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THE
POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE
NEWMAN
VOL. IV.
HENRY FROWDE, M.A.
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS WAREHOUSE
AMEN CORNER, E.G.
THE
POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE
WITH AN INTRODUCTION, TWO PREFATORY ESSAYS
AND NOTES CRITICAL AND EXPLANATORY
W. L. NEWMAN, M.A.
HON. LITT.D. CAMBRIDGE
FELLOW OF BALHOL COLLEGE, AND FORMERLY READER IN ANCIENT HISTORY
IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD
VOLUME IV
ESSAY ON CONSTITUTIONS
BOOKS VI- VIII TEXT AND NOTES
AT THE CLARENDON PRESS
1902
\_All rights reserved]
7C
11
v /f
c op.
OXFORD
PRINTED AT THE CLARENDON PRESS
BY HORACE HART, M.A.
PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY
CONTENTS.
PACK
THE CONSTITUTIONS DEALT WITH BY ARISTOTLE IN THE POLITICS vii
TEXT OF BOOK VI (IV) i
TEXT OF BOOK VII (V) 32
TEXT OF BOOK VIII (VI) 70
CRITICAL NOTES 87
NOTES TO BOOK VI (IV) 135
PRELIMINARY REMARKS ON BOOK VII (V) 27$
NOTES TO BOOK VII (V) 281
NOTES TO BOOK VIII (VI) 489
APPENDIX --..._... l&f
ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS TO VOL. IV 571
INDEXES :
GENERAL INDEX . . . 573
INDEX OF GREEK WORDS NOTICED IN THE WORK . . . 674
GRAMMATICAL INDEX 7 01
SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS 77
THE CONSTITUTIONS DEALT WITH
BY ARISTOTLE IN THE POLITICS.
WE must not expect to find in the last three Books
of the Politics a systematic description of the various
forms of constitution dealt with in them and a complete
estimate of their strength and weakness, their merits and
defects. The object of these Books is rather a practical
object, to teach statesmen how to frame, amend, and
administer each constitution so that it may last. Aristotle
is naturally led in the course of his inquiries on this subject
to mark off the various forms and sub-forms of constitution
from each other, and incidentally to throw much light on
their nature and tendencies, but his paramount object is
a practical object, to give guidance to statesmen, not to
set before us a detailed picture of each constitution and
its working. We gather from what he tells us that
statesmen were not aware how many sub- forms of each
constitution existed, and that consequently they committed
errors both in introducing and in amending constitutions.
They probably confounded the sub-forms, and gave one
of them institutions appropriate to another. We gather
also that they often introduced constitutions and sub-forms
of constitution where they were out of place; that they often
sought rather to make the constitutions they framed pro
nounced examples of their type than to make them durable ;
and that they commonly did not attempt to create by
education and habituation an ethos favourable to the main-
viii CONSTITUTIONS STUDIED IN THE POLITICS.
tenance of the constitution. Aristotle seeks to enable
statesmen to avoid all these errors. His object is to
make the study of constitutions more thorough and
detailed and more practically useful than it had been.
It has been said (vol. i. p. 485) that the Politics is in
part a Statesman s Manual. The last three Books consti
tute such a Manual in an especial degree. Yet they are
not a complete Statesman s Manual. They afford guidance
both to the framers of constitutions and to administrators,
but the guidance which they afford to administrators is
mainly limited to one problem how to administer the
State so as to make the constitution last. Aristotle does
not tell administrators in them how to make government
efficient ; he studies rather how to satisfy all classes of
citizens or most of them, for his object is to make the
constitution last. His treatment, indeed, even of the ques
tion to which he does address himself is incomplete. For
instance, he says but little as to the way in which diffi
culties arising from differences of race among the citizens
should be dealt with. He writes with a special view to
the particular perils to which the Greek City-State was
most exposed those arising from the jealousies and dis
cords of classes. He writes for States in which the relations
between the rich and the poor were bad, and asks how
constitutions are to be made durable where that is the case.
Theabso- At the head of Aristotle s list of constitutions stand the
IhT) amf two f rms t* 16 absolute kingship and the best kind^ of
the best aristocracy in which supreme power rests with men
o. Ol ~ fully equipped virtue, and the aim of the constitution
v. j s t h e realization of the most desirable life, the life which
is lived in accordance with virtue virtue not of one kind
only, but of all and with a full equipment of external
and bodily goods. No constitution could fully satisfy
Aristotle which stopped short of this aim. Holding as
he did that the polis existed to guide men to the life
of full virtue and happiness, he could not fail to hold that
the constitution and laws of the polis must place supreme
THE IDEAL KINGSHIP AND ARISTOCRACY. ix
power in the hands of men able and purposed to rule and
be ruled in such a way as to enable the polls to discharge
this function.
The absolute kingship exists where a man or a family of
surpassing virtue and political ability (3. 13. 1284 a 3 sqq. :
4 (7). 3. 1325 b 10 sqq.) rules over men capable of being
ruled with a view to the most desirable life, who gladly
accept his or their rule.
Of the best kind of aristocracy there are, it would seem,
two varieties :
1. There is the variety in which the same men always
rule, the ruled being always ruled and never succeeding
to rule. Here the rulers must be capable of ruling with
a view to the most desirable life, and the ruled must be
capable of being ruled as freemen should be ruled with
a view to the same end. This is the form described in
3. 17-18. We do not learn whether the rulers in this form
are hereditary or elected by the ruled, nor whether they
are controlled by law.
2. There is the variety in which the ruled succeed to
rule on their attainment of a certain age and after a long
period of military service, preceded by a careful education.
This is the form described in the Fourth and Fifth (old
Seventh and Eighth) Books. Here, as in the first-named
variety, the rulers are capable of ruling, and the ruled
of being ruled, with a view to the most desirable life.
Both rulers and ruled are good men as well as good
citizens, though the ruled are not good citizens and good
men in the fullest sense till they reach the age at which
they acquire moral prudence and become rulers. In this
variety, as in the other, the rulers are apparently conceived
by Aristotle as not numerous not a multitude (TTA^OS).
When a multitude rules for the common good, a polity
exists, not an aristocracy (3. 7. 1279 a 37 sqq.), and though
the ruling class rules for the common good, it does not
apparently rule with a view to the most desirable life.
Next to these ideal constitutions, but next after a great
x CONSTITUTIONS STUDIED IN THE POLITICS.
interval, come constitutions in which rule is in the hands
not indeed of men possessed of transcendent virtue and
a full equipment of external and bodily goods and ruling
with a view to the most desirable life, but of men of virtue
whose rule is based on desert and is exercised for the
common advantage of the citizens. Under this head fall
(1) the forms of kingship other than the absolute form, and
(2) the so-called aristocracies, with the exception of that
form of the so-called aristocracy in which the elements
mingled are merely wealth and free birth, and virtue is
not one of them.
Kingship Kingship other than the absolute kingship is described
Aeabso- by Aristotle in the Politics as a form in which one man
lute king- rules with high and important powers (/xeiCoVow Kvpia, 7 (5).
10. I3i3a5 sq.) and rules for the common good and over
willing subjects. It may be either hereditary (Kara
or not (this is implied by the mention of at Kara
/3ao-iAeiai in 7 (5). 10. 1313 a 10 sq.). It need not be for
life. An elective sole ruler elected for only a few months
is regarded by Aristotle as a king if his powers are large
and his rule is willingly accepted by his subjects. In the
Sixth (old Fourth) Book (c. 10. 1295 a 7 sqq.) Aristotle
denies the name of kingship to monarchies in which the
monarch, though he rules in accordance with law and over
willing subjects, rules despotically and as he pleases (Kara
rr)v avTov yvw/x?^), and classes such monarchies as tyrannies,
and even in the Third he does not seem quite certain that
they should be called kingships, though he there classes
them as such. Yet he classes the absolute kingship as a
kingship, though the absolute king rules as he pleases (/cara
TTJI; O.VTOV (3ov\r]<nv, 3. 16. 1287 a i). Kingship, we are told
in the Seventh (old Fifth) Book, but not, I think, elsewhere
in the Politics, is based on desert (/car* dTay). The king,
or in hereditary kingships the founder of the kingship, has
won his throne by desert. He has been made king by the
people because of his virtue or the virtue of his family, or
else in return for benefits conferred, or in return for benefits
conferred and the power to confer them. In the Third Book,
KINGSHIP OTHER THAN THE IDEAL KINGSHIP, xi
however (3. 14. 1285 b 4 sqq.), not all kingships are traced
to this origin, but only the kingship of the heroic times.
Aristotle was no doubt led to trace kingship, and especially
the kingship of the heroic times, to this illustrious origin by
the authority of Homer and of Greek historical tradition
(see notes on 1285 b 6, 7). The halo with which he invests
kingship, however, often did not belong to it. He himself
tells us that in hereditary kingships the kings were fre
quently contemptible men (7 (5). 10. 1313 a ro sqq.). Else
where (2. u. 1272 b 40 sqq.) he implies that not a few of
the Lacedaemonian kings were insignificant men. Stories
incidentally told by him of the Persian and Macedonian
courts place them in an unfavourable light. Are con
temptible or insignificant or vicious kings rulers by virtue
of desert, and do they rule for the common good ? If
not, are they kings? Aristotle does not consider this
question.
Aristotle s account of kingship leaves us in the dark
about many things. He nowhere even distinguishes between
kingship in a City-State and kingship in a nation. Of the
kingships of the nations bordering on Greece he tells us
little. We do not hear much from him about the Mace
donian or Molossian kingships, and he makes no mention
of those of Thrace and Illyria. We should have been
glad to learn how the Macedonian and Molossian kingships
were administered. A kingship which governs through
sub-kings, or hereditary chiefs of any kind, is very different
from a kingship which governs through non-hereditary
officials appointed by itself. We are told (3. 16. i287b
30 sq.) that kings made their friends partners in rule,
and this statement is probably based both on Homer and
on historical fact (see note on i287b 30). Were these
friends ever hereditary sub-kings? It is not even clear
under which of Aristotle s kinds of kingship the Macedonian
and Molossian kingships fall.
One reason why Aristotle s account of the actually
existing forms of kingship is rather cursory is that he
studies them in the Third Book on his way to the study
xii CONSTITUTIONS STUDIED IN THE POLITICS.
of absolute kingship, and in the Seventh (old Fifth) on
his way to the study of tyranny.
Perhaps the best of his sayings about kingship is that
the king is ideally a guard set to see that the rich suffer
no wrong and the demos no insolence or outrage (7 (5). 10.
1310 b 40 sqq.).
The so- If it is doubtful whether kingship, or at any rate hereditary
tocracv*" 8 " kingship, was always based on desert and whether it always
ruled for the common good, the same doubt arises as to
the so-called aristocracies. These so-called aristocracies
stand on different levels.
1. In some of them not only was account taken of virtue
as well as of free birth in the distribution of political power,
but the promotion of virtue was made a matter of public
concern (6 (4). 7. 1293 b 12 sqq.). This was the case in the
Lacedaemonian aristocracy, though we are told that it
cared for only one kind of virtue, military virtue, and that
it valued military virtue not for its own sake, but because
it was thought to be productive of external goods and of
empire (2. 9. 1271 a 41 sqq. : 4 (7). 15. 1334 a 40 sqq.).
2. There were so-called aristocracies in which the pro
motion of virtue was not made a matter of public concern,
but account was taken of virtue in appointments to office,
and the constitution had regard to virtue as well as to
wealth and free birth. The Carthaginian aristocracy seems
to have belonged to this class, though it is said to have
honoured virtue less than wealth (2. n. 1273 a 4 T sc l-)-
3. There were so-called aristocracies in which account
was not taken of virtue in the distribution of political
power, but only of wealth and free birth (6 (4). 7. I293b
20 sq. : 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 10 sqq.). So-called aristocracies
of this type differed from polities only in inclining more
to oligarchy than polities did.
Even in those so-called aristocracies which belonged to
the first of these three classes, much more in those com
prised in the second, the kind of virtue for which the State
cared was only virtue relative to the constitution, not abso
lute virtue (6 (4). 7. I293b 6 sq.) ; and we note that the
THE SO-CALLED ARISTOCRACY. xiii
deviation-forms of constitution are advised by Aristotle
to take account of virtue relative to the constitution in
elections to office (7 (5). 9. 1309 a 33 sqq.). Are the
so-called aristocracies, then, merely on the same level as
the deviation-forms in this matter ? No : virtue relative
to the constitution is no doubt of a higher type in them
than in the deviation -forms. One defect, however, seems
to attach to all forms of the so-called aristocracy. The
notables were indulged in them, and were allowed to
encroach on the rights of other classes (7 (5). 7. 1307 a
34 sqq.) \
Notwithstanding this, Aristotle evidently regards all
forms of the so-called aristocracy as normal constitutions,
and therefore as existing for the common good of all the
citizens. He probably thought that those in which account
was taken of virtue in the distribution of political
power, and still more those which made the promotion
of virtue a matter of public concern, took the best security
for government with a view to the common good ; while
those which took account only of wealth and free birth
could at any rate plead that they associated more classes
than one in power, and that in them the constitution was
not dominated, as it was in the deviation-forms, by a single
class ruling in its own interest. The same thing, however,
might be said of the polity ; and so-called aristocracies of
this last type could claim no superiority over the polity.
They were, indeed, more insecure than the polity, for they
gave a superior share of power to the rich, a class at once
weaker than the many and therefore less able to hold its
own, and less inclined to rest content with the share awarded
to it (7 (5)- 7- I37 a 12 sqq.).
If we ask how the so-called aristocracy is organized, we
shall find that the same eclectic methods are to be followed
in organizing it as in organizing a polity (6 (4). 9.
1 Aristotle nowhere says that it, arose also in the so-called aris-
the bitter feuds which often arose tocracy ; but he does not explain
within the ruling class in oligar- why they were absent in it, if ab-
chies, and did so much to weaken sent they were.
xiv CONSTITUTIONS STUDIED IN THE POLITICS.
10 sqq.). It is oligarchical to appoint to magistracies by
election, and democratic not to require a property-qualifica
tion ; hence it is suitable to an aristocracy to combine the
two systems, and to appoint by election without requiring
a property- qualification (ibid.) l . In democracy, again, all
appoint to the magistracies out of all, in oligarchy some
out of some ; hence in an aristocracy all will appoint out
of some, or some out of all (6 (4). 15. 1300 b 4 sq. : cp.
6 (4). 5. 1292 b 2 sqq.) 2 . So again, an aristocracy will
award office to men of virtue (6 (4). 8. 1294 a 9 sqq. : 3. u.
1273 a 3 5 sqq- : 3- 5- 1278 a 1 8 sqq.), or at any rate to the
notables (7 (5). 8. 1309 a 2 sq.), but it will divide delibera
tive and judicial authority between all and some (6 (4).
14. 1298 b 5 sqq.: 6(4). 16. 1301 a 13 sqq.) 3 . Aristotle
does not explain why it is characteristic of aristocracy not
to appoint to office by lot or to pay office-holders (2. n.
1 273 a 17 sq.), but the reason probably is that to appoint
to office by lot runs counter to the principle of appointing
to office for virtue, while the payment of office-holders
savours of democracy (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 35 sqq.).
Aristocracy shows the same leaning to a midway course
in its choice of a site for the city. While oligarchy favours
a single lofty acropolis, and democracy a level site, aristo
cracy avoids both these extremes and favours a site com
prising more strong places than one (4 (7). n. i33ob
17 sqq.). It is less easy to say why it is more suitable
to an aristocracy to give certain magistracies the power
1 Thus, when in 7 (5). 6. 1306 b that to make powerful magistracies
6 sqq. and 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 35 sqq. like the Pentarchies at Carthage
constitutions based on a property- self-elective is suitable to oligar-
qualification are referred to, chy, not to aristocracy.
polities and oligarchies are men- s It appears, however, from
tioned, but nothing is said of 2. u. 1 273 a 4 sqq. that an aris-
aristocracies. Yet that property- tocracy goes too far in a demo-
qualifications for office existed in cratic direction when it gives the
some aristocracies appears from assembly not merely the right to
the reference to the aristocracy of have decisions of the magistrates
Thurii in 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 27 sqq. communicated to it, but the right
2 But though it is suitable to to decide questions, and allows
aristocracy that some should ap- any one who pleases to speak in
point the magistrates out of all, it opposition to the proposals of the
appears from 2. n. 1273 a 13 sqq. magistrates.
THE POLITY. xv
to try all lawsuits, as was done at Carthage, than to allow
some suits to be tried by one magistracy and others by
another, as at Sparta (2. u. 1273 a J 9 sc l-)-
The polity is described by Aristotle as a mixture of The polity,
oligarchy and democracy (6 (4). 8. I393b 33 sq.), of wealth
and free birth, and of the rich and the poor (6 (4). 8. 1294 a
1 6 sq., 22 sq.). We naturally ask how it is that the mix
ture of two deviation-forms, oligarchy and democracy,
results in a normal constitution. Would a mixture of
all the three deviation-forms, oligarchy democracy and
tyranny, result in a normal constitution ? Apparently
not. The badness of tyranny is said (7 (5). 10. 1311 a
8 sqq.) to be due to the fact that it is a mixture of the
worst points of extreme oligarchy and extreme democracy.
The reason why the mixture of oligarchy and democracy in
polity results in a normal form is that it mixes them in a
special way. It fuses them in such a manner as to avoid the
excesses and the one-sidedness of both, and to hit the mean
between them (2. 6. 1265 b 26 sqq.) : if it borrows an insti
tution from oligarchy, it borrows another from democracy
to counterbalance it ; if it gives an advantage to the rich
with one hand, it gives an advantage to the poor with the
other. It makes the moderately well-to-do class the arbi
trator between the rich and the poor, and gives this class
supremacy. Aristotle regards it as well fitted for rule,
seeing that it is more ready to be guided by reason than
the very rich and the very poor, and is free from the
insolence of the former class and the petty misdoing of
the latter ; it is capable, unlike them, of both ruling and
being ruled as freemen should be ruled.
We have seen that Aristotle describes the polity as
a mixture of the rich and the poor. Is it really so ? Is it
not rather a mixture of two constitutions, oligarchy and
democracy, than the association of rich and poor in rule ?
Does it give any power to the poor? If we press the
account of polity which we find in 6 (4). 13. 1297 b I sq.,
where we are told that the polity should admit only the
xvi CONSTITUTIONS STUDIED IN THE POLITICS.
possessors of heavy arms to a share of political power,
we shall doubt how far it gave power to any poorer class
than the possessors of heavy arms ; but then it would seem
from 6 (4). 9. 1294 a 36 sqq.,that in a polity the poor would
share at any rate in judicial functions. It is evident also
from 6 (4). II. 1295 b 38, Trpoa-TidffJLevov yap (TO /xe 0-oi>) Ttotei
poTrrjv Kal KooAwei ylv<rda.i rots eravrtas itirepBoXas, that the
poor are conceived by Aristotle to possess considerable
power in a polity and to play an active part, the moderately
well-to-do class giving its support to them or to the rich
as it thinks fit. The extent of the power of the poor in
a polity would evidently depend on the amount of the
property-qualification on which the possession of political
rights was made to depend ; and as this would vary (6 (4).
13. 1297 b 2 sqq.), the polity would also vary in character,
in some cases being more and in others less democratic.
In 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 10 we read of aristocratical polities .
A polity in which the ruling class consisted almost entirely
of the moderately well-to-do would evidently differ much
from one in which it included many poor. One in which
the moderately well-to-do class was more numerous than
rich and poor put together would also differ from one
in which it was only more numerous than one or other
of these classes l . A numerous moderately well-to-do
class was a guarantee for the durability of a polity.
A polity would be all the better if the many were not only
agricultural or pastoral by pursuit, but also lived at a dis
tance from the central city, so that meetings of the assembly
would not be frequent (8 (6). 4. 1319 a 32 sqq.).
Aristotle evidently takes it for granted that the moder
ately well-to-do class in a polity would hold together and
act as a body, but is it not likely that it would be torn
asunder, one section of it siding with the rich and the other
with the poor? If this happened, it would obviously be
1 The moderately well-to-do States than we might expect, for
citizens may well have been more in ancient Greece a large part oi
numerous than the poorer citizens, the working class consisted of
or even than the rich and the slaves and metoeci, who formed
poor put together, in more Greek no part of the citizen-body.
MIXED CONSTITUTIONS. xvii
unable to exercise the controlling influence which Aristotle
counts on its exercising. Is it certain that, if it held toge
ther, it would rule for the common good ? Would not the
moderately well-to-do class, no less than the rich and the
poor, have sectional interests of its own and rule more or
less with a view to them ? Aristotle himself implies in 2. 7.
12660 28 sqq. that the possession of a moderate amount
of property is no security for well-controlled desires in the
absence of a good system of education. We hear nothing
of this in the Sixth (old Fourth) Book, though in the
Seventh (old Fifth) we meet with somewhat similar teaching
again (7 (5). 9. 1310 a 12 sqq.).
The institutions of a polity have been studied in vol. i.
p. 508 sqq. One point should be noticed in connexion
with them which has escaped mention there. In a polity
the few (Aristotle probably means the magistrates) had
a final voice in rejecting measures proposed to them, but
not in voting affirmative resolutions. Such resolutions
became valid only when they had received the assent of
the many, or, in other words, of the assembly (6 (4). 14.
38 sqq.).
The so-called aristocracies and the polity are mixed Mixed con-
constitutions l . Aristotle means by a mixed constitution st
a mixture of two or more constitutions, i. e. of the prin
ciples characteristic of each (virtue, wealth, free birth),
or of institutions characteristic of each, and therefore a
constitution which associates two or more classes in
supreme power.
His best constitution in its two forms, the absolute
kingship and the true aristocracy, is not a mixed con
stitution, but his second-best constitutions are so. He
appears to hold that if rulers of transcendent virtue are
not obtainable, the next best thing is to place supreme
power in the hands of the good, the rich, and the free-born
1 Aristotle nowhere uses the mixed aristocracies and well-
exact phrase mixed constitu- mixed polities , we shall not be
tions , but as he speaks of mixing wrong if we use it in giving an
the constitution and of well- account of his views.
VOL. IV. b
xviii CONSTITUTIONS STUDIED IN THE POLITICS.
(6 (4). 7. I293b 14 sqq. : 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 19 sqq.), and the
next best thing to that is to place it in the hands of the rich
and the free-born, guided by the midway class. If supreme
power is given to the rich and the free-born thus guided,
it should be divided fairly between them, so that the
advantages of the constitution may not be monopolized
by one of the two classes (6 (4). 13. 1297 a 38 sqq.). The
constitution will then be a broad and equal constitution
(KOMI KOI 10-17 Tro\iTfCa, 6 (4). ii. 1296 a 29 sq.), and the fairer
it is, the more durable it will be (6 (4). 12. 1297 a 6 sq.).
It is not quite clear whether the <rvvbva.o-ij.oi described
in 8 (6). i. 1316 b 39 sqq. are regarded by Aristotle as
mixed constitutions. They are constitutions in which the
three departments of the State, the deliberative, magisterial,
and judicial, are not organized harmoniously, one of them,
for instance, being aristocratically organized and the other
two oligarchically or vice versa, or some similar disharmony
existing between the three departments. Perhaps they are
to be considered mixed constitutions, for they combine
institutions characteristic of more forms of constitution
than one.
The milder forms of oligarchy are described by Aristotle
as well-mixed (8 (6). 6. 1320 b 21 : 7 (5). 10. I3i2b 35),
because they were less narrow than the extreme form, and
he would presumably apply the same epithet to the milder
forms of democracy, but it is not likely that he regarded
these forms of oligarchy and democracy as mixed constitu
tions.
Aristotle is content with any mixed constitution which
gives a fair share of power to the three classes, the good,
the rich, and the poor, or to the rich, poor, and p-Voi. More
than this he does not ask. The inquirers mentioned by
him in 2. 6. i265b 33 sqq. had held that the best con
stitution was a mixture of all constitutions, and Polybius
praises (6. 3. 7) a mixture of all normal constitutions, or
in other words of kingship, aristocracy, and democracy.
Aristotle does not accept either view. He does not insist
that his mixed constitution should contain a monarchical
THE DEVIATION-FORMS. xix
element (see vol. i. p. 264 sq.). Polybius (6. 10), followed by
Cicero (De Rep. i. 45. 69), had held that a constitution
composed of his three normal constitutions is free from the
tendency to degenerate which besets the three normal
constitutions when unmixed. In such a constitution,
according to him, the king is checked by the demos and
the demos by the few, and the whole fabric escapes
degeneracy. Aristotle knows nothing of this. He holds
that a well-framed mixed constitution is durable l not for
the reason assigned by Polybius and Cicero, but because
its internal equilibrium is perfect ; it contents all classes by
giving them a share of power, so that no one of them
wishes for another constitution in its place (6 (4). 9. i294b
34 sqq.: cp. 6 (4). 13. 1297 a 40 sqq. and 2. 9. 127ob 21 sqq.).
We now pass on to the deviation-forms. Aristotle seeks The devia
te make them moderate and durable, or where they cannot
be moderate, as little extreme as possible. A constitution
might be tolerable even though it gave supremacy to
a single class ruling for its own advantage, or to a single
individual ruling in the same way. It might be dominated
by the rich or the poor, but not so dominated as to deprive
the less favoured class of all power and all advantage.
Aristotle evidently regards the deviation-forms as at
their best when rule is least monopolized by the ruling
class or individual and least exercised for the exclusive
advantage of that class or individual. Oligarchy and
democracy are according to him at their worst when they
most nearly approach monarchy and cast off the rule of
law, and this happens in a democracy when the ruling class
is so poor as to be supported by State-pay and in an
1 When he implies in 7 (5). 8. nationes et urbes populus aut
1 308 a 3 sqq. that aristocracies are primores aut singuli regunt: de-
unsafe constitutions, he probably lecta ex iis et consociata rei pub-
refers to that variety of the so- licae forma laudari facilius quam
called aristocracy which differs evenire, vel si evenit, haud diu-
from the polity only in inclining turna esse potest), but the mixed
towards oligarchy. Tacitus denied constitution he has in view is
that the mixed constitution is evidently that of Polybius, not
durable (Ann. 4. 33, cunctas that of Aristotle.
b2
xx CONSTITUTIONS STUDIED IN THE POLITICS.
oligarchy when the ruling class is especially small and rich.
Under such circumstances the ruling class has abundance
of leisure, in a democracy because it has no property to
distract its attention from politics, and in an oligarchy
because the property of its members is so large that they
can afford to neglect it. The richer and fewer the oligarchs
become in an oligarchy, and the poorer and more numerous
and less pure in extraction the demos becomes in a demo
cracy, the more the ruling class claims to have everything
its own way and to throw off the control of law.
Thus the more the ruling class in oligarchy and demo
cracy approaches the mean in the amount of its property,
the better and the less exacting it is, and the more ready
to allow the less favoured class some share of power and
advantage. Aristotle has, in fact, in the polity, in which
the moderately well-to-do class rules, a standard for
estimating the merits of the varieties of oligarchy and
democracy (6 (4). n. I296b 4 sqq.). Those varieties are
the best which most nearly approach the polity. He has
no faith in the rule of the very rich or the very poor ;
he prefers those oligarchies and democracies in which the
ruling class most nearly resembles the moderately well-
to-do class. It is evident that Aristotle s confidence in this
class influences his estimate of the comparative merits of
the varieties of oligarchy and democracy.
The question, however, may be raised, whether the
badness of oligarchy and democracy is as closely con
nected as Aristotle thinks with the pecuniary circumstances
of the ruling class. He himself mentions the case of an
oligarchy at Erythrae, that of the Basilidae, in which a few,
presumably very rich, men ruled well (7 (5). 6. 1305 b 18
sqq.). The rule of a party-club, or of a handful of
adventurers, revolutionists (7 (5). 7. 1307 b 18 sq.), con-
dottieri (7 (5). 6. 1306 a 24 sq.), or returned exiles, would
surely be worse than the rule of a few very rich men.
And so again, bad as the rule of a pauper demos may be,
the rule of a demos infuriated by oppression and elated by
victory is probably worse. Aristotle no doubt would not
THE KINDS OF OLIGARCHY. xxi-
claim for his scale of oligarchies and democracies more
than a broad and general truth.
\._
OLIGARCHY.
Oligarchy according to the Sixth (old Fourth) Book
(6 (4). 5. 1 292 a 39 sqq.) is always the rule of a minority;
in 3. 8. 1280 a I sq., however, it is said to exist whether
the ruling class is a majority or a minority, if only this class
rules because of its wealth.
Aristotle was not the first to recognize more kinds than The kinds
one of oligarchy. The Theban orator in Thuc. 3. 62. 4 h y lg
had already distinguished between an oAtyapxta io-ovopos
and a bwaarreia, and Plato (Polit. 301 A) had already marked
off oligarchy controlled by law, which he calls aristocracy,
from oligarchy uncontrolled by law. Aristotle goes farther
in the same direction. He describes the kinds of oligarchy
in the fifth and sixth chapters of the Sixth (old Fourth)
Book and elsewhere as follows :
i. The first kind.
In this kind the property-qualification for office is not
high, though high enough to exclude the poor, who are in
a majority, from office. A distinction is made between
the merely necessary (avaynaiaC) offices and the more
supreme ones (xvptwrepai), and the property-qualification
for the former is fixed at a lower amount than for the
latter (8 (6). 6. 1320 b 22 sqq.) such an amount as will
admit to political rights a sufficient number of persons
belonging to the demos to make the privileged class
stronger than those outside it. The acquisition of this
property-qualification entitles to admission to the privileged
class, no other condition being imposed, such as abstinence
for a certain period from trading or industrial occupations
or election by the privileged class. It would seem from
6 (4). 14. 1298 a 35 sqq. that the deliberative in this kind
of oligarchy would be an elective body, accessible to all
possessing a comparatively moderate property-qualification
and no further condition being imposed. But might it not
also be a gathering of the whole privileged class, not an
xxii CONSTITUTIONS STUDIED IN THE POLITICS.
elective body? No information is given us as to the
nature of the judicial authority in this kind of oligarchy,
but probably all members of the privileged class would
have the right to serve on dicasteries. It would seem that
in some oligarchies both rich and poor were eligible as
members of dicasteries, though the rich were often forced
by fines to attend and the poor were not, but stratagems of
this nature would hardly be employed in a well-organized
oligarchy of the first type.
The merits of this kind of oligarchy are (i) that a large
proportion of the privileged class, like the ruling class in
a polity, is neither very rich nor very poor, and therefore is
free from the defects attaching to the very rich and very
poor ; (2) that admission to the privileged class is made
comparatively easy ; (3) that the privileged class is stronger,
though less numerous, than those outside it ; (4) that it is
too numerous and too much occupied with the care of its
property to throw off the control of law ; (5) that, though
the chief offices fall to the richer members of the privileged
class, none of its members are without a share of political
rights, all of them having access to the less important
offices and the right of electing to the principal ones, while
membership of the deliberative, and probably of the dica
steries, is open to all. Its main weakness is that the poor,
though more numerous than the privileged class, are ex
cluded not only from all offices (which is dangerous : see
3. ii. 1381 b 28 sqq.), but also from deliberative and
judicial authority. Aristotle would probably recommend
that they should be allowed a share of deliberative authority
in one or other of the ways described by him in 6 (4). 14.
I298b 26 sqq. Another of its weaknesses is that it is
exposed to the risks to which all oligarchies based on a
property-qualification were exposed (see note on 1306 b 6).
For other weaknesses attaching to it see notes on 1305 b 30
and 1330 b 19.
The question may be raised, is the first kind of oligarchy
oligarchy at all, if oligarchy is the rule of the few and the
rich ? It is rather the rule of a large well-to-do minority a
THE KINDS OF OLIGARCHY. xxiii
fairly numerous bourgeoisie than the rule of the few and
the rich.
2. The second kind.
In this the privileged class is composed of richer men
and is less numerous, a high property-qualification being
apparently required for all offices, and admission to its
ranks being made more difficult in other ways also, election
by the privileged class being exacted in addition to the
possession of the property-qualification. The privileged
class, again, may elect the new members either from all
possessing the property-qualification or from a specified
section of them. The former plan has something aristo
cratic about it, the latter is more fully oligarchical.
In this kind of oligarchy supreme power rests with a small
and very rich class which does not comprise all the very
rich, inasmuch as the mere possession of the high property-
qualification does not give admission to it, but election by
the privileged class is also required. Its exclusion of
a certain number of very rich men cannot fail to make it
insecure. The privileged class in it also has the faults of
a very rich class and cannot easily be made stronger than
those outside it ; the difficulty of obtaining access to it is
a further defect ; yet it is not small and rich enough to rule
without law.
Aristotle does not include in his list of oligarchies a kind
intermediate between the first and the second, one in which
the property-qualification for office is high, but membership
of the privileged class is open to any one who acquires it,
no further condition being imposed.
3. The third kind.
In this the privileged class is still smaller and richer and
more inaccessible, no one being admitted to it from outside,
but sons succeeding fathers in their offices when they die.
Yet even in this kind the law rules.
4. The fourth kind.
The fourth and last kind of oligarchy has all the character
istics of the third, and this in addition that the law no longer
rules.
xxiv CONSTITUTIONS STUDIED IN THE POLITICS.
It should be added that the account given in 6 (4). 14.
1 298 a 35 sqq. of the modifications of the deliberative in
the various kinds of oligarchy is not quite in harmony with
the list of oligarchies given in 6 (4). 5-6.
other The four kinds of oligarchy enumerated by Aristotle are
oligarchy, rather grades of intensity than kinds. They represent the
steps by which in Aristotle s view oligarchy becomes more
and more extreme. Incidental notices in the Politics enable
us to construct a quite different list of the various forms
assumed by Greek oligarchy l .
1. First we have the form of oligarchy in which rule
rested with a single gens usually the royal gens. To this
type belong the oligarchies of the Bacchiadae at Corinth
and the Basilidae at Erythrae. When kingship fell or was
reduced to sacred functions, the change often only meant
that an annual magistrate took the place of the king, this
magistrate being selected by the royal gens from its own
members. Supremacy in the State passed, in fact, from
the king to the royal gens.
2. There were oligarchies in which rule rested not with
one gens only, but with a plurality of gentes, e.g. that of the
Eupatridae at Athens. Compare the rule of the patricians
at Rome. Aristotle does not appear to notice this kind of
oligarchy.
3. There were oligarchies in which rule rested with the
heads of the tribes. The oligarchy at Epidamnus mentioned
in 7 (5). i. 1301 b 21 sqq. seems to have been of this type.
4. There were oligarchies of knights (iTTTms) or rearers
of horses (tTTTrorpo ^oi), i. e. of the richest families. In these
rule perhaps rested not with all the families belonging to
certain gentes or tribes, but with the richest of them.
Oligarchies of yeco/xo pot, or large landowners, may have been
somewhat akin to these.
5. There were oligarchies in which office was confined to
1 Mr. L. Whibley, in his ex- zation , has anticipated me in
cellent essay on Greek Oligar- distinguishing most of these var-
chies, their character and organi- ieties.
THE KINDS OF OLIGARCHY. xxv
the original settlers and their descendants. In some
colonies founded at a specially early date we find a royal
gens in possession of supreme power (e. g. at Erythrae the
Basilidae), but in colonies founded later (e. g. in Thera and
at Apollonia on the Ionian Gulf) office was accessible to all
the original settlers and their descendants, not exclusively
to the members of a royal gens. The descendants of the
original settlers possessed a certain religious prestige,
because it was from their ranks that the priests of the
oldest worships were taken (Rhet. ad Alex. 3. 1423 a 36
sqq. : see note on I29ob 12). They had done much for
the colony in its early and more struggling days, and it
is not wonderful that they claimed a monopoly of office,
though perhaps they were hardly wise in doing so. Their
claim was analogous to that made on behalf of citizens who
could count three generations of ancestors, but it went
beyond that.
6. There were oligarchies in which office was confined
to the descendants of particular individuals, not however to
the descendants of the original settlers, but to those of
persons who on their return from exile had fought against
and conquered the demos (e. g. the oligarchy at Megara
referred to in 6 (4). 15. 1300 a 17 sqq.). Oligarchies of this
kind rested on a far more invidious basis than those in
which the descendants of the original settlers formed the
ruling class.
7. There were oligarchies in which office was confined to
a fixed number of persons (e.g. 600 or 1000). The fixing
of the number of the privileged class prevented these
oligarchies from changing into polities or democracies on
the one hand, and into narrow oligarchies on the other.
Their nature would vary according to the conditions under
which access was obtained to the privileged class. If, as
will often have happened, the right of co-opting new
members rested with the privileged class, it might be
allowed to co-opt any one it pleased; or its choice might
be confined to certain tribes gentes or families, or to those
possessed of a given property-qualification, or might be
xxvi CONSTITUTIONS STUDIED IN THE POLITICS.
subject to some other restriction. Oligarchies of this kind
had the advantage that an assembly of the privileged class
would probably exist in them, in addition to the smaller
body which managed the current business of the State.
The powers of this assembly would vary ; at Massalia the
assembly of the 600 timuchi apparently received envoys
(Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 200), and may have had
the right of concluding treaties of peace and alliance and
of deciding questions of war and peace ; but, whatever its
powers were, an assembly of this kind must have served to
some extent as a check on the governing council and the
magistrates.
8. There were oligarchies in which office was confined to
persons possessing a certain property-qualification, high or
low, though never so low that the privileged class would be
more numerous than the non-privileged (6 (4). 5- 1292 a 39
sqq.). In these oligarchies the possession of the property-
qualification might or might not be the sole condition of
access to office. Where it was not the sole condition, access
to office might be made dependent in part on membership
of certain tribes, gentes, or families, or on inclusion in a list
framed by the privileged class. Where it was the sole
condition, and the property-qualification was not high, or
there were two property-qualifications a high one for the
major and a lower one for the minor offices the first or
most moderate kind of oligarchy would exist, nearly
approaching polity. This kind of oligarchy has already
been described. The fact that oligarchy in Greece some
times assumed a form so moderate we should not find many
oligarchies of this type in mediaeval or modern Europe
shows that it was not unaffected by influences akin to those
which moulded Greek democracy.
9. There were oligarchies in which office was confined to
the members of certain clubs. A club was often grouped
round a single individual ; hence the power of individuals
was great in this form of oligarchy. The decadarchies of
Lysander were apparently of this type. The right of electing
to the magistracies in these oligarchies would probably in
THE KINDS OF OLIGARCHY. xxvK
most cases rest with the class which was eligible to them,
the members of the clubs (see note on 1305 b 30).
10. There were oligarchies in which eligibility to the
magistracies was confined to a small class, to persons
possessing a high property-qualification, or to the members
of certain clubs, but the demos or the hoplites had the right
to elect to them (7 (5). 6. 1305 b 30 sqq.). Akin to these
were oligarchies in which the dicasteiries were recruited
from a wider class than that which had access to office
(1305 b 34 sqq.). As to the special perils to which olig
archies of these two types were exposed, see 7 (5). 6. 1305 b
28 sqq.
11. There were Swaorecai, hereditary oligarchies in which
the ruling class was very small and ruled uncontrolled by
law. It might be composed of very rich men (6 (4). 6.
1293 a 3 sc l c l-) or f captains of mercenary troops (7 (5).
6. 1306 a 24 sq.), or of the leaders in a successful revolution
(7 (5)- 7- I 37 b 18 sq.), or of the holders of great offices
for long terms (7 (5). 8. 1308 a 18 sqq.).
12. There were oligarchies in which an attempt was
made to conceal the oligarchical character of the constitution
(3. 5. 1278 a 38 sqq.: 6 (4). 13. 1297 a 14 sqq.: 6 (4). 9.
1294 a 37 sqq., cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 17 sqq.).
We do not hear of any oligarchies in Greece in which
office was confined to families members of which had held
office in the past, oligarchies like that which long existed
at Rome. Nor does Aristotle notice the existence of olig
archies based on race, oligarchies in which men of one race
ruled over men of another. Oligarchies based on religion
did not of course exist in Greece in his day.
We must bear in mind, in reading what Aristotle tells us
about Greek oligarchy, that he studied it in its declining
days. He fully recognizes that in the early ages of Greece
it was more in place than it came to be later on (6 (4). 13.
1297 b 25 sqq.). The reason which he gives for this is that
the midway class was then small, and the hoplites were
weaker and less well-trained than they afterwards became,
xxviii CONSTITUTIONS STUDIED IN THE POLITICS.
the cavalry being still the most important military force.
But many other reasons can be given. The rule of the
nobles did much for Greece in its early days. States grew
greater and stronger and wealthier under it ; commerce
discovered new paths, and colonies were founded : temples
were built, and music, choric singing, and lyrical poetry
found a home in them 1 . The nobles of those days had
many claims to rule. They had leisure to practise military
exercises, and even where the cavalry which they furnished
to the State was not its most effective force, they were
probably its best and most fully trained soldiers; they
lived together in the cities, while the demos lived mostly
scattered in country villages ; they were supreme in the
tribes phratries and gentes, and the priests of the chief
public and private worships ; they traced their descent from
gods and heroes, or at any rate from families long settled
in the State ; if they called themselves the good and the
notables , their claims were not unsupported by public
opinion, for they were commonly held to be raised by their
wealth above many temptations to wrong-doing to which
poorer men were exposed (6 (4). 8. 1293 b 38 sqq.). They
were at any rate usually more trustworthy as parties to a
contract than the poor (3. 13. 1283 a 32 sq.). Many members
of the demos owed them money and stood in a dependent
relation to them, for in the early days of Greece there were
few rich metoeci resident in the State from whom money
could be borrowed.
Thus their ascendency was based on some moral and
many material advantages. But even from the outset it
was no doubt often abused. The rise of tyrannies in many
States as early as the seventh century B.C. was probably
to some extent due to misgovernment on the part of the
nobles. Aristotle always regards the rich as feady to
encroach whenever the constitution gives them a chance of
1 Plut. De Musica, C. 27, /x^Se avaarpe<pop.(Vt)s, ev ols TifJirjv re TOU
TO Trapdirav fjdtj dedrpov irnpa rols 6dov 8ia Tavrrjs tnotovvro /cat TU>V
avftpdcriv (Ktivois KaTecrKevcHTfjifvov, ayaOwv av8f>5>v fTTCtlVOVS,
cXX en rtjs p.ovtnKfjs fv rols Ifpols
GREEK OLIGARCHY. xxix
doing so (7 (5). 7. 1307 a 19 sq., 34 sqq.), and the very rich
as unruly and content with nothing short of despotic
authority (6 (4). n. 1295 b 13 sqq.). The less secure
oligarchies became, the more timorous and cruel and
oppressive they grew. The Peloponnesian War redoubled
their fears and their oppressiveness. Oligarchs and demo
crats came now to regard each other not only as rivals
for power, but also as allies of a hated foreign foe. Each
side could count on the support of a leading State, and the
ruling class both in oligarchies and in democracies must
have felt that, however badly it governed, it had protectors
who would not allow it to be driven from power. Oligarchy
was probably worst where it was most insecure and dis
trustful. After the close of the Peloponnesian War it was
least secure in those regions in which democracy had
prevailed under the Athenian empire on the eastern and
northern coasts of the Aegean and in the Aegean islands
and here from the time of the Athenian defeats at Syracuse
and Aegospotami to the victory of Alexander on the
Granicus in B.C. 334 its history was a history of vicissitudes.
Its fortunes were equally varied in Greece Proper after the
defeat of the Lacedaemonians at Leuctra in B.C. 371. For
about forty years before the Politics was written, such
oligarchies as existed in Greece Proper must have lived as
threatened a life as the more eastern oligarchies had done
from a still earlier date. Oligarchies were now often set
up after a conflict with the demos and by returned exiles,
and such oligarchies were sure to be oppressive.
Aristotle studied Greek oligarchy in its worst days, and
its weaknesses, as it existed in his time, were many.
Oligarchies were often too narrow ; they often did not
include even all the rich in the privileged class ; they were
often so framed that the moderately well-to-do class was
not conciliated (6 (4). n. 1296 a 13 sqq.), much less the
demos, and no means were taken to secure that those who
wished the constitution well should be stronger than those
who did not. Admission to the ranks of the privileged
class was often made difficult ; sometimes admission was
xxx CONSTITUTIONS STUDIED IN THE POLITICS.
obtainable only by those who, in addition to possessing
a high property-qualification, were elected by the ruling
class ; sometimes not all those who possessed this high
property-qualification were eligible, but only a favoured
section of them ; and sometimes the privileged class was an
hereditary class, sons succeeding their fathers in office, and
no one else being admissible to it. Nor was the smallness
of the privileged class its only source of weakness. It was
commonly unprepared by training for its position, and was
often at once luxurious and grasping. It was also often
divided against itself by feuds. These sometimes arose
from inequalities of privilege, some families having access
to the most important offices and others not, so that an
oligarchy existed within the oligarchy, or from the fact
that offices were tenable for life or for long terms, and that
a cumulation or repeated tenure of them was allowed, so
that they were practically monopolized by a few. Some
times these feuds arose from quarrels about marriages,
inheritances, or lawsuits, or from a factious persecution of
some oligarchs by others, or from a rivalry in courting the
hoplites or demos, where the hoplites or demos had the
right of electing the holders of great offices. Another
source of weakness in oligarchies was that the leading
oligarchs often sought to make the oligarchy narrower.
Oligarchies, again, no less than democracies, often failed to
place the chief offices in the hands of their best and most
trustworthy men ; they were content if the holders of such
offices were friendly to the constitution and skilful in the
discharge of their official functions, and did not secure that
they should be proof against temptation by requiring them
to possess the kind of virtue suited to the constitution.
To these sources of weakness in oligarchies others were
occasionally added. The tendency of oligarchies was to
rule in a high-handed despotic way (6 (4). 3. 12903 37 sq. :
7 (5). 6. 1306 b 3 sqq.). They often also oppressed the
demos, and failed to enforce purity of administration on
the officials, though nothing angered the demos so
much as to see the holders of offices from which it was
GREEK OLIGARCHY. xxxi
excluded plundering public property and taking bribes,
The privileged class commonly sought to monopolize, not
only office, but also honour and profit. Instead of resting
content with claiming the most important offices for its
members, and abandoning minor but lucrative offices to the
demos, and giving an honorary precedence to the class less
favoured by the constitution, it claimed for itself a mono
poly of office, honour, and profit. That oligarchs were
occasionally guilty of outrages on the poor, is clear from
7 (5). 8. 1309 a 22, and such outrages must often have been
fatal to oligarchies l . Narrow oligarchies, in fact, must
have been almost as much exposed to overthrow as
tyrannies, and yet they do not seem to have taken the
elaborate precautions against overthrow which tyrannies
did. We are told, indeed, that oligarchies often disarmed
the many and expelled them from the central city, but we
do not hear of the leading oligarchs being protected by
a bodyguard, though they must often have needed one.
Unlike tyranny, oligarchy seldom brought glory or
greatness to the States which adopted it, at any rate in the
times of which we know most. It did not exist in any of
the leading States of Greece. Corinth and Massalia were
the greatest of the oligarchical States, and they were only
second-rate States. Oligarchies can seldom have been
strong from a military point of view, for their choice lay
between arming the demos, a course which commonly
involved the concession to it of a share of power, or
employing mercenary troops and running the risk of their
commander making himself tyrant. They were also often
weak in light-armed troops. Nor can they have been
strong financially, for they could hardly with safety impose
heavy taxation on the demos.
And yet, notwithstanding all these weaknesses, there
were States in which oligarchy long held its ground.
Corinth, Epidaurus, Troezen, Phlius, the Arcadian Orcho-
1 Students of the Venetian Aristotle it succeeded in avoiding
oligarchy will notice how many (see notes on 13083 10, 15, b 20,
of the rocks pointed out by 28,1309321,22,23,27).
xxxii CONSTITUTIONS STUDIED IN THE POLITICS.
menus, and Pellene in Achaia remained true to the Lace
daemonians, and probably to oligarchy, after Leuctra (Grote,
Hist, of Greece, Part 2, c. 78 : vol. 10. 299). The fidelity of
some of these States to oligarchy is no doubt attributable
to their fear of the democracy of Argos, but we cannot thus
account for its survival in those Achaean cities which were
too distant from Argos to fear it. Oligarchy, however,
was so little unpopular in Achaia that Epaminondas in
B.C. 367, though the representative of a democratic State,
abstained from overthrowing the Achaean oligarchies
(Grote, 10. 365 sq.), and when Thebes later on reversed his
policy and overthrew them, they were speedily restored
(Xen. Hell. 7. i. 42 sq.). These oligarchies probably held
their ground because they did not oppress or interfere with
the demos (8 (6). 4. I3i8b 17 sqq.). The oligarchy of
Massalia also was long-lived, and if we knew more than we
do of the history of this State, we should know more than
we do of the circumstances under which oligarchy tended
to survive in Greece.
As to one important difference between Greek oligar
chies we learn less from Aristotle than we could wish. We
gather from what he tells us that there were oligarchies in
which the magistracies were everything and the general
body of the privileged class nothing, and also oligarchies
in which the magistracies acted more or less under the
control of the privileged class. In the former no assembly
existed, the magistrates possessing not only administrative,
but also deliberative and judicial authority (3. i. 1275 b
7 17), while in the latter an assembly existed composed
of the members of the privileged class (6 (4). 9. 1294 b
3 sq.), which must probably have possessed some delibera
tive authority, and have operated to a certain extent as a
check on the magistracies. In some cases we find, in place
of an assembly, an elective body chosen by and from the
privileged class (6 (4). 14. 1298 a 35 sqq.) ; and here again
some check on the magistracies would exist. A similar
distinction is traceable in respect of the judicial authority
of the State. There seem to have been oligarchies in which
GREEK OLIGARCHY. xxxiii
the magistracies constituted the judicial authority, and
others in which dicasteries existed independent of the
magistracies. In some cases these dicasteries were prob
ably composed of members taken from the privileged class,
while in others they were, nominally at any rate, com
posed of both rich and poor, though, as the rich were
commonly fined for non-attendance, and the poor were
not, the poor would seldom be present at their meetings
(6 (4). 9. 1294 a 37 sqq. : 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 17 sqq.). It is
evident that oligarchies in which the magistracies consti
tuted the judicial authority must have differed much from
those in which they did not.
Both in oligarchies in which the magistracies combined
deliberative and judicial with administrative authority, and
in those in which they did not, the gerusia would usually
be the most important of the magistracies, but we learn
little from Aristotle as to its powers. It may probably
have exercised some control over the other magistracies,
a control which would be especially needed where no
deliberative or judicial authority existed independent of
the magistracies.
There is another point in connexion with oligarchy on
which Aristotle perhaps hardly lays enough stress. He
does not fully bring out how much support Greek oligar
chies derived from the ascendency of the leading families
in the tribes phratries and gentes. Cleisthenes found that
he could not uproot oligarchical tendencies at Athens
except by substituting wholly new tribes for the old ones.
The fact that oligarchy could not be completely uprooted
without a sweeping change of this kind must often have
delayed or prevented its overthrow.
Aristotle fails to see how deeply rooted oligarchy is in
human nature. He sees that men render willing allegiance
to pre-eminent virtue (see note on 1284 b 32), but he does
not see that they also willingly obey men of pre-eminent
wealth and birth. Oligarchy, after all, had its strong points ;
it did not engender, as democracy often did, a tendency to
indiscipline and anarchy, or a jealousy of superiority of all
VOL. IV. c
xxxiv CONSTITUTIONS STUDIED IN THE POLITICS.
kinds, or a belief in the equality of unequals, or a love of
innovation for its own sake, or a repudiation of parental
authority. The State was not ruled in oligarchies by
popular assemblies and by demagogues more skilled in
oratory than in war, as it was in many democracies, and
the men at the head of oligarchical governments were
usually men of pure local descent, untainted by alien or
servile blood.
Aristotle s Aristotle s theory of oligarchy lags somewhat in the
theprind- rear ^ ^ e facts as to oligarchy which he incidentally
pie of olig- reveals to us in the Politics. In oligarchy, according to
archy.
him, the rich rule because of their wealth (3. 8. 1280 a i sq. :
cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 1 2. ir6ob 14 sq.), and with a view to their own
advantage. The rich may rule in other constitutions also,
but not because of their wealth. Not only, however, do
f the rich rule in oligarchy with a view to their own advan-
\ tage ; they also rule with a view to their own enrichment,
i which is not quite the same thing. Oligarchy prizes
wealth, not virtue (3. 15. I286b 15 sq.) ; it makes wealth
its end (7 (5). 10. 1311 a 9 sq.) and its standard in awarding
office (6 (4). 8. 1294 a u). Yet oligarchies, in common with
other constitutions, are advised in 7 (5). 9. 1309 a 33 sqq. to
require virtue relative to the constitution, as well as friend
liness to the constitution and administrative capacity, in the
holders of important offices. Thus even oligarchy, it would
seem, cannot safely make wealth alone its standard in
awarding office. Then again, does it make wealth its end ?
Aristotle inherits this view from Plato (Rep. 550 D sqq.,
562 B), but he sometimes speaks as if the quest of gain
were characteristic of democracy rather than oligarchy
(e. g. in 8 (6). 7. 1331 a 40 sqq. : cp. 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 16 sq.,
where the many are said to love gain more than honour).
We gather also that oligarchy regards those who are
unequal in wealth as absolutely unequal (7 (5). i. 1301 a
31 sqq.: cp. 3. 9. 1280 a 22 sqq.), and holds that it is not just
that those who possess nothing should have an equal share
of political power with those who possess much (7 (5). 12.
ARISTOTLE S THEORY OF OLIGARCHY, xxxv
1316 b i sqq.), or that one who has contributed a mina to
a common capital of a hundred talents should receive as
much of the capital and profits as one who has contributed
all the rest (3. 9. 1280 a 27 sqq.). So again in 8 (6). 3.
1 31 8 a 1 8 sqq. the partisans of oligarchy are represented as
claiming that whatever commends itself to those who own
a larger amount of property is just, a contention which, as
Aristotle points out in I3i8a 21 sqq., exposed them to the
retort that it gave any rich man who possessed more than
all the rest of the rich put together a right to make himself
tyrant. Elsewhere (3. 13. I28<$b 33 sqq.) Aristotle adds
a further objection, that the many may be richer than the
few rich, if the amount of property held by each of them is
added together.
So far Aristotle regards the claims of oligarchy as
based entirely on wealth. But he occasionally connects
culture as well as wealth with oligarchy (6 (4). 8. 1293 b 36
sqq.), and in 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 38 sq. if that passage is from
his pen he says that oligarchy is defined by birth and
wealth and culture , so that a value for birth and culture, as
well as wealth, is recognized as one of its distinguishing
characteristics. And, in fact, we have seen that many
forms of Greek oligarchy gave supreme power to birth to
the members of a single gens or of several gentes or tribes,
or to the descendants of the earliest settlers, or to the sons
of the oligarchs in a bwaareia so that in them wealth
alone conferred no title to a share of power. Even in
oligarchies based on a property-qualification the possession
of the property-qualification was often not the only con
dition of admission to the privileged class. In oligarchies
based on membership of clubs no one, however rich, could
be a member of the privileged class without belonging
to one of the favoured clubs.
It would seem, indeed, that if the account which Aristotle,
following Plato, usually gives of the principle of oligarchy
were correct, and oligarchy really looked to wealth alone in
awarding political power, it ought not to place all the rich
on a level and give them an equal share of power, but
C 2
xxxvi CONSTITUTIONS STUDIED IN THE POLITICS.
should proportion political power to wealth, giving the
richer more and the less rich less. Yet Aristotle praises
oligarchies which place the privileged class as much as
possible on a level in respect of political power (7 (5). 8.
1308 a ii sqq.).
DEMOCRACY.
The kinds That two kinds of democracy were commonly recognized
we see from 2. 12. 1273 k 3^> where the mention of f)
cracv.
implies the existence of another kind of demo
cracy, not Tiarptos. Plato (Polit. 302 D sq.) distinguishes two
kinds of democracy, one in which law is observed and
another in which it is not. Isocrates also (Areop. 60 :
Panath. 131 sqq.) recognizes two kinds.
Aristotle distinguishes in 7 (5). 6. 1306 b 20 sq. between
Iwopxn SrjiJ.oKpa.Tiat. and nvpioi 6?7juoKpartcu, and in 7 (5)- 5-
1305 a 28 sq. between fj irarpia Sjj/xoxpart a and ^ vewrarTj, but in
the Sixth (old Fourth) Book he goes farther and recognizes
not two, but four, or even five, kinds of democracy five
in 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 30 1292 a 37, but four only in 6 (4).
6. 1292 b 22 1293 a IO an d m ^ (6). 4. 1318 b 6, where
the first two of the five are perhaps treated as virtually
one.
Thus Aristotle distinguishes more kinds of democracy
than Plato. But this is not the only difference between
them. Plato had not explained ivhy law is observed in one
of his two kinds of democracy and not in the other.
Aristotle, on the contrary, explains the origin of the
differences which exist between his five kinds of democracy.
The first four, he tells us, differ from the fifth because law
is supreme in them over the resolutions of the assembly,
and because the magistracies still retain considerable power,
and they differ from each other because the demos which
possesses access to office in each of them differs 1 . In the
first two kinds of democracy the class admissible to office
1 In 8(6). i. 1317 a 22 sqq. he of the institutions characteristic of
adds another source of difference. democracy are adopted and in
In some kinds of democracy more others fewer.
THE KINDS OF DEMOCRACY. xxxvii
and supreme over the constitution is the agricultural and
pastoral class and those who possess a moderate amount
of property, in the third those whose extraction is unim
peachable, and in the fourth all those who possess citizen
ship. It is not quite clear whether in each of these four
forms only those are admissible to the assembly and
dicasteries who are admissible to office, but, at any rate, in
each of them the class which is admissible to office is
supreme.
We obtain a glimpse of the organization of the first two The first
forms in 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 27 sqq., where we are told that j n twoklnds -
the first, or most moderate, kind of democracy all the
citizens have the right to act as dicasts, to elect to elec
tive offices, and to review the conduct of office-holders,
though the most important offices are filled by election,
not by lot, and eligibility to them is confined to those who
possess the requisite property-qualification, which increases
with the importance of the office, or (without any require
ment of a property-qualification) to those who are capable
of filling them l . It would appear from this that even in
the first kind of democracy the less important offices would
be filled by lot. The assembly does not meet often it
meets only when it must (6 (4). 6. 1292 b 28 sq.) and the
same thing probably holds of the meetings of the dica
steries. Still the powers of the assembly and dicasteries
even in this kind of democracy are sufficient to ensure just
and pure administration on the part of the richer citizens
who hold the most important offices.
The main reason why the first kind of democracy (if we
group the first two together) is the best is that the ruling
class in it is most like that which rules in the polity and
least disposed to make itself sole sovereign. It has property
enough to distract its attention from politics. It is too
busy with its own affairs, and the rural section of it lives
1 This does not altogether agree in one of these forms no property-
with the account of the first two qualification for office exists and
kinds of democracy given in 6 (4). in the other only a small one.
4-6, for it would seem from it that
xxxviii CONSTITUTIONS STUDIED IN THE POLITICS.
too far from the central city, to attend frequent meetings of
the assembly, and it cares more for its business pursuits
than for a life of politics and office-holding ; thus it rules
in subordination to the law and leaves a share of power to
the magistrates, the chief citizens, and the rich, and does
not sacrifice them to demagogues. It does so not only
because it has not leisure enough to do otherwise, but
because it would not wish to do otherwise if it could.
It may be asked whether a constitution which makes
only a part of the demos admissible to office is really a
democracy. Aristotle so regards it because the majority is
supreme in it (6 (4). 4. 1291 b 37 sq.), and because it admits
to office all who acquire a certain property-qualification
(6 (4). 6. i292b 30 sqq.). But if those who possess a
moderate amount of property are supreme in it (6 (4). 6.
1292 b 25 sq.), and democracy is a constitution in which the
poor are supreme (3. 8. 1280 a 2 sq.), how can it be a
democracy?
The third In the third and fourth kinds of democracy a wider and
and fourth w [^ er c j ass comes to be admissible to office, the care for
kinds.
purity of extraction which still prevails in the third dis
appearing in the fourth, but Aristotle does not describe
how their organization differs from that of the first and
second. Evidently, however, the class admissible to office
in them includes a larger urban element, and a larger
element of traders, artisans, and day-labourers, and this
element would desire, and be better able to attend, frequent
meetings of the assembly (8 (6). 4. 1319 a 28 sqq.). Yet it
would not have time either to hold office or to attend fre
quent meetings of the assembly in the absence of State-
pay, and not much State-pay is forthcoming in these two
kinds of democracy. Thus the law is still supreme in
them, and the magistrates, the chief citizens, and the rich
still enjoy a -share of power, though probably a smaller
share than in the first two kinds, and a more precarious
share also, for they would be deprived of it if the State was
large enough and rich enough to supply the ruling class
with abundant State-pay.
THE KINDS OF DEMOCRACY. xxxix
Already in the fourth kind of democracy we trace the
indifference to purity of extraction which was one of the
most prominent characteristics of extreme democracy in
Greece. Not only did it tend to place the poor man on a
level with the rich, but it also often tended to place the
semi-slave and the semi-alien on a level with the freeman
and the citizen of pure descent.
In the ultimate kind of democracy every citizen was The ulti-
enabled by State-pay to take an active part in deliberative, mate km(
administrative, and judicial work, and the full programme
of Greek democracy was realized. The aim of democracy
in Greece was not simply the supremacy of the poor, for
the poor might be supreme, and yet their participation in
political activity might be very limited. Its aim was
rather the full participation of all in all forms of political
activity. It was only in the ultimate democracy that this
ideal was realized (6 (4). 6. 1293 a 3 ^Q-)- 1 it not only
was office open to all citizens, whatever their extraction and
however small their means, but pay was freely forthcoming,
owing to a great increase in the populousness of the State
and in its revenues (6 (4). 6. 1293 a J S( l^-) an< ^ P av was
given to the holders of offices and to the members of the
assembly and dicasteries. The result was that the assembly
and dicasteries met frequently, and an assembly which
met frequently was apt to draw all decisions into its own
hands (6 (4). 15. 1299 b 38 sqq. : 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 30 sqq.).
The demos shook off the control of law ; it came to
be like a monarch and to wish to play a monarch s
part. A monarch, however, needs flatterers, and so
demagogues arose, whose interest it was to make the
decrees of the assembly supreme over the laws. The
authority of the magistracies was overthrown also ; persons
brought complaints against them, and appealed to the
assembly for its decision. Thus under this form of demo
cracy the State was ruled not by the universal principles
embodied in the laws, but by successive expressions of
the will of the majority of the assembly. The ultimate
democracy was, .in fact, hardly a democracy, for it was
xl CONSTITUTIONS STUDIED IN THE POLITICS.
hardly a constitution ; a constitution exists only where
laws rule.
Nor were these the only evils connected with it Not
only did decrees of the assembly override the authority of
the laws and the magistrates, and demagogues take the
place of the leading citizens, but the rich ceased to attend
the meetings of the assembly and dicasteries (6 (4). 6.
1293 a 6 sqq.). The care of their property made it
impossible for them to attend frequent meetings of either
(8 (6). 5. 1330 a 27 sqq.), and thus the work of both the
assembly and the dicasteries was less well done than it
would otherwise have been (6 (4). 14. 1298 b 20 sq. : 8 (6). 5.
1320 a 26 sqq.). The poor, on the other hand, were
pauperized by the system of State-pay, and their attention
diverted from the trades which gave them the best chance
of enriching themselves (7 (5). 8. 1309 a 7 sqq.). Nor was
this all. Democracies of this type encouraged every one to
live as he pleased (7 (5). 9. 1310 a 25 sqq.), so that the
control of the law was not only thrown off in them by the
assembly, but also by the citizens individually.
We see that Aristotle regards extreme democracy in
Greece as the source of some evils which do not result from
it in modern States. In our own days, no doubt, under an
extreme form of democracy the rich tend to withdraw to
some extent from active political life, the magistrates to
adopt an attitude of subservience to the popular will, and
demagogues to take the place of the natural leaders of the
State, but the poor are not pauperized, nor is the control of
law thrown off either by the deliberative or by the citizens
individually. Aristotle, on the contrary, depicts the ultimate
democracy as a mixture of tyranny and anarchy.
How far It is an interesting question how far Aristotle obtains his
totle obtain classification of democracies from a study of the history of
his classifi- the Athenian democracy. The first of his kinds of demo-
cation of . .
<kmocra- cracy seems to answer in many respects to the boloman
oes from a democracy, though it does not appear that in the latter the
study of the
history of less important offices were filled by lot i. e. by selection by
THE KINDS OF DEMOCRACY. xli
lot out of all as we gather from 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 30 that the Athe-
they are in the former. On the other hand, the rise of the mocracy ?
ultimate form of democracy is connected by Aristotle with
the provision of pay for the assembly (6 (4). 6. 1293 a
i-io: 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 38 1300 a 4: 8 (6). 2. 1317 b
30-35), but this step does not seem to have been taken
at Athens till soon after the archonship of Eucleides ,
who was archon in B.C. 403 (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of
Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 290 : A0. IIoA. c. 41).
It seems likely, however, from 2. 12. 1274 a 5-15 and
7 (5). 4. 1304 a 20-24 (cp. A0. IToA. c. 27. 11. 7-11)
that Aristotle held that an ultimate democracy existed
at Athens in the latter part of the fifth century B.C.,
or even earlier. If so, his account of the ultimate demo
cracy does not in this particular closely reproduce
the facts of the constitutional development of Athens.
His language, again, suggests (6 (4). 4. 1292 a 4 sqq. :
cp. 8 (6). 4. I3i9b 6 sqq.) that in the ultimate demo
cracy half-aliens were not excluded from citizenship ; this
may have been the case at Athens at certain times (cp.
Aeschin. De Fals. Leg. c. 173 and Isocr. De Pace, 88), but
at any rate after the restoration of the democracy, citizenship
was confined there to the sons of two citizen-parents (vol. i.
p. 227). No close relation seems, therefore, to be traceable
between the course of constitutional change at Athens and
Aristotle s series of democracies.
These four or five kinds, or perhaps rather grades, of Other kinds
democracy are far from exhausting its possible varieties, or rac y m
even the varieties the existence of which is implied in the
Politics.
Thus a form of democracy which is recognized in 8 (6). i.
1317 a 26 sqq. does not seem to be included among them.
This is the form in which the ruling demos consists of culti
vators and artisans, the day-labourers being excluded.
This form approaches near to the first of Aristotle s kinds,
but does not fall within it, for artisans do not appear to find
a place in the demos which bears rule in that form (8 (6). 4.
xlii CONSTITUTIONS STUDIED IN THE POLITICS.
1319 a 24 sqq.). Again, a kind of democracy existed in
which the ruling demos was composed of owners of land,
whether cultivators and herdsmen or not. Phormisius, we
know, proposed in B.C. 403 that the restored democracy at
Athens should be of this type. Then again, there was the
kind of democracy devised by Telecles of Miletus, in
which deliberative authority mainly fell not to a numerous
assembly, which might be guided by demagogues and might
exalt itself above the magistracies and the law, but to suc
cessive sections of the citizen-body, each section being
comparatively small (6 (4). 14. 1298 a n sqq.). In some
other democracies (1298 a 13 sqq.) the assembly had little
or nothing to do, and the real deliberative consisted of the
council of magistrates (awapx/cu), to which all citizens had
access in succession. There was also the kind of demo
cracy which at one time existed at Mantineia. In this the
assembly possessed deliberative authority, but the right of
appointing the magistrates was reserved for persons elected
by alternation out of all (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 23 sqq.). We
see, again, from 6 (4). n. 1296 a 16 sqq., that in some forms
of democracy the poor and the moderately well-to-do out
numbered the rich, but not the poor taken by themselves,
while in others the poor greatly outnumbered the rich,
without the addition to their side of the moderately well-
to-do. Democracies of the latter kind were far more
short-lived than democracies of the former. There were
democracies, again, in which the demos was largely com
posed of trireme-oarsmen, and others in which it was largely
composed of the crews of merchant-ships or fishermen.
The one sort must have differed considerably from the
other (see note on 1291 b 18).
Democracies would of course differ also according to the
circumstances under which democracy was introduced. It
might be introduced suddenly in an extreme form possibly
after some victory, like those of Cnidus, Naxos, or Leuctra,
or after some civil conflict or it might develope gradually.
At Athens democracy only gradually became extreme, and
time was allowed for the growth of laws and customs
THE BEGINNINGS OF DEMOCRACY IN GREECE, xliii
favourable to its maintenance. In the absence of such
laws and customs extreme democracy did not commonly
last long (8 (6). 4. 1319 b 3 sq.). The position and surround
ings of the State, again, would exercise an influence on the
character of its democracy. In a State like Argos, con
stantly in danger of subjugation by powerful neighbours
who were champions of oligarchy, democracy would be
very different from what it was in States less constantly in
peril. Fear of treason on the part of the rich would make
it suspicious and sanguinary. Democracies, again, in which
a single demagogue stood at the head of affairs would be
very different from those in which rival demagogues
struggled for supremacy. The best days of the Athenian
democracy were those in which it was guided, first by the
Council of the Areopagus, and then by Pericles.
Aristotle connects the first appearance of democracy in The cir-
Greece in one passage (3. 15. 1286 b 17 sqq.) with a reaction JJJJJJ* 1 "* 1
against the excessive concentration of power in the tyran- which de
nies, but in 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 22 sqq. he connects it rather cameY/to
with an increase in the populousness of States and in the existence m
Greece.
power of the hoplite force. It is likely enough that many
early democracies originated in this way, for we learn from
Aristotle (1297 b 24 sq.) that early democracies resembled
what were afterwards called polities, and in polities the
hoplites were supreme (2. 6. 1265 b 26 sqq.: 3. 7. 1279 b
2 sqq. : 6 (4). 13. 1297 b I sqq.).
The demos which set up the earliest democracies was
commonly an agricultural or pastoral demos resident in the
country (7 (5). 5. 1305 a 18 sqq.) ; hence the rise of these
democracies indicates a tendency on the part of the rural
citizens to assert their claims at the expense of the nobles,
who dwelt for the most part in the central city. We may
gather the aims of those who founded early democracies
from the organization they gave them. When Solon, for
instance, set up a democracy at Athens, he left the magi
stracies in the hands of the richer class, but he took pains to
secure that this class should govern well by giving the
xliv CONSTITUTIONS STUDIED IN THE POLITICS.
whole body of citizens the right of electing the magistrates
and reviewing their conduct in office and by opening the
dicasteries to all, thus placing an efficient check on the
magistrates (cp. 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 27 1319 a 4). It is likely,
therefore, that, when the rural hoplites set up one of these
early democracies which resembled polities, they did so
with the view of controlling and improving the adminis
tration of the nobles. They probably, however, had
another aim also. They sought to obtain for themselves
the right of deciding questions of peace, war, and alliance.
They formed the most effective part of the army of the
State, and their farms were exposed to the ravages of the
enemy in case of war. It was natural, therefore, that they
should claim this right, and none of the boons conferred by
the early democracy can have been more highly valued by
the peasant demos of those days than the right which it
conferred on the assembly of deciding questions of peace,
war, and alliance.
It is interesting to note that the Lacedaemonian consti
tution, though it was not a democracy, went further than
these early democracies. It opened the ephorate to the
whole body of citizens. The poorest citizen might become
a member of a powerful magistracy which checked and
controlled the other magistracies of the State. The reason
why the Lacedaemonian demos succeeded in acquiring this
great privilege was probably two-fold. In the first place it
was composed of citizens resident in Sparta, and not, like
the demos of most States of early Greece, of citizens
scattered over the territory, and next it was composed of
citizens who were owners of land tilled for them by Helots,
and who were not withdrawn by other occupations from
political activity.
Not all early democracies, however, were as limited and
moderate as the Solonian democracy or the democracies
resembling polities to which reference has been made.
Democracies introduced after a sudden revolution, especially
if that revolution was provoked by oppression or originated
in contempt, were probably more extreme. When the
THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRACY IN GREECE, xlv
demos at Ambracia, for instance, apparently about B. c. 580,
joined in expelling the hateful tyrant Periander, and set up
a democracy (7 (5). 4. 1304 a 31 sqq.), the democracy set up
will hardly have been as moderate as the Solonian. The
same thing may probably be said of the democracy insti
tuted at Erythrae in ancient times (kv TOLS ap\aioi.s \p6wois),
when the demos changed the constitution in its indignation
at the narrowness of the ruling class (7 (5). 6. 1305 b 18
sqq.). It is not certain that the Heracleia referred to in
7 (5)- 5- I 34 D 3 1 is Heracleia on the Euxine, but, if this
is so, as this colony was founded about B. C. 550, the de
mocracy which was introduced there on its foundation was
an early one, and yet of a pronounced type. The same
thing may be said of the democracy which existed at
Syracuse before the tyranny of Gelon. This appears to
have been unruly and disorderly (7 (5). 3. 1302 b 31 sq.),
and cannot have been moderate.
Aristotle is disappointingly silent as to the organization The de-
of the forms of democracy intermediate between the most
moderate forms and the extreme form. We should know cracy in
more than we do about the way in which Greek demo
cracies developed if we knew more than we do of the way
in which the powers of the Boule developed. We know
hardly anything on this subject as to other States than
Athens, and even as to Athens we know but little.
From the first the Boule stands in a close relation to the
popular assembly. As soon as a popular assembly acquires
the right of arriving at political decisions of moment *, we
find it placed in charge of a Boule, much as a blind man is
placed in charge of a dog. We might ask why a separate
body was needed for this purpose why committees of the
assembly chosen by it from time to time should not have
sufficed. The answer is that a body not intermittently, but
permanently in existence was needed, capable of introducing
measures into the assembly and of carrying its decisions
1 It is remarkable that Solon the assembly were very limited
instituted a Boul at Athens, (see note on 1281 b 32).
though the powers which he gave
xlvi CONSTITUTIONS STUDIED IN THE POLITICS,
into effect (8 (6). 8. 1322 b 13 sqq.). This duty might no
doubt have been assigned to one of the ordinary magi
stracies, but it was evidently thought better to assign it to
a body as little differentiated from the assembly and as
accessible to all the citizens as possible. The Boule must
be a numerous body like the assembly and must be
annually appointed by lot, and just as the assembly con
sisted of all the tribes, so all the tribes must have an equal
voice in the Boule. We do not know how soon the rule
was introduced at Athens that no one could be more than
twice a member of the Boule ( A0. IloA. c. 62 sub Jin.) ; one
effect of this rule, however, was that all the citizens came
once or twice in their lives to be members of the Boule,
and that it consequently nearly resembled the small delib
erative body planned by Telecles the Milesian (6 (4). 14.
1298 a 12 sqq.), of which all the citizens were to be members
in succession. Another result of the rule was that none of
the members of the Boule could have more than two years
experience, so that there was no fear of its being a skilled
gathering capable of rivalling the assembly and dictating
to it. More care was taken at Athens to make the Boule
an institution congenial to democratic feeling, and to pre
vent its encroaching on the prerogatives of the assembly,
than to secure its efficiency. Its powers were probably
largely increased when those of the Council of the Areo
pagus were curtailed ; how great they were at one time is
shown by the fact that it could sentence Athenian citizens
to imprisonment and death ( A0. IToX. c. 45) ; yet it continued
to be appointed by lot, not by election. No doubt, indeed,
it was because the Boule was appointed by lot and was the
reverse of a skilled magistracy that so little hesitation was
felt in adding to its powers.
Whether there were any democracies in which the Boule
was appointed by election, we do not learn. In that
of Rhodes, however, the Boule so far differed from the
Athenian Boule that it was headed, and perhaps to a great
extent guided, by great magistrates, the six prytaneis
(Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 178). In that of Thebes (B.C.
THE RISE OF THE ULTIMATE DEMOCRACY, xlvii
366) the Boule seems to have been joined with the magi
strates for purposes of deliberation, and to have had the
right to try murderers and to put them to death, or at any
rate those whose guilt was evident (Xen. Hell. 7. 3. 5 sqq.).
The Boule played a great part in the democracies inter- The rise of
mediate between the first and the last. But in course of m ate de-
time, at any rate in large and populous States, the revenues mocracy.
became sufficient to provide ample pay for the assembly,
dicasteries, and magistracies, and when pay could be pro
vided for the assembly and it came to meet frequently, the
power of the Boule began to decline (6 (4). 15. 1299 b 3^
sqq.: 8 (6). a. I3i7b 30 sqq.). The assembly now re
served all decisions for itself, and democracy assumed its
ultimate form. Aristotle dates the decline of the power of
the Boule from the provision of pay for the assembly, and,
as has already been pointed out, pay does not appear to
have been provided for the assembly at Athens till after
B. c. 403.
The increase in the revenue of the State to which refer
ence has been made is regarded by Aristotle rather as the
indispensable condition of the rise of the ultimate democracy
than as its cause. He frequently traces in the Politics the I
way in which a moderate democracy passes into an ultimate \
democracy (2. 12. 1274 a 5 sqq. : 7 (5). 4. 1304 a 20 sqq.: \
6 (4). 4. 1292 a 4 sqq. : 6 (4). 6. 1292 b 41 sqq. : 7 (5). 5. )
1305 a 28 sqq. : 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 18 sqq.), and we gather that, I
at Athens at any rate, the change was due in part to the
elation of the demos after their naval victory at Salamis,
which had led to the foundation of the Athenian empire,
and in part to the action of demagogues, who kept con
stantly adding to the power of the demos in the hope of
winning its favour, till at last they made the assembly
supreme over the law. In 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 28 sqq., where
the experience of Athens may or may not be present to
Aristotle s mind, the change is traced to the rivalry of
competitors for office when the offices are filled by election
without the safeguard of a property-qualification, and the
demos elects. But perhaps we may infer from 6 (4). 12.
xlviii CONSTITUTIONS STUDIED IN THE POLITICS.
1 296 b 29 sq. that the ultimate democracy would hardly
come into being unless there was a great excess of artisans
and hired labourers in the citizen-body, and that its rise
was due in part to a change m the composition of the
demos. It is implied in 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 4 sqq. that the
admissibility to office of citizens of not unimpeachable
extraction was one of the concomitants of its rise. In
A0. floA. c. 27 a somewhat different account is given of the
circumstances under which democracy became extreme at
Athens, though here too the elation of the many is men
tioned as one of the causes of the change. The decision of
the demos to administer the constitution itself, which pro
bably marks the introduction of the ultimate democracy,
is there connected not with the provision of pay for the
assembly, but with the concentration of the citizens in
Athens during the Peloponnesian War and with their
receipt of State-pay for service in war l . This account of
the origin of the ultimate democracy at Athens does not
quite agree with the account given in the Politics, which
connects it with the provision of pay for the assembly.
That a change sometimes occurred in the opposite direc
tion that the ultimate democracy sometimes passed into
the moderate forms we see from 7 (5). 6. 1306 b 21 and
7 (5). i. 1301 b 15 sq., but Aristotle nowhere gives us any
account of the way in which this change commonly came
about.
The special characteristic of the ultimate democracy
was, according to Aristotle, that under it the decrees of the
assembly became supreme over the law and that the
authority of the magistracies was overthrown (6 (4). 4.
1292 a 4 sqq. : 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 13 sq. : 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 28
sqq.). This would have been a great evil even if the meet
ings of the assembly had been attended by all the citizens,
but, as a matter of fact, more classes than one were unable
A$. IIoX. C. 27, 6 Trpos IleXo- fjLi(r6o(pop(1v ra fj,tv tKtov TO. df UKU>V
irovvrjffiovs etreOTT) TroXe/^oy, tv <u Trpoypdro rrjv iro\iTtiav SioiKelv
KaTaK\rj(r6(ls 6 8rjfios tv TU> acrrei avros.
Kal crvvediaQiis tv rais ararei ais
THE ULTIMATE DEMOCRACY. xlix
to attend them. The rich were often prevented by the
claims of their property from attending the meetings either
of the assembly or of the dicasteries (6 (4). 6. 1293 a 7 sqq.) ;
they could attend occasional meetings, but not very frequent
ones (8 (6). 5. 1320 a 27 sqq.) ; and the rural citizens, some
of whom must have lived, in Attica at all events, twenty or
thirty miles from the place where the assembly met, were
also often unable to be present. The result was that in
the ultimate democracy supremacy over the law and the
administration was exercised not by the whole citizen-body,
but by the poorest class of urban citizens, those whose
means were so small that the State-pay was a sufficient
inducement to them to attend the assembly. Democracy
in Greece, in fact, when fully developed, narrowed the class
with which actual supremacy rested ; we might have
expected it to do the opposite. It culminated in a form in
which the State paid the poorest and most ignorant class of
urban citizens to attend the meetings of the assembly and
did not enforce the attendance of other classes. Probably,
however, other urban classes than the poorest did habitu
ally attend the meetings of the assembly even in this form
of democracy, for we read in 6 (4). u. 1296 a 14 sqq. that
in democracies the moderately well-to-do class shared in
office to a greater extent than in oligarchies, and this
suggests that those of them who lived in or near the central
city were not absent from the meetings of the assembly in
ultimate democracies.
Aristotle makes various suggestions for the mitigation of
the evils connected with the ultimate democracy. It was
because the assembly met frequently in a democracy of
this kind that it came to claim all power for itself (6 (4). 15.
1300 a 3 sq.). Partly perhaps to check this abuse, as well
as to lighten the pecuniary burden on the rich and to make
it easier for them to attend, Aristotle recommends that the
meetings of the assembly and the dicasteries should be
made less frequent (8 (6). 5. 1320 a 22 sqq.). He recom
mends also that meetings of the assembly should not be
held in the absence of the country citizens (8 (6). 4. 13 19 a
VOL. IV. d
1 CONSTITUTIONS STUDIED IN THE POLITICS.
36 sqq.), and that its pauper members should be provided
by States possessing surplus revenues with the means
of engaging in agriculture or trade (8 (6). 5. 1320 a 35 sqq.).
This would make them less eager for frequent meetings of
the assembly. Elsewhere (6 (4). 14. 1298 b 13 sqq.) Aristotle
recommends that the rich should be obliged by fines (he
says nothing about the country citizens) to attend the meet
ings of the assembly. He adds other suggestions in 1298 b
21 sqq. He may have been doubtful whether fines, however
severe they might be, would suffice to enforce the attend
ance of the rich in an assembly in which they were greatly
out-numbered, or he may have thought that the deliberative
body would deliberate better if the numbers of the poor in
it were less disproportionate than they usually were to
those of the rich. At any rate he adds (1298 b 21) it is
advantageous, again, that those who are charged with
deliberative functions should be elected or taken by lot in
equal numbers from the parts of the State (i. e. the
notables and the demos), and it is also advantageous, if
the members of the demos are greatly superior in number
to the men of political capacity (i. e. the notables), either
not to give pay to all, but only to a number proportionate
to the numerical strength of the notables, or to exclude by
lot those who are in excess of the proper number . Aris
totle does not make it clear by whom the deliberative body
the appointment of which he here suggests is to be elected,
if it is elected and not appointed by lot, but his meaning
seems to be that half of it is to be elected by the notables
and half by the demos. If this is so, his recommendation
amounts to a recommendation of a representative delibera
tive body in which the number of the representatives of
the notables and demos should be equal. He omits to
arrange for the payment of the representatives of the
demos, though this would evidently be necessary. He
would not apparently be content with a paid representative
body elected in each deme by the members of the deme or
appointed in each deme by lot, though the substitution of
a representative body of this kind for the popular assembly
THE ULTIMATE DEMOCRACY. \\
would seem to a modern to be the true remedy for the
defects of the popular assembly. Such a representative
body would have been less likely than the popular assembly
to encroach on the province of the law and the magistra
cies, and it would have been more acceptable to the demos
than the kind of representative body which Aristotle sug
gests, one in which the representatives of the notables are
equal in number to those of the demos.
It is evident from Aristotle s language in such passages
as 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 6 sqq. that ultimate democracies were
often introduced in Greece. They must have existed in
many States besides Athens, though we are not able to
point with certainty to any existing elsewhere. Perhaps
the democracies at Cos, Rhodes, Heracleia, and Megara
mentioned in 7 (5). 5. 1304 b 25 sqq. and the democracy at
Cyrene mentioned in 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 22 sq. were ultimate
democracies. Democracy was strong at Byzantium and
Tenedos (6 (4). 4. 1291 b 23 sqq.), but whether ultimate
democracies existed there we do not know.
Some ultimate democracies were no doubt more tolerable
than others. The burden on the rich was less where the
State-pay was provided wholly or in part by special
revenues derived from dependent allies, or an emporium, or
mines, or some exceptional product like silphium, and not
exclusively by taxes levied on the rich. An ultimate
democracy introduced gradually was less oppressive than
one which was suddenly introduced after a victory over the
rich won by leaders embittered by exile at the head of
a demos infuriated by oppression. An ultimate democracy
in which the poor greatly outnumbered the rich without
any addition to their numbers from the moderately well-to-
do was worse than one in which their numbers were less.
It is evident that the ultimate democracy at Athens
in the days before the rich were decimated by defeats
on land (7 (5). 3. 1303 a 8 sqq.) and the whole State im
poverished by the disastrous latter years of the Pelopon-
nesian War, differed greatly from what it became in the
fourth century before Christ. Isocrates tells us (De Antid.
d 2
Hi CONSTITUTIONS STUDIED IN THE POLITICS.
159 sq. : cp. 142) that when he was a boy he was born
in B. C. 436 everybody was eager to be reputed rich, but
that at the time at which he was writing (B. C. 353) it was
more perilous to be thought rich than to be an open
criminal, for criminals were let off with light punishments,
whereas absolute ruin befel persons held to be wealthy.
Aristotle s Aristotle nowhere gives us in the Politics a full descrip
tion to our tion in detail of the organization and working of democracy,
knowledge What he tells us on the subject he tells us incidentally,
democracy. His aim in the last three Books of the Politics, as has
already been said, is a practical aim, to guide Greek states
men and lawgivers in the construction and administration
of the various constitutions, and it is from the remarks he
makes in the course of pursuing this aim that we obtain his
views on the subject of the organization and working of
Greek democracy. Perhaps we learn from him more about
its structure and institutions than about its life and
working.
If we seek pictures of its life and working, we shall find
more of them in the pages of Thucydides than in those of
the Politics. Herodotus had already dwelt on the passionate
vehemence of democracy in action (3. 81) and had pointed
out how much it did at Athens, at any rate in its earlier
days, to stimulate patriotic effort (5. 78). Thucydides tells
us far more. His task compelled him to study the be
haviour of the Athenian assembly in the many crises with
which it had to deal in the course of the Peloponnesian
War. We watch its behaviour to Pericles under the stress
of cruel suffering. We see its hastiness and impulsiveness,
its rapid alternations of severity and clemency, its suscepti
bility to excitement not only in an angry or vindictive
direction, but also in the direction of mercy and sympathy 1 ,
its occasional recklessness and levity in dealing with im
portant affairs, and other weaknesses which affected it.
1 Grote, Hist, of Greece, 9. 377, the Syracusan assembly under
where Xen. Hell. I. 5. 19 is re- similar circumstances (Diod. n.
ferred to, and the behaviour of 92) compared.
ARISTOTLE AND OTHERS ON GREEK DEMOCRACY, liii
We see that in the fifth century before Christ, when the
Athenian democracy was at its best, it was a government
of action as well as of open discussion, though the famous
lines of Ion of Chios in praise of its rival, the Lacedae
monian State (Fragm. 63 Nauck), suggest that he regarded
it as even then too much a government of words. The
orations of Demosthenes complete the picture by setting
before us the weaknesses of the Athenian democracy at
a time when it had lost much of its original vigour.
Among the characteristics of democracy which had been
already pointed out before Aristotle dealt with the subject
the following may be mentioned :
1. its exercise of rule in the interest of a section of the
citizens (Plato, Laws 715 A sq., 832 B sq.) and fre
quent oppression of the rich :
2. its passion for liberty and equality (Plato, Rep. 557 B,
558 C, 562 B sq.) and its jealousy of men of superior
merit (see note on i284b 28):
3. its demand for equality of access to magistracies, and
hence for
A. appointment to magistracies by lot, i. e. appoint
ment by lot out of all, not out of selected persons
(-TrpoKptroi). This had been dwelt on by many
from Herodotus time onwards :
B. a rotation of office (Eurip. Suppl. 392 sqq. Bothe,
406 sqq. Dindorf) :
C. the multiplication of offices and the diminution of
their powers, resulting in feebleness of action
(Plato, Polit. 303 A). Herodotus (3. 80) treats
the accountability of magistrates as one of the
institutions characteristic of democracy.
4. its practice of referring questions to the whole citizen-
body (Hdt. 3. 80 sub fin.) and of consulting the
opinion of all (Eurip. Suppl. 424 sqq. Bothe, 438 sqq.
Dindorf) :
5. its aggrandizement of flatterers and demagogues (Aris-
toph. Eq.) and especially of some one individual
(Plato, Rep. 565 C):
liv CONSTITUTIONS STUDIED IN THE POLITICS.
6. Plato had hinted (Rep. 565 A) that the many were
not eager to attend the meetings of the assembly
unless they derived some profit from so doing, but
he does not point out, as Aristotle does, the effect
of State-pay in making democracies extreme:
7. the favour shown in democracies to low birth, poverty,
and want of education (Aristoph. Eq., [Xen.] Rep.
Ath. : see note on 1317 b 38-41) :
8. the humouring in democracies of women, children, and
slaves, and the license allowed to all to live as they
please (Plato, Rep. 557 B sqq., 562 E sqq.).
The following, on the other hand, are some of the chief
characteristics of democracy to which Aristotle, so far as
we know, was the first to call attention :
i. His classification of the kinds of democracy is more
careful and more complete than the received one,
which distinguished only between the irarpia 8^/^oKparta
and the ^ecorarrj rj/xoKpcm a. That democracies vary in
kind as the demos which bears rule in each varies we
had not been told by any one before, nor does it seem
that any one had dwelt on the merits of an agricultural
and pastoral demos. The effect of abundant State-pay
in making the extreme democracy possible is pointed
out by him more clearly than by any one before.
i. In his picture of the institutions of an extreme demo
cracy he dwells, as no one before him appears to
have done, on its tendency to exalt the power of the
assembly at the expense both of the law and of the
magistracies, even the Boule. His view that the
extreme democracy resembles tyranny may possibly
have been suggested by some lines of Aristophanes
(see note on 1292 a n), but had any one before him
asserted the fact with equal clearness?
3. Aristotle was apparently the first to point out the ten
dency of the extreme democracy to make the citizen-
body as large as possible, so that the demos might
greatly outnumber the rich, and hence to extend
citizenship even to illegitimate sons and the sons of
ARISTOTLE S THEORY OF DEMOCRACY. Iv
an alien or slave father or mother (8 (6). 4. 1319 b
6 sqq.).
4. He was also the first, so far as we know, to dwell on
the tendency of democracy to mingle the citizens -
together and to modify or do away with earlier
sectional distinctions and worships.
5. The view that it is the tendency of democracy to
assimilate the rearing, education, dress, and mode
of life of rich and poor was apparently a common
one (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 19 sqq.), but he seems to have
been among the first to mention this view.
6. Had any one before him pointed out the tendency of
democracy to restrict the term for which magistracies
were tenable and to discourage a repeated tenure of
magistracies, or drawn attention to the variations in
the organization of the deliberative in democracies
and in the extent of its powers ?
7. Had any one before him pointed out that democracies
were more secure and durable than oligarchies, or
traced the various causes to which they owed this
advantage ?
8. We hear from no one else of the existence of demo
cracies not of law, but of custom and training, or of
democracies of law, but not of custom and training.
The first account given us in the Politics of the principle Aristotle s
on which democracy rests is contained in 3.9. 1280 a 7~25- the prin-
We are there told that the champions of the democratic ^P 16 of
democracy.
view of what is just claimed an equal share we do not
distinctly learn in what, but probably in political power
for those who were equal in free birth (eAev0e/Ha). But who
are equal in free birth? According to 3. 8. 1280 a 5 all
share in free birth , but yet we read in 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 26 sq.
of the class which is not free-born by descent from two
citizen-parents (TO JUT) e a/i<ore/3cov 7roAtr<Sy fXtvOepov), an
expression which seems to imply that the sons of only one
citizen-parent are not fully free-born, and in 6 (4). 12.
1296 b 17 sqq. it is implied that free birth is not possessed by
Ivi CONSTITUTIONS STUDIED IN THE POLITICS.
all, for it is there distinguished from numerical superiority
as falling under the head of quality (TO TTOLOV), whereas the
latter falls under the head of quantity (TO TTOO-OV). So in 3.
15. 1286 a 36 a demos consisting of the free-born is tacitly
contrasted with a demos including other elements than the
free-born. It seems clear, then, that democracy according
to one conception of it claimed an equal share of political
power only for those who were equal in free birth, not for
any one and every one who might be made a citizen.
But this restriction appears to pass out of sight in other
accounts of the principle of democracy, for instance in that
contained in 8 (6). 2, where it is implied that democracy
claims equality for all, not merely for all who are equal in
free birth. Democracy is said to aim at freedom and
equality (6 (4). 4. 1291 b 34 sq. : 8 (6). 2. 1318 a 9 sq.), or
at freedom in its two kinds, freedom based on equality,
which implies an interchange among the citizens of ruling
and being ruled and the supremacy of the will of the
majority, and freedom in the sense of living as one likes,
which implies not being ruled at all, or, if that is im
possible, an interchange of ruling and being ruled (8 (6).
2. 1317 a 40 b 17). Elsewhere (7 (5). 9. 1310 a 28 sqq.)
democracy is said to be characterized by two things, the
supremacy of the majority and freedom in the sense of
living as one likes. Here freedom is distinguished from
the supremacy of the majority, though this is regarded as
a kind of freedom in 8 (6). 2. 1317 a 40 sqq.
In these accounts of democracy it is implied that freedom
and equality are conferred on all, both rich and poor. True,
the rich will be in a minority, and as the majority is
supreme, the poor will be supreme. But the rich will have
a share of authority. It is on this principle that the first
form of democracy is organized, that which is especially
based on equality (f) Aeyo/xe in; /mAiora Kara TO LCTOV, 6 (4). 4.
1291 b 30 sqq.). In that form all share in the constitution
alike.
But democracy is also the rule of the poor, whether in
a majority or not (3. 8. 1280 a i sqq.). Then it is not
ARISTOTLE S THEORY OF DEMOCRACY. Ivii
necessarily the rule of the majority, nor is it based on
equality for all. Here we have an account of democracy
which conflicts with those previously given. What right
on democratic principles have the poor to rule, if they are
in a minority ? A democracy which gives supremacy to
a minority of poor would seem to sin against the principle
of arithmetical equality, which is the basis of democracy
according to 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 3 sq.
It will be seen that Aristotle s account of democracy is
not free from inconsistencies. Nor are we yet at an end of
them. Democracy tends to favour not only the poor, but
also bastards, half-aliens, and half-slaves, and to admit
them to citizenship (3. 5. 1278 a 26 sqq. : 8 (6). 4. 1319 b
6 sqq. : 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 26 sq.). Thus democracy is some
thing more than the rule of the poor; it is the rule of
a demos possibly comprising half-alien and half-servile
elements. Now at last we have sounded the depths of the
democratic principle. Low birth and (Bavavo-ia are as dear
to it as poverty (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 38 sqq.).
Another characteristic of democracy is the assimilation
of the dress and mode of life of rich and poor, and of the
rearing of their children (6 (4). 9. i294b 19 sqq.). This is
in harmony with the conception of democracy according to
which it is based on equality for all.
The inconsistencies which have been noticed in Aristotle s
account of democracy perhaps reflect real inconsistencies in
democracy itself. It is perhaps true that democracy claims
equality for all and the supremacy of the majority and an
interchange of rule, but also claims supremacy for the poor
and low-born. Its claims are thus not wholly self-consistent,
but its paramount claim is supremacy for the poor and
the full participation of the poor in all forms of political
activity.
Its organization will evidently vary according as one or
other of these conceptions of it predominates. Aristotle s
first form of democracy is based on the conception accord
ing to which democracy implies equality for all ; the
ultimate democracy on the conception according to which
Iviii CONSTITUTIONS STUDIED IN THE POLITICS.
democracy is the supremacy of the poor and the full
participation of the poor in all forms of political activity.
But even in the ultimate democracy the principle of the
equality of rich and poor was not abandoned ; the rich
were legally possessed of all the political rights enjoyed by
the poor, though they were commonly in too great a minority
to exercise them with effect. There was a nominal equality,
but a real inequality, in the position of rich and poor.
One characteristic of democracy meets with less notice
from Aristotle than we might have expected. If it is the
rule of the many and the poor, the many, we are told in
8 (6). 4. 1318 b 16 sq., seek gain rather than honour, and
gain, we might expect, rather than a barren liberty and
equality, or even a barren rule of the poor, must be the
aim of democracy. And, in fact, Aristotle implies in 8 (6).
7. 1321 a 40 sqq. that one of the characteristics of democracy
is that those who rule in it seek gain rather than honour.
But nothing is said of this characteristic of democracy else
where. The aim of democracy is usually represented by
Aristotle to be liberty, or liberty and equality, or the rule
of the majority or of the poor, or the interchange of rule,
not the gain of the ruling class. Yet perhaps his remark
in 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 40 sqq. is not without an element of
truth. The dominant class in a democracy usually seeks
not only to rule but to derive material profit from its rule.
Some con- Some light will be thrown on the characteristics of Greek
Greek "and democracy if we briefly note a few important points in
modern de- which it differed from modern democracy.
The demos in a Greek State was only a section of the
working class, for a large part of the working class con
sisted of metoeci and slaves. Hence the dominant class in
a Greek democracy was less numerous and outnumbered
the rich and the moderately well-to-do less, than in
a modern democracy. Thus in 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 23 sq. it is
implied that the demos might not greatly exceed the
notables in number. Nor was this all. The poorer class
of citizens in a Greek democracy was itself a privileged
GREEK AND MODERN DEMOCRACY. lix
class and had classes beneath it on which it looked
down, metoeci and slaves. Not so the poor in a modern
democracy.
The demos in a Greek State was not too large to be
brought together in an open-air meeting for purposes of
deliberation and discussion. A meeting composed of all
the citizens of a modern city would often be unmanageably
large, and a meeting composed of all the citizens of a
modern State would be manifestly impossible. Hence
a modern democracy cannot be ruled by the demos in
person ; it must be ruled by representatives, and an assem
bly of representatives is less likely to be able to make its
momentary will supreme over the law and to overthrow
the authority of the magistracies than an assembly com
posed of the citizens themselves. In a Greek democracy,
on the other hand, it was comparatively easy for the whole
citizen-body gathered in an assembly and headed by its
demagogues to administer as well as to rule and to free
itself from the restraints of law.
In a Greek democracy, again, the State was ruled from
one centre, in modern democracies it is ruled from many
centres, which check and balance each other. Its policy is
shaped by representative bodies representing a number of
widely scattered constituencies, no one of which is dominant
over the rest. It is the result of discussion carried on by
persons gathered from a very large area, whereas in the
assembly of a Greek democracy the disputants would usually
be citizens of a single not very large city. A modern
democracy consequently stands far more in need of
organizers and wire-pullers than a Greek democracy did,
and these men play a far greater part in it. They are
needed, indeed, not only to keep the various centres work
ing together, but also to guide the many elections of
officials and representatives which must necessarily take
place. These are far more numerous in a modern than in
a Greek democracy, because the lot is not now used in
making appointments to offices.
We have seen that the deliberative in a Greek demo-
Ix CONSTITUTIONS STUDIED IN THE POLITICS.
cracy, consisting as it did of the citizens themselves, not of
representatives of them, stood in a different relation to the
magistracies from that in which a representative deliber
ative body stands to the executive in a modern democracy.
It was also less checked by the judicial authority than the
deliberative in a modern democracy. The judges in a
Greek democracy were not trained lawyers marked off by
special knowledge from the common herd, but ordinary
citizens grouped in large dicasteries, who shared the pas
sions and the prejudices which prevailed in the deliberative
assembly. In the ultimate democracy these dicasteries
were paid, and consisted to a large extent of poor men,
who were often only too ready to become the tools of the
demagogues in their schemes of confiscation (8 (6). 5. 1320 a
4 sqq.).
Another difference may be noted between the deliber
ative assembly in a Greek democracy and the legislature in
a modern democracy. It was not a legislative body only,
but both a legislative and a deliberative body, having power
to decide some important administrative questions, such as
those of peace, war, and alliance. Indeed, it had also power
to decide some important judicial questions, for it had
power to inflict on citizens the punishments of death, exile,
and confiscation of property. Its powers, therefore, re
sembled those of the magistrates more than those of a
modern legislative body do, and it was more easy for it to
become a jealous rival of the magistrates, and ultimately to
weaken their authority.
The poorer citizens in a Greek democracy, again, were
more aspiring than the corresponding class in a modern
democracy. They sought not merely for substantial gains
or for a control of legislation and taxation in their own
interest, but also for the gratification of their vanity ; they
wished to hold office and to act as judges and members
of the assembly. They enjoyed having great men before
them competing for their votes. In modern demo
cracy this aim is still present, but as the sovereign people
does not rule in person and cannot be gathered into one
THE DEFINITION OF TYRANNY. Ixi
all-powerful assembly, it is gratified in a less direct way.
Modern democracy, though it demands a rotation of office
(see note on 131 7 b 17), seeks rather to regulate legislation
and taxation in the interest of the labouring class than to
give a turn of office to every poor man. Even in the ulti
mate form of Greek democracy, indeed, the poor did not
claim to hold offices which demanded special experience
and skill.
In ancient Greece, again, democracy, or at any rate
extreme democracy, meant the supremacy of classes which
were often in part of semi-alien or semi-servile origin.
In many Greek cities the urban section of the demos
contained a large admixture of elements of this kind.
Democracy in most modern States brings no such conse
quences with it, though it is true that in the United States
classes which are semi-alien, or even more than semi-alien,
play a considerable part in politics.
I
TYRANNY.
Aristotle does not always define tyranny in the same The defin-
way. His earliest definition of it in the Politics makes it
a form of monarchy in which rule is exercised for the
advantage of the monarch (3. 7. 1279b 6sq.), but in the Sixth
(old Fourth) Book he treats as forms of tyranny a despotic
kind of kingship found in some barbarian nations and the
aesymneteship of early Greece (6 (4). 10. 1295 a 7 sqq.),
though he does not appear to hold that either the barbarian
king or the aesymnete ruled for his own advantage. His
reason for classing these two forms of monarchy as tyrannies
apparently is that both possessed large powers of arbitrary
rule (1295 a i6sq.). Viewed in this light, the name of tyranny
may be given to any office exercising despotic authority ;
thus the ephorship was regarded by some as a tyranny
(2. 6. 1265 b 40 : cp. 2. 9. 1270 b 13 sq.). Thucydides seems
to approach this view when he tacitly contrasts tyrannies
with hereditary kingships with fixed rights (ri
ytpacri. ira.Tpt.Kal /ScccriAetcu, I. 13).
Ixii CONSTITUTIONS STUDIED IN THE POLITICS.
Others found the distinctive mark of tyranny not so
much in the despotic character of its rule as in its not
ruling in accordance with law. Thus Plato says in Polit.
301 B, OTO.V /xrjre Kara ro/jiov? /x^re Kara tOr] TrparrT/ n? el?
upxcor . . . fj.>v ov rore TOV TOLOVTOV K.acrTov rupavvov KArjreoz;;
Cp. Rhet. I. 8. 1365!} 37, povapyjia 8 ecrrl Kara rovvo^a fv 17
(Is a.T>avr(tiv nvpios CTTII> roimoy 8e f) /uey Kara rdtz> riva /3acri-
Aaa, f) 8 do ptcrros Tvpavvfa, and Xen. Mem. 4. 6. 12, r?/^ p.fv
yap fKOVTiav re rG>v avOpw nutv K.OL Kara v6fj.ov^ T&V TroAeooy
apxV /3acrtAe6ai ^yetro (sc. 2coKpdrT]s). TTJI; <)e aKoyrcoy re KOI /x^
Kara vo^ovs, aAA OTTCO? 6 ap^cav /3owAotro, rvpavvioa. In the
passage last quoted we find a further characteristic added
that the rule of the tyrant is exercised over unwilling
subjects (cp. Thuc. 3. 37. 2).
Tyranny is also described as a kind of rule based on
deceit or force (Diog. Laert. 3. 83, rvpawls 8e eorty kv fj
7rapaKpow$eWe? t] /SiacrtfeVre? VTTO rtros apyjovTCu. cp. Xen.
Mem. 3. 9. 10 and Pol. 7 (5). 10. 1313 a 9 sq., where see
note).
Aristotle s prevailing tendency is to define tyranny, or at
any rate that kind of tyranny which is thought to be
especially tyranny (6 (4). 10. 1295 a 17 sqq.), as a form of
monarchy in which the monarch rules irresponsibly over
men as good as, or better than, himself for his own advan
tage, and consequently rules over unwilling subjects (6 (4).
10. 1295 a 19 sqq.) 1 . Tyranny is the perversion not merely
of kingship (3. 7. i279b 4 sqq.), but of absolute kingship (6
(4). 2. 1289 a 39 sqq.), and just as the absolute king is
greatly superior to those over whom he rules and rules for
the common advantage, so his antithesis the tyrant is the
inferior, or at any rate only the equal, of those over whom
he rules and rules for his own advantage. It follows that
if a man is to possess absolute power and not to be
a tyrant, he must not only rule for the common advantage,
but also be greatly superior to those over whom he rules
1 In this kind of tyranny the in which the tyrant possesses only
tyrant possesses unlimited powers, limited powers and uses them for
but is there not a kind of tyranny his own advantage ?
THE RISE OF TYRANNY IN GREEK STATES. Ixiii
(4 (7). 3. I32jb 3 sqq.). When the ruler possesses this
transcendent superiority, men willingly accept his rule (3.
13. 12845 32 sqq.), and he is not a tyrant. Rule comes to
the king by reason of his virtue, to the tyrant by reason of
the power which enables him to make himself tyrant,
whether that power is possessed by him as a king or as
a great official or as a demagogue and general (7 (5). 10.
I3iob I4-3 1 )-
The first introduction of tyranny in the Greek world The rise of
seems to have been due not to demagogues, but to kings
or great officials who converted the positions legally held
by them into tyrannies, and thus were the first to make
the breach through which later on so many soldier-dema
gogues successfully passed. Tyranny was a legacy from
the early incautious days in which kingships existed and
great magistracies were held by single individuals. Even
the soldier-demagogue, when he arose, commonly held some
great military office before he made himself tyrant (7 (5).
5. 1 305 a 7 sqq.).
In later days most tyrants, but not all, won their tyran
nies as demagogues. Not all, for some won their tyrannies
simply because they possessed an overpowering influence
in the State (7 (5). 3. 1302 b 15 sqq.), others because they
were the holders of important offices for long terms (7 (5).
8. 1308 a 20 sqq.), others because they belonged to leading
families in close oligarchies (7 (5). 8. 1308 a 22 sq.), others
because they were captains of mercenaries (7 (5). 6. 1306 a
22 sq.) or neutral magistrates (apyjovres /ie<n 8toi, 7 (5). 6.
1306 a 26 sqq.). Another class of tyrants consisted of
nominees of Persia or in later days of Macedon.
The rise of tyranny in ancient Greece was not. as it was
in mediaeval Italy, a symptom of exhaustion and weariness
of faction. It was often due rather to the difficulty which
the demos experienced in overthrowing oligarchies which
oppressed it. It could not easily overthrow these olig
archies unless it was headed by a man possessing both
military and demagogic skill. In early oligarchies the
demos was for the most part a rural demos, while the
Ixiv CONSTITUTIONS STUDIED IN THE POLITICS.
oligarchs dwelt in the city. A demagogue at the head of
a demos of this kind found himself in a difficult position.
He had to defend in the city the rights of supporters
scattered over the country, too distant and busy to give
him effective support. He had to prosecute in oligarchical
lawcourts rich men who had wronged poor men. We can
readily imagine that he was almost driven by stress of
circumstances to make himself tyrant (Plato, Rep. 565 D
sqq.). He would obviously stand in great need of a body
guard. That Cypselus, though the founder of a tyranny at
Corinth, never had a bodyguard is mentioned as a remark
able fact (7 (5). 12. 1315 b 27 sq.). This bodyguard he had to
ask of the State, and Aristotle thinks (3. 15. 1286 b 35 sqq.)
that the citizens would have been wise if they had done
what was usually done when an aesymnete was elected,
and had limited the numbers of the bodyguard, not allowing
it to be stronger than the many, but this precaution was
commonly neglected, no doubt because, when the body
guard was granted, the demos felt unbounded confidence in
its champion. The bodyguard of a tyrant was usually
composed of aliens, notwithstanding that he had the sup
port of the demos, and this was a sinister sign. It meant
that he intended to be independent of the demos.
An alien bodyguard would be most easily hired in
regions in which mercenary soldiers were easily obtainable.
Thus Corinth Sicyon and Megara, the earliest homes of
tyranny in Greece Proper, were close to Arcadia, where
mercenary soldiers were always to be had. States
bordering on regions peopled with warlike barbarians
(for. instance, States in Caria, Sicily, or Thrace), or
near bodies of warlike slaves like the Penestae, were
similarly circumstanced. It would be especially easy, again,
to obtain mercenaries at the close of great wars, when large
numbers of men had lost all taste and aptitude for peaceful
pursuits. Thus the tyranny of Dionysius the Elder at
Syracuse and probably that of Pherae arose at the end of
the Peloponnesian War. It was no doubt a fortunate thing
for Greece that these tyrannies enlisted so many turbulent
THE RISE OF TYRANNY IN GREEK STATES. Ixv
spirits in their service and drew them away to Syracuse
and Pherae.
It was not always under oligarchy that the hostility
between rich and poor arose from which tyranny usually
sprang. It sometimes arose under a democracy. Herodotus
(3. 82) describes tyranny as arising under both oligarchy
and democracy. Plato, indeed, in the Republic (562 B sqq.)
conceives tyranny as always arising under democracy, but
that was evidently not the case. In his picture of the
tyrant he clearly has Dionysius the Elder especially in view,
and the tyranny of Dionysius the Elder arose under a
democracy (Plut. Reg. et Imp. Apophth. 176 D).
The rise of tyranny seems to have been often connected
with other than purely internal difficulties, though neither
Plato nor Aristotle draws attention to the fact. Dionysius
the Elder acquired his tyranny when Syracuse was fighting
for its existence against a Carthaginian invasion of Sicily
which had already proved fatal to several of its Greek
cities. It is likely enough that the establishment of a
tyranny at Corinth by Cypselus in B. C. 657 was connected
with the revolt of Corcyra from Corinth and the sea-
fight fought by their fleets in B. C. 664. So again the
origin of the tyranny at Pherae was probably connected
with the struggle of Larissa and Pherae for supremacy,
which, beginning at the end of the fifth century B. C., ulti
mately resulted in the subjection of Thessaly to Philip of
Macedon. At times of crisis, when the existence of the
State was threatened by external foes, the concentration of
civil and military authority in the hands of one able man
had its advantages l . This was especially felt in Sicily,
which never forgot that a formidable Carthaginian invasion
had been repulsed in B. C. 480 by the tyrant Gelon. If the
invasion of Greece Proper by Xerxes had been repulsed
under the leadership of tyrants, it is probable that tyranny
would have won the prestige there which it enjoyed in
1 That the value of a single able 18, Isocr. Nicocl. 24 sq., and
ruler was recognized we see from Demosth. De Fals. Leg. c. 184 sq.
Thuc. 6. 72. 3, Xen. Anab. 6. I.
VOL. IV. e
Ixvi CONSTITUTIONS STUDIED IN THE POLITICS.
Sicily. No doubt tyrannies were often successfully set up
at times when the State was not menaced by any external
perils, and when the only thing that troubled its peace was
internal faction. This was the case with the tyranny of
Peisistratus among others.
The mle of The mere fact that tyrants needed a bodyguard made
tvrants
a considerable revenue a necessity of their position. Thus
it was in wealthy States that tyranny was most at home.
This large revenue was raised by taxation which was often
oppressive. We gather from 7 (5). n. i3Hb 14 that
eisphorae and liturgies were commonly exacted by tyrants
from their subjects. We also hear of their receiving a certain
proportion of the produce of the soil, often a tenth. The
heavy taxes levied by tyrants were a characteristic feature
of their rule, and were no doubt partly responsible for its
commonly short duration. Free States appear to have
intentionally abstained from following their example in
this matter. Usually, however, tyrants were not satisfied
with possessing a large revenue; they also sought to amass
a treasure (7 (5). n. I3i4b 10). The possession of a treasure
enabled them to act more promptly in special emergencies
than they could otherwise have done. They needed it, or
thought that they needed it, to face the perils of their position,
but it also added to these perils, for those whom the tyrant
left in charge of his treasure, when he was absent from the
city, often conspired against him (7 (5). n. 1314 b icsqq.).
It was easy for tyrants to amass a treasure, for, as their rise
to supreme power was commonly opposed by most of the rich,
they had abundant opportunities of enriching themselves
by confiscation. The more the expenditure of the tyrant
increased, the greater would be the temptation to plunder
the rich, and his expenditure constantly tended to increase.
Partly to keep his mercenaries employed, partly to win
glory and popularity, partly to make himself indispensable
to the State, the tyrant often made war. He would easily
find excuses for war, for the great resources, political mili
tary and financial, which were at his disposal and the
concentration of authority in his hands must have made all
THE RULE OF TYRANTS. Ixvii
neighbouring States distrustful of him and anxious, if not
actually hostile. His own subjects were not sorry when he
made war, for they knew that he would be obliged to arm
them, and they hoped, when he had done so, to find some
opportunity of dethroning him (Diod. 14. 45. 5, 14. 64. 4 :
Isocr. Hel. 32).
The extent to which tyrants altered the laws and consti
tution of the State which they ruled seems to have varied.
Mr. Freeman is probably right in saying (Sicily, 2. 53): It
does not appear that the tyrant, as a rule, swept away the
laws and constitution of the city. The forms of law might
go on ; it was enough if magistrates and assemblies practi
cally did their master s bidding. Whenever either silent
influence or express command failed to secure obedience,
the spearmen were ready to step in . Still Herodotus (3. 80)
says of the tyrant, he changes traditional customs (vo^aia
Kivfl Trdrpia), and it is clear from Isocr. Ad Nicocl. 17 sq.
that the tyrants of Salamis in Cyprus at any rate, besides
issuing their edicts (Isocr. loc. cit.: cp". Pol. 6 (4). 4. 1292 a
20), also revised the laws and tried and decided lawsuits in
person.
Aristotle recommends the tyrant to win, if possible, the
support both of the rich and of the poor, or, if not, the
support of whichever of these classes was the stronger
(7 (5). ii. I3i5a3i sqq.). He implies that it was always
open to him to win the support of the rich, but this it must
have commonly been difficult for him to do. His taxation
fell with especial severity on the rich. He dreaded those
of them who ranked as notables, for conspiracies against
him were for the most part their work, and he especially
dreaded those who overtopped the rest (7 (5). n. 1313 a 40).
It cannot have been easy for him to employ the notables
in the work of government, and yet, if they had no share in
it, they were discontented. The tyrants seem to have
brought into the administration of the State the methods
by which the generals in command of besieged cities con
trolled them (see note on 1313341), and these methods
would be especially odious to the leisured class, the class
Ixviii CONSTITUTIONS STUDIED IN THE POLITICS.
which set most store by freedom in social intercourse.
Greek cities were commonly pervaded by a hum of dis
cussion and talk, but a silence fell on them under a tyranny
of the worse kind ; the tyrant s spies made social inter
course dangerous ; the citizens came not only to distrust
each other, but to be unacquainted with each other. The
poor suffered less under a government of this kind than the
rich. The tax on the produce of the soil no doubt fell in
part upon them, and the impoverishment of the rich must
have cost them dear. Tyrants were also sometimes led by
their fear of plots to discourage the residence of the poor
in the central city and to keep them hard at work. Still
they occasionally helped the poor with gifts or loans of
money, and were often great builders, and therefore great
employers of labour. The tyrants of Corinth and probably
of Miletus l founded colonies which must have given many
poor men a chance of enriching themselves, and so did
Dionysius the Elder. The luxurious court of the tyrant
was partly supplied by alien handicraftsmen, but it was
also a source of profit to the native poor, and many new
arts were introduced and old ones developed under his rule.
Plato s sketch of the tyrant s career (Rep. 568 E), how
ever, implies that a time often came in the course of it
when he found that he had run through the property of the
rich. He had now only poor men to tax, and his heavy
expenditure had to be maintained at the cost of his early
friends, the demos. He thus lost their good will, and it
sometimes became necessary for him to disarm them and
to win fresh supporters by emancipating slaves.
Even a short period of tyranny must have been injurious
to a State. Many of its natural leaders would be put to
death or exiled or stripped of their property, and however
short a time a tyranny might last, it would be difficult,
when it fell, to replace them in their position. A long
continuance of tyranny, however, must have been far more
ruinous. In the early days of a tyrant s rule the citizens
would at any rate kpow what freedom meant, for they would
1 See as to the latter E. Meyer, Gesch. des Alterthums, 2. 447.
THE RULE OF TYRANTS. Ixix
have lived at one time under more or less free institutions ;
but as time went on and a generation grew up which had
never known any government but tyranny, a visible deterior
ation of character must have set in. The best elements of
the citizen-body would long have been weeded out and
their place taken by the tyrant s mercenaries, some of them
probably not even of Hellenic extraction, and only those
would have been left from whom the tyrant had nothing to
fear. A general mediocrity would prevail. The citizens
would not be as well acquainted with each other as they
were in a free State, and would often lack confidence in
themselves and in each other. A State thus morally
enfeebled was fit for nothing but tyranny, and tyranny
would find a more or less permanent home in it. This, at
any rate, was the fate of Syracuse. Yet it was not the fate
of all States long ruled by tyrants. At Heracleia on the
Euxine, on the extinction of a tyranny which lasted for
nearly eighty years, a democracy was set up which would
seem to have been sufficiently well-ordered to last for more
than two centuries, and which came to an end only when the
city received its death-blow.
In the later years of Greek tyranny the tyrant was often
not even a native of the State he ruled. He was fre
quently merely a captain of mercenaries unconnected with
the State.
As in mediaeval Italy, so in ancient Greece tyrants do
not all stand on the same level. Not only were some far
better rulers than others, but some could point to public
services which made amends to a certain extent for their
usurpation of power. Gelon and Dionysius the Elder
humbled Carthage and added to the greatness of Syracuse,
while others could claim to have overthrown oppressive
oligarchies.
Tyranny was less widespread in ancient Greece than in Some
mediaeval Italy, and held its ground with more difficulty, contrast
In mediaeval Italy its rise often meant that the citizens between
were weary of the struggles of the factions which had andeiu "
torn the State asunder and had made material prosperity Greece and
VOL. IV. f
Ixx CONSTITUTIONS STUDIED IN THE POLITICS.
tyranny impossible, or that they saw that the days of citizen armies
aevafltal were over anc * ^ at t ^ ie mercenary troops which had taken
their place needed a strong hand to rule them. Its rise was
often a symptom of exhaustion and decline. This was less
the case in ancient Greece. The rise of tyranny there did
not commonly betoken a diminution of political ardour in
the minds of the citizens or a disinclination for military
service. Citizen armies did not fall into the background
in ancient Greece as much as they did in mediaeval Italy.
Tyranny was less dictated by circumstances and was more
reluctantly endured. One indication of this may be found
in the short duration of most dynasties of tyrants in ancient
Greece, and the long continuance of many such dynasties
in mediaeval Italy. The establishment of a tyranny in
ancient Greece often meant no more than this, that some
clever and unscrupulous soldier-demagogue had succeeded
in using for his own aggrandizement a moment of disunion
or of internal or external crisis.
r nOAITIKftN Z (A ).
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fir] Kara popiov yivop.tva.is, dXXd irepl yeVoy eV TL reAe/aty
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^rw yap /faAAtora TTC^VKOTI KCU Kf)(opr)yr)fjLva) TTJV
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3 7re/o< irdcrav dXXrjv Te^vrjv 6p>fjLi> o-vfiftaivov. wore SijXov OTI
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TIS ko TL, Kal Troia TIS a.v ovo~a p.dXio T firj /car fv^rjv, ftijSc-
VOS CfjLTToSlfoVTOS TU>V tKTOS, Kal TiS TiffLV dp/JiOTTOVO a TToX-
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XfXr)6vai TOV dyaQov vofJ.o6fTrjv Kal TOV oby aX^^diy TTO\LTLKOV
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VOL. IV. B
2 nOAITIKflN Z (A ). 1-2.
35 Tovcrav Sei yvoopifeiv, coy oi TrXeicrToi rcoi/ drro^aivofjifvcov
TroXira ay, Kal t raXXa Xeyovvt /caXcoy, TO>V ye
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rtav 5e TroXiretay, Kal trtpl /zef dpio-TOKpartas Kal (IcuriXtfas 30
eiprjrai (TO yap irepl r??y dpfanjs TroXiretay Oecopfjorai ravro
KOU 7Tpt TovT<av tcrrlv fiiTtiv T>V ovofidronv (3ov\(Tai yap
e/carepa /car dperrjv vvvwrdvai Kex o P 7 77 7 7/ i ^ J/7 7 I/ ), ^ rt ^ T*
Siatyepovo-w aXX^Xco;/ aptcrro/cpar/a Kat (3acri\ia y KOI Trore
5et fiacriXttav vop.L^Lv } SiwpiaTai irpoTfpov, Xonrbv Trepl TTO- 35
Xtre/ay 5teX^eFj/ r^y rw KOIVM Trpocrayopefo/xei ^y ovofian,
Kal Trept rS>v a\\a>v TroXirtiaiv , 6Xiyap)(ia$ re Kal Srjfj.0-
2 Kparias Kal rvpavviSos. (pavtpov fjikv ovv Kal rovrwv rS)v
crecoi/ rty ^ipLcrrrj Kal Sevrepa rt y. dvdyKr] yap
r^y TrpcwrTjy >ca2 ^aorarTjy 7rape/c/3a<7ii/ eiVai X i P^~ 4
e jSacriXemi dvaymalov 77 Tovvop.a p.6vov ^X lv ^ K
ovcrav, rj Sia TroXXrjv VTT(poyj]v elvat TT]V TOV /3ao"iXei5o^roy- 1289 b
axrre r^f rvpavvtSa ^ipia Triv ova~av irXtlvTov aTre^etv TroXt-
ret ay, Sevrepov <5e r^r oXiyapyfav (17 yap dpiaroKpaTia Sif-
aTr)Kfv dirb Tavrrjs -rroXv r^y TroXtretay), /ierpioorarTyi/ $e
3 r^j/ 8r)fj.oK parlay. rjSrj fjikv ovv r:y avre^^aro /cat ra>i> ?rp6- 5
repor otfrcoy, 01) /ZT)^ ty rauro jSXoJray ^^. e/ceii/oy /it/ yap
Trao~S>v fj.lv ovo~S)v mLKa>v } OLOv 6Xiyap)(ia$ re
Kal rcav aXXcwt ,
dpio~Trjv jy/ieiy $ 6 Xcoy
Kal /3eXr/oo jjikv oXiyapyia-v dXXrjv dXXrjs ov AcaXcoy e^et 10
4 Xeyeii>, TJTTOV 5e (f)avXr]v. aXXa ?repi fjikv r^y Toiavrrjs Kpi-
(reooy a0icr^a) ra ^0^ i^fi/ 5e irpStrov [ikv SiaipeTtov Trocrai
8ia<f)0pal rS>v TroXireioof, eiVep ecrrif ef^ irXtiova rfjs r $77-
fioKparias Kal rfjs 6Xtyap\ias, erreira r/y Koivordrrj Kal
T/y a/percorarr; /zera rr)v apicrrr/r TroXirei aj/, /c<$i> ei rty aXXr; 15
TfTv\r]Kfv dpio-TOKpanKrj Kal (Tweo-raicra KaXSy, aXXa raFy
5 TrXe/itrraty dpfioTTOvcra TroXeai, rt y ka Tiv firfira Kal rav dX-
B 3
4 nOAITIKflN Z (A ). 2-4.
KpaTia fiaXXov oXiyapx^ay, ro?y 8 avrr) fidXXov e/
20 /zera 8e ravra Tiva Tpoirov Set KaOio-Tavai TOV fiovXojjievov
rauray ray TroXtret ay, Xeya> 5e SrjfjiOKpaTias re KCL& eica-
crroj/ ef<$oy *at irdXiv oXiyap^ias reXoy e, irdvTcov TOVTWV 6
Troirjo-tofieda a-vvTOfioos rr)v fvSf^ofjL^r]!/ fjivei
e7re\6eTv riVey <j)0opal KOL TIVCS (raTrjpiai TO>V
25 Kal Koivfi Kal xctipls iKao-Trjs, KO.I Sia Tivas amay ravra
fj.d\i(TTa yivfaOai irtfyvKtv.
3 Tov fi\v ovv fivai TrXe/oi/y TroXirtias airiov OTI irdo-rjs e
/zepT; TrXeuo 7roXea>y TOJ^ dpiOpov. rrp5)TOv n\v y&p e
<rvyKifj.fi>as Traaay opcofifv ray TroXeiy, eTretra irdXiv TOVTOV
30 roO TrX^oyy roty /*ep eviropovs dvayKcuov eivai rouy 5 azro
rot>y 5e fjL<rov$, Kal rS>v eviropw B\ Kal TO>V diropwv TO
onXiTLKov TO <5e dvoirXov. Kal TOV p.\v ywpyiKbv Sfjfj.ov dpeo- 2
fj.(v ovTa, TOV 8 dyopaiov, TOV $e fidvavaov. Kal TO>V yva>-
pifjL<ov flo-l Siatyopal Kal /cara TOV TrXovTov Kal TO, [HfytOr}
35 TTJS ovorias, oiov lmroTpo(f)ia$ (TOVTO yap ov paSiov p.rj irXov-
TOVVTas noiciv Sionep k-rrl TO>V dp^aicov ^povcov oaais TroXe- 3
<TLV fv TOIS tTTTTO/y r) SvvafjLis Tjv, 6Xtyap\tai irapa TOVTOLS
r]a-av e\p>vTO 5e Trpoy rouy TroXe/zoyy tmrois rrpbs TOVS do~Tv-
yeiTovas, o?ov EpfTpieis Kal XaX/a5ety /cat MdyvrjTts ol CTTI
40 MaidvSpcp Kal TO>V aXAooi/ TroXXoJ nepl TTJV Affiav\ eri Trpoy 4
ra?y Kara TrXovTOv Siafyopais taTiv f) fiev Kara ye^oy r) Se
1290 a KaT dpcTrjv, Kav et TL 8r] TOIOVTOV eTepov tiprjTai TroXecoy efvai.
fitpOS fV TOiS TTfpl TT]V dplO~TOKpaTiav fKtl yap 8llXofjlV
fK 7r6o~a>v fjLfpa>v dvayKaicw ko~Tl irdaa TroXiy. TOVTUV yap
TQ>V fj.pa>v ore fikv ndvTa //T6)(ei r^y TroXiret ay, ore 8
5 eXarro), ore 5e TrXe/co. (fiavepov TOLVVV OTL TrXei oyy a^ayxarot 5
e^ai TroXiref ay, fiSfi Siafapovo-as aXX^Xaw Kal yap TUVT
eiiSet 6\a0epet ra ^tep^ a^&v avTatv. TroXtreta p.\v yap fj
TO>V dpy(S>v ra^ty ko~Ti, TavTrjv 5e SiavefiovTai TfdvTts fj Kara
TTJV SvvafJLLV T<aV fJ.fT^6vTCOV 7) K.O.TO. TIV aVTOIV laOTTJTa
10 KOivrjv (Xeyeo 5" oiov TO>V d-rropav 77 T>V fVTropwv}, TJ Koivrjv
1289 b 19 1290 b 3. 5
6 TIV dfttpoTv. avayKOiov dpa TroXtret ay e/at rocravray ocrai
Trcp raety Kara ray virepo^d^ etcrt Kal Kara ray &ac/>o-
/aay rcoi> ftopdop. /zaXicrra 8k SOKOVCTIV tlvai Svo, KaQdnep
e-rrl rco> TTvevfidTOov XfyTat ra fjilv (36pia ra 8e voria, ra.
8* d\\a rovrmv 7rapK(3dcris, OVTQ> Kal TO>V TroXiTfiwv Svo, 15
7 Srjfjios Kal 6Xiyap)(ia. rrjv yap dptaroKpariav rrjy oXiyap-
^Tay flSos TL$acnv coy ovvav oXiyap^iav rivd, Kal rr)i> Ka~
XovfAi>r)v TroXiTfiai 8rjfiOKpaTiav } axnrfp tv rots Trvfvfj.acrt
TOJ> fJ.V <f)VpOV TOV (3opOV, TOV St VQTOV TOV (VpOV. 6flOlO>$
8" 1 f^ei Kal -rrepl ray apfj.ovias, coy 0acri rtJ/ey Kal yap eKi 20
TiOfVTat i8rj 8vo } rr\v Scopiarl Kal (ppvyicrTi, ra 8 aAXa
8 (rvvrdyfj.ara ra ptv Aa>pia ra 8k $pvyia KaXovaiv. [id-
Xicrra /zei> ovv ela>da(riv ourcoy VTroXafJ.pdvfiv irepl rcoi/ -rroXi-
T(.i)v dXrjOecrTtpov 8e Kal fifXTiov coy i7/ify 8iiXofj.v } 8volv
fj fjiias ovcrrjs rf;y AfaXcoy (rvi>crTr)Kvia$ ray aXXay tlvai 25
Trape/fjSczcrety, ray p.\v rfjs eu Af6ACpa/tev7yy ap/zoi/^ay, ray 8e
r^y a/jiVrT/y TroXire/ay, oXiyapx^^y /^i> ray cri/i roi/core/oay
<at c5ecT7rorMfcoryoay, ray 5 dvtip-tvas Kal /iaXa/cay 8r)/j.o-
Tt/cay.
, aTrXcoy ourcoy, OTTOU Kvpiov TO irXfjOos (/caJ ya/) ef rafy
ts Kal iravrayov ro TrXeoj/ /ipoy Kvpiov), ovtf 6Xt-
2 yapxiav, OTTOV Kvpioi oXtycu r?]y TroXtre/iay. et ya/o ftrjcrav
ol Trai/rey x / Xtoi Kat TpiaKoarioi, Kal TOVTCOV ol ^tXiot irXov-
<noi t Kal p.^i fj.Ta8i8oTV d.px*)s ro ^ TpUOlOfffoiS Kal TTfvrja-ii 35
eXfv6poi$ ovai Kal raXXa 6/zotbty, ovSfls av (pair] SijfioKpa-
3 Tfi<rQai TOVTOVS- (J/xoi coy 5e Kal el Trei/Tjrey //v oXiyoi eltv }
KptiTTovs Se T&V finropcw TTXtiovwv ovTOiv , ovSfh av oXiyap-
\iav Trpoo-ayopevo-ficv ov8e rrjv ToiavTrjv, el ro?y aXXoty ovai
irXoVCTLOLS fJi^j fJLTl7) TO>V TLfJiSiV. [JLClXXov TOIVVV \KTtOV OTl 40
Sfjfjios fJL(:V <rriv orav ol fXevOtpoi Kvpiot (acrii> } oXiyap^ia 1290 b
4 $* orav ol rrXovaiof aXXa <rv\ifta,ivti TOVS fjikv TroXXoi^y ewai
TOVS 8 oXtyouy fXfvdepoi fti> yap iroXXoi, TrXovo-ioi 8 oXiyoi.
6 nOAITIKflN Z (A }. 4.
Kal yap av et Kara /zeyefloy 8izvt[JiovTO ray d
5 eV AlOioTTta (fiacre rt^ey, 77 Kara /caXXoy 5 oXiyapyjia r\v av
oXtyov yap TO TrXfjOos KOI TO TO>V Ka\a>v KOI TO TCOV /ze-
yd\a>v. ov prjv d\\ ovSk TOVTOLS \iovov ixavws fyfi 8i(opio-0at 5
ray TroXirei ay ravray* aXX eTret TrXziova fjiopia KOL TOV
SfifjLov Kal TTJS oXiyap^ia^ e/crtV, eri SiaXrjTTTtov coy OVT av oi
10 eXfvOepoi oXtyoi oVrey TrXfiovaiv Kal fj.rj eXevOtpcoi apxaxri,
8fjfj.o?, oiov kv ATToXXcwia TTJ kv ra5 loviop Kal tv @rjpa (tv
rovTQtv yap iKarepa T>V vroXecor kv ra?y TifiaTs rjcrai ol
8iacf)fpovTs K.O.T (.vykvtiav Kal Trpcoroi /caracrxwrey ray
aTTOiKias, oXiyoL oi/rey TroXXcoj/V OVT av oi irXovcrioi SLO, TO
15 KaTo, TrXfjdos i^Tre/ae^et^, oXiyap-^ia, OLOV kv KoXcxp&vi TO Tra-
Xatov (CKCI yap e/ceKTT/i/ro p.aKpav ovo~iav ol TrXetbuy Trpiv
ytveo~6ai TOV TroXe/zoz/ TOV irpos Av8ovs\ aXX ecrri Sr]fj.oKpa- 6
Tta ptv OTav oi (Xevdepot Kal aTropoi irXeiovs oi/rey Kvpioi
TTJS a/?X^ 9 &o~iv, oXiyapyta 8 OTav ol TcXovaioL Kal euyei/e-
20 (rrepoi oXiyoi o//ry.
OTL jjitv ovv TroXtrelat TrXetofy, KCU 5t ^ alriav, etpfj- 7
Tai SCOTL 5e TrXetbfy TO>V flprjfjievcoi , Kal r/Vey /cat 8ia TC }
Xeyco/iei/ ap^v Xaj36frey r^r ^Iprjfjiivr^v TrpoTepov. 6//oXo-
yovp,tv yap ov^ ej/ /xe/aoy aXXa TrXe/co Trdcrav ^\iv noXiv.
25 cucTTrep ow e/ ^ cooL TTpoypovfjieda Xafteiv ei8r), irpS)Tov IJL\V av 8
dTroSicopigofiev OTTfp dvayKalov Tfav ^X eLV C ov i ^ ov * VL & re
r<i> alcr6T]Tr]picDv Kal TO r??y Tpocfrfjs kpya.o-TiK.ov Kal SZKTIKOV,
oiov OTo/m /cai KoiXiav, irpbs Se TOVTOIS, 01$ Kii tirai
tKaarTov avTa>v et ^ TocravTa [ei <5^] \JLQVOV, TOVTWV 8
30 8ca(f)opai, Xeya> 5 ofor crro/zaroy -n^a TrXei co ye^?y >cat
Xt ay Kai rcov alo-6r)Tr]pi(i)v, en <5e /cat rcoi/ KIVTJTIK&V
6 TTJS o-y^e^eooy r^y roi/rcoi dptOftbs e^ dvdyKrjs
TrXet co yei/7; ^wcoi/ (ou yap o?6r re rauroi ^tooi/ ^tv
oTo/zaroy Sia^opds, o/zo/iay 5e oiy<5 eorooi/), cScr^ orai/ XT/-
35 (j>0(acri TOVTCCV Trai^rey ot evSt^ofjievoi avvSvao-fioL, Troirjo ovo-iv
(ov } Kal TOvavT eiSrj TOV <ov oaanrep al <n^ei;ety
1290 b 41291 a 29. 7
9 r>v dvayKaicav //optW ivtv. rov avrov <Se rpoirov Kal rS>v
lpT)fiv(oi> iroXiTiS>v Kal yap at TroXety OVK e eVoy aXX
e/c TroXXcoj/ vvyKtivTai [ifpwv, cocrTrep ffprjTat 7roXXa/ay. ep
fjifv ovv e<rri ro ?repi rr]v rpoffiv irXfjOos, oi KaXovpevoi yecop- 40
yot, Sfvrepov Sk TO KaXovpevov fidvavaov (eorri 8e TOVTO TO Trepl 1291 a
T^y T^j/ay 3>v dvev iroXiv aSvvaTov oiKe?o~dai TOVTCOV Se
T&V T %yS)v ray p.\v e^ avdyKt]^ vTrdpyjtw Set, ray Se 6/y
10 Tpvtyrji rj TO icaXcoy ^t ), rpirov 8 dyopalov (Xeya) 5 dyo-
pdfov TO Trepl ray Trpdo-fts Kal ray <uj/ay Arat ray e/nro/nay AfaJ 5
/caTT^Xe/ay SiaTpifiois}, rerapro^ 5e ro OIJTIKOJ/, TT^TTTOV 8t
ytvos TO TrpoTroXe/ZTycroi , o rourcoj/ oi)5er T^rroi kcrTiv dvayKalov
1 1 vTrdp^fiv, i /j.XXovo~i /J.TJ SovXtvaftv ro?y eTTiovcriv. fj.rj yap ft/
r\ TroXtv dfciov etvai Ka\tlv Tr\v (pvcrfi SovXrjv
yap 17 TroXty, ro 8e SovXov OVK airrap/cey. SioTTfp 10
12 tv TTJ TroXiTfta ico/z^coy rovro, ov^ iKava>$ 5e fi prjTai. (pr)o~l
yap 6 ^co/cparT/y e/c rerrapco^ ra>i> afay>catorara)i/ TroXti
vvyKtlcrOai, Xeyet <5e rouroyy v$a.vn]v Kal yecopybv Kal CTKV-
t TOTofiov Kal OLKoSofjiov 7raXii/ <5e TTpoo~Ti6r]o~ii , coy 01^ avTap-
Tovro)v y %aXKfa Kal roz)y eTTf roFy dvayKafois (3oo~Krjfi.a- 15
er^ 5 ffnropov re *cat KdnrjXov Kal Tavra irdvTa yi-
TrXrj pa>fj.a r^y 7rpcur7;y TroXecoy, coy rcoj/ aVayKa/W re
w irdo-av rroXiv o~vveaTr)Kv iai J dXX ov rov KaXov
13 Ta-oi re Seo^vijv o-KVTta>v re /cat yecopycoj/. ro <Se T
oy Trporepov dnoSiStoo-i //epoy 7rp?j/ 77 r^y x<upay &vo- 20
Kal rf/y rcoi/ TrXrjo ioi aTrro/zei ^y e/y vroXe/zor /cara-
aXXa //T)^ /cat ei/ roly rerrapo^i /cat roFy onocroiaovv
dvayKalov tlvai Tiva TOV aTroBwaovTa Kal KpivovvTa
14 ro SiKaiov. eiVep ow *cai ^V^TJV dv TLS defy a>ov p.6piov
[idXXov f) trco/ua, /ca2 TroXecoi/ ra TOiavTa ftaXXov QCTZOV 25
rco^ e/y r^ dvayKatav ^pijcnv avvTtivovTtov, ro noXefUKov
Kal TO //ere^of SiKaioavvrjs SiKaaTiKrjs, rrpoy e rovroty ro
15 (3ovXv6fj.vov, oTrep ecrrZ crui/eaecoy vroXiri/c^y tpyov. Kal TavT
efre xe^copicr/xej coy vrrdp^ei Tio~lv efre roty ayroFy,
8 nOAITIKHN Z (A ). 4.
30 0epet Trpoy rov Xoyov Kal yap 6rrXiTVtv Kal yecopyeo
crvfj./3atv(i ro?y avTois 7roXXa/ay cocrre enrep Kal ravra KOI
tKtiva derea /j.6pia rr/y TroXecoy, fyavepov OTL TO ye orrXiTi-
KOV dvayKoiov eo~Ti popiov rfj? TroXecoy. (38o/j.ov St TO raty
ovcriais XeiTovpyovv, o KaXovfjLtv evTropovs. oySoov <Se ro Srj/jiiovp- 16
35 yiKov KOI TO irtpl ray a/3)(ay XeiTOvpyovv, t7rp avev dp^ov-
T<>V aSvvaTov tivai iroXiv. ava.yK.aiov ovv elvai rti/ay roi)y
8vvap.evovs apyjeiv Kal XfiTOVpyovvTa? r) crvvf^at^ rj Kara
TTJ yroXei TCLVTTJV TT^V XeiTOVpyiav. Xonra <5e Trept cor 17
5icwpi^6rey a/or/coy, TO fiovXevofjitvov Kal Kplvov
40 Trept TCOJ/ SiKaiwv roly afjL^io-^rjTovcnv. eijrep ovv raura cVet
ycveo-OaL ra?y iroXeo-L Kal KaXSts yevto-Qai Kal (Sf/ca/coy,
1291 b avayKalov Kal //ere^oj/ray e^ai rti/ay aper^y rco/> TroXiTi-
K>V. ray //ei^ ow> d XXay Swdftfis roFy ai^roty VTrdp^ftv 18
(v$)(o-Qai SoKfi TToXXoty, ofoi> roi>y avTov? tivai roi)y TrpoTroXe-
/zovi/ray /cat yecwpyoCi/ray Ki re^^tVay, ert 5e roi)y ftovXfvo-
*
5 yue^ouy re icai KpivovTas avrnvoiovvrai 5e /cat r^y aper^y
TrdvTes, Kal ray TrXeiVray ap^ay ap^eiv o iovrai 8vvao~Qai ^
aXXa TrevtcrOai Kal TrXovTfTv roi)y avTOvs dSvvaTov. SLO raOra 19
//ep?7 fidXicrTa eivai SOKCI TroXecoy, o/ evnopoi Kal ol aTropoi.
ZTI Se Sia TO coy e?n ro TroXy rouy /let oXiyovy tlvat. rouy 5e
10 TToXXoi^y, raOra tvavTia p-^prj <paivtTat T$>V r^y TroXecoy
fiopfov. cocrre /cai ray TroXiremy /cara ray U7repo>(ay royrcor
Ka6i.crTao~i, Kal Svo TroXireTai SOKOVO~IV tlvai, 8r]/j.oKpaTia Kal
ow e/cr( noXiTfiai rrXet ofy, /cat c^ia r/Vay 20
15 am ay, efp^rat Trporepoi/- 6Vi 5 ecrrt /cat SrjfjioKpaTias ttSr)
ir\i<o Kal oXiyapx^ay, Xeyco^ue^. tfiavfpbv Se TOVTO Kal e<
rcoi flpr]fjLeva)v. fiSrj yap TrXe/co roO re 8rj/j.ov Kal rcoi/ Xeyo- 21
yv(opifj.(ov 0~Tiv, OLOV Srifjtov fjikv ei Sr) cv p.\v ot yecopyot,
5e ro Trept ray re^i^ay, aXXo <Se ro dyopalov TO Trepl
20 c0i/7)r /cat -rrpda-LV SiaTpt^ov, aXXo <Se ro ?repi r^ OdXaTTav, Kal
TOVTOV TO fiev TToXe/ztKOf, ro 5e ^prj^aTia-TLKOv, TO 8e irop-
1291 a 301292 a 13. 9
ov, rb 8 dXifVTiKov ^noXXa^ov yap fKacna TOVTCOV
a, oTov dXteFy fiev tv TdpavTi Kal BvavTi(p, rpirj-
piKov 8( AOr/vrjo-iv, efitropiKov 8e kv Alyivy Kal Xto), irop-
QfjKVTlKOV (V TfVfSa)}, 7T/)dy TOVTOIS TO \tpVrjTlKOV KOI TO 25
fjiiKpav t\ov ovo-iav cooTe p.rj 8vvaa6ai o-%oXdiv, ert TO
jj.r) e^ dfjicfioTfpow 7roXiTo>v eXtvOepov, Kav ft TI TOIOVTOV
22 eVepoi/ TrX^ouy efo^oy T>V 8e yv(apip.a)v TrXoOToy, fvytveia,
dpfTrj, TraiSfta, Kal TO, TOVTOIS Xeyo//ej/a K.O.TO, TTJV avTrjv
8ta(f)0pdv. SypoKpaTia p.\v ovv ea-Tt 7rp<Tr] fikv 17 Xeyo/zei/Ty 30
Kara TO i<rov. ivov ydp (firjcriv 6 i>6fj.o$ 6 Trjs
SrjfiOKpaTLas TO //ry^ei/ fidXXov inrdp^etv TOV?
diropovs rj TOVS einropovs, ftTjSe tcupiov? tlvai OTTOTepovo-ow, dXX
23 opoiovs a//00T/)ouy. fi irep yap eXevOtpia fj.dXio~T ecrTt^ kv 8r)-
ftoKpaTia, Kaddrrep VTroXa^/Bdvovo-i Ti^ey, Kal iVoTT/y, oi/TOoy 35
av irj fjidXicTTa, KoivtovovvTwv airdvTtov //aXto"Ta T^y TTO\I-
Ttfat 6/*oia>$. eTrei 5e irXtitov 6 8fjfj.o$ } Kvpiov Se TO 86av
24 TOty irXfCoatV, avdyKrj SrjftoKpaTiav ef/ai ravTr^v. tv fjikv ovv
efo^oy Sr)fj.oKpaTias TOVTO, dXXo 8c TO Tay ap^as diro Tif^rj-
lidTGw eo/ai, @pa)(ea)v <Se TOVTCOV OVTOSV, 8f.l 8e TO> KTQ)fj.va> 40
fovo~iav tivat //ere^(^, Kal TOV diro{5d\\ovTa fir] ^eTe^eti/*
eTfpov i^oy 8r]fJLOKpaTias TO HTf\fiv airavTas TOVS TroXrray 1292 a
25 O<TOI dwrrevOvvoi, dp\eiv 8c TOV vop.ov eTepov Se e?<Soy 8r)-
fjiOKpaTias TO Trda-i fj.Tfti>ai TO>V dp^wv, lav \tovov r) TroXi-
T7/y, dp)(iv 8e TOV VO/JLOV (Tepov efiSoy tojfUHCpaTfas TaXXct
fiv flvai TavTa, Kvpiov 8 (Tvai TO TrXfjOos Kal ^ TOV vo~ 5
ftov TOVTO 8c yiveTai, OTO.V TO, \lrr)(f)icr[j.aTa Kvpia fj aXXa
26 ft?) o v6[j.o$. o~ufj.@aivfi 8e TOVTO Sia TOVS Srjfj.aymyov^. tv
fiv yap TaTy K.O.TO. VOJJLOV 8r]fjLOKpaTov/J.vai$ ov ytvfTat STJ-
//aycoyoy, aXX ol /SeXTtoTot TO>V TroXiTwv (to~lv kv TrpoeSpia
orrov 8 ol v6fj.oi ftrj fieri Kvpioi, kvTavQa yivovTai 8r)fj.aya)- 10
yot . fi6vap)(os yap 6 8fjfJ.os ytveTai, vvvQeTOS e?y IK TroX-
Xa>V ol ydp iroXXol Kvpioi flaiv ov\ a>y e<ao-Toy aXXa TTO.V-
27 Tey. "O^pos 8e iroiav Xeyei OI^AC dyadrjv tivai TroXvKOipavfyv,
io UOAITIKflN Z (A*). 4-6.
TTOTfpov TavTrjv rj orav irXeiaus Sxrtv ol dp^ovT9 coy
15 d8rj\ov. 6 6" ovv roioVTO? 8rjfj.os, are p-ovapyjos coV, {rjTfT /JLO-
vapyjeiv Std TO p.r] dp^aOai virb vofiov, Kal yivtTat Sea-iro-
T*6y, coo-re ol KoXetKey ei/ri/zoi- Kal fariv 6 TOIOVTOS 8fjfj.os
dvdXoyov TU>V p,ovap\iG>v Trj rvpavvtSi. SLO KOL TO rjOos TO 28
ai>TO } Kal a/i0co StcnroTiKa rS>v /SeXTtorco^, Kal TO. ^77-
20 0iV/zaTa (uo-Tre/o e/ce? ra TriTdy(j.aTa, Kal 6 ^Tj/zaycoyo?
Kal 6 Ko\a ol avrol Kal avdXoyov. Kal ndXia-ra 8 e*a-
repoi (nap } iKartpois La^vovaiv, ol /zei> /coAaice? Trapd rols
Tvpdvvoi?, ol 5e Srjfjiaya>yol TO?? STJ/AOLS TOLS TOLOVTOLS. amot 29
<5e e/cri ToiJ iVai Ta ^fr](f)LO fJ.aTa Kvpia aXXa //?) TOI)? vopovs
25 ovroij Trdvra dvdyovTes e/y TOJ^ Srjftov crvfji(3atvi yap avrois
yiveaOat ^ueyaXoty 5ia TO TOV fjitv 8fjfj.oi> Trdvra>v etVat KV-
piov } rfjs 8z TOV 8ri[JLOV 86rjS TOVTOVS ireiOtTai yap TO TrXfjdo?
Tovroty. Ti 8 ol Taty ap^aFy ey/caXoOi/Tey Tor Sfjfj.6v (pao-i 30
6"eri/ KptvtLr, 6 5e acr/zei/coy Se^eTai ri]v TrpoK\r](TLv COCTT Aca-
30 TaX^ovTai TrdcraL at dp^ai. tvXoycas c5e ai> 86ziev k
p.dv 6 <pdo~K(av rr]v TOiavTrjv tivai SrjfjioKpaTiav ov
OTTOV ydp fj.r/ v6fj.oi dp^ovcnv^ OVK <TTL 7ToXtTia. 8ei ydp TOV 31
IL\V vofjiov dp-^iv TrdvTtov, T&V cSc KaO e/cacrTa Tay dp^as
Kal TT]v TroXiTtiav Kpiveiv. COCTT L7rep ecrTi SrjuoKpaTia fj.ta
35 T0)v TroXiTeicov, fyavtpov coy fj ToiavTrj KaTaa-Tacris, tv fj ^rj-
(pto-fLacri irdvTa ^ioi/cerrai, ov8\ 8r)p.oKpaTia KV picas ov8\v
yap fv8)(Tai ^?70icr/za eiVat KaSoXov. TO. [L\v ovv T?yy $77-
HOKpaTias iSrj StwpicrOa) TOV TpoTrov TOVTOV
5 OXiyap^ias 8e (iSr), ev fi\v TO diro
40 Tay a/)^ay TrjXiKovTwv COCTTC Toyy djropovs p.r]
oWay, e^ea^ai 8e TCO KTCofteva* p.cT)(eiv Tryy rroXiTei ay aXXo
1292 b 5e, oVai enro TifJ.rjfj.aTO)v p.aKpS)V axriv at dp^al Kal alpS>v-
rat avTol Toi/y eXXe/Vro^ray (av [itv ovv K TrdvTOtv TOVTWV
TOVTO TToicocrij SOKGI TOVT^ eiVai fjidXXov dpi&TOKpaTiKov, kdv 8\
K nva>v d(j)(0pio-fj.evct)v } oXiyap-^iKov^ Tpov 180$ oXiyap- 2
5 X t/cxy > QTav Traty dvT\ TraTpoy flair) TfTapTOv 8 , OTO.V
1292 a 141292 b 38. n
TO T vvv Xe^0(v Kal dp^rj fir) 6 vofios d\\ ol
ap)(oi/Tey. KOI to-Tiv dvTt(TTpo<f>os afar] fv TaTs o
axnrfp 17 Tvpavvls ei> Tais fiovap^iais Kal irepl r)S
Taias fiTTOfiev SrjfioKpaTias kv TaFy SrjfioKpaTiats Kal Ka-
Xovo~i 8r) Trjv ToiavTrjv oXiyap^iav Svvaa-Tfiav. 10
3 OAiyapx/a? fJ.ev ovv fi Sr] rotravra Kal Sr/poKpaTtas ov
SfT $ \av6dvttv on TToXXa^ov <rvfif3(3r)Ki <2<rre TYJV fttv
iroXiTeiav Trjv Kara rovs vofiovs fj.r) SrifioriKrjv tlvai, Sia $
TO e^oy Kal TT/P dyoiyrjv 7roXiTVcr6ai SrjfiOTiKais, o/zo/coy
Sf irdXiv irap aXXois rrjv fifv Kara Touy vofiovs fTvai TroXi- 15
r^iav SrjfjLOTiK&Tepav, rfj S dywyfj Kal To?y e$ecni/ oXiyap-
4 \fia-6ai ndXXov. of/z/3a/Vei 8\ TOVTO fidXio-ra
/zeTa/SoAay T&V iroXiTfian ov yap ev6i>$
dXXa dyairGxn ra irpS>ra fiiKpa TrXeovsKrovvTes Trap dXXrj-
Aoo^, <u<r^ ol fJL\v vofioi 8iafivov<riv ol Trpoi/Va^oi/Tey, Kpa- 20
rovcri 8 01 fiTa(3dXXovres TJ)J> TroXiTtiav.
"On 8 fo-Tt roa-avra ei Sr] SrjfjiOKp arias Kal oXiyap- Q
\ias, e^ avrS>v T&V eipr/fifvcoy Qavepov eoriv. dvdyKrj yap
r) TrdfTa TO. flpr)fj.tva fiepr) TOV Sr}fiov KOivtovtiv rfjs TroXireias,
2 r) TO. p.\v TO. 5e fir), orav fifv ovv TO yecapyiKov Kal TO Afe-^5
KTrffitvov fieTpiav ovo-iav Kvpiov r) Trjs TroXiTtias,
Tai KaTa vofjiovs fyovo-i yap epya^6/zei>oi ^v, ov
& o-yoiXdfav , coo*T6 TOV vofiov (Trio-Trjo-ai Tes eKKXtjo-Lagovo-i Tay
di/ayKafas KKXr)o~ias TOIS 8e dXXois fiT^iv Zgea-Tiv, OTO.V
3 KTrjo~(i)VTai TO TifJ.r)fj.a TO 8ia>pio p.vov virb T&v vo\ia>v. SXcos 30
p.\v yap TO fjifv fir) feivai irdo iv oXiyap^iKov, TO 8e 8rj t
(rrdo i SrjfioKpaTiKov}- 8to irdcri. TOIS KTr)o~afJii>ois e^ecrTi
\ lv ffyjoXdfciv (8 } dSvvaTOv fir) TT poo~6S(t)v ovaaiv. TOVTO /JLV
ovv flSos ev SrjfioKpaTias 8id TavTas Tay aiTias fTpov 8t
eiSos Sia Tr)i> ^ofievrjv Siaipeo~iv, <EO~TI yap Kal Trdo~iv etivai 35
T0?y dvvTTfv Ovvois KaTa TO ytvos, fifTf^fiv fitvToi
4 o-^oXd^fLv. Siorrep kv Tfl ToiavTr) SrjfioKpaTia ol vofioi
8ta TO fir) fivai TrpocoSov TpiTov 8 fiSos TO irdo~iv f
nOAITIKflN Z (A }. 6-7.
cow av e XevOepoi 3><n, fj-fre^fiv r^y TroXireias, fir] fj.fVTOi
40 /J-fTe^fiv Sia TTJV 7rpoipT]/j.^vr]v atriav, COOT dvayKaiov Kal
kv TavTT) dp-^eiv TOV vop.ov TCTapTov Se eiSos SrjfjioKpaTias 5
1293 a 77 TeXevTaia rofy x/ooVoty ev rats 7r6X((ri yeyevr)fj.evr}. Sia
yap TO fj.tiovs ytyovtvai TTO\V ray TroXety ra>v e^ inrap^i]^
Kal TrpoaoScDv vTrdpy^eiv evnopias, fter^ova-t fj.\v Trdvrts r^y
Sia rr^v VTTfpo^rjv TOV TrXr/Qovs, KOLV&VOVCTI <5e Kal
5 iroXiTtvovrai Sia TO SvvaaQai a"^o\d^ir Kal rouy
XafJifidvovras fj.icr66v. Kal fidXicrra St a^oXd^ei TO TOLOVTOV 6
ir\f}6oS ov yap f/ATroSifci avrovs ovSev 17 rfav IBuav CTTi/ze-
Xeta, Toi)y 5e TrXoucri Duy kpiro8(^i t axrrf. ?roXXa/ciy oy KOLVCOVOVCTI
rfjs eKKXrjcrias ovre rov 8iKaeiv. Sio yiverai TO T&V diropcov
10 7rX?70oy Kvpiov rfjs TroXiTe/ay, aXX o^ oi vop.oi. ra [JL\V ovv 7
TTyy Srjfj.oKpaTiay tiSr) rocravra Kal roiavra Sia ravras ra?
kvriv TO. Se T^y oXiyap^ias, orav p.\v TrXet oi/y
ovcriav, (Xdrrco Se Kal JJLT) TroXXrjv \iav, TO
oXiyap-ftias et<56y kariv TTOIOVCTI yap kfcovcriav
15 TO KTco/^e^co, Kal Sia TO TrXfjQos tlvai T>V ^T^OVTODV TOV 8
iroXiTv/j.aTOS dvdyxrj fir) T0ty dvQp&irovs dXXa TOV vofjiov
tivai Kvpiov oo-oo yap av TrXeTov aTre^coa-i T^y fj.ovap\ias,
Kal /J.rJT Too-avTrjv tyjuaiv ovcriav COCTTC o~^oXd^iv dpeXovv-
Tey, firjO ouTtoy oXiyrjv a>o~T TpefacrOai dwo Trjs TroXecoy,
20 dvdyKr] TOV VO/JLOV dgiovv avToIs ap^iv } aXXa fjirj avTOV?.
eav St Sr] eXaTTOi<y (bcriv oi Tay ovaias %yow$ r) oi TO Trpo- 9
Tpov } ir\i<o S, TO T^y SevTepas oXiyap^ias yive-ai ef6\>y,
fjidXXov yap io-\vovTf^ TrXeoveKTeiv dgiovo-iv Sib avTol jjikv
alpovvTai fK TO>V dXXcov TOVS e/y TO TroXiTevfia (BaS
25 Sia Se TO fjiTjTro) OVTGDS lcr\vpol tlvai &O-T dvev vopov
TOV vofiov TidevTai TOLOVTOV. cav S kTrntivaixn TO) eXaTTorey 10
6Wey /ze^oi/ay ovo-ias *X lI/ > ^ TpiTrj ttriSoa-is yiveTai T^y
oXiyap^ias, TO Si avTcov [Jikv Tay ap^ay *X* iv > KaTa vo-
fjiov St TOV KfXfvovTa TO>V TeXevTtoVTcav SiaSe^o-dai Toi)y
30 vii?. OTav Se rjSr] 7roXi> vTrepTeivcixri Taiy ovo-iais Kal Tafy 1 1
1292 b 391293 b 21. 13
, eyyuy 17 TotavTt] Swao-rcia fjLovap^ias ICTTIV, Kal
Kvpioi yivovrai ol dvOpairoi, dXX ofy 6 j/6/foy Kal TO T-
raprov tlSos rfjs 6Xiyap\ias TOVT eo~Tiv, dvTio~Tpo(f>ov TO> TC-
Xfvraia) TTJS SrifjiOKpaTias.
"En. ff fia-l 8vo TroXiTfiai irapa SrjfjLOKpaTiap re Kal 7
oXiyapxiav, a>v rrjv ^kv irtpav \eyov<ri re Tra^rey Kal fiprj-
rai T>V TTTap<t)v iro\iT(t>v ef<5oy tv \eyov<n. 5e rerrapay
fjiovap\iav, 6\iyap\iav } 8rjfjLOKpaTLav t rtTaprov 8\ TTJV K.O.-
XovfjLfvrji/ apia-TOKpariav TTtfiTTTT) 8 eoriV f) Trpo<rayopVTai
TO KOivov ovofJLa TracrSiv (jToXiTfiav yap KaXovcriv), d\Xa Sia 4
TO ftr] iroXXaKis yive&Oai XavOdvet TOVS Trip<ofjii>ov$ d-
TO. T&v TroXiTfiStv eiSrj, Kal xpatvTai rals TCTrapcri
2 axrirep UXdrcDv tv rats -rroXiTfiais. dpLo-TOKpariav p.\v ovv 1293 b
/caX<y ^et KaXfTv irepl rjs SirjXOopev kv To?y 7rp<oToi$ Xo-
yoty (TTJV yap e/c rStv dpicrTcw aTrXcoy tear dperr)^ 7roXiTiav t
Kal fir} 7r/)oy vir66t<riv riva dyaBtov dvSp&v, fiovr^v St
Trpoaayopeveiv dpiaTOKpaTiav tv fiovij yap cbrXcoy 6 auToy 5
dvrjp Kal TroXtTTjs dyados (.<TTLV, ol 8 kv rats dXXais dya-
3 6ol npbs rr}v TroXiTfiav ei(rl TTJV avT<ov) ov ^v aXX tW
rives at Trpos T Tay oXiyap^ovfjievas e^ofo-i 6\a0o/aay, Kal
KaXovvrat dpia-roKpariai^ Kal Trpoy TTJV KaXov/j.tvriv TroXiTfiav,
OTTOV yf pr) IJLOVQV TrXovTiv8r]v aXXa Kal dpi<TTLv8r)v alpovvTat 10
Tay ap^ay. avrif 17 iroXiTtta Siatytpti T d^olv Kal dpi-
4 aroKpaTLK^l KaXeirai- Kal yap iv rais fir) TroLovpfvais KOIVTJV
a/3T^y el&lv o/zcoy Tf^ey ol evSoKifj-ovvrts Kal 80-
fTvai tTTifiKets. oirov ovv 17 iroXireia /JXeTret cfy TC
nXovrov Kal aperr)? Kal SfjfjLov, OLOV zv KapxrjSovi, avrr] dpi- 15
o~TOKpaTiKr) eo-Ttv, Kal kv afy /y ra 8vo HQVOV, olov 17 AaK-
5 TOVTWV, 8rjfj.oKpaTia$ re Kal dpeTrjs. dpio-TOKparias n\v ovv
napa rrjv irp<&Tr\v TTJV dpia-Trjv TroXiTftav ravra 8vo (iSrj-
Kal rptrov ocrai TTJ$ KaXovfjLevrjs -rroXiTcias ptirovo-i. Trpoy TTJV 20
fidXXov
I 4 nOAITIKflN Z (A*). 8-9.
8 AOLTTOV 8 CCTTfJ rjlUV TTfpl T( TrjS 6fOfjLao[J.VT)S
eiVefy Kal Trept TvpavviSos raa/zej> 8 ovrccs OVK ovo~av ovre
To.vTT]v TraptKJ:$a<nv oure ray apn prjOeiaas dpicrTOKparias, on
25 ro p.\v dXr)6e$ Trdcrac Sir)napTiJKao~i rr/y opOordTTjs TroXt-
re/iay, evretra Karapidfj.ovfTaL /zera TOVTCOV, fiat r avratv
avrcLL 7rape/c/3ccreis, cocrrrep kv ro?y KCLT dpx*} v etiroftev, re- 2
\tvTouov St TTpl rvpavviSos tvXoyov ear* Troiijcrao-Oai fj.i>iav
8ia TO 7rao-o)i/ rfKiara TavTrjv eivai TroXireiav, r]\uv
30 ptdoSov tlvai rrepl TroXire/ ay. 5i ^j/ p.\v ovv alriav
roi/ Tpoivov TOVTOV, ipr)Tai vvv Se SCIKTCOV fjp.lv Trepl TroXi-
retay. 0ai/eyocorepa yap rj Svi/afiis avrfjy 8L(apLcr^vu>v TCOJ/
TTtpl oXiyap^ias Kal SrjfjLOKparia?. ecrr: yap f] TroXireia coy 3
cbrAcoy tiireiv [ti^is 6Xiyap)(ias Kal 8t]fj.oKpaTLa9, tlatOacri
35 5e KaXe?^ ray /ief aTro/cAi^oucray coy TT/ody r^ 8r]fj.oKpariav
y, ray <Se vr/aoy r^ oXiyap^iav /zaAAoi> dptcrTOKpa-
8ia TO fj.dXXov aKoXovOtlv TraiSetav Kal evytvtiav ro?y
et^ropa)re/)0iy. eri <5e SOKOVCTIV ^etr oi evTropoi &&gt;v et^e/cej/ o/ 4
a^KoiJvrey dSiKovanv oQtv Kal /caAouy KayaOovs Kal yvwptjJLOVS
40 roi/rouy Trpoaayopevova-iv. evrei ow 17 dpi&TOKpaTLa fiovXtrai
Trjv i)TTfpoyr)v O.TTOV^^IV ro?y apiVroiy rcoj/ TroAircoi , *a< ray
6Xiyap)(ias ttvai <f>a<rLv e/c rcoi KaXav KayaQcav p.dX\ov, 80- 5
1294 a ft 8 tivai TO>V dSwdro^v TO et}j/o/zet<r0at Trjv fir) dpio-TOKpa-
iro\Lv aAAa 7roi>ripoKpaTovfj.vr)if, dfiouos 5e Kal dpi-
Oai TTJV fir] evvop.ov[j.tvr)v. OVK HCTTL 8t evvo/iia TO ev
Kio~daL TOVS vofiovs, fir) TreiOecrOai Se. Sib ftfav jjikv vvofj.iav 6
5 vTrorjTTTfov tvaL TO TTftfaai roy /cei/zroty j//z<uy, repav
8e TO AcaAcoy KtlvOai rouy v 6/zouy ofy ffifiti/ovo-iv (eo-TL yap irci-
6eo~0ai Kal /ca/ccoy Kifj.evoi$}. TOVTO 8t v8e^fTai <5i^y f)
yap roty apiVrcuy rcor evSe^ofi^Qiv avTois, rj roFy drrAcoy
apurroiy. SoKfi 5e dpicrTOKpaTia p.\v tlvai fidXicrTa TO ray 7
10 rt/zay vtvffirjo-Oai /car aper^y dpto~TOKpaTias p.\v yap opos
dpfTrj, oAiyap^t ay 5e TrAoCroy, Srjfiov 8 fXfvOepia- TO 8 o TI
av 86rj TO?S TT\tioviv } kv Tracra^y virdp^fi Kal yap kv 6X1-
1293 b 221294 b 4. 15
ia Kal tv dpio~TOKpaTia Kal lv o^/zoty, o n av 86r) TO>
irXttovt LiepeL ro>v p.Tf XOVTCW rrjs TroXiTftas, TOUT e<m Kvptov.
8 ei> fikv ovv Tals TrXearraty Tr6\<ri TO Tt/y TroXtTeiay eiSos /ca- 15
Xe2Vai (JJLOVOV yap 17 /* iy <rro)(d(Tai TWV tviropoH KOL
dnopcw, irXovrov KOI tXevdepias- o"%f8bi> yap irapa roty
ol cvTropoi TO>I> Ka\S>v Kaya65)v SoKova
9 ^a>pav\ tirel St rpta e<m ra dfji(f)i<r(3r)Tovi Ta rfjs /ao
rf;y TroXtretay, eXeu^epi a TrXoOroy a/jer^ (TO yap rera/oroi/, o 20
Ka\ov<nv fvyevfiav, aKoXovOfTrois Svviv 17 yap evycvfid e
TrXoCroy /cat aper^), (f>avtpov on TTJV /zei/ roo/
rpicov dpLo~TOKpaTiav //aXtara rcor aXXcoi/ Trapa rr)V
10 dXrjOtvrjv Kal TrpatTrjv. OTL p.\v ovv ea-Ti Kal erepa TroXire/ay 25
ef^T/ Trapa povapyiav T Afat SrjfioKpaTLav Kal oXtyap^iav,
ftprjrai, Kal irola ravra, Kal ri Siafytpovcriv d\\r)\<av at r
dpio-TOKpariai Kal al TroXiTetai r^y aptcrro/cpanay, Kal OTL ou
Troppoo avTai dXXrjXwv, <f>avtp6v
Tiva 8\ TpoTrov ytvtTai Trapa SrjuoKpaTtav Kal 6X1- 9
yapyfav rj Ka\ovp.vrj TroXiTta y Kal Trcoy avTrjv Set Ka6io-Ta-
vai, XtyatfjLfir e^e^y roFy etp^/zei/oiy. apa 8e 8r)\ov ecrrat
Kal ofy 6piovTai TTJV SrjfjLOKpaTiav Kal Ti]v oXiyap^iav Xrj-
TTTZOV yap TTJV TOVTCOV Siaipfaiv, fiTa K TovTotv d<p c/carepay
2 coo-rrep o-vp.fio\ov XayujSaroi/ray crvvOtTtov. et crt 8k opoi rpety 35
T^y (Ti/i ^eo eooy ^cat /zf ^ecoy. ^ yap a/i^orepa X^Trreoi/ a
Ka.T(pai vop.o6tTovo~iv, oiov TTfpl Tov 8iKativ iv p.\v yap
Tats oXtyap^/aty rofy (irrropots ^-qp.iav TaTTOvcnv, av /XT) 5i-
Kafaxri, TOIS 8 aVopoty ovSzva fj.to-06v } kv 8e Tats 8rjp.oKpa-
rtaty roty /iei aTropoiy fjii<r66v, roFy 5 fv-rropois ovScjj-iav fa- 40
3 /z/ai/ /coti/dy <5e /cai /zeo-of TOUTCO^ a/x0orepa raOra 5io >cai
TroXiTiKov, fiffJ-tKTai yap e dptyoiv. *y //ei/ ow ouroy roO 1294 b
o*vv8va<Tfjiov rpoTroy, ercpoy 5e TO p.fo oi Xa/j
TaTTovo-tv, olov tKKXT](rideiv ol fifv aTro
77 niKpov irdnnav, ol 8 diro fiaKpov Ttfj.rjfjiaTo$ KOL-
16 nOAITIKflN Z (J ). 9-11.
5 vbv 8e ye ovStTepov, dXXd TO fteow tKarepov rt/i^/xaroy rov-
TCOJ>. TptTov 6 e/c 6Voff TaypaTOiv, ra //er e/c TOI) oXiyap- 4
X*Koi5 VO/J.QV, TO. <$ /c TOW 8rjp.oKpaTiKov. Xeyco 5 ofoj/ SoKtl
8rjfj.oKpaTt.Kbv p.tv eivai KXrjpa>Tas eivat ray dp^ds, TO
5* aiperas oXiyapxtKov, Kal Srjfj.oKpaTiKoi /xer TO /z^ aTro
10 Ti/ZTy/zaToy, 6\Lyap\iKov Se TO a?ro Ti/xTy/zaToy* dpiffTOKpa- 5
TIKOV TOLVVV Kal TToXiTiKov TO e^ tKciTepas tKaTtpov \afitiv,
IK fjLff TTjy 6Xiyap)(ia$ TO a//3CTay TroieFi/ Tay a/o^ay, e/c 5e
Tt/y SrjpoKpaTtas TO /z^ CCTTO Tipr/fiarcs. 6 p.\v ovv rponos rfjs 6
fiieco$ ouToy, ToO 5 e fj.ffj.i\6aL 8r)fj.oKpaTiav Kal 6Xiyap\iai>
15 opoy, oVar ei>6\r)Tai. Xeyeiv TTJV avrrjv TroXtrtiav SrjuoKpa-
rtav Kal oXiyap^iav SfjXov yap OTI TOVTO -nacryovviv ol Xe-
yovrts 8ia TO ftefJ.i)(Qai /caAcoy. Treirovde 8e TOVTO Kal TO
fj.faov tfjupaiveTai yap kKa.Tf.pov kv ai^TO) Tcof aKp<ov. OTTC/J 7
(TVfji^aivfL TTpl TT]f AaK^8aip.ovL(ii)v TroXiTfiav. TroXXol yap
20 iy^ipovcri Xeyfiv coy SrjfjioKpaTias ovo~r)$ Sid TO Sr]fj.oKpaTiKa
TroAXa TTJV Ta^Lv %yjttv ) oiov TrpS>Tov TO Trept TIJV Tpoffiv T<OV
o/io/icoy yap ol TO>V ir\ovo-t<ov TptyovTai TOty TCOV
, Kal iraiSevovTai TOV Tponov TOVTOV ov av SvvaivTO
Kal TO>V TTv^TO)v ol TTaiSts o/iOiiooy St Kal krrl TTJS e^o/ze- 8
25 VT)$ fjXiKtas, Kal oTav dvSpts ytvai Tai, TOV avTov Tponov
ov\v yap SidSrjXos 6 TrXovo~ios Kal 6 rrevrjs- OVTCO TO, irtpl TTJV
Tpotyrjv TavTa Trdcriv kv Tols O~UO~O~LTIOI$, Kal Trjv ecrdfJTO. ol
TrXovo-ioi TOLavTrjv o iav dv TIS 7rapao~Kvdcrai SvvaiTO Kal
TS>v TTfviJTQiv OO-TIO~OVV. tTi Ta> Svo Tay /zeyi o-Tay ap^ay T)J> 9
30 p.\v alpelo~6ai TOV Srjfiov, TTJS 8t /xeTe^eir TOVS p\v yap
alpovvTai, T7?y 8 e^opei ay fjiT^ovo"iv. ol 8 oXiyap-
SLO, TO TroXXa tX tv oXiyap^iKa, oiov TO 7rao~ay alpe-
TO.S eivat Kal p.r]8^^iav KXrjpaiTijv, Kal 6Xiyov$ eivat Kvpiovs
OavaTov Kal <pvyfjs } Kal dXXa TOiavTa TroXXd. 8ei 8 kv 10
35 rf) TroXiTC/a Tfl /ie/iiy/zei/7; /caXaiy dficpoTfpa SoKfiv ftvat
Kal fjirjSeTfpov, Kal o~<ato-Qai 81 avTrjs Kal fj.r) e^co^ef, Kal
Si avTrj? fir) T& TrXeiovs [e^cu^e^"] tivai TOVS (3ovXofj.tvovs
1294 b 51295 a 29. 17
yap av Kal rrovrjpa iroXiTtia rovff v-jrdpyov) dXXa r<3 p.rjS av
fiovXearQai TroXiTeiav erepai> fj.r]8ev T&V rrjs TroXeeoy popiw
oXo>y. TLVO. (*v ovv rpoirov 6VT KaQicrTavai TroXtTtiav, 6/zoto>y 40
8e Kal ray oVo/za^o/zeVay dpicrTOKparias, vvv tiprjTai
Ilepl 8e rvpavviSos r\v f]fj.iv XOLTTOV etTTtiv, ofy <uy vov- 1295 a. 10
(rrj? TroAfXoy/a? trepl avrrjv, aXX oVcoy Xd(3r) rfjs p.t668ov
TO /xepoy, TTi8r) Kal ravTr]v TiQf^v rutv TroXtreieSf TI p.t-
poy. TTfpl p.\v ovv /SacrtXeiay Sicapia-afjLfv kv ro?p Trpcoroty Xo-
yo:y, er o/y Trepl TTJS yuaXiora Xeyo/ierr;y /SacriXeuzy GTTOIOV- 5
/ze^a r^f (r/ce>|riv, iroTepov d(rv/j.(f)opos rj <rup.<pp^t rats TTO-
2 Xecrir, Kai r/Va KCU TroOev Sti KaOicrrdvai, Kal 7r<y rvpav-
viSos 8 fiSr] Svo \i\v 8iL\ofj.v kv ofy vrep2 /SacriXe/ay CTTC-
<TKOTrov[j.v, Sia TO TJ)J/ 8vvafj.iv kiraXXdrreiv TTCOS avrcov Kal
7r/)oy r^ (SaaiXfiav, 8ia TO Kara VO/JLOV eivai djjKpoTepas 10
ravray ray dp-^ds (ei/ re yap reo^ (3ap(3dpav Ti&lv aipovv-
Tat avTOKpaTopas /ioj/apxofy, /cat ro TraXatoi/ ej ro?y ap-
\aioL$ "EXXrjo-Lv kyiyvovTQ Tives fj.6vap^oi TOV Tpoirov TOVTOV,
3 ovs fKaXovv atW/i^Tyray), e^ovai 5e rtpay vrpoy aXX^Xay avTai
5ia0opay, ^(ray 5e 5ia /zei/ ro Kara vopov j3a(riXiKal Kal 15
8ia TO fjLovapyjtlv IKOVTCDV, TvpavviKal <Se Sta TO SecnroTiKais
Kara TTJV avTutv yv^n^v TptTOv Se fiSos TVpavviSos,
fjidXia T elvai SOKG? Tvpavvis, arrt(rrpo0oy oi?o a TTJ TrafjL-
4 (3ao-iXia. TOiavTrjv 8 dvayKalov fTvai TVpavviSa TJ\V JJLO-
vap^iav, ^riy dvvirevOvvos dp\fi TO>V bpoLoav Kal fteXTiovcov 20
wdvTcov ?rpoy ro o~(j)Tpov avTrjs <7f//0epop, aXXa fj.rj Trpoy
ro T>V dp-^ofiv<ov. SioTrep dKofotos* ovSels yap IKO>V vrrofie-
vfi T>V tXv6tpa>v TTJV ToiavTTjv dp^i]v. TvpavviSos (lev ovv
fiSrj TavTa Kal roo-atnra Sia ray clprjfj.fvas air/iay
T/y 8 dpio-Tij 7roXtre/a Kat rty apio-roy j3/by ra?y TrXei- 11
oraiy TroXeo^i Kat ro?y TrXetoroiy T>V dv6pd>iro)v, /iJ^re rrpoy
dpTr]v o~vyKpivovo~i Trjv vnfp TOVS ISuoTas, prJTf Trpoy TraiSfiav
rj <f>vcT(o? SetTai Kal xoprjyias TV\r]pas, /J^re Trpoy TroXi-
Tftav TTJV Kar fv^rjv yivofjievrjv, dXXa (3tov re TOV
VOL. IV. C
i8 IIOAITIKfiN Z (A ). 11.
30 TrAe/crroiy Koivcovijcrai Svvarov Kal TroXiTfiav rjs ray TrAeiaray
TroAety ei/^e^erai //eratrxeff. Kal yap ay KaXovaiv dpio~TO- 2
/e/oar/ay, Trept aw yOi> iTrofj.v, ra ynei/ e^corepa) TTITTTOVO-I ra?y
TrAeiaraiy rcSr TroXtGw, TO, 8e ytiTviaxri rfj KaXovftevr) -jroXi-
Ttia- Sib irepl dp.fyo iv coy //iay Ae/creoi . 77 <Se 5?) /cpiViy 7re/)t
35 aTrarraH rourcor e/c rco^ avraiv aTOi^ficov kariv. el yap /caAcoy 3
tv roTs r)6iKoi$ ciprjrai rb rbv ftiSaipova fiiov elvai TOV Kar
aptrrjv avefJuroSiarrov, /lecror^ra Se rr]v dptTrji , rbv /j,ecrov
avayxatov (3iov elvai /3eAricrroi/ 3 rfjs eVaVrofy e^5e^o/iej/j;y
rv-^tiv /zecror^roy rouy <Se ai)roi)y rourof y opovy dvayKalov elvai
40 /cai TroAecoy dperfjs KOL KaKias Kal TroAiret ay 17 yap TTO\L-
1295 b rei a /3* oy r/y eo-rt TroAecoy. ei/ aTraua/y cS?) rafy TroAecriV eori 4
Tyota /ie/3?; r^y zroAecoy, CM //e^ euVopoi acfroSpa, oi (5e aTro-
/ooi arcfioSpa, ol 8e rpiroi ot /zecroi TOVTCOI . eTra roivvv 6fio\o-
TO ptrpiov dpicrTov Kal TO p-tcrov, fyavtpbv OTI Kal TU>V
5 fVTV^rjfj.aTCOi f) KTrj(ris fj ptcrr] /SeAr/ar?? irdvTW paa-Trj yap
rco Aoyoo TreiOapxew vrrepKaXov 5e ^ virtpLO"xypov T) v-rrep- 5
tvytvfj 77 vTrfpTrXovaiov, 77 rdvavTia roi^roty, V7rep7TTa>\ov 77
r) Kal crfioSpa aTifJ.oi> ; ^aXerrbv rco Aoyco a/coAoi/-
yiyvovTai yap ol p.\v vftpicrTal Kal f.ieyaXoTroi rjpoi
10 fJidXXov, ol <5e KaKOVpyoi Kal /J.iKpOTroi rjpoi \iav TWV S dSi-
KrjfjidTcov TO, fjikv ytyveraL Si v(3piv, TO, <5e Sia KaKovpyiav.
Ti S TJKicrd OVTOI (^vXap^ovai Kal ^ovXap^ovcriv raCra 8
dfj.^>oTpa (3Xaftepa raiy TroXfaiv. -jrpbs 8e TOVTOIS oi [nlv ev 6
vrrepo^aTs VTV^rjfj.dTcov oVrey, icr^voy Kal nXovTov Kal <pi-
15 \<>v Kal TCOV d\\(ic>v rcoi/ TOIOVTW, dp^ccrdai OVTC (BovXovTai
ovTe tiricrTavTai (Kal TOVT evOvs oiKoOtv vrrdp^i rraicrlv ovviv
Sid yap rv]v rpv^rfv ovS kv roly SiSa&KaXtiois dp^fadai
crvvrjOts avTols\ ol 8\ Ka@ u7re/9/3oAr)j/ tv evStia TOVTCOV TaTrei-
vol Xtav. axrO oi [i\v dp^Lv OVK kTriarcLvrai dXX dp^aOai 7
20 SovXiKrjv d.pyj]v, oi 8 dp^f(rdai p.\v ovSffjiia dp^
cSe Seo-TTOTiKrjit dpyj\v. yivtrai ovv \KaT\ 8ov\(ov Kal
, aAA OVK tXevOepow, Kal
1295 a 301296 a 15. 19
a 7rXtio~TOi> drre^ei 0iXt ay Kal
?) yap Koivoovia (piXiKov ovSt yap 68ov fiovXovTai
8 Koii>a>vii> roty ex^poFy. fiovXerai <Se ye 17 7roX/y e "<ru>v tivai 25
Kal ojjLoidov on /laXtcrra, roOro 8 vrrdp^ei fj.dXio~Ta rots fj.t-
&&lt;TT dvayKalov dpiara 7To\LTvea-6at ravrrjv TTJV TTO\IV
lv e| 5)v 0a/zei/ (frvcrei TTJV avcrraa-tv eivai rfjs TroXeooy. Kal
9 (?u>ovTai 8 kv ra.^ TroXfaiv OVTOL fidXio-ra rS>v TTO\IT(OV. OVTC
yap avrol r>v dXXorpioov axnrfp oi irtvr\Tt<$ k-rrLBvp-ovcTiv, ovrf 30
TTjy TOVTGW ere/joi, KaOdnep rfjs TO>V TrXoucriW oi irtv 7/res eTn-
Bvjjiovcnv Kal Sia TO P.TJT em(3ovXVcr6ai
d.Kiv8vva>s Sidyovcriv. 8ia TOVTO KaXcos r
10 " TroXXa fitcroicnv apiara /iecroy ^eXco ei^ TroXei eivai.. SfjXov
dpa OTL Kal r) KOivcovia rj TroXiriKr] dpicrTr) rj Sid r>v /xecra>i , 35
KOL ray rotavras ivSe^rai ev TroXiTevea-Oai TroXeiy, kv afy
Srj TroXv TO jjitcrov Kal Kptlrrov /j-dXicrra fjCtv dp.(f)olv, el
8t fir], Oarepov ptpovs TrpocmOefJ.evoi yap TroteT poTrr]v Kal
1 1 KwXvei yivtcrOai ray tvavTias VTTfp(3oXds. Sioirtp fvrv^ia
TOVS TToXtrei/o/zet oi S overlay %X flv t JL ^ a "n v Ka -i iKavrjv, 40
OTTOV ol fiw TroXXa o~(f)6S pa KKTr)i>Tai oi $ firjStv, rj 8rj- 1296 a
eo-^aroy yfyvcrat r) oXiyap^ia a/cparoy r) rvpawlf 8S
d[i<f)OTepa$ ray t>7rep/5oXay Kal yap CK dfffMKparCas rfjs
i>eaviK(i)TdTr)$ Kal e oXiyap-^ias yiyverai rvpavvis, e/c Se
12 T&V fjieo-cw Kal rS>v vvveyyvs rroXv r\rrov. TT/V 8 airiav 5
vcrTfpov kv rofy Trepl ray /zera^3oXay rcof TroXirecof epoO/zei/.
ori 5 17 /ieo-7/ {3eXTi(TTr) } fyavepov p.6vr) yap d<TTa<riacrTOS
oirov yap noXv TO Sid yuecrou, fJKKTTa crrctcreiy /cat 8iao~Tdcri$
13 yiyvovrai TU>V TroXtrcoi/. KGU at /zeyaXat TroXety da-Tao-ia-
T^ a.vrr\v aiTiav, OTC TroXv TO [j.tcrov kv 8t 10
pdSiov re 8ia\af$tiv ei y ^vo Trai/ray, coore //?;-
.^o ov, Kal TrdvTfs <r)(e6cv d-rropoi rj evrropoi
14 tio~iv. Kal at SrjfiOKpaTiai Se acr0aXe(rrepai TWJ/ oXiyap^iwv
fieri Kal rroXv\povia)Tfpai 8id rouy /zeVoyy (vrXeioyy r ya/>
/cr( /cat fJLaXXov //ere^ofai r<Sf TI/J.COV eV raiy SrjfjioKpaTiais 15
C 2
20 nOAITIKnN Z (J ). 11-12.
77 rats- oXiyap^i aty), evret 6 rai> areu rot/rcoi ra> 7T\r)6ei V
ol drropoc, KaKorrpayia ytVerat Kal diroXXvvTai
ecoy. a-r] fjLtiov 8\ Sti vopifav Kal TO TOVS /SeArurrouy vofto- 15
$eray etVat T>V fj.eo~G>v 7roAmoi> JToAcoi re yap T)I> roiyrooj/
20 ((S^AoF 8 e/c rr;y TroiT^crecoy) /ca: AvKovpyos (ov yap r]v /3aa-i-
Aeuy) Kal Xapcoi/5ay /cat (7X650^ ol TrAearrcH rcoi/ a\\o>v.
(pavtpbv 8 e< roi/rcoi/ /cai 5tori at TrAewrra: TroXirtiai at [JL\V 16
8rjfj,oKpaTiKai fiaiv at 8 6\iyap^LKa[ Sia yap TO tv rav-
raty TroAAa^iy oXiyov tivai TO /^eo-or, a/et oiroTepoi av
2 5 X 000 "^ e ^ Oi Tas ovaia? e^oi/rey et ^ o 5^/ioy, o/ ro
eK/3afVo^rey /ca$ avTovs ayovo~i TTJV iroXiTeiav, cocrre ^
yiyvtTai r) oXiyap^ia. TTpoy 5e rouroiy 5ia ro o-rao-eiy yiyve- 17
cr^ai Kai /za^ay Trpoy aAA^Aouy ra5 ^77/10) /cat roFy euTropoiy,
OTTorepoty a> /zaAAoi/ o~vfji(3f) KpaTrjo-at, TO>V tvavTiav, ov Ka-
30 Qio-Taai KOLvr\v TroXiTetav ov8 lo-rjv, dXXa Trjs VIK^S a6\ov TT]V
vrrepo^v r^y TroAire/ay Xafj.(3dvovo-iv, Kal oi ptv 8r)/j.oKpa-
Tiav ol 8 o\iyap\tav TTQIOVO-IV. ZTI 8e Kal T>V tv f]yfioi>ia 18
TTJS EXXdSos rrpbs Trjv Trap airnuy Kare/)Oi TTO-
aTro/SAeTrofrey o/ /ze*> ^/zo/cpar/ay ef rafy
35 Ka6to-Tao~av ol 8 oXiyap^ias, ov Trpoy ro rr TroAecoj/
0epoj/ o-/co7roCj/rey aAAa Trpoy ro o-fytTepov avTav. OXTTC 8ia 19
ra^ray ray air/ay ?) /i^o^eTrore r^i/ fj,o~r]v yivto~6ai TroXi-
Tftav r) oXtyaKis Kal Trap oAtyojy efy yap ai/^p o~vvTrfi-
(rOrj [twos TO>V TrpOTtpov e0 rjyffjiovia ydvo^kvaiv Ta\)Tr\v
40 aTToSovvai TTJV Taiv. f]8rj 5e /cat roFy e^ ra?y TroAeo-ir e $oy
1296 b Ka@eo-Tr)K prjSe (3ovXo~0ai TO LVOV, dXX rj dpytiv ^rjTfiv rj
KpaTOvp.tvovs viro^viv. r/y jj.\v ovv dpio-Trj iroXtTfia, Kal Sid 20
rtV alTiav, e/c rourooi fyavtpov TO>V 8 dXXcov TroAiretcov,
rj TrXeiov y SrjpoKpaTias Kal TrAe/buy 6\iyap\ias <f)afj.ev
5 eiVaij Troiay TrpwTrjv OtTeov Kal SevTepav Kal TOVTOV Srj TOV
TpOTTOV e^OfJ.VT]V TO) TT]V fJikv tivai PtXTLto Tr)V 8\ \flpO),
5ioopicr/zef7;y r^y dpicrTrjs ov ^aXenbv I8t.1v. del yap dvayKalov 21
tlvai /3eAr/ft) TTJV eyyurara
1296 a 161297 a i. 21
TOV neaov rrXeTov, av JJ.T) Trpbs V7r66e<riv Kpivy TLS. Xlyo>
8e ro Trpoy vtroBta-iv, OTI TroXXaKLS ovo-r)S dXXr]S TroXiTtias 10
a/peTa>Tepay ew oiy oviSej/ KcoXvei <n//j0epefj/ eVepav fiaXXov
TV y <5e TToXiTfia TIO~I Kal iroia ffvjufttpet Troiois, e^(6- 12
[JLtVOV k(TTl TtoV LprjfJ.f.VO)V 8lf\OflV. X^TTTeOJ/ 5?) irpS)TOV TTfpl
coi KaOoXov TCLVTOV Sfl yap KpeirTov tivaL TO ^ov\6fjL^vov 15
rfjs TroXfcoy roO /z^ (SovXofMevov pevtiv rr]v iroXirtiav.
Se Trdora TroXty e/c re ro5 TTOLOV KCU irovov. Xsyoo 5e
TTOLOV fjikv eXei/^ep/ar nXovrov TraiStiav evyeveiav, TTOO-QV
2 Sf rr]v TOV TrXrjOovs inrepo^rjv. c^e^erai $ TO p\v TTOIOV
vTrdpxeiv erepoo /iepet r?yy TroXecoy, e^ co^ o-weorTyKe /zepcoi 20
17 TroXiy, d XXco ^e /ze/3t TO iroo-ov, QLOV TrXeibfy TW a/oi-
ytvvaiwv TOVS ayei/^efy 77 r<u^ ir\ov(riu>v roi)y
[AT] fJ.fVTOl TOaOVTOV V7Tp)(lV TO) TTOO-O)
3 TreaOai r<3 7roi. <5io raCra Trpoy dXXrjXa crvyKpiTtov. OTTOV
ftfV OVV V7Tp^L TO TO)V OLTTOptoV TrXfjOoS TTjV lprjfjLVr]V O.VGL- 25
\oyiav, kvTavOa TrtfyvKev tivai Srj/j.OKpaTiav, Kal e /caoroi/
e?5oy SrjfioKpaTias Kara TTJV VTTfpo^v TOV Srjfj.ov e/cacrrof,
ofoj/ eai> /ief TO TV ytwpy&v vnepTeivrj rrXfjOos, Tr]v 7rp<a-
TT]V SrjfjiOKpaTiav, kav 8t TO T&v Pavavo-Q&v Kal fiiaOap-
, TTJV TeXevTaiav, o/zoicoy St Kal Tay aXXay Tay 30
TOVTW OTTOV <5e TO T>V WTTopow Kal yv(>pip.a*v fj.dX-
Xov vTrepTea/ei TO> TroiS 77 XeiVeTai T TTOO-O}, tvTavQa Se
6Xtyap)(iav } Kal Tr^y oXtyapx^ay TOI avroi Tpotrov tKao-Tov
4 elSos KaTa TTJV virfpo^v TOV oXiyap^iKOV TrXrjOovs. Sec S
del TOV vo/j.oOeTr]v kv Tfj TToXiTeia irpoa\ap.pdvtiv TOVS /ze- 35
crovs dv Te yap oXiyap-^iKovs TOVS vof^ovs TiOfj^ o"To^d^o~dat
TO>V fMeo-tov, kdv T SrjfjiOKpaTiKovs, Trpoo-dyfcrOaL TOIS
TOVTOVS. oTTOv 8e TO T>V fjito-Gw vTTepTeivet TrXfjOos T)
o-vvafj.<poTep<ov T>V aKpav rj Kal OaTepov [iovov, kvraJvQ kv-
5 Se^fTat TroXiTciav eivai n.6vip.ov. ovStv yap <f)o(3tpbv 7477 40
ol ir\ov<noi TOIS irkvr\<siv tirl T&i rot y 1297 a
22 nOAITIKHN Z (A ). 12-13.
ovStTrore yap drfpoi fiovXTJo-ovrat. SovXfveiv TOIS erepoty, KOL-
vortpav 8 av {TJTOXTIV, OirSffiiav evprjaovcrtv dXXrjv ravrr)S
e.v fj.tpei yap ap-^iv OVK av vtrofj-eiveiav Sid rr)v diriCTTiav
5 rrjv Trpoy dXXrjXovs -rravrayjov <5e rrLo-roraros o ^tatrr/TTyy,
Siat.rr)rr)$ 8 6 /iecroy. ocrco 5 av dfjLfivov 77 TroXtTtia p,L- G
\8fj, ToaovTO) /J.ovtfJ.coTfpa. SiaftapTdvovcri <5e TroAXoi Kal
ray dpiGTOKpariKas (3ovXofj,v(i)v Troitlv TroAirei a?, ov
kv r<3 irXeiov vtptiv roFy euTropoi?, aAAa /ca2 ef ra>
10 7rapaKpovcr6ai rov Srjpov. dvdyKt] yap y^povcp Trore e< rcot
tytvSSts dya6)V aA?/^e? crv^ffvaL KaKov at yap TrAeoi/e-
i cu TO)^ TrAoucr/coi/ ctTroAAvoucrt p.d\\ov TTJV TroXireiav rj al
rov 8rjfj.ov.
13 "E<rTi 5 ocra 7rpo0acrea>y \dpiv tv rals TroAire/aij cro-
15 <hiovTO.i Trpbs rov Sfjuov Tret/re TW dpi6p.6v t Trepl tKKXrj-
(riav, TTpl ray a/j^ay, Trept Si-Kao-rrjpia, nepl oTrXicriv, -rrepl
yvfjivacriav Trepl tKKXrjcriav fj.v rb k^tivai kK.K.\r\aids.iv
Trdcri, {rjiJLiav 8\ eTTiKt tcrdai roty evnopois, kdv fj.r] eKKXrj-
oridfaa-iv, rj //oroiy r) /*e^<w TroAAw, 7Tpl 8e ray ap^ay 2
20 70 roFy /ief cloven TifJLrjfAa ftr) egetvai e^ojJivvvOai, rofy 8
aTropoiy tgeivai, Kal -rrepl ra SiKaarrjpia TOIS ftev fVTropois
tlvai r][j.iav, av pr) SiKafacri, rots 8 dnopois dSeiav, rj
rois fj.ev /j.eydXr]v rots 8e piKpav, &&lt;rrrp kv ro?s Xapa>v-
8ov v6/j.oi$ fvia^ov 8 effort fJ.ev irdo-iv dTroypa-fyap.vois 3
, kav Se
iva 8ia fj.ev rr\v fyftiav favy(ao-i rb
Sid 5e ro fj.rj aTToypd(pecrOai fir] SiKafaa
(*MTIV. rov avrov 8k rporrov Kal TTfpl rov oirXa KKrrjo-6ai 4
30 Kal rov yvfivdfco-Qai vop.o6trovcnv rots p.tv yap d-rropoi?
.r] K$Krfjo-6at, rots 8 evTropois iiriffifiior firj KKrrj~
KO.V fj.r) yv[j.vd(>vrai, rois ptv ovdefifa fonta, rois
8 et;7ropoty 7ri^rjfj.iov, oVcoy ol p.\v Sid rr]v grjftiav /icre-
oi 8\ 8id rb fjirj (f)o(3fio-6aL /j.ij ^rtaa-iv. ravra 5
1297 a 21297 b 26. 23
ovv oXiyap-^iKa TO. o-o^ar/zara rfjs vopoOeaias, ev 8e rats 35
iats Trpoy ravr dvTivofyi^ovTai rots p.tv yap
aVopoty jjuadbv TTOpiovcnv tKK\r](na.ovcn Kal SiKagovo-iv, roty
6 8 (viropois ovStfiiav rdrrovcrL r]\iiav. (ware fyavepbv on et
rty /SovAerat piyvvvai SiKatws, Set fa nap e/carepoty a-vvd-
ytiv Kal roty ^^f fiia-Qov vopffeiv rots 8e fypfar OVT<O 40
yap av K0iva>voitv anavTfS, e/cetVcoy 8 17 7roXire/a y/yFCTttf
7 ret)j> ere/oft)!/ fj.6vov. Set 8e Trjv TroXiTfiav tivai [ikv e/c roif 1297 b
ra 6VAa tyovTav povov TOV <5e Ti/j,rjfj.aTO$ TO
drrAcoy ^tej/ optcra/jei/ouy oi)< ecrrif e/Trea roo-oCroi/
aAAa o /ce^a/zefouy ro Troroi/ e?n/3aAAei ^.aKporarov
Toi)y /zere^oi/ray r^y 7roAire/ay cT^ai TrAetbuy ra>f /*T) /itre- 5
, rouro rarretf. t6t\ov<n yap ol Trci Tyrey /cai y^^ ^ere-
reoi TifMatv rja-v^fav e^eti/, eai/ /i^re vftpifa rty
f^rJT a.$a.ipr\Ta.i ILT\$\V rfjs oi)a/ay. aAAa roOro ou
paSiov ov yap del (7f///?atWi \apitvTas zivai roi)y JJL^T^OV-
9 ray roi; 7roAirev//aroy. /ca2 eicodatn 8e, orav TroAe/ioy 77, 10
oKvtiv, av fir) XappdvaMTi rpo^v, d-jropoi 6e wcrii/ eaf
5e Tropigrj TIS Tpofyrjv, (SovXovTai TroXffJ.eii . ecm 5* 17
rroAire/a ?ra/) kviois ov \JLOVQV e< rai^ OTrAireyoi/rcoi aAAa
/cai /c Toit (UTrAirev/corooj/ e^ MaAteCa-i <Se 17 /zev vroAi-
re/ia JyV e/c rovrcoi , ray 6 e dp^as ypovvro e/c TO)!/ <rrparefo- 15
10 }JitvG>v. Kal 77 7rpa>Trj <5e TroXiTfia kv TOIS "EXXr]o~ii> eyei/ero
/iera ray /9acriAe/ay e/c ro>v 7roAe/iowr<w^ } 17 /zet e dp^fjs
e/c reoi^ Imrtcav (rrjv yap io~yvv /cat r^v fartpO)$V tv roty
imrtvo~iv 6 TroAe/zoy ei^ej/ dVey yuet yap crufra^eooy d^prj-
Q-TOV TO 6ir\iTLKov, at <Se ?repi raif roioi/ra)! e/ZTrefptai /cat 20
ra^ety e^ roFy dp-%aiots ofy v-rrripyov, &VT kv rots lmrtvo-iv
etvai TTfV tV^vf), av^avop.va)v 8\ T<av TroAeooi/ /cat rcSf ef
roFy oVAoty io~yycrdvT<>ov fj.dXXoi frXc/ovf /^erer^oj/ r^y TTO-
1 1 Airei ay. SiOTTfp ay i/ui/ KaXovfj.v TroAtret ay, ot nporepov e/ca-
Aou^ Sr)fj.oKpaTia9. rjaav 8e at dp^aiai TroXireiai evXoycos 25
oXiyapyjiKoi Kal fiao-iXiKai 81 oXiyavOpoxriai yap OVK
24 nOAITIKflN Z (A ). 13-14.
ffyov TroXv TO [j-tcrov, OXTT oXtyoL re oi>Ty TO nXfjdos Kal
Kara rr]v vvvra^iv ftaXXov inrefj-tvov TO dp^eadai. SLO. 12
Tiva fJL\v ovv elo~lv aiTiav at TroXiTtlai TrXttovs, Kal 8ia ri
30 irapa ray Xeyojueray eVepai (8r)fj.oKpaTta re yap ov p.ia
TOV dplOfJiOV 0~Tl, Kal TO>V ci\\(>V 6fJ.Oia)$\, fTl 8f TlVfS al
Siafyopal Kal Sia riva ahiav avufiaivei, Trpbs Sf TOVTOIS
r/9 apicrTr] r>v TroXiTeifov coy tirl TO TrXtiGTOv eiVer^, Kal
Tcav dXXwv Trota iroiois dp/zorrei T<I> TroXiTeicov,
14 Hd\iv 8e Kal Koivf) Kal ^oopls irepl eVatrr^y
T&V c$>e^y, Xa^Sorrey dp-^rjv TTJV Trpoo-iJKOva-ai atrco>.
STJ Tpia fj-opia TWV 7roXLTiS>v Trav&v, Trepl 5>v Sei deco-
peiv TOV (nrovSaTov vop.o6Tr)v e/caor^ TO av^epov a>v tyov-
TU>V KaXa>s dvdyKi] TT/V iroXiTeiav f\ lv xaXms, Kal Tay
40 TroAtTet ay aAX^Xcor Staffiepfiv kv TOO Siafytpeiv eKaaTOV TOV-
TtoV. CTTi <5e TO)V TplG>V TOVTCOV V fJLV Tl TO (3ovXVO/Jl.VOV 2
1298 a irepl T>V KOLV&V, SevTtpov 8e TO TTtpl Tay ap^ay (TOUTO 5
e<TTlv ay Set Kal Tivtov tlvai Kvpias, Kal iroiav Tiva SeT yiyvt-
(r6ai Tr)v atpta-iv avTa>v} } Tpfcov 5e TL TO 8iKaov. Kvpiov 8 ICTTI 3
TO ffovXevontvov Trtpl 7roX/j.ov Kal fipdjvrjS Kal 0-vfj.fj.a^ias Kal
5 8LaXvo~(c^ ) Kal irepl vofioov, Kal nepl BOLVOLTOV Kal (ftvyfjs Kal
Sr)fjfvo-o>s, Kal Trepl dpx&v a/peo-ecoy Kal TO>V evQvvG>v. dvay-
Kaiov 6^ ^TOi Trao-i ToFy TroXiVaiy aTroSeSoo-Oai irdvas TavTay
Kpi<Tfis rj TLcrl Tracray (oiov dp^fj Tivl p.ia rj irXefoffiv, 77
eVepay) ^ Ti^ay fjikv avTatv irao-t Tivas 8( -rivlv. TO 4
10 n\v ovv TrdvTas Kal irepl airdvT(>v 8r}/j.oTiKoi> Trjv
yap io~oTT]Ta faTef 6 Sfffto? (Icrl 81 oi Tpoiroi TOV
TrXe/byy, efy fjitv TO KaTa /icpoy dXXa p.r] TrdvTas dOpoovs,
cd(T7rep tv Tff TroXiTtia Trj TrjXeKXeovs ko~Tl TOV Mi\r)o~Lov (Kal
tv aXXaty 5e TroXiTe/cuy flovXevovTai at crvvapyjiai avviov-
15 o-at, ei y 8\ Tay ap^ay ftaSigovcrL Trai Tey >caTa /zepoy e/c
TO>V (frv\S>v Kal T>V fjLOpiav T&V Xa^io~Ta>v Trai/TfXcoy, ecoy
av SicXOy 8ia TrdvTowJ, avvitvai 8e povov TTf.pt Tf v6p.a>v
Kal T&V nepl T^y TroXiTefay, Kal TO, TrapayyeXXo-
1297 b 271298 b n. 25
5 fJitva. a/coufro/teVofy VTTO rS)v dpyjbvrav aXXoy 8\ rpoVoy TO
TraVray ddpoovs, crvvievcu <Se p.6vov ?rpoy re ray dp^aipe- 20
o~t ay \alpr] <rofj.tvovs\ /cat Trpdy ray vofioOtcrias /cat Trept iro-
\ip.ov /cat (Iprji Tjs /cat Trpdy tvOvvas, ra S aXXa ray ap-
Xy ftovXevecrQai ray <p eVacrroiy reray/ieray, a/peray
6 ovoras ^ airavTw TJ K\rj pcoray aXAoy 5e rpoTroy TO Trept
ray ap^ay >caJ ray ey^way diravrdv TOVS TroX/ray. /cai 25
TreyOi 7ro\fj.ov /3oiA6v<ro/iei Ot;y /cat (rv^fJia^ia^, ra 8 d XXa
ray ap>(ay SLOLK^LV a/peray ouVay, 6Vay e^^e^erat, roiav-
7 rat $* etVtt ocray dp-^eiv dvayKcuov roi)y eTTto-ra/iei/ouy re-
raproy <Se rpoTroy ro ?raj/ray Trept Trdvroav (BovXeveadai
ray 5 ap^ay Trepi [irjStvbs Kpivf.iv aXXa povov 30
, ovntp 17 reXei^rata ^/to/cparta i/w SioiKti-
rat rpoirov, r)V dvd\oyov (pa.fj.tv flvai oXtyapxta re (5u-
vaarevTiKfj KCU povapyjia rupavviKfj. oSrot yuef ow ot rp6?rot
8rjfj.oKpa.TiKol Trai/rey, ro <Se rii ay Trept irdvTtov oXtyap^t-
8 KOV. e^et 5e /cat roOro 5ta0opay TrXetbi/y. orav /zer yap 35
aVo Tt[j.r)fj.dTa)v y^erptcorepcoj/ at perot re coo-t /cat TrXetouy
5ta r?)^ fj.fTpiOTr)Ta TOV rt/^Ty/zaroy, /cat vrept v 6 ^6//oy
aTrayopei/ef p;^ KIVOKTLV aXX aKoXovOaxri, /cat e?; /crco/xei/O)
ro TifJ.r)fj.a fJ.T^iv, oXtyap)(ta p:ej/ TroXtrt/c^ <5 eartj/ 17
roiavTT) Sid TO //erpta^etf orar 5e /t^ Trai/rey roO (3ov\fve- 40
cr^at ^T^OXTLV aXX atperot , /cara VOJJLOV 8 dp^ccxriv a>o~- 1298 b
9 ?rep /cat Trporepoi/, oXtyap^t/coi/* 6 rai/ 5e /cat atp<j/rat
ai/rot cri>TOV$ ot Kvpioc TOV ftovXtveo-Oai, /cat oraj/ Trary ai/rt
Trarpoy et o-n; /cat Kvpioi TU>V i/6//ooj/ coo ti , oXtyap^t/c^i/ dvay-
10 /cator ef/at TT)* ra^ti TavTrjv. orav $ TIVO>V Tives, olov 5
TToXe/zoi; /tei> /cat L7rep et p^^y /cat eu0ui a>i Travrey, ri/ 5e aX-
Xcoj/ dp-^ovTfS, /cat o5rot a/perot [17 /cX?;pcorot ], apto-ro/cparta
57 TToXtret a- eai/ 5 ei/tW //ef a/perot ei/tW 5e K\r)po)TOi }
KCU /cX^pcorot 77 aTrXeoy ^ e/c TrpOKpiTwv, rj KOivrj aiperol
/cat K\r)pa>Tot, ra yuer rroXtret ay apto-ro/cpart/c^y eo-rt rovran/, 10
11 ra c;e TroXtretay avTfjs. SiypTjTai p.tv ovv ro
26 nOAITIKflN Z (J ). 14-15.
Trpoy ray TroXtreta? TOVTOV TOV Tponov, Kal SioiKtiTai e/caVr??
TroXiTfia Kara TOV e/p^/ieVoi/ 8iopio-fj.6v o-vfjL<f>epei 8e 8rj- 12
p.oKparia re r# fj.dXio~T etvai SoKovvrj SrjfjLOKpaTia vvv (Xeyco
15 <5>e TotavTrjv kv rj Kvpios 6 Sfjfioy Kal T>V v6fj.a>v ecrriV)
ro (3ov\VcrQai /SeXrtoj/ ro avro TTOie?^ oVep tnl TO>V
(rrripictiv kv rouy oKiyapyla.i s (rarrofo-i ya/> fapiav TOVTOIS
ous fiovXovTai SiKageiv, iva SiKa^oxnv^ ol 8\ Srj^oTiKol {J.L-
a6ov rofy dnopoLs}, TOVTO Se /ecu Trepl ray e/c/cXT/cr/ay
20 /3oi/Xei5<jo^rat ya/3 /SeXriOi/ Koivfj (3ov\fv6fj.i>oi Trdvres, 6
Sfjfj.09 y^era rcoj/ ywopifjuov, OVTOL Se /zera ro TrX^ofy au/z- 13
0epei 5e /cat ro alperovs eiVcu roi)y /SofXefo/iei/ouy 77 KXrjpcorovy
fcrcoy >c r<S^ fiopl&v crvfji^pti 8e KOLV vTrtpftaXXwcn TroXv
Kara ro TrXfjOos ol BrjfjiOTiKol r$>v iroXiTiKaiv, r) p.r] nacre
2 5 SiSovai fJLLcrQdv, aXX ocroi (TVp.jj.^TpOL Trpoy ro raJi/ yvaypi-
nXfjOos, rj a.TTOK\ripovv rovs nXeiovs kv Se ra?y oXiyap- 14
?7 TrpocraiptTcrOat nvas K TOV 7rXrjdovs } r) KaracrKfvd-
cravras dp^tlov oiov kv kviai S TroXirtiais kcrrlv oi)y KaXovcri
TrpofiovXovs Kal voftotyvXaKas, [/cai] -jrepl TOVTMV %pr]fj,aTiiv
30 ncpl &v av OVTOL Trpo(3ovXfV(T(t)criv (OVTCO yap peOegti. 6 8rjfj.o$
TOV fiovXtvea-Oai, Kal \veiv ovSev 8vvrj<rTai TO>V irept Tr)v TTO-
XlTeiav} tTt r) TavTa -^770/eo-$ai TOV Sfjfiov rj jj.rjSti ej/- 15
avTiov roiy i o-0epo/ze^oiy, 17 Trjs (Tf/x/3ouX^y /zei/
vai Traai, ftovXtvecrOai. Se roi)y ap^oz/ray. Kal TO d
35 fjLevov Se TOV kv raTy TroXiretaiy yiyvofitvov 8tl Troif.lv a?ro-
p.\v yap Kvpiov [ef^ai] SeiTroifiv TO irXr/dos, KaTa-
8e /j.r) Kvpiov, aXX tTravayeorQat irdXiv errt
roi)y ap^o^ray. fV yap raty TroXirei aiy af0"rpa///ii/coy 16
Trotouaii ot yap oXtyoi dno^rri<piO d^voL fjiv Kvpioi, Ka-
40 Ta^rj^Lad^voL <5e 01) Kvpioi, dXX tnavdytTat e/y roi)y
1299 a irXeiovs alei. irtpl fj.cv ovv TOV (3ovXfvo(j.i>ov Kal TOV Kvpiov
8r) r?yy TroXiretay roOror SiwpLo-Oa) TOV Tpoirov
15 ^ofj.vr] e TovT()v eo~Tiv r] nep
yap /cat rovro ro fiopiov r^y TroXtre/ay TroXXas 6\a-
1298 b 121299 a 37. 27
0opay, iroo-ai re dp^ai } Kal Kvpiai TIVCOV, Kal Trept ^povov, 5
TroVoy e /cdVrr/y dp^fj? (pi fiv yap IgafjLTJvovs, ot 5e &
eXarroi/oy, o/ 5 Iriautrlaf, o/ 5e noXv^pov tare pas noiovat
ray PX#?)j KC " iroTtpov eivai 5et ray dp^as diSiovs fj
TroXv^poviovy rj fj.rjSeTpo^ d\Xa TrXeoi/a/fiy roi)y avTov$ } r]
HTJ TOV avrov Sly dXX aira JJLOVOV erf <5e Trept r^ Afa- 10
racrracr/v roif a/o^coj/, e/c T(VU>V Set yivecrOai Kal VTTO
2 Kal TToiy. 7Tfp2 TrdvTtov yap TOVTO>V Set 8vva<r6ai
Kara TTOCTOVS er^e^erat yevtcrOai rporrovs, KantiTa irpocrap-
fjiovai, Troiais rrolai mXvrttaif <rvfj.<p povcnv. ecrrt <5e ovSe TOVTO
8iopi(rai pdSiov, mias 8^1 KaXeiv ayo^ay TroXAcoi/ yap km- 15
(rrara)! 77 TroXiriKr) Koivcovia Setrai, Sioirep Trdvras OVT rouy
alperovs OVT TOVS KXrjpcorovs ap^ovras ^ereov, oTov TOVS U
TrpwTov TOVTO yap fTfpov TL irapa ray TroXiTiKas
3 flereW. eri 5e \opyyol Kal KijpvKes aipovvrai <5e Kai Tr/oecr-
fieri Se at /zei> TroXiri/cai rcoi CTrt/zeXeico^, ^ TraV- 20
r<Si/ TroXireof npos TLva 7rpatv, OLOV ar/oar^yoy crTpa-
KaTa ftepos, OLOV 6 yvvaiKovofjios rj
fios n at 8 OLKOvofJiLKai (jroXXaKis yap alpovvrai
at 5 vTTTjptTiKal Kal Trpoy ay, av eviropSxri, rarrofcri SovXovs.
4 /laXicrra 8 a>y aTrXcoy eiTreiv dp^as Xe>creoj> rai/ray, ocraiy 25
(3ovXtvo-ao-6at re Trepi rtt eSi/ /ca2 Kplvai Kal
i, /cai /faXtcrra TOVTO TO yap kiriraTTt
aXXa raCra <5ia0epei Trpoy /ze/> ray
<uy finely (ov ydp TTCO Kptcris ytyovtv dfj.(f)LO ^r]TOvvT(ov Trept
roO oi/6/zaroy), e^ei ^ rtv aXXjji/ SiavorjTiK^v TrpayfiaTfiav. 30
5 TroTai 8 dp^al Kal trocrai dvayKaiai el eVrai vroXty, icai
TroTai dvayKaiai fti> ov ^prjcnfjLOL 8f ?rpoy cnrovSaiav TTO\L-
Tfiav, fjidXXov av riy aTrop^a-fLf rrpbs dnao-dv re T) TTO-
6 XiTtiav Kal Srj Kal ray //i^pay TroXety. e> /zei/ yap ^17
/zeyaXajy evS^fTat re /cat 5e? /ztaj/ TfTa^dai Trpoy 35
epyov (TroXXovy re yap e/y ra dp^tia e^^e^erai {3a8i-
v 8ia TO TToXXovs eivai TOVS TroXrray, cScrre ray //er 5ta-
28 nOAITIKflN Z (A ). 15.
Xeineiv TroXvv y^povov ras 8 drra dpyjeiv, Kal (3eXTiov
eKacrrov epyov Tvy^dvei TTJS eTTifj.e\eias fj.ovo7rpa-yfj.arov err] s
1299 b ?; TroXv7rpayfJ.aTOVo-r)sy kv 8k Tais p.iKpals dvdyKrj avvdyeiv 7
els oXiyovs TroAAay dp^ds 6\a yap oXiyavOpanriav ov
pd8iov ko~Ti TroAAot y ei/ ra?y appals eivat. rives yap oi
TOVTOVS tcrovTai 8ia8e6p.tvoi irdKiv ; Stovrai S kviore r$>v
5 avrS>v apyjav KCU vo/j.cov al ftiKpal ra?y yueyaAaty*
at /J.ev Seovrai TroAAa/cty rcof avr&v, ra?y 5 f
-p6va> TOVTO crvfj-fiatvei. SioTrep ovSev KGO\VI TroAAay t-m- 8
fj.\ias afjia TrpocrTOLTTeiv (ov yap /j.7roSiovcriv aAA^Aaiy),
Kal Trpoy rryi/ oXiyavOpocmiav dvayKalov ra dpye ia oiov
10 o^e\i(TKo\v-^yia iroit iv. kav ovv ^(ap.ev Xeyeiv novas
dvayKalov vnap^eiv navy iroXti, Kal novas OVK dvay
Kalov fj.\v 8tl 5 v7rdp^Lv } paov dv ns fiScbs ravra crvvd-
yoi TTOias dppoTTei crvvdytiv dpyjds els fJ.iav dp^ijv.
dpfj.oTTi 8e Kal TOVTO fj.r] XeXrjOevai, iroiuiv del Kara TOTTOV 9
15 dpyjtla TToXXa tTripeXelo-Oai Kal Troiatv TravTa^ov piav
dp^rjv eivai Kvpiav, oiov evKoafJiias Trorepov kv dyopa [jikv
dyopavofjiov, dXXov Se /car a AAof TOTTOV, r) iravTa^ov rov
avTov Kal iroTtpov Kara TO 7rpay/za 8el 8iaipelv rj Kara
rovs dv6pa>7rovs, Aeyco 8 oiov eva rfjs VKoo~fj,ias, tj Trat8a>v
20 dXXov Kal yvvaiK&v Kal Kara ray iroXireias 8e, irortpov 10
8ia(f)epei Kaff 1 eKaa-Trjv KOI TO T>V dpy&v yevos fj ov8ev, oiov
ev 8r]fj.oKpaTta Kal oXiyapyta Kal dpicrTOKpaTia Kal JJLO-
vap^ia TroTfpov at avral fj.ev eicriv dp^al Kvpiai, OVK e
fotov 8 oi>8 f 6/j.oi(i)v, aAA iripa>v ev erepaty, oiov kv fj.ev
25 TaFy dpio-TOKpaTiais e/c TreTraiSevpevcw, kv Se rais oXiyap-
\iais K ra>v TrXovo-ta)v } kv 8k rais SvjfjioKpaTiais e/c TO>V
eXevOepatv, rj rvyyjavovo~i /J.ev rives ovcrai Kal Kar avrds
Siacpopal TWV dp^S>v } eo~Ti 8 oirov o~vfji<f)epovcriv at avral
Kal OTTOV 8ia<ppovo-iv (evQa f*kv yap dpfJiorTei peydXas,
30 evOa 8 eivai fiiKpas Tay avrds). ov /J.TJV dXXd Kal iSiai 11
eiffiv, o?ov fj T>V Trpo(3ovXa>v avrrj yap ov
1299 a 381300 a 23. 29
77/07, fiovXr] SI SrifjiOTLKov. Set p.tv yap tlvat TL TOLOVTOV &
CTn/ieXey eorat ro Srjfjtov 7rpo(3ov\eviv } OTTCOS d(T\oXa>v earar
roro 5 , eaf oXtyot TOV dpiOfibv Sxnv, 6Xiyap\iK6v roi)y
(5e irpo(3ovXovs oXtyovs avayKaiov etrat TO TrXrjQos, war oXt- 35
12 yap-^LKov. dXX OTTOV afj.(pa> avrai at dp^ai, oi irpo^ovXoi
LV 7Ti TO?? fiovXevTaTs 6 fj-tv yap fiovXevrrjs Srj-
OV, 6 8e 7rp6(3ovXo$ oXiyapy^iKov. /caraXuerai Se /cat
ftovXfjs 17 Svvafjiis kv Tea s roiavTais Srjfj.oKpaTcais kv
13 afy avrbs ovviobv 6 8fjfj.os \prjftaTt^i irepl Trdvroov. rovro 1300 a
<5e <rv[ji(3aivtiv efoo^ej/, OTO.V fvrropia TLS 77 fJLLcrQov rofy
eKKXr]<Tidgova-iv o")(o\d^ovT^ yap (rvXXeyovrai re 7roAAa/as
/cai anavTa avrol tcpfvowriv. TraiSovopos 5e /cat yvva.iK.ovQ-
/zoy, /cat ef rts aXXoy dp^cov Kvpios <TTL roiavTr]? eTTi/xe- 5
Aetay, dpiaroKpaTiKov, Sr)p.oKpaTiKov 8 ov /TraJy yap oioj/ re
KooXveiv t^itvai ray T(I/ dTropcoi/ ;) o^5 oXiyap^iKov (rpv-
14 0<wcri ya/j a/ reo^ oXtya/J^owrcoi V aXXa Trtpl fj.ev TOVTCOV
enl TOCTOVTOV fiprjcrOa) vvv, TTfpl 8e ray T>V dpya>v /cara-
orrao-eiy Tfdipa.Tf.ov e^ dp^fjs SieXOetv. flat 8 at 8ta(f>opal 10
ei/ Tpialv o/joiy, a>j/ (rvvTiOffMcvcw dvayxatov TraVray e/X?7-
0^ai roi)y rpoTrouy. ecrri <5e riSv TpiS>v TOVTUV eV /zev r/Vey o:
KaOt(TTdvTs ray dp^ds, Sevrepov 5 e/f TIVCOV, XotTrbv <5e
15 nVa Tpo-jTov. ixdffTOV 8e T&V TpiStv TOVTCW Statyopal r/oeFy
6/<rtf ^ yap TraVrey o/ iroXtTat KaOtcrTaatv 77 rii^ey, /cat 77 15
e/c TravTtov r\ /c TLV&V d^wpto-ftevGw, olov 77 TtfJ.rifJ.aTi rj
yej/6t 77 dpeTrj r\ TIVL TOIOVTW dXXa>, (ucrTrep ei/ Meydpots e/c
r<Si> (TvyKaTt\66vT<av /cat crvfjLfia^a-afj.eva)^ Trpoy roi> 5^-
16/toi/, /cat raOra 77 atpecret r) K\r)pq> TrdXiv raOra ay^-
8va6fj,va, Xeyco 5e ray /aei> rt^ey ray ^e TraVrey, /cat 20
ray /te^ e/c TTUVTCDV ray 5 e/c TivStv, /cat ray /tei/ atpea-et
ray 5e KXrjpa). TOVTCW 8 e /cacrrT/y etrovrat r^y 5ta0opay
17 TpoTTOL rerra/aey. +77 yap 1 ?rai/rey e/c Trarrcor at pecret, 77
1 In the following attempt to frame a text of 1300 a 23-05 the
similar attempts of C. Thurot, Spengel, and Susemihl (see the critical
30 nOAITIKflN Z (A \ 15-16.
rey e/c TrdVrcoi K\rjpa> (/cat 77 e anavr^v f) coy ava /ze-
2 5 poy, o?oi> Kara 0uXay /caf Sijfjiovs Kal 0parpt ay, ecoy ai/
SieXOrj Sia irdvTtov r&v TroXircof, 77 aet e aTraVrco* ), Kal
77 TO, p.\v OVTO> ra <5e GKfivtos ird\Lv el rt^ey oi /ca0icrraVrey, 18
77 e/c TTdVrcoi a/pecret 77 e/c TrdvToav K\ijp(f), 77 e/c TivS>v alpe-
crei 77 e/c TLVO>V K\ijpo> ; rj ra /*i> ourco ra 5e fKefvoos, Xeyco
3 5e ra /zef e/c -rravrcav a/pecrei ra 5e K\^pa>. cocrTe <5co5eKa
oi rpoTTOi yivovrai ^(opls raw 5uo a~vvSva<r[jiS)v. TOVTGOV 8 1 9
a/ /*ev <5uo Karacrra(T6iy SrjfioriKaC, TO Trdvras e/c TTOLVT&V
a/pecrei 77 K\rjpu> yivtcrQaL 77 dfj.<pow, ray /aey KXijpfp ray
5 a/pecrei rcot dpywv TO <5e /ZT) Trarray a/ua /.tet KaOi-
35 oraVat, e^ ttTraj/rcov 5 77 e/c TLVCOV, 77 K\r)p(t> rj aipeaei 77
dufyo iv, 77 ray /iey e/c irdvTtov ray 5 e/c rit co^ dfj-fyow
(TO <5e d/j.(f)o ii> Xeyco ray /zev K\TJpa> ray 5 a/pecreA, TTO-
notes on this passage) have been kept in view. Added words are
printed in thicker type, and omitted words are placed within square
brackets :
jj yap TrdiTff e/c Travrtow alpeaei tj TtavrfS fK iravTu>v K\r)pa> (at [^] e|
faravrcav f] a>s dva ftfpos, olov Kara (^uXay Kal fiij/novs KCU (frparpias, tu>s av
$ie\6r] Sia Traira)! rcof TroXtTO)!/, ij aei e ^ aTraircovV [KM T] TTCiiTes K TU WC
alpecrci rj ircikTes K Tivaii KXi^pu ^ ra fj.(v OVTO> ra fie tK(iva>s TTII\IV d
rives oi KadicrTavTfS, 17 ex irdvTGdV alpfcrft fj (K TiavTutV K\r]pa>, fj CK riviav
aipfCTfi f) eK Tiva>v K\rjp(i), jj TO. fi.fv ovrw Ta Se entlvatg, Xe ya) Se Ta fjifv fK
Trdvrojv nlpforei rd fie K\rjp(i> KOA. TO, fiei* eK TICWC alpc crci ra Be KXi^pa).
OXTTC 5a)Sea oi rporroi ytvoVTOt xa>p\s TCOI/ fivo (rvv8va<T/j.5)v. TOVTOIV S at
/ner Si;o tcaracrTacrei? 5^/ioriKai, TO TraVra? ex irdvrcav atpetrft ^ K\r)pa \yive-
ff^at] TJ dpfpolv, rds p,fv cXi}pa) TOS 8 alpecrfi TUIV ap^wj/ TO fie ^.17 Trdvras
apa peV /ca^io Tcli at, e aTraircoi 1 8* I ^ e < ripfivlj 17 K\fjpco r) ajp/cret 7) djJL^oiVj
rj rds fj.fi> fK mivT&v rds 8 (K TIVUIV r\ KXr^pw TJ alpeVei r\ dfj.(f>oiv (TO 8e
ipcpoii Xf yco Tay /zf v K\Tjpa> rds 8 alpttrfi), TroKiTiKi if Kai TO TIVCIS fK irdtrasv
rds fjitv aipfaei Kadiardvai rds 8e K\f)pa> [77 dp.(potv, rds p.fv K\rjp<a rds 8
aipecrrt, oXiyap^tKof], oXiyap^iKWTepoi 8e, /cai TO e ^ dp.(po~tv, TO 8e Taj /xer
K 7T(iyToi Tay 8 ex Tiv)v iro\iTiKOV dpKTTOKpariKuts, r\ atp^CTei r\ K\i]poj 77
Taj pei/ aipeVei Tay 8e <cX)]/)a) TO 8 rtvaf e rivuv aip^crei oXiyap^iKoi/, (cat
TO Tti/a? e < rivcov /cXijpw, [pi; yivoptvov 8 opotWjJ Kai TO Ttvar CK nvu>v
dp.(f)oiv. TO Se Ttrnf t{- &aavr(ov TO T e riva>v Travras
1300 a 241300 b 29. 31
20 XITIKOV. Kal TO Tivas K TcdvTtov ray fjitv a/peVet Kadto~Ta-
vai ray <5e K\ijp(t> rj dfttpolv, ray [jiev KXrjpcp ray 8 alpt-
cret, oXiyap^iKov oXiyapy^iKwrtpov 8t Kal TO e ap.fyo iv. 40
TO 8e ray [jikv e* TraVrcoi ray 8 e* TIVO>V TroXiTiKov dpi-
21 oro/cpcm/aSy, ^ ray /^ei ou yoecrei ray ^e K\rjpa>. TO <Se rt-1300b
I ay e/c rtt cot oXiyap^iKov, KOL TO Ttvas *K TivS>v
fJLr] yiv6p.evov 8 6//o/a)y, KOU TO Tivas K Tivatv
TO 8k ri^ay e aTrdvTwv, TO re K TivG>v aipeati vra^ray
22 dpLo-TOKpaTiKov^. oi /zei> ow TpOTroi T&V Trepl ray ap^ay ro- 5
o~oi/roi roi/ dpiQ^ov elcri, Kal SifjprjvTaL KOTO, ray TroAirei ay
oi/rcoy r/Va 5e rtVi o~vft(ppi Kal 7T<y <5er yivta~6a.L ray ica-
raardVeiy, a/^a ra?y 8vvdp.eo~i T>V ap^cor, [icai] r/Vey tlfftv,
eVrai (fravtpov. Aeyco 5e 8vvafj.iv dp^fjs, oiov TTJV Kvpiav
TO>I> rrpoaoScov Kal TTJV Kvpiav rrjy 0fXa/c^y d XXo yap 10
t5oy o^fi/a/zecoy o/oi/ aTpaTrjycas Kal r^y rcoj/ 7re/n r^ ayo-
pat o~vfj.^o\ai(t)v Kvpias.
AoLTTOV Sf TO)V TplSiV 7Tpl 8iKaCTTrjpL(CV tLTTt lV. Xrj7TTOV 16
<Se /cai roi/rcov rot y rpovrovy Kara r^ avTrjv vTroQecriv. to~Ti
8e 5ia0opa rco^ 8iKao-TT]pt(av kv Tpialv 6 poty, ^ i/ re Kal 15
Trept coi/ icat Trcoy. Xeyco 8e e^ cur fJ.tv, TroTtpov K irdv-
TGW 77 e/c rit coj/ Trept cor <Se, 7roo~a i8rj SiKa&Trjptw TO Se
2 Tra>9, Trorepof KXrjpa) rj a/peo~ei. irp&TOv ovv 8iaipco~6a> TroVa
et 5?; SiKao-TijpiGov. eori 5e roy dpi6p.ov o/crco, ei^ //ei^ tvOvv-
dXXo 8e ef r/y ri rco^ KOLV&V dSiKtT, e repoj/ ocra e/y 20
TToXiTtcav 0epei, reraproj/ Kai dp^ovai Kal /<$ic6raty oVa
f J t(pio~(3r]Tovcrii , 7re//7rrof ro vrepi r<v ISianr
Kal t-^ovTW /zeye^oy, /cat ?rapa raOra
3 ro re <f>oviKov Kal TO ^ZVIKOV. (fioviKov {JL\V ovv fiSij, dv r
eV rofy aiiroFy SiKacrTaTs dv r ei/ aXXoty, Trep/ re T>V ^25
irpovoLas Kal Trepl TO>V aKovo-iatv, Kal oo~a o/zoXoyetrat p-tv,
dp(f)t,o-l3r]TeiTat 8e vrepi roC SiKaiov, reraproj/ 6"e ocra ro?y
(j)vyovo~L tpovov 7rl KaOoSo) e7Ti0eperai, OLOV AOrjvrjo-L Xeye-
rai /cai ro ej/ ^pearro? 8iKao~Trjpiov, o~v[i(3aivi <5e ra
32 nOAITIKflN Z (J ). 16 H (E ). 1.
30 ei/ ro) TravTi xpovcp oXiya Kal eV rcay /zeyaXcuy
TOV 8f evLKov e> /^ey eVoiy Trpoy et>ouy, a XXo ej/oty Trpoy 4
ao-royy. eYt <5e ?rapa irdvTa raCra irtpl TO>V fUKpcov vvvaX-
Xay/zaro0i>, 6Va 8pa\fjiiaia Kal TrevrdSpa^fia Kal fjiiKpco
irXeiovos Sei jjikv yap Kal irepl TOVTO>V yivecrdai Kpicriv, OVK
35 /j.7riiTT(i Se ei? SiKacrT&v 7r\fj6o$. aXXa Trept /zei/ TOVT&V 5
Kal T&V (fioviKwv Kal rS>v fceviK&v, nepl Se rail
Xey<//ez/, Trepl cov fj.rj yivo\i*.v(tiv KaXcos SiacrTa-
ytvovrai Kal r<av Tro\ireiS)v al Kivrjcret.?. dvdyKrj 5
Trdvras Trepl Trdvraiv Kpiveiv TO>V SLflprjfj.ti/cov aipe&ei
40 rj KXrjpa), rj Trdvras TTtpl iravraiv ra p.tv K\rjpa> TO. 8
aipecrfi, 77 Trept kvi<>v TWV avr&v rovs [jikv K\rjp(p rovs 5
1301 a a/perovy. OVTOI p.tv ovv ol rpoTroi rerrapey TOV dpiOfj.ov, TO- 6
aovTOi & erepoi Kal ol /cara /zepoy TfdXiv yap ZK TLV&V
Kal ol SiKd^ovTts Trepl TtdvTtov aiptcrti, 77 K TLV&V irpl
Typco, 77 ra fi\v K\rjpa> TO. 8e aipeaei, rj tvi.a Si-
5 KacrTTJpia nepl T>V avT&v e/c K\rjpa)TO)v Kal aiptT&v. OVTOI
ovv } cocTTrep k\yjdr](rav , oi rpoTTOi . . . rofy e/pr^/iej/oiy
<5e ra aura o~vi>8va6[ii a } Xeya) <5 o/oy ra /lev e/c Trai/- 7
ra 5 e/c rivu>v TO, 8 e^ a/i0oa/ 3 oiW i rou a^roO
SiKao-Trjpiov tTev oi fjikv e/c Ttavrtov OL 8 e/c TivStu, Kal 77
10 K\rjpa) 77 aipcrL 77 dp-fyotv. ocrofy /ze^ ow kvSt^Tai. Tporrovs 8
elvai TO. 8iKao~Trjpia, el prjTai TOVTOOV <5e ra /ze
d, oo-a (.K TfdvT<av [77] Trept TfdvTav, TO, 8e
ocra e/c rii wi Trep: TfdvTUiv, ra <Se rpira api-
a Kal TroXiTiKa, oara TO. n\v K TfdvToov ra 5
15 CAT TLl>S)V.
(E ).
aXXcoi/ 5>v
20 fiprjTai irepl irdvTW e/c ra coi 5e fiTa^dXXovo-iv at iroXi-
Kal TTOO-CDV Kal TTOLMV, Kal riVey
1300 b 301301 b 12. 33
Kal e/c TTOICDV /y Troias /zaAicrra p.t6io~TavTai } eri
tie awTTjpiai rives Kal Koivfi Kal \a>pls e/cacrrTfy e/crtV, ert Se
Sta TLVOHV av /zaAicrra cra^btro ra>v noXiTftcov e /coVrT/, cr/ce-
2 TTTfov <pffjs ToT$ /p?7//eVoy. 8ei St TrpcoTOv viroXafttiv 2 5
dp^rjv, on TroAAat ytyvr\vTai TroXiTtiai. irdvTtov fjikv
vTCtiv TO SiKaiov Kal TO /car dvaXoyiav i crov, TOVTOU
3 8 afj.apTav6vT()v, i&cnrep ti pTjTai Kal Trporepov. Srjfj.o$ p.\v
yap eyo/ero e/c rov io~ovs OTIOVV ovras oitaOai arrXas LO~OVS
elvai (OTL yap tXtvdepoi Tra^rey oyuo/ooy, airXws iaoi eivai 3
vo LvJ, oXtyap^ta <5e e/c TOV dvivovs <iv Tt oVras 6 Acoy
dvio-ovs vnoXafjipdvtiv //car ovo-tav yap ai>tcroi oVrey
4 aTrAais &VLVOL vno\ap.fidvov(nv co^at)- e?ra ol pkv coy
orrey irdvT<av T&V urooi/ dgiovai /zere^ett , ot S J coy
5 oi/rey TrAeoi e/crea ^TOVQ-LV TO yap TrXeiov dvivov. e^ovo-i 35
/ze^ ow TI Tracrat SiKaiov, r\\iap-nr]\Jikvai 8 aTrAcoy
/cai c?ia TavTrjv rrjv aLTtav, orav ftr] Kara T rjv
r)v e/care/ooi rvyyavova-Lv e^o^rey yuere^cocrt r?;y
6 (TTacrtdovo~iv l . . . navrav 8e SiKaioTaTa p.tv av
fjKto Ta 8e TOVTO TrpaTTOvo iv ol /car dpeTrjV 8ia(ppoi>Tf$ fid- 40
7 Aicrra ya/> evXoyov dvio~ovs aTrAcoy e/ai rovroi/y povov. e/cri 1301 b
<5e rtt ey oi /cara ye^oy I Trepe^ofrey oi//c di.ovo-i
aitTovs 8ia TTJV dviaoTrjTa TavTr\v eyyej eiy ya/9
KOVGIV oTs virdp^ft irpoyovtov d/oerr) Ka2 T^AoCroy. dp-^al
ovv coy etTTftv avrai Ka Trrjya rcoi/ crracrecoi ecri^, oe^ 5
8 <TTao-Ldov(TLv (Sib Kal at /*era/3oAat yiyvovTai
pew yap 7T/)oy r^f noXLTftav, oVcoy e/c ri;y K
dXXrjv /ieraoT77crc0cni>, ofoi/ /c SrjftoKpaTcas oXiyapyjiav rj
SrjfjLoKpaTtav e| oXiyap^iay, rj iroXiTftav Kal dpio~TOKpaTiav
e/c royrcot , 77 rauray e| e/ceiVco^ c5re 5 ou vrpoy r^f ica^e- 10
o-TTjKviav noXLTfiav, dXXd TTJV JJL\V KaTaaTacriv trpoaipovvTai
rfjv avTijv, cV avTaJv 8 dvai fiovXovTai TavTrjv, OLOV
1 The insertion here of c. 3. 1303 b 3, orao-iafouo-i 8 . . . 7, forts
is suggested in the critical note on 1301 a 39.
VOL. IV. D
34 nOAITIKflN H ( ). 1-2.
oXiyapYtav r) rrjv [JLovapyjiav kri rrepi rov /JidXXov Kal 9
rjrrov, OLOV rj oXiyapxiav ovcrav e/y TO pdXXov oXLyap^T-
15 adat rj e/y TO ^rror, 77 SrjfjiOKparLav ovo-av e/y TO fidXXov
rj e/y TO rjrrov, 6/*oia>y <5e /cat 7r2 TCOV
Tj/a eiriTaOaxriv r) dveOaxriv eri Trpoy 10
TO /zepoy Ti Kivrjvai TT}$ TroXireLas, olov dp^rjif TWO, Kara-
&Tr)crai r) ai/eXelV, wcnrep kv AaKtSaifJLOvt (pa<ri AvcravSpov
20 Tij/ey e7ri)(iprj(rai KaraXvaai rr]v ftacriXeiav KCU Tlavcra-
viav TOV {3a(riXa Trjv tfyoptiav KCU kv ^TTi^a/zi/oo 8e yue-
Te/3aXef 57 TroXireia Kara p.6piov, dvrl yap rS>v 0uXap-
y<>v (3ovXr]i> e7roir](rai>, e/y <Se TJ)^ rjXiaiav eTrdvayK^s tcrnv 11
eVt TCOI/ ez/ TW 7roXiTVfj.aTi ftaSifciv Tay dp^ds, orav
25 e7rityrj(pir]Tat dp^rj Tiy, oXiyap^iKov 8\ KCU 6 dipya>v o
e/y 7/V ej/ TT; TroXiTtia ravr^Y Travra^ov yap Sta TO &VKTQV
r) (Travis ov firjv (e/) To?y dvt<roi$ virdp^et dvdXoyov
yap jSacriXeta avLcros, tav 77 ev tcroiyV oXcoy ya/j TO i
r]TowT$ <TTacridov(TLv. <m Se SiTTov TO fcTOi/ TO [JLtv yap 12
30 dpiQiJiw ro 5e /car dtav tvTiv. Xeyco 5e dpi6fj.a> [JLIV TO
irXrjdft r} fttytQtL ravrb Kal icrov, Kar a^iav <5e TO T<3
Xoyco, ofoi/ V7repe)(ei Kar dpiOp.ov p.\v i(r<p ra rpia roiv
Svolv Kal ravra rov ei/oy, Xoyco Se ra rerrapa roiv Svolv Kal
ravra rov e>oy ILQ-QV yap /ie/joy ra Svo rwv rerrdpcov Kal
35 TO ej/ rS>v Svotv a/i0co yap r)fj.icrrj. 6fJ.oXoyovvre$ 8e TO 13
eivai SiKaiov ro Kar dgiav } SiafyepovraL, KaOdirep
Trporepov, ol [lev ori, kav Kara n foot S>O-LV, 6 Xcoy
vop.i^ovo Lv eivai, ol S J on, kav Kara n avicroi, rcdv-
rcw dviuwv dgiovcriv lavrovs. Sco Kal fj.dXio~ra Svo yivovrai 14
40 TroXiTeica, 8fjfj,os Kal oXiyap^ia- evyevaa yap Kal dperr}
1302 a kv oXfyois, ravra 8 kv TrXcioo-Lv fvyeveis yap Kal dya-
6ol ovSafjiov Karov, fv-rropoi 8e TroXXa^ov. TO 8e
avrXcoy irdvrg Ka6 fKartpav rtrd\6ai rr\v laorrira (f>av-
Xov. (fiavepbv 8 fK rov o-vfj.(3aivovro$ ovSffiia yap
5 e< rS)v rotovrcov TroXirei&v. rovrov 8 atnov on dSvvarov dwo 15
1301 b 131302 a 38. 35
TOV TTpcoTov Kal TOV ei> dpxfi 77/zapr77/teVou p.r) drravTav e/y TO
reXoy KGLKOV TL. Sib <5et ra /zei> aptfy^rt/crj IcroTrjTi \P^J~
crOai, TO, 8e rfj /car diav. o/za>y 8\ acrc^aXecrrepa /cat
16 acrrao-tacrroy fJ.dXXov 77 SijfJ-OKpaTia rfjs oXiyap*)(ias. kv fj&v
yap TCU$ 6\iy a p)(iai.$ kyytyvovTau. Svo } 77 re Trpoy dXXrjXovs 10
Kal eri r) TT/JOS TOV Srjfj.oi J kv 8e TCUS SrjfjLOKpaTiais
Trjv o\iyapyj[av /J.DVOV, avTco 5e vrpoy O.VTOV, o TL
Kal d^Lov enrefV, OVK eyyiyvfTat TG> Srjfjici) crracriy* ert Se
rj K T&V fiZcrcov TroXiTfia eyyvTfpa) TOV 8rjp.ov 77 [17] TWV 6\t-
yav, rJTrcp fo-Tiv acr^aXecrTarTi T&V TOIOVTCOV iro\iTfia>v. 15
Enel 8e Q-KOTTOV^V e/c TLVMV ai re (rracreiy yiyvovTai. 2
Kal ai fj.Ta(3o\al Trepl ray TroXire^ay, XrjTTTeov KaOoXov
Trp&TOv ray ap^ay /cat ray am ay avTatv. fieri Srj cr^eSbv
toy i7Tfiv Tpeis TOV dpiOfjiov, ay SioptaTfov K.a& auray TATTOO
irpStTov. <5eT yap XafteTv rrcSy re e^oi/rey crTaaid^ovcri Kal 20
TlVtoV ISKV, Kal TptTOV TIVS dp^al yiVOVTai TQ)V TToXlTL-
2 KCOI> Tapay&v Kal TO>V Trpoy aXX^Xouy crracrecor. roO /zet ovv
avTOVS *X lv "^^ Trpoy TTJV y^erajSoX^ atTiav KaOoXov /za-
Xitrra Qs.Te.ov Trept ^y 77^77 Tvy^dvon^v e/p^icorey. o/ /zei/
yap IcroTrjTos e0ie/ierOi o-Tao-idgov&iv, av vo/j.i(o(riv e Xarroi/ 25
e^eii^ oi/rey Tcroi roFy TrXeoi/e/croucriv, o/ 5e rr^y awa-o^roy
/cat rr^y tVepox^y, ai^ vnoXafj.f3dva)o-Lv oWey avivoi /zr)
3 TrXeo// e^etf aXX fcroi 77 eXarroy (rourcoi/ ^ ecrri /ze^ ope-
yeo-Qai 8iKai<cs, ecrrt ^e >cat dSiKO)^) eXarrot/y re yap of-
rey oVcoy t crot d)crt crTacrid^ovcri, Kal tcroi Oi rey oVooy yuet - 30
^oi/y. Trcoy yuei^ ovv e ^ofrey crTacnd^ovcnv, eiprjTai- Trept cot <5e
<rTa(Tidovcriv, ecrrt /cep5oy /cat rt/XT) /cat TavavTia roi^roty >cat
yap drifiiav 0euyo^rey /cat fypfav, 77 L7Tep avrcov TJ T>V
4 (piXcw, crTacridgov&iv kv ra?y TroXeo ti at 5 atrt at /cat ap-
j(at rcoi/ Kivrj<T<0v, 06 ev avToi re SiaTi0VTat TOV flprjfMevov 35
Tpdirov Kal rrept TCOJ> Xe^^errcoj/, ecrrt /zei/ coy roi> dpiQfj.bv
5 eVra Tvyyavovo-iv ovo~ai, eVrt 5 coy TrXetbyy. coV 5uo /zet/ ecrrt
dXX ov% cocraurcoy &a /cep5oy yap
D a
36 nOAITIKflN H (E ). 2-3.
Kal Sid rifj-rjv 7rapovvovrai TT/ooy dXXijXovs ov\ I va KTIJ-
40 crcavrai crtyicriv auroFy, axnrep fi prjrai irporepov, aXX ere-
1302 b pov y 6/9(Sj>rey rovs p.\v SlKaias rovs 8 dSiKws TrXeove/crom/ray
TOVTCW en Sid vftpiv, Sea (f)6@ov, Sid V7rfpo\rjv ) Sid KCL- 6
Tafyp6vr]crLv, Sia avrjcrii> ryv rrapa TO dvdXoyov ert 8\
dXXov rpoTTOV 81 eptOttav, Si oXiywpiav, SLO, fJUKporrjTa,
3 81 dvofj.oLOTrjTa. rovroov 8e v/3pi$ fjikv KOI KepSos riva
Svva^iLv Kal Treoy ai na, a-^tSov fan fyavepoV vftpL
T yap T>V kv rais dp)(CUS Kal TrXeovtKrovvTtov crTao-
Kal Trpbs dXXr/Xovs Kal TTyooy ray TroXtrei as ray
TTJV kov<riav T] Se TrXtovegfa y/Wrcu ore fj.ev dnb TO>V
10 ISiwv, ore 5e avro TO>I> KOIV&V. SfjXov <5e Kal rj Ttfjt,r) y Kal 2
TI Svvarai Kal Trooy alria crracrecwy* Kal yap avrol dri\ia-
6fj.fvot Kal dXXovy opcotrey r//io/xej/oyy (TTa(ridov<nv ravra
8e d8iKQ>$ fifif y literal, orav irapa rr^v d(av rj rifj.a>vrai
rives TI dTip.da>vrai., SiKaicos <54, orav Kara rrjv diav.
15 Si vnepo^v Se, orav ris $ rfj 8vvdfj.fi. fieifoi , 77 efy 77 3
nXfiovs, r) Kara rr)V iroXtv Kal rrjv SvvafJiLv rov noXirev-
/j.aros yivccrOai yap tiooQev eic rav roiovrwi ftovapxia 77
Swacrrfia. Sib tviayov flo)0a<nv oa-rpaKi^eiv, oiov kv "Apyei
Kal A6rjvrj(riv Kairoi fitXriov e dp^ijs opdv orrooy /zr) tve-
20 (rovrai rocrovrov t Tre/ae^orrey, rj eacrarray ye^ecr^at idadai
vcrrepov. Sid 8e tyoftov aracrid^ovcriv 01 re rjSiKrjKores, SeSto- 4
rey //?) Saxri SiKrjv, Kal oi /^eXXo^rey dSiKeicrdai,
voi (pddcrai Trplv dSiKrjOfjvai, cbcnrep kv Po^co
oi yvtopipoi 7Ti rbv 8rjp.ov Sid ray e
25 Sid Kara(f)povr]cnv <5e KOI <rra(ridgov(ri Kal kTririOwrai, oiov 5
tv re raTs oXiyap^iais, orav irXeiovs 3>o-iv oi fir] /zere^or-
rey rfjs TroXireias (Kpeirrovs yap oiovrai eu/at), Kal kv rai<s
8rjfj.oKpariais oi tvrropoi Kara(f)pcvijo-ai>res rr^y draia$ Kal
avapylas, oiov Kal ev &^/3ai^ ^tera rr]v kv Olvotyvrois
30 f^d^rjv KaKa>s noXirtvofitvcov 77 8r]p.oKparia Si(j)0dprj, Kal
T) Meyaptccv Si drafciav Kal dvap-^iav rirrr)6ei T(cn> ) Kal kv
1302 a 391303 a 24. 37
2vpaKovcrai$ Trpb rfjs PeXco^ay rvpavvi8os, Kal kv PoSco 6
6 Srjfios 77/00 T7?y eTrai/acrracreooy. yivovTat 8k KO.I 6Y avr]o~Lv
TTJV TTapd TO dvdXoyov /iera/SoXat rcSf TroXtTffooj/. axnrep
yap o~>fjta K ftfpwv avyKfiTat Kal Set avdvo-dat dvd- 35
\oyov y iva ptvr) r) crf/z/zerpta, el <5e ^77, ^^etperaf, orav o
ywe^ 7roi)y TTrdp(ov irr))(a>v jj TO 5 aAXo o-eS/ia ^fo^ o-TTt-
dafiatv, fVLOTf 8e Kav e/y dXXov <pov ^era/3aXXoi [iop(f)rjv,
fl fj.rj P.QVOV Kara TTOO-QV aXXa /cat Kara TO Troioi avd-
VOLTO irapa TO a^aXoyor, OVTOO Kat TroXty (rvyKctTai K 40
fjipa>i ) G>V TroXXa/as \av6dvei TI av^avop-evov, oiov TO 1303 a
TO)I/ aTTOpG&V 7T\rj6oS tV TdlS 8r)[iOKpaTiatS KOI TToXiTeiai?. ~
7 (rvfj.^aivi 8 viOT TOVTO Kat 8ia rv^a9, OLOV ei/ Tdpavn
xal aTToXofitvoov 7ToXX<j/ yvcopificw inrb r>v
vcrrepov T>V Mr]StKo>v 8r)/j.oKpaTia yei/eTO 5
/c TroXiTetay, Kal kv "Apyti T&V kv rfj 1^86/j.j] aTroXo/te-
v(av VTTO KXeo//ej/ou? ToO AaKwvos rjvayKdcrOrjcrav TrapaSe-
acr6ai TG>V TT^PLOLKODV nvds, Kal kv AOrjvais drv^ovvrtov
TTtgfi ol yva>pifj.oi eXaTTOf? eyei oi TO Sia TO K KaraXoyov
8 (TTpaTVcr6ai vnb rov AaK&viKov TroXe/jiov. (run/Saivei 8e 10
TOUTO Kal kv rats SrjiJioKpaTiais, f\TTQv 8t rrXeiovav yap
T$>V V7r6p<ov yivofjLevoov rj rGtv ovcnS>v
9 (3dXXov(rii> ety oXcyap^iay Kal Svvacrrfiay.
8 at TroXiTtTat Kal dvev araVecoy Sid T6 Tay epi^etay, axr-
rrep kv Hpata (e aip<Ta>v yap 8td TOVTO k-noir]<yav KXrjpoo- 15
Tay, 6Vi rjpovvTO TOVS epi^evoyuei/oyy), Kal 8t oXiyoopiaf, oTav
tdvaxnv ei y Tay dp^ds Tay Kvptas iraptfvat TOVS fJtrj TTJS
TroXiTfias <j>tXovs, axrirep kv lOpeai KaTfXvOrj rj oXtyap^ia
TO>V dp~)(6vTO)V yevo/j.vov < HpaKXfo8a>pov, o$ e^ oXtyap^tas
10 TroXiTeiav Kal Srjfj.oKpaTtai KaTeo-Kcvao-W Tt Sid TO Trapa 20
[iiKpov Xeyoo 8k irapa piKpov, OTI TroXXa/fiy XavOdvet /ie-
ydXrj yivo\Jif.vT] fi.eTd(3ao-is TO>V i/o/ii/icoj/, OTav irapopSxri
TO (jUKpov, a>o-7Tfp kv AftftpaKta fiiKpov rjv TO TtfJ.r)fia, T!-
Xoy 8 (avr ) ovSevbs ^PX OV , $ cyy^? or 77 fj.r)8kv Siafapov TOV
38 nOAITIKHN H ( ). 3-4.
25 fJLr)8kl> TO fiLKpOV. (TTCLCTLdOTLKOV Sk KOL TO fJ.T) OfJLOfyvXoV, Icoy 1 1
av o v/jLTrveva-y (&&lt;rrrep yap ov8 K TOV TV^OVTOS TrXrj&ovs TroXis
ytyi/ercu, OVTO&S ov8 kv r< TvyjbvTi ^p6v(d\ 810 ocroi rjSrj
kSk^avTO rj kiroiKovs, 01 TrXeTcrroi 8Lo~Tacriacrav, OLOV
LS Amatol <rvv(j>Kr]crav ^vftapiv, erra rrXtiovs ol
30 A^aiol yv6fj.voi e^e/3aAoi/ TOVS Tpotfaviovs, oOtv TO ayo?
HvftapiTais Kcd kv Govpiois 2v(3apiTai rcny 12
(TrAeoi/e/creii/ yap a^iovvTts coy <j0ere^ay
(f>a)pa6ei>T6S k^tTTtvov Sia fid^r]^ Kal AvTicro-aloi TOVS XLOOV
35 (fivydSas etV^e^a^evoi Sia pdx 1 !* e^e/SaAo^, ZayKXacoi
Kal Airo\- 13
o v r veva) TfvT(p TTOIKOVS
to-Tao~iao-av Kal ^vpaKoixnot /zera ra TvpavviKa rot-y gevovs
1303 b Kal TOVS /J.icr6o(p6povs jroAtras 7roi^cra/zej/oi ^(rraa iao av Kal
k^-rrecrov virb TOVT(>V ol 7rXeio~Tot avT&v. [crTacrid^ovo-i 14
8 tv \ikv raiy oAtya/j^i aiy ol TroXXol a>y dSiKovfj.evoL, OTI
5 ov /j.T)(ovo-i To>v icrwv, KaOdrrep ftpr)Tai TrpoTtpov, tarot oVrey,
kv ra?y Sr)[j.oKpaTiai.s ol yva>pLp.oi } OTL fifT\ovo-L TU>V
i<?(>v OVK foot oVrey.J a-Tacridovo-i Se wore at TroAe^y Kal 8ia 15
roi)y roTrofy, orai /^^ V(f)va>s \U r] X<*>pa ?rpoy TO //i ai
/ai TroAtt j oioi kv KXafoutvaw ol TTL Xurpa) npbs TOVS
10 kv vr)o-(p, Kal KoXotycavioi Kal NoTieis Kal AOrjvrja-iv ov^
6/j.oicos elcriv ; dXXa paXXov 8rjfjLOTLKol ol TOV TLtLpaid OIKOVV-
rey T(OV TO do~Tv. coaTrep yap kv TOCS TroAe/zoiy al 8ia(3d- 16
crety Tcav o^era)^, Kal TO>V Ttdvv cr/zi/cpcor, <5ia<r7r<cn ray
<pdXayya$, OVTCOS eoi/ce irdcra Sia(f)0pd Troitlv 8ido-Tao-Lv.
15 fJ.eyio-Tr] fjikv ovv fcrooy Sido-Tao-is dpeTT) Kal ^o^drjpia, e?ra
TrXovTOS Kal TCtvta, Kal OVT(O 8r] ere/)a erepay yuaAAoi/ cui/
4 pia Kal 17 etyor^/zei/T/ ecrnV. yiyvovTai pkv ovv al o-racreiy 01)
Trepi [j.LKpS)v aAA e< p.iKpS)v, aracria^QVcn 8k rrepl jj.eyd\(av.
fj.dXio~Ta 8k Kal al ftiKpal icrviuouo iv, orav kv TOIS
1303 a 251304 a 14. 39
i, OLOV crvveftrj Kal ev ^vpaKovcrais ev ToTs dp)(aiois 20
/iere/3aXe yap 17 TroXtTet a e/c 6\;o vf.avicrK.wv ora-
kv Tcuy dp^ats OVTCOV, Trepl po)TiKT)v airiav.
2 Oarepov yap diroSrjfj.ovi TOS eVcupoy coV Tiy TOV epco/zei/oj/ avTOv
VTTZTroirjaaro, irdXiv 8 fKtivos TOVT<O ^aAeTr^a? r^f yv-
vaiK.a avrov dvTTLcrev coy avrov t\6elv oOev 7rpocrXa/i/3a- 25
3 J>oi/rey TOVS e^ r<5 TroXtTtvfjiaTi 8iCTTacrtacrav TrdvTas. Siorrep
apyoptvoov evXaftcLcrQai Set rcoi/ TOIOVT&V, Kal SiaXveiv ray
TU>V r\y^p.6v(av Kal Swaptvctiv crracreiy* kv dp^fj yap yiyvz-
rat. ro dfj.dpTJ]iJ.a ) T) S dp\rj Xeyerat rjjjLicrv eivat iravros,
coo-re Kai TO ej/ avrfj piKpov a/za/jrrj/za dvdXoyov kcm irpos 30
4 ra ei/ roiy aAAoty //epecrii/. 6 Xcoy <5e a/ TCOJ/ yt/copi)ucoi/ o-ra-
crvvairoXavtiv TTOLOVCTL Kal TTJV oXrjv iroXiv, olov kv
ia crvv(3r) //era ra Mr]8iKd y Svo a<5eX0co^ irtpl rfjs
rcoi/ Trarpoocoi/ vop.T]S StevfxOtvTW 6 fjikv yap ctTropcorepoy,
coy OUK dnofyaivovTos [^arepouj T?)/ ovcriav ovSe TOV drjcravpbv 35
oy evpev 6 TrarTJp, TrpocrijyfTO roi)y 8r]fj.oTtKovy ) 6 & erepoy c^coy
5 ovcriav TroXXrjv Toi>$ timopovs, Kal iv AtXfyo is e< KrjSeias ye-
vofjievTis 8ia<popas dpyr] TracrS>v eyerero rcoi/ crracrecoi/ TCOJ/
vcrrepov 6 p.\v yap o/coi/icra/xej/oy rt cri//Z7rTCo/fa, coy rjXOev 1304 a
7Tt T^ vvfKprjv, ov Xa/3cov aTrfjXdev, ot S coy v{3pLcr6ei/T$
fve(3aXov TCOJ/ /epcoj/ -^prj^aTcav Ovovros, KaneLra coy /epo-
6 cri/Xoi/ dTTCKTeivav. Kal vrepi MirvXrjvrji <5e e
cTTacrecoy yej/o/iev^y TroXXcoV eytj/eTO dp^rj KaK&v Kal TOV 5
TOU Trpoy AOrjvaiovs, kv a> Ild^rjy eXa^Se TT)I/ TroXii/
TifJicxpavovs yap TcoV fVTropcav TIVOS KaTaXnrovTos
Svo OvyaTtpas, 6 Treptcocr^eiy /ca2 oy Xa/3coj/ T0?y vikcnv avTov
Ai^avSpos rjpt Trjs crTao-ecoy /ca2 Toi/y ^^i/auwy rrapdogvve,
7 7rpo^ej/oy coi/ T^y TroXecoy. /cai ei/ ^co/ceOcrij/ e fTTiKXrjpov 10
o-Tacrecoy yej/o/zei/^y Trepi Jkfj/acreai/ TOJ/ ikfi/ao coj/oy TraTepa /ecu
EvOvKpaTrj TOV Oi/o/zap^of, 17 oraaiy at/TT; dp^rj TOV Upov
TToXepov KaTto-Tt] TOCS $(OKfvo-Lv. /^6Te/3aXe <Se /cat i/ Eirt-
8dfj.v(> 17 TroXiTia c/c ya/zt/ccoj/ v7ro/j.vr)o~Tevadfji.vos yap
40 nOAITIKflN H (E ). 4-5.
ig riy [6vyaTepa~], coy i^rjfJLioMTfv avTov 6 TOV v7ro/J.vrjo~TvOevTOS
TraTrjp yevo/j.evos rco> dp^ovTcov, arepoy crt;/z7rapeXa/3e roi)y
eirrdy rfjs 7roXire/ay co? eTTT/peao-^e/y. //era/3XXot;o-i <Se /cat 8
e/y oXiyap^iav Kal e/y Srifjiov Kal e/y TroXiTtiav e/c TOV
(vSoKijJ.rjo~ai TL f) av^rjOrjisat rj apyjtlov rj p.6piov r^y TTO-
20 Xecoy, ofoi/ 17 ei/ Apia> waym (3ov\rj evSoKifj-rjcracra tv roty
e5o^e crvvTovtoTtpav Troifjcrat rrjv TroXireiav, Kal
6 vavTiKos o)(Xoy yei/6/zei/oy afrioy r^y Trepl ^aXa-
tAfT/y /cat Sia ravrrjs rfjs ^ye/zo^tay ^ia rrjv Kara
6d\arrav Svvafj.iv rr^v SrjpoKpaTiav la-yyporepav k-no n^vtv,
25 Kal kv " Apyei oi yva>pLfj.ot v8oKLp.rjcravT^ TTtpl rrjv kv 9
MavTiveia nd^rjv Trjv TTyaoy AaKeSai/toviovs tTrexeiprjcrav
xaraXveiv TOV Srjfj.ov, Kal tv %vpaKovcrais 6 8fjfj.o$ a irios
yevoptvos rr/y viKrjs TOV no\e/j.ov TOV npos A6i]vatov$ e/c TTO-
Xire/ay e/y SrjfiOKpaTiav fj.Tf(3aXfv, Kal kv XaXxiSi $6gov
30 TOV Tvpavvov /j,eTa TO>V yva)pifj.<t)v 6 Sfj/jios dvtXcov evdvs
efyfTO Trjs TroXtret ay, Kal kv A/j,f3paKia TrdXiv cocraurcoy
UcpiavSpov o~vvK(3aX(bv ro?y eTTt^e/ze^oiy o 8fjfj.os TOV TV-
pavvov 6/y eavTov Trepieo-rTjcre TTJV noXiTtiav. Kal 6 Xcoy Srj 10
^e? TOVTO /J.T) Xav6dveLv } <wy o/ 8vvdfj.ea>$ aiTioi yevofievoi,
35 /cai ISiaiTai Kal dp-^al Kal (f>vXal Kal 6 Xeoy y^epoy /cat
orroiovovv TrXfjOos, o~Tdo~iv KIVOVCTLV rj yap ol TOVTOIS fidovovv-
rey Tf/zco//ej/oiy dp^ovo~i r^y crraaecoy, ^ oSroi <5ia r^ VTrepo^rjv
ov OfXovcri fjLevtiv e?n TO)!/ fVco^. KivovvTai 8 at TroXiTtTai 1 1
/cat oTav TavavTta civai SOKOVVTU fteprj Trjs TroXecoy lo-dr)
1304 b aXXTyXoiy, OLOV oi TrXovcrLot Kal 6 Sfjfj.o$, fj.o~ov 8 rj jj.r]8kv
7) fjiiKpov TrdftTrav av yap noXv irnepe^r) onoTfpovovv TO>V
/j.(p>v, ?rpoy ro 0aj ep<y KpclTTOv TO Xoirrbv ov OtXei KivSv-
vevfiv. 810 Kal ol /car dpeTTjv 5ia0epoj/rey ov TTOIOVCTL o~Tao-iv 12
5 <wy fiTTftv oXiyoi yap yiyvovTai Trpoy TroXXovy. KadoXov jj.ev
ovv trtpl Tracray ray TroXiretay at dp-^al Kal aiTiai TO>V
(TTdo~u>v Kal T>V [j.Ta@oX)v TOVTOV fyovcri TOV Tponov KL-
vovcri 8k ray 7roXire/ay ore fifv Sid ^3iay ore 5e Si
1304 a 151305 a 2. 41
Sib (3ias ftev T) ev6vs e dp^fjy 77 vaTepov
13 Kal yap 77 aTrdrrj SiTTrj ore fiev yap ZgairaTricravTts TO 10
TTpWTOV CKOVTWV fJ.Ta/3dXXoVO-l TTJV 7ToAiTe/ai>, fW VO-TpOV
(3ia Kartyjovcriv aKOvrw, OLOV kirl TO>V TTpaKocrL<ov TOV Srj-
f^rfTrdTrjcrav, (f)dcrKOVTS TOV (3acri\a \pr)p.ara irapf-
irpbs TOV -rroXffiov TOV Tr/ooy AaKcSaipoviovs, \lftvcrd-
eiv tnfip&vTo T-^V iroXiTeiav ore <Se e^ apx^ y X 5
re Tre/irai/rey Kal ixrTtpov TrdXiv ireio-OevTav CKOVTOW dp-^ov-
<TIV avra)v. aTrXeoy /j.v ovv irepl Trdcras ray TroAirefay K
Tatv fipr]fjifva)v o~f^/3e/3?;/ce yiyvtcrQai ray ^era/3oAay"
ILaQ (KaaTov S dSos TroAtre/ay e/c TOVTODV /zept^oi/ray 5
ra (rv/ji^aivovTa SeT Oewpeiv. at fj.ev ovv 8rjfj.oKpariaL fid- 20
Aiora /zera/3aAAouo~t Sia Tr\v T$>V 8r)p.aya>
TO, fifv yap ISia o-vKotyavTovvTes TOV$ ray otxrias
o-va-Tptyovo-iv avTOVS (vvvdytL yap Kal roi/y e^Oio-rovs 6 KOLVOS
06/3oy), ra 5e Koivfi TO irXfjOos eTrayo^rey. Kal TOVTO TTI
2 TToXX&v dv rty iSoi yiyvo/ttvov o{5ra>y. Kal yap kv K<a 17 25
SrjfjLOKpaTia /zere/3aAe Trovrjpav eyyevofjievtov SrjfjLayaiywv
(ot yap yv(apifj.oi o-vvo~Trjo~av\ Kal kv Poo^a)- /j.io~0o(f)0pdv
re ya/o 01 Srjfiayooyol fTropigov, Kal e/ccoAuoj/ d-jroSiSovaL
ra ofaiXofjitva roFy TpLrjpdp-^ois, ot 8e Sia ray e7rt0e/)o-
/Ltej/ay ^t /cay r)vayKdo-Qr]o~av avo~TdvTS KaTaXvo-at TOV Sfj- 30
3 ytio^. KaTeXvdrj 5e /cat ei/ HpaKXfia 6 Sfj/jios fiTa TOV
aTTOiKio-fibv fvOi>s Sia TOVS Srjpaywyovs dSiKov/tevoi yap
VTC OVT&V oi yvwpipoi fgeTWTTOv, e?reira aQpoiaOevTes ol
4 e/CTrnrroi rey /cat KareA^oj rey KaTtXvcrav TOV Sijfjiov. Trapa-
TrA^a /coy 6^e >cat 77 ei/ Meyapoiy KaTtXvOr) SrjfioKpaTia ol 35
ya/o 8r)fjLayct)yoi } tva ^pr^aTa <i\<a<n Srj/jLevfiv, tgtftaXXov
iroXXovs TO>V yvGopipoav, eooy TroXXovs eTroirjo-av TOVS (pevyov-
ray, o/ ^e Kartoj/rey fviKrjcrav fj.a^6/jLvot TOV Srjfjiov Kal
TfV 6Xiyap)(iav. avveftr) $e TavTov Kal Trepl
enl r?7y SrjpoKpaTias TJV KareAfo-e pao-v/jia^os. 1305 a
5 a-\fSbv Se Kal enl TO>V dXXcov dv TIS i Sot 6ta>pS>v ray pe-
42 nOAITIKfiN H ( ). 5-6.
ra/3oAay TOVTOV e^ovaas TOV rpoTrov. ore yue^ yap, iva
\apigcovTai, dSiKOVVTSTQV$ yi/copt/zouy avvLo-Tdo-LV,rj ray ov(rias
5 dvaSdaTOVs TTOLOVVTZS rj ray 7rpocr66Wy raTy XetTOVpytais, ore
$e Sia{3dXXovT$, iv e>(a)0"i STJU^V^LV ra /crr^ara rcoi> TrAof-
<nW. e?rf <Se roo> dp^aioDv, ore ykvoiTO o az^roy dr/paya)- G
ybs Kal crrparT/yoy, ety rvpavviSa yuere/3aAAo^ cr^eSot ya/3
o/ TrAeFo-rot rcor dp^aiu>v rvpdvvtov e/c 8r]p.ayu>yS>v ytyova-
10 <ni/. O.ITLOV <5e roO rore /zei> ytyvt(r6aL vvv Se /J.TI, on rore 7
/ze^ o/ $r)fj.aya>yol rjcrav e/c rcor crrparrjyovi Tcov (ov yap
TTCO S^ivoi rjcrav Aeyeti/V j/{5i/ 5e rTyy pr]TOpLKr}s rjv^rjuevrjs ol
Swdnevoi Aeyeii/ Sr]fj.aya)yov(n p.tv, St. direLpiav Se T>V
7roAe/it/ccoi/ OVK eiriTtOevTai, irX^v ef irov (3pa)(v TI yeyove
15 TOIOVTOV. kytyvovro <5e rvpavvi&ts Trpbrtpov p.d\\ov r) vvv 8
/cat SLO, TO /zeyaAay dp^as tyxeipigecrOai ricriv, (cxnrtp
(v M.L\r}T(p e/c rf/y irpvTaveias TroAAcSj/ yap ^i/ Kal /ze-
yaAcoz/ Kvpios 6 Trpvravis. ert o^e ^a ro /*?) yiteyaAay
etVat rore ray TroAeiy, aAA eTTf rco^ dyp>v oiKetv TOV
20 8r}jjiov dcr^oXov ovra vr/Joy roty epyoty, o/ Tr/ooorarai roO
Sijfj.ov } ore TroXffjLiKol yeVotrro, rvpavviSi kTTtTiBtvTO. Trdvres 9
<Se roCro eSpcov vno TOV 8rjfj.ov TTio-ref^e^rey, 77 5e vrt crrty ?}^ 77
aVex^eia 17 Trpoy rouy TrXovaLovs, olov ABr\v-r]<ji re Ueicricrrpa-
roy o-racrfaVay Trpoy roi>y 7re5ia/covy, /cai eaye^7?y e/^ Meya-
25 poiy rcoi/ evTTOpcov ra KTr/vrj diroa-fyd^as, Xaficbv irapa TOV
TTOTafjibv 7TiVfJ.ovTa$, Kal Aiovvcrios KaTrjyopcov Aatpvaiov 10
Ka rcot rrXovaicov rjgidaOr] rTyy TVpavvtSos, Sid Ti]v
coy <5^^ori/coy cof. yuera^SaAAoucri <5e /cat e/c
cfy/zo/cpartay e/y rr)^ i/ecorar?;^* OTTOU yap a/peraf
30 /^er a/ dp^ai, fj.rj a?ro Ti/J.rjfj,dTQ)v 5e, a/peTrai <Se 6 5^-
/zoy, SrjuaycoyovvTfS ol cnrov8ap^iS>vT^ ety TOVTO KaOiaTacrLv
coy KvpLov etVaf rov SfjfJ.ov Kal TO>V v6fj.a>v. a/coy 5e roi) T; 11
/z^ ytvtaOai 77 roC yiveaOaL TJTTOV TO ray 0fAay (pepsiv TOVS
dp^ovTas, dXXd p.i] -rrdvTa TOV SrjfJLOV. TU>V /zei/ ow 6^77-
35 fjLOKpaTtuiv at fjt.Ta(3oXal yiyvovTac Trdcrai a^Sbv Sid TO.V-
ray ray cur/ay
1305 a 31305 b 28. 43
At 8 oXiyapytai. fJ.Ta(3dXXov(ri 8ia Svo fj.dXio~Ta rpo- Q
TTOVS Toi>$ <})avp(OTdTOV$ kva fj.kv kav dSiKwori TO TrXfjOos
(?ray -yap iKavbs ytveTai Trpoa-Tdrrjs, /J.dXio~Ta 8 orav e
avrfjs o-v/j,/3fj TTJS oAtyapx/ay yt veo~6ai TOV f]yjj.6va, Ka- 40
OaTrep kv Ndga) AvySapis, oy Kal tTvpdvvrjatv vaTtpov rcav
2 NagicwJ )(i 8e Kal 17 e^ a AAcoz/ dp^rj oracreeoy Siafyo- 1305 b
pay ore IJL\V yap e^ avrcov T&V tvTroptov, ov TO>V OVTCW
8 kv rats dp^ats, yiyverai KaTaXvcrts, orav oXtyoi <706-
Spa SXTLV ot kv rais rifiais, o?ov kv Mao-aaXia Kal kv
cp Kal kv HpaKXtia Kal kv dXXais rroXeo-i o-vn(3e{3r)- 5
3 KfV oi yap fj.r) /zere)(oi/rey rS>v dp^oav tKivovv, ecoy ytzere-
\aftov ol Trpfo-fivrepoi Trportpov rcoi> a5eX0coi/, ixrrepov 8*
ol vtd)Tfpoi irdXiv ov yap apyovcriv kviayov /zer a/za ira-
rrfp T Kal vlos, kvia*)(ov 8e 6 7rpecr(3vTepo$ Kal 6 i/etorepoy
a$eA0oy Kal evda p.tv TroXiTLKWTfpa eyevero 17 oXiyapy^ia, 10
kv "Icrrp(> 8 e/y Sfj/j.ov aTrereAet/r^crej/, kv HpaKXeia 8 k
4 eAarroi/cci/ e/y tgaKoo-iovs rjXOev /iere/SaAe 8k Kal kv KviSco
rj oXLyap^ta crraaiacra^ra)^ rcov yvcopifjLGOv avrcav TT/aoy avrovy
Sia TO oXiyovs pfTf^iv Kat y KaOdirfp ei prjTai, ei TraTrjp,
vlov fj.r) /ierex tl/ , M^ t> wXe&wf a5eA0oi, aAA 1 ^ TOV 15
, kiri\a^6p.^vo^ yap o-Tao-tagovTcov 6 Sij^os, Kal
5 dcrOtvks yap TO o~Tao~idov. Kal kv EpvOpafe Sk CTU TTJS
TO>V BaviXiScov 6Xtyap)(ia$ kv TO"I$ dp^aioi^ ^povoty, Kai-
Trep KaXcos f7TLfj.eXofj.V(cv TO>V kv Trj TroAireta, o//coy 8ia 20
TO VTT oXiycov apyzcrQai dyavaKTa>v 6 8fjfJ.os /zere/3aAe
TTJV iroXiTeiav. KLvovvTai 8 at 6Xiyap)(iai e| avrav Kal
6 Sta <f>iXoviKLav 8r]fj.aya>yovvTQ)v r) 8rjfj.ay(oyta 8k
17 fj.kv kv ai>Tois roty oAi yoiy (kyyiyvtTai. yap
K&V irdvv oXiyoi (acrtv, o?ov kv roiy TpiaKovra AOijvrjo-tv ol 25
Trept Xapt/cAea i o-\vaav TOVS TpiaKOVTa SrjuaywyovvTes, Kal
kv T0l$ TfTpaKOO-LOtS 01 7Tpl $pVVl)(OV TOV aVTOV TpOTTOJ/),
rj oTav TOV 6y\ov 8r]fj.ay(oytoo~iv oi kv TT) oXiyap^ia OV
44 nOAITIKflN H ( ). 6.
olov kv Aaplcrrj ol TroXfro0t>XaKey 8ia rb a!peio~6ai avTovs
30 TOV o^Xov k8rj/j.aya>yovv, Kal kv Sffatjl oXiyap^iat.^ ov% OVTOL
alpovvrai ray ap^ay e d>v ol apyjovTes dcriv, aXX at fj.kv
dpyja.1 K Tifj.r)fidT(av /teyaXcoz/ ettrlv 77 e ratptcoi/, aipovvrai
S ol oirXtTai TI 6 Sfj/j-os, orrep kv A(3v8a> <rvvtpaivev, /cat 7
OTTOV TO. SiKacrrripia fJ.r) K TOV TToXireu/iaro? k(mv 8r)fj.aya)-
35 yovvTts yap vrpoy ray KpfoetS //era/3aXXot><n rr]v TroXiTtiav,
oirep KOL kv Jf/ja/cXeta eyevero rfj kv ra> IToi/rco en 5
6 rai/ tvioi els cXarrouy eX/ccocri r^f 6\iyapyiav oi yap TO
fcroi 7]TovvT$ dvayKa^ovrai @or]Qbv err ay ay fa 6 a i TOV Srj-
IJLOV. yiyvovTai 8e yuera/SoXai Trjs 6\iyapy^ias Kal orav 8
40 aVaXcoo-cocn ra f(5ia &Wey aaeXyaiy /ca yap ot TOIOVTOL
KatvoTOfjidv {rjTOvcri, Kal 77 TVpavviSi eTTiTiOevrai avrol rj
1306 a KaTao-Kevdova-iv erepov, coo-rep iTrtrapivos AIOVVCTIOV kv 2v-
paKovcraiS, Kal kv AnfaTroXei, co ovofta rjv JfXeoTi/ioy, roi)y
rot y XaXKiStcov r/yaye, /cai kX66vT<av ^iecrracr/acrej/
?rpoy roi)y V7r6pov? y Kal kv Alyivy 6 TTJV irpa^iv TT)I/ 9
5 Trpoy XdprjTa Trpa^ay ere^e/pT/cre
8ia TOiavTTjv aLTLav ore yuei ow i>6v$ kTriy^tipovcri TL
ore $e KXtirTovai TO, Kowd, 6Qev Trpoy avTovs o-Tacridovo~tv
77 oSrot 77 ot Trpoy TOVTOVS /za)(6/iei/oi KXeVroi ray, OTTC/O ei/
-(iTToXXcBi i a crvvefir) T?} kv rco H6vT(t>. 6/j.ovoovo~a 8e 6X1- 10
10 yap^ta OVK ev8id(f)6opos e avTf}s. trrjfietov 8e rj kv $ap-
(rdXa> TroXiTfia eKeivoi yap oXiyoi oVrey TroXXcoi Kvpcoi elcri
8ia TO y^pfjcrQai <r(pio~iv avTols KaXcoy. KaraXuo^rai 8e
Kal OTO.V kv Trj oXtyapx/a krkpav oXiyap^iav ffj.Troico(rii>,
TOVTO 8 k(TT\V OTCLV TOV TfaVTOS TTO\lTVfJLaTOS oXtyOV SvTOS TO>V 1 1
1 5 fty(<rr&v dpyS>v /IT) /lere^cocrii ol oXiyot irdvTes, 6-rrep kv
o~vv(3r) Trore* TTjy TroXiret^ay yap 8C oXiycov ovo-r>s
yepovTcw oXiyoi irdftTrav kyivovTO Sia TO diSfovs fivat
oi/ray, TTJV 8 aipecriv SvvacrTevTtKrjv clvai Kal
ofioiav TTJ T&V kv ActKcSatftovi yepovTtov. yiyvtTai 8k //e- 12
20 Ta8oXr) TCOV oXiyap^icov Kal kv 7roXe//a) Kal kv elptfvfl,
1305 b 291306 b 14. 45
kv n\v TroXe/to) 8ta TTJV ?rpoy TOV Srjuov dirio-Tiav or par tco-
raty aVay/ca^o/ieVeoj/ xprjo-Oai (< yap aV kyyjtiptaaMTiv,
OVTOS 7roXXa/ay yiyverai rvpavvos, u>cnrtp kv KopivOco Ti-
dv 8k 7rX([ov$ } OVTOL auroFy TreptTrotoCyrat Svva-
ore (5e ravra SeStorfS //era<5i^6aa-t TO) TrX^ei r^y 25
1 3 TroAiret ay ^ia; TO dvayKdt<rQai T< ^//oo \pfjo-6cu kv \
rfj elprjvrj 8ia TTJV dmo Tiais ri]v Trpoy aXX?7Aoi;y ky^tipi-
OV(TI r^jv (f)V\aKr]V arparicoTaiy Kal apyovn fj.f<nSLa), oy
ei/i ore ytVerai Kvpios a/i^orepco^, oVep crvv(3r) tv Aapivy
kirl rfjs T&V AXevaScov dp-^rjs TO>V irepl ^l\iov Kal kv 3
14^4/3u5a> eTTt T>V TaipLa>v >v r\v pia 17 IfadSov. yivovrai
Se orao eiy Kal e/c roO TrepiooOelcrOai ereyoofy trepans rStv
kv rfj oXiyap^ia avr&v Kal KaTacrTaaidgea-Oai Kara yd-
fj-ovs 57 StKas, OLOV * ya/itK^y /ze* amay at ^Iprj^vai
irporepov, Kal T^V kv jEperpta 5* oXiyapyiav rr]v rG>v ITT- 35
15 7rea>j> Atayopas KartXvvtv dSiKrjOels irepl ydp.ov, k< 8k
f) kv HpaKXeia o-rao-ry eyerero Kal kv
j.oi)(ias SiKafcos fj.kv orao-icort/ccoy ^
Troir]crafj.i (av rrjv KoXa&iv T&V fjikv kv HpaKXeia Kar Evpv-
Ticavos, ratv 8 kv @rj/3ais /car AfnrfoV k^iXovfiKijaav yap 1306 b
avrovs ol k^Opol &CTT SeOfjvai kv dyopa kv ra> KV^XDVI.
16 TroXXat 8k Kal 6\a ro dyav SecnroriKas eivai ray oXtyap-
VTTO TU)V kv rrj TroXiTfia TLVCOV 8var^fpavdvT(i)v /care-
XvOrjcrav, axnrfp rj kv Kvi8a> Kal fj kv Xia> oXiyap^ia. 5
yiyvovTai 8k Kal a?ro o^f/zTrrco/zaroy /zera/3oXat Kal r^y
TroXireias Kal T>V 6Xiyap^ia>v kv ocraty diro
(SovXevovcri Kal 8iKaov(ri Kal ray a XXay ap^ay
17 dpyovcriv. 7roXXa/ay yap ro ra-^dkv npcorov rifj.r]fj.a Trpoy
roi/y Trapoi/ray Kaipovs, coo-re fifrk^fiv kv \ikv rfj oXiyap^ta 10
oX/yofy ei/ o^e rrj TroXiTfia rouy pkcrovs, euerT/pi ay yiyi/o/zey^y
5t tlpr)VT)v f} 8i dXXrjv nv VTV%iav crvftftaLVfi TroXXaTrXa-
ffiov yiyveaOai ri/z?;/zaroy a^i ay ray az/ray /cr^crety, twcrre
rravras ndvTQiv fj.eTt)(iv, ore /^ej/ e/c Trpoo-aycoy^y /cat
46 nOAITIKfiN H (E ). 6-7.
15 Kara LLiKpov yivofjLtvr}? rfjs /lera/SoXTyy Kal XavOavovo-rjs,
ore 8\ Kal Qdrrov. at p-tv ovv oXiyap^iai fj,Ta{3dXXovo~i 18
Kal o~Tao-idovo~i Sia ToiavTas airias (6 Xcoy 5e Kal at Sr/-
fj.oKpaTiai Kal at oXiyap^iat k^LcrravraL eV/ore OVK e/y ray
(vavTias TroXtrei ay aXX e/y ray iv rS> aurco ye^a, olov
20 e/c root- kwo^div Srjfj.oKparicoi Kal o\Lyapy^iS)v 6/y ray KV-
ptovs Kal < TOVTGOV i$ e/cetVay)
7 Et 5e ra^y apitrro/cpari aty ytyvovTai at crracreiy ai /^e^
<5ia ro oXiyofS TCO^ TI/J-OIV yuere^eii^, 6Vep efpTjrai Kivtiv Kal
ray oXtyap^ias Sia ro /cat r^i/ dpicrroKpariav o\iyapyj.av
25 e^Vat" Trcoy ev ayu^orepaty yap 6\iyoi ot apyjovrts, ov p.tv-
TQL Sia ravrov oXiyoi, eTrei SOKZL ye 8ia ravra Kal 17
dpiarroKparia oXiyap^a eivai. /zaXio-ra 5e TOVTO crv[j.fiaivtiv 2
avayKatov, orav rj ro TrXfjOos T&V Tre^poi/Ty/zaricr/zej/coz/ coy
OJJLOLOV Kar aper^y, ofoj/ ei/ AaKtSaip.ovL oi Xeyoynei Oi II ap-
30 Oeviai UK r<av oyuoicoz/ yap rj(rav\ oz)y ^copacrai/rey tTrtftov-
aTreo-reiXaj/ Tapai/roy o/Ktcrray, ^ ora^ ri^ey ari-
[teydXoi oVrey /cai /i^oWoy ^ rroyy /car
VTTO TlVtoV kvTl[MOTtp(t>V, OLOV AvCTavSpOS VTTO TO)V
rj orav dvSpatSr]? rty coi/ ^ fj.re^rj rS>v TLfj.a>v, OLOV Ki- 3
35 vdSa>v 6 TTJV CTT AyrjcriXdov crycrr^cray tTTideaiv 7rl TOVS
^TrapTLaras, in orav ot LL\V dnopcoo-t Xtav oi 8 evno-
pSxrtv (/cat /zaXicrra ei roty ?roXe/zoiy roi)ro yivtrai a-weftr)
$e Kal TOVTO kv AaKcSaiLtovt inrb TOV Mo~o-r]viaKbi> TroXe-
p.ov SfjXov 8e ^Kal roCrol e/c rr^y Tvpraiov 7roirjcrea>$ Trjs K.O.- 4
1307 a XovLivr]s Evvofitas OXL^oLitvoL yap rii/ey 5ia rw 7r6Xe/xoi/
T]IOVV dvd8ao~TOv rroteiv TT/V ^copav} eri eaV riy /teyay ^
/cat Svvdfj,evos Tt fj.ia>v etvat, iva fiovap^fj } a)(T7rep e^
AaKeSaiLiovi SoKei Ilavo-avLas 6 o-TpaTr)yijo-as /cara rw M.r\-
5 SLKOV TroXeLtov Kal kv Kap^rjSovi "Avvcov. XvovTai Se fid- 5
Xicrra ai re TroXtreTai Kal ai dptaTOKpaTtat Sia TTJV kv avTy
TTJ TToXiTeia TOV SiKaiov 7rape/c/3acrir. dp-^r] yap TO p-rj /xe-
/caXcoy kv p.tv TTJ TroXiTeia SrjLtoKpaTiav Kal 6X1-
1306 b 151307 b i. 47
iav, kv 8e rfj dpicrroKparla ravra re Kal rr)i> dperrjv,
fj.aXi.ar a 5e ra Svo Xeyco 8e ra 8vo 8fjfJ.ov Kal oXiyap- 10
X_tav ravra yap at iroXirtlai re TTfipcovrai inyvvvai Kal
6 at TroXXal rS>v KaXovLievcDv dpio-TOKparitov. Sia<f)povo~i yap
r&v ovofj.aofj.V(av iro\iTei>v at dpicrroKpariai TOVTO), Kal
8ia TOVT flcrlv at p.lv TJTTOV at 8e fiaXXov fj.6vLp.OL avT<av
ras yap dnoKXivovaas iioiXXov irpbs TTJV 6\Lyapytav dpi- 15
(TTOKparCas KaXovanv, ray <5e TT/JO? ro rrXfjOos TroXireias- 816-
irep a<T0aAe<jrepat at roiavrai rS>v erepcoj/ tlfftv
re yap ro ir\tiov, Kal LidXXov dyarrwa-Lv i o-ov
7 ot 8 kv ra?y eviropiats, av rj TroXireia 8i8a> rrjv U
grjrovo~L Kal 7rXeoz/e/cren/. oAcoy 5 (f> onorepov av 20
r) TroXtrei a, trrl ravra peOio-raraL e /carepco^ ro
avav6vr<t)v y OLOV 17 LL\V iroXtTcfa e/y Sffiiov, dpi-
8 aroKparia 8 e/y 6\Lyap\iav r) e/y rdvavrta, OLOV 17 \JL\V
dpiaroKparia e/y Sfjiiov (coy d8iKovfj,voi yap rrepLO rrSiO Lv els
rovvavriov ot 7ropcorepoA at <5e TroXtrtTai e/y oXiyap^iav 25
(LIOVOV yap LLOVLLLOV TO Kar dgtav io~ov Kal ro e x il/ r
9 ai^rcorV crvv(3r) 8e ro *if>r\iLkvov kv QovpioLS Sia LL\V yap
ro diro TrAet oi/oy rifJ.TjfJ.aros tlvaL ray ap^ay e/y eXarrov
fj.re(3r) Kal e/y ap^eFa TrAetco, 5ta <5e ro r^ )(c6paj> o^ 7 / 7
roi)y yva)pifj.ovs o~vyKrijo~ao 6ai rrapa rov VQLJLOV (i] yap TTO- 30
Xirfia 6Xiyap)(iK(iorfpa rjv, coo-re tSvvavro rrXeoveKreiv) ..."
6 <5e 8fjfj.o? yvfjivao-Qtls kv rco TroXe/xco rcoi fypovpwv tytvero
Kpeirrwv, ecoy d(f)fto-av r^y \a>pas oaoi TrXe/co ^crar e^oi/rey.
10 eri 6\a ro vracray ray aptcrro^pari/cay rroXtretay oXiyap^t-
Ka.9 fivat fj.dXXov TrXeoveKrovcriv ot yva>pifj,oL } OLOV Kal kv 35
AaKeSaiLiovi ety 6Xi"yoyy a/ oixriai ep^ovraL Kal e^ecrri Troiea/
o rt ctr ^eXcocri roFy yvcopifj-OL? /zaXXoi/, /cai KrjSeveiv orco
OeXovcriv, Sib Kal fj AoKptov TroXiy ctTrcoXero e/c r?;y Trpoy
ALOVVO~LOV KrjSeias, 8 ef SrjfjoKparia OVK av eye^ero, ou5 a>
11 er dpiaroKparia fti fj.ffj.iyfj.^i ij. LidXtcrra 5e XavOdvovo~iv at 40
dpiaroKpariai [j.ra(3dXXovo-ai rco Xuecr^ai Kara (JLiKpov, 1307 b
48 nOAITIKflN H (E 1 ). 7-8.
oVep efpTjrai kv roty 7rp6repoi> KadoXov Kara -iracrwv rS>v
7roAireia>j>, on aiTtov rS>v /iera/3oA<5i> Kal TO fJUKpov k<rriv
OTO.V yap ri irpo&vTai TWV Trpoy TTJV TroXiTtiav, /zera TOVTO
5 Kal dXXo /zi/rp<3 [*.tiov ev\epeo~Tepov KLVOVGLV, ecoy dv Trdvra
TOV Koap-ov. awe fir] 8\ TOVTO Kal twl r^y ovpia>v 12
v6p.ov yap orroy <5ia Trerre era)// (rrpar^yea , ye-
vo\itvoi ri^ey TroAe/zi/cot roil recorepcoi/ ^cat Trapa TOO TrAT
rcoj <f>povpG)v i>SoKifJt.ovvT$, KaTa<j)povr}(ravTts TU>V kv
10 Trpdyiiacn Kal vofJLL^ovTZS paSicos KaTao"^rjo-i^ } TOVTOV
VOfJLOV \V61V TT\lpT]0~aV TTp&TOV, &CTT k^tlvai TOVS
crrparT/yea , opcoi Tey ro^ ST^JLOV avTovs
7rpoOvfj,(o$. oi 8 TTI TOVTQ* rerayytiei/oi TCOJ/ apyjiv- 13
roof, o/ Ka\ovfJ.voL av[j,(3ovXoi, op/iTytra^rey TO irp&Tov kvav-
15 TiovcrOat <rvveTreio-dr]crai , u7roAa/z/3ai/oi/rey ro5rof K.ivr\<ravTa<i
TOV vofjiov tdveiv Tr)v aX\r]v TroXiTttav, vaTepov 5e /?oi;A6/ze-
voi /ccoAveii/ dXXcov KIVOV^VODV. OVKZTI TrXeov iiroiovv ovSev,
dXXa ^uere/5aAe^ 77 ra^y Trdaa r^y TroAtre/ay e/y (5ffa-
a-Teiav T>V km^iprjo-dvTCdv veooTepifciv. irdcraL 8 at TroXt- 14
20 racu Ai/o^rai ore /iei/ e^ avTa>v ore (5 e&)$ej J orai/ ei/ai/-
r/a TroAiret a 77 ^ 7rXr)o-[oi> 77 noppca fjiev e^ovcra Se ^vva^Lv.
o?rep o-wtftaivev CTT AQrivatonv Kal AaKtSainovitov oi
yap ^AQr\valoi iravTa^ov ray oAtyapxtay, oi 5e
roi)y 8rjfj.ov9 KaTeXvov. o6ei> p.\v ovv at
25 rcof Tro\LTiS)v Kal at o-racreiy, fi prjTai <r
8 jTTepi 6"e o-u>TrjpLas Kal KOivfj Kal \a)pls eVa
rei ay k^o^vov CCTTLV tiTTtlv. TrpSiTov /zev ow SrjXov OTL, eivrep
8C <bv (pOetpovTaL ai TroXiTtiat, e^o/zer /cai 6Y cot
ra)^ yap kvavTiwv TavavTia Troir]TiKd } <p6opd $e
30 o-coTrjpia kvavTiov. kv p.\v ovv ra?y eu /ce/cpa/zeraiy TroAi- 2
re/aiy (ocnrep dXXo TI Set Trfpzlv 07ra>y p.rj8ev Trapavop-Sio-L,
Kai /zaAicrra ro (JUKpov (pvXdTTfiv Xav&dvti yap TrapaSvo-
likvr) r] irapavop-ia, coo-yrep ray ovcrias TO jj-LKpov Sandvrj/ia
dvaiptl TroAAaKiy yt.v6p.evov. XavOdvet <5e 77 Sanavrj 3
1307 b 21308 a 27. 49
Sia TO IJITJ dOpoa yiyvfaOai TrapaXoyiferai yap 17 Sid- 35
voia VTT avT&v, oxrrrep 6 (TO^LCTTLKOS Xoyoy e/ tKao~Tov (JLI-
KpOV, Kal TTaVTa. TOVTO 8 <TTl fJ.V (US , eOTt S O>y OV TO
yap oXov Kal TO, irdvTa ov /u/cpoV, aXXa cruy/cetrai e/c
4 niKpfav. p.iav n\v ovv (f)V\aKr)v irpos TavTtji/ TTJV dp^rjv
Sfl 7TOlflO~Oai ) 7TiTa fJ.7] TTlO~TVll ToTs CTO^lCTfJLaTOS \dplV 40
Trpoy ro 7T\fj6o$ 0-vyKeiiJ.tvois, e^eXlyxerai yap VTTO TQ>V 1308 a
epyow (jroTa <5e Xeyo^er TCOI/ TroXiTeiwv ao^icr/J-aTa, irpo-
5 Ttpov ?pT)Tai\. eri S opdv OTL eviat ptvovo-Lv ov p.6vov dpi-
o~TOKpaTiai aXXa Kal oXiyapyjiai ov Sta TO datyaXets tvai
ray iroXiTeias, aXXa; Sia TO v ^pfjo-Oai Toi>$ kv raFy dp- 5
\als ywofjitvovs Kal roty e^co r^y TroXtre/ay Kal ro?y kv ra>
TroXiTv/j.aTi, roi)y p.\v fir] //ere^oj/ray TO) //^ dSiKeiv Kal
T&) roi)y fjytfjioi iKovs avT&v e/crayeij/ e/y r^ vroXireia^ /cat
roi)y /xei/ (f>iXoTt/j,ovs //?) dSiKeiv e/y aTi^tav TOV$ $e TroXXovs
e/y /ce/3<5oy, Trpoy avTovs Se Kal ro^y /zere^oj/ray rw ^pfjaOat to
6 aXX^Xoty ^/iori/cwy. o ya/J ezri TOU TrX^oyy
8ri[JLOTlKol TO f(TOJ/ } ToCr eVTi Tffll 6/iOiCOJ/ OU \LQVOV
aXXa icai o~up.<j>tpov kariv. Sib kav vrXeibuy cocrti ej/ ra>
TToXiTtv/jLaTi, TroXXa crf/i0e/oei rwt STJ/JLOTIKCOI voftodeTrjud-
TO>V, Oiov TO e ^a/^Tyi/ofy ray dp^as eivai, Iva Tra^rey o/ 15
ofjLoioi y^ere^(0)crit" eVri yap a>o~7Tp Srjftos tfSr) oi opoioi
(Sib Kal kv TOVTOIS kyytyvovTai Sr)fj.aycoyol vroXXa/Ciy, a>o~7Tp
7 ipr]Tai TrpoTtpov)- evret^ T\TTOV e/y 5y^acrretay cfjnriTTTOvo U at
oXiyap^iai Kal dpio-TOKpaTiai (ov yap o/^oicoy paSiov Ka-
Kovpyfjo-ai oXiyov yjpovov ap^oj/ray >cai TroXw/, e?rei 5ia 20
roiJro eV Tafy 6Xiyap\iais Kal SrjfjioKpaTiais yiyvovTai TV-
pavviSts 77 yap oi fj.yio~Toi kv e>carepa TTiTi6fVTai Tvpav-
viSi } tvQa p.\v oi Sr]p.aya>yol tv6a S oi 8vvdo~Tai f 77 oi ray
8 /^ey/itrray e^o^rey ap^ay, orav TroXvv ^povov dp^cocriiA. crco-
ovTai S ai TroXiTelai ov povov Sia TO Troppco eivai T>V 25
Sia(j)6ipoi>Tau>, dXX eWore Afai <5ia TO eyyvy (f)o(3ov/j,fi 0i
yap Sia ^eipa>v iyovcri fjiaXXov TTJV noXiTtiav &o~T Set
VOL. IV. E
50 nOAITIKflN H (E ). 8.
<f)vXaTT(oo~i Kal pr) KaraXvaxriv wcnrep vvKTepLvrjv <f>vXa-
30 Kr]v TTJV rrjS TToXirtias TT/jprjo-Lv., Kal TO Troppa) eyyuy TTOfefr.
UTI Tay TO>V yv(optfj.a)v <f)tXoi>eiKias Kal o~Tao-ay Kal Sta rS>v 9
TreipacrOai SaT ^uXarrefi/, Kal rovs e^oo Trjs (f>i\o-
oVray, -jrplv TraptiXrjtpei ai Kal avrovs, co? TO kv
ywofjitvov KaKov yvtovai ov TOV TW^JOVTOS aXAa iro\i-
35 riKov dvSpos. Trpo? 8e TTJV Sia ra TifJ.rjfJ.ara yiyvop.evr]v 10
fj.Ta(3oXr)i> e oXiyap^ia^ Kal TroXLTtias, orav
TOVTO fJLVOVT(>V JJL\V TO>V aVT(0>V TifJ.r)fJ.a.T(Ol>
vofjit<T[J.aTO$ yiyvofjievris, crvfj.(ppi TOV Tifj.rjfj.aToy
irtlv TOV KOLVOV TO TrXfjOos Trpo? TO TraptX&ov, kv oo~ais
40 TroAeai TLfiwvTai K.O.T kviavTov, Kara TOVTOV TOV
1308 b cv 5e Tats fieigoo-i Sia TpieTrjpiSos i} TrerTaeT^p^oy, Kav rj
7roXXa7rXdo~ioi> rj TroXXoo-Trjfj.6pi.oi> TOV TrpoTepov, kv a> at TL-
fj.rjo-fL$ KaTeaTrjcrav TTJS TroAtTe/ ay, vofjiov elvai Kal TO.
rj dvitvat, tav JJL\V v7rp(3dXXr}, k-
5 ray Kara Tr\v TroXXaTrXao-iaxnv, tav 8 eAAenn?,
Kal eAaTTG) iroiovvTas Trjv TifJ.rjo-iv. kv fAtv yap TaFy oAi- 11
Kal Ta?y TroAtTeiaty fj,r) iroiovvTtov fj.ev ourcoy
e/cetVcoy <5e e/c p.lv TToXtTeias SrjfjtOKpartav, e/c 8 oXiyap-
10 X ay voXireiav r} Srjfj.ov. KOLVOV 8t Kal kv 8r]p.(t> KOI 0X1- 12
yap)(ia \Kal kv fj.ovap^ia~\ Kal ndo-r) TroXiTtia fj.rJT avdveiv
Xiav p.Y)8tva irapa TT]V 0-v/j.fj.tTpiav, dXXa fiaXXov irei-
pao-Oai fj.iKpas Kal TroXv^povtovs SiSovat Ti/^ay r) rctylb
/icyaAay (ia<f)0ipovTCU yap, Kal 0epeii/ ov TTUVTOS dvSpbs
15 tvTvytav), t fJLr}, fir) TOC y dOpoas SovTas dfyaipzlo-Qai
Trd\iv ddpoas, dXX CK Trpoo-ayatyfjs Kal fj.dXio~Ta p.\v
7Tipdo-6aL Toty i/6/zoty ourcoy ayiv cocrTe p^Sti/a eyyiyvo~6ai
rroXv imeptyjovTa Svvdfj,ei fj.rJT (pi\a>v fj.rJT ^prj^aTcov,
i Se fj,rj, dTTo8rjfjir)TiKa$ Troifto-dai Tay Trapao-Tacrety avT&v.
2O 7Ti Kal Sia TOVS ISlOVS /SiOfy VtGOTeplfoVCTlV, Sfi k(J.TTOllV 13
1308 a 281309 a 13. 51
Tiva TT}V firo-^ro fa i\v TOVS ^oWay dcrv^opcas Trpos
TToXiTfiav, fv fikv torffUHCparfy Trpoy rrjv 8ij/j.oKpaTiav,
fv 8f oXiyap^ia Trpoy TTJV oXcyap-^iav o/iouoy 8f KOI rS>v
dXXcav TToXiTfiSiv fKao-TTj. Kal TO evrjfj.fpovv 8f Trjs iroXfcos
14 dva fifpos <f)vXdTTfo~6ai Sid ray a^ray alrias TOVTOV S 25
aicoy TO a/et TOIS arri/fei/ie^oiy popiois kyyeipL
Trpa^ety Kal ray dp^ds (Xeyco $ dvTiKi<r6ai rouy ii
Kfis TO> TrXrjOti Kal TOVS diTopovs roiy tvnopois) Kal TO 7m-
pd<rQai r) a-vp-fjiiyvvvai TO TWV dnoptov TrXfjOos Kal TO TO>V
evTropcov rj TO fieaov avw TOVTO yap SiaXvei ray 8ia 30
15 TTJV di>io~OTr)Ta crraaeiy. /j.eyiaTov 5e kv Trdcrrj TroAtre/a TO
Kal TOIS vofjiois Kal Trj d\\r) OLKOvop.ia OVTCO TTa^6ai a>o~T
fj.rj fivat Tay ap^ay KtpSaivtLv. TOVTO 8e p.d\ivTa tv
16 oXiyap^iKaty SfT Trjptlv. ov yap ouTcoy dyavaKTOvcriv
ftevoi TOV dpyjtiv ol TroXXot, aXXa Kal ^aipovcnv kdv T*y 35
fa Trpoy Toty /oYoty cryjoXdfciv, a>y kav oioovTat TO, KOivd
KXenTeiv TOVS ap^oi/Tay, TOTC 8 a/z0oTepa XuTreT, TO Te
17 TtoV TlfJ-OtV ft}} fiTf\fiV Kal TO TO>V Kp8a>V. fJiOVa^S)^ 8f
Kal v8\Tai dfJia tlvai SrjfjLOKpaTiav Kal dpLVTOKpaTLav,
cl TOVTO KaTao~K(vdo-fi TL$ evSe^oiTO yap av Kal TOVS 40
yvobpifjiovs Kal TO TrXfjOos %X LV a ftovXovTai a//00Tepoi;y. 1309 a
TO [lev yap t^tlvai rrdo-Lv dp^Lv 8rjfj.oKpaTiKov y TO 8* TOVS
18 yvoopipovs flvat. kv Tais dp^ats dpLo-TOKpaTiKov, TOVTO 8
o~Tai OTav fir) ff KepSaiveiv TTO TO>V dp^mv ol yap diro-
poi ov ftov\r)crovTai dp^fiv T<S fjirjSev KtpSatveiv, d\\a Trpoy 5
ISiois flvaL p.dXXov } ol 5e fvnopoi SvvrjcrovTai Sid TO
vos 7rpoo-8eio~6ai T>V KOLVWV &CTT o"u/z/?7jo - eTat To?y p\v
diropois yiyvfo-6ai fviropoi? 8id TO SiaTpt(3iv Trpoy TOIS
epyoiy, TOty 8t yv&ptfUM fJ.rj dp^o~dai VTTO TU>V Tf^ot/Tcor.
19 ToO fJL^v ovv fjLrj KXtTTTevOai TO, Koivd 17 7rapd8oo~is yiyv(r6(o
T&V xprjuaTtov TrapovTcov TTO.VT(AV T>V TroXiTa>v t Kal
ypa(f>a K.OLTO. (ppaTpias Kal Xo^ouy Kal (f>vXds
TOV 8k a/cep<5coy dp^tv Tt//ay cTt/at 8fT vfvofjLo6eTrjfj.fi
E 2
52 nOAITIKflN H ( ). 8-9.
t>8oKlfJLOV(TlV. Sfl 8 kv \L\V TO.IS 8rj/J.OKpaTiaiS TCOV 20
15 evTTOpav faiSeaOai, fir] povov rw ray KTrja-eis fir] TTOLZLV dva-
Sdcrrovs, aXXa fj.rj$ TOVS Kapirovs, o kv tvlais ratv iroXiretatv
yiyvofjifvov /SeXrfoi/ 8\ Kal (3ovXofj.evovs KcoXveiv
r^- *^*\
ray Scnravrjpas /zei/ pr] xpr)criiJ.ov$ St Xfirovpyias, V*o
oiov yjzpriyias Kal XafJ.TraSap^iay Kal 6(rai aXXai TOiav-
20 rat tv 8 oXiyapxia rwv anoptov eTrifieXeiav TroieTaOai ^
Kal ray dp^as d(f> 3>v X?7/z^ara TOVTOIS aTrovt-
K&V riy vfipio-T) r5)v finr6pa)i> /y TOVTOVS, fttifo ra
flvai 77 av cr(f)a>v avTa>v, Kal ray KXr]povofj.ias fir)
Kara 86criv ?vai aXXa Kara yei>oy, jJLT)8\ irXeLovtov rf ^tay
25 rov avTov K\i] povo}j.f.lv OVTW yap av 6fj.aXa>Tpat ai ovcriai
tltv Kal roav airopwv e/y ftnropiav av KaBicnaLVTO TrXeibyy.
ert>/z0/)ei ^e Kal kv 8r]/j.oKpaTia Kal kv oXiyap^ia T>V 21
dXX(ov f) i&OTrjTa ff TrpofSpiav vk\iiv ro?y TJTTOV KOLVCOVOVCTI
rfjs 7roXrre/ay, er fi.lv 8rjfj.m To?y tvTropois, kv 8 oXiyap-
30 \ta ro?y aTropoiy, TrXrjv ocrai dp\al Kvpiai r^y 7roXire/ay,
rauray $e rory tK TTyy TroXirei ay ey^ei/ji^eti/ povois fj
irXtiocriv.
9 T/tu a 5e Tti/a xp^ ^X etl/ T0 - s> /^eXXoi/ray dpgfiv ray
Kvpias ap^ay, TT/JCOTOI/ /zej/ (piXiav TTyOoy T^
35 TroXlTfCav, cTreira 8vvap.iv p.yicrTT]v rS>v <lpy<ov
rptrov 8 dperr/v Kal SiKatoavvtjv ev e/facrr?; TroXtreta T^J/
TTjooy r^ TToXtre/ ai e/ yap /XT) rayrw TO StKatov Kara,
TrdVay ray TroXire^ay, dvdyKr) Kal rfjs SiKaioo-vvrjs ewai
8ia<popds. ^X i ^ dnoptav, orav fj.rj crvfj.^aivrj ravra 2
40 irdvra irepl rov avrov, Treoy ^P^ iroLticrOai TT\V aiptaiv
1309 b o/o/ e/ crrpar^yi/coy /iej^ riy efT;, Troi^^poy ^e ica2 /i^ r^ TTO-
y, 6 5e SiKaios Kal 0/Xoy, 7r<y ^e? TroieiaQai
aipeatv ; eot/ce 5e ^e^ fiXeTTfiv et y 5^0, r/Voy TrXefoi/
Tra^rey ^a2 rtVoy eXarroi . ^io ev crrparT/y/a /if 3
5 ety r^v ffifreipiav fidXXov r?yy aper^y tXarrov yap orpa-
rrjyias ^fTe^ova-i, TTJS 8 CTnei/caay
1309 a 141309 b 39. 53
Kal raftifia ra.va.vria. irXtiovos yap dperfjs Seirai $ oo~r)v
4 ol TroXXol tx ov<Tlv > 17 kiTi(TT-f]\n} KOivrj iracriv. drropija-fif
8 dv rts KOLV 8vva.fj.is virdpxy Kal rfjs TroXtrcias (piXta,
ri 8ft rfjs dperfjs ; TroLrjo~t yap TO, <rvp.<ptpovra Kal ra Svo. ro
^ OTI evStxerat rovs ra 8io f^a J^ras^oaTg^
&(TT KaOdirfp Kal avrots ov\ v-rrrj ptroixnv e/^ore? Kal (pi-
XOVVT$ avrovs, ovTO) Kal Trpbs TO KOIVOV ovfttv KG&Xvei e x etl/
5 fviovs ; arrXws Sf, o&a kv rots f6/zoiy toy crL//0e/3oi/ra Xe-
yofifv ra?y TroXire/aty, anavra ravra crafci ray TroXiretay, 15
Kal TO TroXXaKiy tiprjiJLtvov fj.eyi(TTOv (rrot^iov, TO Trjpeiv
oTrcoy KptiTTOv eoTai TO [3ovX6[j.fvov Trjv TTo\LTtiav TrXrjdos TOV
6 fj.r] (3ovXo[j.j/ov. Trapa irdvra 8e ravra Set fir] XavQdvttv,
o vvv XavQdvei Tay irapK(3e(3r)KVta$ TroXiretas, TO pea-ov
TroXXa yap T>V SOKOVVTOW STJ/JLOTLKCOJ/ Xvei Tay Srj/jLOKpa- 20
7 T/ay /cat Taif oXiyapxiKw Tay oXiyap^tas. ol 8 old^voi
tlvai \Lia.v dpeTrjv HXKOVO-IV e/y TT)I> V7Tp(3oXiji J
OTL KaOdnep pts ecrTi 7rapK(3(3r)KvTa fjikv rrjv
rrjv KaXXio~TT)v Trpbs TO ypvirbv r) TO crifjiov, aXX
xaX?) ica2 \dpiv e^ofo~a Trpoy T^r 6 fy iv, ov firjv 2^
aXX* eaj/ tiriTeivr) TIS eVi /laXXof /s T^ ^Trep/SoX?;!/, 7T/3(S-
TOJ/ ^er aTro(3aXfi rr)v /J.ZT piorrjTa rod fj.optov, TeXoy 5 ouTCoy
(Sore /^7;5 /d/a TTOL^a-fi <paiveo-0ai Sta TTJV vnfpo^rjv Kal
rr\v eXXef-vJaj/ TO)! tvavriav, rbv avrbv 8e rporrov ^et Kat
8 TTfpl rS>v aXXcoi/ fj,opia>v, ffVflfta&tt 8rj rovro Kal Trepl Tay 30
aXXay TroXirfias. Kal yap oXiyap-^tav Kal 8rjp.oKpariav
f<rriv &o~r X ai/ LKav <*>S, Kafoep egeo-rrjKvias TTJS peXrio-rrjs
Ta^eooy* ear 8e ns kirirtivri paXXov Karepav avr&v, Trpat-
rov n\v X^P 7roL n a l r *l v TroXireiav, reXos 8 ovSe iroXi-
9 Tfiav. 8ib 8fi rovro fj.rj dyvofiv rbv vofj.o6trr)v Kal rbv TTO- 35
XtrtKov, Troia aco^et rG>v 8r)fj.oriKa>v Kal nota (pQeipei rf]v
8r)fj,oKpariav } Kal TTOIO rS>v oXiyapxiKatv rqv 6Xiyap-)(iav.
ovSerepav jikv yap kv8tx* raL avT ^> v fw&i Kal Siapfveiv
dvev r<av evrropav Kal rov irXijOovs, dXX orav 6/iaXoT^t
54 nOAITIKflN H (E ). 9-10.
40 yevqTai 7779 ouov ay, dXXrjv dvdyKrj tlvai TavTr]v TT\V TroXi-
1 3 1 a T Lav, coo-re (pdeipovTes TOIS /ca$ vTrepo^v vop.ois (pOefpovcri
~~ ray 7roA*r ay. a/iapraVoucrt <Se /cat ei> raFy SrjfJiOKpaTLais 10
*at ei> raty oXiyap^iai^, kv fjikv raty 8r]/j.oKpaTiat$ oi Srj-
fjLayayoi, OTTOV TO irXrjdos Kvpiov rS>v vo^cav Svo yap
5 TTOLOvaiv aei Tr\v TTO\IV, p.ayjb[j.tvot roty euTropoty, c^el 5e
Tovvavriov atel SoKelv Aeyet^ uTrep tviropatv, kv 8\ ra?y 6At-
yap)(tais virep TOV Sijfj.ov roi)y oXiyap^iKovs, KOL rovy BpKOVS
kvavTiovs T) vvv o\ivvva,i roi)y oXiyap^iKov^ vvv p.tv yap kv 1 1
kviais 6fj.vvov(TL " Kal rco 5i7/ico Kaxovovs eVo/zai icai
100 rt i
KpiveorOai rovvavrov, e7Ttcn//zatro/xei/oi/y e/ roy op/any ort
" oy/c aSi.Krj<T(a rov Sfjfj.oi ." {JLtyivrov 5e TrdvTcw T&V d
Trpoy ro SiafjLtvtiv ray TroAtrei ay, ou i/)t/ oXiyapovcn
TO TraiStveaOai Trpoy ray TroAtremy. 6 0eAoy ya/o ou<5ei rcor 12
15 co0eAt^a)rara>i> vofj.oov Kal crvvSeSogao fJ.ti ati VTTO
TToAireuo/ze^coi , e/ /z^ eVoi rat i6io-fj.ei>ot Kal
ei/ r^ TroAirei a 3 ei /zei/ ot f vopioi SijftOTiKOi,
ri/ccoy, i 5 oXiyap-^iKoi, oAtyap^i/ccoy. eiVep yap ZCTTIV e0
I ei/oy aKpacrta, ecrrt /cat eTTt TroAecoy. eVri 5e ro irtiraiStv- 13
20 crflai vrpoy rr/i* TroXiTtLav ov TOVTO, TO TroifTv oty ^atpovariv oi
ourrey ^ o/ 8rm.oKpaTLav (3ovX6(jii>oi, dXX oi l y Svvrf-
ol JJL\V oXiyapxeiv oi Se 8rjfj.oKpaTelo~6ai. vvv 8 kv
\ikv rafy 6Xiyap)(iais oi TO>V dp^6vTQ)v viol TpvfySxnv, oi
8\ T&V d-rropcov ytyvovTai yeyvftvao-fitvoi Kal TTCTroi T/Korey,
25 (Borre /cat (3ovXovTai paXXov Kal SvvavTai fecorepi^eii/* ey 5e 14
rafy Srj/jiOKpaTiais raty /zaAiara eiVai SoKovcrai? 8rjfj.oKpa-
TlKaiS TOVVaVTLOV TOV CTV/JLcptpOVTOS KaOtO-TrjKfV aiTLOV Se TOV-
TOV OTL KaKcoy opigovTai. TO eXevOepov. Svo ydp ecrrif ots 17 5?y-
fjLOKpaTia SoKfi <npio-0ai, rco ro TrAaoi efi/at Kvpiov Kal Trj
30 eXtvOepia- TO p.tv yap SiKaiov i o~ov SOKCI ftvaL, Luov S 6 TL 15
ar <5o?7 rco TrAT^^ei, ro)r elvai Kvpiov, eXtvdfpov Se Kal
to~ov TO o TI av fiovXrjTai r*y iroif.lv cocrre fj kv Tats TOiav-
1309 b 401310 b 25. 55
fraty SrjfioKpariais e/cacrroy coy (3ov\Tai, Kal ety 8
d coy (prja-lv EvpnriSrjs TOVTO S eVrt (pavXoV ov yap Set
oifaOai SovXeiav etrat TO fjv Trpdy ri]v TroXtrciav, dXXd 35
,<raT7)piav. e &v /zei> ovv at TroXireiai /zera/3aAAofcrt /cat
^fletpoprat, KOI Sid TIVCOV o-cogovTai Kal Siafj-evovoriv, coy
ciTrAcoy tiirtlv rocravTa ecrrtr
8 fTTfXOtTv Kal TTfpl /zo^a/o^iay, e^ coj/ re 10
Kal Si a>v crco^ecrflcu ntfyvK.s.v. cr^e^of 5e napa- 40
roiy ipr)fj,ei>oi.s irepl ray TroXtreias ecrrt xai ra cry/*- 1310 b
2 ftatvovTa Trepl ray /SacrtXe/ccy /cat ray rvpavvidas. r) y.\v
yap (Baa-iXeia Kara TTJV dpio-TOKpartav ecrrtV, j) (5e rvpavvls
* oXiyap^ias rrjs t crrar^y o-vyKtirai Kal
Stb 8r) Kal /SAa/SepcoraTT/ rofy ap^o/zei/oty kvriv, are e* c^yoa/ 5
(rvyKfi/jLfvrj KaK&v Kal ray 7rape/c/3acrety /ca2 ray dfiap-
3 r/ay e^(oi;cra ray Trap a/*0ore/3a>i/ rco^ TroAiretco//.
8 TI yei/criy evOvs e kvavrifttv e/care/oa rcoi/
T; ^ej^ ya/? /SacriXet a TT/ooy fiorjOeiav rr\v tirl rbv Sfjfj.oi rcuy
eTTtei/cecri yiyovtv, Kal KaOio-Tarai ^acrtAe^y e/c rcoi/ 7Ttet/ccoi/ 10
/ca0 vTrepo^v aper^y ^ Trpa^ecoj/ rcoi> aTro r^y aper^y, ^
/ca$ VTrtpoxrjv TOIOVTOV yevovs, 6 Se Tvpavvos IK TOV 8rjp.ov Kal
TOV TrXr/dovs 7rt roi)y yycopr/zouy, oTrcoy 6 Sfjfjios dSiKfjrai firj-
4 5e/ VTT aurcoj/. 0ayepcV 5 e/c rcoj/ crf/z/Se/S^/corcoi cr^e^oj/
yap o/ TrAeraroi rcoi/ rvpdvvwv yeyovatnv e/c 5^/zaycoycof 15
5 coy e/TretV, TTicrref Kerrey e/c ro Sta^dXXeiv roi)y yi/copi/zouy. at
/f yap roOroj/ roi/ rponov /carecrr^crai/ r<Sj/ rvpavvtStov, ijSr}
T<OV TroAecof Tjulr/^eVcoj , at 5e Trpo rourcoi/ e/c re rcoi/ /3a<rt-
AeW TrapfK^aLvoj^TOtv ra Trarpta /cat (SecrTrort/ccorepay dp^fjs
opeyo/ze^coj/, at c^e e>c rcoi atpercoi^ eTrt ray /cuptay ap>(ay 20
(ro yap dpyjcuov oi Sfjuoi /ca^tcrracrai/ TroXv^poviov^ ray
Srj/jLiovpyias Kal ray ^ecopt ay), at 5 e/c rcof 6Atyap)(tcof
6 a/poi//teVcoi eVa rti/d Kvpiov evrt ray /Lteyt crray ap^ay. Tracrt
yap UTTT/pxe roty rpovroty rouroty ro /carepya^ecr^at p a^t coy,
t HOVQV (3ovXr)6eiev, Sid ro BvvafJLiv Trpovndp-^Lv roty /tef 25
56 nOAITIKHN H (E 1 ). 10.
(3a<n\iKrjs dp^rj^, TOLS 8e TTJV rfjs
7Tpl "Apyos Kal e repoi rvpavvoL /careVr^cra^
VTrapxov&rjs, ol 8e rrepl rr)f Iwvtav Kal <aXapty e/c rS>v
TLp.5)v i HavaiTios 8 kv AeovTivois Kal Kv-tyeXos eV Kopiv6a>
30 Kal UeiaiVr/jaroy Adijvrja-i KOL Aiovv<no$ kv ^vpaKovaais
KOI erepo: TOV avrov rpoirov e/c ^/zaycoyms 1 . KaOdirtp ovv 1
eiVo/ier, rj (3a(ri\ia rera/crai Kara Trjv dpia-TOKpartav.
Kar aiav yap kcniv, rj KO.T I8tav dptTr\v r) Kara yevovs,
rj KO.T fvtpyeo-ias, rj Kara ravrd re KOL Svva/jiiv. arrav- 8
35 T6y yap VpyTrjcraj>T<> rj Swdpevoi ray TroAety rj ra Wvr]
evepyerew krvy^avov TTjy TifJ.fj$ TavTr/s, ol p.tv Kara. TTO-
veiv, axnrep K68po$, oi 8 eXet;$e-
, axnrep Kvpos, rj KTiaavres rj KTrjo d/j.fi Oi ^d>pav,
oi AaKeSaifj-oviow (3ao-L\eis Kal MaKtSovav KOI
40 MoXo.TTooy. ftovXerai 8 6 /3a<nXei)y eivai <f>vXag, oVcoy ol 9
1311 a ptv KfKTrjutvoi ray ovaias fJ.r]8\v dSiKov irdo")((ii(nv, 6 8f
8fjftos fj.rj vf3pir]Tai p.r]8ev rj 8e rvpavvis, axnrep t tprjTai
TToXXa/Ciy, Trpoy ovStv aTro/SXeTra KOIVOV, i fj.r) r^y ISias
\dpiv. O~TI 8e a/co7roy rvpavviKos ptv TO r)8v,
5 /3ao-i\iKos Se TO Ka\6v. Sib Kal TO>V TrXeoj/e/crT/yuarcoi/ ra 10
fjitv xprjfjiaTa TvpavviKa, ra 8 e/y r//i^v (3acri\iKa fj.d\-
XoV Kal (fivXaKr) fiacnXLKr] n\v TtoXiTiKr], TVpavviKr] 8e
8ia ^voov. OTL 8 rj Tvpavvls e^et KaKa Kal ra r^y 8rj- 11
poKpaTias Kal TO, r^y oXiyap^ias, <pavep6v } e/c fikv oXi-
10 yapx f a? T ro T ^y etVat TT\OVTOV (OVTU> yap Kal 8iaji-
vtiv dvayKalov ftovoos TT\V re (f>vXaKr]v Kal Tr]v Tpv(f)r]v\
Kat TO T& 7rXrj$i fj.rjSev Tno~Ttveiv, Sib Kal r^r Trapaipecnv
TTOLOVVTai TU>V OTf\(GV Kal TO KaKOVV TOV 8\\QV Kal TO K
TOV ao-reoy aTreXaweii/ Kal StoiK^eiv djj.(f)OTtpa>v KOLVOV, Kal
15 r^y 6Xtyap)(ia$ Kal r^y rvpawi&OS e/c Sr/jjioKpaTtas 8e TO 12
TToXe/zea/ ro?y yvcopipois Kal 8ca<f)6eipiv Xd$pa Kal fya-
vep&S Kal <pvya8evLv o>y dvTiTtyv v S Ka * ""poy TTJV dp^rjv
fiiro8iovs e/c yap TOVTCOV o-vfj.(3aivi yiyveaOaL Kal ray
1310 b 261311 b ii. 57
7Tl(3ovXd$, TO)V fJ.V dp-^lV aVT&V (3oV\OfJLtV(>V, T&V Sf /JiT]
13 SovXfVfiv. odev Kal TO HepidvSpov Tr/ody pavvfiovXov cru/z- 20
, f) TO>V vTrtpey^ovTtov araxyow KoXovvis, coy
altl Toi>$ VTrep^ovTa^ TU)v TToXircoi/ avaipt iv, KaQd-rrfp
ovv o~\8bv fXe^dr], ray aura? ap^as $*? vo\ii^iv Trepi re
ra? rroXiTfias e?vai rG>v yuera^oXcoi/ KOI irepl ray p.ovap-
Std re yap aBiKLav KOU 8ia (p6f3ov KOI Sia Kara- 25
vTai ir6X\ol TO>V ap^o/zei/coi/ ra?y p.ovap-
, rfjs Se dSiKias /zaXia-ra 81 vftpw, eviore Sk Kal Sia
14 rrjv rS>v I8ia>v (TTtpr]<nv. < ecm Se Kal ra re\rj ravrd, Kadd-
7Tp KaKft, Kal Trepl TO.? TvpavviSas Kal ray /3a<nAay
/ieye^oy yap inrdp^fi rrXovrov Kal rt/x^y roFy /zo^ap^oiy, 30
3>v i<piVTai iravrts. rS>v 8 kinQkvtQbv ai fii> tirl TO crcS/za
yiyvovTai TWV apyovToav, at 8 enl rfv apyr\v. ai \ikv ovv
15 8t vfipiv eTTi TO crco/ia. r^y c^ t//3/>eooy oucr^y TroXvpepovs,
Kao~TOv avTcov aiTiov yiyveTat rr)y opyfjs T$>V 8 6pyio-
ot TrXeta-Tot TipwpLas yapiv eTTiTiOevTai, dXX 35
, oiov f) n\v T&V Ileio-io-TpaTiSSH 8ia TO Trpo-
Tr]V ApfioScov dSfX^rjf, 7TT]pedo~ai 8 Ap-
yap l App.68ios 8ia rr/i/ acVeX^f, 6 <5 Api-
16 crToyeLTdov Sia TOV ApfjLoSioV eTTf^ovXevaav 8t Kal Tltpidv-
8pa> rco kv AftfipaKia Tvpdvv<& Sia TO o~ufJLTTivovTa /iera 4
TCOJ/ TraiSiKwv e/jcor^crai avTov el rjSrj e avTOv KVCL 17 5e 1311 b
3>iXi7nrov viro Hawaviov Sia TO eao-ai vfBpio-OrjvaL avrov
i>7T(> T>V TTfpl "ATTttXov, Kal f} AjJlVVTOV TOV fjUKpOV VTTO
Sia TO Kavyjia-atyQai i$ T-r\v r]\iKiav avTov, Kal 17
TOV vvov)(ov Evayopa ro> Kwrrpia) Sia yap TO TTJV yvvatxa 5
17 TrapeXto-Qai TOV viov avTov aTreKTfivev coy t/3pi(r^ei/oy. TroX-
Xal 8 e7r^ea-iy ytytvrjVTai Kal Sia TO e/y TO o-co/za aio"xy-
vai T&V fjLovd px o)v Tivds, oiov Kal rj KpaTaiov e/y
\aov aUl yap /3a/)ecoy ?^e Trpoy rfv 6/J.iXiav, <wo-Te i
Kal kXaTTODv eyej/eTO Trpo^acrty, ^ c^toTt TMV OvyaTtpav ovSf- 10
eSa>Kv dfioXoyijo-as auTco, aXXa T^ ptv 7rpOTfpav y
5 8 nOAITIEfiN H f (E ). 10.
Kare^o/ze^oy viro TroXe/tot/ Trpoy %ippav Kal Appdftaiov,
e<5co/ce TCO fiacriXcL TCO r^s .EXt/te/ay, TTjf cSe recoTepaf TCO
ut et Afj-vvra, ot o/zei oy ot>Tcoy ar e/ceti>oj/ rJKiarTa <Stac/>epecr$at
15 /cat TcV e/c T??y JfXeoTraVpay aXXa T?jy ye
vrrfjpxev PX^ r fi&ptW (frepetv npos TTJV
ydpiv. (rvvtTrtOtTO <5e /cat EXXavoKpdrrjS 6 AapivaTos Sia 18
r^v avrrjv airiav coy yap xpco/iei/oy &VTOV Trj fjXiKia ov
KaTrj-yev i 7rocr>(6/iej/oy, c^t vftpiv /cat ou 5t fpcoTLKrjv evrt-
20 Qvfiiav c^ero etVat r^ y^yfvrjfj.^iji ofj-iXiav. tlappcov Se
/cat .Hpa/cAet^y ot A ivioi Korvv SitfyOtipav ra> irarpl TI-
p.Q)povi T$ J ASdftas 5 dnecTTr] KOTVOS Sia TO e/cr/t^^^at
Traty cwf LTT avrov coy v(3pi(rfjLvos. TroAXot c5e /cat 5ta TO 19
ety TO crania aiKurOrj^ai vrA^yaty o pytcr^efTey ot /zei> 5te-
25 (f)6eipav ot <$ tvtytiprjcrav coy vftpia-OevTes, Kal TO>V Trepi
Tay apx^ y Ka /3acrtXt/cay SwaarTtias, olov kv MiTvXrjvrj
TOVS HevOiXiSas MeyaKXfjs Trepuovras /cat TVTTTO^Tay Taty
Kopvvais eTrt^e/tei oy /teTa TCO> 0tXcoi/ ai/etXer, /cat vcrTtpov
JtpepSis IlevOiXov TrXrjyas Xaficov /cat Trapa T^y yirat/coy
30 e^eX/cfcr^ety Sitfydeiptv. /cat T?}y ^yO^eXaof <5 e7rt(9ecrecoy ^Ie- 20
/ca/zrt^oy ^yeyucov eyej/eTO, TTa.povv(av TOVS eyri^e/te^oyy TT/OCO-
Toy atTfoi/ c5e T^y opyfjs 6Vt avTov e^e<5co/c fj.ao~TtyaxraL
EvpnriSrj TCO 7Toir]Tfj 6 5 Evpnri8r]$ e^aXeTratt e^ etVoi/Toy
Tt avTov et y SvcrcoSiav TOV crToyuaToy. /cat d XXot <5e TroXXot
35 5ta ToiavTas atrtay ot yuet dvrjpeOrjcrav ot 5 Tre(3ovXevdr)-
<rav. 6/zotcoy (5e /cat 6\a (f)6{3ov i> ydp Tt TOI)TO TCOJ/ atVtW 21
^f, cocrTrep /cat vrept Tay TroXtTetay, /cat Tay p.ovapyjias oiov
pTairdvr]$ 0o/3oi//tei/oy T^I/ 8ia(3oXr)v TTJV Trepi Aa~
, OTL e/cpe/zacrei 01) /ceXei/crarToy Hep^oy, aXX ot 6/zeroy
40 (rvyyvaxj-ecrOai a>y dp.vr]fj.ovovvTa Sia TO StiTrvtlv, at 5e <5ta 22
1312 a KaTa$p6vr)(Ti.v, cocrTrep SapSavdiraXXov t cScov Tty aivovTa
TO>V yvvaiKOiv (el dXrjOfj TavTa ot ftvOoXoyovvTes
et oe /x^ CTT e/cetVoi;, aXX eTr d XXoi; ye di yei/otTO
Toro dXrjdesJ, /cat ^dto^fo-ta) TCO vaTtpo) Aiw tirtOtTO <5ta TO 23
1311 b 121312 a 35. 59
6pa>v rovs re noXiras oi/rcoy f%ovTa$ Kal 5
avrov del fiedvovTa 1 . . . . Kal rS>v <pi\cov Se rives eniTidevTai
Sib KaTa<pp6vrjo-iv Sid yap TO Trio-Teveo-Qai KaTa(f)povovo~iv
24 coy X^crorrey. Kal oi ol6fj.evoi Svvao~dai KaTacr^eTv TTJV
dpyj]v rpoirov Tivd Sid rb Karafypoveiv fTTiTiOfVTai a>y
Svvd/j.voi yap Kal KarafypovovvTes TOV KivSvvov Sia TTJV Sv- 10
vajj.iv k-rriytipovo-i paSia)?, axnrfp ol o-rpar^yoOrrey ro^ /j.o-
vdpxois, oiov Kvpos Aarvdyti Kal TOV (3iov KaTafypovS>v Kal
rfjs 8vvdp.<0$ Sia TO T7)i> fJ.v Svvafjiiv er)pyr)Kti ai, avTov
Sf Tpvtpdv, Kal HevOrjs 6 pa AfJ.aSoK(t> aTpaTrjybs &v.
25 o/ Se Kal Sid 7rXe/co TOVT&V eniTiOevTai, oiov Kal Kara^po- 15
Kal Sid KepSos, coo-Trep Apio^ap^dvr]
Se Sid -rav-n\v Tr\v ahiav kyyeipovcriv oi Tr]v
6pao-eTs, Tiftrjv S e^ofrey 7roXe/ii/cJ)j/ Trapd roFy po-
dvSpia yap Svvafj.iv e^oucra Opdaos ZO-TIV, Si as
a/z0orepay, coy paSi(as KpaTrjcrovTes, TroiovvTai ray eTTi^ecreiy.J 20
TCOV Sf Sid <j)i\OTifjiiav erriTiOffifvctiv erepoy rpOTroy ecrri TTJS
26 aiTias vrapa TOVS ^lpr\\ikvovs irpoTtpov. ov yap cocrTrep Zvioi
TOIS Tvpdvvois f7ri\fipovo-iv opcoj/rey KtpSr) re /ieyaXa Kal
Tifjids fj.ydXas ovcras avTOis, oi/rco Kal T$>V Sid <pi\o-
Ti/jiiav tTTiTiOefj.ei ooi e/cacrroy TrpoaipeiTai KivSvi>evii> d\\ 25
p.\v Sid TTJV fiprjfjievrjv aiTiav, OVTOI 5 cocrTrep KOLV
TIVOS yvo(j.vr)S vrpa^ecoy TrepiTTrjs, Kal Si TJV ovo-
fjiao~Tol yiyvovTai Kal yvoopijioi TOIS dXXois, OVTCO Kal
Tols p.ovdpyjois y^ipovcriv t ov KTrjo~ao-6ai /3ofX6/ze^Oi
27 fiovap-^iav dXXd 86av. ov fj.i]v dXX fXd^ia-Toi ye TOV 30
dpiBfiov flo~iv ol Sid Tavrrjv TT^V aiTiav 6p/icoi/rey VTTOKI-
o~Qai yap Sei TO TOV o~o)6fjvai fjLrjSev <f)povTieiv t dv ftr)
28 fjieXXy /caracr^T/creir TTJV trpdfciv, oTs aKO\ov6f.lv fiev Sel
TTJV AiQ)vos vTroXrj-fyiv, ov p dSiov S avTrjv eyyeveaOai TroX-
Xois tKtivos yap /ier oXiyoov eo-TpdTfvo~ev k~rrl Aiovixnov 35
1 The insertion here of 1 7, /iaXtora 8 . . . 20, eVt&Vetv is suggested
in the critical note oa 1312 a 6.
r (
I vr, V , \ IV^. ^-rc^JLo U/NA^ \ h. (OjUw^ t" l*-4v If****
i\\ - \
IW- t>x4V> r V^
,--. wv. lu
6o nOAITIKfiN H (E ). 10-11.
ourcoy ^X iv ( f> aa Ka)V &$> OTTOV ?rep av
iKavov aurco TOCTOVTOV }ieTacryjeiv rfjs 7rpaecoy, oiov fl fiL-
Kpov tTTiftavTCL T??? yr\S evOvs av[t/3air] T^XevTrjaai, TOVTOV
KaXcoy ex fl/ airco rcV Odvarov. (ftQeiperai 5e rvpavvls eVa 29
40 /zev Tpoirov, eocTTre/j Afat rcoi/ dXXcov eKaa-TT} TroXireiw^, eco-
1312 b ^et , eat kvavrta rt? 17 TroXtre/a KptirToav (TO n\v yap
SfjXov coy vndp^ti Sia rrjv evavTioTrjTa
a 5e jSouXorrai, Swdpevoi TrpdrTOVcn
kvavriai 8 at troXiTtlai, Sfjfios ^v rvpavviSi Ka6 l H<rio- 30
5 (W coy KepafMfvs /cepa^e? (/cat yap 77 SrjfAOKpaTia rj re-
XtvTaia Tvpavvts farivY |8acrtX/a 5e icai dpicrroKpaTia Sia
Tr]v evavTioTrjra rfjs TroXiremy (&o AaKeSainovioi TrXeicrray
KareXvcrav rvpavvlSas KOI 2vpaKov(rioi Kara TOV y^povov ov
TroXiTvoi>TO KaXcoy) eVa 5 e avrfjs, orav ol ^ere^o^rey 31
10 o-Tacn.dfaorti , cocrTrep 17 r<i/ Trept PeXcoi/a /cai i/Of 17 rcoi/
Trept ^iorvo-tot , 17 /*ei> PeXcoz/oy @pa<rv(3ovXov TOV le
dSfX(f)ov TOV vlov TOV PeXcoi/oy cS^aycoyouJToy ^cai ?rpoy 17
ray opyuco^roy, fV auroy PX?7, T ^ I/ ^ otKffcov ava-TrjcrdvTmv,
i va fj.r] Tvpavvls oXcoy KaTaXvOfj aXXa @pacrv(3ovXos, ol
15 5e crfaraVrey avTatv, coy Kaipov e^oi/rey, ktfia\ov aTrai/ray
avTOvs Aiovvcriov 8\ Ai<>v crrparevcray, KrjSecrTrjS coV, Kat 32
TrpocrXa/Jcoi roi SrjfjLov, ttctLvov CK/3aXa>v SietyOdpij. Svo 8e
ovcrcov aiTi>v Si ay /zaXtcrr eiriTiQevTai ra?y TVpavvivi, fit-
erovy /cat /cara^poi/Tycrecoy, OaTtpov fj.\v Set TOVTCOV imdpyjeiv
20 roty Tvpdvvois, TO ftTaos, CK 8e TOV KaTaippoveio-dat TroXXal
yivovTdL T&V KaTaXvaecw. arjfietov 8e rcor /zev yap /CTT;- 33
ol TrXeTo-Toi Kal 8i(f)vXagav ray ap^ay, o/ <5e
rey evdvs coy eiTreTv d7roXXvao~i Tra^rey* a?ro-
Xaucrri/ccoy yap ^coVrey tvKaTafypovrjToi re yiyvovTai Kal
25 TroXXoC-y xaipovs TrapaSiSoaai rcny eTTin^e/zet Oiy. p.optov 8e
TL TOV [j.i(rov$ Kal TT)i> opyrjv 8eT TiOevai Tpoirov ydp TLva
T$>V avT&v aiTia ytvtTai Trpdea>v. iroXXaKi? 8e Kal irpa- 34
TOV fj.Lo~ovs o~uvTOv<*)Tepov yap eTTiTiOevTat Sia TO
1312 a 361313 a 21. 61
Xoyio-fjia TO Trddos (/iaXtcrra <Se
rofy Qvfjiois aKoXov6f.lv Sid TT)V vf3piv } Si rjv alriav 77 re 30
TCOV Ilfiorio-TpaTiSwv KareXvOrj Tvpavvl? Kal iroXXal T>V
35 aXXa>j>V aXXa fidXXov TO /zlcroy rj fjikv yap opyr) fAfTa
Xinrris Trdpfcrnv, a>(TT ou paSiov XoyifecrOai, 7; 8 f^Opa dvtv
Xvrrrjs. v a>s Se tv Kt(f)aXaiot$ flneiy, oaay alria.<s elp^Kafiev
TTJS re oXtyap^tas rr^y aKpdrov KOL reXeuratay KCU rr}y 35
SrjfiiOKpaTias rfjs fo"%dT7]S } roo-avras Kal rrjs rvpavviSos
6eroy Kal yap avrai rvyyavovviv ov<rai Siaiperal rvpav-
36 pt <Sey. ficuriXefa 8 VTTO IM\V roof ea>$e* rjKio-ra <j>0*ipTai,
8tb Kal TroXvxpovios tVTW e^ avTrjs 8 at TrXctcrTai <j)0opal
<rvp.paivov<Tiv. (f)0ipTai 8e Kara Svo rpoTrouy, o/a /xer 40
crraa iaa dvT&v TO>V /zere^orrcor r^y pacriXtias, aXXoj/ 5e 1313 a
TpOTTOV TVpaVVlKO>Tp01> TTip(>p.f.V<X>V 8lOlKf.lv, QTOV fivai KVplOl
37 irXtiovtov a^icocri Kal Trapa rov vofMov. ov yiyvovrai 8 eri
vvv, dXX dv Trep yiyvavrai, povapyjai Kal rv~
pavviSts /laXXoy, Sid TO Tr\v f$ao-iXtiav fKOVo-iov /zei/ dp-^v 5
ewai, fieigovGw 8f Kvpiav, iroXXovs 8 etvai TOVS opotovs, Kal
fj,rj8fva 8ta<f)povTa TOVOVTOV <5<rre dirapTigeiv Trpoy TO /ie-
ye^oy Kal TO d^ta>p.a Trjs dp^rjy. &o~T 8id JJLZV TOVTO Kov-
Tey oi>x virofJiivova-Lv dv 8\ 8C arraTT/y dprj TIS rj /Si ay,
38 rj8r) SoKeT TOVTO etvai TV paw is. ev 8e Tais Afara ye^oy /3a- 10
o^fXeiaiy TiOevat Sel Trjs (frOopds aiTiav Trpos ra?y eiprjfjLt-
vai$ Kal TO yivevOai TroXXoyy VKaTa<f>poviJTOv$ } Kal TO 8v-
vap.iv (J.T) KeKTTjfizvovs TvpavviKr)v aXXa /3acrtXiKr)j>
vftpifciv paSia yap eytVero 77 /caraXi/o"ty* /IT)
yap fi>6vs OVK %o~Tai /3acriXeuy, aXX d Tvpavvos Kal p.rj 15
PovXofJLtvtov. (pOfipovTai n\v ovv ai p.ovap^iai Sid TavTas
KOI ToiavTas eVe/)ay amay
2<t)govTat 5e SrjXov cwy aTrXcoy [ikv eiTTfiv 6K TO>V 11
evavTiwv, a>y <Se Kad eKaaTov TW ray //ey flwrtXttas dyeiv
7rt TO fjiTpia>Tepov. oo"co ya/j a^ eXarTOj/cov oocn Kvptoi, 20
yjpovov dvayKaiov ptveiv ndaav TTJV dp-^v avroi
62 nOAITIEfiN H (E ). 11.
re yap rjrrov yivovrai SecnroTiKol Kal roFy rf$ecrfi> Tcroi fj.dX-
\ov : Kal VTTO TU)V dp^ofievcov fyBovovvrai TJTTOV. Sia yap 2
TOVTO Kal 77 Trepl MoXoTTovs rroXvv \povov {BacnXfia Si./j,eivv }
25 Kal 17 AaKtSaifjiovLtov Sia TO e dp^fjy T ^ $v ^P 7 )
8iaLp$f)vai rrjv dpxrjv, Kal ird\Lv tOTro/nrov [j.Tpid(ravTOS
rofy re a XXoi? Kal rriv r&v (f>6p(ov apyj]v ki
roy r^y yap <5f^a/zeco? a0eXcoj/ qvgrjcr
jSacriXeiav, &arre rpOTrov nva eTToirjcrev OVK cXdrrova dXXa
30 fifiova avrr\v. oVep Kal irpos rr]v yvvaiKa. aTroKpivaarQai 3
(fia&iv avTOV, flrrovo-av et fj.r)v aicryvvtrai Trjv ftacriXfiav
(Xdrrco TrapaSiSovs rofy viecrLv r} irapa rov Trarpoy rrapeXa-
(Bev " ov Sfjra " (pdvac " 7rapaS[Sct)fj.c yap TroXv^povKOTepav."
at 8\ TVpavviSts crw^ovTai Kara Svo rpo-rrovs roi)y tvavTiw- 4
35 rarouy, 3>v arepoy kcrnv 6 irapaSeSop-tvos Kal KaO ov 8101-
KOVCTLV ol TrXeierroi TO>V rvpdvvtov rr)v apyrjv. TOVTGOV 8\ ra
TroXXd (j)a(TL KaracrrfjaraL TIeplavSpov rov Kopiv&Lov
8\ Kal irapa r^y Hepcrwv ap^r^y eoTi roiavra
eVri Se rd re irdXai X^Oevra Trpoy crwrrj piav , coy oiov re, 5
40 r^y Tvpavi/iSo$ ; TO TOVS ^yrepe^oj/ray KoXovtiv Kal TOVS (ppovrj-
jjiaTta? dvaipelv, Kal /^re crvcrtTLTia kdv ytt^re iraipiav
1313 b /^Te rraiSeiav fj.^Tf dXXo fj.r)8ev TOIOVTOV, dXXa rrdvTa
(fivXaTTeiv oQcv eico(9e yiyvecr&ai Svo } (fipovrj/j.d re Kal TTICTTIS,
Kal fj.iJT cr)(oXay yui^re aXXoi/y avXXoyovs (TriTpeTrftv yivt-
o~6ai a\oXao-TiKovy } Kal TrdvTa iroLelv e 3>v on
5 ayvcorey aXX^Xoty ecro^rat Traz/rey (17 yap yrcoo-ty TTIO-TLV
jj.d\\ov Trpoy aXX^Xot/y) /cai ro roL>y eTTiS^/zowray a/et 6
eiVai /ecu SiaTpt^ftv irepl dvpas (OVTO> yap av
\av6dvoiev TI rrpaTTOVcri, Kal fypovtiv av e$ioivTO
aitl SovXevovTts} Kal raXXa oo~a ToiavTa Ilepo-LKoc,
10 Kal fldpflapa TvpavviKa eo~Tiv (rrdvTa yap TavTov SvvaTai)
Kai TO /J.T] XavQdvzLv TreipdcrOai o&a Tvy%dvi rfy Xeywv 7
^ irpaTTcov T>V dpxo/j.ev(i)v } aXX elvai KaTa&KOTrov?, ofov
Trepl SvpaKovo~a$ al Troraycoy/^ey /caXou/iej/ai, Kal TOVS
V ovJW &W *^M.*- .- *. ^yw
1313 a 221314 a 5. 63
toTa.Kov(TTa$ ee7T6/i7re Icpcov, OTTOV TLS fl r} crvvov<rta Kal o~vX-
Aoyoy (rrapprjcnd^ovTai re yap rjTTOv, (f)0/3ovfj.evoL roi)y TOLOV- 15
8 rouy, KO> irapprjvidfavTa.i, Xav6dvovo~iv rJTTOv)- Kal TO 8ia-
/SaAAfiy aAAT^Aoiy *a* crvyKpoveiv Kal (pt\ov$ (friXois Kal
rov Sfjpov TOIS yvwptfjiois Kal rovs TT\OV<TLOVS eavrois Kal TO
Trei/Tjray Troitlv rovs dp^oftevovs rvpavviKov, OTTOO? 7/77x6 0u-
Aa/c^ rpe(pr)Tai Kal Trpbs T> Kaff f)/j.epav orrey acr^oAoi 20
9 3)(riv eTTiflovXtveiv. TrapdSeiypa Sk TOVTOV at re
at TTfpl AiyvTTTOv Kal ra dvaBrffiaTa T>V
Kal rov OXvfj.7Tiov rj oiKo86fj.r]o~is vno rS>v
Kal TO>V Trepl ^djMov e/jya HoXvKpdrtia (iravra yap ravra
10 SvvaraL ravrbv, do-^oXiav Kal irtviav TWV dp^ofjLV(f>v\ Kal 25
77 /cr0opa rwv reAr, oiov kv SvpaKovcrais kv 7rei/re yap
To~iv TTI Aiovvo~iov Tr)i> ovcrcav cLiravav flo~^r]i/o^evaL crvve-
ftaivtv. fern 5e Kal TroAey^oTTOioy 6 rvpavvos, OTTCOS- Srj do~)(oXoi
re 3><n Kal r)ye//6roy kv XP ei/ ? 8iareXS>o-iv oVrey. Kal 77
(3a(nXia o-cogerai Sia rS>v ^iAcof, rvpavviKov 5e TO 30
or aTTicrTerf roty 0iAoiy, coy /JofAo/zeVcoi/ /iet/ Trai/rcot ,
llSvvafjLv<av $ ftdXicrTa TOVTWV. Kal TO, irepl TTJV 8rjfj,oKpa-
Tiav 8\ yiyvojjLtva TT)I/ reAeura/ at rvpavviKa Trdvra, yv-
vaiKOKparia re Trepl Tay otKias, iv e^ayyeAAcoo- /caTa Tcot
dvSpwv, Kal 8ovXa>i> avto-is Sia TTJV avrr]v alriav ovre yap 35
e7ri(3ovXevovo~ii> oi SovXoi Kal at yvvalKfS T0?y rvpdvvoi<s^
vr]HpovvTds re dvayKalov ewouy fivai Kal raFy Tvpavv(<n
Kal TaTy 8r]/j.oKpaTiais Kal yap 6 Sfj/nos flvai /3ouAercu
12 fiovap-^oy. Sib Kal 6 KoXag nap a/z0orepoy eVriyuoy, -rrapa
p.\v TOiy 8rjfj.oi$ b 8r)/jiaya>y6$ (eVri yap 6 STJ fj.aycoybs TOV 40
8r]fj.ov KoXaV trapa 8e ro?y rvpdvvois oi raTrei^coy o/ziAowrey,
OTrep eorJi epyoi KoXaKeias. Kal yap 8id TOVTO TTOvripofyiXov 1314 a
17 Tvpavvis KoXaKfvoftevoi yap yjaipov<nv, TOVTO 8 ov8 av efy
7roLijo-i (frpovrj/j.a e-^mv eAev^epoi/, aAAa (f)iXov<rtv ol firiei-
13 /ceFy 77 oy KoXaKevovviv. Kal xprjo-ifjioi ol rrovrjpol e/y ra TTO-
r^Aco yap o r^Aoy, coo-Trep 77 7rapoi/j.ia. Kal TO p.rj- 5
64 nOAITIKflN H ( ). 11.
Sevl ^aipfLv o-fLLvSi LirjS eXeu^epco TVpavviKov avTov yap
elvai LLQVOV d^Lol TOLOVTOV 6 Tvpavvos, 6 8 dvTLGfLLvvvoLLfvos
Kal fXtvOfpidfav d<paipeLTai TTJV VTTfpo^rjv Kal TO 8fo~7ro-
TLKOV Trjs TvpavvtSos LIIO-OVO~LV ovv co<T7rep /caraXuoj Tay TT)J/
10 dpxijv. Kal TO \prjo~6ai crucrcrtTOiy Kal o~vvrjLiepVTaTs evi- 14
LLOLXXOV T) TToXlTlKOLS TVpaWLKOV } coy TOV9 LL\V TToXe-
TOVS 8 OVK dvTlTTOLOVLtevOVS. TaVTa Kal TO, TOiaVTa TV-
pavvLKa Likv Kal o~a>Tripia T^y dp^rjy } ovSev 8
Lio^OrjpLas. to~Tt 8 coy tLTTtlv TtdvTa TavTa
15 Tpicrlv eiSeo-Lv. Q-To^d^fTai yap 77 Tvpavvls Tpioiv, tvbs Liev 15
ToO LtiKpa (ppovecv TOVS dp^oiievovs (ovStvl yap av LtiKpo^v-
\os t7rL(3ovXtvo-Lev^ } SevTfpov Se TOV Siamo-Tew dXXrjXois ov
yap TrpoTepov TV pawls rrplv 77 7rio-Tvo~<ocri TLVCS
Stb Kal TOIS 7TiiKo-i 7roXeLiovo~Lv coy /SXajSepoFy
20 Trpoy TTJV dpyj]v ov LLOVOV Sia TO LLTJ d^LOvv apyjea-QaL 8f-
crTTori/ccoy, aXXa Kal Sia TO TTLO~TOVS Kal eavTols Kal TO??
aXXoiy fivaL Kal LLTJ KaTayopeveLV firJTe eaurcoi/ firfTf. TG>V
dXXa)v. TpLTOv 8 dSvvaLiLa TO>V TrpayfiaTcov ovSels yap 16
fTri)(ipi ToTs dSvvaTOts, cocrTe ovSe Tvpavvt&a KaTaXvcLv {JLTJ
25 8vvdLiQ)S V7rap^ovo~r]s. e/y oi)y Liev ovv opovs dvdytTai Ta
PovXrjiLaTa T&V Tvpdvvcov, OVTOL Tpeis Tvy^dvovcriv oirey
TrdvTa yap dvaydyoi TLS av TO, TvpavviKa vrpoy rauTay
Tay VTTodeo-eLS, TO, Ltev oVcoy pr) TTio-Ttva>o~Lv dXXijXois, TO,
8 OTTCOy LLT] SvVfOVTai, TO. 8 OTTCOy fJLLKpOV (f>pOV(OO~iV. 6 fJ.V 17
30 ovv efy TpOTroy SL ov yiyverat o~a)Tr]pLa Tals Tvpavvio~i TOLOVTOS
to-TLv, 6 8 erepoy o-^eSbv e^ evavTias e^ei ToFy fipr]Lievoi$
TT]V kTTLjj.fXf.Lav. ecrTi 8\ Xaftflv avTov e/c T7?y <p6opds Trjs 18
TG>V /3acriXeico> coo^Trep yap Trjs /SacriXetay e/y TpoTroy T?;y
<f>0opds TO TTOLfLV TT]V dp^T]V TVpaVVlKWTtpaV, OVTCO TT^y TV-
35 pawtSos o-(i)T7]pia TTOLflv avTT]v f3ao~iXiKG>Tpav, e
TOVTa fJ.OVOV } TTJV SvvaLLLV, OTTCOy dp^rj LIT] JJ.OVOV
vccv dXXa Kal fj.rj {3ovXofj.v<DV TrpoLtLLfvos yap Kal TOVTO
7rpoLTaL Kal TO Tvpavvftv. dXXa TOVTO iiev cocrTrep vnoOt- 19
1314 a 61314 b 31. 65
<riv 8ft fjtfVftv, TO. 8 dXXa TO, JJL\V Troiflv TO. 8k
VTTOKpiv6/J.vov TOV @ao~tXiKbv KaXcoy, TrpStTOv p.tv TOV SoKftv 40
tppovTifciv rco> KOIVO>V, [J.r)T 8a7ravG)VTa (els] Scopeas TOiavTas 1314 b
(p afy ra TrXrjdrj xaXfTratvovariv, OTO.V air avT&v fj.\v
X.a/i/?aVcocrfi> ep"yaofj.vcw Kal TrovovvT<nv yXurxpwy, StSaxri
5 eraipats Kal gevois Kal Tf)(vfaats d^Qovcos, \6yov re
drroSiSovra T>V \ap.^avo^v(av KOI BaTravtofjLtvtov, o7re/> 5
rjSrj TTfnoniJKaa-i rives TO>V rvpdvvwv (ovTat yap av TIS Siot-
20 KUV oiKOVOfios aXX ov rvpavvos tlva.i Sogeiw ov Sei Se 0o-
(J.TJ 7roT dTTOprjo-rj -^pj] \jidr (>v KVpLos &v rfjs TTO-
aXXa TOI$ y fKroiri^ova-i Tvpdvvois dnb rrjs oiKtias
Kal (TVfj.(ppci TOVTO fidXXov 7} KardXiTre iv aOpotcravTas 10
yap av ol <pv\drrovre^ tinTiOflvTO roTs Trpdyfiacrii ^
e (f>o(3epa)Tpoi TO>V rvpdvvo>v TO?? dTroSrjfj.ovcrii ol
<f>vXdTToi>TS rG>v TToXiTotv ol fj.v yap <Tvva7ro87]fj.ov(riv } oi
21 Se \}Tro\if.vov<nv) cTreiTO. ray elcrfpopas Kal ray Xcirovpyias
Set <f>aiv(rOai rfj? re oiKovo/tias eVe/ca (rvvdyovra, KO.V 15
Trore SerjQfj xpfjo-Qai irpbs rovs TroXtfUKovs Kaipovs, 6 Xcoy re
avTov Trapao-Kevdfciv (pvXaKa Kal rafiiav coy KOIV&V aXXa
fj.T] coy ISiow Kal (f>aiv<r6ai pr] ^aXfTrbv dXXa
ert 8e TOIOVTOV cocrre firj (fiofie icrOai roi)y
22 aXXa //dXXoj/ alStiaOai TOVTOV /zei/rot Tvyy^dvtiv ov pd8i.ov 20
ovra fVKaraQpovrjTov, Sib Set KO.V pr) rcoi/ aXXow apercoi/
eirifJ-fXetav TroifJTat, dXXa rfjs TroXepiKrjs, Kal S6av e/z-
Troiew TTtpl avTov TOiavrrjV en Se /j.r) povov avTov ai-
V<r6ai fj.r)8eva rS>v dp^oftevcw vfipigovTa, fju/JT vtov \ir\rz
23 vtav, aXXa ftrjS dXXov fir]8eva T>V Trepl avTov, 6 pottos 25
8e Kal ray oiKetas *X LJ yvvaiKas Trpbs ray aXXay, coy
Kal Sia yvvaiK&v vftpeis TroXXat rvpavviSes diroXa>Xao~iv
Trepi re ray aTroXawray ray crcoyuari/fay rovvavriov iroifiv
77 vvv rives rS>v rvpdvvo)v TTOLOVO-LV (ov yap fiovov evOvs
eco^ev roOro SpSxnv, Kal a-vve^Sis TroXXas rjpepas, dXXa 30
Kal <f)atveo-6at TOIS dXXoi? (3ovXovTat TOVTO Trparroi/rey, i v
VOL. IV. F
66 nOAITIKflN H (E ). 11-12.
coy evSaLLLovas Kal paKapiovs 6avfj.do-coo-iv), dXXa ytmXicrra 24
fji.lv fjitTpidgeiv rcny TOiovTOif, L 8e fj.rj, TO "/ 0afVecr$at
ro?y aXXcuy Sia<pevyeii> (ovre yap eveTrtderos OVT evKara-
35 <bpovr]Tos 6 vrjiptoi , d\\ 6 fj.e6va)v, ovS 6 dypvrrvos, aXX
6 KaOev8a>v\ TovvavTLOv re troir^rkov rS>v TrdXat
cr^tSov TTOLVTW KaraaKtva^eiv yap Set Kal KoarfJitlv
iroXiv coy fTn TpoTrov ovTa Kal fj.7) Tvpavvov eri <5e ra Trpoy 25
roz)y Oeovs (f)aiv(r0ai del <nrov8dovTa 8ia<pp6i/To>$ (TJTTOV re
40 yap fyopovvTai TO iraO^lv TL Trapdvop.ov VTTO T&V TOLOVTWV,
1315 a e.av 8ei(ri8aifi.oi>a vofjLi(>o~iv zivai TOV dp^ovra Kal
Ti^tiv TO>V ^ecov, Kal kiriftovXevovcnv TJTTOV coy
^OVTI Kal TOVS Oeovs), Set <5e dvev ajSeXrep/ay 0atVecr^a 26
TOLOVTOV TOVS re ayaOovs Trepi TL yiyvop-tvovs Tip.av OVTWS
5 cocrre /J.rj vopifciv dv Trore Tifj.r]6fji>ai fj-dXXov VTTO rcor TTO-
avTOvo\i(AV ovTtov, Kal ray p.\v TOicana. S Ti/zay diro-
avTov, ray 5e /coXacreiy Si erepco^, ap^orrcoi/ >cat 5i-
KacrTripi(>v. KOLvr] 8t (frvXaKrj irdcrr]? fiovapyjas TO fj.r]8i>a 27
TTOLf.lv (Iva iityav, dXX eiirfp, irXftavs (Trjprjo-ovo-i yap dXXrj-
10 XoyyV eav 8 dpa TLVO, Sty Troifjcrai //eyav, firf TOI TO ye
rjQos 6pao~vv (eTTi^eri/ccorarov yap ro TOLOVTOV r\6os Trepl
Tracray ray Trpa^etyV Kav TTJS 5tra/iec6y rti/a SoKrj irapa-
XVZLV, e/c Trpocraycoy^y TOVTO 8pdv Kal Lt-q irdcrav dBpoov
d<paLptl(T6aL TTJV e^ovaiav. eri 8\ TrdcrrjS p.\v i//3pecoy efpye- 28
15 cr6ai } irapa Tracray 5e 8ve.lv } TTJS re e/y rd crco/^ara [KO-
Xacrecoy] /cai rryy e/y r^f rjXiKiav. //cfXicrra <5e TavT-qv Troir)-
Teov Trjv evXaftuav Trepl rouy tpiXoTiflovS TTJV LJL\V yap e/y
ra XprjfjiaTa oXiycopcav oi (f)tXo^pr)fj.aTOi <f)pov(n /3apecoy,
Trjv 8 e/y aTiiiLav o l re (f>iXoTtfj.oi Kal oi tTrieiKels T&V
20 dvOp&TTtov. Sio-jrep r} /ZT) xpfjarQai 8ei ro?y roioyroty, 77 ray 29
^er KoXacreiy Trarpi/ccoy (paiveo-Qai Troiovfievov Kal fir) 81
oXiycopiav, ray 5e Trpoy r^r rjXiKiav c5/iiX/ay cVi epcori/cay
a/r/ay aXXd /i^ c^i egovo-iav, oXcoy 5e ray 8oKovo-a$ CLTI-
iga>veio-6ai ^el^oo-i ri/za?y. rcoj 5 eTTi\eipovvT(ov tnl 30
1314 b 321315 b 16. 67
TTJV TOV aoo/^aroy Sia(pdopdv ovroi (po(3epa>TaTOi Kal Seovrai 25
TrXficrTT/y (pvXaKrjs, ocrot p,rj TrpoaLpovvTai irepiTroitTcrdai TO
31 tf\v Sia<f>6eipavTe$. Sib fidXicrra fvXa^eTardai Sri TOVS v[3pi-
fccrOai vQ\JLiovTa<$ r) avrovs rj &&gt;v KrjSo/jievoi Tvyyjdvovcriv
d(pi8a>s yap eavTfov eyjavviv oi SLO, 6vfJ.bv tTny^ipovvTts,
KaOaTTfp Kal HpaKXeiros etTre, ^aXeTrbv (pd(TK(0i> elvai 30
32 6vfji(> fid)(e<rOai ^fv^fj^ yap (avetcrOai. , firel S at
e/c Svo crvvecrTriKacn ftopfov t e/c re ra>v airoptov
Kal TWV ei;7r6/3Q)^, fj-dXtcTTa fiev d/i(f>oTpovs vir
SeT cru)ecr6ai Sia TTJV dp^is, Kal TOVS ere/jouy UTTO TCOV ere-
paov dSLKi<r6ai fJ.rjSei , oiroTfpoi S av cocri KpeiTTOV?, TOVTOVS 35
ISiovs ywaAicrra Troitio-Qat TTJS ^PX^> ">$> a
ToTs TT pay fj.a<nv , cure SovXcw eXevOepaxru/ dvdyKrj
TOV Tvpavvov OVT oTT\o)v 7Tapaip^(TLv tKavbv yap
/zepo? trpbs TTJ Swdpei trpovTiQkiitvov, OKTTC Kpttrrovs elvai
33 T>V trriTiOe /J.i> <>v. Trepttpyov <Se ro Xtyew KaO eKavTOv TO>V 40
ToiovToav 6 yap O-KOTTOS (pavepo?, on SL p.^ TvpavviKov
dXX oiKov6p.ov Kal {$a<nXiKov twai (paivfaOai TO?$ dp%o- 1315 b
P.ZVOLS Kal fj.r] o-(j)Tpia Tr}v dXX tTrirpOTrov, Kal ray
TrjTas TOV (3iov Sid>Kii>, fjiTj ray vTrepfioXds, eri 5e roi^y
34 yva)pi[j.ovs KaOofuXfiv, TOVS Se iroXXovs Srjfjiaycoytiv. IK yap
avayKalov ov p.6vov Tr)v dp^rjv ttvai KaXXtco Kal 5
ra> /SeXrto^coj/ dp^iv Kal fj.rj reraTrei^oo/zefcoi/
f jjiicrovfj.ei ov Kal (poftovfievov 5tareAeiV, aAXa Kal TT\V
TroXv)(poi/ia)Tfpav } eri S avTov
/cara ro ^oy TJTOI /caAcoy -rrpos dpeTrjv rj fj
Kal /J.TJ Trovripov aAA fjfj.t.Troi rjpoi , 10
[KaiToi Tracr&v oXiyo^povKOTepai TO>V 7roXiTia>v cicrlv 12
oXiyapyJ.a Kal Tvpavvts. TrXticrTov yap eyet/ero y^povov 17
Trepl %iKvS>va Tvpavvts, -f) T>V OpOayopov iraLStov Kal avTov
OpOayopov CTTJ S avrrj duptUKV tKaTov. TOVTOV S amor
ort ro?s dpxo/j.fvoi$ k^patvTO fterpicos Kal iroXXa TOIS vo- 15
/toty kdovXevov, Kal Sid TO TroAe/uKoy yeveo-Qat KX(iaOfi>T)$
Fa
63 nOAITIKfiN H (E ). 12.
OVK ]v i>KaTa<)pvr)Tos, <a ra
fSyfiayayovv. Xeyerat yovv KXfio~6evr)S TOV airoKptvavra 2
Trjs VIKTJS avTov coy ecrre0aVcocrej > tvioi $ eiKova (pacrlv
20 fTvat TOV KptvavTos OVTCO TOV dvSpidvTa TOV kv TTJ dyopa
Ka6rjfj.vov. (f>acrl Se KOU JTeicricrrparoi/ inrofifivat Trore Trpocr-
K\rj6evTa SiKrjv et y "Apeiov irdyov. SevTtpa 8e Trtpl Kopiv- 3
6ov f) T&V Kv^f\iSS>v Kal yap avTrj 5iereAecrei/ er?; Tpta
Kol ef3Sofj.i]KOVTa Kal e fjLrjvas Kv\}re\o$ n\v yap TV-
25 pdvvrivev tTr) Tpid-KOVTa, rLcpiavSpos St TfTTapaKovTa Kal
TfTTapa, WafJi/j-iTi^os 8 6 TopStov Tpia er?/. ra 8 aiTia 4
TavTa Kal TavTrjs* 6 fj\v yap JTu^eXoy 8r)fj.aya)yb$ -r\v
Kal /cara TTJV dp^rjv ^ereXecrei dSopv^oprjTOS, HtpiavBpos
8 eyweTO fikv TVpavviKos, aXXa TroXe/iiKos". rpiTi] 8 f) 5
30 T0)v Ili(n(TTpaTi8S)v A6ijvr]cnv, OVK eyerero <5e o-fi/exTyy 81$
yap e0uye Ueicrtcrr/jaToy TVpavv&v, tocrr e^ erecri TpiaKOVTa
Kal Tpialv tiTTaKaiSeKa tTr] TOVTGOV fTVpdvvfvo-w, o
SfKa 5e TraiSes, cocrre ra irdvTa eyez^ero er?/
Kal 7TVT. TO>V 8\ \OLTrS>V f] TTpl ItpCOVa Kal
35 SvpaKOvcras. (.TTJ 8 ovS avTrj TroXXa Siffjifivev, aXXa ra 6
Svoiv BtovTa fiKOcri PeXcor /iej/ yap ima TV-
rco oy$6a> TOV (3iov fTeXevTrjcrev, StKa 8 lepcov,
&pa<rv(3ovXos Se rco ei^e/caVa) p-r^vl e^eTrecrei/. a/ 5e TroXXat
rcoi/ Tvpavvtdtov oXiyoxpovtai Traaai yeyovaai TrarreXcoy.]
40 Ta //ej/ ovv irepl ray TroXire/ay /cat ra 7rep2 ray /no- 7
vap)(ia$ } * coi re (fideipovTai Kal TrdXiv <ra)ovTai, a-^fSbv
1316 a ctprjTai rrepl TrdvTW tv 8\ Tfj TroXiret a Xeyerai /zei/ irepl
TO>V fjifTa^oXcov VTTO TOV HcoKpaTovs, ov pevToi Xeyerai K.OL-
X<y r^y re yap ap/crr^y TroXtret ay /cat Trpcor^y ovo~r]$ ov
Xeyet r^r fj.Ta(3oXr]v I8ia>s. (prjal yap amor efyat TO /iTy 8
5 fifvtiv p.rj8\v aXX* eV riv: 7repi65a) y^era/3aXXeij/ 3 dp^rjv 8
fivac TOVTCOV d>v eTrrrpiroy TrvOfjLrjv irffjiTrdSt crvfayels Svo
appovias Trape^erai, Xeycoi/ oral 6 rot) 8iaypdfj.fj.aTOS
TOVTOV ytvrjTai o-repeoy, coy r^y 0i;crec6y ?rore
1315 b 171316 b i. 69
(pavXovs Kal Kpetrrovy rfjs iraiSfias, TOVTO /zev ovv avro
Xeya)i> fcrcoy ov KaKa>s ci/5e^erai yap clvai Tivas ovs irai- 10
9 SevOfjvat Kal yevtvOai o~Trov8aiovs av8pa$ dSvvaTOV aXX
avrrj ri av i Sios eirj /zera/3oX7) rfjs VIT CKCLVOV Xeyo/ze^y
dpio~Tr)$ TToXtretay /zaXXoy 77 TOJI a XXcoi/ -jraaStv KOL rwv
TrdvTwv ; KCU Sid ye TOV xpovov, 81 ov Xeyei
/ieTa/3aXXeii>, KCU ra fj.rj ap.a dpd[j.va yiyvtadai 15
a/za /zerajSaXXet, ofoi> e/ TT; Trpore/oa rj/ttpa eyei/ero 7779
10 r/)07T^y, a/za a/oa /zera/SaXXei ; Trpoy 5e rourois &a TiV atriav
e/c ravrrjy e/y r^ AaKcaviKrjv /iera/3aXXet ; TrXeoya/as yap
e/y TT)^ tvavriav /zera/SaXXovcn Tracrai at TroXtreTat ^ T^J/
cryj/eyyuy. o 5 aiJroy Xoyoy Ka2 Trepi rw^ a XXcoi /zera- 20
f$o\S)v e< ya/o rr/y AaKmviKrjs, 0^0"^, /zera^SaXXei e/y TT)J/
6\iyap\iav } e< 5e Tavrr)? els Srjp.oKpaTiav } /y rvpavviSa
11 <5e e/c SrjfioKpaTias. Kairot Kal avdiraXiv i*.Taf$d\\ov<nv }
OLOV K Srjfjiov e/y o\iyapyiav, Kal fiaXXov fj e/y liwapyiav.
ert 5e TvpavviSos ov Xeyei o^V e/ ecrrat /zerajSoX?) oi r e/ /z^ 25
eorai, (OVT , e/ ecrrai,) 5ia riV aiTLav Kal e/y -rroiav TroXtre/aj/.
airiov OTL ov paStco? av efye Xtyeiv dopio-rov ydp }
^i/ TTpatTrjv Kal TTJV dpfanjV OVTCO
12 ya/> a> eyiy^ero cryfexey fat /cu^Xoy. aXXa /zera/SaXXe/. /cat
e/y rvpavviSa TV paw is, &o-nep 77 JJIKVWVOS e/c r^y Mvpwvos 30
e/y TT)I/ KXsicrOevovs, Kal e/y oXiyap^tav, wcrirsp 77 e^ XaX-
KiSi 77 ./li TtXeoj Toy, Kai e/y SrjfioKpaTtav, a>o~TTp 77 r^
PeXooj/oy ef 2vpaKovo~ais, Kal e/y dpurTOKpaTtav, two-Trep 77
13 XapiXdov kv AaKe8aifj.ovi Kal. . . eV Kap^Sovi. Kal e/y ry-
pavviSa /zera/SaXXei e| oXtyapx/ay, axnrfp ev SiKeXia 35
erXe$oi> a/ TrXerarat roo^ dpxaiav, kv Aeovrivois e/y TT)I/
UavaiTiov rvpavviSa Kal kv PeXa e/y TT)P KXedvSpov Kal kv
Prjyiw e/y TT)I/ Avai\dov Kal kv aXXaiy TroXXaTy TroXeo-iy
14 cocrai/rcoy. droirov 5e >cat TO oi eo-Qai e/y oXiyapyJiav Sia
TOVTO fjifTafiaXXfiv OTI (piXo^prj/jiaTOi Kal "^prj/jiaTicrTal ol 40
ej> raty apafy, czXX oi5 on o/ ?roXi) ^TTeeoi/rey ra?y 1316 b
f
"-*
i^U
yo nOAITIKflN H (E ). 12. & (Z 1 ). 1.
ovcriais ov SiKaiov oiovrai tivai LVOV fJ.T^iv rrjs TroXeooy
rovs KKTr]/j,vov$ LLrjSev To?y KKTT)LLVOLS kv TroXXary re
6Xiyap)(iai$ OVK &f ea " Ti X/ 37 ?A tar ^ eor ^ at 5 <*XXa J 6/zoi
5 /ccwXiWTey, ep KapyrjSovL 8e SrjfiOKpa.Tovfj.ei r)
TO.L Kal OVTTCO utTafiefiXriKao-iv. aroirov 8e KOL TO <f>dvai 15
Svo TToXei? fivai rqv oXiyap^LKrii , irXovffi&v Kal TrevriTwv.
ri yap avrr] /xaXXof 7779 AaKowiKrjs ireTrovOev rj oiroiaa-ovv
aXX?/?, ov /j.r) -rravrts KtKTrjvTai i ara rj JJ.T] irdvres dftofos
10 e t<r lv dyaQol avSpts ; ovSevbs Se 7rei>o-Tepov yevofitvov TJ Trpore- 1(5
pov ovSev rJTTOv fj.era^dXXovo LV ety Sfjuov e oXiyap^iay, av
ytvwvrai irXeiovs oi airopoi, Kal /c ST^JLOV els b
tav KptiTTOv 27 T irXrjOovs TO evTropov Kal oi
<JLV oi <5e Trpoorl^cocrt rov vovv. iro\\>v re QV<T$>V aiTiatv Si* 17
15 air yiyvovrai at //era^oXa/, ou Xeyei aXXa ptav, OTI a<ra)-
revofJievoL /cararo/ci^o/zei Oi ytyvovrai irtvqres, <wy e dp^fjs
TT\ovo~t(t)v 6vT<av rrdvTtov rj rS>v TrXe/crrcoi/. TOVTO 5 eorri ^eO-
5oy, aXX oral/ /^ei/ ra)^ ^ye/zo^co^ ri^ey azroXecrcocri ray
ov<ria$ t KaivoTOjJiOVffiv, orav Se rS>v dXX(ov, ovStv ytyverai
20 8tivov } Kal fj-fTapaXXovo-iv ovSev fj.d\\ov ovSe Tore e/y Sfj^ov 18
77 e/y aXXqv Tro\LTtiav. Ti <5e /cai TI^V fj.r] fJiT^aritf }
Kav dSiKtovraL rj vfipLgowrai, araaid^ovo-i Kal //era/JaXXouo-i
ray vroXtreiiay, /cai/ //T) KaTaSaTravrjo-cocri rrjv ovaiav 8ia TO
egtwai o TL av ftovXoovTat noLf.lv ov alriav TTJV dyav eXef-
25 6epiav tivai (firjcriv. TT\LOVQ>V 8 ovo~a>v oXtyap^L&v Kal Srj-
coy yLtiay ovo rjs e/caTe/3ay Xlyet Tay
/V \
(Z).
II6o~ai LL\V ovv 8ia(f)opal Kal rives TOV re
Kal Kvpiov rfjs iroXireias Kal rfjs -rrepl Tay czp^ay
Kal Trepl SiKacrnipicw, Kal Troia irpbs noiav
Ti 5e Trepl 0^opay TC /cat croDTTjptas TCOV TroXi-
1316 b 21317 a 27. 71
K TTOLCOV re y/erai /ecu &a r>ay am ay, ftprjrai 35
2 TrpoTcpoV eVei <5e rert>x 7 7 /fei/ tiSr) TrXeico fyfjtOKpttT&lS oVra
Kal T&V dXXcav 6fJ.oi(os TroXtrefoof, a /ia re vrepi e/ce/a>i/ e?
rt XowroV, ov yjtipov kiricrKtyacrOai, Kal TOV oiKtiov KOI TOV
3 <TVp.<f)epovTa, rpoirov drroSovvat rrpoy e KaoTTjj/. eri 5e Kai
ray crui/aya>yay avr5>v rS>v flprj^vatv e7Tia-/ce7rreoi/ iravrav 40
rd)i/ rpoTTW ravra yap crvvSva^ofji^va iroiet ray 7roXtre/ay 1317 a
eTraXXarrei* , coo-re a/jtcrro/cpariay re 6\tyap)(iKa$ ewat Kal
4 TroXireiay (S^o/cpari/ccorepay. Xeyco 5e roz)y 0-vvSvaajj.ovs,
ot)y ^ei /ier tirio-KOTTtiv, OVK eovce/i/*eVoi 5 eiV2 z/w, ofoi/ aV
ro /Lie^ ^ov\vop.evov Kal TO Trept ray dp^aLpfcrias oXiyap- 5
77 o"f j/reray//ei/o^, ra <Se ?rept ra SucacrTripia dpicrTO-
?) ravra /ze^ /ca2 ro ?rept ro /Soi/Xefo/zei oi/ oXt-
, apio-ro/cpariKcSy o^e ro vrepi ray ap^aipeo-my, 77
/car aXXoi ri^a rponov /zr) irdvra, crvvTtOfj ra r^y TroXi-
5 retay o//ceta. 7ro/a /zej/ ouf Sr]fj.oKpaTia zrpdy Troiav appor- 10
ret 7roXiJ>, cuo-avrooy 5e Kat 7ro/a fair 6\Lyap^ia>v iroi(p
wXrjdei, Kal rS>v XOLTTWV St Tro\ireiS>v TI$ <rvfj.(j)pei TLO-LV,
6 fiprjTat. TrpoTfpov. o/zcoy 5e, (e?rei) 5et yej/ecr^ai SfjXov firj p.6vov
Troia TOVTCOV T&v TroXiTi<oi> dptcrTr] rats TroXeo-^, aXXa KOL
ay <5et KaraarKevdfciv Kal ravray /cat ray aXXay, e?reX- 15
d/j.a yap Kal Trepl rr)y ai/ri/cei/ie^ryy TroXtretay
7 avTT) 8 eVra T^I/ KaXovcri rt^ey oXiyapxiav. X^Trreor <5e
Trpoy ravTrjj/ rr)i/ //e$ooW irdvra ra StjporiKdl Kal ra 5o-
raty 8r]p.oKpariais aKoXovOfiv e/c yap roi5ra)j/ <TVVTI- 20
ra r^y ^/lo/cpari ay e^r; yiveaOai o-v/J-jBaiitei, Kal
8 TrXet ofy 8r]fj.oKp arias fJ.ids fivai Kal 8ia(f)6pov$. Svo yap
airiai Si acnrzp at SrjjjLOKpaTtai vXcfovs fieri, TTpStrov
17 Xe^^ero~a Trporepoi/, ori did(f>opoi 01 Sfjftoi (yivtrcu
yap ro /if yfwpyiKbv irXrjOos, ro 5e fidvavaov Kal Orjn- 25
/coy toi/ rot) 7rpa>Tov r 5eurepa) TrpocrXap.pavop.tvov, Kal TOV
TfdXiv TOIS dj,<)OTois ov .6vov 8ia<ei T>
7 2 nOAITIKfiN e f (Z ). 1-2.
Kal X^ P 00 yivffBai Tr)v 8rjfj.oKpa.Tiav, dXXd Kal TCO fir]
Trjv ai/Tijv} <$frepa Se rrepl 77? vvv Aeyo/zer" ra yap rats 9
30 8r)fj.oKpaTiai$ d-KoXovdovvra Kal SoKovvTa eivat rfjs TroAtre/ay
oiKtla ravTrjs Troiet 0-vvTtdffj.eva ray o^/zoKpaTtay erepay
rfj p.\v yap eAarrco, rfj S a,Ko\ov6ij(ri irXeiova, rfj 8
airavra ravra. ^prjcrLfj.oi 8 e/cacrroj avra>v yva>pieiv Trpoy
re TO K.ara(rK.evdeLv r)v av rty avratv rv^rj ftovXop.f.vos,
35 /cat Trpoy ray SiopO&creis. rjTov(ri fjikv yap ol ray TroAire/ay 10
OLTravra TO. otKtia avvayaytiv Trpoy rr)v VTTO-
, apaprdvovcn 8e TOVTO TTOLOVVTZS, KaOdrrep kv ro?y Trepi
ray 0^opay Kal ray o-corT/pfay r<Si/ TToAirei<r d prjTat Trporepoi/.
rirt 5e ra a^ico/zara Kat ra -7^7; /cat coj/ kfyfevrai Aeyco/zej/.
2 T7r6^eo~iy /zef ow r?)y <5?7/io/cpariK^y TroAire/ay eAei;-
Qepia (TOVTO yap Xeyew La>6a(ni>, coy ev 7/0^77 rr} TroAtre/a
1317 b TavTrj /zerexorray eXtvOepias TOVTOV yap aToy(dto~6ai 0acrt
"" iraa-av ^rj/zo/cpar/a^)- tXevdepias 5e ej/ //cy ro ei/ /zepei ap-
Xf<r6ai Kal ap^tiv. Kal yap TO SiKaiov TO SyjiOTiiebv TO 2
-bv dXXa fj.r) K.O.T d^lav, TOVTOV 8
5 oi/roy TOU SiKaiov TO TrXf)6o$ dvayKaiov thai Kvpwv, Kal 6 TL
av 86fl T0?y TrAeTocri, TOWT etVai [/cat] TeAoy Ki roCr /at
TO SiKaLov 0acri yap 5eTi/ tcrov ^X lv ^xao-Tov TO>V TroXiT&v
o>crT ev Tats SrjftoKpaTiais avfj.(3acvet. Kvpia>Tpov y elvac TOVS
diropovs TWV tvnopctiv TrAei ouy yap e/cri 5 Kvpiov Se TO Tols
10 TrAetbcri S6av. v /zer ow Tr^y eAey^ep/ay crrjfte iov ToOro, of 3
TiOcvTaL rravres ol 8r]p.oTiKol Trjs -rroXiTfias 6pov } ev 8f TO
{rjv coy ftovXeTai Tiy* TO)TO yap T^y cAeu^ep/ay epyo^ e?i/ai
<pao~iv, eiVep roO c^ofAeuoi/roy TO ^"77^ /z?) coy jSo^Aerat. rr^y 4
/zer ow 8r)fj.oKpaTias 6 poy ovroy SevTepos, evTevQev 8 eA?7-
15 Af^e TO /ZT) dp^fcrdaij /zaAicrTa /ze^ J/TTO fjiySevos, i Se
/z?7, AraTa /zepoy. /cat cru/z/3aAAerai TavTrj Trpoy TT)J/ eAeu-
Qepiav Tr]v /cara ro fcroy. rot^rcor 5 I Tro/cei/zei/cof /cat roiai/- 5
TTjy 0170-77 y r^y ap^y ra romOra Sr)fj.oTiKd, TO aipeio-dat
ray ap^ay vra^ray e/c Traj/rcoi , ro dp^fiv TrdvTas /ze^
1317 a 281318 a 10. 73
Kao-TOV eKao-Tov 8 kv /zepei navTcav, TO KXrjpaTas tlvai Tay 20
dp^ay rj TraVay rj oo~ai /ZT) e/^Tretp/ay SeovTat Kal Te\vr]y }
TO fj,rj drrb TtfJ.rjfj.aToy p.rj8fvoy eivai Tay ap^ay 77 ori /zt-
KpOTaTov, TO fJ.r/ Sly TOV av~bv apyjeiv fj.rjSejj.iav rj oXiyaKis rj
e a> TO>V KaTa TroXe/zof, TO oXiyo^poviovs fivai ray
^ irdcras rj 6Wy vde^fTai, TO SiKafciv irdvTas 25
/CCti Af TfdvTWV KOL TTfpl TfdvTtoV Tj TTfpl TO>V TrXeLO-TOOV Kai
TWV [leyicrToov Kal T&V KvpicoTdTauf, OLOV Trepl evBvv&v Kal
TToXireiay Kal TO>V i8ia>v crvva\\ayfj.dT(i)V, TO Tr]v KK\r)o-iav
Kvpiav tlvai irdvTtov (rj TO>V ^eyicrra)^), dp^r]v <5e /J.r]8fJ,iai>
6 firjSfvoy rj OTL oXiyio-Tcov [77 TU>V /zeyurrcoi/J Kvptav (rS>v 8 3
8r//j.oTiKa>TaTov ftovXri, OTTOV fir) ftiaOov evTcopia Trdcriv
a yap dfyaipovvTai Kal Ta\)Tr\<$ Trjs dp-^rjy Tr/v 8vvap.iv
avTov yap dvdyei ray /c/3/crety Traaay o Srjfjios evTrop&v
Oov, Kaddrrep tipr/Tai irpoTepov tv Ty /ze0o& Trj irpb
7 raurryy), eTreira TO /J.icr6o(pope?i } p.dXicrTa p.\v irdvTas, e/c- 35
KXrja-iav SiKao-Trjpia ap^ay, ei 6"e fj.rj y Tay dp^ay Kal TO,
8iKao~Trjpia Kal ftovXrjv Kal Tay tKKXrjo-tas Tay Kvpias, 77
ratv dpyjav ay dvdyKrj o~vo-o~iTttv /ZCT dXXijXw feVi 7re<$r)
oXiyap^ia Kal ytvzi Kal TrXovTOt Kal TraiSeLa opifeTai,
TO, Sr/fj-OTiKcc SoKec TGivavTia TOVTCOV fivai, ayei/eta irevia 4
8 f$avavcria ~\ en 8e TO>V dpy&v TO fnrj8^p.iav dtSiov etVai,
tav Se Tty KaTaXtKfrOfj e^ dpyaias /zeTa/SoXr^y, TO ye Tre- 1318 a
piaiptio~6ai Tr]v 8vvan.iv avTrjs Kal e alptT&v KXr/pooTOVs
9 Troieo/. Ta p.\v ovv Koiva TaFy 8r]fiOKpa,TCai$ TavT e&Ti, o~v/j.-
8 K TOV StKaiov TOV 6fj.oXoyovfj.fvov eivai Srjfj.oKpaTiKOV
(TOVTO 8 ecrTi TO to-ov \ftv anavTas KaT* dpiOpov) 77 /j.d- 5
XiaT* eTvac SoKovaa Srifj,oKpaTta Kal 8fjfj.os LCTOV yap TO
p.rj8\v fj.dXXov dp^eLv TOVS dnopovs fj TOVS fVTrop
Kvpiovs fivai fj.6vov$ aXXa vraj/Tay e^ IQ-OV KaT d
ovT(o yap av inrdp^eiv vojj.ioitv TT\V T io-OTr/Ta Tr} TroXi-
ia Kal Tr)v eXevGepiav. 10
74 nOAITIKflN & (Z ). 3-4.
3 To Se //era TOVTO aTropetrai Treoy fovo~i TO LO~OV, TTO-
Tfpov 8tL TO, TLfj.ijfj.aTa SitXeiv ^tXiOiS TO, T>V vrefraKO-
o~i<ov <al roi)y ^tXiovs LVOV 8vvao~6ai ro?y TrerraKocri oty, 77
ov)( ovTo> Stl TiOevai TTJV Kara TOVTO iVor^ra, aXXa SttXtw
15 Ltev OVTCOS, eneiTa e/c T>V Trei/ra/cocnW arouy Xa/So^ra /cat
e/c rcof x^" 01 ; rourouy Kvpiovs tivai TO>V a/pecrecoj /cal rcot
SiKao~Tr)pio)i>. TTOTtpov ovv avTi] rj iroXiTfia SiKaioTaTT] /cara 2
TO SrjijLOTiKov SiKaiov, rj p.a\\ov 17 Kara ro TrXfjOos ; <pao~l
yap ot Sij/jLOTiKol TOVTO SiKaiov 6 Ti av 86^rj TOIS vrXe/ocrii/,
20 oi 8 oXiyap^LKol 6 TI av 86rj TTJ TtXtiovi ovo~ia Kara
TrXrjdos yap ovo-ias (fraat KpivfarOai Sew. e-^ei 8 dfityoTepa 3
Kal dSiKiav ft fj.ev yap 6 TI av oi oXiyot., TV-
is (<al yap kav efy ^(77 TrXet oo rcoi/ aXXa>v fv-rropwi ,
Kara ro 6Xiyap\iKov SiKaiov apyjtiv Sficaios fj.6vos) } ei
25 8 o Ti av oi TrXtiovs Kar dpi6fJ.6v, dSiKrjo-ovo~i 8r)fj.vovTes TO,
Tcav TrXovvicav Kal XaTTOva>i> } KaOaTTfp f^ipr/Tai TrpoTfpov.
TIS av ovv ir) iVori/y rjv 6fj.oXoytjarovo~iv a/z06repoi, o~K7TTeov 4
e d>v 6piovTai SlKattov a/i06repoi. Aeyotxn yap a>$ 6 TI
av 86rj roFy rrXioo~i TO>V TroXiTcov, TOVT eivai. 8tl Kvpiov.
30 ecrrco STJ TOVTO, /IT) p.evTOi TrdvTWi, aXX fTreiSr) 8vo ^pf]
TeTv%r)Kv e^ &v 17 TroXty, irXovcrioi Kal Tre^^rey, o TI av
dfj.(f>oTepoi$ 86r) rj TOW irXeio&i, TOVTO Kvpiov ecrrco, eai> 8e
TavavTta 86gr) } 6 TL av oi irXeiovs Kal 3>v ro TtfJ.rjfj.a irXtlov.
diov t oi jjLv StKa oi 8t iKoo~iv, <5o^e 5 TGOV fj.ev TrXovo-itov 5
35 ro?y e , TMV 8 diropcoTepwv ro?y TrevTCKaiSeKa, irpoaytyt-
vrjvTai ToTs p.tv 7Tvr)0~i rerrapey TO>V 7rXovo~icov } roiy 8e rrXov-
o"i oiy Trerre TCOV TrvrjTQ)v oTTOTtpav ovv TO TCfj-r/na vrrepTtivei
o~uvapi6fj.ovfj.va>v dfj.(poTpa>v eKarepoiy, TOVTO Kvptov. kav 8e Q
io~oi o~vfj,TTo~<oo~t, K0ivr]v ftvai TavTTfv vo/j.io~Tov a7ropiav cocTTrep
40 vvv, kav 8fya rj kKKXr]o-ta yevrjTai rj TO SiKao-Trjpiov r)
1318 b yo-P aTTOKXr/pcoreo^ r; a XXo TL TOLOVTOV TTOLrjTtov. aXXa vrept
~ Li\v TOV io-ov Kal Tov SiKaiov, Kav rj ndvv
Tr)v dXrjQeiav Trept ai>Ta>v } o/icos p aoi/ TV^LV r}
1318 a u1318 b 36. 75
TOVS 8vfafj.fi/ovs TrXeovtKTeiV del yap rjTovo~i TO LVOV Kal TO
SiKaiov ol rJTTOvs, oi 8e KpaTOvt/Tts ovSev <f)povTiovcriv 5
ArujLoxpaTLtov 8 ovo-fav rerrapco^ /SeXnoTT/ n\v 17 Trpcarrj 4
Taei, KaOdrrep kv To?y TT/JO TOVTCOV fXe^Grj Xoyois tern 8e
Kal dp^atordrr] Trao-)i> avrij. Xeya> 8e 7rp<aTr]v cocrTrep dv
TIS 8i\oi TOVS Sr/fjiovs /3eXri(rroy yap Sfffio^ 6 yewpyi/coy
tvTLv, eoo-re Kal Troiftv ei/Se^erai 8r)fj.oKpaTtav, OTTOV {ft TO 10
2 TrX^oy a?ro yeoopymy ^ po/^y. 5ia /lev yap TO /JT) TroX-
X^f ovutav Ivcty aor^oXoy, eoo Te /z^ TroXXa/cty KK\r]o~tdgiv
8ia 8e TO /i?) e^eii/ Ta^ay/faFa Trpoy To?y epyoty Siarpt-
POVO-I Kal T>V dXXorpiciw OVK tTnBvfJLOvcrLV, aXX ^ 5ioi/ auToFy
TO epydgfo-Oat TOV TroXireveo-Oat Kal dpyjeiv, OTTOV av fj.rj 77 15
3 Xrip-para fteydXa dnb rS>v dpx&v. ol yap TroXXoi fidX-
Xov opeyovrai TOV KepSovs rj TTJS TifJ.fjs. <rr)fj.iov 8- Kal
yap Tay dp-%aia$ TvpavviSas vntfjitvov Kal Tay oXiyap^ias
VTrofjLevovcrii , kdv Tty airro^y epya^ecr^ai ftr] KwXvr) fJ-t]8^
d<f>aipf}Tai fjLrjStv Ta^eca^ yap oi p.\v TT\OVTOV<TIV avTcov, 20
4 ol 8 OVK diropovo~Lv. ZTI 8e TO Kvpiovs eivai TOV eXto-Qat Kal
fi>6wiv dvaTrXrjpol Trjv evSeiav, fi TL (fiiXoTifitas c^ovcny,
tirfl trap* eviots 5i7//oiy, KO.V p.rj fjLTe\Q)cri Trjs a/peo-ecoy
TCOV dp)(>v dXXd Tivts aiptTol KaTa /fepoy e/c TrdvTcov,
axnrfp kv MavTiveta, TOV 8e (3ovXevo-0ai Kvpioi (oarus, iKavSis 25
5 <-%i To:y TroXXory. Kal 8fi VO\JLL^IV Kal TOUT etVat o-^fj-d
TL 8rjfj.oKpaTia$, wcnrtp ev MavTiveia TTOT r\v. 8ib 8r) Kal
o~vn<f>tpov ear? Trj irpoTtpov p rjdfio-rj 8rj]j.OKpaTia Kal virdp-
ti caOw, alpftcrOai p\v Tay dp-^ds Kal vOvi/iv Kal
-rrdvTas, dpyew 8e Tay /feyurray atpfTovs Kal a?ro 30
/, Tay fj.eigovs diro /m^onDV, rj Kal dirb Tifir)-
6 //cmi> fiv fjL7]Sffj.iav } dXXd TOVS Swapevovs. dvdyKt] 8\
TroXiTVOfj.fvovs ovT(o TroXiTtvevQai /caXcoy (a i TC yap dp^al
alfl 8id T&V /3eXTi oTa>i/ eo-oj/Tat TOU STJ/JLOV ^ov\op.^vov Kal Tofy
eTrifiKeo-iv ov <j>6ovovvTos^ Kal To?y eTneiKeo-i Kal yvcopifjLois 35
dpKova-av tlvai Tainrfv Ti]v rdfciv dpgovTai yap ov\ vir
76 nOAITIKflN 9 (Z r ). 4.
aXXaiv xeipovwv, Kal dpovo-i 8iKaia>s Sict TO rS>v v6vva>v
tivai Kvptovs eVepof y. TO yap tTravaKpeLtao-dai, Kal LIT] TTOLV 7
e^eo/at TTOLCLV o TL dv 86r] 9 crvLKptpov kvriv r\ yap t^ovcria
40 To5 irpaTTeiv o TL av eOeXrj rty ov Svvarai (f>vXaTTLV TO kv
1 3 1 9 a e/cao~Tft) T&V dvOpwircov (^avXof. coa Te avayKalov crvfj.f3ai-
veiv oirep kcrrlv co0eXi/ia)TaTOj/ er TCU? iroXiTfiais, ap^eus
TOVS TriLKi? dvafJLaprriTOVs o^Tay, fjirjSev kXarrovfi^vov TOV
TrXrjOovs. OTL fjikv ovv avrrj TCOV Srjfj.oKparicoi/ dpi<TTrj } 0are- 8
5 yooV, KOI Sia riv airiav, OTL SLO, TO TTOLOV TLva ivai TOV
SYJLLOV Trpoy 8\ TO KaTacncevdgeiv yewpybv TOV 8fjfj.ov TO>V
T6 VOfjLCOV TLVCS TWV TTapO. TOIS TToXXoTs KtLfJ.v(i)V TO dp-
^alov Xpria-LiLOL TrdvT^s, T) TO oXws ftr] e^e^at KeKTrjo-6ai
rrXe/co yfjv LieTpov TLVOS r) diro TLVOS TOTTOV Trpbs TO ao~Tf
10 Kal Tyv TroXiv TfV 8t TO y dp^alov kv TToXXals TroXeo i 9
vfvoLiodeTrjfjLevov LirjSe ncoXfTv k^tivai TOVS 7rpa)TOVS KXrjpovs,
fo~Tt 5e Kal ov XtyovcrLv OvXov VOLLOV tlvaL TOLOVTOV TL Sv-
vdittvos, TO Lirj 8aveifLv efy TL Litpos Trjs V7rap^ovo~T]y
Kdo-T(p yfjs vvv <5e SZL SLOpQovv Kal T5 AfaTaLcov VOLL<O"
15 Trpo? yap o XeyoLiev O~TL xp-rjo-LLios. eKelvoi ydp } Kafcep 10
ot Tey noXXol KCKTrjLievoL 8t yfjv oXiyrjv, o/zooy Traj/Tey yecop-
yovo-iv TiLi&vTai yap ov% 6 Xay Tay KT^o-eiy, aXXa /caTa
TrjXLKavTa fiopia SiaLpovvTes O>O~T ^X eiJ/ VTrtpftaXXtLv Taly
TLJJLIJO~O-I Kal TOVS TTtvrjTas. LitTa Se TO yecopyLKov TrXfjdos 11
2O f3XTLO-TO$ SrJLLOS eCTTLV 07TOV VOLll$ LO~L Kal a>0~lV dlTO /So-
o~Kr)LtdTQ)v rroXXa yap e^et Trj yeatpyia 7rapanXr]o-L(as }
Kal TO, irpbs Tay TroXe/ui/cay 7T/oa|eiy LidXiaO OVTOL yeyv-
Livao-fj-tvoL Tay e^eiy Kal ^PTJO-LLLOL TO, crco/iaTa Kal 8v-
vdfievoL dvpavXfiv. TO, 8 d\Xa irXijOr) irdvTa o-^eSoVj e^ 12
25 (ov at XoLnal SrjLioKpaTLaL o-vv<TTdo-L, 7roXX<S (pavXoTfpa
TOVTW o yap /3/by 0ai)Xoy, Kal ovSev cpyov /J.ZT dpcTrjs
(ov LLTa\Lp(^eTaL TO TrXfjOos TO Tf TO>V (3avavo-(ov Kal
TO Tatv dyopai(ov dvOpooTrav Kal TO Or]TiKOv. ZTL St <5ta TO 13
jrepl TTJV dyopav Kal TO do-TV KV\Uo~BaL Tfdv TO TOLOVTOV
1318 b 371319 b 22. 77
yeVoy coy eliretv /oaoYcoy eKKXrjaidfci ol 8e yecopyoiVrey Sta 30
TO 8teo~7rdpOai Kara rrjv \a>pav OVT airavTSxriv ovO 6fjtoi<o$
14 SeovTat Trjs o~vv68ov Tavrrjs. OTTOV <5e Kal o~ufj.(3aivi TTJV
TTJV 6eatv *X flv T la -VTr\v cocrre TTJV y&pav TTO\V TTJS
aTrrjpTfjo-Oai, paSiov KOI Srjftoicpcerfap Troieio-Qai \pr]-
<rrr\v Kal TroXiTtiav dvayKafcrai yap TO irXfjOos eirl TWV 35
aypStv 7TOiti(r6ai ray d-rroiKias, (wore Set, KOLV dyopaTos
o^Ao? %, fj.rj Troifiv kv raFy SqfiOKparfaus ^KK\*i<r(as dvev
15 rot; Kara rr)> \a>pav irXrjOovs. Treoy JJL\V ovv 8ft Karao-Kevd-
eiv Tr)v fieXTio TTii Kal irpwTrjv 8r]fj.oKpaTiav, ftprjrat 0a-
vepbv 8f Kal Trcoy ray aAAay CTro/zei ooy yap Set irapeK- 40
ftaivfiv Kal TO -^Ipov del TrXrjdos ^wpt^etv. TTJV 8k TfXfv- 1319 b
Tatav, 8ta TO Travras KOLvatvetv, OVT* Trdorr]? eo-r
fytpeiv, OVT paSiov Stafj-evetv fir) roFy ro/xoty Kal TOIS
GTLV ev o~vyKifjLevr)V a 8e tjt&efptiv o-v(j,(3atvi Kal
Kal ray aAAay 7roAtr6("ay, etprjTat irpoTtpov ra TrActora 5
16 o"^e86v. Trpbs 8e TO KaQicrTavat Ta\)Tt]v TTJV SijfjLOKpaTtav,
Kal TOV SfjfJLov TTOiflv ivyvpov dtoOao ii ol Trpoeo rcorey r5
7r/Doo Aa/i/3aVetj> coy TrAeiVrouy Kal Troielv TroAi ray JJ.TI p.6vov
TOI>S yvr)o~Lovs aAAa Kal roi)y voQovs Kal TOVS e oTTOTepovovv
TroXiTov, Aeyco Se otov Trarpoy T) //?;rp6y airav yap o lKtlov 10
1 7 rouro rep roiovrco Srjfia) fMaXXov. et<adao i fikv ovv ol Srjfjta-
yooyol KaTao-Ktvdeti oi/rcoy, Set fi.ei>TOi Trpoo-Xafipdvetv fjie-
Xpt av VTrepTetvrj TO TrA^^oy T&V yvaptfjLObv Kal T>V pe-
a-ow, Kal TOVTOV JJ.T) Trepa TrpofiaLveiv vnepftaXXovTe? yap
aTaKTOTepav re Trotovai Tr)v TroXiTciav, Kal roi)y yvcaptfiovs 15
Trpoy ro \aXeTra>$ {nrofj.evetv TTJV 8r)fj.oKpaTtav irapovvovo*L
, oTTfp o-vve(3r] r^y o-racrecoy atTtov yeveo~6ai rrepl
r]v oXiyov fiev yap rrovrjpbv TrapopaTat, TroXv 8e
18 ytvoftfvov eV 6(f)6aXfj.ow p.d\\6v e<TTiv. ert 8e Kal TO.
TOiavTa KaTao~Kvdo~fJiaTa ^prjo tfjia Trpoy TTJV Srj/jiOKpaTiav 20
TTJV TOtavTTjv, ofy KXeto-6evT)S re AQr\vr\aiv e^p^craro /3oi/A6-
avfj(rai Ti}V 8rjfioKpaTtav } Kal irepl Kvp-qvrjv ol TOV
;8 nOAITIKflN 6 (Z f ). 4-5.
Srjfjiov KaOio-TavTes. (ftvXat T yap eYepat TroiT/reat irXtfovs 19
Ki (fiparpiai, Kal TO, rG>v ISicav lepa>v o~uvaKTtov et y oXiya
25 Kal KOivd, Kal irdvTa cro^icrreof oTrooy av OTL yuaXtcrra dva-
LLiyjd)crL TrdvTts dXXrjXoLS, at Se awr/dtiai, SiafcvxQ&criv
0.1 TTpOTfpOV. TL $ Kal TO, TVpaWlKO. KaTa(TKvd(r/J,aTa 20
Sr/fjiOTiKa SoKfL irdvTa, Aeyco 8 OLOV dvapyfa re SovXatv
(avrr) S &v trj ^\pi rov (rv/j.(pepov(ra) Kal yvvaiK&v Kal
30 TraiSav, Kal TO gfjv oVcoy rt? ftovXtTai irapopav (jroXv yap
e crrcu TO rfj roiavrp iro\iTtla &or)6ovv rjSiov yap roTs TroX-
Xoiy TO r\v draKTCOS r) TO o-o)0poi/coy).
5 "EffTi <$ epyoi/ ToO vofj.o6f.Tov Kal TU>V (3ovXofj.i>coi crvv-
KTrdvai nva ToiavTrfv TfoXiTtiav ov TO KaTao~Tfjo-ai /neyioroi/
35 epyov ovSe p.6vov, aXX 6Vco? o-a>r]Tai jjidXXov p.iav yap
7) 8vo 77 Tpery r][jiepas ov y^aXtTrov fjitlvai TroXLTvofj.vov$
QTftocrovv. SLO Set, TTf.pl <av T^Ofdp^Tai irpoTtpov, Tives cra>Tr)- 2
piai Kal <p6opal TO>V TroXiTeicov, K TOVTCOV TttLpacrOai KaTa-
(TKtvdfciv TTJV do~(f)dXiav , vXa(3ovfj.evovs jjikv TO, <f)6tipovTa,
40 Ti^e/zevoyy Se TOIOVTOVS vop.ovs Kal TOVS dypd(f)ovs Kal TOI)?
1320 a yeypajj.fj.ei ovs 01 TTfpiXri^rovTaL fj.dXio~Ta TO, cr<ji)ovTa Ta$
Kal fir] vopL^tiv TOUT tlvai STUJLOTLKOV fj.rj8 0X1-
o TfOLYjo-fL T-qv TfoXiv OTL ndXio-Ta 8r)fj,oKpaTeio-dai
fj 6Xiyap)(et(rQaL, dXX o TrXtLo~Tov -^povov. ol 8t vvv Srj- 3
5 fiayaoyol xapigofjLevoi TOLS 8rj(j.ois TroXXa Srjfifvova-l 8ia
T>I> 8iKaa-Tr)pL(0v. 8ib Sti Trpbs TavTa OLVT LIT parr tiv TOJ)? KTJ-
rjy 7roXiTiay, vofjioOtTovvTas fjiT]8ev tivai 8r]p.6criov
KaTaSiKaofJ.i>Q)i Kal 0epo/ie^oj/ Trpoy TO KOLVOV, aXX
ol p.\v yap dSLKOvvTts ovStv T\TTOV
10 (frfuaxrovTat yap 6/zoicoy), o 8 o^Xo? rJTTOv
Tai TWV Kpivofj.evcoi , Xrj^reo-dai /J.r)8ev ^teXXeoj/. eVi 8e Tay 4
yivoiitvas 8rmoo-tas SiKas coy oXiyicrTay alel iroieiv, /zeya-
Xoiy eTTiTi/zibiy roi)y (iKy ypa0o/zeVoi;y KtaXvovTas ov yap
T0t>y SrjfjLOTLKovs aXXa TOVS yvo)pip,ovs (la>6ao-ii> eiVayetr; Sfi
15 oe Kal TTJ TfoXiTtta irdvTas /j.dXio~Ta fjitv fvvovs tivai TOVS
1319 b 231320 b 9. 79
rroXtray, c 8t H.TI, pri rot ye coy TroXe/ztbvy vofttfeiv TOVS
5 Kvpcovs. TTt 8 at TcXevTaTai Sij/j-OKpaTiat noXvavOpaTroi
re i(Ti Kal ^aXeTrbv eKKXrjo-Ldgeiv d/j.icr()ov$ } TOVTO 8 OTTOV
TrpoaoSoL fj.rj Tvy^dvovaiv ovcrai iroXf/jLiov rot? yvcopifioty
(a-rro re yap e/cr0opay Kal ^//ei/creooy dvayKaiov yivzaOai 20
iow (f)av\a)v, a TroXAa? rjSr] 8r]jjLOKparta^ dv-
p.tv ovv irpocroSoi fir] Tvyyavovaiv ovcrai, Set
oX/yay eKK\rj(ria$, Kal SiKaa-rripia 7roXX<Sj/ /^er oXt -
6 ycay 5" ^/iepaty (rovro yap 0epet /iei^ /cai 7r/joy TO /J.r) 0o-
/SeTaOaL rovs TrXovatovs ray Sa-rrdva?, eav ol n\v tviropoi fj.r) 25
Xa///3ai/coo-i SiKaa-TtKov, ol 8 arropoi, (pepei 8e KOI Trpoy TO
KpwecrQaL Tay <5//cay 77-0X1) fitXriov ol yap evTropoi TTO\-
Xay /zei ^/zepay ou/c t6t\ovo-iv euro T&V I8io)v d-rrsivai, /3pa-
7 x^j/ $e \povov eOeXovaiv), OTTOV 8 i(rl 7rp6(ro8oi } fj,r) Troitiv o
vvv ol 8rjfj.aycoyoi TTOLOVO-IV (TO, yap irepiovra vk^ova-iV Xafj,- 30
fidvovcri 81 afia } Kal irdXiv Seovrat r5>v avT&v 6 Terpr)[j.-
i/oy yap <TTI TriOos rj TOtavrr) (3oij0ia T0?y aTropoiyV aXXa
SeT TOV dXrjOtvo)? S-TJ^OTLKOV bpav 6Veoy TO TrX^^oy fir] \iav
airopov f) TOVTO yap aiTiov TOV fj.o^6r)pav elvai Trjv SrjfjioKpa-
8 Tiav. TeyvavTtov ovv OTTCOS av evTropia ytvoiTO \povios. tirel 35
8e avfj.(pepft TOVTO Kal TOIS fviropois, Ta fJikv a?ro TCOJ/ Trpocr-
Tas ddpoa )(pr) 5/ai/e/zeii/ Toly
8vvaTai TOO-OVTOV o-vva6poifciv oo~ov
ety yrjSiov KTTJO-LV, el 8e ^77, Trpoy d(popfj.rjv e/nroptay Kal
9 yecopytay, Kal ei ftr) Trdo~i SvvaTov, dXXa KaTa 0fXay ^1320b
TL /zepoy eVepoj> kv /zepet Stavefj-eiv, kv 8e TOVTW Trpoy Tay
dvayKaias (rvv68ovs Touy fimopovs flarQepfiv TOV p.Lcr66v } d0ie-
T(av parafov XtiTovpyiaiv. TOLOVTOV 8 Tiva Tponov
Kap^rj86vioi iroXtTv6fjLcvoL (piXov KGKTrjvTai TOV STJ/J.OV. ae< 5
yap Tiva? tKTrtjJurovTts TOV Srjfiov Trpoy Tay TrpiotKi8a$Troiov<riv
10 euTTopovy. ^apifVTCov 8 eari Kal vovv f\6vT(ov yvcapifjioov Kal
ovTas ToC-y arropoi/y a0op/zay SiSovTas TptTrciv
epyacr/ay. /caXcoy 5 e^ et pi[J.io-6ai Kal TO, TapavTtvW
8o nOAITIKfiN 9 (Z ). 5-7.
> ~
10 fKeivoi yap Koiva TTOIOVVTZS ra KTrjftaTa roiy a-rropois err* TT\V
Xpr]<n.v evvovv TrapaaKevagovcri TO TrXfjOos ert <Se ray dp)(a$ 11
Traaay TTOLrj(rav &rray, ray /zer a/peray ray <Se KXTjpcoray,
ray /zei/ /cXTypcoray OTrcoy 6 STJ/J.OS avT&v ^ere^T/, ray 5
a/peray T/ a noXirfvcovrai (3\TLOi>. tern <5e roCro Troifjcrai KCLL
15 T7/y avTfjs p^^y [i.piovTas ro^y /iey KXrjpcoTovs TOVS 5
alperovs. Trcoy /zei/ ow 5e? ray ^/zo/c/aar/ay Ka.TacrKtvdeiv,
5*xe5or 5e /cai 7re/) ray oAiyap^my Trcoy
K TOVTCOV. e/c TO)^ tvavTLcav yap Set avvdytiv liedffTrjv 0X1-
20 yapyjiav Trpoy r^ kvavTLav Srjfj.oKpariai
[ikv evKparov /laXiara rcoi/ oXiyapyjiStv Kal
ecrru j) crvveyyvs TTJ KaXovpevT] TroXire/a, ?/ 5et ra 2
TtfJ.rjfJ.aTa StaLptTv, TO. n\v eAarrco ra 5e fJ.ei<o
eXarrco /zev a0 cor rcov ai/ay/ccuW fj.t6
25 fJ.eiw 8 d(f> &v TO>V KvpiooTepW rco re KTcafJ-evQ) TO ri-
fj.r][ia /zere^eif teivai TTJS TroXiTCLas, TOCTOVTOV e/a-ayo/zet/ouy
rou SrjfjLov TrXfjQos Sia TOV TifJ.rjfj.aTO$ } fj.e@ ov /cpe/rrofey ecroi/-
rai rcoi/ /z^ fj.T\6vTcov act 5e 5et 7rapaXa[i(3di ii e/c roi; 3
/SeXri oi/oy Srjfiov roi)y /coij/coi o^y. o/zo/coy 5e /cai r7?i> e^o/zerTyi/
30 oXiyapyJav eTTireiVoj/ray cSe? piKpov KaTao-Ktvdgeiv. Trj $
Kal TvpavvLKtoTaTrj TU>V 6Xiyap\i>v, oaco ?rep ytipicrTri, ro-
vTO) Sei TrXei ovoy <pvXaKf)$. axnrep yap ra /zer ei? <rc6//ara 4
va Trpoy vyUiav Kal TrXoFa ra ?rpoy vavTiXiav
35 /caXcoy e^orra . . . ro?y TrXa)Tr}pcnv 7ri5e>^erai TrXei oyy a/zaprmy
wcrre ^77 (ftdeipeaOai Si ai;ray, ra <5e z^ocrepcoy e^orra
<7co//arcoj/ Kat ra rcoj/ TrXo/coi/ e/cXeXf/zlfa /cai
TfTv^rjKOTa (f>avXo)v ovSe ray /zi/cpay SvvavTai
T/ay, ovrco /cat rail/ TroXtreicor a/
1321 a 0uXa/c^y. ray /uei/ ow Sr/ftoicpaTias oXcoy ^ TroXvavdpcorria 5
<ra>ti TOVTO yap avTiKtirai Trpoy ro SiKaiov TO KOTO. TT\V
dfctav Tr]v 8 oXiyap^iav SfjXov OTI TOvvavTiov vnb
6i>Taias Sei Tvy^dvfiv r^y
1320 b 101321 a 37. 81
8k TtTTapa fj,ev ka~L fieprj //aAicrra TOV TrXij6ov$, 7
fiavavo-LKov dyopatov O-TJTIKOV, rerrapa Sk TO,
o-Lp.a 73750? TroXe/ioi/, LTTTTLKOV birXiTiKov -fyiXo
OTTOV p.kv <rvn(3e(3r]Ke Trjv ^copav flvai tTnrdo-inov, kvTavQa
p.kv eiHpvais e x Karaa-Kevafciv rrjv oXiyapyfav uryfvpdv
(17 yap crcoTrjpia rofy OLKOVCTL 8ia TavTrjs earl rf/s 8vvdfj.fa>$, 10
at 5 i7T7roTpo(f)iai r5)v //a/cpay ovcrias K^KTrjp.evu>v eiffiv),
OTTOV 8 OTT\iTLKr)v, Trjv ^o^vrjv oXiyap^tav (TO yap OTT\I-
2 TLKOV ru)v eviToptov ko~T\ fjid\\ov fj T&v d.7r6p(t)v\ T) Se "^n\r}
vvafj.is KOL vavriKrj S-rj/xoTLKri rrdfJiiTav. vvv n\v ovv
TOIOVTOV 7ro\i> 7r\fj66$ ta~Tiv, QTCLV (JiaoTcocn, iroXXaKis 15
yetpar SeT Se Trpo? TOVTO <f)dp[j,aKov irapa TO>V
Xa fj.fi dveiv crTparriyuiv, OL crvvSva^ovai Trpbs TTJV
liTTTiKr]V 8vvap.iv Kal TTJV oTrXiTtKrjv TTJV apjJLOTTOVO av ~S)V
3 -fyiXtov. ravrrj S kiriKpaTOVcriv kv raFy Siao~Tdo~criv ol Sfjfj.oi
T&V V7r6po)v -^nXol yap oVrey Trpbs iTnriKTjv Kal OTrXiTiKrjv 20
dy(oviovTai paSicos. TO /j.v ovv e/c TOVTCOV KadcaTavai TO.V-
Tt]v Trjv Svvafj.iv zavTOvs ko~Ti Ka6io~Tavai, (5eT Se Siypr)-
(Jitvrjs r^y r/XiKias, Kal T&V p.\v OVTCOV Trpecr/JfrepcBv TCOV
8e VQ)v, eri fj.v ovTas veovs roi)y avT&v vltTs 8i8do~Ko~6ai
ray Kovcpas Kal ray ^iXay epyaovay, fKKtKpiftevovs $ e>c 25
4 TraL^CDv dOXrjTas fivai avTOvs TO>V tpyatv. Tr/v
yivfaOai TO) TfXrjQ^L TOV 7roXirei///aroy TJTOL, KaQdirep
Trporepov, rory TO Ti/J.rj/j.a /crco/ieroty, rf, KadaTrep @r)f:$aiois,
aTrocr^o/zet Oiy \povov Tiva T&V ftavavo~(iov tpycov, r], KaOd-
Trep kv MacrcraXia, Kpccriv rroiovnevovs TO>V agitat/ TOOV kv r 30
5 7roXi.TVfj.aTL Kal To>v fgcoOfv. Tt <5e Kal Tais ap^a?y Tats
ay 5e? rowy kv TTJ TroXiTtia Kare^eij/, Sei
Aeirofpyt ay, iv KO>V 6 8fjfj.os p.r] //ere^?/ Kal
o~vyyva>fj.rjv ^rj rofy dp^ovo~iv coy fjLio~6ov TfoXvv SiSov&i TTJS
6 dpyrjs. dpftoTTci 8k Ovo-fas re e/o-io^ray iroulo-Qai /zeya- 35
XoTrpeTrery Kal KaTao-Kwdgetv TL TO>V KOLVO>V, tva T>V Trept
ray eVriao-eiy /lere^coj/ 6 Sfjpos Kal TTJV TroXiv opcov KOO-/JLOV-
VOL. IV. G
82 nOAITIKflN @ (Z ). 7-8.
ra Se oiKo8ofj.rjfia(nv &(rfjivps
opd fjLvovaav rrjv TroXirtiav crvfj.(3rjcreTat 8e Kal TOIS yv(a-
40 pifJ.ois elvai fj.vr)fj.?a r^y SaTrdvrjs. dXXd TOVTO vvv ot Trepi 7
ray 6Xtyap\tas ov TTOLOVQ-IV, dXXa rovvavriov ra
yap r\TO\)<nv ov^ TJTTOV t) TTJV TifJirjV, SiOTrep ev
1321 b ravras elvai 8r)/i.oKpaTias fUKpds. Traiy fjikv ovv \pr] Ka-
di<rrdvai ray 8r)(JtOKpetTi(t$ KOU ray oXiyap^as, 8iGopL(r6a>
rov rpOTTQV TOVTOV
8 AxoXovGov Se roty e/pTy^eroiy ecrrt ro SipprjarOai KaAaiy
5 ra TTtpl ray ap^ay, Troaai KOL r/i/ey KCU TIVCOV, Ka6d,7Tp
fiprjrai KCU irpoTepov TCOV p.tv yap dvayKa.L<t>v dp^a>f \(a-
pls dSvvarov eu/at iroXiv, rS>v 5e ?rpoy evTa(av KOL KO-
<r[iov dSvvarov oiKtTcrOai KaXcoy. eri 5 dvayKcuov ei/ fj.fv 2
raty fJUKpaTs eXarrofy efrai ray ap^ay, kv 5e ra?y peyd-
10 Xaty rrXe/bwy, cucrTrep ruy^a^ei Trporepoi/ f.ipr](j.^.vov Troias
ovv dp/zorrei vvvdytiv Kal Trotas yyopifav, 5ei /i^ XavOd-
veiv. Trp>TQv /zei/ ow 7Ti/zeXeia rcof dvayKaicav 17 7rep2 r^ 3
ayopaV, e0 ?; (JeT ri^a dp^v efi/ai r?)v t<ftopa>crav Trepi re
ra o"f///36Xaia /cat r^i^ evKocr^iav cryjtSov yap dvayKolov
15 Tracraiy ra?y TroXecri ra //ej/ dtvtia-Qai ra 5e ircoXtiv Trpoy
rr)* aXX^Xooi/ dvayKatav \ptiav, Kal TOVT kariv vTroyviora-
TOV Trpoy avrdpKeiav, Si rjv SoKovcriv e/y /a ai/ TroXiTeiav
erepa <5e tTn/teXeia raur?;y e^o/ie^T/ /cat 4
77 rcof Trepi ro a ari/ 8r)/j.O(Tia>v Kal ISicov, OTrcoy
20 evKOcrjAia y, Kal ra>v TTLTTTOVTC^V oiKoSo/j.rjudrctii Kal o85>v
<r<oTr]pia Kal SiopQcocris, Kal T&V opiav r&v Trpoy aXX^Xouy,
O7rooy ai/ey/cX^rcoy e^cocri^, >cai 6Va TOVTOIS d XXa r?;y eTTi-
/leXet ay 6/xoi6rp07ra. KaXovcri <$ dcrrvvofjiLav ot TrXtlcrroi rr]v 5
TOLavrriv apyj]v, e^et 5e fjiopia irXeico rov dpid/j.6v, &v
25 erepoi/y e0 erepa Ka6i<TTd(nv tv raty
olov Ti)(07roiovs Kal Kprivwv eTrt/ieX^ray /cat
a XX?; 5 dvayKaia re /cat TrapaTrXrjcria TavTy 6
f root avratv p.\v yap, dXXa Trepi r^ ^a>pav eo~rt /cat [ral
Trept ra e^co roC ao-reoy KaXovcri 5e roi)y ap^o^ray rouro^y
1321 a 381322 a 21. 83
oi fj.fv dypovofj-ovs ot 8 uAoopouy. avrai [ikv ovv firifj-eXeiai 30
i<rt TOVTMV rpefy, dXXrj 8 dp%r) Trpoy yv at -rrpoo-oSoi T$>V
vafapovTai, Trap (bv (pvXaTTovTow fiepigovrai rrpdy
SiOLKrjcrti KaXovcri 8 aTroSeKTas TOVTOVS Kal Tafias.
7 erepa <5 dpyji Trpoy rjv dvaypdfytcrQai 8ti ra re i8ia (TVJJ.-
Kal ray /c/iurety e< TCOI/ SiKaaTrjpiW Trapa 8e TOIS 35
TOVTOIS Kal ray y/ja0ay rw^ 8tKa>v ytvfcrdai Set Kal
ray /<raya>yay. e^ia^(oi5 /zej/ ow jjLpiovcri Kal ravrr^v ety
TrAetbi/y, ecrri 5e /ii a /cypta roura)i/ iravTW KaXovvrai 8k ipo-
fj.vrj(j,ovfs Kal kniffrdraL Kal nvr)fj.ovS Kal rouroty aAAa ovo-
8 fjLara crvveyyvs. fjt,ra 8e ravrrjv e^ofj-evr] p.\v dvayKaio- 40
rdrrj 8e cr^eSbv Kal )( a ^- 7rQ)raT1 l r ^> v dp^(S>v tcrrlv TJ Trcpl
ray Trpdgeis r>v KaTa8tKaa6fVT(DV Kal r&v irpoTiB^^vdnv
Kara ray eyypa0ay Kal irepl ray 0uAa/cay ra>v crco/iarcop. 1322 a
9 x a ^ 67r ^ ptv o&v ecrri <5ta ro TroAA^
OTTOV fir] fj.yd\a ecrri /cep5atVeii/, o^r
eOeXovcrt Trpdrrftv Kara roiis
dvayKaia 5 ecrriV, ort ou^ei o<j6eAoy yivfcrOat n\v SiKas irepl 5
TO>V SiKaiwv, ravras 8e fjirj \aiiftdveiv reAoy, atcrr t fj.r)
yiyvoiitvtov Koivtovtiv dSvvarov aAATyAoty, Kal 7r/oae(W fir]
10 yiyvofjitvow. 8to peXriov fj.r) jj.[av tlvai TOVTrjv TTJV dp^rjv,
dXX aAAouy e aAAcoi 5i/cacrr7ypia)j/ 3 >cat Trepi ray 7rpo$e<reiy
dvaytypap.iJ.wtov axravroiS TTfipdcrOai SiaiptTv, eri 5 10
7rparreo-$ai /cat ray ap^ay Tay re aAAay >cai ray
fj.dXXov ray j/eay, >cat ray r<r et ccrrcoroof erepay
Irepav twai TT]V TrpaTTOfifvrjv, OLOV d(rrvv6-
[j.ovs ray Trapa rail dyopav6/j.(ov } ray 5e irapa TOVTODV ere-
11 poyy. ocrcp yap a> eAarrtwi/ axre^^eta ei/?/ rofy 7rparro/*ei>o{y, 15
rocrouro) juaAAoi/ A^x^orrai reAoy a/ Trpa^ety ro /xe^ ow/ ro^y
aurouy e^Vai roi)y KaraSiKacrai Tas Kal Trparro/xet oi/y dTTtyjQeLav
e^ei SnrXfjv, ro 5e Trept Trdvrtav roi)y avrovs noXefj-iovs ird<nv.
noXXa^ov 8t SirjprjTai Kal 17 (fivXarrovcra ?rpoy r^i/ Trparro-
12 f*tVT]v, olov A6r\vT}aiv (17) rcoj^ cvStKa KaXovfievcw. Sib /3eArioi/ 20
/cat Tavrrjv ycapi^tiv, Kal ro o-60{cr//a r)Tetv Kal Trtpl TOM-
G 2
84 nOAITIKflN & (Z ). 8.
vayKaa p.v yap crriv ov% rrrov rs etp^/ze^y,
fiatvei 8e TOVS fikv tirLtLKtis (pevyew (j.dXi(TTa ravrrjv
Q.f>yj]V, TOVS 8e fJio^Orjpovs OVK oV0aAey TroLtlv Kvpiovs avTol
25 yap SiovTaL (pvXaKrjs /jidXXov r} (pvXdrreiv dXXovs 8vvav-
rai. Sib 8ti fJirj p.iav O.TV or ^r ay \ikvr\v apyjiv tlvai Trpo? 13
avTO?s, fJ.rjSe crvvf^^ rr]v av"rr\v^ dXXa rS>v re i>ean>, onov
ris kfyrjfiav TI (ppovpcov eort ra^iy, Kal T>V dpyS>v 8ei Kara
ftepr) TroieTcrOai TTJV eTTifteXeiav ere/joyy. rauray /zer ovv ray
30 a/o>(ay coy avayKaioTdras QtTeov tivai Trpcoras, yitera 5e
rai/ray ray avayKaias \JL\V ov8\v r^rrov, kv (Tyji^ari Se JJ.L-
OVL reray/zei ay Kal yap e/nrap/ay Kal TTi crrecoy <5eoi/raf
TroAX^y. roiavrai S ei ei/ av at re Trept rr}i> (frvXaKrjv r?;y TTO- 14
Aecoy, Kal ocrai rarro^reu ?rpoy ray 7roAe/zi/cay
35 5e >ca ei/ flprjvr) Kal eV TroAeyuco TrvXS>v re /cat
o/iOicoy e77i/ieA?;ray ei^ai /cat e^eracrecoy /cat crvvrd-
rcot" iroXiT&v. tv6a fjLfv ovv e-jrl TTCLO-L rouroiy
tiaiv, ev6a 8 eAarroyy, ofov ei/ ra?y piKpaTs
y^m ?rep TrdvTcov. KaXovcri 5e crTpaTrjyovs Kal TroAe/zap^ofy 15
1322 b roi)y roiouroyy. eri <5e ^ai cocrir imreTs r) -^siXol rj ro^orai. rj
vavTiKov } Kal eVt royrcoi e /cacrrcor ei/iore KaOicrravrai dp^ai,
at KaXovvrai vavap^iai Kal imrapyjiai Kal ra^tap^i ai, /cat
Kara /zepoy 5e ai ^TTO rauray rpir)pap)(iai Kal Xo^ayiat
5 /cat (pvXapyjiaL Kal ocra roi/rcov \Lopia- ro 5e Trat 1 eV ri roi>-
ecrrti/ ei<5oy 3 evn/ieAe/ay 7roAe/zi/ca)^. ?repi /zej/ ow ravrrji/ 16
ap^Tyi/ e^ei rot rporrov rovrov end 8e iviai rcoi/ dp^coi/,
i Kal fj.r) Trdcrai, 8ia^ipL^ovcn TroXXa TWV KOIV&V, dvay-
Kalov krkpav tivai rrp Xrj^o/J.ei tji XoyicrjJiov Kal TrpocrevOv-
10 vov&av, avTT]v jJirjSlv Siaxeipigovo-av erepor* KaXovvt St TOV-
rovs ol jj.ev evOvvovs, ot 5e Aoytcrray, oi 8 e^eracrray, o/ e
(rvvrjyopovs, irapa Trczcray 5e rauray ray dp^as r) fidXiara 17
Kvpia TrdvTtov ka-riv rj yap auTrj TroAAa/ciy e)(ei ro reAoy Kal
Tr]v icr(popdv rj TrpoKadrjTai rov nXrjOovs, OTTOV Kvpios kanv o
15 5^/zoy* 8eT yap etVai ro <ruvdyov ro Kvpiov rfjs TroAiref ay.
e eV$a /ief TrpoftovXoi Sia TO TrpofiovXevtiv, onov
1322 a 221323 a 10. 85
18 8t irXrjQos ecrri, @ov\r] fidXXov. at [M\v ovv TroXiTiKal T>V
dp^atv cr^eSbv Toaravrai rives io-iv } dXXo 8 eiSos eVi/ie-
Xei ay f] TTtpl Toi>s tfeouy, oiov i epefc re Kal tTrifjLtXrjTal rS>v
?repi TO, i epa TOV crtofecrOai re ra vnap^ovTa Kcd dvopOovadai 20
TO, TTiTTTOvTa TO>V oiKo8ofj.r)fj.dT<i)v KOL rG>v ciXXmv o<ra rera-
19 Krai TT/Joy TOVS Oeovs. (rvfj.(3aii i Se rr}v e7rt//eAeia^ Tavrr]v
evia^ov fjikv f.iva.1 fiiav, oiov kv rat? fjiiKpals TroXecriv, kvia.-
^ov Se iroXXas KCU K^(opi<rfivas r^s lepOMnuvrjf, oiov tepo-
TTOIOVS KCU vaoipvXaKas KOL ra/zt ay ra>v iepatv ^pr}fj.aTa>v. 25
20 f^ofjLfvr) 8e TavTr]$ f] Tr/ody ray Ov&ias d(po)picriJ-vr] ray /cot-
ray TrdVay, oVay fj,rj roFy iepevo-iv diroSiSooo-iv 6 vopos, dXX
diro rrjs KOivfjs eVr/ ay e^oucri TTJV TLfj.ijv KaXovai 8 oi n\v
21 ap\ovras TOVTOVS, oi 8e fiacriXtts, ot Se TrpvTdvtts. ai p.\v
ovv dvayKoiai CTTi^eAeiai etVi -rrepl rovratv, coy fliretv avyK- 3
(paXaiGoo-afjievovs, Trepi re ra Saipovia KOL ra TroXe/zi/ca
Kal Trepl ray 7rpoo-68ov$ KOU rrepl ra dvaXio-Kopeva, Kal irepl
dyopav Kal Trepl TO ao~TV Kal Xifievas Kal rr]v ^a>pav } ert
ra TTtpi ra SiKaorrripia. Kal (rvvaXXayftdTcav dvaypa<pas
Kal irpdgeis Kal 0y\aKay Kal eTTiXoyicr^ouy re Kal ee- 35
ratreiy Kal TrpocrevOvvas T>V dp^ovrcov, Kal reXoy ai
22 TO (BovXevoftfvov elcri TO>V KOIVO>V iSiai Se ra?y o-
repaty Kal paXXov evr)(j.fpovo~ai$ TroXeo-tv, ZTI 8k (f>povTigov-
a-aty eu/coa/ii ay, yvvaiKOvofita vojj.o<f>vXaKia TraiSovopta
yvfjivao- capita, Tr/joy 5e royroiy Trepi aycoyay eTTf/zeXeta yv- 1323 a
HVIKOVS Kal AiovvcriaKovs, KOLV ti Tivas e repay o~vfi(3aivL
23 roiavray yivt&Oai ^eoop/ay. TOVTGW 8 tviai 0ayepa>y eurtv ov
8r)fj.OTiKal TOiV apxojj/, oiov yvvaiKOvopia Kal T
TOIS yap aTropoiy dvdyKrj xpfjo-0ai Kal yvvail Kal irai<T\v 5
24 cocTTrep aKoXovOois 8ia Tr]v d8ovX(av. TptS>v 8 ovo~Stv dpy>v
Kad ay atpovvTat ri^ey ap^ay ray /cupt oyy, vopotyvXaKcov vrpo-
fiovXctiv fiovXfjs, ol fj.ev vofj.o<f)vXaKe$ dpio~TOKpaTiKov } oXtyap-
^(iKoi 5 oi Trpo^SouXoi, (3ovXr) 8e STJUOTLKOV. irepl [lev ovv
TO>V dp^cov, <uy e^ rvTrco, o-^fSbv efpiyrat ?repi Tracrco^ ... 10
CRITICAL NOTES.
BOOK VI (IV).
1288 b 16. tpyov n 1 Vat. Pal. marg. P 4 Sus. : om. n 2 Bekk.
18. tp?8ei/ rjTTov . . . 19. 8wa/nii>t] There can be little doubt that
these words have come down to us in a corrupt and probably
imperfect form. Bekk. 2 reads oi8eV in place of prjbev. Te can
hardly be right, n 1 marg. P 4 have en in place of eWi (Vat. Pal. etmi/).
Possibly we should read ov8h TJTTOV TOV TraiSorpt iSov re Kal TOV yvfjiva-
(TTIKOV Trapaa-Kevdcrai KOI Tavrrjv e crl rrjv dvvapiv, but it is difficult to be
certain how the text originally stood. 24. apporTovo-a n 2 Vat. Pal.
Bekk. : appofrvaa M 8 P 1 Sus. and possibly r. See critical note on
1 338 b 3. 27. ayaQov n 1 Vat. Pal. marg. P 4 Sus.: om. n 2 Bekk.
29. e dpxys Te K&S " ye wiTo] ylvoiro ? Sus., but cp. Xen. Cyrop.
4. 3. 8, aXX* eicfivo "eras frwciTV nu>s av TOVTO yevoiro. 32. r] See
explanatory note on izSSb 30 sqq. 33. irapa mivra d( raOra]
See critical note on 1282 a 40. 36. Vet. Int. adds /amen before
his equivalent for T&V ye xprja-ipaiv.
1289 a 1. emuvovo-iv Bekk. Sus., firaivova-i II 2 COrr. P 1 : fntuvovfitv
r M s pr. P 1 . 3. Koivwtlv n 2 Bekk. Sus. : Kwdv M s pr. P 1 : Vet. Int.
has prosequt\ and I am not certain what this represents. 5. TOV
n 2 Bekk.: fj n 1 Sus. A word is sometimes displaced in n 1 by
another word wrongly repeated from a neighbouring line, and here
% from the preceding line has probably displaced TOV. 8. 8e n 2
Bekk.: yap T M 8 Sus., yap 8^ P 1 . 11. n(Ta 8e K.T.A.] See
explanatory note. 17. doroif r P 1 Sus. (Vet. Int. stnguh s] :
(Kaa-Trjs M 8 n 2 Ar. Bekk. less well. TJJS miMtWar] z has communica-
tioms, which sometimes represents Koivtavlas in the Vetus Versio
(e.g. in 1 252 a 7) and may possibly be right: the other MSS.
have communionis. 24. Vet. Int. does not translate 8) after
ewe/? : did r omit it ? n-XeiW n 1 corn P 2 Bekk. Sus.: n-Aeuo P 3 C* n*
pr. P 2 : see explanatory note on 1289 a 24. 26. irtpl om. n 1 .
33. K(xopr)yr}nfVT)v~\ Vet. Int. diffusam, which might suggest that he
88 CRITICAL NOTES.
misread the word as Kex^^^v, were it not that he has distributores
for xoprjyoi in 1299 a 19.
1289 b 1. TOV /3ao-iXeuoi/ros] Vet. Int. regis, but we must not infer
any difference of reading in r, for in 1291 b 4 Vet. Int. has
agricolas for yeapyovvras, in I298b22 consiliarios for TOVS /3oiAevo-
fifvovs, in 1304 a 3 sacrificatorem for &VOVTOS, in 1305 a 31 demagogi
for dr)p.aya)yovi>T(s, in 1 306 a Sfures for K\firTovras, and in 13 19 a 30
terrae cultores for ot yecopyowres-. The reverse inexactness also
occurs : thus in i32ob 29 we have communic antes for row KOLVOWOVS.
13. II 1 Sus. add ela-iv or tlviv after TroXiretoJi/. 25. eKaorrjs M s P 1
Bekk. Sus. : e/caorov n 2 : Vet. Int. uniuscuiusque leaves it uncertain
which reading he found in T. ravra n 1 Bekk. Sus.: ravras n 2 Ar.
32. Se avon\ov n 2 Bekk.: 8 SoTrXov M s P 1 Sus.: we cannot tell from
Vet. Int. autem sine armis which reading he found in r. "Avon\os
seems to be a later and less correct form, v. Dind. Steph. Thes. s.v.
(Liddell and Scott s.v. aon-Xoy) : still it may be right here, for in
Eth. Nic. 3. ii. in6b 12 all MSS. have the form awrrXos. The
form avoTT\ov occurs in Plato, Euthyd. 299 B, though we find the
form aoriKov in Protag. 32oE and 321 C, where the word is used in
a wider sense than in the Euthydemus. 38. iroXepovs r Bekk. 2
Sus. (Vet. Int. bella) : TroXe/u ous n Bekk. 1 As to the second npbs see
explanatory note. 39. rl Mcudi>Spa>] Vet. Int. sub Maeandro
probably represents eVi M.cudv8p<a, for in 1306 b 35 eV AyTjcnXaw is
rendered sub Agesilao, and in 1271 a 39 eVi rois fiao-iXivo-i sub
regibus.
1290 a 1. nav fi n 2 Bekk. Sus.: KOI M 3 P 1 and possibly r, for
Vet. Int. has et si, but et si seems sometimes to represent *av d in
Vet. Int. (see critical note on 1278 b 7). 617 r P 1 Bekk. Sus.: 8*1
M 9 n 2 (corrected in P 4 and in ink which may or may not be that
of the MS. in P 2 ). 2. SmXo/^&z P 1 Bekk. : Vet. Int. divisimus,
which represents 8itXo^ej in 1290 a 24 and 1295 a 8, but 8ifi\6/jLfda
in 1289 a 26, so that we cannot be certain which reading Vet. Int.
found in his text : SieiXo /iiei/ over an erasure P 4 : 8 if tXd/xi/z/ M s P 2 3 8
etc. Perhaps the chances are in favour of- Siec Xo/xev, the reading
of Gottling and Sus., as r n have Siet Xo/z<ri> in 1290 a 24. See
critical note on i257b 33. 18. fi/?/xoKpanW T n Bekk. Sus.:
drjuoKparias Lamb. Schn. Cor., but not, I think, rightly. 21. Q b ,
a MS. of little authority, followed by Bekk., adds T^V before
<ppvyiaTi. 32. ot6 . . . 33, oXt yot rfjs TroXtreias is placed after 37,
in P 2 6 Qb Ub Vb LS Aid., marg. rec. P 3 , and pr. P 4 , and
1289 b 11291 a 7. 89
after 39, rrpovayopfvo-ftev, over an erasure in pr. P 3 , so that only n 1
and marg. P 4 , and probably Vat. Pal., place these words in their
right place. We may infer this as to Vat. Pal., for, though the
fragment preserved by it begins only with 36, opolois (see vol. i.
p. viii), we note that it does not give the words either in 37 or in
39: therefore it probably placed them rightly in 32. r M 8 and
marg. P 4 place oXt yoi after rrjs TroAn-et ay.
1290 b 2. TroXXovy n 2 Vat. Pal. Bekk.: 7rXW n 1 Sus. 15.
oXiyapxta Bojesen, Sus., Welldon : drj/j-os T n Vat. Pal. Bekk. av is
added after OIOK in n 2 Vat. Pal., but is omitted by n 1 Bekk. Sus. and
expunged by corr. P 4 . It probably comes from the preceding line.
19. oXiyapxia n 1 Vat. Pal. Bekk. Sus., but \ l is over an erasure in
P 1 : oXiynpxiat n 2 . 22. Vet. Int. has et plures for wXeiW, but he
sometimes adds et where no /cat existed in his Greek text (see
critical notes on 1252 a 25, 1262 a 29, 1264 a 9, and 1284 b 32).
25. npor)povp.fda n 2 Vat. Pal. and probably r (Vet. Int. vellemus) :
irpoT]pf)p.(0a M 9 and perhaps pr. P 1 , for in P 1 r/pov is over an erasure.
Trpcorov p.v n 1 Sus. : TTpSorov n 2 Vat. Pal. Bekk. 26. oTrep r n
Bekk. Sus. Richards would read oacmfp or amp. 29. f"i8ij r n
Vat. Pal. is probably a repetition of ei 817, unless it is repeated
erroneously from Too-ovr ei8/, 36 (see critical notes on i298b 35
and 1 3 09 a 29). Or should e irj be read in place of it? Supply
p.6pta with Too-avra from /jopt oiy, 28. As to i 817 see explanatory
note. 33. TOVTW P 23 Vat. Pal. etc.: ravrb M s , TO.VTO P 1 : the
reading of r is of course uncertain. Forma generis neutrius
Tamov saepe legitur non solum ante vocales, verum etiam ante con-
sonantes (Bon. Ind. 125 b 16). So in 7 (5). 5. 1304 b 39 all
MSS. have ravrbv before KOI. 39. /iepwi> n 2 Vat. Pal. Bekk.:
popiuv M* P 1 Sus.: Vet. Int. partibus leaves the reading of r
uncertain. MopiW is perhaps here repeated from two lines above,
for this kind of error occurs occasionally in n 1 .
1291 a 1. TO after TOVTO is omitted in n 3 Bekk., but n 3 often omit
the article, e.g. in 1291 b 3, where these MSS. omit TOVS before
TrpoTroXf^oii/ras, in 1292 a 22, 1297 a 35, and 1305 b IO. 4. rpirov
8 dyopalov II Vat. Pal. : r probably read rpirov 8e TO dyopdiov (Vet. Int.
tertia autem quae circa forum). But the article is often expressed
and omitted irregularly in enumerations : see critical note on
I 3 I 7 D 37> Riddell, Apology of Plato, p. 211 ( 237 F), and
Holden, Oeconomicus of Xenophon, critical note on c. i. i.
7. TO trpono\fp.fj<Toi>] Vet. Int. quod propugnans, but we must not
90 CRITICAL NOTES.
infer a difference of reading in r, for in 1291 a 23 Vet. Int. has
reddenlem ci iudicantem for TOV dnoSaxrofTa KOI Kpivovvra and in
1 298 a 19 audientcs for oKovaonevovs, though he renders the future
participle correctly in 1298 a 21, 26. 8. Vet. Int. has si debeant
non servire invadeniibus, which probably stands for ei /zeXXovo-t ^77
ov\fva-fiv TO!? f moua-iv, for in 1283 a 6 we have si differ at for t
Sia(pep(t and in 1331 b 25 civitatem quae dcbet esse beata stands for
TTJV p.fX\ovcrav ecrecrdnt. noXiv p.aKapiav. p.rj yap If TU>V abvvdrcav j;J Vet.
Int. nihil enim minus impossibilium quam : it is difficult to guess
what he found in his Greek text. 11. KOJU^WS] Vet. Int. leviter :
he probably misread KO/J.\^SIS as KOV^WS. 14. avrdpKa>v\ Vet. Int.
necessariis, which probably comes from necessaria a little further on.
Whether the error is that of Vet. Int. or of his Greek text, it is
impossible to say. See critical note on i33ob 7. 17. re P 23 Vat.
Pal. Bekk. 2 Sus., re P 1 , TO MS, yf n 3 Bekk. 1 Vet. Int., as usual, does
not render re. 21. TTJS is not rendered by Vet. Int. and may have
been omitted in r, but see critical note on 1306 a 30. anro^v^ n 1
Bekk. Sus. : a-KTopivav n 2 Vat. Pal. 29. Vat. Pal. agrees with n 1 in
adding yap after ovfov, but probably wrongly. For other passages in
which the MSS. differ as to the insertion or omission of yap, see
critical notes on i272b 36 and 13 24 a 22. 34. o n 2 Vat. Pal.:
oTrep M 8 P 1 : we cannot tell from Vet. Int. quam which reading he
found in r, for he often fails to render Trep. 35. TO ntpl ras dpxas
AetToupyow] z has here rightly quae circa principatus administrat :
other MSS. aministrat or amministrat. 39. a/m <as] Vet. Int.
perfects. Did he misread dpriats as aKpiftus ? ^ov^.tv6p.fvov n 2 Vat.
Pal. Bekk.: l^ovKeva-o^vov n 1 Sus. KpivovU 5 Bekk., tplvov P 23 : Kptvovv
P 1 Vat. Pal. Sus., mvovv M 8 , KOIVMOVV T (Vet. Int. communicat\
41. y(i>f<r6cu] Vet. Int. fieri, which often stands for yevea-dai (e.g. in
i34ob 25). KaXwj ywevQai Schn. Bekk. 2 Sus. probably rightly:
KaXJjf yiveffdat n Vat. Pal. and probably r (Vet. Int. fieri).
1291 b 1. dpfrrjs TWV TToXtTiKcii ] Richards would add rij? after
dptTTJf. 3. rovs before 7rpo7rd\ffj.ovvTas om. n 3 , but see critical note
on 1291 a I. 6. dpxas om. II 2 (P 2 however has ras TrXetVrar dpxas
over an erasure), but not n 1 or Vat. Pal. 8. ot before arropoi is
omitted in pr. P 1 2 , but it is inserted in both these MSS. in the same
ink as the MS. 12. Kadio-rdo-iP 5 etc. Bekk. Sus., nca&oraow Vat.
Pal., Kadurrda-i P 4 , Ka6i(TTd(rdai M 8 . Vet. Int. has consistant, which
probably represents Kadia-rao-i, for consistere stands for KOTao-Tijo-ai in
is87b ii and for Kadurrdvat in 1321 a 21. I do not think with
1291 a 8 1292 a 22. 91
Sus. that consistant here necessarily represents Ka&Vrao-ftii. 16.
TOVTO na\ r n 2 Bekk. : TOVTO M 9 P 1 : wu TOVTO Sus. Et is absent in
z and in the edition of the Vetus Versio contained in the Works of
Albertus Magnus, ed. Lyons, 1651. 24. nopG^v-rue.ov Camerarius
(Interp. p. 150), Bekk., Sus.: nopd^iKuv n: Vet. Int. Iransveciivum
leaves the reading of r uncertain. All MSS. of Vet. Int. have
transvectivum autem, but whether he found 8e in r is doubtful (see
critical notes on 1308 b 28 and 1318 a 35). 27. M n 2 corn P 1 :
pev r M 9 pr. P 1 (for the f) of w in P 1 is over an erasure). 28.
tTtpov Ar. Bekk. 2 Sus.: irtpov r n Vat. Pal. Bekk. 1 (Vet. Int. alterius).
29. TO. TOVTOIS \fyd[j.fva Kara Tip av-ryv 8ia(f>opdi>^ Vet. Int. his similia
dicta secundum eandem differ enliam, where similia probably repre
sents a gloss Snoia which the translator renders as part of the text.
The same thing happens in 13 i8a 17: see also 1 2 87 a 10. 32. TO
fjirjKfv fia\\ov inrdpxeiv TOVS diropovs ff TOVS tviropovs] Vet. Int. nihil magis
existere egenis vel divitibus (TO fj.rj8ei> /^aXXoi/ vnapxa-v Tols dnopois tj TOIS
(VTropois r ?). As to vndpxfiv see explanatory note. 40. Ppaxfw
&] Vet. Int. et brevibus, but see critical notes on i274b 40 and
i3iia 37.
1202 a 3. TO iraat /neTfti/at] raXXa/zez/ ftvat Vat. Pal., and probably
raXXa pep c tvai pr. P 1 , for TO 7ra<rt is over an erasure and tlvai is
corrected from mu: Vet. Int. has alia quidcm esse, if we follow
b g k 1 m z, or alia quidcm esse eadem, if we follow a c h, so that r
will have had either raXXa p.ev dvai or raXXa p.tv (ivai railra. This
erroneous reading evidently arises from the substitution of words
from 4-5 for the true reading. 4. 8e is added after eWpoi/ in
r P* L 8 Aid. 6. TOVTO] z has hoc, the other MSS. of Vet. Int.
haec. 13. dyadrjv M 3 pr. P 2 3 and probably r (Vet. Int. bonam),
followed by Sus., dyaGfjv P 1 , aya6r) V Vat. Pal.: dyadbv n 3 Bekk. and
corr. 1 P 2 3 (i. e. a correction in these MSS. in the ink of the MS.).
17. Vet. Int. has quare et for &&lt;rre, but see critical note on 1290 b 22.
6 TotoOror Sfjfjios n 2 Vat. Pal. Bekk. : 6 8rjp.os OVTOS n 1 Sus. Compare the
readings in 1332 b 40. 22. (irap ) eWr/joir] (KUTtpois n Vat. Pal.:
Vet. Int. apud utrosque (nap eicaTepois r?). Dap" is added by Viet.
Bekk. Sus., probably rightly, for all MSS. have napa TOIS Tvpdwois or
napa Tvpdwois : the dative without irapd, however, is not perhaps
impossible, cp. 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 28, Qrjftaiois, and Ilepl dvairvo^s 17.
478 b 27 sq. and 18. 479 b 3 sq. (compare with the two latter
passages Plato, Rep. 546 A). It is not certain that Vet. Int. found
nap in r, for he has apud populos tales in 23 for TOIS
92 CRITICAL NOTES.
TOIOVTOIS, where no MS. has Trapa and where it may well be
dispensed with, rots is omitted before rvpdvvois in Q b V b Aid.
Bekk. and pr. P 4 , but see critical note on 1291 a i. 29.
irpoK\r](Tiv II 2 Bekk.: 7rpo<TK\t]<riv Vat. Pal., irpoa-KXrjanv II 1 SuS. (P 1
however has a dot under the first o- of irp6a-K\r](nv to expunge it : see
Sus. 1 ). See explanatory note. 33. a<rra or fKaa-rov Vat. Pal.
35. eV fl ^^(picrfiacri Trdvra StotKeZrat] F P 1 perhaps had ^Tyc^ioyxara ill
place of ^l/r)(f)icrp.acri, for Vet. Int. has zw ^wa sententiae omnia dispen-
sant, and in P 1 the cri of i/^ioy/ao-i is over an erasure.
1292 b 1. p.aKp>v n 1 Vat. Pal. Bekk. Sus. (Vet. Int. immensis) :
p.iKp>v n 2 , but t in P 4 is over an erasure. 5. eio-i i/ n 2 Vat. Pal.
Bekk. Sus.: Is fy n 1 (corrected in the margin of P 1 in the
ink of the MS.). 9. uno^fv M s P 1 Sus.: tma^v n 2 Vat. Pal.
Bekk. The reading of r is of course uncertain. See Bon. Ind.
222 a 1 6 sqq. K b has e Lira^ev in Eth. Nic. i. n. noo bg and
i. 12. noi b 21, but eirropev is probably the correct reading. In
Pol. 2. ii. 1273 b 14 and 3. 16. 1287 a 4 all MSS. have etn-o/xcv.
10. 817] Vet. Int. etiam, as in 1275 b 21, 1277 b 16, and 1304 a 33.
13. Vat. Pal. leaves room for three letters after Kara. 14. edos n 1
Vat. Pal. Sus. (Vet. Int. assue(udinef)i) : r)6os n" Bekk. TroXtrfiW&u
SriiJiOTiKws] All MSS. of Vet. Int. except z have politizet et democratice:
z rightly omits et. Vat. Pal. adds Se after TroXirevea&u. 15. TOVS
^ovs P 2 3 Vat. Pal. Aid. Bekk. : wJpw? P 1 4 Q b V b LS Sus., vd/xoi
M s : Vet. Int. leges may stand for either TOVS v6p.ovs or vopavs.
19. /MtKpa] Vet. Int. paulatim^ which stands for Kara fuKpov in
1278 a 32 and 1307 bi. In 1314 a 16 piicpd is rendered modica.
29. dvaynaLas] Vet. Int. necessariissimas, but he is not always exact in
rendering degrees of comparison. 30-33. I follow Rassow and
Sus. in their reconstitution of the text. n 2 omit 5i6 TTOO-I roi?
KTrjo-apevots effort /xfre^eti/, and II 1 place these Words after co/icoz>, 30,
but Rassow and Sus. are probably right in adding S^o/cpartKov after
e^fivai (I prefer to add rrao-t 8r}fj.oKpaTiKov), and in inserting 8ib . . .
fitrexfiv after b^oKpariKov. It then becomes necessary to add 8
after o-xoXdi>, 33. I prefer this reconstitution of the text to any
other which has been suggested, but it is less doubtful that a lacuna
exists after the second egelvai than that no more has dropped out
than ^rjp.oKpanKoi or irao-i drjuoKpariKov, and it must also be admitted
that it is not easy to see why it is a democratic course to give
access to office to all who possess a certain property-qualification,
seeing that the first form of oligarchy goes as far as that (1293 a
1292 a 29 1293 b 17. 93
14 sq.). Krrja-aufvois in 32 is the reading of all the MSS. which do
not omit 816 . . . /*PT/XI (Vet. Int. has possidentibus, which probably
represents it) : Krcoutvoif Viet. Bekk. 31. M" after TO is omitted in
n 1 , but Bekk. and Sus. retain it. 8e 817] Vet. Int. autem: see
critical note on 1286 a 38. 35. foatpeo-u ] See explanatory note.
36. 8wafj.evovs] 8wap.fvois n 1 L s Aid. corr. P 4 Bekk.: Svi/a^eVow the
rest followed by Sus. 39. otrot av] Vet. Int. quicunque : so we
have quicunque excesserint (without any utique to represent av) for
oirorepoi av vTrfpe xoxn in 1296 a 24 (cp. 29). Sus. 1 adds utique here
without necessity.
1293 a 3. n-poo-o Sow] 7rpoVo8oi> M 9 , Tr/joo-oSoi/ apparently pr. P 1 ,
corrected to rrpoa-oSav in the ink of the MS. *al is added before
fvTroplas in r M s pr. P 1 . 7. ou yap n 2 Bekk. : ov8e yap n 1 Sus. 9.
ovTf n : o8e Bekk. Sus. Stahr retains ovrt (see his note in his edition
of the Politics). See critical note on i257b 12, and compare, in
addition to the passages there referred to, 4 (7). n. 1330 b 15 sq.:
Demosth. De Fals. Leg. cc. 159, 1 60 : see also Kuhner, Ausfiihrl. gr.
Gramm., ed. 2, 536. 2 b, where reference is made, among other
passages, to Lys. Or. 16. pro Mantith. c. 3, oi/x tnnfvov OVT erreS^ow
tirl rcav rpiaKovra, IsaeUS 8. I (OVK. . .ovre], and PlatO, Rep. 398 A. 12.
ru 8f r n Bekk. : raSf 8e Bojesen, Sus. 18. a/zeXoOzrrfs Spengel,
Sus. (Jelf, Gr. Gr. 863, Obs. 9): a^XoC^a? n Bekk. 21. f, ol
n 1 Bekk. Sus.: uw P 23 pr. P 4 etc. TO om. M" P 1 and possibly r
(Vet. Int. quam qui prius). 24. aX\a>v n 2 Bekk. : ?roXXcoi/ n 1 Sus.
25. de om. P 284 etc. 26. T n 2 , T Bekk.: TO n 1 Sus. 28. avrvv
rP 1 , avrwv M 9 P 234 Aid. r P 1 make a similar correction in 1274 a
23, 1302 a 33, 1308 a 10, 1312 b 9, and 1314 b 17, 23, and P 1 in
i293b 7, 1303 b 25, 1305 b 22, and 1315 a 28. See also Susemihl s
apparatus criticus in 1301 b 3 and 1312 b 39. Ini252b 28 r P 1
have #817 rightly, all the other MSS. 17 8,7 or 17 Se. ptv om. r M" pr. P 1 :
it is supplied in P 1 in the ink of the MS. 37. rerrapas n 2 Bekk.
Sus.: Tfrrapa M 8 P 1 : the reading of r is of course uncertain.
1293 b 8. Kal Ka\ovvrai dpicrroKpaTi ai] See explanatory note.
10. ye] yap M 8 , but no weight attaches to the unsupported testi
mony of MS. Vet. Int. has vero, which probably represents Se here,
as it does in i299b 26 and 1323 a 9, though 8e is usually rendered
autem. In 1286 b 22 vero stands for 8e 817 : it frequently stands for
fjLfvroi. 11. av-n} f] noXiTfia] See explanatory note. 17. r
dpfTr]i> Tf n 2 Bekk. : ("is rt dpfrfjv M 8 P 1 Sus. We cannot tell from
Vet. Int. ad virtutem which reading he found in r. See critical note
94 CRITICAL NOTES.
on 1277 b 29. 22. dvop.a&p.ei ys n 1 and corr. P 4 , followed by
Bekk. 2 Sus. : vop.ifrp.fvys P 2 " etc. Bekk. 1 and pr. P 4 . 24. a/m
pydeiaas TL~ Bekk. SUS. : diroftndeio-as IT 1 . 32. (paveparepa II 2 Bekk.
Sus.: (pavepardry IT 1 . See critical notes on 1299 a 27 and 1315 b
II. 39. Kayadovs T IT 2 Bekk. Sus. : Kal dyaBoiis M s P 1 .
1294 a 1. TO evvop.f icrdaL ryv p.y dpujroKparovnevyv] See explanatory
note on 1293 b 42. 7. Kna^y n 2 Bekk. Sus. : Ka\>s n 1 (corrected
in P 1 in the ink of the MS.). 11. o n av Sd^] Vet. Int. quod-
cunque videatur (see critical note on 1287 a 27). 18. As to the
absence of ryv before ru>v *aXv ndyadav see explanatory note on
1 294 a 17. 22. dpxaios TT\OVTOS KO\ apery n 2 Bekk. (except that
P 4 omits Kcii) : apery KOI ir\ovros dpxaios n 1 Sus. There is this to be
said for the order of n 1 that in 1301 b 3 we have evyevels yap elvat
SoKovcriv ois imdpxei Trpoyovcov apery KOI TrXovToy, where apery precedes
n-Xovros : on the other hand, 7rpoy6i>o)i>, which answers to dpxaios, is
placed first, and dpxaios is probably rightly placed by n 2 before the
substantives which it accompanies, for it thus acquires emphasis
(see explanatory note on 1275 a 32). 36. a M s P 1 Sus. and
probably r (Vet. Int. quae) : S>v n 2 Bekk. 37. (xdrepai n 2 Bekk. :
eKdrepoi n 1 Sus. In 34 we have d(f) enarepas, though it is true that
in 1294 b 2 all MSS. have eKarepoi, not fKarepai.
1294 b 2. erepos] Vet. Int. alterum (erepov I 1 ?). 5. rip.yp.aros
MS n 2 Bekk. Sus. : n> W a r P 1 Qb. 8. P 1 Bekk. 1 add ro before
K\ypa>ras, and we cannot be certain that r did not do so too, but in
the absence of evidence as to r it would be rash to follow P 1 .
26. o-uiSyXos n 1 (Vet. Int. disttnclus} : a8y\os n 2 , though this is
corrected in P 234 (in P 2 in the ink of the MS.). 29. rS> r P 1 ,
TW Bekk. Sus. : r&v M 8 n-. 37. eo>6ev is rightly bracketed by
Thurot and Sus. : it may have found its way into this line by
repetition from the preceding one. z has ab extrinsecus for fu6ev
possibly rightly: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. extrinsecus. In 1312 a
40 all MSS. have ab extrinseco for ega>8ev. In i294b 36 et-u>6fv
is rendered ab extra. 38. T&&gt; n 1 , TW Bekk. Sus. : ro n 2 . 39.
TroXewy II 2 Bekk. Sus. : iroXireias IT 1 . See critical note on 1318 a 9.
40. Set KaOicrrdvaL Tro\ireiav] Vet. Int. videtur consistere politia. r no
doubt had Som with M s in place of oe t, but whether it had Ka6rravai
TToXiTeia in place of Kadio-rdvai TroXireiav, which is the reading of all
the extant MSS., may well be doubted. Vet. Int. may have
emended his Greek text to suit the false reading So/m (see vol. ii.
p. Ixiv). It is not, indeed, quite certain that consistere represents
1293 b 22 1295 b 40. 95
here, for it represents Karao-rijo-at in 1287 b n and icadtv-
rdvai in 1321 a 21. See critical note on 1291 b 12.
1295 a 6. davp.(popos M 8 P 1 2 3 Sus. : d<rvp.(f>opov n 3 Bekk. : Vet.
Int. inexpediens leaves the reading of r uncertain. Compare the
various readings in 1301 b 28. 12. fwvdpxovs n 2 Bekk. and also
r, for all MSS. of Vet Int. (including z) have monarchos, though in
the next line Vet. Int. has monarchae. 13. povapxoi M 8 P 1 * Aid.
Bekk. and pr. P 2 3 : poviipxai r corr. P 2 3 Sus. 15. 8ia p.ev TO K.T.X.]
Sus. 1 queries whether propterea quidem quod in Vet. Int. should not
be propter quidem quod, but see critical note on 1328 b 4. 2O.
5 PX (i P 2 4 Qb Aid. Bekk. Sus. and rec. P 3 , 5p X r) Vb and pr. P 3 , d px ^
r MS, dpxn P 1 . 27. T77/] Vet. Int. esse (eivai I 1 ?). 28. f| a r n,
except L 8 and a MS. mentioned by Camerarius (Interp. p. 163),
which have ^. Bekker and Sus. are probably right in reading ^,
for the antecedent appears to be iraidfiav, not dperjji/ and iraiddav.
38. Chandler and Richards would add r6i/ after /SeAnoroi/. n 1 add
8t, and marg. P 4 8\ after Tfjs, possibly repeating it from /ieo-dr^ra
8e in the preceding line.
1295 b 7. \mfpirTu>xov\ Spengel would insert vTrepaiaxpov tj before
vTTfpnTcoxov to make the correspondence exact, but not rightly : see
explanatory note on 1323 b 35. 8. KCU n Bekk. Sus.: Vet. Int.
aut, but he has aut or vel in 1262 a 8, 1298 b 29, and 1317 b 26,
where n have KOI. 12. ert . . . 13. TrdXeo-ii/j See explanatory note.
(pv\apxov<ri P 1 Aid. Bekk. and corrections in P 2 3 * in the ink of the
MSS., <pi\ap X ot<n T MS Qb Vb I> pr. P 2 3 4 Sus. 17. oifi / P 2 *
L s Aid. Bekk. and a correction in P 3 in the ink of the MS., ovSeV
Qb yb pr. P 3 : oi8e n 1 SUS. Is dtdaoxoXctW P 3 4 Aid. Bekk., rols
8i8ao-KaXiois P 2 and the margin of L 8 , Tats Sifiaon<aAiW pr. L 8 : rots
n 1 Sus. See critical note on i259a 13. 20. ovStma
iav dp X T]v Spengel, Sus. 21. KO.\ before 8ov\a>v om. n 1 :
I follow Sus. in bracketing it, though not without hesitation. See
critical note on 1282 a 17. 31. rfjj rovra>i>] Vet. Int. substantiam
horum, but we must not suppose that he found ovvias added in r,
for in I3i7b 23 he translates TO ^ 8ls rbv avrbv 5p X eiv pjfltftiaf non
bis eundem principari nullo principatu, where he adds principatu.
34. & Xo> r P 1 Bekk. Sus. : #Xow M 8 P 2 4 Vb Aid. pr. P 3 . 39.
fvrv X ia (j.tyicrTii\ Vet. Int. eufortunium maximum. Had r fvrvxniM
Eufortunium stands for ev-rvxw 1 i n 1 333^ J 8 and
14, whereas drvxia is always, I think, in the Politics ren
dered by dona fortuna. 40. TOVS om. M 3 P 1 and possibly r.
96 CRITICAL NOTES.
1296 a 8. oruo-m] See explanatory note. 9. TWV TroAmof Ar.
Bekk. 2 Sus. : v TroXtrfiwi/ r n Bekk. 1 28. ras is added before
p.dxas in M s P 1 : we cannot tell from Vet. Int. pugnas whether it
was added in r. 32. eVt n 1 Bekk. Sus. : e<r P 3 n 3 and pr. P 2 ,
where it is corrected in the ink of the MS. 34. 8r)p.oKpaTias, and
35. oXiyapxias] Vet. Int. democraliam and oligarchiam, but he some
times renders the plural by the singular: thus in 1338 b u he has
speciem for ra e tftrj, in 1303 a 14 verecundiam for ras- eptdeias, and in
I3Iob 34 beneficium for tvepyeaias. 35. KaOio-rao-av T P 2 Aid.
rec. P 3 Bekk. Sus., Ka6t<rTa<Tiv P 1 , /ca&crrSa-i P 6 , KadiarcKTiv P 4 Qt> V b L 8
and pr. P 3 , KadicrrSxriv M 8 .
1296 b 4. <pa/xei> P 2 3 etc. Bekk. : fpap.fv n 1 P 4 Sus. 7. a
Spengel Bekk. 2 Sus., SI r n Bekk. 1 10. r6 om. P 1 and possibly
r (Vet. Int. ^zVfl autem ad hypothesim), but cp. 1300 b 17, TO e TTW?
(sc. Xe yw), which Vet. Int. translates quomodo autem. 11. KwAvei]
KwAwm n 3 Bekk. 26. eVaC&i om. M s P 6 L s and pr. P 4 (it is
supplied in the margin of P 4 ). 29. /iio-$apnWcoi<] z has mercedem
agentium, the other MSS. of Vet. Int. mercede agentium : z may be
right, for in 1303 b i mvs ^ia-6o<p6povs is translated merces portantes.
31. \>.a\\ P 4 c LS "O Ar. Bekk. : om. n 1 P 2 3 Qb Vb Aid. Sus.
inserts it in angular brackets. 32. Se om. n 1 Ar. 34-38.
See explanatory note. 36. TOVS om. M s P 1 : we cannot tell from
Vet. Int. leges whether he found it in r or not. 38. Tr\rjdos n
Ar. Bekk. : Vet. Int. multitudine, whence Sus. reads 7rX^, but does
not Vet. Int. take n\rj6os wrongly with inrepreivfi as in the ace., and
translate it as if it were TO TrX^o?? 40. fj.ovip.ov n 2 Bekk. Sus.,
except that P 4 has p.6wp.ov : v6p.tp.ov r M 8 and probably pr. P 1 (cor
rected into p.6vip.ov in text and margin).
1297 a 1. TOVTOVS] TOVTW P 1 , TOV with r superscribed over v M 9 :
Vet. Int. super hoc, which stands for eVt TOVTU> in 1307 b 13. 2.
f3ov\t)(TovTai] z has volent rightly: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have
volunt. rols erepois om. n 1 . 6 b 28. See explanatory note on
1296 b 34. 9. The second V is omitted in M s P 1 and possibly
r, for Vet. Int. in practeraudiendo populum may stand for TW -rrapa-
Kpovfa-dai (jrapaKoveaQai T M 8 ) TOV dfjp-ov, just as in 1309 a 15 in non
faciendo possessiones aeque partiales stands for r<u ray Knja-ei? \u]
TToitlv dvaoda-Tovs. See also critical note on 1253 a 36. 11.
v//eufia>ff] -^fvowv Viet. Bekk. and possibly Ar. 14. re is added
after So-a in M s P 1 and may have been added in r, for Vet. Int.
seldom translates re. 17. yvp.vao-iav n 2 Ar. Bekk. : yvp.vdo-ta P 1
1296 a 8 1298 a 17. 97
Sus., TO yvfj.vaaia M 8 and possibly r (Vet. Int. exercitia). 24.
8 fgforiv is added after d^oypa^a^vois in n 1 and 8e in P 4 : 8 ft-eo-nv
is evidently repeated in n 1 from S e^ort just before, an error into
which these MSS. occasionally fall, as we have already seen.
28. Vet. Int. has neque for ^ before Sucafwo-i. 35. ra om. n s
Bekk., but- see critical note on 1291 a i. 4O. ^ is added
before ^iav in n 1 , but expunged in P 1 by a corrector. 41. av
om. n 1 .
1297 b 1. fiovov P 1 n 2 Bekk. Sus. : povuv r MS. 2. /*oW n 2
Bekk. : /KOI/OW n 1 Sus. 3. opta-a^vovs P J n 2 Bekk. Sus. (see explana
tory note on 1297 b i): wpto-a/iei/ou M 8 : Vet. Int. determinata (in
agreement with honorabilitate), which perhaps represents wptayieVou.
4. iroiov r n Bekk. : TTOO-OI/ Lindau, Sus. 7. eav n 2 Bekk., but
there is an erasure in P 3 between e and a, and the accents and
breathings are corrected (see Sus. 1 ) : 3i> M 8 P 1 Sus. : we cannot tell
from Vet. Int. si what reading he found in r. /xijre n 1 Sus. : w n 2
Bekk. (corrected to fjre in P 4 ), which may be right (see critical
notes on 1257 b 12, 1330 b 16, and 1293 a 9)- H- owflv n 2
Bekk. Sus. : welv r M B pr. P 1 . 18. V] z has z : the other MSS.
of Vet. Int. ex: Sus. 1 in ? 19. 6 Tj-oXf/xoy] Vet. Int. proelium, as
in 1330 a 22. 25. *m is added after & in n 1 , but P 1 omits at, so
that KOI in r M s may be a repetition of at. 27 sq. See explana
tory note. 35. Vet. Int. adds cum dixerimus after his equivalent
for naAu/ Se, but whether these words represent anything in his
Greek text is very doubtful. He may possibly have found a gloss
\favTfs or (InovTfs in the margin of his MS. Xeyo>/*ei> r Aid. Ar.
Bekk. Sus. and pr. P 2 : Xe yo/iej/ M" P 1 3 4 Qb V*> and a correction in
P 2 in the ink of the MS. 41. pev TI Congreve, Sus. (cp. c. 15.
1 300 a 12, eort Se rS>v rpi>v TOVTOOV tv p.ev rives ol Kadicrruvres ras
dpxds K.T.X.) : p.fv n n 1 Aid. Bekk. and a correction in P 2 in the
ink of the MS., /zeV roi P 3 * Qb Vb and pr. P 2 .
1298 a 2. yiyve<T0ai H 2 Bekk. 1 , yiW<9ai Bekk. 2 SUS. : -yei/e o-tfat M?,
and perhaps P 1 (for yiW in P 1 is over an erasure) and r (for Vet.
Int. fieri often stands for yeveardai). 3. TI M 8 P 1 Bekk. Sus., r\ P 4 ,
n r P 2 3 . 6. /cat Trepl a p^ajj/ aJpeVeooy om. n 2 Bekk. (the words are
added in P 4 by a corrector). 7. dno8e86a-dm P 1 n 2 Bekk. Sus. :
diro8ioor6ai M a and possibly r, for Vet. Int. has dare, though this
might also stand for dno^oaQai, for he has determinare for diapiadai
in 1290 b 7. 8. olov n 1 P 2 3 Bekk. Sus. : f, P 4 6 Qb Vb L" and
a MS. known to Camerarius (Interp. p. 167). 17. dieXdi? n 2 ,
VOL. IV. H
98 CRITICAL NOTES.
bie\6jl Bekk. (in P s however e X is written in darker ink over an
erasure) and probably r, for Vet. \ni.pertranseai may well represent
Ste Afy, as in 1300 a 26: ef- Xfy M 8 , 8icfK0Tj P 1 , 8iee \6r) Sus. (ap
parently an amalgamation of the two other readings). 21. ulprj-
a-ofjiivovs is bracketed by Sus. probably rightly. 31. TrpoavaKpivtiv
II 2 Bekk. Sus. (cp. Ad. IIoX. C. 3. 1. 32) : avaKpiveiv M s , avanpivtiv
pr. P 1 (-n-poavaxpivetv marg. P ) : Vet. Int. referre (avatfrfpeiv F ?, for
referuntur stands for dvcxpepovrai ini32ib32: it stands, however,
for fTravdytivin i298b 37).
1298 b 4. 6\iyapxiKr]v F II : o\iyapxiKu>TaTr]v Or oXiyap^tuu 8v-
i>ao-TfVTi)icr)t> Coray, Sus. : oXiyapxiKa>TUT7z> Welldon. 5. All the
MSS. of Vet. Int. except a z, which have quidem wrongly for
quidam, fail to give an equivalent for rives. 6. KOI inrtp P 1 3 n 3 ,
vnep P 2 , Koi oxrvrep M 8 , coanep KCI I T (Vet. Int. sicut et\ K.CLI Viet.
Bekk. 7. [fj KX^pcoToi] I follow Brandis Sus. and Welldon in
bracketing: see explanatory note on lapSb 5. Possibly, how
ever, pr) should be read in place of 17. 8. 17 n 1 Sus. probably
rightly: 77 n 2 : /^eV 17 Bekk. following two MSS. of little authority.
See explanatory note on 1298 b 5. 12. SioiKetrat possibly r (Vet.
Int. disponitur], but Vet. Int. occasionally renders an active by a
passive verb (see vol. ii. p. Ixiii, note 6) : dioixd n Bekk. Sus. Atoi/ceZrai
is probably right, cp. 1298 a 31, and A0. IIoX. c. 27. 1. n, H-po^pe!
TTjV 7rO\tTL(lV SlOlKflv UVTOS. 13. StOplCT/Lldl J TpUITOV F M S and aftCr
fypoKparia pr. P 1 (corrected in the margin in paler ink). TpdTroi/ has
evidently crept in from the preceding line and displaced 8iopio-^6v:
blunders of this kind occasionally occur in n 1 , as has been already
pointed out. 14. re] See explanatory note on i298b 13. n 1
add T) before vvv: see explanatory note oni298bi3. 15. u
TUV v6^v\ z has etiam legum : the other MSS. of Vet. Int. et legum.
16. re aiiro F n (Vet. Int. meliusque ipsum facer e) : Ar. Schn. Bekk.
read TO airo. Sus. brackets re and adds TO before avro. 19.
TOTO 8e] Richards would read TOVTO 817. See explanatory note.
20. jSouXevo-oj/Ttu n 2 Bekk. Sus. : @ov\(vovrai n 1 . 23. to-wr n 2
Bekk. : la-ovs F M 8 pr. P 1 Sus. KUV] Vet. Int. si, but see critical
notes on i282b 8 and i3O9b 9. 27. Trpoo-atpeior&u] See ex
planatory note. 28. *v om. n 2 : see critical note on i275b 7.
29. KCU /o^o^)uXa/caj] Vet. Int. vel legis servatores, but see critical
note on I2g5b 8. [m] rtfpl TOUTCOI/] I follow Coray and Sus. in
bracketing this *cai. 32. fj before Tavra. is omitted in n 1 : these
MSS. omit TI before TGIUTU in 1268 a 6, and they are apt to omit
1298 a 21 1299 a 19. 99
the first rj wnere one ij follows another (see critical note on 1282 a
17). 33. Tr)s o-vpi/SouXTJs] rots <rvp.@ov\ois r (Vet. Int. consiliariis],
rois crv^/SovXj;? L s Aid. 35. TO TrXf^oy is added after Set Troteii/ in
P 2 s , evidently because 8i Troiftp TO TrXf^oy occurs in the next line (see
critical notes on 1290 b 29 and 1309 a 29). ar,o-fyr]<$>i6i>.fvov . . . 36,
irmtiv is omitted in P 4 6 etc. and pr. P 3 Q b : P- has di
fj.fi> yap Set Kvpwv flvai irottiv TO ir\rj6os, and II 1 Bekk. dT
fifv yap Kvpiov Set 7roifli> TO TrXJyfloy. Sus. follows n 1 , and brackets
e<at, placing it between icvptov and Set. In P 2 two alternative
readings, ilvai and Troteti/, seem to have found their way into the text
together. 38. avf^Tpa^v^s] See explanatory note.
1299 a 1. TrXemus r MS Sus. : TrXe/o-Tovs P 1 II 2 Bekk. 2. 817
r P* L 8 Bekk. Sus. and a MS. known to Camerarius (Interp.
p. 169) : 8d MS P 1 2 3 6 etc. 6-to)/K o-0a> r P 4 Ar. Bekk. Sus., Stco P /o-<9ai
P 1 2 3 6 etc. M 9 omits TOVTOI>, 2 ... TroXtret ay, 4. 8. *at Trdrepoi/
eifat Set TCU dpxas om. r M s pr. P 1 (the words are supplied in
P 1 by a corrector in the margin). 9. TrXeomKir] Vet. Int. saepe
(TroXXam r?). 14. TroXtreiai T n Bekk., except a correction
in P 1 probably in the ink of the MS. : TroXn-eiW corr. P 1 Ar.
Sus. probably rightly. 16. ov is added before TracTa? by Rassow
and Sus., but see Bonitz, Ind. 539 a 59, who remarks on the
passage before us, negatio simplex, quae ad universum enunciatum
pertineat, omissa est propter negationes singulorum membrorum,
and compares Hist. An. 2. 12. 503 b 34, xelpay 8 ov8e 7r68as 71730-
(rdiovs e^. Cp. also Pol. 4 (7)- 17- I 33^t) 2O, Toiiy 8e vecaTfpovs OVT
ta/i/Stoi ovTe Kc>)fjico8iat 6taTas vofj.o6fTrjTeov K.T.\. The following sentence
occurs in a letter addressed by the United States Venezuelan
Boundary Commission to Mr. Olney, the Secretary of State The
present Commission neither by the mode of its appointment nor
by the nature of its duties may be said to belong to tribunals of
this character (Times, Jan. 22, 1896). 19. 8e xp?yo! n 2 Bekk. :
8e KOI x/?yt M s P 1 Sus. : KOI xwx r ? (Vet. Int. adhuc et dislri-
butores). irpeo-pevrai T n : Trpeo-^eurar Congreve probably rightly,
if alpovvrai in a passive sense is not to be supplied with eYt
8f xoprjyol Kai KrjpvKfs. Four lines lower We have alpovvrai O-ITO-
ptTpus. In Lex. Rhet. Cant. p. 672. 20 (quoted by Sandys on
A$. IIoX. C. 54- 2 ) we read Apto-TOTfXrjf eV Ty Adrjvaiav TroXtTei a
oiJTtos \eyei hoyicrTai 8f alpovvrai 8fKa, but Sandys Suggests that K\TJ-
povvTm should be read in place of alpovvrm. However, in Menand.
Inc. Fab. Fragm. Hi (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 250) we have TO*
H 2
ioo CRITICAL NOTES.
i/ irpoo-TdTflv aipovp.vov. It is possible therefore that
may be right. See Liddell and Scott s. v. aiptw C. ii. 24. KO.I
r n Sus., om. Viet. Bekk. : but cp. 2. 7. 1266 a 32, ru>v KaGfurT^KVMv
Kal naff as TToXiTfvovrai vvv, 26. aTroSe Sorai II : Vet. Int. dtlribuitur.
See critical note on i275b 16. 27. apxiK^repov IVTIV r n
Bekk. 1 : dp^iKurarov e oriV Bekk. 2 , dp^i/cwraroj (<TTIV Sus. A similar
doubt arises in 1256 b 3, where all the MSS. and r have eVSeeoraroi/,
but Bernays and Susemihl read tVSeeWepoj/ : see also critical notes
on 1293 b 32 and 1315 b 1 1. 29. ov yap ma] Vet. Int. non enim
unquam, which stands for ov yap THB, for nulli enim unquam stands
for ovSfi/i yap TrwTroT-e in 1336 b 29, and nihil unquam tale for oi>SeV
TTW TOIOVTOV in 1269 a 40. 31. al is added after 8 in P 2 3 : om.
M 8 P 1 n 3 Bekk. Sus.: the reading of r is of course uncertain.
33. Vet. Int. does not translate re 8/). 37. ras fi.ev, and 38. ras
8* n Bekk. 1 : TOVS p.ev and TOVS 8 Viet. Bekk. 2 Sus. The reading
of r is uncertain.
1299 b 6. v UVTWK r n Bekk.: avrwv F. Thurot, Sus. 12. 8r
is questioned by Susemihl (see Sus. 3 a and Jahresbericht fur
Altertumswissenschaft, Ixxix. 1894, p. 273, where he commends
Norden s suggestion of eVSe ^erai in place of it), and others. I am
not satisfied with any of the substitutes which have been suggested.
ffvvayoi\ o-vviSoi Bojesen, Sus., probably rightly. 14. up/*orr . . .
8t r n. Sus., following Aretinus translation, interchanges the
position of these two words, but in 18 we have 8e! Biaiptlv, not
appoTTfi Siaipeiv. Camerarius (Interp. p. 171) would read in 13
fls fiiav apxfiv, f) fjif) apfj.oTTft. 8fi 8e Kal TOVTO K.r.X. Ap/xdrret may be
repeated from the preceding line, and may have taken the place of
some other word, such as Sel or XP*I- noiav, and 15, noX\a Thurot
(iLtudes sur Aristote, p. 74), Sus., probably rightly: TTOIO, and 15,
rroXXwi r n Bekk. 22. I bracket KO\ lv /ioj/ap^/g in 1308 b n,
and it might be asked whether KO\ povapxiq- should not be bracketed
here. There is no reference to novap\ia in 24 sqq., but only to
aristocracy, oligarchy, and democracy ; still I think that it would
be hypercritical to bracket Kal povapxia. 24. 8 om. r M 8 L 8 . 068
rM P 4 6 LS Ar.Bekk., oiSe P 1 , oi/c P 2 3 Qi> V^ Aid. fr^w pr. P 1 Sus. :
erfpai the Other MSS. and r Bekk. 27. Kal Kara raiiTas ras ?>ia<pnpas
r<av ap\u>v r M s pr. P 1 , /cat KOT avras ras 8ia(j)opas TWV dpx<oi> n 2 Bekk. 1 ,
Kal KOT avras 8ia<popal TU>V dpx^v Viet. Bekk. 2 , whom I now incline
to follow, though in vol. ii. p. 362 I favoured the reading *cai Kara
ravraj ray diacpopas Siafpopai TMV upx^v. Thurot (Etudes SUr Aristote,
1299 a 24 1300 a 30. 101
p. 75) would read KOT aura? TOT TroXireiar 8ia(popal T>V appeal*, and this
reading also is a possible one. 29. 8ia<f>epov<nv is queried by
Bonitz (Ind. 191 a 60). After 8ta<p<(pouo-i M 9 P 1 add 8ia ravras and
r Sia ravra or 8ta TOVTO, for some MSS. of Vet. Int. have propter
haec and others propter hoc. Is not 8ia ravras an alternative reading
for *cara TOUTUS, 27, which has crept from the margin into the text
of these MSS. ? 33. aff X oX* P 2 3 etc. Bekk. Sus., aV^dX^ P 4 :
oo-^oXov M 8 , aVxoXoi/ P 1 : Vet. Int. non vacant, which probably stands
for ao-^oXoi/ here as elsewhere. 34. 8 fav P 2 3 Q b V b Bekk. and
corr. P 4 : fie av P 1 Aid. and perhaps pr. P* (for 8 tdv is over an
erasure in P 4 ) : 8<? , av Sus. : 8e tnav r M s (Vet. Int. autem cum).
36. avrat ai Ar. Viet. Bekk. Sus., UVTOI al n 2 and a correction in pale
ink in the margin of P 1 : m aural r M 8 pr. P 1 .
130O a 2. fjnadov Spengel, Bekk. 2 : % fuvMt r n Ar. Bekk. 1 : [17]
purdov Sus. Cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 3 1 ) OTTOU [iff p.i(r6ov eimopia tracriv,
and 33, 6 Sfjp.o? eviropcov fjua-dov. 23. rtVrapfs M 8 P 1 Sus. : TfWap<s
n 2 Bekk. : the reading of r is of course uncertain, but the form
Terrapes is the form which is usually found in Aristotle s writings.
M 9 P 1 have Tto-o-apn and n 2 reVrapa in 1315 b 26. 23. v yP
irdvTfs . . . 1300 b 5, apuTTOKpariKov] As to the text of this passage,
see Sus. 12s : Spengel, Aristotelische Studien, 3. 53 sqq. : Thurot,
tudes sur Aristote, p. 75 sqq.: H. Rabe in Jahrbiicher fur class.
Philol. 1894, pp. 450-453. 24. Either we must bracket fj before
e dndvrojv (with Schn., Thurot, Spengel, and Sus.) or we must read
(I in place of it with a corrector in pale ink in the margin of P 1
and with Coray. The former course is probably the better (see
Thurot, Eludes sur Aristote, p. 75). Vet. Int. does not translate
wr in if ava p.epos : he has simply divisim. 26. TTO\IT>V Ar. Lamb.
Bekk. Sus.: TTO\ITIKS>V r n (Vet. Int. civtles). I follow Conring and
Spengel in bracketing KCU after andvTow and inserting fj mivrts
rivtov alpta-fi r) irdvTfs fK rivfav K\T)pa>. 27. fj before ra fitv om. II 2
wrongly, r n Bekk. have TO p,eV . . . ra 8 here and in 29 and 30 :
Spengel, followed by Sus., substitutes ray for ra in all the six places,
but perhaps Rabe is right in thinking this change unnecessary ;
he considers Ta ... TO to be used adverbially as in c. 16. 1300 b
40, 1301 a 4, 7 (5). i. 1302 a 7 sq., 7 (5). 5. 1304 b 22 sqq., and
8 (6). 7. 1321 a 38, and adds, the fact that in 1300 a 33 we have
rar . . . TUS does not make in favour of the change, since T>V dpx&v
is added in that passage/ 30. After *Ajpa> I insert u ra piv
tK TivS>v alpeo-tt ra 8f fXiypw, following Sus., who however has ras ptv
102 CRITICAL NOTES.
and TO.S 8t in place of TO. ^v and T<Z Se. 31. See explanatory
note. 32. irdvras if Bekk. Sus. : iravra r M s pr. P 1 (corrected in
pale ink). 33. I bracket yivta-dai with Thurot, Spengel, and Sus.
It may be an alternative reading for yivovrai, 31, which has found
its way into the text in a wrong place. 35. 8 om. r M s pr. P l
(corrected in pale ink). I bracket fj TIV&V with Spengel. 36.
I add fj K\fipa> fj aipto-fi f) after Tiv>v with Spengel. 37. KOSTIKOV
. . . 40, oXiyapxiKov om. pr. P 1 , but in the margin is added in
pale ink aXXcos TTO\ITIKOV. Kal TO Tivas ex irdvrcov Tas Hfv aipe cret
KadiffTavai TO.S 8f K\r)pu> fj dp.(polv oXryap^tKoV (where Tas fj.fv K\rjpo)
TUS 8 alpto-fi is omitted before oXiyapxtKoV), and also TTJS KaXovp.(vrjs
t(TTi TToXiTetas TO 8e Tivas fK ndvrcov KadicrTavai TOVS ufv atpeVft TOVS
8f K\Tjpa> o\iyap\iKov (where rijs Ka\ovij.fvr]s fcrri TroXtTfi aj takes the
place of KOSTIKOV and, among other variations, the words fj dn<poiv,
ras p.tv K\fipa> ras 8 alpea-ii are omitted). This latter reading is
the one translated by Ar. 38. *! TO ... 130O b 3, a^0oli/]
Spengel reconstructs this passage as follows u TO rivas ft navTcav
ras p.ev aipecrfi KaBia-ravai ras 8e K\rjpco TO 8e TCIS fJ.ev fK irdvTcov TOS
8 fK Tll>(OV TToXlTlKOV dpKTTOKpaTlKOtS (r) K\T]pa> fj alpf(Tfl) fj TCIS fJ.el>
aipffffi Tas 8e K\f]pca TO 8e Tifay fK Tivfav (aipfVei) oKiyap-^KOV , KOI TI>
rivas eK Tiva>v K\r]pu>, Kal TO Tivas fK Tii>a>v dfjifpoiv oXiyapxiKov, oXiyap-
XiK<uTepov df TO aipf<Tfi fj TO a^oiv. Thurot reconstructs it thus
KOI TO Tivas fK TtavTcov TO.S p.fv alpeaei KadicrTavai Tas 8f K\r]pa> 7ro\iTiKov
dpicTTOKpaTtKOis Kal TO f d[j.(f)oiv Tas pen fK irdvTfov Tas 8 fK TIVUIV, Tas p.fv
K\rjpa> Tas 8 aipfo-fi, TroXtrtKOf, 6\iyiipxiKa>Tfpov 8e. TO 8e Tivds fK Tivcav
o\iyapxiKov, *cal TO Tivas fK TIVU>V K\r]pa>, Kal TO Ttvas fK TIVUIV alpecrei, Kal
TO Tivas fK Tivatv d^ifpolv : and Susemihl thus Kal TO Tivas (K irdvTcai
Tas p,fv aipfcrti Kadio~Tuvai TOS 8f K\r]pa) TroXiTiKov dpio~TOKpaTiK(os, Kal TO
(TIVCIS) f dp,(polv, Tas utv eK mivTav Tas 8 fK TIVVV, 6\iyapxiKO)Tfpov (r;
jcXijpw) fj TO.S pfv aipto~fi Tas 8f K\r)p<o TO 8e Tivas fK TIVO>V (alpfO fi) oXiyap-
X<-K<)V Kal TO Tivas tK TLVWV K\r]pcf, fif) yfvouevov 8 6aoi<as, Kal TO Tivas fK
TIVWV ducpolv. I incline to suggest the following text Kal TO Tivas t<
irdvTcnv Tas fJ-fv aipto-fi KadiffTavai TO.S 8f K\r]pa>, 6\iyapxiK<aTfpov 8e, Kal TO
f dfj.(poiv > TO 8e Tas p.fv fK Tfdvruv Tas 8 fK Tivatv TTO\ITIKOV dpio~TOKpaTi-
KOJS fj aipto-fi fj K\rjpa> fj Tas ufv alpfcrfi TOS 8f /cX^pw. TO 8f Tivas fK Tiv<av
(atpeVet) oXiyap^iKoi/, Kal TO Tivas fK Tivcav K\rjptn, Kal TO Tivas fK Tivtav
du<po~iv. E^ du(poiv, 40, means from a combination of some and
all : cp. C. 1 6. 1301 a 8 Sq. With TO 8e TOS p.fv eV irdvrw Tas 8 fK
Tivaiv I supply Tti/as K<i8io-Tiivai from what precedes. I omit fj dptpoli ,
Tas pfv K\r]pu> TOS 8 aipetrfi (39), because I regard these words as
1300 a 31 1300 b 13. 103
a various reading for ras ptv alpecrei KaQia-Tuvai rus 8e K\rjpca which has
been noted in the margin and has crept into the text. I omit
oKiya.pxiK.6v, 40, because it may well be an alternative reading for
oXiyapxtKtoTfpov : r M 8 omit it. In I3OOb 3 I Omit /iij yevop.fvov b
opoias (n 2 ) or pi] ywdfjLevov 8 o/zoiW (M 8 P 1 and possibly r: Vet. Int.
nonfactum autem similiter) for a different reason. I think that this
clause is out of place where it stands, and venture to suggest the
possibility that ^ yivo^evmv 8* 6/aotW should be read, and that these
words should be transposed to after icwf/creis in c. 16. 1300 b 38.
They may have been omitted in i3oob 38 in the archetype and
wrongly inserted in the margin opposite to 1 300 b 3 instead of
i3oob 38. Compare the error by which evdvs is inserted in the
margin of P 4 in 1305 b 41 instead of 1306 a 6 (see critical note on
the latter passage). For P.TJ yivopevaw cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 6 sqq.
39. ras 8<f K\r)pa>] Tf ?; K\r]pa> M> and probably r, for Vet. Int. has
aut sorte. 40. Vet. Int. does not translate Be after oXt-yap^tKw-
repov. 41. TO 8e om. r M s pr. P 1 (the words are added in P 1 in
pale ink).
1300 b 1. TO 8e rii as tK Tivfov oXtyap^tKOj/] Lamb, translates, at
quosdam ex quibusdam electione fieri oligarchiae convenit : thus
he adds alpeaei before oXiyapxixov. In this he is followed by
Conring, Spengel, and Sus., probably rightly. Fieri in Lam-
binus rendering should have been facere or some such word.
4. Vet. Int. has quosdam autem ex simul omnibus non oligarchtcum.
He probably found OUK 6\iyapxu<6v added as a gloss in the margin of
r and translated these words as part of the text, for they appear as
a red-ink gloss in P 2 . TO re Ar. : TO re [fie] Sus., TO re 8e a pale-ink
correction in P 1 , TO T* 8? a MS. known to Camerarius (Interp.
p. 172) : TO fie r Ma Aid. Bekk. and pr. P 1 : ToVe S P 2 3 * Q* Vb IA
In several MSS., it will be seen, the two alternative readings rt and
8e have found their way into the text together. Thurot and
Spengel would read KO\ TO. ndvras alpta-ei. Spengel, Sus., probably
rightly : alpeaei irdvras T n. 8. cai om. r M 9 pr. P 1 (it is added
in P 1 in pale ink). Sus. omits it also : I bracket it, though not
without doubt, for the authority of these MSS. is weak in omis
sions, and especially in omissions of small words. 13. n 2
have Xowroi Se r&&gt;v rpiS>v TO ducaoriKov eiTre 1v : II 1 \OITTOV 8( TUIV rpicav
tlireiv TO 8tKaarriKW TTtpl SiKao-T/jpiW, except that P 1 has SiKna-njpias.
In n 1 two alternative readings have evidently together found
their way into the text. TOVTW, 14, suggests that nt
104 CRITICAL NOTES.
has preceded and should be substituted for TO SIKCUTTIKOV, which
is itself an unusual expression in the sense in which it is used
here. In the recapitulation contained in 8 (6). i. 1316 b 33 we
have Km Kepi btKa<TTT)pl<av. Welldon reads ntpl diKaarrjpiaiv and
brackets TO ducao-TiKov : Sus. 3 takes the reverse course. 17.
M s pr. P 1 have n-epl 8e S>v Be : n 2 Bekk. Sus. ivepl Z>v 8e. Vet. Int. has
de quibtis autcm, which might stand for either nepl av Se or irfpl Be
S)i>. See critical note on 1277 b 29. 27. a/i0io-/3r;TelTai] Vet. Int.
nltercantur : the translator s eye has probably wandered to a^fpiy^rj-
rovfftv, 22. 28. (nxfrfpeTai II 2 Bekk. Sus.: (pfperai II 1 . oioi> . . .
StKao-TTjpio!/ is bracketed by Chandler perhaps rightly (cp. 1322 a 20).
29. iv (ppearToi P 1 n 2 Bekk. Sus.: eV (ppeardi M s : we cannot tell
from Vet. Int. quod in puteum compidit index what reading he found
in r. The reading of M> may be correct: see Sandys critical
note on Ad. IloX. c. 57. 1. 22, eV QpfdTov. 30. Trawl n 2 Bekk.:
trapovTi n 1 Sus. See explanatory note on 1300 b 29. 32. aorovs
n 2 Bekk. Sus.: avrovs r M 9 pr. P 1 , for O-T is over an erasure in P 1 .
38. After Kivfia-eis should possibly be inserted ^ yivo/j.evcov 8 6[j.oiu>s
from i30ob 3 (see critical note on 1300 a 38-b 3). Translate,
and similarly if they are not instituted at all. For ojimW cp.
C. 13. 1297 b 31, KOI Ttav a\\av 6/uouoy. For the contrast of yevtaOai
and /caXcos yeveadai cp. c. 4. 1291 a 41. S ] 8f] T (Vet. Int. Hague].
41. K\rjpa> r n Bekk. 1 : K^pcarovs Lamb. Bekk.- Sus.
1301 a 3. See explanatory note. 6. See explanatory note
on 1301 a 5. 8. auToO om. n 1 . 12. Sus. appears to be right
in thinking that rj, the reading of r n, must either be bracketed or
replaced by KOI.
BOOK VII (V).
1301 a 22. els froias n 2 Bekk. Sus.: e<p oiroias M s P 1 and possibly
r, for Vet. Int. has ad guales, and he often renders eVt by ad (e. g.
in 1280 b 27, 1287 a 41, and 1304 a 2), while qualis is his ordinary
equivalent for onoios. 23. ?Vi 8e . . . 24, e/aio-TT?] See explanatory
note on 1301 a 22. 27. TO ducoiov K<U TO KCIT dvaXoyiav lo-ov] See
explanatory note on 1301 a 26. TOUTOU 8 &iiapTav6vTa>v\ Most MSS.
of Vet. Int. have ad hoc autem peccanh bus, but a z have ab in place
of ad and are probably right: cp. 6 (4). 8. 1293 b 25, where
rrjs opdoTdrrjs TroXiTet as is rendered sunt vitiatae a rectis-
1300 b 171301 b 33. 105
sima politia. 30. 6Yt . . . elvai om. P 2 3 V b Aid., or/ ... vonifrvo-iv
om. P* 6 L 9 An, efmt . . . tlvai om. pr. Q b . 31. ev n n 2 Bekk.
Sus. : en M 8 , e followed by a space sufficient for one letter and then
rt pr. P 1 (corrected into fv n. in paie ink) : Vet. Int. in quocunque,
which is his equivalent for OTIOVV in 29; perhaps his eye wandered
from fK TOV dvio-ovs fv n Svras, 31, to the similar phrase TOV to-ovs
OTIOVV ovras, 2 9, unless indeed Busse (De praesidiis Aristotelis
Politica emendandi, p. 15) is right in regarding OTIOVV, 31, as a con
jecture of Vet. Int. 36. T M 8 add at iroXiTeiat before iraa-ai and
M 9 omits rt, but at TToXtretat is a gloss which has crept into the
text ; at Ti-oXtTftai 817X01/07-1 appears as a red-ink gloss in P 2 . 38.
ffv om. P 3 n 3 and pr. P 2 (where it is supplied in darker ink than
that of the MS.): it is placed after ocdVepoi in M 8 P 1 , but Vet.
Int. has quam forte habent utrique, so that it probably stood before
fKOTfpoi in I\ Tvyxdvovo-iv II 1 Bekk. SuS., Tvyxdvcoo-iv P 3 II 3 pr. P 2
(corrected in darker ink than that of the MS.). 39. o-rao-ta^bvo-ti/]
After this word I propose to insert c. 3. 1303 b 3, o-rao-id&vo-i 8e . . .
7, ovres, as to which see explanatory note on 1303^ 3.
13O1 b 3. r P 1 * and perhaps P 3 (Sus. 1 ) have the correct reading
avrovs, while M 8 P 2 Aid. have avTovs. See critical note on 1293 a 28.
6. dt^wy II 1 Bekk. Sus. : StKai wy I! 2 . 8. /ierao-rijcrcoo-ti l KaracrDjcrcocrii is
the reading of two MSS. of little weight (R b V b ) and, Sus. 2 thinks,
perhaps of r. Vet. Int. has ex instituta aliam constituant, and
constitute undoubtedly often represents Kadia-rdvai, whereas peQia-ravai.
is usually rendered by transferre : still constituit stands for Trepte o-rjjo-e
in 1304 a 33, and it is possible that constituant may stand for
HfTao-TTjo-axnv here. 10. ou P 1 n 2 Bekk. Sus. : ov8e r M 8 . 17. ;
tva] Vet. Int. ut aut (iva tj r ?). 26. rjv om. n 1 , but see explanatory
note on 1301 b 25. iravraxov n 1 P 2 Bekk. Sus.: 7rdVri> P 34 V b Aid.
and pr, Q b according to Sus. 1 2 : Sus. 3 probably errs in ascribing the
reading navruv to n 2 , for St. Hilaire (Politique d Aristote, ed. 1837,
vol. ii. p. 344) finds Traira^oG in P 2 . 27. ov /J.TJV M s n 2 Bekk., ou
fif/v 8e P 1 : Vet. Int. non solum, which probably stands for ov prjv, for,
though he usually renders ov ^v non tamen, a frequent equivalent
for ou firjv dXXa is non solum sed. I add after ov pfjv : see as to the
whole passage explanatory note on 1301 b 26. 28. oWos n 2
Bekk. 1 (corrected into avicrov in P 2 3 ) : avio-ov n 1 Bekk. 2 Sus. Com
pare the various readings in 1295 a 6. 32. tcroo r M 9 pr. P 1 ,
lo-w Sus.: *<TOV n 2 Bekk. 33. Xdya 8e TO M corr. P 1 Bekk. 2 Sus.
and possibly r (Vet. Int. ratione autem quatuor) : \6ya> 8e P 2 Bekk. 1
106 CRITICAL NOTES.
and corr. P 3 : X(ya> 8e R b Ar. Aid. pr. P 3 , X<fy<u Se ra perhaps pr. P 1 :
Kar a^lav 8t X/yo> Ivov vnepexfiv ra P 4 6 L s and a MS. known to
Camerarius (Interp. p. 177). rolv Svoiv M 9 P 1 3 cbrr. P 2 Bekk. Sus. :
rwv 8vo P 4 6 L S pr. P 2 (corrected in the ink of the MS.): the reading
of r is uncertain. 35. TU>V 8voiv pr. P 1 (corrected into rolv 8vo!v
by Demetrius Chalcondylas, the writer of the MS., perhaps rightly),
TUV 8vu M B , ra>i> Svtlv P 2 3 : the reading of r is uncertain. In c. 3.
1302 b 37 M s P 1 Sus. have 8volv (nnBa^mv (the reading of r is of
course uncertain). In c. 10. 1310 b 5 all MSS. have bvoiv (or Svdv)
KOKWV. In Hippocr. ap. Plut. Non posse suaviter vivi secundum
Epicurum, c. 17 sub fin., we have dvolv novav. rjnia-rj n, though Vet.
Int. has dimidium (ijnicrv r ?). The earlier Attic form is i^uVea, and
this is the form which is used in Attic inscriptions of the fourth
century B.C., though I^/LUOT; appears in an inscription of B.C. 180 or
thereabouts (Meisterhans, Grammatik der att. Inschr., ed. 2, p, 118).
However, q/u o-q occurs in several passages of Demosthenes Cod. 2
and in Hyperid. c. Demosth. col. 10. 28 (Kiihner, Ausfiihrl. Gramm.
der gr. Sprache, ed. Blass, i. 443). The only instance of r^la-co. in
Aristotle s writings given in the Index Aristotelicus is Phys. 8. 8.
263 b 8, to which 263 a 30 should be added. Immediately above
in 263 a 23, 26, 28 we have ij/u o-jj. TO dnXus] Vet. Int. does not
translate TO.
1302 a 2. eu Tj-opoi MS P 1 2 4 etc. Sus. and pr. P 3 : 7ropo t r Bekk.
Evnopoi is probably right, though Aristotle speaks otherwise in 3. 8.
1 280 a 4 sq. TroXXoi is added before noX\axov in P 4 6 L 9 Aid. Bekk.,
but TroXXol and TroXXa^oO are probably two alternative readings which
in these MSS. have together found their way into the text. 1O.
fyyiyvovrai II 2 Harl.: tyyivovrai M s P 1 Bekk. Sus. 14. e yyvTe pco]
Vet. Int. propinquior (eyyvrepa r ?). For the confusion of a and
compare i3O5b 10. The second 17 is omitted by P 4 6 L 8 V b Bojesen
Sus. probably rightly. 15. roiovrcav om. P 1 4 L 8 . 18. eri r n 2
Bekk. : r<m M 8 P 1 . 8t, P 2 3 4 V b Aid. Bekk. : 8 n 1 R b Ar. : 7 a^ Sus.
31. TTfpl S>v 8e n 2 Bekk. : rrepl 8e a>i/ M s P 1 Sus. : Vet. Int. de quibus
autem leaves the reading of r uncertain. See critical notes on
i277b 29 and i3oob 17. 33. avruv r P 1 Bekk. Sus.: the rest
avra>v. See critical note on 1293 a 28.
1302 b 4. 3ta fjuKpoT^ra n 2 Bekk. Sus. : 8ia o-^iKpoV^ra M s P : the
reading of r is of course uncertain. The forms papas, p.iKp6rrjs are
far more common in Aristotle s writings than a-fjuicpos, a-p.iKporr]s. Still
in 4 (7). 4. 1326 b i all MSS. but M 8 have 8ia o-fjmcpoTrjTa. 6. s
1301 b 35 1303 a 36. 107
II 1 Bekk. Sus. : -noa n 2 (noaa R b ). 28. TTJS dramas KOI dvapxias]
Vet. Int. eos qui sine ordine et sine principatu (T&V draKTccv KOI dvdpxcav
r?). But see critical note on 1326 big. 29. olov xal iv e^ots]
z has velut et in thebis, the other MSS. velut in thebis. 30.
rro\iT(vop.fi>a>v II 2 Bekk. and a correction in pale ink in P 1 : jioXtrtvo-
/ieWs M 8 P 1 Sus. and probably r (though Vet. Int. politizantibus may
represent either of the two readings). 36. 17 om. n 2 Bekk. before
0-vfj.fj.cTpia : whether r added it, is of course uncertain. It dropped
out easily after p.tvrj, just as in 1305 b 24 >J drops out after SITT?; in
P 2 s Rb V*>. 37. 17 om. n 1 . duol* amfaiuuv P 2 3 4 etc. Bekk. :
8volv o~in0ap.S>v M s P 1 Sus. The reading of r is uncertain (Vet. Int.
duorum palmoruni). See critical note on 1301 b 35. 38. ^ra-
0dXXot r M s n 3 Bekk. Sus. : /^tra/SaXX?? with ot written above the
last letter P 1 : p.fra$d\oi P 2 3 . 39. TO is added before iroabv by
only one MS. and that of little importance. Its absence is amply
justified by the passages collected by Vahlen on Poet. 4. 1449 a i.
1303 a 2. rats om. M 8 P 1 : the reading of r is of course un
certain. 5. piKpbv] Vet. Int. paulo, which usually represents
HiKpa. He has paulo posterius a Medicis for p.i<pbv vtrrtpov TO>I/
MrjdiKwv : a is perhaps repeated from a before lapygis. 11. yap
n 2 Bekk. : yap 8r) M 8 P 1 Sus. and possibly r, for Vet. Int. has enim,
and this represents yap 8f] in i284b 29 and 1328 a 5. 13. See
explanatory note. 14. ras eptdelas] Vet. Int. verecundiam, but see
critical note on 1296 a 34-35. 22. yivopfvi) P 1 n 2 Bekk. Sus.:
yfvopfinj M 9 : Vet. Int. facia leaves the reading of r uncertain.
24. (an- ) ovdfvbs vpx"> ** s f yyvs ov] dir om. r n (Vet. Int. nullius] :
it is added by Schn., Bekk. 2 , Sus., and probably they are right.
In place of tyyvs w all MSS. have cyyiov, except possibly r,
which may have had fyyvs bv, for Vet. Int. has tanquam pro-
pinquum sit, and in 5 (8). 4. i338b 13 Vet. Int. has tanquam
hoc ad fortitudinem maxime sit conferens for &s TOVTO irpbs dvdpiav
/LtdXto-ra avpfpfpov. However in 2. 2. i26ia 15 he renders <or
npia-Tov bv tanquam optimum ens : therefore it is not certain that he
found o>s tyyvs bv in r. Propinquum might stand for eyyiov (see
critical note on 1271 b 6 and compare the renderings of Vet. Int.
in 1283 a 35 and 1287 b 9, to mention no others), and the auxiliary
verb is often added without support from MSS. (vol. ii. p. Ixii,
note 2). 28. difo-rcuriaauv H l P 2 3 Sus., 8 tarao-iavav V b : e crra-
viavav P 6 L 9 Aid. Bekk., earaortWaj P 4 . 35. ZayKXaloi] rryXntoi II 1 ,
aK X aioi P 4 . 36. /cat is added before avroi in P 4 V b L a Aid. Bekk.
io8 CRITICAL NOTES.
aTToXXawdrai M s , aTroXXeoi/eiarai P 2 3 R b V^ Aid., an-oX-
P 4 . 38. avpaKova-ioi H Bekk. Sus. : see critical note on
i286b 40.
1303 b 3. dnoiKovs r n Bekk. (Vet. Int. expulsos) : firoixovs
Spengel, Sus., possibly rightly (cp. 1306 a 3, where all MSS. have
firoiKovs : Coray, however, would read UTTOIKOVS there as well as here).
In 1319 a 36, where n have drroiidas (Vet. Int. habitacula), Coray,
followed by Sus., Would read eiroiidas. aracridfrva-i. 8e . . . >j } oi/Tfs]
See critical note on 1301 a 39. 9. Xurpw] See explanatory
note. 11. TOV Ufipata] Vet. Int. Sllburbium. 12, at 8iaj3dcreis TK>V
o^eraw] Vet. Int. penetrationcs aperturarum (is oxeruv connected by
Vet. Int. with oTyeii-?). 31. ra R b and probably r (Vet. Int. ea
quae in aliis partibus) : rds M s P 1 2 s * etc. 33. /HjSuca M s P 1 *
etc. : fypoTiKd P 2 3 etc. : piSucd probably r, for Vet. Int. has midica
(z nudica). 34. rwr TrarpoW] II 2 Trarpcoaw (rwi/ add. Viet. Bekk.) :
n 1 Trarptoaj (Vet. Int. de patcrna hereditate), Sus. -rrarpaias. 35.
dartpov is added after dnofaivovTos in P 4 6 U b L s Aid. Bekk. See
critical notes on 1255 b 12, 1304 a 15, 1309 b 2, and 1313 b 32.
1304 a 3. 6vovros\ Qvovres P 1 : Vet. Int. sacrificatorem, which
may perhaps represent dvovra. See critical note on 1289 b i.
4. Mirv\r)VT)i>] [ivri\T)VT]v pi. P 3 . See critical note on 1285 a 35.
f f-rriKXrjpav] Vet. Int. ex hereditatibus. See critical note on i274b
25. 8. 6 TcepiaiaQeis P 1 2 s Bekk. Sus.: 6 ntpio)6e\s R b : 6 irepica-
pta-dfls M 8 P 4 etc. and probably r (Vet. Int. coartatus]. 9.
8fai>8 P os n 1 P 2 Sus. : 86av&pos P 3 n 3 Bekk. 11. /awwreai; n 2 Bekk. :
fjLvaa-iav ti 1 Sus. The Phocian whom Aristotle mentions here is
probably the same man as the Mnaseas of Diod. 16. 38. For the
forms Mnaseas, Mnasias, and Mnesias see Pape-Benseler, Worter-
buch der gr. Eigennamen. Both Mnaseas and Mnasias seem to
have been forms used in Phocis. Mraawi/os] ^i/jjo-eoi/os P 1 n 2 Bekk. :
nvfja-wpos r M 8 : the translation of Vet. Int., however, in the form
in which it appears in the works of Thomas Aquinas and Albertus
Magnus has Mnasonis (Sus.), and Sch afer (Demosthenes, i. 445.
3), whom Susemihl follows, adopts the reading Mi/ao-oovoy. 15.
Qvyartpa is added after ns in P 4 6 L 8 U b Aid. Bekk. See critical
note on i303b 35. 17. 7roXtr as] n-oX followed by a lacuna pr.
M 8 , TrdXfcos P 1 , which shows that the archetype of these two MSS.
contained ambiguous contractions. 18. *al is added before *
in n 1 Sus. : om. n 2 Bekk. 29. /xere /3aXej>] Vet. Int. transmutatio
facia est, but he will have found /ier<f/3aXfi/ in r : cp. 1305 a 8, where
1303 a 38 1305 b 4. 109
is rendered fiebat transmutatio, 1316 a 18, where /xtra-
/3aXX is rendered fit transmutatio, and 1309 a 5, where ro> /^Sdi/
KepSaiveiv is rendered <?<? ^#<?</ nullum sit lucrum. 33. ets eavrw
TrepteWrio-e] Vet. Int. /# j<? ipso constituit. 8fi T n (Vet. Int. etiam,
which stands for 817 in 12755 21, 12775 16, and 12925 10).
1304 b 1. 77] v n 1 Bekk. Sus. : fj n 2 . fujSiv r, fu Kp 6v n 1 Sus. :
HiKpbv r) prjdev II 2 Bekk. For fJUKpov Trap-nav cp. 1270 a 17, 1294 b 4.
6. atYtat n 1 Bekk. Sus.: at n 2 . n 2 should probably have had i
amai in place of amat, the reading of n 1 , but omitted am at after at.
It is doubtful whether the right reading is amat or at atY/at, for
while in 1302 a 18 we have ray dpxas KOI ras ahias avTiov, in 1302 a 34
we have at 8 am at Kat px a T>I> Kivfjaretav. 12. oiov errt TUIV Tfrpa-
Koo-ttoi/ TOV STJ/JLOV ^irar^ow] Vet. Int. velut in trecentis qui populum
deceperunt, whence it would seem that ot was added in r before TOV
STJP.OV. TfTpaKoa-ttov n 2 Bekk. Sus.: rpiaicoaitov n 1 . In 1305 b 27 n 1
have rpiaKocriois in place of TfrpaKoa-iois wrongly. The two words
are often confused in the MSS. See critical note on 1286 a 13.
23. avTovs is not translated by Vet. Int. TOVS t x&Wouy] Vet. Int.
separatissimos. 25. OUTW n 2 , OVTCOS Bekk. : om. n 1 . 27.
mo-tiofpopdv] p.HT0o(popav M s and probably r, for Vet. Int. has tractare
stipendia. 28. re yap om. n 1 P* 6 L 9 , yap om. pr. P 2 (it is supplied
by a correction in pale ink, and in the margin is added in the same
pale ink ev oXXo) fjuardofpopav ot 8r)fj.aya>yo\ KU\ e^ff). Sus. brackets Tf
yap. SO. SIKUS] Vet. Int. iniurias, probably an error for vindictas.
34. Karf\66vT(s] Vet. Int. supervenientes (tneXdovres r ?, for eirepxeo-Oai
is rendered supervenire in 1289 b 24 and 1310 a 39). 35. f) eV
Mtydpois] Vet. Int. does not render TJ, but neither does he render 17
in 1313 a 24, 17 TTfpt MoXorrovy. See critical note on 1306 a 30.
36. <#/3aXXoi/ MS n 3 (except Aid.) Bekk. Sus. : e//3aXoi/ P 1 2 s Aid. :
Vet. Int. etecerunt, which probably represents e^e/SaXoi/.
1305 a 3. ore r n 2 Bekk. Sus. (Vet. Int. quandoque) : rare P 1 ,
TOT* M s . 13. 8Tjp.ay<ayova-i p,fv] Vet. Int. fiunt demagogi. 24.
<rrao-tao-as] Vet. Int. seditionem movit, but see critical note on 1286 b
10. 32. KOI rS>v vofttov] z has etiam legum; the other MSS. of
Vet. Int. wrongly legum. TOV 77] t) om. n 1 : see critical note on
i282a 17.
1305 b 4. (v Mao-croXt a] M 9 has the form Mao-aXta here and
M 8 P 1 in 1321 a 30 (where see critical note), but Head (Hist. Num.
p. 7) does not mention the occurrence of this form on the coins,
some of which have the inscription MA22A. In both passages
no CRITICAL NOTES.
z has massalia, though most MSS. of Vet. Int. have masalia in the
passage before us and some of them in 1321 a 30. 6. /*eT?Aa#oi>
n- Bekk. Sus. : /zer<f/3aAoi> pr. P 1 (corrected in pale ink), neTe/3aXXoi>
M 8 V b , (jL(Te@a\oi> or peTefiaXXov T (Vet. Int. donee transmutarent}.
8. 01 vfu>Tepoi\ z has iuniores, the usual equivalent; the other MSS.
of Vet. Int. less well minores, though it is possible that, as 6 j/ewrepos
occurs in the next line and is rendered tumor, Vet. Int. may have
preferred, as he sometimes does, to render it otherwise in 8.
10. fi>6a\ Vet. Int. in cho (b g h k 1 m) or in tho (a c s : z has
inthd). He probably misread fv6a as eV 6S> : see critical note on
1 302 a 14. 17 is omitted, in P 4 L 8 V*> Aid. Bekk. 2 , but as to the
omission of the article in these MSS. see critical notes on 1291 a
i, b 3, and 1292 a 22. 11. aTrereXeun/o-ei ] Vet. Int. remissa fuit.
16. eTri\ad6fj.evo^ Vet. Int. insurgent. His translation of eViXn^jSo-
vnvrai TOIV o<p6a\nS>v in Rhet. 3. 1 6. I4i7b 6 (deprehendnntur in
oculis] is equally wide of the mark, but insurgere is a frequent
equivalent for ennidevQai in Vet. Int., and it is possible that r had
eni6efj.(vos in 1 6 as well as in 17. 17. tmQf^evni] Vet. Int.
invalescens should probably be invadens (for invadere represents
eniTiOeo-Oai in i272b 16, 1327 a 23, 1330 b 27, and 1331 a 17).
20. errtpeXonevav II, except M 8 Aid., which have e m/ueXov/^eWi . The
form used elsewhere in the Politics is eVtfteXeto-^at, and in 1339 a
38 n have fmfj.e\ovfj.(vcav. The word does not occur again in the
present Book. The form eVt/ieAfZcr&u is always used in the A#. noX.,
except in one passage (c. 50. 1. 10), where the papyrus has fnipe-
Xocrai. In Attic inscriptions between B.C. 380 and 30 n^eXfio-&u
is found far more often than empt \ea-dai (Meisterhans, Gramm. d.
att. Inschr., ed. 2, p. 139). 24. 17 om. P 23 R b V b . See critical
note on 1302 b 36. ryyiyi/erai P 234 : fyyiverai M S P J etc. 25. irdvv]
Vet. Int. omm no, which represents a variety of words, among them
n-apTrav, but may possibly stand for irdw here, though ndvv is
rendered valde in I3i8b 2. 26. IO-^UO-OT/] Vet. Int. habuerunt
should probably be valuerunt, as Sus. 1 suggests. In 1292 a 22
icrxvovcriv is rendered valent. 27. TerpaKoa-iois n 2 Bekk. Sus. :
rpiaicoaiois n 1 . See critical notes on 1304 b 12 and 1286 a 13.
34. eWi n 2 , eVm Aid., <mv Bekk. 1 , f<rriv Bekk. 2 : eZ<ri MS, etVt P 1
Sus. (Vet. Int. sunt or sint after praetoria leaves the reading in r
uncertain).
1306 a 3. firoiKovs r U : see critical note on i3O3b 3. rovs if
Bekk. : TU>V M 8 P 1 Sus. : Vet. Int. advenas Chalcideorum leaves the
1305 b 6 1306 a 39. in
reading of r uncertain. 6. n 1 add fWvs after ptv ovv, probably
rightly, for n 2 sometimes omit single words, e.g. in 1288 b 16, 27,
1259 a 37, and 1276 a 33. In the margin of P* ev&vs is added not
here, but after *at in 1305 b 41, probably, as Sus. suggests, by an
oversight. See critical note on 1300 a 38. eVixftpovo-i] z has
conaniur; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. conatur wrongly. 8. *Xe-
Vet. Int. f tires, but see critical note on i28pb i. 13.
/] Vet. Int. tnducunt, which might represent fl(rdya>viv.
is rendered efficere orfacere elsewhere in the Politics and
mostly in the Rhetoric, but it is rendered insinuare in Rhet. 3. 14.
I4i5b 2, and inducunt may possibly stand for fp-noiSxriv here. 21.
tv p.(v TroXejuo)] See explanatory note. 22. rygnpfaiHm ] Vet. Int.
manus iniecerint probably stands for (yxtipitroxriv and not eyxfip^croxriv,
the reading of M s , for tyxeiptlv is always rendered conari or invadere.
In 2 7 f yxeiplovo-i is rendered muniunt or minuunt (so z) : should
manuunt be read, or mandantl In I3i4a 24 eVt^eipei rois ddwdrois
is rendered manum mitlit ad impossibilia. 24. avTols] z has zpsis
(aurols r); the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have amplius wrongly.
30. AAfvaSiv] aXwcSwi r M 8 pr. P 1 (corrected in P 1 in the ink of
the MS.). T&V TTfpl 2t/iof] Vet. Int. circa Samum : thus he does
not translate T>V, but whether (as Sus. 3 a thinks) T&V was omitted in
r is doubtful (see critical notes on 1304 b 35 and 1313 a 24).
21/jiov Schlosser (Aristoteles Politik, 2. 188, note 84): o-a/ioi/ r n.
Corruptelam primus suspicatus est Camerarius (Sus. 3 ) : see
Camerarius, Interp. p. 201. 31. fraipt&v P 1 Aid. Bekk. Sus.:
tTaipdtov the rest. In 1272 b 34 all MSS. have eraipiwv, but in
J 3 5 b 32 pr. MS P 1S have eVatpeiwi/, and in 1313 a 41 pr. P 3 has
(raipfiav. In Ad. iToX. the form ermpet a is always used. 36. Se is
added after Atayopas in n 2 except in P 4 , which omits it in a lacuna :
it is bracketed in Bekk. 12 . 37. KOI eV] Should 17 be added
between KOI and iv (cp. I3o6b 5)? 38. o-Tao-ia>ca>s n 2 Bekk.:
(TTaviaariKuts M 8 P 1 : Vet. Int. sedilionaliter leaves the reading of r
uncertain. 39. EipunWor P 5 R b and a MS. known to Came
rarius (Interp. p. 202), Viet. Bekk.: eupn-iWo? P 24 V b and probably
pr. P 3 (for P 3 has fvairiuwos with evat over an erasure), euf/mWos r,
fvfTLwvos M 8 P 1 . Perhaps the name of Eurytion is the more likely
to be right. Eurytion was one of the Argonauts (Diet, of Greek
and Roman Biography s. v. : Pape-Benseler, Worterbuch der gr.
Eigennamen, s. vv. EvpimW and Evpvros), and, it was claimed that
the Argonauts on their way to Colchis landed on the coast where
H2 CRITICAL NOTES.
Heracleia was afterwards founded (Preller, Gr. Mythol. 2. 332).
The tomb of the prophet Idmon, an Argonaut, was to be seen in
the marketplace of Heracleia (Preller, p. 333, note).
1306 b 2. avrovs] See explanatory note on 1306 b i. 4.
Tiv&v is left untranslated by Vet. Int. 8. SXXas n 2 Ar. Bekk. :
om. n 1 . Sus. brackets it. 9 sqq. See explanatory note. 18.
at is added before oXryapxuu in M 9 P 1 Sus.: om. n 2 Bekk.: the
reading of r is of course uncertain. 20. fw6p.u>v\ v6p.cov r M 8
(Vet. Int. ex legibus democraticis et oligarchicis in eas quae dominae).
ras P 2 3 R b Aid. pr. P 1 Bekk. Sus. : roiis M s P 4 etc. and probably r,
rour a correction in P 1 in pale ink. 28. Congreve s conjecture
of n for TO deserves to be mentioned, though I do not adopt
it. See explanatory note. 35. Ayjjo-iXdov Schn. Cor. Bekk. 2
Sus. : dy^o-iXuco r n Bekk. 1 , for Vet. Int. sub Agesilao stands for
(ir AyrjanXdat (see critical note on 1289 b 39 and cp. 1271 a 39).
38. KOI TOVTO n Bekk. Sus.: Vet. Int. hoc et (TOVTO KOI r?). /zeo-o-?;-
i/iaKoi P 2 s etc. Bekk. : jueo-^iaKoi n 1 P 4 V b Sus. 3 n Sus. 3 have ^eo-^iot
in 1269 b 4 and M 8 P 1 2 3 4 Sus. 3 uta-rjviovs in 1270 a 3. Thus in
the Politics the MSS. are divided. But in Rhet. 2. 23. 1397 an
and 3. 17. 1418 b n the best MSS. have nco-o-Tji/iaKw and /ieo-o-^waKij,
and in Rhet. i. 13. 1373 b 18 all the MSS. have neo-o-TjvtaicS). On
coins we find the form Meo-oWcov, and the form with one sigma is
of rare occurrence in inscriptions (see for an instance of it Ditten-
berger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 181, where both forms occur). 39.
8fj\ov Se [*ai TOVTO] K.r.X.] I bracket Kal TOVTO, suspecting (as I see
since writing this note that Mr. A. W. Verrall in Class. Rev. 10. 273,
note, also does) that it has found its way into the text by repetition
from the preceding line. This error is of frequent occurrence in
n 1 , but it probably now and then affects all the MSS.
1307 a 5. awav n Bekk. The MSS. of Vet. Int. have various cor
ruptions of the word all beginning with h, whence Sus. reads 9 Avvw.
But Herodotus (7. 165), Polybius, Plutarch (Timol. c. 19), Diodorus,
and Justin all give the name without the aspirate. 22. av%uv6vTuv\
z has augmentantibus, which is perhaps the reading of a : the other
MSS. have angcntibus. In 1303 a 12 avavoneva>v is rendered aug-
mentatis. 31. f ovvavro n 2 Bekk. : rjowavro M 8 P 1 Sus. (r uncertain).
See critical note on 1253 b 33. Schneider, followed by Sus.,
believes, probably rightly, that a lacuna exists before 6 8e c%os.
It is difficult to say what has dropped out : possibly (o-Taaiafrv or
some such word or words. 32. T&V typovuv om. n 1 . 33. T^S
1306 b 2 1307 b 34. 113
rjv xo>pav M 8 P 2 V b . 38. 6e\ov<nv M 8 P 1 Sus. and possibly
T : dfXaxri n 2 , efkaxnv Bekk.
1307 b 1. All the MSS. of Vet. Int. add quod after aristocratiae.
This is probably repeated by anticipation from eo quod solvantur or
quod quidem dictum est in the following line. In much the same
way in 1308 a 38 Vet. Int. has honor abilitatis for VO^KT^OTOS, re
peating it from honor abilitatis communis immediately after. 12.
XfipOTovrjcrovTa II 2 Bekk. SllS. : xfipOTOVTjcravTas P 1 , \eipoTnvyTav with T
superscribed over a M 8 (= probably x fl P OTOV W avTn } Vet. Int. ordi-
nantem (z ordinantes), which may stand either for x el P OTOV W avra or
for x fl P OTOV h (TOVTa i f r l&tyas is rendered aspiciens in 1289 b 6 and
oKovo-opfvovs audientes in 1298 a 19. 18. neTefiaXev r P 1 corr. M 8
etc. Bekk. Sus. (for Vet. Int. transmutatus est stands for fji(Tfj3a\(v, as
transmutata fuit does in 1301 b 21, 1303 b 21, 1304 b 26, and
1 305 b 1 2) : fj.fTf^a\\fv P 4 pr. M 8 : /ier<f/3oAXoi> P 2 3 etc. 3O. V pfv
ovv rats eu Kdcpanevais TroAtretatrJ z has : # fo# temperatis quidem
igitur politiis ; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. wrongly add autem after
&?. 31. Trapafo/iwcrt] z has praevaricentur rightly ; a praevari-
cetur, and the other MSS. privarentur. 32. napadvop.^ . . . 34,
8e om. n 2 Ar. pr. P 5 (no doubt owing to the recurrence of \av8dvti
in 34), so that we are dependent for these words on r M 6 P 1 . M 8
P 1 , followed by Gottling, have \av6avfi yap 7rapa8vofj.evr) f] Trapavofjiia,
S>crirfp ras ovcrias TO piKpov 8aTrdvr]p.a dvaipfl TroXXaKij yivopfvov (i of
ywofifvov in P 1 over an erasure). Aai/0am 5e (yap P 1 Gottl. in place
of Se), and this reading I have adopted. Vet. Int. has latet enim
subintrans praevaricatio, sicut substantias parvae expensae consumunt
saepe factae. latet autem, so that he may have found in his Greek
text at fiiKpai Sandvai dvaipoixri 7roXX<mj yivofifvai, but I do not think
this very likely, for he renders ftaTrdvr) (sing.) by expensae (plur.) in
1 330 a 13 and 1321 a 40. Praevaricatio stands for Trapavopia, for
praevaricentur represents irapavo^ai. in 31. That Victorius con
jecture of fVeto-Svovo-a for napa^vofievrj (in which Bekker follows him)
and of TrapdficKris or 7rap//3a<7is for napavo/jiia is wrong (he probably
obtained his version of the passage by retranslation from Vet. Int.)
is evident from Plato, Rep. 424 D (quoted in explanatory note
on 1307 b 30), from which passage the sentence is repeated, a
fact which seems hitherto to have escaped notice. [Since the
foregoing note was written, Sus. 3 a has called attention to this and
adopted the reading of M 8 P 1 .] 34. 17 8airdvr) P 1 n 2 (bracketed
by Sus.): 17 dndrrj M s and probably r, for Vet. Int. has seduciio and
VOL. IV. I
ii4 CRITICAL NOTES.
seductis stands for iairaTT)0evrmi in Rhet. I. 15. I376b 23: 17
ftao-is Viet. Bekk. 36. 6 om. M s P 1 (it is supplied in P 1 in the
ink of the MS.) and probably r (Vet. Int. sicut sophistica oratio).
1308 a 3. en n 1 Bekk. Sus. : eort n 2 . 10. avrovs r and, as it
would seem, P 1 (see critical note on 1293 a 28): avrovs M s n 2 .
17. tyyiyvovrai] Vet. Int. fiunt, as in 1288 a 13, 1302 a 10, 13, and
1304 b 26. 33. irapti\r)(pevai~\ Vet. Int. comprehendantur, but he
often renders the active by the passive. 35. 8ia ra Ti/i^ara] Sia
TtfjLrjfjLara P 4 : 8ta rj/xjj/zaroy r M 9 V b (Vet. Int. per honorabititateni).
39. KOIVOV r II Bekk. : Kaivov Coray, Sus. 40. Kara TOVTOV TOV
Xpwov is placed in n 2 before fv 00-019, 39, and Bekker places these
words there between brackets : n 1 Sus. rightly place them after
fvuwrov. Bekk. 1 had already remarked in his note on 1308 a 39
that the Vet. Int. did so.
1308 b 6. See explanatory note. 10- ev is added before 0X1-
yap\ia in n 1 Sus. 11. Kal (v povapxiq is added in n 1 , but crossed
through with red ink in P 1 : om. n 2 Bekk. 2 : KOI povapxiq Viet.
Casaubon Bekk. 1 , but Casaubon and Bekk. 1 bracket the words,
and KOI lv novapxiq is bracketed by Sus. I bracket KOI eV p.ovapxiq,
though not without hesitation, for in 1301 b 13 we have a refer
ence to povapxia. See also critical note on 1299 b 22. 13.
Taxi* /ie-yoXay n Bekk. Sus. : Vet. Int. breviter magnos (so z with
all MSS. of Vet. Int. except a, which has breviter et magnos): did
he find 3pa^v in place of ra^u in r? 14. iravros] z has omnis
rightly; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. (except a recent hand in b and
m) have omnes. 15. \ir\ roi y Bekk. Sus. : ^TOI y P 4 Aid., \ir\ rot
y P 6 L 8 : M n y P 2 3 etc. : wr r M 8 , ^ T P 1 . In c. 1 1. 1315 a 10
all MSS. have ^ rot. TO ye rjdos Qpaavv. In 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 1 6 P 4 L 8
Aid. have M rot ye, and all the other MSS. M n -ye. In Metaph.
Z. 10. 1035 a 29 we have ^ oXwr ?} OVTOI OVTU> ye. See Eucken, De
Partic. Usu, p. 70, and cp. Xen. Cyrop. 2. 3. 24. 16. KO\ om.
n 2 (it is supplied in P 4 by a corrector). 17. oZr<as aytiv n 2 Bekk.,
but in P 2 is added in the ink of the MS. eV aXXw ov pv6p.i(iv and
in the margin in pale ink ovrta pvyni&iv : O\>TU> pvdnifciv M 8 P 1 : Vet.
Int. has sic ordinare, which may stand here for ovra> pvOfufav, but
ordinare in Vet. Int. commonly stands for rarrfiv. 22. M 8 P 1
omit the second rfjv : the reading of r is of course uncertain. But
these MSS. have little authority in questions as to the omission of
small words. 25. TOVTOV n 2 Bekk. Sus. : TOVTO n 1 . 26. TO om.
M 8 P 1 : the reading of r is uncertain, for Vet. Int. firmare might
1307 b 36 1309 b 25. 115
stand either for fyxdf>ieiv or for TO ryxfipi&iv (cp. 1314 a 10, where
uti stands for TO xpw^ al , a "d 1315 a 8, where nullum unum facer e
magnum stands for TO pr)8fva TTOK IV eva peyav). 28. n 1 may pos
sibly be right in omitting the first *m (see critical notes on 1254 b
14 and 1260 a 26), but no great weight attaches to the omission of
*m by these MSS. Vet. Int. adds aufem after his equivalent for
rovs dnopovs, but see critical note on 1318 a 35. 34. oAtyapxoeaij
n Bekk. Sus. : Vet. Int. in oligarchiis. 37. Vet. Int. does not
translate 5 .
1309 a 5. ftovXfaovrai] z has vohnt; the other MSS. of Vet. Int.
volunt or valent. 10. G /iei> ovv p.r) (cXeVTeo-^at] Vet. Int. et ut non
furenlur. Had r /ou ToC fir/ A7TTf o-$at ? M 8 OmitS ovv. 12. Xfyovs
r P 4 Aid. Ar. and a correction in pale ink in P 1 (Vet. Int. contu-
bernia): \6yovs M 8 P 2 3 etc. and pr. P 1 . Ti&V&ao-ai/] Vet. Int.
reponantur, which stands for nStadcoo-av here as reposito does for
rfdfvros in 1259 a 23. 15. TO> r M 9 Lamb. Cor. Sus., TOV P 1 :
om. n 2 Bekk. In 1319 b 7 n 1 omit T. 29. n 1 add ravrrjs after
T?)S TroXtTf las , probably owing to the occurrence of TTJS TroXn-e/a? ravms
(or TaOra) a line below. Sus. 3 a brackets TOVT^S. See critical notes
on 1290 b 29 and 1298 b 35. 31. ravras n 2 (except P 2 , which
omits Tavras Se Tots rijs Tro\iTfias) Bekk. Sus. : Tavra II 1 . 35.
fivvafiiv fji(yi(TTr]v ra>v epyav rf)s u^^s] Vet. Int. potentiam maximorum
operum principatus, but maximorum is probably a clerical error for
maximam, 4O. a1priv corr. P* Sus. and other editors : biaipevtv
all other MSS. and Bekker. Atpeo-w is probably right : cp.
1309 b 2 sq.
1309 b 2. W (rrparrjyiKos 8e is added in P 4 6 L s after <t Aor, but
see critical notes on 1255 b 12, 1303 b 35, and 1304 a 15. 7.
ravavriii P 1 II 2 Bekk. : rovvavriov F M 8 Sus. 9. Kav fivvafMis VTrapxy
KOI TTJS nohiTfias 0iAi a Stahr, Sus., while Eucken would place Trjr
iro\iT(ias after <pi\ia. All the MSS. and Vet. Int. place rrjs iro\irflas
before *tal. They are probably wrong, as n 1 are probably wrong
in 1312 a 27, where n 1 read Si ty imfHumH yivovrai rols aAXots
KOL yvtopifj.01 in place of oV fjv ovopacrTdi. yiyvovrai Km yvatpipoi rois
aXXotf, which is the reading of n 2 . Vet. Int. has si for K&V,
but he probably found K&V in r (see critical notes on i282b 8
and 1298 b 23). 10. u TO n 1 Bekk. Sus. : KOTO P " etc. and
pr. P 4 : TO corr. P 4 . For a similar error see 1319 b 24. 14.
fviovs n 1 Bekk. Sus. : eViW n 2 . 19. vvv P 1 n 2 Bekk. Sus. : 817 r
M 8 . 25. ov ^rjv dXXa] Vet. Int. non /amen, which stands for oi
I 2
n6 CRITICAL NOTES.
wv in 1275 b 6 and 1289 b 6 and for ov pfvroi in 1306 b 25, but
may possibly stand for ov ^v dXXa here, for in 1312 a 30 sed tamen
stands for ov ^v dXXa. Should sed tamen be read here in place of
non tamen ? 27. aTrojSaXei II 1 Bekk. Sus., aVo/SaXf i Aid. : oVo/SaXr/
P :i and pr. P 2 : a7ro/3dXXet Ar. and a correction in P 2 in the ink of
the MS., anopdXXr) P 4 V b L s , VTrep/SaXe? R b . 28. iroifaei ] TTO^O-T) M 3
pr. P 2 (corrected in P 2 in the ink of the MS.), TJ-OIJ? with <r super
scribed over 77 P 3 : woi^o-fi the rest and r. 30. ray aXXa?
TroXtreiar] See explanatory note. 37. Trota n 1 Rb Aid. Bekk.
Sus. : TTOUU P 2 3 4 Q b V b . 38. pev yap II 2 Bekk. (yap /xej> yap
corr. P 4 ) : yap n 1 . Sus. brackets p.tv.
1310 a 18. f artp H 2 Bekk. Sus. : rjntp H 1 . 19. Wi fie TO Treirai-
8(V<T0<U TTpbs TTJV TToXlTfiaV OV TOVTO, TO TTOlflV OiS \alpOV<Tlv] "V Ct. Int. S(
autem erudiri ad faciendum non hoc quibus gaudent (so z with the
other MSS., except that the symbol in z may stand for either hoc or
haec). The words should probably run est autem erudiri ad
politiam non hoc,facere quibus gaudent. 21. ^ M s n 2 Bekk.: *cal
r P 1 Sus. 22. Vet. Int. democratizare stands for br)fj,oicpaTfi<r6ai
as in 1 290 a 36 (cp. 1292 a 8). 33. fls 6 xpfifa v \ f is XP*l ftv
P 4 6 L 8 . Vet. Int. ad quod abundat. Perhaps he misread xPtifav as
xopvywv (cp. 1325 b 38, where abundantia stands for xwy*"*)-
39. *ai om. n 1 .
1310 b 5. Suou/j Svelv P 2 pr. P 3 . z (with b alone) has duobus
rightly ; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. duabus. 9. T^V eVi rov d^opj
See explanatory note. 1O. om. n 1 . 15. S^a-ywy
ywyou P 2 s . 17. TWJ/ rvpavviBcov P 2 3 4 etc. Bekk. Sus. : at
n 1 . 21. raj drjpiovpyias KO\ ras dtapias] Vet. Int. conditores populi
et prospector es. See critical notes on 1326 b 19 and 1302 b 28.
24. TouTotj n 2 Bekk. 1 Sus. and corr. P 1 : TOTO ds r M 8 pr. P 1 : Bekk. 2
omits TOUTOIS. 29. KityeXos] KityeXXo? P 1 4 . So in 1315 b 24 M 8
and perhaps r have KitytXXor and in 1315 b 27 P 1 V b and perhaps r,
and in I3i5b 23 P 4 has Kv^eXXtSwi/. In 1313 b 22 all MSS. have
KvfyeXibcov or <v<Jst\!.8(0v, and we find Kv\f/e\id(av in A$. noX. c. 17.
1. 14. In Plut. De Pyth. Orac. c. 13 the form Kv^eXXot occurs. In
Hist. An. 9. 30. 6i8a 31 there is a various reading KV^\\OVS for
Kv^ftXovs ( swifts ), and in 34 a various reading *m/ eXXicrii> for Kv-^f-
\iaiv. 33. yevovs II 2 Bekk. Sus. : yevos U\ 37. KoSpos] KeSpos
P 2 3 V b and perhaps r. 4O. MoXoTTwr] z has molottorum ; all the
other MSS. of Vet. Int. have some corruption or other. 5e] Vet. Int.
mini, but whether r had yap is doubtful.
1309b 271311 b 8. 117
1311 a 6. xPW nra n Bekk.: Vet. Int. pecuniarum (xprj^drmv r?).
#a<rXiKa] z has regales (agreeing with supergressiones) ; the other
MSS. of Vet. Int. regalis. 10. TO TO Ar. corn P 5 Bekk. Sus. :
TO r MS n 2 pr. P 5 : TW P 1 . 11. rpv^v n 1 Bekk. Sus. : rpo^v n 2 .
13. KOKOVV rov o^Xof] Vet. Int. suspectam habere turbam ; suspectam
is probably corrupt, for KUKOXJ-IS is rendered anocietas in Rhet. 2. 7-
1385 a 24 and afflictio in Rhet. 2.8. I386a8 (KOKOVV does not occur
again in the Politics or at all, it would seem, in the Rhetoric).
Should subiectam be read in place of suspectam ? 15. KOI is added
after 8e in r M 9 ; two MSS. of Vet. Int., however (a z), omit el.
21. eWiKJ Vet. Int./wz /. See critical note on 1316 b 10. 22.
xaBcnrep ovv cr^eSop eXt^drj, ras auras K.T.X.] S^eSoV is often used with
("iprjrm and similar words to soften the statement that such and
such a topic has been dealt with (Bon. Ind. s.v. o-xeSoV), but there
seems to be less reason for its use here in the simple repetition of
an assertion, and in 1310 a 40 (the passage referred to) we have
O Xfo bv 8e TrapaTrXijo-ta rdis flprj/jifvois irepl ras TroXweias 1 e orJ KOI ra
irvpftaivovTa TTfpl ras /SacriXeias KOI ras rvpavi>i8as, SO that Spengel may
well be right ill reading Kadairep ovv e X/^^, o-^efioi/ ras arras K.T.X.
28. ravrd T M 9 Bekk. Sus., Tawa P 1 : TOVTO H 2 . 30. fJiovdpxois II 2
Bekk.: povdpxais M 8 P 1 Sus.: Vet. Int. monarchis leaves the reading
of r uncertain. 36. Sia . . . 39. AppoStov is cited, as Sus. points
out, in Schol. Aristoph. Acharn. 980, but the passage occurs only in
the Aldine edition. Dindorf s note is Omittunt Ravennas et
Suidas. Videntur eiusdem esse auctoris qui Aristotelis locum
inseruit scholio v. 92. See critical note on 1287 b 31. 37.
Vet. Int. renders 8 by et, as in 1291 b 40 and 1312 a 1 8. Apfwdiov j
appoftiu M 9 and possibly r (Vet. Int. illusisse Harmodio). 38.
z has aristogiton ; of the other MSS. of Vet. Int. a has aristogitaton
and the rest aristoginton.
1311 b 5. 8ia yap TO rfjv jwaiKa irapf\to-6ai rbv vibv avrov] Vet. Int.
quia enim mulier recusavit filium ipsius, where TrapeXea&u has
probably been misread or misunderstood by the translator. 7.
alaxyvai Sus. : alvxvvai M s P 1 and probably r (Vet. Int. verecundiam
fecerunt . alo-x^vto-Bat is rendered verecundari in i324b 34 and
1313 a 31): al<rxvvfo-8ai. n 2 Bekk., accepting which reading Viet.,
followed by Bpnitz (Ind. 22 a 30), would insert vnb before TWI/
fu>vdpx(ov. 8. fj.wdpx<i>v n Bekk. : novapx&v r Sus. (Vet. Int.
monarcharum}. xparaiov n 2 Bekk. Sus.: KpaTatoC M s P 1 : VeL Int.
Crataei, which leaves the reading of r uncertain : Kparewv Scaliger,
n8 CRITICAL NOTES.
comparing Ael. Var. Hist. 8. 9. 10. f) n 2 Sus. : 17 M> P 1 and
probably r, for Vet. Int. gives no equivalent for it, and he often
gives no equivalent for the article : om. Viet. Giph. Bekk. 12.
Should TOV be added before irpbs ? 13. eXi/iW n 1 Bekk. Sus. :
e\tpfias n 2 Ar., but a mark resembling a colon (:) is placed in P 4 over
X (see Sus. 1 ). The letters p. and /3 are interchanged in some words,
e.g. in Sep/ivXtJys, which appears also in Attic inscriptions as 2ep/3iA}?
(Meisterhans, Gramm. der att. Inschr., ed. 2, pp. 59-60). But e Xt/Sei uy
is probably merely the mistake of a copyist for eXiptias, the letters p.
and /3 having been for a considerable period very similar in form in
minuscule writing. 14. vlel n 2 Bekk.: via M s P 1 Sus.: the read
ing of r is of course uncertain. In 1304 a 8 and 1313 a 32 all
MSS. have vtiaiv, in i277a 18 ol vlfls, in i293a 29 rovs vids, but
on the other hand all have vioi in 1261 b 39 and vlovs in 1270 b
4. The Index Aristotelicus records no instance of the occurrence
of the forms v mls and vitos in Aristotle s writings : viou occurs in
Eth. Nic. 7. 7. 1149 b ii. In the A0. lloX. the forms vitls (nom.
and ace.), view are exclusively found. As to the use of these
various forms see Meisterhans, Gramm. der att. Inschr., ed. 2,
p. 113, who remarks that after B.C. 350 the forms of the word used
in Attic inscriptions are generally those of the second declension,
and Kiihner, Ausfiihrl. gr. Gramm., ed. Blass, i. 506 sqq. TJKHTTO]
Vet. Int. nihil. 20. ndppw n 2 Bekk. and a correction in P 1 in
the ink of the MS.: irvppuv r M" pr. P 1 (Vet. Int. pirron or pyrron:
z has pirron) : nu&oi/ Fabius Benevolentius ap. Viet, ad locum,
followed by Sus. The murderer of Cotys is usually called TUvdw :
thus the best MS. of Diogenes Laertius, the Burbonicus, has UvQw
(so Prof. Bywater informs me) in 3. 46, and Demosthenes has
Uv6o)i> in c. Aristocr. cc. 119, 127, 163, and so has Plutarch in Adv.
Colot. c. 32, De se ipsum citra invidiam laudando, c. n, Reip.
Gerend. Praec. c. 20, and elsewhere. In Diog. Laert. 9. 65, indeed,
it is implied that Diocles called the murderer of Cotys Uvppa>v, but
the passage is thought by Casaubon and Menage to be a gloss on
eV TO Ylvdcavt, a dozen lines above which has crept from the margin
into the text and has been severed in the process from the words
on which it was a comment. There is much, therefore, to be said
for the reading nvdwv in the passage before us. I hesitate, how
ever, to depart from the reading of the MSS., as Aristotle may
have written Udppw or nvppuv, though he may have been in error
in doing so. Zeller (Plato, Eng. Tr., p. 30, note 64) apparently
1311 b 10 1312 a 16. 119
accepts the reading ndppw, for he distinguishes between Parrhon
and Pytho. 25. KOI T>V irtpl ras px<w] Vet. Int. et ea quae circa
principatus. He takes rS>v to be neuter and appears to make T>V
iTfpl ras dpxas K.T.\. dependent on dtffpfcipav and iv*xtiffffow. 27.
TTft>8a\iftas r n Bekk., except that pr. M 8 has invdaXridas and R b
rrfVTa\i8as : Iifv6i\i8as Schn. Sus. Almost all MSS. have irevdihov
or irfvdlXov in 29. We find the form TievdiXos in Strabo, p. 582,
and Paus. 3. 2. I. irepuovras P 1 4 R b Ar. Bekk. Sus.: ntpiovras
MB P 2 3 V b Aid. and probably r (Vet. Int. circumstantes\ he renders
irepiovo- ia in 1329 b 28 by circumstantid). 29. 2/iepSts Camotius
(editor of the Aldina minor in 1552), Sylburg, Bekk. Sus. etc.:
o-fj.(por)s r n Ar. See explanatory note. 30. Kal rfjs ApxtXdou o
eVi&Vfioy] Vet. Int. does not translate Se, but this he fails to do in
some other passages in which /cm ... fie occurs (i252a 13, I3i3b
32 sq.). 35. Totavras II 1 Bekk. Sus. : roiavrrjs II 2 . 37. KOI
Trepl TO? TToXiret ar om. r M s pr. P 1 (the words are added in the
margin of P 1 in pale ink). 40. vvyyvvvta-Qai. n 2 Bekk. Sus.:
o-vyyvaxrOai M s and probably F (Vet. Int. tttdulgeri), o-vyyvaxrQai. pr. P 1
(corrected in pale ink).
1312 a 1. SapSaj/oTraXXoi/ Bekk. 2 Sus. : o-apSai/aTraXoi/ T H Bekk. 1 .
gaivovra] Vet. Int. percutientem se. 2. a\r)6r)\ Vet. Int. vere (akr\6^y
r ?). 4. TOVTO r P 1 Sus., TotJro with T superscribed over the second
T M s (two alternative readings being thus offered, i. TOVTO, 2. TOUT
or TOVTO TO, it is uncertain which) : TO P 2R R b V b : om. P 4 Aid. Bekk.
6. nfdvovra] After this word I propose to insert 17, ^dXtora fie ...
20, fnidfo-tis. See explanatory notes on 1312 a 6, 17. 7. Sia yap
TO irio~Tfvto-6m. KaTa(ppovovo-iv u>s XjjcrovTfyJ Vet. Int. propter confidere
enim contemnunt tanquam oblituri. niorevecr&u is elsewhere in the
Politics rendered credi or credibilis fieri. Confidere stands for
irappT)o-idf <r6ai in I3i3b 15, 1 6, and the translator may have misread
irio-Tfvto-6ai as Trappr)o-id(co-6ai. Perhaps latituri should be read in
place of oblituri. 1O. *a! om. n 1 (z omits et with most of the
MSS. of Vet. Int., unlike a). 11. novdpxots n Bekk. Sus.: the
reading of r is uncertain. The first family of MSS. usually has
the form povapxrjs (vol. ii. p. liii). 12. Ao-Twryet] do-rvdyrj L s Aid.
( Aorvayfl Bekk.) : d<7Tjdyet P 4 . See Kiihner, Ausfiihrl. gr. Gramm.,
ed. Blass, i. 513, Anm. 2, and Pape-Benseler, Worterbuch d. gr.
Eigennamen, s. v. Ao-Tudy^f. 14. 6pa n 2 (Qpa Bekk. 2 Sus. 3 ) :
6pa M 8 P 1 (6pa Bekk. 1 Sus. 3a ). 16. z has ariobar sa e (perhaps
=.ariobarsaneni); most of the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have ario-
120 CRITICAL NOTES.
bar sane or ariobar sane. 18. napa rols novdpxois] Vet. Int. a
monarchis. povapxois n Bekk. Sus.: the reading of r is uncertain.
19. 0pd<Tos n Bekk. (6 in P 1 over an erasure) : ddpo-os Giph.
(p. 678) Sus. probably rightly: Vet. Int. audacia, which may
represent either Gpavos or ddpo-os, for it represents dpaa-vrrjs in
I269b 35 and Qdpvos in 1258 an. 26. Sxnrep KO.V\ Vet. Int. ac
si utique: so in 1278 a 37 ebtm is rendered ac si. 28. yiyvovrai\
Vet. Int. fierent is probably a clerical error caused by fierel in the
preceding line. See however critical note on I3i3a 14. 29.
povdpxois P 1 I! 2 Bekk. : fj.ovdpxis r M. s Sus. 30. ot> ^v aXXa]
Vet. Int. sed /amen: see critical note on 1309 b 25. 31. oi om.
M 9 P 1 and perhaps also r. 32. w om. r M 8 pr. P 1 (it is added
in P 1 in paler ink) possibly rightly, but these MSS. are prone to
omit, and especially to omit small words. 34. eyyeveo-dai TroXXoZ?
n 2 Bekk. Sus. : ytveo-Oai iroXXols M 8 P 1 : Vet. Int. adesse multis, which
probably stands for eyyeveadat TroXXoiy, though adesse is not the usual
equivalent for eyyevfo-dcu. 36. OTTOU] OTTOI Thompson Sus., but
Xenophon sometimes wrote OTTOV where he should have written
emu (Rutherford, New Phrynichus, p. 115: see Liddell and Scott
on OTTOV and ou), and it is possible that Aristotle wrote oirov here.
37. airs* r (Vet. Int. sibt) : avr> n Bekk. 38. rov fiiov is added
after rfXturijo-m in P 1 and marg. P 4 : for similar explanatory additions
in MSS. of the first family see critical note on 1255 b 12.
1312 b 4. al om. M s P 1 Sus. and perhaps r. 5. Ktpapfvs
Kfpu/i D 1 Sus. probably rightly (see explanatory note on 1311 a
17 and Hesiod, Op. et Dies, 25): Kepafj.fi Kepapevs n 2 Bekk. 9.
tva] z has aliquando with all the MSS. of Vet. Int. except a,
which has alii, probably a mis writing of the contraction for
aliquando. Did Vet. Int. find eViore in r? More probably he
substitutes aliquando for uno for the sake of clearness, orav oi
peTe xovres oTatrtafcoo-ti ] Vet. Int. quando qui participant seditiones
fecerunt. Fecerunt should probably be fecerint. 10. Sxrirep 17
ran/ Trept TeXcoi/a] Vet. Int. sicut qui circa Gelonem. Sus. 1 rightly
suggests that quae eorum has dropped out before qui. 13.
fyxn] z nas participaretur wrongly with all the other MSS. of
\ et. Int. in place of principetur or principaretur. o-v<rrT]<rdvTu>v
pi 3 4 Rb yb Aid. Sus.: cnHrrdirw r M P 2 Bekk. (Vet. Int. has
congregatis and renders awTavres in 15 by congregati). 14.
Should T) be added before TV pawls? 15. avruv] Sus. (M er> )
si omnino correctione opus est. 20. c 8e TOV KOTO-
1312a 18 1313b 13. 121
Vet. Int. ex contemptu autem. 23. dn-oXXiWi n 3 Bekk.
pr. P 2 (corrected in the ink of the MS.) and corrections in P 1 in
pale ink and in the margin of P 3 : dno\\vov<ri M 8 pr. P 1 3 Sus. See
explanatory note on 13245 20.
1313 a 9. &i> n 2 Bekk.: eai/ M 8 P 1 Sus.: the reading of r is
of course uncertain. 11. npos rats tlpruuvms^ z has cum his quae
dictae sun/; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have cum his quae dicta
sun/. 14. tylvfTo] Vet. Int. fieret. See critical note on 1312 a
28. 18. Brj\ov r n : it is bracketed by Schneider, Coray, and
Bekk. 2 (see also Bon. Ind. 173 b 38 sqq.), but Vahlen, whom Sus.
follows, is probably right in suggesting that 8fj\ov on should be
read (Beitrage zu Aristoteles Poetik, 4. 432 sq.). 2O. av om. n 1 .
24. 17 ntp\ MoAoTToiir] Vet. Int. does not translate 17, but see critical
notes on 1304 b 35 and 1306 a 30. 32. Trape Xo/Sep] z has
acceperat, a acciperat; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. accepit. 33.
" ou fij/ra " <pdvat] Vet. Int. non oportet haec dicer e, but it is more
likely that he misread his Greek text than that he found ov 8fl
ravTd (pdvai in it. 38. ru>v is added after T/)? in P 4 6 V b Aid.
Bekk.: om. M 3 P 1 2 Sus. (the reading of r is of course uncertain) :
in pr. P 3 TOW takes the place of rrjs, but is altered into rrjs by
a corrector in the ink of the MS. 39. rd re r n 2 Bekk. Sus.:
TO. M 8 P 1 . Bekk. 1 conjectures olovrcu for olov re, and is followed by
Sus., but Bekk. 2 has olov re. olovrai seems to me to give a wrong
sense; it implies that the advocates of this mode of preserving
tyrannies are mistaken in thinking that it is preservative of them,
whereas Aristotle admits that it is so (1314 a 12 sq., 29 sqq.), but
says that it is wicked (i3i4a 13 sq.). 41. a-va-aina] Vet. Int.
communicationes : elsewhere in the Politics ava-a-iTia is always ren
dered convivia. Should concenationes (or convivattones) be read ?
Convtvare stands for crva-a-ire iv in 1317 b 38. Communicationes
usually stands for Kotvwias.
1313 b 2. Qpovrjud re P 1 B Rb Ar. Bekk. Sus. and a MS. used by
Victorius, and also the edition of the Vetus Interpres translation
contained in Albertus Magnus Works : (ppovfj^ard re r M 8 P 2 s * Q l>
Vi> Aid. (see Sus. 1 ). 7. <n om. r MS pr. P 1 (it is supplied in P 1
in the ink of the MS.). 8. $powu] Vet. Int. deprehendere. Sus. 1
suggests that he may have found <pcapdv in r, but perhaps he misread
(ppovdv as <pa>pav. Qcapdv, however, is rendered by depraedare in
1303 a 34 and I3o6b 30. 13. avpaicov<ras P 1 n 2 Bekk. Sus.:
wppaKovcriuvs M 8 {Syracusanos Vet. Int.). TOVS wraKovora?
122 CRITICAL NOTES.
II 2 Bekk.: rovs uTaKovcrrds, ots e^fTrffirrev H 1 SllS.: ovs draKovoTay tf-
irfp,7rci> Coray. But if with n 2 we omit ovs, the structure of the
sentence introduced by ofoi , 12, will resemble that of not a few
other passages (see explanatory note). 14. 6 is added before
lfpa>v in M 8 P 1 Sus.: whether r added it is uncertain. 15. Vet.
Int. has confident for nappr^a-td^ovTai, which is the reading of n
Bekk, Sus., and latebunt for \av6dvov<ru> (n Bekk. Sus.), but he some
times renders the present by the future: thus in 1281 a 19 he has
corrumpet for (j)6fipei and in i287a 31 interimet for Suxpdeipti.
19. M }] See explanatory note on 1313 b 18. 20. npos T <aff
fjnepav ovres] Vet. Int. occupati circa cotidiana. Did he find not rw,
but rot? in r? 23. OXvp.Tri.ov r n : oXv/i7riov Sus. probably rightly
(see explanatory note). 24. ruiv -nepl Sdp.ov epya noXuK/jarfta] Vet.
Int. eorum quae de Samo opera multi imperi. Sus. 1 suggests that r
had Trapd in place of irtpi, but see 1258 b 40 and 1317 b 26 sqq.,
where de represents irepl. See explanatory note. 28. 617 om. n 2
Bekk. probably wrongly : n 2 are probably wrong in omitting 8fj
in 1330 a 37. 32. TOVTUV is omitted in r INK aiirbv nadfKfiv is
added after TOVTUV in P* 6 L 8 Aid. Ar., but see critical notes on
1255 b 12, 1303 b 35, and 1304 a 15. 33. 8e n 2 Bekk. : 8 en M 8
P 1 Sus, and possibly r, for though Vet. Int. has adhuc (=en) only
and does not translate 8, he sometimes fails to give an equivalent
for 5e in rendering *al . . . 8e (see critical note on 1311 b 30).
39. dfj.<poTtpots n 2 Bekk. Sus.: d^orfpais n 1 (Vet. Int. utrasque).
1314 a 2. old fa f ls P 1 n 2 Bekk. Sus.: ofidds fo r M 8 . 4. i}]
Vet. Int. si (el r ?). 5. fj.r)8fv\ n 1 Bekk. Sus. : pr)8ev n 2 (corrected
in P 2 in the ink of the MS.). 7. Vet. Int. does not render
TOIOVTOV. 8. Kal before e\(v8epida>v om. II 3 . 10. (rvcrcriTOtsJ
a-va-ffiriots r M s R b : avtra-iriois P 1 with a dot under the second t to
erase it. 13. 5 eXXei rr n 2 Bekk. Sus.: Se XetVei P 1 , Se Xvuei M s :
Vet. Int. autem deficit (8 eXXc/rrct probably T). 18. tnareva-uxrl
n 1 Sus. (Vet. Int. credanf) : in P 3 ov is written by the scribe himself
over an erasure, so that nia-TfiHrvfri may have been the original
reading : Trio-reva-ova-i P 2 4 R b V b Aid. Bekk. and a correction in P 3 .
19. iavrois] aiirois the third Basle edition of Aristotle followed by
Viet, and Bekker: avrols L 8 Aid.: the rest tavTols, and so Sus.
25. olv r P 1 Bekk. Sus.: om. M 8 H 2 . 31. a- X (8ov e evavrias]
Vet. Int. ut ex contrario (ut om. z with g h m n). Had r ua-irtp
i fvavriaf? 40. r6v M" P 1 2 3 4 R b Sus.: TO T P 6 ]> V b Ar. Bekk.
roO n 1 Sus. (Vei. Int. ut videatur}: om. n 2 Bekk.
1313 b 14 1315 a 38. 123
1314 b 1. 8airav>i>ra] Vet. Int. expendat (the whole sentence
running, primo quidem, ut videatur ctirare commimia neque expendat
gratuita /alia), and so in 5 oTroSiSwra reddat. Schn. Bekk. 2 and
Sus., but not Coray, add eis before Swpea?, probably rightly. 3.
n 2 Bekk. Sus.: SiSdWi M* P 1 . 7. &&gt;ftei/ n 1 Bekk. 2 Sus.:
n 2 Bekk. 1 9. y om. M 8 P 1 : the reading of r is uncer
tain, as Vet. Int. usually fails to render ye. 11. Wi&uro
p* Rb yb Bekk. and corr. P 3 , eWi&fr TO Aid.: Armdouro P 1 Sus.,
firiTiOoivro pr. P 3 , fni6oi.vTo M s : the reading of r is of course
uncertain (Vet. Int. insilient: z insilief). See Ku hner, Ausfuhrl.
gr. Gramm., ed. Blass, 282, Anm. 5, where Plato, Laws 922 B, is
referred to for ridt iWo, and Xen. Mem. 3. 8. 10 for ndolro. Tidd^v
occurs in Plato, Laws 674 A etc. In 2. n. 1273 b 6 all MSS.
except M 8 have Trpodro. 16. re] Vet. Int. aulem, as in 1336 a 5,
where see critical note. 17. KOIV&V n 1 P 4 Bekk. Sus. and over
an erasure P 2 : KOIVOV P 3 R*> V*>. 22. TroXe/ntK^ Madvig (Adv.
Critica, i. 468) who compares c. 12. 1315 b 16, 8ia TO iroXepiKos
yevea-dai KXeiaGevris OVK r\v (VKaTcxfrpovrjTos, and 1315 b 28 Sq. and
also Sus.: TroAm^j r n Bekk. 26. aXAas n 2 Bekk.: Twy aXAwj/
n 1 Sus. So in 1 260 a 26 M 9 P 1 have rotoCrov, the rest n -rvv
TOIOVTUV, and in 1331 a 34 M 9 n 2 corr. P 1 have n^eva TOIOVTOV and
pr. P 1 (perhaps r also) /^Se i/a TWJ/ TOIOVTWI/. See critical notes on
I 33 I a 34 and 1336 b 8. 32. Qav^aaaxnv n, except corr. P 5
which is of no authority: Buvpafaaiv corr. P 5 Cor. Bekk. 2 Sus.
The reading of r is of course uncertain. See explanatory note.
33. TO y] Vet. Int. tune (roYe r?). See critical note on 1318 a i.
1315 a 3. a$f\Tfpiai\ dfifXrrjpias Bekk. 1 (see Liddell and Scott) :
dfj.f\TTjpias P 4 , the rest dpeXrfpias. 7. &pX&TP ical SiaoT7/pi&)f] See
explanatory note. 11. nepl n 2 Bekk. : irapa n 1 Sus. 15. 8vfli>
M 9 P 1 2 3 Sus. : Svolv n 3 Bekk. See critical note on 1310 b 5. ra
o-co/xaTa n 2 Bekk. : TO <r>p.a M 9 P 1 Sus. and probably r, for though
a has corporum, several MSS. of Vet. Int. (including z) have corpus.
KoXao-tws is bracketed by Schneider Bekk. 2 and Sus. probably rightly.
20. fj jL7 is omitted in r in a lacuna ; no blank, however, is left
in z. 31. ^vxrjs yap iovda-dai] Vet. Int. animae enim pretium fieri.
38. Trapaipfviv P 2 etc. Bekk. and probably pr. P 1 (for d<p is over
an erasure), irapaiveviv pr. P 3 4 : dcpaipeviv M 9 Sus. corr. P 1 : the
reading of r is uncertain (Vet. Int. ablationem, which is his equiva
lent for napaiptffiv in 1311 a 12). liapaipeaw is probably right, for
all the MSS. have Trupaiprw or napaiveviv in 1311 a 12, and in the
124 CRITICAL NOTES.
A0. lloX. (see Sandys Index) rrapaipelo-dai is exclusively used with
on-Xa, though in Plato, Rep. 569 B We have d<peXop.ei/ov ra o?rXa.
40. -r<av before (mTi6ffj.fvuv om. M s pr. P 1 (it is supplied in P 1 in the
ink of the MS.) : the reading of r is of course uncertain.
1315 b 6. TO P 2 3 etc., TW Bekk. Sus. : T&V MS P 1 4 IA Vet. Int. has
guam quod meliores principentur et non humiles (TOV pfXriovas apxav
Ka\ p.}/ T(Tajreivo)iJ.evovs T ?). 11. As to the brackets within which
I have placed 1315 b 11-39 see explanatory note on 1315 b u.
oXtyo^powwrepat] oXiyo^powcorarat Or rather <J\iyoxpovia>Ta.rr] and tort
in place of tlcrlv, the words 6\iyapxia Kal being omitted, Spengel
(Aristot. Studien, 3. 63). oXtyoxpowojrarcu should probably be read.
See critical notes on 1293 b 32 and 1299 a 27. 14. en/ S aun?
>if[ji(tvei> ejcardp] Vet. Int. has enim ipsa for 8 avrrj (yap avrrj r?).
MS has 8 air}), P 1 8 avrr). 18. yovv n 2 Bekk. Sus. : ovv n 1 .
See critical note on 1320 a 29. 24. tTvpavvrjo-ev n 2 Bekk.:
fTvpdvvfva-tv M s Sus., trvpaveva-fv P 1 : the reading of r is of course
uncertain. In 32 all MSS. have trvpawtva-fv (P 1 ervpdvevcrev), except
P 2 , which has iTvpaw^tv, and in 36 all have rvpawevo-as. It
seems likely, therefore, that the form rvpaweva should be preferred
in all these three passages, though in 31 all MSS. have rvpawmv.
The form rvpavvevm, however, occurs nowhere else in the Politics,
and the Index Aristotelicus gives no other instance of it from
Aristotle s writings ; its occurrence here, therefore, throws addi
tional doubt on the genuineness of 1315 b 11-39. The rare fern.
d\iyoxp6viai also occurs in 39 (oXiyoxpoi/toi P 1 pr. P s only). The
Index Aristotelicus gives no reference for it to Aristotle s writings.
In 1317 b 24 we have the fern. 6\i,yoxpoviovs. 26. rerrapa n 2
Bekk. : reWapa M s P 1 : Vet. Int. quatuor leaves the reading of r
uncertain. See critical note on 1300 a 23. Susemihl is probably
right in adopting T. Hirsch s emendation rjpiav. The symbol occa
sionally used in Greek MSS. to represent rjpiarv is one which it
would be easy to confound with that for TeVrapa . see Gardthausen,
Gr. Palaeographie, p. 268. *a/ijniVt^of] ^ap.p.iTixos n 1 P 2 s Sus.:
^anp.t)Tixos R b V b Aid. Bekk. (recte, ut videtur), ^a^TLKos P 4
(Sus.). See Pape-Benseler, Worterbuch d. gr. Eigennamen for the
two forms of the name and their use by various authors. The
famous Greek inscription (Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions,
p. 4) has the forms ^np.a.Tixos and ^ap^aVt^oj. TopSt ov] So r n
Bekk. : Sus. To pyov, which is the correct name (it appears on two
coins of Ambracia: see Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, i. 642. 6), but
1315 a 40 1316 b 2. 125
it is possible that the writer of the passage made a slip : Topyiov
Roper and a MS. of the Vet. Int. (m), which has gorgie, not gordj e,
like the rest, and Plut. Sept. Sap. Conv. c. 17 sqq. 27. ravra r
P 4 Bekk. Sus., ravra L 8 : -raiira the rest (M 8 has rav with T over the
v). 28. aSopucpdp^Tos] z has sine armatorum custodia perhaps
rightly; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. sine armorum custodia. 31.
e<vye] z has fugit rightly; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. fuit.
34. Bojesen and Sus. insert r5>v before wtpi leptova, but without
necessity : see explanatory note, irep\ a-vpaKoixras P 1 Sus., irepi <rvp-
paKovaas M 9 : Vet. Int. circa siracusam or syracusam (n-epl o-vpaKova-av
r?) : Trepl o-vpaKova-ais P 2 s * V b Aid. Bekk. 1 (irapa SvpaKovcriots Schn.
Bekk. 2 ). 35. err] 8 ov8 aim] Tj-oXXa ftic/MiMy] Vet. Int. <? autem
permansit ipsa multis annis (erij 8 owe auri) TroXXa diefj.nv(v r ?). M 9
P 1 have ovS OVTTJ. 36. WHI P 1 n 3 Bekk. Sus. : 8vtw MS P 2 3 .
1316 a 1. TOV nXdravos is added after rrj in P 4 6 L 9 Aid. Ar., but
see critical note on 1313 b 32. 9. ptv OVP is left untranslated by
Vet. Int., olv om. M. 14. ye corr. P 5 Cor. Bekk. 2 Sus. : re M" P 1
n 2 Bekk. 1 : Vet. Int., as usual, does not render re. 8C 6i>] propter quod
b c g h k 1 m n rightly, for 8ta with the accusative is commonly
rendered propter by Vet. Int. : per quod a z. 17. apa om. r P 1 (oibi>,
1 6 . . . /TadXXe, 1 7, is omitted in M 8 ): apa a/*a ^erajSdXXet Thompson,
Sus. 3ft . 26. Casaubon, followed by Sus., is probably right in
adding OVT ei eorat after tarai. 28. KOI is added after Set in n 1 .
29. vvvexfs H 1 Bekk. Sus. : avvex&s n2 32. T&&gt;I> . . . 33. Sxmfp
T) om. r M 8 , so that for these words P 1 is the only representative of
the first family of MSS., and P 1 has TOV in place of rS>v in 32.
34. XaptXaov] See critical note on 1271 b 25. KO\ eV Kapx^ovt om.
pr. P 3 . Kluge (Aristoteles de Politia Carthaginiensium, p. 86) is
perhaps right in thinking that something has dropped out after MU.
He says, nomen quidem huius Poenorum regis, sub quo haec
mutatio imperii facta fuerit, aut textu excidit aut philosophus
ignorasse videtur/ H followed by the name of the tyrant in the
genitive has perhaps dropped out. 36. at om. M 8 P 1 and possibly
r (Vet. Int. plurimae). 38. di/a|tXdov P 1 4 Bekk. Sus. : aVfiXaou
r M 8 P 2 3 R*> V*> Aid.
1316 b 1. TroXv r P 1 Viet, (who however translates of iroXXol)
Schn. Cor. Gottl. Bekk. 2 Sus.: TroXXoi M" n 2 Bekk. 1 2. wat
P 1 n 2 Bekk. : om. r M 8 : it is bracketed by Sus. See critical note
on 1252 a 8. to-oi ] z has equalizer with a; the other MSS. of Vet.
Int. equate or equalem. rijs 7roXj] z has per civitates with a ; the
i 2 6 CRITICAL NOTES.
other MSS. of Vet. Int. have per civitatem. See critical note on
1253 a IO - 5. o^/ioKparov/zeV?/] See explanatory note on 1316 b 3.
xpij/wm foimu] T. has pecuniosi fiunt, not pecuniosi sunt, as most of the
other MSS., and probably rightly, for xP r H JMT ^ far ^ at is rendered
pecuniosum fieri in 1316 b 4. 6. 8e] z has autem with a; the
other MSS. of Vet. Int. have enim. 8. ov-ny n 1 Sus. : avrr) n u
Bekk. 10. fla-lv] rjaav T M s (Vet. Int. eranf). See critical note
on 1311 a 21. 16. Lamb. Bekk. 2 Sus. add KCU before KOTO-
roKi^ofifvot, but see critical note on 1260 a 26. 20. ov8e ToYe
Camotius in the later Aldine (or Camotian) edition of Aristotle s
writings published at Venice in 1552, followed by Bekk. 2 and Sus.:
nvdefrore rii Bekk. 1 23. See explanatory notes on 1316 b 23,
24. 24. P 1 adds of after wu, M 9 o t , r ot (Vet. Int. sibt) : [of]
Sus. The word is probably repeated from o n, which follows.
25. <famv n 1 Bekk. Sus. : fari P 2 n 3 An, $S<n P 3 . 27. As to the
existence of a lacuna here see explanatory note.
BOOK VIII (VI).
1316 b 33. iroia MS P 1 4 etc. Sus. : iroia r Ar. Bekk. and pr. P 3 :
TTOld P 2 .
1317 a 2. re is placed after oXiyapxitds in M 8 P 1 , but not by Sus. :
the reading of r is uncertain, as Vet. Int. seldom renders re. 5.
Spengel Bekk. 2 Sus. add n-epl TO before fiovXtvofMevov. oKiynpxixcas . . .
8. dpxaLpta-ias Om. M 8 . 6. TO 8e . . . 7. /Ltev om. P 4 6 R b L s Aid.
Ar. and pr. P 3 , so that for these words we are dependent on r P 1 2
(a recent correction in the margin of P 3 has been erased). Spengel
and Bekk. 2 read TO 8e in place of Ta 8e. 11. oAiynpx w" r P 8 Ar.
Viet. Bekk. Sus. (Vet. Int. oligarchiarum, though one MS., g, has
oligarchicarum): all the MSS. except r P 5 have 6\iyapxu<>v.
12. ris R b Ar. Bekk. Sus.: T! P 1 , ri r M P 234 etc. 13.
Schneider, following the translations of Lamb, and Ramus, and
followed by Bekk. 2 , is probably right in adding V before 8et.
23. ao-Trep n 2 Bekk. Sus. : as M 8 P 1 : the reading of r is uncer
tain, for Vet. Int. often fails to render irtp. 28. aXXa KOI] z has
sed ei rightly; a has sed and the other MSS. of Vet. Int. sed
ex. 36. o-wayaydv if Bekk. : orvvaytiv M 8 P 1 : Vet. Int. congre-
gare leaves the reading of r uncertain. For similar differences of
1316b 5 1317b 29. 127
reading see critical note on 1284 a 5. 39. Xya>/iei> n 1 R b Ar.
Bekk. Sus. : Xeyo/xf v P 2 3 * etc.
1317 b 3. SWOTIKW n 2 Bekk. : brj^oKpaTtKov M s P 1 Sus. Vet. Int.
has democraticum, which probably represents drjuoKpariKov, though
8r)poTtKos is rendered democraticus in 1292 b 13, 16 and 1299 b 32.
In 1318 a 1 8 all MSS. have TO SIJUOTIKW BIKUIOV, though in 131834
all have rov 8iKaiov TOV 6fio\oyovp.evov flvat 8r}poKpariKov and in 3. 9.
1280 a 8 all have TO OIKMOV TO Te o\iyapxiKov Kal 8rjfjtoKpaTiKw. 6.
TOVT flvai [KOI] TsXoy] Kal om. n 1 and Ar. does not translate it. n 1
may be right, and I have bracketed Kal, though the authority of
these MSS. is small in cases of omission. Sus. follows Thurot in
reading *at TOUT flvai re\os, but TOVTO is probably the antecedent of
o Tt. Compare for the form of the sentence 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 33,
Kal oirfp avrois txaoTot ov (paaiv flvai dlxaiov ov8e crvpfpepov, TOUT OVK
alo"xyvovTai irpos roiis aXXovs do~Kovvr(s, and 7 (S) 9- I 3 IC - ) ^ 3 S< 1
12. TO is added before T^S in M 8 P 1 Sus. : the reading of r is of
course uncertain. 13. SovXf vovros n 1 Bekk. 2 Sus. : SovXov OVTOS n 2
Bekk. 1 np<uTou SVTOS takes the place of trpurfvovros in some MSS. in
Xen. Cyrop. 8. 7. 16. I see no such reason for OVTOS here as exists
in Plato, Laws 728 B, TO 6/jioiova-dm TO IS ov&i KaKols dv8pdo-iv: Aristot.
De Part. An. 4. 10. 687 a 12 : Demosth. in Lept. c. 7. 17. TOVTW
n 2 Bekk. : TOIOVTCOV n 1 Sus. 24. n 1 Sus. may be right in adding
flvm after 6\tyoxpoviovs : it is omitted by all MSS. in the somewhat
similar passage 2. 12. i273b 40, but there it can be more easily
supplied from what precedes. 27. irepl is added after (vdw&v
Kal in M 8 P 1 Sus. and possibly also in r, but this is uncertain
because praepositionem cum plurium nominum casibus copulatam
ante unumquodque eorum repetere solet Guilelmus (Sus. 1 p. xxxiii :
see vol. ii. p. 65), and here he repeats de not only before his equi
valent for TroXtTfias, but also before his equivalent for TWI> loiwv
o-vva\\aynaT(av. 29. ITUVTIOV fj TWI/ ^teyto-Toji/J In F II Bekk. the
words T) T&V fieyttrTtav follow oAiyiWai , 30, but (with Schn. Cor. and
Sus.) I follow the third Basle edition of Aristotle in placing them
after Trdvrmv. It is possible that owing to the similar ending of
p.fyio-TO>v and 6\iyio-ra>v the words dp\fii> fie fj.r)8fiMav pr)8(vbs f) OTI
oAiyumaK were omitted by the writer of the archetype and subse
quently added by him in the margin without a sufficiently clear
indication of the place at which he intended them to be inserted.
The only thing which throws doubt on this transposition is the
presence in the text of the second wpiav, which seems needless if
i 2 8 CRITICAL NOTES.
we adopt the transposition, but I do not think that this is sufficient
to turn the scale. 30. oXiyiVreoj/] okiyomvv M 9 pr. P 1 (corrected
into oXiyrri in P 1 in the ink of the MS.) and possibly r. In
1320 a 12 P 1 has oXiyoo-Tas with i superscribed over the second o.
In Metaph. I. i. 1053 a g A b , and in Phys. 5. 3. 226 b 28 pr. E,
have oAryoorov (see also the various readings in De An. 3. 3. 428 b
19 and De Gen. An. i. 18. 725 a 18, and Soph. Antig. 625, referred
to by Liddell and Scott). 37. KO\ /SouX^] Kal @ov\as r M 9 (Vet.
Int. consilia). Schneider and Bekker add TTJV before $ov\r]v, but as
to the omission of the article in enumerations see critical notes on
1291 a 4 and 1274 a 21, and cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 31 sqq. and Plato,
R e P- 545 A. Sus. brackets KCU /SouX^, and no doubt it has just
been implied that the Boule is one of the magistracies, from which
it is here distinguished, but Aristotle is sometimes inconsistent.
Apx at and /SouXm are mentioned separately in a similar way in Plut.
Solon, C. 1 6, ndvTa () 6fin\cii>s fTTiTptyavrfs, ap\as fKK\T](rias SiKaorijpia
jSovXaj. That the payment of the Boule was of importance in
a democracy we see from Demosth. c. Timocr. c. 99, TTCO? oi> Sewdj/,
et 8ta TOP vo/iof, ov o~v Tt6fiKcis fj.i(r6bv Xti/Saw, afucrdos 6 8fjfj.os Kal 17 jSovXij
icat ra &iKa<rTi]pia ecrrai ; 38. eri . . . 41. /3ai>av<rt a] See explana
tory note. 41. en Ar. Lamb. Sus. : fVl r n Bekk.
1318 a 1. KaTa\ei<j)0fj^ Vet. Int. deficiat (we expect relicta sit or
derelicia sil : deficere usually represents eXXetVeti ). TO ye Cor. Sus. :
rdre r n. See critical note oni3i4b33. 3. rals S^/no/cpaTuus n 2
Bekk. Sus. : rfjs Sq/iOAcpcm ar n 1 . 7. P 5 Ar. Bekk. 2 Sus. have TOVS
tvnopovs fj rovs diropovs : P 3 has TOII? eviropovs (corrected into dn-opovr)
T) TOVS finropovs . all other MSS., including r, have TOVS anopovs fj TOVS
fvnopovs. The authority of P 5 is very small. As to apx"" see
explanatory note on 1291 b 32. 9. TroXwe/a n 2 Ar. Bekk. : TrdXet
n 1 Sus. noXiT/a seems preferable to 7roX : cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 34
sqq. and 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 28 sqq. 12. x^uW] TO!J ^iX/oi? r (Vet.
Int. t psis mille]. 14. KUTU TOVTO] Vet. Int. in his (KIVTO. TOVTCOV r
with P 1 ?). 16. alptcreav Camot. Viet. Lamb. Schn. Bekk. 2 Sus.
Bonitz (Ind. i8ob 59): biaipio-ewv r n Bekk. 1 See critical note on
1332 b 36. Ai easily drops out and is easily added before AI.
24. StWos /zwo?] Vet. Int. solum iustum (SUmon nwov r ?). 27.
o^oXoyi5o-ovat P 3 R> Aid. Bekk. SUS. : o^oXoyovo-ti* n 1 P 2 4 L 8 Ar.
32. TO is added after TOVTO in r M s . 34. om. n 2 Bekk. These
MSS. omit ei in i287b 6 also. 35. irpoo-yfyfvrjvrai] Vet. Int.
adiunganlur aulem. Compare his addition of autem in 1308 b 28.
1317 b 30 1319 a 33. 129
37. oiroTfpwv n 2 Bekk. Sus. and probably r (Vet. Int. guorum-
cunque] : iroTtpcw M s pr. P 1 (corrected in the ink of the MS.).
40. 8i X a P 24 R*> Aid. Bekk. and a recent correction in P 3 , Si
followed by a lacuna pr. P 3 : 8i\^j P 1 , &x#v M 8 and possibly r (Vet.
Int. divisa in dud] : 81x77 Sus. Ai ^a is probably right : cp. Hdt. 6.
lOQj Totcri ( A6rjvaia>v crrpaTTjyola-i eyivovTO 8i\a al yvatpai.
1318 b 3. erv/xTreto-cu] Vet. Int. permittere should probably be
persuadere. 4. TO larov Kal TO SiKaiov n 2 Bekk.: TO SIKOIOV nai TO
iaov n 1 Sus. In 2 all the MSS. have TOV ?o-ou KOI TOV Sucalov, and
this is the usual order. It is possible that n 1 are right (compare
the change from TO edos KOI TTJV dya>yr]V in 6 (4). 5. I2Q2b 14 tO
Tr/ dyuyfi Ka\ TOIS e6e<nv in 1 292 b 16), but it is more likely that n 2
are. For similar diversities of order in the two families of MSS.,
see critical notes on 1331 b 41 and 1333 b 36. 9. Ste Xot] SiX^
P 1 2 and probably r (Vet. Int. sicut si quis distinguat populos). 14.
avTols n 1 Sus.: om. n 2 Bekk. 17. v P 4 L 8 Aid. and P 6 in the
margin, followed by Bekk. and Sus. : r also may have had fj (Vet.
Int. magi s appeiunt lucrum quam honor eni) : om. M 8 P 12S Q b R b .
36. dpKovo-av eti/a:] Vet. Int. sufficere.
1319 a 1. <pav\ov] <pv\ov MS pr. P 1 and perhaps r (Vet. Int.
Iribuale). 7. TOIS noXXols n 2 Ar. Bekk.: TOIS iraXawis n 1 Sus., the
acceptance of which reading necessitates the omission of TO dpxalov,
which all MSS. have. The reading of n 2 is confirmed by the
similarity of the language in 10. 1O. ye om. M 8 P 1 and possibly r,
but this is doubtful, for Vet. Int. seldom renders -ye. 14. AfpvTaiw
Sepulveda (p. 193 b), Camerarius (Interp. p. 253), Lambinus : d$v-
Td\o)v r P 1 n 2 Ar. (X however is over an erasure in P 3 ) : a^vTaXw M 8 .
15. Kamfp] a z have equidem rightly, for Vet. Int. renders Kaimp
equidem in 1309 b 32; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have quidem,
except k, which has quidam. 22. Ta irpbs TOS 7roXf/xt/cas 7rpaets]
TO? irpbs Ta TroXe/^iKa trpd^fis F (Vet. Int. actionibus ad belltca), TO. Trpbs
TO TToXffMiKa Trpdgfis M 3 . Sus. (following Schn.) brackets TO. 24.
6vpav\fiv\ Vet. Int. venari. Did he misread 0vpav\(~iv as fypfveiv ?
29. Kv\ir6ai] z has conversatur probably rightly; the other MSS.
of Vet. Int. c onversantur. 33. The second T^ x<*P av is bracketed
by Coray and Sus. and might well be dispensed with, but surplus
age of a somewhat similar kind may be noted elsewhere in the
Politics e.g. in 3. 3. 12 76 a 19-21 (see critical note oni276a2i),
4 (?) 2 - I3 2 4 a 23 sqq., 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 38-40 (cp. [Xen.] Rep.
Ath. i. 3) and i34oa 33, 34, 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 10 sq., 6 (4). 12. 1296 b
VOL. IV. K
I 3 o CRITICAL NOTES.
19 sqq. Cp. also Hist. An. 2. n. 503 a 23 sqq., Hicks, Greek
Historical Inscriptions, No. 21, 5, [TO]> i/o/xoi> TOCTOI> ^ r tfeXj?
ftrvyl^eai 77 7r/jo^^ra[i] (j/rjtpov wore /i[)7 eJtVat TOf i>6fj.ov TOVTOV, and See
critical note on 1319 b 35. 37. S^oKpanW Lamb., Camerarius
(Interp. p. 253), Bekk., Sus.: brj^oKpariKals r n, because almost all
the MSS. read eKKXrjaiats, not eK/cA^o-ias. eKK\r)o-ias L s Aid. Ar. Viet.
Lamb. Bekk. Sus. and corr. P 3 and pr. P 6 : all the rest of the MSS.
(including all the better ones) fKK\rja-iais.
1319 b 7. Ivxvpbv] Vet. Int. impotentem. T&&gt; n 2 , T Bekk.: om.
n 1 Sus. 8. Ttoiflvj Vet. Int. aliquando (jrore r ?). 11. TOVTO om.
n 1 . 12. H*XP I M 8 P 1 an d possibly r (see critical note on
1336 b 39): fj^xpis n 2 Bekk. Sus. 21. ols n 2 Bekk. Sus.: olw
r MS pr. P 1 (ofo corr. P 1 ). 24. xal TO P 1 and (with yp.) corr. P 4
in the margin : Kara r M 8 P 2 s R b Aid. Ar. pr. P 4 . For this differ
ence of reading cp. 1309 b 10. 26. 8iaet>x<9<I>o-ti>] Vet. Int. con-
iunganiur, which should probably be disiungantur , for 8uievxQr)vui
is rendered disiungi in I2y6a 21. 27. Trporepov n 2 Bekk.:
irporepai n 1 Sus. corr. P 4 . 33. Vet. Int. consislere probably stands
for avvuTTavai (not (Tvveardvai., as Sus. 1 2 thinks) : see critical note on
1291 b 12. 35. epyov is bracketed by Bekk. 2 and Sus., following
Lamb., but cp. 2. 6. 1265 b 19 sqq., where 8ew is repeated in
a similar way, and 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 38 sqq., and see critical note on
I3!9 a 33-
1320 a 4. ?) n 2 Bekk. Sus.: M S r MS, ^ 8 pr. P 1 (corrected in the
ink of the MS.). This nrfe is probably an intruder from two lines
above. 8. fapouevov Bernays (Ges. Abhandlungen, i. 173. i),
Sus. 3 a , (pepoufvav T P 1 , (pepdvrwv the rest followed by Bekk. 10.
KaTa^0trai corrections in P 23 in the ink of those MSS. and pro
bably r (Vet. Int. corrumpd sententias), followed by Bekk. Sus.:
KaTa\}/r](pi(Tai M 8 P 1 4 and pr. P 2 3 . 13. f-rriTiuiois n 2 Bekk. : fTrifo-
nlots n 1 Sus. (Vet. Int. damnis, which probably stands for eVif^tW,
for emri/j.ia is rendered increpationes in 1309 a 23 and tin^iov
damnosum in Rhet. 2. 23. 1399 b 35). n 2 are likely to be right, for
em^La does not occur in this sense in the Politics, and the only
instance of its use in this sense in Aristotle s writings given in the
Index Aristotelicus is from Probl. 29. 14. 952 b 12. 16. rot P*
L 8 Aid., TOI Bekk. Sus. : the rest. See critical note on 1308 b 15.
21. SiKaarripiuv (pav\a>v] Vet. Int. praetoria malorum, but whether he
found SiKavrfipta <j)av\a>v in F is very doubtful. 23. oAi yar 8*
n 3 Bekk. pr. P 1 and a correction in P 2 in the ink of the MS.:
1319 a 37 1320 b 38. 131
oXi yatf 6 fjutpais M 9 P 3 pr. P 2 and a correction in P 1 in the ink of
the MS., followed by Sus. Vet. Int. has paucis autem diebus, which
may represent either reading, for in 27 and 1314 b 30 multis diebus
stands for noXXas fj^fpas. 29. eBeXovatv n 2 Bekk. (over an erasure
in P s ) : GeXoviTiv M 9 P 1 Sus. : the reading of r is of course uncertain.
In the preceding line all MSS. except P* have fdf\ovaiv. n 1 are
rather apt to omit the first letter of words (see for instance critical
notes on 1265 b 19, 1324 b 30, and 1315 b 18). 30. ra yap
TrfpioVra] Vet. Int. obvenientia enim (TO yap napiovra r? In 1303 a
17 Vet. Int. translates -napUvai in/rare). 35. yevoiro P 23 Rb
Aid. Bekk. : yei/on-o 6 (6 over an erasure) P 4 : -yiWro M 8 P 1
Sus.: Vet. Int. fiat leaves the reading of r uncertain.
is probably right: cp. 6 (4). i. i288b 29, Ofupe iv, e
TTOJS civ ytvoiTO. 38. <rvva6poiei.v Sus., avvadpoifav M 8 P 1 and
probably r (Vet. Int. congregans, but this verb represents dGpoi&iv
in 1314 b 10) : dGpoifav n 2 Bekk. 1 , adpoi&iv Ar., the third Basle
edition of Aristotle, Bekk. 2 39. fpnopias n 1 Ar. Bekk. Sus.:
evnopias n 2 .
1320 b 3. d(pt(fi.fvovs r P 1 Bekk. 1 Sus. (Vet. Int. respuentes vanas
oblationes] : efaffj-ivovs M 8 n 2 : afpftpfvovs Schn. Bekk. 2 6. irtpi-
otKifias M> P 1 2 Bekk. Sus. (Vet. Int. negotia domus, which perhaps
stands for Trepioiidas, the reading of Aid., for in 1269 b 3 praedia
circa domes represents Trepto/Kovr) : TTfpiouciftias P 3 4 6 . 9. ra
Tapavrivav n 2 Bekk. : TTJV Tapavrivcov M 8 P 1 , but M 8 has a lacuna
after rapavrivuv : rf]v rapavrlvatv upx 1 ?" ^ ? (Vet. Int. Tarentinorum prin-
cipatum]. If r had TTJV rapavrivcav dpxf)i>, and principatum was not
merely supplied e con/, by Vet. Int., dpxf)v may have been repeated
from dpxas, ii. For if rfjv rapavrivav is right, one would be
inclined to add jroXw rather than dp^v. 15. rf/s air^r dpxrjs r
Schn. Cor. Bekk. 2 Sus. (Vet. Int. de eodem principatif): rijs d
avrijs II Bekk. 1 25. TO> TC KTu>p.tva> II 1 Bekk. Sus. : T>V re
H*. 26. (lo-ayoptvovs n 1 Sus. (see explanatory note) :
n 2 Bekk. 29. TOVS KOIVUVOVS] Vet. Int. communicantes. See
critical note on i289b i. 3O. umpov] z hzsparum; the other
MSS. of Vet. Int. probably rightly parvum. 35. Thurot
(fitudes sur Aristote, p. 91) would add xal before rols irXwr^o-tv,
while Rassow, followed by Sus., would add rois nAXoty Kal in the
same place. Something seems to be missing, and either Thurot
or Rassow may be right. 38. fltWvreu n Sus. and probably r :
SCvarai Aid. Bekk.
K 2
I 3 2 CRITICAL NOTES.
1321 a 3. &TI\OV OTL r Bekk. Sus. (Vet. Int. palam quod} : 8r)\ovoTi
M s P 1 II 2 . 5. p-aXiora II 1 Bekk. Sus. : KaXXtora II 2 . 6. /3ai/au-
a-iKw n Sus., except that R b and a recent marginal correction in
M s have ftdvavo-ov (so Bekk.) : vavo-inbv pr. M 8 (Vet. Int. nauttca).
The Index Aristotelicus does not include the word ftavavaiKos.
12. oTT\i.TiKr}v Camerarius (Interp. p. 258), Sus., and perhaps r
(Vet. Int. armativam}: onKLr^v M 8 P 1 n 2 Bekk. 1 , onhlnv Lamb.
Schn. Cor. Gottl. Bekk. 2 14. S^ori^] S^o/cpai-iKi) L s Aid. Bekk.
16. xpa> n 2 Bekk. 1 : x p<w MS P 1 Bekk. 2 Sus. and probably r (Vet.
Int. deterius). 19. %*oi n Bekk. Sus. : Sij/zori/col r (Vet. Int.
populates}. 20. The MSS. of Vet. Int. add et before the equiva
lent for Trpos ITTTVLKTIV, but Z Omits this /. nririKTjv Kal oK\iTiKr)v r P 2 3
Bekk. Sus. (Vet. Int. equestrem et armativajn) : InniKov Kal 6n\iriKov
M s P 1 : Kal 6n\iTiKT)v is omitted in P* 6 L 8 . 22. e< eWous P 2 3
Rb Aid. Bekk. : e 0" avrols P 1 , eV avrols M 8 , e </> favrois P 4 : avrols F
(Vet. Int. JZ^z Ipsis] : e $ avrovs Sus. Cp. eVi TOI)? TroXt ra? in 3. 14.
12853 28. 26. ri^i/ /ifraSoo-tj ] Vet. Int. appositionem (TrpoV^eo-ti/
r?). He does not elsewhere render /neTdSoo-is thus. In Rhet. 3. 2.
1405 b 3 William of Moerbeke renders -n-poa-dea-if by appositio.
30. Mao-o-aXia] pacraXia M 8 P 1 and perhaps r (rnasalia b g m n,
masilia k). See critical note on 1305 b 4. For the various emenda
tions of the words T>V eV r<5 TroXn-ev/nari which have been proposed
see Sus. Sa . I have myself been sometimes tempted to substitute
Tifj.rjfj.ari for TroXirev/iart (for TO>V eV ra) Tifj.rjfj,ari Cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 12.
u6ob 19), but I do not believe that any change in the text is
called for. 31. rJjs iroXeus is added after f<*6ev in r M 8 . 33.
irpo(TK.fla6ai\ Vet. Int. apponere, but he probably found Trpoo-Keto-ftu
in r, for he often renders the passive by the active voice, and in
i2Q7a 17, 26 fm.Kfl(rdai is rendered imponi. 35. eforfvras] Vet.
Int. immittentes (elo tevras r or dviovras misread as elcruvras ?). 37.
Koafj.ovfj.evr]v] z has ornatam rightly ; the other MSS. of Vet. Int.
armatam. 40. TTJS danavris] Vet. Int. expensarum, but see critical
notes on 1287 a 27 and 1307 b 32-34.
1321 b 16. aXXijXcw] z has invicem probably rightly ; the other
MSS. of Vet. Int. have ad invicem. The equivalent for aXX^Xwi/
in Vet. Int. is usually invicem or ab invicem, not ad invicem.
iiiroyvioraTov Rb Bekk. : inroyvvTaTov M 8 P 1 Sus. : vTroyvorarov P 2 3 4
Q b Aid. : the reading of r is uncertain. The form \nr6yvios occurs
in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Rhetoric (see Bon. Ind. s.v.):
the Index Aristotelicus gives one reference for vnoyvos to the
1321 a 3 1322 b 9. 133
genuine writings of Aristotle (De Gen. An. 3. 7. 757 a 28, where
however Z has virog . . . o). 26. Xt/icW n 2 Ar. Bekk. : Xi/ueVo s
n 1 Sus. In 1322 b 33 all MSS. have Xt/ieW, not Xt/^eVa. 28.
KOI [raj TTtpt Ta ?&&gt; TOU a-Tfoj] Vet. Int. et de eo quod extra oppidum :
hence it is likely that the first ra was omitted in T ; it is omitted
by Bekk. 2 and bracketed by Sus. In place of the second TO M 8
has TOU and T also apparently. 35. ras is added before by
Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (Aristoteles und Athen, i. 235, note), but
see explanatory note on 1334 b 12. We might compare 2. 8.
1 2 68 a I, ras 8f Kpiafis fv rots SiKacrTijpiois ov 8ia ^/rjfpofpopias weTO
yivfvBai Sf iv, if it were clear that ev rots StKao-Trjplois should here be
taken closely with ras Kpta-tu. 38. tort 8e r n Ar. Bekk.: rn S
(ov) Thurot, Sus.
1322 a 9. SXXow P s 4 etc. Bekk. Sus.: Z\\a S P 1 2 Aid., S\as M".
r may have had nXXas, for Vet. Int. has propter quod melius non
unum esse hunc principatum, sed alios ex aliis praeioriis, where alios
may agree with principatus understood. 11. For the third ras
Sus. 3 a , following Niemeyer, reads Ta, and also for Ta? in ras rS>v
fWo-TWTaw, 12, and in ras irapa and TOS 8e in 14, in all which
passages r n Bekk. have ras. See explanatory note on 1322 a 8.
12. evav Scaliger, Sus. : vttav r II Bekk. 14. Tar -napa TWI>
dyopav6p.a>v] napa om. n 1 (Vet. Int. eos qui agoranomon), but not
Bekk. or Sus. 18. See explanatory note on i322a 16. 20.
olov A.6f)vri<nv (^) TWI/ evSexa Ka\ovfj.fva>v is bracketed by Sus., and
he may well be right (see explanatory note and cp. I3oob 28).
Coray, followed by Bekk. 2 and Sus., is probably right in adding 17.
25. r adds oXXcoi* before /uaXXov (Vet. Int. custodia aliorum magi s)
and M 8 has oXXwi/ in place of ^aXXor. 26. Trpos avrols] Vet. Int.
apudipsos, but Sus. 1 is mistaken in inferring from this that he found
Trap avToTy in T, for in 1331 b 10 apud forum represents npos dyopa
(see critical note on 1329 b 18). 27. rtjv avrfiv n Bekk. Sus.:
Vet. Int. eosdem (if we follow a b z : the other MSS. of Vet. Int.
have eodem), with which however it is possible that principatus
should be supplied ; in that case eosdem would represent TO* avrds .
33. av n 1 Sus. : om. n 2 Bekk. 1 : Bekk. 2 adds tiv before wv.
1322 b 2. ao-Twi> P 1 n 2 Bekk. : fKaarov r M 8 Sus. Kadia-ravrai
l n 1 Bekk. Sus. (except that P 1 has apx an d pr. M 8 dpxals) :
xn n 2 . 9. trpoo-fvSvvova-av Bekk. and many editors
before him : npovtvdvvowav n Sus. (except that M s has irpo<T(i>6v-
Vet. Int. has sumentem rationem et emendantem for rfjv
I 3 4 CRITICAL NOTES.
\oyKrpbv xai irpocrevdwoixrav (or TTpo&tvOvvovcrav}, 14.
n 2 Bekk. Sus. : ctyopciav n 1 . $ M Bekk. 2 Sus., $ P 2 3 4
etc. Bekk. 1 , ,v r (Vet. Int. qua). 16. KaAeirai] KaXoOi/rai P 1 and
perhaps r (for a z have vocantur). 18. o-^eSoi/ om. r M 9 pr. P 1
(supplied in P 1 in the ink of the MS.). 32. The second n-fpi is
omitted in n 1 and bracketed by Sus. See critical note on 1331 b
24. 34. TO. before irepl is bracketed by Schneider and Sus. and
expunged by Bekk. 2 , but cp. 1317 a 6. o-vva\\ayp.dT(av n 1 Bekk.
Sus. : <rvv(i\\dyfj.aTa n 2 . 35. eViXoyto /xoiiy] Vet. Int. circa ratio-
cinationes (nepl Xoyter/iov? F ?). 36. npbs tvdvvas M s P 1 II 2 Bekk. :
trpoa-fvdvvas Sylburg, Gottling, Sus., and perhaps r (Vet. Int. el
correctiones). 37. iStai n 1 Sus.: I8ia n 2 Ar.: ISia Bekk.
1323 a 2. avppaivti n 2 Bekk. Sus. and probably r (Vet. Int.
accidif) : trvrfaimi M P 1 . 3. yivc<r6tu MS P 1 2 3 Bekk. Sus. :
yevea-Qai n 3 : Vet. Int. fieri may stand for either. 7. <aff is
bracketed by Schn. Gottl. Bekk. 2 , following Heinsius, whose para
phrase is, cum tres in civitatibus plerisque eligantur magistratus,
qui sunt omnium supremi (Politica, p. 758). It is omitted by
Coray. 10. I follow Conring and Sus. in placing the mark of
a lacuna after
NOTES.
BOOK VI (IV).
10. Ev dircicrais TCUS rex^ais K.T.\. As to the absence of C. 1.
a connecting particle see note on 1274 b 26. I am not aware 1288 b.
of any other passage in which Aristotle sets forth with equal
fulness the manifold problems to which any art or science that
lays claim to completeness must address itself, but we are more or
less prepared for his teaching on this subject by Rhet. i. i. 1355 b
10 sqq., Top. i. 3. 101 b 5 sqq., and Eth. Nic. i. n. 1101 a 3 sqq.
See vol. ii. p. 397 s P t t - ^ n e>w ^W^OWS rais rf%vais KOI rais eirio-TTjpais
Aristotle must be speaking of Troii/riKai and -rrpa.KTi.Kai eVto-rij/iai, not
of 6f(>pr]TiKal (TTivrrjuai, for the latter are not concerned with TO
apfiOTTOv. For rats re^uais KOI rais erri(TTrjfjMis Cp. 2. 8. 1268 b 3436,
3. 12. 1282 b 14, and 4 (7). 13. 1331 b 37. En-io-T^r; is inter
changed with rexvij in 1288 b 21, 22 : cp. 2. 8. 1268 b 34-38,
where Jj 7roXmK!7 eTrioTTj/xi; IS Said to be One Of the rexyai KOI 8vvdfj.fis.
As to the various problems to which Political Science is here
required to address itself, see vol. i. p. 488. They are as follows
it must seek to ascertain
I. TO Trepi &00TW yevos dp/xoYrop in its two forms,
A. the constitution which suits those who possess the best
natural gifts and the best equipment, i.e. 17
B. that which suits those who are less well circumstanced
(17 fK TIV vnoKfipfViav dpicrrr) Ol" 77 ev8fxop.(i>rj << T>I>
2. how any given constitution (17 Sodelo-a or 17 | inrodfa-ew
TToXiTfia) is to be brought into being and kept in existence
as long as possible,
3. 17 /xaXicrTa TTcurais rais TroAfcriz app.6rrovcra iroXirda, or 17 pawi/ *a!
Koivortpa anda-ais,
4. what are 01 apio-roi v6fj.ot and ol enaarr) r(av no\ir(ia>v ap(j.6rrovr(s.
See Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 707. 3 (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripa-
136 NOTES.
tetics, Eng. Trans., 2. 235. 3), and Sus. 2 , Note 1116. Aristotle s
enumeration of the various problems with which Political Science
has to deal prepares the way for a descent in the last three Books
of the Politics to less exalted questions than those with which he
has so far been dealing. It was something new to say that the
inquiry how democracy or oligarchy or tyranny should be consti
tuted so as to last holds as legitimate a place among the inquiries
of Political Science as the inquiry respecting the best or the best
attainable constitution.
TOILS fit) Kara popiov yti/ojiEi cus, which do not come into being
in a fragmentary shape : cp. 7 (5). i. 1301 b 21, <a\ lv En-iSa/xi/w
fie jucre/SaXcv 17 TroAim a Kara popiov (Sus. theilweise ), and 6 (4). ii.
1295 a 28, HT]Tf npos Tro\LTfiav rf]v (car tvjflv yivofjieinjv. That Political
Science was often studied in a fragmentary way we know from
Plato, Laws 630 E, quoted in vol. i. p. 375, note i. For the
contrast of Kara popiov and re Xetoy, cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 3. 1 1 74 a
24 sqq.
11. ye vos ev Tl > one whole class of subject-matter : cp. Plato,
Laws 916 D, KijBdrj hfiav 8e xpr) Travra uvftpa 8iavor)0f)vai KOI ijsfvBos xai
UTraTTjv coy ev ri ytvos ov.
12. jucis (sc. Tf xvrjs Ka\ eVto-T^y), one and the same art and
science : Cp. 22, Trjs avTrjs eTrtUTi^/iTjy.
, each description of thing/ whether it be <caAAio-rn
v or otherwise.
17. iKyoufieV^s = 7rpocrr]Kov(rr]s (Bon. Ind. S.V.).
18. According to Bon. Ind. 8 a 16, where Eth. Nic. 3. 7. 1114 a
8 and Probl. 30. n. 956 b 16 are compared, dyufia is here idem
quod dycav.
18. tpjSei . . . 19. Sucafjuct. This sentence appears to be
corrupt or mutilated. See critical note.
TOU iraiSoTpijBou K<X! TOO yupvaanKoS. The yv/jLvatrTiKos imparts
the correct e|iy of body and the iraiSorpi^rjs skill and science in the
performance of athletic feats (5 (8). 3. 1338 b 6 sqq.). See note
on 1 338 b 7. For TOV yupvao-TiKov, the master of gymnastic science/
cp. Plato, Polit. 295 C, Gorg. 464 A, and Protag. 3130.
19. KOI TauTTjy TTJI/ SuVajjuK, this inferior degree of capability
also (i.e. this inferior grade of bodily constitution and science).
20. There is a roughness about eaSrJTa (i.e. ea-drjros iroi-qaiv, Bon.
Ind. 289 a 15) which is not without occasional parallels in the style
of the Politics (see note on 1258 b 19). We expect vfavriKrjv (cp. 4
6 (4). 1. 1288 b 1128. 137
(7). 4. 1325 b 41, v^iavrrj KOI vavirrjyat), but eV^ra is more definite,
because other things are woven besides clothes, and then again the
difference between one quality of clothes and another may not be
in the weaving but in the dyeing or something else. The word
ifiartovpyiKT] is used by Plato in Polit. 280 A and would have suited
Aristotle s purpose here, but this word seems either to have been
invented by Plato on this occasion or at any rate to have been
rarely used. No general word for clothes-making is given by
Pollux in 7. 33 sq., 159. The non-repetition of irtpi before eV^ra
links the making of ships and garments together as to a certain
extent cognate : cp. c. 14. 1298 a 4 sqq. and 4 (7). 12. 1331 b 7-10.
23. TIS eon, KCU, irota TIS &v ouaa. K.T.X. The answer to ris
comes in a definition of the best constitution, the answer to iroia ns
in a full description of it (see note on i274b 32).
24. TIS Tiaii dpfiorrouCTct. Cp. Rhet. i. 4. 1360 a 30 sqq.
25. TT)C Kpcnicnr\v re dirXws KCU TTJC ex rdv uirOKeifieVwi dpurrrp.
For the combination of KpaTio-njv and dpiarr]v here Bonitz (Ind.
408 b 21 sqq.) compares Eth. Eud. i. 3. 1215 a 4 sq.
26. -n\v eic Twy uiroiceifAeVui dpumr]i>, the best that the assumed
circumstances allow (cp. 32, rfjv fi>8(x^ vr l v * K " &rapx6vr)>
The phrase e< T&V uTroKet^eVw^ does not seem to occur elsewhere in
the Politics.
27. TOC dyaQoi i 0(Ao9eTif]i KCU rov ws dXrjflws iroXiTiKoc. See note
on 1274 b 36 and cp. c. 14. 1297 b 38, TOV a-irov8aiov vo[j.odfTt)v, and
Eth. Nic. i. 13. 1102 a 8, 6 /car aXrjdeiav TroAtTiKo? : also Eth. Eud.
I. 5- I2l6a 23, dXX oi TroXXol TWV TTO\ITIKU>V ovK a\r]0S)S rvyxdvovai TTJS
irpcxrrjyopias ov yap flat iroXiTiKoi Kara TTJV dXrjdeiav, and Plato, Rep.
564 C, TOV dyadbv larpov re KOI vopoOerriv TrdXecoy, and 489 C, where oi
ws d\r]6u>f KvfiepvrjTat are Contrasted with oi vvv TroXmKot apxovrts.
28. CTl 8e TplTTjy TT)V ^ UTToOcCTCUS, SC. TToXlTetdf 6fO>prj(Tat TTJS avTTJS
f(TT\v eVtoTJ^y, and still further it is the business of the same
science to study as a third constitution that which is based on
something given and presupposed for instance, it may be given
and presupposed that the constitution to be studied is not to be
either the best or the best attainable, but inferior to both (30 sqq.).
So when the gymnastic trainer is asked to produce an Zgis falling
short of 17 iKvovnevrj <?is, he is asked to produce an e vTro^ o-ecos
tgis (16 sqq.). In c. n. 1296 b 9 sqq., as Sus. 2 (Note 1306)
points out, irpbs v7r6Q((nv is used in a different sense. Contrast the
tone of [PlatO,] Epist. 7. 330 E, TO IS 6* e TO -napd-nav jBaivovvi rrjs
138 NOTES.
opdrjs TToXim as *ai pr)8anfj tdfXovcriv avrffs (Is IXVQS levai, irpoayopcuovcri
bf T<U vfj.!3ov\(a TTJV pev iro\iT(iav tav KOI fir) Kivflv, u>s drfoffavovp-fvca eav
Kivfj, rais 8( /3ouXij(7e(r( Kat enidv/jLiais avrcoi/ inrypfTOvvra vfJL@ov\fveiv K(\({I-
ovcri, riva rponov yiyvoir* av pacrrd re Knl ra^tcrra (Is TOV del -^povov,
TOV pin vno/j.evovTa v(j.Bov\as Toiavras ffyolpjv av Ovavdpov, TOV 8 ov%
viropevovra avfya : cp. Plato, Laws 684 B sq.
29. e| dpx^s TC TTUS &v yevono. This question has been raised
as to the best constitution in 3. 1 8. 1288 b 2 sqq., and we are told
in 6 (4). 9. 1 294 a 30 sqq. how the polity comes into being, and
in 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 7 sqq. how kingship and tyranny come into
being, but the question most often raised by Aristotle as to consti
tutions is rather TTW? Sel Kadia-rdvat or KaraffKfvd^fLv (see for instance
6 (4). 9. 1294 b 40, 8 (6). i. 1317 a 14 sqq., 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 38
sqq., and 8 (6). 7. 1321 b i sqq.). The reason why this latter
question is raised more often than the former probably is that the
really important and difficult thing is not to bring a constitution
into being, but to frame it so as to last (8 (6). 5. 1319 b 33 sqq.).
30. Xe yu 8e K.T.\. The structure of this sentence deserves
study. MTJTC, 31, is clearly answered by wre, 32, but what is the
place of dxopi]yr]r6v -re elvai KOI roiv dvayKaiaw in the sentence ? Does
re answer to M"? Tf > 3 r > m th fi way in which n often answers to p-rjTf
(i.e. in the sense of not only not but : cp. 2. 10. i272b 19 sqq.
and 7 (5). n. 1313 b 35 sqq.)? It is possible, but I have not
noticed a parallel in Aristotle s writings or elsewhere to this
sequence of ^njre rf ^re, and it seems better to regard dxoprj-
yrjTov re flvat Kal rS>v dvaynaiutv as a parenthetical addition to wre
rf)v dpiarrjv 7roXireiW$ai TTO\iT(iav, and not as taking Up prfTf, 31.
Richards, regarding it thus, would read 8e in place of rt.
31. rr\v dpioTT]! iroXiTeuecrOai TroXirciaK. Cp. 2. 5. 1262 b 38 Sq.
and Plut. Phocion, C. 27, no\iTtvofj.(vois 8e rrjv Trdrptov UTTO
32. dxoprjyTjTov re etrai Kal rwi dcayKaiwv , and indeed to be
unprovided even with the things that are necessary to it/ much
more with those that are merely desirable and expedient with
a view tO it. For d\opr)yr)Tov Koi rtav dvuy<aia>v cp. 5 () 4- JSS^ b 33,
TU>V dvayKaiuv dnaidnywyovs, and see Kiihner, Ausfiihrl. gr. Gramm.,
ed. 2, 421. 4. Anm. 5, 6 (ed. Gerth, 421. Anm. 5-7).
35. ds ot TT-Xeioroi K.T.X. That Political Science should make
TO XPW I P OV its aim as well as TO 6p65>s e\ ov > we have already been
told (see notes on i253b 14 and i26ob 32). For is, since/ cp,
6 (4). 1. 1288 b 29 1289 a 1. 139
1289 a 3. The Index Aristotelicus does not appear to notice this
use of wr with the indicative.
36. KCU el by no means implies that the fact is so.
38. Tr\y $uva.Tr\v, i.e. TT/V fvbf\0fj,tvrjv e TO>J/ tiTrap^oVroM , 32, and TTJV
tK TO>V inroKfiftfvcav dpi<TTT)v, 26.
TT\V paw icai Koivorepaf dimerous, that which is easier and more
attainable by all States. Supply rais no^ta-iv. For other instances
of the omission of the word n6Xis see notes on i266b i and
1293 b 12.
39. Scofi^Tjc iro\\TJs xPW as - Cp. 4 (7). 4. 1325 b 37 sq. and
6 (4). ii. 1295 a 27 sqq.
41. rds uirapxouo-as dycupourres iroXireias, abolishing the existing
constitutions. Aristotle no doubt refers to Plato among others:
cp. Rep. 501 A, where Plato commends the lawgiver who makes
the tablet a clean surface before he writes his laws upon it. and
Rep. 540 E sq., and compare what Plutarch says of Lycurgus in
Lycurg. c. 5.
1. Tim aXXn]i>, such as the State sketched by Plato in the Laws : 1289 a.
cp. 2. 6. 1265 a 2 sqq., where it is implied that this State is
allowed by Plato to approach that of the Republic too nearly to
be practicable.
Xprj 8e K.T.X., but a lawgiver should introduce a constitution of
such a kind that those for whom he legislates will easily, starting
from their existing constitutions, be induced and be able to live
under it. Aristotle apparently regards the constitution which he
has described in I288b 38 as rfjv paw KOI Koivorepav OTrao-ais ra is
-iroXeariv as answering to this description, and looks upon its dis
covery as one way among others of amending (erravopdcoo-ai, 3)
a constitution. See note on 6. He probably has before him
a saying of Solon (Plut. Solon, c. 15), oXX $ fj.tv apivrov %, OVK
fTrfjyayev larpdav ov8f KaivoTop.iav, (poflrfOfis fJ.r) (rvy\(as ira.VTa.-na.cn. KOI
rapdgas TT]t> TroXii/ d<r6fi>f(TTfpos yevrjTai TOV Karaorqcrat irn\iv KOI (rvvap-
p.6cra<T0ai Kpos TO apiarTov & 8f KCU Xeyeoi/ T^XTTife irfi6o[jifvots KOI Trpo&ayw
dvdyKrjv VTro^tvowi xpr)cra(r()ai y TCLVT enpaTTtv, cos (prjcnv ai/Tos,
Ofjiov ftir}i> Tf (cat d(cr;i <rvvapp.6(ras.
"O6(v vuTfpov (pa>TT)6fls, el TOVS dpt orovs A^i/at oty vopovs typatytv,
" &v av," f<pi, " irpo(T8(avTo TOVS dpiaTovs" : cp. also Dio Chrys. Or.
80 (2. 437 R), SoXcopa fjLfvroi KOI OVTOV (IpTjKtvai <fraa\ii us at>T<a pi)
d(if<TKovTa citrTjytiTO A.6r]i>aiois, aXX ois avrovy vTT(\dp.ftavf xprjtrftrdai,
Isocr. Areop. 57, and Plato, Polit. 296 A and Laws 684 B sq.,
140 NOTES.
where Plato disagrees with the common view that lawgivers ought
to impose such laws as the mass of the people will be ready to
receive. 6 Hi- (sc. TUIV) Koivavtlv I take to be a construction with
a cogn. ace., raii> standing for Koivaviav : for Koivcovflv Koivuviav cp.
Plato, Laws 88 1 E. I prefer this interpretation of the passage to
taking fjv (raiv) as equivalent to <aff fjv rdgiv and comparing 4 (7).
12. 1331 b 13) vevfp,r)trdai fie %pr] TTJV eipTfftevtjv rdiv Kal ra irtp\ rfjv
2. KCU, TreicrO^o-oi Tai tea! So^cTorrai. We expect rather KOI
8vvf)(TOVTai Kal TTicr6rjcrovTai (cp. 3.. 13. 1284 a 2, 6 Swdpfvos KOI
Trpoaipovfjifvos), but see note on 1264 b 18.
3. us eonr K.r.X. Solon had been appointed 8iop6a>TTjs KOI vop.o-
0fTi]s TTJS TToXiTfias (Plut. Solon, c. 1 6 sub fin. ), and the greatness of
his task was well known. Burke in his Reflections on the Revolu
tion in France (Works, ed. Bohn, 2. 439) speaks to much the same
effect as Aristotle does here. At once to preserve and to reform
is quite another thing (i. e. calls for much ability). When the
useful parts of an old establishment are kept, and what is super-
added is to be fitted to what is retained, a vigorous mind, steady,
persevering attention, various powers of comparison and combina
tion, and the resources of an understanding fruitful in expedients,
are to be exercised.
TO eirai OpOcjCTai iroXireiac r\ KaTaaKuaeii e dpx^S- For the
contrast cp. 8 (6). i. 1317 a 33 sqq., and for the omission of TO
before Kara<TKfvdfiv cp. Xen. Oecon. 9. 19, and see note on 1263 a
15. The difference of tense in enavopdcoa-ai and Karaa-Kevd^eiv should
be noticed (see note on 1331 b 21). For firavopOwcrai TroAn-eiW cp.
A0. IIoX. C. 35, 1. 12 Sq., IsOCr. Areop. 15, r)S (TroXire/as) rjfjLfls
and Strabo, p. 398, where we read of Demetrius Phalereus that he
ov p.6vov ov KareXvae rfjv drjuoKpariavj dXXa Kai fnrjvc^pdaxrf.
5. ir-pos rots eipTjjxeVois, i.e. in addition to studying the best
constitution and a constitution like the Lacedaemonian, more
attainable than the best, but still involving for its realization the
abolition of the existing constitution.
6. TCUS uirapxouo-cus iroXiTeicus jSorjOeii probably includes not
only the discovery of a constitution the realization of which will
not involve the sacrifice of the existing constitution, and in par
ticular the discovery of TTJV pda> Kal KOivoTtpav airdaais rals TrdXetrt, but
also r6 (7ravop6>crai iroXirfiav in general, and perhaps in addition the
6 (4). 1. 1289 a 211. 141
study of the question how any given constitution may be so
instituted as to last as long as possible. The inquiry in 8 (6).
4-7 as to the way in which the different kinds of democracy and
oligarchy should be framed so as to last illustrates the meaning
of the expression. There was a proverb TO irapbv *v noitiv : see
Stallbaum on Plato, Gorg. 499 C, and Meineke on Cratin. UvXaia,
Fragm. 3 (Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 113),
avSpas crocpovs xpr) TO irapbv TrpaypM. /aiAoJ? (Is 8vvap.iv ridecrdai.
Cp. also Eth. Nic. i. n. noo b 35 sqq. and 10. 10. 1180 b
25 sqq.
7. irpcmpoc, in 1288 b 28-39.
TOUTO 8e dSuVaroc K.T.\., and this it is impossible to do, if one is
ignorant how many kinds there are of a constitution (for the sing.
TroXtTeiar Cp. C. 4. 1290 b 25, wcnrep ovv el fwou irpOT)povp.(da Xa/3etf
fi&jj). If we supply Troielv, the case of dyvoovvra is explained. Com
pare (with Buchsenschutz, Studien zu Aristoteles Politik, p. 5,
note) Rhet. i. 4. 13603 17 sqq. In amending democracies and
oligarchies it is necessary to distinguish between the different kinds
of these constitutions and to deal with each kind in a different way,
so that those who recognize only one kind of democracy and one
of oligarchy cannot amend these constitutions aright.
9. TIPCS here, as sometimes elsewhere (e.g. in 4 (7). 7. 1327 b
39), refers to Plato : cp. 7 (5). 12. 1316 b 25 sqq.
OUK eon 8e TOUT d\T]0e s. For the use in reference to Plato of
this blunt expression cp. i. i. 1252 a 16, where see note.
10. Tots 8ia<|>opds TO.S Twi TroXiTeiui I take to mean the varieties
of each constitution, cp. 20 sqq. and c. 2. i289b 12 sqq. Sus.,
however, appears to understand the words otherwise, translating
die sammtlichen Unterschiede unter den Verfassungen, and
Welldon also translates all the shades of difference between the
various polities.
11. auvTi0i>TCu irooraxws, SC. at r>v TroXtreieov 8ta(popai, in how many
ways the varieties of each constitution are compounded. This
is explained by 8 (6). i. 1317 a 2 9> T 7"P ""* fypoKpariats
aKoXovdovtna KOI SOKOVVTU (tvai rrjs TroXtreias oixeia Tavrrjs noid avv-
ri6fp.fva ras 8rjp.oKpa.Tias frepas Ty p.ev yap e XaTTw, 177 S dKo\ov6r)crfi
irXduva, TT) 8 airavra ravTa: cp. 1317 a 2O Sqq.
p.Ta 8e TTJS auTTJs $>povr\cre<M><i TauTTjs K.T.X., and with the help of
this same kind of scientific insight the man of political science
should discover the best laws/ etc. In 1288 b 22 we have rJjs
142 NOTES.
For (pp6vr)<ns used as here in much the same sense
as yvuHTis or eVtCTTij/i?;, cp. Metaph. M. 4. 1078 b 15, e?7rp fJTWnjpj
Tii/os eorat Atai (ppovrjcris, Metaph. A. 2. 982 b 24, 17 TOiavrr] (ftpovrjcris
fjpgaTo r]Telo-0cii, and other passages collected in Bon. Ind. 831 b 4
sqq. I have followed the text of the MSS., but there is some
strangeness about ^ra rfjs avTijs (ppovfja-ftas. Has ravra fallen out
after Se (cp. c. 2. 1289 b 20, p-era Se raura) ? Since the above was
written, I see that my suggestion has been anticipated by an
annotator on the margin of the copy of Morel s edition of the
Politics used by Stahr (see Stahr and Sus. 1 ).
13. irpos Y^P T ^s iroXireias K.T.\. Cp. 3. ii. i282b 10, and see
explanatory note on 1282 b 8. For rifleo-Oai (not -nQevai), see
note on 1283 b 38. We should have been glad if Aristotle had
illustrated this remark and shown us by instances how laws vary to
suit constitutions. Of course the laws in which the constitution is
embodied will vary, and such laws as that prohibiting a repeated
tenure of offices would be especially found in democracies, but
other laws also would vary for instance, laws as to inheritance
(see note on 1309 a 23) and as to the disposal of orphan heiresses
in marriage (note on 1270 a 21). Oligarchies tended to allow full
freedom in these matters (cp. Plato, Rep. 552 A sq., 555 C : A.0.
Uo\. c. 35, 1. 14 sqq.) and to ignore the claims of relatives (cp. Pol.
7 (5). 8. 1309 a 23 sqq.).
15. iroXiTcia ptv ydp K.T.\. This gives the reason why the laws
must be adjusted to the constitution and not the constitution to the
laws. The constitution embodies the end, the laws the rules to be
followed by the magistrates and others with a view to that end. The
sharp distinction here drawn between the constitution and the laws
(cp. C. 14. 1 298 a I 7> ovvuvtu 8f povov nepi re vopcav dtcrfcos KCU r>v nfpl
TTJS Tj-oXtretaf) is not, however, always maintained; thus in c. 5-i292b
15, Tt]v pfv KOTO. TOVS VOJJLOVS TroAiretaf, it seems to be implied that the
constitution is embodied in laws : on the other hand in Eth. Nic.
IO. IO. IlSlb 12 Sqq. We have TO Trepl TTJS vofjLodfcrias . . . Kai oXtur 817
nfp\ TToXtrem? , as if TO irfpl vopodtcrius was a part of TO TTtpl iro\iT(ias,
and not the latter a part of the former. So in Laws 735 A Plato
had brought under the common head of TroXiTeta the two things
distinguished by Aristotle in the passage before us, for he there
Says, ecrrov yap Si; Suo TroXiTfi aj ("&1, TO ftev ap\a>v KaTua-Tacrds ocdo-rot?,
TO Be voftot TOIS appals diro8o6fVTfs. Yet he seems to distinguish
between Ti-oXtTfi a and vopo6c<rla in Laws 678 A. The distinction
6 (4). 1. 1289 a 132. 1289 a 26. 143
between noXtTfia and vopoi passed to Cicero, who marks off the
optimus rei publicae status from leges (De Leg. i. 5. 15), and
has been inherited by ourselves. With the account here given of
the nature of a constitution cp. 3. 6. 1278 b 8 sqq., where TO Kvpiov
rf/s TrdAfoK is identified with TO noXirfvp-a, and see vol. i. p. 243, note i.
That each form of constitution assigns a different end to the State,
we see from such passages as 7 (5). 10. 1311 a g sq. and 8 (6). 2.
1317 b i (cp. 6 (4). 8. 1 294 a 10 sq. and 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 37-b 2).
See also Rhet. i. 8. 1366 a 2-6. Then again the normal constitu
tions aim at the common good and the deviation-forms do not.
16. perc piirai. For the perfect see notes on 1280 a 16 and
1282 b 24.
19. <j>uXdTTeii/ TOUS irapapati on-as aurous, watch and check those
who transgress them , for (pv^drrav probably here means something
more than to watch : see Bon. Ind. s.v. and cp. 8 (6). 4.
1318 b 40.
20. rds 8ia4>opds, the varieties : see above on 10.
21. Toy dpidfioc, SC. rtav 8ia<j)opa>v. Cp. C. 4. 1290 b 32.
24. eiirep Srj according to Eucken, De Panic. Usu, p. 48, does
not occur elsewhere in Aristotle s writings. As P s C 4 n 3 and pr. P 2
have TrXfi co in place of 7t\tiovs, Stahr, followed by Eucken, proposes
to read fify in place of 817 (cp., with Eucken, c. 2. i289b 13).
E lTTfp drj occurs, however, as Eucken points out, in Theophr. Hist.
Plant. 6. 6. 3, and 7rAW is supported by c. n. i296b 4, fV>7
TrAf/ovs ftrjfjLOKparias /cat TrAet ovf oAiyap^t af <pap.ei> tlvai.
26. Eire! 8e K.T.\. After the statements of c. i we expect to be c. 2.
told in c. 2 that, the best constitution having already been dealt with,
it remains to deal with the other questions marked out for considera
tion in c. i, but in place of this we are unexpectedly carried back, to
the list of constitutions given in 3. 7 and are informed that two of
these constitutions have now been dealt with, and that it remains
to deal with the rest. An attempt is, in fact, made in c. 2 to
represent the Sixth (old Fourth) Book of the Politics as taking up
the programme set forth in 3. 7 init. in addition to that of the first
chapter of the Sixth (old Fourth) Book. See vol. i. p. 489.
iv TTJ irpwTT] fie068u) Trepl ruv iroXiTciwc. This term does not
include the First Book (cp. i. 13. I26ob 12), but it probably
includes the Second, and certainly the Third, possibly also the
Fourth (old Seventh) and Fifth (old Eighth). See vol. ii. p. xx sqq.
Aristotle evidently regards the investigation on which he is entering
144 NOTES.
as a Sfvr-cpa pedobos Kfpi T>V TroXireiaiv, probably because he is about
to deal with an inferior group of constitutions to that with which he
has hitherto been dealing, for though polity is a normal constitution,
it is inferior to kingship and aristocracy.
30. KCU irepl jjtei/ dpioroicpaTias K.T.\. That the study of the best
.constitution is in fact equivalent to the study of kingship and
aristocracy is implied in the closing chapter of the Third Book,
where we are told that, if we wish to bring a kingship or
an aristocracy into existence, we must ask what education and
habits will produce citizens of the best State, or in other words
good men. As it is implied here that the best constitution has
been already dealt with, some inquiry on the subject must have
intervened, or, if it was still unwritten, must have been intended
to intervene, between the end of the Third Book and the beginning
of the Sixth (old Fourth), but that this inquiry is that contained in
our Fourth and Fifth (old Seventh and Eighth) Books we are not
in a position to prove. It has already been pointed out (vol. i.
p. 295) that while in the last chapter of the Third Book kingship
and aristocracy are classed together as the best of constitutions, true
kingship is dismissed as no longer practicable in our Fourth Book
(4 (7). 14. 1332 b 1 6 sqq.). It seems strange that Aristotle should
treat an inquiry respecting the best constitution as equivalent to
a discussion of kingship and aristocracy, when he has in that
inquiry dismissed kingship as impracticable. This inconsistency
may be accounted for either by supposing that after writing the
Third Book Aristotle passed on at once to the composition of the
Sixth (old Fourth) Book, and that the Fourth and Fifth (old
Seventh and Eighth) Books had not yet been written when the
passage before us was penned, or by supposing that the Fourth
and Fifth Books are a second edition of the original inquiry on the
subject of the best constitution, and that the reference in the
passage before us escaped revision after the substitution of the
second edition for the original inquiry. See on this subject vol. ii.
p. xxv sq. and p. xxxi, note 2. I do not feel sure that Wilamowitz-
Moellendorff (Aristoteles und Athen, i. 356) and Sus. 4 (i. 660, 662)
are right in holding that the Fourth and Fifth (old Seventh and
Eighth) Books were written before the Sixth (old Fourth). The
remark in 4 (7). 4- 1326 b 14, ap^ovTos 3 eVi ra^u KOI Kpi cru fpyov,
may be a reminiscence of 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 25 sqq., and that in
4 (7)- 9- *3 2 9 a 2 ~5 a reminiscence of 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 24 sqq.
6(4). 2. 1289 a 3038. 145
Compare also 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 25 sqq. with 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 2 sqq.,
4 (7). 9. 1328 b 29 sqq. with 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 3 sqq., and 4 (7).
9. 1328 b 37 sqq. with 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 3 sqq., though it is
impossible to say whether the passages in the one Book were
written earlier than those in the other. It is true, however, that we
are reminded of 4 (7). i. i323b 40 sqq. when we are told in the
passage before us that the best constitution is based on fully
equipped virtue. That aristocracy and kingship are based on
virtue is implied in 7 (5). 10. i3iob 31 sqq.: cp. 6 (4). 8.
1 294 a 9 sqq.
32. irepl TOuTwy ciircii rS>v okOfidrcoc. Cp. Isocr. De Antid.
270, TTfpi 8f ao(pias not (f)i\ocro(f)ias rols fttv wept aAAcof TLVCOV
ayutvi^ofjievois OVK civ dpfioa-fif \eyftv -ntpi T>V 6vop.dru>v TOVTO>V, i.e.
about the things called by these names.
33. KCIT dpcTT)K oweoTdyai Kf)(op r}y/r\\j.4vTiv, to be constituted on
the basis of virtue furnished with external means (Welldon), just
as the best constitution is. Cp. 3. 6. 1279 a 9, orav ?/ KO.T tVdr^ra
r>v 7roXtra>i> <rvvf(TTT)Kvla. Kai Kaff o/ioionjTa, and 4 (7). 8. 1328 b
19 Sq. We do not hear of TroArreTtu <rvvecrn]Kv iat Kara ir\ovrov or
tar (\fvdepiav, though oligarchy and democracy might conceivably
be thus described. Not all forms of aristocracy can be said to be
4 constituted on the basis of virtue furnished with external means
this can hardly be said, for instance, of those aristocracies which
combine only democracy and oligarchy and differ from polities
solely in inclining to oligarchy more than polities do : see c. 7.
1293 b 20 sq. and 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 10 sqq. but aristocracy at its
best aims at being thus constituted.
CTI 8e TI Sia<t>epouaii/ dXXi^Xwy dpioroicpaTia icat (3aaiXeia. This
has been explained in 3. 7. 1279 a 33 sqq., 3. 15. 1286 b 3 sqq.,
and 3. 16. 1287 b 35-17. 1288 a 15.
34. KCU -rrore 8ci pao-tXeiaf yofueu . This has been explained in
3. 17. 1288 a 15 sqq. For vo/ii i/, to adopt, cp. 3. i. 1275 b 7,
ovS KK\t)criav vopi^owiv.
38. (jxxyepof fiey oui K.T.\. MV ovv appears to be answered
by <lXXa in 1289 b n. Aristotle s remark is suggested by his
identification of aristocracy and kingship with the best constitu
tion, which implies that they are the best of the normal constitutions
(cp. 3. 18. 1288 a 32 sqq.); hence the Kai in Kal rovratv rS>v
irapfKpdo-tcov ( of these deviation-forms also ). Another reason for
the remark is that the better a constitution is, the better is its claim
VOL. IV. L
146 NOTES.
to priority of consideration (c. 8. i293b 27 sqq.), and the fewer
precautions are needed for its preservation (8 (6). 6. 1320 b 30
sqq.). Thus the question which is the worst of the deviation-
forms, and which is the worst but one and so forth, has a bearing
on the task which lies before Aristotle. Besides, Plato had already
considered it (Rep. 544 C : Polit. 302 B sqq.). Aristotle s solution
of it seems to be that the worst deviation-form is that which
deviates most from the normal constitution of which it is the
deviation-form, and the least bad one that which deviates least.
This is the case with democracy, as we are told in Eth. Nic. 8. 12.
1 1 60 b 19, TJKKTra 8e fioxflypdv tcrnv rj BrjfjiOKpaTiti firi piKpov yap
7raptKf3aiVfi TO rrjs rrohiTeias e?8oy.
39. dkdyKTj ydp K.T.\. Plato also had placed tyranny lowest in
Rep. 544 C and 576 D, and Aristotle himself in Eth. Nic. 8. 12.
n6ob 8 sqq. Cp. Plato, Rep. 491 D, and Shakespeare s lines
(Ninety-Fourth Sonnet),
For sweetest things turn sourest by their deeds,
Lilies that fester smell far worse than weeds.
Tvpawis is said in 28 and in 3. 7. 1279 b 4 sq. to be the
of kingship, but here we learn that it is the -napfitfiaa-is of the
absolute form of kingship (cp. c. 10. 1295 a 17 sqq.). It is said in
7 (5). 10. 1310 b 5 sqq. to be the most injurious of constitutions
to the ruled , and, if Aristotle sometimes groups the worst forms
of democracy and oligarchy with it and calls them divided
tyrannies (6 (4). 4. 1292 a 17 sq. : 7 (5). 10. 1312 b 34 sqq.:
8 (6). 6. 1 3 20 b 30 sqq.), he does not probably intend to say that
they are as bad as tyranny (see note on 1292 a 17). Km 6eioTaTT)s
is added after rfjs TTP^TTJS to explain in what sense kingship is said
to be the first of constitutions ; it is the first in the sense in which
what is divine is first (cp. 4 (7). 8. i328b n sq.). Kingship is
most divine, because the rule of Zeus is the rule of a king (i. 12.
1259 b I2 sqq.: i. 2. 1252 b 24 sq.) : cp. also Plut. Amat. c. 16.
759 D, KafloTi KOI ra>v avOpamiv&v dyadwv Svo ravra, /SaaiXftW KOI
apfrrjv, QdoTara KOI vop.ifofi.tv nai &vopa{opev. A note on the passage
before us written by Macaulay in his copy of the Politics runs,
I think narrow oligarchy on the whole the worst form of govern
ment in the world (Macmillans Magazine, July, 1875, p. 221).
41. TT\V Be j3o.criX.eiaK K.T.\., i.e. but kingship must necessarily be
the first and most divine of constitutions.
6(4). 2. 1289 a 39 1289 b 11. 147
Toui 0|j.a \i.&vQv xeic OUK ooaaf, like the kingship of a
fvs (Eth. Nic. 8. 12. n6ob 6).
1. ?j 8ia jroXXrji forepart et^ai TTJI TOU pacriXeuorros. Cp. 3. 13. 1289 b.
1 284 a 3 sqq., 3. 17. 1288 a 15 sqq., and 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 10 ?qq.
2. \eipi(m}v oucrav irXeioroK dirlxc" iroXiTeias. As Thurot points
out (Etudes sur Aristote, p. 56), we expect rather x fl p iCTTJ l v "" m
TrXflcrroi car(x ovcTnv noXiTtlas, but see Stallbaum on Plato, Laws 960 B.
TrXeioroc dWxeif iroXtreias, to be furthest removed from a con
stitution : cp. c. 8. 1293 b 27 sqq.
4. fi6TpiuT<TT|i 8^, sc. rivm. See notes on i2^jgb 7 and
U34 b 25.
5. T^STJ JACK o3f K.T.X. Miv ovv is answered by ov ^v, 6, as in
2. 7. I267a37 sqq., except that ov \u)v here introduces a participial
clause. For 17817 with the aorist see note on 1303 a 27.
TIS roir irp<$Tpof, Plato in Polit. 303 A sq.
6. ou jji^jc els rauro pXe vj/as r)fuf, not however keeping in view the
same thing as ourselves (Viet, non tamen ad idem respiciens
quod nos ). Plato took as his guide the principle that there is
a good and a bad sort of oligarchy and democracy, Aristotle the
principle that both oligarchy and democracy are perversions, and
that there is no good sort of either. For ffMirfiv ds or npos, see
Plato, Rep. 477 C-D, Laws 965 D, Cratyl. 389 A: Andoc. 3. 35:
Isocr. De Pace 142.
^iceifos ply y&p K.T.X., for he [recognized a good and a bad form
of each of these polities and] held, etc. (Welldon). Cp. Plato,
Polit. 303 A, 816 yiyovf (sc. fj TOV TT\Tjdovs upX 1 ?) "Ra-Vtov M / VQfUjNt*
T>V irdhiTfiiov oiHTutv TOVTUV ^fipior?;, irapavSpav 8 ovcraiv vfjiTracru>v
fif\TicrTrj ) KOI aKO\d(rT<i>v (jiev jracr>v ovautv tv 8r;/io(cpaTtg VIKO. fjv, HOffdtar
8 ovvSsv fJKurTa iv ravrrj /3ia>TW. Plato had not, however, called the
good sort of oligarchy good oligarchy but aristocracy (Polit.
301 A).
0. Tj|ieis 8e K.T.X. Cp. 3. 6. 1279 a 19 sq. and 7 (5). i. 1301 a
35 sq.
cT)fiapTt]|i^i as. The Index Aristotelicus gives no other reference
for i^apapTavfiv to the genuine writings of Aristotle.
11. TiTTcy B 4>auXT)y. Cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 12. n6ob 19 sqq. As
Suserr.ihl has already pointed out (Sus. 2 , Note 1140), Aristotle does
not always observe this rule ; thus we find the epithets XnW and
pt\Tt(TTT) applied to varieties of democracy in c. n. i296b 6 and
8 (6). 4. 1318 b 6.
L a
148 NOTES.
dXXa K.T.X. The judgement of which we have spoken is the
judgement in what order of demerit the deviation-forms stand. The
subject does not seem to be farther considered in what we possess
of the Politics, for in c. u. 1296 b 3 sqq. the question raised
relates to the order of merit in which the varieties of democracy
and oligarchy stand.
12. ijfxii 8e irpwTov K.T.\. As to this programme of the remaining
inquiries of the Politics, see vol. i. p. 492 sqq., where we have seen
that it does not fully harmonize with the contents of c. i. The
recapitulations in c. 13. 1297 b 28 sqq. and 8 (6). i. 1317 a 10 sqq.
should be compared with it. The first question suggested for
examination the question how many varieties of constitution
there are is one suggested for examination in c. i. 1289 a 711,
a passage which appears to be taken up in Trdom duxpopai T>V
TroXtreicov here, though the words ewrep OTII> eiS?; Tr\eiova TTJS re fir/^to-
KpaTias Kal rrjs oXiyapxtas seem to imply that the inquiry will be con
fined to varieties of democracy and oligarchy, a limitation for which
we are not distinctly prepared in c. i. 1289 a 7-11. Some sort of
answer to the question how many varieties of constitution there
are is obtainable from cc. 3 and 4 (see c. 3. 1290 an sqq. and c. 4.
r290 b 34 sqq.), though in the recapitulation in c. 4. 1291 b 14 sq.
the question which has been under consideration is said to have
been the question whether there are more constitutions than one
and why, not how many varieties of constitution there are (cp. c. 13.
1297 b 28 sqq.). It should be noticed that in etrrep e<rri.v fidrj ir\tiova
TTfs re ^rjnoKparias Kal TT}? o\iyap%ias a fact is assumed the truth of
which forms the subject of a separate inquiry in c. 4. 1291 b 15-30.
13. irXeioya (neut. plur.), not 7rX a> : cp. c. 4. 1290 b 8.
14. eireiTa K.T.X. That 17 KOIVOTO.TT) iro\iTfia and fj atperwrarr; pfTa
TTJV dp[<TTT]v TroXiTtiav are not necessarily the same, we have learnt in
2. 6. 1265 b 29 sqq. Aristotle s language here leads us to expect
to find in c. n, where the topic now referred to is dealt with,
a discussion both of the question what is the most generally
attainable constitution and of the question what constitution is the
most desirable after the best, but in fact he there asks what con
stitution is the best for most States and most men, and decides that
it is T) Sia TUV pea-civ. Nothing is said in c. 1 1 of any constitution
other than this which is at once aristocratic and well organized
and suitable to most States. The recapitulation in c. 13. 1297
b 32 sq. corresponds better with the actual contents of c. n than
6 (4). 2. 1289b 1222. 149
does the preliminary announcement before us. Aristotle probably
adds xav ( TIS aX\Tj K.T.X., because he does not wish to exclude in
advance the consideration of forms to which the superlatives
KOtvoTaTT] Kal atpercoTtzTT; /ifTa TTJV apitmjv Tro\iTfiav do not apply, but
which are at once aristocratic in the broader sense of the word
and suitable to most States. Many aristocratic constitutions are
not suitable to most States (c. n. 1295 a 31 sqq.).
17. lireira Kal r&v aXXuc TIS Tiorik atpcTi], next which among the
other constitutions also [i. e. other than those just referred to] is
desirable for whom. This question is dealt with in c. 12. 1296 b
13 sqq. As Sus. 2 points out (Note 1142), the addition of u
before rS>v a\\w prepares us to find the question rts T KTIV alperr]
considered with reference to other constitutions than democracy
and oligarchy, and we do in fact find that it is considered with
reference to the polity (c. 12. I2p6b 38 sqq.), though, not with
reference to the so r called aristocracy.
20. jiera Be raura K.T.\. This question is dealt with to some
extent in 6 (4). 14-16, though not, as we should expect from the
passage before us, exclusively with reference to the various kinds of
democracy and oligarchy (see 6 (4). 14. 1297 b 35 sq.). The
question is more fully dealt with, so far at least as the various kinds
of democracy and oligarchy are concerned, in the Eighth (old
Sixth) Book, cc. 1-7, and we are led in 8 (6). i. I3i6b 36 sqq.
and 1317 a 14 sq. to expect to learn in the Eighth Book how to
construct the other constitutions also, but our expectation is disap
pointed. Thus promise and performance are at variance both in
the Sixth (old Fourth) and in the Eighth (old Sixth) Book. There
is, indeed, a further discrepancy between the intimation given in
the passage before us and the sequel of the Sixth Book, for we find
in c. 9. 1 294 a 31 sq. (cp. 1294 b 40 sq.) an inquiry how the polity
and the so-called aristocracies should be constructed, which is
more than the passage before us leads us to expect.
22. reXos 8^ K.r.X. This question is dealt with in the Seventh
(old Fifth) Book, which is often implied to be ntpi ras (pdopas KOI
ras (rcorripias rS>v 7roAtreian> (8 (6). I. 1317 & 37 s q- 8 (6). 5. 1319 b
37 sq.). The passage before us certainly leads us to expect that
the old Fifth Book will be the last Book of the Politics, whereas the
MSS. unanimously place the old Sixth Book after it. The inser
tion of the old Seventh and Eighth Books after the Third is justified
by (among other things) indications in the MSS. at the close of the
i 5 o NOTES.
Third that the old Seventh at one time followed immediately after
it, but there are no similar indications in the MSS. to justify the
insertion of the old Sixth Book between the old Fourth and the old
Fifth. Aristotle may have come to see, as he progressed with his
work, that his study of the way in which each form of democracy
and oligarchy should be constructed in order to last (8 (6). 5.
I 3 I 9 b 33 SC W-) should follow, and not precede, his study of the
causes which prevent constitutions from lasting. That he did so
seems likely from 8 (6). 5. 1319 b 371320 a 4. See vol. i.
p. 493 sq. Vet. Int. takes rtXos 8e irdvruv TOVTW together, translating
tandem autem post omnia haec, but the words can hardly be
taken together, and a genitive is also needed after TrotTjo-w/xetfa T^I/
fvdfxop-tvrjv /jiVfiav. Tiavrcav TOVTUV is emphasized by being placed
before orav : cp. Aristoph. TeX/i77<n}s, Fragm. i, 2 (Meineke, Fr.
Com. Gr. 2. 1 159),
(pfpf 8f) roivvif, ravd orav eX%, ri iroiflv %pf) p , o> Tf\ffj.Tj(Tcr(is ,
and Philemon, AvaKa\vtrTa>i> Fragm. (Meineke, 4. 5),
\vnov/jLfi/a) 8 orai/ TIS aKO\ov6a>i> \fyjj
X a ^p > * dvdyKris OVTOS oi/xobeii> Xe-ytt.
24. riyes <j>0opal K.T.\., what forms are assumed by the destruc
tion and preservation of constitutions, both of constitutions in
general and of each constitution separately, and by reason of what
causes these destructions and preservations tend most to come about.
&6opas et a-carrjpias rerum publicarum vocat interitus et incolumitates
(Camerarius, Interp. p. 144). Sepulveda translates ru/ey (pdopai
/c.r.A., quae res interitum afferant et quae vicissim rebus publicis
sint salutares/ and many translate in a similar way (so Sus.
welches die Mittel zur Zerstorung und zur Erhaltung der Verfas-
sungen sind ), but I prefer the above rendering. Cp. 8 (6). i. 1316 b
34, en 8e irepl (pdopas re KOI crtoTrjpias TO>I> noKiTtifov, f< Ttoiaiv re yivfrai KOI 8ia
rlvas alrias, (tprjTat nporepov. We 3.i Q not prepared in the passage
before us for the separate treatment of the way in which monarchies
are destroyed and preserved which we find in 7 (5). 10-12.
25. For Tttura referring to fern, substantives, see Vahlen on Poet.
4. 1449 a 7> an d see notes on 1263 a i and 1291 a 16.
C. 3. 27. As to the Third and Fourth Chapters see vol. i. Appendix A.
We look to these chapters for an answer to the inquiry suggested
in c. 2. 1289 b 12-14 an d in c. i. 1289 a 7-11 and 20 sqq., the
inquiry how many varieties of each constitution, and especially of
democracy and oligarchy, there are, and, as has been said above on
6(4). 2. 1289 b 243. 1289 b 27. 151
1289 b 12, we find in them some sort of answer to this question,
but the answer which we find in them is by no means distinct, and
the main aim of the two chapters seems rather to be to explain
why there are many constitutions (an inquiry for which we have
not been prepared in the opening chapters of the Book, though it is
referred to in c. 13. 1297 b 28 sqq. as having been dealt with), and
at once to account for and to disprove the view that there are only
two constitutions, democracy and oligarchy, a heresy of which we
hear nothing in cc. i and 2. A further defect of the Third and
Fourth Chapters is that (as has been pointed out in vol. i. p. 495,
note i, and Appendix A : see also below on 1290 b 21-24) tne y
give mutually inconsistent accounts of the parts of the State without
distinctly substituting the one for the other. The first discussion
traces the variety of constitutions to a variation in the way in which
office is distributed to the different kinds of Srjpos and -yi/wpi/not, the
second to a variation in the combinations made of the various
forms assumed by the cultivators, artisans, deliberators, judges,
and other necessary parts of the State. According to the first
discussion, again, the reason why democracy and oligarchy are
thought to be the only two constitutions is that the one represents
the rule of the many and the other the rule of the few, and that the
remaining constitutions are deviation-forms of these, while accord
ing to the second the reason is that a constitution implies the rule
of a distinct class and the only necessarily distinct classes in
a State are the rich and the poor, the former ruling in oligarchy^
and the latter in democracy. It is more easy to see that these
chapters are unsatisfactory as. they stand than to say how it happens
that they are not more satisfactory than they are. There seems to
be little doubt that both of them are from Aristotle s pen it is,
indeed, possible that, as has been pointed out above on 1289 a 30,
a reminiscence of a passage in the Fourth Chapter (1291 a 24 sqq.)
is contained in 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 2-5 but it is difficult to think that
he intended the two disquisitions, c. 3. 1289 b 27-0. 4. 1290 b 20
and c. 4. 1290 b 21-1291 b 13, to stand together in the text of
the Politics. He may have written the second of these disquisitions
in the margin of his manuscript of the Politics with the intention of
substituting it for the first, or with the intention of using the two
disquisitions as materials for a third, which would take their place
on a final revision of the work, and an editor, finding the manuscript
in this state and misinterpreting Aristotle s purpose, may have
I 5 2 NOTES.
added whatever was necessary to make a connected whole of them.
Throughout the Sixth (old Fourth) Book there is much to suggest
the suspicion that an editor s hand has been at work, piecing
together materials which Aristotle had left in an unconnected state, or
which at any rate were unconnected, whatever the cause. Susemihl
brackets as interpolated the entire passage 1289 b 27-1291 b 13,
but then the succeeding sentence 1291 b 14, on p.fv ovv etVl TroXirelat
TrXetovy, KOI 8ia rivas alrias, eip^rm Trporepov, ceases to have anything to
refer to, unless we take it to refer to 3. 6. 1278 b 6 sqq. Besides.
1291 b 1 6, (pavepbv 8e TOVTO icai tK T>V elprjfuwav, appears to refer to
1289 b 32 sqq.
ToG \j.ev ouv K.T.X. Mev ovv has nothing to answer to it. Other
explanations why there are more constitutions than one are to be
found in 3. 6-7, in 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 37 sqq., and in 7 (5). i. 1301 a
25 sqq. In these passages Aristotle shows that there are more
constitutions than one, and why this is so, but he does not show
how large the number of possible constitutions is. He shows in
3. 6-7 that six constitutions exist, for rule may be in the hands of
one man, or a few, or many, and the one, the few, or the many may
rule for the common advantage or for their own, and elsewhere he
shows that rule may be awarded for virtue, as in kingship and
aristocracy, or for military virtue, as in polity, or for wealth, as in
oligarchy, or for free birth, as in democracy, or it may be won by
force and deceit, as in tyranny. But now he shows that the
number of possible constitutions is not limited to six, but is very
large. Constitutions, he now tells us, vary in relation to the parts
of the State; these parts vary and rule is distributed among the
varying parts in a varying way (c. 3), or the varying parts are
_ combined in a varying way (c. 4). It may be noted that the ex-
planations given in the chapter before us and in the succeeding
chapter do not seem to account for the existence of kingship and
tyranny.
29. eireiTa ir^Xi^ K.T.\. Cp. c. ii. i295b i sqq., and contrast
8 (6). 3. 1318 a 30 sq.
31. KCU TGJV euTT-opwi 8e K.T.X., and indeed of the well-to-do and the
poor the one part, [the well-to-do,] heavy-armed, and the other part,
[the poor,] without heavy arms. Cp. 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 33, where ol
oTrXIrai are distinguished from 6 8^0?, and 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 12, TO
yap OTT\ITIKOV ra>v eviropwv eVrl paXXov r\ T>V airopw. Yet SCC note On
1294 a 41. Aristotle cannot mean to say that a part both of the
6 (4). 3. 1289 b 2936. 153
well-to-do and of the poor was heavy-armed and a part not, for
surely none of the well-to-do would be avoir\oi.
32. KOI TOC fief yewpyiKoy Srjp.of 6pup.ec ocra, TOV 8 dyopaioc, TOC
8e pdVauo-oK. Aristotle usually divides the demos into four classes,
not three cultivators, artisans, traders, and day-labourers (8 (6). 7.
1321 a 5 sq.) or into five, if we add herdsmen and shepherds (8
(6). 4. 1319 a 19-28). In 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 18 sqq. he adds TO irtpi.
rrjv 6a\arrav and TO ^17 e apfporfpaiv TroXtTwi/ f\evdepov. Thus he
omits in the passage before us day-labourers and herdsmen and
shepherds, to say nothing of the two last-named classes. See note
on 1319 a 24, and as to the dyopaloi note on 1291 a 4.
33. icai TWK ycupip.wi K.T.X. Here, as often elsewhere, the
antithesis to 6 8rjfj.os is ot yvatpi^oi, a wide term including not only
01 TrXovo-toi, but also those whose claims were based on birth or
virtue (cp. c. 4. 1291 b 28 sqq. and 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 38 sqq.). See
note on 1304 b i.
34. Kd! icard TOC irXouToy icai TO, p,ey^0T] TTJS oocrias. Bonitz (Ind.
357 b 34) remarks as to the first <ai, Ad KOI praeparativum post
aliquod intervallum en referri videtur in Pol. 6 (4). 3. i289b 34,
40. To fjityedr) TTJS ova-iat is probably added to make it clear in
what sense 6 TT\OVTOS is here used, for the word was sometimes
used in the sense of 17 apery rfjs ccnjo-ecos (i. 13. I259b2o). For
the absence of Kara before Ta p.e-yedr) see critical note on 1330 b 31.
35. olov i7nroTpo4>ias, sc. Sia^opa eVri. For the genitive of Epex-
egesis, see note on 1322 b 5 and Riddell, Apology of Plato, p. 124,
who quotes Apol. 29 B, apaiB ui . . .avrrj 77 tmvtQfuTTOS, T) TOV o tfa-Qai
tlSfvai a OVK olSev, and other passages. For the fact mentioned
cp. 8 (6). 7- 1 3 2 I a 1 1 , atS m-noTpofyiai TK*V paKpas ovcrias MXnpCNtD
fla-iv. 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 16 sqq.: Xen. Ages. i. 23. Why were
rich men alone able to rear horses? We never find the same
thing said of the rearing of horned cattle or sheep (cp. i. n.
i258b 14), or even of mules. The reason must be that horses
were used in ancient Greece mainly for war, racing, or similar
purposes, and that it did not pay to keep them.
36. Sioirep K.T.\. The sense is and hence it was that in ancient
times States whose strength lay in their cavalry were ruled by the
wealthy, for the wealthy alone could rear horses, and that oligarchies
existed in them. Aristotle s language implies that this was not as
much the rule in later days, though it would seem that even in later
days the more pronounced type of oligarchy found a congenial
154
NOTES.
home in States whose territory was suited to cavalry (8 (6). 7.
1321 a 8 sqq.).
38. expwrro 8e K.T.\., and they were in the habit of using
horses for their wars with their neighbours. It would be difficult
in early times to transport horses by sea for use in distant
campaigns. The fact stated shows how important horses were to
the State, and explains why supremacy in the State fell to those
who were able to keep them. Wars with neighbours were more
trying and more full of peril than any others (Demosth. Olynth. 2.
21 : De Cor. c. 241). For one thing it was easy during such wars
for slaves to desert en masse (C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant., ed. Bliimner,
4. p. 89). For \prjcr6ai, Trpbs TOVS TroXe povj, Cp. 2. 6. 1265 a 22, TOIOVTOIS
xprjo-6ai Trpbs TOV TroXf/iop oVrXou, and Aristot. Fragm. 499. 1559 a 31,
ApitTTOTe\r]s 8e (prjcriv ev TTJ A.aK(8aip.ovia>i> TroXiTfia xpr/adat AaKf8aifj.oviovs
(pmviKidi npbs TOVS iroXefiovs. The sentence would be improved if the
second irpos were omitted (for 7rdXep>s aoTvyeiYow cp. 4 (7). 10. 1330 a
17 sq.), but see note on 1328 a 19. We have in Ad. IloX. c. 35,
if the text is correct, f< TrpoKpircav e /c T>V xiXi o>i>.
39. As to the oligarchy of the Hippobotae at Chalcis see Strabo,
p. 447 (Aristot. Fragm. 560. 1570 a 40 sqq.), and as to the oligarchy
of the Knights at Eretria see 7 (5). 6. 1306 a 35 sq. The Thessa-
lians were ImroTpocpoi. (Heraclid. Pont. ap. Athen. Deipn. 624 c-e).
As to Magnesia on the Maeander we read in [Heraclid. Pont.]
De Rebuspubl. C. 22, lmroTpo(poi 8 tlaiv, ov Tporrov KOI KoXo^coi toi,
TTfSuida x^>P av fX ol>Tfs - I n T ^ >v n\\(ov TroXXol nepl rr)v Acriav there IS
no doubt a reference to Colophon (cp. Strabo, p. 643) : Cyme
also is probably among the cities referred to ([Heraclid. Pont.]
De Rebuspubl. c. n. 6). See notes on 1297 bi6 and 1321 a 8.
Caria is said to be unsuitable for cavalry in Xen. Hell. 3. 4. 12
(cp. Julian, Or. 7. 205 D), and though this cannot have been true
of the lower part of the valley of the Maeander, Aristotle is
probably not speaking in the passage before us of most of the
Greek cities of Caria. No doubt also he is not speaking of the
islands off the coast of Asia Minor.
40. In K.T.X. Cp. Plato, Laws 7 1 1 D, ^leyoXai? rial fiuj/aorei atr, j)
Kara fiovap^iav dwaarrfvovcrais fj Kara TT\OVTU>V vrrfpo^as dicuptpovorais r)
yevuiv.
1290 a. 1. K&f ei n STJ K.T.\. To what is this a reference ? According
to Susemihl (Sus. 3a , Appendix, p. 366), to 4 (7). 7. 1328 a 17-9.
1329 a 39, and it is true that TOVTUV yap K.T.X. (1290 a 3 sqq.) may
6(4). 3. 1289 b 38 1290 a 7. 155
refer to 4 (7). 9. 13285 29 sqq., but we hear nothing in 4 (7).
79 of a 8ta(pupa ru>v yv<i)pip.cav KOTO yfvos, Or indeed of 8ia<popai T&V
yvupifjiuv of any kind. Is not the reference rather to 3. 12. 1283 a
14 sqq. ? See vol. ii. p. xxv.
3. -rouTwy yap v pt-puv tc.r.X., [for these parts are the cause
of the existence of a plurality of constitutions,] for sometimes all
of them share in the constitution, and sometimes a smaller number
of them and sometimes a larger. In democracy, for instance, all
kinds of yvuptpoi and all kinds of demos share in the constitution
(4 (7). 9. 1328 b 32 sq.), while in the more extreme forms of
oligarchy only nriroTpofoi. share in it.
7. iroXiTeia fiey ycip K.T.\. This is added to explain and justify
what has just been said, that the existence of parts of the State
differing in kind involves the existence of constitutions differing in
kind. A constitution is an ordering of the parts of the State in
relation to their participation in magistracies. One constitution
gives the magistracies to the rich, another to the poor, another to
rich and poor together, and constitutions differ according as they
give the magistracies to one part of the State or to another. I repeat
here for the sake of convenience the translation of the passage
already given in vol. i. p. 566 for a constitution is the ordering
of the magistracies of the State, and this ordering all men distribute
among themselves either according to the power of those who are
admitted to political rights or according to some common equality
subsisting among them I mean, for example, the power of the poor
or the rich or some power common to both. Thus there will
necessarily be as many constitutions as there are ways of ordering
the magistracies of a State according to the relative superiorities
and differences exhibited by the parts. For Kara nv avrS>i> unmjra
KOIVT)V, Cp. PlatO, LaWS 695 C, VOfJlOVS ^InV 6fp.fl>OS OLKf iv IfTOTTjTO. TlVa
Kotvfjv ftV^f pwi , and Pol. 6 (4). n. 1296 a 29 sqq., in addition to
3. 6. 1 279 a 9, orav f/ KOT lo-orr/TO. TU>V iro\iT<ov a-vvfffTrjKma <u xaff
o/ioioTTjra, and other passages referred to in vol. i. p. 566, note i.
With ru>v diTOpcw 77 TO>I> fvnoptav I supply rf]v dwapiv, and with 7? KOIVTJV
Tin dfj.(polv I supply 8vvap.iv. In 12, Kara rat imepo^as KCU Kara ras
Suxpopas TVV p.opia>v, it is implied that constitutions vary both according
to the superiorities (in wealth, birth, or virtue, or in numbers)
possessed by this or that part of the State and according to the
differences between the parts (for instance, the yvupipoi may be
yvupip.oi Kara TrXoOrov or Kara ye i/or or KCLT dprrtjv, and the demos may
156 NOTES.
be agricultural or trading or artisan). T>v popicov is emphatic.
Each constitution reflects a difference in the parts of the State and
the way in which office is assigned to them. For KOTO, TO? vnepoxas,
Cp. 3. 17. 1288 a 22 Sq. and 6 (4). 4. 1291 b II, &a-Tf Kal ras TToXtreiaf
Kara ras virtpoxas rovrav K.aBurra.O i, Kal 8vo iro\iT(iai 8oKov<Tiv fivai,
brjfjLOKpaTia Ka\ o\iyapxia : 7 (5). 9. 1310 a I : 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 26
sqq.
13. fidXtcrra 8e SOKOUCTIK elcai 8uo . . . 16. oXiyapxi - For the
structure of the sentence see note on 1253 b 35-37. Demo
sthenes took this view (vol. i. p. 494, note i). Nothing is said
about monarchy, but perhaps the inquirers here referred to regarded
it as a form of oligarchy. Those who viewed f] KO.T dpfrrjv dicxfropd
as a Sia<opa ran/ yvapiputv (i 289 b 40 sqq.) would naturally be led to
class apia-TOKparia as a kind of oligarchy ; Aristotle himself, in fact,
admits i" 7 (5). 7. 1306 b 24 that it is oXiyapxia rra>s. Polities,
again, were accounted democracies in early times (6 (4). 13. 1297 b
24). Not many, however, can have held the view that there were
only two constitutions, for we are told in c. 7. 1293 a 35 sqq.
that the existence of four constitutions monarchy, oligarchy,
democracy, and the so-called aristocracy was recognized by all,
though polity was generally ignored. There is a reference to
the opinion that there are only two winds in Meteor. 2. 6. 364 a
19 sqq. and in Strabo, p. 29, where Posidonius is quoted as saying
that it was not accepted by Aristotle or by Timosthenes (a Rhodian
writer of the first half of the third century B.C.) or by the
astronomer Bion. Some held that there were only two elements
and not four (De Gen. et Corr. 2. 3. 330 b 13, ot 8 fv&vs 8vo TTOI-
OVVTS, axTTrep Hap/j.fvi8r]s Trvp Kal yrjv, ra fifra^v fjiiyfj-ara iroiovcri rovrcav,
olov depa Kal uSwp), and some recognized only two Greek dialects,
identifying the ancient Attic dialect with the Ionic and the Doric
with the Aeolic (Strabo, p. 333). In the same way some studied
dichotomy in their divisions of animals (De Part. An. i. 2. 642 b
5 sqq.). This tendency would be favoured by the influence of
Heraclitus 1 teaching (see Plut. De Tranq. An. c. 15). But the
view that there were only two constitutions, democracy and
oligarchy, may well have been suggested by the fact that most
constitutions in ancient Greece were democratic or oligarchical
(c. n. 1296 a 22 sq.: 7 (5). i. 1301 b 39 sq.), just as the view that
there were only two winds, the North and the South, may well have
been suggested by the fact that the wind blew oftenest from these
6 (4). 3. 1290 a 1324. 157
quarters (Meteor. 2. 4. 361 a 6: cp. Theophrast. Fragm. 5. 2
Wimmer).
15. OUTOJ KCU Toif iroXiTCiuK 8uo, SC. (to~i] 8o*ei dvat : cp. 2O, KOI yap
(K(l TiQfVTai (*8r] Bvo.
18. wcnrep iv TOIS TryeujAaai K.T.\. Cp. Meteor. 2. 6. 364 a 19,
oAcos Se TO /iV /So paa TOVTCOV KaXcTrac, ra 8e voVia. trpoarriderai Se TO
M<v f<pvpiica TO) jSopea (^v\poTfpa yap 8ta TO dnb bvcrfj.S>v irvftv), voYw Se
TO c-Trr/XtwTtKa (BeppoTtpa yap TO> GTT dvaToXJ;? Tr^ftv). For the reversal
in the Order of the words, rbv piv f(pvpov TOV /3opeov, rov de VOTOV TOV
fvpov, cp. 27-29 and see note oni277a3i.
19. TOU Pope ou, sc. fl8os.
24. d\T]0^(rrepoi 8e Kal P^Xrioi ws ^fiis SieiXofxec K.T.\. The
inquirers criticized by Aristotle regarded democracy and oligarchy
as the forms of constitution of which the rest are deviations, but
Aristotle is always inclined to point to a mean form as the best and
to regard the extremes between which it lies as deviations from it.
Each of the moral virtues, for instance, is a /ifo-oV^y between two
extreme states which are deviations from it (Eth. Nic. 2. 5. no6b
27 sqq. : 2. 9. iiO9b 18, o piKpbv TOV <v irapfKftaivwv), and the
Dorian mode is a midway mode between two deviation-forms
(Pol. 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 42 sqq.). That the correct form of constitu
tion assumes only one or two shapes, while the deviation-forms
are many, is quite what we should expect: cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 5.
Ilo6b 28, ert TO fj.fv dfj.apTavfit> TroXXa^ois itrrllf (TO yap KaKov TOV
aneipov, cjj ot Ilvdayoptioi fiKaov, TO 8" ayaGov TOV rrfnfpaarp.evov), TO 8e
KoropBovv p.ovax5>s, where Aristotle follows Plato, Rep. 445 C, / pev
fivat fiftos TTJS aprrr)s, anfipa 8e TTJS Kaxias. Cp. also 7 (5) ^- I 3^ 1 3,
26 sqq., where the existence of a multiplicity of constitutions is
traced to the fact that men err (apapTavovrcav) in their attempts to
realize TO SUaiov KCU TO KOT avaXoylav Ivov. AXrjdeaTfpov KO\ jSeXTtoi ,
because it is better so to classify constitutions as to give prominence
to the best. Qs ^leTr 5ietXo/iv, i.e. in c. 2, where apio-TOKparia
and /Sao-iXft a are said to be the best constitution, and oligarchy,
democracy, and tyranny to be deviation-forms (1289 a 38, b 9).
Aristotle, however, speaks in the passage before us as if the polity
was also a deviation-form, but this is probably by inadvertence;
he speaks more exactly in c. 8. I293b 23 sqq. Plato had already
said in Rep. 445 D, 449 A, that the best constitution may take the
form either of a kingship or of an aristocracy, and that all other
constitutions are deviation-forms of it. Aristotle s teaching in 3. 7.
158 NOTES,
4 sqq. (cp. 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 26-30) is different (see vol. i.
p. 218).
27. oXiyapxiicas fiec K.T.\. Oligarchy is here compared with
tense modes like the mixo-Lydian (5 (8). 5. 1340 a 42 sqq.) and
democracy with relaxed modes like the softer variety of the Ionian.
The metaphor recurs in 7 (5). 4. 1304 a 20 sqq. and in Plut.
Pericl. c. 15, Coriolan. c. 5 sub Jin., and Lycurg. c. 29 sub fin.
Cp. also A$. IIoX. C. 26. 1. 2, pera 8f ravra mvtjiaivfv avifcrdai fj.a\\ov
TTJV TroAirei av 8ia TOVS TrpoOvpcos drj/jLaycayovvras, and Demosth. C.
Androt. C. 5 J > TTUVTO. npaoTtpd etrnv tv drj^oKparia.
C. 4. 30. Oo Set 8e ndecai S-qjioKpaTiac K.T.\. In Tives Aristotle prob
ably refers among others to Plato, who had said in Polit. 291 D,
SE. KOI fifra. fj.ovap)(iav eiTroi ris av, ot/xai, rfjv viro TO>V o\iy<av SvvaffTfiav.
NE. 2S2. TTCOS 8 ov , SE. rpirov 8t cr^/ia TroXtre/as oi^ 17 rot) Tr\f]6ovs
apxr), drjuoKpuTia Toward K\rjdel(ra ; The reason why Aristotle takes
so much pains here to correct this definition of democracy and
oligarchy appears to be that he holds that it tends to facilitate the
error of reducing all constitutions to these two forms. He seeks,
therefore, to show that democracy and oligarchy cannot be defined
as forms in which supremacy falls to the majority or to the few, or
even (though we thus approach nearer to the truth) as forms in
which supremacy falls to eXev&p/a or to wealth; they are rather
forms in which the eXfvdepoi being a majority, and the rich being
a few, rule. Two things (fXevdepia and superior numbers), or even
three, if we add poverty, must be conjoined in those who are
supreme in a democracy, and two things (wealth and paucity), or
three, if we add high birth, in those who are supreme in an
oligarchy. If we thus define democracy and oligarchy, it becomes
impossible to group all constitutions under these two heads and to
treat polity as a kind of democracy and aristocracy as a kind of
oligarchy, for in the polity the hoplites rule, who do not belong to
the poorer class, and in the aristocracy rule falls not to wealth or
to high birth, but to virtue. It is evident, then, that this inquiry as
to the true definition of democracy and oligarchy is not altogether
out of place here, looking to what precedes it, but we are surprised
that no notice is taken in it of the similar inquiry in 3. 8, especially
as a different definition of democracy and oligarchy is there arrived
at, and one which takes fuller account of the difficulties of the
question. For if in a democracy the free-born and poor being
a majority rule, and in an oligarchy the rich and noble being few
6(4). 3. 1290 a 274. 1290b 5. 159
in number rule, what are we to call the constitutions in which the
free-born and poor not being a majority rule, and those in which
the rich and noble not being few rule? They cannot be called
democracies, no r can they be called oligarchies. This difficulty
is considered and solved in 3. 8, but it is neither considered nor
solved in the chapter before us. It should be noted that, notwith
standing what he says here and in c. 8. 1294 an sqq., Aristotle
takes TO Kvpiov flvai TO 86gav TO IS ir\(ioo-ii> as a mark of democracy in
1291 b 37 sqq., in 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 28 sqq., and in 8 (6). 2. 1317 b
4 sqq. (cp. 8 (6). 3. 1318 a 18 sqq., 24 sqq.).
31. dirXdis OUTUS, in this unqualified way : cp. Plato, Gorg.
468 C (where Stallbaum translates, sic simpliciter, ita ut nihil aliud
respiciamus ), Protag. 351 C, and other passages referred to by
Ast, Lex. PlatOn. S. V. dnrXaiy.
Ktu yap iv rats oXiyapxicus *a! irarraxou TO irX^ov fxepo; Kupioc, i.e.
TO n\ft>v pepos TU>V fi.(T(xovTa>v TJJS TroXiTf/aj (cp. C. 8. 1294 ail sqq.).
35. Toig rpiaicocriois KCH ireVijo ii K.T.X., to those who are but three
hundred in number and poor, though free-born (or perhaps of
citizen-birth ) and alike in all other respects. For rot? rptaKoo-iois
Kai rrevrjo-iv, cp. 8 (6). 3. 1318 a 25, TO ru>v TrXovcricav KOI eXarrdfwv, and
6 (4). 1 6. I3Oob 22, TO Trtpl T(0>v I8i(ov crvvaXXayftdraiv Kal t^ovrcov
fitytdos, and Polyaen. Strateg. 5- 47> r ^ s wtmfrat KO\ irfovs rois
tviropois Ka\ anrfvvi crvveKpovaev.
37. TOU TOUS, i.e. the members of the 7r6\is in which this is the
case.
el ir^nrjTes fiey 6Xiyoi etec, Kpeirrous 8e K.T.X., if there were
a few men poor but stronger, etc.
39. nji Toiaimjc, sc. TroXiTei ai/. For similar omissions see notes
on 1266 b i and 1279 a 9.
3. Aeu Ocpoi fici yap iroXXoi, irXouaioi 8 6Xiyoi, for there are 1290 b.
many free-born, but few rich.
4. Kal yap &v K.T.X., for otherwise, etc. (i.e. if we define ,
oligarchy as the rule of a few).
6. TIKCS. Herodotus says (3. 20: see above on i282b 27) that
the Ethiopians chose their kings in this way (Schneider, Eaton).
The case, however, which Aristotle is imagining is the choice not
of kings, but of magistrates for their stature. In Hist. An. 2. i.
499 a 20, S><nrtp \tyowi TUXS, Herodotus (3. 103) is similarly
referred to.
t\ KOTCI KciXXos. For the choice of kings on this principle, see
160 NOTES.
(with Schneider, Eaton, and Sus. 2 ) Athen. Deipn. 566 c, Strabo,
pp. 699 and 822, and Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 142 (Miiller, Fr. Hist.
Gr. 3. 463), but these passages refer to kings, not magistrates.
7. ou8e TOUTOIS \iovov, i.e. TrXovTo) *ai fXfvdtpia.
8. d\\ eirel K.T.\., but since there are more elements than one
both in a democracy and in an oligarchy, we must add this further
distinction that, etc. It is implied that democracy does not exist
unless all its elements (the free-born, the many, and the poor) are
present in the ruling class, nor oligarchy, unless all its elements
(the rich, the few, and the noble) are present in the ruling class.
Aij/io? here = &7/ioi>cp<m a, as in i29ob i and c. 3. 1290 a 16. For
the expression popta rou 8f]fj.ov KO.\ TJ)S oXiyap^tar, cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 a
24, TO. 8 oXXa jrKrjdi] tiavra. cr^eSci , e >v ai XoiTrat drjfjioKpaTiai a~vvf(TTa(Ti,
TroXXw (pav\6rfpa TOVT&V. The. elements Of a democracy or an
oligarchy seem here to be the elements of which the dominant
class in each is composed. The term p6pioi> rfjs 7roXtraj is other
wise used in c. 14. 1297 b 37, c. 15. 1299 a 4, and 7 (5). i. 1301 b
22. For irXeiova neut. plur. (not TrXfico), cp. c. 2. 1289 b 13. The
neuter plural substantive /xdpta is followed, as often elsewhere, by
a verb in the plural.
9. ol t\eu 0epoi must here mean those of full citizen-birth. In
Apollonia on the Ionian Gulf (for /$X7ra is to be supplied, see note
on 1329 b 20) and in Thera no one seems at one time to have been
accounted of full citizen-birth who was not a descendant of the
earliest settlers. Ho-ai/, 12, implies that this was no longer the case
in Aristotle s day. Compare 3. 2. 1275 b 23 sqq., where we read
that there were those who denied the name of citizen to any one
who could not trace back his origin to two or three or more citizen
grandfathers. Apollonia and Thera in a similar spirit required of
those who held office a pedigree reaching back to the very founda
tion of the colony. Oligarchy in these two cities was evidently of
an old-world type, based on nobility of birth rather than on wealth.
Apollonia was in many respects a kind of foil to its neighbour
Epidamnus ; it was an eui/o/iamm? TrdXt? (Strabo, p. 316), whereas
Epidamnus was famous for its civil broils (Thuc. i. 24. 3). It was
situated nearly seven miles from the sea, and more than one mile
from the river Aous (Strabo, ibid.), whereas Epidamnus was a seaport ;
unlike Epidamnus, it kept strangers at a distance, just as Sparta did
(Aelian, Var. Hist. 13. 15, on ArroXA&warai fvr]\acrias eiroiovv Kara TOV
ETTtSa/moi 5e ejriSij/ietf T^apd^ov ra>
6 (4). 4. 1290 b 715. 161
12. ol Sia^poyres icar euyeVeiaK ical irpwroi Karaa)(orr6s T&S
dirotKias. Km seems here to be explanatory ; nobility in these two
States was based on descent from the earliest settlers, for npuroi
Karaa-xovrts ras diroiitias no doubt includes the descendants of the
original settlers, as well as the original settlers themselves. Ot
TrpebToi Ka.Ta<rx6vTfs ras d-rroiicias were the founders not only of the
State but of its worships (Rhet. ad Alex. 3. 1423 a 36, KOI on ru>v
oiKt^ovrtav ras iroXeis Kal rols Btols i&pvcrap.fv<i>v TO. lepa /iaXiora
ras nep\ TOVS 6eovs eVifieXeiay). Compare the monopoly
of the more important offices at Thurii by the Sybarite element in
its citizen-body (Diod. 12. n. i : Pol. 7 (5). 3. 1303 a 31 sqq.), and
similar distinctions within the citizen-bodies of some Phoenician
settlements (Freeman, Sicily, i. 294). The same thing happened
at Venice according to Machiavelli, Discorsi sopra la prima Deca
di Tito Livio, i. 6 init. As a great number of people were forced
to retire into those isles where Venice now stands, and the multitude
at last increased to such a degree that it became necessary to make
some laws, in order to live peaceably and securely together, they
established a form of government, and assembling frequently in
council to deliberate on the affairs of the city, when they thought
they were numerous enough to form a State, they ordained that
nobody that should come thereafter to live amongst them should
have any share in the government; and in course of time, when
a sufficient number of inhabitants outside the government had
settled in the place to give distinction to those who governed,
they called themselves Gentlemen, and the others men of the
People (Farneworth s Translation with some modifications).
Compare the way in which in the South African Republic
the Boers have excluded the Uitlanders from full participation in
the suffrage.
14. oXiyoi orres iroXXwy. For this use of the partitive genitive,
Cp. Plato, Tim. 39 C, ra>v 8 3X\a>v ras ireptodovs OVK evvfvoTjKoTes
avQputTTOi, ir\T]V oXi yoi r<av iro\\>v.
cure &v ol irXoucrioi K.T.X., nor if the rich rule [not because of their
wealth, but] simply because they are more numerous than the poor,
does an oligarchy exist. Cp. 3. 8. 1280 a I, avaynaiov /LUX, onov av
(ipx^m Sta TrXovTov av T eXdrrovs av rt TrXet ouj, flvai ravrrjv o\iyap\iav,
where Sta uXovrov is emphatic. As to the reading oXiyapxta see
critical note on 1290 b 15.
15. otoi lv KoXo4>uta TO iraXaidf. For the fact cp. Athen. Deipn.
VOL. IV. M
162 NOTES.
526 a sqq. The war with the Lydians referred to occurred during
the reign of Gyges, who captured Colophon (Hdt. i. 14), and
therefore during the first half of the seventh century before Christ
(Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 458). Colophon was not only strong
in cavalry at the time of which Aristotle speaks, but also had
a fleet (Strabo, p. 643).
16. fiaKpdv oucriav. Cp. 8 (6). 7. 1321 ail.
18. Kupioi rJ]s apxfjs waic, have rule in their hands : cp. 1290 a
33, Kvptoi TTJS TToXirft ar, and 35, /"? pfTa&iSdiev dpxrjs. The phrase is
not a common one. For TTJS dpx^s cp. 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 8, npos re
TT)V dpXTJV.
21. "On fief ouv . . . 24. iroXiv. The first of these sentences is
repeated ini29ibi4 sq., and it is likely enough that the disquisition
which finds a place between these two identical remarks is a subse
quent addition, whether it was inserted here by Aristotle or by some
later hand. The sentences from 21, on pev ovv, to 24,7roXtv, look as
if they had been added by some editor, who has sought to link
together two inconsistent disquisitions on the plurality of constitutions
found by him in Aristotle s manuscript or among his papers. See
note on 1289 b 27. The inquiry just concluded is said to have
shown that there are more constitutions than one and why an
inadequate account of its drift and the inquiry now announced is
said to be designed to show that there are more constitutions than
those which have been mentioned and what they are and why
this is so, but in reality the two inquiries deal with the same subject,
though they are not at all in agreement (see note on 1289 b 27).
Congreve, Sus., and others take the constitutions which have been
mentioned (T>V dprj^evtav, 22) to be democracy and oligarchy, and
certainly it is not easy to see what else the words can mean. But
then it seems difficult not to attach the same meaning to T>V
(lprjfj.fva)v no\iTiS>v in 37; yet, if we do so, we must conclude that the
inquiry which commences in 22 is intended to prove, not that there
are more kinds of constitution than democracy and oligarchy, but
that there are many varieties of democracy and oligarchy. This,
however, can hardly be what it is intended to prove, for it is a point
to the proof of which a separate inquiry (1291 b 15-30) is devoted.
We seem, therefore, to be compelled to fall back on the only
alternative open to us, which is to explain T>V flp-q^vaiv iro\iTfia>v in
37 differently from v tlprjuevvv in 22, and to take the former
expression to refer to the six constitutions enumerated in c. 2.
6 (4). 4. 1290b 1G 25. 163
1 289 a 26-30, and the latter to refer to the two constitutions,
democracy and oligarchy.
23. TTjk eipTjfieVTjt irporcpov, in c. 3. 1289 b 27.
25. wairep OUK ci u> ou irpoii]poujj,e6a Xapeiy eiSir) K.T.\. Eucken
(Methode der Aristotelischen Forschung, p. 54) distinguishes this
deductive mode of arriving at a classification of animals from the
inductive method by which the classification of animals is arrived
at which we find in Aristotle s zoological works (for this see
Dr. Ogle, Aristotle on the Parts of Animals, p. xxxiii). The two
methods are mentioned side by side, as Eucken points out, in
Top. i. 8. 103 b 3 sqq. in reference to the inquiry contained in
that passage how many kinds of ravrov there are. The teaching,
however, of the text as to the nature of a zoological species agrees
in the main with that of the zoological works. Both there and here
Aristotle bases identity of species on identity of parts : see Ogle.
p. 148, who says, When the individuals in a group are precisely
alike in all their parts, the group is a species, and p. 141, and cp.
Hist. An. i. 6. 491 a 14 sqq. and De Part. An. i. 4. 644 b 7 sqq.
We note, indeed, one difference between the passage before us and
the teaching of the zoological works, for while in them we are told
that a difference in any one part suffices to produce a difference of
species, we are told here that only a difference in a necessary part
does so. The question then arises, what parts are necessary to an
animal. The list of necessary parts here given is a good deal longer
than that which we find in De Part. An. 2. 10. 655 b 29, 71-00-1 yap
ToTf o>oty Kal TfXfiois 8vo TO. dvayKaiOTara p.6pui ifTtv, y re 8f^ovrat
TTJV Tpo(pr]V Ka\ rj TO 7repirrci>/ia d(f)r](TOV(Tiv, Or in Hist. An. I. 2. 488 b 29,
irdvrcw 8 etTTJ ra>v <aa>v Koiva p6pia, co Se^fTat TT/V Tpr,<pr)v xal els o Se^eTai
. . . ^iera 8e TaGra aXXa KOIVII p.6pin r^et ra TrXfTcrra TUIV fajwc rrpoy rovroty,
17 d<f)iT)(ri TO rrepiTTiofia TIJS Tpoffis [al 77 \aplBdi>fi] ov yap ndaiv vrm p^ft
ToCro. (caXfirat 8* T* p.(v \afjLJ3dtxi, (TTopa, fls o fit de%(Tai } KotXi a (where
Aubert and Wimmer omit xai^Xa^avet), or in nepl vfoT^Tos na\ y^p<as
2. 468 a 13, TOIUIV 8e fjitpaiv OVTCHV fls a 8iaip(lrai jrdvra TO reXfta rav
feoo)! , tvbs p.fv 11 8(x(Tat rr]v Tpotprjv, evos 8 i; TO 7TpiTTU>p.a irpoifrat, Tpirov
8e TOV fj,fo~ov TiivTO)v ) TOVTO fv fifis Tols [jifyKrTois Tu>v cati>v KaXfirai (TTr)6cs,
(if 8t Tols aXXoir TO dvdXoyov . . . ckra 8* avruiv e o~rl iroptvriKa, rrp6o~KfiTat
Kai p.6pia TO npos ravTTjv TIJV virrjpfo-iav, ois TO tiav oi&ovo-t KVTOS, (TKeXr) T
Kal n68es not TO. TOVTOIS f^ovra rr\v avTrjv 8wa/xi . In the passage before
us Aristotle appears rightly to mark off the parts which serve for
locomotion from those which it is necessary that every animal should
M 2
164 NOTES.
possess. He can hardly mean that any and every difference in
a necessary part suffices to constitute a difference of species, for in
that case blue-eyed men would belong to a different species from
black-eyed men. Bonitz (Ind. 151 b 54 sqq.) points out that eiSq
is used here and in 36 interchangeably with jfvrj, 33. See above
on 1258 b 32.
irpwToy has nothing to answer to it, for it does not seem to be
taken up by npos 8e TOVTOIS, 28 ; the second step, however, apparently
is to point out the possible varieties of each part. A similar question
arises as to the use of Trpfarov in 7 (5). i. 1301 a 25 (see note).
26. ecid re rutv al(rQ-r\-n}pi(av. Organs of touch and taste are
regarded by Aristotle as the most indispensable (De An. 3. 12.
434 b 1 1 sqq.) : next come organs of smell. Aristotle doubts
whether some animals possess organs of sight and hearing (Hist.
An. 4. 8. 535 a 13 sqq.).
27. TO TTJS Tpo^rjs epYaoTiKoV, i. e. the mouth : cp. Hist. An. 2. 5.
501 b 29, 6 8 f\e(pas o86vTas [J.ev e^et, rerrapas f<p fKarepa, otr Karepyd^fTai
Ti]v rpo(j)T]v, and Ilfpi vforrjTOs 3. 469 a 2, <pavepov roivvv OTI piav pev riva
ep-yacriav f] rov crTOfiaros Xetroup-yft 8vvap.is, erepav 8" TJ rrjs Koi\ias Kepi rr]V
28. ots Ki^eiTai (j-opiois, like C. 5- 1292 b 8, Sxnrfp f) rvpavins tv rais
fjiovapxims KOI Trepl r/s T(\fvraias ("iTTO/jifv 8r]fjLOKpa.TLas tv rats 8r)fj.oK.paTims.
29. el or] Too-aura [eiSt]] povov. Cp. Eth. Nic. 3. 7. ni4b 12,
where ft 617 raCr ea-rlv dXrjdfi similarly refers back to what has
preceded. I cannot follow Thurot and Sus. in reading ft 8e in
place of ft 8r). As to 8j see note on 1331 a 10, and as to [&;]
see critical note. Supply /j.dpia with roo-aCra from popiois, 28.
30. crrofiaTos rica irXeiw yevT\. So birds have a peculiar kind of
mouth (Hist. An. 2. 12. 54 a I 9> 0" r <V a ^ * ^pviffes ex ova t f**yt(Btov 8f*
ouVf -yap X e ^ T J ^ T> odovras exovcriv, dXXa puy^oy). As to differences in
the KoiXia, see De Part. An. 3. 14. 674 a 21 sqq. In homine pars
motus est pes, in ave ala, in pisce pinna, et rursus in homine bini
pedes, in beluis fere quaterni, et rursus in quaternis alii fissi, alii
solidi (Giph. p. 431). As to TWO. TrXft w yevtj see note on 1319 b 34.
32. TOVTW, SC. TO>V 8ia<f)op(i}V (cp. 34, 8ia(popds).
33. irXetw y 6 ^ IWOIK. In 25 we have (pov (not acav) ddrj. In
just the same way we have in Plato, Rep. 445 D, TrfW (rpoiroi Vl)
jroXtrftwi , and in Laws 735 A, 8vo noXirfias ftSiy.
rauroc IUQV, the same kind of animal.
35. TOUTUV, SC. TOJl/
6 (4). 4. 1290 b 261291 a 3. 165
cp. c. 9. I2p4b I sq.
36. TOU wou. See note on 1286 b 17.
37- TOC auToy 8e rp6irov nal rS>v clpqp&M iroXiTeiwK, and it is the
same with the constitutions that have been mentioned : i. e. there
are as many kinds of them as there are possible combinations of
the various forms of necessary parts of the State. For the gen. see
above on i253b 27. As to the constitutions that have been
mentioned see above on 2 1-24. It is easy to see how differences in
some of the parts of the State enumerated here (e.g. in the fighting,
the judicial, the well-to-do, the deliberative, and the official classes)
would cause a difference in the constitution, but how would
differences in the cultivating or day-labouring class or in the class
of artisans or shopkeepers do so ? And to what differences in
these classes does Aristotle refer ? Probably he refers partly to
differences in the relative numbers of these classes (for the effect of
such differences on the constitution see c. 12. 1296 b 26 sqq.) and
partly to differences in their composition. For instance, if the
/Saj/avo-ot or the dyopaioi or the BrjTfs consisted to a large extent of
persons open to exception on the score of their extraction (half-
servile, it may be, or half-alien or illegitimate), and persons of this
kind had access to the deliberative, the dicasteries, and the magis
tracies, the result would be that an advanced form of democracy
would exist.
39. waircp eipT]Tai iroXXciKis, in 3. i. 1274 b 38 sqq., 3. 12. 1283 a
14 sqq., 6 (4). 3. 1289 b 27 sq., and 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 23 sq.
cv fief our K.T.X. For the differences between this list of the
necessary parts of a State and that given in 4 (7). 8, see vol. i. p. 97.
40. ot KaXou fievoi yccopyoi. Here, as in 4 (7). 8. I328b 20 sqq.,
Aristotle omits from his enumeration herdsmen, shepherds, fisher
men, and hunters, though these also are providers of food ; perhaps
he is concerned both here and there only with those whose services
cannot be dispensed with. Plato had spoken in the same way in
Rep. 369 D. As to the expression ol KaXovpevot yevpyoi see note
on 1331 b 9.
2. &v aveu iro\iv dSuca-rof oiiceurdai. We see from 3. 12. 1283 a 1291 ;i.
20 sqq. (cp. 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 6 sqq.) that this phrase includes both
the things without which a State cannot exist and the things without
which it cannot exist nobly.
3. rots 8e els Tpu4>TjK ?j TO KdXus ITJ". These are the two opposites
to that which is necessary, for ra avayKaia are contrasted both with
166 NOTES.
TO. fls fvo-xT)p.oo-vvT]v Kal Kfpiovo-iav (4 (7). 10. 1329 b 27 sqq.) and with
T<iKXd( 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 32 sq.).
4. Tpiroi 8 dyopcuov K.T.\. For the omission of the article before
dyopaioi/ see critical note. For rds npavf is Kal ras uvds cp. 1291 b 19,
TO dyopalov TO irep\ uvrfv Kal 7rpa(Tu> 8iarp i@ov: Eth. Eud. 1.4. 1215 a 31,
Xprip.aTHTTiKas 8e (reacts-) ras irpbs dyopds p.ei> (dyopdo-fis Sylburg, SuS.)
<al Trpdcreis KaTrrjXiKas . PlatO, Rep. 5 2 5 C, OIIK utvrjs ov8f Trpdcreo)? X^P IV
QJ? ffLTtopovs T) KcnrrjXovs p-fXtruvTas : and Xen. De Vect. 3. 12. Neither
TO ayopaiov nor TO 6r)TiKov is included among the necessary parts
of a TrdXi? in 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 4 sqq., though it is afterwards implied
that TO drjriKov is among them (see vol. i. p. 97), but in 8 (6). 8.
1321 b 14 sqq. buying and selling are treated as necessary incidents
of life in a noXis, and in the passage before us Aristotle goes farther
and treats e/x7ropoi and Kdn-^Xoi as necessary classes. The term
TO dyopalov is used here apparently in a sense inclusive both of
e/iTi-opoi and of /i7rj?Aoi, but in Xen. De Vect. 3. 12 sq. (cp. Xen.
Mem. 3. 7. 6 and Plato, Rep. 371 D) e/xn-opot are distinguished from
uyopatoi. The dyopatoi were so called because most selling was done
in or near the agora (see Btichsenschiitz, Besitz und Erwerb, p. 469
sq.). The ftdvava-oi Ttxyirai and the df/res, however, were frequenters
of the agora as well as ol dyopaioi (8 (6). 4. I3i9a 28 sqq.). In TO
rrepl TO? vrpdo-ets Kal ras a>vas Ka\ ras e/JLTropias Kal KaTTJjXei as One irepi Serves
for all the substantives because the things they represent are nearly
akin. Compare the use of nepi in 4 (7). 6. I327b 16 sqq. and
4 (7). 12. 1331 b 6 sqq.
6. TO Q^IKOV. The existence in ancient Greece of a numerous
class of this kind deserves notice, for, according to Mommsen, Rom.
Staatsrecht, 2. 474. 4, the working of free persons for hire was
confined in Italy within narrow limits.
7. o TOUTWC ouSek TJTToV ecTTii dt ayKaloi uTrapx^i . For the con
struction see note on 1329 a 35.
8. pi Y&P K.T.X., for is it not impossible that it should be meet
to give the name of State to a State which is by nature the slave
of others ? For figiov tlvai cp. 3. 14. i285b 17 sq. For the use of
/ii7 here see note on 1263 a 41. As to the importance of valour
to a State compare a Delphic response to Lycurgus quoted in Diod.
7. 14. 2 and the comment of Ephorus in the next section, and also
Ephor. ap. Strab. p. 480.
9. rr\v 4>u<7i 8ou \r]c, not TVXU : cp. I. 2. 1 253 a 3, 6 an-o\i.s oui
(f)vcrii> Kal oil 8id rv^rjv.
6 (4). 4. 1291 a 419. 167
10. auTdipKTjs yip *\ T<5Xi$, TO 8e SouXoy OUK aurapK69. For the
reversal in the order of the words see note on 1277 a 31.
TO Be SoCXof OUK auTttpKes. Cp. i. 2. 1252 a 26-34, and i. 5. 1254
b 20 sqq.
11. For If TTJ iroXireia see note on 1342 a 32. The reference is to
Rep. 369 6-371 E. For KO/X^&&gt;J, ov% i<avS>s 8e f iprjrai Bonitz (Ind.
s.v. KOTO S) compares De Caelo, 2. 9. 2 gob 14 sq. and 2.13.295516.
4>T](r! yap 6 IwKpcmjs K.T.X. Contrast Eth. Nic. 9. 10. 11700 31,
oijrf yap (K. 8fKa dvdpainmv ytvoir av TTO\IS.
14. irdXu 8e Trpoo-TiSTjo-iv K.T.X. Cp. Rep. 370 D.
16. CTI 8 efiTropoV re Kdl KairTjXof. Cp. Rep. 371 A-D. The
word KcwnjXos is often used by Plato, but seldom by Aristotle, who
here repeats it from Plato. It is omitted by mistake in the Index
Aristotelicus.
TauTa trami, neuter, though referring to men: see notes on
1263 a i, 1289 b 25, and 1307 a 39, and Holden s note on Xen.
Oecon. 6. 13, raAXa ra roiavra, who compares Demosth. Phil. i. 8,
KaTenrrjxe navra ravra, and refers to Jebb s note on Soph. O. T. 1 195.
As to the order ravra ndvra, not irdvra ravra, see critical note on
1282 a 40.
YtVerai, comes to be : cp. 7 (5). 4. 1304 b 5, 7 (5). 6. 1305 a 39,
and 8 (6). i. 1317 a 24.
17. TTJS Trpam]S iroXews, cp. 4 (7). 4. I326b 7 sqq.
<S Tail di/ayicaiwi TC X<ipw irao-ay iroXic <ru 6(m]Kuiai , dXX ou TOU
KaXou jAaXXof, icrof TC Seop.e rni o-KUTe uf Te Kal yeajpywc. All that
Plato says is that the vroXts comes into being for the supply of the
physical needs of those who form it, and Aristotle himself describes
the TroAis in i. 2. I252b29 as ywo\t.tvr\ TOU r\v evfKtv. Still a real
difference exists between them, for it is evident from the passage
before us that in Aristotle s view soldiers and judges and delibera-
tors must find a place even in the TT^WTJ; troXts, whereas Plato thinks
that soldiers need not, and says nothing about judges and deliber-
ators. Plato s language is open, in Aristotle s opinion, to another
objection also. It implies that shoemakers are as necessary to
a TroAi? as cultivators, which is far from being the case.
19. TO 8e irpoiroXefioui K.T.X. Cp. Rep. 373 D, OVKOVV TTJS TO>V TT\T]-
criov \copas f)/J.~iv amtfUfnov . . . TroXc/M^cro/iei/ 8f) TO p-era TOVTO, 2) T\ai>Ka>v ,
According to 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 7 sqq. a military force is necessary not
only for defence against external foes, but also to control insub
ordinate members of the State.
1 68 NOTES.
20. Trply r\ . . . KaTaoTcj<rii . See note on 1336 b 21.
22. dXXa fifjc . . . 33. TroXeus. Cp. 3. 12. 1283 a 19-13. 1283 a
26 and 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 16-25. For the necessity of a judicial
authority within the State, cp. 4 (7). 8. 13285 13 sqq. : i. 2.
1 253 a 37 sq. : 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 5 sqq. For *al eV i-oTy reVrapo-i ai
roiy oTToa-oia-ovi/ KOHxoi/oZr, where eV is not repeated, see note on
12895 34.
25. TO, Toiaura, parts of the aforesaid kind/ i. e. xpfaw" npbs
TToKiTinov &LOV, not npos TTJV avayKCiiav xprja-iv. For the contrast cp.
i. 5. 12545 28 sqq.
27. 8iKcuo0wT]s 8tKaoriKT)g. Compare the account of rj TTJS r&v
&iKa<TTo)v 8vvdp.fu>s tSt a apery given in Plato, Polit. 305 B. The refer
ence to the SiKaiocrvvr) SiKaariKTi possessed 5y judges and to the
a-vvfo-is iroKiTiKr/ possessed 5y deli5erators serves to sharpen the
contrast 5etween judges and deli5erators on the one hand and TO
els TTjp dvaynaiav xp^ (Tlv owreivavra on the other, and to suggest a
resem51ance 5et\veen the former classes and the soul.
TO pouXeuofxecof, OTrep eor! cruv.<T(.<i)s iroXiTiKTjs epyor. Cp. Eth.
Nic. 6. 5- 1140 a 25, 8o<el fir) (ppovipov final TO fivvaadai KaXuts (3ov\(v-
(racrdai irepl ra aurw dyada Kal crvfifpfpovra, ov Kara uepos, oiov TTO LU rrpos
vyieiav, Trpbs Icrxyv, dXXa rrola Tfpos TO fv ijv. I incline, looking to this
passage, to translate cnWo-ts TroXmKJ? here as political prudence/ and
not as the political art/ as Sus. 3 Ind. s. v.
28. Kal TCIUT etre K.T.X., and whether these three kinds of work
fall to separate classes or to the same persons makes no difference
to the argument, for it often happens to the same persons to 5e
hoplites and cultivators [and yet hoplites and cultivators are distinct
parts of the State]. For the construction ouSeV Siafapei </re . . . etre,
cp. Rhet. 3. 15. 1416 a 5.
31. Kal TaGra Kal eKeli/a, i. e. 5oth parts contri5uting to political
life and parts contri5uting to merely necessary uses, or in other
words 5oth parts which constitute the soul of the State and parts
which constitute its 5ody.
32. TO ye oirXmKoy, the hoplite force at any rate/ whatever we
may think of other 5ranches of the fighting class, such as trireme-
oarsmen : cp. 4 (7). 6. 13275 8, ov8fv yap avrovs (i.e. TOK vavrixbv
o^Xof) p.fpos flvai 8el rrjs TroXecay.
33. IpSojioK. The sixth part has not 5een named, and some
think that a mention of it has 5een lost in a lacuna 5efore t^o^ov,
5ut pro5a51y the judicial authority (22 sqq.) is the sixth, notwith-
6 (4). 4. 1291 a 20 1291 b 5. 169
standing the renewed reference to it in 39 sq. That the rich are
a necessary part of the State, we see from Dio Chrys. Or. 38 (2.
130 R), fl 8e rrdcrais p.fv rats TroXecri, /j.a\\oi> 8e ra is /ueydAai?, 8t1 (j.tv Kal.
T&V irKov&itov , Iva Kal ^oprjySacri Kal (ptXori/iaJiTui ravrl ra vevofj
34. SySooK Se K.T.\. Kai is explanatory, as often elsewhere.
Hesych. (s. V. 8rjutovpyos), Trapd rois Aapievcnv ol ap^ovrts, TO- S^/ioVia
TrpaTTOVTfs . Etym. Magn. (s. V. 8r)niovpy6s), 8j)p.iovpyol 8e fKoXovvro Trapa
re Apyeiois KO\ QeffvaXols ol irtpl TO. re\r] (see Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2.
327- 3>
35. XeiroupyoGc. See above on 1279 a u.
36. TOUS Su^ajieVous apxeif, those who are fit to serve as
magistrates : cp. 1291 b 6 and 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 32.
40. TauTd, i. e. TO PovXevecrdai Kal Kpivctv rrept TOJI/ SIKULCHV TOIS dp.(pt-
a-pr)Tov<nv. Sus. 2 (Note 1189) misses a reference to the work of TO
nepl ras dpxas Xfirovpyovv, but we often note an absence in the
Politics of absolute completeness and precision.
1. drayicaioi Kal p-erexovras etrai rifas dpeTrjs TW^ iroXtTtKui/. 1291 b.
These words have been interpreted in different ways. Some have
taken T>V no\iriKS>v as in the genitive after nvas : so Vet. Int. ( neces-
sarium et aliquos politicorum esse participates virtute ), Viet.,
Congreve, and Welldon. Sepulveda, however, following Aretinus
and followed by Giph. and Schn., translates utique necesse est ut
aliqui sint virtutis res civiles attingentis compotes, while Sus. (and
perhaps Lamb.) takes ra>v troXiriKciv as in the genitive after apfr^,
but makes the words masc. and not neuter. Sepulveda is probably
right : Cp. PlatO, Laws 643 D, T Xoj/ elvai T^S rov Trpdy^aros dper^s
(Stallbaum, virtutis quam negotium ipsius postulat ).
2. Tots p-ev ouc K.r.X. Cp. 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 25 sqq. The cultivator
in ancient Greece seems to have been sometimes also a handicrafts
man an interesting fact. This is confirmed by Diod. i. 74. 7,
Trapa y.tv yap TOIS aXXotj (i. e. other races than the Egyptian) t Sen/ ea-n
TOVS TX"iras irepl TroXXa rfj Siavoiq nfpicnrapfvovs Kal did TTJV it\eoveiav
pr] pfvovras TO napdnav eVl TT}S I8ias tpyaaias oi fj.ev yap etpdnrovrai
ytupylas, ol 8 (piroplas KOIVWOVO-IV K.r.X. : cp. also PlatO, Rep. 397 E, 551
E sq. That cultivators and handicraftsmen were often also soldiers
is well known. Mev ovv is answered by aXXa, 7. Awaits, powers
or capacities, such as the capacity to fight or to till the soil.
5. drrnroiouyTtu 8e Kal rqs dperfjs irarrcs, so that they would not
admit that a separate class of men possessed of virtue is a necessary
f
iyo NOTES.
part of the State. Virtue also, as well as serving in war, tilling
the soil, judging, etc. Cp. Eth. Nic. 9. 4. n66a 10, irpos eavTov 8e
TOVTO>V enaarov ro> eViet/cfi imdp^ei, rots 8f XoiTrots 1 , ?/ TOIOVTOI viro\ap.ftd-
vova-iv final, and 1 1 66 b 3 sq., and also the sarcastic line of Cratinus
(Inc. Fab. Fragm. 141 : Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 221),
dv8pu>v dpicTTcav Tracra yapyaipei TroXtj.
6. KCU TOIS TrXeioras dp^ois ap^eif oionrac. Sucaadai, SO that they
would not admit that a separate official class is a necessary part of
the State. That the demos did not claim a share in all offices, we
see from [Xen.] Rep. Ath. i. 3 (cp. Pol. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 20 sq.).
According to King George the Third (quoted by Bryce, American
Commonwealth, 2. 484) every man is good enough for any place
he can get.
7. 816 raura fAeprj p,dXi<7Ta etyai Soicel iroXecos, ot euiropoi tea! ot
airopoi. TaCra, i.e. ot Trtvopevoi KOI ol TrXovrovvres, Or, in Aristotle s OW11
words, ot evTropoi Kal ol airopoi. TaOra (= OVTOI), like raina in IO, IS
attracted into the gender of p,fprj (cp. avrr) in 5 (8). 3. 1337 b 32).
Aristotle on the contrary holds that a fighting class, judges, and
deliberators are parts of the State in the fullest sense, and not the
rich and the poor (1291 a 24sqq.).
9. en Be K.T.X. As to rauTa see preceding note. The rich and
the poor are again referred to. Cp. 7 (5). 4. 1304 a 38, KLVOVVTO.I
8 al TroXtreiat KOI orav rdvavTia flvai 8oK.ovvra pepr) rfjs TroXew? icrdfri
dXXrjXois, oiov ol nXovcrini *cat 6 8rjp,os, and 7 (5) 1 ^- I 3S b 25 sqq.,
where the a-nopoi and the evnopoi are spoken of as dvriKfip.va p.6pia.
EvavTia is emphatic not only parts of the State, as the rich and
the poor have been said to be in 7 sq., but also opposite parts of
the State, and it is into opposite part^ embodj/mg attrihute&aidikh
cannot be ^combined that a whole should be divided ...(cp. De Part.
An. I. 3. 643 a 31, eVi rots dvTiKfifjifvois diaipelv 8id(popa yap dXXi^Xots
rdifTiKfifJievaj oiov XevKOTrjs Kal fjifXavia KOI (vdvTr)s Kal Kannv\oTr]s^. These
inquirers, therefore, had something to urge in defence of their view,
but they erred in supposing that all men have virtue and capacity
for office. Besides, the rich and the poor are not as much opposites
to each other as the good and the bad (7 (5). 3. 1303 b 15 sq.).
For /xepij . . . fj.opi(av see note on 1339 b 38.
11. ware Kal rds iroXireias K.T.X., so that they [not only treat the
rich and the poor as opposite parts of the State, but also]/ etc.
Kara rds uirepoxas rouriav KaOioTao-i. Cp. 3. 17- 1288 a 2024
and 6 (4). u. 1296 a 27-32.
6 (4). 4. 1291 b 618. 171
14-30. That the first sentence of this passage repeats 12906 21
has been remarked already (see above on i29ob 21-24). The
doctrine of c. 3 that the parts of the State are the various kinds of
Sijuos and yvwpipoi reappears here intact, notwithstanding the totally
different account of the parts of the State given in c. 4. 1290 b 21-
i29ib 13 (see vol. i. Appendix A). Much of what is said in
1291 b 14-30 has already been said with less detail in c. 3. 1289 b
27-1290 a 2, and we hardly expect to find the ground gone over
again. In severing the artisan class from TO ^f/jj^rtKoV (19, 25) the
passage before us differs from 3. 4. 12 77 a 38 sqq. ; it may also
be not quite in accord with 1291 a 4 sqq. (see note on 21). We
are surprised to observe that little or no account is taken of its
teaching when the various kinds of democracy and oligarchy come
to be distinguished in 1291 b 3O-c. 6. 1293 a 34.
15. STI 8 lor! K.T.X. Plato in the Politicus (302 D sq.) had already
distinguished democracy according to law from the opposite kind,
and Isocrates (Areop. 60, 70) had distinguished well constituted
democracies from others. The Theban orator in Thuc. 3. 62. 4
had implied that a distinction exists between an oXi-yap^m iaovopos
and a Bwaa-rfia 6\iy<av dj/Spwi/, and Plato in the Politicus (301 A) had
marked off oligarchy according to law, which he calls aristocracy,
from oligarchy not according to law. Isocrates implies that there
are two kinds of oligarchy in Panath. 132. Aristotle advances
further in the same track.
16. Kal TUV ciprjfieVcjK, even from what has been already said
(in c. 3. 1289 b 28 sqq.) : cp. c. 6. 1292 b 23, e avrwi/ ra> (Ip^fv^v
(pavepov eanv. Aristotle says nothing here as to the other cause for
the existence of different kinds of democracy which he points out
in 8 (6). i. 13 17 a 22 sqq., a passage which may probably have
been written later than that before us.
18. otoK 8if](Aou fttf eiSif] K.T.X. In the terminology of the passage
before us whatever does not fall under the head of of yvapipoi falls
under that of 6 S^os. O S^o? thus becomes a term of wide
extension ; it includes not a few who were by no means poor ;
many rf^virm, for instance, were well-to-do (3. 5. 12 78 a 24) and
many fpnopoi. The /xe o-oi or moderately well-to-do, again, of whom
we read in c. 3. 1289 b 31, must here be reckoned among the
demos. But the term 6 Sij/xos is not always thus used. We some
times find it used in contrast not to ot yvvpipoi, but to 01 tvnopoi
(c. n. i296a 28: c. 12. i297a 9sq.: 7 (5). 9. isioa 5sqq.).
172 NOTES.
The demos then becomes the part of the citizen-body which is not
fVTropov, not the part which does not consist of yixopt.fj.oi, and is
consequently a less extensive class. In 7 (5). 4. i3O4b i sq.
and 6 (4). 12. 1297 a 12 sq., again, 6 8ijp.os is opposed to ol TT\oixnoi,
and in 6 (4). u. 12 96 a 25 to 01 ras ovo-ias e^oires-. The poorest
classes within the demos would be the fishermen (Theocr. Idyll. 21.
1 6) and the day-labourers (here called TO x f pi"i TlK > )- The trireme-
oarsmen at Athens must also have been poor. A demos of trireme-
oarsmen would be a demos of a very special type ; it would have
much more national feeling than a demos of epnopoi bent on gain
and wandering from one seaport to another (see Herondas, 2.
55sqq.), but it would be somewhat inclined to war: cp. Diod. 18.
10. i, where we read of the Athenian assembly at the outbreak of
the Lamian War, TTO\V rdis Trhr/dfcriv vrrepel^ov ol TOV TroXe/ioz/ alpov^fvoi
teal ras rpo(pas (la>66rts fX elv e K TOV Hi<r$o(popfiv ols TTOT e<pr)o~fv 6 <bi\iinros
TOV p.fi> TroKffiov eiprjvrjv virdp^eiv, rrjv de elpi]vrjv noXfpov (this, however,
was said by Philip of the orators of the Athenian assembly : see his
Letter to the Athenians, c. 19). There must have been a large
contingent of trireme-oarsmen in the demos of Carthage, if Meltzer
(Gesch. der Karthager, 2. 136) is right in thinking that the oarsmen
and sailors of the Carthaginian fleet were taken as a rule and in
the main from the demos. Aristotle includes the -yeapyoi in his
enumeration here, but not ol vop.e is, as to whom see 8 (6). 4. 1319 a
19 sqq.
20. KCU TOUTOU K.T.X. For the distinction between r6 Tropdfj.fvTiKov
and ro aAievTiKoi/, Cp. Xen. Hell. 5- Ji 2 3> ToXXa K U \ aXteim/ca (sc.
TrXoZa) eXajSe /cat Tropd^fla dvdponrcav ^fcrra KaraTrXe cwra ayro vfjcroov, and
as to the class of vessels designated by the word TropfyteZa see Busolt,
Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 3. i. 483. 8. Many Tenedians seem to have
been employed as sailors in vessels carrying passengers from
Tenedos or other islands to the mainland, or from one side of the
neighbouring Hellespont to the other. Another city in which many
of the inhabitants were similarly engaged was the Boeotian city of
Anthedon on the Euripus (Pseudo-Dicaearch. De Graeciae Urbibus,
C. 24, npo(TTTfTrovddTfs T>op0[jLOLS ol TrXflcTToi. KOI vdVTrrjyoi . ]Vl tiller, Fr.
Hist. Gr. 2. 259). As to ol iropdnevovres els Epvdpds in Chios see
Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 3, i. 592. Biichsenschiitz (Besitz und
Erwerb, p. 348) says, as to the crews of trading vessels we have no
information (fehlt es uns an Nachrichten), still it is probable that
they consisted to a large extent of slaves, and he refers to Demosth.
6 (4). 4. 1291 b 2026. 173
in Apatur. c. 8, but it would seem from the passage before us that
their crews often formed part of the demos and therefore must
often have consisted of freemen and citizens. The Athenian orator
Demades had been a vaimjs and a Tropfyieur (see Schafer, Demo
sthenes, 3. i. 19. 4), and the lowness of his birth was a stock
reproach to him. There was a proverb dnb KWTTTJS eVt %ia, indi
cating the length of the step from the one to the other. As to the
fishermen of Tarentum, see Mr. A. J. Evans in the Journal of
Hellenic Studies, 7. 35, and as to Byzantium, Dio Chrys. Or. 35,
2. 73 R> $ P ^*li r tva s oXXovy Tcjv naff j]^us (v8aip.ovas aKovopev j
Bvfavriovs, x<apav rt dpiaTrjv v(p.op.evovs KOI 6d\arrav fVKafmoTarr]v TTJS 8e
yr]S r)(Jif\T]K.acri 8ia TTJV apfrrfv rr/s 8a\aTTT)s T) fiev yap 8ta paicpov (pepfi ran
KapTrov avTols Kal Set Xa/Seu/ Ipyaa-apfvovs, 17 8e avrodfv fjiT]8(i> irovrjcrcuTiv.
Byzantium, as is well known, was a great centre for the tunny-
fishery (Strabo, p. 320). The soil of Chios was rocky, and though
its wine was good, its inhabitants must have been forced to live to
a large extent by commerce, like those of Aegina (see note on
1258 a 34) and other States in a more or less similar position (see
note on 1326 b 26). The passage before us shows that, whatever
may have been the case in earlier times (see Isocr. De Pace, 48,
Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 326 sq.,
and above on 1327 b n), in Aristotle s time many Athenian citizens
served as oarsmen in the fleet. To e/wroptKoj , however, must also
have been a numerous class at the Peiraeus.
21. xP T 1l JI aTlo " rtK oi , explained by tunopiKov in 24. Aristotle appears
to be speaking of seafaring men on board merchant-ships ; it is not
quite clear whether he includes f^nopoi among them. If he does, he
brings e/xTTopot here under the head of TO itep\ rfjv tiaXaTrav, not under
that of TO dyopcuov, as in 1291 a 4 sqq. For the contrast of no\(fiiKov
and xpjj/zaTto-riKoi/, cp. i. 9. 1 258 a losqq.
25. TO ~)(cpvT\rit(.6v, here apparently = TO 6r)ruct >v, though in 3. 4.
1277 a 38 Sqq. ot \tpvrirfs include 6 fitivavcros Te\viTT]s.
TO fUKpay %xov ouaiav, less than the -yewpyot, who are grouped in
c. 6. 1292 b 25 sq. with persons possessing p.fTpiav oixriav.
26. TO JIT] t dfj.4>OTe p<i>i iroXiToif i\tvQepov, that which is not
citizen by both parents : see vol. i. p. 248, note i, and cp. c. 6.
1292 b 39, where eXfvStpoi seems to answer to noXiV^s in c. 4.
1292 a 3. Cp. also Diog. Laert. 6. 4, oi/eiSifo/iej/o ? iron CAi/Tto-&W;j)
us OVK ("TJ eK 8110 fXfvdtpcw, " ov8e yap (K 8vo, f(pr), " jraXaicrTiKwv, d\\a
fju." At Athens, democratic though it was, the class of
174 NOTES.
half-breeds was looked down upon, all the more so probably
because the Athenians claimed to be avro^dovfs : cp. Eurip. Ion, 529
Bothe (589 Dindorf),
flvai (pavi TCIS avTO\6ovas
K\(ivas Adijvas OVK firtiffdKTOV yevos,
iv fcrnfcrov^iai Bva votrto KKTTJ fjievos,
TTClTpOS T firClKTOV KO.VTOS (0V VodayVT]S.
They were regarded as evoi (3. 5. 1278 a 26 sqq.) and were often
of partly servile origin (1278 a 33). Not every kind of democracy
admitted them to citizenship (ibid, and 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 6-n), and
even the democracies which made them citizens did so mostly when
they were short of genuine citizens, and withdrew the boon when
they ceased to be so (1278 a 29 sqq.). According to Isocrates they
were the bane of the States to which they belonged (Panath. 165,
TOIS re fjiT] ^vva/j-fvots tv Tois dVT&V fjv Kal Tols \flpov yfyov6<riv u>v ol i/o/not
Trpoo-TaTTovo-iv, alnep o>? eVl TO TroXv \vftaiimvTai ras TroXety : Cp. Schol.
Aristoph. Ran. I53 2 ) fJXLX^ a ^ u>crav ^ v i ( t"T T ^ KXeot^ooJ/ xai ol aXXoi otrot
rouro) 6fj.ot.oi fieri tvoi ev rat? TrarplfTiv CIVTU>V, Knl JUT) tv TTJ ArrtKr/ Kiveiru)-
crav TroXfpovs ov yap eanv avrcov rrarpls avrr)^. We learn from "A$.
HoX. c. 13 that the class of citizens whose extraction was not pure
was one of the classes which supported Peisistratus before he made
himself tyrant. Many demagogues belonged to this class (Gilbert,
Beitrage zur innern Geschichte Athens, p. 75 sqq.). It was to
a corresponding class at Rome that Scipio Africanus the younger
referred in the stern words which he addressed to the Roman mob,
Taceant quibus Italia noverca est (Val. Max. 6. 2. 3).
28. With T>\> yi copip.ut some such words as t ibrj TTOIOVO-IV must
apparently be supplied (Viet. notorum autem species constituunt
divitiae/ etc.). For the fact cp, c. 3. 1289 b 33 sqq. and c. 8.
1293 b 37 sq., and 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 39, oXiyap^ia at ytvfi KO\ TrXovrw
29. Kal ra TOUTOIS Xeyojxeca Kara TTJ^ auTrjy Sia^opdc. Tovrot? is
neuter, though it refers to masc. and fern, substantives : see note
On 1291 a 1 6. Kara rf/v avrfjv 8ta(j)opdv is fere idem quod Kara
Tr}v avTrjv avaroL^iav (Bon. Ind. 192 b 34), and ovarroi%ia = series
notionum quae eodem genere continentur (Bon. Ind. s. v.). Cp.
Metaph. A. 10. IOl8 a 35, ret fie TO tv Kal TO ov TroXXa^wr Xe yeTat,
aKoXovdflv avayKr) Ka\ TaXXa ocra Kara ravra XeytTat, coaT6 Kai TO ravrov
Kal TO eTfpov KOI TO fvavTiov.
30. STjjioKparia \t,tv ouv K.T.\. Aristotle now goes on to fulfil the
6 (4). 4. 1291 b 2832. 175
promise he makes in 15 sq. (cp. c. i. 1289 a 10 sq. andc. 2. 1289
b 1 2 sqq.) to show that there are more kinds than one of democracy
and oligarchy. As to the various kinds of democracy see Essay on
Constitutions. Aristotle deals with democracy before oligarchy
because it is less bad than oligarchy, and the better constitutions
deserve to be noticed first (c. 8. 1293 b 27 sqq.: 3. 7. 1279 a 23
sqq.). MeV ovv is taken up by p.iv ovv, 38, but to /*/ after Trpcor/; there
is nothing to answer. For the absence of the article with Sr/p-oKpar/a
Cp. 3. 8. 1279 b 2O, where See note. For 17 XeyopeVr; p,aXrra Kara TO
la-ov, that which is so called most in accordance with equality,
Cp. Meteor. 4. 3. 381 a 9, f] pen ovv Kara rfjV tyr)(Tiv hcyopevr] Treats
TOUT e o-TiV. Aristotle regards this kind of democracy as placing
rich and poor on a level more than any other, but his view is open
to question. It placed rich and poor nominally on a level, but, as
it did not provide pay, the holders of office would be unremune-
rated, and members of the assembly and dicasts would be so too.
Hence it would be difficult for poor men to play an active part in
the State, and Greek democrats would deny that this form of demo
cracy really placed rich and poor on a level. The constitution of
Rhodes as described by Cicero in De Rep. 3. 35. 48, in which pay
was provided, seems to make a nearer approach to this ideal. It
may, indeed, be questioned whether the kind of democracy described
in the passage before us falls within the definition of democracy
given in 3. 8. 1279 b 18, where democracy is said to exist when the
poor are supreme, not when neither rich nor poor are supreme.
It should be noticed that in the kind of democracy which
ranks as first in the Eighth (old Sixth) Book a kind which
appears to answer to the first two of the chapter before us
property-qualifications for office may or may not exist ; they may
be entirely absent (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 31 sq.), as indeed they may be
in the Trdrpios SrjfjLOKparia (7 (5). 5. 1305 a 28 sqq.), but they may also
exist, and indeed may reach a high amount in the case of the most
important offices (1318 b 30 sq.), and in that case these would be
quite beyond the reach of the poor.
32. TO jjujSey ficiXXof uirdpxeii TOUS Air^pous ^ TOUS euTropous.
Vndpxfiv is the reading of r MS P 2 3 6 etc. Vat. Pal. Bekk., while
P 1 4 Ar. Sus. have vrreptxtiv, but in 8 (6). 2. 1318 a 6 sqq., a
passage apparently based on that before us, we have ta-ov yap TO
pTjSei fia\\ov ap%(tv TOVS dnopovs 77 TOVS (vnopovs, fjuj&t Kvpiovs tlvai povovs
aXXu Tranras e laov KOT dpidp.6v. Hence Viet., followed by Schn.,
176 NOTES.
Coray, Stahr, Bonitz (Ind. 789 b 2 .sqq.), and Welldon, would
read Sp^fw in plate of inrdp^fiv. It is not easy to account for the
addition in the MSS. of the prefix VTT-, but I am inclined on the
\vhole to think that Viet, is right, unless indeed apxovras or some
such word should be added before imdpxtiv.
34. eiiTp yap K.T.X., [and the law is right,] for if, etc. Tap in
troduces a justification of the interpretation of political equality
adopted by the law of this democracy. Freedom will be enjoyed
by the citizens under a democracy of this kind, because office will
be open alike to all (cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 2 sqq.), and equality,
because they will all share alike. That freedom and equality were
commonly thought to go with democracy, we see from 7 (5).
9. 1310 a 28 sqq..: cp. 3. 13. 1284 a 19, Isocr. Areop. 60,
Plato, Rep. 562, and Plut. Themist. c. 27, where Artabanus says to
ThemistodeS, vp.as pev ovv e\tv8fpiav p.d\i.crTa 6avp.dfiv Koi icroTTjra
Xo-yoj. But in 3. 6. I279a2i Aristotle says that all the irapeK-
ftdo-fis are 8e<nruTiKai.
37. eirel 8e K.T.\. Here the test of the existence of a democracy
is found in TO <vpiov tlvm TO 86gav TOIS nXtioo-iv, notwithstanding what
has been said in c. 4. 1290 a 30 sqq. See note on that passage.
39. aXXo 8e K.T.X., and another, the characteristic of which is that
the offices are held on a property-qualification, this property-quali
fication being, however, small. Ael Se K.r.X. is added to make it clear
that admissibility to office is not confined in this kind of democracy
to those who at the moment of its institution happen to possess the
small prescribed property-qualification, but falls of right to any one
who may acquire the property-qualification from time to time, and
is not retained by any one who loses it. Cp. c. 5. 1292 a 41.
Mere^ftv, SC. T&v dpxmv. In rds dpxas dirb TifJ.r]p.dTcav elvai, 39, WC have
the plural dirb Tt/^/iarcor, and this occurs more frequently in such
phrases than the singular dn-6 TLp.fjfj.aTos, but the latter occurs in 7 (5).
6. 1306 b 7 sqq., 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 28, and elsewhere.
1292 a. 1. For the absence of 8e after Irepot cp. 4, c. 16. 1300 b 20, 31,
Rhet. 2. 23. 1397 a 2Oj uXXos eK TUIV 6fj.oia>v 7rTa><Tfa>v, and 3. 15- I4i6a
6, 13, 20, 21, 24.
2. oaoi dvuireuSuvoi, i. e. <ara r6 yivos: cp. c. 6. I292b35 sq., where
see note. Compare also Diog. Laert. i. 55, *al 6 dpybs virevBvvos eo-r<a
iravrl TU> jSouXo/ieVw ypd(pfo-6ai. To the mind of a Greek there would
be a great difference between a democracy which excluded from
office persons of illegitimate birth or wholly or in part of alien or slave
6 (4). 4. 1291 b 34 1292 a 4. 177
extraction, and a democracy which did not. Aristotle distinguishes
in 3. 5. 1278 a 17 sq., 26 sqq., between democracies which admitted
artisans and day-labourers to citizenship and democracies which
went further and made half-aliens and vodoi citizens. So Aeschines
traces disastrous results to a contamination of the Athenian citizen-
body (De Fals. Leg. c. i73> xapcfunvfortti* 8* ds TTJV nx&tn&ni f)p.S>v
OVK f\tvdfpa>v dv6pa>Tfa>v Kal TOIS rponois ov fj.Tpio)v K.T.X.). Compare
the cry sometimes heard in France, A bas les Juifs ! Vive la
France Frangaise ! Some States of the American Union are easier
than others in admitting aliens to citizenship (Bryce, American
Commonwealth, Part 3, c. 62 : vol. ii. p. 440 sq.), and this no doubt
affects the working of the State-constitution.
3. lav fiococ fj iroXiTTjs. This answers to 00-01 av e\fvdfpoi &&gt;o-t in
C. 6. 1292 b 39. Cp. 3. 5. 1278 a 27, o yap IK TroXtYiSor t!i> rtcrt
dtjfLOKpariais iroXirrjs fcrriv.
4. Ircpoi etSos SrjfioKpaTias K.T.\. Taura seems to mean the
same as in the last-mentioned kind of democracy. For <vpiov 8
tlvai, TO ir\fjdos Kal fj.f] TOP PO/XOI/ (where TO 7r\fj6os = 6 S^/ios, cp. ii and
26-28), Compare C. 14. 1298 b 13, o-u/*$ep 8e SrjfjLOKparia re rfj ^laXto-T*
fivut BoKoixry drjfjioKparia vvv (Xeyeo 8e ToiavTTjv tv rj Kvpios 6 8fjfj.os ai TO>V
vup-w itrriv) K.T.\. An Attic law quoted in Demosth. c. Aristocr.
c. 87 and Andoc. De Myst. c. 87 contains a provision, ^<pia-^a
firjdev fJirjTf PovXfjs /^"JTe Sij^ov vop,ov nvpitorepov flvai. In the kind of
democracy to which Aristotle here refers the assembly sets itself
above the law, and passes decrees which are not in accordance
with it. The majority of the Athenian assembly claims a right to
do this in Xen. Hell. I. 7. 12, rov 8e Ka\\igfvov n-poo-fKaXeVni To irapu-
vofjiu (pdcTKovrfs ytypa<j>(vai Evpvm6\([ji6s re 6 neicrtdi/aicTos Kai aXXoi rivts.
rov Se 8) ]fj,ov evioi ravra fnt ivovv, TO 8e TrXij^oy e/3oa 8eivw tivai ft pr) TIS
edo-fi rov 8ijp.ov irpdrrfiv o av /SouX^Tot : cp. [Demosth.] c. Neaer. c. 88,
o yap brjfjios 6 Adrjvaicw KVpiutTUTOS &&gt;v TQ>V eV TJ] TroXet hnavruiv Atal e^oi
GVTW Troiflv o Tt av j3ovX^rai, O^TCO KO\OI> Kal crffj.voi> TjyrjtTaT (ivat 8copov TO
A.6r)valoi> ytvtaQai, &arre vop.ovs (&TO avTia naff ovs noieto-6ai 8ft, lav Tiva
^ovXwvrat, iro\tTrjv, and see Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and
Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 310, on these two passages. Aeschines
appears to imply in c. Timarch. c. 177 sqq. that decrees were
often passed by the Athenian assembly which were in contra
vention of law. This may well have been the case, notwith
standing what Demosthenes says of Midias in c. Mid. c. 150,
r TtTtv^wy fj v6p.ots TWV aira<ru>v iruXtuv /zciXiora olKfl(r6ai SoKti.
VOL. IV. N
178 NOTES.
That Aristotle objects to rule uncontrolled by law, except in the
case of the absolute king, we have seen already (see note on 1 2 7 2 b
7 and cp. also 3. 16. 1287 a 28 sqq.). His statement that when
the decrees of the assembly come to be supreme and not the law,
this is due to the demagogues, appears to be inconsistent with the
statement which he makes immediately after, that demagoguei do
not arise except in the kind of democracy in which the law is
already not supreme. Elsewhere he does not seem to hold that
demagogues do not exist in democracies according to law, for
he implies in 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 7 sqq. and 7 (5). 10. 1310 b
i/ 29 sqq. that Peisistratus was a demagogue, yet he cannot think
that in those early times a democracy existed at Athens in which
decrees, not laws, were supreme: see also 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 28
sqq., where it is implied that demagogy is practised even in the
narpLa 8r]p.oKparia. In c. 6. 1 292 b 41 sqq. the rise of the ultimate
kind of democracy is traced to a different cause ; it is ascribed
not to the flattery of the assembly by demagogues, but to pro-
founder causes to an increase of the States in populousness and
in revenue and to the provision of pay. It is implied in 36 sq. that
the difference between a law and a decree of the assembly is that
a law is universal in its terms, whereas a decree is drawn to meet
the shifting circumstances of the moment (cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 14.
1137 b 27 sqq.) and is not universal. Yet we find an instance of
a decree of an universal character in Plut. Aristid. c. 22, ypdfpti
(6 Api(rrei8rjsf \|/?j^)tcr/xa K0ivr)i> elvai rrjv TToXirdav KOI TOVS ap^ovrat (
A.6r]vala)v iravTav atpcurdat. We might infer from what Aristotle says
here that it was the assembly only that shook off the restraints
of law in the ultimate democracy, but it would seem from 7 (5). 9.
1310 a 25-36 that the individual citizens also did so. Did the
dicasteries in an ultimate democracy observe the laws ? Aristotle
appears to be silent as to this in the Politics.
7. TOUS SruAayuYou s. The word 8rjp.ayu>y6s, which appears to be
modelled on mnday^yos, is occasionally used in a neutral sense of
influential p^Topts in general (e.g. in Thuc. 4. 21. 3, Isocr. De
Antid. 234, and [Demosth.] c. Aristog. 2.4), and in 2. 12. 1274 a
14 we hear of 8rjpaya>yo\ <pav\ot and in 7 (5). 5. 1304 b 26 of
fynayiayoi Trovrjpoi, so that we conclude that Aristotle regarded some
demagogues as good, but he commonly uses the word in an
unfavourable sense of those among them who habitually flattered
the demos. Here the 8rjp.ayuy6s is tacitly contrasted with of
6 (4). 4. 1292 a 711. 179
ru>v iro\iTvv, the upper class of citizens. The word is for obvious
reasons seldom used by the Attic Orators (with the exception of
Isocrates), and, if one may judge by the silence of Ast s Lexicon
Platonicum, never by Plato.
lv jjiei yap K.T.X. Supply voXfai (with Welldon). Cp. A0. EIoX. C. 28,
(u>s p.tv ovv HfpiK\f)S TTpoeicrTrjKfi TOV S^ou /SeXriw rd Kara rr]v iroXireiav
T)v^ Tf\fVTr](Tat>Tos tif H(piK\fovs TToAi/ ^dp6). TrpwTov yap Tore Trpoordr^i
tXafiev 6 8rjfios OVK (v8oKifj.ovvra Trapd rots ciruuteo tv tv 8e rots Trporfpov
Xpovois det ftiereXovv oi eirtfiKfls 8T)fj.aya>yovvTfs . Schol. AristOph. Pac.
681 (quoted by Sandys): and Pol. 2. 12. 1274 a 14 sq. (see note).
9. ol P\TIOTOI rdv iroXiroii , the upper class of citizens : cp.
8 (6). 4. 13i8b34 (where oi /Se Xrto-Toi = ot (ntfiKfls Kal yvuipinoi) : Isocr.
Hel. 33 (rovs pf\Ti<TTovs T0)i> woXtrwi ) : Diod. II. 86. 5 (ot ^apu o-Tarot
ra>v TroXiTwi/) : Plut. Phocion, C. 34 (ot /Se XTtcrroi TU>V TTO\ITO>V) . Thuc. 8.
47 (TOVS f3f\Ti(rTovs rcav dvdpancov) : Xen. Hell. 5- 2 - 6 (ot ^eArtorot
T>V MavTivtav), and Grote s remarks on this passage in Hist, of
Greece, Part 2. c. 76 (vol. 10. 50, note). It^wasjio doubt a name
which this class of the citizens had given themselves (Xen. Hell. 2_,
3". 22). But the phrase is sometimes used in a more purely ethical
sense, e.g. in Isocr. De Pace, 119, and perhaps in Panath. 148.
In c. 8. i293b 41 we have rots dpia-Tois TU>V iroKiT&v, and in Xen.
Hell. i. 4. 13 KpaTHTTos ra>v 7roXira>i/, used in this ethical sense.
L<T!I> iv irpoeSpia eiVii ot ^i/yio-rot (cp. 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 22).
11. fiompxos Y^P STJ|JIOS yivtrai K.T.\., for there (i. e. where
the laws are not supreme) the demos becomes a monarch. The
picture of a tyrant Demos surrounded by flatterers comes to
Aristotle from the Equites of Aristophanes : cp. Eq. 1 1 1 1 Didot,
aXfjv y *X (ts
navrfs av-
TTfp av8pa rvpavvov.
AXX* (uTTapdyoyos ei,
6<>>Trev6p.fv6s rt x a *~
pfis K.T.\.
and 1330,
toti^are TOV TTIS EXXaSoy ij/iti KOI rijr yrjs Tr/crSt p6vap\ov.
Compare 7 (5). n. 1313 b 38 sqq., 2. 12. 1274 a 5 sqq., and 6 (4).
14. 1298 a 31 sqq. It is when a democracy or an oligarchy (c. 6.
1293 a 17 sqq.) comes to be like a monarchy that law ceases to be
supreme and men become supreme in place of it.
N 3
i8o NOTES.
13. *Op]pog, in II. 2. 203 sqq., where Odysseus addressing men
of the people says,
ov fj.fv TTcas TrdvTfS @a<n\(v<TOfiv fvddb "A^atoi.
OVK dyaQbv TroXvKoipavtr) els Koipavos fcrrco, ^** 1>-
eis /3a<riXevs, to eSoxce Kpovov Trais uyKvXo/ii^rf co. < lr jy-
Aristotle sees that there may be two kinds of TroXvuipavir), one in
which the ruler is one, though made up of many individuals, and
another in which there are more rulers than one. As to the evils
of the latter kind, see Thuc. 6. 72. 3, Xen. Anab. 6. i. 18, and
Isocr. Nicocl. 24 sq.
15. 6 8 ou\> TOIOUTOS Sr]fi.os K.T.\., be that as it may, the kind of
demos we have mentioned/ etc., as in 23, though in 17 the same
words must mean (as in 8 (6). 4. 1319 b n) a democracy of
the kind we have mentioned. By 6 TOIOVTOS 8^/nos is meant a demos
which is not ruled by law. For the thought cp. Fragm. Trag.
Adesp. 426 Nauck (506, ed. 2),
navraiv rvpavvos 17 TV^T) tort TO>J> 6ea>v,
ra 8 oXX ovofjLaTa TCIVTO. TrpocrKfirai fj.drr]v
fj.6v7] dioiKelv ovv arravra j3ov\Tai,
or, if we adopt Nauck s reading in his second edition,
pottr] SiotKfl yovv arravd TJ /3oi>Xercu.
17. wore ot KoXaites ein-ijioi. Cp. 7 (5). n. 1313 b 38 sqq.:
Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 234 sqq. : Aristoph. Eq. 1116 Didot : Demosth.
Phil. 3. 4.
ical lane K.T.X. Cp. c. 5. 1292 b 7 sqq., 7 (5). 10. 1312 b 5 sq.,
37 sq., and 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 30 sqq. Had this been said of the
ultimate democracy by any one before ? Aristotle, however, does
not probably mean to say that this kind of democracy is as bad as
tyranny, for tyranny combines in itself the evils of the extreme
forms of oligarchy and democracy (7 (5). 10. 1310 b 3 sqq., 1311 a
8 sqq. : see also above on 1289 a 39).
19. SeairoTtKo, rwf jSeXTiocuy. Cp. c. 10. 1295 a 19 sqq. and
7 (5). 10. 1311 a 15 sqq. In the first, or most moderate, form
of democracy the fmtiKfls Kal yvu>ptp.oi are not ruled by men worse
than themselves (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 35 sqq.).
20. TCI eTriTcxYfiaTa, the technical term for the ukases of tyrants :
cp. Plato, Laws 722 E, rvpavvmbv fTTLTaypa, and 859 A : Stob.
Floril. 99. 34, o> (f)i\o<ro(pia, rvpavvind crov ra eVtrdy/xara, and DemOSth.
De Fals. Leg. c. 185, where, however, it is implied that oligarchies
6 (4). 4. 1292 a 13-32. 181
issue eViTay/xara as well as tyrants : also (with Viet.) Demosth.
01. 2. 30, el 8f rois fifv wcrTrfp fK Tvpavvi&os vfJ.u>v twtrAmtf drroS&xreTf.
n/jocrrayftara 8ecr7rora>i> occurs in Plut. Pelop. C. 34.
Kal 6 8t]p.aywyos K0 ^ ^ *oXa ol aurol Kal dkdXoyoc. Cp. 7 (5}-
ii. 1313 b 40 and Aristot. Fragm. 421. 1548 a 24, r5>v
TO. n\TJ0T} KO\aKfv6vTO>V, OK <f)T]<TlV AptOTOTf \.Y]S (V 7TO\iTfiatS
to in Bon. Ind. 174 a 38). Km before dvaXoyov means or, as in
2. 3. 1262 a 8, fito-x<Xi caj> Kal fjivpiav. See also note on 1294 a 35.
23. TOIS S^jiois TOIS TOIOUTOIS. For the omission of napd, see
notes on 1274 b 12 and 1295 a 29.
25. irdWa drdyorres els TOC STJ/JLOJ , everything, even matters
regulated by law. For dvayovrts cp. 8 (6). 2. I3i7b 32 sqq. and
2. 8. 1267 b 40. For the fact cp. c. 15. 1300 a 3 sq. and 7 (5). 5.
1305 a 29 sqq.
28. en S 1 ol TOIS dpxals eyitaXoGrres K.T.\., and further those
who bring charges against the magistrates [also add to the
supremacy of the people, for they] say, etc. Not a few held that
the many were the fittest judges of disputed questions when the
arguments of the contending parties had been placed before them
(3. ii : 3. 16. 1287 b 23 sqq.: so Athenagoras in Thuc. 6.
39- 0-
29. Several rt\v irpoKXTjo-ii , receives the invitation to decide
the question at issue. Ae xeo-&u rij/ Trpo /cXr/ow is a phrase of frequent
occurrence (Thuc. 3. 64. 5 : Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 7. 39 init. : Plut.
Pyrrh. c. 12 init., Sulla, c. 22 sub fin.}, and in Dion. Hal. Ant.
Rom. 7. 41 we have rrjv eVJ rov 8rjp,nv irpoK\T]cnv. Thus there is little
doubt that 7rp6K\T}(nv is the true reading here, and not Trpoo-KXr/o-tf,
though the latter reading has the support of Vat. Pal. as well
as n 1 .
wore KaraXuorrai irao-ai at dpx<u, as well as the law. Even the
Boule (c. 15. i299b 38 sqq. : 8 (6). 2. I3i7b 30 sqq.).
31. 6 <|xt<rKCDi . Plato is probably referred to : cp. Rep. 557 C sqq.,
Laws 712 E, and Plut. Dion, C. 53, firtvoti fie rfjv p.ev aKparov 8rjfjLO<pa~
riav, is ov noKirflav dXXa 7raiT07ra>Xto> ov&av TroXtrftwj/ Kara TOV TL\dru>va
K.T.\.
ou TroXiTciac. For the position of the negative see Waitz on
Categ. 6. 4b 22 and Bon. Ind. 539 a 5 sqq.
32. oirou yap JJ.T) c6p.oi apxoueru , OUK eori iroXireia. Cp. 2. IO.
1 2 72 b 9 sqq. If it is objected that the absolute kingship, in
which laws do not rule, is nevertheless a form of constitution,
i82 NOTES.
Aristotle s reply would probably be that the absolute king is himself
a law.
8ei yoip K.T.X., for the law ought to rule over everything, and
the magistrates and the citizen-body to decide [only] in reference
to particulars. For the suppression of only see note on 1282 a
36. Aristotle probably remembers the saying of Pindar quoted
in Hdt. 3. 38 (cp. Plut. Demetr. c. 42), opQw /zot 8oKei nivSapos
TrotTJcrai, v6p.ov iravrtov /3acriXea (prjcras elvai. The magistrates and the
citizen-body should decide about particulars, because the magis
trates will deal with some things best and the citizen-body with
others (3. n. 1281 b 21-38 : 3. 15. 1286 a 26 sqq. : 3. 16. 1287 b
15 sqq.). For the gen. ru>v naff fxao-Ta, see Kiihner, Ausfiihrl. gr.
Gramm., ed. Gerth, 417. 4. Anm. 10 c (p. 363), where Plato,
Rep. 576 D, dXX fvbaijjiovias re av KOI d6\ioTrjros wcravrtos fj aXXeus
Kpivfis; is referred to (see Stallbaum s note), and cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 b
36, at Trepi TO ^ov\ev6fj.fvov etcri ra>v xotvcav (see note On 1322 b 37)-
For Tj-oXtrfia in the sense of universitas civium see Bon. Ind. s. v.
and Liddell and Scott.
35. iv r\ v|rr)4>ia/Jia(ri irarra SioiKeirai. Cp. Ad. IIoX. C. 41, where
We read of Athens, airdvT<av yap avros avrov -rrenoirjKfv 6 8r]p.os Kvpiov
KOI ndvra dioiKelrai ^rri(^i<T^i.acnv Kal 8iKa(TTT]pioiS) ev ois 6 8fjfj.6s ftrnv
6 Kparcav, and Cic. De Rep. i. 27. 43, Athenienses quibusdam
temporibus sublato Areopago nihil nisi populi scitis ac decretis
agebant. Contrast the language of Demosthenes about Athens in
c. Timocr. c. I5 2 > V Y&P ToXts i^wi/, avOipfs dtKoorat, vopois KO.\
36. ouSec Y^P ei Sexerai i^^iafxa et^ou Ka06Xoo, and in constitu
tions the universal rules, because law rules in them and law is an
embodiment of the universal.
C. 5. 39. As to the various kinds of oligarchy see Essay on Constitutions.
40. fit] fiere xeii , sc. TO>K dp^utv, or, which is the same thing, rfjs
irXeious ocras. But suppose the poor are not more numerous
but fewer than the privileged class, does not an oligarchy exist
even then ? The answer given in 6 (4). 4. i29ob 19 sq. is No, but
in 3. 8. 1 280 a i sqq. Yes. In the polity the class which shares
in the advantages of the constitution is more numerous than that
which does not (c. 13. 1297 b 4 sqq.). Even in an oligarchy the
privileged class ought to be stronger than those excluded (8 (6). 6.
1320 b 26 sqq.).
6 (4). 4. 1292 a 355. 1292 b 7. 183
41. e^elvcu 8e TW KTWfitVu fiTe xeiy r>)s iroXiretas. That this was
the rule in the first form of oligarchy is confirmed by 8 (6). 6.
1320 b 25 sqq. (cp. 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 26-28). The words before us
are added because even where the property-qualification was not
high, admission to the privileged class might be made subject to
additional conditions, such as the abandonment of trade or selection
by the authorities (8 (6). 7. 1321 a 26 sqq.).
1. orav diro TifiTjfAaTui jiaKpuc <S<ric ai o.px at - Cp. 3. 5. 1278 a 1292 1).
21 sqq.
Kal cupdivTcu aurol Tou ^XXciiroi Tas. Awrot is usually explained
to mean the office-holders, but in c. 6. 1293 a 23, where the kind
of oligarchy referred to in the passage before us is further described,
avToi means ol raj overlay f^ovres, or in other words the class
which has access to office, the members of the TroXtVev/xa, and that
is probably what it means here. Toi>s fXXfirrovTas is explained in
c. 6. 1 293 a 24 by rovs ds TO 7roXi rev/ua SSa$iovras. I can hardly
think, therefore, that the explanation of Bonitz (Ind. 238 b to),
eos magistratus qui desunt/ is correct.
2. &\> [iv oui/ K.T.X. E< irdvrwv TOVTUV, from all those who
possess this property-qualification. For TOVTO>V thus used cp. ravra,
4 (7). 1 6. 1335 b 24, and see note on 1252 a 33. Aristotle regards
this mode of electing as comparatively aristocratic, and the mode
in which the choice is made from a designated section of those who
possess the property-qualification as oligarchical, because, when
some elect out of all, the arrangement is aristocratic (c. 15.
i3oob 4 sq.), and when some elect out of some, oligarchical
(1300 b i sq.).
5. elcriTj, sc. fls ras dpxas (so Stahr and Welldon), or possibly tls
TO 7roXiVev/xa, not, I think, els rr)i> ftov\T)i> (as Bonitz suggests, Ind.
224 b 15, where c. 14. 1298 b 2 sqq. is compared).
6. re is displaced ; it should follow vnapxn, not TO.
7. KCU evriv K.T.X. This echoes the corresponding remark about
the extreme democracy in c. 4. 1292 a 17.
For dyTiorpo4os wonrep, cp. De Gen. An. i. 19. 727 a 3, or*
avaKoyov <os roty apptariv fj yovr) otlrco TOtj 6rj\ecri TO. KaTa^ir/na, (pavfpov.
Aristotle probably has before him here Thuc. 3. 62. 4, where the
Thebans say, fal" ptv yap 17 iro\is rore fTvyxavfv OVT( K.O.T oXiyapxiav
Iffovo/jLOv Tro\iT(vov(ra ovTf KUTU 8r]p.oKpaTiav oTTfp 8e (<TTL VQJJ.OIS /xev KOI TO>
<r<i>(ppovc(TTdTa> (vavTiuraTov, tyyvr&nt 8f Tvpdvvov, Svvaarda oXiyvv dvdptav
(i%e TU npdypara. See also c. 6. 1293 a 31 and 2. 10. 1272 b 7-11.
184 NOTES.
9. KCU icaXoucn 8fj K.T.X., and further they call, etc. For Kal . . .
8f) see note on i253a 18. Viet, quare addit, vocare consuerunt
hunc dominatum paucorum dynastiam, quia par similisque est
huiuscemodi principatui : dynastas vero appellare mos erat regulos.
Zeus is called a 8vvd<mjs in Soph. Antig. 609. For the term
Swaore/a see (with C. F. Hermann) Thuc. 3. 62. 4 (quoted above)
and 4. 78. 3 : Andoc. De Reditu, c. 27 : Plato, Rep. 5440 : Xen.
Hell. 5. 4. 46 : Isocr. Paneg. 105.
11. ou Set 8e Xai Sdfeii K.T.\. This remark is added to convey
a caution : compare the similar caution introduced by del Se /XT)
\avddvfiv in 3. i. 1275 a 34 sqq. We must not suppose that the
list of democracies and oligarchies just given exhausts the subject.
It is not the case that the only democratically ruled States are
those in which the constitution as embodied in the laws is demo
cratic, and the only oligarchically ruled States those in which it is
oligarchical. There are virtual as well as actual democracies and
oligarchies. A State may be democratically ruled, though its con
stitution is oligarchical, if its customs and training are democratic,
and a State may be oligarchically ruled, though its constitution is
democratic, if its customs and training are oligarchical. When the
constitution is not in harmony with the prevailing customs and
training, the reason usually is that a revolution has occurred which
has affected the customs and training of the State, but has not yet
affected its constitution. Under circumstances of this kind the
law is often the last thing to be changed. Plato had already
spoken to much the same effect (Rep. 424 D: see vol. i. p. 78,
note i). It is interesting to observe that revolutions of a demo
cratic or oligarchical nature were attended with changes of customs
and training. A democratic revolution would bring with it an
alteration in the bearing of the poor to the rich and of the rich to
the poor, and an oligarchical revolution an alteration of an opposite
kind. Mr. Bryce (American Commonwealth, end of c. 76) refers
to England as a country where, though the constitution has
become democratic, the habits of the nation are still aristocratic :
this is the reverse change to that described by Aristotle. For a-vu-
ftaivtiv followed by wore see note on 1261 a 34. For the distinction
between ol i/o/zot and TO edos Kal fj dyayrj, cp. Diog. Laert. 3. 103, eav
P.T) bvrasv TOIV v6fj.a>v Kara fffrj Kal (iriTT)$fv/jiaTa ^pr/crrcos noXirfixovrai, for
eTTirr]8( vfjLara = aytoyiy, as WC SCC from Diod. II. 87. 5, Kal Ka66\ov
TroAXoi TO (f)av\a rcav fnirrfbfv^dTmv dvrl TTJS TraXaias Kal airovbaias d
6 (4). 5. 1292 b 9 6. 1292 b 25. 185
Some light is thrown on the meaning of dyuyrj by
Diod. 9. I. 4, STI 6 avros 2dXo)j/ rfjv 0X770 dycoy^i/ TT)? TroXfcos fxovcrrjs
latvixrjv, Kal 8ia TTJV Tpvcpyv KOI rf/v p^trr&vrjf fKTtdrj\vp.p.fi>a)v TWV di 8p<a7r<av,
fifTfdrjKe ri] (Tvvrjdfiq npos dpcrrjv /cat rjKov TO>Z> appfvcnratv 7rpdf<av,
14. The subject of iroXiTcueo-0ai is probably TTJV Tro\tTftav, 12, as
the Subject of oXryapxeltr&u, 16, is TT]V TToXiTftav, 15 (cp. 2. II. 1273 b
l): Compare PlatO, Laws *]Ol E, TOVTOOV eW/ta 8fj rroXiTiias rr\v re
fo-TroTiKa>Ta.Tr)v Trpof\6p.fvoi KOI TTJV eXfvdtpiKtoTarrjv fTTKricnnovfjiev vvvi,
nortpa Tovrcav op0>s iro\irfvfTai, and see note on 1293 b 8.
18. ou yap eudus fjieTaj3aii Oua i ii , SC. i o\iyap\ias fly ^p-oKpariav, or
vice -versa, for they (i. e. the citizens of the State which undergoes
a change of constitution) do not [in this case] change at once
from the one constitution to the other (cp. Plato, Rep. 550 D).
Bonitz (Ind. s. v. /xera/3aiVeii/) supplies t TToXtrtiat, but it seems better
to supply the Same subject with neTa@alvovcnv and with dyaTraxri.
19. irap dXX^Xuc, i. e. the oligarchical party from the democratic
or vice versa.
23. e afnuv rS>\> fipruitvwv, i. e. probably from the account which C. 6.
has been given in c. 4. 1291 b 17 sqq. of the different 5ij or ntprj
TOV drjpov. The reference may, however, possibly be to c. 3.
1289 b 32 sq. and i29oa 3-5. For in one form of democracy
(the ultimate form) all these kinds of demos both share (/iere^ovo-t)
in the constitution and take an active part in its working (xoH/coi/oOa-t),
whereas in two at any rate of the three other forms not all of
them even share in it, access to a share in it being accorded in
the one to those only who acquire a certain property-qualification,
and in the other to those whose extraction is unimpeachable, while
in all three those who share in the constitution (owing to the
absence of revenues and consequently of pay) have not the leisure
to take an active part in its working.
25. TO yeupyiitov Kal TO KCKTrifieVoK p,CTpiav ouo-iac. The yecopyoi
are a pare only of TO Kfur^fvov ptrpiuv ovo-iav, for the vopt is also
belong to this category (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 9 sqq.) and probably other
classes. The ycapyol of Aristotle are evidently peasant-proprietors,
and the vo^tls also may have been owners of land as well as of the
herds and flocks they tended (see notes on 1318 b 9 and 1319 a 19,
and for cases of the existence of democracies of this kind see note
on I3i8b 10). We read of ^frpia ova- la here and in 2. 7. i266b
28 sq., and the class which is here said to have p-trpia ova-ia appears
to be the same as that which is said in 8 (6). 4. 1318 b n sq. to
186 NOTES.
have (J.TI 7ro\\T)i> ov(Tiav : we read, again, of ovcria (j.fo~r) KO\ iKavfj,
a larger amount apparently, in 6 (4). n. 1295 b 40, of piKpa ova-ia
in 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 26 and ova-ia /3pax 6 a i 2 - 7- I2 67 a 9 sq., and
of fjLdKpa ovcria and aaKpal ovcriai in 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 16 and 8 (6). 7.
1321 a ii.
28. rok yofxoc eirioTTi]o-ai/Tes, setting the law over men s doings
as a ruler : Cp. Plut. Solon, C. 21, eVeVrqo-f 8e KOI rats egodois TUV
yvvaiKwv KO\ TO LS Tj-evdem Kal TUIS eoprais vouov drreipyovTa TO ara<TOV /cat
i/, and C. 6. 1293 a 2O, dvdyKTi TOV vupov diovv carols ap
ras drayKaias eKK\Tjo-ias. Cp. 8 (6). 4. I3l8b II,
Sia fjifv yap TO pr) TroXXijt" ovcriav fX fw acr^oXos (6 yempyiKos fiiy/xos), cocrre
(j,r) TToXXaxts fKK\tjo-id^eiv. It was when meetings of the assembly
came to be frequent that it was led to draw all authority to itself
(6 (4). 15. 1 300 a 3 sq.) and to set itself above the law.
29. TOIS 8e aXXois fjLere xeif e|ecmi K.T.\. So that not only does
the class in possession of power rule in accordance with law, but
the admission of those outside it to its ranks is also regulated by
law, and indeed by a law which does not leave it free to admit or
exclude whomsoever it pleases : contrast the law referred to in
1293 a 23 sqq. MtTfxftv, sc. Trjs n-oXtreiaj (cp. 39), or in other
words TU>V dpxu>v, though the yftopyoi and 01 K.fK.Tr]^evoi ^erpiav ovcriav
would enjoy only a nominal access to office, as they would not be
rich enough to hold office without pay (8 (6). 4. I3i8b 13 sqq.),
and pay is not forthcoming in this kind of democracy. It is not
clear whether in democracies of this type purity of extraction is
made a condition of sharing in the constitution, as well as the
possession of a certain property-qualification, but this may be
Aristotle s meaning.
30. oXws p-ey vP K.T.X., for that it should not be open on any
terms to all to share in the constitution is characteristic of an
oligarchy [and inappropriate to a democracy], but that it should be
open to all to do so is characteristic of a democracy ; hence it is
open [in this form of democracy] to all who have acquired the
property-qualification to share in the constitution, but it is impossible
[for the ruling class in it] to take leisure in the absence of revenues,
[and consequently to hold office]. As to the text of this passage
see critical note on 1292 b 30-33. "oXcos qualifies /4 e ^eirat : cp.
8 (6). 4. 13*9 ^ 8, TI TO oXoos prj t^fivai Kf<TT]a 6ai TrXet o) yr)v [itrpov TWOS
TJ OTTO TWOS TOTTOV irpos TO ao-Tv nal TJJV TTO\IV. For the repetition of ptv
6 (4). 6. 1292 b 2835. 187
cp. 3. i. 1275 a 23-26 and Plato, Rep. 421 A, el n*v oZv qjuel? ^v
(J)v\aKas ws a\T)6a>s Troiov[j.ev rjKicrTa KaKovpyovs Trjs TroAecoj K.T.A. For 8f
8rj cp. 12933 21 and c. n. 1295 a 34. Ac ty secundum usum
vulgarem Aristoteles ita adhibet, ut 8f) " manifesto fere " (sed lenior
vis est particulae 817) significans oppositionem urgueat, id quod
maxime post tl fit (Eucken, De Partic. Usu, p. 46). For TO //
o\a>s pf) e^elvai nacrtv oXiyap^iKov, cp. 7 (5)- 8. 1309 a 2, TO fj.ev yap
(f~ivai iratriv apxeiv 8r)/j.oKpaTiKov, and 3. II. 1281 b 28 Sq. By irp6<ro8oi
are meant special revenues providing a surplus which can be
distributed as pay or otherwise (8 (6). 5. 13203 29 sqq.). These
revenues might be derived from dependent allies or from an empo
rium (4 (7). 6. 1327 a 29 sq.) or from a monopoly of some special
product such as the silphium at Cyrene ([Aristot.J Oecon. 2.
13463 5 sqq.). See note on 13203 17.
33. TOUTO fiec cue etSos ev Sr]p,OKpaTia5 8ia raoras rag alrias, this
then is one kind of democracy by reason of these causes : i. e. it is
marked off from other kinds by the fact that, while it opens office
to all who can acquire a moderate property-qualification, and
therefore is a democracy, office in it falls to those who are enabled
by 3dequ3te means to take leisure. For Sia rain-as TUS alrias cp.
1293 a IO Sqq. and C. IO. 1295 a 23, rvpomdof /xei/ ovv (I8rj ravra Kai
Totravra 8ia TO.S elprjfjifvas alrias.
35. Sid, TTJI exop.e nr)! Siaipecrii/. I follow Spengel, Sus., and Bonitz
(Ind. i8b 52) in reading diaipfviv in place of aipea-iv, which is the
reading of r n Bekk. Sus. translates 8ia TTJV exoptv^v diatpfa-iv, durch
die zunachst 3ngrenzende Unterscheidung ( by reason of the
distinction which stands next in order ). Aia rfjv f^ofjtfvrjv aiptaiv
i s rendered by Sepulveda per proximam rationem mandandi magis-
tratus, and so Viet., L3mb., 3nd others. I should prefer the render
ing by reason of the choice [of a ruling class] which stands next
in order/ if atpfcnv were retained, but it seems better to read Siaipfaiv.
K.a.1 iraaii . . . rots dfuireuOocois Kara TO ylvos, to all those also
who are not open to objection on the score of extraction, as well
as to those who possess a certain property-qualification. For rols
dwTTfvdvvois Kara TO yevos, see above on 1292 3 2, and cp. Libanius
Life of Demosthenes (prefixed to Bekker s Demosthenes, p. 5),
&r)fj.oo~dfvei TO LVVV T<5 pi]ropi irarr]p TJV AT/jucxr&i/T/r, dvfntXrjnTos rw yevti
8oK<at> : Aeschin. C. CtCS. C. 169, ot/xtu TOUWP atravras an vfias 6fj.v\oyfjo~ai
rd8e 8f iv vndp^ai rw 8rjfj.oTiKm, npStrov /j.(v e\ev6tpov OVTOV fivat teal rrpos
rraTfjos *al Ttpbs fjLTjTpos, Iva jui) 8ia TTJV irtpl TO ytvos aTv\lav dvfTfifvrjs r;
1 88 NOTES.
Tols vopois oi cra>ov<Ti TTJV brjfioKpaTiav : A0. IloX. C. 13. 1. 22, ot r<S yevei
fj.r) Ka6apoi.
39. OCTOI &v eXeu 06poi WCTI answers tO eav povov rj TrdXirrjs in C. 4.
1292 a 3. It would seem from c. 4. 1291 b 26, TO /^ t dp.<portptov
TToXiTuv (\tv6fpov, that even those who were the offspring of only
one citizen parent would be accounted eXevdepm.
40. <3or dcayiccuoi K.r.X. Because, as there is no revenue to
furnish the ruling class with pay, they cannot meet in the popular
assembly often enough to usurp the place of the law (cp. c. 15.
1 300 a 3 sq.).
1293 a. 1. tj TeXeuTtuo. TCHS XP^ 01 ? * v TO "S ToXeo-1 yeye^fjiei t]. Cp. 7 (5).
5. 1305 a 29, TT]V vf(HTaTr]v 8r]p,oKpariav. Aristotle s language in 3. 4.
12*77 ^ *? ^ ^ irap eviois ov p-erel^ov ol 8t]p.iovpyo\ TO TraXaibv dp^cov, Trpiv
8ijp.ov yfveadai TOV fcrxarov, suggests that he regarded the ultimate
democracy as not having been introduced very recently.
8id yap K.r.X. Does ras TroXeis here mean cities or States ?
Ei> rnZj rro Xeo-i in the preceding sentence means in the States ; it
is probably, therefore, better to take ras ir6\fts to mean States/ but
when States are said to have grown larger, or in other words more
populous (for, notwithstanding 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 24 sq., fififav seems
here to mean more populous ), the increase referred to in their popu
lation is no doubt an increase in the population, and especially the
citizen-population, of the central city and its seaport, if it has one.
not an increase in the rural population. Hence the meaning of
the passage is much the same, whether we translate ras noXfis
cities or States. That an increase in the size and populousness
of a State was favourable to democracy, and in particular to
extreme democracy, we see from 3. 15. I286b2o sqq. and 8 (6).
5- 1320 a 17 Sq. : Cp. IsOCr. Areop. 62, rwv rolvvv a\\a>v 7rdAea>i> rais
fTTKpavfcrTaTais KOI /ifyiorair . . . evprjaofjifv ras S^juoKpartas p.5X\ov rj ray
6\i-yapxias av^Kpfpoixras. Athens is described by Critias in Xen.
Hell. 2. 3. 24 as the most populous of Greek States. This increase
in population would lead to an increase of revenue, because a large
part of the revenue of Greek States was derived from imposts which
would become more productive as the population of the State
increased, such as customs, market-dues (cp. 4 (7). 6. 1321 & 29
sq.), fees and fines in the lawcourts, and the like, to say nothing
of the probability that the State, as it became more populous,
would acquire dependent allies and would receive tribute from
them. Compare Xen. Anab. 7. i. 27 and Demosth. Phil. 3.
6 (4). 6. 1292 b 391293 a 10. 189
40. An ultimate democracy might, however, exist where there
were no irpocroftot (8 (6). 5. I32Oa 17 Sqq.). For irpoo-obav finropias
cp. Rhet. ad Alex. 2. 1422 a 13, irpo<r68a>v tvnopla (with Bonitz),
and for the plural tviropias Demosth. De Pace, c. 8, TO IS fKtWev
fvddbf Tas (viropias ayovo-iv, and Diod. 12. 30. I, 8ia ras Trpofiprjp-fvas
rvrjfttpiat,
3. fiCTe xouo-t fiec irdi Tes TTJS iroXireias 8101 TTJK uTTepoxV TOU
irXiiOous, all share in the constitution on account of the superiority
(in number, not in quality) of the multitude : cp. c. 12. 12965
24, OTTOU pfi> ovv VTT(pf)(fi TO T>V ajTopoiV 7r\T]dos TTjv (lpr)fjLfVT]v avokoyiav,
Kf(pvKtv flvai SrjfjLOKpaTiav, /cat tuavTOV (Idas dij/JLOKparias Kara TTJV
TOV OTJ(J.OV tKaarov, and 1 296 b 34.
4. KOiiwoikn 8e KOI iroXiTeuorrai. Cp. 4 (7). 2. 1324 a 15,
6 8ia TOU o~ufj.no\iTtvfcrdat KU\ Koivaveiv 7roXa)f (/3/os). For KOIMVOIKFI
cp. 8 (6). 4. 13195 2. no\iTevea-6ai is a wider term .than apx^v.
it includes sharing in any kind of political activity, for instance
habitual attendance at the meetings of the assembly and dicasteries.
Pay enabled the poor to attend frequent meetings of the assembly
(Plato, Rep. 565 A: Pol. 6 (4). 15. 13003 i sqq.).
6. TO TOIOUTOI/ ir\T]0os, the kind of multitude we have described/
i. e. one composed of poor men receiving pay.
8. TOUS Be irXouo-ious 6fJuroSici K.T.X. Cp. c. 14. 1298 b 13 sqq. and
8 (6). 5. 1320 a 27 sqq. Aristotle does not say that the rich often
did not belong to the Boule, but this seems to be a natural inference
from these passages. It is hardly likely that at Athens, if the lot
fell on them and they declined to serve, they were forced to do so.
They do not appear to have been liable to any fine for refusing to
serve on the dicasteries (c. 14. 1298 b 13 sqq.), and they were
probably not liable to a fine if they declined to serve on the BoulS.
As to the absence of the rich from the dicasteries at Athens see
Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 3. i. 289.
1O. Tci, ptv ouv K.T.X. Cp. C. IO. 12953 23 Sq., and for Sta ravras
TCLS dvdyKas (with Bon. Ind. 43 b 42) De Caelo, i. 8. 2773 n, rols
avrois TtKfUfftlou TOVTOIS xal ra~is avrais dvdyKats : cp. also Hippocr.
De Acre, Aquis, Locis, vol. i. p. 560 Kiihn, imb TOVTMV rS>v dvayKaiw
ov iroXvyovov ftmv TO ytvos TO Sici/diKov, and De Morbis, 4. vol. ii. p. 348
Kiihn, KUT dvdyKrjv Tomtit, and lamblich. Protrept. 96. i (quoted
by Blass, De Antiphonte Sophista lamblichi auctore, Fragm. E,
p. 15)? Sta TavTas ToLvvv ras dvdyKas TOV Tf vopov KO\ TO dixaiov p.f3acri-
\fvfiv TO IS dvdpvrrois. In Plato, Rep. 4890, rfjs 8f TU>V 7roAAo>i> irovrjpias
190 NOTES.
TTJV dvdyKrjv jSouXft ro Hera TOUTO 8if\6a>p.fv, the word dvdyKrj is explained
as = causa by Ast, Lex. Platon. s. v.
12. Ta 8e TT]9 oXiyapX 101 ?) SC. Totravra Kal roiaurd etrriv.
15. Kal 8ia TO irXtjOos etyai K.T.X. For raw /xfrf^oiTcoj/ rov 7roXtTi<-
^ai-os cp. c. 13. 1297 b 9. We see from what follows that the mere
numerousness of the dominant class does not by itself suffice to
secure the supremacy of the law, if the dominant class possesses
leisure, being either so rich as to be able to live without paying
close attention to its property or so poor as to be supported by
State-pay. The class which is supreme in an ultimate democracy
is very numerous, and yet it becomes collectively a monarch,
because it possesses leisure, being supported by State-pay.
17. We expect oo-u yap &v irXeloc K.T.X. to be answered by roo-ourw
p.d\\ov dvdyKf] rov vop-ov diovv avTois ap^eiv, but the clause is in fact
answered by dvdyKrj TOV v6pov diovv airols apxtiv without TOtrouTO)
p.d\\ov. This is probably due to the interposition of <a\ ^re . . .
7TQ\fa>s between oaa> yap av TrXdov dfl-e ^axrt rfjs p.ovap^ias and dvdyKT] TOV
v6p.ov df^iovv avrois ap^fiv. It rarely happens that TO&OVTCO p.d\\ov is
omitted after oo-w with a comparative. Kiihner (Ausfuhrl. gr.
Gramm., ed. 2, 582. ii. 2. Anm. i), however, gives an instance of
this from Xen. Cyrop. I. 3. 14, KOI \dpt.v croi etcro/iai ocra) av nXeovaKis
tla-irjs cos fft,f, and another will be found in Demosth. Prooem. 51.
p. 1457) OTO ydp av TiXeovaKis ftTdjj TIS avrd, dvdyKT) TOVS TOVTUV
alriovs evdoKLfj.f iv.
20. Viet., Eaton, and Sus. take auTois to be in the dative after
apxeiv (Viet. statuere ut lex ipsis imperet ), but the Index Aristo-
telicus gives no instance of apxfiv governing the dative, and perhaps
we should rather translate for them (Welldon, in their case ).
The position of the word makes it unlikely that it is to be taken
with dvdyKrj.
22. irXeiw 8e, SC. ovcrtav e^wcrt.
24. For TOUS eis TO iroXiTeujjia paSi^oi Tas, cp. Dittenberger, Syll.
Inscr. Gr. No. I7l- 60 (vol. i. p. 270), TOVS KaTax<apiop.evovs (Is TO
26. TOV cojj.01/ TtOei Tai TOIOUTOV, they enact the law in terms of
that kind, i. e. to the effect that the members of the TroAtYeu/ia shall
have the power to elect those who are to be admitted into it from
the outside. In the third form of oligarchy the law provides that
when a member of the Tj-oAiVeu/ja dies, his son shall succeed him, so
that in this form no one is admitted from outside (28 sqq.). For
6 (4). 6. 1293 a 127. 1293 a 35. 191
riQtvrai rmovrov, Cp. De Part. An. 4. 5. 680 b 27, 8ia TTJV avrf)i> 8
alrlav Kal 17 Koi\ta Totavrr) eo^torat.
iuT6iVwai, strain matters further in the direction of excess.
For fjriTfivfiv, non addito obiecto, Bonitz (Ind. s. v.) refers to 7 (5).
9. 1309 b 26, 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 30, and Eth. Nic. 6. i. usSb 23.
28. For 81 auroii e\f(.v cp. 7 (5). i. 1301 b 12, and Aristid.
LeUCtr. I. p. 421, ^eyfiv yap e<pr) 71736? avrovs EfTap.fivuiv&av a>s ov8(v
o(p(\t>s riiiv fv TTJ yfj rT\(ov(KTT)/juiTa>v, fl fj.f) Kal TTJV 6d\ciTTav 81 avr&v eov(rti>.
29. TOJC TeXeuTwvTwy, those who from time to time die : cp. 2. 8.
1268 a 8, and 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 2O, rcav TTITTTOVTUIV olKo8op.Tjfj.dT<av Kal
68uv (TUTTjpia KO.\ 8i6p6w(n<i, and 1322 b 21 : also Pint. Lycurg. c. 26
init. See note on i324b 18.
31. eyY"5 "f) ToiaoTTj Suyacrreta fiokapxias eorij repeats Thuc. 3. 62.
4, quoted above on 1292 b 7. H roiavrrj dwaa-Tfia, i.e. a 8vi>aa-T(ia
Tu>t> TroAi virfpreivovTiav rais ovcriais Kai Tais ird\v(f>i\.iais.
33. dinrtcrTpo<})oi TW reXeuraiw TT]S 8t]|uiOKpaTias. Cp. C. 14. 1298 a
31 sqq.
35. "En 8" eial K.T.\., and further there are/ etc. Besides that C. 7.
there are more kinds of democracy and oligarchy than one, there
are other constitutions besides democracy and oligarchy. Aristotle
has now dealt with the question which stands first in the programme
contained in c. 2. 1289 b 12 sqq., the question how many varieties
of democracy and oligarchy there are, and we expect that he will
pass OI1 tO the next, ris Tro\irfia Koivordrrj Kal ris aipfTtaTaTi) Ufra TTJV
apivTTjv 7To\iTftat>, but this he does not do ; he does not deal with
this question till c. n, and cc. 7-10 are occupied with investiga
tions respecting constitutions which have not hitherto been
sufficiently studied. Aristocracy has been studied, so far as it is
coincident with the best constitution, but the so-called aristocracy
(which, it would seem from 1293 a 38 sq., was the only form of
aristocracy commonly included in enumerations of constitutions) has
not been studied, nor have polity and tyranny. These forms are
therefore dealt with in cc. 7-10, before Aristotle passes on to the
question rtr TroXire/a Koivorarri Kal ris aipeTWTar^ p.tTa TTJV dpicrTriv 7ro\tT(lav,
Aristotle has, in fact, already promised in c. 2. 1289 a 35 sqq. to
treat of polity and tyranny as well as of democracy and oligarchy,
so that we are prepared for the investigations contained in cc. 7-10
with the exception of those relating to the so-called aristocracy.
In 35 his words are irapa 8r)p,oKpaTiav re KOI o\tyapxiai , but in strict
ness he should have said irapa fypoKpariav Kal oKiyapyiav na\ p.ovap%iav
1 92 NOTES.
(cp. c. 8. 1 294 a 26). When he says that all included aristocracy
in their list of constitutions, his statement is not literally correct (see
vol. i. p. 211, note i). The view, however, that there were four
constitutions, monarchy, oligarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, was
no doubt a common one ; we trace it in 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 22 sq., in
Rhet. i. 8. 1365 b 29 sq., and in the title of the rioXiretai ascribed to
Aristotle, IIoXiTeuu Tro\ta>v 8voiv Seoviraiv p . . . 8ijp.oKpariKai, oXiyapxi-
KUI, dpicrTOKpariKai, TvpawiKcd (where however rvpawis takes the place
of monarchy, and kingship is omitted), Aristot. Fragm. 1465 b (143).
36. we TTJI [iey ere pav Xe youcri re iravres ical eiprjrai. K.T.\. For the
structure of the sentence cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 27, oo-as M rols iepevcnv
dnoCiiSuxTiv 6 v6fj.os, aXX dno rf/s KOLvfjs t arias e^ovcri TTJV rinrjv.
38. re rap-roy 8e TTJV KaXoufxeVrji dpioroKpcmai , and in the fourth
place the so-called aristocracy. Aristotle appears to imply that no
one had yet included in their list the true aristocracy, that in which
the good citizen is also a good man. Even the aristocracy sketched
in Plato s Republic would count among its citizens many who could
not be called good men in the sense which Aristotle attaches to the
term.
39. TTcfiiTTT] 8 iorlv K.T.X. The existence of the polity specially
so called was generally recognized (noXiTfiav yap KaXovaiv, cp. c. 8.
1293 b 34 sqq.), but those who sought to enumerate the different
kinds of constitutions had omitted it from their lists. As to Plato,
indeed, all that Aristotle says is that he had not included the polity
in the list of constitutions given in the Republic, so that Aristotle s
words do not absolutely exclude the supposition that he regarded
it as included in the list given in the Politicus (302 C sqq.). In
Laws 7 1 2 C Plato enumerates only three constitutions, democracy,
oligarchy, and aristocracy, in addition to tyranny and kingship
( = monarchy). The expression eV rais TroXirdais refers either to the
Republic of Plato as a whole (for other instances of the use of it in
this sense see Henkel, Studien zur Geschichte der griechischen
Lehre vom Staat, p. 10, who refers to Themist. Or. 2. 32 c, noXn-euu
re al nXfivai Kal ol 6nre<noi No/xoi, etc.) or (as Bonitz, Ind. 598 a 42,
and Sus. 2 , Note 1231, think) to the Eighth and Ninth Books of it
only (see note on i342a 32). Though Aristotle says here that the
Polity did not occur frequently, we gather from c. 13. 1297 b 24 sq.
that what were called democracies in early times were really polities,
and of early democracies there can have been no lack ; besides, as
Prof. Francotte points out (Les Formes Mixtes de Gouvernement
6 (4). 7. 1293 a 36 1293 b 10. 193
d apres Aristote, p. 17, note i), the polity appears to have existed
at one time or another at Malis (c. 13. 1297 b J 4 sc W-)> at Tarentum
(7 (5)- 3- 1303 a 3 sqq.). at Syracuse (7 (5). 4. 1304 a 27 sqq.),
and at Oreus (7 (5). 3. 1303 a 18 sqq.).
1. ApioroicpaTiai JICK ouv K.T.\., true, it is right to call by the 1293 b.
name of aristocracy, etc. Aristotle feels it necessary to justify his use
of the name in 38 sq. in reference to the so-called aristocracy. As
to the reference in ntpl T)S SiTjXdopev *v rols -npuirois \6yois see vol. ii.
p. xxv. Sus. 3a (p. 367) takes the reference to be to the Fourth and
Fifth (old Seventh and Eighth) Books, and it is very possible that
4 (7). 14. 1333 a ii sqq. (cp. 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 37 sqq.) is referred
to, but this is not certain, and as a similar account of the best con
stitution is already in substance given in the Third Book (cc. 4-5,
c. 7. 1279 a 34 sqq.,c. 15. 1286 b 3 sqq., and c. 18. 1288 a 37 sqq.),
the reference may be to the Third Book. It is not certain that the
Fourth and Fifth Books were in existence when the words before
us were written (see note on 1289 a 30 and vol. ii. p. xxvsq.).
3. -rt\v yap K.T.X., for to only one constitution is it right to apply
the name of aristocracy, to the constitution the citizens of which are
men best in respect of virtue absolutely and not merely good with
reference to certain given conditions, for in this constitution alone
the same man is an absolutely good man and good citizen, whereas
in all others good citizens are good men only relatively to their own
constitution (i. e. with reference to certain given conditions, not
absolutely). Apiara? KCIT aptTrjv, best in respect of virtue/ and not
merely in respect of other things such as practical ability or service-
ableness to the constitution under which they live (cp. 4 (7). 3-
1325 b IO, Kpfirrtov tear dptrrjv Kal Kara 8vvafj.iv TTJV irpa.KTiKr]V rS>v
api(TT<av}. For the account here given of aristocracy cp. 4. (7). 9.
1328 b 37, fv rfj KoXXiora ndXiTfvofjLtvTj TroXei *at ry KtKTTjfjifVT) diKatovs
avftpas ajrXcos 1 , dXXa ^17 irpos rqv im66f<riv t and 3. 5- 1278 b I Sqq., and
as to the variation of virtue and justice with the constitution, 3. 4.
1276 b 30 sqq. and 7 (5). 9. 1309 a 36 sqq. For npbs im66riv TWO.
ayadvv, cp. Probl. IO. 52. 896 b 22, where TO trpos xP f>lav Tl "u xaXov is
Contrasted with TO Kaff avrb Ka\6v.
8. rots ^XiyapxcofjieVas, sc. 7roXiTi a? (see note on 1292 b 14).
The words Kal KaXoGcrai dpiaroKpariai, which follow 8ia(popds in
r n, are placed by Thurot and Sus. after noXtrfiav, probably rightly.
Jackson and Welldon would omit them.
10. OTTOU ye K.T.X., seeing that in them, etc. : cp. Plato, Rep.
VOL. IV. O
I 9 4 NOTES.
343 A, on roi erf, f(pr], Kopv5>vra irtpiopa Kai OVK aTrofivmi bf6/jL(vov, os
ye avrfi ov8e 7rpo/3ara ov8( noip.(i>a yiyvaxrKeis. "Orrov ye often quando-
quidem/ and Liddell and Scott, s.v. OTTOV, give the words that
meaning here, but in Snov yt as used here OTTOU seems to retain its
ordinary meaning of where. Magistrates are elected TrXovT-iVV
in oligarchies (2. n. 1273 a 21 sqq.), and Aristotle appears to
imply here that they are not elected even partially dpta-rivdrjv in
polities (see vol. i. p. 219, note 2). How far does this agree with
what we are told in 3. 17. 1288 a 14 sq., that elections to office
in polities take place Kara v6/j.oi> TOV KO.T diav Siavfiiovra TOIS (vnopots
raj dpxds? Perhaps to distribute office among the well-to-do in
accordance with dia is not to elect dpia-Tivfyv. It should be noticed
that in 2. n. 1273 a 2 3 SQQ- a constitution in which magistracies
are filled dpia-rivfyv Kal 7r\ovTiv8r]v is distinguished from an aristocracy
on the ground that in an aristocracy election to office is HOT
I dpfTrjv. Aristotle s conception of aristocracy in the Sixth Book
appears to be less strict than in the Second.
11. auTT] TJ iroXn-eux. For the asyndeton see note on 1286 a 30.
12. KOI yap K.T.\. This is added to explain and justify dpta-TivSriv
and dpia-TOKpariKri. When, in the absence of a public care for virtue
on the part of the State, men reputed to be good (eVieims) are
elected to office, the community may fairly be said to elect dpurriv^v
and its constitution may be called aristocratic. Cp. Rhet. i. 8.
T 3^5 b 35) y^P f^P-f^ff^KOTfS fl> TOIS VOp.LfJ.OLS fV TTj dplCTTOKpaTia
apxovmV dvdyKT) 8( TOVTOVS (paiixudai dpicrrovs o6ev KOI rovvop.a fl\T]<f)(
TOVTO, and Plato, Laws 854 B, ^ e>7r r ^ ? r ^ v ^tyofixvtov dv8po>v vtiiv
uya6u)V vvovcrias. Cp. also PlatO, Rep. 554 C, fv TOLS aXXoiy ^v/x-
/BoXaiois . . . tv ols (v8oKifj.el 8oK<av 8iKaios fivai: also A^. IIoX. C. 25,
(^E(pid\TT]s) 8oKa>v ddatpodoKrjTos fivai KOI 8tKaios Trpos rfjv noXiTflav, and
the line of Cratinus quoted on 1291 b 5. ndXeo-i must be supplied
with ev rais p.?) TToioviifvais KOIVTJV firipeXeiav dpfrrjs : this is a word
which is frequently omitted by Aristotle (see notes on 1266 b i and
1288 b 38). For the use of 5tiu>s here cp. De Part. An. i. 5. 645 a
5 sqq. (quoted in note on 1258 b 10).
14. OTTOU 05^ K.r.X. Aristotle does not explain why a constitution
which recognizes virtue and wealth only is not an aristocracy.
Looking to 10, we expect him to regard a constitution of this kind
as an aristocracy. Such a constitution would seem at any rate to
be superior to constitutions which do not recognize virtue at all,
yet these are allowed the name of aristocracies in 20 sq.
6 (4). 7. 1293 b 118. 1293 b 26. 195
19. T$]V 1Tp<I>Tt]V TT]V &pi<TT1\V TroXlTClClC. Cp. C. 8. I 294 a 2$, TfJV
d\T)6ivr)v Kail irpdi>TT]v, and 7 (5)- I2 - 1316 a 3, rf/s dpio-rrjs TroXrm as KOI
irpdiTrjs OVOTJJ, and 28, rfjv Trparyv KOI rf]V dpiffrrfv.
20. K<U rpirov K.T.\., and in the third place whatever [mixed]
constitutions incline towards oligarchy more than the polity does,
for TToXiTflai should probably be supplied with ocrai, and not dpiaro-
Kpariai (cp. 7 (5). 7- J 37 a X 5> where TroXcrei ay, not dpicrTOKparias,
must be supplied). Aristotle here departs from the account which
he frequently gives of aristocracy as a constitution in which virtue
is recognized in the award of office either alone or in combination
with other things, and concedes the name to constitutions in which
this is not the case. Hence Sus. brackets as interpolated Kal rpirov
. . . fwXXov, but the same view reappears in 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 10 16, and
Sus. is compelled to bracket this passage together with its context,
a course in which it is difficult to follow him. It seems more prob
able that both passages are genuine, and that Aristotle is guilty of
an inconsistency, into which he is led, partly by his reluctance to
depart too far from the ordinary classification (cp. De Part. An. i.
3. 643 b 10 sqq.) and from the ordinary use of language, partly by
the difficulty of bringing these constitutions under any other of the
six forms of constitution recognized by him, and partly by the
kinship which (following Plato in Polit. 301 A and other inquirers)
he always conceives to exist between aristocracy and oligarchy (3.
7. 1279 b 5: 7 (5). 7. 1306 b 22 sqq.). See Prof. H. Sidgwick in
the Classical Review, 6. 144.
23. eT(iap,eK 8 OUTGJS, SC. rrjv 6vop.aop.fvr)v iroXireiav. Oimor, i. e. C. 8.
among the irapeKpda-fis, and not before them, where we expect to
find polity dealt with looking to the announcements in c. 2. 1289 a
35 sqq. and 3. 7. 1279 a 23 sqq.
24. Taorrji , i.e. the polity. See note on 1306 b 26.
25. In TO n^ d\T]6e s we have an instance of p.ev solitarium (see
notes on 1262 a 6 and 1270 a 34).
iraaai, i. e. both polity and the aristocracies just described.
26. eireira KaTapiGjJtourrai (Jtera TOUTWI , and consequently are
counted with the deviation-forms : cp. c. 3. 12 90 a 16 sqq., where
aristocracy is said to be often held to be a form of oligarchy and
polity of democracy.
elcri T auTwi aural irapeic|3<cris, and these deviation-forms are
deviation-forms of them (i. e. of the aristocracies just described
and of polity). This implies that oligarchy is a deviation-form of
o a
196 NOTES.
the so-called aristocracy and not of the true aristocracy, but we are
not told this elsewhere. Tyranny at any rate is a deviation-form of
the true kingship (c. 2. 1289 a 40).
27. *v TOIS KCIT dpxV) i- e - m 3- 7) where however oligarchy is
not said to be a deviation-form of the so-called aristocracy, but of
aristocracy generally.
TeXeuraioi 8e K.T.X. Contrast Hist. An. 5. i. 539 a 7, vvv 8e nepl
TOVTOV (i.e. avflpumov) TfXfvraiov \fKTfov 8ta TO rr\(i(TTT)v ?x tl/ irpayftarcica
(comparing with this passage c. 10. 1295 a i sqq.). That tyranny
is the worst of the deviation-forms we have been told in c. 2. 1289 a
39 sqq- (cp. 7 (5)- io- i3ib 3 sqq.).
30. TCTaKTCu, SC. ravra. Cp. rraa/a, 23.
31. vuv 8e SeucTeoc ^jjuc uepl iroXueias K.T.X. For the use of bfucvvvat
without an object, Bonitz (Ind. 167 b 26 sqq.) compares Phys. 8. 6.
259 a 25 sqq. and Eth. Nic. 7. i. ii45b 7. For f) 8vvap.is m/r^s
Cp. C. IO. 1295 a 9 and I. 4. 1254 a 13, ris pev ovi> f] (frvcris TOV
8ov\ov Kal TIS f) Svvafiis, ex rovrcoi/ S^Xo//, and Isocr. Panath. 134, nt
ft.fv ovv (fivcreis KOI ftwapeis ra>v iroXireicav OVTUS exovcriv. Aristotle
describes how polity differs from the so-called aristocracy in the
remainder of c. 8, and how it comes into being and how it should
be constituted in c. 9.
34. ei(50a<ri 8e KaXetc K.T.X. Aristotle has just said that the
polity is a mixture of oligarchy and democracy, and now he goes
on but people are wont to give the name of polity to those
mixtures of oligarchy and democracy only which incline to
democracy and to call those which incline to oligarchy aristocra
cies. Twice before in this Book (c. 3. 1290 a 22 sqq. and c. 4.
1 290 a 30 sqq.) Aristotle has corrected customary views, and now
he corrects this one. He grudges the name of aristocracy to
a mere mixture of oligarchy and democracy inclining to oligarchy,
and gradually feels his way in 1293 b 34-1294 a 25 to the con
clusion that, next to the true aristocracy, the constitution which
has most right to the name of aristocracy is that in which there is
a mixture of all the three things which claim to be recognized in
constitutions free birth, wealth, and virtue. This conclusion is
quite in harmony with the tendency of what is said in 3. 13. 1283 a
26 sqq. and 2. 6. 1266 a 4 sq. (It would seem from Aristotle s
use of the word most that while he ranks the claims of the form
in which all the three attributes are recognized above those of the
form in which only two virtue and free birth are recognized,
6 (4). 8. 1293 b 2739. 197
and also above those of the mixed constitutions which incline to
oligarchy rather than to democracy, he does not deny the name of
aristocracy to either of these forms.) Thus he is led to draw
a different distinction between the so-called aristocracy and the
polity from that which was commonly drawn. He first describes
in 1293 b 34-42 the way in which mixtures of oligarchy and
democracy inclining to oligarchy had come to be thought specially
to deserve the name of aristocracies, and then in i293b 42 sqq.
he appeals in correction of this view to the commonly received
opinion that aristocracy and evvop.ia go together, and argues that if
this is the case and tvvup.ia involves obedience to well-constituted
laws, and well-constituted laws are either the best attainable or the
best absolutely, then aristocracy implies obedience either to the
best attainable laws or to the laws which are absolutely the best,
neither of which tests is satisfied by laws inclining towards oli
garchy. A further proof of the same conclusion is derived from
another commonly held opinion that aristocracy especially implies
the award of office for virtue, whereas in oligarchy office is awarded
for wealth.
37. ircuSeiav Kal coy^eicr. It is taken for granted that these
attributes are closely connected with aristocracy. That iraifaia is
SO, We See from C. 15. I29pb 24, lv fj.iv rats dpiarroKpariais eVc ncnai-
Sev/xeixuv (at dp%ai fl<nv), and that fvytvfta is so may be inferred
from the fact that virtue is an element in it (1294 a 20 sqq.). For
the connexion of naiftfia and evyevtia with wealth cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b
38 sqq.
38. ?TI Be SoKOUffii K.T.X. Cp. [Xen.] Rep. Ath. I. 5, eV yap Totr
jSfXrt oroif evi aKoXacria re oXty/ori; Kal dSiKt a, iiKpiftfia 8e TrXfi oTJj fls ra
Xpr](TTa fV fie ra> S /fiw dp.a6ia Tf ir\fiaTTj Kal drata KOI irovt]pia rj Tf yap
iTtvia avroiis p.aX\ov uyti (ir\ TO. atcr^pa cai fj dnatdfvcria Kal f) dp.u6ia 81
(v8(tav xpip-aTuf fvioit T>V dvdpunwv. That this view is not regarded
by Aristotle as correct we see from 2. 7. 1267 a 2 sqq. A wealthy
man is not saved by his wealth from temptations to commit
injustice.
39. oQev Kal KaXous K<rya0ous Kal yvupipous TOUTOUS irpoaayopeo-
ouaiv. Cp. PlatO, Rep. 5^9 A, rfav TrXovo-icor re Kal KO\U>V Kaya6u>v
\tyoptv<av (v TTI TToXet, and Cic. De Rep. i. 34. 51 : perhaps also
Hesiod, Op. et Dies, 313, 7rXovra> 8" apery Kal Kv8os oirrjfal. Aristotle
appears to hold that the belief in the virtue of the rich won them
the name not only of xuXot icdyadoi, but also of yvwpipoi, so that
198 NOTES.
he must understand yva>pip.tn-..tQ mean widely known for their
virtue : cp. 7 (5). 10. 1312 a 27 sq.
41. TT)V uirepoxV. Cp. 3. 17. 1288 a 20 sqq.
Kttl TCIS oXiyapxias eiyat ^acrif CK rwf KaXuf KayaGaJK jxaXXof.
Bonitz (Ind. 503 b 7 sq.), followed by Sus. 3 , Ind. s.v., takes oXiyapxia
here in the sense of TO eV 6\iyap^ia iroXirevna, Ki/ptov, and groups this
passage with 7 (5). 6. 1305 a 39, e avr^s rtjs oXiyapx/ay, but I do
not feel sure that they are right : cp. c. 7. 1293 b 3 sqq., 8 (6). 4.
1319 a 24, TO 8 XXa ir\r)0T] iravra crj^Sdj , f a>t> at XotTral &rj/j.oKpaTicu
(Tweo-Tao-i. /c.r.X., and 2. 6. 1265 b 2629.
42. SOKCI 8 etrai K.T.X. Mr] is placed by F n before evvo/jLeladai,
but I follow Thurot and Sus. in transferring it to after nyi/ and
before dpta-TOKpaTovfjLevrjv. If r n were right in placing /*?; before
(vvofifla-dai, we should expect the second clause to run 6/ioiW fie
Kal fjLTj dpiaTOKpaTflcrdai TTJV tvvofiovfifvrjv, but F II have o/^iot wf Se cai
dpHTTOKparfladai rfjv p.f) evvofj.ovfjL(vr)v, which seems to show that the
fil St clause should run TO fiivofifladai TTJV p.f) dpiaTOKpaTOVfievijii TroXiv
aXXa irovT]poKpaTovp.evr)v. The change in the position of firj has
this further advantage, that the words aXXa TrovrjpoKpaTovp.fvr;v, which
are not easily explained if we retain the reading of F n, no longer
present any difficulty. The view that evvop.ia is found where the
best men rule, is implied in Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 154, or evvo/uerro
^laXXoi f) TTO\IS Ka\ /3eXTi o<ri irpoardrais e xprjro, and in IsOCr. Panath.
132 sq., and indeed in Theogn. 43-52 and Pindar, Pyth. 10.
71 sq. Bergk : cp. also Pol. 3. 9. 1280 b 5 sq. and Plato, Rep.
605 B.
1294 a. 3. OUK rn. 8e euyojjua K.T.X. This had been already in substance
said by Xenophon in Oecon. 9. 14 and by Ephorus in Fragm. 47
(Miiller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. I. 246), ewo/mcr&u yap ov TOVS ev TO"LS
j/o /ioiy aTraiTtt (pv\aTTOfj.vovs TO. T<av crvKo<pavTa>i>, aXXa TOVS fpufVOVTas
TO IS cnr\u>s Kfip.vois : cp. Aeschin. c. Timarch. c. 6 and Demosth.
c. Mid. c. 57. But the remarks of Aeschines on Athenian ways
in c. Timarch. cc. 177-179 are especially present to Aristotle s
memory.
4. 816 fiiay fiey eucojiiai/ K.r.X. In Diog. Laert. 3. 103 Plato is
said to have distinguished three senses of evvopia evvopia Biatpt iTai
fly rp ia fi> (ifv uv u>criv oi vop.oi (TTTOvSaiot, fvvofjiiav (pap,ev fivaC fTfpov Se
eav TOIS KfifjLtvois vopois efipeva>fTiv oi TroXirm, Kal TOVTO (pa/iev tvvopiav
ttvai TptTov 8e (av JJLIJ OVT<>>V TOIV v6fia>v Kara f Grj Kal f niT7)8fv[i.aTa xpr/(TT<as
i, Kal TOVTO tlvopiav Trpoo-ayopevo/xej/. Compare with this
6 (4). 8. 1293 b 41 1294 a 19. 199
the definition of flvo^ia which we find in the Definitions ascribed to
Plato, 413 E, evvo/jiia TTddapxia vofjtcav airovftaiccv. How far either of
these accounts of evvoput is correctly attributed to Plato is extremely
doubtful. Aristotle appears to find true fvvo^ia in obedience to
good laws.
7. TOUTO 8e ^C&^XT<U Sixws K.T.\., and this (i.e. obedience to
well-constituted law) is possible [only] in two ways, for [it is
possible to obey] either the best laws attainable in the given case
or those which are absolutely the best. For the omission of
only/ see note on 1282 a 36.
9. SOKCI Se K.T.X., aristocracy again is thought especially to
consist in the distribution of the offices according to virtue/ and
not according to wealth, which would be the rule of distribution if
it bordered on oligarchy. See note on 1309 a 2.
11. TO 8 o TI &v SoC 1 !] TOIS irXeioCTif, SC. Kvpiov elvni, but the
principle that whatever the majority decide is supreme [is not
characteristic of any particular constitution, for it] is recognized in
all. Cp. 6 (4). 4. 1290 a 31 sq., 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 28 sqq., and 8
(6). 2. I3i7b 4 sqq., where it appears that the supremacy of the
decisions of the majority was commonly conceived to be a mark
of democracy.
12. Kal yelp K.r.X. For the repetition of ev see notes on 1325 b
10 and 1305 b 4.
15. For TO -rijs iroXiTcias et8os icaXeiTai, the form which is
called polity exists/ cp. Xen. Oecon. 4. 6, ev6a Si) 6 o-vXXoyos KaXtlrai,
which Holden translates, where the so-called muster of forces is/
and see Slallbaum s note on Plato, Phaedo 107 C, TOV xpovov TOVTOV
17. For the absence of KOI before irXouToo KCU, eXeuOepias see
explanatory note on i277b 10 and critical note on 12 60 a 26.
ax e &oy v^P K.r.X. See above on I293b 39. For the absence
of TTJV before T>V KO\G>V Kaya6a>v (which Coray, Bekk. 2 , and Sus. add
without necessity), cp. Menand. Inc. Fab. Fragm. 470 (Meineke,
Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 325 and 5. ccxc),
firfTfoff (fJ-fjff MSS.) 6 Trovrjpbs KaT(X(TO> xprjoToC Toirov.
19. ^irel 8e K.T.X., but since there are three things which lay
claim to an equal participation in the constitution, free birth,
wealth, and virtue I say three, for the fourth, that which is called
nobility, [is not a distinct thing, for it] is a concomitant of the two
latter. For d^ta^Tovvra cp. 3. 12. 1 283 a 16 sqq., where, as
200 NOTES.
Bonitz points out (Ind. 40 a 28 sqq.), avrmoielo-dai is used as
synonymous with apfpto-^re iv (1283 a n, 38), and for r^s lo-6rr)ros
TTJS iro\iTfiat, C. II. 1 296 a 30, rr/v iirepoxf)v TTJS rrohireias, and 3. 9.
I 280 a 1 8, rfjv rov Trpdyp.aTos icrdr^ra.
21. v\ yap euy^veia, i<rnv K.T.X. In 3. 13. 1 283 a 37, evyeveia yap
fo-nv apery yevovs, we hear nothing of wealth (cp. Plato, Rep. 618 B,
rovs 8 eVt yeveo-L KOI npoyovwv dperals, and Aristot. Fragm. 83. 1490 a
1 8 sqq.), but in 7 (5). i, 1301 b 3 those persons ols imdpxei TrpoyoWi/
dperf) Kal nXovros are said to be thought fvyevely. The common
Greek view probably was that evyeveia implied nothing mere than
of wealthy ancestors : cp. Plato,
Theaet. I74E, ra 8e 8f) yevrj vpvovvrwVj u>s yevvalos ris (irra, Trairnovs
ir\ovo-iovs fx MV tmo(f)r)v<u, and a fragment from the Aeolus of Euripides
(Fragm. 22), in which one of the characters, no doubt wishing to
depreciate noble birth, says of it, cv xpw affw T0 ^ e>crri > an d adds,
to 8 av tv 86fj,ois
Xpovov (TvvoiKrj <n\tl(Trov (sc. ra xPW aTa }> ovros fvyfvrjs.
Cp. also Julian, Or. 2. p. 8l B, (paa-l yap ol TroXXot rovs < TTa\at
TrXovo-i wv fvyevels. The Greeks would, it would seem, refuse the
epithet tvyevris to a newly-made Peer of the Realm, unless the
family to which he belonged had been distinguished for wealth for
generations past.
C. 9. 30. Tica 8e rporcov K.T.\. Cp. 2. 6. 1266 a 22 sqq. and see
notes on 1288 b 29 and 1293 b 31 and vol. i. p. 294, note i.
34. Trjy Tourwk Siaipeffu , i.e. TTJV ro\)To>v Sia(popuv (Bon. Ind. i8ob
40, where Phys. 7. 4. 249 a 3 is referred to, aXX apa ov povov S ra
avn^\r]Ta p.i) ofi^wfjia tlvai dXXa Kal fifj e^fti/ 8ta(fropdv, pyre o u-qr" ev to;
Xe yw 8e olov xp^ - *X fi Siaipecrii/). Sus. 3 (Ind. s. v. diaipns), however,
explains Siaipeo-iv here as synonymous with ^opia-p-ov. TOVTUV, i.e.
rfjs brjiJiOKparias KOI rr/s oXtyap^t ay.
IK Tourcot is rendered by Viet, in his translation post haec (so
Stahr, alsdann, and apparently Sus. and Welldon), but in his
commentary ex ipsis, and Lamb, and Giph. render the words
ex his (i. e. of democracy and oligarchy). I incline to render ex
TOVTWV in the latter way, taking it with vwdfreov : cp. Plato, Soph.
252 B, (K rovra>v ffvvriQevTfS, and Cratyl. 427 C, fK 8e rovrcov ra \onra
tj8rf avrols rovrois crvvri6tvai dTrofiip.oiip.evus. The words d(fi fKarepas
Starrep uvp^o\ v \appdvovras will then be added to explain the exact
method by which the polity is to be compounded of democracy and
oligarchy.
6 (4). 8. 1294 a 219. 1294 b 1. 201
35. au upoXoi , pars (Bon. Ind. s. v.), where we find a reference
among other passages to De Gen. An. i. 18. 722 b 10, $j<ri yap
( E/MTfSoAeAj/y) ev ra> apptvi KCU TW 6r]\( i oiov crvuftdhov evtivai, oKov 8 an
ovdtrtpov anuvai, dXAa fiteVrracrTai /neAe a>i> (pvvif, 17 p.tv eV dvSpos (cp.
De Gen. An. 4. i. 764 b 3 sqq.).
eial Be opoi rpeis TTJS auvOe aews <al p,i|e(i>s, and there are three
determining principles of this combination or mixture. For K<U =
or/ see note on 1292 a 20 and cp. De An. i. 4. 407 b 30, KO! yhp
TTJV appoviav Kpacriv Ka\ crvvQtaiv (vavriav flvai. Mlfa>s is probably
added because the polity had been described as a p.iis in i293b
34 and 1 294 a 16, 23. "Opor is explained by Bonitz (Ind. 529 b 53)
in the passage before us and in 1294 b 15 as id quo alicuius rei
natura constituitur et definitur. Cp. 5 (8). 7. 1342 b 33, S)Aoi/ 6Yt
TOVTOVS opovs rptls noirjrfov fis rfjv Traidfiav, TO rt p.ta ov KCU TO dvvarbv KOI
TO npenov.
37. cv JACK yap rats oXiyapxicus . . . 4O. T]p,iay. This is repeated
in c. 13. 1 297 a 21-24 a "d 35-38, and in c. 14. i298b 13 sqq.
It appears from the passage before us that there were oligarchies
in which dicasteries existed composed of both rich and poor,
though the poor would not be likely often to act on them, no pay
being provided, and the rich would be sure to act, as they would
incur a penalty if they did not. The oligarchies in which this
system existed would not be oligarchies of an extreme type, for in
extreme oligarchies the poor would be excluded from the dicasteries
altogether. So again paid dicasteries would not exist in all forms of
democracy, but only in those which approached the ultimate form.
41. KOICOK 8e K.T.X. Cp. c. 13. 1297 a 38 sqq. We gather from
the passage before us that in a polity there may be poor dicasts
receiving pay, yet in c. 13. i297b i sqq. we read of the polity, 8
8e rrjv 7To\iTfiav flvai eVc ratv ra OTrXa (XOVTW povov, and in what follows
oi TO. oTrXo (x VTfS are tacitly distinguished from ol ntvrjTfs (see note
on 1289 b 31). We must suppose that there might be a proportion
of poor men even in the hoplite class (8 (6). 7. 1321 a 12). See
vol. i. p. 503, note i. This is confirmed by 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 12,
Kai TO TO) Tf\T]6fl fJiTjbfV ITlCTTflKlV, ftlb KOI TT]V JTCtpaipfO lV TTOlOVITat TU)V
OTTAWA, which implies that the TrAjjtfoy has heavy arms to be taken
away.
1. iroXiTiKoc, characteristic of a polity. 1294 b.
els p.k ouv K.T.X. In the first of the three modes of mixing de
mocracy and oligarchy here described the entire arrangement
202 NOTES.
characteristic of democracy is adopted in conjunction with the
entire arrangement characteristic of oligarchy, in the second an
institution (a property-qualification for the assembly) is borrowed
from both, not however in the form in which it exists in demo
cracies and oligarchies, but in a midway form, and in the third
a part of the arrangement characteristic of democracy is adopted
in conjunction with a part of the arrangement characteristic of
oligarchy. Thus in framing a polity the lawgiver might balance
a democratic institution with an oligarchical one, or he might steer
a midway course between democracy and oligarchy, or he might
ally a part of a democratic institution with a part of an oligarchical
one. A polity would evidently differ much according as one or
other of these methods was predominantly employed in its con
struction.
3. (HOC eKK\T]<naen K.T.\. Supply TUTTOVO-IV. It would seem
from this passage that even in democracies a small property-quali
fication for membership of the assembly might exist (see vol. i.
p. 508, note 3). We also gather that an assembly often existed
in oligarchies, though membership of it would be confined to those
possessed of a high property-qualification (cp. Plato, Polit. 298 C,
v\\(ai 8e eKK\T)aiav r)p.a>v avrwv, rj ^vpnavTa TOV ^TUJLOV fj TOVS TrXowiovs
P.OVOV). This would not be the case in the first, or most moderate,
form of oligarchy, for in that form a high property-qualification
would hardly be required for membership of the assembly, and in
not a few oligarchies there would be no assembly whatever (3. i.
i275b 7).
4. Koii oj 8e ye K.T.\. Thus in a polity there would be a moderate
property-qualification for membership of the assembly, but none
for office (i2p4b 12 sq.).
5. TO fjieVof eKtxTc pou Tijii^fJiaTOS TOurwy. For ficarepov rt^rj/jLarof
TOVTCOV see note on 1283 b 4.
6. TpiTOk, in the third place. TptVos would have been more
regular, but for a similarly imperfect correspondence cp. 7 (5).
11. I3i4a 23, where rpirov 6 dSwapia TU>V TTpayndrcav should have
been rpirov 8" n8vva/j,ias ru>v Trpaynarutv.
Tayixdroii takes up TUTTOVVIV, 3. The Index Aristotelicus trans
lates T(iyp,a here by lex, institutum, and gives no other instance of
the occurrence of the word in the genuine writings of Aristotle.
m occurs in a different sense in Oecon. 2. 1349 a 24.
TCI ficV, sc. Xanfiuvfiv, obtained from 2 (cp. Aa/3fu>, n).
6 (4). 9. 1294 b 310. 203
7. X^yw S 5 olov K.T.X. Aristotle is here only stating the popular
impression (Som). As a matter of fact, even extreme democracies
did not always, or perhaps generally, claim that all magistracies
should be filled by lot (8 (6). 2. I3i7b 20 sq.), and magistracies
would seem to have been sometimes filled by lot in oligarchies,
though of course not iravruv but c nvav(6 (4). 15. 1300 b i sqq. :
cp. 2. 6, 12663. 8 sq.). So again the filling of magistracies by
election, and not by lot, is not peculiar to oligarchy ; the magi
stracies are filled by election on the ground of virtue in an aristocracy
(2. ii. 1273 a 25 sqq.); what4WharaT^ristitr^f--Qligar.chy is rather
to electjfl magistracies on the..^^Uii^QiwejJth_(ibid : }^ But indeed
they seem to have been filled in some oligarchies not by election,
but by hereditary succession (c. 5. 1292 b 4 sqq.). In 3. 5. 1278 a
23 it is implied to be characteristic of oligarchy not simply to
require a property-qualification for office, but to require a high
property-qualification. Indeed, in the more moderate forms of
democracy a property-qualification for office often existed (6 (4). 4.
1291 b 39: see note on 1305 a 28), sometimes varying with the
importance of the office (8 (6). 4. 131 8 b 30 sq.); still it is true
that the tendency of democracy was to do away with property-
qualifications for office (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 22 sq.). Cp. Diod. 18. 18.
4, TTJV 8e TidhiTfiav p.fTf(TTTj(rfv c TTJS 8r]p.oKf)arias Kal Trpocrera^ev dnb
Ti/ijj crews fivat TO Troklrev/JLa.
1O. dpioTOKpariKoc tolvuv ica! iroXiTiKof K.T.X. For the association
here of aristocracy and polity cp. 2. n. 12 73 a 4, T>V 8e npbs rqv
inrodfariv rfjs dpiffTOKparias KOI rrjs TroXirei as K.T.X. The reference to
aristocracy here shows that the mode of combining democratic and
oligarchical elements in the case of a so-called aristocracy is
similar to that which obtains in the case of a polity. Aristotle,
in fact, considers himself to have been dealing in c. 9 with so-
called aristocracies as well as with polities (1294 b 40 sq.). Though
according to the passage before us it is appropriate to a so-called
aristocracy that no property-qualification for office should exist,
we learn from 7 (5). 8. 1309 a 2 sq. that it is appropriate to
the same constitution (dpia-TOKpariKov) that the yvutpipoi should hold
the offices. This would be all the more likely to be the case
because it is dpKTTOKpariKov that offices should be unpaid (2. n.
1273 a 17). It may be noted that the conception of dpia-roKparia in
a fragment of the Constitutions ascribed to Aristotle (Aristot.
Fragm. 560. I57ob 4), Trpoe crnjo-av yap avrfjs (i.e. TTJS ru>v iirir
204 NOTES.
TToXtTfios 1 ) aTro Ti^rjudrcjiv livBpts dpitTToKpariKtas up^ovres, and in [Hera-
clid. Pont.] De Rebuspubl. 25. 4, TroXtreiW 8e Acareo-nja-airo aptoro-
KpaTtKTjv ^iXioi -yap rrdvra 8ioiKOv<riv aiptToi dnb rifirj/jidTwv, which may
also be derived from the Constitutions, stands in marked contrast
to that in the passage before us, for in these passages we read
of aristocracies in which office was elective, subject to a property-
qualification. For another instance of a discrepancy, between
the Politics and [Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspubl. see note on
1306 b 29.
12. eK \iev TT)S oXiyapxias TO alpeTcls iroieLK TO, dpxds. As to the
way in which offices were filled in a polity see note on 1288 a 12.
15. opos, the determining mark, or criterion : see note on
i294a 35.
evSe xTjTai, it is possible.
18. epjmiceTai yap K.T.\. Cp. Eth. Eud. 3. 7. 1234 b 5, eV TW
fifffto yap ftTTi Trwr ra a/cpa, and De An. 2. II. 424 a 6, TO yap piaov
KpniKov yiverai yap Trpoy tKartpov aiirmv Sdrtpov ratv aKpcov.
OTrep (Tujji^aicei rrepl TTJ^ AaKeSatp.oi iax iroXiTeiac. "Onep seems
tO refer to 15) orav eVSf ^?;ra6 Xeyetv 1-171 OVTTJV TroXirdav 8ijp.OKpaTi.av ical
oXiyapxiav. Aristotle has here before him Plato, Laws 7120 sqq.,
and also Isocr. Areop. 6l, oi fia yap . . . AaKfdaip.oviov$ dia TOUTO
xdXXtcrra iroXiTdio^evovs , on ud\i<TTa drjuoKpaTovufvoi Tvy^dvowiv ev yap
rff TU>V dpx&v alpfcrei Kal T<O 0t w TW xaff rjpepav Kal TOLS a XXot? fTriTTjfifv-
fj.a<riv idoip.fi> av Trap avrols rds IcroTrjTas xa\ ras o^ioioV^rar /xaXXov fj irapa
rols aXXois la-xvovaas, while another mood of Isocrates mind is re
presented in Nicocl. 24, eYt 8e Kapxi$oviovs Ka\ A.aKf8aifj.ovtovs, roi/s
tipicTTa Ttov E\\T)v<i)V Trd\iTfvop.evovs, (airavTis lcrp.fv} OIKOI p.fv oXiyap^ov/Lie-
vovs, irapa 8e rbv Tr6\fp,ov f$a<ri\evop.fvovs.
21. TT)> Td^if = TTJV iro\iTfiav, as in c. i. 1289 a i, c. 3. 1290 a 12,
and c. n. 1296 a 40 (Sus. 3 Ind. s. v.).
is taken up by 6p.oia>s 8t, 24.
>r]i , bringing-up, whereas in 26 sq. rpofyrj means food.
In an oligarchy the bringing-up of the sons of the rich, or at any
rate those of them who were in office, was luxurious (7 (5). 9.
1310 a 22 sqq.) and very unlike that of the sons of the poor.
23. For Toy TpoTfOf TOUTO* see note on 1281 a 21.
24. OJAOUOS 8e K.T.X., and [things are ordered] similarly. We
are not probably intended to carry on rpe ^oirat and iratdtvovTai.
26. ouSey yap SidS-qXos 6 TrXouVios KOI 6 ireVTjs. Cp. ThuC. I. 6. 4
and Plato, Laws 696 A.
6 (4). 9. 1294 b 1233. 205
OUTO) TO, irep! TT)y TpO$r\V TttUTO. TTaCTll iv TOIS (TUCTCTITIOIS, and [jUSt
as no difference is made between the rich and the poor in other
ways,] so also is the food in the syssitia the same for all. Ourw
carries on the comparison just as if tcaddnep had preceded. Sus.
translates so sehr ist die Kost fur Alle dieselbe in den gemein-
samen Mahlzeiten so much is the food the same for all in the
common meals but I doubt whether this is the meaning of OVTO>,
and Welldon translates the word so too/ For the fact cp. Plut.
Lycurg. c. 10. Tpo</j and eV^s are mentioned together in 3. 16.
1287 a J 4 s i-
27. nol TT]^ eff0T]Ta K.T.\. Spcngel would insert exovo->, but we
are by this time familiar with Aristotle s tendency in the Politics to
omit words. See vol. ii. p. li, note 4. For ns KO\ T>V TrtvrjTcov
ofma-ovv cp. Plato, Rep. 350 A, t ris <rot Soxei faurrfffMim OOTTICTOVV
tr\(i<o av edeXeiv aipflordai rj ocra K.r.X. The dress of the rich in ancient
Greece would ordinarily differ from that of the poor in fineness of
material and in dye, to say nothing of ornamental accessories. It
is interesting to gather from the passage before us that a too great
contrast between the rearing and education, and also the food
and dress, of rich and poor was regarded as undemocratic (cp.
Demosth. Ol. 3. c. 25 sq. : yet that a difference did exist between
the dress of the rich and the demos at Athens is implied in [Xen.]
Rep. Ath. i. 10). Was the change from an ornate costume to
Hfr pia tfftifjs which Thucydides (i. 6. 3) describes at Athens con
nected with the rise of democracy there ? At Venice the Nobili
and the Cittadini wore the same plain black clothes, partly because
the poorer Nobili were thus saved expense, and partly because in
concourses the small number of the ruling class became less
conspicuous (Roscher, Politik, p. 159).
29. CTI T<3 8uo K.T.X. Supply fypoKpaTiav tlvai Xeyovaiv.
T&S peyio-ras apx<s seems to imply that the senatorship and the
ephorship were greater offices than the kingship in the Lacedae
monian State. Yet the kings are said to be ^eydXa>i> Kvpiot in 2. n.
1272 b 41 (cp. 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 35). As to the way in which the
ephors were appointed see note on 1270 b 28.
31. ot 8 oXiyopX^ 1 ) SC. tivat \fyovcriv.
32. irdicras, sc. ray ap^ds, which must be supplied from 29. As
to the non-employment of the lot in appointments to offices in
oligarchies see note on 7.
33. oXiyous eimi Kupious 9a.va.rou tc.a.1 <|>uyTjs. The reference is to
206 NOTES.
the Lacedaemonian senate (Xen. Rep. Lac. 10. 2: Plut. Lycurg.
c. 26). In democracies the infliction of these penalties fell to the
popular assembly (c. 14. 1298 a 5-10) or to popular dicasteries.
But did it not fall to a few in aristocracies as well as in oligarchies ?
34. 8el 8 iv rrj iroXiTcia K.T.\., and in the polity that is mixed
well both of the mixed elements (democracy and oligarchy) should
seem to be present and neither of the two. The mixture must be
so subtle and complete that the mixed elements are felt to be both
present in it and not present, just as one might say of a glass of
wine and water both that wine and water are each present in it and
that neither is present but only a mixture of wine and water.
36. KCU crw^eaOai 81 aurfjs Kal JJLTJ l^coGey, SC. riji/ TroXtm az/. Cp. 2.
1 1. 1273 b 21 sq.
Kal 81 aurfjs K.T.X. Cp. 2. 9. 1270 b 21 sq. and 8 (6). 5. 1320 a
14 sqq.
37. As to [e|oj0ec] see critical note.
38. Kaissling (Ueber den Gebrauch der Tempora und Modi in
des Aristoteles Politica und in der Atheniensium Politia, p. 7) notes
the use here of the substantival infinitive with av.
40. ojioiws 8e KOI ras 6yofi,aop.eVas dpioroicpaTias. Hardly any
reference has been made in c. 9 to the so-called aristocracies, but
the use of the word apia-roKpariKov in i294b 10 probably indicates
that Aristotle has had them in view in this chapter as well as
polities (see note on 10).
C. 10. 1- nepl Sc rupavWSos K.T.\. Aristotle sometimes treats of
1295 a. a subject last when it requires especially full treatment (Hist. An.
5- I. 539 ^ 7 V ^ V ^ 7!" f P TOVTOV TfXfVTCllOV XfKTeOV dlO. TO 1T\eiOTT)V f\flV
Trpay/j-aTeiav), so now he explains that he does not treat of tyranny
last for this reason.
2. d\X oircos XapT] TTJS fiefloSou T 6 (ie pos. Bonitz (Ind. 455 b 2)
compares Meteor, i. i. 338 a 25, \onrbv 8 e ort ntpos rfjs ^f668ov
ravTTjs (TI QewprjTfov, o K.T.X. Tyranny was often contrasted with
iroXu-ctat, as in Demosth. Olynth. i. 5, and indeed by Aristotle
himself in the Seventh (old Fifth) Book of the Politics.
4. & roTs Trpoirois Xoyois K.T.X., i. c. in 3. 1417.
7. iroOei , from what source : cp. Plato, Rep. 375 C, nodtv ap.a
Trpaov KOL p.fyaXodvp.ov rj6os tvpf)crop.fi> ; and Pol. 7 (s)- IO - I 3 I ^ IO >
Kadia-rarm @a(ri\fvs eVc TUV eiruiK&v. The answer given has been, from
men of surpassing virtue, not from men of surpassing stature, as
was the practice in Ethiopia (6 (4). 4. 1290 b 4 sq.).
6 (4). 9. 1294 b 3410. 1295 a 18. 207
8 eiSt] K.r.X. In these two kinds of tyranny rule is
exercised over willing subjects (16), and yet they are here classed
as tyrannies. This does not agree with 3. 14. 1285 a 27, ol fie
(rvpuwoi) uKovrcav apxovffiv. Aristotle, in fact, here includes among
tyrannies any forms of monarchy in which the monarch rules
ftfcnroTiKas Kara rrjv (IVTOV yva>p.r)v (16 Sq.). In 3. 14. 1285 a 1 6 Sqq.
he classes these two kinds of tyranny among kingships ; still even
there he seems to feel that they are rather novapxiai than /Sao-iXelai
(see note on 1285 a 16).
8. [Af is taken up by fie in rpirov fie etSos rupavviSos, 17.
ei* ots irepl jSacriXeias eireo-KOTT-oup.ei , in 3. 14. 1285 a l6-b3. The
two kinds of tyranny there described are the form of hereditary
kingship with despotic authority which existed among some
barbarian races and the aesymneteship of the early Greeks. As
to the electiveness of these barbarian kingships see note on 1285 b
2. They seem to have been hereditary as well as elective, though
we hear nothing of their hereditariness here (see note on 1313 a 10).
How they combined the two characteristics we are not told.
9. Sid TO TT]y Suyafuv eTraXXdrreii TTUS aurwi xat irpos TTJC f3a<ri-
Xciar, because their nature in a way overlaps in relation to king
ship also [as well as mutually]/ As to eVaXXarreii/, which is here
followed by wpos, see note on 1255 a 13. For T^ 8vvap.iv avr&v cp.
C. 8. I293b32,^ 8vvap.ts avrrjs.
11. e.v re yap TWC Pappapwy Tialv K.r.X. The fact that these
monarchs were elective is dwelt on because it shows that their
monarchy was in accordance with law: cp. Diog. Laert. 3. 92,
ot p.V ovv tv rats TToXetrtJ apftovres vnb TWJ/ rroKiT&v eirav aipfdaxri, Kara
vopov apxovcriv. AvTOKpdropas is explained by Kara TTJV avrcov yvufJLTjv, I J.
Niebuhr (quoted by Eaton) thinks that Aristotle here refers to the
Roman Dictatorship, and certainly we are reminded of the passage
before us in Appian, Bell. Civ. i. 99, Pwjuaioi Se . . . ^eiporowOa-i rbv
ts oaov 6e\oi rvpavvov avroKparopa rvpavvos p.ev yap fj ratv StKra-
px*! KOI TraXai, oXtyw %p6va> 6piof4evT), Tore 8e irpatrov ts dopurrov
(\dova-a rvpavvls fyiyvero eVrtXjjy, but Aristotle may have in his mind
among other barbarian kings those of the Ethiopians, who are
spoken of as elected in Diod. 3. 9. 4. See note on 1313 a 10.
13. TW TpoTrov TouToy, i. c. by election.
15. r\<rav 8e K.r.X. Cp. 3. 14. I285b 2 sq. Ata TO Kara vopov, SC. eivai.
18. Tjirep fidXiCTT elk ai Soicei Tupaf^is. So we hear of a /laXtora
\fyofj.vi) jSacriXeta in 5> &nd of a /xdXtora eivai 8oKov<ra SrjfJLOKparia in
2 o8 NOTES.
c. 14. 1298 b 13 sq. and 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 26. Cp. also 1.9. 1256 b
40. ea-Ti Se yevot <"XXo KrrjTticJ;?. fji/ jiaXicrra KaXoucrt, *ai 8i<atov avrb Ka\dv,
19. rr]v fiorapxiai , TJTIS K.T.X. Possibly a reminiscence of Hdt. 3.
80, K&S 8 av eiTj xprjfjLa KaTTjpTrjfjLevov fj.ovvapxt.ri TTJ e^ecrrt avfvQvvat Troienv
ra @ov\(Tai ; For the definition here given of f/ ^aXiora rvpawis, cp.
4 (7)- 3- X 3 2 5 a 4 1 sqq- an< ^ Rhet. i. 8. 1365 b 37, povapxia $ eWl
*cara rovvofia ev y ds cnravraiv Kvpios fcrriv rovrutv 8e fj ptv Kara Taf-iv nva
/SacriXfia, fj 8 dopiaTos rvpavvis.
C. 11. 25. Tis S dpiCTTT] iroXireia K.T.\. Welldon places a note of
interrogation after ^rao-xt iv, 31, and he may be right, but perhaps
it is more likely that the sentence is incomplete and that arKfirrfov or
some such word would have been added but for the interposition of
the clause KOI yap . . . \(Kreov (31-34), which distracts the writer s
attention. I do not think (with Conring and Sus.) that any word or
words have fallen out of the text after ^eraa-xfiv, 31, for the same
thing occurs elsewhere in the Politics, e. g. in i. 12. 1259 a 37 sqq.
26. fiV]T irpos dpeTTji K.T.X. For the dative a-vyKpivova-t compare
the dative in Rhet. i. 4. 1360 a 31, e* T>V TrapeXrjXvdoTuv dfupovm.
For aptTTjv TTJV inrfp rotT ZSicoras see note on 1330 b 38.
27. fiT]T irpos iraiSeiat K.T.X. Aristotle appears here to speak
not of TTaiSda in general, but of a specially exalted kind of it ; in
Lucian, Somn. c. i, however, we read of nai.8fia in general, rolr
TrXeurrois ovv e8o( iraidfia pev xa\ novov rroXXou Ka\ ^povou paicpov KU\
8aTrdvr)s ov fjiiKpas /cat TV^S 8f1(r6ai Xa/iTrpay.
28. Tuxrjpas qualifies xopqy ar, but not, I think, (pi/a-eas, as Sus.
apparently holds that it does (Sus. 3 Ind. s. v. (pv<ns). Tv^ is some
thing apart from $iW (cp. 4 (7). i. I323b 27 sqq. and 4 (7). 13.
1331 b 41). For the contrast of (pvcns and xP r iy t - a C P- Polyb. 6. 2. 13.
29. (3ioy re roy TOIS irXeicrTOis icou wi Tjcrai Sui aToi . Supply npos.
See note on 1274 b 12, and cp. 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 23. For ftlov TOV
rots TrXei oToiy Koivcavfjcrai 8vvarov cp. Xen. Anab. 4. I. 24, avrbs 8 f(prj
T]yr)(TTdai 8vvarrjv Kal i>7rovyiois irQpf\!r6ai 686v.
31. Kal y^P ^s K.T.X. The sense is for the so-called aristo
cracies described by us just now, which might seem to be in
a special degree the constitution of which we are in quest, are
partly beyond the reach of most States, so that they do not really
concern us now, and partly border on the polity, so that they are
not more the constitution of which we are in quest than the polity
is, and we must speak of them and of it as one constitution.
6 (4). 10. 1295 a 1911. 1295 a 35. 209
Aristotle adds this remark to show that the question which he has
just asked has not as yet been answered, and that it still needs to
be dealt with.
32. T& fiei/ ed>WpU TTlTTTOUO-l TCUS irXciOTCUS TUV TToKfUV. ThlS is
implied as to the Lacedaemonian constitution in c. i. 1288 b 40
sqq. For (t-vrepu nlrrrtiv see Bon. Ind. 594 b 59 sqq.
34. dpfxnr, these aristocracies and the polity.
TJ 8e Sfj Kpioris K.T.X. Aristotle shows in 34-1295 b i that the
pews j3tos and the ^(nj TroXtm a are the best. He thus prepares
the way for the conclusion which he is occupied in establishing in
i295b 1-35, that fj Sta ru>v pea-cav troXireia is the best, a distinct
conclusion, be it observed, from that which he had previously
arrived at, that the /ue cn? TroXtrtia is the best, for we can conceive
a fj.(<T7] Tj-oXtTfi a which is not 8ia T>V pea-cav. However, Aristotle
identifies fj dia TO>V pevuv TroXtTeia with f] fj.ea-1] TroXirei a in 1296 a 7.
He proves that 17 8m TU>V pta-cov TroXtrtia is the best in the following
way : A mean state in respect of the gifts of fortune is best. For
those who are thus circumstanced (i) obey reason most readily, and
therefore are less likely to commit unjust acts, (2) they are most
capable, as citizens should be, of both ruling and being ruled, and
also most alike and equal, and for both these reasons are best
suited for membership of a TroXtr, for a TroXi? thrives best when it
consists of men alike and equal, among whom the friendship and
community of feeling essential to a n6\is are most likely to be found;
besides, those who are moderately well-to-do are most secure, for
they are least given to plot against others and are least plotted
against themselves. Hence the constitution which places supreme
power in the hands of the moderately well-to-do class is the best
(1295 b 34 sqq.). It is also the best because it is least subject
to civil discord (1296 a 7 sqq.). A further indication that it
is the best may be found in the fact that the best lawgivers have
belonged to this class (1296 a 18 sqq.). It is only because in many
States the moderately well-to-do class is small, and for other reasons
which Aristotle gives in 1296 a 22-b 2, that TJ uto-r) TroXn-eto, or in
other words f) fiia rS>v \i.*a&v no\irda, has so seldom existed.
irepi dimiTu^ TOUTWC, i. e. which is the best constitution and the
best life for most States and most men (25 sq.).
35. In rStv ainStv OTTOIXCUOK, based on the same elementary
principles : cp. Top. 6. 5. 143 a 13, aKvntiv in ru>v trtpl TO ytvT)
croixfiW, and Pol. 7 (5)- 9- I 39 D I ^> T n-oXXd/cis fipypfvov /it ytorov
VOL. IV. P
210 NOTES.
(rroixtlov, TO rrjpelv OTTOS K.T.\. : also IsOCr. Ad Nicocl. 1 6, ravra
yap oToi^fta irpatTa KCU fjifyiara ^p^orf}? TroXiTei a? ttrriv.
36. iv TOIS T|0iKois. Probably a reference to Eth. Nic. 7. 14.
ii53b 9-21, as well as to Eth. Nic. i. n. noi a 14 sqq. and
similar passages.
rov tear dperV dyefiiroSioroy, that which is unimpededly lived in
accordance with virtue. Avep-irofturrov agrees with fitov understood,
not with dptTTjv, as Vet. Int. supposes that it does, translating earn
quae secundum virtutem non impeditam.
37. /io-(5rr)Ta 8e TTJK dpe-n^y, cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 8. Iio8b II, rpiu>v
fie Btadfcrfcov ovcrcav, 8vo fj.tv KaKiS>v, rfjs pfv Kaff vn(p[Bd\r)v TTJS 8e KOT
eXXet\|/w, fjnas 8 aprnjr TTJS p.fO-6rrjTos. As Sus. 2 points OUt (Note 1288),
Aristotle would have spoken more exactly if he had said that moral
virtue is a mean state. TTJV is added before dpfrfjv because KO.T aptrrfv
has preceded : see note on i286b 17.
TDK fie cro^ dyayKcuoi PIOI/ eti/ai pcXrio-TOV. Cp. Plato, Rep. 619 A.
Tow fJLftrov 3/of = TOV Kara /iiecror^Ta /Slav.
38. Tt]S cKdoroig efSExoH-^^S ru^eiy fieaorrjTOs, ea msdiocritate
quae potest singulis contingere (Sepulv.). This is added because
the same mean state is not within the reach of every one (see Eth.
Nic. 2. 5. 1106 a 32 sqq.). The mean state of a great wrestler like
Milo in respect of food is not attainable by a novice. For the
explanatory genitive TJ/I eKaoroiv eVSe^o^ieV^s Tv\ei.v fjLfcrorrjTos, added in
interpretation of rbv pta-ov fiiov, compare the somewhat similar
genitive in Plato, Laws 7760, fj HpaxXfcoTwi SovXfta rrjs rS>v
MaptavSwuv (faTaSoi^Xaxrfcoy ( servitium, sive servi, Heracleotarum, qui
extiterunt ex subiectione Mariandynorum/ Stallbaum), and see
Stallbaum s note on Phaedo 97 A, 17 gvvoftos TOV ir\rjo-iov
39. TOUS 8e aoroos TOUTOUS opous K.T.\., and these same criteria
must necessarily be the criteria of the goodness or badness of
a State also and a constitution, i. e. States and constitutions will be
good or bad according as they are or are not in a mean condition,
just as the life of an individual will be good or bad according as it
is or is not in a mean condition. Kai before Tro Xews probably means
also, not both, though it is followed by another /cat : see note on
1342 a 4.
40. T) yap iroXiTeia PI OS TIS eon iroXews, i. e. for what holds
of a State is likely to hold of a constitution, for a constitution is
a foim of the life of a State. See vol. i. p. 210, note i.
6 (4). 11. 1295 a 36 1295 b 4. 211
1. tv dir<S<rais K.T.\. Cp. c. 3. 1289 b 29 sqq., where the pfVot are 1295 b.
the midway class between the (faopoi and the anopot, just as they are
in 1296 a 10-13 an d 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 28 sqq., whereas in the passage
before us they are the midway class between the (faopoi o-<d8pa and
the airopoi o-(f)68pa. In 7 (5). 4. 1304 b i sq. they are the midway
class between ot TrXowo-tot and 6 8^10? (cp. 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 40 sqq.,
where ol nXova-ioi and of irfvrfrfs are the extremes between which they
stand), and in 8 (6). 4. I3i9b 12 sqq. the midway class between ol
yvwptfjiot and o otjuns. In Eth. Nic. 4. 8. ii24b iSsqq. they are
opposed to ol tv dto>/zart /tal tvruxiais. We hear nothing of the
pfo-oi in 8 (6). 3. 1318 a 30 sq. It would seem from 1296 a 10 sqq.
that, notwithstanding what is said in the passage before us, the
jit o-ot hardly existed in small Greek States. Aristotle no doubt has
before him Eurip. Suppl. 225 Bothe (238 Dindorf),
Tpfis yap 7roAiT&&gt;j fufpidft ol fitv o\@ioi
aW^eXet? re Tr\fi6va>v T epwcr aft
ot If OVK (\OVT(S KOI tnravioi>T(s /Si ou,
Kfvrp a<pia<rtv
novrjptav Trpoarar&v (f)
lSiV 8f p.OtpS>V ff l> fl,f<T(f (Tti>
Kocrpov <pv\d(r<rovcr OVTIV &v r
3. eircl roivuv ojioXoyeiTcu TO ^crpioc apiaro* KOI TO p.e croi . Cp.
5 (8). 7. 1342 b 14 sq. As Camerarius points out (Interp. p. 163),
the saying McVpov apurrov was ascribed to Cleobulus of Lindus
(Diog. Laert. i. 93), and Theognis had said (335),
fir)8V ayav crnfvSfiv TTO.VTCW jueV apurra.
For TO ftfTptov Ka\ TO fjL(<rov, cp. De Part. An. 2. 7. 652 b 17 sq. and
Plut. De Prefect, in Virt. C.I3 sub fin., tls TO ptaov Kadi<rra<r0ai KOI
flfTptOV.
4. Qavepov STI K.T.X. Cp. Eth. Nic. 7. 14. ii53b 21 sqq. Under
tv-rvx^To. Aristotle evidently includes both bodily and external
goods ; both are the gifts of fortune (Pol. 4 (7). i. 1323 b 27 sq.).
He has before him here and in what follows Plato, Laws 679 B sq.
and 728 D, p^vvtiv of] p.oi <fra[v(Tai . . . 729 A, o>r TO TroXv. Compare
also Eurip. Fragm. 80 Nauck (79, ed. 2),
Pporols ra neifa TO>V \iiau>v TiKTfi VOGOVS
Qt&v Se 0vr)Tovs Ko<rfj.ov ov jrpfTTfi (peptiv,
and the fragment of Rhianus referred to in vol. ii. p. 419 (Stob.
Floril. 4. 34).
P 2
212 NOTES.
6. paVnj yap TU> Xoyw irciOapxeip, for it is most ready to obey
reason : cp. [Plato,] Menex. 249 C, rolr T -yap TeXevrrjaavi. KOI rois
faJo-if ovTcas av Trpo(T(pi\(<TTaTOi flr]T( Kal pacrroi 6(paTT(v(iv re Ka\ 6(pa-
irfixadai, and Plut. Anton. C. 6, ov yap OVTOJS (i>x(pf]S TJV ovSe p aSioy vri
opyrjs (KTrecTflv rcav \oyuTpa>v Taios Kaicrap, wore K.T.X. We hardly expect
to find Aristotle asserting so close a connexion between a moderate
amount of property and a readiness to be swayed by reason after
what he has said in 2. 7. 1266 b 28 sqq. and 1267 a 41 sqq.
6. uirepio-xupoy. Cp. Dio Chrys. Or. 17. 470 R.
9. yiyyorrcu yap K.T.X. Cp. Rhet. 2. 16. 1390 b 32, ra> 8e nXovrcp
a ejrerai f/dr), (TtnroXrjs (<JT\V Ibtiv ajracriv v/3ptcrrai yap Kal v7T(pr](pavoi,
m uTxovTfs TI VTTO Ttjs KTr](T(ii)s Tov Tr\ovrov axnTfp yap %oi>Tes anavra
rayaQa OVTV Stn ^eij/rat, and Plato, Laws 742 E.
10. Twy 8 dSiKTjp.diTwi K.T.X. Cp. Rhet. 2. 13. 1390 a 18, Kal
Ta.diKT]p.aTa dbiKovcriv (ot irpfcr{3iiTfpoi Kal naprjKp.aKOTfs) (Is KaKovpyiav, OVK
(Is vftpiv.
12. en 8 TJKio-6 OUTOI <|)uXapxou(Ti Kal pouXapxou<rii raura 8
djj.4>oTepa |3Xaj3epa rais iroXeo-iv. OVTOI evidently refers to the /o-oi,
who have not, however, been mentioned since 3. It may be
doubted, therefore, whether the words ert 8e . . . ir6\( cnv stand in their
right place; they would be more in place after Tro Xewr, 28, or elvai,
34. As to their probable meaning see vol. i. p. 499, note i, and
compare Xen. Oecon. 2. 5 sq. (already referred to in vol. i. p. 580).
Cp. also Pol. 7 (5). 8. 1 309 a 17 sqq. If the words are in their
right place, they adduce a further proof that the pto-oi are more
under the guidance of reason than the very rich, derived from their
abstinence from extravagant expenditure on liturgies. Giph. (p. 467)
would expunge ert 8 . . . Pov\apxov<nv as an interpolation and retain
in the text only ravra . . . ir6\(o-iv, and Sus. adopts a similar course,
bracketing en de . . . ftovXapxovo-iv and reading ravra 8rj in place
of ravra 8 . It is of course possible that the words en 8e . . .
fiovXapxova-iv, and indeed the whole clause ert Se . . . TrdXeo-ti/, are
nothing more than a remark added by Aristotle or some one else
in the margin which has crept into the text, but I incline on the
whole to a more favourable view of them, though, as has been
said, I doubt whether they are in their right place.
13. irpos 8e TOU TOIS K.T.X. Aristotle now turns to the political, as
distinguished from the moral, defects of those who have too much
or too little of the goods of fortune. He has before him Plato,
Laws 7280-729 A: cp. also Laws 791 D, A ya> 8% TO yt nap fj^v
6 (4). 11. 1295 b 524. 213
us 17 p,fv rpv<pri 8v(TKO\a Kal aKpd^o\a KOI o~<p68pa djrb crfiiKpcov KI-
vovptva TO rav veatv fjdij OTrepydfeTat, TO 8e TOVTtOV tvavriov rj re o~(po8pa KOI
dypia SovXcocrtj rcnrfivovs Kal di>f\fvdepovs Kal /j.i<rav0pa>Trovs iroiovaa
dvfiriTrjSfiovs gwoiKovs aTroreXei. We are told, however, in Eth.
Nic. 4. 8. 1 1 24 a 20 sq. that an abundance of the goods of fortune
is thought to engender greatness of soul (^eyaXo^u^i a). In Pol.
7 (s)- 7- X 37 a 19 sq. much the same unfavourable account is given
of 01 ev rdls evnopiais generally, not merely of those who are
extremely rich.
16. K.a.1 TOUT euOus K.T.X. EvGvs oiKofav, from their parents house
at the outset : cp. Xen. Cyrop. 2.3.7, K ^p<? w* o tKoOev o-wrjdrjs xal
dpforbs avr]p. For the fact here mentioned, cp. Carneades ap. Plut.
De Adul. et Amic. C. l6, Kapved^r/s 8t eXeyf, on TrXoixr/coi KOI iacri\(u>p
Traldfs imrfiifiv povov, aXXo 8e ov8ev fv Kal Ka\S>s ^av6dvov<rC KoKaKciiti
yap avrovs Iv TCUS Siarpi/Sats 6 diBdcrKoXos firaivS>i>, Kal 6 7rpo<r7raXai a>i VTTO-
KaTaK\iv6fjifvos. Plato had said much the same thing in Laws 695 B,
irapd\a^6vrfs 8 ovv oi TraTSes T(\(VTr}<Tavros Kvpov rpv^s ntcrrol KOI
dvf7ri7r\r]^las, irparrov pLtv TOV erepov artpos dnfKTfive rw icro) dyavaKTa>t>
c.T.X., and 695 E, TO 8 CUTIOV ov rv^rjs, wf 6 ffios Xoyor, dXX 6 KCIKOS
Qios, ov oi r<av dicKptpovrcas Tr\ovo~ia>v Kal rvpdvvatv iralSes TO TroXXa MTIV.
Cp. also Laws 791 D, quoted above on 13. A boy has the best
chance of being well brought up in a household where there is
solid comfort combined with thrift and simplicity (Trevelyan, Life
of Lord Macaulay, i. 37).
21. yiKCTai o6V ic/r.X. That a TrdXty in which one section of the
citizens consists of masters and the other of slaves is no true TrdAts
is a view inherited by Aristotle from the Menexenus (238 E sq.),
and from Plato, Laws 756 E sq. (quoted in vol. i. p. 499, note 2) and
71 2 E, and Rep.4i7A-B. He probably also remembers Laws 6796,
fj 8 av TTOTt vvoiKiq /J.r]Tf rrXouros -vvoiKfj pyre TTvia, cr^eSbv tv TOVTTJ
ytwaiorara f)6r) yiyvoir" av ovre yap vftpis OVT ddiKia, ff)Xoi Te aw Kal
cpdovoi OVK eyyiyvovrai. That the TrdXts is an association of tXtvdtpoi
we are told in 3. 6. 12 79 a 21.
23. Koicwi ias iroXmicT]s. HO\ITIKIJS goes only with Koivcavias, not
with <pi\ias. For Koivwvia? TTO\ITIKTJS without the article cp. i. 2.
i253a 38.
24. T) yap Koivuvia 4>iXiKOf, for association is a thing connected
with [and springing from] friendliness : cp. 3. 9. i28ob 38, TO 8e
TOIOVTOV (piXlas fpyoV f/ yap TOV o-vf)v rrpoaipto-is (f)i\ia, and PlatO,
Gorg. 507 E, OTO) 8f pr) fvi Koivuvia, <f>i\ia OVK av fir). In Laws 697 C
214 NOTES.
TO <j)i\oi> is conjoined with TO KOIVOV, and in 695 D $tXia with <oivcwia :
cp. also Laws 837 B.
ooSe y^P ^" pouXorrai noivuvf.lv TOIS ex^P ^- Is Aristotle
thinking of Aeschines and Demosthenes on their second embassy
to Pella ? Cp. Aeschin. De Fals. Leg. c. 97, ov8t\s airy (i.e.
&rj(j.o<j-d(Vfi) crvcrcriTflv, 6V e i;/iej/ eVt rrjv vcrrfpav npecrjSetaP, r/OeXev,
ovde eV TOIS 68ois, OTTOV fivvarbv yv, els ravrbv iravboKfiov KaraXvfiv. More
probably he has in view the general inclination of foes to give each
other a wide berth (Demosth. De Fals. Leg. c. 225 : Aristoph.
Plut. 837). We read of the old families and their antagonists at
Lausanne in 1817 in Mr. S. Lane-Poole s Life of Lord Stratford de
Redcliffe (i. 274), The spirit of democracy showed itself even on
the high-road, and whenever cart met carriage, the latter in most
instances had to knock under.
25. pouXercu 8e ye r\ 776X1.5 e| tcrcjy ctfai KCU ofiouof on jiaXtara
BouXerai, i. e. aims at being, not tends to be/ for Aristotle does
not mean to assert that the noXis tends, as time goes on, to
become an union of men alike and equal. Aristotle is here
speaking of the citizens of the TroAty, not, as in 3. 4. 127 7 a 5,
en-el f dvopoiav 17 n6\is, of all its components. Compare Eth.
Eud. 7- IO- 1242 b 30, KdT laoTrjra Sr) j3ov\erai tlvai rj noXiTiKr) <f)i\ta,
and Pol. 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 35, 17 8e no\ts KOlvtovia rt? O-TI TOIV opo iav.
Political rule itself is a rule over men free and equal (i. 7. 12555 20).
It is not of course enough that the citizens should be alike ; poor
men are alike and slaves are alike, yet a TrdXt? composed of poor
men or of slaves would not be a noXis (3. 12. 1283 a 18 sq.).
Machiavelli (Discorsi sopra la Prima Deca di Tito Livio, Book i.
c. 55) goes so far as to say that whosoever shall attempt to found
a Republic where there are many gentlemen will never effect his
purpose except he can first root them all out. He explains that
he means by gentlemen such as live in idleness and abundance
on the income of their estates without needing to trouble themselves
to till the soil or to undertake any other kind of labour, in order
to live. He holds that if three Republics, Florence, Siena, and
Lucca, had subsisted a long time in the not large country of
Tuscany, it was because there were but very few gentlemen there
and no Lords with castles and subjects of their own, whereas
Lombardy and the Kingdom of Naples abounded with these two
sorts of men, and were consequently marked out for monarchy.
27. <5or dKayKtuoi K.T.\., so that this State (i. e. a State com-
6 (4). 11. 1295 b 2536. 215
posed of moderately well-to-do citizens) will necessarily be best
constituted in respect of those elements of which we say that the
State is by nature composed. The elements referred to are
the very rich, the very poor, and the moderately well-to-do
(i2Q5b i sqq.). A saying is attributed to Thales in [Plut.] Sept.
Sap. Conv. c. n that the best democracy is that in which the
citizens are neither very rich nor very poor. For ravr^v rqv ir6\tv
rr\v fK T>V p.f(ra>v (rvvfarSxrav Tro Xii/, cp. 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 6, ravTas ras
TToXirdas ( = ras TU>V apicrra SOKOVVTW no\tT(i>((rdai TO>I> EXXiyi/cai ). For
the ellipse in e &v see note on 1253 b 3.
28. KH cru^orrai 8 iv rais TroXeaip K.r.X., i. e. not only save the
State, but also save their own lives and fortunes. Euripides had
said, Tptiov 8e fjioipun % v fjLftria o-&&gt; jroXetr (see note on 1295 b i) :
cp. also PlatO, Rep. 417 A, na\ ovra> fi(v <TU>OIVTO T av KOI cra>otfv
rf)v n-oXiv. For the fact cp. Fragm. Trag. Adesp. 462 Nauck (547,
ed. 2), esp.
17 5e fJLfirorrjs (V iraaiv dcr(j)a\fcrTfpa,
and Xen. Mem. 4. 2. 35.
31. TTJS TOUTUC. Aristotle expects us to supply oixrias : compare
the omission of 7roXtrwK in 1296 a 5. For similar omissions see
vol. ii. p. li, note 4.
KaOdircp -rfjs ruy irXouaiuc ol ir^rrjTes e-mOufiouait . Compare
the passage from the Supplices of Euripides quoted above on
1295 b i, Rhet. ad Alex. 3. 1424 a 28-31, and Corn. Nepos,
Chabrias, c. 3, neque animo aequo pauperes alienam opulentium
intueantur fortunam.
33. Sid TOOTO K.T.X. For the asyndeton see note on 1286 a 30.
<t>a>KuXi8T]s, fragm. 12 Bergk. Cp. Pindar, Pyth. n. 52 sq.
Bergk.
34. SrjXot apa K.T.X., it is clear then that the constitution also in
which the moderately well-to-do are supreme is best, as well as
17 P.(<TTJ KTr)<nsTG>v fvru)(T]ndT(0v (1295 b 4 sq.), or perhaps as well as the
TroXXd of 34. H Kotvwvia fj ITO\ITIKT) here means the constitution, as
in 2. i. 1260 b 27 (cp. 3. 4. 1276 b 29). In i. i. 1252 a 7 it seems
to mean the TroAis. For 17 8ta ru>v pi<r<ov, cp. 3. 13. 1283 b 6 sq.
36. Kal T&S roiauras K.T.X. The condition of economical and
political well-being in any highly civilized nation is a harmony of
large, moderate, and small incomes. Things are best when the
moderate incomes predominate when, as Rousseau says, "no
citizen is so rich that he can buy up the rest and none so poor
2 i6 NOTES.
that he must needs sell himself" (Roscher, Politik, p. 473).
Mr. A. J. Balfour remarked of Ireland in the House of Commons
(Times, March u, 1890), that one reason why its land-system was
imperfect was that there was an absence of a class intermediate
between the occupying farmer and the landlord which might hold
the balance between the two/ Cp. 7 (5). 4. 1304 a 38 sqq.
lv ats 8rj. A>7 vim relativi urguet, " welcher eben," " welcher
gerade " (Eucken, De Partic. Usu, p. 43).
39. ras eramas uTrep|3oXds, i.e. extreme democracy and unmixed
oligarchy.
40. TOUS iroXiTeuojjieVous, cives optimo iure (Bon. Ind. 613 b 27),
the active citizens (Welldon). See note on 1328 a 17.
1296 a. 1- us OTTOU K.T.X. Cp. 7 (5). 7. 1306 b 36 sqq. and 8 (6). 5.
1320 a 32 sqq.
T] 8fjfj.os eoxaros rj oXiyapxia aKparos- Cp. 7 (5). IO. I3I2b
35 sq. and 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 21.
2. f\ Tupams Si dp,<f>OT^pas ras uireppoXcis, or, as a result of
both these extremes (extreme oligarchy and extreme democracy),
a tyranny/
3. KCU, yap K.T.X. T^s v(aviKa>T(iTT)s probably qualifies both S^/xo-
Kparias and 6Xiyap%ias . Cp. 7 (5)- IO - I3Iob 3, 17 8e Tvpavvls e
oXiyapxias rrjs wraT^y vvyKfiTai KOL drjuoKpartas. The reason why
extreme democracies and extreme oligarchies were apt to change
into tyrannies may be gathered from 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 20 sqq. ; both
these constitutions placed great power in the hands of individuals,
the one of them in the hands of demagogues and the other in those
of the leading oligarchs. Tyranny often arose out of oligarchy
(7 (5). 12. 1316 a 34 sqq.), and according to a saying of Dionysius
the younger (Plut. Reg. et Imp. Apophth. Dionys. lun. 4. 1 76 D), the
elder Dionysius became tyrant /ito-ou/iei^r S^oKpari a?. The narrow
oligarchy of the Bacchiadae at Corinth ended in a tyranny, but the
less narrow oligarchy which was set up on the fall of the tyranny
had not been replaced by a tyranny, though it is true that Timo-
phanes had attempted to overthrow it (7 (5). 6. 1306 a 23 sq.).
5. Twy fiEcrojc, sc. TroAireicoi/, which is suppressed because easily
supplied. The term 17 n(<rr) TroXiret a is used of a constitution midway
between oligarchy and democracy in Ad. HoX. c. 13. 1. 18.
TO^ auVeyyus, i. e. the moderate forms of oligarchy (cp. 8 (6). 6.
1320 b 21, TTJV p.fv evKparov jidAtara TU>V u\iya.p\ia>v Kal irpaiTTjv, avrrj 8
rrj KaXovfjLfvjj TroAima) and also of democracy. Thus
6 (4). 11. 1295b 39 1296a 9. 217
the cities of Achaia, being under moderate democracies, were mostly
free from tyranny (Paus. 7. 7. i : Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 105).
Tf|f 8 alriav K.T.\. The reference perhaps is especially to 7 (5).
8. 1308 a 20 sqq. (see above on 3).
7. Tj p.e <n), SC. TToXiTft a. It is implied that in the ^e cnj irdXireia the
midway class will be large : cp. 23 sqq., where iv ravrais apparently
means V Tals TrXeiorais TroXiTei atr, and C. 13. I2p7b 26, 81 oXiyav-
Gp&itiav yap OVK ei^ov (ai dpxaiai TroXtreicu) iroXii TO fifcrov.
8. oirou yap K.T.\. Cp. 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 30, TO p.e<rov av%iV TOVTO
yap StaXuet ray Sta T^I* dvKTOTijra (rrda-fis. Aristotle has before him
PlatO, Laws 744 D, del yap ev TroXft TTOV, (pofifv, 777 TOV fj.eyi<rrov vocrrj-
ov fi.t6{ov<TT), b 8uia~ra(riv r) (rrd(nv op66rtpot> av fir) KfKXfja-dai, p.rjrf
tvelvat irapd ncrt TU>V ird\iTu>v fj.T)T av TT\OVTOV, ws
ravra dfjKporfpa. This passage lends support to
the reading of the MSS. here, arda-fis KOI 8taordo-s, and makes
it unlikely that Schneider and Sus. are right in reading o-voratms
in place of ordo-fiy, a change suggested by the rendering of Vet. Int.,
conturbationes et dissensiones politiarum, where however con-
turbationes may stand for ordo-eif, for ordo-tr is not always rendered
seditio by Vet. Int. Compare also Menecles of Barca, Fragm. i
(Miiller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 4. 449), 01 TroXtrat eV rfj 0ijpa ecrTao-iaa-av KOI
Ste trnjo-ai/ aXX^Xwi/, and Gellius version of Solon s law as to neutrality
in a sedition (Gell. 2. 12, si ob discordiam dissensionemque seditio
atque discessio populi in duas partes (vTdcris KO\ Sida-rao-is) fiet, etc.) ;
also Plato, Rep. 560 A, ordo-ts ral dvrivrains, and Plut. Solon, C. 12,
TTJS ordcrfws aKfifiv \aj3ovcrr)S judXtora KO.\ TOV 8r)p.ov diacrravros. In a
fitdoruo-is the citizens were divided into two camps, and a division
into two camps was probably often the precursor of actual fighting
(cp. 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 19).
9. at fxeyaXai iroXeis, large States probably, not large cities,
as in 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 18 sq. The tendency of small States to
arda-is may be illustrated by the examples of Cynaetha (Polyb. 4.
17), Epidamnus (Thuc. i. 24), and Delphi (Pol. 7 (5). 4. 1303 b
37 sqq.). Aristotle s remark that r6 pta-ov was a numerous class
in large Greek States throws an interesting light on the distribution
of property in them. If we could trust the statement of the tribune
Marcius Philippus in B.C. 104 that there were not two thousand
men in Rome who possessed property (Cic. De Offic. 2. 21. 73),
which is in all probability an exaggerated one, the state of things at
Rome must have been at that time very different.
2i8 NOTES.
10. lv 8e TCUS fuicpcus K.T.\. If 01 /ie o-oi were so few in number
in small Greek States, the polity can hardly have been suitable to
them. Yet were not most Greek States small ? If so, can the polity
have been suitable to most Greek States ? Aristotle says himself
in 1 296 a 23sqq. that the midway class was often a small one
in Greek States. The difficulty just pointed out does not seem,
however, to have occurred to him.
11. fiT)8ei piaov, nothing midway between the very rich and the
very poor.
13. KCU al T]p.OKpaTiai 8e dor^aX^arepai TW^ 6\iyap\in> K.T.X.
A different reason is given for this in 7 (5). i. 1302 a 8 sqq. : cp.
also 7 (5). 7. 1 307 a 15 sqq.
16. Itrei introduces a proof that the greater durability of
democracy as compared with oligarchy is due to the /xeo-ot, the
proof being furnished by the fact that when the supremacy of the
poor in a democracy is not due to the aid of the /xeo-ot but to their
own superiority in number, democracies do not last long. Cp.
8 (6). 4. 1319 b 12-19. The fact mentioned by Aristotle is interest
ing. The Athenian democracy, which lasted long, must have had
the support of the /ueVot. Mommsen (History of Rome, Book 4,
c. 6 : Eng. Trans., ed. i, vol. iii. p. 212) says of the demagogues
Saturninus and Glaucia, While Gaius Gracchus, clearly perceiving
that no government could be overthrown by means of the proletariate
alone, had especially sought to gain over to his side the propertied
classes, these continuators of his work began by producing a recon
ciliation between the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie? For KOKO-
TTpayla yiWrat cp. PlatO, La\VS 701 E, tyevero einrpayia.
18. crTjfieioK 8e K.T.\. An indication of what ? Probably of the
fact that the constitution which gives supreme power to the midway
class is the best.
19. loXwy re yap T" TOUTUC (SirjXoi 8 IK. TT)S iroii]o-(i)s). For 8rj\ol
= 8r)\6v eWt, see Liddell and Scott and Bon. Ind. 174 a 14 sqq.
That Solon belonged to the moderately well-to-do class is testified
also by Ad. noA. c. 5 and Plut. Solon, cc. i and 14. No evidence
of the fact is to be found in Solon, Fragm. 15, which seems only
to show that he was not wealthy, nor do the quotations from his
poems in Ad. noX. c. 5 prove the point, as the writer seems to think
that they do. Aristotle probably did not regard Cleisthenes as one
of the best lawgivers. He must have been a wealthy man.
20. ou yap r\v paaiXeus. This is added in correction of those who
6 (4). 11. 1296a 1032. 219
had said that Lycurgus was king. Ephorus had done so (Fragm. 64,
ap. Strab. p. 482, TC<BS ptv ovv fftaaiXevtv 6 AvKovpyos dvri rov afieXc^ot/,
ytvontvov de TTaiSor fnerpoirfvev (Kfivov : cp. Plut. Lycurg. C. 3). Other
authorities went further ; according to them Lycurgus was for many
years king at Lacedaemon (Plut. Solon, c. 16). Wide domains were
attached to the Lacedaemonian kingship (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of
Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 44. 2), and if Lycurgus had been
king, he would have been a rich man and not one of the ^eo-ot. Cp.
Horn. Odyss. i. 392,
oil p.(v yap n KCIKOV ftaaiXfVffjifv ai\frd T( ol 8&&gt;
d(pvtiov TreXertu, Koi Tt/iTjeorepoj avrds.
The view that Lycurgus was not a king recurs in the speech of
Cleomenes III in Plut. Cleom. C. IO, rov Avxovpyov, or oure /3ao-iXci>r
iiv ovrf ap%u>v, t5ia>T7jj fie (3a<Ti\tvtiv tTn\ti.pasv eV rots oTrXots TrpoJjX&i/
(is dyopdv K.r.X.
21. XapwcSas. Charondas, though praised here, is apparently
referred to in c. 13. 1297 a 23 sqq. as the author of an aptoro/cpana
embodying one at any rate of the o-o<pio>iaTa to which Aristotle
objects (see note on 1274 a 22).
22. fyavepov 8 CK TOUTWI K.T.X. Three reasons for the comparative
rarity of 17 &a T&JK /z/o-wv TroXireia are given in what follows :
(i) the class of ^e o-oi is often small, (2) the constitution is the
outcome of a victory of the rich or the poor, (3) those who have
had the hegemony in Greece have seldom favoured this consti
tution. In 7 (5). i. 1301 b 39 sqq. a different reason is given for
the tendency of constitutions to assume the form of oligarchy or
democracy.
23. lv TaoTdis, i. e. (V rals irXdarms iroXiTficus (cp. 14 Sqq.).
27. irpos Se TOU TOIS K.T.X. Compare Plato, Laws 7 1 5 A, and as
to Argos Thuc. 5. 82. 2, Plut. Alcib. c. 15, and Paus. 2. 20. 2.
As to Tegea see Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 6-10.
30. TT|> oTrepoxTji TTJS iToXiTcias, the superior share in the
advantages of the constitution : cp. 7 (5). 8. 1309 a 28, rols ^TTOV
KOlVCaVOlKTl T^t JTO\lT(iaS, and 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 19, TT)S io-OTTJTOS TTJS
TToXtTflW.
32. en 8e K.T.X. The cause now mentioned for the general
prevalence in Greece of democracy and oligarchy does not account
for the prevalence of these two constitutions throughout the Greek
world, for though the constitutional development of the States of
Greece Proper, Western Asia Minor, the Northern Aegean, and
220 NOTES.
the Propontis, etc. was considerably influenced by the Athenians
and Lacedaemonians, this can hardly be said of the constitutional
development of the Greek States of Italy and Sicily, in which Athens
did not interfere till a comparatively late date, or of Cyrene and
Massalia, where neither the Lacedaemonians nor the Athenians
appear to have interfered at all.
Twy iv f]yf\i.ovia. yecoji^wi TTJS EXXdSos, those who held in the
past the hegemony of Greece. Aristotle refers to the Athenians
and Lacedaemonians (7 (5). 7. 1307 b 22sqq.). For the phrase
cp. Aeschin. C. CtCS. C. 133, ol ra>v E\\T)v<av irore d^iovvres fjyffioves flvai
(said of the Lacedaemonians) : Demosth. Fragm. 1 7, TWI/ ^yr/o-a^Vwi/
Trjs EXXdSoy (said of the Thebans) : and Sext. Empir. adv. Mathem.
6. 9, Te TIJS EXXdfios fjyovfjifvoi. KCU. eV dvbpiq 8ta/3o?/rot STrapnarfu. Cp.
also for ylyveadai ei> fjytfjtovia 7 (5). 8. 1 308 a 5> TO ^ S e " Ta LS opxais
yivopevovs,
38. oXiydKis Kal imp oXiyois. Aristotle often uses expressions
like this: cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 23, oXiydms rj uXiyas, and see Vahlen
on Poet. 14. 1454 a i, who refers to Poet. 24. 1460 a 9, De Gen.
An. 1. 19. 727 b 28 sq. and 3. 5. 756 a 16 sq., Eth. Nic. 7. n. 1151 b
30, and other passages. See also Bon. Ind. s. v. oXiyd^?, and Plato,
Rep. 491 B.
els Y<*P ^)P K.T.X., for one man only of those formerly in
a position of supreme authority was persuaded to allot this con
stitution [to those with whom he had to do]. For the use of
in TCBP irporepov ($> f}ytfj,ovta yevofjievov, cp. eV fvnpa^ia in Soph. O. C.
yevoicrdf, Ktm tvTrpaf-iq
f p.ov davovros f\>Tv\is dfi.
It is doubtful whether we should supply TJ?? EXXdSo? with f<f> fjy
though we have had T>V eV fiytpoviif yevop.evu>v Ttjs EXXdSoj in 32 ;
Bonitz (Ind. s. v. T)y(p.ovia) and Sus. 2 (i. 597) do not appear to
supply TTJS EXXdfio?, but to take statesmen at the head of their
respective States to be referred to. Statesmen at the head of the
greater Greek States would, however, be in a position to exercise
an influence over the affairs of Greece. It is to be noticed that while
the reference is to peoples in 32, statesmen are now referred to.
I take the allusion to be to Theramenes : see vol. i. p. 470. A con
stitution which Thucydides describes both as oXtyapxia and as
upivroKpaTia was introduced at Thasos and in other States dependent
on Athens in the time of the Four Hundred (Thuc. 8. 64). Aristotle
6 (4). 11. 1296 a 38 1296 b 5. 221
may well have thought that Epaminondas and Pelopidas missed
a splendid opportunity of introducing the polity when the victory
of Leuctra made Thebes the leading power in Greece, and that
Arcadia, for instance, might have prospered better if Epaminondas
had advised those who reorganized it to give it a less democratic
constitution than they actually did. Why crvvfirdo-dr] and not
fT-flo-dr- ? ^vpntidfiv seems hardly to differ in meaning from nddeiv
in De Caelo, 2. I. 284 a 2, StoVep KaXws e^ei crvfinfiddv tavTov TOVS
dpxaiovs KCU /u.aXtora jrarpiovs r]^v dXrjOfls tlvai \6yovs, and the word is
said by Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 3. i. 254. 3 to be often used in
the same sense as neidfiv by Theopompus. Sweirtivdr) may mean
no more here, or it may mean, as Richards suggests, was per
suaded to agree in doing so and so. For rm/n/v ditoSovvcu T^V
rdgiv, where I can hardly think (with Welldon) that aTroSowat
means to restore (Sus. translates the word ins Leben zu rufen/
to call into being. ), cp. Xen. Rep. Lac. 8. 5, ov irportpov dirfdaitt T&&gt;
irXrjdfi TOVS vopovs (6 AvKoupyor). In A$. IIoX. C. II, TTJV avrrjv -rd^tv
diro8a>(r(ti>, the word perhaps means to restore.
40. 7]8T] 8e K.r.X. Kal rols tv rals noXevtv, among those in the
individual cities also, as well as among rulers of the leading States
of Greece: cp. Xen. Anab. 6. 6. 12, fieri p.*v yap tyyvs al EXfyviSfs
no\fis rr)s 8e EXXaSoy AaKfSoj^tdwoi npofcrTTjKacnv iKavol fie fieri KOI tls
fKCHTTOs A.aKf8aifj.ovia>v tv rnij rroXecrtJ o rt j3ov\ovTai ciianparrfcrdai.
Aristotle evidently holds that the bad spirit to which he refers had
had its origin in the policy of the Athenian and Lacedaemonian
statesmen and had spread from it to the dependent States ruled by
them. Macaulay perhaps remembers the passage before us when
he writes of the Englishry and Irishry of Ireland in 1688-9 (History
of England, c. 12), It was now impossible to establish in Ireland
a just and beneficent government. . . . The opportunity had passed
away; compromise had become impossible; the two infuriated
castes were alike convinced that it was necessary to oppress or to
be oppressed, and that there could be no safety but in victory,
vengeance, and dominion. M^Se @ov\(cr0ai TO Icrov, not even to
wish for that which is equal and fair, much less to endeavour to
realize it. For TO Icrov cp. 29, ov Ka0io~Tacri. Koivf/v m>\iT(iav ovcf io~r)v.
2. dpionr], SC. Tals irXfiorais noXtcrt (c. II. 1295 a 25: C. 13-12965.
1297 b 33).
5. KQI ToG-rov STJ TOK rpoirov ^x o f te >n T Cp. 2. 8. I268b 15, Kal
TOVTOV 8f) TOV Tpoirov S^Xov on pfpiovcriv : Metaph. Z. 2. 1028 b 24,
222 NOTES.
Kal TOVTOV &rj TOV Tpoirov tTTfKTtivti ras ovfrlas, and Other passages
collected in Bon. Ind. 173 a 16 sqq. In 7 (5). 3. 130313 16 we
have KOI ourw 817, which is less common.
7. Act Y^P *- T -^- So in 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 21 sq, we are told
that the first form of oligarchy is that which makes a near approach
to the polity.
9. irpo9 iiiroQeaiv, in relation to a presupposition (in contra
distinction to dTrXwt), i. e. in relation to the presupposition of
a given case in which what is in the abstract most choiceworthy
is not most advantageous. For trpos wadeo-iv see Bon. Ind. 797 a
52 sqq.
Xyu 8e K.T.X. It does not follow that what is in the abstract
most choiceworthy will be advantageous in a given case. Punish
ment, which is in the abstract by no means choiceworthy, will be
advantageous in the case of a criminal (4 (7). 13. 1332 a icsqq.).
Cp. also Rhet. 2.13. 1389 b 37> T ptv yap ffvu^epov avra ayaBov ttrri,
TO 8t Ka\bv dTrXtof. Thus, though the first form of oligarchy, which
makes a near approach to the polity, is in the abstract the most
choiceworthy form, in a given case an extreme form of oligarchy
may be advantageous (cp. c. 12. 1296 b 33 sq.).
C. 12. 13. Tig Be iroXireia K.T.X. Cp. c. i. 1288 b 24 sqq. and c. 2. 1289 b
17 sqq. Compare also Rhet. i. 4. 1360 a 30, xph <Tl f- ov & "?* Tas
vofiodftrias TO fir) fiovov enatfiv TIS TroXirem (rvp.<$)fptt. eVc TO>V 7rapf\T}\vdoT(t>v
Ofcopovvri, dXXa Kal TUS napa Tails aXXotr eiSeVai, at Trolat rols rroiois
14. XYjirTeoK, i.e. vnodfTeov: cp. 2. 2. I26ia 1 6, Xa/z/Sdi/ft yap
TavTrjv vrrodfffiv o 2<BAf/>dr7j, and 8 (6). i. 1317 a 18. In a logical
sense Xa/^aWtv is used synonymously with atTeur&u, iiro6eo-6ai, and
in contrast to 8(iicn>vai (Bon. Ind. 42 2 b n). That the principle
here insisted on was inherited by Aristotle from Theramenes we
have seen in vol. i. p. 491. Aristotle draws attention to it here
because it has a bearing on the question what constitution is
advantageous in a given case. To answer this question we must
begin by ascertaining what is the strongest element in the given
State, and what constitution will enlist its support.
17. ?K re TOU TTOIOU lea! Tfoaou. For the omission of the article
before no&ov cp. 4 (7). II. 1330 b I, npos rt TOS TroXiTiKas irpa^fts Kal
TroXf/iiKos. New England abolished caste; in Virginia they still
talk of "quality folk " (Lowell, Among my Books, p. 239).
18 cXeufiepia, which is said in c. 8. 1294 a n to be the opos of
6 (4). 11. 1296 b 712. 1296 b 34. 223
democracy, is here distinguished from f) TOV -n\r)6ovs virfpn^. The
irX^dos, in fact, may include others than of Xv%w (3. 15. 1286 a
36). For the grouping together of irXovrov iraibdav tvyevtiav cp. C. 4.
1291 b 28 sq. and 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 39.
20. For IWpw fi^pei TTJS iroXews, e S>v auce o~rT)K ptpwv rj ir<5Xis, see
note on 1339 b 38. For the reversal of the order of the words in
TO fJLfV TTOWV VTfdpXtlV fTfpta fJifpfl TTJS 7ToXfO>S . . . oXXw 8e ptpfl TO TTOffOV
See note on 1277 a 31, and cp. 26, tKavrov tl8os 8r)poicpaTias Kara TTJV
23. uirepe xeii , SC. TOUTO TO
25. TTji elpTjfieVrjy di aXoytai , i. e. so as to overbalance its defect
in quality.
26. Though Aristotle uses the word irtyuitev here, he does not
probably intend to imply that democracy or oligarchy exist by
nature under any circumstances (cp. 3. 17. i287b 39 sq.).
29. eav 8e TO T&V Pavauvdiv Kal fuo-Oapfournitf, TTJC rcXeuraiaj .
This hardly agrees with c. 6. 1293 a I s^Q- ^ doubt the ultimate
democracy will exist only in States in which artisans and day-
labourers are very numerous, but it will not exist even in them
unless the revenue is large enough to make an ample provision of
pay possible.
31. OTTOU 8e TO Twf euir<5poji Kal y^wpifAwv K.T.X. We see from 8 (6).
7. 1321 a 8 sqq. that other things have to be taken into account in
deciding what kind of oligarchy is suitable to a given State besides
that mentioned here for instance, the character of the territory.
In 2. 12. 1274 a l8 we have T>V yva>pip.a>v Kal ra>v evrropcov, but in
the passage before us the article is omitted after KOI because the
two classes are treated as nearly akin. Compare with 31 sq. U(p\
fJuiKpofiioTTjTos 5- 466 a 33, fjuiKpo^iu>Tfpa yap ra \fin6p.fva TW TrXiJ&i
ToC vypov, (av TrXeiWi Xoyo> vnepf\r} Kara TO TTOIOV rj XetVfTat KOTO. TO
34. KOTO, TTJJ uirepoxT]* TOO oXiyapxiKou TrX^Oous, according to
the degree of superiority (i. e. in quality) possessed by the oligar
chical population. UX^or must here be used of the class referred
to without much reference to its numbers : cp. 3 1 , TO rS>v eviropw Kal
yvapipcav (sc. TrXj/tfos). The phrase recurs in 8 (6). i. 1317 a n,
wffai/rwf 8e KOI -iroia TCOV oXcyap^twi Trot w Tr\r)6n.
34. 8ei 8" del . . . 38. TOUTOUS, and 1297 a 6. Saw . . . b 1. ptvov Sus.,
following Buecheler, would transfer to before i294b 14, TOV, and
1297 b 1. Set . . . 28. apxeaOai, to after oXwj, 1294 b 40. But
224 NOTES.
Welldon retains the traditional order of these passages, and,
I think, rightly. I do not see any reason why Aristotle should not
in 1296 b 34-38 advise the framers of oligarchies and democracies
to frame their constitutions so as to satisfy the /xeVot, and though
the counsel as to the construction of durable polities and aristo
cracies which is given in 1297 a 6-b 28 might have been given in
c. 9, where Buecheler and Sus. would place it, it should not escape
attention that povipcarepa, 1297 a 7, evidently takes up p.6vifj.ov, 1296
b 40, and that it can hardly be right to tear asunder the two sen
tences in which these words occur, as Buecheler and Sus. would
do. It should also be noticed that the closing remark in 1297 b
26-28 as to TO pta-ov comes better after, than before, what we have
been told in c. n as to the importance of of /aeo-oi. Aristotle s
object in 1297 a 6-b 28 is to add two cautions to what he has
already said in c. 9 as to the proper way of constructing polities
and aristocracies, the one against falling into the error into which
framers of these constitutions frequently fell, and trying to deceive
the demos in addition to giving an unfair share of power to the
well-to-do, and the other against fixing the property-qualification
without reference to the circumstances of the particular case, and
omitting to take care that those admitted to political rights shall
be more numerous than those excluded from them. The latter
caution is in complete harmony with, and was probably suggested
by, what is said at the outset of the discussion in c. 12. 1296 b
14 sqq.
35. ef rp iroXireta goes with Trpoo-Xafipamf, and we should
translate should make the moderately well-to-do sharers in the
advantages of the constitution in addition to the class specially
favoured by him. Bonitz (Ind. s. v. Trpoo-Xa^/Sami/) compares with the
passage before us 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 7, T Trpoa-Xa^dvew as
/cat iroieiv TToXt ray fj.rj povov TOVS yvrjcriovs aXXa KOI TOVS vodovs K.r.X.
36. crroxaeo-0ai r&v p.e acuy. Cp. A#. IIoX. c. 22, (TTo
irXrjdovs, and Polyb. 6. 15. 9.
37. lav re SijfioKpariKoJs K.r.X. Cp. c. n. 1296 a 13 sqq.
38. oirou 8e K.T.X., but where the mass of the moderately well-
to-do outweighs either both the extreme classes taken together or
even one of them only, there it is possible for a durable polity to
exist. See vol. i. p. 501, note. Yn-eprfiVei probably means out
weighs (cp. 32, vnfpreivei TO> iroia>\ not exceeds in number,
though in small Greek States the very rich may often have been
6 (4). 12. 1296 b 35 1297 a 9. 225
more numerous than the moderately well-to-do (c. n. 1296 a
10 sqq.).
4O. For ou&ey ^opepoy firj cp. (with Bon. Ind. 828 a 30) Metaph.
0. 8. 1050 b 23, KOI ov fpofitpbv pfj noTf 0-777 : cp. also Xen. Hiero,
T. 12, <pofifpbv yap pf) ajua (TTfprjduxri rrjs dp^s Koi. dSi/varoi ytviavrai
rtfjuapijcracrdai. TOVS dStKijcrairar.
2. ouSerroTe yap arepoi {SouX^croKTai, SouXeucif TOIS er^pois K.T.\. 1297 a.
The sense is for, if the rich are to combine with the poor against
the nf<roi, either the one class must submit to be ruled by the other,
and neither of the two classes will agree to that, or they must fall
back on a Kowt) TroXtre/a which will give both classes a share of
power, and if they seek to find a noXirda more Koivf) than this, they
will seek in vain.
3. ouSep.icu cupi^o-Quo-if aXX^ raimjs. Viet, and Lamb, supply
Koivortpav before ravr^s, while Sus. 2 ( so werden sie keine andere als
diese finden ) and Welldon ( they will not discover any other than
this ) make Tavrrjf in the gen. after aXXrjv. For oXXoy with the gen.
cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 15. 1 138 a 15 sq. and see Bon. Ind. s. v. I incline
myself, however, to supply Koivo-rtpav.
4. f.v fiepei yap apxeiy K.r.X. To Iv pepfi (!p\tiv KOI ap^tffdat is
a sign of freedom (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 2 sq.), and a constitution in
which it found a place would be especially Koivf].
6. 8iai.TT]TT)S 8 6 /i&ros. Cp. De An. 2. II. 424 a 6, TO yap p.ecrov
KpiriKov yivcrai yap irpbs fKarepov airutv ddrepov T>V aKp<ov. Aristotle s
conception of the /i/o-oi ruling as arbitrators between rich and poor
was perhaps suggested to him by the fact that Greek States
occasionally had recourse to an apxa>v /zeo-i Sior when the amaria
npos dXX^Xovy mentioned in 4 sq. existed (cp. 7 (5). 6. 1306 a
26 sqq., where the phrase recurs).
oorw 8* 8r ap.ifov ^ TioXireia fuxOfj, Toaourw jioi tjiwTepa. Cp. 7 (5).
7. 1 307 a 5 sqq.
7. KOI TUK TOIS dpioroKpaTiKas pouXojieVwi Troieif TroXireia?, even
of those who wish to construct aristocratic constitutions, not merely
of those who wish to construct oligarchies. I incline to think that
TUS dpHTTOKpaTiKas iroXiTtias means here aristocratic constitutions,
not aristocratic polities, though in c. 14. 1298 b 10 we have
7ToXiT aj dpiaroKpaTiKtjs used in the sense of an aristocratic polity.
That many aristocracies were not unlike oligarchies we know from
c. 7. 1293 b 20 sq. and 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 15 sqq.
9. ef TU irapaKpouco-Oai rov Sfjfioi . How odious laws were
VOL. IV. Q
226 NOTES.
which deceived the demos, we see from Demosth. c. Timocr.
c. 79.
10. drayKTj yap K.r.X. By \l/fv8a>s dyadd Aristotle means apparent
privileges which come to nothing and disappoint those to whom
they are given. He perhaps remembers Theogn. 607,
dpxfl em ^stvftovs fiiKprj X"P is 6 s ^ Tf\evri)V
al(T\pov 8fj Kfpdos fcai KCIKOV, dfj.(p6Tfpoi> }
yiffrat, oiSe TI Ka\6v, OT<O \l/fi>8os wpovopapTy
dv8p\ KOI f(X6r) irparov dirb oro ^iaros
(a saying which is apparently referred to in Soph. Fragm. 749, 750
Nauck ; Cp. also PlatO, Rep. 490 C, r]yovp.fv^ 81} dXrjfleias OVK iiv iroTf,
olpai, <fca~i/j.ev avrrj xopbv KdKStv dKO\ov6r)aai). Eurip. Fragm. IO22 Nauck
(i35? ed. 2) should also be compared,
SIHTTTJUOS ocrrts ra (coXa *cat ^/ev8f) \ya>v
ov ToicrSe ^p^rai rots KaXols d\rjd(<ri>>,
and Fragm. 266 Nauck (264, ed. 2),
TCI yap OVK opdws npacrrr6[jLfi> opd&s
rois TTpdcrarovcriv KOKOV rj\dfv,
and Menand. Inc. Fab. Fragm. cclxx (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4.
292),
Kpf nrov 5 e Xt cr&u ^eCSos f) d\T]des KUKOV.
Some familiar proverb or verse probably lies at the root of all these
passages.
11. at yap irXeove^uu rail irXouaiwy aTroXXuoucri fi&XXoc TTJ^ TTO\I-
Tiac ^ al TOU Srjfiou, for the undue gains of the rich (i. e. the
superiority of political advantage which the ingenious constitutional
contrivances referred to secure to the rich) are more fatal to the
constitution than those of the demos. nXeovtgia here = r6 irXeov
fX f <- v , not TO ftovXfcrOai TrXe ov e^eti/ (Bon. Ind. s. v.). The reason
why the undue gains of the rich are more fatal to the constitution
than those of the poor probably is that these gains fall to a minority,
and to a minority specially keen for political predominance (7 (5).
7- 1307 3. I7 Kpf irrov Tf yap TO TrXetoi/ KOI paXXov dyairaicnv icrov e^oi/Tej)
and specially ready to abuse it (1307 a 19 sq.).
13. 14. "Eon 8 oaa K.r.X. Ev rais TroXtreiats probably means in
polities, i.e. in polities strictly so called: cp. 7 (5). 8. I3o7b 40
sqq., where a warning is addressed to well-mixed constitutions
not to trust to the artifices described in the chapter before us ; hence
it is likely that framers of aristocracies and polities often com
mitted the error of trusting to them. We know that Plato did so
6 (4). 12. 1297a 10 13. 1297a 17. 227
in the Laws (see vol. i. p. 502, note 2), and the constitution
sketched in the Laws is said by Aristotle to be meant for a polity
(2. 6. 1265 b 26 sqq.). Plato may have been misled by the
example of Charondas (1297 a 23). The plan followed in the
aristocracies and polities which Aristotle here criticizes was to give
the demos an apparent, but illusory, share in the popular assembly,
in office, in the dicasteries, and in the possession of arms and the
practice of gymnastic exercises. Similar devices are occasionally
practised in modern times. Thus in the South African Republic
the Uitlander or alien after a period of two years residence and
naturalization acquires only a vote in the election of the second
Raad, a worthless franchise, for the Acts of this body must be pre
sented to the President of the Republic for consideration, and can
only become law if he decides to submit them for the approval of
the first Raad, and its approval is obtained (Times, Jan. i, 1896).
It should be noticed that the advice which Aristotle himself gives to
oligarchies to associate the demos with the privileged class in the
deliberative, but to give it only a nugatory or consultative voice
(c. 14. i298b 32 sqq.) comes perilously near that which he
censures here. It would seem from what Aristotle says in the
passage before us that even in polities the rich had to be forced by
penalties to attend in the assembly and dicasteries, and to possess
heavy arms and practise gymnastic exercises, so that it is not
surprising that in extreme democracies they commonly absented
themselves from the meetings of the assembly and dicasteries
(c. 6. 1293 a 8 sq.).
17. irepl lK.K.\r\aria.v p.ec K.r.X. Cp. 2. 6. 1266 a 9 sqq. Aristotle
does not object to the imposition of a fine on all, whether rich or
poor, for non-attendance at the assembly, but to the imposition of
a fine exclusively on the well-to-do, or of a much larger fine on
them than was imposed on the poor, unless indeed the imposition of
a fine on the rich is balanced by the provision of pay for the poor
(1297 a38 sqq. : cp. c. 14. 1298 b 13 sqq.). A fine was imposed at
Athens on those who did not attend the assembly (Pollux, 8. 104,
where habitual absentees are perhaps meant by TOVS ^ fK^aidCov-
Tor), but no doubt on rich and poor alike, though of course a fine
would not be easily leviable from the very poor. If the fine thus
levied was of equal amount for both rich and poor, it would
obviously fall more lightly on the rich than on the poor, and there
fore would be more effective in securing the attendance of the poor
Q 2
228 NOTES.
than of the rich, whether this was intended by those who instituted
it or not. The comitia centuriata at Rome were so organized that
the centuries of the rich outnumbered those of the poor (Seeley,
Introduction to Political Science, p. 350).
19. irepl 8e ra<s dpx&s K.T.\. A device of a somewhat similar
kind finds a place in the constitution of the imaginary Persia of
Xenophon s Cyropaedeia, for under this constitution office was
confined to the complete citizens, and no one could become
a complete citizen without having in youth attended the public
schools, which only those could do whose fathers could afford to
maintain them in idleness. Thus while Xenophon can say that
none of the 120,000 Persians were excluded from office by law, it
was practically possible only for the sons of well-to-do parents to
hold office (Xen. Cyrop. i. 2. 15).
20. TOIS pev IXOUCTI Tip/r^a, those who possess rateable pro
perty, cp. 3. 12. 1283 a 17, riprifjia (frepovTas, and A$. lloX. c. 39,
1. 24, iv rois ra ri^fj^ara Trapf^o/^eVoir.
fi$l e^eimi IfopuaOai. It is implied that in the constitutions to
which Aristotle refers men were glad to avoid holding office ; hence
no pay can have been attached to the offices, or at any rate no
pay large enough to be tempting. The tenure of office without
pay is described in 2. n. i273a 17 as characteristic of aristo
cracy, and some of the constitutions to which Aristotle here refers
were aristocracies (cp. 8) ; whether offices were unremunerated in
polities also, we do not learn.
21. KCU. irepl TO, SiKacrn^pia K.T.\. Cp. c. 14. 12981^ 16 sqq.
In the constitutions referred to here there seem to have been dica-
steries of which the poor were nominally at any rate members, but
in the Lacedaemonian and Carthaginian aristocracies the magistrates
constituted the judicial authority of the State (3. i. 1275 b 8 sqq.).
23. iv TOIS XapcjkSou voftois. Charondas legislated for Catana
and the other Chalcidian cities of Italy and Sicily (2. 12. 1274 a 23
sqq.), but his laws seem to have been in use also at Thurii, if we
may trust Diod. 12. n sqq., at Mazaca in Cappadocia (Strabo,
P- 539)> an d apparently at Cos (Herondas, 2. 48 : see Crusius,
Untersuchungen, p. 34 sqq.), and very possibly in other cities of
which we do not hear.
24. diroYpouJ/ajitVois, after having their names entered in a
register. There was a list of members of the assembly at Athens
), in which men entered their names on attain-
6 (4). 13. 1297 a 1940. 229
ing the proper age (Demosth. Or. 44. in Leoch. c. 35 : Gilbert,
Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., pp. 199, 289 :
Haussoullier, Vie Municipale en Attique, p. 1 1 2 sq.), and such lists
must have existed in most Greek States which had assemblies,
for otherwise it would be impossible to exclude persons not
entitled to serve, especially where pay was forthcoming for
attendance, but the peculiarity of the arrangement described in
the text is that registration was optional, and that poor men were
discouraged from registering by the imposition of heavy penalties on
those who after registering failed to attend (TOVTOIS, 27). This
device differs from the rest in not affecting the poor exclusively.
Not a few rich persons might be glad to avoid all risk of incurring
these heavy penalties, and might consequently abstain from
entering their names on the register. As to the use of the word
dnoypafaadai see Mr. W. Wyse in Class. Rev. 12. 392.
29. rov auroj Se Tpoteov K.T.\. Some oligarchies deprived the
many of their heavy arms (7 (5). 10. 1311 a 12 sq.), and the consti
tutions referred to here did in a stealthy way much the same thing
as those oligarchies did openly. We are told in 2. 5. 1264 a 20 sqq.
that the Cretan States forbade their slaves to practise gymnastic
exercises and to possess heavy arms, and the two things go together
in the passage before us also.
34. raura fiey ouv 6\iyap)(iKa rcl ao<J>io|,aTa rfjs vojioOecrias.
Cp. Eth. Nic. IO. 2. 1173 b ^r rnvra Se oxojuaTiKa e ori ra Trddrj.
35. lv 8e rais 8r]p.oKpaTiais K.T.\. This was the case at Athens,
where pay was provided for attendance at the assembly and dica-
steries, but no special fine was imposed on the rich for non-
attendance. Pay would be provided in democracies for holders of
office also, but Aristotle does not dwell on that, because in many
democracies the real authority rested to a large extent with the
assembly and the dicasteries. We do not hear, so far as I am aware,
that poor men were ever in democracies enabled by pay to possess
heavy arms and practise gymnastic exercises.
40. TOIS fiey [iiaQov Tropi^ic TOIS oe ^fiiav. Hopi&iv does not
suit with C 1 ?/* 1 "* and we expect rols 8e rurrfiv fr^ iav (cp. 38), but see
notes on 1257 a 21 and 1287 b 26, and cp. 6 (4). 14. i298b 17
sqq., where rarTfiv is used both with /ito-tfov and with fmtlar. Aristotle
evidently sees that simply extending the fine to the poor would
not suffice, inasmuch as many of them would be too poor to pay
it, and indeed could not afford to attend without remuneration.
230 NOTES.
4-1, KOIVUKOICV, SC. roil fKK\r)<ndfiv Kal $iicdfiv.
1297 b. 1. Sei Se K.T.\., but the constitution [of the polity] should indeed
be composed of (or in other words should give political rights to )
the possessors of heavy arms and none others, [so that it will be
necessary to name a property-qualification for membership of it ;]
still it is not possible to define the amount of this property-qualifica
tion absolutely (in contradistinction to relatively to the particular
State ) and to say that it should be this or that, but we must
consider what is the highest amount falling within the reach of the
particular State that will allow those who share in the constitution
to outnumber those who do not, and we must fix this amount.
Sus. and Welldon translate T^V noXtTfiav here the polity, but if we
translate it thus, we can hardly avoid translating 17 TroXiret a in 1 2 sq.
and 14 sq. in the same way. In 14 sq., however, at any rate
77 noXiTfia cannot be thus translated, and neither Sus. nor Welldon
thus translate it there. I incline, therefore, to translate TI}V truXiTfiav
here the constitution [of the polity], and to translate rj TroXim a in
12 sq. and 14 sq. the constitution. Bonitz (Ind. 612 b 12 sq.)
translates rrjv Tro\irdav in the passage before us and f) iroXirda in
i 2 sq. universitas civium, but I prefer the rendering the con
stitution (see note on 1293 b 41). That the polity will confine
political rights to the possessors of heavy arms is taken for
granted; this has been already said in 2. 6. 1265 b 28 sq.
and 3. 7. 1279 b 2 sqq. If the property-qualification were
fixed so high as to make those excluded from political rights
more numerous than those admitted to them, the constitution
would not be a polity but an oligarchy (c. 5. 1292 a 39 sqq.).
The property-qualification which entitles to political rights in the
polity will vary in different States; it will be high where a high quali
fication will bring an adequate number within the constitution, it will
be lower where that will not be so. When it is said that the consti
tution must be composed of the possessors of heavy arms (for
here designates the material of which the constitution is made, cp. 2.
6. 1 265 b 28 sq. and 3. 7. 1279 b 2 sqq., and see notes on 1290 b 8
and 1319 a 24), the meaning probably is that membership of the
assembly and dicasteries and the right of electing magistrates should
be confined to this class. For though KG! p.fj perexovres TQ>V TI^MV, 6,
might seem to indicate that the phrase implies access to office strictly
so called, a distinction is drawn in 14 sqq. between membership of
the TroXiru a and eligibility to office. It is evident, in fact, from 2. 8,
6 (4). 13. 1297 a 41 1297 b 10. 231
1268 a 27 sqq. and 3. n. 1281 b 28 sq. that, though the expression
(KTtxtut Trjs iro\iTfias often means ^eTf\.v r&v Tip.>v (e.g. in c. 5.
1292 a 41 and 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 26) in one passage, indeed (2. 8.
1 268 a 21 sqq.), it means fttTt^tv navfav rS>v TJ/IWJ/ it does not
always do so, and sometimes implies nothing more than member
ship of the assembly and dicasteries and the right of electing
magistrates. Under of ra 6VXa fx ovr(S Aristotle probably includes
only 01 onXiTfvovTtt, not ui wTrXircvKorfs (cp. 12 sqq. and 2. 8.
1267 b 32 sq., where TO T<\ on\u ex ov is coupled with TO irpono\ffj.ovv}.
of TO 6WAa txovTts are tacitly distinguished in what follows from
oi rr(VT]Tf s : see as to this above on 1289 b 31 and 1294 a 41.
For opiaap-tvovs Busse (De Praesidiis Aristotelis Politica Emen-
dandi, p. 22) compares Poet. c. 7. 1451 a 9, 6 de KOT avrrjv T^V
fpvcriv TOV TTpdy/jiaTos opos, del p.fi> 6 ptifav pf xpi TOV <rvvSr)\os eivat
RuXXuHi ttrrl Kara TO fjLtyfdos, a>s fie dn\a>s diopiffavras fmtiv, lv ocro)
pfytdfi K.T&. Aeli/ must be supplied with vnapxtw (Schneider) and
Set with rdTTfiv. As to the suppression of 6t see notes on 1335 b 5
and 1328 a 8.
6. e O&ouo-i yap ol TreVrjTes K.T.\., for [this course will not cause
any difficulty with the poor, for] they are willing, etc. We learn,
however, from 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 34 sqq. and 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 14 sqq.
that something besides abstinence from outrage or spoliation on
the part of the rulers is necessary if the poor are to remain quiet ;
office must not be a source of large gains. Who are meant by oi
nfvrjTfs, we see from Aristoph. Plut. 552 Didot,
TTTU>XOV fifv yap /Bios, ov <rv Xtyeiy, rjv f<mv
TOW 8f TTfV/yrof TJV (pti8<>ij.(i>ov KOI rots fpyois
vtpiyiyvtaBcu 8 avr<a fi^bef^ pr/ fiaTH fwjS* nnXctirftv.
The passage before us shows that they possessed some property :
in i. 2. 1252 b 12 it is implied that the nt ^s owned an ox for
ploughing, but of course this would be true only of small cultivating
landowners, not of urban irfvrjTts. In Plato, Rep.jj5.2..A-the terms
irevrjs and anupos are conjoined. As to the anopoi see note on
1279 b 19.
9. xaplevras. See note on 1267 a i.
10. KCU eiwOaai 8e K.T.\, Aristotle has just noticed a difficulty
in connexion with his proposal which may be removed by wise
conduct on the part of the ruling class, and now he notices another
of which the same thing may be said. He perhaps remembers how
the Council of the Areopagus had induced the poorer citizens of
232 NOTES.
Athens to take their place in the triremes and to fight at Salamis
by giving each man eight drachmae (\\0. IIoX. c. 23). Compare
the experience of the oligarchical leaders at Mytilene (Thuc. 3.
27. 2). To be willing to fight on condition of receiving food and
without any pay was evidence of an easily contented disposition :
Cp. PlatO, Rep. 420 A, vai, r/v 8 eya>, Kal ravTii ye ctruririoi Kal ovSe
picr6bi> Trpos Tols (TITIOIS Xd^i/SncoiTfy, cocrjrep ol aXXoi (eVtKOUpoe), and
Eubul. Aeu SaXos, Fragm. i (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 3. 216),
tdfXti 8 avtv
[u<T0ov Trap" avTois Kara^tvdv (TTKTITI.OS.
Cp. also Plut. Aristid. C. 10, opyi&aBai fie Aa/ceSai/iomW, ori rr)V irtviav
Kal TTJV diToplav TTJV vvv irapoiKrav A6r]i>aiois p.6vov opcotrt, rrjs 8" dperrjs Kal
TJJS (piKorifiias dfj.VTjiJ.ovov<nv eVi crm oir iinep TTJS EXXa Sos dy<t>viecr6ai
napaKoXovvTes. It would seem from the passage before us that the
poor were commonly expected to help in fighting for the State even
in a polity whether as hoplites or as light-armed troops (3 (6). 7.
1321 a 13 sq.), we are not told.
12. eon 8 TI iroXireia Trap eiaois ou [LQVOV CK rS>v oirXiTeuorra)*
dXXa. Kal eK T&V w-rrXiTeuKOTuc. H iroXireia, the constitution.
Aristotle would approve this arrangement because it adds to the
number of those admitted to political rights (and so to the strength
of the polity) without altering the class to which they belong.
Plato (Laws 753 B: vol. i. p. 446) had given the right of
nominating the three hundred citizens from whom the thirty-seven
Nomophylakes are afterwards chosen by the whole city to those
citizens, onoa-oi -ntp av on\a imriKa fj irffaa ridtavrai /cai iroXtfjiOv
K.fKOiva>vi]K.a>criv ev rdls crfperepais avratv rijs r)\iKias 8wdfj.fcri, a COn-
stituency not very unlike that described in the text.
15. eK TOUTUi , i.e. e<c T&V 6ir\iTfv6i>Tu>v KOI TMV wTrXirev/corcoi/. Mem
bership of the assembly and the dicasteries was conferred on both
these classes. So in the constitution of the imaginary Persia of
Xenophon s Cyropaedeia office was confined to those citizens who,
being between the ages of twenty-six and fifty-one, bore heavy
arms and served on foreign expeditions, while the citizens above
fifty-one years of age elected the holders of the magistracies and
acted as judges (Xen. Cyrop. i. 2. 13 sq.).
16. Kal TJ irpam] Se iroXireia K.T.X. This is added in justification
of the recommendation in 1297 b i that the polity should confine
political rights to the possessors of heavy arms. The earliest
constitution gave political rights to those who fought for the State,
6 (4). 13. 1297 b 1220. 233
and Aristotle is probably inclined to presume that the earliest
constitution will have been framed on a correct principle ; thus he
holds that the oldest kind of democracy is the best (8 (6). 4. 1318 b
6 sqq.). We do not hear what was the nature of the military force
under the kings, but the knights were supreme in the oligarchies
which arose after the fall of kingship. It is clear from c. 3. 1289 b
36 sqq. that the strength of every State did not lie in cavalry, and
therefore that these oligarchies of knights did not exist everywhere,
but they are said in that passage to have existed, among other
places, at Chalcis and Eretria, at Magnesia ad Maeandrum, and at
many cities in Asia, They probably existed wherever there was
a spacious open (Hdt. 5. 63) plain near the city, in which cavalry
could act with effect (8 (6). 7. 1321 a 8 sqq.). See notes on
1289 b 39 and 1321 a 8.
18. TTJK yap icrx" KG* TT] V uTrepoxV iv TOIS iinreuan 6 iroXefios
tl\ev. Cp. 7 (5). ii. 1314 a 31 sq., De Part. An. 2. 7. 653 b 13,
ra fjifv ovv TTJS Tpo<prjs nfpiTTa>p.aTa TTfpl TTJV Ttjs TpoCpfjs <TKf\l/iv Kal fltcapiav
oiKflovs (x fl Toiis Xdyour, and Diod. 14. 7 2. 4> UttfttfOXOVitOfOt d viro rf]s
ovTT)TO$ TOV KdlpOV TTjV (OVT&V CTTTOvSlJI fi%OI> UTTpaKTOV.
10. arcu [Aey yap auiraea>s K.T.\. Cp. Eurip. Here. Fur. 185
Bothe (190 Dindorf),
avr)p 6n\iTT]s SovXof eVrt ra>v oTrXcof,
icat Toicri (rvvra^Gficnv oS(ri /JLTJ yadois
aiiros TtBvrjKf 8ei\ia rrj TO>V TreXas,
and Plut. T. Flamin. C. 8, fcaw yap ?; <pd\ay eoiKtv ajua^o) TIJV la^vi ,
((US fv fern craj/xa Kal rrjpfi TOV crvva(T7ri(rp.i)v fv r<iet fna, diaXvdficrrjS 8e Kal
TT]V Ka6 eVO. pGlfJLTjV UTToXXtlffl TO3J/ Ha^OfJi(VU>V eKOCTTOS 8ld Tf TOV TpOTTOV TtJS
orrXtcrfwr KOI OTI iravrbs oXou roly Trap dXXjjXwi /xe /aeo-t ^laXXov rj di UVTOV
2O. at 8e irepl r&v TOIOUTOJV efiireipiai Kal ra|eis iv TOIS d
oox uirfjpxoc, and the crafts and tactical rules connected with the
above-mentioned matters (i.e. the ordering of hoplites) did not
exist among the ancients. Aristotle speaks of f^nfipiai, not T/XWH,
because the crafts based on mere practice to which he refers
hardly deserved the name of arts ; arts have to do with TO Ka66\ov,
not so (jjLiTfipia (Metaph. A. i. 981 a 15 sq.). Cp. Pol. 3. n. 1282 a
I, Tas aXXay tprrftpiat Kai rt xvas, and Plato, Phaedr. 260 E, OVK eort
T(XVT), aXX UTXVOS TPI&TI, Gorg. 462 B sq., 465 A, and Laws 938 A,
UT ovv Tfx VT l r aTtx^ds (a-Tt Tit ffjuTtipla KOI TptjSij. For Ta(ts
( taktischen Regeln, Stahr), cp. Plato, Laws 688 A, TOS Tdy T^K
234 NOTES.
vt>fjLu>v. 721 A, mis ra^fa-i ( praescriptionibus suis, Stallbaum) :
823 C, niseis Hal fofjiias fTtiTtdevra. For ft> ruls np^ai ots, cp. C. IO.
I 295 a 12, (V TOIS dpxci<-ois"E\\r)(nv.
22. aucu>op.lvw Toif TroXewf, the States increasing in size : see
notes on 1293 a i, where it has been explained that this increase
\vould especially consist in an increase of the central city, and on
1310 b 17.
24. Stoirep, hence, i.e. the constitutions which then arose were
called democracies (though they would now be called polities),
because the possessors of political rights under them were more
numerous than before and might well seem to be a demos when
compared with the handful of men who ruled in the oligarchies
which preceded them. It was perhaps in part because Aristotle
saw that the earliest democracies were polities that he came to
, regard democracy as a perverted development of polity.
25. at dpxaitu iroXiTeuu. Bonitz (Ind. 613 b 12), Susemihl, and
others take these words to mean the ancient polities, but I incline
rather to render them, with other interpreters, the ancient con
stitutions. The words al dpxniai TroAiTftai seem to take up f] Trpon-r;
noXiTeia tv TOIS "EXXqaiv, where TroXirf ia means constitution, not
polity. Prof. Francotte (Les Formes Mixtes de Gouvernement
d apres Aristote, p. 41, note 2) is not altogether satisfied with
Susemihl s rendering, though he follows it.
26. 81 oXiyaMOpajmac yap OUK fl^ov TroXu TO p.e aov (sc. n t rroXetr).
Cp. c. 1 1. 1296 a 9 sqq.
27. oXiyoi re cWes TO irXTJflos KCU KaTa Trjy (TUVTOL^V. OAryoi must
be supplied with Kara TJ]V aiWaiz> in the sense of insignificant,
which of course is not its natural sense, but Aristotle often makes
one word do, where the use of a second would have improved the
sentence (see notes on 12573 21 and 1297 a 40). I do not think that
any adjective, such as <aCAoi, has dropped out before or after Kara r^v
(Tvvraiv. What is the suppressed nominative to vni^fvov ? I incline
to think 01 Sr^oriKot , or in other words the class which rose to
supreme power in the democracies, better called polities, which
succeeded the kingships and oligarchies, i.e. <>i ra 5n\a exovrts. For
the displacement of re, which should follow TO, see note on 1325 a 19.
28. 810, Ti^a p,ec ouf eivlv alriav at iroXiTeiai irXeioug. This
question has been dealt with in c. 3. 1289 b 27~c. 4. 1291 b 13.
29. KCU 810, TI Trapo. TOIS Xeyopecas CTepai. Taj \fyofj.e vas appears
to include monarchy, democracy, and oligarchy, one kind only of
6 (4). 13. 1297 b 2214. 1297 b 36. 235
democracy and oligarchy being recognized : cp. c. 8. 1294 a 25, on
piti ovv fcrr\ KOI erf pa TroXfmar fi8r) napa p-ovap^iav T( KO.I 8rjfj.oKpciTiav Kai
oXiyapxiav. This question has been dealt with in c. 4. 1291 b 15
c. 8. 1294 a 25.
31. rwy aXXwr ofioicos. For the genitive see note on i253b 27.
Monarchy has two forms, kingship and tyranny ; oligarchy has
four (c. 5), aristocracy several (cc. 7-8) ; we are not distinctly told
that there are more forms than one of polity, though we hear
incidentally of aristocratical polities (6 (4). 14. 1298 b 10: cp. 6 (4).
15. 1300 a 41 sq.).
ITI 8e Ti^es cu 8ia<f)opal ical 8ia riva airiaf aufAJSaiyei, and further
what the differences between them are, and owing to what cause it
happens [that they are what they are]. Cp. c. 6. i293a 10 sqq.
and 3. 6. 1278 b 8.
32. irpos 8e TOUTOIS TIS dpiorr] K.T.\. Dealt with in c. II.
33. ica! rSiv aXXwK iroia K.T.X., and of the other constitutions
which constitution (literally, which of the constitutions ) is suit
able to whom. Dealt with in c. 12. Cp. 8 (6). i. 1317 a 10 sqq.
35. ndXic 8e K.T.X. This inquiry is referred to as past in 8 (6). C. 14.
i. I3i6b 31 sqq., but we are not prepared for it in the programme
given in c. 2. 1289 b 12-26, except so far as it relates to democracy
and oligarchy (see vol. i. p. 493). Its aim is to s how how the
deliberative magisterial and judicial elements should be organized
under each constitution and each variety of constitution so as to
harmonize with the constitution of which they form a part (cp. 8 (6).
i. 1316 b 31 sqq.: 6 (4). 14. 1298 b usqq. : 6 (4). 15. 12993
12 sqq.). Aristotle seeks to enable the statesman to avoid in
framing each constitution adopting an organization of any one of
these elements inappropriate to the tendency and spirit of the
constitution, his special aim being, it would seem from c. 16.
1300 b 36 sqq., to prevent civil troubles and constitutional innova
tion. It should be noticed that Aristotle here proceeds to study
constitutions in their parts, the most searching way of studying
them (see note on 1252 a 17, TTJV vfyffiftiMnp p.e6o8ov), and also that
TO irponoXffjiovv, notwithstanding what is said as to its importance in
c. 4. 1291 a 6 sqq., is not one of the fiopia TU>V mtXiTdcav mentioned
here. Aristotle appears to regard it as a ptpos TTJS noKtcos, and
an important one, but not a pipos r^s iroXirdas. It is, in fact,
concerned, not with ruling or judging, but with fighting.
36. auTuv, i.e. rd>
236 NOTES.
37. jxopia TWC iroXiTeicif irao-am Cp. c. 15. 1 299 a 4, TOVTO TO
n6piov TTJS Tj-oXiTeiris, and see vol. i. p. 5 1 4, note. Compare also
LyCUrg. C. LeOCr. C. 79- T P l/a y"/ 3 f<mv aw ^ TroXtTa a crwitTTriKfv, 6
apx<av, 6 8iKa(TTi ]s, 6 iSiam/r. The expression at TrcXirftai Tracrai seems
to be used here in a sense exclusive of kingship and tyranny,
of which we hear hardly anything in cc. 14-16.
38. eicdcrnr) TO o-ufi^epoi/, cp, 8 (6). I. 1316 b 38, KOL rbv oiKtlov *a\
rov <rvfj,(f)(povTa rpcnrov cnroftovvat irpos Ka.<TTr)v.
&v l)(6w<av KaXws K.T.X. Cp. Isocr. Nicocl. 48, a>s Trap fKcurrov
TU>V p.fpu>v fj KiiXSis f) KaKuis TO (rvfiirav tt;ov, ovro) <TTrov8d(Te irepl avTa>v.
That the parts, on the other hand, cannot be in a good state if the
whole is not so, is a remark ascribed to the Thracian Zamolxis in
Plato, Charm. 156 E, where he is made to say of the Greek
physicians, that they knew not how to cure most diseases, on ro
oXoi> dyvooiev, ov fit oi TTJV eiri/J-sXfiav iroiflffdiu, ov (JLTJ Ka\a>s e^oi/ror
ativvarov f irj TO jiepos ev f xfiv.
39. KOI rag iroXiTeias dXXi^Xwi Sia^epeii/ ev TW 8ia<j>e peii eKaoroK
TouTwi . We have been told in 3. 6. 1278 b 8 sqq. that constitutions
differ because they give supreme power to different supreme
authorities, but now we are told that they also differ because they
organize the deliberative, magisterial, and judicial elements in
a different way.
41. e crn Se K.T.X. Zeller has already remarked (Gr. Ph. 2. 2.
749 : Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. ii.
p. 283) that the three elements of all constitutions named by
Aristotle the deliberative, the magistracies, and the judiciary do
not coincide with the legislative, executive, and judicial authorities
of modern theorists. Aristotle s deliberative is indeed charged with
legislative functions, but it is also charged with executive functions
(for questions of peace, war, and alliance come before it) and with
judicial functions (for it has power to inflict the punishments of
death, exile, and confiscation). For the union of legislative and
judicial authority in the hands of the deliberative no defence can be
offered ; it was not well that the deliberative authority should have
power to punish with death, exile, or confiscation. But when the
Greek State gave the authority which had to do with legislation
a voice in questions of \var, peace, and alliance, it anticipated the
practice of modern States. Prof. H. Sidgwick (Elements of
Politics, ed. i, p. 439) recommends that the consent of the
legislature should be required, as a general rule, for making war,
6 (4). 14. 1297 b 3741. 237
or ceding or annexing territory, or making treaties that pledge the
State to any such measures or that otherwise affect materially
the financial liabilities or resources of the State. The three
elements named by Aristotle were probably marked off from each
other in most Greek constitutions, but they were not in all. In
many forms of oligarchy, for instance, and in some of aristocracy
(3. i. 1275 b 8 sqq.) judicial authority rested with the magistrates,
and in some extreme forms of oligarchy one or more magistracies
often perhaps a gerusia constituted the deliberative (1298 a 8 sq.).
The deliberative in Greek States was not so called because it had
a monopoly of deliberation, for the magistrates also deliberated
(c. 15. 1299 a 2 5 sqq-)* but because certain specially important
subjects of deliberation were made over to it, just as in a modern
joint-stock company the consideration of some specially important
matters is often reserved for meetings of the shareholders. (Compare
Tac. Germ. c. n, de minoribus rebus principes consultant, de
maioribus omnes, ita tamen ut ea quoque quorum penes plebem
arbitrium est apud principes pertractentur.) What these subjects
were, we learn from 12983 3 sqq. It should be noticed that the
right to inflict the punishments of death, exile, and confiscation and
that of reviewing the conduct of magistrates in office (c. 16. 1300 b
19) were often possessed also by dicasteries, so that the deliberative
had not exclusive competence on these subjects. We see from
the chapter before us that some of the powers enumerated in
1298 a 3 sqq. were given to the magistrates even in some forms of
democracy, for there were democracies in which the functions of the
assembly were confined to the enactment of laws and of provisions
connected with the constitution, while in others they did not include
the review of the magistrates conduct in office and the infliction of
the punishments of death, exile, and confiscation. In the ultimate
form of democracy, on the other hand, not only did the competence
of the assembly include the whole range of the subjects mentioned
in 12983 3 sqq., but the functions of the magistracies (with the
exception no doubt of those of the strategi when employed on
expeditions) extended only to making preliminary inquiries, the
right of effectual decision on all important matters being reserved
for the assembly, which thus tended to become the supreme
administrative authority of the State (cp. A.6. lioX. c. 27, 6 8^05 . . .
TU fttv fKu>v ra 8 aKutv Trpoijptlro TTJV TroXtTtiav Stoucflv avri ts). That
the demos at Rome possessed most of the powers ascribed to the
238 NOTES.
deliberative by Aristotle, we see from Polyb. 6. 14, n^y for]
Ttfjiupias tv Ty TTohiTtq /tdvos o 8fi/j.os nvpios . . . icpivii /j.tv ovv 6 Srj
xiil diafpopov TroXXoKtr, 5rai> di6)(p(a>v rj TO TLfj.rjfj.a rrjs dftiKias, KOI /^a
Toi y ray fmCpavfls fV^r/Koraj dp%ds, davdrov 8e Kpivti fidvof . . . KOI p.rjv rat
dpxiis 6 8tjfj.os 5/Saxri rotr nioiy . . . (%fi 8f TIJV Kvpiav Kai Trepl TTJS TCOV
vofjiw 8oKifiaiT/ar, Koi TO fj.tyi(TTov, imtp flprjvijs OVTOS /SovXciiernt Kat TroXe/nov.
KOI iii]v nep\ (rv/j.fj.a)(ias Kai SmXucreaK cat crvvGrjKtov, OVTOS eort" o /Se/Satcoi
ticaiTTa TOVTWV KOL Kvpia niiiwv jj Tovvavriov, Aristotle omits to mention
some of the powers possessed by the deliberative for instance, its
power of conferring citizenship and its powers in reference to
taxation, such as the power to impose an eisphora or a new tax.
Nor does he say anything of the power sometimes possessed by
it of suspending or displacing any magistrate whom it held to
discharge his duties ill (as to the exercise of this power by the
deliberative at Athens, see Gilbert, Constitutional Antiquities of
Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 223 sq.).
1298 a. 2. ds ei. sc. eivat. For as, not nWs, though ritxov follows, see
Kiihner, Ausfiihrl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, 562. 4, who refers to
Isocr. Ad Demon. 5> bionep ly/xetv . . . /zeXXo/ifV crot avuPovXfueiv a>v
Xprj TOVS vfuiTepovs opyfrrdai Kal Tiixav fpyatv unf^firQni KOI iroiois TKT\V
dvdpanrois 6/^iXfti/ KOI irais rov tavTwv f3iov uiKOVopelv. Cp. also PlatO,
Laws 728 D, Tas 8 aii Ttfius 8(1 o~KOTTflv ) xal TOVTMV Tivts dXrjdels Km
ri^a 8ei yiycecrQai rrjf aipecric aoTuc. Cp. C. 15. 1299 a
10 sqq.
3. TTji cupecnr must here include appointment by lot as well as
by election.
5. KCU irepl yctfiui/. That it often fell to the whole body of citizens
to enact, or at any rate to confirm, laws, we see from Xen. Mem. i .
2. 42, irdvTts yitp OVTOI vofjioi eicriV, ovs TO Tr\r)6os o~vi>eX6ov KOI doKifj.do~uv
(ypa\l/f, (ppd^ov a re 8T Trr/ieti/ Kai a /LIIJ. A common course was for
the assembly to appoint vopoypatpoi to draft laws and submit them
to it for confirmation : see as to Teos Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr.
Gr. No. 126. 45 sqq. (referred to by Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 313. 2),
where the assembly of Teos is advised by Antigonus to appoint
vo/j.oypd(poi for this purpose, and compare A#. noX. c. 29 sqq., where
the Athenian assembly appoints o-uyypti^fls to draw up a new con
stitution, which is afterwards submitted to it for confirmation (cc. 30
init., 32 init.\ Laws, however, were occasionally enacted by the
deliberative without recourse being had to vopoypd(poi or
G (4). 14. 1298 a 28. 239
see Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 470 (quoted by Gilbert ibid.),
[ayja^^t TVJfl)^ [orcjoi/o^oi)l rof Arj/iT/rpiov, pr)vbs Qapyr/\iS)vos fifvrepai,
A\t<ov Aa/MOVOC ftirev vofiov Wat Tafi^p(iu)rais K.T.\, As to the mode
in which laws were enacted at Athens, see Gilbert, Const. Antiq.
of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 300 sqq., and Busolt, Gr.
Gesch., ed. 2, 3. i. 290 sqq., and on the broad subject of direct
legislation by the people Bryce, American Commonwealth, c. 39.
There is this to be said in favour of direct legislation by the people
in a Greek City-State, that the people were not precluded by their
numbers from meeting together for discussion, as the people of
a modern State are.
Kal irepl dacdrou Kal ^uyrjs KCU Srjjjieuo-eus. That questions of this
kind came not only before the dicasteries in Greek States, but also
before the deliberative is proved by the inscriptions collected by
Gilbert in Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 314. i Cauer, Delectus Inscr. Gr.
No. 55 1 (about B. C. 357), fSogfv TO) 8f]fj.<f 3>iXu>va (cat SrparoicXt a
faoyfiv A/i0t7roX> Kai -rr)y yr\v rf)v Afj.(pinoXiTfa>v deKpvyirjv KOL avro[i>~^s
KM To[tijf naidas, KOI ijfi. 7ro[v] aXicrKcavTai, iracr-^fiv avTO\ii}s wr 7roXf/xt oru]y
KOI vrjTToivel reovoMu, ra 8e xprj/jLara avTwv 8r]fj.6<na etvai : Dittenberger,
Syll. No. 77 (from lasus), cdngev rrji fiovXrji ical rwt
ru>v tjn$ov\tvva.VTU)v MaucrwXAaH KOI riji latrecov TroArji ra KT^fiarci ?>r)fj.(V(rai
. . . Kal (pfvyfiv avrovs KOI (Kyovovs [e sj TOI* diSiov xpovov. Gilbert also
quotes Cic. De Rep. 3. 35. 48, where we read of the Rhodians, et
in theatre et in curia res capitalis et reliquas omnis iudicabant idem.
As to Athens see Hdt. 6. 136, Xen. Hell. i. 7. 9 sq., and Gilbert,
Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 306.
6. Kal irepl &p\S)v aipcaews Kal r&v eudukuc. Cp. 3. II. 1 282 a
26 sqq.
8. OICF dpx fi Tirl fiia r\ irXeioau , rj eWpais ere pas, as for instance
all may be assigned to some one magistracy or to more magistracies
than one, or some may be assigned to certain magistracies and
others to others. Aristotle here has oligarchies mainly in view, and
it appears from what he says that in an oligarchy a single magistracy
possibly even a single magistrate might be invested with all
these great powers, the right, that is to say, to punish with death,
exile, or confiscation, the right to appoint the magistrates and to
review their conduct in office, the right to make laws, and the supreme
control over the foreign policy of the State. When a single magistrate
possessed all these powers, it must have been easy for him to convert
240 NOTES.
his position into a tyranny (7 (5). 10. 1310 b 22 sqq.). There were
well-governed oligarchies where a single magistracy possessed these
high prerogatives ; the oligarchy of Massalia would seem to have
been a case in point, for the great council of the Six Hundred
rifjiovxot must probably have possessed them (cp. Cic. De Rep. i.
27. 43, ac modo si Massilienses, nostri clientes, per delectos et
principes cives summa iustitia reguntur, inest tamen in ea condicione
populi similitudo quaedam servitutis). Oligarchy would assume
a still more extreme form, where the magistracy which was invested
with these prerogatives was less numerous than at Massalia. On
the other hand, it would be less extreme where they were given to
more magistracies than one, acting, we must suppose, together, and
less extreme still, when some of these powers were given to some
magistracies and others to others, for then the one group of
magistracies would be a check on the other.
9. r\ nvag per O.UTUV Treun nvas 8e TUTIV. This would be the case
in an aristocracy or a polity.
TO ficv ouv Trarras KCU irepl a-rrarrwi 8r]p,OTi.K6V. Supply fiovKtwaOai
before ^^.OTIKOV. Cp. Cic. De Rep. i. 32. 48, si vero ius suum
populi teneant, negant quicquam esse praestantius, liberius, beatius,
quippe qui domini sint legum, iudiciorum, belli, pacis, foederum,
capitis uniuscuiusque, pecuniae.
10. TTji Toiaurqv lo-or^Ta, i.e. the equality implied in all deliber
ating about everything. This is arithmetical, in contradistinction
to proportional, equality, TO irXfjdei f/ pfyedei ravro Kal Irrov (7 (5). I.
1301 b 29 Sqq.). Cp. PlatO, Laws 757 A, 8vo1v yap tVorqroti/ ovaaiv
K.r.A.
11. eicrl 8e oi rpoiroi TOO ircti Tas irXeious. All may be said to
share in deliberative authority, (i) if all do so successively (i. e. by
relays) on almost all subjects, and the subjects on which all
deliberate collectively are very few, so that the powers of the
collective gathering of all the citizens are small, and deliberative
work falls for the most part either to relays of citizens, the magi
strates taking no part in it, or to a council of magistrates to which
all the citizens are admitted by relays; (2) if all deliberate col
lectively on a considerable number of subjects, and magistrates
elected or taken by lot from all deliberate on the rest ; (3) if all
deliberate collectively on a considerable number of subjects, and
magistrates deliberate on the rest taken by lot (from all ?) in all
cases in which the nature of the office does not make it essential
6 (4). 14. 1298 a 912. 241
that its holders shall be skilled persons, and consequently that it
shall be filled by election (from all ?) ; (4) if all deliberate collectively
about all subjects and the magistrates merely make preliminary
inquiries. But if TO irdvras $ov\tvf(r6ai KOI nepl 6irdvra>v is democratic
(1298 a 9 sq.), are the second and third modes really democratic?
12. ets fie* TO icard jie pos dXXd JITJ irdrras dGpoous, SC. /3ovXciW#at.
It was possible to give deliberative authority to sections of the
whole citizen-body in rotation, or to a council composed of boards
of magistrates on which every citizen served by turns, and by thus
admitting all the citizens in relays to a share in deliberation, to
reduce to a minimum the work of the collective assembly of all the
citizens. Of the Telecles mentioned in the text nothing is known
but what we learn here. Sus. 2 (Note 1321) regards him as a con
stitutional theorist, and groups him with Hippodamus and Phaleas.
Certainly the phrase Sxrnfp tv rfj irdXireia rfj Trj\fK\fovs f errt TOV
MtXrjcrtov reminds US of woTrep tv Tjj TroXtrfi a rfi IlXaTtavof in 2. I.
1261 a 5. A parallel to his constitution is offered to some extent
by the arrangements in connexion with the Five Thousand at
Athens, at any rate as represented by the envoys of the Four
Hundred to the armament at Samos (Thuc. 8. 86. 3, rSv n irfvra-
Kurx<ov 0" ndvrfs tv ro> /* pet pfdegovaiv). So again, in the demo
cracy of Mantineia and others the right to elect the magistrates
belonged not to the assembly, but to rti> alptTol Kara fitpos e* irdvra>v
(8 (6). 4. 13i8b23 sqq.). We must not mix up Telecles organiza
tion of the deliberative with the first kind of democracy described
in c. 4. 1291 b 30 sqq. and c. 6. 1292 b 22 sqq., for in this kind
of democracy the deliberative seems to have consisted of all the
citizens, not of a part of them only (c. 6. 1292 b 27 sqq.). We are
not told of what nature the sections were to which deliberative
authority was successively entrusted under the constitution of
Telecles. Were they tribes or subdivisions of the tribe, or were
they independent of the tribe ? It is evident that if some sections
lived nearer to the city than others, it would be easier for them to
act when their turn of deliberative authority came than for those
further off. Nor are we told for what length of time each section
was to continue to act as a deliberative. The successive sections
appear to have been given the power of appointing the magistrates
(by election or by lot or in both ways ?) and that of inflicting the
punishments of death, exile, and confiscation, and the concession to
them of these great powers would be attended with many dangers.
VOL. IV. R
242 NOTES.
We do not learn whether popular dicasteries were to exist in the
State of Telecles or not. Obviously he had no choice but to with
hold from the sections the right of legislation, or at any rate of
legislation in relation to the constitution, and to reserve it for
a collective gathering of the citizens, for otherwise each section would
have been able during its term of power freely to modify, and even
to abolish, the constitution ; the sections, in fact, would have been,
especially if no popular dicasteries existed, the absolute masters of the
State. The scheme of Telecles, however, possessed this merit, that
the deliberative would not be as large as if it consisted of the whole
citizen-body, and that it would not be likely to claim or to acquire
that supremacy over the law which the popular assembly tended to
acquire in the ultimate form of democracy (cp. 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 32
sqq.). Demagogues would not have the same power in a delibera
tive of this kind as they had in gatherings of the whole citizen-body.
True, even under this constitution the whole citizen-body would
occasionally meet in a collective assembly, but as it would meet
only for the enactment of laws and to deal with questions as to the
constitution and to receive the directions of the magistrates, it
would meet but seldom, and consequently the assembly would
acquire but little cohesion or power.
13. KOI lv aXXcus Se iroXirciais K.T.\. These constitutions (we
are not told whether they were ideal or actual) were more demo
cratic than that of Telecles, for while his gave every citizen by turns
a place in the deliberative assembly, they gave every citizen by
turns a share of office (cp. c. 15. 1300 a 23 sqq.) ; this was exactly
what Solon, who distrusted the fitness of the many for office, had
sought to avoid (3. n. 1281 b 32 sqq.). In the opinion of the
Greeks democracy was most fully realized when a rotation of office
was established, so that every citizen held office in turn : cp. 2. 2.
1261 a 30 sqq., and Eurip. Suppl. 392 Bothe (406 Dindorf),
SrjfJios 8 avacrcrti $ia8o\aicrii> ei> [Jifpfi
fviav<riaicrtv, oi>x\ ru> ir\ovra> 8t8ovs
TO -n\fivTov, aXXa ^u> TTtvrjs e^wv tcrov.
1 The effect of the rule forbidding more than one reappointment to
the Boule at Athens was to give every Athenian citizen at some
period of his life a seat in that body (Sandys on A0. iioX. c. 62).
So we read in Cic. De Rep. 3. 35. 48 as to Rhodes, omnes erant
idem turn de plebe turn senatores, vicissitudinesque habebant,
quibus mensibus populari munere fungerentur, quibus senatorio :
6 (4). 14. 1298a 13 14. 343
utrobique autem conventicium accipiebant. Democracy, in fact,
meant to the Greeks equality, and the arrangement most consonant
with equality was a rotation of office ; even appointment to office
by lot fell short in this respect of rotation. The system described
in the passage before us had this merit, that under it the participa
tion of all the citizens in the government was effected at a far
smaller cost than in those democracies in which a paid and
frequently meeting assembly existed. It was open, however, to the
objection that there was no security that the decisions of the portion
of the citizen-body which happened to be in office at any given
time would be satisfactory to the citizens generally.
14. at owapxuu owiouaai. This is an early instance of the
occurrence of the word awapxlai. For another see Aen. Poliorc.
c. 4. ii. The word is often met with in inscriptions after the
death of Alexander and also in Polybius (4. 4. 2 : 38. n. 4 sq.).
Swapxiai here means the boards of magistrates, as in Ditten-
berger, Syll. Inscr. Gr., Nos. 132, 234. The principal boards of
magistrates were frequently formed into a combined board a
great administrative improvement, for the magistracies were thus
grouped together in a kind of Cabinet and were better able to
consult and to act in concert and we sometimes find this com
bined board discharging the functions of a pre-considering body
in relation to the Boule and Assembly (see Gilbert on o-wapxiai
in Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 322. i, and Hicks, Greek Historical Inscrip
tions, pp. 249, 323). In the constitutions referred to in the
passage before us, however, the o-wapxiat appear to have been
invested with far more considerable powers ; they were not a mere
pre-considering body entitled to draw up resolutions to be
sanctioned or the reverse by the Boule and Assembly, but were the
deliberative authority of the State, competent to deal finally with
questions of war and peace and alliance, to inflict the punishments
of death, exile, and confiscation, and to review the conduct of the
magistrates on the expiration of their term of office, the only
matters withdrawn from their jurisdiction being the making of laws
and of enactments relating to the constitution. We are, in fact,
surprised to find any form of Greek democracy trusting these great
powers to a board composed of magistrates ; we must remember,
however, that all citizens in turn became members of this board.
It should be noted that o-wapxlai appear to have existed at Miletus,
the city of Telecles, in later days at any rate than his: see Meineke,
R 2
244 NOTES.
Fragm. Com. Gr. 4. 625, where MtXao-tois KOI rats a-vvapxiais tal TO IS
ytpovrois is quoted from a grammarian.
16. TUK jiopiwK TWK ^Xaxioruk. Households are probably
referred to.
17. 8iA.0T], sc. TO apxfiv. See note on 1300 a 26.
o-imeVcu Se n-ovov K.T.X., sc. iravras, i. e. the whole body of citizens,
for Hildenbrand (Gesch. und System der Rechts- und Staats-
philosophie, i. 468) seems to me to be right in translating wahrend
Generalversammlungen der Burgerschaft nur dann zusammen-
treten, wenn es gilt Gesetze zu geben, etc. (so too Welldon). In a
democracy like that of Telecles it was necessary to reserve legislative
authority for a collective gathering of the citizens for the reason
mentioned above on 1 2 ; besides it was well to have the consent of all
the citizens to laws and constitutional enactments, and also to have
means of acquainting them with directions given by the magistrates.
18. rStv irepl TTJS iroXireias. Cp. 1298 b 31, TO>V rrtpl rf)v iroXirdav,
and 7 (5). 7. 1307 b 4, rS>v Trpbs TTJV TroXiTfiav. Here the distinction
between i/o/xoi and noXirtia is maintained, which is not always the
case (see above on 1289 a 15).
19. aXXos 8e rp6iro<s ic.T.X. In this form the magistracies are
not filled in turn by all the citizens, but those who hold them
are selected by election or lot out of all the citizens, so that
a turn of office does not necessarily come to every citizen, and
consequently the powers of the collective assembly of all the
citizens are more extensive. The magistracies being less acces
sible to all, the collective assembly naturally acquires greater
importance. As to this form and the next see note on i298a n.
In it the right to inflict the punishments of death, exile, and con
fiscation apparently falls to the magistrates, though we might have
expected it to be given to popular dicasteries.
22. T& 8 aXXa T&S dp^as pouXeu eo-flai K.r.X. Cp. Xen. Anab.
6. I. 33, ra 8* aXXa, (TTftSav (Ktitre eX$co^ev, J3ov\tv(r6p.fda.. Tar apx^s
Tat t(j> fKa<TTois TfTaypevas probably Stands in opposition tO at a~uvapxicu
(ri/ptoutrat, 14.
24. aXXos 8e rpoirog K.r.X. In this form only those offices are
filled by election which an advanced democracy will allow to be so
filled the offices referred to are explained to be those which
demand experience and skill in the holder (cp. 8 (6). 2. I3i7b 21 :
[Xen.] Rep. Ath. i. 3) and all the rest are filled by lot (a system
specially dear to democracy, 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 20 sq.), and here
6 (4). 14. 1298 a 1635. 245
again the powers of the collective assembly are extensive. They
do not, however, include the right to inflict the punishments of
death, exile, and confiscation, which seems to fall, as in the last
form, to magistrates, nor is the making of laws expressly men
tioned among them, though the omission of any reference to this
latter subject is probably accidental. In the explanation given
above of oa-as tVSexrai I follow Sepulveda and Victorius. The former
(p. 136 b) explains these words thus ratio reipublicae popularis
poscit ut magistratus non suffragio mandentur sed sortibus, per-
mittit tamen ut suffragio mandentur qui debent a doctis aut
peritis administrari necessitatis causa. Welldon s translation is
similar who are appointed by suffrage so far as is possible [in
this advanced form of democracy]. E| airdvruv is not added with
aiptras ov<ras, as in 23 sq., but this is probably what is intended, for
otherwise the rpoiros under consideration would not be democratic.
30. TOIS 8 dpxas irepl pjSefos Kpi\>iv dXXa. p,6foi/ irpoava.K.pit tiv.
Cp. c. 4. 12923 28 sqq. and 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 28 sqq., and for
avaKpivtiv "Ad. noX. c. 56. 1. 29 sq. That this had come to be true
of the Boule at Athens, we see from Ad. noX. c. 45 (cp. Pol. 6 (4).
15. 1299 b 38-13003 4) and c. 55. 1. 10 sqq.; that it had also
come to be true of the archons, we see from Atf. HoX. c. 3. 1. 31 sqq.
(where see Sandys note) and c. 48. 1. 26 sqq. As to the euthyni,
see c. 48. 1. 23 sqq. That the powers of the strategi when
employed on expeditions cannot have been narrowed in this way,
we have seen above oni297b4i.
32. Tjf dydXoy<Ji ^apef K.T.\. Cp. c. 4. 1292 a 17 sqq. and c. 6.
12933 32 sqq.
35. o-rav fiey yap ic.T.X., for when eligibility to the deliberative
body is conferred by a comparatively moderate property-qualifica
tion, and a comparatively large number of persons is eligible
because of its moderateness, and the members of the deliberative
do not make changes in things which the law forbids to be changed
but conform to the law, and it is open to any one acquiring the
property-qualification to be elected to the deliberative, the con
stitution is indeed an oligarchy, but it is an oligarchy bordering on
polity by reason of its moderateness of spirit. Sepulveda, who
translates furtx^v, 39, aditus ad rempublicam, supplies rijr
noXtretaj with ptTtxtw and is followed by Viet, and Lamb.: Sus.
also translates der Zutritt zu alien Aemtern offen steht. But it
seems more natural to supply TOV /SovXeiW&u (cp. 40, Srav 8* ^
246 NOTES.
It would appear from the passage
before us that in the most moderate form of oligarchy the de
liberative was not composed of the whole number of those who
were privileged under the constitution, but was an elective body
chosen from them (and by them ?). Yet we gather from c. 9. 1294 b
3 sqq. that there were oligarchies in which an assembly existed,
and we know that this was so at Corinth (Plut. Dion, c. 53). Aris
totle s list of the forms assumed by the deliberative in oligarchies is
silent as to those oligarchies in which deliberative authority was
confined to the magistrates, but the demos had a consultative voice
(1298 b 33 sq.). Nor does it quite tally with his list of oligarchies.
38. dicoXouOakri,, sc. rw v6fj.a> : see note on i339a 19.
39. oXiyapxia fiek TTO\ITIKT) 8e K.T.X. Cp. 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 10,
KOI ev6a fj,tv TroXiTiKoorepa eyeVero 17 oXiyapxia.
f\ roiauTK], SC. TToXtreia.
40. orav 8e K.T.X., but when not all [those who acquire the
property-qualification] have access to the deliberative, but only
selected persons, but they rule in accordance with law, as before
also, this is oligarchical. Alperoi seems to be used here in much the
same sense as a^pia^voi in c. 15. 1300 a 16 sqq. We are not told
who the electors were in this form. Under the rule of the Thirty at
Athens the magistracies (including the Boule) were confined, if the
text is correct, to npoKpiToi eV T>V ^iXiw*/, i.e. out of the knights ( A0.
rioX. c. 35. 1. 3 sqq.). Office was sometimes confined in oligarchies
to the members of certain clubs (7 (5). 6. 1305 b 31 sq.).
1293 b, 5. TTJI* ra.%i,v ra.vrr]v, cp. 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 36.
OTCIV Se -riv&v rise s K.r.X. Supply Kvpioi OXTLV from what precedes.
ndvTfs 7r<-/ji TTUVTCOV is the democratic arrangement, rives Trtpl irdvratv
the oligarchical, rives nepl TIV&V the arrangement appropriate to
an aristocracy or polity, being intermediate between the other two.
In the aristocracy which Aristotle imagines questions of peace and
war and the review of the conduct of magistrates in office and
probably their election would fall within the competence of all
acting collectively, while legislation and the conclusion and dis
solution of alliances and the infliction of the punishments of death,
exile, and confiscation would be reserved for the cognizance of
some. It is not surprising to find legislation reserved for some
in an aristocracy, for in 2. 8. 1269 a 24 sqq. Aristotle in effect
suggests that not any one and every one should have to do with
the alteration of laws, but only select persons. There would also
6 (4). 14. 1298 a 38 1298 b 8. 247
be an obvious advantage in reserving for the consideration of
a few questions relating to alliance and the infliction of the grave
punishments referred to, though the reservation to a few of the
power to inflict these punishments was in the case of the Lacedae
monian State commonly criticized as oligarchical (6 (4). g. 1294 b
33 sq.). When, on the other hand, we are told in 7 that the magi
strates of an aristocracy may be appointed either by election or by
lot (i. e. apparently by lot pure and simple, not by lot 7rpoKpiYi>,
as to which see note on 8), the statement conflicts with 2. n.
1 27 3 a 17, TO S* dfj,icr6ovs KOI p.f) K\rjpo)Tas dpioTOKpariKov Bertov (cp.
6 (4). 15. i3Oob 4 sq.), and Brandis, followed by Sus., is probably,
therefore, right in bracketing rj xX^pamu. Another reason for
bracketing fj /cX^pwroi is that, if we do not, it becomes difficult to
distinguish the organization of the deliberative in aristocracy from
its organization in those forms of democracy in which some of the
subjects dealt with by the deliberative are reserved for the cogniz
ance of magistrates elected or taken by lot out of all (1298 a 19
sqq.), unless indeed we add < * TIVO>I> in 7 before afperoi fj K\T)pa>Toi.
Viet., followed by Giph. (p. 497), reads rj n-oXirei a in 8 in place of
f) iroXiTfia, and Giph. (ibid.) explains, et aristocratiae quidem
(proprium), ubi magistratus non sortito verum suffrages mandentur,
reipublicae vero, ubi sortito sint facti/ but Camerarius, Bekk., and
Sus. are probably right in reading 17 Ti-oXirfi a. It should be noted that
even where the magistrates are appointed by election, if they are not
elected for virtue, the constitution does not really deserve the name
of an aristocracy (c. 7. 1293 b 7 sqq. : c. 8. 1294 a 9 sq., 19 sqq.).
6. For uWp in the sense of irtpi, see Bon. Ind. s.v. and Eucken,
Praepositionen, p. 47, who remarks that it is used in this sense
oftener in the Nicomachean Ethics, the Rhetoric, and the Topics
than elsewhere in Aristotle s writings.
8. eciy 8e K.r.X. Two questions arise as to the organization of
the deliberative which is here said to be suitable to an aristocratic
polity or a polity i. Are we to carry on from 5 sq. olov noXepov
p,fv Kal {mfp (iprjvrjs ical tiiOvvvv ndvrey, so that the modes of organiza
tion described in 8 sqq. apply only to those subjects which are
not reserved for the cognizance of all ? This question should
probably be answered in the affirmative. 2. Are the ulperot and
*A>7pwrot, or the mixed body of alptroi and KXijpcoTot referred to
in 8 sqq., magistrates, or are they simply a deliberative council?
The answer is doubtful, but as Aristotle does not repeat the
248 NOTES.
word apxovTfs, perhaps the chances are in favour of the latter
hypothesis. The plans appropriate to polity proper are probably
that by which some subjects are assigned to persons appointed
by election and others to persons appointed by lot, and that by
which some members of a deliberative council are appointed by
election and others by lot (compare the advice which Aristotle
gives to extreme democracies in 8 (6). 5. 1320 b n 16), while
the appointment of deliberators by lot eVc irpoKpircov savours rather
of an aristocratic polity. Thus, when Athens was under a democracy
mingled with aristocracy (Isocr. Panath. 130-1), it appointed
its magistrates in this way (Panath. 145, naBicmicrav eVi ras dpxas
roits TrponptdfVTas viro ra>v (pvXfrutv KOI SrjuoTcov : cp. Areop. 22, owe
(j- andmaiv ras apx^s K\r}povvr(s, aXXa Tovsf3e\Ti<rTovs KOITOVS iKavatTaTovs
((p fKacrrov TCOV fpycav TrpoKpivovrts, and A.6. noX. c. 8. 1. 1 sqq. : c. 22.
1. 20 sqq.: c. 30. 1. n sq. : c. 31. 1. 2 sqq.). Appointments to
priesthoods were sometimes made in this way (Demosth. Or. 57. in
Eubul. c. 46). When it is implied in 2. n. I273a 17 sq. that the
appointment of magistrates by lot is inconsistent with aristocracy,
Aristotle probably refers to their appointment by lot ?* ndvratv, not
fK TrpoKpiruv. In 2. 6. 1266 a 8 we are told that the appointment of
magistrates by lot out of elected persons is common to oligarchy
and democracy ; it would seem, therefore, that both oligarchy and
democracy used this mode of appointing magistrates.
9. In T] KOICT] alpeTol ica! K\T]puToi the reference seems to be to
a mixed body or bodies composed of elective members and members
appointed by lot, acting as the deliberative in relation to all the sub
jects which are not reserved for the cognizance of all.
11. SiTJpTjrai fief ou^ K.T.\. For irpos cp. 4 (7). 17. I336b 37, 8vo
S flalv fjXixiai irpos as avayxaiov diflprjcrdat rrjv rratdflav. In 6 (4). 15-
1 300 b 5 sqq. we have ol pev ovv rpcmoi raw rrept ras dpxas . . . 8irjpr)i>-
rai Kara ras iroXiTfias ovrats, Cp. Rhet. I. 8. 1365 b 2*], TO. 8f Kvpia
$iripi)Tcu Kara ras TroXireias.
13. o-u(x4>e pei Be K.r.X. Further advice as to the assembly in the
ultimate democracy is given in 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 17 sqq., but here
Aristotle places in the forefront of his recommendations the
adoption of measures to induce the yvtaptfioi to attend its meetings.
As to these recommendations see vol. i. p. 513. They are quite in
harmony with the views expressed in 3. n. 1281 b 34 sqq. (see
note on 1281 b 35) and 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 25 sqq., but they can have
had but little chance of being adopted in an ultimate democracy.
6 (4). 14. 1298 b 920. 249
<rufi4>e pei Se 8r)|ioKpaTia re rfj paXicn- elvai SOKOUOT) Sit]fiOKpaTia
vuv K.r.X. Bekk. 2 omits n, and Schneider, though he leaves it in
his text, calls it superfluous (2. 265), but Sus. 2 may be right in
regarding it as corresponding, though in an anacoluthic way, to fie
in ev 8e rais oXcyapx a *r, 26. Aristotle would probably have con
tinued KOI rats oAtyapx""*, if the intervening recommendations to
the ultimate democracy had not run to a considerable length. For
rfj fia\i(TT tlvai doKova-r/ 8r)poKpaTia vvv, cp. C. IO. I2p5a 5> l8, and
7 (5)- 9- 1310 a 25, f" Tats drjfjLOKpariais rals ^aXrra tivat SoKoixrais
SrjuoKpariKals, which suggests whether we should not read drj^oKpariKf)
in place of the second fepiMpnrdf (or ^^oKparia TJ n 1 ) in the passage
before us. The expression fi paXtor flvai SoKoCo-a 8rj/j,oKparia is
applied in 8 (6). 2. 13183 5, not to an ultimate democracy, as in
the passage before us and in i3ioa 25 sqq., but to one in which
rich and poor stand on a level, neither being alone supreme.
14. Xyu 8e Toiaorr]v K.T.\. Cp. C. 4. 1292 a 5.
16. oirep irt TCJC 8iica<m]piwi cc rats oXiyapxiais. Cp. C. 9.
1 294 a 37 sqq.
18. ol 8e 8T)p.OTiKol p,ia0oK TOIS diropois. Cp. C. 13. I297a
36 sqq.
19. TOUTO 8e KOI Trepl rets eKKXif)crtas iroieii . For TOVTO 8t see Ast,
Lex. Platon. i. 422, who says of TOVTO 8 in Plato, Tim. 59 D,
redintegrat orationis structuram post parenthesin quae dicitur.
Richards, however, would read 817 in place of 8e in the passage
before us.
20. ^ooXuoo^ Tal yip peXnoi K.r.X. See note on 1281 b 35. So
lawsuits will be tried all the better if rich and poor sit together on
dicasteries (8 (6). 5. 13203 26 sqq.). Cp. also 7 (5). 8. 1308 b
25 sqq. Contrast the provision in Plato s Laws 764 A by which
attendance at the assembly is made compulsory only on members
of the first and second property-classes, not on members of the
third and fourth, though the composition of the Boule in the Laws
(756 B sqq.) suggests that Plato no less than Aristotle sought to
bring rich and poor to deliberate together, for while the Athenian
Boule" was composed of representatives not of the property-classes
but of the tribes, Plato in the Laws by a remarkable innovation
makes his Bould consist of representatives of the property-classes,
and thus secures that both rich and poor shall find a place upon it.
Aristotle s desire that the assembly and dicasteries in an ultimate
democracy should be composed of both rich and poor deserves
250 NOTES.
notice, because this is not the way in which our own deliberative
assemblies and juries are constituted, but we must not lose sight
of the fact that he recommends this only in the case of an
ultimate democracy. He would undoubtedly prefer assemblies
and dicasteries in which the moderately well-to-do predominate.
21. o-ufi4> e p l 8e K.T.X. Compare with this suggestion 8 (6). 3.
1 3 1 8 a 13 sqq. J E TO>V poplcov, which I have taken in vol. i. p. 513
to refer to tribes and other sections of the State, probably rather
refers to the sections just named, the yva>pip.oi and 8^os (cp.
7 (5). 8. 1308 b 25 sqq.). We gather from what follows that
Aristotle regards this suggestion as suitable only to the case in
which there is no great disparity between the numbers of the
yvvptfjioi and 6%ioy. He comes here near to suggesting a repre
sentative assembly, though one of a doubtfully workable kind, for
would a representative chamber prove workable in which half the
members were returned by the yvapipoi and half by the 8j/io? ? It
is true that Zurich was ruled for many years by a Council of
twenty- six, half of the members of which were taken from the
upper class (Konstafel) and half from the trades or arts (Dandliker,
Geschichte der Schweiz, i. 456-8 : Short History of Switzerland,
Eng. Trans., p. 70).
23. (ru/A<J>e pei 8e K.&V K.T.\. Kav, if also : cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 b i,
CTI 8e KUV o>aiv frmfls K.T.\. When the numbers of the 8ijp.os greatly
exceed those of the yv^pipot,, evil results follow ; the constitution
becomes disorderly and the yvupip-ot insubordinate (8 (6). 4. 1319 b
ii sqq.: 6 (4). u. 12 96 a 16 sqq. : 4 (7). 4. i326a 31 sq.).
24. For ot SrjfAOTiKoi, the men of the people/ cp. 2. 6. 1266 a 22 :
7 (5). 4. 1303 b 36 : 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 14.
r>v iroXiTiKwk here seems = T&V yva>ptfj.a>v, 25. For the contrast
drawn between oi /?/IOTIKOI and ot iroXiriKoi compare that between oi
i and ot no\iTiKoi in Polyb. 10. 1 6. i, and that between TO
and TO dartlov in Plut. Camill. c. 38.
26. TOUS irXeious, those who are in excess of this number. Cp.
Isocr. Philip. 63, KOI -ri 8tl TO TrXe/co \eyetv ;
eV 8e rats oXiYapxiais x.r.X. Just as the ultimate democracy is
advised to induce the yvd>pip.oi. to take part in the work of the
deliberative, so oligarchies are advised to allow the voice of the
dr/pos to be heard in the deliberative, not however without taking
certain precautions. As to these precautions see vol. i. p. 513 sq.
27. ^ Trpo<7CHpi<r0cu Tims In TOO irX^Oous. Supply
6 (4). 14. 1298b 2132. 251
Sus. is probably right in suggesting that npo<raipeio-6ai should be read
in place of rrpoaipe ta-dai : cp. Xen. Cyrop. i. 5. 56. So we are told
in Xen. Hell. 2. 3. 17 that Theramenes said on. tl ^ m KOIVWOVS
IKOVOVS Xjj\|fOiro TO>V irpayfiaTtoV, dSiivarov (croiro TIJJ/ o\iyapxiav diafjLevtiv.
At Solothurn in Switzerland in the fourteenth century the Council
of Twelve chosen from the nobles added to itself two representatives
of the eleven arts (Ziinfte) selected by itself (Dandliker, Geschichte
der Schweiz, 2. 367).
$ KttTounccvdUrarras K.T.\. Cp. c. 15. 1299 b 30 sqq., where
probuli are said to be an oligarchical magistracy, 8 (6). 8. i322b
i6sq., and 1323 a 6 sqq., the last-named passage so far disagreeing
with that before us that it connects vofio(pv\aKfs with aristocracy, not
with oligarchy. Compare (with Arnold) Thuc. 8. i. 3, where the
Athenians after the disaster at Syracuse decide to appoint dpx*i v Tiva
tp&v dvSpatv, olrivts irtpi ra>v irapuvTw, a>s av xaipos j/, 7rpo/3oi/Xev-
It is possible that in the long-lived oligarchy of Corinth, in
which probuli found a place side by side with a Boule" (see note on
i299b 36), and, it would seem from Plut. Dion, c. 53, a popular
assembly, the powers of the popular assembly were restricted in the
manner described in the text. Even where probuli were not elderly
men, they would be few in number in comparison with a Boule,
and therefore the institution would be oligarchical (c. 15. 1299 b 34
sqq.). A sole TrpopovXos occurs in an inscription which probably
belongs to Leucas (Oberhummer, Akarnanien, pp. 272, 274). As to
probuli see Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 315, and as to nomophylakes,
ibid. 2. 337 sq., though no instances are there given of nomophy
lakes acting in a probouleutic capacity. We read in Pollux, 8. 94
of nomophylakes at Athens, who rois -rrpoedpots *v f<K\r]a-iais avyxa-
6io\)(Tiv, (via 8iaKo>\vovT(s eiri^fiporovfiv, ocra pj crvp.<pfpti. The existence
of probuli in a State appears to imply the existence in it of a
larger deliberative body, for the function of the probuli was to
consider beforehand matters to be brought before such a body.
Thus probuli will hardly have existed in the more extreme forms of
oligarchy, for in them this larger body will not have found a place.
31. T(t>v irepl TT]V iroXireiai . Cp. 1298 a 1 8.
32. en T| TCIUTO. ij/T]4>i^ea0ai TOV Srjfiok T| frpSef ecavrioc TOIS eta<J>epo
peVois. A stronger measure than the restriction of the delibera
tions of the popular assembly to proposals introduced by probuli or
nomophylakes, for the latter measure would leave the assembly free
to deal with these proposals as it pleased, whereas the former would
252 NOTES.
tie its hands. For this measure cp. 2. 10. 1272 a 10 sqq. and 2.11.
1273 a 9 sqq. In some States only the xP r l a " ro>l were allowed to
speak in the assembly ([Xen.] Rep. Ath. i. 6).
33. tj TTJS o-ufi{3ou\TJs K.T.X. A stronger measure still. For the
implied contrast between a consultative and an effective voice in
deliberation, cp. Aeschin. De Fals. Leg. c. 65, v w (palverai ytypa^w
ri) p.tv irporepq rS>v fKK\i](ri5)V av/ji^ov\iifiv rov ^ov\6/jLfvov, 177 8 Vfrrfpaia
roi/s npotSpovs fTn^rr]<pl^fiv ras yva>p.as, \6yov 8e fj.f) rrpoTidevai.
34. KOI TO dn-iKifjiei o> 8e K.T.X. This recommendation of course
applies only to cases in which the assembly has something more
than the mere right to give advice. It would seem that in polities
the few (by which is probably meant the magistrates) often
possessed a final and decisive voice in rejecting a measure, while
affirmative resolutions arrived at by them were not valid until con
firmed by the assembly. Aristotle advises oligarchies to adopt the
opposite plan to give the assembly a final voice only in rejecting,
and to require that affirmative decisions should be referred back for
confirmation by the magistrates. (So I understand the passage :
compare Viet., who explains, iubet igitur ipsos contrarium facere
eius quod servatur in statibus liberis et qui reguntur a multitudine,
id est, permittere multitudini ut improbet repudietque quae sibi non
placent, nee tamen valeat sententiam ullam confirmare ac ratam
facere, quia necesse est quod illi probatum sit referri ad principes.
Stahr and Welldon, on the other hand, take eVai/a-yeo-^o) ird\iv rl
TOVS tipxovras to refer not to affirmative decisions of the assembly,
but to bills rejected by it. Whichever view we adopt, however, as
to the meaning of these words, there- is no difference of opinion as
to the invalidity attaching to affirmative decisions of the assembly.)
The restriction suggested by Aristotle would place a check on rash
affirmative resolutions of the assembly resolutions, for instance, in
favour of a declaration of war by making them invalid if the
magistrates withheld their approval. Compare the rule at Rome as
stated by Cicero, De Rep. 2. 32. 56, quodque erat ad obtinendam
potentiam nobilium vel maximum, vehementer id retinebatur,
populi comitia ne essent rata, nisi ea patrum adprobavisset auctori-
tas, and by Livy, i. 17. 9, decreverunt enim ut cum populus regem
iussisset, id sic ratum esset, si patres auctores fierent, and 6. 42. 10.
Compare also the addition to the Rhetrae of Lycurgus made by the
kings Polydorus and Theopompus, at 8i <TKO\IOV 6 5a/xor eXotro, TOVS
s KOI dp^ayfTas ajrofrrarfipas r/fj-ev. TOUT etm p.f) Kvpovv, oXX
6 (4). 14. 1298 b 3315. 1299 a 3. 253
oXo>? a<piarTa<T0m KO\ 8ia\veiv rov drjpov (Plut. LyCUrg. C. 6), and SCC
Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 49. 3.
I am so far anti- democratic, says H. Crabb Robinson in a letter
dated Sept. 13, 1831 (Diary and Reminiscences, 2. 509), that
I would allow the people to do very little ; but I would enable
them to hinder a great deal. Yet it would hardly have been to the
advantage of Rome if the Roman comitia had persisted in their
refusal to declare war against Philip V of Macedon in B.C. 200 (see
Mommsen, Hist, of Rome, Book 3, c. 8: Eng. Trans., vol. ii. p. 233).
35. d-n-oil/TjcJu^ofieyov. For the use of airo^rjfpi&frdai in the sense
Of reject/ Cp. PlatO, Laws 8OO D, rovrov 8f) rov vo^ov ap OVK diro-^rj-
<t>i6p(6a ; Demosth. De Fals. Leg. c. 174, and Deinarch. c. Aristog.
c. 9.
36. For the use of KaravJnfj^iJiJfjievoi in the sense of voting affirma
tively, or perhaps simply in that of decernere, see Bon. Ind. s.v.,
where Poet. 25. 1461 b 2 is referred to, and Vahlen, Beitrage zu
Aristoteles Poetik, 4. 423.
38. dt eorpafifi^ws. Cp. Eth. Eud. 7. 10. 1242 b 7, where how
ever Fritzsche reads avrfarpamifws, as indeed Bekker (with one or
two inferior MSS.) does here.
1. KCU TOU icupiou STJ TTJS TToXiTcias. Cp. c. i. 1289 a 17, 8 (6). i. 1299 a.
1316 b 31 sq., and 3. n. 1282 a 25 sqq. In 2. 6. 1264 b 33 sq.
TO ftov\fv6p.ft>ov is said to be Kvpiov rf/s TroXftur, not TTJS TToXiretas.
3. Exo(A^nf] 8e TOUTWC ic.T.X. The list of questions as to magi- C. 15.
stracies given in c. 14. 1298 a i sqq. omits, as Sus. 2 points out (Note
1343), the third question mentioned here, the question as to the
period for which they are held and the permissibility of a repeated
tenure, and this question is not dealt with either in the chapter
before us or in 8 (6). 8, though something may be learnt on the
subject from 34 sqq. and more from 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 13 sqq. If
we look back to c. 14. 1297 b 37 sqq., we shall see that the
main object which Aristotle has in view is to discover what
organization of the magistracies is appropriate to each constitution,
and it is to this problem that he chiefly addresses himself in the
chapter before us, but he finds it requisite to inquire first, what are
and what are not magistracies (1299 a I 4~3). afi d what magis
tracies are absolutely necessary to a State and what are desirable if
the constitution is to be a good one (a question as to which we
learn but little from 1299 a 3i-b 13, and more from 8 (6). 8), and
to deal with one or two other preliminary inquiries (1299 b 14-20),
254 NOTES.
before he strikes into his destined path and asks how far the same
magistracies will exist in different constitutions (1299 b 20-1300 a
8), and how the mode of appointing to them will differ in each
(1300 a 9 sqq.). See as to the contents of the chapter before us and
its relation to 8 (6). 8, vol. i. p. 514 sqq.
4. Ixci yap K.T.\. rioVai re apxal K.r.X. is added to explain in
reference to what points the many differences spoken of arise.
Compare the very similar sentence in 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 5, eon &
TroXiTiKrjs xP 1 jy^ as npS>rov ro re irXrjdos T>V avdpdrrrav, jroaovs re KOI TTOIOVS
Tivas virapxtw 8ei <pv<rft, as to which see note. For TOVTO TO nopiov rijs
rro\iTfias cp. c. 14. 1297 b 37. In the Lacedaemonian State the
magistracies would seem to have been much fewer and less
specialized than at Athens. Judging from 8 (6). 8, one would say
that Aristotle desires to steer a midway course between the two
States in this matter. It would be easy to add to the list of que
stions as to magistracies and their tenure which Aristotle gives here.
Questions might be raised as to whether magistracies should be
salaried, whether they should be subject to review and by whom,
whether more than one should be allowed to be held by the same
person at the same time, whether the chief magistracies of a State
should be combined to form a single great board, and whether
boards are better than single magistrates, and if so, of how many
members they should be composed, etc.
6. ol (jieK y^P K.T.X. Democracies liked to make magistracies, or
as many of them as possible, tenable for only a short time (8 (6). 2.
1317 b 24 sq.), six months (7 (5). 8. 1308 a 13 sqq.) or less. In
early democracies, however, we hear of magistracies tenable for
long periods (7 (5). 10. 1310 b 21 sq.). The prytaneis at Athens
held office for thirty-five or thirty-six days ( A#. UoX. c. 43), and
their epistates for one day and night only (c. 44). Still there were
magistrates at Athens (for instance, the radios a-TpariuTiKuv, and d
firi TO Bf&piKov, and 6 T>V Kpyvatv fni[t.f\r)Tf)s : see A$. rioX. c. 43) who
held office for four years ; Aristotle, indeed, can hardly mean to
say that some States made all their magistracies of brief tenure.
Democracies were especially opposed to offices tenable for life
(8 (6). 2. I3i7b4i sqq.). In oligarchies, on the other hand,
offices were often held for life (7 (5). 6. 1306 a 16 sqq.), or at any
rate for long terms (7 (5). 8. 1308 a 13 sqq.). In the Lacedaemo
nian dpHTTOKparia the kings and senators held their offices for life.
9. TrXeokdias TOUS aurous, SC. ap^eiv. For n\tova.Kis TOVS avrovs
6 (4). 15. 1299 a 414. 255
Bonitz (Ind. s. v.) compares Top. 5. 2. 130 a 29 and 6. 3. 141 a 21.
Democracies tended to set limits to a repeated tenure of all offices
except those relating to war and a few others (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 23
sq., where see note: see also Sandys note on Ad. lloA. c. 62. 1. 18).
At Thurii a course was adopted unusual even in democracies, and
restrictions of this kind were extended to offices relating to war, the
office of strategus not being tenable a second time by the same
person, except after an interval of five years (7 (5). 7. 1307 b 7).
10. TTJI KardoTao-ii v &p\S>f, cp. 1300 a 9 sq., 32, b 7 sq., and
PlatO, Laws 768 D, al ntp\ ras aXXa? dpxds Karaoratrftr.
11. Set YiveaOai, SC. rfjv Kararrracriv ra>v dpx&v . cp. !3OOb 7> n ^> f
Sei yivtffdai raj Karaardcrfis.
12. irais, i. e. by election, or by lot, or by a combination of the two.
14. Trolai, SC. dpxai.
IOTI 8e K.r.X. See note on 1275 a 26, and compare Aeschin.
c. Ctes. cc. 13-19, a passage which is probably present to
Aristotle S mind here, \tov<ri 8e . . . Kai erepov riva \6yov . . . <ay apa
ocra rts alperos >v TrpaVret Kara -^(pia-fia, OVK tern ravra dpx*l dXX r-
/ie Xfid TIS KOI SiaKovia (cp. TO>V rnt/LuXfUW, 20) dpxas 8e <f>T]<rov<TtV
fxtivas fivai as oi Qfa-poOfTai diroK\T]p(>v(nv lv rai Qr)<Tfi<n, Kaxftvas as
6 dijfj.os tio)df xfiporovtiv tv dpxaipecriais, (TTparrjyovs Kal nnrdpxovs Kai
ras ptra TOVT&V dp^ds, TO. S aXXa rrdvra TV pay pare ias TrpoffTeray^fvas Kara
^(pia-pa. To this plea Aeschines opposes the language of the law,
which declares dp%as ananas (ivai as 6 8rjuos \(ipOTOve1 9 " KOI TOVS ein-
(rrdras <prj(r\ " T>V drjuoaiatv fpya>v (eari 8f 6 Ar]p.oa6evr)S Tfixonoios,
tm(rrdTT)s rov utyiarov T>V tpyoav) K.T.X., where we are reminded of 15,
TroXXwi/ yap fiTHTTarcav f] irdXiriKr) aoivavia Sflrat. (If CC. 1319 of
Aeschin. c. Ctes. are here present to Aristotle s mind, the passage
before us cannot have been written before B.C. 330, for Aeschines
speech was delivered in that year.) Aristotle seems here by implica
tion to deny the name of magistracy to any post which is not filled
either by election or by lot, and consequently to the position of
member of the assembly, if not to that of dicast. He speaks more
decidedly here than in 3. i. 1275 a 26 sqq. He adds that not all
posts which were filled by election or lot were to be accounted
magistracies ; priests were not magistrates (cp. Demosth. Prooem.
55. p. 1461), though some of them were elected (Paus. 7. 20. i)
and others appointed by lot (Demosth. Or. 57. in Eubul. c. 46),
nor were choregi, though some of them were elected ( A0. lioX.
c. 56. 1. 7 sqq.), nor heralds (of the mode of whose appointment in
256 NOTES.
most States little seems to be definitely known, though they were
a hereditary profession at Sparta, Hdt. 6. 60), nor ambassadors, who
were elected (19). Aristotle may have been led to mark off jroXiTiKal
ap\ai from such posts as those of priests and heralds by a recollect
ion of what Plato had said of priests and heralds in Polit. 290.
16. SiOTrep Trdiras OUTC TOUS aiperous cure TOUS K\T]POTOUS apx oi> ~
TOS Qerlov. The inference appears to be as so many functionaries
are required for the purposes of the political association, it is not
likely that they will all be magistrates, and therefore we must not
treat as magistrates all those functionaries who are appointed by
election or by lot. For the absence of ov before irdvras, which some
would add, see critical note.
18. TOOTO, the office of priest. Aristotle does not explain why he
denies the name of apxovres to priests, choregi, heralds, and envoys.
19. In 8e xot]Yi *a! K^puKes. We should probably supply are
not magistrates. It would, however, also be possible to supply are
elected.
aipoGn-ai 8e K<X! irpeapeuTcu. See critical note. Compare [Hera-
Clid. Pont.] De Rebuspubl. 31, vopos 8e rjv Xa\Ki8fvcri fif) apai p.rj8e
Trpforfievcrat vturepov tratv TTfvrfjKOVTa, and HarpOCr. tvQvvai (Aristot.
Fragm. 405. 1545 b 43), ol irpeo-fjfva-avTfs fj ap^avrts r\ bioiKT/a-avTes rt
rS>v 8r]fjLocria)v, passages which imply that the post of envoy was not
an office. In Attic inscriptions the plural of irpfa-ptvTTjs is till
B.C. 250 Trpear^eis, afterwards 7rpeo-/3evTai" (Meisterhans, Gramm. d.
Att. Inschr., ed. 2, p. 112). The plural irpea-pevrai, however, occurs
in our text of Thucydides (8. 77 and 86), and wpea^fvrds in Andoc.
3. 41 and Demosth. c. Timocr. c. 12.
20. eioi Se at fief iroXmical TUI/ eirtfieXeiwi . Tcov eVt/neXetdii takes
up TroXXwp eiri<rrar>v, 15. Aristotle appears to regard only iroXtTiKoi
errifj.f\fiai as ap^al in the truest sense. noXtriKa! fVi/icXftat are
explained to be offices in which an cV^ie Xfia is exercised over the
whole or a part of the citizens (TroXrrat, hence TroXtrwcai) with a view
to a given action. It is implied apparently that no such ri/ieXa
is exercised in the case of oiKovofUKai or virrjpeTiKai eVifieXeiat. Aristotle
does not explain how treasurers or auditors or registrars of con
tracts, whom he no doubt regards as entrusted with iroXiTtcal eVt/ieXeieu,
can be said to exercise an e7rt/xXa of the kind to which he refers.
ndrrw TUV iroXiT&y. Supply fnifitXeiai.
21. For irpos Tica irpd^ic cp. 1299 b 18, irorepov Kara TO
8fl diatpilv fi KOTO TOVS avdpvTTOvs, and Polyb. IO. 1 6. 2.
6 (4). 15. 1299 a 1624. 257
cwK, SC. fTrifi,(\ovp(vos. We expect o-rpanjyla,
but Cp. Ad. IToX. C. 3> M e y Tat ^ * a * wpwrai rS>v dp%S)V rjcrav j3a(r[tXei/s
*at TToXjf /zapxor fal appeal/], c. 7. 1. 9 sqq., and c. 31.1. 1 6 : also Pol.
3. i. 1275 a 23-26, and the passage quoted above on 14 from
Aeschin. c. Ctes. cc. 13-19, KaKtivas K.T.\.
22. f\ icard fi^pos, or sectionally. It is implied that women and
children are citizens, which is of course not strictly the case.
23. oiKoyofiiKoi, economic : i. e. these magistracies have to deal
with matters similar to those with which the head of a household
has to deal, for instance the distribution of food (cp. i. 10. 1258 a
2 1 sqq.).
iroXXdius yap alpoun-ai o-iTOjierpas. Corn-measurers would be
elected when corn was distributed among the citizens, and this
would occur in times of scarcity or when a present of corn was
made to the State : thus we read in Diod. 13. 58. 4 ol yap AKpayavrivot
(TiTontTpTjvavTfs avrols 8rjfj.oo~la Suduxav Kara ras oiitias : see also an
inscription from lasus in \h& Journal of Hellenic Studies, 8. 100, and
Plut. Cato Censor, c. 8 init. In Pollux 7. 18 o-tro/ierpai are included
under the head of at eVl rals rpocpais Tf\vai. They must not be
confounded with the Prometretae, as to whom see Boeckh, Public
Economy of Athens, Eng. Trans., pp. 48, 239. Public measurings-
out of wheat no doubt took place at Athens during the four years
of scarcity B.C. 330-326 (see vol. i. p. 135, note 2, and Schafer,
Demosthenes, 3. i. 268 sq.), and it is possible that the passage before
us was written during or after the scarcity which these distributions
of food were intended to alleviate. Cp. Demosth. Or. 34. in Phorm.
C. 37, W TOlOVrO) Kdtpw Iv <f Vft.S>V OI p,fV tV T<5 aCTTfl OlKOVVTfS SlCptTpOVVTO
ra a\<piTU tv TW wSf/w, ol 8 tv T lleipintl tv TW vftopita (\dp.$avov Kar
o/SoXov TOIIJ aprovs Kal e ni TTJS paxpas areas, TO. aXfpira Kaff fip.i(KTov
Kal KUTanaTovp.fvoi. Sus. 2 (Note 1348) identifies the
with the o-iTo<pv\aKfs, but not, I think, rightly, nor do
I agree with Liddell and Scott that inspectors of corn-measures
are referred to in the passage before us.
24. ai 8 uTrpperiKal K.T.\. Plato had already marked off
magistrates from v^ptrai in Polit. 2906, onep (tires vvv, vnrjpfTas,
XX OVK avTovs (v Tali iroXctrtf ap^ovras. As to the employment of
public slaves as clerks and the like, see Gilbert, Constitutional
Antiquities of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 341, note 3.
Yrniperai were a despised race (Demosth. De Fals. Leg. c. 249 :
Diod. 14. 66. 6).
VOL. IV. S
258 NOTES.
25. fi<\urra 8e K.T.\. Cp. 4 (7). 4. i326b 14, where see note.
Aristotle has before him Plato, Polit. 260 C sqq., where TO fTriTarrtiv.
or rather 17 avrtniraKTiKri, is ascribed to 6 ap^a>v, and probably also
Xen. Mem. 3. 9. II, OTroYe yap ns 6fj.o\oyfj(Tif TOV fjitv np^ovros elvai TO
TrpoaruTTfiv o ri xpr) Trottlv K.T.\. (cp. Poet. 19. I456b 1 7, TO yap
Kf\vcrai, (prjcrl (sc. UpcoTayopar), iroitlv TI ff firj entra^is CO-TIP). In
ocrais aTroSeSorai fiovXevcracrQai re TTfpl nvoiv Kai Kpivai KOI firira^ai
Aristotle adds nepl nvS>v because a magistracy has a definite, not
an indefinite, sphere of competence. He does not confine the
name of ap^ to posts of which Sa-ais K.T.A. can be said, but he thinks
that these deserve it best. He would hardly include among the
posts which best deserve the name of apxai the eVi/xAetai which he
describes as oiKovofjuxai and vTn/peTifcai, or indeed the magistracies of
ultimate democracies, for they possessed only the power to make
preliminary inquiries (c. 14. 1298 a 30 sqq.). But he does not
distinctly say to what posts he would give the name of ap\r) and to
what he would not. The question was made all the more per
plexing by the fact that in the ordinary use of the Greek language
a distinction was drawn between ap^at and such posts as that of
envoy. Giphanius remarks (p. 504), Bodinus in methodo historica,
pagina 195, ita definit : Magistratus, inquit, est is qui imperii publici
partem habet publici inquam, ut ab imperio herili, patrio, aut alio
domestico distinguatur : ubi multis quoque verbis hunc locum et de-
finitionem Aristotelis reprehendit. The criticism referred to by Giph.
will be found in Bodinus, Methodus ad facilem historiarum cogni-
tionem, p. 154, ed. 1595. Viet, quotes Cic. De Leg. 3. i. 2, videtis
igitur magistratus hanc esse vim, ut praesit praescribatque recta et
utilia et coniuncta cum legibus. But is a magistrate not a magistrate
if the things which he orders to be done are not recta et utilia, etc. ?
28. d\Xa TauTa K.T.\. This remark is added to break off the
discussion (for similar breakings-off see note on 1274 a 30 and see
4 (7). 12. 1331 b 1 8 sqq.); what Aristotle says in 30 explains
why he has given a certain amount of consideration to the question.
Hoc dicit, quoniam (ut alio in loco adnotavimus et saepe ipse
admonet) in doctrina civili, licet pleraque omnia ad actionem perti-
neant, ut in ceteris doctrinis practicis sive activis, tamen quaedam
cognitionis duntaxat gratia traduntur (Sepulveda, p. 140 b) : cp.
3. 8. i279b ii sqq.
Taura, the determination of the question who is a magistrate and
who is not.
6 (4). 15. 1299 a 2537. 259
irpos ras xP 1 l l s> in relation to practice (in contrast to irpos rat
iiavorj(T(isj.
29. ou ydp irw K.T.X., for no decision has yet been given, the
discussion having been merely about the name. The fact is men
tioned to show that the question is not one of practical importance.
It would have already been decided one way or the other, if it had
been. For Kpicrts yeyovtv cp. C. 1 6. I3Oob 34, Set piv yap Kai irtpl
rovruv yiveirdai Kpicriv.
30. ?xei 8^ TI/ aXXiji 8uu OY]TiicY]i irpayfiaTeiai , but it offers an
opportunity to a certain extent for speculative inquiry : cp. Hist.
An. 5- I. 539 <* 7> v ^ v ^ IT* pi TOVTOV T(\(VTa1ov \(Kreov 8ia TO TrXtiffrr/v
(Xfiv irpaypaTfiav, and Eth. Eud. I. I. 12142. 12, 8<ra (j.tv ovv x
<pi\o(ro<ptav p.6vov tifaprjTiKrjv. *AXXoy is pleonastic, as often elsewhere
(see note on 1309 b 30).
31. iroiai 8 dpxal K.r.X. For the answer to this question see
8 (6). 8. i322b 29 sqq. (cp. 1300 a 4 sqq.).
33. irpos airaadc re. STJ iroXireiai K.T.X., with a view to every
constitution, and especially with a view to small States. For &?
following OTTOS, cp. Soph. Aj. 992. For KO\ 817 Kai, cp. Poet. 24.
1460 a 5 : Meteor. 2. 3. 357 b 26 : *A#. lloX. c. 2. 1. 2 sqq.: and
Plato. Laws 758 E. Aristotle occasionally studies the circumstances
of small States, e.g. in c. n. 1296 a tosqq., 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 35 sqq.,
and 2. ii. I273b 12 sqq. Most Greek States were small, and it
is probable that many of his pupils, like himself, came from small
States, for the attractions of philosophy were greater where those of
a political career were less (Plato, Rep. 496 B).
34. iv p,ei> yap STJ rats jicydXais K.T.X., for in the large States
[there will be as many offices as there are duties to be discharged,
for in them] it is possible and right for one office to be set apart
for the discharge of one duty. Aristotle has already said of
Carthage what he says here (2. n. i273b 8 sqq.). The course
which he here recommends had not always been followed at Athens,
though it was a large State : thus we read of the Commissioners of
the Theoric Fund (ol Vi TO GtapiKov Mxeiporovrmfvoi) in the days of the
ascendency of Eubulus, vpx 01 P* v "Y 3 " ^ v HyjpMPflt v6p.ov ytvtvdai ryv
TOV avTiypa<p(u>s dpxfjv, r)PX v &* r *l v r v a no8(KT<av KOI v(a>pia>v d
<TK(V00f)KT)v coKofio/zoui , rjvav 8e Kai oSoiroioi Kai (T)(f8ov rrjv oXrjv
fixov TIJS rroXewj (Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 25).
37. wore Tas ficK K.T.X., so that in the case of some offices men
intermit the tenure of them for a long time, while others they hold
S 2
260 NOTES.
only once. Cp. 3. i. 1 275 a 24 sqq. So in the constitution adopted
at Erythrae after its reduction by Athens towards the middle of the
fifth century B.C. no one was to be a member of the Boule a second
time till four years had elapsed (Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions,
No. 23). At Athens the position of epistates of the prytaneis could
only be held once by the same individual ( Ad. noX. c. 44). So in the
days of the Four Hundred at Athens, according to A0. noX. c. 31.
1. 1 6 sqq., it was ordained that except in the case of the Boule and
the office of strategus, no one should hold the same magistracy
twice. Aristotle does not notice, or at any rate point out, that the
frequent tenure of important posts by novices which regulations of
this kind involve would not be favourable to efficiency.
38. KCU |3A.Tioy K.T.X., and every task is better attended to, when
the attention of the person discharging it is directed to doing one
thing and not many. Compare i. 2. i252b 3 sqq. and 2. n.
t273b 14 sq. Aristotle has here before him Plato, Rep. 370 C,
fK. df) TOVTGOV TrXe iw Tf eKCUTTa ytyvfTdi KOI Ka\\tov KOI poov } orav fis fv Kara
cfixriv Kal tv Kaipto, <rxo\T]v Tu>v XXo)i/ uyotv, -npdTTr), and 374 A sqq., and
(as Viet, points out) Laws 8460 sqq. He probably also has before
him Xen. Cyrop. 2. I. 21, txtlvo 8oKS>v K.a.rap,fna6riK.fvai OTI oiroi Kpiiricrroi
(KdffTd yiyvovrat 01 av a(pep.fvoi TOV iroXXotr rrpocrf^ftv TOV vovv tiri (v tpyov
rpdncavrai, and 8. 2. 5-6, where the increased specialization of labour
in large States as compared with small is dwelt upon, and the
increased excellence of work resulting from this is described.
Formae p.ovonpayp.aTf iv et rro\vnpaynaTf iv unicum ex hoc loco ex-
emplum posuit Stephanus (Schn.).
299 b. 1. owdyeiy els oXiyous. Cp. Xen. Cyrop. 8. 6. 14, iracrai Se
<rvyKe<pa\aioiJvrai -rroXiriKal irpdgeis tls oXiyovs firuTTaTas, and Pol. 7 (5).
6. 1305 b 37, orav fvioi (Is fXdrrouj e\Kaxn TTJV okiyapxiav.
2. oXiyai Opumai , paucity of citizens, as is clear from 1299 a 37,
dia TO TroXXovr tlvai TQVS TroXiVas 1 .
5. Kal yojiwc, i. e. laws regulating the tenure and administration
of magistracies.
n-X^i al fiei K.T.X., but large States often require the same
magistracies, whereas it is only at long intervals that small States
do so. In large States, for example, magistrates for the repair of
the walls will often need to be appointed, not so in small States.
Cp. C. 1 6. 1300 b 29, avfJipaivd 8e TO. rotavTa tv rco iravri XP v< f o\tya
KOI tv rals ptyuXais noXfaiv. It appears from the Gortyna Code that
the opnavoSiKcuTTai of Gortyna n avaient qu une existence inter-
6 (4). 15. 1299 a 38 1299 b 16. 261
mittente, for the words of the Code are ai KO far) lavn. o
(col. 12. 22 sq. : see Dareste, Inscriptions Juridiques Grecques.
premiere se*rie, pp. 390, 476).
7. SuSirep ouSec icuXuci ic.T.X. In small States several magistracies
may be held by the same person at one time, for they will not clash,
because some of them for long periods of time together will give
their holders but little to do.
9. wpds TTJK 6XiYac0pwmaK, to suit the paucity of citizens. Cp.
3. 13. I284a I, irpos 8t TTJV dpicrTTjv.
10. ^peXioxoXuxyio- See notes on i252b i and 2. We read of
similar contrivances in Athen. Deipn. 700 d, "Eppnnros 8 6
irotbs fv rot? lapftois TO crrpaTHaTtKov Xvx^fiov o-vvdtrov ovriat (i. e.
ovofM^d (Hermipp. Fragm. 8 Bergk), and 700 e, ^v\o\vxvov\ov &
ltffivr)Tai*A\(is KM. Taxa rovrca Sfioiov eart TO napa Qfonofjina o/3Aio-o-
\{/Xviov (see Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 3. 517).
inSaas, sc. apxas, which does not come to the surface, as it were,
till 13. See notes on 1281 a 26 and 1336 a 21.
14. dpfiorrci 8e K.T.X. This question needs to be considered
because it has a bearing on the question raised in 1299 a 31 sqq.,
what offices are necessary. A similar question would be whether it
is better to give the strategi, as at Athens, command both by land
and by sea, or, as in the Lacedaemonian State, to give the command
by land to one magistracy and the command by sea to another.
16. coKoojuas. Cp. 8 (6). 8. 132 ib 14, 20, and Plato, Laws
7 64 B. At one time in the history of Athens the Council of the
Areopagus was charged with the maintenance of eicoo-/xt a throughout
the State : Cp. Isocr. Areop. 37, TTJV e Aptiov irdyov @ov\f]v
firifjLfXficrdai rf/s (VKocrp.ias, and *A$. IIoX. C. 3, rj 8e rS>v ApeoirayiTa>v |
rfjv (Me? rdgiv tt^c TOV diarrjpfiv TOVS vopovs, 8i<pKfi fie ra TrXfio-ra Kai ra
(ixytfrra T>V tv rjj ir6\(i, KOI Ko\dov(ra KOI fy//[to]{)cra ndvras TOVS aro-
<rpovvras Kvpia>s. This width of jurisdiction had its drawbacks,
especially as the Council not only tried and sentenced culprits,
but also carried the sentence into effect ( A0. noX. ibid, and c. 8.
1. 19 sqq.: cp. Pol. 8 (6). 8. 1322 a i6sqq.), and we may probably
infer from 8 (6). 8. i32ib 12 sqq. that Aristotle prefers, at any rate
in the case of large States, the arrangement by which the task of
caring for fVKo<rp.ia is entrusted to more magistracies than one.
There is obviously something to be said on the other side. In
modern States we are accustomed to look to one supreme police-
authority in each city. We note that Aristotle entrusts the receipt
262 NOTES.
and paying out of the revenue to one magistracy with jurisdiction
everywhere (8 (6). 8. 1321 b 31 sqq. : 6 (4). 15. 13005 9 sq.).
17. aXXo 8e RUT* aXXoi Toirof, i. e. astynomi in the city and agro-
nomi in the country (8 (6). 8. I32ibi8 sqq., 27 sqq.). The proedri
(irffjif\ovvTo Trjs (VKocrp.ias in the assembly ( A0. IloX. c. 44. 1. 10).
18. KCU irorepOK KOTO. TO Trpdyp-a Set Siaipeic r\ Kara TOUS dy6pwirous.
The latter method seems to have been followed in some cases in
Persia according to Xen. Oecon. 4. 9, KOI ela-l d aurw 01 apxoirts
Siareray/i/j/ot t(j) tKarfpov ov\ oi avrol, aXX ot fJ.fi> ap^ovcrt TU>V KOTOIKOVVTUV
re Ka\ T>V (pyarav . . . ot 8 apxovtri ru>v unrXicrp-fvatv (ppovpiov. We are
ourselves familiar with Guardians charged with the care of the poor
and Commissioners charged with the care of lunatics.
19. Xe yw 8 cloy Ira TTJS euxoorfuas. Supply Trorepov eVt/neXfio-^ai 8tl.
21. Kal TO TUV dpxwc yeVo9, the magistracies also, as well as the
constitution. To T>V dpx^v yevos probably means no more than at
apxal. See as to expressions of this kind Ast, Lex. Platon. i. 382,
and cp. Plato, Laws 797 A, TO T>V Trai8i>v yevos, and Tim. 76 C, TO
Tciji Tpt\u>v ytvos.
24. iv (iec TCHS dpioTOKpaTiais eK ireTraiSeufi^wi . Cp. Rhet. I. 8.
1365 b 33, dpioTOKpaTia Se tv rj oi Kara iraiftdav (8iavfp.ovrai ras dp%ds).
27. Kal KttT 1 auTas, i.e. KOTO ras iroXirfias (cp. 21, KO.& eKacrrrjv}, as
well as Kara roiif TOTTOVS, Kara ra npdyp.ara, and KOTO TOVS dvdpatnovs.
29. evQa per yap K.T.X. Great magistracies were seldom found in
democracies (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 24 sq., 29 sq., 41 sqq.), except in early
times (7 (5). 10. 1310 b 20 sqq.).
BO. ou fiTjK dXXa Kal tSiai Tide s eiaiv. To the magistracies
mentioned here as peculiar to special constitutions a gerusia may
be added, for a gerusia can hardly have existed in democracies.
31. TJ TWI TfpopouXuK. See note on 1298 b 27.
auTTj yap ou S^pLOKpaTiK^. Nor was the office of probulus suit
able to an aristocracy either: cp. 8 (6). 8. 1323 a 8 sq.
32. pouXr) 8e STJJIOTIKOI . The name Boule seems, however, some
times to be applied to Councils not of a democratic character : see
Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 131. i : 2. 190: 2. 315. 3. The yepowia
in the Cretan States, which was composed of persons who had held
the office of cosmus, an office tenable only by the members of
certain gentes, was called a Boule (2. 10. 127237 sq., 33 sqq.), though
there was nothing democratic about it. It is implied in 7 (5). 6.
1 306 b 6-9, where the word /SovXcvovo-i is used, that a Boule 1 might
exist in an oligarchy.
6 (4). 15. 1299b 17 1300 a 5. 263
33. OTTWS doxoXuc eoroi, in order that it may be able to attend
to its business.
34. TOUTO 8 , cap oXiyoi rov ci.pi0p.oi UULV, SKiyap^iKOV. Cp. Plut.
Camill. C. I, TO yap e avbpas, aXAa fir) 8vo, rois Trpdypcuriv ffpiardvat
irapfnvdf iTO TOVS f3apvvop.fvovs rrjv n\iyap\iav.
36. dXX OTTOU K.T.X., but where both these magistracies exist, [the
arrangement is still oligarchical, for] the probuli are established as
a check upon the bouleutae. We can trace the existence of probuli
in addition to a Boule at Corinth (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 90, who
refers to Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 60 in Miiller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 3.
394), at Corcyra (Gilbert, 2. 234 sq.), at Eretria (Gilbert, 2. 67),
and indeed at Athens after the Syracusan disaster (Thuc. 8. i. 3).
Since the foregoing note was written, I have noticed that my
remark as to the coexistence of probuli and a Boule at Corinth
has been anticipated by Professor Wilisch (Beitrage zur inneren
Geschichte des alten Korinth, p. 17) and by Mr. Lutz (Class. Rev.
10. 419).
38. KaraXueTCit 8 . . . 1300 a 4. Kpivouaii . The connexion with
what precedes is, but though the Boule is a democratic institution,
even its authority is destroyed in extreme democracies. The
substance of this passage is repeated in 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 30-35. Cp.
also 6 (4). 4- 1292 a 29, Sxrrf KaraXvovrat iracrai. ai ap^at, and Cic. pro
L. Flacco, c. 7. 1 6, Graecorum autem totae respublicae sedentis con-
tionis temeritate administrantur. As to Athens, cp. *A0. IIoX. c. 41.
1. 24 sqq., c. 45, c. 49. 11. 20-24, and see Sandys note on c. 43.
I. 30, where ways are pointed out in which a departure occurred
from the principle laid down by Solon, mftev tav uTrpo^ov\fvTov tls
fKK\T)(riav flafpcpeatiai (Plut. Solon, c. 19). It should be noticed that
Aristotle here connects the decline of the power of the Boule with
the introduction of liberal pay for the assembly (cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b
31, onov /AT) ptadov timopia naaiv). This throws light on the date at
which he would place the decline of the Boule at Athens.
4. iraiSoKOfios 8e ic.T.X. This remark is partly repeated in 8 (6). 1300 a.
8. 1 323 a 3 sqq.
5. Kal ei TIS oXXos ic.T.X. Aristotle refers to the yvnvaviapxos
among others, as appears from 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 37 sqq. : see
Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 337. 3, where Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr.
No. 246. 30 sqq. is quoted, yv/n/ao-tap^ds re alp(8f\s TTJS Tf tvTaias TOIV
f<pr)fta>i KCU Ttov vf<av irpo(i>or)6t), rrft re aXA;s fiKr^rjfj.oavtrrjs rrjs Kara TO
yvfivdcriov dvT(\d^(TO KaXcor icai (
264 NOTES.
6. irws Y^p *" T K-T.X. Cp. 8 (6). 8. 1323 a 5 sq.
7. rpo<|>w(ri Y&P ctl TWK SXiyapxoui Twi . Cp. Plato, Rep. 550 D,
556 B.
8. irepl p.y TOUTOJC. In the next line we have Tj-e/n with the ace.
See for other instances of this Bon. Ind. 579 b 20 sqq., where
8 (6). 8. 1322 b 30 sq. is among the passages referred to. Cp. also
8 (6). 8. 1321 b 28 sq.
10. For e| dpxrjs see Bon. Ind. 1 1 1 a 56 sqq.
flal 8 at Sia<(>opal Iv rpicrlv Spots, and the varieties [in the mode
of appointing magistrates] are dependent on three determining
factors (see note on 1294 a 35). For tivai *v, see note on 1330 b 8.
Compare also c. 16. 1300 b 14 sq. and Plato, Protag. 354 E, erreira
tv rovTw tla-l naam al dnoStigfis ( in hac re totius disputationis nostrae
cardo versatur/ Stallbaum).
14. eitdoTOu 8e roic Tpiojc Tourcji Sia^opal rpeis eurii . I take the
nine 8ia<popai to be as follows: All appoint, or some, or all to
some offices and some to others ; the appointment is made out of
all, or out of some, or to some offices out of all and to others out
of some ; the appointment is made by election or by lot, or to
some offices by election and to others by lot.
17. Y^ et > as tne Cosmi in Crete (2. 10. 1272 a 33 sq.).
dpTfj, as in the election to the Lacedaemonian Gerusia (2. 9.
1270 b 23 sqq.).
wcnrep Iv MeY^pois K.T.\. Plato appears to have cases of this
kind before him in Laws 7 1 5 A, dpx&v Trept/ia^^rwi/ yevopfvmv, ol vi<r}-
vavTfs TO. Tf irpdy/jLara Kara TTJV TroXiv OVTMS fffCptTepKrav o~0dSpa, axrrf
fir)8 OTIOVV /xcTaStfioj/at TOIS rjTTTjdfla i, /i^Te avrols fJ-^Tf tKyovois,
v\dTTOVT(s 8e dXXr;Xowv a><rtV) OTTWS p.f] Trore TIS els dp^v d(f)iKofj,fvos
firavavrf) p.(p.vr][jLevos ra>v tfnrpocrtifv yeyovoTiov KO.KOIV. It is not certain
when the change from democracy to oligarchy at Megara referred
to in the text took place. A change of this nature probably took
place there in the time of the poet Theognis, whose date however
is a contested point (see Christ, Gesch. d. gr. Litt. p. 113 sq., and
Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 394. 2). Plutarch may have the
democracy of those days in view when he describes in Quaest. Gr.
c. 1 8 the oppressive way in which the rich were at one time treated
at Megara, and in c. 59 the disorderly spirit which prevailed there
and the sacrilegious outrage of which some Megarians were guilty ;
he does not, however, mention that it was overthrown and that
an oligarchy took its place. It is to the overthrow of this
6 (4). 15. 1300 a 622. 265
democracy that Welcker (Theogn. p. xii), Sus. 2 (Notes 1365, 1513,
and 1556), and Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 70. i) take Aristotle to
refer in the passage before us and in 7 (5). 3. i3O2b 30 sq. and
7 (s)- 5- X 34 b 34 S( l- Busolt, on the other hand (Gr. Gesch.,
ed. 2, 2. 395. 6), takes Aristotle to refer to this revolution in 7 (5).
5. 1304 b 34 sqq., but thinks that the reference in the passage
before us and in 7 (5). 3. 1302 b 30 sq. is to the events of B. c. 424,
described in Thuc. 4. 66-74, when a democracy was succeeded at
Megara by an extreme oligarchy (Thuc. 4. 74). He does not give
the reasons which lead him to take this view. Others, among
whom are Schlosser (Aristoteles Politik, 2. 169, note) and E. Meyer
(Gesch. d. Alterth. 2. 633), take all the three passages to refer to the
revolution of B. c. 424. Sus. 2 (Note 1365) objects that the account
of Aristotle does not suit the description of the events given by
Thucydides, and it is true that while Aristotle evidently refers to
an overthrow of democracy which was the result of a victory over
the demos won by oligarchs returning from exile, Thucydides says
nothing of any such victory and represents the fall of the democracy
to have been due to the intervention of Brasidas and his army aided
by a Boeotian force. Still the oligarchical exiles at Pegae, who,
as Thucydides tells us (4. 74), were enabled by the fall of the
democracy to return to Megara, may have won a victory over the
demos which Thucydides omits to record, and certainly his descrip
tion of the oligarchy set up in B.C. 424 as extremely oligarchical
(4. 74) quite agrees with what Aristotle says in the passage before
us. A third view is that of Congreve, who in his notes on 1302 b
30 and 1304 b 34 connects the overthrow of democracy at Megara
mentioned in the three passages of the Politics with the withdrawal
of Megara from the Athenian alliance after the battle of Coroneia
in B.C. 447 (Thuc. i. 113 sq.). An oligarchy in which power was
confined to returned exiles would probably be especially oppressive,
for exiles could hardly fail to return embittered by exile. Philip
of Macedon set up an oligarchy of this type at Thebes after
Chaeroneia (Justin, 9. 4, pulsos deinde per iniuriam in patriam
restituit : ex horum numero trecentos exules iudices rectoresque
civitati dedit).
19. TrdXiy TauTa owSua^op.cca, again there is the case of these
things being combined. For the asyndeton in iraXtv cp. i. 5.
1254 b 10.
22. TOUTUf 8 icdoTT)s caorrai rfjs Sia<topas Tpoiroi TtTrapes, and
266 NOTES.
of each variety of these there will be four modes. Tourcof, i. e. r&v
rpi&v opoiv (10 sqq.). Take, for instance, the first opos who is it
that appoint ? One variety under this head is that all appoint.
There will be four modes of this variety.
All may appoint from all by election,
i lot,
All may appoint from some by election,
!J lOt.
The same holds good of the second variety under this head, that
in which some appoint.
Some may appoint from all by election,
lot,
Some may appoint from some by election,
lot.
So again as to the third variety, in which partly all, partly some,
appoint.
Partly all, partly some may appoint from all by election,
>, lot,
Partly all, partly some may appoint from some by election,
,> lot.
Thus there .will be twelve modes of each opos, if we confine our
attention to one only of the three possible o-wSvao-noi, i. e. the
aw8vaap.6t partly all, partly some, and neglect the two others,
which are partly from all, partly from some and partly by
election, partly by lot. This is explained in 30 sq. If we took
account of all three a-wSvavpoi, there would be more than twelve
modes. See Spengel, Aristotelische Studien, 3. 53, whose explana
tion I follow. But what is exactly meant by all or some appointing
by lot ? If an appointment is made by lot, how can it be said that
all appoint or some appoint ?
23. r\ yap Trdrres . . . 1300 b 5. dpioroKpcmicoy. As to the text of
this passage see critical notes.
24-26. The first of these two modes of appointing from all is
open to the objection that, as the magistrates would be taken by
election or lot or both from each of the tribes, demes, and phratries
composing the State in succession, all the magistrates of the
State might at a given moment belong to one and the same
tribe.
25. <j>parpia$. The way in which phratries are referred to here
6 (4). 15. 1300 a 2331. 267
suggests that they were a subdivision of the deme. As to the
relation of the phratry to the deme at Athens see Busolt, Gr.
Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 428 sq.
26. 8iA0Tj. Sus. apparently takes the nom. to 8it\6rj to be die
Ernennung aus Allen ( the nomination out of all ), and probably
this is so. In c. 14. 1298 a 17, on the other hand (cp. A0. lloX.
c. 4. 1. 1 6), TO apx*iv has to be supplied with SuA0i;.
del ^| dTrdkTwf, i. e. on each occasion out of all ; not merely
out of all, if we take several occasions together.
31. x w P* l s y ^" o ufSuaojiwi . See above on 22.
rouTdiv 8 at (lev 8uo Karaordaeis 8r]|iOTucai K.T.\. It has been
objected to the text as it stands that not two, but only one mode of
appointing is mentioned in what follows (TO ndvTas e /c ndvra>v\ or
else three (TO ndvras (< 7rdvra>i> aipetrti 77 K\f)pa fj dp<j)oiv) : hence Sus.
would read rpeis instead of Svo, and H. Rabe would insert KOI TO
irdvras /c rivS>v after irdvrwv, 32. I incline to think that no change
should be made in the text. It has been explained in 24-26 that
the one democratic mode of appointing (TO irdvras <rVc itdvruv) assumes
two forms, TO irdvras ( airdiv&v dvd /iepor and TO navras del e anntnvv.
Mtv is answered by 8e, 34. I take Aristotle s meaning to be that if
all appoint out of all taken in successive sections, so that the appoint
ment is made out of all, though not out of all simultaneously, the
arrangement is democratic, but that if all appoint by successive
sections, one section appointing first and then the next and so on
till all have had their turn of appointing, and the appointment
is made out of all the MS. text adds (probably erroneously),
or out of some by lot or election or both, or to some offices
out of all and to others out of some by lot or election or both,
the arrangement is suitable to a polity. In other words, it is
essential to democracy that the appointment should be made by
all simultaneously, but not that the selection should be made from all
simultaneously. It should, however, be pointed out that in one or
two passages of the Politics Aristotle seems to take a different view.
Thus in 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 23-27 a scheme under which persons
elected from all the citizens by alternation (nvis aiptrol Kara fitpos
irdvrav) elect the magistrates is treated as democratic. Perhaps,
however, in this scheme the electors were elected by all simul
taneously, and this is regarded by Aristotle as equivalent to the
election of the magistrates being made by all simultaneously.
Another passage which deserves attention is that in which the
268 NOTES.
constitution of Telecles is described (6 (4). 14. 1298 a n sqq.)-
This constitution is regarded by Aristotle as a democratic con
stitution. Were not, however, successive sections of the citizens
invested under it with the right of appointing the magistrates? We
are not explicitly told that they were, but, if this was the case, it is
not easy to reconcile the teaching of 1298 an sqq. with that of
the passage before us.
1300 b. 1. TO Se Tirds In -nvStv K.T.\. See note on 1292 b 2.
3. As to /AT) yicopei oi 8 ojioius see note on 1300 b 37.
4. TO o TII CIS e dirdi TGJi K.T.\. See note on 1292 b 2.
7. Ti^a 8e Ticri aup.(f>e pei K.T.X. Tiva, SC. ra>i> jrepl ras dp%ds. We
gather from this remark that offices of importance ought not to be
filled in the same way as minor ones. Perhaps they should be filled
by election (8 (6). 5. i32ob n sqq.) and exclusively or pre
dominantly from the class favoured by the constitution (7 (5). 8.
1309 a 30 sqq.). See vol. i. p. 516 sq.
8. Sjxa TCUS Suydfieai TWC dpx&c. [icat] Tifes flviv, ( as soon as the
prerogatives of the various magistracies shall have become manifest,
what they are. As to [KOI] see critical note.
9. TT)v Kupi cu- T&V irpoa-dSuK, sc. apx*i v , the magistracy of the
apodectae or tamiae (8 (6). 8. 1321 b 31 sqq.).
10. TTJI/ Kupiac TTJS <f>uXaKT)s, the magistracy of the strategi (8 (6).
8. 1322 a 33 sqq.).
11. Ttjs Toil irepl TTjr dyopay aufifSoXaiojc Kupias, the magistracy of
the agoranomi (8 (6). 8. i32ib 12 sqq.: Plato, Rep. 4250 sq.).
We see from Demosth. c. Timocr. c. 1 1 2 how humble the position
of an dyopavofjtos Of dcrrvvofjios Or diKaarfjs KOTO. 8f]fiovs was at Athens
compared with that of an envoy. Cp. also Pol. 2. 5. 1264 a 31,
where it is implied that daruvofjuKo. and dyopavofjuKa v6p.tfj.a are of little
importance.
C. 16. 14. Kcn-d TYJK auTTjc uiroflean , in accordance with the same plan :
Cp. Plato, Gorg. 454 C, aXXa crv ra cravTov Kara TTJV inroSfaiv otrtas av
B 8ia<|)opoi K.T.X., now there is a difference between
dicasteries, dependent on three determining factors : cp. Eth.
Nic. I. I. 1094 a 3, 8ia<popa Se rtf (patverai TCOV rtXcov. In C. 15.
1 300 a 10 we have el<rl 8 at Sta^opat fv Tpia\v Spots, where the
article is added before duxpopai See note on 1300 a 10. There
were other differences between dicasteries besides those noticed
here. For instance, the members of some were paid, of others
6 (4). 15. 1300 b 1 16. 1300 b 19. 269
not ; the richer members of some were fined for non-attendance, of
others not ; the members of some were numerous, of others not,
and so forth. Aristotle takes no notice of these differences, and
confines his attention to the three points mentioned by him, which
he probably regards as more closely connected with the Karaa-ratris
TO>V StKcurrrjpitov than the others.
18. TrpwroK ouv SiaipeiaOo) irotra ei8r] SiKaemjpiui . Aristotle takes
it for granted that a separate kind of dicastery will exist for each of
the more important departments of judicial jurisdiction. Hippo-
damus had classified lawsuits (2. 8. 1267 b 37 sqq.) as concerned
with three subjects only, vftpts, /3Xa/3?7, Odvaros: he would seem,
therefore, to omit offences against the State and against religion
unless they can be brought under one or other of these three heads
(see note on 1267 b 37). Aristotle, on the other hand, gives much
prominence to offences against the State (no doubt for the reason
mentioned in 36 sqq.), but omits from his classification many suits
which Hippodamus includes in his; we hear nothing from him
about suits connected with vfipis or 0Xa/3?;, except where there is
a contract (<rwdXXay^a), nor indeed of any criminal trials except
those for homicide or offences against the State ; none connected
with offences against the gods. Which of his dicasteries, again, would
try questions of inheritance ? Plato had already distinguished, as
Aristotle does here, between the way in which dicasteries dealing
with offences against the State and dicasteries dealing with
offences against private persons should be constituted (Laws
767 sq. : 957 A). We see which were the most important dicas
teries of those enumerated here from 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 25, TO 8iied(iv
namas Kal fK Trdvrcov KOI iff pi iravrav f) irtp\ TWV TrXetoraJi KOL T>V pcyicrTaiv
KOI TU>V Kvpt(ordra>v, oiov irtpl tiiQwaiv KOI 7ro\iTfias KOI T>V I8ia>i> trwaXXay-
paTw. The most important dicasteries were probably also those
on which the largest number of dicasts sat (see Ad. liuX. c. 53. 1. 15
sqq. and Sandys note, and Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions,
No. 31. 12 sqq.). We hear at Athens of dicasteries of 200, 400,
500, r,ooo, 1,500, 2,000, and 2,500 members (Gilbert, Const. Antiq.
of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 393).
19. If /iey euOurriKoi . As to this kind of dicastery see Ad. noX.
c. 48 sub fin. It has this peculiarity, that the persons brought
before it were exclusively magistrates. Dicasteries of this kind
seem to have found a place both in democracies and in oligarchies
(Plato, Polit. 298 E sq.). Aristotle might have added as another
270 NOTES.
kind of dicastery those which dealt with the 8o/za<n m of magistrates
(*A0. noA. c. 55. 1. 6 sqq.).
20. aXXo 8e ei TI S TI TUC KoiyoW dSiicei, and another dealing with
any one who commits an offence against any public interest : cp.
Rhet. I. 13. 1373 b 2O, fito (cat TO.8tKTjp.aTa KOI TO. SiKaiw^taTa Si^wf (<TTIV
ddiKflv Kal diKaionpaydv f) yap irpbs eva Kal a>pio~fJLfvov 77 Trpbs TO KOIVOV 6
yap [jioi^fvcav KO\ TVTTTCW dbiKfl Tiva T>V wpjcr/xeVwi , 6 8f fir) o~TpaT(v6ptvos
TO KOIVOV (compared by Bonitz, Ind. 9 a 58), Rhet. ad Alex. 39.
14465 35, TOVS dStKovvTds Tt TUV KoivSjv, and Plato, Laws 7676,
TO 8 OTTOTOV TO 8rj^6o-iov vwo TWOS Tu>v TToXirwj/ fjyrJTai Tts dSiKelcrdai *a\
/3ouX7$/7 TW Kowto ^orjdflv. Under the head of aStKij/iara Trpos TO KOIVOV
would fall not only the avoidance of military service, but theft of
public property (Laws 941 C-D : Xen. De Vect. 4. 20 sq.), the
non-payment of debts to the State, and a host of other offences.
See Demosth. in Lept. cc. TOO, 135, and c. Timocr. c. 172 sq.
Irepoy Sera els TT| iroXiTCtai 4>e pei. For the ellipse of 7rpt raOra
before oo-a see note on 1253 b 3. Cp. also Demosth. Or. 41. in Spud.
C. 7? TOV v6[j.ov, os OVK fa SiapprjSrjv, ova TIS aTTfTiprjo-ev, aval 8iKas OVT avToiis
ovTt TOIS /cA^poi/o /ioiy. For fls TTJV iroXiTfiav (pepti cp. Plato, Rep.
449 D. Acts alleged to be unconstitutional and attempts to change
the constitution by force would fall within the province of this kind
of dicastery.
21. nh-aproi K.T.X., a fourth both for magistrates and for private
persons dealing with contentions arising about impositions of
penalties. How important it was that a court of this kind should
exist, we see from 7 (5). 4. 1304 a 13 sqq. This court, unlike the
one which will next be mentioned as dealing only with differences
between private persons, had to do with questions affecting both
private persons and magistrates. Plato perhaps refers to this kind
of dicastery among others in Laws 957 A, TO. fie S^/ioo-ta *al KOIVU (sc.
8iKa(TTt]pia\ Kal ocrots dp^as 8(1 )(pa>p.fi>as Ta TTpoa~f]KOVTa eKacrrrj TO>V dp^Sav
dioiKtlv. Zr)p.laio-is appears to be a rare word. Greek officials, unlike
officials in general among ourselves, had the power of imposing
money-fines (7 (5). 4. 1304 a 13 sqq.: as to Athens see Gilbert,
Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 215. 3). Plato,
indeed (Laws 847 A), empowers the da-rvvofjioi of his State in
a particular case to punish the offender, if a citizen, ovtiSecri T* Kal
s, i.e. with penalties other than money-fines.
22. Tre fnrrof K.T.X. Cp. Polyb. 6. 17- 7> ro ^* p-eyicrTov, eic ravTTjt
al TUV 7T\fiaT(av Kal TUV drjfj,ocrici)v Kal TUV IdicaTtKwv <rvva\-
6 (4). 16. 1300 b 2031. 271
ova (jifyfdos *x fl v eyn\r]p.dTeav. In loiuv KOI e\o j/
a limitation of loimv seems to be introduced by Kai : see as to this
use of xai Bon. Ind. 357 b 8 sqq., and cp. Plato, Laws 766 C, oi
irpoffTjKovTfs Kai (Tri$r)p.ovvTfs irpbs irarpbt KO\ prjTpbs pe^pi. dvc^n5>v nai8cov.
24. (JxmicoG p-eK ouc ei8ir| ic.T.X. This is based on Athenian
custom. For similar enumerations of courts dealing with homicide
see Ad. IIoX. c. 57. 1. 14 sqq., Demosth. c. Aristocr. cc. 65-77, an( ^
Helladius, ap. Phot. Biblioth. Cod. 279 (p. 535 a 22 sqq. Bekker).
In the passage before us and in Helladius only four kinds of court
are enumerated, whereas Demosthenes and the A0. IIoX. mention
five, the additional court being that which tries cases of homicide in
which death is caused by the impact of stone, wood, iron, or the
like, the thrower being unknown.
27. dfi<J>io-pT]TeiTai 8e irept TOU SIKCUOU. Cp. I. 6. 1 255 a 16,
aXXa TTtpi TOV SiKaiov /JLOVOV ttvai rfjv d[i.(pio~l3f)TT)o-iv, Eth. Nic. 5 IO -
1135 b 27 sq., and Rhet. 3. 17. 1417 b 25 sq.
Wrap-TOf 8e K.T.\., and a fourth kind of court concerned with
acts of homicide charged against persons who have left the country
for homicide upon their return. The first act of homicide would
be accidental, the second wilful: cp. Demosth. c. Aristocr. c. 77,
tri TO LVVV TTtp-TTTOV 8iKao~TT)piov nXXo dfdcracrdf oiov virtpfieftrjKf, TO tv
i* (vravda yap . . . KeXeuei 8iKas ime^fiv 6 v6[j.os, fdv Tit fir aKovcrua
tpuvov tKowiov.
29. Kai, for instance. See note on 1255 a 36.
0-o/ipaii ei 8e K.T.\. For the first time during the last twenty
years the Isle of Man has been the scene of a trial for murder
(Times, Nov. 15, 1892). EV TW navrl xp vc f>> C P- Ptato, Tim. 36 E,
irpbs TOV giipnavra xpovov, and Phaedo, 107 C, ov% virep TOV xpovov TOVTOV
fiovov, fv ta Ka\ovfj.(v TO fijy, aXX vrrep TOV navTos : Cauer, Delectus
Inscr. Gr. No. 117. 15, o-u/i^a^o-w Tols ifpanvTviots TOV iravra xpovov :
Pindar, Pyth. i. 46, 6 nds xp v f- n 1 have eV TW Trapovn xP"<?> which
seems less suitable.
31. TOU 8e |eciKOu If JACK ^eVois irp^s le^oos, aXXo |eVois irpos
darous, and of the dicastery for alien suits one kind for aliens in
litigation with aliens, and another for aliens in litigation with
citizens. Sevan npbs do-Tovs might refer only to suits brought by
aliens against citizens, and not to litigation between aliens and
citizens generally. But Susemihl, Welldon, and other interpreters
are probably right in giving the words the wider meaning. At
272 NOTES.
Athens according to Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens,
Kng. Trans., p. 254, the -no\f^apxos had jurisdiction in most
private suits in which the defendant was a foreigner. The kind
of dicastery which dealt with litigation between aliens and citizens
would obviously be regarded as more important than that which
dealt with litigation between aliens ; it would also be that in which
infractions of justice were most likely to occur (Isocr. Ad Nicocl.
22), and infractions of justice which might possibly result in war.
We read of t-evodlxai at Oeantheia and Chaleion in Hicks, Greek
Historical Inscriptions, No. 31.
32. eri 8e irapd Trdrra raora K.r.X. Supply 8iKacrTT)pi6v tcrri. The
Forty had jurisdiction at Athens in suits where the matter in dispute
did not exceed the value of ten drachmae ( A0. iloX. c. 53. 1. 5).
33. jJUKpw -n-Xeiovos. Here the amount of money which is
involved in the contract is expressed in the genitive : see Kiihner,
Ausfiihrl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, 418. 6c (ed. Gerth, 418. 7).
34. OUK efimirrei Se eis SiKao-Twf irXTJflos. Bonitz (Ind. S. v.
/i7rt7rTeii/) compares such expressions as e / rl 7I " rou0 1 fj.(i> olv OVTOI KOI
tls a\\as Xuo-? (Soph. El. 30. 181 b 19). Cp. alsoPlut. Solon, c. 18,
TO. yap TrXeicrra TWV &ui<p6p<t>i> fveirilTTfV fls TOI/S BiKacrrds.
35. irepl JACV TOUTOJK, SC. ru>v 8iKacrTT]p!.a>v. AiKacrT^piwi must also be
supplied with T>V <poviK<av KOI ru>v fviK.a>v and with rS>v TroXcrueau . The
term ra noXiriKa Sifcao-Tij^ta seems to include the first five kinds of
dicastery. We read of oJ n-oXtrtKcu dyS>vfs in Rhet. 2. 18. 1391 b 18
(Bon. Ind. 614 a 57) : cp. also Lys. Or. 30. c. Nicom. c. 8. That
injustice in the review of magistrates conduct in office had a special
tendency to produce oruo-ts we see from Plato, Laws 945 D sq.
37. irepl &v p,T] yivo^lvdiv KaXws Siaoracreis yi^orrai Kal TWC TroXi-
Teioit al Ki^aeis. At the end of this sentence should possibly be
added p.rj yivop-tvav 8 6/ioiW from i3oob 3. See critical note on
i3Oob 38. For the thought cp. 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 20 sqq.
38. dkdyKT] 8e K.T.X. Aristotle does not consider the possible
alternative of all the citizens sitting as a dicastery. He would
probably regard a dicastery of this kind as too numerous. He
takes it for granted that a dicastery will comprise only a part of the
citizens, whether selected by election or by lot or by both.
39. irepl ird^Twi ruv 8iT)pr](jieVoji , respecting all the subjects which
have been distinguished (cp. i3Oob 18, famptiada). Looking to
35-38, we expect Aristotle to confine his attention to the matters
with which political dicasteries have to do, but irep\ nav
6 (4). 16. 1300 b 32 1301 a 10. 273
pfvwv seems to imply, as Prof. Jowett remarks, that he does not
do so.
41. Trepl eviwv T&V avruv. This has been interpreted in different
ways. Viet. de quibusdam certisque : Sepulv. de quibusdam
eiusdem generis controversiis : Welldon, or some of them must
invariably come before certain judges appointed partly by lot and
partly by suffrage. Of these interpretations I prefer those of Viet,
and Welldon, but another is possible, and I incline to adopt it,
about some things, the same [for both classes of dicasts]. If my
view is correct, Aristotle adds rS>v avrS>v wishing to make it clear
that the two classes of dicasts, those elected and those appointed
by lot, have similar competence and deal with the same, and not
with different, causes. Cp. Rhet. 2. 2. 1378 b 35, <a\ 5Xo>s eV <L av
f^rj TroXv, oiov ei> xpTjuacnv 6 irXovcrios Trfvrjros Knl ev TW \eynv
v flntlv *.r.X., where ruvTca, which has been doubted
(A c has Tavra), receives some support from the passage before us.
2. ol Kara fie pos, the sectional modes, i. e. the modes in which 1301 a.
some, not all, judge.
3. Is K<X! ot Sucd^orres the dicasts also as well as those appointed
to magistracies, who have been dealt with in c. 15. 1300 a 27 sqq. ?
Spengel brackets KCU and Sus. is inclined to transfer it to before
tK TIVUV, 2, but perhaps without absolute necessity.
4. TO, p-ey icXrjpu TO, 8e alpecrei, partly by lot and partly by election.
The dicasteries dealing with the more important matters would
probably be elective.
t) evia. Sucaarrjpia Trep! TWC auruc in icXtjpwTcii Kal aiper&v, or
some dicasteries composed of persons appointed by lot and by
election, the subjects dealt with being the same for both classes of
dicasts.
5. OUTOI \LV ouv K.T.X. It seems likely that one or more words
have dropped out in this sentence. Viet, and Sus. insert ot ainol
den. after oi rpoirot, while Schneider and Coray add i<rot, which Coray
places after rois (Iprj^tvois. Possibly avriffrpo^oi may be the missing
word, and should be added after ot rpoVot. A.vrio-Tpo(pot. would
easily drop out after rprmoi from the similarity of the ending. The
translation will then be, these modes then, as they were previously
said to do, correspond to those already mentioned.
7. TO, aura. AiKacmjpta should probably be supplied, as with ra
P(V and ra 6V.
10. dp-^oiK. I take Aristotle s meaning to be that dicasts might
VOL. IV. T
274 NOTES.
be appointed from all or from some or from both all and some,
either by election or by lot or by both methods.
11. TOurwy Be K.T.X. To p.(i> irp)Ta, SC. SiKatrrqpia. It Seems from
this that there was nothing undemocratic in an elected dicastery or
in a dicastery appointed partly by election and partly by lot, if only
the dicasts were elected out of all. This is remarkable, as even
in the Solonian democracy, a very moderate form, the dicasts were
appointed by lot (2. 12. 1274 a 5). Aristotle probably preferred in
a democracy dicasteries appointed from all wholly or in part by
election to dicasteries wholly appointed from all by lot, but would
Greek democrats agree with him in regarding such dicasteries as
democratic ? And would they be content even with dicasteries
appointed by lot from all, if these dicasteries were not both
numerous and paid ? Dicasteries appointed wholly or in part by
election would hardly be suitable to any but moderate democracies.
And what does Aristotle mean by dicasts appointed by election ?
Does he mean dicasts thus appointed for a given term say a year
or some longer or shorter term or for a given trial ? There would
be obvious objections to appointing dicasts by election for a given
trial, though the three hundred dicasts who tried the eVayels for the
murder of the followers of Cylon were appointed for the trial and
by some sort of selection, not by lot (Plut. Solon, c. 1 2). Imagine if
the English judge and jury who tried the leaders in the Transvaal
raid had been appointed for the given trial by election !
12. TCI Be Seurepa o\iyap)(iK(i, otra eic riv&v irepl irdvTwy. So that
if the dicasts were selected nv&v by lot or partly by election and
partly by lot, the plan would be oligarchical. Aristotle does not
tell us whether the plan would be oligarchical, if they were elected
K TIVVV by all, but probably it would not. It is to be presumed
that by eVc TU/OM/ Aristotle means from the rich or from the well
born/ for there would be nothing oligarchical in a selection from
the good.
13. rot 8e rpira K.T.\., and the third sort of dicasteries is
suitable to an aristocracy or a polity, all those which are partly
taken from all and partly from a limited class. So Sus. probably
rightly : Stahr, however, translates ra fj.ev TO. 8e for some matters
and for others ( fur einige Sachen and fur andere ). Dicasteries
composed both of members appointed out of all and of members ap
pointed out of a limited class (e dpfoiv, 8) are not distinctly named,
though Aristotle probably intends to class these also as suitable to
6 (4). 16. 1301 a 117(5). 275
aristocracies and polities. He may well, indeed, have preferred
dicasteries of this kind to any others, if we may judge by what he
says in c. 14. 1298 b 20 sq. and 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 26 sqq., where
he holds that in an extreme democracy rich and poor should
deliberate and judge together. But of the three other plans
that by which some suits were dealt with by dicasts taken from
a limited class and others by dicasts taken from all, that by
which all suits were dealt with by dicasts taken from all, and that
by which all suits were dealt with by dicasts taken from a limited
class he will have preferred the first. Here again it is remarkable
that Aristotle does not explain what sort of limited class he means
by rives. Would he regard it as an aristocratic arrangement if
some suits were tried by dicasts taken from all and others by dicasts
taken from the rich ?
BOOK VII (V).
PRELIMINARY REMARKS.
A few remarks may here be added to what has already been said
in vol. i. p. 521 sqq. as to the teaching of this Book.
If we study the eleven causes of orao-tt and constitutional change
enumerated in c. 2. 1302 a 34 sqq. (see vol. i. p. 523 sqq.), we
shall see that they may be grouped under three main heads. Srdtrif
and constitutional change may arise either from a certain emotional
state of the minds of the citizens or some of them, or from social
causes, such as the increase of a class in size out of proportion to
the rest or the unlikeness of one part of the citizen-body to the
other, or from negligence on the part of the authorities of the State
and similar causes. It is obvious that a great difference exists
between the second group of causes and the two others. Negli
gence in government can be avoided, and it is possible also to
avoid arousing feelings of envy, or contempt, or indignation at
oppression or fears of future oppression, but it is far less easy to
prevent a class increasing in size or credit, or an individual or
individuals acquiring a pre-eminence in power, or to secure the
existence of a midway class capable of holding the balance between
rich and poor, or to soften distinctions of race or geographical con
trasts. If the increase of a class in relative magnitude is often due
to accidental causes, as we are told that it is in c. 3. 1303 a 3 sqq.,
how is it possible to prevent it in these cases ? When the numbers
of the upper class at Tarentum were greatly reduced in consequence
T 2
276 NOTES.
of the defeat of the Tarentines by the lapygians, what amount of
good conduct or vigilance on the part of the magistrates would have
saved the polity from becoming a democracy ?
Aristotle s analysis of the causes of ytdvisj and constitutional
change reveals, in fact, the existence of causes with which it is
extremely difficult for the statesman to deal, however great his
skill and watchfulness. Aristotle himself seems, indeed, to be
hardly conscious of this. He hardly realizes how difficult it is to
prevent a-rda-is and constitutional change when they are brought
about by changes in the size or credit of classes, or other social
changes not easily guided or controlled. He may possibly have
" .underrated the difficulty of doing this, for we find him in 7 (5). 8.
1308 b 30 advising statesmen under certain circumstances to try to
x X increase the midway class without betraying much consciousness
of the difficulty of the task.
.Another consequence of his recognition of the share of social
causes in bringing about araa-is and constitutional change seems
also to be imperfectly realized by him. Does not the fact suggest
a resort to means of preserving constitutions of which he would
hardly approve ? If the increase of the rich in numbers or wealth
is often fatal to democracies (7 (5). 3. 1303 a 10 sqq. : 7 (5). 12.
1316 b 12 sqq.), will not democracies be wise if they thin the
numbers of the rich and impoverish them ? This view was com-
monly held by Greek democrats (see vol. i. p. 538 sqq. and Pol. 7
(5). 9. 1310 a 8 sqq.), but Aristotle advises democracies to adopt
an opposite policy and to spare the resources of the rich (7 (5). 8.
1309 a 14 sqq.). Is he not rather inconsequent in this? He
would probably reply that, however dangerous to democracies an
overgreat increase in the numbers or wealth of the rich may be, the
danger of driving the rich to combine against the democracy by
oppressive measures is still greater (7 (5). 5. 1304 b 20 sqq.).
When at the close of c. 4 Aristotle passes on from studying the
causes of constitutional change in constitutions taken as a whole to
study in cc. 5-7 its causes in each constitution taken separately,
some causes are pointed out of which we hear nothing in the first
four chapters. We now learn that changes of constitution may result
in democracies from oppression practised on the rich not by magi
strates, but by demagogues (c. 5. i3O4b 20 sqq.), or from the
ambition of demagogues who are also generals, in oligarchies from
the rivalry of great officials in courting the favour of those who
7 (5). PRELIMINARY REMARKS. 277
elect to offices, from an overgreat narrowness of the constitution,
from feuds within the ruling class, or from the ruin of individual
oligarchs by spendthrift and dissolute habits of life, and in aristo
cracies from strong contrasts of wealth and poverty within the
citizen-body. These are causes of constitutional change of which
we have not heard before.
It has already been pointed out in vol. i. p. 527 that the theory
of constitutional change set forth in this Book is not quite the
theory which we expect from Aristotle. We do not hear as much
in it as we expect of the effect of ethical changes in the citizens in
bringing about changes of constitution. We know that the consti
tution represents the mode of life preferred by the State (vol. i.
p. 209 sqq.) and reflects its conception of justice, and its view as to
the things which produce happiness (vol. i. p. 220 sq.), or in other
words is an indication of the moral level of the community, and we
are, in fact, told in 5 (8). i. I337ai4 sqq. that each constitution
is preserved by the rjdos appropriate to it, so that we infer that
a change in the rjdos of the citizens will often produce a change in
the constitution, but this cause of change remains unnoticed in this
(Book till we are told in c. 9. 1310 a 12 sqq. how important it is
jthat the citizens should receive an education conducive to the pre-
/ servation of the constitution. We infer, again, from such passages
^as 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 28 sqq. that the rise or increase of new
passes in a State, such as those of artisans, day-labourers, or sea
faring men, will result in constitutional change, but this source of
^constitutional change is nowhere dwelt on in this Book. Other
/ causes of constitutional change which we expect to find noticed in
/ it, but do not, are pernicious and erroneous teaching, or teaching
likely to overthrow or undermine the existing constitution, disasters
\ to the State (see note on 1304 a 33), disease and famine (Plato,
\ Laws 709 A), great differences of opinion among the citizens, the
mistakes of statesmen, the presence of nn/*oi within the city ([Xen.j
Rep. Ath. 3. 12 sq.), or of exiles in neighbouring cities. Some
thing is said in c. u. 13145 i sqq. of the dangers attaching to
heavy taxation in tyrannies, but we hear little or nothing of it as
a source of mavis and constitutional change in constitutions
generally, except incidentally in c. 5. 1305 a 5, c. 8. 1309 a 14 sqq.,
and 8 (6). 5. 13203 20 sqq. Aristotle does not notice how often
the foreign relations of a State, helped to determine its constitution.
Ss, One reason why Corinth, for instance, was oligarchically governed
278 NOTES.
no doubt was that its dreaded neighbour, Argos, was democratically
governed, and one reason why a democracy existed at Argos was
that its enemy, the Lacedaemonian State, was in the opposite camp.
States were apt to give supreme power to the class which was
least likely to betray them to the foe they feared. Instances of this
might easily be multiplied. Some occasions of trrao-tr and constitu
tional change which Aristotle notices elsewhere escape mention in
this Book. We gather, for instance, from 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 16 sqq.
that changes in the relative importance of different arms of the
military force of the State bring with them changes of constitution,
but we hear nothing of this in the Book before us. So again we
gather from the Second Book that ortwm is caused by the continued
rule of the same men (2. 5. i264b 8 sqq.), and by the coexistence
of two similar and rival great magistracies (2. 9. 1271 a 39 sqq.).
In Eth. Nic. 9. 6. 1167 b 9-16 bad men are said to be in a state of
(Troertr among themselves because of their moral badness. Of these
sources of ordo-ts we hear nothing in this Book.
/ As to the causes to which the fall of monarchies is traced in it,
i we note that while we hear of their being overthrown owing to mis-
\ government, and especially owing to Zfipu in its various forms (c. 10.
v 1311 a 27 sqq.), owing to fear, and owing to contempt (i3iia 25
J sqq.), and we gather that they sometimes fell in consequence of
disunion within the ruling family (1312 b 9 sqq., 40 sq.) or of
making a single individual overgreat (c. n. I3i5a8 sqq.), or not
taking sufficient care to have the strongest class in the State on
their side (1315 a 31 sqq.), we do not hear that they were affected,
as constitutions strictly so called were, by what we have termed the
social causes of constitutional change, such causes, for instance, as
the disproportionate increase of a class in size or the like.
From the counsels given in cc. 8 and 9 we learn that constitutions
are especially preserved (i) by vigilance. The constitution must
be carefully guarded ; in well-balanced constitutions small infrac
tions of law must not be tolerated, and in oligarchies resting on
a property-qualification and polities the property-qualification must
be altered, if any changes should occur from time to time in its
value ; the first begmftings of rivalrie&-an<l-fe-uds^mQng^ the_nojables
must be detected and checked ; both in oligarchy and in democracy
the private life of the citizens must be watched and spendthrift
habits controlled. Under no constitution should a single individual
be made overgreat or be suddenly dispossessed of his greatness.
7 (5). PRELIMINARY REMARKS. 279
(2) Both the class favoured by the constitution and the class not so
favoured should be fairly treated. In aristocracies and oligarchies
the members of the former class should be placed as far as possible
on a level, and their access to office facilitated by making official
terms short. In alLconstitutions special care should be taken of
the class not favoured by the constitution. It must not be wronged
or" oppressed. Its more ambitious members must not suffer in
their honour nor the many in their pecuniary interests7"and those
who are fiFTor rule must" ~Be~ bTOOgtit within the constitution. If
this class is excluded from office, as was often the case in oligar
chies, it should be reconciled to its exclusion by laws and regulations
securing that office shall not be a source of gain, but oligarchies are
advised in 1309 a 20 sqq. to reserve minor but lucrative o"ffic"e~s"for
it, "and both oligarchies and democracies are advised (13093 27
sqq.) to award it honorary distinctions to make up for its non-
admission_to the more important offices. Too often, it would
seem, the class favoured by the Constitution claimed a monopoly
both of power and of honour and profit : Aristotle advises, on the
contrary, that it should be content with a monopoly, or something
like it, of the more important offices, and allow a full share of
honour and profit to the less fortunate class. But he evidently
holds that neither vigilance nor fair and kindly treatment both of
the class favoured by the constitution and of the class not so
favoured would suffice without attention to a third point (3). The
constitution, if a deviation-form, nmsl_be_ moderate and must have
thg_strpngest element in the State on its side, and the ruling class
must be prepared by~ahlippropriate education to rule in such a way
as to secure that the constitution will last. Vigilance, fair treat
ment of all wilnTh the State, a moderate and strongly supported
constitution, and a ruling class fitted by education to rule these
are the things whTchmake constitutions~durable.
Aristotle s counsels are wise, but yet we feel that he has pointed
out causes of ordo-tr and constitutional change with which they do
not enable us to deal. How is it possible to counteract the social
causes of crao-tr and constitutional change, such causes, for instance,
as the disproportionate increase of a class, especially in those cases
in which it is due to defeat in war or other circumstances of an
accidental kind?
The question of the causes of ord<m and constitutional change
had been studied to some extent by others before Plato and Aristotle
a8o NOTES.
took it up. Some light is thrown on it now and then by Herodotus
(e. g. in 3. 80-82), by Thucydides (e. g. in 3. 82 sqq. and 8. 89. 3),
and by Ephorus (ap. Strab. p. 480 : see note on 1302 a 34). The
date of Phaleas is not known, but he had evidently considered it.
No one, however, appears to have dealt with it at all fully till Plato
dealt with it in the Republic and Laws and Aristotle in the Politics.
Throughout the Politics Aristotle often illustrates and confirms
general statements made by him by adducing historical examples
in support of them, but in none of its Books does he make a larger
use of this method than in that before us. U. Kohler (Rhein. Mus.
53. 491) has anticipated me in raising the interesting question
what class of Greek writers first made use of this method, and in
pointing out that it is already used by Aeneas in his Commentarius
Poliorceticus thirty years or more before the Politics was written.
He may well be right in thinking that Aeneas will not have been
the first to use it. I am sometimes inclined to suspect that the
references in medical writers to cases occurring in their practice
(see e. g. Hippocr. De Morb. Vulgar. 6) suggested the employment
of a similar method in other fields of inquiry.
The historical examples adduced in this Book are drawn pretty
evenly from most parts of the Hellenic world, most freely perhaps
from the less remote parts of the coast of Asia Minor and the
islands lying off it. In Greece Proper they are largely furnished by
the history of the chief cities, Athens, Megara, Corinth, Argos,
Lacedaemon, Heraea, Elis, Thebes, Larissa, Pharsalus; no reference
is made to the cities of Achaia, to Messene after its restoration, or to
Megalopolis, to the Acarnanians or Aetolians, to Corcyra (which is
surprising, considering how full an account Thucydides had given of
its troubles), or to Crete. Not many illustrations are drawn from the
history of the Sicilian cities, with the exception of Syracuse, nor
from that of the Aegean islands other than those lying near the
mainland of Asia or Europe ; none from the history of the cities of
the more distant part of the Euxine. We might have expected that
Aristotle would make more use than he appears to do of the histories
of Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon. Whether he made
a larger use of the history of Ephorus, we cannot say. It is not
easy to trace the source from which he obtained his illustrations.
Some of the facts he mentions may have become known to him
personally (see notes on 1304 a 4 and 1311 a 36), and he may have
learnt others from his numerous pupils.
7 (5). 1. 1301 a 1922. 281
19. flepl |ie> ovv T&V aXXwi we TrpoeiXdp,c6a axeSoi ciprjTcu irepl C. 1.
TT&VTUV. For the needless repetition of ntpi in mpl Trdvrtov cp. 8 (6). ^ a "
8. 1323 a 9* fepl M* J v v r ^ v ^PX^"^ ^ s f v Timca, a-\fbov dprjrai irtpl
TTCUTUV, and 2. 12. 1273 b 29 sq. (compare also 7 (5). 12. 1315 b 40
sqq.). In nept TTJS naff VTTVOV /xairiKJJy 2. 464 b 1 8, where Bekker
reads eYt fie Trepi TTJS en T>V fwirvinv pavriKris etpj/rat, Biehl (who reads
fiavTflas in place Of pavrixris) adds wept ird(TT)s after ftprjrai with EMY,
probably rightly. Cp. nepl dvairvofjs 21. 480 b 21 sq.
20. eic TIIWK Be fierapdXXouaii al TroXireiat Kal irooxov Kat iroiui .
This question, stated in a slightly different form in c. 2. 1302 a 16,
eVet 6 OKO7rovp.fv (K rivu>v al re ardafis yiyvovrai Kal al /iera/3oXal Trtpt ras
TToXtrdas (cp. c. 4. 1304 b 5 sqq., 17 sqq., and c. 7. 1307 b 24 sq.),
is dealt with in cc. 2-4. It has been already noticed in vol. i.
p. 521 that this summary does not prepare us for the distinction
between TroAtrelat and povapxia which is a conspicuous feature of
the Book. See also note on 1289 b 24.
21. Tiees eKdcmjs iroXiTcias 4>0opai. This question is dealt with
in cc. 5-7.
22. ^K Ttolwv is iroias fidXtora fieOioramu. This is a question
on which light is occasionally thrown in cc. 5-7 and elsewhere in
the Book We gather, for instance, from c. 5 that democracies
are apt to change into oligarchies and tyrannies: see also c. 7.
1307 a 20-27.
ert 8e <rwn]piai TIKCS *a! KOiin] Kal x u pi5 eKaa-njs i<nv, In 8e 8ia
Ticoje dv fjtdXiora CTW^OITO r&v TroXireicij EKCIOTT]. Giphanius (p. 525)
brackets tn 8* 8ia riv<av fKdcTTTj, and Spengel and Sus. regard these
words as an alternative recension of en de (rtorrjpiai tla-iv. It is
possible that they are so ; it is also possible that they are a gloss
which has crept from the margin into the text ; I incline to think,
however, that they are neither, but, on the contrary, are in place
where they stand: cp. 6 (4). 2. i289b 23, jrfipareov eVeA&Ii/ rivts
<j)6opai Kal rives cra>TT)piai ra>v Trd\iTfio>v Kal KOivfi Kal xa>pls fKaa-njs, Kal 8iu
rlvat alrias ravra /uaXtora yivfcrBai jrecpVKev, and 8 (6). T. I3l6b 34,
fri 8e TTfpl <j)0opas re Kal (rutrrjpias riov Tro\tTfiu>v, tK no uav re yiverai Kal
8ia rlvas alrias, tiprjrai irportpov. Both these passages distinguish
between the o-oynjpim, or modes of preserving constitutions, and the
mYi ai (ruTTjpias, the means by which they are preserved. Thus in
7 (5). ii. I3i3a34 sqq. and 1314 a 29 sqq. two broad modes of
preserving tyrannies are described, distinct from the means which
each mode employs for the purpose. So again in 8 (6). 5. 1319 b
282 NOTES.
37 sqq. the erorrrjpuu are mentioned side by side with TO. <rd>ui>Ta.
We often trace in the Politics a distinction between the rpdn-or and
the &i ov, e.g. in 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 41, aX\ov yap rponov Kal C X\our
(Kao-Toi TOVTO 6r]pevovT(s K.r.A. : 4 (7). 15. 1334 b 5, ir>s fie xa\ dia
rivals (crrai : 3. 1 8. 1288 a 39, rov avrov rpAitav /cat fiia TCOI avTutv.
25 1302 a 15. The contents of this part of c. i may be thus
summarized. The origin of a-rdcns is to be found in the fact that
men seek what is equal and that many constitutions do not give
what is equal, inasmuch as they treat as equals men who are not
really equal, or as unequals men who are not really unequal. Hence
(rrdo-if arises, which sometimes seeks to substitute one constitution
for another, and sometimes does not. What it always seeks to do
is to obtain that which is equal. But the equal is of two kinds
the arithmetically equal and the equal according to desert. Hence
two main constitutions come into existence, democracy and
oligarchy, the one based on the one sort of equality and the other
on the other. Democracy is safer than oligarchy, but they both
rest on one sort of equality only, and both are consequently unsafe.
Constitutions should combine both sorts of equality. Here Aristotle
follows in the track of Plato, Laws 757 A-E.
Aristotle has promised in 1 301 a 20 sq.to inquire into the causes of
changes of constitution (eV rivutv pfTaftaXXoviriv ai TToXiTfitu Kal ir6<r<t)v KUI
TToicov), but we find him inquiring in the passage before us how o-rdo-ts
originates, and hence he is led in c. 2. 1302 a 16 sqq. to enlarge
the subject of his inquiry, and to ask what are the causes of OT<MT
as well as of changes of constitution. Now ordo-tj does not always
aim at a change of constitution (1301 b 6-26), nor are changes of
constitution always preceded or accompanied by ordo-tj (c. 3. 1303 a
13 sqq.), so that Aristotle s addition of an inquiry into the cause of
o-rd<m to an inquiry into the causes of constitutional change some
what complicates his investigation. Still it enables him to insist
that the constitution should realize that which is equal and should
realize it in both its forms, and this he is no doubt glad to have an
opportunity of doing. It should be noticed, however, that constitu
tional change may occur not only without being preceded or
accompanied by ordo-ir, but also without the existence in anybody s
mind of a sense of injustice. In oligarchies based on a property-
qualification and polities, for instance, it may occur through accident,
if owing to any cause there should be a rise or a fall in the value of
property (c. 6. 1306 b 6 sqq.: c. 8. 1308 a 35 sqq.).
7 (5). 1. 1301 a 2528. 283
25. 8ei 8c irpwTOv urroXapeic TTJI dpxV K.T.\., and we must first
assume the starting-point that the reason why many different con
stitutions have come into being is that, etc. Cp. De Gen. An. i.
I 8. 7 2 4 a r 4> <*PX*1 $* * a TQVTTJS TTJS <TKf^fO)S KO.I TO>V firOfJL(VO>V 7TpTOI>
Xa/3etj/ irtpl cnr(pp.aTOs ri t<mv. For vrro\a&tlv ( SUmere ac Statuere
aliquid pro vero, Bon. Ind. 799 b 26), cp. Anal. Post. i. 16. 79 b
26 Sqq., where djrXwr inro\a@tiv is opposed to ^ta (rvXXoyurfiov Xa/3fii>
rr)v vjr6\rj\lsiv. The first step taken is the assumption of the starting-
point that the existence of numerous constitutions is due to an
error as to what is just and proportionally equal, but what is the
next? Perhaps to point out (13013 37 sqq.) that ordo-ir arises
when constitutions are found by certain classes (the rich and
the freeborn) not to give them the position which they think
their due.
26. iracrwy fiec ofioXoyourrui TO SIKOUOC KCU TO KOT dyaXoyiaf tow.
Spengel, Bekk. 2 , and Sus. read flvai in place of *ai (cp. 1301 b
35 sq.), but Bonitz (Ind. 51 2 a 33) brackets KOI, coupling the
passage before us with 6 (4). n. i2g^b 3, eWi roiwv 6/uoXoyirai TO
(jifTpiov apurrov. I doubt whether any change is called for in the
text : Kat is probably here, as often elsewhere, explanatory ( the
just in the sense of that which is proportionally equal : see note
on 1318 a 33). For opoXoytiv with an ace. (meaning to agree
about ) Cp. 3. 9. 1280 a 1 8, rrjv fj.(i> TOV npdyparos urdrTjTa o^toXoyovo t,
rrjv 8e pts dfXpiafirjroixTi, and Plato, Rep. 597 E, rov pev 8f) fUfj.7)rr)v
^Ho\oytjKiifj.ev. For TO Kar avahoyiav iaov cp. Eth. End. 7-9 124! b
32, e7Ti 8f TO *<rov TO p.tv KQT upi.6p.ov TO 8f KQT avoXoyiav, not TOV Siicaiov
flBrj e<rrai KOI TTJS (pi\ias KO.I TIJS Koivatvias K.T.X., 7- 3- 1238 b 19 Sqq.,
and 7. 10. 1242 b 12 sqq. In a just award of advantages to persons
proportionally, not arithmetically, equal the advantages which fall to
each are proportionally, not arithmetically, equal, i. e. they are pro
portioned to the comparative ai a of the persons (Pol. 3. 9. 1280 a
f6sqq. : Eth. Nic. 5. 6. 1131 a 24 sqq.). Hence in 1301 b 2 9 sqq.
and c. 7. 1307 a 26 we have TO KOT dgiav "ivov in the same sense as
TO KO.T ava^oyiav "(rov here. But TO KOT di-iav "urov is TO ATT\U>S Sixaiov
(1301 b 35 sq. : cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 9. ns8b 30, m yap tv piv
StKaiois laov irpa>Ta>s TO KUT aj-iav, TO B( KOTCI itotrbv 8fVT(pu>s) : therefore
TO MKCUOV is identified in the passage before us with TO KQT dvaXoytav
\<TOV.
28. ucnrep eiprjToi KO.I irpoTcpoy, in 3. 9. 1280 a 7 sqq. and 3. 12.
1282 b 14 sqq.
284 NOTES.
31. oXiyapXi" ^ K.r.X. Cp. c. 12. I3i6b I sqq.
34. irdi Twi Twy law d|iou<n. (jLeTexeif, and so demand a demo
cracy.
TrdvTOjy raJy 1(70)1 . Cp. Diod. 15. 29. 6, npocrtKafiovTO Se *ut TOUS
6r]f3aiovs tnl TO KOIVOV (rvveBpiov erri TOIS icrois ndariv : Plut. Alex. C. 13?
rots Kara(})vyov(nv ri riyf TroXtv dndvraiv piTtSi8ocrav TUIV
Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 321, KOI yds KOI olidas
Kal TO. oXXti TLfj.ia KOI. (j)i\dv6pu>7Ta TrdvTO. ocra K.r.X. Various changes
in the text have been proposed (see Sus. s a ), but, as it seems to me,
without necessity.
35. ir\ovK.r.lv STJTOUCTII , and so demand an oligarchy.
TO yap irXeioc avio-ok, for [they seek the unequal and] the more
is unequal.
36. iraoxu, i. e. both democracy and oligarchy. See note on
i28oa 9.
Tjfiaprr]|iEVai 8 cbrXws elatj , but from an absolute point of view
they are erroneous/ They are KOTO ri dpdal, but jj^apr^/ieVai aTrXws-.
Compare (with Lutoslawski, Erhaltung und Untergang der Staats-
verfaSSUngen, p. 91) PlatO, Rep. 543 D, aXX ovv drj ras aXXas ^aprr]-
ptvas eXfyes, el avrr) op6r). Cp. also 3. 6. 1 279 a 19 Sq. and 6 (4).
2. 1289 b 9.
37. 8id TauTrp rfji aiTiav. Does this mean because democracy
and oligarchy are i^aprq/ite i/ai dn\>s, based on erroneous views of
what is just/ or because the supporters of democracy and
oligarchy take erroneous views of what is just ? I incline to the
former interpretation. Cp. Plato, Laws 7 57 A, 8ia yap d^orfpa
raiira (the giving of too much power to the few and of an equal
share to the good and the bad) ardtjew ai -noKirfiai irXripovvrai.
39. oracrid^oucrii . What is the exact meaning of a-rdans and
araaid&iv ? To vraoidfav occurs when a number of the citizens of
a State form themselves into a faction for the attainment of some
political end by legal and illegal means. A party is assumed to
pursue its end by legal means only, whereas a cmio-is is prepared
to carry its point by illegal means, if necessary. Srao-ts may have as
its aim either an entire change of constitution or something short
of that (1301 b 6-26). The existence of crrdo-iy implies the absence
of 6/Moi/ota (Plato, Rep. 352 A); it implies hostility between those
who ought to be friendly to each other (Rep. 470 B), but ro
erra<n.d(iv is distinguished from ro firiTiBea-Qat in 7 (5). 3. 1302 b 25,
and ardors from pdxai in 6 (4). n. 12 96 a 2 7 sqq. (cp. 7 (5). 3.
7 (5). 1. 1301 a 311301 b 4. 285
1303 b i sq.) and Plato, Rep. 560 A, and from 7rdXf/w>s in Polit.
271 E etc., though in Laws 629 D orao-ts is said to be navr^v iro\fj.<i>v
After OTao-id^ouCTiv I propose to insert C. 3. 1303 b 3, orao-tafoven
fie 7, ovrfs : see critical note on 1301 a 39 and explanatory notes
on isosb 3-5.
irdvrwv 8e SucaiOTCvra K.T.\. Cp. 3. 13. 1283 a 24 sqq.
2. OUK. d^ioucri. TUC uro CIUTOUS. Cp. 3. 13. 1 284 a 9, dtov[i.(voi 1301 b.
T>V la-cav, and Plut. Pelop. C. 25, ru>v icrcav OVK rjgtoiiTO, and for the fact
Rhet. 2. 2. 1378 b 34 sqq.
3. euyems yap ei^ai SoKooaif K.T.\. Aristotle uses the word
doKova-iv here, but in 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 21 sq. (where see note) he
adopts this view as his own. In the passage before us he hints
that true tiytveta is something different (cp. i. 6. 1255 a 39 sqq.
and the fragment of Menander quoted in the note on 1255 a 34,
where true nobility is identified with virtue). Whatever claim to
rule wealth and virtue may confer on their possessors, mere descent
from the wealthy and virtuous confers none.
4. apx 01 ^ P* v v v ^S eiireti CIUTCH ica! TrTjyal TWK OTao-eoSc elaic,
oOev orao-id^ouffii , these then are the sources, speaking broadly,
and the springs of civil discord, from which civil discord takes its
rise. Mev ovv may possibly be taken up by eWi 8e o-KOTrovnev, c. 2.
1302 a 1 6, but it is not certain whether (owing to the length of the
disquisition which follows) it is taken up by anything. AVTCU, i. e.
a sense on the part of a person or persons that they have not the
position under the constitution which they regard as their due.
Thurot would place us fiTi-tlv before Trtjyai and Sus. after it, because,
while apxai est une expression ordinaire, qui n a pas besoin d etre
adoucie et excuse e/ Tn/ym est une expression figure^, but &&gt;r
dnflv is often used where no expression figure e has gone before,
to restrict and qualify an absolute statement (e.g. in 3. n. 1282 a
5, 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 28 sq., and 7 (5). 4. 1304 b 4 sq.) : see
Bon. Ind. 872 a 34 sqq. and Ast, Lex. Platon. i. 631, who says
wj fiTtfiv proprie est modeste loquentis et rem infmita ratione
vel universe significantis. So here Aristotle uses it to express
the fact that it is only in a broad way that inequality under
the constitution can be said to be the source of oraW, for a more
detailed investigation (c. 2. 1302 a 16 sqq.) reveals to him that
a sense of unequal treatment under the constitution is not the only
source of errao-ts and constitutional change. The phrase irrjyal rav
286 NOTES.
comes to Aristotle from Plato, Laws 690 D, vvv yap fir;
(rrdcrfatv irrjyrjv riva dvfvpf^Ka^fv fj^ls,
6. Sio Kal al fierapoXal yiyvovrai bix&S, hence the changes also
[as well as the a-rda-ds that lead to them] come into being in two
ways (i.e. they arise either from o-rao-t? which seeks a complete
change of constitution or from a-rda-is which does not). As the aim
in a-rdans is broadly the removal of inequality, and inequality may
be removed with or without a change of constitution, the changes
which result may be either changes in the constitution or changes
stopping short of that. The long parenthetical passage, 1301 b
6-26, breaks the continuity of the argument and looks at first sight
like a marginal note which has found its way into the text, but this
it can hardly be, for it is with reference to the case of Lysander
mentioned in 19 sqq. that the inequality of a perpetual kingship,
where all are equal, is dwelt upon in 27 sq.
ore fiec yap irpos TTJC iroXiTeiai , SC. crTamdgovtnv.
10. rain-as e eKeicwr, i.e. oligarchy and democracy in place of
polity and aristocracy.
ore 8 ou irpos TTJI Ka0eoTt]Kuiai iroXireiar K.T.X. Of this kind of
change (i.e. change which does not seek the substitution of one
constitution for another), three kinds are mentioned ; its promoters
may seek either (i) to leave the constitution as it is, but to take
the place of the existing holders of supreme power, or (2) to make
the constitution more moderate or more pronounced, or (3) to alter
a part of it. Those whose aims fall under the second or third
head, no less than those who do not desire any change in the
constitution, are marked off from those who seek to replace the
existing constitution by another, for they seek only to modify it.
I cannot follow Susemihl, therefore, in transposing 10, ore 8e . . .
13, ftovapxiav, to after TToXiTeia ravrr), 26. Aristotle makes no men
tion here of a fourth type of revolution, of which we read in 6 (4).
5. 1292 b 17 sqq. The leaders in this sought the total overthrow
, of the existing constitution and its replacement by another, but
they did not, when successful, proceed at once to overthrow it,
"Vesting content for a time with acquiring supreme power for them-
/ selves and modifying the customs and training of the State.
V.. 13. r\ TTJK p>fap)(iaf. Cp. C. 12. 1316 a 29, a\Xa /zera(3dXX KOI
fls Tvpavvifta rvpavvis, Stcrtrfp f] StKua>i/o? (K rfjs Mvpowos (Is TTJV KAe<-
adevovs.
CTl TTCpl TOU (JiaXXoC Kal TJTTOy, SC. <TTa(TldovaiV.
7 (5). 1. 1301 b 622. 287
14. olov TJ oXiyapxiaK ouaav K.T.\. M(ra^a\\ova-iv should probably
be supplied.
15. ?j Stjp.oKpaTiai ouo-a.v els T& fiaXXoy 8T]fioicpaTur0ai, like Clei-
sthenes at Athens (8 (6). 4. 1319 b 21 sq.).
16. 6fJLOiw9 8e KOI em rS>v XOITTUK iroXiTCiwc, SC.
17. TI K.r.X. Here again we must supply o-raa-
18. (j^pos TI T^S iroXireias. See note on 1297 b 37 and vol. i.
p. 514, note.
dpx^c nya KaTaoTTJcrai, as for instance at Epidamnus a Boule.
Kingship is here treated as an ap^, as in c. 10. 1313 a 5, 8.
19. T] dveXeii . So, in addition to Lysander and Pausanias, Empe-
docleS at AgrigentUm TO ra>v \t\i<av SOpoto-pa Kar/Xvo-f trvvf arras firl
(TTJ rpia (Diog. Laert. 8. 66). See also Plut. Reip. Gerend. Praec.
c. 10 (quoted on 1306 a 12) as to Ephialtes at Athens and
Phormion at Elis. As to Lysander see note on 1271 a 21. In
strictness his plan seems to have been to open the kingship to
the best of the Spartans irrespectively of descent, but this change
was equivalent to putting an end to the kingship of the Hera-
cleidae (cp. Diod. 14. 13, Stnwfp *Vl rovrots TTf^povrjfj.aritTfj.fi Ot
Kara\v(rai TTJV ru>v HpaK\fi8>v f3a(Tt\f{av KOI KOIVTJV eVc TT&VTtOV
noiijo-cu TTJV dtpfo-iv r>v /3a<rtXeo>i/), and perhaps Aristotle here means
no more than this by his phrase xaraXva-ai ryv f3aan\eiav, as to which
cp. Xen. Ages. i. 4. As to the question to what Pausanias Aris
totle here refers, see notes on 1333 b 34 and 1307 a 3. Pausanias
.6 /Sao-tXeuj is said in 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 32 sqq. to have tried to make
himself master of his own State, and we know that Pausanias the
victor of Plataea did so (7 (5). 7. 1307 a 2 sqq.). Is it likely that
two men of the name of Pausanias plotted at Sparta at different
times with the same end in view ?
21. ical Ic EiriSajii a) 8e K.r.X. Changes of a part of a constitu
tion would mostly occur where the partisans of the existing
constitution were strong and offered a vigorous resistance to
proposals of change. In a State torn by faction like Epidamnus
this would be likely to be the case.
22. dvr! yap iStv ^u\a.p\<av pouXrji iitovt\aa.v. For (iroirja-av cp.
6 (4). 12. 1297 a 8, rtov ras dpioroKpariKas (3ov\o[i.(vu>v noitiv TroXrm ar,
and see note on 1274 b 7. This was of course a change in a
democratic direction, for a BoulS was a democratic institution (6 (4).
15. 1299 b 32). The context implies that the <vXapx<u were an
element of inequality in the State, and that their exalted position
288 NOTES.
gave rise to a feeling in the minds of the citizens generally that they
were unjustly dealt with. Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 236) conceives
them to have been the heads of the three Dorian tribes and to have
acted as a council to the single magistrate who managed the affairs
of the State (1301 b 25). This is possible, but we know too little
about Epidamnus to be sure of it. That the three Dorian tribes
existed at Epidamnus is likely enough, for we find traces of one
of them at all events in the mother-State, Corcyra (Gilbert, Gr.
Staatsalt. 2. 236. 2). But it is not certain that they existed there,
nor that, if they did, they were the only tribes, for at Calymna we
find the three Dorian tribes co-existing with others (Gilbert, 2. 213).
As we know neither how many tribes there were at Epidamnus
nor whether each tribe had one or more (pv\apxoi at its head, we
cannot tell how many in number the <pv\apxoi were, but they were
no doubt less numerous than the Boule which took their place.
As to Epidamnus see notes on 1290 b 9 and 1304 a 13.
23. els 8e rr\v ifjXi.aiai K.T.\., but it is still obligatory on the
magistrates [alone] among the members of the privileged class to
proceed to the Heliaea when an appointment to a magistracy is
put to the vote, [which is an oligarchical arrangement]. Gottling
was apparently the first to interpret this passage aright. He says
(p. 391), sic intelligendus est locus aristotelicus : ex omnibus iis
qui ad rempublicam accedere possunt non nisi magistratibus impe-
ratur interesse comitiis cum creatur aliquis magistratus; ceteris
civibus interesse licet quidem, at non imperatum est. Susemihl
and Welldon take the passage substantially in the same way.
Stahr, on the other hand, in his translation of 1860, takes r5>i> ev r<p
T7o\i.revfj.aTi not as a partitive genitive after THS dpxds, but as in the
genitive after TTJV faiaiav ( the Heliaea of the members of the
privileged class ), and this is a possible view, though I prefer
the other. To enforce the attendance of the magistrates exclu
sively at elections by the Heliaea was an oligarchical measure,
because when one set of men were forced to be present and the
rest were not, the probability was that those only would be present
whose attendance was enforced, and that they would thus acquire
a decisive voice in the election. The magistrates would, in fact,
be almost placed in a position to name their successors in office.
Plato in a similar spirit arranges in Laws 755 C and 756 A that the
nomophylakes shall propose the generals and hipparchs to the
assembly, though he allows any one to propose alternative names.
7(5). 1. 1301 b 2326. 289
Some Greek States enforced the attendance of the rich exclusively
at meetings of the assembly (6 (4). 13. 1297 a 17 sqq.) ; Epidamnus
enforced the attendance of the magistrates exclusively at elections
by the Heliaea. Compare Baunack, Die delphischen Inschriften,
No. 2561. D 25 (in Collitz, Sammlung der gr. Dialekt-Inschriften),
o[i 8" aJXt ai ITOIOVTVV apx<o[v nJTrfi q, aTrorettrara) o3eXoi>, where the
assembly of the members of the Delphic phratry of the Labyadae is
referred to. Aristotle mentions the continued existence of this
oligarchical feature of the constitution of Epidamnus, and of the
other to which he refers in 25 sq., in order to show that democratic
innovation there was confined to one point and that the consti
tution /nfre/3aXe Kara fioptov. The TjXtaai (i.e. the assembly) at Epi
damnus was probably called there dXtat a or &\ia (see Liddell and
Scott on these words), but Aristotle uses the Attic form. For ds
TIJI> ijXtai af Paftifiv cp. Plut. Dion, C. 53> Ka TrpaiTOv pfv els (rvvedpiov
rrapaKuXovfjifvos OVK ((3ov\tTo J3a8itit>.
25. oXiyapxiKoi/ Be KCU, 6 apxwy 6 ets r\v lv TTJ iroXireia rauTTj.
That the single supreme magistrate was an oligarchical feature, we
see from 3. 10. 1281 a 32 sqq. and 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 22 sq., though
it is implied in 3. 16. 1287 a 4 sqq. that making one man Kvpiov rrjs
8iGiKt)u-(u>s, as at Epidamnus and Opus, was not an arrangement
peculiar to oligarchies. The use of the word 8ioiKrjvis suggests that
this great officer did not add military functions to his civil ones
(see note on 1287 a 6). In c. 4. 1304 a 16 it is implied that
a plurality of magistrates existed at Epidamnus, at any rate at one
time. A difficulty arises in connexion with ?", 26, for this magistracy
is referred to in 3. 16. 1287 a 7 as actually existent, but too much
need not be made of this discrepancy, for the office may have
ceased to exist when the passage before us was written, n 1 omit
rfv, but little weight attaches to these MSS. when they omit small
words.
26. irarraxou yap 810, TO aviaov ) ardaris ou pty (ei) rots dcurois
UTrdpxi d^dXoyof (diSios yap (3aai\eia aiao-os, io-v TJ iv urois). I add
et before TOI? dtia-ots, and translate, for everywhere (i.e. both
where those who stir civil discord seek to overthrow the constitution
and where they stop short of this) civil discord arises on account
of inequality, not however if unequals receive in proportion to the
inequality subsisting between them (for a perpetual kingship [such
as that which Lysander sought to abolish] is unequal [only] if it
exists among equals). In other words, inequality of advantage
VOL. IV. U
290 NOTES.
does not give rise to civil discord if those to whom it falls deserve
the superiority of advantage which they enjoy. Compare 3. 9.
1280 a 12, KOI TO avicrov 8oKfl SiKaiov flvai, KOI yap (<TTLV, aXX" ov Traffic
dXXa rols dviaois, 3. 1 6. 1287 a io sqq., and Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 b
3, ov yap Vfp.fi TrXe op TOV anXcos dyadov airw, fl p.r] npos avTov avd\oy6v
fcrTiv. Aristotle has in his memory in the passage before us Plato,
Laws 757 A> T0 s 7"P dviauis TO. tcra aviffa ylyvoir av, fl p.fj Tvyxdvoi
TOV p.(Tpov 8ia yap dfJL(f)oTfpa TavTa crruo-fcoi al TroXiTflai TrXrjpovvTai.
Schneider (following Sepulveda, who has cum non in his transla
tion for oil p.r)i>, and Ramus, who has nisi ) reads ov /uij in place of
ov P.TJV, and is followed by Coray and Sus., but ov P.TJV can be retained
if we add el before TO IS dvio-ois. Welldon retains the reading of
the MSS. and takes dvd\oyov with TO IS dviaois, translating not
that inequality [in this sense] exists among people who are only
proportionately unequal/ but I cannot follow him in this. The
thought that inequality is the source of orao-tj is derived from Solon
(Plut. Solon, C. 14, <p(avf] TIS avTov Tr(pi<pfpvp.ei>T) npoTepov flnovTOS cos TO
luov TToXe/xoi/ ou iroie i : compare the proverb IO-OTIJS (piXorrjs in Eth.
Nic. 9. 8. u68b 8 and elsewhere, and Plato, Rep. 547 A, Laws
757 A).
29. can Se SiT-roy TO ICTOC. Aristotle here follows in the track of
Plato, Laws 757 A sqq., and Isocr. Areop. 21 sq. See Stallbaum
on Laws 757 B.
30. Xeyw 8e dpi0/ju3 jiiy TO 7r\i]0ei r\ fieycOei TOUTO Kal laov.
Cp. Plato, Laws 757 B, TTJV ^irp<f lo-r)i> Kal aradpqi Kal dpi6p.u>
31. KaT* d^iay Be TO TW Xoyu. That which is equal according to
desert is the proportionally equal, because in any just distribution
between A and B the share of A will be to the share of B as the
desert of A is to the desert of B. See note on 1301 a 26.
32. olov uirepe xei K.T.\. This is added not to prove that the
equal according to desert is the proportionally equal, for that it
does not do, but to illustrate by an example the difference between
the proportionally equal and the arithmetically equal. The excess
of four over two is proportionally equal to the excess of two over
one, but not arithmetically equal to it, for what is arithmetically equal
to the excess of two over one is the excess of three over two, not
that of four over two. The proportion in which two stands to four
is the same as that in which one stands to two, for two is the half
of four and one is the half of two.
7(5). 1. 1301 b 29 1302 a 4. 291
35. ofioXoyourre? 8e K.T.X., and though men agree that the
absolutely just is that which is in accordance with desert, they
differ etc. Cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 6. II3ia 25, TO yiip SIKQIOV cV rats
8iavofj.ais 6fj.okoyovffi Trdvres KO.T dtav TLVCL 8flv (ivai, TTJV fjLfvroi diav ov
TTJV avTTjv Xe yovcri Travrts VTrfip^etf, dXX 01 fj.tv 8r;p.oKpaTiKol fXfvdeptav, ol
8 o\iyap\iKol IT\OVTOV, ol 8 evyfvttav, ol 8* dpirTTOKpariKoi dpfTTjV. Yet
in 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 3 we read KOI yap TO 8i zioi> TO STJUOTIKOV TO "Lvov
f\ftv f(TT\ Kara dpidpbv dXXa fifj KOT diav (cp. 13183 3 Sqq.). See
note on 12883 22. For the contrast of opoXoye tv and 8ta0f peo-0<u
cp- 4 (?) 3- 1325 a l6 sq.
36. KaOtxirep e Xe xOr] Trporepoj , in 1301 a 26 sqq.
39. 810 Kal (idXicrra n/r.X., hence two constitutions especially
come into being, democracy and oligarchy, for [only constitutions
championed by a large number of supporters are likely to come
into being, and] while high birth and virtue are found in few, the
attributes on which democracy and oligarchy are based are found
in a larger number. These attributes are wealth and poverty.
Contrast the reasons given for the prevalence of democracy and
oligarchy in 6 (4). n. 12963 22 sqq. For Kal /*a\iora cp. Plato,
Phaedo 61 D and Laws 773 C, quoted by Riddell in his Digest of
Platonic Idioms, 133 (Plato, Apol. p. 169 sq.).
40. cuy^cia yap Kal dpeyr) iv 6X^015. Cp. Theogn. 149 sq.
2. euiropoi 8e iroXXaxou. We expect fVTropoi 8e Kal airopoi TroXXa^of , 1302 a
but Aristotle does not add Kal anopoi, because the fact is obvious.
TO 8e dirXws K.T.X. Cp. Plato, Laws 757 E, OVTU> of] xpTjcrre oi/
avayKaitas ptv rolv IO-OTTJTOIV dp,(po1v, u>s 8* o n fid^.io Ta eV oXiyi orois rf/
tTfpq, rfj Tys TI>XT)S ofOfj.(vr]. We need not perhaps supply TTJV TroXireiav
with Tfrdxdai: cp. c. 8. 1308 b 31 sqq. It follows that, if o-rdo-tr is
to be avoided, the constitution must not only secure the citizens
that which is equal, but must combine the two kinds of
equality. It has hitherto been implied that democracy no less
than oligarchy rests on a misconception of TO <ar diav lo-ov
(cp. 1301 a 25 sqq., b 35 sqq.), but now Aristotle implies that
it rests on arithmetical equality, not on equality according to
desert. Perhaps he regards its contention that those who are
equal in one thing are wholly equal as tantamount to a demand
for arithmetical equality.
4. ouSepu yap ju.cmp.os ^K roJv TOIOUTWI iroXireiwi , for of consti
tutions of the sort we have mentioned (i. e. constitutions based on
one of the two kinds of equality) none is durable. For the use
U 2
292 NOTES.
of (K here, see Kiihner, Ausfuhrl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, 414. 5 b,
Anm. 4 (ed. Gerth, 414. 5 b, Anm. 5). Compare also its use in
3. 3. 1276 a 1 6, Tar (< TTJS oXiyapxias *cat TTJS Tvpavvidos (npufis},
where, as in the passage before us, the simple genitive would have
sufficed.
5. TOUTOU 8 aiTioc K.r.X. Cp. c. 4. 1 303 b 28 sqq., and (with
Camerarius, Interp. p. 177 sq.) Soph. Fragrn. 747,
fpyov 8e TTO.VTOS rjv TIS ap^rjTai. Ka\u>s,
KOI TCIS Tf\(vras (IKOS faff OVTCOS fx fiv
(lines which are perhaps in Isocrates memory in De Pace 101,
105: cp., with Viet., Cic. Epist. ad Att. 10. 18. 2, ut male
posuimus initia, sic cetera sequentur) : also Eurip. Here. Fur.
1152 Bothe (1261 Dindorf),
OTUV df KprjTrls p.f] KaTaff\rj6jj ytvovs
opdcas, avdyKT) fiucrrv^eli/ TOVS tKyovovs,
and Demosth. Olynth. 2. 10. Camerarius adds Eurip. Fragm. 32,
KaKrjs OTT apxrjs yiverai Tt\os KUKOV,
and a line of Gregory of Nazianzus,
apxrjs Ka\T]s KU\\KTTOI> eifai KOI reXor.
In TO TTpuirov KOI TO eV cipxfj ^fMpnjfuvov (cp. Isocr. De Pace 101,
TO!S jrpuTois TUV ap.upTrjfj.dToav) the basing of the constitution exclu
sively on one kind of equality is referred to.
\ 8. Sfxws 8e K.T.X., but nevertheless, i. e. though both democracy
and oligarchy are unsafe, as resting on one kind of equality only.
It appears from_c. 6. 1305 b 2 sqq. that oligarchy is exposed to
a third sort of o-Tao-irlbesides the two mentioned here, when the
privileged class does not include all the rich to crao-tr arising
between the privileged and the excluded rich. The fact mentioned
in 12 sqq. that orao-is did not arise to any considerable extent
within the demos is remarkable, for the interests of the peasants
must often in ancient Greece, as in modern times, have been by no
means the same as those of the artisans and labourers of the city
(cp. Aristoph. Eccl. 431 sqq.). At Athens the trireme-oarsmen
gained by war (see note on 1291 b 18) and the peasant-proprietors
by peace. Did not a-rdms arise within the demos when one part of
it was of pure extraction and the other alien or semi-alien, or when
the demos was composed of persons differing in race ? drains will
also have arisen in democracies between rival demagogues and
their followers. The fact that democracy is safer than oligarchy
\ is differently accounted for in 6 (4). u. 1296 a 13 sqq.
7(5). 1. 1302 a 52. 1302 a 20. 293
11. KCU I, cp. Eth. Nic. 7. 12. 1152 b 21 (Bon. Ind. s.v. ?n).
12. -ri}v oXtyapxiai , the oligarchs, as in c. 6. 1305 a 39 sq.
13. en 8e K.T.X. Yet we are told in 8 (6). 6. 13205 22 sqq.
that the most moderate form of oligarchy is o-vveyyvs rrj Kc&ovufvrj
fl-oXiTfia. Are we to infer from the passage before us that the
constitution in which the midway class is supreme is based on
both kinds of equality?
14. eyYUTepcu. For eyyvrepm flvai cp. PlatO, Apol. Socr. 30 A,
fj.a\\ov 8e rols acrrots, otrtn p.ov e yyure pa> ecrre ytvfi, and Rep. 33^ -^>
Sxnrtp f}8r] eyyurepco a>v row ec.
15. TUC ToiouTui TToXiTeiwy, of the constitutions of the kind we
have mentioned. What constitutions are referred to ? Sepulveda
(p. 145 b) takes Aristotle to refer to the depravatae respublicae, seu
quae ab optimo statu reipublicae deflexerunt, Sus. 2 (Note 1508 b)
interprets the phrase in the same way, and it is not easy to see
what else it can mean, though we might have expected it to bear
the same meaning as in 5. Cp. Rhet. i. 4. 1360 a 23 sqq.
17. irepl TCIS iroXireias may go either with at /xra/3oXat (cp. C. 7- C. 2.
1307 b 24 sq.) or with yiyvovrm (cp. c. 4. 1304 b 17 sq.). Sus. and
Welldon perhaps rightly take the words with cu pfra0o\ai.
KctGoXou irpwroc, first generally in constitutions as a whole
(cp. c. 4. 1304 b 5 sqq., 17 sq., and c. 7. 1307 b 2 sq.), afterwards
in each constitution taken separately.
18. TO.S dpxas Kal rds airias auTwy. Cp. 34 sq., and see for the
phrase Bon. Ind. 112 a 49 sqq. t
eio-l ST) K.T.X. We gather from what follows that it is not
enough to cause a-rdcns and constitutional change that there should
be a sense of injustice in men s minds and advantages to be won ;
there must also be occasions calling that sense of injustice into
activity (1302 a 34 sqq.). Special stress is laid on these occasions
in Aristotle s theory of constitutional change, as we have it in the
Book before us, and if we study cc. 8 and 9, the chapters in which
the means of preserving constitutions are described, we shall see
that Aristotle s counsels are mainly directed to preventing the rise
of these occasions of evil. He perhaps rates rather too highly the
share of these occasions in causing constitutional change. __j
19. .9 SiopicTTeof Ka6 aurcis Tuirw irpuToy, which we must mark
out each by itself first of all in outline.
20. Set Y<*P XafBeii K.T.X. See vol. i. p. 523, note i, where it
has been already shown that a similar classification is employed in
294 NOTES.
the Rhetoric (i. 10. 1368 b 27): compare also Eth. Nic. 7. 4.
H46b 15 sqq.
21. Twy iroXiTiKwv Tapaxwy Kal T&V irpos aXX^Xoug ord o ewi . Ta>i
TToXtrtKwi Tapax&v, because there are such things as rapaxai between
members of the same family or between States (Thuc. 5. 25, Kal
ev6its aXXr; rapa;^ Kadiararo r<av vp.p.dx<ov Trpbs TTJV AflKeSat p.oi a). The
rapaxai here referred to are between citizens of the same State.
For the conjunction of rapaxai and o-rdo-fts, cp. Isocr. Philip. 107,
ot fjiev yap ev rats avT&v TroXf o~t crrd<T(is Kal rapa^ds /cat cr(payds fpnoiovvTes
SKTCOITO TTJV Tlp.T)V TOVTTJV, <LTld Diod. I 5 4^ I? jHfTO yap TJ]V CTUy^COp^-
Oeirrav rots STJ/HOIS avrovofjtiav at TroXets evtmtnov els rapa^as /xeydXas Kal
crrdo-ety. Tapa^?j implies strife, but not necessarily actual fighting ;
it is coupled with epty in Demosth. De Cor. c. 18, aXXd ns -fjv a<pnos
KOI Trapa TOVTOIS not napa rots aXXots airacnv e pis Kal rapa^ij. It is a more
general word than o-rdrrts : thus in Hdt. 4. 162 the recourse of
Arcesilaus of Cyrene to o-rdo-ts is an incident of the TroXXi) Tapax?)
nepl rS>v np-futv.
24. irepl ^s t]8ir) TiYX a ^ o | Jiei elp^Kores, in c. I. 1301 a 33 sqq.
and 1301 b 35 sqq.
28. TOUTUI , i. e. equality and inequality.
29. eXdrrous, smaller/ opposed to /ie/bvs : cp. Alex. Kv^p^r^s,
Fragm. i (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 434),
wCTTrep eVt TU>I> ftlatv 8e rovs ^ev 17 rv^r;
TJ/JLUV /LieydXots Trpo(reveip.e rous 8 eXdrrocru/.
31. ircpl wv 8e CTTaaid^oucrii K.T.X., in Other words ra re X; (c. IO.
1311 a 28). Thucydides had said much the same thing (3. 82. 16,
ndvrcav 8 avraiv alrtov dpx?) 17 8ta Tr\eov(iav Kal <pi\OTip.iav, which is
perhaps present to Aristotle s memory in Pol. 2. 9. 1271 a 16 sqq.:
Cp.Thuc. I. 76. 2, OVTCHS ovb r]fj.(is 6avp.aarbv ov$fi> TTfTTOirjKafJifV ovf? OTTO roO
dvdp<i>n(iov Tponov, t dpxTjv Tf 8t$ofi.ei>r]v e8fd/j.f6a, Kal Ta.vrr\v urj di>flp.fv
iino TU>V fj.tyicrT<i)i> viKrjde vrfs, Tip.rjs Kal dtovs Kal cLcpfXei as). PlatO also
implies in Rep. 464 D sq. that one of the causes of o-rdVis is
TO>V KTrj<ns. Phaleas had held (2. 7. 1266 a 38 sqq.) that
arises exclusively in connexion with property, and especially, it
would seem, landed property, for he meddled with nothing else
(2. 7. 1267 b 9 sqq.), and hence had gain or the avoidance of
loss as its object and had nothing to do with honour (2. 7. 1266 b
38 sqq.).
32. al yap aTip.iai> 4>euyon-6s K.T.X. So at Epidamnus (c. 4.
1304 a 13 sqq.) and at Heracleia and Thebes (c. 6. 1306 a
7(5). 2. 1302 a 2134. 295
36 sqq.). C. etiam Caesar dicebat se civile bellum movisse ut
ignominiam a se depelleret, quod quasi concedit M. Cicero, cum
Q. Ligarium defenderet (c. 6. 18), refellit autem ac falsum esse
docet in epistola quadam ad Atticum (7. n. i) his verbis, Atque
omnia se facere ait dignitatis causa, qui ne umbrarn quidem TOV
AcnAot) vidit unquam (Viet., who slightly alters the passage).
33. T) uirep aurwi r\ TUV cfuXcov. Cp. C. II. 1315 a 27 sq. The
preposition is not repeated before r<av fy&w : cp. c. 10. 1311 a 29,
b 25 sq., and 4 (7). n. 1330 b 31.
34. at 8 aiTicu ical dpxal r&v Kici^creuv K.r.X. Bonitz (Ind. 392 b
1 1 sqq.) appears to supply rfjs iroXireias with TU>V Kivrjo-ewv, and he may
well be right, for though Stahr and Sus. translate Bewegungen
( movements ), and Polybius uses KLvrja-is in this sense (3. 4. 12:
3. 5. i), I do not notice that Aristotle does so elsewhere. Viet,
explains T>V Kivrj<Tav motuum animi, but this can hardly be the
meaning of the word here. It is implied in 22 sqq. that a sense of
injustice is broadly the cause of the mental state which prompts to
revolution, but now we study the causes of revolution more in
detail, and the detailed study of them discloses that a sense of
injustice is not always present in the minds of those who aim at
constitutional change,, For men may be stirred to aim at constitu
tional change~by witnessing the deserved enjoyment by others of
a superior degree of profit or honour, or, in other words, under
circumstances which leave no room for a sense of injustice in their
^minctsT Nor do the circumstances under whTch~^coirtilulional
change is said to occur ir|_c. 3. 1303 a^3~25 Sjfem to be connected
with a sense of injustice. With the account here given of the causes
of o-rao-is and constitutional change compare the view of Ephorus
(ap. Strab. p. 480, Fragm. 64 in Miiller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. i. 249:
cp. Cic. Pro Rose. Amerin. 27.75), who holds that Si^oo-rao-ia arises
8ta n\(oveiav KOI rpvfprjv, which cause (frdovos vfipts and fJiia-os, SO that
the best means the lawgiver has of preventing di^oo-rao-ia is to compel
the citizens to lead a temperate and frugal life. The Cynic Crates
seems to have taken a similar view (Plut. De tuenda sanitate
praecepta, c. 7 : see Wyttenbach s note on 125 E), but Aristotle
agrees with Ephorus only in part ; he holds, indeed, that (fidovos
and vftpis are potent causes of orao-i?, but he does not think that
the prevention of luxurious living will do much to prevent it, nor
would he say that (pdovos vffpis and plaos are its only causes : it may
arise, for instance, when none of these things are present, but only
296 NOTES.
vnepoxfj or nv^rjais Trapa TO avdXoyov. It should be noticed that of
the seven causes enumerated by Aristotle the first four affect those
who are depressed in the political scale and the three others those
who are exalted. Revolution as often proceeds from those who
wax fat as from those who are in the opposite case. The order
in which the causes are enumerated here (vfipis, (/>o/3o?, {me poxy,
K(iTa(j)p6vr](ris K.r.A.) agrees with the order in which the causes of
attacks on monarchies are enumerated in c. 10. 1311 a 311312 a
39 (v/3p, (popes, KaTcKfipovrjais, (pi\uTifj.ia). The list of causes of
(rrda-is and constitutional change here given seems incomplete.
Other causes besides the seven or eleven here mentioned appear
to disclose themselves when Aristotle proceeds in cc. 5-7 to deal
with each constitution separately. The overthrow of oligarchies,
for instance, by the demagogy of some of the oligarchs (c. 6. 1305 b
22 sqq.) or by spendthrift and ruined oligarchs (c. 6. i3O5b 39
f sqq.) cannot easily be brought under any of the eleven heads.
37. eon 8 ws irXeious, i. e. if we count in the four additional
causes mentioned in 1302 b 3 sqq. Nam septem sunt quae magis
per se iram et seditionem moverit, alia vero, ut negligentia . . . ,
magis ex accidenti (Sepulveda).
&v 8u o jjieV K.T.X. Me v is here displaced, as occasionally elsewhere
(see notes on 1259 b 15 and 1268 b 12) ; it qualifies ravrd. Supply
rnvrd with oxruurco? : see note on i257b 35.
38. Sid. Ke pSos vP K0 * ^> 1 ^ Tijifji K.T.X. Cp. 2. 7. 1266 b 38 sqq.
and 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 30 sq.
40. TrpoTcpoc, in 31 sqq.
1302 b. 2. en 8ia uftpw, sc. irapofcvvovrat Trpos aXXijXovj.
3. ?TI 8e aXXok Tpoirov K.T.X. Here again we must supply Trapogv-
vovrai, npbs d\\rj\iivs. Hence it would seem that the four causes now
named by Aristotle may produce ordo-ts, though we learn in 1303 a
13 sqq. that they do not always do so. I do not agree with Viet.,
therefore, when he explains aXXov rponov alio pacto, id est sine
dissensionibus et armis (he is followed in this by Giph., p. 539) :
Aristotle s meaning seems rather to be that we have now to do
with causes of a more remote kind and acting less directly, due to
the action or default of the authorities of the State (see Sepulveda,
quoted above on 1302 a 37).
5. Si dyop,oi6TY}Ta. This cause is dealt with in 1303 a 25 sqq.
Compare OeCOn. I. 4. 1344 a l8, at yap di/o^otOTr/Tfs T<OV rjdtav fJKKTTa
<t>i\iK6i>. Democritus had long before said that his atoms were in
7(5). 2. 1302 a 373. 1302 b 12. 297
a state of ordo-ts because of their unlikeness (Aristot. Fragm. 202.
1514 b I 8, (TTaaid^fiv 8e KU\ (pfpeadai ei> TW Kevca 8td re TTJV dvofjLoiorrjTa
KOI Tay nXXas TOS flprjfjifvas 8ia(popds), and Plato (Rep. 547 A), speaking
of dvofjLoioTrjs Kal dv<ap.d\ia dvdpnocrros, Says, a yevopcva, ov av f yyevrjTat,
dft TlKTl 7l6\ffJLOV KOI H^GpClV.
6. irws curia, SC. oTao-ewr, cp. II. C. 3.
uJBpi^orruK re yap K.T.X. Cp. c. 8. I3o8b 31 sqq. The subject
of orao-idfowi is the citizens. Aristotle probably has before him
Theogn. 43-52. "Y@pis and 7rXeoi>eia are often mentioned in con
junction (c. 7. 1 307 a 20: Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 94 : Polyb. i. 81. 10).
A8iKia is said to be the offspring of vftpis in Plato, Laws 691 C (cp.
713 C, v@pf<i>s Tf Koi dBiKtas, and 775 D). It was by the vftpis and
n\fovfgia of the leading men of Agrigentum that Empedocles was
roused to action (Plut. Adv. Colot. C. 32, E/wrfSoKX^s 8e rovs Tf rrpu>-
TOVS T&V TToXtToi)!/ vppi^ovTas KOI 8ia<popovi>Tas TO. Koivci (^(Key^as K.T.X. :
Diog. Laert. 8. 64). Cp. also Solon, Fragm. 4. 37,
evdvvti 8f 8 iKas cricdXids VTTtprjfpavd T fpya
TrpaviHt,
and Ad. IIoX. C. 5 sub fin., not. ev dpxfj rrjs e\eyeins de&oiicevai (prjo-lv
(6 SoXcoc)
rr\v Tf (p[t\apyvp~^Lav TTJV ff vnfpr)<paviav,
wj did ravTa TTJS exQpas fvfcrT&^cryjs. As to rStv fi> rals dp%uis, See
note on 1303 b 22.
9. TJ 8e irXcoi/e^ia yiv^ron, ore fj.ei diro -r&v iSiuc, ore 8e diro TWI/
K.OLVUV. Depredations by magistrates on public property were
probably more frequent than on private we hear of them at
Apollonia on the Euxine in c. 6. 1306 a 7, and Aristotle makes
special provision against them in c. 8. 1308 b 31 sqq. but depreda
tions by magistrates in oligarchies on the property of the many
seem to be referred to in 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 19 sq.
11. Kal y^P ttUTOi dnp.a^op.ei Oi KCU aXXous opwrres TifiwjuieVous
0Tao-idouo-ir. Aristotle remembers the case of Lysander (see c. 7.
1 306 b 3 1 sqq.). Compare also the conspiracy of wealthy Athenians
just before the battle of Plataea (Plut. Aristid. c. 13, av8ps e oi*&&gt;i/
(TTicpavfav KU\ xprnidruiv p.tyah.a>v TifvrjTfs vno TOV TioXefj.ov ytyovortv Kai
irdcrav apa TO> TrXovro) TIJI/ iv rfj 7roX 8vvci(jiiv avra>v not 86j-av ol^ofj.fvr]i>
6pa>vT(Sj (Ttpiav rip.u>p.vu>v Kai dpxovrtov, . . . avva>p.6cravTo KaraXvcrdv TOV
12. raora 8e K.T.\. Tavra, this honouring and dishonouring.
There is perhaps here a reminiscence of Hippias of Elis, Fragm. 13
298 NOTES.
(Miiller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 2. 62), iTTTna? Xe yfi Suo fivai (p66vovs, TOV
flfV SlKdlOV, OTCIV TLS Tolt KdKolf (p0Ovf) Tlp.GL>p.fVOlS, TOV 8f d8lKOV, OTdV TO(S
dyadols. For Kara TTJV diav, not (car d^iw, cp. 8 (6). 6. 1321 a 2 Sq.
15. 81 UTrepoxTjC 8e K.T.X., SC. OTa<rtbi;o-tJ . We read of the im-epo^r)
of Themistocles at Athens in Diod. n. 54. 5 (cp. Demosth. c.
AristOCl". C. 205, fKflvoi Q(p.HTTOK\fd Xa/3(Wfy fulfav avTcov dt-iovvra
(ppovelv fr)\a(rav ex rrjs TroXewy KOI p.rjdiarp.oj> KUTtyvaxrav) , we read also
of Theron before he became tyrant of Agrigentum in Diod. 10.
27. 3, OTI Qrjpav o A.Kpayui>T4VOS ytvfi KOI TrXouTco KOI rfj npos TO TrXr^oy
(j)i\av6panria TTO\V Trpoei^fv ov fjiovov TWV noKiTutv, aXXa K.CLI Trdincav Tcav
StfceXtwTwj/. Compare Eurip. Phoeniss. 650 Bothe (703 Dindorf ),
fjKovcra fjifl^ov avrov r] Gij/Sas <f)pov(iv,
Krj8ei r* ASpaorov KOI arpaTU TTfTrotdora,
Justin, 21. 4. i, opes suas, quibus vires reipublicae superabat, and
Aeschin. C. Ctes. C. 235, oi fUfunfO ff 6Vt ovdtls nunrore etrtdero
TTportpov ftrjfjiov KctTcuiva-fi, np\v ai> p.dov TU>V 8iKa(TTTjpia>v la-^varj ;
Mfi^cov 77 Kara TTJV TToXll* Kiii TI]I> 8vvap.iv TOV TroXireu/xaroy, great OUt of
proportion to the State and to the power of its supreme authority.
It appears, however, from c. 6. 1305 b 39 sqq. that not only over-
powerful men but also men of ruined fortunes sought to make
themselves tyrants.
17. fJiocapxia rj Suraareia. The former, if this superiority of
power is possessed by one man ; the latter, if by more than one.
Cp. c. 6. 1306 a 22 sqq. and Plato, Gorg. 492 B, dpx^v Tiva TJ -rvpawiSa
fi SvvacTTfiav. For povapxia, which is here apparently =rvpawis, cp.
c. 10. isisa 4.
18. 816 et iaxou x.T.X. See note on 1284 a 17. The ostracism
seems to have been not unknown to the laws even of the oligarchy
of Berne. If the influence of a citizen had increased so much,
owing to benefits conferred by him on the people, that in the
opinion of the Council or a majority of the Council it threatened
to be injurious to the State, he was to absent himself from the city
for five years and to pay a fine of ten pounds. An ostracism, in
fact, in optima forma (Geiser, Gesch. der bernischen Verfassung
von 1191-1471, p. 31).
19. KaiToi PE XTIOI K.r.X. Compare the saying of Pittacus quoted
in the note on 1308 a 33. For TOO-OVTOV vntpfxovTfs (not ot TOO-OVTOV
fnrepfX OVTts ) see Kiihner, Ausfiihrl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, 462. 1.
21. 01 T T|8lKT](COTS, SeStOTCS fi$) SoKTl SlKT)^. Cp. Ck. prO SeSt. 46.
99, etenim in tanto civium numero magna multitude est eorum qui
7(5). 3. 1302 b 1523. 299
aut propter metum poenae peccatorum suorum conscii novos motus
conversionesque reipublicae quaerant, aut etc. To this category
belong the five wealthy men brought to trial at Corcyra (Thuc. 3.
70. 5 sqq.), Hanno at Carthage in his alleged second attempt to
make himself tyrant (Justin, 21.4. 6), and the friends of Catiline
at Rome (Sallust, De Coniur. Catil. c. 14, referred to by Giph.).
Hence too the support given to the designs of Peisistratus by
persons who claimed to be citizens of Athens without being of pure
Athenian extraction ( Ad. lioA. c. 13. 1. 22 sqq.), and, if we could
trust Ad. IloX. c. 25. 1. ii sqq., the intrigue of Themistocles against
the Council of the Areopagus.
22. Kal ol fieXXon-es dStKcicrOai K.T.\. For an instance of this at
Argos see Diod. 15. 58. i. We see from c. 5. 1305 a 5 sqq. that
a period during which the rich were plied with calumnious accusa
tions often preceded that in which actual wrong was done to them,
and no doubt they frequently took up arms during the period in
which there was only a menace of future wrong. Eadem causa
et Caesarem concitavit et impulit, metuentem ne dimisso exercitu
privatus, Romam et domum reversus, a potentissimis inimicis
opprimeretur (Giph.). But Caesar had more genuine reasons than
this for the course which he took.
23. ev PoSw. Cp. 32 sq. and c. 5. 1304 b 27 sqq. The three
passages probably refer to the same combination of the notables
against the demos, though it would seem from i3O4b 2 7 sqq. that
the notables were driven to combine not by the dread of wrong,
but by actual experience of wrong, the action of the demagogues
being such as to expose them to the lawsuits briefly referred to in
the passage before us, and it would also seem from 1302 b 32 sq.
that they were encouraged to combine by a feeling of contempt for
the disorderliness of the democracy. Susemihl is probably right in
taking the revolution of B.C. 390 to be referred to, though Schafer
(Demosthenes, i. 427), followed by Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 175),
believes Aristotle to refer to the substitution of an oligarchy for
a democracy in B.C. 357 (Demosth. De Rhod. Libert, cc. 14, 19),
when Rhodes revolted from Athens at the commencement of the
Social War. We find, in fact, that Diodorus in describing the
revolution of B.C. 390 uses the same expression as Aristotle does
in 33, where he speaks of 17 (iravdaravts (Diod. 14. 97, ol Xa/cowfoi/res
rS>v PoSieur fnavacrravres rw 817/^0) rovs ra rwi> AQrjvnLatv fypovovvras fj-t-
TTJS TroXews). It is true that, as Susemihl points out (Sus. 2 ,
3 oo NOTES.
Note 1511), Xenophon (Hell. 4. 8. 20-24) represents this revolution
as effected not by the Laconizing party at Rhodes, as does Diodorus.
but by an intervention of the Spartan Teleutias at the head of
a fleet after the failure and exile of the Rhodians who were opposed
to the democracy ; this, however, only shows that Aristotle s version
of the transaction agrees with that of the authority followed by
Diodorus, and not with that of Xenophon.
25. KCU oraond^oucn, KCU emTiOeirai. The two words are con
joined in 2. 7. 1267 a. 41 a l so T orao-iafeii/ does not necessarily
involve TO fTnritieaQai (see note on 1301 a 39).
26. tv re TCUS oXiyapxicu?, OTO.V irXeious (Scric ol firj jieTexorres rrjs
TToXn-etas. We might infer from 6 (4). 5. 1292 a 39 sqq., where we
are told that even in the first and most moderate form of oligarchy
the poor, though more numerous than the rich, do not share in the
offices, that in all forms of oligarchy those who do not share in
the constitution are more numerous than those who do, but it is
implied in 3. 8. 1280 a i sqq. that there were oligarchies in which
this was not the case.
28. KaTd<|>poi>rjo-akTes, as in c. 7. 1307 b 9 (cp. c. n. 1314 b 32,
BavpdcraHTiv). We have KarcxfrfiovoiJVTes in c. io. 1312 a io, 15 sq.,
and KdTa<ppov5>i> in 1312 a 12.
TTJS dramas. Some light is thrown on what is meant by this
WOrd by Plut. QuaeSt. Gr. C. 59, ol pev uvv Mryapfls fit dragiav TTJS
TroXiTfi aj }ffU\ij(rca> TOV uStKi^aro?.
29. cloy KCU iv 0i]j3ais p-erd Tr\v iv OlkO(j)UTOis fid)(T]v KCIKUS
TToXiTeuofie cwi r) SirjfioKpaTta 8ie<}>0dpif). The wording of this passage
is ambiguous, and we cannot be sure that we are right in inferring
from it that the democracy the existence of which at Thebes after
the battle of Oenophyta it clearly implies dated from that battle,
and did not exist before it, for Aristotle may only mean that the
maladministration of the democracy began then, but it is likely
enough that this was the case. Nor do we learn from the passage
when the democracy was overthrown, but its fall probably did not
occur till after the Athenian defeat at Coroneia (Thuc. i. 113). The
course of events in Boeotia after the battle of Oenophyta is disputed
and obscure. Busolt s view on the subject, whether it is correct or
not, may be gathered from Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 3. i. 320. 3. He
places the battle of Oenophyta in B.C. 457 (ed. 2, 3. i. 258. i) and
that of Coroneia in B.C. 447 (ibid. p. 422. i).
30. Kal T) MtyapeW Si ara^iav KOI dcapxiav TjrnjGe rrwi . Supply
7 (5). 3. 1302 b 2534. 301
8rj/j,OKpnTia 8it<pddpr]. Cp. Plut. QliaCSt. Gr. C. 59, " irofffv ev Mtydpois
yevos ufjLaoKv\io-Tti>v ; eVi rfjs aKoXdarov 8r]/jLOKpaTias, f] KOI TfjvnaXivToKiav
fircLrjcrf al TTJV tfpn(7vXtaf, eVopeuero dfeapla He\oirovvr]<T Icav tls f\(poi>s
8ia -njs MfyapiKTJs. This facopia was maltreated by certain Megarians,
and then the narrative proceeds, of p.tv ovv Meyapels 81 drugiav TTJS
Tro\iTfias r]pf\r)(rav rov d8iKi]p.aros K.T.\. It Seems likely that r\TTr]QivTu>v
in the passage before us refers to the victory won by the returning
oligarchical exiles over the commons of Megara (see note on
1 300 a 17), but this is not absolutely certain. As Richards points
out, f)TTrj6(VT(av may refer, as in 1303 a 4, to a victory won over the
Megarians by a foreign foe.
31. KCU f lupaKOuVcus irpo Tt]S r^Xupos TUporyiSos, Kal lv PoSu 6
ST](JIOS irpo TT]S eTraraaTcio-eajs. It is not certain what should be
supplied after ev Svpaxova-ais and after 6 8^oy, but I incline to think
that we should supply in the former place the democracy aroused
contempt by disorderliness and in the latter aroused contempt in
a similar way. I take 6 8rj^os here to mean the commons, not
the democracy ; it was against the commons that the insurrection
of the notables was directed (see Diod. 14. 97, quoted above on
23). Some supply f/ ftrjuoKparia 8if(f)6dpTi after ev SvpaKovrrais and
8if>6dpr] after 6 8^os, but I cannot think that this is right, for the
democracy was overthrown at Syracuse by, and not before, the advent
of Gelon as tyrant, and at Rhodes by, and not before, the insurrection
against it. As to Syracuse, see Freeman, Sicily, 2. 126, and Busolt,
Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 785. The demos of Syracuse had recently put
an end to the oligarchy of the Gamori and expelled them from the
city with the help of the serfs who tilled the soil of the State. Both
demos and serfs were probably to a large extent of Sicel origin,
and it is likely enough that a demos of this kind, intoxicated by its
triumph, would be disorderly and undisciplined. As to Rhodes see
above on 23.
34. uJairep yap o-wfia K.r.X. Bonitz (Ind. 122 b 17) compares
De Gen. An. 4. 3. 768 b 27, 17; p.tv yap Kparovv (sc. TO TreTro/^fi oi ) rfj
8f ov Kparovv noiti Tro\v^op(pov TO avvKrrd/jifvov, oiov cVJ TO>I> dd\rjTu>v
(Tu/j/Sn/i/fi 8ta rf]i> iro\v(payitw 8ia rrX^oj -yap TpfXprjs ov 8vvap.fvris Trjs
<pvcrf(0s KpciTtlv, Star dva\oyov av^fiv KOI ttUftlfttf opoiav rf)v p.op<pr)v,
aXXota yivtrat ra p.(prj, KU\ o-^eSoi* evioff OKTCOJ toorf prfifv toiKtvai TQJ
irpoTfpvv. irapaTr\7)(Tiov 8e TOWTW Km TO v6<rrjpa. TO Ka\ovp.fvov o-aTvpiav
KCU yap (v TOVT& 8ia ptvp.aTos TJ nv(vp.aros dnenTOv ir\fjdos, (Is fiopia rov
Trape/iTreaofTos, [TOV C"? ^ Ka crarupov (puivtTai TO
302 NOTES.
and De Gen. et Corr. 1.5.321528 sqq. Compare also Dio Chrys.
Or. 17. 47oR. In the passage before us we must supply TO o-w/^a
before avave<r6ai (35), with (pdfipfrai (36), and with /*era/3dAXoi (38)
and avgdvoiro (39). We gather from what Aristotle says that a whole
consisting of parts, for instance a body or a State, must grow in such
a way as to preserve a certain proportion or symmetry between its
parts, otherwise it will be destroyed and may even change into
a wholly different entity. I am not aware that Aristotle anywhere
formulates this doctrine as clearly as he does here, but we trace
some approach to it in Phys. i. 5. i88b 12 sqq., where he tells us
that TO fippoa-ftfvov (pfffiperai ds dvapiKXTriav, and in Fragm. 4i.i482a6
(compared by BoilitZ, Ind. 744 & 45)) r fl O-p^ovLa rov cnapaTos tvavriov
farlv T) dvapnoaTia ruv cra>//aror, dvap/j.o<TTia 8f rov e/n^v^ou crto/zaTos vocros
Km dffdtvfia KOI mo^or. An overgreat increase of a part, indeed, is
fatal to the identity not only of the whole of which it is a part, but
also of the part itself (c. 9. 1309 b 27 sqq.).
38. eyioTc Be K.T.\. This would happen if, for instance, the
human foot not only grew to be out of proportion to the body in
size, but also underwent a disproportionate qualitative increase, e.g.
in hardness, so that flesh and muscle stiffened into horn, and the
foot became a hoof. Changes not unlike this were thought to
occur in certain diseases, such as satyriasis (see above on 34),
leontiasis, and elephantiasis, which were held to cause the human
form to approach that of the satyr, the lion, or the elephant. See
a paper by F. E. Hoggan, M.D., on the Leper Terra-Cotta of
Athens in the Journal of Hellenic Studies, 13. 101, where the
leonine aspect characteristic of leprosy is mentioned.
40. OUTU KCU iroXis K.T.X. Aristotle does not directly tell us
anywhere how he proposes to prevent the disproportionate increase
of a part of the State, but we can see from passages like c. 8.
1309 a 20-26 and 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 29~b 16 how he would combat
an increase of the poor. The measures suggested in c. 8. 1309 a
20-26 would also serve to some extent to prevent a disproportionate
increase in the numbers of the rich.
1303 a. 1. olov TO TWV diropwc ir\T]0os iv TCUS SrjfioicpaTiais KCU iroXireiais.
That a too great excess of poor is fatal to democracies, we have
seen in 6 (4). u. 1296 a i6sqq. But why are democracies and
polities mentioned alone? That the numbers of the poor may
increase in oligarchies, we see, if we needed to be told it, from
c. 12. 1316 b 10 sqq. But Aristotle would probably say that in
7(5). 3. 1302 b 38 1303 a 6. 303
oligarchies the poor are not a part of the State (6 (4). 5. 1292 a
39 sqq.), and that in them an increase of the poor would not be an
increase of a part of the State. As to the use in the Seventh (old
Fifth) Book of the term parts of the State see vol. i. p. 567. The
change to which Aristotle refers may have occurred in recent times
among ourselves, for I read in the Times, April 7, 1899, that what
is certain is that the wage-earning class [in Great Britain] has
greatly added to its numbers probably out of all proportion to the
increase in other classes of the community during the past thirty
years/
3. o-ufj.paii ci 8 Iviore TOUTO KCU 8td ru xas, and this (i.e. a change
of constitution arising from the disproportionate increase of a part
of the State) happens occasionally by reason of accidents also/ as
well as in consequence of insensible or unnoticed growth. The rv^ai.
referred to would not escape notice : cp. c. 6. 1306 b 14 sqq. The
Athenian Stranger in Laws 708 E is tempted to say as ovStis nore
dvdpanraiv ovbev vo/jLodeTfl, rv\ai. 8e ical {-vp.(j)opa.l travrolai TrinTovcrai morrouos
vofjiodfTovai TO irdvra TH^IV*
olov ly Tdparri K.T.X. HrrriQevratv, SC. TCOV Tapavriva>v (cp. 8, drv-
Xovvrav iref], SC. r<av A&ji/atW). As to the meaning of ra>v MqStKtoi
see note on 1341 a 28. This great defeat is placed by Diod. n. 52
in B.C. 473 : see also Hdt. 7. 170 and Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2.
805 sq. Ut contigit post Sembachiam cladem, qua Helvetiorum
qui monies accolunt nobilitas paene tota occubuit; ceteri ferre
liberum exilium quam plebis direptionibus et contumeliis patere
maluerunt (Bodinus, De Republica, p. 235).
6. Kal t.v "Apyei K.T.X., and at Argos, those [who perished] on
the seventh day of the month having been put to death by Cleomenes
the Laconian, they were compelled to receive into the citizen-body
some of the serfs/ That ol ev rrj c/38d/i# most probably means those
who perished on the seventh day of the month appears from Plut.
De Mulierum Virtutibus, c. 4, where we read as to the victory of
Cleomenes, T^V 5e ^.d^jv /"" tfiSop-fl Ae youow iaTap.fvov IJ.TJVOS, ol Se
vovprfviq ytvtffSai K.T.X. The first and seventh days of the month
were sacred at Athens to Apollo (see C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 2.
44. 5), and probably at other places also, and there was evidently
a tradition at Argos that the battle occurred on a day sacred to
Apollo, though some thought that it occurred on the first and others
(with whom Aristotle agrees) on the seventh. For ev TTJ e/SSd/iij cp.
Lucian, Pseudolog. C. l6, 6 8e (f&oprjv (SC. rtva dirty), OTI, &ajrfp ol
304 NOTES.
TralSfy eV rair fj3$6fJ.ais, Kami/o? fv rats fKK\rj(riais ?7raie Km Siiyfha Km
TTctiftiav (rroiflro rf]i> o"irov8r)i> TOV S^/zov. The first and seventh days
of the month were days on which Apollo was specially honoured
at Sparta (Hdt. 6. 57), and the victory was no doubt attributed to
aid rendered by Apollo, which would evoke all the more gratitude
in the minds of the Spartans because Apollo was also one of the
chief gods of Argos (Paus. 2. 19. 3 : 2. 24. i). Apollo was
believed to have been born on the seventh of the month (Preller,
Gr. Mythologie, i. 187) and was therefore called f^o^ay^s (Plut.
Sympos. 8. i. 2), and it was remembered of Plato and Carneades
that they were born, like Apollo, on the seventh (Plut. ibid.). See
as to the seventh day of the month Leutsch and Schneidewin,
Paroem. Gr. 2. 410 (59 h). Viet, remarks, est autem obscurum
quid hie valeat illud auctoris TWV / TJJ e/SScyi?? : a diversis sane inter-
pretibus longe aliter acceptum est, cum quidam ipsorum putarint
tempus ostendere, et ipsum infaustum, alii vero locum. Ego facile
crederem ordinem quendam certum in ea republica significare/
Welldon accordingly translates the members of the seventh order/
It is conceivable that ^uXi? or some such word should be supplied,
and not ^epa, for we read cV rnva> fp86p.a> in an inscription of
Tenos, a city divided into TOWH (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 207. 2),
but on the whole I prefer to supply rj^pa, at any rate till we are
in possession of some fresh data on the subject. Cleomenes is
distinguished as 6 Aa/cwc because there were other well known
persons of the name, for instance the nomarch of the Arabian nome
of Egypt under Alexander. la>v irfpio iKwv rivds, some of the serfs,
for this is the sense in which the word treploiKoi seems always to be
used by Aristotle. Herodotus speaks of them as 8ov\ot (6. S^,"Apyos
8e dvopoiv f^Tjputdr] ovrco, wore 01 SoiJXoi avreatv tcr^ov Itdvra TO. Trpiyy/xara,
apxoiT(s re Km bifirovrts es o firrjftrjcrav ol ra>v urro\ofi*vwv TratSfj). It
would seem that the serfs admitted to citizenship became the masters
of the State. Plutarch, indeed (De Mul. Virt. c. 4), claims that the
persons admitted to citizenship were not slaves, but Perioeci, using
the word apparently in the sense in which we use it of the Lacedae
monian Perioeci, and it is of Perioeci of this kind that Gilbert
(Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 75. 2) and Sus. 2 (Note 1518) understand Aristotle
to speak, but the word does not appear to be used in this sense by
Aristotle.
8. Kdl ec A0T^ais K.T.X., and at Athens owing to reverses by
land the upper class came to be less numerous than before, because
7 (5). 3. 1303 a 810. 305
during the Laconian War service in the army fell on citizens taken
from the service-list [and not on mercenaries]. In Aristotle s day
the citizens were apt to leave service in the hoplite force to
mercenaries (Demosth. Olynth. 3. 30). KardXoyoi were kept at
Athens of citizens who served in the cavalry ( A$. lloX. c. 49.
1. 8 sqq. with Sandys note), of citizens liable to serve as hoplites
(including only the three higher property-classes, and not the Thetes,
Thuc. 6. 43), and apparently also of trireme-oarsmen (Demosth.
Or. 50. in Polycl. cc. 6, 16). It is to the two former lists, and
especially to the second of them, that Aristotle here refers. This
list included all Athenian citizens from eighteen to sixty years of
age belonging to the three higher property-classes, except presuma
bly those who rendered cavalry service (see Gilbert, Constitutional
Antiquities of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 315). A similar
catalogue of of tv f]\iKia seems to have been kept at Syracuse (Plut.
Nic. c. 14): as to the cities of Boeotia see Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt.
2. 58 sq. The phrase < KaraXdyov aTparevfcrdai. occurs in Xen.
Mem. 3. 4. I, and we read in A#. IIoX. C. 26, rrjs yap a-rpareias yiyvo-
p.fvr)s tv TO LS Tore xpovou fK KaraXdyou. In the last-named passage
a diminution in the number of of eVictcce!? KM rot) fi^ou KOI TU>V fvn6pa>v
is said to have occurred in the time of Cimon owing to urpartii-
effdai, e< KaraXoyov, whereas in the passage before us Aristotle speaks
of the yvupifi.01 becoming fewer from the same cause during the
Peloponnesian War. Isocrates in De Pace, 86 sqq. traces losses
extending over the whole period of the first Athenian Empire end
ing in the dieappearance of many ancient families at Athens ( 88 :
cp. Diod. 13. 97. i). That the rich became fewer at Athens towards
the close of the Peloponnesian War is evident from the fact that
the task of equipping a trireme was then for the first time allowed
to be divided between two trierarchs (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta
and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 370). The Choregia for tragedy and
comedy was also then allowed to be divided between two citizens
(Schol. Aristoph. Ran. 404 : Gilbert, ibid. p. 359). Aristotle does
not say that a change of constitution resulted at Athens, but he may
have thought that the constitution became more democratic in con
sequence of these losses.
10. UTTO TQ\> AcucwviKoy iroXe/iOf. For vno Eucken (Praeposi-
tionen, p. 74) compares c. 7. I3o6b 38. For rbv Aa/eowKoi/ TroXtpov
in the sense of the Peloponnesian War, cp. c. 4. 1 304 b 1 4, TUV
iroXffjLOv TOV npos .\aKfdui[i.oi>ivvs. Cp. also Diod. 15. 25. I, V1 8e
VOL. IV. X
306 NOTES.
Tovratv 6 ieXr)d(\s BOUOTIKOS jroXe/iof W<rnj AaKf^atpovlois irpbs BOICOTOIT Bta
Toiavras curias. In PauS. 8. 48. 4 6 AOKWIKOS TroXf/ioy is Used of an
early war between Tegea and the Lacedaemonians in the days of
King Charillus or Charilaus.
11. TOUTO, i. e. a change of constitution arising from the dispro
portionate increase of a part of the State, as in 3.
irXewWf yip K.T.\. This explains why not a few democrats
thought that the best means of preserving a democracy was to
oppress and plunder the rich ([Xen.j Rep. Ath. i. 4, 14). That
when the rich increased in wealth without increasing in numbers
a 8wna~r(ia often resulted is what we should expect from 6 (4). 6.
1293 a 30 sqq.
13. Suyaoretas. After this word Sus. would insert 1304 a 17,
/ra/3aXXovo-i. fie ... b 5, npbs TTO\\OVS, but this change of order involves
the insertion of a passage dealing with the e &v al ^mi/3oXai, which
is the subject treated in 1303 b 17-1304 b 5, in the midst of
a passage dealing with the 81 & al nerafioXai, the subject treated in
1302 a 371303 b 17, for K TOV tv8oKifi.rj<rai,, 1304 a 1 8, takes up
the (K of 1303 b 18, 21, 37, 1304 a 4, 10, 14. Besides, the passage
1304 a I7~b5 must not be severed from what immediately pre
cedes it in 1303 b 17-1304 a 17, for it stands in contrast to this,
a transition being made from revolutions occasioned by insult
to revolutions occasioned by a rise in reputation and greatness (see
note on 1304 a 17).
ficrap<lXXoo(Ti 8 at iroXireiat xai ayeu ordo ews K.T.X., and con
stitutions change even without civil discord, etc. See note on
i3O2b 3. Another way in which constitutions changed without
civil discord was through a change in the value of the property-
qualification (c. 6. 1306 b 6 sqq.: c. 8. 1308 a 35 sqq.). This is
not mentioned here.
14. rcis epiOeias. EpiOeia ( canvassing for office ) occurs in the
sing, in c. 2. 1302 b 4, but both it and Ipi6tve<r6ai (16) are very rare
words.
worrep iv Hpaia. Heraea appears to have been under an
oligarchy when this change was introduced (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt.
2. 130). The lot is spoken of as an antidote to oraW in Rhet. ad
Alex. c. 3. 1424 a 12 sqq. Compare the reason for which the lot
was introduced in 1268 at Venice in the election of the Doge (De
La Houssaye, Histoire du Gouvernement de Venise, i. 15 : Yriarte,
Patricien de Venise, pp. 340 sqq., 345), and also that for which the
7(5). 3. 1303 a 1118. 307
practice of imborsazione was introduced at Florence. The names
of all who were to hold any of the magistracies for a long time
to come were put into a bag or purse and drawn out from time to
time when an office had to be filled. It was thought that these
" indorsations" would prevent much trouble to the city and remove
the cause of those tumults which took place on the creation of
magistrates from the number of candidates for office (Machiavelli,
History of Florence, Book ii, c. 6 : Eng. Trans., p. 81). The lot
was introduced at Basle in 1 7 1 8 to prevent election intrigues. The
only exception made was in the case of the Burgomaster and of
envoys (Roscher, Politik, p. 369, note 13). See note on 1305 a 28
as to the risks attending the filling of offices by popular election.
15. iifoii\<rav, sc. Tar apxds, which is suppressed because it will
readily be supplied (see note on 12 96 a 5). It is hardly likely,
however, that all the offices, the military ones not excepted, came
to be filled by lot. Still Aristotle seems to imply that the change
amounted to a modification of the constitution in a democratic
direction.
16. ical 81 oXiyuptaf K.T.\. Hence the advice given in c. 9.
i3O9a33sqq. That a magistrate had special opportunities of
overthrowing a constitution we see from Plato, Laws 715 A, irapa-
(pv\a.TTOVT(s fie dXXJjXovy fwcrti/, oirats p-fj irore ns (Is apxyv d(piKop,(i>os
iiravcuTTT) pfp.vrjp.evos ratv tp.npoa6(v ytyovoratv Kax&v : see also note On
1310 b 23. It is well known how many precautions were taken at
Florence to prevent Ghibellines finding their way into office.
17. is rds dpxas rds Kupias irapieVai. Cp. Plut. Reip. Gerend.
Praec. C. IO, Tiopwrfios c Kal 6piap.ftfv(iv rjiov pf]Trco Ttapivv (Is a"vyK\rjrov,
and [Demosth.] Epist. 3. p. 1481, (Is TO iro\tT(vf<rd(u napr/d. Taj
dpxas ras Kvpius, the supreme magistracies. The phrase recurs in
c. 9. 1309 a 33 sq. and c. 10. 1310 b 20 and in 8 (6). 8. 1323 a 7 :
cp. 2. 8. 1268 a 23, 3. 6. 1278 b 10, 8 (6). 6. i32ob 25, and 8 (6). 7.
1321 a 31 sq. In 7 (5). 8. 1309 a 30 we read of dpxai. Kvpiai TTJS nu\i-
Tftus, which is not quite the same thing. The expression at Kvpun
dpxai does not seem to be of frequent occurrence outside the Politics.
It does not occur in the A^vaiwi/ noXtT a.
18. worrep lv Qpew K.r.X. Hestiaea in Euboea (mentioned
under that name in c. 4. 1303 b 32 sqq.) came to be often called
by the name of Oreus, one of its demes, when after its revolt from
Athens in B. c. 446 its citizens were expelled from Euboea and
their place was taken by 2,000 Athenian cleruchs. Sus. 2 (Note
X a
3 o8 NOTES.
1529) and Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 64. 2, refer the change intro
duced by Heracleodorus to B.C. 377, when the State revolted from
the Lacedaemonians (Xen. Hell. 5. 4. 56 sq.) and joined the new
Athenian Confederacy, in which it appears under the title [ Etrjnaiijs
(Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 81). This was, in fact,
still the official name of the colony, though the name Oreus was
more commonly used (Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 3. i. 430. 2).
According to Pausanias (7. 26. 4) some people even in his day
called Oreus by its old name Hestiaea. Oreus lay on the coast
a little to the west of Hestiaea (Baedeker s Greece, p. 208). Compare
with the case of Heracleodorus at Oreus that of Leontiades at
Thebes, who, holding the office of polemarch, introduced the Spartan
Phoebidas and his troops into the Cadmeia and revolutionized the
State (Grote, Hist, of Greece, Part 2, c. 76 : vol. 10, p. Sosqq.).
20. KCU, or rather : see Shilleto on Demosth. De Fals. Leg.
C. 90 (102), aTToXcoXe Kai ytyovev da-dfVTjs, where Phil. 3. C. 39, aTroXcoXe
KOI vev6crr]Kfv fj EXXar, is compared, and cp. Thuc. 6. 60. i, ndvra
avTols e SoKfi eVi vva>fjacriq. 6\iyap^iK^ Kai rvpavviKfj TTfTTpd^dai. See also
notes on 1262 a 6 and 1335 b 40.
en Siot TO irapa |iiKp6V, further on account of the slightness of
the difference between one thing and another. This source of
constitutional change is marked off from oXiyoop/a because, while in
cases of 6\iya>pia the peril is not overlooked but is made light of,
here it is overlooked and escapes attention altogether. For TO rrapa
piKpov see Bon. Ind. 562 a 28 sqq., where Anal. Pr. i. 33. 47 b 38 is
referred to among Other passages, avrr) fj.ev ovv TJ dira.^ yivfrai ei> TV
frapa /AiKpov OK yo.p ov8ev 8ia(f)fpov elirelv r68e roJSe indp^fiv 77 roSe ru>8e
navrl uTrap^ff, avyx^povp-fv (a passage evidently based on Plato,
Phaedrus, 261 E sq., which Eaton quotes). In c. 7. 1307 b 2 sq.
and c. 8. 1307 b 32 r6 puepov takes the place of TO irapa piKpov. As
to Ambracia see note on 1304 a 31.
22. Twy yofupjf. The expression ra v6pip,a is used in much the
same sense as 01 v6p.m in 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 5, 7 (see note), but in
Plato, Crito, 53 C and Laws 793 A sqq. Ta Top-ipa and ol VO/J.QI are
distinguished, the latter passage explaining ra v6fj.tp.a to be the un
written customs which are the best support of written laws. In the
passage before us Ta vop-i^a probably includes both written and un
written law, so that Susemihl s rendering der gesetzlichen Zustande
(_ of the legal order of things ) is perhaps not far from the truth.
25. OTCMTiomicoi Sc Kai TO JO.TJ ojAO^uXof, eus o-v <rufjun eucn].
7 (5). 3. 1303 a 2025. 309
Here we enter on the class of ora<ms caused by dfo/zojoY^y (c. 2,
1 302 b 5). There may be dvo^oio-njs of race (i. e. T>V dvdpwiruv) or
avofuu^TTjs of site (TO>I/ TOTTWV). The former is dealt with in 1 303 a
25-b 3, and the latter in 1303 b 7-17. Aristotle does not say
that unlikeness in either respect causes constitutional change, but
Only that it Causes a-raa-is. For o-Tao-iamKdV (the adjective o-Tao-iao--
riw is is not given in the Index Aristotelicus and does not appear
to be used by Aristotle, though all MSS. have <rrao-iao-TtKa>s in 3. 13.
1284 b 22), cp. c. 6. 1306 a 38, where n 2 have O-TUO-IWTIKCOJ and
M s P 1 and possibly r oraenao-i-iKwr. Aristotle has here before him
Plato, Laws 708 D (where Plato may remember the experience of
Thurii), TO 8 av iravrobairov ey TUI TO ^vvfppvrjKoy yevos VTraKovvai fj.ev
TIVO>V v6\L<i>v Kaivatv rd^a av c&X^aete /iaXXov, TO 8f a~vfj.irvfvcrai KOI KaOdnep
tvyos Kad tva fls Tavrov, TO \fyop.tvov, ^v/u^voTjcrat xpovov TroXXov teal
Oj/. Cp. also Plut. Lycurg. et Num. inter se comp. c. 4 sub fin.,
OVTTOJ (TVfjurcTTVfvitvlas, and Sympos. 4. i. 2, and Dion. Hal.
Ant. Rom. 3. IO sub fin., rj 8 vnfTepanoXts dBiaKO(rp.T)T6s fffTiv eri KCU dSta-
TOKTOS, are VCOKTUTTOS ovcra KOI fK TroXXcoi/ rrvpfpopTfrf) (6va>v } rj iiaicpiav dfl
Xpovcw KOI Tradtj^draiv TrairoSaTrcov, Iva KaTaprtcrdf) KCII iravcrr^Tai. TapaTTOp.fvr]
ral o-Tao-tdfoucra Sxnrtp vvv. See also Eth. Nic. 8. 4. H56b 25 sqq.
and 9. 5. 1167 a ii sqq. As to TO JUT) 6fi.6<pv\ov see note on 1330 a
26. It would seem from the examples adduced in what follows
that Aristotle denies the name of 6^o^>uXoi not only to Achaeans
and Troezenians or to Lesbians and Chians, but also to Zanclaeans
and Samians and to Amphipolitans and Chalcidians, though all
four peoples were of Ionic extraction. Aristotle s remark is illus
trated by our own experience in South Africa. There is a native
population in South Africa in varying stages of civilization, and
there is a white population of diverse nationalities. There are
descendants of Dutch settlers and of French refugees, a considera
ble German population, and a large number, but not a majority, of
English people. It is not an easy matter to carry on the adminis
tration of affairs in such a country, but it has been the aim of the
Colonial Governments to weld together as one people those various
nationalities (Speech of Sir J. Gordon Sprigg, Times, August 5,
1886). It will be noticed that in most of the instances given by
Aristotle either the one stock or the other was expelled from the
State. Conflicts of race were as bitter within the Greek City-State
as conflicts of class. We notice also that after a time distinct races
came to pull better together. The children born in the colony
310
NOTES.
would feel less removed from each other in race, and would agree
better together, than the immigrants themselves had done, and the
lapse of time would do something to improve the relations even of
the latter to each other. Plutarch (Num. c. 1 7) gives an interesting
account of the way in which he conceives that Numa at Rome
sought to make the distinction between the Sabines and Romans
less sharp (see note on i^igb 19).
26. <3<nrcp Y^P "^ * K TO " TUXOVTOS 7rXT)0ous iroXis yiyveTOi.
Sus. 2 (Note 1531 b) refers to 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 18 and to 4 (7). 8.
I328b 1 6, r] yap TrdXjy irXrjdos ecrnv ov TO ni^oy, dXXa irpos faty
avrapKfi, which explains the passage before us. Not any and
every body of men will serve to form a TrdXis : they must not be too
many or too few (4 (7). 4. 1326 b 2 sqq.), nor all slaves nor all
poor men (3. 9. 1280 a 32: 3. 12. 1283 a 18), nor all ftdvava-oi
(4 (7), 4. 1326 a 18 sqq.); some of them must be righting men
(6 (4). 4. 1291 a 6 sqq.), some fit to be judges and members of the
deliberative (1291 a 22 sqq.). They must be unlike (2. 2. 1261 a
22 sqq.), yet not too unlike (6 (4). n. 1295 b 21 sqq.). For axrnep
ov8e followed by ourwr ovbe, cp. Xen. Cyrop. I. 6. l8, Xe yets crv, tfpr],
Z> TraTtp, a>s ffjuil 8oKfl, oKrrrfp ovSe ytcopyov dpyov ov8ei> o<pf\os, OVTO>S
ov8e (rTpa.TT)yav apyovvrus ovSec o(f)f\os eivai.
27. Bio OCTOI T^8i] CTUCOIKOUS eSe^ai ro ?j CITOIKOUS, ol irXcioroi
SieaTao-iacraf. See in Rhein. Mus. 42. p. 424 O. Crusius remarks
on the Greek proverbs, noirjcrov pe tvoucov, Iva ere TTotjjo-w fotKov, and
fTTTJXvs TOP fvoiKov XeiTTft TO e|e/3aXXei . Ato, hence," because TO p)
6fio(pv\ov is productive of o-Tao-is. It is implied that cnW/coi and
eiroiKot will not be 6p.6<pv\oi. The word O-VVOIKQI is here used of
those who join in founding a city, but it is not always used in this
strict sense; it is not, for instance, in Thuc. 2. 68. 5 and Diod. 14.
9. 9, where the VVVOIKOI spoken of might have been called enoiKoi.
Aristotle s first two examples are of O-VVOIKOI, the rest of enoiKoi.
All his illustrations of fnoiKOL are taken from colonies. States in
Greece Proper, however, must sometimes have recruited their
population with enoiKoi. The introduction of ZITOIKOI from the
mother-city will hardly have been attended with the risks here
described, though even eiroixoi from the mother-city would perhaps
not be accounted 6p6(pv\oi. It was when, as at Antissa and Zancle,
the eiroiKoi came not from a variety of alien sources, but from
a single State which was not the mother-State of the colony, or
when they belonged to an alien stock powerful in the vicinity, as
7(5). 3. 1303 a 2631. 311
at Amphipolis and Argos Amphilochicum (Thuc. 2. 68. 5), or when,
as at Syracuse, they formed a body of men accustomed to act
together, that the operation of introducing IITOIKOI was attended with
most risk. The metoeci and other aliens to whom Cleisthenes
gave citizenship at Athens probably came from a variety of sources,
not from a single city or stock, and their successful fusion with the
older citizens was no doubt due partly to this, and partly to the
pains which Cleisthenes took to mingle the two elements of the
citizen-body (8 (6). 4. i^igb 19 sqq. : A0. lloA. c. 21). *H87, ere
now/ cp. 6 (4). 2. 1289 b 5 sq., Xen. Mem. 4. 8. 5, ov% 6pas
. . . on ot A.6r]VT)o~i Stxaorai TroXXovs ftev r}8rj p.r]8fi> d8iKovvras Xdyw Trapa-
xdf vTts dirtKTfivav, iroXXovs 8e d8iKovi>ras direXvcrav ; and Eth. Nic. I. I.
1094 b 1 8 sq. "Hdij with the perfect, as in Hist. An. 7. 6. 585 b
7 sq., is much less common than rjfy with the aorist (Richards).
Aifo-rao-iao-av is here intrans. as in Polyb. i. 82. 4: it is used in
a transitive sense in c. 4. 1303 b 26 and c. 6. 1306 a 3.
28. OIOK Tpoi^irjyiois AXOUO! <ruviatii\<rav lu ^apiv. Cp. Solin. 2. I
(Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, i. 398. 5) Solin. 2. 10 Mommsen.
Some identify the expulsion of the Troezenians here mentioned
with the expulsion by the demagogue Telys of the five hundred
wealthiest citizens mentioned by Diodorus (12. 9. 2), but with
doubtful correctness. The expulsion of the Troezenians probably
occurred at a far earlier date.
30. 50f TO cfyos OW^PTJ TOIS ZufBapirais. The ayos at Athens is
well known. We hear of an ayos also at Megara (Plut. Quaest.
Gr. c. 59) and at Delphi (Plut. Reip. Gerend. Praec. c. 32.
825 A sqq.), to say nothing of that which arose from the murder
of Aesop there (Plut. De Sera Numinis Vindicta, c. 12). In the
last-named chapter we read of a /x^w/za TJJS Aevieadias "Upas with
which Sybaris was afflicted 2v/3apiVat9 Se (frpdfav (6 ATroXXwv)
dwoXucrti TUIV KaKa>f, oral/ rpuriv oXtdpois JXao-wirai TO fii/vipa rrjs \tvica-
tiias "Upas but whether this was identical with the ayos mentioned
in the text does not appear. See as to the passage before us
Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 769. i, where other crimes are noticed
which were supposed to have led to the destruction of Sybaris.
31. teal iv 6oupiois Xu(Baprrai rots owouti^aaaiy, sc. dif<TTa<riao-av or
f<rrao-iao-av. Cp. Diod. 12. II. I, oXiyov 8e \povov 6p,ovof)cravrfs oi
Qovpioi o-rdo-fi p.(ya\i) irfpitirtvov OVK d\6yu>s oi yap irpovirdpxorrfs
Sv/SapTrat ras fi-iv d^iokoywrdras dp^as tavrols npoo~fV(p.ov, ray 8 eirtXe "is
TOIS ixrrtpov Trpoo-yfypapufvois TToXi ratr, /cat ras ywatKus etttOvfiv TOIS Of ois
312 NOTES.
Selv TTpuras fJ-fv ray TroXiViSay, voTepas fie ras fjitrayevfcrrepas rrpos
TOIS TT]V fj.tv avvtyyvs rfj TroXet ^<i>pav K(iTeK\r/pov^ovi> tavrols, Trjv 8(
a) Keip.evT)v rols tVjjXvcTi yfvofjLtvrjs 8e diafpopas Sta rny tlpTfpcvas
curias, ol Trpoo"ypa(pfVTes vcrrtpov TroXtrai n\fiovs Ka\ Kpeirrovs 6Wey
arrfKTfivav cr^f86v airavras TOVS TrpovTrdpxovras SujSaptYas 1 (Aristotle Says
that the Sybarites were driven out) KOI ri}v irohiv avro\ KarcpKrja-av,
and Strabo, p. 263, va-rtpov 5 ot irfpiyevo^tvoi (2u/3apTrai) avvt\-
QovTfs (7T(0Kovv oX/yoi* XP^ V V 8* Ka OVTOI 8ip6dpT)(rav VTTO Adrjvaimv
Kai aXXajj/ EXX^i/coi , 01 arvvoiKriaovTes fj.ev fKtivoiS dfplKOVTO, Kara^povrjcravrfs
Se avru>v TOVS p.tv K)({ipicravTO . . . TTJV Se TTO\IV fls tTfpov TOTTOV fjLfTeOrjKnv
7T\r)criov KOL Qovpiovs 7rpo(rr)-y6pev(rav ano Kprjvrjs o/ncorv/iov. Busolt (Gr.
Gesch., ed. 2, 3. i. 523. 3) bases partly on this passage of Strabo,
partly on other considerations, his conclusion that the colonization
of Thurii from Athens and other parts of Hellas was preceded by
a similar colonization of Sybaris, and that it was from Sybaris,
and not from the subsequently founded colony of Thurii, that
the Sybarite section of the colonists was expelled in consequence
of the position of superior privilege assumed by it. Aristotle s
language in the passage before us, however, leaves no doubt that,
in his view at any rate, the expulsion took place at Thurii.
32. w o-<J>Te pas TTJS x^P as > m the view that the country
belonged to them. TTJS x^P as means, I think, the country, not
the soil. Cp. Demosth. c. Aristocr. c. 177, &&gt;r auroO TTJS x^P ns
ouo-rjj. The extent to which the Sybarite members of the colony
of Thurii carried their claims may be inferred from the fact that
the name 7roXiYi8 is given in Diod. 12. n. i (quoted above on
31) to their wives and daughters exclusively. So in Thera and in
Apollonia on the Ionian Gulf the descendants of the first settlers
were alone accounted (hfvdepoi and were alone admissible to office
(6 (4). 4. i2pob 9 sqq.). In our own day, as has been noticed
already, the burghers of the South African Republic, representing
the original colonists, claim in a similar way to exclude the
Uitlanders, or alien new-comers to the colony, from all real
participation in political power.
33. Kai Bu^cm-1019 K.T.X. Nothing is known of this event, or of
the events at Antissa mentioned in the next line. The success
of the people of Antissa in ridding themselves of the Chians is
evidently contrasted with the failure of the Zanclaeans to rid them
selves of the Samians. It was a bold step on the part of a small
Aeolian State like Antissa to receive a body of exiles belonging to
7 (5). 3. 1303 a 3236. 313
a powerful Ionian State like Chios. It was through receiving
exiles from Colophon that the Aeolic city of Smyrna was detached
from the neighbouring group of Aeolic States (Hdt. i. 150).
These Chian exiles probably hoped to repeat at Antissa the coup
which had succeeded so well at Smyrna.
35. ZayicXcuoi 8e Zap.iou uiroSe^djAeyoi e^eirecroi auroi. According
to Hdt. 6. 22 sqq. the Zanclaeans did not invite the Samians who
fled their country after the suppression of the Ionic Revolt to join
them at Zancle ; they invited the lonians of Asia Minor in general
to found a new Ionic colony at Cale Acte on the north coast of
Sicily, no doubt with the object of strengthening the Ionic
element in Sicily against the Doric and of strengthening Zancle
against the Sicels ; it was a foe of Zancle, Anaxilaus tyrant of
Rhegium, who suggested to the Samians to give up colonizing Cale
Acte and to seize Zancle during the temporary absence of its
citizens, who were occupied in besieging a Sicel city. The whole
story is told by Herodotus (6. 22 sqq.) : see also Freeman, Sicily, 2.
109 sqq. Egenfa-ov avroi contrasts the case of Zancle with those
of Byzantium and Antissa, in which the new settlers were expelled.
36. KCU. ATToXXawaTcu ot Iv TW Eueira) irorrw K.T.\. The last
five words are added to distinguish this Apollonia, which was
a colony of Miletus, from other cities of the same name, and
especially from Apollonia on the Ionian Gulf, which was a colony
of Corinth and Corcyra. The busy seaport of the Euxine coast of
Thrace with its two large harbours, situated, partly on an island, close
to the southern horn of the deep bay of Bourgas, was, however,
a very different sort of .place from the quiet and well-ordered city
of Illyria nearly seven miles from the sea, as to which see note on
i2gob 9. The Thracian city owed its name to its famous temple
of Apollo (Strabo, p. 319 : Head, Hist. Num. p. 236), and perhaps
also to its Milesian origin, for one of the chief worships of the
Milesian State was that of Apollo at Branchidae. It is said in the
poem which passes under the name of Scymnus Chius (730 sqq.)
to have been founded fifty years before the kingship of Cyrus,
i.e. in B.C. 610, but if it was founded by the philosopher
Anaximander (Aelian, Var. Hist. 3. 17), who was apparently born
in B.C. 611 and died soon after B.C. 547 (Diog. Laert. 2. 2), it must
have been founded at least twenty or thirty years later. It deserves
notice that the Megarian colony of Heracleia, which was founded
on the south coast of the Euxine by Megarians and Boeotians
3 i4 NOTES.
(Ephor. Fragm. 83 : Miiller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. i. 259) about the
middle of the sixth century B. c. (Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 487),
and which was situated at about the same distance from Byzantium
as Apollonia, was named after Heracles just as Apollonia was
named after Apollo, probably because Heracles was born at
Thebes and his mother Alcmene and son Hyllus had tombs at
Megara (Paus. i. 41 : cp. Justin, 16. 3. 4). Apollonia was in all
likelihood founded a good deal earlier than Heracleia, but the
resemblance of the names of the two colonies suggests that the
latter may have been founded in rivalry with the former. The
Euxine (EV&IVOS, not Evgevos, probably because it received its name
from the Milesian settlers on its shores) is here called by its full
title : more usually Aristotle speaks of it as 6 n6vros (5 (8). 4.
i338b 21 : 7 (5). 6. i3O5b 36, 1306 a 9). We read in c. 6.
1 306 a 7 sqq. of an oligarchy at the Pontic Apollonia which was
overthrown by citizens attacking dishonest office-holders, but
whether the incident mentioned in the passage before us was
connected with the fall of this oligarchy it is impossible to say.
38. KCH lupaKouaioi K.T.\. As to this passage see Grote, Hist,
of Greece, 5. 318, note. The aliens and mercenaries referred to
were already citizens before the fall of the tyranny of Thrasybulus
they had been made citizens by the tyrants (Diod. n. 72. 3)
but now the Syracusans made them citizens, rendering them how
ever and this important fact Aristotle does not mention inad
missible to office (Diod. ibid.). It was the infliction of this
disability on men who, as Grote says, had been the first citizens
of the State under the tyrants, that led them to rebel. They
rebelled, in fact, not because they were citizens of a different stock
from the rest, which is the cause assigned by Aristotle for their
rebellion, but because the citizenship conferred on them was of an
inferior kind. This is not a case properly adducible to prove the
difficulty of adjusting matters with new-coming citizens (Grote).
Sus. 2 (Note 1538) seeks to reconcile Aristotle s account with that
of DiodorUS by taking /*era TO. rvpavviKa exclusively with eWatr/ao-ai/
and not also with Troiqo-d/tecoi, but it seems hardly possible to get
over the difficulty in this way.
Herd, TO, Tupackiicd. See note on 1270 b n.
TOUS le^ous Ktu TOUS u.io-0o4>6pous. Km is here explanatory (see
note on 1257 b 7). The addition of KO.\ TOVS nio-6o(f)6povs, however,
also serves to place the step in its full significance before the
7(5). 3. 1303 a 38 1303 b 2. 315
reader. To make eW citizens was a strong measure, but to make
^lo-tfoc/jdpoi citizens was a still stronger one. Mi<r$o$dpot were both
disliked and despised in Greece (Plato, Laws 630 B : Demosth. c.
Aristocr. c. 123). Wyttenbach (Index to Plutarch, s. v. /uo-0o$dpoj)
remarks, In vita Dionis fjuaGocfropoi dicuntur Dionysii milites, ei/oi
Dionis milites. Attamen aliquoties Dionis milites dicuntur pia-Oo-
(fropot, sed ex persona Syracusanorum, qui iam Dionis eVovy odisse
incipiebant. See note on 1310 b 12, roD 8^ov KOI TOV wXrjdovs.
2. KO.I Ap.<f>nroXiT<u K.r.X. The people of Amphipolis were rash. 1303 b.
The city lay in the immediate neighbourhood of the powerful
Chalcidian Confederacy, the cities composing which had from the
first viewed with jealousy its colonization by Athens (Busolt, Gr.
Gesch., ed. 2, 3. i. 560), and to admit a body of Chalcidians to
citizenship was to incur a great risk. This soon became evident.
The newly-made Chalcidian citizens, strong in the support of the
neighbouring Confederacy, expelled most of the older citizens of
Amphipolis (cp. c. 6. 1306 a 2 sqq.). It is possible that Amphipolis
was already on friendly terms with the Chalcidian Confederacy
when it decided to admit these new citizens ; it is, however, also
possible that the step prepared the way for the close relation in
which we find Amphipolis standing to Olynthus, the head of the
Chalcidian Confederacy, in B.C. 365-4. Schafer (Demosthenes, 2.
9) takes the latter view. In any case the victory of the Chalcidian
settlers at Amphipolis strengthened the hold of Olynthus on the
city and secured to the Chalcidian Confederacy the important
bridge over the Strymon at Amphipolis which was a main means
of communication between Macedon and Thrace, much no doubt
to the dissatisfaction of Macedon. Amphipolis was, in fact, in
B.C. 365-4, not long in all probability after the event here mentioned
by Aristotle, a free Greek city inhabited by a population in the
main seemingly Chalkidic, and in confederacy with Olynthus
(Grote, Hist, of Greece, 10. 344, who refers to Demosth. c.
Aristocr. c. 150). Hence Timotheus, seeking in that year to
recover Amphipolis for Athens, attacked and took many Chalcidic
towns allied with Olynthus (Diod. 15. 81 : Deinarch. c. Demosth.
c. 14, c. Philocl. c. 17). Olynthus was thus weakened, and the
most effective barrier against Macedonian aggrandizement broken
down (Grote, 10. 525). The coins both of Amphipolis and of the
Chalcidian Confederacy have a head of Apollo on the obverse, in
the former however facing, in the latter in profile (Head, Hist.
316 NOTES.
Num. pp. 185, 190). It is probable that some of the Amphipo-
litans who were exiled by the Chalcidian intruders on the occasion
referred to in the text lived to see with vengeful exultation the
destruction of Olynthus by Philip of Macedon in B.C. 348. For
the qualifying addition of ol ir^ela-roi aiiruv cp. Strabo, Book 7.
Fragm. II, e o>v (SC. Ti6\fa>v) vcrrepov eK/SaXXo /iei Ot (oi XaXjctSfly)
(Tvvrf^.6ov (is p.iav ol TrXfiovs avTcav.
3. [oTaCTidouori 8e 7. orresj. I agree with Sus. and others
that this paragraph is not in place here. Sus. 3 thinks that there is
no other place to which it can fitly be transferred, but it has
been already suggested in the critical and explanatory notes on
1 301 a 39, o-Taandov<nv, that it should be inserted after that word.
4. iv pet TCUS oXiyapxiais. In aristocracies also, it would seem
(c. 7. 1307 a 23 sqq.).
5. irporepoy, in c. i. 1301 a 33 sqq. It is no objection to the
proposed transposition that, if we place 1303 b 3-7 after 1301 a 39,
(TTacnafavviv, the reference in KaBdnep tiprjrui nporepov will be to what
has been said eight lines above. Reference is made in a similar
way to passages equally near or nearer in 4 (7). 7. 1328 an, where
Sirep (iprjTai nporepov refers to 1328 a i sqq., in 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 29,
where KaSdnep drro^fv refers to 1328 b 24-28, and in De Caelo, i. i.
268 a 19, where uxnrtp tipcat refers to 268 a 13 sqq.
7. ora(7idouori 8e ewrre al iroXeis KCU Sia TOUS TOTTOUS K.T.\. Km
dia rovs TOTTOVS stands in tacit contrast to 8ta rovs avdpcanovs, or in
other words 8ia TO HTJ 6fj.6<pv\ov, which is the origin of a-rdo-is dealt
with in what precedes, if we remove 1303 b 3-7 .to another place.
See note on 1303 a 25. Cp. Plut. Solon, c. 13, ol B" Aftjwuoi . . .
TTJV iraXaidv avdis trrdtriv vntp TTJS no\iTfias fOTatriaftov, Baas 17 X^P a
8ia<popas (iXfv, fts rocravTa. fJ-fpr} TTJS TroXfais Siao-Tao-rjs. Cities, both
Greek and other, were often built partly on an island close to the
coast and partly on the mainland itself: so Cnidus, which Strabo
calls 8/7roXi? on this account (p. 656), Apollonia on the Euxine
(note on 1303 a 36), and also Aradus and Tyre. Comme Arad,
Tyr avait une partie insulaire ou s e"levaient ses temples et ses
arsenaux, une partie continentale qu on appelait la vieille Tyr, Palae-
Tyros (Maspero, Hist. Ancienne des Peuples de 1 Orient, p. 192).
We read of the Aradians in Polyb. 5. 68. 7, rrjv oicxpopav TTJV
irpo\mup\ovcra.v avrols rrpbs aX\rj\ovs Kare-ava-fv ( h.vrio\os\ ftiakvcras TOVS
tv rji vf](T<f 7r/x>y rovs rrjv f/rreipov KaroiKovvras ra>v ApaSt tDV. Part of
Clazomenae, again, was on an island, part on the mainland
7 (5). 3. 1303 b 310. 317
opposite to it, and the two parts did not pull well together. The
interest of those who dwelt in the island would be to favour the
masters of the sea, for instance Athens ; the interest of those who
dwelt on the mainland would be to favour Persia. So in
Thuc. 3. 34 Persia finds it easier to win Colophon than Notium,
the seaport of Colophon. We are reminded of the feud between
Plymouth and Plymouth Dock in BoswelPs Life of Johnson.
Johnson affecting to entertain the passions of the place was violent
in opposition . . . No, no ! I am against the Dockers ; I am a
Plymouth man. Rogues ! Let them die of thirst. They shall not
have a drop ! The relations between England and Ireland might
have been better if the two countries were not severed by the sea.
9. ot CTTI Xu rpu, sc. oraffiafouo-t. Sus. 3 and Mr. E. L. Hicks
(Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 76) follow Sylburg in reading
Xvrw in place of Xvrpw, referring to Corpus Inscr. Att. 2. pp. 397,
423, with which Sus. compares Ephor. Fragm. 136 (Miiller, Fragm.
Hist. Gr. i. 271), and it is much in favour of their view that the
phrase oi eV! Xurw occurs in the inscription, and that r and rp
are easily confused (see critical note on 1338 b 23), but Strabo
(p. 645) has Xvrpiov, and this fact lends some support to the
reading Xvrpw here. There was a town called Xvrpos in Cyprus,
and another called \vTp6mi\is in Thrace (Theopomp. Fragm. 150 :
Miiller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. i. 304). Why eVt Xurpw, not eV Xvrpw ?
Is fVi here = f v, or does it mean near (cp. Soph. Philoct. 353,
rarrt Tpoia nepyafia) ?
10. Kal > A0rji/T]<ni K.T.\. A6r)vrj(nv, in the Athenian State/ as in
2. 7. 1267 b 18, 3. 2. 1275 b 35, 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 24 etc., not
specially at Athens, for evidently A.6>ivij<riv includes the Peiraeus.
Compare the use of eV AaKe<W/*oKi in 2. 5. 1263 a 35, where see
note. Aristotle does not say of the Athenian citizens resident at
the Peiraeus and of those resident at Athens what he says of the
two sections of Clazomenians, that they <rrao-id<>v<n -npbs dXXj}Xovs,
though that did come about in the days of the Thirty (Xen. Hell. 2.
4. 24 sqq., 35-37), but only that there is a difference of political
sentiment between them. Perhaps, however, this was more due to
a difference of class and occupation, the Peiraeus being full of
vavras KOI Kf\ev<TTas KOI Kv@fpi>T]Tas (Plut. Themist. C. 19 sub fin.},
than to residence on a distinct site. The site of Eleusis was
distinct from that of Athens, but no great difference of political
sentiment seems to have resulted.
318 NOTES.
12. lv rots iroX^iois. Aristotle implies that the thing did not
happen much in marches in time of peace.
15. fieyioTT] \if.v ouv K.T.\., the greatest severance is perhaps
that of virtue and vice. This is so because it involves a difference
of soul and of character (Poet. 2. 1448 a 2 sqq.), a difference
in respect of goods of the soul, not external goods (4 (7). i. 1323 b
6 sqq.). It is only on a severance of this kind that Aristotle con
sents to base the distinction of slave and free, well-born and low
born (i. 6. 1 255 a 39 sqq.). MeV ovv has nothing to answer to it,
but it is perhaps virtually taken up by &&gt;v pia <al fj flptjuevrj eo-riv,
i. e. but the severance we have mentioned is a severance, though
a minor one.
SiaoTCKns. We expect rather Siacpopd, but Plato (Rep. 360 E)
had spoken of the dida-raa-is of the aoixos and the SI KUIOJ.
16. KCU OUTU r\. See note on 1296 b 5.
jiaXXoy, SC. Stao-racn? ((rnv.
4. 17. yiyvovrai \iev ouc K.T.\. Aristotle s reference to the effect of
small differences of locality in producing ord<mr leads him to notice
other minute causes of o-rdo-ts. MeV ovv introduces a summing-up
of what has just been said, in order that a further statement may be
added to make the exact extent of Aristotle s assertion clear. Some
might infer from his remarks that ordo-ir is in his view concerned
with things of trivial moment, and Aristotle hastens to correct this
^impression by adding that though the occasions of arda-is are often
V .small (I do not understand him to mean that tfiey aiways~arej7the
things with a view to which recourse is had to a-rdo-is are great, and
indeedjhat small discords are most fruitful of result when they arise
within the circle of those who are supreme in the State (eV rois
19). In i3O3b 17 1304 b 5 we have to do with the e 5>v of con
stitutional change, its immediate occasions, not its profound causes.
We see this from the recurrence of * in 1303 b 18, 21, 37. 1304 a
4, 10, 14, 18 (see note on 1303 a 13). That disagreements often
arise e < niKpS>i> we have been told in 2. 5. 1263 a 17 sqq. We
read in De Gen. An. 5- 6. 785 b 36 fvfpdaprov KOL {VKIVTJTOV TO piKpov.
Solon had said of the beginnings of Ate (Fragm. 13. 14),
* oXi you ylyvfTai wore nvpos,
(f)\avpT) p.ei> TO Trpwrof, dvirjpf/ 8f reAeuTa,
and a similar thought may be traced in Soph. Aj. 1077 sq. : Eurip.
Fragm. 415 Nauck (411. ed. 2),
7(5). 3. 1303 b 124. 1303 b 20. 319
yap (K Aa/Lwrnypor l8<uoi XfVay
irpT)crti(v av TIS,
and 424 Nauck (420, ed. 2): Demosth. in Lept. c. 162 (already
referred to in vol. i. p. 525, note 2) : Polyb. 3. 7. 7, eVft&j <pvfTm
p.fv (< TO>V Tvx6i>T(0i> TToXXd/cty TO fifyHTTd Tcoi/ 7rpayfj.dTa>v : Tac. Ann. 4.
32 sub fin. Compare also De Caelo, 4. 3. 3100 26, aiVot fWorf
rat Taura avrwy /ifTajSdXAti, KOL (juKpus ytvofuvijs tv Tols ea> Kivr)<ra>s
TO fifv fls vyiftav (p^tTai TO 8 (Is avi)i>. Aristotle does not COn-
sider whether constitutional change is not sometimes prevented,
as well as brought about, by small things. It should be noticed
that the instances which Aristotle gives in what follows of a-rdo-as
arising from small causes seem all to be taken from oligarchies
(cp. c. 6. 1 306 a 31 sqq.). Quarrels would be especially frequent
and mischievotrs~nToIigarchies.
19. fj-dXicrra. 8e K.T.X. Kai at piKpai, SC. order-fir, even small
discords (much more great ones): cp. 30, Km TO eV avTfj pixpov
dfjidpTTjfjui. PlatO had Said in Rep. 545 D, iraara noXirda fjLfrafia\\fi
( O.VTOV TOV fftovTOs TOS dpxds, orav tv ai/Tta TOVTO) <rra<rty (yyeisrjTtu,
ofjLovoovvros 8(, K&V Trdw 6\iyov fj, d&vvaTov MMyAjPM. Compare also for
the thought De Gen. An. 4. 4. 771 a n, ra pev ovv (uxp^v irapfK@ai-
vovra TTJV (pvcriv (sc. Tcai> TUenjHMt9\ ijv (itadfv, ra Se TrXetoi ov rjv } OTOV
(v rots Kvpiois TOV r)v ytvTjTcu TO irapa <pv<riv, and Hist. An. 8. 2.
590 a 2, axrrf 8r)\ov ort KOI fi> TIJ f dp^fjs (rvorderft aKapiaiov TWOS
H(Taf3d\\ovTOS TU> [Kytdd, tav jy dp^ofififj, yiveTai TO fj.ev OrjXv TO 8
appfv.
20. otoi <ruvpr\ K<H iv ZupaKOuaais Iv TOIS dp^aiois xP t/ol 5- ^ ai
lv 2vpaKova-ais, for example in Syracuse (see note on 1255 a 36).
If Busolt is right (Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 785. 2), this feud arose under
the oligarchy of the Gamori at Syracuse shortly before it was
overthrown by the demos and the serfs (see note on 1302 b 31),
an event followed by Gelon s seizure of Syracuse in B.C. 485. For
iv roiy dpxaiots \povois cp. 3. 14. 1285 b 13, iit\ TCOI/ dp\aiu>v xpovtov,
and 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 7, eVi TO>I> dpxaiav, and see note on 1285 a 30.
This story and that told about Delphi in 37 sqq. are told with
added details in Plut. Reip. Gerend. Praec. c. 32, where we read,
tv S Svpa/covcraty 8votv veavio-Kuiv ffwqOwv, 6 p.iv TOV fpa^ifvov TOV (Talpov
Xa/SoW (pv\d<T(T(tv &tf<p6(ip(is d-troSrjiiovvTOs 6 8 e mVa) irdXiv axnvfp
dvTanodto ovs vfipiv tfjioi-)((V(Tf Tr t v yvvalica TU>V 8 irpfaftvriptov TIS (Is
ftovXrjV napf\6(i)v fKf\tv(T(i> dp(poTfpovs (Xavvtiv irplv diroXetrai Kai dva-
7rXr)a&T)vai rffv frdXti an auTatv TTJS f)(6pa.s ov firjv (r(i(Tfi> } aXXa teat IK
3 20 NOTES.
TOVTOV (TTacruicravTes Vt (Tv[J.fpopals p.tyd\ais Trjv dplo~TT]v TToXiretai/ uve-
Tpf^rav. Plutarch not only, like Aristotle here, tells the two stories
together, but also, as U. Kohler points out (Rhein. Mus. 53. 491),
prefixes to them a remark very similar to that made by Aristotle in
26 sqq., ov8fvos TJTTOV r< TroAtrtKw Trpoo-rjKfi ravra (i.e. ray eK
av <cai irpoo-Kpovo-jj.aTU>v ISlcov 8ta(f)opds) iacrdai Kal irpOKara-
\ap.$dv(iv, OTTCOS TO [lev oi8e o\a>s f crrai, Ta Se Traversal ra^ecos, TO 8" ov
Xi ^eTai peyedos ov8e a\^erai TOOP drj/jLocricav, aXX eV avrois p.fvfl rois
8ia<f)epO[tfVOlS, aiirov re Trpocre^oira KU\ (ppd^ovra TOIS aXXot? ws iSia
a [J.(yd\(i)v atria KaOiaraTai, Trapo(pdfvra KU\ fj.rj rv^oi Ta
dpxfj w8e Traptjyopias. Kohler thinks that Aristotle
and Plutarch derive the stories from some common source in
which they were narrated together and the moral was drawn as
to the duty of the statesman which both of them draw. It should
be noticed, however, that the two stories are told by Plutarch in
a different order, the Delphian story coming first and the Syracusan
second, and the intervening story about Hestiaea being omitted ;
that no mention is made by Plutarch of the point on which
Aristotle especially insists, the fact that the two young Syracusans
belonged to the ruling class ; and that the moral drawn by Plutarch
is not the same as that drawn by Aristotle, for while Plutarch advises
that private feuds should be prevented from spreading to public
affairs, Aristotle s advice is that feuds about small matters arising
between members of leading families should be prevented from
ending in a conflagration involving the whole State. If Aristotle
and Plutarch, therefore, used a common source, one or other of
them must have failed to follow it closely. Other hypotheses are
possible. It will be observed that the two stories told by Plutarch
are love-stories, and that he does not tell the story of the two
brothers who quarrelled over an inheritance at Hestiaea. This
fact suggests that the source from which the two stories came
to him may have been a collection of Epa>Ti<d, possibly that of the
Peripatetic Ariston of Ceos, from whom he gets the story that the
hostility between Aristides and Themistocles at Athens began in
a love-quarrel (Aristid. c. 2, and Themist. c. 3, where the account
ends, CK fie TOVTOV 8ifTf\ovv KOI irepl Ta Sij/uocria ffTacndovT(S, words
which remind us of the passage quoted above from Reip. Gerend.
Praec. c. 32). Whether the more detailed form in which Plutarch
gives the two stories came ultimately from the Constitutions
ascribed to Aristotle, as has been suggested in vol. ii. p. xix, it
7(5). 4. 1303 b 2026. 321
is impossible to say, but Ariston of Ceos would no doubt be
acquainted with the Constitutions.
22. iv rats Apx<"s &vruv. Kohler remarks (Rhein. Mus. 53.
490, note) that these words should not be taken to refer to the
holding of definite offices, a view which has often been taken of
their meaning, but to indicate that the two Syracusans belonged
to the ruling class. His interpretation of them suits the passage
before us well, for it is a little surprising to hear of two vtavuritoi
holding office, and also of one of them being absent from the
State, though in office, unless indeed his office was a military
office. The word vtaviaimi, however, must not be pressed too
much, for one of the veavio-Koi was old enough to have a wife,
and the use of iv rals dpxais elvai in 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 2 sq.,
where it seems clearly to mean to be in office/ makes against
Kohler s view. Looking to this passage we shall probably be
right in interpreting the phrase in the same way in c. 3. 1302 b
6 sqq., c. 6. 1305 b 2 sqq., c. 8. 1309 a 3, and the passage before
us: cp. c. 8. 1 308 a 5 sq., 6 (4). 4. i29ob 12, and Thuc. 8. 89. 2.
23. &rcupos &v ns, a person, though being his comrade : cp.
c. 10. I3i2b 1 6, Kr)8TTfis a>v. We expect arepos in place of ns
(so Coray, placing it before craipos), but cp. Philipp. Apyvpiov
A.(pavi(riJ.6s, Fragm. (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 4. 469),
av yap dvaOrj ns, vdvs frtpos rjpiracrfv,
and Epicrat. Inc. Fab. Fragm. (Meineke, 3. 371),
\a-)(av6v ns (<prj (rrpoyyvXov tivai,
iroiav 8 aXXof, SevSpov 8 trtpos,
25. us auToy ^XOcii . Cp. Rhet. 2. 23. 1398 a 24 sq. (Bon. Ind.
872 b 2). If adultery was a criminal offence at Syracuse, as it was
at Heracleia and Thebes and elsewhere (see note on 1306 a 36),
the aggrieved husband might have prosecuted the adulterer, though
the fact that he was the original offender would probably have told
against him in the lawcourt. But we hear nothing of any resulting
lawsuit, only of a orao-i? and 6titmnt,
26. Sieoraatao-ai , here transitive (see note on 13033 27).
Sio-rrep dpxop.eVwK K.T.\. To>v rwavfw, the feuds which we have
described, cp. C. 8. 1308 331, ras TWI/ yv&plpav (piXovtiKias Kal crrda-fts.
Aristotle s precept is based on an early medical precept, which may
be traced in Theogn. 1133,
K.vpve, napovai,
VOL. iv.
322 NOTES.
quoted by Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 2. 308, in their
note on the proverb apxv" ia(r6ai iro\v Aoxov fj Tf\evrf)v, where they
also refer to Ovid, Rem. Amor. 91 sq. and Pers. Sat. 3. 64. Com
pare too Xen. De Re Equestri, 4. 2, and Hippocr. Aphor. vol. iii.
p. 716 Ktihn.
28. Twy ^yep.oytoi KCU Sumji^ajy. Cp. Plato, Gorg. 525 E, dXXa
yap . . . (K TG>V 8vvafjLev<av flal Kal ol <r(p68pa irovrjpol ytyvoptvot <ivd parrot.
cc Apxfj Y^P Y^V eTai T afj,dpTT])xa, for the error arises in a
starting-point (or source ). The error referred to is the initial
feud. Aristotle is led to speak of the ruling class as a starting-
point, because the Greek word for rule means also beginning.
Compare the similar play on the word in the De Pace of Isocrates,
roi, 105. Aristotle perhaps remembers Plato, Laws 792 C,
f<TTt yap ovv rifuv 17 ToiavTT) Trpais 8ta(p6opa fU-yiOTT) Tracr&v ev ap\y yap
yiyverai eKacrroTf rpcxpfjs. Cp. c. i. 1302 a 6, and De Anim. Motione,
7- 7 O1 b 24, OTI de fiiKpa fifrafiohf) yivofjLtvr) eV dpx?/ fifydXas Kal TroXXar
Trotei 8ia(f)opas uTrodtv, OVK a8r)\ov olov TOV OLOKOS aKapialov TI fjifdicrrafJifvov
TroXX^ f) rrjs Trpcppas yivfrai fj-fTacrTacris : De Gen. An. I. 2. ^16 b 3
sqq., 4. I. 766 a 28 sqq., and 5. 7. 788 a II, fjuiepa\ ^erao-Tao-eis
fjitya\o>v alrlai yivovrai, oil 81 auras, dXX orav rrvfj.fta.lvr] ap-)(r]v <TVfjL(j,(Ta-
/StiXXfU at yap ap^at p.fyedei outrai piKpal TJ/ 8vvdfj.fi /ifydXat ficrtV, TOVTO
yap ecrri TO ap^fjv eivai, TO OVTTJV fj.tv aiTiav eivai TroXXaJi/, Tavrtjs 8 aXXo
ava>6fv p.r]8ev, together with Fragm. Aristot. 85. 1491 a 2 sqq.
29. 11 8 &PXT Xeyerai TJ/xioru etyai iravros. As to this familiar
proverb see Eaton s note and that of Leutsch and Schneidewin in
Paroem. Gr. 2. 13.
30. dyaXoyoy eari irpos ra if rots aXXois p.e peaii , bears a similar
proportion to the errors in all the other parts/ i. e. is half of the
whole, and therefore is equal to them, as they can be no more.
Cp. De Caelo, i. 5. 271 b 6 sqq., and especially n, TOVTOV 8 O.ITIOV
OTI f] apxfj 8vvdfjii udfav fj p.fy(6ci, StOTrep TO (v dpxfj fiiKpov ev TTJ Tf\evrf)
yiverai Trafj.pey(dfs.
31. oXws 8e K.T.X., and broadly (i.e. whether they arise irfp\
(pa>TiKrjv alriav, like the one at Syracuse just referred to, which
involved the whole State in its consequences, or not).
32. olov lv Eoriai a K.r.X. As to Hestiaea see note on 1303 a
1 8. As to ra Mrj8iKd see note on 1341 a 28. This quarrel appears
to have happened between the battle of Plataea and the reduction
of Hestiaea by Athens in B.C. 446. It is likely that the dissatisfied
brother brought his case before a court of law, but without success.
7(5). 4. 1303 b 2837. 323
Hestiaea was probably under an oligarchy at the time (Gilbert, Gr.
Staatsalt. 2. 64. 2), and the law or the lawcourts of an oligarchy
may have favoured the richer suitor. Airotpawfiv TTJI> ovo-iav is
a technical expression : cp. Ad. IloX. c. 4. 1. 8, and [Demosth.]
Or. 42. in Phaenipp. cc. i, n, 14. It will be noticed that in 35 the
treasure discovered by the father is distinguished from ^ ovo-ia,
perhaps because it was less unequivocally the property of the
deceased man. This treasure may have been a treasure buried by
the Persians like that discovered by Ameinocles the Magnesian, as
to which compare (with Eaton) Hdt. 7. 190. See Schneider s note.
But it may also have been a treasure laid up by some Greek for
himself and his family : cp. Plato, Laws 913, where we learn what
was thought of those who took up such treasures.
37. Kai iv AeX<|>ois K.T.X. The story is thus told by Plutarch, Reip.
Gerend. Praec. C. 32, olov ev AeX$o7j 6 p.(yiarTos Xeyerai yevtcrdai. vta>T(-
pio-p.bs vno Kpurryroy, ov p.fX\a>v dvyarepa yapdv Opyi Xaos 6 4>aXtSoj, tra
TOU KpaTrjpos aurttyiaTwy tn\ Tciis O~TTOVOCUS p.e(rov paytvros olavKrdfMfvos KOI
KaTaAiTraJi/ TI]V i>vp.(pr)i> dnrj\d( p.era TOV irarpos 6 8e Kpdrjjj o\iyoi> varepov
6vov(Tiv avrois VTro/SaXwi/ xpvoriov TI T<av lfpS)v, K.a.TfK.priiivia f TOV Opyi\aov
Kal TOV d8f\(pbl> UKplTOVt, KO.I TTO\IV TO>V (f)lX<i)V TIVO.S KOI OlKflOJl/ IKfTfVOVTaS
fv TO) tepw Trjs Upovaias dvelXe rf6\\cjv 8e TOIOVTW yevofitvatv, dr
oi AeX^>ot TOV Kpdrjjra KOI TOVS o-Tao-idcravTas (K TU>V xpi]fjd.Ta>v
irpo<rayopfv8fVT<t)v TOVS (COTCO vaovs avwKoSo/irjo-ai . See also Aelian, Var.
Hist. n. 5. The name of the defaulting bridegroom should
perhaps be Orsilaus, not Orgilaus. At the marriage-feast in the
house of the bride s father, at the close of which the bride would
be conducted in procession to her new home, and in the presence
of many of her relations and friends the crater, or vessel for mixing
wine and water, burst asunder just when the libations were being
made, the worst moment at which the mischance could happen.
U. Kohler (Rhein. Mm. 53. 487) takes the /carw vaot of Plutarch to
be three temples in a line with a fourth, identified by him as that
of Athene Pronaia, the foundations of which have been traced
below the road leading from Arachova to Delphi, a little before it
crosses the brook which flows from the fountain of Castalia (see
Frazer, Pausanias, 5. 251), but the point is uncertain. Aesop seems
to have met a similar fate at Delphi to that which befel Orgilaus
and his brother (Plut. De sera numinis vindicta, c. 12 : Aristoph.
Vesp. 1446 sqq. Didot). Viet, and many after him have compared
the story of the jilting of a girl of the Amidei family at Florence by
Y 2
324 NOTES.
young Buondelmonte (Machiavelli, Hist, of Florence, Book ii : Eng.
Trans. Bohn, p. 50). The Emperor Frederick the Second, Machia
velli adds, took the side of the Amidei and Uberti, who drove out
the Buondelmonti, and so our city came to be divided into Guelfs
and Ghibellines, as the whole of Italy was for a long time. How
ever, Orgilaus had a better case than Buondelmonte, for the latter
had no ill omen to plead. It is not surprising that Delphi was
much troubled with oraa-tr, for, to begin with, it was a small State,
and small States were more troubled with o-rao-is than large (6 (4).
n. 1 296 a 9 sqq.), and then again we can easily imagine how
many opportunities of lawful and unlawful gain the authorities of
the Delphic temple must have possessed (see for instance Diod. 14.
13), and how keen in consequence must have been the struggle for
political power and control over the temple. Inscriptions recently
discovered at Delphi have shown also how much profit of a lawful
kind the Delphians and their phratries derived from the influx of
strangers desirous of consulting the oracle (see Buchheim, Beitrage
zur Geschichte des delphischen Staatswesens, i. 21 sqq.).
38. 8ia<f>opds. See note on 1334 b 37.
eyeVero, sc. 17 8ia(popd. For the construction compare 1304 a 4
sqq. and 10 sqq., and see Vahlen s note on Poet. 4. 1449 a 9.
1304 a. 1. oiwurdpci ds TI o-ufiirrwfia. Not, as Viet., cum enim sponsus
ominatus esset quendam gravem casum/ but, as Welldon, inter
preting as an omen of evil some accidental occurrence : compare
Plutarch s narrative (quoted on 1303 b 37) and also Xen. Cyrop. i.
6. I, eVet fie eo> TT}S oiKias fytvovro, \tyovrai da-rpanal KOI /3poi/ra!
avrw oicriot yevicrQaA rovrvv 8e (ftavivrov ov8ti> aXXo ert ola>vL^op.evoi.
CTTOpfVOVTO.
2. ot 8 us upptafleVres K.T.\. The bride s relations thought that
they were treated with v/Bpis, but in reality Orgilaus act was not
one of vfipis, but of superstitious dread. We learn from Plutarch
that Orgilaus and his brother were put to death without trial : cp.
Aelian, Var. Hist. II. 5> ^aftovres ovv OVTOVS <ur 6fotrv\a?, cmriyayov eVrt
TT]V nerpav, Kai KarfKprjuvKTav Kara TOV A(\<piKov VO/J.QV. Precipitation
from a cliff was the recognized punishment at Delphi for persons
guilty of sacrilege (Paus. 10. 2. 4), and it may have been lawful,
especially for men of high position like Crates, to inflict this
punishment without a previous trial on offenders caught in the act.
As to summary punishments of this kind see Thonissen, Droit
Penal de la Republique Athenienne, p. 92. Crates subsequent
7 (5). 4. 1303 b 38 1304 a 7. 325
murder of friends and relatives of the victims, when suppliants in
a temple, cannot, however, have been even technically legal.
4. KCU irepl MiruX^irji Se ic.T.X. See Prof. Jowett s note. I agree
with him that there is no inconsistency between the passage before
us and the account given by Thucydides of the revolt of Mytilene,
except that the deeper causes of the revolt are better set forth by
the latter. Thucydides explains how the proxenus of Athens
spurred on the Athenians in 3. 2. 3, Ttvedioi yap ovres avrols 8id<popoi
KOI MrjOvfjtvdloi KOL avrutv Mim\r)vaia>v idia avftpes Kara a~ra<riv, irpo^tvoi
A07)t>aia>v, fJujWTai yiyvovrai TOIS A.6r)i>aiois on {-vvoiKi^ovcri re TTJV Ato-fiov
(s rf)v MvTihrjvijv $( a Kal rqv irapaa-Kfvrjv airaaav /tera AaKtSaifjioviaiv Kal
BotwraJv {-vyytvtov ovr<av eirl aTrotrrdtret (rrfiyovrat. It is evident from
the speech of the Mytilenean envoys in Thuc. 3. 9 sqq. that the
real cause of the revolt was the fear which the Mytileneans not
unnaturally entertained of the ultimate loss of their independence,
and nothing would do more to intensify this fear than the con
sciousness that they had been denounced to the Athenians.
Aristotle was for some time a resident at Mytilene (vol. i. p. 466),
and he may have heard this story there, possibly from a descendant
of Timophanes, or he may have heard it from his friend and pupil
Theophrastus, who belonged to Eresus in Lesbos.
5. ey^ero, sc. 17 orao-tf (see note on 1303 b 38).
7. Tifio^ayous yap K.T.\. We are more familiar with the Corinthian
Timophanes, the brother of Timoleon, of whom we read in c. 6.
13063 23 sq. We do not learn whether Timophanes had made
a will and bequeathed his two orphan heiresses to others than the
two sons of Dexander, or why, if he had not, they did not pass in
marriage to the nearest male relative (see note on 12 70 a 21).
Perhaps the question who the nearest male relative was may have
been a disputed one and may have been decided by the magistrates
or lawcourts of the Mytilenean oligarchy against Dexander, or
perhaps the strict rules which prevailed at Athens with respect to
succession to the hand of an orphan heiress did not prevail at
Mytilene, and much was left to the discretion of the magistrate or
the heir of the deceased father (as at Sparta : see note on 1 2 70 a
21). It is evident that a precise rule as to the succession to the
hand of an orphan heiress and an honest application of it by the
magistrate or the lawcourt were things very conducive to the internal
peace of Greek States. Aristotle s narrative does not make it clear
why Dexander avenged his disappointment, not on his successful
326 NOTES.
rival, but on the State of Mytilene ; probably, however, the authori
ties of the State had in some way or other lent support to the
claims of his opponent.
8. 6 irepiwcrOeis, cp. C. 6. 1 306 a 32.
TOIS uU crif auToG, for his own sons/ a dative of gain.
9. The difference of tense in rjpe and irapci^uve (a continued
action) should be noticed.
10. Kal iv <t>o)Koo-n K.r.X. Hcp\ Mvaaeav, in connexion with
Mnaseas : cp. Hdt. 3. 76, ra irep\ Uprjgdvnfa yryovoTa, the circum-
stances that had happened in connexion with Prexaspes." T6i<
Ovofidpxov, sc. Trarepa. The passage before us is our only source of
information with respect to this (miens. Mnason was a friend
of Aristotle (Timaeus ap. Athen. Deipn. 264 d) and was probably
his informant, as Schafer (Demosthenes, i. 445) has pointed out.
He seems to have given evidence favourable to the conduct of
Aeschines in Phocian matters at the trial of the latter in B.C. 343
for misconduct on his second embassy to Philip, which ended in
his acquittal (Aeschin. De Fals. Leg. ^c. 142 sq.), and later to have
become the tyrant of Elateia (Schafer, Demosthenes, 3. 36). His
house and that of Onomarchus were among the leading houses of
Phocis (Schafer, i. 444 sq.). As to his patronage of artists see
Plin. Nat. Hist. 35. 99, 107. Aristotle does not tell us in what way
the quarrel between the two houses resulted in the Sacred War.
The immediate causes of the war were i. the imposition of a heavy
fine by the Amphictyonic Council under the influence of Thebes
on some Phocians (Onomarchus perhaps being one of them) who
had cultivated land belonging to the Delphic temple, and 2. a threat
that, if the fine remained unpaid, Phocis should be declared to have
escheated to the Delphic god (Grote, Hist, of Greece, n. 342 :
Curtius, Hist, of Greece, Eng. Trans., 5. 62 sqq. : Schafer, i. 443
sqq.). Aristotle probably means that the existence of this ordo-is-
in Phocis encouraged Thebes and the Amphictyons to do what
they did, or else that Mnaseas invoked the aid of Thebes. Justin
(8. i) lays the blame of the war entirely on Thebes ; Aristotle, on
the other hand, as a friend of Macedon, which had overthrown and
ruined Phocis in the war, was perhaps not sorry to be able to
point out that some leading families of Phocis itself were partly to
blame (see note on 1306 a 10).
13. (iCT^paXe 8e ica! iv EiriSafiKw f\ iroXireia CK yajuicwt K.r.X.
The change of constitution at Epidamnus here referred to may
7 (5). 4. 1304 a 825. 327
probably be the same as that described in c. i. 1301 b 21 sqq., but
we cannot be certain of this. Does KOI lv l Em8dfjLv<o imply that the
troubles arising K yafuwv at Delphi and Mytilene and in Phocis
had also led to a change of constitution ?
14. uTTo^vT)OTu<TdfAe> os, having betrothed his daughter to a man.
"\rt pos is added in 1 6 with fatal results to the sentence : see note
on 1306 b 9.
17. fiTapa\Xouo-i 8e K.T.X. See note on 1303 a 13. So far we have
had to do with cases in which orao-ts has arisen from contumely or
wrong : now we learn that constitutional change may arise from
the growth in reputation or power of a magistracy (such as the
Council of the Areopagus) or a part of the State (such as the
demos or the VOVTIKOS 0^X05 or the yvupipoi). A similar transition
from TO dnp-d^fo-dai to uTrepo^ is made in c. 3. 1302 b 15.
20. olov TJ lv Apeico Trdyw pouXfj K.r.X. The Council of the
Areopagus had induced the poorer citizens to man the triremes
and to fight at Salamis by distributing eight drachmae to each man
( A.0. HoX. c. 23: Plut. Themist. c. 10: see note on 1297 b 10).
Cicero goes further in De Offic. i. 22. 75, where he says of the war
against the Persians, est enim bellum gestum consilio senatus eius,
qui a Solone erat constitutus.
21. o-uirrofuTepai , i.e. more approaching oligarchy (6 (4). 3.
i29oa 27 : Rhet. i. 4. 1360 a 23 sqq.: *A0. rioX. c. 26. 1. 2). Cp-
2. 12. 1273 b 39 sq.
KCH irdXiK 6 cauTiKos oxXos K.T.X., and on the other hand the
naval multitude, having been the cause of the victory at Salamis
and by means of it of the hegemony by reason of the power [of the
State] by sea, made the democracy of a more decided type. Cp.
2. 12. i274a 12 sqq. and Plut. Aristid. c. 22, and for io-xvporepav
8 (6). 7. 1321 a 9. With Sus. and Welldon I take 8ia TTJV Kara
ddXarrav tivvapw with what precedes, and not (as Lamb, and Stahr)
with TTJV 8r)p,oKpariav la^vporfpav firotTjcrtv. Hd\iv here, as in 6 (4). 15.
i299b 4 and other passages, contrarium motum vel actum signi-
ficat (Bon. Ind. 559 a 60 sqq.). O vavriKos o^Xor refers to the
trireme-oarsmen who formed a large element in the Athenian demos
(6 (4). 4. 1291 b 23 sq.). Atd TavTTjs, SC. rijs I>IKI}.
25. KOI e^ Apyci K.T.X. The yvvptpot referred to are the thousand
picked warriors of the richest class (Diod. 12. 75. 7, 80. 3), who after
the battle of Mantineia in B.C. 418 took it in hand to overthrow
the democracy at Argos, and indeed ruled the State for some months
328 NOTES.
(eight according to Diod. 12. 80. 4, but see Grote, Hist, of Greece,
7. 136. 2), and might have ruled it longer but for the brutal conduct
of their leader Bryas (Paus. 2. 20. 2). See as to the thousand Thuc.
5. 67, Diod. 12. 75, 80, Plut. Alcib. c. 15, and Paus. 2. 20, with
Gilbert s note in Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 78. As to their success against
the Lacedaemonians see Thuc. 5. 72. 3 and Diod. 12. 79. 4 sqq.
That they won credit in a war with the Lacedaemonians is mentioned
because this added to the credit acquired, and it is for the same
reason that we are told in what follows that the war in which
the Syracusan demos triumphed and won political supremacy was
a war with Athens. KardXvfiv TOV br^nv recurs in c. 5. i304b
30, 31, 34, and c. 7. 1307 b 24. In c. 5. i3O4b 35 we have
K<iTt\v6ri f] BrjuoKparia. K.aTa\vtiv TOV 8rjfj.ov > KaraAverir TOV 8jjfiov were
the phrases used in the vo^os dvayyeXias, as to which see ! A0. noX.
c. 8. 1. 25 sq. and Sandys note.
27. KU lv IupClKOU(TCU9 K.T.X. For TTJS VIKTJS TOV TTO\f fJ.OV Cp. PlatO,
Laws 641 A, viKT) iro\fpov TOIS firopevois av yiyvoiTo, and 638 A, VIKTJV
Tt KOI jJTTav \eyovres /-la^y : Thuc. I. 121. 5? A"? rf V LK H vavfut\ias Kara
TO ftKot &\ta-KovTai. Aristotle sometimes distinguishes 6 8fjfj.os from
oi on-AIrai (c. 6. 1305 b 33 : cp. 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 12-14). Does he
mean here that the failure of the Athenians in the siege of Syracuse
was brought about rather by the fleet and light troops of the
Syracusans than by their hoplites and cavalry? The turning-point
of the siege came when the victory of Gylippus (Thuc. 7. 6) made
it possible for him to complete the building of his wall (Freeman.
Sicily, 3. 254 sq.). This victory was won by the Syracusan hoplites
assisted by their cavalry and light troops (dKotmo-Tai), but, to judge
by Thucydides account, the cavalry did more to win it than the
hoplites and light troops. Aristotle may have been otherwise
informed, or he may have regarded the first victory won by the
Syracusan fleet in the Great Harbour (Thuc. 7. 41 : Freeman, 3.
298 sqq.) as the real turning-point of the siege. There is at any
rate no doubt that the Syracusan fleet and light-armed did much to
make the disaster complete and irreparable (Thuc. 7. 71 : 7. 81. 4 :
7. 84. 4). The Syracusan heavy-armed infantry seems to have
been of a very inferior description and never to have encountered
the Athenians with effect except when supported by the Syracusan
cavalry (Arnold on Thuc. 7. 84). But the cavalry, a force not
recruited from the demos, appears to have often done good service.
At the same time nothing reflected more lustre on Syracuse or did
7 (5). 4. 1304 a 27- -31. 329
more to depress the spirits of the Athenians than the unexpected
victory of her fleet (Thuc. 7. 55). Aristotle appears to consider that
a polity or aristocracy (c. 10. 1312 b 6-9) existed at Syracuse from
B.C. 466-5, when the tyranny was overthrown, to B.C. 413, the date
of the failure of the Athenian expedition. Yet inc. I2.i3i6a32sq.
we are told that the tyranny was succeeded by a democracy. As
to the part of the Twelfth Chapter in which this statement occurs,
however, see vol. i. p. 519, note i. Thucydides (7. 55) says that
the Syracusans were under a democracy at the time of the Athenian
invasion. The main change in the institutions of Syracuse which
was made after the Athenian repulse seems to have been that the
lot came into use in appointments to magistracies (Diod. 13. 34. 6).
It is perhaps this change that Aristotle has in view when he says
that a polity was succeeded by a democracy. Tfjv irokneiav must
apparently be supplied with ptTi$a\fv.
29. KCU lv Xa\Ki8i K.r.X. Nothing is known about the tyrant
Phoxus at Chalcis, or about the tyrant Antileon, who is mentioned
in c. 12. 1316 a 31 sq. Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 66) surmises that
these two tyrannies occurred as temporary breaks in the continuity
of the oligarchy of the Hippobotae at Chalcis, which seems to have
lasted from very early times till the reduction of Chalcis by Athens
in B.C. 506. Unlike the tyranny of Antileon, which was followed
by an oligarchy (1316 a 31), the tyranny of Phoxus was followed by
a democracy. Hence it is not likely that Phoxus was the last tyrant
of a dynasty founded by Antileon. *odr (the accent being altered,
as usual, in proper names) means peaked in the head, an indication
of impudence ([Aristot.] Physiognom. 6. 812 a 8); Thersites is
(frogos in Horn. II. 2. 219. But $oot were believed often to possess
great physical strength (Hippocr. De Morb. Vulgar. 6 : vol. iii. p. 583
Kiihn). Compare such names as Simus and Pyrrhus. The name
Phoxus occurs at Phocaea (Polyaen. Strateg. 8. 37).
31. cixTo TTJS iroXircias, took firm hold of the constitution.
KCU tv AfAfBpaiaa K.T.\. We might have expected the order of the
words to be Htpiavftpov rov rvpavvov rots f7ri6(p.f vois o dfjuos (TvveK^a\u>v,
but then it would have resembled too nearly the order of the words
in the preceding sentence, and therefore a different order is preferred.
Cypseltis, tyrant of Corinth, sent his illegitimate son Gorgus to
found a colony at Ambracia, and Gorgus had two sons,
Psammetichus and Periander. The former in B.C. 585 succeeded
Cypselus son Periander in the tyranny of Corinth and was slain,
330 NOTES.
and the tyranny overthrown, three years later. The latter became
tyrant of Ambracia and was expelled (Plutarch, Amat. c. 23, says
slain), probably not long after the fall of Psammetichus at Corinth,
under the circumstances narrated in c. 10. 1311 a 39 sqq. A
democracy was then established at Ambracia, but as this revolution
occurred early in the sixth century B.C., it is perhaps hardly likely
that in the democracy then set up the low property-qualification
for office existed of which we read in c. 3. 1303 a 23 sqq. It may
have been introduced later. The neighbouring Corinthian colony
Leucas seems to have undergone a somewhat similar change in
a democratic direction (2. 7. i266b 21 sqq.), but we are not told
at what time this happened. At Corinth, on the other hand, the
tyranny was succeeded by an oligarchy, which held its own for
a very long time (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 90).
33. Kal SXws 8fj K.T.X., and further broadly this must not escape
notice etc. For KO\ . . . 8rj, see note on 1253 a 18, and cp. i. 13.
1259 b 32, Kal Ka66\ov 8rj. Aristotle has said that when a magistracy
or a part of the State, such as the demos or the yvcapi^ot, grows in
reputation or influence, constitutional change is apt to follow, and
now he adds the broad statement that all winners of power for the
State, even if the winner is not a magistracy or an important part
of the State like the demos or yi/cbpt/xoi, but only a private individual
or a body of individuals, become the source of o-rdais. Of men who
won power for their State as magistrates and who afterwards were
not willing peveiv eVl rojj/ UHDJ/ we have a conspicuous instance in
Lysander (see Diod. 14. 13. i sq.). Themistocles may have been
another (see note on 1302 b 15). Hermocrates of Syracuse made his
State great by his policy of resistance to Athens and was eventually
banished by his fellow-citizens (Xen. Hell. i. i. 27 : Freeman, Sicily,
3. 429 sqq.). The Council of the Areopagus helped to make Athens
great by its action before the battle of Salamis (1304 a 20 sq. :
\\0. rioX. c. 23), and the honours paid it in consequence may well
have aroused jealousy and caused avdais, and ultimately led to
a limitation of its powers. Aristotle may possibly have before him
among other things in his reference to private individuals, and
also in onoiovovv ir\fj0os, the services rendered by Pythagoras and the
Pythagoreans to Croton. It was during the period of their ascen
dency that Croton conquered and destroyed Sybaris in B.C. 510,
and the honours they then earned may probably have led to the
attack which was subsequently made on them and to their expul-
7(5). 4. 1304 a 3338. 331
sion from Croton. I do not know to what tribes Aristotle refers.
The Aeantid tribe at Athens covered itself with glory at Marathon
and Plataea and received special honours in consequence (Plut.
Sympos. i. 10. 3, Aristid. c. 19), but whether these honours aroused
the jealousy of other tribes, we are not told. The Aeschrionian
tribe at Samos must have done much for the greatness of the State,
for some members of it were resident in Herodotus day in the
Great Oasis, seven days journey west of Thebes (Hdt. 3. 26), but
we know of no resulting irraa-is. It is possible that Aristotle has in
view the case of Sicyon, where the tribe Aegialeis, to which the
tyrant Cleisthenes belonged and on which he heaped honours (Hdt.
5. 68), may well have helped him to achieve greatness for the State
with the result that orao-iy followed and the tyranny was overthrown.
That trrao-ts sometimes arose in connexion with gentes we see from
the story of the Myletidae in Thuc. 6. 5. The case of the Aegeidae
at Sparta (Hdt. 4. 149) may have been similar. Oiroiovovv ir\?i6os,
e. g. whether composed of rich men like the thousand picked
warriors at Argos or of poor men like the VOVTIKOS o^Xo? at
Athens or of philosophers like the Pythagoreans. Aristotle does
not notice that those to whose mismanagement a diminution in the
power of the State is due are still more often the cause of o-rdais
than those who have added to its power. The troubles, for instance,
of the reigns of Richard the Second and Henry the Sixth in England
were to some extent due to the loss of the possessions of the Crown
in France. National ill-success had something to do with the
French Revolution of 1789 and the following years. Throughout
ancient as well as modern history defeat and embarrassment in
the foreign relations have proved fruitful causes of change in the
internal government (Grote, Hist, of Greece, 10. 598).
34. ol 8ukdfj,eoj9 aiTioi ycvopccoi. Cp. [Xen.] Rep. Ath. i. 2,
6 8fjp.6s fffnv 6 e\avva>v ras vavs *al 6 rr/v 8vvap.iv ntpiTifftls rfj TrdXet.
37. 8ia TT\V uir^po j^v. Cp. Rhet. 2. 2. 1379 a 6, dyavaKrovvi yap
Sia Ttjv vTrfpo^Tjv,
38. Kivoon-ai 8 ai TroXireiai K.T.\. Aristotle here passes from
cases in which one part of the State is greatly superior in position
to the rest to the case in which the rich and the demos stand on
an equality in respect of strength. For the thought cp. Manil.
Astronom. i. 334 (a line pronounced by Bentley to be spurious),
Semper erit paribus bellum, quia viribus aequant,
and Justin, 13. 2. 3, who says of the generals of Alexander after
332 NOTES.
his death, inter ipsos vero aequalitas discordiam augebat, nemine
tantum ceteros excedente ut ei aliquis se submitteret, and 16. 3. i,
adsiduum inter pares discordiae malum. Emu &&gt;KotWa, because
the really contrary parts of the State are the good and the bad
(c. 3. 1303 b 15). That the rich and the poor are thought to be
contrary we have seen in 6 (4). 4. i2prb 2-11 ; they are treated
as actually so in 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 27 sq.
1:-!04 b. 1. ot irXooo-ioi KCH 6 Sfjfjios. o S^os is contrasted with ol nXoixrioi
here and in 6 (4). 12. 1297 an sqq., with ot eviropoi in 6 (4). n.
1296 a 28, 6 (4). 12. 1297 a 9 sq., and 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 6 sq., with
ot ras ovvias (\ovrfs in 6 (4). ii. 1296 a 25 ; still oftener with ot
yvcopinoi, especially in the present Book (6 (4). 14. 1298 b 20 sq.:
7 (5)- 4- 1304 a 25 sqq., 30: 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 16 sq. : 7 (5). 7.
1307 a 29 sqq. : 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 12 sq.: 7 (5). n. 1313 b 18); else
where with oifTtitiKfis (2. 12. 1 274 a 12 sqq. : 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 9 sq. :
8 (6). 4. I3i8b34sq.). In 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 33 6 %tos is distinguished
from ot on-XiTot, and in the passage before us by implication from
TO (iiffov. And yet we see from 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 18 sqq. that
6 Bfj/jLos includes classes many members of which must have been
rich, for instance the Te^i/Irai (3. 5. 1278 a 24, TrXovrouo-i yap *a\ nl
TToXXot TO)V Tt^VlTCav).
5. oXiyoi yap yiyyoiTai irp&s iroXXous, for they come to be few
against many. See notes on 1252 b 7 and 1264 a 14, and cp.
8 (6). i. 1317 a 24.
icadoXou fiey ouc K.r.X. This is virtually repeated in 17, d7rX&&gt;r /iej>
<wv K.T.X., and it is very possible that the passage 7-17, which
intervenes between these two sentences, is a later addition, though
it may well have been placed where it stands by Aristotle.
7. KifoCo-i 8c rds TToXircias K.r.X. This is mentioned in order
that those who seek to preserve constitutions may be prepared for
the -various methods to which those who seek to destroy them may
,be expected to have recourse. Peisistratus won his tyranny on the
first two occasions by deceit and on the third by force ( A0. noX. cc.
14, 15), and Dionysius the Elder imitated him in beginning by deceit
(Diod. 13. 95. 5 sq.). Lysander had sought to change the Lacedae
monian constitution by attempting to suborn various oracles to give
answers in support of his policy (Diod. 14. 13), and was no doubt
prepared, if necessary, to follow up his intrigue by the use of force.
Tyrants were commonly conceived to win their tyrannies either by
deceit or by force (Diog. Laert. 3. 83 : cp. Xen. Mem. 3. 9. 10 and
7(5). 4. 1304 b 15. 1304 b 19. 333
Pol. 7 (5). 10. I3i3a 9 sq.) : it was Aristotle s merit to have pointed
out that all persons who sought to change a constitution were apt to
resort either to force or to deceit or to a combination of the two.
To win by deceit was more odious than to win by force (Thuc. 4.
86. 4 : Dio Cass. 52. 2. 6 sq.). We need not take Aristotle to mean
that constitutional change is always effected either by force or by
deceit or by a combination of the two.
10. Kal yap TJ dwdTTj Simi, for deceit also is twofold [and there
fore it is not surprising that force is so]. Km ydp here retains its
full meaning, as in i. 9. 1257 b 8. There is deceit which is eked
out by a subsequent use of force, force being called in to complete
what deceit has begun, and there is deceit which is not supple
mented subsequently by force, but suffices by itself and is employed
throughout.
12. Karexouo-ir, sc. rf]i> iroXiTtlav (cp. 15 : see Bon. Ind. 377 a 12),
keep the constitution in their hands. Cp. Demosth. Ol. 2. 9, *<u
fj-fjv fl TIS vp.)v raiira p.ev ovrats fX elv 1 77 f * ra , olfrai 8e ftiq naQe^fiv avrov
TO. irpa.yp.ara r<5 ra \u>pia KOI Xt/ne cas <cai ra rotavra TrpofiXrjfpevai, OVK
opdats oitrai.
olov eVi Twi TCTpaKoo-iui/ K.r.X. Aristotle seems to imply that
Peisander and his colleagues had overstated from the first their con
fidence in the promises of Alcibiades, and were not so sinned
against as Thucydides describes (Mr. E. L. Hicks in Journal of
Hellenic Studies, 8. 403, note).
13. elTjirdrqaaf, SC. ot /xra/3aXAoj/r TTJV iroXiTfiav.
rbv paatXea. The article is usually omitted (as in A0. HoX. c. 29.
11. 4, 8) when the Persian king is referred to (see Liddell and
Scott s.v.).
14. ^cuadjiecoi, after this false statement (Welldon). Bonitz
(Ind. s.v.), however, explains \^fu<m/ze>ot as synonymous with (t-cnra-
rfaavrfs, 10. Perhaps the latter of these two interpretations is to
be preferred.
17. aurwc, i. e. those living under the constitution.
19. Ka0 eicaoTOV 8 elSos iroXtTtias K.T.X., but [we must not rest
content with ascertaining the broad causes common to all con
stitutions;] we must take each kind of constitution, and making x
these broad principles our starting-point, we must study kind by
kind what happens in each. So in c. 12. 1316 a 3 sqq. Aristotle
finds fault with the Platonic Socrates for not tracing the overthrow
of the best constitution to causes special to it. Mep t ovrar, sc. rat
334 NOTES.
s, dividing constitutions as a whole into the different kinds
composing the whole. For ra a-v^aivovra cp. c. 10. 1310 b i sq..
and see Bon. Ind. 7 13 a 19 sqq.
20. 0,1 fjiec ouv 8r]fjLOKpaTi cu K.T.X. Mev oZv is taken up by IMCV ovv,
I 35 a 34> an d tnen Answered by 8 in c. 6. 1305 a 37. In the
chapter before us Aristotle dwells only on those modes of change
special to democracy which are most apt to affect democracies
(/iaXrra, 2O : yet Trao-ai o^eSci/, 1 305 a 35). Demagogues are
especially fatal to them, causing them to change into oligarchies
and formerly into tyrannies, and also causing them to change from
the traditional kind of democracy into the ultimate democracy.
We have been told in c. 3. i3O2b 6 sqq. that vfipts and irXfovegla
in magistrates are sources of constitutional change, but now we
learn that the misconduct of demagogues, who are not necessarily
magistrates, is a source of constitutional change in democracies.
That there are other causes of change in democracies not special
to them, we have learnt already. They are subject to changes
arising from contempt engendered by disorder (c. 3. i302b
2 7 sqq.), from the disproportionate increase of a class (in their
case the rich: cp. c. 3. 1303 a 10 sqq.), from the adjnissiqn to
important offices of men unfriendly to the constitution (c. 3. 1303 a
1 6 sqq.), and from trie aggrandizement of single individuals or
a few persons (c. 3. 1302 b 15 sqq.), to mention no others. Plato
had ascribed the fall of democracies rather to rj ayav eXevdepia
(Rep. 5626, 564 A) than to the license of demagogues; he had
also said (Rep. 564 A : cp. c. 12. 1316 a 22 sq.) that democracies
tended to change into tyrannies, and Aristotle agrees that this is
especially true of the extreme democracy (see note on 1316 a 24), but
he thinks, as the chapter before us shows, that democracies were
in his own day less apt to change into tyrannies than they had once
been, and that their tendency then was rather to change into
oligarchies (cp. c. 12. I3i6a 23 sq.). The view that the
impudent license of demagogues leads to the fall of democracies
comes to Aristotle from Lysias (Or. 25. 27, quoted by Eaton) and
from Isocrates (De Pace, 108, 123). In the hope of counter
acting this source of change in democracies Aristotle gives some
wholesome advice in c. 8. 1309 a 14 sqq. and c. 9. 1310 a 2 sqq.,
and also in 8 (6). 5, where he suggests means of checking the abuse
of the lawcourts by demagogues. Possibly too the advice given in
c. 8. 1 308 bio sqq. not to make any single individual overgreat refers
7(5). 5. 1304b 2021. 335
to demagogues among others, though it seems rather to refer to the
aggrandizement of magistrates. It will be noticed that in 8 (6). 5
what he dreads for the extreme democracy is not its conversion into
f-a tyranny, but its tendency to alienate the rich. Democracies do
ffiot seem, to judge by the chapter before us, often to have changed
into aristocracies or polities, nor do we often hear of the extreme
^.democracy changing into fj narpia 8rjnoKparia. Yet that this some-
Atimes occurred seems clear from c. 6. 1306 b 21^ rovrtov fls tKfivns.
j 21. TTJC T&V STjfiaywYwc Ao cXyciai . The passage before us should
be compared with 7 (5). 10. 1311 a iSsqq. and 8 (6). 5. i32oa
4 sqq. In all these three passages some light is thrown on the
ways in which the rich were oppressed in those democracies in which
they suffered oppression. In 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 15 sqq. democracy
is said not only to exile the notables, but also to destroy them
secretly and openly. Of this we do not hear anything in the
,-passage before us or in 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 4 sqq. The demagogues
are said in the passage before us to oppress the rich in a variety of
sways. Sometimes they made the rich as a class the object of their
.attacks, setting the many on them (cp. c. 9. 1310 a 3 sqq.); some-
Itimes they singled out individual rich men for attack and brought
/ calumnious accusations against them with a view to the confiscation
of their property, or confiscated their property without these
^preliminary accusations, often exiling them to make the thing
easier (we do not learn whether in these cases confiscation was
effected by the assembly cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 6, S^eiW<uy or by
the dicasteries) ; sometimes, again, they robbed the rich of part of
their income by imposing heavy liturgies upon them (cp. c. 8. 1309 a
14 sqq.). From the third passage, 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 4 sqq., we gather
that what the rich had to fear in a democracy was rather the
confiscation of their property by dicasteries and as a result of
public actions than its confiscation by the assembly, and that
they were especially exposed to oppression in those extreme demo
cracies in which, the assembly being a very numerous body, a large
sum of money was required to provide it with pay, and there were
no special revenues to supply the pay. In such democracies the
eisphora would be heavy, confiscations frequent, and the dicasteries
bad. We sometimes find democracy credited with a leaning to
a general redivision of the land and a cancelling of debts e. g. by
Plato (Rep. 565 E sq.) and Polybius (6. 9. 8 sq. : cp. Justin, 16.
4. 2) but of this Aristotle says nothing.
336 NOTES.
22. TCI (iec yap K.T.\. This is based on Plato, Rep. 565 A-B.
Compare the circumstances under which the famous cncuraXioTxdr at
Argos arose, which are thus narrated by Diodorus (15. 58. i), rrjy
TroXecos ruiv Apyeiuv r]/jLOKpaTovf4fi>r]s Kai TIV&V 8r)fj.ayary>v 7rapovvovTQ)v TO
7r\f)6os Kara ra>v rats (ov<riais Kai 86ais iinfpfX" VTa>v i 1 5ia/3aAXo/Mfi/oi
(Tva-ravrfy tyvcocrav KaraXva-ai rov Srjfjiov K.r.X., though it IS not clear
that in this instance the demagogues singled out individual rich
men for calumnious attack.
23. owdyei yap Kai TOUS e)(0urrous 6 KOIMOS <f>6f3os. Cp. Plut.
De Solert. Anim. C. 31, 6 yap AptcrroTeX^y lo-rope? (f>i\ias aXwneKcav KOI
ofacav Sia TO KOIVOV avTois TroXe/woj emu rbv deroi/, however the fox and
snake are said to be friends in Hist. An. 9. I. 6ioa 12 : cp. also
Rhet. I. 6. 1362 b 36, ovdev yap ccwAuet eVi ore TO.VTO <rvfji(pfpfiv rots
fvatTLois odfv Xtyerat ws ra KaKa crvvdyei roiis dvdpo)7rovs, orav y ravrii
24. eTrdyoi Tes, setting on, as hunters do dogs (Horn. Odyss. 1 9.
445: Xen. Cyneg. 10. 19: Plut. Pelop. c. 29: see Liddell and
Scott s.v.).
TOUTO, i.e. the overthrow of democracies owing to the misconduct
of demagogues.
25. Kai yap iv Kw K.T.\. Schafer (Demosthenes, i. 427) con
nects this change with the defection of Cos from the Athenian
Confederacy in B.C. 357 (Diod. 16. 7. 3), but nothing is certainly
known as to its date. We notice that the examples which follow
are taken from Dorian States (Cos, Rhodes, the Pontic Heracleia,
and Megara).
27. Kai Iv c Po8a> K.T.\. See note on i3O2b 23. The demagogues
at Rhodes, in their anxiety to provide funds for the supply of pay
to the poorer citizens (for attendance probably at the assembly and
dicasteries, etc.), seem to have prevented, or at any rate delayed, the
payment to the trierarchs (who would of course belong to the class of
yi/wpi/zot) of sums due to them from the State for work done by ship
builders or ship-fitters by their direction, the result being that the
ship-builders or ship-fitters brought actions against the trierarchs
for the recovery of the money owing to them. In other words
the demagogues obtained the means of providing pay for the
poorer citizens by leaving expenses in connexion with ship
building or ship-fitting for which the State was properly responsible
to be defrayed by the trierarchs. As to liturgies at Rhodes con
nected with the navy see Strabo, p. 653, where however a lacuna in
7(5). 5. 1304b 2231. 337
the text makes the exact nature of the liturgy obscure. At Rhodes
there was a refusal under the influence of demagogues to pay
money justly due to yvupipoi from the State, or at any rate a delay
to pay it ; at Heracleia, Megara, and Cyme the demagogues went
further and exiled many of the yv<apipm.
28. ^7r6pioc . . . eKwXuoi . The tense used shows that the
demagogues kept doing this (cp. 33, (gemmou, and 36, ee ;SaXXoi>).
29. 8ia ras em<J>epofi,eVas Bucas. Cp. Diod. 2O. 62. 5, 6 8e
(pot3r)6f\s Tas (iri(p{pop.tvas tvdvvas KOI Kpifffis aTTfxcopJjcrei fls rf/v Te\av.
31. KareXuOr] 8e Kal Iv HpcucXeia K.T.\. What Heracleia is here
referred to ? The Trachinian Heracleia according to C. O. Miiller
and Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 190. 2), the Pontic Heracleia
according to Bonitz (Ind. 319 b 39), Sus. 2 (Note 1555), and Busolt
(Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 395). The latter view is probably correct,
for though in C. 6. 1305 b 36 we have iv HpancXe/a TJ / T Uovrta
as the designation of this city, the words V HpaxXci a (without rfj eV
TW Uovrtf) in c. 6. 1305 b 5 and 1306 a 37 appear to refer to the
Pontic Heracleia, as do the words fj TTO\IS ra>v HpaK\fa>Tmv in 4 (7).
6. 1327 b 14. So in Diog. Laert. 7. 166 TroXeoK Se Hpa/cXet a? refers
to the Pontic Heracleia. This was a colony of Megara, founded
in the middle of the sixth century B. c. (see note on 1303 a 36), and
it would seem from the passage before us to have been at the
outset democratically governed. It is not clear whether it is to this
democracy that Aeneas refers in Poliorc. n. 10, or to a democracy
of a later date (see note on i3O5b 33). The chronology of the
constitutional changes at Megara in the sixth century B.C. is too little
known to us to allow of a certain answer to the question whether
a democracy existed at Megara when it founded Heracleia, but this
may possibly have been the case (Plut. Quaest. Gr. cc. 18, 59 : see
note on 1300 a 17). The transition to Megara in 34 sqq. makes in
favour of the view that the Pontic Heracleia is referred to. The
demagogues appear to have behaved in much the same way in
the mother-city and in the colony, and with fatal results to the
democracy in both places. We observe that the contrast of 817^01
and yvwpipoi existed in Heracleia immediately after the foundation
of the colony ; this seems to show that the original lots of land
there cannot have been equal (see note on i266b i). Newly
founded cities were often in a disturbed state (Isocr. De Pace, 49,
%fipov KOI Tapax<aSf<rTfpov TTJV y/urtpav avrwv diuiKovp.fi/ TO>I> apn ras
VOL. IV.
338 NOTES.
32. Some light is thrown on the meaning of dSiKoupcyoi by
1305 a 3-5-
34. TrapcnrXrjo-iws Be K.T.\. See note on 1300 a 17. It appears
from c. 3. 1302 b 31 that the democracy at Megara referred to fell
not only owing to the conduct of the demagogues, but also because
much dra^ia KCI\ dvap\la prevailed under it. The democracies
introduced by Thebes in the cities of Achaia fell in a somewhat
similar way to this Megarian democracy (Xen. Hell. 7. i. 43).
36. Iva. xpTJfJiaTa IXWCTI STjfieoeii , in order to be able to confiscate
property : cp. 1305 a 6 sq. The proceeds of the confiscated pro
perty, or whatever part of them was not plundered on the way by
the demagogues, would be distributed among the poorer citizens or
used to provide them with pay for attendance at the assembly and
dicasteries. Nullo loco Aristoteles optative post particulas finales
utitur, sed promiscue et post tempus praesens et post praeteritum
coniunctivum adhibet (Eucken, De Partic. Usu, p. 52). In 8 (6). 5.
1320 a 35, T(xva<TT(ov ovv OTT<I)S av (vrropia ytvoiro xpovios, according to
Eucken, videtur particula OTTWS vi plane relativa uti/ and in Eth.
Nic. 10. 7. 1177 b 9-12 Eucken would read yivuvrai with M b in
place of yiyvmvro. Weber, however (Die Absichtssatze bei Aristo
teles, p. 25), retains yiyvowro and explains it by attraction to noiolro.
He produces (ibid.) another exception to the rule (overlooked
apparently by Eucken), Hist. An. 9. 9. 614 b 14, xai ridaa-a-evofjifvos be
TIS fjdt) df*vy8a\ov (Is p<ayfj.f]v v\ov fi>d(is f ojrtas (vappocrdfv inropeiveuv
avrov TTJV TrA^yTjc, eV rfj Tpirg TrX^yj; 8ifKt>\^f KOI KarfjcrOif TO fiaXaKov, but
adds that this exception does not interfere with our acceptance of
the rule.
39. iV oXiyapxiai , perhaps the well-known oligarchy : cp. 6 (4).
15. 1300 a 17 sqq.
<nW(3t] 8c raoTw K.T.\. Nothing is known about these events.
Which Cyme is referred to, is uncertain both here and in 2. 8.
1269 a i. Forma generis neutrius TUVTOV saepe legitur non solum
ante vocales, verum etiam ante consonantes" (Bon. Ind. 125 b 16).
1305 a. 2. TWV aXXwy, sc. noXecov. See note on 1266 b i.
3. Iva. xapi^wyTai, sc. rajSij/ia), the mark of a demagogue (see Plato,
Gorg. 502 E, and note on 1274 a 5).
4. rj TO,? oucrtas K.T.X. Cp. c. 8. 1309 a 15 sqq. It is curious
that in both places dva8d<rrovs is applied somewhat loosely to the
second substantive. The annual proceeds are not /^-divided
(Richards). See notes on 1257 a 21, 1297 a 40, and 1297 b 27.
7(5). 5. 1304b 32 1305a 7. 339
7. ^irl & Twf dpxatwy K.T.\. For this expression see notes on
i3O3b 20 and 12853 30. In Ad. rioA. c. 28. 1. 28 sqq. Nicias,
Thucydides son of Melesias, and Theramenes are marked off
from ol dpxaioi. McrejSaAAov, SC. at drjfjLOKparicu. We read in Ad.
Ho\. C. 22 OTI HlfKricrTparof 8r)fiaya>y6s KOI (rrparrjyos &&gt;v rvpavvos Kariori).
Plato (Rep. 565 C sqq.), following Herodotus (3. 82) and Euripides
(Fragm. 628 Nauck: 626, ed. 2), had depicted the conversion of
the tynov npoa-rd-n)! into a tyrant, evidently holding that the change
was as likely to occur in his own time as in earlier days, but
Aristotle thinks otherwise for three reasons i. the modern dema
gogue was not, like the demagogue of earlier times, a man of
military skill and prowess, therefore he was not equally able to
seize power by force; 2. great magistracies held by individuals
were rarer than they had been ; 3. the demos no longer lived
a busy life in the country, so as to be unable to control the action
of its champion in the city, but dwelt to a large extent in the
city. It should be noticed, however, that Aristotle speaks of the
change of democracy into tyranny in c. 8. 1308 a 20 sqq. and 6 (4).
n. 1296 a 3 sqq. without any intimation that it was of rarer occur
rence than it had once been. Cypselus, the founder of the tyranny
at Corinth, was a demagogue (c. 10. 1310 b 29 : c. 12. 1315 b 27)
and also polemarch (Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 58 : Miiller, Fragm.
Hist. Gr. 3. 392). Panaetius of Leontini (Polyaen. Strateg. 5. 47),
Peisistratus, and Dionysius the Elder were, like him, both dema
gogues and holders of high military offices. The same thing is true
of Euphron, who made himself tyrant of Sicyon in B. c. 368 or
soon after (Xen. Hell. 7. i. 44 sqq.). The tyrants of mediaeval
Italy also were commonly men of military prowess, though this
is not true of the founders of the Medicean dynasty (Roscher,
Politik, p. 684). Military prowess alone, however, did not usually
suffice in ancient Greece to enable a man to win a tyranny ; he had
also to gain the confidence of the demos by action hostile to the
rich. Plato had said much the same in Rep. 565 D sq., but he
goes farther than Aristotle in that passage, for he speaks as if
tyranny always arose npoa-r unites pi&s, whereas Aristotle only
says that most of the ancient tyrants had been demagogues before
they were tyrants. There were, in fact, kings (like Pheidon of
Argos), and holders of great offices (like the tyrants of Ionia, and
also Phalaris) who had made themselves tyrants without having
been demagogues (c. 10. i3iob 18-29). The same thing holds
Z 2
340 NOTES.
of Bwdcrrai in oligarchies (c. 8. 1308 a 22 sqq.), and of commanders
of mercenary troops (c. 6. 1306 a 21 sqq.). Indeed we gather that
any citizen who surpassed the rest in wealth and influence was
often suspected of a design to make himself tyrant (3. 13. 1284 a
20 sqq. : 7 (5). 3. 1302 b 15 sqq. : A#. noX. c. 22 : Diod. 19. i).
That the orators at Athens were no longer also the generals of the
State had already been remarked by Isocrates (De Pace, 54 sqq. :
cp. Philip. 140). Phocion, indeed, made it his aim, according to
Plut. Phocion, c. 7, to be both prjT<op and arpcrnjyoy, as Solon Aris-
tides and Pericles had been (see this passage, which confirms
what Aristotle says), but he probably stood almost alone in this
ambition at Athens. At Thebes, however, Epaminondas and Pelo-
pidas were surely both S^aywyoi and o-Tpai-jjyot.
8. (rxeSov yap K.T.X. Cp. C. IO. 1310 b 14, cr^eSov yap ol TrXeioroi
rovs ywpipovs, where dpxaltov disappears, and Plato, Rep.
565 D Sq. For ra>v dpxaicav rvpdvva>v Cp. 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 1 8, ras dp-
\aias rupawidas. With ap\al<av the perfect yeyovao-iv is hardly logical.
I have noticed a few similar uses, e. g. Thuc. i. 50. 2, yeyeVqTat : Plato,
Apol. Socr. 28 C, TfTf\fVTT]Kuaiv : Lycurg. C. LeOCr. C. 70, irfpiyfyovaai.
In all these places the perfect seems = the aorist. Yiyova is very
commonly thus used in late Greek, e. g. in giving a man s date,
ytyove Kara rrjv . . . O\v[t,irid8a (Richards).
11. ou ydp iru Seicol ^craf Xeyeic, ( nondum hominibus dicendi
facultatem adeptis (Sepulveda). I prefer this interpretation to that
of Sus., because there were as yet no trained speakers ( weil es
damals noch keine geschulten Redner gab ). It seems better to
render rja-av men were than there were.
14. Tr\T|i ct TTOU K.T.X., except if anywhere one or two cases of
the kind have occurred. For ppaxv cp. Plato, Rep. 496 B and
Laws 711 D. Bpaxv ri, per breve tempus ?/ suggests Bonitz (Ind.
143 a 44), but I do not think that he can be right. To what cases
Aristotle refers is unknown.
15. lylyvorro Se K.r.X. Cp. c. 10. 1310 b 20 sqq. and c. 8.
1308 a 20 sqq., from which passages we learn that the tenure of
great offices for long terms was especially apt to result in tyranny,
and that great offices were often held for long terms even in
democracies in early days, though not many would be so in the
democracies of Aristotle s own day (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 24 sq.).
16. <3<nrep Iv MiXi]Tw ^K TTJS irpurat eias. Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt.
7 (5). 5. 1305 a 824. 341
2. 139. 2) thinks that the tyranny of Thrasybulus (Hdt. i. 20) is
here referred to as arising out of the office of prytanis. The same
thing is said of tyranny throughout Ionia in c. 10. i3iob 28 sq. The
prytanis at Miletus appears to have been a sole magistrate, like the
annual prytanis who took the place of the king at Corinth under
the Bacchiadae (Diod. 7. 9. 5 : Paus. 2. 4. 4), and unlike the later
prytaneis at Rhodes, who were six in number (Gilbert, Gr. Staats-
alt. 2. 178). As to the title see 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 26 sqq.
18. In 8e Sid TO fit) fieyaXas etrai TOTC ras ir<5Xeis K.T.\. Tag iro-
Xs here must mean the cities, not, as in 6 (4). 6. 1293 a i sq. and
6 (4). 13. 1297 b 22, the States. As the demos lived a busy life
in the country, it could not itself rule, and it was obliged to allow
the leader whom it trusted to seize and exercise supreme power.
The Eupatridae lived in the city, the demos lived in the country
and were mostly tillers of the soil (Etymol. Magn. p. 395. 50 : Thuc.
i. 126. 7, 2. 14). Thus the aypoiKoi formed in early days a large
section of the demos at Athens ( A^. noX. c. 13 : see Sandys note).
Compare Theogn. 55 sqq., and as to Epidaurus Plut. Quaest.
Gr. c. i. Compare what we read of the Allobroges at a far later time
(Strabo, p. 186, AXXd/Spfye? 8f . . . ytutpyovai ra ireSia KOL TOVS av\u>vas
TOVS (v rais *A.\irfari KOL oi ptv oXXoi Ku>/j.Tjf>ut> >(riv t ol S" f-mfyavfcrraroi rrjv
Gvifvvav fxovres . . . Korea ice vaKa<n TroXti/). At Plataea in the fourth
century B. c. the peasants lived in the city (Paus. 9. i. 4-7), but this
was owing to their distrust of the Thebans. Tanagra is a better
instance of a peasant-town. There the townsmen were largely
tillers of the soil (Pseudo-Dicaearch. De Graeciae Urbibus, c. 9 :
Miiller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 257), In c. 10. 1310 b 17 sqq. the acquisi
tion of tyrannies by demagogues is said to have occurred fj8rj ra>v
noKfw r)vgT]p.fv<av, where reoi/ TroXf a>v probably means the States (see
note) ; the cities may well have been small, however, even if we
take ro)v noXfcav to mean the cities.
20. ol irpoordTai TOO oi^ou here takes the place of ol Sij/wyoyyoj,
n. In c. 6. 1305 a 39, 40 Trpoo-rdrTjr is explained by ^yffuop. Oi
TOV d^ov is probably a somewhat narrower term than oi
oi, for not every demagogue would be one of the heads of
the demos. For rvpawlbi fircridevro see note on 1305 b 41.
21. irdcTts Se TOUTO ISpui UTTO TOU S^fiou moreufl^rres. Cp. C. JO.
1310 b 14 sqq.
23. fleio-torpaTOS, SC. T)iu>6r) TTJS rvpavvi&os.
24. TOUS TreSioKoos. The form ir8iaKos recurs in A0. lloX. c. 13.
342 NOTES.
The more usual form is TT&? (see Sandys note). Cp. Plato, Rep.
566 A, ovros 817, (ft)*]", o aracruifav yiyixrai irpbs rovs f)(ovras ras overlay ;
In Diog. Laert. i. 58 the Pedieis are distinguished from of e <rrfos
as well as from of napdXiot.
KQI cavers K.T.\. Nothing is known from any other source of
the exploit mentioned in the text.
25. XajSui irapa r&v iroTafiof ^TriWuorras, having caught them
grazing their herds and flocks in land not their own by the river.
Enivfpftv est in alieno agro pascere (Stallbaum on Plato, Laws
843 D) : cp. Demosth. Or. 55. in Callicl. c. 1 1.
26. KCU Aioruo-ios n.r.X. Daphnaeus was one of the Syracusan
generals who failed to save Agrigentum from capture by the Cartha
ginians and who were consequently accused by Dionysius the Elder
before the Syracusan assembly and dismissed from office, Dionysius
himself being one of the generals appointed in their place (Diod. 13.
86-92). When Dionysius had made himself tyrant, Daphnaeus
became one of his chief opponents till Dionysius convoked an
assembly and had him put to death (Diod. 13. 96. 4). We can
guess what allegations Dionysius would make against generals who
were rich men from Diod. 13. 91. 5.
28. ws STJUOTIKOS WK. It was Peisistratus reputation for being
ft/^ortKos that more than anything else enabled him to become tyrant
( Ad. IIoX. c. 13. 1. 21 : c. 14 init, : c. 16. 1. 29 sq.).
}XCTaj3dXXoucri Be K.T.X. Supply af SrjfjLOKpariat. Cp. C. 6. 1306 b
17 sqq., where however the contrast is between m ewyioi brj^oKpa-
r uu and at Kvptot, We have rj narpia 8rjfj.oKparia here, but 17 ndrpios
dil/j.oKpaTia in 2. 12. 1273 b 38. Harpies is the more common form
of the fem. in Aristotle s writings (see critical note on 1285 b 5), but
all the MSS. have naTpias here except P 4 , which has irarpi&os
wrongly: in 3. 14. 1285 b 5 only n 2 and possibly r have n-arpiat.
Tf/v vftoTaTTjv, cp. 6 (4). 6. 1292 b 41, Tfraprov 8e i5oy 8rjp.oKpaTiat (\
TfXfvraia rois \povois ev rais irdXfai yfyevr)p.fvr). Polybius (6. 57) gives
a somewhat similar account of the change of democracy into ochlo
cracy. We gather from the passage before us that in the irarpia
fypoKparia there may be no property-qualification for office, and this
agrees with 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 27-32. The absence of a property-
qualification for office is said to be characteristic of democracy in
6(4). 9. 1 2 94 b 9 sq. (cp. 8(6). 2. 1 3 1 7 b 2 2 sq.) ; yet it would seem
from 2. 7. 1266 b 21 sqq. (cp. 7 (5). 3. 1303 a 21 sqq.) that the
absence of a property- qualification for office makes a constitution
7 (5). 5. 1305 a 2528. 343
too democratic ; hence a irarpia br^oKparia in which there is none
is defective. It is true that in a polity there may be no property-
qualification for office (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 10 sqq.), but then in
a well-organized polity it is not the demos that elects to office, but
the hoplites (6 (4). 13. i297b i sq.). The teaching of Aristotle
in the passage before us is in effect that if in a irarpia ^ftoKparia
there is no property-qualification for office and the demos elects,
a keen competition for office results (see note on 1303 a 14),
and the competitors make rival bids for the favour of the demos
with the result that they eventually place the demos in a position of
superiority to the laws. (Thurot has already pointed out in Etudes
sur Aristote, p. 82, referring to c. 6. 1305 b 30 sqq., that even
when there is a property-qualification for office, candidates for
office will do the same thing; hence he proposes to place ^17 dirb
TipT}fjidTO)v 8f after o ?}/>?, translating oil Election est faite par le
peuple entier, sans condition de cens, while Sus. proposes to omit
these words, but the tendency to demagogy would at any rate be
stronger where there was no property-qualification for office. For
one thing the competitors would be more numerous.) Aristotle adds
that this would happen less often if the magistrates were elected
not by the demos as a whole, but by the tribes. We do not learn
whether what he recommends is that the right of electing the
magistrates should fall to each tribe in turn (cp. 8(6). 4. I3i8b
23 sqq.), or that one tribe should elect to one magistracy and
another to another, or that the magistracies should be organized as
boards and that each tribe should elect a member of each of the
boards. Perhaps he would prefer the last-mentioned alternative.
Choregi, rcixoiroioi, ra<f>p(moioi, and rptijpoiroiol were elected by the
tribes at Athens (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng.
Trans., p. 202), and at one time the preliminary selection of the
persons out of whom the magistrates appointed by lot were so
chosen seems to have rested (with one or two exceptions) with the
tribes (Gilbert, ibid., p. 217 : cp. Isocr. Panath. 145). Election by
the tribe would have the advantage that no competitor for office, how
ever eager he might be, would be likely to make the tribe with which
the election lay superior to the laws. At Rome even in its demo
cratic days the assemblies voted not per capita as in Greece, but by
divisions (curiae, centuriae, tribus) see Roscher, Politik, p. 343,
and Willems, Droit Public Remain, p. 168 but Aristotle would
hardly have been satisfied with this. He seems to have desired
344 NOTES.
that the magistrates should be elected, not in a collective assembly
of the citizens, but by each tribe meeting separately from the rest.
The evil of which he complains would be remedied by the adoption
of the lot in appointments to office, but he probably does not
think the lot a fit means of filling high offices in a irarpia fij^oKpan a
(8(6). 4. isiSb 27 sqq.) ; some offices, indeed, could not well
be filled by lot. Another remedy would be, as Thurot says, to
introduce a property-qualification for office, but this it might be
difficult to do under the circumstances described in the text. Aristotle
forgets to mention in the passage before us that an abundance of
pay must be forthcoming before an ultimate democracy can come
into being even in a State in which there is no property-qualification
for office (6 (4). 6. 1292 b 41 sqq.). The experience of modern
States has confirmed Aristotle s view that the filling of the highest
offices by popular election has its dangers, but it has taught
us that these dangers exist, whether the election is made in
a collective assembly or not. The influential men who compete for
high office are exposed to the temptation of making rival bids for
popular support, and of promising, where the institutions of the
State give them opportunities of fulfilling their promises, to promote
an alteration of the constitution in a popular direction.
32. CIKOS 8e TOU K.T.\. See note on 1267 a 3. If UKOS is here
used in its usual sense of remedy, rov K.T.\. will be in the genitive
after it and will express the effect of the remedy.
C. 8. 37 sqq. In the sixth chapter we have in strictness to do only
with those causes of the fall of oligarchies which are special to them :
still some of the causes enumerated must have affected other con
stitutions also ; we know, for instance, that the paucity of those
admitted to office was perilous to aristocracies as well as to olig
archies (c. 7. 1306 b 22 sqq.). Causes which affect oligarchies in
common with other constitutions have been already dealt with in
cc. 3 and 4 (for instance in c. 3. 1302 b 15 sqq. and 1303 a 16 sqq.
and in c. 4. 1304 a 17 sqq.). Some additional causes of the fall of
oligarchies over and above those mentioned in cc. 3, 4, and 6 may
be gleaned from c. 8. 1308 a 18 sqq. and c. 10. i3iob_gsq., where
\the long tenure onTgreat office "Ey one man or the uniono? several
fgreat offices in the hands of one man is said to be often fatal to
them (cp. 6 (4). u. 1296 a 3 sqq. and 3. 15. 1286 b 16 sqq.), and
from 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 14 sqq. and 26 sqq., whence we gather that
oligarchies were often overthrown owing to their making no satis-
7(5). 5. 1305 a 326. 1305 a 39. 345
factory provision for the admission of deserving members of the
demos into the privileged body, and owing to the defective numbers
and quality of their light-armed troops. On two or three points
Aristotle differs from Plato. The latter had said in Rep. 564 A,
(iKOTcos roivvv, eurov, OVK a\\rjs TroXiTfiay rvpavins KaBicrrarai, rj tx
fyp-oKparias : Aristotle holds, on the contrary, that extreme oligarchy
was specially apt to pass into tyranny (6 (4). 1 1. 1296 a 3 sqq. : cp.
3. 15. 1286 b i6sq. and 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 34 sqq.). Plato, again,
had spoken in a passage of the Republic (545 D : cp. Laws 683 E)
as if changes of constitution were always due to quarrels among
the holders of supreme power : Aristotle, on the contrary, points out
m the chapter before us that oligarchigs_were often overthrown
without discord amongjtheoligarchs. Indeed, oligarchies based
TcJrT a property-qualification (and polities also) migh"ToW iheh fall
~se of the average level of ibe jgpgjtb of the
individual members of the State. So again in Rep. 551 D sq. Plato
hadspolcen^foligarchies as unable to make war without risk of
overthrow, and hence Aristotle is careful to point out that they ran
a similar risk in time of peace (1306 a 19 sqq.). The sixth chapter
distinguishes between eWojuoi and Kvptot 6\iyapxiai (i3o6b 20 sq.),
but it takes no account of this distinction in dealing with the causes
of the fall of oligarchies ; it is evident, however, that most of the
causes which it enumerates would affect Kvptoi oXiyapxiat in a higher
degree than Wo/j.oi. Not a few of these causes were probably
pointed out here for the first time ; there is more that was new in
this chapter than in the preceding one. Here and there we may
suspect that Aristotle exalts the occasions of constitutional change
into its causes.
At 8 oXiyapxicu K.T.\. The use of 8ta in 8a 8vo rponovy ( owing
to two modes ) is remarkable. In c. n. 1314 a 29 we have 6 p.iv
nvv (Is TpoTros 81 ov ylyvtrai (TtoTypia rdis TvpavvifTi rotovros eortj/. The
tWO <pavfpa>Taroi rpoiroi are (l) tan dSuccocrt (sc. ot oKiyap^oiivrfs) TO
7r\^0os, or if in some other way civil discord originates with others
than the oligarchs (see note on i3O5b i), and (2) if it originates
with the oligarchs.
38. Im n& has nothing strictly answering to it, but is virtually
taken Up in 1305 b 22, KIVOVVTO.I. 8 al oXiyapxiat e avratv K.T.\.
39. irfis yap tKacos yivcrai irpoorciirqs, i. e. iras yap irpoaTartjs (KO.I
6 rux<i)v) yiverai IKOVOS (Coray, p. 329).
fidXicrra 8e, SC. IKOVOS yivtrai, not, I think,
346 NOTES.
l aurfjs TTJS 6Xiyap)(ias = t avriov TU>V 6\iyapxovvTa>v : cp. C. I.
1302 a 12.
4O. KaOdirep iv Nd|u AuySap,i5 K.T.X. Supply (yevrro o qye/uwi .
As to Lygdamis see Hdt. i. 61, 64, Aristot. Fragm. 517 (from the
Constitution of the Naxians ascribed to Aristotle, ap. Athen.
Deipn. p. 348), Oecon. 2. 13465 7 sqq., and A0. noX. c. 15 with
Sandys notes. The fragment of the Constitution of the Naxians
traces the Naxian orao-ts to an outrage committed by some young
Naxians of the wealthy class on a fellow-citizen named Telestagoras
belonging to the same class and his two daughters, not on members
of the demos, but it is likely enough that similar outrages were also
committed on the demos. We find Lygdamis first heading the
Naxian demos in its successful revolt against the oligarchs and
establishing, it would seem, a democracy in place of the pre-existing
oligarchy, then after an interval of uncertain length visiting Eretria
to offer Peisistratus aid in men and money in acquiring for the
third time the tyranny at Athens whether as head of the Naxian
democracy or after his own fall from power or the fall of the
democracy, we do not know and thus paving the way for his own
accession to the tyranny of Naxos, which followed on Peisistratus
capture of the island. When the fragment of the Constitution of
the Naxians says that Lygdamis became tyrant of Naxos in
consequence of his leadership of the people against the authors
of the outrage referred to, the statement may be so far correct that,
if he had not led the demos, he would not have been in a position
to induce Peisistratus to make him tyrant. See Busolt, Gr. Gesch.,
ed. 2, 2. 324. 3.
1. exet 8e KCU Y) e aXXui dpx*) ordaews 8ia4>opd. Compare
6 (4). 14. 1 298 a 35, fX ft S* Ka * T v TO $ia(j)opas n\fiovs. *A\Xa>i> has
been interpreted in many different ways. Sepulveda, Giphanius,
Heinsius, and Gottling take it to mean a\Xa>v f) TO\> n\f]0ovs, but if we
so take it, it is difficult to explain the mention in 1305 b 18 sqq. of
the revolution at Erythrae, which was caused by the demos, and
also to explain *ai, for we have not been clearly told that, when
civil discord originates with the many, it originates in different
ways. Stahr s interpretation, from other causes than that just
mentioned ( es gehen aber auch noch aus andern Ursachen die
Anfange zu Revolutionen hervor, die verschiedene Erscheinungen
bieten ), escapes the first of these difficulties, but aAXaw in e aXAeoi*
is probably masculine. Viet, explains aXXj> as others than those
7(5). 6. 1305 a 40 1305 b 4. 347
v ho have governed oppressively ( expertibus illius iniustae
potestatis ), but not, I think, rightly. The natural meaning of
aAAcoi appears to me to be XX&&gt;i> tj riav 6\tyapxovvra>i> : I translate,
therefore, but when civil discord originates also with others than
the oligarchs [as well as when it originates with the oligarchs], it
originates in different ways. That civil discord originating with
the oligarchs originates in different ways, we see from 1305 b
22 sqq. Some would emend oXXuw, but the emendations hitherto
proposed do not seem satisfactory. A.VT&V is suggested in place of
it in the margin of the third Basle edition of Aristotle and is read
by Schneider, Coray, and Welldon ; avruvby Nickesand Congreve.
Spengel, followed by Sus., would read * fie KOI f] e d\\f]\wv dpxr)v
arrdirfoiS 8ia<popd. But if WC read avrutv, avruv, Or d\\ij\<i>v, we must
take these words to mean T>V oXiyapxovvrav : the examples which
follow, however, are of changes of constitution brought about not
by 01 o\iyap\ovvTs, but by evrropoi OT yvvpipoi excluded from office,
as Prof. Jowett has already pointed out, or else by the spontaneous
action of the demos, as at Erythrae.
2. ore jxef yap K.r.X. There is nothing to answer to this /x-,
but Aristotle intended 10 go on and sometimes from the demos.
ou rcif orruv 8 iv rais ap^ais. For the phrase see note on
1303 b 22.
3. yiyverai KardXuais. Cp. C. II. 13143 30, yiyvtrai trutrrjpia,
At Istrus there was a complete KaraXvats of oligarchy, but at Massalia
and Heracleia only a KardXixrts of the extreme oligarchy in favour of
a moderate form.
4. olov Hv MaaaoXio ic.r.X. As to the repetition of ev here see
notes on 1294 a 12 and 1325 b 10, and cp. Plato, Rep. 563 E, V
tapais T( teal tv (pvrols Kai iv cra>iJLacri, KCU 8i) xal iv TroXtTfiats ov% fJKurra,
and Xen. Rep. Lac. 8. 3, tTrtiiitp tyvwav TO neidtadai p.(yi(TTov dyadov
tlvM KOI (v 7ToXi Kal ev arpaTia Kal iv OIKO>. In the States here mentioned
it was the rule that father and son or more brothers than one should
not be in office at the same time. The object of the rule no
doubt was to place on an equal footing the various households
comprised within the privileged class and to prevent any one of them
acquiring a disproportionate share of power, but this object might
have been attained equally well if three or four members of each
household, not one or two only, had been allowed to be in office
at the same time, and then the number of those in office would not
have been so small. At Venice three members of the same family
348 NOTES.
could be Senators at the same time (Yriarte, Patricien de Venise,
p. 76), though two nobles from the same quarter of the city or the
same family could not be Counsellors of the Doge at the same
time (Yriarte, p. 349). The rule mentioned by Aristotle finds
many parallels in mediaeval Italy. Thus at Siena there were five
families two of whose members could be in the government at the
same time, while for all other families the number was limited to
one (Duffy, Tuscan Republics, p. 73). So again in the Republic
of San Marino, as of old at Venice, precautions are taken that
family rings should not dominate the State, for in elections to the
Council but one member from each family may be chosen, and if
personal interests are discussed in Council, the Statutes provide that
relations to the third degree shall leave the hall (E. Armstrong,
A Political Survival/ Macmillari s Magazine, No. 375, Jan. 1891,
p. 199). Spinoza adopts a similar rule for the judges and councils
of an aristocracy (Tractat. Polit. c. 8. 39, quamvis non opus sit lit
unusquisque (iudex) ex diversa sit familia, necesse tamen est ne duo
sanguine propinqui simul in subselliis locum occupent ; quod in
reliquis conciliis observandum est, praeterquam in supremo, in quo
sumcit, si modo in electionibus lege cautum sit ne cuiquam pro-
pinquum nominare, nee de eo, si ab alio nominatus sit, suffragium
ferre liceat, et praeterea ne ad imperii ministrum quemcumque
nominandum duo propinqui sortem ex urna tollant). If, as is
probable, the Heracleia here mentioned is the Pontic Heracleia,
the three States instanced by Aristotle were all of them situated
in positions of peril on the outskirts of the Hellenic world,
and precautions of this kind would be especially in place
under those circumstances; the restriction, however, also existed
at Cnidus (12 sqq.), which was in a different geographical
position.
6. luivouv, turbas ciebant (Sus. 2 , Unruhen erregten ) : cp.
Polvb. I. 69. 6, TrXetcrra KfKivrjKws Kara ras Trpofipijutvas rapa\as.
10. KCU eV8a fief TroXiriKwr^pa iylvtTO r\ oXiyapxia, i. e. tv Marra-aXi a.
For iro\iTiKo>Tepa cp. 6 (4). 14. 1 298 a 39. It was at this time in all
probability that the machinery was devised by which members of
the demos were admitted to the privileged class (8 (6). 7. 13213
29 sqq., where Aristotle gives it his approval). In B.C. 196
(Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 200) and in the time of Strabo
(p. 179) the city was ruled by a Council of 600 timuchi, holding
office for life, who were required to be fathers of children and to be
7 (5). 6. 1305b 618. 349
descended from three generations of citizens, but it is doubtful
whether this supreme Council of 600 came into existence on this
occasion, for in that case we might have expected Aristotle to say
of Massalia what he says of Heracleia, e e^arrovuv els egaicoo-tovs
ii\6ev 17 oXiyapx/a.
11. dTT6Tc\euTT]aei , SC. f/ oXryapx/a.
12. eis l|aKO(Tious rjXOei , SC. fj dXiyap^/a, cp. C. 7. 1 307 a 36, els
u\iyovs al oi(ricu (p^ovrai. The chief place in the oligarchy over
thrown by Agathocles at Syracuse was held by a Council of 600
(Diod. 19. 5. 6). See above on 1305 b 10 as to Massalia. It is not
clear whether the arrangement as to the dicasteries at the Pontic
Heracleia described in isosb 34 sqq. existed there under the
oligarchy of 600 which is here referred to.
HCT^paXe 8e K.T.\. At Cnidus, unlike the States just mentioned,
the oligarchy was not overthrown by the excluded yvupipoi, but by the
demos, as in Naxos (1305 a 38 sqq.), but this case is distinguished
from that because at Cnidus (as also at Erythrae) the demos was
not driven to revolt by oppression ; its revolt was due rather to
contempt (c. 3. 1302 b 25 sqq.). As this oligarchy was overthrown
by the demos, it is probably to be distinguished from the oligarchy
at Cnidus which is said in 1306 b 3 sqq. to have been overthrown
by some members of the privileged class disgusted with the despotic
character of its rule.
15. oXX l\ rov irpeo-puTaToc. Bonitz (Ind. 33 a 61 sqq.) includes
this among the passages in which dXX fj ad significationem
particulae n\t)i> vel el pt) prope accedit/ of which he gives a con
siderable number.
18. KOI iv EpuOpcus Se K.r.X. We find a gens of Basilidae also
at Ephesus (Baton ap. Suid. TivQayopas, quoted by Gilbert, Gr.
Staatsalt. 2. 141. 2 : cp. Strabo, p. 633, 8t6irep TO (BaalXeiov rS>v
l&vwv eVcei (at Ephesus) trv(TTr)vai <pa<ri } teat en vi : v ol < rov ytvovs
ovofjid^ovrai jSacriXety e^ovrts rivets rt/xar, npoeSpiav re ev ayaxri KOI
nopcbvpav tTricrTjp.ov TOV /3a(riX(Ko{) ye i/ovr, <rKijra>va avr\ (TKijrrTpou, Kal ra
lepa rfjs E\evcnvlas Ar^^rpoy), and perhaps also at Chios (Gilbert, 2.
153. i). See ToepfTer, Attische Genealogie, p. 240. The gens
of the Basilidae was probably composed of descendants of the
kings: compare the Neleidae at Miletus (Aristot. Fragm. 515.
1562 a 29), the Penthilidae at Mytilene (7 (5). 10. 1311 b 25 sqq.:
Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 162), and the Eupatridae at Athens, who
are described by one authority as ot avro TO aoru oiKovvres KU\
350 NOTES.
/3a<n\iKov yevovt (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and
Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 102. 3).
19. Kcuirep Ka\iis 3irificXo}ii&uv ruv iv rrj TroXireia. Lamb. quamvis
ea quae ad rempublicam pertinerent bene procurarent, and Sus. 3a
(Ind. p. 347) apparently takes r&v to be neuter, but surely rS>v is
masc., and the sentence should be rendered though those who
possessed rights under the constitution managed [the affairs of the
State] well.
/ 22. Kifouirai 8 at oXiyapxiai K.T.X. Aristotle now passes to the
second of the heads under which he groups the causes of the over
throw of oligarchies, causes originating with the oligarchs them
selves. Cp. ThllC. 8. 89. 3, tear" I8ins 8e ^>iX<m/xi ar ol TroXXol avrcav ro>
Toioi/ro) npvo fKeivTo, fv anrtp KOI /^aXtora oXiynp^uz (K f>Tjfj.oKparias y(vop.fvr)
aTToXXvrai irdvrts yap avdrjp.fpov d{-iovcriv ovx OTT<OS icroi, aXXa Kal TroXu
7Tpa>Tos avrt>s fKacrros flvm (which is partly based on Hdt. 3. 82), and
A$. UoX. c. 13, where f) irpbf aXXijXovr (f)i\oi>iKia is mentioned as
a cause of orders at Athens.
23. TJ S^fiaywY 1 * 1 ^ SITTI], r\ fiec iv aorois TOIS 8\iyois K.T.X.
This is repeated in c. 8. 1308 a 17. C H ^tv is answered not with
out some roughness by ^ orav K.T.\., 28 : cp. 3. i. 1275 a 23 sqq.,
where fvLas /*/ is followed by rj (see note on 1275 a 24), and see
note on i338b i. &rjpay<ayia is a humouring of the propensities of
the 8r)fj.ay<oyovp,(vos with a view to the aggrandizement of o d^naya>yS>v,
and may be resorted to not only in relation to a few persons or
many, but even in relation to one (c. 10. 1312 b 12 sq.).
25. cloy ef TOIS TpitlKOcra K.T.X. Ol nfp\ XapucXe a, i. e. Charicles
(Eucken, Praepositionen, p. 66). It would seem that in Aristotle s
opinion the Thirty were led into the excesses which proved fatal to
them by Charicles rather than by Critias. The name of Charicles
also comes first in Lys. c. Eratosth. c. 55, trepoi ol SoKovvrts flvat
(vavTKOTaroi XapKcXel Kal Kpm a (cat TI; fKfivotv frmpeiq. We hear
nothing of Charicles in the A^i/atwi/ noXtrda, which is remarkable
if the work is from Aristotle s pen. According to Isocr. De
Big. 42, Charicles was a returned exile and eager both to enslave
Athens to the Lacedaemonians and to rule over her himself.
&rjiJ.aya>yovi>Tts TOVS rpinKoi/ra, through courting the Thirty. Kaibel
(Stil und Text der A0. TloX., p. 54) remarks, Everywhere in the
A0. IIoX. the word 8r)p.ayuy tv is USed absolutely : drjpayccytlv TOV
o^Xoi/ etc. occurs in the Politics, but 
