 

1  Cons.  Ord.  XL.  13.  ton,  9  Jur.  N.  S.  1270, 1272;  12  W.  R.  40,  V.  C. 

8  Poole  v.  Gordon,  C.  P.  Coop.  433;  8  L.  J.  K.;  see  order  in  Seton,  1256,  No.  8;  see  as  to 
N.  S.  Ch.  265.  costs,  where  several  questions  were  contained  in 

9  Beames's  Ord.  182,  183.  the  interrogatory  and  some  answered,  Langton 
i°  Ibid.;  and  Beames  on  Costs,  227.  V.  Waite,  W.  N.  (1866)  328;  15  W.  R.  53,  V. 
11  13  &  14  Vic.  c.  35,  §  32;  Morgan  &  Davey,      C.  K. 

27.  *  Crossley  v.   Stewart,  11  W.  R.  636,  V. 

i  Newton  v.  Dimes,  3  Jnr.  N.  S.  583,  V.  C.  K. 
C  W.  5  Earp  v.  Lloyd,  4  K.  &  J.  58;  Crossley  v. 

2  Stent  v.  Wickens,  5  De  G.  &  S.  384;  B.  v.  Stewart,  11  W.  R.  636,  V.  C.  K.;  Betts  v. 
W.  31  Beav.  342.  346;  S.  C.  nom.  A.  r.  B.  8  Rimell,  W.  N.  (1866)  22,  V.  C.  W. 

Jur.  N.  S.  1141.     See  the  65th  Equity  Rule  of  6  Thomas  v.  Bawling,  27  Beav.  375. 

the  U.  S.  Courts,  post,  p.  2390.  "  Pemberton  v.  M'Gill,  1  Jur.  N.  S.  1045, 

8  Willis  v.  Childe,  13  Beav.  454;    Dally  v.      V.  C.  W. 

7G7 


*  775  ANSWERS. 

Where,  on  a  sufficient  answer  being  filed,  the  plaintiff  has  been  ordered 
to  pay  the  costs  of  a  bill  of  discovery,8  the  costs  of  exceptions  which 
have  been  allowed  to  the  first  answer  may  be  ordered,  on  the  plain- 
tiffs ex  parte  application,  to  be  deducted  from  the  costs  payable  to  the 
defendant.9 

The  costs  of  insufficient  answers  are  recoverable  by  the  usual  process 
of  subpoena  and  attachment,  or  by  fieri  facias,  or  elegit ;  and  if  a  first  or 
second  answer  is  held  insufficient,  the  plaintiff  will  not,  by  accepting  a 
further  answer,  waive  his  right  to  the  costs  already  due  to  him  for  the 
insufficiency  of  the  former  answer.10 

An  order  of  the  Court,  allowing  or  overruling  exceptions,  may  be 
appealed  from  in  the  usual  manner.11 


*  775    *  Section  V.  —  Further  Answers  —  Answers  to  Amended  Bills. 

If  a  defendant,  not  being  in  contempt,  submits  to  exceptions  to  his 
answer  for  insufficiency  before  they  are  set  down  for  hearing,  he  has, 
as  we  have  seen,1  fourteen  days  from  the  date  of  the  submission  within 
which  to  put  in  his  further  answer;  and  if  he  does  not  answer  within 
such  time,  or  obtain  further  time  and  answer  within  such  further  time,2 
the  plaintiff  may  sue  out  process  of  contempt  against  him.8 

If  the  defendant  is  in  contempt,  no  time  is  allowed  him  to  put  in  his 
further  answer,  beyond  the  eight  days  from  the  filing  of  the  exceptions ; 
before  the  expiration  of  which  time  the  plaintiff  cannot,  as  we  have  seen, 
set  them  down  for  hearing :  *  a  defendant  may,  however,  put  in  a  further 
answer,  at  any  time,  pending  the  exceptions.6 

If,  after  the  exceptions  are  set  down  for  hearing,  a  defendant,  not 
being  in  contempt,  submits  to  answer,  or  if  the  Court  holds  the  first  or 
second  answer  to  be  insufficient,  the  Court  may,  as  we  have  seen,  appoint 
a  time  within  which  he  must  put  in  his  further  answer  ;  and  if  he  does 
not  put  in  his  further  answer  within  the  time  so  appointed,  or  obtain 
further  time  and  answer  within  such  further  time,  the  plaintiff  may  sue 
out  process  of  contempt  against  him.6 

If  the  defendant  submits  to  the  exceptions  after  they  are  set  down,  it 
seems  that  they  should  be  allowed  to  come  on  for  hearing,  and  an  appli- 
cation be  then  made  to  the  Court  to  appoint  a  time  within  which  the 
defendant  must  put  in  his  further  answer.7  If  the  exceptions  are  allowed, 
the  Court  will,  at  the  request  of  the  parties,  at  the  time  of  giving  its 
decision,  appoint  a  time  within  which  the  defendant  is  to  put  in  his 
further  answer.8 

8  See  post,  Chap.  XXXIV.  §2,  Bills  of  3  Cons.  Ord.  XVI.  9,  15;  ante.  p.  767,  note. 
DUcovery.  4  Cons.  Ord.  XVI.  8,  11;  ante,  p.  767. 

9  Hughes  v.  Clerk,  6  Hare,  195;  but  see  5  Ingham  v.  Ingham,  9  Sim.  363;  2  Jur. 
now,  Thomas  v.  Rawling,  27  Beav.  375.  886. 

i°  Brotherton  v.  Chance,  Bunb.  34.  6  Cons.  Ord.  XVI.  14.  15 ;  ante,  p.  769. 

11  See   post,  Chap.  XXXII.  Rehearing  and           7  Manchester,    Sheffield,    and    Lincolnshire 

Appeals.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Worksop  Board  of  Health,  2  K.  & 

1  Ante,  p.  767.  J.  25;  but  see  ante,  p.  770,  n.  (9). 

2  See  Ibid.  8  Ante,  p.  769. 

76S 


FURTHER  ANSWERS  —  ANSWERS  TO  AMENDED  BILLS.     *  776 

If,  after  the  exceptions  are  allowed  or  submitted  to,  the  defendant 
desires  to  amend  his  bill,  he  may  obtain  on  petition,  as  of  course,  at  the 
Bolls,  an  order  that  he  may  be  at  liberty  to  amend  his  bill,  and  that 
the  defendant  may  answer  the  amendments  and  exceptions  together.9 
The  defendant  must  then,  as  we  have  seen,10  put  in  his  further  answer 
and  his  answer  to  the  amended  bill,  within  fourteen  days  after 
service  on  him  of  the  interrogatories  *  to  the  amended  bill.1  If  *  776 
the  defendant  put  in  a  further  answer  only,  or  an  answer  to  the 
amended  bill  only,  the  plaintiff  may  move  to  have  it  taken  off  the  file, 
unless  he  is  desirous  that  it  should  remain  there ;  in  which  case  he 
should  move  for  leave  to  issue  an  attachment.2  If  the  defendant,  after 
exceptions  allowed,  put  in  his  further  answer  to  the  original  bill,  before 
the  plaintiff  serves  the  order  for  him  to  answer  the  amendments  and 
exceptions  at  the  same  time,  he  will  deprive  the  plaintiff  of  the  benefit 
of  the  order.3 

A  further  answer,  as  well  as  an  answer  to  an  amended  bill,  is  in  every 
respect  similar  to,  and  is  considered  as  part  of,  the  answer  to  the  original 
bill;4  therefore,  a  further  answer  should  only  extend  to  the  interroga- 
tories which  have  not  been  answered  already ;  and  if  a  defendant,  in  a 
further  answer,  or  an  answer  to  an  amended  bill,  repeats  anything  con- 
tained in  a  former  answer,  the  repetition,  unless  it  varies  the  defence  in 
point  of  substance,  or  is  otherwise  necessary  or  expedient,  will  be  con- 
sidered as  impertinent ; 5  and  the  defendant  may  be  ordered  to  pay  the 
costs  occasioned  by  the  introduction  of  such  impertinent  matter.6 

The  defendant  need  not  answer  any  interrogatories  to  the  amended 
bill  which  have  been,7  or  might  have  been,8  put  to  the  original  bill,  un- 
less the  plaintiff  has  amended  his  bill,  stating  an  entirely  new  case ;  for 
then  the  defendant  must  answer  that  case,  even  though  in  so  doing  he 
answers  some  of  the  interrogatories  which  were  or  might  have  been  filed 
to  the  original  bill.9 

The  form  of  a  further  answer  and  of  an  answer  to  an  amended  bill,  is 
nearly  the  same  as  that  of  an  answer  to  an  original  bill.  If  it  be  an 
answer  to  amendments  as  well  as  to  exceptions,  it  must  be  entitled  "  the 
further  answer  of  A  B,  the  above-named  defendant,  to  the  bill  of  com- 
plaint of  the  above-named  plaintiff,  and  the  answer  of  the  same  defend- 
ant to  the  amended  bill  of  complaint  of  the  said  plaintiff."  10     If,  after 

9  Ante,  p.  769.  6  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  17.    For  the  practice 

10  Ante,  pp.  739,  769.  as  to  impertinence,  see  ante,  pp.  349,  350. 

1  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.  6.  "  Wich  v.  Parker,  22  Beav.  59;  2  Jur.  N.  S. 

2  De  Tastet  v.  Lopez,  1  Sim.  11.  583  ;  ante,  p.  729. 

s  Mayne  v.  Hochin,  1  Dick.  255;  Bethuen  v.  «  Drake  v.  Symes,  2   De  G.  F.  &  J.  81; 

Bateman,  id.  296;  Knox  v.  Symmonds,  1  Ves.  Dennis  v    Rochussen,  4  Jur.  N.  S.  298,  V.  C. 

Jr.  87,  88;  Paty  v.  Simpson,  2  Cox,  392;  Par-  W.|   Newry  v.  Kilmorey,  L.  R.   11   Eq.  425. 

tridge  v.  Haycraft,  11  Ves.  570,  578;  Hemming  V.  C.  B. 

v.  Dingwall,  8  Beav.  102;  Pariente  v.  Bensusan,  9  Mazerredo  v.  Maitland,  3  Mad.  60,  72. 

13  Sim.  522;  7  Jur.  618.  1°  Peacock  0.  Duke  of  Bedford.  1  V.  &   I'.. 

4  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  868;  Bennington  Iron  Co.  186;  Braithwaite's  Pr.  42  ;  see  Bennington  [ron 

v.  Campbell,  2  Paige,  160;  Mitford,  Eq.  PI.  by  Co.  v.  Campbell,  2  Paige,  160;   see   forms   in 

Jeremy,  318.  Vol.  III. 

6  Bowen  v.  Idley,  6  Paige,  46  ;  Trust  &  Fire 
Ins.  Co.  v.  Jenkins,  8  Paige,  590. 


•49 


769 


*  777  ANSWERS. 

exceptions  to  the  original  bill  are  allowed,  the  plaintiff  amends  his  bill, 

and  the  defendant  puts  in  a  further  answer  to  the  original  bill  and  an 

answer  to  the  amended  bill,  and  the  answer  is  again  held  insufficient, 

whereupon  the    bill  is   again   amended,    the  answer   should   be 

*  777    entitled  *  "  the  further  answer  of  A  B,  the  above-named  defend- 

ant, to  the  original  and  first  amended  bill  of  complaint  of  the 
above-named  plaintiff,  and  the  answer  of  the  same  defendant  to  the 
secondly  amended  bill  of  complaint  of  the  said  plaintiff." x  It  is  not 
necessary,  in  answering  a  bill  which  has  been  amended  before  answer,  to 
call  it  an  answer  to  the  original  and  amended  bill :  the  most  correct  way 
is  to  call  it  the  answer  to  "  the  amended  bill,"  or  to  "  the  secondly  (or 
thirdly)  amended  bill,"  only ;  as  the  original  bill  has  become  nugatory 
by  the  amendment,  and  the  defendant  is  not  bound  to  notice  it,  either  in 
an  answer  or  a  demurrer.2 

Further  answers,  and  answers  to  amended  bills,  must  be  prepared, 
signed,  taken,  filed,  and  printed  in  the  same  manner  as  answers  to  original 
bills.3 

If  the  plaintiff  has  vexatiously  required  an  answer  to  the  amended  bill, 
and  the  defendant  claims  the  costs  of  it  in  such  answer,  and  asks  for  them 
at  the  hearing,  the  Court  will  order  them  to  be  paid  at  once.4 

.A  defendant  who  is  required  to  answer  an  amended  bill  must  put  in 
his  plea,  answer,  or  demurrer  thereto,  not  demurring  alone,  within  twenty- 
eight  days  from  the  delivery  to  him  or  his  solicitor  of  a  copy  of  the  inter- 
rogatories which  he  is  required  to  answer ; 5  and  if  an  answer  is  not 
required  to  the  amended  bill,  a  defendant  who  has  appeared  to  and 
answered,  or  has  not  been  required  to  answer,  the  original  bill,  but  de- 
sires to  answer  the  amended  bill,  must  put  in  his  answer  thereto  within 
fourteen  days  after  the  expiration  of  the  time  within  which,  if  an  answer 
had  been  required,  he  might  have  been  served  with  interrogatories  for 
his  examination  in  answer  to  such  amended  bill,  or  within  such  further 
time  as  the  Judge  may  allow.6  An  application  for  further  time  must  be 
made  by  special  summons,  in  the  manner  before  explained.7  (a) 

Section  VI.  —  Amending  Answers  —  and  Supplemental  Answers. 

After  an  answer  has  been  put  in  upon  oath,  the  Court  will  not, 
for  obvious   reasons,  readily  suffer  any  alteration  to  be  made  in   it.8 

1  See  Braithwaite's  Pr.  42,    and   forms   in  5  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.  4;  ante,  p.  738. 
y0l   jjL  6  Cons-  0rd-  XXXVII.  7.    This  gives  thirty 

2  Smith  v.  Bryon,  3  Mad.  428.  It  may  be  days  from  the  date  of  service  of  the  amended 
called  "the  answer  to  the  bill  of  complaint."  bill,  where  the  service  is  effected  within  the 
Rigby  o.  Rigby,  0  Beav.  311,  313.  jurisdiction;  see  ante,  p.  740. 

3  *See  ante, "§§  2,  3,  of  this  chapter.  7  Ante,  p.  741. 

4  Cocks  v.  Stanley,  4  Jur.  N.  S.  942 ;  6  W.  8  See  Howe  v.  Russell,  36  Maine,  115  ; 
R.  45,  V.  C.  S.                                         

(a)  When  no  rule  day  is  prescribed  by  statute  A  reasonable  time  should   always   be  allowed 

for  answering  an  amended  petition,  the  time  for  the  defendant  to  answer  a  material  amendment 

answer  is  in  the  Court's  discretion,  and  setting  of  the  bill ;  and  one  hour  and  three  quarters  is 

the  case  down  for  trial  on  a  certain  day  amounts  not  such  reasonable  time.      Davis  v.  Davis,  62 

to  ordering  the  issue  made  up  by  that  day.  Miss.  818. 
Neininger  v.  State  (Ohio),  34  N.  E.  Rep.  633. 
770 


AMENDING    ANSWERS  —  SUPPLEMENTAL    ANSWERS. 


779 


*  There  are,  however,  many  instances  in  the  books  in  which  *  778 
it  appears  that  the  Court,  upon  special  application,  has  allowed 
the  defendant  to  reform  his  answer.1  Thus,  where,  in  answer  to  a 
tithe  bill,  the  defendant  has  sworn  that  a  certain  close  contained  nine 
acres,  he  was  permitted  to  amend  it  by  stating  the  close  to  contain 
seventeen  acres,  even  though  issue  had  been  joined; 2  so  where,  owing  to 
the  mistake  of  the  engrossing  clerk,  the  words  "  her  shares  "  had  been 
introduced  into  an  answer  instead  of  "  ten  shares,"  the  answer  was 
allowed  to  be  taken  off  the  file  and  amended,  though  a  service  had  been 
made  ; 3  and  where  there  has  been  a  mistake  in  the  title  of  the  answer, 
an  amendment  of  it  has  been  permitted,4  even  though  opposed  by  the 
plaintiff.5 

The  Court  has  also  allowed  a  defendant  to  amend  his  answer  where 
new  matter  has  come  to  his  knowledge  since  it  was  put  in,6  or  in  cases 
of  surprise,  as  where  an  addition  has  been  made  to  the  draft  of  the 
answer,  after  the  defendant  has  perused  it.7  In  like  manner, 
where  a  plaintiff,  having  drawn  the  defendant  into  an  *  agree-  *  779 
ment,  whereby,  for  £300,  he  was  to  relinquish  to  the  plaintiff  all 
his  right  and  interest  in  a  certain  estate  which  had  been  left  to  him, 


American  Life  Ins.  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Bayard, 
and  Same  ?'.  Sackett,  3  Barb.  Ch.  610;  Vander- 
vere  v.  Reading,  9  N.  J.  Eq.  446.  But  the  dis- 
cretionary power  of  the  inferior  Court  to  refuse 
leave  to  file  a  supplemental  answer  will  be 
supervised  where  it  deprives  the  defendant  of 
the  opportunity  to  set  up  a  meritorious  defence. 
Brooks  v.  Moody,  25  Ark.  452.  In  Maine,  an- 
swers, pleas,  and  rules  may  be  amended  at  any 
time  on  the  like  terms  as  a  bill.  Maine  Ch. 
Rule  3;  but  see  Howe  v.  Russell,  30  Maine,  115. 
l  Campion  v.  Kille,  14  N.  J.  Eq.  229.  232. 
In  matters  of  form,  or  mistakes  of  dates,  or  ver- 
bal inaccuracies,  Courts  of  Equity  are  verv 
indulgent  in  allowing  amendments  of  answers; 
but  it  is  only  under  very  special  circumstances 
that  a  defendant  can  be  allowed  to  make  any 
material  alteration  in  his  answer,  after  it  has 
been  put  in.  See  M'Kim  v.  Thompson,  1  Bland, 
162;  Bowen  v.  Cross,  4  John.  Ch.  375;  1  Barb. 
Ch.  Pr.  163,  164;  Smith  t\  Babcock,  3  Sumner, 
583;  Burden  V.  M'Elmoyle,  1  Bailey  Eq.  375; 
Giles  v.  Giles,  id.  428  ;  Western  Reserve  Hank  V. 
Stryker,  1  Clarke,  380;  Cock  v.  Evans,  9  Ver- 
ger", 287,  288;  Caster  v.  Wood,  1  Bald.  289; 
Culloway  v.  Dobson,  1  Brock.  119;  Liggon  v. 
Smith,  4  Hen.  &  M.  405;  Coffman  v.  Allin, 
Litt.  Sel.  Cas.  201;  Mason  v.  Debow,  2  Hayw. 
178;  Flora  v.  Rogers,  4  Hayw.  202;  Jackson  v. 
Cutright,  5  Munf.  308;  Beach  v.  Fulton  Bank, 
3  Wend.  574;  Hennings  v.  Conner,  4  Bibb,  299; 
Taylor  v.  Bogert,  5  Paige,  33.  This  subject  is 
treated  at  length  in  Story,  Eq.  PL  §§  896-901 ; 
also  in  Smith  ».  Babcock,  ubi  supra  ;  Williams 
i'.  Savage  Manuf.  Co.  3  Md.  Ch.  Dec.  418;  Til- 
linghast  v.  Champlin,  4  It.  I.  128;  Howe  v. 
Russell,   30  Maine,  115;    Vandervere   v.  Read- 


ing, 9  N.  J.  Eq.  446.  And  see  Dearth  v.  Hide 
and  Leather  Nat'I  Bk.  100  Mass.  540  :  Webster 
Loom  Co.  v.  Higgins,  13  Blatchf.  349;  Huffman 
v.  Hummer,  17  N.  J.  Eq.  271. 

See  the  60th  Equity  Rule  of  the  U.  S.  Courts, 
post,  p.  2389. 

An  amendment  changing  the  whole  ground 
of  defence  set  up  in  the  tirst  answer  will  not  be 
allowed.  Western  Reserve  Bank  v.  Stryker, 
1  Clarke,  380.  Where  an  answer  is  amended, 
the  old  answer  must  remain  on  rile  as  originally 
put  in.     Ibid. 

Where  the  defendant  has  obtained  leave  to 
file  an  amended  answer,  he  is  not  to  be  con- 
sidered as  having  put  in  any  answer,  until 
such  amended  answer  has  been  filed.  White 
r.  Hampton,  9  Iowa,  181. 

2  Berney  v.  Chambers,  Bunb.  248:  but  see 

Montague  v. ,  cited  id.  n. ;  and  2  Gwil.  674, 

n.  (b). 

3  Countess  of  Gainsborough  v.  Gifford,  2  P. 
Wms.  424,  427  ;  but  see  Vandervere  v.  Reading, 
9  N.  J.  Eq.  446. 

«  White  v.  Godbold,  1  Mad.  269;  Peacock 
v.  Duke  of  Bedford,  1  V.  &  B.  180 ;  Thatcher 
v.  Lambert,  5  Hare.  228. 

5  Att.-Gen.  v.  Worcester,  2  Phil.  3 ;  1  C.  P. 
Coop.  temp.  Cott.  18. 

6  Patterson  v.  Slaughter,  Amb.  292;  Wells 
v.  Wood,  10  Ves.  401 ;  and  see  remaiks  on  Pat- 
terson r.  Slaughter,  in  F\iIton  v.  Gilmore.  1  Phil. 
528;  Tillinghast  v.  Champlin,  4  R.  I.  128. 

"  Chute  v.  Lady  Dacre,  1  Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  29, 
pi.  4.  Especially  where  the  answer  has  not 
been  sworn  to.  Taylor  v.  Dodd,  5  Ind. 
(Porter)  246.     See  Morrill  v.  Morrill,  53  Vt.  74 

771 


779 


ANSWERS. 


filed  a  bill  to  have  the  agreement  performed,  to  which  the  defendant  put 
in  an  answer  confessing  the  agreement,  and  submitting  to  have  it  per- 
formed, but,  afterwards  discovering  that  the  estate  was  of  several  thou- 
sand pounds'  value,  he  applied  for  leave  to  take  his  answer  off  the  file, 
and  to  put  in  another,  leave  was  granted.1  The  Court  has  also  permitted 
a  defendant  to  amend  an  answer  by  limiting  the  admission  of  assets  con- 
tained therein,  where  it  was  clearly  established  that  such  admission  had 
been  made  by  mistake,  and  through  the  carelessness  of  the  solicitor's 
clerk.2  («) 

The  Court,  however,  has  never  permitted  amendments  of  this  nature 
where  the  application  has  been  made  merely  on  the  ground  that  the 
defendant,  at  the  time  he  put  in  his  answer,  was  acting  under  a  mistake 
in  point  of  law ;   and  not  on  the  ground  of  a  fact  having  been  incor- 


1  Alpha  v.  Paj'man,  1  Dick.  33.  So  where  an 
order,  granting  to  the  plaintiff  the  right  to  sur- 
charge and  falsify  an  account,  was  appealed 
from,  and  the  Appellate  Court  remanded  the 
cause  for  the  purpose  of  having  the  pleadings 
amended,  and  for  further  proceedings,  and 
extended  the  right  to  surcharge  and  falsify  the 
account  to  both  parties,  provided  the  defend- 
ant's amended  pleadings  should  warrant  such 


(a)  In  Cross  v.  Morgan,  6  Fed.  Rep.  241  (a 
suit  to  foreclose  a  mortgage),  leave  was  refused 
to  amend  an  answer  by  adding  a  fact  which 
was  known  to  the  defendant  when  he  filed  it. 
See  also  as  to  amending  answers,  Cotten  v.  Fi- 
delity &c.  Co.  41  Fed.  Rep.  506;  Stewart  v. 
Townsend,  id.  121 ;  Gardner  v.  Grossman,  11 
id.  851;  Charlton  v.  Scoville,  68  Hun,  348; 
Radam  v.  Capital  M.  D.  Co.  81  Texas,  122; 
Newton  v.  Terry  (Ky.),  22  S.  W.  Rep.  159; 
Louisville  Underwriters  v.  Pence  (Ky.),  19  id. 
10;  Angel  r.  Penn.  R.  Co.  37  N.  J.  Eq.  92; 
Richardson  v.  Wallace  (S.  C),  17  S.  E.  Rep. 
725;  Woodward  V.Williamson,  id.  778 ;  Mer- 
chant v.  Bowyer  (Tex.),  22  S.  W.  Rep.  763. 

New  issues  or  irrelevant  matter  in  an  amend- 
ed answer  will  be  rejected.  Font}'  v.  Poar,  35 
W.  Va.  70;  McKay  v.  McKay,  33  W.  Va.  724; 
Tracewell  v.  Boggs,  14  W.  Va.  254;  Elder  v. 
Harris,  76  Va.  187;  McMichael  v.  Brennan,  31 
N.  J.  Eq.  496;  Hagar  v.  Whitmore,  82  Maine, 
248:  Hinton  v.  Citizens'  Mutual  Ins.  Co.  63 
Ala.  48S;  East  St.  Louis  v.  Trustees,  6  111.  App. 
130  ;  Hibernia  S.  &  L.  Co.  v.  Jones,  89  Cal.  507; 
Eckert  v.  Binkley  (Ind.),  33  N.  E.  Rep.  619. 

After  a  material  amendment  of  the  bill,  the 
defendant  is  entitled  to  amend  his  answer  pre- 
viously filed.  Perkins  v.  Hendryx,  31  Fed. 
Rep.  522;  White  v.  White,  11  X.  Y.  S.  575; 
Russell  V.  Gregg.  49  Kansas,  89.  But  allega- 
tions in  an  rmswer  to  an  amended  bill  or  petition 
which  are  already  in  issue  under  the  first  answer 
may  be  stricken  out.  Work  v.  McCoy  (Iowa), 
54  N.  W.  Rep.  140.  An  amendment  will  not  be 
allowed  for  the  purpose  of  setting  up  a  defence 
770 


extension,  it  was  held  that  the  defendant  could 
amend  his  answer  so  as  to  surcharge  and  falsify 
in  respect  to  matters  known  to  him  at  the  time 
of  filing  his  original  answer.  Williams  v.  Sav- 
age Manuf.  Co.  3  Md.  Ch.  418. 

2  Dagly  v.  Crump,  1  Dick.  35;  and  see 
Cooper  v.  Uttoxeter  Burial  Board,  1  H.  & 
M.  680 ;  Hughes  v.  Bloomer,  9  Paige,  269. 


that  will  prove  ineffectual.  Murphy  v.  Jack- 
son, 69  Miss.  403.  Where  payment  is  the 
alleged  defence  until  about  the  time  of  trial, 
the  Court  in  its  discretion  may  refuse  leave  to 
file  a  supplemental  answer  which  shows  excuses 
for  non-payment.  Voak  v.  National  Inv.  Co. 
(Minn.)  53*  N-  W.  Rep.  708.  In  North  Caro- 
lina, amendments  to  answers  are  permitted  for 
the  purpose  of  setting  up  facts  occurring  after 
the  suit  was  begun,  which  invalidate  the  plain- 
tiff's title,  or  strengthen  that  of  the  defendant. 
Johnson  v.  Swain,  44  N.  C.  335;  Taylor  v. 
Gooch,  110  N.  C.  387.  Amendments  will  not 
usually  be  allowed  for  the  purpose  of  setting 
up  the  Statute  of  Limitations  to  defeat  a  claim 
otherwise  equitable  and  just.  See  lie  Bear,  8 
Fed.  Rep.  428.  It  is  within  the  Court's  discre- 
tion to  allow  an  answer  to  be  withdrawn,  and 
to  substitute  a  motion  to  strike  out.  Bowman 
v.  Chicago  &c.  Ry.  Co.  (Iowa)  53  N.  W.  Rep. 
327. 

In  the  Federal  Courts,  under  U.  S.  Rev. 
Stats.  §  954,  allowing  amendments  of  plead- 
ings, an  answer  may  be  withdrawn,  on  leave, 
and  a  plea  substituted,  setting  up  the  same  de- 
fence as  that  contained  in  a  co-defendant's  plea. 
United  States  v.  American  Bell  Tel.  Co.  39 
Fed.  Rep.  716.  In  a  patent  suit,  the  Court,  in  its 
discretion,  may  allow  evidence  to  stand,  which 
was  taken  under  objection  before  the  answer 
was  amended  to  set  up  the  defence  of  prior  use. 
Allis  o.  Buckstaff,  13  Fed.  Rep.  879;  see  Bab- 
cock  &  Wilcox  Co.  v.  Pioneer  Iron  Works, 
31  id.  338;  Seibert  C.  O.  C.  Co.  r.  Newark  L. 
Manuf.  Co.  35  id.  509. 


AMENDING    ANSWERS  —  SUPPLEMENTAL   ANSWERS.  *  780 

rectly  stated.3  Thus,  where  a  defendant,  who  was  an  executor,  had 
admitted  himself  accountable  for  the  surplus,  and  it  was  afterwards 
found  that  the  circumstances  of  the  case  were  such  that  he  would  have 
been  entitled  to  it  himself,  permission  to  amend  was  refused.4  So, 
where  a  defendant  had,  by  his  answer,  admitted  the  receipt  of  a  sum  of 
money  from  his  father  by  way  of  advancement,  and  refused  to  bring  it 
into  hotchpot,  he  was  not  permitted  to  amend  his  answer  as  to  the 
admission,  although  he  swore  that  he  made  it  under  a  mistake  as  to  the 
law  of  the  case.5 

The  Court  will  also  refuse  to  permit  an  amendment  of  an  answer,  after 
an  indictment  for  perjury  preferred  or  threatened,  even  though  it  con- 
sider it  to  be  clear  that  the  defendant  did  not  intend  to  perjure  himself, 
and  had  no  interest  in  so  doing.6 

From  the  above  cases  it  appears  that  it  was  formerly  the  general 
practice  of  the  Court,  if  it  saw  a  sufficient  ground  for  so  doing,  to  per- 
mit the  defendant  to  amend  his  answer.  Lord  Thurlow,  however, 
as  it  seems,  introduced  a  better  course  in  cases  of  mistake ;  *  not  *  780 
taking  the  answer  off  the  file,  but  permitting  a  sort  of  supple- 
mental answer  to  be  filed,  and  by  that  course  leaving  to  the  parties  the 
effect  of  what  has  been  sworn  before,  with  the  explanation  given  by  the 
supplemental  answer.1 

This  practice  has  been  since  adopted,  in  all  cases  in  which  it  is 
wished  to  correct  a  mistake  in  an  answer  as  to  a  matter  of  fact ; 2  and 
it  is  not  confined  to  cases  of  mistake  only,  but  has  been  extended  to 
other  analogous  cases :  as  where  a  defendant,  at  the  time  of  putting  in 
his  original  answer,  was  ignorant  of  a  particular  circumstance,  he  has 
been  permitted  to  introduce  that  circumstance  by  supplemental  answer,3 
even  though  the  information  was  obtained  by  a  violation  of  professional 

3  Branch  r.  Dawson,  9  Ga.  592.  up  in  the  first  answer.     Ibid.     The  defendant 

4  Rawlins  v.  Powel,  1  P.  Wins.  298;  see,  will  not  be  allowed  to  amend  his  answer  after 
however,  Brown  v.  Lake,  1  De  G.  &  S.  144.  the  opinion  of  the   Court,  and  the   testimony 

5  Pearce  v.  Grove,  Anib.  65 ;  3  Atk.  522.  have  indicated  in  what  respect  it  may  be  mod- 

6  Earl  Verney  v.  Macnamara,  1  Bro.  C.  C.  ified  so  as  to  effect  his  purpose.  Colloway 
419;  Phelps  v.  Pro  there,  2  De  G.  &  S.  274.  v.  Dobson,  1  Brock.  119.      A  defendant  is  not 

1  Per  Lord  Eldon,  in  Dolderv.  Bank  of  Eng-  allowed  to  file  a  supplemental  answer  for  the 

land,  10  Ves.  285;  and  see  Jennings  v.  Merton  purpose  of  setting  up  an  important  fact,  which 

College,  8  Ves.  79;  Wells  v.  Wood,  10  Ves.  401;  has  arisen  since  the  filing  of  the  original  answer. 

Phelps  o.  Prothero,  2  De  G.  &  S.  274;  12  Jur.  He  should  file  a  bill  in  the  nature  of  a  supple- 

733;  see  Bowen  v.  Cross,  4  John.  Ch.  375;  Van-  mental  bill.  Taylor  v.  Titus,  2  Edw.  Ch.  13E. 
dervere  v.  Reading,  9  N.  J.  Eq.  446;  Howe  v.  2  Strange  v.  Collins,  2  V.  &  B.    163.   167; 

Russell,  36  Maine,  124;  Edwards  v.  M'Leay,  2  Taylor  v.  Obee,  3  Price,  83;  Ridley   v.  Ohee, 

V.  &  B.  256.     A  supplemental  answer,  to  cor-  Wightw.  32;  Swallow  v.  Day,  2  Coll.   133;  9 

rect  any  error  in  the  original  answer,  will  not  Jur.  805;  Bell  r.  Dunmore,  7  Beav.  283,  287; 

be  allowed   except   with    great    caution,    unci  Cooper  v.  Uttoxeter  Burial  Board,  1   H.  &  M. 

always  on  equitable  terms  as  to  costs  and  fur-  680;  Mounce  v.  Byars,  11  Ga.  180;  Tillinghast 

Dishing  copies  gratis.     Western  Reserve  Hank  r.  Cliamplin,  4  R.  I.  128. 

v.  Stryker,  1  Clarke,  380.     When  a  supplemen-  3  Jackson  v.  Parish,  1  Sim.  505,  509  :  Tids- 

tal  answer  is  put  in,  the  old  answer  must  remain  well  v.  Bowyer,  7  Sim.  64;  see  Const  v.  Barr, 

on  file  as  it  was  originally  put  in.     Murdock'a  2  Mer.  57,  60;  Frankland  v.  Overend,  9  Sim. 

case,  2  Bland,  261;  Western  Reserve  Bank  v.  365;  Fulton  v.  Gilmore,  8  Beav.  154;  9  Jur.  1; 

Stryker,  1  Clarke,  380.      An  application  will  1  Phil.  522,  528;  Chadwick  v.  Turner.  34  L.  J. 

not  be  entertained  to  file  a  supplemental  an-  Ch.  62.  M.  R. ;  Talmage  v.  Pell,  9  Paige,  410; 

swer  to  change  the  whole  ground  of  defence  set  Suydam  v.  Truesdale,  6  McLean,  459. 

773 


781 


ANSWERS. 


confidence.4  And  where  a  defendant  had  wished  to  state  a  fact  in  his 
original  answer,  but  had  been  induced  to  leave  it  out  by  the  mistaken 
advice  of  his  solicitor,  he  was  allowed  to  state  it  by  supplemental 
answer.6  Again,  where,  subsequently  to  the  filing  of  the  answer,  events 
had  occurred  which  the  defendant  was  advised  ought,  for  the  purposes 
of  his  defence,  to  appear  on  the  record,  he  was  allowed  to  state  them  by 
means  of  a  supplemental  answer.6  (a) 

Although  the  Court  will,  in  cases  of  mistake,  or  other  cases  of  that 
description,  permit  a  defendant  to  correct  his  answer  by  supplemental 
answer,  it  always  does  so  with  great  difficulty,  where  an  addition 
*  781  is  to  be  put  upon  the  record  prejudicial  to  the  plaintiff,7  *  though 
it  will  be  inclined  to  yield  to  the  application,  if  the  object  is  to 
remove  out  of  the  plaintiff's  way  the  effect  of  a  denial,  or  to  give  him 
the  benefit  of  a  material  admission.1  Therefore,  where  the  application 
was  made  for  the  purpose  of  enabling  the  defendant  to  raise  the  Stat- 
ute of  Limitations  as  a  defence,  leave  to  file  a  supplemental  answer  was 
refused  ; 2  and  where  the  defendant  had,  by  his  original  answer  to  a 
bill  for  the  specific  performance  of  a  contract,  admitted  that  he  took 
possession  of  the  whole  property  in  pursuance  of  the  contract,  but 
afterwards  applied  for  leave  to  put  in  a  supplemental  answer  to  limit 
the  admission  to  part  of  the  premises  only,  upon  affidavits  of  mistake, 
the  motion  was  refused :  unless  the  defendant  would  state  upon  oath, 
that  when  he  swore  to  the  original  answer,  he  meant  to  swear  in  the 
sense  in  which  he,  by  the  application,  desired  to  be  permitted  to  swear 
to  it.3 


4  Raincock  v.  Young,  16  Sim.  122. 

5  Nail  v.  Punter,  4  Sim.  474,  483;  Burgin  v. 
Giberson,  23  N.  J.  Eq.  403.  Or  where  by  over- 
sight of  the  solicitor  the  fact  was  omitted  from 
the  answer.     Arnaud  v.  Grigg,  29  N.  J.  Eq.  1. 

6  Stamps  v.  Birmingham  &  Stour  Valley 
Ry.  Co.  2  Phil.  673,  677 ;  7  Hare,  251;  Southall 
v.  British  Mut.  Life  Ass.  Co.  38  L.  J.  Cli.  711. 
See  ante,  p.  409,  n.  3;  Anon.  Hopk.  27;  Smith 
v.  Smith,  4  Paige,  132. 

7  Where  the  purpose  of  the  amendment  is 
not  to  correct  any  mistake  or  misstatement  in 
the  original  answer,  but  to  set  up  substantially 
a  new  ground  of  defence  at  the  hearing,  it  will 
not  be  permitted.  Campion  v.  Kille,  14  N.  J. 
Eq.  229,  232.  Or  an  unconscientious  defence,  as 
that  the  plaintiff,  a  corporation,  was  acting  ulini. 
viies  in  making  the  contract  sued  on.  Third 
Avenue  Sav.  Bk.  o.  Dimock,  24  N.  J.  Eq.  26. 


i  Edwards  v.  M'Leay,  2  V.  &  B.  256.  Lord 
Eklon  in  this  case,  as  well  as  in  Strange  v.  Col- 
lins, id.  166,  appears  to  have  been  of  opinion 
that  a  supplemental  answer  ought  not  to  have 
any  effect  upon  an  indictment  for  perjury  upon 
the  original  answer;  but  see  King  ?•.  Carr,  1 
Sid.  418;  2  Keb.  516;  see  Phelps  v.  Prothero,  2 
De  G.  &  Sm.  278;  Swallow  v.  Day,  2  Coll.  133; 
Hughes  v.  Bloomer,  7  Paige,  269. 

2  Percival  v.  Caney,  14  Jur.  473,  V.  C.  K. 
B. ;  Stall  v.  Goode,  10  Heisk.  58;  Cock  r.  Evans, 
9  Yerg.  287.  Especially  after  a  decree  for  an 
account.  McRea  v.  David,  7  Rich.  Eq.  375. 
So,  when  the  object  was  to  fet  up  the  defence 
of  the  Statute  of  Frauds.  Cook  v.  Bee,  2  Tenn. 
Ch.  344. 

3  Livesey  ».  Wilson,  1  V.  &  B.  149;  see  also 
Greenwood  V.  Atkinson,  4  Sim.  54,  64;  Mur- 
doch's case,  2  Bland,  461 ;  Vandervere  v.  Read- 


(a)  Thames  &  Mersey  M  Ins.  Co.  v.  Con- 
tinental Ins.  Co.  37  Fed.  Rep.  286;  McCrady 
v.  Davie,  36  S.  C.  136;  United  States  v  Morris, 
7  Mackay,  8;  Sylvester  v.  Jerome  (Col.),  34 
Pac.  Rep.  760.  A  defendant  who  has  ac- 
quired title  to  land  in  controversy  after  filing 
his  answer,  may  set  it  up  by  amending  his 
answer.  Barnegat  City  Beach  Association  v. 
Buzby(N.  J.),  20  Atl.  214.  A  title  cannot, 
after  hearing,  be  set  up  by  supplemental  an- 

774 


swer,  when  it  is  inconsistent  with  a  right  dis- 
tinctly admitted  by  the  first  answer.  Mon- 
tague v.  Selb,  106  111.  49.  A  supplemental 
answer  requires  notice  and  leave  of  Court. 
Goodacre  v.  Skinner,  47  Kansas,  575;  Wood  v. 
Brush,  72  Cal.  224.  Whether  the  issues  raised 
by  supplemental  answers  should  be  tried  with 
the  original  issues  is  a  matter  of  convenience. 
Pearson  v.  Northern  R.  Co.  63  N.  H.  534. 


AMENDING   ANSWERS  —  SUPPLEMENTAL    ANSWERS.  *  782 

An  application  for  leave  to  file  a  supplemental  answer  is  made  upon 
motion  or  by  summons.4  The  summons  or  notice  of  motion  must  be 
served  on  the  plaintiff,  and  must  specify  the  facts  intended  to  be  stated 
in  the  proposed  supplemental  answer,  and  be  supported  by  affidavit 
verifying  the  truth  of  the  proposed  supplemental  answer,  specifically 
stating  the  facts  intended  to  be  placed  on  the  record,6  and  showing  a 
sufficient  reason  why  they  were  not  introduced  into  the  original  answer.6 
The  defendant  must  also,  it  seems,  produce  a  full  copy  of  the  intended 
supplemental  answer,7  for  the  inspection  of  the  plaintiff.8 

In  making  an  application  for  leave  to  file  a  supplemental  answer,  the 
defendant  must  also  make  a  case  showing  that  justice  requires  that  he 
should  be  permitted  to  alter  the  defence  already  on  record ;  and  even 
where  a  defendant  applied  for  leave  to  file  a  supplemental  answer 
for  the  purpose  of  making  an  admission  in  *  favor  of  the  plaintiff,  *  782 
upon  an  affidavit  that,  from  certain  circumstances  which  had  since 
occurred,  he  was  satisfied  he  ought  to  have  admitted  a  fact  which  he 
had  denied,1  Lord  Eldon  held,  that  the  affidavit  ought  to  have  stated 
that,  at  the  time  of  putting  in  the  answer,  the  defendant  did  not  know 
the  circumstances  upon  which  he  made  the  application,  or  any  other  cir- 
cumstances upon  which  he  ought  to  have  stated  the  fact  otherwise.2 

Where  a  defendant  has  obtained  permission  to  file  a  supplemental 
answer,  for  the  purpose  of  correcting  a  mistake  in  his  original  answer, 
he  must  confine  his  supplemental  answer  strictly  to  the  correction  of  the 
mistake  sworn  to.  If  he  goes  beyond  that,  and  makes  any  other  altera- 
tion in  the  case  than  what  arises  from  the  correction  of  such  mistake, 
his  supplemental  answer  will  be  taken  off  the  file.8  (a) 

Where  a  defendant  has,  at  the  time  of  putting  in  his  original  answer, 
mistaken  facts,  he  cannot  contravene  his  own  admission  in  any  other 
way  than  by  moving  to  correct  his  answer,  either  by  amendment  or  sup- 
plemental answer.     He  cannot  do  so  by  filing  a  cross-bill.4  (li) 

ing,  9  N.  J.  Eq.  446.     A  defendant  will  not  be  mentary  evidence,  it  must  be  produced.    Cliur- 

allowed  to  file  a  supplemental  answer  contra-  ton  v.  Frewen,  L.  R.  1  Eq.  238,  V.  C.  K. 
dieting  the   statements    in    the    first  answer.  6  Tennant  v.  Wilsmore,  2  Anst.  3G2;  Scott 

Greenwood  v.  Atkinson,  4  Sim.  61;  see  Thomas  v.  Carter,  1  Y.  &  J.  452;  Podmore  v.  Skipwith, 

v.  Visitors  of  Frederick  Co.  School,  7  Gill  &  J.  2  Sim.  565;  Smallwood  v.  Lewin,  13  N.  J.  Eq. 

389.  123;  Smith  v.  Babcock,  3  Sumner,  585;  Van- 

4  For  forms  of  notice  of  motion  and  sum-  dervere  v.  Reading,  9  N.  J.  Eq.  440. 

mons,  see  Vol.  III.;  for  order  or  summons,  see  7  Bell  v.  Punmore,  7  Beav.  283;  Fulton  v. 

Bovill  v.  Clark,  V.  C.  W.,   at  Chambers,  23  Gilmore.  ubi  supra. 

Nov.,  1865,  Reg.  Lib.  A.  2221;  and  see  Seton,  8  Fulton  v.  Gilmore,  ubi  supra. 

45.   It  seems,  however,  from  Churton  r.  Frewen,  1  The  motion  for  leave  to  file  a  supplemental 

L.  R.  1  Eq.  238,  V.  C.  K.,  that  the  application  answer  must  be  accompanied  with  an  affidavit. 

should  be  made  by  motion  only.  Thomas  v.  Doub,  1  Md.  252;  McKim  v.  Thomp- 

5  Curling  v.  Marquis  Townshend,  19  Ves.  son,  1  Bland,  150. 

628,  631;  Smith  v.  Hartley,  5  Beav.  432;  Has-  -  Wells  v.  Wood,  10  Ves.  401. 

lar  v.  Hollis,  2  Beav.  236;*Fulton  v.  Gilmore.  8  3  Strange  v.  Collins,  2  V.  &  B.  163,  167. 

Beav.  154;  9  Jur.  1;   I  Phil.  522,  527;  9  Jur.  *  Berkley   v.  Ryder,   2   Ves.  Sr.  533,  537; 

265.    Where  the  application  is  founded  ondocu-  Graham  v.  Tankersley,  15  Ala.  634. 


(a)  See  Allis  v.  Stowell,  5  Fed.  Rep.  203 ;  the  defence  by  mistake   admitted  a  payment, 

McCrady  v.  Jones,  36  S.  C.  136.  leave  to  amend  by  withdrawing  this  admission 

(6)  See  Andrews  v.  Gilman,  122  Mass.  471.  was  given   on  the  terms  of  the  money  being 

In  Hollis  v.  Burton,  [1892]  3  Ch.  226,  where  brought  into  Court. 

775 


*  783  ANSWERS.. 

There  appears  to  be  no  particular  limit  to  the  time  within  which  an 
application  for  leave  to  file  a  supplemental  answer,  to  correct  a  mistake 
in  an  original  answer,  will  be  complied  with  :  provided  the  cause  is  in 
such  a  state  that  the  plaintiff  may  be  placed  in  the  same  situation  that 
he  would  have  been  in  had  the  answer  been  correct  at  first.5  Accord- 
ingly, we  find  several  instances  in  the  books  in  which  such  applications 
have  been  granted  after  replication,6  and  even  after  the  cause  has  been 
set  down,  and  in  the  paper  for  hearing.7  Where,  however,  the  plaintiff 
cannot  be  placed  in  the  same  situation  that  he  would  have  been  in,  had 
the  defence  been  stated  on  the  record  in  due  time,  the  Court  will  not 
permit  a  supplemental  answer  to  be  filed.  Therefore,  where,  after  the 
cause  had  been  set  down  for  hearing,  an  application  was  made  for  leave 
to  file  a  supplemental  answer,  which  set  up  a  totally  new  defence,  while 
it  admitted  the  facts  as  stated  in  the  original  answer  to  be  true,  the 
Court  refused  the  motion  with  costs.8  (c) 

But  although  the  rule  of  practice  now  is,  that,  in  cases  of  mistake  in 
the  statement  or  admissions  in  an  answer,  or  in  analogous  cases, 

*  783    the  defendant  will  not  be  permitted  to  amend  his  answer,  *  but 

must  apply  for  leave  to  file  a  supplemental  answer,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  correcting  the  mistake,  the  old  course  of  amending  the  answer 
may  still  be  pursued  in  cases  of  error  or  mistake  in  matters  of  form. 
Thus,  where  the  title  of  an  answer  was  defective,  a  motion  by  the 
defendant  to  take  it  off  the  file  and  amend  and  reswear  it,  was  granted ; * 
and  so,  where,  in  the  title  of  an  answer,  the  name  of  the  plaintiff  was 
mistaken,  a  similar  order  was  made.2  The  addition  of  the  name  of  a 
party  omitted  in  the  title  has  also  been  permitted.3     Where,  however, 

5  Martin  v.  Atkinson,  5  Ga.  390.  But  an  answer  by  the  addition  of  material  facts  known 
application  to  amend  a  sworn  answer  made  to  the  defendant  at  the  time  the  original  answer 
more  than  two  years  after  the  discovery  of  the  was  sworn  to,  was  not  permitted  on  final  hear- 
alleged  mistakeand  filing  of  the  answer,  with-  ing.  Marsh  v.  Mitchell,  26  N.  J.  Eq.  497. 
out  excuse  for  the  delay,  was  refused.  Wilson  Nor,  a  fortiori,  after  an  agreement  to  try  at  a 
v.  Wintermute,  27  N.  J.  Eq.  63.  And  see  fixed  time,  on  the  existing  pleadings.  Furman 
where  the  application  was  to  amend  after  the  v.  Edwards,  3  Tenn.  Ch.  365. 

hearing  in  a  patent  case,  with  a  view  to  contest  8  Macdougal  v.  Furrier,   4  Russ.  486  ;   see 

the  question  of  infringement  before  the  Master,  Smallwood  v.  Lewin,  13  N.  J.  Eq.  123. 
or,  at  any  rate,  the  extent  of  infringement,  and  *  White  v.  Godbold,  1  Mad.  269;  the  order 

was  refused.     Ruggles  v.  Eddy,  11  Blatch.  524.  was,  however,  made  by  consent  in  this  case. 

6  Jackson  v.  Parish,  1  Sim.  505,  509;  Rain-  2  Feacock  v.  Duke  of  Bedford,  1  V.  &  B. 
cock  v.  Young,  16  Sim.  122;  Parsons  v.  Hardy,  186;  Woodger  v.  Crumpter,  1  Fowl.  Ex.  Pr. 
21  L.  J.  Ch.  400,  V.  C.  T.  388;  Lloyd  v.  Mytton,  id.  389;  Keen  v.   Stan- 

7  Fulton  v.  Gilmore,  8  Beav.  154.  158;  9  ley,  ibid.;  Rabbeth  v.  Squire,  10  Hare  App.  3; 
Jur.  1 ;  1  Phil.  522,  525,  530;  9  Jur.  265  ;  Chad-  but  see  Fry  v.  Mantell.  4  Beav.  485 ;  S.  C.  nom. 
wick  v.  Turner.  34  L.  J.  Ch.  62,  M.  R. ;  Arnaud  Fry  v.  Martel,  5  Jur.  1194;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Wor- 
v.  Grigg,  29  N.  J.  Eq.  1;  Podmore  v.  Skipwith,  cester.  2  Phil.  3  ;  1  Cooper  temp.  Cott.  18. 

2  Sim.  565.     But  an   amendment  to  a  sworn  3  Wright  v.  Campbell,  1  Fowl.  Ex.  Pr.  389. 


(c)  An  amendment  of  the  answer  may,  in  the  plaintiff.     See  Laird  v.  Briggs,  19  Ch.  D. 

the  Court's  discretion,  be  allowed  after  it  has  22;  Arnold  v.  Chesebrough,  33  Fed  Rep.  571; 

decided  the  cause.     Arnett  v.  Welch,  46  N.J.  Whelan  v.  Sullivan,  102  Mass.  204;  Morrison 

Eq.  548;  United  Railroad  &  Canal  Companies  v.  Mayer,  63  Mich.  238;  Rettig  v.  Newman,  99 

v.  Long  Dock  Co.  41  id.  407;  Sawyer  v.  Camp-  Ind.  424;  Depue  v.  Sergent,  21  W.  Va.  326; 

bell,  130  111.  186.     Such  amendment  may  also  McKay  v.  McKay,  33  W.  Va.  724:  Richardson 

be  allowed  at  the  hearing,  usually  with  costs  to  v.  Wallace  (S.  C),  17  S.  E.  Rep.  725. 

776 


TAKING   ANSWERS    OFF   THE    FILE.  *  784 

an  answer  had  been  prepared  for  certain  defendants,  but  only  sworn  to 
by  some  of  them,  it  was  directed  to  be  received  as  the  answer  of  those  who 
had  sworn  to  it,  without  striking  out  the  names  of  those  who  had  not.4 
A  defendant  has,  also,  been  permitted  to  add  the  schedules  referred  to 
in  his  answer,  where  they  had  been  accidentally  omitted ; 5  and  in  several 
cases,  where  verbal  inaccuracies  have  crept  into  answers,  they  have  been 
ordered,  at  the  hearing,  to  be  struck  out.6  In  like  manner,  where,  in 
filing  an  answer,  one  skin  had,  by  accident,  been  omitted,  leave  was 
given  to  the  defendant  to  take  it  off  the  file,  for  the  purpose  of  rectifying 
the  omission,  upon  condition,  however,  of  his  reswearing  it  imme- 
diately.7 A  similar  order  was  made,  in  a  case  where  the  defendant  had 
omitted  to  sign  some  of  the  skins  ; 8  and,  in  general,  the  Court  will  not 
permit  such  amendments  as  those  above  mentioned,  without  making  it 
part  of  the  order  that  the  answer  shall  be  resworn,  or,  in  case  of  a  peer, 
again  attested  upon  honor.9  The  Court  has  also  permitted  an  answer  to 
be  amended,  by  adding  to  the  record  the  name  of  the  counsel  who  signed 
the  draft.10 

An  order  to  amend  an  answer  must  state  the  particular  amendment 
to  be  made  ;  and  may,  by  consent,  be  obtained  on  petition,  as  of  course, 
at  the  Rolls.11  If  the  plaintiff  will  not  consent,  it  seems  that  a  special 
application  must  be  made  by  the  Court,  on  motion,  of  which  notice  must 
be  given,  specifying  the  proposed  amendment.12 

*  The  amendment  will  be  made  by  the  Clerk  of  Records  and  *  784 
Writs,  on  the  draft  of  the  answer,  as  amended  and  signed  by 
counsel,  together  with  the  order  to  amend,  being  left  with  him  for  that 
purpose.  Any  official  printed  copies  of  the  answer  which  may  have  been 
taken  should  also  be  left,  in  order  that  they  may  be  altered,  so  as  to 
agree  with  the  amended  answer.1 

A  supplemental  answer  cannot  be  excepted  to  without  leave  ;  so  that, 
for  the  purpose  of  determining  the  time  at  which  the  defendant  may 
move  to  dismiss  the  bill,  a  supplemental  answer  is  to  be  deemed,  prima 
facie,  sufficient  when  it  is  filed.2 

Section  VII.  —  Taking  Answers  off  the  File. 

If  any  irregularity  has  occurred,  either  in  the  frame  or  form  of  an 
answer,  or  in  the  taking  or  filing  of  it,  the  plaintiff  may  take  advantage 
of  such  irregularity,  by  moving  to  take  the  answer  off  the  file.3     In- 

*  Done  v.  Read,  2  V.  &  B.  310;  and  see  «  Braithwaite's  Pr.  312 ;  and  see  Wyatt's  P. 
Lyons  v.  Read,  Braithwaite's  Pr.  51;  see  also  R.  19;  Hinde,  206.  For  form  of  petition,  see 
ante,  p.  733.                                                                  Vol.  III. 

6  Bryan  v.  Truman,  1  Fowl.  Ex.  Pr.  389.  12  Att.-Gen.  v.  Worcester,  2  Phil.  3;  1  C.  P. 

6  Ellis  v-  Saul,  1  Anst.  332,  338,  341 ;  and  see  Coop.  temp.  Cott.  18.  For  form  of  notice,  see 
Jesus  College  v.  Gibbs,  1  Y.  &  C.  Ex.  145, 162.  Vol.  III. 

7  Browning  v.  Sloman,  6  Law  J.  N.  S.  Ex.  •  Braithwaite's  Pr.  312. 

Eq.  48;  1  Jur.  58.  2  Barnes  v.  Tweddle,  10  Sim.  481,  483. 

8  Lord  Moncaster  v.  Braithwaite,  1  You.  382.  8  See  Littlejohn   v.   Mur.n,    3    Paige,   280; 

9  Peacock  v.  Duke  of  Bedford,  1  V.  &  B.  186.      Supervisors  &c.  v.  Mississippi  &c.  R.   R.  Co. 
1°  Harrison  v.  Delmont,  1  Price,  108  ;  White-      21    111.   338;   Spivey   v.    Frazee,    7   Ind.   661; 

head  v.  Cunliffe,  2  Y.  &  C.  Ex.  3  ;  ante,  p.  733.      McLure  v.  Colclough,  17  Ala.  89.    An  answer, 

777 


785 


ANSWERS. 


stances  in  which  such  motions  may  be  made  have  been  before  pointed 
out.4  If,  however,  the  plaintiff  intends  to  apply  to  the  Court  to  take 
an  answer  off  the  file  for  irregularity,  he  must  do  so  before  he  accepts 
the  answer :  otherwise,  he  will  have  waived  his  right  to  make  the 
*785  application  ; 5  unless  in  the  case  of  an  irregularity  *  in  the  jurat, 
or  of  an  omission  of  the  oath  or  attestation  of  honor  of  the  de- 
fendant, without  an  order  to  warrant  such  omission  :  in  which  cases,  as 
we  have  seen,  there  must  be  an  express  waiver  of  the  irregularity.1 

The  Court  has  sometimes  also,  as  before  stated,2  allowed  an  answer 
to  be  taken  off  the  file  on  an  application  on  the  part  of  the  defendant, 
for  the  purpose  of  enabling  him  to  correct  a  mistake  in  its  form  ;  but  it 
does  so  only,  as  we  have  seen,  upon  condition  that  the  defendant  shall 
immediately  cause  the  correction  to  be  made,  and  reswear  and  file  the 
answer ;  and  it  will  never  make  such  an  order  where  the  plaintiff  can 
be  at  all  prejudiced  by  it. 

Where  an  answer  is  evidently,  on  the  face  of  it,  evasive,  the  Court 
will  order  it  to  be  taken  off  the  file,  and  not  leave  the  plaintiff  to  his 
remedy  by  exceptions.3  (a) 


taken  by  commission,  will  be  taken  off  the  file, 
if  the  jurat  does  not  state  where  it  was  sworn. 
Henry  v.  Costello,  1  Hogan,  130.     The  answer 
of  a  foreigner,  who  does  not  understand  English, 
must  be  sworn  in  the  language  he  speaks,  and 
be  filed  with  an  English  translation  ;  and  if  he 
files  an  answer  in  English  only,  it  will  be  taken 
off  the  file.     Hayes  v.  Lequin,  1  Hogan,  274. 
But  a  mistake  in  the  English  translation  of  an 
answer  is  no  ground  for  taking  it  off  the  file. 
Ibid.     An   answer   was   taken  off   the  file  for 
irregularity,  one  skin  only  out  of  six  skins 
having  been  signed  by  the   defendant.     Lord 
Moneaster  v.  Braithwaite,  Younge,  382;  Carter 
v.  Bosanquet,  13  Price,  604;   Bailey  v.  Forbes, 
M'Clel.  &  Y.  462.     So  where  the  answer  has 
not  been  signed  at  all.     Denison  v.  Bassford,  7 
Paige,  370.     A  bill  amended  without  leave  was 
ordered  to  be  taken  off  the   file.     Thomas  v. 
Frederick  Co.  School,  7  Gill  &  J.  369.    If  the 
plaintiff  waives  an  answer  on  oath,  he  cannot 
apply  to   have   it   taken   off   the   files   on   the 
ground  that  the  defendant  knows  it  to  be  wholly 
untrue.     Denison  v.  Bassford,  7  Paige,  370.     In 
a  suit  against  husband  and  wife,  the  filing  of 
a  separate  answer  by  the    husband   was   held 
irregular,  and  no  act  of  waiver  on  the  part  of 
the  plaintiff  appearing,  the  Court  held  that  it 
must  be  taken  off  the  file.     Leavitt  v.  Cruger, 
et  vx.  1  Paige,  422;  Collard  v.  Smith,  13  N.  J. 
Eq.  43;  ante,  p.  754,  n.    For  other  cases  where  an 
answer  will  be  taken  from  the  iiles,  see  Perine 
v.  Swaine,  1  John.  Ch.  24;  Trumbull  v.  Gib- 
bons, Halst.  Dig.  172;  Nesbitt  v.  Dallam,  7  Gill 
&  J.  494;  Fulton  Bank  v.  Beach,  6  Wend.  36; 


New  York  Chem.  Co.  v.  Flowers,  6  Paige,  654. 
An  application  to  take  an  answer  off  the  file,  in 
order  to  prosecute  for  perjury,  is  made  to  the 
discretion  of  the  Court,  and  will  not  be  granted 
unless  some  ground  is  laid  to  enable  the  Court 
to  judge  of  the  propriety  of  such  a  proceeding. 
Daly  v.  Toole,  1  Ir.  Eq."344;  S.  C.  2  Dru.  & 
Wal.  599.  The  Court  will  not  allow  an  answer 
to  be  taken  off  the  file  for  this  purpose,  if  it 
appears  that  the  alleged  perjury  is  in  a  part 
wholly  immaterial  to  the  merits  of  the  case. 
M/Gowan  v.  Hall,  Hayes,  17;  see  Napier  v. 
Napier,  1  Ir.  Eq.  414  ;  S.  C.  2  Dru.  &  Wal.  604. 
4  Ante,  pp.  731,  733,  748,  753,  771;  and  see 
Fry  v.  Mantell,  4  Beav.  485 ;  S.  C.  nom.  Fry  v. 
Martel,  5  Jur.  1194;  Kaistrick  v.  Elsworth,  12 
Jar.  782,  V.  C.  K.  B. ;  Liverpool  v.  Chippen- 
dall,  14  Jur.  301,  V.  C.  E. 

5  Taking  an  office  copy  of  the  answer  does 
not  seem  to  be  an  acceptance  for  this  purpose. 
Frv  v.  Mantell,  ubi  supra ;  and  see  Woodward 
v.  Twinaine,  9  Sim.  301  ;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Shield, 
11  Beav.  441,  445  ;  13  Jur.  330.  In  pleading,  a 
positive  step  on  the  basis  of  the  regularity  of 
a  previous  pleading,  waives  any  irregularity 
therein.  Steele  v.  Plomer,  2  Phil.  780;  Fulton 
Bank  v.  Beach,  2  Paige,  307;  S.  C.  6  Wend.  36; 
Seifreid  v.  People's  Bank,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  17;  S.  C. 
1  Baxt.  200. 

1  Ante,  p.  748;  see  Trumbull  v.  Gibbons,  1 
Halst.  Dig.  172;  Nesbitt  v.  Dallam,  7  Gill  &  J. 
494;  Scott  v.  Allett,  1  Hogan,  375. 

2  Ante,  p.  732. 

s  Lynch  v.  Lecesne,  1  Hare,  626,  631 ;  7  Jur. 
35 ;  Read  v.  Barton,  3  K.  &  J.  166 ;  3  Jur.  N.  S. 


(a)  See  Thorp  v.  Holdsworth,  3  Ch.  D.  637; 
Bvrd  v.  Nunn,  5  Ch.  D.  781;  7  id.  284;  Harris 
778 


v.  Gamble,  7  Ch.  D.  877;  Collette  v.  Goode,  id. 
842 ;  Tildesley  v.  Harper,  id.  403 ;  10  id.  393; 


FROM    WHAT    TIME    ANSWER    DEEMED    SUFFICIENT.  *  786 

The  application  to  take  an  evasive  answer  off  the  file  is  made  by  mo- 
tion, of  which  notice  must  be  given  to  the  defendant.4  The  defendant 
will  be  ordered  to  pay  the  costs  of  the  motion,  and  the  costs  of  an  office 
copy  of  the  document  filed  as  the  answer,  and  all  other  costs  properly 
incurred  by  the  plaintiff  in  consequence  of  the  filing  of  the  evasive 
answer.5  The  plaintiff  cannot  apply  to  take  the  answer  off  the  file  after 
he  has  excepted  to  it  for  insufficiency.6 

Lastly,  it  may  be  here  observed  that  the  Court  will,  upon  the  consent 
of  all  parties,  order  pleadings,  affidavits,  and  other  documents  to  be 
taken  off  the  file,  where  they  contain  matter  which  is  scandalous,  or 
which  it  is  desirable  should  not  remain  recorded.7 


*  Section  VIII.  —  From  what  Time  Answer  deemed  sufficient.    *  786 

The  answer  of  a  defendant  is  generally  treated  as  being  sufficient  until 
it  is  found  to  be  insufficient ; *  and  it  will  be  deemed  to  be  sufficient  :  — 

1.  Where  no  exceptions  for  insufficiency  are  filed  thereto,  within  six 
weeks  after  the  filing  of  such  answer.2 

2.  Where,  exceptions  being  filed,  the  plaintiff  does  not  set  them  down 
for  hearing  within  fourteen  days  after  the  filing  thereof.8 

3.  Where,  within  fourteen  days  after  the  filing  of  a  further  answer,  the 
plaintiff  does  not  set  down  the  old  exceptions.4 

We  have  before  seen  that  the  vacations  are  not  reckoned  in  the  com- 
putation of  the  time  allowed  for  filing  or  setting  down  exceptions,  in 
cases  where  the  time  is  not  limited  by  notice  given  by  the  defendant  in 
a  case  of  election  ; 5  so  that,  in  computing  the  above-mentioned  periods, 
the  vacations  are  not  included. 

263  ;  see  also  Tomkin  v.  Lethbridge,  9  Ves.  179;  N.  S.  263;  Financial  Corporation  v.  Bristol  & 
Smith  v.  Serle,  14  Ves.  415;  Brooks  v.  Purton,  North  Somerset  Ry.  Co.  L.  R.  3  Eq.  422. 
1  Y.  &   C.    C.   C.   278;  see  contra,  Marsh    o.  6  Glassington  r.  Thwaites,  2  Russ.  458,  4G2; 
Hunter,  3  Mad.  437;  White  v.  Howard,  2   De  Seaton  v.  Grant,  L.  R.  2  Ch.  459. 
G.  &  S.  223.     If  an  answer  is  so  evasive  that  it  7  Tremaine  v.  Tremaine,  1  Vern.  189;  Wal- 
ls obviously  a  mere  delusion,  —  if  there  is  no  ton  v.  Broadbent,  3  Hare,  334 ;  Jewin  v.  Taylor, 
answer  to  any  of  the  material  facts  stated  in  0  Beav.  120;  Clifton  v.  Bentall,  9  Beav.  105; 
the  bill,  and  no  reason  assigned  for  not  answer-  Barritt  v.   Tidswell,    7   W.    R.  85,  V.  C.  K.; 
ing  tliem,  —  it  will  be  considered  as  no  answer,  Makepeace  v.  Romieux,  8  W.  R.  G87,   V.  C. 
and  the  Court  will  order  it  to  be  taken  from  tie  K. ;  see  also  Goddard  v.  Parr,  24  L.  J.  Ch.  783, 
tile.     If,  on  the  other  hand,  it  be  an   answer,  V.  C.  K. ;  Kernick  v.  Kernick,  12  W.  R.  335, 
however   defective,    the   plaintiff    must    either  V.  C.  W.;  Seaton  v.  Grant,  L.  R.  2  Ch.  459. 
tile  exceptions  or  a  replication,  or  set  down  the  x  Sibbald  v.    Lowrie,  2   K.    &  J.   277,   n.; 
cause  for  hearing  upon  bill  and  answer.    Travers  La  f  one  v.  Falkland  Islands  Co.  id.  277. 
v.  Ross,  14  N.  J.  Eq.  254  ;  Squier  v.  Shaw,  24           2  See  Equity  Rule  61  of  the  U.  S.  Courts, 
N.  J.   Eq.  74;    see    Financial    Corporation    v.  and  Mass.  Ch.  Rule  17;  ante,  p.  765,  note. 
Bristol  &  North  Somerset  Ry.  Co.  L.  R.  3  Eq.           3  See  Equity  Rule  63  of  the  U.  S.  Courts. 
422.  *  Cons.  Ord.  XVI.  16. 

*  For  form  of  notice,  see  Vol.  III.  6  Cons.    Ord.    XXXVII.    13    (2);  XLII.  6; 

5  Read  v.   Barton,  3   K.  &  J.  166  ;  3  Jur.  ante,  p.  768. 


Rutter  v.  Tregent,   12  Ch.  D.  758;  Smith   v.  Metropolitan  Tramways  Co.  16  Q.  B.  D.  178. 

Gamlen,  W.  N.  (1881)  110;  Benbow  v.  Low,  13  556;  Claparede  v.  Commercial  Union  Associa- 

Ch.  D.  553;  Green  v.  Sevin,  id.  589;  Edevain  tion,  32  W.  R.  151. 
v.  Cohen,  41  Ch.  D.  563  ;   Steward   v.   North 

779 


*  786  ANSWERS. 

Where,  upon  the  hearing  of  exceptions,  the  answer  is  held  sufficient, 
it  will  be  deemed  to  be  so  from  the  date  of  the  order  made  on  the  hear- 
ing ;  and  where  the  defendant  submits  to  answer  without  an  order  from 
the  Court,  the  answer  will  be  deemed  insufficient  from  the  date  of  the 
submission.6 

It  is  important  to  fix  with  precision  when  an  answer  is  to  be  deemed 
sufficient,  because,  as  we  shall  see  hereafter,  in  treating  of  motions  to 
dismiss,7  the  date  of  the  sufficiency  of  the  answer  constitutes  the  point 
of  time  from  which  is  to  be  reckoned  the  period,  at  the  expiration  of 
which  a  motion  to  dismiss  the  bill  for  want  of  prosecution  may  be 
made.8 

6  Cons.  Ord.  XVI.  18.  8  For  the  manner  of  computing  the  several 

7  See  post,  p.  801,  et  seq.  periods,  see  ante,  p.  786. 

780 


*  CHAPTER   XVIII.  *787 

THE    JOINDER    OF    SEVERAL    DEFENCES. 

All  or  any  of  the  several  modes  of  defence  before  enumerated  may 
be  joined  in  the  defence  to  a  bill ; *  thus,  a  defendant  may  demur  to 
one  part  of  the  bill,  plead  to  another,  answer  to  another,  and  disclaim 
as  to  another.2  A  defendant  may  also,  as  we  have  seen,  put  in  sepa- 
rate and  distinct  demurrers,  to  separate  and  distinct  parts  of  the  same 
bill;3  he  may  also  plead  different  matters,  to  separate  parts  of  the 
same  bill.4  When  the  species  of  defence  is  adopted,  the  same  rules 
which  have  been  before  laid  down  with  reference  to  each  mode  of  de- 
fence when  adopted  singly,  must  be  observed  when  the  same  modes  of 
defence  are  resorted  to  collectively.  Lord  Eedesdale  lays  it  down  that 
"  all  these  defences  must  clearly  refer  to  separate  and  distinct  parts  of 
the  bill ;  for  a  defendant  cannot  plead  to  that  part  to  which  he  has 
already  demurred,  neither  can  he  answer  to  any  part  to  which  he  has 
either  demurred  or  pleaded,  — the  demurrer  demanding  the  judgment  of 
the  Court  whether  he  shall  make  any  answer,  and  the  plea,  whether  he 
shall  make  any  other  answer  than  what  is  contained  in  the  plea.  Nor 
can  the  defendant,  by  answer,  claim  what,  by  disclaimer,  he  has  declared 
he  has  no  right  to.  A  plea  or  answer 5  will,  therefore,  overrule 
a  demurrer,6  and  an  answer  a  plea;7  and  *if  a  disclaimer  and    *  788 

i  Provided  each  relates  to  a  separate  and  Furse,  1  Bailey  Eq.  187;    H.  K.  Chase's  case, 

distinct  part  of  the  bill.     Mitford,  Eq.  PI.  by  1   Bland,  217;  Souzer  v.  De  Meyer,  2  Paige, 

Jeremy,  106,  319;  Livingston  v.  Story,  9  Peters,  574;  Robertson  v.  Ringley,  1  M'Cord  Ch.  352  ; 

623;    Lube,  Eq.   PI.   319;  Clark   v"  Phelps,   6  Mass.  Ch.   Rule  10,  and  23d  Equity  Rule   of 

John.  Ch.  214;  Beauchamp  v.  Gibbs,  1  Bibb,  the  U.  S.  Courts.     Ante,  pp.  534,  590,  notes. 

481;  Robertson  v.  Bingley,  1  M'Cord  Ch.  352.  '  Bolton  v  Gardner,  3  Paige,  273;    H.  K. 

2  Ld.  Red.  319;  Mass.  Ch.  Rule  10;  Maine  Ch:ise's  case,  1  Bland,  217;  Souzer  v.  De 
Ch.  Rule  6.  See  the  32d  Equity  Rule  of  the  Meyer,  2  Paige,  574;  Ferguson  v.  O'Harra, 
U.  S.  Courts,  post,  p.  2383.  The  defendant,  in  1  Peters,  C.  C.  493;  Leaycraft  v.  Dempsey,  4 
Massachusetts,  may,  instead  of  filing  a  formal  Paige,  124;  Stearns  v.  Page,  1  Story,  204.  In 
demurrer  or  plea,  insist  on  any  special  matter  Maine,  "demurrers,  pleas,  and  answers  will  be 
in  his  answer,  and  have  the  same  benefit  thereof  decided  on  their  own  merits,  and  one  will  not 
as  if  he  had  pleaded  the  same,  or  demurred  to  be  regarded  as  overruling  another."  Ch.  Rule 
the  bill.  Mass.  Ch.  Rule  14.  So  in  Maine  6.  37  Maine,  583.  By  the  rules  in  Maine,  de- 
(Ch.  Rule  6)  the  defendant  may  have  the  fendants  may  severally  demur  and  answer  to 
benefit  of  a  plea  by  inserting  its  substance  in  the  merits  of  the  bill  at  the  same  time.  Smith 
his  answer.  See  39th  Equity  Rule  of  the  U.  S.  v.  Kelley,  56  Maine,  64,  65.  In  this  case  the 
Courts;  ante,  pp.  589,  590,  note;  Hartshorn  v.  defendants  each  put  in  a  demurrer,  and  at  the 
Fames,  31  Maine,  97;  Smith  v.  Kelley,  58  same  time  answered  to  the  whole  bill,  and  the 
Maine,  64,  65;  Code  of  Tenn.  §  4318.  demurrers  were   sustained.     See   also    Harts- 

3  Ante,  p.  584.  horn  v.  Eames,  31  Maine,  97. 

*  Ante,  p.  610.  By    the    Tennessee    Code,  §  4319,  the  de- 

6  See  Bolton  v.  Gardner,  3  Paige,  273.  fendant  may  have  the  benefit   of  a  demurrer, 

6  See  Spofford  v.  Manning,  6  Paige,  383;      except    for  the  want  of   jurisdiction   of    the 

Clark  v.  Phelps,   6  John.  Ch.  214;  Miller  v.      subject-matter  or  of   the  person,   by   relying 

781 


*  789  JOINDER   OF   SEVERAL   DEFENCES. 

answer  are  inconsistent,  the  matter  will  be  taken  most  strongly  against 
the  defendant  upon  the  disclaimer."  1 

The  strict  application  of  these  principles  has,  as  we  have  seen,  been 
relaxed ;  and  now,  no  demurrer  or  plea  will  be  held  bad  and  overruled 
on  argument,  only  because  such  demurrer  or  plea  does  not  cover  so 
much  of  the  bill  as  it  might  by  law  have  extended  to,  or  only  because 
the  answer  of  the  defendant  extends  to  some  part  of  the  same  matter  as 
is  covered  by  such  demurrer  or  plea.2 

In  all  cases  not  coming  strictly  within  these  rules,  the  principles  above 
quoted  from  Lord  Redesdale  still  apply  ;  and,  in  addition  thereto,  it  is 
to  be  remarked  that,  where  a  defendant  adopts  this  mode  of  defence,  not 
only  should  each  defence  in  words  be  applicable  to  the  distinct  part  of 
the  bill  to  which  it  professes  to  apply,  but  that  it  should  also,  in  sub- 
stance, relate  peculiarly  to  that  part  of  the  bill  which  it  professes  to 
cover ;  so  that  a  defence  in  words  applicable  to  part  of  a  bill  only,  but 
in  reality  applicable  to  the  whole  bill,  is  not  good,  and  cannot  stand,  in 
conjunction  with  another  distinct  defence  applicable  and  applied  to 
another  distinct  part  of  the  bill.3  Where,  therefore,  a  defendant  put  in 
a  joint  demurrer  and  plea,  each  of  which  went  to  the  whole  bill,  the 
demurrer  was  overruled ; 4  and  where  a  defendant,  as  to  part  of  a  bill, 
put  in  a  plea  that  there  was  no  outstanding  term,  and  a  demurrer  as  to 
the  rest  on  the  ground  that  the  plaintiff  had  no  title,  Lord  Langdale  M. 
R.,  although  he  held  the  plea  to  be  good,  was  of  opinion  that  the  demur- 
rer being  applicable  to  the  whole  bill,  and  consequently  to  that  part  of 
it  which  was  covered  by  the  plea,  was  bad.5 

"When  a  demurrer  is  to  part  only  of  the  bill,  and  is  accompanied  by 
an  answer  or  other  defence  to  the  remainder,  it  should  be  entitled,  "  The 
demurrer  of  A  B,  the  above-named  defendant,  to  part  of  the  bill,  and 
the  answer  of  the  said  defendant  to  the  remainder  of  the  bill  of  com- 
plaint of  the  above-named  plaintiff/' 6     The  same  rule  is  applicable  to 

cases  where  the  defence  is  partly  by  plea,  and  partly  by  answer ; 
*  789    except  in  those  cases  where  the  answer  is  *  in  support  of  the 

plea ;   for  then  the  plea  and  answer  form  but  one  defence,  and 
the  title  is  properly  "  The  Plea  and  Answer." 1 

Where  a  defence  of  this  nature  has  been  put  in,  the  first  thing  is  to 
dispose  of  the  demurrer,  and  also  of  the  plea,  if  there  is  one  (unless  it 
is  intended  to  admit  that  it  is  a  valid  defence,  if  true),  and  for  this  pur- 

thereon  in  his  answer;    and  bv  §  4320,  either  ing  Co.  2  J.  &  H.  282;  8  Jur.  N.  S.  694;  see 

party   may   set  the   matters    of  demurrer   for  also  Mansell  v.  Feeney,  2  J.  &  H.  313. 
hearing  at  the  next  term.      Harding  v.  Egin,  5  Crouch  v.  Hickin,  ubi  supra.     His  Lord- 

2  Tenn.  Ch.  39.    And  if  the  defendant  neglects  ship,  however,  allowed  a  demurrer  ore  temis, 

to  have  his  demurrer,  thus   filed,  disposed  of  for  want  of  equity,  to  that   part   of    the  bill 

before  the  hearing  on  the  merits,  he  waives  the  which  was  not  covered  by  the  plea, 
benefit  of  it.     Kyle  v.  Riley,  11  Heisk.  230.  6  Tomlinson  v.   Swinnerton,  1   Keen,  9,  13; 

i  Ld.  Red.  319.  Braithwaite's  Pr.  43. 

2  Cons.  Ord.XIV.  8,  9;  ante,  pp.  584,  585,  *  Ante,  p.  682.      If  an  answer  commences 

617.     These  orders  have  been  adopted  in  the  as  an  answer  to  the  whole  bill,  it  overrules  a 

36th   and   37th   Equity   Rules    of   the   U.    S.  plea  or  demurrer  to  any  particular  part  of  the 

Supreme  Court,  January  Term,  1842.  bill,  although  such  part  is  not  in  fact  answered. 

s  Crouch  v.  Hickin,  1  Keen,  385,389.  Leaycraft  v.  Pempsey,  4  Paige,  124;  Summers 

4  Lowndes  v.  Garnett  &  Moseley  Gold  Min-  r.  Murray,  2  Edw.  Ch.  205. 
782 


JOINDER   OF   SEVERAL   DEFENCES.  *  789 

pose  the  demurrer  and  plea  must  be  set  down  for  argument  in  the  usual 
way.2  The  plaintiff  must,  however,  be  careful  not  to  amend  his  bill,  or 
except  to  the  answer  for  insufficiency,  before  the  demurrer  and  plea  have 
been  disposed  of  :  otherwise,  they  will  be  held  sufficient.3 

If,  upon  the  argument,  the  demurrer  and  plea  are,  or  either  of  them 
is  overruled,  the  plaintiff  may  deliver  exceptions  for  insufficiency,  ex- 
tending not  only  to  the  answer,  but  to  the  parts  of  the  bill  which  were 
intended  to  be  covered  by  the  demurrer  and  plea ;  but  if  the  demurrer 
and  plea  are,  or  either  of  them  is,  allowed,  the  exceptions  must  not 
extend  to  the  parts  of  the  bill  covered  by  them.4  The  proper  course  to 
be  pursued,  where  a  partial  demurrer  has  been  allowed  to  a  bill,  appears 
to  be,  to  amend  the  bill,  either  by  striking  out  the  part  demurred  to,  or 
by  making  such  alteration  in  the  bill  -as  will  obviate  the  ground  of  de- 
murrer. Thus,  after  a  partial  demurrer,  ore  temis,  for  want  of  parties, 
has  been  allowed,  the  bill  may  be  amended  by  adding  the  necessary 
parties,  or  stating  them  to  be  out  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court ;  and 
it  seems  that  such  an  amendment  will  not  preclude  the  plaintiff  from 
excepting  to  the  answer  to  those  parts  of  the  bill  which  are  not  covered 
by  the  demurrer.5 

After  a  plea  has  been  allowed,  no  amendment  of  the  bill  can  be  made 
without  a  special  order  of  the  Court ;  and  in  applying  for  such  order, 
the  plaintiff  must  specify  the  amendments  he  intends  to  make.6  After 
the  allowance  of  the  plea,  the  plaintiff  must  reply  to  the  plea  as  well  as 
to  the  answer,  and  proceed  with  the  case  in  the  usual  manner. 

2  Ante,  pp.  594,  693.  609,  the  Court,  on  allowing  a  demurrer,   re- 

3  Ante,  pp.  594,  691,  760.  fused  leave  to  amend  the  bill. 

4  Ante,  p.  760.  6  Ante,  pp.   419,   699;  Taylor  v.   Shaw,   2 

5  Taylor  v.  Bailey,  3  M.  &  C.  677,  683;  3  S.  &S.  12;  Neck  v.  Gains.  l"De  G.  &  S.  223; 
Jur.  308;  Foster  v.  Fisher,  4  Law  J.  N.  S.  237,  11  Jur.  763. 

M.  R.    In  Osborne  v-  Jullion,  3  Drew.  596, 

783 


790 


*  CHAPTER  XIX. 


DISMISSING    BILLS,    OTHERWISE    THAN    AT    THE    HEARING, 
AND    STAYING    PROCEEDINGS. 


Section  I.  —  Generally. 

Before  a  defendant  has  appeared  to  the  bill,  the  plaintiff  may  dis- 
miss the  bill,  as  against  him,  without  costs,  on  an  order  to  be  obtained 
upon  motion  of  course,  or  upon  petition  of  course,  at  the  Eolls.1  Where 
however,  such  an  order  was  obtained  in  breach  of  faith  of  a  compromise 
entered  into  with  the  defendant,  it  was  discharged  with  costs.2  (a) 


l  Thompson  v.  Thompson,  7  Beav.  350  ; 
Wyatt's  P.  R.  60,  61;  Braithwaite's  Pr.  566. 
For  form  of  order,  see  Seton ;  1277,  No.  1 ;  and 


(a)  The  general  rule  is  that  the  plaintiff  may 
dismiss  his  bill  at  any  time  before  final  or  inter- 
locutory decree  when  the  defendant  demands 
no  affirmative  relief,  but  that  after  decree  the 
consent  of  the  other  parties  is  necessary.  West- 
ern Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  American  Bell  Tel.  Co. 
50  Fed.  Rep.  662;  Hat-Sweat  Manuf.  Co.  v. 
Waring,  46  id.  87;  Connecticut  &  P.  R.  R.  Co. 
v.  Hendee,  27  id.  678;  Pullman's  Palace  Car 
Co.  i».  Central  Trans.  Co.  49  id.  261;  Moriarty 
v.  Mason,  47  Conn.  436 ;  Dawson  v.  Amey, 
40  N.  J.  Eq.  494;  Russell  V.  Lamb,  82  Iowa, 
558;  Hathaway  v.  Hagan,  64  Vt.  135;  Kreider 
v.  Mehaffy,  lo"Pa.  Co.  Ct.  Rep.  412;  Purdy  v. 
Henslee,97  111.  389;  Ives  ».  Ashelby,  26  111.  App. 
244;  Adger  v.  Pringle,  11  S.  C.527;  Gatewood 
v.  Leak,"  99  N.  C.  363;  Evans  v.  Sheldon,  69 
Ga.  100:  Waite  V.  Wingate,  4  Wash.  324.  In 
.Equity,  an  order  of  Court  is  necessary  to  dis- 
continue a  suit.  American  Zylonite  Co.  v. 
Celluloid  Manuf.  Co.  32  Fed.  Rep.  809 ;  New- 
comb  v.  White  (N.  Mex.),  23  Pac.  Rep.  671. 
In  the  Federal  Courts,  no  docket  fee  is  allowed 
when  the  plaintiff  discontinues  before  any  final 
or  interlocutory  hearing.  Consolidated  B.  A. 
Co.  v.  American  P.  F.  Co.  24  Fed.  Rep.  658; 
Mercartney  v.  Crittenden,  id.  401.  Defendants 
who  are  not  prejudiced  by  a  dismissal  of  the 
bill  as  to  other  defendants,  cannot  object 
thereto.  Jefferson  v.  Jefferson,  96  111.  551.  If 
the  defendant's  cross-bill  is  dismissed  on  de- 
murrer, the  plaintiff  is  then  entitled  to  dis- 
continue as  if  no  cross-bill  had  been  filed;  if 
the  first  order  is  reversed,  the  other  may  per- 

784 


for  forms  of  motion  paper  and  petition,  see 
Vol.  III. 

2  Betts  0.  Barton,  3  Jur.  N.  S.  154,  V.  C.  W. 


haps  be  vacated.  Ogle  v.  Koerner,  140  111. 
170.  As  to  the  effect,  upon  the  plaintiff's  right 
to  discontinue  a  representative  suit,  of  others 
intervening  who  belong  to  the  same  class,  see 
ante,  pp.  236,  and  note.  Frelinghuysen  V. 
Nugent,  36  Fed.  Rep.  229. 

A  suit  in  Equity  cannot  be  dismissed  by 
the  plaintiff  without  the  defendant's  consent 
on  payment  of  costs,  after  issue  joined,  even 
though  no  cross-bill  has  been  filed,  when  it  in- 
volves the  title  to  real  estate:  Hershberger  v. 
Blewett,  55  Fed.  Rep.  170;  or  if  the  defend- 
ant will  be  thereby  prejudiced. as  where  he  has 
fully  prepared  for  hearing  and  has  filed  a  cross- 
bill: Detroit  v.  Detroit  City  Ry.  Co.  55  Fed. 
Rep.  569;  or  if  the  plaintiff,  upon  a  bill  to  fore- 
close, admits  the  mortgage,  which  the  defend- 
ant claims  the  right  to  redeem ;  such  dismissal 
should  be  without  prejudice  to  the  defendant's 
right  to  redeem.  McCarren  v.  Coogan,  50  N.  J. 
Eq.  268,  611. 

Such  dismissal  is  usually  "  without  pre- 
judice." As  to  such  dismissal  and  its  effect, 
see  Ibid.;  Kendig  v.  Dean,  97  U.  S.  423; 
Lacassagne  v.  Chapuis,  144  U.S.  119;  Kemp- 
ton  v.  Burgess,  136  Mass.  192;  Forsythe  v. 
McMurty,  59  Iowa,  162;  Benscotter  v.  Green, 
60  Md.  327;  Mabry  v.  Churchwell,  1  Lea,  416; 
Sharpe  v.  Allen.  11  Lea,  518;  Harris  v.  Hines, 
59  Ga.  427;  Brunswick  v.  Lamb,  60  Ga.  342; 
Evans  ».  Sheldon,  69  Ga.  100 ;  Sandeford  i\ 
Lewis,  68  Ga.  482;  Jennings  r.  Pierce  (Ala.), 
13  So.  Rep.  605;  Blair  v.  Reading,  99  111.  600; 
Smith  v.  Brittenham,  98  111.  188;   Reilly   v. 


GENERALLY. 


791 


After  appearance,  and  before  decree,  the  plaintiff  may,  generally, 
obtain  an  order  to  dismiss  the  bill,  but  only  upon  payment  of  costs  ; 3 
unless  the  parties  against  whom  it  is  dismissed  consent  to  its  being  dis- 
missed without  costs.4  The  order  may  be  obtained  either  on  petition 
of  course  or  motion ; 5  and  if  the  defendant's  consent  is  required,  it  is 
signified  by  the  appearance  of  counsel  on  his  behalf  on  the  motion,  or 
by  his  solicitor  subscribing  his  consent  to  the  prayer  of  the  petition. 
The  application  is  usually  made  by  petition.6  Where,  however,  there 
has  been  any  proceeding  in  the  cause  which  has  given  the  defendant  a 
right  against  the  plaintiff,  the  plaintiff  cannot  dismiss  his  bill  as  of 
course  :  thus,  where  a  general  demurrer  had  been  overruled  on  argu- 
ment, Lord  Cottenham  was  of  opinion  that  the  plaintiff  could  not  dis- 
miss his  bill  as  of  course,  the  defendant  having  a  right  to  appeal 
against  *the  order  overruling  the  demurrer,  — which  right  he  *  791 
ought  not  to  be  deprived  of,  on  an  ex  parte  application.1 

It  seems  once  to  have  been  the  privilege  of  the  plaintiff  to  dismiss  his 
bill,  when  the  defendant  had  answered,  upon  payment  of  20s.  costs  ; 2 
but  that  rule  was  altered ; 8  and  the  Statute  of  Anne  has  since  enacted,4 
that,  upon  the  plaintiff's  dismissing  his  own  bill,  or  the  defendant's  dis- 
missing the  same  for  want  of  prosecution,  the  plaintiff  in  such  suit  shall 
pay  to  the  defendant  or  defendants  his  or  their  full  costs,  to  be  taxed 
by  the  Master.5    It  seems,  formerly,  to  have  been  considered,  that  the 


3  The  plaintiff  cannot  dismiss  his  bill  as  to 
part  of  the  relief  prayed,  and  proceed  with  the 
residue;  he  must  apply  to  amend.  The  Cam- 
den &  Amboy  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Stewart,  19  N.  J. 
Eq.  69;  see  New  Jersey  Ch.  Rule  94. 

4  Dixon  v.  Parks,  1  Ves.  Jr.  402;  Wyatt's 
P.  R.  61 ;  Braithwaite's  Pr.  566.  These  rules 
also  apply  where  the  plaintiff  is  suing  on  be- 
half of  himself  and  others.  Handford  v.  Storie, 
2  S.  &  S.  196,  198;  Armstrong  v.  Storer,  9 
Beav.  277,  281 ;  Seaton  v.  Grant,  36  L.  J.  Ch. 
638;  ante,  pp.  239,  240.  But  a  bill  will  not  be 
dismissed  "  without  prejudice,"  when  the  plain- 
tiff has  had  ample  opportunity  to  obtain  his 
testimony,  and  prepare  his  case  on  the  merits. 
Rumbly  v.  Stainton,  24  Ala.  712;  see  Rochester 
v.  Lee,  1  M'N.  &  G.  467,  469,  470. 

5  But  a  bill  will  not  be  dismissed  upon  a 
mere  suggestion.  Wiswell  v.  Starr,  50  Maine, 
381,  384. 

6  For  form  of  order,  see  Seton,  1277,  Nos. 


1,  2;  and  for  forms  of  motion  paper  and  peti- 
tion, see  Vol.  III. 

1  Cooper  v.  Lewis,  2  Phil.  178,  181 ;  and  see 
Ainslie  v.  Sims,  17  Beav.  174;  see  also  Booth 
v.  Leycester,  1  Keen,  247,  255,  where  a  bill  and 
cross-bill  had  been  set  down  to  be  heard  to- 
gether. 

2  Gilb.  For.  Rom.  110;  2  Atk.  288. 

3  Anon.  1  Vern.  116;  Anon.  id.  334. 

4  4  &  5  Anne,  c.  16,  §  23. 

5  The  plaintiff  seems  to  have  been  liable, 
notwithstanding  the  statute,  to  the  payment  of 
only  40s.  costs  where  the  cause  was  set  down 
and  dismissed  on  bill  and  answer;  see  New- 
sham  v.  Gray,  2  Atk.  288;  but  by  General 
Order  of  27th  April,  1748,  id.  289,  Sand. 
Ord.  628,  it  is  provided,  that,  in  such  a  case, 
the  Court  may  dismiss  the  bill,  either  with  40*\ 
costs,  or  with  taxed  costs,  or  without  costs. 
This  order  appears,  in  this  respect,  to  be 
abrogated  by  the  Cons.  Ord. 


Reilly,  139  111.  180;  Barrett  v.  Short,  41  111. 
App."  25;  Richards  v.  Allis,  82  Wis.  509; 
National  Hotel  Co.  v.  Crane  Brothers  Manuf. 
Co.  50  Kansas,  49;  Ilelmick  v.  Davidson,  18 
Oregon,  456 ;  Bomar  r.  Parker,  68  Texas,  435. 
A  dismissal  "  without  prejudice  "  leaves  the 
parties  as  if  no  suit  had  been  instituted.  Ma- 
gill  v.  Mercantile  Trust  Co.  81  Ky.  129;  Rey- 
nolds v.  Hennessy,  17  R.  1.169,  175;  Weighley 
v.  Coffman,  144  Penn.  St.  489.  The  general 
practice  is  to  dismiss  the  bill  "  without  pre- 
judice "  when  the  merits  have  not  been  consid- 

VOL.   I.  —  50 


ered;  and  the  omission  of  this  qualification  of 
the  decree  may  be  corrected  by  the  Court  on 
appeal  in  a  proper  case.  See  Durant  t'.  Essex 
Co.  7  Wall.  107.  After  dismissal,  the  bill  still 
remains  a  part  of  the  record,  and  may  be 
used  as  evidence,  when  competent.  Lyster  v. 
Stickney,  12  Fed.  Rep.  609.  Upon  ordering  a 
dismissal,  the  Court  may  impose  conditions,  as 
to  future  use  of  evidence,  &c.  See  American 
Zylonite  Co.  v.  Celluloid  Manuf.  Co.  32  Fed. 
Rep.  809;  McClung  v.  Steen,  33  id.  373;  Blake 
v.  Barnes,  63  Hun,  633. 

•      785 


*  792  DISMISSING   BILLS,    AND    STAYING   PROCEEDINGS. 

Court  had  no  power  to  make  an  order,  on  the  application  of  the  plain- 
tiff, dismissing  the  bill  without  costs,  except  upon  the  defendant's  con- 
sent actually  given  in  Court.6  It  has  now,  however,  been  decided,  that 
the  Court  has  power  to  make  such  an  order  in  a  proper  case,  and  such 
orders  have  been  made  :  where  the  defendant  surrendered  a  lease,  to 
obtain  an  assignment  of  which  the  bill  was  filed,  and  absconded ; 7  where 
the  bill  was  filed  under  a  mistake,  under  which  both  plaintiffs  and  de- 
fendants were  at  the  time  ; 8  where  the  defendants  had  assigned  their 
interests  to  co-defendants,  after  the  bill  was  filed,  and  had  joined  in  an 
answer  with  such  other  defendants  and  disclaimed  ; 9  where  the  suit  was 
rendered  nugatory  by  the  subsequent  passing  of  an  Act  of  Parliament, 
or  by  the  reversal  of  a  case  on  the  authority  of  which  the  bill  was  filed, 
or  b}r  any  subsequent  matter ; 10  and  where  the  plaintiff  had  been  misled 
by  the  act  of  the  Court.11 

The  application  to  dismiss,  in  these  cases,  is  usually  made  by  special 
motion,  of  which  notice  must  be  served  on  the  defendants,  or  such  of 
them  as  are  affected  by  the  motion.1'2 

*  792        *  Where,  however,  the  matters  in  dispute  have  been  disposed  of 

by  an  independent  proceeding,  but  the  bill  has  been  dismissed  for 
want  of  prosecution,  with  costs,  as  against  some  of  the  defendants,  the 
plaintiff  can  no  longer  move  to  dismiss  it,  as  against  the  others,  without 
costs ;  the  Court  not  being  able  to  adjudicate  as  to  the  costs,  in  the 
absence  of  the  dismissed  parties,  who  might  be  prejudiced  by  the  other 
defendants  being  entitled  to  add  their  costs  to  their  securities,  or  other- 
wise.    In  such  a  case,  the  bill  can  only  be  dismissed  with  costs.1 

Where  the  plaintiff  moved  to  dismiss  the  bill  with  costs  against  some 
of  the  defendants  who  had  disclaimed,  without  prejudice  to  the  question 
by  whom  the  costs  should  ultimately  be  borne,  it  was  held  by  Sir  James 
Wigram  V.  C.  that  the  order  might  be  made  without  serving  the  other 
defendants,  as  they  could  not  be  prejudiced ; 2  but  Sir  J.  L.  Knight 
Bruce  V.  C.  refused  to  make  such  an  order,  unless  the  other  defendants 
were  served.3 

Where  the  plaintiff  has  been  admitted  to  sue  in  forma  pauperis,  he 

6  Dixon  v.  Parks,  1  Ves.  Jr.  402;  Anon.  L.  JJ. ;  2  De  G.  J.  &  S.  147;  Riley  v.  Croy- 
id.  140;  Fidelle  v.  Evans,  1  Bro.  C.  C.  2G7;  don,  10  Jur.  N.  S.  1251;  13  W.  R.  223, 
1  Cox,  27;  Fisher  v.  Quick,  9  N.  J.  Eq.  312.  V.  C  K. 

7  Knox  v.  Brown,  2  Bro.  C.  C.  186;  1  Cox,  "  Lister  v.  Leather,  1  De  G.  &  J.  361; 
359;  and  see  Goodday  v.  Sleigh,  1  Jur.  N.  S.  3  Jur.  N.  S.  848.  But  not  where  the  ohject  of 
201;  3  W.  R.  87,  V.  C.  S.;  Wright  v.  Barlow,  the  suit  has  been  defeated  by  the  plaintiff's 
5  De  G.  &  S.  43;  15  Jur.  1149.  own   act    or    procurement.      Haimnersley    v. 

8  Broughton   v.  Lashmar,  5  M.  &   C.   136,  Barker,  2  Paige,  372. 

144.  12  For  form  of  notice,  see  Vol.  III. 

9  Hawkins  v.  Gardiner,  17  Jur.  780,  V.  C.  S.  1  Troward  v.  Attwood,  27  Beav.  85. 

1°  Sutton  Harbor  Co.   v.  Hitchens,  15  Beav.  2  Baily   v.  Lambert,    5   Hare,  178;  10  Jur. 

161 ;  1  De  G.  M.  &  G.  161,  169;  and  see  id.  16  109;    and  see  Collis  v.  Col'is,  14  L.  J.  Ch.  56, 

Beav.  381;  Robinson  v.  Rosher.  1  Y.  &  C.  C.  C.  V.  C.   K.  B.;    Styles   v.  Shipton,  3   Eq.  Rep. 

7,12;  5  Jur.  1006;  but  see  South  Staffordshire  224,  V.  C.   W.     Similar  orders   made   on   ex 

Ry.  Co.  v.  Hall,  16  Jur.  160,  V.  C.  K.;  Lan-  parte  motion  in  Clements  v.  Clifford,  11  Jur. 

eashire  and  Yorkshire   Ry.  Co.  r.    Evans,    14  N.  S.  851;    14  W.  R.  22,  V.  C  K. ;  Berndston 

Beav.  529;  Ventilation  and   Sanitary  Imp.  Co.  v.  Churchill,  W.  N.  (18G6)  8,  V.  C.  W. 
v.  Edelston,  11  W.  R.  613,  V.  C.  S.";    Elsey  v.  3  Wigginton  v.  Pateman,  12  Jur.  89. 

Adams,  10  Jur.   N.  S.  459;  12  W.  R.   586, 
786 


GENERALLY. 


793 


may  move  to  dismiss  his  bill  without  costs,  except  in  cases  in  which 
his  admission  in  forma  pauperis  has  taken  place  subsequently  to  the 
filing  of  the  bill ; 4  but  the  motion  must  not  be  made  ex  parte.5 

The  course  of  proceeding  to  obtain  the  dismissal  of  the  bill  by  a 
plaintiff  who  disavows  the  suit,  has  been  before  pointed  out.6  Where 
the  suit  is  not  disavowed,  one  co-plaintiff  may,  with  the  consent  of  the 
defendant,  dismiss  a  bill  with  costs,  so  far  as  concerns  himself,  if  it  will 
not  in  any  way  injure  the  other  plaintiffs  :  otherwise  the  Court  will 
refuse  the  order,  unless  upon  terms  so  framed  as  to  protect  the  other 
plaintiff  in  the  suit  from  injury.7  The  mere  circumstance  that  the 
rights  of  the  plaintiff  applying  to  be  dismissed  are  concurrent  with 
those  of  the  plaintiffs  who  remain,  will  not  be  a  sufficient  reason  for 
refusing  the  application  ;  since  any  defect  which  his  withdrawal  may 
make  in  the  record  may  be  supplied  by  making  him  a  defendant,  by 
amendment.8 

A  plaintiff  may,  in  general,  obtain  an  order  to  dismiss  his  own  bill, 
with   costs,  as  a  matter  of   course,  at   any  time   before   decree, 
*  and  notwithstanding  a  pending  motion  which  has  been  ordered    *  793 
to  stand  over.1 


4  Ante,  p.  42. 

5  Ibid.;  Parkinson  p.  Hanbury,  4  De  G. 
M.  &  G.  508;  and  see  Wilkinson  v.  Belsher, 
2  Bro.  C.  C.  272.  Where  an  executor  or  ad- 
ministrator has  commenced  a  wrong  suit  by 
mistake,  or  has  ascertained  that  it  would  be 
useless  to  proceed,  in  consequence  of  facts  sub- 
sequently discovered,  he  will  be  permitted  to 
discontinue  without  payment  of  costs.  Arnoux 
v  Steinbrenner,  1  Paige,  82. 

6  Ante,  p.  307. 

7  Holkirk  p.  Holkirk,  4  Mad.  50  ;  Winthrop 
p.  Murray,  7  Hare,  152;  13  Jur.  955 ;  and  see 
ante,  p.  309;  but  see  Langdale  v.  Langdale,  13 
Ves.  167;  see  Muldrow  v.  Du  Bose,  2  Hill  Ch. 
375,  377;  Bank  p.  Rose,  1  Rich.  Ch.  292. 

8  Holkirk  p.  Holkirk,  ubl  supra. 

i  Markwick  v.  Pawson,  33  L.  J.  Ch.  703; 
4  N.  R.  528,  L.  JJ.  Thus,  in  Curtis  P.  Lloyd, 
4  M.  &  C.  194;  2  Jur.  1058,  after  a  cause  had 
been  called  on  for  hearing,  and  had  stood  over 
at  the  request  of  counsel,  t  e  plaintiff  obtained, 
as  of  course,  an  order  to  dismiss  his  bill  with 
costs:  the  defendant  aft'  rwards  objected  to 
this  course;  but  Lord  Cottenham  held,  th  it 
the  plaintiff  was  entitled  to  the  order,  observ- 
ing that  he  could  not  see  wli}'  a  plaintiff 
should  be  in  a  worse  situation,  because  he  in- 
forms die  Court  that  he  does  not  intend  to  pro- 
ceed with  the  hearing  of  his  cause,  than  if  he 
made  default.  It  is  a  matter  of  course  to  per- 
mit the  plaintiff  to  dismiss  the  bill  at  any  time 
before  decree,  upon  payment  of  costs,  but  the 
order  for  such  leave  is  conditional,  and  the  suit 
will  not  be  absolutely  discontinued  so  as  to 
authorize  the  filing  a  new  bill,  till  the  costs  of 
the  first  suit  are  paid.     Cummins  v.  Bennett, 


8  Paige,  79;  see  Thomas  p.  Thomas,  3  Lift. 
9;  Bassard  p.  Lester,  2  M'Cord  Ch.  421 ;  Smith 
p.  Smith,  2  Blackf.  232;    Simpson  r.  Brewster, 

9  Paige,  245;  Elderkin  v.  Fitch,  2  Ind.  90: 
Mason  v.  York  &  Cumberland  R.  R.  Co.  52 
Maine,  82,  107.  The  right  of  the  plaintiff  to 
dismiss  is  not  defeated  by  the  fact  that  the  de- 
fendant has  answered,  and  given  the  discovery 
sought.  Kean  v.  Lathrop,  58  Ga.  355.  But  is 
by  the  commencement  of  the  trial.  Wilder  p. 
Boynton,  G3  Barb.  547.  The  right  to  discon- 
tinue a  suit  after  testimony  taken  is  not  ab- 
solute, but  may  be  controlled  by  the  Court; 
as  where  a  witness  who  had  been  examined 
died,  the  plaintiff  was  permitted  to  dismiss  only 
upon  the  terms  of  allowing  the  deposition  to 
be  read  as  evidence  in  any  future  suit  for  the 
same  cause.  Young  v.  Bush,  36  How.  Pr.  240. 
The  plaintiff's  right  to  dismiss  revives  upon  the 
reversal  of  a  decree  by  the  Appellate  Court  and 
remand.  Mohler  r.  Wiltberger,  74  111.  163. 
After  a  voluntary  dismissal  of  a  bill  by  the  plain- 
tiff, he  will  not  be  allowed  to  reinstate  it.  Orphan 
Asylum  v.  McCartce,  1  Hopk.372.  And  the  re- 
scinding of  an  order  of  dismissal  as  to  certain 
parties  will  not  bring  those  parties  in  again, 
ami  hold  them  bound  by  the  previous  proceed- 
ings and  the  decree.  Johnson  p.  Shepard,  35 
Mich.  115.  And  it  is  within  the  discretion 
of  the  Court  to  refuse  to  permit  a  plaintiff 
to  dismiss  his  bill,  if  the  dismissal  would 
work  a  prejudice  to  other  parties,  as  where 
one  defendant  had  established  his  claim 
against  a  co-defendant.    Bank  v.  Rose,  1  Rich. 

Eq.  292.     Or  a  cross-bill.     Booth  p. ,  cited 

in  that  case.  In  New  Jersey,  by  Rule  of 
Chancery,  when  a  replication   has   been  filed, 

787 


794 


DISMISSING    BILLS,    AND    STAYING    PROCEEDINGS. 


If,  however,  the  plaintiff,  after  the  cause  is  set  down  to  be  heard, 
causes  the  bill  to  be  dismissed  on  his  own  application,  such  dismissal  is, 
unless  the  Court  otherwise  directs,  equivalent  to  a  dismissal  on  the 
merits,  and  may  be  pleaded  in  bar  to  another  suit  for  the  same 
matter.2 

After  a  decree,  or  decretal  order,3  however,  the  Court  will  not  suffer 
a  plaintiff  to  dismiss  his  own  bill,  unless  upon  consent ;  for  all  parties 
are  interested  in  a  decree,  and  any  party  may  take  such  steps  as  he 
may  be  advised  to  have  the  effect  of  it.4  The  proper  form  of  order 
after  decree  is  not  to  dismiss  the  bill,  but  to  stay  all  further  proceed- 
ings.5 If,  however,  the  decree  merely  directs  accounts  and  inquiries,6 
in  order  to  enable  the  Court  to  determine  what  is  to  be  done,  the  bill 
may  be  dismissed.7  And  where,  upon  the  hearing  of  the  cause,  the 
Court  has  merely  directed  an  issue,  the  plaintiff  may,  before  trial  of  the 
issue,  obtain  an  order  to  dismiss  the  bill  with  costs ;  because  the  direct- 
ing of  an  issue  is  only  to  satisfy  the  conscience  of  the  Court,  prefatory 
to  its  giving  judgment.  If,  however,  the  issue  has  been  tried, 
*  794  and  determined  in  *  favor  of  the  defendant,  the  plaintiff  cannot 
move  to  dismiss  :  because  the  defendant  may  have  it  set  down 
on  the  Equity  reserved,  in  order  to  obtain  a  formal  dismissal  of  the  bill 
so  as  to  enroll  it  as  a  final  judgment,  and  thereby  make  it  pleadable.1  (a) 

After  a  decree  has  been  made  of  such  a  kind  that  other  persons, 


and  the  taking  of  proofs  begun  by  either  party, 
the  plaintiff  shall  not  be  allowed  to  dismiss  his 
bill,  except  upon  special  motion  and  notice  to 
the  defendants.     Rule  15;  Dick.  Prec.  4. 

2  Cons.  Old.  XXIII.  13. 

3  Post,  806;  Anon.  11  Ves.  169;  Biscoe  v. 
Brett,  2  V.  &  B.  377;  Bluck  v.  Colnaghi,  9 
Sim.  411;  Collins  v.  Greaves,  5  Hare,  596; 
Gregory  v.  Spencer,  11  Beav.  143. 

4  Guilbert  v.  Hawles,  1  Ch.  Cas.  40;  Car- 
rington  v.  Holly,  1  Dick.  280. 

6  Egg  v.  Devey,  11  Beav.  221 ;  see  also 
Lashley  v.  Hogg,"  11  Ves.  602;  Bluck  v. 
Colnaghi,  9  Sim.  411;  Handford  v.  Storie, 
2  S.  &  S.  196,  198. 

e  Bartou  v.  Barton,  3  K.  &  J.  512;  3  Jur. 
N.  S.  808. 


(a)  After  decree  the  bill  will  not  be  dis- 
missed for  want  of  prosecution,  the  proper 
course  being  to  apply  to  obtain  the  conduct  of 
the  cause.  Simons  v.  Bagnell,  19  W.  R.  217. 
In  Chicago  &  Alton  R.  Co.  v.  Union  Rolling 
Mill  Co.  109  U.  S.  702,  713.  Mr.  Justice  Wood 
thus  clearly  stated  the  practice :  "  It  may  be  con- 
ceded that,  as  a  general  rule,  a  complainant  in 
an  original  bill  has  the  right  at  any  time,  upon 
payment  of  costs,  to  dismiss  his  bill,  .  .  .  sub- 
ject to  a  distinct  and  well-settled  exception, 
namely,  that  after  a  decree,  whether  final  or 
interlocutory,  has  been  made,  by  which  the 
rights  of  a  partv  defendant  have  been  adjudi- 

788 


7  Anon.  11  Ves.  169  ;  Barton  v.  Barton,  nbi 
supra  ;  and  see  post,  pp.  810, 811 ;  see  Clarkson 
v.  Scrogins,  2  Monr.  52.  After  an  order  to 
account,  and  report  made,  the  plaintiff  cannot 
dismiss  on  payment  of  costs.  Bethia  ?'.  M'Kay, 
Cheves,  Ch.  Cas.  93;  see  also  Hall  v.  McPher- 
son,  3  Bland,  529;  but  see  Bassard  v.  Lester, 
2  M'Cord  Ch.  421.  A  bill  by  trustees  to  mar- 
shal assets  and  call  in  creditors  after  a  decree 
made  directing  money  to  be  paid  and  creditors' 
claims  established,  will  not  be  dismissed  at  the 
instance  of  one  of  the  plaintiffs,  his  co-plaintiff 
and  the  creditors  objecting.  Muldrow  v.  Du 
Bose,  2  Hill  Ch.  375,377;  see  Jones  v.  Lansing, 
7  Paige,  583. 

i  Carrington  v.  Holly,  1  Dick.  280. 


cated,  or  such  proceedings  have  been  taken  as 
entitle  the  defendant  to  a  decree,  the  com- 
plainant will  not  be  allowed  to  dismiss  his  bill 
without  the  consent  of  the  defendant."  See  also 
Tanqueray  v.  Bowles,  L.  R.  14  Eq.  151 ;  1  Seton 
on  Judgments  (5th  ed.),  114;  Reynolds  v.  First 
Nat.  Bank,  112  U.  S.  213;  Stevens  v.  Railroads, 
4  Fed.  Rep.  97;  Connecticut  &  P.  R.  Co.  v. 
Hendee,  27  id.  678;  American  Zylonite  Co.  v. 
Celluloid  Manuf.  Co.  32  id.  809;  Electrical 
Accumulator  Co.  v.  Brush  Electric  Co.  44  id. 
602;  Kean  v.  I.athrop,  58  Ga.  355;  Frierson  r. 
Alexander,  74  Ga.  666; 'State  v.  Hemingway, 
69  Miss.  491;  Fisher  v.  Stovall,  85  Tenn.  316. 


GENERALLY.  *  795 

besides  the  parties  on  the  record,  are  interested  in  the  prosecution  of  it, 
neither  the  plaintiff  nor  defendant,  on  the  consent  of  the  other,  can 
obtain  an  order  for  the  dismissal  of  the  bill.2  Thus,  where  a  plaintiff 
sues  on  behalf  of  himself  and  all  other  persons  of  the  same  class,  al- 
though he  acts  upon  his  own  mere  motion,  and  retains  the  absolute 
dominion  of  the  suit  until  the  decree,  and  may  dismiss  the  bill  at  his 
pleasure,  yet,  after  a  decree,  he  cannot  by  his  conduct  deprive  other 
persons  of  the  same  class  of  the  benefit  of  the  decree,  if  they  think  fit 
to  prosecute  it.  "  The  reason  of  the  distinction  is,  that,  before  decree, 
no  other  person  of  the  class  is  bound  to  rely  upon  the  diligence  of  him 
who  has  first  instituted  his  suit,  but  may  file  a  bill  of  his  own  ;  and 
that,  after  a  decree,  no  second  suit  is  permitted."  3 

Where  a  defendant  submits  to  the  whole  demand  of  the  plaintiff,  and 
to  pay  the  costs,  he  has  a  right  to  apply  to  the  Court  to  dismiss  the  bill, 
or  stay  all  further  proceedings.4  The  application  is  usually  made  on 
motion,  of  which  notice  must  be  given.5  The  Court  will  not,  on  such  an 
application,  go  into  the  merits  of  the  case  ;  but  will  only  consider  the 
conduct  of  the  parties  in  conducting  the  cause.  It  will  not,  therefore, 
entertain  such  an  application,  unless  the  defendant  submits  to  pay  the 
costs,  as  well  as  comply  with  all  the  plaintiff's  demands ; 6  though  it  has, 
in  some  cases,  determined  the  question  whether  particular  costs,  incurred 
in  proceedings  collateral  to  the  suit,  are  to  be  paid  by  the  defendant.7 
The  costs  of  suit  which  the  defendant  must  submit  to  pay,  include  the 
costs  of  co-defendants,  for  which  the  plaintiff  is  liable.8 

Where  there  are  several  defendants,  and  the  plaintiff  claims  only 
part  of  the  relief  against  one  defendant,  that  defendant  may  apply,  by 
special  motion,  to  stay  all  further  proceedings,  on  satisfying  the 
*  whole  demand  made  against  him,  and  paying  the  plaintiff's  costs    *  795 
incurred  up  to  the  time  of  making  the  application.1 

In  a  foreclosure  or  redemption  suit,  the  bill  may  be  dismissed  on  the 
special  motion  of  a  subsequent  incumbrancer,  as  against  all  the  defend- 

2  Updike  v.  Doyle,  7  R.  I.  446,  402.  Cott.  229,  234;  10  Jur.  673;  Manton  v.  Roe,  14 

3  Handford  v.  Storie,  2  S.  &  S.  196,  198;  Sim.  353;  Paynter  v.  Carew,  Kay  App.  36;  18 
York  v.  White,  10  Jur.  168,  M.  R. ;  ante,  p.239;  Jur.  417;  Orton  v.  Bainbrigge,  22  L.  J.  Ch. 
and  see  post,  p.  795;  Updike  v.  Doyle,  7  R.  I.  979;  1  W.  R.  487,  M.  R. 

446,  462;  Collins  v.  Taylor,  3  Green  Ch.  163;  5  For  form  of  notice,  see  Vol.  III. 

Williamson  v.  Wilson,  1  Bland,  418;  Waring  6  Wallis  v.  Wallis,  4  Drew.  458;  Rennet  v. 

a.  Robinson,  Hoff.  Ch.  524,  529,  530;  Muldrow  Luard,   ubi  supra;    see,    however,    Holden   v. 

v.  Du  Bose,  2  Hill  Ch.  375,  377;  Jones  v.  Lan-  Kynaston,  ubi  supra. 

sing,  7  Paige,  583;  Shewen  v.  Vanderhorst,  2  V  Penny  v.  Beavan,  7  Hare,    133;    12  Jur. 

R.  &  M.  75;  Atlas  Bank  v.  Nahant  Bank,  23  936. 

Pick.  480;  Mass.  Stat.  1862,  c.  218,  §8,  ante,  8  Pemberton   r.   Topham,   and    Paynter  v. 

p.  239,  and  cases  in  note.  Carew,   ubi  supra.     It   seems,    however,    that 

And  see  Pimbley  v.  Molyneux,  W.  N.  (1867)  where  the  defendant  is  willing  to  comply  with 

250,  where  the  conduct  of  a  creditor's  suit  was  the  plaintiff's  demand,  and  would  have  done 

given  to  a  residuary  legatee,  on  his  paying  the  so  without  suit  if  he  had  been  asked,  he  may 

plaintiffs  debt  and  costs.  obtain  an  order  staying  all  proceedings  without 

*  Per  Lord  Langdale  in  Sivell  v.  Abraham,  costs.     Wallis   r.    Wallis,    4   Drew.  458,  463.. 

8  Beav.  598;  see  also  Pemberton  v.  Topham,  1  Rudd  v.  Rowe,  18  XV.  R.  977. 
Beav.  316;  2  Jur.  1009;  Holden  v.  Kynaston,  2  l  Sawyer  v.  Mills,  1  M'N.  &  G.  390,  395; 

Beav.  204,  206 ;  Field  v.  Robinson,  7  Beav.  66 ;  13  Jur.  1061;   see  also   Holden  v.  Kynaston, 

Hennet  v.  Luard,  12  Beav.  479;  Darner  v.  Lord  ubi  supra.     For  form  of  notice  of  motion,  see 

Portarlington,  2  Phil.  30,35;  C.  P.  Coop.  temp.  Vol.  III. 

789 


796 


DISMISSING    BILLS,    AND    STAYING   PROCEEDINGS. 


ants  except  himself,  on  his  paying  into  Court,  by  a  specified  clay,  a  sum 
sufficient  to  cover  the  mortgage  debt  and  interest,  and  the  costs  of  the 
plaintiff  and  other  defendants.2  Where  discovery  is  sought  from  the 
defendant,  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  continue  his  suit  for  that  purpose; 
and  an  application  by  the  defendant  before  answer  to  stay  proceedings, 
upon  his  submission  to  the  plaintiff's  demand  and  payment  of  the  costs 
of  the  suit,  is  premature,  and  will  not  be  entertained.3 

The  defendant  may  also,  by  submitting  to  pay  the  plaintiff's  demands, 
and  his  costs  of  the  suit,  obtain  an  order  to  stay  the  proceedings,  under 
a  decree  in  which  other  persons  are  interested,  as  well  as  the  parties  to 
the  suit ;  but,  in  such  a  case,  any  one  of  the  persons  so  interested  may 
subsequently,  on  special  motion  or  summons,4  with  notice  to  the  parties 
to  the  cause,  obtain  an  order  that  the  applicant  may  have  either  the 
conduct  of  the  cause,  or  liberty  to  carry  on  the  proceedings  under  the 
decree,  or  the  prosecution  of  particular  accounts  or  inquiries.5 

Orders  to  stay  proceedings,  on  the  ground  that  the  defendant  has  sub- 
mitted to  the  plaintiff's  demands,  have  also  been  made  on  the  application 
of  the  plaintiff,  hostilely  to  the  defendant ; 6  but  it  seems  that  the  defend- 
ant has  a  right  to  have  the  cause  brought  to  a  hearing,  for  the  purpose 
of  determining  the  question  of  costs,  and  that  such  an  application  by 
the  plaintiff  can,  therefore,  only  be  made  by  consent.7  Where  the  ques- 
tion in  dispute  has  been  settled  by  compromise  out  of  Court,  without 
providing  for  the  costs,  the  Court  will  not  determine  the  question  of 

costs,  either  on  motion  or  at  the  hearing.8 
*  796  *  By  consent,  the  bill  may  be  dismissed  or  the  proceedings 
stayed,  on  motion  of  course,  or  petition  of  course  at  the  Rolls, 
or  on  special  motion  or  petition,1  or  on  summons,  on  any  terms  which 
may  be  agreed  upon ; 2  and  where  an  agreement  to  dismiss  a  bill  was 
entered  into  at  the  trial  of  an  action  directed  to  be  brought,  and  made 


2  Jones  v.  Tinney,  Kay  App.  45;  Cliallie 
v.  Gwynne,  id.  46,  where  the  forms  of  the 
orders  are  given;  see  also  Paynter  v.  Carew, 
id.  36;  18  Jur.  417;  and  Paine  v.  Edwards, 
8  Jur.  N.  S.  1200, 1202;  10  W.  R.  709,  V.  C.  S., 
where  the  motion  was  refused,  the  priorities 
being  in  dispute;  Wainwright  v.  Sewell,  11 
W.  R.  560,  V.  C.  S.  For  forms  of  notice,  see 
Vol.  III. 

3  Stevens  v.  Brett,  12  W.  R.  572,  V.  C  W. 

4  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  80,  §  26.  For  forms  of 
notice  of  motion  and  summons,  see  Vol.  III. 

5  See  Salter  v.  Tildesley,  13  W.  R.  376,  M. 
];.;  see  also  ante,  pp.  239.  240,  794. 

6  Nichols  v.  Elford,  5  Jur.  N.  S.  264,  V.  C. 
W.;  North  v.  Great  Western  Ry.  Co.  2  Giff. 
64;  0  Jur.  N.  S.  244;  Thompson  v.  Knight,  7 
Jur.  N.  S.  704;  9  W.  R  780.  V.  C  W.;  Brooks- 
hank  v.  Higginbottom,  31  Beav.  35;  and  see 
Sivell  r.  Abraham,  8  Beav.  598;  Hennet  v. 
Luard,  12  Beav.  479,  480 

7  Langham  v.  Great  Northern  Ry.  Co.  16 
Sim.  173;  12  Jur.  574;  Burgess  r.  Hills,  26 
Beav.  244,  249;  5  Jur.  N.  S.  233;  Burgess  v. 

790 


Hatelv,  26  Beav.  249;  M'Naughtan  v.  Hasker, 

12  Jur.  956,  V.  C.  K.  B. ;  Wilde  v.  Wilde,  10 
W.  R.  503,  L.  JJ.;  Morgan  v.  Great  Eastern 
Ry.  Co.  1  H.  &  M.  78;  and  see  Chester  v. 
Metropolitan  Ry.  Co.  11  Jur.  N.  S.  214,  M.  R.; 

13  W.  R.  333;  Hudson  v.  Bennett,  12  Jur. 
N.  S.  519;  14  W.  R.  911,  V.  C.  S. 

8  Gibson  v.  Lord  Cranky,  6  Mad.  365 ; 
Roberts  v.  Roberts,  IS.  &  S.  39;  Whalley 
v.  Lord  Suffield,  12  Beav.  402;  Nichols  v. 
Elford,  5  Jur.  N.  S.  264,  V.  C.  W. 

1  Where  the  terms  are  complicated,  orafund 
in  Court  is  dealt  with,  the  application  is  usually 
made  on  special  petition.  See  Winthrop  v.  Win- 
throp,  1  C.  P.  Coop.  temp.  Cott.  201;  Richard- 
son r.  Eyton.  2  De  G.  M.  &  G.  79;  Harrison  v. 
Lane,  2  Sm.  &  G.  249;  Dawson  v.  Newsome,  2 
Giff.  272;  6  Jur.  N.  S.  625;  Pryer  v.  Gribble, 
L.  R.  10  Ch.  534,  537,  note  ;  post,  Chap.  XXXV. 
§  1,  Interlocutory  Applications;  or  on  summons. 

2  See  North  r.  Great  Western  Ry.  Co.  2 
Giff.  64;  Troward  v.  Attwood,  27  Beav.  85. 
For  forms  of  motion  paper,  notice  of  motion, 
petition,  and  summons,  see  Vol.  III. 


GENERALLY. 


'97 


a  rule  of  the  Court  of  Law,  the  Court  of  Chancery  enforced  it  against 
the  parties,  on  motion  in  the  canse.3  Where  any  of  the  parties  are  not 
sui  juris,  or  are  executors  or  trustees,  the  Court  must  be  satisfied  of  the 
propriety  of  the  agreement.4 

Where  a  plaintiff  has  made  default  in  payment  of  the  costs  of  a  for- 
mer suit  against  the  same  defendant,  or  the  person  whom  he  represents, 
for  the  same  purpose,  the  defendant  may  obtain  an  order,  on  motion, 
with  notice  to  the  plaintiff,  staying  all  further  proceedings  until  the 
plaintiff  has  paid  such  costs ; 5  and  where,  after  great  delay,  the  costs 
still  continue  unpaid,  the  Court  will  order  the  plaintiff  to  pay  them 
within  a  limited  time,  or,  in  default,  that  the  second  bill  stand  dis- 
missed.6 Where,  however,  the  two  suits  are  not  for  the  same  matter, 
and  the  second  bill  could  not  be  produced  by  a  fair  amendment  of  the 
first,  such  an  order  will  be  refused  ; 7  nor  can  it  be  obtained  where  the 
plaintiff  sues  by  his  next  friend ; 8  (a)  nor,  it  seems,  where  the  defendant 
has  taken  any  step  in  the  new  cause,  before  making  the  application.9 

Where  the  same  object  may  be  attained  under  two  different  modes  of 
proceeding :  if  the  first  is  adopted,  and  then  abandoned  and  the  second 
adopted,  the  proceedings  in  the  second  may  be  stayed  until  the  costs  of 
the  first  are  paid.10  It  would  seem  that  the  amount  of  the  costs  should 
be  ascertained  by  taxation  or  otherwise,  before  the  application  to  stay 
proceedings  is  made.11 

*  Where  a  plaintiff  is  in  contempt  for  non-payment  of  costs    *  797 
in  the  suit,  an  order  to  stay  proceedings  until  the  costs  have  been 
paid  may  be  obtained  on  special  motion  ; 1  (b)  and  where  he  has  failed  to 

3  Tebbittt  v.  Potter,  4  Hare,  164;  see  also 
Warwick  v.  Cox,  9  Hare  App.  14;  Dawson  v. 
Newsome,  ubi  supra ;  see,  however,  Askew  v. 
Millington,  9  Hare,  65;  15  Jur.  532/ 

4  Warwick  v.  Cox,  ubi  supra;  and  see  Lip- 
piat  v.  Holley,  1  Beav.  423;  Seton,  091. 

5  Pickett  v.  Loggan,  5  Ves.  706;  Altree  v. 
Hordern,  5  Beav.  623,  628;  7  Jur.  247;  Lautour 
v.  Holcombe,  10  Beav.  256;  Spires  r.  Sewell,  5 
Sim.  193;  Onge  v.  Truelock,  2  Moll.  41;  Long 
v.  Storie,~13  Jur.  1091,  V.  C.  E. ;  Sprye  v.  Rey- 
nell,  1  De  G.  M.  &  G.  712;  Ernest  v.  Partridge, 
8  L.  T.  N".  S.  762,  V.  C.  W.;  see,  however, 
Wild  v.  Hobson,  2  V.  &  B.  105,  108;  see  Cum- 
mins v.  Bennett,  8  Paige,  79;  Rathbone  v.  Eck- 
ford,  cired  1  Hoff.  Ch.  Pr.  328,  n.  (1);  Simpson 
v.  Brewster,  9  Paige,  245.  The  application 
should  not  be  made  until  the  amount  of  the 
costs  has  been  ascertained  by  taxation.  Ernest 
v.  Partridge,  ubi  supra.  For  form  of  notice  of 
motion,  see  Vol.  III. 

Where,  after  the  dismissal  of  a  bill  by  con- 
sent, the  plaintiff  filed  a  new  bill  which  was, 
with  trifling  alterations,  a  verbatim  copy  of  the 


former  bill,  all  proceedings  in  the  second  suit 
were  ordered  to  be  staved.  Parker  v.  Simpson, 
18  W.  R.  204. 

6  Princess  of  Wales  r.  Lord  Liverpool,  3 
Swanst.  567;  Lautour  v.  Holcombe,  11  Beav. 
624;  Ernest  v.  Govett,  2  N.  R.  486,  V.  C.  W. 
For  form  of  notice  of  motion,  see  Vol.  III. 

"  Budge  v.  Budge,  12  Beav.  385,  387.  And 
where  the  plaintiff  sues  in  a  representative  ca- 
pacity in  the  second  suit.  Partington  v.  Rev- 
nolds,  6  W.  R.  307. 

8  Hind  v.  Whitmore,  2  K.  &  J.  458. 

9  Onge  v.  Truelock,  2  .Moll.  41. 

W  Foley  r.  Smith,  12  Beav.  154;  Davey  «. 
Currant,  24  Beav.  411;  4  Jur.  X.  S.  398,  2  De 
G.  &  J.  506:  see  also  Oldfield  v.  Cobbett.  12 
Beav.  91,  95. 

11  Ernest  v.  Partridge,  8  L.  T.  X.  S.  702- 
V.  C  W. ;  and  see  Foley  r.  Smith,  12  Beav. 
154;  Davey  v.  Durrant,  24  Bp.iv.  411;  Altree  e. 
Hordern,  5  Beav.  623,  628:  Spires  r.  Sewell.  5 
Sim.  193;  Long  v.  Storie,  13  Jur.  1091.  V.  C.  K. 

»  Bradbury  r.  Shawe,  14  Jur.  1042,  V.  C. 
K.  B. ;  Wilson    v.   Bates,  3  M.  &  C.  197,  204; 


(a)  Where  a  suit  brought  by  a  married  wo- 
man by  next  friend  was  dismissed  with  costs 
for  non-compliance  with  an  order  that  the  next 
friend  give  security  for  costs  on  the  ground  of 
poverty,  a  second  suit  by  the  plaintiff  for  the 


same  purpose  by  a  different  next  friend  was 
stayed  until  the  costs  of  the  first  suit  were  paid. 
Be  Payne,  Randle  r.  Payne.  23  Ch.  D.  288; 
ante,  p.  Ill,  note  (a). 

(b)  In  re  Xeal,  Weston  v.  Neal,  31  Ch.  D. 

791 


*  797 


DISMISSING   BILLS,    AND    STAYING    PROCEEDINGS. 


give  security  for  costs  pursuant  to  an  .order,  the  defendant  may  obtain, 
on  motion  with  notice,  an  order  that  he  give  security  within  a  limited 
time,  or  the  bill  be  dismissed.2 

Neither  in  the  Court  of  Chancery  nor  in  the  Court  of  Exchequer  has 
the  practice  prevailed  of  compelling  the  plaintiff  to  consolidate  his  dif- 
ferent suits  against  several  defendants.3 


9  Sim.  54;  Futvoye  v.  Kennard.  2  Giff.  533; 
and  see  Wild  v.  Hobson,  4  Mad.  49;  cited  3  M. 

6  C.  202.  For  form  of  notice  of  motion,  see 
Vol.  III. 

2  Kennedy  v.  Edwards,  11  Jur.  N.  S.  153. 
For  form  of  notice,  see  Vol.  III. 

3  Manchester  College  v.  Isherwood,  2  Sim. 
476.  In  this  case,  which  was  a  motion  by  the 
defendants  to  consolidate  sixteen  bills  for  tithes 
against  different  persons,  all  of  whom  made  the 
same  defence,  the  Vice-Chancellor  reviewed  the 
authorities,  printed  and  in  manuscript,  and  re- 
fused the  motion  with  costs.  It  seems  that  the 
practice  of  consolidating  causes  was  recognized 
in  the  Court  of  Exchequer  at  one  time,  but  was 
afterwards  disapproved.     In  Forman  v.  Blake. 

7  Price,  654,  upon  the  hearing  of  a  similar  mo- 
tion, Chief  Baron  Richards  said:  "I  never 
heard  of  an  order,  in  the  course  of  my  expe- 
rience, for  consolidating  causes  in  Equity,  nor 
can  I  conceive  upon  what  principle  it  can  be 
done."  His  refusal  to  sustain  the  motion  was 
followed  in  Foreman  v.  Southwood,  8  Price,  572, 
and  by  Lord  Eldon,  in  the  manuscript  case  of 
Kynaston  v.  Perry,  cited  in  2  Sim.  478.  His 
Lordship  had  previously  intimated  his  igno- 
rance of  any  such  practice  in  Equity,  in  Keighly 
v.  Brown,  16  Ves.  344.  Following  these  rulings 
it  was  held  by  Chancellor  Cooper  of  Tennessee, 
in  Knight  Brothers  v.  Ogden  Brothers,  3  Tenn- 
Ch.  409,  that  the  Court  of  Chancery  has,  ordi- 
narily, no  power  to  interfere  with  the  rights  of 
parties,  in  invitum,  by  an  order  directing  the 
consolidation  of  independent  suits  of  purely 
equitable  cognizance,  the  complainants  in  one 
suit  seeking  to  reach  the  recovery  in  the  other. 
And  it  has  been  repeatedly  held  by  the  Supreme 
Court  of  that  State,  that  the  consolidation  of 
causes,  either  by  consent  or  by  order  of  Court 
acquiesced  in,  will  not  change  the  rules  of 
Equity  pleading,  or  the  rights  of  the  parties, 
which  rights  must  still  turn  on  the  pleadings, 
proof,  and  proceedings  in  the  respective  causes. 


437,  following  Re  Youngs,  Doggett  v.  Revett, 
id.  239;  Bacon  V.  C.  at  the  defendant's  in- 
stance, when  the  case  was  called  on  the  trial, 
staved  all  further  proceedings  until  the  plain- 
tiff had  cleared  his  contempt  in  no'  paying 
the  costs  of  an  application  in  the  suit.  But 
In  re  Wickham.  Marony  v.  Taylor,  35  Ch.  272. 
Cotton  L.  J.  disapproved  of  this  course,  say- 
ing: "The  matter  ought  not  to  be  disposed  of 

792 


Brevard  v.  Suraraar,  2  Heisk.  105 ;  Lofland  v. 
Coward,  12  Heisk.  546 ;  Masson  v.  Anderson,  3 
Baxt.  290. 

In  Burnham  v.  Dalling,  16  N.  J.  Eq.  310, 
where  three  suits  by  different  wards  against  the 
same  guardian  were,  after  decrees  in  each,  con- 
solidated by  consent,  Chancellor  Green  ex- 
pressed the  opinion  that  it  was  within  the 
power  of  the  Court  of  Equity  to  consolidate 
actions  with  or  without  the  consent  of  the  plain- 
tiffs. While  Chancellor  Runyon  has  suggested 
that  one  of  several  suits  between  the  same 
parties  should  be  tried,  the  others  to  await  the 
result.  Lehigh  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  McFarlan,  30  , 
N.  J.  Eq.  144.  And  this  was  done  by  consent, 
in  Andrews  v.  Speer,  4  Dill.  470.  and  Amos  r. 
Chadwick,  4  Ch.  D.  869;  9  id.  459.  In  Wilson 
v.  Riddle,  48  Ga.  609,  three  suits  in  favor  of 
different  parties  against  the  same  defendant  on 
the  same  claim,  two  of  them  being  for  the  whole 
claim,  and  the  third  for  a  large  portion  thereof, 
and  each  involving  long  and  complicated  ac- 
counts, were  consolidated.  In  Beech  v.  Wood- 
yard,  5  W.  Va.  231,  although  the  motion  to  con- 
solidate was  refused,  the  Court  considered  that 
the  rule  for  consolidation  of  suits  is  alike  in 
Equity  and  at  Law,  the  matter  being  in  the  dis- 
cretion of  the  Court.    See  post,  p.  1120,  note(«). 

In  Foxwell  r. Webster,  cited  ante,  p.  339,  n.  2, 
where  134  suits  were  brought  by  a  patentee 
against  separate  defendants  for  infringements 
of  the  patent,  Vice-Chancellor  Kindersley  re- 
fused an  application  of  seventy-seven  of  the 
defendants  that  the  plaintiff  be  directed  to  pro- 
ceed with  one  suit,  either  to  try  all  the  ques- 
tions, or  at  any  rate  the  validity  of  the  pat- 
ent, the  proceedings  in  the  other  suits  to  be 
stayed  in  the  mean  time.  2  Dr.  &  Sm.  250;  12 
W."  R.  94;  10  Jur.  137.  The  Vice-Chancellor 
thought  the  motion  premature  before  answer 
by  the  defendants,  and  refused  it  with  leave  to 
move  again  on  the  coming  in  of  the  answers, 
saying  that  the  Court  would  "put  the  matter 


upon  an  objection  taken  by  counsel  at  the  hear- 
ing that  costs  have  not  been  paid;  there  ought 
to  be  an  application  for  the  purpose."  See  ante, 
p.  Ill,  n.  ('<).  The  Equity  Rule  which  allows 
the  second  suit  to  proceed  when  a  good  excuse 
for  non-payment  of  costs  is  shown,  prevails  in 
Nebraska,  unaffected  by  the  Code.  Union 
Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Mertes,  35  Neb.  204. 


GENERALLY.  *  798 

But  there  are  several  cases  in  which,  where  there  are  two  suits  relating 
to  the  same  subject-matter,  the  Court  will,  under  certain  circumstances, 
make  an  order  staying  the  proceedings  in  one  of  them.4  Thus,  as  we 
have  seen,  where  two  or  more  suits  are  instituted  in  the  name  of  an 
infant  by  different  persons,  each  acting  as  his  next  friend,  the  Court, 
on  being  satisfied  by  an  inquiry,  or  otherwise,  which  suit  is  most  for 
his  benefit,  will  stay  the  proceedings  in  the  other  suit.5  So,  also, 
where  two  suits  are  instituted,  for  the  administration  of  an  estate, 
when  the  decree  has  been  obtained  in  one  suit,  proceedings  will  be 
stayed  in  the  other. 

Where  the  second  suit  embraces  an  object  not  provided  for  in  the 
decree  pronounced  in  the  first  suit,  the  proceedings  in  the  second  suit 
will  not  be  stayed ; 6  as,  for  instance,  where  the  decree  is  made  in  a 
creditors'  suit,  and  a  bill  is  filed  by  a  legate.7  But  even  in  this  case, 
it  is  often  desirable  to  obtain  a  transfer  and  amalgamation  of  the  two 
suits.8  Where  the  second  suit  prayed  additional  relief,  the  Court  stayed 
proceedings  in  it,  on  the  parties  to  the  first  suit  undertaking  to  intro- 
duce into  the  decree  in  that  suit  the  additional  relief  which  might  be 
obtained  in  the  second  suit.9  In  another  case,  the  Court  stayed 
proceedings  in  the  second  *  suit,  only  so  far  as  the  relief  sought  *  798 
could  be  obtained  in  the  first  suit ; 1  and  recently,  the  Court, 
on  the  parties  consenting  that  an  immediate  decree  should  be  made  in 
the  second  suit,  ordered  the  two  suits  to  be  consolidated,  and  decreed  the 
further  relief  which  could  be  obtained  in  the  second  suit ; 2  but  where, 
after  a  bill  had  been  filed  by  one  executor  against  his  co-executor  for 
administration,  and  asking  special  relief,  but,  before  decree,  the  latter 
obtained,  on  summons,  an  order  against  the  former  to  administer  the 
same  estate,  the  Court  refused  to  discharge  the  order.3     Where  a  decree 

in  a  course  of  decision  to  save  a  multiplicity  of  good,  6  Mad.  374;  Pickford  o.  Hunter,  5  Sim. 
suits."  12  W.  R.  96.  Upon  appeal,  the  Lord  122,  129  ;  Ladbroke  v.  Sloane,  3  De  G.  &  S. 
Chancellor  made  an  order  for  a  trial  of  the  291 ;  Smith  v.  Guy,  ubi  supra  ;  Rump  o.  Green- 
validity  of  the  patent  as  between  the  plaintiff  hill,  20  Beav.  512;  Whittington  v.  Edwards,  3 
and  seventy  of  the  defendants  then  before  the  De  G.  &  J.  243;  Taylor  v.  Southgate,  4  M.  & 
Court,  the  case  to  be  conducted  by  one  or  more  C.  203,  209;  see  Ritchie  v.  Humberstone,  17 
of  the  defendants  for  the  rest.  12  W.  R.  186;  Jur.  N.  S.  756;  Pigott  v.  Young,  7  W.  R.  235; 
10  Jur.  137.  The  order  seems  to  have  been  Colman  v.  Turner,  L.  R.  10  Eq.  230;  De  La 
made  by  consent.  2  Dr.  &  Sin.  250,  note  at  Salle  v.  Moorat,  L.  R.  11  Eq.  8. 
end  of  case.  f  Golder  v.  Golder,  9  Hare,  276 ;  Earl  of 
By  Order  LI.  §  4,  under  the  Judicature  Portarlington  v.  Darner,  2  Phil.  262;  Plunkett 
Acts,   it   is   expressly  provided:    "Actions  in  ??.  Lewis,  11  Sim.  379. 

any  division  or  divisions  may  be  consolidated  8  See  Cumming  v.  Slater,  1  Y.  &  C.  C.  C. 

by  order  of  the   Court,    or   a   Judge,    in   the  484;  Godfrey  v.  Maw,  id.  485;  Pott  v.  Gallini, 

manner    heretofore    in    use    in    the    Superior  1  S.  &  S.  206,  209;  Budgen  v.  Sage,  3  M.  &  C. 

Courts  of  Common  Law."     Morgan's  Acts  and  683,  687. 

Orders,  593.  »  Gwyer  v.  Peterson,  26  Beav.  83  ;  Matthews 

4  Smith  v.  Guy,  2  C.  P.  Coop.  temp.  Cott.  v.  Palmer,  11  W.  R.  610,  V.  C.  K. 
239,  296;  2  Phil.  159;  Rigby  v.  Strangways,  2  i  Dryden  v.  Foster,  6  Beav.  146. 

Phil.  175,  177;  10  Jur.  998;  Underwood  v.Jee,  2  Hoskins  v.  Campbell,  2  H.  &  M.  43;   see 

1  M'N.  &  G.  276;  17  Sim.  119;  15  Jur.  99;  Re  Wortley,  4  Ch.  D.  180;  2  Seton,  1521. 
and  see  Seton,  889.  3  Vanrenen  v.  Piffard,  13  W.  R.  425,  V.  C. 

5  Ante,  pp.  69,  70.  S.;  sedqu.  if  the  plaintiff  in  the  summons  suit 

6  Underwood  v.  Jee,  ubi  supra;  Menzies  v.  was  entitled  so  to  sue;  see  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86, 
Connor,  3  M'N.  &  G.  648,  652 ;  Anson  v.  Tow-  §  45. 

793 


*799 


DISMISSING    BILLS,    AND   STAYING   PROCEEDINGS. 


has  been  made  in  both  suits,  the  Court  will  direct  the  administration  to 
proceed  in  that  branch  of  the  Court  in  which  the  decree  is  in  the  most 
perfect  state,  notwithstanding  that  it  may  be  posterior  in  point  of  date.4 

It  is  the  duty  of  the  personal  representative  to  make  the  application, 
as  soon  as  a  decree  has  been  made  in  one  suit ; 5  but  if  he  neglects  to 
do  so,  the  plaintiff  in  the  suit  in  which  the  decree  has  been  made,6  or 
any  person  interested,7  may  obtain  the  order :  although  he  is  not  a  party 
to  the  other  suit. 

Where  two  suits  for  the  administration  of  the  same  estate,  one  by  the 
executor  and  the  other  by  the  residuary  legatee,  come  on  together,  the 
proceedings  in  the  executor's  suit  will  be  stayed,  and  the  decree  made  in 
the  residuary  legatee's  suit.8 

Where  an  administration  decree  has  been  obtained  in  the  Court  of  the 
Duchy  of  Lancaster,  a  suit  for  the  same  purpose  in  the  Court  of  Chancery 
will  be  stayed,  if  the  whole  subject-matter  is  within  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  Duchy  Court,  but  not  otherwise.9 

Where  the  concurrent  suits  are  in  different  branches  of  the  Court,  a 
difference  of  opinion  prevailed  wuth  reference  to  the  Judge  by  whom 
the  order  staying  proceedings  should  be  made;10  but  the  practice  now 
adopted  is :  to  obtain  from  the  Lord  Chancellor,  or  Lords  Justices,  on 
special  motion,  with  notice  to  the  other  parties  to  the  suits,11  an  order 
transferring  the  cause  in  which  it  is  desired  to  stay  further  proceedings, 
to  the  Judge  who  has  pronounced  the  decree ;  and  then  to  obtain 
*  799  from  him  an  order,  *  entitled  in  both  causes,  staying  further 
proceedings  in  the  transferred  cause,  and  providing  for  the  costs.1 
The  order  to  stay  may  be  obtained  on  special  motion,  or,  where  the 
decree  is  in  prosecution  at  Chambers,  on  special  summons ;  and  notice 
of  the  motion,  or  the  summons,  must  be  served  on  all  parties  to  each 
cause.2 

Where  such  an  order  is  made,  the  costs  of  all  parties  to  the  second 
suit  who  are  parties  to  the  first  suit,  up  to  notice  of  the  decree,  are 
usually  made  costs  in  that  suit,  and  the  costs  of  any  party  who  is  not  a 
party  to  the  first  suit,  are  ordered  to  be  paid  by  the  executor,  and 
added  to  his  own.3     If  the  executor  has  no  assets  to  pay  them,  liberty 


4  Littlewood  ?>.  Collins,  11  W.  R.  387,  L.  JJ. 

5  Therry  r.  Henderson,  1  Y.  &  C.  C.  C.  481, 
483;  6  Jur  380;  Stead  v.  Stead,  2  C.  P.  Coop, 
temp.  Cott.  311 ;  Packwood  v.  Maddison,  1  S.  & 
S.  232,  234;  2  C.  P.  Coop.  temp.  Cott.  312. 

6  Earl  of  Portarlingtou  v.  Darner,  2  Phil.  2G2 ; 
and  see  Swale  v.  Swale,  22  Beav.  401. 

7  Smith  v.  Guy,  2  C.  P.  Coop.  temp.  Cott. 
289,  297. 

8  Kelk  v.  Archer,  16  Jur.  605,  M.  R. ;  and 
Miller  v.  Powell,  V.  C.  K.  B.  14  July,  1849, 
there  referred  to. 

9  Wvnne  v.  Hughes,  26  Beav.  377;  5  Jur. 
N.  S.  165;  and  see  26  Beav.  384,  n.;  28  L.  J. 
Ch.  485,  L.  .U. ;  see  also  Seton,  881 ;  Bradley  e. 
Stelfox,  1  N.  R.  221,  L.  C;  Re  Longdendale 
Cotton  Spinning  Co.  8  Ch.  D.  150. 

1°  White  o.  Johnson,  2  Phil.  689;  Ladbrooke 
794 


v.  Bleadon,  15  Beav.  457;  16  Jur.  851;  Scotto  v. 
Stone,  17  Jur.  588,  V.  C.  K. 

11  Bond  v.  Barnes,  2  De  G.  F.  &  J.  387; 
and  see  ante,  pp.  70,  n.  398.  For  form  of 
notice  of  motion,  see  Vol.  III. 

i  Duffort  ».  Arrowsmitb,  7  De  G.  M.  &  G. 
434;  Harris  v.  Gandy,  1  De  G.  F.  &  J.  13"; 
Swale  r.  Swale,  22  Beav.  401,  and  see  ante, 
pp.  70,  398. 

-  For  form  of  order,  see  Seton,  887;  and 
for  forms  of  notice  of  motion  and  summons,  see 
Vol.  III. 

3  Seton,  888;  Colder  v.  Golder,  9  Hare.  276, 
279;  West  v.  Swinburne,  14  Jur.  360,  V.  C.  K. 
B.;  and  see  Therry  v.  Henderson,  1  Y.  &  C.  C 
C.  481,  483;  6  Jur.  380;  F  rowel  v.  Baker,  4 
Beav.  76,  78 ;  Littlewood  v.  Collins,  11  W.  R. 
387,  L.  JJ. ;  and  see  form  of  order,  Seton,  887. 


GENERALLY.  *  800 

will  be  given  such  party  to  go  in  and  prove  for  them  in  the  first 
suit.4 

If  the  plaintiff  in  the  second  suit  proceed,  after  notice  of  the  decree 
in  the  first  suit,  he  will  not  be  allowed  the  costs  of  such  subsequent  pro- 
ceedings ;  but  he  will  not  be  made  to  pay  costs.5  Where,  however,  the 
Court  considered  that  the  second  suit  was  improperly  instituted,  the 
plaintiff  in  it  was  ordered  to  pay  the  costs  of  the  order  of  transfer,  and 
of  the  motion  to  stay  proceedings.6 

The  rule  that  when  two  suits  are  instituted  for  the  administration  of 
the  same  estate,  that  shall  be  prosecuted  in  which  the  earlier  decree  has 
been  obtained,  does  not  apply  when  it  has  not  been  obtained  fairly  ; 
and  the  Court  held  this  to  have  been  the  case  where,  on  the  same  day 
on  which  notice  had  been  given  to  an  executor  to  appear  to  an  adminis- 
tration summons,  he  appeared  of  his  own  accord  at  an  earlier  hour  in 
the  Chambers  of  another  Judge,  and  consented  to  an  order  on  a  sum- 
mons then,  and  not  previously,  applied  for,  by  another  plaintiff.7  But 
the  Court,  by  consent,  made  an  immediate  decree  in  a  cause  not  in  the 
paper,  for  administration  of  the  real  and  personal  estate  of  an  intestate, 
at  the  suit  of  a  creditor,  after  a  summons  in  Chambers  for  the  adminis- 
tration of  the  personal  estate  had  been  taken  out  by  another  creditor, 
and  which  was  returnable  before  the  first  day  on  which  the  cause  could 
be  heard  as  a  short  cause.8 

Where  the  suit  in  which  the  decree  was  made  was  instituted  by 
*two  executors  against  a  third,  the  Court  refused  to  stay  the  pro-  *800 
ceedings  in  a  suit  by  a  creditor,  whose  case  depended  on  vouchers 
and  documents  in  the  executors'  hands,  until  they  had  put  in  their 
answer ;  and  directed  the  motion  to  stay  proceedings  to  stand  over  until 
that  had  been  done,  observing  that  the  Court  would  then  know  who 
ought  to  have  the  conduct  of  the  litigation.1 

When  the  order  staying  proceedings  is  made,  if  a  sufficient  reason 
for  so  doing  appears,  the  Court  will  give  the  conduct  of  the  decree  to 
the  plaintiff  in  the  suit  in  which  the  proceedings  are  stayed ; 2  but  the 
mere  fact  that  the  plaintiff  and  defendants,  in  the  suit  in  which  the 
decree  has  been  made,  appear  by  the  same  solicitor,  is  not  a  sufficient 
reason  for  so  doing ;  and  where  a  creditors'  and  legatees'  suit  are  amal- 
gamated, the  Court  prefers  giving  the  conduct  of  the  cause  to  the  lega- 
tee, who  is  interested  in  reducing  the  expenses  as  much  as  possible,  all 
persons  being  at  libert}^  to  attend  and  assert  their  claims,  —  considering 

4  Canham  v.  Neal",  26  Beav.  266;  5  Jur.  8  Furze  v.  Hennet,  2  De  G.  &  J.  125;  see 
N.  S.  52;  Ladbroke  v.  Sloane,  3  De  G.  &  S.  291 ;      Scaffold  r.  Hampton,  43  L.  J.  Ch.  137. 

W>  st  v.   Swinburne,   ubi  supra;   see   form  of  l  Macrae  v.  Smith,  2  K.  &  J.  411;  see  also 

order,  Seton,  887.     If  there  is  a  fund  in  Court,  Budgen  v.  Sage,  3  M.  &  C.  683,  687. 

the  costs  ma}' be  ordered  to  be  paid  out  of  it.  2  See  Macrae  v.  Smith,  ubi  supra;  Norvall 

Jackson  v.  Leaf,  1  J.  &  W.  220,  233.  r.  I'ascoe,  10  W.  R.  338,  V.  C.  K.;  Hawkes  v. 

5  Earl  of  Portarlington  v.  Darner,  2  Phil.  Barrett,  5  Mad.  17;  Kelk  v.  Archer,  16  Jur. 
262;  and  see  Seton,  888.  005,  M.  R.;  MHardvr  Hitchcock,  12  Jur.  781, 

6  Salter  v.  Tildesley,  13  W.  R.  376,  M.  R.  L.  C.  ;  Smith  v.  Guy",  2  Phil.  159;  2  C.  P.  Coop. 
1  Harris  v.  Gandv,  1  De  G.  F.  &  J.  13;  and      temp.  Cott.  289;  Wheclhouse  v.  Calvert,  cited 

see  Frost  v.  Wood.  12  W.  R.  285,  L.  J.T.;  S.  C.  Seton,  888;  Frost  v.  Wood,  ubi  supra  ;  Belcher 
boot.  Frost  v.  Ward,  2  De  G.  J.  &  S.  70;  v.  Belcher,  2  Dr.  &  Sm.  -144,  where  the  other 
Harvey  v.  Coxwell,  32  L.  T.  52.  suit  was  by  the  personal  representatives. 

795 


801 


DISMISSING    BILLS,    AND    STAYING    PROCEEDINGS. 


it  very  important  that  administration  suits  should  be  conducted  in  a 
friendly  spirit.8  Where  there  are  no  special  circumstances  giving  the 
preference  to  either  plaintiff,  the  plaintiff  in  the  first  suit  in  point  of 
time  will  have  the  conduct  of  the  proceedings.4 

Where  a  decree  or  judgment  has  been  obtained  in  a  foreign  country, 
in  respect  of  the  same  matter  for  which  a  suit  has  been  commenced  in 
the  Court  of  Chancery,  proceedings  in  such  suit  will  be  stayed,  if  the 
Court  is  satisfied  that  the  decree  or  judgment  in  the  foreign  Court  does 
justice,  and  covers  the  whole  subject  of  the  suit.5 

A  party  to  a  suit  in  the  Court  of  Chancery,  wherein  a  decree  has  been 
made  under  which  he  may  obtain  relief,  will  be  restrained  from  prosecut- 
ing a  suit  in  a  foreign  Court  for  the  same  object.6 

Proceedings  in  a  suit  may  also  be  stayed,  pending  a  rehearing   or 

appeal.7 

*801        *It  may  also  be  mentioned   here,  that   where   an   oppressive 

number  of  bills  has  been  filed,    for   infringement   of  the   same 

patent,  the  Court  will  appoint  some  of  the  infringers  to  represent  the 

others,  and  stay  the  proceedings  in  the  remaining  suits.1 

Where  a  suit  had  been  compromised,  and  the  proceedings  therein 
stayed,  the  Court,  on  setting  aside  the  compromise  as  against  one  of  the 
plaintiffs,  gave  him  permission  to  proceed  with  the  suit,  although  it 
remained  stayed  as  against  the  other  plaintiffs.2 


3  Per  Sir  J.  Romilly  M.  R.  in  Penny  ?•. 
Francis,  7  Jur.  N.  S.  248  ;  9  W.  R.  9  ;  see  also 
Kelk  i'.  Archer,  ubi  supra  ;  Harris  v.  Lightfoot, 
10  W.  R.  31,  V.  C.  K. 

4  Nor  vail  v.  Pascoe,  ubi  supra  ;  and  see 
Salter  v.  Tildesley,  13  W.  R.  376,  M.  R. 

5  Ostell  v.  Le  Page,  2  De  G.  M.  &  G.  892, 
894;  5DeG.  &  Sm.  95;  16  Jur.  1134,  V.C.  S.; 
see  abo  Stainton  v.  Carron  Co.  (No.  3)  21  Beav. 
500;  ante,  pp.  658,  659,  664,  and  note;  Wilson 
v.  Ferrand,  L.  R.  13  Eq.  362 ;  Low  v.  Mussey, 
41  Vt.  393;  Brown  v.  Lexington  &  Danville 
R.  R.  Co.  13  N.J.  Eq.  191. 

6  Harrison  v.  Gurney,  2  J.  &  W.  563 ;  Bushby 
»..Munday,  5  Mad.  297;  Beauchamp  v.  Marquis 
of  Huntley,  Jac.  546 ;  Booth  o.  Leycester,  1  Keen, 
579 ;  Wedderburn  v.  Wedderburn,  2  Beav.  208, 
214;  4  Jur.  66;  4  M.  &  C.  585,  594,  596; 
Graham  v.  Maxwell,  1  M'N.  &  G.  71 ;  13  Jur. 
217;.Maclaren  o.  Stainton,  '16  Beav.  279;  over- 
ruled by  H.  L.  5  H.  L.  Cas.  416;  see  also 
Stainton  v.  Carron  Co.  21  Beav.  152,  500;  2 
Jur.  N.  S.  49,  L.  C.  &  L.  JJ.;  Hyman  v.  Helm, 
24  Ch.  D.  531;  Dawkins  v.  Simonetti,  50  L.  J. 
P.  D.  &  Adm.  30;  and  upon  conflict  of  jurisdic- 
tion, generally,  see,  Yenning  v.  Loyd,  1  De  G. 
F.  &  J.  193,  200;  6  Jur.  N.  S.  81;  and  Seton, 
881. 

"  See  post,  Chap.  XXXII.  §  1,  Rehearing* 
and  Appeals. 

796 


i  Foxwell  B.  Webster,    10  Jur.  N.   S.  137, 
L.  C. ;  2  Dr.  &  S-  250;  9  Jur.  N.  S.  1189. 

2  Brooke  v.  Lord  Mostyn,  13  W.  R.  248, 
L.  J  J.  Where  a  plaintiff,  after  an  order  for  the 
production  of  documents,  persists  in  not  filing  a 
sufficient  affidavit  as  to  documents,  the  Court 
niav  fix  a  time  at  which  the  bill  shall,  in  default 
of  a  sufficient  affidavit,  stand  dismissed.  Re- 
public of  Liberia  v.  Imperial  Bank,  L.  R.  9  Ch. 
569.  A  bill  may  also  be  dismissed,  on  motion 
of  the  defendant,  or  mero  motu  by  the  Court, 
for  want  of  equity  on  its  face.  Speidall  v. 
Jervis,  2  Dick.  632;  Molesworth  v.  Lord  Ver- 
ney,  2  Dick.  667;  Mayse  v.  Biggs,  3  Head,  36; 
Earles  v.  Earles,  3  Head,  366;  Webster  v. 
Thompson,  55  Ga.  546;  Hickey  v.  Stone,  60 
111.  458.  See  also  Pond  v.  Vermont  Valley  R. 
Co.  12  Blatch.  282;  Hine  v.  New  Haven,  40 
Conn.  478.  But  a  bill  ought  not  to  be  dismissed 
by  the  Court  on  its  own  motion  because  brought 
in  the  firm  name,  without  naming  the  partners, 
no  objection  having  been  taken  by  the  parties 
to  the  omission.  Alderson  v.  Henderson.  5  W. 
Va.  182.  Nor  where  the  bill  discloses  equity, 
although  defectively  stated.  Thompson  v. 
Paul,  8  Hum.  114;  Henderson  v.  Mathews,  2 
Tenn.  Leg.  Rep.  181;  Quinn  v.  Leake,  1  Tenn. 
Ch.  67. 


FOR   WANT    OF   PROSECUTION.  *  802 


Section  II. — For   Want  of  Prosecution. 

Any  defendant  may,  upon  notice,8  move  the  Court  that  the  bill  may  be 
dismissed  with  costs,  for  want  of  prosecution,  and  the  Court  may  order 
accordingly,  in  the  following  cases4  (a)  :  — 

(1)  Where  the  plaintiff,  having  obtained  no  order  to  enlarge  the 
time,6  does  not  within  four  weeks6  after  the  answer,  or  the  last  of  the 
answers,  required  to  be  put  in  by  such  defendant,  is  held  or  deemed  to 
be  sufficient,7  or  after  the  filing  of  a  traversing  note  against  such  de- 
fendant,8 file  replication,9  or  set  down  the  cause  to  be  heard  on  bill  and 
answer,10  or  serve  a  notice  of  motion  for  a  decree,11  or  obtain  and  serve 
an  order  for  leave  to  amend  the  bill ; 12  or 

(2)  Where  the  plaintiff,  having  undertaken  to  reply  to  a  plea  filed 
by  such  defendant  to  the  whole  bill,  does  not  file  his  replication  within 
four  weeks  after  the  date  of  his  undertaking ; 13  or 

(3)  Where  the  plaintiff,  having  obtained  no  order  to  enlarge  the 
time,  does  not  set  down  the  cause  to  be  heard,  and  obtain  and  serve  a 
subpoena  to  hear  judgment,  within  four  weeks  after  the  evidence  has 
closed.14 

Where  the  plaintiff  obtains  an  order  for  leave  to  amend  his  bill,  and, 
having  obtained  no  order  to  enlarge  the  time,15  does  not  amend 
*  the  bill  within  the  time  limited  by  the  order  to  amend,  or,  if  no    *802 
time  be  so  limited,  within  fourteen  days   from  the  date  of   such 
order,  the  order  to  amend  is  void,  and  the  cause  as  to  dismissal  stands  in 
the  same  position  as  if  the  order  to  amend  had  not  been  made.1 

Any  defendant  may,  upon  notice,  move  to  dismiss  the  bill  with  costs 

3  See  Hoxey  v.  Carey,  12  Ga.  534.     A  rule  9  Post,  p.  828,  et  seq.:  see  66th  Equity  Rule 

to  speed  the  cause  should  precede  a  motion  to  of  the  U.  S.  Courts;  and  Mass.  Ch.  Rule  17. 

dismiss   for  want  of  prosecution.      Dixon   v.  10  Post,   828,    et   seq.;    and   Chap.    XXIII. 

Rutherford,  26  Ga.  153.    So  in  Tennessee,  a  Setting  d run  Causes;  see  Mass.  Ch.  Rule  17. 

rule  must  be  made  on  the  plaintiff  to  take  any  U  Post,  p.  819,  et  seq. 

step  necessary  to  the  progress  of  the  cause,  after  i2  Ante,  p.  412. 

which  the  Court  may  make  a  peremptory  rule,  13  Ante,  p  696. 

fixing  the  time  within  which  the  step  shall  be  M  Cons.  Ord.  XXXIII.  10,  as  varied  by  Orel, 

taken  or  the  cause  be  dismissed.     Code,  §  4389,  22  Nov.,  1866,  r.  1 ;  see  Ponsardin  v.  Stear,  32 

4390;   Hicks's  Ch.  Pr.    126;   Kain  V.  Ross,  1  Beav.  666;  9  Jur.  N.  S.  885;  Ernest  i\  Govett, 

Lea,  76.  2  N.  R.  486,  V.  C.  W. ;  see  also  Hart  v.  Roberts, 

*  As   to   default   in   delivery  of   pleadings  32  Beav.  231;  7  Jur.  N.  S.  669;  post,   Chap, 

under  the  present  English  practice,  see  1  Dan.  XXIH.  Setting  down  Causes;  and  see  Braith- 

Ch.  Prac.  (6th  Eng.  ed.)  554.  waite's  Manual,  193,  n.  (135). 

5  Ante,  p.  421.  15  Ante,  p.  421. 

6  These  four  weeks  expire  at  12  o'clock  at  J  Cons.  Ord.  XXXIII.  11.  This  order  ap- 
night  on  the  last  day.  Preston  v.  Collett,  20  plies  to  all  orders  to  amend,  whether  of  course 
L.  J.  N.  S.  Ch.  228,  V.  C.  Ld.  C.  or  not;  Armistead  v.  Durham,  11  Beav.  428;  13 

1  Ante,  pp.  412,  786;  see  Leite  v.  Johnston,  Jur.  330 ;  Bainbr igge  «.  Baddeley,  12  Beav.  152; 
L.  R.  5  Eq.  266.  13  Jur.  997 ;  Crossley  v.  Doming,  16  L.  T.  698. 

8  Ante,  p.  514,  et  seq. 


(a)  See  U.  S.    Equity   Rule   69;  Bierne   v.  seven  years,  Sebring  v.  Sebring,  43  N.  J.  Eq. 

Wadsworth,  36  Fed.  Rep.  614;  Cleaver  v.  Smith,  59;   but  not  necessarily  after  one  year  of  in- 

114  111.114.    As  to  the  present  English  practice,  action.     Wilson  V.  Rusling,  13   Phila.  48.     An 

see   Seaar  v.  Webb,  25  Ch.   D.  84;   Crick   v.  order  to  dismiss  for  want  of  prosecution  must 

Hewlett,  27  Ch.  D.  354.     Where  the  proof  is  be  upon  notice  giving  the  plaintiff  a  reasonable 

chiefly  oral,  a  suit  should  be  dismissed  after  time  to  proceed.    Kain  v.  Ross,  1  Lea,  76. 

797 


803 


DISMISSING   BILLS,    AND    STAYING    PROCEEDINGS. 


for  want  of  prosecution,  where  the  plaintiff,  after  answer,  amends  his 
bill  without  requiring  an  answer  to  the  amendments  from  any  of  the 
defendants,2  and,  having  obtained  no  order  to  enlarge  the  time,3  does 
not  file  the  replication,4  or  set  down  the  cause  to  be  heard  on  bill  and 
answer,5  or  serve  a  notice  of  motion  for  a  decree,6  within  the  times  fol- 
lowing, namely  :  — 

(1)  Within  one  week  after  the  expiration  of  the  time  within  which 
the  defendant  might  have  put  in  an  answer,7  in  cases  where  the  defend- 
ant does  not  desire  to  answer  the  amendments.8 

(2)  Within  fourteen  days  after  the  refusal  to  allow  further  time,  in 
cases  where  the  defendant,  desiring  to  answer,  has  not  put  in  his  an- 
swer within  the  time  allowed  for  that  purpose,  and  the  Judge  has 
refused  to  allow  further  time. 

(3)  Within  fourteen  days  after  the  filing  of  the  answer,  in  cases  where 
the  defendant  has  put  in  an  answer  to  the  amendments,  unless  the  plain- 
tiff has,  within  such  fourteen  days,  obtained  a  special  order  for  leave  to 
except  to  such  answer  or  to  re-amend  the  bill.9 

In  cases  where  the  defendant  puts  in  an  answer  to  amendments  to 
which  the  plaintiff  has  not  required  an  answer,  vacations  are  not  reck- 
oned in  computing  the  times  for  filing  replication,  setting  down  the 
cause,  or  setting  down  a  motion  for  a  decree.10 

If  the  plaintiff  fails  to  set  down  a  motion  for  decree  within  one  week 
after  the  expiration  of  the  time  allowed  to  him  to  file  his  affidavits  in 
reply,  in  case  the  defendant  has  filed  any  affidavit,  or  within  one  week 
after  the  expiration  of  the  time  allowed  to  the  defendant  to  file  his 
affidavits  in  answer,  in  case  the  defendant  has  not  filed  any  affi- 
*  803  davit,  or  in  case  the  time  allowed  for  either  of  the  *  purposes 
aforesaid  shall  be  enlarged,  then  within  one  week  after  the  ex- 
piration of  such  enlarged  time,  the  defendant  may  move  to  dismiss  the 
bill  for  want  of  prosecution.1 

If  the  plaintiff  amends  his  bill,  and  requires  an  answer,  the  defend- 
ant cannot  move  to  dismiss  the  bill  for  want  of  prosecution  until  four 
weeks  from  the  expiration  of  the  time  when  his  answer,  or  the  last  of 
his  answers,  to  the  amended  bill  is  held  or  deemed  sufficient,  except 
upon  the  same  contingencies  as  are  mentioned  above,  with  respect  to 
answers  to  original  bills.2 


2  Brown  v.  Butter,  21  Beav.  615.  This  case 
appears  to  be  inconsistent  with  Bramston  v. 
Carter,  2  Sim.  458  ;  Cooke  v.  Davies,  1  Russ. 
153,  n.  (e);  and  Raistrick  v.  Elsworth,  2  De  G. 
&  S.  95:  12  Jur.  281,  none  of  which  were  cited 
in  Brown  v.  Butter:  and  see  Forbes  v.  Preston, 
11  Jur.  N.  S.  198,  V.  C.  S. 

3  Ante,  p.  421. 

4  Post,  p.  828.  et  seq. 

5  Post,  p.  828,  et  seq. ;  and  Chap.  XXIII. 
Setting  down  Omses. 

6  Post,  p.  819,  et  seq. 

7  See  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.  7,  which  fixes 
the  time  at  thirty  days  from  service  of  the 
amended  bill;  and  see  ante,  p.  740. 

798 


8  This  applies,  although  an  answer  to  the 
amended  bill  may  have  been  required  from 
another  defendant.  Forbes  v.  Preston,  ubi 
supra. 

9  Cons.  Ord.  XXXIII.  12;  as  varied  by  Ord. 
22  Nov..  1866,  r.  1;  ante.  p.  765. 

io  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.  13  (4).  It  is  as- 
sumed that  the  words  "  setting  down  causes," 
in  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.  13  (4),  include  setting 
down  motions  for  decree.  As  to  the  vacations, 
see  ante.  p.  412;  and  Braithwaite's  Manual, 
188,  n.  (109). 

i  Ord.  22  Nov.,  1866,  rr.  2,  3. 

2  Ante,  p.  801. 


FOR   WANT    OF    PROSECUTION.  *  804 

A  defendant  to  a  suit  commenced  by  bill,  who  has  not  been  required 
to  answer  the  bill,  and  has  not  answered  it,  may  apply  for  an  order  to 
dismiss  the  bill  for  want  of  prosecution,  at  any  time  after  the  expiration 
of  three  months  from  the  time  of  his  appearance,  unless  a  notice  of 
motion  for  a  decree  has  been  served  in  the  mean  time,  or  the  cause  has 
been  set  down  to  be  heard  ;  and  the  Court  may,  upon  such  application, 
if  it  shall  think  fit,  make  an  order  dismissing  the  bill,  or  make  such 
other  order  and  impose  such  terms  as  may  appear  just  and  reasonable.3 
In  computing  the  three  months,  vacations  are  reckoned.4 

Where,  at  the  expiration  of  the  three  months,  the  evidence  had  not 
closed,  so  that  the  plaintiff  could  not  set  down  the  cause,  the  Court, 
upon  a  motion  to  dismiss  for  want  of  prosecution,  gave  the  plain- 
tiff leave  to  set  down  the  cause  after  the  expiration  of  the  three 
months.5 

The  right  of  a  defendant  to  move  to  dismiss  depends  in  all  cases 
upon  the  proceedings  of  the  plaintiff  relative  to  the  particular  defend- 
ant making  the  motion,  and  not  to  the  general  proceedings  in  the 
cause  as  to  other  defendants.6  The  form  of  order  to  be  made 
*  upon  such  a  motion,  is,  however,  within  the  discretion  of  the  *  804 
Court ;  which  will,  of  course,  be  guided  by  the  conduct  of  the 
cause  relative  to  all  the  defendants. 

The  plaintiff,  by  obtaining  and  serving  an  order  for  leave  to  amend 
the  bill,  precludes  the  defendant  from  moving  to  dismiss  ;  and  the 
order  to  amend  is  in  time,  if  drawn  up  and  served  before  the  motion 
to  dismiss  is  actually  made,  although  after  notice  of  the  motion  has 
been  served.1  And  if,  after  service  of  the  notice,  the  plaintiff  files 
replication,  it  is  also  a  complete  answer  to  the  motion.2  But  in  such 
cases,  and  in  others  where  a  defendant's  title  to  dismiss  is  intercepted 
by  a  step  taken  by  the  plaintiff  between  the  notice  of  motion  and  its 
being  heard,  the  plaintiff  has  to  pay  the  costs  of  the  defendant's 
application  to  dismiss  the  bill.3  It  must  be  remembered,  however, 
that  after  service  of  a  notice  of  motion  to  dismiss,  in  a  case  where  the 


8  Cons.  Ord.  XXXIII.  13;  as  varied  by  Ord.  three  months  from  the  date  of  his  appearance, 

22  Nov.,  1896,  r.  1.     A  bill  was  dismissed  with  and  four  weeks  from  the  filing  of  his  answer, 

costs  under  this  order,  in  Haddon  v.  Pegler,  5  and  possibly  even  after  the  expiration  of  the 

Jur.  N.  S.  1123,  V.  C.  W.  four  weeks,   although  the  three  months  have 

4  Bothomley  v.  Squire,  7  De  G.  M.  &  G.  not  expired.     See    also  Weeks  r.  Heward,  11 

246;  Cons.   Ord.  XXXVII.   13  (Hth  of  May,  W.   R.  79,  V.  C.  W. ;    Semple   v.  Holland,  1 

1845,  Sand.  Ord.  984)  does  not  apply  to  this  N.  R.  504.  M.  R.;  and  Nugent  v.  Jenkinson, 

case.   Ibid-  Astothe  vacations, see  ante,  p.  412.  cited  Braithwaite's  Pr.  572. 

6  Bates  v.  Brothers,  2  W.  R.  388,  V.  C.  S.  6  See  Nicholl   v.  .Tones,  14  W.  R.  79.  V.  C. 

The  orders  do  not  appear  to  be  framed  to  meet  W.  :  Semmes  ».  Mott,  27  Ga.  92.     A  bill  can- 

the  case  of  a  defendant  who  files  a  voluntary  not  be  dismissed  for  failure  to  prosecute,  if  the 

answer  ;  but  it  was  said  by  Sir  W.  P.  Wood  V.  defendants  have  caused  or  acquiesced   in   the 

C.  in  Bentley  v.  Mercer," 4  Jur.  N.  S.  407:  6  delay      Dixon  r.  Rutherford.  26  Ga.  153. 
W.  R.  265,  that  it  must  have  been  intended  J  Peacock  v.   Sievier.  5  Sim.  553  ;  Jones  v. 

that  such  a  defendant  should,  in  some  way,  be  Lord  Chailemont,  12  Jur.  389,  V.  C.  E.     As  to 

able  to  get  rid  of  a  suit,  after  having  put  in  a  orders  to  amend,  see  ante,  p.  409,  et  seq. 
voluntary  answer;  and  it  would  sc  m  that  a  "2  Story  v.  Official  Manager,  2  N.  R.  351,  V. 

defendant  may.  in  such  a  case,  move  to  dismiss  C.  W. :  and  see  post,  p.  805. 
for  want  of  prosecution,  after  the  expiration  of  3  Ibid. ;  Waller  v.  Pedlington,  4  Beav.  124. 

799 


*  805 


DISMISSING    BILLS,    AND    STAYING    PROCEEDINGS. 


defendant  is  entitled  to  move,  an  order  of  course  to  amend  cannot  be 
obtained.4 

An  order  to  amend,  if  irregularly  obtained,  has  been  held  to  be  a 
nullity,  and  not,  therefore,  to  stop  a  motion  to  dismiss  ; 5  but  this  decision 
would  seem  to  be  overruled,  the  rule  of  the  Court  now  being  to  treat 
all  orders  that  have  been  made  as  valid,  until  they  have  been  regularly 
discharged.6 

If,  upon  the  hearing  of  a  cause,  it  is  ordered  to  stand  over,  with  lib- 
erty to  the  plaintiff  to  amend  his  bill  by  adding  parties,  in  pursuance 
of  which  the  plaintiff  amends,  but  does  not  proceed  any  further,  the 
defendant  may  move  specially  to  dismiss  the  bill  for  want  of  prosecu- 
tion, and  is  not  bound  to  set  the  cause  down  again.7  And  where  the 
order  directs  the  cause  to  stand  over  for  a  limited  time,  within  which 
the  plaintiff  is  to  add  necessary  parties,  and  that  in  default  thereof  the 
bill  is  to  stand  dismissed  with  costs,  without  further  order,  if  the  plain- 
tiff does  not  add  the  parties  within  the  limited  time,  no  further  applica- 
tion need  be  made  to  dismiss  the  bill,  as  it  is  already  out  of  Court ; 8 
but  if  the  order  does  not  contain  a  direction  for  taxation  and  payment 
of  costs,  an  ex  parte  application  for  an  order  for  such  direction  must  be 
made.9  Where  the  order  does  not  direct  the  bill  to  be  dismissed 
*  805  in  case  *  the  bill  is  not  amended  within  the  time  specified  in  the 
order,  and  the  plaintiff  omits  to  amend,  the  defendant  may 
move,  upon  notice,  that  unless  the  bill  be  amended  within  a  certain 
time,  it  may  be  dismissed  with  costs.1 

Where,  at  the  time  of  service  of  the  notice  upon  the  plaintiff,  the  de- 
fendant had  a  right  to  move  to  dismiss  the  bill,  yet,  if  the  plaintiff  files 
a  replication,  or  serves  an  order  to  amend  the  bill,  before  the  hearing  of 
the  motion,  the  defendant's  right  is  intercepted,  and  the  plaintiff  will  be 
allowed  to  retain  his  bill.2 

Where,  however,  the  plaintiff  adopts  this  course,  the  Court  usually 
orders  him  to  pay  the  costs  of  the  application  for  dismissal ;  and  even 
though  the  defendant  had  .notice  that  the  plaintiff,  by  taking  a  step  in 
the  cause,  had  prevented  any  order  being  made  upon  the  motion  to  dis- 
miss, yet,  where  the  plaintiff  had  not  tendered  the  costs  of  preparing 
and  serving  the  notice  of  motion,  it  was  held  that  the  defendant  had  a 
right  to  bring  his  motion  before  the  Court,  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining 
his  costs  :  where  the  plaintiff  had  tendered  the  costs  of  preparing  and 
serving  the  notice  of  motion,  there  seems  to  have  been  some  difference 
of  opinion  as  to  the  right  of  the  defendant  to  bring  on  the  motion  to 
obtain  taxed  costs ; 8  but  the  practice  would  now  seem  to  be  that  the 


4  Cons.  Ord.  IX.  12  ;  see  Briggs  v.  Beale,  12 
W.  R.  934.  V.  C  W.;  and  ante,  pp.  412,  410. 

5  Op  Geneve  v.  Hannam,  1  R.  &  M.  494. 

6  Blake  v.  Blake,  7  Beav.  514;  Petty  v. 
Lonsdale,  4  M.  &  C.  545;  3  Jur.  1186.  revers- 
ing id.  1070;  Chuck  v.  Cremer,  2  Phil.  113, 115; 
1  C.  P.  Coop.  temp.  Cott.  338,  342;  and  see 
observations  in  report  last  cited;  Whittington 
v.  Edwards,  3  De  G.  &  J.  243,  249. 

7  Mitchel  v.  Lowndes,  2  Cox,  15. 

8  See  Stevens  v.  Praed,  2  Cox,  374. 

800 


9  Dobede  v.  Edwards,  11  Sim.  454.  Qucere, 
if  the  application  should  not  be  on  notice,  see 
Seton,  1116.  For  form  of  motion  paper,  see 
Vol.  III. 

1  Emerson  v.  Emerson,  6  Hare,  442;  12  Jur. 
973. 

2  Waller  v.  Pedlington,  4  Beav.  124  ;  Corry 
v.  Curlewis,  8  Beav.  606 ;  Heanley  v.  Abraham, 
5  Hare.  214;  Young  v.  Quincey,  9  Beav.  160; 
and  see  ante,  p.  804. 

3  Att.-Gen.  v.  Cooper,  9  Sim.  379  ;  2  Jur. 


FOR   WANT   OF   PROSECUTION.  *  806 

defendant  is  entitled  to  the  costs  actually  incurred,  and  that  he  may  in 
all  cases,  if  necessary,  bring  on  his  motion  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining 
them.4  It  would  seem,  however,  that  if  the  plaintiff  tenders  the  costs 
which  have  been  incurred,  it  is  improper  for  the  defendant  to  bring  on 
his  motion,  and  that  he  would  not  be  allowed  subsequent  costs.5 

Where  there  is  an  irregularity  in  the  notice  of  motion  to  dismiss,  the 
Court  will  not  make  the  plaintiff  pay  the  costs  of  the  application  for 
dismissal.6 

An  order  to  dismiss  a  bill  for  want  of  prosecution,  operates  from  the 
time  of  its  being  pronounced ;  and  it  would  seem,  therefore,  that  the 
filing  of  replication  on  the  same  day  does  not  prevent  its  effect,7 
although  the  contrary  has  been  held,  under  the  old  practice,  where  the 
order  was  made  ex  parte* 

*  The  defendant  is  not  prevented,  by  an  interlocutory  applica-  *  806 
tion,  from  moving  to  dismiss  for  want  of  prosecution;  and  even 
the  obtaining  an  injunction  does  not  prevent  the  bill  being  dismissed.1 
The  same  was  also  held  of  showing  cause,  successfully,  against  dis- 
solving an  injunction ; 2  and  an  order  to  dismiss  a  bill  for  want  of  pros- 
ecution was  held  to  be  regular,  although  made  after  a  notice  had  been 
given  by  the  defendant  of  a  motion  to  dissolve  an  injunction,  but  which 
motion  was  not  made,  in  consequence  of  the  state  of  business  in  the 
Court.3 

There  is  one  case,  however,  in  which  an  order  made  upon  an  inter- 
locutory application  is  considered  as  a  sufficient  proceeding  to  prevent 
the  dismissal  of  a  bill  for  want  of  prosecution ;  namely  where  the  bill 
having  been  filed  for  the  specific  performance  of  a  contract,  and  the 
title  only  being  in  dispute,  a  reference  is  made,  upon  motion,  to  inquire 
into  the  title.4  In  such  case,  the  order  being  in  the  nature  of  a  decree, 
made  upon  the  hearing  of  the  cause,  prevents  the  dismissal  of  the  bill. 
The  same  rule  applies  to  all  decretal  orders.5 

It  has  always  been  a  general  rule,  that  if  notice  of  motion  to  dismiss 

917;  Fiper  v.  Gittens,  11  Sim.  282;  Wright  v.  proceed  against  the  other  parties  so  that  such 

Angle,  6  Hare,    109;  12  Jur.    34;  Hughes   v.  defendant  cannot  proceed  to  examine  witnesses 

Lewis,  John.  696 ;  6  Jur.  N.  S.  804.  and  close  the  proofs,  he  may  move  to  dismiss 

4  Hughes  i\  Lewis,  6  Jur.  N.  S.  442;  John.  the  plaintiff's  bill  for  want  of  prosecution. 
696,  698;  and  see  note  by  Registrars  there  set  Vermilyea  v.  Odell,  4  Paige,  121;  S.  C.  1  Edw. 
out.  Findlay  v.  Lawrence,  11  Jur.  705,  V.  C.  Ch.  617;  Whitney  v.  Mayor  &c.  of  New  York, 
K.  B.  1  Paige,  548  ;  Hastings  v.  Palmer,  1  Clarke,  52. 

5  Newton  v.  Ricketts,  11  Beav.  164.  1  Day  v.  Snee,  3  V.  &  B.  170;  James  v.  Biou, 

6  Steedman  v.  Poole,  10  Jur.  979;  11  Jur.  3  Swanst.  234,  239;  Bliss  v.  Collins,  cited  2 
555,  V.  C.  W.  Mer.  62. 

7  Lorimer  v.  Lorimer,  1  J.  &  W.  284,  288;  2  Earl  of  Warwick  v.  Duke  of  Beaufort, 
and  see  note  of  Registrars  in  Hughes  v.  Lewis,  1  Cox,  111. 

John.  698.  3  Farquharson  v.  Pitcher,  3  Russ.  383.    Mo- 

8  Reynolds  v.  Nelson,  5  Mad.  60;  Fox  v.  tion  refused  where  defendant  had  tiled  interrog- 
Morewood,  2  S.  &  S.  325.  The  filing  of  a  atories  for  the  examination  of  the  plaintiff. 
replication  after  notice  given  of  a  motion  to  Jackson  i'.  Ivimey,  L.  R.  1  Eq.  693,  V.  C.  W. 
dismiss  the  bill  for  want  thereof,  is  good  cause  4  Biscoe  v.  Brett,  2  V.  &  B.  377;  Collins  r. 
against  the  motion;  but  it  will  be  allowed  only  Greaves,  5  Hare,  596;  Gregory  v.  Spencer,  11 
on  payment  of  costs.     Griswold  v.  Inman,  1  Beav.  143. 

Hopk.  86.     Where  a  cause  is  at  issue  as  to  one  5  Bluck    v.   Coln.ighi,    9    Sim.   411;    ante, 

of  the  defendants,  by  filing  a  replication  to  his  p.  793;  post,  p.  810  ;  Anon.  11  Ves.  169. 

answer,    and  the  plaintiff    has    neglected    to  _._ 

VOL.  I. —  51  801 


807 


DISMISSING    BILLS,    AND    STAYING   PROCEEDINGS. 


for  want  of  prosecution  be  given  for  too  early  a  clay,  the  defect  is  not 
cured  by  the  motion  being  accidentally  postponed  to  a  day  when  it 
might  have  been  regularly  made.6 

It  is  to  be  recollected  that  a  defendant  who  is  in  contempt  for  non- 
payment of  the  costs  of  an  attachment,  for  not  putting  in  his  answer  in 
due  time,  will  not  be  in  a  situation,  even  after  answer,  to  move  to  dis- 
miss the  bill  for  want  of  prosecution,  —  unless,  indeed,  the  plaintiff  has 
replied  to  the  answer,  or  taken  any  other  step  amounting  to  an  accept- 
ance of  it.7 

After  an  order  to  stay  proceedings  until  the  plaintiff  had  cleared  his 
contempt,  a  motion  to  dismiss  was  held  to  be  irregular,  and  was 
refused.8 

Where  the  defendant  has  obtained  an  order  for  security  for  costs, 
which  has  not  been  complied  with,  he  should  not  move  to  dismiss  the 
bill  for  want  of  prosecution,  but  that,  unless  security  is  given  within  a 

limited  time,  the  bill  may  be  dismissed.9 
*  807        *  A  defendant  can  only  have  the  bill  dismissed  as  against  him- 
self, not  as  against  all  the  defendants  ; x  and  the  notice  of  motion 
should  be  framed  accordingly. 

An  order  to  dismiss  a  bill  can  only  be  drawn  up  on  the  production  of 
the  Record  and  Writ  Clerk's  certificate  of  the  proceedings  in  the  cause, 
for  the  purpose  of  showing  what  proceedings  have  been  had.  This 
certificate  ought  to  be  produced  in  Court  at  the  time  of  the  motion 
being  made,  or  at  all  events  before  the  rising  of  the  Court  on  that  day  ; 2 
and  the  Registrar  will  not  draw  up  the  order  until  he  sees  that  the  cer- 
tificate has  been  granted.3  Sometimes  the  certificate  has  been  applied 
for,  and  obtained,  after  the  order  has  been  pronounced  by  the  Court, 
so  that  it  was  dated  subsequently  to  the  order ;  which,  although  drawn 
up  and  entered  afterwards,  is  always  dated  on  the  day  that  it  is  pro- 
nounced by  the  Court.4  This  practice  would  seem  to  have  been  irreg- 
ular, and,  if  objected  to,  not  now  to  be  permitted.5 

Where  either  party  does  not  appear  on  the  motion,  an  office  copy  of 
the  affidavit  of  service  of  the  notice  of  motion6  must  also  be  in  Court; 
and  where  the  defendant  fails  to  move,  the  plaintiff  may  obtain  an  order 
for  payment  of  his  costs  of  the  abandoned  motion.7 

Upon  hearing  the  motion,  the  Court  usually  either  dismisses  the  bill 
with  costs,  or  orders  the  plaintiff  to  pay  the  costs  of  the  motion,  and  to 
enter  into  an  undertaking  to  amend  the  bill,  file  replication,  or  set 
down  the  cause  to  be  heard  on  motion  for  decree,  or  on  bill  and  answer, 


6  De  Geneve  v.  Hannam,  1  R.  &  M.  494  ; 
and.  see  Ponsardin  v.  Stear,  32  Beav.  GOG;  9 
Jur.  N.  S.  885;  Ernest  v.  Govett,  2  N.  R.  48G, 

V.  c.  w. 

7  Anon.  15  Ves.  174;  Herrett  v.  Reynolds, 
2  Giff.  409;  6  Jur.  N.  S.  880. 

8  Futvoye  v.  Kennard,  2  Giff.  533;  7  Jur. 
N.  S.  9r,8. " 

9  Kennedy  v.  Edwards,  11  Jur.  N.  S.  153, 
V.  C.  W.;  ante,  pp.  35,36. 

i  Ward  v.  Ward,  11  Beav.  159,  162;  12  Jur. 
592. 

802 


2  Freeston  v.  Claydon,  17  Jur.  435,  V.  C.  W. 

s  Wills  v.  Pugh,  10  Ves.  402,  403. 

4  Ibid.;  M'Mahon  v.  Sisson,  12  Ves.  465; 
Att.-Gen.  v.  Finch,  1  V.  &  B.  368;  King  v. 
Noel,  5  Mad.  13;  Re  Risca  Coal  Co.  10  W.  R. 
701,  L.  C. 

s  Bell  v.  Bell,  14  Jur.  1129,  V.  C.  Ld.  C. ; 
Freeston  v.  Claydon,  nbi  supra. 

6  For  forms  of  affidavit,  see  Vol.  III. 

7  See  post,  Chap.  XXXV.  §  2,  Motions;  Cons. 
Ord.  XL.  23. 


FOR   WANT    OF   PROSECUTION. 


808 


within  a  limited  period,  according  to  the  state  of  the  suit ; 8  or,  as  it  is 
usually  expressed,  to  "  speed  the  cause." 

The  Court,  however,  sometimes  directs  the  motion  to  stand  over,  in 
order  to  give  the  plaintiff  an  opportunity  of  taking  a  step  in  the  cause, 
and  so  preventing  the  bill  being  dismissed  ;  and  upon  his  doing  so,  makes 
no  other  order  on  the  motion  than  that  the  plaintiff  pay  the  costs  ; 9  or, 
if  satisfied  that  the  plaintiff  has  used  reasonable  diligence,  it  has 
refused  to  make  any  order  on  *  the  motion  ; 1  and  after  replica-  *  808 
tion  has  been  filed,  the  Court  will,  in  a  proper  case,  give  the 
plaintiff  further  time.2 

Notwithstanding  the  enactment  that,  upon  the  defendant's  dismissing 
a  bill  for  want  of  prosecution,  the  plaintiff  shall  pay  to  the  defendant  his 
costs,  to  be  taxed  by  the  Master,3  the  Court  has  a  discretion  to  make 
such  order  in  respect  of  costs,  as  well  as  in  other  respects,  as  it  thinks 
fit :  and  though,  in  most  cases,  where  the  defendant  was  in  a  position  to 
move  to  dismiss  at  the  time  the  notice  was  served,  the  Court  orders  the 
plaintiff  to  pay  the  costs,  whatever  order  it  may  make  in  other  respects, 
it  has  refused  to  make  any  order  upon  the  motion;4  has  dismissed  the 
bill,  without  costs  ; 5  and  has  even  gone  the  length  of  dismissing  the 
motion  with  costs.6 

Where  the  plaintiff  becomes  bankrupt,7  or  has  filed  his  bill  in  forma 
pauperis,8  the  rule  is  to  dismiss  the  bill  without  costs.  Where  the 
defendant  becomes  bankrupt,  it  seems  to  have  been  formerly  considered 
that  the  bill,  if  dismissed  for  want  of  prosecution,  ought  to  be  dismissed 
without  costs  ; 9  but  it  has  since  been  held,  that  the  fact  of  a  defendant 
becoming  a  bankrupt,  is  not  of  itself  a  sufficient  reason  for  departing  from 


8  Stinton  v.  Taylor,  4  Hare,  008;  10  Jur. 
386;  Earl  of  Mornington  v.  Smith,  9  Beav. 
251;  Hardy  v.  Hardy,  1  C.  P.  Coop.  temp. 
Cott.  16;  Williams  v.  Rowland,  3  Jur.  N.  S. 
G58,  V.  C.  W.;  Hancock  v.  Rollison,  5  Jur. 
N.  S.  1199;  8  W.  R.  18,  V.  C.  S. ;  Hand  r. 
King,  10  Jur.  N.  S.  91,  V.  C.  W. ;  Jones  v. 
Jones,  10  Jar.  N.  S.  1167,  L.  JJ.;  Forbes  v. 
Preston,  11  Jur.  N.  S.  198,  V.  C  S. ;  South- 
ampton &c.  Steamboat  Co  (Limited)  v.  Raw- 
lins, 13  W.  R.  512,  L.  JJ.  Where  several 
defendants,  who  appeared  separately,  moved, 
the  Court,  to  save  costs,  made  an  order  for  dis- 
missal on  all  the  motions.  Jones  v.  Perrott, 
36  L.  J.  Ch.  488. 

'•>  Young  w.Quincey,  9  Beav.  160;  Stinton  r. 
Taylor,  4  Hare,  608,  609;  10  Jur.  386.  See 
London  and  Colonial  Co.  v.  Elworthv,  18  W 
R.  246. 

1  Ingle  n.  Partridge,  12  W.  R  65,  M.  R. ;  33 
Beav.  287. 

2  Pollard  v.  Doyle,  2  W.  R.  509,  V.  C.  K. ; 
and  see  Forbes  v.  Preston,  11  Jur.  N.  S.  198 
V.  C.  S. 

8  4  &  5  Anne,  c.  16,  §  23,  ante,  p.  791.  As 
to  the  form  of  order,  where  the  suit  is  bv  an 


official  manager  or  liquidator,  see  Grand  Trunk 
Co.  v.  Brodie,  3  D-  G.  M.  &  G.  146;  17  Jur. 
309;  9  Hare,  823;  17  Jur.  205;  Official  Manager 
of  Consols  Ins.  Co.  v.  Wood,  13  W.  R.  492,  V. 
C  K.;  2  Dr.  &  Sm.  353;  and  see  Re  Anglo- 
Moravian  H.  J.  Ry.  Co.  1  Ch.  D.  130;  Morgan 
&  Davey,  226. 

4  Vent  v.  Pacey,  3  Sim.  382;  and  see  [ngle 
v.  Partridge,  ubi  supra. 

5  Pinfold  v.  Pinfold,  9  Hare  App.  14;  16  Jur. 
1081,  V.  C-  T. ;  and  see  South  Staffordshire 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Hall,  10  Jur.  160,  V.  C.  K.;  Lan- 
cashire and  Yorkshire  Ry.  Co.  v.  Evans  14 
Beav.  529;  Kemball  r.  Walduck,  1  Sm.  &  G 
App.  27;  18  Jur.  69,  V.  C.  S. 

6  Partington  v.  Raillie,  5  Sim.  667:  Wm- 
throp  v.  Murray,  7  Hare,  150;  13  Jur.  32;  Ingle 
v.  Partridge,  33  Reav.  287. 

'  Ante,  p.  64,  post,  p.  813;  Meiklam  v.  El- 
more, 4  De  G.  &  J.  208;  5  Jur.  N.  S.  904;  and 
see  post,  p.  814. 

8  Ante,  p  792;  and  see  p.  42. 

9  Blanchard  ?•.  Drew,  10  Sim.  240:  Monteith 
v.  Taylor,  9  Yes.  615;  1  M'N.  &  G.  81.  n.; 
Kemball  v.  Walduck,  1  Sm.  &  G.  App.  27:  18 
Jur.  69;  Findlay  v.  Lawrence,  2  De  G.  &  S  303. 

803 


809 


DISMISSING   BILLS,    AND    STAYING   PROCEEDINGS. 


the  ordinary  rule  that,  a  bill  dismissed  for  want  of  prosecution,  is  dis- 
missed with  costs.10 

The  Court  will  not  enter  into  the  merits  of  the  case,  for  the  purpose 
of  determining  whether  the  bill  shall  be  dismissed  with  or  without  costs  ; 
but  will,  for  that  purpose,  only  consider  the  conduct  of  the  parties  in  the 
prosecution  of  the  cause.11 

Where  a  defendant,  knowing  that  the  plaintiff  has  used  due  diligence 
and  been  unable  to  get  in  the  answers  of  other  defendants,  moves  to 
dismiss  the  bill  for  want  of  prosecution,  the  motion  will  be  dis- 
*  809  missed  with  costs  ;  u  and  it  is,  therefore,  prudent  on  the  *part  of 
the  plaintiff  to  give  a  defendant  who  is  in  a  position  to  move  to 
dismiss,  notice  that  the  other  answers  have  not  been  got  in,  if  such  is 
the  fact.1 

Where  the  plaintiff  undertakes  to  speed  the  cause,  the  order  ought  to 
go  on  to  provide  that,  in  default  of  his  taking  the  appointed  step  within 
the  prescribed  period,  the  bill  shall  be  dismissed  with  costs,  without 
further  notice.2 

If  the  plaintiff  makes  default  in  taking  the  next  step  within  the  time 
limited,  no  further  indulgence  will  in  general  be  granted  him.8  Where, 
however,  the  plaintiff  considers  he  has  a  case  entitling  him  to  ask  for 
further  indulgence,  he  should  make  a  special  application  for  further 
time,  by  motion  or  summons,  before  the  expiration  of  the  period  lim- 
ited ; 4  or  if  the  time  has  expired,  the  application  must  be  to  have  the 
bill  restored.5  It  is  not,  however,  the  ordinary  course  of  the  Court  to 
restore  a  bill  which  has  once  been  dismissed ;  it  must  be  shown  that 
substantial  justice  requires  that  it  should  be  done,  and  then,  upon  the 
particular  circumstances,  the  Court  will  make  the  order.6  The  Court 
will  not  restore  a  bill,  which  has  been  regularly  dismissed,  for  the  mere 
purpose  of  agitating  the  question  of  costs.7 


M  Blackmore  r.  Smith.  1  M'N.  &  G.  80;  13 
Jur.  218 ;  Robson  r.  Earl  of  Devon,  3  Sm.  &  G. 
227;  2  Jur.  N.  S.  565;  Levi  v.  Heritage,  26 
Beav.  560;  S.  C.  nom.  Lever  v.  Heritage,  5  Jur. 
N.  S.  215. 

11  Stagg  v.  Knowles,  3  Hare,  241,  244:  South 
Staffordshire  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hall,  16  Jur.  160,  V. 
C.  K.;  Wallis  v.  Wallis,  4  Drew.  458;  Waring 
v.  Lockett,  18  W.  R.  915. 

12  Partington  v.  Baillie,  5  Sim.  667  ;  Win- 
throp  r.  Murray,  7  Hare.  150;  13  Jur.  32;  and 
see  Ingle  >:  Partridge.  12  W.  R.  65,  M.  R.;  33 
Beav.  287;  Nicholl  v.  Jones,  14  W.  R.  79,  V. 
C.  W. ;  Barker  v.  Piele.  12  W.  R.  460,  V.  C.  K. ; 
Hurd  v.  Lupton,  W.  N.  (1869)  28. 

i  Adair  v.  Barrington,  2  W.  R.  361;  2  Eq. 
Rep.  408,  V.  C.  W. 

2  Emerson  v.  Emerson,  6  Hare,  442;  12  Jur. 
973;  Stephenson  v.  Mackay,  24  Beav.  252; 
Pearce  v.  Wrigton,  id.  253;  and  see  Bartlett  v. 
Harton,  17  Beav.  479;  17  Jur.  1019;  Stevens 
v.  Praed,  2  Cox,  374;  Dobede  v.  Edwards,  11 
Sim.  454.  For  form  of  order  in  such  case,  see 
Seton,  1278,  No.  4. 
804 


3  La  Mert  r.  Stanhope,  5  De  G.  &  S.  247; 
Stephenson  v.  Mackay,  ubi  supra;  Williams  v. 
Page,  24  Beav.  490;  Bartlett  v.  Harton,  ubi 
supra. 

4  La  Mert  r.  Stanhope,  ubi  supra.  In  an 
ordinary  case  the  application  should  be  made 
by  summons.  For  forms  of  notice  of  motion 
and  summons,  see  Vol.  III. 

5  Bartktt  r.  Harton,  17  Beav.  479  ;- 17  Jur. 
1019;  Jackson  r.  Purnell,  16  Ves.  204;  the  ap- 
plication, in  this  case,  should  be  made  by 
motion.  For  form  of  notice  of  motion,  see 
Vol.  III. 

6  See  Southampton  Steamboat  Co.  v.  Raw- 
lins, 11  Jur.  N.  S.  230;  13  W.  R.  512,  L.  JJ., 
where  the  delay  had  been  occasioned  by  a 
mistake. 

"  Hannam  r.  South  London  Water  Works 
Co.  2  Mer.  63,  64;  Stone  v.  Locke,  48  Maine, 
425.  Where  a  bill  has  been  dismissed  from  the 
docket  for  want  of  prosecution,  on  motion  of 
the  defendant,  the  suit  cannot  properly  be 
brought  forward  at  a  subsequent  term,  on  mo- 
tion, to  obtain  an  order  for  costs.     It  seems  the 


FOR   WANT    OF   PROSECUTION. 


810 


It  has  been  held,  that  it  is  no  answer  to  a  motion  to  dismiss  that  the 
plaintiff  has  not  been  able  to  get  in  the  answers  of  other  defendants  ; 8 
or  that  the  delay  of  the  plaintiff  was  occasioned  by  difficulties  in  draw- 
ing up  an  order  allowing  a  demurrer  by  other  defendants,  with  leave  to 
amend  ; 9  or  that  the  plaintiff  has  applied  for  the  production  of  docu- 
ments, unless  the  application  was  made  without  delay  ; 10  or  that  proceed- 
ings had  been  stayed,  against  other  defendants,  till  the  plaintiff 
should  pay  them  certain  *  costs  ; 1  or  that  the  plaintiff  had  offered  *  810 
to  dismiss  the  bill  without  costs  ;  the  decision  on  which  it  had 
been  filed  having  been  overruled ; 2  or  that  the  defendant  has  become 
bankrupt.3 

Where,  however,  in  consequence  of  negotiations  with  the  principal  de- 
fendant, the  plaintiff  did  not  get  in  the  answers  of  the  other  defendants, 
and  the  principal  defendant,  during  the  absence  of  the  plaintiff  abroad, 
moved  to  dismiss  for  want  of  prosecution,  Lord  Cottenham  gave  the 
plaintiff  (on  the  7th  of  July)  till  the  first  day  of  the  ensuing  Michaelmas 
term,  to  file  replication.4  The  omission,  on  the  part  of  the  defendant,  to 
give  notice  of  the  filing  of  his  answer,5  does  not  affect  his  right  to 
move  to  dismiss  the  bill  for  want  of  prosecution ;  though,  of  course, 
it  may  materially  affect  the  order  which  the  Court  will  make  upon  the 
motion.6 

A  bill  may  be  dismissed  for  want  of  prosecution,  while  the  plaintiff  is 
an  outlaw.7 

A  defendant  is  not  prevented  from  moving  to  dismiss  by  the  suit 
having  abated,  through  the  death  of  another  defendant.8 

In  bills  to  perpetuate  testimony,  it  does  not  seem  that  the  defendant 
has  hitherto  had,  under  any  circumstances,  a  right  to  have  the  bill  dis- 
missed for  want  of  prosecution.9 


proper  proceeding  for  the  defendant,  after  dis- 
missal for  want  of  prosecution,  is  to  apply  for 
an  order  to  discharge  the  decree  dismissing  the 
bill.     Stone  v.  Locke,  ubi  supra. 

8  Lester  v.  Archdale,  9  Beav.  156;  Earl  of 
Mornington  v.  Smith,  id.  251 ;  Baldwin  v. 
Darner,  11  Jur.  723.  V.  C.  E.;  Stinton  v.  Tay- 
lor, 4  Hare,  608,  609;  10  Jur.  386;  Adair  v. 
Barrington,  2  W.  R.  361;  2  Eq.  Rep.  408,  V. 
C.  W. ;  Briggs  v.  Beale,  12  W.  R.  934,  V.  C. 
W.;  but  see  ante,  p.  808. 

9  Jones  v.  Morgan,  12  Jur.  388,  V.  C.  E.;  see 
also  Drioli  v.  Sedgwick,  15  Jur.  284,  V.  C. 
Ld.  C. 

10  Franco  v.  Meyer,  2  H.  &  M.  42. 

1  Lautour  v.  Holcombe,  10  Beav.  256. 

2  Lancashire  and  Yorkshire  Ry.  Co.  t>.  Evans, 
14  Beav.  529  ;  the  bill  was,  however,  in  this 
case,  afterwards  dismissed  without  costs.  South 
Staffordshire  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hall,  16  Jur.  160,  V. 
C.  K. 

3  Levi  v.  Heritage,  26  Beav.  560,  and  cases 
there  cited;  S.  C.  now.  Lever  v.  Heritage,  5 
Jur.  N.  S.  215;  or  that  a  cross-bill  at  the  suit 
of  another  defendant  is  pending.  Windham  v. 
Cooper,  14  W.  R.  8,  V.  C.  W.    Or  that  a  de- 


fendant, who  has  made  an  insufficient  affidavit 
as  to  documents,  has  not  complied  with  an 
order,  not  served,  for  a  further  affidavit.  Howe 
v.  Grey,  W.  N.  (1867)  141. 

4  Hardy  v.  Hardy,  1  C.  P.  Coop.  temp. 
Cott.  16. 

6  Cons.  Ord.  III.  9 ;  see  ante,  p.  755. 

6  Jones  v.  Jones,  1  Jur.  N.  S.  863 ;  3  W.  R. 
638,  V.  C.  S. 

'  Knowles  v.  Rhvdydefed  Colliery  Co.  John. 
630;  6  Jur.  N.  S.  291. 

8  Williams  v.  Page,  24  Beav.  490.  Nor  by 
the  death  of  a  co-plaintiff,  if  no  abatement  has 
been  occasioned  thereby.  Wilson  v.  Wilson, 
L.  R.  9  Eq.  452. 

9  In  Beavan  r.  Carpenter,  11  Sim.  22,  a 
cause  of  this  kind,  a  motion  to  dismiss  before 
replication,  was  refused;  but  Sir  Lancelot  Shad- 
well  V.  C.  made  an  order  that  the  plaintiff 
should  file  a  replication  forthwith,  and  proceed 
to  the  examination  of  his  witnesses,  as  prayed 
by  his  bill,  and  procure  such  examination  to  be 
completed  on  or  before  a  certain  day  ;  and  that, 
in  default  thereof,  he  should  pay  to  the  defend- 
ant his  costs  of  the  suit.  And  a  similar  older 
was  made,  on  a  like  motion  after  replication. 

805 


811 


DISMISSING   BILLS,    AND   STAYING   PROCEEDINGS. 


So,  in  the  case  of  a  bill  for  discovery,  the  defendant  should  not  move 
to  dismiss  for  want  of  prosecution,  but  should,  after  the  time  for 
excepting  to  his  answer  has  elapsed,  obtain,  on  petition  as  of  course, 
an  order  for  the  payment  of  his  costs  by  the  plaintiff.10  And  in 
*  811  a  suit  for  a  receiver,  pendente  lite,  the  motion  *  should  be  for 
payment  of  costs,  to  stay  proceedings,  and,  if  necessary,  to  dis- 
charge the  receiver.1 

After  a  decree,  or  even  a  decretal  order,  has  been  made,  a  bill  cannot 
be  dismissed  for  want  of  prosecution.2  But  after  a  decree  merely  direct- 
ing accounts  and  inquiries,  to  enable  the  Court  to  determine  what  is  to 
be  done,  a  bill  can  always  be  dismissed.8 

It  has  been  before  stated,  that  an  order  to  dismiss  a  bill  for  want  of 
prosecution  cannot  be  pleaded  in  bar  to  a  new  bill  for  the  same  matter.4 
Where  however,  after  a  bill  has  been  so  dismissed,  the  plaintiff  files 
another  bill  for  the  same  purpose,  the  Court  will  suspend  the  proceed- 
ings on  such  new  bill  till  the  costs  of  the  former  suit  have  been  paid  ; 
and  where  the  defendant,  in  the  suit  which  had  been  dismissed,  died 
before  he  had  received  his  costs,  and  the  plaintiff  filed  a  new  bill  against 
his  executor  for  the  same  object,  the  proceedings  on  the  new  bill  were 
ordered  to  be  stayed,  until  the  plaintiff  had  paid  the  executor  the  costs 
of  the  dismissed  suit.5  This  rule  does  not  apply,  where  the  plaintiff  sues 
by  a  next  friend.6 

An  order  to  dismiss  a  bill  for  want  of  prosecution,  effectually  puts  an 
end  to  every  proceeding  in  the  suit  which  has  been  dismissed,  and  no 
subsequent  step  can  be  taken  in  it,  except  such  as  may  be  necessary 
for  carrying  into  effect  the  order  of  dismissal.7  Therefore,  where  a  de- 
fendant obtains  an  order  to  dismiss  a  bill  for  want  of  prosecution,  with- 


Wright  v.  Tatham,  2  Sim.  459 ;  and  Barham  v. 
Longman,  id.  460;  see  also  Brigstocke  v.  Both, 
7  Jur.  N.  S.  63,  V.  C.  S.;  and  pott,  Chap. 
XXXIV.  §  4,  Bills  to  Perpetuate  Testimony. 

1"  Woodcock  v.  King,  1  Atk.  286;  Att.-Gen. 
v.  Burch,  4  Mad.  178;  Rhodes  v.  Hayne,  9  Jur. 
175,  V.  C.  K.  B.;  South  Eastern  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Submarine  Telegraph  Co.  18  Beav.  429;  17 
Jur.  1044;  Fitzgerald  r.  Butt,  9  Hare  App.  65; 
see  post,  Chap.  XXXIV.  §  2,  Bills  of  Discovery. 
For  form  of  petition,  see  post,  Vol.  III. 

i  Edwards  v.  Edwards,  17  Jur.  826,  V.  C. 
W.;  Anderson  o  Guichard,  9  Hare,  275  ;  Barton 
?■.  Rock  (No.  2),  22  Beav.  376;  see  now  20  &  21 
Vice.  77,  §§  70,  71;  but  see  Williams  v.  Att.- 
Gen.,  Seton,  1003. 

2  Thus,  in  Bluck  v.  Colnaghi,  9  Sim.  411,  a 
suit  for  winding  up  the  affairs  of  the  partner- 
ship between  the  plaintiff  and  defendant,  in 
which  an  order  had  been  made,  by  consent  on 
motion,  for  taking  the  accounts  of  the  partner- 
ship, but  had  not  been  drawn  up.  Sir  Lancelot 
Shadwell  V.  C.  said  that  the  order  which  had 
been  pronounced  was  a  decretal  order;  and 
though  it  had  not  been  drawn  up,  yet  either 
party  was  at  liberty  to  draw  it  up;  and  that  an 

806 


order  in  the  nature  of  a  decree  having  been 
made  in  the  cause,  the  bill  could  not  he  dis- 
missed. See  also  Egg  r.  Devey,  11  Beav.  221; 
ante,  pp.  793,  806;  and  Collins  r.  Greaves,  5 
Hare,  596;  Gregory  v.  Spencer,  11  Beav.  143. 

a  Anon.  11  Ves.  169;  Barton  v.  Barton,  3  K. 
&  J.  512;  3  Jur.  N.  S.  808;  and  see  ante, 
pp.  793,  794,  n. 

*  Ante,  p.  659;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  793;  Mit- 
ford,  Eq.  PI.  by  Jeremy,  238;  see  Byrne  v.' 
Frese,  2  Moll.  157.  When  a  bill  is  dismissed 
for  want  of  prosecution,  it  operates  as  a  discon- 
tinuance, and  is  no  more  than  a  nonsuit  at  law, 
and  does  not  prevent  the  bringing  of  a  new 
bill.  McBroom  v.  Sotnmerville,  2  Stewart,  515: 
Porter  v  Vaughan,  26  Vt.  624.  The  dismissal 
absolutely  of  a  bill  by  a  Court  which  had  no 
jurisdiction  of  the  case  is  no  bar  to  another 
suit.     Lancaster  r.  Lair,  1  Dana,  109. 

5  Long  v.  Storie,  13  Jur.  1091,  V.  C.  E.;  and 
see  ante,  p.  796. 

6  Hind  v.  Whitmore,  2  K.  &  J.  458;  ante, 
p   796,  n. 

"  See  Lorimer  v.  Lorimer,  1  J.  &  W.  284; 
Bartlett  v.  Harton,  17  Jur.  1019,  M.  R. 


WHERE   SUIT   HAS   ABATED,   OR   BECOME   DEFECTIVE.  *  813 

out  the  plaintiff's  having  made  a  ^motion  of  which  he  has  given 
notice,  the  defendant  cannot  *  afterwards  obtain  the  costs  of  the    *  812 
motion,  as  an  abandoned  motion.1 

Where  a  bill  is  dismissed  with  costs,  they  may  be  taxed  without  any 
order  referring  them  for  taxation,  unless  the  Court  prohibits  the  taxa- 
tion ;  and  they  will  be  recoverable  by  subpoena,  in  the  usual  manner.2 
Where  the  dismissal  takes  place  before  the  hearing,  only  those  costs 
which  are  costs  in  the  cause  are  included : 3  therefore,  when  the  costs  of 
a  motion  or  other  application  in  the  cause  are  reserved,  they  should  be 
made  costs  in  the  cause,  or  reserved  "  until  the  hearing  or  further 
order,"  and  not  simply  "  until   the  hearing."  4 

Where  a  bill  was  dismissed  for  want  of  prosecution,  in  a  suit  in  which 
the  official  manager  of  a  company  under  process  of  winding  up  had, 
after  institution  of  the  suit,  been  substituted  as  plaintiff,  the  order  pro- 
vided that  the  defendants  should  be  at  liberty  to  prove  for  their  costs 
in  the  winding  up.5 

'The  order  dismissing  a  bill  for  want  of  prosecution,  may  be  enrolled, 
although  the  only  object  in  doing  so  be  to  prevent  an  appeal.6 

Where  a  plea  to  the  whole  bill  is  not  set  down  for  argument  within 
three  weeks  after  the  filing,  and  the  plaintiff  does  not  within  such  three 
weeks  serve  an  order  for  leave  to  amend  the  bill,  or  by  notice  in  writing 
undertake  to  reply  to  the  plea,  the  defendant  by  whom  such  plea  was 
filed  may  obtain,  as  of  course,  an  order  to  dismiss  the  bill.7 

Section  III.  —  Where  the  Suit  has  abated,  or  become  otherwise 

defective. 

Where  a  suit  abates  by  the  death  of  a  sole  plaintiff,  the  Court,  upon 
motion  of  any  defendant,  made  on  notice  served  on  the  legal  represen- 
tative of  the  deceased  plaintiff,  may  order  that  such  legal  repre- 
sentative do  revive  the  suit  within  a  limited  time,  or  that  the  bill 
be  dismissed.8 

*  The  words  legal  representative  mean   heir,    or   devisee,   or     *  813 

1  As  to  abandoned  motions,  see  post,  Chap.  ity,  to  a  previous  order  for  the  amendment  of 
XXXV.  §  2,  Motions ;  and  Cons.  Ord.  XL.  the  bill,  Kettlewell  v.  Bristow,  L.  R.  10  Eq. 
23.  210. 

2  Cons.  Old.  XL.  38.  8  Cons.  Ord.  XXXII.  4.     This  rule  is  only 

3  Stevens  v.  Keating,  1  M'N.  &  G.  659,  663;  applicable  to  an  abatement  or  defect  occurring 
14  Jur.  157;  see  Webster  v.  Manby,  L.  R.  4  Ch.  before  decree.  As  to  proceedings  in  the  suit, 
372.  after  an  abatement,  but  in  ignorance  of  it,  see 

<  Rumbold  r.   Forteath,  4  Jur.  N.  S.  608,  Smith  v.  Horsfall,  24  Beav.  331;    Houston  v. 

V.  C.  W.  Briscoe,  7  W.  R.  394,  V.  C.  K.    In  Massachu- 

5  Caldwell  v.  Ernest  (No.  2),  27  Beav.  42;  setts,  "when  the  death  of  any  party  shall  be 
5  Jur.  N.  S.  667.  suggested  in  writing,  and  entered  on  the  docket, 

6  Williams  v.  Page,  1  De  G.  &  J.  561.  the  clerk,  upon  application,  may  issue  process  to 

7  Cons.  Ord.  XIV.  17;  ante,  p.  695.  As  to  bring  into  Court  the  representative  of  such  de- 
liches  in  applying,  see  Campbell  v.  Joyce,  ceased  part}-."  Ch.  Rule  25;  see  also  50th  and 
L.  R.  2  Eq.  337,  V.  C.  W.  And  see,  as  to  the  57th  Equity  Rules  of  the  U.  S.  Courts,  post, 
discharge  of  the  order,  on  the  ground  of  bad  p.  2'388.  For  form  of  order  under  r.  4,  see 
faith,  Talbot  v.  Keay,  L.  R.  8  Eq.  610;  and  as  Seton,  1278,  No.  5;  and  for  form  of  notice  of 
to  the  effect  of  a  motion  to  dismiss  for  want  of  motion,  see  Vol.  III. 


prosecution  on  the  right  to  object  for  irregular- 


807 


*  814 


DISMISSING    BILLS,    AND    STAYING   PROCEEDINGS. 


executor,  or  administrator,  according  as  the  suit  relates  to  real  or  per- 
sonal estate.1 

Where  the  sole  plaintiff  died  after  decree,  and  after  an  injunction  to 
restrain  waste,  Lord  Langdale  M.  R,.  made  an  order  that  all  further 
proceedings  should  be  stayed,  and  the  injunction  dissolved,  unless  the 
suit  were  revived  within  a  limited  time  ; 2  but  Sir  R.  T.  Kindersley 
V.  C.  declined  to  follow  this  case,3  on  the  ground  that  the  defendant 
could  himself  revive.4  And  where  an  injunction  had  been  obtained, 
restraining  an  action  at  law,  and  the  sole  plaintiff  died,  Sir  John  Roni- 
illy  M.  R.  said  he  had  no  jurisdiction  to  make  an  order  that  the  suit  be 
revived  by  the  plaintiff's  representatives,  or  the  bill  be  dismissed.5  If 
the  bill  is  dismissed,  it  will  be  dismissed  without  costs.6 

A  suit  does  not  abate  by  the  death  of  a  sole  plaintiff,  who  is  the  pub- 
lic officer  of  a  joint-stock  company:7  in  such  a  case,  therefore,  the  de- 
fendant should  apply  to  dismiss  the  bill  in  the  usual  form,  and  not  that 
it  may  be  revived  within  a  limited  time  or  dismissed.8 

"Where  a  suit  abates  by  the  death  of  one  of  several  co-plaintiffs,  the 
defendant  may,  on  motion,9  obtain  an  order  that  the  surviving  plaintiffs 
do  revive  within  a  limited  time,  or,  in  default,  that  the  bill  stand  dis- 
missed with  costs  ; 10  and  it  is  no  answer  to  such  an  application  that 
there  is  no  personal  representative  of  the  deceased  plaintiff.11  No  order 
will  be  made  as  to  the  costs  of  the  motion.12 

Where  a  suit  abates  by  the  marriage  of  a  female  sole  plaintiff,  a 
similar  order  may  be  obtained  against  her  husband ; 13  and  it  seems 
that  the  order  will  be  made  with  costs.14 

Where  the  abatement  is  caused  by  the  death  of  a  defendant,  his 
representative  may  move  that  the  plaintiff  do  revive  the  suit 
*  814  *  within  a  limited  time,  or,  in  default,  that  the  bill  may  be  dis- 
missed as  against  them ;  and  the  order  is,  it  seems,  for  the  dis- 
missal without  costs.1 


*  See  Price  v.  Berrington,  11  Beav.  90. 

2  Ibid. 

a  Mills  v.  Dudgeon,  1  W.  R.  514,  V.  C.  K. 

4  See  Devavnes  v.  Morris,  1  M.  &  C.  213, 
225. 

5  Oldfield  v.  Cobbett,  20  Beav.  563. 

6  Chowick  i'.  Dimes,  3  Beav.  290,  492,  n. ; 
and  cases  in  id.  294,  n. ;  Hill  v.  Gaunt,  7  Jur. 
N.  S.  42;  9  W.  R.  68,  V.  C.  W. 

7  See  7  Geo.  IV.  c.  46,  §  9. 

8  Burmester  v.  Von  Stenz,  23  Beav.  32. 

9  For  form  of  notice,  see  Vol.  III. 

1°  Adamson  v.  Hall,  T.  &  R.  258,  overruling 
S.  C.  nom.  Adamson  v.  Hull,  1  S.  &  S.  249; 
Chichester  v.  Hunter,  3  Beav.  491;  Lord  Hunt- 
ingtower  v.  Sherborn.  5  Beav.  380;  Holcombe 
v.  Trotter,  1  Coll.  654;  Norton  v.  White,  2  De 
G.  M.  &  G.  678;  Powell  v.  Powell,  id.  n.; 
Pudge  v.  Pitt,  3  VV.  R.  100,  V.  C.  S.;  Pearce 
v.  Wrigton,  24  Beav.  253 ;  Hinde  v.  Morton,  13 
W.  R.  401,  V.  C.  W.  See  Pells  v.  Coon,  1 
Hopk.  450,  in  which  it  was  held  in  New  York, 
that  upon  the  abatement  of  a  suit,  bv  the  death 

808 


of  one  of  several  co-plaintiffs,  it  is  at  the  election 
of  the  surviving  co-plaintiffs  whether  they  will 
revive  the  suit.  The  Court  will  limit  the  time 
within  which  they  shall  make  that  election. 
And  if  they  do  not  revive  the  suit  within  the 
time  limited,  the  Court  will  order  that  they 
be  precluded  from  any  further  prosecution  of 
it. 

11  Saner  v.  Deaven,  16  Beav.  30. 

12  Hinde  ».  Morton,  ubi  supra.  According 
to  the  report  of  Hinde  v.  Morton,  in  2  H.  & 
M.  308,  the  order  in  the  case  of  the  death  of  a 
co-plaintiff,  one  of  several  residuary  legatees, 
should  be  that  the  remaining  plaintiffs  proceed, 
or  the  bill  be  dismissed  with  costs,  the  death  of 
the  co-plaintiff  being  marked  on  the  record. 

3  Johnson  v.  Horlock,  3  Beav.  294,  n.; 
Wilkinson  v.  Charlesworth,  id.  297,  n. 

14  Johnson  v.  Horlock,  ubi  supra  ;  see,  how- 
ever, Wilkinson  v.  Charlesworth,  ubi  supra  ; 
contra. 

1  Burnell  v.  Duke  of  Wellington,  6  Sim. 
461;  Norton  v.  White,  2  De  G.  M.  &  G.  678; 


WHERE   SUIT   HAS   ABATED,   OR   BECOME   DEFECTIVE.  *  815 

Where  a  suit  becomes  defective  by  the  bankruptcy  of  a  sole  plaintiff, 
the  defendant  may  obtaiu,  on  special  motion,2  an  order  that  the  assignee 
do  within  a  limited  time  (usually  three  weeks)  take  proper  supplemental 
proceedings  for  the  purpose  of  prosecuting  the  suit  against  the  defend- 
ant,  or,  in  default,  that  the  bill  be  dismissed,  without  costs.8  And  where 
one  of  several  co-plaintiffs  becomes  bankrupt,  a  similar  order  may  be 
obtained  against  the  other  co-plaintiffs  ; 4  but  in  this  case,  the  dismissal 
will  be  with  costs.5 

If  the  plaintiff  become  bankrupt  after  decree,  the  Court  will,  on  the 
motion  of  the  defendant,  order  that  the  assignees  elect,  within  a  limited 
time,  whether  they  will  prosecute  the  suit,  and,  in  default,  that  all 
further  proceedings  be  stayed.6  And  a  similar  order  has  been  made, 
with  respect  to  a  trustee  under  the  act  to  facilitate  arrangements  with 
creditors.7 

The  order  to  dismiss  on  occasions  of  abatement,  or  of  the  suit  becom- 
ing defective,  must  not  be  confounded  with  an  ordinary  order  to  dismiss 
for  want  of  prosecution.  The  two  orders  differ  from  one  another  materi- 
ally, both  in  the  circumstances  in  which  they  may  be  obtained,  and  the 
form  of  the  order  when  it  is  made.  After  a  suit  has  abated,  or  after  it 
has  become  defective  by  the  bankruptcy  of  the  plaintiff,  it  is  irregular  to 
move  for  the  ordinary  order  to  dismiss  the  bill  for  want  of  prosecution ; 8 
and  such  an  order,  if  made,  will  be  discharged  for  irregularity.9 

Where  a  suit  becomes  defective  by  the  bankruptcy  of  a  defendant,  he 
may,  as  we  have  seen,  notwithstanding  his  bankruptcy,  obtain  the 
usual  order  to  dismiss  the  bill  for  want  of  prosecution,  *  with    *  815 
costs;1  but  he  cannot  obtain  an  order  of  a  similar  kind  to  that 
granted  on  the  bankruptcy  of  a  plaintiff.2 

Powell  v.  Powell,  id.  n. ;  Cross  v.  Cross,  11  W.  *  Ward  v.  Ward,  8  Beav.  397;    11  Bear. 

R.  797,  V.  C.  S. ;  Reeves  v.  Baker,  13  Beav.  115,  159;  12  Jur.  592  ;  Kilminster  v.  Pratt,  1  Hare, 

is  incorrectly  reported ;  see  2  De   G.  M.  &  G.  632;  see,  however,  Caddick  v.  Masson,  1  Sim. 

679,  n.  (b).     So  the  survivors  upon  the  death  501. 

of  one  of  several  defendants  may  move  that  the  °  Ward  v.  Ward,   and  Kilminster  v.  Pratt, 

plaintiff  revive,  or  the  bill  be  dismissed.     Har-  ubi  supra.     Where  the  bankruptcy  takes  place 

rington    v.    Becker,    2    Barb.    Ch.   647.      See  between  the  hearing  and  judgment,  the  Court 

Thompson  v.  Hill,  5  Yerger,  418.  will  not,  before  giving  judgment,  compel  the 

2  As  to  serving  notice  of  the  motion  on  the  trustee  to  revive.  Boucicault  v.  Delatield,  V2 
bankrupt,  as  well  as  on  the  assignees,  see  Ves-  W.  R.  8. 

tris  v.  Hooper,  8  Sim.  570.  c  Whitmore  V.  Oxborrow,  1  Coll.  91  ;  Clarke 

3  Ante,  pp.  64,  808;  Sharp  v.  Hullett,  2  S.      v.  Tipping,  16  Beav.  12. 

&S.  496;  Wheeler  ».  Malins,  4  Mad.  171;  Porter  ?  Hardy  v.  Dartnell,   4  De   G.  &   S.  568; 

v.  Cox,  5  Mad.  80;  Lord  Huntingtower  v.  Sher-  see  7  &   8  Vic.  c.  70;  24  &  25  Vic.  c.  134, 

born,  ubi  supra;  Robinson  v.  Norton,  10  Beav.  §  197. 

484 ;  Fisher  v.  Fisher,  6  Hare,  628;  2  Phil.  236;  «  Robinson  v.  Norton,  10  Beav.  484. 

Meiklam  v.  Elmore,  4  De  G.  &  J.  208;  5  Jur.  9  Boddy  v.  Kent,  1  Mer.   361,  365;  Sellers 

N.  S.  904;  Jackson  v.  Riga  Railway,  28  Beav.  v.  Dawson,  2  Dick.  738;  S.  C.  nom.  Sellas  v. 

75;  Boucicault  v.  Delatield,  10  Jur.'N.  S.  937;  Dawson,  2  Anst.  458,  n. 

12  W.  R.  1025,  V.  C.  W.;  10  Jur.  N.  S.  1063;  l  Blackmore  v.  Smith,  1  M'N.  &  G.  80;  13 

13  W.  R.  64,  L.  JJ.;  where  the  bankruptcy  has  Jur.  218;  Robson  v.  Earl  of  Devon,  3  Sin.  &  G. 
occurred  in  a  foreign  country,  see  Bourbaud  v.  227;  2  Jur.  N.  S.  565;  Levi  r.  Heritage,  26 
Bourbaud,  12  W.  R.  1024,  V.  C.  W.  As  to  the  Beav.  560 ;  S.  C  nom.  Lever  v.  Heritage.  5  Jur. 
effect  of  a  trust  deed  by  the  plaintiff,  under  24  N.  S.  215;  but  see  Kemball  v.  Walduck,  1  Sin. 
&  25  Vic.  c.  134,  see  §  197.  For  form  of  order,  &  G.  App.  27;  18  Jur.  09,  V.  C.  S.,  where  the 
see  Seton,  1278,  No.  6;  and  for  form  of  notice  dismissal  was  without  costs. 

of  motion,  see  Vol.  III.  2  Manson  v.  Burton,  1  Y.  &  C.  C.  C.  626. 

809 


81i 


DISMISSING   BILLS,    AND   STAYING   PROCEEDINGS. 


Section  IV.  —  Cases  of  Election. 

Where  the  plaintiff  is  suing  both  at  Law  and  in  Equity,  at  the  same 
time,  for  the  same  matter,  the  defendant  is  entitled  to  an  order  that  the 
plaintiff  do  elect  whether  he  will  proceed  with  the  suit  in  Equity,  or  with 
the  action  at  Law.8  Thus,  the  Court  will  generally  compel  a  plaintiff  to 
elect  between  a  suit  in  Equity  for  the  specific  performance  of  an  agree- 
ment, and  an  action  at  Law  brought  in  respect  of  the  same  agreement.4  (<>) 
So  also,  as  a  general  rule,  a  party  suing  in  Equity- will  not  be  allowed  to 
sue  at  Law  for  the  same  debt.  The  case  of  a  mortgagee  is  an  exception 
to  this  rule ;  it  is  frequently  said,  that  he  may  pursue  all  his  remedies 


3  Ld.  Red.  249;  Carlisle  v.  Cooper,  3  C.  E. 
Green  (N.  J.),  241;  Livingston  v.  Kane,  3  John. 
Ch.  224,  Sanger  v.  Wood,  id.  416 ;  Rogers  v. 
Vosburgh,  4  John.  Ch.  84;  Gibbs  v.  Perkinson, 
4  Hen.  &  M.  415;  ante,  p.  634,  note.  Where  the 
remedies  at  Law  and  in  Equity  are  inconsistent, 
any  decisive  act  of  the  party  under  either  juris- 
diction, with  knowledge  of  his  rights  and  of  the 
facts,  determines  his  election.  Sanger  v.  Wood, 
ubi  supra  ;  see  Combs  v.  Tarlton,  2  B.  Mon.  194; 
ante,  p.  634,  note.  For  form  of  order,  see  2 
Seton,  Dec.  (3d  Eng.  ed.)  947. 


4  Carrick  v.  Young,  4  Mad.  437;  Ambrose 
v.  Nott,  2  Hare,  649,  651;  see  also  Fennings  v. 
Humphery,  4  Beav.  1;  5  Jur.  455;  Faulkner  v. 
Llewellyn,  10  W.  R.  506,  V.  C.  K.;  Gedye 
r.  Duke  of  Montrose,  5  W.  R.  537;  S.  C.  26 
Beav.  45,  47;  Kerr  v.  Campbell,  17  W.  R.  155. 
Where  the  plaintiff  sued  at  Law  and  in  Equity 
for  the  same  debt,  but  the  action  was  dismissed 
on  payment  of  the  debt  and  costs  at  Law,  the 
Court  ordered  the  suit  to  be  stayed  on  payment 
of  costs  bv  the  defendant.  Deane  v.  Hambcr, 
14  W.  R.  167,  V.  C.  S. 


(a)  See  Terry  v.  Munger,  121  N.  Y.  161; 
Bach  v.  Tuch,  126  N.  Y.  53;  Harrison  v.  Lynes 
(S.  C),  15  S.  E.  Rep.  335;  Ex  parte  Alabama 
Gold  Life  Ins.  Co.  59  Ala.  192;  Turners.  Davis, 
48  Conn.  397.  In  order  that  an  election  of 
remedies  may  be  binding,  the  party  to  be  bound 
thereby  must  have  acted  advisedly  and  with 
knowledge  of  all  the  circumstances  and  of  the 
effect  of  his  act,  or  the  other  party  must,  in 
consequence  thereof,  have  so  changed  his  posi- 
tion as  to  make  a  recession  inequitable.  Young 
v.  Young  (N.  J.),  27  Atl.  Rep.  627. 

The  doctrine  of  election  does  not  apply  in 
the  case  of  creditors  who  assail  as  fraudu- 
lent an  assignment  for  their  benefit,  and  then 
claim  a  dividend  from  the  estate.  Mills  r.  Park- 
hurst  (N.  Y.),  30  Am.  L.  Reg.  340,  and  note.  A 
party,  electing  to  rescind  and  cancel  a  contract 
for  fraud,  must  act  promptly,  especially  if  it  re- 
lates to  property  of  a  speculative  and  fluctuating 
value.  United  States  v.  Ferguson.  54  Fed.  Rep. 
28.  Where  the  defendants  thus  failed  to  elect 
until  the  filing  of  their  answer  and  cross-bill,  in 
a  suit  for  specific  performance,  their  prayer  for  a 
rescission  was  refused.  Davis  v.  Read,  37  Fed. 
Rep.  418.  Under  the  Code  system,  it  is  held 
in  Iowa  that  commencing  a  suit  for  false  repre- 
sentations upon  an  exchange  of  land  is  not  such 
an  election  as  prevents  the  plaintiff  from  after- 
wards substituting,  upon  finding  that  the  de- 
fendant did  not  know  their  falsity,  a  petition 
in  Equity  for  a  rescission  of  the  exchange. 
Smith  »."  Bricker  (Iowa),  53  N.  W.  Rep.  250. 
So,  in  general,  a  suit  begun,  but  early  discon- 
810 


tinued,  does  not  amount  to  an  election  of  reme- 
dies. Bishop  8.  McGillis  (Wis.),  51  N-  W.  Rep. 
1075;  Flower  v.  Blumbach,  131  111.  646;  Nyse- 
wander  v.  Lowman,  124  Ind.  584.  Yet  the 
prosecution  of  a  suit  at  Law  for  five  years  pre- 
cludes its  abandonment  in  order  to  substitute  a 
suit  in  Equity.  Angus  r.  Robinson,  62  Vt.  60. 
Land  owners  who  apply  for  an  injunction  against 
assessments  by  a  city  upon  their  property,  are 
held  to  have  accepted  the  legal  remedy  by  filing 
objections,  as  allowed  by  statute,  to  the  city 
engineer's  report  as  to  the  expense  of  the  im- 
provement. De  Puy  v.  Wabash  (Ind.),  32  N. 
E.  Rep.  1016.  A  party  who  erroneously  relies 
upon  two  inconsistent  rights  is  not  precluded 
from  asserting  one  by  the  fact  that  he  has  first 
attempted  to  rely  upon  the  other,  to  which  he  is 
not  entitled.  Snow  v.  Alley,  156  Mass.  193. 
In  admiralty  a  maritime  lien  for  repairs  and 
supplies  furnished  to  a  vessel  in  a  foreign  port 
may  be  enforced  pending  a  suit  at  Law  to  re- 
cover their  value.  The  Kalorama,  10  Wall. 
204.  A  statutory  remedy  for  a  right  conferred 
by  the  same  statute  can  alone  be  pursued. 
James  v.  Atlantic  Delaine  Co.  11  Bankr.  Reg. 
390.  A  party  who  elects  to  submit  the  case  on 
evidence  taken  by  the  master,  cannot  thereafter 
put  in  additional  testimony.  Cox  v.  Pierce, 
22  111.  App.  43.  As  to  motion  to  compel  an 
election  of  remedies,  see  Stewart  v.  Huntington, 
124  N.  Y.  127;  Weinberg  r.  Weinberg,  60  Hun, 
167;  Barndt  r.  Frederick,  78  Wis.  1;  Roberts 
v.  Quincy,  O.  &  K.  R.  Co.  43  Mo.  App.  287; 
Taylor  County  p.  Standley,  79  Iowa,  666. 


CASES   OF   ELECTION.  *  816 

concurrently;  at  any  rate,  he  can  proceed  on  his  mortgage  in  Equity,  and 
on  his  bond  or  covenant  at  Law  at  the  same  time.5 

The  principle  of  election  has  also  been  applied  where  there  was  one 
suit  in  this  country,  and  another  for  the  same  matter  in  a  foreign  Court 
of  competent  jurisdiction.6  (b) 

It  seems  that,  in  a  particular  case,  the  plaintiff  may  be  allowed  to 
proceed  partially  in  Equity,  and  partially  at  Law,  and  compelled  to 
enter  into  a  special  election.7 

*  If  the  defendant's  answer  is  not  excepted  to,  or  set  down  for  *  816 
hearing  on  former  exceptions,  he  may,  on  an  allegation  that  the 
plaintiff  is  prosecuting  him  in  this  Court,  and  also  at  Law,  for  the  same 
matter,  obtain,  at  the  expiration  of  eight  days  after  his  answer,  or  further 
answer  is  filed,  as  of  course,  on  motion  or  petition,  the  usual  order  for 
the  plaintiff  to  make  his  election  in  which  Court  he  will  proceed.  If  his 
answer  is  excepted  to,  he  may,  by  notice  in  writing,  require  the  plaintiff 
to  set  down  the  exceptions,  within  four  days  from  the  service  of  the 
notice ; r  and  if  the  plaintiff  does  not  set  down  the  exceptions  within 
such  four  days,  or  if  they  are  not  allowed,  the  defendant  is  entitled  as 
of  course,  on  motion  or  petition,  to  obtain  the  usual  order  for  the  plain- 
tiff to  make  his  election  in  which  Court  he  will  proceed.2  Where  the 
plaintiff  has  amended  his  bill,  the  defendant  cannot  obtain  the  order  to 
elect  until  the  time  for  excepting  to  his  answer  to  the  amendments  has 
expired,  notwithstanding  the  time  for  excepting  to  his  answer  to  the 
original  bill  has  expired.8 

If  the  defendant  is  not  required  to  answer,  he  may,  at  the  expiration 
of  the  time  within  which  he  might  have  been  served  with  interrogatories 
to  the  bill,  in  like  manner  obtain  a  similar  order  to  elect.4 

We  have  before  seen  that,  for  some  purposes,  a  plea  is  included  in  the 
term  answer ; 5  but  under  the  old  practice  it  was  decided,  that  neither  a 

s  Schoole  v.  Sail,  1  Sch.  &  Lef.  176;  Booth  6  Pieters  v.  Thompson,  G.  Coop.  294. 

v.  Booth,  2  Atk.  343;  Willes  v.  Levett,  1  De  G.  ">  Barken'.  Dumaresque,  2  Atk.  11!);  Scton, 

&  S.  3',)2;  Kinnaird  v.  Trollope,  39  Ch.  D.  636;  949;  Anon.  1  Vern.  104;    3  Atk.  129 ;  Trimles- 

Dunkley  v.  Van  Buren,  3  John.  Ch.  330;  Chad-  ton  v.  Kenimis,  LI.  &  Goold.  29;  Mills   v.  Fry, 

well  v.  Jones,  1  Tenn.  Ch.  493.     And  the  mort-  G.  Coop.  107;  19  Ves.  277;  Franklin  v.  Hersch, 

gagee  .may  enforce   his   lien   in   Equity  after  2  Tenn.  Ch.  467.     For  form  of  the  order,  see 

judgment  at  Law  and  taking  the  body  of  the  3  Seton,  Dec.  (3d  Eng.  ed.)  948. 
debtor  in  execution:  Davis  v.  Battine,  4  R.  &  1  For  form  of  notice,  see  Vol.  III. 

M.  76;  and  after  the  debtor  has  been  discharged  2  Cons.  Ord.  XLII.  5,  6;  ante,  pp.  766,  767; 

of  the  debt  in  bankruptcy:  Lewis  v.  Hawkins,  Royle   v.  Wynne,  C.  &   P.  252,  255;   5   Jur. 

23  Wall.  119.     And  see  Harris  v.  Vaughn,  2  1002:  the  vacations  are  not  excluded.     Cons. 

Tenn.  Ch.  483.     In  Barker  i\  Smark,  3  Beav.  Ord.  XXXVII.  13.     For  form  of  order  to  elect, 

64,  Lord  L:\ngdale  M.  R.  refused  to  extend  the  see  Seton,  947,  No.  1 :  and  for  forms  of  motion 

exception  to  the  case  of  a  vendor,   who   had  paper  and  petition,  see  Vol.  III. 
commenced  an  action  at  Law  upon  a  bond  for  8  Leicester    v.   Leicester,  10    Sim.    87,    89; 

his  unpaid  purchase-money,  and  at  the  same  Affd.  id.  91,  n.;  3  Jur.  308. 
time  was  suing  in   Equity  to  establish  a  lien  4  Cons.  Ord.  XLII.  7;  and  see  Braithwaite's 

upon  the  estate  for  the  same  sum.     See  also  Manual,  156,  n.  (5).     For  forms,  see  Vol.  III. 
Walsh  v.  Bishop  of  Lincoln,  L.  R.  4  Adm.  &  5  See  ante,  p.  G90. 

Ecc.  242,  253. 


(6)  In  the  Federal  Courts  of   Equity  and  the  suits, when  an  adequate  remedy  may  be  had 

Admiralty,  although  a  plea  of  lis  alibi  pendens  is  in  either.      Lynch   v.  Hartford   Fire   Ins.   Co. 

not  strictly  applicable  to  litigation  abroad,  yet  17  Fed.  Rep.  027;   see  ante,  p.  633,  note  (a). 
the  plaintiff  mav  be  required  to  elect  between 

811 


817 


DISMISSING   BILLS,   AND    STAYING   PROCEEDINGS. 


plea  nor  a  joint  plea  and  answer  was  so  far  an  answer  to  the  bill  as  to 
entitle  a  defendant  to  move  for  an  order  for  the  plaintiff  to  elect ; 6  and 
it  does  not  seem  that  there  is  anything  in  the  present  practice  to  affect 
this  decision. 

The  order  must  be  served  on  the  plaintiff  or  his  solicitor,  and  attor- 
ney-at-law  ;  and  within  eight  days  after  such  service,  the  plaintiff  must 
make  his  election  in  which  Court  he  will  proceed ; 7  and  if  he  elect  to 
proceed  in  this  Court,  then  his  proceedings  at  Law  are  thereby  stayed  by 
injunction  ;  but  if  he  elect  to  proceed  at  Law,  or  in  default  of  his  making 
his  election  within  the  specified  time,  then  his  bill  from  thenceforth 
stands  dismissed  out  of  this  Court,  with  costs  to  be  taxed  by  the  Taxing 
Master,  without  further  order ;  such  costs  to  be  paid  by  the  plain- 
*  817  tiff  to  the  defendant.8  It  *  is  not  the  practice  to  issue  an  injunc- 
tion ;  the  service  of  the  order  being  sufficient.1 
When  the  defendant  has  obtained  such  an  order,  the  plaintiff  may 
move,  on  notice  to  the  defendant,  to  discharge  it,  either  for  irregularity 
or  upon  the  merits  confessed  in  the  answer,  or  proved  by  affidavit.2  If, 
upon  such  a  motion,  there  should  be  any  doubt  as  to  whether  the  suit  in 
Equity,  and  the  action  at  Law,  are  for  the  same  matter,  it  is  the  usual 
course  to  direct  an  inquiry  into  that  fact.3  In  the  event  of  such  an 
inquiry  being  directed,  it  seems  that  all  the  proceedings  in  both  Courts 
are  stayed  in  the  mean  time,4  unless  the  plaintiff  can  show  that  justice 
will  be  better  done  by  permitting  proceedings  to  some  extent;  in  which 
case,  special  leave  will  be  given  him  to  proceed.6 

If  the  common  order  cannot,  under  the  circumstances,  be  obtained,  it 
seems  that  the  Court  will,  if  necessary,  make  a  special  order,  and  grant 
an  injunction  in  the  mean  time.6 

The  election  must  be  in  writing,  and  signed  by  the  plaintiff  or  his 
solicitor,7  and  be  filed  at  the  Report  Office ;  and  notice  thereof  must 
be  given  to  the  defendant's  solicitor ;  who  thereupon  obtains  an  office 
copy.8 

The  dismissal  of  the  bill,  in  consequence  of  an  election  by  the  plaintiff 
to  proceed  at  Law,  cannot  be  pleaded  in  bar  to  another  suit  for  the  same 
matter.9 


6  Fisher  r.  Mee,  3  Mer.  45,  47 ;  Vaughan  v. 
Welsh,  Mos.  210;  Soule  v.  Corning,  11  Paige, 
412. 

7  The  Court  will  allow  the  party  a  reason- 
able time  to  make  his  election.  Bracken  v. 
Martin,  3  Yerger,  55;  see  Houston  v.  Sadler, 
4  Stew.  &  Port.  130;  Rogers  v.  Vosburg,  4 
John.  Ch.  84. 

8  See  the  order  in  Seton,  947,  No.  1;  see 
also  Boyd  v.  Heinzelman,  1 V.  &  B.  331 ;  Mouse- 
ley  v.  Basnett,  id.  382,  n.  ;  Jones  v.  Earl  Straf- 
ford, 3  P.  Wras.  90,  n.  (B.);  see  Livingston  v. 
Kane,  3  John.  Ch.  224;  Rogers  v.  Vosburg, 
4  John.  Ch.84. 

1  Braithwaite's  Pr.  229;  see  Fennings  v. 
Humphery,  4  Beav.  1,  7,  8;  5  Jur.  455. 

2  ConsOrd.  XLII.  8.  For  form  of  notice  of 
motion,  see  Vol.  III. 

812 


3  Mouseley  v.  Basnett,  1  V.  &  B.  382,  n.; 
and  for  form  of  order  for  inquiry,  see  Seton, 
948,  No.  3. 

4  Mills  v.  Fry,  3Ves.  &  B.  9;  Anon.  2  Mad. 
395. 

s  Amory  v.  Brodrick,  Jac.  530,  533;  Car- 
wick  v.  Young,  2  Swanst.  239,  243;  Mouseley  V. 
Basnett,  ubi  supra ;  see,  however,  Fennings 
v.  Humphery,  4  Beav.  1,  8;  5  Jur.  455;  Anglo- 
Danubian  Co.  v.  Rogerson,  L.  R.  4  Eq.  3. 

6  Hogue  v.  Curtis,  1  J.  &  W.  449. 

1  Cons.  Ord.  III.  1. 

8  For  forms  of  election  and  notice,  see 
Vol.  III. 

9  Countess  of  Plymouth  v.  Bladon,  2  Vern. 
32. 


CASES    OF   ELECTION. 


813 


If  the  plaintiff  requires  further  time  to  make  his  election,  he  must 
apply  to  the  Court  by  motion,  on  notice,  to  have  the  time  enlarged.10 

After  decree,  it  is  not  the  practice  to  make  an  order  to  elect  (a) ;  but 
the  plaintiff  will  be  restrained,  on  the  motion  of  the  defendant,  from 
proceeding  in  another  Court,  in  respect  of  the  same  matter  ;  even  though 
such  proceedings  are  merely  auxiliary  to  the  proceedings  in  Equity.11 

If  the  plaintiff  elect  to  proceed  in  Equity,  the  defendant  will  either 
be  allowed  to  recover  the  costs  of  the  action  in  the  Court  of 
*  Law,1  or  the  plaintiff  will  be  directed  by  the  Court  of  Chancery    *  818 
to  pay  them  ; 2  and  if  he  elect  to  proceed  at  Law,  the  bill  is,  as  we 
have  seen,  by  the  order  dismissed  with  costs.3 


10  For  form  of  order  enlarging  the  time,  see 
Seton,  948,  No.  2;  and  for  form  of  notice  of 
motion,  see  Vol.  III. 

"  Wilson  v.  Wetherherd,  2  Mer.  406,  408 ; 
Frank  v.  Basnett,  2  M.  &  K.  618,  620;  Wed- 
derburn  v.  Wedderbum,  2  Beav.  208,213;  4 
Jur.  66;  4  M.  &  C.  585,  596;  Phelps  v.  Pro- 
thero,  7  De  G.  M.  &  G.  722;  2  Jur.  N.  S.  173. 
And  although  the  decree  in  Equity  is  adverse 
to  the  right.  Lord  Tredegar  v.  Windus,  L.  R. 
19  Eq.  607.     Going  in  under  an  administration 


decree  to  prove  a  debt  is  not  such  an  election 
to  proceed  in  Equity  as  prevents  an  action  at 
Law.     Sexton  v.  Smith,  3  De  G.  &  S.  694. 

i  Simpson  v.  Sadd,  3  W.  R.  191,  L.  C;  see 
also  S.  C.  16  C.  B.  26;  1  Jur.  N.  S.  736;  and 
Mortimore  v.  Soares,  5  Jur.  N.  S.  574,  Q.  B. ; 
S.  C.  1  El.  &  Bl.  390. 

2  See  Carwick  v.  Young,  2  Swanst.  239, 
242. 

3  Ante,  p.  816. 


(n)  In  Rochester  Distilling  Co.  v.  Devendorf, 
54  N.  Y.  St.  Rep.  871,  it  was  held  that  a  suit 
for  the  purchase  price  was  not  an  election  of 
remedies  precluding  a  suit  for  fraudulent  repre- 
sentations, unless  prosecuted  to  judgment  with 
knowledge  of  the  fraud.  A  person  fraudulently 
induced  to  releace  property  may  sue  for  dam- 
ages, and  is  not  limited  to  a  suit  to  set  aside 
the  release.    Talbot  v.  Cruger,  25  N.  Y.  S.  285. 


A  plaintiff  who  insists  on  appeal  that  the  judg- 
ment or  decree  rendered  for  damages  in  his 
favor  be  sustained,  loses  his  right  to  the  specific 
performance  asked  and  refused  below.  Gold- 
thwait  v.  Lynch  (Utah),  33  Pac.  Rep.  699.  A 
suit  against  an  agent  does  not  bar  a  subsequent 
suit  against  his  principal.  Baltimore  &  O.  Tel. 
Co.  v.  Interstate  Tel.  Co.,  54  Fed.  Rep.  50. 

813 


[The  statutory  proceedings  under  this  chapter  are  not  applicable  to  the  practice  in  the 

United  States.] 


819 


*  CHAPTER   XX. 

MOTION    FOR    A    DECREE. 


At  any  time  after  the  expiration  of  the  time  allowed  to  the  defendant 
for  answering,1  but  before  replication,  the  plaintiff  may  move  the  Court 
for  such  decree  or  decretal  order  as  he  may  think  himself  entitled  to.'2  (a) 
Of  this  motion,  one  month's,  or  twenty-eight  days'  notice  must  be  given 
to  the  defendant.3 

If  further  time  is  granted  to  the  defendant  for  pleading,  answering, 
or  demurring,  the  plaintiff  cannot  move  for  a  decree  until  such  further 
time  has  expired ; 4  and  where  there  are  several  defendants,  and  the  plain- 
tiff is  in  a  position  to  serve  a  notice  of  motion  for  a  decree,  or  to  file 
replication,  or  set  down  the  cause  on  bill  and  answer,  as  to  some  of  them, 
but  the  time  for  so  doing  as  to  the  others  has  not  arrived,  he  should,  to 
avoid  an  application  to  dismiss  the  bill  for  want  of  prosecution,5  obtain 
further  time,  on  special  summons,  to  serve  the  notice  or  file  the 
replication.6 

The  filing  of  a  traversing  note  against  a  defendant  does  not  preclude 
the  plaintiff  from  moving  for  a  decree.7 

Where,  at  the  hearing,  a  cause  was  ordered  to  stand  over  for  the  pur- 
pose of  adding  parties  by  amendment,  the  cause  was  allowed  to  be  heard 
on  motion  for  decree  against  the  new  defendants  ;  though  replication  had 
been  filed  against  the  original  defendants.8 


1  Or,  by  consent,  before  the  expiration  of 
the  time.  Braithwaite's  Pr.  429.  For  form  of 
consent,  see  Vol.  III. 

2  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  15.  If  the  plaintiff 
moves  for  a  decree,  replication  need  not  after- 
wards be  filed.  Duffield  v.  Sturges,  9  Hare 
App.  87;  Blake  v.  Cox,  1  W.  R.  124,  V.  C.  W. 

8  Cons.  Ord.  XXXIII.  4;  XXXVII.  10. 

4  15  &  16  Vice.  86,  §  13. 

5  See  ante,  p.  801,  et  seq. 

6  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.  17.  For  form  of 
summons,  see  Vol.  IIT. 


(a)  As  to  motion  for  judgment  under  the 
present  English  practice,  see  1  Dan.  Ch.  Prac. 
(6th  Eng.  ed.)  663;  Coke  v.  Gilbert  (No.  2), 
40  W.  R.  682;  W.  N.  (1892)  111,  128,  note. 
The  Court  does  not  require  evidence  upon  motion 
for  judgment  in  default  of  pleading.  Bagley 
v.  Searle,  56  L.  T.  306;  35  W.  R.  404;  see 

814 


"'  Maniere  v.  Leicester,  Kay  App.  48;  18 
Jur.  320;  5  De  G.  M.  &  G.  75;  Jones  v.  Howell, 
3  W.  R.  559,  V.  C.  W.  As  to  traversing  notes, 
see  ante,  p.  513,  et  seq.  The  causes  of  Gohegan 
v.  Barlow  (1863,  G.  132),  and  Leke  v.  Vicini 
(1863,  L.  46),  were  set  down  on  motion  for  de- 
cree as  to  some  of  the  defendants,  and  on  orders 
to  take  the  bill  pro  confesso  as  to  others. 

8  Gwvon  v.  Gwvon,  1  K.  &  J.  211. 


Charles  v.  Shepherd,  [1892]  2  Q.  B.  622.  Upon 
such  a  motion,  in  a  suit  for  specific  performance, 
the  plaintiff  should  state  in  his  notice  of  motion 
the  precise  words  of  the  judgment  for  which  he 
asks,  when  no  minutes  of  the  proposed  judg- 
ment are  presented.  De  Jongh  v.  Newman,  56 
L.  T.  180;  35  W.  R.  403. 


MOTION    FOR    A    DECREE.  *  821 

An  order  of  course  to  amend  the  bill  may  be  obtained  after  notice  of 
motion  for  a  decree  has  been  served,  but  before  it  has  been  set  down ; 
although  the  defendant  has  filed  affidavits  in  opposition.9 

*  The  form  of  notice  of  motion  for  decree  commonly  adopted  is     *  820 
to  the  effect,  that  the  Court  will  be  moved  for  a  decree,  "  accord- 
ing to  the  prayer  of  the  plaintiff's  bill;"  and  where  this  form  is  used 
the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  have  the  same  relief  as  he  might  have  had  if 
the  cause  had  been  brought  to  a  hearing  in  the  ordinary  way.1 

The  notice  of  motion  may  be  served  out  of  the  jurisdiction  ;  but  an 
order  allowing  this  to  be  done  is  necessary.2  Such  an  order  may  be 
obtained  on  an  ex  parte  motion  or  summons,  supported  by  an  affidavit 
showing  where  the  defendant  is  resident,  or  may  probably  be  found.3 
In  such  a  case,  the  order  giving  leave  to  serve  the  notice  out  of  the  juris- 
diction must  specify  the  time  allowed  for  filing  affidavits  in  answer  and 
reply,  and  must  be  drawn  up  and  served  with  the  notice  of  motion ; 4 
and  the  notice  of  motion  must  be  given  for  a  day  sufficiently  distant  to 
include  the  whole  time  limited  for  service,  and  the  times  limited  for  the 
defendant  to  file  affidavits  in  answer,  and  the  plaintiff  to  file  affidavits 
in  reply,  and  so  as  to  allow  the  defendant  proper  time  to  obtain  copies 
of  the  plaintiff's  affidavits  in  support  and  in  reply.  These  times  must, 
therefore,  be  regulated  by  the  place  where  the  service  is  to  be  effected.5 
In  some  cases  the  order  giving  leave  to  effect  the  service  has  directed 
copies  of  the  plaintiff's  affidavits  in  support  of  the  motion  for  decree  to 
be  served  with  the  notice  ; 6  but  it  seems  this  cannot  be  required.7 

Where  an  application  was  made  to  the  Court  for  leave  to  advertise  in 
the  Gazette  a  notice  of  motion  for  a  decree,  against  an  absconding  de- 
fendant, for  whom  an  appearance  had  been  entered,8  it  was  refused  by 
Sir  John  Romilly  M.  R. :  who  observed,  that  the  6th  Rule  of  the  10th 
Consolidated  Order  had  no  application  to  such  a  case ;  but  he  gave  leave 
to  advertise  the  filing  of  replication  in  the  Gazette  9 

By  giving  notice  of  motion  for  a  decree,  the  plaintiff  abandons  his 
claim  to  a  further  answer ;  although  the  answer  has,  upon  exceptions, 
been  held  insufficient. 10 

The  plaintiff    and  defendant  respectively  are   at   liberty  to  file  affi- 
davits in  support  of,  and  in  opposition  to,  the  motion ;  and  to 
*  use  the  same  on  the  hearing  thereof.1     The  evidence  in  chief     *  821 
on  such  motion  is  ordinarily  taken  upon  affidavit ; 2  and  where 

9  Gill  v.  Rayner,  1  K.  &  J.  395.  6  Meek  r.  Ward,  10  Hare  App.  55. 

i  Norton  v.  Steinkopf,  Kay,  45;  id.  App.  10.  »  Seton,  28,  1247 ;  and  for  form  of  ordercon- 

For  form  of  notice,  see  Vol.  III.  taining  such  direction,  see  Seton,  1246,  No.  11. 

2  Meek  v.  Ward,  10  Hare  App.  55;  1  W.  R.  8  Under  Cons.  Ord.  X.  6. 

504 :  and  see  Middleton  v.  Chichestor,  1  N.  R.  9  Leclimere  v.  Clapp,  29  Beav.  259 ;  see  post, 

255,  M.  R.  pp.  831,  832. 

3  For  form  of  order,  see  Seton,  1246,  No.  w  Royse  v.  Cokell,  18  Jar.  770,  V.  C  W. 
11;  and  see  id.  1247;  and  for  forms  of  motion  *  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  15. 

paper,  summons,  and  affidavit,  see  Vol.  III.  2  See  post,  Chap.  XXII.  §  10,  Affidavits;  for 

4  Meek  v.  Ward,  ubi  supra  ;  Seton,  28, 1247;  general  rules  as  to  the  form,  and  mode  of  fram- 
as  to  evidence  of  the  service,  see  Mendes  r.  ing  affidavits.  See  also  Coles  v.  Morris,  L.  R. 
Guedalla,  5  L.  T.  N.  S.  308,  V.  C.  W.  2  Ch.  701,  705. 

5  Seton,  28,  1247,  where  a  list  of  times  is 
given. 

815 


822 


MOTION    FOR   A    DECREE. 


motion  is  made  after  answer  filed,  the  answer  is,  for  the  purposes  of  the 
motion,  to  be  treated  as  an  affidavit ; 3  and  the  plaintiff  has  been  allowed 
to  cross-examine  the  defendant  thereon.4 

The  plaintiff  must  file  his  affidavits,  in  support  of  the  motion  for 
decree,  before  he  serves  the  notice,  and  must  set  forth  a  list  of  the  affi- 
davits he  intends  to  use  at  the  foot  of  the  notice.5  Where  an  answer 
has  been  filed,  the  plaintiff  may  read  it  on  the  motion  against  the  de- 
fendant by  whom  it  was  filed,  without  giving  any  notice  of  his  intention 
to  do  so ;  but  he  cannot  read  it  against  any  other  defendants,  unless  he 
has  included  it  in  the  list  at  the  foot  of  his  notice  of  motion.6 

The  defendant  must  file  his  affidavits,  in  support  of  his  defence,  with- 
in fourteen  days  after  service  of  the  notice  of  motion,  and  deliver  to  the 
plaintiff  or  his  solicitor  a  list  thereof.7 

The  time  for  filing  the  defendant's  affidavits  will,  however,  be  enlarged, 
on  special  application  to  the  Judge  in  Chambers,  by  summons,8  where  a. 
sufficient  reason  is  shown  for  so  doing ; 9  but  the  desire  of  the  defendant 
to  cross-examine  the  plaintiff's  witnesses  on  their  affidavits,  before  filing 
his  own,  on  the  ground  that  by  so  doing  it  might  not  be  necessary  for 
him  to  file  any,  is  not  a  sufficient  reason.10 

"Where  the  defendant  is  served  out  of  the  jurisdiction,  the  special 
order  allowing  such  service  will,  as  we  have  seen,11  fix  the  time  within 
which  the  defendant's  affidavits  are  to  be  filed ;  but  further  time  may,  in 
a  proper  case,  be  obtained  on  special  application  by  summons  at  Chambers. 

If,  after  the  times  allowed  for  filing  affidavits  have  elapsed,  it  is 
desired  to  file  an  affidavit,  or  a  further  affidavit,  an  order  for  leave  to 
do  so  will  be  necessary.  Such  order  may  be  obtained  on  a  special  ap- 
plication by  summons,1'2  supported  by  an  affidavit  showing  a  case  for 
the  indulgence ;  and  the  applicant  will  usually  have  to  pay  the  costs  of 

the  application. 
*  822  *  If  the  defendant  desires  to  read  his  own,  or  a  co-defendant's 
anwer  in  support  of  his  case,  he  must  give  notice  thereof  to  the 
plaintiff ;  !  but  if  the  plaintiff  reads  part  of  a  defendant's  answer  against 
him,  without  notice,  the  defendant  may  read  the  whole  of  his  answer, 
without  notice.2 


3  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  15.  Semble,  an  an- 
swer put  in  bv  a  deceased  defendant  cannot  be 
read.  Moore"  v.  Harper,  W.  N.  (1866)  56;  14 
W.  R.  306,  V.  C.  W. 

4  Wightman  v.  Wheelton.  23  Beav.  397 ;  3 
Jur.  X.  S.  124;  Rehden  v.  Wesley,  26  Beav. 
432;  Brumfit  v.  Hart,  9  Jur.  N.  s"  12;  11  W. 
R.  53,  V.  C.  S.;  and  see  post,  p.  822. 

5  Cons.  Ord.  XXXIII.  5,  see  form  of  notice, 
Vol.  III. 

6  Cousins  v.  Vasey,  9  Hare  App.  61 ;  Paw- 
kins  v.  Mortan,  1  J.  &  H.  339;  Stephens  v. 
Heathcote,  1  Dr.  &  S.  138;  6  Jur.  N.  S.  312. 

7  Cons.  Ord.  XXIII.  6.  As  to  the  defences 
which  may  be  set  up,  where  an  answer  has  not 
been  filed,  see  ante,  pp.  656.  712;  and  Green  v. 
Snead,  30  Beav.  231;  S.  C.  nom.  Snead  v. 
Green,  8  Jur.  X.  S.  4. 

816 


8  For  form  of  summons,  see  Vol.  III. 

9  Cons.  Ord.  XXXIII.  17,  18;  Marchioness 
of  Londonderry  v.  Bramwell,  3  K.  &  J.  162. 

io  Ibid. 

u  Ante,  p.  820. 

12  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.  17,  18.  For  form  of 
summons,  see  Vol.  III. 

i  Stephens  v.  Heathcote,  1  Dr.  &  S.  138;  6 
Jur.  X.  S.  312;  and  see  Barrack  r.  M'Culloch, 
3  K.  &  J.  110;  Rushout  v.  Turner,  1  Dr.  &  S. 
140,  n.;  Wightman  v.  Wheelton,  23  Beav.  397; 
3  Jur.  N.  S.  124.  For  form  of  notice,  see 
Vol.  III. 

2  Stephens  v.  Heathcote,  vbi  supra.  And 
see,  in  an  administration  suit,  the  effect  of  no- 
tice to  read  an  answer,  setting  out  accounts, 
Wright  v.  Edwards,  7  W.  R.  193. 


MOTION   FOR   A   DECREE.  *  823 

The  defendant  having  filed  his  affidavits,  the  plaintiff  has  seven  days 
from  the  expiration  of  the  fourteen  days,  or,  if  the  time  has  been  en- 
larged, from  the  expiration  of  such  enlarged  time,3  within  which  he  may 
file  affidavits  in  reply  :  which  affidavits  must  be  confined  to  matters 
strictly  in  reply.  The  plaintiff  must  deliver  a  list  of  these  affidavits  to 
the  defendant  or  his  solicitor  ; 4  and  except  so  far  as  such  affidavits  are 
in  reply,  they  will  not  be  regarded  by  the  Court,  unless,  upon  the  hear- 
ing of  the  motion,  the  Court  gives  the  defendant  leave  to  answer  them  : 
in  which  case,  unless  the  Court  otherwise  directs,  the  plaintiff  is  to  pay 
the  costs  of  such  affidavits,  and  such  further  affidavits  in  answer.5  The 
time  can,  however,  be  enlarged  by  the  Judge  in  Chambers,  on  a  special 
application  by  summons.6 

Where  either  the  time  for  the  defendant's  filing  his  affidavits,  or  for 
the  plaintiff's  filing  his  affidavits  in  reply,  is  enlarged,  notice  thereof  is 
to  be  given  to  the  Clerk  of  Records  and  Writs  by  production  of  the  order 
for  such  enlargement.7  Such  notice  is  ordinarily  given  by  producing  to 
the  Order  of  Course  Clerk  the  order  enlarging  the  time,  and  he  will 
thereupon  make  a  note  of  such  enlargement,  opposite  the  entry  of  the 
notice  of  motion  in  the  cause  list. 

Where  either  the  fourteen  days  for  the  defendant's  filing  his  affidavits, 
or  the  seven  days  for  the  plaintiff's  filing  his  affidavits  in  reply,  expire 
in  the  Long  Vacation,  the  time  is  extended  to  the  fifth  day  of  the  ensuing 
Michaelmas  Term,  and  will  expire  on  that  day,  unless  enlarged  by  order  ; 
and  if  the  fourteen  days  are  thus  extended,  the  seven  days  commence  to 
run  from  the  expiration  of  such  extended  period.8 

No  further  evidence,  on  either  side,  will  be  allowed  to  be  used  on 
the  hearing  of  the  motion  without  leave  of  the  Court,9  except 
*  the  cross-examinations  of  such  witnesses  as  have  been  cross-     *  823 
examined.1 

All  witnesses  who  have  made  affidavits,  either  on  behalf  of  the  plain- 
tiff or  the  defendant,  are  liable  to  cross-examination ; 2  and  the  party 
desiring  to  cross-examine  any  of  them,  may,  at  any  time  before  the  ex- 
piration of  fourteen  days  next  after  the  end  of  the  time  allowed  for  the 
plaintiff  to  file  affidavits  in  reply,  or  within  such  time  as  the  Court  or 
Judge  in  Chambers  may  specially  appoint,8  give  notice  in  writing  4  to 
the  party  on  whose  behalf  the  affidavit  is  filed,  or  his  solicitor,  to  pro- 

8  Where  the  defendant  is  served  out  of  the  Clark  v.   Malpas,  there  cited,  and  see  Rraith- 

jurisdiction  with   the  notice,  the  time  to  reply  waite's  Manual,  107,  n.  (40). 
will  be  regulated  by  the  service  order;  see  ante,  9  Cons.  Ord.  XXXIII.  8.    For  cases  in  which 

P-  810.  special  leave  was  given,  see  Watson  v.  Cleaver. 

<  For  form  of  list,  see  Vol.  III.  20  Beav.  137;  1  Jur.  N.  S.  270;  and  Richards 

5  Cons.  Ord.  XXXIII.  7.  v.  Curlewis,  18  Reav.  402,  where  it  was  held, 

6  See  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.  17, 18,    For  form  that  the  application  must  not  be  ex  parte. 

of  summons,  see  Vol.  III.  i  Redwell  v.  Prudence,  1  Dr.  &  S.  221,  223. 

1  Ord.  22  Nov.,  1800,  r.  5.  2  15  &  ]6  Vic.  c.  80,  §  40;  Williams  v.  Wil- 

8  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.   15.     A  doubt   has  liams,  17  Beav.  150;  17  Jur.  434. 

arisen  whether  this  rule  applies  to  a  case  where  8  The  application  is  usually  made  by  sum- 

the  fourteen  days,  or  the  seven  days,  are  en-  mons;  for  a  form,  see  Vol.  III. 

larged  before  the  Long  Vacation  to  a  day  oc-  *  For  a  form,  see  Vol.  III. 

curring  in  the  Vacation;  see  Morgan,  553,  and 

VOL.  1.  —  52  817 


*  824  MOTION    FOR   A    DECREE. 

cluce  the  witness  for  cross-examination  before  the  examiner ;  and  unless 
the  witness  is  produced  accordingly,  the  affidavit  cannot  be  used  as  evi- 
dence, without  special  leave  of  the  Court.5  The  plaintiff  is  entitled  to 
cross-examine  any  defendant  upon  his  answer  ; 6  and  where  the  plaintiff 
gives  notice  of  his  intention  to  use  a  defendant's  answer  against  a  co- 
defendant,  the  co-defendant  may  cross-examine  upon  the  answer;7  and 
where  a  defendant  gives  notice  to  use  his  or  a  co-defendant's  answer 
against  the  plaintiff,  he,  or  the  co-defendant,  as  the  case  may  be,  may  be 
cross-examined  by  the  plaintiff  : 8  the  answer  in  such  cases  being  treated 
as  an  affidavit.  And  even  where  the  plaintiff  had  given  notice  to  use  the 
defendant's  answers  as  affidavits,  in  support  of  his  motion  for  a  decree, 
he  was  allowed  to  cross-examine  the  defendants  on  the  answers,  without 
prejudice  to  the  right  of  the  other  defendants  to  object  to  the  cross- 
examination  being  used  against  them  ;  9  but  when  no  notice  is  given  of 
the  intention  to  read  the  answer  of  the  defendant,  and  it  is  read  as  an 
admission,  and  not  as  an  affidavit,  he  cannot  be  cross-examined  upon  it.10 

According  to  the  practice  introduced  by  the  Order  of  5th  February, 
1861,  it  seems  that  all  the  evidence  in  chief  on  motions  for  decree  must 
be  taken  by  affidavit.11  The  Court  has,  however,  power,  it  is  presumed, 
in  any  case,  upon  special  application,  to  order  the  evidence  of  any  parti- 
cular witness  or  witnesses  to  be  taken  viva  voce.  Such  an  application  could 
only  be  made  on  the  part  of  the  defendant,  as  the  plaintiff  would, 
*824  of  course,  ascertain,  before  *  serving  his  notice  of  motion  for  a 
decree,  whether  it  was  necessary,  or  desirable,  to  examine  any 
witness  on  his  behalf  orally,  and  if  so,  would  bring  the  cause  to  a  hearing 
in  the  ordinary  way,  instead  of  serving  the  notice.  Before  the  Order  of 
5th  February,  1861,  it  seems  to  have  been  thought  that  the  evidence  in 
support  of  a  motion  for  decree  might  be  taken  orally,  by  specifying  the 
names  of  the  witnesses  to  be  examined,  in  the  notice  of  motion,  and 
summoning  them  before  the  examiner ; 1  but,  whether  this  could  then 
have  been  done  or  not,  it  is  conceived  that  it  cannot  be  done  under  the 
present  practice. 

The  cross-examination  of  witnesses  on  their  affidavits  must,  on  mo- 
tion for  decree,  be  taken  before  the  examiner  ; 2  the  Court  has,  however, 

5  Ord.  5  Feb.,  1861,  r.  19.  As  to  the  course  in  See  Dawkins  v.  Morton,  1  J.  &  H.  339, 
to  be  pursued  by  either  party  after  such  notice,  341 ;  Cousins  v.Vasey,  9  Hare  App.  61 ;  Stephens 
see  post,  Chap".  XXII.  §  10,  Affidavits,  and  V.  Heathcote,  1  Dr.  &  S.  138;  6  Jur.  N.  S.  312. 
Braithwaite's  Manual,  178,  n.  (85).  And  see  u  See  Ord.  5  Feb.,  1861,  particularly  r.  19; 
as  to  the  effect  of  delay  in  proceeding  to  cross-  and  see  Smith  r.  Baker,  4  N.  R.  321,  V.  C.  W. ; 
examine.  Bourdillon  ».  Baddeley,  26  Beav.  2  H.  &  M.  498.  And  any  depositions  taken  in 
255.  support  of  the  motion   will   be  irregular,  and 

6  Wightman  v.  Wheelton.  23  Beav.  397;  3  may  be  ordered  to  be  taken  off  the  file.  Coles 
Jur.  N.'s    124;  Rehden  v.  Weslev.  26  Beav.  V.  Morris,  L.  R.  2  Ch.  701. 

432;  Brumfit  v.  Hart,  9  Jur.  N.  S.  12;  11  W.  i  Pellatt  v.  Nicholls,  24  B°av.  298;  Rehden 

R.  53,  V.  C.  S.  r.  Wesley,  26  Beav.  432,  and  see  15  &  16  Vic. 

7  Rehden  v.  Wesley,  and  Wightman  v.  c.  86,  §  40;  and  Williams  v.  Williams,  17  Beav. 
Wheelton,  vbi  supra  ;  Dawkins  v.  Mortan,  1  J.  156;  17  Jur.  434. 

&  H.  339.  2  Ord.  5  Feb.,  1861,  r.  19;  Bodger  v.  Bod- 

8  See  Rehden  v.  Wesley  and  Wightman  v.  ger,  11  W.  R.  80,  V.  C.  K.  For  mode  of  taking 
Wheelton,  ubi  supra,  the  cross-examination,  see  post,  Chap.  XXIL 

9  Rehden  v.  Wesley,  ubi  supra.  §  10,  Affidavits. 

818 


MOTION    FOR   A    DECREE.  *  8-0 

power  to  order  it  to  be  taken  viva  voce  at  the  hearing.3  No  time  has 
been  limited  for  the  cross-examination,  but  it  must,  it  seems,  take  place 
within  a  reasonable  time.4 

Where  a  suit  is  brought  on  by  motion  for  decree,  and  replication  has 
been  filed  in  a  cross-suit,  and  the  plaintiff  in  the  original  suit  has  ob- 
tained an  order  for  leave  to  use,  in  the  cross-suit,  the  affidavits  filed  in 
the  original  suit,  the  plaintiff  in  the  cross-suit  may  either  treat  the  affi- 
davits filed  in  the  cross-suit  as  if  they  were  filed  in  the  original  suit, 
and  give  notice  to  cross-examine  the  witnesses  before  an  examiner,  or  he 
may  treat  them  as  evidence  filed  in  the  cross-suit,  and  give  notice  of 
cross-examination  in  open  Court  at  the  hearing.5 

A  subpoena  duces  tecum,  for  the  production  of  a  will  or  other  document 
at  the  hearing  of  a  motion  for  a  decree,  may  be  issued,6  and,  it  seems,  as 
of  course.7 

Motions  for  decree  are  set  down  with  the  Registrar  in  the  cause-book, 
with  the  causes,  and  come  on  accordingly,  unless  the  Court  otherwise 
directs.8  They  must  be  set  down  within  one  week  after  the  expiration 
of  the  time  allowed  to  the  plaintiff  for  filing  his  affidavits  in  reply,  in 
case  the  defendant  has  filed  any  affidavit,  or  within  one  week  after  the 
expiration  of  the  time  allowed  to  the  defendant  to  file  his  affidavits  in 
answer,  in  case  the  defendant  has  not  filed  any  affidavit ;  but  in  case 
the  time  allowed  for  either  of  the  purposes  aforesaid  shall  be  enlarged, 
then  within  one  week  after  the  expiration  of  such  enlarged  time.9 
In  order  to  set  down  *  a  motion  for  decree,  the  Record  and  Writ  *  825 
Clerk's  certificate  that  the  cause  is  in  a  fit  state  to  enable  the 
plaintiff  to  move  for  a  decree,  indorsed  by  the  plaintiff's  solicitor  with 
a  memorandum  of  the  date  when  the  notice  was  served,  and  when  it  will 
expire,  and,  if  there  be  any  infant  defendant,  stating  that  a  guardian  ad 
litem  has  been  appointed,  or,  if  there  be  not,  stating  that  there  is  not 
any  infant  defendant,  must  be  produced  at  the  order  of  course  seat  in 
the  Registrar's  office.1  The  certificate  is  not  to  be  given  until  after  the 
expiration  of  the  time  allowed  to  the  plaintiff  to  file  his  affidavits  in 
reply,  in  case  the  defendant  shall  have  filed  any  affidavits,  or  until  after 
the  expiration  of  the  time  allowed  to  the  defendant  to  file  his  affidavits 
in  answer,  in  case  the  defendant  has  not  filed  any  affidavit;  but  in  case 
the  time  allowed  for  either  of  the  purposes  aforesaid  shall  be  enlarged, 
then  not  until  after  the  expiration  of  such  enlarged  time.2  After  the 
expiration  of  the  week,  the  motion  will  not  be  set  down  without  the  con- 

3  See  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  39.  l  Reg.  Regul.  15th  Mar.,  1860,  r.  6;  and  see 

4  Bed  well  v.  Prudence,  1  Dr.  &  S.  221;  Boyd  v.  Jaggar,  ubi  supra.  For  forms  of  cert i- 
Morey  v.  Vandenbergh,  1  W.  N.  107,  V.  C.  S.  ficate  and   memorandum,  see  Reg.   Regul.   15 

5  Neve  v.  Pennell,  I  H.  &  M.  252.  Mar.,  1860,  r.  6,  and  Vol.  III.     The  certificate 

6  Wigram  v.  Rowland,  10  Hare  App.  18;  of  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerk  will  not  be 
Raworth  v.  Parker,  2  K.  &  J.  163.  For  form  granted  before  the  expiration  of  the  time  for 
of  subpeena,  see  Vol   III.  answering,  unless  a  written  consent  by  the  de- 

7  Wilhem  y.  Reynolds,  8  W.  R.  625,  V.  fendant's  solicitor  is  left  with  him.  For  a  form, 
C.  K.  see  Vol.  II l. 

s  Cons.  Ord.  XXXIII.  9.  2  Ord.  22  Nov.,  1866,  r.  4. 

9  Ord.  22  Nov.,  1866,  r.  2.;  see  Boyd  v. 
Jaggar,  17  Jur,  655;  10  Hare  App.  54,  L."C.  & 
L.  JJ. 

819 


*  826  MOTION    FOR   A    DECREE. 

sent  in  writing  of  the  defendant's  solicitor.3  If  the  plaintiff  fails  to  set 
down  the  motion  within  the  time  above  limited,  the  defendant  may 
either  move  to  dismiss  the  bill  with  costs,  for  want  of  prosecution,  or 
set  the  motion  down  at  his  own  request.* 

In  a  proper  case,  a  motion  for  decree  may  be  marked,5  and  heard  as 
a  short  cause  ; 6  and  it  will  be  so  marked,  on  production  of  the  certificate 
of  the  plaintiff's  counsel  that  the  motion  is  fit  to  be  so  heard,  without 
the  consent  of  the  solicitors  of  any  of  the  defendants ;  but  notice  of  the 
cause  having  been  so  marked,  must  be  given  to  the  defendants  ; 7  and  the 
motion  will  not  be  heard  before  the  day  for  which  notice  is  given,  except 
by  consent  of  all  parties.8 

If  a  motion  for  injunction  is,  by  consent,  turned  into  a  motion  for 
decree,  it  should  be  set  down  "  by  order,"  that  the  month's  delay  may 
be  saved.9 

All  affidavits  and  depositions  to  be  used  on  the  hearing  of  the  motion 
must  be  printed,  under  the  regulations  hereafter  explained.10 

Two  printed  copies  of  the  bill,  and  of  each  of  the  answers,  must 
also  be  left  with  the  Train-bearer  of  the  Master  of  the  Rolls,  or 

*  826    *  of  the  Vice-Chancellor,  as  may  be,  for  the  use  of  the  Court  and 

the  Registrar,  before  the  motion  comes  on  for  hearing.1 
If  the  plaintiff  fails  to  appear  when  the  motion  is  called  on,  the  de- 
fendant's counsel  may  apply  to  have  the  bill  dismissed  with  costs,  and 
need  not,  it  seems,  for  this  purpose  produce  an  affidavit  of  the  defend- 
ant's having  been  served  with  the  notice  of  motion.2  Where  the  defend- 
ant fails  to  appear,  the  plaintiff  may  move  for  the  decree  in  his  absence, 
subject  to  the  production  of  an  affidavit  of  service  of  the  notice ; 3  but 
the  Court  has,  in  such  case,  allowed  the  decree  to  be  re-opened  on  mo- 
tion.4 The  affidavit,  in  either  case,  should  be  filed  at  the  Record  and 
Writ  Clerk's  Office,  and  an  office  copy  be  produced  to  the  Registrar,  at 
the  latest  before  the  rising  of  the  Court  on  the  day  on  which  the  appli- 
cation is  made.5  If  neither  party  appears  on  the  motion,  it  will  be 
struck  out  of  the  paper. 

Where  the  motion  cannot  conveniently  proceed  by  reason  of  the  solici- 
tor for  any  party  neglecting  to  attend  personally,  or  by  some  proper 

3  For  a  form  of  consent,  see  Vol.  III.  12       The  plaintiff's  briefs   consist  of    printed 

4  Ord.  22  Nov.,  1866,  r.  3.  copies   of  the  bill,  and  answers,  affidavits  in 

5  Ames  v.  Ames,  10  Hare  App.  54;  17  Jur.  support,  opposition,  and  reply,  and  of  the  depo- 
664;  Drew  v.  Long,  17  Jur.  173,  V.  C.  K.;  see  sitions  of  the  witnesses  on  their  cross-examina- 
post,  Chap.  XXV.  Hearing  Causes.  tion,  and  of  written  copies  of  such  exhibits  or 

6  Reg.  Regul.  15  Mar.  1860,  r.  10.  For  form  other  documents  as  maybe  necessary.  A  de- 
of  certificate,  see  Vol.  III.  fendant's  briefs  are  the  same,  except  that  copies 

7  Molesworth  v.  Snead,  11  W.  R.  934,  V.  of  only  the  answer,  and  of  such  answers  of  co- 
C.  W.  defendants  as  the   plaintiff  has  notified  his  in- 

8  Ibid.;  Loinsworth  v.  Rowley,  10  Hare  App.  tention  to  read  against  him,  or  as  he  has  signi- 
55.     For  form  of  consent,  see  Vol.  III.  tied  his  intention  to  read  against  the  plain-tiff 

9  Green  v.  Low,  22  Beav.  395.  The  Record  or  co-defendants,  should  be  furnished.  Each 
and  Writ  Clerk's  certificate  will  be  required  in  brief  should  be  accompanied  with  observations, 
such  case.  2  Marter  v.  Marter,  12  W.  R.  34,  M.  R. 

io  Ord.  16  May,  1862;  post,  Ch.  XXII.  §  10,  3  For  form  of  affidavit,  see  Vol.  III. 

Affidavits.  4  Hughes  t\  Jones,  26  Beav.  24. 

i  Reg.  Regul.  15  March,  1860,  r.  22;  Reg.  5  Lord  Milltown  r.  Stuart,  8  Sim.  34;  Seton, 

Notice,  23  Nov.,  1861;  and  see  Cons.  Ord.  XXL  29 ;  see  Seear  v.  Webb..  25  Ch.  D.  84. 
820 


MOTION    FOR    A    DECREE.  *  827 

person  on.  his  behalf,  or  omitting  to  deliver  any  paper  necessary  for  the 
use  of  the  Court,  and  which  according  to  its  practice  ought  to  have  been 
delivered,  such  solicitor  is  personally  to  pay  to  all  or  any  of  the  parties 
such  costs  as  the  Court  may  award.6 

Upon  hearing  a  motion  for  a  decree,  it  is  discretionary  with  the  Court 
to  grant  or  refuse  the  motion,  or  to  make  an  order  giving  such  direc- 
tions with  respect  to  the  further  prosecution  of  the  suit  as  the  circum- 
stances of  the  case  may  require,  and  to  make  such  order  as  to  costs  as 
it  may  think  right.7  The  decree  or  order  is  drawn  up,  passed,  and 
entered  in  the  manner  hereafter  explained,  in  treating  of  decrees  made 
on  the  hearing  of  the  cause.8  After  an  unsuccessful  motion  for  a  decree, 
the  bill  has  been  allowed  to  be  amended.9 

Upon  an  appeal  from  the  whole  decree,  made  on  motion  for  decree, 
the  plaintiff  has  the  right  to  begin.10 

*  Where  a  decree,  made  on  a  motion  for  a  decree,  is  appealed  *  827 
from,  a  petition  of  appeal  must  be  presented.1 

By  bringing  a  cause  to  a  hearing  on  a  motion  for  a  decree,  considerable 
delay  is  saved:  it  is,  therefore,  the  better  course  for  a  plaintiff  to  follow, 
where  he  expects  to  be  able  to  prove  his  case  by  affidavit ;  but  where  he 
desires  to  examine  witnesses  in  chief,  orally,  he  should  file  replication.2 
It  is  also  to  be  observed,  that  on  motions  for  a  decree,  the  plaintiff's 
evidence  is  known  to  the  defendant  before  he  prepares  his  proofs,  the 
cross-examination  of  witnesses  takes  place  before  the  examiner,3  and  the 
plaintiff  has  an  opportunity  of  adducing  evidence  in  reply;  but  that  if 
replication  has  been  filed,  both  parties  have  to  prepare  their  proofs 
before  the  evidence  of  the  other  side  is  known,  the  cross-examination  of 
witnesses  must  take  place  before  the  Court  itself,4  and  there  is  no  op- 
portunity of  adducing  evidence  in  reply. 

«  Cons.  Ord.  XXI.  12.  R.  86,  V.  C.  K. ;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Cambridge  Con- 

1  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  16;  see  Thomas  v.  Burners'  Gas  Co.  L.  R.  6  Eq.  282,  308;  4  Ch.  71. 

Bernard,  5  Jur.  N.  S.  31 ;  7  W.  R.  86,  V.  C.  10  Birkenhead  Docks  v.  Laird,  4  De  G.  M.  & 

K.;  Warde  v.  Dickson,  5  Jur.  N.  S.  698 ;  7  W.  G.  732. 

K.  148,  V  C.  K.;   Raworth  ?-.  Parker,  2  K.  &  1  Cons.  Ord.  XXXI.  8.   For  form  of  petition, 

J.  163:  Norton  v.  Steinkopf,  Kay,  45;  id.  App.  see  Vol.  III.;  31  &  32  Vic.  c.  11,  §  1, overruling 

10;   Robinson   v.   Lowater,  2  Eq.  Rep.   1072,  Baxendale  ».  McMurray,  L.  R.  2  Ch.  790. 

L.  JJ.  2  See  ante,  p.  823.  " 

*  See  post,  Chap.  XXVI.  §  3,  Drawing  tip  3  Ord.  2  Feb.,  1861,  r.  19. 

Decrees.     For  form  of  decree  on  motion,  see  4  Ord.  5  Feb.,  1861,  r.  7;  with  certain  ex- 

Seton.  26.  captions,  for  which  see  Ord.  5  Feb.,  IStil,  rr. 

9  Thomas  v.  Bernard,  5  Jur.  N.  S.  31 ;  7  W.      10,  11,  16. 

821 


828 


*  CHAPTER  XXI. 


REPLICATION. 

After  the  defendant,  if  required  to  answer,  has  fully  answered  the 
bill,  or,  if  not  required  to  answer,  the  time  allowed  for  putting  in  a  vol- 
untary answer  has  expired,  the  plaintiff,  if  he  determines  not  to  move 
for  a  decree,  or  his  motion  has  been  refused,  must  file  a  replication  ;  1 
unless,  where  an  answer  has  been  filed,  he  decides  to  go  to  a  hearing  of 
the  cause  on  bill  and  answer,  (a) 

If,  upon  the  answer  alone,  without  further  proof,  there  is  sufficient 
ground  for  a  final  order  or  decree,  the  plaintiff  must  proceed  to  a  hear- 
ing on  bill  and  answer,  without  entering  into  evidence : 2  as  where  the 


i  Cons.  Ord.  XVII.  1 ;  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86, 
§  26;  Duffield  v.  Sturges,  9  Hare  App.  87;  Blake 
r.  Cox,  1  W.  R.  124,  V.  C.  W.  If  the  plain- 
tiff wishes  to  prove  any  fact  on  the  hearing,  not 
admitted  by  the  answer,  he  must  rile  a  replica- 
tion.    Mills  v.  Pitman,  1  Paige,  490. 

In  Maine,  "  within  thirty  days  after  the  an- 
swer is  filed,  unless  exceptions  are  taken,  or 
within  fifteen  days  after  it  is  perfected,  the 
plaintiff's  counsel  shall  file  the  general  replica- 
tion, and  give  notice  thereof;  or  give  notice  of 
a  hearing  at  the  next  term  on  bill  and  answer." 
Rule  9  of  Ch.  Prac. ;  see  N.  Hamp.  Ch.  Rule  17, 
38  N.  H.  608;  Mass.  Ch.  Rule  17;  see  Rules  45, 
66,  of  IT.  S.  Courts,  posl,  pp.  2885, 2390.  Under 
Rule  66  the  complainant  must  reply  to  the  an- 
swer of  each  defendant,  when  sufficient,  with- 
out reference  to  the  state  of  the  cause,  or  of  the 
pleadings,  in  regard  to  any  other  defendant. 
Coleman  v.  Martin,  6  Blatch.  290.  A  special 
replication  cannot  be  filed  without  leave  of 
Court.     Storms  v.  Storms,  1  Edw.  Ch.  358. 

A  general  replication  denies  every  allegation 
in  the  answer  of  the  defendant  not  responsive 
to  the  bill,  and  he  must  prove  matter  pleaded 
in  avoidance,  or  by  way  of  estoppel.  Humes 
v.  Scruggs,  94  U.  S*.  22." 

In  Massachusetts,  "the  form  of  the  general 


(n)  See  Ca vender  v.  Ca vender,  114  IT.  S. 
464;  3  McCrary,  158;  8  Fed.  Rep.  641;  Adams 
v.  Bridgewater  Iron  Co.  6  id.  179;  O'Hare  v. 
Downing,  130  Mass.  16.  As  to  the  reply  and 
subsequent  pleadings  under  the  present  English 
practice,  see  1  Dan.  Ch.  Prac.  (6th  Eng.  ed.) 
520.  A  general  replication  does  not  affect  ad- 
missions in  the  answer  of  the  allegations  of  the 

822 


replication  shall  be  that  the  plaintiff  joins  issue 
on  the  answer.  No  special  replication  shall  be 
filed  but  by  leave  of  the  Court."  Ch.  Rule  16. 
In  New  Hampshire,  a  replication  shall  be  en- 
titled as  an  answer,  and  shall  be  in  substance, 
"The  plaintiff  says  his  bill  is  true,  and  the  de- 
fendant's answer,  as  set  forth,  is  not  true,  and 
this  he  is  ready  to  prove."  Ch.  Rule  22;  see 
Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  878;  Storms  ».  Storms,  1  Edw. 
Ch.  358;  Dupote  v.  Massy,  Cox's  Dig.  146; 
Brown  v.  Ricketts,  2  John.  Ch.  425 ;  Lyon  r.  Tall- 
madge,  1  John.Cli.  184;  Livingston  v  Gibbons, 
4  John.  Ch.  94;  Thorn  v.  Germand,  id.  363;  Pratt 
v.  Bacon,  10  Pick.  123.  In  Tennessee,  no  repli- 
cation or  other  pleading  after  answer  is  allowed  ; 
but  the  cause  is  at  issue  upon  the  expiration  of 
the  time  allowed  to  file  exceptions  to  the  an- 
swer. Code,  §§  4322,  4328,  4401.  Matters  in 
avoidance  of  a  plea,  which  have  arisen  since  the 
suit  began,  are  properly  set  up  by  a  supple- 
mental bill,  not  by  a  special  replication.  Chou- 
teau v.  Rice,  1  Minn.  106.  A  special  replication, 
denying  part  of  the  matter  of  the  plea,  and 
reasserting  the  substance  of  the  bill,  is  inad- 
missible, Newton  v.  Thayer,  17  Pick.  129; 
but  may  be  treated  as  a  general  replication. 
Allen  v.  Allen,  3  Tenn.  Ch.  145. 
2  Cons  Ord.  XIX.  1. 


bill  Cavender  v.  Cavender,  114  IT.  S.  464; 
3  McCrary,  158.  It  puts  in  issue  all  such  parts 
of  the  answer  as  are  not  responsive  to  the  bill. 
Humes  v.  Scruggs,  94  U.  S.  22.  See  Clements 
v.  Moore,  6  Wall.  299.  In  Tennessee  replications 
are  abolished  by  the  Code  as  to  answers,  but 
not  as  to  pleas.  Cheatham  v.  Pearce,  89  Tenn. 
668. 


REPLICATION. 


829 


plaintiff  makes  his  title  by  a  will  or  other  conveyance  in  the  defendant's 
hands,  and  the  defendant,  by  his  answer,  confesses  it,  or  where  a  trust 
is  confessed  by  the  answer,  and  nothing  further  is  required  than  to  have 
the  accounts  taken.3 

A  cause  is  now,  however,  rarely  heard  on  bill  and  answer. 
*The  only  advantage  in  doing  so,  instead  of  hearing  it  on  motion  *820 
for  decree,  is,  that  the  month's  notice  is  thereby  saved ;  but,  on 
the  other  hand,  where  a  cause  is  heard  upon  bill  and  answer,  the  answer 
must  be  admitted  to  be  true  in  all  points,  and  no  other  evidence  will  be 
admitted,1  unless  it  be  matter  of  record  to  which  the  answer  refers, 
and  which  is  provable  by  the  record  itself,2  or  documents  proved  as 
exhibits  at  the  hearing.3  It  therefore  behooves  the  plaintiff  to  look 
attentively  into  the  answer ;  and  if  be  finds  that  the  effect  of  the  de- 
fendant's admissions  is  avoided  by  any  new  matter  there  introduced,  he 
should  serve  notice  of  motion  for  a  decree,4  or  reply  to  the  answer,  and 
proceed  to  establish  his  case  by  proofs.5  If  the  plaintiff  decides  upon 
having  the  cause  heard  upon  bill  and  answer  against  one  or  all  of  the 
defendants,  he  must  proceed  in  the  manner  hereafter  pointed  out.6 

A  replication  must  also  be  put  in  by  the  plaintiff  where  the  defendant 
has  pleaded  to  the  bill,  whether  his  plea  be  accompanied  by  an  answer 
or  not.7  It  is,  however,  to  be  recollected,  that,  if  the  plaintiff  replies  to 
a  plea  before  it  has  been  argued,  he  admits  the  plea  to  be  valid,  if  true ; 8 
and  that  he  cannot  afterwards  object  to  it,  on  the  ground  of  its  invalidity 
or  irregularity.9 


3  Wyatt's  P.  R.  374. 

i  Contee  v.  Dawson,  2  Bland,  264;  Childs 
v.  Horr,  1  Clarke  (Iowa),  432;  Rogers  v.  Mitch- 
ell, 41  N.  H  154;  Pierce  v.  West,  1  Peters, 
C.  C.  351;  Pickett  v.  Chilton,  5  Munf.  467; 
Scott  v.  Clarkson,  1  Bibb,  277.  But  where  the 
cause  is  set  down  for  heaving  on  bill,  answer, 
and  depositions,  the  replication  is  mere  form, 
and  the  Court  will  suffer  it  to  be  tiled  nunc  pro 
tunc.(a)  Rodney  r.  Hare,  Mos.  296;  Jones  v. 
Brittan,  I  Woods,  667;  Scott  v.  Clarkson,  ubi 
supra;  Demaree  v.  Driskill,  3  Blackf.  115; 
Pierce  v.  West,  ubi  supra ;  Glenn  v.  Hebb,  12 
Gill  &  J.  271;  Armistead  v.  Bozman,  1  lied. 
Ch.  117;  Smith  v.  West,  3  John.  Ch.  363;  see 
Reading  v.  Ford,  1  Bibb,  338. 

2  Cons.  Ord.  XIX.  2;  Legard  v.  Sheffield,  2 
Atk.  377;  see,  however,  Stanton  v.  Percival, 
3  W.  R.  391;  24  L.  J.  Ch.  369,  H.  L. 

3  Post,  p.  874,  et  seq.;  Rowland  v.  Sturgis,  2 

(a)  See  Weston  v.  Empire  Assurance  Co. 
L.  li.  6  Eq.  23;  Clifford  v.  Coleman,  13  Rlatch. 
210;  Bullinger  »>.  Mackey,  14  id.  355;  Doody 
v.  Pierce,  9  Allen,  141.  As  to  the  time  allowed 
in  the  Federal  Courts  for  filing  replications,  see 
Heyman  v.  Uhlman,  34  Fed.  Rep.  686.  Under 
the  U.  S.  Equity  Rule  38,  a  decree  which  dis- 
misses a  bill  because  of  the  plaintiff's  failure 
to  reply  or  set  a  plea  down  for  argument,  is 
not  conclusive.  Keller  v.  Stolzenbach,  20  Fed. 
Rep.  47.  A  Federal  Court  has  discretion  to  order 


Hare,  520;  Chalk  v.  Raine,  7  Hare,  393;  13 
Jur.  981;  Neville  v.  Fitzgerald,  2  Dr.  &  War. 
530;  contra,  Jones  v.  Griffith,  14  Sim.  262; 
8  Jur.  733. 

4  See  ante,  p.  819. 

5  Wyatt's  P.  R.  375. 

6  See  post,  Chap.  XXV.  Hearing  Causes. 

7  Ante,  p.  664.  A  plea  may  be  set  down  to 
obtain  judgment  of  its  sufficiency  and  formal- 
ity, without  a  replication.  Moreton  r.  Harrison, 
1  Bland,  491. 

8  Hughes  v.  Blake,  6  Wheat.  472;  S.  C.  1 
Mason,  515;  Daniels  v.  Taggart,  1  Gill  &  J. 
312;  Brooks  v.  Mead,  Walk.  Ch.  389;  Bellows 
v.  Stone,  8  N.  H.  280;  Newton  p.  Thayer,  17 
Pick.  129;  Hurlburt  v.  Britain,  Walk.  454. 
Upon  a  replication  to  a  plea,  nothing  is  in  issue 
except  what  is  distinctly  averred  in  the  plea.' 
Fish  v.  Miller,  5  Paige,  26. 

9  Ibid. 


a  replication  to  stand  nunc  pro  tunc,  and  as  if 
filed  in  time,  although  it  was  actually  filed  after 
the  time  prescribed  in  Equity  Rule  66.  Fischer 
v.  Hayes,  19  Blatcli.  26;  see  Allis  p.  Stowell,  10 
Biss.  57.  But  after  a  cause  is  set  down  for 
hearing  on  bill  and  answer,  it  is  too  late  for  a 
motion  to  dismiss  on  the  ground  that  a  repli- 
cation has  not  been  filed  within  the  time  limited 
by  Rule  66  Reynolds  r.  Crawfordsville  Dank. 
112  U.  S.  405;  Fischer  v.  Wilson,  16  Blatch. 
220. 

823 


*  830  REPLICATION. 

We  have  seen  before  that  a  replication  to  a  general  disclaimer  to  the 
whole  bill  is  improper ;  although,  when  a  disclaimer  to  part  of  the  bill 
is  accompanied  by  a  plea  or  answer  to  another  part,  there  may  be  a 
replication  to  such  plea  or  answer.10(&) 

A  replication  is  the  plaintiff's  answer  or  reply  to  the  defendant's  plea 
or  answer.  By  replying  to  the  answer,  the  plaintiff  does  not  preclude 
himself  from  reading  any  part  of  the  answer  he  may  consider  essential 
to  assist  his  case. 

Only  one  replication  is  to  be  filed  in  each  cause,  unless  the  Court 
otherwise  directs.11 

The  Court  will  not  as  of  course,  or  except  in  cases  of  necessity, 
*  830  *  give  the  plaintiff  leave  to  file  more  than  one  replication ; 1  but 
where  the  replication  only  applied  to  some  defendants,  and  as  to 
the  others  the  cause  was  not  at  issue,  leave  was  given  to  file  a  second 
replication  against  such  other  defendants  : 2  and  where,  upon  notice  of 
motion  to  dismiss  for  want  of  prosecution,  by  one  of  two  defendants, 
the  plaintiff  filed  replication  against  such  defendant  alone,  the  other  de- 
fendant not  having  appeared,  the  Court  refused  the  motion,  on  the 
plaintiff  undertaking  to  dismiss  the  bill  against  the  defendant  who  had 
not  appeared,  but  ordered  the  plaintiff  to  pay  the  costs  of  the  motion.3 

Upon  filing  the  replication,  the  cause  is  deemed  to  be  completely  at 
issue,4  and  each  defendant  may,  without  any  rule  or  order,  proceed  to 
verify  his  case  by  evidence  ;  and  the  plaintiff  may,  in  like  manner,  pro- 
ceed to  verify  his  case  by  evidence,  so  soon  as  notice  of  the  replication 
being  filed  has  been  duly  served  on  all  the  defendants  who  have  filed  an 
answer  or  plea,  or  against  whom  a  traversing  note  has  been  filed,  or  who 
have  not  been  required  to  answer  and  have  not  answered  the  bill.5 

The  form  of  the  replication  in  the  General  Orders  assumes  a  case 
where  the  plaintiff  desires  to  join  issue  as  to  one  of  the  defendants ;  to 
hear  the  cause  on  bill  and  answer  as  to  another ;  and  to  take  the  bill  as 
confessed  as  against  a  third.6  Where,  however,  the  plaintiff  does  not 
desire  to  join  issue  with  any  defendant,   no  replication  can  be  filed.7  (a) 

10  Ante,  p.  708.  at  issue  upon  the  filing  of  the  replication.  This  is 

11  Cons.  Ord.  XVII.  2.  the  general  practice  in  the  Courts  of  the  United 
i  Stinton  v.  Taylor,   4  Hare,   608,  610;    10      States.  Story,  Eq.  PL  §  879,  note;  66th  Equity 

Jur.  386.  Rule  of  the  U.  S.  Courts.   And  in  New  Jersey, 

2  Rogers  v.  Hooper,  2  Drew.  97.  McClane  v.  Shepherd,  21  N.  J.  Eq.  76. 

3  Heanley  v.  Abraham,  5  Hare,  214.  As  to  6  Cons.  Ord.  XVII.  2,  where  the  form  of 
when  a  second  or  further  replication  may  be  replication  is  given,  which  is  to  be  adopted,  as 
filed,  without  special  leave,  see  Braithwaite's  near  as  circumstances  admit  and  require;  and 
Pr.  73.  see  form.  Vol    III. 

4  In  America,  generally,  if  not  universally,  6  Cons.  Ord.  XVII.  2. 
the  pleadings  terminate  with  the  replication,  7  Braithwaite's  Pr.  72. 
and  no  rejoinder  is  filed;  and  the  case  is  deemed 


(J)  A  replication  to  a  plea  admits  its   suf-  or  special  (see  Story.  Eq.  PI.  §  878);  the  latter 

ficiency.      Farley  v.  Kittson,   120  U.  S.  303;  being  in  reply  to  and  setting  up  some  matter 

Cottle  v.  Kremeiitz,  25  Fed.  Rep.  494;  Bean  v.  in  avoidance  of  new  matter  introduced  in  the 

Clark,  30  id.  225;  Sharon  v.  Hill, 22  id.  28;  Little  defendant's  answer  or  plea.     Such  replications 

v.  Stephens,  82  Mich.  596;  ante,  p.  694,  note  (a).  have  now  gone  out  of   use.     See,  in  different 

(a)  Formerly  replications  were  either  generl  jurisdictions,  as  to  replying  to  new  matter  set 

824 


REPLICATION. 


*  831 


The  full  title  of  the  cause,  as  it  stands  at  the  time  the  replication  is 
filed,  must  be  set  forth  in  the  heading  of  the  replication,  but  only  the 
names  of  such  of  the  defendants  as  have  appeared  should  be  inserted  or 
referred  to  in  the  body.  If  a  defendant's  name  has  been  misspelled  by 
the  plaintiff,  and  such  defendant  has  corrected  the  same  by  his  answer, 
but  the  plaintiff  has  not  afterwards  amended  his  bill  with  respect  to  such 
name,  the  correction  should  be  shown  in  the  title  of  the  replication ; 8 
in  the  body  of  the  replication,  however,  the  correct  name  only  should 
be  inserted.  Where  any  defendant  has  died  since  the  bill  was  hied, 
the  words  "  since  deceased  "  should  follow  his  name  in  the  title,  but 
his  name  should  be  omitted  in  the  body  of  the  replication.  If  the 
plaintiff  joins  issue  with  all  the  defendants,  their  names  need  not  be 
repeated  in  the  body  ;  it  is  sufficient,  in  such  case,  to  designate 
*  them  as  "  all  the  defendants :  "  but  if  he  does  not  join  issue  *  831 
with  all,  the  names  of  the  defendants  must  be  set  out  in  the  body. 
The  names  of  those  defendants  who  are  stated  in  the  bill  to  be  out  of 
the  jurisdiction,  and  who  have  not  appeared,  must  be  inserted  in  the 
title,  but  not  in  the  body ;  and  the  names  of  such  formal  defendants  as 
have  been  served  with  a  copy  of  the  bill  must  be  inserted  in  the  title  of 


8  Thus:    "John    Jones    (in   the   bill   called  William  Jones)." 


forth  by  the  defendant,  Williamson  v.  London 
&  N.  W.  Rv.  Co.  12  Ch.  D.  787;  Mason  v. 
Hartford  &c.  R.  Co.  10  Fed.  Rep.  334,  335; 
Parker  v.  Concord,  39  id.  718;  Burdell  v. 
Denig,  15  id.  397;  Blue  Ridge  Clay  Co.  v. 
Floyd-Jones,  269  id.  817;  Hanover  Fire  Ins.  Co. 
r.  Brown  (Md.),  25  Atl.  Rep.  989;  Winter  v. 
Mobile  Savings  Bank,  5-1  Ala.  172;  Savage  v. 
Aiken,  21  Neb.  605;  Allen  v.  Allen,  3  Tenn. 
Ch.  145;  Jackson  v.  Hull,  21  W.  Va.  601;  Kil- 
breth  v.  Roots,  33  id.  600;  Elliott  v.  Trahern, 
35  id.  640;  Newton  v.  Thayer,  17  Pick.  129; 
Larsen  v.  Oregon  Ry.  &  Nav.  Co.  19  Oregon, 
240.  There  must  be  no  departure  from  the  bill 
or  complaint  by  the  plaintiff's  replication  or 
replv.  See  Ibid.;  Hoover  v.  Mo.  Pac.  Ry.  Co. 
(Mo.)  16  S.  W.  Rep.  480;  Houston  v.  Sledge,  101 
N.  C.  640;  Gibson  v.  Black  (Ky.),  9  S.  W.  Rep. 
379;  Cobbey  v.  Knapp,  23  Neb.  579;  Turner 
Coal  Co.  v.  Glover  (Ala.),  13  So.  Rep.  478.  The 
allegations  of  a  reply  cannot  enlarge  the  claim 
for  relief  in  the  complaint.  Bell  v.  Waudby,  4 
Wash.  St.  743.  To  a  plea  of  release  under  seal, 
the  proper  reply  by  replication  is  non  est  factum, 
and  not  fraud.  Shampeau  v.  Connecticut  River 
L.  Co.  42  Fed.  Rep.  760;  see  Mullakin  v.  Mul- 
lakin  (Ky.),  23  S.  W.  Rep.  352. 

After  the  close  of  the  evidence  in  a  case 
tried  as  if  a  reply  had  been  filed,  the  absence 
of  the  reply  will  not  be  taken  as  an  admission 
of  new  matter  in  the  answer.  Tighlman  r. 
Proctor,  102  U.  S.  707;  Washington  &c.  R. 
Co.  v.  Bradleys,  10  Wall.  299;  Central  Nat. 
Bank  v.  Connecticut  M.  L.  Ins.  Co.  104  U.  S. 


54;  Fischer  v.  Wilson,  16  Blatch.  220;  Holt  v. 
Weld,  140  Mass.  578;  Snyder  v.  Martin,  17 
W.  Va.  276;  Kepley  v.  Carter,  49  Kansas, 
72;  Carpenter  v.  Ritchie,  2  Wash.  St.  512; 
Schreffler  v.  Nadelhoffer,  133  111.  536;  Thomp- 
son v.  Wooldridge,  102  Mo.  505;  Camp- 
bell v.  Seeley,  43  Mo.  A  pp.  23.  In  such  case, 
the  Court  in  its  discretion  may  permit  a  reply 
to  be  filed  even  after  verdict.  Whitney  v. 
Preston,  29  Neb.  243.  In  New  York  a  reply  is 
not  necessary  to  new  matter  in  the  answer 
averring  a  foreign  adjudication  of  the  questions 
involved  in  the  suit.  New  York  &c.  R.  Co.  v. 
Robinson,  25  Abb.  N.  Cas.  116;  Winchester 
v.  Browne,  id.  148;  Columbus  Sec.  R.  Co.  v. 
Ellis,  id.  150.  A  defendant,  by  going  to 
trial  on  an  affirmative  plea,  to  which  no  reply 
has  been  filed  or  demanded,  waives  its  absence, 
and  the  case  will  be  treated  as  if  there  were  a 
general  denial  of  the  plea.  Young  v.  Genlis 
(Ind.),  32  N.  E.  Rep.  790;  Burrell  v.  Hackley, 
35  Fed.  Rep.  833.  The  want  of  a  formal  rep- 
plication  cannot  be  assigned  for  error  on  appeal 
in  an  Equity  case  which  has  been  heard  upon 
bill,  answer,  and  proofs.  National  Bank  v. 
Insurance  Co.  104  U.  S.  54. 

If  the  plaintiff  waives  his  replication,  and 
the  oause  is  set  down  on  bill  and  answer,  the 
answer  is  to  be  taken  as  true.  Dascomb  r. 
Marston,  80  Maine,  223.  Where  a  sworn  plea 
irregularly  filed  to  an  answer  was  treated  as  an 
affidavit,  and  an  issue  was  taken  thereon,  the 
decree  was  not  reversed.  Simmons  v.  Sim- 
mons, 33  Gratt.  451. 

825 


*  832  REPLICATION. 

the  replication,  but  only  such  of  them  as  have  entered  a  common  appear- 
ance should  be  named  in  the  body.1 

The  replication  is  prepared  by  the  solicitor  of  the  plaintiff  ;  it  must 
be  written  on  paper  of  the  same  description  and  size  as  that  on  which 
bills  are  printed,2  and  be  underwritten  with  the  name  and  place  of 
business  of  the  plaintiff's  solicitor,  and  of  his  agent,  if  any,  or  with  the 
name  and  place  of  residence  of  the  plaintiff  where  he  acts  in  person, 
and,  in  either  case,  with  the  address  for  service,  if  any;8  and  the 
replication  must  then  be  filed  at  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerks'  Office.4 
It  does  not  require  the  signature  of  counsel. 

Any  error  in  the  replication,  except  the  omission  of  the  names  of  any 
defendants,  may  be  corrected  by  amendment ;  but  an  order  to  amend  is 
necessary.  The  order  may  be  obtained  on  special  summons  at  Cham- 
bers, or,  by  consent,  on  petition  of  course  at  the  Rolls.5  Against  the 
defendants  whose  names  have  been  omitted,  another  replication  must 
be  filed,  or  leave  obtained  to  withdraw  the  existing  replication  and  file 
another ;  and  an  order  for  leave  so  to  do,  in  either  case,  must  be  obtained 
in  like  manner,  or  upon  special  motion  with  notice.6 

The  solicitor  must  give  notice  of  the  filing  of  the  replication  to  the 
solicitor  of  the  adverse  party,  or  to  the  adverse  party  himself  if  he  acts 
in  person,  on  the  same  day  on  which  it  is  filed.7  If  he  neglects  to  do 
so,  the  opposite  party  should  move  that  the  time  for  him  to  take  the 
next  step  may  be  extended ; 8  not  that  the  replication  may  be  taken  off 
the  file. 

The  notice  must  be  served  before  seven  o'clock  in  the  evening,  except 
on  Saturday,  when  it  must  be  served  before  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon. 
If  served  after  these  hours,  the  service  will  be  considered  to  have  been 
made  on  the  following  day,  or  Monday,  as  the  case  may  be.9 

*  832        *  In  proper  cases,  the  notice  will  be  allowed  to  be  served  out  of 

.  the  jurisdiction,1  and  for  this  purpose  the  time  for  service  will 
be  extended;2  service  of  the  notice  may  also  be  substituted,  and  this 
has  been  done  by  allowing  the  notice  to  be  advertised  in  the  Gazette, 
and  in  two  newspapers  circulating  in  the  county  in  which  the  defendant 
was  last  known  to  have  resided.8  An  order  for  leave  to  serve  notice  of 
the  replication,  in  any  of  the  modes  above  mentioned,  may  be  obtained 

1  Braithwaite's  Pr.  75.  their  solicitors,  who   have  appeared.     Braith- 

2  OH.  6    March,    1800,    r.  16;  as   to  such      waite's  Pr.  79. 

paper,  see  Cons.  Ord.  IX.  3,  ante,  p.  396.  s  Wright   v.  Angle,  6  Hare,  107;    11  Jur. 

8  Cons.  Ord.  III.  2,   5;  ante,  pp.453,  454.  987:    Lloyd  v    Solicitors'  Life  Assurance  Co. 

For  a  form,  see  Vol.  HI.     Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  878,  3  W.  R.*640,  V.  C.  W.;   contra,  Johnson  v. 

note  ;  Barton  Suits  in   Equity,  144,  145;  Chou-  Tucker.  15  Sim.  599:  11  Jur.  4G6.    For  form  of 

teau  r.  Rice,  1  Minn.  106.  notice  of  motion,  see  Vol.  III. 

4  Cons.  Ord.  I.  35.     No  fee  is  payable.  9  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.  2;  ante,  p.  456. 

6  Braithwaite's  Pr.  318.  For  forms  of  sum-  *  Lanham  v.  Pirie,  2  Jur.  N.  S.  1201,  V. 
mons  and  petition,  see  Vol.  III.  C.  S.;    Heath  v.  Lewi-,  2  W.  R.  488,  M.  P. 

«  Stinton  r.  Taylor,  4  Hare,  608,  610;    10  2  Rooper  v.  Harrison,  2  W.  R.  510;  2  Eq. 

Jur.  386;  Braithwaite's  Pr.  318.     For  forms  of  Rep.  1085,  V.  C.  W. 

notice  of   motion,   summons,  and  petition,  see  3  Barton  V.  Whitcomb,  17  Jur.  81,  L.  C.  & 

Vol.  III.  L.  ,TJ.;    16  Beav.  206,  n.;  see  also  Jenkin  v. 

7  Cons.  Ord.  III.  9.  In  practice,  it  is  usual  Vaughan,  3  Drew.  20;  Lechmere  r.  Clamp,  29 
to  serve  the  notice   on  all   the  defendants,  or  Beav.  259. 

826 


REPLICATION.  *  833 

on  ex  parte  motion,  supported  by  an  affidavit  of  the  facts ;  and  a  copy 
of  the  order  must  be  served  with  the  notice.4 

In  giving  notice  of  the  filing  of  replication,  the  most  convenient  course 
is  to  serve  a  copy  of  the  replication ;  but  it  is  not  essential  to  do  so,  and 
if  not  done,  the  notice  must  show  the  purport  of  the  replication.6  The 
time  for  closing  the  evidence  is  computed  from  the  day  on  which  the 
replication  is  filed. 

The  plaintiff  may  file  replication  immediately  after  the  answers  have 
been  put  in,  or  a  traversing  note  has  been  filed  and  served,  or,  where  no 
answer  is  required,  immediately  after  the  time  allowed  for  answering 
has  expired;6  and  when  he  desires  to  file  replication,  without  waiting 
till  all  the  answers  required  by  him  have  been  put  in,  or  till  the  time 
has  expired  for  defendants  to  answer  voluntarily,  he  should  amend  the 
interrogatories,7  by  striking  out  so  much  of  the  heading  and  foot-notes 
as  requires  an  answer  from  the  particular  defendants  who  have  not 
answered,8  and  should  obtain  the  consent  of  the  solicitor  of  those  de- 
fendants whose  time  to  answer  voluntarily  has  not  elapsed,  to  such 
replication  being  filed,  notwithstanding  the  time  to  file  a  voluntary 
answer  has  not  expired.9 

Where  any  formal  defendants  have  been  served  with  a  copy  of  the 
bill,  replication  may  be  filed,  notwithstanding  a  memorandum  of  such 
service  may  not  have  been  entered;  it  being  sufficient  if  such  memo- 
randum is  entered  before  the  certificate  to  set  down  the  cause  is 
granted.10 

If  the  plaintiff  proposes  to  take  the  bill  pro  confesso  against  any  de- 
fendant, he  cannot  file  replication  until  the  order  to  take  the  bill  pro 
confesso  has  been  obtained  ;  and  such  order  must  be  produced  to  the 
officer  when  the  replication  is  presented  for  filing,  unless  it 
*  has  been  previously  left  for  entry,  in  the  cause-book  kept  by  *  833 
the  Clerks  of  Records  and  "Writs.1 

Replication  must  be  filed  within  the  times  following :  within  four 
weeks  after  the  answer,  or  the  last  of  the  answers  required  to  be  put  in 
by  a  defendant,  is  held  or  deemed  to  be  sufficient ; 2  or,  where  the  plain- 
tiff has  undertaken  to  reply  to  a  plea,  within  four  weeks  after  the  date 
of  his  undertaking  ; 3  or,  where  a  traversing  note  has  been  filed,  within 
four  weeks  after  the  filing  of  the  traversing  note ; 4  or,  where  he  has 
amended  his  bill  without  requiring  an  answer,  within  one  week  after 
the  expiration  of  the  time  within  which  the  defendant  might  have 
answered,  but  does  not  desire  to  answer,5  or  within  fourteen  days  after 
the  refusal  of  further  time  to  put  in  his  answer,6  or  within  fourteen  da3^s 

4  For  forms  of  motion  paper  and  affidavit,  the  proposed  replication.  For  form  of  consent, 
see  Vol.  III.  see  Vol.  III. 

5  Braithwaite's  Pr.  79.     For  form  of  notice,  l0  Braithwaite's  Pr.  74. 
see  Vol.  III.  i  Ibid. 

6  Braithwaite's  Pr.  74,  76;  and  see  Cons.  2  Cons.  Ord.  XXXIII.  10  (1);  ante,  p.  828, 
Ord.  XXXIII.  10,  12;  ante,  p.  828.  note. 

1  As  to  amending  interrogatories,  see  ante,  3  Cons.  Ord.  XXXIII.  10  (2). 

p.  486.  4  Cons.  Ord.  XXXIII.  10  (1). 

8  Braithwaite's  Pr.  76.  5  Cons.  Ord.  XXXIII.  12  il);    XXXVII.  7 

9  Ibid.     The  consent  should  be  indorsed  on  6  Cons.  Ord.  XXXIII.  12  (2). 

S2T 


834 


REPLICATION. 


after  the  filing  of  the  answer, — unless  the  plaintiff  has,  within  such 
fourteen  days,  obtained  a  special  order  to  except  to  such  answer,  or  to 
re-amend  the  bill.7 

The  plaintiff  may,  however,  in  all  these  cases  apply  by  motion,  or  by 
summons  in  Chambers,  upon  notice  to  the  defendants,  for  an  order  to 
enlarge  the  time  for  filing  replication.8 

In  computing  the  fourteen  days,9  within  which  the  plaintiff  must  file 
replication,  in  cases  where  he  has  amended  his  bill,  without  requiring 
an  answer  to  the  amendments,  and  the  defendant  has  answered  the 
amendments,  vacations  are  not  reckoned ; 10  but  in  computing  the  time 
in  all  other  cases,  they  are  reckoned.11 

By  not  filing  replication  within  the  time  allowed  for  so  doing,  the 
plaintiff  subjects  himself  to  an  application  for  the  dismissal  of  his  bill 
for  want  of  prosecution  ; 12  but  the  replication  will  be  received  and  filed 
at  any  time  at  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerks'  Office,  if  it  appears  by  the 
books  of  that  office  that  the  cause  is  in  a  state  to  admit  of  its  being  filed, 
even  after  notice  of  motion  to  dismiss  has  been  served  ;  and,  indeed,  to 
do  so,  and  tender  the  costs  of  the  motion,  is  generally  the  best  way  of 

meeting  it.13 
*  834  *  We  have  seen  before,  that  after  a  replication  has  been  filed, 
a  plaintiff,  if  he  wishes  to  withdraw  it  and  amend  his  bill  further 
than  by  adding  parties,  must  make  a  special  application  by  summons 
for  leave  to  do  so ; 1  in  which  case,  in  addition  to  the  affidavit  ordinarily 
required  upon  an  application  to  amend,  a  further  affidavit  is  necessary, 
showing  that  the  matter  of  the  proposed  amendment  is  material,  and 
could  not,  with  reasonable  diligence,  have  been  sooner  introduced  into 
the  bill.2  After  the  evidence  is  closed,  the  application  will  be  refused ;  3 
but  where,  during  the  time  for  taking  the  evidence,  the  plaintiff  dis- 
covered an  important  mistake  of  facts  in  the  bill,  the  Court,  thinking 
that  the  plaintiff  had  not  shown  such  want  of  diligence  as  to  preclude  it 
from  giving  him  leave  to  amend,  gave  liberty  to  withdraw  replication, 
and  amend  the  bill,  on  the  terms  of  the  plaintiff  paying  the  costs  of  the 
suit  then  incurred,  including  the  costs  of  the  application.4 


1  Cons.  Ord.  XXXIII.  12  (3).  As  to  filing 
replication  in  anticipation  of  some  of  the  an- 
swers, see  Braithwaite's  Pr.  74. 

8  Cons.  Ord.  XXXIII.  10,  12;  XXXVII. 
17;  see  Stinton  v.  Taylor,  4  Hare,  608,  610;  10 
Jur.  386 ;  Dalton  v.  Hayter,  9  Jur.  1000,  M.  R. 
For  form  of  summons,  see  Vol.  III. 

9  Under  Cons.  Ord.  XXXIII.  12  (3). 

10  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.  13  (4). 

11  Stinton  o   Taylor,  ubi  supra. 

12  See  66th  Equity  Rule  of  the  U.  S.  Courts, 
post,  p.  2390;  Rule  17,  Mass.  Ch.  Rules. 

In  reference  to  extending  the  time  to  reply, 
in  New  York,  see  the  Sea  Ins.  Co.  v.  Day,  9 
Paige,  247;  Kane  v.  Van  Vranken,  5  Paige,  63. 

If  the  plaintiff  wishes  to  amend  his  bill,  and 
a  special  application  to  the  Court  for  leave  to 
do  so  is  necessary,  he  should  not  file  a  replica- 
tion, but  should  obtain  an  order  to  extend  the 
time  for  filing  the  replication,  until  after  the  de- 

828 


cision  of  the  Court  upon  the  application  to  amend. 
Vermilyea  ?•.  Odell,  4  Paige,  122.  If  the  plain- 
tiff files  a  replication  to  the  answer  after  he  is 
apprised  of  the  necessity  of  an  amendment  of 
his  bill,  he  precludes  himself  from  making 
such  amendment.  Vermilyea  v.  Odell,  ubi 
supra  ;  Clifford  i\  Coleman,"] 3  Blatch.  210. 

13  Braithwaite's  Pr.  78;  and  see  ante,  p.  805. 

i  Woods  v.  Woods,  13  L.  J.  Ch.  98,  V.  C.  E. : 
Wilson  v.  Parker,  9  Jur.  769,  V.  C.  K.  B.; 
Cons.  Ord.  XXXV.  61 ;  ante,  p.  417.  For  form 
of  summons,  see  Vol.  III. 

2  Cons.  Ord.  IX.  15.  For  form  of  affidavit, 
see  Vol.  III. 

a  Gascovne  v.  Chandler,  3  Swanst.  418,  420, 
n.;  Bousfield  v.  Mould,  1  De  G.  &  S.  347;  11 
Jur.  902  :  Horton  v.  Brocklehurst  (No.  1),  29 
Beav.  503:  Godbold  v.  Ellis,  23  W  R.  333. 

4  Champneys  v.  Buchan,  3  Drew.  5. 


REPLICATION. 


835 


A  plaintiff  has  also  been  permitted,  on  motion,  to  withdraw  his  repli- 
cation, and  set  his  cause  down  for  hearing  upon  bill  and  answer.5 

Where  replication  is  withdrawn,  after  evidence  under  it  has  been 
entered  into,  the  order  should  provide  that  the  withdrawal  is  to  be  with- 
out prejudice  to  such  evidence. 

It  has  sometimes  happened  that,  even  after  witnesses  have  been 
examined,  it  has  been  discovered  that,  owing  to  a  mistake,  no  replication 
has  been  tiled  ;  in  such  cases,  the  Court  has  permitted  the  replication  to 
be  filed  nunc  pro  tunc.6  And  it  seems  that  the  Court  has  permitted  this 
to  be  done  after  the  cause  has  come  on  for  hearing,  and  the  reading  of 
the  proofs  has  been  commenced.7 

After  replication  has  been  filed,  exceptions  cannot  be  taken  to  the 
answer  for  insufficiency.8 

Replication  may  be  filed  to  an  answer  put  in  to  a  supplemental 
statement.9 

By  the  Bankruptcy  Consolidation  Act,  it  is  enacted  that,  in  all  suits  in 
Equity,  other  than  a  suit  brought  by  the  assignees  for  any  debt  or  de- 
mand for  which  the  bankrupt  might  have  sustained  a  suit  in  Equity 
had  he  not  been  adjudged  bankrupt,  and  whether  at  the  suit  of 
or  against  the  assignees  of  a  bankrupt,  no  proof  *  shall  be  re-  *  835 
quired,  at  the  hearing,  of  the  petitioning  creditor's  debt,  or  of 
the  trading  or  act  of  bankruptcy  respectively,  as  against  any  of  the 
parties  in  such  suit,  except  such  parties  as  shall,  within  ten  days  after 
rejoinder,  give  notice  in  writing  to  the  assignees  of  their  intention  to 
dispute  some  and  which  of  such  matters.1  Rejoinder  being  abolished 
in  Equity,2  it  seems  that  the  notice  must  be  given  within  ten  days  after 
the  filing  of  replication.8 


6  Rogers  v.  Gore,  17  Ves.  130;  Brown  v. 
Ricketts,  2  John.  Ch.  425.  So  for  the  purpose 
of  questioning  the  sufficiency  of  a  plea,  Green 
v.  Harris,  9  R.I.  401. 

6  Wyatt's  P.  R.  370;  Armistead  r.  Bozman, 
1  Ired.  Eq.  (N.  C.)  117.  See  ante,  p.  829,  n.  1. 

1  Rodney  v.  Hare,  Mos.  290;  see  also  Healey 
v.  Jaggar,  3  Sim.  494,  497.  The  like  permis- 
sion has  also  been  given  after  the  cause  has 
been  set  down  for  hearing  on  bill  and  answer, 
and  a  reference  ordered.  Pierce  v.  West,  1 
Peters,  C.  C.  351;  Smith  v.  West,  3  John.  Ch. 
363  ;  Doody  v.  Pierce,  9  Allen,141,143, 144.  And 


even  where  the  case  has  been  actually  heard, 
the  parties  will  be  considered  as  having  waived 
the  formality  of  such  an  issue,  and  the  answer 
will  have  no  greater  effect  than  if  a  replication 
had  been  filed.     Corbus  t\  Teed,  69  111.  205. 

8  Cons.  Ord.  XVI.  7;  ante,  pp.  695,  note. 

9  Braithwaite's  Pr.  74. 

i  12  &  13  Vic.  c.  106,  §  235. 

2  Cons.  Ord.  XVII.  2;  ante,  pp.  829,  830, 
note. 

3  Pennell  ?>.  Home,  3  Drew.  337;  see,  how- 
ever, Lee  v.  Donnistoun,  29  Beav.  465. 

829 


836 


*  CHAPTER  XXII. 

EVIDENCE. 


Section  I.  —  Admissions. 

The  cause  being  at  issue,  by  the  filing  of  the  replication,  the  next 
step  to  be  taken  by  the  plaintiff  is  to  prepare  his  proofs.  The  defendant 
also,  if  he  has  any  case  to  establish  in  opposition  to  that  made  by  the 
plaintiff,  must,  in  like  manner,  prepare  to  substantiate  it  by  evidence.1 
For  this  purpose,  both  parties  must  first  consider  what  is  necessary  to 
be  proved,  and  then,  the  manner  in  which  the  proof  is  to  be  effected  ; 
and,  in  treating  of  these  subjects,  it  will  be  convenient  to  consider, 
shortly,  the  general  rules  of  evidence.2  With  respect  to  the  first  point, 
it  may  be  laid  down  as  an  indisputable  proposition,  that  whatever  is 
necessary  to  support  the  case  of  the  plaintiff,  so  as  to  entitle  him  to  a 
a  decree  against  the  defendant,  or  of  a  defendant,  to  support  his  own 
case  against  that  of  the  plaintiff,  must  be  proved ; 3  unless  it  is  admitted 

by  the  other  party.4 
*837        *Our  object  at  present,  therefore,  must  be  to  consider   what 

admissions  by  the  parties  will  preclude  the  necessity  of  proofs  ; 
and  it  is  to  be  observed  that,  if  evidence  is  gone  into  to  prove  what  is 


l  Nothing  is  evidence  in  the  Court  of  Chan- 
cery, says  Mr.  Gresley,  that  is  not  read  or  put  in, 
that  is  to  say,  used  by  the  parties  at  the  hear- 
ing, and  entered  on  the  Master's  books.  Gresl. 
Eq.  Ev.  212,  see  infra,  p.  1003,  n.  3;  p.  1504, 
n.  10.  In  New  Hampshire  the  rules  in  Chan- 
cery provide  for  the  trial  of  the  cause  on  depo- 
sitions, and  prescribe  the  time  within  which  the 
evidence  of  each  party  must  be  taken.  Special 
orders  may  be  made  by  the  Court  or  by  a  Jus- 
tice, upon  petition  and  due  notice,  enlarging  or 
reducing  the  time  of  taking  testimony  of  either 
or  both  the  parties.  Rule  21,  38  N.  H.  609, 
610. 

In  Maine,  "  all  testimony  is  to  be  taken  in 
writing,  by  virtue  of  a  commission  issued  on 
interrogatories  filed  with  the  clerk,"  &c.  The 
formalities  to  be  observed  in  taking,  filing, 
abstracting,  and  producing  the  evidence  are 
minutely  pointed  out  in  Ch.  Rules  13-18,  37 
Maine,  585,  586. 

In  Massachusetts,  the  evidence  in  proceed- 
ings in  Equity  is  required  to  be  taken  in  the 
same  manner  as  in  suits  at  Law,  unless  the 
Court  for  special  reasons  otherwise  directs  :  but 
this  does  not  prevent  the  use  of  affidavits  where 
they  have  heretofore  been  allowed.     Pub.  Stats. 

830 


c.  169,  §  66.  The  rules  in  New  Jersey  provide 
for  the  filing  of  interrogatories  to  the  plaintiff. 
Ch.  Rule  77:  Dick.  Prec.  20;  so  in  England 
such  interrogatories  for  the  examination  of  the 
plaintiff  may  be  filed  under  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86, 
§  19.     See  ante,  p.  758,  and  post,  p.  810. 

In  Tennessee,  the  plaintiff  may  take  testi- 
mony at  any  time  after  answer  filed,  and  the 
defendant  after  filing  a  sufficient  answer.  Code, 
§  4457.  Each  party  must  take  his  proof  in  chief 
in  four  months,  and  rebutting  proof  within  two 
months.  Ch.  Rule  2,  subs.  4;  Code,  §  4457,  a. 
Failure  to  take  proof  within  the  time  prescribed 
only  deprives  the  party  of  evidence,  but  is  no 
ground  for  dismissing  the  bill  for  want  of  prose- 
cution. Sargeant  v.  First  Natl.  Bank,  7  Rep. 
231,  U.  S.  C.  C.  Penn. 

2  As  to  the  present  English  practice,  see  1 
Dan.  Ch.  Prac.  (6th  Eng.  ed.)  572.  As  to  ad- 
missions in  the  pleadings,  see  id.  548;  Hughes 
v.  London  &c.  Assurance  Co.  8  L.  T.  R.  81. 

3  For  what  is  sufficient  to  throw  upon  the 
defendant  the  onus  of  denying  the  plaintiff's 
case,  see  Bell  v.  Wilson,  11  Jur.  N.  S.  437, 
V.  C.  K. 

4  Nelson  v.  Pinegar,  30  111.  473. 


ADMISSIONS. 


837 


admitted,  or  at  an  unnecessary  or  improper  length,  the  costs  of  such 
evidence  will  be  disallowed.1 

Admissions  are  either :  I.  Upon  the  Record ;  or,  II.  By  Agreement 
between  the  Parties.2 

I.  Admissions  on  the  llecord  may  be :  Constructive,  namely,  those 
which  are  the  necessary  consequence  of  the  form  of  pleading  adopted ;  or 
Actual,  namely,  those  which  are  positively  contained  in  the  pleading,  (a) 

With  respect  to  constructive  admissions,  the  most  ordinary  instance 
of  them  is,  where  a  plea  has  been  put  in  by  a  defendant,  either  to  the 
whole,  or  part  of  the  bill ;  in  that  case,  as  we  have  seen,8  the  bill,  or 
that  part  of  it  which  is  pleaded  to,  so  far  as  it  is  not  controverted  by  the 
plea,  is  admitted  to  be  true.4  A  plaintiff,  therefore,  where  he  has  replied 
to  a  plea,  may  rest  satisfied  with  that  admission,  and  need  not  go  into 


i  Cons.  Ord.  XIX.  1 ;  Harvey  r.  Mount,  8 
Beav.  439,  453 ;  9  Jur.  741 ;  Smith  v.  Chambers, 
2  Phil.  221,  226;  S.  C.  nom.  Chambers  v.  Smith, 
11  Jur.  359  ;  Mayor  &c.  of  Berwick  v.  Murray, 
7  De  G.  M.  &G."497,  514;  3  Jur.  N.  S.  1.  5; 
Att.-Gen.  v.  Halifax,  18  W.  R.  37.  As  to  ad- 
missions of  allegations  of  Law,  see  Chilton  v. 
London,  7  Ch.  D.  735;  see  Studdert  v.  Von 
Steiglitz,  19  L.  R.  Ir.  237. 

2  As  to  admissions  generally,  see  the  follow- 
ing works  on  evidence:  Taylor,  §  G53,  tt  scq.; 
Best,  §§  543,  632;  Gresley.Pt.  I.  chaps.  1,  2; 
Powell,  151. 

8  Ante,  p.  614. 

4  Gresley,  Eq.  Ev.  (Am.  ed.)  9.  Where  the 
bill  charges  a  fact  to  be  within  the  knowledge 
of  the  defendant,  or  which  may  fairly  be  pre- 
sumed to  be  so,  if  the  answer  is  silent  as  to  the 
fact,  it  will  be  taken  as  admitted.  McAllister 
v.  Clopton,  51  Miss.  257;  Mead  v.  Day,  54 
Miss.  58.  It  is  otherwise,  where  the  fact  is  not 
within  the  knowledge  of  the  defendant,  nor  pre- 
sumed to  be  so.  Moore  v.  Lockett,  2  Bibb,  67, 
69;  Mitchell  v.  Maupin,  3  Monroe,  187;  Hardy 
v.  Heard,  15  Ark.  184;  Booth  v.  Booth,  3  Litt. 
57;  Moseley  v.  Gassett,  1  J.  J.  Marsh.  212, 
215;  M'Campbell  v.  Gill,  4  J.  J.  Marsh.  87,  90; 
Kennedy  v.  Meredith,  3  Bibb,  466;  Pierson  v. 
Meaux,  3  A.  K.  Marsh.  6;  Wilson  v.  Carver,  4 
Hay w.  92;  Neal  v.  Hagthrop,  3  Bland,  551; 
Bank  of  Mobile  v.  Planters  and  Merchants' 
Bank,  8  Ala.  772;  Smilie  v.  Siler,  35  Ala.  88. 
But  see  Gamble  v.  Johnson,  9  Mo.  605;  Nelson 
r.  Pineaar,  30  111.  473;  DeWolf  v.  Long,  2  Gil- 
man,  679.  Any  material  matter  charged  in  the 
bill  and  neither  admitted  ivr  denied  in  the  an- 
swer must  be  proved  by  the  plaintiff.  Bagshaw 
v.  Batson,  1  Dick.  113;  Young  v.  Grundy,  6 
Cranch,    51;    Brown   v.   Pierce,  7    Wall.   211; 


Brockway  v.  Coff,  3  Paige,  539 ;  Cropper  v. 
Burton,  5  Leigh,  425;  Lun  v.  John  on,  3  Ired. 
Eq.  70;  Hoyal  v.  Bryson,  6  Heisk.  142;  Smith 
v.  St.  Louis  Mutual  Life  Ins.  Co.  2  Tenn.  Ch. 
602,  where  the  point  is  discussed,  and  the  au- 
thorities reviewed.  See  also  Cowen  v.  Alsop, 
51  Miss.  158,  and  Hardwick  v.  Bassett,  25 
Mich.  149.  In  New  Jersey,  it  has  been  recently 
held  that  a  material  fact  averred  in  the  bill,  and 
not  denied  or  alluded  to  in  the  answer,  must  be 
taken  as  admitted.  Sanborn  v.  Adair,  29  N  J. 
Eq.  338;  Lee  v.  Stiger,  30  id.  610.  By  Ch. 
Rule  8  in  New  Hampshire,  "all  facts  well 
alleged  in  the  bill,  and  not  denied  or  explained 
in  the  answer,  will  be  held  to  be  admitted." 
Where  a  fact  is  admitted  by  the  answer,  the 
defendant  cannot  question  or  deny  it  by  the 
proofs.  Lippencott  v.  Ridgway,  UN.  J.  Eq. 
526;  Weider  v.  Clark,  27  III.  251.  The  answer 
of  a  defendant  in  Chancery,  being  a  confession, 
is  always  evidence  against  him,  when  pertinent, 
whoever  may  have  been  the  parties  in  the  cause 
in  which  it  was  interposed.  Kiddie  v.  Debrutz, 
1  Hayw.  420;  Minis  v.  Minis,  3  J.  J.  Marsh. 
103,109,  110;  Roberts  v  Tenaell,  3  Monroe, 
247,249;  Hunter  v.  Jones,  0  Rand.  541.  An 
answer,  admitting  the  correctness  of  a  copv  of 
a  deed  made  by  another  person,  and  to  which 
there  was  no  subscribing  witness,  is  evidence, 
both  of  the  contents  and  of  the  execution  of  the 
deed,  against  the  person  making  such  admis- 
sion. Adams  v.  Shelby,  10  Ala.  478;  see  Clarke 
v.  Spears,  7  Blackf.  96.  The  answer,  not  under 
oath,  may,  in  relation  to  its  admissions,  be  used 
against  the  defendant  as  if  it  were  under  oath. 
Smith  v.  Potter.  3  Wis.  432.  And  the  plaintiff 
may  avail  himself  of  such  admissions  without 
thereby  making  the  denials  evidence  for  the 
defendant.     Ibid. 


(a)  As  to  admissions  by  notice  under  the 
present  English  practice,  see  1  Dan.  Ch.  Prac. 
(6th  Eng.  ed.)  576  ;  R.  S.  C.  1883,  Ord.  XXXII. 


1-5,  App.  B.  Nos.  12,  13.  The  notice  cannot 
be  set  aside.  Crawford  v.  Chorlev,  W.  N. 
(1883)  198. 

831 


*  838  EVIDENCE. 

evidence  as  to  that  part  of  his  case  which  the  plea  is  intended  to  cover,6  — 
unless  the  plea  is  a  negative  plea ;  for  in  that  case  it  will  be  necessary 
for  him  to  prove  the  matter  negatived,  for  the  purpose  of  disproving  the 
plea,  in  the  same  manner  as  he  may  enter  into  evidence,  for  the  purpose 
of  disproving  matter  which  has  been  pleaded  affirmatively.6 

*  838        *  Actual  admissions  on  the   record   are   those   which   appear, 

either  in  the  bill,  or  in  the  answer. 
The  facts  alleged  in  a  bill,  where  they  are  alleged  positively,  are  ad- 
missions in  favor  of  the  defendant,  of  the  facts  so  alleged,  and,  there- 
fore, need  not  be  proved  by  other  evidence  ;  for,  whether  they  are  true  or 
not,  the  plaintiff,  by  introducing  them  into  his  bill,  and  making  them 
part  of  the  record,  precludes  himself  from  afterwards  disputing  their 
truth. 

The  plaintiff,  of  course,  cannot  read  any  part  of  his  own  bill  as  evi- 
dence in  support  of  his  case,  unless  where  it  is  corroborated  by  the 
answer ; i  as,  where  the  bill  states  a  deed,  or  a  will,  and  the  defendant, 
in  his  answer,  admits  the  deed  or  will  to  have  been  properly  executed, 
and  to  be  to  the  tenor  and  effect  set  forth  in  the  bill :  in  such  case,  the 
plaintiff,  having  read  the  admission  from  the  answer,  may  read  his  bill, 
to  show  the  extent  of  the  admission  made  by  the  defendant.  In  strict- 
ness, however,  this  can  hardly  be  called  reading  the  bill  on  the  part  of 
the  plaintiff,  since  the  reading  is  only  allowed  because  the  defendant,  by 
admitting  the  statement  to  be  true  as  set  forth  in  the  bill,  has,  to  that 
extent,  made  that  portion  of  the  bill  a  part  of  his  answer.2 

In  general,  where  a  defendant  refers  to  a  document  for  greater  cer- 
tainty, he  has  a  right  to  insist  upon  the  document  itself  being  read  ; 8  but 
the  plaintiff  need  not,  on  that  ground,  reply  to  the  answer,  but  may  set 
the  cause  down  for  hearing  on  bill  and  answer,  and  obtain  an  order  to 
prove  the  document  viva  voce  or  by  affidavit  at  the  hearing : 4  provided  it 
be  such  a  document  as  by  the  rules  of  the  Court  hereafter  to  be  noticed, 
can  be  proved  in  that  manner.5 

With  respect  to  the  right  of  a  defendant  to  make  use  of  the  plaintiff's 
bill  as  an  admission  of  the  facts  therein  stated,  it  is  to  be  observed,  that, 

5  The  plaintiff  may,  however,  as  we  have  8  Cox  v.  Allingham,  Jac.  337,  339;  Lett  v. 
seen,  go  into  evidence  as  to  his  whole  case;  Morris,  4  Sim.  607,  611 ;  and  see  ante,  p.  726. 
ante,  p.  614.  But  the  admission  by  answer  that  a  document 

6  Ante,  p.  614.  was  of  the  purport  stated  in  the  bill,  and  a 

1  The  answer  of  a  party  in  Chancery  is  reference  to  it  when  produced  and  proved,  will 
proper  evidence  against  him,  and  so  much  of  not  entitle  the  plaintiff  to  read  the  statement  of 
the  bill  as  is  necessary  to  explain  the  answer,  the  contents  from  the  bill;  nor  will  a  further 
McGowen  v.  Young,  2  Stewart,  276.  admission  that  the  document   is  in  the  defend- 

2  Where,  however,  an  order  has  been  ob-  ant's  possession  entitle  the  plaintiff  to  call  for 
tained  to  take  the  bill  pro  confesso,  the  bill  its  production  at  the  hearing.  Dowling  v.  Legh, 
may  be  read  in  evidence,  as  an  answer  admit-  3  J.  &  Lat.  716.  See  also  Owen  v.  Jones,  2 
ting  the  facts.  11  Geo.  IV.  &  1  Will.  IV.  Anst.  505;  but  see  Barnard  v.  Wieland,  W.N. 
c.  36,  §   14;  ante,  p.  531.     So  in   Tennessee,  (1872)  103;  30  W.  R.  947. 

except   in   the  case   of  infant  defendants,  de-  4  Fielde  v.  Cage,  cited  Wyatt's  P.  R.  219; 

fendants  of  unsound  mind,  executors  or  admin-      ante,  p.  828. 

istrators,  defendants  to  divorce  bills,  non-resi-  5  Post,  p.  908,  et  seg. 

dents  of  the  State,  and  persons  who=e  names 

and  residences  are  unknown,  made  defendants 

without  attachment  of  property.   Code,  §  4371. 

832 


ADMISSIONS. 


*839 


at  Common  Law,  the  general  rule  is,  that  a  bill  in  Chancery  will  not  be 
evidence,  except  to  show  that  such  a  bill  did  exist,  and  that  certain  facts 
were  in  issue  between  the  parties,  in  order  to  introduce  the  answer,  or 
the  depositions  of  witnesses ;  and  that  it  cannot  be  admitted  as  evidence 
to  prove  any  facts,  either  alleged  or  denied  in  the  bill.6  (a)  In 
Courts  of  Equity,  however,  *a  different  rule  prevails,  and  the  bill  *  839 
may  be  read  as  evidence,  for  the  defendant,  of  any  of  the  matters 
therein  positively  averred.1 

A  defendant's  right  to  read  the  plaintiff's  bill  as  evidence  against  him 
is  confined  to  the  bill  as  it  stands  on  the  record.  If  the  bill  has  been 
amended,  the  amended  bill  is  the  only  one  upon  the  record,  and  the 
defendant  has  no  right,  in  that  case,  to  read  the  original  bill  in  evidence.2 
It  seems,  however,  that  where  the  consequence  of  the  amendment  has 
been  to  alter  the  effect  of  the  answer  to  the  original  bill,  or  to  render  it 
obscure,  the  defendant  has  a  right  to  read  the  original  bill,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  explaining  the  answer ; 3  and  in  a  cause  in  the  Court  of  Chancery 
in  Ireland,  in  deciding  upon  the  question  of  costs,  certain  charges  in  the 
original  bill  which  had  been  expunged  by  amendment,  were  read  from 
the  defendant's  office  copy  for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  quo  animo  the 
bill  had  been  filed.4  (b) 

A  bill  may  also  be  read  in  evidence  against  a  plaintiff,  although  filed 
by  him  in  another  suit.  In  such  case,  however,  it  will  be  necessary  to 
prove  that  it  was  exhibited  by  the  direction,  or  with  the  privity,  of  the 


6  Boileau  v.  Rutlin,  2  Exch.  665;  2  Phil,  on 
Evid.  37,  38;  Taylor  on  Evid.  §  786;  1  Phil. 
Ev.  (Cowen  and  Hill's  ed.  1839)  358,  359,  note 
640  in  2  id.  Cowen  and  Hill's  notes,  923, 
924;  Rankin  v.  Maxwell,  2  Marsh.  (Ky.)  488, 
489;  Belden  v.  Davies,  2  Hall  (N.  Y.),  444; 
Owens  v.  Dawson,  1  Watts,  149,  150;  Rees  v. 
Lawless,  4  Litt.  218;  Cooley  v.  State,  55  Ala. 
162. 

i  Ives  v.  Medcalfe,  1  Atk.  63,  65.  Neither 
the  bill  nor  the  answer  is  evidence  in  a  techni- 
cal sense  on  the  hearing,  nor  is  either  allowed 
to  be  read  in  extenso  under  the  English  prac- 


(rt)  Under  the  present  English  practice,  an 
admission  in  the  answer  or  statement  of  de- 
fence is  not  conclusive  in  other  proceedings 
between  the  same  parties,  but  on  a  different 
issue.  Re  Walters,  Neison  v.  Walters,  61  L.  T. 
872 ;  63  id.  328.  In  general,  a  partj^'s  admis- 
sions in  the  pleadings  of  another  suit  may  be 
explained,  as  by  showing  that  the  admitted 
fact  was  not  in  issue,  or  that  the  pleading  was 
not  read  when  signed.  Banks  v.  Klein,  53 
Fed.  Rep.  436  ;  see  Pope  v.  Allis,  115  U.  S.  363. 
Admissions  in  an  answer,  the  oath  to  which 
has  been  waived,  are  still  evidence  against  the 
defendant.  Uhlmann  v.  Arnholt  &  S.  B.  Co. 
41  Fed.  Rep.  369.  And  sworn  answers  to  a 
bill  which  is  dismissed  without  prejudice  may 
have  their  full  weight  in  a  second  suit  for  sub- 

vol.  i.  —  53 


tice.  The  plaintiff  only  reads  such  parts  of  the 
answer  as  he  relies  on  to  support  his  case  as  ad- 
missions, and  the  defendant  reads  such  part  of 
the  bill  as  he  relies  on  as  admissions.  In  Amer- 
ica, the  pleadings  are  usually  read  in  lieu  of  the 
preliminary  statement  of  counsel  in  England, 
ad  hiformandum  conscientiam  curias.  Bartlett 
v.  Gale,  4  Paige,  507;  Beech  v.  Haynes,  ITenn. 
Ch.  576;  Hart  v.  Ten  Eyck,  2  John.  Ch.  91; 
Lady  Ormond  v.  Hutchinson,  13  Vc\?.  50. 
2' Hales  v.  Pomfret,  Dan.  141. 

3  Ibid. 

4  Fitzgerald  v.  O'Flaherty,  1  Moll.  347. 


stantially  the  same  cause,  in  which  the  bill 
waives  an  answer  under  oath.  Mey  v.  Gulli- 
man,  105  111.  272;  Throckmorton  v.  Throck- 
morton, 86   V~a.  768;   see  Williams  ?•.  Cheney, 

3  Gray,  215,  220;  Printup  v.  Patton  (Ga.),  18 
S.  E.  Rep.  311. 

(6)  See  Steuart  ».  Gladstone,  10  Ch.  D. 
626,  644;  Smith  v.  Davidson,  41  Fed.  P.ep. 
172;  Hurst  p.  Jones,  10  Lea,  8:  Kankakee  &c. 
R.  Co.  v.  Horan,  131  111.  288:  17  III.  App. 
650;  22  id.  145;  23  id.  259;  30  id.  552;  Buzard 
v.  McAnuIty,  77  Texas,  438;  Brown  r.  Pickard, 

4  Utah,  292;  Bailey  r.  O'Bannon,  28  Mo.  App. 
39;  Wheeler  v.  West,  71  Cal.  120;  Baxter  v. 
New  York,  T.  &  M.  Ry.  Co.  (Texas)  22  S.  W. 
Rep.  1002. 

833 


*840 


EVIDENCE. 


party  plaintiff  in  it ;  "  for  any  person  may  file  a  bill  in  another  person's 
name.''" 6 

Although  a  plaintiff,  by  his  replication,  denies  the  truth  of  the  whole 
of  the  defendant's  answer,  he  does  not  thereby  preclude  himself  from 
reading  whatever  portion  of  it  he  thinks  will  support  his  case,  —  except 
the  answer  be  that  of  an  infant,  which,  as  we  have  seen,  can  never  be 
read  to  establish  a  fact  which  it  is  against  the  infant's  interest  to  admit.6 
The  answer  of  the  person  under  whom  he  derives  title,  may,  however,  be 
so  read ;  and  therefore  it  has  been  held,  that  if,  in  a  suit  to  establish  a 
will  against  the  heir,  the  heir  puts  in  his  answer  admitting  the  wilk  and 
dies  before  the  hearing,  the  derivative  heir,  though  an  infant,  will  be 
bound  by  the  admission,  and  the  execution  of  the  will  need  not,  in  such 
case,  be  proved.7  Of  course,  if  an  infant  heir  is  bound  by  the  admission 
of  his  ancestor,  such  an  admission  will  be  equally  binding  upon  an  adult. 

Where  a  plaintiff  proposes  to  read  a  passage  from  the  defendant's 
answer  as  an  admission,  he  must  read  all  the  circumstances  stated  in 
the  passage  ;  and  if  the  passage  contains  a  reference  to  any  other 
*  840  passage,  that  other  passage  must  be  read  also.8  But  *  where  a 
plaintiff,  in  reading  a  passage  from  a  defendant's  answer,  has 
been  obliged  to  read  an  allegation  which  makes  against  his  case,  he  will 
be  permitted  to  read  evidence  to  disprove  such  allegation.1 

There  was  formerly  a  distinction  between  bills  for  relief  and  bills  for 
discovery,  in  the  right  of  the  plaintiff  to  read  the  answer  of  the  defend- 
ant ;  but  now,  where  a  defendant  in  Equity  files  a  cross-bill  for  discovery 
only  against  the  plaintiff  in  Equity,  or  exhibits  interrogatories  for  his 
examination,  the  answer  to  such  cross-bill,  or  interrogatories,  may  be 
read  and  used  by  the  party  filing  such  cross-bill,  or  exhibiting  such  inter- 
rogatories, in  the  same  manner,  and  under  the  same  restrictions,  as  the 
answer  to  a  bill  praying  relief  may  be  read  and  used.2 

5  Wollet  r.  Roberts,  1  Ch.  Cas.  64. 

6  Ante,  p.  169.  Express  admissions  by  an- 
swer stand  as  conclusive,  and  cannot  be  dis- 
puted, unless  it  is  first  shown  that  they  were 
made  by  mistake.  Marsh  v.  Mitchell,  26  N.  J. 
Eq.  497. 

7  Robinson  v.  Cooper,  4  Sim.  131;  Lock  v. 
Foote,  id.  132;  ante,  p.  172.  Lewis  v.  Outlaw, 
1  Tenn.  140.  And  see  as  to  the  effect  of  ad- 
missions by  testamentary  trustees  in  estopping 
them  from  proving  the  contrarv,  Coops  v.  Cress- 
well,  L.  R.  2  Ch.  112,  121 ;  L.  R.  2  Eq.  106. 

8  Bartlett  v.  Gillard,  3  Russ.  149;  see  also 
Lady  Ormond  V.  Hutchinson,  13  Ves.  47,  53; 
Rude  ?•.  Whitchurch,  3  Sim.  562;  Nurse  v. 
Bunn.  5  Sim.  225:  Freeman  r.  Tatham.  5  Hare, 
329,  335;  10  .Tur.  685;  Beech  v.  Haynes,  2 
Tenn.  Ch.  571 ;  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  XXXI.  23.  And 
see  Taylor  on  Evid.  §  730;  1  Phil.  Ev.  (Cowen 
&  Hill's  ed.  1839)  359,  360,  note  643  in  2  id. 
926-92S.  If  on  exceptions  being  taken,  a  second 
answer  is  put  in,  the  defendant  may  insist  upon 
having  that  also  read,  to  explain  what  he  swore 
in  his  first  answer.  1  Phil.  Ev.  359,  note  644, 
in  2  id.  928. 

834 


1  Price  v.  Lytton,  3  Russ.  206.  Where  an 
answer  admits  a  fact  and  insists  on  a  distinct 
fact  by  way  of  discharge  or  avoidance,  the 
latter,  even  if  part  of  the  same  transaction, 
must  be  proved  by  evidence  aliunde.  Parkes 
r.  Gorton,  3  R.  I.  27:  Walker  v.  Berry,  8  Rich. 
33;  Cummins  r.  Cummins,  15  111.  33 ;  Stevens 
v.  Post,  12  N.  J.  Eq.  408,  410,  411;  Hart  r. 
Ten  Eyck,  2  John.  Ch.  62;  Miller  v.  Wack. 
Saxt.  209;  Beckwith  ».  Butler,  1  Wash.  224; 
Thompson  v.  Lamb,  7  Ves.  587;  Clements  v. 
Moore,  6  Wall.  315;  Napier  v.  Elam,  6  Verg. 
113 :  Beech  v.  Haynes,  1  Tenn.  Ch.  569.  But  if 
the  facts  in  discharge  or  avoidance  are  a  direct 
and  proper  reply  to  an  express  charge  or  inter- 
rogatory of  the  hill,  the  answer  is  evidence  of 
those  facts.  Hart  v  Ten  Eyck,  1  Cow.  744, 
note;  Alexander  v.  Williams,  10  Yerg.  109; 
Goss  v.  Simpson,  4  Coldw.  288;  Walter  v.  Mc- 
Nabh.  1  Heisk.  703.  And  this,  whether  the 
response  be  a  direct  denial  or  by  a  statement 
of  acts  in  avoidance.  Hopkins  v.  Spurlock,  2 
Heisk.  152;  infra,  p.  845,  note. 

2  Cons.  Ord.  XIX.  6. 


ADMISSIONS. 


841 


Formerly,  when  the  parties  to  a  cause  could  not  be  witnesses,  ques- 
tions as  to  reading  the  answer  of  the  defendant  frequently  arose  ; 3  but 
they  are  now  of  no  practical  importance,  the  answer  being  almost 
invariably  made  evidence  in  the  cause.4 

With  respect  to  what  will  be  considered  as  such  an  admission  by  an 
answer  as  will  dispense  with  the  necessity  of  other  proof,  it  may  be 
stated,  that,  besides  those  expressions  which  in  words  admit  the  fact 
alleged  to  be  true,  a  statement  by  the  defendant  that  "  he  believes,"  or 
thai)  he  has  been  "  informed  and  believes,"  that  such  fact  is  true,  will  be 
sufficient,  unless  such  statement  is  coupled  by  some  clause  to  prevent  its 
being  considered  as  an  admission.5  (a)  A  mere  statement,  however,  in 
an  answer,  that  a  defendant  has  been  informed  that  a  fact  is  as  stated, 
without  an  answer  as  to  his  belief  concerning  it,  will  not  be  such  an 
admission  as  can  be  read  as  evidence  of  the  fact.6  Such  an  answer  is,  in 
effect,  insufficient;  and  if  the  plaintiff,  upon  reading  the  pleadings,  finds 
such  a  statement  as  to  a  fact  with  respect  to  which  it  is  important 
to  have  the  defendant's  belief,  he  should  except  to  the  answer  for 
insufficiency. 

*  It  has  been  before  stated,  that  the  answer  of  an  infant,  being  *  841 
in  fact  the  answer  of  his  guardian,  cannot  be  read  against  him.1 
The  answer,  however,  may,  it  seems,  be  read  against  the  guardian  ;  and 
the  answer  of  an  infant,  by  his  mother  and  guardian  in  another  cause, 
has  been  read  against  the  mother  in  her  own  capacity.2  It  seems  also, 
that  where  a  defendant,  being  an  infant,  answers  by  guardian,  and,  at 


3  Davis  v.  Spurling,  1  R.  &  M.  64,  68; 
Miller  p.  Gow,  1  Y.  &  C.  C.  C.  56,  59 ;  Connop 
v.  Hay  ward,  id.  33,  34;  Allfrey  v.  Allfrey,  1 
M'N.  &G.  87,93;  13  Jur.  269. 

4  See  post,  p.  843,  n.  3. 

6  See  Potter  v.  Potter,  1  Ves.  Sr.  274;  Hill 
v.  Binney,  6  Ves.  738;  and  see  Woodhatch  v. 
Freeland^  11  W.  R.  398,  V.  C.  K.;  see  also 
Bird  v.  Lake,  1  H.  &  M.  111.  See,  where  the 
answer  admitted  the  execution  of  "some  such" 
bonds  and  mortgages  as  were  set  out  in  the  bill, 


(a)  Under  the  Code  system,  the  defendant's 
denial,  upon  information  and  belief,  of  a  ma- 
terial allegation  in  the  complaint  cannot  be 
stricken  out  as  a  sham  Rnswer:  Robert  Gere 
Bank  v.  Inman,  51  Hun,  97;  Zivi  v.  Kinstein, 
21  N.  Y.  S.  583;  see  Metzger  v.  Metropolitan 
El.  Rv.  Co.  id,  676;  except,  perhaps,  where 
the  ignorance  is  pretended,  as  in  matters  of 
public  record.  See  Zivi  v.  Einstein,  20  X.  Y. 
S.  893,  894. 

An  answer  under  oath  may  be  made  on  in- 
formation and  belief,  and  it  may  be  sufficient 
as  a  pleading  when  it  sets  up  hearsay,  though 
this  will  deprive  it  of  its  weight  as  evidence. 
Agnew  v.  McGill  (Ala.),  11  So.  Rep.  537; 
Noyes  v.  Inland  &  S.  C.  Co.  4  Mar  Arthur,  1 ; 
Humble  v.  McDonough,  25  X.  Y.  S.  965.  In 
general,  an  answer  upon  information  and  be- 


Wills  r.  McKinney,  30  N".  J.  Eq.  465.  An 
answer  admitting  a  verbal  agreement  alleged 
in  the  bill,  but  insisting  on  the  Statute  of 
Frauds,  cannot  be  read  as  an  admission  of  the 
agreement.  Jackson  r.  Oglander,  2  H.  &  M. 
465. 

6  1   Phil.   Ev.  (Cowen    &   Hill's  ed.   1839) 
360,  note. 

1  Ante,  p.  169;  Gresley,  Eq.  Ev.  (Am.  ed.) 
323. 

2  Beasley  v.  Magrath,  2  Sch.  &  Lef.  34. 


lief  does  not  require  two  witnesses  to  overcome 
it.  See  Pope  v.  Allis,  115  U.  S.  363;  Berry  v. 
Sawyer,  19  Fed.  Rep.  286;  Allen  v.  O'Donald, 
28  id.  17;  Robinson  v.  Mandell,  3  Cliff.  169; 
Deimel  v.  Brown,  136  III.  586  ;  Atlantic  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Wilson,  5  R.  I.  479  ;  Loomis  c.  Fay,  24 
Vt.  240;  Town  v.  Needham,  3  Paige,  545  :  M<- 
Guffie  v.  Planters'  Hank,  Freem.  (Miss.)  383; 
Carpenter  v.  Edwards,  64  Miss.  595;  Carrick  i». 
Prater,  10  Humph  270;  Pierson  v.  Ryerson,  5 
N.  J.  Eq.  196;  Miller  v.  District  of  Columbia, 
5  Mackey,  291.  Denials  in  an  answer  upon 
information  and  belief  are  not  sufficient  to  sup- 
port a  motion  to  dissolve  an  injunction.  Porter 
r.  Jennings,  89  Cal.  440.  Denials  so  made, 
when  they  should  be  positive,  are  ineffectual, 
though  some  immaterial  issues  are  positively 
denied.  Loveland  v.  Garner,  74  Cal.  298. 
835 


*842 


EVIDENCE. 


full  age,  neither  amends  nor  makes  a  new  answer,  as  he  may  do,  but 
prays  a  hearing  of  the  cause  de  novo,  his  answer  is  evidence  against  him.3 
The  answer  of  an  idiot  or  lunatic,  put  in  by  his  committee,  may  be 
read  against  him  ;  and  it  has  been  held  that  the  answer  of  a  person  of 
weak  intellect,  put  in  by  his  guardian,  could  also  be  read  against  him  ; 4 
but  it  is  doubtful  if  this  decision  would  now  be  followed.5 

The  plaintiff  cannot,  of  course,  read   the  answer   of   one    defendant 
against   a  co-defendant  as  an  admission  : 6   and,  as  a  general  rule,  it 

cannot  be  read  as  evidence  except  on  motion  for  a  decree,  where 
*  842    *  notice  of  the  intention  to  read  it  has  been  given.1     Thus,  where 

the  answer  of  an  executor  was  offered  as  evidence  against  the 
residuary  legatee,  who  had  been  made  a  party  to  the  suit,  its  reception  was 
refused  for  any  other  purpose  than  that  of  showing  what  funds  came  to 
the  hands  of  the  executors,  what  debts  there  were,  and  the  value  of  the 
estate.2  In  cases,  however,  where  the  right  of  the  plaintiff,  as  against 
one  defendant,  is  only  prevented  from  being  complete  by  some  question 


8  Hinde,  422. 

4  Leving  v.  Caverly,  Prec.  in  Ch.  229. 

5  Ante,  pp.  177, 178;  Micklethwaite  v.  Atkin- 
son, 1  Coll.  173 ;  Percival  v.  Cane)-,  4  De  G.  & 
S.  610;  14  Jur.  1056,  1062;  S.  C.  nam.  Stanton 
v.  Percival,  3  W.  K.  391;  24  L.  J.  Ch.  369,  H. 
L. ;  Ingram  v.  Little,  11  Q.  B.  D.  251.  For  the 
rules  of  practice  with  regard  to  reading  the 
answer  of  married  persons,  see  ante,  pp.  184, 
185. 

6  Jones  v.  Turberville,  2  Sumner's  Ves.  Jr. 
11,  note  (b);  4  Bro.  C.  C.  115,  S.  C  ;  Atwood 
v.  Small.  6  CI.  &  F.  282,  295;  1  Greenl.  Ev. 
§  178:  1  Phil.  Ev.  (Cowen  &  Hill's  ed.  1839) 
362,  note  650;  2  id.  931;  Porter  v.  Bank  of 
Kutland,  19  Vt.  410;  Blodget  v.  Hobart,  18  Vt. 
414.  It  seems  to  be  a  well-established  general 
principle  that  the  answer  of  one  defendant  can- 
not be  read  in  evidence  against  a  co-defendant, 
if  there  is  no  joint  interest,  privity,  fraud,  collu- 
sion, or  combination  between  them.  Jones  v. 
Jones,  13  Iowa,  276;  Rust  v.  Mansfield,  25  111. 
336;  Williamson  v.  Haycock,  11  Iowa,  40; 
Mobley  v.  Dubuque  &c.  Co.  id.  71  ;  Judd  v. 
Seaver,  8  Paige,  548:  Hay  ward  v.  Carroll,  4 
Harr.  &  J.  518;  Singleton  v.  Gayle,  8  Porter, 
271;  Conner  v.  Chase,  15  Vt.  764;  Thomasson 
v.  Tucker.  2  Blackf.  172;  Moseley  v.  Armstrong, 
3  Monroe.  389;  Robinson  v.  Sampson,  23  Maine, 
388;  Webb  v.  Pell,  3  Paige,  368;  Collier  v. 
Chapman,  2  Stew.  163;  Chambliss  v.  Smith, 
30  Ala.  366;  Graham  v.  Sublett,  G  J.  J.  Marsh. 
145;  M'Kim  v.  Thompson,  1  Bland,  160;  Cal- 
well  P.  Boyer,  8  Gill  &  J.  136;  Dexter  v.  Arnold, 
3  Sumner,  152;  Felch  v.  Hooper,  20  Maine,  159; 
Clarke  v.  Van  Reimsdyk,  9  Cranch,  152,  156; 
Leeds  v.  Mar.  Ins.  Co.  of  Alex.  2  Wheat.  380, 
383;  Dade  v.  Madison,  5  Leigh,  401;  Daniel  V. 
Boullard,  2  Dana,  296;  Field  v.  Holland,  6 
Cranch,  8;  Fanning  v.  Pritchett,  6  Monroe,  79, 

836 


80;  Roundlett  v.  Jordan,  3  Greenl.  47;  Mills  v. 
Gore,  20  Pick.  34;  Wells  v.  Stratton,  1  Tenn.  Ch. 
328.  The  answer  of  one  defendant  is  not  evi- 
dence against  the  other  defendant,  though  prior 
to  the  filing  of  the  answer  the  former  may  have 
transferred  to  the  latter  all  his  interest  in  the 
subject-matter  of  the  controversy.  Jones  v. 
Hardesty,  10  Gill  &  J.  404;  see  also  Haworth 
v.  Bostock,  4  Y.  &  C  1 ;  Hoare  v.  Johnstone,  2 
Keen,  553;  Lewis  ».  Owen,  1  Ired.  Eq.  290; 
Dickinson  r.  Railroad  Co.  7  W.  Va.  390.  But 
the  answer  of  a  defendant,  which  is  responsive 
to  the  bill,  is  admissible  as  evidence  in  favor  of  a 
co-defendant  (Davis  v.  Clayton,  5  Humph.  440); 
more  especially  where  such  co-defendant,  being 
the  depositary  of  a  chattel  claimed  by  the  plain- 
tiff, defends  himself  under  the  title  of  the  other 
defendant.  Mil's  v.  Gore,  20  Pick.  28;  but  see 
Morris  v.  Nixon,  1  How.  (U.  S-)  118;  Cannon 
v.  Norton,  14  Vt.  178.  The  deposition  of  a 
party  in  Chancery,  read  without  objection,  is 
evidence  for  his  co-defendnnt.  Fletcher  V. 
Wier,  7  Dana,  354;  see  AVolley  v.  Brownhill, 
13  Price,  500 ;  S.  C.  1  M'Lel.  317.  If  a  defend- 
ant in  his  argument  relies  on  the  answer  of  his 
co-defendant,  he  thereby  makes  it  evidence 
against  himself.  Chase  v.  Manhardt,  1  Bland, 
336. 

i  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  15;  Cousins  v.  Vasey, 
9  Hare  App.  61;  Dawkins  v.  Mortan,  1  J.  &  H. 
339;  Stephens  v.  Heatcote,  1  Dr.  &  S.  138;  6 
Jur.  N.  S.  312;  ante,  p.  821;  see  Fielden  v. 
Slater,  L.  R.  7  Eq.  523. 

2  Morse  v.  Royal,  12  Ves.  355,  361;  see  also 
M'Intosh  r.  Great  Western  Ry.  Co.  4  De  G.  & 
S.  544;  Wych  v.  Meal,  3  P.  Wms.  310;  and 
Gibbons  r.*Waterloo  Bridge  Co.  1  C.  P.  Coop, 
temp.  Cott.  385,  where  the  answer  of  the  officer  of 
a  corporation  was  not  allowed  to  be  read  against 
the  corporation.     Taylor  on  Evid.  §  684. 


ADMISSIONS. 


843 


between  the  plaintiff  and  a  second  defendant,  the  plaintiff  is  permitted 
to  read  the  answer  of  such  second  defendant,  for  the  purpose  of  complet- 
ing his  claim  against  the  first ; 3  and  where  several  persons  are  mutually 
interested  as  partners,  or  jointly  liable  as  the  co-obligors  of  a  bond,  the 
declarations  or  answers  of  one  may  be  admissible  against  the  others.4 

Cases,  moreover,  have  occurred  in  which  a  defendant  has,  by  the  form 
of  his  answer,  made  the  answer  of  a  co-defendant  evidence  against 
himself  (a)  ;  as,  where  a  defendant  stated  in  his  answer  that  he  was  much 
in  years,  and  could  not  remember  the  matter  charged  in  the  bill,  but 
that  J.  S.  was  his  attorney  and  transacted  the  matter,  whereupon 
J.  S.  was  made  a  defendant,  the  answer  *  was  allowed  to  be  read  *  843 
against  the  original  defendant,  the  judge  being  of  opinion  that 
the  words  in  the  first  answer  amounted  to  a  reference  to  a  co-defendant's 
answer.1 

Interpleader  suits  form  an  exception  to  this  rule;  and  the  answer  of 


3  Green  v.  Pledger,  3  Hare,  165,  170;  8  Jur. 
801 ;  and  generally  concerning  the  circumstances 
in  which  the  Court  will  try  and  decide  a  case 
between  co-defendants,  see  Cottinghani  v.  Lord 
Shrewsbury,  3  Hare,  627,  638;  Lord  Chamley 
r.  Lord  Dunsany,  2  Sch.  &  Lef.  690,  706,  709, 
H.  L. ;  Farquharson  v.  Seton,  5  Russ.  45,  62; 
Smith  v.  Baker,  1  Y.  &  C.  C.  C.  223,  228; 
Fletcher  v.  Green  (No.  2),  33  Beav.  513;  Sand- 
ford  v.  Morrice,  11  CI.  &  F.  667,  681;  Mount  v. 
Potts,  23  N.  J.  Eq.  188;  Ingram  v.  Smith,  1 
Head,  412,  427;  Symmes  v.  Strong,  28  N.  J. 
Eq.  131. 

4  Crosse  v.  Bedingfield,  12  Sim.  35,  39;  5 
Jur.  836 ;  but  the  answer  of  a  defendant  who 
has  become  bankrupt,  and  ceased  to  be  a  part- 
ner, cannot.  Parker  v.  Morrell,  2  Phil.  453,  463; 
12  Jur.  253;  see  1  Greenl.  Ev.  §  178;  Clarke  v. 
Van  Reimsdyk,  9  Cranch,  153,  156;  Williams 
v.  Hodgson,  2  Harr.  &  J.  474,  477;  Van  Keims- 
dyk v.  Kane,  1  Gall.  630;  Hutchins  t.  Child- 
less, 4  Stew.  &  P.  34;  Gilmore  v.  Patterson,  36 
Maine,  544;  Clayton  v.  Thompson,  13  Ga.  291. 
Upon  a  bill  in  Equity  by  one  partner  against 
his  co-partners  for  an  account,  the  answer  of 
one  of  the  defendants  will  not  be  evidence  to 
charge  another.  Chapin  v.  Colman,  11  Pick. 
331.  But  if  it  appears  that  the  defendants,  as 
constituting  a  partnership  among  themselves, 
of  the  one  part,  were  in  partnership  with  the 


(a)  The  answer  of  one  defendant  is  evidence 
against  a  co-defendant  only  when  the  latter 
adopts  it.  Hanover  Nat.  Bank  v.  Klein,  64 
Miss.  141.  Their  relations  to  each  other  ina3r 
be  such,  as  partners,  &c,  that  the  admissions 
of  one  are  competent  evidence  against  the 
other.  McElroy  r.  Ludlum,  32  N.  J.  Eq.  828. 
But  the  answer  of  one  defendant,  if  responsive 
to  the  bill,  enures  to  the  benefit  of  his  co-defend- 
ants, and,  if  established,  precludes  relief  against 
any  of  them.    Pleasanton  v.  Raughley,  3  Del. 


plaintiff  of  the  other  part,  the  answer  of  one  of 
the  defendants  would  be  evidence  to  charge  the 
others.  Ibid. ;  see  also  Judd  v.  Seaver,  8  Paige, 
548;  Van  Keimsdyk  v.  Kane,  1  Gall.  630;  Win- 
chester v.  Jackson,  3  Hayw.  310;  Rector  v. 
Rector,  3  Gilman,  105.  The  answer  of  a  wife 
is  not  evidence  against  her  husband.  The  City 
Bank  v.  Bangs,  3  Paige,  36.  Nor  is  the  answer 
of  an  obligee,  evidence  against  his  previous  as- 
signee, a  party  in  the  same  suit.  Fanning  r. 
Pritchett,  6  Monroe,  79;  Turner  v.  Holman, 
5  Monroe,  411.  Nor  is  the  answer  of  a  prin- 
cipal debtor,  admitting  his  insolvency,  evidence 
against  his  surety,  a  co-defendant,  at  the  suit  of 
a  co-surety  for  contribution.  Daniel  v.  Ballard, 
2  Dana,  296.  A  fortiori,  it  follows,  that  the 
mere  silence  of  one  defendant  is  no  evidence 
against  his  co-defendant.  Timberlake  v.  Cobbs, 
2  J.  J.  Marsh.  136;  Blight  v.  Banks,  6  Monroe, 
192;  Harrison  v.  Johnson,  3  Litt.  286. 

The  rule  that  the  answer  of  one  defendant 
cannot  be  read  in  evidence  against  his  co-defend- 
ant, does  not  apply  where  the  latter  claims 
through  him  whose  answer  is  offered  in  evi- 
dence. 1  Greenl.  Ev.  §  178.  Nor  where  one 
defendant  in  his  answer  refers  to  the  answer  of 
his  co-defendant.  Anon.  1  P.  Wins.  301 ;  Dun- 
ham v.  Gates,  3  Barb.  Ch.  196;  Blakeney  v. 
Ferguson,  14  Ark.  641. 

1  Anon.  1  P.  Wins.  301. 


Ch.  124;  McElroy  v.  Ludlum,  32  N.  J.  Eq. 
828;  Salmon  e.  Smith,  58  Miss.  399;  State  v. 
Columbia,  12  S.  C.  370;  Hartley  v.  Matthews 
(Ala.),  11  So.  Rep.  452.  A  defendant,  who 
has  appeared  specially  to  object  to  the  Court's 
jurisdiction,  will  be  permitted  to  contest  an- 
other defendant's  cross-bill  only  on  condition 
of  entering  a  full  appearance.  National  Fur- 
nace Co.  v.  Moline  M.  I.  Works,  18  Fed.  Rep. 
863. 

837 


*843 


EVIDENCE. 


one  defendant  may  be  read  against  a  co-defendant,  to  show  that  adverse 
claims  are  made.2 

It  is  to  be  observed,  that  where  an  answer  has  been  replied  to  gen- 
erally, it  cannot  (except  by  consent)  be  read  as  evidence  on  the  part  of  the 
defendant  himself.3  In  disposing  of  the  question  of  costs,  however,  the 
Court  will  permit  the  defendant's  answer  to  be  read  in  his  own  behalf ; 4 
and  it  has  been  held,  that  a  peer's  answer  upon  protestation  of  honor 
may  also  be  read  on  the  question  of  costs,  on  behalf  of  the  defendant 
who  has  put  it  in.5  Moreover,  the  Court  itself  will  look  at  the  answer, 
not  as  evidence,  but  as  what  may  regulate  its  discretion  with  respect  to 
the  further  investigation  of  particular  facts.6 

Although  a  defendant  cannot  read  his  own  answer  as  evidence  for 
himself,  as  to  any  other  point  than  that  of  costs,  he  is  entitled  to  have 
the  benefit  of  his  answer,  so  far  as  it  amounts  to  a  denial  of  the  plaintiff's 
case,  unless  the  denial  by  the  answer  is  contradicted  by  the  evidence 
of  more  than  one  witness ;  the  rule  of  Courts  of  Equity  being,  that 
where  the  defendant,  in  express  terms,  negatives  the  allegations  in 
the  bill,  and  the  evidence  is  that  of  only  one  person  affirming  what 
has  been  so  negatived,  the  Court  will  not  make  a   decree.7  («)      The 


2  Masterman  v.  Price,  1  C.  P.  Coop.  temp. 
Cott.  383;  Chevet  r.  Jones,  ibid.;  6  Mad.  267; 
and  see  post,  Chap.  XXXIV.  §  3,  Bills  of ' Inter- 
pleader. 

3  Where  a  defendant  has  riled  an  answer, 
and  it  has  been  replied  to,  it  is  now  a  common 
practice  to  file  a  short  affidavit  by  him,  veri- 
fying the  statements  of  his  answer,  in  order  to 
make  it  evidence  on  his  own  behalf.  Barrack 
v.  M'Culloch,  3  K.  &  J.  110;  3  Jur.  N.  S.  180; 
and  see  Williams  v.  Williams,  10  Jur.  N.  S. 
608-  12  W.  R.  603,  V.  C.  K.  For  forms  of 
affidavit,  see  Vol.  III. 

4  Vancouver  v.  Bliss,  11  Ves.  458;  Howell 
v.  George,  1  Mad.  1,  13;  and  see  M  rgan  & 
Davey,  85;  and  pus/,  Chap.  XXXI.  §  1,  Costs. 

5  Dawson  r.  Ellis,  1  J.  &  W.  524,526. 

6  Miller  v.  Gow,  1  Y.  &  C  C.  C.  56,  59; 
Robson  v.  Flight,  33  Beav.  208,  271;  B^ech  v. 
Haynes,  1  Tenn.  Ch.  569,  576;  ante,  p.  839,  note. 

1  Peniber  v.  Mathers,  1  Bro.  C.  C  52;  see 
also  Kingdome  r.  Boakes,  Prec.  in  Ch.  19; 
Wakelin  v.  Walthal,  2  Ch.  Cas.  8;  Alam  v. 
Jourdan,  1  Vfirn.  161;  Christ's  Coll.  Cam.  v. 


Widdrington,  2  Vern.  283;  Hine  r.  Dodd,  2 
Atk.  270:  Glynn  v.  Bank  of  England,  2  Ves. 
Sr.  38;  Mortimer  v.  Orchard,  2  Ves.  Jr.  243; 
Lord  Cranstown  v.  Johnston,  3  Ves.  170:  Cooth 
v.  Jackson,  0  Ves.  40;  Evans  v.  Bicknell,  id. 
174,  183:  Cooke  v.  Clay  worth,  18  Ves.  12; 
Holdernesse  v.  Rankin,  2  De  G.  F.  &  J.  258, 
272;  6  Jur.  N.  S.  903;  and  see  Williams  r. 
Williams,  10  Jur.  N.  S.  008;  12  W.  R.  663,  V. 
C.  K. ;  Stearns  v.  Stearns,  23  X.  J.  Eq.  107. 
Where  a  replication  is  put  in,  and  the  parties 
proceed  to  a  hearing,  all  the  allegations  of  the 
answer  which  are  responsive  to  the  bill  shall 
be  taken  as  true,  unle?s  they  are  disproved  by 
evidence  of  greater  weight  than  the  testimony 
of  a  single  witness.  This  may  result  from  the 
testimony  of  two  witnesses,  or  of  one  with  cor- 
roborating circumstances;  or  from  corroborat- 
ing circumstances  alone  ;  or  from  documentary 
evidence  alone.  Pierson  r.  Cutler,  5  Vt.  272; 
Dunham  v.  Gates,  1  Hoff.  Ch.  188;  Hart  r.  Ten 
Eyck,  2  John.  Ch.  92;  Watkins  v.  Stockett,  6 
Hair.  &  J.  435;  Hughes  ?•.  Blake,  6  Wheat.  468; 
Pierson  v.  Clayes,  15  Vt.  93;  Gould  v.  William- 


(")  See  Parker  v.  Phetteplace,  1  Wall.  084; 
Seit/.  v.  Mitchell,  94  U.  S.  58D;  American  File 
Co.  v.  Garrett,  110  U.  S.  288;  Morrison  v. 
Durr,  122  U.  S.  518;  Monroe  Catt'e  Co.  v. 
Becker,  147  U.  S.  47;  Beals  v.  III.  M.  &  T.  R. 
Co.  133  U.  S.  290;  Peeler  v.  Lathrop,  2  U.  S. 
App.  40  ;  Slessinger  v.  Buckingham,  17  Fed. 
Rep.  454;  Walcott  v.  Watson,  53  id.  429; 
Brooks  v.  Silver,  5  Del.  Ch.  7;  Hurd  v.  Ascher- 
man,  117  111.  501:  Deimel  v.  Brown,  130  III. 
586;  35  111.  App.  303;  Nulton^s  Appeal,  103 
Penn.  S\  280;  Smith  v.  Ewing,  151  id.  256; 
Hand    v.   Weidner,    id.   362;    McCullough   r. 

838 


Barr,  145  id.  459;  Field  v.  Wilbur,  49  Vt.  157: 
Thompson  v.  Clark.  81  Va.  422;  Johnson  '■. 
Crippen,  02  Miss.  597;  Manatt  v.  Starr,  72 
Iowa,  677;  Brittin  v.  Crabtree,  20  Ark.  30J  ; 
Durham  r.  Taylor,  29  Ga.  166;  Pickering  v. 
Day,  3  Houston,  474.  The  rule  which  requires 
two  witnesses  to  overcome  a  sworn  answer  is  a 
rule  of  Equity  practice,  and  does  not  apply  to 
the  Co  !e  Procedure.  Conger  v.  Cotton,  37 
Ark.  280.  As  the  plaintiff  has  the  burden  to 
prove  his  own  allegations,  the  two  witnesses 
are  needed  to  overcome  the  oath  of  the  answer. 
Vigel    v.   Hopp,    104  U.   S.   441;    Hewitt   v. 


ADMISSIONS. 


844 


denial,  however,  by  the  answer,  *  must    in  such  cases  be  posi-    *  844 


son,   21    Maine,  273;  Johnson   v.    Richardson, 
38  X.  H.  353;  Moors  v.  Moors,  17  N.  H.  483; 


Robinson   r.  Stewart,   10  N.  Y.  189;  Miles  v. 
Miles,  32  X.  H.  147;  Camp   v.  Simon,  34  Ala. 


Campbell,  109  U.  S.  103;  Farrington  v.  Harri- 
son, 44  N.  J.  Eq.  232;  Smith  v.  Ewing,  151 
Penn.  St.  256;  Morrison  v.  Stewart,  24  111. 
24;  Veile  v.  Blodgett,  49  Vt.  270.  This  rule 
has  no  application  to  a  sworn  plea.  Farley  v. 
'  Kittson,  120  U.  S  303.  Documentary  evidence, 
such  as  a  sworn  statement  required  by  law, 
may  be  evidence  equal  to  the  testimonj"  of  one 
witness  in  the  plaintiff' s  favor.  Rowley's  Ap- 
peal, 115  Penn.  St.  150 ;  Jones  v.  Abraham, 
75  Va.  466.  In  order  to  overcome  an  answer 
under  oath,  previous  verbal  admissions  by  the 
defendant  should  be  proved  by  two  witnesses. 
See  Petty  v.  Taylor,  5  Dana,  598;  Gillett  v. 
Robbins,  12  Wis.  319;  Love  v.  Braxton,  5 
Call,  537. 

The  rule  does  not  apply  where  the  defendant 
offers  himself  as  a  witness.  Morris  v.  White, 
36  N.  J.  Eq.  324;  Frink  v.  Adams,  id.  485; 
see  Campbell  v.  Patterson,  95  Penn.  St.  447. 
There  is  no  presumption  against  a  defendant 
answering  under  oath  because  he  does  not  tes- 
tify as  a  witness,  and  submit  to  cross-examina- 
tion, at  least  where  the  plaintiff  has  the  privi- 
lege of  calling  him  as  a  witness.  United  States 
v.  Budd,  144  U.  S.  154.  If  he  testifies  as  a  wit- 
ness evasively,  the  fact  that  his  testimony  is 
not  in  harmony  with  the  rest  of  the  evidence, 
may  suffice  to  impeach  his  sworn  answer. 
Deimel  v.  Brown,  136  111.  586. 

As  to  new  matter,  or  matter  in  avoidance  and 
discharge,  under  this  rule,  see  Banks  v.  Man- 
chester, 128  U.  S.  244;  Reid  v.  McCallister,  49 
Fed.  Rep.  16 ;  Beckhaus  v.  Ladner,  48  N.  J.  Eq. 
152;  Ingersoll  v.  Stiger,  46  id.  511 ;  Hazelhurst 
v.  Sea  Isle  City  Hotel  Co.(N.  J.  Eq.)  25  Atl.  201 ; 
Atkinson  r.  Foster,  134  III.  472;  Harding  v. 
Hawkins,  141  111.  572;  Ferris  v.  Ha  d,  135 
N.  Y.  354;  Cecil  v.  Cecil,  19  Md  72;  Lewis  v. 
Mason,  84  Va.  731 .  Certain  at  least  of  the  Codes 
provide  that  new  matter  alleged  in  an  answer 
is  to  be  taken  as  true  unless  contradicted  bv  the 
reply.  See  Maxwell  v.  Johnson,  2  Wash  St. 
482;  Hamilton  Loan  &  T.  Co.  v.  Gordon,  32 
Neb.  663;   Pomeroy,  Code  Rem.  (3d  ed.)  752. 

As  to  responsiveness  in  the  answer  under  this 
rule,  see  United  States  v.  Ferguson,  54  Fed.  Rep. 
28;  Tread  well  v.  Lennig,50  id.  872;  American  M. 
Co.  v.  O  Harra,56  id.  278;  Comstoek  o.  Herron, 
45  id.  660  ;  Peeler  v.  Lathrop,48  id.  780;  4  U.  S. 
App.  40;  2  id.  40;  Bell  v.  Farmers'  Deposit 
Nat'l  Bank,  131  Penn.  St.  318;  Crammer  r. 
Atlantic  City  Gas  Co.  39  N.  J.  Eq.  76;  Bell  v. 
Moon,  79  Va.  341:  Cole  v.  Shetterlv,  13  111. 
App.  420;  Harding  v.  Hawkins,  141  111.572; 
Newaygo  County  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Stevens,  79 
Mich.  398;  Goodloe  v.  Dean,  81  Ala.  479;  Bar- 
ton v.  Barton,  75  Ala.  400 ;   Gass  v.  Arnold,  6 


Baxter,  329;  Collins  v.  North  British  &  M. 
Ins.  Co.  (Teiin.)  19  S.  W.  Rep.  525.  An  answer 
alleging  a  gift  is  responsive  to  a  bill  averring  a 
loan.  Gleghorne  v.  Gleghorne,  118  Penn.  St. 
383.  A  responsive  denial  which  sets  forth  all 
the  facts,  but  which  incidentally  introduces  new 
matter,  is  good  as  an  answer.  Fidelity  Title  & 
Trust  Co.  v.  Weitzel,  152  Penn.  St.  498.  The 
answer  must  not  be  evasive;  hence,  upon  a  bill 
charging  the  respondents  with  purchasing  real 
estate  for  certain  improper  purposes,  an  answer 
which  denies  these  purposes,  and  alleges  gener- 
ally other  and  proper  purposes,  is  insufficient  on 
exception,  as  the  purposes  referred  to  in  the 
answer  should  be  specifically  set  forth,  and 
averred  to  be  the  real  and  sole  purposes.  Place 
r.  Providence,  12  R.  I.  1;  Seybert  v.  Robinson, 
2  Penn.  Dist.  R.  403.  But  averments  in  an  an- 
swer, incompatible  with  the  allegations  of  the 
complaint,  may  be  equivalent  to  a  denial.  Per- 
kins v.  Brock,  80  Cal.  320.  An  answer  which 
simply  denies  indebtedness,  and  does  not  replv 
to  the  facts  of  the  complaint,  fails  to  raise  issues 
of  fact.  Swanholm  v  Reeser  (Idaho),  31  Pac. 
Rep.  804.  Tue  absence  ot  a  replication  does 
not  affect  the  rule  as  to  responsiveness.  See 
Gunnell  v.  Bird,  10  Wall.  304;  Corbus  v.  Teed, 
69  111.  205.  A  detective  answer  may  be  cured 
by  the  reply.  James  v.  McPhee,  9  Col.  486; 
Burns  v.  Cushing,  96  Cal.  669.  But  the  entire 
absence  of  material  allegations  cannot  be  cured 
by  verdict.  Richards  v.  Travellers'  Ins.  Co.  80 
Cal.  505 ;  see  Rice  v.  Merrimack  Hosiery  Co. 
56  N.  H.  114. 

An  infringer  of  a  recorded  patent,  who  in.-ists 
that  he  did  not  know  of  the  existence  of  the 
patent,  and  denies  that  the  patented  articles 
were  marked  "patented,"  as  required  by  law, 
must  aver  want  of  knowledge  in  his  answer. 
Sessions  v.  Romadka,  145  U.  S.  29.  A  general 
denial  of  infringement  in  an  answer  without 
setting  forth  the  facts  is  not  sufficient  when  the 
bill  interrogates  as  to  the  defendant's  use  of 
devices  which  infringe.  Coop  v.  Dr.  Savage 
P.  D.  Inst.  48  Fed.  Rep.  239.  As  to  other  de- 
fences in  patent  suits  available  by  answer  or 
plea,  see  Secomb  v.  Campbell,  2  Fed.  Fep.  •':.">: ; 
Matthews  v.  Lalance  &  <;.  M.  Co.  id.  232;  Car- 
nick  v.  McKesson,  8  id.  807;  Miller  v.  Foree, 
9  id.  603;  Blatherwick  v.  Carey,  id.  202; 
Sharp  ».  Reissner,  id.  445;  Shaw  r.  Co! well 
Lead  Co.  11  id.  711;  Searls  r.  Bouton,  12  id. 
140;  Allis  r.  Buckstaff.  13  id.  879:  Ilubbell  r. 
De  Land,  14  id.  471;  Pelham  v.  Edelmayer,  15 
id.  203:  Cottier  r.  Stimson,  20  id.  906;  18  id. 
689;  Steiger  r.  He;delberger,  4  id.  455:  While 
v.  Lee,  id.  916  ;  Lilienthal  v.  Washburn,  8  id. 
707. 

839 


845 


EVIDENCE. 


845    tive ;  (a)    otherwise,   the    rule   will   not   apply  ;    *  as   where   a 


126;  Davis  ».  Stevens,  3  Clarke,  158;  Panton  r. 
Tefft,22  111.  366;  Pusey  v.  Wright,  31  Penn.  St. 
387 ;  Spence  v  Dodd,  19  Ark.  166;  Hill  v.  Bush, 
19  Ark.  522;  1  Greenl.  Ev.  §  260;  Gresley,  Eq. 
Ev.  4;  Clarke  v.  Van  Reimsdyk,  9  Cranch,  160; 
Hollister  v.  Barkley,  11  N.  H.  501;  Langdon  v. 
Goddard,  2  Story,  267;  Koherts  v.  Salisbury,  3 
Gill  &  J.  425;  Purcell  v.  Purcell,  4  Hen.  & 
M.  607 ;  M'Cowen  v.  Young,  2  Stew.  &  P.  161; 
Alexander  v.  Wallace,  10  Yerger,  115;  Daniel 
V.  Mitchell,  1  Story,  172;  Neville  v.  Demeritt, 
1  Green  Ch.  322;  Betty  v.  Taylor,  5  Dana, 
598;  Gray  v.  Paris,  7  Yerger,  155;  Johnson 
v.  Slawsen,  1  Bailey  Eq.  463;  Mason  v.  Peck, 
7  J.  J.  Marsh.  301;  Stafford  v.  Bryan,  1 
Paige,  239;  Clark  v.  Oakley,  4  Ark.  236; 
Towne  r.  Smith,  1  Wood.  &  M.  115;  Green  v. 
Tanner,  8  Met.  422;  Cushing  v.  Smith,  3  Story, 
556;  Hough  v.  Richardson,  id.  659,  692;  Gould 
v.  Gould,  id.  516,  540;  Jones  v.  Belt,  2  Gill, 
106;  Menifee  v.  Menifee,  3  English,  9;  Morgan 
v.  Tifdon,  3  McLean,  339;  Appleton  v.  Horton, 
25  Maine,  23  ;  Eastman  v.  McAlpice,  1  Kelly, 
157;  Tobey  v.  Leonard,  2  Wall.  423;  O'Ban- 
non  v.  Myer,  36  Ala.  551 ;  Benson  v.  Woolver- 
ton,  15  N.  J.  Eq.  158;  Bird  v.  Styles,  18  id. 
297;  Hynson  v.  Voshell,  26  Md.  83,  94;  De 
Hart  p.  Baud,  19  N.  J.  Eq.  423;  Hughes  v. 
Blackwell;  6  Jones  Eq.  73;  Hill  v.  Williams, 
id.  242:  Stephens  v.  Orman,  10  Fla.  9;  Barton 
v.  Moss,  32  111.  50;  Dunlap  v.  Wilson,  id.  517; 
Myers  v.  Kinzie,  26  111.  36;  White  v.  Hampton, 
10  Iowa,  238;  Gillett  v.  Bobbins,  12  Wis.  319; 
Bent  v.  Smith,  22  N.  J.  Eq.  560;  Beverley  r. 
Walden,  20  Gratt.  147;  Powell  ».  Manson,  22 
Gratt.  189;  Falk  v.  Turner,  101  Mass.  495; 
Zane  v.  Cawley,  21  N.  J.  Eq.  130;  Fulton  v. 
Woodman,  54  Miss.  158.  The  right  of  a  de- 
fendant in  a  bill  in  Chancery,  to  have  his 
answer  thereto  taken  in  evidence,  is  co-exten- 
sive with  his  obligation  to  answer.  Blaisdell  v. 
Bowers,  40  Vt.  126.  The  statute  of  Vermont, 
providing  that  parties  shall  not  testify  in  their 
own  behalf,  in  certain  cases,  does  not  appl}'  to 
an  answer  to  a  b  11  in  Chancery,  but  the  answer, 
when  responsive,  is  evidence,  and  is  not  affected 
by  that  statute.  Blaisdell  v.  Bowers,  ubi  supra. 
The  plaintiff  is  not  allowed  to  impeach  the  char- 
acter of  the  defendant,  for  truth  and  veracity, 
but  must  overcome  his  answer  by  stronger  evi- 
dence. Vandegrift  v.  Herbert.  18  N.  J.  Eq. 
469;  Brown  v.  Bulkier,  14  id.  294;  Chambers 
v.  Warren,  13  111.321;  Butler  v.  Catling,  1 
Boot.  310;  Salmon  v.  Clagett,  3  Bland,  165; 
but  see  Miller  v.  Tolleson,  1  Harp.  Ch.  145. 
The  operation  of  the  defendant's  answer  is  the 
same,  although  the  equity  of  the  plaintiff's  bill 


is  grounded  on  the  allegation  of  fraud.  Dilly 
v.  Barnard,  8  Gill  &  J.  171;  M'Donald  v. 
M'Cleod,  1  Ired.  Eq.  226;  Lewis  v.  Owen.  id. 
290;  Murray  v.  Blatchford,  1  Wend.  583;  Cun- 
ningham v.  Freeborn,  3  Paige,  557;  Graham  v. 
Berryman,  19  N.  J.  Eq.  29 ;  Blanton  r.  Brack- 
ett,  5  Coll.  232  ;  Green  v.  Vaughan,  2  Blatkf. 
324;  Hart  v.  Ten  Eyck,  2  John.  Ch.  92;  Wight 
v.  Prescott,  2  Barb.  Ch.  196 ;  Fant  v.  Miller,  17 
Gratt.  187;  see  Miller  v.  Tolleson,  Harper  Eq. 
145.  The  defendant  is  as  much  bound  to  an- 
swer the  charging  part  as  the  stating  part, 
of  the  bill;  and  his  answer  to  the  charging 
part,  if  responsive  thereto,  is  evidence  in  his 
own  favor,  if  an  answer  on  oath  has  not  been 
waived  by  the  plaintiff.  Smith  r.  Clark,  4 
Paige,  368;  Rich  v.  Austin,  40  Vt.  416;  Adams 
v.  Adams,  22  Vt.  68.  Where,  however,  the 
answer  of  the  defendant  is  not  responsive  to 
the  bill,  or  sets  up  affirmative  allegations  of 
new  matter  not  stated  or  inquired  of  in  the  bill, 
in  opposition  to,  or  in  avoidance  of,  the  plain- 
tiff's demand,  and  is  replied  to,  the  answer  is  of 
no  avail  in  respect  to  such  allegations;  and  the 
defendant  is  as  much  bound  to  establish  the 
allegations  so  made,  by  independent  testimony, 
as  the  plaintiff  is  to  sustain  his  bill.  Clemeiits 
r.  Moore,  6  Wall.  315;  Seitz  v.  Mitchell,  94 
TJ.  S.  580:  Roberts  v.  Stigleman,  78  111.  120; 
Gordon  v.  Bell,  50  Ala.  213;  Roberts  r.  Birgess, 
20  N.  J.  Eq.  139;  O'Brien  v.  Fry,  82  111.  274; 
Hart  v.  Carpenter,  36  Mich.  402;  Bellows  v. 
Stone,  18  N.  H.  465;  Wakeman  v.  Grover, 
4  Paige,  23;  New  England  Bank  v.  Lewis,  8 
Pick.  113;  Hart  v.  Ten  Eyck,  2  John.  Ch.  89; 
Dickey  v.  Allen,  1  Green  Ch.  406;  Bradley  v. 
W'ebb",  53  Maine,  462;  O'Brien  v.  Elliot,  15 
Maine,  125;  Lucas  r.  Bank  of  Darien,  2  Stewart, 
280;Winansf.Winans,  19  N.J.  Eq  220;Pierson 
».  Clayes.  15  Vt.  93;  Wells  v.  Houston,  37  Vt. 
245;  M' Daniel  v.  Barnam,  5  Vt.  279;  Tobin  v. 
Walkinshaw,  1  McAll.  C.  C.  26;  Pusey  v. 
Wright,  31  Penn.  St.  387;  Garlick  c.  Mo- 
Arthur,  6  Wis.  450;  Ives  v.  Hazard,  4  R.  I.  14; 
Dease  v.  Moody,  31  Miss.  617;  Fisler  v.  Porch, 
10  N.  J.  Eq.  243;  Voorhees  v.  Voorhees,  18  id. 
223;  Miles  v.  Miles,  32  N.  H.  147;  Busby  v. 
Littlefield,  33  N.  H.  76 ;  Rogers  v.  Mitchell,  41 
N.  H.  157;  Leach  v.  Fobes,  11  Gray,  509,- 
M'Donald  v.  M'Donald,  16  Vt.  630;  Randall  v. 
Phillips,  3  Mason,  378;  Gordon  v.  Sims,  2 
M'Cord  Ch.  156;  Clarke  v.  White,  12  Peters, 
178;  Lampton  v.  Lampton,  6  Monroe,  620; 
Purcell  v.  Purcell,  4  Hen.  &  M.  511;  Hagthorp 
v.  Hook,  1  Gill  &  J.  272;  Alexander  v.  Wal- 
lace, 10  Yerger,  105;  Cocke  v.  Trotter,  id.  213; 
Carter  v.  Sleeper,  5  Dana,  263;  Flagg  v.  Mann, 


(o)  See    Toulme    v.   Clark,  64    Miss.    471 ; 
Morse  r.  Hill.  136  Mass.  60;  Burlew  r.  Quarrier, 
16  W.  Va.  108;  Harris  v.  Collins,  75  Ga.  97; 
840 


Saunders  v.  Allen,  53  Fed.  Rep  109  ;  Atkinson 
v.  Foster,  134  111.  472. 


ADMISSIONS. 


*846 


defendant,  by  his  answer,  denies  a  fact  as  to  his  belief  *  only ; 1  or    *  846 


2  Sumner,  487;  Gould  v.  Williamson,  21  Maine, 
273;  Jones  v.  Jones,  1  Ired.  Eq.  332;  Johnson 
v.  Pierson,  Dev.  Eq.  3G4;  Miller  v.  Wack, 
1  Saxton,  204;  Pierce  v.  Gates,  7  Blackf.  102; 
Dunn  v.  Dunn,  8  Ala.  784;  Sanborn  17.  Kit- 
tredge,  20  Vt.  632;  Fitzhugh  c.  M'Pherson,  3 
Gill,  408;  Patton  v.  Ashley,  3  Eng.  290;  Brooks 
v.  Gillis,  12  Sin.  &  M.  538.  An  answer  to 
statements  of  the  bill  not  necessary  to  the  com- 
plainant's case  are  not  evidence  for  the  defend- 
ant. Brown  v.  Kahnweiler,  28  N.  J.  Eq.  311, 
citing  Wanmaker  v.  Van  Buskirk,  Saxt.  685; 
Farnum  v.  Burnett,  21  N.  J.  Eq.  87;  Day  v. 
Perkins,  2  Sandf.  Ch.  359,  365.  The  bill  set 
out  an  agreement,  and  called  upon  the  defend- 
ant to  admit  or  deny  it,  but  not  to  state  what  it 
was,  and  the  defendant  in  his  answer  set  forth 
another  agreement;  such  statement  of  the  lat- 
ter agreement  is  not  responsive  to  the  bill,  and 
is  not  evidence  for  the  defendant.  Jones  v. 
Beet,  2  Gill,  106.  An  answer,  in  stating  the 
particulars  of  a  transaction  charged  and  in- 
quired into  by  the  bill,  is  responsive.  Merritt 
v.  Brown,  19  N.  J.  Eq.  286,  289 ;  Youle  v.  Rich- 
ards, Saxton,  539;  Moody  v.  Metcalf,  51  Ga. 
128.  To  a  bill  for  an  account  between  partners, 
alleging  that  each  partner  had  an  equal  inter- 
est, the  answer  was  held  responsive  which 
denied  the  allegation,  and  averred  that  the 
shares  were  unequal,  specifying  them.  Eaton's 
Appeal,  66  Penn.  St.  483.  If  the  bill  requires 
the  defendant  to  state  an  account  between  the 
parties,  the  account  so  stated  is  responsive  to 
the  bill.  Bellows  v.  Stone,  18  N.  H.  465.  If 
the  defendant  might  have  full}'  answered  the 
plaintiff's  bill,  and  left  out  an}'  particular 
allegations  of  new  matter  in  his  answer,  then 
those  allegations  are  not  responsive;  but  all 
allegations  are  responsive,  the  absence  of 
which  in  the  answer  would  furnish  just 
ground  for  exception.  Bellows  v.  Stone,  18 
N.  H.  465.  But  when  the  case  is  heard  upon 
the  bill  and  answer  alone,  the  answer  must  be 
taken  as  true,  whether  responsive  to  the  bill  or 
not,  because  the  defendant  is  precluded  from 
proving  it. (b)  Lowry  v.  Armstrong,  2  Stew. 
&  P.  297 ;  Cheny  v.  Belcher,  5  id.  134  ;  M'Gowen 
v.Young,  3  id.  161;  Paulling  r.  Sturgis,  id. 
95;  Stone  v.  Moore,  26  111.  165;  Doolittle  v. 
Gooking,  10  Vt.  275;  Slason  v.  Wright,  14 
Vt.  208;  Wright  v.  Bates,  13  V7t.  341;  Dale 
v.  M'Evers,  2  Cowen,  118;  Reed  v.  Reed,  16 
N.  J.  Eq.  248;  Jones  v.  Mason,  5  Rand.  577; 
Kennedy  v.  Baylor,  1  Wash.  162;  Copeland  V. 


Crane,  9  Pick.  73 ;  Tainter  v.  Clark,  5  Allen,  66 ; 
Perkins  v.  Nichols,  11  Allen,  542;  Russell  v.  Mof- 
fit,  6  How.  (Miss.)  303;  Trout  v.  Emmons,  29  111. 
433;  Buntain  v.  Wood,  id.  504;  Gaskill  c.  Sine, 
13  N.  J.  Eq.  130;  Mason  v.  McGore,  28  111. 
322;  De  Wolf  v.  Long,  2  Gilman,  679;  Rogers  v. 
Mitchell,  41  N.  II.  154.  Still,  general  allegations 
in  an  answer,  containing  matters  of  belief  and 
conclusions  from  facts  not  particularly  stated, 
are  said  by  Wilde  J.  in  Copeland  v.  Crane,  9 
Pick.  73,  78,  to  be  entitled  to  little  or  no  weight 
in  a  hearing  on  the  bill  and  answer.  See 
Beford  v.  Crane,  16  N.  J.  Eq.  265.  Such  an 
answer,  however,  is  sufficient  to  put  the  plaintiff 
to  the  proof  of  his  case;  the  Court  in  such  a 
case  will  believe  what  the  defendant  believes, 
nothing  being  found  to  the  contrary.  Buttrick 
v.  Holden,  13  Met.  355,  377.  And  so  far  as 
his  answer  is  a  mere  denial  of  the  plaintiff's 
case,  of  course  it  prevails.  It  is  for  the  plaintiff 
to  prove  the  allegations  in  the  bill  which  are 
denied  by  the  answer.  But  when  the  answer 
admits  the  plaintiff's  case,  and  seeks  to  avoid 
it,  by  general  allegations  of  the  character  above 
alluded  to  by  Mr.  Justice  Wilde,  then  the  ques- 
tion of  its  effect,  as  an  answer,  properly  arises, 
and  undoubtedly,  in  such  a  case,  it  would  be 
entitled  to  but  little  weight.  See  Givens  v. 
Tidniore,  8  Ala.  745.  An  answer  which  alleges 
as  facts  what  the  defendant  could  not  personally 
know,  though  responsive  to  the  bill,  merely 
puts  the  plaintiff  upon  the  proof  of  his  own 
allegations.  Dugan  v.  Gittings,  3  Gill,  138;  see 
Drury  v.  Conner,  6  Harr.  &  J.  288,  291 ;  Law- 
rence v.  Lawrence,  21  N.  J.  Eq.  317.  So  of  a 
denial  by  the  defendant  upon  information  and 
belief,  not  founded  on  the  personal  knowledge 
of  the  defendant.  Coleman  v.  Ross,  46  Penn. 
St.  180;  Newman  v.  James,  12  Ala.  29  :  Town- 
send  v.  Mcintosh,  14  Ind.  57;  Ilartwell  v. 
Whitman,  36  Ala.  712;  see  Bellows  v.  Stone, 
18  N.  H.  465,  479.  So,  an  answer  on  informa- 
tion simply  makes  an  issue.  Wilkins  v.  May, 
3  Head,  173.  As  to  the  effect  of  the  answer  of 
a  corporation  being  put  in,  not  under  oath,  but 
under  the  common  seal  of  the  corporation,  see 
Haight  v.  Proprietors  of  Morris  Aqueduct,  4 
Wash.  C.  C.  601;  Lovett  v.  Steam  Saw  Mill 
Ass.  6  Paige,  54;  State  Bank  v.  Edwards,  20 
Ala.  512;  Union  Bank  v.  Geary,  5  Peters,  99. 
Such  answer  has  no  other  force  and  effect  than 
that  of  an  individual  not  under  oath.  Mary- 
land and  New  York  Coal  &  Iron  Co.  v.  Win- 
gert,  8  Gill,  170.     So  of  an  answer  sworn  to  in 


1  Arnot  v.  Biscoe,  1  Yes.  Sr.  95,  97 ;  Hughes 
v.  Garner,  2  Y.  &C.  Ex.  328,  335.     The  true 


rule  in  such  case  is  that  the  answer  is  to  be  re- 
garded as  the  deposition  of  one  witness,  and 


(b)  McCully  i'.  Peel,  42  N.  J.  Eq.  493;  Mar- 
zet  v.  Pittsburgh,  137  Penn.  St.  548;  Ameri- 
can Carpet  Linen  Co.  v.  Chipman,  146  Mass. 


385;    Davenport  v.  Auditor-General,  70  Mich. 
192;  Bierne  v.  Ray,  37  W.  Va.  571. 

841 


816 


EVIDENCE. 


where  it  is  a  mere  constructive  denial,  by  the  filing  of  a  traversing  note.2 


another  State  before  an  officer  not  authorized  to 
take  an  oath  to  an  answer.  Freytag  v.  Hoeland, 
23  N.  J.  Eq.  30.  As  to  the  effect  of  an  answer, 
made  by  one  incompetent  to  give  testimony  in 
any  case,  and  incapable  of  making  oath,  see  Sal- 
mon r.  Clagett,  3  Bland,  105.  The  oaths,  of 
two  plaintiffs  in  the  same  cause,  made  by  the 
statute  of  New  Jersey  competent  witnesses  for 
themselves,  will  not  be  considered  as  destroy- 
ing the  effect  of  the  responsive  denial  of  the 
answer,  unless  they  seem  to  the  Court  to  be 
entitled  to  the  weight  of  the  oaths  of  two  cred- 
ible witnesses;  and,  in  considering  their  weight, 
the  fact  of  the  interest  of  these  witnesses  as 
parties  to  the  suit  must  be  taken  into  consid- 
eration. Vandegrift  v.  Herbert,  18  N.  J.  Eq. 
466.  It  has  been  stated  above,  in  this  note,  that 
the  plaintiff  will  not  be  allowed  to  discredit  the 
answer  by  impeaching  the  character  of  the  de- 
fendant for  truth  and  veracity.  This  subject 
was  very  fully  examined  by  Chancellor  Green, 
in  Brown  v.  Bulkley,  14  N.  J.  Eq.  294,  and  he 
entirely  sustains  this  position. 

Under  the  Practice  Act  in  California,  a  sworn 


the  plaintiffs  must  produce  evidence  sufficient  to 
overcome  it,  and  there  is  no  unvarying  rule  on 
the  subject.  Veile  v.  Blodgett,  49  Vt.  270.  Where 
the  answer  does  not  state  facts  positively,  or  as 
within  the  defendant's  own  knowledge,  or  does 
state  them  iuferentially  merely,  or  only  accord- 
ing to  the  defendant's  best  knowledge  and 
belief,  the  rule  requiring  two  witnesses,  or  one 
witness  with  corroborating  circumstances,  to 
counteract  its  effect,  does  not  apply.  Cunning- 
ham v.  Ferry,  74  111.  426.  The  only  effect  of  the 
answer  in  such  case  is,  to  put  the  plaintiff  to  the 
necessity  of  proving  the  facts  alleged  in  his  bill. 
Waters  v.  Creagh,  4  Stew.  &  P.  410;  Hughes 
v.  Garner,  2  Y.  &  C.  127;  Knickerbacker  v. 
Harris,  1  Paige,  209 ;  Stevens  v.  Post,  12  N.  J. 
Eq.  408;  Pearce  v.  Nix,  34  Ala.  183;  Watson 
v.  Palmer,  5  Ark.  501,  505,  506;  Drury  v. 
Conner,  6  Harr.  &  J.  288;  Phillips  v.  Richard- 
son, 4  J.  J.  Marsh.  213;  Copeland  v.  Crane,  9 
Pick.  73,  78;  Parkman  v.  Welch,  19  Pick.  231; 
Norwood  v.  Norwood,  2  Harr.  &  J.  328;  Pen- 
nington v.  Gittings,  2  Gill  &  J.  208  ;  Bellows  v. 
Stone,  18  N.  H.  465;  Hunt  v.  Rousmanier,  3 
Mason,  294 ;  Brown  v.  Brown,  10  Yerger,  84; 
Combs  v.  Buswell,  2  Dana,  474  ;  Young  v. 
Hopkins,  6  Monroe,  22;  Martin  v.  Greene,  10 
Mo.  652.  The  same  is  true  where  the  answer  is 
evasive,  or  so  expressed  as  not  to  amount  to  a 
positive  denial.  Wilkins  v.  Woodfin,  5  Munf. 
183;  M'Campbell  v.  Gill,  4  Monroe,  90 ;  Sallee 
v.  Duncan,  7  Monroe,  383;  Hutchinson  v.  Sin- 
clair, id.  293:  Neal  v.  Ogden,  5  Monroe,  362; 
Lyon  v.  Hunt,  11  Ala.  295;  Hrirtwell  r.  Whit- 
man, 36  Ala.  712;  Martin  v.  Greene,  10  Mo. 
652.     And  if  the  facts  are  stated  in  the  bill  to  be 

842 


answer  is  no  evidence  for  the  defendant.  Good- 
win v.  Hammond,  13  Cal.  168;  Bostic  v.  Love, 
16  Cal.  69.  And  in  Missouri  the  old  rule  with 
respect  to  the  weight  of  an  answer  in  Chancery 
has  been  done  away  with  by  the  new  Code. 
Walton  v.  Walton,  17  Mo.  376;  Cornet  v. 
Bertelsmann.  61  Mo.  118, 126.  So  in  Iowa  the 
rule  requiring  two  witnesses,  or  one  and  strong 
corroborating  circumstances,  to  overcome  the 
answer,  does  not  exist;  though  such  answer 
throws  upon  the  plaintiff  the  onus  of  sus- 
taining his  material  charges  by  competent 
proof.  Graves  v.  Alden,  13  Iowa,  573;  Jones 
v.  Jones,  id.  276  ;  Culbertson  v.  Luckey,  id. 
12;  Cheuvette  v.  Mason,  4  Green,  231;  White 
v.  Hampton,  10  Iowa,  238 ;  Gilbert  v.  Mosier, 
11  Iowa,  498.  A  sworn  answer  in  Chancery,  if 
not  demanded,  only  puts  in  issue  the  allegations 
of  the  bill.  Wilson  v.  Holcomb,  13  Iowa,  110; 
Connelly  v.  Carlin,  id.  383.  An  answer  in 
Chancery  without  an  oath  is  a  mere  pleading, 
and  of  no  effect  as  evidence.  Morris  t;.  Hoyt, 
11  Mich.  9. 


in  the  defendant's  personal  knowledge,  and  the 
defendant  merely  disclaim  personal  knowledge 
and  demand  strict  proof,  this  will  not  amount 
to  a  denial  of  the  facts  and  put  the  complainant 
on  proof  of  them.  McAllister  v.  Clorton,  51 
Miss.  257.  So  where  the  answer  is  merely 
formal  to  put  in  issue  the  allegations  of  the  bill. 
Reynolds  v.  Pharr,  9  Ala.  560.  Or  neither 
admits  nor  denies  a  fact  charged  by  the  bill. 
Ante,  p.  837,  n.  4.  The  answei  of  a  corporation, 
being  put  in  under  its  common  seal  only,  cannot 
be  used  as  evidence,  but  puts  in  issue  the  allega- 
tions to  which  it  responds,  and  imposes  on  the 
plaintiff  the  burden  of  proving  such  allegations. 
Baltimore  &  Ohio  R.  R.  v.  Wheeling,  13  Gratt. 
40.  Where  an  answer  on  oath  is  waived,  the 
answer  is  not  evidence  in  favor  of  the  defend- 
ant for  any  purpose :  Patterson  v.  Gaines,  6 
How.  (U.  S.)  550;  Larsh  v.  Brown,  3  Ind.  234  ; 
Moore  v.  McClintock,  6  Ind.  209  ;  Doo:i  v.  Bayer, 
16  Md.  144:  although  in  fact  put  in  under 
oath  :  Gerrish  v.  Towne,  3  Gray,  82  ;  Armstrong 
v.  Scott,  3  Iowa  433;  Wilson  v.  Holcomb,  13 
Iowa,  110;  Connelly  v.  Carlin,  id.  383;  see 
Patterson  v.  Scott,  138  111.  100  ;  37  III.  App.  520; 
but  as  a  pleading,  the  plaintiff  may  avail  him- 
self of  the  admissions  and  allegations  contained 
therein,  which  establish  the  case  made  by  the 
bill.  Bartlett  r.  Gale.  4  Paige,  503;  Miller  v. 
Avery.  2  Birb.  Ch.  582;  Wilson  v.  Towle,  36 
N.  H.  129;  Durfee  v.  McClurg,  6  Mich.  223; 
Smith  r.  Potter,  3  Wis.  432;  see  also  Union 
Bank  of  Georgetown  v.  Geary,  5  Peters,  99, 
110-112; 'Story,  Eq.  PI  §  875  a,  and  note; 
White  v.  Hampton,  10  Iowa,  238. 
2  See  ante,  p.  514. 


ADMISSIONS.  *  847 

The  reason  for  the  adoption  of  this  rule  by  the  Courts  was :  because, 
there  being  a  single  deposition  only,  against  the  oath  of  the  defendant 
in  his  answer,  the  denial  of  facts  by  the  answer  was  equally  strong  with 
the  affirmation  of  them  by  the  deposition.8  Where,  therefore,  there  were 
any  corroborative  circumstances  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff's  case,  which 
gave  a  preponderance  in  his  favor,  the  Court  departed  from  the  rule, 
and  either  made  a  decree,  or  directed  an  issue.4  Thus,  where 
a  bill  was  filed  for  the  specific  *  performance  of  an  agreement,  *  847 
which  the  defendant  denied  by  his  answer,  but  the  agreement 
was  proved  by  one  witness,  and  there  was  also  evidence  to  prove  the 
defendant's  confession  of  it,  besides  other  corroborative  circumstances,  a 
decree  was  made.1  So,  where  a  defendant  had  denied  notice  of  a  previous 
mortgage,  which,  however,  was  proved  by  a  single  witness,  and  it  was  also 
proved,  by  other  evidence,  that  upon  an  application  being  made  to  the 
defendant  on  behalf  of  the  previous  mortgagee  for  an  account,  he  ob- 
served, "You  have  no  right,  for  your  mortgage  is  not  registered,"  Lord 
Redesdale  held,  that  the  testimony  of  the  witness,  who  proved  the  notice 
directly,  was  confirmed  by  that  observation,  which  showed  that  the 
defendant  had  investigated  the  subject,  and  relied  on  the  neglect  to 
register  the  mortgage.2 

Upon  the  same  principle,  where  a  parol  agreement,  with  part-perform- 
ance, is  insisted  upon  in  a  bill,  and  the  agreement  is  denied  by  the  answer, 
yet,  if  it  is  proved  by  one  witness,  and  supported  by  circumstances  of  part- 
performance,  such  as  delivery  of  possession,  the  specific  performance  of 
the  agreement  has  been  decreed.3     In  such  cases,  however,  if  the  defend- 

3  Walton  v.  Hobbs,  2  Atk.  19.  Eq.  205.     Circumstances  alone,  in  the  absence 

4  Pember  v.  Mathers,  Walton  v.  Hobbs,  of  a  positive  witness,  may  be  sufficient  to  over- 
Hine  v.  Dodd,  ubi  supra  ;  and  Janson  v.  Rany,  come  the  denial  of  the  answer,  even  of  a  person 
2  Atk.  140  ;  see  also  Re  Barr's  Trust,  4  K.  &  J.  who  answers  on  his  own  knowledge.  Long  v. 
219;  Dunn  v.  Graham,  17  Ark.  60;  1  Greenl.  White, 5  J.  J.  Marsh.  238;  Robinson  v.  Stewart, 
Ev.  §  200;  1  Phil.  Ev.  (Cowen  &  Hill's  ed.)  10  N.  Y.  189;  Robinson  e.  Hardin,  20  Ga.  344; 
154,  155,  and  notes  referred  to;  Sturtevant  v.  Roberts  v.  Kelly,  2  P.  &  H.  390;  see  also  Stur- 
Waterbury,  1  Edw.  Ch.  442;  Columbia  Bank  v.  tevant  v.  Waterbury,  1  Edw.  442;  Broun  v. 
Black,  2  M'Cord  Ch.  344,  350;  Smith  v.  Shane,  Brown,  10  Yerger,  84;  Dunham  v.  Gates.  1  Hoff. 
1  M'Lean,  27;  Clark  v.  Van  Reimsdyk,  9  Ch.  188;  Cunningham  v.  Freeborn,  3  Paige, 
Cranch,  160;  Neilson  v.  Dickinson,  1  Desaus.  564  ;  S.  C.  on  appeal,  11  Wend.  251;  Gould  v. 
103;  Union  Bank  of  Georgetown  v.  Geary,  5  Williamson,  21  Maine,  276;  Preschbaker  r. 
Peters,  99;  Clark  v.  Hunt,  3  J.  .1.  Marsh.  £60;  Freeman,  32  III.  475. 

Young  v.  Hopkins,  6  Monroe,  22;  Watson  v.  The  credit  due  to  an  answer  in  Chancery  is 
Stockett,  6  Harr.  &  J.  435;  Roberts  v.  Salis-  no  greater  than  that  which  i>  due  to  the  deposi- 
bury,  3  Gill  &  J.  425;  McNeil  v.  Magee,  5  tion  of  a  witness,  and,  therefore,  if  that  which 
Mason,  244;  Pierson  v.  Catlin.  3  Vt.  272;  Dun-  is  in  favor  of  respondent  be  unreasonable  in  it- 
ham  v.  Jackson,  0  Wen  1.  72;  Turner  v.  Holman,  self,  or  be  disproved  by  other  witnesses,  or  be 
5  Monroe,  410;  Hutchinson  v.  Sinclair,  7  Mon-  inconsistent  with  other  facts  in  the  cause,  it  mav 
roe,  294;  Drury  v.  Connor,  6  Harr.  &  J.  288;  be  rejected,  although  there  may  not  be  two 
Wilkins  ».Woodfin,  5  Munf.  183;  Love  v.  Brax-  witnesses  contradicting  the  respondent.  Brown 
ton,  5  Call,  527;  Vance  v.  Vance,  5  Mon.  523;  v.  Brown,  10  Yerger,  84  ;  see  Forsvtb  v.  (lark, 
Cunningham  v.  Freeborn,  3  Paige,  557;  Kstep  3  Wend.  637;  Young  v.  Hopkins,  6  T.  B.  Mon. 
v.  Watkins,  1  Bland,  488.  The  answer  that  18  ;  Houndtree  v.  Gordon,  8  Mo.  19. 
denies,  may  contain  the  circumstances  to  cor-  1  Only  v.  Walker,  3  Atk.  407,  408. 
roborate  the  plaintiff's  proof,  so  as  to  overcome  2  Biddulph  v.  St.  John.  2  Sch.  &  I>ef.  532. 
itself,  when  taken  in  connection  with  that  proof.  8  Morphelt  v.  Jones.  I  Swanst.  '72,  182:  see 
Pierson  v.  Catlin,  3  Vt.  272;  Maury  v.  Lewis,  Maddison  v.  Alderson,  8  App.  Cas.  467,  478;  5 
10  Yerger,  115  ;  Sayre  v.  Fredericks,  16  N.  J.  Ex.  D.  293;  McManus  v.  Cooke,  35  Ch.  D.  G81. 

843 


848 


EVIDENCE. 


ant,  by  his  answer,  denies  the  agreement  set  up  by  the  bill,  and  his 
denial  is  confirmed  by  circumstances,  the'Court  will  not  decree  a  specific 
performance,  although  the  case  made  by  the  bill  is  corroborated  by  one 
witness.4  And  where  a  particular  agreement  by  parol,  namely,  an  agree- 
ment to  grant  a  lease  for  three  lives,  was  stated  in  the  bill,  and  proved 
by  one  witness,  and  confirmed  by  acts  of  part-performance,  but  the 
answer  admitted  an  agreement  for  one  life  only,  and  was  supported  by 
the  testimony  of  one  witness,  the  Court  refused  to  decree  for  the  plain- 
tiff, the  evidence  of  part-performance  being  equally  applicable  to  either 
agreement.5 

Sometimes  the  Court  gave  the  defendant  an  opportunity  of  trying 
the  case  at  Law,  when  the  plaintiff's  case  was  supported  by 
*  848  *  the  evidence  of  only  one  witness  and  corroborating  circum- 
stances ; 1  and  sometimes  the  Court  directed  the  answer  of  the 
defendant  to  be  read  as  evidence.2  As  the  practice  of  directing  an 
issue,  in  a  case  of  this  description,  was  intended  solely  for  the  satisfac- 
tion of  the  defendant,  it  was  by  no  means  compulsory  upon  the  defend- 
ant to  take  one ;  and  if  the  defendant  declined  an  issue,  the  Court  itself 
was  bound  to  give  judgment  upon  the  question  whether  the  circum- 
stances outweighed  the  effect  of  the  rule,  so  as  to  authorize  a  decree 
against  the  denial  in  the  answer. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  the  parties  to  a  cause  can  now  be  wit- 
nesses on  their  own  behalf ; 3  so  that  such  questions  as  we  have  just 
been  considering  are  of  very  rare  occurrence  in  modern  practice. 

II.  Admissions  by  agreement  between  the  parties  are  those  which, 
for  the  sake  of  saving  expense  or  preventing  delay,  the  parties,  or  their 
solicitors,  agree  upon  between  themselves.4 

Admissions  of  this  description  depend  entirely  upon  the  circumstances 
of  each  case,  and  little  can  now  be  said  respecting  them  beyond  drawing 
to  the  practitioner's  notice  the  necessity  there  exists  that  they  should 
be  clear  and  distinct.  In  general,  they  ought  to  be  in  writing  and  signed 
either  by  the  parties  or  their  solicitors ;  aud  the  signature  of  the  solici- 


4  Pilling  v.  Armitage,  12  Ves.  78.  79;  Money 
v.  Jordan,  2  De  G.  M.  &  G.  318;  S.  C  nom. 
Jorden  v.  Money,  5  H.  L.  Cas.  185;  Glass  v. 
Hulbert,  102  Mass.  28. 

5  Lindsay  ».  Lynch,  2  Sch.  &  Lef.  1,  7. 

i  East  India  Co.  v.  Donald,  9  Ves.  275,  283, 
284 ;  Ibbottson  v.  Rhodes,  1  Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  229, 
pi.  13:  2  Vern.  554:  Pember  r.  Mathers,  1  Bro. 
C.  C.  52;  Savage  v.  Brocksopp,  18  Ves.  335  337; 
post,  "  Trial  of  Questions  of  Fact ;  "  Lancaster 
v.  Ward,  Overton,  430;  Smith  v.  Betty,  11 
Gratt.  752. 

2  Ibbottson  v.  Rhodes,  ubi  supra.  The  an- 
swer cannot  be  read  unless  an  order  is  made  to 
that  effect.  Black  v.  Lamb,  12  X.  J.  Eq.  108; 
Gresley,  Eq.  Ev.  227;  see  Rule  33  of  the  Rules 
of  Practice  in  Chancery  in  Massachusetts  ; 
Gamble  v.  Johnson,  9  Mo.  605;  Kinsey  v. 
Grimes,  7  Black f.  290.  See,  as  to  the  effect  of 
the  answer,  Richmond  v.  Richmond,  10  Yerger, 

844 


343.  In  Marston  v.  Brackett,  9  ST.  H.  350,  the 
Court  remarked  that  "  the  manner  of  proceed- 
ing to  the  trial  of  issues  from  Chancery  is  under 
the  control  of  the  Court.  Orders  may  be  made 
respecting  the  admission  of  testimony,  and  an 
order  may  be  made  for  the  examination  of  one 
or  both  of  the  parties;  but  this  may  be  refused. 
If  the  party,  after  the  evidence  has  been 
taken  for  the  hearing,  moves  for  a  trial  by 
the  jury,  we  are  of  opinion  the  case  should 
be  tried  there  upon  the  same  evidence  upon 
which  it  would  have  been  tried  had  it  taken 
the  usual  course  of  cases  in  Chancery,  and 
been  examined  by  the  Court ;  unless  the  Court, 
upon  cause  shown,  made  an  order  permitting 
further  evidence  to  be  introduced.  Any  other 
course  would  lead  to  great  abuse,"  &c. 

3  See  14  &  15  Vic.  c.  99,  §  2. 

4  Gresley,  Eq.  Ev.  (Am.  ed.)  38,  etseq. 


THE   ONUS   PROBANDI.  *  849 

tor  employed  by  the  party  is  considered  sufficient  to  bind  his  principal, 
the  Court  inferring  that  he  had  authority  for  that  purpose.5  It  does 
not,  however,  appear  to  be  necessary  that  an  agreement  to  admit  a  par- 
ticular fact  should  be  in  writing.6 

*  It  is  to  be  remarked,  that  although  the  Courts  are  disposed  *  849 
to  give  every  encouragement  to  the  practice  of  parties  or  their 
solicitors  agreeing  upon  admissions  among  themselves,  they  will  not  sanc- 
tion an  agreement  for  an  admission  by  which  any  of  the  known  principles 
of  Law  are  evaded  ; 1  and,  therefore,  where  the  law  requires  an  instrument 
to  be  stamped,  the  Court  will  not  give  effect  to  an  agreement  between  the 
solicitors  to  waive  the  objection  arising  from  its  not  being  stamped.2 

To  save  expense,  it  has  been  recently  enacted,  that  where  all  the 
parties  to  a  suit  are  competent  to  make  admissions,  any  party  may 
call  on  any  other,  by  notice,  to  admit  any  document,  saving  all  just 
exceptions.3 

All  written  admissions  of  evidence,  whereon  any  order  is  founded, 
must  be  indorsed  by  the  Eegistrar,4  and  be  then  filed  at  the  Report 
Office,5  and  a  note  thereof  made  on  the  order,  by  the  Clerk  of 
Reports.6 

Section  II.  —  The  Onus  Probandi. 

Having  ascertained  what  matters  are  to  be  considered  as  admitted 
between  the  parties,  either  by  the  pleadings  or  by  agreement,  the  next 
step  is  to  consider  what  proofs  are  to  be  adduced  in  support  of  those 
points  which  are  not  so  admitted.7 

In   considering   the   question,  what   matters   are  to   be    proved  in  a 

5  Young  v.  Wright,  1  Camp.  N.  P.  139;  with  regard  to  husband  and  wife  giving  cvi- 
Gainsford  v.  Gammer,  2  id.  9;  Laing  v.  Kaine,  dence  for  or  against  each  other,  see  16  &  17  Vic. 
2  Bos.  &  P.  85.  For  form  of  admission,  see  c.  83;  32  &  33  Vic.  c.  68 ;  Rt  Hideout's  Trusts, 
Vol.  III.  L.  R.  10  Eq.  41;    Re  Yearwocd's  Trusts,  5  Ch. 

6  Thus,  where  at  Law  the  plaintiff's  attorney  D.  545;  Nottingham  Union  Guardians  v.  Tom- 
swore  that  he  had  proposed  that  the  defendant  kinson,  4  C.  P.  D.  343. 

should  acknowledge  a  warrant  of  attorney,  so  2  Owen  t\  Thomas,  3  M.  &   K.  353,  357; 

as  to  enable  the  deponent,  if  it  should  become  Nixon    v.  Albion  Mar.   Ins.  Co.   L.  R.  2  Ex. 

necessary,  to  enter  up  judgment  thereon,  and  438;    see,  however,    Orange   0.   Pickford,  and 

that  the  defendant  had  accepted  his  offer,  it  was  Thompson   r.   Webster,  cited  Seton,    16;   see 

considered  well  proved  that  the  defendant  had  also  post,  p.   880,  and  Chap.  XXV.,  Hearing 

agreed  to  acknowledge  the  instrument  for  all  Causes. 

purposes,  and  that  the  plaintiff  was  at  liberty  3  21  &  22  Vic.  c.  27,  §  7;  see  post,  p.  879. 

to  act  upon  the  instrument  without  the  necessity  4  Reg.  Regul.  15  March,  1860,  r.  23.    For 

of  producing   the  subscribing   witness.     Mar-  form  of  entering  admissions,  see  Seton,  24. 
shall  v.  Cliff,  4  Camp.  133.    But   it  may  be  6  Cons.  Ord.  I.  44. 

doubted  whether  it   is  not  necessary,  in  Chan-  6  Cons.  Ord.  XXIII.  23. 

eery,  that  all  admissions  should  be  in  writing.  '  The   rules  of  evidence   are   the   same   in 

See  Ord.  III.  11.  Courts  of  Equity  as  in  Courts  of  Law.     Morri- 

l  Thus,  where  a  husband  was  willing  that  son  v.  Hart,  2  Bibb,  4;  Lemaster  v.  Burckhart, 

his  wife  should  be  examined  as  a  witness,  in  an  id.  28;  Dwight  v.  Poineroy,  17  Mass.  303;  Reed 

action  against  him  for  a  malicious  prosecution,  p.  Clark,  4  Monroe,   20;  Stevens  v.  Cooper,  1 

Lord  Hardwicke  refused  to  allow  her  examina-  John.  Ch.  425;  Baugh   v.  Ramsey,  4  Monroe, 

tion,  because  it  was  against  the  policy  of  the  137;  Eveleth  r.  Wilson,  15  Mass.  109.      As  to 

law  to  allow  a  woman  to  be  a  witness,  either  the  onus  in   cases  of  trusts,    see    Roberts  v. 

for  or  against  her  husband.     Barker  i\  Dixie,  Roberts,  12  Jur.  N.  S.  971. 
Rep.  temp.  Hardwicke,   2G4.     As  to  the  law 

845 


8o0 


EVIDENCE. 


cause. 


850 


Law 


the  first  point  to  be  ascertained  is,  upon  whom  the  burden 
of  the  proof  lies  ?  And  here  it  may  be  laid  down,  as  a  general 
*  proposition,  that  the  point  in  issue  is  to  be  proved  by  the  party 
who  asserts  the  affirmative,  according  to  the  maxim  of  the  Civil 
"  Ei  incumbit  pvubatio  qui  dicit,  non  qui  negate  x  («)     This  rule  is 


1  On  this  subject,  see  the  following  works 
on  evidence:  1  Phillips,  552;  1  Taylor,  §337, 
et  seq. ;  Best,  §  271 ;  Gresley,  388;  Starkie,  586 : 
Powell,  180.  This  is  a  rule  of  convenience, 
adopted,  not  because  it  is  impossible  to  prove  a 
negative,  but  because  a  negative  does  not  ad- 
mit of  the  direct  and  simple  proof  of  which  the 
affirmative  is  capable.  1  Greenl.  Ev.  §  74; 
Dranquet  v.  Prudhomme,  3  La.  83,  86;  1  Phil. 
Ev.  194-203;  2  Phil.  Ev.  (Cowen  &  Hill's  notes, 
ed.  1839)  475,  et  seq. ;  Phelps  v.  Hartwell,  1 
Mass.  71;  Blaney  v.  Sargeant,  id.  335;  Loring 
v.  Steinman,  1  Met.  204,  211;  Phillips  v.  Ford, 
9  Pick.  39.  Regard  is  to  be  had  in  this  matter 
to  the  substance  of  the  issue  rather  than  to  the 
form  of  it;  for  in  many  cases  the  party,  by 
making  a  slight  change  in  his  pleading,  may 
give  the  issue  a  negative  or  affirmative  form, 
at  his  pleasure.  1  Greenl.  Ev.  §  74.  To  this 
general  rule,  that  the  burden  of  proof  is  on  the 
party  holding  the  affirmative,  there  are  some 
exceptions.  Ibid.  §  78.  One  class  of  these 
exceptions  will  be  found  to  include  those  cases 
in  which  the  party  grounds  his  right  of  action 


(a)  All  the  admissions  in  a  pleading  are  to 
be  taken  together.  Spencer  v.  Fortescue,  1 12 
N.  C.  208.  In  some  jurisdictions  it  is  held  that 
facts  well  pleaded  are  admitted  if  not  denied. 
See  Cobbey  c.  Wright,  34  Neb.  771 .  More  often, 
perhaps,  it  is  held  that  allegations  which  are 
neither  admitted  nor  denied  by  the  answer, 
must  be  proved.  Litch  v.  Clinch,  136  111.  410; 
Cushman  v.  Bonfield,  139  111.219;  Randolph  i\ 
GIos,  135  111.  200;  Smith  v.  Ewing,  23  Fed. 
Rep.  741;  Rogers  )•.  Marshall,  13  id.  59;  Mead 
?■.  Day,  54  Miss.  58.  So  under  the  Code  of 
Colorado,  material  allegations  in  the  complaint, 
if  not  denied  by  the  answer,  need  not  be  proved. 
Wall  v.  Livezay,  6  Col.  465.  In  Ferris  ?>.  Hard, 
135  N.  Y.  354,"  361,  Peckham  J.  said:  "An 
answer  may  contain  a  direct  or  an  implied  ad- 
mission of  some  fact  alleged  in  the  complaint. 
The  admission  is  implied  when  the  fact  alleged 
in  the  complaint  is  not  denied  in  the  answer, 
It  is  direct  when  the  admission  is  made  in 
terms.  Either  form  of  an  admission  of  an 
allegation  contained  in  the  complaint  is  conclu- 
sive upon  a  defendant  so  long  as  it  remains  in 
the  pleading,  and  the  plaintiff  can  point  to  it  as 
conclusive  proof  of  the  truth  of  his  allegation. 
Paige  v.  Willett,  38  N.  Y.  28;  Robbins  v.  Cod- 
man,  4  E.  D.  Smith,  315,  325.  An  allegation 
contained  in  an  answer  setting  up  an  affirmative 

846 


upon  a  negative  allegation,  and  where  of  course 
the  establishment  of  this  negative  is  an  essential 
element  of  his  case.  Ibid.  Lane  v.  Crombie,  12 
Pick.  177;  Kerr  v.  Freeman,  33  Miss.  292.  So 
where  the  negative  allegation  involves  a  charge 
of  criminal  neglect  of  duty,  whether  official  or 
otherwise;  or  fraud;  or  the  wrongful  violation 
of  actual  lawful  possession  of  property,  the 
party  making  the  allegation  must  prove  it. 
1  Greenl.  Ev.  §  80.  There  is  no  difference  in  re- 
spect to  the  burden  of  proof,  between  proceed- 
ings at  Law  and  in  Equity;  in  both  the  party 
maintaining  the  affirmative  of  the  issue  cast 
upon  him.  Pusey  v.  Wright,  31  Penn.  St.  387. 
Upon  the  party  alleging  an  alteration  in  a  deed 
rests  the  burden  of  proving  the  alteration.  Put- 
nam r.  Clark,  29  N.  J.  Eq.  412.  And  upon  him 
who  claims  under  an  agreement  in  writing  rests 
the  burden  of  proving  its  execution  and  con- 
tents, although  lost.  Swaiue  v.  Maryott,  28 
N.  J.  Eq.  589.  So,  upon  him  who  has  signed  a 
joint  and  several  note,  rests  the  burden  of  prov- 
ing that  he  signed  only  as  surety.  Coleman  v. 
Norman,  10  Heisk.  590.     A    party   in    Equity, 


defence,  which  has  no  reference  to  and  does  not 
admit  any  allegation  of  the  complaint,  is  of  an 
entirely  different  nature.  Such  allegation  is 
not  an  admission  contained  in  a  pleading  which 
is  conclusive,  so  I  ng  as  it  remains  in  the 
record." 

Allegations  in  a  complaint  which  are  ad- 
mitted in  the  answer  absolutely  conclude  the 
parties  and  need  not  be  proved.  Northern 
Pacific  R.  Co.  v.  Pain",  119  U.  S.  561:  United 
Telephone  Co.  v.  Donohoe,  31  Ch.  D.  399; 
California  Electrical  Works  v.  Finck,  47  Fed. 
Rep.  583:  Quinby  v.  Carbart,  133  N.  Y.  579; 
Deimel  r.  Brown,  136  111.  586;  Stepp  v.  National 
Life  Association,  37  S.  C.  417.  If  an  answer, 
to  which  replication  is  filed,  literally  denies  a 
material  allegation  of  the  bill,  this,  even  though 
insufficient  on  exception,  is  not  an  admission. 
United  States  r.  Ferguson,  54  Fed.  Rep.  28. 
The  plaintiff's  admission  in  his  bill  of  aeon- 
tract,  which  is  within  the  Statute  of  Frauds,  is 
permanent,  and  he  cannot  afterwards  set  up  the 
statute  in  his  answer  to  a  cross-bill.  Battell  v. 
Matot,  58  Vt.  271.  In  Traver  v.  Purdy,  25  N. 
Y.  S.  452,  it  was  held  that  the  defendant  is  re- 
quired to  plead  the  statute  only  when  he  admits 
or  does  not  deny  the  contract;  not  when  he 
denies  its  existence.     See  ante,  p.  656. 


THE   ONUS   PROBANDI. 


851 


common  to  Courts  of  Equity  and  of  Law  ;  and  accordingly,  when  a 
defendant  insists  upon  a  purchase  for  a  valuable  consideration,  without 
notice,  the  fact  of  the  defendant,  or  those  under  whom  he  claims,  having 
had  notice  of  the  plaintiff's  title,  must  be  proved  by  the  plaintiff.-  So 
where  a  feme  covert,  having  a  separate  property,  had  joined  with  her 
husband  in  a  security  for  money  which  it  was  the  object  of  the  bill  to 
recover  from  her  (her  husband  being  dead),  and  the  defendant,  by  her 
answer,  admitted  that  she  had  signed  the  security,  but  alleged  that  she 
had  done  so,  not  of  her  own  free-will,  but  under  the  influence  of  her 
husband,  it  was  held  that  it  lay  upon  the  wife  to  repel  the  effect  of  her 
signature,  by  evidence  of  undue  influence,  and  not  upon  the  plaintiff  to 
prove  a  negative.3 

In  general,  it  may  be  taken  for  granted,  that  wherever  a  prima  facie 
right  is  proved,  or  admitted  by  the  pleadings,  the  onus  probandi  is  always 
upon  the  person  calling  such  right  in  question.4  And  here  it  may  be  ob- 
served, that  a  Court  will  always  treat  a  deed  or  instrument  as  being  the 
thing  which  it  purports  to  be,  unless  the  contrary  is  shown ;  and,  there- 
fore, it  is  incumbent  upon  the  party  impeaching  it  to  show  that  the  deed 
or  instrument  in  question  is  not  what  it  purports  to  be ; 5  thus,  where  a 
bond,  which  was  upon  the  face  of  it  a  simple  money  bond,  was  impeached 
as  being  intended  merely  as  an  indemnity  bond,  it  was  held,  that  the 
burden  of  proving  it  to  be  an  indemnity  bond,  lay  on  the  party 
*  impeaching  it.1  (a)  So,  if  a  party  claims  two  legacies  under  two  *  851 
different  instruments,  the  burden  of  showing  that  he  is  only  en- 
titled to  one  will  lie  upon  the  person  attempting  to  make  out  that  prop- 
osition :  for  the  Court  will  assume  that  the  testator,  having  given  the 
two  legacies  by  different  documents,  meant  to  do  so,  till  the  contrary  is 
established.2 

Indeed,  in  all  cases  where  the  presumption  of  Law  is  in  favor  of  a 

pleading  matter  in  avoidance,  takes  upon  him-  Upsall,   L.  R.  20  Eq.  1-36.     See  Robinson  v. 

self  the  burden  of  proof  of  the  matter  so  pleaded.  Gallier,  2  Woods,  178,  and  the  very  able  argu- 

Peck  ».  Hunter,  7  Ind.  295.  ment  of  Mr.   Spoffmd  in  that  case.     See  also 

The  party  setting  up  that  the  consideration  Wing  t\  Angrave,  8  H.  L.  C  is.  182;  Newell  v. 

of  a  mortgage  arose  out  of  an  illegal  contract  Nichols,  19  N.  Y.  Sup.  ft   604. 

has  the  burden  of  proof  upon  him.     Feldman  2  Eyre  v.  Dolphin,  2  Ball  &  B.  303;  Saun- 

v.  Gamb'e,  20  N.  J.   Eq.  494.     After  fraud  is  ders  v.  Leslie,  id.  515;  ante,  p.  698. 

proved,  the  burden  is  on  the  other  party,  who  8  Field  v.  Sowle,  4  Russ.  112. 

relies  on  laches,  to  show  when  a  knowledge  of  *  Banbury  Peerage  case,  1  S.  &  S.  153,  155; 

the  truth  was  acquired.      Lindsay   Petroleum  see  Hall  v.  Bvron,  4  Ph.  D  667. 

Co.  t\  Hurd,  L.  R.  5  P.  C.  221.     Those  who  5  Vreeland  v.  Bramhall.  28  N.  L  Eq.  85. 

found  a  right  upon  a  person  having  survived  a  i  Ntcol  v.  Vaughan,  6  Bligb,  N.  R.  104;   1 

particular  period,  as  the  date  of  the  death  of  a  CI.  &  F.  49. 

testator,  must  establish  that  fact  affirmatively  2  Lee  v.  Pain,  4  Hare,  216;  IIoolov  r.  Hat- 
by  evidence,  and  this  although  he  may  have  ton,  2  Dick.  461.  Where  two  legacies  are  given 
been  heard  from  only  shortly  before  that  period.  to  the  same  legatee,  by  the  same  instrument. 
In  re  Phen^'s  Trusts,  L.  R.  5  Ch.  139;  In  re  the  presumption  is  the  other  way.  Id.  462;  see 
Lewes's  Trusts,  L.  R.  11  Eq.  236  :  L.  R.  6  Ch.  VVhvte  v.  Whyte,  L.  R.  17  Eq.  50;  Wilson  v. 
356;   Re  Rhodes,  36  Ch.  D.  586;  Hickman  v.  O'Leary,  L.  R.  7  Ch.  448;   L.  R.  12  Eq.  525. 


(a)  "In  Equity  a  contract  to  indemnify  can  tain  an  action  at  law."  Per  Lindley  L.  J.  in 
be  specifically  enforced  before  there  has  been  Johnston  v.  Salvage  Association,  19  Q-  B.  D. 
any  such  breach  of  the  contract  as  would  sus-      458. 

847 


*851 


EVIDENCE. 


party,  it  will  be  incumbent  on  the  other  party  to  disprove  it : 8  though. 
in  so  doing  he  may  have  to  prove  a  negative,4  therefore,  where  the  ques- 
tion turns  on  the  legitimacy  of  a  child,  if  a  legal  marriage  is  proved,  the 
legitimacy  is  presumed,  and  the  party  asserting  the  illegitimacy  ought  to 
prove  it,5  for  the  presumption  of  Law  is,  that  a  child  born  of  a  married 
woman  whose  husband  is  within  the  four  seas,  is  legitimate,  unless  there 
is  irresistible  evidence  against  the  possibility  of  sexual  intercourse  having 
taken  place.6  (b) 

It  is  important,  in  this  place,  to  notice,  that  in  cases  where  it  is  sought 
to  impeach  a  will,  or  other  instrument,  on  the  ground  of  insanity,  the 
rule  as  to  the  onus  probandi  is  :  that  where  a  party  has  ever  been  subject 
to  a  commission,  or  to  any  restraint  permitted  by  Law,  even  a  domestic 
restraint,  clearly  and  plainly  imposed  upon  him  in  consequence  of  un- 
disputed insanity,  the  proof,  showing  sanity,  is  thrown  upon  him.7  On 
the  other  hand,  where  insanity  has  not  been  imputed  by  relations  or 
friends,  or  even  by  common  fame,  the  proof  of  insanity,  which  does 
not  appear  to  have  ever  existed,  is  thrown  upon  the  other  side : 8  and 


3  See  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  XIX.  28. 

4  Whenever  there  is  a  presumption  that  a  fact 
exists,  he  who  makes  an  allegation  to  the  con- 
trary must  prove  it.  Higdon  v.  Higdon,  6  J. 
J.  Marsh.  51.  Deeds  are  presumed  to  be  de- 
livered on  the  day  of  their  date.  An  allegation 
of  another  day  must  be  proved.     Ibid. 

5  1  Phil,  on  Evid.  197;  1  Greenl.  Ev.  §  81. 
So  where  infancy  is  alleged.  Ibid.  So  in  case 
a  party  once  proved  to  be  living  is  alleged  to 
be  dead,  the  presumption  of  life  not  yet  being 
worn  out  by  lapse  of  time ;  the  burden  of  proof 
is  on  the  party  making  the  allegation,  notwith- 
standing its  negative  character.     Ibid. 

6  Head  v.  Head,  lg.&S.  150;  T.  &  R. 
138;  see  also  Bury  v.  Ph-llpot,  2  M.  &  K.  349, 
352;  Hargrave  v.  Hargrave,  9  Beav.  552;  10 
Jur.  957;  Plowes  v.  Bossey,  2  Dr.  &  S.  145;  8 
Jur.  N.  S.  352,  V.  C.  K.;  Atchley  v.  Sprigg,  10 
Jur.  X.  S.  144,  V.  C.  K.;  and  cases  cited  ante, 
p.  849,  note  2.  As  to  other  instances  of  pre- 
sumptions of  law,  see  the  following  works  on 
evidence:  1  Phillips,  467,  et  seq. ;  1  Taylor, 
§§97-218;  Best,  §305,  et  seq.;  Gresley,  473; 
Powell,  66-98. 

"  Where  one  is  under  guardianship  as  non 
compos,  the  presumption  is  that  he  is  incapable 
of  making  a  will.  Breed  v.  Pratt,  18  Pick. 
115.  Yet  this  does  not  prevent  his  making  a 
will  if  his  mind  is  actually  sound.    Ibid. ;  Stone 


(6)  A  mulatto  child  born  of  a  white  married 
woman,  whose  husband  is  white,  is  not  presum- 
ably legitimate.  Bullock  v.  Knox  (Ala.),  11 
So.  Rep.  339.  The  presumption  of  legitimacy 
is  now  held  to  be  rebuttable.  Hawes  v. 
Draeger,  23  Ch.  D.  173;  Gardner  v.  Gardner, 
2  App.  Cas.  723;  Burnaby  r.  Baillie,  42  Ch.  D. 
282;  Re  Walker,  53  L.  f .  660;  Re  Perton,  id. 
848 


v.  Damon,  12  Mass.  488;  2  Greenl.  Ev.  §  690; 
Crowningshield  v.  Crowningshield,  2  Gray, 
531;  see  Stewart  v.  Lispenard,  26  Wend.  255. 
The  commission  of  suicide  by  the  testator  is  not 
conclusive  evidence  of  insanity.  Brooks  v. 
Barrett,  7  Pick.  94;  Duffield  r.  Robeson,  2 
Harring.  583;  see  2  Greenl.  Ev.  §§  689,  690. 

a  See  2  Greenl.  Ev.  §§  689,  690;  Phelps  v. 
Hartwell,  1  Mass.  71;  Hubbard  v.  Hubbard, 
6  Mass.  397;  Breed  v.  Pratt,  18  Pick.  115; 
Rogers  v.  Thomas,  1  B.  Monroe,  394;  Morse  o. 
Slason,  13  Vt.  296;  Jackson  v.  King,  4  Cowen, 
207;  Stevens  v.  Van  Cleve,  4  Wash.  C.  C.  262; 
Burton  v.  Scott,  3  Rand.  399;  Jackson  v.  Van 
Dusen,  5  John.  144;  Hoge  v.  Fisher,  1  Peters, 
C.  C.  163;  Pettes  v.  Bingham,  10  N.  H.  514; 
Gerrish  v.  Mason,  22  Maine,  438;  Brooks  t'. 
Barrett,  7  Pick.  94,  99;  Commonwealth  c. 
Eddy,  7  Gray,  583;  Baxter  v.  Abbott,  id.  71. 
Under  the  statutes  of  Massachusetts,  it  has  been 
held  that  the  burden  of  proving  the  sanity  of 
the  testator  is  upon  him  who  offers  the  will  for 
probate.  Crowningshield  v.  Crowningshield,  2 
Gray,  524;  see  Comstock  v.  Hadlyme,  8  Conn. 
261.  But  in  the  absence  of  evidence  to  the 
contrary,  the  legal  presumption  is  in  favor  of 
the  sanity  of  the  testator.  Baxter  v.  Abbott,  7 
Grav,  71.  The  presumption  is  always  in  favor 
of  sanity,  and  insanity  cannot  be  presumed 
from  the  mere  fact  of  suicide.    Weed  v.  Mutual 


707;  Pittsford  v.  Chittenden,  58  Vt.  49;  Her- 
ring v.  Goodson,  43  Miss.  392;  Egbert  v.  Green- 
wait,  44  Mich.  245;  Dean  v.  State,  29  Ind.  483; 
Orthwein  v.  Thomas,  127  111.  554;  Vetten  r. 
"Wallace,  39  111.  App.  390;  Reynolds  v.  Rey- 
nolds, 3  Allen,  605;  Simon  v.  State  (Texas), 
20  S.  W.  Rep.  399,  716;  Shuman  v.  Shuman, 
83  Wis.  250. 


CONFINED   TO    MATTERS   IN   ISSUE.  *  852 

the  insanity  is  not  to  be  *  made  out   by  rambling  through  the     *  852 
whole  life  of  the  party,  but  must  be  applied  to  the  particular  date 
of  the  transaction.1 

It  has  also  been  held,  that  where  general  lunacy  has  been  established, 
,  and  a  party  insists  upon  an  act  clone  during  a  lucid  interval,  the  proof  is 
thrown  upon  the  party  alleging  the  lucid  interval ;  and  that,  in  order  to 
establish  such  an  interval,  he  must  prove  not  merely  a  cessation  of  violent 
symptoms,  but  a  restoration  of  mind  to  the  party,  sufficient  to  enable 
him  to  judge  soundly  of  the  act.2 

It  may  also  be  stated,  generally,  that  whenever  a  person  obtains  by 
voluntary  donation  a  benefit  from  another,  the  onus  probandi  is  upon  the 
former,  if  the  transaction  be  questioned,  to  prove  that  the  transaction 
was  righteous,3  and  that  the  donor  voluntarily  and  deliberately  did  the 
act,  knowing  its  nature  and  effect.  Moreover,  where '  the  relation  of  the 
parties  is  such  that  undue  influence  might  have  been  used,  the  onus 
probandi,  to  show  that  such  influence  was  not  exerted,  is  upon  the  person 
receiving  the  benefit.4 

In  a  patent  suit  to  restrain  the  sale  of  a  patented  article,  the  onus  is 
on  the  plaintiff  to  prove  not  only  the  sale,  but  also  that  the  article  sold 
was  not  made  by  himself  or  his  agents.5 

Section  III.  —  Confined  to  Matters  in  Issue. 

It  is  a  fundamental  maxim,  both  in  this  Court  and  in  Courts  of  Law, 
that  no  proof  can  be  admitted  of  any  matter  which  is  not  noticed  in 

Benefit  Life  Ins.  Co.  70  N.  Y.  561;  see  An-  7  Ch.  329;  Hall  v.  Hall,  L.  R.  8  Ch.  430;  L.  R. 
derson  v.  Cramer,  11  W.  Va.  562;  Mayo  v.  14  Eq.  365;  Toker  v.  Toker,  3  De  G.  J.  &  S. 
Jones,  78  N.  C.  402.  If  it  is  alleged  that  the  487;  Welman  v.  Welman,  15  Ch.  D.  570;  Henry 
testator  had  no  knowledge  of  the  contents  of  v.  Armstrong,  18  Ch.  D.  668. 
the  will  he  has  executed,  or  that  he  was  induced  4  Hoghton  v.  Hoghton,  15  Beav.  278-  Not- 
to  execute  it  by  misrepresentation,  the  burden  tidge  v.  Prince,  2  Giff.  246;  6  Jur.  N.  S  1066- 
of  proof  is  on  those  who  object  to  the  will.  Walker  v.  Smith,  29  Beav.  394;  Asliwell  y. 
Pettes  v.  Bingham,  10  N.  H.  514.  Lomi,  L.  R.  2  P.  &  D.  477;  Re  Biel,  L.  R.  16  Eq. 
i  White  v.  Wilson,  13  Ves.  87,88;  and  see  577;  Taylor  v.  Johnston,  19  Ch.  D.  603.  An 
Att.-Gen.  v.  Parnther,  3  Bro.  C.  C.  441,  443;  agent  or  trustee  has  the  onus  to  show  fair  deal- 
Jacobs  v.  Richards,  18  Beav.  300;  18  Jur.  527;  ing.  Dunne  v.  English,  L.  R.  18  Eq.  524;  Pisani 
Smith  v.  Tebbitt,  L.  R.  1  P.  &  D.  398;  Jen-  v.  Att.-Gen.  L.  R.  5  P.  C.  516;  Mcpherson 
kins  v.  Morris,  14  Ch.  D.  674.  v.  Watt,  3  App.  Cas.  254;  Re  Worssam,  W. 

2  Hall  v.  Warren,  9  Ves.  605,  611;  Clark  v.  N.  (1882)  61;  Readdy  v.  Pendergast,  55  L.  T. 
Fisher,  1  Paige,  171 ;  Halley  v.  Webster,  21  767.  See  Lyon  v.  Home,  L.  R.  6  Eq.  655, 
Maine,  461;  Boyd  v.  Ebv,  8  Watts,  66;  Jack-  where  the  relation  was  that  of  spiritual  medium 
son  v.  Van  Dusen,  5  John.  144,  159;  Goble  v.  and  follower.  See,  also,  where  one  of  the  par- 
Grant,  2  Green  Ch.  629;  Whitenach  v.  Stryker,  ties  labors  under  some  inequality  of  condition  : 
1  id.  8;  Duffield  v.  Robeson,  2  Hairing.  375;  Kempson  v.  Ashbee,  L.  R.  10  Ch.  19;  Baker  v. 
Harden  u.'Hays,  9  Penn.  St.  151;  Jencks  v.  Bradley,  7  De  G.  M.  &  G.  621;  Connellv  v. 
Probate  Court,  2  R.  I.  255.  The  rule  does  not  Fisher,  3  Tenn.  Ch.  382;  or  there  is  a  fiduciary 
apply  to  a  case  of  insanity  caused  by  vio-  relation  between  the  parties.  Malone  v.  Kelley, 
lent  disease.  Hix  v.  Whittemore,  4  Met.  545;  54  Ala.  532;  Leighton  v.  Orr,  44  Iowa,  679.  As 
Townshend  v.  Townshend,  7  Gill,  10.  to  an  alleged  distinction  between  a  gift  inter 

3  Cooke  v.  Lamotte.  15  Beav.  234;  Mitchell  v.  vivos,  and  a  gift  by  will,  see  Partit  v.  Lawless, 
Homfray,  8  Q.  B.  D.  587;  Hemberow  v.  Frost,  L.  R.  2  P.  &  D.  462;  and  see  Huguenin  v.  Base- 
W.  N.  (1883)  144;  Allcard  v.  Skinner,  36  Ch.  ley,  2  W.  &  T.  547,  and  notes. 

D.  145.     As  to  impeaching  voluntary  donations,  6  Leather  Cloth  Co.  P.  Hirschfield,  L.R.I 

see  Phillips  v.  Mullings,  L.  R.  7Ch.244;  Coutls  Eq.  299.     As  to  presuming  a  patent  valid,  see 

i\  Acworth,  L.  R.  8    Eq.    558;    Wallaston  v.  Halsey  v.  Brotherhood,  15  Ch.  D.  514,  528;  19 

Tribe,  L.  R.  9  Eq.  44;  Turner  v.  Collins,  L.  R.  Ch.  D.  386;  29  W.  R.  9. 

VOL.  I.  —  54  849 


*853 


EVIDENCE. 


*  853  the  pleadings.6  (a)  This  maxim  has  been  adopted,  in  *  order  to 
obviate  the  great  inconvenience  to  which  parties  would  be  exposed, 
if  they  were  liable  to  be  affected  by  evidence  at  the  hearing,  of  the  inten- 
tion to  produce  which  they  had  received  no  notice.1  In  certain  cases, 
however,  evidence  of  particular  facts  may  be  given  under  general  allega- 
tions, and,  in  such  cases,  therefore,  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  particular 
facts  intended  to  be  proved  should  be  stated  in  the  pleadings.2  The 
cases  in  which  this  exception  to  the  general  rule  is  principally  appli- 
cable, are  those  where  malice,  fraudulent  intention,  knowledge,  or  other 
condition  of  mind,  or  the  character  of  an  individual,  or  his  general 
behavior,  or  quality  of  mind  comes  in  question ;  as  where,  for  example, 
it  is  alleged  that  a  man  is  non  compos,  particular  acts  of  madness  may 
be  given  in  evidence,  and  not  general  evidence  only  that  he  is  insane.3 
So,  also,  where  it  is'  alleged  that  a  man  is  addicted  to  drinking,  and  liable 
to  be  imposed  upon,  the  evidence  should  not  be  confined  to  his  being  a 
drunkard,  but  particular  instances  may  be  given.4     In  like  manner,  where 


6  Whaley  v.  Norton,  1  Vern.  484;  Gordon 
v.  Gordon,  3  Swanst.  472;  Clarke  v.  Turton,  11 
Ves.  240;  Williams  v.  Llewellyn,  2  Y.  &  J.  68; 
Hall  v.  Maltby,  6  Price,  240,  259;  Powys  v. 
Mansfield,  6  Sim.  565;  Langdon  v.  Goddard,  2 
Story,  2G7;  James  v.  M'Keinon,  6  John.  543; 
Lyon  v.  Tallmudge,  14  John.  501;  Barque 
Chusan,  2  Story,  456;  Barrett  v.  Sargeant,  18 
Vt.  365,  Pinson"  v.  Williams,  23  Miss.  64;  Kidd 
v.  Manley,  28  Miss.  156;  Surget  v.  Byers,  1 
Hemp.  715;  Craige  v.  Craige,  6  Ired.  Eq.  191; 
Moores  v.  Moores,  16  N.  J.  Eq.  275;  Burnham 
v.  Dalling,  18  id.  134;  Chandler  v.  Herriek.  11 
N.  J.  Eq  497:  see  1  Taylor  on  Evid.  §  298; 
R.  S.  C.  Ord.  XIX.  18,  25,  26;  Scott  v.  Samp- 
son. 8  Q.  B.  D.  491.  Proofs  taken  in  a  cause 
must  be  pertinent  to  the  issue  in  that  cause.secun- 
dum  allegata.  Underbill  v.  Van  Cortlandt,  2 
John.  Ch.  339 ;  Parsons  v.  Heston,  11  N.  J.  Eq. 
155.  Evidence  relative  to  matters  not  stated  in  the 
pleadings,  nor  fairly  within  their  general  allega- 
tions, is  impertinent,  and  cannot  be  made  the 
foundation  of  a  decree.  Vansciver  v.  Bryan, 
13  N.  J.  Eq.  434;  and  see  the  following  works 
on  evidence:  Taylor.  §  239,  et  seq.  ;  Best.  §  253, 
etseq. ;  Gresley,  230;  Powell,  220. 

A  decree  entirely  outside  of  the  issue  raised 


(a)  In  general,  no  evidence  will  be  received 
of  facts  not  alleged  in  the  bill.  Anderson  v. 
Northrop,  30  Fla.  612.  But  a  defendant's  ad- 
mis-ions  may  be  proved  in  evidence,  though  not 
alleged  in  the  bill.  Cannon  v.  Collins,  3  Del.  Ch. 
132;  Cleveland  Target  Co.  v.  U.  S.  Pigeon  Co. 
52  Fed.  Kep.  385.  Evidence  set  out  in  a  plead- 
ing need  not  be  denied  or  admitted.  Steinway 
v.  Steinway,  22  N.  Y.  S.  945.  In  Runge  v. 
Schleicher  (Texas),  21  S.  W.  Rep.  423,  it  was 
held  improper,  as  stating  evidence,  to  allege  a 
custom  to  deliver  deeds  containing  blanks,  with 
power  to  the  grantee  to  fill  them. 

850 


in  the  record  is  coram  non  judice,  and  will  be 
so  adjudged,  even  when  assailed  in  a  collateral 
proceeding.  Munday  v.  Vail,  34  N.  J.  L.  418; 
Windsor  v.  McVeigh,  93  U.  S.  283;  Dillard  r. 
Harris,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  196;  Mayo  v.  Harding.  3 
id.  237;  Easley  v.  Tarkington,  5  Baxt.  592. 
See  also  Marsh  v.  Mitchell,  26  N.  J.  Eq.  499. 

1  See  ante,  pp.  326,711;  Smith  v.  Clarke,  12 
Ves.  477,  480.  From  the  case  of  London  and 
Birmingham  Ry.  Co.  v.  Winter,  Cr.  &  P.  57, 
62,  it  seems  that  a  fact  brought  to  the  attention 
of  the  Court  by  the  evidence,  but  not  stated 
upon  the  answer,  will,  under  some  circum- 
stances, afford  a  ground  for  inquiry,  before  a 
final  decree. 

2  Moores  v.  Moores,  16  N.  J.  Eq.  275;  Hewett 
v.  Adams,  50  Maine.  271,  276;  Gresley,  Eq.  Ev. 
161,  et  seq. ;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §§  28,  252. 

3  Clarke  v.  Periam,  2  Atk.  333,  340. 

4  Ibid.  So,  also,  where  it  was  alleged  that 
the  defendant  had  not  accounted  for  divers  fees 
received  in  the  execution  of  an  office,  and  had 
taken  several  fees  which  were  not  due,  and  had 
concealed  instruments  and  writings  relating  to 
the  office,  evidence  of  particular  instances  of 
such  misconduct  was  permitted.  Wheeler  v. 
Trotter,  3  Swanst.  174,  n. 


The  defendant's  admission  that  a  deed  be- 
tween the  parties  was  a  mortgage  is  as  binding 
in  a  subsequent  suit  between  them  as  a  finding 
to  that  effect.  Fowler  v.  Osborne,  111  N.  C. 
404.  The  defendant's  answer  in  another  suit, 
if  intended  as  an  admission,  is  admissible  as 
such,  though  never  filed  in  that  suit.  Matson 
v.  Melchor,  42  Mich.  477.  In  New  York,  an 
attorney's  unqualified  admission  that  a  paper 
exhibited  to  him  in  order  to  dispense  with  for- 
mal proof  thereof,  may.  if  not  withdrawn,  be 
relied  upon  at  a  subsequent  trial.  Voisin  v. 
Commercial  M.  Ins.  Co.  22  N.  Y.  S.  348. 


CONFINED    TO    MATTERS   IN   ISSUE.  *  855 

the'  charge  in  a  bill  was,  that  the  defendant  was  a  lewd  woman,  evidence 
of  particular  acts  of  incontinence  was  allowed  to  be  adduced.5  In  cases 
of  this  nature,  however,  it  is  necessary,  in  order  to  entitle  the  party  to 
read  evidence  of  particular  facts,  that  they  should  point  directly  to  the 
charge  ;  and  therefore  it  has  been  held,  that  an  allegation  in  a  bill,  that 
a  wife  had  misbehaved  herself,  did  not  imply  that  she  was  an  adulteress, 
and  that  a  deposition  to  prove  her  one  ought  not  to  be  read.6  And  so 
the  mere  saying  that  a  wife  did  not  behave  herself  as  a  virtuous  woman 
will  not  entitle  her  husband  to  prove  that  she  has  committed  adultery 
unless  there  is  an  express  charge  of  the  kind : 7  for  the  virtue  of  a  woman 
does  not  consist  merely  in  her  chastity.8 

*  The  cases  in  which  evidence  of  particular  facts  may  be  given  *  854 
under  a  general  allegation  or  charge,  are  not  confined  to  cases  in 
which  the  character,  or  quality  of  mind,  or  general  behavior  of  a  party 
comes  in  issue.  The  same  thing  may  be  done,  where  the  question  of 
notice  is  raised  in  the  pleadings  by  a  general  allegation  or  charge. 
Thus,  where  the  defence  was  a  purchase  for  a  valuable  consider- 
ation, without  notice  of  a  particular  deed,  but,  in  order  to  meet 
that  case  by  anticipation,  the  bill  had  suggested  that  the  defendant  pre- 
tended that  she  was  a  purchaser  for  a  valuable  consideration,  with- 
out notice,  and  simply  charged  the  contrary,  *  the  deposition  of  *  855 
a  witness,  who  proved  a  conversation  to  have  taken  place  between 
himself  and  a  third  person,  who  was  the  solicitor  of  the  defendant,  and 
the  consequent  production  of  the  deed,  was  allowed  to  be  read  as  evi- 
dence of  notice.1  In  such  a  case,  the  question  whether  the  party  has 
notice  or  not,  is  a  fact,  which  should  be  put  in  issue,  but  the  mode  in 
which  it  is  to  be  proved  need  not  be  put  upon  the  record ;  for  the  rule 
that  no  evidence  will  be  admitted,  in  support  of  any  facts  but  those 
which  are  mentioned  in  the  pleadings,  requires  that  the  facts  only 
intended  to  be  proved  should  be  put  in  issue,  and  not  the  materials  of 
which  the  proof  of  those  facts  is  to  consist.2  Where,  however,  the  party 
had  not  any  opportunity  of  disproving  a  particular  act  of  notice  which 
was  proved  in  evidence,  although  not  alleged  in  the  pleadings,  an  inquiry 
was  directed  whether  he  had  or  had  not  notice.3  (") 

5  Clarke  v.  Periam,  ubi  supra  ;  and  the  cases  discovery  of  particular  facts  under  a  general 
there  cited.  allegation,  see  Saunders    v.  Jones,    7  Ch.  D. 

6  Ibid.;  Sidney  ».  Sidney.  3  P.  Wins.  209,  435;    Kuhliger  v.  Bailey,   W.  N.  (1881)  l(i5; 
276;  1  C.  P.  Coop.  temp.  Cott.  514,  note.  Benbow  ».  Low,  16  Ch.  D.  93. 

7  Lord   Donerail  v.  Ladv  Donerail,  cited  2  2  Blacker  v.  Phepoe,  1  Moll.  354;  see  Story, 
Atk.  338.  Eq.  PI.  §§  '28,  252,  203,  205,  n. 

8  Per  Lord  Hardwicke,  in  2  Atk.  339.  3  Weston  e.  Empire  Assurance  Co.  L.  R.  6 
l  1  Hughes  v.  Garner,  2  Y.  &  C.  Ex.  328,      Eq.  23. 

335;  see  now  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  XIX.  20.     As    to 


(a)  Evidence  offered  respecting  a  fact  which  is  Co.  77  Ala.   184.     Upon  a  bill  for  discovery 

admitted  by  the  answer  should  be  refused.    Rob-  and  relief,  the  answer,  including  its  affirmative 

inson  v.  Philadelphia  &  R.  R.  Co.  28  Fed.  Rep.  statements,  is  evidence  of  facts  which  are  per- 

577.    Thus,  previous  admissions  by  a  doiendant  tinent  to  the  discovery  sought.     Thompson  r. 

of  facts  admitted  in  his  answer  are  to  be  re-  Clark,  81  Va.  422.     When  the  case  is  set  down 

jected  as  cumulative  evidence.    Morris  v.  Morris  by  the  plaintiff  for  hearing  on  bill,  answer,  and 

&  C.  D.  Co.  38  Fed.  Rep.  776.     Co-defendants  replication,  and  the  defendant  has  no  opporfu- 

are  not  affected  by   admissions   in   unverified  nity  to  prove  his  answer,  the  answer  is  takpn 

answers.     Danner  Land  Co.  v.  Stonewall  Ins.  as    true,  as    if  the  hearing    were    on  bill  and 

851 


*856 


EVIDENCE. 


It  is  upon  this  principle  that  documentary  evidence,  or  letters  them- 
selves, are  not  specifically  put  in  issue.4  Indeed,  a  party  may  prove  his 
case  by  written  or  parol  evidence,  indifferently,  and  is  under  no  more 
restrictions  in  one  case  than  in  another.  It  is  not  necessary  to  put  every 
written  document  in  issue  ; s  and  documents  containing  relevant  admis- 
sions may  now  be  made  use  of  as  evidence,  though  they  have  never  been 
pleaded.6  (b)  Defendants  have  also  been  held  entitled  to  put  in  evidence 
letters  written  by  the  plaintiff  to  a  person  not  a  party  to  the  action,  and 
containing  admissions  by  the  plaintiff,  material  to  the  questions  in  issue  ; 
but  the  plaintiff  must  have,  if  he  desires  it,  an  opportunity  of  explain- 
ing the  letters.7 

If  letters  and  writings  in  the  hands  of  a  party  are  intended  to  be  used 
as  admissions  or  confessions  of  facts  by  the  opposite  party,  they  should 
be  mentioned  in  the  pleadings,8  in  order  that  the  party  against  whom 
they  are  intended  to  be  read  may  have  an  opportunity  to  meet  them  by 
evidence  or  explanation.9 

This  principle  is  not  confined  to  writings,  but  applies  to  every 
*  856  *  case  where  the  admission  or  confession  of  a  party  is  to  be  made 
use  of  against  him  ;  thus,  it  has  been  held,  that  evidence  of  a 
confession  by  a  party  that  he  was  guilty  of  a  fraud,  could  not  be  read : 
because  it  was  not  distinctly  put  in  issue.1  So,  also,  evidence  of  alleged 
conversations  between  a  witness  and  a  party  to  the  suit,  in  which  such 


4  Blacker  v.  Phepoe.  1  Moll.  354.  Letters 
written  without  prejudice  are  not  admissible  in 
evidence.  Hoghton  v.  Hoghton,  15  Beav.  278, 
321;  Jones  v.  Foxall,  id.  388,  396;  except  on 
behalf  of  the  writer:  Williams  V.  Thomas,  2 
Dr.  &  Sm.  29,  37;  8  Jar.  N.  S.  250,  252;  and 
see  Woodard  v.  Eastern  Counties  Ky.  Co.  1  Jur. 
N.  S.  899. 

5  Per  Sir  Anthony  Hart,  in  Fitzgerald  v. 
O'Flaherty,  1  Moll.  350;  see  also  Lord  Crans- 
town  v.  Johnston,  3  Ves.  170,  176;  Dey  v. 
Dunham,  2  John.  Ch.  188;  Pardee  v.  De  Cola, 
7  Paige,  132;  Kellogg  v.  Wood,  6  Paige,  578. 

6  See  Davy  v.  Garrett,  7  Ch.  D.  473;  Steuart 
r.  Gladstone,  10  Ch.  D.  626,  644;  and  see  R.  S. 
C.  Ord.  XIX.  4. 

7  Steuart  v.  Gladstone,  10  Ch.  D.  626,  644; 


per  Fry  J.;  Malcolm  v.  Scott,  3  Hare,  63;  S- 
C.  nom.  Scott  v.  Macolm,  8  Jur.  1059. 

8  Houlditch  v.  Marquis  of  Donegal,  1  Moll. 
364;  Austin  v.  Chambers,  6  CI.  &  F.  1,  39; 
Whitley  v.  Martin,  3  Beav.  226. 

9  Blacker  v.  Phepoe,  ubi  supra.  But,  in 
M'Mahon  v.  Burchell,  2  Phil.  127,  133 ;  1  C.  P. 
Coop.  temp.  475,  however,  Lord  Cottenham  al- 
lowed certain  letters  to  be  used  as  evidence  of 
admissions,  though  not  mentioned  in  the  plead- 
ings: observing,  that  "he  could  not  go  the 
length  of  saying  that  evidence  of  an  admission 
was  not  admissible,  merely,  because  it  was  not 
put  in  issue." 

i  Hall  v.  Maltby,  6  Price,  240  ;  Mulholland 
v.  Hendrick,  1  Moll.  359. 


answer  alone.  Starr's  Estate,  13  Phila.  212; 
United  States  v.  Trans-Missouri  Freight  Ass. 
58  Fed.  Kep.  58.  Upon  a  bill  to  correct  a  mis- 
take in  a  lease,  a  statement  in  the  answer  that 
the  defendant,  if  asked,  "would  have  corrected 
any  mistake  in  said  lease,"  is  not  equivalent  to 
an  admission  of  the  mistake  and  an  offer  to  cor- 
rect it.  Robinson  v.  Battle  House  Co.  74  Ala. 
499.  A  defendant  who.  after  evidence  is  taken, 
is  also  made  a  party  as  executor  and  trustee,  is 
bound  by  the  evidence  so  taken.  Canton  v. 
McGraw,  67  Md.583. 

(b)  In  general  the  rule  that  evidence  is  not 
to  be  pleaded  applies  to  admissions.  Davy  v. 
Garrett,   7  Ch.   D.   473.     No   estoppel   iucon- 

852 


sistent  with  a  document  can  be  raised  thereon. 
Colonial  Bank  ».  Hepworth,  36  Ch.  D.  36.  But 
when  the  defendant  states  in  his  sworn  answer 
the  provisions  of  a  written  instrument  presum- 
ably in  his  possession,  he  cannot  complain  if 
the  Court  acts  on  such  admission.  Cavender 
v.  Cavender,  114  U.  S-  464.  When  the  case  is 
set  down  for  hearing  on  the  pleadings,  the  plain- 
tiff cannot  put  in  evidence  documents  which 
are  not  made  a  part  of  the  bill  by  reference. 
Robinson  Tobacco  Co.  v.  Phillips,  20  Blatch. 
569.  An  estoppel  in  pais  must  be  pleaded  in 
order  to  avail  a  defendant.  Prewitt  v.  Lambert 
(Col.),  34Pac.  Rep.  684. 


CONFINED   TO    MATTERS   IN   ISSUE.  *  857 

party  admitted  that  he  had  defrauded  the  other,  was  rejected ;  because 
such  alleged  conversations  had  not  been  noticed  in  the  pleadings.2  "  Xo 
man,"  observes  Sir  Anthony  Hart,  "  would  be  safe,  if  he  could  be  affected 
by  such  evidence.  Lord  Talbot  said  long  ago,  that  if  you  are  to  oust  a 
defendant  for  fraud  alleged  against  him,  and  the  fraud  is  proved  by  the 
acknowledgment  of  the  defendant  that  he  had  no  right  to  the  matter 
in  litigation,  the  plaintiff  must  charge  that  on  the  record,  to  give  him 
the  opportunity  to  deny  or  explain  and  avoid  it."  3 

It  is  only  when  conversations  are  to  be  used  as  admissions,  that  the 
rule  which  requires  them  to  be  stated  on  the  record  applies.  Where  the 
conversation  is  in  itself  the  evidence  of  the  fact,  it  need  not  be  specially 
alluded  to :  as,  where  the  notice  was  communicated  to  the  defendant  by 
a  conversation,  which  was  made  use  of  to  prove  the  fact  of  the  conversa- 
tion having  taken  place,  and  not  as  an  admission  by  the  party  that  he 
had  received  notice.4 

Another  rule  of  evidence,  which  may  be  noticed  in  this  place,  is,  that 
the  substance  of  the  case  made  by  the  pleadings  must  be  proved  ;  that 
is,  all  the  facts  alleged  upon  the  pleadings  which  are  necessary  to  the 
case  of  the  party  alleging  them,  and  which  are  not  the  subject  of  ad- 
missions, either  in  the  pleadings  or  by  agreement,  must  be  established 
by  evidence.5  In  the  case  of  a  plaintiff,  however,  it  is  sufficient  to 
prove  so  much  only  of  the  allegations  in  the  bill  as  are  necessary 
to  entitle  him  to  a  decree.6  Thus,  *  where  the  suit  is  for  an  ac-  *  857 
count,  all  the  .evidence  necessary  to  be  read  at  the  hearing  is 
that  which  proves  the  defendant  to  be  an  accounting  party,  and  then 
the  decree  to  account  follows  of  course  ;  and  any  evidence  as  to  the 
particular  items  of  an  account,  however  useful  they  may  be  in  a  subse- 
quent stage  of  the  cause,  would  be  irrelevant  at  the  original  hearing.1 

2  Farrel  v. ,  1  Moll.  363;    M'Mahon   v.  167,  et  seq.    The  rule  at  Law,  that  the  evidence 

Burchell,  2  Phil.  127;  1  C.  P.  Coop,  t -_■  i n j > .  Cott.  must  substantially  support  the  plaintiff's  decla- 

475;  Langley  v.  Fisher,  9  Beav.  'JO,  101;  Gra-  ration,  is  applicable  to  bills  in  Chancery.    MoITet 

ham  v.  Oliver,  3  Beav.  124,  129.     But  it  has  v.  Claberts,  1  Scam.  384;  Mansy  »,  Mason,  8 

been  held  in  the  United  States  by  Mr.  Justice  Porter,  111;  Shelby  v.  Shelby,  1  B.  Mon.  278; 

Story,  upon  full  consideration,  that  the  confes-  Thompson  v.  Thompson,  2  B.  Mon.  174;  Beers 

sions,  conversations,  and  admissions  of  the  do-  v.  Botsford,  13  Conn.  146;  Simplot  r.  Simplot, 

fendant  need  not  be  expressly  charged  in  a  bill  14  Iowa,  449;  Chaflin  v.  Kimball,  23  111.  36. 

in  Equity,  in  order  to  enable  the  plaintiff  to  use  6  See,  however,  Edney  V.  Jewell,  6  Mad.  165, 

them  in  proof  of  facts  charged,  and   in  issue  where  an  unnecessary  statement  was  required 

therein.     Smith  v.   Burnham,  2  Sunnier,  012;  to  be  proved. 

Jenkins  v.  Eldredge,  3  Story,  183,  283,  284;  see  l  Gresley,   Eq.  Ev.   168;    Dubourg  de   St. 

Story,   Eq.  PI.  §  265,  a,   and  note;  Brown  v.  Colombo  v.  United  States,  7  Peters,  025,  626; 

Chambers,    Hayes    Exch.    597 ;    Malcolm     v.  Hudson  v.  Trenton  &e.  Manuf.  Co.   16  N.  J. 

Scott,  3  Hare,  39,  63;    Brandon  r.  Cabiness,  Eq.  475;  Lockett  r.  Lockett,  L.  R.  4  Ch.  336. 

10  Ala.   155;    Bishop  r.  Bishop,  13  Ala.  475;  The  Court  should  be  satisfied  that  the  plaintiff 

Camden   &   Amboy    It.  R.  Co.  r.   Stewart,  19  is  entitled   to  have  an  account  taken.     If  the 

N.  J.  Eq.  343,  346,  347.  Court  is  satisfied  upon  that  point  the  practice  is 

3  Farrel  v. ,  ubi  supra.  to  refer  the  case  to  a  Master  to  state  the  details 

4  Hughes  v.  Garner,  2  Y.  &  C.  Ex.  328,  335;  of  the  account,  and  ascertain  the  balance.  But 
Graham  v.  Oliver,  ubi  supra.  the  Chancellor  may,  if  he  sees  fit,  take  the  ac- 

5  See  the  following  works  on  evidence:  1  count  himself.  He  not  only  may,  however,  but 
Taylor,  §§  221-253,  el  seq. ;  Best,  §  280,  et  seq. ;  ought  to  refuse  an  account,  if  he  is  satisfied  upon 
Powell,  470,  et  seq.;  1  Phil.  Ev.  (Cowen  &  the  evidence  that  nothing  is  due  the  plaintiff,  or 
Hill's  ed.  1839)  200,  et  seq.  and  notes;  1  Greenl.  that  for  any  cause  an  account  ought  not  to 
Ev.  §  56,  et  seq.;  Gresley,  Eq.  Ev.  (Am.  ed.)  be  decreed.     Campbell  v.  Campbell,  4  Hal  t. 

853 


858 


EVIDENCE. 


For  this  reason,  where  the  suit  is  against  an  administrator,  or  an  exec- 
utor, all  that  it  is  necessary  to  prove,  on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff,  is, 
that  the  defendant  fills  and  has  acted  in  that  character,  and  that  the 
plaintiff  is  entitled  to  maintain  the  suit.2 

Where,   however,'  through   inadvertence  or   negligence,  the   plaintiff 
has  omitted  to  prove  some  particular  fact  which  is  necessary  to  support 

his  case,  the  Court  sometimes  will  permit  him  to  supply  the  de- 
*  858    feet,  by  giving  him  leave  to  prove  the  fact  *  omitted.1     This  is 

frequently  done  in  the  case  of  wills  disposing  of  real  estate,2 
where  either  the  plaintiff  has  relied  upon  an  admission  of  the  will  by 
answer,  which  the  Court  thinks  not  sufficiently  full,3  or  where  the  ab- 
sence or  death  of  one  of  the  witnesses  to  the  will,4  or  the  testator's 
sanity,5  has  not  been  proved.6  The  practice  of  the  Court,  in  this  respect, 
is  not  confined  to  cases  of  wills  :  a  cause  has  been  ordered  to  stand  over, 
for  the  purpose  of  allowing  proof  of  the  due  execution  of  a  deed,  or  the 


Ch.  (X.  J.)  743;  see  Wright  v.  McKean,  13 
N.  J.  Eq.  259.  Where  the  evidence  has  been 
taken  on  both  sides  before  the  hearing,  without 
objection,  it  may  be  used  by  the  Court,  so  far  as 
may  be  necessary,  in  giving  directions  to  the 
Master,  as  to  the  manner  of  taking  the  account, 
and  the  principles  by  which  he  should  be  gov- 
erned in  taking  it.  The  decree  must  direct  to 
what  matters  the  account  shall  extend,  and  in 
decreeing  a  general  account,  special  directions 
will  be  rendered  proper  and  necessary  by  the 
particular  circumstances  of  the  case.  Hudson 
v.  Trenton  &c.  Manuf.  Co.  16  N.  J.  Eq.  475, 
477,  478;  Izard  v.  Bodine,  9  N.  J.  Eq.  311; 
Sharp  v.  Morrow,  6  Monroe,  300;  Remsen  v. 
Remsen,  2  John.  Ch.  501.  In  the  Federal 
Courts,  see  Pulliam  v.  Pulliam,  10  Fed.  Rep. 
23;  Newman  v.  Moody,  19  id.  858. 

An  account  should  not  be  ordered  until 
there  has  been  a  decree  adjudicating  the  rights 
of  the  parties.  Carey  v.  Williams,  1  Lea,  51; 
S.  C.  2  Tenn.  Leg.  Rep.  192;  Patton  v.  Cone, 
1  Lea,  14;  S.  C.  2  Tenn.  Leg.  Rep.  171.  And 
the  Court  has  no  authority,  without  such  decree, 
except  by  consent  of  parlies,  to  order  an  account. 
Smith  t'.  Earl  of  Pomfret,2  Dick.  437;  McLin  p. 
McXamara,  1  D.  &  B.  Eq.  409;  Trimble  r. 
Dodd,  2  Tenn.  500;  Wessells  v.  Wessells,  1 
Tenn.  Ch.  58. 

2  See  Law  v.  Hunter,  1  Russ.  100, 102,  where 
the  defendant,  who  had  principally  acted  as 
executor  of  the  testator,  admitted  that  he  had 
received  personal  estate  of  the  testator  to  the 
amount  of  from  .£35,000  to  £45,000:  and  the 
plaintiff,  having  gone  into  very  voluminous  evi- 
dence to  show  how  much  of  the  personal  estate  of 
the  testator  had  come  into  the  defendant's  hands, 
in  order  to  prove  that  he  had  received  assets  to 
a  much  larger  amount  than  that  admitted  by 
the  answer,  proposed  to  enter  such  evidence  as 
read ;  but  the  Master  of  the  Rolls  would  not 
permit  it  to  be  done,  as  the  only  tendency  of 

854 


such  evidence  was  to  show  the  state  of  the  ac- 
count, which  the  Court  itself  could  not  inquire 
into,  but  must  refer  to  the  Master  as  the  proper 
person  for  taking  the  account.  See  Hudson  v. 
Treuton  &c.  Manuf.  Co.  1G  X.  J.  Eq.  475,  477. 
The  same  principle  was  afterwards  acted  upon, 
by  the  same  learned  Judge,  where,  upon  a  bill 
for  an  account,  the  liability  to  account  having 
been  admitted  by  the  defendant,  he  had  entered 
into  evidence  to  prove  itenis  of  his  discharge, 
but  was  not  suffered  to  read  them  at  the  hear- 
ing. Walker  v.  Woodward,  1  Russ.  107,  110, 
see  Smith  v.  Chambers,  2  Phil.  221,  226  ;  S.  C. 
nom.  Chambers  v.  Smith,  2  Coll.  742 ;  11  Jur. 
359  ;  see,  however,  the  observations  of  Sir  J. 
YVigram  V  C.  in  Tomlin  v.  Tomlin,  1  Hare, 
241,  245;  and  see  id.  241,  n. ;  see  also  Forsyth 
v.  Ellice,  2  M'N.  &  G  209,  214;  Waters  v.  Earl 
of  Shaftesbury,  14  W.  R.  259;  12  Jur.  N.  S.  3; 
and  in  administration  suits,  Foster  ».  Foster, 
L.  R.  3  Ch.  330.  Production  of  probate  will 
sustain  the  allegation  of  proof  of  will.  Dyson 
v.  Morris,  1  Hare,  413;  Moons  v.  De  Bernales, 
1  Russ.  301. 

1  See  Seton,  1118  ;  Thexton  v.  Edmonston, 
L   R.  5  Eq.  373. 

2  Lechmere  v.  Brasier,  2  J.  &  W.  288; 
Chichester  v.  Chichester,  24  Beav.  289. 

3  Potter  v.  Potter,  1  Ves.  Sr.  274;  Belt's 
Sup.  147;  and  see  Hood  v.  Pimm,  4  Sim  101, 
110. 

*  Wood  v.  Stane,  8  Price,  613. 

5  Abrams  v.  Winshup,  1  Russ.  526;  Wallis 
v.  Hodgson,  id.  527,  n.;  2  Atk,  56. 

6  See  Gresley,  Eq.  Ev.  (Am.  ed.)  132-US, 
where  many  instances  are  given  of  relief  in 
cases  of  defects  or  omissions,  whether  they  are 
brought  to  light  and  become  material  in  conse- 
quence of  something  which  arises  unexpectedly 
in  the  course  of  the  proceedings,  or  were  caused 
by  accident  or  inadvertence. 


CONFINED   TO    MATTERS   IN   ISSUE.  *  859 

death  of  a  party,7  or  the  fact  of  trading ; 8  and  we  have  before  seen,9  that 
where  the  plaintiff  has  omitted  to  give  due  proof  at  the  hearing  of  the 
fact  of  the  defendant  being  out  of  the  jurisdiction,  he  has  been  allowed 
to  prove  it.  And  where  the  evidence  read  at  the  hearing,  to  prove  the 
loss  of  a  deed,  was  held  not  sufficiently  strong  to  entitle  the  party  to 
read  secondary  evidence  of  its  contents,  the  plaintiff  was  given  leave  to 
prove  the  loss  of  the  deed  more  strictly.10  At  no  period  of  a  cause  is  it 
too  late  to  show  that  confusion  and  error  have  arisen  from  two  persons, 
or  two  places,  or  two  things,  passing  by  the  same  name,  and  more 
especially  to  show  that  through  such  confusion  the  Court  had  been 
deceived  by  a  misleading  experiment  performed  in  its  own  presence.11 

In  general,  orders  of  this  nature  are  made  upon  a  simple  application 
by  counsel  at  the  hearing  of  the  cause  :  the  application  may,  however, 
be  made  before  the  hearing; 12  in  which  case  it  was  formerly  made  on 
motion,13  or  by  petition,14  and,  it  is  presumed,  may  now  be  made 
either  by  motion,  or  by  summons  in  Chambers.15  Formerly,  when  the 
evidence  in  causes  was  taken  on  interrogatories,  the  plaintiff  was  per- 
mitted to  exhibit  an  interrogatory  to  prove  the  fact  desired ;  now,  he  is 
permitted  to  prove  it,  either  viva  voce,  or  by  affidavit.16 

Sometimes  the  Court,  instead  of  directing  an  interrogatory 
to  be  exhibited  to  prove  the  fact  omitted,  directs  17  an  *  inquiry  *  859 
into  the  fact ;  and  it  seems  that,  in  some  cases,  the  deficiency  of 
proof  against  infants  may  be  supplied  in  the  same  manner.1  It  is  not, 
however,  the  practice  to  direct  inquiries  as  to  any  facts  which  are  the 
foundation  of  the  relief;  such  as  the  execution  of  a  will,  or  the  fact  of 
trading.2  The  course,  in  such  case,  is  to  order  the  cause  to  stand  over, 
and  direct  the  proofs  to  be  supplied  ;  in  which  case,  the  cause  must  be 
again  set  down.3  "Where,  however,  the  plaintiffs  claimed  to  be  the 
children  of  a  certain  marriage,  but  did  not  prove  that  they  were  so, 
an  inquiry  was  directed.4 

7  .Moons  v.  De  Bernales,  1  Russ.  301.  is  See  15  &  Vic.  c.  80,  §  26;  15  &  16  Vie. 

8  Lechmere  v.  Brasier,  ubi  supra.  c.  86,  §  38.     For  forms  of  notice  of  motion  and 

9  Ante,  p.  152  ;  Hughes  v.  Eades,  1  Hare,      summons,  see  Vol.  III. 

486,  488;  6  Jar.  455.     So,  where  the  plaintiff  16  See  13  &  14  Vic.  c.  35,  §  28;  15  &  16  Vic. 

had  relied  upon  the  admission  of  facts  by  the  c.  86,  §§  38-41 ;  Cons.  Ord.  XIX. ;  Ord.  5  Feb., 

answers,  and  it  was  held  that,  some  of  the  de-  1861.    In  Smith  v.  Blackman,  cited  Seton,1117, 

fendants    being    married   women,   the    admis-  the  Court  would  not  allow  the   testator's  will 

sions  in  their  answers  would  not  bind  them,  the  to  be  proved  at  the  hearing  by  affidavit;  but 

Court  of  Exchequer  allowed  the  cause  to  stand  gave  leave  to  exhibit  an  interrogatory  for  that 

over,  with  liberty  to  the  plaintiff  to  supply  the  purpose. 

requisite  proof.     Hodgson  v.  Merest,  9   Price,  17  Edney  v.  Jewell,  6  Mad.  165. 

563.  1  See  Quantock  v.  Bullen,  5  Mad.  81 ;  Cox 

1°  Cox  v.  Allingham,  Jac.  337,  341,  345.  v.  Bockett,  35  Beav.  48;  Gascoyne  v.  Lamb,  11 

n  Bigsby  ji.  Dickinson,  4  Ch.  D.  24,  28.  Jur.  902,  V.  C.  K.  B. 

12  Douglas  r.  Archbutt,  23  Beav.  233.     See  "-  Lechmere  v.  Brasier,  2  J.  &  W.  289;  Hol- 

Budd  v.  Davison,  W.  N.  (1880)  191;  R.  S.  C.  den  v.  Hearn,  1  Beav.  445,  456;  Chapman   r. 

Ord.  XXXVII. ;  Smith  v.   Filgrim,  2  Ch.   D.  Chapman,  13  Beav.  308.    See  Weston  v.  Em- 

127    As   to   further  evidence   on   appeals,  see  pire  Assurance  Co.  L.  R.  6  Eq.  23,  where  an 

Hastie  v.  Hastie,  1  Ch.  D.  562;  Re  Chennell,  inquiry,  whether  the  defendant  had  or  had  net 

Jones  v.  Chennell,  8  Ch.  D.  492,  505;  Dicks  v.  notice  of  a  charge,  was  directed.     See  Steuart 

Brooks,  13  Ch.  D.  652.  v.  Gladstone,  10  Ch.  D.  626. 

18  Att.-Gen.  v.  Thurnall,  2  Cox,  2.  3  Lechmere  v.  Brasier,  ubi  supra. 

14  Cox  v.  Allingham,  ubi  supra.  ■>  Miller  v.  Priddon,  1  M'N.  &  G.  687;  and 

855 


860 


EVIDENCE. 


In  some  cases,  the  Court,  instead  of  ordering  the  cause  to  stand  over 
for  the  purpose  of  supplying  the  deficient  evidence,  will  make  a  decree 
as  to  all  that  part  of  the  case  which  is  in  a  situation  to  be  decided  upon, 
and  give  liberty  to  prove  the  rest.  This  has  been  frequently  done  in 
the  case  of  a  will,  where,  although  it  was  not  sufficiently  proved  to 
affect  the  real  estate,  the  Court  has  decreed  an  account  of  the  personal 
estate,  with  liberty  to  supply  the  deficiency  of  proof.5  In  reference  to 
the  cases  on  this  subject,  Lord  Cottenham  has  said:6  "It  is  impossible 
to  reconcile  the  cases,  or  to  extract  any  principle  upon  which  any  fixed 
rule  can  be  founded.  The  Court  has  exercised  a  wide  discretion  in 
giving  or  refusing  leave  to  supply  the  defect  of  evidence,  in  doing 
which,  the  merits  of  the  case  upon  the  plaintiff's  own  showing  ought 
to  have  a  leading  influence."  7 


860 


*  Section  IV.  —  Of  the  Effect  of  a  Variance. 


It  is  not  only  necessary  that  the  substance  of  the  case  made  by  each 
party  should  be  proved,1  but  it  must  be  substantially  the  same  case  as 
that  which  he  has  stated  upon  the  record : 2  for  the  Court  will  not  al- 
low a  party  to  be  taken  by  surprise,  by  the  other  side  proving  a  case 
different  from  that  set  up  in  the  pleadings.3  (a)     Thus,  the  specific  per- 


see  observations  of  Lord  Truro  in  Fowler  v. 
Reynal,  3  M'N.  &  G.  500,  511;  15  Jur.  1019, 
1021. 

5  Lechmere  v.  Brasier,  2  J.  &.  W.  289 ;  Ros- 
siter  v.  Pitt,  2  Mad.  165. 

6  Marten  v.  Whichelo,  C.  &  P.  257,  2G1 ;  see 
also  Simmons  v.  Simmons,  6  Hare,  360;  12  Jur. 
8,  11 ;  Williams  v.  Knipe,  5  Beav.  273,  276. 

7  This  ease  was  a  creditor's  suit,  where  the 
plaintiff  had  taken  the  b\\\ pro  confesso  against 
one  of  the  defendants,  who  was  the  executor, 
but  had  adduced  no  evidence  of  his  debt  as 
against  the  other  defendants,  who  were  the 
devisees  of  the  testator's  real  estate,  and  who 
did  not  sufficiently  admit  the  debt;  and  his 
Lordship  refused  to  allow  the  plaintiff  an 
opportunity  of  going  into  new  evidence  against 
the  devisees,  and  dismissed  the  bill  with  costs 
against  them;  as  the  plaintiff,  on  her  own  state- 
ment, appeared  to  be  a  simple  contract  creditor, 
suing  the  devisees  of  the  real  estate  more  than 
six  years  after  the  debt  accrued;  although  the 
personal  representative  had  received  ample 
assets,  and  a  judgment  de  bonis  testatoris,  et,  si 
nnn  de  bonis propriis,  had  been  obtained  against 
him.  hi  Davies  v.  Davies,  3  De  G.  &  S.  698, 
Sir  J.  L.  Knight  Bruce  V.  C.  allowed  evidence 
of  the  due  execution  of  a  will  to  be  supplied;  but 
thought  that  the  defendants  were  entitled  to 
have  the  evidence  supplied  in  whatever  manner 


thejr  might  elect;  and,  in  accordance  with  their 
desire,  directed  the  plaintiffs  to  bring  an  action 
of  ejectment. 

1  See  Seton,  1117,  where  the  cases  on  the 
subject  of  supplying  defective  evidence  are 
collected. 

2  Gresley,  Eq.  Ev.  170-173;  1  Greenl.  Ev. 
§  63,  et  sen. ;  Hobart  v.  Andrews,  21  Pick.  526, 
534;  Bellows  v.  Stone,  14  N.  H.  175;  Crothers 
v.  Lee,  29  Ala.  337:  Bowman  v.  O'Reilly,  31 
Miss.  261;  Reynolds  v.  Morris,  7  Ohio  St. 
310;  Williams  v.  Starr,  5  Wis.  534;  Gurney  v. 
Ford,  2  Allen,  576  ;  Andrews  v.  Farnham,  10 
N.  J.  Eq.  91;  McWhorter  v.  McMahan,  10 
Paige,  386;  Sears  v.  Barnum,  1  Clark,  139; 
Simplot  v.  Simplot,  14  Iowa,  449;  Feckham  v. 
Buff  urn,  11  Mich.  529;  Holman  v.  Vallejo,  19 
Cal.  498;  Singleton  v.  Scott,  11  Iowa,  589; 
Ohling  v.  Luitjens,  32  111.  23. 

The  rule  applies  as  well  to  the  defendant  as 
the  plaintiff.  Mead  v.  Coombs,  26  N.  J.  Eq. 
173.  Although  a  rigid  and  technical  construc- 
tion of  bills  and  proceedings  in  Equity  is  ex- 
ploded in  favor  of  substance,  yet  a  party  will 
not  be  allowed  to  recover  upon  a  case  proved, 
essentially  different  from  that  alleged  in  the  bill. 
Baugher  "v.  Eichelberger,  11  W.  Va.  217;  Pas- 
man  v.  Montague,  30  N.  J.  Eq.  385. 

3  As  to  variance  generally,  see  the  following 
works  on  evidence;  1  Phillips,  569,  et  seq.,  1 


(n)  The  rule  as  to  variance  is  to  be  applied 
fairlv  and  equitablv,  and  not  rigidly  or  techni- 

856  " 


callv.     Crawford  v.  Moore,  28  Fed.  Rep.  824; 
130U.  S.  122;  Tafti>.  Taft, 73 Mich.  502 ;  Camp- 


EFFECT   OF   A    VARIANCE. 


860 


forinance  of  an  agreement,  to  grant  a  lease  for  three  lives,  cannot  be 
decreed  upon  what  amounts  to  evidence  of  an  agreement  to  grant  only 
for  one  life.4  In  matters  of  this  description  the  general  practice  of  the 
Court  is  to  compel  parties,  who  come  for  the  execution  of  agreements, 
to  state  them  as  they  ought  to  be  stated,  and  not  to  set  up  titles  which, 
when  the  cause  comes  to  a  hearing,  they  cannot  support.5  (7>) 


Taylor,  §§  254-297  ;  Best,  §  287;  Gresley,  242  ; 
Powell,  478-495. 

Where  the  bill  sought  to  establish  a  trust  by- 
virtue  of  an  express  agreement,  and  the  evi- 
dence was  of  a  purely  resulting  trust  in  an 
entirely  different  person,  and  at  a  different  time, 
the  variance  was  held  fatal,  and  the  Court 
refused,  under  the  circumstances,  to  allow  an 
amendment.  Midmer  v.  Midmer,  26  N.  J.  Eq. 
299;  affirmed,  27  id.  548. 


bell  v.  Sloane,  22  ST.  Y.  S.  81 ;  Stearns  v.  Reidv, 
135  111.  119;  Davis  v.  Guilford,  55  Conn.  351; 
Biven  v.  Bostwick,  70  Cal.  639;  Goree  v.  Cle- 
ments, 94  Ala.  337.  Hence  an  issue  need  be 
established  only  in  substance.  Phoenix  M.  L. 
Ins.  Co.  v.  Hinesley,  75  Ind.  1.  The  objection 
will  not  prevail  if  there  is  a  case  upon  the 
pleadings  and  the  adverse  party  is  not  misled 
or  prejudiced.  Pope  v.  Allis,  115  U.  S.  363; 
Zeininger  v.  Schnitzler,  48  Kansas,  63,  66; 
First  Nat.  Bank  <>.  Stephenson,  82  Texas,  435; 
Lawrence  v.  Hester,  93  N.  C.  79.  An  express 
contract  declared  on  is  not  proved  by  an  im- 
plied one.  Smoot  v.  Strauss,  21  Fla.  611;  or 
by  evidence  of  an  agreement  with  other  parties 
than  those  alleged.  Pendleton  v.  Dalton,  96 
N.  C.  507;  Steward  t>.  Gordon,  65  Texas,  344; 
McMillan  v.  Otis,  74  Ala.  560;  Mead  v.  Ray- 
mond, 52  Mich.  14;  or  of  an  essentially  different 
agreement.  Cox  v.  McLaughlin,  63  Cal.  196; 
see  Moore  v.  Lake  Co.  58  N.  H.  254.  An 
alleged  written  contract  is  not  proved  by  an 
oral  one.  Fleetwood  v.  Dorsey  Machine  Co. 
95  Ind.  491 ;  Barrett  v.  Wheeler,  66  Iowa,  560. 
In  a  suit  to  quiet  title,  proof  cannot  be  made  of 
breach  of  a  contract  or  of  violation  of  a  trust. 
Hays  v.  Carr,  83  Ind.  275.  So  non-feasance 
alleged  is  not  supported  by  proof  of  malfea- 
sance, South  &  North  Alabama  R.  Co.  v. 
Wilson,  78  Ala.  587;  and  an  averment  of  per- 
formance is  not  proved  by  evidence  of  a  waiver. 
Safety  Fund  Bank  v.  Westlake,  21  Mo.  App. 
565.  An  allegation  of  authority  to  do  an  act  is 
proved  by  evidence  of  a  ratification.  Janney  v. 
Boyd,  30Minn.  319. 

The  character  of  the  suit  and  the  extent  of 
the  relief  granted  by  the  decree  are  deter- 
mined by  the  pleadings  and  not  by  the  facts 
disclosed  in  evidence.  Tinsley  V.  Penniman,  83 
Texas,  54;  Edichal  Bullion  Co.  v.  Columbia 
G  M.  Co.  87  Va.  641;  Hoffman  v.  McMorran, 
52  Mich.  318;  Paddock  v.  Lance,  94  Mo.  283. 
When  the  bill  justifies  relief,  and  the  defend- 


4  Lindsay  v.  Lynch,  2  Sch.  &  Lef.  1;  see 
also  Mortimer  v.  Orchard,  2  Ves.  Jr.  243;  Legh 
v.  Havertield,  5  Ves.  453,  457;  Woollain  v. 
Hearn,  7  Ves.  211  ;  Deniston  v.  Little,  2  Sch.& 
Lef.  11,  n. ;  Savage  v.  Carroll,  2  Ball  &  B.  451 ; 
Daniels  v.  Davison,  16  Ves.  249,  256;  Story, 
Eq.  PI.  §  394,  n.;  Harris  v.  Knickerbacker,  5 
Wend.  638. 

5  Per  Lord  Redesdale,  in  Deniston  v.  Little, 
2  Sch.  &  Lef.  11,  note. 


ants  have  not  been  taken  by  surprise,  a  decree 
will  not  be  reversed,  or  a  new  trial  granted,  be- 
cause of  variance.  Moore  v.  Crawford,  130 
U.  S.  122;  see  Wallace  v  Loomis,  97  U.  S.  146; 
Walker  v.  Duncan,  68  Wis.  624;  Webster  v. 
Peet  (Mich.),  56  N.  W.  Rep.  558.  The  objection 
of  variance,  if  not  raised  at  the  trial,  will  not  be 
considered  on  appeal.  O'Connor  r.  Delaney 
(Minn.),  54  N.  W.  Rep.  1108.  This  objection 
does  not  present  a  question  of  law  for  the  Ap- 
peal Court  when  stated  only  in  general  terms  in 
a  motion  for  new  trial,  no  objection  to  the  evi- 
dence having  been  made  at  the  trial.  Libby  v. 
Scherman,  146  111.,  540;  34  N.  E.  Rep.  801.  A 
bill  which  asks  relief  under  a  statute,  and  dis- 
closes a  case  for  relief  upon  the  general  principles 
of  Equity,  will  not  be  dismissed.  Adams  v. 
Kehlor  Milling  Co.  36  Fed.  Rep  212. 

Other  instructive  decisions  relating  to  vari- 
ance are:  Speidel  V.  Henrici,  120  U.  S.  377; 
Bradley  v.  Converse,  4  Cliff.  366;  Henry  v. 
Suttle,  42  Fed.  Rep.  91;  Elliott  v.  Amazon'lns. 
Co.  49  Mich.  73;  Gardner  v.  Raisbeck,  31  N.  J. 
Eq.  23;  O'Neal  v.  Boone,  82  111.  589;  Rabber- 
man  v.  House.  89  111.  209;  Walsh  v.  Wright, 
101  111.  178;  Booth  v.  Wiley,  102  111.  84;  Mann 
v.  Edwards,  138  III.  19;  Floyd  v.  Jones,  19  W. 
Va.  359;  Roanoke  Gas  Co.  v.  Roanoke,  88  Va. 
810;  Campell  v.  Bowles,  30  Gratt.  652;  Mc- 
Comb  v.  Lobdell,  32  Gratt.  185;  Meadors  v. 
Askew,  56  Ala.  584;  Helmetag  v.  Frank,  61 
Ala.  G7;  Rapier  v.  Gulf  City  Paper  Co.  64 
Ala.  330;  Munchus  v.  Harris,  09  Ala.  506; 
Gilmer  v.  Wallace,  75  Ala.  220;  Webb  v.  Pob- 
bins,  77  Ala.  176;  Webb  v.  Crawford,  id.  440-, 
Edwards  v.  Rogers,  81  Ala.  568;  Forrester  v. 
Vason,   71  Ga.  49. 

(6)  If  a  bill  for  the  specific  performance  of 
an  oral  agreement  for  the  sale  of  land  relies 
upon  part  performance,  it  must  clearly  set  forth 
the  acts  of  part  performance  relied  upon,  ami  is 
insufficient  if  it  merely  alleges  that  the  vendee 
entered  upon  the  premises  and  made  valuable 

857 


*861 


EVIDENCE. 


"We  have  seeD,  in  a  former  part  of  this  Treatise,  that,  in  bills  where 
the  rights  asserted  are  founded  on  prescription,  a  considerable  degree 
of  certainty  is  required  in  setting  out  the  plaintiff's  case  ; 6  to  which 
may  be  added,  that,  in  general,  the  proof  must  correspond  in  certainty 
with  the  case  so  set  out.7  Thus,  the  Court  of  Exchequer,  in  deciding 
upon  tithe  questions,  was  in  the  habit  of  requiring  that  the  proof  of  a 
modus  should  correspond  with  the  modus  as  laid  in  the  bill.8  And  so 
in  other  cases,  where  particular  customs  are  prescribed  for,  the 
*  8C1  evidence  is,  *  in  general,  required  to  be  in  conformity  with  the 
statement  in  the  pleadings.1 

"We  have  seen  before  that,  in  some  cases,  where  a  plaintiff  has  alleged 
a  different  agreement,  in  his  bill,  from  that  which  has  been  admitted  by 
the  answer,  the  Court  has  permitted  the  plaintiff  to  amend  his  bill,  by 
abandoning  the  first  agreement  and  insisting  upon  that  stated  upon  the 
answer ; 2  and  when  the  defendant  sets  up  a  parol  variation  from  the 
written  contract,  it  will  depend  on  the  particular  circumstances  of  each 
case  whether  that  is  to  defeat  the  plaintiff's  title  to  specific  perform- 
ance, or  whether  the  Court  will  perform  the  contract :  taking  care  that 
the  subject-matter  of  this  parol  agreement  or  understanding  is  carried 
into  effect,  so  that  all  parties  may  have  the  benefit  of  what  they  con- 
tracted for.3  When,  however,  there  is  a  material  variance  in  a  written 
agreement,  it  is  the  ordinary  practice  to  dismiss  the  bill  with  costs, 
without  prejudice  to  the  plaintiff's  bringing  a  new  bill.4 


6  Ante,  p.  369. 

7  1  Greenl.  Ev.  §§  71,  72;  ante,  p.  361,  note  1. 

8  Scott  v.  Fenwick,  3  Eagle  &  Y.  1318; 
Uhthoff  v.  Lord  Huntingfield,  2  id.  649;  cited  1 
Price,  237;  Prevost  v.  Benett,  3  Eagle  &  Y.  705; 
1  Price.  236 ;  Blake  v.  Veysie,  3  Dow.  189 ;  2 
Eagle  &  Y.  699;  Miller  "v.  Jackson,  1  Y.  & 
J.  65. 

1  But  in  The  Dean  and  Chapter  of  Ely  v. 
Warren,  2  Atk.  190,  however,  Lord  Hardwicke 
said  that  the  Court  of  Chancery  would  not  put 
persons  to  set  forth  a  custom  with  so  much  exact- 
ness as  isrequisiteat  Law,  or  with  so  much  nicety 
as  the  Court  of  Exchequer  expects.  A  custom 
mav  be  proved  bv  an  instance.  Hanmer  v. 
Chance,  4  De  G.  J.  &  S.  626;  11  Jur.  N.  S.  397. 

2  Ante,  p.  408;  Bellows  v.  Stone,  14  X.  H. 
17"> :  such  amendment  may  be  allowed  even 
after  a  hearing  upon  bill,  answer,  and  evidence. 
Ibid.  As  to  amendments  in  cases  of  main  fides, 
&c.  see  Tildesleyr.  Harper,  10 Ch.  D.  393;  King 
v.  Corke,  1  Ch.  D.  57;  Caldwell  v.  Pagham  Har- 
bour Co.  2  Ch.  D.  221  :  Roe  r.  Davies,  2  id.  729. 

3  London  and  Birmingham  Ry.  Co.  v.  Winter, 
C.  &  P.  62;  and   see  Benson  v.   Glastonbury 


improvements.  Fowler  r.  Sunderland,  68  Cal. 
414.  If  the  answer  to  a  bill  to  subject  land  sold 
for  payment  of  the  purchase  money  avers  and 
show*  that  portions  of  the  land  are  held  by 
third   persons   named  by  title  paramount,  the 

858 


Canal  Co.  1  C.  P.  Coop.  temp.  Cott.  350;  C  P. 
Coop.  42;  Smith  v.  Wheatcroft,  9  Ch.  D.  227. 

4  Lindsay  v.  Lynch,  2  Sch.  &  Lef.  1; 
Woollam  v.  Hearn,  7  Yes.  211,  222;  Deniston 
v.  Little,  2  Sch.  &  Lef.  11,  note.  Where,  how- 
ever, the  plaintiff  prayed  the  specific  perform- 
ance of  an  agreement  stated  in  the  bill,  but 
proved  a  parol  agreement  which  was  quite 
different,  the  Court,  although  it  thought  the  bill 
ought  to  be  dismissed,  yet,  as  there  had  been  a 
partial  execution  of  some  agreement  between 
the  parties,  by  the  building  of  a  house,  directed 
a  reference  to  the  Master,  to  settle  a  lease  pur- 
suant to  the  agreement  confessed  in  the  answer. 
Mortimer  v.  Orchard,  2  Yes.  Jr.  243;  see  Story, 
Eq.  PI.  §  394,  and  note.  Relief  may  be  granted 
upon  the  statements  made  by  the  answer,  al- 
though the  case  made  by  the  bill  is  different  and 
not  sustained  by  the  proof.  Rose  r.  Mynatt.  7 
Yerg.  30;  Bailey  v.  Bailey,  8  Humph.  230. 
But  the  whole  answer  must  be  taken  together, 
the  matter  of  discharge  as  well  as  the  matter  of 
charge.  Neal  v.  Robinson,  8  Humph.  435; 
Mulloy  t\  Young,  10  Humph.  298;  ante,  p. 361, 
note  1. 


plaintiff  must  amend  his  bill  by  stating  the 
facts  within  his  knowledge  respecting  such  title, 
or,  if  he  insists  upon  his  own  title,  he  must 
make  such  third  persons  defendants.  Heavner 
v.  Morgan,  30  W.  7a.  335. 


DOCUMENTARY    EVIDENCE    WHICH   PROVES   ITSELF.  *  862 

The  rules  which  have  just  been  discussed  relate  to  the  general  aim 
or  tendency  of  the  proof  to  be  adduced.  There  are  other  rules  relating 
to  the  medium  of  proof,  independently  of  its  tendency,  which  might 
properly  be  introduced  in  this  place,  such  as  the  General  Rules  :  that 
the  best  evidence  which  the  nature  of  the  case  admits,  ought  to  be  pro- 
duced, and  that  hearsay  of  a  fact  is  not  admissible ;  but  a  discussion  of 
these  rules  would  extend  this  Treatise  beyond  all  reasonable  limits. 
The  reader  is,  therefore,  referred  to  the  Treatises  on  the  Law  of 
Evidence  ; 6  and  what  is  laid  down  in  any  of  those  *  Treatises  as  the  *  862 
rule  of  evidence  in  Courts  of  Law  will  generally  be  applicable 
to  cases  in  Courts  of  Equity.1 


Section  V.  —  Documentary  Evidence  which  proves  itself. 

Having  endeavored  to  direct  the  practitioner's  attention  to  the  matters 
which  it  will  be  necessary  for  him  to  prove  in  the  cause,  the  next  thing 
to  be  considered  is  the  evidence  by  which  such  matters  are  to  be  sub- 
stantiated. This  evidence  may  be  either:  I.  Documentary;  or,  II. 
The  testimony  of  witnesses. 

Documentary  evidence  consists  of  all  those  matters  which  are  sub- 
mitted to  the  Court  in  the  shape  of  written  documents.  It  is  not,  of 
course,  intended  to  include  in  this  definition  the  depositions  of  wit- 
nesses examined  in  the  cause  ;  for  this  evidence,  having  been  given  by 
the  witness  viva  voce  to  the  person  by  whom  he  was  examined,  does  not, 
from  the  circumstance  of  its  being  committed  to  writing,  for  more  con- 
venient use  before  the  Judge,  lose  its  p_arol_character.  Neither  is  it 
intended  to  include  evidence  by  affidavit ;  Avhich  is  now  the  most  usual 
form  in  which  the  evidence  of  the  witnesses  is  adduced.  Such  evidence 
is,  in  fact,  a  simple  and  easier  mode  by  which  the  parol  evidence  of 
witnesses  is  communicated  to  the  Court. 

Some  descriptions  of  documentary  evidence  are  admitted  by  the 
Court,  without  the  necessity  of  any  proof  being  gone  into  to  establish 
their  validity  ;  whilst  others  require  the  support  of  parol  testimony, 
before  they  can  be  received.  It  is  proposed,  in  this  section,  to  consider 
documentary  evidence  of  the  first  description  ;  and,  in  the  next  section, 
to  treat  of  documents  which  require  parol  proof. 

All  public  Acts  of  Parliament,  being  judicially  noticed,   require  no 

5  As   to    hf.st  EVIDENCE:   see   1   Phillips,  231.     Parol  testimony  which  tends  to  confirm  a 

chap,  ix.;  1  Taylor,  §§  391-397;   Best,  §§  87-  written  contract  is  not  objectionable:  Southern 

107;  Gresley,    247.      As   to   hearsay:    see   1  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Trear,  29  Gratt.  255;  or  to 

Phillips,  chap.  viii. ;  1  Taylor,  §§-507-600;  Best,  a-certain  the  person  intended  to  be  benefited  by 

§  497;    Hubback,  648-711;    Gresley,  304-325;  a  written  guaranty :  Hodges  v.   Bowen,  83  III*. 

Powell,  84-93.     Parol  evidence  is  admissible  to  161:  or  trust:  Railroad  Co.  v.  Durant,  95  U.  S. 

establish  the  terms  of  a  sale,  although  a  mem-  576. 

orandum  of  sale  has   been  given.     Perrine  v.  l  Manning  v.  Lechmere,  1  Atk.  453;  Glynn 

Cooley,  39  N.  J.  L.  449.    So,  although  a  deed  v.  Bank  of  England,  2  Ves.  Sr.  41;  Morrison  v. 

may  have  been  delivered  and  accepted.     Trayer  Hart,  2  Bibb.  5 ;  Lemaster  v.  Burckhart,  2  Bibb, 

v.  Ruder,  45  Iowa,  272.     And  see,  as  to  proof  28;  Dwight  v.  Pomeroy,  17  Mass.  303;  1  Greenl. 

of  a  lost  judgment-roll,  Marideville  r.  Reynolds,  Ev.  §  98,  et  seq.;  Gresley,  Eq.  Ev.   (Am.  ed.) 

68  N.  Y.  528;  Beveridge  V.  Chctlain.l  111.  App.  218,  ct  seq. 

859 


*863 


EVIDENCE. 


proof ; 2  copies  of  private  Acts  of  Parliament,  purporting  to  be  printed 
by  the  Queen's  printer,  and  all  copies  of  the  journals  of  Parlia- 
ment, and  of  Royal  proclamations,  purporting  to  be  printed  by  the 
Queen's  printer,  or  by  the  printers  of  either  House  of  Parliament, 
*  863  are  admitted  as  evidence  thereof ; 3  and  *  copies  of  the  statutes 
of  Great  Britain  and  of  Ireland  respectively,  before  the  Union, 
are  received  as  conclusive  evidence  of  the  several  statutes,  in  the  Courts 
of  either  kingdom.1 

Exemplified  copies  of  records  in  other  Courts  of  Justice  under  the 
Great  Seal  of  Great  Britain,  or  under  the  seals  of  the  Courts  them- 
selves,2 and  the  seal  of  the  Queen,  and  of  the  superior  Courts  of  Justice, 
and  of  the  Courts  established  here  by  Act  of  Parliament,  are  admitted 
in  evidence,  without  extrinsic  proof  of  their  genuineness.3 

All  proclamations,  treaties,  and  other  acts  of  state,  of  any  foreign 
state,  or  of  any  British  colony;  and  all  judgments,  decrees,  orders,  and 
other  judicial  proceedings  of  any  Court  of  Justice  in  any  foreign  state, 
or  in  any  British  colony,  and  all  affidavits,  pleadings,  and  other  legal 
documents  filed  or  deposited  in  any  such  Court,  may  be  proved  by 
examined  or  authenticated  copies  :  that  is  to  say,  in  the  case  of  a 
proclamation,  treaty,  or  other  act  of  state,  the  authenticated  copy  must 
purport  to  be  sealed  with  the  seal  of  the  foreign  state  or  British  colony  to 
which  the  original  document  belongs ;  but  if  the  document  sought  to  be 
proved  be  a  judgment,  decree,   order,   or  other  judicial  proceeding  of 


2  See  2  Taylor,  §§  1523,  1524. 

3  8  &  9  Vic.  c.  113,  §  3;  13  &  14  Vic.  c.  21, 
§  7;  2  Taylor  on  Evid.  §§  1527-1529;  2  Phil, 
on  Evid.  135,  194.  Private  Acts  of  Parliament, 
not  printed  by  the  Queen's  printer,  are  proved 
by  an  examined  copy,  compared  with  the  ori- 
ginal in  the  Parliament  Office  at  Westminster. 
2  Tiylor,  §  1523;  Hubback,  G13;  see  1  Greenl. 
Ev.  §§  479,  482. 

i  41  Geo.  III.  c.  90,  §  9;  1  Greenl.  Ev. 
§  480;  Voung  v.  Bank  of  Alexandria,  4  Cranch, 
388;  Biddis  r.  James,  6  Binney,  321,  326; 
Gresley,  Eq.  Ev.  (Am.  ed)  302-305;  1  Phil. 
Ev.  (Cowen  &  Hill's  ed.  1839)  317,  et  seq.  It  is 
not  the  duty  of  Courts  to  take  judicial  notice  of 
the  execution  of  a  public  statute.  Canal  Co. 
v.  Railroad  Co.  4  Gill  &  J.  7  ;  see  1  Greenl. 
Ev.  §  481.  In  Massachusetts,  the  printed  copies 
of  all  statutes,  acts,  and  resolves  of  the  Com- 
monwealth, whether  of  a  public  or  private 
nature,  published  under  the  authority  of  the 
government,  shall  be  admitted  as  sufficient  evi- 
dence thereof  in  all  Courts  of  Law,  and  on  all 
occasions  whatsoever.     Pub.  Stats,  c.  169,  §  69. 

As  to  the  proof  of  foreign  laws,  of  the  laws 
of  sister  States,  of  the  laws  of  Congress  in  the 
State  Courts,  and  of  the  laws  of  the  States  in 
the  U.  S.  Courts,  see  1  Greenl.  Ev.  §§  486-490. 
The  Act  of  Congress  prescribing  the  mode  in 
which  public  acts,  records,  &c,  shall  be  authen- 
ticated as  evidence,  does  not  relate  to  the  ad- 
missibility  of  such  acts,  records,  &c,  of  a  State 

860 


in  its  own  Courts,  or  in  the  Courts  of  the  United 
States  sitting  in  that  State.  South  Ottawa  r. 
Perkins,  94  U.  S.  260-  In  Massachusetts,  printed 
copies  of  the  statute  Laws  of  any  other  State 
and  of  the  United  States,  or  of  the  territories 
thereof,  if  purporting  to  be  published  under  the 
authority  of  their  respective  governments,  or  if 
commonly  admitted  and  read  as  evidence  in 
their  Courts,  shall  be  admitted  in  all  Courts  of 
Law,  and  on  all  other  occasions,  in  that  State,  as 
prima  facie  evidence  of  such  laws.  Pub.  Stats. 
c.  169,  §  71.  For  the  mode  of  authenticating 
the  records  and  judicial  proceedings  of  one 
State  to  be  used  in  the  Courts  of  other  States, 
see  1  Greenl.  Ev.  §§  504-506. 

2  See  1  Greenl.  Ev  §  501.  Levisay  v.  Delp, 
1  Tenn.  Leg.  Rep.  275. 

3  2  Phil,  on  Evid.  197;  2  Taylor,  §  1534;  1 
Greenl.  Ev.  §  503.  As  to  the  proof  of  British 
treaties,  charters,  letters-patent,  grants  from 
the  Crown,  pardons,  and  commissions,  see  2 
Taylor,  §  1526;  of  the  general  records  of  the 
realm,  in  the  custody  of  the  M:isterof  the  Rolls, 
see  1  &  2  Vic.  c.  94,'§§  12,  13 ;  2  Taylor,  §  1533; 
and  of  documents  belonging  to  the  Common 
Law  side  of  the  Court  of  Chancery,  see  12  & 
13  Vic.  c.  109,  §§  11,  13;  Taylor,  §  1385.  See 
Documentary  Evidence  Act  of  1868,  31  &  32 
Vic.  c.  37;  and  of  1882  (45  &  46  Vic.  c.  9,  §  2); 
1  Dan.  Ch.  Prac.  (6th  Eng.  ed.),  587;  R.  S.  C 
Ord.  LIE  A.  (Ord.  April,  1880,  r.  45);  36  &  37 
Vic.  c.  GQ,  §  61 


DOCUMENTARY   EVIDENCE   WHICH    PROVES   ITSELF. 


864 


any  foreign  or  colonial  Court,  or  an  affidavit,  pleading,  or  other  legal 
document,  filed  or  deposited  in  any  such  Court,  the  authenticated  copy, 
to  be  admissible,  in  evidence,  must  purport  either  to  be  sealed  with 
the  seal  of  the  foreign  or  colonial  Court,  to  which  the  original  document 
belongs,  or,  in  the  event  of  such  Court  having  no  seal,  to  be  signed  by 
the  Judge,  or  if  there  be  more  than  one  Judge,  by  any  one  of  the 
Judges  ;  and  the  Judge  must  attach  to  his  signature  a  statement 
in  writing  on  the  said  *  copy,  "  that  the  Court  whereof  he  is  *  864 
a  Judge  has  no  seal."  And  where  the  authenticated  copies 
purport  to  be  sealed  or  signed  as  above  mentioned,  the  same  are  to 
be  admitted  as  evidence,  in  every  case  in  which  the  original  document 
could  have  been  received  in  evidence,  without  any  proof  of  the  seal, 
where  a  seal  is  necessary,  or  of  the  signature,  or  of  the  truth  of  the 
statement  attached  thereto,  where  such  signature  and  statement  are 
necessary,  or  of  the  judicial  character  of  the  person  appearing  to  have 
made  such  signature  and  statement.1 

It  may  be  observed  here  that  questions  of  foreign  law  are  questions 
of  fact,  which  must  be  determined  in  each  case  on  the  evidence  adduced 
in  it ;  and  for  this  purpose,  a  decision  on  a  former  case,  or  the  evidence 
then  made  use  of,  is  not  available.  It  cannot  be  proved  by  the  produc- 
tion of  a  copy  of  the  law,  however  well  authenticated ;  but  persons 
skilled  in  the  foreign  law  must  be  called  to  prove  its  existence  and 
meaning,2  and  the  evidence  of  a  person  whose  only  knowledge  of  the 


1  14  &  15  Vic.  c.  99,  §  7;  Taylor,  §§  10, 
1372,  1398;  see  1  Greenl.  Ev.  §  514."  If  the  for- 
eign document  sought  to  be  proved  by  a  copy 
does  not  fall  within  the  language  of  §  7,  evidence 
must  be  given  that  it  is  a  public  writing,  de- 
posited in  some  registry  or  place,  whence,  by 
the  law,  or  the  established  usage  of  the  coun- 
try, it  cannot  be  removed;  and  the  copy  must 
then  be  shown  to  have  been  duly  examined. 
2  Taylor,  §  1556. 

-  Marl  Xelson  v.  Lord  Bridport,  8  Reav.  527, 
554;  M'Cormick  v.  Garnett,  5  De  G.  M.  &  G. 
278:  and  see  Sussex  Peerage  Case,  11  CI.  &  F. 
85;  Di  Sma  v.  I'hillipps,  10  H.  L.  Cas.  624;  2 
Taylor,  §§  1423-1425;  United  States  v.  M'Rae, 
L.  U.  3  Ch.  85,  86.  English  Courts  may  now 
ascertain  what  the  foreign  law  is,  by  sending 
cases  for  the  opinion  of  foreign  Courts;  but, 
unless  they  are  in  countries  under  the  govern- 
ment of  the  Queen,  a  convention  must  first  be 
entered  into  with  the  foreign  government.  22 
&  23  Vic.  c.  63;  24  &  25  Vic.  c.  11;  and  see 
post,  Chap.  XXVII.  Trials  of  Questions  oj 
Fart.  In  Massachusetts,  the  unwritten  or  com- 
mon law  of  any  other  of  the  United  States,  or 
of  the  territories  thereof,  may  be  proved  as 
facts  by  parol  evidence;  and  the  books  of  re- 
ports of  cases  adjudged  in  their  Courts  may 
also  be  admitted  as  evidence  of  such  law.  Pub. 
Stats,  c.  169,  §  72.  The  existence,  tenor,  or 
effect,  of  all  foreign  laws,  may   be  proved  as 


facts,  by  parol  evidence ;  but  if  it  appears  that 
the  law  in  question  is  contained  in  a  written 
statute  or  code,  the  Court  may  in  its  discretion 
reject  any  evidence  of  such  law  that  is  not  ac- 
companied by  a  copy  thereof.     Ibid.  §  65. 

In  Tennessee,  the  laws  of  other  States  may 
be  proved  by  copies  of  the  statutes  purporting 
to  be  published  by  authority  of  the  particular 
State.  Code,  §  3800.  And  under  the  Code, 
§  3801,  the  Supreme  Court  takes  judicial  notice 
of  the  laws  and  statutes  of  sister  States.  Hobbs 
r.  Memphis  &c.  R.  Co.  9  Heisk.  873;  Ander- 
son v.  May,  10  Heisk.  84.  88. 

Where  the  plaintiff  relies  upon  a  contract 
made  in  another  State,  and  the  defendant 
claims  that  it  is  void  by  the  laws  of  that 
State,  he  must  show  its  validity  as  well  by 
his  pleadings  as  by  his  proof.  It  is  not  suffi- 
cient for  the  defendant  to  allege  in  his  answer 
that  the  contract  is  void  by  the  laws  of  the 
land;  because  that  only  draws  the  attention  of 
the  Court  to  the  laws  of  the  State  in  which  the 
proceedings  are  pending.  Courts  will  not  ex 
officio  take  notice  of  foreign  laws.  Campion 
r.  Kille,  14  N.  J.  Eq.  22!) ;  Dainese  v.  Hale,  91 
U.  S.  13;  Kline  v.  Baker,  99  Mass.  253.  It  is 
otherwise,  where  the  judgment  of  a  Court  of  a 
sister  State  is  impleaded.  Paine  v.  Schenectady 
Ins.  Co.  11  R.  I.  411;  State  of  Ohio  r.  Hinchin, 
27  Penn.  St.  479.  Foreign  laws  and  foreign 
adjudications,  to  be  the   basis  of  decision  in 

861 


865 


EVIDENCE. 


laws  of  a  foreign  country  is  derived  from  having  studied  them,  will  not 
be  received.3  (a) 

Documents  which  are  admissible  without  formal  proof  in  England, 
are  also  admissible  in  Ireland,  and  vice  versa;*  and  such  documents 
are  in  like  manner  admissible  in  colonial  Courts.5 

Kegisters  of  British  vessels,  and  certificates  of  register,  purporting 
to  be  duly  signed,  are  received  in  evidence  as  prima  facie  proof  of  all 
the  matters  contained  or  recited  in  such  register,  and  of  all  the  matters 
contained  or  recited  in,  or  indorsed  on  such  certificate  of  registry,  with- 
out proof  of  the  signature.6 

Whenever  any  book  or  other  document  is  of  such  a  public  nature  as 
to  be  admissible  in  evidence,  on  its  mere  production  from  the 
*  865  proper  custody,  any  copy  thereof  or  extract  therefrom  is  *  admis- 
sible in  evidence,  if  it  be  proved  to  be  an  examined  copy  or 
extract,  or  if  it  purport  to  be  signed,  and  certified  as  a  true  copy  or 
extract,  by  the  officer  to  whose  custody  the  original  is  intrusted.1  Thus, 
extracts  from  parish  registers,  certified  by  the  rector,  vicar,  or  curate  to 
be  true  extracts,  are  evidence  of  the  baptism,  marriage,  or  burial  referred 
to  ;  and  it  is  not  necessary  to  prove  that  the  rector,  vicar,  or  curate  is 
the  person  entitled  to  have  the  custody  of  the  register.2 


Alabama,  must  be  proved  by  being  given  in 
evidence  in  the  Court  below.  Varuer  v.  Young, 
56  Ala.  265. 

The  presumption  is  that  the  law  of  another 
State  is  the  same  as  that  of  the  State  in  which 
the  cause  is  heard.  Paine  v.  Noelke,  43  N.  Y. 
Sup.  Ct.  176;  McLear  i>.  Hunsicker,  29  La.  Ann. 
539. 

For  form  of  case,  see  Vol.  III. 

3  Re  Bonelli,  1  P.  D.  69;  Cartwright  v.  Cart- 
wright,  26  W.  R.  684. 

*14  &  15  Vic.  c.  99,  §§  9,  10;  Re  Mahon,  9 
Hare,  459.  As  to  Scotch  Bankruptcy  proceed- 
ings, see  19  &  20  Vic.  c.  79,  §§  47,  73,  140,  147, 
174;  2  Taylor,  §  1559. 

s  14  &  15  Vic.  c.  99,  §  11. 

6  14  &  15  Vic.  c.  99,  §  12;  17  &  18  Vic.  c. 
104,  §  107;  2  Taylor,  §  1623. 

1  14  &  15  Vic.  c.  99,  §  14;  Dorrett  v.  Meux, 
15  C.  B.  142;  Scott  v.  Walker.  2  E.  &  B. 
555;  Prosser  v.  Bank  of  England.  L.  R.  13  Eq. 
611.  Section  14  also  provides  that  the  officers 
shall  furnish  certified  copies  or  extracts,  on  pay- 
ment of  not  more  than  4'/.  per  folio  of  ninety 
words:  see,  for  cases  under  this  section,  Reg.  v. 
Main  waring,  1  Dears.  &  B.  132;  2  Jur.  N.  S. 
1236;  Reeve  v.  Hodson,  10  Hare  App.  19.  For 
a  list  of  public  books  and  documents,  the  con- 
tents of  which  are  now  provable,  either  by  ex- 
amined or  by  certified  copies,  under  14  &  15 
Vic.  c.  99,  §  14,  see  2  Taylor,  §  1600.     For  a  list 


of  the  principal  public  registers  and  documents, 
certified  copies  of  which  are  receivable  in  evi- 
dence by  virtue  of  some  enactment  having  spe- 
cial reference  to  them,  see  id.  §§  1602-1609.  As 
to  the  statutable  methods  of  proof  of  records  or 
other  proceedings  of  particular  tribunals,  or  .  f 
public  records  and  documents,  see  id.  §§  1547- 
1580;  and  as  to  the  proof  of  certificates,  under 
statutes  having  special  reference  to  them,  see 
id.  §§  1610-1659:  see  Genl.  Stats.  Mass.  c.  21, 
§6;  St.  Mass.  1867.  c.  213;  and  seethe  Naturali- 
zation Act,  1870  (33  &  34  Vic.  c.  14),  §  12.  as 
to  proofs  thereunder.  Proof  of  a  record  is  irrel- 
evant without  proof  of  some  regulation  mak- 
ing a  record  obligatory,  or  giving  it  some  effect. 
Golden  Fleece  Gold  &c.  ('<>.  ».  (able  &c.  Co. 
12  Nev.  312.  And  see  Butler  t>.  St.  Louis  Life 
Ins.  Co.  45  Iowa,  93;  Fraser  v.  Charleston,  8 
S.  C.  318. 

2  1  Greenl.  Ev.  §§  483-485,  493,  498.  507, 
508;  Re  Neddy  Hall's  Estate,  17  Jur.  29,  L.  JJ., 
which  appears  to  be  incorrectly  reported  in 
2  De  G.  M.  &  G.  748;  see  Re  Porter's  Trusts, 
2  Jur.  N.  S.  349,  V.  C.  W. ;  Reg.  v.  Weaver, 
L.R.  2C.  C.  R.  85;  1  Seton,  25.  The  certificate 
should  express  that  the  person  signing  it  is  the 
rector,  &c.,  of  the  parish  or  place;  see  Re  Neddy 
Hall's  Estate,  2  De  G.  M.  &  G.  749;  Sugd.  V. 
&  P.  420,  note.  As  to  burials  in  cemeteries,  see 
10  &  11  Vic.  c.  65,  §§  32,  33;  27  &  28  Vic.  c. 
97.     A  stamp  duty  of  one  penny  is  imposed,  by 


(a)  Counsel  may  make  a  binding  admission      cannot  be  proved  by  an  attorney's  ex  parte 
of  foreign  law  as  a  fact.    Urquhart  v.  Butter-      affidavit.     State  v.  Cross,  68  Iowa,  180. 
field  (No.  1),  37  Ch.  D.  357.     But  foreign  law 
862 


DOCUMENTARY    EVIDENX'E    WHICH    PROVES   ITSELF.  *  866 

Certified  copies  of  entries,  purporting  to  be  sealed  or  stamped  with 
the  seal  of  the  General  Register  Office,  are  evidence  of  the  birth,  death, 
or  marriage  to  which  the  same  relate,  without  any  further  proof  of  such 
entry  ;  but  no  certified  copy,  purporting  to  be  given  in  the  office,  is  of 
any  force  or  effect,  unless  it  is  so  sealed  or  stamped.3 

Copies  or  extracts,  certified  and  sealed  with  the  seal  of  the  commis- 
sioners of  letters-patent,  of  or  from  specifications,  disclaimers,  and 
memoranda  of  alterations,  and  all  other  documents  recorded  and  filed 
in  the  Commissioners'  office,  or  in  the  office  of  the  Court  of  Chancery 
appointed  for  the  filing  of  specifications,  are  to  be  received  in  evidence 
in  all  proceedings  relating  to  letters-patent  for  inventions,  without 
further  proof  or  production  of  the  originals.4 

Whenever,  by  any  Act  now  in  force,  or  hereafter  to  be  in  force,  any 
certificate,  official  or  public  document,  or  document  or  proceeding 
of  any  corporation  or  joint-stock  or  other  company,  or  any  *  certi-  *8G6 
fied  copy  of  any  document,  by-law,  entry  in  any  register  or  other 
book,  or  of  any  other  proceeding,  are  receivable  in  evidence  of  any 
particular  fact  in  any  Court  of  Justice,  or  in  any  judicial  proceeding, 
the  same  are  respectively  to  be  admitted  in  evidence,  provided  they 
respectively  purport  to  be  sealed  or  impressed  with  a  stamp,  or  sealed 
and  signed,  or  signed  alone,  as  required,  or  impressed  with  a  stamp  and 
signed,  as  directed  by  the  respective  Acts,  made,  or  to  be  hereafter 
made,  without  any  proof  of  the  seal  or  stamp,  where  a  seal  or  stamp 
is  necessary,  or  of  the  signature,  or  of  the  official  character,  of  the  person 
appearing  to  have  signed  the  same,  and  without  any  further  proof 
thereof,  in  every  case  in  which  the  original  record  could  have  been 
received  in  evidence.1 

All  Courts,  Judges,  and  other  judicial  officers,  are  bound  to  take 
judicial  notice  of  the  signature  of  any  of  the  Equity  or  Common  Law 
Judges  of  the  Superior  Courts  at  Westminster,  where  such  signature  is 
attached,  or  appended  to  any  decree,  order,  certificate,  or  other  judicial 


23  &  24  Vic.  c.  15,  §§  1,  2,  and  Sched.;  33  &  generally  admitted:  ibid.;  Reg.  v.  Weaver,  L. 

34  Vic.  c.  97,  §§  3,  80,  &  Sched.  on  every  certi-  R.  2  C.  C.  R.  85;  Reg.  r.  Mainwaring,  1  Dears, 

ficate    of  birth,   baptism,   marriage,  death,   or  &  B.  132;  2  Jur.   N.   S.   1136;  and  see  6  &  7 

burial;    it  is  payable  by  the  party  requiring  Will.    IV.  c.  86.  §  36;  not,  however,  it  seems, 

the  certificate,  and  is  to  be  denoted  by  an  im-  at  the   Rolls.     As  to  the  stamp  dutv  on  the 

pressed  or  adhesive  stamp,  to  be  cancelled  by  certificate,    see   supra.     As    to    extracts    from 

the  person  who  giants  the  certificate.     For  form  non-parochial  registers,  deposited  with  the  Reg- 

<>f  certificate  see  Vol.  III.  istrar-General,  under  the  3  &  4  Vic.  c.  92,  see 

s  6  &  7  Will.  IV.  c.  86,  §  38.     See  the  Births  §§  9-15;  2  Phil,  on  Evid.  145;  2  Taylor,  §  1503. 

and  Deaths  Registration  Act,  1874  (37  &  38  Vic.  Probate  or  letters  of  administration   are   not 

c.  88),  §  38.     The  identity  of  the  person  named  evidence  of  death,  but  show  who  represents  the 

in  the  certificate  must,  of  course,  be  proved.  Par-  deceased.  lSeton,  25;  Hubback  on  Succession, 

kinson  v.  Francis,  15  Sim.  160;  1  Seton,24.     As  161  ;  Thompson  r.  Donaldson,  3  Esp.  63;  Moons 

tn  certificates  of  death,  see  Riseley  v.  Sheppard,  v.  De  Beruales,  1  Russ.  301. 
W.  N.  (1870)  150;  21  W.  R.  782;  and  of  birth,  *  16  &  17  Vic.  c.  115,  §  4;  see  now  46  &  47 

see  Re  Wintle,  L.  R.  9  Eq.  373.     Extracts  from  Vic.  c.  57,  §  113,  Sched. 

the  district  registries  were  not  formerly  received  l  8  &  9  Vic.  c.  113,  §  1;  see  Reg.  v.  Parson3, 

as  evidence  by  the  Court,  but  they  are  now  L.  R.  1  C.  C.  R.  24;  12  Jur.  N.  S.  436. 

863 


*867 


EVIDENCE. 


or  official  document,2  and  also  of  the  seals  of  certain  offices  and 
registries.3 

Amongst  the  records  of  other  Courts  of  Justice,  copies  of  which  the 
Court  of  Chancery  is  in  the  habit  of  receiving  as  evidence,  may  be 
ranked  the  depositions  of  witnesses,  and  proceedings  taken  in  causes 
in  other  Courts  of  Equity  of  concurrent  jurisdiction.  The  rules  by 
which  the  Court  is  governed,  in  receiving  evidence  of  this  description, 
are  the  same  as  those  adopted  by  it  in  cases  where  depositions  taken 
in  the  Court  of  Chancery  in  one  cause  are  offered  to  be  read  in  another ; 4 
but  no  depositions  taken  in  any  other  Court  are  to  be  read,  unless  by 
order.5 

The  method  of  proving  depositions  taken  in  one  Court  of  Equity, 
upon  the  hearing  of  a  cause  in  another,  is,  by  producing  a  certified  copy 
of  the  bill  and  answer,  if  one  has  been  put  in ;  unless  the  depositions 
are  so  ancient  that  no  bill  and  answer  can  be  forthcoming,  or  unless  the 
defendant  has  been  in  contempt,  or  has  had  an  opportunity  of  cross- 
examining,  which  he  chose  to  forego:  in  which  case  the  depositions 
may  be  read  after  proving  the  bill  only.6  Where  the  depositions  have 
been  taken  on  interrogatories,  under  a  commission  issuing  out  of  an- 
other Court,  they  are  not  admissible  without  the  production  of  the  com- 
mission, under  the  authority  of  which  they  were  taken ;  unless  the 
depositions  are  of  long  standing,  so  that  the  commission  may  be  pre- 
sumed to  have  been  lost.7  It  is  to  be  noticed,  however,  that  depositions 
may  be  used  as  evidence  against  a  party  to  the  suit,  or  for  the 
*  867  purpose  of  contradicting  *  the  witness,  without  proof  of  the  bill 
and  answer,  although  some  proof  of  the  identity  of  the  person 
will  be  required.1  Decrees  in  other  courts,2  and  office-copy  proceedings 
in  other  courts,  and,  it  seems,  depositions  taken  in  other  courts,3  may 
be  read  without  an  order. 

The  Court  of  Chancery  takes  notice  of  its  own  proceedings,  although 
they  are  not  actually  recorded : 4  and  all  the  proceedings  of  the  Court 


2  8  &  9  Vic.  c.  113,  §  2.  As  to  Treasury 
Solicitor's  Documents,  see  39  &  40  Vic.  c.  18 
§  1;  as  to  documents  relating  to  Industrial  and 
Provident  Societies,  see  39  &  40  Vic.  c.  45, 
§§  3,  24;  as  to  documents  deposited  under  Life 
Assurance  Companies  Act,  1870,  see  33  <&  34 
Vic.  c.  61,  §  17.  As  to  documents  filed  with  the 
Register  of  Joint  Stock  Companies,  see  40  & 
41  Vic.  c.  26,  §6;  and  see  the  Bankers'  Book 
Evidence  Act,  1879,  42  &  43  Vic.  c.  11 ;  Hard- 
ing v.  Williams,  14  Ch.  D.  197;  Arnott  v. 
Hayes,  36  Ch.  D.  731. 

8  See  Ibid. ;  16  &  17  Vic.  c.  70,  §§  100,  101; 
26  &  27  Vic.  c.  86,  §  29 ;  c.  89,  §  125;  R.  S.  C. 
1883,  Ord.  XXXVII.  4;  Ord.  LX.  A.  5  (Old. 
April,  1880,  r.  45) ;  36  &  37  Vic.  c.  66,  §  61. 

4  See  post,  p.  867. 

5  Cons.  Ord.  XIX.  4;  see,  however,  Good- 
enough  v.  Alway,  2  S.  &  S.  481;  Williams  v. 
Broadhead,  1  Sim.  151;  Manby  v.  Bewicke,  3 
Jur.  N.  S.  685,  V.  C.  W.     In  Lake  v.  Peisley, 

864, 


L.  R.  1  Eq.  173  (11  Jur.  N.  S.  1012,  M.  R.)  an 
order  to  read  depositions  taken  in  bankruptcy 
was  made  on  an  exparte  motion ;  and  in  Stephen- 
son v.  Biney,  L.  R.  2  Eq.  303  (12  Jur.  N.  S. 
428,  V.  C.  W.),  an  order  of  course  to  read  depo- 
sitions taken  in  the  Palatine  Court  of  Lancaster 
was  discharged  as  irregular.  See  Allen  v. 
Bonnett.  L.  R.  6  Eq.  522. 

6  2  Phil,  on  Evid.  210,  211;  2  Taylor, 
§§  1576,  1577;  Goodenough  v.  Alway,  ubi 
supra. 

7  2  Phil,  on  Evid.  210,  211;  2  Taylor, 
§  1577;   1  Greenl.  Ev.  §517. 

i  2  Phil,  on  Evid.  210,  211  ;  2  Taylor, 
§1576;  see  Davison  v.  Robinson,  3  Jur.  N.  S. 
791,  V.  C.  W. ;  6  W.  R.  673,  L.  C. ;  1  Greenl. 
Ev.  §  156;  Bell  v.  Johnson,  1  J.  &  H.  682. 

2  See  Manby  v.  Bewicke,  3  Jur.  N.  S.  685; 
White  v.  Cox,  2  Ch.  D.  387,  397. 

3  See  sttpra,  p.  866,  n.  5. 

4  Ante,  p.  688.    The  final  decree  of  a  Court 


DOCUMENTARY   EVIDENCE   WHICH    PROVES   ITSELF.  *  863 

in  the  cause,  which  are  required  as  evidence,  may  be  used  as  such,  with- 
out further  testimony  to  establish  them  than  the  production  of  the  pro- 
ceeding itself,  or  of  an  office  copy  of  it,  signed  by  the  officer  in  whose 
custody  such  proceeding  properly  is,  according  to  the  practice  of  the 
Court.5 

According  to  the  former  practice  of  the  Court,  it  was  necessary,  when 
any  proceedings  in  one  cause  were  to  be  given  in  evidence  in  another, 
that  the  foundation  for  the  production  of  them  should  be  laid,  by  prov- 
ing the  bill  and  answer  in  the  cause  in  which  they  were  taken.  Gradu- 
ally, however,  this  rule  was  relaxed ;  and  the  Court  will  now  dispense 
with  the  strict  proof  of  the  bill  and  answer,6  and  make  an  order,  that 
the  party  shall  be  at  liberty,  at  the  hearing,  to  read  the  proceedings  in 
the  former  cause.  Such  an  order  is  not,  however,  necessary  to  entitle 
a  party  to  read  a  decree  or  order.7 

A  decree  or  order  of  the  Court  of  Chancery,  determining  a  matter  of 
right,  is  good  evidence  as  to  that  right,  not  only  against  the  party 
against  whom  the  decree  was  made,  but  against  all  those  claiming  under 
him  ; 8  but  a  verdict  on  issues  in  a  suit  between  predecessors  in  title  does 
not  in  itself  create  an  estoppel,  and  the  decree  and  pleadings  must  be 
taken  into  consideration.9  Although  a  decree  between  other  parties  can- 
not be  read  as  evidence,  yet  it  may  be  read  as  a  precedent.10  And  it 
is  not  in  any  case  necessary,  in  order  that  it  should  be  admissible  as 
evidence,  that  the  parties  to  it  should  have  filled  the  relative  situations 
of  plaintiff  and  defendant:  if  the  present  plaintiff  and  the  defendant 
were  co-defendants  in  the  former  cause,  the  decree  in  that  cause  may  be 
read,  though  not  as  conclusive  evidence.11  "It  frequently  happens," 
observes  Lord  Hardwicke,  "that  there  are  several  defendants,  all  claim- 
ing against  the  plaintiff,  and  having  also  different  rights  and  claims 
among  one  another :  the  Court  then  makes  a  decree,  settling  the 
rights  of  all  the  parties ;  *  but  a  declaration  for  that  purpose  *  868 
could  not  be  made,  if  this  objection,  (namely,  to  receiving  the  decree 

of  Equity  may  be  given  in  evidence  in  another  Phil.  Ev.  (Cowen  &  Hill's  ed.  1839)  358,  note, 
suit,  although  such  decree  has  not  been  for-  639  in  2  id.  915,  et  seq.  For  the  mode  of  prov- 
nially  enrolled.  Bates  v.  Delavan,  I  Paige,  299.  ing  decrees  and  answers  in  Chancery,  see  1 
A  Court  will  take  judicial  notice  of  its  own  Greenl.  Ev.  §§  511,  512.  A  decree  in  Chan- 
records,  and  the  book  of  records  of  its  judg-  eery,  being  the  act  of  a  Court  of  a  sifter  State, 
ments  proves  itself  when  offered  in  evidence  in  must  be  authenticated  according  to  the  U.  S. 
that  Court.  Robinson  v.  Brown,  82  111.  279.  Statute,  1790,  May  20,  1  U.  S.  Stat,  at  Large, 
So  of  the  entire  record  of  a  cause.  Nichol  v.  122  (1  Greenl.  Ev.  §  504),  to  be  admissible  in 
Ridley,  5  Yerg.  03.  And  see  Natl.  Bank  v.  evidence.  Barbour  v.  Watts,  2  A.  K.  Marsh. 
Bryant,  13  Bush,  419.  290.    The  printed  report  of  a  decision  of  the 

"5  See  R.  S.  C  Ord.  LX.  A.  r.  5  (Ord.  April,  Supreme  Court,  though  issued  by  authority  of 

1880,  r.  45),  R.  S.  C.  1883,  XXXIII.  1;   36  &  law,  is  secondary  evidence,  and  inadmissible  as 

37  Vic.  c.  66,  §  61.  evidence  of  the  judgment,  unless  the  original 

6  Cons.  Ord.   XIX.  4;   Seton,  980,  et  seq. ;  record  be  lost  or  destroyed.    Donellan  ?•.  Hardy. 

Taylor,  §  1413.  57   Ind.   393;     Taylor    v.   Commonwealth,    21 

'v  Cons.  Ord.  XIX  4;  Brooks  V.  Taylor,  Mos.  Gratt.  780.     And   see   Mason   V.  Pelletier,  77 

188;  see  Green  v.  Green,  5  Ohio,  278."  N.  C.  52. 

8  Borough  r.   Whichcote,  3  Bro.  P.  C.  ed.  9  Robinson  v.  Duleep  Singh,  11  Ch.  D.  798 

Toml.  595;  Maule  v.  Bruce,  2  C.  P.  Coop.  temp.  10  Austen  r.  Nicholas,  7  Bro.  P.  C.  9. 

Cott.  215;  see  Re  Defries,  W.  N.  (1883)  87;  31         «  Askew  r.  Poulterers'  Co.  2  Ves.  Sr.  89; 

W.  R.  720;  1  Greenl.  Ev.  §§  522,  523,  536;  1  Belt's  Sup.  299. 

vol.  1. -55  865 


868 


EVIDENCE. 


as  evidence,  because  made  between  co-defendants)  holds :  which  would 
be  very  fatal,  as  it  would  occasion  the  splitting  one  cause  into  several."  1 
The  depositions  of  witnesses,  which  have  been  taken  in  another  cause, 
may,  as  well  as  other  proceedings,  be  read  at  the  hearing,  under  an 
order  to  be  obtained  for  that  purpose,2  if  the  two  suits  are  between  the 
same  parties  or  their  privies,  and  the  issue  is  the  same  ; 8  and  such 
depositions  are  admissible  in  evidence  in  the  former  cause.4  Thus,  evi- 
dence which  has  been  taken  in  a  cross-cause  may,  by  order,  be  read  at 
the  hearing  of  the  original  cause,5  and  vice  versa,  provided  the  point  in 
issue  is  the  same  in  each  case.  Where  the  matter  in  issue  is  not  the 
same,  the  depositions  taken  in  one  cause  cannot  be  read  in  the  other ; 6 
and  even  where  two  suits  related  substantially  to  the  same  matters,  one 
suit  being  instituted  by  the  first  tenant  for  life  in  remainder,  and  the 
other  by  the  first  tenant  in  tail  in  remainder,  the  Court  refused  to  allow 
the  evidence  taken  in  one  suit  to  be  used  in  the  other.7  Where  the 
person  against  whom  the  evidence  is  offered  was  neither  a  party  to  the 
other  cause,  nor  privy  to  a  person  who  was  a  party,  the  depositions 
taken  in  that  cause  cannot  be  read :  thus,  where  a  father  is  tenant  for 
life  only,  depositions  taken  in  a  cause  to  which  he  was  a  party  cannot 
be  read  against  his  son  who  claims  as  tenant  in  tail.8  The  rule  with 
regard  to  reading  depositions  in  another  suit  appears  to  be  the  same  as 
that  with  respect  to  reading  verdicts  at  Common  Law,  namely,  "that 
nobody  can  take  a  benefit  by  it  who  had  not  been  prejudiced  by  it,  had 
it  gone  contrary." 9  Thus,  it  has  been  held,  that  if  A  prefers  his  bill 
against  B,  and  B  exhibits  his  bill  against  A  and  C,  in  relation  to  the 


1  Ibid.;  see  also,  Chamley  v.  Lord  Dunsany, 
2  Sch.  &  Lef.  710,  H.  L.;  Farquharson  i\  Seton, 
5  Russ.  45,0-3. 

2  See  post,  p.  871;  Leviston  v.  French,  45 
N.  H.  21. 

3  Maekworth  v.  Penrose,  1  Dick.  50;  Fade  v. 
Lingood,  1  Atk.  203;   Humphreys  r.  Pensam, 

1  M.  &  C.  580,  586  ;  Hope  v.  Liddell  (No.  2), 
21  Beav.  180;  Williams  v.  Williams,  10  Jur.  N. 
S.  608;  12  W.  R.  663,  V.  C.  K.;  Llanover  v. 
Homfray,  19  Ch.  D.  224,  230;  Maule  v.  Bruce, 

2  C.  P.  Coop.  temp.  Cott.  215;  Brooks  v.  Can- 
non, 2  A.  K.  Marsh.  525;  Leviston  v.  French, 
45  N.  H.  21;  Gresley,  Eq.  Ev.  (Am.  ed.)  185, 
180;  1  Phil.  Ev.  (Cowen  &  Hill's  ed.  1839), 
364,  and  notes  in  2  id.  934,  935;  Harrington  v. 
Harrington,  2  How.  701;  Payne  v.  Coles,  1 
Munf.  373;  Dale  v.  Rosevelt,  1  Paige,  36;  Rob- 
erts v.  Anderson.  3  John.  Ch.  376;  see  Lake  v. 
Peisley,  L.  R.  1  Eq.  173;  11  Jur.  N.  S.  1012, 
M.  R  ';  Stephenson  v.  Binev,  L.  R.  2  Eq.  303; 
12  Jur.  N.  S.  428,  V.  C.  w". ;  see  Allen  v.  Bon- 
nett,  L.  R.  6  Eq.  522 ;  Hill  v.  Hibbit,  L.  R.  7  Eq. 
421;  Laurence  v.  Maule,  4  Drew.  472;  Ernest 
r.  Weiss,  1  N.  R.  6.  And  where  the  chief  mat- 
ter of  controversy  in  two  suits  was  the  same, 
the  Court,  on  motion,  ordered  that  the  testi- 
money  taken  in  either  suit'  should  be  read  in 
the  other,  and  that  the  hearing  on  both  should 

866 


come  on  together.  Evans  v.  Evans,  23  N.  J. 
Eq.  180.  In  a  suit  in  Chancery  to  quiet  title, 
and  restrain  an  action  of  ejectment,  the  deposi- 
tion of  a  witness  who  has  since  died,  taken  in 
that  action,  is  competent  evidence.  Wanner  v. 
Sisson,  29  N.  J.  Eq.  141. 

4  Williams  v.  Williams,  10  Jur.  N.  S.  608; 
12  W.  R.  663,  V.  C.  K. 

5  Lubiere  v.  Genou,  2  Ves.  Sr.  579,  in  which 
case  the  cross-bill  had  been  dismissed.  Hol- 
combe  v.  HnUombe,  10  N.  J.  Eq.  284;  see  post, 
Chap.  XXXIV.  §  1,  Cross  Bills.  For  form  of 
order,  see  Seton,  1275,  No.  2.  The  order  does 
not  extend  to  an  answer  not  put  in  evidence. 
Moore  v.  Harper,  W.  N.  (1866)  56;  14  W.  R. 
306.  V.  C  W. 

6  Christian  v.  Wrenn,  Bunb.  321;  Republic 
of  Peru  v.  Ruzo,  W.  N.  (1875)72;  23  W.  R. 
546;  see  Re  Wontner,  Brown  V.  White,  W.  N. 
(1876)  116;  24  W.  R.  450;  Re  Woolley's  Trusts, 
24  W.  R.  783. 

"  Blagrave  v.  Blagrave,  1  De  G.  &  S.  2-V2, 
259;  11  Jur.  744;  and  see  Hope  v.  Liddell  (No. 
2),  21  Beav.  180. 

8  Peterborough  v.  Norfolk,  Prec.  in  Ch.  212; 
Coke  v.  Fountain,  1  Vern.  413;  and  see  Rhodes 
v.  Rhodes,  14  W.  R.  515,  V.  C.  W. 

9  Gilb.  on  Evid.  28;  Buller,  N.  P.  229;  2 
Phil.  r.n  Evid.  8. 


DOCUMENTARY   EVIDENCE   WHICH    PROVES   ITSELF.  *  870 

same  matter,  and  a  trial  at   Law  is  directed,  C  cannot  give  in 

*  evidence  the  depositions  in  the  cause  between  A  and  B,  but  the  *  SG9 

trial  must  be  entirely  as  of  a  new  cause.1 

This  rule  appears  to  be  somewhat  at  variance  with  what  has  been 
stated  to  be  a  common  one,  namely,  that  where  one  legatee  has  brought 
his  bill  against  an  executor,  and  proved  assets,  and  afterwards  another 
legatee  brings  his  bill,  the  last-named  legatee  should  have  the  benefit  of 
the  depositions  in  the  former  suit,  though  he  was  not  a  party  to  it ; 2  but 
it  is  to  be  observed,  that  the  case  of  the  legatee  is  different  from  the 
case  of  a  plaintiff  in  ordinary  circumstances  ;  for  although  the  legatee 
was  not  actually  a  party  to  the  original  suit,  yet  he  was  so  virtually, 
his  interest  in  the  first  suit  having  been  represented  by  the  executor. 
In  fact,  in  the  case  of  the  legatee,  the  suit  is  in  pari  materia;  and,  with 
respect  to  the  subject  in  dispute,  the  plaintiff  in  the  second  suit  stands 
in  the  same  situation,  with  regard  to  the  defendant,  as  the  plaintiff  in 
the  first. 

The  same  principle  appears  to  have  been  acted  upon  in  other  cases 
besides  those  of  legatees.  Thus  where  the  same  matters  were  under  ex- 
amination and  in  issue,  depositions  taken  in  an  old  cause  were  permitted 
to  be  read,  although  the  plaintiff  and  those  under  whom  he  claimed 
were  not  parties  to  the  former  cause  :  inasmuch  as  the  terre  tewuits  of 
the  same  lands  were  then  parties.'5  In  like  manner,  depositions  which 
had  been  taken  in  a  suit  by  one  tenant  in  common  against  another  were 
admitted  in  evidence,  in  a  suit  by  another  tenant  in  common,  against 
the  same  defendant.4  In  such  cases,  however,  it  must  be  proved  that 
the  depositions  are  touching  the  same  land.5 

It  seems  not  to  be  important  what  character  the  individual,  against 
whom  the  depositions  in  the  former  suit  are  offered,  filled  in  that  suit, 
whether  that  of  plaintiff  or  defendant,  provided  he  had,  in  such  char- 
acter, an  opportunity  of  cross-examining  the  witness.  If  he  was  a 
party  to  the  first  suit  as  a  co-defendant,  and  becomes  a  plain- 
tiff in  the  second  suit,  making  his  co-defendant  in  *  the  first  suit  *  870 
a  defendant,  he  may,  if  such  co-defendant  sets  up  the  same  de- 
fence that  he  did  in  the  original  suit,  read  the  evidence  taken  in  that 
suit  against  such  co-defendant.  Thus,  where  the  creditors  of  a  testator 
filed  their  bill  against  the  residuary  legatees,  and  also  against  a  pur- 
chaser from  the  testator,  praying  to  have  their  debts  paid,  and  the  con- 
veyances, alleged  to  have  been  executed  by  the  testator  to  the  purchaser, 
set  aside  for  fraud,  and  obtained  a  decree  accordingly,  and  afterwards 
the  residuary  legatees  filed  another  bill  against  the  purchaser,  praying 
for  an  account  of  the  residue,  and  to  set  aside  the  conveyances,  it  was 
held,  that  as  there  was  the  same  question  and  the  same  defence  in  both 

1  Rushworth    v.    Countess    of    Pembroke,  see  also  Travis  v.   Challenor,   3  Gwill.  1237; 

Hardres,  472.     For  the  reason  why    a  verdict  Ashhy  v.  Power,  id.  1239;  Benson  v.  Olive,  2 

is  not  evidence  for  or  against  a  person  who  was  Gwill.  701 ;  Earl  of  Sussex  v.  Temple,  1  Lord 

not  a  party  to  it,  see 2  Phil.  Evid.  8.    See  R.  S.  Raym.  310. 
C.  1833,  Ord.  XXXVII.  3.  4  Byrne  v.   Frere,  2  Moll.   157;    and    see 

*  Coke  v.  Fountain,  1  Vern.  413.  Bishop  of  Lincoln  v.  Ellis,  Bunb.  110. 

3  Terwit   v.   Greshnm,  1  Ch.  Cas.  73;  and  5  Benson  v.  Olive,  Bunb.  284. 

see  Lady  Dartmouth  r.  Roberts.  1G  East,  334; 

8G7 


*  871  EVIDENCE. 

the  causes,  the  depositions  taken  in  the  former  cause,  as  to  the  fraud 
in  obtaining  the  conveyances,  could  be  read  in  the  second  cause,  on  be- 
half of  the  legatees  against  the  purchasers,  who  were  co-defendants  in 
the  former  cause.1 

Where  a  cause  had  been  set  down  for  hearing  on  motion  for  a  decree, 
the  Court  allowed  the  plaintiff  to  use  the  examination  of  the  defendant, 
taken  in  another  cause  ;  but  gave  leave  to  the  defendant  to  file  affidavits 
in  explanation,  subject  to  the  right  of  cross-examination.2 

Where  the  depositions  of  witnesses  in  another  suit  are  offered  to  be 
read  at  the  hearing,  against  persons  who  were  parties  to  such  other  suit, 
or  those  claiming  under  them,  it  does  not  appear  to  be  necessary  that 
the  witnesses,  whose  depositions  are  offered  to  be  read,  should  be  proved 
to  be  dead.8 

Some  doubt  seems  to  have  been,  at  one  time,  entertained  whether 
the  depositions  of  witnesses,  taken  in  a  cause  which  had  been  subse- 
quently dismissed,  could  be  read  at  the  hearing  of  another  cause  ; 
*  871  and  the  rule  appears  to  have  been  laid  down,  that  if  the  *  dis- 
missal was  upon  merits,  evidence  of  the  facts  which  have  been 
proved  in  the  cause  may  be  used  as  evidence  of  the  same  facts  in 
another  cause  between  the  same  parties ; *  but  where  a  cause  has  been 
dismissed,  not  upon  merits,  but  upon  the  ground  of  irregularity  (as, 
for  instance,  because  it  comes  on  by  revivor,  where  it  ought  to  have 
come  on  by  original  bill),  so  that  regularly  there  was  no  cause  in  Court, 
and  consequently  no  proofs  properly  taken,  such  proofs  cannot  be  used.2 
If  a  suit  to  perpetuate  testimony  should  be  set  down  for  hearing,  and 
dismissed  because  it  ought  not  to  have  been  set  down,  the  plaintiff  may, 
notwithstanding  the  dismissal,  have  the  benefit  of  the  depositions.3 

An  order  for  leave  to  read,  at  the  hearing,  the  depositions  or  pro- 
ceedings in  a  cross  cause,  is  granted  upon  motion  of  course,  or  on 
petition  of  course  at  the  Rolls,4  and  must  be  served  upon  the  adverse 
party;  who  may,  if  there  is  any  irregularity  in  it,  or  in  the  mode  in  which 
it  has  been  obtained,  apply  by  motion  to  discharge  it.  A.s,  however, 
it  is  possible  that  the  irregularity  of  such  an  order  may  not  appear 
till  it  is  acted  upon  at  the  hearing,  when  it  would  be  too  late  to  dis- 
charge it,  the  order  is  always  made  "saving  all  just  exceptions:"5 
the  effect  of  which  is,  to  leave  it  open  to  the  party  against  whom  the 
evidence  is  offered,  to  make  any  objection  to  the  reading  of  evidence 

1  Nevil  v.  Johnson,  2  Vem.  447:  and  see  *  Lubiere  v.  Genou,  2  Ves.  Sr.  579;  M'Intosh 
Askew  v.  Poulterers'  Co.  2  Ves.  Sr.  89,  90.              v.  Great  Western   Ry.  Co.  7  De  G.  M.  &  G. 

2  Watson  v.  Cleaver,  20  Beav.  137 ;  1  Jur.      737. 

N.  S.  270.  2  Backhouse    v.  Middleton,  1  Ch.  Cas.  173- 

3  London  v.  Perkins,  3  Bro.  P.  C.  ed.  Toml.  175;  3  Ch.  Rep.  22;Gresley,  Eq.  Ev.  (Am.  ed.) 
602;  Williams  v.  Broadhead,  1  Sim.  151;  Car-  187;  Hopkins  r.  Strump,  2  Harr.  &  J  301. 
rington  o.  Cornock,  2  Sim.  567;  and  see  Bla-  3  Hall  v.  Hoddesdon,  2  P.  Wms.  162;  see 
grave  v.  Blagrave,  1  De  G.  &  S.  252;  11  Jur.  also  Vaughan  v.  Fitzgerald,  1  Seh.  &  Lef.  316. 
744;  Lawrence  v.  Maule,  4  Drew.  472.  480;  4  See  now  R.  S.  C.  1883,  Ord.  XXXVII.  3. 
Williams  r.  Williams,  10  Jur.  N.  S.  608;  12  For  forms  of  order  on  motion,  see  Seton,  1275, 
W.  R.  663;  Llanover  v.  Homfray,  19  Ch.  D.  Nos.  1,  2;  and  for  forms  of  motion  paper  and 
224.  230.     The  practice  of  the  Common    Law  petition,  see  Vol.  III. 

Courts  was  different.     See  2  Phil.  Evid  124;  5  Hand,  114,  115;  see  form  of  order,  Seton, 

1  l'aylor,  §§  470-472.  1275,  Nos.  1,  2. 

SG8 


DOCUMENTARY   EVIDENCE    WHICH    PROVES    ITSELF. 


*  S7-? 


under  it  which  the  nature  of  the  case  will  admit,  in  the  same   manner 
that  he  might  have  done  had  no  such  order  been  made.6 

Where  either  party,  plaintiff  or  defendant,  obtains  leave  to  use  the 
depositions  of  witnesses  taken  in  another  cause,  the  opposite  party  may 
likewise  use  the  same  without  leave  ;  unless,  upon  special  reason  shown 
to  the  Court  by  the  party  obtaining  such  leave,  the  opposite  party  be 
prohibited  from  so  doing.7 

When  proceedings  or  depositions  in  another  cause,  in  the  Court  of 
Chancery,  are  ordered  to  be  read  as  evidence  at  the  hearing,  it  will  be 
sufficient  to  produce  the  office  copies  of  them.  Such  office  copies,  how- 
ever, must  be  signed  by  the  proper  officer  or  properly  sealed : 8  other- 
wise, they  cannot  be  read ; 9  and  if  at  the  hearing  of  a  cause  it  is 
found  *  that  the  office  copy  of  a  proceeding,  which  one  party  relied  *  872 
upon  as  evidence,  has  not  been  properly  signed  or  sealed,  the 
Court  will  allow  the  cause  to  stand  over  for  the  purpose  of  procuring 
the  proper  signature  or  seal.1 

No  person  may  take  out  of  the  office  of  the  Clerks  of  Records  and 
Writs  any  record  or  document  filed  there,  except  by  direction  of  the 
Court.2  Where  any  record  or  other  document,  filed  or  deposited  in 
that  office,  is  required  to  be  produced  in  the  Court  of  Chancery,  or  in 
any  of  its  offices,  a  memorandum  bespeaking  an  attendance  therewith 
should  be  left  with  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerk,  and  the  proper  fee  be 
paid,  or  arranged  to  be  paid ;  an  attendance  in  Court  with  records, 
however,  is  made  only  at  the  request  of  the  Judge.3 

Where  a  record  or  other  document,  in  the  custody  of  the  Record  and 
Writ  Clerks,  is  required  to  be  produced  out  of  the  Court  of  Chancery 
or  its  offices,  an  order  authorizing  such  production  must  be  obtained, 
on  motion  of  course,  or  on  petition  of  course  at  the  Rolls,4  supported  by 
an  affidavit  to  the  effect  that  such  production  is  necessary  as  evidence  ;5 
but,  as  a  rule,  no  such  order  will  be  made  for  production  of  original 
documents,  if  certified  or  examined  copies  will  answer  the  purpose.6 
No  subpoena  need  be  issued ;  but  the  officer  will  attend,  on  the  order, 


6  The  order  does  not  extend  to  an  answer  2  Cons.  Ord.  I.  42. 

not  made   evidence   in   the   cause.     Moore   r.  3  Braithwaite'a   Pr.   512.     A   fee   of   £1    in 

Harper,  W.  N.  (1806)  56;  W.  R.  306.  stamps,  is  payable  upon  every  application  for 

7  Cons.  Ord.  XIX.  5.  the  officer's  attendance  in  a  Court,  ami  for  his 

8  See  R.  S.  C.  1883,  Ord.  XXXVIII.  4,  attendance,  per  diem.  Ord.  as  to  Court  fees, 
LXI.  7;  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  LX.  5  (Ord.  April,  1880,  Oct.  28,  1875,  Sched.;  Ord.  April  22,  1876, 
r.  45);  Cons.  Ord.   I.  42;  36  &   37  Vic.  c.  60.  Sched.-,  Regal,  to  Ord.  Schcd.  4.     For  form  oi 

9  Att.-Gen.  r.  Mil  ward,  1  Cox,  437.  Since  18  memorandum  bespeaking  the  attendance,  see 
&  19  Vic.  c.  134,  §  6,  office  copies  of  decrees  Vol.  III. 

and  orders  from  the  Registrars'  books  are  to  be  4  Now  at  the  Order  of  Course  Office, 

certified   by  the  Clerks  of  Records  and  Writs,  5  Braithwaite'a  Pr.  514,  Greslev,  192;  R.  S. 

Seton,  16.  "  The  office  copy  of  an  order,  or  of  a  C.  Ord.  LX.  A.  11  (Ord.  April,  188'".  r.  51).    For 

report  confirmed  by  tiat,  signed  by  the  Regis-  forms  of  motion  paper,  petition,  and  affidavit, 

trar  in  Lunacy,  and  sealed  or  stamped  with  the  see  Vol.  III. 

seal  of  his  office   is  admissible  as  evidence  of  6  Braithwaite's  Pr.  514;  Att.-Gen.  r.  Ray,  6 

such  order  or  report,  without  further  proof.    16  Beav.  335  ;  3  Hare,  335;    2  Hare.  518;  Anon. 

&  17  Vic.  c.  70,  §  100;  and  see  id.  §  101;  and  13    Reav.  420;  Biddulph    r.    Lord  Camoys.  19 

25  &  26  Vic.  c.81,  §  29.  Beav.   467;  and   see  Jervis   t\    White,   8  Ves 

1  Att.-Gen.  v.  Mil  ward,  ubi  supra.  313. 

869 


873 


EVIDENCE. 


and  a  memorandum  bespeaking  his  attendance,  being  left  with  him,  and 
on  the  office  fees,  and  his  reasonable  expenses  (if  any)  being  paid.7 

'With  respect  to  the  production  of  proceedings  in  Chanceiy,  upon 
trials  in  Common  Law  Courts,  it  may  here  be  observed,  that  there  is  a 
difference  between  criminal  and  civil  cases :  in  the  former,  it  is  neces- 
sary that  the  original  record  should  be  procured ; 8  in  the'  latter,  a  copy 
signed  and  certified  by  the  officer  to  whose  custody  the  original  is 
intrusted,9  or  proved  by  the  person  putting  it  in,  to  have  been 
*873  examined  with  the  original  record,  is  *  sufficient;1  and  for  this 
reason,  an  application  for  production  of  the  original  depositions, 
at  the  trial  of  a  civil  action,  was  refused.2 

The  documents  which  have  been  before  enumerated  as  requiring  no 
evidence  to  prove  them,  are  all,  either  in  a  greater  or  less  degree,  public 
documents.  Private  documents  which  are  thirty  years  old  from  the 
time  of  their  date,  also  prove  themselves.3  This  rule  applies,  generally, 
to  deeds  concerning  lands,  and  to  bonds,  receipts,  letters,  and  all  other 
writings :  the  execution  of  which  need  not  be  proved,  provided  they 
have  been  so  acted  upon,  or  are  brought  from  such  a  place,  as  to  afford  a 
reasonable  presumption  that  they  were  honestly  and  fairly  obtained  and 
preserved  for  use,  and  are  free  from  suspicion  of  dishonesty.4  Lord 
Chief  Baron  Gilbert,  however,  upon  this  point,  says,  that  "if  posses- 
sion hath  not  gone  along  with  a  deed,  some  account  ought  to  be  given 
of  the  deed,  because  the  presumption  fails  where  there  is  no  posses- 
sion : " 5  and  he  adds  a  caution,  that  "  if  there  is  any  blemish  in  an 
ancient  deed,  it  ought  to  be  regularly  proved ;  or  where  it  imports  a 
fraud,  as,  where  a  man  conveys  a  reversion  to  one,  and  afterwards 
conveys  it  to  another."  6 

7  Braithwaite's  Pr.  513,  514.  A  fee  of  £1  is 
payable  on  ever}'  application  for  the  officer's 
attendance  in  Courts  of  Law,  per  diem,  and  for 
his  attendance,  besides  his  reasonable  expenses. 
Reg.  to  Ord  Sched.  4,  and  orders  supra.  These 
expenses  are  one  guinea  per  day,  and  travel- 
ling expenses  (first  class),  if  the  attendance  is 
in  the  country  ;  and  half  a  guinea  per  day, 
•without  travelling  expenses,  if  the  attendance 
is  in  a  Court  of  Law  in  London  or  Middlesex. 
Braithwaite's  Pr.  513,  514.  The  office  fees  are 
paid  in  stamps  ;  the  officer's  fees  are  paid  to 
him  in  money  ;  ibid.  ;  and  he  may  require  the 
solicitor  or  party  desiring  his  attendance  to 
deposit  with  him  a  sufficient  sum  to  cover  his 
just  fees,  charges,  and  expenses,  and  undertake 
to  pay  any  further  fees,  &c.,not  fully  answered 
thereby.  Cons.  Ord.  I.  43.  For  form  of  mem- 
orandum bespeaking  attendance,  see  Vol.  III. 

8  See  Jervis  v.  White,  8  Ves.  313. 

9  14  &  15  Vic.  c.  99,  §  14;  Reeve  v.  Hodson, 
10  Hare  App.  19  ;  ante,  p.  865. 

i  2  Phil,  on  Evid.  208,  209;  2  Taylor, 
§  1545. 

2  Att.-Gen.  v.  Ray,  6  Beav.  335:  see  3  Hare, 
335.  In  Smith  v.  Earl  Brownlow,  L.  R.  9  F.q. 
241.  an  old  survev  was  admitted  in  evidence  to 

870' 


establish  rights  of  common.     See  also  Commis- 
sioners of  Sewers  v.  Glasse,  L.  R.  19  Eq.  134. 

3  2  Phil,  on  Evid.  245 ;  1  Taylor,  §  87;  see 
37  &  38  Vic.  c.  78,  §  2. 

4  2  Phil,  on  Evid.  246;  1  Taylor.  §  87;  see 
also,  as  to  letters,  Fenwick  v.  Reed,  6  Mad.  7, 
8;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Stephens,  6  De  G.  M.  &  G. 
Ill;  2Jur.  N.  S.51. 

5  Gilb.  on  Evid.  89 :  and  see  1  Taylor,  §§  87, 
658;  Gresley.  Eq.  Ev.  (Am.  ed.)  124,  125;  1 
Phil.  Ev.  (Cowen  &  Hill's  ed.  1839)  477,  note 
903,  in  2  id.  1310,  et  seq.,  and  cases  cited;  1 
Greenl.  Fv.  §§  21,  570,  and  cases  cited;  M'Ke- 
nire  v.  Fraser,  9  Sumner's  Ves.  5,  note  (a).  It 
is  not  necessary  to  call  the  subscribing  wit- 
nesses, though  they  be  living.  Jackson  r. 
Christman,  4  Wend."  277,  282,  283;  Fetherly  v. 
Waggoner,  11  Wend.  603  ;  1  Greenl.  Ev.  §§  21, 
570;  Jackson  v.  Blanshan,  3  John.  292;  Winn 
v.  Patterson,  9  Peters,  674,  675;  Bennet  v. 
Runyon,  4  Dana,  422,  424;  Cook  v.  Torton,  6 
Dana.  110;  Thurston  v.  Masterton,  9  Dana, 
233;  Hinde  v.  Vattier,  1  M'Lean,  115;  Northop 
r.  Wright,  24  Wend.  221;  1  Phil.  Ev.  (Cowen 
&  Hill's  ed.  1839)478. 

15  Gilb.  on  Evid.  8"»:  and  see  1  Taylor,  §  87; 
1  Phil.  Ev.  (Cowen  &  Hill's  ed.  1819)478,  note 


DOCUMENTARY    EVIDENCE    WHICH    DOES   NOT    PROVE   ITSELF. 


The  rule  of  computing  the  thirty  years  from  the  date  of  a  deed,  is 
equally  applicable  to  a  will,7  although  some  doubt  was  formerly  enter- 
tained on  this  point,  on  the  ground  that  deeds  take  effect  from  their 
execution,  but  wills  from  the  death  of  the  testator.8 

*  It  has  been  doubted,  whether  the  seal  of  a  Court  or  Corporation  *  874 
is  within  the  rule  as  to  thirty  years  ; 1  because,  although  the  wit- 
nesses to  a  private  deed,  or  persons  acquainted  with  a  private  seal, 
may  be  supposed  to  be  dead,  or  not  capable  of  being  accounted  for, 
after  such  a  lapse  of  time,  yet  the  seals  of  Courts  and  of  corporations, 
being  of  a  permanent  character,  may  be  proved  by  persons  at  any 
distance  of  time  from  the  date  of  the  instrument  to  which  they  are 
affixed.2 

Section  VI.  —  Documentary  Evidence  which  does  not  •prove  itself. 

Having  pointed  out  the  species  of  documentary  proofs  which  may  be 
used  in  Courts  of  Equity,  without  the  aid  of  any  other  evidence  to 
authenticate  them,  or  which,  in  other  words,  "prove  themselves,"  the 
next  subject  for  consideration  is  the  nature  of  the  proofs  requisite,  to 
enable  a  party  to  make  use  of  documents  which  do  not  come  under  the 
same  description.  The  rules  upon  this  subject  are,  in  general,  the 
same  in  Equity  as  at  Common  Law,  and  will  be  found  more  fully  set 
forth  in  treatises  upon  the  Law  of  Evidence.3 

With  respect  to  the  cases  in  which  different  rules  prevail  in  Courts  of 
Equity,  from  those  which  are  adopted  at  Law,  the  most  important  are 
those   of   wills  devising  real'  estates.4  (a)     At    Law,  it  is   sufficient  tu 


906,  in  3  id.  1317,  1318;  1  Greenl.  Ev.  §  21, 570; 
Gresley,  Eq.  Ev.  (Am.  ed.)  12-1,  125. 

7  Man  v.  Ricketts,  7  Beav.  93,  101 ;  Orange 
r.  Pickford,  4  Jur.  N.  S.  649,  V.  C.  K.;  Doe 
v.  Burdett,  4  Ad.  &  El.  1;  Doe  v.  Woliev,  8  B. 
&  C.  22. 

8  2  Phil,  on  Evid.  246;  M'Kenire  v.  Fraser, 
9  Ves.  5.  In  Rancliffe  v.  Parkyns,  6  Dow,  202, 
Lord  Eldon  observes  that,  in  a  Court  of  Law, 
"a  will  thirty  years  old,  if  the  possession  has 
gone  under  it,  and  sometimes  without  the  pos- 
session,  but  always  with  possession,  if  the  sign- 
ing is  sufficiently  recorded,  proves  itself.  But 
if  the  signing  is  not  sufficiently  recorded,  it 
would  be  a  question  whether  the  age  proves  its 
validity;  and  then,  possession  under  the  will, 
and  claiming  and  dealing  with  the  property 
as  if  it  had  passed  under  the  will,  would  be 
cogent  evidence  to  prove  the  due  signing  of  the 
will,  though  it  should  not  be  recorded."     See 

1  Phil.  Ev.  (Cowen  &  Hill's  ed.  1839)  503;  1 
Greenl.  Ev.  §  21,  and  cases  in  notes,  §  570,  and 
note;  Jackson  v.  Blanshnn,  3  John.  392;  Doe 
v.  Deakin,  3  C.  &  P.  402;  Doe  v.  Wolley,  8  B. 
&  C  22. 

1  Per  Lord  Tenterden  in  Rex  i>.  Barthwick, 

2  B.  &  Ad.  648. 


2  2  Phil,  on  Evid.  247;  1  Taylor,  §  87;  1 
Greenl.  Ev.  §  570. 

3  2  Phil,  on  Evid.  242,  et  s<q. ;  Taylor, 
§§  1368-1472,  1660-1679;  Best,  §§  245-250; 
Gresley,  173,  et  seq. 

4  Probate  is  evidence  of  the  validity  of  a 
will  only  as  to  personal  estate.  See  generally, 
as  to  probate  jurisdiction  in  England,  1  Dan. 
Ch.  Prac.  (6th  Eng.  ed.),  602.  The  Courts  of 
Probate  in  Massachusetts  have  complete  juris- 
diction over  the  probate  of  wills,  of  both  real 
and  personal  estate,  and  their  decrees  are  con- 
clusive upon  all  parties,  and  not  re-examinable 
in  any  other  Court.  Tompkins  v.  Tompkins,  1 
Story,  547;  see  Osgood  ».  Breed,  12  Mass.  525, 
53:!,  534;  Laughtou  v.  Atkins,  1  Pick.  535, 
547-549.  So  in  Connecticut.  Bush  v.  Sheldon, 
1  Day,  170;  Brown  v.  Lannan,  1  Conn.  476. 
So  in  Rhode  Island.  Tompkins  r.  Tompkins,  1 
Story,  547.  So  in  New  Hampshire.  Poplin  v. 
Hawke.  8  N.  H.  124.  So  in  Ohio.  Bailey  v. 
Bailey,  8  Ohio,  239.  See  as  to  Kentucky.  Rob- 
ertson i'.  Barbour,  6  Mon.  527;  Case  of  Wells's 
Will,  5  Litt.  273.  In  North  Carolina,  said  to 
be  prima  facie  evidence,  Stanley  v.  Ke*n, 
Taylor,  73.  Illinois,  see  Robertson  r  Barbour, 
6  Monr.  527,  528.    Alabama,  see  Tarver  v.  Tar- 


(a)  As  to  the  probate  jurisdiction  of  the  Federal  Courts,  see  ante,  p.  553,  note  (a). 

871 


875 


EVIDENCE. 


*  875  examine  one  witness  to  prove  a  will,  if  he  can  prove  *  the  due 
execution  of  it,  unless  it  is  impeached;1  but,  in  Equity,  in 
order  to  establish  the  will  against  the  heir,  all  the  witnesses  must  be 
examined.2 

This  rule,  although  general,  admits  of  necessary  exceptions,  and  per- 
haps does  not  apply  where  the  will  is  not  wholly,  but  only  partially,  in 
question.8  The  rule  also  does  not  apply,  in  cases  where  one  of  the  wit- 
nesses is  dead,  or  is  abroad  : 4  in  which  cases,  proof  of  his  handwrit- 
ing has  been  held  sufficient.5  It  seems,  however,  that  in  such  a  case,  the 
more  regular  course  is  not  to  declare  the  will  proved,  but  to  enter 
the  evidence  of  the  witnesses  as  read,  and  then  to  direct  the  trusts  of 
the  will  to  be  carried  into  execution.6  Where  a  witness  has  become 
insane,7  or  has  not  been  heard  of  for  many  years,  and  cannot  be  found, 
his  evidence  has  been  dispensed  with.8  It  is  also  necessary,  in  Equity, 
where  the  object  of  the  suit  is  to  establish  a  will  against  the  heir,  to 
prove  the  sanity  of  the  testator.9 

We  have  seen  before,10  that  in  some  cases,  where  the  proof  of  a  will 
is  defective,  leave  will  be  given  to  supply  the  defect  at  the  hearing ;  u 
and  we  have  also  seen,  that  it  is  the  common  practice  of  the  Court  to 


ver,  9  Peters,  174.  It  is  not  necessary  in  Vir- 
ginia that  a  will  should  be  proved  in  a  Court  of 
Probate  in  order  to  give  it  validity  as  a  will  at 
Law.  Bogwell  v.  Elliot,  2  Rand.  19G.  As  to 
New  York,  see  Dubois  v.  Dubois,  6  Cowen,  494; 

2  Rev.  Stat.  57,  §  7,  id.  58,  §  15.  In  Tennes- 
see, see  Code,  §  2197,  2198,  and  Trafford  v. 
Young,  3  Tenn.  Cli.  500. 

1  Seton,  227,  citing  Peake's  Evid.  401:  2 
Greenl.  Ev.  §  G94;  Jackson  v.  La  Grange,  19 
John.  386;  Dan  v.  Brown,  4  Cowen,  483;  Jack- 
son v.  Betts,  6  Cowen,  377 ;  Turnipseed  v. 
Hawkins,  1  M'Cord,  272.  In  Pennsylvania, 
two  witnesses  are  required  in  proof  of  every 
testamentary  writing,  whether  in  the  general 
probate,  before  the  Register  of  Wills,  or  upon 
the  trial  of  an  issue  at  Common  Law;  and  each 
witness  must  separately  depose  to  all  the  facts 
necessary  to  complete  the  chain  of  evidence,  so 
that  no  link  may  depend  upon  the  credibility 
of  but  one.  Lewis  v.  Maris,  1  Dall.  278;  Hock 
v.  Hock,  4  Serg.  &  R.  47.  And  if  there  are 
three  witnesses,  and  the  proof  is  fully  made  by 
two  only,  it  is  enough  without  calling  the  third. 
Jackson  v.  Vandyke,  1  Cox,' 28;  Fox  v.  Evans, 

3  Yeates,  506.  But  if  one  or  both  witnesses  are 
dead,  the  will  may  be  proved  by  the  usual  sec- 
ondarv  evidence.  Miller  v.  Caruthers,  1  Serg. 
&  R.  205. 

2  Bootle  v.  Blundell,  19  Ves.  505;  G.  Coop. 
136,  137;  see  also  Ogle  v.  Cook,  1  Ves.  Sr.  177; 
Townshend  v.  Ives,  1  Wils.  216;  Bullen  v. 
Michel,  2  Price,  491;  2  Greenl.  Ev.  §  694,  and 
note.  Any  person  interested  in  the  estate  of 
the  testator,  may  insist  upon  the  production  of 
all  the  subscribing  witnesses  to  a  will,  at  the 

872 


probate  thereof,  if  they  are  living,  and  subject 
to  the  process  of  the  Court.  Chase  v.  Lincoln, 
3  Mass.  236.  If  it  be  impossible  to  procure 
any  one  of  the  witnesses,  or  he  has  become  in- 
competent, the  Court  will  proceed  without  him 
ex  necessitate  ret,  and  resort  to  the  next  best 
evidence  of  which  the  case  will  admit.  Ibid. ; 
Sears  v.  Bellingham,  12  Mass.  358;  Brown  v. 
Wood,  17  Mass.  68;  see  Swift  r.  Wiley,  1  B. 
Mon.  116;  Brown  v.  Chambers,  Hayes,  Exch. 
597;  Powell  v.  Cleaver,  2  Bro.  C.  C.  (Perkins's 
ed.)  504,  note  (6);  Lord  Carrington  v.  Payne,  5 
Sumner's  Ves.  404,  Perkins's  note  (a),  and 
cases  cited. 

3  Per  Lord  Eldon,  in  Bootle  v.  Blundell, 
ubi  supra. 

4  Ibid. 

5  Lord  Carrington  v.  Payne,  5  Ves.  404,  411; 
see  also  Billing  v.  Brooksbank,  cited  19  Ves. 
505;  Fitzherbert  v.  Fitzherbert,  4  Bro.  C.  C. 
231;  and  Grayson  v.  Atkinson,  2  Ves.  Sr.  454, 
where  it  was  held  that  a  commission  should 
have  been  sent  to  examine  the  witness  abroad ; 
but  the  rule  in  Lord  Carrington  v.  Payne  seems 
to  be  the  one  now  acted  upon.     Seton,  227. 

6  Hare  v.  Hare,  5  Beav.  529,  630;  7  Jur.  336. 
1  Bernett  v.  Taylor,  9  Ves.  381. 

8  James  v.  Parnell,  T.  &  R.  417;  M'Kenire 
v.  Fraser,  9  Ves.  5. 

9  Harris  v.  Ingledew,  3  P.  Wins.  93 ;  Wallis 
v.  Hodgeson,  1  Atk.  56  ;  Seton,  228. 

10  Ante,  p.  858. 

11  Chichester  v.  Chichester,  24  Beav.  289, 
where  the  will  was  allowed  to  be  proved  viva 
voce  at  the  hearing;  see,  however,  Seton,  228, 
and  Smith  v.  Blackman,  ante,  p.  858,  n. 


DOCUMENTARY    EVIDENCE   WHICH    DOES   NOT   PROVE   ITSELF.      *  87T 

carry  the  trusts  of  a  will  into  execution,  without  declaring  the  will 

well  proved.12     Where  the  heir  admits  the  will,  *  the  Court  will   *  876 

establish  it,  without  declaring  it  well  proved  ; x  but  the  admission 

of  a  will  in  the  separate  answer  of  a  married  woman,  who  was  the  heir- 

ess-at-law,  has  been  held  insufficient  to  enable  the  Court  to  declare  the 

will  established.2 

The  Court  of  Chancery  will  establish  a  will  made  and  proved  in  the 
colonies,  on  the  production  of  a  duly  authenticated  copy  of  it ;  provided 
the  due  execution  and  attestation  of  the  original  are  proved  by  the  attest- 
ting  witnesses.3 

The  rule  that,  where  a  will  is  to  be  established  against  an  heir,  it 
must  be  proved  by  all  the  witnesses,  or  by  producing  evidence  of  their 
death  and  handwriting,  does  not  apply  when  proof  of  the  will  is  required 
for  other  purposes  :  in  such  cases,  one  witness  to  prove  it  is  sufficient.4 

The  rule,  that  all  the  witnesses  must  be  examined,  extends  also  to 
the  trial  of  an  issue  declsavit  vel  non  before  a  jury.5 

Formerly,  whenever  the  heir-at-law  was  a  party  to  the  suit,  he  was 
entitled,  as  a  general  rule,  to  an  issue  devisavit  vel  non;  6  but  under  the 
later  practice,  the  Court  of  Chancery  had  power,7  and  it  would  seem  was 
bound,8  to  determine  the  question  itself,  either  with  or  without  a  jury, 
as  it  might  think  fit :  9  though  it  might  direct  the  question  to  be  tried 
at  the  assizes,  or  at  a  sitting  in  London  or  Middlesex,  where  it  appeared 
to  the  Court  that  the  question  might  be  more  conveniently  so  tried.10 

With    respect  to  wills  of   copyhold  estates,  it    seems  that  it    is  not 
the  practice  to  establish  them  against  the  heir-at-law  ;  but  what 
*  will  be  a  sufficient  proof  to  induce  the  Court  to  act  upon  them    *  877 
when  their  validity  is  not  admitted  by  the  heir-at-law,  does  not 
seem  quite  clear.1 

12  See   ante,    p.  232;    Cons.   Old.   VII.    1;  6  See  post,  Chap.  XXVII.  §  1,    Trials  of 

Seton,  228;  Binfield  v.  Lambert,  1  Dick.  337;  Questions  of  Fact;  and  see  Man  ».  Ricketts,  7 

Bird  v.  Butler,  id.  n.;  Fitzhevbert  v.  Fitzherbert,  Beav.  93,  102 ;  8  Jur.  159;  S.  C.  nom.  Ricketts 

4  Bro.  C.  C.  231;  Wood  v.  Stane,  8  Price,  613;  v.  Turquand,  1  H.  L.  Cas.  472. 
Boyse  o.  Rossborongh,  Kay,  71;  3  De  G.  M.  &  ">  21  &  22  Vic  c.  27,  §§  3,  4 ;  and  see  Ord. 

G.  817;  18  Jur.  205;  S.  C.  nom.  Colclough  ».  XLI.   2G,   52;   and  post,  Chap.   XXVII.    §    1, 

Boyse,  6  H.  L.  Cas.  1 ;  3  Jur.  N.  S.  373.  Trials  of  Questions  of  Fact. 

"i  Seton,  228.     For  form  of  decree  in  such  8  05  &  26  Vic.  c.  42,  §  1 :  post.  Chap.  XXVII. 

case,    see  id.  224,  No.  2.  §  1,   Trials  of  Questions  of  Fact;  Baylis   v. 

2  Brown  v.  Hayward,  1  Hare,  432;  ante,  pp.  Watkins,  8  Jur.  N.  S.  1165,  L.  JJ.;  Egmont  P. 
184,  185.  Darell,  1  H.  &  M.  563;  Eaden  v.  Firth,  id.  573; 

3  Kandv.Macmahon,  12  Sim.  553;  6  Jur.  450.  Young  v.  Fernie,  1  De  G.J.  &  S.  353;  10  Jur. 

4  Concannon  v.  Cruise,  2  Moll.  332.  N.  S.  58;  Re  Catholic  Publishing  Co.  10  Jur. 

5  Femberton  r.  Pemberton,  11  Ves.  53;  N.  S.  192,  M.  R. ;  Williams  v.  Williams,  12  W. 
Bootle  v.  Blundell,  19  Ves.  505;  G.  Coop.  137.  R.  140,  M.  R. ;  33  Beav.  306;  and  see  Curlewis 
Where,  howevor,  the  bill  was  not  filed  by  the  v.  Carter,  9  Jur.  N.  S.  1148;  12  W.  R.  97, 
devisee  to  establish  the  will,  but  by  the  heir  to  V.  C.  S. 

s^t  it  aside,  the  defendant  called  one  witness,  9  21  &  22  Vic.  c.  27,  §  5;  and  25  &  26  Vic. 

and  produced  the  other  two,  offering  them  to  c.  42,  §  3. 

the  plaintiff  to  call  and  examine  them,  which  10  25  &  26  Vic.  c.  42,  §  2. 

he  declined,  not  wishing  to  make  them  his  own  1  Archer  v.   Slater,  10   Sim.  624;  11  Sim. 

witnesses;  upon  a  motion  for  a  new  trial,  the  507;  Jervoise  v.  Duke   of   Northumberland,  1 

cause  was  held  to  have  been  sufficiently  tried.  J.  &  W.  570. 


Tatham  v.  Wright,  2  R.  &  M.  1,  17;  see 
Gresley,  Eq.  Ev.  (Am.  ed.)  123,  124;  2  Greenl. 
Ev.  5  693. 


873 


*  878 


EVIDENCE. 


The  Ecclesiastical  Courts  had  no  jurisdiction  to  determine  the  validity 
of  wills  of  real  estate ;  and  the  production  of  probate  was,  therefore,  no 
evidence  of  the  validity  of  the  will  as  to  real  estate.2  But  the  Court  of 
Probate  has  such  jurisdiction  conferred  upon  it;3  and  when  probate  of 
a  will,  not  confined  to  personalty,  has  been  granted  in  solemn  form,  the 
probate  is  conclusive  evidence,  in  all  Courts,  of  the  validity  of  the  will 
as  to  real,  as  well  as  to  personal  estate.4  And  when  the  will  is  not 
proved  in  solemn  form,  if  ten  days'  notice  of  the  intention  to  read  the 
probate  of  the  will,  or  copy  thereof,  stamped  with  any  seal  of  the  Court 
of  Probate,5  as  evidence,  is  given,  it  will  be  conclusive  evidence  against 
the  person  to  whom  notice  is  given,  unless  such  person,  within  four 
days  after  receiving  such  notice,  gives  notice  that  he  disputes  the  valid- 
ity of  the  devise.6  The  consequence  of  the  above-mentioned  alterations 
in  the  law  is,  that  the  practice  of  establishing  a  will  in  Chancery  is  of 
comparatively  rare  occurrence.7 

Where  an  original  will  is  required  to  be  produced  in  the  Court  of 
Chancery,  the  attendance  with  it  of  the  proper  officer,  in  whose  custody 
it  is  deposited,8  may  be  procured  in  the  same  manner  as  in  the  other 
cases  where  the  production  of  an  original  record,  or  instrument  in  the 

nature  of  a  record,  is  required.9 
*  878        *  There  are  several  cases  in  which  a  Court  of  Equity  has  es- 
tablished a  will,  without  the  production  of  the  original,  where  the 


2  2  Taylor  on  Evid.  §  1578;  1  Wins.  Exors. 
569. 

3  20  &  21  Vic.  c.  77,  §§  61-05;  Dodd  & 
Brooke,  595,  641 ;  see  also  21  &  22  Vic.  c.  95 ; 
see  now  36  &  37  Vic.  c.  66,  §§  16,  34,  76; 
Pinney  v.  Hunt,  6  Ch.  D.  98;  Waite  v.  Bingley, 
21  Ch.  D.  674.  As  to  wills  of  personal  estate, 
the  Court  of  Chancery  has  looked  at  the  original, 
for  the  purpose  of  determining  the  construction, 
in  Phillips  v.  Chamberlaine,  4  Ves.  57;  Comp- 
lain v.  Bloxham,  2  Coll.  201,  204;  Oppenheim 
v.  Martin,  9  Hare,  802,  n.;  Manning  v.  Purcell, 
7  De  G.  M.  &  G.  55;  see,  however.  Gann  v. 
Gregory,  3  De  G.  M.  &  G.  777,  780;  18  Jur. 
1003. 

4  20  &  21  Vic.  c.  77,  §  62.  As  to  the  ad- 
vantage of  proving  a  will  in  solemn  form,  see 
Dodd  &  Brooke,  641,  note  («);  and  for  the  prac- 
tice, id.  641-652. 

5  The  stamp  is  only  required  for  the  copy. 
Rippon  v.  Priest,  3  F.  &  F.  644. 

6  20  &  21  Vic.  c.  77,  §  64;  see  Danby  v. 
Poole,  10  \V.  R.  515,  V.  C.  S.;  Barraclough  v. 
Greenhough,  W.  N.  (1866)  319;  15  VV.  R.  21, 
Q.  B.  Office  copies  of  wills  are  not  collated 
with  the  original,  unless  specially  required; 
even-  copy  so  required  to  be  examined  will  be 
certified  under  the  hand  of  one  of  the  principal 
Registrars  to  be  an  examined  copy;  and  the 
seal  of  the  Court  is  not  to  be  affixed  to  an 
office  copy  unless  the  same  has  been  so  certified. 
Court  of  Probate  Rules,  30  July,  1862,  rr.  80, 
81;  Dodd  &  Brooke,  1076.  An  office  copy  not 
so  certified  and  sealed  is  not,  therefore,  usually 

874 


received  in  evidence.  An  extra  fee  of  7*.  6'/.  is 
charged  for  a  certified  office  copy;  and  see  20  & 
21  Vic.  c.  77,  §  69.  For  forms  of  notice,  under 
section  64,  see  Vol.  III. 

»  See  now  1  Dan.  Ch.  Prac.  (6th  Eng.  ed.) 
602. 

8  A  subpoena  duces  tecum  will  be  issued  for 
this  purpose.  Wigan  v.  Rowland,  10  Hare  App. 
18,  19;  17  Jur.  816.  For  the  fees  payable  to 
the  officer  of  the  Court  of  Probate  attending 
with  the  will,  see  Court  of  Probate  Rules,  30 
July,  1862;  Dodd  &  Brooke,  1151,  1230;  8  Jur. 
N.  S.  Pt.  2,  392,  397. 

9  Formerly  the  practice  was  for  the  Court  to 
make  an  order  upon  the  officer  of  the  Eccle- 
siastical Court  to  deliver  the  original  will  to 
the  solicitor  in  the  cause,  upon  his  giving  secur- 
ity (to  be  approved  by  the  Judge  of  that  Court) 
to  return  it  safe  and  undefaced  within  a  par- 
ticular time.  Morse  v.  Roach,  2  Strange,  961; 
1  Dick  65;  Frederick  v.  Aynscombe,  1  Atk. 
627:  Peirce  v.  Watkin,  2  Dick.  485;  Lake  v. 
Causfield,  3  Bro.  C.  C.  263 ;  Forder  v.  Wade, 

4  id   476;  Hodson  v. ,  6  Ves.  135;  Ford  r. 

,  id.  802;  see  also  Seton,  226;  and  for  forms 

of  order,  see  2  Van  Hey.  361,  302.  In  Fauquier 
v.  Tynte,  7  Ves.  292  (and  see  6  Ves.  135 ;  id. 
802),  Lord  Eldon  seemed  at  a  loss  to  account  for 
this  deviation  from  the  ordinary  course,  which 
he  thought  might  be  inoperative  if  the  officer 
of  the  Ecclesiastical  Court  refused  to  obey  the 
order;  and  he  declined  to  extend  it  to  any  other 
case  than  that  of  a  will. 


DOCUMENTARY    EVIDENCE    WHICH    DOES   NOT    PROVE    ITSELF.      *  879 

fact  of  the  will  having  been  proved  and  retained  abroad,  or  otlior  cir- 
cumstances,1 have  rendered  it  impossible  to  bring  the  original  before  the 
Court;2  but  it  seems  that,  in  such  cases,  strict  proof  of  the  execution 
and  attestation  must  be  given,  unless  they  are  admitted,  or  unless  the 
will  is  old  enough  to  prove  itself.8  The  contents  of  the  will  must  be 
proved  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  Court ; 4  and,  in  the  absence  of  the 
original,  there  are  various  means  of  secondary  evidence  applicable  for 
this  purpose.5 

Secondary  evidence  of  the  contents  of  written  documents  is  admitted, 
both  at  Law  and  in  Equity,  when  the  party  has  not  the  means  of  pro- 
ducing them,  because  they  are  either  lost  or  destroyed,  or  in  the  posses- 
sion or  power  of  the  adverse  party.  At  Law,  where  it  is  not  known 
till  the  time  of  trial  what  evidence  will  be  offered  on  either  side,  a  party, 
in  order  to  entitle  himself  to  give  secondary  evidence  of  the  contents  of 
a  written  document,  on  the  ground  of  its  being  in  the  possession  of  his 
adversary,  ought  to  give  him  notice  to  produce  it ;  for  otherwise,  non 
constat  that  the  best  evidence  might  not  be  had.6  But  even  at  Law, 
when,  from  the  nature  of  the  proceeding,  the  party  must  know  that  tbe 
contents  of  a  written  instrument  in  his  possession  will  come  into  ques- 
tion, it  is  not  necessary  to  give  any  notice  for  its  production ;  and, 
therefore,  in  an  action  of  trover  for  a  deed,7  or  upon  an  indictment  for 
stealing  a  bill  of  exchange,8  it  has  been  held,  that,  without  pre- 
vious notice,  parol  evidence  may  be  given  of  the  *  contents  of  the  *  879 
instrument  which  is  the  foundation  of  the  proceeding.1 

The  same  exception  to  the  general  rule  appears  to  be  equally  applica- 
ble in  Courts  of  Equity  ;  for  there  it  is  held,  that  when,  either  from  the 
pleadings  or  depositions,  a  party  is  apprised  that  it  is  the  intention  of 
the  opposite  party  to  make  use  of  secondary  evidence  of  the  contents 
of  a  document  in  his  possession,  such  secondary  evidence  may  be  used 
at  the  hearing,  without  serving  the  party  in  whose  possession  it  is  with 
notice  to  produce  it.2  Thus,3  where  a  witness,  who  had  been  examined 
on  the  part  of  the  defendant,  deposed  to  the  contents  of  a  certain  letter 

i  Ellis  v.  Medlicott,  cited  4  Beav.  144.  Eq.  238;  and  see  Heath  v.  Crealock,  L.  R.  10 

2  A  codicil  destroyed  without  the  testator's  Ch.  22.     For  form  of  notice  to  produce,  see  R. 
consent  was  established   in  Clark  v.  Wright,  3  S.  C.  1883:  Ord.  XXXII.  8  App.  B.  No.  14. 
Pick.  07  (2d  ed.)  69,  note  (1),  and  cases  cited.  7  How  v.  Hall,  14  East,  274. 

3  Rand  v.  Macmahon,  12  Sim.  553,  550;  0  8  Aiekles's  case,  1  Leach,  294. 

Jur.  450.  l  See  1  Taylor  on  Evid.  §§  378,  379 ;  1  Greenl. 

4  The  evidence  of  the  entire  contents  of  the  Eq.  §  501.  Photographic  copies  of  instru- 
will  must,  in  such  cases,  be  most  clear  and  ments  are,  like  press  copies,  secondary  evidence. 
satisfactory.  Davis  v.  Sigourney,  8  Met.  487;  Eborn  v.  Zimpelinan,  47  Texas,  503.  And  see, 
Durfee  v.  Durfee,  id.  490,  note;  Huble  v. Clark,  as  to  photographs,  Locke  v.  Sioux  &c.  Ry.  Co. 
1  Hagg.  Eccl.  115.  40  Iowa,  109.     Blair  v.  Pelham.  1 18  Mass.  420; 

5  In  Pullan  v.  Rawlins,  4  Beav.  142,  suffi-  Udderzook  r.  Commonwealth,  70  Penn.  St.  340. 
cicnt  secondary  evidence  was  given,  by  means  Copy  of  a  telegram  held  admissible  on  proof 
of  a  copy  admitted  to  probate  in  this  country,  of  the  destruction  of  the  original.  State  v. 
certified  by  the  Registrar  of    the  place  where  Hopkins,  50  Vt.  316. 

the  original  was  deposited.  2  See  Greslev,   Eq.  Ev.   (Am.   ed.)  118;    1 

6  1  Phil.  Ev.  (Cowen  &  Hill's  ed.  1839)439,      Taylor,  §  452. 

et  seq. ;  3  id.  1182,  note,  834,  and  cases  cited;  1  3  Wood  v.  Strickland,  2  Mer.  404,  405;  and 

Greenl.  Ev.  §  500.  As  to  secondary  evidence  see  Lyne  v.  Lock  wood,  2  Moll.  321;  Davison  v. 
of  a  mortgage,  see  Waldy  v.  Gray,  L.  R.  20      Robinson,  6  W.  R.  673,  L.  C. 

875 


*  880  EVIDENCE. 

which  had  been  written  by  the  plaintiff  to  the  witness,  and  which  the 
witness  stated  that  he  had  himself  subsequently  returned  to  the  plaintiff, 
who  immediately  threw  it  into  the  fire  and  destroyed  it,  an  objection 
which  was  taken  at  the  hearing,  on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff,  to  the 
admissibility  of  this  evidence,  on  the  ground  that  there  was  no  proof  of 
the  letter  being  lost  or  destroyed,  or  of  any  notice  given  to  the  plaintiff 
to  produce  it,  was  overruled  because  the  plaintiff  must  have  seen,  by  the 
depositions,  that  the  evidence  of  the  case,  set  up  as  a  defence  to  the 
bill,  consisted  of  certain  written  communications  which  had  taken  place 
on  the  subject  of  the  suit,  and  that  it  was  impossible,  therefore,  that  he 
could  have  been  taken  by  surprise,  or  could  not  be  prepared  to  produce 
any  letter  that  might  be  in  his  possession.4 

Where  a  defendant  admits  a  deed  to  be  in  his  possession,  but  declines 
to  produce  it,  on  the  ground  that  it  might  convict  him  of  simony,  or 
any  other  criminal  offence,  it  seems  that  secondary  evidence  of  its 
coutents  may  be  received.5 

Where  written  documents  are  not  admitted,  and  do  not  prove 
*880    *  themselves,  they  must  be  proved  by  the  same  evidence  as  at 
Law,1    the   evidence,    however,    being    taken    according    to    the 
practice  of  the  Court  of  Chancery. 

Where  an  instrument,  to  the  validity  of  which  attestation  is  not 
requisite,  has  been  attested,  such  instrument  may  be  proved  by  admis- 
sion, or  otherwise,  as  if  there  had  been  no  attesting  witness  thereto ; 2 
and  it  is  not  requisite  to  prove  it  by  the  attesting  witness,  except  in  the 
case  of  ex  parte  applications:  on  which. the  evidence  of  the  attesting 
witness  will  still  be  required,3  unless  it  can  be  shown  that  there  is  a 
difficulty  in  procuring  it.4  It  would  seem  that  proof  by  the  attesting 
witness  is  necessary,  where  the  validity  of  the  instrument,  and  payment 
of  the  consideration,  are  contested  by  a  person  not  a  party  to  it.5 

To  avoid  unnecessary  expense  in  the  proof  of  documents,  it  has  been 
enacted  that,  where  all  parties  to  a  suit  are  competent  to  make  admis- 
sions, any  party  may  call  on  any  other  party,  by  notice,  to  admit  any 
document  saving  all  just  exceptions  ;  and  that  in  case  of  refusal  or 
neglect  to  admit,  the  cost  of  proving  the  document  shall  be  paid  by  the 
party  so  neglecting  or  refusing,  whatever  the  result  of  the  cause  may 

4  In  Hawkesworth  v.  Dewsnap,  cited  5  Sim.  2  17  &  18  Vic.  c.  125,  §  26;  See  Homer  v. 
400,  Sir  Lancelot  Shadwell  V.  C.  came  to  a  de-  Wallis,  11  Mass.  309.  As  to  notice  of  admis- 
cision  which  was  contrary  to  that  in  Wood  v.  sions,  see  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  XXXII.  1-4,  and  App. 
Strickland,  2  Mer.  400,  and  in  Stulz  ».  Stulz,  B.  No.  12;  Watson  r.  Rodwell,  11  Ch.  D.  150. 
5  Sim.  400,  he  referred  with  approbation  to  3  Re  Reay,  1  Jur.  N  S.  222:  3  W.  R.  312, 
his  own  decision  in  Hawkesworth  v.  Dewsnap,  V.  C.  K. ;  Pedder  v.  Pedder,  cited  Seton,  16. 
though  he  expressed  himself  willing  to  have  the  4  Re  Dierdon,  10  Jur.  N.  S.  673;  12  W.  R. 
point  again  argued,  in  order  that  the  practice  978,  V.  C.  W. ;  Jearrard  v.  Tracy,  11  W.  R. 
might  be  settled.  The  point,  however,  was  not  97,  V.  C.  K.  In  Re  Hall,  9  W.  R.  776,  V.  C. 
argued,  the  objection  having  been  waived.  K.,  where  no  solemnities  were  required  for  the 

5  Parkhurst  v.  Lowten,  2  Swanst.  213;  1  execution  of  a  power,  a  fund  was  directed  to  be 
Taylor,  §§  409,  428;  see  Webb  v.  East,  5  Ex.  paid  out  of  Court,  without  the  evidence  of  the 
D.  108.  attesting  witness;  and  >*>e  Taylor,  §  1640. 

1  See  ante,  p.  874,  and  note  ;  1  Greenl.  Ev.  5  Leigh  v.  Boyd,  35  Beav.  455. 

§  589,  et  ser/.  and  note;  Gresley,  Eq.  Ev.  (Am 
ed.)  118,  119,  etseq. 
876 


DOCUMENTARY   EVIDENCE    WHICH    DOES    NOT    PROVE    ITSELF. 


881 


be,  unless  the  Court  shall  certify  that  the  refusal  to  admit  was  reason- 
able ;  and  that  no  costs  of  proving  any  document  shall  be  allowed, 
unless  such  notice  be  given  :  except  in  cases  where  the  omission  to 
give  the  notice  is,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Taxing  Master,  a  saving  of 
expense.6 

Any  document  requiring  to  be  stamped  will  not  be  received  in  evi- 
dence, until  it  has  been  stamped,7  except  for  a  collateral  purpose  ; 8  and 
upon  the  production  of  any  document  (except  such  as  cannot  be  stamped 
after  execution,  on  payment  of  the  duty  and  a  penalty  9)  as  evidence  at 
the  trial  of  any  cause,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  officer  of  the  Court,  whose 
duty  it  is  to  read  such  document,  to  call  the  attention  of  the  Judge  to 
any  omission  or  insufficiency  of  the  stamp;  and  the  document,  if 
unstamped,  or  not  sufficiently  stamped,  will  not  be  received  in  evidence 
until  the  whole,  or  the  deficiency  of  the  stamp  duty,  and  the  penalty 
required  by  statute,  together  with  the  additional  penalty  of  one  pound, 
has  been  paid;  and  thereupon  such  document  is  admissible  in 
evidence,  saving  all  *  just  exceptions  on  other  grounds.1  No  new  *  881 
trial  will  be  granted  by  reason  of  the  ruling  of  any  Judge  that 
the  stamp  upon  any  document  is  sufficient,  or  that  the  document  does 
not  require  a  stamp.2  (a) 


6  Ante,  p.  819 ;  21  &  22  Vic.  c.  27,  §  7 ;  Cons. 
Ord.  XLI.  39,  and  Sched.  N.  No.  6;  Taylor, 
§  707  A.  Under  these  provisions,  a  bankrupt 
and  a  married  woman  are  competent  to  admit 
documents.  Churchill  v.  Collier,  1  N.  R.  82. 
Section  7  is,  in  terms,  generally  applicable, 
and  has  been  so  acted  upon;  Seton,  21;  it  is 
framed  on  the  Common  Law  Procedure  Act, 
1852  (15  &  16  Vic.  c.  76),  §  117;  and  see  Com- 
mon Law  Rules  of  II.  T.  1853,  r.  30;  17  Jur. 
Pt.  2,  9 ;  Taj  lor,  §  703.  For  the  cases  at  Law 
on  the  construction  to  be  put  on  §  117,  and  the 
practice  thereunder,  see  Taylor  on  Evid.  §§  704- 
707;  Chitty's  Arch.  319-323;  Chitty's  Forms, 
140-145.  For  forms  of  notice,  admission  there- 
under, and  affidavit  of  service,  see  Vol.  III. 

'  Smith  v.  Henley,  1  Phil.  391,  396;  8  Jur. 
434;  Hart  v.  Hart,  1  Hare,  1,  5;  and  see  the 
Stamp  Act,  1870  (33  &  34  Vic.  c.  97),  §  17. 

8  Blair  v.  Bromley,  11  Jur.  617,  L.  C,  and 
cases  there  cited;  Ponsford  v.  Walton,  L.  R.  3 
C.  P.  167;  Exparte  Squire,  Re  Gouldwell,  L.  R. 
4  Ch.  47. 

9  See  1  Seton,  26. 

l  The  Stamp  Act,  1870  (33  &  34  Vic.  c.  97), 
§  16,  on  and  after  Jan.  1,  1871.  The  17  &  18 
Vic.  c.  125,  §§  28,  29,  is  repealed  on  and  from 
that  date,  by  33  &  34  Vic.  c.  99.  It  seems  there 
is  no  officer  of  the  Court,  strictly  answering  the 
description  in  §  16;  the  Registrar  clearly  does 
not.  1  Seton,  26.  The  practice  in  the  Court  of 
Chancery  is  to  direct  the  cause  to  stand  over,  or 


to  allow  it  to  proceed  on  the  undertaking  of  the 
solicitor  to  procure  the  document  to  be  properly 
stamped;  see  1  Seton,  26;  and  see  ante,  pp. 
848,  849;  Owen  v.  Thomas,  3  M.  &  K.  353; 
Coles  p.  Trecothick,  9  Ves.  234,  239;  Carring- 
ton  v.  Pell,  2  De  G.  &  S.  512;  Browne  v.  Savage, 
5  Jur.  N.  S.  1020,  V.  C.  K.;  see  also  Nixon  v. 
Albion  Marine  Ins.  Co.  L.  R.  2  Exch.  338. 
Receipts  for  payments  not  duly  stamped,  and 
which  could  not  be  stamped  either  with  or  with- 
out a  penalty,  were  received  in  evidence  by 
consent,  in  Orange  v.  Pickford,  and  Thompson 
v.  Webster,  cited  1  Seton,  26. 

2  17  &  18  Vic.  c.  125,  §  31.  In  Carpenters. 
Snelling,  97  Mass.  452,  it  was  held  that  the 
provision  of  the  U.  S.  Stat.  1866,  c.  184,  §  9,  that 
no  instrument  or  document  not  duly  stamped, 
as  required  by  the  internal  revenue  laws  of 
the  United  States,  shall  be  admitted  or  used  as 
evidence  in  any  Court  until  the  requisite  stamps 
shall  have  been  affixed  thereto,  applies  only  to 
the  Courts  of  the  United  States.  BigelowC.  J. 
in  this  case  said  :  "  We  entertain  grave  doubts 
whether  it  is  within  the  constitutional  authority 
of  Congress  to  enact  rules  regulating  the  compe- 
tency of  evidence  on  the  trial  of  cases  in  the 
Courts  of  the  several  States  which  shall  be 
obligatory  upon  them."  See  also  Lynch  v. 
Morse,  97  Mass.  458,  in  note;  Disbrow  r.  John- 
son, 18  N.  J.  Eq.  36;  Woodward  v.  Roberts,  58 
N.  H.  503;  Davy  v.  Morgan,  56  Barb.  218  ; 
Sporrer  v.  Eifler,  1  Heisk.  633. 


(a)  When  secondary  evidence  of  a  written 
instrument  is  admissible,  the  original  is  pre- 
sumed to  have  been  duly  stamped  in  the  ab- 
sence of  evidence;  but  such  presumption  wholly 


ceases  upon  evidence  that  at  a  particular  time 
the  instrument  was  unstamped.  Marine  Inv, 
Co.  v.  Haviside,  L.  R.  5  H.  L.  624. 

877 


882 


EVIDENCE. 


Section  VII. — Proving  Exhibits  at  the  Hearing,  under  an  Order. 

Written  documents,  essential  to  the  justice  of  the  cause,  may  in 
certain  cases  be  proved  at  the  hearing  as  exhibits,  viva  voce  or  by  affi- 
davit.3 (b)  This  course  may  be  adopted,  where  the  cause  is  heard  on 
bill  and  answer,4  or  where  the  documents  have  not  been  proved  before 
the  evidence  in  the  cause  is  closed. 

Amongst  the  documents  which  may  be  thus  proved,  may  be  classed : 
li  all  ancient  records  of  endowments  and  institutions,  whether  they  are 
offered  to  be  proved  as  original  instruments,  or  as  they  are  found 
collected  and  recorded  in  register  books  of  great  antiquity,  depos- 
*882  ited  in  the  registries  of  the  archbishops  and  bishops,  *  or  of  the 
deans  and  chapters  of  collegiate  churches,  or  of  the  Ecclesiasti- 
cal Courts,  bulls  of  the  Popes,  records  from  the  Bodleian,  Harleian, 
and  Museum  libraries,  or  from  any  of  the  public  libraries  belonging  to 
the  two  universities,  or  from  the  library  at  Lambeth  :  all  or  any  of 
which  ancient  documents  must  be  produced  by  those  persons  in  whose 
immediate  custody  they  are,  who  must  be  sworn  to  identify  the  particu- 
lar record  produced  in  his  custody,  before  the  same  can  be  read." x 

So  in  like  manner  may  be  proved,  as  exhibits,  office  copies  of  records  2 


3  The  practice  of  proving  such  documents  by 
affidavit  was  introduced  by  the  43d  Order  of 
August.  1841  (Sand.  Ord.  886;  3  Beav.  XXV.), 
which  directed  that,  "  in  cases  in  which  any 
exhibit  may,  by  the  present  practice  of  the 
Court,  be  proved  viva  voce  at  the  hearing  of  a 
cause,  the  same  may  be  proved  by  the  affidavit 
of  the  witness  who  would  be  competent  to  prove 
the  same  viva  wee  at  the  hearing."  This  order 
is  not  included  in  the  Consolidated  Orders;  but 
the  Prel.  Ord.  r.  5,  which  preserves  any  estab- 
lished practice  originated  in,  or  sanctioned  by, 
the  Orders  thereby  abrogated,  would,  it  is  con- 
ceived, authorize  the  adoption  of  the  practice, 
where  necessary;  seel  Seton,  23;  see  also  13 
&  14  Vic.  c  35*,  §  28 ;  and  orders  to  prove  ex- 
hibit viva  voce  or  by  affidavits  are  frequently 
made;  for  recent  instances,  see  Jegon  v.  Vivian, 
M.  R..  17  Dec,  1869,  Rolls'  Lib.:  Feltham 
v.  Turner,  M.  R-,  2  July,  1870,  Rolls'  Lib. 
Courts  of  Chancery  have  always  had  the  power 
to  examine  witnesses  viva  voce,  for  the  purpose 
of  proving  certain  written  instruments.  Levert 
v.  Redwood,  9  Porter,  80;  Hughes  v.  Phelps, 
3  Bibb,  199;  Gresley,  Eq.  Ev.  126;  Latting  V. 
Hall,  9  Paige,  483;  Dana  v.  Nelson.  1  Aiken, 
254;  see  De  Peyster  v.  Golden,  1  Edw.  Ch.  63; 


Nesmith  v  Calvert,  1  Wood.  &  M.  34:  Gafney 
v.  Reeves,  6  lud.  71;  Morton  v.  White,  5  [nd. 
338. 

It  was  provided  that  the  change  in  the  mode 
of  taking  evidence  in  Equity  in  Massachusetts 
shall  not  prevent  the  use  of  affidavits  where 
they  have  heretofore  been  allowed.  Genl. 
Stats,  c.  131,  §  60  ;  Pub.  Stats,  c.  169,  §  36. 

By  Chancery  Rule  95  of  New  Jersey,  no 
documentary  evidence,  which  is  not  made  an 
exhibit  before  the  Master,  shall  be  read  at  the 
hearing  of  the  cause.     Dick.  Prec.  25. 

4  Ante,  p.  828;  Rowland  v.  Sturgis,  2  Hare, 
520;  Chalk  r.  Raine,  7  Hare.  393;  13  Jur.  981 ; 
Neville  v.  Fitzgerald,  2  Dr.  &  War.  530; 
Wvatt's  P.  R.  219;  contra,  Jones  v.  Griffith, 
14Siin.  262  ;  8  Jur.  733;  see  now  38  &  39  Vic. 
c.  77,  §  21;  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  XXXVIII.  1. 

i  2  Fowl.  Ex.  Pr.  157. 

2  The  office  copies  here  mentioned  are  the 
copies  of  those  records  of  which  it  is  the  duty 
of  proper  officers,  appointed  by  the  law,  to  fur- 
nish copies  for  general  use,  and  are  not  those 
copies  which  it  is  the  duty  of  the  officer  of  the 
Court  to  make  for  the  convenience  of  suitors  in 
that  Court,  such  as  the  ordinary  office  copies  of 
pleadings  and  depositions  in  the  Court  of  Chan- 


(6)  A.n  exhibit  filed  with  a  pleading  is  not  a 
part  thereof.  State  v.  Samuels.  28  Mo.  App. 
649  ;  Poulson  r.  Collier,  18  id.  583.  Where  by 
the  modern  practice  a  document  is  referred  to 
and  relied  upon  in  a  pleading,  but  is  not  an- 
nexed thereto  as  an  exhibit,  there  is  an  implied 
undertaking  toalhw  the  opposite  party  to  iu- 

878 


spect  it  and  take  a  copy.  Hunter  v.  Dublin 
&c.  Ry.  Co.  28  L.  R.  Ir.  489,  493.  In  a  suit 
for  infringing  a  copyright  in  a  painting,  proof 
of  a  copy  thereof  produced  in  Court  may  be 
made  by  the  evidence  of  persons  who  have 
seen  the  original,  without  producing  it  in  Court 
Lucas  v.  William-,  11892]  2  Q.  B.  113. 


PROVING    EXHIBITS    AT   THE    HEARING,    UNDER    AN   ORDER.      *  883 

from  any  of  the  Courts  at  Westminster,  or  of  grants  or  enrolments 
from  the  rolls  or  other  records  deposited  in  the  Public  Record  Offices, 
or  of  records  or  proceedings  from  Courts  of  inferior  jurisdiction  in 
England :  as  those  of  the  counties  palatine  of  Chester,  Lancaster,  or 
Durham,  or  of  the  Courts  of  Great  Session  in  Wales  or  of  the  Courts 
of  the  universities  of  Oxford  and  Cambridge,  or  of  the  City  of  London, 
or  of  the  Cinque  Ports.3  ' 

Deeds,  bonds,  promissory  notes,  bills  of  exchange,  letters,  or  receipts, 
of  which  proof  must  be  made  of  the  handwriting  of  the  persons  writing 
or  executing  the  same,  are  all  considered  as  exhibits,  and  may  be  proved 
at  the  hearing.4 

With  the  exception  of  documents  coming  out  of  the  custody  of  a 
public  officer  having  the  care  of  such  documents  (which  are  proved  by 
the  mere  examination  of  the  officer  to  that  fact),  no  exhibit  can  thus  be 
proved  that  requires  more  than  the  proof  of  the  execution,  or  of  hand- 
writing, to  substantiate  it : 5  if  it  be  anything  that  admits  of  cross- 
examination,  or  that  requires  any  evidence  besides  that  of  handwriting, 
it  cannot  be  received.6  This  rule  is  strictly  adhered  to;  and  in  many 
cases,  where  an  instrument  which,  prima  facie,  appears  to  be  an  exhibit, 
requires  more  formal  proof,  it  cannot  be  received  as  one.7  Thus 
the  Court  refused  *  to  admit  certain  receipts  to  be  proved  viva  *  883 
voce,  although  ordinarily  they  might  be  taken  as  exhibits,  because, 
in  order  to  make  them  evidence  of  the  fact  they  were  intended  to 
substantiate,  a  further  fact  must  have  been  proved,  which  the  other 
side  would  have  had  a  right  to  controvert  and  to  cross-examine  upon.1 
So  also,  where  a  power  was  required  to  be  exercised  by  a  deed  executed 
in  the  presence  of,  and  attested  by  witnesses,  it  was  held  that  the  deed 
by  which  the  power  was  exercised  could  not  be  proved  viva  voce  at  the 
hearing  of  the  cause ; 2  and  where  a  book,  in  which  the  collector  of  a 
former  rector  had  kept  accounts  of  the  receipt  of  tithes,  was  offered 
to  be  proved  viva  voce,  it  was  rejected,  because,  besides  proving  the 
handwriting,  it  would  be  necessary  to  prove  that  it  came  out  of  the 
proper  custody,  and  that  the  writer  was  the  collector  of  the  tithes.3 

eery;  which,  although  the}1"  are  admissible  in  that  the  examination  is  restricted  to  three  or 

the  Courts  to  which  the  officer  belongs,  may  not  four  very  simple  points,  such  as  the  custody 

be  admissible  in  other  Courts  without  further  and  identity  of  an  ancient  document  produced 

proof  of  their  accuracy.     2  Phil,  on  Evid.  197;  by  a  librarian  or  registrar,  the  accuracy  of  an 

2  Taylor,  §  1540.  office  copy  produced  by  the  proper  officer,  the 

3  2  Fowl.  Ex.  Pr.  158.  execution  of  a  deed  where  the  examinant  is  the 

*  2  Fowl.  Ex.  Pr.  158;  Hinde,  370.  attesting  witness,  the  handwriting  of  a  letter,  or 

6  See  Ellis  v.  Deane,  3  Moll.  62;  Emerson  receipt,  or  promissory  note,  &c,  &c.     Gresley, 

v.  Berkley,  4  Hen.  &  M.  441.  Eq.  Ev.  (Am.  ed.)  126. 

6  Lake  v.  Skinner,  1  J.  &  W.  9,  15;  Bowser  Where  a  minor  is  a  party,  the  Court  will  not 
v.  Colby,  1  Hare,  109,  132.  It  seems,  however,  permit  a  witness  to  be  examined  viva  voce  at 
that  the  Court  will,  upon  the  suggestion  of  the  hearing  of  the  cause,  to  prove  a  deed  or 
counsel,  put  questions  to  the  witness;  see  Tur-  exhibit,  which  must  be  proved  at  the  office,  by 
ner  v.  Burleigh,  17  Ves.  354.  an  examination  of  the  witness  upon  interroga- 

7  Bloxton  v.  Drewit,  Prec.  in  Ch.  64;  Ellis  r.  tories.     White  v.  Baker,  1  Ir.  Eq.  282. 
Deane,  3  Moll.  63  ;  Emerson  v.  Berkley,  4  Hen.  »  Earl  Pomfret  v.  Lord  Windsor,  2  Ves.  Sr. 
&  M.  441:    Gresley,  Eq.  Ev.  (Am.   ed.)  132  472,  479;  and  see  Bloxton  v.  Drewit,  Prec.  in 
[199].     It  is  said  not  to  be,  strictly  speaking,  Ch.  G4. 

correct  to  say,  that  no  questions,  which  will  ad-  2  B  ace  v.  Blick,  7  Sim.  619. 

ittit  of  a  cross-examination,  may  be   asked  a  8  Lake  v.  Skinner,  1J.  &  W.  9,  15. 

witness  thus  proving  exhibits;  but  the  fact  is, 

879 


884 


EVIDENCE. 


For  the  same  reason,  a  will  of  real  estate  cannot  be  proved  as  an 
exhibit  at  the  hearing :  because  the  heir  has  a  right  to  cross-examine 
the  witnesses.4  Under  the  later  practice,  however,  a  will  was  allowed  to 
be  proved  at  the  hearing,  with  liberty  to  the  heir  to  cross-examine  the 
witnesses.5 

If  a  document  is  impeached  by  the  answer  of  a  defendant,  it  cannot 
be  proved  viva  voce,  on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff,  against  such  defendant. 
Thus,  where  the  answer  of  one  of  the  defendants  in  a  cause  insisted 
that  a  covenant  was  fraudulently  inserted  in  a  deed,  the  Court  refused 
to  admit  such  deed  to  be  proved  viva  voce  against  that  defendant : 
although  it  was  held,  that  it  might  have  been  so  proved  against  the 
other  defendant,  who  had  not  impeached  its  authenticity.6  So,  where 
a  bill  was  filed  for  the  payment  of  an  annuity,  the  circumstances  under 
which  the  annuity  deed  was  executed  being  disputed  by  the  parties,  the 
plaintiff  was  not  allowed  to  prove  the  deed  viva  voce  as  an  exhibit ; 
but  leave  was  given  to  file  interrogatories  for  that  purpose.7 

It  is  only,  however,  where  the  execution  or  the  authenticity  of  a  deed 
is  impeached,  that  it  cannot  be  proved  as  an  exhibit :  if  the  validity  of 
it  only  is  disputed,  it  may  be  so  proved ; 8  and  upon  this  principle,  the 
plaintiff,  in  a  foreclosure  suit,  was  allowed  to  prove  by  affidavit  the 
mortgage  deed  under  which  he  claimed,  where  it  was  neither  admitted 
nor  denied  by  the  defendant.9 

It  is,  however,  necessary,  in  order  to  authorize  the  proving 
*  884  of  *  an  exhibit  at  the  hearing  of  a  cause,  that  the  party  intend- 
ing to  make  use  of  the  exhibit  should  previously  obtain  an  order 
for  that  purpose.1  This  order  may  be  obtained,  by  the  party  requiring 
it,  on  motion  of  course,  or  on  petition  of  course,2  and  it  may  be  granted 
during  the  hearing  of  the  cause ': 3  in  which  case,  the  cause  will  either 
be  ordered  to  stand  over  for  the  purpose  of  enabling  the  order  to  be 
served  and  acted  upon,  or,  if  the  witness  is  in  Court,  it  may  be  acted 
upon  immediately  ; 4  but  the  Court  has  a  discretion  whether  it  will  allow 
documents  to  be  proved  at  the  hearing  under  an  order  of  course  for  the 
purpose.6 

The  order  when  drawn  up,  must  describe  minutely  the  exhibit?  to 
be  proved;6  and  it  is  always  made,  as  of  course,  "saving  all  just 
exceptions."  7 


4  Harris  v.  Ingledew,  3  P.  Wms.  93;  Niblett 
V.  Daniel,  Bunb.  310;  2  Fowl.  Ex.  Pr.  158; 
ante,  pp.  874,  875. 

5  Chichester  v.  Chichester,  24  Beav.  289 ;  see 
also  Hope  v.  Liddell,  20  Beav.  438. 

6  Barfield  v.  Kelly,  4  Russ.  355,  357;  Joly  v. 
Swift,  3  Jo.  &  Eat.  126;  Hitchcock  v.  Carew, 
Kay  App   14. 

1  Maber  v.  Hobbs,  1  Y.  &  C.  Ex.  585,  586. 

8  Att.-Gen.  v.  Pearson,  7  Sim.  309. 

9  Rowland  v.  Sturgis,  2  Hare,  520;  contra, 
Jones  v.  Griffith,  14  Sim.  262;  8  Jur.  733;  and 
see  Chalk  v.  Baine,  7  Hare,  393;  13  Jur.  981. 

i  Hinde,  370;  Clare  v.  Wood,  1  Hare,  314; 


see  Emerson  v.  Berkley,  4  Hen.  &  M.  441 ;  Bar- 
row v.  Rliinelander,  1  John.  Ch.  559;  Gresley, 
Eq.  Ev.  (Am.  ed.)  131  [188].  The  order  may 
be  obtained  after  the  affidavit  in  proof  of  the 
exhibits  is  made.     Clare  v.  Wood,  supra. 

2  See  Graves  v.  Budgel,  1  Atk.  444.  For 
form  of  order,  see  Seton,   1237,  No.  3. 

3  Bank  v.  Farques,  Amb.  145. 

4  But  see  Bird  v.  Lake,  1  H.  &  M.  111. 

5  Wilson  v.  Thornbury,   L.   R.  10  Ch.  239. 

6  As,  if  a  deed,  the  date  and  parties'  names; 
if  a  letter,  the  date,  and  the  names  of  the  per- 
sons by  whom  it  was  written,  and  to  whom  it 
was  addressed.    Gresley,  Eq.  Ev.  (Am.  ed.)  131 


7  Hinde,  370. 


880 


PROVING   EXHIBITS    AT    THE    HEARING,   UNDER   AN   ORDER.      *  885 

The  order,  being  drawn  up,  passed,  and  entered,  a  copy  thereof  must 
be  served,  in  the  usual  manner,  upon  the  adverse  solicitor,  two  days 
previous  to  the  hearing  of  the  cause.8 

When  the  cause  is  called  on,  the  original  order,  the  exhibit  described 
therein,  and  the  witness  to  prove  the  same,  must  be  produced  in  Court ; 
and  the  Registrar  then  administers  the  oath  and  examines  the  witness  ;9 
or,  if  proved  by  affidavit,  the  order  and  exhibit  must  be  produced  with 
the  affidavit.10 

No  documents  but  those  mentioned  or  described  in  the  order  can  be 
thus  proved  at  the  hearing ; u  and  as  the  order  saves  just  exceptions, 
all  objections  which  can  be  taken  to  the  admissibility  of  the  document 
as  evidence  may  then  be  urged  by  the  opposing  party. 

The  attendance  of  an  unwilling  witness,  to  prove  an  exhibit  at  the 
hearing,  may  be  enforced  by  subpoena,12  and,  unless  an  order  to  prove 
viva  voce  at  the  hearing  has  been  obtained,  an  order  for  leave  to  issue 
the  subpoena  appears  to  be  necessary,  and  may  be  obtained  on  ex  parte 
motion.13  The  subpoena  is  prepared  and  issued  in  the  manner 
hereafter  explained,14  and  is  made  returnable  *  at  the  time  and  *  885 
place  specified  in  an  accompanying  notice  ;  being  usually  the  day 
on  which  the  cause  will  be  in  the  paper  for  hearing,  and  the  Court  of 
the  Judge  who  is  to  hear  it.1  The  order  to  prove  vica  voce,  or  to  issue 
the  subpoena,  as  the  case  may  be,  must  be  produced  at  the  time  the 
subpoena  is  sealed.  Personal  service  is  necessary,  and  a  tender  of 
expenses,  as  in  the  case  of  an  ordinary  subpoena  ad  testificandum.2 

The  adverse  party  has  no  right,  in  the  absence  of  special  circum- 
stances, to  compel  the  production,  before  the  hearing,  of  an  exhibit, 
however  it  has  been  proved,3  unless,  perhaps,  where  the  deposition 
proving  it  sets  it  out  verbatim  ;  4  nor  even  to  inspect  it,  for  he  is  not, 
before  the  hearing,  to  "  see  the  strength  of  the  cause,  or  any  deed  to 
pick  holes  in  it." 5  (a) 

[188].     To  authorize  a  party  to  produce,  at  the  12  Hinde,  371. 

hearing,   documentary  evidence   which   is  not  13  Hinde,  371;  Gresley,    191;    1    Seton,   23; 

made  an  exhibit  before  the  Examiner,  nor  dis-  but  see  Holden  v.  Holden,  5  W.  R  217,  V.  C.  K. ; 

tinctly  referred  to  in  the  pleadings,  the  notice  7  De  G.  M.  &  G.  397;   Vorley  v.  Jerram,  6  W. 

of  intention  to  make  use  of  such  evidence  should  R.  734.     No  formal  order  is  drawn  up;  a  note 

state  sufficient  of  the  substance  of  the  document  signed  by  the  Registrar  of  the  direction  of  the 

intended  to  be  produced  to  enable  the  adverse  Court  being  sufficient.     Raymond  v.  Brown,  4 

party  to  see  that  it  is  evidence  of  some  fact  DeG.  &J.  530. 

against  him.     Miller  v.  Avery,  2  Barb.  Ch.  582.  14  See  post,  pp.  905,  et  seq. 

8  Hinde,  370;  Gresley,  188;  Cons.  Ord.  III.  1.  1  Sched.  to  Ord.  E.  No.  2. 

9  Hinde,  371;    Bowser    p.  Colby,  1   Hare,  2  See  post,  p.  906. 

132,  n.  (a).      A  witness   may  be  examined  to  8  Forrester  v.  Helme,    M'Cl.    558;    Lord  v. 

prove  exhibits,  though  examined  before  in  the  Colvin,  2  Drew.  205;  5  De  G.  M.  &  G.  47;  18 

cause.    Neep  v.  Abbot,  C.  P.  Coop.  191.     For  Jur.  253.     See  now  K.   S.  C.  Ord.  XXXI.  14; 

form  of  oath,  see  Vol.  III.  App.  B.  No.  10,  Ord.  April,  1880,  Sched.  B.  10 

10  The  order  should  be  entered  as  read  in  the  A. ;  Webster  v.  Whewall,  15  Ch.  D.  120;  Re 
decree.    1  Seton,  23,  36,  No.  23.   The  Registrar  Credit  Co.  11  Ch.  D.  256. 

will  indorse  each  exhibit  produced  in  evidence;  4  Hodson  v.  Earl  of  Warrington,  3  P. Wins. 34. 

for  a  form,  see  1  Seton,  37,  No.  30.  6  Gresley,  192,  citing  Davers  v.  Davers,  2  P. 

11  Hinde,  371;  Wyatt's  P.  R.  186.  Wins.  410;*  2  Str.  764;  Wiley  v.  Pistor.  7  Ves. 


(tt)In  Quilterr.  Heatly,  23  Ch.  D.  42,  produc-  hearing  and  before  the  statement   of  defence 

tion  of  document*,  referred  to  in  the  plaintiff's  was  delivered.     See  Smith   v.  Harris,  18  L.  T. 

statement  of  claim,    was    ordered    before  the  809;  Elder  v.  Carter,  25  Q.  B.  D.  11)4. 

vol.  I.  —  56  881 


*885 


EVIDENCE. 


Section  VIII.  —  Testimony  of  Witnesses. 

Formerly,    persons   interested   in    the    matters    in   question    in    the 
suit,   or   parties   thereto,6   or   who   had   been   found   guilty   of  certain 


411;  Fencott  v.  Clarke,  6  Sim.  8;  Lord  v.  Col- 
vin,  ubi  supra;  and  see  post,  p.  896;  Bell  v. 
Johnson,  1  J.  &  H.  682. 

6  In  Chancery,  parties  to  the  record  were 
always  subject  to  examination,  as  witnesses, 
much  more  freely  than  at  Law.  A  plaintiff 
might  obtain  an  order  as  of  course,  to  examine 
a  defendant,  and  a  defendant  a  co-defendant, 
as  a  witness,  upon  affidavit  that  he  was  a  mate- 
rial witness,  and  was  not  interested  on  the  side 
of  the  applicant,  in  the  matter  to  which  it  was 
proposed  to  examine  him;  the  order  being  made 
subject  to  all  just  exceptions.  If  the  answer  of 
the  defendant  had  been  replied  to,  the  replica- 
tion must  be  withdrawn  before  the  plaintiff 
could  examine  him.  but  a  plaintiff  could  not 
be  examined  by  a  defendant,  except  by  consent, 
unless  he  was  merely  a  trustee,  or  had  no  bene- 
ficial interest  in  the  matter  in  question.  Nor 
could  a  co-plaintiff  be  examined  by  a  plaintiff, 
without  the  consent  of  the  defendant.  The 
course  in  the  latter  of  such  cases  was  to  strike 
out  his  name  as  plaintiff,  and  make  him  a 
defendant,  and  in  the  former  to  file  a  cross-bill. 
lGreenl.  Ev.  §  361;  1  Smith,  Ch.  Pr.  343,  344; 
Eckford  v.  Dekay,  6  Paige,  565;  see  Hill  t>. 
Hill,  9  Gill  &  J."  81;  DeWolf  V.  Johnson,  10 
Wheat.  367;  Gresley.  Eq.  Ev.  (Am.  ed.)  242, 
et  seq. ;'  Second  Cong.  Society  in  Hopkinton  v. 
First  Cong.  Society,  14  N.  H.  315.  Where  one 
part}'  was  examined  as  a  witness  against  an- 
other part}-  in  the  same  cause,  he  might  be 
cross-examined  like  any  other  witness  by  the 
party  against  whom  he  was  called,  and  his  evi- 
dence could  not  be  used  in  his  own  favor. 
Benson  v.  Leroy,  1  Paige,  122.  And  his  evi- 
dence must,  as  against  the  party  introducing 
him,  be  taken  as  true,  unless  disproved.  Pow- 
den  v.  Johnson,  7  Rep.  294,  U.  S.  C.  Penn.  But 
where  a  party  was  examined  before  a  Master 
in  relation  to  his  own  rights,  and  the  examina- 
tion was  in  the  nature  of  a  bill  of  discovery, 
he  could  not  be  cross-examined  by  his  own 
counsel,  nor  could  he  give  evidence  in  his  own 
favor,  any  further  than  his  answers  were  re- 
sponsive to  the  questions  put  to  him.  Ibid. 
He  must,  however,  accompany  his  answer  by 
explanations  responsive  to  the  interrogatory, 
which  might  be  necessary  to  rebut  any  im- 
proper inference  arising  from  such  answer. 
Ibid.;  see  Armsby  v   Wood,  1  Hopk.  229. 

If  there  were  more  defendants  than  on»,  an 
examination  of  a  defendant  might  be  had,  and 
a  decree  obtained  against  another  defendant 
upon  the  facts  elicited  by  such  examination; 

882 


but  a  decree  could  not  be  had  against  the  party 
examined,  embracing  such  facts.  Palmer  v. 
Van  Doren,  2  Edw.  Ch.  192 ;  Bradley  v.  Root, 
5  Paige,  633;  Lingan  v.  Henderson,  1  Bland, 
268;  Mann  v.  Ward,  2  Atk.  288;  Weymouth 
v.  Boyer,  1  Ves.  Jr.  416.  And  if  the  examina- 
tion release  a  person  primarily  liable,  it  releases 
those  secondarily  liable  also.  Thompson  v. 
Harrison,  1  Cox,  344.  And  see,  as  to  the  effect 
on  the  liability  of  persons  jointly  bound,  Mead- 
bury  v.  Isdall,  9  Mod.  438;  Goold  v.  O'Keeffc, 
1  Beat.  356;  Massy  v.  Massy,  1  Beat.  353;  Ber- 
nall  v.  Lord  Donegal,  3  Dow.  P.  C.  133;  Hul- 
ton  v.  Sandys,  Younge,  602.  The  reason  of  the 
rule  is  that  plaintiff  shall  not  compel  a  defend- 
ant to  assist,  and  to  act  against  him.  But  it  is 
not  for  the  sake  of  the  defendant  that  the  rule 
has  been  established,  for  he  might  protect  him- 
self by  demurring  to  the  interrogatory.  It  is  for 
the  sake  of  the  other  defendants,  and  they  alone 
can  make  the  objection.  Nightingale  v.  Dodd, 
Amb.  584.  Under  the  present  law  of  evidence, 
the  rule  itself  is,  perhaps,  obsolete.  Jenkins  v. 
Greenwald,  1  Bond,  134.  Where  a  defendant 
had  been  exaniimd  under  the  usual  order,  as  a 
witness,  a  plaintiff  might  have  a  decree  against 
him  upon  other  matters,  to  which  he  was  not 
examined.  Palmer  v.  Van  Doren,  2  Edw.  Ch. 
192.  The  rule  that  a  plaintiff  could  not  have  a 
decree  against  a  defendant,  whom  he  had  ex- 
amined as  a  witness  in  the  cause,  did  not  apply 
to  the  case  of  a  mere  formal  defendant,  as  an 
executor  or  trustee,  against  whom  no  personal 
decree  was  sought,  and  who  had  no  personal 
interest  in  the  question,  as  to  which  he  was  ex- 
amined as  a  witness  against  his  co-defendants; 
nor  to  the  case  of  a  defendant,  who,  by  his  an- 
swer, admitted  his  own  liability,  or  who  suffered 
the  bill  to  be  taken  as  confessed  against  him. 
Bradley  v.  Root,  5  Paige,  633;  Pingree  v. 
Coffin,  12  Gray,  288.  Nor  when  there  is 
nothing  to  show  that  the  defendant  was  ex- 
amined at  the  suggestion,  or  request,  or  with 
the  knowledge  of  the  plaintiff;  nor  in  any  case 
in  the  U.  S.  Courts  on  their  Equity  side  since 
the  adopt;on  of  the  77th  Rule  by  the  Supreme 
Court,  which  Rule  authorizes  the  examination 
of  parties  by  the  Master  on  a  reference.  Jen- 
kins v.  Greenwald,  1  Bond,  134.  Where  a  de- 
fendant admitted  that  he  was  primarily  liable 
to  the  plaintiff  for  the  payment  of  the  demand, 
for  which  the  suit  was  brought,  he  might  be 
examined  either  by  the  plaintiff  or  by  his  co- 
defendants,  as  a  witness  in  the  cause.  "Bradley 
v.  Root,  5  Pai^e,  633 ;  see  Ragan  v.  Echols,  5 


WHO    MAY    BE    WITNESSES. 


886 


*  crimes *  were  incompetent  to  give  evidence  ;  but  these  restric-    *  88G 
tions  have  been  removed.2 

The  witnesses  should  be  sworn  in  such  form,  and  with  such  ceremo- 
nies, as  they  may  declare  to  be  binding  on  their  consciences  3;  and  any 
person  competent  to  be  a  witness  may,  if  he  objects  to  take  an  oath,  or 
is  objected  to  as  incompetent  to  take  an  oath,  and  the  presiding  Judge  4 
is  satisfied  that  the  taking  of  an  oath  would  have  no  binding  effect 
on  his  conscience,  give    evidence   upon   his    promise    and   declaration.5 


Ga.  71;  Palmer  v.  Van  Doren,  2  Edw.  Ch.  192; 
Fulton  Bank  v.  Sharon  Canal  Co.  4  Paige,  127; 
Ormsby  v.  Bakewell,  7  Ohio,  98. 

An  order  allowing  a  defendant  to  examine 
his  co-defendant  as  a  witness  would  always  be 
granted  upon  a  suggestion  that  the  party  to 
be  examined  had  no  interest  in  the  cause,  leav- 
ing the  question  of  interest  to  be  settled  at  the 
hearing,  upon  the  proofs.  Nevill  «?.  Demeritt, 
1  Green  Ch.  -321  ;  Ch.  Rule  of  New  Jersey,  78; 
15  N.  J.  Eq.  523  ;  see  Harrison  v.  Johnson,  18 
id.  420;  Graham  v.  Berryman,  19  id.  29.  The 
adverse  party  might  at  the  hearing  object  to  the 
competency  of  a  defendant's  examination,  and 
if  he  appeared  to  lie  interested  in  the  matters  to 
which  he  was  examined,  the  objection  might  be 
taken  at  the  hearing,  though  it  had  not  been 
made  before.  Mohawk.  Bank  v.  Atwater,  2 
Paige,  54. 

The  evidence  of  a  co-defendant  is  not  ren- 
dered incompe'ent  by  the  fact  that  no  order 
was  made  for  his  examination.  Since  the 
New  Jersey  Act  removing  the  disqualification 
of  interest  in  a  witness,  as  a  party  or  otherwise, 
no  order  for  his  examination  is  necessary  in 
that  State.  Giveans  p.  McMurtry,  16  N.  J.  Eq. 
468.  Nor  is  it  any  objection  to  the  competency 
of  a  co-defendant  to  testify  that  he  has  not  an- 
swered the  bill,  but  has  suffered  a  decree  pro 
confesso  against  him.  The  plaintiff  may,  at 
his  discretion,  require  him  to  answer.  But  if 
he  do  not,  the  defendant,  by  failing  to  answer, 
cannot  deprive  his  co-defendant  of  his  testi- 
mony, or  disqualify  him  as  a  witness  in  the 
cause.     Giveans  v.  McMurtry,  ubi  supra. 

1  As  to  persons  laboring  under  defect  of  un- 
derstanding, see  1  Greenl.  Ev.  §365;  Gresley, 
Eq.  Ev.  (Am.  ed.)  237;  1  Phil.  Ev.  (Cowen  "& 
Hill's  ed.  1839)  18,  19,  notes  (47).  (48).  As  to 
the  competency  of  deaf  and  dumb  persons,  see  1 
Greenl.  Ev.  §  366  ;  State  v.  DeWolf,  8  Conn.  93 ; 
Commonwealth  v.  Hill,  14  Mass.  207 ;  1  Phil. 
Ev.  (Cowen  &  Hill's  ed.  1839)  19,  and  note  (49). 
As  to  the  competency  of  children,  1  Greenl.  Ev. 
§  367;  Gresley,  Eq.  Ev.  (Am.  ed.)  237;  1  Phil. 
Ev.  (Cowen  &  Hill's  ed.  1839)  19,20,  notes  (50), 
(51),  (52).  As  to  the  present  mode  of  taking 
evidence  in  England,  see  1  Dan.  Ch.  Prac.  (6th 
Eng.  ed.)  612. 

2  3  &  4  Will.  IV.  c.  42,  §§  26,  27 :  6  &  7  Vic. 
c.  85;  14  &  15  Vic.  c.  99;  16  &  17  Vic.  c.  83; 


see  2  Taylor,  §§  1342-1393;  Best,  188-273.  As 
to  the  competency  of  witnesses,  see  Taylor, 
§§  1210-1257;  Best,  187-271;  Powell,  25,  et  stq. 
By  a  statute  of  Massachusetts,  no  person  of 
sufficient  understanding  shall  be  excluded  from 
giving  evidence  as  a  witness,  in  any  civil  pro- 
ceeding, in  Court  or  before  a  person  having 
authority  to  receive  evidence, —  subject  to  the 
qualification  that  neither  husband  nor  wife 
shall  be  allowed  to  testify  as  to  private  con- 
versations with  each  other;  and  the  conviction 
of  a  witness  of  any  crime  may  be  shown  to  affecf 
his  credibility.  A  party  to  a  cause  who  shall 
call  the  adverse  party  as  a  witness,  shall  be 
allowed  the  same  liberty  in  the.  examination  of 
such  witness  as  is  now  allowed  upon  cross- 
examination.  St.  Mass.  1870,  c.  393,  §§  1,  3,  4; 
see  Metier  v.  Metier,  18  N.  J.  Eq.  270,  276 ; 
S.  C.  19  id.  457;  Harrison  v.  Johnson,  18  id. 
420;  Bird  v.  Davis,  14  id.  467;  Marlott  v.  War- 
wick, 18  id.  108;  Doody  v.  Pierce,  9  Allen, 
141;   Bailey  v.  Myrick.  52  Maine,  132. 

In  New  Jersey,  the  competency  of  a  witness 
in  an  Equity  suit  depends  upon  his  qualifica- 
tion at  the  time  he  is  examined.  Williams  r. 
Vreeland,  3  Stew.  Eq.  576.  In  Tennessee, 
when  the  evidence  is  offered.  Oliver  v.  Moore, 
12  Heisk.  482;  Beaty  v.  McCorkle,  11  Heisk. 
593. 

»  1  &  2  Vic.  c.  105.  Such  is  the  law  by 
statute  of  Massachusetts.  Pub.  Stats,  c.  169, 
§  17.  In  this  State,  the  oath  is  ordinarily 
administered  with  the  ceremony  of  holding 
up  the  hand.  Pub.  Stats,  c.  169,  §  13.  As  to 
peculiar  modes  of  swearing,  see  Commonwealth 
v.  Buzzell,  16  Pick.  153:  Pub.  Stats,  c.  169, 
§  14:  St.  1873,  c.  212,  §  2. 

4  This  expression  includes  any  person  or 
persons  having  by  law  authority  to  adminis- 
ter an  oath  for  the  taking  of  evidence;  see 
The  Evidence  Amendment  Act,  1870  (33  &  34 
Vic.  c.  49),  §  1. 

5  The  Evidence  Further  Amendment  Act, 
1869  (32  &  33  Vic.  c.  68),  §  4;  and  see  before 
this  Act,  7  &  8  Will.  III.  c.  34,  §  1;  8  Geo.  I. 
c.  6.  §  1 ;  22  Geo.  II.  c.  30,  §  1  ;  i.l.  c.  46.  §  36; 
9  Geo.  IV  c.  32,  §  1 ;  3  &  4  Will.  IV.  c.  4'.';  id. 
c.  82;  1  &  2  Vic.  c.  77;  id.  c.  105;  17  &  18  Vic. 
C  125,  §  20;  2  Taylor,  §§  1160-1163;  Clarke  r. 
Bradlaug'i,  7  Q.  B.  D.  38;  8  id.  63;  Att.-Gen.  v. 
Bradiaugh,  14  i.l.  667.    In  Massachusetts,  every 

8S3 


887 


EVIDENCE. 


*  887   A  peer,  although  privileged  to  *  put  in  his  answer  upon  his  attes- 
tation of  honor,  must,  when  called  upon  to  give  evidence  as  a 
witness,  do  so  upon  oath.1  («) 

It  is  a  contempt  of  Court  to  publish,  while  a  cause  is  pending,  com- 
ments upon  the  evidence  which,  being  calculated  to  injure  the  litigants' 
cases,  or  to  create  ill  feeling  against  the  witnesses,  may  tend  to  hinder 
the  course  of  justice.2  (b.) 


Section  IX.  —  Maimer  of ,  and  Time  for,  taking  Evidence. 

Formerly,  the  general  mode  of  examining  witnesses  in  Equity  was 
by  interrogatories  in  writing,  exhibited  by  the  party,  plaintiff  or  defend- 
ant, or  directed  by  the  Court  to  be  proposed  to  or  asked  of  the  witnesses 


person  who  declares  that  he  has  conscientious 
scruples  against  taking  an  oath,  shall,  when 
called  upon  for  that  purpose,  he  permitted  to 
affirm  in  the  manner  prescribed  for  Quakers,  if 
the  Court  or  magistrate  on  inquiry  is  satisfied 
of  the  truth  of  sucli  declaration.  Pub.  Stats. 
c.  109,  §§  15,  16.  Conscientious  scruples  fur- 
nish ground  for  substituting  an  affirmation  for 
an  oath  in  the  U.  S.  Courts.  Rule  91  of  the 
Equity  Rules  for  U.  S.  Courts.  As  to  the 
effect  of  a  want  of  religious  belief,  see  Maden 
v.  Catanach,  7  H.  &  N.  300;  7  Jur.  N.  S.  1107; 
Gresley,  Eq.  Ev.  (Am.  ed.)  237,  238;  1  Greenl. 
Ev.  §§  368-370,  and  notes  and  cases  cited ; 
1  Phil.  Ev.  (Cowen  &  Hill's  ed.  1839)  20-27, 
and  notes;  Smith  v.  Coffin,  18  Maine,  157. 


(a)  A  non-resident,  who  goes  to  attend  Court 
in  another  State  in  relation  to  a  suit,  and  testi- 
fies therein,  is  privileged  from  service  of  a  writ 
of  summons  in  another  suit.  Capwell  v.  Sipe 
(R.  I.),  23  Atl.  14;  Wilson  v.  Donaldson,  117 
Ind.  356;  see  Parker  v.  Marco,  136  N.  Y.  585; 
Mulhearn  v.  Press  Pub.  Co.  53  N.  J.  L.  150  ; 
Re  Healey,  53  Vt.  694;  ante,  p.  10,  note  (a). 
But  a  witness  or  party  is  not  thus  exempt  from 
service  of  process  in  a  State  through  which  he 
is  passing  to  attend  Court  in  a  different  juris- 
diction. Holvoke  v.  South  Hadley  Falls  Ice 
Co.  55  Fed.  Rep.  593.  A  witness  in  a  Court  of 
Justice  is  absolutely  privileged  as  to  anything 
he  may  say,  as  a  witness,  having  reference  to 
the  inquiry  on  which  he  is  called  as  a  witness. 
Seaman  v.  Netherclift,  2  C.  P.  D.  53;  see  Gof- 
fin  v.  Donnelly,  6  Q.  B.  D.  307;  Minister  v. 
Lamb,  11  id.  588,  594. 

(b)  See  post,  p.  1071,  note  (a);  Re  Crown 
Bank,  44  Ch.  D.  649  ;  Re  American  Exchange, 
58  L.  J.  Ch  706:  Welby  v.  Still.  66  L.  T.  523; 
Bromilow  v.  Phillip*.  40  W.  R.  220.  In  Hunt 
v.  Clarke.  58  L.  .1.  Q.  B.  490  ;  61  L.  T.  343,  it 
was  held  that  such  a  publication,  though  tech- 

884 


In  Massachusetts,  everj'  person  not  a  be- 
liever in  any  religion  shall  be  required  to 
testify  truly,  under  the  pains  and  penalties  of 
perjury  ;  and  the  evidence  of  such  person's  dis- 
belief in  the  existence  of  God  may  be  received 
to  affect  his  credibility  as  a  witness.  Pub. 
Stats,  c.  169,  §  17;  see"  19  Am.  Law  Rev.  347, 
433. 

i  2  Taylor,  §  1380. 

2  Anon.  2  Atk.  469;  S.  C.  nom.  Roach  v. 
Garvan,  2  Dick.  794;  Littler  v.  Thomson,  2 
Beav.  129;  Felkin  v.  Lord  Herbert,  10  Jur. 
N.  S.  62;  12  W.  R.  241,  V.  C.  K. ;  Tichborne  v. 
Mostyn,  L.  R.  7  Eq.  55,  note;  15  W.  R.  1072, 
V.  C.  W. 


nically  a  contempt,  will  be  punished  by  a  com- 
mittal only  when  the  offence  is  likely  to  cause 
substantial  prejudice  to  the  parties  litigant.  In 
America,  such  publications  are  unlawful  only 
when  they  tend  to  interfere  with  proceedings 
before  the  Court.  See  Re  Shortridge  (Cal.), 
34  Pac.  Rep.  227;  32  Am.  Law  Reg.  1046;  37 
Central  L.  J.  276,  294;  State  v.  Frew,  24  W. 
Va.  416;  Hollingsworth  v.  Duane,  Wall.  C.  C. 
77.  In  Plating  Co.  v.  Farquharson,  17  Ch.D.  49, 
it  was  held  upon  a  motion  to  commit  the  pub- 
lisher of  a  newspaper  for  contempt,  to  be  un- 
objectionable, where  an  injunction  had  been 
granted  against  infringing  a  patent  for  nickel- 
plating,  for  the  defendants  to  advertise  inviting 
the  trade  to  subscribe  towards  the  expenses  of 
an  appeal,  or  to  publish  a  reward  for  documen- 
tary evidence  that  nickel-plating  was  done  be- 
fore a  certain  year.  In  Kitcat  v.  Sharp,  52  L. 
J.  Ch.  134,  an  injunction  was  granted  upon  mo- 
tion, in  a  suit  for  false  representations  in  a  sale 
of  stock,  to  restrain  the  defendant  from  a 
threatened  publication  of  circulars  abusive  of 
the  plaintiff  and  tending  to  prejudice  a  fair  trial 
of  the  suit. 


MANNER   OF,   AND    TIME    FOR,   TAKING    EVIDENCE. 


in  a  cause.3  This  practice  has  been  abolished,  and  a  new  system  sub- 
stituted in  its  place.4  The  Court  may,  however,  if  it  shall  think  fit, 
order  any  particular  witness,  either  within  or  out  of  the  jurisdiction,  to 
be  examined  upon  interrogatories ;  and  with  respect  to  such  witness  or 
witnesses,  the  former  practice  of  the  Court  in  relation  to  the  examina- 
tion of  witnesses  continues  in  full  force,  save  only  so  far  as  the  same 
may  be  varied  by  any  General  Order  of  the  Lord  Chancellor  in 
that  behalf,  or  by  any  *  order  of  the  Court  with  reference  to  any  *  888 
particular  case.1  The  Court  has  rarely,  if  ever,  availed  itself  of 
this  power  to  resort  to  the  former  practice  in  the  examination  of  par- 
ticular witnesses.2  It  is,  therefore,  thought  undesirable  to  state  the 
former  practice  in  detail. 

The  evidence  on  interlocutory  applications,  in  causes  and  matters  de- 
pending in  the  Court,  is  usually  taken  by  affidavit ;  but  it  may  be  taken 
by  oral  examination  before  an  Examiner.3  («)     And  after  a  decree  in  a 


3  Ante,  p.  836,  note;  Coffin  v.  Murphy,  02 
Miss.  542. 

4  In  Massachusetts,  "  in  proceedings  in 
Equity,  the  evidence  shall  be  taken  in  the  same 
manner  as  in  suits  at  Law,  unless  the  Court  for 
special  reasons  otherwise  directs;  but  this  shall 
not  prevent  the  use  of  affidavits  where  they 
have  heretofore  been  allowed."  Pub.  Stats,  c. 
169,  §  66.  "  This  statute  necessarily  supersedes 
the  rules  of  Court,  as  to  the  taking  and  filing  of 
depositions  in  Chancer}'."  In  a  suit  in  Equity, 
where  a  commission  was  applied  for  to  take  the 
testimony  of  a  witness  residing  out  of  the  Com- 
monwealth, after  the  time  lixed  by  the  rules  of 
Court  for  setting  the  cause  down  for  hearing, 
the  Court  said:  "  The  plaintiff  is,  therefore,  en- 
titled to  have  a  commission  issue,  as  he  would 
have  been  according  to  the  established  rule  and 


(a)  Hammerschlag  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Judd,  26 
Fed.  Rep.  292;  Shapleigh  v.  Chester  Electric 
Light  &  P.  Co.  47  id.  848.  [Jpon  motion  to 
appoint  an  examiner,  the  testimony  will  not  be 
ordered  to  be  restricted  to  a  single  issue  of 
fraud  raised  by  plea.  United  States  v.  Ameri- 
can Bell  Tel.  Co.  39  Fed.  Rep.  230.  Evidence 
objected  to  and  rejected  by  an  examiner,  in- 
cluding privileged  letters,  especially  when  they 
are  primary  evidence  of  a  fact  in  issue,  should 
be  made  a  part  of  the  record  by  him.  in  order 
that  the  Court  may  judge  of  the  correctness  of 
his  ruling.  Lloyd  v.  Pennie,  50  Fed.  Rep.  4. 
Under  the  U.  S.  Equity  Rule  67  (now  super- 
seded, see  144  U.  S.  689),  the  Court  could  not, 
it  seems,  appoint  examiners  to  take  oral  deposi- 
tions outside  of  or  within  its  territorial  juris- 
diction. Arnold  v.  Chesebrough,  35  Fed.  Rep. 
16;  Celluloid  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Russell,  id.  17. 
Under  Rule  78  the  oral  examination  of  wit- 
nesses at  the  trial  is  onlv  permitted  to  verify  a 
document  or  to  establish  a  fact  of  a  formal 
character.     North  Carolina  R.  Co.   r.  Drew,  3 


practice  at  Law,  where  testimony  is  to  be  taken 
out  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court."  Per  Shaw 
C.  J.  in  Pingree  v.  Coffin,  12  Cush.  600,  601. 

In  Wisconsin,  each  party  to  a  suit  in  Equity 
has  a  right  to  have  his  witnesses  examined  in 
open  Court,  subject  to  the  occasional  exceptions 
provided  for  in  cases  at  Law.     Noonan  v.  Oiton, 

5  Wis.  60;  Brown  v.  Runals,  14  Wis.  693. 

1  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  28.  So  under  the 
amendment  of  the  67th  Equity  Rule  of  the 
U.  S.  Supreme  Court. 

a  See  London  Bank  of  Mexico  v.  Hart,  L.  R. 

6  Eq.  467,  V.  C.  G.,  where  a  commission  ac- 
cording to  former  practice  was  refused. 

3  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  40;  Ord.5  Feb.,  1861, 
r.  22;  see  post,  p.  905,  and  note;  ante,  p.  821, 
note. 


Woods,  691.  Upon  a  commission,  issued  on 
the  plaintiff's  application,  for  his  examination 
on  written  interrogatories,  the  defendant  was 
permitted  to  cross-examine  the  plaintiff  orally, 
in  Biscboffshein  v.  Taaks,  20  Blatch.  229;  see 
Coates  v.  Merrick  Thread  Co.  41  Fed.  Rep.  23. 
A  master  may  be  substituted  for  an  examiner 
upon  motion  and  proof  by  affidavit  that  much 
irrelevant  testimony  is  being  taken,  which  the 
latter  is  not  authorized  to  exclude.  Hepworth 
v.  Henshall,  11  Penn.  Co.  Ct.  Rep.  251;  see 
Surr  r.  Walmsley,  L.  R.  2  Eq.  439;  Howell's 
Estate,  14  Phila.329;  Re  Allis,  44  Fed.  Rep. 
210.  Depositions  taken  before  an  examiner 
not  appointed  by  the  Court,  but  agreed  upon 
by  the  parties,  were  to  be  filed  of  record  under 
U.  S.  Equity  Rule  67  (now  superseded),  the 
same  as  if  the  examiner  were  regularly  ap- 
pointed. J  L.  Mott  Iron  Works  r.  Standard 
Manuf.  Co  48  Fed.  Rep.  345.  See  further  on, 
Rule  07,  Bischoffsheim  o.  Baltzer,  10  Fed.  Rep. 
1;  Re  Allis,  44  id.  210;  Eiffert  v.  Craps,  id. 
164;  Ballard  v.  McCluskev,  52  id.  677.  In 
885 


889 


EVIDENCE. 


cause,  the  evidence  may  be  taken,  either  by  affidavit,  or  by  oral  exami- 
nation before  an  Examiner,  or  Chief  Clerk  of  the  Judge.4 

We  have  already  seen  5  that  a  cause  may  be  brought  to  a  hearing  on 
motion  for  decree,  instead  of  replication  being  filed  in  the  ordinary  way. 
If  this  is  done,  the  evidence  is  adduced  by  affidavit,6  and  in  such  case 
an  answer,  if  one  has  been  filed,  may  be  treated  as  an  affidavit.7 

Jf  the  cause  is  brought  to  a  hearing  by  filing  replication,  the  evidence 
is  taken  by  affidavit,  or  by  ex  parte  examination  before  an  Examiner, 
except  as  to  any  facts  or  issues  ordered  to  be  proved  by  evidence  taken 
viva  voce,  at  the  hearing ; 8  the  parties  having  the  advantage,  which 
they  have  not  on  motion  for  decree,  that  they  may  thus  have  an  ex  parte 
oral  examination  of  a  witness  who  refuses  to  make  an  affidavit.9 

Unless  an  order  to  take  his  evidence  cle  bene  esse  10  has  been  obtained, 
it  is  irregular  to  examine  a  witness  for  the  purposes  of  the  hearing, 
previously  to  serving  a  notice  of  motion  for  a  decree  or  the  filing  of 
replication ; u  and  the  power  to  examine  a  witness  for  the  purpose  of 
using  his  evidence  on  any  claim,  motion,  petition,  or  other  proceeding 
before  the  Court,12  is  confined  to  those  cases  in  which  the  evidence  is  to 
be  used  on  a  claim,  motion,  petition,  or  proceeding  which  is  actually 
pending.13 

Witnesses  who  have  made  affidavits,  or  been  examined  ex  parte  be- 
fore the  Examiner,  are  liable  to  cross-examination  at  the  hearing;14 
and  where  a  party  has  given  notice  to  read  an  affidavit,  he  will  not 
be  allowed  to  withdraw  the  affidavit,  and  so  prevent  the 
*  889  *  witness  from  being  cross-examined  upon  it.1  (a)  There  can  be 
no  cross-examination,  however,  upon  an  affidavit  of  documents.2  (b) 


4  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  41;  15  &  16  Vic.  c. 
80,  §  30;  Ord.  5  Feb.,  1861,  r.  15. 

5  Ante,  pp.  819,  et  seq.;  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86, 

§§  15,  16. 

6  Coles  v.  Morris,  L.  R.  2  Ch.  701,  705, 
L.  C.  Where  the  parties  agree  that  the  evidence 
shall  be  taken  by  affidavit,  it  is  equivalent  to 
an  agreement  to  try  the  case  before  the  Judge 
without  a  jury,  although  the  case  be  a  proper 
one  for  a  jury.  Brooke  t'.  Wigg,  8  Ch.  D.  510. 
See  Ruston  r.  Tobin,  10  Ch.  D.  558. 

7  Ante,  p.  821;  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  15; 
Cons.  Ord.  XXXIII.  5-7. 

8  Ord.  5  Feb.,  1861,  r.  4-  By  consent,  under 
r.  10,  the  examination,  or  cross-examination,  of 
any  particular  witness  may  be  taken  in  manner 
provided  by  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86;  see  pott,  p.  904. 


9  Coles  v.  Morris,  L.  R.  2  Ch.  701,  704,  L.  C. 

10  As  to  taking  evidence  cle  bene  esse,  see  post, 
pp.  932  941. 

i1  Kendle  v.  Metropolitan  Provincial  Bank, 
W.  N.  (1867)239;  15  W.  R.  1068,  V.  C  S. 

12  See  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  40. 

is  Coles  v.  Morris,  L.  R.  2  Ch.  701,  704. 

"  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  38;  Ord.  5  Feb.,  1861, 
rr.  7,  19;  and  see  Fielden  v.  Goschen,  18  W.  R. 
85,  V.  C.  S. 

i  Clarke  v.  Law,  2  K.  &  J.  28;  2  Jur.  N.  S. 
221 ;  National  Insurance  Association  v.  Carstairs, 
9  Jur.  N.  S.  955,  M.  R. 

2  Manby  v.  Bewicke  (No.  2),  8  De  G.  M.  & 
G.  470:  2  Jur.  N.  S.  672;  overruling  Kay  v. 
Smith,  20  Beav.  566. 


England,  other  persons  than  the  examiners  of 
the  Court  are  not  appointed  to  conduct  exami- 
nations except  in  very  special  cases.  Badde'.ey 
v.  Bailey,  [1893]  W.N.  56;  Marquess  of  Bute 
v.  James,  33  Ch.  D.  157. 

(n)  The  fact  that  a  cross-examination  on  an 
affidavit  is  not  concluded  does  not  prevent  the 
Court  from  looking  at  the  affidavit.  Lewis  V. 
James,  54  L.  T.  260. 

(b)  After  a  sufficient  affidavit  of  documents 

886 


the  Court  may,  in  some  cases,  permit  the  plain- 
tiff to  deliver  an  interrogatory  as  to  some  spe- 
cific document  or  documents,  but  not  a  general 
roving  interrogatory;  it  is  within  the  Judge's 
discretion  whether  such  specific  interrogatory 
shall  be  allowed,  and  his  order  thereon,  though 
app'alable,  will  not  he  readily  reversed.  Hall  r. 
Truman.  21  Ch.  P.  307;  see  Nicholl  v.  Wheeler 
17  Q  B.  P.  101;  Morris  v.  Edwards,  23  id. 
287;  15  A.  C.  309. 


MANNER    OF,    AND    TIME    FOR,    TAKING    EVIDENCE.  *  800 

No  affidavit  or  deposition  filed  or  made  before  issue  joined  in  any 
cause  will,  without  special  leave  of  the  Court,  be  received  at  the  hearing 
thereof,  unless  within  one  month  after  issue  joined,  or  within  such 
longer  time  as  may  be  allowed  by  special  leave  of  the  Court,  notice  in 
writing  has  been  given  by  the  party  intending  to  use  the  same,  to  the 
opposite  party,  of  his  intention  in  that  behalf.3  An  application  to  en- 
large the  month  may  be  made  by  summons,4  which  must  be  served  on 
the  other  parties  with  whom  issue  is  joined.  Where  the  affidavit  has 
been  sworn  before,  but  filed  after  issue  was  joined,  it  was  allowed  to  be 
used,  though  the  notice  had  not  been  given.5  Where,  in  consequence  of 
the  opposite  party  having  absconded,  the  notice  could  not  be  served 
upon  him,  leave  was  given  to  advertise  it.6 

The  evidence  in  chief  on  both  sides,  in  any  cause  in  which  issue  is 
joined,  in  respect  of  facts  and  issues  not  included  in  any  order  for  tak- 
ing evidence  in  chief  viva  voce  at  the  hearing,  whether  taken  by  affidavit 
or  before  an  Examiner  (and  including  the  cross-examination  and  re- 
examination of  any  witness  or  other  person),  must  be  closed  within 
eight  weeks  after  issue  joined,  unless  the  time  be  enlarged  b}7  any 
special  order.7  And  no  further  evidence,  except  the  cross-examination 
and  re-examination  of  a  witness  who  has  made  an  affidavit,  or  been 
examined  ex  parte  before  the  Examiner,  will  be  received,  without  special 
leave  of  the  Court,  previously  obtained  for  that  purpose.8 

Where  the  eight  weeks  expire  in  the  long  vacation,  the  time  for  clos- 
ing evidence  is  extended  by  a  General  Order  to  the  fifth  day  of  the 
ensuing  Michaelmas  Term.9 

As  a  general  rule  new  evidence  is  only  allowed  to  be  received  after 
the  evidence  is  closed,  in  the  following  cases :  where  the  party  who 
desires  to  file  an  affidavit  has  not  had  an  opportunity  of  seeing  the  evi- 
dence on  the  other  side  ;  where,  though  he  has  seen  the  evidence  he 
finds  that  it  raises  a  new  issue,  not  raised  by  the  pleadings,  and  which 
is  material  to  the  decision  of  the  case ; 10  where  an  affidavit  has  been 
filed  impeaching  the  character  of  a  witness,  in  which  case  the 
person  whose  character  is  assailed  is  entitled  to  *  adduce  evi-  *  890 
deuce  to  meet  the  charges  ;  and  where  new  facts  material  to  the 
issue  have  arisen  after  the  closing  of  the  evidence.1     Where,  by  inad- 

8    Cons.  Ord.  XIX.  12.  Md.  290;  Bonner  v.  Young:,  68  Ala.  35.    That 

4  See  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.  17.  a  subpoena  for  a  witness  may  issue  at  any  stage 

5  Nicholi  v.  Jones,  36  L.  J.  Ch.  554,  V.  C.  W.  of  the  suit  without  leave  of  Court,  see  Raymond 

6  Murphy   v.  Vincent,    W.  N.   (1870)  217,  v.  Tapson,  22  Ch.  D.  430. 

V.  C.  B.  0  Cons.  Onl.  XXXVII.  15;  and  it  seems  the 

7  Ord.  5  Feb.,  1861,  r.  5;  see  post,  p.  890.  rule  applies  where  the  eight  weeks  have  been 
Where  the  time  is  enlarged,  after  the  cause  lias  enlarged,  and  the  enlarged  time  expires  in  the 
been  set  down  for  hearing,  the  order  should  be  long  vacation  ;  see  Clark  r.  Mai  pas,  cited 
produced  to  the  Order  of  Course  Clerk  in  the  Morgan,  553;  and  see  Braithwaite's  Manual, 
Registrars'  office,  who  will  make  a  note  thereof  167,  n.  (46). 

in  the  cause-book  kept  there;  see  Reg.  Regul.  ln  Leech  v.  Bolland,  L.  R.  10  Ch.  362. 

21Jan.,  1861.  i  Thexton  v.  Edmonston,  L.   R.  5  Eq.  373, 

«  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  38;  Ord.  5  Feb.,  1861,  375,  M.  R.;  and  see  Scott  v.  Mayor  of  Liver-' 

rr.  5,  19;  see  Thexton  r.  Edmonston,  L.  R.  5  pool,  1  De  G.  &  J.  369;  3  Jur.  N.  S.  533.  832; 

Eq.  373;   Re   Quartz  Hill  &c.  Co.,   Ex  parte  Poupard    v.    Fardell,    W.    N.    (1869)  236;    18 

Young,  21  Ch  D.  642;  Swartz  v.  Checkering,  58  W.  R.  37,  59,  V.  C.  M.;  Philips  v.  Warde,  2 

887 


890 


EVIDENCE. 


vertence,  an  affidavit,  though  prepared,  was  not  filed  until  nine  days 
after  the  time  for  taking  evidence  was  closed,  the  Court,  on  motion,  gave 
leave  to  use  it,  on  payment,  of  the  costs  of  the  motion  ; 2  and  it  is  con- 
ceived that  the  Court  will  grant  such  special  leave,  in  all  cases  where, 
under  the  circumstances,  it  thinks  that  justice  requires  it.3  Such  special 
leave  was  refused  where  the  application  was  made  on  the  ground  that 
a  material  witness  had  been  discovered,  whose  evidence  the  applicant 
had  no  means  of  previously  knowing  to  be  obtainable.4 

The  Court  has  also  power,  if  it  thinks  fit,  to  allow  further  evidence  to 
be  used  at  the  hearing,  although  no  special  leave  has  been  previously 
obtained ; 5  and  it  has  allowed  a  motion  for  this  purpose  to  be  brought 
on  with  the  cause.6  (a) 

The  application  for  leave  to  use  affidavits,  filed  after  the  evidence  is 
closed,  may  be  made  in  Chambers  by  summons,  or  in  Court  by  motion ; 
it  has,  however,  been  usually  made  in  Court.  The  summons,  or  notice 
of  the  motion,  should  be  served  on  all  parties.7 

The  application  to  enlarge  the  time  for  taking  evidence  is  made  in 
Chambers  by  summons,8  supported  by  affidavit,  showing  the  grounds  of 
the  application.  The  costs  of  the  application  should  be  disposed  of  at 
the  time  it  is  heard ;  and  will  in  general  be  made  costs  in  the  cause. 
The  summons,  whether  taken  out  by  the  plaintiff  or  by  a  defendant, 
must  be  served  by  the  applicant  upon  all  the  other  parties  to  the  cause 
with  whom  issue  is  joined. 

The  fact  that  the  evidence  of  the  other  party  was  filed  at  the  last 
moment  allowed  for  so  doing,  is  no  ground  for  enlarging  the  time  for 


Jur.  N.  S.  608,  V.  C.  S;  United  States  v. 
Gunning,  23  Fed.  Rep.  6G8;  Peterson  v.  Simp- 
kins,  25  id.  486. 

2  Douglas  v.  Archbutt,  23  Beav.  293. 

3  Scott  v.  Mayor  of  Liverpool,  1  De  G.  &  J. 
369;  3  Jur.  N.  S.  832,  L.  JJ. ;  Philips  v.  Warde, 
2  Jur.  N.  S  608,  V.  C.  S.;  Watson  v.  Cleaver, 
20  Beav.  137 ;  1  Jur.  N.  S.  270 ;  Hope  v.  Threl- 
fall,  1  Sm.  &  G.  App.  21;  17  Jur.  1021; 
McLachlan  v.  Lord,  14  L.  T.  N.  S.  98,  V.  C.  S.; 
Hodges  v.  Doulton,  18  W.  R.  58,  V.  C.  M. 
See  Boon  v.  Pierpont,  32  N.  J.  Eq.  217; 
Wendell  v.  Highstone,  52  Mich.  552;  Summers 
v.  Darne,  31  Gratt.  791. 


(a)  The  other  part}'  must  have  an  oppor- 
tunity to  answer  such  evidence,  and  leave  to 
remi  it  must  be  applied  for  before  the  hearing; 
it  is  not  sufficient  to  deliver  a  copy  of  the  evi- 
dence to  the  other  party  in  time  for  him  to 
answer  it.  Smith  r.  Pilgrim,  2  Ch.  D.  127; 
see  Roe  v.  Davies,  id.  729.  The  Judge,  in  order 
to  determine  a  disputed  fact,  may,  in  his  dis- 
cretion, permit  or  order  additional  testimony  to 
be  taken  after  publica'ion  passed.  Dixon  v. 
Higgins,  82  Ala.  284.  And  if  the  testimony  is 
not  duly  taken,  it  may,  for  good  cause  shown, 
be  ordered  to  be  taken  and  filed  nunc  pro  tunc. 
Coon  v.  Abbott,  37  Fed.  Rep.  98;  see  Wooster^ 
888 


4  Thexton  v.  Edmonston,  L.  R.  5  Eq.  373, 
M.  R.  See  1  Dan.  Ch.  Prac.  (6th  Eng.  ed.) 
617,  as  to  evidence  respecting  costs,  &c. 

5  Boyse  v.  Colclough,  1  K.  &  J.  124,  144 ; 
Bayley  v.  Cass,  10  W.  R.  370,  where  V.  C. 
Stuart  said  that  this  is  the  proper  time.  See 
also  Poupard  v.  Fardell,  W.  N.  (1869)  236;  18 
W.  R.  37,  59,  V.  C.  M. 

«  Hope  v.  Threlfall,  1  Sm.  &  G.  App.  21  ; 
17  Jur.  1021. 

i  See  Richards  B.  Curlewis,  18  Beav.  462. 
8  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  80,  §  26. 


v.  Clark,  9  id.  854;  Fischers.  Hayes,  6  id.  76. 
Under  U.  S.  Equity  Rule  69,  allowing  three 
months  for  testimony  after  the  cause  is  at  issue, 
a  deposition  not  taken  within  the  three  months 
will  be  stricken  from  the  files  if  there  is 
no  motion  to  file  it  nunc  pro  tunc,  and  no  ex- 
tenuating circumstances  appear.  Wenham  v. 
Switzer,  48  Fed.  Rep.  612;  see  Irwin  v.  Mey- 
rose,  2  McCrary,  244;  Magbee  v.  Kennedy,  26 
Fla.  158.  If  there  is  no  statute  or  order  limit- 
ing the  time  for  taking  the  evidence,  it  may  be 
taken  until  and  at  the  hearing.  Tillotson  v. 
Mitchell,  111  111.  518. 


AFFIDAVITS   AND   EX-PARTE   EXAMINATIONS   BEFORE    EXAMINER.      *  891 

taking  evidence,  if  it  is  confined  to  matters  distinctly  put  in  issue  by 
the  pleadings.9 

Whenever  any  party  desires  to  cross-examine  any  witness  who  has 
made  an  affidavit,  or  been  examined  ex  parte  before  the  Examiner,  he 
must  give  notice,  within  certain  limited  times,  to  the  party  by  whom 
the  affidavit  was  filed  or  the  witness  examined,  to  produce  the  witness 
for  cross-examination;10  or  he  may  serve  the  witness  with  a 
subpoena,  requiring  him  to  attend  for  the  same  *  purpose.1  For  *  891 
the  details  of  the  practice  on  the  subject  of  cross-examination, 
the  reader  is  referred  to  the  section  on  viva  voce  evidence.2 

A  plaintiff  cannot,  without  giving  notice,  use  the  evidence  adduced 
on  behalf  of  a  defendant  against  a  co-defendant.3 


Section  X.  —Affidavits  and  Ex-parte  Examinations  before  an 

Examiner. 

An  affidavit  is  a  statement  in  writing  sworn  to,  or  affirmed,4  before 
some  person  having  authority  to  administer  oaths.5  It  must,  except  in 
the  case  of  a  bill  which  is  required  to  be  accompanied  with  an  affida- 
vit,6 be  made  in  some  cause  or  matter  actually  pending  at  the  time  it  is 
sworn  :  otherwise  it  cannot  be  received.7  An  affidavit  will  be  received, 
although  the  deponent  has  died  since  it  was  sworn ;  but  the  Court  will 
not  attach  so  much  weight  to  it  as  it  would  have  done  if  an  oppor- 
tunity for  the  cross-examination  of  the  deponent  thereon  had  been 
afforded.8 


9  Thompson  v.  Partridge,  4  De  G.  M.  &  G. 
794;  17  Jur.  1108;  see  Scott  v.  Mayor  of  Liver- 
pool, 1  De  G.  &  J.  371;  3  Jur.  N.  S.  832;  and 
S.  C.  before  V.  C.  Stuart,  3  Jur.  N.  S.  533. 
For  the  practice  in  adducing  further  evidence 
on  appeals,  see  Re  Coal  E.  Gas  Co.,  Gover's 
case,  24  W.  R.  36;  Hastie  v.  Hastie,  1  Ch.  D. 
562;  Re  Chennell,  Jones  v.  Chennell,  8  Ch.  D. 
492,  504;  Dicks  v.  Brooks,  13  Ch.  D.  652. 

io  Ord.  5  Feb.,  1861,  r.  19. 

1  Singer's  Sewing  Machine  Manuf.  Co.  v. 
Wilson,  2  H.  &  M.  584  ;  11  Jur.  N.  S.  58,  V. 
C.  \V. ;  and  see  Cox  v.  Stephens,  9  Jur.  N.  S. 
1144;  11  W.  R.  929,  V.  C.  K. 

2  Post,  pp.  837,  et  seq. 

8  Fielden  v.  Slater,  L.  R  7  Eq.  523,  529,  V. 
C-  J.;  but  see  Lord  v.  Colvin,  3  Drew.  222; 
Sturgis  V.  Morse  (No.  2),  26  Beav.  562. 

4  17  &  18  Vic.  c.  125,  §  20  ;  and  ante,  p.  887. 
As  to  the  oath  when  the  defendant  is  not  a 
Christian,  see  1  &  2  Vic.  c.  105;  Hinde,  228; 
Braithwaite's  Oaths,  45,  64;  Ramkissenseat  v. 
Barker,  1  Atk.  19;  Omychund  v.  Barker,  id. 
21,  46. 

6  In  Haight  v.  Morris  Aqueduct,  4  Wash. 
C.  C.  601,  it  was  held  that  an  affidavit  in 
Chancery,  not  sworn  before  a  Judge  of  the 
Court,  or  a  commissioner  appointed  to  ad- 
minister an  oath,  could  not  be  received  in 
evidence.     An  affidavit  in  New  York  may  be 


sworn  to  before  a  State  senator,  he  being  ex 
officio  a  Judge  of  the  Court  for  the  Correction 
of  Errors,  which  is  a  Court  of  record.  Craii,r  v. 
Briggs,  4  Paige,  548.  An  affidavit  taken  before 
a  commissioner  of  deeds  de  facto,  for  a  city, 
who  is  exercising  such  office  under  color  of  an 
appointment  by  the  Governor  and  Senate,  may 
be  read  in  a  suit  between  other  persons;  and 
the  Court  will  not  inquire  collaterally  into  the 
legality  of  such  appointment.  Parker  v.  Baker, 
8  Paige,  428.  Oaths  are  to  be  administered  in 
a  reverent  manner.  Cons.  Ord.  XIX.  14.  There 
can  be  no  such  thing  as  an  unwritten  affidavit. 
Windley  v.  Broadway,  77  N.  C.  333.  Nor  can 
the  Court  be  required  to  act  upon  an  oral  state- 
ment, where  the  affidavit  is  waived.  Hart  v. 
Scruggs,  1  Tenn.  Ch.  1. 

6  Ante,  pp.  392-396. 

7  Francome  v.  Franeome,  11  Jur.  N.  S.  123; 
13  W.  R.  355,  L.  C;  overruling  Fennall  >\ 
Brown,  18  Jur.  1051,  V.  C.  W.  Affidavits  filed 
after  payment  in  of  a  fund,  but  before  presen- 
tation of  a  petition  for  payment  out,  were 
received.  Re  Varley,  14  W.  R.  98,  V.  C.  K.; 
and  see  Re  Western  Benefit  Building  Society, 
83  Beav.  368. 

8  Abfldom  v.  Abadom,  24  Beav.  243;  Wil- 
liams v.  Williams,  10  Jur.  N.  S.  60,";  12  W.  R. 
663.  V  C.  K.;  Davies  r.  Otty,  13  W.  R.  4St. 
M.   R.;   35  Beav.  208;  Ridlcv  v.   Ridley,  34 

889 


892 


EVIDENCE. 


Affidavits  may  be  sworn  before  any  of  the  persons  authorized  to  take 
answers  in  Chancery.  Who  these  persons  are,  and  the  nature  and  extent 
of  their  authority,  has  been  already  stated.9 

The  commissioner  before  whom  the  affidavit  is  sworn  must  not  be  a 
solicitor  in  the  cause.10  Where  the  affidavits,  in  support  of  a  petition, 
had  been  sworn  before  the  petitioner's  solicitor,  the  petition  was  dis- 
missed, and  the  costs  were  directed  to  come  out  of  the  solicitor's 
*  892  pocket:11  and  affidavits  have  been  rejected12  because  *  they  had 
been  sworn  before  a  solicitor  who  acted  as  clerk  to  the  plaintiff's 
solicitor  ;  but  an  affidavit  may  be  sworn  before  a  commissioner  acting  as 
a  clerk  to  the  plaintiff,  in  the  cause,  where  the  plaintiff,  though  a  solici- 
tor, does  not  act  as  such  in  the  cause.1  («)  It  is  not  irregular  to  swear 
an  affidavit  before  a  solicitor,  to  whom  it  has  been  sent  for  the  pur- 
pose of  getting  it  sworn  by  the  solicitor  of  the  applicant,  and  who  is 
the  agent  of  the  latter  for  that  purpose  only.2 

The  Court  of  Chancery  is  also  in  the  habit  of  receiving  affidavits  made 
by  parties  resident  out  of  the  jurisdiction,  though  not  sworn  to  before 
any  of  the  functionaries  before  referred  to,  provided  it  is  shown  that  the 
persons  before  whom  they  are  sworn  are  persons  who,  by  the  law  of 
the  country  in  which  the  affidavit  is  sworn,  are  authorized  to  administer 
an  oath,  and  the  signature  of  such  person  is  properly  verified.8  Thus, 
the  Court  has  ordered  an  affidavit  to  be  sworn  before  a  notary  public  in 
Amsterdam,  with  the  intervention  of  a  proper  magistrate,  if  necessary, 
by  the  law  of  Holland,  to  the  administration  of  the  oath.4     The  Court 


Beav.  329 ;  and  see  Morley  P.  Morley,  5  De  G. 
M.  &  G.  610,  613,  614;  1  Jur.  N.  S.  1097,  1098; 
see  i.lso  Tanswell  v.  Scurrah,  11  L.  T.  N.  S. 
761,  M.  R.:  Moore  v.  Harper,  W.  N.  (18G6) 
56;  14  W.  R.  306,  V.  C.  W.;  Braithwaite  r. 
Kearns,  34  Beav.  202;  Scott  v.  McCann,  76 
Md.  47. 

9  Ante,  pp.  743,  744;  and  see  1  Dan.  Ch. 
Prac.  (6th  Eng.  ed.)  621. 

i°  But  this  rule  is  confined  in  New  York  to 
the  solicitor  on  record.  An  affidavit  may  be 
sworn  to  before  any  proper  officer,  although  he 
is  counsel  for  one  of  the  parties,  or  is  a  partner 
of  the  solicitor  in  the  cause.  The  People  v. 
Spalding.  2  Paige,  326;  M'Laren  v.  Charrier,  5 
Paige,  530. 

u  In  re  Hogan,  3  Atk.  812;  but  see  ante, 
p.  749. 

12  Wood  v.  Harpur,  3  Beav.  290;  Hopkin  r. 

Hopkin,  10  Hare  App.  2;  17  Jur.  343;  and  see 

cases  collected,  2  C.  P.  Coop.  temp.  Cott.  174,  n. 

i  Per  Turner  L.  J.  in  Foster  v.  Harvev,  3 


N.  R.  98;  4  De  G.  J.  &  S.  59;  affirming  S.  C.  11 
W.  R.  899,  V.  C.  W.;  diss.  Knight  Bruce  L.  J. 
a  Re  Gregg,  Re  Prance,  L.  R.  9  Eq.  137, 
M.  R.;  see  ante,  p.  749,  note. 

3  An  affidavit  taken  before  a  Master  of  the 
Court  of  Chancery  in  New  Jersey,  at  a  place 
out  of  the  State,  will  not  be  allowed  to  be  read 
in  that  Court;  the  Master  has  no  authority  to 
take  an  affidavit  out  of  the  State.  Lambert  v. 
Maris,  Halst.  Dig.  173.  But  an  affidavit  sworn 
to  before  a  Master  in  Chancer}"  in  another  State, 
who  was  not  a  commissioner  appointed  by  the 
State  where  the  affidavit  was  offered,  was  held 
regular,  in  Allen  v.  State  Bank,  1  Dev.  &  Bat. 
7;  in  Ramy  v.  Kirk,  9  Dana,  267,  an  affidavit 
made  out  of  the  State  was  held  not  admissible. 

4  Chicot  v.  Lequesne,  1  Dick.  150:  see  also 
Warren  v.  Swinburne,  9  Jur.  510,  Bail  Court ; 
Pinkerton  v.  Barnsley  Canal  Co.  3  Y.  &  J.  277, 
n.;  Hutcheon  v.  Mannington,  6  Ves.  823; 
Garvev  r.  Hibbert,  1  J.  &  W.  180;  see  Re 
Prince"  Henry,  28  W.  R.  398;  De  Leon  v.  Hub- 


(n)  In  England,  the  security  of  an  inde- 
pendent commissioner  to  take  the  witness's 
oath  is  required,  and  he  must  satisfy  himself 
that  the  witness  thoroughly  understands  what 
he  is  going  to  swear  to.  Bourke  r.  Davis,  44 
Ch.  D.  110,  126:  see  Duke  of  Northumberland 
v.  Todd,  7  Ch.  D.  777.  In  Massachusetts,  at- 
tornevs  mnv  administer,  as  justices  of  the  peace, 

890 


the  oath  of  voluntary  affidavits  to  their  clients. 
McDonald  r.  Willis,  143  Mass.  452;  see  also 
Smith  v.  Ponath,  17  Mo.  App.  262;  Burton  r. 
Galveston  &C,  Ry.  Co.  61  Texas,  526;  Gary  r. 
Burnett,  16  S.  C.  632.  In  general,  pleadings 
are  allowed  to  be  verified  by  attorneys  only  in 
ca-es  provided  for  by  statute.  Hammerslaugh 
v.  Farrior,  95  N.  C.  135. 


AFFIDAVITS    AND    EX-PARTE    EXAMINATIONS    BEFORE    EXAMINER. 


893 


has  also  admitted  affidavits  sworn  in  Belgium  before  officials  having  only 
a  limited  jurisdiction,  and  power  only  to  administer  oaths  for  certain 
purposes.5 

Although  the  Court  will,  in  cases  of  this  description,  give  credit  to  the 
fact,  as  certified  under  the  seal  or  signature  of  a  notary  public  or  other 
person  authorized  to  administer  an  oath,6  it  will  require  some  evidence 
that  the  person  whose  seal  or  signature  is  affixed  actually  fills  the 
character  he  assumes.  This  may  be  effected,  either  by  the  production 
of  an  affidavit  by  some  person  resident  in  this  country  who  can  depose 
to  the  fact  of  his  filling  that  character,  or  by  the  certificate  of  some 
British  minister  or  consular  agent,  or  of  some  public  officer  of  the 
country  in  which  the  transaction  took  place,  competent  to  give  such 
certificate  ;  and  in  the  latter  case,  the  certificate  must  be  verified  by  the 
certificate  of  some  British  minister,  or  consular  agent,  or  by  the  affidavit 
of  some  impartial  person,  cognizant  of  the  fact  that  such  public  officer 
is  what  he  assumes  to  be.7  (b) 

*  An  affidavit  must  be  correctly  intituled  in  the  cause  or  matter  *  893 
in  which  it  is  made ; J  it  will,  however,  be  sufficient,  if  it  was  cor- 


bard,  W.  N.  (1883)  197.  If  there  is  a  difficulty 
in  taking  the  affidavit  before  the  foreign  author- 
ity, the  Court  will,  it  seems,  appoint  a  special 
Examiner,  and  the  evidence  must  be  taken  as  a 
deposition.  Drevon  v.  Drevon,  12  W.  R.  06, 
V.  C.  K.  As  to  the  mode  of  taking  evidence 
before  an  Examiner,  see  post,  pp.  904,  el  seq. 

6  Kevan  v.  Crawford,  45  L.  J.  Ch.  658. 

6  Elutcheon  r.  Mannington,  6  Ves.  823;  see 
Raney  v.  Kirk,  9  Dana,  267,  as  to  an  affidavit 
sworn  to  before  a  Justice  of  the  Peace  of  another 
State.  In  Tennessee,  the  statement,  in  the  cap- 
tion and  certificate  of  a  deposition,  that  the 
person  taking  it  sustains  the  necessary  char- 
acter, is  sufficient  evidence  of  the  fact,  and  the 
Court  will  give  credence  to  all  he  certifies  in  the 
line  of  his  duty.  Wilson  v.  Smith,  5  Yerg. 
379.  Hoover  v.  Rawlings,  1  Sneed,  287;  Carter 
v.  Ewing,  1  Tenn.  Ch.  212.  And  see  Hay  v. 
State,  58  Ind.  337. 

'  Haggitt  v.  Iniff,  5  De  G.  M.  &  G.  910;  1 
Jur.  N.  S.  49;  Re  Earl's  Trust,  4K.&J.  300; 
1  Seton,  20 ;  see  Re  Davis,  L.  R.  8  Eq.  98  ;  Mayne 
v.  Butler,  13  W.  R.  128.  Thus,  in  I'urkis  v. 
Date,  M.  R.  in  Chambers,  6  May,  1804,  an  affi- 
davit was  received  and  filed,  which  had  been 
sworn  before  H,  the  clerk  of  the  Circuit  Court 
of  Burton  County,  in  the  State  of  Indiana, 
America;  who  had  subscribed  his  name  to  the 
jurat,  and  affixed  thereto  the  seal  of  that  <  !ourl ; 
to  which  was  appended  a  certificate  under  the 
hand  of  A,  as  Secretary  of  that  State,  and  the 
seal  thereof,  that  II  was  such  clerk,  and  was 
authorized  to  administer  oaths ;  and  a  certificate, 


under  the  hand  and  seal  of  office  of  the  British 
acting  consul  at  Chicago,  that  A  was  such 
Secretary,  and  that  his  signature  and  the  State 
seal  were  genuine.  In  Mayne  v.  Butler,  13  W. 
R.  128,  V.  C.  K.,  the  verification  of  the  signa- 
ture of  a  foreign  notary  was  dispensed  with, 
the  fund  being  small,  and  the  solicitor  personally 
undertaking  to  apply  it ;  see  also  Smith  v.  Davies, 
W.  N.  (1868)  269;  17  W.  R.  69,  V.C.  M.,  where 
the  verification  was  dispensed  with;  see  also 
Lvle  v.  Ellwood,  L.  R.  15  Eq.  67;  Belli'.  Turner, 
L.  R.  17  Eq.  439;  22  W.  R.  391;  Re  Lane,  22 
W.  H.  39  (by  consent).  In  Levitt  v.  Levitt,  2 
H.  &  M.  626,  a  certificate  by  the  clerk  and 
under  the  seal  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  city 
and  county  of  New  York,  America,  was  received 
as  sufficient  evidence  that  the  official  had  power 
to  administer  an  oath.  See  also  Alexander  v. 
Nurse,  W.  N.  (1871)  249.  In  Re  Scriven,  17 
L.  T.  N.  S.  641,  V.  C.  M.,  an  affidavit  under 
the  great  spal  of  one  of  the  United  States  of 
America,  and  attested  by  the  governor  of  the 
State,  was  received.  In  Lees  v.  Lees,  W.  N. 
(1868)  268,  M.  R.,  it  appearing  that  the  official 
was  named  in  the  list  of  judicial  officers  of 
tli.'  United  States,  the  affidavit  was  received. 
Where  the  affidavit  is  sworn  within  the  domin- 
ions of  the  Crown,  no  verification  of  the  seal  or 
signature  of  the  official  is  required.  Havward 
v.  Stephens,  W.  N.  (1866)  318,  V.  C.  S. ;  Re 
Goss,  Liddall  v.  Nicholson,  W.  N.  (1866)  256; 
12. Jur.  N.  S.  595,  V.C.  W. 

i  1  May  v.  Prinsep,  11  Jur.  1032,  V.  C.  K. 
B. ;  Mackenzie  v.  Mackenzie,  5  De  G.  &  S.  338; 


(6)  Affidavits  sworn  before  foreign  notaries 
public,  who  are  authorized  by  law  to  administer 
oaths  in  any  law  proceedings  in  their  own 
country,  may  still,  it  seems,  be  filed  under  the 


new  procedure  in  England.  See  Cooke  v. 
Wilby,  25  Ch.  D.  709 ;  see  Brittlebank  r.  Smith, 
50  L.  T.  491.  As  to  taking  testimony  abroad, 
see  Ross  v.  Woodford,  [1891]  1  Ch.  38. 

891 


*894 


EVIDENCE. 


rectly  entitled  when  it  was  sworn,  although  the  title  of  the  cause  may 
have  been  subsequently  altered  by  amendment.2  Where  a  mistake 
occurred  in  the  title  of  affidavits,  by  omitting  the  name  of  one  of  the 
defendants,  they  were  received  on  its  being  shown  by  affidavit  that  there 
was  no  other  suit  pending  to  which  they  could  relate  ; 3  and  where  the 
names  of  the  plaintiffs  and  defendants  were  reversed,4  and  the  plaintiff's 
name  had  been  wrongly  spelt,5  the  Court  allowed  the  affidavits  to  be 
taken  off  the  file  and  re-sworn,  and  then  filed  without  affixing  fresh 
stamps.4  In  another  case,6  the  affidavits  were  allowed  to  be  made  exhibits 
to  an  affidavit  properly  intituled. 

An  affidavit  made  in  one  cause  or  matter  cannot  be  used  to  obtain  an 
order  in  another  cause  or  matter.  The  Court  will,  however,  in  some 
cases,  give  leave  for  this  to  be  done :  thus,  where  affidavits  have  been 
filed  in  a  cause  proving  a  pedigree,  they  were  allowed  to  be  used  on  the 
hearing  of  a  petition  under  the  Trustee  Act,  1850  ; 7  and  in  another  case 
office  copies  of  affidavits  which  had  proved  a  death  in  other  proceedings, 
were  admitted  as  evidence  of  the  same  death.8 

After  an  affidavit  has  been  read  at  the  hearing  by  any  party,  it  cannot 
be  withdrawn  without  the  consent  of  the  other  parties.9 

In  all  affidavits,  the  true  place  of  residence,  description,  and  addition 
of  every  person  swearing  the  same  must  be  inserted.10  This  rule, 
*  894  however,  will  not  apply  to  affidavits  by  parties  in  the  *  cause : 
who  may  describe  themselves,  in  the  affidavit,  as  the  above-named 
plaintiff,  or  defendant,  without  specifying  any  residence,  or  addition,  or 
other  description;  and  even  where  a  plaintiff  so  described  himself  in  an 
affidavit,  and  it  appeared,  upon  inspecting  the  office  copy  of  the  bill, 
that  no  addition  had  been  given  to  him  in  the  bill,  the  affidavit  was  con- 
sidered sufficient.1 

All  affidavits  are  to  be  taken  and  expressed  in  the  first  person  of  the 


as  to  waiver  of  the  irregularity,  see  Blackmore 
v.  Glamorganshire  Canal  Co.  5  Rus<=.  151; 
although,  in  ordinary  cases,  the  Court  will 
disregard  the  misentitling  of  a  paper,  which 
could  not  have  misled  the  opposite  party,  it  is 
otherwise  as  respects  affidavits,  because  the 
misentitling  of  an  affidavit  will  exempt  the  de- 
fendant from  the  punishment  of  perjury,  al- 
though his  oath  is  false.  Hawley  v.  Donnelly,  8 
Paige,  415;  see  Stafford  v.  Brown,  4  Paige,  360. 
Where  there  are  several  defendants  and  there  is 
but  one  suit  pending  between  the  plaintiff  and 
the  defendant  first  named  therein  with  others, 
it  is  sufficient  in  the  entitling  of  an  affidavit,  to 
entitle  it  in  the  name  of  the  plaintiff  against  the 
first  defendant  and  others,  without  setting  forth 
the  names  of  all  the  defendants  at  length. 
White  v.  Hess,  8  Paige,  544.  Under  special 
circumstances  affidavits  may  be  ordered  to  be 
filed  though  not  intituled  in  any  cause.  Sal- 
vidge  v.  Fulton,  20  L.  T.  N.  S.  300,  V.  C.  M. 
See  also  Whiting  r.  Bassett,  L.  R.  14  Eq.  70. 

2  Hawes  r.  Bamford,  9  Sim.  653. 

3  Fisher  ».  Coffev,  1  Jur.  N.  S.  956,  V.  C. 

892 


W. ;    and  see   Re  Harris,    8  Jur.  N.   S.  166, 
V.  C.  K. 

4  Pearson  v.  Wilcox,  10  Hare  App.  35. 

5  Underdown  v.  Stannard,  W.  N.  (1871) 
171. 

6  lie  Varteg  Chapel,  10  Hare  App.  37. 

7  Re  Pickance,  10  Hare  App.  35;  Jones  v. 
Tumbull,  In  re  Turnbull,  17  Jur.  851,  V.  C. 
W.,  which  is  apparently  the  same  case,  under  a 
different  name. 

8  Re  Wool  ley's  Trusts,  24  W.  R.  783. 

9  Prole  v.  Soady,  L.  R.  3  Ch.  220,  L.  C. 

i"  Hinde,  451;  Wyatt's  P.  R.  9;  Hyde  v. 
Hyde,  59  L.  T.  523.  " 

i  Crockett  v.  Bishton,  2  Mad.  446;  and  see 
Boddineton  r.  Woodley,  12  L.  J.  Ch.  15.  M.  R. 
In  the  first  case,  also,  there  were  several  plain- 
tiffs, and  the  plaintiff  making  the  affidavit 
described  himself  as  "  the  above-named  plain- 
tiff;" whereas,  it  was  objected,  that  he  ought 
to  have  called  himself  "  one  of  the  above-named 
plaintiffs;"  but  the  objection  was  overruled. 


AFFIDAVITS   AND    EX-PARTE   EXAMINATIONS    BEFORE    EXAMINER.      *  894 

deponent ; 2  otherwise  the  solicitor,  party,  or  person  filing  the  affidavit, 
is  not  to  be  allowed  the  costs  of  preparing  and  filing  the  same.3 

The  affidavit  must  commence  by  stating  that  the  party  "  makes  oath 
and  says ;  "  for  even  though  the  jurat  express  that  the  party  was  sworn, 
it  will  not  be  sufficient,  unless  the  affidavit  also  state  that  the  party 
makes  oath.4  (a) 

Every  affidavit  must  be  divided  into  paragraphs,  and  every  paragraph 
numbered  consecutively,  and,  as  nearly  as  may  be,  confined  to  a  distinct 
portion  of  the  subject ; 5  and  each  statement  in  an  affidavit  must  show 
the  means  of  knowledge  of  the  person  making  such  statement.6 

An  affidavit  must  be  pertinent  and  material.7  Scandalous  and  irrele- 
vant matter  should  be  carefully  avoided,  and,  if  any  is  inserted,  the 
affidavit  may  be  ordered  to  be  taken  off  the  file ; 8  or  if  the  affidavit  is 
intended  to  be  used  before  the  Court,  the  scandalous  matter  may  be 
expunged,  by  the  same  process  as  scandal  in  a  bill  or  other  pleading ; 9 


2  Cons.  Orel.  XVIII.  1;  see  New  Jersey  Rule 
in  Chancery,  90. 

3  Cons.  "Ord.  XVIII.  2;  see  R.  S.  C.  Ord. 
XXXVII.  3  a,  b  (Ord.  April,  1880,  rr.  12,  13), 
Ord.  XXXVIII.  2,  LVI.  3.  In  Re  Husband, 
12  L.  T.  N.  S.  303,  V.  C.  W.,  affidavits  sworn 
in  America  were  received,  though  expressed  in 
the  third  person. 

4  Phillips  v.  Prentice,  2  Hare,  542;  Re  New- 
ton, 2  De  G.  F.&  J.  3;  Allen  v.  Taylor,  L.  R. 
10  Eq.  52,  V.  C.  J. ;  Ex  parte  Torkington,  L.  R. 
9  Ch.  298.  In  the  case  of  an  affirmation,  the 
words,  "  do  solemnly,  sincerely,  and  truly 
affirm  and  declare,"  are  usually  substituted 
for  "  make  oath  and  say." 

5  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  80,  §  37. 

6  Cons.  Ord.  5  Feb.,  1861,  r.  23;  and  see 
Woodhatch  v.  Freeland,  11  W.  R.   398,  V.  C. 


(a)  See  Allen  v.  Taylor,  L.  R.  10  Eq.  52; 
Eddowes  v.  Argentine  Loan  Co.  (No.  1),  59  L. 
J.  Ch.  392.  The  description  of  the  deponent's 
occupation  and  residence,  when  these  are  re- 
quired to  be  slated,  may  be  in  the  introductory 
part  of  the  affidavit  only,  if  the  body  of  the 
affidavit  incorporates  them  by  reference.  Blai- 
berg  v.  Parke,  10  Q.  B.  D.  90.  A  description 
of  the  deponent  as  "gentleman"  was  held  suf- 
ficient in  Re  Dodsworth,  Spence  v.  Dodsworth, 
[1891]  1  Ch.  657;  but  this  is  not  sufficient  if 
the  deponent  has  a  trade  or  profession.  Re 
Horwood,  55  L.  T.  373;  Spaddacini  v.  Treaty, 
21  L.  R.  Ir.  553.  A  stockbroker's  abode  is  not 
properly  described  as  "Stock  Exchange,  stock- 
broker." Re  Levy,  Levin  v.  Levin,  60  L.  T. 
317.  In  Stoddard  v.  Sloan,  65  Iowa,  680,  it  was 
held  that  the  affidavit  and  jurat  in  a  civil  action 
may  be  construed  together  for  the  purpose  of 
determining  the  deponent's  identity.  In  Ex 
parte  Johnson,  20  Ch.  D.  338,  where  the  com- 
missioner merely  signed  his  jurat  without  his 


K. ;  Meach  v.  Chappell,  8  Paige,  135;  Sea  Ins. 
Co.  r.  Stebbins,  8  Paige,  563. 

7  See  Meach  v.  Chappell,  8  Paige,  135. 

8  Goddard  v.  Parr,  24  L.  J.  Ch.  783;  3.  W. 
R.  633,  V.  C.  K. ;  Kernick  v.  Kernick,  12  W.  R. 
335,  V.  C.  W. ;  see  also  Owens  v.  Emmens,  W. 
N.  (1875)  210,  234;  Taylor  v.  Keily,  W.  N. 
(1876)  139;  Osmaston  v.  Land  Financiers,  W. 
N.  (1878)  101;  Bruff  v.  Cobbold,  20  W.  R.  734; 
Middlemas  v.  Wilson,  L.  R.  10  Ch.  230;  Crack- 
nall  v.  Janson,  11  Ch.  D.  1;  Walker  v.  Poole, 
21  Ch.  D.  835;  Fox  v.  Bearblock,  W.  N. 
(1882)9. 

9  See  ante,  pp.  347,  354;  R.  S.  C.  1883,  Ord. 
XXXVIII.  11.  It  is  competent  for  the  Court, 
upon  the  mere  examination  of  an  affidavit  or 
other  paper  read  before  it,  on  amotion,  to  order 
scandalous  or  impertinent  matter  contained  in 


title  as  commissioner,  the  affidavit  was  held 
sufficient.  In  Alford  v.  McCormac,  90  N.  C. 
151,  it  was  held  that  an  affidavit  annexed  to  a 
pleading  must  be  subscribed  by  the  affiant  only 
when  the  statute  so  directs.  The  certificate 
must  show  in  whose  writing  the  deposition  is. 
R,'  Thomas,  35  Fed.  Rep.  822. 

In  the  Federal  Courts  the  mode  of  taking  a 
deposition  may  be  that  defined  by  either  Fed- 
eral or  State  laws.  McLennan  v.  Kansas  City 
&c.  R.  Co.  22  Fed.  Rep.  198.  The  testimony 
of  a  witness  competent  when  his  deposition  was 
taken  and  filed  remains  competent.  Sheidley 
v.  Aultman,  18  Fed.  Rep.  666;  Kingi>.  Pratt,  13 
R.  I.  132;  but  see  Seabright  v.  Seabright,  28  W. 
Va.  412.  When  the  pleadings  are  so  amended 
as  substantially  to  change  the  issues,  a  deposi- 
tion previously  taken  cannot  be  read  in  evi- 
dence, if  objection  is  made.  State  v.  Nashville 
Savings  Bank,  16  Lea,  111;  Anthony  v.  Sav- 
age, 3  Utah,  277. 

893 


*895 


EVIDENCE. 


or  if  it  is  intended  to  be  used  in  Chambers,  a  summons  may  be  taken  out 
to  have  the  matter  examined  and  expunged.10 

If  an  affidavit  contain  impertinent  matter,  or  be  of  improper  length, 
the  Court  may,  when  it  is  used  in  Court,  at  once  disallow 
*  895  *  the  costs  of  the  improper  part,  or  may  disallow  the  costs  of  the 
part  which  the  Taxing  Master  may  distinguish  as  being  im- 
proper ; *  and  where  it  is  used  in  Chambers,  the  Judge  may  at  once  disallow 
all  unnecessary  matter ;  and  the  part  disallowed  is  to  be  distinguished 
by  the  initials  of  the  Chief  Clerk  in  the  margin.2 

The  application  for  the  costs  of  impertinent  matter  in  an  affidavit 
should  be  made  when  the  affidavit  is  used.3  The  Court  generally  leaves 
it  to  the  Taxing  Master  to  determine  what  part  of  the  affidavit  is  unne- 
cessary, merely  expressing  an  opinion  that  it  is  of  improper  length.4 

Affidavits  ought  to  be  fairly  written  upon  foolscap  paper  bookwise ; 5 
but  the  Clerks  of  Eecords  and  Writs  may  receive  and  file  affidavits 
written  otherwise,  if  in  their  opinion  it  is,  under  the  circumstances, 
desirable  or  necessary.6  The  Clerks  of  Records  and  Writs  may  refuse 
to  file  any  affidavit  in  which  there  is  any  knife  erasure,  or  which  is 
blotted  so  as  to  obliterate  any  word,  or  which  is  improperly  written,  or 
so  altered  as  to  cause  any  material  disfigurement ;  or  in  which  there  is 
any  interlineation,  unless  the  person  before  whom  it  is  sworn  authen- 
ticate such  interlineation  with  his  initials,  so  as  to  show  that  it  was 
made  before  the  affidavit  was  sworn,  and  to  mark  the  extent  of  the 
interlineation.7 

An  affidavit  in  which  there  are  interlineations  or  alterations,  not  so 
marked,  may,  however,  be  filed  with  the  consent  of  the  solicitors  of  all 
parties  against  whom   it  is   intended  to   be  used;    such  consent   being 


it  to  be  expunged  without  reference  to  a  Mas- 
ter, and  to  charge  the  proper  party  with  the 
costs.  Powell  v.  Kane,  5  Paige,  265.  A  party 
who  makes  an  affidavit  to  oppose  a  motion  is 
only  authorized  to  state  the  facts;  and  it  is 
scandalous  and  impertinent  to  draw  inferences 
or  state  arguments  in  the  affidavit,  reflecting  on 
the  character  or  impeaching  the  motives  of  the 
adverse  party  or  his  solicitor.  Powell  v.  Kane, 
5  Paige,  2<>o". 

I"  Cons.  Ord.  XXXV.  60;  ante,  p.  354. 

1  Cons.  Ord.  XL.  9 ;  as  to  this  order,  see  Moure 
r.  Smith,  14  Keav.  393,  396;  Maj-or  of  Berwick 
V.  Murray,  7  De  G.  M.  &  G.  497,  514,  515 ;  3 
Jur.  N.  S.  1,  5;  Hanslip  v.  Kitton,  8  Jur.  N.  S. 
835,841,  V.  C  S.;  id.  1113,  L.  C;  Re  Far- 
ington,  33  Beav.  346;  Guest  v.  Smythe,  L.  R. 
5  Ch.  551.  558.  L.  J.  G. ;  Re  Skidniore,  1  Jur. 
N.  S.  696;  3  W.  R.  584.  V.  C.  S. ;  Scottish 
Union  Ins.  Co.  v.  Steele,  9  L.  T.  N.  S.  677,  V. 
C.  W. ;  Cracknall  v.  Janson,  11  Ch.  D.  1;  Hill 
v.  Hart-Davis,  26  Ch.  D.  470;  Hirst  v.  Procter, 
W.  X.  (1882)12:  R.  S.  C  (costs)  Sched.  r.  18; 
see  ante,  p.  350;  Rea  v.  Rea,  53  Mich  40.  If 
a  solicitor  is  compelk-d-to  pay  <he  cost-  of  ex- 
punging scandalous  or  impertinent  matter,  he 

894 


has  no  legal  or  equitable  claim  upon  his  client 
to  refund  the  amount.  Powell  v.  Kane,  5  Paige, 
265.  For  form  of  order,  see  1  Seton,  89,  120, 
121,  Nos.  24-26. 

2  Cons  Ord.  XL.  10. 

3  See  Cons.  Ord.  XL.  9 ;  Horner  v.  Wheel- 
wright, 2  Jur.  X.  S.  367,  V.  C.  S.;  see  Re 
Wormsley,  Baines  v.  Wormsley,  W.  N.  (1878) 
193;  27  W.  R.  36. 

4  Moore  v.  Smith,  14  Beav.  393,  396;  Re 
Radcliffe,  Seton.  89,  No.  17  ;  Rt  Skidmore,  1 
Jur.  N  S.  696,  V.  C.  S.;  Hanslip  v.  Kitton,  8 
Jur.  N.  S.  835,  841,  V.  C.  S. ;  on  appeal,  id. 
1113;  Scottish  Union  Ins.  Co.  v.  Steele,  ubi 
supra  ;  Guest  v.  Smythe,  L.  R.  5  Ch.  551,  558, 
L.J.  G. 

5  As  to  the  paper  now  used,  and  confining  the 
affidavit  to  facts  within  the  witness's  knowledge, 
see  1  Dan.  Ch.  Prac.  (6th  Eng.  ed.)  625,  626; 
R.  S.  C.  XXXVII.  3;  Gilbert  v.  Endean,  9 
Ch.  D.  259. 

6  Cons.  Ord.  6  March,  1860,  r.  16;  Braith- 
waite's  Oaths  in  Chan.  42. 

1  Cons.  Ord.  I.  36;  and  see  15  &  16  Vic.  c 
86,  §2o;  W.  N.  (1882)  Pt.  II.  81. 


AFFIDAVITS    AND    EX-PARTE    EXAMINATIONS   BEFORE    EXAMINER.      *  896 

indorsed  on  the  affidavit  and  signed  by  the  solicitors.8  And  where  two 
affidavits,  by  A  and  B,  were  written  on  the  same  paper,  and  there 
were  unauthenticated  alterations  in  the  affidavit  of  A,  the  docu- 
ment was  allowed  to  be  filed  as  the  affidavit  of  B,  —  that  of  A  being 
rejected.9 

Dates  and  sums  may  be  written,  either  in  words  or  in  figures ; 10  but 
every  quotation  should  be  placed  between  inverted  commas.11 

Schedules  referred  to  in  an  affidavit  as  "hereunder  written," 
*  should  be  placed  after  the  jurat;  and  the  commissioner,  or  *  896 
other  person  before  whom  the  affidavit  is  sworn,  must  sign  his 
name  at  the  end  of  each  schedule.  If  a  schedule  is  placed  before  the 
jurat,  it  should  not  be  referred  to  as  "hereunder  written,"  but  as  "the 
schedule  (or,  first,  &c,  schedule)  set  forth  in  this  my  affidavit.*' 
The  schedules  may  also  be  embodied  in  the  affidavit.1 

Alterations  in  schedules,  or  in  accounts  made  exhibits  to  affidavits, 
should  be  authenticated  in  the  same  manner  as  in  the  body  of  the 
affidavits.2 

A  document  may  be  referred  to  in  an  affidavit,  either  as  an  exhibit, 
thus,  —  "  produced  and  shown  to  me  at  the  time  of  swearing  this  my 
affidavit,  and  marked  with  the  letter  A;"  or  as  ''hereunto  annexed." 
If  "produced  and  shown,"  the  document  is  not  filed  with  the  affidavit; 
if  "hereunto  annexed,"  the  affidavit  cannot  properly  be  filed  without 
it;  and  it  is  therefore  generally  more  convenient  not  to  refer  to  it  as 
"  hereunto  annexed  ;  "  3  and  if  intended  to  be  used  in  Chambers,  it  must 
not  be  so  referred  to.4 

Any  document  referred  to  must  be  distinguished  by  some  mark 
placed  upon  it,  and  signed  by  the  person  before  whom  the  affidavit  is 
sworn.5 

It  is  the  usual  practice,  in  all  cases,  to  write  the  short  title  of  the 
cause  or  matter  on  the  exhibit;  and  this  must  be  done  in  the  case  of 
documents  made  exhibits,  and  intended  to  be  used  in  Chambers.6 

Where  a  document  is  referred  to  as  being  produced  and  shown  to  the 
deponent,  the  person  before  whom  the  affidavit  is  sworn  must  inquire 
whether  the  deponent  has  seen  the  document,  and  is  aware  of  the  con- 
tents thereof ;  but  this  need  not  be  done  where  the  document  is  referred 
to  as  hereunto  annexed,  the  document  being  annexed  at  the  time  the 
affidavit  is  sworn.7 

Where  one  party  has  proved  written  documents  in  a  cause,  the  other 

8  Braithwaite's  Pr.  340.  See  now  R.  S.  C.  Crook,  1  .Tur.  N.  S.  654,  V.  C.  S.;  Braith- 
Ord.  XXXVII.  3  e.  (Ord.  April,  1880,  r.   10);      waite's  Pr.  340. 

Re  Cloake,  61  L.  J.  Ch.  69.     But  an  irregu-  n  Braithwaite's  Oaths,  79. 

larity  in  the  jurat  cannot  be  waived,  see  post,  i  Braithwaite's  Pr.  341. 

P-  897.  2  see  RegllI.  8  Auff.(  1857)  r  10_ 

9  Gill  '.  Gilbard,  9  Hare  App.  16.  3  Braithwaite's  Pr.  341. 

10  The  present   practice   in  the  Record   and  4  Regul.  8  Aug.,  1857,  r.  11;  and  see  Cons. 

Writ  Clerks'  Office  of   allowing  affidavits  to  be  Ord.  XXIV.  3. 

filed,  notwithstanding  that  dates  and  sums  are  5  Hewetson    v.  Todhunter,    2  Sin.    &  Giff. 

written  therein  in  figures,  instead  of  in  words,  App.  2. 

was  adopted  with  the  sanction  of  Lord  Chan-  G  Regul.   8   Aug.,  1857.  r.    12  (3  Jur.   N.  S. 

cellor  Campbell.    A  previous  usage  in  the  office  Pt.  II.). 
to  the  contrary  was  recognized  in  Crook   v.  '  Braithwaite's  Pr.  341. 

895 


*897 


EVIDENCE. 


side  has  no  right,  upon  that  ground,  and  in  the  absence  of  special 
circumstances,8  to  require  them  to  be  produced  before  the  hearing; 
unless,  perhaps,  where  the  affidavit  proving  them  sets  them  out  verba- 
tim : 9  for  a  party  can  have  no  right  to  see  the  strength  of  his  adver- 
sary's case,  or  the  evidence  of  his  title,  before  the  hearing.10  The 
documents  may,  however,  be  ordered  to  be  produced,  in  order  that  the 
other  side  may  cross-examine  upon  them.11  (a) 

The  jurat  should  be  written  at  the  end  of  the  affidavit,  and  is  usually 
placed  at  the  right-hand  corner ;  it  may,  however,  be  written 
*  897  *  on  either  side  of  the  page,  or,  if  necessary,  in  the  margin ;  but 
not  on  a  page  upon  which  no  part  of  the  statements  in  the 
affidavit  appears.1  It  must  also  correctly  express  the  time  when,  and 
the  place  where,  the  affidavit  is  sworn,  including  the  name  of  the  city, 
borough,  or  county.2 

The  deponent  must  sign  his  name,  or  make  his  mark,  at  the  side  of 
the  jurat,  not  underneath  it.3  The  person  before  whom  the  affidavit 
is  sworn  must  sign  his  name  at  the  foot  of  the  jurat;  to  which  must  be 
added  his  full  official  character  and  description,  not  necessarily,  how- 
ever, in  his  own  handwriting.4 

If  the  deponent  be  a  marksman  or  blind,  the  affidavit  must  be  first 
truly,  distinctly,  and  audibly  read  over  to  him,6  either  by  the  person 
before  whom  the  affidavit  was  sworn,  or  by  some  other  person.  In  the 
first  case,  it  must  be  expressed  in  the  jurat  that  the  affidavit  was  so  read 
over,  and  that  the  mark  or  signature  was  affixed  in  the  presence  of  the 
person  taking  the  affidavit ;  in  the  second  case,  such  other  person  must 
attest  the  mark  or  signature,  and  must  be  first  sworn  that  he  has  so 
read  over  the  affidavit,  and  that  the  mark  or  signature  was  made  in  his 
presence,  and  this  must  be  expressed  in  the  jurat.6 


8  Lord  v.  Colvin,  2  Drew.  205;  5  De  G.  M. 
&  G.  47;  18  Jur.  253;  see  also  Forrester  v. 
Helme,  M'Clel.  558. 

9  Hodson  v.  Earl  of  Warrington,  3  P.  Wins. 
34. 

1°  Davers  v.  Davers,  2  P.  Wms.  410;  Hodson 
v.  Earl  of  Warrington,  ubi  supra  ;  Wiley  v. 
Pistor,  7  Ves.  411 ;  Fencott  v.  Clarke,  6  Sim.  8; 
Lord  v.  Colvin,  ubi  supra;  Gresley,  192;  ante, 
p.  885. 

u  Bell  v.  Johnson,  1  J.  &  H.  682;  see  now 
R.  S.  C.  Ord.  XXXI.  14,  15;  A  pp.  B.  No. 
10,  Ord.  April,  1880,  Sched.  B.  10  A;  Re  Credit 
Co.  11  Ch.  D.  256;  Webster  v.  Whewall,  15 
Ch.  D.  120. 

i  Braithwaite's  Pr.  342. 

2  Ibid.;  18  &  19  Vic.  c.  134,  §  15;  Cons. 
Ord.  IV. ;  but  see  Gates  v.  Buckland,  13  W.  K. 
67,  V.  C.  S. 

3  Anderson  v.  Stather,  9  Jur.  1085,  V.  C.  K. 
B  ;  and  see  Down  v.  Yearley,  W.  N.  (1874) 
158. 


4  Braithwaite's  Pr.  342;  but  see  Gates  v. 
Buckland,  13  W.  R.  67,  V.  C.  S.  The  words 
"before  me"  must  precede  the  commissioner's 
signature.  See  Graham  v.  Ingleby,  5  Dowl.  & 
L.  757;  1  Ex.651;  cited  Braithwaite's  Oaths, 
46.  The  failure  of  the  officer  to  sign  the  jurat 
is  fatal,  and,  it  seems,  cannot  be  cured  by  the 
officer  afterwards  signing  it  in  open  Court,  in 
the  case  of  a  warrant  of  committal  in  bank- 
ruptcy. Ex  parte  Heyman,  L.  R.  7  Ch.  488. 
But  see  infra,  p.  911,  n.  1.  In  Bewley  v.  Ottin- 
ger,  1  Heisk.  354,  the  action  of  the  Court  below 
was  sustained  in  permitting  the  commissioner, 
who  took  a  deposition,  to  amend  the  caption  and 
certificate  to  which  exception  had  been  filed. 
But  the  ruling  was  based  upon  the  liberal  stat- 
utes of  jeofail. 

5  As  to  illiterate  affiants,  see  R.  S.  C.  Ord. 
XXXVII.  3  f.  (Ord.  April,  1880,  r.  17). 

6  If  the  deponent  is  blind,  the  officer  should 
certify  in  the  jurat  that  the  affidavit  whs  carefully 
and  correctly  read  over  to  him,  in  the  presence 


(a)  Production  of  books  or  documents,  when 
ordered,  is  usually  with  liberty  to  seal  up  the 
parts  not  referred  to  in  the  pleadings  or  directly 

896 


material  to  the  examination.  See  Burgess  v. 
Bennett,  20  W.  R.  720 ;  Quilter  v.  Heatly,  23 
Ch.  D.  42;  Pamell  v.  Wood,  [1892]  P.  137. 


AFFIDAVITS    AND    EX-PARTE   EXAMINATIONS    BEFORE    EXAMINER.      *  808 

If  the  deponent  be  a  foreigner,  the  contents  of  the  affidavit  must  be 
interpreted  to  him;  and  the  interpreter  must  be  sworn  that  lie  has 
truly,  distinctly,  and  audibly  done  so,  and  that  he  will  truly  interpret 
the  oath  about  to  be  administered,  and  then  the  deponent  may  be  sworn  ; 
and  that  these  formalities  have  been  complied  with,  must  be  expressed 
in  the  jurat.7 

Formalities  of  a  similar  kind,  by  which  it  may  appear  that  the  depo- 
nent has  fully  understood  the  contents  of  his  affidavit,  before  he  is 
sworn,  must  be  adopted  in  the  case  of  a  deaf,  or  deaf  and  dumb  person, 
or  in  other  similar  cases.8 

*  The  oath  must  be  administered  in  a  reverent  manner ; 1  and,    *  898 
if  not  administered  in  the  usual  form,  the  authority  for  administer- 
ing it  should  appear  in  the  jurat.2 

Quakers,  Moravians,  and  Separatists  give  their  evidence  on  their 
solemn  affirmation ; 3  and  any  person  who  objects,  from  conscientious 
motives,  to  be  sworn,  may  now  give  his  evidence  upon  his  solemn 
affirmation ; 4  but  the  person  qualified  to  take  the  affirmation  must  be 
satisfied  of  the  sincerity  of  the  objection,  and  this  must  appear  in  the 
affirm  at.6 

It  is  a  universal  principle  in  all  Courts,  that  jurats  and  affidavits, 
when  contrary  to  practice,  are  open  to  objection  in  any  stage  of  a  cause. 
This  does  not  depend  upon  any  objection  which  the  parties  in  a  particu- 
lar cause  may  waive,  but  upon  the  general  rule  that  the  document  itself 
shall  not  be  brought  forward  at  all  if  in  any  respect  objectionable  with 
reference  to  the  rule  of  the  Court.  Where,  therefore,  there  was  an 
irregularity  in  the  jurat  of  an  answer,  a  motion  by  the  plaintiff  to  take 
it  off  the  file,  on  the  ground  of  such  irregularity,  was  allowed,  notwith- 
standing that  he  had  taken  an  office  copy  of  the  answer.6    Where,  how- 


of  such  officer,  before  he  swore  to  the  same.  Mat-  8  Reynolds    v.  Jones,   Trin.  Term,    1818; 

terof  Christie, 5  Paige,  242.    So  where  fche  affiant  Braithwaite's  Pr.  383.    For  forms,  see  Vol.  III. 

has  been  found  by  the  inquisition  of  a  jury  to  As  to  insane  persons,  see   Spittle  v.  Walton, 

be  a  lunatic,  the  officer  before  whom   the  af-  L.  R.  11  Eq.  42. 

fidavit  is  sworn  should  state  in  the  jurat  that  *  Ord.  XIX.  14;  ante,  p.  887,  note. 

he  has  examined  the  deponent  for  the  purpose  2  1  &  2  Vic.  c.  105;  see  Braithwaite's  Pr. 

of  ascertaining  the  state  of  his  mind,  and  that  383,  384.     For  forms,  see  Vol.  III. 

he  was  apparently  of  sound  mind,  and  capable  8  7  &  8  Will.  III.  c.  34,  §1:8  Geo.  I.  c.  6, 

of    understanding  the  nature  and   contents  of  §  1 ;    22  Geo.  II.  c.  30,  §  1;    id.   c.  4f?  §  30 :    9 

the  affidavit.     Matter  of  Christie,  5  Paige,  242.  Geo.  IV.  c.  32,  §  1 ;   3  &  4  "Will.  IV.  c.  49;    id. 

The  attestation    should   be   written    near    the  c.  82;  1&  2  Vic.  c.  77;    and  see  id.  105.     For 

jurat.     Wilson  v.  Clifton,  2  Hare,  535;   7  Jur.  forms  of  affirmation  in  these  cases,  see  Vol.  III. 

215;  Braithwaite's  Pr.  380;  and  Oaths,  61,  69,  *  Ante,  p.  887,  note. 

70.      Where  a  marksman  signed  an    affidavit  5  17  &  18  Vic.  c.  125,  §  20;  see  32  &  33  Vic. 

with  his  name  at  length,  his  hand  having  been  c.  68 ;  33  &  34  Vic.  c.  49.     Where  the  affidavit 

guided  on   the   occasion,  it  was  ordered  to  be  is  on  affirmation,  and  the  person  taking  it  does 

taken  off  the  file.    0.  Christopher,  11  Sim.  not  certify  that  the  affirmant  is  a  Quaker  or  other 

409.     For  forms  of  special  jurats,  see  Vol.  III.  person  allowed  by  law  to  make  affirmation,  the 

As  to  several   affidavits,   see  Fernyhough  v.  affidavit  can  be  of  no  avail.    Ringgold  v.  Jones, 

Naylor,  W.  N.  (1875)  22;    23  W.  R.  228;  and  1  Bland,  90.     For  forms,  see  Vol.  ITT. 

as  to   several  deponents,   see   R.    S.   C.   Ord.  6  Pilkington  V.  Himsworth,  1  Y.  &  C   Ex. 

XXXVII.  3  c.  (Ord.  April,  1880,  r.  14).  G12,   010;   but   see  Braithwaite's  Pr.  18.  and 

1  Braithwaite's  Oa'hs,  35.     For  forms,   see  ante,  pp.  743,  895.     The  Court  may  order  an 

Vol.  III.  affidavit  to  be  filed,  notwithstanding  an  irrcgu- 


•57 


897 


899 


EVIDENCE. 


ever,  in  the  case  of  an  affidavit  sworn  abroad,  before  a  notary,  the  place 
where  it  was  sworn  was  omitted  in  the  jurat,  it  was  ordered  to  be  filed, 
the  Vice-Chancellor  observing,  that  he  thought  the  Court  must  assume 
that  the  notary  was  acting  in  pursuance  of  his  duty,  and  that  he  would 
not  perform  a  notarial  act  out  of  the  jurisdiction  in  which  alone  he 
had  authority.7 

Every  affidavit  of  service  of  writs,  or  of  orders,  upon  which  process 
of  contempt  is  to  be  founded,  must  truly  and  fully  prove  good  service  ; 
and  if  the  plaintiff's  name,  the  Court,  the  return  of  the  writ,  or  anything 
material,  be  omitted,  no  attachment  can  be  thereupon  regularly  issued ; 
for,  until  a  due  service  be  shown,  no  contempt  appears  to  the  Court.8 

Before  any  affidavit  is  used  for  any  purpose,  it  must  have  been  filed 

in  the  office  of  the  Clerks  of  Eecords  and  Writs,  and  an  office 

*  899    copy  be  produced.9     Sometimes,  in  vacation,  however,  when  *  the 

matter  was  pressing,  the  Court  has  taken  affidavits  into  its  own 

hands,  and  then  considered  them  as  filed.1 

No  affidavit,  filed  on  or  after  the  first  day  of  Easter  Term,  1861,  is 
to  be  used  as  evidence,  on  any  proceeding  in  any  cause  or  matter,  unless 
there  be  written  at  the  foot  thereof,  at  the  time  of  filing  the  same,  a 
memorandum  stating  by  whom  the  same  is  filed,  which  memorandum  is 
to  be  in  the  form  following,  or  as  near  thereto  as  circumstances  will 
admit  (that  is  to  say)  :  "  This  affidavit  is  filed  on  the  part  and  behalf 
of  the  plaintiffs  "  (or,  "  of  the  defendants  M  and  N  ").2 

Sometimes,  when  expedition  is  required,  the  solicitor  filing  the  affida- 
vit, instead  of  waiting  until  an  office  copy  is  made  by  the  Clerk  of  Rec- 
ords and  Writs,  takes  a  copy  of  the  affidavit  to  the  office,  at  the  same 
time  that  he  takes  the  original  affidavit  to  be  filed,  and  then  the  Clerk 
of  Records  and  Writs  examines  and  marks  the  copy  as  an  office  copy, 
at  the  same  time  that  he  files  the  original.3 

Where  affidavits  are  filed  in  support  of  interlocutory  applications,  or. 
to  be  used  in  proceedings  under  decrees,  there  is  no  particular  time 
fixed  for  filing  them ;  but  they  should  be  filed  in  time  enough,  before 
the  application  or  proceeding  on  which  they  are  intended  to  be  used  is 
brought  on,  to  enable  the  adverse  party  to  obtain  copies  :  otherwise, 
the  application  or  proceeding  will  generally  be  directed  to  stand  over ; 
and  where  it  is  intended  to  make  use  of  affidavits  filed  before  the  par- 
ticular petition,  notice  of  motion,  or  summons,  was  presented,  served, 
or  issued,  express  notice  of  such  intention  should  be  given  in  due  time 


larity  in  the  jurat.  R.  S.  C.  1883,  Ord. 
XXXVIII.  14;  Ord.  LII.  14;  Glover  v.  Green- 
back Alkali  Co.  W.  N.  (1876)  157. 

7  Meek  v.  Ward,  10  Hare  App.  1;  Gates  v. 
Backland,  13  W.  R.  67,  V.  C  S. 

8  Hinde,  453;  Cons.  Ord.  XXVIII.  8;  see 
Re  Holt,  11  Ch.  D.  168. 

9  Cons.  Ord.  XVIII.  5;  R.  S.  C.  1883,  Ord. 
XXXVIII.  19;  Jackson  v.  Cassidy,  10  Sim. 
326;  Darley  v.  Nicholson,  1  Dr.  &  War.  66,  70; 
Elsey  v.  Adams,  4  Giff.  398 ;  9  Jur.  N.  S.  788 ; 
see  Bloodgood  v.  Clark,  4  Paige,  574,  576. 

898 


1  Per  Lord  Langdale  in  Att.-Gen.  v.  Lewis, 
8  Heav.  179.  See  Mercers'  Co.  v.  Great  North- 
ern Ry.  Co  14  Beav.  20;  Niemann  v.  Harris, 
W.  N"  (1870)  6;  Carr  ».  Morice,  L.  R.  16  Eq. 
125;  Campana  v.  Webb,  22  W.  R.  622;  Farrer 
v.  Svkes,  43  L.  J.  Ch.  392;  Watts  v.  Watts, 
45  "id.  658;  R.  S.  C  Ord.  XXXV.  16; 
XXXVII.  3  g. 

2  Cons.  Ord.  5  Feb.,  1861,  r.  18. 

3  Braithwaite's  Pr.  494. 


AFFIDAVITS    AND    EX-PARTE    EXAMINATIONS    BEFORE    EXAMINER.      *  900 

to  the  opposite  party,  as  he  is  not  bound  to  search  for  affidavits  filed 
before  those  respective  periods.4 

The  party  filing  an  affidavit  should,  in  all  cases,  take  an  office  copy 
of  it,  except  in  the  case  of  an  affidavit  filed  by  a  claimant  coining  in 
pursuant  to  advertisement,  under  a  decree :  in  which  case,  the  office 
copy  is  to  be  taken  by  the  party  prosecuting  the  cause,  unless  the  Judge 
otherwise  directs.5  Upon  filing  an  affidavit,  it  is  the  usual  practice  of 
solicitors  in  all  cases  to  give  notice  of  the  tiling  to  the  adverse  party ; 
and  such  notice  must  be  given  by  a  claimant  in  the  exceptional  case 
just  referred  to.6 

Formerly,  any  party  who  required  a  copy  of  an  affidavit,  had  to  obtain 
an  office  copy  at  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerks'  office  ;  but  now,  where 
any  party  requires  a  copy  of  an  affidavit  filed  by  the  adverse 
party,  he  is  to  make  written  application  to  the  party  by  *  whom  *  900 
the  copy  ought  to  be  delivered,  or  his  solicitor,  with  an  undertak- 
ing to  pay  the  proper  charges : 1  and  thereupon  such  party,  or  his  soli- 
citor, is  to  make  such  copy,2  and  deliver  the  same  on  demand  within 
forty-eight  hours,3  and  is  to  produce  the  office  copy  in  Court,  or  in 
Chambers,  when  required.4  In  cases  of  ex  parte  applications  for  injunc- 
tion, or  writs  of  ne  exeat  regno,  the  copies  must  be  delivered  immedi- 
ately upon  the  receipt  of  the  request,  or  within  such  time  as  may  be 
specified  therein,  or  may  have  been  directed  by  the  Court.5 

All  copies  to  be  delivered  by  parties  or  their  solicitors,6  are  to  be 
written  on  paper  of  a  convenient  size,  with  a  sufficient  margin,7  and 
in  a  neat  and  legible  manner,  similar  to  that  which  is  usually  adopted 
by  law  stationers  ;  and,  unless  so  written,  the  parties  or  solicitors  de- 
livering them  will  not  be  entitled  to  be  paid  for  the  same.8  The  folios 
of  all  copies  are  to  be  numbered  consecutively  in  the  margin,  and  the 
name  and  address  of  the  party  or  solicitor,  by  whom  the  same  are  made, 
are  to  be  indorsed  thereon,  in  like  manner  as  upon  the  proceedings  in 
the  Court ; 9  and  such  party  or  solicitor  is  to  be  answerable  for  the  same 
being  true  copies  of  the  originals,  or  of  the  office  copies,  of  which  they 
purport  to  be  copies.10 

Where  any  party  or  solicitor  who  is  required  to  deliver  any  such  copy 
either  refuses  or  does  not  deliver  the  same  within  the  period  allowed 
for  that  purpose,  the  person  making  such   application  may  procure  a 

*  See  Cons. Orel.  XXXV.  27;  R.  S.  C.  1883,  2  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVT.  5. 

Ord.  XXXVIII.  18;    Clements   t\   Griffith,  C.  8  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVI.  6. 

P.  Coop.  470;  zndpost.  Chap.  XXIX.  Proceed-  4  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVI.  10. 

ings  in  Chambers;  Chap.  XXXV.  §  2,  }fotions;  5  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVI.  9. 

§  3,  Petitions.  6  See  1  Dan.  Ch.  Prac.  (6th.  Eng.  ed.)  633, 

5  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVI.  1 ;  Ord.  XXXV.  39;  034. 

R.  S.  C.  1883,  Ord.  LXV.  27  (53);  LV.  27  (54).  7  Foolscap  paper,  with  a  quarter  margin,  is 

6  Cons.    Ord.    XXXV.    38.      For   form    of      ordinarily  used. 

notice,  see  Vol.  III.  and  as  to  what  is  sufficient  8  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVI.  11. 

notice,   Bloxam  v.   Metropolitan    Rv.   Co.  16  »  See    ante,  pp.  453,  454;    Cons.  Ord.  III. 

VV.  R.  490,  492,  note.  2,  5. 

1  Cons.    Ord.    XXXVI.   4.     The   ordinary  w  Cons.    Ord.   XXXVI.  8.     Each  copy  de- 
charges  are  l£r/.  per  folio  to  a  pauper,  and  4'/.  livered  should  include  a  copy  of  the  jurat,  and 
per  folio   to   other   persons.      Regul.  to   Ord.  should   state    the   day  on  which   the  original 
Sched.  4.    For  forms  of  application  and  under-  affidavit  wa«  filed. 
taking,  see  Vol  III. 

899 


*  901  EVIDENCE. 

copy  from  the  office  in  which  the  original  has  been  filed,  in  the  same 
way  as  if  no  such  application  had  been  made  to  the  party  or  solicitor ; 
and,  in  such  case,  no  costs  will  be  due  or  payable  to  the  party  or 
solicitor  so  making  default,  in  respect  of  the  copy  so  applied  for.11 

If  a  party  or  solicitor  by  whom  any  copy  ought  to  be  delivered,  re- 
fuses, or  does  not  deliver  the  same,  within  forty -eight  hours,  an  addi- 
tion of  two  clear  days  is  to  be  made  to  the  period  within  which  any 
proceeding  which  may  have  to  be  taken  after  obtaining  such  copy  ought 
to  be  taken  ;  so  that  the  person  requiring  such  copy  may  be  as  little 
prejudiced  as  possible  by  the  neglect  of  the  party  or  solicitor  to  deliver 
such  copy.1'2 

The  Taxing  Master  is  not  to  allow  any  costs  in  respect  of  any  copy 
so  taken,  unless  it  shall  appear  to  him  to  have  been  requisite, 

*  901   *  and  to  have  been  made  with  due  care,  both  as  regards  the  con- 

tents and  the  writing  thereof.1 

Parties  requiring  copies  of  affidavits  should  proceed  in  the  manner 
above  pointed  out ,  but  office  copies  of  affidavits  will,  nevertheless,  be 
made  by  the  Clerks  of  Eecords  and  Writs,  at  any  time,  for  any  person, 
whether  party  to  the  cause  or  matter  or  not,  who  may  prefer  that 
course,  at  the  risk  of  such  copies  being  disallowed  on  taxation.2 

Expenses  incurred,  in  consequence  of  affidavits  being  prepared  or 
settled  by  counsel,  are  to  be  allowed  only  when  the  Taxing  Master,  in 
his  discretion,  and  on  consideration  of  the  special  circumstances  of  each 
case,  thinks  such  expenses  properly  incurred;  and  in  such  case  he  is 
to  be  at  liberty  to  allow  the  same,  or  such  parts  thereof  as  he  may  con- 
sider just  and  reasonable,  whether  the  taxation  be  between  solicitor 
and  client  or  between  party  and  party.3 

Where  a  witness,  of  whose  evidence  a  party  desires  to  avail  himself 
on  the  hearing  of  a  cause  in  which  issue  has  been  joined,4  refuses  to 
make  an  affidavit,  the  party  may  examine  him  ex  parte?  before  an 
Examiner.6     The  attendance  of  the  witness  is  procured,  and  his  exam- 

n  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVI.  12;  R.  S.  C.  (Costs)  5  Cons.  Ord.  5  Feb.,  1881,  rr.  4,  6. 

Ord.  V.  14.  6  See  Gresley,  Eq.  Ev.  (Am.  ed.)  50,  et  seq. 

12  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.  16.  Under  the  practice  heretofore  existing  in  New 

1  Cons.  Ord   XXXVI.  13.  York,  each  party  had  aright  to   select  his  own 

2  See  Braithwaite's  Pr.  494.  Examiner,  and  the  Court  would  nor,  on  ran- 

3  Cons.  Ord  XL.  17.  Costs  of  settling  an  tion  of  the  opposite  party,  interfere  with  that 
affidavit  (which  was  an  echo  of  the  bill)  by  right.  But  a  direct  examination  might  be  had 
counsel  were  allowed  in  Davies  v.  Marshall  before  one  Examiner,  and  a  cross-examination 
(No.  2).  1  Dr.  &  S.  564;  7  Jur.  N.  S.  669.  See  before  another.  Troup  v.  Haight,6  John.  Ch. 
Rr  Knight,  24  Ch.  D.  606;  25  id.  297;  Back-  335. 

house   v.  Alcock,  28    Ch.   D.    669;    Mansel   V.  The  U.  S.  Circuit  Courts  have  power  to  ap- 

Clanricarde,  54  L.  J.  Ch.  982.  point  Examiners  in  suits  in   Equity,  and  it  is  a 

4  An  ex  parte  examination  cannot,  in  strict-  matter  of  discretion  whether  they  be  standing 
ness,  be  had  where  a  notice  of  motion  for  decree  Examiners,  or  be  designated  as  the  occasion 
has  been  given.  Ante,  pp.  823,  824.  In  Smith  arises  for  their  services  in  any  cause.  Van 
v.  Raker,  4  N.  R.  321,  V.  C.  W".  (2  H.  &  M.  Hook  o.  Pendleton,  2  Blatch.  85;  78th  of  the 
498),  however,  it  was  allowed  to  be  used,  on  U.  S  Equity  Rules.  But  in  these  Courts  an  oral 
terms  as  to  cross-examination  thereon.  See  examination  of  witnesses  before  an  Examiner, 
Raymond  v.  Tapson,  22  Ch.  D.  430;  Fenton  v.  previous  to  the  amendment  of  the  67th  Rule  in 
Cumberlege.  W.  N.  (1883)  116;  1  Dan.  Ch.  March,  1862,  was  irregular,  unless  there  was 
Prac.  (6th  Eng.  ed.)637. 

900 


AFFIDAVITS   AND    EX-PARTE   EXAMINATIONS   BEFORE    EXAMINER.       *  902 

ination  conducted,  in  the  same  manner  as  in  the  case  of  other  examina- 
tions before  the  Examiner ; 7  but  no  party  has  a  right  to  be  present  at 
such  examination,  except  the  party  producing  the  witness,  his  counsel,' 
solicitor,  and  agents.8  When  the  examination  is  concluded,  the  Exam- 
iner transmits  it  to  the  office  of  the  Clerks  of  the  Records  and  Writs, 
having  marked  it  as  taken  ex  parte ;  and  it  will  be  deemed  and  dealt 
with  by  them  as  an  affidavit.9  The  party  requiring  the  attendance  of 
the  witness,  whether  a  party  or  not,  must  give  to  the  opposite  party 
forty-eight  hours'  notice  at  least  of  his  intention  to  examine  such 
*  witness  ;  and  such  notice  must  contain  the  name  and  descrip-  *  902 
tion  of  the  witness,  and  the  time  and  place  of  the  examination, 
unless  the  Court  thinks  fit  to  dispense  with  such  notice.1 

All  affidavits  and  depositions  to  be  used  on  the  hearing  of  any  cause, 
or  motion  for  a  decree,  must  be  printed,2  except  such  as  have  been  filed 
for  the  purpose  of  any  interlocutory  application,  and  of  which  office 
copies  have  been  taken.3 

Such  affidavits  and  depositions  are  printed  under  the  direction  and 
superintendence  of  the  Clerks  of  Records  and  Writs,  upon  paper  of  the 
kind  and  dimensions,  and  with  the  type  prescribed  for  the  printing  of 
bills,  and  in  all  other  respects  in  such  form  and  manner  as  the  Clerks 
of  Records  and  Writs  deem  most  convenient.4 

Solicitors  and  parties,  on  filing  affidavits  required  to  be  printed,  must 
leave  with  the  Clerks  of  Records  and  Writs  a  fair  copy  of  each  affidavit 
filed,  written  on  draft  paper,  on  one  side  only,  and  certified  by  the  solici- 
tor or  party  to  be  a  correct  copy.5 

In  a  cause  in  which  issue  is  joined,  the  Clerks  of  Records  and  Writs 
will,  upon  the  application  of  any  party  to  the  suit,  cause,  such  affidavits 
and  depositions  (other  than  depositions  taken  on  the  oral  cross-exam- 
ination of  witnesses  who  have  made  such  affidavits)  to  be  printed  after 
the  expiration  of  the  time  fixed  for  closing  the  evidence;  and  such  last- 
mentioned  depositions,  after  the  expiration  of  the  time  allowed  for  the 
oral  cross-examination  of  such  witnesses.6 

In  a  cause  in  which  a  notice  of  motion  for  a  decree  has  been  given,, 
the  Clerks  of  Records  and  Writs  will,  upon  the  application  of  any  party 
to  the  suit,  cause  the  affidavits  filed  on  behalf  of  the  plaintiffs,  the  affi- 
davits filed  on  behalf  of  the  defendants,  and  the  affidavits  of  the  plain- 
tiffs in  reply,  to  be  printed  after  the  times  respectively  allowed  for  filing 

an  agreement  between  the  parties  to  waive  writ-  of  motion    for   decree   served,  since   the   18th 

ten  interrogatories;  and   such  agreement  ought  June,  1802.     See  R-  S.  C.  Ord.  XXXVIII.  1-0, 

to  be  in  writing.     Van  Hook    v.  Pendleton,   2  and  (costs),  Ord.  I.-V. 
Blatch.  85.     See  ante,  p.  888,  note  (a).  3  Ord.  16  May,  1802,  r.  9. 

1  As  to  examinations  before  an  Examiner,  4  Ord.  16  May,  1862,  r.  2. 

see. post,  p.  903,  et  seq.  5  Old.  1G  May,  1862,  r.  3.     The  copy  should 

8  Ord.  5  Feb.,  1861,  r.  6.  have  the  usual  margin  on  the  left-hand  side  of 

9  ibid.  each  page.    R.  &  W.  Clerks"  Suggestions,  No.  7. 
i  Ord.  5  Feb,  1861,  r.  22;  and  see  Ford  v.      The  certificate  should  be  written  on  the  left- 

Tennant.  11  W.  R.  275,  M.  R.,  where  it  was  hand  margin  of  the  first  page  of  each  copy,  be- 
held that  this  rule  applies  to  e x parte  examina-  fore  being  left  at  the  office.  Id.  No.  8.  lor 
tions.  form  of  certificate,  see  Vol.  III. 

2  Ord.  16  May,  1862,  r.  1.    This  orderapplies  G  Ord.  16  May,  1862,  r.  i. 
to  cases  where  issue  has  been  joined,  or  notice 

901 


*  903  EVIDENCE. 

each  set  of  such  affidavits,  and  the  depositions  taken  on  the  oral  cross- 
examination  of  the  witnesses  who  have  made  such  affidavits,  after  such 
depositions  have  been  filed.7 

It  is  desirable  that  the  affidavits  to  be  thus  printed  should  be  all  pre- 
sented for  filing  together  at  one  time,  and,  if  possible,  on  the  last  day 
of  the  time  allowed  for  filing  the  same,  that  is  to  say,  —  where 

*  903    issue  has  been  joined,  on  the  last  day  of  the  time  fixed  for  *  clos- 

ing the  evidence ;  and  where  notice  of  motion  for  a  decree  has 
been  served,  on  the  last  day  of  each  of  the  respective  times  allowed  to 
the  plaintiff  and  defendant  for  filing  the  affidavits  ;  and  that  the  fair 
copies  left  with  such  affidavits  should  be  numbered  consecutively  (at 
the  top  of  the  first  page)  in  the  order  in  which  it  is  desired  that  they 
should  be  printed.1  Where  the  foregoing  suggestion  is  complied  with, 
the  application  to  have  the  evidence  printed  may  be  made  at  the  time 
the  evidence  is  filed.2  The  application  to  have  any  evidence  printed, 
which  has  been  taken  orally,  may  be  made  at  any  time  after  such  evi- 
dence is  filed ;  except  that,  in  cases  where  a  time  for  taking  any  oral 
examination  has  been  specially  fixed,  and  also  in  cases  where  issue  has 
been  joined,  the  application  is  not  to  be  made  until  the  time  fixed  for 
taking  the  examination,  or  for  closing  the  evidence,  has  expired.3  A 
written  or  printed  application  to  have  the  evidence  printed,  must  be 
made  ; 4  and  it  is  desirable  that  the  number  of  printed  copies  of  the  evi- 
dence which  may  be  required  for  general  use  in  the  cause  should  be 
stated  in  such  application.5 

Every  party  who  files  an  affidavit,  or  causes  depositions  to  be  taken, 
must  take  from  the  Clerks  of  Records  and  Writs  a  printed  copy  of  every 
affidavit  filed  by  him  and  of  all  such  depositions :  for  which  he  is  to 
pay,  in  stamps,  at  the  rate  of  twopence  per  folio ;  and  unless  such  copy 
is  taken,  he  is  not  to  be  allowed  anything  in  the  taxation  of  costs,  in 
respect  of  such  affidavit  or  depositions.6  As  a  rule,  such  printed  copy 
will  be  ready  for  delivery  within  forty-eight  hours  after  the  application 
to  have  the  evidence  printed  is  made.7 

All  parties  are  to  be  at  liberty  to  take  from  the  Clerks  of  Records 
and  Writs  as  many  other  printed  copies  of  their  own  and  of  their  oppo- 
nents' affidavits  and  depositions  as  they  may  require,  on  paying  for  the 
same,  in  stamps,  at  the  rate  of  one  penny  per  folio.8  These  copies  may 
be  had  at  the  same  time  as  the  official  copy.9 

1  Orel.  16  May.  1862,  r.  5.  5E.&  W.  Clerks'  Suggestions,  No.  5. 
i  R.  &  W.  Cl'erks'  Suggestions,  No.  2.                    6  Ord.  16  May,  1862,  r.  6. 

2  Ibid.  No.  3.  7  K.  &  W.  Clerks'  Suggestions,  No.  6. 

8  Ibid.  No.  4.  8  Ord.  16  May,  1862,  r.7.     As  to  the  allow- 

4  Printed  copies  of  the  form  of  application      ances  to  solicitors,  see  r.  8. 

may  be  had,  on  application  at  the  divisional  9  R.  &  W.  Clerks'  Suggestions,  No.  6. 

seat,  in  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerks'  Office. 

Id.  No.  9.     For  such  form,  see  Vol.  III. 

902 


VIVA   VOCE   EVIDENCE.  *  904 


Section  XI.  —  Of  Viva  Voce  Evidence. 

The  viva  voce  examination  of  witnesses  may  take  place,  either  before 
the  Court,  the  Judge,  or  his  Chief  Clerk,  in  Chambers,  or  an  Examiner 
of  the  Court,  or  an  Examiner  specially  appointed.10 

*  Where  the  issue  has  been  joined,  there  can  be  no  viva  voce  *  904 
examination  of  witnesses  in  chief  for  the  purposes  of  the  hearing 
except  the  ex  parte  examination  before  the  Examiner,  in  manner  before 
pointed  out,1  and  except  the  evidence  as  to  particular  facts  or  issues,  if 
so  -directed  by  special  order ; 2  and  all  cross-examinations  of  witnesses 
must  take  place  before  the  Court  itself  at  the  hearing.3  The  parties 
may,  however,  by  consent  in  writing,  which  must  be  filed  in  the  Record 
and  Writ  Clerks'  Office,  agree  to  take  the  examination  or  cross-exami- 
nation of  any  witness,  in  manner  provided  by  the  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86  ;4 
and  further,  the  Court,  or  Judge  in  Chambers,  may  direct  that  the 
examination  or  cross-examination  of  any  witness  shall  be  taken  in  this 
manner,  where  by  reason  of  the  age,  infirmity,  or  absence  out  of  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  witness,  or  for  any  other  sufficient  cause,  it  is  expe- 
dient that  such  direction  should  be  given.  Such  direction  may  be  ob- 
tained on  application  to  the  Court,  or  the  Judge  in  Chambers,  on 
notice.5 

According  to  the  Act  above  referred  to,  all  witnesses  to  be  examined 
orally  are  to  be  so  examined  by  or  before  one  of  the  Examiners  of  the 
Court,  or  by  or  before  an  Examiner  to  be  specially  appointed  by  the 
Court,6  the  Examiner  being  furnished  by  the  plaintiff  with  a  copy  of 
the  bill,  and  of  the  answer,  if  any,  in  the  cause ;  and  such  examination 
is  to  take  place  in  the  presence  of  the  parties,  their  counsel,  solicitors, 
or  agents  ;  and  the  witnesses  so  examined  orally  are  to  be  subject  to 
cross-examination  and  re-examination  ;  and  such  examination,  cross- 
examination,  and  re-examination,  are  to  be  conducted,  as  nearly  as  may 
be,  in  the  mode  in  use  in  Courts  of  Common  Law,  with  respect  to  a 
witness  about  to  go  abroad,  and  not  expected  to  be  present  at  the  trial 
of  a  cause.7 

The  depositions  so  taken  are  to  be  taken  down  in  writing  by  the 
Examiner,  not  ordinarily  by  question  and  answer,  but  in  the  form  of  a 

i»  See  1  Dan.  Ch.  Prac.  (6th  Eng.  erf.)  639;  6  The  rules  of  Chancery  in  New  Jersey  pro- 

R.  S.  C.  1883,  Orel.  XXXVII.     The  Court  of  vide  that  every  person  who  shall  he  appointed 

the  Examiner  is  not  a  puhlic  Court,  and  no  one  an  Examiner  of  the  Court  of  Chancery  shall, 

has  a  right  to  be  present.     In  re  Western  of  before  he  enters  upon  the  execution  of  his  office, 

Canada  Oil  Lands  Co.  6  Ch.  D.  109.  take,  before  the  Chancellor  or  Clerk,  an  oath  or 

1  'Ante,  p.  901.  affirmation  impartially  and  justly  to  perform 

2  Ord.  5  Feb.,  18G1,  r.  3.  all  the  duties  of  the  office,  according  to  the  best 

3  Ord.  5  Feb.,  1861,  r.  7;  Bodger  v.  Bodger,  of  his  abilities  and  understanding.  Rule  42; 
11  W.  R.  80,  V.C.  K.     Infirm  witnesses  (r.  11),  see  State  i\  Levy,  3  Har.  &  McH.  591. 

and  suits  to  perpetuate  testimony  (r.  16),  are  1  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  31  (now  superseded 

excepted  from  this  rule.  by  46  &  47  Vic.  c.  49,  §  4,  Sched.  and  R  S.  C. 

4  Ord.  5  Feb.,  1861,  r.  10  (7  Jur.  N.  S.  Pt.  1883).  For  the  mode  in  use  at  Law,  sec  1  Chilly's 
11.59).  See  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  XXXVII.  1,  4.  For  Arch.  329-336.  For  form  of  witness's  oath, 
form  of  consent,  see  Vol.  III.  see  Braithwaite's  Oaths,  95. 

5  Ord.   5  Feb.,   1861,  r.   11.     For   forms  of 
notice  of  motion  and  summons,  see  Vol.  III. 

903 


' 


*  90G  EVIDENCE. 

narrative,8  and  when  completed  are  to  be  read  over  to  the  wit- 

*  905    ness,  and  signed  by  him 9  in  the  presence  of  the  parties,  or  *  such 

of  them  as  may  think  fit  to  attend  ;  but  if  the  witness  refuses  to 
sign,  then  the  Examiner  is  to  sign  the  depositions ;  and  the  Examiner 
may,  upon  all  examinations,  state  any  special  matter  to  the  Court,  as 
he  shall  think  fit.  It  is  in  the  discretion  of  the  Examiner  to  put  down 
any  particular  question  or  answer,  if  there  should  appear  any  special 
reason  for  doing  so ;  and  any  question  or  questions  which  may  be  ob- 
jected to  are  to  be  noticed  or  referred  to  by  the  Examiner  in  the  deposi- 
tions, and  he  is  to  state  his  opinion  thereon  to  the  counsel,  solicitors, 
or  parties,  and  to  refer  to  such  statement  on  the  face  of  the  depositions ; 
but  he  is  not  to  have  power  to  decide  upon  the  materiality  or  relevancy 
of  any  question  or  questions.  The  Court  deals  with  the  costs  of  imma- 
terial or  irrelevant  depositions  as  may  be  just.1 

There  are  two  Examiners  of  the  Court2  before  whom  the  examination 
of  witnesses  is  usually  taken ;  but  where,  on  account  of  the  distance 
from  London  at  which  the  witnesses  reside,3  the  pressure  of  business,4 
or  other  sufficient  reason,6  the  examination  cannot  be  conveniently  taken 
before  one  of  the  Examiners  of  the  Court,  a  Special  Examiner  may  be 
appointed ;  but  the  Court  is  unwilling  to  appoint  a  Special  Examiner, 
except  in  cases  of  absolute  necessity.6  Any  fit  person  may  be  a  Special 
Examiner ;  but  a  barrister,  or  solicitor,  is  usually  appointed.7  There 
was  formerly  a  rule,  that  witnesses  residing  more  than  twenty  miles 
from  London  could  not  be  compelled  to  attend  before  an  Examiner  in 
London  ;  but  this  rule  no  longer  exists.8 

The  application  for  the  appointment  of  a  Special  Examiner  may 
*  906   *  be  made  in  Chambers  by  summons,  or  in  Court  by  motion  on 

8  See  New  Jersey  Rule  71  of  Chancery  2  Appointed  under  16  &  17  Vic.  c.  22;  see 
Practice.  ante,  p.  901,  note.     As  to  Examiners'  fees,  see 

9  The  rule  was  the  same  as  to  depositions.  Ord.  as  to  Court  Fees,  1875,  Sched.  Wright 
Copeland  v.  Stanton,  1  P.  W.  414.    But  see^os«,  ».  Larmuth,  L.  R.  10  Eq.  139. 

pp.  918,  note,  and  930,  n.  2.  3  Re  Foster's  Trusts,  2  W.  R.  679,  V.  C.  K.; 

i  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  32;  Suit  v.  Walms-  Ogilby  v.  Gregory,  4  W.  R.  67,  V.  C.  W.;  and 

ley,  L.  R.  2Eq.  439,  V.  C.  W.     The  Rules  of  see  Rawlins  v.  Wickham,   4  Jur.   N.   S.  990, 

Practice   for  the  U.   S.  Courts  of  Equity  pre-  V.  C.  S. 

scribe  that  either  party  may  give  notice  to  the  4  Brennan    v.   Preston,   10   Hare   App.   17; 

other  that  he  desires  the  evidence  to  be  adduced  Jones  v.  "Wood  Street  Warehouse  Co.  W.  N. 

in  the  cause  to  be  taken  orally,  and  thereupon  (1873)  39. 

substantially  the  same  course  of  proceeding  is  5  Pillan  v.  Thompson,  10  Hare  App.  76. 

to  be  pursued  as  that  directed  by  15  &  16  Vic.  6  Brocas  v.  Lloyd,  21  Beav.  519;  2  Jur.  N.  S. 

c.   86,  §§  31.  32,  stated  in  the  text.     Rule  95,  555;  Altree  v.  Sherwin,  2  De  G.  &  J.  92;  Town- 

amending  Rule  67,  see  Vol.  III.  App'x.    By  the  send  v.  Williams,  6  W.  R.  734,  V.  C.  W.     As 

same  rule  it  is  prescribed  that   "notice  shall  be  to  special  examiners   in  winding  up,  see   Re 

given  by  the  respective  counsel  or  solicitors  to  Smith,   Knight  &  Co.  L.  R.  8  Eq.  23;  see  Re 

the  opposite  counsel  or  solicitors  or  parties,  of  Lisbon  Steam  Tramways  Co.  2  Ch.  D.  575. 

the  time  and  place  of  the  examination,  for  such  "  Henderson  v.  Phillipson,  17  Jur.  615,  V.  C. 

reasonable  time  as  the  Examiner  may  fix  by  W.;  Reed  v    Prest,  Kay  App.  14;  and  see  16 

order  in  each   cause."     Under    this    rule  also  &  17  Vic.  c.  22,  §  2.      His  fees  are  5  guineas 

"  testimonv  may  be  taken  on  commission,   in  a  day,  and  5s.  for  his  clerk.     Regul.  to  Ord. 

the  usual  way,  by  written  interrogatories  and  Sched.  1;  Payne  v.  Little,  21  Beav.  65. 

cross-interrogatories,  on  motion  to  the  Court,  in  8  Altree  r.   Sherwin,  and  Brocas  v.  Lloyd, 

term  time,  or  to  a  Judge  in  vacation,  for  special  ubi  supra,  overruling  Reed  v.  Prest,  ubi  supra ; 

reason;    satisfactory  to  the  Court  or  Judge."  and  see  Townsend  r.  Williams,  ubi  sujira. 
For  formal  parts  of  depositions,  see  Vol.  III. 

904 


VIVA    VOCE   EVIDENCE. 


90G 


notice;1  and  should,  except,  perhaps,  where  the  parties  consent,  be 
supported  by  an  affidavit  of  his  fitness,  and  that  he  has  no  adverse 
interest.2 

The  whole  of  the  depositions  of  the  witnesses  must  be  written  by  the 
Examiner,  with  his  own  hand.8 

The  Examiner  is  a  mere  ministerial  officer,  and  has  no  power  to  lay 
down  rules  as  to  the  most  convenient  time  of  taking  examinations ; 4  he 
has,  however,  it  seems,  a  discretion  to  allow  a  witness  to  be  treated  as 
hostile  by  the  party  calling  him ; 5  or  to  determine  the  relevancy  of 
the  evidence.6  Such  questions  must  be  determined  by  the  Court;  and 
for  that  purpose  the  Examiner  should  take  down  the  questions  and 
answers  in  writing.7  The  Examiner  has  power  to  admit  or  exclude  the 
public,  as  he  thinks  fit.8 

Where  it  is  intended  to  examine  witnesses  before  an  Examiner,  an 
appointment  must  be  obtained  from  him,3  and  notice  thereof  given  to 
the  witness10;  and  where  there  is  reason  to  suppose  a  witness  will  not 
voluntarily  attend  to  be  examined,  recourse  must  be  had  to  the  compul- 
sory process  of  a  writ  of  subpoena  ad  testificandum,  which  commands 
the  witness  to  whom  it  is  directed  to  appear  before  the  Examiner,  to 
testify  on  behalf  of  the  party  requiring  his  testimony.11     In  case  the 


1  Reed  v.  Prest,  ubi  supra;  Williams  v. 
Williams,  10  Hare  App.  45;  17  Beav.  150;  17 
Jur.  434. 

2  See  Ongley  v.  Hill,  W.  N.  (1874)  157;  22 
W.  R.  817.  Where  the  examination  was  to  be 
taken  ex  parte,  the  Judge  said  that  if  the  parties 
could  not  agree  upon  an  Examiner,  he  would 
name  one.  Davenport  v.  Goldberg,  2  H.  &  M. 
280.  For  forms  of  summons,  notice  of  motion, 
and  affidavit,  see  Vol.  III. 

3  Stobart  v.  Todd,  18  Jur.  018,  V.  C.  K. ; 
see  Bolton  v.  Bolton,  2  Ch.  D.  217;  Cooper  v. 
Macdonald,  W.  N.  (1807)  41.  A  witness  should 
go  before  the  Examiner,  free  to  answer  all  inter- 
rogatories, and  not  with  a  deposition  already 
prepared.  Underbill  v.  Van  Cortlandt,  2  John. 
Ch.  339.  A  deposition,  prepared  and  written 
by  the  party  for  whom  it  is  taken,  cannot  be 
received  as  evidence.  Amory  v.  Fellows,  5 
Mass.  219;  see  Kay  v.  Walton,  2  A.  K.  Marsh. 
71.  Although  it  is  copied  by  a  third  person. 
Griswold  v.  Griswold,  1  Root,  259.  The  deposi- 
tion is  equally  inadmissible  if  drawn  by  the 
agent  of  the  party.  Smith  ».  Huntington,  1 
Root,  220;  Allen  v.  Rand,  5  Conn.  322;  Ratter- 
son  v.  Patterson,  2  Penn.  200;  Addleman  v. 
Masterson,  1  id.  454;  see  United  States  v. 
Smith,  4  Day,  121 ;  Logan  v.  Steele,  3  Bibb, 
230.  The  practice  of  having  the  questions 
shown  to  the  witness,  and  his  answers  prepared 
beforehand,  and  reduced  to  writing  and  ex- 
amined by  counsel  before  coming  before  the 
Master  to  testify,  was  severely  reprehended  in 
Hickok  v.  Fanners  and  Mechanics'  Bank,  35 
Vt.  470,  490. 


4  Meacham  r.  Cooper,  L.  R.  10  Eq.  102. 

5  Ohlsen  v.  Terrero,  L.  R.  10  Ch.  127,  129; 
see  Wright  v.  Wilkin,  4  Jur.  N.  S.  804;  0 
W.  R.  043,  V.  C.  K. 

o  See  15  &  10  Vice.  80,  §32.  As  to  objecting 
at  the  hearing  in  Court,  see  Kelsey  v.  Snyder, 
118  111.  544. 

"  Buckley  v.  Cooke,  1  K.  &  J.  29;  see  form 
in  Vol.  III. 

8  Wright  v.  Wilkin,  ubi  supra;  see  Re 
Western  of  Canada  Oil  Lands  Co.  0  Ch.  D. 
109. 

9  Ante,  pp.  904,  905,  n. 

10  When  the  examination  takes  place  before 
an  Examiner  of  the  Court,  £3  must  be  de- 
posited with  the  Examiner's  clerk,  by  the  party 
obtaining  the  appointment.  This  is  returned 
to  him  if  he  duly  attends  ;  but  if  he  does  not, 
and  was  not  prevented  by  death,  illness,  or  ' 
unavoidable  accident,  it  is  paid  to  the  opposite 
party  ;  or  if  the  opposite  party  also  fails  to 
attend,  or  the  examination  was  to  have  been 
ex  parte,  the  .£3  is  paid  to  the  suitors'  fee  fund. 
Ord.  1  Jan.,  1802.  See  now  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  as 
to  Court  Fees,  Oct.  1875,  Sched.  The  order 
does  not  apply  to  a  plaintiff  suing  in  forma 
/imi/it  ris.  Skeats  v.  Hurst,  1  N.  R  50,  V.  < '.  W. 
For  form  of  notice  to  the  witness,  see  Vol.  III. 

"  Hinde,  230.  See  78th  Equity  Rule  of  the 
U.  S.  Courts,  post,  p.  2395.  The  compulsory 
attendance  of  witnesses  before  the  Examiner  is 
provided  for  in  Xew  Jersey,  by  Chancery  Rule 
94.  For  form  of  writ,  see  Cons.  Ord.  Sched.  F. 
No.  3;  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  April,  1880,  Sched.  G. 
Nos.  1,  3,  and  post,  Vol.  III. 

905 


*  907 


EVIDENCE. 


*  907  witness  is  required  to  bring  *  with  him  any  written  document  in 
his  possession,  then  the  writ  must  be  a  subpoena  duces  tecum.1 

Every  subpoena,  other  than  a  subpoena  duces  tecum,  is  to  contain  three 
names,  where  necessary  or  required ; 2  and  no  more  than  three  persons 
are  to  be  included  in  one  subpoena  duces  tecum  ;  but  the  party  suing  out 
the  same  is  at  liberty  to  sue  out  a  Subpoena  for  each  person,  if  it  is 
deemed  necessary  or  desirable  to  do  so.8  In  a  subpoena  of  this  nature, 
a  husband  and  his  wife  are  considered  as  two  distinct  persons,  and  her 
Christian  and  surname  must  be  inserted  accordingly.4 

The  subpoena  must  be  indorsed  with  the  name  or  firm,  and  place  of 
business,  of  the  solicitor  issuing  the  same,  and  of  his  ageut,  if  any,  or 
with  the  name  and  place  of  residence  of  the  party  issuing  the  same, 
when  he  acts  in  person ;  and,  in  either  case,  with  the  address  for  ser- 
vice, if  any.5 

On  presenting  a  subpoena  to  be  sealed,  a  praecipe,  in  the  usual  form, 
must  be  filed  at  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerks'  Office.6 

The  service  of  any  subpoena,  except  a  subpoena  for  costs,  is  to  be  of 
no  validity  if  not  made  within  twelve  weeks  after  the  teste  of  the  writ  ;7 
and  in  the  interval  between  the  suing  out  and  service  of  any  subpoena, 
the  party  suing  out  the  same  may  correct  any  error  in  the  names  of 
parties  or  witnesses,  and  may  have  the  writ  resealed,  upon  leaving  a 


1  As  to  the  degree  of  particularity  with 
which  the  documents  must  be  described, see  Att.- 
Gen.  v.  Wilson,  9  Sim.  526.  For  form  of  writ, 
see  Cons.  Ord.  Sched.  E.  No.  3;  R.  S.  C.  Ord. 
April,  1880,  Sched.  G.  Nos.  1,  3,  and  post  Vol. 
III.  When  served  with  a  subpoena  duces  tecum, 
the  witness  must  attend  before  the  Examiner 
and  produce  the  instrument  required,  unless  he 
has  some  legal  or  reasonable  excuse  for  with- 
holding it.  Upon  trials  in  Courts  of  Law,  the 
Court  and  not  the  witness  is  the  judge  of  the 
validity  of  the  objection.  Amey  v.  Long,  9 
East,  473;  Bull  v.  Loveland,  10  Pick.  9.  In 
Courts  of  Equity,  the  validity  of  the  objec- 
tion is  considered,  upon  the  witness  being 
brought  up,  on  an  attachment  for  refusing  to 
produce  the  instrument.  Bradshaw  v.  Brad- 
shaw,  3  Sim.  285;  see  M'Pherson  v.  Rathbone, 
7  Wend.  216;  Jackson  v.  Denison,  4  Wend. 
558;  Newland  v.  Steer,  11  Jur.  N.  S.  596  ;  13 
W.  R.  1014,  V.  C.  K.;  Lee  v.  Angus,  L.  R.  2 
Eq.  59,  V.  C.  W.  A  party  cannot,  by  a  sub- 
piena  duces  tecum,  procure  the  production  of 
documents;  the  proper  course  is  to  apply  for  an 
order  for  that  purpose.  Newland  v.  Steer,  ubi 
supra ;  Crowther  v.  Appleby,  L.  R.  9  C.  P.  23  : 
see  also  Cliff  v.  Bull,  W.  N.  (1869)  182  ;  17 
W.  R.  1120. 

A  party  to  a  cause  who  may  be  compelled  to 
testify  may  also  be  required,  by  a  subpcena 
duces  tecum,  to  produce  books  and  documents 
pertinent  to  the  issues,  unless  he  has  a  lawful 
excuse  to  be  judged  of  by  the  Court.  Murray 
v.  Elston,  21  N.  J.  Eq.  212.  The  highest 
official   is   bound   to  appear  and  testify  when 

906 


required  by  proper  process,  unless  he  has  a  law- 
ful excuse;  but  will  not  be  compelled  to  pro- 
duce a  paper  or  document  if,  in  his  opinion,  his 
official  duty  requires  him  to  withhold  it;  and 
the  Court  will  not  entertain  proceedings  to 
compel  the  President  of  the  United  States,  or 
the  Governor  of  a  State,  to  testify,  by  adjudg- 
ing him  in  contempt.  1  Burr's  Trial,  182;  Gray 
v.  Pentland,  2  S.  &  R.  23 ;  Thompson  v.  German 
A'alley  R.  Co.  22  N.  J.  Eq.  111.  A  subpcena 
duces  tecum  has  been  granted  directed  to  the 
local  manager  of  a  Telegraph  Company  for  the 
original  telegraphic  despatches  on  file.  Ince's 
case,  20  L.  T.  N.  S.  421  ;  Natl.  Bank  v.  Natl. 
Bank,  7  W.  Va.  544;  Heinsler  v.  Friedman,  2 
Pars.  Eq.  Cas.  274  ;  see  also  ex  parte  Brown,  8 
Cent.  L.  J.  378  (St.  Louis  Crt.  of  App.);  Com- 
monwealth v.  Jeffries,  7  Allen,  548  ;  State  v. 
Litchfield,  58  Maine,  267;  United  States  v. 
Babcock,  3  Dill.  567.  See  also  Am.  Law  Reg. 
for  February,  1879,  p.  65,  an  article  by  Judge 
Coolev. 

2  Cons.  Ord.  XXVIII.  3 ;  R.  S.  C.  Ord. 
April,  1880,  Sched.  G.  Nos.  1-6.  In  New 
Jersey,  the  names  of  any  number  of  witnesses 
may  be  inserted  in  the  same  subpcena.     Rule  94. 

3  Cons.  Ord.  XXVIII.  4. 

4  Hinde,  327 ;  Braithwaite's  Pr.  264,  n. 

5  Cons.  Ord.  III.  2,  5 ;  ante,  pp.  453,  454. 
For  form  of  indorsement,  see  Vol.  III. 

6  Cons.  Ord.  XXVIII.  1.  Now  at  the  Cen- 
tral Office.  For  form  of  pracipe,  see  R.  S.  C. 
Ord.  April,  1880,  Sched.  E.  20,  and  Vol.  III. 

~>  Cons.  Ord.  XXVIII.  9. 


VIVA   VOCE   EVIDENCE.  *  908 

corrected  prcecipe  of  such  subpoena,  marked,  "  altered  and  resealed,"  and 
signed  with  the  name  and  address  of  the  solicitor  or  solicitors  suing 
out  the  same.8 

The  service  of  this  subpoena  must,  in  all  cases,  be  personal ; 9  and  is 
effected  by  delivering  a  copy  of  the  writ  and  of  the  indorsement  thereon 
to  the  witness,  and  at  the  same  time  producing  the  original  writ.10  At 
the  time  he  is  served  with  the  writ,  the  witness  should  be  served  with 
a  notice  in  writing,  specifying  the  time  when  he  is  to  attend  the 
Examiner  in  pursuance  of  it.11 

*No  witness  is  bound  to  attend  unless  his  reasonable  expenses    *  908 
are  paid  or  tendered  to  him ;  nor,  if  he  appears,  is  he  bound  to 
give  evidence  until  such  charges  are  actually  paid  him  ; 1  and  the  rule  is 
the  same  where  the  witness  is  a  party  to  the  cause.2 

If  the  witness  whose  attendance  is  required  is  a  married  woman,  the 
subpoena  should  be  served  upon  her  personally,  and  the  tender  of  the 
expenses  made  to  her,  and  not  to  her  husband.8 

If  the  witness,  upon  being  duly  served  with  the  subpoena  and  notice, 
neglects  or  refuses  to  attend  to  be  examined,  a  certificate  of  his  non- 
attendance  must  be  procured  from  the  Examiner,  and  filed  in  the  Record 
and  Writ  Clerks'  Office  ; 4  and  an  application  made  to  the  Court  that  the 
witness  may  be  ordered  to  attend  and  be  sworn  and  examined,  at  such 
time  and  place  as  the  Examiner  may  appoint.5  This  application  is  made 
by  motion,  which  may  be  either  ex  parte,  or  on  notice  to  the  witness.6  The 
application  must  be  supported  by  an  affidavit  of  due  service  of  the  sub- 
poena and  notice,7  and  by  production  of  the  Examiner's  certificate  of 
non-attendance,  or  an  office  copy  thereof.8     When   the  order  is  made 

8  Cons.  Ord.  XXVIII.  5.  W.     For  scale   of   allowances,    see   Vol.    III. 

9  Spicer  v.  Dawson,  22  Beav.  282.  Solici-  Now  the  Taxing  Master  decides.  R.  S.  C. 
tors  of  an  absconding  witness  cannot  be  coin-  Ord.  (costs),  Sehed.  r.  8;  Turnbull  v.  Janson, 
pelled  to  disclose  his  address.  Heath  v.  Crea-  3  C.  P.  D.2G4;  Thomas  v.  Parrv,  W.  N.  (1880) 
lock,  L.  R.  15  Eq.  257.  184. 

1°  Cons.  Ord.  XXVIII.  0.  2  Dave}-  v.    Durrant,  24  Beav.  403;  4  Jur. 

11  Where  the  examination  is  adjourned,  the  N.    S.    230,   a  case   of  cross-examination    on 

witness   is  bound  to  attend  the  adjournment,  affidavit. 

without  being  served  with  a  new  subpoena;  but  3  2  Phil,  on  Evid.  428;  2  Taylor  on  Evid. 

he   should  be   served    with    notice   of  the   ad-  §  1240. 

journed  time;   and  see  Lawson  v.  Stoddart,  10  4  Seton,  1234;  but  see  Cast  v.  Poyser,  3  Sm. 

Jur.  N.  S.  33;  12  W.   R.  286,  V.  C.   K.     For  &  G.  369,  where  an  attachment  was  "held  regu- 

forms  of  notice,  see  Vol.  III.  lar,  though  the  certificate  had   not  been  filed. 

It  is  not  irregular  to  issue  the  subpoena  against  The  filing  is  now  at  the  Central  Office.     See,  as 

persons  who  are  residents  out  of  the  jurisdiction,  to   how   long  a  witness   must  wait  before,   in 

and  it  may  be  enforced  against  them  when  they  consequence  of  the  absence  of  the  examining 

come  within  the  jurisdiction.    Campbell  v.  Att.-  partv,  he  may  leave,   Perks  v.    Stottart,  1  N. 

Gen.  L.  R.  2  Ch.  571.  R.  563. 

1  The   amount  payable  is  according  to  the  5  Braithwaite's   Pr   144.     See  78th  Equity 

scale  fixed  by  the  Common   Law  Judges;  see  Rule  of  the  IT.  S.  Courts,  post,  p.  2395.     For 

Directions  to  Masters,  Hilary  Term,   1853;  17  forms  of  orders  nisi  and  absolute,  see  Seton, 

Jur.  Pt.  II.  41 ;  2  Taylor  on  Evid.  §  1246 ;  Chitty's  1233,  1234. 

Arch.  1765;    see  also  Clark  v.  Gill,  1   K.  &  J.  6  Wisden  v.  Wisden,  6  Hare,  549,  550.     For 

19  ;  Nokcs  v.  Gibbon,  3  Jur.  N.  S.  282,  V.  C.  forms  of  motion  paper  and  notice  of  motion,  see 

K.;  Brocas  v.  Lloyd,  23  Beav.  120;  2  Jur.  N.  Vol.  III. 

S.  555;  Turner  v.  Turner,  5  Jur.  N.   S.  839;  7  1  For  form  of  affidavit,  see  Vol.  III. 

W.   R.   573,  V.  C.  K.;  Morgan  &   Davey,  29;  8  Seton,  1234. 

Wiltshire  v.  Marshall,  W.  N.  (1866)  80,*V.  C. 

907 


*  909  EVIDENCE. 

ex  parte,  it  contains  a  clause  that  in  default  of  attendance  the  witness 
do  stand  committed  to  Whitecross  Street  Prison, 9  and  should  not  direct 
him  to  pay  the  costs  of  the  application.10  A  further  appointment  must 
next  be  obtained  from  the  Examiner,  and  notice  thereof,  and  a  copy  of 
the  order,  duly  served  on  the  witness.11  If  the  witness  still  neglects  or 
refuses  to  attend,  a  further  certificate  of  non-attendance  must  be  obtained 
from  the  Examiner,  and  filed,  as  before  explained.     An  attach- 

*  909    ment  may  then,  if  the  order  has  been  made  *  on  notice,  be  issued 

against  him  on  production  to  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerk  of  an 
affidavit1  of  due  service  of  the  order  and  notice,  and  the  Examiner's 
certificate  of  non-attendance,  or  an  office  copy  thereof.2  If  the  order 
has  been  obtained  ex  parte,  an  order  for  the  committal  of  the  witness  to 
prison  will  be  made,  on  an  ex  parte  application  by  motion,  supported  by 
the  same  evidence.3  This  order,  when  drawn  up,  passed,  and  entered, 
must  be  delivered  to  the  tipstaff  attending  the  Court,  who  will  procure 
a  warrant  from  the  Lord  Chancellor,  and  will  then  apprehend  and  lodge 
the  witness  in  prison,  where  he  must  remain  in  custody,  not  only  till 
he  has  been  examined,  but  also  until  payment  of  taxed  costs  to  the 
party  requiring  his  testimony,  and  likewise  the  tipstaff's  and  keeper's 
fees  for  taking  and  detaining  him.4  (a) 

After  the  witness  has  been  examined,  he  will,  upon  his  motion  or 
petition,  and  production  of  the  Examiner's  certificate  of  his  examination 
being  complete,  be  ordered  to  be  discharged  by  the  Court,  on  paying  or 
tendering  the  costs  of  his  contempt;  or  he  may  be  discharged  by  the 
party  at  whose  instance  he  was  committed,  if  the  jailer  can  be  prevailed 
upon  to  take  such  discharge.5 

The  method  is,  mutatis  mutandis,  the  same  where  a  witness,  having 
attended  in  obedience  to  the  subpwna,  refuses  to  be  sworn,  or,  it  would 
seem,  to  wait  till  his  examination  can  be  taken.6 

If  a  witness,  attending  upon  a  subpoe?ia  duces  tecum,  refuses,  without 
sufficient  cause,  to  produce  the  document  mentioned  in  the  writ,  when 
required,  he  may  be  ordered,  upon  special  motion,  to  attend  again  and 

9  Selon,  1234.     Now  to  Holloway  Prison.  2  Cons.  Ord.  XXIX.  3;  see  R.   S.  C.  Old. 

As  to  waiver  of  expenses  by  witness,  see  Lawton  XLIV.  2;   Seton,  1234.     For  further  informa- 

v.  Price,  W.  N.  (1867)  266  ;  16  W.  R.  73;  W.  N.  tion  as  to  attachments,  see  ante,  p.  403,  et  seq., 

(1808)  110.  and  post,  Chap.  XXVI.  §  7,  Enforcing  Decrees 

w  Nokes  v.  Gibbon,  3  Jur.  N.  S.  282,  V.  C.  and  Orders. 
K  ;  Brook  v.  Biddall,  2  Eq.  Rep.  637 ;  2  W.  R.  3  For  form  of  order,  see  Setnn,  1234;  and  for 

443,  V.  C.  K.  form  of  motion  paper,  see  Vol.  III. 

n  The  copy  of  the  order  must  be  indorsed  4  Hinde,  329. 

according    to    the    provisions    of    Cons.   Ord.  5  Ibid.  330;    Seton,  1237;    Walter  v.  Rutter, 

XXIII.  10,  as  varied  by  Ord.  7  Jan.,  1870,  r.  18  L.  T.  N.  S.  788. 

1  (L.  R.  5  Ch.  xxxiii.),  and  served  in  the  same  6  Hennegal  v.   Evance,    12   Ves.   201;    see 

manner  as    in   other  cases;    see    post,   Chap.  amendment  of  Rule  67,  of  the  Equity  Rules  of 

XXVI.  §   7,  Enforcing  Decrees  and  Orders.  the  U.  S.  Courts,  for  the  method  of  proceeding 

For  form  of  indorsement,  see  Vol.  III.  in  such  case. 
1  For  form,  see  Vol.  III. 


(a)  In  the  Federal  Courts,  any  Judge  having  out  a  hearing,  his  arrest  and  removal  back  to 
jurisdiction  in  the  district  to  which  a  witness  the  latter  district.  Be  Ellerbe,  13  Fed.  Rep.  530. 
has  removed,  after  failure  to  obey  a  subpoena  Depositions  may  now  be  there  taken  accord- 
duly  served  in  another  district,  may  order,  with-  ing  to  State  practice.     27  U.  S.  Stat,  at  L.  7. 

908 


VIVA    VOCE    EVIDENCE.  *  910 

produce  it,  and  to   pay  the  plaintiff  all   the   costs  occasioned   by   his 
refusal.7 

If  a  witness  is  in  prison,  under  a  common-law  process,8  he  may  be 
brought  up  under  a  writ  of  habeas  co)'jnis  ad  testificandum?  Formerly, 
the  practice  was  for  the  Examiner  to  attend  at  the  prison,  if  within  twenty 
miles  of  London  ; 10  and  this  practice  may,  it  is  presumed,  still  be  fol- 
lowed, though  it  would  probably  be  the  more  expensive  course.  The 
writ  of  habeas  corpus  is  never  issued  without  an  order :  the  order  may  be 
obtained  upon  motion  of  course,  or  on  petition  of  course,  at  the 
Rolls,  supported  by  an  *  affidavit  of  the  facts,  and  must  be  produced  *  910 
at  the  time  the  writ  is  sealed.1 

The  Court,  or  the  Judge  in  Chambers,  may  direct  that  the  oral  exami- 
nation and  cross-examination  of  any  witness  (whether  a  party  or  not), 
or  the  cross-examination  of  any  person  who  has  been  examined  ex  parte 
before  an  Examiner,  or  made  an  affidavit,  shall  be  taken  before  an 
Examiner  of  the  Court  or  a  Special  Examiner,  in  the  manner  prescribed 
by  the  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86, 2  in  case  it  shall  appear  to  the  Judge  that 
owing  to  the  age,  infirmity,  or  absence  out  of  the  jurisdiction  of  such 
witness  or  person,3  or  for  any  other  cause  which  to  the  Judge  shall 
appear  sufficient,  it  is  expedient  that  such  direction  should  be  given. 
Such  direction  may  be  obtained  on  application  to  the  Court  or  the  Judge 
in  Chambers,  on  notice.4  And  in  case  the  examination  or  cross-exami- 
nation of  any  person  in  England  or  Wales  is  so  directed,  the  party  re- 
quiring such  examination  or  cross-examination  may  apply  to  the  Court 
or  the  Judge  in  Chambers  for  an  order  that  one  of  the  Examiners  of  the 
Court  may  attend,  for  the  purpose  of  such  examination  or  cross-exami- 
nation, at  any  place  or  places  in  England  or  Wales  to  be  named  in  such 
order.5 

When  the  examination  of  witnesses  before  the  Examiner  has  been 
concluded,  the  original  depositions,  authenticated  by  his  signature,  are 


7  Bradshaw  v.  Bradshaw,  1  R.  &  M.  358;  see  Seton,  1275,  No.  3;  and  for  forms  of  motion 
Hope  v.  Liddell,  20  Beav.  4-38;  7  De  G.  M.  &  paper,  petition,  and  affidavit,  see  Vol.  III. 

G.  331;  Re  Cameron's  Coldbrook  By.  Co.  25  2  Ante,  p.  904. 

Beav.  1;  and  see  Cliff  v.  Bull,  W.   N.  (1869)  3  For  mo^e   0f  taking  evidence   when  the 

182;  17  W.  R.  1120;  Re  Emma  Silver  Mining  witness    is    out    of   the   jurisdiction,  see  post, 

Co.  L.  R.  10  Ch.  194.    And  see,  as  to  the  inter-  p.  848. 

rogation   of    the  witness   touching   documents  4  Ord.  5  Feb.,  1861,   r.    11;    ante,  p.  904. 

before  he  is  sworn,  or  before  trial,  Griffith  v.  For  form  of  notice   of  motion   and  summons, 

Ricketts,  7  Hare,  299;  Lee  v.  Angas,  L.  R.  2  see  Vol.  III. 

Eq.  59;    Steele  v.   Savory,  \V.  N.  (1891)  195;  5  Ord.  5  Feb.,  1861,  r.  12.     The  Examiner 

Re  Smith,  Williams  v.  Frere,  [1891]  1  Ch.  323.  is  entitled,   on  production  to  him  of  the  order, 

8  As  to  criminal  process,  see  16  &  17  Vic.  c.  to  one  guinea  a  day  for  his  expenses,  and  Is.  6<f. 
30,  §  9;  36  &  37  Vic.  c.  GO,  §76;  2  Seton,  1634,  per  mile  for  travelling  expenses.  Those  sums 
No.  2.  are  to  be  paid  him  by  the  party  obtaining  the 

9  Buckeridge  v.  Whalley,  6  W.  R.  180,  V.  order,  and,  subject  to  any  direction  of  the  Court 
C.  K.,  where  the  officer  was  ordered  to  attend  or  Judge  to  the  contrary,  will  be  costs  in  the 
with  the  witness  de  die  in  diem.  See  2  Seton,  cause.  Ord.  5  Feb.,  1861,  r,  13.  Formerly  the 
1574;  R.  S.  C.  1883,  Ord.  LII.  14.  For  form  Examiner  did  not  attend  at  any  place  farther 
of  writ,  see  Vol.  III. ;  R.  S.  C.  Ord.  April.  1880,  than  twenty  miles  from  London".  Hinde.  331 ; 
Scheds.  E.  No.  15,  G.  No.  12.  and  the  application  was  made  ex  parte;  Anon. 

1(»  Hinde,  331.  4  Mad.  463:  Pillan  V.  Thompson,  10  Hare  App. 

1  Braithwaite's  Fr.  224.    For  form  of  order,  76;  Watkins  v.  Atchison,  id.  46. 

909 


*  911  EVIDENCE. 

transmitted  by  him  to  the  Kecord  and  Writ  Clerks'  Office,6  to  be  there 
tiled  ;  and  any  party  to  the  suit  may  have  a  copy  of  the  whole,  or  any 
part.7 

If  the  Examiner  dies  before  signing  the  depositions,  they  must  be 
signed  by  his  successor.8  Where  the  Examiner  omits  to  sign 
*911  *  the  depositions,  the  Court  has  power,  if  it  thinks  fit,  to  order 
them  to  be  filed.1  An  Examiner,  before  whom  witnesses  who 
have  made  affidavits  are  being  cross-examined,  for  the  purpose  of  obtain- 
ing evidence  upon  an  interlocutory  motion,  may  return  part  of  these 
depositions  at  a  time ;  but  if  the  evidence  is  being  taken  for  the  hearing 
of  the  cause,  it  seems  that  he  cannot  return  any  until  the  examination 
is  closed.2  (a) 

The  depositions  are  to  be  written  on  foolscap  paper,  bookwise  or 
brief  wise,  as  the  Examiner  thinks  fit ;  but  depositions  otherwise  writ- 
ten may  be  received  and  filed,  if  the  circumstances  of  the  case  render 
such  reception  and  filing  desirable  or  necessary.8 

Where  issue  has  been  joined,  if  either  party  desires  the  evidence  as 
to  any  facts  or  issues  to  be  taken  viva  voce  at  the  hearing,  he  may,  at  any 
time  within  fourteen  daj's  after  issue  joined,  apply  to  the  Judge  in 
Chambers,  by  summons,4  to  be  served  on  the  opposite  party,  for  an  order 
that  the  evidence  in  chief  as  to  any  facts  or  issues  (such  facts  and  issues 
to  be  distinctly  and  concisely  specified  in  the  summons)  may  be  taken 
viva  voce  at  the  hearing  of  the  cause  ;  and  the  Judge  may  make  an  order 
that  the  evidence  in  chief  as  to  such  facts  and  issues,  or  any  of  them,  be 
taken  viva  voce  at  the  hearing  accordingly ;  and  the  facts  and  issues  as  to 
which  any  such  order  directs  the  evidence  in  chief  to  be  taken  viva  voce 
at  the  hearing,  must  be  distinctly  and  concisely  specified  in  such  order; 
but  in  case  the  Judge  is  satisfied  that  such  application  is  unreasonable, 
or  made  for  the  purpose  of  delay,  oppression,  or  vexation,  he  may  refuse 
to  make  any  such  order ;  and  where  any  such  order  has  been  made,  the 
examination  in  chief,  as  well  as  the  cross-examination,  and  re-examina- 
tion, will  be  taken  before  the  Court  at  the  hearing,  as  to  the  facts  and 

6  Now  at  the  Central  Office.  8  Bryson  »>.  Warwick  and  Birmingham  Canal 

1  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  34.     All  interlinea-  Co.  W.  R.  (1886),  124,  V.  C.  S.;    Felthouse  v. 

tions  or  alterations  in  the  depositions  should  be  Bailey,  14  W.  R.  827,  M.  R. 

authenticated  by  the  initials  of  the  Examiner,  1  Stephens  r.  Wanklin,  19  Beav.  585.     See 

and  if  the  depositions  are  not  left  by  him  per-  ante,  897,  n.  4.     As  to  what  error   in  the  title 

sonally  at  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerks'   Office,  will   invalidate    depositions,    see    Harford    v. 

now  at  the  Central  Office,  they  should  be  sent  Reeves,  9  Hare  App.  68,  and  the   case  there 

there  under  a  sealed  cover.     Braithwaite's  Pr.  referred  to.     See  also  Prince  Albert  v.  Strange, 

126.      For  the  fees  payable,  see  Regul.  to  Ord.  2  De  G.  &  S.  652,  709. 

Scheds.  1,  4.    See  the*U.  S.  Equity  Rule  67,  as  2  Clark  v.  Gill,  1  K.  &  J.  19.     For  formal 

amended,  post,  p.  2391 .   The  duty  of  Examiners  parts  of  depositions,  see  Vol.  III. 

to  transmit  depositions  and  examinations  to  the  3  Ord.  6  March,  1860,  r.  16. 

Clerk  of  the  Court  is  fixed  by  the  same  Pule.  4  jror  forra  0f  summons,  see  Vol.  III. 


(a)  As  to  the  order  in  which  the  witnesses  right  to  demand  compensation  for  his  los3  of 

should  be  cross-examined,  see  Re  Dore  Gallery,  time  before  being  sworn,   and,  though  sworn, 

62  L.  T.  758;  38  W.  R.  491.      As  to  death  of  may  refuse  to  answer  until  thus  compensated, 

the  witness  before  cross-examination,  see  Cel-  Re  Working-men's  Mutual  Society,  21  Ch.  D. 

luloid  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Arlington  Manuf.  Co.  47  831. 
Fed.  Rep.  4.     A  professional   witness   has   the 

910 


VIVA    VOCE    EVIDENCE. 


912 


issues  specified  in  such  order ;  and  no  affidavit  or  evidence  taken  before 
an  Examiner  will  be  admissible  at  the  hearing  of  any  such  cause,  in 
respect  of  any  fact  or  issue  included  in  any  such  order.5 

Where  an  order  for  the  taking  of  the  evidence  as  to  any  fact  or  issue 
viva  voce  at  the  hearing  has  been  made,  the  Clerk  of  Records  and  Writs 
makes,  in  the  certificate  that  the  cause  is  ready  for  hearing,  an  entry 
showing  that  such  an  order  has  been  made ;  and  the  Registrar,  in  set- 
ting down  the  cause  for  hearing  in  the  cause-book  of  the  Judge  to  whose 
Court  the  same  is  attached,  marks  the  same,  so  as  to  indicate  that 
the  taking  of  evidence  in  chief  viva  *  voce  at  the  hearing  has  *  912 
been  ordered  ;  and  the  cause  will  not  be  allowed  to  come  on  to  be 
heard  without  a  special  direction  of  the  Court,  which  may  be  obtained 
upon  an  application  to  the  Court,  by  either  party  upon  notice,  or  to  the 
Judge  in  Chambers,  by  summons,  upon  notice,1  to  fix  a  day  for  the  hear- 
ing.2 No  order  is  drawn  up  on  this  application ;  but  the  Registrar,  or 
the  Chief  Clerk,  as  the  case  may  be,  will  deliver  a  note  of  the  result  of 
the  application  to  the  applicant's  solicitor  ;  and  on  production  thereof 
to  the  Order  of  Course  Clerk  in  the  Registrars'  Office,  he  will  mark 
against  the  entry  of  the  cause,  in  the  cause-book,  the  day  fixed  for  the 
hearing. 

Where  any  such  order  has  been  made,  each  party  is  at  liberty  to  sue 
out,  at  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerks'  Office,  subpoenas  ad  testificandum 
and  sxibpa?nas  duces  tecum,  to  compel  the  attendance,  at  the  hearing,  of 
witnesses  whom  he  may  desire  to  produce,  on  any  issue  or  matter  of 
fact  included  in  such  order.8 

Upon  any  appeal,  rehearing,  or  further  proceedings,  the  Judges'  notes 
of  the  viva  voce  evidence  will,  prima  facie,  be  deemed  to  be  a  sufficient 
note  thereof.4 


6  Ord.  5  Feb.,  1861,  r.  3;  Edmunds  v. 
Brougham,  12  Jut.  N.  S.  934;  15  W.  R.  34, 
V.  C.  S.  See  also  Bovill  v.  Bird,  W.  N. 
(1867)  96;  Other  v.  Smurthwaite,  L.  R.  5  Eq. 
437;  Re  Underbill,  18  Q.  B.  D.  115. 

1  For  forms  of  notice  of  motion  and  sum- 
mons, see  Vol.  III. 

2  Ord.  5  Feb.,  1861,  r.  8;  Boyd  v.  Potrie, 
W.  N.  (1869)  138. 

3  Ord.  5  Feb.,  1861,  r.  9;  see  also  post,  Chap. 
XXVII.  §  2,  Trials  of  Questions  of  Fact.  For 
forms  of  subpoena,  see  Vol.  III. 

*  Ord.  5  Feb.,  1861,  r.  14.  By  consent,  a 
short-hand  writer  is  often  employed  to  take 
down  the  evidence;  and  his  notes  are  then 
used,  instead  of  the  Judge's,  (a)  The  costs  of 
such  notes  will  be  allowed  on  taxations  as  be- 
tween party  and  part}*,  if  taken  at  the  sugges- 
tion of  the  Judge.  Clark  v.  Malpas  (No.  2), 
31  Beav.  554;  9  Jur.  N.  S.  612;  and  see  Flock- 


on  v.  Peake,  12  W.  R.  1023,  V.  C.  W.,  and 
Morgan  &  Davey.  356.  By  Rule  of  Chancery 
in  Massachusetts,  when  a  case  is  heard  before  a 
single  justice  of  the  Court  upon  any  interlocu- 
tory question,  or  for  a  final  decree,  the  evidence 
shall  not  be  reported  to  the  full  Court,  unless 
one  of  the  parties,  before  any  evidence  is  offered, 
shall  request  that  the  same  be  so  reported;  or 
the  justice  shall,  for  special  reasons,  so  direct; 
and  the  justice  will  appoint  a  suitable  disinter- 
ested person  to  take  the  evidence.  The  expense 
of  taking  the  evidence  shall  be  paid  by  the 
party  requesting  the  taking  of  the  same,  to  be 
allowed  in  the  taxation  of  costs,  if  costs  are  de- 
creed to  him.  The  allowance  to  the  person 
appointed  to  take  the  evidence  shall  be  fixed 
by  the  Court,  and  shall  not  exceed  ten  dollars  a 
day.  Rule  35.  See  Granger  v.  Bassett,  98 
Mass.  462. 


(a)  Where,  under  U.  S.  Equity  Rule  67,  a 
deposition  was  by  agreement  of  counsel  taken 
down  at  the  office  of  one  of  them  by  a  type- 
writer in  the  Examiner's  absence,  but  under  his 
constructive  direction,  upon  the  abandonment  of 


such  examination  by  one  of  the  counsel  without 
sufficient  cause,  the  testimony  of  the  witness 
was  ordered  to  be  closed.  Ballard  v.  McCI us- 
key,  52  Fed.  Rep.  677;  sec  Re  Thomas,  35  id. 
822. 

911 


*  913  EVIDENCE. 

Upon  the  hearing  of  any  cause,  the  Court,  if  it  sees  fit,  may  require 
the  production  and  oral  examination  before  itself  of  any  witness  or  party 
in  the  cause  ;  and  may  direct  the  costs  of  and  attending  the  production 
and  examination  of  such  witness  or  party,  to  be  paid  by  such  of  the 
parties  to  the  suit,  or  in  such  manner,  as  it  may  think  fit.6  This  power 
will  only  be  exercised  by  the  Court  at  the  hearing ; 6  and  it  seems  doubt- 
ful whether  the  mode  of  exercising  it  is  by  an  order  directing  the 

*  913    attendance  of  the  witness,7  *  or  by  directing  a  subpoena  to  issue.1 

The  power  is  analogous  to  that  of  a  Judge  at  nisi  prius  to  recall 
a  witness, 2  and  is  confined  to  witnesses  who  have  been  examined  in  the 
cause.3  The  Court  of  Appeal  may  examine  orally  before  it  a  witness 
who  has  not  been  orally  examined  before  the  Court  below.4 

All  witnesses  who  have  made  an  affidavit  or  been  examined  ex  parte 
before  the  Examiner  are,  as  has  been  before  stated,  liable  to  cross-ex- 
amination.5 If  the  affidavit  is  to  be  used  at  the  hearing  of  a  cause  in 
which  issue  has  been  joined,  the  cross-examination  takes  place  before 
the  Court  at  the  hearing ; 6  in  other  cases,  before  the  Examiner, 7  except 
that,  after  decree,  the  cross-examination  on  an  affidavit  used  in  Chambers 
may  be  before  the  Chief  Clerk.8 

An  ex  parte  examination  before  an  Examiner  can,  as  we  have  seen,9 
only  take  place  in  causes  where  issue  has  been  joined,  and  the  cross- 
examination  upon  it  takes  place  at  the  hearing  ; 10  but  in  other  cases,  as 
we  have  seen,  where  witnesses  are  examined  before  the  Examiner,  the 
cross-examination  follows  immediately  upon  the  examination  in  chief.11 

Where  in  any  cause  or  matter  a  party  has  filed  an  affidavit,  or  where 
in  any  cause  in  which  issue  has  been  joined  a  party  has  examined  a 
witness  ex  parte  before  the  Examiner,  any  opposite  party,  desiring  to 
cross-examine  the  deponent  or  witness,  is  not  obliged  to  procure  the 
attendance  of  such  deponent  or  witness  for  cross-examination,  either 
before  the  Examiner  or  before  the  Court ;  but  any  such  opposite  party 
may  serve  upon  the  party  by  whom  such  affidavit  has  been  filed,  or 
witness  examined,  or  his  solicitor,  a  notice  in  writing 12  requiring  the 

5  15  &  16  Yic.  c.  86,  §  39.  For  cases  on  this  2  See  Chitty's  Arch.  395;  Taylor  on  Evid. 
section,  besides  the  cases  mentioned  below,  see      §  1331. 

Oliver  v.  Wright,  1  Sm.  &  G.  App.  16 ;  Wilkin-  3  East  Anglian  Ry.  Co.  v.  Goodwin,  6  W.  R. 

son  v.  Stringer,  9  Hare  App.  23;  16  Jur.  1033;  564,  V.C.  W. 

Deaville  v.  Deaville,   9  Hare  App.    22;  Chi-  *  Hope  v.  Threlfall,  23  L.  J.  Ch.  631;  2  Eq. 

Chester  v.  Chichester.  24  Beav.  589;  Ferguson  Rep.  307,  L.  JJ.;  Langford  v.  May,  22  L.J.  Ch. 

V.  Wilson,  W.  N.   (1866)   324  ;  15  W.  R.  27,  978;  1  VV.  R.  484,  L.JJ.;    and  see  Hind  son  r. 

L.  JJ.  Weatherwill,5DeG.  M.  &G.  301,312:  18  Jur. 

6  Raymond  v.  Brown,  4  De  G.  &  J.  350;  5  499;  Martin  v.  Pycroft,  2  De  G.  M.  &  G.  785, 
Jur.  N.  S.  1046;  May  v.  Biggenden,  1   Sm.&  797;  16  Jur.  1125. 

G.  133;  17  Jur.  252;"and  see  Hope  v.  Liddell,  6  15  &  ]6  Vic    c.  86,  §§  38,  40:  Ord.  5  Feb. 

20  Beav.  438;  East  Anglian  Ry.  Co.  v.  Good-  1861,  r.  6;  ante,  p.  888. 

win,  6  W.   R.  564,  V.  C  W. ;  but  see   ante,  6  Ord.  5  Feb.,  1861,  r.  7. 

p.  820.  7  Ord.  5  Feb.,  1861,  rr.  7,  15. 

7  Mav  v.  Biggenden.  ubi  supra  ;  Nichols  v.  8  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  80,  §  30. 

Ibbetson,  7  W.  R.  430,  V.  C.  W.  9  Ante,  pp  824.  901 ;  Smith  r.  Baker,  4  N.  R. 

1  Braithwaite's   Pr.  254.     A  note  or  memo-  321,  V.  C.  W.;  2  H.  &  M.  498. 

randuin,  signed  by  the  Registrar,  is  evidence  of  10  Ord.  5  Feb.,  1861,  r.  7. 

the  direction  of  the  Court  on  which  the  Record  u  Ante.  p.  904. 

and  Writ  Clerk  will  act.  12  For  form  of  notice,  see  Vol.  III. 
012 


VIVA    VOCE   EVIDENCE.  *  914 

production  of  such  deponent  or  witness  for  cross-examination  before 
the  Examiner,  or  before  the  Court,  as  the  case  may  be,  such  notice  to 
be  served  within  the  time  mentioned  below,  or  within  such  time  as,  in 
any  case,  the  Court  or  the  Judge  in  Chambers  may  specially  appoint 18 
(that  is  to  say)  :  where  such  cross-examination  is  to  be  taken 
before  the  *  Court  at  the  hearing  of  a  cause  in  which  issue  is  *  914 
joined,  then  at  any  time  before  the  expiration  of  fourteen  days 
next  after  the  closing  of  the  evidence ;  and  where  such  cross-examina- 
tion is  to  be  taken  before  the  Examiner  in  a  cause  in  which  a  notice  of 
motion  for  a  decree  or  decretal  order  has  been  served,  and  to  be  used  at  the 
hearing  of  such  motion,  then  at  any  time  before  the  expiration  of  fourteen 
days  next  after  the  end  of  the  time  allowed  for  the  plaintiff  to  file  affida- 
vits in  reply ;  and  in  every  other  case,  within  fourteen  days  next  after 
the  filing  of  the  affidavit  or  examination  upon  which  such  deponent  or 
witness  is  to  be  cross-examined ; l  and  unless  such  deponent  or  witness 
be  produced  accordingly,  such  affidavit  or  examination  cannot  be  used  as 
evidence,  unless  by  the  special  leave  of  the  Court.2  The  party  produ- 
cing such  deponent  or  witness  is  entitled  to  demand  the  expenses  thereof 
in  the  first  instance  from  the  party  requiring  such  production ;  but  such 
expenses  will  ultimately  be  borne  as  the  Court  shall  direct.3 

It  has  been  held  that  the  foregoing  rule  does  not  prohibit  the  party 
desiring  to  cross-examine  from  taking  the  course  provided  by  the  Act ; 4 
and  that,  therefore,  a  deponent  served  with  a  subpoena,  under  the  Act, 
is  bound  to  submit  himself  for  cross-examination  on  his  affidavit  in  op- 
position to  a  motion  for  an  injunction,  notwithstanding  the  lapse  of 
fourteen  days  from  the  time  when  it  was  filed.5 

An  enlargement  of  the  fourteen  days,  in  any  of  the  above  cases,  may, 
on  sufficient  reason  being  shown,  be  obtained  on  an  application  at  Cham- 
bers, by  summons :  the  summons  must  be  served  on  the  opposite 
parties.6 

13  Where  an  affidavit,  which  had  been  used  being  withdrawn,  or  the  cause  standing  over, 
in  Court,  was  subsequently  used  in  Chambers,  Nason  v.  Clamp,  12  W.  R.  973,  M.  R. ;  but  see 
the  Court  specially  appointed  a  time  within  Tanswell  v.  Scurrah,  11  L.  T.  N.  S.  761,  M.  R. 
which  the  cross-examination  was  to  take  place.  Affidavit  allowed  to  be  read,  though  no  cross- 
Spittle  v.  Hughes,  11  Jur.  N.  S.  151,  V.  C.  K. ;  examination.  Simpson  v.  Malherbe,  13  W.  R. 
S.  C.  nam.  Hughes  v.  Spittal,  13  W.  R.  251.  887,  V.  C  S.;  Braithwaite  v.  Kearns,  34  Beav. 
Where  the  cross-examination  of  a  witness  was  202.  Leave  given  to  use  affidavits,  but  order 
proceeded  with,  without  giving  notice  of  it  to  made  saving  all  just  exceptions.  Ridley  v. 
the  party  who  had   given  notice  to  read  the  Ridley,  34  Beav.  329. 

affidavit,  it  was  held  void.   Pennell  v.  Davison,  3  Ord.  5  Feb.,  1861,  r.  19.     As  to  whether 

14  W.  R.  174,  V.  C.  W.  the  costs  of  cross-examination  are  costs  in  the 

1  Where  a  petition  came  on  for  hearing  be-  cause,  see  Hunt  v.  Pullen,  34  Beav.  301.  If  it 
fore  the  expiration  of  the  fourteen  days,  and  appear  that  the  witness  is  kept  back  by  the 
the  affidavit  was  withdrawn,  it  was  held  that  party,  the  latter  will  be  ordered  to  produce  him. 
the  opposite  party  could  not  require  the  hear-  Catholic  Pub.  Co.  v.  Wyman,  1  N.  R.  512. 

ing  to  be  postponed,  because  the  deponent  was  4  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  40. 

not  produced  for  cross-examination.    A'e  Sykes'  6  Singer   Sewing    Machine    Manuf.    Co.    p. 

Trusts,  2  J.  &  H.  415;   see  Concha  v.  Concha,  Wilson,  11  Jur.  N.  S  58,  V.  C.  W. ;  2  II.  &  II. 

11  A.  C.  541.  584;    and   see  Cox  v.  Stephens,  9  Jur.  X.  S. 

2  Ord.  5  Feb.,  1861.  r.  19.     Where  the  wit-  1144;  11  W.  R.  929.  V.  C    K. 

ness  was  unable  from  illness  to  attend  on  the  6  See  Cons.  Ord.  XXXVII.  17.     For  forms 

day  fixed  for  the  hearing  of  a  cause,  it  was  held      of  summons,  see  Vol.  III. 
that  the  defendant  might  insist  on  the  affidavit 

vol.  I.  — 58  913 


*  915 


EVIDENCE. 


Where  the  notice  to  produce  a  witness  is  given,  the  party  to  whom 
it  is  given  is  entitled  to  compel  the  attendance  of  the  deponent  or  wit- 
ness for  cross-examination  before  the  Court  at  the  hearing  of  the  cause, 
or  before  the  Examiner,  as  the  case  may  be,  in  the  same  way  as  he 
might  compel  the  attendance  of  a  witness  to  be  examined,  if  an 
*  915  order  had  been  made  for  taking  evidence  *  viva  voce  at  the  hear- 
ing ; 1  and  if  the  notice  is  given  for  the  production  of  any  depo- 
nent or  witness,  for  cross-examination  at  the  hearing  of  a  cause  in  which 
issue  is  joined,  either  party  may,  upon  notice,  apply  to  the  Court,  or  to 
the  Judge  in  Chambers,  to  fix  a  day  for  the  hearing  of  the  cause.2 

Any  party  to  any  cause  or  matter,  requiring  the  attendance  of  any 
witness,  whether  a  party  or  not,  before  the  Court,  or  before  one  of  the 
Examiners  of  the  Court,  or  a  Special  Examiner,  for  the  purpose  of 
being  examined,  or  of  being  cross-examined,  must  give  to  the  opposite 
party  forty-eight  hours'  notice,  at  least,  of  his  intention  to  examine  or 
cross-examine  such  witness,  such  notice  to  contain  the  name  and  de- 
scription of  the  witness,  and  the  time  and  place  of  the  examination  or 
cross-examination,  unless  the  Court  in  any  case  thinks  fit  to  dispense 
with  such  notice.8  So  far,  however,  as  the  witness  himself  is  concerned, 
the  notice  to  be  given  must  be  according  to  circumstances ;  and  if  he 
resides  in  London,  or  has  his  office  there,  twenty-four  hours'  notice  is 
ample.4 

"Where  a  witness  is  out  of  the  jurisdiction,  a  commission,  as  we  have 
seen,  may  still  be  issued,5  under  an  order,  which  may  be  obtained  on 
special  motion  or  summons,  supported  by  affidavit ; 6  but  the  ordinary 
and  more  convenient  course  is  to  appoint  a  Special  Examiner.7 

Where  a  commission  is  directed  to  issue,  it  is  prepared  by  the 
applicant's   solicitor;    and   will   be    sealed   at    the   Eecord    and   Writ 


i  Ord.  5  Feb.,  1861,  r.  20;  ante,  p.  911.  A 
witness  will  not  be  compelled  to  attend,  if,  from 
the  matter  being  disposed  of,  or  other  cause,  his 
cross-examination  would  be  useless.  Hooper  v. 
Campbell,  13  W.  R.  1003,  L.  C. 

2  Ord.  5  Feb.,  1801,  r.  21 ;  see  ante,  p.  911. 

3  Ord.  5  Feb.,  1861,  r.  22  (7  Jur.  N.  S.  Pt.  II. 
60);  Braithwaite's  Manual,  178,  n.  (85).  For 
form  of  notice,  see  Vol.  III. 

4  Re  North  Wheal  Exmouth  Mining  Co.  31 
Beav.  628;  8  Jur.  N.  S.  1168.  As  to  Special 
Examiners  out  of  the  jurisdiction,  see  De  Brito  v. 
Hillel,  L.  R.  15  Eq.  213.  As  to  costs,  see  R.  S.  C. 
(Costs),  Sched.  r.  18;  Hallows  v.  Fernie,  W.  N. 
(1867)  294 ;  16  W.  R.  175 ;  Smith  v.  Buller,  L.  R. 
19  Eq.  473. 

s  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  28  ;  see  ante,  p.  888; 
R.  S.  C.  Ord.  XXXVII.  1,  4;  1  Dan.  Ch.  Prac. 
(6th  Eng.  ed.)  647;  Nadin  v.  Bassett,  25  Ch.  D. 
21  ;  see  Armour  v.  Walker,  32  W.  R.  214;  Re 
Boyse,  Crofton  v.  Crofton,  20  Ch.  D.  760  ;  Lan- 
gen  v.  Tate,  24  Ch.  D.  522.  In  reference  to  the 
taking  of  depositions  either  at  home  or  abroad, 
many  cases  will  be  found  collected  in  note  (42) 
to  Phil.  Ev.  (Cowen  &  Hill's  notes)  pp.  32-41; 
914 


see  also  1  Greenl.  Ev.  §§  320-325.  To  entitle 
depositions  to  be  read  in  evidence,  the  rules  of 
Court  and  statutes  respecting  them  must  be 
strictly  complied  with.  Wallace  v.  Mease,  4 
Yeates,  520;  Bel!  v.  Morrison,  1  Peters,  351; 
Winooski  Turnp.  Co.  v.  Ridley,  8  Vt.  404; 
Bradstreet  r.  Baldwin,  11  Mass.  229;  The  Argo, 
2  Wheat.  287;  Evans  v.  Eaton,  7  Wheat.  356; 
Sanders  v.  Howe,  1  Chip.  363;  Burroughs  v. 
Booth,  id.  106;  Collins  v.  Elliot,  1  Harr.  &  J.  1; 
Den  v.  Farley,  1  South.  124 ;  Hendricks  v.  Craig, 
2  id.  567;  Worsham  v.  Gove,  4  Porter,  441; 
Wiggins  v.  Pryor,  3  Porter,  430;  Shepherd  v. 
Thompson,  4  N.  H.  213;  Welles  v.  Fish,  3 
Pick.  74. 

6  Hinde,  304.  See  the  67th  Equity  Rule  of 
the  U.  S.  Courts,  post,  p.  2391.  For  forms  of 
notice  of  motion  and  summons,  see  Vol.  III. 

1  Crofts  v.  Middleton,  9  Hare  App.  18 ;  and 
for  form  of  order  in  that  case,  see  id.  75;  Rawlins 
v.  Wickham,  4  Jur.  N.  S.  990,  V.  C  S. ;  Edwards 
v.  Spaight,  2  J.  &  H.  617 ;  London  Bank  v.  Hart, 
L.  R.  6  Eq.  467;  and  for  form  of  order  in  that 
case,  see  id.;  and  see  Drevon  v.  Drevon,  12 
W.  R.  66,  V.  C.  K. 


VIVA    VOCE   EVIDENCE. 


917 


*  Clerks'  Office,  on  production  of  the  order  under  which  it  is     *  91G 
issued,  and  on  aprcecijje  being  left  there.1 

The  commission  is  directed  to  not  less  than  four  commissioners,2  and 
commands  them,  any  two  or  more  of  them,  to  summon  the  witnesses  and 
examine  them  upon  interrogatories,  on  their  oaths,  upon  the  Holy  Evan- 
gelists, or  in  such  other  solemn  manner  as  is  most  binding  on  their  con- 
sciences ;  and  to  take  their  examinations  and  reduce  them  into  writing 
in  the  English  language  ;  and  to  send  the  same  to  the  Court  of  Chancery 
without  delay,  or  by  the  return  day,  if  any,  named  in  the  order,  closed 
up  under  their  seals,  or  the  seals  of  any  three  or  two  of  them,  together 
with  the  interrogatories  and  the  commission,  and  a  certificate  in  what 
manner  the  oath  is  administered  to  such  witnesses  as  cannot  speak  or 
understand  the  English  language.  The  commissioners  are  further  com- 
manded that,  before  any  oue  of  them  acts  in,  or  is  present  at,  the  swear- 
ing or  examining  of  any  witness,  they  severally  take  the  oath  first  spe- 
cified in  the  schedule  to  the  commission  ; 3  and  which  they,  any  three 
or  two  of  them,  are  empowered  to  administer  to  the  rest  or  any  other  of 
them,  upon  the  Holy  Evangelists;  and  all  clerks  employed  in  taking, 
writing,  transcribing,  or  engrossing  the  depositions  of  the  witnesses 
are,  before  they  act,  required  to  take  the  oath  last  specified  in  the 
schedule,4  to  be  administered  by  the  commissioners  or  any  *  one  *  917 
of  them.  The  commissioners  are  lastly  commanded,  if  necessary, 
to  swear  an  interpreter  or  interpreters,  to  interpret  the  oaths  and  inter- 
rogatories to  those  witnesses  who  do  not  understand  English,  into  the 


1  Braithwaite's  Pr.  186.  The  commission 
must  be  stamped  with  a  £1  Chancery  fee  fund 
stamp.  Eegul.  to  Ord.  Sched.  4.  For  forms 
of  commission,  indorsement,  praecipe,  and  oaths 
of  the  commissioners  and  their  clerk,  see  Vol. 
III. 

2  See  the  67th  Equity  Rule  of  the  U.  S. 
Courts,  post,  p.  2391. 

For  cases  touching  the  competency  of  persons 
to  act  as  commissioners,  see  Heacock  r.  Stod- 
dard, 1  Tyler,  344;  and  Chandler  v.  Brainard, 
14  Pick.  285. 

Under  the  provision  that  no  person  interested 
shall  draw  up  a  deposition  to  be  used  in  a  cause, 
&c,  a  son-in-law  of  a  party  was  held  not  dis- 
qualified, in  Heacock  v.  Stoddard,  1  Tyler,  344. 
But  a  deposition  taken  before  the  uncle  of  a 
party  to  a  suit  was  held  inadmissible  in  New 
Hampshire.  Bean  v.  Quimby,  5  N.  II.  94;  see 
Smith  v.  Smith,  2  Greenl.  408;  Coffin  v.  Jones, 
13  Pick.  441;  Wood  r.  Cole,  id.  279. 

In  Pennsylvania,  a  commission  was  issued 
to  four  commissioners,  jointly,  to  take  the 
depositions  of  witnesses  in  England.  It  was 
executed  and  returned  by  three  of  the  com- 
missioners only;  two  of  whom,  however,  were 
of  the  defendant's  nomination,  and  it  was  held 
inadmissible  in  evidence.  Guppy  r.  Brown, 
4  Dall.  410;  see  Marshall  v.  Frisbic,  1  Munf. 
247.  But  depositions  taken  under  a  joint 
and  several  commission  were  held  admissible, 


though  the  defendant's  commissioners  did  not 
attend.  Penncock  v.  Freeman,  1  Watts,  401. 
Where  a  commission  was  directed  to  live  per- 
sons, or  any  one  of  them,  and  the  examination 
was  taken  in  conjunction  with  another  per- 
son, not  named  in  the  commission,  the  depo- 
sition was  held  inadmissible.  Wi  lings  v. 
Consequa,  1  Peters,  C.  C.  301;  see  further  as  to 
commissions,  Cage  v.  Courts,  1  Harr.  &  M'H. 
239.  A  commission  to  take  depositions,  issued 
in  blank  as  to  the  persons  to  whom  directed,  is 
inadmissible.  Worsham  r.  (loar,  4  Porter,  441. 
In  Tennessee,  the  commission  might  be  issued 
in  blank,  but  was  required  to  be  filled  up  with 
the  name  of  the  commissioner  at  or  before  the 
taking  of  the  deposition.  Oliver  v.  Bank  of 
Tennessee,  11  Humph.  74.  And  now  deposi- 
tions may  be  taken  without  commission.  Code, 
§  3847. 

8  Fur  form  of  oath,  see  Vol.  III.  A  single 
commissioner  may  be  authorized  to  administer 
the  oath  to  himself.  Wilson  v.  De  Coulon,  22 
Ch.  D.  841. 

4  It  is  not  necessary,  in  the  United  States, 
that  there  should  be  a  clerk  to  the  commission. 
Beard  v.  Heide,  2  Harr.  &  .!.  442.  The  com- 
missioner should  himself  examine  the  witness, 
and  not  leave  so  weighty  an  iffair  to  his  clerk 
or  others.  Prac.  Peg.  124:  Hinde,  348;  Cap- 
peau  v.  Baker,  1  Harr.  &  J.  154. 

915 


*  917 


EVIDENCE. 


language  of  the  witnesses,  and  also  to  interpret  the  depositions  out  of 
the  language  of  the  witnesses  into  the  English  language,  and  to  keep 
such  depositions  secret.1 

As  a  commission  for  the  examination  of  witnesses  is  rarely,  if  ever, 
resorted  to  under  the  present  practice  of  the  Court,  it  has  not  been 
thought  necessary  to  set  out  the  practice  relative  to  the  execution  of 
such  commission.  The  reader  will,  however,  find  such  practice  fully 
detailed  in  the  second  edition  of  this  treatise.2 


1  See  form  of  commission  in  Braithwaite's 
Pr.  183. 

2  See  pp.  872-908;  3d  Am.  ed.  pp.  924-953. 
The  practice  in  Chancery  in  the  several  States 
in  relation  to  the  issuing,  execution,  and  return 
of  commissions,  is  in  general  regulated  by 
statute  or  by  local  rules,  which  could  not  use- 
fully be  set  out  in  these  notes.  Many  of  the 
cases  and  rules  will  be  found  referred  to  in  2 
Phil.  Ev.  (Coweu  &  Hill's  notes)  pp.  32-41,  in 
note  (42);  see  also  1  Greenl.  Ev.  §§  320-325;  1 
Hoff.  Ch.  Pr.  363,  474  ;  Hunter  v.  Fletcher,  5 
Rand.  126 ;  Edgell  v.  Lowell,  4  Yt.  412.  Depo- 
sitions in  a  foreign  country  must  be  taken  by 
commission.     Stein  v.  Bowman,  13  Peters,  209. 

In  New  Jersey,  see  Ch.  Rules  96-98;  Dick. 
Prec.  25 ;  and  see  Barrett  v.  Pardow,  1  Edw. 
Ch.  11. 

In  Massachusetts,  where  the  testimony  of 
witnesses,  residing  out  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
Court,  is  to  be  taken,  the  plaintiff  is  entitled 
to  have  a  commission  for  that  purpose;  and  all 
the  Rules  of  Law  as  to  the  time  and  manner  of 
taking  and  tiling  depositions  at  Law  will  apply 
in  Equity.    Pingree  v.  Coffin,  12  Cush.  600. 

No  notice  of  the  time  and  place  of  executing 
a  commission  out  of  the  State  is  necessary  to  be 
given  to  the  opposite  party  in  Maryland.  Ow- 
ings  v.  Norwood,  2  Harr.  &  J.  96.  But  time 
should  be  giver,  to  allow  the  opposite  party  to 
exhibit  interrogatories.  Ibid.  The  services  of 
copies  of  the  interrogatories,  which  accompany 
a  commission,  on  the  adverse  party,  a  sufficient 
time  before  the  issuing  of  the  commission,  to 
enable  him  to  file  cross-interrogatories,  is  suffi- 
cient notice  of  the  issuing  of  the  commission, 
and  of  the  time  and  place  of  executing  it.  Law 
v.  Scott,  5  Harr.  &  J.  438. 

Under  the  New  York  Act  of  17th  of  April, 
1823,  parties  and  their  counsel  have  a  right  to 
be  present  at  the  examination  of  witnesses,  and 
to  cross-examine  in  all  cases;  and  this  as  well 
npon  commissions  issued  to  examine  witnesses 
out  of  the  State  as  in  other  cases.  Steer  v. 
Steer,  Hopk.  362.  So  in  Tennessee.  And, 
therefore,  if  the  notice  designate  the  day  on 
which  the  deposition  is  to  be  taken,  without 
more,  the  commissioner  has  no  power  to  adjourn 
until  the  next  day,  even  for  want  of  time  to 
complete  the  deposition.  Brandon  v.  Mullinix, 
11  Heisk.  446.  But  see  Parker  v.  Hayes,  23 
N.  J.  Eq.  186,  where  it  was  held  that,  although 

916 


the  commissioner  had  no  power  to  adjourn  the 
examination,  yet  he  might  continue  it,  when- 
ever commenced,  from  day  to  day,  while  actu- 
ally proceeding  with  the  examination.  For  the 
practice  in  New  Hampshire  on  this  subject,  see 
Marston  v.  Brackett,  9  N.  H.  345,  346. 

It  is  not  necessary  in  Alabama,  that,  pre- 
vious to  the  issuing  of  a  commission  to  take 
the  deposition  of  a  non-resident  witness,  the 
interrogatories  should  be  filed  in  the  Clerk's 
Office.  The  party  may  examine  the  witness 
before  the  commissioners.  Wiggins  v.  Pryor, 
3  Porter,  430. 

In  New  Jersey,  the  deposition  must  be  signed 
by  the  witness.  Flavell  v.  Flavell,  20  N.  J. 
Eq.  211. 

In  Pennsylvania,  a  deposition  taken  under  a 
commission  need  not  be  subscribed  by  the  wit- 
ness. Moulson  v.  Hargrave,  1  Serg.  &  R.  201. 
In  Kentucky,  it  is  no  objection  to  a  deposition 
that  the  witness  omitted  to  subscribe  his  name. 
Motley  v.  Hamit,  1  A.  K.  Marsh.  590.  So  in 
North  Carolina.  Rutherford  v.  Nelson,  1  Hayw. 
105;  Murphy  v.  Work.  id.  So  in  Virginia. 
Barrett  v.  Watson,  1  Wash.  372.  So  in  Ala- 
bama. Wiggins  v.  Pryor,  3  Porter,  430.  A 
deposition  taken  under  a  commission  to  take 
the  deposition  of  John  Priestly,  may  be  read 
in  evidence,  though  signed  "  JohnG.  Priestly." 
Brooks  b.  M'Kean,  Cooke,  162;  see  Breyfogle 
v.  Beckley,  16  Serg.  &  R.  264;  ante,  p.  904,  n.  9. 

A  deposition,  to  which  the  witness  is  not 
sworn  till  his  testimony  is  reduced  to  writing, 
is  irregular.  Armstrong  v.  Burrows,  6  Watts, 
266. 

The  magistrate  who  takes  a  deposition  is  to 
judge  of  the  mental  capacity  of  the  witness. 
Hough  v.  Lawrence,  5  Vt.  299. 

It  will  be  presumed  that  commissioners  have 
done  their  duty  in  keeping  and  forwarding 
depositions,  unless  the  contrary  appear.  Glover 
v.  Millings,  3  Stew.  &  P.  28.  Commissioners 
to  take  depositions  should  certify,  in  their  re- 
turn, that  they  caused  the  witness  to  be  exam- 
ined on  oath  upon  the  interrogatories  annexed, 
and  that  they  caused  the  examination  to  be  re- 
duced to  writing;  otherwise  the  depositions 
cannot  be  read.  Bailis  v.  Cochran,  2  John. 
417;  see  Glover  v.  Millings,  ubi  supra;  Petti- 
bone  v.  Derringer,  4  Wash.  C.  C.  215.  It  is 
sufficient  that  the  commissioners  certify,  in  their 
return,  that  the  oath  has  been  duly  taken  by 


VIVA    VOCE   EVIDENCE.  *  919 

The  commissioners  have   power,  in  Scotland  and   Ireland,  to 
*  call  in  the  aid  of  the  Courts  of  those  countries  to  compel  the  at-   *  918 
tendance  of  any  witness  who  may  neglect  to  obey  their  notice  to 
attend ; 1  and  it  is  conceived  that  Special  Examiners  have  the   same 
power.2 

Where  the  witness  is  resident  at  any  place  in  her  Majesty's  domin- 
ions, the  commissioners,  or  Special  Examiner,  may  obtain  an  order  from 
the  Court  having  jurisdiction  in  such  place,  that  the  examination  may 
proceed  in  accordance  with  the  order  of  the  Court  of  Chancery ;  and 
may  obtain  from  such  first-mentioned  Court  such  further  orders  as  may 
be  necessary,  for  the  purpose  of  compelling  the  attendance  of  the 
witness.3 

Where  the  Examiner  has  to  examine  witnesses  who  cannot  speak 
English,  the  usual  and  proper  course  is  to  take  down  the  depositions 
from  an  interpreter  in  English.4  This,  however,  does  not  appear  to  be 
absolutely  necessary,  since,  in  some  cases,  examinations  taken  down  in 
a  foreign  language  have  been  recognized  by  the  Court.  If  the  deposi- 
tions are  taken  down  in  the  language  of  the  witness,  they  must 
afterwards  *  be  translated  out  of  that  language  into  English,  by  *  919 
a  person  appointed  by  an  order  of  the  Court,  who  must  be  sworn 
to  the  truth  of  his  translation,1  and  must  either  make  such  translation 
before  the  depositions  are  filed,  or  afterwards  attend  at  the  Record  and 
Writ  Clerks'  Office  for  that  purpose  ;  for  the  Court  will  not  make  an 
order  for  the  record  of  the  deposition  to  be  delivered  out,  in  order  that 
they  may  be  translated.2 

The  translation,  after  the  truth  thereof  has  been  sworn  to,  is  annexed 
to  the  depositions,  and  an  office  copy  made  of  it;  which  will  be  per- 
mitted to  be  read  at  the  hearing,  saving  all  just  exceptions,  when,  as  is 
usually  the  case,  the  order  so  directs.  The  order  for  the  appointment 
of  a  translator  of  the  depositions,  and  for  leave  to  use  them  at  the  hear- 
ing, is  obtained  by  motion  of  course,  or  by  petition  of  course.3  Where 
a  witness  disputed  the  correctness  of  an  alleged  translation  of  letters  in 
a  foreign  language,  on  which  translation  he  was  being  cross-examined 
before  an  Examiner,  but  as  to  the  correctness  of  which  there  was  no 
evidence,  it  was  held  that  the  witness  should  be  cross-examined  at  the 

them.     Wilson  v.  Mitchell,  3  Harr.   &  J.  91;  witness.     Maccuhbin  v.  Matthews,  2  Bland,  250; 

Glover  v.  Millings,  ubi  supra.  see  78th  Equity  Rule  of  the  U.  S.  Courts, post, 

As  to  objections  to  the  deposition,  see  Strike  p.  2395.     See  New  Jersey  Ch.  Rule  94. 
v.  M'Donald,  2  Harr.  &  J.  29,  192.  4  j^n\  Belmore  v.  Anderson,  4  Bro.  C.  C. 

10  &  7  Vic.  c.  82,  §5;  Taylor  on   Evid.  90.     In  Gilpins  V.  Consequa,  1  Peters,  C.  C.  85, 

§§  1183, 1183  A.    For  the  practice  at  Law  under  it  was  held  no  objection  that  the  deposition  was 

this  Act,  see  Chitty's  Arch.  341-344.  in  English,    though   taken   before    Dutchmen, 

2  See  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  35  (superseded  who  did  not  appear  to  have  been  assisted  by  a 
by  46  &  47  Vic.  c.  49,  §  4,  Sched.,  and  R.  S.  sworn  interpreter.  See  Amory  v.  Fellows,  "> 
C.  1883).  Mass.  219. 

3  22  Vic.  c.  20,  §  1;  Taylor  on  Evid.  §  1183,  i  1  Newl.  439.  For  form  of  affidavit,  see 
B.     Commissioners  may  summon  a  witness  to  Vol.  III. 

attend  before  them;  and  the  Court  will  compel  -  Fauquier  v.  Tynte,  7  Ves.  292;  see  Gilpins 

the  witness  to  do  so;  but  a  commission  should  v.  Consequa,  1  Peters,  C.  C.  85. 
be  issued  so  as  to  have  the  examination  at  a  3  For  forms  of  motion  paper  and  petition, 

reasonable  distance  from  the  residence  of  the  see  Vol.  III. 


91 


*  920  EVIDENCE. 

hearing  in  open  Court,  and  if  any  difficulties  then  arose,  the  Court 
would,  if  necessary,  consider  how  to  dispose  of  them.4 

It  seems  that  an  examination  of  witnesses  abroad  will  not  be  effected 
by  an  abatement  of  the  suit ;  and  that  the  depositions  (provided  neither 
the  Examiner  nor  the  witnesses  have  received  notice  of  the  abatement) 
will  be  good  evidence.5  The  same  principle  has  been  applied  to  an 
abatement,  pending  an  examination  of  witnesses  in  this  country.6 

In  all  cases  whatever,  the  re-examination  of  a  witness  is  to  follow 
immediately  upon  his  cross-examination.7 

The  evidence,  when  taken,  whether  by  affidavit  or  otherwise,  and 
whether  in  chief  or  on  cross-examination,  is  open  to  all  parties  ; 8  and  a 
defendant  has,  consequently,  a  right  to  cross-examine  his  co-defendant's 
witnesses.9 

The  costs  of  a  commission,  or  Special  Examiner,  to  take  evidence 
abroad,  will  be  taxed  in  this  country,  but  on  the  scale  allowed  in  the 
country  where  the  evidence  was  taken.10  The  costs  of  the  solicitor  here, 
of  attending  the  examination  abroad,  will  not  be  allowed.11 


*  920  *  Section   XII.  —  Of  Interrogatories. 

The  general  mode  of  examining  witnesses  in  Equity  formerly  was  by 
interrogatories  in  writing,  exhibited  by  the  party,  plaintiff  or  defendant, 
or  directed  by  the  Court  to  be  proposed  to  or  asked  of  the  witness  in  a 
cause  touching  the  merits  thereof  or  some  incident  therein.  The  prac- 
tice is  now,  however,  almost  entirely  abolished ;  but,  as  it  may  still  be 
resorted  to  with  respect  to  any  particular  witness  within  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  Court,  and  with  respect  to  all  witnesses  in  the  cause  out  of 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court,1  and  as  it  continues  to  prevail  in  some 
Courts  in  the  United  States,2  it  is  proper  here  to  consider  and  state  the 
rules  by  which  it  is  governed.  These  interrogatories  are  questions  in 
writing,  adapted  to  sustain  the  case  made  by  the  party  exhibiting  them, 
and  are  administered  to  the  witnesses  either  by  the  regular  Examiners 
of  the  Court,  or  through  the  medium  of  commissioners  specially  ap- 
pointed for  the  purpose.3  (a)    They  are  termed  original  when  exhibited  on 

4  Foster  v.  Gladstone,  12  W.  R.  525,  V.  C.  W.  9  Lordi-.  Colvin,  ubi supra  ;  Feilden  v.  Slater, 

An  objection  for  irregularity  should  be  taken  at  L.  R.  7  Eq.  523,  529. 

the  hearing.     De  Brito  v.  Hillel,  L.  R.  15  Eq'.  w  Wentworth  v.  Lloyd,  13  W.  R.  486,  M.  R. ; 

213;  Rickardsw.  Hough.  30  W.  R.  676;  Mey-  34  Beav    455;    see  2  Seton,  1638,  and   as  to 

rick  r.  Jairttes,  W.  X.  (1877)  120;  46  L.  J.  Ch.  costs  of  perusing  the  depositions,  S.  C.  L.  R.  2 

519.     Objections  to  evidence,  when  copies  only  Eq.  609 ;  12  Jur.  N.  S.  581,  M.  R. 

are  produced,  should  be  taken  before  the  com-  n  Hammond  r.  Wordsworth,  1  Dick.  381. 

missioners.     Robinson  r.  Davies,  5  Q  B.  D.  26.  1  Ante,  pp.  887,  888. 

s  Thompson's  case,  3  P.  Wins.  195;  Winter  2  See  37  Maine,  585,  Ch.  Rule  14  ;  Eq.  Rule 

v.  Dancie,  Tothill,  99.  of  U.  S.  Courts,  67;  Code  of  Tenn.  §  3855. 

6  Curtis  v.  Fulbrook.  8  Hare,  29.  3  Hinde,  317. 

'  Cons.  Ord.  XIX.  8. 

8  Lord  v.  Colvin,  3  Drew.  222;    Sturgis  v. 
Morse  (No.  2),  26  Beav.  562. 


(a)  There  is  no  right  to  require  answers  to     Van  Walters  v.  Marion  County  Board,  132  Ind. 
interrogatories  when  there  is  no  cause  of  suit.      567. 

918 


INTERROGATORIES. 


921 


the  part  of  the  person  who  produces  the  witness ;  or  cross-interrogato- 
ries, if  filed  on  behalf  of  the  adverse  party,  to  examine  a  witness  pro- 
duced on  the  other  side.4 

Interrogatories  should  be  short  and  pertinent,  and  necessarily  they 
must  not  be  leading.5  (b)  If  they  are  leading,  the  deposition  taken 
thereon  will  be  suppressed ;  and  so  it  will  be  where  the  interrogatories 
are  too  particular,  and  point  to  one  side  of  the  question  more  than  the 
other.6 

*  Leading  questions   are   such   as   instruct   a  witness  how  to    *  921 
answer  on  material  points,  such  as,  "  Did  you  not  see  or  do  such 
a  thing  ?  "  1  or  which,  embodying  a  material  fact,  admit  of  an  answer  by 
a  simple  negative  or  affirmative,  though  the  question  does  not  suggest 
which.2 


4  Hinde,  317. 

6  As  to  the  forms  of  interrogatories,  see 
Gresley,  Eq.  Ev.  (Am.  ed.)  44—18.  Leading 
questions  are  those  which  suggest  to  the  wit- 
ness the  answer  desired.  See  1  Greenl.  Ev. 
§§  434,  435;  1  Stark.  Ev.  149;  1  Phil.  Ev. 
(Cowen  &  Hill's  ed.  1839)268-272,  and  notes 
referred  to;  Parkin  ?>.  Moore,  7  C.  &  P.  408. 
In  some  cases  leading  questions  are  permitted, 
even  in  a  direct  examination;  namely,  where 
the  witness  appears  to  be  hostile  to  the  party 
producing  him,  or  in  the  interest  of  the  other 
party,  or  unwilling  to  give  evidence;  or  where 
an  omission  in  his  testimony  is  evidently  caused 
by  want  of  recollection,  which  a  suggestion 
ma}'  assist.  Thus  where  the  witness  stated 
that  he  could  not  recollect  the  names  of  the 
component  members  of  a  firm,  so  as  to  repeat 
them,  without  suggestion,  but  thought  he  might 
possibly  recollect  them  if  suggested  to  him,  this 
was  permitted  to  be  done.  So  where  the  trans- 
action involves  numerous  items  or  dates.  So 
where,  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  the  mind  of 
the  witness  cannot  be  directed  to  the  subject  of 
inquiry,  without  a  particular  specification  of  it. 
So  where  a  witness  is  called  to  contradict  an- 
other, who  has  testified  to  particular  expres- 
sions, the  contradicting  witness  may  be  asked 


(h)  The  objection  that  the  interrogatories 
are  leading  cannot  be  first  made  at  the  trial. 
Marx  v.  Heidenheimer,  63  Texas,  304.  In 
modern  practice,  a  defendant  who  refuses  to 
answer  a  relevant  interrogator}'  in  the  bill, 
must  state  his  reason:  if  he  answers  it  in  part, 
he  must  answer  the  whole.  Gray  v.  Bateman, 
21  W.  R.  137;  see  Zunkel  v.  Litchfield,  21  Fed. 
Rep.  196;  Todd  v.  Bishop,  136  Mass.  386.  But 
part  of  a  party's  deposition  may  be  read  to 
prove  an  admission.  Van  Horn  v.  Smith,  59 
Iowa,  142;  Converse  v.  Meyer,  14  Neb.  190. 
Irresponsive  answers  in  a  deposition  taken  by 
an  adversary  may  be  omitted  in  reading  it  in 
evidence.     Fountain  r.  Ware,  56  Ala  558 ;  see 


whether  such  expressions  were  used.  When 
and  under  what  circumstances  a  leading  ques- 
tion may  be  put  is  a  matter  resting  in  the 
sound  discretion  of  the  Court,  arid  not  a  matter 
which  can  be  assigned  for  error.  1  Greenl.  Ev. 
§  435;  Clarke  v.  Saffery,  Ry.  &  M.  126,  per 
Best  C.  J.;  Price  v.  Manning,  42  Ch.  D.  372; 
Regina  v.  Chapman,  8  C.  &  P.  558;  Acerro  v. 
Petroni,  1  Stark.  100;  2  Phil.  Ev.  404,  405; 
Moody  v.  Rowell,  17  Pick.  498. 

6  1  Harr.  ed.  Newl.  259.  Objections  to  in- 
terrogatories, filed  before  the  issuing  of  a 
commission  to  take  a  deposition,  should  specify 
the  ground  of  the  objection,  in  order  that  the 
adverse  party  may  have  an  opportunity  to  vary 
the  interrogatories.  Allen  v.  Babcock,  15  Pick. 
56;  see  Craddock  r.  Craddock,  3Litt.  77;  Jones 
v.  Lucas,  1  Rand.  268.  A  leading  interrogatory 
in  a  deposition,  taken  when  both  parties  are 
present,  must  be  objected  to  at  the  time  it  is  put 
to  the  witness,  if  at  all.  Woodman  v.  Cool- 
broth,  7  Greenl.  181;  Sheeler  v.  Speer,  3  Binn. 
130;  see  Anon.  2  Pick.  165. 

1  See  Craddock  v.  Craddock,  3  Lift.  77. 

2  1  Harr.  Ed.  Newl.  259 ;  see  Lincoln  p. 
Wright,  4  Beav.  166.  "  Such  questions,  as  will 
as  those  which  fall  more  directly  under  the 
denomination  of  leading  questions,  are  objec- 


Chase  v.  Kenniston,  76  Maine,  209.  The  rule, 
in  jurisdictions  where  it  is  so  provided  by 
statute,  that  an  interrogatory  which  the  de- 
ponent refused  to  answer  shall  be  taken  as 
confessed,  applies  only  to  pertinent  interroga- 
tories. Barnard  p.  Blum,  69  Texas,  608.  Upon 
a  refusal  to  produce  documents  merely  because 
they  are  too  voluminous,  the  deposition  may  be 
suppressed  on  motion.  Coleman  r.  Colgate, 
6!)  Texas,  88.  The  deponent  cannot  be  re- 
quired to  attach  to  his  deposition  more  than  a 
transcript  of  a  merchant's  books  of  account. 
Petersburg  Savings  Co.  v.  Manhattan  Fire  Ins. 
Co.  66  Ga.  446. 

919 


922 


EVIDENCE. 


In  order  to  render  an  interrogatory  objectionable,  on  the  ground  of  its 
being  leading,  it  must  relate  to  some  material  poiut  in  the  cause.8 

It  is  difficult,  however,  to  suggest  any  rules,  in  the  abstract,  with 
regard  to  what  will  or  will  not  be  considered  as  a  leading  question,  as 
much,  in  every  case,  must  depend  upon  the  peculiar  circumstances  attend- 
ing it ;  nevertheless,  the  avoiding  such  questions  as  may  be  considered 
leading  is  a  point  very  important  to  be  attended  to  in  the  framing  of 
interrogatories,  as  the  consequences  of  them  may  be  a  motion  to  suppress 
the  evidence  taken  upon  them,  whereby  the  party  will,  in  all  probabil- 
ity, be  deprived  of  an  important  part  of  the  evidence  upon  which 
*  922  he  intends  to  rely.  *  Indeed,  it  seems  that,  where  interrogatories 
are  obviously  leading,  the  Court  will,  without  any  motion  being 
made  to  suppress  the  deposition,  think  it  a  good  ground  to  reject  the 
evidence  taken  upon  it  at  the  hearing.1  Where,  however,  depositions 
are  offered  in  evidence  in  a  trial  at  Law,  they  may  be  read  notwithstand- 
ing the  interrogatories  on  which  they  were  taken  are  leading  ;  — the  other 
side  ought  to  have  applied  to  the  Court  in  which  they  were  taken  to 
have  them  suppressed.2 

Cross-interrogatories  are  not  subject  to  the  same  objections,  on  account 
of  their  leading  the  witness,  as  interrogatories  for  examination  in  chief ; 
care  must  be  taken,  however,  in  framing  them,  not  to'  adapt  them  to  the 
proof  of  new  facts  which  it  is  not  likely  the  party  examining  in  chief  will 
attempt  to  substantiate  by  his  evidence ;  for,  although  the  adverse  party 
may  cross-examine  as  to  the  points  upon  which  a  witness  has  been  ex- 
amined in  chief,  he  cannot  make  use  of  the  same  process  to  prove  a 
different  fact.8 


tionable,  because  the  evidence  elicited  by  them 
is  presented  to  the  Court,  which  is  to  judge  of 
the  effect  of  it,  not  as  it  would  be  if  it  were  the 
unassisted  testimony  of  the  witness,  but  in  the 
form,  and  with  the  coloring,  that  are  prompted 
by  professional  skill  and  a  previous  knowledge 
of  the  case  which  it  is  desired  to  prove.  If 
such  a  mode  of  proof  were  admitted,  there 
would  not  be  the  same  probability  that  a  wit- 
ness would  state  the  whole  transaction,  and 
part  only  might  be  elicited;  the  chance,  too,  of 
detecting  discrepancies  in  perjured  or  mistaken 
testimony  would  be  diminished;  nor  are  those 
objections  removed  by  the  power  of  cross- 
examination,  which,  as  it  often  must  be  con- 
ducted without  previous  knowledge  of  the 
answers  which  the  witnesses  will  give,  is  not  a 
counterbalance  to  the  facility  afforded  of  pre- 
senting a  selected  portion  of  the  evidence  in 
chief."     Phil.  &  Amos,  887. 

3  "  Questions  which  are  intended  merely  as 
introductory,  and  which,  whether  answered  in 
the  affirmative  or  negative,  would  not  be  con- 
clusive on  any  of  the  points  in  the  cause,  are 
not  liable  to  the  objection  of  leading.  If  it 
were  not  allowed  to  approach  the  points  in  issue 
by  such  questions,  the  examination  of  witnesses 
would  run  to  an  immoderate  length.     For  ex- 

920 


■ample,  if  two  defendants  are  charged  as  part- 
ners, a  witness  may  be  properly  asked  whether 
the  one  defendant  has  interfered  in  the  busi- 
ness of  the  other."     Phil.  &  Amos,  887. 

1  Delves  v.  Lord  Bagot,  2  Fowl.  Ex.  Pr. 
129. 

2  4  M.  &  S.  497. 

3  Dean  and  Chapter  of  Ely  v.  Stewart,  2 
Atk.  44.  If,  therefore,  there  should  be  any 
parts  of  a  case  which  can  only  be  proved  by  a 
witness  examined  on  behalf  of  the  adverse 
party,  the  proper  course  is,  not  to  endeavor  to 
establish  them  by  cross-examining  that  wit- 
ness, but  to  exhibit  original  interrogatories  for 
the  examination  of  such  witness  in  chief; 
otherwise  there  will  be  a  risk  that  the  evidence 
of  the  witness,  as  to  these  points,  will  be  lost; 
for,  if  the  reading  of  the  deposition  of  the  wit- 
ness to  the  cross-interrogatory  be  objected  to  at 
the  hearing  as  involving  new  points,  the  other 
party  may  also  prevent  the  reading  of  the 
cross-deposition  by  refusing  to  read  the  ex- 
examination  in  chief.  Smith  v.  Biggs,  5  Sim. 
392;  see  1  Greenl.  Ev.  §  445,  et  seq. ;  1  Phil.  Ev. 
(Cowen  &  Hill's  ed.  1839)  272,  et  seq.  and  notes 
referred  to;  Gresley,  Eq.  Ev.  (Am.  ed.)  49.  But 
see  infra,  p.  950,  n.  8. 


INTERROGATORIES.  *  923 

Interrogatories,  like  all  other  proceedings  in  the  Court,  may  be  the 
subject  of  a  reference  for  scandal.4  It  seems,  however,  that  they  caunot 
be  referred  for  impertinence  alone.5  If  the  witness  himself  objects  to 
the  interrogatory  upon  this  ground,  he  should  do  so  by  demurrer,  before 
he  answers  it.0 

Interrogatories  for  the  examination  of  witnesses  in  a  cause  are  entitled : 
"Interrogatories  to  be  exhibited  to  witnesses  to  be  produced,  sworn,  and 
examined  in  a  certain  cause  now  depending  and  at  issue  in  the  High 
Court  of  Chancery,  wherein  A  B  is  plaintiff,  and  C  D  is  defendant,  on 
the  part  and  behalf  of  the  above-named  plaintiff  "  (or  defendant,  as  the 
case  may  be).  Care  must  be  taken,  in  framing  the  interrogatories, 
that  the  title  of  the  cause 7  *  is  properly  set  out ;  as  any  mistake  *  923 
in  this  particular  may  be  fatal  to  the  depositions.1  The  reason  of 
requiring  this  particularity,  in  the  title,  is  the  impossibility  there  would 
be  of  maintaining  an  indictment  for  perjury,  if  such  variance  between 
the  title  of  the  cause  and  that  of  the  interrogatories  should  appear. 

It  is  usual  to  prefix,  to  all  interrogatories,  a  general  inquiry  "as  to  the 
witness's  knowledge  of  the  parties,  and  the  time  when  the  witness  first 
became  acquainted  with  each,"  &c.  Orders  appear  to  have  formerly 
been  promulgated  by  the  Court  to  restrict  this  practice,  by  which  it  is 
directed  "  that  the  articles  which  are  usually  thrust  into  the  beginning 
of  every  schedule  of  interrogatories,  as  it  were  of  form,  or  course, 
touching  the  witness's  knowledge  of  the  parties,  plaintiffs  or  defendants, 
of  the  lands,  towns,  and  places  in  the  pleadings,  and  the  like,  be  not  so 
needlessly  used  as  they  are  ; " 2  but,  notwithstanding  this  order,  the 
practice  of  introducing  a  general  inquiry  of  this  nature  is  almost  invari- 
ably resorted  to.3 

The  interrogatories  are  broken  into  distinct  interrogatories,  according 
to  the  subject-matter  or  the  witnesses  to  be  examined,  but  each  inter- 
rogatory concludes  with  the  following  words  :  "  Declare  the  truth  of  the 
several  matters  in  this  interrogatory  inquired  after,  according  to  the 
best  of  your  knowledge,  remembrance,  and  belief."  These  words,  how- 
ever, are  mere  matter  of  form,  and  are  not  generally  inserted  in  the 
draft,  but  are  supplied  in  the  engrossment. 

It  has  frequently  happened,  that,  in  framing  the  interrogatories,  some 
point  to  which  it  is  important  that  a  witness  should  depose  has  been 
omitted ;  or  else  it  has  been  found  that  a  witness  is  capable  of  deposing 
as  to  some  matter  as  to  which  it  was  not,  at  the  time,  known  that  any 
witness  could  speak,  in  consequence  of  which,  evidence  which  would  be 
important  to  the  party  would  be  omitted,  from  the  circumstance  of  no 
question  being  addressed  to  the  witness  calculated  to  elicit  it ;  it  there- 

4  Cox  v.  Worthington,  2  Atk.  236.  1  Thus,  where  the  plaintiff's  Christian  name 

5  White  v.  Fussell,  19  Ves.  113;  see  Pynccnt  was  mistaken  in  the  title  of  the  interrogatories, 
v.  Pyncent,  3  Atk.  557.  the  depositions  could  not  be  read,  nor  would  the 

6  Jeffris  v.  Whittuck,  2  Price,  486;  but  see  Court  permit  the  title  to  be  amended,  though 
Ashton  v.  Ashton,  1  Vera.  165;  1  Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  most  of  the  witnesses  had,  since  their  cxamina- 
41,  S.  C  tion,  gone  to  sea.     White  v.  Taj-lor,  2  Vern. 

7  Jones  v.  Smith,  2  Y.  &  C.  42;  Lincoln  v.  435. 

Wright,  4  Beav.  166;  Pritchard  v.  Foulkes,  2  2  Beames's  Ord.  71. 

Beav.  133.  3  Greslev,  Eq.  Ev.  (Am.  ed.)  48,  49. 

921 


*  924  EVIDENCE. 

fore  became  the  practice  to  add  to  eacli  set  of  interrogatories  a  general 
interrogatory  calling  upon  the  witness  to  state  whether  he  knew  or 
could  set  forth  any  matter  or  thing  which  might  in  anywise  tend  to  the 
benefit  or  advantage  of  the  party  for  whom  he  appeared,  other  than 
what  he  had  been  interrogated  to  ?     And  the  witness,  being  ex- 

*  924    amined  upon  *  this  interrogatory,  then  stated  whatever  matter  he 

had  to  prove,  to  which  no  special  interrogatory  had  been  addressed. 
This  form  has,  however,  been  altered  ;  and  now,  by  the  32d  Order,  of 
December,  1833,  it  has  been  directed  "  that  the  last  interrogatory  now 
commonly  in  use  be  in  future  altered,  and  shall  stand  and  be  in  the 
words  or  to  the  effect  following:  Do  you  know  or  can  you  set  forth 
any  other  matter  or  thing  which  may  be  of  benefit  or  advantage  to 
the  parties  at  issue  in  this  cause,  or  either  of  them,  or  that  may  be  mate- 
rial to  the  subject  of  this  your  examination,  or  to  the  matters  in  question 
in  this  cause  ?  If  yea,  set  forth  the  same  fully  and  at  large  in  your 
answer."  1 

But  although  the  order  directs  where  a  general  interrogatory  of  the 
nature  of  that  formerly  used  as  the  last,  is  made  use  of,  the  form  shall 
be  that  prescribed,  it  does  not  compel  a  party  to  use  it.2  So  that  it  is 
optional  with  the  draftsman  to  insert  a  general  interrogatory  or  not. 
Where,  however,  he  does  insert  one,  it  must  be  in  the  form  prescribed 
by  the  32d  Order,  otherwise  the  deposition  taken  upon  it  may  be  sup- 
pressed upon  motion.3 

The  interrogatories  being  drawn  and  signed  by  counsel,  must  be 
copied  upon  parchment,  and,  if  intended  for  the  examination  of  wit- 
nesses in  London,  or  within  twenty  miles  of  it,  they  must  be  left  with 
one  of  the  Examiners  of  the  Court,  which  is  termed  filing  interroga- 
tories ; 4  but  if  any  of  the  witnesses  are  to  be  examined  by  commission, 
the  plaintiff  should  file,  with  the  Examiner,  such  interrogatories  only 
as  apply  to  witnesses  resident  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Examiner's 

office.5 

The  practice  is,  to  draw  all  the  original  interrogatories  exhibited  on 
behalf  of  one  party  in  one  set  or  schedule,  leaving  the  selection  of 
such  as  are  proper  for  the  particular  witnesses  to  the  solicitor,6  and 
where  some  of  the  witnesses  of  a  party  reside  in  London,  and  some  in 
the  country,  it  is  necessary  to  have  one  set  of  interrogatories  only  drawn 
by  counsel ;  and  the  solicitor,  in  procuring  the  same  to  be  engrossed, 
distinguishes  and  copies  those  intended  for  the  examination  of  town 
witnesses,  separately  from  those  intended  for  country  witnesses. 

If  the  interrogatories  are  to  be  exhibited  in  the  Examiner's  office, 
and  witnesses  are  examined  thereon,  either  party  may,  without  appli- 
cation to  the  Court  or  order  for  that  purpose,  exhibit  one  or  more  inter- 

i  Tins  last  interrogatory  is  the  same  as  that  2  Gover  r.  Lucas,  8  Sim.  200. 

adopted  by  the  U.  S.  Supreme  Court  in  the  71st  3  Ibid. 

Equity  Rule.     See  post,  p.  2393;  Gresley,  Eq.  M  T.  &  V.  191. 

Ev.  (Am.  ed.)  49.     It  is  a  fatal  defect  if  this  5  Ibid.;  Hinde,  320,  n. 

general  interrogatory  does  not  appear  to  be  an-  6  See  Beames's  Ord.  71. 
swered.     Richardson  f.  Golden.  3  Wash.  C.  C. 
103;  Dodge  v.  Israel,  i  Wash.  C.  C  323. 

922 


EXAMINATION   BY   EXAMINER   ON    INTERROGATORIES. 


*926 


rogatories,  or  a  new  set  of  interrogatories  for  the  further*  exami-    *  925 
nation  of  the  same  or  other  witnesses.1     But  when  a  commission 
is  taken  out,  the  practice  has  been  different.2 

Under  the  former  practice,  where  additional  interrogatories  were  re- 
quired to  be  exhibited  after  the  commission  had  been  opened,  an  order  for 
that  purpose  must  have  been  obtained.3 

Yet,  although  a  commission  has  been  issued,  and  the  parties  have 
joined  in  it,  and  witnesses  have  been  examined,  new  interrogatories  may 
be  exhibited  into  Court  (i.  e.  before  the  Examiner),  for  the  examination 
of  new  witnesses  at  any  time  before  publication  ; 4  but  if  a  witness  has 
been  examined  by  commissioners  in  the  country,  he  cannot  be  examined 
again  before  the  Examiner,  without  a  special  order.5 

Interrogatories  for  the  cross-examination  of  witnesses  differ  very 
little  in  form  from  original  interrogatories ;  they  may  be  filed  *  with    *  926 
the  Examiner  who  examines  in  chief.1     formerly  this  could  not  be 
done  without  a  special  order.2 


Section  XIII.  —  Of  the  Examination  of  Witnesses  by  the  Examiner  on 

Interrogator  ies.z 

Witnesses  in  Chancery  are  examined  either  by  an  Examiner  or  by 
commissioners  specially  appointed  for  that  purpose  by  commission  under 
the  Great  Seal.4 

The  first  thing  to  be  done  by  the  party  intending  to  examine  witnesses 


i  Smith,  Ch.  Pr.  (ed.  1838)  •'354. 

2  In  Campbell  v.  Scongal,  19  Ves.  552,  it  was 
represented  at  the  bar,  that  the  practice  in 
country  causes  is  to  feed  the  commissioners 
from  time  to  time  with  interrogatories  for  the 
examination,  as  they  can  be  presented  either 
for  original  or  cross-examination,  until  the  com- 
missioners find  that  the  supply  of  witnesses  is 
exhausted;  and  although  Lord  EI  don  observes 
that  there  was  no  doubt  that,  of  late,  interroga- 
tories had  been  sent  down  into  the  country, 
from  time  to  time,  as  often  as  prudence  required, 
and  were  returned,  and  that  the  Court  had  acted 
upon  examination  so  taken  and  returned,  yet 
his  Lordship  said  the  practice  was  not  so  for- 
merly, and  that  lie  had  frequently,  when  at  the 
bar,  drawn  interrogatories  guessing  at  what  any 
witness  to  be  examined  to  any  fact  in  issue, 
could  possibly  represent,  and  that  the  interrog- 
atories, both  for  the  cross-examination  and  for 
the  original  examination  of  the  defendants' 
witnesses,  were  prepared  before  the  commis- 
sion was  opened  :  and,  notwithstanding  the  rep- 
resentation made  at  the  bar,  the  practice  of 
the  Court  appears  to  have  been  in  conformity 
with  his  Lordship's  recollection.  Indeed  it  ob- 
viously must  have  been  so,  from  the  nature  of 
the  oath  which  was  administered  to  the  com- 
missioners, which  was  limited  to  the  examina- 


tion of  witnesses  upon  the  interrogatories  — 
"now  (i.  e.,  at  the  time  of  administering  the 
oath)  produced  and  left  with  you."  This 
word  linow"  has  been  left  out  of  the  oath 
hereafter  to  be  administered  to  the  commis- 
sioners, under  the  104th  Order  of  May,  1845; 
whether,  therefore,  hereafter  new  interroga- 
tories may  be  exhibited  before  a  commission, 
remains  to  be  seen. 

3  Carter  v.  Draper,  2  Sim.  53;  King  of 
Hanover  v.  Wheatley,  4  Beav.  78. 

4  Lewis  r.  Owen,  1  Dick.  6  ;  Beames's  Ord. 
96,  S.  C. :  Hinde,  333. 

5  Hinde,  333. 

i  Ord.  26,  1833. 

2  Turner  v.  Burleigh,  17  Ves.  354. 

3  By  the  78th  Chancery  Rnle  in  New  Jersey, 
when  any  cause  shall  be  at  issue,  &c,  it  shall 
be  the  duty  of  the  parties  to  proceed  and  ex- 
amine their  witnesses  within  a  reasonable  time 
thereafter;  and  on  a  notice  for  the  examination 
of  witnesses  given  by  either  party,  both  parties 
may  produce  and  examine  their  witnesses  ;  but 
the  Examiner,  if  required  so  to  do,  shall  first 
examine  the  witnesses  of  the  party  who  first 
gave  notice. 

4  In  the  U.  S.  Courts  the  commissioner  or 
commissioners  shall  be  named  by  the  Court  or 
a  Judge  thereof  in  all  cases.    Equity  Rule  67. 

923 


*  927  EVIDENCE. 

before  the  Examiner  is  to  file  his  interrogatories,  or  such  of  them  as 
apply  to  the  witnesses  to  be  examined,  in  the  manner  before  pointed 
out.5  He  must  then  procure  the  attendance  of  his  witnesses  at  the 
Examiner's  office ;  for  which  purpose  he  ought  to  fix  a  day  with  the 
Examiner,  when  he  will  be  able  to  examine  them,  and  to  give  notice  of 
such  day  to  the  witnesses.6 

If  the  witness  be  in  prison,  his  situation  must  be  represented  to  the 
Examiner,  who  will  fix  a  day  for  attending  at  the  prison  to  swear  and 
examine  the  witness.  The  Examiner  (with  whom  the  interrogatories  for 
the  examination  of  such  witness  should  have  been  previously  left)  will 
then  proceed  to  the  prison,  taking  the  interrogatories  with  him,  and,  the 
witness  being  sworn  thereto  in  the  common  form,  the  examination  is 
taken  in  the  usual  manner,  and  the  depositions  and  interrogatories  are 
returned  by  the  examiner  to  the  office,  to  be  kept,  as  in  ordinary  cases, 
until  publication  pass  in  the  cause.7 

In  like  manner,  if  a  witness  be  incapable,  by  reason  of  sickness,  of 

attending  at  the  Examiner's  office  to  be  examined,  and  it  is  not  thought 

necessary  to  sue  out  a  commission  to  take  his  examination,  the 

*  927    Examiner  may  go  to  the  place  of  the  witness's  residence  *and 

administer  the  oath  and  take  the  deposition  of  the  witness.1  In 
either  of  the  above  cases  notice  must  be  given  in  the  usual  manner  to  the 
other  party  of  the  time  and  place  of  examination. 

The  form  of  the  oath  administered  to  witnesses  in  Chancery  is  as 
follows  :  — 

''You  shall  true  answer  make  to  all  such  questions  as  shall  be  asked 
of  you  on  these  interrogatories,  without  favor  or  affection  to  either  party, 
and  therein  you  shall  speak  the  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and  nothing  but 
the  truth.     So  help  you  God." 

After  the  witness  has  been  sworn  to  the  interrogatories,  &  jurat  stating 
the  producing  and  swearing  of  the  witness  to  the  interrogatories,  with  his 
name,  and  the  day  and  year  when  sworn,  is  inscribed  upon  the  interroga- 
tories, and  signed  by  the  Examiner.2  If,  after  the  witness  has  been 
sworn,  any  alteration  is  made  in  the  title,  or  any  part  of  the  interroga- 
tories, they  must  be  re-sworn,  but  not  re-produced.3 

"When  new  interrogatories  are  added,  the  witness  must  be  sworn  to 
them  in  the  same  form. 

Before  the  witnesses  are  examined,  the  Examiner  ought  to  be,  and 
generally  is,  furnished  with  instructions  as  to  which  of  the  interroga- 
tories each  witness  is  to  be  examined  upon.     The  solicitor  also  supplies 

6  Supra,  p.  914.  was  necessary  that  the  Master  should  go  to  the 

6  Notice  that  witnesses  will  be  examined  at  a  prison,  as  well  as  the  Examiner,  for  the  purpose 

particular  tavern  in  a  city  named  in  the  notice,  of  administering  the  oath.     Hinde,  330. 
without   naming    the   Christian    name   of    the  *  An  order   for   this    purpose   seems   to   be 

tavern-keeper,  is  good,  unless  it  is  shown  that  necessary.    See  Anon.  4  Mad.  463.    Sed  quart, 

there  were  in  the  same  city  two  tavern-keepers  if  the  Examiner  is  willing  to  go  without  an 

of  the  same  surname.    Overstreet  v.  Thompson,  order. 
1  Litt.  120.     An  irregularity  in  the  service  of  -  Hinde,  322. 

notice   of   examination  will   be   considered   as  3  See  Mr.  Plumer's  return  of  the  duties  of 

waived  by  a  neglect  to  complain  of  it  in  due  Examiners  to  the  Chancery  Commission,  Chan, 

season.     Skinner  v.  Dayton,  5  John.  Ch.  191.  Rep.  Appx.  B.  No.  22,  p.  542. 
1  Before  the  Stat.  3*&  4  Will.  IV.  c.  94,  it 

924 


EXAMINATION    BY   EXAMINER   ON    INTERROGATORIES.  *  928 

a  minute  of  the  evidence  he  expects  his  witness  to  give ;  but  of  such 
minute  no  use  can  be  made  in  the  examination.4 

After  the  examination  is  begun,  the  Examiner  ought  not  to  confer  with 
either  party  touching  the  examination,  or  take  new  instructions  respect- 
ing the  same.5 

With  respect  to  the  method  of  examining  a  witness,6  Lord  Clarendon's 
orders,  which  have  been  before  referred  to,  direct,  that  "  the  Examiner 
is  to  examine  the  deponent  to  the  interrogatories  directed  seriatim,  and 
not  to  permit  him  to  read  over,  or  hear  read,  any  other  interrogatories, 
until  that  in  hand  be  fully  finished ;  much  less  is  he  to  suffer  the  depo- 
nent to  have  the  interrogatories,  and  pen  his  own  depositions,  or  depart 
after  he  hath  heard  an  interrogatory  read  over,  until  he  hath  perfected  his 
examination  thereunto.  And  if  any  witness  shall  refuse  so  to  conform 
himself,  the  Examiner  is  thereof  to  give  notice  to  the  clerk  of  the 
other  *  side,  and  to  proceed  no  further  in  his  examination  without  *  928 
the  consent  of  the  said  clerk,  or  order  made  in  Court  to  warrant 
his  so  doing." l  The  same  Orders  afterwards  direct  that  "  the  Examiners, 
in  whom  the  Court  reposeth  much  confidence,  are  themselves  in  person 
to  be  diligent  in  examination  of  witnesses,  and  not  to  intrust  the  same 
to  mean  and  inferior  clerks,  and  are  to  take  care  and  hold  the  witness  to 
the  point  interrogated,  and  not  to  run  into  extravagances  and  matters  not 
pertinent  to  the  question." 2  Moreover,  they  are  not  to  "  use  any  idle 
repetitions,  or  needless  circumstances,  nor  set  down  any  answer  to  a  ques- 
tion to  which  the  examinant  cannot  depose  other  than  thus, — '  To  such  an 
interrogatory  this  examinant  cannot  depose ;  '  and  in  case  such  imperti- 
nencies  be  observed  by  the  Court,  the  Examiner  is  to  recompence  the 
charge  thereof  to  the  party  grieved,  as  the  Court  shall  award."  3 

"  The  Examiner  is  not  strictly  bound  to  the  letter  of  the  interrogatories, 
but  ought  to  explain  every  matter  or  thing  which  ariseth  necessarily 
thereupon  ; 4  and  forasmuch  as  the  witness,  by  his  oath,  which  is  so 
sacred,  calleth  Almighty  God  (who  is  truth  itself,  and  cannot  be  deceived, 
and  hath  knowledge  of  the  secrets  of  the  heart)  to  witness  that  which  he 
shall  depose,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  Examiner  gravely,  temperately,  and 
leisurely  to  take  the  depositions  of  witnesses,  without  any  menace,  dis- 
turbance, or  interruption  of  them  in  hinderance  of  the  truth."  5 

The  Examiner,  having  read  an  interrogatory  to  the  witness,  takes  down 
the  answer  in  writing  upon  paper,  concluding  the  answer  to  each  inter- 
rogatory before  the  following  one  is  put. 

A  witness  may  be  permitted  to  use  such  short  notes  as  he  brings  with 
him  to  refresh  his  memory,  but  not  the  substance  of  his  depositions  ;  nor 

4  Mr.  Plumer's  statement,  ubi  suprn.  i  Beames's  Ord.  187;  see  Hickok  v.  Farmers 

6  Hinde,  .325;  4  Inst.  278.  and  Mechanics'  Bank,  35  Vt.  476. 
6  In  the  U.  S.  Courts,  these  examinations  2  Ibid.  188. 

may  now  be  conducted  orally,  and  the  testimony  3  Ibid.  190. 

taken  down  in  writing  by  the  Examiner,  the  4  Hinde,  325;  4  Inst.  278;  see  also  Peacock's 

examination  and  cross-examination  to  be  con-  case,  9  Rep.  70. 

ducted  in  the  mode  pursued  in  Common  Law  6  Hinde,  325 ;  4  Inst.  278. 

Courts.  Ante,  p.  905,  note;  IJ.  S.  Courts,  Equity 

Rule  67,  post  p.  2391.     In  Massachusetts,  see 

Pingree  v.  Coffin,  12  Cush.  600. 

925 


*  930  EVIDENCE. 

may  he  transcribe  such  notes  verbatim*    The  rule  at  Law  is,  in  this 
respect,  the  same.7 

*  929        *  In  order  to  secure  the  statement  of  the  evidence  upon  the  depo- 

sitions in  the  very  words  of  the  witness,  the  Stat.  3  &  4  Will.  IV. 
c.  94,  §  27,  has  enacted  that  all  depositions  of  witnesses  examined  in  the 
High  Court  of  Chancery  are  to  be  taken  in  the  first  person ;  formerly  the 
practice  was  to  take  them  in  the  third  person.1 

If  a  witness  to  be  examined  does  not  understand  English,  an  order 
should  be  obtained  to  appoint  an  interpreter  to  interpret  the  interroga- 
tories and  depositions.2  The  person  so  appointed  must  be  sworn  to 
interpret  truly,  and  the  depositions  of  the  witnesses  are  to  be  taken 
down  by  the  Examiner,  from  the  interpretation,  in  English.3  It  was 
Lord  Nottingham  who  established  the  rule  that  "no  alien  should  be  ex- 
amined as  a  witness  without  a  motion  first  made  in  Court  to  swear  an 
interpreter,  that  the  other  side  might  know  him,  and  take  exceptions  to 
the  interpreter."  4 

When  all  the  interrogatories,  upon  which  the  Examiner  has  been  in- 
structed to  examine  the  witness,  have  been  gone  through,  the  Examiner 
carefully  reads  over  the  whole  deposition  to  the  witness,  who,  if  he  be 
satisfied  with  it,  signs  each  sheet  of  it  in  the  presence  of  the  Examiner. 

If  the  witness  wishes  to  vary  his  testimony,  or  to  make  any  alteration 
in  or  addition  to  it,  he  must  do  so  before  signing  the  deposition  ;  for,  by 
an  order  of  the  Court,  when  witnesses  are  examined  in  Court,  they  are 
to  perfect  and  subscribe  their  depositions  to  such  interrogatories  as  they 
have  answered,  before  they  depart  from  the  Examiner  or  his  deputy ; 
and  they  are  not  to  be  permitted  to  make  any  alteration  thereof 

*  930    at  any  time  thereafter  *  without  leave  of  the  Court,  unless  it  be 

in  some  circumstance  of  time  or  the  like,  or  for  making  perfect 

6  Curs.  Cane.  260;  ante,  p.  906,  note.  it;  and  that  it  was,  therefore,  no  more  than  an 

7  In  an  anonymous  case  in  Ambler's  Reports,  affidavit.  See  Phil.  &  Amos,  891 ;  see  Hickok 
p.  252,  Lord  Hardwicke  said  "that,  at  Law,  a  v.  Farmers  and  Mechanics'  Bank,  35  Vt.  476; 
witness  is  allowed  to  refresh  his  memory  by  see  also  Shaw  v.  Lindsey,  15  Ves.  380;  Ferry 
notes  as  to  dates  and  names,  because  there  is  v.  Fisher,  cited  id.  382;  Phil.  &  Amos,  896:  St. 
nothing  to  guide  the  memory  as  to  them;  but  Catherine  Dock  Co.  v.  Mahtzgu,  1  Col.  94;  see 
he  never  knew  a  Court  of  Law  admit  the  whole  Hickok  v.  Farmers  and  Mechanics'  Dank,  35 
evidence  to  be  given  from  writing.     There  is  no  Vt.  476;  ante,  p.  906,  note. 

certain  rule  how  far  evidence  may  be  given  1  By  Chancery  Rule  92,  in  New  Jersey,  the 
from  notes;  some  Judges  had  thought,  and  he  Examiner  shall  number  each  page  of  the  ex- 
was  (he  said)  inclined  the  same  way,  that  the  animation  taken  by  him,  and  also  every  tenth 
witness  might  speak  from  notes  which  were  line  of  the  same,  leaving  sufficient  margin  for 
taken  at  the  time  of  the  transaction  in  question,  the  purpose;  and  where  more  than  one  witness 
but  not  if  they  were  written  afterwards."  is  examined,  he  shall  annex  a  separate  leaf  to 
In  that  case,  a  motion  was  made  to  suppress  the  examination,  containing  a  list  of  the  names 
a  deposition  taken  before  commissioners,  be-  of  the  witnesses,  and  a  reference  to  the  pages 
cause  the  attorney  for  the  plaintiff  had  written  on  which  their  examination  respectively  corn- 
down  the  whole  in  the  exact  form  of  the  depo-  mences;  and  no  costs  are  to  be  taxed  for  any 
sition  before  it  was  taken;  and,  though  it  ap-  examination  where  this  rule  is  not  strictly  com- 
peared that  the  witness  had  told  him  the  facts  plied  with. 

and   circumstances   mentioned    in   it,    yet   his  2  See  Gilpins  v.  Consequa,  1  Peters,  C.  C. 

Lordship  said  it  would  be  of  dangerous  tend-  85;  A mory  v.  Fellows,  5  Mass.  219. 
ency  to  permit  it   to   be  read;   for  in  deposi-  3  Smith   v.  Kirkpatrick,   1  Dick.  103;   see 

tions  it  is  natural  to  state  the  evidence  as  given  also  Lord  Belmore    v.  Anderson,  2  Cox,  288, 

by  the  witnesses,  but  that,  in  the  case  in  ques-  and  4  Bro.  C.  C.  90,  S.  C. 
tion,  the  attorney  had  methodized  and  worded  4  2  Swanst.  201,  n. 

926 


EXAMINATION   BY   EXAMINER   ON   INTERROGATORIES. 


*930 


of  a  sum  upon  view  of  any  deed,  book,  or  writing,  which  the  witness 
shall  show  to  the  Examiner  before  he  permits  such  alteration.1 

It  is  to  be  noticed,  that  the  signature  of  a  witness  to  his  examination 
is  absolutely  necessary,  and  that  if  a  witness  should  die  after  his  exam- 
ination is  completed,  but  before  it  is  signed,  the  deposition  cannot  be 
made  use  of.2  It  seems,  however,  that  if  a  witness,  having  signed  his 
examination  in  chief,  dies  before  he  is  cross-examined,  his  depositions 
may  be  read  as  evidence  ;  the  Court,  however,  bearing  in  mind  the  fact 
that  the  cross-examination  has  not  taken  effect,  especially  if  it  should 
appear  that  the  party  had  lost  any  material  fact  which  was  within  the 
knowledge  of  the  witness,  and  could  not  have  been  proved  by  other 
means.3 

If  a  witness  refuses  to  be  cross-examined,  his  deposition  cannot  be  read.4 
By  the  26th  of  the  Orders  of  1828,5  the  Examiner  who  takes  the  ex- 
amination in  chief  is  at  liberty  to  take  his  cross-examination  also ;  before 
that  time,  the  cross-examination  of  a  witness  was  taken  before  a  differ- 
ent Examiner  from  the  one  who  examined  him  in  chief;6  a  practice 
which  appears  to  have  been  sanctioned  by  the  Stat.  50  Geo.  III.  c.  8,  by 
which  it  was  directed  that,  the  witnesses  on  different  sides  of  the  same 
cause  should  (if  the  same  was  practicable)  be  examined  by  different 
Examiners.7 


1  Beames's  Ord.  74.  A  witness  may  ex- 
plain or  correct  a  mistake  made  by  him  at  any- 
time before  his  examination  is  finally  closed; 
but  no  part  of  his  testimony,  previously  reduced 
to  writing,  can  be  erased  or  altered.  1  Hoff. 
Ch.  Pr.  463.  Under  the  former  practice  in 
Chancery  in  New  York,  amendments  of  testi- 
mony were  allowed  in  open  Court,  after  publi- 
cation and  at  the  hearing,  on  an  allegation  of 
mistake  in  taking  down  the  testimony.  Denton 
v.  Jackson.  1  John.  Ch.  526.  So  a  re-examina- 
tion has  been  allowed  on  the  affidavit  of  the 
witness  that  his  testimony  in  material  parts  was 
not  truly  taken  down.  Kingston  v.  Tappen, 
1  John.  Ch.  368.  The  existence  of  the  mistake 
ought  to  be  made  out  to  the  perfect  satisfaction 
of  the  Chancellor.  Gray  V.  Murray,  4  John. 
Ch.  413;  see  Hallock  v.  Smith,  4  John.  Ch.  649; 
Newman  v.  Kendall,  2  A.  K.  Marsh.  236.  A 
witness  examined  while  incompetent,  by  reason 
of  interest,  may  be  re-examined  after  his  com- 
petency is  restored.  Haddix  v .  Haddix,  5  Litt. 
202;  see  Dunham  v.  Winans,  2  Paige,  24. 

2  Copeland  v.  Stanton,  1  P.  Wms.  414; 
Flavell  v.  Flavell,  20  N.  J.  Eq.  211.  The  signa- 
ture of  the  witness  seems  not  to  be  held  neces- 
sary to  a  deposition  in  many  of  the  States;  see 
Moulson  v.  Hargrave,  1  Serg.  &  R.  201 ;  Mobley 
v.  Hamit,  1  A.  K.  Marsh.  590;  Rutherford  v. 
Nelson,  1  Hayw.  105;  Barnett  v.  Watson,  1 
Wash.  372;  Wiggins  v.  Pryor,  3  Porter,  430; 
ante,  p.  904,  n.  9;  p.  918,  note. 

3  O'Callaghan  v.  Murphy,  2  S.  &  L.  158; 
Arundel  v.  Arundel,  1  Rep.  Ch.  90;  Nolan  v. 
Shannon,  1  Molloy,  157.    A  witness  became 


interested  by  a  death  while  under  examination. 
The  death  occurred  during  his  cross,  but  before 
further  direct,  examination.  The  Court  allowed 
the  deposition  to  stand  so  as  to  embrace  the 
direct  and  cross-examination,  but  struck  out 
the  further  direct.  Fream  v.  Dickinson,  3  Edw. 
Ch.  300. 

i  Prac.  Reg.  The  testimony  of  the  witness 
is  complete,  so  far  as  the  party  calling  him  is 
concerned,  when  the  direct  examination  is 
finished  and  signed  by  the  witness;  but  the 
party  calling  him  is  bound  to  keep  the  witness 
before  the  Examiner  a  sufficient  length  of  time 
afterwards  to  enable  the  adverse  party  to  com- 
plete the  examination,  or  the  deposition  may 
be  suppressed.  Watertown  v.  Cowen,  5  Paige, 
510. 

In  Courtenay  v.  Hoskins,  2  Russ.  253,  Lord 
Eldon  held  that  if  the  witness  appeared  for 
cross-examination  and  refused  to  answer,  his 
direct  examination  should  not  be  suppressed, 
because  it  was  in  the  power  of  the  party  wishing 
to  cross-examine  to  compel  him  to  answer. 
And  see  Goss  V.  Stinson,  3  Sumn.  98,  where 
there  was  great  delay  in  cross-examining,  and 
the  examination  in  chief  was  heard  although 
the  witness  had  in  the  mean  time  died.  See 
also  Flavell  v.  Flavell,  20  N.J.  Eq.  211.  But  if 
the  witness  secrete  himself,  the  deposition  may 
be  suppressed.  Flowerday  v.  Collet,  1  Dick. 
288. 

6  Ord.  1828. 

6  See  Troup  v.  Haight,  6  John.  Ch.  335. 

7  Turner  v.  Burleigh,  17  Yes.  354. 

927 


*  932  EVIDENCE. 

We  have   seen    before,   that,  previously   to    the  examination   of    a 
witness,  a  notice  in  writing  of  the  name  and  description  of  the 

*  931    *  witness  is  to  be  served  upon  the  adverse  solicitor.     The  object 

of  this  notice  is,  that  in  case  the  adverse  party  shall  have  occasion 
to  cross-examine  the  witness,  he  may  have  an  opportunity  of  doing  so. 
The  cross-interrogatories  ought  to  be  filed  before  the  examination  in  chief 
is  completed ;  and  if  they  are  so  filed,  the  party  producing  the  witness  is 
obliged  to  procure  him  to  stay  or  return  to  be  examined.1 

Where  the  interrogatories  for  cross-examining  a  witness  are  not  filed, 
or  the  witness  is  not  required  to  be  cross-examined  whilst  he  is  under 
original  examination,  but  is  allowed  to  depart  about  his  business,  the 
party  who  intends  to  cross-examine  that  witness  must  procure  his  ex- 
amination in  the  best  manner  he  can  :  the  adverse  party  is  not  bound  to 
produce  him  again ;  but  as  it  is  usual  after  the  witness  is  sworn,  if  he  be 
resident  in  London,  for  the  Examiner  to  appoint  some  other  day  for 
him  to  attend  to  be  examined,2  the  party  intending  to  cross-examine  has 
generally  sufficient  opportunity  to  prepare  and  file  his  interrogatories. 
In  the  mean  time,  however,  to  prevent  the  examination  being  taken 
without  the  cross-examination,  a  note  in  writing  may  be  stuck  up  in  the 
Examiner's  office,  that  if  such  a  person  comes  to  be  examined  in  such  a 
cause,  let  him  be  cross-examined.8 

If  a  witness  refuses  to  attend  to  be  cross-examined,  an  application 
may  be  made  to  the  Court  (it  is  presumed  in  the  same  manner  already 
pointed  out  in  the  case  of  a  witness  refusing  to  be  examined  in  chief),4 
which  will  compel  the  witness  to  do  what  the  party  has  a  right  to  require 
of  him.5 

Some  doubt  appears  to  exist  whether  a  subpoena  will  lie  to  compel  a 
witness  to  attend  for  the  purpose  of  being  cross-examined. 

If  a  party  examining  a  witness  does  not  allow  a  sufficient  time  for 
cross-examination  before  the  time  for  passing  publication  expires,  and 
cross-interrogatories  are  left,  such  party  must  either  enlarge  publication, 
or  the  deposition  will  be  suppressed.6 

*  932        *  A  witness  who  is  cross-examined  must  be  sworn  to  the  cross- 

interrogatories  as  well  as  to  the  original  interrogatories. 
Under  the  practice,  before  the  Orders  of  May,  1845,  came  into  opera- 
tion, where  the  Examiner  was  served  with  a  copy  of  a  rule  to  pass  pub- 
lication, he  could  not,  after  the  day  fixed  by  such  rule  for  passing  pub- 
lication, examine  any  more  witnesses,  even  though  the  witnesses  had 
been  already  sworn,1  unless  he  was  served   with  an  order  to   enlarge 

1  Hinde,  323.  time  appointed  to  the  witness,  and  also  to  the 

2  Hinde.  323.  The  depositions,  however,  solicitor  of  the  party  producing  the  witness." 
always  bear  date  the  day  of  the  swearing.  It  appears  from  this  case, that  if  the  party  intend- 

3  Hinde,  323.  In  Keymer  v.  Pering,  10  ing  to  cross-examine  neglects  to  make  the  ap- 
Sim.  179,  it  is  stated  that  "  the  practice  of  the  pointment,  he  loses  the  right  to  cross-examine. 
Examiner's  office  is,  that  where  a  party  pro-  4  Ante,  p.  926. 

duces  a  witness  to  be  examined  by  one  of  the  6  Courtenay  v.  Hoskins,  2  Russ.  253. 

Examiners,  the  opposite  party  having  notice,  6  1  Smith's  Ch.  Pr.  (3d  ed.)  476;   and  see 

and    intending  to  cross-examine  the  witness,  Keymer  v.  Pering,  10  Sim.   179;  ante,  p.  931, 

makes  an  appointment  with  the  other  Examiner  note, 

for  that  purpose,  and  then  gives  notice  of  the  1  Beames's  Ord.  73,  186. 

928 


EXAMINATION    OF   WITNESSES   DE   BENE   ESSE.  *  933 

publication  ;  in  which  case  either  party  might  examine  his  witnesses  as 
long  as  the  publication  continued  enlarged.2  Where,  however,  a  wit- 
ness was  examined,  by  mistake,  two  days  after  publication  had  passed, 
and  was  cross-examined  by  the  defendant,  the  Court  would  not  suppress 
the  deposition.8  Now,  as  we  have  seen,  publication  passes  without  rule 
at  the  expiration  of  two  months  after  the  filing  of  the  replication,  unless 
such  time  expires  in  the  long  vacation,  or  is  enlarged  by  order.  It  is 
presumed,  that,  under  the  present  practice,  any  examination  of  witnesses 
after  the  time  for  publication  has  arrived,  will  be  irregular,  whether  notice 
be  served  upon  the  Examiner  or  not. 4 


Section  XIV.  —  Examination  of  Witnesses  de  bene  esse. 

The  Court  of  Chancery,  in  its  original  institution,  participated  much 
in  the  practice  adopted  by  the  Courts  of  Civil  Law.  The  civilians  had 
a  manner  of  examining  witness,  in  perpetuam  rei  memoriam,  which 
was  twofold,  —  either  the  common  examination,  or  in  'meliori  forma.  The 
common  examination  was  where  the  witnesses  were  very  old  and  infirm, 
sick,  in  danger  of  death,  or  were  going  into  distant  countries.  In  this 
case  it  was  usual  to  file  a  libel,  and,  without  staying  for  the  litis  con- 
testation the  plaintiff  examined  his  witnesses,  immediately  giving  notice 
if  it  were  possible  to  the  other  side  of  the  time  and  place  of  the  ex- 
amination, that  that  party  might  come  and  cross-examine  such  witnesses, 
if  he  thought  fit;  and  these  depositions  stood  good  in  case  the  witnesses 
died,  or  went  abroad  ;  but  the  plaintiff  was  obliged  edere  actionem  within  a 
year :  otherwise,  these  depositions  went  for  nothing.  If  the  witnesses 
lived,  or  did  not  go  abroad  into  distant  countries,  then  they  were  to  be 
examined  post  litem  contestatam.5  The  examination  in  perpetuam 
rei  memoriam  in  meliori  forma  was  ad  transumenda  *  instrumenta :  #  933 
and  in  that  case  there  must  have  been  a  litis  contestatio  before  the 
examination ;  because  there  was  no  need  of  so  much  celerity  in  proving 
the  instruments  as  there  was  where  the  witnesses  were  likely  to  die,  or 
were  going  into  remote  parts.  In  these  cases,  the  plaintiff  was  not 
bound  to  proceed  in  any  action  upon  those  instruments  within  the  year. 
But  in  both  cases  it  seems  that  publicatio  testium  took  place,  when  the 
judgment  was  begun  before  the  ordinary  Judge,  or,  which  is  the  same 
thing,  when  there  was  a  litis  contestatio.1  The  examination,  in  perpetuam 
rei  memoriam  in  meliori  forma,  has  been  adopted  by  the  Court  of  Chan- 
cery ;  and  the  practice  with  regard  to  it  will  be  considered  when  we 
treat  of  suits  instituted  for  the  purpose  of  perpetuating  the  testimony 
of  witnesses.2  The  common  examination  in  perpetuam  rei  memoriam 
has  likewise   been  adopted   by  Courts  of   Equity,  in  their   practice  of 

2  Anon.  1  Vern.  253.  Examiner,  if  necessary,  after  the  expiration  of 

3  Hamond  V. ,  1  Dick.  50.  such  time,  and  until  an  order  to  close  the  proofs 

4  In  the  case  of  Green  v.  Wheeler,  decided      is  actually  entered. 

in  New  York  Chancery,  Aug.  16, 1842,Ch.  Wal-  6  Gilb.  For.  Rom.  118,  119  ;  Hinde.  365. 

worth  held,  that  where  an  examination  of  wit-  '  Gilb.  For.  Rom.  118:  Hinde,  365. 

nesses  is  commenced  before  the  time  for  taking  2  See7?o^,  Chap.  XXXIV.  §  4,  Bills  to  Per- 

testimony  expires,  it  may  be  continued  by  the  petuate  Testimony. 

vol.  i. -59  929 


♦934 


EVIDENCE. 


examining   witnesses  de  bene   esse ; 3    which   forms  the  subject  of  the 
present  section,  (a) 

The  examination  of  a  witness  de  bene  esse  ordinarily  takes  place : 
where  there  is  clanger  of  losing  the  testimony  of  an  important  witness 
from  death,  by  reason  of  age,  as  where  the  witness  is  seventy  years  old 
and  upwards ; 4  (b)  or  dangerous  illness ; 5  or  where  he  is  about  to  go 
abroad : 6  or  where  he  is  the  only  witness  to  an  important  fact.7  In 
such  cases  the  Court,  to  prevent  the  party  from  being  deprived  of  the 
benefit  of  his  evidence,  will  permit  his  depositions  to  be  taken  before  the 
cause  is  at  issue,  in  order  that,  if  the  witness  die,  or  be  not  forthcoming 
to  be  examined  after  issue  joined,  the  depositions  so  taken  may  be  used 
at  the  hearing.8  (c) 

The  examination  of  a  witness  de  bene  esse  may  be  incidental  to 
*  934    *  every  suit ;  whereas  the  examination  for  the  purpose  of  per- 
petuating the  testimony   is  the  fruit  of  a  suit  instituted  for  that 


3  Hinde,  368. 

4  Rowe   v.    ,    13   Ves.   261  ;    Forbes   v. 

Forbes,  9  Hare,  461,  where  the  witness  was  a 
party  to  the  cause.  Lingan  v.  Henderson,  1 
Bland,  238;  Ails  v.  Subiit,  3  Bibb,  204. 

s  Bellamy  v.  Jones,  8  Ves.  31 ;  see  Clark  v. 
Dibble,  16  Wend.  601. 

6  Bown  v.  Child,  3  Sim.  457;  Grove  v. 
Young,  3  De  G.  &  S.  397 :  13  Jur.  847 ;  MTntosh 
».  Great  Western  Ry.  Co.  1  Hare,  328.  Where 
a  witness  is  about  to  depart  from  the  State,  to 
reside  abroad,  the  Court,  on  petition,  verified 
by  affidavit  and  motion  for  the  purpose,  will 
order  him  to  be  examined  de  bene  esse,  without 
previous  notice  of  the  motion.  Rockwell  v. 
Folsom,  4  John.  Ch.  165.  In  South  Carolina, 
an  attorney,  prevented  from  being  a  witness  by 


(a)  The  Federal  Courts  are  governed  in  this 
matter  by  U.  S.  Rev.  Stats.  §§  863-866.  See 
Richter  v.  Union  Trust  Co.  115  U.  S.  55 ;  25 
Fed.  Rep.  679  ;  Gormley  v.  Bunyan,  138  U.  S. 
623;  United  States  v.  Pings,  4  Fed.  Rep.  714; 
New  York  &  B.  C.  P.  Co.  v.  New  York  C.  P. 
Co.  9  id.  578  :  Bischoffsheim  r.  Baltzer,  10  id.  1 ; 
United  States  v.  Wilder,  14  id.  393;  United 
States  r.  Cameron,  15  id.  794;  Re  Rindskopf, 
24  id.  542;  Stegner  v.  Blake,  36  id.  183;  The 
Normandie,  40  id.  590;  Uhle  v.  Burnham,  44 
id.  729;  Re  Allis,  id.  216;  First  Nat.  Bank  v. 
Forest,  id.  246:  United  States  v.  Horn   Hing, 

48  id.  635;  Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Reese,  56  id. 
288;  see  also  Danforth  v.  Bangor,  85  Maine, 
423;  Matthews  v.  Herdtfelder,  60  Hun,  521; 
United  States  r.  Tilden,  10  Ben.  566;  Meyer  v. 
Campbell,  20  N.  Y.  S.  705;  Redding  r.  Wright, 

49  Minn.  322;  Grace  v.  Nesbit,  109  Mo.  9; 
Roberts  v.  Kendall,  3  Ind.  App.  399.  If  the 
deponent  attends  the  trial  and  is  able  to  testify, 
though  living  at  a  distance,  such  deposition 
cannot  be  read  at  the  trial.  Whitford  v.  Clark 
Count v,  119  U.  S.  522;  see  Ihl  v.  St.  Joseph 

930 


duties  in  another  Court,  may  be  examined  de 
bene  esse,  by  commission.  Huffman  r.  Bark- 
ley,  1  Bailey,  34.  So  if  the  witness  is  going 
from  one  State  to  another.    Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  308. 

7  Shirley  v.  Earl  Ferrers,  3  P.  Wins.  77; 
Pearson  v.  Ward,  2  Dick.  648;  Hankin  v.  Mid- 
dleditch,  2  Bro.  C.  C.  641 ;  Brydges  v.  Hatch,  1 
Cox,  423.  In  Earl  of  Cholmondely  v.  Earl  of 
Orford,  4  Bro.  C.  C.  157,  two  witnesses  were 
ordered  to  be  examined  de  bene  esse ;  being  the 
only  persons  who  knew  the  material  facts. 

8  Hinde,  368;  Gilb.  For.  Rom.  140;  2  Phil. 
Ev.  (Cowen  &  Hill's  notes)  n.  (42),  pp.  38  and 
39,  and  cases  cited;  2  Story,  Eq.  Jur.  §§  1513- 
1510  ;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §§  307,  310.  See  now  R. 
S.  C.  Ord.  XXXVII.  4.  See  the  70th  U.  S. 
Equity  Rule,  post,  p.  2393. 


Bank,  26  Mo.  App.  129;  McLaurin  v.  Wilson, 
16  S.  C.  402:  Earnhardt  v.  Smith,  86  N.  C. 
473;  Light  v.  Governor,  58  L.  T.  25.  Deposi- 
tions of  witnesses  in  a  foreign  country  are  to  be 
taken,  not  under  §  863,  but  by  commission. 
Cortes  Co.  v.  Tannhauser,  21  Blatch.  552;  18 
Fed.  Rep.  667. 

(b)  Though  such  age  is  generally  good 
prima  facie  ground  for  ordering  the  witness's 
examination  de  bene  esse,  this  will  not  neces- 
sarily be  done  in  an  extraordinary  case,  as  for 
the  examination  of  thirty  witnesses.  Bidder  v. 
Bridges,  26  Ch.  D.  1. 

(c)  At  the  trial,  before  the  deposition  of  a 
witness  who  was  dangerously  ill  can  be  used  in 
evidence,  it  must  be  proved  that  the  witness  is 
not  then  capable  of  being  examined.  Barton  v. 
North  Staffordshire  Ry.  Co.  56  L.  T.  601, 
where  Kay  J.  disapproved  the  form  of  order  in 
Seton  on  Decrees  (4th  ed.).  1635.  See  Richter 
v.  Jerome,  25  Fed.  Rep.  679;  Johnson  v.  Arn- 
wine,  42  X.  J.  Eq.  451 ;  Sax  v.  Davis,  71  Iowa, 
406 ;  Hall  v.  Stout,  4  Del.  Ch.  269. 


EXAMINATION    OF   WITNESSES    DE    BENE   ESSE  *  935 

particular  purpose.  It  may  even  be  incidental  to  a  suit  to  perpetuate 
testimony,  where  there  is  danger  of  the  evidence  of  the  witnesses,  whose 
testimony  is  intended  to  be  perpetuated,  being  lost  before  the  suit  for 
perpetuating  is  ripe  for  a  regular  examination.1 

In  general,  the  Court  will  not  allow  the  examination  of  a  witness  de 
bene  esse  after  the  closing  of  the  evidence  ; 2  and,  therefore,  where  upon 
a  hearing,  an  issue  had  been  directed,  and  an  order  made  that  the  depo- 
sitions of  the  plaintiff's  witnesses  might  be  read  at  the  trial,  in  case 
such  witnesses,  or  either  of  them,  should  be  dead,  an  application  which 
was  afterwards  made  that  the  trial  should  be  postponed,  and  that  the 
plaintiff  should  be  at  liberty  to  examine  another  witness  de  bene  esse,  was 
refused.3  It  seems,  however,  that  where  a  witness,  who  has  not  been 
before  examined  in  this  Court,  has  been  produced  at  a  trial  at  Law,  and 
another  trial  of  the  same  matter  is  to  be  had,  the  Court  will  entertain  a 
motion  for  the  examination  of  such  witness  de  bene  esse,  with  a  view  to 
such  second  trial.4  And  so,  after  the  trial  of  an  issue  in  the  cause,  an 
application  on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff,  for  liberty  to  examine  a  witness, 
who  was  above  seventy  years  old,  de  bene  esse,  for  the  purpose  of  secur- 
ing his  testimony  in  case  of  his  death,  upon  the  ground  that  it  was 
intended  to  move  for  a  new  trial,  was  granted.5 

Sometimes  it  is  required  to  examine  a  witness  de  bene  esse,  either  in 
support  of,  or  in  defence  to,  an  action  at  Law  ;  in  such  case,  it  was 
formerly  necessary  that  a  bill  should  be  filed  in  this  Court,  with  the 
proper  affidavit  annexed  to  it,  praying  specifically  that  the  witness  might 
be  examined  de  bene  esse;6  and  this  may  still  be  done,  although  the 
Courts  of  Law  have  now  power  themselves  to  take  such  evidence.7  An 
order  of  this  nature  in  aid  of  a  proceeding  at  Law  cannot  be  obtained 
upon  a  bill  filed  for  any  other  purpose  ;  and  where  a  bill  was  filed 
for  a  commission  to  examine  witnesses  abroad  in  aid  of  a  trial  at  Law, 
and  a  commission  had  been  sent  out  accordingly,  but,  before 
*  it  reached  its  destination,  one  of  the  witnesses  returned  to  Eng-  *  (J.'5.j 
land,  whereupon  an  application  was  made  for  leave  to  examine 
him  de  bene  esse,  upon  the  ground  that  he  was  about  to  leave  the  country 
again  before  the  trial  could  be  had,  the  motion  was  refused,  the  Court 
observing  that  this  was  a  different  relief,  and  that  the  bill  must  be 
amended.1 

The  cases  in  which  an  order  will  be  made  for  the  examination  of  wit- 
nesses de  bene  esse  are  not  confined  to  those  of  age  or  sickness,  or  in 
which  the  witness  is  the  only  person  who  can  speak  to  the  fact  intended 
to  be  proved.  The  Court  will  give  permission  for  such  an  examination 
of  witnesses  in  other  cases  which  come  within  the  same  principle ;  indeed 
it  will  do  so,  wherever  the  justice  of  the  case  appears  to  require  it.2   The 

1  Frere  v.  Green,  19  Ves.  310  ;  Campbell  116;  Andrews  t'.  Palmer,  1  V.  &  B.  21.23;  1 
?'.  Att.-Gen.  11  Jnr.  N.  S.  922;  14  W.  R.  45,  Newl.  450  ;  ante,  p.  304  :  post,  Chap.  XXXIV. 
V.  C.  S.  §  4,  Bills  to  Perpetuate  Testimony. 

2  R.  S.  C.  Ord   XXXVIII.  *  i  Will.  IV.  c.  22,  §  4;  see  1  Taylor,  4.  72, 
8  Palmer  v.  Lord  Aylesbury,  15  Ves.  209.           et  seq.  ;  Chitty's  Arch.  329,  1 1  seq. 

4  Anon,  cited  by  Lord  Eldon,  15  Ves.  300.  '   Atkins  r.  Palmer,  5  Mad.  19. 

5  Anon.  6  Ves.  573.  2  Thus,  where  an  application  was  made  to 

6  Ld.  Red.  150  ;  Philips  v.  Carew,  1  P.  Wins.      examine  the  surviving  witness  to  a  will  dt  btnt 

931 


*  936  EVIDENCE. 

Court,  however,  will  not  permit  the  examination  of  witnesses  de  bene  esse, 
on  the  ground  of  their  being  about  to  go  abroad,  where  it  is  in  the  power 
of  the  party  applying  to  detain  them  till  they  have  been  examined  in  the 
ordinary  course.3  (") 

It  seems  also,  that,  in  a  question  of  pedigree,  where  the  case  depends 
upon  a  chain  of  distinct  circumstances  in  the  knowledge  of  different 
individuals,  the  death  of  one  of  whom  would  destroy  the  whole  chain, 
the  Court  will  permit  the  examination  of  such  individuals  de  bene 
*936  esse,  although  none  of  them  come  within  the  description  *of  wit- 
nesses whose  testimony  is  in  danger  of  being  lost,  either  from  age 
or  serious  illness.1 

The  rule,  however,  that  the  examination  of  a  witness  de  bene  esse  will 
be  permitted  where  the  individual  proposed  to  be  examined  is  the  only 
witness,  will  not  be  extended  to  cases  whe.re  there  is  more  than  one 
witness  to  the  same  fact,  unless  upon  the  ground  of  the  age  or  infirmity 
of  the  witness ;  therefore  where  an  application  was  made  for  leave  to 
examine  de  bene  esse  one  of  two  surviving  witnesses  to  a  will,  who  was 
neither  of  the  age  of  seventy  nor  in  a  state  of  dangerous  illness,  on  the 
ground  that  he  was  a  prisoner  charged  with  a  capital  felony,  no  order 
was  made.2 

From  an  observation  which  appears  to  have  been  once  made  by  Lord 
Eldon,3  it  may  be  inferred  that  an  order  of  this  nature  cannot  be  obtained 
before  appearance,  unless  the  defendant  is  in  contempt ;  but  the  practice 
is  not  so,  and  an  order  to  examine  a  witness  de  bene  esse,  upon  either  of 
the  grounds  above  stated,  will  be  granted,  upon  an  affidavit  of  the  facts, 
immediately  after  the  filing  of  the  bill,  without  waiting  either  for  the 
defendant's  appearance,  or  for  his  being  in  contempt  for  non-appearance.4 
There  seems,  however,  to  be  no  doubt  that  the  contempt  of  a  defendant, 

esse,  on  the  ground  that  the  parties  concerned  esse.    Brown  v.  Child,  3  Sim.  457;  M'Intosh  v. 

all  lived  in  America,  and  that  the  surviving  wit-  Great  Western  Ry.  Co.  1  Hare.  32S;  M'Kenna 

ness  was  greatly  afflicted  with  the  gravel,  the  v.  Everitt,  2  Beav.  188;  Grove  v.  Young,  3  De 

order  was    made,    although   the   witness  was  G.  &  S.  397;  13  Jur.  847. 

merely  stated  to  be  "upwards  of  sixty  years  8  Upon  this  ground,  the  Court  of  Exchequer 

old."     Fitzhugh    v.   Lee,    Amb.  65.     (But   in  refused  to  make  an  order,  on  the  application  of 

such  cases,  an  ex  parte  order  is  irregular;  see  the  East  India  Company,  for  the  examination 

M'Kenna  o.   Everitt,  2   Beav.    188;   Hope   t'.  of  witnesses  de  bene  esse,  who  were  going  to 

Hope,  3  Beav.  317,  323;  id.  n.)    So,  also,  where  the  East  Indies:  because  they  were  the  Com- 

the  age  of  the  witness  was  not  stated,  but  the  pany's   servants,   and   they  might   have  kept 

affidavit,  upon  which  the  application  was  made,  them  at  home.     East  India  Co.  r.  Naish,  Bunb. 

alleged   onlv   that  the  witness  was  subject  to  320. 

violent  attacks   of  the   gout,  and   from   these  1  Shelly  v.  ,13  Ves.  56,  58;  Shirley  v. 

attacks  was  under  the  apprehension  of  dying,  Earl  Ferrers,  3  P.  Wins.  77;  Hope  v.  Hope,  3 

and  that  he  was   a  material   witness,  his  tes-  Beav.  317,  323. 

timony  being  required  to  prove  the  draft  of  a  2  Anon.  19  Ves.  321. 

bond  which  he  hail  prepared,  but  which   was  8  Frere  v.  Green,  19  Ves.  320. 

lost,  the  Court  of  Exchequer  made  an  order  for  4  See  Dew  v.  Clarke,  1  S.  &  S.  108,  115; 

his  examination  de  bene  e sse.    Jepson  v.  Green-  Fort  v.  Ragusin,  2  John.  Ch.  146;  see  Wilson 

away,  2  Fowl.  Ex.  Pr.  103.     In  like  manner,  v.  Wilson,  cited  1  Newl.  Ch.  Pr.  287;  Allen  v. 

where  a  witness  is  about  to  go  abroad,  an  order  Annesley,  2  Jones  Exch.  260. 

may  be  obtained  for  his  examination  de  bene 

(a)  A  commission  to  examine  a  material      Q.  B.  D.  1,  178;  Semmens  v.  Walters,  55  Wis. 
witness  abroad  is  not  a  matter  of  ri^ht.  but  of      675. 
judicial  discretion.     Coch  v.  Allcock  &  Co.  21 

932 


EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES    DE    BENE    ESSE. 


937 


in  not  appearing,  would  at  any  time  be  a  reason  for  giving  permission  to 
a  plaintiff  to  examine  his  witnesses  de  bene  esse,  where  a  proper  ground 
is  laid  for  it,  even  where  the  case  does  not  come  within  any  of  the  three 
instances  above  mentioned.5  The  defendant  is,  equally  with  the  plain- 
tiff, entitled  to  examine  witnesses  de  bene  esse  ; 6  and,  on  special  applica- 
tion, the  order  may  be  made  before  answer  filed.7 

An  order  for  leave  to  examine  a  witness  de  bene  esse,  upon  the  ground 
of  the  witness  being  above  seventy  years  of  age,  or  dangerously  ill,  or 
about  to  go  abroad,  may  be  obtained  either  by  motion  in  Court,  without 
notice,  or  upon  petition  of  course  at  the  Eolls ; 8  but  where  the  applica- 
tion is  not  made  on  the  ground  of  the  age  or  dangerous  illness  of  the 
witness,  or  that  he  is  about  to  go  abroad,  the  Court  will  not  make  an 
order  for  his  examination  de  bene  esse,  as  of  course ;  so  that,  if  a  party 
wishes  to  examine  a  witness  de  bene  esse,  upon  a  ground  which  cannot 
be  arranged  under  either  of  those  classes,  he  must  apply  by 
motion  in  Court,  of  which  notice  *  must  be  given  to  the  other  *  937 
side.1 

It  seems,  however,  that,  where  a  defendant  is  in  contempt  for  non- 
appearance, such  an  order  may  be  obtained  without  notice,  and  this  even 
where  the  defendants  are  infants.2 

Although,  in  the  instances  above  mentioned,  an  order  to  examine  a 
witness  de  bene  esse  may  be  obtained  upon  motion  or  petition  without 
notice,  notice  of  the  examination  of  the  witness  must,  in  all  cases,  be 
given,  in  order  that  the  other  side  may  have  the  power  of  cross-exami- 
nation.3 

The  application  for  leave  to  examine  a  witness  de  bene  esse  must,  in 
every  instance,  whether  made  by  a  petition  at  the  Eolls  or  by  motion 


5  Coveny  v.  Athil!,  1  Dick.  355;  Prichard  v. 
Gee,  5  Mad.  3G4. 

6  Williams  v.  Williams,  1  Dick.  92;  Grove 
v.  Young,  3  De  G  &  S.  397. 

7  Bown  v.  Child,  3  Sim.  457. 

8  Bellamy  v.  Jones,  8  Ves.  31;  Tomkins  )'. 
Harrison,  6  Mad.  315;  M'Kenna  v.  Everitt,  2 
Beav.  188;  M' In  tosh  v.  Great  Western  Ry.  Co.  1 
Hare,  328,  330;  Grove  v.  Young,  3  De  G  &  S. 
397;  13  Jur.  847.  For  forms  of  motion  paper 
and  petition,  see  Vol.  III. 

1  Bellamy  v.  Jones,  8  Ves.  31.  For  form  of 
notice  of  motion,  see  Vol.  III.  In  Hope  o.  Hope, 
3  Beav.  317,  323,  n.  (and  see  Pearson  r.  Ward, 
1  Cox,  177),  Lord  Langdale  M.  R.  had  to  con- 
sider whether  an  order  for  the  examination  de 
bene  esse  of  a  person  alleged  to  be  the  sole 
witness  to  a  material  fact,  could  be  regularly 
obtained  ex  parte,  and  he  came  to  the  con- 
clusion, that,  in  such  a  case,  the  application 
should  be  made  on  notice ;  and  it  seems  that 
the  affidavit,  in  support  of  such  an  application, 
ought  to  show  the  facts  as  to  which  it  is  pro- 
posed to  examine  the  witness.  If  the  order  has 
been  obtained  as  of  course,  in  a  case  where  a 
special  application  for  it  should  have  been 
made,  the  adverse  party  may  move,  on  notice, 


to  discharge  it.  See  M'Kenna  v.  Everitt,  ubl 
supra  ;  Hope  v.  Hope,  3  Beav.  317;  for  form  of 
notice  of  motion,  see  Vol.  III. 

2  Thus,  in  Frere  v.  Green,  19  Ves.  319,  320 

(see  also  Shelley  v.  ,  13  Ves.  50),  where 

the  defendants  were  infants  and  in  contempt, 
and  it  appeared  by  the  messenger's  return  that 
they  had  absconded  and  were  not  to  be  found, 
Lord  Eldon,  upon  the  usual  affidavit  of  the 
materiality  of  the  evidence  of  the  witnesses, 
and  the  plaintiffs'  undertaking  to  proceed  with 
all  due  diligence,  and  with  as  much  expedition 
as  the  course  and  practice  of  the  Court  and  the 
contempt  of  the  defendants  would  admit,  to 
bring  the  cause  to  an  issue,  and  examine  their 
witnesses  in  chief,  made  an  order  that  the 
plaintiffs  should  be  at  liberty  to  examine  them 
de  bene  esse;  but  he  provided,  by  the  order, 
that,  before  publication  of  the  depositions  of 
such  witnesses  should  be  allowed  to  pass, 
proper  evidence  should  be  produced  to  satisfy 
the  Court  that  the  plaintiffs  had  complied  with 
the  above  undertaking. 

8  Loveden  v.  Milford,  4  Bro.  C.  C.  540;  Ord. 
5  Feb.  1861,  r.  22;  ante,  pp.  901,  915;  for  form 
of  notice,  see  Vol.  III. 

933 


*  938  EVIDENCE. 

to  the  Court,4  with  notice  or  without,  be  supported  by  an  affidavit  of 

the  facts  which  form  the  ground  of  the  application,  such  as,  the  age 

of  the  witness,  and  that  he  is  a  material  witness  for  the  party 

*  938     making  the  application ; 5   and  also  by  the  Record  *  and  Writ 

Clerk's  certificate  that  the  bill  has  been  filed,  where  the  defend- 
ant has  not  appeared,  or  of  such  appearance,  where  an  appearance  has 
been  entered  by  him.  Where  an  application  is  made  for  an  order  to 
examine  a  witness  on  the  ground  that  he  is  the  only  person  who  knows 
the  fact,  the  affidavit  should  state  the  particular  points  to  which  his 
evidence  is  meant  to  apply,1  and  should  show  the  ground  which  the 
person  who  makes  it  has  for  believing  that  the  witness  is  the  only 
person.2 

The  order  to  examine  witnesses  de  bene  esse  names  the  witnesses  to  be 
examined,  and  only  authorizes  the  examination  of  the  persons  named 
therein.  Where  the  order  is  obtained  without  notice,  after  appearance, 
it  must  be  served  upon  the  solicitor  on  the  other  side  ;  but  where  it  has 
been  obtained  before  appearance,  so  that  there  is  no  adverse  solicitor 
upon  whom  it  can  be  served,  the  order  usually  directs  that  notice  of  the 
order  be  given  to  the  defendant,  or  that  a  copy  thereof  be  left  at  his 
dwelling-house,  or  usual  place  of  abode,  with  his  servant,  agent,  or  other 
person  residing  there,  a  specified  number  of  days  before  the  examination 
of  the  witnesses.3  This  is  done  in  order  to  afford  the  adverse  party 
an  opportunity  for  cross-examination  of  the  witnesses. 

The  examination  of  witnesses  de  bene  esse  is  taken  before  an  Examiner 
of  the  Court,  or  a  Special  Examiner,  in  the  manner  prescribed  by  the 
15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86 ; 4  and  the  depositions  are  transmitted  by  him  to 
the  Record  and  Writ  Clerks'  Office,5  to  be  there  filed.6 

Formerly,  it  was  necessary  to  give  three  days'  notice  of  the  time  and 
place  of  the  examination  to  the  other  side.7  Xow,  it  is  presumed,  forty- 
eight  hours  will  be  sufficient;  but  the  notice  must  also  state  the  name 
and  description  of  the  witness  to  be  examined,  and  the  time  and  place 
of  examination.8 


4  Now  it  seems  by  summons  at  Chambers.  its  averments;  and  without  an  order  to  that 
See  Bolton  v.  Bolton,  2  Ch.  D.  217.  For  form  effect,  he  may  proceed  to  take  his  depositions 
of  order,  see  2  Seton,  1635,  No.  7.  de  bene  esse.      Should    the  necessity  for  such 

5  Grove  v.  Young,  3  De  G.  &  S.  397;  13  depositions  be  superseded  by  the  answer,  the 
Jur.  847;  see  Rockwell  v.  Kolsoin,  4  John.  Ch.  party  who  takes  them  must  pay  the  costs. 
165;    Story,   Eq.  PI.  §  309.     For  form  of  af-  Doyle  r.  Wiley,  15  111.  576. 

fidavit  see  Vol.  III.     The  affidavit  should  give  4  Sects.  31,  32;  see  ante,  pp.  903,  904;  and 

the   place  of  residence  and  description  of  'he  see  Ord.  5  Feb.,  1861,  r.  11;  Cook  v.  Hall,  9 

witnesses  whom  it  is  sought  to  have  examined  Hare  App.  20. 

de   bene  esse.      O'Farrel  v.  O'Farrel,  1   Moll.  5  Now  to  the  Central  Office. 

364.  6  Office  copies  of  the  depositions   may  be 

1  Pearson  v.  Ward.  1  Cox,  177;  2  Dick.  obtained  at  that  office,  as  soon  as  they  are  filed. 
648;  Hope  P.  Hope,  3  Beav.  317,  322.  Braithwaite's  Pr.   122.     As    to  publication  of 

2  Rowe  v. ,  13  Ves.  261.  evidence  taken  de  bene  esse  in  an  ancient  suit, 

8  See  orders  in  Hope  r.  Hope,  3  Beav.  317;  see  Moggridge  r.  Hall,  13  Ch.  D.  380. 

Soffe  v.  Prince,M.  R.  26  Mar.,  1870,  Rolls'  Lib.;  7  Tomkins  v.  Harrison,  6  Mad.  315;  M'ln- 

but  see  form  of  o:der  in  Seton,  1236.  Xo.   2,  tosh  v.  Great  Western  Ry.  Co.  1  Hare,  328. 
which  differs  as  to  the  notice.     The  statute  of  8  Ord.   5  Feb.,  1861,  r.   22   (7  Jur.    X.    S 

Illinois  authorizes  a  person  filing  a  bill,  before  Pt.  II.  60);  for  forms  of  notice,  see  Vol.  III. 
issue  joined,  to  take  depositions  substantiating 

934 


EXAMINATION    OP   WITNESSES    DE    BENE    ESSE.  *  040 

As  the  examination  of  witnesses  de  bene  esse  is  only  a  provisional 
measure,  to  guard  against  the  loss  of  important  evidence  before  the 
cause  is  in  a  state  in  which  a  regular  examination  can  take  place,  it  is 
the  duty  of  the  party  examining  to  take  the  earliest  opportunity  to 
examine  in  the  ordinary  course,  and  if  he  is  guilty  of  any  laches 
in  so  doing,  the  benefit  of  the  examination  *  de  bene  esse  will  be  *  939 
forfeited.1 

Depositions  taken  de  bene  esse  cannot  be  made  use  of  without  an  order. 
The  ordinary  course  of  the  Court  is  not  to  allow  of  their  use  unless  the 
witness  dies  before  issue  is  joined  in  the  cause,  so  that  there  has  been 
no  opportunity  to  examine  him  in  the  ordinary  course ;  or  unless  he  is 
at  a  great  distance,  so  that  it  is  impossible  to  have  him  examined  again. 
These,  however,  although  the  usual,  are  not  the  only  cases  in  which  the 
Court  will  order  depositions  taken  de  bene  esse  to  be  used.  It  is  in  the 
discretion  of  the  Court  to  determine  whether  the  order  shall  be  made  or 
not ;  and  whenever  it  can  be  established,  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  Court, 
that  there  is  a  moral  impossibility  in  the  examination  of  witnesses  in  chief 
taking  place,  it  will  make  the  order.  Therefore  where  a  commission  was 
sent  to  Sweden,  to  examine  witnesses  there,  which  the  government  of 
Sweden  refused  to  permit,  the  Court  allowed  the  depositions  of  those 
witnesses  who  had  been  examined  de  bene  esse  to  be  read  at  the  hearing ; 2 
because  it  was  impossible  to  have  them  examined  in  chief.  So  also  the 
Court  has  permitted  depositions  taken  de  bene  esse  to  be  read,  although 
there  has  been  no  strict  proof  of  the  death  of  the  witnesses ;  because 
the  length  of  time  which  has  elapsed  since  the  depositions  were  taken 
has  afforded  a  just  ground  for  presuming  them  to  be  dead.3 

Sometimes  the  Court  will  allow  depositions  taken  de  bene  esse  to  be 
made  use  of  upon  a  trial  at  Law,  on  the  ground  that  the  witness,  though 
alive,  will  be  unable,  from  age  or  sickness,  or  other  infirmity,  to  attend 
at  the  trial.4  In  such  cases,  however,  the  more  usual  course  is  (especially 
where  there  is  any  doubt  whether  the  grounds  upon  which  the 
application  is  to  be  made  are  such  as  will  be  sufficient,  *  in  a  Court  *  940 
of  Law,  to  authorize  the  admission  of  the  evidence)  to  make  an 
order  that  the  officer,  in  whose  possession  the  original  deposition  is,  shall 
attend  with  it  at  the  trial,  in  order  that,  if  it  should  be  proved  to  the 
satisfaction  of  the  Court  of  Law  that  the  witness  is  unable  to  attend,  the 

1  See  Forsyth  v.  Ellice,  2  M'N.  &  G.  209,  non-appearance,  Lord  Eldon  made  the  order, 

213;  overruling  S.  C.  7  Hare,  290.  In  the  Duke  upon  the   plaintiffs'  expressly  undertaking  to 

of  Hamilton  v.  Meynal,  2  Dick.  788  (S.  C.  nom.  proceed   with   all  due   diligence  to   bring  the 

Anon.  2  Ves.  Sr.  497),  however,    Lord   Hard-  cause  to  issue,  and  to  examine  the  witnesses  in 

wicke  made   an   order  for   the   publication  of  chief. 

depositions  taken  de  bene  esse,  although  ihe  ori-  2  Gason  r.  Wordsworth,  2  Ves.  Sr.  325,  336; 

ginal  bill  was  filed,  and  the  examination  taken,  Amb.  108;  see  also  Biddulph  r.  Lord  Camoys, 

above  thirty  years  before  the  cause  was  brought  19  Bcav.  467. 

to  an  issue;   but  it  seems  that  this  was  done  3  Anon.  2  Ves.  Sr.  497;  S.  C.  now.  Duke  of 

under  particular    circumstances,  and  that  the  Hamilton   v.  Meynal,  2  Dick.  788;  Marsden  v. 

delay  was  accounted  for.    We  have  seen  before,  Bound,  1  Vern.  331;  see  also  M' In  tosh  i\  Great 

ante,  p.  937  (Frere  r.  Green,  19  Ves.  319),  that  Western  Ry.  Co.  7   De  G.  M.  &  G.  737.     See 

in  the  instance  of  an  application  to  examine  2  Seton,  1635,  No.  7. 

witnesses  de  bene  esse,  to  prove  a  case  against  4  Bradley  v.  Crackenthorp,  1  Dick.  182. 
infant  defendants  who   were  in  contempt  for 

935 


*  941  EVIDENCE. 

depositions  should  be  tendered  to  be  read ; 1  it  being  the  province  of  the 
Judge  who  tries  the  cause  at  Law,  and  not  of  this  Court,  to  decide  on 
the  admissibility  of  the  evidence,  upon  the  facts  as  they  appear  before 
him.2  Upon  this  ground  the  Court  has  frequently  refused  to  make  an 
order  that  the  depositions,  taken  de  bene  esse,  of  a  witness  who  was  alive, 
though  sworn  by  affidavit  to  be  unable  to  attend  at  the  trial  of  an  issue 
at  Law,  should  be  read  at  the  trial.3  (a) 

Depositions  of  a  witness,  examined  de  bene  esse,  can  only  be  used  for 
the  purpose  of  supplying  the  want  of  an  examination  in  chief.  Appli- 
cations for  leave  to  use  them,  for  other  purposes,  have  been  refused.4 

An  order  for  leave  to  use  a  deposition,  taken  de  bene  esse,  of  a  witness 
dying  before  he  could  be  examined  in  chief,  may  be  obtained  on  special 
motion  with  notice,  supported  by  evidence  proving  his  death,  in  the 
ordinary  way.5 

Where  the  application  is  made  upon  the  ground  that  a  witness  is  gone 
to  parts  beyond  sea,  or  upon  any  other  grounds,  it  must  be  supported  by 
an  affidavit  of  the  facts  relied  upon  as  the  foundation  of  the  application. 

The  proper  stage  of  the  suit  wherein  this  application  should  be  made, 
seems  to  be  after  the  closing  of  the  evidence,6  unless  it  is  in  a  suit  the 
sole  object  of  which  is  the  examination  of  a  witness  de  bene  esse,  for  the 
purpose  of  using  his  depositions  on  a  trial  at  Law ;  in  which  case, 
the  application  should  be  made  before  the  trial  of  the  action.  The 
*  941  party  moving  should  be  prepared  with  an  affidavit  *  of  service  of 
the  notice  of  motion,  in  order  that,  if  the  other  side  does  not 
attend,  the  order  may,  notwithstanding,  be  obtained.1 

If  any  irregularity  is  discovered,  or  the  adverse  party  is  advised  of 
any  ground  of  objection  to  the  reading  of  the  depositions,  he  should 
give  notice  in  writing  to  the  adverse  solicitor,  and  move  to  discharge 

1  Andrews  v.  Palmer,  1  V.  &  B.  21;  see  also  from  the  strict  practice,  if  it  were  possible  in 
Corbett  v.  Corbett,  id.  335;  Palmer  v.  Lord  any  case  to  dispense  with  it,  Lord  Tluirlow  at 
Aylesbury,  15  Ves.  176;  Att.-Gen.  v.  Ray,  first  made  the  order,  but  upon  further  con- 
2  Hare,  518,  and  form  of  order,  id.  519,  n.;  sideration,  and  before  the  order  was  delivered 
Gompertz  v.  Ansdell,  1  Smith's  Pr.  876.  out,  he   altered   his   opinion,    and   refused   it. 

2  Jones  v.  Jones,  1  Cox,  184.  Pegge  v.  Burnell,  cited,  Hinde,  391 ;  Pasch.  1781. 
8  Hinde,  390.  Evidence  taken  de  bene  esse  in  one  ad- 
*  Cann  v.  Cann,  1  P.  Wms.  567.    Therefore,      ministration  suit  was   not  allowed  to   be  read 

where  an  application  was  made  to  the  Court  to  in  another  administration  suit  previously  corn- 
allow  a  deposition  de  bene  esse  to  be  read  at  menced.  Hill  v.  Hibbit,  L.  li.  7  Eq.  421.  And 
Law,  in  order  to  confront  the  witness  and  in-  it  seems  doubtful  whether  such  evidence  taken 
validate  his  testimony  vivn  voce,  upon  a  new  in  a  suit  can  be  used  after  an  amendment  by 
trial,  on  the  ground  that  on  his  examination,  adding  a  co-plaintiff.  Peek  e.  Earl  Spencer, 
at  the  first  trial,  his  evidence  differed  materially  18  W.  R.  558. 

from  what   he  had  before  uniformly  declared  5  Hinde,  388;  for  forms  of  notice  of  motion 

the  fact  to  be,  and  as  the  case  made  in  support  and  affidavit,  see  Vol.  III. 
of  the   motion    was    a   very  strong  one,  and  6  Hinde,  388. 

abundantly   sufficient   to  justify   a    departure  *  For  form  of  affidavit,  see  Vol.  III. 


(a)  The  record  of  evidence  taken  at  a  former  vale  Mills  Co.  75  Maine,  156;  Sewall  v.  Rob- 
trial  is  only  admissible  upon  notice,  with  proof  bins,  139  Mass.  164;  Cunningham  v.  Hall,  4 
that  the  same  evidence  cannot  now  be  obtained.  Allen,  268;  Seerle  v.  Richardson,  67  Iowa,  170; 
Case  v.  Blood,  71  Iowa,  632;  Mott  v.  Ramsey,  Brooch  v.  Kelly,  71  Ga.  698;  Murphy  v.  New 
92  N.  C.  152.  As  to  the  admission  in  evidence  York  Central  R.  Co.  31  Hun,  358;  Turnley  v 
of  depositions  taken  in  other  proceedings  be-  Hanna,  82  Ala.  139. 
tween  the  same  parties,    see  Chase  v.  Spring- 

936 


DEMURRERS   BY   WITNESSES.  *  942 

the  order  immediately  upon  the  service  of  it,  or  on  the  earliest  oppor- 
tunity ;  for  it  seems  that  although  depositions  taken  de  bene  esse  are  irreg- 
ular, yet  it  is  too  late  to  object  to  them,  on  the  ground  of  irregularity, 
at  the  hearing  of  the  cause ; 2  and  on  this  accouut,  when  the  time  between 
the  closing  of  the  evidence  and  the  hearing  of  the  cause  is  short,  the 
Court  will  extend  it,  for  the  purpose  of  allowing  the  party  an  oppor- 
tunity of  examining  whether  the  depositions  are  regularly  taken  or  not.3 
And  so,  where  depositions  taken  de  bene  esse  are  read  at  the  hearing  of 
the  cause,  it  is  a  matter  of  course,  if  an  issue  is  directed,  to  order  them 
to  be  read  at  the  trial  of  the  issue,  notwithstanding  an  irregularity  in 
the  examination.4 

With  respect  to  the  costs  of  examinations  de  bene  esse,  no  specific  rule 
appears  to  have  been  laid  down,  which  makes  any  distinction  between 
them  and  the  costs  of  examinations  under  ordinary  circumstances ;  ex- 
cept, indeed,  in  the  case  of  bills  filed  for  the  purpose  of  having  witnesses 
examined  de  bene  esse,  in  order  to  render  their  evidence  available  on  a 
trial  at  Law.  In  such  cases,  it  is  presumed,  the  costs  must  be  regulated 
by  the  rule  of  the  Court  with  regard  to  bills  of  a  similar  description, 
namely,  bills  to  examine  witnesses  in  perpetuam  rei  memoriam  ;  in  which 
case  a  defendant  is  entitled  to  apply  for  his  costs  immediately  after  the 
examination  of  the  witnesses  has  been  perfected,  upon  the  simple  allega- 
tion that  he  did  not  examine  any  witnesses  himself.5 


*  Section  XV.  —  Demurrers  by  Witnesses.  *942 

A  witness  examined  before  an  Examiner  may  protect  himself,  by  de- 
murrer, from  answering  any  question  to  which  he  has  a  legal  objection.1 
The  word  "  demurrer,"  however,  is  not,  in  this  instance,  used  in  a  very 
appropriate  sense ;  since  it  here  signifies  merely  the  witness's  tender  of 
reasons  why  he  should  not  answer  the  question,2  and  is  not,  like  a 
demurrer  in  pleading,  confined  to  the  facts  appearing  upon  the  record, 

2  Dean  and  Chapter  of  Ely  v.  Warren,  2  assigning  cause,  demur  to  the  questions  pro- 
Atk.  189;  Hinde,  289.  pounded  to  him;  upon  which  the  examination 

3  Gordon  v.  Gordon,  1  Swanst.  171.  must  be   suspended    until    the   Court   decides. 

4  Ibid.  166.  Winder  v.  Diffenderffer,  2  Bland,  166.    Counsel 

5  Foulds  v.  Midgley,  1  V.  &  B.  138;  post,  have  no  right  to  advise  a  witness  that  he  is  not 
Chap.  XXXIV.  §  4,  Bills  to  Perpetuate  Tes-  bound  to  answer  a  particular  interrogatory.  It 
timony  ;  Morgan  &  Davey,  53,  149.  In  Dew  is  the  duty  of  the  examiner  to  inform  a  witness 
v.  Clarke,  1  S.  &  S.  108, 115,  where  the  plain-  of  his  legal  rights.  Taylor  v.  Wood,  2  Edw. 
tiff  had  filed  a  bill  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  Ch.  94;  1  Hoff.  Ch.  Pr.  466.  A  witness  who 
the  examination  of  witnesses  de  bene  esse  in  aid  demurs  to  a  question  is  not  the  proper  person 
of  a  proceeding  at  Law,  and  obtained  an  order,  to  bring  it  before  the  Court.  If  the  part}'  put- 
ex parte,  for  the  examination  of  such  witnesses,  ting  the  question  does  not  ask  for  an  attach- 
but  afterwards  the  bill  was  demurred  to,  and  ment,  nor  in  an}'  way  bring  the  point  before 
the  demurrer  allowed,  the  Court,  besides  the  the  Court,  no  one  else  can.  The  question  "ill 
usual  costs  of  the  demurrer,  allowed  the  de-  be  considered  as  waived,  or  the  demurrer  well 
fendant  his  costs  of  the  examination,  but  not  taken,  unless  he  who  puts  the  question  persists 
those  occasioned  by  his  cross-examination  of  in  it,  and  takes  measures  to  have  the  demurrer 
the  witnesses.  disposed  of.     Mowatt   r.  Graham,  1  Edw.  Ch. 

1  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  33  (now  superseded,       13;  onte,  p.  574. 
see  ante,  p.  904,   n.  7).    A  witness  may,  on  2  Parkhurst  v.  Lowten,  2  Swanst.  194,  203. 

937 


*  943  EVIDENCE. 

but  states  the  facts  upon  which,  the  witness  relies  as  the  ground  of  his 
objection. 

The  grounds  upon  which  a  witness  may  protect  himself  from  answer- 
ing are,  principally  :  (1)  That  the  answer  may  subject  him  to  pains  and 
penalties,  or  to  a  forfeiture,  or  something  in  the  nature  of  a  forfeiture ; 
(2)  That  he  cannot  answer  the  question  without  a  breach  of  professional 
confidence.  A  witness  also  cannot  be  required  to  answer  any  question 
affecting  his  interest  or  showing  his  liability  in  respect  of  another  action 
in  which  he  is  a  defendant.3 

1.  With  respect  to  the  first  ground  of  objection,  namely,  that  the 
answer  may  expose  the  witness  to  pains  and  penalties,  or  to  a  forfeiture, 
or  something  in  the  nature  of  a  forfeiture,  the  reader  is  referred  to  a 
former  part  of  this  Treatise,4  where  the  privilege  of  a  defendant  to  be 
protected  on  this  ground  from  making  the  discovery  required  by  the  bill 
is  discussed.  Jt  will  be  there  fouud  that  the  privilege  in  such  cases 
arises  from  an  acknowledged  principle  of  Law,  that  no  man  is  bound  to 
answer,  so  as  to  subject  himself  to  punishment ;  and  as  this  principle  is 
applicable  as  well  to  witnesses  as  to  defendants,  the  rules  which  are 
there  found  laid  down  with  regard  to  its  application  to  the  latter  case 
are  equally  applicable  to  the  former.5  (a) 

2.  The  rules  of  exemption  from  discovery,  on  the  ground  of  profes- 
sional confidence,  proceed  upon  the   same   principles    as    are  applica- 
ble to  the   case  of  defendants ;    and   the   reader   is,    therefore, 

*  943   *  referred  for  information  upon  this  head  to  a  former  portion  of 

this  Treatise,  where  these  rules  have  been  discussed  with  refer- 
ence to  the  protection  of  a  defendant  from  answering  the  bill.1  It  may, 
however,  be  noticed  here,  that  the  refusal  of  a  client  to  allow  his  solicitor 
to  disclose  professional  communications  is  not  a  reason  for  treating  him 
as  if  he  had  kept  a  material  witness  out  of  the  way,  or  refused  or  pre- 
vented the  production  of  a  document  in  his  possession.2 

3  Venables  v.  Schweitzer,  L.  R.  1G  Eq.  76.  !  Ante,  pp.  571,  et  seq.,  715,  716;  see  also 
But  see  Re  Western  of  Canada  Oil  Lauds  &  Greenough  v.  Gaskell,  1  M.  &  K.  08,  101 ;  C. 
Works  Co.  26  W.  R.  909;  Massey  v.  Allen,  id.  P.  Coop.  temp.  Brougli.  96;  Lord  Walsingham 
908;  Re  Metropolitan  Bank,  15 Ch.  D.  139;  Re  v.  Goodricke,  3  Hare,  122,  130;  Gore  v.  Bowser, 
North  Australian  Territory  Co.  45  Ch.  D.  87;  5  De  G.  &  S.  30;  S.  C.  nom.  Gore  v.  Harris,  15 
Re  London  &  Lancashire  Paper  Mills  Co.  57  L.  Jur.  1168;  Carpmael  v.  Powis,  1  Phil.  087;  9 
J.  Ch.  766.  Beav.  16;  Thomas  v.  Rawlings,  27  Boav.  140;  5 

4  Ante,  p.  562.  Jur.  N.  S.  667;  Marsh  v.  Keith,  1  Dr.  &  S.  342; 
6  See  2  Phil,  on  Evid.  487,  et  seq.;   Tay-      6  Jur.  N.  S.  1182;  Ford  v.  Tennnnt,  32  Beav. 

lor   on    Evid.    §§   458,   1453;    Best   on    Evid.  162;  9  Jur.  N.  S.  292;  Charlton  v.  Coombes,  4 

§126;  Gresley  on   Evid.  80,  et  seq.;  Osborne  Giff.  372;  9  Jur.  N.  S.  534,  V.  C.  S ;  Re  Land 

v.  London   Dock  Co.  10  Exch.  698,  701;  1  Jur.  Credit  Society,  15  W.  R.  703. 
N.  S.  93;  Sidebottom  v.  Adkins,  3  Jur.  N.  S.  2  Wentworth  v.  Lloyd,  10  H.  L.  Cas.  589; 

631;  5  W.  R.  743,  V.  C.  S.;  Reg.».Boyes,  IB.  &  10  Jur.  N.  S.  961;   and  see  Taylor  on  Evid. 

S.  311;  7  Jur.  N.  S.  1158;  Re  Aston,  27  Beav.  §  101;  Bolton  v.  Liverpool,  1  M.  &  K.  88,  94, 

474;  5  Jur.  N.  S.  615;  4  De  G.  &  J    320;  5  95;  Kennedy?;.  Lyell,  23  Ch.  D.  387. 
Jur.  N.  S.  779;  Ex  parte  Fernandez,  10  C.  B. 
N.  S.  3,  39,  40;  7  Jur.  N.  S.  571. 


(a)  The   Court   must    be   satisfied   that  the      Ex   parte    Reynolds,  20  Ch.    D     294;    antet 
witness  has   reasonable   ground   to   apprehend      p.  563,  note  (b). 
danger   from  his  being  compelled   to  answer. 

938 


DEMURRERS   BY   WITNESSES.  *  944 

"Where  the  witness  is  served  with  a  subpoena  duces  tecum  to  produce  a 
deed  or  other  document,  and,  upon  being  asked  to  produce  it,  objects  to 
do  so,  either  upon  the  ground  of  his  having  an  interest  in  the  deed, 
or  upon  any  other  ground,8  he  may  refuse,  without  a  formal  demurrer. 
The  course  to  be  adopted  by  the  party  seeking  production,  in  such  case, 
is  to  move,  on  notice  to  the  witness,  that  he  do  attend  and  produce  the 
deed,  and  pay  the  costs  occasioned  by  his  previous  refusal ;  upon  the 
hearing  of  which  motion,  the  Court  will  decide  whether  the  reasons 
alleged  by  the  witness  for  his  refusal  are  satisfactory  or  not.4 

The  question  or  questions  put,  and  the  demurrer  or  objection  of  the 
witness  thereto,  must  be  taken  down  by  the  Examiner,5  on  paper,  separate 
and  distinct  from  the  evidence ;  but  there  does  not  seem  ever  to  have 
been  any  particular  form  for  a  demurrer  by  a  witness.6  The  witness 
should  state  clearly  the  grounds  of  his  refusal  to  auswer  ;  thus,  a  witness, 
demurring  on  the  ground  that  his  answer  would  violate  the  confidence 
reposed  in  him  as  a  solicitor,  must  name  the  party  to  whom  he  was 
solicitor.7  He  must  also  swear  that  the  facts,  from  the  discovery  of 
which  he  desires  to  be  protected,  came  to  his  knowledge  in  his  capacity 
of  solicitor  to  a  particular  person  ;  for  a  solicitor,  like  any  other  witness, 
is  bound  to  discover  all  secrets  of  his  client  which  he  did  not  come  to 
the  knowledge  of  in  his  relation  of  solicitor  to  his  client.8  It  must  also 
appear  that  the  knowledge  came  to  him  in  the  character  of  a  professional 
adviser,  and  in  such  character  only  :  and,  therefore,  where  a  demurrer 
stated  that  the  witness  was  the  attorney  or  agent  for  a  person,  it 
*  was  considered  not  to  be  sufficiently  precise ;  for  an  agent  may  *  944 
be  only  a  steward  or  servant.1 

In  taking  down  a  demurrer,  the  Examiner  ought  to  take  the  witness's 
statement  upon  oath  ;  and  it  was  held,  under  the  former  practice,  that 
where  this  was  not  done,  the  demurrer  must  be  supported  by  affidavit; 
for  the  Court  should,  in  some  way  or  other,  have  the  sanction  of  an  oath 
to  the  facts  on  which  the  objection  is  founded.2 

3  Such  as,  that  the  production  of  it  may  Rundle  v.  Foster,  3  Term.  Ch.  G58;  see  ante, 

prove  him  to  be  guilty  of  a  crime.     See  Park-  p.  574,  note  (a). 

hurst  v.  Lowten,  2  Swanst.  214;  but  see  Webb  i  Vaillant  v.    Dodemead,    2  Atk.   524;  and 

v.  East,  5  Ex.  D.  108.     As  to  the  objection  that  see  Reid  v.  Langlois,  1   M'N.  &  G.  627,  037; 

persons  not  before  the  Court  are  interested  in  14  Jur.  407.     The  protection  does  not  extend 

the   document,    see   Bovill   v.  Cowan,  W.    N.  to  facts  as  distinguished  from  matters  of  confi- 

(107)  115;  15  W.  R.  008.  dential  communication.     Sawyer  V.  Birchmore, 

*  Bradshaw  v.  Bradshaw,  1  R.  &  M.  358;  3  M.  &  K.  572;  Desborough  i>.  Rawlins,  3  M. 

Hope  v.  Liddell,  20  Beav.  438,  439;   1  Jur.  N.  &  C.  515;    Brandt  v.    Klein,    17   Johns.  335; 

S.  665;  7   De  G.   M.  &  G.  331.     For  form  of  Driggs  v.  Rockwell,  11  Wend.  504;  Rundle  v. 

notice  see  Vol.  III.;  ante,  p.  007,  n.  1.  Foster,  3  Tenn.  Ch.  658. 

6  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  33  (now  superseded,  •       2  Parkhurst  v.  Lowten.  2  Swanst.  201 ;  Mor- 

see  note  p.  904,  n.  7).     For  the  former  practice,  pan  v.  Shaw,  4   Mad.  54;  Bowman   v.  Rodwell, 

sec    Tippins  v.   Coates,  6   Hare,  16;   11  Jur.  1  Mad.  266;  Davis  v.  Reid,  5  Sim.  443;  Goodale 

1075;  and  tor  formal  parts  of  the  demurrer,  see  v.  Gawthorn,  4  De  G.  &  S.  97.    As  to  the  course 

Vol.  III.  where  a  witness  summoned  before  a  Chief  Clerk 

6  Morris  v.  Williams,  2  Moll.  342.  refuses  to  be  sworn,  see  Electric  Telegraph  Co. 

7  Parkhurst  v.  Lowten,  2  Swanst.  201.  Bur-  of  Ireland,  Ex  parte  Bunn,  24  Beav.  137;  3 
sill  v.  Tanner,  16  Q.  B.  D.  1.  Jur.  N.  S.  1013;  Vcnablcs  v.  Schweitzer,  L.  R 

8  Morgan  v.  Shaw,  4  Mad.  54,  58;  Thomas  16  Eq.  76. 
v.  Rawlings,  27  Beav.   140;  5  Jur.  N.  S.  667; 

939 


*  945  EVIDENCE. 

The  demurrer  is  transmitted  by  the  Examiner  to  the  Kecord  and  Writ 
Clerks'  Office,  and  there  filed ; 3  and  an  office  copy  should  be  taken  by 
the  party  to  the  cause  who  put  the  question  objected  to.4  The  demurrer 
may  then  be  set  down  for  hearing,  under  an  order  of  course,  to  be  obtained 
on  petition,  in  like  manner  as  demurrers  to  bills;5  and  the  validity  of 
the  demurrer  will  be  decided  by  the  Court.6  The  order  to  set  down  the 
demurrer  need  only  be  served  on  the  witness  demurring,7  except  where 
the  witness,  being  the  solicitor  of  the  party  in  the  cause,  claims  privilege 
on  behalf  of  his  client ;  in  which  case,  it  would  seem,  the  client  should 
also  be  served  with  the  order.8 

If  the  Court,  upon  argument,  considers  the  demurrer  to  be  bad,  it  will 
overrule  it ;  in  which  case,  an  order  will  be  made  that  the  witness  attend 
the  Examiner,  and  be  examined,  or  stand  committed.9 

Sometimes,  however,  where  the  ground  for  overruling  the  demurrer  has 
been  its  informality,  and  the  Court  has  considered  that  the  witness  may 
have  a  good  reason  to  be  excused  from  answering,  it  has  ordered  the 
demurrer  to  be  overruled,  without  prejudice  to  the  witness,  upon  his 
re-examination,  objecting  or  demurring  to  the  question,  as  he  may 
be  advised,  upon  such  grounds  as  he  shall  state  in  such  objection  or 
demurrer.10 

Sometimes  the  Court  will  allow  a  demurrer  partially ;  thus,  where  a 

demurrer  was  put  in  to  two  interrogatories,  it  was  allowed  as  to  one,  and 

part  of  the  other ;  and  it  was  directed  that  half  the  costs  should 

*945    be  paid  by  the  witness,11  in  analogy  to  the  practice  when  *  two 

exceptions  are  taken,  one  of  which  succeeds  and  the  other  fails. 

Instead  of  settiug  down  the  demurrer  for  hearing,  the  party  who  asked 
the  question  objected  to  may  move  that  the  witness  may  attend  the 
Examiner  at  his  own  expense,  and  be  further  examined.  Xotice  of  this 
motion  must  be  served  upon  the  witness.1  Upon  hearing  this  motion, 
the  Court  either  allows  the  objection,2  or  directs  the  witness  to  attend 
before  the  Examiner  at  his  own  expense.3 

The  costs  of  and  occasioned  by  the  demurrer,  or  objection,  are  in  the 
discretion  of  the  Court ; 4  and  will  be  disposed  of   at  the  hearing  of 


3  15  &  16  Vice.  86,  §  33  (now  superseded,  Hindustan,  L.  R.  10  Eq.  675;  State  v.  Lons- 
6ee  ante,  p.  904,  n.  7).  dale,  48  Wis.  348. 

4  Braithwaite's  Pr.  539.  10  Morgan  v.  Shaw,  and  Parkburst  v.  Low- 

5  Braithwaite's  Pr.  539;  ante,  p.  594.     For  ten,  ubi  supra. 

form  of  order  to  set  down,  see  Seton,  1257,  No.  n  Davis  v.  Reid,  5  Sim.  443,  448. 

10;  and  for  form  of  petition,  see  Vol.  III.  »  Re  Aston,  27  B-av.  474;  4  De  G.  &  J.  320; 

6  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  33.  5  Jur.  N.   S.  615,  779;  Marriott  v.  Anchor  Re- 

7  Braithwaite's  Pr.  539;  6  Hare,  22,  24.  versionary  Co.  (Limited)  3  Giff.   304;  8  Jur. 

8  Marriott  v.  Anchor  Reversionary  Co.  N.  S.  51.  As  to  service,  where  the  witness  is  a 
(Limited)  3  Giff.  304;  8  Jur.  N.  S.  51;  and  solicitor  claiming  privilege  for  his  client,  see 
see  Tippins  v.  Coates,  6  Hare,  16,  23;  11  Jur.  ibid.;  ante,  p.  944.  For  form  of  notice,  see 
1075.  Vol.  III. 

9  Parkhurst  r.  Lowten,  2  Swanst.  205,  206;  2  Marriott  v.  Anchor  Reversionary  Co. 
see  Re  Aston,  27  Beav.  474;  4  De  G.  &  J.  320;  (Limited)  ubi  supra. 

5  Jur.  N.  S.  615,  779;  Rendle  v.  Metropolitan  3  Re  Aston,  ubi  supra. 

6  Provincial  Bank,  W.  N.  (1867)  239;  15  W.  4  15  &  16  Vic.  c.  86,  §  33  (now  superseded, 
R.  1068  ;  Lawton  v.  Price,  W.  N.  (1867)  266;  10  see  ante,  p.  904,  n.  7);  and  see  Sawyer  v.  Birch- 
W.  R.  73;    W.  N.  (1868)  110;    Re  Bank  of  more,  3  M.  &  K.  572;   Langley  v.  Fisher,  5 

940 


PUBLICATION.  *  946 

the  demurrer  or  motion ;  the  general  rule  being,  that  they  follow  the 
result.5 

Section  XVI.  —  Publication. 

Publication,  in  a  legal  sense,  is  the  open  showing  of  depositions,  and 
giving  copies  of  them  to  the  parties,  by  the  Clerks  or  Examiners  in  whose 
custody  they  are.6 

By  the  Orders  of  the  Court  the  depositions  of  witnesses  are  not  to  be 
disclosed  by  any  of  the  persons  before  whom  they  were  taken  or  by  their 
clerks,  but  are  to  be  closely  kept,  if  taken  in  town,  by  the  Examiners  at 
their  office  ;  if  by  commissioners  in  the  country,  by  the  sworn  clerk  to 
whom  the  commission,  after  its  execution,  was  delivered,  until  publication 
passes. 

We  have  seen  that  now,  under  the  Orders  of  May,  1845,  publication 
is  to  pass  without  rule  or  order  on  the  expiration  of  two  months  after 
the  filing  of  the  replication,  unless  such  time  expires  in  the  long 
vacation  or  is  enlarged  by  order  ; 7  and  that  if  the  *  two  months  *  946 
after  the  filing  of  the  replication  expire  in  the  long  vacation,  pub- 
lication is  to  pass  on  the  second  day  of  the  ensuing  Michaelmas  Term, 
unless  the  time  is  enlarged  by  order ; 1  and  that,  "  if  the  time  is  en- 
larged by  order,  publication  is  to  pass  without  rule  or  order,  on  the 
expiration  of  the  enlarged  time,  unless  the  enlarged  time  expires  in  the 
long  vacation,  in  which  case  publication  is  to  pass  without  rule  or  order 
on  the  second  day  of  the  ensuing  Michaelmas  Term,  unless  the  time  is 
further  enlarged  by  order."  2 

As  these  Orders  fix  precisely  the  time  at  which  publication  is  in  all 
cases  hereafter  to  pass,  it  will  not  be  necessary  to  enter  at  length  into 
the  details  of  the  practice  by  which  the  time  of  publication  has  hitherto 
been  determined. 

It  is  desirable,  however,  to  state  that  before  these  Orders  came  into 
operation  publication  passed  either  by  consent  or  rule. 

A  rule  to  pass  publication  was  in  the  nature  of  an  order  of  the  Court, 

Beav.  443;   7  Jur.  164;   14  L.  J.  Ch.  N.  S.  614;  Woosterp.  Clark,  9  id.  854;  Gilbert*.  Van 

302,  L.  C.  Annan,  1  Flippin,  421.     A  commission  may  be 

6  Wright  v.  Wilkin,  4  Jur.  N.  S.  527,  V.  C.  opened  by  a  Judge  in  vacation  in  New  Jersey. 

K.;  Lee  v.  Hammerton,  12  W.  R.  975,  V.  C.  K.;  Den  v.  Wood,  5  Halst.  62.  It  is  a  fatal  objection 

Re  Newgong  Tea  Co.  16  L.  T.  N.  S.  47;  see  to  a  deposition  taken  under  the  Judiciary  Act  of 

Stebbingr.  Atlee,  2  Jur.  N.  S.  1161;  Anon.  23  1798,  c.  20,  §  30,  that  it  was  opened  out  of  Court. 

L.  J.  Ch.  24.  Beale  v.  Thompson,  8  Cranch,  70.     A  deposi- 

6  Prac.  Reg.  353.  tion  opened  by  mistake  out  of  Court  may  be 

7  11th  Ord.  May,  1845.  In  Massachusetts,  received  and  filed  in  Maine  on  affidavit  of  the 
the  opening  and  filing,  in  the  Clerk's  Office,  a  fact.  Law  v.  Law,  4  Greenl.  167.  In  Massa- 
deposition  taken  in  a  suit  in  Chancery,  is  equiva-  chusetts,  a  deposition  taken  under  a  commis- 
lent  to  a  publication  in  the  English  practice.  A  sion,  so  opened,  may  be  used  in  the  discretion 
particular  rule  for  publication  is  not  necessary.  of  the  Court,  notwithstanding  the  rule,  that 
Charles  River  Bridge  v.  Warren  Bridge,  7  Pick.  "all  depositions  shall  be  opened  and  filed  with 
344.  In  Man-land  there  is  no  publication  of  the  Clerk."  Burrell  v.  Andrews,  16  Pick.  551; 
depositions,   but  all  objections   are  open,    and  Goff  v.  Goff,  1  Pick.  475. 

may  be  taken  at  the  hearing.     Strike's  case,  i  112th  Ord.  May,  1845. 

1  Bland.  96.    See  U.  S.  Equity  Rule  69,  pott,  2  ngth  Ord.  May,  1845;  Moody  v.  Payne,  3 

p.  2392;    Beinic  r.  Wadsworth,  36  Fed.  Rep.      John.  Ch.  294. 

941 


*  947  EVIDENCE. 

directing  that  publication  should  pass  unless  cause  was  shown  by  the 
other  side.  Before  a  rule  to  pass  publication  could  be  entered,  it  was 
necessary,  in  most  cases,  that  there  should  have  been  a  previous  order 
or  rule,  called  a  rule  to  produce  witnesses.  This  rule,  which  was  in  fact 
a  notice  given  by  one  side  to  the  other  to  proceed  with  the  examination 
of  his  witnesses,  was  sometimes  called  the  ordinary  rule. 

When  the  prescribed  period  from  the  date  of  the  rule  to  pass  publi- 
cation expired,  publication  passed  as  of  course,  unless  the  Examiner  or 
the  clerk  in  whose  custody  the  depositions  were  had  been  served  with 
an  order  to  enlarge  publication ;  or  unless  a  commission  had  been  issued 
at  the  instance  of  a  defendant,  under  the  provisions  of  the  17th  Order, 
for  the  examination  of  witnesses  in  the  country,  the  time  allowed  for 
the  return  of  which  had  not  expired,  in  which  case  publication  was 
directed  by  the  17th  Order,  to  stand  enlarged  until  the  commission  was 
returnable. 

The  Orders  of  May,  1845,  apparently  made  no  alteration  in  the  prac- 
tice according  to  which  applications  of  this  kind  were  thereafter  to  be 
made  ;  but  care  was  necessary  in  every  case  that  the  application  to 
enlarge  publication  be  made  before  the  expiration  of  two  months 

*  947     from  the  filing  of  the  *  replication.1     If  this  period  had  expired 

it  would  appear,  from  the  old  practice,  that  the  Master  had  no 
longer  jurisdiction  to  allow  any  further  examination  of  witnesses,  as  any 
subsequent  application,  although,  in  form,  one  to  enlarge  publication,  is 
in  effect  one  for  leave  to  examine  witnesses  notwithstanding  publication 
has  passed.2 

It  has  before  been  stated  that  the  Master  has  no  jurisdiction  to  allow 
of  the  further  examination  of  witnesses  after  the  period  has  arrived  at 
which  publication,  according  to  the  general  Order,  passes.8(a) 

The  Orders  of  May,  1845,  have  now,  as  we  have  seen,  changed  the 
manner  in  which  publication  passes,  and  it  remains  to  be  seen  whether 


1  To  enlarge  publication  is  to  stay  or  post-  3  In  New  Jersey,  if  either  party  cannot 
pone  the  rule  for  passing  publication,  and  a  complete  his  testimony  within  the  prescribed 
motion  for  that  purpose  may  be  granted,  on  period,  his  time  may  be  enlarged  upon  motion, 
reasonable  cause  shown;  but  this  is  very  differ-  on  notice  served  before  the  expiration  of  said 
ent  from  a  motion  to  examine  witnesses  after  time,  for  reasons  verified  by  proof  satisfactory 
publication  has  actually  passed.  Hamersley  v.  to  the  Chancellor.  The  time  limited  for  tak:ng 
Lambert.  2  John.  Ch.  432;  post,  p.  948,  note,  testimony  shall  not  be  extended,  except  by 
It  is  not  of  course  to  enlarge  the  rule  to  pass  written  consent,  or  by  order  of  the  Court,  made 
publication,  and  it  will  be  refused  where  there  upon  notice.     Rules  85,  86. 

has  been  great  delay.     Underhill  v.  Van  Cort-  In  Tennessee,  the  time  may  be  enlarged  by 

landt,  1  John.  Ch.  500.  the  Chancellor  or  Master  on  sufficient  cause 

2  Carr  v.  Appleyard,  2  M.  &  C.  476,  Anon,  shown.    Ch.  Rule  2,  §  4. 
5  Beav.  92;  Strickland  v.  Strickland,  4  Beav. 

146. 


(a)  In  Eillert  v.  Craps,  44  Fed.  Rep.  792,  it  published  before  the  defendant  open9  his  case, 

was  held  that  as  the  defendant  is  entitled  to  with  due  precautions  on  the  plaintiff's  behalf, 

know  whether  the  plaintiff  has  made  out  his  ar.d  subject   to   the   exception,   if   made,   that 

whole  case  in  chief  upon  testimony  taken  by  further  testimony   cannot   be   taken   after   an 

commission,  the  evidence  mav  be  ordered  to  be  order  of  publication. 

942 


PUBLICATION.  *  948 

hereafter  any  terms  or  conditions  will  be"annexed  to  the  order  to  enlarge 
publication. 

Hitherto  in  most  cases  publication  would  have  been  enlarged,  and  a 
party  have  had  an  opportunity  given  him  of  examining  witnesses,  even 
though  publication  had  been  enlarged  by  a  precedent  order,  if  any  ground 
for  doing  it  was  shown  and  verified  by  affidavit ; 4  as  where  witnesses 
resided  in  parts  of  the  kingdom  at  any  distance  from  each  other,  or 
where  the  party  applying  had  not  been  able  to  examine  all  his  witnesses 
under  a  joint  commission,  executed  in  the  cause,  by  reason  of  some  of 
the  witnesses  residing  at  a  great  distance  from  the  party,  and  others  at 
a  great  distance  from  the  place  of  executing  the  commission  ;  or  where 
witnesses  have  refused  or  neglected  to  attend  before  the  commissioners  ; 
or  by  any  accident  have  not  been  examined  at  the  execution  of  the 
commission.5 

Under  the  practice  before  the  Orders  of  1845  came  into  operation, 
when  any  of  the  parties  were  desirous  of  obtaining  a  commission  return- 
able at  a  period  subsequent  to  that  at  which  publication  would  have 
passed,  the  proper  course  seems  to  have  been  first  to  apply  to 
the  Master  to  enlarge  publication,  and  then  *  an  order  might  *  948 
have  been  obtained  from  the  Court  for  the  commission.1  The 
same  practice  appears  to  continue,  except  that  now  the  Master  has  juris- 
diction to  hear  applications  for  additional  commissions,  and  to  determine 
questions  relating  thereto. 

Where  a  cross-bill  has  been  filed  before  the  orginal  suit  has  been 
proceeded  in,  and  the  defendant  to  the  cross-suit  (who  is  the  plaintiff  in 
the  original  suit)  has  not  put  in  an  answer  to  the  cross-bill,  the  plaintiff 
in  the  cross-suit  may  have  publication  enlarged  in  the  original  suit  till 
a  fortnight  after  the  answer  to  the  cross-bill  shall  have  come  in,  as  the 
discovery  afforded  by  such  answer  may  be  of  service  to  him  in  framing 
his  interrogatories.2  But  we  have  before  seen  that  if  publication  has 
been  allowed  to  pass  in  the  original  suit,  witnesses  can  no  longer 
be  examined  in  the  cross-cause  concerning  matters  in  issue  in  the 
original  one.8 

It  seems,  however,  that  after  proceedings  have  been  taken  in  the 
original  cause,  publication  can  only  be  enlarged  where  the  defendant  in 
the  cross-cause  is  in  contempt,  unless  a  special  case  is  made.  Where  the 
cross-bill  was  not  filed  till  after  a  rule  to  pass  publication  had  been  en- 
tered in  the  original  suit,  and  the  defendant  in  the  cross-suit  was  not  in 
contempt,  a  motion  by  the  plaintiff  in  the  cross-suit  to  enlarge  publica- 
tion,4 which  was  not  founded  upon  any  special  grounds,  was  refused  with 
costs.5 

It  may  be  mentioned  here  that  the  Court  of  Exchequer  has  deter- 

*  Hinde,  383;  Mooch'  v.  Learning,  1  Mad.  85.  2  Creswick  v.  Creswick,  1  Atk.  291 ;  see  also 

5  Hinde,  383.     In  Barnes  v.  Abrain,  3  Mad.  Ranikissenseat  v.  Barker,  1  Atk.  19. 

103,  publication,  though  often  enlarged  before,  8  Pascall  v.  Scott,  1  Phil.  110. 

was  enlarged  again  in  order  to  enable  the  de-  4  Cook  v.  Broomhcad,  16  Yes.  133. 

fendant  in  a  tithe  cause  to  search  for  records  in  6  See  Underbill  v.  Van  Cortlandt,  1  Jobru 

the  Vatican  upon  affidavit  as  to  the  probability  Ch.  500;  Governeur  v.  Klmendorf,  4  John.  Cli. 

of  success  there.  357;  Field  v.  Schieffelin,  7  John.  Ch.  250. 


1  Maund  v.  Allies,  4  M.  &  C.  503. 


943 


*  949  EVIDENCE. 

mined  that  an  order  to  enlarge  publication  till  the  coming-in  of  the 
answer  in  a  cross-cause  shall  not  be  granted,  unless  upon  affidavit  of  the 
truth  of  the  facts  stated  in  the  cross-bill,  and  that  the  answer  may  furnish 
a  good  defence  to  the  original  bill.6  It  is  not  necessary,  however,  that 
such  affidavit  should  be  made  by  the  party  himself ;  but  if  made  by  his 
solicitor,  it  will  be  sufficient.7 

Sometimes,  when,  by  accident  or  surprise,  publication  passes  before  a 
party  has  examined  his  witnesses,  and  there  has  been  no  blamable 

*  949     negligence,  publication  will  be  enlarged 8  even  after  the  *  deposi- 

tions have  been  delivered  out,  upon  affidavit  that  they  have  not 
been  read.  Such  an  order,  however,  cannot  be  made1  except  upon 
application  to  the  Court  itself,2  nor  unless  some  cause  is  shown  why  the 
witness  was  not  examined  before.  And  it  is  a  rule  of  the  Court,  that 
the  party,  as  well  as  his  solicitor,  must  make  oath  that  they  have  never 
seen,  read,  nor  been  informed  of  the  contents  of  the  depositions  taken 
in  the  cause,  nor  will  they,  &c,  till  publication  is  duly  passed.3 

An  instance  is  mentioned  in  the  books,  having  occurred  in  Lord 
Somers's  time,  in  which  the  Court  granted  an  order  to  enlarge  publication 
after  it  had  actually  passed,  although  the  rule  of  the  Court  above  stated 
could  not  be  complied  writh ;  but  in  that  case  the  solicitor  on  the  other 
side,  being  an  artful  man,  having  procured  copies  of  his  client's  deposi- 
tions, immediately  went  with  them  to  the  adverse  solicitor,  and  showed 
him  the  depositions,  and  read  them  over  to  him :  the  solicitor  being 
ignorant  of  the  rule,  told  him  he  must,  notwithstanding,  have  an  oppor- 
tunity of  examining  his  witnesses,  and  soon  after  took  his  witnesses  to 
the  Examiner's  office,  where  he  was  told  they  could  not  be  examined, 
because  publication  was  passed  and  the  depositions  delivered  out.  The 
solicitor,  surprised  at  this,  went  to  his  clerk  in  Court  to  know  what  he 
was  to  do,  and  told  him  the  whole  story,  which  being  held  before  the 
Court,  it  enlarged  publication,  and  gave  the  party  an  opportunity  to 

6  Edwards  v.  Morgan,  11  Price,  939.  landt.  2  John.  Ch.  339.    The  Court,  by  extreme 

'  Lowe  v.  Firkins,  M'Clel.  10;  13  Price,  21,  rigor,  endeavors  to  guard  against  the  abuse  of 

g,  c.  introducing  testimony  to  meet  that  which  has 

8  The  time  for  publication  will  be  enlarged,  been  produced;  and   accordingly   it  has   been 

or  more   properly   the   time   for  taking  testi-  held,  that  if,  after  publication  has  passed,  the 

mony  will  be  enlarged,  after  publication  passed,  substance  of  the  testimony  taken  on  a  material 

though  not  in  fact  made  according  to  the  rules  point,  upon  which  further  testimony  is  sought, 

of   the  Court,    provided   some   good    cause   is  has  been  disclosed  to  the  party  applying,  it  is 

shown  therefor  upon  affidavit,  as  surprise,  acci-  too  late  to  move  to  open  or  enlarge  the  rule  on 

dent,  or  other  circumstances,  which  repels  the  affidavit.     Moody  v.  Payne,  3  John.  Ch.  294. 

presumption  of  laches.     The  affidavit  is  indis-  See  this  subject  discussed  in  Wood  v.  Mann,  2 

pensal'le  except  in  cases  of  fraud  practised  by  Sumner,  31fi. 

the  other  party.     Wood  t\  Mann,  2   Sumner,  1  1  Harr.  (ed.  Newl.)  289. 

311.     In    Hamersley  v.  Lambert,  2  John.  Ch.  2  Anon.  5  Beav.  92;  Maund  v.  Allies,  4  M. 

432,  it  was  held,  that  after  publication,  witnesses  &  C.  503. 

cannot  be  examined  unless  under  verv  special  3  Ibid. ;'  but  see   Lawrell   v.  Titchbome,  2 

circumstance.     See  also  Hamersley  v.  Brown,  Cox,  289;  Hamersley  v.  Lambert,  2  John.  Ch. 

2  John.  Ch.  428.     The  deposition  of  a  witness,  432,  433,  where    the  Chancellor   remarks  that 

whose  examination  was  not  closed  until  after  "  such  an  oath  ought  not  to  be  much  encouraged, 

publication  had  passed,  was  allowed  to  be  read,  It  is  partly  promissory;  it  may  be  difficult  to 

he  having  been  cross-examined  by  the  opposite  be  strictly  kept,  and  is  of  dangerous  and  suspi- 

party,  and  no  actual  abuse  appearing;  but  such  cious  tendency," 
practice  is  irregular.     Underbill  V.  Van  Cort- 

944 


PUBLICATION.  *  950 

examine  his  witnesses,  and  the  adverse  party  narrowly  escaped  commit- 
ment for  his  misconduct.4  ■ 

Where  a  defendant  obtained  an  order  to  enlarge  publication  upon  an 
allegation  that  it  had  not  passed,  which  was  untrue,  the  order  was  held 
to  be  informal,  and  an  application,  upon  the  usual  affidavit,  that  publica- 
tion might  be  again  enlarged,  or  the  evidence  taken  under  the  informal 
order,  read  at  the  hearing  of  the  cause,  was  dismissed  with  costs.5 

It  seems  that  the  Court  will  not  only  enlarge  publication,  upon  the 
proper  affidavits,  after  publication  has  actually  passed,  but  it  will,  if  a 
proper  case  is  made,  even  grant  a  second  commission  to  examine 
witnesses,  upon  being  satisfied,  by  affidavit,  that  the  *  party  ap-     *  950 
plying,  and   his  solicitor,  are   ignorant  of   the  contents  of  the 
depositions.1 

The  order  for  enlarging  publication2  is  signed  and  entered  by  the 
Master,  and  a  copy  of  it  must  then  be  served,  not  only  upon  the  other 
side,  but  upon  the  Examiner  who  took  the  depositions,  and  the  Clerk 
of  Records  and  Writs  in  whose  custody  the  depositions,  if  taken  by 
commission,  are,  on  or  before  the  day  on  which  publication  actually 
passes.3 

This  is  necessary,  as  well  to  authorize  the  giving  out  copies  of  the 
depositions,  and  to  preclude  further  examination  after  the  period  to 
which  publication  has  been  enlarged,  as  to  authorize  the  examination  of 
further  witnesses.4 

It  is  a  fixed  rule  of  the  Court,  that  if  one  of  the  parties,  after  publica- 
tion has  passed,  obtains  an  order  to  enlarge  publication,  upon  the  usual 
affidavit,  the  other  party  may  not  only  cross-examine,  but  may  examine 
at  large,  even  though  he  has  seen  and  read  the  former  depositions.5 

Where  a  cause  has  been  set  down  for  hearing,  and  publication  is  en- 
larged beyond  the  day  on  which  the  same  is  set  down  to  be  heard,  the 
proper  course,  if  the  cause  is  likely  to  come  on  before  the  depositions 
are  ready,  is  to  apply  to  the  Court  for  an  order  to  adjourn  the  hearing 
for  a  certain  time.  An  application  for  this  purpose  must  be  made  to 
the  Court 6  upon  motion,  of  which  notice  has  been  duly  served,  and  the 
order  made  thereon  should  be  served,  in  the  usual  manner,  upon  the 
adverse  solicitor,  before  the  day  on  which  the  cause  is  to  be  heard; 
otherwise  the  cause,  when  called  on,  will  be  struck  out  of  the  paper.7 

Publication  being  passed,  the  Examiner  or  Clerk  of  Records  and 
Writs,  in  whose  custody  the  depositions  are,  is  at  liberty  to  permit  them 
to  be  examined,  and  to  deliver  copies  of  them  to  the  parties. 

When  an  office  copy  of  the  depositions  taken  on  behalf  of  an  adverse 
party  is  delivered  out,  a  copy  of  the  interrogatories  whereon  such  deposi- 
tions were  taken  is  always  annexed.8 

4  1  Harr.  (ed.  Newl.)  289.  *  Ibid. 

&  Conethard  v.  Halted,  3  Mad.  429.  6  Anon.  1  Vern.  253. 

1  Turbot  v. ,  8  Ves.  315;   see  also  Din-           6  1  Smith's  Cb.  Pr,  388. 

gle    v.   Rowe,    Wightw.     99;    Cutler    v.  Cre-           <  Hinde,  385,  38G. 

mer,    6   Mad.  25-1;    but  see    Mineve  v.  Kow,           8  Hinde,  395.     If  the  party  taking  and  filing 

1  Dick.  18.  a  deposition  does  not,  before  trial,  obtain  leave 

2  24th  Ord.  1833.  to  withdraw  it,  and  fails  to  read  it  on  the  trial, 
8  Hinde,  381.  the  opposite  party  may  introduce  it.     Adams 

vol.  i.  —  60  lJ45 


951 


EVIDENCE. 


Section  XVII.  —  Suppression  of  Depositions. 

The  ground  upon  which  the  Court  suppressed  depositions  has 
been  either  that  the  interrogatories  upon  which  they  were  taken  were 
leading ;  or  that  the  interrogatories  and  the  depositions  taken 
*951  *upon  them,  or  the  depositions  alone,  were  scandalous  ;  or  else 
that  some  irregularity  has  occurred  in  relation  to  them.1  A  dep- 
osition may  also  be  suppressed  because  a  witness  has  disclosed  some 
matter  which  has  come  to  his  knowledge  as  solicitor  or  attorney  for  the 
party  applying.2 


v.  Russell,  85  111.  284 ;  Brandon  o.  Mullenix,  11 
Heisk.  446. 

1  In  such  cases  the  depositions  are  suppressed 
prior  to  the  hearing,  and  the  witness  will  be 
permitted  to  be  re-examined.  Brown  v.  Bulk- 
ley,  14  N.  J.  Eq.  294,  307,  308:  Van  Namee  v. 
Groot,  40  Vt.  74,  80;  Underhill  v.  Van  Cort- 
landt,  2  John.  Ch.  345;  Stubbs  v.  Burwell,  2 
Hen.  &  M.  536;  Pillow  r.  Shannon,  3  Yerger, 
508;  Ringgold  v.  Jones,  1  Bland,  90;  Perine  v. 
Swaine,  2  John.  Ch.  475;  Hemphill  v.  Miller,  16 
Ark.  271.  It  is  a  fatal  defect  if  the  general  in- 
terrogatory, "  Do  you  know  anything  further," 
&c,  does  not  appear  to  be  answered.  Richard- 
son v.  Golden,  3  Wash.  C.  C.  109 ;  ante,  p.  924, 
note.  So  if  the  deposition  is  taken  before  per- 
sons not  named  in  the  commission.  Banert  v. 
Day,  3  Wash.  C.  C.  243.  So  if  all  proper  inter- 
rogatories do  not  appear  to  have  been  answered, 
on  each  side,  substantially.  Bell  r.  Davidson, 
id.  328 ;  Nelson  v.  United*  States,  1  Peters,  C.  C. 
235.  A  deposition  was  rejected  because  a  wit- 
ness refused  to  answer  a  proper  question ;  also 
because  it  wras  in  the  handwriting  of  the  plain- 
tiff's attorney.  Mosely  v.  Mosely,  Cam.  &  Nor. 
522.  In  Fulton  v.  Golden,  28  N.  J.  Eq.  37,  a 
deposition  of  the  defendant,  taken  by  the  plain- 
tiff, was  suppressed  on  motion  of  the  latter,  for 
the  refusal  of  the  witness  to  answer  proper 
questions,  and  to  produce  papers  and  books,  and 
for  the  introduction  of  matter  in  his  favor  not 
responsive,  and  for  scandal.  Depositions  taken 
without  notice  will  be  rejected.  Honore  v. 
Colmesnil,  1  J.  J.  Marsh.  525.  And  notice 
cannot  be  supplied  by  the  commissioner's  ad- 
journment to  a  day  fixed.  Parker  v.  Hayes,  23 
N.  J.  Eq.  186.  So  a  deposition  taken  after 
argument  of  the  cause,  without  special  order, 
will  be  suppressed.  Dangerfield  v.  Claiborne, 
4  Hen.  &  M.  397.  Evidence  of  a  fact  not  in 
issue  may,  upon  motion,  before  the  hearing, 
be  suppressed,  or  it  may  be  rejected  at  the  hear- 
ing. Trumbull  v.  Gibbons,  Halst.  Dig.  174;  see 
Butman  v.  Ritchie,  6  Paige,  390.  According  to 
the  practice  pursued  in  New  York  by  Chancellor 
Kent,  motions  to  suppress  depositions,  although 
permitted  to  be  made  before  the  hearing,  usu- 
ally resulted,  unless  the  point  was  verv  clear, 

946 


in  permitting  the  evidence  to  stand  de  bene  esse 
and  reserving  the  question.  1  Hoff.  Ch.  Pr. 
495.  It  is  not  in  accordance  with  the  practice 
of  the  Court  to  suppress  testimony  as  incom- 
petent, before  the  hearing  :  Williamson  v.  More, 

1  Barb.  S.  C.  229;  Brown  v.  Bulkley,  14  N.  J. 
Eq.  307;  nor  for  impertinence:  Pyncent  v. 
Pyncent,  3  Atk.  557;  White  v.  Fusseil,  19  Ves. 
113;  Osmond  v.  Tindall,  Jac.  625;  Jones  v. 
Spencer,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  776;  Williams  v.  Vreehmd, 
30  N.  J.  Eq.  576.  "  The  question  whether  the 
deposition  shall  be  suppressed,"  it  was  remarked 
by  the  Chancellor  in  Underhill  v.  Van  Cort- 
landt,  2  John.  Ch.  345,  "is  a  matter  of  discre- 
tion; and  in  Hamond's  case,  1  Dick.  50,  and  in 
Debrox's  case,  cited  in  1  P.  Wms.  414,  the  dep- 
osition of  a  witness  examined  after  publica- 
tion was  admitted  in  the  one  case,  because  the 
opposite  party  had  cross-examined,  and  in  the 
other,  because  the  testimony  would  otherwise 
have  been  lost  forever."  A  deposition  having 
been  taken  after  a  cause  was  set  down  for  hear- 
ing in  the  Superior  Court  of  Chancery,  and  no 
objection  having  been  made  in  that  Court,  the 
Court  of  Appeals  will  presume  that  good  cause 
was  shown  for  admitting  it.     Stubbs  v.  Burwell, 

2  Hen.  &  M.  536;  Pillow  v.  Shannon,  3  Yerger, 
508.  Exceptions  to  the  reading  of  depositions 
taken  by  virtue  of  commissions  issued  after  the 
cause  for  which  they  may  be  required  is  set  down 
for  hearing,  may  be  made  at  any  time  before 
the  cause  is  gone  into,  when  called ;  after  which 
such  exceptions  would  come  too  late.  Foster 
v.  Sutton,  4  Hen.  &  M.  401;  see  further  as  to 
irregularities  in  taking,  &c,  depositions,  and 
when  they  will  or  will  not  cause  their  rejection, 
Greslev,  Eq.  Ev.  147-154;  Cravens  v.  Hani- 
son,  3  Lift.  92;  Clarke  v.  Tinsley,  4  Rand.  250. 
A  party  is  too  late  to  move  to  suppress  a  depo- 
sition for  irregularity  after  having  exhibited 
articles  to  discredit  the  witness.  Malone  v. 
Morris,  2  Moll.  324.  A  motion  to  suppress  depo- 
sitions for  irregularity  in  the  notarial  certi- 
ficate comes  too  late  after  they  have  been  on  file 
for  three  years.  Bank  of  Danville  v.  Travers, 
4  Biss.  507.  And  see  Tedrowe  v.  Esher,  56 
Ind.  443. 

2  Sandford  v.  Remington,  2  Ves.  Jr.  189; 


RE-EXAMINATION   OF   WITNESSES.  *  952 

The  objection  that  the  interrogatories  are  leading  can  scarcely  now  be 
taken,,  as  the  Examiner  himself  either  puts  the  questions,  or  controls 
those  by  whom  the  witnesses  are  examined. 

Formerly,  when  any  valid  objection  could  be  taken  to  the  depositions, 
it  was  the  practice  to  move  for  a  reference  to  the  Master,  and  upon  his 
report  to  move  to  suppress  the  depositions.  Now  that  the  Master's 
office  is  abolished,  the  proper  course  would  be  to  move  the  Court  at  once, 
if  any  objection  could  be  taken,  for  an  order  to  suppress  the  depositions. 

*  Section   XVIII.  —  He-examination  of  Witnesses.        *  952 

The  Court  is  always  desirous  that  the  examination  of  witnesses  should 
be  completed,  as  much  as  possible,  uno  actu,  and  that,  whenever  it  can  be 
accomplished,  no  opportunity  should  be  afforded,  after  a  witness  has 
once  signed  his  deposition,1  and  "  turned  his  back  upon  the  Examiner,"  2 
of  tampering  with  him,  and  inducing  him  to  retract  or  contradict  or  ex- 
plain away  what  he  has  stated  in  his  first  examination  upon  a  sen  mm!; 
but,  notwithstanding  this  unwillingness  to  allow  a  second  examination 
of  the  same  witness,  there  are  cases  in  which,  if  justice  requires  that  a 
second  examination  of  the  same  witnesses  should  take  place,  an  order 
will  be  made  to  permit  it.3 

Thus  where  the  whole  depositions  of  the  witnesses  in  a  cause  are  sup- 
pressed, on  account  of  some  irregularity  in  the  conduct  of  the  cause  or 
in  the  examination  of  the  witnesses,  the  Court  will,  when  it  is  satis- 
fied that  the  irregularity  has  been  accidental  and  unintentional,  direct 
the  witnesses  to  be  re-examined  and  cross-examined  upon  the  origi- 
nal interrogatories.4 

The  cases,  however,  in  which  the  Court  will  permit  the  re-examination 
of  the  same  witnesses  after  publication,  are  not  confined  to  those  in 
which  the  original  depositions  have  been  suppressed  for  irregularity  ; 
it  has,  as  we  have  seen,  permitted  it  to  be  done  in  a  special  case,  where 
the  depositions  had  been  suppressed,  because  the  interrogatories  upon 
which  they  were  taken  were  leading.5 

Bernard  c.  Papineau,  3  De  G.  &  Sm.  498;  Att.-  testimony  taken  on  his  examination  in  chief, 

Gen.  o.  Dew,  3  De  G.  &  Sm.  493.  and  read  it  at  the  hearing,  unless  under  very 

1  Beames's  Ord.  74.  special  circumstances.   Gray  v.  Murray,  4  John. 

2  Lord  Abergavenny  v.  Powell.  1  Mer.  130.  Ch.  412;  Hallock  v.  Smith,  id.  649;  Sterry  c. 

3  The  re-examination  of  a  witness  in  Chan-  Arden,  1  id.  62;  Newman  v.  Kendall,  2  A.  K. 
eery  rests   in  discretion,   and    though  granted  Marsh.  236. 

under  peculiar  circumstances,   is   against    the  4  Fresh  interrogatories  and   re-examination 

ordinary   practice   of    that    Court.      Beach   v.  have  heen   permitted   after  publication,  where 

Fulton  Bank,  3  Wend.  573 ;  Phillips  v.  Tbomp-  depositions  have  been  suppressed  from  the  in- 

snn,   1  John.  Ch.   140.     A  witness,   examined  terrogatories  being  leading,  or  fur  irrt  gularity, 

while  incompetent  by  reason  of  interest,  may  or  where  it  has  heen  discovered  that  a  proper 

be  re-examined  after  hia  competency  is  restored,  release  has  not  been  given,  to  make  a  witness 

Iladdix   o.  Haddix,  S   l.itt.  202.     But  a  party  competent.    Wood  v,  Mann,  2  Sumner,  316;  see 

will   not  be  allowed  to  re-examine  a  witness  FJealey    r.  Jagger,  3  Sim.  494;    Chameau  v. 

whose  memory  has  been  refreshed  since  his  ex-  Riley,  G  Beav.  419;  Shaw  v.  Mndsey, 

animation  closed,  except  as  to  documentary  380;  Att.-Gen.  r.  Nethercote,  9  Sim.  311. 
evidence.     Noel  i>.  Fitzgerald,  1  Hogan,  135;  6  See  Spence  r.  Allen.  Prec.  in  Chan.  493; 

see  Byrne  v.  Frere,  1  Moll.  396.     Nor  can  a  1    Eq.   ('as.  Abr.    2:12:    Lord  Arundel  v.  Pitt, 

witness,  after  a  hearing  and  final  decree  in  a  Amb.  585;  Ilinde,  398. 
cause,  be  re-examined  to  explain  or  correct  his 

947 


*  954  EVIDENCE. 

But,  even  where  the  original  depositions  have  not  been  suppressed, 
the  Court  has  frequently  made  an  order,  after  publication,  for  the 

*  953   re-examination  of    witnesses,  for  the  purpose  of  proving  *  some 

fact  which  has  been  omitted  to  be  proved  upon  the  original  deposi- 
tion. This  is  frequently  done  upon  inquiries  in  the  Master's  office,  under 
decrees  ; J  and  even  before  the  cause  has  been  heard,  the  Court  will 
entertain  applications  for  the  purpose  of  allowing  fresh  interrogatories 
to  be  administered  to  witnesses  who  have  been  already  examined  in  the 
cause.2 

The  Court  will  not  only  entertain  an  application  for  this  purpose,  after 
publication  has  taken  place  in  the  cause,  but  will  even  at  the  hearing, 
where  the  defect  in  the  evidence  of  a  particular  witness  has  not  been 
discovered  before,  permit  the  cause  to  stand  over,  to  enable  the  party 
to  make  an  application  to  the  Court  for  permission  to  re-examine  the 
witness.3 

Sometimes  in  cases  of  this  nature,  the  Court,  instead  of  having  the 
witness  re-examined,  will,  if  the  mistake  involves  only  a  verbal  altera- 
tion, permit  the  original  deposition  to  be  amended.4 

But  before  the  Court  makes  an  order,  either  for  the  re-examination  of 
a  witness  or  for  amending  a  deposition  after  publication,  it  will  examine 
very  strictly  into  the  circumstances  of  the  case;  and  if,  upon  such 
examination,  it  is  not  satisfied  that  the  error  has  been  wholly  accidental, 
or  the  effect  of  mistake  or  omission  either  on  the  part  of  the  witness  or 
of  the  Examiner,  it  will  refuse  the  application.5  And,  in  general,  before 
making  an  order  for  the  amending  of  the  deposition,  it  will,  unless  the 
case  is  very  clear,  examine  both  the  witness  and  the  Examiner.6 

In  all  the  cases  where  a  correction  has  been  permitted  in  the  deposition 
itself,  a  direction  that  the  witness  should  re-swear  his  deposition  after 

the  alteration,  has  formed  part  of  the  order.7 

*  954        *  An  order  to  re-examine  a  witness,  for  the  purpose  of  supplying 

a  defect  in  his  former  examination,  will  not  in  general  be  made 

before  publication  has  passed  in  the  cause  ;  the  reason  of  which  is  the 

difficulty  the  Court,  without  seeing  the  depositions,  would  have  in  com- 

i  See  post,  "Proceedings  in  Master's  office."  was  allowed  to  be  amended  on  examination  of 

2  Cox  v.  Allingham,  Jac.  337;  Turner  v.  the  witness  by  the  Court,  he  being  aged  and 
Trelawny,  9  Sim.  453;  Byrne  r.  Frere.  1  Moll.  very  deaf,  and  a  mistake  made  in  taking  down 
396;  Potts  v.  Turts,  Younge,  343:  Bridge  v.  his  testimony  by  the  Examiner.  Denton  v. 
Bridge,  G  Sim.  352.     In  Kirk  v.  Kirk,  13  Ves.  Jackson.  1  John.  Ch.  526. 

286,  before  Lord  Erskine,  an  order  was  made,  s  Ingram  r.  Mitchell,  5  Ves.  299. 

on  the  application  of  the  witness  himself,  after  6  Ibid. ;  Griells  v.  Gansell,  2  P.  Wras.  646; 

publication,  for  his  re-examination  as  to  a  point  Darling  v.  Staniford,  1  Dick.  358;  Penderil  v. 

upon  which  it  appeared,  by  his  affidavit,  he  h^d  Penderil,  Kel.  25. 

mad.' a  mistake.    The  order,  however,  was  con-  '  It   was    stated    by   Lord    Hardwicke,    in 

fined  to  permit  his  re-examination  as  to  that  Bishop  r.  Church,  2  Ves.  Sr.  100,  that  the  Court 

particular  point  only,  and  it  directed  that  the  had  sometimes  directed  a  witness  to  attend  per- 

other  side  should  have  an  opportunitv  of  cross-  sonally  when  it  had  a  doubt;  but  in  that  case 

examining  him.  the  witness  having  spoken  so  generally  in  his 

3  Cox  ;•.  Allingham,  Jac.  337.  depositions  as  to  leave  a  doubt  in  his  mind  upon 

4  Rowlev  v.  Ridley,  1  Cox.  2S1 :  2  Dick.  687,  a  particular  point,  he  refused  to  proceed  in  the 
S.  C;  Griells  v.  G'ansell,  2  I'.  Wins.  646.  cause  till  the  witness  had  been  examined  upon 
After'  publication    passed   and    the   cause   set  interrogatories  before  the  Master. 

down  for  hearing,  the  deposition  of  a  witness 

948 


REEXAMINATION    OF   WITNESSES.  *  955 

ing  to  a  correct  conclusion  as  to  the  propriety  of  granting   or  refusing 
the  application.1 

The  reader  is  reminded  here,  that  where  the  examination  of  a  witness  is 
hefore  an  Examiner,  either  party  may,  up  to  the  period  of  publication, 
exhibit  new  interrogatories  for  the  further  examination  of  the  same  or 
of  other  witnesses  there,  without  an  order  to  warrant  it;  but  that  when 
a  commission  is  taken  out,  the  practice  has  hitherto  been  different.'2  It 
is,  however,  to  be  here  observed,  that  the  power  of  exhibiting  additional 
interrogatories  for  the  further  examination  of  a  witness  already  examined 
before  the  Examiner  is  confined  to  the  period  of  a  witness  being  under 
examination.  If  the  examination  of  the  witness  has  been  closed,  and 
he  has  perfected  and  signed  his  deposition  (although  he  may  be  per- 
mitted to  perfect  his  deposition  in  some  circumstances  of  time  or  the  like, 
or  by  correcting  a  sum  upon  view  of  any  deed,  book,  or  writing,  to  be 
shown  to  the  Examiner),3  he  cannot  be  again  examined  on  behalf  of  the 
party  producing  him  without  an  order  of  the  Court;  and  it  seems  that 
such  order  cannot  be  obtained,  unless  upon  affidavit  that  the  witness,  if 
he  has  been  cross-examined,  has  not  communicated  the  effect  of  his  cross- 
examination  to  the  party  examining  in  chief.4  Nor  will  such  an  order  be 
made,  at  least  before  publication,  for  the  purpose  of  permitting  a  witness 
to  alter  or  explain  what  he  has  stated  upon  his  first  examination,  although 
he  may  be  re-examined  as  to  different  matter.5 

But  although  a  witness,  after  he  has  closed  his  examination,  cannot 
be  re-examined,  on  behalf  of  the  party  producing  him,  without  an  order, 
he  may,  if  he  has  been  examined  before  the  Examiner,  be  examined 
again  by  the  adverse  party  without  an  order.6  He  is,  in  fact,  in  such 
case,  a  new  witness  for  the  other  party  proposing  to  re-examine  him, 
and  may  not  only  be  examined  by  such  party,  but  may  be  cross-examined 
by  the  party  originally  producing  him.  The  same  rule  will  also  apply 
to  examinations  under  a  commission,  where  a  witness  who  has 
been  examined  by  one  party  may  afterwards  *  be  examined  by  the  *  955 
other  party,  in  chief,  as  his  witness,  without  an  order,  provided 
such  examination  be  upon  interrogatories  which  have  been  produced 
before  the  commissioners  were  sworn.  When  it  is  necessary  to  examine 
him  upon  fresh  interrogatories,  an  order  to  that  effect  must,  as  we  have 
seen,  be  first  obtained.1  Thus,  where  a  motion  was  made  on  the  part  of 
the  defendant,  that  he  might  be  at  liberty  to  exhibit  fresh  interrogatories 
for  the  examination  of  the  plaintiff's  witnesses  in  the  suit,  on  the  ground 
that,  after  the  witnesses  had  been  examined,  it  was  discovered  that  they 
were  interested,  the  order  was  made,2  which  was  afterwards  continued 
on  appeal.3 

1  Lord  Abergavenny  v.  Powell,  1  Mer.  131;  *  Cockerell  v.  Cholmeley,  3  Sim.  313. 
Batt  r.  Birch,  5  Mad.  66;  Asbee  v.  Shipley,  id.  5  Turner  v.  Trelawny,  9  Sim.  453. 
467;  Randall  r.  Ricbford,  1  Ch.  Cas.  25;  but  r>  Vaughan  v.  Wbrrall,  2  Mad.  322. 
see    Kirk    r.    Kirk,    13   Ves.   280;   Stanney   v.  1  Ante,  pp.  924,  925. 

Walmsley,  1  M.  &  C.  361.  -  Vaughan  v.  Worrall,  ubi  supra. 

2  Ante,  pp.  924,  925;   see  also  Andrews  v.  3  o  Swanst.  395;  and  see  Selway  e.  Chap- 
Brown,  1  Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  929.                                       pell,  12  Sim.  1052. 

*  Ante,  p.  929. 

949 


*  956  EVIDENCE. 

It  is  to  be  observed,  also,  that  in  the  above  case,  a  new  commission 
was  necessary  for  the  purpose  of  taking  the  examination  of  the  witnesses 
to  the  interrogatory.  But  even  if  no  new  commission  had  been  required, 
it  would  have  been  necessary  to  have  obtained  an  order  for  the  exhibi- 
tion of  the  interrogatory  before  the  Examiner;  for,  as  we  have  seen 
In- lore,  the  rule  of  the  Court  is,  that  if  a  witness  has  been  examined  by 
commissioners  in  the  country,  he  cannot  be  examined  again,  before  the 
Examiner,  without  a  special  order.4 

It  is  to  be  mentioned  here,. that  where  the  Court  makes  an  order  for 
permitting  the  re-examination  of  witnesses,  it  is  always  coupled  with  a 
direction  that  the  other  side  shall  have  liberty  to  cross-examine  them,5 
and  that  the  proceedings  upon  such  re-examination  are  subject  to  the 
same  rules  as  those  upon  ordinary  examination.6 

Section  XIX.  —  Examination  of  Witnesses  after  Publication. 

After  the  depositions  of  witnesses  have  been  published  and  read  by 
the  parties,  a  new  witness  cannot  be  examined  without  an  order 

*  956    of  the  Court,  which  will  not  be  granted  unless  warranted  by  *  spe- 

cial circumstances,1  except  for  the  purpose  of  proving  an  exhibit 
viva  voce  at  the  hearing;  in  which  case,  as  we  have  seen,  an  order  for 
the  examination  of  the  witness  may  be  obtained  on  motion  or  petition 
of  course.2 

An  order  for  the  examination  of  a  fresh  witness  after  publication, 
except  it  be  for  the  purpose  of  discrediting  a  witness  already  examined, 
is  not  obtained  without  great  difficulty.3  Cases,  however,  do  frequently 
occur,  in  which  the  Courts  will  allow  the  examination  of  witnesses  after 
the  depositions  have  been  seen ;  and  even  at  the  hearing  of  the  cause, 
leave  has  been  given  to  the  parties  to  examine  witnesses  to  facts  which 
have  been  omitted  to  be  proved  in  the  ordinary  course.  This,  as  we 
have  seen,  has  been  frequently  done  in  the  case  of  wills  disposing  of 
real  estates ; 4  but  the  practice  is  not  confined  to  those  cases,  and  other 
cases  have  already  been  mentioned  in  which  the  Court  has  permitted 
such  examinations  as  to  different  points,  either  by  order  made  at  the 
hearing,  or  upon  petition  or  motion,  supported  by  proper  affidavits.5     In 

4  See  Pearson  v.  Rowland,  3  Swanst.  266,  n.  to  facts  and  conversations  occurring  after  the 

5  See  order  in  Cox  v.  Allingham,  Jac.  345;  original  cause  is  at  issue,  and  publication  has 
Stanney  v.  Walmsley,  1  M.  &  C.  -361.  passed.     The  Court  may.  in  the  exercise  of  a 

6  In  Bridge  v.  Bridge.  6  Sim.  352,  however,  sound  discretion,  allow  the  introduction  of  newly 
the  V.  C  of  England,  upon  making  an  order  discovered  evidence  of  witnesses  to  facts  in  issue 
for  re-examination  of  a  witness  to  part  of  an  in  the  cause  after  publication  and  knowledge  of 
interrogatory  (his  deposition  as  to  which  the  the  former  testimony,  and  even  after  the  near- 
Examiner  had  omitted  to  take  down),  made  it  ing.  But  it  will  not  exercise  this  discretion  to 
part  of  the  order,  "  that  publication  should  pass  let  in  merely  corroborative  testimony.  Wood 
immediately   after   the   examination   or   cross-  v.  Mann,  2  Sumner,  316. 

examination  (if  any)  should  be  concluded,  and  2  Ante,  p.  881;  see  Wood  v.  Mann,  2  Sumner, 

that  the  cause  should  be  adjourned,  with  liberty  31G. 

to  the  plaintiffs  to  apply  to  have  it  restored  to  the  3  Willan  V.  Willan,  ubi  sujira. 

paper  when  the  publication  should  have  passed."  4  Ante,  p.  858. 

i  Willan  r.  Willan,  1!'  Ves.  590-592;  Hamers-  5  Ante,  p.  858;  Clarke  v.  Jennings,  1  Anst. 

ley  v.  Lambert,  2  John.  Ch.  432.     It  seems  that  173;   Gage  '•.  Hunter,   1  Dick.  49;  Mulock  v. 

new  testimony  may  be  taken  after  publication,  Mulock,  28  X.  J.  Eq.  15. 

950  * 


EXAMINATION    OP   WITNESSES   AFTER   PUBLICATION.  *  957 

addition  to  which  it  may  be  stated,  that  an  order  for  this  purpose  may 
be  obtained,  even  where  the  same  point  has  been  examined  to  before.6 

It  is  to  be  observed,  that,  in  general,  if  leave  is  given  to  examine 
a  witness  after  publication,  and  before  hearing,  a  Master  is  sometimes 
ordered  to  settle  the  interrogatories,  that  they  may  be  confined  to  such 
points  only  as  were  omitted  before,  and  as  are  now  ordered  to  be 
examined  unto.7  This,  however,  is  not  always  done  ;  and  when  the 
object  is  merely  to  prove  an  exhibit,  and  the  interrogatory  was  before 
filed,  it  is  unnecessary. 

Though,  by  the  orders  of  the  Court,  the  parties  are  to  make  their 
proof  before  publication  and  hearing  of  the  cause,  yet  after 
*  hearing,  if  there  be  a  reference  to  the  Master  for  stating  an  *957 
account  or  such  like  matter,  and  he  shall  find  any  particular  points 
or  circumstances  needful  to  ground  his  report  upon,  which  were  not  fully 
proved,  nor  could  be  properly  examined  to  before  the  Master,  he  may 
direct  the  parties  to  draw  interrogatories  to  such  points  or  circumstances 
only,  and  the  witnesses  are  usually  examined  before  the  Master  upon 
such  interrogatories,  if  the  witness  be  or  reside  within  twenty  miles  of 
London,  but,  if  further  off,  and  the  parties  desire  it,  he  may  by  certifi- 
cate direct  a  commission  into  the  country.1 

The  most  usual  cases  in  which  witnesses  are  required  to  be  examined 
after  publication  are  those  in  which  their  testimony  is  required  for  the 
purpose  of  showing  that  a  witness  already  examined  is  unworthy  of 
credit.2  An  examination  for  this  purpose  is  not,  however,  a  matter  of 
course ;  it  must  have  the  sanction  of  an  order,  the  leading  step  towards 
obtaining  which  is  the  preparing  or  filing  of  objections,  or  "  articles  "  in 
the  Examiner's  office  (if  the  depositions  impeached  be  taken  in  town), 
or  in  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerks'  office  (where  the  depositions  have 
been  taken  by  commission).3 

6  Coley  v.  Coley,  2  Y.  &  J.  44;  Greenwood  material  to  the  merits   of  the  case.     Wood  v. 

v.  Parsons,  2  Sim."  229.    In  Newland  v.  Horse-  Mann,  2  Sumner,  316;  Gresley,  Eq.  Ev.  (Am. 

man,  2  Ch.  Cas.  74,  an  order  was  made  for  the  ed.)  139-144;  Jenkins  v.  Eldredge,  3  Story,  312, 

examination    of  witnesses    abroad,  upon   new  313;  Troup  V.  Sherwood,  3  John.  Ch.  558. 

matter  stated  at  the  hearing,  and  not  in  issue  •'•  Hinde,  374.     These  articles  may  be  in  the 

before,  upon  terms  of   not  delaying  an  action  following  form,  viz.:     "Articles  exhibited  by 

directed  to  be  tried  at  Law;  and  in   Gage   v.  A   B,    complainant   in  a   certain    cause,    now 

Hunter,  1  Dick.  49,  leave  was  given  after  pub-  depending  and  at  issue  in  the   High  Court  of 

lication  to  examine  a  witness  as  to  a  particular  Chancery,    wherein   the  said   A    B   is  plaintiff, 

fact  viva  voce,  the  defendant  being  at  liberty  to  and  C  D  defendant  ;  to  discredit  the  testimony 

cross-examine.     See  Holies  v.  Carr,  3  Swanst.  of  E  V,  <1  H,  and  .1  K.  three  witnesses  examined 

638,  where  a  similar  order  appears  to  have  been  [before  Thomas  Hall  Plumer,  Esquire,  one  of 

made  upon  consent.  Hi"  Examiner.,  of  the   Court],  on  the   part  and 

7  1  Harr.  (ed.  Newl.)  274.  behalf  of  the  3aid  defendant.     (If  the  wil 

i  iijid.  have  been  examined  by  commission,  the  follow- 

2  Although  the  usual  time  for  examining  as  ing  words  are  to  be  substituted  for  those  within 

to  the  credit  of  a  witness  is  after  publication,  brackets:   '  by  virtue  of  a  commission,    issued 

it  seems  that  it  may  be  done  before,  provided  out  of  the  said  Court,  to  X  Y  and  others,  di- 

an  order  for  that  purpose  be  obtained.     Mill  v.  rected  for  the  examination  <>f  witnesses  in  the 

Mill, 12  Yes.  406.  A  witness  maybe  examined  as  said  cause  upon  certain  interrogatories  exhibited 

to  the  mere  credit  of  the  other  witnesses,  whose  before  them,  for  thai   purpose,  and  which  said 

depositions  have  been  already  taken   and   pub-  witnesses  were  examined    in    the    said    cause.' 

lished  in  the  cause,  but  he  will  not  be  allowed  Hinde.  375.)     1st  The  said   \   B  doth  charge 

to  be  examined  to  prove  or  disprove  any  fact  and  allege   that   the  said  E  V   hath,  since  his 

951 


*  959  EVIDENCE. 

*  958        *  The  exhibition  of  these  articles  is  rendered  necessary  by  one 

of  Lord  Clarendon's  Orders,1  which  directs  that  the  Examiner 
shall  not  examine  any  witnesses  to  invalidate  the  credit  of  other 
witnesses,  but  by  special  order  of  the  Court,  which  is  sparingly  to  be 
granted,  and  upon  exceptions  first  put  into  writing,  and  filed  with  the 
Examiner,  without  fee,  and  notice  thereof  given  to  the  adverse  party  or 
his  clerk,  together  with  a  true  copy  of  the  said  exceptions,  at  the  charge 
of  the  party  so  examining. 

The  object  for  which  these  articles  are  required  is  to  give  notice  to 
the  party  whose  witnesses  are  to  be  objected  to,  of  the  ground  of  the 
objection,  in  order  that  he  may  be  prepared  to  meet  it.  Without  some 
notice  of  this  description,  it  would  be  impossible  for  the  other  party  to 
cross-examine  the  witnesses  to  be  adduced,  for  the  purpose  of  discredit- 
ing the  character  of  his  witness ;  for  as  the  rule  of  the  Court  is  that  you 
cannot  examine  to  any  points  not  put  in  issue  by  the  pleadings,  and  as 
the  character  of  a  witness  could  not  by  that  means  be  put  in  issue,  it 
would  be  impossible  that  the  party  should  know  that  the  witnesses 
examined  by  his  adversary  were  for  the  purpose  of  discrediting  his  own. 
For  this  reason,  the  Court  not  only  requires  notice  to  be  given  of  an 
intention  to  discredit  a  witness,  in  the  form  of  articles  as  above  stated, 
but  it  considers  all  examinations,  as  to  the  character  of  witnesses,  with- 
out the  previous  exhibition  of  such  articles,  as  impertinent,  and  will 
order  them,  and  the  interrogatories  upon  which  they  are  taken,  to  be 
suppressed.2 

The  articles  having  been  filed,  a  certificate  thereof  must  be  procured 
from  the  Examiner,  or  from  the  Record  and  Writ  Clerk  with  whom  they 
are  filed,  and  an  application  must  be  made  to  the  Court,  grounded  upon 
the  certificate,  for  leave  to  the  party  applying  to  examine  witnesses 
thereon,  and  if  necessary  for  a  commission  to  take  their  depositions  in 
the  country.3 

Although  by  Lord  Clarendon's  Order,  above  referred  to,4  an  order  for 

leave  to  examine  witnesses  to  credit  is  termed  a  special  order,  it  is  usually 

granted  as  a  matter  of  course,5  and  may  be  obtained  either  by 

*  959    motion,  or  by  petition  at  the  Rolls,  without  *  affidavit,  upon  the 

certificate  of  articles  being  filed.1  It  seems,  however,  that  if  made 
by  motion,  it  should  be  upon  notice,2  and  that  if  the  application  is 
made  after  considerable  delay,  and  the  hearing  of  the  cause  will  thereby 

examination  in  the  said  cause,  owned  and  ac-  so  to  be;  and   that  the  said  G  H  and  J  K  are 

knowledged  that  he  is  to  receive  or   be  paid,  persons  who  have  no  regard  for  the  nature  and 

and  also  that    he  doth  expect   a  considerable  consequences  of  an  oath ;  and   that   they  are 

reward,    gratuity,    recompense,    or   allowance,  persons  whose  testimony  is  not  to  be  credited 

from  the  said  defendant,  in  case  the  said  de-  or  believed."    Hinde,  376. 

fendant  recovers  in  the  said  cause,  or  the  said  1  Beames's  Ord.  187. 

cause  be  determined  in  his  favor,  and  that  the  "  Mill  v.  Mill,  12  Ves.  406. 

said  E  F  is  to  gain  or  lose  by  the  event  of  the  3  Hinde,  377. 

said  cause.  4  Beames's  Ord.  187. 

"2d.  The  said  A  B  doth  charge  and  allege  b  Russell  v.  Atkinson,  2  Dick.  532. 

that  the  said  G  H  and  J  K  are  persons  of  bad  1  Hinde,  377;  Watmore  v.  Dickson,  2  V.  & 

morals,  and  of  evil  fame  and   character,  and  B.  267. 
that  they  are  generally  reputed  and  esteemed  2  Ibid. 

952 


EXAMINATION   OF   WITNESSES   AFTER   PUBLICATION.  *  960 

be  deferred,  the  Court  will  refuse  the  order,  or  qualify  it,  by  directing 
that  it  shall  not  delay  the  hearing  of  the  cause.8  There  is,  however, 
no  precise  time  within  which  the  application  must  be  made.4 

Where  a  commission  is  required,  it  has  generally  been  directed  to  the 
same  commissioners  as  were  named  in  the  former  commission ; 5  but  a 
commission  will  not  be  directed  for  the  purpose  of  examining  witnesses 
abroad,  for  which  purpose  Ireland  is  considered  as  a  foreign  part,  unless 
in  case  of  great  emergency,  and  where  it  is  sworn  that  no  person  in 
England  can  prove  anything  as  to  the  witness's  credit.6  If  a  party,  who 
has  obtained  a  commission  to  examine  a  witness  as  to  credit,  delays  the 
execution  of  it  till  after  the  decree,  he  will  be  made  to  pay  the  costs.7 
The  method  of  proceeding  under  an  order  of  this  nature,  whether  before 
the  Examiner  or  under  a  commission,  is  precisely  similar  to  that  pointed 
out  in  ordinary  cases. 

The  order  usually  directs  that  the  party  applying  be  at  liberty  to  ex- 
amine witnesses,  "as  to  credit,  and  as  to  such  particular  facts  only  as  are 
not  material  to  what  is  in  issue  in  the  cause ; " 8  and  under  it  the  party 
is  at  liberty  to  examine  witnesses,  not  only  to  the  general  character  of 
the  witness  whose  credit  is  impeached,  but  also  for  the  purpose  of  con- 
tradicting particular  facts  sworn  to  by  the  witness,9  provided  such  facts 
are  not  material  to  the  issue  in  the  cause.10 

*  It  seems,  also,  that  Avitnesses  may  be  examined  to  discredit    *  960 
other  witnesses,  by  proving  that,  previously  to  their  examination, 
they  had  made  declarations  contrary  to  their  depositions.1 

But,  although  the  order  permits  the  examination  of  witnesses  to  par- 
ticular facts  as  well  as  to  general  credit,  for  the  purpose  of  contradicting 
a  witness  previously  examined,  such  facts  must  be  strictly  confined  to 
those  not  in  issue  in  the  cause  ;  2  and  you  can  only,  in  examining  as  to 
the  credit  of  the  witness,  put  geneial  questions,  as  "whether  you  would 

8  White  v.  Fussell,  19  Ves.  127.  as  his  milkmaid  in  1775,  she  did  not  live  with 

4  Piggott  v.  Croxhall,  1  S.  &  S.  467.  him  in  that  nrany  other  capacity  till  1786,  and 

6  Wood  v.  Hammerton,  9  Ves.  145.  that  she  had  confessed  to  that  effect,  and  that 

6  Callaghan  v.  Rochfort,  3  Atk.  G43.  she  had  been  prevailed  upon  so  to  depose  at  the 

7  White  b.  Fussell,  1  V.  &  B.  151.  instigation  of  the  plaintiff's  tithing-man,  who 

8  Purcell  v.  M'Namara,  8  Ves.  324;  Wood  r.  wrs  another  witness  for  the  plaintiff,  and  fora 
Hammerton,  9  Ves.  145;  Piggott  v.  Croxhall,  reward.  In  Ambrosio  v.  Francia,  cited  ibid. 
1  S.  &  S.  467.  5th  of  August,  1746,  the  articles  charged  that 

9  This  proceeding  may,  ordinarily,  be  taken  one  of  the  witnesses  who  had  been  examined 
after  publication  and  before  hearing,  but  the  for  a  defendant,  to  nine  out  of  seventeen  inter- 
interrogatories  must  be  so  shaped  as  to  prevent  rogatories,  by  the  description  of  Mary  White, 
the  party,  under  color  of  an  examination  as  to  widow,  was  the  wife  of  the  defendant,  and 
credit,  from  procuring  testimony  to  overcome  known  to  be  such  at  the  time  of  the  examina- 
that  already  taken  and  published  in  the  cause.  don,  suggested  that  if  she  was  not  his  wife, 
(lass  b.  Stinson, 2  Sumner,  605 ;  Wood  v.  Mann,  she  lived  with  him,  and  an  improper  intimacy 
id.  :ilil;  Troup  v.  Sherwood,  3  John.  Ch.  558.  subsisted  between  them,  and  the  order  was  that 

10  See  Purcell  v.  M'Namara  (8Ves.  324),  where  the  plaintiff  should  be  at  liberty  to  examine  to 

the  matter  to  be  examined  to  was,  whether  the  that  fact,  and  also  to  the  competence  and  credit 

witness  had  not  been  a  woollen-draper  and  in-  of  the  witness. 

solvent,  which,  upon  his  cross-examination,  he  l  Piggott  r.  Croxhall.  4  S.  &  S.  477. 

had  denied;   and  Chivers  v.  Bax,  Scacc,  cited  2  Anon.  3  V.  &  B.  94:    see  Troup  v.  Sher- 

8  Ves.  324,  where  the   articles    charged   that  wood,  3  John.  Ch.  558,  and  next   note  above; 

though  the  witness,  in  her  deposition  for  the  Jenkins  v.  Eldredge,   3  Story,  312,  313;  Wood 

plaintiff,  had  deposed  that  she  lived  with  him  v.  Mann,  2  Sumner,  316. 

953 


*  961  EVIDENCE. 

believe  the  witness  upon  his  oath." 3  It  is  not  competent,  even  at  Law, 
to  ask  the  ground  of  that  opinion,  but  only  the  general  question  is  per- 
mitted.4 The  regular  mode  of  examining  into  general  character  is  to 
inquire  of  the  witnesses  whether  they  have  the  means  of  knowing  the 
former  witness's  general  character,  and  whether  upon  such  knowledge 
they  would  believe  him  upon  his  oath.5 

It  is  to  be  noticed,  that  although  articles  may  be  exhibited  as  to  the 
credit  of  witnesses  after  publication,  they  are  never  allowed  as  to  their 
competency,  because  it  is  said  this  might  have  been  examined  to  and  in- 
quired into  upon  the  examination ; 6  and  it  is  for  this  purpose  that  a 
notice  of  the  witness's  name  and  place  of  abode  is  left  with  the 

*  961    solicitor  of  the  opposite  party  before   examination  ;  *  and  that, 

under  the  old  practice,  the  witness  himself  was  produced.1 
Interrogatories  adapted  to  the  inquiry  intended  must  be  drawn  and 
filed  in  the  same  manner  as  upon  examination  in  chief,  and  the  wit- 
nesses examined  thereon,  either  by  commission  or  at  the  Examiner's 
office.  The  other  party  may  cross-examine  those  witnesses,  as  to  their 
means  of  knowledge  and  the  grounds  of  their  opinion,  or  may  attack 
their  general  character,  and,  by  fresh  evidence,  support  the  character  of 
his  own  witness.2 

The  rules  as  to  passing  publication,  &c,  are  the  same,  mutatis  mutan- 
dis, as  those  to  be  observed  in  ordinary  cases. 

Where  an  objection  is  established  to  the  competency  of  a  witness,  his 
deposition  cannot  be  read;  3  but,  where  the  objection  is  only  to  his  credit, 
it  must  be  read  and  left  to  the  consideration  of  the  Court  on  the  whole 
evidence  of  the  case.4 

3  Anon.  3  V.  &  B.  94.  Upon  such  examina-  among  his  neighbors;  and  what  that  reputation 
tion,  the  rule  of  evidence,  as  to  impeaching  the  is,  whether  it  is  good  or  whether  it  is  bad.  In 
credit  of  witnesses,  is  the  same  in  Equity  as  at  the  English  Courts  the  course  is  further  to 
Law.  The  inquiry  must  be  general  as  to  the  inquire  whether,  from  such  knowledge,  the 
general  character  of  the  witness  for  veracity.  witness  would  believe  that  person  upon  his 
Troup  v.  Sherwood,  3  John.  Ch.  558.  The  oath.  In  the  American  Courts  the  same  course 
practice  in  reference  to  the  extent  of  the  has  been  pursued.  Ford  v.  Ford,  7  Humph.  92; 
inquiry  that  may  be  made  respecting  the  char-  but  its  propriety  has  been  questioned,  and  per- 
acter  of  the  witness  to  impeach  his  credit,  and  haps  the  weight  of  authority  is  now  against 
the  questions  that  may  be  put,  is  not  uniform  permitting  the  witness  to  testify  to  his  own 
in  the  American  States.  See  1  Greenl.  Ev.  opinion.  1  Greenl.  Ev.  §  461;  Gass  v.  Stinson, 
§401;  Anon.  1  Hill  (S.  C),  251,  258,  259;  2 Sumner,  610;  Kimmel  v.  Kimmel,  3  Serg.  & 
Hume  v.  Scott,  3  A.  K.  Marsh.  261,  262;  State  R.  337,  338;  Phillips  v.  Kingfield,  19  Maine, 
v.  Boswell,  2  Dev.   Law,  209,  210;  People  v.  375. 

Mather,  4  Wend.  257,  258;  Phillips  v.  King-  6  Callaghan  v.  Rochfort,  3  Atk.  643. 

field,  19  Maine,  375;  Gass  v.  Stinson,  2  Sumner,  *  Hinde,  375. 

610;  Wike  v.  Lightner,  11  Serg.  &  R.   198;  1  2  Hinde,   375,  377.     If  the  witness  be  im- 

Phil.  Ev.  (Cowen  &  Hill's  ed.  1839)291-293,  peached,  evidence  of  his  general  good  character 

notes  (530),  (531);  2  id.  (Cowen  &  Hill's  notes)  has  been  held  admissible.     Richmond  v.  Rich- 

p.  763-770.  mond,  10  Yerger,  343;  1  Greenl.  Ev.  §  461;  see 

4  Carlos  v.  Brook,  10  Ves.  49,  50.  People  v.  Davis,  21  Wend.  309. 

6  Phil.  &  Amos,  925.     The  regular  mode  of  3  The  deposition  of  a  disinterested  person, 

examining   into  the  general    reputation   is  to  who  afterwards   becomes   interested,    may   be 

inquire  of  the  witness  whether  he  knows  the  read.     Hitchcock  v.  Skinner,  1  Hoff.  Ch.  21. 
general  reputation  of  the  person  in  question,  4  Dixon  v.  Parker,  2  Ves.  219,  220. 

954 

END    OF   VOL.    I. 


LAW  LIBRART 
UNIVERSITY  OF  CAJLlFORNW 


UC  SOUTHERN  REGIONAL  LIBRARY  FACILITY 


AA    000  742  648    9 


31  ( 


/