^
STUDIES IN HISTORY
ECONOMICS AND
PUBLIC LAW
EDITED BY
THE FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
VOLUME FORTY-SEVEN
^m ijork
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
LONGMANS, GREEN & CO., AGENTS
London : P. S. King & Son
1912
3\
CONTENTS
1. The Politics of Michigan, 1865-1878 — Harriette M.
Dilla, Ph,D i
2. The United States Beet-Sugar Industry and the Tariff
—Roy G. Blakey, Ph.D 259
1
THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN
STUDIES IN HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC LAW
EDITED BY THE FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
Volume XLVII] [Number 1
Whole Number 118
THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN
1865-1878
BY
HARRIETTE M. PILLA, Ph.D.,
Instructor in History
Wheaton Seminary, Norton^ Mass,
JfetD gork
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
LONGMANS, GREEN & CO., AGENTS
London: P. S. King & Son
1912
Copyright, 1912
BY
HARRIETTE M. DILLA
PREFACE
An attempt has been made in the following pages to set
torth the attitude of Michigan on the leading political
issues during the important years from 1865 to 1878. The
party interests of the state naturally centered about na-
tional questions during this period, but there were certain
local issues, such as railroad construction and internal im-
provement, which also received much attention. Probably
the most striking features of Michigan politics at this time
were the unbroken dominance of the Republican party, and
the prominence of the personal element arising from the
unusual characteristics of several of the leaders.
My research has been greatly facilitated by many per-
sons who have manifested a kind interest in its progress.
Mr. Thomas A. Wilson and Edward W. Barber, of Jack-
son, Michigan, very kindly contributed many personal
reminiscences which were helpful because of their impar-
tiality. Mr. C. M. Burton, of Detroit, Michigan, extended
to me the privilege of his excellent private library, con-
taining all the letters and papers of Jacob M. Howard.
Among the many persons who assisted me in my re-
search, acknowledgments are due Mr. Gaillard Hunt, Mr.
William L. Bishop, and Miss Emily West, of the Library
of Congress, and Mr. Byron A. Finney and Miss Fred-
ricka Gillette, of the Library of the University of Mich-
igan, Ann Arbor.
I am most deeply indebted, however, to Professor Will-
iam A. Dunning, of Columbia University, who has ren-
dered the most valuable assistance throughout the prepara-
tion of this monograph, by his advice both as to content
and as to manner of treatment.
5] 5
241581
CONTENTS
CHAPTER I
Resume of Michigan State Politics During the War
PAGE
Early Politics and the Personal Issues 0/1862
The transition of Michigan politics in 1856 . -, . . 21
Preference for Seward over Lincoln in i860 21
The War Governorship of Austin Blair 22
The loyalty of the state legislature and the " Joint Resoluiion on the
State of the Union," February 2, 1 86 1 23
The extra session of the legislature, 1861 23
Election of Jacob M. Howard to the Senate, 1862 25
The personal element in Michigan politics of 1862 26
Senator Zachariah Chandler and the schism in the Republican party . 26
Hostility to his re-election to the Senate 27
His " blood-letting " letter as an issue 28
His speech of July 16, 1862, agamst McClellan 29
Victory of Chandler over James F. Joy, January, 1863 29
Politics of 186J-4, and the Unionist success in Michigan
Lincoln's policy, the issue in 1863-4 30
History of Michigan's attitude toward the negro 31
Advanced position of Governor Blair , 31
The grievances of the Democratic party, and its platform, 1863. ... "H
The hostility towards presidential dictatorship 33
Disaffection within the Republican party, 1864 33
Attitude of Republicans towards the Wade-Davis Bill 34
Chandler's support of President Lincoln 35
His role in securing Fremont's withdrawal 35
The reuniting of the elements of the Republican party and its solidarity
of interests after the campaign 3^
The Unionists' victory in Michigan in 1864 37
A small decline in Lincoln's support since i860 37
Territorial distribution of the vote, 1864 3^
7] 7
8 CONTENTS [8
PAGE
CHAPTER II
Michigan Politics During the Period of Restoration, 1865- 1866
Michigan and Presidential Restoration
The Thirteenth Amendment and the Michigan delegation in Congress. 39
Ratification of the Amendment by the Michigan state legislature ... 39
Speech of Jacob M. Howard in the Senate, February 25, 1865 .... 40
Michigan and Johnson's initial steps in restoration 42
Attitude towards the President's Amnesty Proclamation of May 29, 1865. 43
Michigan and the question of negro suffrage 44
Views upon the President's procedure in North Carolina and the other
rebel states 45
Chandler and the appointment of Provisional Governors 45
Progress of the Radical tendency in Michigan 46
Presidential versus Congressional Restoration
The Michigan delegation to the Thirty-ninth Congress 49
Their" support of the Stevens Resolution 50
The veto of the Freedmen's Bureau Bill 50
Evidences of reaction against Congressional policy 51
Governor Crapo's Thanksgiving Proclamation relating to the Civil
Rights Bill 51
Presentation of the proposed articles of amendment by Jacob M.
Howard to the Senate 53
The Republicans of Michigan generally in favor of the state regulation
of negro suffrage 53
Issues of the Campaign of 1 866
Threats of extreme measures and possible violence 55
Grounds for Democratic hostility to negro suffrage 56
Fiscal issues of the campaign 57
The Campaign of 1866
Agitation by the Democrats for an early convention 58
The Republicans' suspicion of an intended union of the Democracy
with the soldier^ 58
The Johnson Mass Convention, August 9, 1866 59
The informal meeting of the Democratic State Central Committee and
its appointments . 59
Acceptance of the appointed delegates by the Johnson party 60
Beginning of the alliance of the Democrats with the Johnson or
National Union party . 60
The Republican State Convention, August 30 60
Care in the nomination of a ticket 62
The State Nominating Convention of the Johnson party, September 6 . 62
The State Democratic Convention, September 6 64
9] CONTENTS
9
PAGE
Appointment by the soldiers of delegates to Philadelphia 65
Failure of the soldiers of Michigan to organize 65
Effective organization of the Republican party 65
Prominent part taken by the Detroit Daily Post 66
The personal element in the campaign 55
Effect of President Johnson's address of February 22 67
Ridicule of Seward's attitude ^ 6g
The Election
Important gains of the Republican party 68
Close votes in three Congressional Districts ... 69
Vote on the Soldiers' Suffrage Amendment to the state constitution . . 70
The proposal to revise the state constitution 70
Contested election case in the fifth district and its significance .... 70
Reasons for the defeat of the Democracy 71
Territorial distribution of the vote 71
CHAPTER III
The Politics of Michigan, 1867-68, and the Attitude Towards
Early Reconstruction
State Issues
Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment 73
Ratification, February 15, 1867 74
Attitude of the two leading parties within the state 74
Presentation and veto of railroad-aid bills 74
The revision of the Constitution of 1850 75
Personnel of the Convention which met May 15, 1867 76
Defeat of woman suffrage 76
The State Agricultural College 76
Prohibition of the sale of intoxicating liquors embraced in a separate
article 77
The salary question 77
The provision for biennial sessions embodied in a second separate article. 77
Discussion of negro suffrage 78
Triumph of the more radical element of the Republican party .... 80
The Republicans' defense of the article 80
The railroad-aid provisions 81
The constitution as a Republican platform 81
General Issues
Attitude of Michigan parties toward the early measures of Congres-
sional Reconstruction 82
Negro suffrage in the District of Columbia, January, 1867 83
The Reconstruction Acts of March and July 84
10 CONTENTS [lO
PAGE
Republican support of militarism and impartial suffrage 84
Development of the views of the Michigan delegation in Congress on
the question of impeachment 84
Jacob M. Howard's work and his final opinion 87
General support of the policy by the Republicans 88
Occasional expressions of dissatisfaction 88
The Campaign of the Spring of 1868
Importance of the spring elections of 1868 89
The State Republican Convention, March 18, and its declaration in
favor of the constitution 90
Defeat of the constitution 90
yhe Campaign of the Autumn of 186S
Views of leading Republicans 92
Unanimous agreement of the Republican party of the state upon the
nomination of Grant 93
Michigan in the Republican National Convention 93
The State Democratic Convention, May 27 93
Fiscal issues 94
The Democracy not in agreement upon a candidate for President ... 96
Michigan in the National Democratic Convention 96
The State Nominating Convention of the Democrats 97
The Election of 1868
The Republicans uncertain of their position 97
Victory of the Republicans , . . 97
Height of the Republican power in Michigan during the period of
this study 99
The Senatorial Contest^ i868-g
Relations of Zachariah Chandler and Austin Blair 99
Their negotiations and attempted arrangement 99
The vote in the Republican Legislative Caucus of January 6, 1869 . . 100
Triumph of Chandler over Blair loi
Defeat of the Democratic candidate, January 19 . . , 102
Preparations for the contest of 187 1 102
Senator Jacob M. Howard's standing in Michigan 102
The senatorship a field for personal politics, and a cause of shifting
alliances 103
CHAPTER IV
The Forward Movement of the Democracy in Michigan
Ratification and Interpretation of the Fifteenth Amendment
Characterization of the politics in Michigan, 1869-70 105
The negro suffrage discussion 105
Il] CONTENTS
II
PAGE
Ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment by the Michigan legislature,
March, 1869 106
The negro suffrage amendment to the state constitution, passed by the
Michigan legislature during the spring of 1869 106
Personal rather than political nature of the elections of 1869 107
Novel features of the electorate in Michigan, 1870 107
Exercise of the right of suffrage by negroes 107
Exceptional instances of women voting 107
T^g Railroad-Aid Issue
The Railroad- Aid Law of 1869 as a direct encouragement to local
taxation and bonded indebtedness 108
Case of The People ex rel. the Detroit and Howell Railroad Co. v.
the Township Board of Salem. 108
Financial effects of the decision ,. . . . 109
Comment, favorable and unfavorable, as yet non-partisan 109
Immediate legislative action no
Passage of the constitutional amendment by the state legislature,
August, 1870 no
The Campaign of i8yo
The Democrats' departure from the usual custom 1 10
The Democratic State Convention, August 31 ill
The platform and ticket 1 1 1
The Republican State Convention, September i.. 112
Changes in the organization of the State Central Committee ..... 112
The platform . 112
Ambiguity of the tariff provision 113
The influence of that portion of the Republican party which previously
had Democratic affiliations 113
Division in the Republican party on the question of aid to railroad cor-
porations 114
Austin Blair and the Republican Congressional nomination 114
Probable source of hostility to Blair 115
John A. Driggs and the Republican Congressional nomination .... 116
Relation of the German vote and Prohibition in the campaign of 1870. 117
The attempt of the Republicans to accomplish by amendment in 1870
what ihey failed in 1868 to effect by revision 118
Proposed amendments to the state constitution 118
Results of the Election of 1870
Evidences of Republican decline since 1866 "9
Significance of the Democratic victory in the Sixth District 119
Fate of the amendments ^20
Territorial distribution of the vote 121
General inferences relative to party status in "1870 122
12 CONTENTS [I2
PAGE
T^i Senatorial Election 0/1871
The four rivals for the Republican Senatorial nomination 123
Development of an opposition to Senator Jacob M. Howard 1 23
The significance of the locality consideration 124
Blair's prospect and the Fish letter 124
The vital importance of the enmity of two of the leaders 126
Attitude and preferences of the Michigan members in Congress .... 126
The Republican legislative caucus and the triumph of Ferry 127
Unanimous nomination of H. M. Walker by the Democrats 127
Election of the Republican candidate, January 18 127
Death of Jacob M. Howard 128
Qualifications of his successor 128
The passing of old issues and the appearance of new 128
CHAPTER V
The Campaign of 1872, and the Failure of the Liberal
Movement in Michigan
Preliminary Politics
The Democracy at the opening of the year 187 1 129
Defense of Grant by the Republicans 130
Amendment of the state constitution 130
Reapportionment of the Congressional representation of Michiyai) .. . 131
Hostility engendered by the mode of redistricting , . 131
Impeachment proceedings against Charles A. Edmunds 131
The Liberal Movement
The Liberals in Michigan and the leadership of Austin Blair 132
Motives for his apostasy 133
Delay in the organization of the party 134
Method of choosing delegates to Cincinnati 135
No distinct preference among the Liberals for presidential candidate. . 136
Comment in Michigan on the reception of the news of Greeley's nomi-
nation 1 36
The probability of Greeley's withdrawal from the contest 136
The Democracy and the Liberals
Doubt and uncertainty of the Democrats after the Cincinnati Con-
vention 137
Friendly declarations towards the Liberals 138
The State Democratic Convention, Lansing, July 2, for the election of
delegates to Baltimore 138
Test vote of the Michigan delegation . 138
Attitude towards the adoption of the Cincinnati ticket at Baltimore . . 139
Plans for the joint action of the Democrats and Liberals 140
13] CONTENTS
13
PAGB
The joint convention at Grand Rapids, August 22 141
The State and Congressional nominations 141
Failure of the " Straight Democratic" movement in Michigan .... 142
T^£ Regular Republicans
The State Republican Convention, May 16, for the election of delegates
to the National Convention \^'i
The nominating convention in August, and its work 143
Michigan in the Philadelphia Convention 143
Character of the campaign in Michigan 144
The Election
Dismal failure of the Liberal movement in Michigan 145
Analysis of votes, presidential and state 145
Rejection of the railroad-aid amendment 146
Fate of the other amendments «... 146
Expectations of the Democrats before the election 146
Their reflections upon their defeat 147
Value of this experience two years hence 147
CHAPTER VI
The Schism in the Republican Party in Michigan and the
Success of the Democracy in 1874
Preliminary Politics and Constittitional Revision
Opposition to the Republican party in the spring of 1873 148
Continuation of the joint convention system of the Democratic and
Liberal parties 148
Character of Isaac P. Christiancy 149
His election to the State Supreme Court, April, 1873 149
Amendment or revision of the state constitution as an issue 149
The appointment of a Commission on Revision 150
The personnel of this body 150
Subjects under its consideration 150
The effect of the salary act of April 24, 1873, upon the work of the
Commission 151
Completion of the revised draft of the constitution and its approval by
the legislature 152
Formation of Minor Parties
The presence in Michigan of a number of small parties in 1873-4. . . 152
The phenomenal growth of the Order of Patrons of Industry 153 •
The aims and organization of the movement 153
The attitude of the Order toward the issues of 1874 154
The Prohibitionists and their opponents, the Anti-Prohibitionists . . . 154
14 CONTENTS [14
PAGE
The Independent Action of the Reformers
Appointment of a committee by the state legislature . 155
Relation of the Reform party of 1874 to the Liberal movement of 1872. 155
Initial impulse given the new National Reform party 156
Possibility of a fusion of the elements of opposition in 1874 156
Separate action of the Reformers, a surprise to the Democracy , . . 157
The Convention of August 6, and the sweeping condemnation of both
leading parties 157
Demands of reform and economy . . , 157
The concession of the Reformers to the Inflationists 158
Appointment of a State Executive Committee 158
Its call for a State Reform Nominating Convention, SeptemV)er 9 . . . 158
The Reform ticket 159
The formal dissolution of the alliance 159
Complete abandonment of the plan of separate and simultaneous con-
ventions 159
The Republican Party
The Republican State Central Committee, and its call of June 9, for the
State Convention 160
The Republican State Convention, August 28 160
Defense of the national administration 160
Declarations with reference to negro suffrage 160
Non-committal character of the currency resolution 161
Obvious attempt to please both the Resumptionists and Inflationists . . 161
The real position of the two leading parties on the currency question. . 162
Crisis and threatened rupture in the Republican party 162
Chandler's hostility towards inflation 162
Ferry's leadership of the inflationist faction 163
Vote on inflation 164
Embarrassing inconsistency on the part of the Republicans in five Con-
gressional districts . 165
The Post's apology for Ferry 166
Amicable relations preserved in the Republican party 166
The Democracy in 1874
The Democrats' scrutiny of the Republican record 166
Early doubt concerning the best issues for the approaching campaign. . 167
Meeting of the State Central Committee in Detroit, July 28 168
The Democratic State Convention, Kalamazoo, September 10 ... . 169
The demands and declarations 169
Recommendations of railroad regulation 170
Locality and vocation considerations in the choice of State and Con-
gressional tickets 170
Union between the Democrats and Reformers in Congressional nomi-
nations 170
1 5] CONTENTS
15
PAGE
TAg Elections 0/1874
The October elections, an encouragement to the Democrats 171
The unprecedented repulse of the Republicans in Michigan 171
Rejection of the new constitution 172
Failure of woman suffrage 172
Reflections of the Republican party upon its own defeat 172
Climax of Democratic influence 173
The Senatorial Election 0/1874 ^^^^ ^^^^ De/eat of Chandler
Resemblance of Michigan to Wisconsin, Minnesota and Maine in Sena-
torial politics 174
Early expressions of opposition to Chandler 175
Various possibilities 175
Schism in the party on grounds of personal affiliations 175
Chandler's tactics and his adherence to the caucus system 176
His nomination in the Republican legislative caucus, January 7 . . . . 176
Absence of the members of the opposition 176
The opening of the Senatorial election, July 19 177
Suspense and excitement 177
Large scattering vote on the first ballot 177
Gradual shifting of preferences ... 178
Negotiations between the Democrats and Anti-Chandler Republicans . 178
Their ultimate union upon the name of Isaac P. Christiancy 178
The third ballot, January 21, and the defeat of Chandler ..... . 178
Significance of the fall of Chandler and the triumph of Christiancy . . 179
CHAPTP:R VII
The Politics of 1876 and the Restoration of the Dominant
Party in Michigan
Michigan and Federal Politics 0/187^
Reform and resumption 180
The Force Bill . . , 181
The Civil Rights Act 182
The spring elections ^°3
Views of Michigan on Democratic supremacy in the South, 1875-6 . . 183
Success of Poland in Arkansas 184
Harmony among the Republicans concerning Louisiana 184
Tendencies toward divergence in reference to Mississippi 185
General approval of Governor Chamberlain in South Carolina .... 187
The South as the main issue in the approaching campaign 188
The Universal Amnesty Act ^^^
Occasion for reopening the issues of the war ^^88
1 6 CONTENTS [l6
PAGE
Michigan and the Republican Fresider^tial Ticket
Opening of the campaign of I S76 189
The Republican State Convention in Grand Rapids, May 10 189
Nomination of delegates to the National Convention at Cincinnati . . . 190
The movement for Chandler's candidacy 190
Test votes of the Michigan delegation at Cincinnati 190
Michigan's lead for Hayes on the fifth ballot ... 191
Analysis of the seven ballots of the Michigan delegation 191
Expression of opinion on the defeat of Blaine 192
Importance of Chandler's election to the Chairmanship of the National
Republican Committee 192
State Politics of the Republican Party
Personal politics in Michigan, 1876 192
The movement for William A. Howard as candidate for governor . . . 193
Two possible explanations for this movement 193
The Republican State Nominating Convention, Lansing, August 3 . . 194
Its platform and ticket . . 194
The Democracy
Difference of opinion within the Democratic party relative to the presi-
dential nomination 194
The Democratic State Convention, Lansmg, May 24 195
Election of delegates to the National Convention at St. Louis 195
The majority's preference for Tilden 195
The temporary disaffection in the Michigan delegation to St. Loiiis . . 195
Analysis of the ballots of the delegation .... 195
The currency issue and the threatened rupture of the Democracy in
Michigan . 196
Danger of concession to the soft-money interests in the convention of
May 24 196
The two reports presented by the Committee on Resolutions . . . , 196
Official repudiation of anti resumption tendencies by the Democracy . . 196
Meeting of the Democratic State Central Committee, Detroit, June 7 . 197
Plans for the exclusion of the currency issue from the State Nominating
Convention to be held August 9 197
Organization of Democratic municipal clubs 197
The compromise with Henry Chamberlain 198
The Democratic State Nominating Convention, Detroit, August 9 . . . 198
Its policy and nominations 198
Austin Blair a Presidential Elector of the Democracy 198
The Greenback Party and Prohibitionists
Development and progress of the Greenback party since 1874 .... 198
Resolutions of the Convention, May 3, 1876 199
The State Nominating Convention, August 29 200
ly] CONTENTS 1 7
?AGI
Adoption of several names on the Democratic state ticket 200
Action with reference to Congressional nominations 2cx)
State Convention of the Prohibitionists, March 22 201
TAe Election 0/1876
Small majority of the Republicans on the state ticket 202
Elections for Congress and the state legislature 203
Territorial distribution of the vote 203
Fate of the constitutional amendments 204
The Re'election of Senator Ferry, 1877
The exceptionally quiet Senatorial contest of 1877 204
Breaking-up and disappearance of the old circle of former rivals . . . 205
Ferry's parliamentary ability, a source of his popularity 205
Aspirations of Governor Bagley and his friends 205
Ferry's nomination by the Republicans 205
Rivalry within the Democratic party for candidacy 206
Nomination of Charles S. May by the Democracy 206
Election of Ferry to the Senate 206
Democratic comment . , , 206
Michigan and the Disputed Presidential Count
Conflicting partisan claims following the election . • 207
The telegrams of Zachariah Chandler 207
Views on the correct method of counting the electoral votes 208
The establishment of a Joint Committee on Elections 209
Expressions of opinion on Edmund's Electoral Commission Bill. ... 210
Partisan views concerning the decision on the Florida returns .... 212
Senator Christiancy on Louisiana 212
Christiancy on South Carolina. 213
The Democracy in defeat 213
Democratic sentiment concerning Hayes' inauguration 213
CHAPTER Vni
A RfesuMfe OF THE Politics of Michigan, i 877-1 878
The Close of Reconstruction and the General Issues of 1877
President Hayes' withdrawal of federal troops from South Carolina
and Louisiana 215
Estrangement of Chandler and opposition of the " Stalwarts " .... 215
Remonetization of silver and the attitude of the parties in Michigan . . 216
The National Greenback Party in Michigan
Progress of the party since 1876 218
Factions in Michigan, and the necessity for union 219
The State Convention at Grand Rapids, June 5 ..219
Chairmanship of Moses Field, formerly a soft-money Republican ... 219
Resolutions of the convention 220
Independent and uncompromising attitude towards both parties . , . 220
l8 CONTENTS FtS
fAGE
Tendency toward conciliation on the part of ihe Democracy 220
Attitude of the Republicans 221
TAe Republicans of Michigan
The State Convention in Detroit, June 13 222
Speech of Zachariah Chandler . 222
The platform , . 222
Hostility towards the National Greenbackers 223
Praise of Croswell, and omission of all mention of Hayes .... 223
The movement for Chandler as Governor 223
The Democracy
Obvious danger of concession to the Nationals 224
The State Convention in Lansing, July 10 224
The platform and the currency resolution .... 224
Comparative indifference this year of the Democracy to the agricultural
interests 225
The Prohibitionists
Persistent Prohibitionist sentiment in Michigan 225
Declarations of the State Convention in Lansing, August 13 225
Their influence in the field of social reform and improvement .... 226
The Campaign and Election 0/1878
Influence of the " Stalwarts " in directing the Republican campaign of
1878 226
Chandler's attitude towards Hayes' policy 227
Mutual recrimination on the money question 227
The election and Republican successes 227
Surprising power of National Greenback Party 228
Democratic losses through compromise with J he Nationals 228
Comment and self-reproach 228
The Senatorial Election of i8yg and the Return of Chandler to ihe Senate
Resignation of Christiancy from the Senate 228
Chandler, the one prominent candidate 229
Nomination of Orlando M. Barnes by the Democrats 229
The Greenbackers' candidate, Henry Chamberlain ... 229
Easy victory of Chandler, February 18, and his return to the Senate . . 229
His death, November i, 1S79, in Chicago 229
Republican supremacy in Michigan, succeeded by combired Democratic
and Greenback victory in 1882 230
CHAPTER IX
The Social and Economic Progress of Michigan
Character of the Population of Michigan
Relation of politics to the social and economic conditions in Michigan. 231
Diversity of the population 231
19] CONTENTS ip
PAGE
Immigration from the Eastern States 231
New England influence 231
Foreign elements 232
The Canadians and Irish 232
The Germans and the prohibition issue 232
The Dutch 232
Unimportance of the negro and Indian elements 233
Increase of population in Michigan, 1860-1880 233
Michigan's rank in the Union 233
Direction of the movement of population 234
Growing importance of the northern portion of the state 234
Effect of the north in politics 234
Status of literacy in Michigan 234
Newspapers and other periodicals 235
Schools and libraries 235
The agricultural college in politics 236
Industries of Michigan
Agriculture, first in importance 236
The lumbering interests of Michigan 236
Regions of greatest timber wealth 236
Chief milling districts 237
Mines in the north, and foreign immigration 238
Political significance of this foreign element . 238
Shipbuilding in Michigan 239
The Public Lands of Michigan
The public land policy in Michigan 239
Pre-emption and homestead laws 240
Grants for educational purposes 242
Grants for improvement of the facilities for transportation 244
The St. Mary's Falls Ship Canal 244
Deepening of the St. Clair Flats 245
Grants for wagon-roads 245
Importance of the land grants for railroad construction 246
The Salem decision 246
Crisis of 1873 ^"d ^^s effect 246
Extension of the railway systems in Michigan 246
Michigan Finances During the Period of this Study
The sinking fund and surplus of 1874-75 248
The Bond Purchase Act, 1875 249
Grounds for Republican boasts of successful fhianciering 249
Reduction in the rate of state taxation 249
The relation between the diversified interests of the state and its per-
sonal politics 250
EXPLANATION TO MAP I
The roraan numerals indicate the Congressional Districts into
which the state was divided until the reapportionment of 1872.
The counties indicated by the arabic figures, and the principal
cities by capitals, are enumerated in the explanation of the follow-
ing map.
EXPLANATION TO MAP II
The roman numerals indicate the Congressional
reapportionment of 1872. The map is taken from
1875, following page 144.
The counties are as follows :
Districts according to the
the Michigan Manual of
I Ontonagon
27
Missaukee
52
Clinton
2 Keweenaw
28
Roscommon
53
Shiawassee
3 Houghton
29
Ogemaw
54
Genesee
4 Marquette
30
Iosco
55
Lapeer
5 Menominee
31
Mason
56
St. Clair
6 Delta
32
Lake
57
Allegan
7 Schoolcraft
33
Osceola
58 Barry
8 Chippewa
34
Clare
59
Eaton
9 Mackinac
35
Gladwin
60
Ingham
10 Emmet
36 Bay
61
Livingston
II Cheboygan
37
Oceana
62 Oakland
12 Presque Isle
38 Newago
63
Macomb
1 3 Charlevoix
39
Mecosta
64
Van Buren
14 Antrim
40
Isabella
65
Kalamazoo
15 Otsego
41
Midland
66 Calhoun
16 Montmorency
42
Muskegon
67 Jackson
17 Alpena
43
Montcalm
68
Washtenaw
18 Leelanaw
44
Gratiot
69 Wayne
19 Benzie
45
Saginaw
7c
Berrien
20 Grand Traverse
46
Tuscola
71
Cass
21 Kaskaskia
47
Huron
72
St. Joseph
22 Crawford
48
Sanilac
73
Branch
23 Oscoda
49
Ottawa
74
Hillsdale
24 Alcona
50
Kent
75
Lenawee
25 Manistee
51
Ionia
76
Monroe
26 Wexford
The following are
the cities
indicated :
A Lansing
L
Marshall
W
Manistee
B Detroit
M
Cold water
X
Traverse City
C Cirand Rapids
N
Niles
Y
Alpena
D Kalamazoo
0
Benton Harbor
Z
Mackinaw
E Battle Creek
P
Allegan
F Jackson
Q
Grand Ilav:.n
A'
Sault Ste. Marie
G Ann Arbor
R
Muskegon
B'
Marquette
H Ypsilanti
S
Port Huron
a
Houghton
I Monroe
T
Saginaw
J Adrian
U
Bay City
M'
' Pimtiac
K Hillsdale
V
Ludington
N'
Flint
CHAPTER I
Resum:^ of State Politics During the War
early politics and the personal issues of 1 862
The reorganization of parties in 1854 and the election,
of 1856 marked a transition in the politics of the state of
Michigan. The Democrats had held continued sway since
its organization as a territory, with the exception of the
year 1840, when the first presidential vote was cast for
General Harrison. Their control was now broken by the
advent of the Republican party, whose ascendancy began
with Zachariah Chandler's election to the Senate in 1857,
and the practical retirement of Lewis Cass from politics
after his appointment by Buchanan as Secretary of State,
In 1856 the popular vote supported the Republican candi-
date for President by a majority of over 19,000, and the
six electors accordingly voted for Fremont and Dayton.^
There was early expressed a preference for Seward
over Lincoln as the presidential candidate in 1860,^ and
1 Michigan Manual, 1857, pp. 504-5. Campbell, Outlines of the Poli-
tical History of Michigan, pp. 563 et seq. Tribune Almanac, 1857,
pp. , 59, 60. Fremont received 71,762 votes, Buchanan 52,136, and
Fillmore, 1,660. The vote for governor disclosed the somewhat
smaller Republican majority of 17,317. The majority of Pierce over
Scott four years before was very small, the former receiving 41,842,
the latter 33,859, while the absolute majority of the Democratic can-
didate was further reduced to 746 by the casting of 7,^37 votes for
Hale. Notwithstanding the unmistakable evidence of decline in the
dominant party in 1852, the strength acquired by the Republican move-
ment four years later was most remarkable.
2 " Without any disparagement to numbers of distinguished men
worthy of the highest confidence of the nation, I shall not, I trust,
21] 21
i^
22 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [22
the Michigan delegation to the Chicago Convention, of
which Austin Blair was a member, refused to change their
preference even on the last ballot, when it was apparent
that Lincoln would win the nomination. He was well sup-
ported at the polls, however, receiving 23,423 plurality of
the popular vote over Douglas/
y Austin Blair was elected Governor by a plurality some-
/what smaller than that of Lincoln. It was a fortunate
y/y selection for the Republicans, as Blair's conduct during
( the war was to give their party immense prestige. His
\ father had been a strong Abolitionist, while he hiniself
was a Whig and voted in 1844 for Henry Clay. As a
member of the State legislature, he displeased a faction of
i/V the Whig party when he favored abolishing the color dis-
' tinction in regard to the elective franchise. The opposition
engendered by this agitation defeated him at the next elec-
tion, whereupon he severed his old party affiliations, joined
the Free Soil movement, and became a delegate to the
Buffalo Convention at which the Free Soil party was
founded in 1848. When this organization and the Anti-
Slavery Whigs coalesced in 1854, Blair found that his old
associates had advanced to his position. The Chicago plat-
form of i860 he adhered to throughout his political career,
and twelve years later, when he assailed the administration
and supported Greeley, he insisted that it was the Repub-
be thought unjust on pointing to the distinguished son of New York,
William H. Seward, as the man worthy to receive this high honor.
Never has American statesman been truer to this great cause. Let us
omit no manly effort to give success to our party, and to bring back
the constitution to its original principles and purposes." Letter of
Jacob M. Howard to R. Hosmer, April 18, i860, declining the nomin-
ation as State Attorney-General for the fourth term. — Howard MSS.
* Souvenir of Michigan Legislature and Political History of Michi-
gan, published by the Lansing State Republican, 1897, Mich. Man.,
1861, p. 68. Trih. Aim., 1861. Breckinridge received 805, Bell 405.
Austin Blair received 87,806 votes for governor, and Barry, 67,221.
23] STATE POLITICS DURING THE WAR 23
lican party, and not he, who had abandoned the principles
of that platform/
Under the leadership of Governor Blair, Michigan gave
generous support to the Union cause, and established a
precedent that added much to the standing and tradition of
the party in succeeding contests. One unmistakable ex-
pression of loyalty by the legislature was the carefully
worked out " Joint Resolution on the State of the Union "
finally approved February 2, 1861.^ It declared the su-
premacy of the Government of the United States, and
recognized the " full, inherent powers of self -protection
and defense." The resources and military strength of the
state were pledged to the government, and " concession
and compromise " were declared impossible under all cir-
cumstances.*
The regular session of the legislature closed the middle
of March, but after the fall of Sumter and Lincoln's call for
troops Governor Blair issued the Proclamation of April
23rd, calling an extra session to meet the seventh day of
May.* His message to the legislature was a stirring ten-page
^ Representative Men of Michigan, compiled by F. A. Barnard, Cin-
cinnati, 1878; Michigan Biographies, Lansing, 1888; Michigan His-
torical Collections, vol. xxxv, " Michigan Men in Congress," Edward
W. Barber.
' It originated with the House Committee on Federal Relations and
when the articles were sent to the Senate, the corresponding com-
mittee of that House reported a substitute group of resolutions
differing only in phraseology. As a result of mutual compromise, a
final draft was agreed upon satisfactory to both Houses. House
Documents, 1861, no. i, pp. 1-6; House Journal, pp. 105- 1 11, 162-3,
173-176, 181-187; Senate Journal, pp. 138, 268. The Joint Resolution
is given in Acts of Michigan, 1861, no. 3, p. 579.
' The policy of the federal government was materially aided by the
militia act providing for the preparation, by assessors, of lists of
persons Hable to military duty; for the equipment and recruitment of
troops; and for the authorization of a bond issue. Acts, 1861, pp.
300-305; 545-547, and 606, respectively.
* Senate Jour, and House Jour., Extra Session of 1861.
24 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [24
document, relating the circumstances of the recent procla-
mation calling for two regiments. It pointed out the lack
of fiscal provisions in the militia law of the previous ses-
sion, and made several valuable suggestions/ Grave ap-
prehensions were expressed throughout the document as
to the outcome of the war, and the spirit manifest in the
message, as well as in the legislative support which followed,
undoubtedly had great influence in strengthening the Union
sentiment within the state.
The first act passed at the new session of the legislature
amended the militia act passed at the session just preced-
ing and placed the state upon a war footing.^ It provided
for the muster, drill and instruction of the militia, and re-
quired each member to take the oath of allegiance to the
United States and to the state of Michigan, and of obedi-
ence to the President and Governor. It provided for
courts-martial, and empowered the Governor to establish
recruiting offices whenever he thought it proper in order to
meet any deficiency in the state levy. The Governor was
required to appoint a Military Contract Board of three
officers, the majority of whom must approve all contracts
for equipment, supplies and labor entered into for the state
troops.
The second act provided for the relief by counties of the
families of volunteers mustered into service from Mich-
igan.^ The fifth measure made provision for the negotia-
"^ Senate Jour, and House Jour., pp. i-io; Joint Documents, Extra
Session, 1861, no. i. He urged the amendment of the miHtia law so
that it authorize putting four new regiments upon a war footing, with
power in case of emergency to raise the number to ten. He also
recommended the authorization of towns and cities to levy taxes for
the support of the families of volunteers.
' Acts, 1861, Extra Session, no. i, pp. 595-602.
' Ibid., no. 2, p. 602.
25] STATE POLITICS DURING THE WAR 25
tion of a loan not exceeding one million dollars at a rate of
interest not exceeding seven per cent, to be redeemable
at any time within twenty-five years from January i, 1861,
the interest payable semi-annually on the first day of Janu-
ary and July of each year. The bonds were exempted from
taxation and the proceeds were to be devoted exclusively to
war purposes/
Upon the assembling of the legislature in January of
1862 the duty of selecting a United States Senator devolved
upon it by the death, in October of the previous year, of
Kinsley S. Bingham, the senior senator from Michigan.
Jacob M. Howard, a prominent attorney of Detroit, was
mentioned as a possibility and his friends urged him to
become a candidate. He had been a steadfast Whig until 1 1^
the founding of the Republican party, and like Chandler,/
believed the war to be inevitable, though he was not so
strongly opposed to compromise. He had participated in ?,
the union of the anti-slavery element of the Old Whigs — j ^^^
which in Michigan was the dominant faction of the party — (
with the Abolitionists and Free Soil Democracy. He was
a member of the committee on the address of the Repub-
lican National Convention at Pittsburgh, and his political
training further included membership in the lower house
of the 27th Congress, and the office of State Attorney-Gen-
eral from 1855 to 1861.^ In the canvass for the senator-
ship, Howard's friends had some apprehensions concerning
the "locality" argument; for in the event of his victory
both senators would be residents of Detroit, and sectional
opposition was feared from the central and western por-
tions of the state.^ On the first ballot of the • Republicans,
^ Acts, 1861, Extra Session, no. 5, p. 605.
' Rep. Men of Mich.; Mich. Biog.; Farmer, History of Detroit and
Michigan, vol. ii, p. 1059.
' " My locality, it is true, is unfavorable. I trust, however, the
26 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [26
Howard received 21 votes out of 90, while Blair received
20, and on the seventh ballot, the former was nominated.
Notwithstanding the locality disadvantage, he was elected
over his Democratic adversary, but the difficulty he had
feared in this election was to be effectual ten years later in
working his defeat/
The elections of 1862 were accompanied in Michigan as
in many other states by serious dissensions within the Re-
publican party. All conservative elements fused into what
was known as the Union movement, and to this movement
\/ the less aggressive Republicans contributed considerable
strength. The Michigan Unionists' hostility to radicalism
\in general centered about Senator Chandler as the leader of
•the Radicals. The schism in the Republican party of the
state followed the lines of personal feeling toward an in-
tensely aggressive and uncompromising leader. The per-
sonal and local elements in the situation quite overshadowed
the more important issues of the war and preservation of
I the Union, and thus prevented the " Union " movement
from attaining such importance as it acquired in many
other states. In New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Ohio, Indiana, Oregon, Illinois, and Delaware, the ''Union"
party movement absorbed the Republican party, and the
Democracy stood in the light of an obstinate minority with
disloyal inclinations. In Michigan the relative status was
.entirely different. The Republican party was of course
thoroughly loyal, but in addition, it was committed to the
people of the state have known me too long and well to apprehend
I should make Detroit the horizon of my views or the particular
theater of my attentions. No, Sir, the Republican party owes too
little to the voters of Detroit, and their opponents there are still too
powerful to make it a very lovely spot for those who are attached
to it (the party)." Letter of Howard to Charles Jewitt of Niles,
December 23, 1861. Howard MSS.
* Souv. of the Leg. and Hist, of Mich., p. 50.
2y] STATE POLITICS DURING THE WAR 27
support of the strong if not violent senior senator, and all I
those who were disaffected toward Chandler were forced
over into alliance with the Democracy.
This combined opposition received different names from
different sources. To the Republicans, it was only the
" Democratic " organization swelled by a factious few who
bolted from the lines of the one loyal party on wholly
imaginary and insufficient personal grounds. To its own
members, it was a " Fusion " party built upon a " Demo-
cratic " foundation, and possessing " Union " sentiments.
There was naturally present within the ranks of this party
a well-defined dissatisfaction with the progress of the war.
The results of the failure of the Peninsular Campaign were
visible in Michigan as elsewhere, and a tide of reaction
against the administration was manifest in the election of
1862. But the personal politics in the state had so con-
cealed the actual attitude upon the federal issues, that the
outcome of the campaign surprised many Republicans.
Blair indeed won the governorship by 6,500 over the Union-\ ^, ,
Democratic candidate,^ and five of the six members elected/
to the lower house of Congress were Republicans. But
the combined opposition was more successful in the state
legislature, which showed a large proportion of Fusionists
— 51 against 81 Republicans on the joint ballot^ More-
over, abstention was practiced to a much greater extent
than was customary in the years of state and Congressional
^ Blair received 68,716, and Byron G. Stout, 62,102.
2 In the previous legislature, the joint membership was distributed '
as follows : 100 RepubHcans and 12 Democrats. Trib. Aim., 1861,
p. 63. In 1862, there were 18 Republicans in the Senate, 63 in the ^
House, while the Fusionists elected 14 to the Senate, and 37 to the
House. Trib. Aim. 1863, pp. 61, 62; JVorld Aim., 1863; Mich. Man.,
1863. The reason for the discrepancy in the total membership of the
two successive legislatures is the reapportionment of the State Rep-
resentatives in 1861. Acts, 1861, no. 116, p. 154.
28 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN • [28
elections. The gubernatorial vote of i860 exceeded that of
1862 by almost 25,000, and as the opposition candidate
received approximately only 5,000 less, there was proof of
abstention on the part of 20,000 Republicans at the latter
election. Furthermore, as Blair's majority fell from 20,585
to 6,614, the Republican loss was almost 14,000. The
strongest evidence of a reaction was, however, the presence
of 51 *' Fusionists " or "Unionists" in the state legis-
lature, out of a membership of 132.
It was clearly evident that there would be strong opposi-
tion to a radical candidate in the Senatorial election. Upon
the assembling of the legislature the opponents of Chandler
began to organize. They effected a combination, and after
an extended struggle between the faction favoring Ex-
Senator Alpheus Felch, a Democrat, and those who in-
sisted upon voting for a former Republican, the latter won,
and James F. Joy was agreed upon as the opponent of
Chandler. Joy was a thoroughly trained lawyer and a man
of decided independence of conviction. Both candidates
were residents of Detroit, and old acquaintances with very
similar views upon many questions. Joy had voted the
Republican state ticket, but objected to the re-election of
Chandler on the ground that his faction in the Senate
" dominated the President and thwarted such true leaders
as Seward and Chase." ^
The act which probably told against Chandler most gen-
erally with the people was his letter of February 11, 1861,
to Governor Blair relative to the appointment of delegates
to the Peace Conference at Washington. After this as-
sembly began deliberations and it appeared that the North
was losing ground, Chandler wrote the Governor as fol-
lows : " Ohio, Indiana, and Rhode Island are caving in and
"^ Mich. Coll, vol. XXX, pp. 101-2; Alfred Russell, Life of Joy;
Farmer, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 1059.
29] STATE POLITICS DURING THE WAR 29
there is danger of Illinois, and now they beg us for God's
sake to come to their rescue and save the Republican party
from rupture. I hope you will send stiff-backed men or
none." Then as a postscript the offensive passage was
added : " Some of the manufacturing states think a fight
would be awful. Without a little blood-letting this Union
would not, in my estimation, be worth a rush." ^ Chandler,
like Wade and Cameron, was convinced early in the year
i860 that war was unavoidable. His conversation with
John Slidell of Louisiana, — in which the Southern Sen-
ator declared secession imminent, — and the discovery of
Clay's draft of the secession ordinance for Alabama per-
suaded him that the time for negotiation had passed. It
became his settled conviction that " there was treason- in
the White House, both Houses of Congress, and the Gal-
leries of the Capitol." ^
A second fruitful source of antagonism to Chandler was
his speech of July 16, 1862, denouncing McClellan and the
conduct of the war. Both this and his letter were leading
campaign documents against the Republican cause in the
elections and later in the senatorial contest. But Chandler t
had the advantage of being the " regular " candidate, and \ ^y^
the favorite with the soldiers. He was elected by almost a
two-thirds vote of the legislature, receiving 83 votes, while
Joy, the Union candidate, received 45.^
1 Rhodes, History of the United States, vol. iii, p. 291 and note 3-
Post and Tribune Life of Chandler, pp. 186-200 ; Mich. Coll, vol. xxviii,
p. 439.
* Speech replying to Hendricks of Indiana in defense of his letter,
Globe, Jan. 31, 1866, p. 885. The particulars are given in an article
of reminiscences in the A^. Y. Times, May n, 1879- (Townsend Li-
brary, vol. Ixxxiv, p. 166, columns i, 2.) The letter, though a private
one, soon appeared in the Detroit Free Press, whose editor, Wilbur
Story, was a bitter enemy of the war.
' Alpheus Felch as Democratic Candidate received two complimentary
votes, and two other gentlemen each received one. Souv. of the Leg.
and Hist, of Mich., pp. 50-56.
30 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [30
POLITICS IN 1863 AND 1 864, AND THE UNIONIST SUCCESS IN
MICHIGAN
Political activity in 1863 and 1864 was mainly con-
cerned with criticism and defense of Lincoln's policy, and
chief among the features about which this controversy cen-
tered was emancipation. A consideration of this issue and
the subsequent question of suffrage raises the inquiry as to
the attitude of Michigan tow^ard the negro. The small per-
centage of negro population in the State precluded the
social need for restrictive legislation.^ In the early part of
the legislative session of 1861, there was some agitation
for the repeal of the Personal Liberty Law which gave
fugitive slaves the right of habeas corpus and a trial by
jury, the state paying the costs of defense.^ The bill for
the repeal was referred to the House Committee on
Judiciary, which was unable to arrive at a unanimous agree-
ment. The majority reported adversely, while the minority
recommended its passage.^ At the next session, the meas-
ure was finally tabled by a vote of 54 to 35, and the agita-
tion was ended.*
,* In i860, the negroes constituted 2.17% of the total population of
/the state, and by 1864 their numbers had decreased by a half. Of a
total population of 751,111 in i860, there were 16,310 blacks, and within
four years the colored population fell to 8244, even with a total in-
■>. crease to 803,745. Census Report of Mich,, 1864, pp. 606, 6^2,.
2 Act of Feb. 13, 1855, " to protect the rights and liberties of the
inhabitants of this state."
' House Doc, 1861, no. 16, 15 pages, and no. 17, 16 pages. The
former was signed by Eugene Pringle, W. J. Howell and Gilbert E.
Pratt ; the latter by Thomas W. Lockwood and M. M. Atwood, House
Jour., 1861, pp. 526-40, 576-91.
* It was first postponed indefinitely by a vote of 56 to 30, and then
tabled February 19, 1863. House Jour., 1863, pp. 606, 607, 782, 783.
On January 28 of that year a public meeting was held in Detroit
which called for " the repeal of the Personal Liberty Law, a return to
the Missouri Compromise in order to settle forever the question of
31 ] STATE POLITICS DURING THE WAR 31
Though the dominant element in the legislature was in
favor of the protection of the blacks in their pursuit of
liberty, the Republicans had yet to advance in order to sup:^
port emancipation. In his letter of December 23, 1861,
previously referred to/ Mr. Howard gave what was, in all
probability, a fair resume of the Republican view of the
war. Suppression of the rebellion was considered the pur-
pose of the North, and liberation of the slaves would be
tolerated, if at all, only as a war measure, for the alienation
of loyal slaveowners was, if possible, to be avoided.
The great object of the war is, in my judgment, to beat down^
the rebels and compel them to surrender. Our armies are
called out to effect this ; their mission is not to emancipate or
to return slaves, but to crush the enemy. The Republican
party has never presented themselves to the world as aiming
to emancipate slaves in the states. The Chicago platform nega-
tives the idea. But should it be necessary as a means of prose-
cuting the war to emancipate the slaves of rebels, the means
should be used.
Perhaps the inadvisability of any other position at this time,
from a technical point of view, was uppermost in his mind
when he continued : '' Why strip the Union men of the slave
states of all hope by adopting a policy in which they can-
not, cannot sympathize."
The message of Governor Blair at the opening of the
extra session of 1862 showed an attitude somewhat more
advanced on the emancipation issue, as he was probably the
most radically loyal person of influence in the state at this
time. He declared that by the laws of war, emancipation
was entirely justifiable.
slavery in the South or in the District of Columbia." It was remarked
at the time that "with this ineffective meeting, the Cass idea expired
in Michigan." Mich. Coll., vol. xxviii, p. 439-
1 Cf. supra, p. 25, note 3.
32 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [32
To protect the rebel's slave property is to help him to butcher
our people and to burn our houses. Upon those who caused
the war, and now maintain it, its chief burdens ought to fall.
No property of a rebel ought to be free from confiscation —
not even the sacred slave. The object of war is to destroy the
power of the enemy, and whatever measures are calculated to
accomplish that object and are in accordance with the usages
of civilized nations ought to be employed. To undertake to
put down a powerful rebellion, and at the same time to save
and protect all the chief sources of the power of that rebellion,
seems to common minds but a short remove from folly. He
who is not for the Union unconditionally in this mortal struggle
is against it. To treat the enemy gently is to excite his de-
rision. If our soldiers must die, do not let it be of the in-
activity and diseases of camps, but let them have the satisfac-
tion of falling like soldiers, amid the roar of battle, and hear-
ing the shouts of victory, then will they welcome it as the tired
laborer welcomes sleep. Let us hope that we have not much
longer to wait.^
The war spirit manifested in the legislative and popular
support of the document was strengthened by external cir-
cumstances which proved more threatening than actually
destructive. The proximity of Detroit to Canada exposed
it to invasion by the Southern refugees congregated on the
opposite bank of the river. Their repeated threats were a
source of continual apprehension and this tended to throw
odium upon whatever rebel sympathy existed in the locality.^
1 loint Doc, 1861, p. 10.
» The newspapers of Detroit for the month of July, 1862, contain
numerous warnings for armed defense in case of invasion, and de-
mands for efficient detective service. A mass meeting in that city-
held July 15 to assist in the recruitment of troops was broken up by
a mob which had crossed over from Canada. A second meeting was
successfully held and the press observed that from the large number
of enlistments an important change in the popular feeling was in
evidence. Detroit Advertiser and Tribune, July 16, 1862. L. T.
Hemans, History of Michigan, p. 219.
33] STATE POLITICS DURING THE WAR 33
The discontent with the conduct of the war had increased
by the spring of 1863, and the Fusionist victories of the
preceding November gave encouragement to whatever anti-
war or anti-administration sentiment there was in the
composite party. Democratic members of the legislature
were emboldened to pass sharp criticism upon the adminis-
tration in the course of debates upon measures in support
of the federal policy/ The grievances of the discontented
were set forth in the Democratic State platform adopted
in convention February 11, 1863, — an irregular proceeding
for the " off " year. " The simple issue is now freedom or
despotism," it declared, and evidences of the latter were
enumerated as follows:
the suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus,
the arrest of citizens by military power, denial of the right of
trial by jury, abridgment of freedom of speech and of the press,
a secret police, martial law declared in states not in rebellion,
freeing of the slaves of loyal citizens, and the division of the
state of Virginia.
In the presidential campaign of 1864, the Republicans
were obliged to meet not only the hostility of the Demo-
crats, but a serious schism in their own party. The Repub-
lican sentiment in Michigan shared to a considerable degree
the ideas of the opposition to Lincoln which developed in
the last year of his first term. A feeling was manifest that
* Among the hostile speeches was that directed against the admin-
istration and the war by Edward G. Morton of Monroe, a town which
was a Democratic stronghold. Adv. and Trib., Jan. 25, 1863. Judge
Pratt of Calhoun declared that " the people ought to rise up and
hurl him (the President) from his chair." George W. Peck re-
ferred to Lincoln as " the despot at Washington, the tool of usurpers,"
and declared this a " White Man's government." Most of the regular
Democratic members were more prudent, however, and the Speaker of
the House, Sullivan M. Cutcheon, was a loyal and prudent parlia-
mentarian. Mich. Coll., vol. XXX, pp. 103, 104.
34 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [3^
the plan of the administration concerning Reconstruction
appeared to minimize the functions of Congress and treat
the rebel states with too much leniency. " There is an
obvious change," it was observed, " from the compromising
and hesitant attitude at the early period of the war," and
the case was mildly stated when a leading organ declared
that
among the friends of the administration in this state, there is
not entire unanimity on all points concerning the restoration
of the seceded states. . . . They are generally agreed, however,
that the Government has authority to superintend, regulate,
and control this process and impose such conditions as the
public safety may require.^
y- The Wade-Davis Bill, which was passed by Congress July
» y74, 1864, received the support of the majority of the Mich-
igan delegation, though the Democratic member offered
. strong resistance,^ much to the disgust of a vigorous body
\of enthusiasts at home. This bill not only assumed that the
reconstruction of the states lately in rebellion was a legis-
lative problem, but required the loyalty of at least a ma-
jority of the white male adults in order to form a basis
for the new state government. This was aimed directly
against the theory of the President, that ten per cent of the
votes cast at the Presidential election in i860 formed a
sufficient electorate. Further, the bill asserted the power
of Congress to abolish slavery within the limits of those
^ Adv. and Trib., June 14, 22, July 6. The term "Government"
probably included Congress as an agent equal to the President.
Similar expressions are to be found in the Lansing State Republican,
July 27, Aug. 3.
» Rhodes, op. cit., vol. iii, pp. 485-7. Globe, Mar. 2, 1864, pp. 1243-4 ;
Apr. 29, pp. 1981-5; Apr. 30, pp. 2011-14; July i, pp. 3460-1; July
2, p. 3491. The Democratic member was Augustus Baldwin from the
fifth district.
35] STATE POLITICS DURING THE WAR 3^
States which had lately seceded. It thus abandoned the
theory of " perdurance ", or continuance of statehood after
secession. Those members of the Union had fallen to the
status of territories, it was believed, and, as such, were sub-
ject to the exclusive authority of the central government.
On the last day of the preceding May, the Radicals met
in convention in Cleveland.^ In the twelfth section of their
platform, they declared that Congress, as the representa-
tives of the people, had the exclusive right to restore the
states lately in rebellion. Fremont was named to force the
retirement of Lincoln, whose policy was considered alto-
gether too lenient. It would be expected from temperament
and past convictions that Chandler would have thrown his
influence with the opponent of Lincoln, in the interest of a
more vigorous prosecution of the war. This was not the
case, however, for he labored steadfastly in behalf of Lin-
coln and he was among those who effected the withdrawal
of Fremont. The motive for this action is not evident, but
it is probable that he believed a change of executive would
be unfortunate at such a crisis, and believed that should
Fremont's retirement be followed by the resignation of
Montgomery Blair from the cabinet, the lenient attitude
of the President would give way to more vigorous activity.
Chandler may have felt, — as did many of the Radicals, —
that the removal of Blair's influence for mildness and mod-
eration would materially affect Lincoln's point of view, and
leave him free to pursue the more rigorous plan suggested
by other members of his cabinet. Precisely what Chand-
ler's part was in effecting the withdrawal of Fremont is
uncertain, but his efforts within the state were certainly in
behalf of Lincoln, and with the soldiers he was particu-
larly influential.^
* Rhodes, op. cit., vol. iv, pp. 463-4-
2 Post and Trib. Life of Chandler, p. 263 et seq.
36 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [36
The character of the Unionist movement was fully deter-
mined on Fremont's retirement. Early in the preceding
year, 1863, it was obvious that the Democracy would be
the chief opponent of the party supporting the administra-
tion, and a second element would have been added to the
opposition had Fremont continued candidate for president
The situation of 1862 would thus have been repeated,
though with this difference, that, in 1862, the opposition
within the dominant party was based upon personal grounds
and was conservative, while in 1864, it was based upon
national issues and was radical. The withdrawal of Fre-
mont closed the ranks of the Republican party and brought
back the aggressive members, even in Michigan, to the sup-
port of the administration.
Its schism being a thing of the past, the party took as its
leading issue the preservation of the Union and support of
the administration. It came naturally to be thought of as
containing all loyal persons, and drew to itself many loyal
men who had previously cast their influence with the
Fusionist movement in behalf of moderation. This left
the Democracy now in Michigan — what it had been in
many other states two years before — a party which was,
when compared with the Republicans, under suspicion of
disloyalty, however erroneous that idea might be. The
" Union " party was now set over against the Democracy,
which labored under the disadvantage of having the one
policy of opposition to the war and hostility toward the
administration. The term Unionist had thus changed its
meaning within the last two years. In 1862 it meant one
opposed to the Radicals who persisted in supporting their
leader, Zachariah Chandler, and in working upon the
basis of personal politics. As this aggressive element
constituted what was, in 1862, understood to be the Re-
publican party, the Union movement was at that date
1/
37] STATE POLITICS DURING THE WAR 37
essentially anti-Republican. After the disappearance in
1864 of personal issues — at least from the foreground —
the Union movement bore along the majority of both ele-
ments of the Republican party which now joined forces,
and directed its opposition against the Democracy. It thus
appeared anti-Democratic in its essentials.
As such, the Unionist movement was indeed successful
in Michigan, as the popular vote for President showed it
with a victory over strong opposition, with the small ma-
jority of 16,917 out of a total of 166,125. Lincoln received]
55.89 per cent of the popular vote at this election — a decline^
of 1.74 per cent since i860 — and this, though small, was
significant. The vote for Governor corresponded very
closely with that for President.^
Of the 132 members of the state legislature, the Union-
ists elected 109, and had the powerful majority of 86. All
six Congressional districts elected Unionists to Congress,
but in the fifth, the majority was very small. It was in
this district where there arose the contested election case the
next February, which turned upon the legality of the army
vote.^
The soldiers' vote for President and Governor gave the
Unionist candidates a majority of 75 per cent and in the
Congressional elections the majority for several of- the
Unionists was much greater. There were two obvious rea-
sons for this support offered by the soldier element. In
the first place, Chandler had been extremely popular and
1 Lincoln received 91,521, McClellan 74,604. For governor, Henry 1^_^''
H. Crapo received 91,356 votes or 55.i6%, while Fenton received 74r I
293. A few more votes were polled for President, but the differ-
ence was negligible. These figures include the returns from seven-
teen counties which were not received in time to be counted, but
nevertheless show their political affiliations. Mich. Man., pp. 216,
217, 219-221; World Aim., pp. 68-70; Trib. Aim., pp. 63, 64.
2 This will be considered subsequently, cf. infra, ch. ii, p. 70.
38 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [38
had great influence with it, and in the second place, the tra-
ditions and associations of the Democracy naturally tended
to antagonize the army class.
The distribution of the party vote at this election clearly
indicated certain territorial tendencies. Five of the six
counties that voted in the northern peninsula went Demo-
cratic, and Emmet and Cheboygan, which generally held
similar political preferences with their neighbors on the
north, also voted for McClellan. The southeastern counties
were more evenly divided and showed an unstable party
preference — in most cases for the Democracy. Wayne
county was constantly Democratic, and with the city of
Detroit it has always been recognized as the centre of the
state Democracy. Oakland, Macomb and Monroe gave
small majorities to the Democratic candidate in 1864, all
turned Republican in 1866, and the last returned to the
Democracy in 1868. The south and south-central counties
frequently presented close votes, while in those toward the
west the Republicans predominated.
CHAPTER II
Michigan Politics during the Period of Congres-
sional Restoration
michigan and presidential restoration
The period which intervened between the triumph of the
Federal Executive in 1864 and the defeat of his successor,
two years later, saw a schism in the reigning party, termin-
ating in the rise of the Conservative or Administration
party and the supremacy of the Radical or Congressional
faction.
Already in the last session of the Thirty-eighth Congress
the first step was taken toward securing equality of the civil
rights of the negro. This was the passage of the Thir-
teenth Amendment early in the year 1865. It received the
support of the entire Michigan delegation, as Augustus C.
Baldwin, the one Democratic member, now gave it his
favorable consideration on the final vote/
The question of ratification thus came before the state
legislature in its regular session of 1865. The fact that
the one Democratic member was friendly to the measure
probably had some influence in securing its favorable con-
1 Rhodes, op. cit., vol. v, p. 50 ; Riddle, Recollections of War Times,
p. 324 et seq. Mich. Coll., vol. xxix, pp. 591-3; Trib. Aim., p. 51;
McPherson, History of the Rebellion, p. 258. Mr. Baldwin failed of
re-election in 1866, but this is hardly conclusive evidence of disap-
proval on the part of his constituents. In the general decline of
Democratic power in Michigan that year, he probably would have lost
his seat had he persisted in his opposition to the amendment.
39] 39
V
/
40 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [40
sideration in the state. There was no marked opposition to
its ratification since it was recognized to be merely the
carrying out of the Emancipation Proclamation, and ac-
cordingly the joint resolution was passed February 2nd.
Whereas American slavery, in its wickedness and infatuation,
has added to its many other heinous sins the crime of waging
a causeless, cruel and bloody war for the avowed purpose of
dividing and destroying the nation, whereby it has forfeited all
further right to toleration, ... it has become necessary to
utterly destroy this barbarous foe of civilization, humanity, and
religion.^
Such were the vigorous terms in which the legislature ap-
proved the amendment. Some Democratic journals, it is
true, had expressed the apprehension that this measure
would usher in more objectionable steps in behalf of the
negro, but after the ratification of the amendment they
were, for the most part, ready to defend it and await later
developments.^
In connection with President Lincoln's plan of restora-
tion, the first clear case of disagreement which is of interest
in Michigan history, was the speech of Senator Jacob M.
Howard on February 25, 1865. This was delivered during
the last days of the Thirty-eighth Congress when the ques-
tion of admitting the Senators-elect from Arkansas and
Louisiana was being considered. In this address he rejected
the opposite theories of "perdurance" and "state-suicide",
and presented a view which might be considered analogous
to the " conquered province theory " of Thaddeus Stevens.
y\ He asserted that the states had become " ward-provinces of
* Acts, 1865, pp. 777-8, Joint Res., no. 5.
* Free Press, Jan. 13, 1865; Kal. Gazette, Jan. 25; Argus, Jan. 27,
Feb. 3.
41 ] PERIOD OF CONGRESSIONAL RESTORATION 41
the United States progressing toward the maturity of re- \i^'
vived loyalty ", and the right of restoring these he claimed /
for Congress alone. He opposed the ten-percent govern-'
ments of Lincoln, on the ground that '' minority govern-
ment is an evil example inconsistent with our constitution." ^
This early attack upon the policy of the administration was
discussed in detail throughout the state, and it became the
firm conviction of the leading organs of the dominant party
in Michigan that Congress had exclusive jurisdiction over
the establishment of loyal government in the rebel states.^
It was true, then, that early in the year a small but powerful
opposition was growing up in Michigan against Lincoln's
policy of restoration, and the political theories he main-
tained.
The assassination of President Lincoln brought to the
leadership in this crisis a man who occupied a position some-
what similar to that of Tyler, twenty-five years before.
The exact politics of the Vice-President in each case was a
matter for conjecture. The Democrats believed that Mr.
Johnson was pledged to the same principles as his prede-
cessor, but saw in him " a man with more firmness, more
vigor, and probably more unrelenting passion." * A lead-
ing Democratic journal prophesied that he would find sup-
port among all factions except the Radicals, with whom he
would not long act in harmony.* In short, the DemocracyX y^
in Michigan placed great confidence in the new President, I
and looked forward to his calling Congress " unless pre-
vented by the conviction that it would be swayed by the
1 Globe, Feb. 25, 1865, pp. 1091-1111; Feb. 27, p. 1128.
^ Adv. and Trib., Feb. 21, 25, Mar. 2, Apr. 4; Grand Rapids Daily
Eagle, Mar. 8, 30; Lansing State Rep., Mar. 22; Kal. Tel., Apr. 7, 26;
Jackson Daily Cit., May 4.
» Free Press, Apr. 16, 1865.
* Ibid., Apr. 11.
42 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [42
fanaticism of Wade, Sumner and Stevens — men of that
character whose thirst for blood cannot be assuaged." ^
There was some truth in the charge of the Republicans
that the Democracy was inconsistent. During the cam-
paign of 1864, the latter declared that after Johnson had
been allied with their party, his appearance on a Republican
National ticket was indisputable proof of his apostasy.
After his succession to the presidency, they ceased to em-
phasize this feature of his career, and claimed him again as
a reliable member of their party. ^
It was true that some members of both parties feared that
after his experience as Governor of Tennessee, President
Johnson would manifest a bitter animosity toward the
rebels. His utterances to the effect that " treason must
be made odious," and that " traitors must be punished and
impoverished," ^ naturally led men to expect a rigid appli-
cation of criminal law to the Confederate leaders. It is not
strange, then, that Radicals like Sumner, Wade and Chand-
ler felt a certain grim satisfaction in the prospects of the
administration, and a confidence in the President's deter-
mination to inflict upon the rebels the full penalties of the
law.*
There was little adverse comment upon Johnson's re-
tention of Lincoln's cabinet, and the Republicans generally
did not foresee the possibilities of the conciliatory counsels
of Seward. Among the first steps which the President took
towards restoration were the Proclamations of May 9th and
1 Free Press, Apr. 13.
• Kal. Gazette, Apr. 18, 1865; Adv. and Trib., Apr. 20; Lansing State
Rep., May 7.
• Speech of Apr, 21, 1865, Rhodes, op. cit., vol. v, p. 521.
• Ibid., Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress, vol. ii, p. 13 ; Post and
Tribune Life of Chandler, p. 284; Adv. and Trib., Apr. 18, 1865.
43] PERIOD OF CONGRESSIONAL RESTORATION 43
loth respectively/ The recognition of the Peirpoint Gov-
ernment in Virginia, and the warning to foreign nations
against extending hospitality to the Confederate cruisers
since the close of the war, both met with the approval of the
leading journals of the state.^
The Amnesty Proclamation of May 29th provided for
the pardoning of certain classes, including the rebel leaders,
upon personal application, and the amnesty of all other
rebels upon the taking of a prescribed oath. Upon the basis
of this re-established loyalty. President Johnson proposed
to use the old electorate of the South in the process of res-
toration/ The proclamation met with favorable comment
on the part of the Democrats and many Republicans. A
leading Democratic organ pronounced it " statesmanlike
and manly," * while a mild Republican journal declared it
" the embodiment of the best judgment of the masses in the
state." " There has been a fear," the latter journal con-
tinued, " that undue leniency might make treason respect-
able . . . but to-day every leading traitor stands before the
public a great criminal." ^ Speaking further of the procla-
mation, the same journal continued : '' It is a manifesto to
the world that the government fully recognizes that treason
has been committed, and even with the fourteen classes ex-
cepted, it is as merciful as it is dignified — and none can
rightly complain." In the matter of state regulation of
suffrage, this conservative Republican organ declared itself
in agreement with the President. " As civil communities,
those states have the undoubted right to confer the elective
^ Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. vi, pp. 306-9.
« Lansing State Rep. and Free Press for May, 1865.
' Rhodes, op. cit., vol. v, p. 525 et seq.
* Free Press, May 3i» 1865.
^ Adv. and Trih., June 6.
44 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [44
franchise upon, or withhold it from, such of their popula-
tion as they may deem proper." With reference to the con-
quered, province theory, it was declared that in a process
wherein the Northern States held the Southern States at
their mercy as subject provinces, the distinctive features of
Republican government would receive a fatal obscuration.
'' A state cannot secede from the Union, however much the
people within its limits may rebel. Now that the rebellion
is ended, the states remain with their former names,
boundaries and population, but without laws adapted to
their changed conditions." ^
Such were the views of a very prominent Republican
organ of the milder type ; with the vast majority of the party
in Michigan, however, the Amnesty Proclamation marked
the beginning of hostility to the President. The reason was
obvious. During the months of April and May there had
been a general discussion concerning the probable attitude
that President Johnson would take upon the question of
negro suffrage and the electorate in the South. The Re-
publicans insisted upon one of two alternatives — namely,
the complete disfranchisement of all rebels, or the disfran-
chisement of the leaders only, combined with negro suf-
frage. They generally preferred the latter, and in this they
were probably influenced by the Radical members of their
party who a little later became its leaders.^
The Amnesty Proclamation contained no reference to
negro suffrage, but, on the other hand provided for the
prompt restoring of all rebels, with certain exceptions, to
full civil rights. These excepted classes contained the rebel
leaders whom the Republicans would have barred abso-
1 Adv. and Trih., June 13, 1865.
^Lansing State Rep., Apr. 18, May 17; Grand Rapids Daily Eagle,
May 26, June 7; Letter of J. M. Howard to J. P. Whittemore, Apr. 3,
1865, in the Adv. and Trib., May 31.
45] PERIOD OF CONGRESSIONAL RESTORATION 43
lutely, while under the Proclamation their pardon could be
readily granted by special act of the President. In short,
the document ignored negro suffrage, and looked to the
ultimate if not hasty reinstatement of the white electorate
of the South before the war. The majority of the Repub-
licans of the state, and especially the Radicals, were natur-
ally astounded at this turn in Johnson's policy, since they
had felt fully convinced, only six weeks before, that he was
in harmony with them upon the suffrage question.^
In a second proclamation issued May 29th, the President
made provision for the restoration of North Carolina. He
appointed William W. Holden as Provisional Governor,
and gave to the old white electorate of the state ^ the ex-
clusive right to elect members to the constitutional conven-
tion, and to serve in the capacity of delegate to that body.
Within six weeks a series of similar proclamations followed,
which set into motion the machinery for the restoration of
Mississippi, Georgia, Texas, Alabama, South Carolina, and
Florida. The "ten-percent governments" set up by Lincoln
in Louisiana and Arkansas were finally recognized, and the
government in Tennessee, organized by President Johnson,
himself, as Military Governor, was maintained.^
The appointment of Provisional Governors was promptly
denounced by Chandler, who considered them a different
class of officers from Military Governors.
I believe it is an office unknown to the constitution and laws
of our government, and, in my judgment, the President had
no authority to create it. These governors are not sent to the
1 Rhodes, op. cit, vol. v," p. 523 et seq.
' The electorate previous to May 20, 1861, the date of the secession
of North Carolina.
» Rhodes, op. cit, vol. v, p. 526-7; Burgess, Reconstruction and the
Constitution, p. 35 et seq.
46 ^^^ POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [46
Senate for confirmation, nor would it have made them any
more governors had we confirmed them, because the Senate
and Andrew Johnson together could not have created the office.
If there was no authority of law, then it required the com-
bined action of the House of Representatives, the Senate, and
the President before an officer could be legally appointed/
To the Democrats, these executive acts were " only the
old States Rights doctrine properly applied when opposition
to the authority of the United States has ceased." The
Democracy did not credit the President with going as far as
he should, but supported him in all that he did and con-
gratulated him for going in advance of the party which
elected him.^ There were grave — and as it proved, well-
founded — apprehensions among the Democrats that if the
J Radicals succeeded in creating a popular feeling in favor of
y\ negro suffrage, '' they would unhesitatingly adopt a policy
1 in Congress of refusing seats to members from states not
\ granting negro suffrage." However, it was thought that
\ the people " generally recognized the inherent right of the
\tates to regulate suffrage for themselves," ^ and the Free
Press confidently asserted that " Radical opposition to the
acts of the administration either in or out of Congress can
only delay, not prevent, the restoration of the Union on a
cordial and fraternal basis."
By the end of July, the President's plan was fully under-
stood, and the Radicals became completely estranged from
the administration. They differed from him widely on the
questions of negro suffrage, treatment of the rebel leaders,
and the status of the rebel states. The North Carolina
^ Speech in Detroit, June 12, 1865. The same argument was used
February, 1867, with reference to the grounds for impeachment of the
President.
' Free Press, June 14, 1865.
» Ihid., June 20.
47] PERIOD OF CONGRESSIONAL RESTORATION 47
Proclamation did not create so much dissatisfaction as the
proclamations which followed for the other states, since it
was thought that the alleged union sentiment there justified
a milder policy than ought to be pursued in Mississippi,
Georgia, Texas, Alabama, South Carolina and Florida. It
was with good reason that the Radicals became convinced
that the President had cut loose from them/ This '' Radi-
cal " element of the Republican party in Michigan at first
consisted of a few extremely uncompromising leaders who
were friends of Sumner and Wade. Chief among them
were Zachariah Chandler and Jacob M. Howard. As
Johnson's administration progressed, this faction came to
control more members of the party. ^ The circumstances
of the coming year would necessitate an alignment of
parties in Michigan as elsewhere^'and the Conservative Re-
publicans found themselves defending the President against
the criticism of the Democrats and Radical Republicans
alike. As a middle faction, they must either join the
Democracy, advance to the Radical position, or stand alone
as a party on the defensive. The last-named alternative was
the one adopted, and the process of separation and reorgani-
zation was complete by August of the succeeding year.
Previous to this time, however, the term " Republican "
will be used to include the entire party, and the names "Rad-
ical " and '' Conservative " will be applied only to factions
of that party, and not to separate organizations.
The first convention to assemble in the rebel states for
the purpose of constitutional revision was that of Miss-
issippi, August 2 1 St and 22nd.^ Several questions of great
importance presented themselves. What proceedings should
* Rhodes, op. cit., vol. v, p. 531 et seq.
* Adv. and Trib., June 21, July 2; Lansing State Rep., Aug. 8, 1865.
' Rhodes, op. cit., vol. v, p. 535 et seq.
48 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [48
be taken in reference to the ordinances of secession, and to
the war debt incurred during the Rebellion? It was but
natural that the Radical Republicans of Michigan should de-
mand both a repudiation of the debt in no uncertain terms,
and a declaration of the nullity of the ordinances of seces-
sion ah initio. The Democracy favored the repudiation of
the debt, but were not so particular as to the manner in
which the ordinances of secession were abrogated/
As the time for the meeting of Congress approached,
there was general discussion throughout the state as to
what action would best be taken with reference to the dele-
gates elected by the recently restored Southern States. The
Democrats had expressed apprehensions as early as June
that the Republican party, in its determination to secure
negro suffrage, would refuse seats to the delegates from
states not granting the negroes that, right. ^ The senti-
ment of the Radicals voiced by Jacob M. Howard was no
less intense than the Democrats had feared. " We owe it
to the loyal people of the North to exclude the representa-
tives from the late rebellious states," he declared, shortly
'before leaving for Washington.^ "The states in question
are subjugated provinces, whose inhabitants are not loyal
to-day, and only submitted to the Union authorities because
they were unable to resist," and he demanded the exclu-
sion of all representatives of constituencies still disloyal
and unwilling to co-operate with the loyal element.
On December 4th Congress assembled, and on the fol-
lowing day the President's message was read. It con-
* Lansing State Rep., Grand Rapids Daily Eagle, Adv. and Trih.,
Free Press, Argus, from August to November.
' Free Press, June 20, 1865.
' Speech in Lansing Wed., Nov. 22, 1865, reported in Lansing State
Rep., Nov. 24.
49] PERIOD OF CONGRESSIONAL RESTORATION 49
tained an exposition of the theory of state perdurance, of
which Johnson was a strong defender. As the political
system was an "indissoluble union of indestructible states,'*
the states by attempting secession "impaired but did not
extinguish their functions as members of the Union." The
President attempted to establish his right to prescribe the
conditions by which the states could regain their normal
position in the Union, upon the ground of his power of
pardon.^ The message was so tactfully written that it
appeared not to offend either party. " The message was
favorably received in this locality," declared the Detroit
Tribune, which commended it for its " modest length, ami-
able temper, clearness and candor." ^ " The President did
well," it continued, " when he honorably avoided placing
himself in a position to come into collision with Congress
on the question of admitting the Southern members." The
Democracy rejoiced that the President insisted upon the
recognition of the state government which he had been in-
strumental in founding, and believed he would never ap-
prove of the interference by Congress with suffrage in the
states.^
PRESIDENTIAL VERSUS CONGRESSIONAL RESTORATION
With the entrance of the Thirty-ninth Congress upon
its first session, the politics of Michigan were led by a
delegation which, besides being Unionists, were reliable
Republicans. Four of the members had served in the
previous Congress, and an equal number were to be re-
elected to the succeeding.* Four were thoroughly trained
1 Rhodes, op. cit., vol. v, p. 546 et seq. ; Burgess, op. cit, pp. 40, 4i-
» Adv. and Trib., Dec. 6, 1865.
' Free Press, Dec. 7.
* Fernando C. Beaman, Charles Upson, John W. Longyear, Thomas
W. Ferry, Rowland E. Trowbridge, and John F. Driggs were the mem-
A
50 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [50
lawyers, while the other two, Driggs and Ferry, repre-
sented the industrial interests of the state. The latter was
the prominent guard of the extensive lumber interests of
Michigan, and was destined to become popular both
through his parliamentary skill — which later made him
president of the Senate — and his advocacy of soft money.
The entire delegation gave consistent support, from the
first, to all measures looking to the increased power of
Congress over reconstruction, and in this activity they were
seconded by the great majority of the dominant party of
the state. The Stevens resolution for the appointment
of a Joint Committee on Reconstruction, and later, the ex-
clusion from Congress of the delegates of the late rebel
states elicited a great deal of discussion which seemed on
the whole favorable to the Congressional point of view.^
y/Hh^ veto of the Freedmen's Bureau Bill was hailed by
the Democratic organs as the deserved fate of a measure
" unconstitutional, inexpedient, and extravagant," while
the President was eulogized for his " courage, loyalty, and
firmness." ^ The Republicans seemed on the whole con-
fident that the bill would be passed over his veto. " Some
f such measure is absolutely necessary," declared an influ-
ential Radical organ, " and a substitute will doubtless be
immediately prepared." ^
bers of the Thirty-ninth Congress. Ferry and Trowbridge took the
seats of Francis W. Kellogg and Augustus C. Baldwin respectively.
* Globe, Dec. 12, 1865, pp. 24-28, 30; Feb. 20, 1866, pp. 947, 950; Feb.
27, I053- For comment, N. Y. Herald, Dec. 13, T. L. vol. Ixiii, p. 139,
col. 4. The appointment of Senator Howard to membership in the
Joint Committee insured the keenest attention of the constituency to
the acts of this body.
' Free Press, Feb. 18, 1866. " Monday's session of Congress was
memorable as President Johnson for the first time proved his patriotism
and firmness by an act which, for boldness and decision under all
circumstances, had never been paralleled in the country," ibid., Feb. 21.
• Grand Rapids Daily Eagle, Feb. 21.
51 ] PERIOD OF CONGRESSIONAL RESTORATION 51
The Civil Rights Bill was opposed by the Democrats
upon the principle of non-interference by the general gov-
ernment in matters not clearly delegated to it by the Con-
stitution. In their opinion, there was little chance for
doubt concerning the real motive for these measures.
" Not a single emotion of solicitude for the welfare of the'
black race animated the feelings or action of the Radicals
in Congress. . . . Their action has been dictated by what
they thought was policy, in their anxiety to perpetuate the
rule of their party, . . . and they rejoiced if anything op-
pressive or disagreeable to the Southerners could be in-
cluded." ^ The Radicals claimed to see clearly that the\
President's purpose in his vetoes was " to gain the support
of the entire rebel population of the South, as well as the
entire Democratic party of the North. ^
It was at this point that the real struggle began between
the Presidential and Congressional factions, and the failure
of the latter in two of its early undertakings caused a deep
resentment which led to open hostility in Michigan as else-
where. Many organs which up to this time had not ex-
pressed strong antagonism to the deliberate and scrutiniz-
ing policy of Congress were now alarmed at the extremes
to which that body was willing to go. A reaction is
clearly visible from this time onward, and this gave rise to
the faction which would be known later as the Adminis-
tration party. ^
It was in connection with the anxiety of the Republicans
over the second passage of the Civil Rights Bill, that Gov-
^ Free Press, Mar. 15.
' Post, Mar. 17, 1866.
' Observations to this effect are to be found in the Adv. and Trib.,
Apr. 13, 27, Sept. 19 ; Free Press, Apr. 18, May 2, Nov. 9 ; Argus, Apr.
20, 27. This is set forth in "The Mission of the Administration,"
an anonymous pamphlet, in vol. v, Jettison Collection.
52 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [52
ernor Crapo made the grave mistake of issuing a proclama-
tion for the observance of Thursday, April 19th, as a day
of fasting and prayer for the successful reconstruction of
the Union/ Party spirit was concealed by the phraseology
of the proclamation, but as it came from a governor who
prided himself upon his violent radicalism, it was generally
regarded as a partisan affair. Many influential Republi-
cans foresaw the unfortunate results of such a step, and
knew that it would become effective material in the hands
of the opposition. It was indeed true that this policy of
confusing religion with politics, hereafter referred to as
" Crapo-politico-religion," was extremely opportune for
the cause of the Democrats.^
After the opening of the Thirty-ninth Congress, with its
multitude of proposed amendments to the federal consti-
tution, Michigan resounded with the discussion of the
various plans submitted in Congress. There was con-
fidence among the Democrats that should these or simi-
lar measures pass both houses, they would fail of ratifica-
tion by the required number of states.^ The first draft
of the proposed Fourteenth Amendment, as it was pre-
1 Argus, April 13, 1866. "After a glorious contest in the field of
battle, let us not vainly imagine that all danger is past. ... It was
indeed a mighty achievement to scatter to the wind the armed hosts
of treason and rebellion which were arrayed against us. . . . But the
work is not yet finished. We have a mightier victory still to achieve
in the reconstruction of a united country. Now when our political
skies are clouded by antagonism between the ruling powers at the capi-
tal of our Republic, ... let us seek . . . the Divine Aid to subdue
our pride, to surrender our wills, to abandon our prejudices, and to
reconstruct the Republic upon the broad principles of Right, Human-
ity, Justice, and Eternal Truth."
' The fast day was not generally observed, and it was remarked that
" it ought to be a long time before any future governor of our state
follows the example of Governor Crapo." Argus, April 27; also
Free Press, April 20.
• Free Press, Jan. 7, 28, Feb. 2, 1866.
53] PERIOD OF CONGRESSIONAL RESTORATION 53
sented to the House by Mr. Stevens, seemed to surprise
many Radicals, but they promptly rallied to its support and
declared that " as a policy of cautious expediency, it was
designed to carry more states than could otherwise be
carried." ^
On account of the illness of Senator Fessenden, the
chairman of the Joint Committee on the part of the Senate,
Howard presented to that body the five articles proposed
as the Fourteenth Amendment. In connection with the
first, he commented upon the need of a definition of the
term " citizen ", which occurs twice in the Constitution
without a statement of its precise meaning. He pointed to
the fact that the right to vote was not intended to be among
the rights conferred. Though he plainly stated that he
would be glad to see the negroes enjoy suffrage, at least
to some extent, he declared that " the right of suffrage was
not, in law, one of the privileges or immunities secured by
the Constitution. ... It has always been regarded in this
country as the result of positive local law." This is unmis-
takable evidence that he, as well as the majority of the
committee, was opposed to the assumption by the federal
government of the regulation of suffrage.^ The main cur-
rent of Republican opinion throughout the state seemed in
harmony with this view, though several of the most radical
organs mentioned with approval the assumption by the
central government of the right to regulate suffrage. There^.
was repeatedly expressed the fear that the remaining right
to vote would soon be conferred upon the negro by Con-
gress, since this was the one privilege of citizenship that
was withheld from him.^
1 Adv. and Trib., May i.
' Globe, May 23, pp. 2764-8; Lansing State Rep., May 30-
» Kal. Tel, May 25; Adv. and Trib., June i. Speech of Augustus C.
Baldwin, Pontiac, May 29, vol. vi, Pol. Pamphlets, Jenison Coll
54 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [34
The second section of the proposed amendment had for
its aim, Howard asserted, the encouragement of the states
to admit their colored population to the right of suffrage.
This, he insisted, could not be considered a violation of the
most rigid interpretation of the Constitution. The third
article, which excluded all participants in the insurrection
from the right to vote for Representatives in Congress and
for Electors of the President and Vice-President, Howard
considered defective and of no avail. There was a con-
sistent demand of the party throughout the state that the
disqualification extend to the holding of all offices under
the federal or state governments. It was further urged
that in the fourth section the debt incurred in suppressing
the rebellion should be declared inviolate.^ The fact that
these changes were all embodied in the final draft as agreed
upon by both houses was a source of great rejoicing among
the Republicans of the state and much of the honor was
attributed to Senator Howard. The amendment received
the hearty support of the Michigan delegation, and that
fact insured its adoption and defense by the Republicans
\of the state as their principal issue. ^
THE ISSUES IN THE CAMPAIGN OF 1866
An exceptional feature of this campaign in Michigan
as elsewhere was the threat of extreme measures and pos-
sible violence resorted to by each party. The Republicans
plainly spoke of impeachment, while the Democrats were
accused of hinting at usurpation on the part of the Presi-
dent. There were expressions on both sides of extreme
possibilities of an armed clash. A leading Democratic
organ remarked that " a part of the system of Radical tac-
* Grand Rapids Daily Eagle, Adv and Trib., May 25.
'Globe for May and June, 1866, pp. 2869, 2890-8, 2900, 3042, 3149;
Grand Rapids Daily Eagle, Post, June 14; Free Press, Aug. 15.
55] PERIOD OF CONGRESSIONAL RESTORATION 55
tics in the present canvass is to educate the public ear to a
familiarity with the idea of impeaching the President. To
prevent a shock, they at present permit only such leaders
as Butler and Phillips to make the threat openly; and most
of their organs deprecate the use of such threats, under
cover of insinuations intended to carry the same idea." To
combat the impeachment idea, the Democrats professed to
see as an immediate consequence " the beginning of civil
war in every city and village of the North." ^
On the other hand, there appeared apprehensions among
the Republicans of the state that the President " would
turn usurper and act a Cromwell," and this gave sufficient
ground for urging a continuous session of Congress. " A
danger to be guarded against," according to the Republican
point of view, was the " summoning of an executive ses-
sion and attempting to get the Senators to vote on their
own admission and the President's appointments. If loyal
members refuse to recognize them, the Copperheads and
Rebels could meet by concert and thus convene a majority,
and in case of a threatened interference, the President as
Commander-in-chief of the Army could defend the Rebel
Senate." ^ There were, however, Republican organs that
objected to the continued session on the ground that " a
general removal of officeholders in the recess could work
less injury to the party than the spinning out of the ses-
» Free Press, Apr. 5. The Free Press quoted liberally from the
Cincinnati Commercial, a Johnson sympathizer, which it naturally con-
sidered the " ablest Republican paper in the North."
» Grand Rapids Daily Eagle, July i, 1866. The Post, Oct. 25, re-
marked, however, that if the rumor was true that Sec. Stanton had
filled all the vacancies in the regular army without the knowledge or
assent of President Johnson, the army could not be used in support
of his ambitious schemes.
» Adv. and Trib., July 22, 1866.
56 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [56
yTht Democrats opposed negro suffrage principally on
ij^ /two grounds. In the first place, the black race had not
j shown sufficient willingness to participate in the war, it
\was urged, to warrant taking so grave a step/ Various
utterances of the Democratic press to this effect gave the
Radicals ground for charges that insurrection and treach-
ery of the blacks were encouraged by such sentiments.
They were undoubtedly very dangerous comments, consid-
ering the position of the Democracy in Michigan, and this
argument certainly did not add strength to the party. The
main reason for withholding the right of suffrage from the
negro was the presumption of what the Democrats declared
to be a fact, " the inherent inferiority of the race." When
it should be sufficiently advanced " to appreciate something
of the duties and obligations of citizens ", it was thought
. y\ time enough to consider suffrage. Negro office-holding
y^ was feared as the direct consequence of negro suffrage, and
the Democrats frequently expressed an apprehension of the
possible subordination of the whites to the blacks in the
\ states where the latter constituted the majority of popula-
* " How much did the negro do for his freedom ?" was asked time
and again during the campaign. " When Lee was in Richmond, and
Johnson at Chattanooga, with almost the entire available force of the
rebellion within their command, what a scattering there would have
been at any kind of a hostile demonstration from the black people.
Had the race possessed the faintest aspiration for liberty, what an op-
portunity to grasp it. Other races have plotted and fought to obtain
that boon!" Free Press, Jan. 12, 1866. The following appeared in the
number for Feb. 15 : " For a race who had no blow to strike in the
rear, when their friends were striking in the front, there is poor
argument for a bloody effort to wrench from the white man the
privilege of which they have no conception. The only danger arises
from the influence of such brutalized wretches as Mr. Sumner, whose
' wish is father to the thought.' " With similar vigor his prediction of
a race war on the denial of equal suffrage was refuted by the
Democrats.
V
57] PERIOD OF CONGRESSIONAL RESTORATION cy
tion/ Besides, the Democrats denied that the control of
the suffrage was vested in Congress. There was but one 11^
source for impartial suffrage — the states could establish it I
either by independent action among themselves or by the*
ratification of the constitutional amendment.^ The Radi-\
cals certainly found themselves in an embarrassing situa- \
tion, as the Democrats repeatedly took occasion to observe. *
While demanding negro suffrage for the South, they failed I ^""""^
to grant it in their own state. It was a glaring inconsist-/
ency which was never satisfactorily defended.^ "^
The fiscal questions in 1866 were decidedly less im-
portant than in succeeding campaigns, being relegated to
the background by reconstruction disputes. The Demo-
crats called attention to the " great questions of taxes and
currency in which the people are so vitally interested," in
place of the agitation over suffrage. They favored such
tariff, — " not prohibitory, — as will produce the greatest
amount of revenue." They declared for the payment of
the interest upon the national debt, and its general dis-
charge, and advocated the taxation of government secur-
ities as well as other property.^ The atittude toward re-
sumption was not entirely clear. Both parties desired the
ultimate return to a specie basis, but the means were not
agreed upon. The "unfavorable balance of trade" was
thought to impede prompt resumption, and the export tax
upon cotton advocated by some persons was at the disad-
vantage of requiring a constitutional amendment.^ The
1" Ninety-nine out of every hundred negroes have not the slightest
idea what the ballot is. A horse or a hand-saw may have definite
significance to them but any idea of government ... has never reached
their understanding." Free Press, Jan. 21, 1866; Kal Gazette, Mar. 15.
^ Argus, Mar. 23, 1866; Marshall Expounder, June 14.
* Muskegon News, Oct. 24, 1866; Free Press, Nov. 6.
* Free Press, Jan. 20, 1866.
* Grand Rapids Daily Eagle, Feb. 16.
58 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [58
Republicans had, therefore, what they considered to be a
strong argument for such tariff as would check importa-
tion and stop the balance against us, — practically a pro-
hibitory tariff, — and this the Democrats refused to support,
THE CAMPAIGN
The anxiety on the part of the Democrats had been mani-
fested by an agitation for an early convention. Objection
was made on the grounds of political expediency, and the
latter view prevailed in the end.^ There was a general
belief that a campaign of two months was preferable to one
of four, and a call was issued accordingly for the conven-
tion to meet in Detroit, Wednesday, September 5th. The
Republicans accused the Democrats of waiting to unite
with the soldiers. " They see they cannot beat the Repub-
licans fairly, but they will wait until the soldiers hold a
state convention of their own, and then find it 'inexpedient'
to put up another ticket. But they don't know the men they
have to deal with, for four-fifths of the soldiers of Mich-
igan are Republicans." ^ The prophecy was mistaken,^ for
the soldiers of Michigan never went so far as to organize
in state convention, and put a ticket into the field. They
were earnestly sought by the regular parties, and their
allegiance was divided almost in the proportion guessed by
Kthe paper quoted. The Democrats did, however, combine
with another organization, — the new National Union or
Administration party, — and they accepted its ticket.
* " The Radicals are to be indicted and put on trial, and to do this
understandingly and effectually, it is better to wait until they, through
their leaders in Congress, have made and closed their record, if they
are going to. When Congress has adjourned, or when it has deter-
mined that it will not adjourn, ... a Democratic State Convention
will be better prepared to mark out the Campaign". Editorial of
Argus, June i, 1866.
' Lansing State Rep., July 18, 1866.
^ Cf. infra, p. 65.
59] PERIOD OF CONGRESSIONAL RESTORATION -9
The State campaign was opened August 9th by a Johnson
mass-meeting held in Detroit to consider the appointment
of delegates to the Philadelphia Convention and to pass
resolutions indicative of the party's policy. The attend-
ance was very large and the proceedings were entirely har-
monious. The personnel consisted of able lawyers and
politicians of both parties, while the soldier element was
well represented by the presence of Generals Custer, Wil-
cox, Williams, and McReynolds.^ A resolution was unani-
mously adopted approving " the restoration policy of Presi-
dent Andrew Johnson, the admission to their seats in Con- \
gress of the loyal and duly-elected members, and the prin- I
ciples set forth in the call for the Philadelphia National
Union Convention." In order to distinguish themselves
from the Copperhead element, they declared that " the ad-
mission of those would be unwise who, in the states not in
rebellion, failed to support the government during the
war." ""
During the same day in Detroit, the Democratic State
Central Committee were considering the propriety of send-
1 Among the Republicans who " bolted " from their party were Alfred
Russell, A. Bliss, and James F. Joy, the last of whom had been an
earnest Whig, later a firm Republican, and had served one term in the
legislature at the beginning of the war. The Union Democrats were
represented in part by Byron G. Stout, who had been a Republican until
1862, when he became a Democrat and was nominated for governor.
General Custer cared little for politics, and his only prominence in this
field occurred this year when he was sent as delegate to the Phila-
delphia Convention, and to the Soldiers' Convention in Cleveland.
Generals Alpheus S. Williams and A. T. McReynolds were Democrats
who later received nominations to Congress, the former in 1874, on
the Democratic and Reform ticket, the latter in 1872. Mich. Bio-
graphies; Rep. Men of Mich.
' Free Press, Aug. 10, 1866 ; for comment. New York Herald, Aug.
10 in T. L., vol. Ixvii, p. 294, col. 2; New York Times, Aug. 12, in
T. L., vol. Ixvii, p. 314, col. 4.
(/I
60 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [60
ing delegates to Philadelphia. The Johnson mass meeting
discussed the same subject and thought it best to leave to
the Democrats the appointment of the delegates. As there
was not time to call a convention for the purpose, the Cen-
tral Committee decided to consider themselves empowered
to make the appointments, and these were duly accepted
by the National Union party with " implicit confidence."
The National Unionists began to draw close to the Demo-
crats, and it was thus that mutual confidence was first
shown between the two parties which in a month were to
combine in order to combat their common adversary. The
Democrats had from the first, as would be expected, dis-
couraged the formation of a new party, and had invited the
National Unionists *to join with them.^ The union of the
two organizations was effected, however, by the coalition
of the Democracy with the National Union party a month
later, and by the adoption of the ticket of the latter.
The Republican State Convention of Thursday, August
30th, was the earliest of the three, and naturally laid down
lines for the coming campaign. The first steps toward
practical fusion of the two elements of opposition were
already accomplished, and the call for the convention had
wisely included " War Democrats " among those invited.^
The proceedings were declared unusually harmonious, and
congratulations were offered the soldiers of the Union,
the state administration, and the delegation in Con-
/gress. The theory that by rebellion the states ceased to be
7 states and fell to the status of territories was strictly ad-
hered to, and the exclusive power of Congress over restora-
tion was clearly set forth.
%^
^Free Press, Feb. 20, 1866.
^Lansing State Rep., Aug. 30, Sept. 5, 1866, Kal. Tel, Sept. 6.
William A. Howard of Detroit, one of the most prominent Republi-
cans of the state, was chairman of the convention.
6i] PERIOD OF CONGRESSIONAL RESTORATION 6l
By their acts of treason and rebellion, and by their erection of
governments in hostility to the United States, the rebel com-
munities disrupted their civil society, abrogated their political
institutions, and left their States without governments known
to the country, or recognized by the government of the United
States. ... To Congress alone belongs the imperative duty of
declaring when any such state is properly reorganized, and
any government therein is legitimately constituted so as to re-
sume its former political relations with the national govern-
ment.
It v^as further declared that " in the determination of such
questions, it is the right as the duty of Congress to guard
against future danger to the peace and stability of the Re-
public," by requiring the people of each state by their con-
duct to give " satisfactory proofs of their loyalty." ^ The
duty was proclaimed imperative of protecting the negroes,
— "those who remained loyal to the United States and who
are, in a great degree, incapable of self -protection in the
midst of a hostile element." The Congressional plan of
reconstruction and the constitutional amendment were re-
garded " fundamental and indispensable to the future peace
of the country," and a change in the basis of representation
was declared necessary in the altered condition of the na*
tion. " Exclusion from office of leading rebels and actual
perjured traitors is the mildest and most generous terms of
amnesty ever offered to a rebellious enemy," the platform
declared, and the conception of a " White Man's Govern-
ment " instead of " God's Government for Man " was de-
nounced as "political blasphemy." This body of resolu-
tions was, as the Republicans admitted, a radical one,
though it was not so extravagant in self-praise as those of
succeeding years.
^Post, Aug. 31, 1866; Ann. Cyc, 1866, p. 507. There was apparent
a striking similarity to the views of Sumner concerning the guaran-
ties of loyalty, and to the declarations of the Republican platforms of
the New England states of that year.
62 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [62
Great care was exercised in the selection of a ticket.
There was a strong opposition to Governor Crapo on the
ground that a soldier would receive a greater following.
Several possibilities for the gubernatorial candidacy were
mentioned, but the opponents were unable to agree, and the
prestige of the '' two-term principle " was credited by them
with his renomination. The soldier class was complimented
by the nomination from their class of five candidates ^ who
were intended to combat the six subsequently chosen by the
Democrats, one of whom, General Alpheus S. Williams,
headed the ticket. The Republicans chose Carl Schurz and
Zachariah Chandler as delegates to the Convention of
Northern Republicans and Southern loyalists which was to
meet in Philadelphia, September 3rd.^
The Johnson supporters met in Detroit, Wednesday, Sep-
tember 5th, in accordance with the call issued by the mass
convention of August 9th. Extreme enthusiasm had been
shown over the Philadelphia Convention, and the call for a
grand mass ratification meeting to endorse its action was
combined with a call for a nominating convention to put
into the field a National Union State ticket. This move
was deemed impolitic by an influential faction,^ who fav-
ored postponement of the choice of candidates until the day
* The five soldiers nominated by the Republicans were as follows :
Gen. Dwight May, for Lieutenant Governor, Gen. Oliver Spaulding,
Sec. of State, Gen. Wm. L. Stoughton, Attorney-General, Gen. Wm.
Humphrey, Auditor-General, and Gen. Benjamin D. Pritchard, Land
Commissioner. Gen. May entered the war in i86i as Captain, and re-
mained in active service until its close when he was made Brigadier.
Generals Spaulding, Stoughton, Humphrey, and Pritchard also rose
from captaincies and the last was popular as the captor of Jefferson
Davis. This subject received comment in the N. Y. Tribune, Sat.,
Sept. 29, T. L., vol. Ixviii, p. 279, col. 3.
2 Reminiscences of Carl Schurz, pp. 212-3.
* Argus, July 6, 1866; Free Press, Aug. 3, 19.
63] PERIOD OF CONGRESSIONAL RESTORATION 63
following the one proposed, when they could agree with
the Democrats in convention upon one ticket. The regular
date was observed, however, and it was for the Democrats
rather than the Unionists to make the first advance toward
coalition. Full consciousness of the gravity of the occa-
sion seemed to pervade the meeting. The temporary chair-
man declared in his address that this was " perhaps the last
attempt to preserve intact the integrity of the Union," and
referred to the period as " the most momentous crisis in our
nation's history." ^ Similar sentiments were expressed by
the permanent chairman, Gen. C. O. Loomis. "The present
time is considered one of peril in that ... an attempt is
now being made to make the victory barren of results. The
right of representation," he urged, " belonged under the
Constitution to the eleven states formerly seceded. It is a
right inherent which they possess, without condition other
than that prescribed in the Constitution ; . . . and any who
would prescribe other conditions are just as rebellious as
those who took up arms against us." ^
The party received a permanent organization in the ap-
pointment by the chairman of a State Executive Committee
composed of one representative from each county. The
resolutions were similar to those of August 9th. ^ They de-
clared that the " admission of loyal men into the Congress
from all the states is essential to the complete restoration
of the Federal Union and the maintenance of the Constitu-
tion upon which this Union is founded." The favor of the
soldier element was courted by pointing to the appearance
of veterans among the nominees as testimony of the high
esteem in which they were held as " the defenders of the
* Address may be found in Pol. Pamphlets, vol. v, Jenison Coll.
« Free Press, Sept. 5, 1866 ; Kal. Gazette, Sept. 7.
* Argus, Sept. 7; Ann. Cyc, pp. 508-9.
64 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [64
integrity of the Union." Gen. Alpheus S. Williams headed
the state ticket.^ He was formerly a Whig of the Henry
Clay school, and retired from politics after the dissolution
of that party. From a resume of the past affiliations of the
candidates, it may fairly be inferred that the predominating
influence was very hostile to Congress, for one-half of the
new party's candidates were life-long Democrats, while the
others were dissatisfied Republicans.
The Democratic State Convention met the following day
and adopted the Unionist ticket. After complimenting the
soldiers, the convention expressed strong disapproval of
the Radicals' conduct and endorsed the Philadelphia Con-
vention of August i4th.^ The Democrats declared that ''the
Democracy has risen above party action," by its acceptance
of the National Union ticket and its invitation to '' all good
citizens to unite in this crisis without regard to antecedents."
They gave a distinctly reform character to the party by the
arraignment of the Republicans on charges of " heavy tax-
ation, wasteful and unfair legislation, and a vicious system
of currency." The Democrats declared themselves the true
representatives of the people, and as the Republicans had
advocated shorter hours of labor, both parties began that
^ Gen. J. G. Parkhurst, Col. George Gray, and Col. Louis Dillman
were candidates for the offices of Lieutenant-Governor, Attorney-
General, and Land Commissioner respectively, and they had been
staunch lifelong Democrats. Col. Bradley Thompson, candidate for
Secretary of State, was a Republican who refused to endorse the radi-
cal principles of that party. Luther H. Trask, nominee for State
Treasurer, and Gen. George Spaulding, candidate for Auditor-Gen-
eral, were in a similar position. The two non-political nominations
were for Superintendent of Public Instruction, and for Member of
the State Board of Education.
^ Free Press, Argus, Sept. 7, 1866; Ann. Cyc, p. 508. "The country
is threatened by an unscrupulous faction in Congress who propose to
hold power at all hazards in violation of all law and who, unless ar-
rested, will precipitate another war upon us more deadly than the last."
65] PERIOD OF CONGRESSIONAL RESTORATION 65
recognition of the laboring class which was to become of
greater importance within the next ten years.
The soldiers and sailors of Michigan^ met in Detroit
nine days later to appoint delegates to the Cleveland Con-
vention. The invitation was extended to " all those soldiers
and sailors who approve of the policy of the President of
the United States, and of the restoration of harmony and
good feeling between the different sections of our common
country, — and who are in favor of the admission of loyal
representatives from the states lately in rebellion to seats
in the two houses of Congress.^ The soldiers of Michigan
never attained a separate organization or framed a body
of resolutions of their own, as some Republicans believed
they would. Their allegiance was divided for the reason
that both parties had wisely placed several military names
on their respective tickets and both tried to win their sup-
port by eulogistic resolutions. The fact was evident, how-
ever, after the election, that a large majority of the soldiers
of the state adhered to the Republican party, though the
exact number cannot be ascertained.
The campaign in Michigan, as elsewhere, was extremely
vigorous, and the Republican organization and party man-
agement were most effective. The state organization
known as "Boys in Blue " under the leadership of Russell
A. Alger was very active, especially in the southeast portion
of the state. Among the speakers of national importance
who were appointed to canvass the state were Carl Schurz,
Schuyler Colfax, and Gen. Butler, while the prominent state
politicians were Chandler, Ferry, Trowbridge, Crapo, Bea-
man and Blair.^ It is very probable that some of the ex-
1 Cf. supra, p. 58.
' Argus, Aug. 31, 1866,
3 Post, Oct. 25, 29, 1866. The gist of the campaign addresses, which
were on the whole more rampant with party spirit than those of
66 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [66
Kfreme views expressed by Mr. Chandler tended to alienate
a faction of his party. This fact would undoubtedly have
appeared had not the President caused a similar revulsion
in the opposite direction.^ A very active part was taken by
the Detroit Post which was, from the first, recognized as
the official Radical organ of the state. Behind it stood Sen-
ator Chandler with an abundance of funds at his command,
and at the head of its editorial staff was Carl Schurz.^
The personal element in the campaign had immense influ-
ence in Michigan as elsewhere — perhaps more — as several
of her politicians had acquired the reputation for a strength
of character amounting to eccentricity. The importance of
the personal element began to appear, of course, after the
the Democrats, were the defense of the Fourteenth Amendment and
the ascription to the Democrats of the responsibility for the Rebelhon
and its consequences. Speech of Austin Blair, Wednesday, Oct. 3, Rep-
resentative Hall, Lansing, reported in the Lansing State Rep., Oct 10.
The probability of the assumption by the General Government of the
rebel war debt, if Johnson's policy were sustained, was one of Chandler's
favorite subjects. Speech at Lansing, Oct. 17, with comment in the
Post, Nov. 5. He declared that the method would be to sell to mem-
bers of Congress, in order to pass the measure, a quantity of scr'p
at several cents on the dollar, their notes being payable in ten days
or thereabouts after the passage of the law. " Forever repudiate
the rebel debt and adopt an amendment to this effect, and such a
measure could never be undone by a corrupt Congress." This argu-
ment resembled closely the guaranties urged by Sumner in his speech
at the Worcester Convention of the same year. Insistence upon the
original claims against England with legal interest was also common
to both, but Chandler's demand for the Canadas as a " fair compensa-
tion for all the damages received " was still more extreme than the
other Radicals could endorse.
* Free Press, Feb. 27, Oct. 19, 1866 ; Marshall Statesman, Oct. 25.
' The first issue of the Daily Post was that of March 27, 1866.
After the advent of this rival, the Detroit Advertiser and Tribune be-
came the avowed enemy of Chandler and the Radicals, and entered
upon a middle course. Farmer, op. cit., vol. i, p. 684; Reminiscences'
of Carl Schurs, pp. 211, 212; Mich. Coll., vol. xxx, pp. 507-517; Detroit
Evening News, Feb. 25, 1876.
6y] PERIOD OF CONGRESSIONAL RESTORATION 67
President's White House Speech of February 22nd. The
Democratic organs were naturally loyal to him and em-
phasized his policy rather than his manner, which was some-
times mentioned in an apologetic strain/ The Repub-
licans on their side ably seized their advantage. They com-
pared the President to Fillmore, while the Democrats saw
resemblance to Andrew Jackson. The Post shrewdly alluded
to the campaign of i860 when Johnson " bolted the regu-
lar Democratic party and stumped the states of Mississippi
and Tennessee with Davis against Douglas." ^ " We are
becoming more and more convinced every day that it [the
President's tour] will prove a real Republican victory.^
We rejoice that his natural arrogance and his impetuous,
irascible, and irrational temper . . . were so thoroughly ex-
posed and illuminated by his brutal harangue at Cleveland."
Such was the judgment of the leading radical organs of the
state. It was to be expected that the visit of the Presi-
dential party would stimulate harsh criticism on the part
of the Republicans, especially of Detroit. They remarked
that it was only political tact to arrange for the company of
Grant and Farragut in the excursion, as the enthusiasm
which would undoubtedly be shown them could be con-
1 " The telegraphic report could not do justice to the President's
diction and eloquence. He will stand as the Preserver of his country,
a title no less exalted and no less dear to the American people than
that of * Father of his country.' " Free Press, Feb. 24, 1866. " The
Serenade speech could not be excelled for plainness and directness
to the object, — which was to explain the difference between himself
and the traitors and disunionists in Congress. It went directly to the
spot without circumlocution or mercy." Free Press, April 20.
» Sept. 8, 1866. One Radical organ remarked that Mr. Johnson's
plan received strong support from four Ex-Presidents— Fillmore,
Pierce, Buchanan and Jeff. Davis. Grand Rapids Daily Eagle, Apr. 24.
3 The Presidential party in " swinging 'round the circle " visited
Detroit on the 4th of September.
68 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [68
strued in honor of the President/ The President was not
the victim of all the ridicule of the radical press. Seward's
speeches at Auburn, New York, and in New York City, in
which he predicted " reconciliation and peace ", were gen-
erally made light of as predicting an impossibility and show-
ing little foresight.^
THE ELECTION IN MICHIGAN
The results of the November elections were not surpris-
ing to those who had closely observed the trend of affairs
in Michigan. When the poll was taken the Radicals found
they had an average majority of more than 3,000 in each
Congressional district, and in each of the two immense dis-
tricts comprising the northern and central counties, the ma-
jority reached 6,500. " The contest in Michigan is meas-
urably between Radicals and Conservatives,'' observed the
New York Tribune, and it considered that the former " had
the advantage of popularity and numbers." ^ Throughout
the campaign the Radicals had expressed certainty of their
victory. " Our delegation in the next Congress," declared
the Post confidently, " will present an unbroken front of
radically loyal men elected by majorities that will show this
to be . . . the Massachusetts of the West" * If the spring
elections were indicative of the relative position of the
parties, the Republicans certainly were justified in expect-
ing victory. The returns regularly showed an increase in
their majorities where they won, and increased followings
* Post, Sept. 4, 1866. It further referred to the delegation of Loyal
Southerners from the Philadelphia Convention which would travel the
same route pursued by the President " to tell the people the true situ-
ation of affairs."
' Grand Rapids Daily Eagle, May 24, 1866. Post, July 3, August 31.
» Sat., Sept. 29, 1866.
* Aug. 31.
eg] PERIOD OF CONGRESSIONAL RESTORATION 69
in the territory of the opposition.^ In the November elec-
tions, the Radicals made still more important gains, and
claimed a " sweep " even in old Democratic strongholds.^
All six members elected to the lower house of Congress
were Republicans, and the personnel remained unchanged
save in the case of the third district, which was now repre-
sented by Ex-Governor Austin Blair in place of Hon. John
W. Longyear. The Michigan delegation had satisfied the
expectations of their party, and the most influential Repub-
lican organs cast their influence in favor of their return.^
While some of the Republican candidates received approxi-
mately two-thirds of the votes cast in their respective dis-
tricts, the victory was exceedingly close in the first, third,
and fifth.* The Democratic membership in the lower
house of the state legislature was reduced from 21 to 17,
while their remnant of influence in the upper house was
maintained by the election of two out of 32 senators. The^
party balance was thus more favorable than ever to the'
Republicans, as their joint majority rose from 86 to 95,
* Grand Rapids Daily Eagle, Mar. 30, 1866. Adv. and Trib., Mar.
31 ; Lansing State Rep., Apr, 4.
' " In this city, (Detroit), our gains are so heavy that another cam-
paign may entirely redeem it from Democratic rule." Post, Nov. 7;
Free Press, Nov. 8, 10. The statistical sources for the election were
the Mich. Man., 1867, pp. 251-3; Ann. Cyc., pp. 507-510; Trib. Aim.,
World Aim. The newspapers consulted were as follows : The Post,
Adv. and Tribune, Free Press of Detroit; Mich. Argus of Ann Arbor;
Jackson Citizen, Jackson Patriot; Marshall Statesman, Marshall Ex-
pounder; Battle Creek Journal; Kal. Gazette, Kal. Telegraph; National
Dem. of Cassopolis ; Niles Rep., Hillsdale Daily Standard, of the south-
ern portion of the State; St. Clair Rep.; Wolverine Citizen of Flint;
Bay City Weekly Journal; Lansing State Rep.; Grand Rapids Daily
Eagle; Muskegon News, of the central northern portion of the state.
» Lansing State Rep., July 25 ; Post, Aug. 2.
* The vote in the First Congressional District was 22,197 Rep., to
20,595 Dem.; in the Third, 19,268 to 16,268; and in the Fifth, 16,347
to 14,622. Trib. Aim., p. 35.
70 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [70
:<TOvernor Crapo received 58.83 per cent of the vote and
V^lwas re-elected by a majority of almost 30,000, while the
©ther names on the ticket received even stronger support/
The proposed constitutional amendment granting soldiers'
suffrage and the proposition to revise the state constitution
were both favored by large majorities.^
An incident connected with the Soldiers' Voting Law
had proved very unfortunate for the Democratic party in
the state. This was the law which the proposed constitu-
tional amendment was intended to affirm beyond question.
The contested election case in the fifth district arising
from the election of 1864 brought into discussion the law
providing for the taking of the vote of soldiers in the field.
Mr. Baldwin, the Democratic claimant, alleged that the law
was unconstitutional on the ground that it contravened the
provision requiring residence in the state three months, and
in the township or ward ten days, previous to voting.^ The
1 The vote stood 96,746 to 67,708, excluding the returns from two
wards in Detroit which were rejected for alleged irregularities. They
would have increased Crapo's majority by 456. A Democratic mayor
was elected in Detroit by 360 majority, which showed a reduction in
the party's following of 500 since the last election. The Republicans
declared that even with such results, " a large number did not visit the
polls on Tuesday." Grand Rapids Daily Eagle, Nov. 7, 1866.
» The former by 86,354, to 13,094, the latter by 79,505 to 28,623.
Upon these questions, — the second of which was of great importance,-—
a large number abstained from voting. There were 56,000 more who
expressed their preference for governor and members of Congress
than voted upon the question of constitutional revision. Over twice
as many Democrats absented themselves from the polls as Republicans,
notwithstanding their comparative weakness. The minor parties were
not yet prominent. The Labor Union Candidate for Governor re-
ceived 200 votes in Ionia, whose majority went strongly Republican.
' Globe, Feb. 13, 1866, pp. 839-845. Pol. Pamphets, vol. 3, no. 6,
Jenison Coll. He contended that the majority of 710 for Mr. Trow-
bridge would be changed to a majority in his favor "by the exclusion
of 1 179 illegal votes cast in camp under the Soldiers' Suffrage Act."
The victory of Trowbridge was accounted for in this way by the
71 ] PERIOD OF CONGRESSIONAL RESTORATION 71
controversy inevitably tended to antagonize the soldier ele-
ment whose favor both parties were trying to win. The
acceptance of the majority report in favor of the Repub-
lican claimant incensed the Democratic journals of the state,
and they unfortunately diminished their following by their
continued denunciation of the popular measure. In 1864,
the Democracy commanded approximately one-fourth of
the soldiers' vote, and there are indications that this sup-
port was materially diminished two years later.^
The Democrats were generally agreed upon the reasons
for what they were frank to admit was an overwhelming
defeat. There had been evident a party apathy throughout
the state growing out of either an over-confidence in
strongly Democratic centers, or a conviction of certain
defeat in Republican districts. There was concealed dis-
satisfaction at the union with the Conservative Republicans
who were openly charged with " coldness and open treach-
ery " and the failure to give any support to the Democracy.
The Republican gubernatorial vote rose from 55.16 per
cent of the total in 1864 to 58.83 per cent, and even the
occasion of a party schism failed to bring out all the votes.
The Northern Peninsula was more evenly divided be-
tween the two parties than in 1864, and four of the seven
counties voted Democratic. The southern and south central
counties gave the Republican candidates on the average 60
to 75 per cent of their votes, while every county in the
three lowest tiers, save Wayne, was more evenly balanced,
Democratic organs ; " It is thought that this will compensate for the
escape of Raymond, Darling and a few others, (Conservative Republi-
cans) from Thad. Stevens' pocket, and keep a two-thirds majority in
readiness for an occasion." Argus, Mar. 9, 1866.
^ There is, of course, no separate data for this year to show the exact
proportion, as there was in 1864, but current comments point to this
conclusion. Argus, Nov. 16; Marshall Statesman, Nov. 22; Adv. and
Trib., Nov. 28, 1866.
72 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [72
and several changed their allegiance within the next two
years.
The party position in Michigan in 1866 was very similar
to that of 1872. Both years the Democracy united with
the disaffected minority of the Republican party, and
adopted its ticket. Though the reform element was absent
in 1866, the general subject upon which the dominant
party divided was, in both cases, the method of reconstruc-
tion. It is remarkable that the Democracy — though a de-
cidedly minority party in Michigan — should have chosen
both years to ally itself with a group who had previously
been members of the hostile party. The sacrifice was, how-
ever, far less in 1866 than six years later, as both parties
to the coalition had undoubtedly given strong support to
the old " Union " organization. It is also strange that in
Michigan political literature of the period, the regular
names were employed more generally in reference to the
parties than the terms " Radical " and " Conservative ".
This was contrary to the practice in many of the states, and
in all probability was due to the predominance of the Radi-
cal tendency of the Republican party. The sustaining influ-
^€nce of such Ultra-Radical leaders as Zachariah Chandler,
1/ |\.ustin Blair, Jacob M., and William A. Howard, success-
ifully kept the Radical position practically typical of the
;Republican party, and more nearly identical with it, than
Was the case in most of the other states. Though a small
number of influential men were really Conservative ''bolters"
from the Republican party, the lines remained so sharply
drawn, that as a general truth it may be affirmed that the
Republicans were the Radicals, and the Democrats the Con-
servatives. There was, then, no occasion — or at least no
necessity — to change the old names.
CHAPTER III
The Politics of Michigan, 1867- 1868, and Her Atti-
tude TOWARDS Early Reconstruction
The year 1867 was indeed an important period in the
politics of Michigan from the point of view of both state
and federal legislation. As local interests were of greater
importance in the spring elections of 1868, and federal
issues in the fall campaign, the activities of the state legis-
lature will first be considered.
STATE ISSUES
In the session which met January, 1867, the legislature
ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, considered, but failed
to pass, a number of bills relating to internal improvement,
and provided for the revision of the state constitution.
These three subjects will be treated seriatim.
When the proposed Fourteenth Amendment was sub-
mitted to the several states for their ratification in June of
1866, there were some persons in Michigan who favored
calling an extra session of the legislature for this purpose.
This elicited vigorous opposition on the part of the Democ-
racy and of some Republicans who felt that the vote of a
legislature, elected almost a year and a half before, could
not possibly be considered a true expression of the present
view of the constituency. " Action upon the amendment
properly belongs to a legislature chosen upon the particular
issue ", declared a Republican journal, " for an extra ses-
sion of this legislature might adopt the amendment against
the convictions of the majority of its constituents, thus giv-
ing it a legal but not a moral force." ^
1 Jackson Daily Cit., July 3, 1866.
73] 73
74 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [74
The discussion of the amendment continued throughout
the summer and the following autumn, but not until the
regular session of 1867 was it finally ratified. The great
preponderance of Republican influence in the legislature
rendered the opposition throughout the state altogether in-
effectual. The Democrats regarded the amendment, if fin-
ally adopted, as " the commencement of a revolution in
American affairs ". " The construction of the Union was
effected by willing compromises ", a very able Democratic
editor declared, and
the various independent and sovereign states resigned severally
those portions of their sovereign power which were deemed
necessary to the purposes of the Federal Government, reserv-
ing all other portions as inviolable. . . . The theory on which
amendments are now proposed is that by having entered into
the Union under the Constitution a power has been given to
the General Government to possess itself of the reserved
powers of the states, and that if two-thirds of Congress vote
aye, and three-fourths of the states vote with them, they may
annihilate the last relic of power in any state. ^
Contrary to the hopes of the Democracy, the elections of
1866 resulted in a stronger Republican majority in the new
legislature that was the Union majority in the former
^body and ratification was not long delayed. It took place
February 15th, and Michigan thus became one of the
twenty-one states first ratifying.^
The second feature of the legislative activity of this ses-
sion was the large number of railroad-aid bills presented
in response to numerous petitions from the north, central
* Mr. Elihu B. Pond of Ann Arbor, in the Argus, Jan. 4, 1867. A
similar view was expressed in the speech of Mr. O. C. Comstock in
Jackson, Jan. 22, vol. iii, Pol. Pamphlets, Jenison Coll.
' The Senate ratified by a vote of 25 to i, the House, 77 to 15. Acts,
1867, Joint Res., no. 12, pp. 312-14, Feb. 15; McPherson, Handbook,
1867, p. 68.
75] EARLY RECONSTRUCTION yc
and western portions of the state. These bills authorized
townships, cities and counties to vote pecuniary aid to rail-
road corporations either by taxation or by loans. The bills
were vetoed by the Governor on the ground that they were
both unconstituional and impolitic.^ Only one of them
was passed over the veto — that to legalize bonds already
issued — and the controversy occasioned strong enmity be-
tween the executive and legislature.^
THE CONSTITUTION OF 1867
It was the revision of the constitution of 1850, however,
about which the state politics of this and the succeeding
year principally centered. The contest which was to end
in what the Democrats considered a signal victory was occa-
sioned by the first message of Governor Crapo to the legis-
lature of 1865, in which he recommended the consideration
of constitutional revision.^ The matter was taken up in
^ The provisions of the constitution which in the opinion of the
Governor were violated were sections 6, 8, and 9, Art. XIV : " The
credit of the state shall not be granted to, or in aid of, any person,
association or corporation," " The state shall not subscribe to or be
interested in the stock of any company, association, or corporation,"
and "the state shall not be a party to, or interested in, any work of
internal improvements." The consititution is contained in the Mich.
Man., 1867. Michigan as a Province, Territory, and State, vol. iv, ch.
I, pp. 52-3-
^ Acts, 1867, p. 107; Ann. Cyc, 1867. For accounts of this matter,
and the attitude of different organs toward the railroad question, the
following numbers are valuable: Post, Aug. 16, 27, Sept. 13, Nov. 5,
1867; Free Press, Aug. 24, 26; Adv. and Trib., Aug. 31. This subject
will be more fully examined subsequently, cf. infra, p. 81.
' "At the general election to be held in the year 1866 and in each suc-
ceeding sixteenth year thereafter, and also at such other times as the
legislature may by law provide, the question of a general revision of
the constitution shall be submitted to the electors qualified to vote for
members of the legislature, and in case a majority voting at such elec-
tion shall decide in favor of a convention for such purpose, the legis-
lature at the next session shall provide by law for the election of dele-
gates to such convention." Sec. 2, Art. XX, MzV/i. Ma«., 1867, pp. 136-8;
for manner of submission, ibid., 1871, pp. 399-400.
y(i THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [76
the succeeding legislature, that of 1867, and the composi-
tion of the constitutional convention was the subject of
extended debate. The act which was finally passed March
nth provided in detail for the convention, and allowed each
county as many delegates as it had State Representatives/
The body accordingly assumed practically the same char-
acter as the House, and as its membership included seventy-
, J five Republicans and twenty-five Democrats, it could fairly
'"' ^be considered a Republican convention. It sat seventy-four
days, from May 15th to August 22nd. Among the sub-
jects urged upon its attention were woman suffrage, the
union of the State Agricultural College with the State Uni-
versity, the prohibition of the sale of intoxicating liquors,
the increase of salaries of state officers, annual in place of
biennial sessions of the legislature, negro suffrage, and aid
to railways.
The first subject, woman suffrage, came before the con-
vention twice in the form of a resolution for separate sub-
mission, and was defeated both times — the latter by a close
vote.^
The point which caused the controversy concerning
the compulsory support of the Agricultural College was the
apparent partiality shown by the state toward one class of
citizens. There was strong pressure brought to bear in
favor of combining the institution with the State Univer-
sity and it was also proposed to convert it into a Women's
College. Neither suggestion was carried out, for a provi-
sion was adopted which made its support compulsory as a
separate institution " for the study of agriculture and the
natural sciences connected therewith." *
* Acts, 1867, no. 41, 6062.
' The vote was 31 to 34 against it. Convention Debates, vol. ii, July
26, p. 367; Aug. 12, pp. 766, 789-91. ^
* Debates, vol. ii, p. 483.
77] EARLY RECONSTRUCTION 77
The prohibition of the sale of intoxicating liquors re-
ceived thorough discussion in which the argument of in-
efficacy was brought forward by a strong faction favoring
a rigid license system. The Committee on Intoxicating
Liquors presented a resolution that " the legislature shall
not pass any act authorizing the granting of a license for
the sale of ardent spirits or intoxicating liquors as a bev-
erage." A substitute was presented by Mr. Lothrop which
included this prohibitory resolution and, in addition, a pro-
vision for a separate vote upon the article. The substitute
was adopted by a vote of 45 to 36 and it was thus decided
that prohibition should be excluded from the constitution
in order that it might not impair the adoption of the latter.^
With reference to the question of an increase of salaries,
there was a general conviction that the remuneration of the
state officials was insufficient to secure the best class of in-
cumbents. The salary of the Governor was to be raised
from $1,000 to $3,000, and those of the other officers were
to be materially increased. The resolution to this effect was
passed and the subject was included within the constitution
as Section i of Article X.^
The advocates of annual legislative sessions declared that
the growing interests of the state demanded more frequent
'^Debates, vol. i, p. 596; vol. ii, pp. 679 et seq.; Journal of the Con-
vention, pp. 640-4.
^ Debates, pp. 609 et seq. : The existing and proposed salaries were
as follows :
The Governor, $1000, $3000.
Secretary of State, $800, $2000.
Secretary of Treasury, $1000, $2500.
Commissioner of State Land Office, $1000, $2000.
State Superintendent of Instruction, $1000, $2500.
Auditor General, $1000, $2500.
Attorney General, $800, $2000.
Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Circuit Courts, $2500
and $1500 respectively, $3000.
78 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [78
consideration. They also argued that if the legislature
should meet annually, the hasty procedure which was gen-
erally admitted under the present system would thus be
unnecessary, and greater consideration would be given the
subjects of legislation. The sessions would be shortened,
and the expense would not be materially increased. This
faction of the convention was successful in getting an article
adopted which provided for annual sessions, but this was to
be submitted independently of the constitution, and to re-
ceive a separate ballot.^
The subject of negro suffrage was formally brought
before the convention on May 21st, the fifth day of its ses-
sion. A resolution was presented by Mr. Lovell which
requested that " the Committee on Elections be instructed
to inquire into the propriety of extending the privileges of
the elective franchise to all citizens over twenty-one years
of age who have not been convicted of crime." ^ Following
closely this phraseology of Mr. Lovell's, a resolution was
accordingly reported by the Committee which simply
omitted the word '' white " from the qualifications for vot-
ing. In the protracted debate which followed, Mr. Thomas
M. Crocker, of Macomb County, was prominent as a leading
opponent of those who defended this summary manner of
disposing of so important a subject by the convention. His
plan was embodied in a resolution whose first part consisted
of five articles, and whose second provided for the submis-
sion of the resolution to a separate vote.^
According to Mr. Crocker's plan, all persons should be
considered electors, entitled to vote, who were twenty-one
years of age and belonged to any one of five classes which
were then enumerated. The first provided for " every white
^ Debates, vol. ii, pp. 34-5-
' Journal, p. 44 ; Debates, vol. i, p. 47.
' Journal, pp. 702-5 ; Debates, vol. ii, p. 779.
79] EARLY RECONSTRUCTION jg
male citizen of the United States." The three succeeding
articles respectively related to white male inhabitants in-
tending to become citizens of the United States, to white
male residents in the State on June 24, 1835, the date of
the admission of Michigan into the Union, and to civilized
male Indians with certain restrictions. The fifth and last
article included '' every male inhabitant of African descent,
a native of the United States."
It was obvious that in this resolution the bestowal of
the right of suffrage upon persons of African descent was
considered in the light of a concession. After excluding
blacks in the first three articles, the right was affirmatively
conceded in the fifth. A further evidence that it was not
intended to force the change upon the state was the provi-
sion for the submission of the resolution on impartial suf-
frage to a separate vote of the constituency. Thus the plan
of Mr. Crocker certainly placed the matter before the people
with greater clarity and impartiality than the summary
resolution of the committee.
The conflicting views appeared in a brisk struggle over
this question in which Messrs. Conger, Crocker and Morton
participated.^ The first, Omar D. Conger of St. Clair
County, insisted that impartial suffrage should be estab-
lished by the mere omission of the word " white " from the
qualification for voters. The second, a man who represented
a more conservative class, favored the clear distinction of
voters with respect to color by enumerating the two classes
in separate clauses. He defended his separate-submission
clause as showing only a due regard for the views of the
people on the question. The third member, Mr. Edward
G. Morton of Monroe County, was opposed to negro suf-
frage on any grounds at present.
In the defense of his resolution, Mr. Crocker declared
1 Debates, vol. ii, pp. 712-18, 786-9.
.^
80 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [go
that the change in the electorate anticipated by the resolu-
tion of the committee was of such a nature that it should
be put frankly before the constituency to accept or reject.
Merely to strike out the word " white " from the present
clause would not, he insisted, present clearly to the voters
the full meaning of the proposed change. Mr. Morton, a
Democrat, insisted that " it was wrong to adopt negro suf-
frage as a party measure merely to force it upon the South-
ern States." " Though I have always been a Free-Soil and
Anti-Slavery man and believed slavery degrading in its
effects," he declared,
I cannot now pay the institution such a high compliment as to
say it has elevated and educated the recent slaves for the in-
telligent discharge of the right of suffrage and the maintenance
of good government. I cannot thus unwittingly honor a bar-
barous institution, even though it may have elevated the negro
to some extent above the same race in Africa.
The Democrats had but one-fourth of the membership
of the convention, however, and after all, the original reso-
lution of the Committee was adopted in which the word
" white " was omitted from the qualifications for the
elective franchise. The resolution for separate submission
was rejected by a vote of 16 to 50. Thus the more radical
element of the Republican party succeeded.^
The Republicans usually defended the suffrage article
by pointing to the small negro population in Michigan,
which they said was 6,799. Of these it was thought that
971 would number the negro vote. This was entirely too
low an estimate, as the state census report for 1864 gave
the negro population as 8,244, and of this some Republicans,
themselves, placed the vote at 5,000.^
* Journal, pp. 767-8 ; Debates, vol. ii, pp. 789, 899, 1007. This pro-
vision was to become Section i, Art. Ill, of the new Constitution.
' Pamphlet of the Rep. State Central Committee; Adv. and Tribune,
Mar. 24.
8l ] EARLY RECONSTRUCTION gl
The railroad-aid provisions of the new constitution were
the natural outcome of the controversy between the ex-
ecutive and the legislature during the session immediately
preceding the Convention.' Governor Crapo, it has been
said, had refused to sign a number of aid bills during the
session of 1867 on the ground that they were unconstitu-
tional. In order to accomplish their aim, the railroad-aid
advocates took the next step, which was obviously amend-
ment or revision, and as the people had voted in favor of
the latter, the convention did thorough work. There was
certainly an economic and social need for railways in the
interior and northern portions of the state, as the develop-
ment of industry was handicapped by the inadequate facili-
ties for transportation. On the other hand, the distrust of
corporations which was strong and general, and the lack
of interest in the southern counties already possessing
satisfactory advantages combined to put the suggested
changes into disfavor. Public aid by taxation to railroads
owned and operated by corporations, was considered too
dangerous a policy to be countenanced. As the article was
finally adopted, the legislature was authorized to empower
any city or township to raise by tax in aid of any railroad
an amount not exceeding 10 per cent of its assessed valua-
tion, upon the approval of a majority of the electors. No
county could be authorized to pledge its credit in aid of a
railroad save those of the Upper Peninsula.^
When the work of the convention was completed, the
provisions touching suffrage, salaries and railroad aid were
included in the final draft of the revised constitution. The
prohibition of the sale of intoxicating liquors was em-
1 Cf. supra, p. 75.
' Art. V of the Constitution.
Journal, pp. 643-4; Debates, vol. ii; Mich, as a State, vol. iv, pp
29-36; pp. 121, 137, 198, 688, 925.
82 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [82
bodied in an article that was to be voted upon separately.
If a majority of electors voted favorably, it was to be in-
cluded in the constitution, otherwise it would be null. Simi-
larly the provision for annual in place of biennial sessions
of the legislature was formulated as an article for separate
submission. It was with the constitution and these inde-
pendent articles that the state politicians were occupied dur-
ing the autumn and winter of 1867 and 1868. The fate of
the constitution, which assumed a distinctly partisan char-
acter, was to determine the party status for the time on the
most important current issues. The Republicans termed
their opponents the '' anti-negro, anti-prohibition, anti-
salary, and anti-railroad " party, while the Democrats as-
serted that in the convention every member had endeavored
to leave his mark, " relying upon the negro to carry him
safely through all absurdities." ^ The draft was certainly
more radical than it would have been, had the convention
not closed before the results in the October states became
known. Negro suffrage would, in all probability, have been
made a third separate article in accordance with the advice
of the Democratic minority. There was some reason for
the assertion that the document was practically a party plat-
form, rather than a constitution which could command the
reasonable support of both parties.^
GENERAL ISSUES
The second great factor in the politics of Michigan — and
this was common to the other states — was the Congressional
legislation beginning early in the year 1867. In this ses-
sion Congress entered upon radical reconstruction with
popular approval, established a military government in the
South, and commenced the task of creating a new electorate
* Argus, Mar. 13.
' " Nineteen reasons why the constitution should be rejected," Argus,
Mar. 27, 1867.
83] EARLY RECONSTRUCTION g^
there. The policy of restoring statehood on the basis of
the old electorate was considered a failure, and in the for-
mulation of the new policy the Senators from Michigan
were among the most conspicuous figures. Mr. Howard
had much more to do in formulating the general plan of
Congress than did Mr. Chandler ; for the latter devoted his
first interest to his duties as chairman of the committee
on rivers and harbors and rarely addressed the Senate at
length upon a question of policy other than of a fiscal nature.
When the first step towards a positive assertion of the
power to regulate suffrage was made by Congress in Janu-
ary, 1867, and negro suffrage was granted in the District of
Columbia, a storm of reproach naturally followed from the
Democracy of Michigan. They considered it inadvisable at
this particular time to aggravate race antagonism in any
way; moreover, the act as passed, they said, violated the
preference of a large majority of Northern people. Michi-
gan could not then officially declare her attitude upon the
question of impartial suffrage, as the constitution containing
the provision would not come before the people for ratifi-
cation until the following spring. However, the Democrats
of the state repeatedly took occasion to observe that the
Republicans had radically changed their position since the
preceding June, when in connection with the Fourteenth
Amendment they declared that federal regulation of suf-
frage was not a feature of their policy. It was generally
believed by the minority in Michigan that the act granting
negro suffrage in the District of Columbia — though legally
unassailable in itself — was but the ''entering wedge for
later forcing it upon all the States." In the second place,
it was asked how Congressmen from states denying negroes
the right of suffrage could, with consistency, force it upon
the people of the District. The prevailing interpretation
given by the Conservative Republicans and Democrats to
84 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [84
the act from the first was the desire of the Radicals that the
negro vote might give their party supremacy in the South/
The inevitable effect of the Reconstruction Acts of March
and July which placed the South under military government
and provided for the creation of a new electorate, was to
increase the prejudice of the Democracy against the policy
of Congress. On the other hand, the dominant party of the
state was almost a unit in supporting Jacob M. Howard, its
vigorous leader in the Senate. ^ There were, it is true, a few
exceptions whose only effect was to excite hostile criticism
on the part of the regular journals. " We candidly avow
that we look with distrust upon the policy of some of the
legislation now before Congress," admitted a Republican
journalist. " We want more legislation for the people and
less for Congress and party supremacy."* However, the
system of militarism and the federal guarantee of impartial
suffrage had ceased to be odious to the great mass of Re-
publicans, * and the very few exceptions to this rule had no
hearing which could gain them any influence.
The second branch of Congressional activity which pre-
ceded and influenced the politics and campaign of 1868 was,
of course, the impeachment proceedings against President
Johnson. When the subject was under consideration dur-
ing the last session of the Thirty-ninth Congress, the Mich-
igan delegation in the House was divided. The vote on
* Jackson Cit., Jan. 9; Free Press, Jan. 10; Argus, Jan. 25, 1867.
• The debates of Senator Howard with Senators Hendricks, Hen-
derson, Reverdy Johnson and Oliver P. Morton, showing his aggres-
sive attitude at this time are to be found in the Globe, Jan. 11, 1867,
p. 407 et seq.; Feb. 2, p. 968; Feb. 15, pp. 1365, 1371 ; Mar. 15, p. 112
et seq.; July 10, pp. 549-584.
• De Lano of the Saginaw Republican, Feb. 6.
* The above conclusion was gained from numbers of the Daily Post,
Lansing State Rep., and Grand Rapids Daily Eagle, February to July,
1867.
85] EARLY RECONSTRUCTION gc
Mr. Ashley's Resolution of Impeachment taken January 7,
1867, showed five names in its favor, while one member re-
frained from voting.' On the seventh of the following
December, Mr. Boutwell's resolution of impeachment re-
ceived the favorable vote of but one Michigan Representa-
tive, and the opposition of four.^ The great change in the
attitude of the delegation was probably due to the incon-
clusive nature of the mass of testimony against the Presi-
dent which was submitted by the Committee on the Judic-
iary in pursuance of the Ashley resolution of the preceding
January.
By February of the succeeding year (1868), however,
the Michigan delegation in the House gave united sup-
port to the movement, and the vote on Mr. Covode's reso-
lution, February 24th, reveals all six names among the
yeas.^ The enthusiasm and conviction with which three
members supported the resolution are evidenced by the ad-
dresses prepared by them on the subject. Mr. Beaman
declared the action of the President in removing Secretary
Stanton and appointing General Thomas Secretary of War
ad interim unconstitutional. His basis for this conclusion
was the power of appointment jointly vested in the Presi-
dent and the Senate. In the second place, he considered
the action not only unconstitutional, but corrupt and crimi-
nal— a charge which would justify impeachment of the
President for *' high crimes and misdemeanors." *
Austin Blair put forward more extreme views, and ar-
rived at an astonishing conclusion concerning the relative
» McPherson, 1867, p. 187-8. Messrs. Beaman, Driggs, Ferry, Trow-
bridge and Upson voted yea, while Blair did not express himself.
« Globe, Dec. 7, 1867, p. 68 ; McPherson, 1867, p. 264-5. Beaman,
Driggs, Ferry and Upson voted nay, Trowbridge voted yea, while
Blair, again, did not express himself. Post, Dec. 9.
' Globe, Feb. 24, 1868, p. 1400; McPherson, 1868, p. 20.
* Globe, Feb. 22, pp. 176-7; Adv. and Trib., Feb. 24.
86 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [86
rights of the President and Congress. " The President of
the United States is the servant of the people of the United
States," he asserted, '' and because he is the servant of the
people, he is the servant of Congress, for the time being,
which represents the people, and he must obey the law."
Blair urged the successful carrying out of impeachment '' in
the name of peace and public quiet ", and threw all censure
for the necessity of instituting these proceedings upon the
President.' In the choice of managers, Messrs. Blair and
Upson each received one vote only, and none of the Mich-
igan members appeared as managers of the trial. They
thus had no direct part in the proceedings.^
The Senators from Michigan were known to be warmly
in favor of impeachment from the first, and in various inter-
views and communications they declared their sympathy
with Stanton for refusing to resign '' on grounds of grave
public considerations." ^ Mr. Howard was appointed by
the President of the Senate to the select committee of
seven to consider and report upon the House Resolution of
Impeachment. It was in this capacity that Mr. Howard
exercised a great influence in the formulation of the rules
of procedure for the impeachment trial. On February 26th
he presented the report embodying the work of the Com-
mittee, which was under discussion from February 29th and
was finally adopted the night of March 2nd.*
The activity of Howard in the preparation of the Rules
of Procedure had so broken his health that when the vote
came to be taken on May 12th, Chandler moved adjourn-
1 Globe, Feb. 22, pp. 1367-8. Mr. Driggs expressed similar views in
his speech which followed ; ibid., pp. 1368-9.
' Globe, Mar. 2, 1868, pp. 16, 19.
• Post, Aug. 9, 1867; Adv. and Trib., Aug. 14.
*• Globe, Feb. 26, p. 143 1 ; Feb. 29, pp. 1515, 1523-4, 1532-3, i577;
Mar. 2, 1586, 1603.
8;] EARLY RECONSTRUCTION g^
ment until the i6th in order that his colleague might be
present. On the latter day the vote on Article XI was taken,
and both senators voted " guilty ". This article declared
that the President had intentionally violated the Ten-
ure-of-Office Act of March 2, 1867, and had attempted to
defeat the execution of the Reconstruction Act of the same
date/ On the 26th, Articles II and III were voted upon
and both names were again among the thirty-five who voted
guilty.^
Among the twenty-nine Senators who filed opinions on
the case was Jacob M. Howard, and his was a strong proof
of his legal training and experience. He held the Tenure-
of-Of^ce Act '' fully warranted by the Constitution ", and
he considered that Secretary Stanton came under its pro-
visions. '' There can be but one conclusion," he said, " he
[President Johnson] incurred the guilt . . . whether the
article [Art. XI] be regarded as founded directly upon the
statute or charging a common law misdemeanor of attempt-
ing to commit a statutory ofTence." Howard emphasized
the point that as appointment requires a concurrence of two
agencies removal must have the same.^
Throughout the impeachment discussion and trial, the
Democrats accused Congress of " attempting to annihilate
^ Dunning, Essays on the Civil War and Reconstruction, pp. 272-4.
Globe, Supplement, pp. 410-12; Trib. Aim., 1869, pp. 25, 26. The
former act denied the President the power of removal, even during
the recess of the Senate, which body must concur in every suspen-
sion by the President to make it legal and effective. The second act
established military government throughout the ten Southern states
by dividing them into five military districts, each to be under the
command of an officer of no lower rank than a brigadier-general.
^ McPherson, 1868, p. 282. The charges included in Arts. II and III
were the violation of the Tenure-of-Office Act by the removal of the
Secretary of War and the appointment of General Thomas without
the advice and consent of the Senate.
' Globe, Supplement, pp. 500-6.
88 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [88
the President," and the failure to convict was naturally the
source for much rejoicing. They expressed the hope that
Congress '' might now see fit to recede to its normal posi-
tion under the Constitution." ^
On the other hand, the dominant party in Michigan re-
sponded enthusiastically to the forward steps of the leaders
of impeachment, but in some cases there was a measure of
displeasure at the violent methods employed to force the
conviction of the President. The failure of the undertaking
was a source of regret to the Republicans, and to a few
members of the party the conduct of the leaders at the close
of the trial was still more regretted. One organ urged the
Republicans " not to be discouraged by its failure as it had
not reflected any injury upon the party," and then proceeded
to lecture the organization upon its attempt to force convic-
tion. It strongly denounced the methods employed by the
enthusiasts : " We cannot forbear to express our disap-
proval of the means sought to compel the Senate to find the
respondent guilty, without regard to evidence. . . . The
attempt to coerce certain Senators to pronounce the accused
guilty, whether they believe him so or not, is a sad spectacle,
and must annihilate the party whom the actors represent."
The fierce denunciation of Republican members of the court
who could not conscientiously pronounce the President
guilty, was declared an " unseemly, ungenerous, and un-
called-for wrong." ^
It cannot be a great error to consider the large majority
of Republicans in the state as willing followers of their ex-
treme leaders in Washington with respect to the impeach-
ment proceedings. In this matter, as in others previously
noted, the dominant party of the state was visibly led by its
ultra-radical members in Congress and the Democracy was
powerless to check this tendency toward extremes.^
* Free Press, May 30, 1868. ' Jackson Cit, May 19.
» Post, Feb. 24, May 6, 1868; Adv. and Trib., May 27.
89] EARLY RECONSTRUCTION gg
Such were the subjects of political discussion, state and
federal, which preceded the campaign of 1868. Of the
former, the new constitution was the greatest issue, and of
the latter, the Reconstruction Acts of 1867 and the unsuc-
cessful attempt at impeachment were of the most far-reach-
ing influence. As the two lines of interest were interrelated
in the early part of the campaign, they must, to a certain
degree, be treated together.
THE SPRING CAMPAIGN OF 1 868
The spring elections were considered of equal importance
with the fall. " Let us go into the spring campaign on
local issues — the most important of which is the defeat of
the new constitution — and let the national issues wait the
tide of events." ^ Such was the feeling in the early part of
the year 1868.
The Republican state convention for the year was held
early enough to make declarations upon the constitution
before the spring elections should occur, and thus the
autumn campaign was opened before that of the spring
had closed. By the 21st of February the call was issued for
the convention to meet on the i8th of the next month.
This call invited the *' co-operation and participation of all
friends oi an economical administration of the public ex-
penditure, the speedy reorganization of those states whose
governments were destroyed by the rebellion, and the res-
toration of their proper relations with the United States." ^
This invitation seemed to have particular significance in the
light of the Act of Congress of March nth, which author-
ized the ratification of the constitutions of the states apply-
ing for readmission by a majority of persons voting, in
^ Argus, Feb. 7, 1868.
' Adv. and Trib., Feb. 19, 1868. The call was commented upon with
insinuations by the Democratic press. Argus, Feb. 21 ; Free Press,
Feb. 25.
90 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [90
place of the previous requirement of a majority of the
registered voters. This act also authorized the voting for
state officers and Congressmen at the same election. It
thus marked a change in the policy of Congress from criti-
cal deliberation to readier action.
In the state Republican convention General Grant was
recommended for President, and Colfax for Vice-Presi-
dent.^ The impeachment proceedings were approved, and
impartial suffrage was demanded. The platform contained
a strong plea for the adoption of the revised state consti-
tution, and this resolution was the one to which the Repub-
licans probably attached the greatest importance. It de-
clared that " the Republicans of Michigan owe it to them-
selves, to the memory of the framers of the Declaration of
Independence, and to the interests of free government
everywhere, to secure by a triumphant majority the rati-
fication of the proposed constitution, with its broad plat-
form of equal and exact justice to all men, impartial suf-
frage and equality before the law." '' This constitution,"
it continued, '' is far better adapted to develop the resources
of Michigan, and advance the real interests of the people
than our present constitution."
As the Democrats held no convention before the spring
elections, they did not have an equal opportunity to state
their attitude officially upon the proposed draft, but there
was no necessity, as the people rejected it by a majority of
1 Following Austin Blair's speech in the Lower House of Congress
recommending Grant's candidacy, Edward W. Barber, who was then
Reading Clerk of the House, — now a resident of Jackson, and the
editor of the Patriot, — sent a letter to a Michigan journal urging the
nomination of Grant. Mr. Driggs of the Sixth District read the article
and showed it to Mr. Washburne of Illinois. The latter approved it
and immediately went up to the Clerk's desk and assured Mr. Barber
that he was right. " If the Republicans don't nominate Grant," he
said, "the Democrats will."
9l] EARLY RECONSTRUCTION gi
38,853 when they came to express themselves April 6th/
Prohibition and annual sessions were emphatically voted
down by those who voted upon those issues. Almost 25,000
who voted upon the constitution neglected to express them-
selves upon prohibition, yet from the comparatively small
anti-prohibition majority it appears that this issue was
stronger than the constitution itself, and would probably
have helped it at the polls rather than have caused its de-
feat. The southern and south-central counties with their
Democratic leaning naturally manifested the greatest dis-
approval. In twenty of these, which presented a Radical
majority of 15,000 in 1866, the returns showed a majority
of 25,000 in opposition to the constitution.^
A comparison of the vote on the adoption of the constitu-
tion with that on Governor seven months later reveals the
fact that over 43,000 voters declined to express themselves
upon the former. This indicates either an indifference or
an unwillingness of Republicans to approve the work of the
convention. Rather than vote against it, they preferred not
to vote at all, as the document was in reality a partisan
affair made evident by the strict party vote upon the ques-
tion of its adoption. The strong Republican counties of the
northwest — among them Antrim, Leelanaw, Grand Tra-
verse, Manistee and Oceana — returned large majorities in
its favor. The issue in the southern and south-central coun-
ties is less evident, as the tendencies of this group were
1 Mich. Man., 1869, p. 246 ; Trih. Aim., p. yz ; World Aim. ; Ann. Cyc. ;
McPherson, 1868, p. 353; Mich, as a State, vol. iv, ch. i. The vote
on the constitution stood 71,729 to 110,582. On prohibition, the af-
firmative votes numbered 72,462, negatives, 86,143, and the proposed
annual sessions were defeated by a majority of almost 76,000. The
Nation, Apr. 23, 1868, p. 322.
^ Free Press, Apr. 8; Argus, Apr. 10; containing editorial comment
from the Democratic point of view; Adv. and Trih., Apr. 8; Lansing
State Rep., Apr. 10, presenting Republican reflections upon the out-
come of the election.
92 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [92
Democratic, and from year to year they often changed
allegiance. At the same time it was to be expected that the
south portion of the state would possess the largest propor-
\/ tion of negro population. These counties returned an aver-
. age negative vote of 60 per cent to 80 per cent, and among
I this group were the ten counties with one per cent or over of
colored population. Whether the rejection of the proposed
constitution was due, then, to partisan feeling, aversion to
the negro, or opposition to railroad aid, it is impossible to
decide.^
THE AUTUMN CAMPAIGN OF 1868
The autumn campaign had already begun with the Re-
publican state convention which had met early in 1868,
and vainly urged the adoption of the new constitution.*
The campaign program was naturally a eulogy of the party
and ticket, and a bitter invective against the Democrats and
their anti-war declaration of 1864. In strange inconsistency
with their invitation issued for the convention, the Repub-
licans declared against speedy restoration and amnesty.^
One of the most widely-circulated campaign tracts was the
speech of Austin Blair,^ which appears in the Congressional
Globe for July 13th. In this address, dealing with the
" Issues of the Campaign ", he quoted passages from notable
Democratic speeches, and charged the party with disloyalty.
He vigorously opposed amnesty and denounced the Green-
* The World Almanac for 1869 strangely lists the votes upon the
constitution as if they were cast exclusively upon the question of
negro suffrage. This was certainly the most important issue in the
proposed constitution, but cannot be considered identical with it.
Precisely what proportion of the negative votes were cast purposely
against the suffrage provision, it is impossible to ascertain.
2 Cf. supra, pp. 89, 90,
* Post, Apr. 22; Lansing State Rep., May 13, 1868.
* Blair's speech, which presented the Republican point of view in a
typical fashion, may be found in the Globe, Appx., pp. 414-18; Pol.
Pamphlets, vol. i, Jenison Coll.
93] EARLY RECONSTRUCTION g^
back policy with which the Democracy had become identi-
fied. He declared that " but for the unparalleled treachery
of Johnson, reconstruction would have been completed long
since," and he closed with a eulogy of Grant and Colfax.
Upon the choice for President there seemed entire agree-
ment in the state. All the delegates to the national conven-
tion cast their votes for Grant from the first to the last
ballot. The state ticket was headed by Henry P. Baldwin
for Governor, a milder partisan than his two predecessors
had been, and the other names were not among the most
prominent Republicans of the state. ^
Turning now to the consideration of the Democracy, we
find that there was an inclination on the part of some of the
members to favor the early date of March 4th for the state
convention. Others urged the same objections which ap-
peared two years before against premature state resolutions.
They declared that " the true policy for a minority party
is to wait for its opponents to make their platform ... in
order that it may act understanding^ and attack vulnerable
points." Besides, a campaign of three months was prefer-
able to one of eight, for the latter would be too tiresome for
the candidates, and financially too destructive without cor-
responding gains. A call was finally issued for the conven-
tion to meet in Detroit, May 27th. The platform declared
that
the difference between American Democracy and Federacy is
as radical and as eternal as the laws of the mind, and as long
as men segregate by affinity into political organizations, so
long the Democratic policy will, and the Republican will not,
harmonize with our form of government; and the adherents
of the latter can never establish such harmony until they
change their natures or the form of our government. The
^ Ann. Cyc, p. 500; Adv. and Trib., Mar. 19; Lansing State Rep.,
Mar. 20.
94 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [94
first is impossible, the last is revolution. . . . Revolution is
the logical tendency and (if not resisted) the necessary re-
sult of Republicanism to which its leaders consciously, and
the people unconsciously, are rapidly advancing.^
The platform contained a long rehearsal of the features
of Republican absolutism, and condemned emphatically the
tendencies toward centralization. It was '' the firm, united
purpose " of the Democracy " to restore the union of the
states, keep the federal government and each of its depart-
ments within its proper sphere, and cause it to respect the
reserved rights of the states and the people." It demanded
the abolition of all bank and tariff monopolies, the Freed-
men's Bureau, and all standing armies in time of peace
Extravagance and corruption must be checked and economy
practiced. One of the most significant provisions was in
part well disguised by the phraseology — that of leniency
toward the rebels. '' All men should be held innocent until
proven guilty, crime should be punished according to law,
and equal justice be done to all men, irrespective of color or
race." The aim of the Democracy was declared to be " to
keep this country as our fathers made it, a white man's gov-
ernment." Immigration, it was demanded, should be en-
couraged and the public domain retained for the people
rather than given up to speculating corporations.
The platform declared for the " preservation of the public
credit," and the taxation of government bonds. It promised
that the party, if successful, would see that '' all public debts
shall be honorably paid," and that " the bonds of the federal
government issued after the greenbacks were made legal
tender shall be paid in the currency of the country except
where otherwise expressly provided by law or stipulated
in the bond." This evidence of a willingness to counten-
ance the greenback movement was sufficient to fasten upon
1 Ann. Cyc, p. 494; Free Press, May 28, June 2; Argus, May 29.
95] EARLY RECONSTRUCTION gr
the Democracy more than the Republican party the reproach
and disadvantage of soft-money sympathies. The Repub-
licans declared that this plank favored " the twin-brother of
repudiation — the payment of the bonds in greenbacks."
The currency issue was more important from the point
of view of the Democracy than of the Republicans. It
was, however, very prominent in the campaign speeches of
both parties, and the demand for the payment of the govern-
ment debt — especially of the five-twenties — in greenbacks
in preference to gold, naturally placed the former organiza-
tion in the position of a soft-money party. Its members
were accused of demanding the issue of an immense addi-
tional volume of greenbacks which would be followed by
the depreciation of the currency.^ Their creed with refer-
ence to this issue was thus set forth by them :
The Democrats have always advocated hard money in pre-
ference to soft, and opposed the old National Bank with its
note issue. It opposed the Legal Tender Act of 1862, and
pronounced it unconstitutional especially in the case of con-
tracts made prior to its passage. The party favors the earliest
possible withdrawal of the greenback currency and return to
specie payments, but it believes that as long as greenbacks are
to remain currency of the country and a legal tender, they
should be kept in circulation and general use.^
The Democrats were persistent in their protest against being
considered repudiators and inflationists, for " the payment
of obligations in greenbacks where gold is not promised is
not repudiation." They did not intend, it was declared, to
increase paper to the amount of the bonds in question, but
they expected by rigid economy in administration to pay the
1 Speech of Chandler in Battle Creek, Aug. 24, Battle Creek Journal,
Aug. 26. The speech of Charles L. May in Ann Arbor, Sept. 21,
Argus, Sept. 25.
' Argus, Aug. 21 ; also Oct. 2, " Facts about money."
96 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [96
debt out of the surplus revenue in greenbacks or at a green-
back standard. If payments in gold were exacted, immense
premiums would necessarily be paid, as there never was
at one time over $250,000,000 in gold coin, and this would
be entirely inadequate. With the greenback policy, the tax-
payer would be saved the premium, and the government
need only keep its legal tenders moving, by paying them out
in bonds and receiving them for taxes to pay its debt.
Such were the arguments of the Democratic party, and the
financial evils of a Radical victory were vividly outlined.^
In the national democratic convention, Michigan was
represented by well-known Union Democrats, some of
whom worked with the Johnson party in 1866.^ Before
the convention, the preference of Michigan for the presi-
dency was not definite, and Pendleton, Reverdy Johnson,
Hendricks and Seymour all had followers. On the first
four ballots, Michigan voted for Johnson, and from that to
the twenty-first, the delegates cast their votes for Hendricks.
When the twenty-second ballot was being taken, Mr. Stuart
made a short speech in which he declared that Michigan's
sole hope was to nominate a candidate whose election was
certain. The votes were then cast in favor of Seymour.^
^ " The payment of the debt in gold will cause $7,000,000,000 of
added debt — which will be fastened upon the country as a permanent
institution, and every fifteen years the interest alone will amount to
the principal. Money will become scarce as bondholders will desire
to have greenbacks called in, in order that they can receive their pay
in gold. Prices v/ill fall, employment will be more poorly remunerated,
and taxes will be higher and the times harder for all but the bankers
and the bond-holders." Argus, Oct. 23.
' Five delegates at large and two alternates were appointed to the
national convention. Michigan was represented on the committee of
credentials by Byron G. Stout, on the committee of organization by
Charles E. Stuart, and on the committee on resolutions by John
Moore. The first was one who supported Johnson two years before.
• Official Proceedings of the Nat. Dent. Conv., 1868 ; Free Press, July
7, 9; Argus, July 10, 17.
97] EARLY RECONSTRUCTION gy
The state Democratic convention of July 15th was held
to nominate state officers and presidential electors. It
pledged its support to the Detroit and New York platforms,
and denounced the extravagances in the state administra-
tion. This resolution was directed against the expensive
improvement policies, the practice of appointing commis-
sions to carry out the same, and the railroad-aid legisla-
tion which had remained a leading state issue after the
failure of the proposed constitution. The fear that the
favorite schemes of the Republicans rejected with the con-
stitution might be brought forward gave grounds for the
declaration against the " attempted changes in the organic
law," extravagance and negro suffrage, and the interfer-
ence in municipal affairs with reference to the taxation of
cities and towns for corporation aid.^
THE ELECTION OF 1 868
The spring elections and the vote upon the constitution
had made the Radicals less certain of success than usual.
Doubtful counties of the south and central portions were
showing an increased allegiance to the Democrats, and
campaign arrangements were focused upon the lower three
Congressional Districts.^ The arrangements of the Re-
publicans for their campaign were very detailed and ef-
fective. Speakers of note were engaged for addresses,
and among them were Colfax and Wade.*
The results of the election revealed a slight gain in the
1 For the convention of July 15, Free Press, July 15, 16. Comment
in the New York World, July 24, T. L., vol. Ixxviii p. 206, col. 4.
2 Chandler himself was not so confident as usual. On August 27 he
wrote from Detroit to his colleague, Sen. Howard, in Washington:
"the Copperheads are at work in earnest, and have some hopes of
carrying at least two or three Congressional Districts. I think you
should come here at the earliest possible moment." Howard MSS.
* Post, Sept. 9; Jackson Cit, Oct. 27; Lansing State Rep., Nov. 3.
98 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [98
Republican following since the last presidential campaign.
Lincoln received 55.89 per cent of the popular vote,
whereas Grant was given 56.98 per cent.^ The guberna-
torial vote was remarkably similar to the presidential, the
latter being only 300 larger than the former. In 1866, the
Republicans polled 58.83 per cent of the total vote for gov-
ernor, at this election, only 56.8 per cent. Apparently there
was a contrary tendency within the state to that of the
federal ticket, and this was due undoubtedly to the per-
sonality of Grant. The six Congressmen elected were all
Republicans. In the sixth district Strickland was elected,
who two years later was to lead the opposition in the name
of reform against Driggs, his predecessor in the House.
The joint majority of the dominant party in the state
legislature was reduced from 94 in 1866 to 66. There
were 27 Republicans and 5 Democrats in the Senate, while
the proportion in the House was 72 to 28.^
Apparently neither party made startling inroads upon
the reliable territory of the other and it was merely the
customary shifting of allegiance with small majorities in
the more evenly balanced counties that determined the re-
sults of 1868. Two of the northern counties, Keweenaw
and Ontonagon, changed from Republican to Democratic
by a small margin, and five of seven counties of the north-
ern peninsula were thus Democratic. Emmet and Che-
boygan regularly followed their neighbors on the north.
In the three southern tiers of counties, Livingston and
Wayne remained Democratic by small majorities and
Washtenaw made its third successive change, giving its
majority to the Democracy.
* Grant received 128,550, Seymour, 97,069, the Republican majority
thus approximating 31,000. In the gubernatorial contest Baldwin re-
ceived 128,051, Moore, 97,290. Mich. Man., 1869, pp. 229-30, 235-2;.
Mich. Aim., 1869, pp. 34-44-
' Mich. Man., 1869, pp. 231-3; Trih. Aim., p. 7Z.
99] EARLY RECONSTRUCTION ^^
The elections of 1866 and 1868 showed the Radical ele-
ment supreme, but from this time forward its influence
waned. In the former year the state showed its preference
for radical reconstruction, and in 1868 it approved what
had been done. In the two next years, however, a tide of
reaction and reform would send one Democrat to Congress
and alter considerably the balance in the state legislature.
In 1872, the actual state of opposition was obscured by the
political catastrophe which overwhelmed the Democracy
of Michigan as that of other states. From that year,
however, the Democratic party with its various allies was
a growing power, and the Republicans were no longer ab-
solute.
THE SENATORIAL CONTEST OF 1868-9, AND THE TRIUMPH
OF CHANDLER
The Senatorial campaign was notable as the conflict
between two of the most prominent Republicans in Mich-
igan, Ex-Governor Blair and Senator Chandler. They
held very similar party principles at this time, but en-
tirely conflicting ambitions. The former had aspired to
a seat in the Senate since 1857, and was an avowed can-
didate in 1863 and 1865. On account of the strong fol-
lowing of each in the state, a compromise was planned by
their mutual friends ^ in 1868. The attempted arrangement
provided for the retirement of Austin Blair from the pres-
ent contest with the assurance by Chandler that he would
not give any support to any other candidate at the next
election. Several of Blair's wisest supporters urged his
acceptance of the plan, and this would certainly have been
the prudent thing to do. When he visited the state, how-
ever, during the early part of the senatorial campaign, his
» James A. Walters of Kalamazoo, Fred Morley and George Jerome
of Detroit.
lOO THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [loo
more moderate advisers were unfortunately absent, and
rash counsel persuaded the Ex-Governor to reject the ar-
rangement and enter the contest for nomination against
Chandler/
The opposition to Chandler was considered hopeful by
the Democrats, who suggested the coalition of the anti-
Chandlerites with the Democrats for the election of Ex-
Governor Crapo to the Senate.^ The name proposed was
a poor one, considering the violent hostility that Crapo
had always shown toward the Democracy. This sugges-
tion was a forecast, however, of the actual event six years
later. There were charges of bribery brought against
Chandler from various sources, and the personal influence
of Michigan residents in Washington was largely thrown
against him.^ Stanton, who naturally supported him, wrote
that " Chandler's re-election would be a vindication of the
judgment of Congress, of Mr. Lincoln, and the conduct of
the war." *
The Republican legislative caucus was held Wednesday
evening, January 6, 1869, and the votes stood Chandler 78,
* Mich. Coll., vol. XXXV ; " Mich, Men in Congress," Edward W.
Barber. Among the friends of Blair who regretted his continued
rivalry with Chandler, was Amos Root, and he was absent at the time
of Blair's visit to Michigan. Mr. Edward W. Barber related the above
account in an interview which serves to amplify the mention of the
affair given m the biographies of Mr. Blair. Mr. H. H. Bingham
wrote to Howard, Nov. 17, 1868: "Several of Governor Blair's friends
had a conference with him last night, and were of the opinion that
he had better withdraw as a candidate for Senator this winter and
wait for the next vacancy when he would be more likely to succeed.
I am told this was finally agreed upon." Howard MSS. If this
action was ever taken, it was rescinded.
» Flint Dem., Dec. 7.
' Some unfriendly discrimination had been manifested toward them
at a social function of the Chandlers. Argus, Jan. 8, 1869.
* Letter of Dec. 22, 1868; Compient in the New York Herald, Jan.
10, 1869, T. L., vol. Ixxxii, p. 53, col. 4.
lOi] EARLY RECONSTRUCTION lOi
Thomas W. Ferry 3, Austin Blair 3, and 7 scattering on
five other names/ It was stated by an observer who "went
to Lansing in the interest of the anti-Chandlerites, that
the doubtful votes or members were very soon disposed
of by the unprecedented pressure of Chandler's lobby." ^
Another observer who was a loyal Chandlerite wrote to
Howard that
the opposition to Mr. Chandler never had any strength. . . .
This ends Blair's prospects in that direction forever, and his
friends say he will not be brought forward again. Blair was
on hand, but Ferry was more discreet and remained at home.
On learning of the situation, his friends early withdrew his
name. Blair's withdrawal was without terms or conditions
of any kind, and so was Ferry's. This contest demonstrates
the weakness of the locality argument more satisfactorily than
ever. No one urged it or cared for it, but Mr. Chandler was
renominated " because the Legislature thought he had done
good service, and was the best man for the place." . . . They
tried to influence some members of the Legislature against
Chandler, by claiming that his nomination would prejudice
your chance two years hence, but it was ridiculed on all sides
as without any force.
The writer closed reassuringly : " You need have no fear
of your success unless the Republican party is defeated on
all sides." *
* Of these, Isaac P. Christiancy and William A. Howard each re-
ceived one. Five Republicans were absent. Argus, Jan. 8, 1869; Post
and Tribune Life of Chandler, p. 298.
2 Letter of Allen Potter of Kalamazoo, Jan. 12, to Howard, who
he " thought would be interested, having in view his own election two
years hence." Howard MSS.
' Letter of A. B. Maynard of Detroit, to Howard, Jan. 9, Howard
MSS. He also had been in Lansing and closely observed the caucus
preliminaries. As a friend of Howard, he was anxious to give him
all information which would be helpful in 1871.
I02 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [102
At the election of January 19th, Chandler was re-elected
over San ford M. Green, the Democratic candidate, by a
vote of three- fourths of the legislature.^ The Democratic
candidate was a jurist of note throughout the state, and
though he was not such a strong party favorite as the
Democrats should have placed in opposition to Chandler,
still their most prominent man would undoubtedly have
lost to Chandler this year.
PREPARATIONS FOR THE CONTEST OF 1 87 1
The election of 1871 was already in the mind of every
politician, and Mr. Howard was being coached by his
friends with a view to his renomination. One friend hinted
at the importance of appointments throughout the state,
and advised him to '* hold close to Chandler." " The con-
test this fall," he assured Howard, " has accomplished one
result in your favor. It has substantially united your
friends and Chandler's." ^ He then alluded to the inef-
fectiveness of the locality argument with the legislature
and the great majority of the Republican press, and assured
him that " the Republicans will never refuse you two full
terms in the Senate when they have given your colleague
three."
The strength of the opposition to Howard was probably
greater than his friends thought. There was little personal
criticism and his activity throughout Reconstruction and
his speeches on suffrage, amnesty and civil rights became
campaign documents. Yet there was a desire for a vacancy
in the Senate, which would allow a man from another sec-
^ Chandler received 24 votes in the Senate, 70 in the House; Green,
4 votes in the Senate, 26 in the House, Mich. Man., 1869, pp. 263-4;
Lansing State Rep., Jan. 20; Post, Jan. 21, 23; Sen. lour, and House
Jour., 1869.
' Letter of A. B. Maynard, Jan. 14, 1869, Howard MSS.
I03] EARLY RECONSTRUCTION IO3
tion to come forward, and this feeling was stronger than
any personal hostility toward Howard. If his seat could
be vacated by his promotion rather than his defeat, it
would be entirely satisfactory. It was with this motive
that the name of Jacob M. Howard was mentioned early
in February for the Vice-Presidency, and Sumner's com-
pliment was repeated — that he was the ablest man in the
United States Senate.^ The suggestion was not widely
taken up, and the probabilities are that some safe though
complimentary disposition of the Detroit Senator was de-
sired by an up-state faction, who knew Chandler's strength
and probability of re-election. In such a manner, some
aspirant from another locality could be accommodated
without waiting for so improbable an occurrence as
Chandler's defeat. This desire to have central and north-
ern Michigan represented in the Senate cannot be cen-
sured, though it appears from the Globe that Mr. Chandler
was taking good care of the industrial and economic inter-
ests of the entire state.
A movement full of interest was started for Howard's
appointment to a cabinet position. In November he was
urged by several influential friends to avail himself of a
place in the cabinet — the Secretaryship of the Interior
being " probably preferred." ^ The means to this end
were well worked out by Justice Christiancy, a friend of
Howard, who expected no gain and was undoubtedly sin-
cere.* He expressed a willingness to sign recommenda-
tions for Howard, contrary to the newly-adopted prac-
^ This remark was made by Charles Sumner in an address at Lansing.
The recommendation was given by the Lansing State Rep., Feb. 3, and
commented upon by the Argus, Feb. 5, 1868.
' S. D. Bingham to Howard, Nov. 28, 1868. Mr. Bingham was editor
of the Lansing State Rep. Howard MSS.
* Letter of Jan. 15, 1869, from Monroe, Howard MSS.
I04 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [104
tice of the State Supreme Court. The method proposed in
this letter was " to get a resolution through the Legislature
to the effect that ' Michigan is entitled to a Cabinet office '
— mentioning no names, and relying upon a petition with a
long list of Republican signatures." There is probable
evidence of Ex-Grovernor Blair's continued ambitions, in
the care and thoroughness with which he canvassed signa-
tures for the petition.^
At this time it is evident that both Christiancy and Blair
were on very friendly terms with Howard, whether or no
there was a partisan motive for it. Christiancy expressed
the hope that Howard would feel free to repose the deepest
confidence in him concerning the political aspects of the
latter 's re-election, and it is not to be doubted that he was
entirely honest in his friendly offices. There is no proof
that Ex-Governor Blair was insincere at this time and he
certainly was not hostile. In the light, however, of his
avowed candidacy two years later and his well-known am-
bitions for the senatorship, it is only probable that he had
hopes of succeeding to the vacancy. The opposition on
ground of locality seemed auspicious for him. The schemes
for Howard's promotion generally originated in the office
of the influential Lansing State Republican, and a resident
of Jackson would have reason to consider himself far
enough removed from Detroit to satisfy the requirements
of eligibility from the central west.
* Mr. J. M. Cravath informed Howard of the friendly offices of
Ex-Governor Blair, who "would not permit his friends to do any-
thing for him, but threw his influence actively in his (Howard's) favor.
CHAPTER IV
Forward Movement of the Democracy in Michigan
ratification and interpretation of the fifteenth
amendment
The years 1869 and 1870 saw the ratification of the
Fifteenth Amendment and the culmination of the suffrage
agitation in Michigan by amendment of the state consti-
tution. The railroad question which had received some
previous attention — entirely non-partisan — became the
strongest of local issues and affected the development of
the conflict two years hence. Fiscal questions were promi-
nent and received the consideration of both parties, but this
was not yet the period of their greatest importance. A
reform movement, though not strong, arose this year in
connection with a Representative in Congress, and was to
attain greater prominence within the next two years. This
was obviously a period of the passing of former issues and
the introduction of new.
The political field in the early part of 1869 was occupied
by the suffrage discussion and the struggle over the ratifi-
cation of the federal amendment. The Democrats opposed
the consideration of the amendment by the legislature, and
seized upon a point of order which they hoped would
strengthen their plea of inexpediency and unconstitutional-
ity. The state constitution provided that no new bill
should be introduced into the legislature after the first
fifty days of the session had expired, and as this period
105] 105
Io6 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [io6
had elapsed, it was urged that the ratification, if given,
would be void/ It was said too, that the existing legislature
could not properly take action upon this question ; for that
body had not been elected with reference to it, and was
not therefore capable of expressing the will of the people,
who had one year before rejected a constitution involving
the same issue. These considerations were merely second-
ary to the fear of consolidation of power in the general
government, and its encroachment upon the rights of the
states in reference to suffrage. The House ratified by a
vote of 68 to 24, four Republicans and as many Democrats
being absent. The resolution was immediately sent to the
Senate, where it was adopted without debate by a vote of
25 to 5, only two Republicans being absent.^ The fact of
ratification made it desirable — though not constitutionally
necessary — for the state to grant negro suffrage in con-
formity to the federal precedent. Accordingly, an amend-
ment to strike out the word " white " from the suffrage
clause was passed by the legislature, to be submitted to the
people for ratification at the fall election of the next year.^
In April of this year, 1869, occurred the election of
' Sec. 28, Art. IV. This objection was easily disposed of by the
Speaker when he construed the fifty-day limit to apply only to bills
and such resolutions as require the signature of the Governor in
order to become laws. This joint resolution of ratification, he in-
sisted, did not come within the classes enumerated by the constitution
and could therefore be introduced. To justify this ruling, however,
strict construction must be resorted to. Sec. 14, Art. XIV, did not
provide for the submission of joint resolutions to the governor, and
as the measure in question belonged to this class, the limit of time
during which it might be introduced did not apply. This is based upon
the understanding that the aim of Sec. 28, Art. IV, was to give the
governor sufficient time for consideration and signature.
* Acts, 1869, vol. i, p. 391, Joint Res., no. 9; Globe, Mar. 26, 1869,
p. 289.
^ Acts, 1869; Mich. Man., 1869, pp. 298-303.
I07] FORWARD MOVEMENT OF THE DEMOCRACY 107
Justice of the State Supreme Court and of Regents of the
University. This was not, however, indicative of the rela-
tive party status in Michigan for several reasons. At these
elections of the odd years, when the party antecedents of
the candidates are less important than their personality,
and party gains are comparatively of little consequence,
there is the maximum degree of abstention. Out of a
voting population of probably 250,000, the votes cast for
Justice of the Supreme Court at this election did not ex-
ceed 150,591.^ Furthermore, the personal element is for-
tunately of far greater weight than in other elections, and
the fact that the Republican candidates received on an aver-
age three-fifths of the entire vote cannot be said, in itself,
to indicate any precise party tendency.
In the spring election of 1870 there were several novel
features with regard to the electorate. Negroes exer-
cised the right of suffrage throughout the state. Their
right to do so was questioned, but it was defended by the
Republicans on the ground that after the ratification of
the Fifteenth Amendment, it was unnecessary to wait for
the adoption of the state amendment. Colored citizens
were generally registered on Saturday, April 2nd, of this
year, and regularly voted on the next Monday.^ The last
two amendments to the federal constitution were also
claimed by a certain faction to enfranchise women. A
strong movement for woman suffrage had been in prog-
ress for some time. It was not strange, then, that some
advantage was taken of the extremely confused condition
* The Mich. Man. of 1875 gives a voting population of 268,736 for
1870, and 250,000 is certainly not an overestimate for that of 1869.
Thomas M. Cooley received 90,705, and O. Darwin Hughes, 59,886.
McPherson, 1869, p. 506; Mich. Man., 1871. In the district judicial
elections, six out of sixteen judges chosen were Democrats.
' In Ann Arbor there were 64, in Battle Creek, 200, and Ypsilanti,
52. Jackson Cit., Apr. 4; Argus, Apr. 8.
Io8 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [io8
of suffrage ideas; for it was evident that the precise effect
of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments was not
clear in the minds of many. Two instances of women
voting were reported at the time,^ and it was expected by
many that by the next election they would be positively en-
franchised.
THE RAILROAD AID ISSUE
In the regular campaign of 1870, railroad aid was the
strongest state issue, yet it constituted only a part of the
general movement of the period. It grew out of legisla-
tion passed at the regular session of 1869. The General
Railroad Aid Law, passed early in the session, authorized
towns and cities, and in some cases counties, to loan their
credit to railroad corporations and to levy taxes to aid them
either by donation or subscription to stock, first submitting
the question of proposed aid to a vote of the people.^
Under this act a very large amount of aid was voted to
projected roads by various municipalities, of which a large
portion was represented by bonds in deposit in the office
of the State Treasurer awaiting the performance of pre-
cedent conditions specified in the notes. In May of 1870,
the matter was brought before the Supreme Court of the
State for adjudication, and the decision was rendered,
three of the four justices agreeing, that all this aid was
unconstitutional and void on the fundamental principle
that taxation, to be valid, must be levied for a public pur-
pose. To tax a community for the benefit of a private
corporation which proposed to construct a railroad, was
not a power of the legislature. The public might be
* Mrs. N. B. Gardner of the 19th ward, Detroit, and one Mary-
Wilson in Battle Creek. Adv. and Tribune, Apr. 6; Argus, Apr. 7.
* Acts, 1869, vol. i, pp. 89-95, no. 45; Mich. Aim., 1870, pp. 58-60;
Ann. Cyc, p. 500.
I09] FORWARD MOVEMENT OF THE DEMOCRACY 109
incidentally benefited, but " incidental benefits to spring
from private undertakings — and these enterprises were
considered such — could not be urged as giving them the
character of a public object to which unwilling parties
could be compelled to contribute." ^
This decision destroyed over $7,000,000 worth of aid,
and bonds to the amount of over $1,200,000 had already
passed into the hands of bona-fide holders. There were
various opinions as to the advisability of calling an extra
session to meet the emergency, and '* to reconstruct the
Supreme Court." Inasmuch as the comment immediately
after the rendering of this decision was non-partisan in
character, and approval and dissent both came from each
party, the railroad problem cannot yet be considered a real
issue. ^ It was a question, however, which could easily
1 The people ex rel. the Detroit and Howell Railroad Co. vs. The
Township Board of Salem, 20 Mich., pp. 452-522. By legislation of
1864, the towns on the line of a railroad projected between Detroit
and Howell were authorized to raise money by tax or loan to aid in
its construction. The electors of the township of Salem, Washtenaw
County, voted such aid, but the township board refused to issue the
bonds. Suit was brought by the people against the board, and a
mandamus applied for in the interests of the company. Justices
Campbell, Cooley and Christiancy supported the decision, Justice
Graves dissented. Mich. Aim., 1871, p. 75- Ann. Cyc, 500; Argus,
June 3, 1870. Hemans, op. cit., pp. 222-3.
^ The Jackson Citizen, Republican, May 3, 1870, favored an extra
session, and the " reconstruction of the Supreme Court." The Ypsilanti
Sentinel, extremely Democrat, and the Kalamazoo Republican charged
Justice Cooley with implication in a scheme to injure the Air Line, one
of the roads to receive benefits. These accusations were not proven,
and they never had any weight. The Free Press, Dem., and the radi-
cal Post both endorsed the decision but favored the extra session.
The Monroe Monitor, Dem., the Grand Rapids Democrat, and the
Grand Rapids Eagle, Rep., all commended the decision and declared
against an extra session. The Hillsdale Standard, Rep., regretted the
decision, and also the Marshall Expounder, Dem., which objected how-
ever to legislative action on the grounds that less confidence was to
I lo THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [no
become a vital issue as soon as sentiment crystallized and
partisan opinion took opposite sides. The sentiment in
favor of immediate legislative action prevailed, and on
June 8th Governor Baldwin called an extra session to meet
the 27th of the next month. The result was the passage of
a resolution submitting to the people a constitutional
amendment with three sections to be voted upon at the gen-
eral election, November 8th. ^ The first section authorized
the legislature to regulate passenger and freight charges
on railroads, and prohibited discrimination. The second
prohibited the consolidation of parallel or competing lines,
while the third permitted the people of the various munici-
palities to vote the payment of their indebtedness should
they so desire, but in no case was the state to become
liable for any portion of such bonds. The first two sections
w^ere thus restrictive in character, while the tendency of
the third was favorable to railroads. Such, then, was the
state of the problem when the conventions met in the fall
of the year.
THE CAMPAIGN OF 187O
The Democrats held their convention before the Repub-
licans. This was very unusual as it had been customary to
be reposed in the legislature than in the Supreme Court. Prominent
lawyers throughout the state took sides in the case and freely declared
their opinions for and against it. This summary of the press views
was gathered from editorial comments during May and the first two
weeks in June.
^ Acts, Extra session of 1870, pp. 13-15, Joint Res., no. i, approved
Aug. 10; Mich. Aim., 1870, p. 26; 1871, p. 75; World Aim., 1871, pp.
69, 70; Adv. and Trib., and Free Press, Aug. 11; Argus, Aug. 12. The
resolution was agreed to in the House by a vote of 67 to 28, and
passed the Senate 23 to 4. The division was on party lines and it was
evident that the Democrats were united against the measure, while
the Republicans refused to express themselves. This proposed amend-
ment, if adopted, was to become " Art. XIX, A, of Railroads."
Ill] FORWARD MOVEMENT OF THE DEMOCRACY 1 1 1
allow the majority party to nominate their candidates and
announce their issues first. The Democracy met in Detroit,
Wednesday, August 31st, and arraigned the Radicals for
" misuse of power." Their platform dealt mainly with
fiscal issues. It declared the protective tariff " a sys-
tem of plunder whereby labor is compelled to pay tribute to
capital," and " tariff for revenue only, all that is warranted
by justice and the federal constitution." The system of
national banks was denounced as " a monopoly which bene-
fitted certain persons " and which required modification to
make its privilege free to all. The platform demanded that
public debt should be paid " strictly in accordance with its
terms," and while it conceded that " specie or its equiva-
lent is the only sound money," it favored a return to specie
payments " no sooner than can be done consistently with
laws of trade and interests of the great debtor class."
The principal state issue was, however, the railroad ques-
tion. Almost three months had passed since the rendering
of the decision in the Salem case. Comment, friendly and
hostile, had at first been non-partisan. Within this inter-
vening period, however, the court's definition of taxation
had become widely known and discussed, and it was gen-
erally inferred that the benefits accruing to a railroad cor-
poration were essentially of a private nature. Further-
more, the fact that the Republicans had formed the con-
trolling majority in the legislature which passed the Rail-
road-Aid Law early in 1869, gave the Democrats sufficient
grounds for strongly opposing the entire policy of aid to
railroad corporations. They defended the court's position
in the Salem case, and declared that " taxation of citizens
for private purposes without their consent was a violation
of the fundamental principles of justice." The ticket,
headed by Charles C. Comstock for Governor, was an un-
usually strong one which was liable to call out a generous
1 12 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [112
following, and which the Republicans could not attack on
personal grounds/
The Republican state convention also met in Detroit on
the following day, September ist, nominated Henry P.
Baldwin for Governor to head the state ticket, and made
some changes in the organization of the state central com-
mittee. Since the organization of the party, the chairman
of the committee had resided in Detroit, which therefore
became the political centre of the party. Lansing was
henceforth to become the centre, and Detroit was given
but one member in the state central committee. An ob-
vious result of having a Lansing chairmanship occupied by
S. D. Bingham, editor of the Lansing State Republican,
and leader of the movement for central western supremacy,
was thus a decline in the power of the Detroit faction.
Another change which was favored by a large number was
the reduction and concentration of the membership of the
committee. " A few good men should be chosen from
localities which are not so widely separated that a quorum
is almost impossible," declared an important organ; the
committee was not a representative body as intended, for
there were members who lived eight hundred miles apart
and found it impossible to attend the conferences.
The convention framed resolutions which included the
usual amount of recrimination against the Democracy and
congratulated the national administration upon the reduc-
tion of the national debt. It also rejoiced that the state
administration had reduced the state bonded indebtedness
by $1,500,000, notwithstanding a decrease in the taxes of
$485,000 since 1867.^
1 Argus, Sept. 2, 1870.
2 The Republicans were supported in their declarations concerning
state finances by the statistics of the period. It was true that the
bonded indebtedness had fallen from $3,979,921.25 in Nov. 30, 1866,
113] P^R^'^RD MOVEMENT OF THE DEMOCRACY 113
The tariff resolution was so ambiguous that there was
good reason to credit the statement of the Advertiser and
Tribune that it was made so purposely. " The policy of
revenue is part of the history of the government," it de-
clared, " and has received the sanction in some form of
every party." It further observed that " as the war has
made larger revenues necessary, they should be so adjusted
as to be least prejudicial to the individual producing inter-
ests of every class and section, securing the home producer
a fair competition against foreign producers." This reso-
lution was certainly non-committal and there was a potent
reason for its vague character. The Democrats repeatedly
asserted — and the Republicans never successfully dis-
proved the statement — that a considerable proportion of
the Republican party of the state was made up of Demo-
crats who had bolted on the slavery-extension issue alone.
The seceders insisted, however, that it was rather the party
that had forsaken them, and they distinctly declared their
agreement with the Democrats on all other subjects, es-
pecially free trade. ^ It was estimated by Democratic
organs that there were no less than 3,000 of this element,
and their number was at least great enough to impress upon
to $2,385,028.49 in 1870, while direct taxes were reduced from $880,-
739.30 in 1867 to $395,264.97 in 1870. In the former year the rate of
assessment was 2.859 mills on the dollar, in 1870, 1.283 mills. Ad-
dress of Rep. State Central Committee, signed by S. D. Bingham;
Mich. Aim., 1871, pp. 62-63; Mich. Man., 1873, pp. 336, 35o, 35i ; 1875,
p. 316; Adv. and Trib., Sept. 2, 3.
1 There were proofs of the existence of this faction within the
Republican party, but it was not generally influential at this time.
Argus, Mar. 25, Sept. 23. The "Appeal by Free Trade Republicans,"
a card in the Free Press, Nov. 2, signed by N. B. Eldridge, declared
that "the old party lines are breaking up" and that "only two party
issues exist at the present, — ^removal of all political disabilities from
the southern states, and free trade." The Adv. and Trib., July i, de-
clared against protective tariff and the general policy of Chandler.
1 1 4 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [114
the Republican convention the necessity for a neutral reso-
lution.
The Republican party was not a unit upon another issue
— that of aid to railroad corporations. The division was
most evident in the choice of Congressional candidates, and
the greatest interest was centered in the third and sixth
districts. The Republicans were awake to the growing
disfavor towards corporations and the fear of monopolies,
and there were evidences of hostility towards Austin Blair
on the ground that he had warmly supported in the House
measures friendly to these interests. Before the nominat-
ing convention of the Third Congressional District in
Jackson, he defended the action of Congress and of himself
on the public land grant bills, and declared that the policy
had been begun by the Democrats in 1857. The Demo-
crats claimed to see in various comments of the Republican
press a personal warning to Blair against the support of
such measures. It was true that both parties had declared
against the land-grant policy to railroads, and the Post in-
sisted that " the platforms express the will of the people of
the West, and they mean exactly what they say." ^ Austin
Blair described his own attitude in the matter in his
speeches before the state Republican convention, and the
Congressional convention of the third district.
I do not expect to vote for many, if for any, measures for
land grants to railroads. Certainly an indiscriminate granting
of public lands for railroad purposes will not get my support.
As a rule I design to oppose them, but there are cases in which
they are required by sound policy. They ought to be of na-
tional and not merely local importance to secure Congres-
sional aid.*
> Post, Sept. 13.
' Speech of Aug. 30, reported in Jackson Daily Cit., Sept. 5, 1870;
favorable comment in the Adv. and Trib., Sept. i.
115] FORWARD MOVEMENT OF THE DEMOCRACY 1 1 r
There was some uncertainty as to the advisability of
naming him for re-election to the lower house of Con-
gress, but the opposition did not prevail against his re-
nomination. Some of his friends feared that it might
prejudice his chances for the Senatorship, while others
urged that no risk should be taken of his missing both
House and Senate. In this way the Congressional election
in the third district was connected with the approaching
Senatorial campaign, and preferences were already being
discussed and plans laid. With reference merely to Blair's
return to the lower house, a large number of important
journals in the lower portion of the state supported him.*
It is probable that the political feud between Mr. Blair and
William A. Howard was responsible for much of the agi-
tation against the former.
This hostility was due to Senatorial rivalry which was
to make opponents of the two Howards at the same time.
It had been usual in the past for William A. Howard to
support Senator Jacob M. Howard, but the former had
ambitions of his own which occasioned mutual unfriendli-
ness. The two Howards were not related, but both had
emigrated from Vermont while young, and become promi-
nent politicians and office-holders in the same party. Both
had been residents of Detroit until shortly before this time
when William A. Howard removed to Grand Rapids. The
organs favorable to Blair openly insinuated that this step
had been taken with the sole motive of becoming an eligible
for the Senatorship, as it was generally expected that the
central and western portion of the state would demand the
^ Among these were the Jackson Cit., Battle Creek Journal, Cold-
water Rep., Saginaw Daily Enterprise, Marshall Statesman and
Ypsilanti Commercial, all of which contained much editorial comment
during August and September. " It would be a great mistake if
Blair should be sacrificed to local prejudices and corrupt combina-
tions outside of his district," Ypsilanti Com., Aug. 20, 1870.
1 1 6 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [ 1 1 6
choice in 1871. As Thomas W. Ferry was a resident of
Grand Haven, his location was good, but his qualifications
were considered unsatisfactory by a considerable number
who looked upon him as a weak candidate. Next to the
Senator himself, then, Austin Blair was considered the
most probable candidate, and it was naturally the desire
of the third aspirant, William A. Howard, to put a danger-
ous rival at a serious disadvantage. None of the charges
of implication in land frauds was proven against Blair and
his position was not seriously impaired by the alleged fav-
oritism toward corporations.
In 1870 Blair appeared a perfectly orthodox Republican,
supporting the suffrage, protective tariff and railway
policies of the party. In his speeches of August and Sep-
tember he enthusiastically indorsed President Grant and
declared '' a universal prosperity testifies to his ability and
fidelity." " Let the people sustain him," he urged, " and
they will not be disappointed. No charge has been brought
against him that deserves an answer. ... In the approach-
ing elections we must look for some changes, but I do not
anticipate any serious defections from the party of the ad-
ministration." ^
Disaffection in the sixth district was more troublesome
than that in the third. The basis of the situation in the
sixth was the alleged corruption of the candidate. In the
face of serious charges, the incumbent, John A. Driggs,
won the renomination, and the Democrats saw an excellent
opportunity for gain. The Saginaw Valley district had
always shown considerable Democratic sympathy, and a
wise nomination they saw could possibly give Michigan
one Democratic Congressman. A convention of Repub-
licans at St. John's openly repudiated their candidate,
' Jackson Cit., Sept. 5.
117] FORWARD MOVEMENT OF THE DEMOCRACY uy
against whom they brought three distinct charges/ and
declared in favor of Judge Jabez G. Sutherland, the Demo-
cratic candidate. The Saginaw Valley News, a Repub-
lican organ, opposed Driggs and threw its influence for
Sutherland, supported by a number of prominent Repub-
licans of the vicinity.^ The repudiation of a candidate by
a faction of the Republican party and the strength of the
Democrats certainly gave the party in power grave cause
for apprehension.
In this campaign, the competition for the German vote
was unusually active, and its relation to the Prohibition
movement made the matter somewhat complicated. The
Republicans in their convention declared their sympathy
for the Germans in the struggle against the French Em-
peror, and while this seemed entirely irrelevant in a party
platform, it had an underlying purpose. The ostensible
cause for this declaration was the friendly attitude of the
Germans during the Rebellion, in comparison with the
policy of the French, but the resolution was addressed to
the 64,000 German voters of the state. The Democrats, on
their side, placed a German upon their state ticket, and
^ He was accused of appointing a non-resident of his district to
West Point, for a valuable consideration, of receiving $5000 for his
services in procuring for private parties the passage of the bill frau-
dulently disposing of an Indian Reservation, and finally of offering
by his agents sums of money to several delegates as bribes to induce
them to vote for his nomination. The Clinton County Republican
and the Saginaw Republican both preferred a reform candidate, but
refused to repudiate Driggs after his nomination. Argus, Sept. 16.
John F. Driggs was a member of the 39th and 40th Congresses, and
Randolph Strickland succeeded him to the 41st. The latter did not
appear as a candidate for re-election and it was remarked that it was
a rare instance of a Congressman being dropped by the Republican
party after one term. Strickland led the opposition against Driggs,
and it was widely believed this activity was responsible for the un-
popularity of the former. Adv. and Trib., Sept. 16, 1870.
' Letter from Bay City to the Free Press, Sept. 10.
1 1 8 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [ 1 1 g
further strove to win whatever German following they
could by declaring formally against Prohibition/ The
Prohibition or Temperance party — for the terms were as
yet politicially synonymous — made nominations for gov-
ernor and for Congress, the latter in the first five districts.
Though it was not strong, it caused considerable appre-
hension on the part of the two regular organizations, and
they both lost some members to it. They could not, how-
ever, favor Prohibition or tacitly approve it without alien-
ating the German vote. Both believed the Temperance
movement merely the temporary outcome of the somewhat
disordered state of politics, and preferred to allow it to
go its own way, rather than endanger themselves and lose
the reliable German vote, by making concessions.
The election of 1870 was not so important for the tickets
put forward as for the policies involved. In 1868, the
revised constitution had been rejected, and it was obvious
in 1870 that the Republicans sought to effect by amend-
ment of the state constitution what they had failed to ac-
complish by revision two years before. In addition to the
suffrage and railroad amendments there were two other
issues which came before the people through proposed
amendments to the constitution — internal improvements
and salaries. The enthusiasm for internal improvement
occasioned the demand for increased powers of supervisors
over repair and improvement of public buildings, highways
and bridges. Accordingly an amendment was submitted
to the people by the legislature allowing $2,000 to be bor-
rowed or raised by tax in each township for those pur-
poses.^ In the second place the salaries question had been
a cause of sharp partisan recrimination since the constitu-
^ Compilation of Census Statistics for Mich., 1870, p. xlvi, table 13,
German born population, 64,143. Jackson Cit., Oct. 4; Argus, Oct. 21.
' Mich. Aim., 1871, pp. 69, 70. World Aim., 1871, pp. 82, 83.
lig] FORWARD MOVEMENT OF THE DEMOCRACY ng
tion of 1867 w^s proposed. In the session of 1869 the
legislature adopted a resolution recommending an amend-
ment increasing the salaries of state officials, which was
submitted at the same time with those on the other three
subjects/
THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTION
The election of 1870 marked the beginning of the Re-
form movement which attained a tremendous importance
four years later. Henry P. Baldwin was re-elected Gov-
ernor by a plurality of 16,785, and received 53.8 per cent
of the vote. The other members on the ticket received sim-
ilar votes, never exceeding 19,000. The Temperance can-
didate for governor received comparatively little support,
with less than 2 per cent of the vote.^ A comparison of
the gubernatorial vote for the last three elections discloses
a real decline of Republican strength since 1866. The vote
fell from 58.8 per cent to 56.8 per cent two years later, and
finally to 53.8 per cent in 1870. The character of the state
legislature remained practically unchanged, and the oppo-
sition was still limited to one-fifth of the membership.
The gains of the opposition were more apparent in the
triumph of Sutherland over Driggs in the sixth district
by a majority as large as that which most of the Republican
candidates on the state ticket had received.^ The fact that
* Salary of Governor from $1000 to $2500, Justices of the Circuit
Courts, $1500 to $2000, State Treasurer, Auditor Gen., Superintendent
of Public Instruction, $1000 to $2000, Sec. of State, Attorney Gen.,
Commissioner of state land offices, $800 to $2000. Mich. Man., 1869,
pp. 302-3.
^ Mich. Man., 1871, p. 82; Mich. Aim., 1871, pp. 129, 130; Ann. Cyc,
1868, pp. 492-9, 1870, p. 500; Trih. Aim., 1871, pp. 62, 63. Baldwin re-
ceived 100,176, Comstock 83,391, and Henry Fish, the Temperance
candidate, 2,710.
* Mich. Aim., p. 83; Mich. Man., p. 232; Saginaw Enterprise, Sept.
27, 1870; Argus, Sept. 30, Nov. 11. The vote stood 16,618 for Suther-
land, 14,879 for Driggs.
120 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [120
two years before the Republicans were sustained by a
majority of over 3,000 in that district indicates that they
had suffered a loss of almost 5,000. The other five districts
elected Republicans to Congress with smaller majorities.
In the third, Austin Blair won by a vote of 15,236 to
13,768, a smaller plurality than that of either of his two
preceding elections. He barely won in Jackson, his home
county, with a vote of 3,365 to 3,353, when his majority in
1868 had been 250. To this extent had the opposition
against him been effective. The Democrats were naturally
strong in the first district with the city of Detroit, and
here the Republican candidate won by a plurality of 901.
The closest vote was cast in the fifth, where Omar D.
Conger was successful by the margin of 189.^
The vote on the amendments was examined perhaps
more eagerly than that on the candidates. The suffrage
amendment was ratified by a closer vote than was polled
on any of the other articles — 54,105 against 50,098. The
salary amendment was rejected by a vote of 68,912 to
36,109 which often crossed party lines, as many Repub-
licans evidently supported the negative.^ The amendment
increasing the powers of supervisors failed of ratification
by a smaller majority. In regard to the railroad question,
the first two sections, which were distinctly restrictive in
their nature, were adopted, while the last one, validating
previous aid, was rejected by almost the reverse vote.^
The majority opinion on the railroad question was thus
* Post, Nov. 9, 10.
' Thirty-six out of sixty- four counties rejected the salary amendment.
* Mich. Aim., 1870, p. 58; 1871, pp. 75, 82, 83; Mich. Man., 1871 ;
Adv. and Trib., Nov. 9.
Section i Yes 78,602 No 51,397.
" 76,912 " 51,194.
" 50,078 " 78,453-
I2i] FORWARD MOVEMENT OF THE DEMOCRACY 121
clearly indicated — legislative restriction, and absolute re-
pudiation of all promised aid. The natural result was
great discouragement to many incipient schemes of rail-
road building, and there was reason to believe that this was
what many counties desired/ The railway and salary
amendments received warmest support in the north, and
the strongest opposition with reference to the former was
found in Washington, Wayne, Berrien and Cass counties.
The railroad issue thus received a rebuff in the very locali-
ties which were most directly concerned. A change had
come in the popular mind which contrasted strangely with
the enthusiasm which prevailed less than a year before.
Just what occasioned this change of attitude is not clear,
but there is a probability that the decision of the Supreme
Court presented the matter in a light which appealed at
once to the people. The vote of the legislature upon the
proposed amendment at the extra session disclosed a party
division, and the state of popular opinion manifested by
personal comment pointed in the same direction. It was
in all probability the abstract principle of taxation of the
public for private gains, as set forth clearly in the decision,
which crystalized sentiment and caused the revulsion
against the Republican administration. The lines were
well laid for the next campaign, when the element of re-
form would be introduced into the present issue by the
opposition.
It would be interesting to ascertain the relation of the
vote on the suffrage amendment to the proportion of negro
population in each county. This is practically impossible,
however, as the southern counties where the largest percent
1 Among the lines injured were the Grand Rapids and Indiana;
Detroit, Hillsdale and Indiana; Michigan Air Line from Jackson to
Niles; Fort Wayne, Jackson and Saginaw; Kalamazoo and South
Haven; Chicago and Michigan Lake Shore.
122 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [122
of negro population naturally existed, were strongest in
Democratic tendencies. Of the ten counties having one
per cent or over of color, six voted in favor of suffrage/
Oakland, Washtenaw and Wayne voted for suffrage by
large majorities, and Van Buren, Kalamazoo and Calhoun
with stronger opposition. Bay, Saginaw, Genesee, Ingham,
Macomb, and St. Joseph possessed not more than one-third
of one per cent of negro population and they ratified the
amendment.^ It thus seems improbable that the presence
of negroes influenced the vote in any important degree, as
there was only one per cent of color in the state as a whole,
and Cass County, with its exceptional eight per cent,
showed a close vote on the suffrage question. Democratic
affiliations were much stronger in determining the results
than presence of color, since the twelve counties which re-
jected suffrage lay to the south and southeast, and had
consistently shown Democratic preferences.
As a final generalization, it may be noted that eleven
counties went Democratic, of which four were northern,
and seven were south and southeastern.^ The counties of
the four lower tiers gave rather large votes to the Temper-
ance ticket, the highest point reached being approximately
five per cent of the vote for Governor. The unexpected had
occurred in favor of the Democrats in the Sixth Congres-
sional District, and in favor of the Republicans in some
of the southern counties, where negro suffrage was sus-
tained, contrary to party antecedents or the vote on the
1 Allegan, Jackson, Oakland, each 1%; Berrien 1.4%; Calhoun 1.5%;
Kalamazoo 1.6%; Van Buren 1.8%; Wayne 2.2%; Washtenaw 2.6%;
Cass 8%.
^ Mich. Aim., 1871, p. 81; Census of 1870; Total population in 1870,
1,184,059, Colored 11,849, Whites 1,167,282.
• Marquette, Keweenaw, Emmet and Ontonagon ; Jackson, Livings-
ton, Macomb, Monroe, Oakland, Washtenaw, Wayne. Mich. Aim.,
pp. 69-72, 82, 83.
123] FORWARD MOVEMENT OF THE DEMOCRACY 122
party ticket. Wayne County, the centre of the Democracy
of the state, naturally elected the entire Democratic ticket
but at the same time it gave a strong majority in favor of
negro suffrage. Jackson went almost entirely Democratic
on the local ticket and voted with the Republicans on the
suffrage issue. These apparently contradictory facts can
be accounted for on two grounds. In the first place, it
was true that in several counties the few affirmative votes
were all that were cast. For instance, the suffrage and
salary amendments commanded the vote of only 56 per
cent of those who voted for governor and the railroad
amendment received only 69 per cent. Probably the more
immediate reason for these results was the crossing of
party lines on the suffrage issue. This was a natural out-
come of the general belief that the Fifteenth Amendment
had already enfranchised the negro within the state, not-
withstanding Sec. I, of Art. VII, of the state constitution.
The state amendment was a mere formality which might
best be willingly complied with so that the controversy
could be settled in a consistent manner.^
THE SENATORIAL ELECTION
As we* have seen, a strong opposition to the re-election
of Senator Jacob M. Howard developed early in 1869, and
several names were mentioned as possibilities for the suc-
cession. Among them were Austin Blair, Thomas W.
Ferry, two members of Congress, and William A. Howard.
The last named received an appointment to China — much
to his regret — and he declined in order to be able to help
turn the tide against Jacob M. Howard. By the autumn
* The following papers for the several weeks following election con-
tain the most important material for this summary; Post, Adv. and
Trib., Argus, Jackson Cit., Lansing State Rep., Niles Rep., Kal.
Gazette, Grand Rapids Daily Eagle.
124 ^^^ POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [124
of 1870, the lines of opposition were more clearly drawn.
There was a declared need for a change in the office; the
locality feeling demanded satisfaction, and furthermore,
Howard was charged with supporting the land-grant
policy. It was a strange incident for Republicans, even of
the conservative class, to assail their Senator for his sup-
port of the policy which they had fostered and defended
from 1865 to 1869. It is probable that much of the oppo-
sition to Howard came from the same source as that to
Blair, and with the same motives. It was also plainly
stated that he was a " much less useful Senator in attend-
ing to the wants and requests of his constituency than
Chandler." " So far as any results of his public services
have been reflected upon our state, Mr. Howard might as
well have hailed from California." This was the opinion
of a strong faction in the south and west-central portion
of the state. In Detroit the verdict was different though
not contradictory. " In his ability to grapple with large
public questions and in his range of information. Senator
Howard has well sustained himself, and conferred honor
upon the state." It was only a matter of considering his
local or his federal activity of the greater importance.
Blair had been an active Radical in the House, but his
chances were injured by the " Fish letter " of February 28,
1869. This was written by Austin Blair himself from
Washington, D. C, to George W. Fish of Flint, collector
of internal revenue of the sixth district. It was ob-
viously confidential and the recipient inadvertently left it
in his desk where it was found by his successor. The
letter gained publicity, partly through the activity of Mr.
Strickland, who was at that time also hostile towards the
dominant Republican faction, and believed that its publicity
would aid Blair and injure Howard. In this letter, written
shortly after the senatorial election of 1869, Blair ex-
125] FORWARD MOVEMENT OF THE DEMOCRACY 125
pressed himself in part as follows : " There was nothing in
the senatorial contest to give one great confidence in politi-
cal affairs. It furnished more evidence of the inconstancy
of politicians and of how little timber it really takes to
make a great man of." In speaking of Howard, he de-
clared him to be " the right bower of all the corrupt rings
here." Of Ferry, he unfortunately added, " there is not
enough of him to make a man apprehensive," a phrase
which, in the light of the outcome of the approaching con-
test, was somewhat amusing. The entire group of Repub-
lican possibilities Blair termed "a lot of corrupt scoundrels"
who " will keep no agreements except such as put money
into their pockets." "You say, what are we coming to?
This is a question I have revolved a good deal in my own
mind, and cannot find a very satisfactory answer, but I
think there is but one remedy, and that is defeat. When-
ever the people learn the truth, they will apply the whole-
some corrective." With reference to the appointment of
office-seekers, Blair closed by saying : " It is a comfort
that the rascals will have to disappoint a good many any-
way." ^
Nothing could express more clearly than this letter
Blair's bitter disappointment at his repeated failures to
realize his own ambition. Probably some of his closest
friends believed in 1869 that he would permanently give
up the struggle for the Senate, but the contest of 1871 was
certainly uppermost in his mind. At first he was appar-
ently friendly with Howard, but the publication of this
letter at once made them avowed enemies. Blair refused
to retract a single word and declared " he would make
no apology for writing the letter, he would ask no mercy,
and would not even admit it to be an imprudence." In
* Argus, Jan. 13, 1871.
126 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [126
reply to this unfavorable characterization, Howard pub-
lished a letter in which he declared the accusation '' totally
and unqualifiedly false," and termed the author, among
other epithets, '' a deliberate slanderer — unworthy of the
association and respect of gentlemen." ^
This estrangement of two of the foremost leaders of the
Republican party and the reciprocal accusations that natur-
ally resulted were probably of great importance in decid-
ing the result unfavorably to both. There was apparently
no great amount of truth in either charge of corruption,
as both Blair and Howard were considered honest, and still
are held in that reputation. Blair was supported by an
immense number of influential journals throughout the
state — no less than forty — and was considered favorably
by the western faction. There was also a visible division
in the allegiance of the Michigan delegation in Congress
upon the question of candidacy. A Democratic observer
stated that Blair's best and only friend there was Driggs
of the sixth district, who was deserted, he said, by all
Republicans save Blair. ^ Beaman had his own candidacy
in view, Ferry decidedly objected to William A. Howard
of his own district, Stoughton and Strickland favored the
selection of Jacob M. Howard, and Chandler very definitely
preferred him or any man who could defeat Blair. It was
said that Chandler advised his friends, '' in case the con-
test is a close one, throw over all four candidates and bring
out Judge Withey." The prospects appeared to Washing-
ton observers favorable to Jacob Howard, and he was cer-
tain of his re-election.
The personal hostility of the leaders was a dangerous
» Adv. and Trib., Feb. i, 1871 ; Argus, Feb. 3.
• Washington correspondent of the Free Press, Dec. 27, 1870. The
list of journals favorable "to Blair is given, with excerpts, in the
Jackson at., Dec. 13, 1870.
127] PORWARD MOVEMENT OF THE DEMOCRACY 127
condition for a party against whom the opposition was
visibly gaining ground. It was observed by Republican
organs within the state that if the " proscription of Repub-
licans on account of their personal preferences does not
cease, the Republicans have elected their last Senator." ^
At the Republican legislative caucus six ballots were
necessary before a majority was obtained. Ferry and
Blair both received 30 on the first ballot; on the second,
fourth and fifth Blair led, but on the sixth and final Ferry
was chosen. Neither of the Howards showed a large fol-
lowing, and Blair, who was stronger now than ever before,
again lost out by only a small margin.^ The success of
Ferry was due largely to his position on the tariff ques-
tion.* He was the guard of the Michigan lumbering inter-
ests and had exceedingly strong support in the northern
part of the state.
The Democratic caucus on the second ballot gave unani-
mous preference to H. N. Walker of the Detroit Free
Press. Two other prominent Democrats had each received
five votes in the first ballot, Benjamin G. Stout and Henry
Chamberlain.* The election was held Wednesday, Janu-
ary 1 8th. Ferry received 24 votes in the Senate, 70 in the
House, while Walker was given 5 in the Senate, and 29 in
* Adv. and Trib., Dec. 29, 1870.
2 Lansing State Rep., Jan. 4, 1871 ; Argus, Jan. 6. The following
table will show the votes of the several ballots.
123456
Ferry 30 31 37 37 4i 50
Blair 30 32 35 40 43 43
J. Howard 20 16 16 15 9 4
Wm. Howard.. 17 10 9 5 4 —
' Globe, May 24, 1870, Appx., pp. 370-3.
^Lansing State Rep., Jan. 11; Argus, Jan. 13.
128 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [128
the House. Three Republican Senators were absent, and
one Representative.^
The election was shortly followed by the death of Jacob
M. Howard, Sunday, April 2nd, and one of the radical
leaders of the old type thus disappeared from politics. The
new Senator, whose usefulness was to lie in the field of
parliamentary tactics and finance, had enjoyed ample politi-
cal training. He was a delegate-at-large to the National
Republican Convention of i860, and was one of its vice-
presidents. In 1864 he was elected Representative to the
Thirty-ninth Congress, and re-elected to the succeeding
three Congresses. It was during the last that he resigned
his seat to accept the Senatorship. He was chairman of
the Committee on Revision of Rules, and on the death of
Vice-President Wilson, he served as acting Vice-President
until March 4, 1877. Up to this time, his popularity was
due mainly to his excellent parliamentary abilities which
he repeatedly had occasion to exercise. In his purely legis-
lative activities in Congress, he confined himself entirely to
financial interests and was soon to become prominent as
one leader of the soft-money party.
Contemporary with the passing of Howard and the elec-
tion of Ferry, it happened that a new series of issues pre-
sented themselves, and the problems of constitutional re-
construction and the enfranchisement of the negro were
relegated to the background. Accordingly, the questions
immediately connected with the war gave way to the de-
mands of the Reform, the Granger, and the Greenback
movements.
* Post, Adv. and Trib., Jan. 19, 1871 ; Lansing State Rep., Jan. 20;
Argus, Jan. 20, 27.
CHAPTER V
The Campaign of 1872, and the Complete Failure of
THE Liberal Movement in Michigan
PRELIMINARY POLITICS
The attitude of the Democracy of Michigan at the be-
ginning of 187 1 was clear from the resolutions adopted in
State Convention, February 21st.
While we denounce partisanship in judicial offices — yet the
Democrats ought to elect justices sympathetic with Democratic
ideas of limitation of power. The class legislation of the Re-
publican party, by which immense private fortunes are being
consolidated in the hands of the few to the detriment of the
many, the public domain wasted, monopolies created, and sec-
tions of the country fostered at the expense of the greater
portion of the nation, deserves the reprehension of all advo-
cates of equal rights for all men.
The platform demanded the removal from citizens of all
political disabilities incurred by reason of their conduct in
the war. It declared its purpose of reforming the abuses
and corruptions introduced into the public service by the
Republican party. The employment of troops of the
United States to influence elections was denounced as in-
imical to free government.^
Two days later the Republicans convened and issued the
declaration that
as the Republican party proved a good party in time of war
— so it has proved a good party in time of peace, reconstruct-
* Free Press, Kal. Gazette, Feb. 22, 1871 ; Argus, Feb. 24.
129] 129
I30 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [130
ing rebellious states in the interest of freedom, maintaining
inviolate the public faith, establishing equality of all men
before the law, and establishing the government in such a
manner as best to promote the general good.
They indulged in praise of Grant's administration, with
special reference to the reduction of taxation and the na-
tional debt/ The result of the annual election of Justice
of the Supreme Court was the victory of the able and ex-
perienced Republican candidate, James V. Campbell, by a
plurality of 18,500. A Temperance candidate, Albert
Williams, was in the field, and received the small support
of 1719.^
In March, 1871, the attention of the legislature was
again directed to the amendment of the constitution in sev-
eral important respects. A joint resolution was passed
recommending an amendment providing for the payment
by the counties, townships and municipalities of all bonds
and other obligations heretofore issued or negotiated. The
question of payment was first to be submitted to the
electors, of whom a majority was required to sanction the
meeting of the indebtedness.^
Other amendments looked to limiting the number of
judicial circuits and to the increase of the salary of circuit
judges from $1,500 to $2,500.* There was strong agita-
* Post, Adv. and Trib., Feb. 24, 1871 ; Lansing State Rep., Mar. i.
McPherson, 1871, p. 139.
2 O. Darwin Hughes, the Democratic nominee who had run the pre-
vious election also, received 74,740. The Regents of the University
received practically the same vote. Ann. Cyc, 1871, p. 510-515; Mich.
Aim., 1872.
' Acts, 1871, p. 398, April 15, 1871; S. Jour., Mar. 23, 1871, pp. 1202-5;
H. Jour., pp. 240-3. This section was to be added as Sec. 3, Art. XIX,
A, of Railroads.
* H. Jour., Mar. 15, vol. ii, pp. 1413-4. S. Jour., pp. 1 184-5. Acts,
1871, vol. i, pp. 404-6, no. 36.
131] FAILURE OF THE LIBERAL MOVEMENT 131
tion in favor of the last, as it was felt that any good lawyer
could earn in private practice more than the salary of a
circuit judge. An increase would therefore tend to secure
better talent than was possible under the old rate of remun-
eration. The railroad amendment was practically the same
as had been rejected at the fall election of 1870, and the
chances were against it now.
Bad feeling was engendered early in 1872 by the re-
apportionment of the Congressional districts within the
state. As Michigan had now become entitled to nine Repre-
sentatives in place of six, some rearrangement was neces-
sary. The act of reapportionment was considered by the
Democrats a *' device for burying the Democratic counties
under an extra load of Republican majorities," and though
.•5uch an attitude was to be expected from a minority party,
there were evidences of truth in the assertion. The meas-
ure was opposed by six Republicans in the Senate and six-
teen in the House, with the vote standing 19 to 11 in the
former, and 50 to 40 in the latter. The opposition was
strong and its passage in the House was exceedingly close. ^
During this session of the legislature, there was an oc-
currence which clearly explains the demand this year for
morality in politics, with special reference to state admin-
istration. A petition signed by a number of residents of
Lansing was presented to the House requesting investiga-
tion of the conduct of Charles A. Edmonds, the Commis-
sioner of the State Land Office. The select committee to
which this was referred reported serious charges against
the conduct and administration of the incumbent and sev-
^ Acts, 1872, Extra Session, pp. 74-5, no. 44. The population of the
state was 1,184,638 by the census of 1870, and the district average was
131,626. By the new apportionment, they ranged from 92,843 to 163,074
Only two Democrats supported the bill as finally agreed upon by the
conference committee, one for the purpose of moving a recon-
sideration.
132 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [132
eral of his clerks. Impeachment proceedings were begun
and the managers presented eleven articles embodying
charges of corrupt administration and gross immorality.
On May 24th after a hearing of twenty-four days the
Senate failed to convict him on any of the eleven articles.
Though he was declared acquitted of all charges, it was
generally conceded that the testimony was so damaging
that he ought in all decency to resign.^ It was urged by
Edmonds' friends that the petition for investigation grew
out of the animosity of a resident of Lansing who was a
discharged deputy of the commissioner. Whatever may
have been the personal element involved, enough evidence
was taken to afford sufficient grounds for a demand of
reform.
THE LIBERAL MOVEMENT IN MICHIGAN IN 1872
The liberal movement in Michigan was led by Austin
Blair, whose abandonment of former party allegiance
brought down upon him a storm of bitter denunciation. It
is indeed strange to see an orthodox Republican leader
from i860 to 1868 become the first adherent of the liberal
movement in Michigan. There were early indications of
his dissatisfaction with the party, and rumors of a schism
were started in March, immediately upon the announcement
of his resolution in Congress calling for investigation of the
charges against Secretary Robeson. The break was in evi-
dence April 9th, when he delivered the oration at a public
ceremonial in Detroit.^ On this occasion he expressed strong
opposition to centralization of the government, and asked
that amnesty be granted to the ex-rebels.^ The motive for
1 Mich, as a State, iv, pp. 69-73; Adv. and Trib., May 25, 1872.
2 The unveiling of the monument to the soldiers and sailors of
Michigan in the Civil War.
* The Regulars denounced him as a deserter and " confidence poli-
133] FAILURE OF THE LIBERAL MOVEMENT 133
his action was promptly asserted by the "Regulars" to be the
promise of the Democratic nomination for governor, and
the Senatorial succession to Chandler. It would be difficult
to say precisely how much truth, if any, there was in this
statement. It was true that he did receive the nomination
for governor, and possibly he would have been chosen to
succeed Chandler had not the Liberals been so thoroughly
defeated in the fall elections. Possibly the desire to avenge
past defeats at the hands of his party caused him to see
more clearly its defects. Neither of these reasons, how-
ever, is necessary to account for his change of allegiance,
for he had once before changed as radically, when there
were no past disappointments to stimulate him, and no
greater opportunities open by the change.
He was unquestionably a man of strong convictions, and
his independence of thought prevented him from being a
successful politician. He was repeatedly called upon in the
course of the campaign to defend his change of allegiance,
and this he did on the grounds that party principles are of
far greater consequence than party success. The old war
questions, he urged, were succeeded by new issues, the lead-
ing one being reform, and this the Republicans were un-
willing to concede. " I am compelled to say that this
administration as a whole is simply damnable," ^ he de-
clared, and throughout the campaign he insisted that it was
tician along with Schurz, Trumbull, Greeley and the Blairs." His
oration was called a " stump speech ... in favor of exploded states
rights theories of the Democratic party ", and his plea for universal
amnesty for rebels, an " insult to fallen heroes." Post, Apr. 10.
For comment, Argus, Apr. 19, 26.
* In his speech at the Greeley-Brown ratification meeting held July
10 in Jackson, he referred at length to his earlier history and defended
his abandonment of the Whig party in 1848, as well as his recent
change. Free Press, July 11; Argus, July 12. The home paper of
Blair, the Jackson Citizen, refused to join in slandering him, but
declined to follow him out of the party.
e
134 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [134
executive misconduct and federal mal-administration that
drove him from his party.
There are some grounds, however, for the suspicion that
the ill-concealed disaffection in the Republican party which
drew along with it unpleasant accusations against Blair's
motives in Congress, was a cause of deeper significance
than was generally conceded at the time. It is a question
if some of the Republican leaders, finding dissensions im-
minent on several issues, did not seek to relieve the party
of all blame by attributing the fault to some individual
whom they could chastise before their constituents. If this
was the truth, it was but natural that Blair should be the
victim, as the men most influential in the party at that time
were not those who would be expected to call themselves his
friends. Chandler had emerged victorious from the Sen-
atorial contest with Blair the year before, and the Howards
were obviously his Senatorial rivals the coming campaign.
The Liberal movement did not from the first receive
strong support in Michigan. It was true that Austin Blair,
on his return to Washington from a visit to his constitu-
ency, declared the anti-Grant feeling in the south portion
of the state very general among Republicans. He found
the people " hostile to the reckless extravagance of the ad-
; ministration, and clamoring for a change." ^ But in his
enthusiasm he was perhaps inclined to overrate its im-
portance, for there are indications that Liberalism was met
with great hesitancy on the part of Michigan politicians.
Among the Democrats and disaffected Republicans the
declarations of the Cooper Institute Meeting of April 12th
were considered weak and non-committal.^ " Though the
* Washington Correspondent to A^. Y. World, April 16.
2 The mass meeting held in Cooper Institute, New York City,
emphasized the growing importance of the comparatively small body
135] FAILURE OF THE LIBERAL MOVEMENT 135
Speeches were pointed and direct, we cannot say as much
for the platform adopted. . . . The omissions in this creed
are more noticeable than the declarations. In short, it is
a milk and water affair, a very good specimen of how not
to do it."^
The campaign was exceedingly complicated this year, as
there were two state conventions held by each of the three
parties — an early one for the appointment of delegates to
the national convention, and a later one for the nomina-
tion of a state ticket. Besides the regular proceedings,
there were also irregular and preliminary meetings and
conferences required by the particular exigencies of the
campaign. There was an unusual delay this spring on the
part of the Liberal opposition, due undoubtedly to the fact
that it had no previous organization.
An informal meeting of local Liberal leaders was held
in Detroit ^ to consider the appointment of delegates to the
Cincinnati Convention — the national convention of the
new party, which was called for May ist. It was imprac-
ticable in the short time that remained to call a state con-
vention for the purpose, and the conference recommended
that each town, city, and county send delegates who should
there meet, organize and appoint such committees and take
such action as would be necessary to represent the state
'' All Republicans " were invited " who believe a change
should be made in the management of the government and
of prominent persons who demanded a change in the method of treat-
ment of the South. The speakers on this occasion were Trumbull
and Schurz. Rhodes, op. cit., vol. vi, pp. 413-4-
* Argus, April 19, 1872.
' The conference was held at the Biddle House on Thursday evening,
April 18. The call was issued April 22, and signed by Duncan Stewart,
Chairman, D. C. Holbrook of Detroit, T. C. Hall of Hudson, W. S.
Maynard of St. Joseph. Free Press, April 19.
136 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [136
its administration purified," and a large attendance was
urged. Names of influential Republicans inclined to this
direction were requested in order that some organization
could be effected through correspondence. Blair returned
to Michigan, and openly declared his support of the move-
ment and his intention to go to Cincinnati.^
With reference to the nomination of a presidential can-
didate, there was no declared preference among the dis-
affected Republicans in Michigan, though Charles Francis
Adams and Gratz Brown were apparently in highest favor.
Many preferred David Davis on account of his past asso-
ciations with Lincoln. They believed that his former rela-
tions with President Lincoln would insure him substantial
support of members from both parties. In the conferences
of the Michigan delegation at its head-quarters before the
convention, it appeared that Adams, Brown and Davis were
all popular. Notwithstanding this fact, the entire delega-
tion gave its support to Greeley upon his nomination in the
convention. It may be suspected, however, that some did
so with reluctance.^
When the results of the Cincinnati Convention became
known, some organs optimistically rejoiced that Greeley
had been preferred to Judge Davis, since they opposed the
entrance into politics of a Justice of the Supreme Court.*
It was generally thought more probable than ever that the
Democrats would now nominate a regular ticket. If this
was done, many believed that Greeley would withdraw
^ Rhodes, op. cit, vol. vi, p. 413.
' Letter of Apr. 29 from J. P. Thompson, Jackson Cit., May 4, 1872 ;
interview with Mr. Edward W. Barber of Jackson, editor of Jackson
Patriot.
* Free Press, May 6, 1872; Marshall Expounder, May 9; Argus,
May 10.
137] FAILURE OF THE LIBERAL MOVEMENT 137
from the canvass, and the Republican candidate would be
successful/
Austin Blair, the leader of the Michigan Liberals, seemed
on the whole, well pleased with the choice. In one of his
speeches early in the campaign, he expressed the warmest
personal friendship for Greeley and declared him his prefer-
ence as a reformer. He believed that Adams had no hold
upon the laboring people, especially of the West.^
THE DEMOCRACY AND THE LIBERALS
After the Cincinnati convention, there was naturally a
great measure of uncertainty and anxiety among the Demo-
crats as to the most advisable course f6r the State Conven-
tion to pursue, which would meet July 2nd. In reply to an
inquiry concerning the attitude of the party in lower Mich-
igan during the spring of 1872, a reliable observer showed
that there was a wide divergence in the views of three dis-
tinct classes. First were those who believed the Democracy
was a lost cause, and no further harm could be accom-
plished by supporting Greeley. Second, those who, believ-
ing that the only way of defeating Grant was the election
of Greeley, would vote for him on purely partisan grounds.
The third class actively protested against the nomination of
* Jackson Cit., May 4, which admitted that the " contingencies are
innumerable, and Mr. Greeley may develop unexpected strength."
The Kal. Tel., May 14, declared that " every man at Cincinnati had
his own grievance and labored for revenge. The Adv. and Tribune,
May 16, charged Greeley with conduct " approaching rank apostasy."
The Battle Creek Journal, May 8, Marshall Statesman, May 9, two
Independent Republican journals, regretted the selection, while the
Ypsilanti Sentinel, known as a Copperhead sheet, was too ultra-
Democratic to support Greeley.
• The Greeley-Brown ratification meeting at Jackson, July 10 : In this
speech Blair termed the Adamses "a family of office-seekers" and re-
marked that " one son of the recent candidate wants to be Governor of
Massachusetts, and another will want to be President as soon as he is
old enough." Jackson Cit., July 11.
138 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [138
Greeley at Baltimore, and declared they would not support
him for any reason. They asserted that the party was not
obliged to adopt the Liberal candidate, and they looked
with preference upon Groesbeck, Hendricks, Thurman or
Adams. It was generally believed, however, that the Cin-
cinnati ticket would be indorsed and a fusion state ticket
agreed upon by both branches of the opposition.^ A large
meeting of the " Democratic Association " convened in
Detroit May 21st, and resolved that the declaration of the
Cincinnati convention was " evidence of the progress of
public opinion ". They declared in favor of " harmonizing
the action of the Liberal Republican and Democratic parties
in the coming presidential election ", and thus gave a
strong impulse to the idea of a coalition.
The preliminary convention was held in Lansing, July
2nd. Four delegates at large and eighteen district dele-
gates were elected to represent the Michigan Democracy
in the national convention at Baltimore. The state conven-
tion endorsed the principles embodied in the Cincin-
nati platform, and directed the members to vote as a
unit.^ When the Michigan delegation to Baltimore took
a preliminary test vote on the presidential preference, the
* Elihu B. Pond of the Mich. Argus, May 31.
' The delegates-at-large were William A. Moore, of Detroit, a mem-
ber of the National Committee, E. H. Lothrop, Fidas Livermore and
Hon. J. G. Sutherland. Each was allov/ed to appoint his own sub-
stitute. The last named was the successful Democratic opponent of
J. T. Driggs in <the sixth District two years before, and was re-
cognized as a very able legalist and a man of reliable principles*
Official Proceedings of the National Dem. Convention, 1872, pp. 44,
60, 69. Free Press, July 3; Argus, July 5. McPherson, 1872, p. 163.
The same day and place a Liberal Republican meeting was held, and
among the conspicuous members were Austin Blair and J. T. Driggs.
The arrangement of simultaneous conventions at the same place fore-
shadowed the system formally adopted a little later to secure unity of
purpose and action.
139] FAILURE OF THE LIBERAL MOVEMENT 13^
entire body except Hawley and Briggs of the first dis-
trict voted for Greeley and Brown. These members fav-
ored Groesbeck and Hancock. Two others had at first
opposed the acceptance of the Cincinnati candidates, but
later changed their preference, and when the gentlemen of
the first district yielded, Michigan's vote was unanimous
for Greeley.
The adoption of the Cincinnati ticket at Baltimore was
accepted almost without adverse comments by the Demo-
crats in Michigan, who promptly took up the heavy burden
of the campaign. Of the important Democratic journals,
only the Free Press declared its hostility to Greeley and
Brown, as it always preferred Adams. It had been one of
the earliest advocates of the Cincinnati Convention, and
had at one time favored dispensing entirely with the Demo-
cratic National Convention. Now it considered the out-
come of the Liberal movement so unsatisfactory as to
justify repudiation and independent action on the part of
the Democrats. Later, however, it returned to the support
of the Liberals.*
Of the prevailing attitude of the Democratic press, the
following declarations are typical :
In accordance with our previously declared policy — we place
their name [Greeley and Brown] at the head of our column,
and invite for them the votes of the Democrats. They were
not our choice — but to withhold our vote is to lend our influ-
ence to Grant and Wilson. We regard the defeat of Grant
necessary to the best interests of the country. As between him
and Greeley — and no other choice is now left — we cannot hesi-
tate for a moment. ^
'^ Free Press, Apr. 16, July 11, 1872.
* Argus, July 12. Similar expressions are found in the following:
National Dem., Cassopolis, July 11; lackson Patriot, July 12. The
Grand Rapids Dem. was the leading Greeley organ in western
Michigan. Large ratification meetings were held in Jackson, July 10,
and in Detroit, July 17 and July 22.
140 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [140
The Liberals could consistently show more enthusiasm
for Greeley than the Democrats could, and among the lead-
ing speakers at the large Liberal ratification meetings were
Blair, Peck, Pringle, Driggs, and Strickland. It was ob-
served by several regular Republican papers that the Lib-
eral leaders were disappointed office-seekers, and whatever
importance the fact may have had, the assertion was in
part true at least. ^
The preliminary Liberal Republican state convention
met at Jackson, July 25th, and was a pronounced success.
Trumbull addressed the meeting, and Blair, Driggs and
Strickland were there. In the evening the state central
committees of the Democrat and Liberal Republican wings
of the Greeley-Brown movement held a joint session and
unanimously adopted a plan of co-operation which would
have been efficient, had not the movement been doomed
from the beginning. Until all nominations were made, the
two branches were to maintain separate organizations and
each was to be represented in primary meetings, and in
county, congressional, legislative and state conventions by
its own appointed delegates. The conventions were to
be held by the two parties at the same times and places,
and all nominations made by joint conference. It was
recommended that all county conventions elect delegates to
the state and their respective Congressional conventions in
order to facilitate organization. Each wing was thus made
a high contracting party to all nominations, which would
therefore be acceptable to both, since each was bound by
the action of its delegates. This was the system adopted
in some of the other states and recommended by both Na-
tional Committees. The formation of Greeley Clubs was
urged in all localities, and the campaign executive com-
1 Post, Aug. I.
141 ] FAILURE OF THE LIBERAL MOVEMENT i^i
mittee jointly appointed by the two state central com-
mittees, consisted of four Democrats and three Liberal
Republicans. ^
In pursuance of the joint conference plan of this year,
both the regular — as distinguished from the preliminary —
Democratic and Liberal Republican State Conventions
were held at Grand Rapids, August 22nd. Nominations
were made upon the joint recommendation of the Confer-
ence Committees, and eleven Presidential Electors were
chosen, among whom were Charles S. May and Randolph
Strickland. Austin Blair received the nomination for Gov-
ernor as the Regulars had predicted, and they now felt
assured that their earlier impression of Blair's motives was
proven. They called the ticket '* obscure and essentially
correct ". It was true that the members of the state ticket
were not so popular and well-known as they might have
been had a larger following presented themselves as possi-
bilities. The ticket was, however, beyond the reproach of
Republicans on personal grounds, and that was the im-
portant point in the minds of the opposition. The Con-
gressional nominations of the opposition were far more
popular than the state ticket.
Under the new apportionment and on the basis of past
votes, the third district was most strongly Republican. It
included Branch, Calhoun, Jackson, Barry and Eaton
Counties. In this district John Parkhurst, the Reform
candidate, was a Democrat and his Republican opponent
was George Willard of the radical Baitle Creek Journal.
Augustus C. Baldwin, of the sixth district, was a Demo-
crat, as was Wisner of the eighth. The fourth, fifth, and
seventh chose Liberal Republican candidates, while the sec-
ond nominated an academic man of no special partisan in-
^ Free Press, Argus, July 26.
142 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [142
clinations/ The names presented this year included the
strongest representatives of the Reform movement.
There was some sympathy in the state with the "Straight
Democratic " movement, but it was severely denounced by
all the Reform organs. The response was so weak to the
call for a " State Convention " in Jackson, Monday, Sep-
tember 23rd, that the members met in a private room and a
Post reporter was at first taken for a delegate. The conven-
tion nominated a state ticket, and chose Presidential electors
and a State Central Committee. It declared that " in view
of the present political contest " it put up a ticket so that
Democrats need not be denied the privilege of voting for
distinctly Democratic candidates. It indorsed the nomi-
nation of O'Conor and Adams and the platform of the
Louisville convention. William W. Wheaton was chairman,
and by the close of the convention, seventeen members were
present. In the evening there was a mass-meeting attended
by less than a hundred persons, and while this was being
held a large Greeley procession paraded the streets. The
enthusiasm was obviously wanting which would warrant
the nomination of Congressional and county delegates, and
though the little meeting at first considered it, they shortly
abandoned the idea.^
THE REGULAR REPUBLICANS
On account of the close relation existing between the
activities of the Liberal Republicans and Democrats of
Michigan this year, it was necessary, in order to preserve
the continuity of the story, to omit the Republicans from
the narrative up to this point. Their share in the campaign
* Traverse City Herald, St. Clair Rep., Pontiac Gazette, Saginaw
Valley News, Saginaw Enterprise, for the months of August and Sep-
tember, 1872.
» Free Press, Sept. 28.
143] FAILURE OF THE LIBERAL MOVEMENT 140
presented no such complexities as did that of their allied
opponents. The state convention which met May i6th
at Jackson elected delegates to the national convention
and adopted a platform very similar to that of a year
before. " The unexampled prosperity of the country — and
the visible dissolution of the Democratic party so long
hostile to justice and equal rights — are the satisfactory
proofs of national confidence in a Republican administra-
tion of the government." General Grant was declared as
faithful in the cabinet as in the field, and the platform con-
tinued : '* Relying upon his honest heart and pure purpose,
his renomination to the presidency is earnestly desired by
the great mass of the Republican party." ^ The delegates
chosen to the Philadelphia convention numbered twenty-
two, and it was declared that not an office-holder was to
be found among them.
Early in August the Republicans held their state nomi-
nating convention, which named John G. Bagley for Gov-
ernor, and formulated another platform. This called for
economy in government expenditure, and a more liberal
standard of wages. It was evident that the Republicans
were competing with the Liberals this year for the votes of
the wage-earning classes.^
Early in June the Republican national convention met
in Philadelphia, and William A. Howard, as chairman of
the Michigan delegation, took a rather prominent part in
the proceedings. When the roll was called upon the adop-
tion of the platform and the election of each of the two
national candidates, he announced the unanimous support
of the state. In his response to the call for the vote on
President, he declared his wish that Michigan had 44 in-
* Post, Adv. and Trib., May 17, 1872; Lansing State Rep., May 22.
McPherson, 1872, p. 163.
' Palladium, Aug. 9, 1872; Lansing State Rep., Aug. 15.
144 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [j^^
Stead of 22 votes to cast.^ Before the balloting for Vice-
President began, he briefly addressed the convention in
favor of Colfax, and pleaded that the convention might not
" endanger a doubtful state by insulting her noble son."
He conceded all the good qualities of Henry Wilson, but
believed Colfax was as able a man, and a wiser choice.
In Michigan, as elsewhere, the chief characteristic of
the contest was personal comment, and while the Reform
journals exposed the shortcomings of the dominant party,
the latter complained of " uncalled-for slander, and in-
cessant abuse ". The partisan recrimination upon the de-
sertion of so noted a Radical as Blair gave the politics of
this state an unusually violent character. It was but natural
that after two changes of affiliation he was a subject for
doubt and suspicion by both parties. Even the Democrats
were skeptical after his ultra-radical career in the House,
and though they supported him before the election, they
subsequently declared him an unfortunate candidate to ask
support of those whom he had opposed with particular vio-
lence during the last twelve years. The Regulars were cer-
tain that even the leadership of Carl Schurz could not win
the Germans to the opposition, and this was in most cases
true. It was necessary in Michigan as elsewhere to vin-
dicate Greeley's furnishing of bail to Jefferson Davis,
which was declared by the Liberals a " wise and generous
deed ". ^ The editorial and exchange columns of Repub-
lican newspapers were filled with the stock-in-hand Greeley
selections which Chandler aided materially in procuring for
campaign purposes.
* Official Proceedings of the National Republican Convention, 1872,
pp. 161, 171, 172. The Mich, delegation consisted of 22 regular mem-
bers, four delegates-at-large, and two from each of the nine districts.
Each had his alternate.
2 Post, Sept. 22>; Adv. and Trib., Sept. 28, 1872; Pol. Pamphlets, K-27.
" Greeley vs. Greeley." Jenison Coll.
145] FAILURE OF THE LIBERAL MOVEMENT i^r
THE ELECTION
The result of the election in Michigan certainly discour-
aged any hopes of a reaction that the Democrats may have
entertained in 1870. Grant received nearly 60,000 votes
over Greeley, and 62.66 per cent of the entire vote cast for
President. A large gain was made since 1868, when he re-
ceived 56.98 per cent of the vote — which was still one per
cent better than 1864. The Straight Democrats gave
O'Conor 2,873 votes, while Black, the Temperance nomi-
nee, received 1,271.^ Only two counties out of seventy
went Liberal, and the straight Democratic vote for Presi-
dent was most prominent in the four southern tiers of
counties and in the southeast — a fact entirely consistent
with their past history.^
The votes for governor disclosed a somewhat smaller
percent of Republican gain. Bagley received 61.84 per
cent; Blair, 36.38 per cent; William M. Ferry, Straight
Democrat, 1.18 per cent, and Henry Fish, Temperance,
.6 per cent. It was thus manifest that the opposition to the
presidential candidate of the Liberals was stronger than
that to Blair, the gubernatorial nominee. As 217,351
votes were cast for President, and 222,511 for governor, it
was also evident that more were willing to commit them-
selves upon the choice of governor. The legislature of
1 873- 1 874 would be made up of 31 Republicans, i Demo-
^ Grant received 136,199, Greeley 77,020. The Straight Democratic
vote averaged only 1.3%, while the Temperance reached little more
than 5%. Mich. Man., 1873, pp. 231-310; Mich. Aim., 1873, PP- 28, 84;
Tribune Aim., 1873, p. 65; Adv. and Trib., Nov. 6, 7.
' The following gives the percent of Democratic vote in eleven
counties where the support was strongest: Wayne, i; Calhoun 1.4;
Washtenaw 1.6; Lenawee 1.8; Berrien 1.8; Hillsdale 1.9; Saginaw 2;
Oakland 2.5; Livingston 2.5; Ottawa 2.8; Van Buren 2.9. Ottawa
thus diverged from its customary Republican leaning. Temperance
reached its highest mark in Calhoun, Isabella and Delta counties
where the voles were respectively 1.6%, 12.5%, and 25.6%.
146 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [146
crat in the upper house, while the proportion in the lower
was 94 to 6. The Republican majority thus rose to 120,
and was obviously practically absolute. In all nine Con-
gressional Districts, Republicans were elected.
The proposed amendment relative to the payment of rail-
road-aid bonds was rejected by a strong vote, and from a
second refusal it appeared that the people were positively
unwilling to legalize the aid already voted. It was pleaded,
however, by some Republican organs that the failure to
adopt this amendment would '' savor of repudiation ".^
The amendments pertaining to the limitation of the num-
ber of judicial circuits and the salary increase for circuit
judges were rejected by smaller majorities. Much of the
work of the session of 1871 thus came to nothing and as
the desired changes could not be wrought by amendment,
the other alternative would be tried again and revision
shortly undertaken.
The earlier decline in the Republican party, as evidenced
by the successive gubernatorial and Congressional votes
and the growing discontent within the Republican party,
had seemed auspicious for a '* tidal wave " so often pre-
dicted by Democratic organs. The outcome of the Cin-
cinnati convention, however, at once silenced all expres-
sions of optimism and the party organs settled down to
campaign labor in the face of very discouraging odds. In
some respects, Austin Blair's support was a hindrance
rather than a source of strength, as a defense of his action
was incessantly demanded by the Regulars. They relied
mainly upon the absence of Democrats from the polls on
November 5th, and this proved to be the most disastrous
feature of the election for the Liberal movement.^
* Adv. and Trib., Sept. 29.
' Post, Oct. 15 ; Argus, Oct. 25 ; Blair was defeated in Jackson, — his
home county, — a fact of which the Regulars made great capital.
Statistics of Mich., 1870, pp. Ixii-lxiv.
147] FAILURE OF THE LIBERAL MOVEMENT 147
After the election was over, the Democratic and Liberal
papers were free to express themselves, and it was evident
that most of them despaired of success from the begin-
ning. The nomination of Greeley was, of course, the first
great mistake. In the second place, it was agreed that he
should have been repudiated and a new candidate chosen.
If the Liberals themselves did not venture to do this, the
Democrats " should have turned their backs upon Greeley
and Brown, and when at Baltimore nominated the best
men in the party " — Adams and Groesbeck. Another great
error was made by placing Austin Blair at the head of the
state ticket. A war Democrat would have commanded the
support of the disaffected Republicans and yet would have
been favored by the state Democracy. It was impossible
for the latter to forget Blair's ultra-radicalism of the past,
while the former would not have hesitated to support a
reliable War Democrat.
Such then was the extent of Michigan's response to the
Liberal movement. The Post believed this election to be
a real " political revolution ", and declared it '* scarcely pos-
sible to doubt that this will be the death of the Democratic
party." ^ It was to be very different, however, in the suc-
ceeding campaigns, when the lessons in organization and
nomination of this contest were to prove of immense value
to both branches of the opposition.
* Nov. 7, 1872.
CHAPTER VI
The Schism in the Republican Party in Michigan
AND THE Success of the Democracy
preliminary politics and constitutional revision
" The revelations of the past winter have shown that
the necessity for overthrowing the party in power is greater
than was thought last year," commented the leading Demo-
cratic organ of Michigan in March, 1873, ^^^ such was
the opinion of the opposition to Republicanism which had
remained virtually intact since the preceding year. "Slowly
but surely all the defeated forces of Retrenchment and Re-
form are moving towards new and complete organization,"
it continued, and the defeat in 1872 was considered more
propitious for the future than success would have been, as
the elements of disaffection were held more closely united
by the continued evidences of corruption in the Grant Ad-
ministration.^
A call was issued March 3, 1873, ^^^ ^^^ Democratic and
Liberal State conventions to be held at Jackson, March
27th. All persons were invited who were " opposed to the
corruption of men in power," and each county was entitled
to two delegates for each Representative in the legislature.
In pursuance of the system of joint individual action in
the previous campaign, the two organizations were to meet
simultaneously and the call was signed by both Foster Pratt
and N. B. Jones, the state chairmen of the Democratic and
Liberal Republican committees respectively. The pro-
^ Free Press, Mar. 6, 1873.
148 [148
149] ^^^ SCHISM IN THE REPUBLICAN PARTY j^g
ceedings were entirely harmonious, and I. P. Christiancy
was unanimously renominated for Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court.
Mr. Christiancy had been a Democrat until the anti-
slavery controversy, when he became an active leader in
the Free Soil movement, and by successive re-elections he
had served in the Supreme Court from its founding, Janu-
ary I, 1858. The non-partisan character of his politics
made him a reliable and favorite candidate of a united op-
position. His anti-slavery sentiment of 1848 was no longer
a source of Democratic criticism, while his Free Soil sym-
pathies strengthened him with the Republicans who adopted
him as their candidate also. The fact that he had so long
occupied an office not strictly political, and had remained
apart from active or prominent participation in politics
made him the most conspicuous man in the state for nomi-
nation. He was elected without opposition and his success
this year undoubtedly served to make him the first prefer-
ence of the anti-Chandler combination two years later.
Of the six candidates for the two Regencies of the Uni-
versity, the two Republicans won over the Democrats and
Temperance candidates by large majorities. The special
elections in two judicial districts and one Congressional
also resulted in Republican victories.^
Again the constitution received attention now by at-
tempted revision instead of amendment. There was no
particular reason for it at this time. It had, however, be-
come the settled aim of the administration party to obtain
change, and they alternately tried amendment and revision.
It had likewise become the policy of the Democracy to look
with disfavor upon such proceedings, and the people had
1 Argus, Apr. 4, 1873 ; Free Press, Apr, 5 ; Mich. Coll., vol. xviii, pp.
333-8 ; Biog. of Christiancy, by Justice Graves ; Post and Tribune Life
of Chandler, p. 338.
I50 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [i^q
acquired the habit of rejecting all such proposed altera-
tions. During the legislative session of 1873, the Governor
was authorized to appoint a commission of eighteen mem-
bers, two from each district, to revise the Constitution/
The proposed draft would be acted upon by the legislature
and if approved, it would then be submitted to the people
The Commission as named by the Governor consisted of
twelve Republicans and six Democrats, a proportion fairly
representative of the political status of the state, but one
which was bound to cause the active opposition of the
minority party to the final draft/ Among the most popular
members of the Commission were G. V. N. Lothrop — who
had been an active supporter of Andrew Johnson — Charles
Upson, a member of Congress for several terms, and Sul-
livan M. Cutcheon, Ex- Speaker of the House of the State
Legislature.
The subjects under consideration before this body were
chiefly taxation, salaries and method of appointment of cir-
cuit judges. The power of taxation — general and local —
should be limited, it was urged, rather than increased. The
matter of fixing salaries should not, in the light of the
" Salary Grab " Act of Congress and a similar one of the
State Legislature, ever be given over to the legislature.
The Democrats clearly understood this, some of the Re-
publicans did not. Though it was admitted generally by
both parties that the remuneration provided in the consti-
tution was entirely inadequate, the increase must be defi-
nitely specified in the revised constitution. The present
^ Acts, 1873, p. 573, Joint Res., no. 19, offered Apr. 24; H. Jour., p.
214; 5". Jour., p. 1254.
' It mfet late in August and adjourned the middle of October, re-
maining in session 51 days. By the act providing for the Commission
it must complete its labors on or before Dec. i. Argus, Aug. 15, 1873;
Lansing State Rep., Sept. 24.
1 5 1 ] THE SCHISM IN THE REPUBLICAN PARTY 1 5 1
state of popular feeling would prevent the adoption of a
proposal placing the matter in the hands of the legislature,
a body which the people did not feel inclined to trust.
The legislation which had occasioned this hostility was
the Act of April 24, 1873, which voted additional payment
to secretaries, clerks, sergeants-at-arms, firemen and mes-
sengers of the legislature, to the amount of several thou-
sand dollars/ It was urged that this action was taken in
direct violation of Article IV, Section 21, of the constitu-
tion, which declared that " The legislature shall not grant
nor authorize extra compensation to any public officer,
agent or contractor after the service has been rendered or
the contract entered into." The Democrats observed that
" the legislature of this state has proven an apt scholar
in learning the bad tricks of Congress." The Republican
organs arraigned the Democrats in the legislature for this
piece of legislation, while the latter defended themselves on
the grounds that '' the majority is by right held respon-
sible for the action of any legislative body." ^ It was thus
natural that the recent acts of the legislature would en-
danger the salary articles which the Commission might
recommend, and lead to the rejection of the revised consti-
tution. Contrary to the advice of members of both parties,
the Commission gave the legislature the power to estab-
lish the salaries of all state officers, with the result which
was generally foreseen.
An innovation was proposed by the Commission, provid-
ing for the appointment in place of the election of State
and Circuit Judges, but it was here defeated by a strong
opposition who pointed to the fortunate results of the
elective system in the case of the Supreme Court.
In October, the Commission closed its work of constitu-
* S. Jour., p. 1441, Apr. 10, 1873; Free Press, Apr. 25.
' Jackson Cit, May 3-
1 52 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [152
tional revision. Pursuant to the call of Governor Bagley,
an extra session of the legislature was convened on Tues-
day, March 3, 1874, to consider the constitution as revised
the previous autumn. After a thorough discussion of each
article, it was approved with some changes by both Houses,
and recommended for submission to the people to be voted
upon in November.^
Another matter received the attention of the legislature
— that of woman suffrage. This movement had been in
progress since the constitutional convention of 1867, and
it culminated in a joint resolution proposing an amend-
ment to Section i, Article 7, relative to the qualifications
of electors.^ This was to be submitted as a separate article
at the same time with the draft of the revised constitution,
as the sentiment against woman suffrage would have en-
dangered the constitution.
FORMATION OF MINOR PARTIES
The campaign of 1874 was certainly one of many issues
and a complication of many movements. There was some
uncertainty concerning the relation of the Democracy to
the Reform Republicans, and the matter ended in some ill-
feeling and an entirely separate organization of the two,
which abrogated the arrangement of two years before.
The Grangers had attained some importance the previous
year, and both the regular organizations visibly catered to
them. The Democrats had the advantage of the Repub-
licans in this respect, and pursued it to extremes. The
* 5". Jour, and H. Jour., for Extra Session, 1874.
' Acts, Extra Session, 1874, PP- 9, 10, Joint Res., no. 2, approved
Mar. 23. The Grand Traverse Herald, Republican, was probably the
strongest advocate of woman's suffrage in Michigan. The Democrats
generally opposed it or ignored the question, while the Republican or-
gans were inclined to be more liberal. Grand Traverse Herald,
Mar. 24.
153] ^^^ SCHISM IN THE REPUBLICAN PARTY 153
Greenback party became prominent at this time partly be-
cause of the financial panic of the preceding year. The
past agitation of the Prohibitionists raised up against them
the License or Anti-Prohibition party. There was thus
some danger of confusing the less important issues with
those of greater consequence — woman suffrage, prohibi-
tion, re-election of Chandler, with reform, resumption, cen-
tralization and the tariff.
The organization called Patrons of Industry had be-
come prominent in Michigan among the agricultural class
by the fall of 1873, when there were one hundred- and
thirteen local granges organized. When a county was
thoroughly organized a grange selected three delegates
who formed the '' County Council." Among its recog-
nized duties were the arrangement of terms of sale of var-
ious commodities with local dealers and the guarantee of
the exclusive patronage of the organization. The sale of
agricultural implements and other articles at wholesale was
also arranged by the state executive committee. By Janu-
ary, 1874, the movement was sufficiently extensive and
unified to make possible a state convention which met at
Kalamazoo and framed a comprehensive platform highly
complimentary to the order. The aims of the order were
declared to be the facilitating of social intercourse, the in-
crease of knowledge and intelligence by the discussion of
public questions, and the advancement of pecuniary inter-
ests through co-operation. The last purpose could be ac-
complished by buying directly from manufacturers and
selling directly to consumers. " As agriculture furnishes
the main source of the nation's wealth and greatness, and
over one-half of the productions of the country and nearly
one-half of the voters," the farmers are entitled to equal
privileges, equal taxation and equal justice in the admin-
istration of the laws. The platform demanded cheap trans-
\^
154 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [154
portation and urged the legislature to control and regulate
the carrying trade of our country and compel all railway
companies to adopt equal and uniform rates for passengers
and freight/
The Grangers were favorable to the elected judiciary,
and constitutional regulation of state salaries. They de-
nounced the Credit Mobilier and Salary Act and demanded
the repeal of the latter. The Patrons were thus conser-
vative with respect to the minor questions of constitutional
revision, and on reform their views coincided with those
of the Democracy. Their chief interests were industrial
and their platform omitted the important question of cur-
rency. Their demand for railway regulation was not now
incompatible with the policy of either of the leading parties
and their other issues were not strong enough to cause any
apprehension of a new division. The great issues of the
present campaign were fiscal in nature and the Patrons
took no cognizance of this fact. Their organization in
Michigan as in the other states was more social and indus-
trial than political, and their function was to influence the
old parties in legislation rather than cause a new political
formation. Only a party built upon the currency issue
could endanger the lines of the old organizations.
The Prohibition party held a state convention July 30th,
and nominated an entire state ticket. The Post among
other Republican papers looked with disfavor upon the per-
sistence of this faction, while the Democracy was openly
hostile to it.
This year appeared a new organization founded upon
the temperance question — the Anti-Prohibition or State
License Party. Prohibition had been a more or less promi-
nent issue since 1868, when a proposed amendment in its
favor was rejected by a majority strong enough to encour-
^ Mich, as a State, vol. iv, pp. 149- 151 ; Free Press, Jan. 31, 1874.
155] '^^^ SCHISM IN THE REPUBLICAN PARTY 155
age the license advocates. A convention of Anti-Prohibi-
tionists met in Detroit, August 12th, with an attendance
of 300, including delegates from every district. The reso-
lutions embodied strong arguments for a well-administered
state license system, and prominent Republican journals
admitted the soundness of some of the views. It was con-
ceded that " doubtless a majority of the people of the state
are tired of the experiment of prohibition and would wel-
come legislation on a practical, not sentimental basis." The
convention gave the party a permanent organization by the
appointment of a state central committee, and the move-
ment received encouragement from various journals of
both parties.^
THE INDEPENDENT ACTION OF THE REFORMERS
The initial step toward the formation of a new reform
party in the state was taken by the opposition members of
the legislature in May, 1874. They appointed a committee
which issued a call for the ** National Reform conven-
tion " to meet in Lansing, Thursday, August 6th. The
question arises at once concerning the connection, if any,
between the Liberal party of 1872 and this new " National
Reform Party ". The foundations of the former were
primarily hostility to Grant, agitation for administrative
reform, and the demand of a milder policy in the treatment
of the Southern states, during the progress of Reconstruc-
tion. The *' National Reform Party " of this year was
dedicated, as its name implies, to the " restoration of purity
and statesmanship to the high places of our state and na-
tional administration." As both were built upon the com-
mon grounds of reform, especially in so far as national
administration is concerned, there appears an obvious simi-
^ Adv. and Trib., Aug. 14, 1874; Argus, Oct. 16.
156 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [156
larity between the two organizations. The fact that the
personnel in Michigan was practically the same — at least
the leaders — lends additional force to this inference.
On the other hand, if the two parties are formally and
officially considered, the conclusion is necessarily quite dif-
ferent. The National Reform Party received an abso-
lutely fresh organization, and was — to all appearances — a
new party, with no intimation that it was the unfortunate
Liberal organization under a new name. The opposition
members of the state legislature who appointed the com-
mittee for preliminary deliberation, the committee itself,
and the state convention — all three bodies — declared de-
finitely that a new organization had been formed. Formally,
then, the National Reform Party in 1874 was decidedly
a new one, and entirely independent of the Liberals of two
years before. In reality, however, their identical purpose
and personnel warrant the view that they were one.
According to the committee, the National Reform con-
vention of August 6th was '' to take such steps as may
be deemed advisable to secure the organization of a party
on a basis of live issues and for the restoration of purity
and statesmanship to the high places of our state and na-
tional government." There was no doubt that a new party
was anticipated by this call. As late as the last of May
there appeared a strong probability that the elements of
opposition would unite for the campaign. It was the " Re-
form " faction who thus first made clear an intention of
independent action on their part, and the Democrats were
not a little surprised at the call. The Republicans believed
this a " feeler " for '' finding a platform for the Demo-
crats," but there was no evidence of connection between the
two elements of the opposition. From the general senti-
ments expressed in the convention and the platform it ap-
pears that the Reformers acted somewhat rashly, if not
157] THE SCHISM IN THE REPUBLICAN PARTY 157
selfishly, this year, and were instrumental in decreasing the
influence which a party effectively representing their views
might otherwise have attained/ The charge made by some
leading Republican journals that " the call for a distinctly
Democratic convention killed the Reform movement" could
not possibly be true, as the Reformers themselves took the
first step to secure separate organization, and the Demo-
crats did the one thing that was left them — ignore the Re-
form element in their call.
The National Reform convention was not largely at-
tended, and among the delegates were some who had been
Reformers in 1870 and Liberals in 1872. The preamble
to the resolutions adopted by the convention declared nec-
essary the reform of both of the old parties, and while the
Reformers '^ recognized the honesty and patriotism of a
large portion of the Democratic and Republican parties,"
yet " they could never hope to effect reform by acting with
either of them." They enumerated the many evidences of
corruption, and declared there was a positive ** necessity of
independent action ". The convention cordially invited to
join with them all men of whatever class and vocation re-
gardless of past political views.
The Democrats with good reason were offended and at
once looked with disfavor upon the independent action of
the Reformers. The alienation of the Democracy seems
now, as it did at that time, a grave mistake. It was not
the Reformers but the Democrats who had sacrificed them-
selves in the campaign two years before, and if one of the
parties to that coalition now felt unfavorably disposed, it
should certainly have been the latter.
The platform demanded a reduction in the number of
offices under the national government and a reduction both
^Evening News, May 26, 1874; Lansing State Rep., May 27, Argus,
May 29.
158 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [158
of their powers and of their salaries. It favored measures
securing free banking, a revenue tariff and an equitable
system of taxation. It also recommended legislative regu-
lation of railway fares and the taxation of railway prop-
erty, and denounced the issuance of free passes to state
officials.
The currency resolution was by far the most important,
and it was awaited by both parties with great interest. Its
essence proved to be a demand for return to a specie basis
" as rapidly as shall be consistent with financial prosperity."
The Democrats promptly criticised this plank as being non-
committal and uncertain, and saw in it a concession to in-
flationist Republicans. There was widespread disappoint-
ment that a convention addressed by Ex-Governor Blair
should make such a weak declaration upon a vital issue/
The advocates of inflation had withdrawn from the con-
vention, and a decisive declaration in favor of resumption
could have been adopted without difficulty, as there was
unmistakable evidence that the prevailing preference was
in that direction. The plank was obviously designed to
satisfy the Greenbackers, but failed to do so.
The Reform convention appointed a state committee
which issued a call for a convention, September 9th, to
make nominations and appoint Congressional district com-
mittees. This meeting adopted resolutions similar to those
of August 6th. Col. A. T. McReynolds was appointed
chairman pro tern, and a full ticket was nominated of which
four names were adopted by the Democrats in convention
the next day.^ A fifth nomination became concurrent by
^ The chairman was Hon. Eugene Pringle, and Randolph Strickland
was a speaker. Evening News, Aug. 7, 1874; Jackson Cit., Aug. 10.
' Henry Chamberlain for Governor, George H. House for Sec. of
State, Chauncey W. Green for Commissioner of the State Land Office,
and Duane Doty, Member of State Board of Education.
159] ^^^ SCHISM IN THE REPUBLICAN PARTY i^^
the subsequent withdrawal of Col. McReynolds, the candi-
date for Attorney-General, whose successor was M. V.
Montgomery, the corresponding nominee of the Demo-
crats. Five nominations were thus identical, of which four
were again original with the minority branch and accept-
able to the Democracy. The campaign within the state, so
far as it related to the state ticket, thus presented a differ-
ent form of union from that in 1872. The principal candi-
dates were the same, but the parties worked separately
throughout the campaign.
The efforts of the Reform party were a great disappoint-
ment to many. The hard-money faction, it was generally
thought, should have expressed themselves without such
ambiguity and vagueness. " The Democrats have done
well in not identifying themselves with the convention,"
declared the leading Democratic organ, " and while we
would have concurred on every point, the Reformers have
not rendered a Democratic convention unnecessary, as they
have left undone something we can and will do."
The alliance which had earlier been thought possible
between the Democracy and Reform party was never ef-
fected and the two branches maintained throughout a
separate organization. The Democrats were naturally sen-
sitive in this matter, and the leading organs urged the party
''to go forward just as if this new party had not been
organized, nominate its ticket and announce its principles."
They also urged the party " to shun all entangling alliances
and let the Reformers cast their vote with the Democracy."
They referred to the failure of the Reform minority to
carry over the majority in 1872 and declared the former
could not now absorb the latter. The defeat at the last
election also showed the inadequacy of the "double jointed"
organization with simultaneous and separate conventions
and separate platforms. The co-operation in this election,
i6o THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [i6o
if there were any, must be through mere mutual adoption
of individual names — and this was what took place in sev-
eral instances.
THE REPUBLICAN PARTY
The Republican state central committee met at Jack-
son, Tuesday, June 9th, and issued a call for the State
Convention to meet at Lansing, August 28th. The size
of the convention was doubled, as four delegates were
allowed each district instead of two. The party was on
the defensive, and its platform, like its other campaign
efforts, was a vindication of the past policy of the national
administration. It declared that the party '' offered no
apologies," but " challenged a faithful scrutiny of its
record through every vicissitude of war and peace, and the
candid judgment of all just men." The Republicans " saw
no reason to surrender the reins of power into the hands
of a party whose last public service was to drag the country
into civil war — and which made its last effort to regain the
confidence of the people under the lead of its life-long
enemy in the most brazen, bare-faced, shameless coalition
ever known in the history of parties, formed solely and
avowedly on the basis of ' spoils alone '." The state ad-
ministration was highly commended for its interest in pro-
curing social legislation.^
With reference to the negroes, the platform declared
that " freedom was bestowed upon them as a war measure
* The measures particularly referred to were the establishment of
the State Board of Charities and Corrections in 1871 for the reforma-
tory treatment of the insane ; the founding of the State Public School
for dependent children two years later, — both under Governor Baldwin,
and the creation of the State Board of Health under Governor
Bagley. During the administration of the latter incumbent the office
of Commissioner of Insurance was provided for, and a Bureau of
Inspection of Banks was established in the Treasury Department.
Mich, as a State, vol. iv, pp. 66-9, 106-8.
l6i] THE SCHISM IN THE REPUBLICAN PARTY i6i
and in aid of the Union cause, and the electoral function
was thrust upon them as a means of protection not only to
themselves but to the nation." It was therefore the duty of
the country to " protect them in all rights and privileges
of their enforced citizenship." " Their ignorance is not
their fault," it asserted, " but the legitimate fruit of their
former condition." The government ''assumed the respon-
sibility for problems resulting from their status when it
clothed them with full rights and privileges of citizens."
These statements certainly had a more apologetic tone than
the dominant party had yet shown with reference to the
race problem. The Republicans insisted throughout the
campaign that the Northerners were a necessary element
in the South to guarantee protection to the negro, and they
went so far as to concede that whatever trouble there was
occasioned by the presence of the Northerners was due to
their '' ignorance and inexperience, rather than their fraud
and corruption." ^
The resolutions touching the currency were so unsatis-
factory that even the Advertiser and Tribune considered
them vague and non-committal. The Post, however, re-
sented the insinuation on the part of the less aggressive
Republican journal that the party must have wanted to
please the resumptionists without offending the inflation-
ists. The platform declared that while greenbacks and
national bank notes were far superior as a circulating
medium to any other paper currency existing in the United
States — yet resumption of specie payments was demanded
*' as soon as possible." Banking under a well-guarded na-
tional system should be free, and the volume of its issues
regulated by the business law of demand.^
^ Post, Sept. 4.
' Eve. News, Aug. 29, 1874; Ann. Cyc, 1874. I
l62 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [162
The old parties were formally, at least, approaching
unanimity on the currency question, though the Democrats
declared for immediate resumption in much more em-
phatic terms than the Republicans. In Michigan the former
adhered to resumption with fair consistency throughout the
period, though they had become classed as a soft-money
party in 1870 because they advocated postponement of
specie payments until they could be effected " without in-
jury to industrial interests." Whatever disadvantages they
suffered from this tendency, however, were equaled and
overshadowed by the Republican support of the Inflation
Bill defeated by the President the previous April.
Precisely what the attitude of the Republicans towards
resumption was in Michigan it is difficult to say. They
were undoubtedly divided among themselves and there was
radical disagreement among the members in each House of
Congress. The state platform was naturally an attempt to
avoid offending either element, and there was a consensus
of opinion that it was intended to reconcile the antagonism
of Chandler and Ferry, the two Michigan Senators, whose
views upon this question were diametrically opposed. It
was generally thought that had Ferry carried the day, noth-
ing would have prevented the division of the party on the
lines of that issue alone. Chandler, Waldron, Willard and
William B. Williams were the advocates of immediate re-
sumption, while Ferry, seconded by Hubbell, Conger and
Field, defended a paper currency in true greenback fashion.
The views of the Michigan delegation are set forth in the
debates from January to March, 1874, on H. R. 1572, a
bill to amend the National Currency Act. Chandler's
speech of January 20th in opposition to the Inflation Bill
became a party tract in Michigan. He began with the often
quoted introduction, " We need one thing besides more
money, and that is better money," and declared that he had
163] THE SCHISM IN THE REPUBLICAN PARTY 163
advocated from the first the earliest possible return to pay-
ment in coin. " I believe the time has arrived or very
nearly arrived for coming to it/' he continued, and " I have
not the same timidity in fixing the date that some of my
friends have." He believed that the increase of the vol-
ume of paper currency was a step in the wrong direction,
and thought that January of the succeeding year was un-
necessarily remote for resumption.^
Waldron considered the issue of paper currency by the
government " at least a doubtful exercise of power and cer-
tainly pernicious in its influence on the business interests
of the people." He showed that it was a dangerous char-
acteristic of such issues " that each creates demand for ad-
ditional issues," and that the legal-tender currency was the
obstacle to resumption.^ Williams favored gradual retire-
ment and a return to specie payments. He viewed the
power to issue legal tender as " essentially a war power, a
forced loan upon the creditor class which cannot exist — for
the necessity cannot exist — in time of peace." ^
Thomas W. Ferry, the leader of the " Paper Money
Trinity," maintained that the panic was due to the insuffi-
ciency of available currency, while want of elasticity though
it intensified the panic was merely incidental. He did not
consider a specie basis an indispensable requisite to national
prosperity and cited French and English economic history
to sustain him. The resumption theory he attributed to
capitalists. *' The increasing business interests in the coun-
try would be crippled by specie payments, since means to
facilitate their development would be denied." The mone-
* Globe, Jan. 20, 1874, pp. 777-8; Mar. 5, p. 2013; Mar. 17, p. 2183;
Post and Tribune Life of Chandler, pp. 319-336.
' Globe, March 30, 1874, P- 2598.
' Globe, Apr. 9, 1874, pp. 2967-8.
1 64 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [164
tary standard, whatever it may be, was conventional, he
asserted. '' Labor alone is the true standard of value and
its origin is the cost of production." He insisted that "con-
fidence and implicit faith are the basis of utility of any
medium of circulation rather than intrinsic value." On
January 13th, he was glad to sacrifice all the subsidiary
considerations in his resolution in order to win the primary
one — the increase of the currency.^
In the House, Hubbell and Field defended paper cur-
rency against the attacks of resumptionists. The former
insisted that it was not excessive for the purposes of in-
dustry and the industrial demands of the West. Field, of
Detroit, was probably the most extreme Michigan member
in the House. He boldly asserted that a petition in favor
of resumption presented by his colleague, Waldron, of
Hillsdale, was unreliable, as " the gentleman had doubtless
been imposed upon and deceived." He attributed the
periodic crises in England to their standard. " Money is
for domestic uses," he further insisted, and '' our green-
backs are the people's money, and the best money we ever
had." A full legal tender does not require any redemption,
he asserted, as nothing is superior to it. *' The credit of
the nation possesses intrinsic value as well as gold, because
it is issued in exchange for labor." ^
The vote on the Inflation Bill in the Senate showed that
Ferry, Morton and Logan were its chief supporters, and
Chandler, Schurz, Sherman and Thurman its strongest op-
ponents. In the House, Waldron and Willard recorded
their votes against it, Williams and Burrows were absent
or refrained from voting, and the other five voted yea.
» Ihid., Dec. 18, 1873, p. 297; Jan. 13, 1874, p. 607; Jan. 14, pp. 640,
708; Mar. 23, p. 2350; Apr. 6, p. 2818.
* Globe, Mar. 31, 1874, pp. 2661-5; Mar. 27, pp. 2551-61; Apr. 8,
Appx. pp. 211-215.
165] THE SCHISM IN THE REPUBLICAN PARTY 165
After the vote of April 22nd, the vote in the Senate showed
Ferry and Chandler still persisting in their differences.^
The Republican party found itself in a most trying posi-
tion. It could not declare one policy and denounce the
other while its own members in Congress defended both
with almost an equal vote. With this threatened schism
before it, the party was compelled to come before the peo-
ple with the appearance of a united policy, and the reason
for the non-committal plank in the state platform is thus
very obvious. The Congressmen were the centers about
which the politics of the respective localities were to draw,
and the party must, in six of the nine districts, repudiate its
own prominent leaders, or tacitly consign the party to a
soft-money position by renominating them. The former
would have been harsh treatment, inasmuch as the dele-
gates were all strong partisans on other subjects, and the
latter would have been very unwise. The only alternative
left them was the embarrassing inconsistency of declaring
for resumption in the district nominating conventions and
at the same time renominating the inflationist members. In
fact this was done in five of the six districts represented by
men of inflationist tendencies, and the nominations were
made in several instances by unanimous vote.^ The three
anti-inflation Congressmen of the second, third, and fifth
districts were renominated and indorsed. In the second
district strong influence was exerted in favor of Webster
* Globe, S. no. 150, Apr. 6, 1874, P- 2835; Apr. 14, p. 3078; Apr. 28, p.
3436. Rhodes, op. cit, vol. vii, p. 62.
2 The five nominations above referred to were Field in the first
district, Burrows in the fourth, Begole in the sixth, Conger in the
seventh, and Hubbell in the ninth. The declaration in the sixth was
similar to the others — " We are in favor of the resumption of specie
payments at the earliest possible moment," but in the eighth district,
in which Bradley was unanimously renominated, the convention con-
sistently refused to declare in favor of resumption.
1 66 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [i66
Childs, representing the agricultural interests, and a com-
promise was necessarily entered into with the Granger ele-
ment. The friends of both were finally satisfied by the
withdrawal of Childs from the present contest with the
understanding that he should be supported for the Senator-
ship in opposition to Chandler, and should be chosen Presi-
dent of the Republican state convention. He had a strong
following and had been mentioned in connection with the
office of Governor or Secretary of State, but he preferred
to keep his chances clear for the Senate.
In one instance, however, an explanation was offered for
this obvious inconsistency concerning the currency ques-
tion. There was a strong element in the first district
hostile to Field, and the Post with its anti-inflation position
— following, of course, the views of Chandler — was anxious
to make the case clear, and to warn the offender. " On the
question of currency," it declared, " we have strongly dif-
fered from Mr. Field during the financial discussion at the
last session of Congress. The question has been practically
settled by the veto of the President and by financial meas-
ures passed just before Congress adjourned. It is an issue
of the past and not likely to be revived. If it should again
arise, however, the Representatives in Congress from Mich-
igan will be guided by the will of the party and of the peo-
ple of the state." '
THE DEMOCRACY IN 1874
The Democrats watched closely to discover evidences of
the indorsement not only of inflation but of the so-called
* Post, Aug. 2Z, 1874; Comment in Free Press, Aug. 26, and Argus,
Aug. 28. The main sources for the subject of Congressional politics
and nominations have been the following journals for the months
of August and September: Post, Adv. and Trib., Eve. News, Coldwater
Rep., Jackson Cit., Kal. Tel, Lansing State Rep., Battle Creek Journal,
Grand Rapids Daily Eagle, Grand Traverse Herald, Saginaw Rep.
167] THE SCHISM IN THE REPUBLICAN PARTY 167
salary grab. Both Senators from Michigan had consis-
tently opposed the provision relating to the salaries of
Congressmen, and only two Representatives had recorded
their vote in its favor — one of them being the one Demo-
cratic member of the House/
Another question involved in the Republican politics
which the Democrats attacked this year was that of the
assessment of office-holders for party purposes. It was
the practice in the Republican party to mail letters to each
office-holder with a pointed request for the remittance of a
certain percentage of his salary to the treasurer of the
state organization. The exact amount was generally
already computed and written out. This was certainly an
effective arrangement, as the request signed by the state
chairman was virtually a demand. The organization and
system of assessment for campaign purposes was probably
at its best in Michigan, as the party had been almost abso-
lute for the last twenty years. It was a method of which
the Democrats could not if they wished avail themselves,
as they had practically no incumbents to assess. The re-
crimination on this subject was probably more bitter than
in states where the opposition had some hopes of meeting
the majority upon a more equal footing.
There was some doubt early in the year concerning the
best issues upon which to build the Democratic platform.
Opinions seemed to differ. In some cases the lesser ques-
tions obscured the greater, but the main one was gener-
ally conceded to be the currency. The recent panic was
undoubtedly the cause of the agitation of the money issue
by the Democrats particularly, and as early as February
they demanded contraction and specie payments. " Green-
backs must be made worth their face value in gold. This
can be done," they declared, " by withdrawing a portion
* McPherson, 1874, pp. 17, 18, 20.
l68 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [i68
of them from circulation, ceasing to purchase with them
bonds due five, ten, or fifteen years hence, and using the
gold accumulating in the Treasury to redeem the overdue
and dishonored paper of the government." ^
The Democratic state central committee issued the call
for the convention to be held at Kalamazoo on Thursday,
September loth.^ It allowed double the former number of
delegates, following the precedent of the Republican party,
four from each Representative district and two from
each organized county. The call also recommended that
the convention arraign the Republicans for their " mal-
administration, extravagance and corruption." The Demo-
crats were to accept the abolition of slavery, it insisted, but
resist all attempts to treat the southern states as con-
quered provinces. The party should declare obedience to
the national constitution but tolerate no interference from
Washington with municipal affairs.^ The last was home
rule, and '' this with hard money and a revenue tariff must
constitute the main federal issues." In matters of state
administration, the call demanded the revision of tax laws
to prevent the accumulation of large balances, the addi-
tional security from legislative interference in merely local
affairs, and the economical administration of the state
* Argus, Feb. 13, 1874, " The Money Question." There were general
expressions of delight on Grant's veto, Apr. 22, of the Senate Finance
Bill, no. 617, known as the Inflation Bill.
' Issued in Detroit, July 28, and signed by Foster Pratt.
• This was aimed against the Interstate Commerce Bill providing
for " the appointment of commissioners with powers to establish
freights and fares." It was discussed in the House, March 18, and
Willard of Mich, spoke against is as a measure "inexpedient, diffi-
cult, and dangerous." On March 26 it passed the House, Bradley,
Waldron, Willard in the opposition, the other six members voting yea.
This was not of course a party vote, but indicated difference of
opinion among the Republicans. For comment, Post, Mar. 27, 1874;
Argus, Apr. 3.
169] ^^^ SCHISM IN THE REPUBLICAN PARTY 169
government. The agitation for tax revision arose from
the accumulation of a large amount in the treasury which
the treasurer loaned to certain local banks at a lower rate
of interest than that which was generally current, and
often on poor security. At this time there was a surplus
of $13,600,985, and the Democrats opposed the loan of
these state funds with what they considered to be insuffi-
cient security, since the Treasurer's bond was too small
to protect the state. ^
The convention followed closely the lines laid down by
the committee in its call of July 28th. The platform was
a long one, and opened by an arraignment of the party in
power for " unexampled extravagance and corruption, and
unconstitutional and dangerous usurpation of powers not
delegated to the federal government." It demanded the
" immediate abandonment of all efforts to rule the states
for corrupt party purposes by an infamous alliance of
carpet-baggers, scalawags and bayonets." It further de-
manded the immediate repeal of the Salary Act and the
Gag Law " by which the party in power seeks to muzzle a
free press." With respect to the currency, the Democrats
declared for resumption, free banking, and tariff for
revenue only. They also demanded that the repeal of the
Legal Tender Act take effect not later than July 4, 1876.
The management of the state finances was sharply criti-
cised, and the surplus was considered so large that state
taxes could be abolished for a year.
Upon the perplexing subject of the liquor traffic the
Democrats advocated regulation by constitutional amend-
ment rather than prohibition. They thus secured the sup-
port of the German element, and incurred the hostility of
the Prohibitionists. When the motion was made for the
^ Free Press, July 29, 1874; Argus, July 31 ; Treasurer's Report, fiscal
year 1873-4.
lyo THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [170
adoption of the resolution there was some debate upon the
relative merits of prohibition and a well-regulated control
of licenses. The latter was preferred by the majority and
the resolutions were adopted with but few dissenting votes.
At the close of the state convention, Mr. Allison, of Cass
county, moved a suspension of the rules to enable him to
offer a resolution supporting the proposed constitutional
amendment granting woman's suffrage. It was voted down
by almost a unanimous vote, and the Democrats thus offi-
cially declared against the movement.
There was one declaration in the platform of this con-
vention which reflected the general sentiment within the
state not only of the Democrats but also of the Republican
majority in the state legislature. It declared that " rail-
way and industrial interests ought to be reciprocal," and
" the legislature ought to secure reasonable and uniform
rates of freight."
The influence of the Granger element was thus apparent
in both parties. The nominations were made with unusual
care, as the locality and vocation considerations were of
great importance in the appeal to the less frequently repre-
sented classes. The Democratic ticket thus became the
favorite of the Granger element, especially since Mr.
Chamberlain, the gubernatorial nominee, was an agricul-
turist. Four candidates were taken from the Reformer's
ticket, as has been stated, and one originally named by the
Democrats was later adopted by them. The ticket was a
very strong one, and the platform was certainly unobjec-
tionable.^
The Congressional nominations were made with greater
care, if possible, than the state ticket in order to insure the
support of the agricultural class. There was a general
^ Free Press, S>t^\.. ii; Argus, Sept. 18. For comment Eve. News,
Sept. 15.
171 ] THE SCHISM IN THE REPUBLICAN PARTY 171
expectation that a union would be effected between the
Democracy and the Reformers in the Congressional nomi-
nations and this proved to be the case in the first and
fourth districts. Furthermore a strong opposition to the
Republican incumbents had grown up in the first, fourth
and sixth districts, and the Democratic candidates accord-
ingly found strong support.
THE ELECTIONS OF 1874
The October elections, especially in Ohio, Indiana and
Iowa, greatly encouraged the Democrats. In a triumphant
address the state chairman declared : " The people of
eleven states have now spoken. The popular verdict
against corrupt rulers has been rendered." ^
An opportunity so favorable to the Democracy of Mich-
igan had not occurred since the formation of the Republican
party. The result was what the Republicans themselves were
frank to call " an unprecedented repulse of Republicanism
in Michigan." The Republican following fell from 61.84
per cent to 50.46 per cent in the gubernatorial vote, and
this change of over 10 per cent of the total vote was the
greatest within the period of this study.^ It will be re-
membered that the Reformers had several joint nomina-
tions with the Democracy and these commanded a vote
similar to that of governor. The tide of opposition ap-
1 The address was signed by the chairman, Foster Pratt, and the
other four members of the Committee. Argus, Oct. 16.
Bagley received 111,519, Chamberlain io5,55o and Carpenter, Tem-
perance, 3,937. The Republican candidate won this year by the small
majority of 2000, while two years ago it was over 57,000. The votes
of Manitou and Presque Isle were not received in time for the count,
but swelled the vote for the Republican candidate 92, the Democrat
154. The other state officers received an average vote of 112,000. The
Prohibition vote on governor was tripled and rose to 1.78% of the
total vote.
172 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [172
peared in the election of 14 members to the state Senate
and 47 to the House, reducing the Republican joint ma-
jority to 10/ The results of the Congressional elections
were probably the most important of the year, for the
Democrats carried the first, fourth and sixth districts,
which had been strongly administration two years before.
The Republicans won in the other six districts, but re-
ceived small majorities.
The vote on the constitution disclosed a stronger oppo-
sition to it than mere Democratic hostility, as it was re-
jected by a vote of 124,039 to 39,285. The separate
proposition of woman's suffrage received a somewhat
larger vote and a stronger repudiation, the opposition ma-
jority approximating three-fourths in each case.^
The result was declared by Republican organs a '' re-
buke " to their party, but '' not a political revolution." It
was admitted to be a '' purification of the party by ridding
it of a number of unworthy leaders over whose downfall
few regrets will be felt," except in so far as those who de-
served a better fate were " caught in bad company " and
rebuked accordingly. " Purged of its elements of weak-
ness the Republican party will emerge all the stronger,"
declared the Post, but '' Congress must get out of the paper
money business as soon as it can." ^
The party was more odious to the Reform and Granger
^ There were only 18 Republicans in the Upper House, and 53 in the
Lower, whereas their membership in the previous legislature was 31
and 94 respectively.
^ Mich. Aim., 1875; Mich. Man., 1875, pp. 236-240; Trih. Aim.,
pp. 86-7; McPherson, 1874, pp. 63, 64. The press material of greatest
value was found in the following journals; Post, Adv. and Trih., Eve.
News, Free Press, Jackson Cit., Argus, Hillsdale Standard, Battle
Creek Daily Eagle, Kal. Gazette, Kal. Tel., Lansing State Rep., Tra-
verse City Herald, Muskegon News.
» Post, Nov. 9, 1874.
173] ^^^ SCHISM IN THE REPUBLICAN PARTY 173
elements than was the Democracy, while its prohibition
sympathies alienated the German element. The adminis-
tration of state finances by Treasurer Collier elicited harsh'
criticism and the large surplus with continued taxation
embittered many taxpayers who would otherwise have
supported the Republican party. It was felt that its tacit
sympathy with the woman's suffrage movement had in-
jured the party, but more damaging, it was conceded, was
Sumner's " Civil Rights Bill ", which was left hanging
over the country. " Probably this will prove the final end
of attempts at class legislation," asserted the leading Re-
publican organ of the State, with reference to that bill.
" But," it continued reassuringly, '' the Democratic legis-
latures will enact so much class legislation that a reaction
will occur in favor of the Republicans." Probably the
greatest mischief was wrought by the '* inflation talk of
last winter," it was widely admitted ; and this was certainly
true. Thus the Republicans in Michigan for the first time
in their history had occasion to analyze the many causes
that contributed to what seemed to them an overwhelming
defeat, and in their adversity they were compelled to be
truthful.
The results of the fall election, coupled with the victory
of the opposition over Chandler the succeeding January,
mark the climax of Democratic influence during this
period. In the past the Democracy had suffered from the
disadvantages of the war and the Republicans had secured
virtually an absolute hold upon the state. In 1870, the
Democrats were much encouraged, only to meet utter de-
feat in the great catastrophe at the next election. In 1874
no alliances were entered into, and the coalition candidates
were nominated in separate conventions at different times.
A greater tendency to combine would probably have been
fortunate, inasmuch as four minor factions existed and
174 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [174
two subordinate tickets. The Anti-Prohibition and
Granger elements nominated no tickets, but the latter had
great influence with the Democracy. In the Fourth Con-
gressional District the opposing elements united under the
suggestive name of Independents, and their candidate, who
was a Reform Republican of long standing, was success-
ful.^ The Independents, Reformers and License Men had
many of the features of the Democratic party, while the
Prohibitionists could have merged with the Republicans.
The era of small parties had now begun and with the ap-
proach of the settlement of the great issues of the last
twelve years, popular feeling centered about the less im-
portant questions and tended to over-emphasize them. The
dissension among the Republicans this year on the currency
question was a clear forecast of the Greenback party which
was to frame its first national platform the next campaign.
THE DEFEAT OF CHANDLER
The Senatorial situation in Michigan in the winter of
1874-75 was often compared by the anti-Chandlerites to
that in Wisconsin, Minnesota and Maine, where there were
hopes of defeating the three absolute leaders. Carpenter,
Ramsey and Hamlin respectively.^ One of the earliest ex-
pressions of distinct opposition came from the Advertiser
and Tribune, which recommended the names of the three
popular Justices of the Supreme Court as possibilities —
Campbell, Cooley and Christiancy. Its denunciation of the
caucus system and its demand for Chandler's retirement
naturally provoked the resentment of the Post, and the
* Allen Potter over Julius C. Burrows. The " Independent " move-
ment of this year is not generally distinguished from the Reform and
Democratic coalition which occurred in the Congressional nomination.
' "A Trio in Tribulation," Boston Post, cited in the Free Press, Jan.
I, 1875.
175] THE SCHISM IN THE REPUBLICAN PARTY 175
month of November found the two journals in a contro-
versy which brought both sides of the issue clearly before
the people/ There was a strong movement in favor of
Webster Childs, the choice of the Granger element, and
this was a part of the arrangement previously mentioned
in connection with the Congressional nomination of the
second district. The Tribune advised the Democrats " to
stand ready to elect an anti-Chandler Republican if a real
Democrat could not be found." The disaffected Repub-
lican minority refused absolutely to support any Democrat,
and of the two elements of the opposition, the latter was
the more ready to make concessions and accept the condi-
tions imposed upon them by their allies. It was believed
by some that it had been Chandler's aim to effect a whole
series of re-elections in the state legislature which had been
strongly Republican, and this would culminate in his own
re-election.^
There was an obvious schism in the Republican party
on the grounds of personal attitude towards Chandler, and
each side was supported by prominent journals.^ Elab-
1 The numbers of the Adv. and Trib., for Nov. 10, 13, 27, are of
special interest. As early as July there was speculation as to the out-
come of the contest and the expression of personal opinions.
* Chicago Tribune, Sept. 3, 1874; mentioned in the Argus, Sept. 11.
' A. distant observer, the Boston Post, remarked that only thirty-six
of the one hundred thirty-six party journals of the state supported
Chandler. It would be impossible to verify this statement but it was
not, at least, improbable. Among the most influential defenders of
the Senator were the Post, Lansing State Rep., Grand Rapids Daily
Eagle, Kal. Tel., Marshall Statesman, Bay City Chronicle, Saginaw
Valley News, Menominee Herald, Monroe Commercial, Pontiac
Gazette, and Ionia Sentinel. His most powerful enemies were the
Free Press, Evening News, Lansing Journal, Argus and Grand Rapids
Dem. There was a movement started to establish an opposition Re-
publican paper in Grand Rapids to combat the Eagle, and one of the
prime movers of this enterprise was Edward P. Ferry, brother of
Senator Ferry,
176 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [176
orate plans were laid by the Chandlerites to " whip in the
wavering," and after the arrival in Lansing of Judge Ed-
munds, Chandler's most reliable friend, the program was
fully arranged. The lobby was immense. Besides public
accommodations private houses were thrown open to the
guests invited to visit Lansing for the Senatorial election,
and their lodging and traveling expenses were provided
for out of the Republican campaign fund. It was claimed
that the enemies in the legislature numbered only two indi-
viduals, both of whom would shortly be conciliated by
threats or by promise of offices. It was also said that
Chandler had been strengthened by securing the support of
the entire delegation from the Upper Peninsula on the
pledge to vote for a measure making that portion a separate
state. Yet whatever may have been the external appear-
ance, Chandler's friends were not hopeful.
The Republican Senatorial caucus was planned for Wed-
nesday evening, January 6th, in order to bind as many
Republicans as possible before unfavorable news could
come from Wisconsin, but it was postponed until a stronger
force could be mustered. Chandler arrived that evening,
held a reception, and greeted many guests. The next day
a conference was held and it was thought best to employ
conciliatory means to win over the disaffected. He sent
two messengers to Mr. Childs inviting him to call, but the
latter refused both times and replied that Chandler " must
call on him ". The opposition had not yet agreed upon any
candidate, for they were strongly opposed to the caucus
system, which had tended to fall into disrepute. They ap-
peared, however, to act in perfect harmony — a fact which
caused the Chandlerites much uneasiness.
On Thursday evening, January 7th, the caucus was held,
and the votes were distributed as follows: Chandler 52,
Webster Childs 3, Bagley and Campbell each one. The
177] ^^^ SCHISM IN THE REPUBLICAN PARTY 177
nomination was later made unanimous, but this fact was
not significant, for fourteen Republican members refused
to participate. Ten days later the Chandlerites held an-
other conference and the opposition declined an invitation
to join. The latter met in a separate convention to await
the action of the Chandler men, but became tired and ad-
journed. The regular conference remained in session three
hours and was characterized by one present as " an har-
monious confusion ". They finally appointed a committee
to meet the opposition the next day, but this was unavail-
ing. The breach widened and the excitement increased on
the part of the regular element, including Chandler him-
self. He was personally superintending the details of his
campaign, and even the Post did not favor the active part
he took in his own behalf.^
Tuesday, January 19th, was the day set for the election,
and great crowds thronged the capitol and filled the aisles
of the chamber. It was to be a protracted suspense, how-
ever, as a majority would not be attained until the third
day. On the first ballot the House vote was divided among
fourteen names, the Senate, ten. It was surprising that the
Democrats should have cast such a scattering vote, as it
greatly tended to their disadvantage. Chandler received
46 votes, all Republican, and among the last in the list
was Christiancy, supported by only two Republicans. Next
to Chandler the strongest candidates were George V. N.
Lothrop, Henry Chamberlain and Orlando M. Barnes,
who received respectively seventeen, twelve, and seven
Democratic votes, and Webster Childs, who was supported
by four Republicans. In the Senate there was also a large
scattering vote. Chandler receiving seventeen votes and
Christiancy only two.
1 Post, Jan. 8, 13, 1875. ;
178 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [i^g
Another ballot was taken the next day, Wednesday,
January 20th, when the joint vote for Chandler was 64,
for Lothrop 60, for Christiancy 5, and for Childs 3
Chandler had gained the support of one vote since the first
ballot, and now needed but three more to be elected. But
on the other hand, the sixty Democratic members of the
legislature had now united and given their combined sup-
port to Lothrop. They had consistently refused to resort
to the caucus plan, and seemed able at last to approach
unanimity. Of the fourteen Republicans who bolted the
regular caucus which nominated Chandler, seven had
turned to his support. Seven, however, remained obstinate
and this fact was most encouraging to the Democrats.
Chandler had received 64 votes out of a Republican mem-
bership in the legislature of 71, and if these persistent op-
ponents of Chandler's could be won over by the Democ-
racy, the victory would be theirs.
Meanwhile the Democrats and anti-Chandler Repub-
licans held secret meetings, and the result of their discus-
sions was the agreement that if a man satisfactory to both
parties could be found, they would unite and secure his
election. All available candidates were discussed, but the
choice was not large. It was the Republican faction which
had previously voted for and now proposed Isaac P.
Christiancy, and the selection was a fortunate one. On
the 2 1 St of January the third ballot was taken and the
crowd of eager spectators was greater than before. When
the roll was called Adair led off with Christiancy, and the
election resulted in Chandler's defeat by a vote of 67
to 40.
Thus on the first ballot Chandler lacked four votes of
an election; on the second he lacked only three, but the
Democrats had concentrated upon a candidate of their
own; and on the third, a coalition was formed between
179] ^^^ SCHISM IN THE REPUBLICAN PARTY lyg
them and the seven anti-Chandlerites which succeeded in
defeating Chandler, to his complete surprise and utter
chagrin. He hastened back to Washington without form-
ally taking leave of his friends in Lansing or stopping
in Detroit, and his failure to secure a fourth term was
probably a more bitter disappointment than repeated de-
feats had been to Austin Blair.
In his " downfall ", the successful opposition could see
the passing of an absolute and arbitrary leader whose hos-
tility to amnesty and southern rights and bitterness toward
members of a party sympathizing with southern interests
had kept alive unfortunate animosities for an unneces-
sarily long period of time. Furthermore, his defense of
centralizing tendencies clearly contrasted with the conser-
vative views of Christiancy on the question. Personally
he was odious to many because of his violent partisanship,
and a tendency toward unnecessarily bitter denunciation of
his opponents. His loyalty to the Republican party passed
all bounds of conviction, and his want of financial scruples
in campaign work was not always exaggerated by the op-
position.
This marks the high-tide of Democratic success within
the period of this study — or at least of anti-Republican
success — as three Representatives and a Senator of this
class were among the Michigan delegation. To the Granger-
inclined Democrats, it appeared to mark the " beginning of
the people's rule and the end of the politicians." ^
* The references consulted were S. Jour., 1875, pp. 91, loi ; H. Jour.,
pp. 126, 135-7; Mich. Coll., vol. xxix, pp. 500-1; vol. xxxv, pp. 494,
504; Post and Tribune Life of Chandler, pp. 337-9; Pree Press, Eve.
News, Post, Adv. and Trib., Lansing State Rep., and Argus for the
closing months of 1874, and especially January i to 25, 1875.
CHAPTER VII
The Politics of 1876 and the Restoration of Repub-
licanism IN Michigan
MICHIGAN AND FEDERAL POLITICS OF 1875
The issues which were most generally discussed in
Michigan as elsewhere in 1875 and 1876 were reform,
resumption, and the completion of reconstruction legisla-
tion as exemplified in the Force Bill and Civil Rights Act
The Democrats arraigned the administration party for
" profligacy in every department of public affairs, extra-
ordinary public frauds and crimes in the District of Colum-
bia, and the attempt to foist General Grant upon the coun-
try a third time." ^ The Republicans themselves empha-
sized reform in their call, March, 1876, for the state nomi-
nating convention.^ They made few attempts at apology,
and boldly eulogized the administration.
The resumption of specie payments was always one of
Chandler's favorite policies. On December 22, 1874, the
Resumption Bill passed the Senate and both he and Ferry
gave it their favorable vote. January 7th it passed the
House, and six of the nine Michigan members voted in the
affirmative.' This measure was unsatisfactory to certain
* Free Press, Oct. 22, 1875.
2 Cf. infra, p. 189.
' Rhodes, op. cit., vol. vii, pp. 69-73. The yeas were Begole, Bradley,
Burrows, Waldron, Williams, Willard. Moses T. Field voted nay,
Conger refrained from voting at all, and Hubbell was absent from
Washington. Congressional Record, pp. 208, 319, 459.
180 [180
1 8 1 ] THE RESTORA TION OF REPUBLICANISM j g i
individuals in both parties, who insisted that resumption,
though four years distant, was premature.^
The last months of the Forty-third Congress saw not
only the solution of the currency problem, but the close of
legislation upon the subject of reconstruction. The Force
Bill proposed to give the President the power to suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Louisiana,
Arkansas, Mississippi and Alabama for ^' two years and
from thence until the end of the next session of Congress
thereafter." ^ The House debates show the opposition of
one Michigan Representative, George Willard, to the
policy of " despotism in the South." He deprecated " any
and all legislative action which should result in still further
inflaming the public mind." * " Conditions a year ago
were far less disturbed than now," he observed, " due to
partisan manoeuvres in two of the southern states and the
utterly reprehensible conduct of certain unlawful combi-
nations." He advocated a policy of reconciliation in place
of coercive legislation, and his objections to the bill were
based upon the constitution. " The suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus/^ he insisted, " was
conceded by the constitution only in case of rebellion or
invasion, and that either of these contingencies now exists,
no man will pretend." Furthermore, he declared it impos-
sible to frame a federal law that should not apply alike to
all states. Lastly, he believed that further coercive fed-
eral legislation for the South was not only destructive of
material prosperity, but tended to the continued stagnation
of business and the depression of industrial activity
throughout the country.
* Palladium, Oct. 8, Nov. 19, 1875.
' Rhodes, op. cit., vol. vii, pp. 89-90.
" Cong. Record, H. R. no. 4745, Feb. 26, 27, 1875, pp. 1836-9, 1935 ;
Mar. I, 2, pp. 1940, 2035.
1 82 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [182
Of the Michigan delegation Julius C. Burrows was the
most ardent defender of the bill and he declared this to be
the only way to secure peace/ The House voted February
2y, 1875, ai^d Willard alone of the Michigan delegation
appeared against it. The Democrats in the state expressed
great satisfaction that " one Michigan Congressman cut
loose from the extremists." ^ The Republican sentiment
within the state was not unanimously in sympathy with the
bill and the more liberal journals rejoiced when the Senate
failed to take action upon the measure.
The Civil Rights Act was the outcome of a bill presented
as a memorial to Charles Sumner, and provided that
negroes be accorded equal rights in inns, public schools,
public conveyances and theatres or other places of amuse-
ment, and that they be not disqualified for service on juries.'
Probably the most ardent defender of this measure also
was Julius C. Burrows, who claimed to believe that " this
enactment was dictated by the highest considerations of
public policy, and the simplest demands of individual jus-
tice." A system of separate education would, he declared,
incur double expense and tend to foster race prejudice and
hostility. On February 4, 1875, the bill passed the House
and every Michigan member voted in the affirmative.*
To the Democrats, the bill appeared to be a device by
which the leaders of the Republican party could stir up
discord between the blacks and the whites of the South,
in order that more data could be obtained for use in the
coming campaign. Some thought during the pending of
1 Cong. Record, Feb. 27, 1875, p. 1923-5-
« Free Press, Feb. 28, 1875. The friends of the bill were the Post,
Grand Rapids Daily Eagle, and Lansing State Rep. The Adv. and
Trib., lackson Cit. and Kal Tel. were far less enthusiastic.
• Rhodes, op. cit., vol. vii, pp. 90-91.
* Cong. Record, H. R. no. 796, Feb. 4, 187S, PP- 999-ioii.
183] THE RESTORATION OF REPUBLICANISM 183
the bill that the Senate would pass it, notwithstanding the
lateness of the session and the exigencies which might
force its abandonment.^ This anticipation proved to be
well founded, for the Senate passed the House Bill 38 to
26, with Chandler and Ferry both voting in the affirmative.
On the first of March, it received the approval of the Presi-
dent.'
The spring elections were now approaching, and early
in March occurred the state conventions, none of which
framed resolutions. The Democrats met in Jackson,
March 2nd, and made nominations which were adopted by
the " Reformers " who convened the next day in Lansing.
On March 3rd, the Republicans met in Jackson, indorsed
Benjamin F. Graves for Justice of the State Supreme
Court, and named Byron M. Cutcheon and Samuel L.
Walker for Regents of the University. The candidates of
the Democrats and Reformers were strong ones, and as
politics were usually less rampant in the spring elections
than in the fall campaigns, the Republicans did not win
with a great margin.* It was said that the Democracy at-
tempted to win over Austin Blair this spring by choosing
him a delegate to their convention, but as he failed to ap-
pear, the alliance was not yet effected.
The years 1875 and 1876 saw not only the culmination
of radical reconstruction within the southern states and
the attendant negro rule, but also its final overthrow by the
» Free Press, Feb. 7, 1875.
* Cong. Record, Feb. 27, 1875, p. 1870 ; Mar. i, p. 2013; Free Press,
Mar. 3, 4.
' The nominations of the Democracy and Reformers included Ben-
jamin F. Graves for Justice of the State Supreme Court, and Samuel
Douglass and Peter White for Regents of the University. For suc-
cessor to the vacancy of Isaac P. Christiancy in the State Supreme
Court, Isaac Marsten, candidate of the Republicans, defeated Lyman
D. Morris, the Democratic nominee. Free Press, Post, Mar. 3, 1875.
1 84 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [184
establishment of white supremacy or " home rule ". In
Alabama the Democrats had succeeded in 1874, and the
next year a new constitution was adopted/ Arkansas had
received a new constitution in 1874, and set the machinery
of state government in motion. Early the succeeding year
President Grant was thwarted in his plans of intervention
by the adoption of the resolution of non-interference
framed by the House committee under the chairmanship
of Luke P. Poland. This resolution declared that " in the
judgment of this House no interference with the existing
government in Arkansas by any department of the Gov-
ernment of the United States is advisable." ^ The Repub-
lican opinion in Michigan with reference to Arkansas was
divided. There were some members who could always be
depended upon to defend Grant, and after Poland's reso-
lution was adopted, they very naturally felt that " political
chaos and rebel supremacy would become the order of the
day." «
Louisiana had been suffering under a corrupt govern-
ment maintained by federal authorities, and the approach-
ing election tended to aggravate the difficulties. The Colfax
and Coushatta massacres which had occurred in 1873 and
1874 continued to furnish the Republicans grounds for
agitation, while the fraud practised by the returning board
after election of members of the legislature, and the ex-
pulsion of five Democratic members from the legislature
early in 1875 afforded the Democrats ample subject-matter
for bitter invective."*
They were most deeply incensed, however, by the mes-
* Rhodes, op. cit., vol. vii, pp. 83-4.
2 Ibid., pp. 86-88.
» Post, Mar. 8, 1875.
* Rhodes, op. cit., vol. vii, pp. 112-115.
185] THE RESTORATION OF REPUBLICANISM 185
sage of Sheridan, who had been sent by the President to
New Orleans to investigate the actual conditions there,
and to assume military command. On January 5th he sent
his first telegram in which he characterized certain persons
in New Orleans as " banditti ", and in a second message,
he recommended the "trial of the ring-leaders of the armed
White Leagues "/ The President imposed far greater
confidence in Sheridan than in Schurz and others with
more generous views. The liberal report of Foster,
Phelps and Potter, three Representatives sent to investi-
gate affairs in New Orleans, was made public early in 1875,
and highly pleased the Democracy and less radical Repub-
licans. A second favorable report was made a little later
by Hoar, Wheeler and Frye, which proved that many of
the Republican campaign charges were fabrications. Upon
these revelations the Democrats rejoiced openly.
The Republicans in Michigan apparently were not ser-
iously divided in their views on the policy of intervention.
The indignation which was expressed by members of the
party in other states was not general in Michigan, but was
rather manifested by the Democracy. The supporters of
Grant and of Chandler in Michigan invariably defended
the policy of federal intervention and, while the second
faction was less radical, it also tended to side with the ad-
ministration rather than make concessions to the Democ-
racy. The Independent and Democratic Journals, on the
other hand, expressed bitterness and disgust at the desire
of the Republicans to make political capital for the next
election out of the disorders in Louisiana.^
In Mississippi the process of Africanization was com-
plete in 1873 ^^^ corruption and extravagance were preva-
1 Rhodes, op. cit., vol. vii, pp. 119-122.
^ Eve. News, Mar. 11; Free Press, May 13, 1874.
1 86 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [i86
lent in their worst forms. In the midst of such conditions
Lucius Q. C. Lamar delivered a eulogy on Charles Sumner
in Congress, April 2y, 1874, and presented the southern
point of view in such a way as to appeal to the sentiment
of the North/ There were a few Republicans of the
milder type in Michigan who responded sufficiently to de-
clare that " under the existing conditions in Mississippi,
' it was only a great spirit who could speak as Lamar did
of Sumner,* and it was hoped that ' perhaps the Northern
point of view would be influenced somewhat by sentiment
in the last resort.' " ^ The Democrats at once took occa-
sion to draw an apt comparison.
What would Chandler take to speak in so impartial a fashion
of Lamar, for instance, or any of the leading contemporary
spirits of the South, as Lamar did of Sumner? Isn't it prob-
able that he would have indulged in unpleasant personalities
which would have overshadowed the broader unselfishness
manifested by the Mississippian ? ^
In December the misgovernment and exorbitant taxa-
tion, particularly in Warren County, led to a riot at Vicks-
burg and the re-establishment of combined negro and
carpet-bag government under the protection of federal
troops. Another Vicksburg conflict and riots at Yazoo
City in the fall of 1875 were incidental to the preparations
of both parties for the election on November 2nd, and
when Governor Ames asked for federal troops they were
denied him — much to the pleasure of the Democrats and
the more liberal Republicans. The radical element in
Michigan attributed all the blame to the whites and re-
* Rhodes, op. cit., vol. vii, pp. 100-102.
* Adv. and Trib., April 29; Jackson Daily Cit., Apr. 30, 1874.
* Free Press, Apr. 30, 1874.
iSy] THE RESTORATION OF REPUBLICANISM 187
fused absolutely to consider their grievances. " The
sooner the White Leaguers learn to respect a legitimate
government of the majority," said a leading radical organ,
" the better it will be for them." ^ The liberal element ad-
mitted that the experiences were most trying, but declared
the only remedy to be prompt and absolute submission of
the whites.^ The differences between the two views was
one of intensity, rather than principle.
By a sweeping victory at the polls November 2, 1875,
the Democrats won the state ticket in Mississippi, most
of the local offices, a large majority of the legislature, and
four out of six members to Congress.^ Mississippi was
now redeemed from negro rule; in December the House
of Representatives admitted the Mississippi members, but
not until March, 1877, was L. Q. C. Lamar admitted to
the Senate. The radical element throughout Michigan de-
clared that only fraud and violence could accomplish this
result, and they would have been pleased to see the Presi-
dent overturn the new system.'' The liberal members agreed
that illegitimate means had been employed by the Democ-
racy, but refused to advocate interference, and the Demo-
crats expressed unbounded joy/
South Carolina had suffered from the corruption and
extravagance of negro-carpet-bag rule during the six years,
1 868- 1 874. In the last named year, Daniel H. Chamber-
lain was elected Governor, and though a Republican and
native of Massachusetts, his administration was absolutely
impartial. He was sustained by Republicans in Michigan
of all shades of opinion, and the Democrats unhesitatingly
» Lansing State Rep., Sept. 12 ; Rhodes, op. cit., vol. vii, pp. 103-4, 130-2-
^ Adv. and Trib., Oct. 19, 1874; Jackson Daily Cit., Nov. 2.
» Rhodes, op. cit., vol. vii, pp. 137-9-
* Grand Rapids Daily Eagle, Nov. 5, 1875.
* Adv. and Trib., Nov. 4; Eve. News, Nov. 6.
l88 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [igg
declared him " a rare individual among the heterogeneous
mass of office-seeking invaders of the South." ^
During the period embraced in this brief resume the
main subject of politics in Michigan as elsewhere was the
outcome of reconstruction in the several southern states.
The Republican party clearly presented two elements —
radical and liberal — of which the former tended to domi-
nate the latter in Michigan and it is extremely improbable
that the policy of the administration alienated a single
member from the Republican party in Michigan.
During the last half of December, 1875, ^^^ January of
1876, there was considerable discussion of the Universal
Amnesty bill, introduced into the House of Representatives
by Samuel J. Randall. It provided for the removal of all
disabilities remaining under the Fourteenth Amendment,
and Blaine, who had earlier favored a similar measure, now
excepted Jefferson Davis, and took occasion to deliver a
bitter invective against Davis and the treatment of North-
ern prisoners.^ He declared that the ex-Confederates
swept into Congress by the Democratic victories of 1874
were a source of danger, and he sought to revive the war
issues and the war spirit as completely as possible. This
was clearly understood by the Democrats as an attempt to
defend and justify the rigid policy of the administration
in the South and to reinstate the earlier war issues in the
campaign of 1876.^ Blaine's conduct was inexplicable on
any other grounds. The Republicans rallied loyally to his
support, and a representative organ declared that " while
there may be some differences in opinion among Repub-
licans as to the wisdom of omitting Jeff. Davis from an
1 Kal Gazette, Jan. 30, 1875 ; Rhodes, op. cit., vol. vii, pp. 161-7.
' Rhodes, op. cit., vol. vii, pp. 179-80. The Amnesty Bill did not re-
ceive a two-thirds vote, and thus failed to pass the House.
• Free Press, Feb. 4, 1876.
l8g] THE RESTORATION OF REPUBLICANISM 189
act of general amnesty, yet the party everywhere insists
that rebel leaders shall seek their pardon before it is
granted." ^ x\gain, it observed that " amnesty is parallel
to the pardoning power, and its exercise must be guided
by discretion, since it is different now, with a Democratic
House, from what it was in the Forty-third Congress
where the Republicans constituted the majority.^
MICHIGAN AND THE REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTIAL TICKET
This year each of the two leading parties met twice in
state convention, once for the appointment of delegates to
the national convention, and again for the nomination of
a state ticket. As early as January, the call was issued for
the first Republican convention. The selection of Grand
Rapids for the meeting was a concession to the west and
northwest portions of the state, whose majorities were
large and reliable, and who asked the favor with much
earnestness.^ The invitation to join the party was ex-
tended to " all in favor of the prosecution and punishment
of all official dishonesty, and of the economic administra-
tion of the government by honest, faithful, capable offi-
cers." * The element of reform was thus a prominent
feature of the Republican program, and the responsible
organs of the party rarely attempted to defend the scandals
of the administration.
As the time approached for the nominating convention,
the problem of presidential possibilities continued puzzling.
" In other presidential elections, Michigan Republicans
had a presidential candidate ready, but this year, they have
none," remarked a reliable party journal.^ On May loth,
* Post, Jan. 15. ' Post, Jan. 18.
^ Adv. and Trib., Feb. 2, 1876.
* Ibid., Jan. 15. ^ /did., Apr. 25.
igO THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [igo
the convention met and among the prominent Republicans
present were Governor Bagley, Senator Ferry, and Zacha-
riah Chandler. The delegates elected to Cincinnati, of
whom William A. Howard was one, reflected the uncertain
attitude of their party, and were far from agreement in
their choice of presidential candidate. Certain prominent
journals gave out a division in favor of Blaine over Bris-
tow by a proportion of i8 to 4. Others believed that the
former had but 1 1 supporters, the latter 7, Hayes 3, Morton
one. It was well known when the delegates were elected
that a small majority favored Blaine, while those who sup-
ported Bristow were not very firm.^ The party leaders
themselves within the state did not agree in their prefer-
ences. Chandler insisted upon Blaine, even as late as
Thursday, June I5th.^ Governor Bagley favored Hayes
from an early date, and William A. Howard preferred
Morton. As a result, the delegates were uninstructed and
thus were free to exercise their individual preferences.
The National Republican Convention met in Cincinnati,
June 14th. On the previous day the Michigan delegation
assembled, and a few of the members representing the in-
terests of the Post desired to have Chandler included in
the national ticket, but he did not encourage it and his
name was dropped after the first test ballot. When the
first test vote for President was taken by the Michigan dele-
gation at 11.30 on the morning of June 13th, Bristow re-
ceived II, Blaine 6, Hayes 3, and Chandler i. Howard,
who had previously preferred Morton, came over to Hayes*
support in time to cast one of the three votes on this ballot
On the second test vote the Michigan name disappeared,
^ Adv. and Trib._, May 10, 27, 1876; Free Press, May 11, 13.
2 On June 15 he telegraphed Eugene Hale at Cincinnati: "The eyes
of the country are upon the Michigan delegation. They must vote
for Blaine."
igi] THE RESTORATION OF REPUBLICANISM igi
Blaine led with Hayes second, and Bristow received but
one vote. The friends of the last complained that Mich-
igan had been instrumental in defeating him as they be-
lieved that, had the delegation held together for him, he
would have been nominated. The steady accessions to his
support at first indicated this result, but his votes were lost
to Hayes. ^
The Michigan delegation with but one exception had
agreed before going into the convention upon Hayes as
second choice. When Blaine took the lead, it was known
that if the fifth ballot were not decisive, Connecticut would
throw her vote for Hayes. To take the first step in what
promised to be a successful movement, the Michigan men
decided to come out for Hayes, themselves, on the fifth.
In the first four ballots of the Michigan members, Bristow
had led, Blaine followed, with Hayes a close third. Will-
iam A. Howard, the Chairman of the Michigan delegation,
had already stepped into the aisle to state the vote of the
fifth ballot, when the one persistent Blaine supporter
yielded, and the unanimous voice of the state was declared
for Hayes. Referring to him, Howard declared, " there
is a man in this section who has beaten in succession three
Democratic candidates for President in his own state,"
and he wished to " give him a chance to beat another
Democratic candidate for the Presidency in the broader
field of the United States." '
* Adv. and Trib., June 13, 14; Eve. News, June 17.
" Official proceedings of the National Republican Convention, pp. 250,
305, 323, 330, 345, 370, 371. Numbers of the Eve. News, Adv. and
Trib., Post, Lansing State Rep., and Argus for June. The ballots of
the Michigan delegation were as follows:
Ballot
Bristow
Hayes
Blaine
Conkling
I
9
4
8
I
2
9
4
8
I
3
10
4
8
4
II
5
6
5. 6, 7.
22
192 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [192
The Republican organs were pleased to believe that
Michigan's action had changed the trend of the votes and
secured the nomination of Hayes. It undoubtedly caused
the concentration of scattering votes to some extent, and
however decisive the influence of the Michigan delegation
may have been, the matter was a subject of much self-
praise on the part of Republican organs.^ After the con-
vention there were genuine regrets expressed for Blaine's
defeat and it was hoped by some Republicans that " he
might grace a cabinet position the next fall." The Demo-
crats felt that " Blaine, the favorite candidate of the Re-
publicans^ had been slaughtered for Hayes, who was him-
self a strong candidate." ^ The election of Chandler by the
national convention to the chairmanship of the national
Republican committee and the executive committee was
effectively exploited by the Democrats on the ground that
the party indorsed the notorious system of extortionate
campaign assessments.^ They also foresaw the possibility
of an arbitrary and unscrupulous management of the cam-
paign this year, for the political methods of Chandler were
well known to everybody.
STATE POLITICS OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY
The personal politics of 1876 were unusually interest-
ing, and the crossplans of several of the leaders with refer-
ence to the senatorship greatly complicated the Republican
state campaign. There was a strong movement afoot for
^ Rhodes, op. cit., vol. vii, pp. 206-212. The persons chiefly respon-
sible for the solid vote were Dr. Rynd of Adrian, and W. G. Thompson
and Dr. Kiefer of Detroit.
^ Adv. and Trih., June 19. Also Marshall Statesman, June 29;
Benton Harbor Times, June 30.
'Rhodes, op. cit., vol. vii, p. 223; Hav^orth, The Hayes-Tilden Dis-
puted Election of 1876, p. 42; Free Press, June 15,
193] '^HE RESTORATION OF REPUBLICANISM 193
William A. Howard's candidacy for governor, and this
apparently originated in Washington, D. C. As Mr.
Howard was at this time sixty-three years of age and too
infirm to assume the responsibilities of that office, the
movement at first caused much uncertainty and consterna-
tion. It was well known that Chandler aspired to return
to the Senate, and the earliest time at which this could be
accomplished was on the expiration of Ferry's term in
March of 1877. Probably the strongest rival besides the
incumbent himself would have been William A. Howard,
and the purpose was soon understood to be the safe dis-
position of the latter who could not then oppose Chandler
in the contest. This would have occasioned a break be-
tween Chandler and Ferry, which many believed would
never occur, as they had always been congenial save on the
currency question. Besides completely disposing of
Howard, the success of this scheme would have crippled
Ferry for the senatorship. The western portion of the
state would be satisfied — or at least appeased — by supply-
ing an incumbent for the gubernatorial office, and the
selection of a Senator from the central or western quarter
would not be considered so imperative. The suspicion that
there were designs upon Ferry's seat in the Senate became
strengthened by the proposal to have Ferry's name brought
before the Cincinnati convention with reference to the
Vice-Presidency. The Senator did not decline absolutely
but it was clear that his preference was to remain in his
present position.
Another solution of the Howard problem was volun-
teered after Chandler's denial of the imputed senatorial
designs on his part. It was said that Governor Bagley as-
pired to Ferry's place and thought it advisable to forego
a re-election in order to be free for the Senate. Whatever
were the impelling motives for this agitation, it was gen-
194 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [194
erally suspected that Howard was the candidate of the
*' Chandler Ring," and the position of Charles M. Cros-
well, the " People's Candidate ", was strengthened. The
movement did not arouse the enthusiasm expected and
Howard himself was not in favor of it.
The state Republican convention to nominate the state
ticket was held at Lansing, August 3rd. The platform
which it adopted was exclusively a eulogy of the party and
its candidates, and contained no declaration on the tariff
or currency. The renomination of Charles M. Croswell
for governor and successor of Charles Bagley was ac-
claimed unanimously without the formality of a ballot.
He had been a State Senator from 1862 to 1868, Represen-
tative from 1872 to 1874, and president of the constitu-
tional convention of 1867. His abilities as a parliamen-
tarian were a potent factor in his popularity as well as his
interests in all charitable and penal reforms. The other
names on the ticket were not among the best known in the
state, and the Democrats declared that several were com-
promises with the Granger element.^
THE DEMOCRACY
The Democrats of the state were no nearer unanimity
in the matter of presidential candidate than were the Re-
publicans. There was early mention of William Allen,
General Hancock, Judge David Davis, and Charles Francis
Adams, while Tilden and Hendricks were naturally the
leading preferences. The hard-money element rebelled at
William Allen, and Davis and Adams were not considered
sufficiently partisan. It was remarked that enough experi-
1 The personal politics of the time and the state convention are dealt
with most fully in the Post, Adv. and Trib. and Eve. News, for June,
July and August. Most of the discussion took place after the first
state convention when the main interest of the party was the selection
of ctate and Congressional candidates.
195] ^-^^ RESTORATION OF REPUBLICANISM 195
meriting had been done in 1872 with candidates with a his-
tory not thoroughly Democratic.^
The state Democratic convention to choose delegates
to the national convention met in Lansing, May 24th,
with William L. Webber as temporary chairman, and it
was declared the largest and most enthusiastic in fifteen
years. Of the twenty-two delegates elected, at least two-
thirds were known to favor Tilden, and by some it was
thought that eighteen would vote for him. Their first
trial ballot taken at St. Louis, on Wednesday evening,
June 27th, the day before the national convention opened,
disclosed a vote of 14 for Tilden, 6 for Hendricks, and 2
for Seymour. There was great disappointment over the
small vote for Tilden and a dissension among the members
from Michigan caused some alarm. Mr. M. I. Mills had
been chosen delegate over Mr. Wells on the understanding
that the former would support Tilden, but being disap-
pointed in not receiving the chairmanship of the delega-
tion, he wasted his vote for Seymour. When the first
ballot of the convention was taken, the disaffection had
disappeared and the two Seymour votes were turned over
to Hendricks.^ On the second ballot Tilden received all
but the three votes of Blair, Burrows and Chamberlain,
who persisted in supporting Hendricks.^ The completed
ticket, Tilden and Hendricks, met with the general ap-
proval of the Democracy within the state.
Besides the choice of delegates the Lansing convention
of May 24th had other important business before it. A
struggle had been in progress for some time between fac-
1 Argus, Apr. 28, 1876.
2 The eight votes for Hendricks were cast by Austin Blair, Bower,
Burrows, Chamberlain, Mills, Shoemaker, Stimson and Turner.
' Official Proceedings of the National Democratic Convention, 1876,
pp. 144, 146.
196 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [ig6
tions of the party over the currency question. Great ap-
prehension was expressed by hard-money advocates with
reference to possible unwise action on the part of the state
convention, and warnings were uttered against any anti-
resumption resolutions, or declarations which " could be
tortured into nullifying any of the old issues settled by
the war." ^ The proceedings of the convention clearly
exhibited the differences within the party. Two reports
were presented from the committee on resolutions. That
of the majority embodied twelve resolutions dealing mostly
wnth general party principles and justifying tariff on
grounds of revenue only! The minority report declared
that '' Sixteen years of Republican rule has entailed upon
the country vast indebtedness, national and domestic," and
denounced all measures " making the payment of indebt-
edness more burdensome." The Resumption Act was de-
clared a '* sharp legislative device in the unwarrantable
interest of the creditor class, calculated to enrich the few
and sacrifice the best interests of the many." The minor-
ity demanded its repeal and that of the Act of 1873 demon-
etizing silver. After an extended debate the majority re-
port was adopted with the exception of the tariff resolu-
tion, which was laid on the table. The lines were obviously
drawn on the currency question and the vote stood 157 to
70 in favor of hard money. A large number of delegates
had left the convention when the vote was taken but all
seemed satisfied with the work.
The Democracy thus officially repudiated the anti-
resumption tendencies of a minority of its members, and it
was certain that at least a majority of the delegates chosen
to the St. Louis Convention hoped for the nomination of
the hard-money candidate. The currency issue was, how-
1 Speech of Hon. W. P. Wells of Detroit before the State Con-
vention, Argus, June 2.
197] THE RESTORATION OF REPUBLICANISM igy
ever, a delicate matter and was cautiously handled by the
leaders throughout the campaign. From the omission of
positive declarations in its platform, it was evident that a
negative policy was to be pursued by the Democracy, and
tactful arrangements were made for the state nominating
convention in August.
It might be questioned whether the Democrats of Mich-
igan were traditionally a hard-money or a soft-money
party. They had proudly stood forth in 1874 and pre-
sented a united opposition to the soft-money tendency
which threatened to cause a schism in the Republican party.
The Grand Rapids Democrat, one of the strongest advo-
cates of paper money, considered the hard-money tendency
of the Michigan Democracy in 1874 " a mistake and an
exception." ^ The fact that a large minority of the party
two years before preferred a permanent paper currency
gives some support to this declaration. Furthermore, as
the Greenbackers united with the Democrats in three names
on the state tickets this year, the two parties obviously had
something in common. It is safe, however, to assert that
the Democracy in Michigan was less disposed to favor
paper currency than in many other states during this period.
The Democratic state central committee met in Detroit,
June 7th, and devised an elaborate plan of organizing
political clubs in every town and city. The committee was
composed of younger men than dominated the other party,
and it was urged that this class be introduced into all
committees from the local to the Congressional. Secret
aid was promised to the Prohibitionists in order to draw
heavily from the Republicans. The greenback question was
to be carried into the western Congressional conventions,
but strictly excluded from the State Convention. This
omission, it was thought, could be partially compensated
1 Apr. 20.
198 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [igg
for in the adoption of a series of reform resolutions. A
compromise would be made with Henry Chamberlain, the
Greenback candidate for Governor, who would be re-
quested to withdraw from the candidacy for governorship
and accept the nomination for Congress on a Greenback
platform. His friends believed he could carry his district
in this way as it was inclined in that direction.^
The regular state convention for the nomination of a
state ticket met in Detroit, August 9th. The platform was
drawn up along the lines indicated by the state central
committee, and indorsed the previous state and national
resolutions. William X Webber, who had been chairman
of the Michigan delegation to St. Louis, was nominated
by Peter White for governor. He was the leader of the
Anti-Chandler forces in the state legislature of 1875, and
was considered a strong candidate. Three of the names
on the state ticket were later adopted by the Greenback
party, and being joint nominations they received stronger
support than the other candidates.^ Strangely enough,
Austin Blair, once a strong Republican, had become by this
time fully in sympathy with the Democratic party of the
state, and was chosen elector-at-large by the side of G. V.
N. Lothrop, who had never been allied with the Republican
party. This event is the last stage in the progress of
Blair's political career. He had served as the strongly
Republican War Governor, i860- 1864, he had been guber-
natorial candidate of the combined Reform and Democratic
parties in 1872, and was now chosen an elector-at-large by
the Democracy in 1876.
THE GREENBACK PARTY
The tendency in Michigan to favor cheap currency had
* Eve. News, June 8.
^ Free Press, Aug. 10, 11.
199] ^^^ RESTORATION OF REPUBLICANISM 199
been shunned by the Democracy in 1874, and after almost
causing a schism in the Republican party it was finally
overcome by the hard-money majority led by Chandler
and Jacob M. Howard. The Greenback faction, however,
gained strength during 1875, and by February of the suc-
ceeding year it was evident that they had determined to
enter upon the presidential campaign as a separate and in-
dependent party with their own candidates and platform/
Early in February, the Greenbackers of the various states
called a National Convention to meet in Indianapolis, May
17th, and already in January and February, state conven-
tions had been held in Indiana and Illionis. The Repub-
licans in Michigan were confident that the " Independents,"
as the Greenbackers called themselves, could not carry a
single state, and that there was no danger that they would
throw the election into the House. "If the Democratic Na-
tional Convention should nominate a real inflationist like
Allen of Ohio." the Advertiser and Tribune declared, " the
Greenback faction would be of hardly greater account in
the election of 1876 than were the straight Democrats in
1872. But, should both parties defend hard money, the
new movement would probably develop somewhat such
strength as did the Free Soilers in 1848 and 1852," the
journal continued, '* and seriously impair the political situ-
ation in Michigan as well as in Indiana, Illinois, and Ohio."^
It was thought far better if they separated from the two
main parties than if they remained with them, as their in-
fluence in the latter case was sure to be disastrous.^
The Greenbackers this year did organize as a separate
party and they held a preliminary convention in Jackson,
^ Adv. and Trib., Feb. 4, 1876.
' Feb. 21.
^ Ibid., Apr. 5.
200 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [200
May 3rd.^ This body framed a platform which demanded
the unconditional repeal of the Resumption Act, and de-
clared it " the duty of Congress to so regulate the volume
of currency that the rate of interest shall never be greater
than the increase of wealth by productive labor." It de-
fended the " efforts of the laboring class to improve their
condition " against the charges that they were " commu-
nistic and incendiary," and demanded the reservation of
the public lands for actual settlers.
On August the 29th the Greenbackers held their state
nominating convention. They named Levi Sparks for gov-
ernor and adopted the Democratic nominations for lieuten-
ant-governor, auditor-general, and state treasurer. They
also made independent nomination in the first, second, third
and seventh Congressional districts, and in the fourth, fifth
and ninth they accepted the Democratic candidates. In
the two other districts no action was taken. ^
There was a very friendly relationship existing between
the Democratic and Greenback parties during this cam-
paign, and the Republicans intimated that it was not an un-
selfish one. The Democracy, it was said, hoped to win
through the Greenback party, by inducing all the Repub-
licans possible to vote the Greenback ticket, and all the
Greenbackers possible to vote the straight Democratic
ticket. In this way, the new party became a convenient
medium through which the Republican party could be
weakened and the Democracy reinforced by a judicious
distribution of dubious voters.^ To what extent this plan
was worked by the managers of the state Democracy can-
^ Free Press, May 5; Palladium, May 12; Ann. Cyc, pp. 551-4- The
Niles Mirror and Battle Creek Journal were Greenback sheets but no
files of them for this period have been available to me.
» Free Press, Aug. 30.
* Post, Oct. I, 27, 1876; Lansing State Rep., Nov. 3-
20l] THE RESTORATION OF REPUBLICANISM 201
not be known, but it is very probable that the Republicans
had some grounds for their suspicion.
In addition to the three parties in Michigan above men-
tioned the Prohibitionists revived and rallied from their
successive defeats at the polls. They held their state con-
vention in Detroit, March 22nd, and chose a state ticket
headed by A. Williams for governor.^ Their platform
demanded with some bitterness " the restoration of prohi-
bition " in place of legislative regulation of license for the
sale of liquors.
THE ELECTION OF 1876
The campaign was waged in Michigan principally upon
the currency question. It was the favorite charge of the
Democrats that their opponents had given the country the
Greenback currency, while the Republicans replied with a
long list of charges of which the following are typical.
The Democrats
at first encouraged states rights, and thus secession and war;
when in power they refused to take steps against disruption;
they showed sympathy with the rebellion, and when the vic-
tory was near at hand, they declared in National Convention
the war to be a failure ; since the war, they obstructed a peace-
ful readjustment, and opposed in Congress and the several
state legislatures the last three amendments ; they condoned
the outrages of the whites against the negroes in the South,
and in general, were said to " contain the worst elements
of society." ^ Meantime, election approached. The expec-
tations of both parties before the election seemed very
1 In the first five districts the Prohibitionists later made nominations
to Congress.
' Post, Sept. 22, 1876, copying from the Republican Magazine edited
by the radical element in Michigan. Unfortunately no copies have
been available.
202 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [202
conservative. The Republicans repeatedly assured them-
selves that the Democratic triumph of 1874 was '* tempor-
ary and exceptional ". However, they predicted that there
was no reason for either party to expect '' a tidal wave
bringing them a great majority." ^
The prophecy was not a false one. In both the presi-
dential and the state elections, the Republicans polled a
little over 52 per cent of the total vote of the state, and this
was obviously no '' great majority ". The fact that Grant
had received 63.86 per cent of the entire popular vote in
1872 and Hayes but 52.27 per cent this year, apparently
disclosed a large decline in the dominant party. ^ This is,
however, somewhat less serious than it appears, since many
Democrats refused to vote for Greeley in 1872 and thus
gave the Republicans a larger proportional following than
they otherwise would have had. As this unusual condition
of affairs no longer existed, a position nearer equilibrium
was attained, and the party balance reacted in favor of the
Democracy.
The vote for governor was very similar to that for Presi-
dent, and the support of the other members of the state
ticket closely approximated that of the governor.^ Mr.
Croswell, the successful candidate, was fifty-one years of
age and a prominent lawyer of Adrian. In personality and
politics he was highly respected by both parties, and the
most serious comment ever passed upon him during the
campaign was " his lack of positiveness ".
^ Adv. and Trib., Nov. 5.
' Hayes received 166,901, Tilden 141,595, Cooper, the Greenback
candidate, 9,060; Mich. Aim., 1877, pp. 13-65; Trib. Aim., 1877, pp.
83-85; Mich. Man. 1877, pp. 209-212. These votes include the returns
from the counties of Chippewa, Mackinac and Schoolcraft which were
not received in time for the official canvass but which show the party-
preferences of those localities.
• Croswell received 165,926, Webster 142,492, Sparks 8,297, and Wil-
liams, 874. Mich. Man., 1877, pp. 213-294; Mich. Aim., 1877, pp. 13-24-
203] TH^ RESTORATION OF REPUBLICANISM 203
In the Congressional elections, the Republicans were as
a rule victorious. In the first district alone was a Demo-
crat, Alpheus S. Williams, elected to Congress. His ma-
jority was somewhat larger than it was two years before
when as a Democrat and Reform candidate, he defeated
Field, the Republican.^
In the state legislature, the Republicans showed the
greatest gains. Their joint majority rose from 10 to 64
and their membership now exceeded three-fourths of the
body. The Upper Peninsula remained divided, and in the
five upper tiers of counties, which showed a tendency
toward the Democracy in 1872, the Republicans were
strongly predominant. In the central portion the latter
were also in the majority, but in the south the parties were
as usual much more evenly divided.^
The Greenback vote varied widely but nowhere did it
exceed 13^^ per cent of the total vote, and this it received
in Kent County. The party gained greater support in the
counties of the lower west and south. ^ The names on the
Prohibition state ticket received on an average only 750
votes this year, while the so-called *' Temperance candi-
dates " two years before polled 3,900 votes on an average.
This falling-ofT was undoubtedly due to the activity of
the State License party since 1874. The Prohibition can-
didates for Congress in the first five districts received but
little support, and in those which had made nominations
for Congress in 1874, it was evident the support had de-
* Mich. Aim., 1877, p. 66. The greatest Democratic gains are notice-
able in Branch, Hillsdale, Houghton, Ionia, Kent, Lenawee and Van
Buren Counties.
' The most evenly balanced counties were Clinton, Ingham, Jackson,
Livingston, Macomb. Oakland and St. Clair.
' Allegan, Barry, Berrien, Branch, Hillsdale, Kent, Muskegon, Newago^
St. Joieph, Van Buren and Wayne.
204 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [204
creased. The Temperance advocates received a further
discouragement by the adoption of the proposed amend-
ment permitting the sale of intoxicating liquors under
rigid regulations/
Besides the amendment providing for the licensed sale
of liquors, two others were submitted to the people at the
general elections. The proposition to increase the salaries
of circuit court judges was again defeated by the close
vote of 65,371 to 65,966, and that authorizing the submis-
sion of the question of amendment or revision at spring as
well as fall elections was adopted by a vote of 52,306 to
21,684.'
THE RE-ELECTION OF SENATOR FERRY
At this point the Senatorial election can best be consid-
ered; for though it did not occur until January, the story
of Michigan and the contested election does not close until
early in March. The latter subject will, therefore, be con-
sidered last in order that it may not be interrupted. The
Senatorial election of 1877 was less spirited than it had been
for years. As Chandler was busied now with his duties as
Secretary of the Interior and especially as Chairman of the
Republican national committee, he did not interfere in the
movement to re-elect Ferry this year. The career of the
latter as a President of the Senate had made him more
popular than any measures he had introduced or furthered
— except perhaps his currency policy, which found support
among the soft-money element. The opinion is now gener-
ally expressed that he was politically a weak man and the
fact was undoubtedly realized at that time, but fortunately
^ An amendment to Section 47, Article TV. The vote was 60,639 in
its favor, to 52,561 in opposition.
* Mich. Aim., 1877, pp. 51, 64-66; Mich. Man., 1879, pp. 174-6.
205] THE RESTORATION OF REPUBLICANISM 205
for him there was no strong rival for the nomination.
William A. Howard was too infirm to think of the Senator-
ship, and Austin Blair had so far forsaken the Republican
party that he had been placed on the electoral ticket of the
Democracy in company with George V. N. Lothrop, a
staunch hard-money Democrat. The position of Ferry on
the currency question undoubtedly alienated many, though
it secured for him a portion of the vote of the Greenback
party. Resumption was now provided for, and the im-
portance of the currency question was diminished to such
an extent that it no longer formed the main criterion of
party judgment. It was Ferry's parliamentary ability that
was undoubtedly the strongest in his favor, and the impar-
tiality he showed in presiding during the electoral count
was to confirm the high regard in which he was held.
At first it was expected to run Governor Bagley in oppo-
sition to Ferry, but the movement was not a strong one.
In the Republican caucus of the state legislature held
Wednesday evening, January 3rd, not a half-dozen mem-
bers could be found to support Governor Bagley, and as
his friends decided to withdraw his name. Ferry was
chosen by unanimous vote. His brother, Edward P. Ferry,
addressed the caucus and expressed appreciation for the
nomination. It was true that " a hard-money party had,"
as the Democrats observed, *' selected as its candidate one
of the softest of soft-money fanatics." ^
There was far more rivalry among the factions of the
Democratic party. On January nth, the Democrats held
their legislative caucus at which thirty-one were present.
Three ballots were taken, the first two of which were in-
formal, the last formal. There were three possibilities —
^ It was decided at this caucus that each Congressional district should
second Ferry's nomination, but no action was taken in the first dis-
trict in which Bagley resided. Adv. and Trib., Jan. 4, 1877.
2o6 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [206
General Charles S. May, once a supporter of Johnson, and
now a prominent Democrat who had several times been
candidate for high state offices, and the two Democratic
electors, Austin Blair and General G. V. N. Lothrop. On
the first ballot, May led with 11 votes, Blair followed a
close second with 10, and Lothrop ranked last. On the
third ballot, May received 18 votes, Blair 13, while Lothrop
received none, and on the motion of Senator Shoemaker
the nomination of May was made unanimous. It is ob-
vious that Blair was not far from gaining the candidacy,
and had he succeeded, he would then have accomplished
the rare political feat of first serving as War Governor and
Republican Representative in Congress and after a few
years becoming the Senatorial candidate of the Democracy.
The election took place January i6th, and Thomas W.
Ferry, the Republican candidate, was again chosen Sen-
ator. The joint vote was 94 to 32 in Ferry's favor, and
one of the two senatorships was thus provided for until
March 3, 1883.'
The Democrats were not silent upon the question of
Ferry's election. *' Governor Bagley found the office-hold-
ing element under Chandler too strong," insinuated a
Democratic journal, and Chandler personally was very
hostile to any candidate from Detroit." ^ As Chandler was
at the time Secretary of the Interior and not a candidate
for the office, it might be wondered why he should wish to
defeat a resident of Detroit. The reason lay in the fact
that he expected to run for the next Senatorial election,
and understood the significance of the '* locality principle,"
which required a territorial balance of representation in
the upper house of Congress.
*| Senate, 23 to 9, House 71 to 23. H. Jour., 1877, pp. 147-9; Post,
Grand Rapids Daily Eagle, Jan. 12, 1877.
• Free Press, Jan. 6, 1877.
207] THE RESTORATION OF REPUBLICANISM 207
MICHIGAN AND THE DISPUTED ELECTORAL COUNT
The Presidential election and the Hayes-Tilden con-
test were watched in Michigan as elsewhere with a zeal
that overshadowed the interest in both the State elec-
tions and the choice of Senator. From November 8, 1876,
to March 3, 1877, the attention of both parties was directed
exclusively to the outcome of the controversy, with no in-
terruption except the Senatorial election in January, which
commanded far less interest this year than usual. It is
generally believed that several members of the National
Republican Committee attempted to establish a Republican
victory by issuing bulletins and sending messages the
morning following the election, declaring Hayes President.
At a very early hour the morning of November 8th, William
E. Chandler wrote three telegrams to this effect, " Hayes
is elected if we have carried South Carolina, Florida, and
Louisiana," and one was sent by him and Mr. John C.
Reid, news editor of the New York Times, to the Return-
ing Board of each of the three states.
It was also during the early morning that Zachariah
Chandler, the National Republican Chairman, wrote the
telegram which has become well known, " Rutherford B
Hayes has received 185 electoral votes and is elected," and
sent it over the wires of the Associated Press. The motive
was alleged by the Democrats to be a conspiracy among
leading Republican politicians to take advantage of the un-
certainty expressed in a message of William Barnum to
the New York Times, concerning the three doubtful south-
ern states and Oregon.^
1 Chandler wrote this telegram seated in his office in the Fifth Avenue
Hotel, New York City, the headquarters of the National Committee.
William Barnum was the Chairman of the Democratic National Com-
mittee. Haworth, The Hayes-Tilden Disputed Election of 1876, pp.
50-52; Rhodes, op. cit., vol. vii, p. 228, and note; Post and Tribune
2o8 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [208
On the same day, November 8th, the Detroit Free Press
on the other hand declared victory certain for the Demo-
crats, and the succeeding day it announced the election of
Tilden as an accomplished fact. The same organ declared
there were no grounds for doubt, as the party was sure of
victory " unless there should be cheating." During these
three anxious days the leading Republican journals never
admitted defeat, and on November nth the Advertiser and
Tribune ventured to assert that South Carolina, Louisiana,
Florida and Mississippi had gone Republican. However.
November 13th, it was generally conceded by both parties
that the uncertainty would be protracted, though at the
same time each claimed the victory.
The two views concerning the correct method of count-
ing the electoral vote in Congress were held in Michigan,
as elsewhere, by members of the two opposing parties.
Some of the Republicans in Michigan, led by Chandler, de-
clared that to the President of the Senate belonged the
power to count the electoral votes. The Constitution pro-
vides that " the President of the Senate shall, in the pres-
ence of the Senate and the House of Representatives, open
all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted."
Upon this provision, then, a group of Michigan Republi-
cans claimed for Mr. Ferry the exclusive right to count
the votes — however unwilling he may have been to assume
the responsibilty — and the two houses they considered
were witnesses rather than participants in the process.
The main subject of controversy was the twenty-second
joint rule which provided that the electoral vote of any
State could be excluded by either house. This rule had
Life of Chandler, p. 356 et seq.; Foulke, Life of Oliver P. Morton,
p. 432; Mich. Coll., vol. xxix, p. 593; North American Review, "The
Death Struggle of the Republican Party," by George W. Julian, p. 282;
Eve. News, Apr. 6, 1877.
209] THE RESTORATION OF REPUBLICANISM 209
remained in force since the election of 1864, but as it had
not been re-enacted by the present Congress, it could not be
considered as binding upon it, and either house could law-
fully refuse to acquiesce in its further application. As the
majority of the House were Democratic, it was obvious
that should the rule be considered still in force, they would
throw out the returns from the Republican authorities in
the three doubtful southern states. South Carolina, Florida
and Louisiana, and thus secure the election of Mr. Tilden.
The majority of the Republicans were therefore strong
opponents of the joint rule, while the Democrats were its
staunch defenders.^
On December 7th, while this question was receiving gen-
eral discussion, George W. McCrary, a Representative
from Iowa, proposed a plan by which the question of joint
rule could be evaded by the appointment of a Joint Com-
mittee on the Election by the Senate and the House. Both
bodies adopted a resolution to this effect and promptly ap-
pointed their respective committees of seven, in which the
only Michigan member was George Willard of the House.
When, after almost a month had elapsed, this Joint Com-
mittee was found to be powerless in effecting an adjust-
ment of the two conflicting views, it was again McCrary
who devised a plan which he hoped would be successful.^
This was developed by January 13th in the secret sessions
of the Joint Committee, of which McCrary was a mem-
ber, and provided for a tribunal of fifteen whose member-
ship was to include five Representatives, five Senators, and
five Justices of the Supreme Court. As it was known that
the Senate would choose Republicans and the House Demo-
crats, it was obvious that the political status of the Com-
mission as a whole would be determined by the preference
^ Burgess, Reconstruction and the Constitution, p. 283 et seq.
' Rhodes, op. cit., vol. vii, pp. 248, 250-1.
2IO THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [210
of the majority of the Justices. This was left to chance,
by excluding by lot one of the names of the six senior As-
sociate Justices. The plan became generally known by
January 15th, and was opposed in Michigan by members
of both parties, who urged the impropriety of leaving so
grave a problem to be settled by lot.^
After various attempts at agreement upon a satisfactory
organization of the Commission, Senator Edmunds de-
vised a plan acceptable to all the members of the Joint
Committee save Morton, and framed a bill providing that
" no electoral vote or votes of any state from which but
one return has been received shall be rejected except by the
affirmative vote of the two Houses." In the cases of states
from which there were more than one return — Florida,
Louisiana, South Carolina and Oregon — all such returns
and papers must be submitted to the judgment and de-
cision of an Electoral Commission. This body was given
the same form of organization as that under McCrary's
plan, except the choice of the fifth justice by the first four.^
As fortunate and commendable as was this proposition,,
there was a considerable element of opposition to it in
Michigan, headed by Zachariah Chandler. He vigorously
objected to the measure and declared there was but one
agent by whom the votes could be counted and announced^
and that was the President of the Senate. Generally, how-
ever the Edmunds plan met with very friendly support in
Michigan, among both the Democrats and less extreme Re-
publicans.*
1 Post, Jan. 16, 1877, with the views of Chandler and William A.
Howard.
' Rhodes, op. cit., vol. vii, p. 255 ; Post and Trib. Life of Chandler,
p. 358; Post, Jan. 21, 1877.
' Argus, Free Press, Eve. News, Jackson Daily Citizen, for the
month of January.
2 1 1 ] THE RESTORA TION OF REPUBLICANISM 2 1 1
The bill was introduced into the Senate by EdmundS;
January 20th, and Christiancy, who had returned from
Columbia, South Carolina, whither he had gone as member
of the Investigating Committee, made a short speech in its
favor/ It was passed in the legislative session of Janu-
ary 24th, with Christiancy among those voting in the affir-
mative, and Ferry among the absent.^ On January 26th,
the bill came to a vote in the House, and here it was op-
posed by three Michigan members, all of whom were Re-
publicans— Omar D. Conger, Jay Hubbell and Henry
Waldron.^ The Democrats throughout the state were well
pleased with the passage of the Electoral Bill, and expressed
the hope that the Commission would not confine itself to
merely clerical duties but would not hesitate to go behind
the returns. They assured themselves that '* each house
alone or both houses together could go behind returns, and
therefore the Electoral Commission can do so." ^ On the
other hand, it was apparent that the Republicans were not
of the same opinion, using as their main argument : "Where
would the investigation end if the commission should go
behind the votes and inquire into their validity? " ^
In pursuance of the new Electoral Commission Act, the
Senate and House each chose their five members vive voce,
January 30th. In the Senate neither Michigan member
was mentioned, but both favored the five who were chosen.
In the House Willard, having received but two votes,
» Cong. Record, pp. 886-8, [S. no. 1153.]
' Cong. Record, p. 913; Rhodes, op. cit, vol. vii, p. 261.
' Cong. Record, p. 1050. Those who had been on the whole most
favorable were Allen Potter, William B. Williams, and George Wil-
lard, while Nathaniel Bradley, George Durand and Alpheus Williams
were less enthusiastic. Argus, Jan. 26, 1877.
^ Argus, Feb. 7, 1877.
<* Adv. and Trib., Feb. 2.
212 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [212
ranked eighth, and thus Michigan failed to be represented
on the Commission/
The first case to go before the Electoral Commission
was that of Florida, and and on February loth, that state
was adjudged to Hayes by a vote of 8 to 7.^ As the Com-
mission had refused to investigate the returns, the Demo-
crats were deeply disappointed and naturally considered
the activity of that body as " narrow work ". They de-
clared that as the Justices were not free from political mo-
tives, the decision was " decidedly unpalatable ". While
expressing high respect for Hayes, they considered that by
the Florida decision " a great wrong had been done the
country." ^
The next state to be considered was Louisiana, and re-
ferring to its Returning Board Senator Christiancy con-
fessed that he " had not felt and did not then feel a very
high confidence in its integrity." He feared that " they
may have sought to overcome by fraud, on their own part,
the fraud, violence and intimidations committed by their
opponents, thus creating a fearful clashing of wrongs
which would not be likely to result in the attainment of
right." " I have therefore," he continued, " felt that
whichever party should triumph — that triumph would be
no cause for exultation; that it must be accepted without
pride and not wholly without some feeling of humiliation
at some unwarrantable means used by its friends for the
attainment of their object." It is obvious that Senator
Christiancy possessed a greater degree of frankness than
most of the Republican leaders, but upon Sherman's reso-
lution to accept the report of the Commission giving the
* Cong. Record, Jan. 30, pp. 1 108-9, iii3-4- Rhodes, op. cit., vol. vii,
p. 263.
' Rhodes, op. cit, vol. vii, pp. 265-9.
» Free Press, Feb. 8, 1877.
213] THE RESTORATION OF REPUBLICANISM 213
electoral vote to Hayes, Christiancy voted with Ferry in
the affirmative.^
The case of South Carolina was decided in the Commis-
sion February 27th, and came before Congress on the suc-
ceeding day. Senator Christiancy of Michigan had served
with Cameron of Wisconsin and Merriman of North Caro-
lina on the Committee of Investigation for South Caro-
lina. He remained there and took testimony for over a
month and declared February 28th that there was no evi-
dence of any influence exerted upon the voters by the pres-
ence of the military force. " The army was used simply
to repress violence," he said, " and protect the lives of the
colored people who were fleeing to the swamps. H it had
not been there," he continued, '' the rebels would have in-
timidated negroes into voting the Democratic ticket." He
wished it understood that he did not favor a permanent
military government in these states. With reference to
going behind the returns and inquiring into the question of
fraud, he declared '' a single presidential term would not
be long enough " to complete this work. Upon the ques-
tion of adopting the Commission's decision to give South
Carolina to the Republicans, both Christiancy and Ferry
voted yea.^
After all the thirty-eight states had been considered, the
result was announced by Ferry at four o'clock Friday
morning, March 2nd — which was the close of the session
of the preceding day. Tilden had received 184 electoral
votes, Hayes 185, and was elected.^
The flood of comment on the mornings of March 3rd
and 5th included much that was bitter. If the Democracy
of the state was fairly represented by its journals, it was
^ Cong. Record, Feb. 19, 1877, p. 1683.
' Cong. Record, pp. 2001-2; Eve. News, Feb. 29, 1877.
' Rhodes, op. cit., vol. vii, pp. 278-9.
214 ^^^ POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [214
true that the party believed it had been cheated out of its
rightful victory.^ It was not strange that their invective
centered about Zachariah Chandler, the National Repub-
lican Chairman, against whom charges were made of en-
couraging an unscrupulous manipulation of the returns
from the dubious Southern states. They alleged that one
week before election Chandler declared : "If the result shall
depend upon South Carolina, Florida and Louisiana, Hayes
will be elected. We have the means to carry these states." ^
On Hayes' inauguration, a prominent Democratic organ
called him a minority President but show^ed a strong ap-
preciation of his policy. " He contemplates building up a
Republican party in the South," it observed, " composed of
some other elements than Scalawag Whites and ignorant
Blacks. He designs a radically different policy from that
which was pursued by the late administration." ^ Such
was the optimistic attitude of a Democratic daily, towards
a Republican President who took office under color of ille-
gality.
^ Free Press, Eve. News, Jackson Patriot, Kal. Gazette, Lansing
Courier for the days immediately following the announcement.
' Argus, Nov. 10, 1876, Mar. 9, 1877.
» Free Press, Mar. 6, 1877. >
CHAPTER VIII
A Resum]^ of the Politics of Michigan^ 1877- 1878
THE CLOSE OF RECONSTRUCTION AND THE GENERAL ISSUES
OF 1877
The early part of 1877 saw the withdrawal of federal
troops from Florida, South Carolina and Louisiana and
the supremacy of the white Democracy in those states.
Previous to his election Hayes had not declared his policy
with reference to the South, but the opinion became gen-
eral that he would not continue the policy of federal inter-
vention. He was not to be considered a deserter, however,
since Grant himself would have entered upon a more lib-
eral policy in reconstruction, had he continued in office, and
a certain element of the Republican party also was willing
to make concessions.^ The others were strongly opposed
to any deviation from the rigid plan of enforced
negro suffrage secured by the intervention of United
States troops, and these very soon came to be known as
the " Stalwarts ".
At the time of the inauguration of President Hayes
there were claimants of both parties to the state offices in
South Carolina and Louisiana. The former was first to
receive attention. After a consultation with both Cham-
berlain and Wade Hampton, Hayes decided to withdraw
the federal forces from Columbia, and on April loth the
Republican administration of Chamberlain gave way to
Democratic rule under Wade Hampton.^ It was with this
* Rhodes, op. cit., vol. vii, p. 286.
» Ibid., pp. 285-7-
215]
215
2l6 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [216
event that there began an estrangement between Hayes and
Chandler, and the breach was widened by the similar with-
drawal of federal military support in Louisiana accom-
panied by the triumph of Nicholls and the Democracy,
April 24th. ^ The opposition of Chandler was potent
enough to cause all praise and commendation of the Presi-
dent to be omitted in the State Republican platform of the
following year.^
During the last months of 1877 the silver question was
uppermost in national politics, and elicited much local com-
ment. The Republicans in Michigan, with Chandler at
their head, objected to the proposal of Mr. Bland of Miss-
ouri, to restore the silver dollar to free coinage as had
been the case before 1873. The Allison Amendment desig-
nated the amount of silver bullion to be purchased for this
coinage provided for in the Bland Act.^ During the clos-
ing months of the year 1877 and the early part of 1878 the
question received full discussion in the journals of the
state. In answer to a Republican criticism that silver
would drive gold out of circulation should the Bland bill
* Rhodes, op. cit., vol. vii, pp. 287-9.
' The comment of the Post during the summer of 1877 was more
unfriendly than after its consolidation with the more liberal Advertiser
and Tribune, October 14, 1877. In the number for Dec. 21, the blame
for Hayes' policy was removed from the President and laid upon the
cabinet, "whose advice showed it to be out of harmony with the
majority" of its party.
' This act required the government to purchase every month not less
than $2,000,000 nor more than $4,000,000 worth of silver bullion, and
coin it into dollars at the rate of 371^ grains of fine silver for each
dollar, and these were made full legal tender. There was thus added
to the currency a large amount of debased money, as the legal and
market ratios of silver to gold varied widely. Furthermore, the in-
creased demand thus created for silver failed to raise its price.
Dewey, Financial History of the United States.
Laurence J. Laughlin, History of Bimetallism in the United States,
ch. xiii.
217] ^ RBSUME, 1877-1878 217
with the Allison amendment become a law, a Democratic
organ replied in the following manner :
It is not impracticable to keep two metals in circulation, each
in its own sphere with the rate properly adjusted, and inves-
tigation will show what the ratio between the two metals,
should be. It is quite certain that limiting the amount of coin-
age or the extent of its use as legal tender would appreciate
silver.^
Such was a statement of principle found in a leading
Democratic journal of the state, but on grounds of prac-
tical expediency, the organ was not favorably disposed
toward the Bland-Allison measure. There were some
Democrats in the state, however, who were not hostile to
the bill with the amendment, and the greenback element
strongly urged its passage.
The Republicans in Michigan as elsewhere were not in
harmony upon this issue, and the division cannot therefore
be traced to party affiliations. Senator Ferry of Michigan,
the well-known defender of paper currency, appeared as
the persistent advocate of silver, while his colleague. Sen-
ator Christiancy, was among the strongest opponents of
the silver measure. In his long speech of January 30, 1878,
Mr. Christiancy said in part :
This silver mania . . . seems to me a very peculiar disease.
... Its intensity seems to be manifested very nearly in pro-
portion to the proximity of the victims to the great bonnza
mines. It seems to have passed to the people, attacking with
most severity those most deeply in debt.^
On February 15th, the Bland Bill with the Allison
1 Free Press, Dec. 5, i877.
' Laughlin, op. cit., p. 192, footnote i; Globe, vol. cxxxvi, pp. 666-71;
for a second important speech delivered Feb. 6, 1878, ibid., pp. 792-6.
2i8 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [218
Amendment passed the Senate by a vote of 48 to 21, with
Ferry voting in the affirmative, and Christiancy in the
negative.^ Six days later it passed the House by a vote of
203 to 72, with eight Michigan members expressing them-
selves favorably, and one not voting.^ On February 28th,
the President's veto message was received,^ and on the
same day the bill was repassed by the House, in which only
two Michigan members opposed it, and by the Senate
where Ferry continued his support and Christiancy re-
frained from voting.^
The comment throughout the state showed differences
of opinion within both parties. The majority of Michigan
Republicans in Congress had certainly thrown their influ-
ence in favor of the bill, and thus proved themselves
friends of a silver currency. It cannot be ascertained what
view was predominant in the state, but several of the lead-
ing organs declared themselves out of sympathy with
Ferry, and defended the position of Christiancy.^
The time was approaching when preparations must be
made for the election of 1878, and the organization and
issues of the several parties in Michigan will now be con-
sidered.
THE NATIONAL GREENBACK PARTY IN MICHIGAN
The Greenback party continued to flourish in Michigan
after 1876, but during the succeeding year and a half there
* Globe, vol. cxxxvii, p. 11 12.
2 Globe, p. 1284. Edwin W. Keightley was a Republican not voting.
» Ibid., pp. 1418-9.
* The vote in the House was 196 to 7^, in the Senate 46 to 19. The
two Representatives who voted in the negative were Alpheus S. Wil-
liams, the one Democrat, and Charles C. Ellsworth, a Republican.
Globe, pp. 1420, 141 1.
^ Lansing State Rep., Feb. 23, Mar. 2, 1878; Grand Rapids Daily
Eagle, Feb. 25.
219] ^ RESUME, 1877-1878 219
developed some slight differences of view which tended to
weaken the party. The faction within the state who
termed themselves " Nationals " favored the issue of bonds
not convertible into coin, but payable in greenbacks, while
the " Greenbackers " opposed bonds of any kind because
of their interest-bearing character. The leader of the
latter was Ralph E. Hoyt, of Jackson, and of the former
was Moses Field, a well-known Republican with paper cur-
rency inclinations. The necessity for harmony was appar-
ent, and on May loth the call was issued for a state con-
vention, June 5th, " to effect a more perfect union." ^
It was understood generally that '' should the difficulties
be adjusted, there will be cause for anxiety on the part
of the Republicans." ^ Both the " Nationals " and the
" Greenbackers " declared against any '* entangling alli-
ances ", and the Republicans in turn refused to make any
concessions. There were indications, however, that a con-
siderable number of votes would be deflected from the Re-
publican party, and should the new organization — if such
should be formed — find very strong support, the Democ-
racy would have an easy victory.^
The convention met at Grand Rapids, June 5th, effected
a coalition which was of great interest to both of the regu-
lar organizations, and gave themselves the name of '' Na-
tional Greenback Party."
The purposes of the movement as set forth by George
Willard, the temporary chairman of the convention, were
" to create a national paper and suppress bank issues ".
The interests of the party in general were not sectional
but national, he declared, and its object was to secure a
nationally-recognized currency — hence its name. It also
^ Free Press, May n, 1878.
' Eve. News, June 5. '
• Eve. News, July 13, Aug. 3, 1878.
220 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [220
tended to represent the interests of the laboring and the
debtor classes. Both factions united in choosing Moses
Field for permanent chairman, and proceeded to formulate
their platform.
The resolutions demanded the unconditional repeal of
the " so-called Resumption Act " and the National Bank-
ing Law, and required that paper be issued exclusively by
the general government, '' such paper money to be a full
legal tender for all debts public and private." Resolutions
were also adopted against the further issue of interest-
bearing bonds. The party showed itself friendly to labor-
ing interests by demanding a reduction of the number of
hours of toil in order to give " more leisure for mental im-
provement and saving from premature decay and death."
The tariff plank was made carefully non-committal, merely
expressing favor for " such laws as will best protect the
industries of the nation and confer the greatest good on
the greatest number." ^ The state ticket was headed by
Henry S. Smith for governor.
It was a debated question which of the older organiza-
tions lost the more members to this new National Green-
back Party. From the first it was understood that it would
not form a coalition with either of the old organizations
and its absolute independence and uncompromising char-
acter tempted the Democrats to conciliate, for a time
threatening to cause a schism in that party. There was
some evidence, however, that after the nomination of the
National Greenback state ticket, the members of Demo-
cratic antecedents wished to withdraw from the " irre-
* Grand Rapids Dem., June 7. The Adrian Press, June 14, declared
that the " lack of intrinsic value only makes the greenback inferior
because it can't be used as an international currency. However, the
convenience and safety as paper money far over-balances its intrinsic
inferiority."
22 1 ] A RRSUMR, 1877-1878
221
deemable party," ^ and a Democratic organ confidently pre-
dicted that nine-tenths of them would return before elec-
tion.^ Though there is no way of proving a statement of
such a nature, it is a safe conclusion that the conscience of
the Democracy was not on the side of an irredeemable
paper currency. Nevertheless concessions were made and
compromises reluctantly entered into in local nominations
which seriously diminished the following of the older or-
ganization.
There was far less response on the part of Republicans,
as most of them had been whipped into line with the tradi-
tional hard-money policy of the party by the warnings of
a few leading organs and by the defeat in 1874. As the
district party platforms had almost always contained
declarations in favor of hard money, the men of opposite
inclinations promptly abandoned their former principles,
or absolutely severed their party affiliations. There was
little tolerance within the party for members of Greenback
sympathies, and a state conference was held in Detroit,
April 1 8th, to denounce the movement. A leading Repub-
lican journal declared that of about seventy-five Republican
organs in the state that had taken sides on the question, all
but three favored the maintenance of specie payments. On
the other hand, it stated that ten of the thirty Democratic
journals had soft-money preferences, but this statement
cannot be proven, and was probably an exaggeration.*
One notable instance of disaffection in the Republican
party was not a surprise to anyone — that of Moses Field.
He was the only member of the Michigan delegation to
Congress who voted against the Resumption Act, and the
1 Eve. Nezvs, June 6. 7, 1878.
' Free Press, June 14.
2 Lansing State Rep., April 26, 1878.
222 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [222
next year he openly joined the new party and became the
chairman of its state executive committee.^
THE REPUBLICANS
The Republicans held their State Convention in Detroit,
Thursday, June 13th, and chose Zachariah Chandler as
permanent chairman. When he took the chair he indulged
in a '' ringing speech of fifteen minutes against the rebel
conspirators at Washington," of which the following is a
typical selection.
Why are there so many here to-day ? The reason is obvious,
there is danger in the country. The rebels have captured
Washington, gained possession of one branch of the National
Legislature by fraud, murder, assassination and torture, and
they are liable soon to gain possession of the other. The
Democrats have determined through revolution to overturn
the Constitution and the Government.^
With reference to the money question he declared that,
" the Republican party was the original greenback party,
and no other class of men has any right to that name. The
Republican party demands that one dollar in greenbacks
shall be made equal to one dollar in gold or silver, and re-
deemable in the latter." Later in his speech Chandler paid
his respects in typical fashion to the National party, which
he declared '' an agglomeration of all the rascality in the
nation." At the close of his address Chandler received
tremendous applause, to which the Republican organs
took great pleasure in drawing the attention of the public.
The platform demanded the " free and untrammelled
exercise of the right of suffrage," with reference obviously
* Globe, Dec. 22, 1874, p. 208, Jan. 7, 1875, p. 319; Lansing State Rep.,
May 10.
• Lansing State Rep., Post, June 14, 1878.
223] ^ RBSUM^, 1877-1878 223
to the difficulties of the negroes in voting in the Southern
States. The party rejoiced at the early adjournment of
Congress, and the " respite it afforded from the reckless
and mischievous schemes of ignorant legislators made
formidable by the despotism of a caucus." This was no
unmistakable expression of the Republican attitude upon
the financial legislation which, after pending since the
middle of 1876, was finally passed as the Bland- Allison
Act, February 28, 1878.^ Repudiation was denounced in
every form, and a " circulation of paper and coin inter-
changeable at par and at the will of the holder " was de-
clared the best known to commerce. The party viewed
" with apprehension the platform, resolutions and publica-
tions of the uncompromising opposition." ^
The state ticket was headed by Governor Croswell,
whose administration was declared " prudent, wise, honest,
and economical." In closing, the convention declared him
entitled to the '* cordial respect and confidence of the peo-
ple of the state of Michigan." Earlier in the campaign,
however, there had been a movement set afoot for Zacha-
riah Chandler as the successor of Governor Croswell,
whom a small faction thought of dismissing after one
term in office. This was closely connected with the es-
trangement of Chandler from Hayes, as Croswell was gen-
erally understood to be the opponent of the leader of the
Stalwarts. Chandler stoutly denied all rumors of his con-
nection with the governorship, and it is to be concluded
that the movement was undertaken by some of his Stal-
wart friends, who did not understand that their leader
preferred keeping himself independent and in readiness for
a Senatorship.
^ Cf. supra, p. 216, note 2.
' Lansing State Rep., June 14; Mich. Aim., 1879, PP- i5. 16.
224 ^^^ POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [224
THE DEMOCRACY
The Democracy of Michigan this year presented various
shades of opinion on the money question. Some of the
leading journals feared that a disposition to conciliate the
National Greenback party would lead to very unwise con-
cessions. They accordingly declared that delegates could
not afford to sacrifice any principles in order to secure
votes. If the platform touched the currency question, it
must contain only such declarations as approve resump-
tion. ** No overtures are to be made to the Greenback
party," insisted a prominent Democratic leader, who
warned the convention that '' coin was the constitutional
money of the country " and that the value of paper was
only acquired by the pledge of the government stamp, con-
vertibility being an indispensable requirement.^ The party
certainly had reason for apprehending a disagreement in
its ranks on the currency issue, which had been revived —
or at least renewed — by the efforts to repeal the Resump-
tion Act. It was, then, its main interest to maintain unity,
and receive all the support possible without compromising
too much.
The State Convention met in Lansing, July loth, with a
large and harmonious attendance. The platform as pre-
sented by the Committee on Resolutions was discussed
fully and finally adopted by almost a unanimous vote. It
arraigned the Republican party for corruption, for the es-
tablishment of giant monopolies, and for squandering the
public lands. It declared that the prostrate condition of
the country demanded the reduction of state and national
taxation to the lowest point possible. The plank to which
the greatest attention by far was directed was that on the
currency issue. " Gold and silver are the money of the
^ Address of George V. N. Lothrop, Free Press, July 5, 1878.
225] ^ RESUME, 1877-1878 225
Constitution ", it declared, " and all paper currency should
be convertible into such coin at the will of the holder."
The state ticket was headed this year by Orlando M.
Barnes for governor, a man with hard-money preferences.^
It was noticeable that in making its nomination this year,
the party practically abandoned its policy of yielding to the
Granger sentiment. In 1874 it had exercised great care
in selecting a ticket representative of the agriculturist
class. Four years later not one farmer was to be found
among the candidates for state office, though several were
owners of rural property. This fact would not require
mention had not the Democracy formerly declared and
shown themselves the special friends of the agriculturist
class. It was evident that the party had left behind it sev-
eral of the minor issues by which it had advanced to
greater power in the several years just preceding, and the
Republicans took occasion to make this observation more
than once.^
THE PROHIBITIONISTS
The Prohibitionists still continued to meet, make nomi-
nations and to declare their views, notwithstanding their
constantly failing power in Michigan, and the constitu-
tional amendment against prohibition adopted in Novem-
ber, 1876.^^ Their convention was held in Lansing, August
13th, and the platform related to many matters of reform
and social improvement. The party demanded an amend-
ment to the Federal Constitution prohibiting " the impor-
tation, exportation, manufacture and traffic of all alcoholic
^ Mich. Aim., 1879, p. 17; Free Press, July 11.
» The Lansing State Rep., July 12, classified the ticket as follows :
three lawyers, three editors, one lumber dealer, one real estate agent
and one teacher.
2 Cf. supra, chap, vii, p. 204.
226 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [226
beverages in all places subject to the Congress of the United
States," and it recommended treaties to that effect with
foreign powers. It declared for the abolition of class
legislation and the adoption of equal suffrage and eligibil-
ity to office without distinction of race, religious creed or
sex. The public lands were to be reserved for actual
settlers, and the federal and state government should com-
pel the establishment of free public schools. Amicable
relations between nations were to be furthered by arbitra-
tion provisions in all treaties thereafter signed, and the
penal methods of the country were to be reformed by the
adoption of *' more human modes of punishment."
The position of the Prohibitionists upon the financial
issue was for the most part sound. The national govern-
ment alone should have the right to issue paper money,
they insisted, and this should be subject to prompt redemp-
tion on demand in gold or silver. The party also declared
for the abolition of executive and legislative patronage,
fgr direct popular vote in the election of civil officers so
far as possible, for reduction of salaries of public officers
and for strict economy in the discharge of their adminis-
trative duties. The interests of the party thus came to in-
clude general reforms, and while it exercised little direct
influence upon the politics of the time, it pointed out much-
needed changes.^
THE CAMPAIGN AND ELECTION OF 1 878
The campaign in Michigan was fought bitterly by the
Republicans, who were dominated as usual by the more ex-
treme and radical faction — the " Stalwarts " under Zach-
ariah Chandler. They drew up their campaign plans along
* Lansing State Rep., Evening News, Aug. 14 ; Lansing Journal, Aug.
15; Argus, Aug. 16. The candidate for governor was Watson Snyder,
who was not prominent in a political capacity.
227] ^ RESUME, 2877-1878 227
the line of the obsolete issue of Reconstruction and their
treatment of that theme is typified by the speech of Chand-
ler at the State Republican Convention. The withdrawal
of federal troops from South Carolina and Louisiana ^
highly displeased Chandler, who believed that the Presi-
dent of his choice had abandoned the chief principle of
the party — sufficient guarantee of loyalty before admission
of the rebel states into the union.
It was against Chandler, then, as the leader of the " Stal-
warts " that the fire of the Democrats was directed this
year.^ The latter effectively seized upon the vulnerable
points in the Republican position, and asked : " Who nomi-
nated Hayes and was responsible for his candidacy? And
who made him President of the United States? The Re-
publican party nominated him, and no less a notable than
the National Chairman of the Republican party made him
President. . . . Tragic it is when a favorite falls so soon
before his benefactors ! " '
The paper-money issue was another fruitful source of
mutual recrimination. The Republicans, who expected that
a division would occur in the Democratic party along that
line, were often found scoffing at the Democrats for show-
ing a rather embarrassing tendency to embrace the green-
back doctrines. The offended party, however, had good
material for retaliation. " Who was Moses Field, that
friend of soft money," they asked, " and Thomas M.
Ferry, a member of the Paper Trinity? " *
The election of 1878 was more disastrous to the Democ-
1 Cf. supra, p. 215.
« Address of the Democratic State Central Committee, in the Argus,
Sept. 13, 1878. Don. M. Dickinson, who had served as chairman, was
succeeded by William B. Moran.
' Lansing Jour., July 9.
* Niles Dent., July 19, 1878.
228 'i'^'E. POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [228
racy of Michigan than that two years before. Besides
electing the entire state ticket — which was only to be ex-
pected— the Republicans chose all nine Congressmen, and
90 members of a legislature of 132. The Democratic mem-
bership receded to 24, and the Greenbackers claimed 18.
The dominant party could thus boast practically three-
fourths of the membership/ Strangely enough the Green-
back party advanced so rapidly, that its power was not far
inferior to that of the Democracy this year. The former
carried eight counties, the latter fourteen, but in the south-
ern portion of the state a very strong minority of Green-
backers existed in many of the counties. From the relative
strength of the two parties in the election of state legis-
lature and local officers, it may be concluded that the
Greenback party contained about three-fourths as great
a membership as the Democracy.
It was also obvious that the Democrats had lost to the
newer organization — and this they recognized themselves.
Their attitude after the election was mainly one of dis-
gust at the " attempt of their party to secure votes by a
sacrifice of principle." It was felt that the Democracy had
lowered their standard in order to prevent defection to the
National Greenback party, and to win back deserters — and
they suffered accordingly. But the tone of the press was
hopeful. " The losses from defection will be made up and
the strength of the Democratic party will return." ^
SENATORIAL ELECTION OF 1 879, AND THE RETURN OF
CHANDLER
This was not the year for a regular Senatorial election,
» Mich. Aim., 1879, pp. 69-81, 88, 123; Mich. Man., 1879, 123-153, 154-9,
160-79; Trih. Aim., 1879.
2 Argus, Nov. 8. For other accounts of the election, Free Press,
Jackson Patriot, Grand Rapids Dent., Nov. 6-9.
229] ^ RESUME, ISTT'-ISTS 229
but Mr. Christianc3^'s seat unexpectedly became vacant,
and the new legislature was called upon to choose his suc-
cessor. An unfortunate matrimonial experience while in
Washington rendered Mr. Christiancy's domestic life so
unhappy, and his social relations so uncongenial, that he
resigned from the Senate in January to accept a foreign
post. Several positions were offered him, and he accepted
the ministry to Peru. It was no less than a tragedy which
removed from Congress so able a man elected by an inde-
pendent movement, and so well qualified to do splendid ser-
vice.
The Republicans agreed this time on Chandler, as the
opposition against him had ceased to be effective. The
Democrats nominated Orlando M. Barnes, and the Green-
backers Henry Chamberlain — both very prominent Demo-
crats. The election occurred February 18, 1878, and the
joint vote for Chandler was 88, that of Barnes 22, that of
Chamberlain 18, and four members were absent.^ Thus
Chandler w^as returned to the Senate without strong oppo-
sition, and his ambition since his defeat four years before
was realized by an unexpected contingency and a special
election. He did not serve out the unfinished term for
which he was elected, however, as his death suddenly oc-
curred after a strenuous campaign in Illinois in 1879.^
With the return of Chandler to the Senate and the re-
stored harmony within the Republican party, this study
will end. The rise of an opposition would be noticeable
henceforth, if the investigation were continued, which
^Senate and House Jour., 1879; Mich. Man., 1879, PP- 319-20. The
vote in the Senate stood thus: Chandler 22, Barnes 2, Chamberlain 5,
absent and not voting, 2 Democrats, i Republican. In the House
Chandler received 66 votes, Barnes 20, Chamberlain 13, and one
Democrat was absent. The credentials were read in the Senate, Feb. 22.
2 Nov. I, 1879, in Chicago. He was succeeded by H. P. Baldwin, who
was appointed Nov. 17. The term expired 1881 ; Mich. Aim., 1880, p. 57.
230 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [230
would show the Democratic and Greenback parties moving
forward until a coalition in 1882 defeated the Republican
State ticket for the first time in the history of that party/
David H. Jerome was defeated for re-election to the Gov-
ernorship, and Josiah W. Begole, nominated by the alli-
ance, won. Neither Ferry nor Byron G. Stout received a
majority of the votes of the legislature the following spring
for Senator, and Thomas W. Palmer was elected on the
first of March to succeed Mr. Ferry.
^Michigan as a State, vol. iv, pp. 151 et seq. Hemans, History of
Michigan, pp. 233-4.
CHAPTER IX
The Social and Economic Progress of Michigan
character of the population of michigan
The political history of Michigan has been intimately
connected with the social condition and industrial activities
of the people, and these were greatly influenced by two
factors which contributed largely to the motives for politi-
cal action. In the first place, the character and diversity
of the population, which included a large percentage of
natives of other states and foreign immigrants, were im-
portant elements in determining party preferences. In the
second place, the geographical and geological conditions of
the state insured diverse industrial interests which de-
manded different policies with reference to commerce and
the tariff.
The adult population of the state at the period covered
by this monograph consisted largely of emigrants from the
New England States and from New York. In 1870 the
state of New York was more extensively represented in
the population of Michigan than the other eastern states,
and Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maine and New
Hampshire ranked next in the order named.^ Nearly all
1 New York State 231,509
Vermont 14,445
Mass 10,839
Conn 7,412
Maine 3,932
Mich. Statistics, 1870, pp. xliv, xlv.
231] 231
232 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [232
the men who gained prominence in Michigan politics were
natives of the eastern states who migrated westward and
as a rule took up first agriculture or some trade, then legal
study and practice, and finally politics/ A large number
received academic training while yet in the east, and
brought with them a well-developed enthusiasm for
higher learning and literary achievement.
The foreign-born population of the state in 1870 in-
cluded 22.63 P^^ cent of the total, and a decade later, the
state ranked seventh in this respect.^ Michigan had a
larger Canadian element than any other state in the Union,
and this class comprised one-third of the foreign element.
The lumbering interests were a great encouragement, and
the proximity of the Canadian provinces facilitated migra-
tion. Of the European countries. Great Britain and Ire-
land contributed the largest number. During the two
decades from 1830-50, many Irish arrived and by 1870
there were over 42,000 in the state. The Germans ranked
second, and a large immigration of Prussians set in from
1840 to 1850, but this, like the entire movement, re-
ceived a sharp check by the crisis of 1873. It was also at
this time that there occurred the great influx of Dutch,
who settled principally in Ottawa County, about a center
called Holland City, and by 1884, Michigan contained a
greater Dutch population than any other state of the Union.
At the time when this study ends Michigan ranked seventh
* David li. Jerome, Governor 1880-2, M^as the only Michigan born
incumbent of that office within the period of this study, and Thomas
W. Ferry the only Senator, 1871-1883.
' British America 89,590, Great Britain and Ireland 86,200, Germany
64,142 (Prussia 28,660), Holland 12,559, France 3.121.
In i860 the foreign-born numbered 149,093, the native 600,020. In
1870 the former increased to 268,010, the latter to 916,049, showing that
the foreign population had increased approximately 80%, and the
native-born 50%. Mich. Stat., 1870, pp. xliii, vi, vii, Iviii-lxi; Mich.
Aim., 1873, pp. 36, 37; Census of Mich., 1884, pp. xxx-xxxiii.
233] SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS 233
in the number of German inhabitants. They were always a
carefully considered element in the contentions between the
two regular parties, and with the increased prominence of
the prohibition issue, the rivalry became more active. As
a rule the Democracy had the larger vote among the Ger-
mans and the same was probably true of the other foreign
nationalities.
The negro population was never an important element in
Michigan either socially or politically. Numerically it was
too insignificant to influence public opinion on the suffrage
question or, upon its enfranchisement, to give any effectual
aid to the Republican party. In 1870 it comprised only one
per cent of the entire population, and in Cass County it
reached its highest level of eight per cent.^ Another ele-
ment within the state which may be considered practically
negligible in the politics of this period were the Aborigines.
In 1870 there were only 4,926 Indians in Michigan, located
in the northern portion of the state, and of these a large
number had crossed the border from Canada.^
The increase in the population of the state was phenom-
enal during the period of this study. In the twenty years
beginning with i860 it much more than doubled. From
the rank of sixteenth in the Union, Michigan rose to the
ninth place, and the average annual rate of increase for the
first decade mentioned was nearly 4.69 per cent. The finan-
cial crisis of 1873 naturally caused a temporary fall and
from 1870 to 1874 it was 3.02 per cent.^ There was an
* This matter has been treated more fully in the chapters relating
to the suffrage issues as presented in 1868 and 1870. Cf. supra, ch. iii,
p. 80; ch. iv, p. 122.
' Mich. Stat, 1870, p. xliv.
' The population in i860 was 749,ii3, in 1870, 1,184,282, 1874, i,334,03i,
and in 1880, 1,636,937. Mich. Stat, 1870, pp. Iv-lvii; Comp. of Mich.
Stat., 1876 pp. 14, 15, 16. Census of Mich., 1874; Mich. Man., 1879,
pp. 181-3.
234 ^^^ POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [234
obvious movement of settlement toward the northern and
northwestern portions of the state during these years, and
though the southern counties gained, it was in smaller ratic
than the other parts of the state. In the decade preceding
1870, the Upper Peninsula increased in population fifty
per cent, the central and southern portions of the state in-
creased two hundred per cent, and the uppermost counties
of the lower Peninsula showed a population almost five
times as great as that at the beginning of the decade.^ The
next ten years did not show so rapid an increase. The
Northern Peninsula doubled its numbers, while the popula-
tion of the Central and Southern portions did not gain so
rapidly. From a decennial rate of almost 58 per cent in-
crease during the first decade, the state as a whole fell to
38.2 per cent, and of this the Northern portion claimed the
largest proportional gain." With this increase in the popu-
lation of the northern portions of the state and because
of the growth in the industries of those regions the pro-
tective tariff was to receive added support and the trans-
portation facilities by rail and by water were to be built up
and improved.
In respect to literacy and education, a frontier state like
Michigan, possessing a large percentage of foreign-born
population, would naturally be expected to rank rather low.
The large previous immigrations from the eastern states,
^ Mich. Stat., 1870, pp. Iv-lvil. The rank of the counties as given in
the pages cited is not of great value in this connection, since those
newly organized withdrew a large population from the more densely
settled ones, and the variations in their relative rank are not always
indicative of the local changes in population.
' Mich. Man., 1879, PP. 181-183 ; Census of Mich., 1884, pp. xxx-xxxiii,
clxxxiv-v. The density of population was 13 per square mile in i860,
20.6 in 1870, and 28.5 in 1880. The distinctly frontier nature of the
state is thus evident in its rank as twenty-first in the Union in this
respect.
235] SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS 235
however, held up the intellectual standard, when the great
extractive industries of the north, and the frontier loca-
tion of the state naturally tended to lower it. In 1870 the
total number of persons of ten years and over who were
unable to read did not exceed 3.5 per cent of the entire
population of the state. Those who could not write
slightly exceeded 5.6 per cent, and of these 57.56 per cent
were of foreign birth. ^ In respect to the number of its
prublications Michigan ranked eighth.^ Within the decade
beginning with 1870, the number of newspapers and period-
icals more than doubled, the weeklies outnumbering the
dailies. In i860 there were only 118 publications of all
classes, including eight dailies. Within the two decades
from i860 to 1880, the journals trebled in number and of
these many were devoted to non-political subjects.^
There were over 5,400 public schools of all grades
within the state in 1870, with an attendance of almost
250,000 pupils. The private institutions of learning num-
bered over 150, and these included Day, Boarding, Paro-
chial, Charity and Indian schools. Twenty-three higher
institutions, twelve of which were termed " Classical ", had
an attendance of almost 3,400 students, and were main-
tained by endowment, public funds and tuition. It was not
strange that all but one of these institutions were to be
found in the five lower rows of counties, and these also had
by far the best educational advantages so far as private
schools were concerned. At this time the state possessed
* Comp. of Mich. Stat., 1876, p. 16. Among the native-born in the
latter case were 1823 Indians.
2 In 1870 it had 215 newspapers and periodicals, in 1880, 464. The
dailies had increased from 16 to 33, and the weeklies, 176 to 397.
Fifteen of the publications were printed in German, and several in
Dutch ; twenty-six were non-political.
' Mich. Stat., 1870, pp. 666-677 ; Census of Mich., 1884, p. xxxiv.
236 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [236
over 26,000 libraries of all classes with nearly 2,200,000
volumes. Of these the largest was the State Library at
Lansing/
The educational topic which was the subject for the
keenest political discussion was the state maintenance of
the Agricultural College as a separate institution. Some
urged its removal to Ann Arbor and its incorporation as a
part of the State University, while others opposed it as a
purely class institution. It was, however, maintained as
founded — a state institution for special instruction.^
INDUSTRIES OF MICHIGAN
Of the industries carried on in Michigan agriculture was
first in importance. The southern and south central por-
tions of the state were most typically agricultural and small
farms from twenty to fifty acres in extent were most gen-
eral. About half of the land was improved and by 1884
the state ranked seventh in the gross value of its farms and
farm machinery, and eighth in the value of its farm
products.^ It was the southern and south-central portions
which showed the most even balance of party preference
and the strongest Democratic sympathies. It was also in
these districts that the Granger and Greenback movements
found the strongest support and influenced the leading
parties to the greatest degree.
Next to agriculture the lumbering interests v/ere of
greatest importance in Michigan, and the state ranked first
in respect to the value of the product. In 1870 the chief
timber wealth was to be found in a territory between two
* Mich. Stat., 1870, pp. 650-661, 663-665.
2 Cf. supra, ch. iii, p. 76, for the discussion in the Constitutional Con-
vention of 1867.
» Mich. Stat., 1870, pp. 274-277; Coinp. of Mich. Stat., for 1876, p. 27;
Census of Mich., 1884, pp. xxxi-ii.
237] SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS 27,7
lines, of which the northern one connected Alpena and
Grand Traverse Bay, the southern one extended from Port
Huron to Grand Haven. Here grew forests of pine, oak,
hemlock and ash, the first immensely exceeding the others
in abundance. North of this belt, and extending to the
Straits of Mackinac there were forests of maple, beech,
ash, oak and elm with extensive areas of pine. Here also
grew some of the most valuable ornamental woods indige-
nous to the continent. The Upper Peninsula was far less
noted for its timber than its minerals, but abounded in
nearly all the variety of trees that were found farther
south.
This timber was worked up mainly in the districts on the
Great Lakes and along the large rivers, both east and west.
In the Saginaw Valley, especially in Saginaw and Bay
Counties, there were many mills located along the Saginaw
River from which the products were shipped in great quan-
tities. Other milling districts on the east shore were Tus-
cola, Huron, Sanilac and St. Clair Counties and Detroit.
On the west, the chief centers were Grand Rapids, Grand
Haven, Ludington, Manistee and Muskegon. In 1873
there were 1,600 saw-mills, the value of whose products
very nearly approximated $40,000,000, and much of this
output was shipped to Quebec and Buffalo. In 1884 the
annual value of the product was more than one-fifth of
that of the entire Union.
The work in the forests of the north drew a large num-
ber of foreigners, Canada supplying by far the greatest
number, and Germany and Ireland ranking next. In 1870
nearly one-half of the lumbermen, raftsmen and wood-
choppers were foreigners.^ Their alliance with the Demo-
^ U. S. Census, 1870, vol. i, p. 740; Mich. Stat., 1870, pp. xlviii-li;
Comp. of Mich. Stat., 1876, pp. 40-45; Census of Mich., 1884, pp.
238 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [038
cratic party accounts in part for the strong Democratic
tendencies of the northernmost counties of the Lower Pen-
insula. The north-central portions, especially of the west,
were consistently Republican, however, and the manufac-
turing interests tended to promote the tariff policy in the
state.'
The immense mineral resources of the Upper Peninsula
put Michigan in the first place with respect to the value of
copper mined and the amount and value of the iron ore.*
The work in the mines was chiefly carried on by foreigners,
and out of 3,426 miners in 1870, only 233 were natives of
the United States. The English and Welsh formed almost
one-half of the foreign miners, while the Irish, German,
Swedes, Norwegians and Danes followed in smaller num-
bers.*
The same observation may be made with reference to
the political importance of the foreign element engaged in
the mines of the Northern Peninsula as that with reference
to the foreign class in the lumbering districts of the state.
The Upper Peninsula was generally found to have strong
Democratic sympathies, and the counties were often almost
evenly divided. However, this region was so remote, and
the means of transportation at this period were so imper-
fect in the north, that the election returns were often too
» Senator Thomas W. Ferry of Grand Haven was the chief repre-
sentative of these interests in Michigan, and his attitude on the tariff
question is obvious from his speeches in 1870 and 1872, e. g., the speech
on the " Folly of Reciprocity," May 24, 1870, Globe, Appx., pp. 370 et seq.
' Copper was mined in Houghton, Keweenaw and Ontonagon
Counties, iron in Marquette, with smelting furnaces in that and adjoin-
ing counties. In the production of salt Michigan also ranked first,
and the location of this industry was the district comprising Bay,
Huron, Macomb, and Saginaw Counties. Coal, oil and gypsum were
minor products. Mich. Stat., 1870, pp. 550-569; Comp. of Mich. Stat.,
1876, pp. 4873 ; Census of Mich., 1884, pp. xxxii-vi.
» Mich. Stat. 1870, p. li.
239] SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS 239
late to be counted in the official canvass. There was natur-
ally a greater indifference in this region to political issues
than in any other with the exception of issues involving
railroad constructipn and improvement in the facilities for
commerce.
By far the greatest items of manufacture in the state
were lumber and minerals, and these branches of the in-
dustry were most often carried on in districts convenient
to the source of raw material. The manufacture of finished
products was not so extensive as might be expected. There
were, however, vehicle and furniture factories of consid-
erable importance, especially in Grand Rapids, agricultural
implement works and woolen and cotton factories. In-
clusive of all classes of manufacture, the value of the entire
product for 1870 was nearly $123,000,000.^ It is not im-
probable that the districts which contained most of these
interests — the central and southern portions of the state —
would be influenced by them to favor protective tariff and
oppose free trade. The ship-building industry of Mich-
igan was comparatively unimportant during the early part
of the period, and in 1870 less than 600 persons were thus
occupied. There were twelve ship-building yards, and the
value of the vessels exceeded $1,200,000.*
THE PUBLIC LANDS OF MICHIGAN
The public land question was an important issue through-
out this period in Michigan political history, and mention
has been made of the repeated declarations of the different
parties in favor of more rigorous terms of land grants by
the state to corporations, especially railroad companies.'
* Comp. of Mich. Stat., 1876, pp. 81-87.
' Ibid., p. 87 ; Census of Mich., 1884, p. xxxvi ; Mich. Stat., 1870, p. li.
3 Cf. supra, ch. iii, p. 94; ch. v, p. i ; ch. viii, pp. 224, 226.
240 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [240
The problem in Michigan was very similar to that in the
other states of the Northwest. As part of the territory
ceded to the National Government from 1781 to 1786 by
the states of New York, Virginia, Massachusetts and Con-
necticut, Michigan was one of the so-called " Public Land
States " of the Union. Congress was the sole owner of
the soil, with complete jurisdiction over the same.^ It thus
had the power under the Constitution ^ to dispose of this
public domain under any conditions or by any method it
saw fit, and all laws relating to this subject fall under two
general heads. First are those providing directly for per-
manent private settlement and ownership, and second are
those which make grants to states — or reserve tracts in ter-
ritories— from the sale of which various interests, espec-
ially railroad companies, are to receive financial aid.
The earliest provision for the disposition of the public
domain of the Northwest Territory was the Act of May
18, 1796 — the first land ordinance of the Congress under
the Constitution.^ The land was to pass to the highest
bidder, the minimum price being fixed at $2.00 per acre,
and the purchaser was required to deposit but five per cent
of the price at the time of sale. Various laws were passed
which modified the Act of 1796, but the credit feature re-
mained until April 24, 1820.* From the opening of the
land offices in the Northwest in 18 10 to 1820, the sales in
Michigan under the credit system amounted to 67,362.02
acres, yielding $47,689,563.09.*^ Through the failure of
the purchasers to meet the terms of sale, some of this land
reverted to the national government.
* Donaldson, Public Domain, pp. 10, 13. United States vs. Railroad
Bridge Co., 6 McLean, 517.
2 Art. IV, §3, p. 2.
» Laws of U. S., n, 533-
* Stat, at Large, iii, 566.
* Donaldson, op. cit., p. 203.
24 1 ] SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS 241
From 1820 to 1840, various temporary relief meas-
ures were passed by Congress to relieve the financial
distress of settlers who were not able to complete the terms
of sale/ From September 4, 1841, dates the permanent
pre-emption system of disposition of public lands, which,
by the end of the period of this study, entitled persons of
twenty-one years of age, or heads of families, to secure
land to a maximum extent of 160 acres through the essen-
tial conditions of actual residence, improvement, and the
payment of the price varying from $1.25 to $2.50 per
acre.^ Very nearly related to pre-emption was the home-
stead policy which, after several attempts and long discus-
sion, was finally entered upon May 20, 1862,^ The act
was several times amended, but the essential features of the
policy are these — the gift of land in tracts of 160 acres or
legal subdivisions, free of charge, to any citizen who is
twenty-one years of age or the head of a family, and re-
sides upon the land for five years. A nominal sum was
chargeable merely sufficient to cover the costs of the sur-
veys. Title could be secured prior to the five years regu-
larly required, by the payment of the minimum price of the
land as provided in the pre-emption acts. This was known
as " commutation of homestead entries ". In the same
manner, a pre-emptor was allowed to change his holding to
a homestead entry by residing upon the land the required
length of time, and the land became taxable, by state law,
at the close of the residence period of five years.^
In Michigan, during the year 1863, there were 1,537 en-
1 Donaldson, op. cit., p. 205 et seq.
^ Ibid., pp. 214-16; Stat, at Large, vol. v, p. 453.
» Donaldson, op. cit., pp. 349-50; Revised Statutes, pp. 419-24.
* Acts of Mich., 1873, no. 169, pp. 227-8.
242 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [242
tries calling for 195,939.66 acres. The number of entries
was reduced to half in 1865, rose again the succeeding year
and maintained an annual average of 1,500 until 1877,
when it fell to 947.^ The aggregate number of entries in
the state from 1863 to 1880 was 25,086, with a total of 2,-
911,749.13 acres. It will thus be seen that within the two
decades of this study, almost 10 per cent of the area of the
state, which constituted a little over 36 millions of acres,
was entered for homesteads. This manner of dealing with
the public domain was much encouraged by the state, and
frequent declarations appear in the party platforms de-
manding the preference of home-seekers over corporations.
The second method of disposition of the public domain
not included within territories is that of grants to states
for the financial aid of various interests. Among the
earliest grants made to Michigan were those of June 23,
1856,^ for educational purposes. In the first place the six-
teenth section of every township was granted for the com-
mon schools of the state, and this approximated one-thirty-
sixth of the entire area of Michigan, or almost 1,067,400
acres. In Ohio, Indiana and Illinois it was the customary
practice to give over the management of these sections to
the respective townships in which they lay, but Michigan
wisely reserved the control in the hands of the state gov-
ernment. In the second place, Michigan and Arkansas
each received two townships for university purposes. The
State Commission appointed to make the selection for
* Donaldson, op. cit., pp. 350-355. S. Sato, " History of the Land
question in the United States," Johns Hopkins University Studies in
Hist, and Pol. Science, 1886, Fourth Series, Pamphlets 7, 8, 9, p. 176
et seq.
' Donaldson, op. cit., p. 228; Mich. Coll., vol. vii, pp. 17-35- "History
of Land Grants for Education in Michigan," George W. Knight,
pp. 23-28.
243] SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS 243
Michigan chose a tract which lay along the Maumee River.
It was then included within the limits of the state, and is
now the heart of the city of Toledo, Ohio. These lands
were early sold far below their real value, as 400 acres
were disposed of for $5,000, and the remainder of the
46,080 acres passed for little more than $19 per acre/
In order to complete the brief account of educational
grants in Michigan the Morrill Act of July 2, 1862 ^ should
be mentioned at this point. By this measure each state
was to receive 30,000 acres for each of its members in
Congress in i860, though a maximum was placed at one
million acres for one state, and the old states were re-
quired to accept within three years. ^ The moneys derived
from the sale of these lands were to create a fund, the
interest of which was to be used for '* at least one college "
in each state, the leading object of which was " to promote
the liberal and practical education of the industrial classes
in their several pursuits in life." As Michigan was then
represented in the lower house of Congress by six mem-
bers, the state received 240,000 acres of land, and from
this land she realized somewhat over $275,000.
The proceeds of the sale of these " educational lands "
of various classes were not all devoted to the purposes for
which they were originally intended. An act of March 10,
1875, provided that " all money received into the State
Treasury for the sale of lands and placed to the credit of
the University, Agricultural College, Normal or Primary
School fund, after March i, 1875 shall be used in defray-
ing the expenses of the state government*
» Knight, op. cit, pp. 29-34.
* U. S. Stat, at Large, xii, p. 5035.
' Michigan accepted July 25, 1863, Acts, 1863, p. 54.
* Acts, 1875, no. 22, p. 21.
244 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [244
The second great class of federal land grants were those
for internal improvements, and among these, the railroad
lands were probably of the greatest ultimate importance.^
Canals and wagon roads were of earlier construction. In
Michigan there were large tracts of swamp lands alleged
to be worthless in their natural condition and impossible
of reclamation by direct national interposition. Their
improvement was extremely desirable, however, from the
point of view of sanitation and also of the enhancement in
value of the adjoining government property. Accordingly,
in 1850, Congress granted Michigan, among other states,
the wet lands within her limits for reclamation.^ In this
state, as well as Wisconsin and Minnesota, the selection was
made not by state agents, as it was customary to provide
in some of the other states, but by federal officers — either
the Surveyor-General or the Commissioner of the General
Land Office. This grant of 7,373,804.72 acres constituted
the largest single gift made to the state at any one time,
and it was expected that the sale of part of these *' swamp
and overflowed lands " would pay the expenses of reclaim-
ing the rest, which could be used for the development of
transportation facilities.
In addition to these Congress made special grants from
time to time for the construction of canals, wagon-roads
and railroads. The total amount of land granted by Con-
gress for the construction of canals from 1852 to the close
of the period of this study was 1,250,000 acres. For the
construction of the St. Mary's Falls Ship Canal, alone,
750,000 acres of mineral and farming lands were donated.
^ Mich. Coll, vol. vii, pp. 52-68. " Federal Land grants for Internal
Improvements in the state of Michigan," by A. N. Bliss, A. M.
2 Donaldson, op. cit., pp. 219-20 ; Bliss, op. cit., p. 53 ^t ^^Q- The
state legislature passed an act in 1861 to secure the settlement and
drainage of the swamp land. Acts, 1861, p. 145.
245] SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS 245
They were located in the region of the " Mineral Range "
in the Upper Peninsula, and included the site of the famous
Calumet and Hecla Copper Mines/ The canal was com-
pleted in 1855, but the needs of commerce later required
its deepening and enlargement. Accordingly, Congress
donated 250,000 acres to the state and this was in turn
appropriated. In 1881 the canal was completed, and five
years later the construction of the present locks ^ was
begun.
Water transportation was also promoted by deepening
the channel between Lakes St. Clair and Huron. On ac-
count of the vast natural resources of the state, the entire
district about the lakes demanded improved facilities for
transportation by water. All large vessels were com-
pelled to sail by a long and tortuous route through Wal-
pole Creek between Harson's and Walpole Islands, or by
way of Bear River around Ann's Island, for the main
channel of the St. Clair River south of Algonac was very
shallow. Finally, in 1856, General Cass secured an appro-
priation of $65,000. With this amount a channel was
cleared six thousand feet long, one hundred-fifty feet wide,
and nine feet deep. After several unsuccessful attempts
on the part of Chandler an additional appropriation was
secured in 1866, with which the channel was deepened to
sixteen feet.^ The lands granted for the building of wagon
roads exceeded 221,000 acres by June 20, 1864, after which
date the practice ceased.^
^ Donaldson, op. cit.,. p. 258; Bliss, op. cit., pp. 57-65, The land for
the canal was donated by Congress, Aug. 26, 1852, and accepted by
Michigan, Feb. 5, 1853.
^ Acts, 1871, no. 88, p. 117; R. D. Williams, Life of Peter White,
pp. 210-11.
• Mich. Coll., vol. 21, pp. 3S^-Z^7\ xxii, p. 496.
* Donaldson, op. cit., p. 260; Bliss, op. cit., pp. 5--57-
246 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [246
Railroads were, however, the state issue of greatest eco-
nomic importance during this period. After 1864 there
was rapid progress in their construction, due mainly to
the demand for additional outlets for the natural products
of the state, especially lumber, salt and plaster. The trunk
lines at this time entered into competition in the projection
of lateral and connecting lines, and a strong feeling in
favor of extending local aid to these enterprises existed
prior to 1849. The adverse decision in the Salem case ^
in 1870 temporarily checked construction, but the rapid
progress made during the succeeding three years demon-
strated the absence of any necessity for municipal aid.^
The growth of the railroad systems in Michigan had
been phenomenal. In i860 there were less than 800 miles
of railroad in operation in the state; ten years later there
were over 1,700 miles; and by 1876 there were 3,615 miles.
The crisis of 1873 abruptly checked construction and the
following year only 61 miles were added. However, there
were in 1874 thirty-four corporations operating in the
state, with about three-fifths of their mileage lying within
its boundaries. For the period from 1865 to 1875 which
marked the greatest activity in railroad building, the aver-
age annual construction was 330 miles, but the climax was
reached in 1872 when 901 miles were added. The greatest
mileage in 1876 was operated by the Lake Shore and Mich-
igan Southern with its branches, the Grand Rapids and
Indiana ranked next, the Flint and Pere Marquette, the
* Mich. Law Reports, vol. xx, pp. 452-522.
» Municipal aid had been granted by Acts 1869, No. 45, pp. 89-95,
which enabled any township to give aid to railroads, and No. 336,
pp. 660-1, March 24, legalizing such action on the part of towns.
For the importance of this question in politics, cf. supra, ch. iii, pp.
For the importance of this question in politics, cf. supra, ch. iii, p.
81 ; ch. iv, pp. 108 et seq.
247] SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS 247
Chicago and Michigan Lake Shore, and the Michigan Cen-
tral followed in the order named/
The railroads, it has been said, were the chief recipients
of federal aid. All attempts to secure land grants in their
behalf failed until June 3, 1856, but from that date until
the close of this period almost 3,356,000 acres were given
the state for their benefit. The mileage of exclusively land
grant railroads, however, did not exceed 1,005 by June 30,
1880.^ The main beneficiaries during the period from 1856
to 1872 were the Jackson, Lansing and Saginaw Railway,
which received almost 750,000 acres, the Grand Rapids
and Indiana, almost 630,000 acres, the Chicago and North
Western, 518,000 acres, and the Flint, Pere Marquette,
512,000 acres.
The state, as a rule, promptly accepted these lands for
the corporations already in existence, for whom they were
intended, or encouraged the creation of corporations to
undertake the work anticipated by Congress. It passed
precautionary measures designed to protect the wooded
lands, and prevent the cutting and carrying away of lum-
ber.^ There were cases when the state was called upon to
declare the forfeiture of land by a railroad which failed
to comply with the required conditions in the grant. Thus
in 1869, the Marquette and Ontario Railroad Company
lost its lands on the ground that it had failed to construct
ten miles of road each year.*
From time to time Congress was called upon to extend
* The mileage was approximately 403, 280, 279, 246, 220 respectively;
Comp. of Mich. Stat., 1875, pp. 89-94; Mich. Man., 1877, p. 298;
Mich. Aim., 1879, p. 47; 1880, p. 30.
2 Donaldson, op. cit., p. 268, 275, 287, and chart, p. 948; Bliss, op. cit.,
pp. 65-68.
" Acts of Mich., 1867, no. 97, Mar. 25, 1867, and 1869, no. 34, p. 51.
* Acts, 1869, p. 411.
248 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [248
the period for the construction of a land-grant railway.
These repeated demands upon its time and attention finally
ended in 1879, when the United States released to Mich-
igan all interest in the lands granted to the state by the
act of 1856/
THE FINANCES OF MICHIGAN
The financial condition of Michigan during this period
gave the Republicans good grounds for congratulating
themselves upon an economical administration. The
bonded indebtedness of the state had reached very nearly
$4,000,000 by the close of 1866 and annual reductions
brought the debt down to approximately $2,385,000 in
1870. The crisis of 1873 caused the proceeds from the
sale of lands to fall from over $230,000 in 1873 to less
than $62,000 the next year.
The years of 1874 and 1875 were the most important
politically with reference to the management of the state
finances. The Constitution provided for a sinking fund
to be applied solely to the payment and extinguishment of
the principal of the state debt, with certain qualifications.^
The specific taxes applicable to the purpose not only met
the interest on the entire indebtedness, both bonded and
trust, but afforded a surplus more than sufficient to pay
the maturing principal of the bonded debt. The surplus
from this source averaged about $210,000 per annum dur-
ing the early years of the decade. It was this constantly
increasing surplus that the Democrats strongly objected to,
alleging that it was loaned to favored banks, in which state
ofificials were interested, at a lower rate of interest than
was generally current, and with poor security. They urged
in 1874 that due to this accumulation of state funds in
^ Stat, at Large, vol. Ixx, p. 490.
' Constitution, Art. XIV, Sections i and 2.
249] SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS 249
1874 the state taxes should not be assessed this year, but
their demand was not complied with. This agitation was
certainly an influence in bringing about legislation in the
session of 1875 authorizing the purchase of unmatured
bonds at such rates as the Governor, State Treasurer and
Auditor General should see fit.^ Under this act bonds to
the amount of $125,000 were purchased at a premium of a
fraction over three per cent.
The Republicans could substantiate their boast that in
the face of accumulation of the surplus, taxation had been
reduced. From approximately $590,000 in 1866 it had
risen and fallen until in 1870 it was less than $483,000.
In 1872, however, it rose to over $920,000, and in the year
of the crisis the receipts fell short of the disbursements by
over $170,000. The specific taxes for the period from
1866 to 1875 were received mainly from railroads, insur-
ance companies, mines and banks, and the total receipts of
this nature were almost three times as great at the close of
the decade as at the beginning. The entire appropriations
to institutions charitable, reformatory, penal, and educa-
tional, increased from almost $178,000 to $427,000.^
It was not strange, then, that the dominant party should
point with pride to the financial condition of the state,
especially as it appeared before the panic, and that they
should claim to have secured a surplus in the treasury not-
withstanding the reduction of taxation. The charges
brought against the financing of the surplus, and the cen-
sure naturally attached by the Democrats in 1873 to the
railroad policy of the Republicans both aided to give the
» Acts, 1875, P- 294.
2 Mich. Aim., 1870, pp. 62, 63; Mich. Man., 1873, pp. 336, 348, 350, 351 ;
1875, pp. 314-319; 1877, pp. 352, 356, 357; 1879, p. 306; Comp. of Mich.
Stat., 1876, pp. 16-20; Census of Mich., 1884, pp. xxxii-iii; Report of
Auditor General, 1874, p. 385; 1875, p. 8.
250 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [250
combined opposition great gains in the fall election of
1874. The suspicion aroused by the accumulation of over
$1,000,000, with no intention of exempting the state from
taxation for one year, obviously helped turn the tide in
state politics against the dominant party.
Such were the social, industrial and economic condi-
tions of the state which were most prominent in the politics
of the period. The diversity of interests led to a diversity
of issues, and the rapid industrial development of this
naturally rich frontier state brought into the foreground
questions of internal improvement and railroad extension.
The size of the state directly tended to foster sectionalism,
and this was a potent factor in the personal politics of the
period. The defeat of Jacob M. Howard for the Senator-
ship, the succession of Thomas W. Ferry, and the policies
of Austin Blair and William A. Howard are all evidences
of the extent to which this factor influenced the politics
of the time.
CONCLUSION
At the dose of this study it may be remarked in sum-
mary that the politics of the state were at first dominated
by national issues, while the local interests which centered
about the extension of railroads and the development of
industry were decidedly of secondary importance. With
the close of the war these state matters assumed greater
importance, and repeated attempts were made to revise
or amend the constitution with reference to railroad aid, in-
ternal improvement and the increase of salaries. The negro
suffrage issue, which was purely national at first, became a
subject for state action in 1868, and in 1870 on the second
trial the change was adopted by a vote which obviously
crossed party lines. The development of railroads was at
first a non-political matter which was but a part of the
general tendency of the period. After the decision in the
Salem case had popularized the conception of the nature of
'taxation, the parties took sides and the Republicans were
reasonably considered the friends of railway aid. By
1 87 1, however, the opposition was so strong that they were
glad to abandon their extreme projects and progress with
greater conservatism.
The well-nigh unassailable position of the Republican
party in Michigan rendered the Democracy virtually power-
less save when a union could be effected with some dis-
affected faction. The unusually violent and aggressive
nature of the powerful leader, Zachariah Chandler, occa-
sioned strong opposition which several times threatened
to cause a schism in the party. The disaffected joined with
251] 251
252 THE POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [252
the Democracy in 1870, giving it one member in Congress.
The rise of a combined opposition was interrupted by the
catastrophe of 1872, but two years later resulted in a sur-
prising defeat of the dominant party. This opposition re-
ceded again in 1876 and 1878, then took on new vigor and
reached its climax six years later in the election of the state
ticket by the combined forces of the Democracy and Green-
back party. The latter had not become directly influential
until 1878.
The currency issue more than any other endangered the
unity of the two regular parties. At different times it came
near to disrupting both parties, and out of political expe-
diency both were forced into some inconsistencies. The
Republicans suffered from serious disaffection in their
ranks in 1874, but after their punishment at the polls, the
factions again became entirely harmonious. It was the
Democracy which in 1878 was seriously divided between
suspension and resumption, and its willingness to combine
with the National Greenback party four years later broke
the continuous line of state Republican victories. Late in
the seventies the new party threatened to disrupt both of
the old organizations along the lines of soft money and
suspension, but that danger was averted, with the result
that alliance rather than disruption reversed the political
status in Michigan.
The Reform element within the state consisted not only
of the powerless minority party but of disaffected factions
within the leading party. This movement was temporarily
successful within the state in 1870 and again four years
later, but the personal politics centering about Austin Blair
made the contest unusually bitter. It was an unfortunate
instance of the powerful conservatives chastising a small
group of reformers, the leader of whom had been a great
factor in giving the party its high standard in the state.
253] CONCLUSION 253
The war-governorship of Austin Blair was, by its attend-
ant circumstances, one of the most powerful forces which
gave the Republicans their ultra-loyal appearance during
the war and their strong position in succeeding years. The
ex-governor is conceded to have been a man of far too
great conscience and conviction to have made a successful
political career for himself amid the conflicting ambitions
of the entire group of leaders. Furthermore, it is not un-
reasonable to suppose that his successive defeats for the
much-desired senatorship made him extremely sensitive to
the factious troubles within his party. Whatever may
have been the dominant reason for these movements, his
was certainly an unusual record. As an extreme anti-
slavery Whig he joined the Free Soil party and later be-
came one of the ultra-Radical leaders among the Repub-
licans. In 1872 he was the foremost Michigan man in the
Reform movement and the candidate for Governor of the
combined opposition. He became so completely alienated
from his former alliance that four years later he was named
for Presidential elector by the Democracy of the state. It
is not improbable that the sharp criticism he suffered at
the hands of his former friends drove Austin Blair further
than he would otherwise have gone.
Prohibition was a persistent movement which encoun-
tered a reaction in the form of the License party, and the
temperance question was throughout a troublesome one for
both parties. It was well understood that the large German
vote would be at the opposite end of the balance and the
two parties were cautious about favor to the Prohibi-
tionists.
The Grangers in Michigan did not nominate a state
ticket, but they exercised a potent influence over the Democ-
racy in 1874, especially in its nominations. The subordi-
nate organizations built upon the minor issues that ap-
254 ^^^ POLITICS OF MICHIGAN [254
peared locally and depended upon temporary conditions
could not prevail to any considerable extent against the
regular party formation.
In the general view of the period of this study, the Re-
publican party of Michigan appears virtually invulnerable.
It had advantages historically, and the party organization
was as nearly perfect as strong-minded and absolute leaders
could make it with the aid of a most effectual assessment
system. Thus Michigan was, at this period, what the
foremost leader often called this state, the " Massachu-
setts of the West ".
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
I. WORKS OF GENERAL IMPORTANCE.
Congressional Globe and Congressional Record; Johnson Papers,
Library of Congress; Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presi-
dents, Washington, D. C, 1897; McPherson, History of the Rebellion,
and Handbooks of Politics for the succeeding years; Annual Cyclo-
pedia; Tribune and World Almanacs; Essays on the Civil War and
Reconstruction, William A. Dunning, New York, 1904; History of the
United States, 1850-1877, James Ford Rhodes, New York, 1904; The
Hayes-Tilden Disputed Election of 1876, Haworth, Cleveland, 1906;
Recollections of War Times, A. G. Riddle, New York, 1895 ; Reminis-
cences of Carl Schurs, New York, 1907; Townsend Library, Columbia
University, for comment of New York papers during the period of
this study.
IL GENERAL WORKS IN MICHIGAN HISTORY.
Michigan Red Book, Charles Lanman, Detroit, 1871 ; General His-
tory of Michigan, Compiled by C. R. Tuttle, Detroit, 1874; Outlines
of the Political History of Michigan, James V. Campbell, Detroit, 1876 ;
History of Detroit and Michigan, 2 volumes, Silas Farmer, Detroit,
1884; Michigan (American Commonwealth Series), Thomas M. Cooley,
Boston, 1886; Vol. IV of Michigan as a Province, Territory and State,
in 4 volumes, by Henry M. Utley, Byron M. Cutcheon, and C. M.
Burton, Advisory editor. New York, 1906; History of Michigan,
Lawton T. Hemans, Lansing, 1906; Histories of the various counties
of Michigan, by local historians or compilers.
The value of most of the general works lies in their suggestive
nature and to a much greater degree in their biographical material.
The last two state histories cited were most useful of all, but in
these authorities are wanting and it is necessary to rely upon the im-
partiality of the writers. The biographical notes are in most cases
of exclusively local interest and are often in the nature of personal
reminiscences.
255] 255
256 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE [256
III. BIOGRAPHY.
The available biography exclusive of that contained in the general
historical treatises is as follows :
General.
Representative Men of Michigan, by F. A. Barnard, Cincinnati,
1878, a cumbersome volume which is comprehensive but unfortunately
arranged by congressional district rather than by alphabet. Biogra-
phical History of Eminent and Self -Made Men of Michigan, Detroit
1878; History of Michigan, Silas Farmer, vol. ii, Detroit, 1886; Early
History of Michigan and Michigan Biographies, including state officers,
members of Congress, judges and legislatures, published in Lansing,
1888, pursuant to Act 59, 1887.
Individual.
Life of Zachariah Chandler by the Post and Tribune staff, Detroit,
1880; The Doric Pillar of Michigan, a memorial sermon by A. T.
Pierson, 1879, and the Memorial Addresses pronounced in the Forty-
sixth Congress, February, 1880, were eulogistic and practically with-
out value; Jacob M. Howard, a Memorial Address, by Justice James
V. Campbell; Isaac P. Christiancy, a Memorial by Justice Graves;
James Frederick Joy, by Alfred Russell; Life of Peter White, Ralph
D. Williams, Cleveland, 1905.
IV. MISCELLANEOUS COLLECTIONS.
The Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collection contains consider-
able material of an economic and political nature. The following
volumes contain the most important contributions : vol. vii, History of
Land Grants for Education in Michigan, pp. 17-35, George W. Knight;
Federal Land Grants for Internal Improvements in the State of
Michigan, pp. 52-68, A. N. Bliss, A. M. ; Vol. xxx, A Sketch of the
Life of Sullivan M. Cutcheon zuith particular reference to Michigan
political history during the war of the Rebellion, pp. 99-108, by Charles
Moore; Reminiscences of Michigan Journalism, pp. 507-517, by Hon.
William E. Quinby of the Detroit Free Press', Vol. xxxv, Michigan
Men in Congress," pp. 506-517, by Edward W. Barber.
The " Jenison Collection " in the Michigan State Library at Lansing
contains volumes of political pamphlets with speeches in Congress and
campaign addresses delivered throughout the state.
The Howard Manuscripts, Volumes 89 to 95, in the library of Mr.
C. M. Burton, Detroit, contain many valuable personal communica-
tions of Jacob M. Howard relative to the politics of the time. Though
by far the greatest part of his correspondence relates to his legal
practice and is bound with the Joy and Emmons papers, the several
257] BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 257
volumes above cited contain many letters of very deep interest. They
are the only accessible manuscript source of any importance for this
study.
V. OFFICIAL STATE PUBLICATIONS.
Acts of the Legislature, passed in the Biennial Sessions mcetingf
the odd years, and the Extra Sessions; Senate and House Journals;
Senate, House and Joint Documents; Journal of the Constitutional
Convention of 1867, and Debates of the Convention, 2 volumes ; Annual
Report of the Auditor General; State Census Reports for 1864 and the
decennial years following; Compilation of Michigan Statistics, 1876,
compiled under authority of the Governor in the interest of Emi-
gration, S. B. McCracken; Michigan Manual, a convenient compilation
of extensive data for the use of members of the legislature. It is
published every odd year and contains various election statistics
with valuable comparative tables.
VI. NEWSPAPER COMPILATIONS.
The Michigan Almanac, published by the Detroit Tribune^ is the
best source for a study of the political statistics of Michigan; The
Legislative Souvenir and Political History of Michigan, 1897, pub-
lished by the Lansing State Republican, contains useful material re-
lating to the period in question.
VII. NEWSPAPERS.
By far the most important sources for the political history of this
period are the journals of the state. The number of newspapers
available has unfortunately been limited by a frequent neglect on the
part of offices and libraries to preserve contemporary files. In many
of the offices throughout the state, however, are found files of papers
now continued or absorbed, but the larger libraries are, of course, the
most valuable repositories of old numbers. The most important of
these are the State Library at Lansing, the Detroit, Battle Creek,
Bay City, Grand Rapids, Hillsdale, Jackson, Kalamazoo and Niles Pub-
lic Libraries, and the Libraries of the State University at Ann Arbor
and the College of Mines at Houghton. The Library of Congress,
Washington, D. C, has a very good collection of files of the leading
party organs of Michigan during this period. They include the
Detroit Post, Advertiser and Tribune, Free Press, Evening News,
Lansing State Republican, Grand Rapids Daily Eagle, Jackson Daily
Citizen, Benton Harbor Palladium.
The Republican journals which have been available for this period,
1864- 1878, either entire or in part are as follows, in the order of relative
importance: Detroit Post; Detroit Advertiser and Tribune; Lansing
258 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE [258
State Republican; Grand Rapids Daily Eagle; Jackson Citizen; Kala-
mazoo Telegraph; Niles Republican, Hillsdale Daily Standard; Benton
Harbor Palladium; Grand Traverse Herald; Pontiac Gazette; Saginaw
Valley News; Bay City Daily Tribune; Coldwater Republican; Wol-
verine Citizen, Flint; Mason News; St. Clair Republican; Ypsilanti
Commercial ; Allegan Journal; Aarian Times; Charlotte Republican.
The journals which were considered "independent" are as follows:
Detroit Evening News, Marshall Statesman, Portage Lake Mining
Gazette; Grand Rapids Times; Benton Harbor Times; Saginaw
Courier; Michigan Tribune, Battle Creek. With the exception of the
first two papers, there are very few numbers of these independent
journals accessible.
Those which supported the Greenback movement are: Adrian Press;
Allegan Democrat; Battle Creek Journal; Grand Rapids Democrat;
Niles Weekly Mirror.
The Democratic organs which were consulted are as follows : Detroit
Free Press; Michigan Argus, Ann Arbor; Jackson Patriot; Kala-
mazoo Gazette; Niles Democrat; Lansing Journal; Marshall Expounder;
Muskegon News; National Democrat, Cassopolis; Bay City Observer;
Monroe Monitor; Traverse Bay Eagle; and the unreconciled copper-
head sheet, ypsilanti Sentinel.
This list of consulted journals includes all that are available, so
far as exhaustive and insistent correspondence was able to prove, and
of the papers cited last in each list there were discovered in some
cases only a few numbers unbound and unarranged, in offices, court
house collections and public and private libraries.
It will be observed that almost none of the newspapers mentioned
were from the northern part of the state. There were, of course, re-
latively fewer published in that portion, and less fortunate facilities
existed for their preservation.. In the state as a whole, there are over
one hundred newspapers unavailable for this period, as there were
163 political organs in 1870 and only 49 can be accounted for, in-
cluding many with only a few scattered numbers.
The Republican Party is most completely represented in the jour-
nals still remaining, for the obvious reason that it naturally supported
the greatest number of publications in Michigan.
For election returns, most if not all of the above-named organs
have been cited, as it was thought they indicated local sentiment and
political preferences. For really valuable editorial comment, however,
the four large Detroit journals, the Lansing State Republican, Grand
Rapids Daily Eagle, and the Ann Arbor Argus are by far the most
reliable.
2
THE UNITED STATES BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY
AND THE TARIFF
STUDIES IN HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC LAW
EDITED BY THE FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE OF
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
Volume XLVII] [Number 2
Whole Number 119
THE UNITED STATES BEET-SUGAR
INDUSTRY AND THE TARIFF
BY
ROY G. BLAKEY, Ph.D.
ISim Uork
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
LONGMANS, GREEN & CO., AGENTS
London : P. S. King & Son
1912
Copyright, 1913
BY
ROY G. BLAKEY
PREFACE
The limitations of a study of this kind are such that
only a few of the principal problems involved can be set
forth, even in outline. Hence, most attention has been
paid to the three main factors which will determine the
future development of the domestic beet-sugar industry,
namely: agricultural conditions, cane-sugar competition
and modifying legislation. Suits, legislation and other
matters now pending may soon render obsolete certain
parts of anything which may be written, but the funda-
mental facts and principles involved are not subject to such
rapid change, even in the case of matters so highly dynamic
as those here under consideration.
Lack of space forbids the naming of the many indi-
viduals to whom the writer is indebted for assistance in the
preparation of this study. They include experiment-sta-
tion directors, beet-sugar authorities and correspondents
in the sugar-producing states; heads of bureaus, chiefs of
divisions and individual investigators in various depart-
ments of the federal government; manufacturers, brokers
and statisticians in New York and other centers. The
writer is grateful to each and all and cannot fail to men-
tion his appreciation of the special courtesies of Messrs.
Willett & Gray and the helpful suggestions of Professors
E. R. A. Seligman and H. R. Seager. He is under even
greater obligations for the very special and extensive
favors of Mr. M. L. Jacobson and Professor H. R. Mussey.
Columbia University, New York City, April, 1912.
263] 5
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
A. INTRODUCTORY BACKGROUND
Chapter I. Rise and Development of the European Beet-
Sugar Industry
1. Intoductory II
2. Origin and spread of the cane-sugar industry 12
3. Inception and development of the European beet-sugar
industry 14
a. Early beginnings.— Marggraf's discovery 14
b. Experiments of Achard and other German and
French scientists. 15
c. Napoleon's decrees. — Development in France and
other European countries 17
4. Bounties and the Brussels convention of 1902 20
a. The bounty system in Europe 20
b. The Brussels convention of 1902 25
(i) Position of Great Britain and other im-
mediate causes of the convention ... 25
(2) Provisions of the convention 26
(3) The convention as amended ....... 2^
(4) Summary of results and events following
the convention 28
B. DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BEET-
SUGAR INDUSTRY
Chapter II. Historical Sketch and Survey of the Present
Situation
I. Historical sketch 2^2
a. Early attempts to establish the industry yt.
(i) Various early attempts, mostly unsuc-
cessful 32
(2) Some of the first successes 34
(3) More important attempts following the
formation of the sugar trust and the
passage of the McKinley bill 35
265] 7
8 CONTENTS [266
PAGE
b. Passage of the Dingley bill and growth of the in-
dustry 37
(i) Rapid increase in factory building .... 37
(2) Effect of the rapid growth, together with
the Cuban and Philippine concessions. 41
(3) Later developments 42
2. Survey of progress and present situation of the United
States beet-sugar industry. (Based on a comparison of
census reports) ' 43
a. Increases in quantity and value of products, ex-
penses, capitalization 43
b. Comparison of developments in different states . . 49
c. Comparison of United States beet- and cane-sugar
industries 50
d. Comparison of United States and German beet-
sugar-factory operations 51
C. PROBLEMS AFFECTING THE FUTURE OF THE
UNITED STATES BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY
Chapter III. Preliminary Survey of the Field
/ I. Introductory . 54
^ 2. Recent tendencies and situation in the various countries of
the world 55
3. Possibilities of expansion 57
a. In the world as a whole 57
b. In the United States 59
(i) Question of market 59
(2) Question of agricultural area 6i
.Chapter IV. Costs in the United States. (Other than agri-
^ cultural)
1. Preliminary considerations 65
a. Relative importance of various costs 65
b. Character of available data 67
2. Cost figures of different authorities. {Mostly ex parte) . . 69
3. Analyses of different parts of cost 78
a. Cost of raw material to the factories 78
(i) Cost of beets in various states and factors
affecting the same 78
(2) Sugar content and extraction as affecting
cost 86
b. Manufacturing costs 91
267] CONTENTS 9
PACK
4. Summary of United States costs 99
5. Comparison with European costs 99
a. Data in different terms 99
b. Cost of raw materials. — Prices paid for beets . • . 100
c. Manufacturing costs 102
d. Summary iii
Chapter V. Cost of Growing Beets in the United States
1. Principal classes of data 114
a. Agricultural experiment station records 114
b. Farmers' reports 117
c. Estimates 119
2. Example of a good record of data 121
3. Data from the writer's experience. (Somewhat detailed) . 123
4. Summary regarding cost of growing beets in the United
States 129
5. Comparison with German agricultural costs 135
Chapter VI . Possible Improvements and Indirect Advantages.
(Special reference to the agricultural phases of the industry)
1. Possible improvements 141
a. Seed selection and breeding 142
b. Invention and use of machinery 144
c. Utilization of by-products • 145
d. Crop rotation .... 146
e. Manufacturing wastes 148
2. Indirect advantages . . 148
a. European agricultural investigations 148
b. United States data relative to the subject 152
c. Other indirect advantages 153
3. Some comparisons and criticisms 156
Chapter VII. Cane-Sugar Competition
1 . Cuba 164
a. Recent changes significant 164
b. Various estimates of Cuban possibilities 167
c. Agricultural conditions 169
d. Cost statements of various authorities 172
e. Labor and wages 178
f . Conclusion 180
2. The Philippine Islands 181
a. Area and sugar production of the islands 181
b. Special investigation of the Island of Negros . . . 184
(i) Area and sugar production of Negros . . 185
(2) Comparison with other cane-sugar coun-
tries 186
lO CONTENTS [268
PAOB
(3) Wasteful methods 189
(4) Cost of sugar production. — Labor and
wages 191
(5) Conclusions as to Negros 193
c. Statements of various authorities as to Philippine
conditions and costs 193
d. Conclusion 196
3. Other cane-sugar countries 197
a. Java 197
b Hawaii 199
c. Porto Rico . 201
4. Conclusion 203
Chapter VIII. Tariffs and Prices
1. United States sugar-tariff rates 2c6
2. Professor Taussig's analysis 209
3. Ex parte statements oi tariff costs 212
4. Analyses of the effects of tariffs and other factors govern-
ing prices 213
a. Effects of world supply on world prices of raws . . 213
b. Effect of United States duties on New York prices
of raw and granulated 214
c. Effect of refiners' competition on the margin be-
tween raw and granulated 219
d. The Cuban concession 222
e. Summary and conclusion 229
Chapter IX. The Sugar Trust
1. Sugar-trust methods 234
2. The trust's relations to the beet-sugar industry 235
Chapter X. Freight Rates
1. Ocean rates 244
2. Rates affecting cane-sugar distribution primarily 245
3. Rates affecting more directly the distribution of beet-sugar
in its competition with cane-sugar 247
Chapter XI. Conclusion 253
Appendix
1. Agricultural costs 267
2. Foreign labor 277
3. Bibliography 280
A. INTRODUCTORY BACKGROUND
Chapter I. Origin and Rise of the European
Beet-Sugar Industry
I. introductory
The United States is much the largest sugar market
in the world, consuming twenty-two per cent of the
total world product, or three and two-thirds million
short tons annually. Of this amount, about half is im-
ported from foreign countries — mostly from Cuba — and
one-fourth from insular possessions. One-tenth is fur-
nished by the domestic cane, and one-seventh by the home
beet-sugar industry. The aggregate consumption has
doubled in the last fifteen years and quadrupled in twenty-
five years, the average annual increase for the last three
decades being 4.267 per cent.'
In the sugar-campaign year of 1910-11, the last for
which we have official statistics,'' the United States pro-
duced 510,172 short tons of granulated beet sugar. This
is six times the output of the industry ten years previous
(1901), fifteen times that of fifteen years before (1896),
and one hundred and thirty-five times that of twenty
years before (1891). What have been the causes of this
^ Willett & Gray's Weekly Statistical Sugar Trade Journal, Jan. 4,
1912, p. 2. In most instances, the years 1910 and 191 1 are the last ones
for which we have data, hence calculations are made from them.
' U. S. Dept. of Agr., Crop Reporter, Oct., 191 1. Estimated produc-
tion, 1911-12, 540,000 long tons (604,800 short tons of 2,000 lbs. each),
Willett & Gray, ibid., p. 9; 572,415 short tons, American Sugar Industry,
Jan., 1912, p. 20.
269] " II
12 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [270
remarkable growth and what factors will determine its
future development? Should the industry continue to
receive state and national encouragement as during the
past two decades, or should protective duties be reduced
or abolished? How shall we determine such matters
wisely, that is, so as to conserve and promote as best we
can the highest interests of the whole people? To
throw some light upon these problems is the purpose of
this study.
Inasmuch as sugar has so many fields of production,
both actual and potential, and even wider fields of distri-
bution, also capable of expansion, a proper estimate of
past and future developments of the United States beet-
sugar industry — both possible and desirable develop-
ments— demands that this industry, be studied as a part
of an intricate and interacting world system rather than
as an independent whole in itself. Just as certainly as
the fluctuations of the wheat, wool, cotton, iron, and
other industries in particular countries have seriously
affected these and allied industries in other countries,
regardless of internal conditions of the countries affected,
just so certainly have similar reactions modified and even
determined the developments of the various sugar in-
dustries of the world.'
2. ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF THE CANE-SUGAR INDUSTRY
Though sugar cane and sugar beets have been culti-
^ Consequently, we shall be obliged to pay some attention to ques-
tions that may seem rather remote upon first thought. Furthermore,
to avoid too much repetition, it may not always be best to elaborate
the full relation between each part and the whole as we proceed;
rather, it seems more desirable in many instances to postpone most
of the correlating of facts and the drawing of conclusions until all
of the various parts with which we shall deal shall have been pre-
sented.
271] ORIGIN AND RISE 13
vated for thousands of years, the commercial production
of sugar on a large scale is of comparatively recent date.
Cane was used for the extraction of sugar at least twenty
centuries before beets were so used. Its original home
is a matter of dispute, though most authorities agree
that i-t was in Southern Asia,' probably in India or Bengal.
From there it gradually spread all over Southern Asia,
going both east into China and west towards Europe,
entering the latter by way of Spain, where it is said to
have been carried by the Moors, probably about 714 A. D.,
though Nearchos, one of Alexander's generals, is said
to have brought the first knowledge of sugar cane to
Europe about 327 B. C. From Spain the culture of cane
spread to Provence and the islands of the Mediterranean ;
later to the Madeira and Canary Islands, to the West
Indies and to the tropics of America soon after the
voyage of Columbus. Lippmann'' gives the date of its
introduction into Louisiana as 1673 and Gayarre, in his
history of that state, speaks of 1751 being the date of
the first attempt worthy of mention.^
^ Karl Ritter, " Uber die geograpische Verbreitung des Zuckerrohrs ",
Akad. d. Wissenschaften, Abhandlungen," 1839, pp. 305-412. Es-
pecially pp. 320 et seq., and references.
E. O. Von Lippmann, Geschichte des Zuckers, especially pp. 443
et seq., and references.
W. Falconer, " Sketch of History of Sugar," Memoirs of Literary
and Philos. Sac. of Manchester, vol. iv, 1793, pp. 291-301 and refer-
ences.
G. T. Surface, Story of Sugar, pp. 15-20. Prof. Surface does not
cite authorities in most cases.
^ See Lippmann, ibid., p. 443, for brief chronological table of spread
of sugar cane.
' W. C Stubbs, citations in Cultivation of Sugar Cane, p. 5.
14 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [272
3. INCEPTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN
BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY
a. Early Begi7t7tings — Marggraf s Discovery
March 25, 181 1, or one hundred years ago. Napoleon
issued the famous decree that gave birth to the beet-
sugar industry of the world. The history of the growth
of that industry constitutes one of the most interesting
chapters in the progress of a most progressive century.
By careful breeding and selection, the sugar content
of the unknown beet was doubled and trebled; by the
many inventions of machinery and the discoveries of new
processes, the extraction was likewise increased; and by
the most cunningly devised legislation these improve-
ments were cherished and magnified. In 1825 the pro-
duction of beet sugar was only 5000 tons, by 1850 it was
190,000 tons, or nearly one-sixth of the cane-sugar pro-
duction, and by the end of the century it was eight and
one-half million tons, nearly twice as great as its rival
which had held the field for over twenty centuries.
Where the beet had its origin is as uncertain as the
same fact regarding cane, but it is known that it grew
wild in Southern and Middle Asia and it is thought pos-
sible that it was cultivated in Southern Europe and
Northern Africa in ancient times. Prof. Grififin' says
" Herodotus mentions the sugar beet as one of the plants
which served to nourish the builders of the pyramids.'*
The famous German sugar expert and historian, Dr.
Lippmann, cites the same reference" and also quotes
Voltz^ as authority for the statement that the Romans
first brought the beet into Gaul. He traces somewhat
^ Quar. Jour, of Economics, vol. xvii, p. i.
* Geschichte des Zuckers, p. 391.
• Ibid., p. 400.
273] ORIGIN AND RISE l^
in detail its early history in the various countries of
Europe.
Originally, when grown in southern latitudes the beet
was an annual, but when taken north became a biennial,
storing sugar the first year and not producing seed till
the second. This was an important change without
which it is not at all probable that it would ever have
been used for commercial sugar production. As far
back as we have data on the subject, the cane has been
famous for its exceedingly sweet juice and the sugar
content has not been increased very much in all these
centuries.' But the saccharine qualities of the beet were
not known, or were little thought of, till they were dis-
covered in 1747 by Andrew Marggraf,'' a chemist and
member of the Berlin Academy of Science. He urged
the importance of the discovery upon the Academy and
hoped to see practical results in the building up of a
great sugar industry in Europe.
b. Experiments of Achard and Other Scientists
But this discovery did not get beyond the laboratory
for half a century. In 17863 one of Marggrafs pupils,
Franz Karl Achard, again took up the research and suc-
^ For a good account of this early history of the sugar beet, both in
Europe and in the United States, see the report of Dr. William Mc-
Murtrie (Department of Agriculture, special report, no. 28, 1880),
who was appointed by our Government to make this special report.
L. S. Ware (Sugar Beet, p. 25) speaks of the sugar beet as having
been carried to Bohemia by the barbarians after the fall of the
Roman Empire, and says that in 1705 Oliver de Serres considered that
alcohol might be obtained from the fermentation of the beet as he
was convinced that it contained sugar. He says that Marggraf suc-
ceeded in extracting five per cent of sugar.
' Marggraf, Berichte der Berliner Akademie, 1747; Chemische
Schriften, 1768, ii, 70. Cited by Lippmann, op. cit., pp. 391 et seq.
' Lippmann, op. cit., p. 405.
l6 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [274
ceeded in extracting sugar from beets on a larger scale
than ever before. He published his results and methods
of operation, and reported that a good muscovado sugar
should be produced at six cents per pound. His report
was received with astonishment and considerable ridicule.
But the French Institute was aroused, and found, upon
following Marggraf's line of experiments, that their beets
contained a little over six per cent of sugar. However,
after repeatedly trying Achard's methods, they con-
cluded that it would cost eighteen cents to produce re-
fined sugar on a commercial scale.'
A number of German scientists took up and continued
Achard's and Marggraf's experiments, and verified and
improved their results. In 1799, Lampadius succeeded
in getting four pounds of white molasses out of one
hundred pounds of beets, and in a second greater at-
tempt, got two zentner of raw sugar (220.46 pounds)
and one hundred and eighty pounds of molasses out of
one hundred zentner of beets (11,023 pounds). The
first real sugar factory in Germany was built by Achard,
with the assistance of Frederick the Great, on the
former's estate at Cunern in Silesia. It was put in
operation March, 1802.^ A number of other German
factories were built shortly after this, among them being
one by Baron de Koppy, according to designs furnished
by Achard. He was one of the most enthusiastic pro-
moters of the new discoveries, and, besides extracting
sugar, also manufactured rum and vinegar from the pulp
and molasses by-products.^ However, the current com-
* McMurtrie, op. cit., pp. 8, 9; Lippmann, op. cit., pp. 404-6.
' Lippmann, op. cit., pp. 405-6. Lippmann, op. cit., p. 405, gives as
authority for early attempts, Scheibler, 21; Rosig, 18; Gotthard, 37,
and Poppe, Techn. Lex., v, 829, et seq.
• McMurtrie, op. cit., p. 10; Lippmann. op. cit., p. 406.
275] ORIGIN AND RISE 1 7
merits of the time show that it was generally thought,
even by the scientists, that the commercial production of
sugar would be impractical, and, at best, that nothing
better than sugar in the form of a good syrup could be
manufactured.
c. Napoleon s Decrees, — Development in France and
Other European Countries
In France, after the report of the commission ap-
pointed by the French Institute to test Achard's experi-
ments, two factories were erected at St. Ouen and
Chelles, but they were failures, owing to lack of prac-
tical knowledge. In 1808, Delessert, who had estab-
lished a factory at Passy near Paris in 1801, again under-
took the manufacture of sugar and, after many fruitless
efforts, achieved a remarkable success by changing the
method of clarification and by the use of charcoal. It
was upon Chaptal's report of this success that Napoleon
paid his noteworthy visit to Passy in 1812, and ordered
Delessert to build ten new factories as quickly as possible.^
What made it possible to manufacture sugar from
beets at this time, aside from the technical considera-
tions, was the continental blockade following the decrees
of Berlin and Milan. The prohibitions upon importa-
tions made sugar very scarce and so dear that it was
possible to produce beet sugar within the price thus
made. August 22, 1810, Napoleon issued a decree dis-
tributing 200,000 francs ($40,000) among twelve estab-
lishments to promote the manufacture of sugar from
grapes. In March, i^ii, the SociHk d' Encouragement
pour V Industrie Nationale laid before him some of their
results, exhibiting samples of beet sugar, and on the
^ Lippmann, op. cit., p. 406; Flourens, " filoge historique de Benjamin
Delessert," Memoires de l' Academic, 1850, pp. 1 19-145.
l8 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [276
twenty-fifth of that month he issued the famous decree
which resulted in the establishment of the French beet-
sugar industry, and, we may say, of the world's beet-
sugar industry. This decree directed the setting apart
of 32,000 hectares (79,040 acres) for the culture of beets
in various departments of the empire, and ordered that
measures be taken to see that they should be in full cul-
tivation the first year, or the next year, at least. It also
ordered the establishment of six experimental schools,
in which pupils could be instructed in the processes of
manufacture, and provided for courses of lectures for
proprietors and farmers, all to be under the direction of
the commission. This decree was followed by numerous
reports of experimenting scientists and government
officials, and they were followed in turn by Napoleon's
instructions to Delessert mentioned above, and by other
orders providing for the establishment of the industry,
among them being appropriations of several millions of
francs from a revenue already scanty for the uses of the
ambitious emperor.
In 1812 and 1813 over 2,000,000 kilos of sugar
(4,409,200 pounds) were manufactured' but in 1814 and
18 15 there were excessive rains and the Cossacks were
encamping on the French beet fields. With the over-
throw of Napoleon and the raising of the continental
blockade, the new industry was unable to meet the com-
petition of foreign sugars and lower prices, and but one
factory survived the wreck. However, the great neces-
sities for revenue after 181 5 resulted in making the
import duties on sugar very high and under this protec-
tion the number of factories in France reached 100 in
1825 and the maximum of 581 in 1838.'' In that year
* Ware, op. cit., p. 28.
* Jules Helot, Sucre de Betterave en France, p. 208.
277] ORIGIN AND RISE ig
an ordinance gradually increasing the taxes on the home
sugar industry was passed and, i66 factories went out
of existence. The colonial sugar interests, the shipping
interests and the refiners brought so much influence to
bear that both in 1840 and in 1843 the government
seriously considered buying up the home beet-sugar
factories and abolishing the industry entirely, but Thiers
succeeding in defeating this.^ From this time on, the
industry experienced many fluctuations and showed the
effects of many influences, chief among which were the
various changes in taxes and tariffs,'' abolition of slavery
in the colonies, high prices of alcohol transforming the
factories into distilleries, international treaties and con-
ferences, in addition to the influences of world produc-
tion and prices. Though there were many retrogres-
sions, the industry in France grew on the whole.
In Germany, Achard and Baron de Koppy continued
their endeavors to promote the industry, being encour-
aged by financial aid from the King of Prussia. The
former opened a school in January 1812. This and his
model factory drew students from all parts of the conti-
nent and it is said that they scattered the seeds which
brought forth the later development of the industry
throughout the countries of Europe. However, the indus-
try was not so well developed in Germany as in France and
did not survive the breaking of the continental blockade
nor was it revived until after 1835 when its promotion w^as
taken up by Krause of Austria and Schubarth of Prussia.
They went to France about this time to make a special
study of the industry and, as a result of their work and
^ 40,000,000 francs ($8,000,000) was the purchase price considered.
Helot, op, cit., pp. 51 ^f seq.; Ware, op. cit., pp. 31 <?/ seq.
' Ware, op. cit., pp. 30, 31 ; Helot, op. cit., pp. 62, 64, 80, 82, 120-126,
146-149.
20 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [278
succeeding efforts, the industry was re-established and
has been of growing importance in Germany practically
ever since.^
The industry was of very small proportions in other
European countries before the middle of the last century,
but after that time became of importance in Austria-
Hungary, Russia, Belgium and Holland. Their systems
of promoting sugar production and the courses of de-
velopment have been very similar to those of France and
Germany. The industry is of comparatively recent date
in Sweden, Italy and Spain. France held the lead in
production till 1880 when it was surpassed by Germany,
the latter maintaining its supremacy ever since. The
differences in the successes of these two countries have
been due largely to their differences in taxation."" Ger-
many purposely subsidized the industry more than
France, though the latter finally attempted to change to
the German policy and with some degree of success.
4. BOUNTIES AND THE BRUSSELS CONVENTION
a. The Bounty System in Europe
The measures which the European countries adopted
to promote the. beet-sugar industry were eminently suc-
cessful, in fact, so successful that in time these countries
not only supplied their home markets but became large
exporters. These encouragements also finally resulted
in abuses which brought about the Brussels Convention
and the abolition of bounties.
Though differing somewhat in details, the various
methods of encouraging the industry and of making sugar
^ McMurtrie, op. cit., pp. 24-28; Ware, op. cit., pp. 35-37.
* See Sugar, Cane and Beet, George Martineau, 1910.
279] ORIGIN AND RISE 21
a producer of revenue were very similar throughout
Europe. One of the main features of the legislation was
a prohibitive import duty combined with a high, though
lower, excise or consumption tax. The excise tax paid
by the home consumers provided revenue for the gov-
ernment and the margin between it and the import duty
was kept large enough to prevent foreign competition.
The amount of this margin was the amount of protection
and determined the amount of profit which the home
producer could exact and also enabled the forming of
cartels, or pools, to control output and price.
As production increased and the home markets were
more than supplied, these countries became exporters of
sugar and, in order to allow the home producers to com-
pete in the foreign markets, the manufacturers were
allowed drawbacks of the excise. The interesting feat-
ure about the legislation providing for these drawbacks
is that it was framed in such a way as to give hidden
bounties to exported sugar. When this legislation was
first begun it probably was not the intention that it
should give bounties, but it promoted improvements that
resulted in bounties and was afterwards intentionally
used for this very purpose.
The essence of the system in Germany was that the
excise tax was laid upon the amount of beets sliced and
the drawback was given on the quantity of sugar pro-
duced. For example, when the law in force from Sep-
tember I, 1869 to July 31, 1886 was passed, it was
calculated that the sugar yield would be 8.51 per cent
of the weight of the beets (on the basis of 11.75 ^^^^ ^^
beets for one ton of sugar) and the raw sugar exported
was allowed a drawback of $2.03 per one hundred pounds
(18.80 marks per quintal) which would return the excise
22 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [280
tax exactly, it being 17 cents per one hundred pounds
of beets (1.60 marks per quintal).'
For a few years following the passage of this law it
took twelve tons of beets to produce a ton of sugar so
that the exporter's drawback did not repay all of the
excise. This made it to the interest of the producers
to improve the beets, the machinery and processes of
extraction and, by 1882, it took only 10.46 tons, instead
of 11.75 tons, to produce one ton of sugar. The tax on
the beets was still at the same rate upon the weight of
beets and amounted, at this time, to $1.81 per 100
pounds of sugar. But the drawback on the sugar was
still calculated at the same rate, $2.03 per one hundred
pounds, so that the exporter got a bounty of 22 cents
more than the excise tax.
In Austria,'' instead of basing the excise tax upon the
weight of beets, it was calculated upon the estimated
capacity of the machinery, and this led to the invention
and use of larger and better machinery and to higher
speed of operation, which achieved the same end of pro-
curing a bounty above the legal estimates.
In France 3 the estimates were based upon the quantity
and density of the juice from 1864 to 1875, and this
allowed an indirect bounty, much as the other methods.
However, the French government officials were more
careful to see that the estimates corresponded with the
actual sugar production than was the case in other coun-
tries and, hence, the bounties were less. From 1875 to
1884 French sugar received no bounties, direct or in-
direct.
* Data taken from International Sugar Situation, R R. Rutter, pp.
25 et seq., and " Sugar Industry in Europe " C. F. Griffin, Quar. Jour,
of Econ., vol, 17, pp. 29 et seq.
2 Rutter, ihid., pp. 38 ct seq.
•'^Griffin, ihid., pp. 30 et seq.; Rutter, op. cit., p. 58.
28 1 ] ORIGIN AND RISE 23
A few years before the latter date, France lost the lead
which she had always held as a sugar producer, and real-
izing that she was falling behind, and that neither her
beets nor her factories were on a par with those of Ger-
many, she again (July 29, 1884) resorted to the indirect
bounty to build up her industry, and substantial improve-
ment followed this legislation immediately. The laws in
other European countries were very similar and had very
similar results.
These various laws were changed from time to time in
the effort to make the estimates correspond more nearly
with the actual results, but the producers were able to
make improvements rapidly enough to keep considerably
ahead of the excise tax and thus receive an indirect and
more or less hidden and unknown bounty.
The payment of these bounties made a heavy drain
upon the revenues of the various countries and, in some
cases, notably in Austria-Hungary, more than consumed
the entire amounts raised upon sugar. This led to the
substitution of direct for indirect bounties and to the
limitation of the aggregate amounts that could be paid
in any one year.
Of course, these bounties stimulated the production
and exportation of sugar and of what is termed " dump-
ing." This ** dumping " led to the lowering of the prices
of sugar in the world's markets and the substitution of
the bountied beet sugar for the non-bountied cane sugar
of the tropics. This lowering of prices also brought
about the formation of cartels,' or pools, to control
prices and output and thereby increase prices and profits
in the home market of the European beet-sugar coun-
* The cartel is more of a pool than a trust in the American sense
of the word, the companies composing it maintaining their separate
existence and management. See Rutter, op. cit., p. 28, footnote.
24 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [282
tries. They not only succeeded in that, but also had the
effect of bounties in increasing " dumping " upon the
world's market.
In Germany in 1896, four years before the formation
of the cartels in that country, the goverment undertook
the regulation of the output of each factory by extra
taxes upon all over the official allotment. The year
before that the Russian government took a similar step,
though it went much further and has continued its system
to the present time. The latter government not only ap-
portions the amount of sugar which each factory may
sell upon the home market, in order to prevent the
producer's price from falling below a profitable margin,
but it also undertakes to limit the price to be paid by the
consumer by fixing a maximum price, which if exceeded,
allows surplus sugar to be thrown on the home market,
and it has even imported sugar when necessary to pre-,
vent the price from going too high.
These have been among the most influential means of
promoting the growth of the European sugar industry,
though there have been numerous other forms of aid.' Ex-
emptions from taxation have been common in the early
stages in several countries but have been discontinued
for the most part. However, they have been more or
less important in France under what is known as taxes
de distance, which are designed to overcome the disad-
vantages of factories unfavorably located with reference
to disposal of output. There have also been favorable
government railroad rates, not only for the products,
but also for the transportation of laborers who make
annual migrations to and from the beet-growing regions.
^ C F. Griffin, Quar. Jour, of Econ., vol. 17, pp. 22 et seq.; Willett &
Gray, op. cit., Feb. 27, 1902.
283] ORIGIN AND RISE 25
b. The Brussels Convention of 1902
As mentioned previously, all of these favors had the
efifect of increasing production, exportation and " dump-
ing," and created much friction among the various coun-
tries of Europe, besides causing heavy drains upon their
revenues. From 1863 to the close of the century many
international sugar conferences were held in the attempt
to overcome some of the vexatious difficulties. Several
agreements were signed but none became effective be-
cause, in every case, the home government of one or
more nations refused to ratify the action of its delegates.
( I ) Position of Great Britain
But the conference which agreed to the Brussels Con-
vention of March 5, 1902, was more successful, a result
largely due to England's importance as a market for
surplus sugar and her threats to countervail all bountied
sugars. Great Britain's stand was taken after a careful
investigation and report of conditions in the West Indies
by a royal commission and this influence was supported
by the refiners and other manufacturing interests using
sugar as a raw material. In 1897 the United States' had
imposed a countervailing duty upon bountied sugar and,
March 20, 1899, the government of British India did the
same as to importations into that country. England was
the only considerable market left for these favored surplus
exportations and if she should countervail the bounty,
there might just as well be no bpunty, and furthermore,
* By the tariff acts of 1890 and 1894 provisions were made for a
certain amount of countervailing, but they were small flat rates, the
same on sugar from all countries without discrimination as to whether
the export bounties were large or small and not like those of 1897,
which were made to counteract completely and exactly the bounty of
every country upon its sugar exports to the United States. Summary
of Commerce and Finance, U. S. Treas. Dept., Nov., 1902, p. 1275.
26 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [284
to assist her colonies she might grant them preferential
treatment. Such a move would be disastrous to Conti-
nental exports of beet sugar; hence it was possible to
bring about an agreement between the greater European
producing countries (except Russia), a thing impossible
theretofore.
(2) Provisions of the Brussels Convention^
The main features of the agreement made at this
conference are as follows:
All bounties, direct and indirect, are prohibited.
The surtax (excess of import duty over domestic
excise tax) is limited to 53 cents per 100 pounds in case
of refined and 48 cents per 100 pounds in case of raw
(6 francs and 5.50 francs, respectively, per 100 kilograms).
Importations of bounty-fed sugar from all other coun-
tries are to be prohibited or contervailed by the signatory
parties.
Great Britain and the Netherlands agree to grant their
colonial sugar no preferential treatment during the
continuance of the agreement.
The agreement is to continue in force for five years
and from year to year thereafter until denounced by one
of the signatory parties, such denunciation affecting the
party making it only.
A permanent commission is appointed to watch the
execution of the terms of the convention.
The signatory powers were Great Britain, Germany,
Austria-Hungary, France, Belgium, Holland*, Italy, Spain
and Sweden. The last three were exempted from the
principal restrictions, so long as they remained non-
* Text of Convention in Great Britain, Parliament, Sessional Papers,
1902, vol. 104, cd. 1003. Translation, also, in Hardwick Committee
Hearings, pp. 2642-2646.
285] ORIGIN AND RISE 27
exporters. Russia is the only considerable exporter of
beet-sugar which did not sign the convention. It refused
to participate, saying that it granted no bounty.' The
convention went into effect September i, 1903.
(3) T/ie Convention as Amended
In Great Britain there had been much opposition upon
the part of many to that government's taking the action
it did with reference to the Brussels Convention of 1902,
and it was argued that it was a great detriment to the
millions of English consumers thus to raise the price of
sugar, and it was also charged that the agitation on the
part of the West Indies cane industry was really due, at
bottom, to the efforts of selfish English investors in
colonial sugar lands ^ and home refineries. This dissatis-
faction and agitation were greatly increased with the
rise of prices following the Convention, an increase
which was accentuated by the short European sugar crop
of 1904, that is, directly following the taking effect of
the Convention. It was doubtful if Great Britain would
consent to the renewal of the agreement upon its ex-
piration.3
But an ''Additional Act" dated August 28, 1907, was
annexed to the original Convention, and this released
Great Britain from the obligations of Article 4, wherein
it had been agreed by all to prohibit the importation of,
or to countervail, all bountied sugars. This prohibition
^ See World's Sugar Production and Consumption, U. S. Treas.
Dept., 1902, p. 1274.
2 See Thomas Lough's charge, Contemporary Review, vol. 87. p.
267, and vol. 83, p. 84. See Economic Journal, vol. 17, p. 316, for reply
to these arguments; also Mr. Balfour's debate on Enabling Bill, H. of
C, June 26, 1907.
' The agreement of the conference held till September i, 1908, but
any notice of withdrawal had to be given a year in advance.
28 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [286
had special reference to Russian exports which the Eng-
lish did not want shut out of their markets. On De-
cember 19, 1907, Russia was admitted to the "Sugar
Union," and allowed to retain her existing fiscal and
customs regulations, though she undertook to limit the
aggregate of her sugar exports to 1,000,000 tons for the
five years beginning September i, 1907. Thus, both
Great Britain and Russia were given concessions as re-
gards some of the cardinal provisions of the original
agreement, and the Convention, with these modifications,
is still in force/
(4) Summary of Results and Events Following the Convention
To sum up briefly some of the principal movements in
the sugar world following the Brussels Sugar Conference
it may be said that the principal European beet-growing
countries which participated in it restricted their sow-
ings ; excises and imports were lowered, cartels were
broken, domestic prices fell, and per capita consumption
increased. Net revenues fell temporarily where the ex-
cise tax was lowered and export prices were raised with
the removal of the bounties. Cane sugar was then upon
even terms with beet, with a slightly advanced price for
sugar in the world's market. Consequently, European
exports were diminished and, on the whole, have scarcely
been able to maintain their own since, while the increase
* See British Parliamentary Papers, Sessional Papers, 1907, Com-
mercial, no. 10, cd. 3780, and Sessional Papers, 1908, Commercial, no.
I, cd. 3877. Also Economic Journal, vol. 18, p. 649, article by E.
Cozens Cooke. Press reports stated that, on March 15, 1912, a formal
agreement would be reached by the international sugar conference,
whereby the convention would be renewed for five more years (till
1918), Russia to be allowed an additional "export contingent" of
150,000 tons for the present season and a further 100,000 tons to be
spread over the following years. Willett & Gray, op. c'xt., Feb. 29,
1912, p. 92; A''. Y. Herald, March 14, 1912.
287] ORIGIN AND RISE 29
in the world's consumption has been supplied mostly by
an increase of tropical cane-sugar production, the ad-
vances being notable in Mauritius and Hawaii, more so
in Java under the Dutch, and most of all in Porto Rico
and Cuba under the stimulation of their new relations to
the United States.
To provide for the growth of their existing industries,
the European countries have been endeavoring to open
up new markets and also to increase home consumption.
It is in this latter field that they have been most suc-
cessful, and most of their principal writers seem to think
it is the main hope of any material expansion in their
industries.
It may be said that, for the most part, the Brussels
Convention did away with artificial conditions and put
beet and cane sugar upon equal footings in the world
markets. The big change was a shock to the conti-
nental industry, but the reverse was for a few years only,
and there are indications that the growth will be normal,
though slow, from now on. Austria-Hungary, Germany
and the lesser sugar producers of Europe seem to be
making gradual progress and will probably continue to
do so. Russia, which is less restricted by the terms of
the Convention, has shown the greatest advance of any
European country in sugar production and will probably
continue in this. On the other hand, France seems to
be barely holding her own.
Though the efifects of the Brussels Convention have
been great and far-reaching, nevertheless, as mentioned
above, it has not been the only large factor influencing
movements in the sugar world in recent years. For in-
stance, many of the European countries have been rais-
ing the import duties on cereals and breadstuffs from
time to time, both before and after the Brussels Confer-
30 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [288
ence, notably Germany and Austria-Hungary in 1906.
This has a decided tendency to increase the acreage de-
voted to such crops as wheat and rye and thus to
decrease somewhat the acreage that might otherwise be
devoted to beets. Some think this factor has had as
much to do in restricting the beet acreage as has the
Brussels Convention, but the extent of its influence in
this direction is problematical.' This is only one factor
illustrative of the complexity of the influences at work.
Probably the most important recent change affecting the
European field, and indeed the whole sugar world, has
been the new relations which the United States, the
largest sugar market in the world, has assumed to trop-
ical islands already large producers and probably capable
of great expansion under proper stimuli. These will be
discussed more fully later."*
^ The statistics since 1506 cover so short a period and are of such a
character as to warrant no definite conclusions upon this matter,
though there has been an increase in the acreage put to rye since that
time. See Vierteljahrshefte, 1910, I, p. 84.
^ It has been asked why the United States did not participate in the
Brussels Sugar Conference and the reply was that it was not in-
vited. (Hardwick Committee Hearings, Special Investigation of the
American Sugar Refining Co. and Others, 1911, p. 2734.) To the
invitation to participate in a former conference the United States had
taken much the same ground as Russia did, replying that "no legal
bounty existed in the United States upon the exportations of im-
ported sugar or upon the production or manufacture of sugar; that
the Secretary of the Treasury considered that the relative drawback
which was then allowed by law upon the exportation of refined
sugars manufactured from imported sugars was not excessive, and
did not constitute an indirect bounty as claimed." Furthermore, " that
the very question as to whether any bounty or subsidy should be
allowed in connection with the production or manufacture of sugar
was one which could not be determined by the executive branch of
the United States government. Congress having sole and exclusive
jurisdiction in such matters." (See World's Sugar Production and
Consumption in Summary of Commerce and Finance, for November,
1902, U. S. Treasury Dept., Bureau of Statistics, p. 1274.)
289] ORIGIN AND RISE 3 1
It might be remarked further, that the United States was a large
importer and consumer of sugar, with a new sugar industry of its
own which it had just begun to foster. It h^d not promoted the in-
dustry for decades as had the European countries, and hence, unUke
them, did not have to meet the problems occasioned by over-stimu-
lation, namely, the disposal of a surplus through exportation and con-
sequent drains upon the national revenues, nor did it, on the other
hand, like Great Britain, have sugar-producing colonies going to ruin
in face of bountied beet-sugar competition.
Still further, it may be mentioned that, had the United States agreed
to the terms of the Convention, it could not have levied import duties
in excess of 53 cents and 48 cents per one hundred pounds upon re-
fined and raw sugar respectively, in place of $1.95 and $i.6Sj/2, the
duties then in force (and still in force except it is $1.90 on refined
since the passage of the Payne- Aldrich Bill of 1909) and that would
have been a nearer approach to free trade than either the home
industries or Congress would have approved. It may occur to some
that if we do encourage domestic sugar production, both continental
and insular, as the European nations have done in the past, we may, in
time, have to solve just the same problems that have been vexing
them so many years.
B. DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY
Chapter II. Historical Sketch and Survey of
Present Situation
I. historical sketch
a. Early Attempts to Establish the Industry
(i) Various Early Attempts, Mostly Unsuccessful
Beet-sugar production in the United States before
1898 was scarcely sufficient in size to be termed an in-
dustry. As far back as 1830 an attempt was made to
establish the industry by a Philadelphia company, of
which John Vaughn and James Ronaldson were presi-
dents.' In 1838 and 1839 David Lee Child, of North-
ampton, Mass., organized the Northampton Beet Sugar
Company. He had spent a year and a half in Europe
studying the growing and manufacture of beet sugar and
later published a small work ^ stating that the cost of cul-
ture in the Connecticut River Valley was $42 per acre,
that the average yield was 13 to 15 tons, that the beets
yielded 6 per cent sugar and 2J per cent molasses, and
that the cost of the sugar was 11 cents per pound, not
taking account of pulp and manure. These seem to be
1 Ware, L. S., The Sugar Beet, p. 41 ; McMurtrie, Wm., Culture
of the Sugar Beet, p. 167. Surface, G. T., Story of Sugar, pp. 114
et seq. Hardwick Committee Hearings, pp. 3613-3616,
* Culture of the Beet and Mfg. of Beet Sugar.
32 [290
291] HISTORICAL SKETCH AND SURVEY 33
rather favorable results for the time, but his reports were
probably rather optimistic, as are some of more recent
date, for, after having obtained 1300 pounds of sugar he
went out of the business, although there was a Massa-
chusetts bounty of 3 cents per pound.
In 1838, the Committee on Agriculture, which was
under the United States Commissioner of Patents ' at
that time, made a report saying, among other things,
that " From all the information which the committee
have been able to obtain, they are induced to believe
that no country in the world is better adapted for the
production of sugar beets than most parts of the United
States, whether we consider the soil, the climate or the
people."'' The next year there was also a report of the
Committee on Manufactures on the memorial of Charles
Lewis Fleischman relative to the sugar beet.^
Brigham Young sent to France for some machinery
and the Mormons attempted the production of beet sugar
in Utah in the early 50's, but they failed also.'^ Be-
sides more or less experimenting in a small way, no other
considerable attempt was made until 1863, when Gennert
Brothers, formerly of Braunschweig, Germany, erected a
factory at Chatsworth, 111.^ They struggled along for six
years and, in a final effort, removed the factory to Free-
port, 111., where it survived only one year. Their failure
is said to have been due to lack of practical knowledge,
bad weather conditions and unsuitable soil. Some of the
1 Surface, G. T., ibid., p. 115.
' 25th Congress, 2d Sess., House Report no. 815.
' 25th Congres4^3d Sess., House Doc. 62; Sen. Doc. 147 and House
Report 319.
* Hardwick Committee Hearings, H. R., 62d Cong., ist Sess., p. 767;
also, Amer, Sugar Industry and Beet Sugar Gazette, Sept., 191 1, p. 428.
' Ware, op. cit., p. 41 ; McMurtrie, op. cit., p. 168.
34 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [292
machinery was taken to Black Hawk, Sauk County, Wis-
consin, to join with a co-operative company formed there
the year before, but that failed also.
( 2 ) So7ne of the First Successes
In 1866, two Germans, Messrs. Otto and Bonesteel,
erected a factory at Fond-du-lac, Wisconsin, and are said
to have attained considerable success in the following two
years. Shortly after this a San Francisco company with
a capital of $250,000 induced them to move their plant
to Alvarado, California, where they began operations in
1870. The Alvarado Co. struggled along till 1876, but
finally failed.^ After a year or so, the work was again
taken up at the same place and, though for several years the
output was insignificant, a factory has been in operation
there ever since. "" Numerous other attempts were made
about this time in California, New Jersey, Delaware,
Maine and even in the South.^ Most of the states men-
tioned gave special encouragement to the industry in the
form of bounties, or tax exemptions, or both, besides
doing experimental work, but, up to 1888, the Alvarado
factory was the only one that had been able to survive.
In that year (the first year after the formation of the
original trust) Claus Spreckels, the *' Hawaiian Sugar
King,"'* erected the second successful factory in the
United States at Watsonville, California, which also had
a prosperous existence. In 1898 it was replaced by a
new factory fifteen miles distant, and to-day this is the
' McMurtrie, op. cit., p. 168; Ware, op. cit., p. 42.
2 G. T. Surface, op. cit., p. 116. Press reports indicate that compe-
tition with other crops, fruit and vegetables may force it to move soon.
Willett & Gray, op. cit., Aug. 3, 191 1, p. 313.
' Ware, op. cit., p. 43; McMurtrie, op. cit., pp. 168, 169.
* Surface, op. cit., p. 116,
293] HISTORICAL SKETCH AND SURVEY 35
largest sugar factory in the world, ^ one half the stock
being owned by John D. Spreckels and associates and
the other half by the Sugar Trust. ^
(3) More Important Attempts Following the Formation of the
Sugar Trust and the Passage of the McKinley Bill
Oxnard Brothers,^ with their Brooklyn refinery, went
into the original sugar trust when it was organized in
1887. Robert and James remained with the trust, but
Henry T. Oxnard '^ went to Europe to study the beet-
sugar industry. He returned in 1888 and, with his
brothers and the Cuttings ^ of New York, organized a
corporation which erected a beet-sugar factory at Grand
Island, Nebraska, in 1890.^ The year before, H. T.
Oxnard had appeared before Congress ^ to get protection
for beet-sugar production and the McKinley bill of 1890
was the first national legislation to recognize and en-
courage the new industry by a manufacturer's bounty of
two cents on each pound of sugar produced, and by
provisions for the free importation of beet seed and
* Capacity, 3,000 tons of beets daily.
2 Hardwick Committee Hearings, H. R., 62A Cong., ist Sess., pp.
100, 928 et seq., 947 et scq. Since this was written the N. Y. Times
published a report that the trust had disposed of its interests in the
Spreckels plants. Willett & Gray reported official announcement of
this in their Weekly Journal of Dec. 7, 191 1, p. 488.
^ Four brothers, Henry T., Robert, Benjamin and Jas. G., Hardwick
Committee Hearings, p. 367.
"^ Ibid., p. 372.
^ Ibid., pp. 375 et seq. W. Bayard Cutting, R. Fulton Cutting, J. G.
Hamilton, Robt., Benj., Jas., and Henry Oxnard organized the Ox-
nard Beet Sugar Co., which later became the American Beet Sugar
Co. of to-day.
^ Ibid., pp. 375 et seq., 384 et seq. Ground was broken in Dec, 1889.
'^ Ibid., p. 384. He has appeared before every Ways and Means
Committee since.
36 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [294
sugar machinery. Nebraska and numerous other states
at that time and later also offered bounties/ and under
these encouragements the Oxnard Co. erected two
more factories the next year (1891), one at Norfolk,
Neb. and the other at Chino, California.
The same year (1891) T. R. Cutler and others of
Utah took over the incorporation of a company that had
failed in an attempt to manufacture sugar from sorghum
and built a beet-sugar factory^ at Lehi, Utah. Utah
was among the states which offered bounties in addition
to the United States bounty. Except the Oxnard
factory at Norfolk, Nebraska, which was moved to
Lamar, Colo, in 1905, and the Spreckels factory at
Watsonville, Calif., whose interests were really merged
in the new monster factory at Spreckels, Calif, (about
fifteen miles distant), in 1898, all of these factories have
continued in successful operation ever since.^
This may be reckoned as the first period of any con-
siderable and successful interest in the beet-sugar indus-
try in the United States, and it seems that the formation
of the trust by the merging of interests of such men as
the Oxnards and their associates left them free to take
up the beet-sugar industry; also, that the members of
this family had interests both in the beet industry and in
the trust, and hence there was a community of interests
which became even closer in later years. It was the
practical experience, capital and infliience of such men
^ See article by P. T. Cherington on " State Bounties and the Beet-
Sugar Industry," Quar. Jour, of Econ., vol. xxvi, pp. 381-386 (Feb.,
1912). This article is correct in the main, but is inaccurate in saying
that no beet-sugar factories are now in operation in Nebraska; also,
in saying that one factory still survives in New York.
2 Hardwick Committee Hearings, pp. 768 et seq.
' Letter of Secretary of Agriculture, 6ist Cong., ist Sess., Sen. Doc.
22, p. 3.
295] HISTORICAL SKETCH AND SURVEY 37
as these back of the industry, their success before Con-
gress in securing favorable legislation, and the bounties
and other encouragements of the various states which
combined to make a success of an undertaking in which
so many others had failed.
But besides the unavoidable and serious difficulties of
establishing a highly technical industry which was new,
both as regards its promoters and its field of operation,
the beet-sugar producers were confronted with questions
of constitutionality as to both state and federal bounties.
They soon lost the latter and, in some cases, the former
also.^ It had been the intention to give the beet-sugar
industry encouragement by a protective duty in the Mc-
Kinley bill, but sugar was a great revenue producer, and
in order to reduce the surplus which the party in power
had had great trouble in spending, ex-Governor Gear, of
Iowa,"" who was then on the Ways and Means Commit-
tee, suggested giving sugar a bounty instead of a tariff,
as this would cut the revenue at both ends and also give
sugar a large subsidy. This bounty was to continue for
fourteen years, but the Democrats came into power and,
in pursuing their plan of tariff for revenue (ostensibly, at
least), they removed the bounty on sugar and established
an ad valorem duty of 40 per cent, which gave very much
less protection than the bounty.^
b. Passage of the Dingley Bill and Growth of the
Industry
( I ) Rapid Increase in Factory Building
As a reeult of the loss of bounties and the financial de-
^ Hardwick Committee Hearings, pp. 384 et seq., and p. 398.
2 Ibid., p. 387.
2 Incidentally, 'or otherwise, the Wilson bill gave the refiners J^c.
protection which is about equal to the entire cost of refining to-day.
38 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [296
pression at that time, no beet-sugar factories were built
until 1897, except one at Menominee Falls, Wisconsin
(in 1896), which "proved an immediate and disastrous
failure owing to ill-conceived plans and inexperience." ^
But with the defeat of the party in power in 1896 and the
enactment of the Dingley bill of 1897, which put a duty
of $1.95 on the refined and $1,685 on 96° centrifugals —
which is the form in which most raw sugar is imported —
the building of new factories began in earnest, and this
may be taken as the date of the beginning of the revivi-
fication which has resulted in the present industry.
The accompanying tables (p. 39), which were presented
by theSecretary of Agriculture in a report^ to Congress
in 1909, show the growth in factory construction since
the passage of this bill.
We have had two official reports since these tables
were compiled. The annual report for 1909 includes one
new factory of 600 tons capacity at Santa Ana, California
and a factory of 800 tons capacity at Glendale, Arizona.
The latter, an old factory which had been idle, has been
put in operation by a new company. The 1910 report,^
which is the last, was very brief and made no mention of
new factories or failures. However, it showed that Cali-
fornia had eight instead of ten factories ; Colorado, thir-
teen instead of sixteen; Idaho, three instead of four and
Michigan seventeen instead of sixteen, with a total for the
United States of sixty-one instead of sixty-five, as in 1909.
^ Letter of Secretary of Agriculture, 6ist Cong., ist Sess., Sen. Doc.
22, p. 2.
^ 61st Cong., 1st Session., Sen. Doc. no. 22, pp. 8-9.
^ Previous reports were prepared by Mr. C. F. Saylor, who died
in April, 191 1. No successor was appointed and instead of a report
of 70 or more pages as usual, the only data published occupied less
than a column in the monthly Crop Reporter of the.U. S. Dept. of
Agr., Oct., 191 1. This is the latest official report and is given further
on in this study.
297] HISTORICAL SKETCH AND SURVEY 39
Table I. Summary of factory construction, i8gy-igo8
Number of
factories
completed.
Total daily
capacity, in
tons, of beets.
Factories which failed
later.
Year.
Number.
Daily capacity,
in tons, of
beets.
i8q7
3
9
12
5
1
9
4
6
12
2
I
750
8,440
5,800
2,850
■3 oco
2
4
\
T
400
2,240
2,900
350
6co
1898
19CO
I go I
1002
4 coo 1 ^
7,400
3»ooo
3.150
8,oco
1,200
600
.
0
0
0
0
600
000
TQOC
lgo6
800
1908
Total 1 . -
74
49,090
16
7,890
Table II. Factories completed and put in operation, with percentages of failure,
jSg6-igo8, by periods
I 1896-1901. 1902-1908.
Factories completed and put in operation
Total daily capacity of factories in tons of beets . .
Factories which failed later
Total capacity of failed factories in tons of beets .
Percentage of failure based on number of factories
Percentage of failure based on capacity
'41
40
24,840
28,250
17
2
8,190
1,400
41
5
33
5
As is mentioned elsewhere, the census and other
official reports are always a year or more behind time
^ This does not include seven factories in operation at the beginning
of this period.
' Including the six factories built prior to 1896.
40 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [298
and do not show the present condition of the industry.
A year or more ago, there was a new factory built at
Paulding, Ohio, not mentioned in any of^cial report.
The factory at Lyons, New York, has closed, probably
permanently, and the one in Washington did not operate
during the 191 1- 12 campaign. Colorado does not now
occupy the pre-eminence she did at the time the census
was taken, her acreage having dropped to two-thirds of
what it formerly was, while Michigan has had unusually
favorable results and her acreage has increased slightly,
giving her the lead of all states.
According to Willett & Gray,^ in the campaign year
of 1910-11, there were 68 factories with a total daily
slicing capacity of 51,200 tons and there were six new
factories building for the campaign of 1911-12 as follows:
Continental Sugar Co., Findlay, Ohio 600 tons capacity
San Luis Valley Beet Sugar Co., Montevista, Col 6oo' "
Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., Austin, Utah 500 "
Nevada Sugar Co. , Fallon, Nev 500 ' '
Holly Sugar Co., Huntington Beach, Calif 600 "
Anaheim Sugar Co., Anaheim, Calif 750 "
According to the same authority, in 1910-11, there were
five factories not in operation, two being in southern
Colorado, two in California and one in Idaho; in 191 1-
12, six factories were idle, two of them being in Cali-
fornia, three in Colorado and one in Washington.^
From the data presented above it may be seen that,
within about two years after the enactment of the Ding-
ley bill, 24 new factories were erected and put in opera-
^ See Weekly Statistical Sugar Trade Journal, May 25, 191 1, p. 213,
also p. 223. Ibid., Oct. 26, 191 1, p. 433, reports a new factory building
at Newport, California; also locations of several prospective fac-
tories. See also Amer. Sug. Ind., Dec, 191 1.
^ Ibid., Oct. 26, 191 1, p. 433.
299] HISTORICAL SKETCH AND SURVEY 41
tion, and of these exactly half (12) failed/ The stimulus
of the new law caused too much haste and the disregard-
ing of sound practical considerations, hence failure
was inevitable in many cases. Most of the survivors
were the factories of California and Michigan.
(2) Effect of Rapid Growth, together with Cuban and
Philippine Concessions
Factory building was not so rapid during the next
three years (1900-1902), probably as a result of these
failures, and of the agitation for Cuban reciprocity and
concessions to the Philippines. As mentioned hereto-
fore, a 25 per cent concession in duties and other favors
were given to the Philippines March 8, 1902, and a 20
per cent concession to Cuba"* December 27, 1903, but
the figures do not seem to show that these concessions
were so disastrous to the existing home industry as some
of its advocates tried to make Congress believe. It was
at this period that H. O. Havemeyer and the trust
began extensive operations in the acquiring of interests
in the existing beet-sugar factories and in the erection
of others.3 In spite of all this agitation and in spite of
the failures of the factories built previously, five or six
new factories were erected in each of these years. The
1 Sec. of Agr., 6ist Cong., ist Sess., Sen. Doc. 22, p. 8.
2 See JJ. S. Tariff Acts, House Doc. 671, 6ist Cong., 2d Sess., pp.
621, 625.
' See original Petition of U. S. of Amer. v. Amer. Sugar Refining
Co. et al, in the Circuit Ct. of the U. S., Southern Dist. of N. Y., pp.
92-133. Also Hearings of Special Committee on the Investigation of
the Amer. Sugar Refining Co. et al. To cite all the references in these
hearings would hardly be justifiable, but attention is called particu-
larly to pp. I- 100, 774, and the extracts from the minutes of the di-
rectors and of the executive committee of the A. S. R. Co. Ibid., pp.
2943-3062.
42 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [300
very year that Cuban reciprocity went into effect the num-
ber of new factories put in operation increased by nine,
and in 1906 by twelve.
This seems a satisfactory and normal growth, and
it appears that what the over-ardent beet-sugar advo-
cates said would destroy the industry was really
beneficial in some important respects. In all proba-
bility, with plenty of encouragement and no adverse
conditions, factory construction would have continued
to be too rapid and failures too numerous, somewhat
as immediately after the passage of the Dingley Bill.
But the reverses of those put in operation soon after
the enactment of this act and the granting of conces-
sions to the Philippine Islands and Cuba resulted in
more conservative and practical factory construction and
location, and of those put in operation since that time
comparatively few have failed.
(3) Later Developments
The figures indicate that, by 1906, the industry was
again on the way to rapid and more substantial growth,
but, for a number of reasons, this has fallen below ex-
pectations. Among the causes of this, probably first in
importance were the conditions accompanying and fol-
lowing the financial panic of 1907. Unfavorable crop
conditions during several years and the difficulty in get-
ting the farmers to grow sufficient beets to run the
factories have also been important factors. Other im-
portant factors have been the uncertainty of the develop-
ment of the cane-sugar competition under present and
possible concessions to the Philippines and, especially,
to Cuba. The influence of this competition has been
growing considerably, and the effect on the erecting of
beet-sugar factories is probably much more on account
301 ] HISTORICAL SKETCH AND SURVEY 43
of the potentialities of the future than the actualities of
the present.'
However, during the last two years the standstill that
began with the 1907 panic has given way to considerably
better conditions in some sections. Though the increases
have been offset by some retrogressions/ there has been
a net gain and several new factories have just been put in
operation, or are in process of construction. ^ In the fol-
lowing section there is a somewhat further analysis of
the industry principally upon the basis of the data pre-
sented in the last census, though it should be remem-
bered that most of these statistics are for 1909 and do
not include changes since that time.
2. SURVEY OF THE PROGRESS AND PRESENT SITUATION
OF THE UNITED STATES BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY '^
a. Increases in Quantity and Value of Products^ Ex-
penses^ and Capitalization
The report upon the beet-sugar industry of the
United States by the 1910 Census, Division of Manufac-
tures, together with similar reports for previous cen-
suses, affords a basis for measuring the progress of the
industry.5 Table III shows the progress in each of the
^The reduction of the duty on refined sugar from $1.95 to $1.90 by
the Payne-Aldrich bill of 1909 was insignificant and the concession
of free sugar up to 300,000 tons annually from the Philippines was of
comparatively small importance in itself and for the time being.
* See Hardwick Committee Hearings, pp. 645 ff. Testimony of Chas.
B. Warren, p. 2700. Testimony of T. G. Palmer, 69 in operation and
six in process of construction.
' See Census Reports and Annual Reports of Special Agent of U.
S. Dept. of Agr. for idle factories each year.
* Based on a comparison of census reports, hence most of the data
in this section are not later than the last census.
^ See loth (1880) Census, Manufactures, pp. 94, loi and 127, and
i2th (igoo) Census Bui. 59, P- 6.
IX-
44
THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY
J>
:g
H
H
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C/3
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\P
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"4
H
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V
H
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^^.■S
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°. "t ^ "^ ^
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t^ in "J
■* in CO t-.vO
fo O ■* c« H
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1/5 t^« 000
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00 w •
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vn CO in
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m-^tvcnH T(-r»vD-<*->
cn t^oo_^ g; rjj o° -„ ^ t^^
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VD "i-vO OS vo
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— Ovr-
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_ _ <3 "" js
rt rt « « }J
'c c'5
c« c«
.2.i2.2t!t; ooS
E £ £.5.2 "^"^.S
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0-2
f ■ r5
^ '^
5 <"
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11:
o .
•£■5
13 "O-
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.si-
■2 -•
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303]
HISTORICAL SKETCH AND SURVEY
45
I
q !>. q
d fo I 00
?1
1904-09 1
i 1
a
d
ph eu c/2 ;> PL, u w
o =«
46 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [304
quinquennial periods from 1899 to 1909. The returns
for this industry in the Eleventh Census (1890) are very
meager. There were only two factories at that time, both
located in California/ and the quantity of beet sugar
manufactured, as well as numerous other matters, was
not tabulated separately in the census report.
The accompanying tables show a record of very rapid
progress and need few comments to explain them. In
the five-year period preceding the last census, the number
of factories increased by about a fourth, the total capacity
by about a half, the primary horse-power by 41. i per
cent, the expenses by 87 per cent, the value of the pro-
ducts by 97.3 per cent, the value added to the products
in the process of manufacture by 110.5 per cent, and the
capital by 131. 8 per cent. These are large increases, but
it is seen that the increase in capital is greatest of all,
and this is the reverse of what would be expected if there
were no ^* water" in this increase.
The capitalization per ton of daily slicing capacity in
1889 was $1097; i" 1904, $1502 and in 1909, $2458.
The additions of machinery for the extraction of sugar
from the molasses by the osmose and Steffens processes,
for drying pulp, and numerous other improvements ac-
count for a part of the increase, but most of it in both
periods, as regards capitalization per ton capacity, is
probably fictitious.'
^See I2th Census Bui. 59, pp. 6 and 7.
' See Hearings of the Special CommiUee (Hardwick) to Investigate
the Amer. Sug. Ref. Co. ct al., pp. 379 et scq., where H. T. Oxnard
represents that $1,000 is an approximation to the original cost and
that a third more would probably cover it in the case of latest im-
proved factories. Several other witnesses give somewhat similar tes-
timony.
305]
HISTORICAL SKETCH AND SURVEY
47
Table V. Number and nominal daily capacity of beet- sugar
ESTABLISHMENTS BY STATES (IQIO CENSUS)^
States.
United States
Arizona
California
Colorado
Idaho
Illinois
Iowa
Kansas
Michigan
Minnesota . . ..
Montana
Nebraska
New Mexico ..
New York ....
Ohio
Oregon
Utah
Washington, . .
Wisconsin ....
1909.
«
>, w
• r- a>
<*- s
0 J3
u
»- .2
rt"-
<u _-
.0 0
6 i3
^s
5S 2
rt 2,
68^
52750
I
boo
11^
II 700
12200
3750
I
350
*
5CO
1200
17'
II 900
600
I
I2CO
350
600
400
400
4COO
500
2300
[904.
51
5
9
3
35900
7300
^350
1800
12550
400
600
400
350
2850
400
1700
*, g
O JZ
31"
'8
I
I9IIO
9900
350
4ICO
400
1260
2CO
400
350
1 100
350
Summary
Total.
1859 19110
1904 359CO
1909 52750
1909.
California daily capacity over 1000 tons.
Average.
616
704
776
Number of
factories.
31
51
68
Michigan.
Colorado "
Utah «
Idaho «
Wisconsin "
Kansas ( i factory) *'
Montana ( I factory) "
700
762
800
937
575
I2CO
1200
' From census office manuscripts.
' Includes 2 idle.
^ Includes 3 idle establishments.
* Includes i idle.
48
THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY
[306
Table VI. Beet-Sugar Factories Classified According to Tons of Beets
Used (1910 Census for 1909) ^
United States
California
Colorado
Idaho
Michigan .
Ut^h
Wisconsin
All other states ^.
0
der
^^
0
a tn '
5J
1^
!3 C
« 0
0 ^
«
T32 '
§§ 1
58
14
12
9
I
2
15
I
2
3
..
I
II
2
3
5
••
I
4
2
2
II
8
'
4)
"-1 o
o
S ^
s o
The number of wage earners,^ the amount of wages
paid, the amount paid for materials, and the value of the
products all increased in about the same ratio, approxi-
mately 80 per cent, from 1904 to 1909 and less than the
value of the products, or the value added by manufacture,
and much less than the capitalization. .
While the tables show in what states there were in-
creases in factories, daily slicing capacities and value of
products, they do not show the same as regards cap-
italization and it is to be regretted that they are not
nearly so complete in details for the last census as for
the two previous ones.
It is interesting to note that the value of by-products
has increased per unit, showing a better utilization ; also
' From office manuscripts.
' Includes one factory each in Arizona, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota,
Montana, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Washington.
' The census figures are those relating to the manufacture of beet
sugar primarily and do not include agricultural statistics except where
so specified. Hence these wage earners do not include farm laborers.
307] HISTORICAL SKETCH AND SURVEY 49
that the average results of growers under their own
management is considerably better, upon the whole, than
where the beets are grown by the factories in large
tracts, or even by tenants upon the factories' land, thus
indicating the element of personal interest and manage-
ment in this part of the industry.
It is also worthy of note that the cost of i;n^terial con-
stitutes a large proportion of the total expe.mse of beet-
sugar production, the average for the Uniterf States for
1909 being, salaries 4.7 per cent ; wages 12.9 per cent ;
materials 73 per cent; and miscellaneous expenses 9.4
per cent. By far the biggest item in materials is
"beets," and the next ''fuel," though, unfortutiately, the
separate figures for these are not given for 1969 as they
are for 1904 and 1899. \
b. Comparison of Development in Different":, States
Nearly all of the important states show material in-
creases in nearly every phase of the industry in both
quinquennial periods, though California shows consider-
able retrogression in the first one ; Colorado, California
and Michigan show practically the same aggregate
daily capacity at the last census, with Colorado slightly
in the lead and with Michigan with a slight decrease in
both total capacity and number of factories in the last
quinquennial period. Counting either the last ten-year
or last five-year period ending 1909, Colorado had made
much the largest growth of any state as regards the beet-
sugar industry and heads the list in acreage, quantity of
beets and value of products, though in proportion to acre-
age California's results surpassed those of both Michigan
and Colorado. Utah, Idaho and Wisconsin increased
in relative importance and Nebraska and New York^
^ All factories in New York are closed now. There have been some
50 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [308
declined considerably. Montana, Kansas and Arizona
are some of the states with single new factories of con-
siderable size. The industry is rather problematical
under present conditions in these states, as well as in
Ohio, Illinois and Minnesota, but the outlook for it in
them seems somewhat more hopeful than in Washington
and Iowa. Washington produces a good quality of beet
but competition with other crops and other causes have
made the maintenance of the factory there a struggle and
similar causes and low-quality beets in addition have
been serious drawbacks in Iowa.' It seemed that the
industry in New York could not survive the abolition of
the state bounty as other crops were more profitable on
the whole.
c. Comparison of United States Beet and Cane-Sugar
Industries
The accompanying table offers a basis for comparison
of beet and cane-sugar manufacture in the United States.
As compared with manufactures in the beet-sugar in-
dustry, the capital invested in the manufacture of cane
sugar is less than one-third, the total expenses two-
fifths, the wages paid three-eighths, but the cost of the
materials is six-sevenths, the total value of the products
five-eighths and the value added by manufacturing two-
thirds of what it is in beet-sugar manufacturing.
changes in several states, particularly in Colorado and Michigan, since
the census data were obtained. These changes are noted in current
periodicals and some of them in the Hardwick Hearings.
^The 191 1 crop of beets in Iowa was better than the average. The
Washington factory could not secure sufficient acreage, so is not in
operation for thei9ii-i2 campaign. Willett and Gray, op. cit., Mar. 23,
191 1, pp. 121 and 253; also issue for Oct., 191 1.
309]
HISTORICAL SKETCH AND SURVEY
51
Table VII. Beet- and Cane-Sugar Manufacture in the United States.-
COMPARISON
(19 10 Census — for the year 1909) *
Item.
Number of establishments
Capital
Expenses, total
Services »
Officials -
Clerks
Wage earners
Materials
Fuel and rent of power
Other
Miscellaneous
Rent of works
Taxes, including internal rev-
enue
Contract woik
Other
Value of products, total
Sugar.
Quantity (short tons)
Value
All other products, value
Persons engaged in industry, aver-
age during the year
Officials.
Proprietors and firm members,
Salaried officials of corporation
Superintendents and managers
Clerks
Wage earners
Number or amount.
Total.
268
$167,359,000
62,841,000
9,127,000
1,520,000
961,000
6,646,000
47,978,000
3,331,000
44,647,000
5,736,000
156,000
790,000
45,000
4,745,000
Beet Sugar.
58
$129,629,000
37.3S3.ooo
6,578,000
1,008,000
762,000
4,808,000
27,265,000
1,900,000
25,365,000
3,510,000
126,000
508,000
2,000
2,874,000
77,991,000 ! 48,122,000
829,000
72,033,000
5,958,000
13,628
194
193
514
1,448
11,279
I
228
865
7,204
Cane Sugar.
502,000 1
45,9.^7.000 !
2,185,000 i
8,389
2ZO
$37,730,000
25,488,000
2,549,000
512,000
199,000
1,838,000
20,7x3,000
1,431,000
19,282,000
2,226,000
30,000
282,000
43,000
1,871,000
29,869,000
327,000
26,096,000
3,773,000
193
102
286
583
4,075
Per cent of
total.
Beet. Cane.
21.6
77-4
59.4
72.1
723
56.8
57-0
56.8
61.2
80.6
60.6
63.8
36.7
0.5
47-1
44-3
59-7
63-9
78.4
22.6
40.6
27.9
663 i 33-7
79.3 i 20.7
27.7
43-2
43.0
43-2
38.8
19.4
64-3 ! 35-7
3-6 : 96.4
60.6 39.4
6i-7 I 38.3
39-4
^6.3
63.3
5,239 61.6 I 38.4
99-5
529
55-7
40.3
36.1
d. Comparison of United States and German Factory
Operations
The average rated capacity of the 68 beet-sugar fac-
tories in the United States in 1909 was 776 tons of beets
(of 2000 lbs.) per day each, and on the basis of 83 days
for the average length of the campaign'' the 65 factories
in operation actually averaged 756.5 tons of beets (short
tons of 2000 lbs.) as compared with 647 tons (587 metric
^ From office manuscripts.
2 Counting three not in operation. According to Report no. 92, U. S.
Dept. of Agr., p. 50.
52 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY * [310
tons of 2204.6 lbs.) by the German factories' in the same
year. The United States factories averaged working
62,790 tons of beets per factory during the entire cam-
paign, from which they got 7,884 tons of granulated
sugar as compared with about 40,000 tons of beets
(36,213.7 metric tons) and an extraction of about 6,000
tons of raw sugar (5,426 metric tons) per factory by the
German factories.
That is, on the average the American factories operate
upon a greater scale than the German by about one-fifth
and the Germans surpass all the other large European
producers. For example, in the same year, the average
French factory* ground 25,602 metric tons (2204.6 lbs.
each) of beets and produced 3,008 metric tons of raw
sugar, or about two-thirds to five-ninths of the German and
considerably less than half the average American factory
output. In Austria-Hungary the quantity of beets
worked per factory per year 3 is approximately the same
as in Germany (35,375 metric tons in 1908-09), though
the total sugar extracted per factory that year was some-
what higher (6,211 metric tons) than that given above
for the American factory. The Russian factories come
about half way between the French and the German in
the comparison in tonnage of beets and sugar manu-
factured per factory. '^
It has been worked out very carefully in Germany by
1 Quarterly of German Imperial Statistical Office, 1910, IV, p. 147.
^ Jour, des Fabricants de Sucre, Supplement, Feb. 8, 191 1.
^ For 1908-09, the latest available estimate, Jahr- und Adressenbuch
der Zuckerfabriken und RaiHnerien, Oesterreich-Ungarns, p. 517.
* Figures of International Stat. Association quoted in Jahr- und
Adressenbuch cited supra.
31 1 ] HISTORICAL SKETCH AND SURVEY 53
Ernst Glanz, whose figures are adopted by H. Claassen,"
the well known authority on sugar manufacture, that,
other things being equal, the larger the factory the
cheaper the production, and in this respect the American
factories are superior to all others.
On the whole the United States industry has made
rapid progress since 1897. It is becoming more firmly
established in the sections best adapted to it, and failures,
which were frequent in the first years of this period,
are becoming rare. However, in a number of sections
the success of the industry is very problematical, and
whether or not it will expand materially and rapidly even
in the more favorable sections depends upon various
factors, some of which will be discussed in the next
chapter.
^ Ztickerfabrikation, pp. 102 et seq. Original articles by E. Glanz in
Zeitschrift fur den Verein der deutschen Zuckerindustrie, 1907, and
previous years. These articles ran serially.
C. PROBLEMS AFFECTING THE FUTURE OF
THE UNITED STATES BEET-SUGAR
INDUSTRY
Chapter III. Preliminary Survey of the Field
I. INTRODUCTORY
We have noticed briefly some of the movements in the
development of the great European sugar industry and,
also, a few of the forces at work in the promotion of the
comparatively new and small, though growing beet-sugar
industry of the United States. Can we reasonably ex-
pect a development in this country similar to that which
has taken place across the Atlantic?
What will be the probable increase in the consumption
of sugar and expansion of markets in the United States
and in the world at large? Is the sugar beet an exotic
as has been claimed? If not, can an area sufficient to
promote a material expansion of the industry be with-
drawn from the acreage devoted to cereal production,
especially in view of the constant increase of population
and the growing demand for breadstufifs and meat?
Are our agricultural and industrial conditions such
that we can compete with foreign producers? Are there
any indirect factors having material bearings upon the
questions involved ? Is it wise to encourage the industry
through protection? In short, can we utilize our resources
more advantageously in the production of beet sugar or
in some other way? We shall now consider some of
these questions.
54 [312
313] PRELIMINARY SURVEY OF THE FIELD 55
2. RECENT TENDENCIES AND SITUATION IN THE VARIOUS
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD
During the last decade the world's annual sugar pro-
duction and consumption has grown from about 12,000,-
000 to over 16,000,000 long tons,' a remarkable increase
of over one-third in this very short period. It has been
pointed out before that most of this growth has been in
cane sugar and that the principal large producers sharing
the increase are Cuba and Java ; somewhat smaller ones
are Hawaii, Porto Rico and Brazil, and still smaller, though
important producers showing material growth are For-
mosa, Australia, Mauritius, the Philippines, Peru, Argen-
tina and Mexico. Austria-Hungary and Russia are the
only large producers of beet sugar that have made any
notable increase in production in the same period, though
numerous small producers have made equal or greater
proportionate growth as, for example, the United
States, Holland, Sweden and Denmark.
The large producers of sugar approximately in their
order of importance are:
1909-10 yields
British India 2,127,100 long tons'
Germany 2,037,400 metric
Cuba 1,804,349 long
Austria- Hungary i ,245,600 metric
Java 1 ,200,618 long
Russia 1,123,600 metric
France 803,000 ' '
^ Of 2,240 lbs. each. Equal to between 19,000,000 and 20,000,000
short tons of 2,000 lbs. each.
* Long ton equals 2,240 lbs. Metric ton equals 2,204.6 lbs. This
order changes from year to year ; for example, Russia will probably
surpass Austria-Hungary and Java in later figures. For yields since
this see Willett & Gray's Weekly Journal for Jan. 4, 1912. The above
yields are probably more nearly normal than those for the calendar
year of 191 1.
56 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [314
If the industries of the continental United States and
of all its insular possessions are combined and counted as
one, it would rank in this class for the same year with
1,310,613 long tons, but its largest single producer is
Hawaii with 462,613 long tons while its domestic beet-
sugar industry is a close second with 450,595 long tons.
Louisiana, Porto Rico and the Philippines follow with
325,000, 308,000 and 126,854 long tons respectively.
The two great sugar markets of the world for the
surplus production of other countries are the United
States and Great Britain. British India is one of the
largest producers, but as it consumes practically all that
it produces and imports comparatively small quantities,
it has been almost a negligible factor upon the world's
market, though it is now increasing its imports.'
In 1910, which was a more nearly normal year than
191 1, the consumption of the United States amounted to
3,350,355 long tons,"" or one-fifth of the world's product.
Of this amount, 52.6 per cent was imported from foreign
countries (nearly all from Cuba), 25.2 per cent from in-
sular possessions, and 22.4 per cent was the product of
the domestic cane and beet-sugar industries, the latter
standing to the former in the ratio of 4 to 3.
The consumption of Great Britain is just about one-half
that of the United States, or one-tenth of the world's
total, the larger portions of it being imported from
^ They amounted to 544,464 long tons of refined sugar in 1910. See
oflBcial Trade Record of British India for 1910.
' Willett & Gray, Statistical Sugar Trade Journal, Jan, 5, 191 1.
Statistical Abstract of U. S., 1910, p. 537. 7,360,126,811 lbs. equal to
22.1 per cent of world's product, which was 33,230,475,440 lbs. 191 1
consumption according to W. & G., ibid., Jan. 4, 1912, p. 2, was 3,35ir
391 long tons. The proportions supplied from different sources
changed somewhat but not greatly.
315] PRELIMINARY SURVEY OF THE FIELD 57
Germany, Austria-Hungary, Java, Holland and Brazil/
Russia and Germany each consume nearly one-third, and
Austria-Hungary and France each approximately one-
sixth as much as the United States. These constitute
all of the large sugar consumers of the world.
However, practically every important continental
European country already produces its own sugar, and
even the less important countries are promoting the same
policy. This means that continental Europe will afford
no market for surplus sugar but will itself be a producer
of such a surplus as it can market advantageously. Thus
it is seen that at present the greatest sugar markets of
the world are furnished by the English-speaking peoples,
who are the greatest consumers per capita, averaging
about double their nearest competitors.^
3. POSSIBILITIES OF EXPANSION
a. In the World as a Whole
There are three main lines through which the great
sugar-exporting nations, particularly those of continental
Europe, hope to expand their sugar industries. First is
the increase that comes with increase of population in
their respective countries and throughout the world.
Second is the expected increase in per capita consump-
tion, especially in their domestic markets, which it is
hoped will be brought about through reduction of ex-
cises and cheapening of sugar. Third is the opening up
* There were considerable importations from Cuba in 1910 and 191 1,
when Cuban prices fell considerably in excess of the United States
concession of 34 cents.
' Excluding the comparatively small countries of Denmark (77-91
lbs.), Switzerland (64.24 lbs.), and Sweden (54-Oi lbs.), U. S- average
is about 80 lbs., U. K. about 86 lbs., and Australia about 100 lbs. in
1910.
58 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [316
of new markets and the expansion of old ones, all over
the world, but especially in Asia, which contains over
one-half the population of the globe, and which has a
very low per capita consumption.
Estimating the world's population at 1,700,000,000,'
and the world production of sugar at 16,000,000 long
tons,'' the average per capita consumption of the world
is about 21 pounds. To raise this figure to the level of
Europe (32.67 pounds) would mean a 50 per cent ex-
pansion of the world industry. To raise it to the level
of Germany (43.84 pounds) would double it ; to that of
the United States (79.90 pounds) would quadruple it,
and to that of Australia would mean an annual world pro-
duction of 80,000,000 long tons, or five times that of the
present, making no allowance for increase of population.
Of course, this shows merely the possibilities of expan-
sion ; they are far in excess of probable increases within
the near future.^
^ 1,606,542,000 in 1907. Encyclopedia Britannica, nth ed,, vol. xxii,
p. 92.
' It was about 15^ million in 191 1, a little less than 17 million in
1910 and 15 million in 1909. See W. & G., Sugar Trade Jour., Jan. i,
1912, p. II.
' In estimating the possibilities of expansion the determination of
the limit of per capita consumption is of some interest. For practical
purposes it does not appear far wrong to put this limit at 100 lbs. for
any period in the immediate future, but it is not unreasonable to
think that sugar might possibly be cheapened and used for food,
in connection with other foods both for man and for animals, so as
to increase its use considerably, not to mention other uses such as
for cultures in laboratory experiments. No one can dogmatically
fix any figure as a limit for all time, but for practical purposes we
seem justified in assuming that it probably will no' soon exceed 100
lbs., barring unforeseen and revolutionary inventions or discoveries.
Even this limit is far beyond the probabilities in any except the more
advanced nations. Julius Wolf (in Der deutsch-amerikanische
Handelsvertrag, p. 116) puts the "satiety point" at 50 kg. or no lbs.
317] PRELIMINARY SURVEY OF THE FIELD 59
b. Possible Expansion in the United States
( I ) Question of Market
So far as any future for which we can make definite
plans is concerned, it seems that the present status and
prospective growths of existing industries in other
countries are such that the world's market will not offer
any great inducement for the United States to produce
a surplus beyond its own consumption. At present nt
one advocates that this country should produce more
than this, hence the possibilities and probabilities of ex-
ansion in the home field are of more immediate inter o
than those of the world at large.
As stated above, the present consumption of sugar in
the United States is approximately 80 pounds per capita
and the total over 3^^ million long tons. It does not
seem improbable that this total shall be trebled by the
end of the present century. Of course these are rough
estimates, for no one can foresee the future, but it does
not seem improbable that the population of what now
constitutes continental United States shall be 200,000,000
by that time, nor that the per capita consumption shall
be 100 pounds. Looking at it from another point of
view, we see that the aggregate consumption in the
United States for the thirty years preceding 1912 made
an average annual increase of 4.267 per cent.' An aver-
age increase of one-third of this rate would treble the
On this point see Sugar as a Food, U. S. Dept. of Agr., Farmers'
Bulletins 53 and 142, and Experiment Station Circular no. no. Also
Der Einiiuss des Ziickers anf die Muskelarheit, Ugolino Mosso; Der
Zucker in seiner Bedeiitung filr die V olkserndhrung, Theodor Jaensch ;
L'industrie du Sucre, Alfred Foret; Le mouvement agricole, L. N.
Grandeau.
^Willett & Gray, Weekly Statistical Sugar Trade Journal, January
4, 1912, gives the increase for each year and the average for the
period.
6o THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [318
present total consumption, making it approximately
10,000,000 long tons by the end of the century. At any
rate, there seems to be considerable room for the
growth of the United States beet-sugar industry in
order to supply the domestic market alone.'
It will be recalled that the existing beet-sugar industry
supplies only 15 per cent of the present consumption
and only 5 per cent of what we have estimated it may
be by the end of the century. Of course, what part of
this consumption will be supplied by the cane sugar of
the southern states and of our insular possessions and
by the sugar of foreign countries will depend largely
upon legislative policies, as well as upon economic and
industrial conditions which cannot be foreseen with ac-
curacy,^ and, for the most part, it will be safest to confine
ourselves to the present and the near future.
^ It is without the scope of this study to go into details and argu-
ments concerning the possible developments of the cane-sugar industry
in continental United States. It seems that the climate of the southern
states is not such as to mature cane and that this section is at a great
disadvantage as compared with tropical countries. The records of
many decades show a comparatively small net growth, and radical
changes will have to take place if the industry ever shows any rapid
material expansion. It is true that there are a number of factors
other than climate affecting adversely the growth of the industry, as
for example, the domination of the trusts, the lack of capital, small
scale production and inability to store sugars and distribute them
upon the market throughout the year, besides other industrial and
economic conditions. It would be foolish to deny the possibility of a
material improvement, or to declare that no progress is being
made, but the probabilities of large immediate expansion do not ap-
pear very great at present.
' In view of past history it would be rash to say just what our ter-
ritorial possessions will be at any future time.
319] PRELIMINARY SURVEY OF THE FIELD 6 1
(2) Question of Agricultural Area
It has been argued before congressional committees
and elsewhere that there is not sufficient land in the
United States suitable to the economic production of
beet sugar and that the expansion of the industry would
be a great disadvantage to the country by decreasing the
production of cereals and meats.
The theoretical sugar-beet belt of the United States as
determined by the extensive series of experiments by the
U. S. Bureau of Chemistry, lies between the mean iso-
thermal lines of 69 degrees and 71 degrees, counting the
months of June, July and August.'
This beet belt contains 274,000,000 acres. In some
places it crosses lakes and mountains ; in others, the soil
is not the best for beets ; in others, other crops can be
raised more profitably and, for various reasons, not
nearly all of it is available for beet-sugar production."
* See Special Report on the Beet Sugar Industry of the U. S., 1897.
U. S. Dept. of Agr. Also H. Doc. 396, 55th Cong., 2d Sess., and
annual reports for each succeeding year. Also, Letter of Sec. of
Agriculture, S. Doc. 22, 6ist Cong., ist Session, p. 33. Accompanying
map is taken from Farmers' Bui. no. 52, U. S. Dept. of Agr.
^ An extensive series of experiments conducted by Dr. H. W. Wiley,
of the Bureau of Chemistry, U. S. Dept. of Agr,, show that the sugar
stored in the beet root, being entirely a product of the air and sun
elaborated by the beet leaves, reaches a higher percentage of the
weight of the beet in the higher latitudes where the days are longer
than further south. However, this does not seem to require the direct
rays of the sun as cloudy seasons in the northern latitude do not
seem to affect the sugar content materially. But the shortness of
periods between spring and autumn freezes sets limits to the planting
and harvesting seasons and thus effectually restricts the area prac-
ticable to devote to the industry in these latitudes.
Latitudes considerably south of the sugar-beet belt can produce a
good tonnage of beets, but they are usually low in sugar content.
California produces the richest beets of any state in the union and
seems an important exception to the rule. See Bulletins of the Bureau
62
THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY
[320
32 1 ] PRELIMINARY SURVEY OF THE FIELD 63
However, this is only the theoretical center of the area
actually adapted to the industry. At .the present time,
many of the factories are without, though near, these iso-
thermal lines and probably there is a§ much land without
the belt that is suited to the industry as there is within
it, for temperature is only one of the important consid-
erations in determining location, and other advantages
may overcome a slight handicap in this respect.
The average production of sugar per acre in the United
States is now about 1.2 short tons, or 2400 pounds.
Our total consumption in 1910'' was 7,360,126,811
pounds. At 2400 pounds per acre it would require
3,066,720 acres to produce that amount. This is only
about one-ninetieth of the total area of the beet belt. If
it were assumed that rotation would be adopted so that
each acre would be put in beets only one year in five, it
would then require only one-eighteenth of the area of the
beet belt, and if our consumption trebled, as it was esti-
mated it would do before the end of the present century,
it would take only one-sixth of the area of this beet belt
to produce it all, using each acre only once in five years
and assuming no improvement in the sugar yield per
acre, and assuming further that we got no sugar from
any source whatever except our own home beet industry.
But what would be the efifect upon the acreage of other
crops of the withdrawal of this 3,066,720 acres for beets,
that is, 2% million acres in addition to what is now de-
of Chemistry, U. S. Dept. of Agr., nos. 3, 30, 33, 36, 39, 52, and
especially, nos. 64, 74, 78, 95 and 96, as to the influence of soil, climate
and environment upon the composition of the sugar beet.
^ U. S. Dept. of Agr. Report, no. 92, p. 56. Average, 1906- 1909,
1.2306 short tons ; 1901-1905, 1,0522 tons.
' Statistical Abstract of U. S., 1910, p. 537. About the same in 191 1.
64 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [322
voted to this crop ? In the year 1910 the following acre-
ages were devoted to the following crops as indicated.
Corn 114,002,000 acres
Wheat 49,205,000
Oats 35,288,000
Rye 2,028,000
Barley 7,257,000
Flaxseed 2,916,000
Potatoes 3,591,000
Hay 45,691,000
259,978,000 acres
It is evident that the withdrawal of 3,066,720 acres' to
supply our entire present sugar consumption, or three
times that much, should our consumption treble and all
of it be supplied by beets, would be almost insignifi-
cant as compared with 260,000,000 acres devoted to our
main food and forage crops, and it is not at all certain,
as we shall attempt to show later, that the production of
these crops would be lessened at all thereby. Hence,
whatever may be said of other arguments, this argument
regarding lack of area to devote to the crop is not to be
taken very seriously at present.
^ Statistical Abstract of U. S. 1910, pp. 125-146.
' This is less than one-twentieth of the total area of the single state
of Colorado.
Chapter IV. Costs in the United States'
I. preliminary considerations
a. Relative Importance of Various Costs
The United States has the land, the climate and the
market for a great expansion of the beet-sugar industry.
Can she compete with other sugar-producing countries?
Among the foremost questions for consideration in this
connection are costs of production. In most cases these
reflect all factors and may be said to be resultants of their
combined forces.
We shall see that, of these costs, the agricultural costs,
especially the labor costs of producing beets, are, at
present, the most important in the United States. In
the manufacturing costs of beet sugar ^ the element of
labor forms a very small proportion and it is not gen-
erally questioned by the best authorities that the United
States can compete with, and often surpass, almost all
other countries when it comes to a combination of skilled
labor, machinery and large-scale production. Further-
more, it has already been pointed out that German in-
vestigations have shown that cost of production decreases
^ Other than agricultural costs, which will be considered more fully
in a separate chapter, but including some comparisons with Europe,
particularly with Germany.
* 1910 Census Report on Beet-Sugar Mfg. Costs for 1909 : Salaries,
4.7% ; wages, 12.9% ; materials, 73.0% ; miscellaneous expenses, 9.4%.
(From manuscript previous to publication.)
323] 65
66 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [324
with increased size of factory operations,' and we have
seen that the United States beet-sugar factories operate
on a larger scale than those of any other country.
With the improvement of the beets and better organi-
zation and management of the factories, the absolute and
relative costs of manufacturing are decreasing, while the
expense of raw material is increasing. In 1899'' the cost
of beets was about 50 per cent of the entire expense of
the United States factories in producing granulated
sugar. In 1904 this item formed about 56 per cent and
in 1909 about 60 per cent of the total. The next largest
item under materials was fuel, which was only about one-
tenth as great as that of beets.
It will be shown later that half to five-sixths of the
cost of these beets was labor cost, largely unskilled
hand-labor costs ; hence, it is that this factor is of rela-
tively large importance in a consideration of the United
States beet-sugar industry and its competitive ability as
regards the sugar industries of other countries, and also
as regards competitive crops and industries in this
country.
We shall take up a brief consideration of the main
economic and industrial factors, especially costs of pro-
duction, first in the United States and then in some of
the important and typical beet and cane-sugar countries,
especially those where the industry has reached its
highest economic development. Then we shall consider
similar factors as afifecting the probable and possible
development in comparatively undeveloped countries,
* See Zuckerfabrikation by H. Claassen, pp. 102, 103 ; also igio Cen-
sus Report on the Sugar Industry of the U. S., and official reports of
the various sugar-producing countries. All of these are cited else-
where in connection with these various matters.
' The census report covers the preceding year in each case.
325] COSTS IN THE UNITED STATES 67
such as Cuba and the PhiHppines, and in addition, we
shall consider probable improvements and developments
in both cane and beet-sugar industries, as well as impor-
tant indirect factors bearing upon the main problems.
b. Character of Available Data
Thousands upon thousands of printed pages relative
to the sugar industries of this and other countries fill
the published hearings of various congressional commit-
tees. Some of the more important hearings of recent
years relative to sugar are those before the House Ways
and Means Committees and the Senate Finance Commit-
tees of 1897 and 1909, the Philippine and Cuban Reci-
procity Hearings of 1902-1905, and the Hearings of the
Special Committee on the Investigation of the Amer-
ican Sugar Refining Co. and Others of 191 1.' Through-
out nearly all of these voluminous and more or less dis-
connected masses of printed material, and taking up a
considerable portion of the aggregate, is the testimony
upon costs and conditions of sugar production in the
various countries.
Near the close of the last of these protracted hearings,*
after repeated efforts to get at the costs of production
from nearly every witness, Representative Raker, the Cal-
ifornia member of the Hardwick Committee, complained
that he had not, even yet, been able to get at the real
facts of the matter.^
* Hardwick Committee.
2 That is, up to the adjournment of the first session of the 62d Con-
gress. After the above was written, some further testimony was taken
in Dec, 191 1 and Jan., 1912, the final report being submitted to Congress
Feb. 17, 1912. See New York Times, Feb. 18 and 19, 1912. See also
Hardwick Committee Hearings, pp. 3393-3424, and House Report no.
331, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. (1912).
' See Hardwick Committee Hearings (Special Investigation of A. S.
R. Co. 1911), pp. 2501-06 and 2794-2814; particularly pp. 2502, 2795.
68 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [326
For obvious reasons, the only parties who could fur-
nish the manufacturing costs in sufficient detail to be of
much worth have preferred not to do so. Nor have
comprehensive and detailed records of agricultural costs
been kept, unless by the sugar companies, and they are
unwilling to make these public, also. Hence, the best
that can be done regarding the ascertainment of such
matters is to try to learn as much as possible from
the material that is available, checking it here and there
and always considering the source and probable bias of
the party giving it, for as regards the United States,
nearly everything published relative to sugar costs and
the tariff shows the prejudice of an advocate. Of course,
there are exceptions, including some government publi-
cations, but not all of the latter seem entirely free from
the same bias. Hence, we must be on our guard to take
the statements of each for what they are worth, and this
Near the close of the same hearings (see note above) Mr. Truman
G. Palmer stated that he could not give details of costs, either for the
United States, Europe, the Philippines or Cuba, not to mention other
countries. Mr. Palmer of Chicago and Washington, formerly of Cali-
fornia and of New York, is the able representative of the " United
States Beet Sugar Industry," an association of a majority of the beet-
sugar manufacturers of the United States, and has spent years in this
country and Europe collecting statistics (including those regarding
cost) from the factories and principal authorities of these various
countries relative to the sugar industry in every important country of
the world. His testimony and briefs (which include many statistics
on costs) covering nearly all of the important countries, take up a
considerable part of each of the hearings mentioned above.
These facts are not mentioned by way of criticism, but as typical of
instances that could be multiplied, showing the state of actual available
knowledge regarding costs of production. It might be added that the
legal method of discovering the truth regarding mooted points through
the taking of testimony was originally intended to be used in the
ascertainment of facts entirely different from those of complex indus-
trial and economic costs. In this latter class of inquiries such methods
are apt to be about as unsuccessful as they are antiquated.
327] COSTS IN THE UNITED STATES 69
Special warning is given here because of the pecuHar dif-
ficulties involved in this part of the study.
2. COST FIGURES OF DIFFERENT AUTHORITIES ^
In the next six or eight pages we shall present some
of the typical statements of the total costs of producing
beet sugar in the United States, most of them being
made before congressional committees by interested par-
ties. Following this, we shall approach the matter from
another standpoint.^
According to the sworn statement ^ of the present
secretary of the American Sugar Refining Co. (sugar
trust), which owns or controls many of the beet-sugar
factories of the United States,'* the costs of producing
granulated beet sugar per 100 pounds, in the various
factories in which it was interested in the campaign
year of 1910-11 were as follows:
Michigan Sugar Co. (operating 6 factories*) $3-48
Great Western Sugar Co. (Colo., oper'g 9 " ) 3.43
Billings Sugar Co. (Mont., i factory ) 3.49
ScottsblufT Sugar Co. (Neb., i " ) 3.85
Amalgamated Sugar Co. (Ore. & Utah, 3 " ) 3.05
Lewiston Sugar Co. (Utah, i factory ) 3.03
Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. (6 factories, one idle ) 3.53
Alameda Sugar Co. (Calif., i factory ) 4.32
Spreckels Sugar Co. (Calif., 2 factories ) 2.70
Menominee " *' (Wis., i factory ) 4.39
Continental " " (Ohio, i " ) 4.08
Iowa " " (Iowa, I " ) 5.14
Carver County " *' (Minn., i " ) 3.75
^ Mostly ex parte.
' Where it is necessary to deal with so many details regarding con-
troverted facts in order to have sufficient basis for valid deductions,
as is here the case, the general reader, seeking for conclusions only,
will be relieved of considerable tedium by turning at once to the ends
of the sections and chapters where these are found.
' Hardwick Committee Hearings, p. 2379. * Ibid., p. 100.
* Explanations in parentheses are taken from U. S. Dept. of Agr.
yo
THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY
[328
According to the statements accompanying these
figures they represent ''actual, bare cost" with nothing
included for depreciation, interest on investment, or
freight in marketing.
These figures are said to be taken from the books of
the company, and correspond very closely in character
and amounts to similar figures given by a number of
officials of various ones of these constituent companies/
Table VIII. Costs of Manufacturing Beet Sugar (as reported by the
FACTORIES) '
[906-07 1907-08 : 1908-09 1909-10 1910-11
(1 ) Tons of beets sliced 81,371
(2) Sugar extracted per ton of
beets 235.2
(3) Average price paid per ton
of beets : $4.95
(4) Cost of raw material at fac-
tory, per ton of beets . . \ 5.71
Cost of manufacture perj
100 pounds of granulated i
sugar :
(5) (a) Raw material (mostly
beets) $2,439
(6) (b) Factory cost i«i53
(7) (c) Overhead and adminis-
tration charges .156
(8) (d) Taxes and insurance . .075
(9) Total j $3,823
(10) Total, including ten other
factories i 3.94
71*845 ;
269.9
$5.01 i
5-73 '
$2,268
1.217
.208
.093
65,647
248.5
$5.08
5.86
$2,339
1.215
73,012
252.7
$5.12
6.00
$2,431
1.243
70,043
262.2
$5.41
6.49
$2,621
1. 120
.267
.104
.098
$3,786
3-56
$3,925
3.87
$4,065
3.73
.242
.117
$4,100
3.89
Report no. 92 (1909), pp. 46-48. It is possible that in some instances
the number of factories under certain company names have changed
slightly in the meantime. The Continental Sugar Co. has recently
erected another factory in Ohio and one in Michigan. See H. R. Re-
port no. 331, p, 12, 62d Cong., 2d Sess., Report of Hardwick Com.,
Feb. 17, 1912. See Hardwick Committee Hearings, pp. 75, 100, 2876,
2894 et seq.
^ See Hardwick Committee Hearings, pp. 400, 419, 660, 805, 889, 950,
1704, 2248, 2379. 2630, 2724, 2876, 2894.
'These figures are averages compiled from the reports of thirty-three factories
329] COSTS IN THE UNITED STATES 71
In January, 191 2, there were filed with the Hardwick
Committee the most complete ex parte statements of
cost that have been made public' These statements
cover the operations of 33 factories, 18 of them being in-
cluded in the American Sugar Refining Company's list
above. Of these 33 factories, 4 are located in California,
13 in Colorado, 2 in Nebraska, i in Montana, 2 in Utah,
4 in Idaho, 6 in Michigan and i in Ohio. In these state-
ments the various items of cost are reported under more
nearly uniform heads than is usually the case, but a careful
examination shows that a considerable part of the uni-
formity is apparent only. With one or two exceptions
there is doubt in every case as to what some item in-
cludes, and it is generally evident that some expenses are
included that are not accounted for. The accompanying
table (No. VIII) gives a summary of the arithmetical
averages compiled from these sworn statements, but the
reader is warned that the lack of uniformity mentioned
above renders them of very doubtful worth. In each
case the average is for all of the factories reporting that
item, and the number varies with the different items as
is indicated in the note.
Taking the last year (1910-11), the total costs of pro-
ducing 100 pounds of granulated sugar, as reported by
the different factories, vary from $2.81 to $4.93 and even
to $8.39 in the case of the factory at Nampa, Idaho,
as published in the Hardwick Committee Hearings^ pp. 3393-3424 (Jan.,
1912).
Number of factories reporting above items :
1906-07 1907-08 1908-09 1909-10 1910-11
Items (i), (2) and (10) 29 30 30 30 29
Item (3) 21 21 22 21 22
Item (4) 16 17 17 17 15
Items (5), (6), (7), (8) and (9). 19 20 20 20 19
^ These statements did not become available to the writer till Mar. i,
1912, after this study was practically ready for the printer.
72 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [330
which sHced only 4595 tons of beets. (That is, it was
practically idle.) The reported average total costs varied
in the other years as follows: 1909-10, $2.98 to $6.24;
1908-09, $2.92 to $6.17; 1907-08, $2.76 to $4.'64; 1906-
07, $2.91 to $6.00, and even to $9.58 in the case of the
new factory at Ft. Morgan, Colorado, which sliced only
16,998 tons of beets.
These cost figures are not presumed to include interest
on investment, depreciation of plant or cost of selling.
The American Beet Sugar Company, operating six fac-
tories, states that these items add to the cost by averages
of $.84, $.88, $1.25, $.87 and $.85 for the five respective
years ending 1910-11, the average of all six factories for
all five years being $.96 per 100 pounds of sugar divided
as follows: Selling, $.573; interest on borrowed money,
$.14; depreciation, $.25. The Utah-Idaho Sugar Com-
pany reports the additional cost on account of interest as
varying from $.10 to $.20 and ** miscellaneous revenue
and expenditures" from $.01 to $.32 per 100 pounds of
sugar.
Mr. T. G. Palmer' has made calculations "^ based upon
the United States census reports to show that the aver-
age costs for the entire country were $4.2561 in 1899 ;
$3.8577 in 1904 and and $3.6737 in 1909, per 100 pounds
of granulated sugar, and that if the cost of beets per ton
delivered to the factory had not increased from $4,386 in
1899 to about $6.00 3 in 1909 the cost of sugar produc-
* Representing the association of beet-sugar manufacturers of the
United States. Some of his tables are given near the end of this
chapter.
' Hardwick Committee Hearings, p. 2630. See tables xiv and xv,
infra.
' We think this estimate as to cost of beets to factories is a trifle
high, possibly by as much as 25 cents, though there is no way to tell
exactly. This matter will be mentioned later.
33 1 ] COSTS IN THE UNITED STATES 73
tion in the latter year would have been diminished by
79.11 cents per 100 pounds, making it $2.8826, or only
two-thirds of what it was ten years before, the principal
improvement being due to the higher sugar content of
the beet and larger extraction by the factory.
November 17, 1908, before the Ways and Means Com-
mittee, Mr. E. F. Atkins ' also made a somewhat detailed
calculation of the costs of beet sugar, taking his figures
from 1906 and 1907 United States government reports
of actual results and obtaining as average costs for the
United States $2.87 for 1906 and $2.89 for 1907, per 100
pounds, not allowing 70 cents profit (approximately) to
the farmer, which, if added, would have made the cost to
the factories $3.59. This was after making what he con-
sidered more than necessary allowances for some items
for which he did not have detailed data."" He also took
the figures obtained from a report of the Utah-Idaho
Sugar Company and calculated that their costs of pro-
duction were $3.70 in a year (1907-08) when they were
put to a certain extra and unusual expense of 73 cents
per 100 pounds. Deducting this amount and the profits
to the farmer, the actual cost was only $2.27.3
^ Mr. E. F. Atkins of Boston went into the sugar trust at its original
formation, and has been a stockholder in the American Sugar Re-
fining Co. ever since its organization. He was elected director in Jan-
uary, 1910, and is at present its acting president. He and his father
before him have, for years, been heavily interested in Cuban sugar
lands. The whole trend of his arguments before 191 1 was in favor
of material reductions in the tariff and concessions to Cuba. Before
the Hardwick Committee, his new relation to the A. S. R. Co., in view
of its holdings in the beet-sugar companies, seems to have repressed
these arguments. See Hardwick Committee Hearings, pp. 1-176 ; Tariff
Hearings, 1908-09, pp. 3349-3389-
' Tariff Hearings, Schedule E, Ways and Means Committee, 60th
Cong., pp. 3359 et seq.
' That company's report of total costs for this year gives figures
74 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [332
Mr. Edw. F. Dyer ' also presented details of costs
which he said represented those of the best U. S. fac-
tories under favorable conditions and his figure was
$3,382. He also presented a table which he said showed
the cost in each of seven modern representative factories
in the United States and these figures ranged from
$3,461 to $4,695 with an average of $3,732 per 100
pounds.
In January 1902, Dr. Harvey W. Wiley' stated before
the Ways and Means Committee ^ (basing his statement
upon the 1900 Census of beet-sugar manufactures) that
in 1899, the year covered by the census, the average
cost of producing beet sugar in the United States was
varying from $3.04 to $3.80. If debits and credits for interest, by-
products and miscellaneous items are included, they vary from $3.28 to
$4.25 per 100 lbs. of granulated sugar. See Hardwick Committee
Hearings, p. 3401 (Jan. 1912).
1 Tariff Hearings, 1908-09, pp. 3496 et seq. Mr. Edw. F. Dyer and his
firm, builders of sugar works, Cleveland, Ohio, have taken a prominent
part in the building of more beet-sugar factories, probably, than any
other firm in the United States. He is a relative (I think, a son, but
the reference in the Hearings of the Hardwick Committee has been
lost) of E. H. Dyer, one of the early pioneers and prominent founders
of the industry in California.
' Chief of the Bureau of Chemistry, U. S. Dept. of Agriculture. It
was under Dr. Wiley's direction that most of the government sugar-
beet experiments were made, especially as regards the effect of climate
and soil upon the beet and the best locations for the industry within
the United States. It was under his direction, also, that Dr. G. K.
Spencer, his assistant, whom he considered the " best posted sugar
expert in the United States," and who is now in charge of American
sugar interests in Cuba, took the 1900 census of United States beet-
sugar manufactures, probably the most careful census of the industry
ever taken.
^ Cuban Reciprocity Hearings, pp. 474-520. This testimony was pub-
lished later in the Beet Sugar Gazette (vol. 4, March and April, 1902)
in more connected form, as questions of members of the committee
were omitted.
333]
COSTS IN THE UNITED STATES
75
4.15 cents per pound and "up to the present time,
[1902] the minimum cost has not been less than 4 cents
a pound." ' These figures correspond very closely to
those of Mr. T. G. Palmer (4.2561 cents, cited above)
which v^'ere based upon the same census report.
Table IX. American Beet Sugar Co. Costs
Location of factory.
Beets worked, tons
Cost of beets per ton
Expense of working, per ton of beets
Maintenance, per ton of beets (including part of
season not in operation)
Net profit per ton of beets
Sugar obtained (gran.), per ton of beets, pounds..
Cost of beets per lOO lbs. sugar'
Cost of working per loo lbs. sugar
Cost of maintenance per lOO lbs. sugar
Total cost of sugar per lOO lbs
5 rt
O
I o
i ^
Is
18,546
^4.00
2.05
1.68
31,066
^4.00
2.53
1.20
$3-73
I-3I
(not given.)
(not given.)
(not given.)
(not given.)
I ^3.73
3-30
.2
'5
47.302
$4.00
2.92
1.50
$4.42
3.56
250 I 256
(not given.)
$i.6o|
I.OI|
.48
$1.56
1. 14
•59
$3'09\ 53-29
In 1899, i" ^ letter^ or prospectus by H. F. Oxnard,
president, and W. Bayard Cutting, director, of the Amer-
ican Beet Sugar Co., which operated four factories in Ne-
braska and California, details of costs at their various fact-
ories are presented and they undertake to show by their
^ Cuban Reciprocity Hearings, p. 486.
' This and the following calculations are made by the writer from
the above. The factory at Oxnard, California, was built in 1898 and
figures are not given for it.
' Printed in part in the N. Y. Evening Post of Dec. 12, 1901, p. 12.
76 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [334
own results that the beet-sugar industry of the United
States could thrive without protection, even assuming that
sugar prices should fall so that they could realize only 4
cents per pound. This was also upon the assumption of
$4. per ton ' for beets. They had been in the beet-sugar
business in the United States for ten years at that time,
but most of their figures were for the campaign of 1898
from which they are taken.
Something over two years later ^ Mr. Oxnard stated
that the Norfolk costs in 1898 were 3J cents per pound
(instead of 3.09 cents for the same year, as calculated
above) and that results that year were more favorable
than for later years, especially as droughts in California
had cut down the tonnage and thus prevented full runs.
Besides, other unexpected factors had upset calculations.
He then put the costs at between 4 and 4J cents, allow-
ing 5 per cent to 7 per cent for depreciation of plants,
but nothing for interest.
In 191 1 3 he gives the costs for each year from 1905 to
1910, inclusive, the figures decreasing from $4.49 in 1905
and $4.63 in 1906 to $4.24 in 1910. These include de-
preciation and delivery of sugar to the grocer. Else-
where he states^ the cost at the factory as ''somewhere
between 3J cents and 4 cents per pound," and of this, i
to ij cents is factory or manufacturing cost, but this
^ The average price now is about $5.50 as compared with this, though
prices vary from $4 to $6 or $7, depending upon, sugar content in
some sections and, almost everywhere, upon the companies' ability to
get beets at the cheapest price at which they can get a sufficient supply
to run their factories. Sometimes they fail to get enough, and this
has forced raising prices on the whole.
' Cuban Reciprocity Hearings, 1902, p. 170. Mr. Oxnard was here
opposing concessions to Cuba.
' Hardwick Committee Hearings, p. 1704.
* Ibid., p. 400.
335] COSTS IN THE UNITED STATES 77
latter does not include barrels, sacks, and '* overhead "
or " dead " expenses, which amount to i cent to J cent
per pound, nor does it include interest or depreciation.
He also estimates that the cost has been reduced " all
through " by i cent per pound in the last ten years/
The United States Industrial Commission in 1902, in
summing up the conclusions drawn from its hearings,
says : "
The relative cost of producing beet and cane sugar will have
much to do with the future of the domestic beet-sugar indus-
try. There are no very exact figures available, but it is stated
on good authority that the cost of producing sugar in Louisi-
ana is higher than in Porto Rico, although costs are sure to
rise in the latter place and be reduced here. Porto Rico can
produce sugar at 2 cents a pound (the duty of $1.68 per 100
lbs. having been discontinued); here it costs from 3 cents to
sH cents a pound- Dr. Wiley estimates the cost of the
product in Germany at from 2}^ to 2}i cents per pound, ex-
clusive of taxes. In the United States the cost is perhaps 3
cents. [The latter evidently refers to beet sugar.]
Other figures of a similar nature, or less reliable,
might be quoted ad infinitum but satisfactory detailed
figures are nowhere available. However, if we take the
most complete statement of lump costs that we have,
those of the American Sugar Refining Co. and allied
beet-sugar companies, for example, it is the writer's
opinion, based upon various facts not entirely conclusive
but having some bearing upon the matter, that they are
not so far wrong as some may believe. ^ It is probable
^ Hardwick Committee Hearings, p. 432. See later data referred to
in connection with Table VIII, supra, and ibid., pp. 3415-3422.
* Final Report, vol. 19, pp. 86, 87.
* A very few of these are quoted near the beginning of this chapter.
78 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [336
that they contain some items that ought to be eHminated
and it is possible that these amount to enough in the
aggregate to hide handsome profits.'
3. ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENT PARTS OF COST
We have been running over a few of the better state-
ments of total costs as they have been presented before
congressional committees. Now we shall endeavor to
check up some of them by means of independent data
and, in so doing, shall consider some of the factors upon
which different parts of the cost are dependent. First,
we shall consider the price paid for beets ; second, the
amount of sugar obtained from the beets and the cost of
the same to the factory ; third, the manufacturing costs.
a. Cost of the Raw Material to the Factories
(i) Cost of Beets in Various States and Factors Affecting the Same
If we examine the reports of the United States Census
and the Department of Agriculture "" we shall see that
the greater part of the cost of beet sugar is usually
taken up in the cost of the beets, as has been mentioned
above. The cost of the sugar in the beet (before the
manufacturing process begins) depends mainly upon two
things : the price paid the farmer, and the richness or
per cent of sugar in the beet. We shall consider the
former first.
^ Owing to its importance and to some peculiar considerations, the
cost of growing beets is not taken up at this point, but is discussed in-
the next chapter, where some phases of it are gone into more fully
than can be done here.
* Most of the facts in these reports are given voluntarily by the fac-
tories upon requests from U. S. officials and are not sworn to, and
while it has been hinted that they may be colored by the sugar com-
panies, it is the writer's opinion that they are treated in such a manner
by the government that the operations of individual factories or com-
337] COSTS IN THE UNITED STATES yg
There are two methods of paying the growers for beets.
One is the flat price per ton, regardless of quaHty; the
other the sHding scale, the price depending upon the per
cent of sugar in the weight of the bejct, the latter being
determined by the factory from tests of samples. Some
factories allow their growers options between the two
methods. About two-thirds of the beets in the United
States are now paid for upon the flat-price basis. ^
In nearly all of the states the flat price has been $5.00
per ton of beets (2000 lbs.) though in Utah and Idaho it
has been only $4.50, in Arizona $4.75, in Minnesota
$5.50 and in Washington $5.75.'
In Michigan about three-fourths of the beets are
bought upon a sliding scale, in California about four-
sevenths, and in Colorado about one-tenth. The total
tonnage bought in this way in other states is relatively
small. The most usual basis in these sliding scale con-
panies are not shown and that there is not sufficient reason for them
to discolor greatly the figures on acreage, yield, extraction and purity.
It is true that reports vary slightly, even if they are from the same
original sources. For example, the tonnage of beets worked and total
amount of sugar obtained in 1909 is reported as greater in the annual
report of the Department of Agriculture, than in the census report,
and hence calculations based upon these figures vary somewhat also.
It is to be remembered, however, that in dealing with averages in any
case there are apt to be errors unless the manner of making the aver-
ages is known, and this is not the case as regards all of these figures.
However, it is not believed that there are so many errors of this kind
in this connection as in the case of import and export prices where the
price on 100 tons of sugar one day counts as much in making up
averages as a price on 100,000 tons some other day.
* 1910 census for 1909 has 2,710,382 tons (of 2,000 lbs.) at fixed price
and 1,254,974 tons upon a sliding scale. However, there is a growing
tendency to go over to the sliding-scale basis.
' Nearly all systematic reliable data which we have are not later than
1909 or 1910 and prices are being advanced all the time. See note
next page.
8o THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [338
tracts is $4.50 for beets containing 12 per cent ' of their
weight in sugar and 33^ cents additional for every ad-
ditional per cent of sugar. In most cases the factories
do not have storage capacities to run them for more
than a few days, or weeks, at the most. In some cases
the beets that cannot be received when harvested are
delivered and left in huge piles at the various dumps,
being shipped to the factory as needed, but this usually
involves considerable damage through shrinking, freezing
and thawing, if the beets are left exposed to the weather
for any length of time. In other cases the growers silo
the beets (pile and cover with earth), in their fields, for
which they are now usually paid extra. In cases coming
within the writer's experience this has varied from 20 to
50 cents per ton. This, of course, adds to the cost to
the factory.^
Though the above practices are the rule, there are num-
erous exceptions. 3 Very naturally the sugar companies
^ Beets with lower sugar content than this are not considered very
profitable to work, as the expense does not decrease proportionately
with the decrease in sugar content.
'^ The extra labor involved in siloing, "uncovering the beets later, and
leveling the ground probably costs from 20 to 40 cents per ton, vary-
ing considerably with conditions. But where the soil is dry and cloddy
the grower is apt to lose a good deal through shrinkage, especially if
he has to keep beets in silo for two or three months before getting
orders to deliver the last of his crop, as is frequently the case. Colo.
Agr. Exp. Sta. Bui. no. 42 (1897), p. 30, reports some experiments
on loss of weight from drying, running from 5% in 24 hours to 38%
in 16 days for beets tightly wrapped in paper in the cellar of the
laboratory.
3 In the statement of these prices the endeavor has been to bring
them up to date, but there are so many changes being made from time to
time that it is possible that some have been overlooked. Most changes
are apt to be increases in order to get sufficient tonnage to run the
factories more days in the year, and hence more economically. If the
files of the different sugar periodicals (and some others) are examined
339] COSTS IN THE UNITED STATES gl
endeavor to get their beets at the lowest prices possible
and the farmer's opinion of the comparative advantages
of growing this and other crops is a deciding factor as
we can note some of these changes. For example, to mention only a
few, in the 1909 volume of Willett and Gray's Statistical Sugar Trade
Journal we see that the Holly Sugar Co. has adopted a modified form
of the sliding scale, paying $4.50 for beets from 12% to 14.4% ; $5.00
for those from 14.5% to 15.9%, and $5.50 for those 16% and over (p.
75). The Glendale, Arizona, factory will pay $4.75 flat for beets (p.
55). The Spreckels Sugar Co, of California offers a new contract
for 1910, paying $5.00 flat at the loading stations, whereas before they
had been requiring the growers to pay the freight to the factory.
They expect to increase their acreage at King City (factory is located
at Spreckels) by 1,000 acres (pp. 421, 441). Utah farmers also forced
a raise of 25c. per ton for the year 1911-12. Later similar references
to increase of prices may be found in W. & G., Journal, vol. for 191 1,
PP- 413. 525 and vol. for 1912, p. 49.
As an instance of reports in other classes of papers, the Fowler
(Colo.) Tribune of Dec. 2, 1910, reports that the American Beet Sugar
Co. announces a new contract for 191 1, giving a $5.50 fiat rate, or $5.00
for beets testing 12% and on increase of 335^ cents for each per cent
of increase, instead of $5.00 for 14% beets and an increase of 25
cents for each per cent of increase of sugar content as before. That
is, beets bringing $5.00 previously would bring $5.66 in 191 1.
This article does not so state, but in 1908 this company had made a
change in contracts to a sort of sliding scale in which the price paid
for beets was not satisfactory to many of the growers. That year was
unusually dry, and later a leaf blight also reduced the tonnage grown,
so that since 1908 the company has not been able to operate all of its
Colorado factories, nor those it did operate for as long campaigns as
desirable. Hence, the greater inducements to the farmers to grow
more beets. The above are a few typical instances only.
Since the above was written the Report of the Hardwick Committee
has been published (62d Cong., 2d Sess., H. R. Report no. 331). Its
statements are based on testimony as indicated, and the writer is of
the opinion that these " averages " are a little above actual averages,
though not a great deal. Following is the reference (p. 20) :
" Your committee reports that the evidence as taken does not dis-
close combinations between manufacturers in the beet-sugar industry
that have caused or had a tendency to cause a decrease in the cost of
sugar beets. In California the price of beets in 191 1 was $5.30 per
ton of beets grading 16 per cent, and a contract has been made
82 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [340
to how much of an acreage he plants ; consequently, in
some cases, where necessary,' the sugar companies pay
more for beets, as, for example, in Washington and
Minnesota, and in at least one of the Michigan factories'"
where there is no reason to believe that the difference
can be explained by differences in sugar content. The
same fact is illustrated by the fact that the usual price is
paid for the inferior beets of Iowa and, as mentioned
above, the Utah and Idaho companies have been paying
50 cents per ton under the usual price.
for an increase of 75 cents per ton for the year 1912. (Hearings, p.
3873.)
" In Utah and Idaho the ruling price is $5 per ton and freight,
which makes the beets cost, delivered at the factory, over $5.60 to
$5.65 per ton. (Hearings, p. 797.)
" In Colorado and Nebraska the price averages from $5,50 per ton
to $6.50 per ton. (Hearings, pp. 400, 888.)
" In Michigan and Ohio the customary contract calls for a payment
by the factory of $4.50 per ton for beets testing 12 per cent sugar with
SSYs cents per ton for each additional per cent of sugar in the beets,
with a minimum guaranty of $5 per ton. (Hearings, p. 719.)
"Under such form of contract, coupled with the freight charges
paid by the factory, the average price paid by one of the leading
Michigan companies in 1910 was $6.91 per ton. (Hearings, p. 712.)
" These figures represent an increase in price to the farmer for his
beets over the price of former years. This increase has been largely
caused by improved methods of culture and increasing sugar contents
of the beets, though doubtless accelerated by the demand of the
farmer for higher prices."
See also Table VIII, supra.
^ See testimony of C. S. Morey, president of Great Western Sugar
Co. with nine factories in Colorado, and other allied factories. Hard-
wick Committee Hearings, pp. 887 et seq.
2 Chas. B. Warren. Hardwick Committee Hearings, p. 720. As a
matter of fact this factory pays about $1 per ton more than the other
Michigan factories because that inducement is necessary to get the
beets. There is no reason to believe that the beets it gets are better
in quality than those of the average Michigan factory. See, also,
Hardwick Committee Hearings, pp. 3393-3424, (1912).
341 ] COSTS IN THE UNITED STATES 83
These variations make it very difficult to arrive at a
satisfactory figure as to the average price paid for beets
at present. It has been on the increase from year to
year because the securing of a sufficient tonnage of beets
has demanded it. The following table (No. X) illus-
trates this fact.
Table X. Quantities, Prices, and Total Values of Beets Worked by
Factories, 1897-1908, by Years
(Compiled from reports on progress of the beet-sugar industry)^
Year.
1897
1898
1899=*....
1900
1901
1902
1903
19043.. ..
1905
1906
1907
1908
Total
Beets worked.
Tons.2
389,385
363,680
832,939
845,600
1,685,689
1,895,812
2,076,494
2,071.539
2,665,913
4,236,112
3.767,871
3,414,891
24,245,925
Average price
per ton.
4-30
4.60
4-73
4.60
4.84
4.86
4-95
5. CO
*5.io
^5.20
*5-35
Total value.
^1,596,478
1,563,824
3,831,519
3,999,688
7,754,169
9.175,730
10,091,761
10,254,118
13,329,565
21,604,171
19,592,929
18,269,667
$121,063,619
^ Letter of the Secretary of Agriculture, 61st Cong., ist Sess., Sen.
Doc. no. 22, p. 16. See also Table VIII, supra, and Hardwick Com-
mittee Hearings, pp. 3393-3424-
^ Here and elsewhere throughout this report the short ton (2,000
pounds) is used.
' These figures differ, though not widely, from the census figures
(see Bui. 61, Bureau of the Census). The census figures are as
follows: For 1899, beets worked, 794,658 tons; price per ton, $4.39;
total value, $3,485,320; for 1904, beets worked, 2,175,417 tons; price per
ton, $5.21; total value, $11,345,875.
* Estimated.
84 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [342
Following is an estimate of the average cost of sugar
beeis to the factories, and also of the price paid to the
farmer in 1909, based upon a comparison of the reports
of the Census and of the Department of Agriculture.
Upon these bases, it is estimated that the Michigan beets,
containing an average of 17 per cent sugar, and bought
upon a sliding scale, brought $6.16 per ton;' that those
of Wisconsin, containing 15.88 per cent sugar, brought
$5.79, and that those of all other states bought upon a
sliding scale averaged, on the whole, just about the same
as the flat price of $5.00. The flat-price beets of Utah
and Idaho are figured at $4.50 and all others at $5.00,
the usual price. In two or three states, having single
factories for which separate returns are not given, the
flat price was higher than this and, in Arizona, it was
lower ; in two or three others, where the sliding-scale
basis is used, it was also probably a little over $5.00, as
calculated above, and in one factory in Michigan a still
greater error may occur, but these errors are upon rela-
tively small tonnages of beets compared with the whole.
Assuming that these factories ran at their full capacities "^
for the average length of campaign,^ it is reckoned that
these errors amount to about $110,000 in the aggregate,
or less than 3 cents per ton on the total tonnage of the
United States. This allowance is made in the calcula-
tions below.
It is estimated that one-third of the total tonnage is
siloed and paid for at 50 cents per ton extra, or an aver-
^ It is probable that the factory with higher rate than the usual one
paid more but there is no way to separate this from the others and
it is believed that all the errors concerned in this estimate tend to
counterbalance each other.
' See Amer. Sugar Industry and Beet Sugar Gazette, 1910, p. 441.
3 See U. S. Dept. of Agr., Report no. 92, p. 50.
343] COSTS IN THE UNITED STATES 85
age of 17 cents on the total tonnage. The average cost
of delivering beets, including those on which no freight
is paid by the factory, is calculated at 45 cents per ton/
These are all estimates and it is admitted that they con-
tain some errors, but, with the allowances that have been
made, they are probably very close to the facts and the
result probably does not vary 10 cents per ton from the
correct figure.'' This makes the average amount paid to
the farmer $5.30 per ton of beets, and the average cost
to the factory $5.75 per ton. A summary of the calcu-
lation follows :3
ESTIMATED AVERAGE PRICE OF BEETS PER TON TO THE GROWER AND
COST TO THE FACTORY
(For the United States, 1909, per ton of 2000 lbs.)
Tons
2,785,345 at $5.00 equals $13,926,725
587,000" 4-50 " 2,641,500
575,945" 6.16 " 3,551,656
17,066" 5.79 " 98,812
3,965,356 20,218,693
Average per ton $5.10
Allowance for error (noted above) 03
Siloing ^ crop at 50 cents per ton 17
Average price received by grower * $5-30
Cost of delivery to factory 45
Cost per ton of beets to factory^ $5-75
^ The Michigan factories have been getting a rate of 40 cts. and the
writer has been told of several others that got a rate of 30 cents.
This may or may not be correct. See Willett & Gray's Weekly
Journal, vol. for 1909, p. 496.
' Assuming the correctness of the government's figures.
' See references to reports given above.
* This makes no allowance to the grower in case he pays the freight,
nor for the dumping charge he pays. This is 5 cents lower than the
estimate for 1908 found on p. 16, Senate Doc. 22, 6ist Cong., ist Sess.
' This does not include extra expenses to the factory such as those
for agriculturists, for dumps in some cases, for office help, etc., all of
which have a more or less direct connection with the getting of beets.
See Table VIII, supra.
86 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [344
(2) Sugar Content and Extraction as Affecting Cost
The second point in the cost of the sugar in the beet,
namely the richness or sugar content of the beet, has
just been touched upon above. While the average ton-
nage of beets per acre harvested has fluctuated, but on
the whole remained almost stationary at 9.7 short tons,
for the past ten years, the average sugar content for the
United States has steadily advanced in that period from
14.8 per cent to 16.35 P^^ cent (1.5 per cent net) and
the extraction from 10.95 P^^ ^^^^ to 12.61 per cent
(1.66 per cent net, of the weight of the beet)
Nearly all of this increase, as shown in the govern-
ment reports, is in the sugar content and not in the
relative increase in extraction of the total sugar content
because the margin between the two, that is, the residue
of sugar left in the molasses and other by-products, has
remained almost stationary at about 3.5 per cent of the
weight of the beet, or nearly one-fourth of the sugar in
the beet.
These figure seem to show a very unfortunate lack of
progress in some Hues, and, at the same time, an appar-
ent inconsistency. For, while the average purity co-
efficient of beets (as well as the sugar content) has been
increasing, and improved processes of working the
residue of sugar from the molasses have been installed
in numerous factories, still the amount of sugar lost
(except for use as a by-product) has remained about
stationary.
It is estimated that 73 to 75 per cent of the sugar in
the beet is crystallizable without the employment of the
improved processes of working the residue molasses ;
that 80 to 85 per cent of it is obtainable by the use of
the osmose process ; and 90 to 93 per cent with the
StefTens process.
345] COSTS IN THE UNITED STATES 87
Table XI. Sugar-beet Acreage and Beet-sugar Production in the
United States 1901-1910 ^
State and Year.
1910.
California .
Colorado . . •
Idaho
Michigan...
Utah ......
Wisconsin . .
Other states
Totals and aver-
ages "
1909.
1908
1907.
1906.
190S.
1904.
1903.
1903.
1901
Acres.
90,500
81,412
13,178
117,500
26,767
4
II
ir,772
51,900
61
398,029
65
420,262 j
62
364,913
t.3
370.984
b3
376,074
52
307.364
48
197.784 i
49
242,576 i
41
*2i6,4oo
36
175,083
0
13
■0
HI
0
as
%
11
i2
<
n
Tons. 3
Tons.^
10 20
923,100
10.62
864,474
8.39
110,556
10.28
1,207,700
11.42
305,773
9.14
153,327
9.29
482,362
X0.17
4,047,292
9.71
4,081,382
936
3,414,891
10.16
3,767.871
11.26
4,236,112
8.67
2,665,913
10.47
2,071,539
8.5h
2,076,494
8.76
1,895,812
9.63
1,685,689
Tons. 3
139,890
103,092
14,269
139,215
38,490
18,130
57,086
512,469
425,884
463,628
483,612
312,921
242,113
240,604
218,406
184,606
C B
c 0
III
"S^
<
<
P.ct.
P.ct.
15-15
18.20
11.93
15-19
12.91
16.82
"•53
16.08
12.59
1580
11.82
16.75
11.83
15-66
12,56
12.47
12.30
11.42
11.74
11.69
"•59
11.52
10.95
16.10
15-74
15-8
14.9
15-3
15-3
'15-1
''14.6
14.8
<
p.ct.
82.78
83.40
87.38
86.15
85^7i
84.14
82.69
r6.35 84.35
84.11
83.5
83.6
82.2
83.0
83.1
"83.3
82.2
-5
B .
2 B
Days.
114
63
51
100
83
76
68
83
74
89
105
77
78
75
94
^ U. S. Dept. of Agr., Crop Reporter, Oct., 1911, These statistics of acreage in sugar beets
and the production of beet sugar for the season 1910 are based upon the actual returns to this
department from 57 factories, and estimates of 4 factories from which returns were not received.
The acreage planted in 1910 was about 434,800 acres, and the amount abandoned about 9.5
per cent. By stales, the planted area was: California, 97,000 acres; Colorado, 90,268; Idaho,
15,662; Michigan, 127,000; Utah, 28,220 Wisconsin, 18,639; other states 58,000 acres.
^ By purity coefficient is meant the percentage ol sugar in the total solids of the substance
tested, whether it be beets, juice, or sugar. In this table it represents the average percentage of
sugar in the total solids of the beets as determined by tests made at the factories.
^ Tons of 2,000 pounds each.
* Grouped together to avoid giving publicity to data relating to individual factories.
" The average yield of beets per acre is found by dividing the total beets worked by the total
acreage harvested ; the average extraction of sugar by dividing the total sugar produced by the
total beets worked; the average content of sugar, coefficient of purity, and length of campaign
by adding the figures reported by the different factories and dividing by the number of reporting
factories.
® These averages are not based on data for all the factories, as some of them failed to report
results of tests, but it is believed that they fairly represent the character of the toul beet crops.
' No data reported.
* Based on reports from 27 factories and careful estimates for 14 others.
88 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [346
It is probable that some of these improvements have
been made too recently for their full effect to show in
the government reports. Colorado,' most of whose fac-
tories adopted one of the improved processes, is the
only state that shows a marked improvement in the re-
duction of the loss in extraction, though many factories in
other states have installed similar improved processes.
On the whole, these partial explanations do not seem
sufficient to remove all of the apparent inconsistency.^
The granulated sugar obtained per ton of beets and
per acre is shown in the following table which indicates
considerable net progress.
The average extraction of sugar per ton of beets as
reported for 1909-10 was 251.1 pounds and for 1908-09,
249.4 pounds ; the four-year average was 243.3 pounds. ^
Taking the average for 1909 and the estimate of prices
given above, the grower was paid, on the average for
the United States, $2.11 for every 100 pounds of sugar in
the beet and the same amount cost the sugar companies
at the factory $2.29 '^ before the manufacturing began.
^ Annual Reports, U. S. Dept. of Agr,, on Progress of the Beet-
Sugar Industry of the U. S. See table of T. G. Palmer, Hardwick
Committee Hearings, pp. 2638, 2639.
* There was some late testimony by Mr. E. U. Combs, (Dec, 191 1,
Hardwick Hearings, p. 3284) to the effect that some of the Colorado
factories have abandoned the Steffens process because it is not profit-
able on the whole.
' U. S. Dept. of Agr. Report no. 92, p. 56. The 1910-11 average,
252.1 lbs. See Table XI, supra. U. S. Crop Reporter, Oct., 191 1.
All of the following calculations were made before the latter was pub-
lished.
* This is very close to Mr. Palmer's estimate of $2,3734 based upon
$6.00 per ton of beets delivered at the factory and upon the . census
report of sugar extraction which involves an extra calculation of
converting raw sugar into terms of granulated upon the basis of 100
lbs. of the former for 90 of the latter. Hardwick Committee Hearings,
p. 2630.
347]
COSTS IN THE UNITED STATES
89
Table XII. Yield of Sugar per Acre of Beets Harvested and per Ton
OF Beets Worked by States for 1909 and by Years for 1901-1909 ^
State and Year.
California . .
Colorado . . .
Idaho
Michigan . . .
Utah
Wisconsin ..
Other states
1909.
The United States :
1909
1908
1907
1906
I 906- I 909
1905.
1904.
1903.
1902.
1901.
I 90 I -I 905
Yield of sugar from —
An acre of beets.
A ton of beets.
Tons.
Pounds.
1.5335
288.6
1.2277
237.8
1.2955
244.5
.9449
258.7
1.5621
214.8
1.2264
240.1
1.0265
242.1
1.2194
251.1
1.1671
249.4
1.2497
246.1
1.2859
228.3
1.2306
243-3
1.0181
234.8
1.2241
2338
.9919
231.7
1.0093
230.4
1.0544
219.0
1.0522
230.6
If the four-year instead of the one-year average of ex-
traction is taken, upon the same estimates of prices, the
growers were paid $2.18 for each 100 pounds of sugar
in their beets and the same cost the factory $2.37
delivered. An error of 10 cents on a ton of beets, which
1 Annual Report (1909) U. S. Dept. of Agr., no. 92, p. 56. The
corresponding figures for the last campaign year (1910-11) are 1.2817
tons of sugar per acre of beets and 252.1 pounds of sugar per ton
of beets. See Table XI, supra. Compare with it Table VIII, supra.
go THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [348
amount we think our estimate does not exceed, means
only 4 cents per 100 pounds of sugar.
Above we have been speaking of the average prices
and costs of sugar in the beet for the whole United
States. Besides the average for the United States it is
well to know, also, what are the particular costs in the
more favorable and less favorable locations. According
to the figures of prices and per cent of extraction given
above, the sugar in the beets delivered at the factories
in 1909-10 cost approximately as follows per 100 pounds :
California $1 .90
Colorado 2.35
Idaho 2.10
Michigan 2.60
Utah 2.40
Wisconsin 2.65
" Other states " 2.40
This shows a very great range, the average for Wis-
consin and Michigan being nearly 40 per cent higher
than that of California, the difference being due to three
causes, namely : higher price paid for beets, lower sugar
content of beets, and lower relative extraction in Wiscon-
sin and Michigan than in California. The loss in extrac-
tion in Michigan and Utah was unusually large for this
year and that in Colorado below the average for that
state.
In view of these averages and other known facts it is
probable that extractions of 325 to 340 pounds of sugar
in California are not exceedingly rare and at $5.50 per
ton for beets this would mean $1.70 to $1.60 per 100
pounds of sugar in the beet. On the other hand, for
similar reasons it is equally probable that the extraction
not infrequently falls as low as 200 pouunds, or even to
180 pounds per ton in other localities, and at the cost
349] COSTS IN THE UNITED STATES gi
of $5.50 to 5.75 per ton, the sugar in the beet would
cost from $2.75 to $3.20 per 100 pounds before manu-
facturing begins.'
These are not the extreme limits but they are sufficient
to indicate one of the chief reasons for variations in
the cost of the finished product. In some cases they are
diminished, and in others accentuated, by variations in
general management, purity co-efificient, chemical con-
trol, freight, price of fuel, and other factors bearing upon
the cost of manufacture. To take advantage of these
favorable variations by locating the industry in the most
advantageous sections, and keeping it out of the un-
profitable ones, is one of the main steps that can be made
towards cheaper average costs and economic efificiency,
and the above figures indicate that there is considerable
room for real progress in this direction.
b. Manufacturing Costs
As to beet-sugar factory costs ^ in the United States,
practically no one knows the details with suf^cient ac-
curacy to speak authoritatively except those whose inter-
ests are such that they are very averse to imparting this
information in a form that means much. Following are
some typical ex parte statements.
Mr. Oxnard's figures, given a few pages preceding
this,3 show the cost of working beets in one of his fac-
tories in 1898 as $1.01 per 100 pounds of granulated
sugar and in the other factory as $1.14, with an addi-
tional cost for maintenance of $.48 and $.59 respectively.
In 191 1 he stated^ that the bare cost of manufacturing
^ See Table VIII supra; also Hardwick Committee Hearings, pp.
3393-3424, (1912).
^ That is, exclusive of cost of beets.
* Quoted in N. Y. Evening Post, Dec. 12, 1901, p. 12.
* Jlardwick Com. Hearings, pp. 400-412.
92 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [3^0
is I cent to i}4 cents per pound, but that this does not
include barrels, sacks, office expenses, and " overhead"
expenses which amount to ^ to ^ cent per pound, nor
depreciation of plant nor interest on investment. He
also testified that his company' paid about $5.75 to
$6.50 per ton for beets, or about 2}4 cents a pound for
the sugar in the beets, and that the total cost was 3.90
to 4 cents per pound, which would make- the cost above
that of the raw material $1.40 to $1.50 per 100 pounds
of granulated sugar. He also stated that the costs of
the finished product have been falling and estimates that
they have been reduced by j4 cent a pound in the last
ten years. Other figures that we have cited show that
there has been no reduction, but a slight increase in the
cost of raw material, or sugar in the beet ^ in this period
so that practically all of the reduction, or a little more,
must have been in manufacturing and management.
Mr. Chas. B. Warren ^ gave the costs of the sugar in
the beet for each factory for 1910-11^ as $2.94; $2.96;
$2.73 ; $2.73 ; $3.03 and $2.65 respectively, and the average
for all as $2.89. He testified in the same connection that
the average cost of the finished product for the years
since the organization of the company had been $3.65 to
$3.75 5 which he says covers everything except depreci-
ation. Comparing these figures, the average difference,
^ The American Beet Sugar Co. has i factory m Nebraska, 3 in
Colorado and 2 in California.
2 By cost of " sugar in the beet " is meant the cost of lects sufficient
to produce 100 lbs., or i lb., or whatever the amount may be, of granu-
lated sugar.
' President of Michigan Sugar Co. operating 6 sugar factories.
Combination effected and company organized in 1906, Hardwick Com-
mittee Hearings, p. 631.
* Hardwick Committee Hearings, pp. 660, 661.
* Ibid., pp. 661 and 662.
35 1 ] COSTS IN THE UNITED STATES 93
or cost of manufacture per 100 pounds of granulated
sugar, is from 76 to 86 cents. These are lower figures
than had been admitted by any other American beet-
sugar manufacturer up to January 1912, so far as we
have been able to ascertain, and it is probable that they
come nearer representing actual costs in reasonably
modern and efBcient factories than some figures that
have been given by others.
Near the beginning of the chapter we referred to the
ex parte statements of costs just published in the last
volume of the Hearings of the Hardwick Committee.'
The five-year averages of factories reporting are as fol-
lows: "Cost of raw material" (mostly beets), $2.42;
"factory cost," $1.19; "overhead and administration
charges," $0,225; "taxes and insurance," $0.08; total,
$3,925. If the totals of eleven other factories, which did
not classify expenses, are included, the 5-year average
total is $3.40 instead of $3,925.
The average "factory cost," as reported for 1910-11,
varied among the dififerent factories from $0.56 to $1.88.''
The variations for the preceding years were as follows :
1909-10, $0.45 to $2.79; 1908-09, $.56 to $2.92; 1907-
08, $.51 to $2.04; 1906-07, $.67 to $1.92. In 1910-11,
the item of " overhead and administrative charges " varied
among the factories from $.09 to $.45, and the item of
"taxes and insurance" from $.007 to $.132. All these
figures are per 100 pounds of granulated sugar. Of the
33 factories reporting costs as mentioned above, only one
gave anything like an itemized statement. These data
are shown in the accompanying table (No. XIII).
1 Vol. iv, pp. 3393-3424. It will be remembered that these figures
cover 33 factories, though not all report all items. See Table VIII,
supra, and explanations accompanying.
' A few instances which are obviously not at all comparable with
others of the class are excluded here.
94 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [35:
Table XIII. Cost of Manufacturing 100 Pounds of Sugar ^
Labor
Factory salaries '^
Coke
Chemicals
Filter cloth
Fuel oil
Lime rock
Tools and equipment ^
Factory supplies
Laboratory supplies
Repairs and replacements
Hospital fees
Beets.
Beet dumps, expense
Field salaries and expense
Factory sheds and yard expense*..
Wells and water supply expense. . .
Pipe line
Sugar bags
Freight and drayage
General expense
Insurance
Interest on loans not on investment
Office expense and supplies
Office salaries
Storage
Taxes
1909
;^o.4o664
.04118
.00855
.01265
•30736
.09431
.03105
.00352
.01065
2.12593
.05902
.02647
.03476
.11293
.03235
.C0302
.01292
.01374
.07958
;553.4i663
1910
50.2865
.1152
.0444
.0058
.0100
.2727
.0946
.0158
.0306
.0046
.0846
.0024
2.1580
.0301
.0206
.0607
.0249
.1115
.0023
.0227
.OIOX
.0479
.0065
.0532
.0020
•0379
^3-5556
^0.2608
.1264
.0346
.0114
.0222
.2651
.0930
.0069
.0285
.0026
.0632
.0005
2.2424
.0287
.0245
.0586
.1228
.0041
.0152
.0126
.0419
.0089
.0568
.0041
.0425
^^3-5783
Mr. Edw. F. Dyer, in the detailed statement quoted
heretofore,^ gave the operating expenses in the manufac-
ture of beet sugar in the United States as $1.6461 per
^ From the statement of the Southern California Sugar Co. of
Santa Ana, California. Hardwick Committee Hearings, p. 3404.
^ Factory salaries 1909 included in labor.
3 Tools and equipment 1909 included in repairs and replacements
and factory supplies.
* Factory sheds and yard expense 1909 included in beet dumps.
^ Tariff Hearings, House Ways and Means Committee, 60th Cong.,
Schedule E, pp. 3496 et seq.
353] COSTS IN THE UNITED STATES 95
ton of beets which, upon his estimate of a yield of 224.8'
pounds of sugar per ton, would be $.732 per 100 pounds,
of sugar. Upon the basis of the same yield his figures
for administration and maintenance, not including inter-
est and taxes, are, $0,685 per ton of beets or, $0,304 per
100 pounds of sugar. He estimates that taxes would
add $0.06 and interest about $0.275. =* That is, the total
cost of manfacturing (not counting cost of raw material),
upon the basis of an extraction of 224.8 pounds of sugar
per ton of beets is $1,372 per 100 pounds of sugar, or
$1.04 if interest and taxes are not included. For the
three years for which we have official reports since he
made this estimate, the average extraction has been 250
pounds per ton of sugar, or over 10 per cent above
what he took as the average, and this would reduce con-
siderably the cost of extraction per 100 pounds of sugar.
Mr. E. F. Atkins^ in the calculations^ previously quoted
said that he did not know exact costs but that even the
gentlemen interested would hardly claim that the cost
of manufacturing, cooperage and delivery to cars would
exceed $1.25 per 100 pounds of sugar, an estimate which
he seemed to consider very liberal.
According to an analysis based upon the census re-
turns for the years 1899, 1904? ^^^ 1909? Mr. T. G. Palmer^
calculates the costs of administration and manufacture
^ Which he took as representing the average for the United States.
' When converted from expense per ton of beets to expense per
100 lbs. of sugar.
' Now acting president of the trust which owns and controls many
beet-sugar factories.
* Ways and Means Com., 60th Cong., 1908-09. Tariff Hearings,
Schedule E, p. 3360.
* Hardwick Committee Hearings, p. 2630. See tables XIV and
XV, infra.
^6 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [354
Table Xllla. Cost of Production of Sugar from Cuban Sugar Cane and
Domestic Sugar Beets ^
Sugar Cane. Sugar Beets.
Per ton. Per ton.
Cost of growing $1.6964 $3,000
Freight 2567 .350
Agricultural implements 0479 .172
Net cost delivered $2,001 $4,522 »
Operating expenses:
Labor 2330 .5541
Fuel 0444 .4200
Lime 0025 .2100
Chemicals 0061 .0313
Lubricants and waste 0067 .0100
Filter cloth oiii .0500
Laboratory supplies 0028 .0083
Packages, bags 1167 .3400
Cutter knives and files .0074
Miscellaneous 0056 .0150
0.4289 1. 646 1
General expenses :
Administration 0.0555 0.1600
Maintenance 2778 .5000
Interest 3333 .6250
Taxes 0167 .1333
Insurance 0013 .0250
0.6846 1.4433
Total cost $3.1145 $7.6114'
(everything except cost of beets and allowance for de-
preciation) to be $2.06, $1.62, and $1.30 per 100 pounds
of granulated sugar for these respective years and esti-
mates that 4 per cent for depreciation would add to this
50.6 cents, 44.2 cents, and 28.5 cents respectively. Other
^ Edw. F. Dyer, The Dyer Co., Builders of Sugar Works, Cleveland,
Ohio, Tariff Hearings, 1908-09, Schedule E, House Doc. 141, Pp.
3497-8.
' Error of $1 or a misprint in some item.
355]
COSTS IN THE UNITED STATES
Table XIV. Expense per ton of Beets
97
Sugar beets
Fuel <
All other supplies
Officers' salaries
General superintendents, managers, clerks, etc .
Wage earners
Miscellaneous expenses
Cost of working raw sugar
[899
[904
1909
M.3860
$5.2154
$6.0000
.5701
.5631
.5631
1. 089 1
.8808
.8808
.1438
.1309
.0912
.3050
.3309
.2313
1.3744
1.1431
1.1431
•5555
.9191
.9191
.1983
.0170
.0087
Total cost per ton of beets 8.6223 9.2004 9.8373
Table XV. Expense per 100 Pounds of Sugar
1899 1904 1909
Sugar beets : $2.1974 $2.2393 : $2.3734
Fuel .2856 .2418; .2228
All other supplies -5456 -3782 .3484
Officers' salaries 0721 .0562 .0361
General superintendents, managers, clerks, etc ... . .1528 .1421 , •0915
Wage earners .6886 .4908 .4522
Miscellaneous expenses 2783 .3946 .3636
Cost of working raw sugar 0993 '^^73 .0035
Total 4.3197 3-9503' 3-8915
Value of by-products per 100 pounds sugar 0636 \ .0926 .2178
Net cost or sugar per 100 pounds 4.2561 ; 3.8577 3.6737
^ Calculations by T.
2630, (1911).
G. Palmer, Hardwick Committee Hearings, p.
Note [by T. G. Palmer]. — If, with the increased extraction, the cost
n the same as in IQ04, the cost of production would have been
aer ton of beets in 190^
had been the same as in IQ04, the cost of production would have been $3.3633 per 100 pounds'
Beets in 1909 averaged 16.10 per cent sugar and the extraction was 12.56 per cent, or 251.2
pounds sugar per ton of beets, making the sugar in the beets cost $2.3734 per 100 pounds. The
price of 16 per cent beets in 1891, when the industry was established east of the Rocky Moun-
tains, was $4 per ton, at which figure an extraction of 251.2 pounds would cost $1.5823 per 100
pounds. Had the price of beets not been increased, the cost of production in 1909 would have
been lower by 79.11 cents per 100 pounds, or $2.8826 per 100 pounds of sugar instead of $3.6737.
Depreciation. — In the above figures nothing has been carried in for depreciation of plants.
Four per cent depreciation amounts to 50.6 rents per 100 pounds of sugar produced in 1899, 44.2
cents in 1904, and 28.5 cents in 1909, thus making the cost of production $4.7621 per 100 pounds
in 1899, $4.2997 in 1904, and $3.9587 in 1909.
98 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [356
figures of a similar nature regarding the cost of manu-
facture might be given but, for the reasons mentioned,
entirely satisfactory ones are not to be had. These costs
in the better factories in the United States are probably
close to I cent a pound. Some do better than this,
probably more not quite so well.' The accompanying
tables (Nos. Xllla-XV) give analyses of costs made
by Mr. Dyer and Mr. Palmer.
It v^ill be noticed that Mr. Dyer's calculations are not
supposed to include profits in growing beets, and this
estimate of cost is only a little over half what Mr. Palmer
gives for 1909. His labor costs are less than one-half
those given by Mr. Palmer for wage-earners ; fuel three-
fourths as much and total costs per ton of beets less than
three-fourths as much, though it includes interest, which
is not supposed to be included in Mr. Palmer's estimate.
This interest subtracted from the costs given for beets
accounts for the main difference between the two results.
Mr. Palmer's estimate of the price of beets for 1909 is
25 cents per ton above our estimate. This would affect the
cost per 100 pounds of sugar by 10 cents. Some of his
other figures for 1909 are calculated upon the bases of
the former censuses because the figures for the 1909
census are, unfortunately, not so complete as those for
former years. His figures also involve such calculations
as converting 100 pounds of raw sugar into 90 pounds of
granulated at 33 cents per 100 pounds. The amount of
this raw sugar is comparatively small, hence affects the
results slightly. Though these census figures are as good
as any we have, nevertheless they are collected and pub-
lished in such a way as to prevent any conclusive anal-
ysis as to many points and may include some things
' This matter will be taken up again in comparison with other costs.
357] COSTS IN THE UNITED STATES 99
which should not be included. Mr. Palmer's analyses of
the figures as they stand appear very fair, on the whole,
but facts which we have pointed out heretofore indicate
that his totals are rather large.
4. SUMMARY OF UNITED STATES COSTS
It seems probable from the figures given above and
other facts disclosed in making this study that the aver-
age total cost to the American manufacturer of producing
granulated beet sugar at the factory is between $3.00 and
$3.50 per 100 pounds, being a combination of about $2.30
for the sugar in the beets and near $1.00 for manufac-
turing the same. In localities where the sugar in the
beets costs $2.75 to $3.00 and the manufacturing $1.25 to
$2.00, the finished product costs $4.00 to $5.00 and,
doubtless, there are some factories thus near the margin.
In more favorable localities and under more economical
manufacturing conditions, where the sugar in the beets
can be obtained for $1.75 to $2.00 and the manufacturing
can be done at a cost of 60 cents to $1.00, the total cost
is $2.35 to $3.00, and it is probable that a number of fac-
tories come within these figures, though very few have
published such results.^
5. COMPARISONS WITH EUROPEAN COSTS
a. Da I a in Difi event Terms
Having considered some of the costs of sugar produc-
tion in the United States, we may inquire how they
compare, with European costs, particularly with costs in
* A few have, however. See Hardwick Committee Hearings, pp.
2379, 2875-2895 and 3393-3424. Some suggestions as to possible
ways of making the average costs approach these latter figures will
be made under discussion of agricultural costs and improvements in
chapters v and vi, infra.
lOO THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [358
Germany where the great European industry has reached
its largest and highest development.
In the first place, it should be remarked by way of
caution that comparisons between the United States and
European countries are very liable to error unless unusual
care is taken to allow for different conditions and differ-
ent practices regarding use of terms and items reported.
For example, in Germany, a much larger proportion of
the beets are grown upon the estates of the owners of
the factories and the price of these beets is said to be
represented partly in the dividends of the factories rather
than wholly in the nominal price.' In some cases, the
prices include freight, in others they do not. Some
beets are paid for at a flat rate and others according to
sliding scale. "^ A very important difference to be noted
in comparing American and European results, especially
as regards per cent of sugar content, extraction and yield
per acre, is the fact that, in the United States, these
figures are practically always in terms of granulated,
whereas, in Europe, they are usually, though not always, in
terms of raw sugar of which it takes about 100 pounds
to make 90 pounds of granulated. Many comparisons
of Europe's superiority over the United States in sugar
yields do not call attention to this fact and the margin
of apparent superiority would often be reduced if the
European figures were put in the same terms, though it
would still remain significant in many instances.
b. Cost of Raw Material — Prices Paid for Beets
Following are prices paid for beets in Germany and
France as reported through of^cial sources.
^ Die Zuckerproducktion der Welt, H. Paasche, 1905 edition, p. 15.
' Quarterly of German Imperial Statistical Office, 1910, IV, pp.
137 et seq.
359] COSTS IN THE UNITED STATES iqi
Table XVI. Prices Paid for Sugar Beets in Germany and France ^
Germany.
France.
Year.
Price per
short ton.
Per cent of
extraction,
88 fc (raw).
Price per
short ton.
M.547
4.627
4.254
4-547
5.294.
5.263*
5.201
4.456
4.028
3.920
3.892
4.308
3.813
3.976
4.184
4.266
Per cent of
extraction,
refined.
i8q4.-oi;
^^4.365
3.825
3.825
3.738
3.954,
4.127
4.257
4.084
3.868
3.846
4.343
4.322
4.041
4235
4.603
4-732
4.86
12.15
13.11
12.66
12.79
13.37
I3-58*
14.14
13.63
14.60
14.38
14.92
14.71
14.97
14.96
16.77
15.11
15.96
9.87
10.97
9.89
11.40
12 08
1895-96
1896-97
1897-98
i8q8 oq
1899-1900
1900—01
"■754
19.933
11.249
12.384
11.180
12.050
II. 701
12.471
11.930
12.3
11.7
Tor>'7— n"! ..........
1903-04
1905-06
1906-07
1907-08
1908-09
1909-10
IQI 0— II»»».«««.«»
Estimating 100 pounds of German raw sugar as equal
to 90 pounds =" of granulated and converting to American
terms, we see that the average German cost of beets to
produce 100 pounds of granulated sugar in 1909-10 was
$1.74 or, in 1907-8, which is a year where the average
is more nearly typical of the past six years, it was $1.58.
These figures are from $0.55 to $0.80 less than similarly
calculated costs for the United States. Similar costs for
' German figures from the Quarterlies of the German Imperial
Statistical Office, French figures from the official Bulletins of Statistics
of the Minister of Finance. The French figures as reported in differ-
ent bulletins from year to year do not always exactly agree with one
another. In some cases it is stated that the per cent of extraction
is in terms of refined, in others this has been inferred.
^ This is an approximation only; actual results usually vary a pound
or two. but this is a common calculation.
I02 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [360
France are $1.81 in 1909-10 and $1.70 in 1908-9, or from
$0.50 to $0.65 less than our estimates for the United
States. These differences are due to lower prices for
richer beets than the average American factories secure
and it seems that they amount to advantages to Ger-
many of approximately one-half to four-fifths of a cent
and to France of one-half to two-thirds of a cent per
pound as compared with the United States.
c. Manufacturing Costs
A rather detailed study of the costs in thirty-three
German factories has been made by Ernst Glanz, part
of which has been presented in a very interesting way
by H. Claassen, the well-known authority on sugar manu-
facturing.' The principal object of this study, or at least
the principal conclusion drawn, was as to the relative
manufacturing costs according to size of factory and
amount of beets worked in a season. It was found that,
while the average cost of working beets for the 33
factories was $1.67 per short ton of beets (38.7 pfennigs
per 50 kilograms) "^ the costs in the different factories
varied from $1.21 to $2.29 (28 to 53 pf. per 50 kilograms
of beets) and, grouped according to amount of beets
worked in the campaign, the costs of working beets were
as follows :
* Zuckerfabrikation, pp. 101-104, (Leipzig and Berlin, 1905). The
1910 English translation of Claassen's work by Hall and Rolfe does not
contain these figures, but only a brief unsatisfactory reference.
These figures are based upon a study made by Glanz and published
in a series of articles in the Zeitschrift des Vereins der deutschen
Zuckerindustrie. Glanz's study was continued in later years. See
Zeitschrift for 1907.
' Including amortization.
36 1 ] COSTS IN THE UNITED STATES 103
Factories '
Cost per
Factories
Cost per
working tons
short ton
working zentner
SO kilos
of beets up to
of beets
of beets up to
of beets
27,557-5
$1.87
( 500,000 ztr.
43.3 Pf.)
55,115.
1.75
(1,000,000 "
40.6 " )
110,230.
1.54
(2,000,000 "
35.6 " )
165,34s.
1.30
(3,000,000 "
30.0 " )
It will be noticed that the average tonnage of beets
sliced by the 33 German factories included in this study
is one-half greater than for the average of all Germany
in 1901-2 and two-thirds greater than in 1909-10; that
is, it was about one-half greater than the average for the
United States in 1901-2 and just a little greater than the
United States average tonnage worked in 1909-10.
These various proportions should be borne in mind in
making comparisons with the United States.
Glanz's cost figures are for tons of beets and it is not
stated in this connection what the extraction was per ton.
It is presumable that these factories, which were much
above the average in size, were also better equipped than
the average German factory and that they extracted more
sugar per ton. The average for all Germany that year
was 13.63 per cent in terms of raw, or 272.6 pounds per
short ton of beets. This could be converted into 245.36
^ Average for all of Germany's 395 factories that year (1901-02)
44,649 short tons. (This was about one-fifth larger than for the
average year.) The average for the 33 German factories in this
comparison, or study, 66,703 short tons. In the same year (1901-02),
the 36 factories in the U. S., worked 1,685,688.6 tons of beets, or an
average of 46,825 short tons. In 1909-10, the average for all German
factories was 39,918 short tons ; for the same year in the U. S. it was
61,005 short tons. (According to census figures; if Dept. of Agricul-
ture report is taken, it is 62,790), See census table showing amount
of beets worked by various U. S. factories and the various official
reports cited, chapter ii, supra.
I04 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [362
pounds of granulated sugar upon the assumption of 100
pounds of raw making 90 pounds of granulated.'
This 245.36 pounds of granulated sugar is more than
the U. S. average for that year, but just about equal to
the present. U. S. average and about one-fifth under the
present German average extraction.''
1 This is a basis that has been taken by others usually and may vary
a pound or two either way in actual experience. Most of the
German factories make raw sugar which later goes to refineries to be
converted into granulated, though more and more of the factories are
coming to perform both operations, as is the case with all American
beet-sugar factories. But the German manufacturers (all except one,
so it is said — T. G. Palmer, Hardwick Com. Hearings, p. 2768) filter
their sugar through bone black as do American refiners, who work
cane mostly, though beet to some extent, and both in practically the
same way; at least, both go through bone black. But the American
beet-sugar manufacturers turn out a finished granulated sugar, refining
it without the bone-black process, using a process invented by Dr.
E. O. von Lippman of Germany, which is said to be cheaper and
almost as satisfactory, though perhaps it leaves a small fraction of
a per c|nt more impurity in the beet sugar than is left in either beet
or canelsugar that is filtered through bone black. The writer suggests
that thil may be an explanation of some little real difference of which
housewiles complain in preferring cane sugar for preserving and
candy making, though it is probable that this difference is generally
more imaginary than real. Tests by the U. S. Dept. of Agriculture,
Bureau of''; Chemistry, and various other experiments have shown that
there is no real difference between pure cane and beet sugars. Loaf
sugar is said to be "probably the purest of all substances in com-
merce". (See Sugar as Food, p. 14, U. S. Dept. of Agriculture,
Farmers' Bulletin no. 95; also Division of Chemistry, Bulletin 13, p.
6, and Bureau of Chemistry, Bulletin 100.)
It is interesting to note, though difficult to explain, that while Dr.
von Lippman was highly honored (being decorated by the German
government) for his discovery, or invention, of the cheaper process of
refining beet sugar without the use of bone black, still, only one Ger-
man factory is said to employ it, though all of the American beet-
sugar factories use it.
' The average extraction of raw sugar for all German factories
in 1901-02 was 13.63%; in 1909-10, 15.11%; equivalent to about 245.36
lbs. and 272 lbs., respectively, of granulated per short ton of beets.
363] COSTS IN THE UNITED STATES 105
On these assumptions, the average cost of working
enough beets to produce 100 pounds of granulated sugar'
up to the raw-sugar stage in these 33 factories was 68
cents,^ though it varied in the different factories from 49
cents to 93 cents. If to this we should add 30 cents as
an average cost of refining to produce 100 pounds of
granulated from raw,^ we should have an average manu-
The average U. S. extractions for these respective years in terms of
granulated were 219 and 251. i lbs. and the U. S. average for five years,
1906-1911, was 245.1 lbs.
^ It is to be noted that this method of calculating makes full
allowance for the loss in refining.
2 100/245.36 of $1.67.
^ Various costs of refining have been given by different persons at
different times. In an analysis before the Industrial Commission, (vol.
I, p. 150-151, June 16, 1899) James H. Post of the National Sugar
Refining Co. gives the costs of which the following figures are
summaries :
per 100 lbs.
Losses due to elimination of impurities and loss of sugar.. $.281
Brokerage, ^% and gov't tax, ^4% 04799
Office expenses, J4% 10
Packages, wages, fuel, bone black, repairs and sundries 20
$.629
This is on the basis of granulated sugar at $5,375, or $5.08 net, the
actual operating cost as estimated here being 30 cents per 100 lbs.
Very interesting estimates of costs of refining are given in Willett &
Gray's Statistical Sugar Trade lournal, Feb., 1891, p. 3, ancl by Byron
W. Holt (press editor of Reform Club) and L. Carroll Root (fellow
of Cornell Univ.), the latter being prepared to present before the
Senate Finance Committee of 1893-94 (Senate Report, 432, 53d Con-
gress, 2d Session, pp. 78-83.) Here it is estimated that the total cost
of refining at that timiC was about 30 cents per 100 lbs. and that 35 to
40 cents per 100 lbs. for the trust, a large-scale producer, and 35 to
45 cents for the independents would cover all losses and costs (no
dividends). It is proper to say that raw sugar paid no duty at that
time, and was about 3 cents a pound. The smaller the cost price,
the less the loss in refining, operating and other expenses remaining
constant.
There is a very great uniformity among many statements by various
I06 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [364
facturing cost of $.98, or practically i cent a pound.
There would certainly be some variations as to this re-
fining cost in different factories, so that the total manu-
facturing costs per 100 pounds of granulated sugar varied
from about 75 cents to $1.30, to speak conservatively.
It will be noted that these figures are remarkably close
to our estimates of similar costs in American factories
and, while it is not claimed that they are anything but
refiners in nearly all of the sugar hearings that the total cost of
refining, including losses, operation and selling, is five-eighths of a
cen:, or .62j^c. — Hardwick Committee Hearings: E. F. Atkins,
62 >2, p. 140; F. C. Lowry, .65, p. 1696; W. B. Thomas, .62!/^, p. 1986;
J. E. Burguieres, very much less than ^ cent, p. 1866; C. A. Spreckels,
less than .30 for manufacturing; total, including losses, about .65, p.
2260; W. G. Gilmore, .65, p. 1134. Cuban Reciprocity Hearings: H.
W. Wiley quoting Willett & Gray, .625, p. 509; E. F. Atkins, at
formation of trust, about yic. for expenses, now (1902) much less,
p. 36; H. T. Oxnard, .50 to .60. 1908-09 Tariff Hearings: E. F.
x\tkins, .62. See also Hardwick Committee Hearings, pp. 2607 and
2647 ; Paul L. Vogt, Sugar Refining Industry of U. S., p. 103. This is
not an exhaustive, but a suggestive list of references.
Most of these estimates are for cane-sugar refining. It is stated
by some that there is no practical difference in this respect as re-
gards cane and beet (C. A. Spreckels, Hardwick Com. Hearings, p.
2064) but this is denied by others. Raw beet sugar has a little more
ash and water and a trifle less sugar in it than raw cane sugar. (See
analysis, U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, Farmers' Bulletin, no. 93, p. 14).
Our estimates of cost of refining in this comparison of German with
American costs are for operation costs only, as we have already made
allowances for the other costs. As we have seen, J. H. Post put these
at about $.30 per 100 lbs., Edw. F. Dyer at $.30 (1908-09 Tariff
Hearings, p. 3489), H. T. Oxnard 3/10 to Voc. a pound {Cuban
Reciprocity Hearings, 1902, p. 187) ; C. A. Spreckels, less than $.30
(Plardwick Committee Hearings, 191 1, p. 2260; Chas. Lyle, $.32^^ for
Great Britain (one pound, ten shillings, Report of Tariff Commission,
vol. I, Witness No. 117, quoted by T. G. Palmer in Hardwick Com-
mittee Hearings, p. 2606) ; T. G. Palmer %.2Z for beet {Ibid., p. 2629).
Weighing all of the statements, most of which are evidently "safe"
estimates, and comparing with other known facts, a layman would
estimate the total actual cost to be near 50c. per 100 lbs., and not
more than half that amount as cost of operation.
365] COSTS IN THE UNITED STATES 107
estimates, it is not probable that the errors in them are
great enough to invalidate them for the use to which we
shall put them later in this study.
Above, we have been speaking of manufacturing costs.
The average price paid for beets by these 33 factories
was $3.80 per short ton (88 pf. per 50 kilos) which is
the lowest for several years, the average for the 5 years
previous, as given by Glanz, being $4.08 per ton,' (94.3
pf. per 50 kilos). Upon the average basis of extraction
for Germany which we assumed above (272.6 lbs. of raw,
or 245.36 lbs. of granulated sugar per short ton of beets)
this would mean a cost of $1.55 for the year 1901-02, or
$1.66 for the 5-year average, as the cost of the beets to
produce 100 pounds of granulated sugar before the pro-
cess of manufacture began. These are average figures;
the costs of the beets to the different factories varied
from $2.98 to $4.70 per short ton, which would make a
variation in the cost of the raw material to produce 100
pounds of granulated sugar of from $1.21 to $1.90, as-
suming the same extraction as above, namely, the
average of all German factories. However, it is certain
that there were variations in this factor and they pro-
bably accentuated the variations in some cases and less-
ened them in others. It will be noticed that these costs
run from 50 cents to $1.00 under those we found for the
United States, or about 75 cents on the average for years
more recent, when our average sugar extraction is about
what Germany's was then.
The average combined costs of beets and manufactur-
ing for these 33 factories is $5.47 per short ton of beets
(1.267 marks per 50 kilos) and varies among the fac-
^ The average (1901-02) for the whole of Germany was $4.08, and
for the five-year period ending then, $4.03.
I08 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [366
tories from $4.92 to $7.34. This would mean ' an aver-
age total cost of $2.53 per 100 pounds of granulated and
a variation from $2.30 to $3.29 upon the basis of our
former calculations. The average proceeds over costs
were 81 cents per ton of beets or 33 cents per 100
pounds of granulated sugar. The extraction for 1909-10,
which was near the average for the last few years, was
about one-ninth greater than for this year's (1901-02)
average, so that the average costs for the present on the
basis of these figures would be near 2^ cents per pound,
varying from 2 cents to 3 cents, or running about 2 of a
cent to I cent under American figures. Nearly all of the
difference is accounted for by the difference in cost of
raw material, due to cheaper price per ton, and better
quality of German beets. It should be remembered that
these German factories were among the larger ones and
averaged slicing about one and a half times as much as
the average German factory at that time, or one and two-
third times as much as in 1909-10, and that the year of
1901-02 was one of unusually large tonnage shortly be-
fore the Brussels Convention took effect.
According to this German study, the average labor
cost of working the beets into raw sugar was 29 per
cent of the manufacturing cost, or 9 per cent of the
combined costs of beets and manufacturing. The average
fuel cost was 24 per cent of the manufacturing cost, or
y.y per cent of the combined costs. Beets form 70 per
cent of the combined costs, and manufacturing 30 per
cent.^ As these are for raw-sugar manufacture and
^ Upon the basis of the average extraction for all Germany that
year being 245.36 lbs. granulated per short ton of beets and adding
30c. for cost of converting raw sugar to refined granulated.
' 1910 United States Census report on beet-sugar manufacturing costs
— salaries, 4.7 per cent; wages, 12.9 per cent; materials, 73.0 per cent;
miscellaneous expenses, 9.4 per cent.
367] COSTS IN THE UNITED STATES ' log
American data are for granulated-sugar manufacture, the
figures we have for the two are not easily comparable in
every respect, because we have no sufficient analysis of
the various factors entering the costs of conversion from
raw to refined, though we do know that absolute wages
in Germany are lower and fuel costs relatively higher
than here.
This study of German costs by E. Glanz seems to be
the most complete and considered as the best authority
on the subject by all recent German writers. Partly on
the basis of the same study, H. Birschel ' calculates the
cost of German raw-sugar production at $2.06 per 100
pounds, deducting the value of the molasses (19.03 marks
for 100 kilos of raw sugar) and calculating the cost of
growing beets at $4.75 per short ton; but he estimates
that the worth of the pulp and tops reduces this by three-
twenty-seconds and the ''indirect benefits" by about as
much more, making the net cost of growing the beets
about $3.45 per short ton, and the cost of producing
100 pounds of raw sugar, including manufacturing, $1.87.
If this is converted into refined sugar upon the same basis
as in our previous estimates, it would make the cost
$2.38 per 100 pounds of granulated.
According to these figures, the agricultural costs are
just about equal to the price of beets and all the grower's
profits come in the ''indirect advantages." But this
matter of agricultural costs will be presented a little
more fully in the next chapter.
For purposes of comparison, we give briefly in the
next two pages the European cost figures of a few
other sugar authorities.
^ Briisseler Zucker-Konvention, pp. 59-64.
no THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [368
Lewis Ware gives the following raw-sugar costs for
Germany and France : '
France Germany
Beets, per metric ton $5-09 $4.72
Transportation 60
Cost of manufacture 2.40 2.00
Interest and sinking fund 50 .50
$8.59 $7.22
Less pulp and molasses 1.14
Molasses .32 '
$7.45 J6.90
Extraction in kilos 116.7 136.
Cost per 100 kilos of raw sugar $6.38 $5.08
Advantage of Germany i .30
Upon the basis of our previous estimates these figures
would be equivalent to about $2.85 per 100 pounds of
granulated sugar for Germany and $3.53 for France.
They seem considerably higher than most of the figures
we have, but it is noticed that they include interest and
sinking fund ; furthermore, most of the items are given
in round numbers.
Herbertz^ gives the following costs for the production
of 100 pounds of sugar in the same countries :
France Germany
Beets at $4.24 per short ton $2.00 $1,856
Fuel 30 .323
Labor 182 .123
$2,482 $2,302
* Beet Sugar Mfg. and Refining, vol. i, p. xx (1905, N. Y. and
London). See also, vol. ii, pp. 616-618, data regarding one of the
largest German factory's results.
"^ This one number is supplied by the writer. It is implied by Ware.
' Cited in Sugar, John E. R. Newlands, and Benj. E. R. Newlands,
p. 876 (1909, London and New York). The original and citation are
in marks per cwt.
369] COSTS IN THE UNITED STATES HI
George Martineau' gives as the average costs of 68
German factories $2.07 per 100 pounds (9s. lod. per
cwt."") and says the cost of the rest of Europe is higher.
In comparison with this he gives the following costs in
shillings per cwt.: West Indies, 8.98s.; Hawaii, 8.22s.;
Egypt, 9.09s.; Queensland, 8.05s., and estimates that the
average beet sugar costs more than £10 per ton ($2.18
per 100 lbs.) and cane sugar less than £9 per ton ($1.86
per 100 lbs.). 3
Most of the sugar hearings before the United States
congressional committees contain many statements of
costs for Europe as well as for most other countries, but
all, with a few exceptions, are made by advocates favor-
ing special legislation, many of whom have little first-
hand knowledge, as is the case with many making state-
ments about United States costs. Their interests have to
be considered in judging their statements; furthermore,
practically all of them present lump figures and not
itemized costs.'^
d. Summary
f Considering the material available and the purposes of
this study, it is hardly profitable to quote European costs
at greater length at this point. It is generally conceded
that the beet-sugar industry on a large scale is on a
cheaper basis and a firmer agricultural and scientific foun-
1 British delegate to Brussels Convention, in loiirnal of the Royal
Statistical Society, June, 1899, v. 62, p. 122. Costs are presumed to be
of raw sugar unless otherwise stated.
' 112 lbs.
' See Deutsche Zuckerindustrie, Theodor Schuchart (Leipzig, 1908),
pp. 258 et seq.; Philippine Revenue Hearings, (1905-06), p. 262,
W. C. Wellborn, Chief of Agr. Bureau.
* For example, see 1908-9 Tariff Hearings, p. 3280 (H. T. Oxnard) ;
pp. 3338-9 (W. H. Baird) ; pp. 3465-6 (T. G. Palmer).
112 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [370
dation in Germany than anywhere else and that, if the
competition of the United States beet-sugar industry is
with any part of Europe, it is with Germany. It has
been seen that Germany's agricultural costs and, hence,
her total costs of producing beet sugar approximate half
a cent to a cent a pound less than the same for the
United States though on the whole she probably has no
advantage in the manufacturing end of the industry.'
* Both sugar refiners and beet-sugar manufacturers have admitted
the equality and even the superiority of Americans in manufacturing;
others wanting legislative favors do not admit it. See Louisiana
Planter, Feb. 5, 1910, pp. 88 et seq.; Hardwick Committee Hearings,
pp. 712, 1985, 2260-65; 53d Congress, 2d Session, Sen. Report 452, pp.
79 et seq. ; Sugar Industry of U. S. and The Tariff, D, A. Wells, p.
112, (New York, 1878).
Chapter V. Cost of Growing Beets in the
United States
So far we have been considering the cost of producing
beet sugar from the standpoint of the manufacturer. As
indicated in the beginning of the discussion of costs, we
have seen that by far the largest item in these costs, and
practically the only important one in which the best
European manufacturers have the advantage over those
of the United States, is raw material. For example, the
German factories have been purchasing beets of approxi-
mately 10 per cent better quality for 15 per cent less per
ton. We have seen that, in the last fifteen years, the
average price of beets in the United States has risen
from about $4.10 to $5.50 per short ton' and that in the
past decade the expense of this one item to the factory
has increased from about 50 per cent to 60 per cent of
the total cost of the finished product.
It has been represented by many interested parties
that beet growing is very profitable to the American
farmer. Numerous reports in ofificial agricultural bul-
letins and elsewhere seem to bear out this contention and
it has been suggested that the grower has been receiving
undue profits to the disadvantage of the home manufac-
turer in his competition with the foreign producer. On
the other hand, it is stoutly maintained that the average
grower receives practically no profit. What it actually
costs the farmer to grow sugar beets is a question fre-
quently asked and seldom, if ever, satisfactorily answered,
^ See Tables VIII-X, supra, and the pages following.
371] 113
114 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [3*72
because sufficient comprehensive scientific data do not
exist, and yet, as in the case of some of other matters
which have been considered, there are enough available
facts to help us arrive at tentative conclusions.'
I. PRINCIPAL CLASSES OF DATA
Most of the data we have regarding the cost of grow-
ing sugar beets may be put in three main classes, each of
which is liable to serious errors. In the first class we
may include the data regarding beets grown under the
direction of agricultural experiment stations ; in the
second and largest class, miscellaneous reports from
farmers collected here and there with little apparent
system and published frequently in agricultural bulletins ;
in the third class, pure estimates of various authorities
made upon unknown bases. In addition to the data
which properly belong to these three classe, we have a
very small number of reports which seem to be more
representative on the whole and which bear indications
of really careful and accurate accounting.
a. Agricultural Experime^it Station Records
In the first class of reports, the records usually appear
to have been kept with more than average accuracy,
often very carefully, but the results are not normal for
several reasons. The beets are usually grown on small
plats of from one-tenth of an acre to two acres in area,
and hence require an unusually large proportion of hand
work. These experiments are usually made at the early
^ The character of available data on agricultural costs is such that
any conclusions of value will have to be substantiated by a greater
amount of detail than the patience of the general reader will permit.
Hence, in the body of the study at this place we shall present only
typical data and our findings, placing additional references for the reader
who cares for fuller details and analyses in an appendix to this chapter.
373]
COST OF GROWING BEETS
115
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Il6 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [374
Stages of the introduction of the industry, often without
the use of any specialized beet-farming implements and
with little previous experience on the part of the growers.
On the other hand, the operations are usually directed
by more than average intelligence, and it is probable that
better than average land is used and that better than
average care is given; at least, the results show better
than average yields. (See Table XVII for examples of
such reports.)
The reports of 75 Wisconsin growers for the season of
1904 showed the following variations and averages : ^
Lowest Highest Average
Acres grown 0.4 12. 2.8
Per cent of sugar 13. 17.2 15. i
Tons of beets per acre 6.5 30.7 16. i
Net receipts . ; . 1^24.07 $138.67 $70.57
Expense per acre 12.00 43.26 29.09
Most of the farmers reported on every item mentioned
above, as well as upon a number of others not mentioned,
but in the item of " expense per acre" there were
many failures to report, especially by the growers whose
yield was largest and whose expense would naturally be
above the average, hence the average reported for this
item is probably too low.
As mentioned before, the average yields and, hence,
the average returns in these reports are from 60
to 75 per cent above the average for the United States.'
The cost of growing does not decrease proportionately
with decreased yields ; hence these figures show much
larger profits than would the United States average.
* Univ. of Wis., Agr. Exp. Station, Bui. no. 123, pp. 20 et seq.,
(April, 1905).
^ lo-yr average, 1901-10, 9.7 short tons per acre (Table XI, supra).
375] COST OF GROWING BEETS II7
b. Farmers^ Reports
The second class of data, namely, those gathered from
farmers here and there without any apparent system and
frequently published in agricultural bulletins, often cover
large and more typical acreages but they are also liable
to contain certain errors. Most of these reports appear
to be those of growers who have been more successful
than the average and most of them also s.eem to be
estimates, largely, rather than actual costs as ascertained
by careful accounting. They show the farmer's habit of
omitting many costs which he does not pay directly in
cash and also the universal human trait of reporting the
unusually favorable results and of not reporting the fail-
ures and near failures.
Following is an example of this class of data :
Actual Cost of Growing and Marketing s% Acres of Beets at
Larkin, Kansas, (1908) *
Water and labor in applying $3.00
Plowing II .00
Harrowing (three times) 3.00
Planting 2.50
Thinning 31 .50
Hoeing twice 2.50
Cultivating (4 times) 14.00
Water and labor for two irrigations 6.00
Plowing out beets 7.50
Topping 15.00
Hauling % mile to market 11 .00
$114.50
Average cost per acre 21 .81
The yield is not reported in this case, but one would
judge from the hauling expense that it was good. This
statement is more detailed than the average of this class,
1 Progress of Beet-Sugar Ind. in U. S., U. S. Dept. Agr., Report no.
90 (1908).
ii8
THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY
[376
but it will be noticed that all the items are in round num-
bers. They are probably considerably below the average
costs ; in fact, they are not much over half the average
for the state, as estimated by Secretary F. D. Coburn.'
The following three reports do not show costs that
seem so far from the average as the one just cited, but
there are internal and other evidences that they are not
altogether representative of present costs. In the first
Table XVIII. Reported Cost of Sugar-beet Culture in three Actual
Cases, and the Net Returns *
Items.
Number of acres planted . . .
Plowing, harrowing, leveling
Seed
Drilling
Thinning
Hoeing
Cultivating and ditching. . . .
Irrigating
Colorado, i Wisconsin, i Washington
$8.75
12.30
2.25
22.75
10.25
9.00
3.50
Total cost $Ti.'0<^
Average cost per acre I 14.21
Cost of harvesting and delivery ! ....
Total average cost per acre ! $27
Number of tons of beets harvested . . . . ;
Amount received for beets
Average receipts per acre
Net returns per acre I
II
39.00
6.40
60.00
27.50
J 5-25
218.00
^35-07
'35
$695.00
63.18
28.11
$24.00
26.70
4.00
66.00
30.50
17-50
$168.70
15-34
133-15
$27.44
"5
$607.00
55.18
27.74
place, most of the figures are in round numbers. In the
second place, a number of the items are lower than
would be possible under average conditions as known by
the writer from actual experience and observation. For
example, the items of plowing, harrowing, leveling and
1 Report of Sept., 1906. Cited in U. S. Dept. of Agr., Report no. 84,
p. 121, and Report no. 86, p. 16. Estimated cost in Kansas, $37-50
per acre,
' U. S. Dept. of Agr., Farmers' Bui, no. 52, p. 26 (1910).
1771
COST OF GROWING BEETS
119
irrigating, as given, for Colorado, are considerably too
small, not for exceptional, but for average conditions.
It will also be noticed that the big item of " harvesting
and delivery " is not included in the Colorado expense.
Though these figures are taken from a 1910 bulletin, it
is very probable that they are for costs of some years ago,
as this bulletin is a revision of a former publication which
has been reprinted and revised several times, beginning
in 1897.
c. Estimates
The third class of data regarding cost of growing sugar
beets consists of estimates, the bases of which are not
given. They vary greatly; some appear good, others
very misleading; probably most of them show results
considerably more favorable than the average. We cite
below what we consider some of the better of such esti-
mates. However, we would make much the same criti-
cisms of the first table and the items in it as we did of
the last table presented above, particularly with reference
to cost in the irrigated states.
Table XIX. Estimated Cost per Acre of Sugar-beet Culture '
Items.
California, i Utah.
Nebraska.
Clearing the land ! i ' $i.oo to $1.50
3.00
3.85
7.00
4.00
1.60
Plowing and harrowing. ...
Seed and seeding
Bunching and thinning . . . .
Hoeing ,
Cultivating
Other expenses
Harvesting and delivering . .
J^5-37
1.80
[ 1440
'1.50
Total
2.75
00
00
CO
1.50
5.00
J 4:
i 2.
2.50 to
3-25 to
2.00 to
1.50 to
Michigan.
I $2.25
2.50
7.00
4.00
1.50
11.00 to 13.20
17.20
i 23-07 32.75 I 28.25 to 34.15
Cost of siloing when necessary. \ > I 2.50 to 8.00
34.45
^ U. S. Dept. of Agr., Farmer's Bulletin, No. 52, p. 25 (1910).
'Cost of irrigation. ' Exclusive of delivery.
* Based on a yield of 15 tons per acre.
I20 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [378
The following estimate of costs appears to be much
more in accord with the facts of to-day than is usually
the case in estimates, but in the calculating of profits it
will be seen that the yield of beets has been put far
above the average of the United States and of the sec-
tion in question.
Cost and Profits of Growing Beets (United States, Irrigated
Section)^
Expenses Receipts
Per acre Per acre
17 tons beets, at $5 flat rate $85.
Plowing land, 10 to 12 inches deep $3.00
Harrowing, leveling, cultivating and preparing seed
bed : 2.00
Drilling in seed .50
20 lbs. seed 2.00
Cultivating, 5 times at 40 cents 2.00
Furrowing twice i .00
Irrigating 3 times, labor 3.00
Thinning, hoeing and topping, contract 20.00
Plowing out 2.00
Hauling at 50 cents per ton (17 tons) 8.50
Water charge for maintenance of canals 75
Total cost of raising, per acre $44-75
Profit per acre 40.25
Mr. Roeding adds the following comment regarding
his estimates :
In California, the hand-labor item is usually less, but the
cost of water for irrigfation is higher, so that the total is about
the same. Generally speaking, an 8-ton or lo-ton crop will
just about pay the expense of growing, while anything above
that yield will be profitable, and as tonnage increases, the
greater the returns in proportion. On smaller fields the
* U. S. Dept. Agr., Farmer's Bui. 392, p. 45, 1910, by F. W. Roeding,
Irrigation Manager, Irrigation Investigations.
379] COST OF GROWING BEETS 12 1
grower and his family often do all, or the g^reater part, of the
work themselves, so that they earn g^ood wag^es besides the
profits from a good yield. Where beet land is rented for
cash, $8 to $15 per acre is charged, which includes water
rights, while for share rent, one-fourth of the crop is the us-
ual rate.
2. EXAMPLE OF A GOOD RECORD OF DATA
We have cited in the preceding pages several of the
better examples of the three classes of agricultural data
which form the bulk of the matter we have on the sub-
ject, but which are really far from satisfactory. In the
next citation we present a table which, in several respects,
appears to the writer to be the best of any that he has
been able to discover.
Here, it seems, we have a case of real accounting, cov-
ering a period of nine consecutive years. Furthermore,
the various items bear the mark of probability more
clearly than is usually the case. On the other hand, the
company grew a much larger acreage than the average
farmer and allowances should be made for both advan-
tages and disadvantages due to this fact. It is also to
be noted that these costs, so far as appears in the state-
ment, do not include expenses of depreciation of imple-
ments, management, interest on capital invested in crop,
rent of land and taxes. The further analysis of the 1894
crop shows this a little more clearly than the first table.
But, while it is true that there are many matters bearing
very directly upon cost that cannot be shown in such
brief compass, nevertheless these figures appear to the
writer to be the most accurate and comprehensive ones
relative to the United States cost of growing beets that
he has seen published anywhere.
The following table is taken from the books of the
122
THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY
[380
Standard Cattle Co. (of Ames, Neb.) where a careful
account has been kept of every item of expense.^
Table XX. Cost of Growing Beets in Nebraska
Year.
Manuring.
Seed.
,2 w>
-73
#7.90
3.89
5.56
2.36
7.14
4.65
4.37
Cultivation.
■
^5541.30
30.16
23.74
24.17
29.88
25-52
32.12
20.26
26.27
28.16
1
a
X
Total.
iSoq
$2.25
2.00
2.12
3-33
2.75
2.46
2.68
JJ531.15
22.07
15.08
14.09
18.32
15.59
21.98
12.38
18.44
18.80
$12.75
8.13
13-19
13.02
8.94
11.80
16.99
15-47
12.95
12.58
$54.05
38.29
36.93
37.19
38.82
37.32
49.11
35-73
39.22
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
$2.20
.98
2.66
3.56
'it
Average
1.66
2.80
4.90
40.74
The following is a slightly extended analysis of the costs
for 1894 :'
Manuring $2.00
Plowing 2.01
Seed 2.00
Seeding 30
Harrowing 50
Rolling 31
First hoeing i .44
Bunching 2.12
Thinning 2-72
Second hoeing 5.25
Third hoeing 4.81
Fourth hoeing 2.91
Cultivating i .92
Sundry expenses, time-keeper,
killing bugs, etc .77
Cost of laying by $30. 16
Harvesting 4.00
Plowing out , 2.00
Hauling and loading 2.13
$38.29
^ Univ. of Nebraska A. E. S., Bui. 73, May, 1902, R. M. Allen, Gen.
Mgr. of Standard Cattle Co., pp. 19 and 20.
' Wisconsin A. E. S., Bui. 55, p. 29, Dec, 1896.
381] COST OF GROWING BEETS 123
The following explanation is quoted from the bulletin
from which this table was taken :
Mr. Allen has grown as high as 560 acres of beets in a
sing-le year. Not long- since he harvested an average of 15
tons of beets to the acre, from 500 acres of land. To aid in
this work, a trained beet grower was brought from Germany
and the best of German machinery for beet cultivation was
imported. Following the strictest business methods, Mr.
Allen keeps an account of each and every operation in the
beet field and this carefulness and accuracy makes his state-
ments unusually valuable and helpful at this time.
3. DATA FROM THE WRITER'S EXPERIENCE
In the few tables following are presented some of the
cost figures for beets grown by the writer in the Arkan-
sas Valley near Fowler, Colorado. The first four tables
(Nos. XXI-XXIV) present summaries of certain details
for three successive crops and the next two tables (Nos.
XXV and XXVI) show a somewhat further analysis of
the costs of one particular year. The writer does not
want to make too broad generalizations on the basis
of these figures but merely offers them for what they are
worth. Lack of space prevents the full explanation of
many facts affecting the various items of cost, but it is
believed that the data that are given here, together with
some additions that are put in the appendix, show more
fully and accurately than do any published reports which
the writer has been able to discover, just what factors
enter into these costs and in what proportion.^
These costs are probably about 20 per cent above the
average for the state. The official reports show that
these yields are approximately 40 per cent above the
state average. The greater cost is due principally to a
^ See further details and explanations in appendix to this chapter.
124 ^^^ BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [^82
somewhat greater amount of labor than is usually put on
the crop, hence this item of expense, which is generally
Table XXI. Cost of Growing Sugar Beets
(Comparison of three crops. — Average per acre. — Fowler, Colo.)
1905
(6 acres)
average.
Labor costs : }
Preparatory to plowing..
Plowing I
Harrowing J ^
Leveling and dragging. . I j
Removing alfalfa roots ....
Seeding j .83
Cultivating ' 4.32
2.16
1.88
1906 j 1907
(37 acres) | (61 acres)
average. | average.
Irrigating
Spraying ...
Thinning .. .
Hoeing . . .
Topping . . .
Pulling ...
Hauling . . .
Siloing ^ . . .
Supervision
2.46
(special)
7-37
3.19
7.11
2.23
8.43
.31
2.24
•72K
.50
.47
3-23)^
1.83
.65
7.60
2.36
9.27
1.84
8.93
.90
Sub-totals
Other costs :
Seed
Dump
Blacksmithing and re-
pairs
Miscellaneous expenses..
Implement depreciation
(estimated)
Interest, crop investment
(estimated)
Sub-totals
Totals $50.00
(42.02)^)
1.67
.60
•47
.58
3-33
C7.98)
1. 61
.93
I. II
•17
2.70
1-35
(7.87)
5?52.77
•54
3^40
1.99
.92
.41
3.36
2.97
7.28
3.34
9-73
2.41
7.87
2.24
•57
(44.90) ; (47-03
2.34
.78
1.87
.41
1.64
I.3I
(8.35)
j?55.38
Average of
the 3 previous
columns.
$4.06
2.75
•57
3.64
2.42
.22
7.42
2.96
8.70
2.16
8.41
'•i5
.19
(44^65)
1.87
•77
^•i5
•39
2.56
1.33
(8.07)
$S2.'J2
* DiiTerent parts of crops different years. Should be taken in con-
nection w^ith explanation in text. Does not represent cost of siloing
per acre, but average distributed over entire acreage.
' See explanation in text.
383]
COST OF GROWING BEETS
Table XXII. Cost of Growing Sugar Beets
125
(Division of expenses expressed in percentages of whole cost. Comparison of
three crops, Fowler, Colorado)
1905
(6 acres).
1906 ^
(37 acres).
1907
(61 acres).
Average of 3
preceding
columns.
Per cent, of whole cost.
Labor costs :
Hand labor (strictly) ..
Hand labor (with team,
not counting the team)
T'pam laV)nr ...........
42.23
22.22
19.60
15.95
43.81K
19.14)^
22.12
14.92
48.14
17.61
19.15
15.10
44.73
19.66
20.29
15-32
Other expenses (than labor)
100.
100.
100.
100.
Table XXIII. Same Costs Compared on a Different Basis
(Expressed in percentages of total cost)
Home forces, man . . •
Home forces, boy ....
Home forces, team . . .
Regular hands,bythe month
Regular hands, by the day.
Contract labor, Mexican
Contract labor, Indian
Contract labor, Japanese • •
Contract labor, white ^ . . . .
Expenses other than labor .
1905
(6 acres).
1906
(37 acres).
1907
(61 acres).
Average of 3
preceding
columns.
%
%
%
%
%
13.48
6.83
18.70
1.22
.79
3.50
19.6
22.12
17.57
19.76
5-7
12.69
10.51
9.63
3.8
4.38
7.17
5.12
10.6
30.35
22.11
21.02
....
1.49
•50
....
....
11.32
3.77
....
.81
7.12
2.64
15.95
14.92
15.10
15.32
100.
100.
100.
100.
^ Includes 1^3% for team in 1907.
126 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [384
Table XXIV. Comparisons of the Three Crops
Average yield, tons per acre ..
Average cost, dollars per acre^.
Average cost per ton of beets..
Average receipts per acre ^ . . . .
Average receipts per ton of
beets
Average price paid by sugar
company per ton beets
Average cost of growing beets
containing 100 pounds sugar.*
Average receipts per 100 pounds
sugar in beets ^
Average price per 100 pounds
sugar in beets paid by sugar
company
Average profits to grower^
Per acre
Per ton of beets
1905
(6 acres)
II
4
61
5
5
2
2
2,
II,
•95
,00
,18
■99
,19
•03
,00
48
40
99
01
1906 I 1907 , .
(37 acres). I (61 acres) .; ^""^"^^S^-
18.61
2.83
100.29
5-30
1.26
2.40
2.36
47.52
2.55
15.65
$55-38
3.54
84.60
540
5.36
1.59
243
2.41
29.22
1.66
15.40
$52.72
3.52
82.29
5-32
5-23
1.62
243
2.39
29.57
1.74
large, anyway, forms a greater proportion of the total
cost than is usual. As practically all the profits are in
the excess over the average yield per acre, this item is
probably considerably more above the average than is
the tonnage.
It is to be noted that none of these costs contain any-
thing for management, with an unimportant exception
for 1907. The writer is aware of the difficulty of making
an accurate and proper estimate, but believes that $2 per
acre for the larger crop of 1907, $3 for 1906 and $4 for
the small crop of 1905 are conservative for this item. In
making comparisons with humid countries, the annual
water rates should be added also, and they averaged
* Includes receipts for by-products.
' Based on average extraction in Colorado for the respective years.
• It should be noted that there are other charges to be added to costs
and deducted from profits. See explanation in text.
385]
COST OF GROWING BEETS
127
^8
<u o
-^ X "^
vg
< ^ eu
I
,— . O .0 qj
H Ml o 1^
O O CO
(4
Cost at
^1.40
per day.
8 8^8.888^^. :
: R
e2
Days.
S^"^^?^^^'' J
: ^
t^oo I
1.^ •
1) .
•g •' .
o .^
C/2
o
•w >>
a tj-^ vi
0 • u-iu^ .
. 0 .
. u-> . . . .
10 .
j_. t^HD
q • N cj .
. 0 .
. t^ . . . .
CJ .
a^i
! ^ I I I ^ I f< »^ I
.' cr* ;
• ....
f^ '.
=Wb
&.
«4-i .
0 M
• • • • • > •
. .
. • • • •
. >•
00 • fo rx .
. N .
m •
O* rt
. ....
CO •
1'^
rt O rt
vg
100 M ^ O t^mrot>.
O tfl
O rt
to N CO m
X
W)J2
c o
\=i o
15 m
b/3- C t^
2 o
s «
o o
: ^S
o o
G el
o o
M tUD M
b/0 bio ej
c - - - r^ " ^ C .S .S .S W) M M p' «- euo ^ cijo
.2 J5 2 S ^ -5 -g S.-^ :5 -^ o o o §- §--3 rt ^
a. !ll Q p:; c/: U h3 cJ: H HH!^EffiHHOsffic«
1^
HO
128 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [386
OTHER EXPENSES (1906 CROP)
Average
added expense
to each of
37 acres.
Paid to sugar company —
Use of dump at 5 cents a ton i$3443 3.93+
595 pounds seed at lo cents a pound 59-SO i'6l
Blacicsmithing and repairs —
Sharpening plows 6.80 .i8-f-
Horseshoeing 8.75 .24 —
Wagon tongues and repairs 10.00 .27
Miscellaneout repairs I5'62 .42
Spraying —
Apparatus and material 6.20 .17
Estimated —
Implement depreciation (estimated value, ^1800) . . 100.00 2.70-f-
Interest crop investment (approximate, $1^00) 50.00 i-35-|-
Total ;5529i.3o j$7.87
Table XXVI. Further Analysis of Labor Costs (1906 Crop) ^
Labor costs.
Hand labor
without team.
whole
cost.
40
Plowing
Harrowing
Dragging and leveling .....
Removing roots (Div. Est.)
Seeding '
Cultivating \
Irrigating (Div. Est. ) \ 57.95
Spraying ' 2.25
Thinning (regular labor) ] 18.55
Thinning, contract, white ! 7.75
Thinning, contract, Mexican . . . . i 248.30
Hoeing (regular labor) j 66.00
Hoeing, contract, white ; 9.45
.27
12.00 J
9-30 I
332.00 I
2.97
.11
.95
.40
12.72
3.38
.48
17.00
Hoeing, contract, Mexican..
Topping ( regular labor) .....
Topping, contract, Mexican.
Pufhng
Hauling (Div. Est.)
Hauling, loading 53.30 1 2.73
Siloing 33.25 i 1.70
Costs other than labor.
Working
with team."
$65.55
40.85
11.40
6.00
10.45
73-45
5-70
13.30
3.80
^of
whole
3.36
"si
•31
•54
3-76
.29
.68
.19
•95 .05
30.40 1.56
tI2.00 5.73
$855-50 1 43-8i>^ $373.85
I9.i4>^
Team.
i^of
whole
$95-20
42.00
15-40
7.00
7.00
46.20
4.20
8.40
3.80
4.87
2.15
•79
.36
a.37
.33
•43
.'4
37.80
165.20
1.94
8.46
i, total!
8.23
4.24
1.37
.93
90
6.13
3.48
1.22
Z.38)
.40 y
12.72J
.62 j
.57
17.00
3-50
14.19 j
373'
1.70
$431.90 92.13
85.08
X4.99
^ For similar analysis of costs for other years, see appendix.
' But not counting the teams' work in this column.
387] ^O^T OF GROWING BEETS 1 29
$1.31 per acre for 1905, $1.39 for 1906 and $1.50 for
1907. If these two items are included in the respective
average cost per acre for each year, the latter are as
follows :
Costs. Receipts. Profits.
1905 $55.31 $61.99 $6.68
1906 57.16 100.29 43.13
1907 58.88 84.60 25.72
Average $57.12 $82.29 $25.17
These figures do not contain any items of taxes, nor
of interest on capital invested in land.' The former
amounted to practically $.75, $.85 and $1.00 per acre for
the three years respectively.
4. SUMMARY REGARDING COST OF GROWING BEETS IN THE
UNITED STATES
From the facts that are available it is evident that the
farmers' costs of growing beets in the United States are
as various as those of the finished product to the manu-
facturer. We have cited costs ranging from $11.72 to
$108.86 per acre ; ^ the yields are from nothing to over 30
tons per acre, and even greater variations as to both
yields and costs could be cited. It is impossible to de-
termine with any degree of certainty the average cost for
the United States or for any single state, but the writer's
judgment is that in the humid states most of the actual
normal costs range near $30 to $35 per acre and in the
irrigated states $5 to 10 higher, not including rent for
^ Current rates of interests : Good farm loans, 7%, some 8%. Good
crop loans, chattels and commercial paper, 10%. Others of more
risk 1% to i^% a month. This farm was purchased in 1903 at
$62.50 per acre; appraised in 1908 at $125 per acre, and sold in 1910
at $153, though the latter figure covered substantial improvements.
* See Appendix.
130 T^HE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [388
the land, or interest on capital invested in the same.
The principal reasons for higher cost in the irrigated
states are costs of irrigation and higher wages, though
there are some additional considerations.
The figures cited indicate that the costs per acre in
New York are higher than in most of the other humid
beet-growing states, and also that the costs in Wiscon-
sin, Michigan and surrounding states are somewhat lower
than in the Nebraska section. But in every state there is
a great range of difference in costs, due to differences in
season, differences in condition of land, differences in
care and amount of work put upon the crop, differences
in distances from loading station, and the like.
It is probable that the average of the published reports
of growers' costs would not be quite so high as the esti-
mates made by the present writer. It is believed that a
majority of the reports are by better growers than the
average, and that they are usually for the more favorable
results of these growers. Naturally, few of the failures
are reported. For example, as regards the matter of
yield, few of the reports show a yield of less than 12 tons
per acre, and most of them are for 14 tons or more,
whereas the average yield of the United States for the
last ten years has been 9.675 tons,' the highest annual
average being 11.26 tons per acre in 1906. Even these
latter figures of the United States are apt to be mislead-
ing, for they are for harvested acreage and not for planted
acreage. The abandoned acreage was not reported in
full in the publications of the United States Department
of Agriculture prior to 1906. Since that time it has
varied from 5.2 per cent to 13.4 per cent, with an aver-
age of 9.02 per cent. If this was the average for the last
1 Crop Reporter, Oct., 191 1, U. S. Dept. of Agr.
389] COST OF GROWING BEETS 13 1
ten years, the average yield per acre planted has been
8.794 tons.
Another source of error tending to make the costs re-
ported by farmers too low is the fact that they seldom
keep complete and accurate accounts and most of the
costs which they give indicate that they are estimates
rather than actual records as regards a number of the
important items. It is well known by those acquainted
with farmers that, in making such reports, they have a
tendency to omit, or underestimate, a great many of the
factors of cost, notably the labor of themselves, of mem-
bers of their families and of their teams, costs of board
and lodging for hired labor, depreciation of implements
and all other items that do not cause a direct outlay of
cash for the particular purpose in hand. A typical
illustration of this was given the writer by a farmer
who told of how much he had received for a bunch of
fat hogs and claimed that it was all "clear money" (net
profits) as he raised both the hogs and the corn to fatten
them on his own farm, without hired labor. Errors of
the latter class are probably greater and more frequent
in reports from the Central States than in those from the
Western, because the average beet acreage per farmer is
smaller and more of the labor is done by home forces.
However, there is some contract work in the humid states
and, on the other hand, a good deal of work by home
forces on many small beet fields of the West.
According to data already given, the experience of the
writer has been that over two-fifths of the cost of pro-
ducing beets has been hand labor working without a
team, and nearly another fifth, hand labor aided by a
team, and over another fifth, the labor of the team ; that
is, on an average, 64.39 per cent of the costs of raising
132 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [390
beets was wages,' and the combined cost of laborers and
teams was 84.68 per cent. This indicates the importance
of the rate of wages and efficiency of labor in the cost of
producing beets.
The accompanying table gives the wages for all of the
beet-growing states (and others, for comparison) and
shows that the Central States have a decidedly lower
wage rate than most of the Western States. For ex-
ample, Michigan, which is the largest beet producer of
the humid states, has a wage rate of only two-thirds of
that of Colorado and California, the largest producers of
the irrigated section.
However, the greater cost in the irrigated sections has
been somewhat counterbalanced by greater yields, though
the prices paid for most of the beets in the Central States
appear to have been higher than in the Western States,
where the average sugar content has been about the
same, except that it has been higher in California than
elsewhere.
It has been calculated in an earlier part of this study
that the average price paid for beets in the United
States has risen from $4.10 in 1897 to $5.30 in 1909, and
it is now probably not far from $5.50 per short ton. It
has also been shown that the average yield for the past
ten years has been 9.675 tons per acre harvested and
8.794 tons per acre planted. If allowances are made for
expenses on the abandoned acreage, taking into consid-
eration the fact that part of it might have been utilized
^ Not including water assessments, taxes, rent or interest on land.
It has been pointed out that the labor costs in this particular case
are probably higher than the average, perhaps by 15% or 20% of the
total cost of growing, but they are the only definite figures of such
costs available, and, after due allowances are made, justify the con-
clusions which are based upon them in this study.
391 ] COST OF GROWING BEETS 133
in growing later crops so that its use was not entirely
lost, we have an approximate real average yield of 9 tons
per acre. At an average price of $5 per ton, a price
which the Secretary of Agriculture estimates was not
reached till 1905,' the average returns would have been
only $45 per acre, and to-day, at $5.50, about $50. Where
a fourth or a fifth of the crop, or its equivalent in cash,
has been paid for rent, as has usually been the case ac-
cording to the writer's observation and information, there
has been left about $35 to $40, an amount just about suf-
ficient to cover the average of other costs of production.
In California the average yield has been about 10 tons,^
which at $5 would mean a return of $50 per acre ; in Col-
orado, about loj tons, which at $5 would be a return of
$52.50; in Idaho, about 9J tons, which at $4.50 would
be $42.75 ; in Utah, about 124 tons, which at $4.50
would be $55.12; in Michigan, about 7J tons, which at
$6.16 would be $46.25; in Wisconsin, about 9^ tons,
which at $5.79 would be $55; and in " other states"
about 8 tons, which at $5 would be $40.3
^ Sen. Doc. 22, p. 16, 6ist Cong., ist Sess.
^ Owing to lack of uniformity in keeping and publishing records,
it is impossible to give exact figures. The annual reports on the
beet-sugar industry published from 1898 to 1909 (with a few excep-
tions) give a lo-year average for the U. S. as a whole as regards sev-
eral items but only a 7-year average (1904-10) of state averages and
only a 4-year record (1906-09) of acreage abandoned in each state.
The average yields per acre and per cent of acreage abandoned ac-
cording to these averages are as follows: California, 10.65 tons,
11% abandoned; Colorado, 11. 15 tons, 7.9% abandoned; Idaho, 9.73
tons, 5.6% abandoned; Michigan, 8.09 tons, 9.6% abandoned; Ne-
braska, (3-yr. av.), 8.75 tons, 10.2% (i yr.) abandoned; Utah, 12.44
tons, 3% abandoned ; Wisconsin, 9.93 tons, 8% abandoned ; " Other
States" (including Nebraska) 8.76 tons, 12.3% abandoned; average
for U. S., 9.675 tons, 9.02% abandoned.
' These prices are the ones calculated in a previous chapter of this
134 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [392
This indicates that, on the whole, the average returns
almost parallel the average costs, but if the statistics of
yields, costs, prices, and wages which we have cited and
estimated are to be relied upon, it appears that Wiscon-
sin, Michigan and Utah offer more opportunity for profit
to the grower than the other large producing states.
The states having single factories are grouped in such a
way that little can be told about them. It should be
noted that Wisconsin, which seems to show the highest
returns over cost, has a comparatively small acreage.
We may conclude, then, that on the whole, practically
all the direct profits in beet raising in the United States
are those of growers and owners of land who get more
than average returns. The profits and losses of growing
beets increase, not in proportion to the size of the crop,
but approximately in proportion as the yields are above
or below the average. Though we have had no adequate
investigation as a basis for conclusive statements, the in-
formation that we do possess indicates that large profits
have been made by many individual growers and com-
paratively large profits in some considerable sections and
that these have resulted in increasing the price of land ;
that is, profits have been capitalized. But in view of the
great increase of land values all over the United States
in the last decade, it is doubtful if as much of the increase
in beet-growing states can be attributed to the sugar
industry as some think.'
study and are probably considerably higher than the average of the
last ten years, but 15 or 20 cents per ton below the present average.
They are for prices about 1909.
^ According to bulletins issued by the U. S. Census Bureau, the in-
crease in total farm land values (not including buildings) from 1900
to 1910 was 117.4%; in average value per acre, 108.7%. Respective
averages for some of the beet-growing states were as follows :
Michigan, 45.3% and 34.7%; Colorado, 301.6%. and 181.0%; Cahfornia,
393] COST OF GROWING BEETS 1 35
5. COMPARISON WITH GERMAN AGRICULTURAL COSTS
It is interesting, as well as suggestive, to compare
some data of German agricultural costs with those of
United States costs. The two following tables are
taken from a study of one hundred and forty German
estates' and most of the costs are five-year averages.
The exceptions, which are three-year averages, are noted.
In the first table we have selected each tenth estate to
give an idea of the normal range of costs ; in the second
table we have presented estates in which some item of
cost or return was highest or lowest.
It should be noted that the average yield of 13.83
short tons reported here is very near the average yield of
109% and 116%; Utah, 147.9% and 200.3%; Idaho, 519.8% and
276.1%. Less important beet-growing states: Arizona, 271% and
475-8%; Illinois, 104.1% and 105.8%; Iowa, 123% and 127.2%; Minne-
sota, 82.2% and 72.8%; Montana, 330.6% and 276.2%; New York,
28.4% and 32% ; Oregon, 263.9% and 213.7%. Some non-beet-growing
states: Missouri, 107.9% and 104.3%,; Kansas, 189% and 177.6%;
Nevada, 165.7% and i5i-3%; Indiana, 93-2%, and 96%; South Dakota,
377-1% and 249.7%; North Dakota, 321.3% and 130.4%; Massachu-
setts, 21.4% and 32.8% ; New Jersey, 33% and 46.8% ; Pennsylvania.
9.6% and 14.2%.
Kansas and Nevada now grow beets, but none which were reflected
in the values much before 1910.
In the first place, on account of its small size, the beet industry
probably affected these average values comparatively little in most
states. In states where the industry is of larger proportions there
has been much increase in land values, but this same increase has been
characteristic of non-beet-growing states in the same section. See the
agricultural bulletins for each of the states, 13th Census, 1910, pub.
191 1 and 1912.
1 Die Produktionskosten unserer wichtigsten Feldfruchte by Dr. W.
H. Howard, Professor in the University of Leipzig. (Berlin, 1908.)
The substitution of American terms for German equivalents is that of
the present writer. These figures are for the years preceding the
first publication in 1901. The author says that recent costs are a
little higher but that the ones given are the more normal.
136 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [394
the empire as officially reported in the Quarterly of the
German Imperial Statistical Office, namely, 13.40 tons
for the decade ending 1900, and 13.13 tons for the suc-
ceeding decade. The average cost per acre ($51.20, not
including delivery to factory) for these estates is higher
than that for the United States and it is seen that there
is also an average loss of $2.32 per acre on account of
live-stock which should be charged to cost of beets, as
the main purpose of handling this stock is to return the
by-products of the beets to the land.
The average price received for beets on these estates
was $4.59 per short ton and this gave a profit of only
$.13 per ton, or $1.80 per acre. If the price received
had been the German average for the past five years,
there would have been an actual loss of $.07 per ton, or
$.97 per acre. If it had been the German average for the
five-year period which is covered by this study, there
would have been a loss of $.70 per ton, or $9.68 per acre.
If, from the total cost of $5 1.20 per acre, we deduct the
item of ** Rent, Taxes and Drainage," we have a remain-
ing cost of $42.12 per acre, which is probably about $10
above the average for the United States.' Of this
amount, over 40 per cent is spent for fertilizer, an item
which occupies no such prominence in the United States,
and only about 45 per cent is spent for labor and other
items combined in the term '* other costs"; whereas, on
the one series of crops in the United States, of which we
have kept records of such percentages, the labor of
hands (not counting teams) averaged 64.39 P^^ cent
and the labor, counting teams, 84.68 per cent of the
cost. In other words, the labor cost per acre in the
1 It is to be remembered that cost of hauling is omitted.
395]
COST OF GROWING BEETS
137
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397] <^OST OF GROWING BEETS 139
United States' is much greater than in Germany. As
the Germans get about 50 per cent more sugar per acre
than the Americans,^ the agricultural labor cost per 100
pounds of sugar is very much less than in the United
States, approximately only half as much.
Although, on the average, the German grower gets
$.50 to $.75 per ton less for his beets than the American
grower, he gets about $7 or $8 more per acre, on ac-
count of greater yield, and the sugar in the beet costs
the German factory about $.50 to $.80 less per 100 pounds
of granulated sugar, owing to lower price per ton and
higher sugar content of beets. ^
^ it will be remembered that the labor cost in this instance was higher
than the average for the U. S., probably by 15% or 20% of the total
cost of growing.
22299 lbs. for U. S., ten-year average ending campaign year 1910-11,
3575 lbs. for Germany, ten-year average beginning one year earlier and
calculating 90% of yield of raw sugar for yield of refined. See official
Annual Reports for both countries, particularly U. S. Crop Reporter,
Oct., 191 1, and Vierteljahreshefte zur Statistik des Deutschen Reichs,
1910, Part IV, pp. 147 et seq.
^ That this great difference in labor cost of producing beets and
consequent actual cost of raw material to the factory is due mostly
to the difference in wages in the two countries scarcely admits of
doubt in view of the figures that have been presented. While we have
no adequate figures on German agricultural wages (real wages) and
the comparative efficiency and actual cost of this labor, we do know
that nominal agricultural wages in the U. S. are several times what
they are in Germany. While it is certainly true that the highly paid
American beet-field labor is more efficient than the low-price German
labor, it is also certain that this efficiency, together with the use of
m.achines that have been invented up to the present time, is not suffi-
cient to overcome the low costs due to low German wages. An
adequate investigation of this phase of the subject would be a very
large undertaking, too large to include in this study.
Agricultural costs as calculated by some other German authorities
are given below for the purpose of comparison with American costs
and German costs already cited.
Chr. Grotewold in Die Zuckerindustrie, p. 126, (Stuttgart, 1907)
I40 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [398
gives itemized costs for Saxony, Silesia and West Prussia which
total $72.30, $52.05, and $59.77 per acre, respectively. He says that
the yield is 25 to 50 metric tons, with an average of about 33^ tons
of beets, or 5 tons of raw sugar per hectar, and that the income, count-
ing receipts for molasses, tops and pulp, is about 900 marks ($86.76
per acre). He gives the manufacturing cost for factories working
100,000 metric tons of beets per campaign at 60 pf. per 100 kg. beets
($1,296 per short ton of beets. This is probably meant for producing
raw sugar, not including refining).
H. Claassenand W. Bartz (Die Zuckerfabrikation, Berlin, 1905, p. 13)
give itemized costs the totals of which in American equivalents are
as follows :
Magdeburg, $71.13 per acre (official report of yield for 1906-07,
14.87 short tons) ; Breslau, $49.02 (yield, 13.30 tons) ; West Prussia,
$58.15 (12.42 tons) ; Halle, $67.15. They quote Vibraus Wenhausen for
Hanover at $67.60 and Plehn for West Prussia at $56.71, the average
of the six being $61.62 per acre.
See also Hermann Birschel's Die Bedeutung der Briisseler Zucker-
Konvention, p. 58 (Berlin, 1909), and Theodor Schuchart's Die
V olkswirtschaftliche Bedeutung der technischen Entwicklung der
deutschen Zuckerindustrie (Leipzig, 1908).
Bui. no. 38 of the Nebraska Agr. Exp. Station (p. 123) contains a
translation of a report of Dr. Max Hollrung which gives a com-
parison of Nebraskan and German costs, the totals of the latter being
$48.28 per acre for Thuringia, $65.51 for Magdeburg, and $71.26 for
Jrialle.
Chapter VI. Possible Improvements and Indirect
Advantages
We have considered some of the direct costs of beet-
sugar production and have seen that there is no great
direct profit to the American grower in the average crop.
We have seen also that Germany, the most advanced of
beet-sugar countries, gets 50 per cent more sugar per
acre than the United States and, furthermore, that the
manufacturers of that country secure their raw material
considerably cheaper than those of this country. This
great advantage on the agricultural side of the industry
is practically the only important one in which our pro-
ducers are surpassed by theirs, and it naturally raises
questions of possible improvements and indirect advan-
tages. By the very nature of the case, answers to such
questions cannot be certain and definite, but some con-
sideration of possibilities and probabilities may be sug-
gestive of important advances.
I. POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS
According to Mr. C. O. Townsend,' the use of im-
proved cultural methods, fertilizers, systems of rotation
^ " Methods of reducing the cost of producing beet sugar," Yearbook,
U. S. Dept. of Agr., 1906, • pp. 265-278. Mr. Townsend was at that
time pathologist in charge of sugar-beet investigations of the U. S.
Bur. of Plant Industry. He has since been employed by the U. S.
Sugar and Land Co. of Garden City, Kan. Several of the improve-
ments considered later in this paper are mentioned by Mr. Townsend,
though they came originally from various other sources.
399] 141
142 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [400
and selection may so increase the size and quality of the
yield as to make it
entirely possible to obtain three times as much sug-ar per acre
as is produced on the average acre at the present time. For ex-
ample, the present averag^e yield of beets per acre in the United
States is about 10 tons, and the percentage of sugar actually
extracted and refined does not exceed 12, ' making the average
yield of sugar per acre approximately 2400 lbs. Yields of
more than 30 tons of beets per acre are sometimes obtained,
and yields of more than 20 tons are common. From 20 to 25
per cent of sugar in beets has been reported so frequently that
it is safe to assume that an average sugar content of 18 per
cent is within the limits of possibility. If an average yield of
20 tons per acre and an average sugar content of 18 per cent
could be reached, we would have an average yield of 7,200
pounds of sugar per acre.'^
a. Seed Selection and Breeding
There are several improvements which may be obtained
through seed selection and breeding. Nearly all Ameri-
can beets are grown from seed imported from Europe,
and it is said that sometimes we get the best seed on
the market and sometimes the poorest. There have been
1 This was written in 1906-1907. The report for 1909 gives the
average for that year at 12.56%. See Report 92, U. S. Dept. of Agr.
The 1910 extraction was 12.61%. Crop Reporter, Oct. 191 1.
* Even considerably higher yields than this are sometimes reported.
' Mr. Townsend would not argue, probably, that we are apt to reach
this figure in the near future. The present writer would not, at
any rate. By similar illustrations we could show the possibility of
trebling the United States' average yields of almost all of our import-
ant crops. But this does not make against the validity of the state-
men quoted and of the possibility of great improvements. One trouble
with many estimates is that they go far beyond probabilities. When
it comes to possibilities, few careful scientists are willing to set limits,
especially if indefinite time is assumed.
40 1 ] POSSIBLE IMPRO VEMENTS 1 43
frequent charges that officials of the factories, who nearly
always bind their growers to purchase seed from them,
are tempted to buy low-priced seed for the sake of direct
profits, even at the cost of reduced yields. It is also
charged that factories paying the grower a fiat price per
ton sell seed which will produce small, but high sugar-
content beets. It is impossible to determine the exact
facts in the case, but it is known that there has been
some friction between grower and factory on this ac-
count. It is known, further, that seed should be adapted
to soil and climate and, to secure the best results, should
be produced in the country where the beets are to be
grown, or in one very nearly like it. Authorities claim
that European growers have paid a great deal of atten-
tion to this but the American factories comparatively
little, and that the latter send to humid Michigan, arid
and temperate Colorado, and arid and subtropical Cali-
fornia practically the same seed, regardless of its source.
There have been a few efforts to grow seed in the United
States, some of them fairly successful, but most of them
have been given up when serious difficulties were en-
countered. But the recent European crop shortage will
probably handicap the American industry very seriously
for a year or two and may bring about an effective at-
tempt to produce home-grown seed in order to avoid
such occurrences in the future. This is one of the most
promising fields of improvement and it is to be regretted
that it has not already been developed more than it has.
Another thing that is being attempted through seed
breeding is the production of varieties which will mature
earlier and thus permit longer seasons for factory opera-
tion and require a smaller part of the crop to be siloed.
The most radical thing that is being attempted in seed
selection and breeding is the development of a single-
144 ^^^ BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [402
germ seed. The seeds now used contain two to seven
individual seeds welded into one mass, or compound seed.
The young plants grow closely together, often twisted
around one another, so that they can be thinned only by
laborious hand work, which is usually done in the West
by Mexicans, Japanese, Russians, Indians and Hindus,
crawling on their hands and knees under a broiling sun.
The theory is that sprouts coming from single-germ seeds
could be spaced a few inches apart and thinned by ma-
chinery, at least the superfluous plants could be chopped
out with hoes without requiring the laborer to crawl on
the ground and separate each cluster with his fingers.
Experiments have been carried on for several years by
the Department of Agriculture of the United States and
the published reports give hopes of success, but there
are many difiliculties to be overcome that have not been
dwelt upon in these reports, and some of those who
should know most of the prospects of success in this di-
rection are not so optimistic as one might infer from the
reports. However, the attempt seems worth making
and, if it should be successful, it would reduce one of the
largest costs in beet production, possibly by $3 to $5
per acre.
b. Invention and Use of Machinery
The three most expensive operations in raising beets
are thinning, topping, and hauling, the latter including
loading. They are about equally expensive, together
amounting to nearly half of the entire cost of raising
beets and each averaging about $6 to $8 per acre. We
have just mentioned an effort to reduce the thinning
cost, all of which is hand labor. Topping and loading
are also hand labor, almost exclusively, but fortunately
there seems to be reasonable prospect of getting machines
403] POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS 145
that will do a great part of this work. A number of in-
ventions which promise ultimate success, have already-
been made.' A successful machine which would pull, top
and load the beets ought to reduce the cost by $4 to $7
per acre, though this reduction will be gradual and will
reach the higher figure only after several years of im-
provements, Improvements have already been made in
the use of other farm implements, as for example, the
substitution of two and four-row cultivators for one-row
implements.
c. Utilization of By-products
A better utilization of by-products is being brought
about, but there is an exceedingly great waste here that
can be saved. Much that is not absolutely wasted could
be put to more profitable uses. The more general own-
ership and breeding of stock by the small farmers of the
West^ would probably provide the means for a much
more profitable utilization of some of the by-products
and, at the same time, help to maintain and restore the
fertility of the soil and make possible more frequent and
more profitable beet crops.
The great forage crop of the irrigated sections of the
West is alfalfa, but it bloats cattle and sheep so badly
that it is very dangerous to pasture it, hence the farmers
of the irrigated sections (and they form the great ma-
jority of the substantial farmers in Colorado,. Utah and
surrounding states) do not keep anything like the amount
of stock that they would if it were not for this bloating.
If some discovery or substitution which would overcome
^ See Amer. Sugar Ind. mid Beet Sugar Gazette, Sept., 191 1, p. 410,
relative to Sandberg Beet Harvester Co., Odgen, Utah.
' Good stock as distinguished from the poor grade cattle which run
on the semi-arid ranges.
146 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [404
this great disadvantage could be made, there would be a
reaction upon many phases of agriculture, including the
growing of beets.' This is only one example of the indi-
rect and complex matters involved.
d. Crop Rotation
Probably one of the greatest opportunities for improve-
ment is in crop rotation. Too many American farmers
grow three or four, or even more, crops of beets, one
after the other, on the same land. It has been said that
sugar removes no fertility from the soil, as it is entirely
a product of sun and air. Though this is true of sugar,
it is not true of sugar beets, and most good European
farmers seldom grow two successive beet crops on the
same land.
The following table "^ will enable one to form an idea of
the comparative amounts of important elements drawn
from the soil and the air by beets and other products.
All of these crops draw these elements from the soil
except alfalfa, which gets a great deal from the atmos-
phere and thus puts more nitrogen into the soil than it
removes.
It is seen that beets are about as exhausting as corn
and somewhat more so than wheat and oats, though it
should be observed that the amounts given above are not
normal yields for an acre, the discrepancy being less for
* It might very conceivably zo increase the price of alfalfa as to
decrease the sowings of beets, though it would tend to make their cost
of production less except as it would raise the price of land. It does
not seem that this difficulty ought to be insurmountable. The over-
coming of it would mean millions of dollars to states which are
producers of alfalfa.
' Alvin Keyser, Prof, of Agronomy, State Agricultural College, Fort
Collins, Colorado, in Amer. Sugar Industry and Beet Sugar Gazette,
Jan., 191 1, p. 31. Similar analyses may be found in many places,
e. g., Wis. Agr. Exp. Sta. Bui. 123, p. 48 (1905).
405] POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS 147
Table XXX. Elements Drawn from Soil by Various Crops
Nitrogen. Phosphorus.
T3 I jj
O ! J?
CL, I >
50 bushels wheat i 96 $14.40 16
100 bushels oats
100 bushels corn
20 tons beets
4 tons alfalfa
1,000 lbs. fat cattle . . .
97 14.55 16
1 48 1 22.20 23
$0.
ICO
200
25
1,000 lbs. hogs iSj
10,000 lbs. milk
400 lbs. butter .
57
0.8
15.00
i
30.00
3.75,
2.7o|
8.55I
O.I2| 0.2
Potassium.
a ;
pi 1
^ i
58^
68:
71!
157!
i
192}
1
^1
i!
12
0.1
;?348
4.08
4.26
9.42
5.76
.06
.06
.72
.01
Total value.
•a S-
I'-
J5518.56 1^24.00
I
19.1I] 25.00
i
27.151 35.00
24.96' 32.00
36.30
4.02
2.85
9.48
.14
48.00
5-35
390
12.50
.19
beets than for the cereals. However, these figures show
the necessity for rotation.
Successive beet crops on the same land not only ex-
haust the soil and lower the quality and tonnage of beets
but they also frequently result in the introduction and
perpetuation of diseases. This is one of the serious diffi-
culties now being encountered in some localities in the
West, and sugar companies, unable to cope with the
problem, have appealed to the government for assistance.
On the whole, better cultural methods and rotation are
among the most pressing needs, and probably promise
more immediate improvements than can be secured by
any other practical means.'
* The effect of beet culture upon yields of other crops will be dis-
cussed under indirect advantages, a few pages later.
148 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [406
e. Manufacturing Wastes
These are only some of the improvements which have
particular reference to the agricultural end of the indus-
try. The manufacturing phases of the industry in the
United States are upon much more ef^cient bases than
the agricultural operations but even here there are
possibilities of reducing the cost. The average extrac-
tion of sugar is not what it should be, if the reports sent
by the companies to the United States Department of
Agriculture are to be relied upon and the factories are in
operation too small a proportion of the year to secure
the maximum returns from the fixed capital and over-
head expenses. Great improvements should be made in
the preparation and disposition of by-products in the
case of some factories. There is also room for improve-
ment as regards the relations between grower and fac-
tory in some sections, but, generally, the sugar com-
panies show an enlightened interest in the growers and
co-operate with them in many ways. Though nearly
every one of these problems is very difficult of satis-
factory solution, gradual progress is being made in most
of them.
2. INDIRECT ADVANTAGES
Very closely related to the subject of improvements is
that of indirect advantages which must be taken into con-
sideration in forming any adequate estimate of the pres-
ent and future values of the United States beet-sugar in-
dustry. Among the most important of these is the effect
of beet culture upon the yields of succeeding crops.
a. European Agricultural Investigations
Though no comprehensive and scientific investigation
of this matter has been made in America, a number ot
careful studies have been published in Europe and they
40?]
POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS
149
present some striking facts that few Americans seem to
have thought of; at least, they have not realized their sig-
nificance.' Following are two series of ten-year averages
of yields on the same estate, the first being for the ten-
year period in which no beets were grown, and the sec-
ond for the immediately following ten-year period when
beets were used in rotation with the other crops.
Table XXXI. Yields of Cereals, With
AND Without Beet Rotation*
1855-1864.
Wheat.
Rye.
Barley.
Oats.
Peas.
Rape.
Potatoes.
Without beet
rotation.
Kilos per hectare. ..
1,965
1,730
1,580
1,450
1.408
1,339
11,200
Pounds per acre
i»7S3
1.543
1,410
1,294
1,256
1,195
9,993
1865-1874.
With beets in
rotation.
Kilos per hectare . . .
2,184
1,680
2,030
1,600
1,408
1,296
13,000
Pounds per acre
1,949
1,499
1,811
1,428
1,256
1,156
11,598
Dr. Humbert showed that the law of diminishing
returns or increasing costs did not operate so far as
results for these estates were concerned, the cost to pro-
duce " 100 kg. Kornwerth'' (220.46 lbs.) on beet-grow-
* We can present only a few brief extracts here. Any interested
student should see the original sources cited.
' Gustav Humbert, A grarstatistische Untersuchungen iiber den Ein-
Huss des Zuckerriibenbaues auf die Land- und Volkswirtschaft unter
besonderer Beriicksichtigung der Provinz Sachsen. In Sammlung na-
tionalokonomischer und statistischer Abhandlungen des staatwissen-
schaftlichen Seminars zu Halle a. d. S. herausgeben Dr. Johann Con-
rad, Jena, 1877-1893, pp. 29 et seq. A very careful study.
I50
THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY
[408
Table XXXII. Comparison of io-Year Average Yields of 35 German
Estates Containing 12,792 Hectares (about 30,000 Acres)'
PQ
P^
Average of 29 estates using
beets in their crop rotation. , ;
Kilos per hectare 2420 1890 2460 217611970:1424 14302
Pounds per acre 2159 1686 2195 1941I1758 1270 1276c
Average of 6 similar estates
without beet rotation
Kilos per hectare
Pounds per acre
Excess of yield of beet-grow-
ing over non-beet-growing
estates
Kilos per hectare
Pounds per acre
Per cent
2089 1786 1908J1546 ii3i|i200 13420
1864 1593 170211379:1009; 1071 1 1973
331 104 552 630 839; 224 882
295 93 493 562 7491 I99 7^7
: ■ i :
15.8 5.8| 28.9 40.7; 74.2! 18.6 6.5
32414! 2090
2891911865
By reducing all to terms of rye Q' Kornwerth")^ Dr. Humbert arrived at the
following yields :
Average for the estates with beet rotation, 3096 kg. per ha. (2762 lbs. per acre).
Average for the estates without beet rotation, 215 1 kg. per ha. (1919 lbs. per
acre) .
ing estates being 13.6 marks ($3.23) ; for non-beet-
growing estates, 14 marks ($3.33) with a net profit of
5.2 marks ($1.24) on the former and 5 marks ($1.19) on
the latter.
The following extract is taken from another investiga-
tion : "
1 Humbert, op. cit., p. 26. Great care was taken to select estates
that were fairly comparable. See original study for details.
^Einiiuss des Zuckerriihenhaues auf die Landwirtschaft unter
hesonderer Beriicksichtigung einiger im Furstenthum Calenhurg gele-
genen Giiter, doctor's dissertation by Richard Woge, Univ. of Leipzig,
1892, pp. 23-34.
409]
POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS
151
Table XXXIII. Comparison of Crop Yields on Beet-Growing and Non-
Beet-Growing Farms
(In pounds per acre)
c 0.2
o t-»^
«3 00 «^
^ ^^ v<
Oh ^%
Q I-. W
Rye i 2,338
Wheat : 2,427
Oats ; 2,309
Barley i 1,829
Summer wheat ; • • . •
Beans and peas '
Beans i>945
Peas I 1,338
Mixed grain \ ....
Buckwheat ,
Rape j ....
Potatoes j 12,392
Stock beets j ....
Sugar beets | 30,370
Beet seed I ....
no -t;
.2 ^
2,677
2,677
2,855
2,409
11,152
29,442
isS si
4J
>> rt 5
Jr: <y
rt '0' 0
2^g
i ^?-2
oTT^tJ
rt^
; ^^B
<uOO 0
^00 V-
in .,
CS W4-.
c ^-^ —
(0 ■*
1 « (U (U
^ <" 0
^ r^-
1 ^ tCXi
c 2 cu
Svg^S
0 <U ■'-•
l^-s
1)00 i!
•^ > "s:
S ^— ' 0
i S « ^
g rt CS
jO
PQ
J5
2,419
2,282
1,588
2,654
2,475
1,472
' 2,310
2,409
1,975
2,088
1,113
....
1,270
1.667 !
2,067
2,005
i»755
1,711
....
823 1
1
1,784
! ....
2,438
1,162
1 M.275
14,275
13,112 1
27,961
27,832
30,307
2,614
1
43.1
68.1
21.9
8.9
Numerous other similar tables in this and other studies
could be cited, but these are sufficient to indicate some-
thing of the great indirect benefits of beet culture in this
one direction. The results of the German investigations
have been put in a striking manner in somewhat the fol-
lowing form :
Given, two large adjacent estates, equal in size and
quality. On one of them grow the ordinary cereals and
other crops for a series of ten years, rotating them in the
most approved manner, but growing no beets. On the
other estate put three-tenths of the land in beets every
year and grow the same cereals in the same proportions
152 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [410
as7upon the first estate, though, of course, devoting to
them only seven-tenths of the acreage used on the first
estate. The sum of the yields for the ten years will
show that the second estate produced as great or greater
quantity of cereals and other crops on seven-tenths of its
area as the first estate on the whole of its area, and that
the second estate produced, in addition, a large tonnage
of beets upon three-tenths of its area each year.
b. United States Data Bearing on the Subject
Practically all that is known in the United States about
the effect of beet culture on yields of other crops is gen-
eral impression and unconfirmed opinion. In 1909 the
Secretary of Agriculture published a number of general
statements to show the beneficial effects of beet grow-
ing and the influences upon the prices of land, most of
the data being taken from an Agricultural Department
bulletin by George K. Holmes.' The following tables are
taken from this report of the Secretary of Agriculture :
Table XXXIV. Increase in Value of Medium Farms, 1900-1905 '
All medium Medium
farms. sugar-beet farms.
California 27.4% 42.4%
Colorado 55-3^ 112.5%
Utah 38.1% 36.0%
Nebraska 54.0% 67. %
Michigan 22.3 % 20.7 %
Comparative Increase in Value of Irrigated Land in Medium Farms,
I 900- I 905
General Sugar-beet
farming. farms.
California 27.2% 42.5%
Colorado 47-8% 118.0%
Utah 33.4% 35.6%
* Bulletins 43 and 44, both of the Bureau of Statistics and concerning
conditions affecting, and changes in, farm values, 1900-1905.
' 6ist Cong. 1st Sess., Sen. Doc. 22, pp. 17-23.
41 1 ] POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS 1 53
Other interesting data have been presented by Mr.
T. G. Palmer,' but most of them are in terms too general
to have much scientific value. However, there is no
doubt that the physical benefits to the soil through the
deep plowing and thorough cultivation required for suc-
cessful beet growing are of great importance. During
the past year the government began, in a small way,
some preliminary experim.ents in co-operation with the
United States Sugar and Land Co. of Garden City,
Kansas, in order to determine the lines to be followed
in more extensive rotation experiments planned for en-
suing years. This work should be done upon a compre-
hensive scale and, not only in co-operation with sugar
companies, but also in co-operation with many farmers.
Methods similar to those follow^ed by Messrs. Parker and
Cooper in Minnesota as regards costs of the agricultural
products of that state and further adapted to the prob-
lems in hand could be used to secure really valuable
data."
Although we have not, at present, comprehensive sci-
entific studies of the effects of beets in rotation in the
United States, we have sufficient data to suggest that
the benefits in this direction alone are worthy of ascer-
taining, and that they may be great enough to offset
numerous disadvantages.
c. Other Indirect Advantages
A very important advantage accompanying the intro-
1 See such pamphlets as Sen. Doc. no. 79, 62d Cong., ist Sess. (July
25, 191 1 ) on the Indirect Beneiits of Sugar-Beet Culture and The
Sugar-Beet Industry as Affecting Amer. Agriculture, pub. by Beet
Sugar Gazette Co., Chicago, 1909. Mr. Palmer represents the inter-
ests of the Association of U. S. Beet Sugar Mfrs.
' See Bui. 73, Bureau of Statistics, U. S. Dept. of Agr. (1909).
154 ^^^ BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [412
duction of the sugar-beet industry is the educational
effect. Successful beet raising requires more careful and
scientific management than general farming as usually
practised. Every beet-sugar factory employs a corps of
agriculturists who spend most of the growing season
visiting the beet fields and advising the farmers, not only
as to their beet crops, but also as to crops that should
be grown in rotation, and, incidentally, they give many
suggestions in regard to all sorts of farm problems. It
has been claimed that every sugar factory is a kind of
agricultural college and there is no doubt that it greatly
improves and stimulates the agricultural efBciency of
nearly every community it enters.'
The mere furnishing of an additional crop which has
a certain market at a certain cash price is no small con-
sideration in estimating the value of the beet-sugar in-
dustry. This is especially true in western states where
agriculture is carried on under widely different condi-
tions from those in the older, humid and less elevated
states, and most western agriculture may be said to be
as yet in the experimental state.
Furthermore, the soil needs to be broken up and cul-
tivated occasionally. The raising of corn furnishes the
opportunity to do this on a large scale in the Mississippi
Valley but this crop does not thrive so well in the cool
nights of the higher altitudes such as those in many
parts of the West, and beets have been found to be one
of the most successful substitutes. It is sometimes
asked if turnips, garden vegetables, and some other root
' It is true that numerous complaints have been made to the effect
that the sugar companies' agriculturists are not practical farmers.
No doubt there has been some ground for these complaints in many
cases, but on the whole the writer is convinced that they have been
helpful.
413] POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS 155
crops would not serve cultural purposes as well as beets,
both as regards cleaning the ground of the noxious
weeds and as regards the beneficial effects upon succeed-
ing crops. This is probably approximately true but
there is no market for such crops in sparsely populated
states sufficient to justify their being grown on a large
scale, whereas there is a certain market at a predeter-
mined price for all the sugar beets that can be produced.
Many sections in the West are rather handicapped
through lack of sufBcient diversity of satisfactory crops
and the beet crop fills a real need.
Again, the by-products are worth more in sections
where corn is not grown. This is a big consideration
in Europe and will probably become more important in
the Rocky Mountain section of the United States.
Another indirect advantage of the beet-sugar industry
which is urged as an argument for its protection is its
effect upon the other industries and business. There
can be no doubt that it gives much freight to the rail-
roads, principally in the hauling of beets, coal, lime
and sugar. There are few practical uses to which the
land of many sections can be put which will provide for
the employment of so much labor for the same acreage
and the towns of beet growing sections undoubtedly get
the stimulation and benefits that come with increased
population. Practically every line of business shares this
"unearned social increment."
It is sometimes objected that these advantages are
lessened, or offset entirely, by the disadvantages of bring-
ing in a large element of foreign labor, particularly of
Mexican and Oriental labor which is used so largely in
some of the larger western sections, and if a long look
forward is taken, there is probably considerable weight
156 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [414
to this argument.' However, more immediate considera-
tions usually carry the day and the business men of
nearly all locaHties that give any promise of sustaining a
successful beet-sugar industry make strenuous efforts to
secure and maintain its establishment.
Another point somewhat related to this is the claim
that the development of the arid lands of the West is
largely dependent upon the encouragement of the beet-
sugar industry. All of the water that is easily and
cheaply available has been appropriated. To secure
good water rights for developing new land costs heavily,
say from $30 to $50 an acre now, so that land cannot
be brought under irrigation unless it can be put to
some crop which yields big profits per acre. Exten-
sive cultivation cannot be profitable on such expensive
land and few or no crops that can be grown and mark-
eted upon a large scaile are equal to beets in meeting
this situation.
This and the argument presented just previously con-
tain a great deal of truth but their validity depends upon
the assumption that the indirect benefits are worth the
subsidies, or protective tariffs, necessary to maintain the
industry and further, that similar benefits cannot be ob-
tained in better ways. This is a very difficult matter to
ascertain with scientific exactness and we lack a great
deal of having learned all that could be learned about the
matter if proper investigations were made. To make
them is one of the problems of determining what legisla-
tion should be enacted.
3. SOME COMPARISONS AND CRITICISMS
It is very common to cite European statistics when
the matter of possible improvements in American agri-
* See appendix for some data having reference to foreign laborers.
415] POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS 157
culture is broached, but in such cases there are usually
factors which do not appear on the surface and, though
we can get valuable suggestions from partial truths, we
are apt to be misled.' This fact should be kept in mind
in the following comparisons.
In the sugar year of 1909-10, the average yield in the
United States was 9.71 short tons of beets per acre, with
an extraction of 12.56 per cent of the weight of the
beets, or 2439 pounds of granulated sugar per acre.' The
same year for Germany, the yield per acre was 12.6 short
tons (282 dz. per ha.), with an extraction of 15. 11 per
cent in terms of raw sugar, that is, 3612 pounds of raw
sugar per acre (equivalent to about 3277.8 pounds of
granulated). 3 The yield of beets per acre in France was
12.4 short tons, the extraction 11.75 per cent, or the
yield per acre 2462 pounds of granulated sugar.'^ It will
be seen from this that for the year 1909-10 the yields in
terms of granulated sugar were practically the same in the
United States and France, and Germany's yield was about
50 per cent greater.
The figures for the United States and France are only
very slightly above the average for the past five years;
those of Germany are about one-fifteenth lower than for
a similar average, owing to about that reduction in ton-
nage per acre for the year 1909-10. ^ Thus we see that,
^ Though some statements are meant to deceive, many mislead
because the reader makes a different application than the one justified
and the one the writer had in mind. By the nature of the case, it
is never possible to present all the details in any matter.
' Progress of U. S. Beet Sugar Industry, 1909, U. S. Dept. of Agr.,
Report 92, p. 50.
' Quarterly of the German Imperial Statistical Office, 1910, Part TV,
pp. 147 et seq.
* Supplement, Journal des Fabricants de Sucre, Feb. 8, 191 1.
^ This is the last year for which we have official data at this writing.
1^8 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [416
SO far as averages go, we are about on a par with France,
but excelled by Germany by about 50 to 60 per cent. '
Numerous people seem to take a great deal of pleasure
in citing the superiority of Germany and other countries
in the matter of agricultural yields and they make rather
uncomplimentary remarks about the ability and methods
of the American farmer. They may even lead some to
infer that he is hardly as sensible and shrewd as his Ger-
man cousin. It cannot be denied that there is some jus-
tification for some of their criticisms of the American
agriculturist, but it may be asked which is the shrewder
1 The following extract (including Table XXXIVa, p. 159) from a
U. S. official publication is illustrative of the way in which compari-
sons are apt to be misleading to the lay reader.
THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY OF EUROPE
"The following table [XXXIVa] shows the enormous proportions
to which the beet-sugar industry has developed throughout central Europe
and especially in Germany, Austria, and Russia. The figures for 1909
for the United States have been included for sake of comparison."
The U. S. official publication makes no comments or explanations
other than those given above. The following comments are those of
the writer of this study.
It should be noted that in the European countries the yields of
beets per acre are in terms of metric tons (2204.6 lbs. each), whereas,
those in the U. S. are in terms of short tons (2000 lbs. each). Further-
more, the yield of sugar per acre is expressed in terms of granulated
sugar for the U. S. ; that is, to make the figures comparable the yield
as expressed in percentages and as expressed in pounds per acre
should be reduced by about 10% in the case of the European countries
for it takes about 100 lbs. of their raw sugar to make 90 lbs. of granu-
lated. In the third place, though these figures were published a year
after the close of the season to which they refer, they do not agree
with those given by the official reports. For example, the yield of
sugar in per cent of the weight of beets is given in the Quarterly
of the German Imperial Statistical office (Part IV, pp. 147 et seq.),
not as 17.63% as above, but as 16.77%. Even this is much the highest
average yield in the history of the German beet-sugar industry, the
next nearest prior to 1909 being 14.97%, so that the official figures for
this one year did not represent the average for a series of years.
417]
POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS
159
N
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l6o I^HE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [418
thing for the American to do : to spend $25 for extra
labor on an acre of ground already in cultivation, or $5
for the rent of an extra acre upon which, by using $10
worth of extra labor he can get the same increase of
profits? It is principally a question of using available
resources, consisting of land, labor and capital, to the
best advantage. In Germany, it is labor that is relatively
abundant as compared v^ith land ; in the United States, it
is land instead of labor. If the yields are measured per
unit of land, the comparisons are, and must be, favorable
to Germany ; if per unit of labor, to the United States.
It seems to be generally admitted, by Americans at least,
that our soil is superior to that of Germany. If it re-
mains so, and if other conditions are equal, yields in the
United States will surpass those of Germany when we
reach the same intensive stage of economic conditions,
though there will probably never be an exact parallel.
Though Germany gets more sugar per acre than the
United States, this does not necessarily mean that the
United States can, or should, endeavor to equal Germany
in this, either immediately or in the future, unless the
means are justifiable. No doubt it can be done if the
American industry is subsidized sufficiently, but the
question is whether or not it will pay to do it ; or to be
more exact, just what is the best method of utilizing all
of our available resources, taking everything into consid-
eration.
While German farmers produce about 50 per cent
more sugar per acre than Americans, they do not sur-
pass us so much in this crop as in other important crops,
as the following table indicates.
This table shows what was mentioned above, namely
that the German conditions are such as to force in-
creased yields chiefly through more intensive cultivation,
419] POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS
Table XXXV. Average Yield in Bushels per Acre*
161
Wheat ..
Rye
Barley . .
Oats
Potatoes
Germany.
1884. 1909. Increase.
19.2
14.8
23-9
33-3
30.5
27.6
394
"•3
12.8
15-5
59.125.8
1 26. 1 1 208.982.8
58.8%
85.1%
64.8%
774%
65.6%
United
1884.
13.0
1909.
15.8
12.2
16.1
23-5
24.3
27.4
30.3
85.8
106.8
2.8
3-9
.8
2.9
21.0
21.5%
21.2%
34%
10.5 %
244%
Germany.
1909.
United States.
1884.
1909.
Total yields, 5 crops,
bushels ■ 1,622,192,944
43>588,i56! 67,951,000! 93,469,000
3,060,277,002 1,376,878.000 2,323,602,000
while those in America have been brought about largely
by increase of area devoted to the several crops. It will
be noted that Germany's increases in yields per acre in
the last twenty-five years are almost as great as the
present American yields. The table suggests further,
that, inasmuch as we are nearer the German standard in
yield of sugar than in that of almost any other impor-
tant crop, w^e ought not to expect so much further im-
provement in this product as we should if the compari-
* Compiled by T. G. Palmer from Yearbook of U. S. Dept. of Agri-
culture and Yearbook of German government, Hardwick Committee
Hearings, July 31, 1911, pp. 2635-2636.
1 62 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [420
son were relatively less favorable. Possibly w^e have
reached the limit justified by natural and present econo-
mic conditions. Some w^eight is added to the force of
this suggestion v^hen w^e consider that a relatively large
proportion of the cost of producing beet sugar and
sugar beets is taken up by comparatively unskilled hand
labor of which Germany has a much greater relative
supply than the United States. In calculations that
have been referred to in previous parts of this study ^ it
has been seen that the cost of the beets represents about
60 per cent in the total cost of granulated sugar in the
United States and that a considerable part of the re-
maining 40 per cent is taken up by wages of factory em-
ployees, many of whom are relatively unskilled. It has
also been pointed out that from 50 per cent to 85 per
cent of the expenses of growing beets are unskilled labor
costs. Hence, any country, such as Germany, with a
greater abundance of cheap unskilled labor than the
United States must have a big advantage in this respect.
While it may be argued that, on account of greater
efficiency, American skilled labor, using the best machin-
ery, is really cheaper than European labor, such has not
been shown to be the case as regards unskilled hand
labor in agriculture where it uses only the simplest tools
such as are employed in many operations in connection
with raising beets.
In the case of the other important crops, such as the
cereals,'' where the proportion of hand labor is much less
and the use of machinery more extensive, the American
^ See Census reports for 1899, 1904, 1909. Also calculation by T. G.
Palmer, Hardwick Com, Hearings, pp. 2630 et seq.
* For an excellent study of costs of cereal production see Bui. yz,
Bureau of Statistics, U. S. Dept. of Agr. (1909). For one of German
costs see Die Produktionskosten unserer wichtigsten Feldfriichte, by
W. H. Howard. (Berlin, 1908.)
42 1 ] POSSIBLE IMPRO VEMENTS 1 63
with his comparatively cheap land is in a much better
position to compete with his foreign competitor who has
not these advantages.
However, the superiorities and advantages of Europe
as regards richness of beets, tonnage per acre and lower
labor costs suggest the points where great improvements
can be made in this country. The advances already made
indicate that we have some very superior advantages and
that, in time, we may be able to excel our European com-
petitors. But it has already been hinted that more serious
competition may be met with elsewhere than from Europe.
This matter will be taken up in the next chapter.
Chapter VII. Cane-sugar Competition
We have considered some of the fundamental condi-
tions and costs of producing beet sugar in the United
States and, in doing so, we have made some comparisons
with Europe, but relatively few, because our study has
convinced us that even Germany, the largest and most
advanced of European countries as regards sugar pro-
duction, is not the source from which our domestic in-
dustry may expect its most important competition in the
near future.
At present Cuba and the Philippines loom large on the
horizon ; at least, the expansion of their industries con-
cerns the United States more immediately than develop-
ments in other countries. Hence the necessity of an
estimate of their conditions and possibilities. After pre-
senting some of the facts regarding these two large, but
comparatively undeveloped, fields, we shall consider
briefly a few of the countries where cane-sugar produc-
tion has reached its highest stages in order to see what
light they throw upon future developments in unex-
ploited fields.'
I. Cuba
a. Recent Changes Significant
When most of the producers in the European sugar-
exporting nations, or in the United States, think of com-
* In this chapter, as in others, the reader desiring conclusions only,
will save much time and tedium" by skipping the presentation of
details, many of which are necessarily of disputed value, and turning
at once to the ends of the sections where conclusions are to be found.
164 [422
423] CANE-SUGAR COMPETITION 165
petition to-day they think of Cuba.' No other large pro-
ducing country has shown such great progress in the
last decade and no other presents the same possibil-
ities of large expansion within a short period. It may
come about in the course of time that other countries of
the world will surpass Cuba, but such development, if it
occurs at all, does not seem probable in as near a future
as it does in Cuba.
Nor is it to be understood that Cuba's development is
not highly problematical. No recent comprehensive and
authoritative study of Cuba's sugar industry and its
future has been made, though enough information is
available to indicate that it can be expanded very much
if certain obstacles can be overcome. Furthermore, it is
evident that the future of the United States beet-sugar
industry is intimately involved in the future of Cuba's in-
dustry and of this government's treatment of her sugar
exports.
Sugar cane is thought to have been introduced into
Cuba shortly after Columbus' discovery of America,^ but
so long as Spain's principal interests in the New World
were on the continent of North and South America, she
paid comparatively little attention to the development of
Cuba. Hence, the latter's sugar industry did not become
1 As good illustrations of this see " The Deadly Parallel," " The
Story of Cuban Distress," and other vigorous articles and testimony
by T. G. Palmer and others in the various Cuban Reciprocity and
Revenue Hearings and also in the tariff hearings. All of these hear-
ings are full of the great dangers of Cuban and other tropical cane-
sugar production to the American sugar industries, both beet and
cane. Der deutsch-amerikanische HandeJsvertrag by Dr. Julius Wolf,
presents a phase of the matter from the German standpoint in a rather
vigorous manner.
' Industrial Cuba, Robt. P. Porter.
World's Production and Consumption of Sugar, 1902, p. 1328.
Commercial Cuba, W. J. Clark, p. 208.
1 66
THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY
[424
of very great importance much before the middle of the
last century. The accompanying table shows the growth
and fluctuations in the output since that time.
Table XXXVl. Cuban Production of Sugar (1850-1912) '
1850
1851
1852
1853
1854
185s
1856
1857
1858
1859
i860
1861
1862
1863
1864
1865
223,145
263,999
251,609
322,000
374,000
392,000
348,000
555»ooo
385,000
536,000
447,oco
446,000
525,000
507,000
575»ooo
620,000
1866.
1867.
1868.
1869.
1870.
1871.
1872.
1873-
1874.
1875.
1876.
1877.
1878.
1879.
1880.
612,000
597,000
749,000
726,000
726,000
5475OOO:
690,000!
775»ooo;
681,000
718,000:
590,000
520,000
553,ooo|
670,000!
530,0001
493,000'
11882
1 1883
1 1 884
'1881:
11886
11887
1 1 888
J1889
1 1 890
I1891
:i892
I1893
11894
I1895
11896
1897
ugar,
tons.
1 i
m to
■s^
cS
CJ —
CJ
p^
>
595,000
1898...:
460,397
1899...:
558,932,
1900. ..
631,000
I90I...
731,723:
1902...!
646,578
1903...
656,719
1904...
560,333
1905.. .j
632,368
1906... 1
816,980
1907-.. 1
976,000
1908...;
815,894
1909...;
1,054,214
I9I0...J
1,004,264
I9II ^..
225,221
I9I22..
212,051
S to
^ p
305,543
335.668
283,651
612,777
863,792
1,003,873
1,052,273
1,183,347
I 229,736
1,441,916
969,275
1,521,818
1,808,221
1,483,451
1,800,000
It will be seen that in 1894 and 1895 Cuba had
reached an annual production of over 1,000,000 long
tons. This immediately fell to less than a quarter of a
million in 1896, on account of the war. A rapid recov-
ery followed the close of the war and the year 1910
shows a production nearly twice as great as the high
point before the war. This increase has been due largely
to more stable conditions and the practical assurance of
an American protectorate, to the 20 per cent concession
given by the United States to Cuban imports, to the
entry of American and other capital, and to the gradual
^ Compiled from the official Estadistica Azucarera.
» Estimates by Willett & Gray.
425] CANE-SUGAR COMPETITION 167
putting of the industry upon a basis of modern large-scale
and economic production. These are not all of the
causes and they are partly effects as well as causes. The
fundamental factors have been the acts and policies of the
United States and they will continue to be so for an in-
definite time according to present indications.
b. Various Estimates of Cuban Possibilities
Since there is no recent comprehensive and reliable
study of Cuba's sugar industry, we shall have to deal
largely with estimates and probabilities as regards the
future progress, and even as regards many phases of the
present industry.
Dr. Herman Paasche, in what is probably the best
general work upon the present world's sugar industry,'
does not think that Germany has any great cause to fear
Cuba's competition. He says^ that the expansion of the
industry in the latter country is not a question of avail-
able area but one of economic consideration ; that if
Cuba were given free entry to the large protected
market of the United States she could probably double
her output, but he says that those who see a five or six-
fold increase in Cuban production indulge in phan-
tasies.^ He wrote in 1905 and attributed the growth up
to that time to a natural recovery from the war and con-
sidered a large part of the production as only temporary
and due to the European shortage at that time. Had he
seen the output increase more than 50 per cent above
that high point within five more years, he would prob-
ably have made more allowance for possible expansion.
^ Die Zuckerindustrie der Welt, pp. 162-179, particularly. Besides
being a world authority on sugar, Dr. Paasche is, or was at the time
this work was published (1905), vice-president of the German Reich-
stag and member of the Prussian Diet.
' Ihid., p. 178. • Ihid., p. 164.
l68 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [426
However, he admits that the production of Cuba, to-
gether with that of our insular possessions and domestic
beet industry, may supply the entire consumption of the
United States in the near future. As a matter of fact,
that time has already arrived.
Mr. M. L. Jacobson^ takes issue with Dr. Paasche,
saying that the latter underrates the possibilities of trop-
ical cane-sugar production and, especially, those of Cuba.
Mr. Jacobson grants that the future of the Cuban sugar
industry, as well as that of our insular possessions, de-
pends chiefly upon a proper adjustment of the labor prob-
lem, and yet he submits that preferential legislation and
other fiscal measures should not be underrated, and,
further, that Cuban possibilities have been discounted by
Europe at large.
But this statement of Mr. Jacobson is very conserva-
tive compared with the presentation of probable devel-
opment in Cuba by Dr. Julius Wolf,* who calls it " the
land of unlimited possibilities," and who cites scores of
facts and authorities to prove his statement of the case.
The main contention of his work is that the American
tariff concession to Cuba is a violation of the most-
tavored-nation clause in the treaties of the United States
and Germany and that it does great injury to Germany's
sugar industry. He presents a rather strong case as
regards Cuba's possibiUties of expansion and her conse-
quent injury to the German industry.
^ Pol. Sci. Quar., vol. 22 (1907), pp. 535-36. Mr. Jacobson is the
sugar expert of the U. S. Dept. of Commerce and Labor, and is one
of the best authorities in America upon the world's production and
commercial movement of sugar,
^ Der deutsch-amerikanische Handelsvertrag (Jena, 1906). Dr. Wolf
is professor of political science in the University of Breslau and has
written more or less extensively upon sugar and sugar taxes.
427] CANE-SUGAR COMPETITION 169
c. Agricultural Conditions
The accompanying table shows statistics of the esti-
mated acreage devoted to cane, the production of cane
and of sugar and the per cent of yield of sugar in the
cane, for a series of years.
Table XXXVII. Cuban Sugar Production*
Crop years.
Estimated
Cane ground,
Sugar output,
Yield of
acreage.
long tons.
long tons.
sugar.
1902-03. . ..
625,294
10,521,955
1,003,873
%
9-54
9.88
1903-04....
628,942
10,583,151
1,052,273
1904-05....
687,939
11.576,137
1,183,347
10.22
1905-06
744,914
I2,53'1»999
1,229,736
9.81
1906-07.. ..
844,769
14,214,946
1,441,916
10.16
1907-08.. ..
540,031
9,087,064
969,275
I0.66
1908-09
829,149
13,951.998
1,521,818
10.90
1909-10
(no data)
16,396,885
1,808,221
11.03
The total area of Cuba is 45,883 sq. miles, or 29,365,120
acres* and it is seen from the above table that the high-
est acreage devoted to cane in any year of the past
decade has been less than 3 per cent of the total area.
Although agriculture is the principal industry of the
island and sugar is king, yet this 3 per cent of the total
area which is devoted to that crop represents about half 3
* Compiled from the official Estadistica Aziicarera.
2 Cuba, International Bureau of American Republics ( 1909) , p. 3. This
is 600 square miles more than the state of Pennsylvania and about two-
fifths the size of Colorado. Population 2,048,980, equal to 44 per sq.
mi. as compared with 23.2 for the U. S. as estimated at that date.
See also, Censo de la Republica de Cuba, 1907, pp. 21-48, 189 et seq.,
and 301 et seq.
' 47 per cent, according to the census of 1899. See " Labor Condi-
tions in Cuba," by Dr. Victor S. Clark. Bui. 41, U. S. Bureau of Labor
(1902), pp. 663 et seq. An admirable report by a recognized authority.
See also, Commercial Cuba in 1905, U. S. Dept. of Com. and Labor.
170 I^HE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [428
of all the land under cultivation in the island in spite of
the fact that Cuba is said to have a larger proportion of
its surface suitable for cultivation than almost any Amer-
ican state.'
The report of the United States Department of Com-
merce & Labor' says that
without doubt at least 5,000,000 acres of the island mig^ht
quickly and easily be turned into first class sugar plantations
in addition to plantations already existing and in operation,
and granting that these plantations be managed on the most
approved modern systems, the imagination is dazzled by the
contemplation of what Cuba would be capable of doing in the
sugar-producing line in the near future.
The same report gives the cane yield as from 12 to 50
tons per acre with an average of about 2% tons of
sugar. According to the above table the average yield
runs at about 16 to 17 tons of cane, or i^ to i^ tons
of sugar per acre. It is to be noted that the richness of
the cane is represented as having increased materially
within the period covered by the table.^
Dr. W. D. Home'* gives the average yield as from 15
to 20 tons of cane per acre and says that the crops are
usually allowed to ratoon for ten years and sometimes
longer. He states, also, that Cuba does not suffer the
ravages of cane diseases and insects as do some countries,
but that there are many destructive fires and concludes
^ U. S. Bureau of Labor, Bui. 41, p. 663.
' Commercial Cuba in 1903, p. 3903.
^' The table is taken from the official Estadistica Azucarera, but it
is based upon estimates that are liable to considerable error. In fact,
the average in the census reports is arrived at from the output
through an assumed yield per acre. See Censo de la Republica de
Cuba, 1907, pp. 38, 39-
* Journal, Society of Chemical Industry, vol. 25, pp. 161 et seq.
429] CANE-SUGAR COMPETITION 171
with the statement that a new era has begun with the
advent of American capital and consequent improvements
and that the pride of excelling runs high in the different
plantations.
Mr. Alexander Gollan, British consul-general at
Havana, is reported ' as saying a few years ago that
Cuba in normal times may be said to be one of the most
favored countries of the world for the economical production
of sug-ar. [He g-ives as reasons :] First, the excellence of the
climate and fertility of the soil, which allow largfe crops of
good cane. The rainfall, about 50 inches, is so distributed
that irrigation is not necessary, though it would, in many
cases, be advisable. Second, the g:reat movement toward
centralization of the estates which took place in the early
eig-hties, planters having understood the value of large sugar
houses and overcome their difficulties in this way. Third,
the proximity of the United States, affording- as it does, a
cash market for the sugar.
This was before the Cuban concession made by the
United States in 1903 and before the recent entry of
large amounts of American and European capital and
the accompanying increased tendency towards moderni-
zation of the industry.
Mr. Robert P. Porter says : "
As a cane-sugfar-producingf country, nature has made Cuba
superior to any country which may appear With
millions of acres of the richest and best cane land on the globe,
yet untouched by the plough, with a climate unsurpassed for
the growth and development of sugar cane, and with a prestige
for Cuban sugar second to none in the markets of the world,
^ Commercial Cuba, W. J. Clark, p. 212.
2 Special Commissioner of the U. S. to Cuba and Porto Rico, in his
work, Industrial Cuba (1899), pp. 281 et seq. See also. Commercial
Cuba, by William J. Clark (1898), pp. 208-228.
172 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [430
the future of Cuba's sug-ar presents a possibility of wealth sur-
passing the riches of gfold and silver which came to Columbus
in the marvellous tales of the interior of the mag^nificent island
which he had discovered,
d. Cost Statements of Various Authorities
Data of cost of production in Cuba are of much the
same character as those for the United States, being esti-
mates for the most part. In the Cuban Reciprocity
Hearings of 1902/ Colonel Tasker H. Bliss, U. S. A.,
Collector of the port of Habana, presented tables of costs
on twelve different plantations in various provinces of
Cuba, of which the following is an example :
Plantation 60 kilometers from Cienfuegos (Cuban 96° Sugar)
Cost of cultivating 100 arrobas (2500 lbs.) cane $0.82
Cutting, piling, and hauling to railroad 1.30
Hauling by railroad to mill . .12
Cost, 100 arrobas (2500 lbs.) at mill . $2.24
Cost of manufacture (extraction 250 lbs.) . 2.22
Cost, 250 lbs. sugar at mill $4.46
Cost per pound at mill .01784
Freight to port . .00123
Cost per lb. at port .01907
Cost at port, adding for up-keep (40c. per 2500 lbs. of cane). .02068
Shipping charges .0023
Bags. .000676
Cost per pound, f. o. b. :
Spanish gold .023656
American currency .0225
We see that, according to the above figures, the cost
f. o. b. for that plantation at that time w^as 2% cents a
pound. Similar statements are given for a number of
other plantations with the following total cost figures
per pound in American currency: $0.02027; $0.019126;
$0.02008.
^ p. 402,
43 1 ] CANE-SUGAR COMPETITION 1 73
The following is an estimate by Mr. Lacoste, the Cuban
Secretary of Agriculture : ^
Cost of Cuban Sugar Production (96°)
Cost of cultivating 100 arrobas (2500 lbs.) of cane $1.12
Cost of cutting and hauling to mill ... .... 1.50
Cost of conversion into sugar . 2.00
Cost of 242 lbs. of sugar (on 9.68% extraction) $4.62
Cost per pound at mill 01910
Freight to port . .02000
Shipping charges 0023
Bags. ..... .000676
Cost I lb., f. o. b., Spanish gold 024246
Cost I lb , f. o. b., American currency , .02206
It will be seen that these calculations correspond very
closely.
Mr. Edward P. Atkins'' gave the following analysis of
Cuban costs in 1908:
Cost of cane to produce 100 lbs. of 96° sugar $i.37
Manufacturing cost. . . .53
Cost at factory $1.90
Freight from factory to port 10
Shipping charges, including packages 20
Cost f. o. b. Cuban port $2.20
U. S. duty 1.35
Refining 62
Freight [presumably to American port] 10
Freight (American port to Chicago) 28
Cost of Cuban sugar in Chicago (includes depreciation, but
no interest or profit to anyone) . , , . • • ■ $4-55
^ Cuban Reciprocity Hearings, p. 404, and Cuba at the Pan-American
Exposition, p. 104.
^ Mr. Atkins and his father before him have been interested in
Cuban sugar plantations for many years. He is now acting president
of the American Sugar Refining Co. (trust). This estimate is given in
the 1908-09 Tariff Hearings before the Ways and Means Committee,
p. 3358.
174 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [432
The report of the United States Department of Com-
merce and Labor ' says :
The cost of raising: a pound of stigfar in Cuba may be said to
be, speaking: roug:hly, i cent, and the cost of manufacturing:
and transporting: it to the seaboard under present conditions
1 cent more, so that the total cost of production of sug:ar in
Cuba, from the planting: to the shipment at Habana, is about
2 cents a pound — not less than that, and perhaps on the
averag:e a little more.
Many other statements of costs and conditions of costs
have been made, some of which are probably close to the
facts and others of which are very much colored by the
interests of those giving them. Mr. T. G. Palmer^ esti-
mates the present (1911) average cost in Cuba at i>^
cents a pound ; Mr. Horace Havemeyer,^ 2 cents a pound
including freight to New^ York ; Mr. H. T. Oxnard,*
lyi cents to 2 cents a pound, and he has heard the cost
put as low as i cent; Mr. Edw. F. Dyer^ at $3.1145 per
ton of cane (equal to about 1% cents per pound of
sugar) ; Mr. Joseph H. Post,^ 1% cents for cane and ^
cent for manufacturing, total 2 cents per pound, f. o. b. ;
' Commercial Cuba in 1905, p. 3902.
* Representing the Assn. of American Beet Sugar Mfrs., Hardwick
Committee Hearings, p. 2797.
' Mr. Havemeyer is interested not only in N. Y. refineries but also
in Cuban sugar plantations and American beet-sugar factories. Hard-
wick Committee Hearings, p. 581. Says Porto Rican cost is higher,
due to poorer and higher priced land for sugar.
* Of the American Beet Sugar Co. Hardwick Committee Hearings,
pp. 412-416.
^ Builder of beet-sugar factories. 1908-09 Tariff Hearings, pp.
3497, 3498.
* Pres. National Sugar Refining Co. ot N. J. Hardwick Committee
Hearings, p. 515. He gives these as costs for the Cuban-American
Sugar Co., of which he is treasurer.
433 j CANE-SUGAR COMPETITION 175
Mr. Moriz Weinrich,' i^ cents under favorable condi-
tions, and this might be ''shaded" a Httle by utilizing
molasses ; Mr. R. B. Hawley,'' about 2 cents this year
(1902-03) ; Mr. D. P. Machado,^ $2.06 per 100 pounds,
f. o. b. Cuban port ; Mr. George R. Fowler,'^ $2.13 f. o. b.;
Mr. J. W. De Castro.s $1.35 in 1895-96 and $1.31 in
1900-01.
In the Philippi7te Hearings,^ Mr. George Bronson Rea
cites the testimony on Cuban costs in the Cuban
Reciprocity Hearings as follows :
Mr. Edward Atkins, of Boston, owner of the Soledad Cen-
tral, near Cienfuegos, testified that the cost was 2^^ cents ; Mr.
Hugo Kelly, of the Central Teresa Co., at Manzanillo, said it
was 2.16; Mr. Miguel Mendoza, of the Central Santa
Gertrudis, at Banaguises, said it was 2% cents ; Mr. Arm-
strong said that, with modern methods, it should be 2 cents ;
Senator Hawley, of Texas, of the Chapparra Sugar Co., said
it was about 2 cents ; Mr, William Bass, of the Central Con-
suelo, in Santo Domingo, said that a.t S/4 cents in New York
he was being put out of business.^
Mr. C. F. Saylor^ gave the cost in Cuba at about i}4
^ Cuban Reciprocity Hearings, p. 340. In a letter to Mr. H. T. Ox-
nard, presented to the committee by the latter.
' Ibid., p. 366. Mr, Hawley represented Texas sugar interests.
' Ibid., p. 446. Sugar planter of La Grande, Cuba.
* Ibid., p. 461. Sugar planter of Santa Clara, Cuba.
^ Ibid., p. 653. In a letter to Mr. H. T. Oxnard and presented by the
latter.
^ 59th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1030. Mr. Rea is editor of the Far Eastern
Review, and favors Philippine Island interests.
' Mr. Rea also quotes other estimates which we have given and
states that, after 13 years' residence in Cuba, he is of the opinion that
2.25 cents is about correct. Of course, he did not cite many of the low
figures given by the beet-sugar advocates.
8 190&-9 Tariff Hearings, p. 3347. Mr. Saylor was the special agent
176 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [434
cents and stated that some French experts put it at 1%
cents.
Dr. H. Paasche' estimates the Cuban cost at $1.73 to
$1.94 per 100 pounds (8 to 9 marks per zentner,). Dr.
Julius Wolf^ quotes Professor Herzfeld as saying that
only in the small, old-style factories is the cost as great
as $1.94 (9 m. per ztr.) and Consul General Steinhart
as putting the average at 2 cents a pound and, under
especially favorable conditions, at 1% to lYs cents a
pound.3 The latter adds that, with the old methods and
machinery, the extraction is from 8^4 to 9 per cent and
with modern, from lo^^ to 11 percent. The latter pro-
duce sugar (in 1903) at an average of ij^ cents and at a
minimum oi 1% cents. At that time he stated that
88 per cent of the output was produced with the old
methods and machinery and 12 per cent with the mod-
ern. The German consul general in Santiago reported
one modern factory working under favorable conditions
and transportation facilities that produced at a cost of
$1.0795 P^^ 100 pounds (5 marks), f. o. b. Cuban port.
Another report from Santiago* gives an analysis of
costs which amount to about i^ cents a pound and, in
the better factories, lYz cents, though running up to i^
to I J4 cents in those less favorably situated.
In his report on Cuban Reciprocity,^ Mr. Sereno E.
of the U. S. Dept. of Agr. who wrote the annual reports, The Progress
of the U. S. Beet-Sugar Industry. He died April, 191 1, and no suc-
cessor has been appointed.
^ Die Zuckerproduktion der Welt, p. 175. See also pp. 168-175.
^ Der detitsche-amerikanische Handelsvertag (1906), pp. 15 et seq.
^Second Supplemental Report (1903).
* Published in Zeitschrift des Vereins der Deutschen Zucker-Indus-
trie, 1905, pp. 341 et seq. Wolf, Handelsvertrag, p. 17.
• 57th Cong., ist Sess., House Report no. 1276, pt. i, p. 2.
435] CANE-SUGAR COMPETITION lyy
Payne, of the Ways and Means Committee, stated that
Cuban sugar cost over 2 cents to produce and, at the selling-
price of ij^ cents, the producer lost one-half cent a pound.
Mr. George B. McClellan, in the minority report,^ stated
that the average of the costs of production as given by the
witnesses before the committee, was exactly 2 cents, f. o. b.
Habana.
As mentioned under Javan costs, Mr. H. C. Prinsen Geer-
ligs estimates the present cost in Cuba at $2.03 per 100
pounds (9.40 marks per 50 kilos), ^ and the Produce Market
Reviezu of London ^ says : " Cuba, with its great central
factories, can also produce at a very low cost, probably
from 6 shillings to 7 shillings per cwt. ($1.31 to $1.51 per
too pounds)." Willett & Gray* think the latter estimate
too low and say that
while large and small estates in Cuba vary in cost of pro-
duction, the same as with beet factories, yet the lowest cost
of the large estates is understood to be i^ cents per pound
up to 2 cents per pound for others. The average cost of pro-
duction may fairly be estimated at 1.85 cents per pound, f. o.
b. Cuba, or say 1.95 cents, cost and freight, New York (equal
to 8s. 6d., f. o. b. Cuba, or 9s. 3d. per cwt., landed in United
Kingdom).
It is scarcely necessary to quote further such estimates
of costs and more reliable ones are not available. Ad-
mitting that we have no satisfactory basis for making an
accurate estimate, it appears probable that Willett & Gray's
* 57th Cong., I St Sess., House Report no. 1276, pt. 2, p. 2.
* Amer. Sugar Industry and Beet Sugar Gazette, July, 191 1, p. 306.
Java, $1.59; Cuba, $2.03; Hawaii, $2.70,
•' Cited in Sen. Doc. 55, 62d Cong., ist Sess., June, 191 1, p. 15.
Review, issue of Oct. 22, 1910.
* Ibid., p. 16.
178 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [436
estimates, quoted above, are sufficiently high. Average
costs, and costs upon the best plantations with their modern
mills and systems are two entirely different things and, no
doubt, there are enough mills and plantations not thor-
oughly modern to bring the average far below that of the
best Always and everywhere, in every industry, some
are producing at the margin, some even below it usually,
and they are included in an average. While it is probable
that the average cost, f. o. b. Cuban port, is near 2 cents,
yet it is also probable that a few of the most favorably
situated and best-managed plantations can average very
close to iJ4 cents and that, in a number of cases, i>4
cents is not exceeded.
e. Labor and Wages
Although the Cuban sugar industry has been making
giant strides since the Spanish-American War, its develop-
ment would be still more rapid were it not for the labor
problems involved. Nearly every extensive work on Cuba
mentions this matter, though perhaps the best and most
comprehensive study of the subject is that of Dr. Victor S.
Clark in 1902.^ Unfortunately, we have no such reliable
study of recent date from which we can quote satisfactory
statistics concerning labor and wages, and it is understood
that wages have increased somewhat since, though prob-
ably general conditions are much the same as then.
Dr. Clark gives the monthly field wages in Spanish gold
in the Habana market during the crop season for each
decade from i860 to 1902 as $28, $28, $25, $20 and $15,
lU. S. Bureau of Labor, Bui. 41 (1902). See Industrial Cuba, Robt.
P. Porter, pp. 73-89; Commercial Cuba in 1905, V. S. Clark, pp.
3977-9; Commercial Cuba, W. J. Clark, pp. 22-42; Amer. Sugar In-
dustry and Beet Sugar Gazette, June, 191 1, p. 251; also many refer-
ences in the Cuban Reciprocity Hearings and other congressional
hearings already referred to.
437] CANE-SUGAR COMPETITION lyg
respectively, in addition to board. His index numbers of
the principal articles of food for each succeeding decade
as compared with i860 are 108, 204, 38, 84, respectively,
showing that wages have fallen both absolutely and rela-
tively.^ He gives the field wages in three other provinces
for the years 1900-02 as follows: ^
Province. Highest. Lowest. Usual.
Pinar del Rio $3.10 $0.60 $1.00 to 1.50
Matanzas 1.50 .60 .65
Santiago. i.oo .50 .70
These prices are in American currency and do not in-
clude board. It is added that wages during the crop sea-
son of 1902 were affected by many special and unusual
conditions, among them being low price of sugar, tariff
agitation, use of three kinds of currency and unusual de-
mand for railroad labor. Grades of skill are recognized
among agricultural laborers and influence the scale of
wages paid. Women receive the same rates as men in
the cane fields.^
From the above it is seen that wages in Cuba are higher
than in most important tropical cane-producing countries,
and Dr. Clark quotes a number of authorities to show that ^
inefficiency makes Cuban labor costs, in most lines of work,
relatively higher than labor costs in the United States and
other American countries, though he says that American
supervision has been able to increase efficiency very much
in some cases.*
Some effort has been made to secure outside labor,
though relatively little as compared with Hawaii. The
Spanish immigrants are said to be much more satisfactory
than the natives, but Dr. Clark doubted if enough of them
^ Bureau of Labor, Bui. 41, p. 682. "^ Ibid., p. 696.
» Ibid., p. 697. * Ibid., pp. 712, 778-
l8o THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [438
could be secured to supply the demand/ In concluding^
Dr. Clark says :
When the condition of the Cuban laborer compares unfavor-
ably with the condition of the man of similar status in the
United States, the cause of his disadvantage lies deeper than
lavirs and treaties reach. It is to be found in qualities of habit
and temperament that are modified only by a process of
social evolution.^
f. Conclusion
Though v^e have not sufficient accurate and comprehen-
sive data to present the exact situation in Cuba, v^e do have
enough to knov^ that Cuba's modern sugar plantations, in-
cluding their mills and entire system of production and
marketing, can, at present, produce sugar cheaper than
Germany or any other important beet-growing country;
further, that it can produce below the cost of any large
cane-sugar-exporting country, unless it be Java.^ Further-
more, although foreign capital has been improving condi-
tions very rapidly for the past decade, still it seems almost
certain that the possibilities of expansion and improvement
— for example, as regards area that can be devoted to the
industry, agricultural methods, transportation and market-
ing, and labor supply — have just begun on a large scale.
True, the real and serious obstacles must not be disregarded,
and political considerations are very important, but it can-
not be successfully denied that " with a fair field and no-
favors " Cuba has great possibilities.*
1 Bureau of Labor, Bui. 41, p. 788. ' Ibid., p. 777.
' We do not include Formosa or other small countries which are
compartively small factors in the world's market at present.
* A great many points relative to sugar production in the West
Indies are illuminated by the Report of the British Royal West India
Commission, though there is little direct reference to Cuba. {Ses-
sional Papers, 1898, vols. 50 and 51.)
ii
439] CANE-SUGAR COMPETITION igl
2. PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
Though the extent and rapidity of the probable develop-
ment of the sugar industry in Cuba is highly problematical
there is even more uncertainty as regards the Phil-
ippines. In some respects and under certain conditions,
developments in these islands may affect the United States
beet-sugar industry more than competition from any other
country, not excepting Cuba.
As in the case of Cuba there has been no comprehensive
study of the Philippine sugar industry as a whole, nor of
any considerable portion of it covering a sufficient length
of time to enable us to make accurate forecasts of future
development. Nevertheless, we are fortunate in having
the results of two or three studies of certain parts of the
field which appear to be admirable. In addition to these,
we have fairly reliable data on some points from a few
other sources. If all of these are combined with the sift-
ings from the Tariff and Revenue Hearings and other
more or less controverted data, we have a sufficient basis
to draw some fairly reliable general conclusions which will
be helpful for purposes of this study.
a. Area and Sugar Production
The area of the Philippines is 29,791,734 hectares (73,-
000,000 acres) or two and one-half times that of Cuba, or
of the state of Pennsylvania.^ Of this, two-thirds, or
50,000,000 acres, are estimated to be covered with forests
and only 9.5 per cent is classed as agricultural. A little
less than half of the latter (45.9 per cent) was returned
by the census of 1903 as being in cultivation,^ that is,
about three and one-half million acres.
* Census of the Philippines, 1903, vol. 4, pp. 181 et seq.
2 Ihid. Also, Secretary (now President) Taft in Philippine Revenue
Hearings, 1905-06, 59th Cong., ist Sess., Sen. Doc, 277, pp. 453 ^t ^^Q-
l82 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [440
Table XXXVIII. Area and Product of Chief Cultivated Crops^
Crop.
Area cultivated,
acres.
Rice
Hemp
Cocoanuts ..
Indian corn
Sugar cane .
Tobacco . . ,
Cotton . . . . .
Coffee
1,464,725
538,199
366,313''
266,821
177,628
77.631
7»544
2,469
Product.
24,402,368 bushels.
147,172,166 lbs.
94,434,707 lbs.«
3,391,776 bushels.
397,311,047 lbs. sugar.*
37,499,043 lbs.
2,914,769 lbs.
164,431 quarts.
From this it is seen that the area devoted to sugar cane
in 1902 was less than one-fourth of one per cent of the
total area of the islands and only about 5 per cent of the
cultivated area. Of the total area devoted to cane (71,885
hectares, or 177,628 acres), half (35,524 hectares) was
in the Island of Luzon and two-fifths (28,994 hectares)
in the Island of Negros. However, of the total yield, over
half was produced in Negros (93,041 out of a total of
180,217 metric tons) and a little over a third (69,231
metric tons) was produced in Luzon; that is, the yield was
about three and one-seventh metric tons of sugar per hectare
in Negros but a little less than two metric tons in Luzon, the
average for the archipelago being a little over two and one-
half metric tons per hectare, or a trifle over one short ton
per acre. This sugar is a low grade of muscovado, of
about 84° quality and worth about one cent less than 96""
sugar (e. g., Cuban).
Accompanying is a table of Philippine sugar exports:
^Philippine Census, 1903, pp. 325-328. Converted into Amer. terms
in Bui. no. 58 Dept. of Labor, vol. x, p. 743 (1905), V. S. Clark. See
later data cited infra.
' Not including isolated trees and uncultivated groves.
' Not including 12,033,765 quarts tuba, 1,660,162 quarts oil and 2,323,-
148 nuts from the estimated annual product of cultivated trees.
* Unrefined sugar, not including 471,385 gals, molasses.
Table XXXIX.
Quantity axd Value of Sugar Exported from the
Philippines '
1854 .
1855 .
1856 .
1857 .
1858 .
1860'i
1861 .
1862 .
1863 .
1864
1865 .
1866 .
1867 .
1873'
1874 .
1875 .
1876 .
1877.
1878 .
1879 •
1880 .
1881 .
1882 .
1883 .
1884
1885 .
1886 .
1887 .
1888 .
1889 .
l8qo .
1891 .
1892 .
1893 .
1894 .
1895 .
1896 .
1897 •
1898 .
1899 .
1900 •
IQOI .
1902 .
1903 ■
1904 ,
1995 ■
1906 .
1907 .
1908 .
1909
1910
Quantity,
Value,
% of total
Metric tons.
Dollars.
exports.
47.704
$2,225,022
33.07
35.570
1,725,630
26.83
4«,i57
3.705.434
38.61
36.645
4.576,531
36.19
27,289
2,249,195
22.73
49,800
4,136,296
4093
46,043
3.166,678
37-41
6r,935
3.561,289
37.00
52,062
3,341.056
31.44
45 '036
3,513,603
31.20
46,832
6,383,629
29.01
41,288
6,039,096
25.88
56,080
6,^,25,351
28.42
85,210
13,970,243
58.24
ICI.371
6,104,729
35"
128,112
9,028,775
48.88
130.547
6,773,177
49-91
122,994
8,309,585
53.77
122,023
7,496,824
47.34
I3'.859
6,846,510
41.21
181,190
10,265,788
48.65
2o8;8o6
11.035.833
5047
150,422
7,972,780
43.22
196.835
10,546,185
45.83
122,128
6,013,082
30.33
204,222
8,646,735
42.18
184,940
7,016,348
34.90
171,752
6,153,5"
31.66
160,988
6,274,385
32.32
228,469.
9,098,548
3545
144.841
7,266,798
33.72
138,218
5,698,949
27.29
252,798
7,766,326
40.54
261,522
10,370,574
46.63
210,646
5,474,422
33."
341.469
6,068,485
32.22
229439(a)
(c)
(c)
202,CO0(a)
(c)
(c)
1 78,729 (a)
(c)
(c)
85,828
3,458,370
I 23.29
65,191
2,397,144
: 1043
56,873
2,549.147
1 lo.ao
98,596
3'342,473
11.66
I09,899(b)
3.955,568
(c)
73'977Ch)
2,668,507
1 (c)
I II, 850(b)
4,977,026
i (c)
i23,790(b)
4,863,865
1 1'^
ii8,396(h)
3.934,460
(c)
I49,323(b)
5,664,666
(c)
iio,6o4(b)
4,373.338
^f\
I25,699(b)
7,040,690
(c)
(») Long tons. (^) Long tons. («) Not given. ("i) Omissions of years thus in originaL
^ Figures up to 1902 inclusive from Philippine Census, 1903, vol. iv,
441] 183
l84 ^^^ BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [442
Of the 180,217 metric tons produced the year covered
by the census (1902), 98,596 metric tons were exported.
From the table we see that, in 1895, exports reached their
highest point, by far ; also that they were very low for sev-
eral years following the American acquisition. For several
years previous to 1909 the greater part of these exports
went to China and Hongkong, but the taking off of the
import duty by the United States in 1909 ^ resulted in over
two-thirds of the 19 10 exports coming to this country.
b. Special Investigation of the Island of Negros
So far as we have been able to discover, there are only
two good recent, extensive and detailed studies bearing
directly upon the sugar industry of the Philippines. These
are the studies of the industry in the Island of Negros by
Dr. H. S. Walker and the report on labor conditions by
Dr. Victor S. Clark. ^ Dr. Walker took a portable labor-
p. 25, except those marked (a) which are in long tons (2,240 lbs.)
from Summary of Commerce and Finance for Nov., 1902, U. S.
Treas. Dept., p. 1348, Figures for 1903-1910 are from Production and
Commercial Movement of Sugar (1906), Sen. Doc, 250, S9th Cong.,
ist Sess., p. 97, and from forthcoming monograph of Bureau of Sta-
tistics, Dept. of Com. and Labor. Latter does not include refined
sugar which is very small in amount.
*6ist Cong., 2d Sess., House Doc. 671, p. JJZ- 300,000 tons or less
are to be allowed free entry at U. S. ports, the smaller shippers being
favored in case there is an excess of this amount, which has not yet
been approached.
' Sugar Industry of the Island of Negros, H. S. Walker, Div. of
Chem., Govt. Sugar Laboratory at Iloilo, P. I. (1910, Manila). Most
of the statements in the following pages are based upon this study ;
V. S. Clark's report of labor conditions, Bui. 58, Bureau of Labor,
1905 ; and the Philippine Census of 1903. However, numerous other
works have been consulted also. We refer the investigator to these
original sources, but in view of the importance of securing a proper
background for some of our conclusions, we take the liberty of pre-
senting herewith more liberal extracts from these authorities than
would otherwise be justified in a study of this kind.
443] CANE-SUGAR COMPETITION 185
atory from the experiment station at Iloilo to the Island of
Negros and spent the period of the sugar campaign inves-
tigating the industry. It is true that his study and observa-
tions were for a single campaign and the probabilities of
error in drawing general conclusions from such a brief
study must not be overlooked, yet his methods and results
appear very much more satisfactory than those of most
studies, or so-called investigations.
(i) Area and Sugar Production of Negros
Though Negros is one of the smaller of the large Phil-
ippine Islands, it produced over 50 per cent of the total
sugar output in the year covered by the census (1902,
93,042 out of 180,217 metric tons),^ and 40 per cent in
1907-8 (73,498 out of 180,000 metric tons).^ The sugar
belt is mostly in Occidental Negros as the mountains are
too close to the East to leave a coastal plain. The rivers
are short and navigable for short distances only and, as
there is no deep water harbor, sugar for export has to be
taken on small boats to Iloilo on another island. This is a
great drawback. The rainfall is subject to great local var-
iation and averages about 100 inches. Usually there is a
favorable dry milling season.
Statistics of Bureau of Internal Revenue for 1908'
Negros, Negros,
Occidental. Oriental.
Number of growers 450 34
Area of growers' land actually cultivated in sugar,
hectares 24,748 2,348
Area of growers' land adapted to sugar cane, not
as yet planted, hectares ... 37,004 1,501
Area of other land not planted, hectares ..... 14,414 2,490
Piculs of 63.25 kilos sugar 1,053,927 107,509
Metric tons (2204.6 lbs.) 66,661 6,801
* Census of Philippines, 1903, vol. iv, p. 328.
2 Walker, op. cit., p. 10. s Walker, op. cit., p. 18.
l86 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [444
The yield throughout Negros is 42.9 piculs ^ per hectare
(2.71 metric tons per hectare, or 2,430 pounds per acre).
There is much variation, however, there being well authen-
ticated cases of yields as low as 10 piculs per hectare (.63
metric tons per hectare, or 560 pounds per acre), and as
high as 200 piculs per hectare (12.6 metric tons per hec-
tare or 11,335 pounds per acre). The average yield of the
island is greatly reduced by a comparatively large number
of small growers who lack resources or ability to care for
cane properly.
I may state from personal observation that on a well-man-
aged plantation — and there are a few such in Negros — the yield
per hectare, under normal conditions, of land actually planted
in cane will rarely fall below 60 piculs (3.8 metric tons per
hectare, or 3,400 lbs. per acre) and frequently comes nearer
70 piculs (4.4 metric tons per hectare or 3,970 lbs. per acre).
This should hold true in the poorer as well as in the richer
sections, as the difference in quality of soil is, in a measure,
made up for by the fact that cane grown on the former is,
as a rule, richer in sucrose and is replanted every year on
fresh soil, whereas, in the latter, it is allowed to ratoon, until
the yield becomes greatly diminished.^
(2) Comparison zvith Other Cane Countries
Analyses of the soil of Negros when compared with those
of Hawaii, Egypt, Louisiana, Demerara, Berbice and
* Picul equals one-sixteenth long ton, or 140 lbs. Metric ton equals
2,204.6 Ihs. Hectare equals 2.47 acres. Short ton equals 2,000 lbs.:
long ton, 2,240 lbs. Peso equals $0.50, and a ccntavo equals one-half
cent, or one one-hundredth of a peso.
' This is muscovado and is almost exactly the same weight as the
average yield of granulated per acre as given for U. S. beet sugar for
several years, namely, 2,461 lbs. U. S. Dept. of Agr., Report no. 92,
p. 56.
• Walker, op. cit., p. 18. Conversions into U. S. terms by the v^rriter
of this study.
445] CANE-SUGAR COMPETITION 187
Mauritius justify the conclusion that, although not pre-
eminently rich in most constituents, it is among the better
sugar lands of the world and, given proper care in cultiva-
tion, should be able to yield eventually as much sugar in
proportion to area of ground planted as any other country
depending on natural rainfall. Experience shows that
culture is more important than soil if the latter is not
" utterly deficient " in the necessary elements of nutrition.
The following from H. C. Prinsen Geerligs, the well-
known and reliable Dutch and Javan sugar expert, has a
direct bearing upon this point.
The lo-year average yield (1897-1906) for Hawaii was:
All Hawaiian Islands 9-997 metric tons per hectare.
Irrigated section 13.133 " " " '*
Unirrigated section 7.241 '' " ** "
The latter figure equals about 115 piculs (6,580 lbs. per
acre), or nearly three times the average yield of Negros, but
it is often exceeded on some of the better plantations of con-
siderable size, both in richer and poorer sections of Negros.
Java, with much poorer soil than Negros, yields, on the
average, fully as much sugar per hectare as the islands of
Hawaii. Hawaii, which is largely dependent upon rainfall,
has an average yield per acre about half that of Oahu, which
is well irrigated, though the former has decidedly superior
soil.
The soil of the Hawaiian Islands does not give such an
enormously high yield of sugar as is commonly attributed to
it by writers on the subject. The popular impression to the
contrary comes from the fact that there are, in the neighbor-
hood of Honolulu (on the Island of Oahu) a few estates of
extra fertile land, especially well cultivated and provided with
perfect irrigation plants, so that here extraordinarily large
crops of cane and sugar are produced. As the majority of
tourists do not get any further away than the outskirts of
Honolulu, the conditions existing there are too readily gener-
1 88
THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY
[446
alized and reports come out that in Hawaii they get 12 tons
of sugar per acre, that is, 26.88 metric tons, or 430 piculs
per hectare.^
Dr. Walker adds that Negros can produce fully as much
Table XL. Comparison of Cane of Different Countries'
In cane.
In juice.
\ Kilos. 1 %
Negros, native cane, average of prin-j
cipal districts j 0.92 16.06
Egypts I 1.19 14.5
I
Java* I 12.30
Louisiana ^ |
Antigua^ j 14.39
British West Indies— ;
First juice i
yo
%
10.02 20.35
12.01
18.40,90.38; 0.71
16.8887.9 ' .18
....83.74 .-.•
5.00 11.7878.53 1.56
5-07
20.58 18.51 1 89.09
•93
" Whole juice " \ .... j 120.58 17.06 87.03 .88
^ H. C. Prinsen Geerligs in " De Rietsuikerindustrie in de verschill-
ende landen von Productie," De Indische Mercuur (1909), 32, 897.
Cited by Walker, op. cit., pp. 72, 73. The quotation is loose and con-
densed in some parts.
^ Walker, op. cit., pp. 73 et seq.
' Tiemann, " Dynamic Viewpoint of Soils," Jour. Ind. and Eng.
Chem. (1909), 810. Analysis for 1897, exceptionally good year. 12 per
cent in cane given as former's average.
* Geerlig's average for 107 factories, 1908. Int. Sugar Jour. (1909).
II, 324.
'W. C. Stubbs, La. Exp. Station, 1902. Bull. no. 70.
« Watts, West Indian Bulletin (1908), 9, 91, for 1907 results.
447] CANE-SUGAR COMPETITION 189
per acre as Hawaii without irrigation, with the same culti-
vation and fertilization. The majority of planters in
Negros pay no attention to fertilization/ Cane diseases
and insect enemies are few and unimportant in the Phil-
ippines. Nearly all the cane in Negros is the variety called
" cana niorado," similar to the Louisiana purple. The
accompanying table shows that in respect to richness and
purity of juice it is equal to that of almost any other sugar-
producing country of the world. In addition, it has a low
fiber content and could hardly be improved upon as regards
its adaptability to a thorough and economical extraction by
milling. However, it might prove worth while to try to
increase the yield per acre by experimenting with other
varieties.
(3) Wasteful Methods
Methods and means of cultivation, manufacture and
transportation are very crude and wasteful for the most
part. The crop is allowed to ratoon from one to seven
times, the number depending upon the cost of labor and the
amount of available cheap land. Following is an estimate
of the average decrease in yield per hectare for successive
crops without replanting, under native methods :
Plant cane 100 piculs — - 6.33 metric tons per hectare.
ist ratoon .80 *' 5.06 " " "
2nd " 70 " 4.43 " " "
3rd " 60 " 3.80 " '.' '*
4th " 50 '' 3.16 '' " "
Cane yielding less than two metric tons of sugar per hec-
tare is not considered worth cutting. The average number
of ratoons may be put at about four (five years for one
planting) so that about one-fourth, of the sugar is pro-
duced from plant cane and three-fourths from ratoon cane.
^ Walker, op. cit., p. 73.
igo THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [448
Owing to excessive rains, the crop cannot be allowed to
grow eighteen months as in Hawaii but is in the ground
from nine to fourteen months, the average being eleven
to twelve months/
The following will give an idea of the average loss of
sucrose in cane in the process of sugar making as carried
on in Negros, based on actual experiments and tests. ^
In bagasse 25.0%
In skimmings (where no filter press is used) 5.0%
By inversion (including "apparent," or analytical losses) 2.5%
Burned, spilled, stolen and unaccounted for 10.0%
Shrinkage en route to Iloilo (including tare) 1.5%
Total 44.0%
Average yield of raw sugar, about 10% of weight of cane.
The following statement of Dr. Clark,^ relative to
wastes in sugar production gives figures very similar to
the estimates of Dr. Walker cited above:
The imperfect methods of manufacture employed in the
Philippines are the occasion of great waste, and the product
of cane per acre might be indefinitely increased by scientific
fertilizing, stripping, irrigation, cane selection, and possibly
by deeper plowing and more thorough cultivation. On a
single plantation visited, the writer estimated that sugar to
the value of $45,000 American currency was being burned
up in the bagasse through imperfect extraction alone, and the
governor of the province estimated that the loss from this
source averaged 45 per cent of the sugar content of the cane.
Foreman gives the average juice extraction as 56.37 per cent
of the full weight of the cane and the weight of the dry
bagasse as 26.84 per cent. This would mean that slightly
more than 70 per cent of the total juice was extracted, as
' Walker, op. cit., pp. 75 et seq.
' Ibid., pp. 122, 123.
• U. S. Bureau of Labor, Bui. 58, p. 753-
449] CANE-SUGAR COMPETITION igi
against 96^ per cent on the Ewa plantation in Hawaii; but
it is very doubtful if there is more than 55 per cent to 60 per
cent extracted in the majority of the Philippine mills.
(4) Cost of Production — Labor and Wages
Cost of J^ugar Production.* (Philippine Island Currency.')
Per Per metric
picul of ton of
sugar. sugar.
Plowing, planting, and cultivation $0.60 $9-49
Cutting 16 2.53
Carting cane to mill 16 2.53
Manufacturing 63 9.96
Cost at hacienda $i-55 $24.51
Shipping to Iloilo and marketing there ... .53 8.38
$2.08 $32.89
Total fixed expenses, including 10% deprecia-
tion and 10^ interest on capital invested . 2.07 32.72
$4.15 $65.61
As regards wages and cost of producing sugar in the
Philippines Dr. Clark says : ^
The actual cash wages of a field laborer is the same or less
for a week in the Philippines than for a day in the Hawaiian
Islands. Though rations are provided in the former country
and not in the latter, the Hawaiian planter has a far greater
expense for importing labor, medical attendance and for
quarters and other living conveniences than has his Filipino
^ Walker, op. cit., pp. 123-138. This is only a brief summary of de-
tails of the various items of cost in growing, manufacturing and ex-
porting which are given in Dr. Walker's study. Details of estimate
of fixed charges, etc., are given on pages 125 et seq. of the same report.
The above are supposed to represent the average and there are many
variations. If no interest were included the cost would be $51.86 per
metric ton ($1,176 American per 100 lbs.).
* Divide by two to get equivalent in American currency.
3 U. S. Bureau of Labor, Bui. 58, p. 752.
192 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [^^^q
rival, and he must pay interest on a much higher investment
for each ton of sugar produced. The writer saw a nippa
barrack capable of accommodating 50 Filipino plantation
laborers that cost the planter between $25 and $30 American
currency. The cost of producing a picul (one-sixteenth of
a long ton) of muscovado sugar was given by the proprietors
of two plantations in different locations and of different
capacity at $3 silver currency ($1.26 American currency) per
picul and the cost of marketing at Iloilo at fifty cents silver
(twenty-one cents American currency) in each case. This
would make the cost of sugar placed in the market about
$23.50 a ton in American currency, against an average cost
for a somewhat higher grade of sugar ^ of over $45 a ton in
Hawaii and $28 a ton in Java. The average selling price of
sugar in Iloilo market in the autumn of 1903 was about $32
American currency.
The people of Negros are Spanish, Spanish mestigos or
native Visayans, Spanish being the universal language.^
Labor is imported by contract for the season from the
neighboring islands of Panay and Cebu,"^ all native Visa-
yans. Average wages are 25 centavos * and board (cost-
ing 15 centavos) per day, or 50 centavos without board.
' There is usually enough difference in quality between the Philippine
sugar and that of Hawaii, Java, or Cuba to make a difference of about
a cent a pound in price, and besides, there are more refiners who
cannot, or will not, handle the lower grade of Philippine Island sugar.
2 Walker, op. cit., p. 19.
' Dr. V. S. Clark says that the importation of labor is in no wise
due to lack of resident labor, " for the road-side huts always contained
one or two able-bodied men without employment but because the
spur of necessity or some unreasoning habit of migration causes the
Antique nativies to seek work abroad while those of Negros refuse it
at their doors." U. S. Bureau of Labor, Bui. 58, p. 750 (1905) • For an
excellent and comprehensive investigation of the Philippine labor
situation see this Bulletin.
* A centavo is equal to one-half a cent.
45 1 ] CANE-SUGAR COMPETITION 193
There is universal complaint of the difficulty in getting
sufficient labor as the demand is largely seasonal and there
is much loss and abuse as regards advances of cash made
in contracting labor. This is much the same as before
American control.^
(5) Conclusions as to Negros
Dr. Walker concludes his study by making a detailed
analysis of costs and profits of sugar production as now-
carried on in Negros upon most plantations and what they
w^ould be under modern scientific large-scale production,
showing the handsome profits and great advantage of the
latter, though he states that there are already a few well-
managed plantations showing good profits. He says thai
the future of the industry depends largely upon good man-
agement of the first attempts to establish modern methods
wdth outside capital. He estimates that under the present
system we cannot expect the output to be more than trebled
in fifteen years ; this to be made possible through doubling
the cane acreage and making improvements increasing
the net yield per acre by 50 per cent. This trebling would
mean a total production of 220,000 metric tons. With
modern methods this could be increased to 500,000 metric
tons, that is, for the Island of Negros, which now produces
40 per cent of the sugar of the Philippine Islands. This is
200,000 tons more than the maximum amount that would
be allowed free entry to United States ports from all the
Philippine Islands combined, if the present law is not
changed.
c. Statements of Various Authorities as to Philippine
Conditions and Costs
The little that may be gleaned from the masses of tes-
* Walker, op. cit., pp. 20, 21.
194 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [452
timony in the Philippine Revenue Hearings and the Tariif
Hearings on the sugar schedule adds a few, but not a
great many, important points to these more comprehensive
studies. This testimony shows the usual bias of such
hearings, those having interests in the increase of Phil-
ippine sugar production endeavoring to get legislation in
their favor, and those fearing that the increase would
lessen the profits of the American beet-sugar industry try-
ing to prevent the Philippine competition.
The gist of Secretary (now President) Taft's argument
was that so much of the area of the islands is covered with
forests and the expense of putting to sugar would be so
prohibitive that we can expect no increase of production
great enough to endanger the American market if it were
allowed free entry. He estimated the cost of producing
sugar at one and one-half cents per pound (84° sugar),
not allowing anything for rent or profit and said this was
equivalent to $3.34, plus freight to New York, to compete
with beet sugar at $3.00 to $3.50.^ He discredits the state-
ments concerning Philippine sugar production made before
the committee by Mr. Hathaway, of the Michigan Sugar
Co., and Major Gove, representing Colorado beet-sugar
interests, both of whom visited the islands, and, also, the
reports of Mr. Stewart given by Mr. Palmer, who repre-
sented the Association of American Beet Sugar Manufac-
turers.^ The latter citation was to the effect that Philippine
sugar could be produced for less than one cent per pound.
Secretary Taft quotes Professor Knapp, the rice expert,
to the effect that 20 cents for Filipino labor is more expen-
sive than $1.50 for American labor.^
^ Philippine Revenue Hearings (1905-6), pp. 456-470. Cost of sugar
$1.50. 84° sugar worth one cent less than 96° sugar and cost of re-
fining 96° sugar is put at $0.84. $1.50 + $1.00 + .84 — $3.34.
^ Ihid., pp. 471-3, 1 1 12, 1 1 16, 1203.
' Ibid., p. 467. Citation from American Economist, July 7, 1895.
453] CANE-SUGAR COMPETITION 195
W. C. Welborn, Chief of the Bureau of Agriculture,
testified ^ that 40 per cent of the juice is lost in extraction,
that no centrifugal sugar is produced, that no progress is
possible with the carabao as a draft animal, that there is
already as large a percentage of the land cultivated in the
Philippines as in Florida and Texas and three-fourths as
large a percentage as in Louisiana, and that the sand bars
and shallow water around Negros put that island at a great
disadvantage as compared with other countries.
Colonel J. D. Hill, sugar expert of New Orleans, who
went with the Taft party to the Philippines, said that those
islands have enough sugar-cane area to produce twice the
sugar Cuba can ever produce.^
Mr. T. G. Palmer, representing the American Associa-
tion of Beet-Sugar Manufacturers, presented a great deal
of testimony, in part of which he cited Mr. Taft's state-
ment before the Insular Commission (p. 265) to the effect
that the Philippines can supply the world with sugar.^ He
also quoted General Luke E. Wright as saying that the
Philippines are as good for sugar as Hawaii * and gives
figures to show that the cost of production in the Phil-
ippines is $0.62)^ to $0.95 per 100 pounds.^ He also
quoted H. C. Prinsen Geerligs, the Dutch sugar expert, as
saying that at one and one-half cents per pound Java made
40 per cent profit and the Philippines could do better.®
^Philippine Revenue Hearings (1905-6), pp. 193, 254, 255, 1095.
2 Ibid., pp. 991 et seq. ^ Ibid., p. 590. ^'Ibid., p. 590.
' Ibid., p. 592. Citation from Hearings before Senate Philippine
Committee, pp. 2364, 2365.
« Tariff Hearings, 1908-09, p. 3473. He stated later (Hardwick
Commitee Hearings, p. 2744, Aug. 2, 1911), that Mr. Prinsen Geerligs
had confirmed these figures afterwards, but they do not agree with
the figures of Mr. Prinsen Geerligs, published in an article by him in
the American Sugar Industry and Beet Sugar Gazette, July, 191 1, p.
303 et seq.
196 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [4-4
Dr. Paasche says ^ that it can scarcely be doubted that
the soil and climate of the Philippines are well adapted to
sugar production. He suggests the difficulties connected
with securing plenty of efficient labor but adds that the pro-
duction is sure to increase. and says that it is difficult to
form a judgment of the future of so rich a field under the
new American rule.
d. Conclusion
Without quoting further, it seems safe to say that, in
any case, there are great difficulties to be overcome before
the Philippines can reach the limits of their possibilities in
sugar production. Though the extent and the rapidity of
the probable developments are extremely uncertain, never-
theless, the possibilities of producing sugar very cheaply
and in large quantities are extremely great, especially if the
United States would permit unlimited free entry and pre-
serve a highly protected market and if it would, at the same
time, remove restrictions as to securing outside labor and
as to land holdings by corporations. Economic conditions
are not insurmountable: the political restrictions and un-
certainties have been the main factors in delaying the entry
of modern methods. But there are signs of change. Mr.
Horace Havemeyer and associates are now erecting a mod-
ern mill and there are recent reports that Hawaiian inter-
ests have just entered the field with considerable capital."
If these enterprises are successful, there is little doubt
that before long great pressure will be brought to bear in
order to remove restrictions which prevent the rapid de-
velopment of the Philippine sugar industry.
^ Die Zuckerproduktion der Welt, pp. 127-129.
" See New York Times, June 22, 191 1, p. 3. Also, testimony of
Horace Havemeyer, Hardwick Committee Hearings, June 20, 191 1,
pp. 561, 562, and Willett & Gray's Statistical Sugar Trade Journal,
July 6, 191 1, p, 274.
455] CANE-SUGAR COMPETITION i_gy
3. OTHER CANE-SUGAR COUNTRIES
Though the conditions in no two countries are ever the
same, nevertheless, the recent developments in such tropical
cane-sugar countries as Java, Hawaii, and Porto Rico are
pregnant with significance as to the possibilities of develop-
ment in Cuba, the Philippines, and other unexploited fields.
a. Java
The history of the Javan sugar industry is largely a
story of exploitation in which the Dutch East India Com-
pany, and later the Dutch government, sought to derive
the greatest possible revenue from the island/ The rise
of the industry to its present position dates from the crisis
of 1884. A great fall in the price of sugar forced many
factories into the hands of their creditors and caused others
to suffer bitter losses.^ To add to the disaster, a mysterious
disease called " sereh " invaded the island and threatened
to destroy the entire sugar industry. After fighting a hard,
but losing, battle for a number of years, those interested
in sugar production appealed to the mother country ^ ( in
1891), and H. C. Prinsen Geerligs was selected to go to
Java to try to save the industry and the people of the
island. He established an experiment station and, after
much effort, succeeded in combating the disease.
^ See Summary of Commerce and Finance for Nov., 1902, U, S.
Treas. Dept, Bureau of Statistics, pp. 1316-20. Das Zuckerrohr und
seine Kultur mit besonderer BerUcksichtigung der V erh'dltnisse und
Untersuchungen auf Java, Wilhelm Kriiger. (Madgeburg und Wien,
1899).
2 See " Progress and Present Condition of the Cane-Sugar In-
dustry," a lecture delivered before the 99th General Meeting of the
Braunschweig-Hanover Section of the Verein der Deutschen Zucker-
Industrie by H. C. Prinsen Geerligs, pub. in American Sugar In-
dustry and Beet Sugar Gazette, Chicago, July, 191 1, p. 303- This is
an admirable brief account by one of the best of authorities.
» T. G. Palmer, 1908-09, Tariff Hearings, p. 3473.
198
THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY
[456
But he did much more than this. He was imbued with
the spirit which had built up the beet-sugar industry of
Europe, and he undertook to make fundamental improve-
ments which later doubled the output and which gave a
great impulse to the cane-sugar industry of the whole
world. '' Experimental fields were laid out, new varieties
and fertilizers tested, factory methods were improved,
chemical control was introduced into the factory — in short,
there were introduced into every department of the cane-
sugar industry, research, study, testing and learning." ^
The effects are reflected in the following table and to-day
Java probably produces sugar cheaper than any other large
exporting country.
Table XLI. Acreage and Production of Raw Sugar in Java'
Area under
cane, acres.
Raw sugar,
long tons.
Average per
acre, lbs.
% yield of
sugar from
cane.
I 893-1 894....
192,541
522,572
6,079
10.36
I894-I895....
190,500
572,378
6,730
9.79
I895-I896 —
182,840
529,945
6,443
10.55
I896-I897 —
186,064
577,033
6,947
10.06
I 897-1 898 —
198,516
713,572
8,052
10.21
1 898-1 899 —
206,159
750,398
8,154
10.94
I899-I900.. ..
224,309
732,495
7,315
9.57
I900-I90I —
251,290
791,033
Kl'
10.16
I90I-I902 —
257,401
882.952
7,684
10.77
I902-I903 —
251,438
937,257
8,350
10.03
I903-I904....
254,609
1,038,370
9,135
10.74
1904-1905 —
260,430
1,042,439
8,797
10.37
I905-I906....
273,673
1,050,923
8,602
10.04
I906-I907
280,621
1,191,072
9,520
10.76
I 907-1 908.. ..
285,600
1,222,259
9,574
10.00
I908-I909 —
301,741
1,222,102
9,139
9-97
I909-I9IO —
312,643
1,260,067
9,216
10.33
I9IO-I9II —
325,814
* Amer. Sugar Industry and Beet Sugar Gazette, July, 1911, p.
2 From Journal des Fabricants du Sucre, May 10, 1911.
304-
457] CANE-SUGAR COMPETITION jgg
b. Hawaii
Perhaps no sugar-producing country in the world exem-
plifies in a more forcible way than Hawaii what can be
done in cane-sugar production through scientific methods,
large-scale production and modern capitalistic manage-
ment, especially when favored with free entry to a large
and protected sugar market.
The reciprocity treaty admitting Hawaiian sugar to the
United States free of duty went into force in 1876 and it
has enjoyed an uninterrupted period of free trade with
the United States ever since, though the McKinley bill of
1890, which put raw sugar on the free list, temporarily
removed Hawaii's special advantage as regards sugar in
the United States markets.
The Hawaiian production of sugar in 1876 was scarcely
over 13,000 short tons. In three years it had doubled, and
in three more years it had doubled again, and the increase
has continued almost without interruption up to the present
time. In spite of the fact that, for the last decade or more,
nearly every one referring to the matter says that the
Hawaiian Islands have reached their limit, nevertheless
the output continues to increase and within the past ten
years has doubled. It is now about half a million long
tons annually, or over forty times what it was when reci-
procity began with the United States thirty-five years ago.
Those not familiar with Hawaiian conditions and the
history of the growth of this industry may think that her
remarkable increase in sugar production has been a matter
of comparative ease to accomplish, that by virtue of her
soil and climatic conditions sugar can be grown almost
without effort. Those who hold such views err greatly.
Few industries have shown a more prolonged and incessant
struggle against fundamental and perplexing difficulties
and few have been under more persevering and intelligent
direction.
200 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [458
True, the sugar industry has been extremely profitable
but this has only been a spur to redouble efforts towards
expansion and the output has measured the limit of the
powers of human brain and brawn. In proportion to area,
this output has exceeded that of any country on the globe.
Table XLII. Sugar Yield Per Acre in Various Countries ^
Cane. Beets.
Tons of sugar Tons of sugar
per acre. per acre.
Hawaii 4.64 Germany 2.1 5
India.... 0.45 France 1.62
Java 4.00-4.46 Austria-Hungary 1.67
New South Wales 1.78 Russia 92
Queensland 1.43 Belgium 2.08
Fiji 1.43 Holland 1.87
Mauritius 2.23-2.68 Denmark 1.80
Reunion i. 34-1.56 United States 89
Natal 76-1.43
Cuba 1.78-2.00
Jamaica 80
British Guiana i .61-1 .78
Trinidad 98-1.34
British Honduras 38- .62
Peru 2.68-3.12
Ecuador 1.78-2.00
Louisiana 1.34
Since the rise of the sugar industry the ends of the earth
have been scoured for laborers. Both the planters and the
government have maintained employment agencies and
have exerted the utmost efforts to secure desirable immi-
gration. Considering the difficulties encountered, they
have been fairly successful.
Nor has labor been the only big problem in the growth
of the Hawaiian industry. The rise to the present status
^ Beet crops are produced within a year; cane crops vary from 12 to
18 months. Compiled from H. Passche, Die Zuckerprodukion der
Welt (Leipzig and Berlin, 1905), pp. 265-269. Cited in forthcoming
Commercial Hawaii, U. S. Dept. of Commerce and Labor.
459] CANE-SUGAR COMPETITION 201
has meant the expenditure of vast sums for enormous irri-
gation systems. For example, Dr. Stubbs' report, men-
tioned above, states that the Ewa plantation had a system
with eight pumps, costing $1,750,000, and capable of sup-
plying 75,000,000 gallons of water daily. This was for
5,000 acres in cane. The expenses for irrigation alone for
the one year given (1898-9) were $64.07 per acre, con-
sisting of $24.84 pumping expense, $37.18 for expense of
applying, and $2.05 for ditches. Coal was imported from
New Zealand and cost $7.50 to $10.00 per ton, besides
paying a tariff.
The efforts as regards labor and irrigation, the estab-
lishment of experiment stations, the co-operation of the
planters in all lines of endeavor, including those of market-
ing and refining their sugar — all are illustrative of the
enterprise back of the Hawaiian industry and of what such
enterprise can achieve in tropical cane-sugar production,
even in the face of great obstacles.
c. Porto Rico
Since the advent of American rule,^ the development of
the Porto Rican sugar industry has been very rapid. The
exports of sugar, practically all of which have been to the
United States, have been as follows : ^
Long tons of Long tons of
2240 lbs. each. 2240 lbs. each.
1900 - . 26,462 1906 180,283
1901 61,526 1907 182,213
1902 82,064 1908 209,471
1903 100,989 1909 218,086
1904 115,756 1910 254,038
1905 121,127
1 Act of May i, 1900 provided for a presidential proclamation of
free trade which became effective July 25, 1901.
' Production and Commercial Movement of Sugar, U. S. Dept. of
Commerce and Labor. (Forthcoming, exact title undetermined.)
202 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [460
These figures show a substantial increase for nearly
every year and a total of nearly ten-fold in ten years.
The increase is only partially accounted for by the in-
crease in area devoted to the culture, though that has
been considerable. For example, in 1905, the area devoted
to cane was 137,733 acres and in 1910, 178,984 acres, an
increase of 30 per cent, while the exports of sugar had in-
creased over 100 per cent.^
The greatest factors in this increase of output have been
free trade with the United States and the development
which it has caused. With this great advantage as against
the other sugar-producing countries of the world, American
capital, science and enterprise have been induced to go into
the island, which had an abundance of cheap labor, and ex-
cellent soil and climatic conditions. Before the Spanish-
American war, many sugar estates and mills had been
abandoned, owing to unprofitable production under con-
tinuous cultivation with crude agricultural implements and,
also, owing to obsolete machinery and methods in manu-
facturing.
The Foraker Act of 1900 provided that no company
should acquire possession of over 500 acres of land in
Porto Rico, and that no stockholder in an agricultural
company should have any interest in any other corporation
or company of the island. This was meant to prevent the
exploitation of the island and its people by outside capital-
ists and it tended to prevent the rapid development of the
industry, which needed modern capitalistic and economic
production more than anything else if it were to reach the
fullness of its possibilities.^
* Commercial Porto Rico, U. S. Dept. of Com. and Labor (forth-
coming).
2 Not considring social effects for the present. See article by H. C.
Prinsen Geerligs, Amer. Sug. Ind. and Beet Sugar Gaz., June, 191 1,
p. 251.
46l] CANE-SUGAR COMPETITION 203
But this law was changed somewhat later. Americans,
French and English have made considerable investments
in the islands and the old regime is giving way to a more
modern one. The United States government has estab-
lished an agricultural experiment station and this has kept
up continuous experiments with varieties of cane and fer-
tilizers. Lands which are too wet are being drained ; those
on the south side of the island which are too dry are being
put under irrigation; deep plowing is taking the place of
skimming the surface; steam plows are being used on the
larger estates and, on both the agricultural and manufac-
turing sides of the industry, modern methods and machin-
ery are taking the place of obsolete ones.
It is not to be assumed that this revolution is complete
by any means, or that the industry is not confronted with
many problems, but the development of the last decade in-
dicates something of what we may expect for the future
in view of the economic conditions and in view of what has
been accomplished in Java and Hawaii.
These three countries are merely leading examples of
the recent rise of the tropical cane-sugar industry all over
the world. Others which might be mentioned are For-
mosa, Australia, Mauritius, Peru, Argentina and Mexico.
The very rapid development in Formosa, which has been
purposely promoted by Japanese political measures, is par-
ticularly instructive as regards the part such measures can
play in this movement.
4. CONCLUSION
On the whole, the economic conditions in Cuba and the
Philippines and the recent progress in cane-sugar countries
indicate that the United States beet-sugar industry will
have to face serious competition from these quarters if
204 ^^^ BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [462
their possibilities are exploited. An important factor in de-
termining the extent of the development of these economic
possibilities will be the political measures of the United
States. Of these political measures, the tariff is the most
important, and in the next chapter we shall consider some
of its effects.
Chapter VIIL Tariffs and Prices
In view of the prominent part which legislation has
played in the past and promises to play in the future, as
regards the development of the sugar industries of the
various countries of the world, it seems desirable to study
somewhat more closely the effects of such legislation in the
United States, particularly the effects of tariffs upon prices.
This seems the more necessary when we think of the
controversies over such questions as the following: How
much more do the American people have to pay for their
sugar than if there were no tariff? If the tariff were low-
ered, would the price of sugar fall by the full amount of
the reduction, or by only a small part of it? To whom
have the benefits of the Cuban concession gone, to the
Cuban producer, the American consumer, or the sugar
trust ? Besides the direct effect of tariffs upon prices, what
are the indirect effects upon supply? If the present duties
were lowered, would not the domestic industries be crip-
pled or destroyed and would not the American consumer
ultimately have to pay more for his sugar on account of
this reduction?
Though it is impossible to answer all of these questions
fully and definitely, nevertheless we shall present briefly
a few considerations bearing upon them. First, after
stating the essential features of present and recent sugar
tariffs, we shall present an analysis by Professor Taussig
wherein he calculates the taxes paid by American con-
sumers and the amounts of the same as distributed to the
federal government and to the various sugar interests by
463] ,205
2o6 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [464
virtue of these duties. Next we shall present the ex parte
statements of various sugar producers as to the cost of the
tariff to the American consumer. Then we shall present
our own analysis of United States sugar prices for the last
three decades, attempting to separate influences of tariffs
upon prices from those of world's supply and refiners'
combinations, and endeavoring to show the effect of each.
Following this, we shall consider the effect of the Cuban
concession, reserving for the conclusion of the study a
further statement of the bearings of tariff legislation upon
the domestic beet-sugar industry.
I. UNITED STATES SUGAR-TARIFF RATES
Briefly stated, the sugar tariffs of the Payne-Aldrich
bill of August 5, 1909, which are now in force, are as fol-
lows:
Per 100 pounds.
Sugars not above No. 16 Dutch Standard ^ in color,
and not above 75O polarization $0.95 -
For each additional degree in polarization, $0,035
This makes the duty upon 89° mucovado ... 1.44 •
Upon 96° centrifugals 1.685
Sugar above No. 16 Dutch Standard in color, and
all that has gone through a process of refining. . r.90
* Formerly, the quality of sugar was judged by its color; the whiter
the color, the purer the sugar was supposed to be. This was found to
be very inaccurate and many manufacturers and importers of sugar
colored it artificially in order to evade part, or all, of the import
duties. The polariscope is an instrument to determine the purity of
sugar by the reflection of rays of light passing through it. It is
much more accurate than the color test and the use of the Dutch
Standard has been discarded by practically all civilized countries,
though the United States, Canada, and a few others retain it in con-
nection with the polariscope test. Pure sugar has a polarization of
100° ; No. 16 D. S. sugar normally has a polarization of about 96°,
though it varies considerably. For a discussion of these standards,
see H. W. Wiley, Forum, vol. 23, pp. 591, et seq.; speech of Senator
J. L. Bristow, Cong. Record, July 13 and 14, 191 1; D. A. Wells, Sugar
465] TARIFFS AND PRICES 20/
By an act of the same date, free entry is given to 300,000
gross tons of Philippine sugar annually, the smaller pro-
ducers to be favored in case imports exceed this amount.
Prior to that time (from March 8, 1902) Philippine sugars
paid 75 per cent of the regular duties. By a reciprocity
act which went into effect December 27, 1903, Cuban
sugars are given a concession of 20 per cent of the regular
duties. Porto Rican sugars have had free entry to the
United States since July 25, 1901, and Hawaiian sugars
since August 15, 1876.
The duties on sugar in the Dingley bill of July 24, 1897
were the same as those of the Payne-Aldrich bill except
that the rate on refined was $1.95 instead of $1.90; that is,
rates on sugar have remained practically unchanged since
1897, except for concessions to Cuba, Porto Rico and the
Philippines.^ Under the Wilson bill of August 27, 1894,
the duty upon all sugar, both raw and refined, was 40 per
cent ad valorem, plus one-eighth of a cent per pound upon
refined. Under the McKinley Bill of October i, 1890,
raws were made free, refined paid only one-half cent, and
the domestic beet and cane-sugar industries were given the
encouragement and protection of a bounty of two cents
per pound which was to run fourteen years, but this entire
law was repealed by the Wilson Bill, except that the flat
countervailing duty of one-tenth of a cent per pound upon
the importations of bountied foreign sugar was retained.
Previous to the McKinley Bill,^ 96° raw sugar paid $2.24,
Industry of the U. S. and the Tariff, pp. 23 et seq. Various refer-
ences are also found in the different congressional Hearings upon
sugar. Among the latest discussions' are those by H. W. Wiley and
W. L. Bass in the Hardwick Committee Hearings, pp. 3424-3456 and
3923-3952 (1912).
^ All these tariffs are found collected and indexed in House Doc.
no. 671, 61 st Cong., 2d Sess. (1909)-
' That is, beginning with the bill of 1883 in effect June i, 1883.
208
THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY
[466
if not above No. 13 Dutch Standard in color, and $2.75,
if between Nos. 13 and 16, and $3.00, if between Nos. 16
and 20, and $3.50, if No. 20 or over, so that the bill of
Table XLIII. United States Government in Account with United
States Sugar Consumers ^
(for the year 1906.)
Dr.
Cr.
Taxes paid on
total con-
sumption of
6370 million
pounds.
Received
by U. S.
Treasury.
jOn 1128 million pounds
full-duty sugar i$i9,ioo,ooo
iOn 2782 million pounds
Cuba sugar , 32,800,000
On 69 million pounds
Philippine sugar ' 500,000
$101, 000,000 1 On 712 million pounds ;
i Hawaii sugar :
jOn 410 million pounds i
Porto Rico sugar \
On 594 million pounds
Louisiana sugar
On 672 million pounds
domestic beet sugar . .
Total $101,000,000
Potal $52,400,000 $48,600,000
Received
by the
sugar pro-
ducers.
$9,200,000
200,000
11,700,000
6,800,000
9,600,000
11,100,000
$101,000,000
1890 was a lowering of the tariff by $2.24 on most raw
sugar and $3.00 on refined. The Dingley Act of 1897
changed the countervailing duty from the flat, or uniform,
rate of one-tenth of a cent to an amount to be determined
for each country as occasion should arise, the aim being
to make it exactly equivalent to the amount of the foreign
^ F. W. Taussig, Atlantic Monthly, vol. loi, p. 342. According to
this table the tax paid by the U. S. consumers averaged $1.58555 per
100 lbs. upon all consumed, whether it was produced at home or im-
ported. This is approximately the duty upon 93° sugar.
467]
TARIFFS AND PRICES
209
bounty. This feature was retained in the Payne-Aldrich
Bill of 1909, and is still in force/
2. PROFESSOR Taussig's analysis
Though not many deny that our tariff upon sugar sub-
sidizes our domestic cane and beet-sugar industries and
raises the cost to consumers by millions of dollars annually,
yet few agree on the amount of the net cost to the people at
large, or even upon the extent of the benefit to the protected
industries. Professor Taussig presents the accompanying
table (No. XLIII) as his approximate estimate of the
costs of our sugar tariff and the amounts of the proceeds
going to various interests. The duties upon imports going
into the United States Treasury and the amounts received
by the various producers on account of the tariff in 1906
as estimated in the above table by Professor Taussig are
shown in table No. XLIV.
Table XLIV. Distribution of Tariff Benefits
Full- duty sugar
Cuba sugar
Philippine sugar . . . .
Hawaii sugar
Porto Rico sugar . .
Louisiana sugar
Domestic beet sugar .
Average
Received by
U. S. Treasury
per 100 pounds
sugar.
.8226
Received by
sugar producers
per 100 pounds
sugar.
.00
3306
.2898
1.6432
1.6585
1.6161
1.6517
.7629
Table XLV for 19 10 is calculated at the same rates as
* For present tariffs of foreign countries see Hardwick Committee
Hearings, pp. 3775-3862.
2IO
THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY
[468
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(N O
469] TARIFFS AND PRICES 211
that of Professor Taussig, except that the entire amount
for the Philippines is put in one column, as this sugar has
had free entry since August 5, 1909/
It will be seen that rates have changed a little since Pro-
fessor Taussig wrote, or that his estimates were not quite
correct, for the table for 19 10, calculated at the same rates,
lacks $1,902,222.25 of balancing and the amount shown
as going to the United States Treasury lacks about $6,-
000,000 of corresponding with the facts. On the basis of
these calculations, jtlie consumers paid an average of $1,585
per 100 pounds 01 sugar on account of the tariff in 1906.
This equaled 35 per cent of the New York wholesale price
of granulated, or 68 per cent of the New York price of
96° centrifugals, without duty. Of this amount, an aver-
age of $0.82, or a trifle over half, went into the United
States Treasury and $0.76 into the pockets of the pro-
ducers, among whom were Cubans, Hawaiians, Porto
Ricans, Filipinos, and domestic beet and cane-sugar pro-
ducers.
Assuming for the present that these rates held for 1910,
the consumers paid $1.56 per 100 pounds on account of the
tariff; that is, 31 per cent of the New York wholesale
price of granulated, or 55 per cent of that of 96° centri-
fugals. Of this amount, the United States Treasury re-
ceived $0.62, or two-fifths, and the producers $0.94, or
three-fifths. Whether the estimates of Professor Taussig
are correct or not,^ it is evident that the amount received by
the government has remained about the same for the two
years, though the consumption increased 20 per cent.
1 Professor Taussig's table does not claim to be other than an ap-
proximation. This fact must be kept in mind ; also, the further fact
that various circumstances may have modified the actual rates for en-
suing years, hence a comparison based upon this table must not be
pressed too far.
' What the writer deems to be the facts will appear as we proceed.
212 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [470
3. EX PARTE STATEMENTS OF TARIFF COSTS
The ex parte statements of tariff costs by sugar pro-
ducers are as various as their interests, as the following
will illustrate. Mr. Claus A. Spreckels said that the tariff
causes the American consumers to pay extra by two cents
a pound, or, $134,000,000 annually;^ Mr. E. F. Atkins
said the cost to the consumer is raised by the full amount
of the tariff except in a few instances ; ^ Mr. H. O. Have-
meyer said, '' It represents a charge upon consumption of
nearly two cents a pound " ;^ Mr. Frank C. Lowry says :
" it increases in-bond values to the extent of the duty." *
According to these gentlemen, and others who maintain
that the price of sugar is raised by the full amount of the
duty on refined sugar, the tax upon the consumers in 19 10
was about $140,000,000. According to Mr. T. G. Palmer,''
representing the beet-sugar interests, it amounted to only
$74,030,251 ($1,007 per 100 pounds), of which only $22,-
259,109 was chargeable to protection. According to Mr.
J. E. Burguieres,^ a Louisiana sugar planter, the present
protection amounts to about $1.09 per 100 pounds; that
is, his figures are a little higher than those of Mr. Palmer.
Mr. Charles B. Warren,'^ president of the Michigan
Sugar Co., said that a reduction of the tariff upon 96°
* Tariff Hearings, 1908-09, p. 3443. Hardwick Committee Hearings,
p. 2246.
' Tariff Hearings, 1908-09, p. 3379. Hardwick Committee Hearings,
pp. 171 et seq.
• Hardwick Committee Hearings, p. 2048. From minutes of stock-
holders' meeting of 1902.
* Ibid., pp. 1665 et seq. (1911). Similar testimony by W. P. Willett,
ibid., p. 3547.
' Ibid., pp. 2651-2.
• Ibid., p. 1880.
^ Ibid., p. 721.
47 1 ] TARIFFS AND PRICES 2 1 3
sugar from $1,685 to $1,345 (Cuban duty) probably would
not affect the price.
4. ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF TARIFFS AND OTHER
FACTORS GOVERNING PRICE
In the accompanying table and following explanations
we present a summary of our own analysis of the principal
influences affecting United States sugar prices, trying to
separate those of the tariff from those of world supply
and those of refiners' combinations.*
a. Effect of World's Supply on Prices of Raws
First, if we compare columns 2 and 3 showing the
world's production and the world's price as given at Ham-
burg, we notice that there is a very close connection be-
tween them. On the whole it is noticeable that there has
been a great increase in production and a similar decrease
in world prices for these three decades.^ In most cases,
wherever there is a large increase in production there is a
still greater decrease in price and vice versa. When pro-
duction remains at a standstill there is usually a tendency
for prices to rise unless there have been several big pre-
ceding crops which have left stocks on hand. This is prob-
ably because of a constant increase of population and at the
same time a tendency towards greater per capita consump-
tion. Among the more notable instances showing this re-
lation between the fluctuations in world's production and
^ Since this was written, the 4th volume of the Hardwick Committee
Hearings has been published. In them appear very detailed analyses
of the effects of U. S. sugar tariffs by Mr. W. P. Willett. See pp.
3063-3165, 3541-3616, 3739-3775, 3976-3978; particularly, pp. 3548-3555,
3608, 3977. For an extensive presentation of foreign prices and
duties, see pp. 3775-3862; also, for prices, Sen, Doc. no. 55, 62d Cong.,
I St Sess. See, also, Report of Hardwick Committee, 62d Cong., 2d
Sess., H. R. no. 331, pp. 16-18, 22.
' And this is true of the entire last century.
214 ^^^ BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [4^3
world's prices, we may cite the periods immediately preced-
ing and following the years 1887, 1893, 1897, 1902, 1906
and 191 1. The years 1900 and 1904 are only apparent ex-
ceptions to the rule, due to the fact that the price figures are
for calendar years and the production figures for the crop
of the preceding year, most of which is put on the market
the first half of the year for which the price is given. That
is, prices reflect crop conditions of the same year, especially
the latter half of the year, though comparatively little of
the sugar of that crop gets on the market before the fol-
lowing year.
b. Effect of United States Ditties on New York Prices of
Raw and Granulated
It is often disputed whether or not a change in the tariff
affects the price to the American consumer by the amount
of the change in the duty. Too many who argue this ques-
tion assume that they can take the price of granulated
sugar as a simple price affected by the tariff only, whereas,
as shown above, this price is a resultant of at least three
very important forces, or independent variables, not to
mention minor factors. Furthermore, it is common to take
averages of yearly prices which do not make due allow-
ances for changes within the year, and as most tariff
changes are within the year, considerable error arises from
this fact. The two accompanying tables are made up to
correspond more exactly with tariff changes.
From what has been said, it is evident that column 5
(both tables) showing the difference between the Hamburg
and New York prices of centrifugals has the closest rela-
tion of any to tariff changes.^ For instance, the average
* According to Willett & Gray, about 35 cents, plus the duty, should
be added to the Hamburg price to ascertain the New York parity.
This, as is seen from their calculation, is to cover freight, insurance,
473] TARIFFS AND PRICES 21 5
Table XLVII. Prices Grouped According to United States Tariff Changes *
(Per 100 pounds.)
From
Jan.
[882
To.
U. S. Import Duties.
June 1, 1883
June I, 1883
Apr. I, 1891
Apr. 1,1891 ! Aug. 37,1894
Aug. 37, 1894 I July 34, 1897
July 24, 1897
Dec. 37, 1903
No. 7-10 D. S., $3.50.
No. 10-13 D. S.,$2.8i.
No. 13-16 D. S., $3.43.
Refined, $5.00.
96° if not above No. 13 D. S., $2.24
96° if above No. 13 and not above No.
16, $2.75.
Refined, $3 50.
Raw sugar free.
Above No. 16 D. S., $0.50.
Bountied sugar extra, $0.10.
All sugars 40 per cent ad valorem.
Sugars above 16 D. S., additional duty,
$0,125.
Countervailing duty on bountied sugar,
$0.10.
Sugars not above No. 16 D. S. and 75°
I polarization, $0.95.
j Every additional degree, $0,035.
Dec. 27, 1903 I Equal to $1,685 for 96°-
j Over 16 D. S. and refined, $1.95.
I Countervailing duty equal to bounty,
equal to 27c on German raw sugar.
j Dec. 27, 1903, Cuba given 20 per cent,
concession.
Dec. 31, 1910 Aug. 5, 1909, P. I. given 300,000 tons
I free entry.
i Duty on refined reduced to $1.90.
s.%
U
$4,668
3.062
3.011
2.160
1.927
2.291
V -
wo
II
o ;.<s rt>'
$3-236 $7.904 !$i. 232 $9,136
2.881 5.943
•375 3.386
1.265 1 3.425
2.148 4.075
1.704
.877 6.820
I.03I 4.407
.881 4.306
.8231 4.898
3.995 .846 4.841
1 Averages of weekly New York prices and averages of monthly
Hamburg prices. Compiled from Willett & Gray's Weekly Statistical
Sugar Trade Journal.
commission, loss of weight and a difference in quality, arbitrarily
assumed to be 19 cents per 100 lbs. A larger tariff than the present
one would make a slightly greater difference in value, due to the pay-
ing of a larger duty on what is lost in refining. It will be noticed that
during the two whole years (1892 and 1893) under free raw sugar,
the average differences in prices were 37.3 cents and 33.5 cents, re-
2i6 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [474
difference between 88 per cent Hamburg and 96° New
York in the first period is $3,236 per 100 pounds. In that
period, the duty on No. 13 D. S. is $2.81. The next
period, the average difference between Hamburg and New
York is $2,881, a fall of $0,355; the duty on 96°, if not
spectively, so that the estimate of 35 cents, plus the duty, must have
been very nearly correct at that time.
Willett & Gray's Calculation.
Parity of 88% analysis beet and 96° polarization cane sugar, duty
paid, and Cuban sugar, cost and freight (without bounty and coun-
tervailing duty. Exchange at $4.88).
Beet at i6s. per cwt. (112 lbs.), f. o. b. Hamburg, add 4J^d. for
freight and lighterage to refinery, say i6s. 4j^d. net per cwt.
c. i. f. to New York 3-570c
Insurance — Bk. Com. — Loss weight, together i^% 055
Duty (88 anal, out-turn, 94° polarization) 1.615
Difference in value to refiners between beet and cane 19
88% beet, f. o. b. Hamburg.
s. d.
14 0
15 0
16 3
17 sX
18 jVz
To ascertain c. & f. parity of centrifugals paying full duty, deduct
34 cents from parity of Cubas, c. & f. — Willett & Gray's Weekly Sta-
tistical Sugar Trade Journal, Sept. 7, 191 1.
The bounty on German raws, from 1896 to Aug. 31, 1903, amounted
to 27 cents per 100 lbs., according to Mr. F. R. Rutter (Bui. 30, p. 27,.
Bureau of Statistics, U. S. Dept. of Agr.), and the Dingley Bill, which
went into effect July 24, 1897, niade the countervailing duty equal to
the full amount of the bounty, instead of 10 cents per 100 lbs. as
previously.
The Dutch Standard was used up to 1883 when the polariscope test
was added. Before that time the duty on sugar from Nos. 13 to 16
was $3.43 ; on sugar from Nos. 10 to 13, $2.81 ; and on sugar from
Nos. 7 to 10, $2.50. It is probable that most of what was imported
5.430c
Equals to 96°
Equals to 96°
centrif. at N. Y.
Cuba centrif. c&f
duty-paid.
N.Y., without duty.
$4.99
$3^63
S.21
3.85
5.50
4.14
5.75
4-38
6.01
4.65
475] TARIFFS AND PRICES 21/
^^^^^ ^5^3-ijLP' ^•' ^^^ *^^^ $2.24, and if above No. 13,
it was $2 . 7 57a fall of $0.57 in duty on most of the sugar
and of $0.06 on a small part; that is, a fall in the duty of
about $0.57 was accompanied by a fall or $0,355 i^ the dif-
ference between Hamburg and New York, or something
less than the amount of the change in duty, though it is dif-
ficult to estimate the exact change, because standards by
which the tests were applied were different in the two
periods.
In the next period in which we had free raw sugar
(April I, 1891-August 2^, 1894), the duty on raws fell
$2.24 ($2.75 on a small part of the imports) and the differ-
ence between New York and Hamburg fell $2,506, that is,
by something more than the amount of the fall in the duty.
The next tariff imposed ad valorem rates which would
amount to about $0.86 on the average Hamburg price and,
if these sugars were colored, $0,125 might be added. The
increase in the difference in prices between New York and
Hamburg w^as $0.89, or approximately the same as the
change in duty.
The Dingley bill went back to the specific duty, which
amounted to very nearly the same as the increase in the
difference in price between the two places, vi;s., $0,883.
Near the close of the year 1903, the Cuban reciprocity bill
lowered the duty on her imports of 96° centrifugals by
paid the latter amount, though the writer has not sufficient data at
hand to determine exactly. However, in 1877, about half of the
duties collected on sugar came from those not above No. 7 and
nearly as much from sugars above No. 7, and not above No. 10,
leaving very little from sugars above No. 10 D. S. (See D. A. Wells,
Sugar Industry of the U. S. and the Tariff, p. 23.) From the Act of
1883 to that of 1890, the duty on sugar not over No. 13 was $1.40
for 75° polarization with an increase of $0.04 for every degree of
purity, equal to $2.24 for 96° sugar, and this is usually assumed to be
the duty, as few importers would allow the color to go above No. 13,
and thus have to pay $2.75 duty.
2i8 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [^y^
$0,337 and since that date the average difference between
New ^'ork and Hamburg prices has fallen by $0,444.
To sum up, it can be said that prices of raw sugar have
been affected approximately by the amount of change in
the tariff. Generally speaking, the difference between the
Hamburg price of 88 per cent beet and the New York
price of 96° centrifugal approximated fairly closely the
difference of 35 cents plus the duty (including the coun-
tervailing duty) ^ up to 1901. It is true that sometimes
the average price of 96° centrifugal was a little above, or
a little below, the Hamburg parity (more often above), but
for several years back, this disparity had not been great.
But beginning with 1901, 96° centrifugals have always
been below the Hamburg parity and increasingly so.^
The prices of granulated have also been affected in the
same direction, but this effect has often been accentuated
or neutralized in part by other factors and it is manifestly
unscientific to try to explain changes in prices of granu-
lated by changes in tariff only»- For example, in the above
table, the average price of granulated before June i, 1883,
was $9,136 and, after that time, with a lowering of the
duty by about $0.57 on raws and $1.50 on refined, there
was a fall in "the average price of $2,316, making it $6.82.
The greater part of this fall in the price of granulated was
accounted for by the fall of $1,606 in the world price of
raws at Hamburg and a very much smaller proportion by
the change in the tariff, though neither factor alone offers
a complete explanation.
^ The countervailing duty on Hamburg sugar was $0.10 per 100 lbs.
from April i, 1891 (McKinley bill) to July 24, 1897 (Dingley bill).
From that date to Sept. i, 1903 (Brussels Convention in effect) it
was equivalent to the full amount of the bounty, or $0.27 per 100 lbs.
' This naturally brings up the matter of the Cuban concession, a
short discussion of which will be given a little later.
^i %
477] TARIFFS AND PRICES / 21
Again, under the Wilson bill, there was an increase of
nearly a cent a pound in the duty on raw sugar but the
average price of granulated was a little lower under the
higher duty because the world's price of raws had fallen
almost exactly enough to counterbalance the increase of
duty. The price of granulated was not increased by the
full increase of the duty under the Dingley bill, because of
a further lowering of the world's price in consequence of
increased production. In all cases, allowances should be
made for fluctuations in refiners' margins, the causes of
which will be considered next.
c. Eifect of Refiners' Competition on the Margin between
Raw and Granulated
We have been considering the prices of raw sugar, for
the most part, up to this point. Though all the factors in-
fluencing these prices are carried forward in the prices of
granulated, still, in the latter, there is the further addition
of the refiners' margin, the fluctuations in which are most
affected by another factor. This margin between the price
of raw and granulated goes to the refiner for cost of re-
fining and profits. It is pretty generally declared by re-
finers that the cost of converting 96° sugar into granulated
is about 60 or 65 cents per 100 pounds, 62y2 cents being
the most common figure given, when the tariff is at the
present rate and with granulated sugar selling at about
$5.00.^ It is reasonable to suppose that it is no more than
this, and there are indications that it is probably as low as
50 cents sometimes.^
^ In the process of refining a few pounds of impurities and low
grade sugar are lost, wholly or in part. The greater the tariff on raw
sugar, the greater the loss thus sustained; hence, the higher the tariff,
or the higher the price of raw sugar, the greater the cost of refining.
' For an analysis of cost of refining by J. H. Post, see Report of In-
220 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [^^^g
As is natural to suppose, the difference between the
prices of raw and refined sugars will seldom go below the
actual cost of refining and only in one year (1899) has this
difference averaged as low as 50 cents/
A study of the table presented a few pages above bears
out, in a most convincing way, the theory that our import
duties upon sugar have been so high and so arranged
that the tariff has set only the maximum limit to the
dustrial Comtnission, vol. i, pp. 150-151. Also, D. D. Colcock, Tariff
Hearings, 1908-09, vol. iii, pp. 3257 et seq. Following are typical
statements relative to the cost of refining : Americans can refine nearly
as cheaply as any in the world. Washington B. Thomas, Hardwick
Committee Hearings, p. 1985. Cost is less than 30 cents, from
the standpoint of manufacturing, but 65 cents including loss. Beet
and cane the same. Less in the United States than in foreign
countries. C. A. Spreckels, Hardwick Committee Hearings, pp. 2060-
2065. Cost of refining in the United States less than l4 cent. J.
E. Burguieres, ibid., p. 1866. Cost of refining, ^ cents. E. F.
Atkins, ibid., p. 140. ^ cent for refining and freight on Cuban
sugar. H. T. Oxnard, ibid., p. 416. 60 cents. J. H. Post, ibid.,
p. 541. 60 to 65 cents. W. G. Gilmore, ibid., June 28, 191 1.
£1 los. in London (equals 32^ cents per 100 lbs.). Charles Lyle,
London refiner, in Report of Tariff Commission of Great Britain, vol.
7, witness no. 117. Quoted by T. G. Palmer, Hardwick Committee
Hearings, p. 2606. About J^ cent, varies according to factory between
50 and 60 cents, including waste. About .3 cent to .5 cent not counting
waste. H. T. Oxnard, Cuban Reciprocity Hearings, 1902, p. 157. 30
cents for cane, not including loss. Edw. F. Dyer, Tariff Hearings,
1908-09, p. 3489. Refining cost, 65 cents. F. C. Lowry, Hardwick
Committee Hearings, p. 1696. Refining cos't in the United States
less than elsewhere in the world, and will continue to be so. Labor
cost of refining (1890) Germany, 43 cents; France, 38 cents; Eng-
land, 34 cents; United States, 14 cents. Sugar refining costs 10
cents to 15 cents less here than anywhere else in the world. John de
Witt Warner, Byron W. Holt and L. C. Root, Sen. Rept. 452, p. 80,
53d Congress, 2d Session. Our refiners can beat the world
without any differential. H. W. Wiley, Hardwick Committee Hear-
ings, p. 3446 (1912). Many other similar statements are scattered
throughout the various congressional hearings relating to sugar.
' At the time of the Trust-Arbuckles fight.
479] TARIFFS AND PRICES 221
amount of the refiners' addition to the price, and that the
actual determinants have been the factors of trust control
and competition by independents.
According to detailed figures of Willett & Gray,^ the
average difference between the prices of centrifugal and
granulated for the nine years preceding the formation of
the trust was $1,098 and the average for the eleven years
succeeding was $0,958. But the more striking and signifi-
cant facts regarding the effects of trust control and com-
petition are not shown by such averages because the ex-
treme variations within such periods counterbalance each
other. If one follows the column showing the refiners'
margin for each year (column 7, table XLVI), and each
part of a year, preceding and following the important turn-
ing points in the trust's control of output, he can easily see
how this difference has been a barometer of the pressure
of competition. In other words, the tariff has been high
enough to prevent effective foreign competition with Amer-
ican refiners and the tendency of the refiners has been to
combine and put up prices, but this has always been a cause
of domestic competition and a lowered margin. This cycle
has been repeated again and again but, since the close of
the warfare with the Arbuckles and the organization of
the National in 1900, it appears that the policy has been
to refrain from former excesses as regards margins and
to maintain a fairly steady good margin rather than invite
too much competition through very large profits.^
^ Weekly lournal, May 11, 1899, p. 8.
^ For a treatment of the causes of growth of the American sugar
refining industry and the effect of the tariff upon it see The Sugar
Refining Industry in the United States, by Paul L. Vogt, particularly
chapters II and III, and page 33. Part of the latter is quoted later in
this study in connection with the consideration of the sugar trust.
222 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [480
d. The Cuban Concession
It has already been mentioned that since 1901, and par-
ticularly since 1903, the New York price of 96° centri-
fugals has been below the Hamburg parity and there has
been much discussion as to who gets the benefit of the 20
per cent concession ($0,337 on 96° sugar) to the Cubans.
Some have argued that the Cubans get the benefit of it,
others that the United States consumers get it, others that
the trust appropriates it. Professor Taussig's estimate,
given at the beginning of this chapter, calculates that the
Cuban producer got nearly all of it in 1906 and, presum-
ably, in other years. Following is an analysis by Messrs.
Willett&Gray:^
EFFECT OF REDUCTION OF 20% RECIPROCITY WITH CUBA UNDER DINGLEY
LAW.
The full duty on 96° test centrifugals $1,685 per 100 lbs.
20% less allowed to Cuba 1.348
The reduction in duty $0,337 per 100 lbs.
The full duty on 107 lbs. raws to make 100 lbs. refined gran-
ulated was $1,803
The 20% less duty on 107 lbs. raws to make 100 lbs. refined
granulated was 1.442
The reduction in duty on 100 lbs. refined was $0,361
The period of the Dingley Law without reciprocity was from July
24, 1897, to Dec. 27, 1903—340 weeks.
The period of the Dingley Law with reciprocity was from Dec. 27,
1903, to Aug. 6, 1909 (date of the Payne bill), comprising 298 weeks.
The average price of 96° centrifugals for 340
weeks without reciprocity was $4-075 per 100 lbs.
And for 298 weeks with reciprocity 3-940 per 100 lbs.
Reduction in raw quotations 0.135 per 100 lbs
* Hard wick Committee Hearings, pp. 3549-3551.
48 1 ] TARIFFS AND PRICES
223
It requires 107 lbs. of centrifugals of 96° test to make 100 lbs. of
refined of 100 test.
Without reciprocity, raws at $4,075 per 100 lbs. cost re-
finers $4,360 per 107
With reciprocity, raws at $3,940 per 100 lbs. cost re-
finers 4.209 per 107
With reciprocity, refiners paid less price for raws .... $0,151 per 107
Without reciprocity, refined granulated sold by re-
finers at $4-897 per 100
With reciprocity, refined granulated sold by refiners at. . 4.809 per 100
With reciprocity, refiners sold less price for gran-
ulated $0,088 per 100
Result — refiners saved in price of raws $0,151 per 107
Refiners lost in price of refined 0.088 per 100
Net gain of refiners by Cuban reciprocity $0,063 per 100
Amount of duty taken off 100 lbs. granulated $0,361
Of which refiners kept 0.063
Leaving for division between Cuba and U. S. consumers . . $0,298
In order to obtain the correct division of the $0,292 per 100 lbs.
gained by Cuba and United States consumers separately, the follow-
ing analysis must be made.
The average difference [per 100 lbs.] between centrifugal sugars of
96° polariscope in New York and raw beet sugar, 88 analysis, f. o. b.
Hamburg, reduced to the parity of 96° centrifugals in New York, for
six years under the Dingley Bill preceding reciprocity, compared with
eight years of reciprocity, is shown in the table. [Table XLVTII, page
224.]
These tables show that during the six years of Dingley Law, pre-
ceding reciprocity, Cuba sold her crop within $0,044 per 100 lbs. of
the world's price as fixed by the Hamburg market, notwithstanding it
included countervailing duty of $0.27 assessed by the United States,
while during the eight years of reciprocity, Cuba has sold her crop
at an average per year of $0,240 per 100 lbs. below the world's price.
The reciprocity duty allowance to Cuba is $0,337 per 100 lbs.
Of which amount Cuba received $0,097 per 100 lbs.
224
THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY
[482
Our first analysis shows that refiners received of
the $0,337 allowance $.063 per 100 lbs.
$0,160
Leaving the gain to consumers by reciprocity $0,177 per 100 lbs.
Cuban [producer] received $0,097 per 100 lbs.
[American] consumer received 0.177 per 100 lbs.
Cuba and consumer received $0,274 per 100 lbs.
which virtually confirms our first table that Cuba and consumer re-
ceived, together, $0,298 per 100 lbs.
Table XLVIII. Effect of Cuban Reciprocity
Year.»
Beets i Centrifs. i
at N. Y. at N, Y.
duty paid, duty paid
1898 i ;^4.27i
1899 ■ 4.393
1900 4454
1901 4 088
1902 3-645
1903 i 3-940
Average ^4.132
Centrifs.
higher.
^0.026
0.112
^4.235
4.419
4.566
4.047
3.542
3.720
$4,088 ' $0,138
Centrifs.
lower.
$0,036
0.041
0.103
0.220
$0,400
.138
6)$.262
For 6 years preceding reciprocity, centrifugals lower $0,044
1904.
1905.
1906.
1907.
1908.
1909,
1910.
1911 .
Average .
4.I4I
$3-974
$0,167
4.420
4.278
0.142
3.800
3.686
0.1 14
3.990
3-756
0.234
4.208
4.073 j
0.135
4-3"
4.007
0.304
4.722
4.188
0-534
4-749
4.453 ' •••• ! 0.295
$4,291
$4,051
...
$0,240
[For the four years preceding 1898, that is, under the Wilson bill,
centrifugals were above parity every year except 1895. The re-
spective averages were : 1894, + $0.06 ; 1895, — $0.067 ; 1896, + $0.023 ;
1897, +$0.043.— R. G. B.]
483] TARIFFS AND PRICES 225
It seems also that there have been numerous indirect
benefits in connection with Cuban reciprocity, though it is
impossible to measure their extent. The Cuban producer
has been favored against fuU-dutied sugar and has pre-
ferred to increase his output, selling it somewhat under the
world's market as he was thus enabled to do. Perhaps it
has not been so much a matter of preference with him as
it has been an inevitable consequence of the competition
among producers but, at any rate, this concession has
enabled him to sell a greater output below the world's
market to an extent that he could not have done without
the concession.
The refiners have gotten the indirect benefit that comes
with lower-cost sugar which is two-fold, first, in the lessen-
ing of the cost of refining, second, in the effect upon con-
sumption. Furthermore, refinery stockholders who are in-
terested in Cuban production have had the opportunity of
sharing in any benefits to the Cuban producer. Still fur-
ther, the refiners indirectly, and the consumers of the
United States more directly, have been able to benefit in-
creasingly by the depression of Cuban prices consequent
upon greater output. Of course, their gain has been the
Cuban's loss as regards this particular feature. This ap-
pears to be an indirect, rather than a direct, result of the
Cuban concession, and this concession has been only one
of a number of causes of depressed prices.
In 1890, the United States put a countervailing bounty
of $0.10 upon bountied sugars above No. 16 Dutch Stand-
ard. In 1897, the countervailing duty was made equal to
the entire amount of the foreign bounty.^ This put Cuba
upon a parity with European countries in the United States
^ 27c. per 100 lbs. on German raw sugar from this time till August
31, 1903, according to Rutter, op. cit., p. 27.
226 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [484
market, but not in other markets, particularly in the British
market. With the taking effect of the Brussels Conven-
tion, September i, 1903, Cuba was on a par with all im-
portant sugar-producing countries in both of the large im-
porting markets and, a little later in the same year, came
the treaty with the United States, which gave her a prefer-
ence of $0,337 as has been mentioned above. During these
years she has been recovering from the effects of the war ;
her plantations and mills are being modernized ; new areas
are being brought under cultivation, and new mills con-
structed. In a word, a variety of powerful forces have
been working together to increase the Cuban output and it
has come about that she now supplies practically all the
dutied sugar that the United States consumes.
So long as it was necessary for United States refiners
to buy any large proportion of full-dutied European sugar,
there was more competition in buying the lower-dutied
Cuban sugars than there is now when Cuba can furnish all
we need. That is, Cuban sellers could come nearer com-
manding world prices. But with the great increase of
Cuban production, the depression of prices at the height
of the milling season is naturally greater than formerly
and the period of distribution is greatly extended, thus
tending to prolong the depression. United States buyers
have thus become less dependent upon European sugar
and, instead of having to add the cost of transportation
to the cost of European sugar as the price for Cuban sugar,
they subtract the excess cost of sending Cuban sugar to
Europe. In other words, for the greater part of the year,
the pressure upon the Cuban to sell is greater than the
pressure upon the United States refiner to buy; hence in-
stead of its being a question to the American buyer of
European or Cuban price, plus transportation to New
York, it is now more of a question to the Cuban seller of
485] TARIFFS AND PRICES 227
taking the American tariff favor of $0,337 ^^^ ^ delivery
cost of about $0.09, as opposed to a delivery cost to the
United Kingdom of about 15 cents with no favors; that is,
the Cuban can afford to sell in New York for about 40
cents less than in London.
But even this does not explain everything. Taking the
average for 19 10, the Cuban price was depressed about
53 cents below the Hamburg parity, or 13 cents in excess
of the difference explained above. This 53 cents is arrived
at by taking the average of weekly prices without regard
to the amount of sugar imported any one week. But the
difference is really much greater than this for the reason
that the depression is greatest when the most sugar is
coming in and the least when there are no imports from
Cuba. For example, if instead of the simple average, the
weekly prices for 19 10 are weighted according to the
amount of Cuban imports received at the four principal
United States ports,^ the average depression of Cuban
prices for the year 1910 was 73 cents instead of 53 cents.
It is very noticeable that, in the latter part of the year,
when Cuba had practically no sugars on the market and
United States buyers had to go elsewhere for their sup-
plies, Cuban prices were not depressed, but were above
the Hamburg parity. It is also noticeable that, in 1908,
when Cuba had a much smaller crop than in the preced-
ing or in the following year, the depression was much
less than in these other two years; also, that with her
largest crop of 19 10, the depression was the greatest. The
191 1 crop w^as somewhat smaller again, there was also a
European shortage, and the disparity of Cuban prices was
less than in 19 10.
However, the writer has never been able to obtain an
^ New York, Boston, Philadelphia and Baltimore. According to the
statistics of Willett & Gray's Journal.
228 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [486
entirely satisfactory explanation of why the Cuban prices
can run 60, 70 and 90 cents below the Hamburg parity for
week after week. It seems that in the face of a disad-
vantage of only 40 cents the Cuban sellers would enter the
English market and not allow the difference to remain 70
to 90 cents for months at a time. It is true that they did
ship a considerable quantity of sugar to England, and
even to the Continent, in 1910 and 191 1, but not enough
to bring their price to a parity. Among other explanations
that have been offered the writer by various buyers, re-
finers' agents and others who should know the facts are
the following: The English and other European refineries
are prepared to handle European beet sugar, but not Cuban
cane sugar, hence they do not care to put it through their
plants and thus lessen their daily output, just as American
refiners do not like to put low-grade Philippine sugar
through their plants which are intended primarily for high-
grade centrifugals. A second point is that many of the
sugars are bought on contract and do not bring the price
quoted the day of arrival in port. Another explanation is
that the Cuban sellers are not well organized, as are those
of Hawaii, and that they dislike to sell to independent
European buyers for fear that the American buyers will
retaliate as it is claimed by the Louisiana planters that the
trust did when they sold a part of a cargo to the Federal
Refinery a few years ago.
While the explanations do not appear complete, nor
entirely satisfactory, they do help to lessen the discrep-
ancies. The writer is of the opinion that if the pro-
ducers of Cuba had the financial means and organization to
hold and distribute their sugars throughout the year, they
could obtain approximately the full world price, plus the
United States tariff concession so long as the United States
had to buy any considerable amount of fuU-dutied sugars^
487] TARIFFS AND PRICES 229
and that their prices need not be depressed more than about
40 cents below the United Kingdom price when they pro-
duce a surplus above what the United States can take/
But without such financial means and co-operative distri-
bution, the competition among sellers continues to depress
the market more and more as Cuban production increases
and as the quantity of full-dutied sugar which the United
States has to buy becomes smaller.
In the main, the efifect of the Cuban concession was to
raise Cuban prices temporarily, to increase production,^
and thus lead to a gradual depression of prices which en-
abled the American consumers to benefit by a large part
of the tariff concession and, at the same time, allowed the
Cuban all the benefits of the increased production. This
concession was also one of the causes inviting the participa-
tion of American capital and the modernization of the in-
dustry, with all of its manifold and far-reaching conse-
quences.
e. Summary
In summing up this part of our study of the more direct
effect of the tariff upon prices, it may be said that the New
York wholesale price of granulated sugar, which is the
basis of all prices of granulated in the United States, is
made up of at least three distinct parts, all of which are
affected by tariffs, but only one of which is directly affected
in this manner. First is the world price, the fluctuations
in which are influenced most largely by world supply; sec-
ond is the New York price of raws, plus the import duty
and cost of delivery; that is, the United States tariff has
entered directly into this part of the price. Third is the
price of granulated, whose fluctuations above the price of
^ This is on the basis of present tariffs.
' Several other causes were making for this same result
230
THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY
[48S
raws have been inliuenced mostly by competition, or lack of
competition, among refiners.^
* A discussion of retail prices would hardly be justifiable in this
study. It is generally considered that sugar is sold on a smaller
margin by both jobbers and retailers than almost any other commodity.
See Hardwick Committee Hearings, tables of T. G. Palmer, pp. 2655,
2657 ; Eighth Annual Report, United States Commissioner of Labor
(i903)> PP- 820-830; U. S. Bureau of Labor, Bulletin no. 59 (1904),
p. 282, Bui. no. 71 (1905-06), p. 306; Bui. no. 77 (1906-07), pp. 200
and 310.
Changes in prices of sugar, as compared with prices of other com-
modities, are strikingly illustrated by the accompanying table:
Table XLVIIIa. Differentiation of Sugar Prices from those of Other
Commodities ^
(Comparison of English and American price-index numbers, average for 1891-
1900=
100. — From the London Economist oi Dec, 23, 1911.)
United Kingdom.
United States.
Articles.
1894-1898
1 Percent-
j decrease.
1894-1898
; Percent-
■906-9.0 ;«:;■-
; decrease.
Food:
Wheat
Oats
Maize
Potatoes ....
Beef
Sugar
Pork
Butter
Materials:
Coal
Iron
Copper
Tin
Cotton
Wool
Flax
Petroleum . . .
94.8
93-0
89.4
98.6
96.2
87.8
94.6
95.6
91.0
96.0
92.4
80.2
90.8
103.8
97.0
97.8
1 10.9
103.8
127.8
103.4
1 1 7.4
84.0
1 13.6
111.6
102.6
123.0
140.4
191.2
154.0
106.2
109.2
124.0
■+- 13K
+ II
+ 31)^
+ 5
4- 22
— 4
-f 20
+ 16K
+ 13
-f 28
+ 52
+ 139
4- 70
+ 2)^
4- I2>^
+ 26>^
95.8
86.1
87.0
833
98.8
94 2
89*9
91.5
85.0
86.1
81.2
91. 1
834
111.15
132.8 • + 3'^
160.3 , + 86
1537 i + 77
114.8 1 -f 3^
129.4 1 4- 31
102.0 1 + 8
156.9 1 4 74
126.8 + 41
126.8 -^ 38
132.0 -h 55
127.2 4- 48
186.5 4-130
156.1 ! -f 711^
120.6 1 4- 44><2
1
178.4 ] 4- 60
2 Report, Hardwick Committee, 62d Cong., 2d Sess., H. Report no.
331, p. 22 (Feb. 17, 1912).
489] TARIFFS AND PRICES 23 1
The first part, or the world price, has undoubtedly been
influenced indirectly by tariffs, bounties and other legal
restrictions and encouragements which have affected the
supply and demand. As regards the second part, that is,
the excess of the New York price of raws over the world
price of raws, we have seen that a change in United States
import duties has usually affected it by approximately the
amount of the change, other factors remaining constant.
But a concession to a country like Hawaii producing a
relatively small proportion of the sugar needed by the
United States had no direct benefit for American con-
sumers but was almost a complete subsidy to the producers
because of the great amount of full-dutied sugar which it
was necessary to import. On the other hand, a concession
to a country like Cuba — a country capable of producing
cheap sugar to a far greater extent than formerly and thus
supplying all the needs of the United States so that very
little full-dutied sugar is necessary — has had the ultimate
result of lowering prices by most of the amount of the
concession. Of course, this lowering of prices has affected,
by the full amount of the decrease, the prices obtained by
domestic sugar producers as well as those of Hawaii and
all other countries selling sugar in the United States
markets.
The third part of the price, or the refiner's addition to
the price of raw, has been the cost of refining plus a profit
which has been determined by the ability of the trust to
hold it as high as possible or, in later years, as high as
most profitable. The excess of the protection to refined
over that to raw has sufficed to keep out nearly all foreign
refined sugar and the problem of the trust has been to keep
profits at a good margin, but not so high as to invite inde-
pendents to enter the business. In this it has been only par-
tially successful.
232 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [490
Thus we see that the United States tariff on sugar has a
very direct effect upon the price of raws, an important, but
indirect, effect upon the refiners' differential, but relatively
little effect upon the world price of raws.^
^ Since the above was written, the following statement has been pub-
lished : " All the analyses of changing from duty to free sugar show
that whenever duty is taken off, the cost of refining decreases and
when duty is added the cost of refining increases, but these analyses
also show that whenever duty is taken off the consumer gets the full
benefit of the amount of the duty taken off and also a part of the
lower cost of refining, and whenever the duty is increased the refiners
bear a certain portion of the increase and the consumer does not pay
the full addition of the duty."— W. P. Willett, Hardwick Committee
Hearings, p. 2S47 (1Q12).
Chapter IX. The Sugar Trust ^
An exterided treatment of the problems affecting the
future of the United States beet-sugar industry would re-
quire a consideration of several matters which we must
omit but, in order to see the whole subject in its proper
setting, there are two factors, some phases of which have
already been mentioned, that demand at least passing
notice, even in this outline study, namely, trust operations
and freight rates in their bearings upon the domestic beet-
sugar industry. These problems, particularly the first, have
been, or are being, investigated extensively by others,^
^ In his study, The Sugar Reiining Industry in the United States (p.
ZZ), Mr. Vogt makes the following brief summary: "In summarizing
the results of the inquiry into the causes of the growth of the refining
industry, it may be said that from the earliest times to the Civil
War the tariff was a very important factor; that during the Civil
War this influence, while doubtless real, is merged with a number of
other causes, such as the destruction of the Louisiana sugar industry,
the stimulus of increased prices, and the influence of the drawback.
It has been shown, further, that the influence of the internal revenue
tax tended to neutralize the effect of the increased tariff, but that this
influence probably was of minor importance. It seems, too, that neither
the tariff nor the panic of 1873 had any great direct effect in hastening
the failures of refining companies during the seventies. The tariff of
1883 may have hastened the final combination. The effect of the tariff
was the indirect one of being a factor in stimulating the industry to
the point of over-production during the years preceding 1870. It may
be concluded, then, that the transition that took place leading up to
the formation of the Sugar Trust was the natural result of over-
production due to excessive movement of capital into this industrial
group at a time when capacity for production was being greatly in-
creased by remarkable improvements in methods of refining."
2 See Hearings of the special (Hardwick) committee on the inves-
491] 2Z2
234 ^^^ BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [492
hence we shall attempt only to indicate the importance of
their relation to the main subject of our study. In the case
of each we shall cite, first, a few facts having indirect bear-
ing upon the beet-sugar industry and then others affecting
it more directly.
I. SUGAR-TRUST METHODS
The methods of the sugar trust have been typical. After
having formed its combination with a highly-inflated capi-
talization, it has fought competitors vigorously. In cases
where it has failed to overcome them, it has either ab-
sorbed them or made truce upon terms profitable to both
parties. It has shut down a large number of the factories
acquired and run the others on full capacity, and it has
been enabled to use the ones where production was the
most economical and to introduce into all of its plants the
best methods of refining. Doubtless it has also been able
to eliminate former wastes of marketing and, by virtue
of its advantages, has been able to extend its control of
prices, both of raw and of refined sugar, further than in
the reduction of mere economic wastes. It has been able to
deduct the freight from Louisiana to New York from the
price of Louisiana sugars, although it paid no freight on
them, but refined them in Louisiana ; it has been able to buy
Hawaiian sugars at a certain fixed rate under the market;
it has had the advantage of a large buyer in the Cuban,
Porto Rican and other markets; it has had the advantage
tigation of the American Sugar Refining Co. and others (1911-12) ;
Original Petition and Answer in the case of the United States of
America v. American Sugar Refining Co. et al., in the United States
Circuit Court, Southern Dist. of New York; proceedings of the Fed-
eral Sugar Refining Co. before the Interstate Commerce Commission
and appeal of railroads to Commerce Court with reference to New
York lighterage charge (still pending). See Hard wick Committee
Hearings, p. 2238; The Sugar Refining Industry in the United States,
by Paul L. Vogt, Publications of University of Pennsylvania (1908).
493] ^^^ SUGAR TRUST 235
of a large seller with several distributing points for dispos-
ing of its finished product. The selling price has not been
based upon cost plus transportation, except as its lower
limit, but rather it has been based upon the cost plus trans-
portation of its competitors. For example, although it
could get raw sugar from Hawaii and turn out the finished
product in San Francisco as cheaply as in New York, it
had no effective competition in that territory for a long
time, hence the San Francisco selling price was approxi-
mately the New York price plus the freight from the
Atlantic seaboard, where its competitors were located. If
it shipped San Francisco sugars to the Missouri River and
paid an extra freight rate on them, still it sold them for
less than in San Francisco, because its competitors could
sell for less at the Missouri River than in San Francisco.
There is nothing strange or unnatural about this policy
which is the one that is followed practically everywhere,
not only as regards sugar but as regards almost everything.
The trust has acquired and used many agencies and
methods to serve its ends. It has engaged in the coffee
business to fight rivals; it has obtained large interests in
the glucose industry; it has acquired complete or partial
ownership and control of cooperage, transportation and
terminal companies; it has secured railroad rebates, direct
and indirect; it has made contributions to both political
parties; it has been involved in scandalous customs frauds
and other practices equally culpable; in short, it has been
what the popular mind conceives of as a typical trust.
2. THE trust's relations TO THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY
Few of the interests of the trust have been more im-
portant, and none have more direct relation to the study in
hand, than its interest in the beet-sugar industry.^ As will
* See particularly Original Petition, U. S. v. American Sugar Refining
236 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [494
be remembered, the beet-sugar industry began its rapid
growth with the passage of the Dingley Bill in 1897, there
being 34 factories erected in the years 1897 to 1901. It
was in this latter year that the trust began active operations
to acquire large interests in the new and rapidly-growing
industry.
According to the allegations of the United States in a
suit now pending,^
in the summer of 1901 the American Sugar Refining Co., in-
tending to destroy the competition of the beet-sugar com-
panies with which it was confronted, manufactured an enor-
mous quantity of refined sugar, which was in amount far in
excess of any previous production by it in any similar period,
for the purpose of selling and delivering it in the territories
where the beet-sugar companies usually marketed their pro-
duct, and intended to sell the same at prices with which they
could not compete, and, if necessary, at prices below the actual
cost of production; and about the same time, in order to
secure still further advantages, Henry O. Havemeyer and
Lowell M. Palmer entered into unlawful agreements with
various railroad companies operating lines of railway out of
the cities of Boston, New York, Jersey City, Philadelphia and
New Orleans, and other large cities, for the transportation of
large quantities of refined sugar for the American Sugar Re-
fining Co., the American Sugar Refining Co., of New York,
the Franklin Sugar Refining Co., and Spreckels Sugar Refin-
ing Co. to the territories where the beet-sugar companies
marketed their products, and for free storage of such sugar
in the warehouses of the respective railroads, and for the
transportation of such sugars at rates far below the lawful
Co., et al. (1910), pp. 92-132; Hardwick Committee Hearings, pp. 179
et seq., 21 18 et seq., 2951 et seq.; Vogt, op. cit., pp. 58-65. Answer to
above petition filed Feb. 5, 1912. Trial began Mar. 12, 1912, as this
study was going to press. Later, jury failed to agree.
* Original Petition, pp. 98 et seq. Cited supra.
495] ^^^ SUGAR TRUST ^'^J
published rates of such railroads, and for the payment by the
railroad companies to the American Sugar Refining Co. of
large sums of money by way of unlawful rebates thereon.
Under these agreements, these railroad companies in 1901 to
1904, inclusive, transported, for these sugar companies many
million pounds of refined sugar and stored the same in their
warehouses in the beet-sugar territories for months at a time,
for which storage they made no charge and collected no com-
pensation, and also paid the American Sugar Refining Co.
unlawful rebates aggregating upward of $500,000.
In 1 90 1 and 1902, the American Sugar Refining Co. re-
duced the selling price of refined sugar below cost of produc-
tion in available markets of the competing beet-sugar con-
cerns, and thus rendered it impossible for the latter profitably
to operate. In this and other ways the beet-sugar concerns
were harassed and a state of affairs brought about which, if
continued, meant their financial destruction. The owners of
the beet-sugar concerns were thus compelled either to face
almost inevitable ruin or to sell out to the American Sugar
Refining Co. Therefore the American Sugar Refining Co.
commenced and continued to secure control of the beet-sugar
concerns, to destroy the former competition, restrain the
trade, and strengthen its monopoly in such ways as appeared
feasible, among others those now specified, and in December,
1901, for this express purpose its Board of Directors held a
meeting and appointed Henry O. Havemeyer, Washington B.
Thomas, Lowell M. Palmer and Arthur Donner as a com-
mittee with power and authority to purchase and acquire for
it a controlling interest in all beet-sugar companies that might
then or thereafter engage in business in the United States,
and to take charge of the management of such companies as
to when the control thereof should be acquired.^
^ It is to be remembered that not all of the government's allegations
have been proved in open court, though many of the facts which are
not in dispute tend to confirm one's opinion of the truth of the main
allegations. There is very much testimony throughout the Hardwick
Hearings on these matters. See also House Report no. 331, pp. 5, 6,
II, 62d Cong., 2d Sess.
238 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [496
The petition of the government then goes on to set forth
in more detail how the trust acquired its holdings in each
of the various fields and how prospective competitors were
forestalled, if possible, wherever they appeared. The
minutes of the board of directors and of the executive com-
mittee of the American Sugar Refining Co., throughout all
the years since 1901, contain numerous and frequent refer-
ences to the acquiring of the beet-sugar interests, the build-
ing of new factories and the making of loans to the various
companies.^ Mr. Vogt estimates that by 1905 the trust
controlled 6S.y per cent of the beet sugar produced in this
country.^
Accompanying is a statement of the trust holdings made
by its acting president, Mr. E. F. Atkins, June 12, 191 1.
According to this statement, the trust's holdings were
about 41 per cent of the stock of the companies in which
it was interested. The capitalization of these companies,
viz., $56,883,617, was considerably less than half the total
capitalization of beet-sugar companies in 1909, as reported
by the last census, viz., $129,629,000. The output of these
factories for 1910-1911 was 546,049,181 pounds, or a little
over half the total output for that year, which was 1,020,-
344,000 pounds. ^ In other words, according to the state-
ment, the trust really owned less than one-fifth of the cap-
italization and a little over one-fifth of the output of the
United States beet-sugar factories. May 23, 191 1, and,
according to further statements- of Mr. Atkins, it had dis-
posed of a considerable part of its beet-sugar holdings since
the death of Mr. Havemeyer and wished to dispose of
more. Since that time the papers have reported some
^ See extracts from these minutes in Hardwick Committee Hearings,
pp. 2904-3062.
* Vogt, op. cit., p. 63.
' Crop Reporter, October, 191 1.
497]
THE SUGAR TRUST
239
Table XLIX. The American Sugar Refining Company's Interest in Beet-Sugar
Companies, May 23, 191 1 ^
of Companies.
Alameda Sugar Co ...
Spreckels Sugar Co . • ;
Utah-Idaho Sugar Co- i
Amalgamated Sugar
Co I
I.ewistoii Sugar Co ;
Great Western Sugar
Co., including Bill-
ings Sugar Co., and
Scottsbluff i
Kind of
stock.
Capital stock.
Par
value
of
shares.
Total
issued.
(^wned
by Ameri-
can Sugar
Refining
Co.
Per
cent
owned.
Common.
.... do ... .
f Pre'erred .
(Common..
Preferred
Common..
! . . do ... .
; Prelerred
$25.00 $745,825: $37^.250 +49
100.00 j 5,000,000 2,500,000 50
10.00 I 9,449,090^ 4,650,500 449
10.00 I i»470i ••••
100.00
10.00
2,551,400^ 1,275,700
606,4301 225,000
Michigan Sugar Co...
Iowa Sugar Co
Cars'er County Sugar
Co
Menominee River
Sugar Co
Continental Sugar Co.
( Common.
\ Preferred
Common.
do ...
100 00 10,544,000 2,735,500
100.00 13,630,000 5,159,200
I
100.00 I 7,471,107 2,607,400
100 00 I 3,703,500 2,043,800
100.00 j 550,000 416,500
,. do ....
,. do ....
10.00
ICO. 00
B2S,ooo;
1,200,000
300,000
415,440
156,883,617 23,183,990
50
■t37
26
38
35
55
Ms
100.00 600,000 483,700 -1-80
American
Sugar
Production,
Refining
campaign
Co.'s in-
1910-11.
terest per
stock-
Pounds.
holdings.
Pounds.
12,482,400
6,116,375
68 452,800
34,226,400
70,965,800
34.773.242
25,801,300
12,900,650
10,619,300
3,929,564
t 191,810,800
63,297.564
} 123.130,991
51,715,016
7.486,330
5.614,747
5,003,696
4,002,957
6,135,588
2,208,813
24,160,176
i
; 546,049,181
8,456.062
227,240,967
further dispositions of beet-sugar interests and also the
dissolving of connections with the Spreckels in California.
The latter are also engaged in both the cane and beet-sugar
industries.^
It should be mentioned in this connection that Mr. Have-
meyer secured considerable personal interests in some of
the beet-sugar companies and that, in some cases in which
the trust alone did not have the control, the interests of
himself and the trust combined were sufficient to control.
These appear to have given him and his heirs the whip
^ Hardwick Committee Hearings (1911), p. 100. Statements for Oct.
I, 1911, are given in the Report of the Hardwick Committee, 62d Cong.,
2d Sess., House Report no. 331, pp. 12-14.
^ Willett & Gray, op. cit., Dec. 7, 1911, p. 488; House Report, no.
331, 62d Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 6, 7. See also pp. 12-14.
240 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [498
hand in the event of a disagreement in policy and this
would be a matter of some importance if there is as much
friction between his heirs and the present management of
the trust as some of the witnesses appeared to try to make
the Hard wick Committee believe. The appraisement of
Mr. Havemeyer's estate ^ showed larger holdings in beet-
sugar concerns, in Mexican, Cuban, Hawaiian and other
sugar interests, than in the trust, but his beet-sugar inter-
ests, as shown by this appraisement, do not seem large
enough to have given him any great control in any group
of factories except those of the Great Western Sugar Co.,
whose plants are located in Colorado, Nebraska, and Mon-
tana. However, there is no way of knowing just what
were, and are, the interests of friends of Mr. Havemeyer,
of trust stockholders and of others.
It is impossible to tell just w^hat were the motives and
results of the trust's acquisitions of its beet interests. The
acting president, Mr. Atkins, states that there is a dis-
agreement between himself and other members of the
board of directors as to what is the best policy for the trust
regarding them. Before its acquisitions in the beet-sugar
industry, the officers in the trust favored free sugar or
lower duties. During the Cuban Reciprocity hearings,
the beet-sugar interests were lobbying vigorously against
concessions, but suddenly ceased their opposition about the
time that the trust took a large block of their stock. Since
securing these holdings, noticeably in 1908 and 1909, the
trust has ceased to argue so strenuously for free sugar
before the Ways and Means Committee and seems to have
been consoled by prospective advantages to its beet-sugar
and other interests. Mr. Atkins' Cuban holdings are an
additional reason fc^ftfis favoring concessions to Cuba, but
* See Hardwick Committee Hearings, pp. 2510 et seq.
499] ^^^ SUGAR TRUST 241
with his entry into the active management of the trust, his
arguments for lower duties have become less emphatic; in
fact, he seems rather doubtful as to the best policy to
pursue.
A study of the available material does not seem to show
that the control of the beet-sugar factories by the trust has
been sufficient to prevent each selling sugar in the other's
territory, though the trust did have a contract with the
American Beet Sugar Co. to dispose of its output and
there are indications that a community of interests has had
some harmonizing influences upon sales, if not absolute
direction of them. In no case that we have been able to
ascertain have the consumers gotten the benefit of competi-
tion in the sense that local manufacturers have sold to them
upon the basis of cost of production and delivery. The
factories and refineries, even if they were not in the com-
bine, have taken advantage of the opportunity to dispose
of their product at approximately the prices maintained by
the combine, or, in common parlance, they have " stood
under the umbrella " held by the trust. Of course, con-
sumers would get sugar at lower prices if efficient factories
operated and entered no agreements as to sales, but such
has not been the general practice in any industry, whether
there has been one big combine or many smaller ones.
There seems to be little reason to think that the price paid
the farmer for his beets is much affected by the trust in
any direct way. In any case, the factory owners pay only
so much as is necessary to get sufficient tonnage to run
their factories and the price they must pay is largely deter-
mined by profits which the farmer can make by devoting
his resources to other lines.^
1 This is closely related to a matter which would make the subject of
an interesting, though involved, investigation, namely, an inquiry into
the inter-relations and reactions of trust control of what a farmer sells
242 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [^qo
The extent of the trust's influence upon the beet-sugar
industry through the forestalling of competition, selling
contracts and combinations of former competitors, together
with other common trust practices, can be judged better
after the government has pressed its suit now pending, and
will not be dwelt upon here/
On the whole, it appears that the trust's relation to the
beet-sugar companies has tended to harmonize and promote
the interests of both, even if it has not prevented all com-
petition. Under such a relation, the trust could have con-
siderable control and direction of any development of the
domestic beet-sugar industry and, through the protection
to the latter, could recoup the losses to its refining industry
caused by the same high duties. The beet-sugar industry
gives promise of growing to large proportions if sufficient
protection is afforded and would become an increasingly
vexatious thorn in the side of the cane-sugar refiners, of
which the trust is by far the largest, unless measures were
taken to turn the prospective advantages of the beet-sugar
producers into the coffers of the trust. Apparently, this is
what the trust undertook to do. Just how far the future
policy of the trust will follow that of the past, and just
what will be the effect upon the beet-sugar industry, is a
matter of some difference of opinion. The majority of the
stock of the trust has been owned in New England for
some time and, since Mr. Havem.eyer's death in 1907, the
active management has been taken from New York and
and buys upon the comparative profits of his different products and the
consequent effect upon his operations. Also the more ultimate effects
upon society at large.
^ That this influence has been considerable has been indicated in the
Hardwick Committee Hearings, but the material available at this writ-
ing does not appear to the writer to justify an extended study of this
matter by a private investigator in view of the government's suit and
the facts it should bring out.
5oi] THE SUGAR TRUST 243
put into the hands of Boston men. This new regime has
evidently tried to give the impression that it turned over a
new leaf and expects to be a " good trust " in the future.
It has ceased to refrain from all publicity, it has been dis-
posing of some of its beet-sugar holdings and is reported
to have dissovled its connection with the Spreckels of Cali-
fornia. It is significant that this change of policy, real or
apparent, has been subsequent, not only to the death of
Mr. Havemeyer and the entry of a new management, but
also, to some very malodorous revelations relative to New
York customs frauds and flagrant transactions with Phila-
delphia parties, and that it is at a time of great agitation as
to trust methods, dissolution, regulation and control. There
is no doubt that great economies can be effected and great
benefits obtained through co-operation and combination,
and it is just as evident that the opportunities thus afforded
are often abused. To whom the benefits will go and
whether or not there will be grave abuses will depend on
the methods that are pursued. How to obtain the maxi-
mum of benefits and the minimum of abuses is one of the
most important and immediate problems now confronting
the American government.
Chapter X. Freight Rates
Freight rates have already been mentioned incidentally
a number of times because of their intimate connection
with the matters of markets, prices and trust control. Both
ocean and inland rates vitally affect the beet-sugar industry
of this country because they largely determine the compe-
tition it must meet. We shall present this matter in the
next few pages only to the extent of illustrating by a few
facts and examples.^
I. OCEAN RATES
Ocean rates are comparatively low, so that foreign sugar
can be delivered to many parts of the United States, per-
haps to the majority of the people of the United States,
cheaper than can home-grown beet sugar. Following are
some of the approximate ocean rates according to various
authorities: Hamburg to New York, 8 to lo cents per lOO
pounds ; ^ Havana to New York, practically the same ; *
New Orleans to New York, 1 5 cents ; * Hawaii to New
York or Philadelphia, 32 to 2,^ cents ; ^ Java to New York,
Boston or Philadelphia, 25 cents. ^
1 See chapter x, paragraphs i and 2, supra. Mr. Robt. M. Parker,
traffic manager of the A. S. R. Co. (trust), estimates that one-third of
the long-haul freight that goes out of New York (freight that goes
west of Buffalo) is sugar. " Of the total freight, I do not suppose it
is over io%." Hardwick Committee Hearings, p. 1413.
' F. R. Hathaway, Tariff Hearings (1908-09), vol. 3, p. 3294; E. F.
Atkins, Hardwick Committee Hearings (1911), p. 1371 T. R. Cutler,
ibid., p. 808.
' J. H. Post, ibid., p. 517 ; Robert M. Parker, ibid., p. 1468.
* E. F. Atkins, ibid., p. 133. ' J. H. Post, ibid., p. 518.
« Frank L. Neall, ibid., p. 1478.
244 [502
503]
FREIGHT RATES
245
2. RATES AFFECTING CANE-SUGAR DISTRIBUTION PRIMARILY
Within the United States, the freight rates depend
largely upon whether or not there is water competition, all
or part of the way, as the accompanying table indicates.
Table L. Freight Rates on Sugar in Car Lots
Chicago
Cincinnati .
Terre Haute
Detroit
St. Louis . . .
Pittsburgh .
St. Paul
Wheeling. .
Water-and-rail.
All-rail.
Rail-an
New
Phila-
New
Phila-
New
York.
delphia.
York.
delphia.
York.
1 24
22
26
24
23
20
18
22
20
i 24
22
26
24
24
! 18
«i6
20
18
23
21
25
23
23
..
16
14
31
29
33
31
30
* *
• •
16
14
Phila-
delphia.
21
22
21
28
Note. — Where rate is omitted, no rate is published.
As further illustrations, the following may be cited. The
freight rate from New York to Philadelphia (90 miles),
to Baltimore (184 miles), to Washington (224 miles), and
to Alexandria (232 miles) is the same, namely, 8J/2 cents,
while the rate from Philadelphia to Baltimore is 6 cents,
and to Washington, 8^ cents.^ The rate from New York
to Buffalo is 10 cents by canal and 14 cents by rail; to
Rochester, Utica and Syracuse, 8J/2 cents by canal and 13
cents by rail.*
^ Hardwick Committee Hearings, p. 1556. Table presented by Mr.
F. C. Lowry, salesman of the Federal Refining Co. (July 12, 1911).
' Rate will be canceled July 17, 1911.
' H. E. Bellis, Hardwick Committee Hearings, p. 2842. F. L. Neall,
ihid., p. 1483.
* Neall, ibid., p. 1466.
246 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [504
The rate on sugar from New York to San Francisco in
hundred-ton lots has been as low as 45 cents per hundred-
weight, uninsured, via the Panama route. . . . We are ad-
vised that the rate on sugar in any quantity from San Fran-
cisco to New York and Philadelphia is 40 cents per hundred-
weight, uninsured, and 45 cents per hundredweight to New
Orleans via Panama route. The insurance costs 4 to 5 cents
more. The overland rate from New York to San Francisco
combines on St. Louis and, on verifying from the tariffs, I
find it to be $1.08 per hundredweight from New York to San
Francisco. Whatever sugar we may ship has gone via Tehuan-
tepec by reason of the high overland rates.^
There is much complaint on the part of Philadelphia and
New York refiners who do not operate terminal stations
that the American Sugar Refining Co. and the Arbuckles
Co. get virtual rebates by means of terminal charges. The
Havemeyer family and the Arbuckles Company have oper-
ated terminal stations for a number of years and have
charged the railroads three cents lighterage on short haul
shipments, four and one-fifth cents on long haul shipments,
and one and four-fifth cents for returning empty cars.^ It
is alleged that the lighterage service for which these ter-
minal companies receive three and four and one-fifth cents
does not cost more than two cents, and that the railroads
are forced to accept it and pay for it, even though much of
the service is unnecessary; in other words, it is claimed
that it is an indirect rebate, nullifying the Philadelphia dif-
ferential rate to Chicago and the West and also giving
great advantage to the refineries owning and controlling
the terminals.
1 Robt. M. Parker, Traffic Mgr., A. S. R. Co., Hardwick Committee
Hearings, pp. 2514-15. Mr. F. C. Lowry, of the Federal Sugar Refining
Co., gives the rail rate at the same ($1.08), but the water rate at 75
cents. See Table LII, infra.
' Hardwick Committee Hearings, pp. 1488 et seq., 2238 et seq.
505]
FREIGHT RATES
247
3. RATES AFFECTING MORE DIRECTLY THE DISTRIBUTION OF
BEET SUGAR IN ITS COMPETITION WITH CANE SUGAR
The facts mentioned above have only an indirect bearing
upon the beet-sugar industry, but the rates in the accom-
panying and following tables have more direct reference
to the' beet-sugar industry and to the competition with
Table LI. Freight Rates on Sugar, Car Lots *
From-
Miles.
New York
Philadelphia
Baltimore
New Orleans J
Owosso 331
Alma 369
New York 818
Philadelphia 728
Baltimore 523
New Orleans ( approximate ) . 800
Owosso )
Alma J
New York i>059
Philadelphia 969
Baltimore 936
New Orleans 710
Owosso 457
Alma 495
New York 438
Philadelphia 359
Baltimore 342
New Orleans
Owosso ; 362
Alma 400
Cincinnati
do
Indianapolis.
do
St. Louis
do
1
\ Pittsburgh
J
do
All
Rail-
rail.
lake.
Cents.
Cents.
21
19
19
17
18
^ 18K
..
13
13
24
22
22
20
21
, 23
..
14
..
. 14
20
18
18
16
17
15
. 17
16
. 16
' 14
14
13
. 30
15
^ »5
cane sugar which it must meet. A study of these tables,
in connection with the statements of the distribution ^ made
^ Hardwick Committee Hearings, p. 2839. Table presented by Mr.
Harry E. Bellis, of Philadelphia, freight-rate expert.
^ For statements of distribution, see Hardwick Committee Hearings,
pp. 649, 704, 70s, 800, 895, 2881, 3970-3973-
248 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [506
by the various beet-sugar manufacturers, not only shows
where the sugar goes but also indicates the reasons for the
direction of the movements.
As is natural to expect, all of these beet-sugar companies
sell most of their output in the states immediately surround-
ing their factories, though it may be a little surprising to
some to learn what a large proportion they ship further,
and how much of their own natural territory is supplied by
others. For example, the Michigan Sugar Co., operating
six factories distributed 21,193,882 pounds of sugar in
Michigan in 1910, which is estimated to be less than 10 per
cent of the total amount consumed in that state and the
president estimated that this company supplied only 5.3
per cent of the sugar consumed in the territory of its dis-
tribution.^ This company sells even more of its output in
Ohio than in Michigan.^ In both of these states and in Chi-
cago, it has the advantage of cheaper freight rates than its
eastern, western or southern competitors, many of which,
including itself, are subsidiaries of the trust. The rate
from its factories to Pittsburgh is 15 cents as compared
with a 14-cent rate from New York and Philadelphia and
13 cents from Baltimore so that it has to absorb one cent
on its large shipments to that city. For similar reasons, it
can get into western New York to dispose of large sur-
plus quantities which it can not distribute in its more fav-
ored territory. Its rates to St. Louis, Mo. are 16 cents as
compared with 17 cents from New Orleans, which is the
next lowest rate; hence, it can deliver to an advantage in
eastern Missouri.
Naturally the factories of the Northwest-Territory
states have a better rate to Chicago than those of any other
section, it being 11 cents from the Michigan factories, 23
* Hardwick Committee Hearings, p. 705. ^ Ibid., pp. 649, 704, 705.
507]
FREIGHT RATES
249
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250 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [508
cents from New York and New Orleans, 21 cents from
Philadelphia, and 25 cents from Colorado. The rates of
the Colorado factories are the same whether the sugar goes
to Missouri River points, St. Louis or Chicago. New Or-
leans has a rate of 17 cents to St. Louis and 32 cents to
Kansas City. The New York and Philadelphia rates to
the Missouri River are 38 cents and 36 cents respectively.
Mr. Lowry's table gives the rate from Spreckels, Cali-
fornia, to Salt Lake City, Denver, Missouri River points,
St. Louis and Chicago, as 55 cents (on 60,000-pound car-
loads) and the rates from Ogden, Utah, to all these points
(exclusive of Salt Lake City) are only 5 cents less.^ The
rates from other California and Utah points are slightly
higher but in about the same proportion; that is, the Cali-
fornia, Utah and Colorado groups of factories have prac-
tically blanket rates to this wide belt of territory, though
the further west the factory is located, the wider its belt,
and this gives it a comparatively greater advantage over its
competitors. California factories can ship to Colorado for
55 cents, but Colorado factories have to pay 85 cents to get
to California.^ Similarly, the rate from California to Utah
is less than the rate in the opposite direction,^ and the rate
from Utah to Colorado less than from Colorado to Utah.
The overland rate. New York to San Francisco, is $1.08.
but for the shorter distance from New York to Salt Lake
it is $1.27, from Michigan to Salt Lake, $1.44, and from
New Orleans to Salt Lake, $1.45. However, these latter
rates are nominal rather than real. From this arrange-
^ See freight-rate table and statements furnished later by the Great
Western Sugar Co. and others. Hardwick Committee Hearings, pp.
3723, 3970-3973-
* The San Francisco Betteravia and Alvarado rates to Denver and
Chicago are not given, but their rates to Salt Lake City are much
higher than those of the other California factories given.
' With the exception of the Ogden rate.
509] FREIGHT RATES 25 1
ment of rates it is evident that the Atlantic refineries would
naturally supply the bulk of the sugar consumed in the
populous eastern states, the New Orleans refineries those
of the Mississippi Valley, except those northernmost, and
the California refineries and beet-sugar factories the west-
ern states. The eastern sugar meets the northern beet
sugar upon fairly even terms at Pittsburgh and in western
New York and, by virtue of the comparatively small
amount of the beet-sugar output and the established trade
in cane sugar, the latter is able to extend its field of distri-
bution to the Mississippi River and beyond, though Chi-
cago is the largest point of distribution where cane and
beet sugar meet. The cane sugar from New Orleans meets
its sharpest competition with beet sugar at Kansas City.
The freight rates, both in the East and in the West, favor
the inland movement of sugar and thus put the coast pro-
ducers on better bases to compete with the inland producers
than vice versa. This, together with the extensive blanket
rates from the various western beet-sugar centers to the
western half of the Mississippi Valley, including Chicago,
make this territory the great dumping ground for dis-
tributing sugars that cannot be marketed in the localities
near the respective factories.
Thus, Mr. Morey's table ^ shows that the Great Western
Sugar Co. (in 1909-10) sold more sugar in Missouri than
in its home state of Colorado and nearly as much in Illi-
nois, Iowa and Kansas, and about half as much in Ne-
braska, Kansas and Minnesota, but none in California,
Utah or Michigan, the centers of the other beet-sugar
groups. Mr. John D. Spreckels' table ^ shows not only the
^ Hardwick Committee Hearings, p. 895.
' Ibid., p. 2881. Michigan Sugar Co.'s shipments, ibid., pp. 649, 704,
705. Also, Minority Report, Ways and Means Committee, 62d Cong., 2d
Sess., House Report no. 391, pt. 2, p. 19 (Mar. 7, 1912).
252 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [510
largest shipments to the Pacific states from his California
plants, but also considerable shipments to Idaho, Utah,
Colorado, Montana, Minnesota, Missouri, Iowa and Okla-
homa, some of which would not generally be deemed the
natural territory for large distributions from California.
A voluminous treatise would not exhaust the problems
regarding freight rates on sugar, but the principles involved
are not peculiar to the subject of our study. The few
points cited in the preceding pages are merely to illustrate
the importance of this factor and its effects upon the beet-
sugar industry. Rates can be fi:?ied so as to accentuate, or
to neutralize, natural advantages, trust control and tariffs;
hence, an adequate regulation of one factor involves care-
ful attention to the others.
Chapter XL Conclusion
One who has studied the development of the sugar in-
dustry in the various countries of the world can not help
being impressed with the rapidity of this development in
modern times, and particularly, within the last century;
nor can one fail to note the important part which legisla-
tion has had in shaping this growth. While it is true that
agricultural and industrial factors have been of funda-
mental importance in every case, yet favorable conditions
of these kinds have been so widespread, comparatively, that
political considerations and legislation have been the fac-
tors which have determined, largely, the direction and the
rapidity of this development in nearly every important
sugar-producing country. As regards the industry of any
particular nation, not only the policies of the home gov-
ernment, but also those of foreign nations are often of vital
importance. Striking examples of these facts have been
shown in the remarkable rise and great vicissitudes of
the European beet-sugar industry, and, also, in the recent
extraordinary revival of the tropical cane-sugar industry.
The same has been shown to be emphatically true of the
growth of the domestic beet-sugar industry and there is
scarcely any doubt that the United States can, by following
certain political policies and adopting certain forms of
legislation, either develop the home beet-sugar industry so
as to supply our entire consumption or, on the other hand,
bring it about that our entire needs will be supplied through
importations.
So far as this particular study is concerned, the question
511] 253
254 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [^12
of primary importance is: What legislation affecting the
United States beet-sugar industry will be to the best in-
terests of the people as a whole, taking a broad view and
looking far ahead ? It has been shown, so far as the limi-
tations of this study have permitted, that before this ques-
tion can be answered satisfactorily, there are certain prob-
lems which should be worked out more thoroughly than is
possible upon the basis of available data. It has been indi-
cated, also, how some of the more important of these prob-
lems may be approached and, furthermore, that the facts
which are known are sufficient to justify the adoption of a
tentative policy while these problems are being worked out.
It is almost certain that the immediate and permanent re-
moval of all sugar duties would result in the speedy de-
struction of most of the sugar factories in the United
States, both beet and cane/ On the other hand, sufficiently
high tariff rates will encourage the domestic beet-sugar
industry, and it seems capable of great improvements and
indirect advantages that may offset the cost of its pro-
tection.
On the whole, the domestic industry has shown, not only
rapid growth, but considerable improvements in quality
of beets, in invention and use of machinery, and in adapta-
tion as regards localization. In some sections, notably in
California, many features of our results compare favor-
ably with the best of Europe, but the average, both as re-
gards quality and tonnage of beets, is considerably lower
than that of Germany. However, the United States Agri-
cultural Department and many state experiment stations
are co-operating with the sugar companies and the growers
to increase the improvements that have been begun. These
improvements should be promoted still further by the
growing practice of paying for beets on a sliding scale ac-
^ Not including refineries.
513] CONCLUSION 255
cording to quality, instead of by weight alone, as has been
the prevailing method heretofore.
But, in spite of increasing use of machinery, the nature
of the work necessary to produce sugar beets is such that a
large proportion of it will probably be done by unskilled
hand labor for a long time to come. Hence, the disad-
vantage of the United States on account of its high wages
will be an important factor retarding the improvement of
beets and the lowering of their cost of production. Di-
rectly connected with this is the problem of undesirable
foreign labor in beet raising. Careful statistics should
be secured so as to determine just what this phase of the
problem is. While the matter has been both exaggerated
and minimized by the opposing interests appearing before
congressional committees, yet it is probable that the pro-
portion of such foreign labor is somewhat smaller than is
generally supposed. However, the seriousness of it has not
been sufficiently recognized and the experience of the
United States should make us more careful to prevent
future race and social problems, rather than let them take
their own course and thus force us to suffer the conse-
quences later.
Probably the most important point upon which we have
the least definite information is that of the indirect advan-
tages of beet-sugar production, particularly as regards the
effect of beet culture upon yields of other crops. The
studies that have been made in Europe and the few data
we have for this country indicate that these advantages
alone are sufficiently great to counterbalance large direct
losses. This is one of the foremost matters in which the
United States Department of Agriculture, the many state
experiment stations, the beet-sugar companies and the
growers should co-operate to secure accurate data covering
the entire country for a series of years. The matter of
256 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [^14
agricultural costs should be thoroughly investigated at the
same time. These facts should be ascertained, not only as
regards beets, but also as regards other crops; that is, the
investigation should be a comprehensive agricultural sur-
vey. To make this properly is a large undertaking, but it
can be done, and it would be of incalculable value. Though
v^^e have a few isolated studies, we have not begun to de-
velop the possibilities in this field.^
While we do not possess the data for accurate determin-
ation of comparative costs, or even of absolute costs, as
regards the United States and other countries, we do have
a little better information regarding the latter class, and
this must always serve as one of the bases for estimating
comparative advantages. With respect to absolute costs
of production, there is no doubt that the most advanced
European countries can turn out sugar more cheaply than
do the average beet-sugar manufacturers of the United
States, probably by approximately three-fourths of a cent
per pound of granulated. Furthermore, their outputs are
capable of considerable expansion if exportations could be
increased without depressing prices. The producers of
Java, Cuba and the Philippines probably have even slightly
greater advantages over the United States producers as
regards costs of production and the last two are capable of
greatly expanded outputs. Not many other large producers
give promise of immediate important increases in exporta-
^ We can never make a very accurate estimate of either absolute or
relative costs and profits until we have much better data. While com-
parative costs are ultimately more important than absolute costs in
determining what any country can produce most advantageously, and
while the former automatically control in a rough way, even in the
absence of very accurate comprehensive data, nevertheless much fric-
tion and loss could be avoided by substituting scientific for haphazard
methods. The uses to which such methods and the data acquired could
be put are by no means limited to questions involved in this study.
515] CONCLUSION 257
tions, even if markets are developed faster than seems
probable.
Our study of the tariff and prices has indicated that, on
the whole, the United States prices fluctuate above world
prices by approximately the amount of tariff on raws.,
plus such a part of the differential on refined as is deter-
mined by competition between American refiners/ This
proposition has several corollaries. One is that immediate
free sugar would wipe out most, if not all, of the present
domestic beet-sugar industry. Another is that, if duties
were lowered, the consumers of the United States would
ultimately benefit in the matter of lower prices by approxi-
mately the full reduction. Of course, it is true, that the
elimination of the United States industries might lessen the
world supply and, hence, raise the world price but, in view
of the comparatively small amount of the United States
production, and the great possibilities of expansion in other
countries, it seems that this would be only temporary and
would probably be more than offset within two or three
years, particularly if certain legislation were adopted so as
to promote this end.^
If this is a correct estimate, and if the United States con-
sumers have paid extra for their sugar by the amount of
the duty on Cuban raws in the past few years, by virtue of
the tariff, as the writer believes is approximately the case,
they have paid about $100,000,000 extra annually on ac-
1 Of course, this is a very broad general statement having many ex-
ceptions. See chapter viii, supra, on this phase of the question.
^ Much has heen made of this possible decrease of world's supply,
and consequent higher prices, if the domestic industries are checked.
While it is impossible to estimate how much the United States or any
other country will, or would, produce under certain circumstances,
there has probably been much exaggeration as regards this matter. The
continental United States production of both cane and beet is less than
half of Europe's shortage in 191 1 or of Cuba's output in 1910.
258 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [516
count of import duties. About half of this has gone into
the United States treasury and the rest has gone for pro-
tection to sugar, the beet-sugar industry getting a little
less than a sixth of the total, or say, $15,000,000, in round
numbers. This is about one-third of the total value of the
output and about one-eighth of the total book-value capital
invested in this industry, according to the census report for
the year 1909.^ This protection has gone to the manu-
facturers primarily, and not to the growers of beets be-
cause the price of beets has been fixed by competition with
other crops. However, there have probably been some in-
direct reactions affecting such prices.
Just before this chapter went to press, the Ways and
Means Committee reported a bill placing sugar on the free
list, and, coupled with it, an income-tax bill to offset the
loss of $50,000,000 which will be occasioned to the federal
revenues if the former becomes law.^ The important effects
which w^ould follow such a change have already been indi-
cated. However, it is very doubtful if such a bill can re-
ceive the approval of the Senate and the President and there
is considerable talk of some compromise measure, as for
example, a reduction to the present Cuban rate ($1,348 on
96°), or to a cent a pound, with the accompanying removal
of the refiner's differential and the Dutch Standard color
* Both output and prices are greater now, though we have no exact
figures. See tables given in previous chapters on prices and on prob-
lems of the United States industry. Available evidence indicates that
a good deal of this capital is fictitious.
' Free Sugar Bill, H. R. 21213 ; Report of the Ways and Means
Committee, House Report no. 391, 2 parts, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. (March
5 and 7, 1912). This bill passed the House by a vote of 198 to 103,
March 15, 1912. Willett & Gray say that it will probably never be
heard of again, except politically, but that the Senate may pass a com-
promise measure, as for example, $0.80 on 96° Cuban cenrifugals.
Weekly Journal, March 14, 1912, p. 106.
517] CONCLUSION 259
test, but the retention of the present 20 per cent concession
to Cuba.
An immediate reduction of the duty on refined to the
Cuban rate mentioned above would be partly nominal but
would probably reduce actual duties by 25 per cent or 30
per cent, making the rate on Cuban centrifugals near $1.00
per 100 pounds, or about 50 per cent of their value. Our
study indicates that this is about the difference in absolute
costs between Cuban and domestic sugars, but the latter
would have the protection of transportation charges. If
this were not considered a sufficient reduction, a further
lowering of duties could be brought about by a provision
scaling them down each year, say by one-fifteenth or one-
twentieth of their respective amounts. The initial and
subsequent small reductions would not be so great but that
factories now on fairly economic bases could adapt them-
selves to the changes. Of those now on the margin, some
would probably be stimulated to make improvements and
better adaptations; others on less substantial bases would
be forced out of this industry into something else promis-
ing more profit.
An immediate reduction to $1.00 on refined and the re-
tention of the concession to Cuba, if both were made per-
manent, would probably put the Cuban and American pro-
ducers upon very even terms of competition and give Cuba
the advantage in the long run because of her greater pos-
sibilities of rapid development in the large-scale production
of cheap sugar. It would probably soon come about that
the domestic beet-sugar producers could sell their sugars
only in markets protected by substantial advantages in
freight rates, and these would be rather limited. The lower
the reduction of duties, the greater the advantage of Cuba
in United States markets as compared with domestic pro-
ducers, but the less her advantage as compared with other
26o THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [^ig
foreign exporters, provided the 20 per cent concession is
retained. With free sugar, the concession would amount
to nothing.
The removal of the Dutch Standard would simplify
matters and eliminate it as a possible '' joker," though it
is comparatively unimportant now. The removal of the
differential protection to American refiners would not em-
barrass them as they can compete upon even terms with
those of any country. The Cuban industry is so undevel-
oped as compared with its possibilities that the retention
of the present concession to her imports would probably
continue to stimulate increased production to the advan-
tage of both Cuban producers and United States consumers.
But our study has shown that whatever sugar-tariff legis-
lation may be passed at present must be passed upon the
basis of a very inexact knowledge of its ultimate effects
or, at any rate, upon the basis of very inadequate informa-
tion as to just what continuous policy of legislation would
be to the best interests of the people as a whole, considering
the direct and indirect effects, not only upon the sugar in-
dustries, but also upon the other important matters which
would be affected by such legislation. There is no question
that the general welfare is promoted by the legislative en-
couragement of some nascent industries. There is also
little doubt that the public suffers in most instances if it
continues to grant them large subsidies indefinitely. In
the case of some other industries, it may be very doubtful
whether or not protection would be beneficial at any stage
of their development. Each should be judged upon its own
merits. Heretofore, we have been deciding between them
by a crude rule-of -thumb. As a practical fact, the manu-
facturers have been enabled to control legislators and to
mislead the public to such an extent that they have been
able to carry out long-continued policies of protection that
519] CONCLUSION 261
would not have been tolerated by an electorate fully in-
formed as to the facts.
It is to the advantage of certain interests to make it ap-
pear that certain rates will be to the advantage of the
public; it is to the interest of the public, and of the Con-
gress which represents it, to have the best possible means
of determining whether or not such is the case. Neither
ordinary private citizens, nor members of Congress, with
their multitudinous duties, can have the time to investigate
adequately the complex and ever-changing economic and
industrial problems involved in tariff making. Probably
no agency more feasible than a permanent board of experts
can perform this highly desirable service.
Those who do not believe in any protective tariff might
consistently favor a fair and competent expert commission
on the grounds of policy alone. A great part of our in-
dustries have been built and now rest upon a protective
basis. Both our foreign and our home markets and all in-
dustries interested in them, are directly or indirectly de-
pendent upon domestic and foreign tariffs. However far
from right these may be, we cannot change the latter di-
rectly, and, in many cases, we cannot change the former
rapidly without entailing greater losses than even most free-
traders would favor. An expert board could enable Con-
gress and the public to tell where and how fast various
changes could be made and, if it were the desire of the
people of the United States to go over to a policy of free
trade, this could be brought about gradually with a mini-
mum of loss.
As a matter of party policy, the Democrats could afford
to favor a board of experts so as to enable them to ascertain
how to make changes that would not be so radical as to
cause a reaction. The Republicans could afford to favor
it as a means of preventing them from going too far in the
262 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [520
other direction. This would necessitate no change what-
ever as regards fundamental principles or policies of either
party, but would provide a proper basis for working out
these policies. Only interests wanting unfair advantages
can have real objections to the obtaining of the most com-
plete and accurate information which can be secured. Such
information can be furnished to the public and its repre-
sentatives only by experts. It is true that the establish-
ment and continuance of a competent board involves great
practical difficulties; also, that our experience to date as
regards the boards we have had has not been altogether
satisfactory, but the overcoming of such difficulties should
not be allowed to stand in the way of positive steps in the
right direction.^
* The writer is aware of some of the difficulties involved in the
securing of a properly constituted and properly empowered tariff com-
mission, but an adequate discussion of this phase of the subject would
take us beyond the limitations of this study. One great difficulty is in
getting a competent and fair board whose findings will be above sus-
picion, both as regards accuracy and fairness. The tasks involved are
so numerous that selection must be made as regards just what is to be
investigated and how it shall be done; also, as regards matters of pre-
sentation. In the case of such a partisan matter as the tariff, bias can
hardly be eliminated. The tariff boards which we have had illustrate
this fact, but they could never have been directed as they have been
had it not been that the interests of party and also of " big business "
were unduly influential in their creation and constitution. Hence they
are not adequate arguments against the right kind of a board, consti-
tuted primarily in the interests of the public. In a government like
that of England, where the cabinet determines policies and takes the
initiative in legislation, the tariff commission should work under its
general direction. In the United States, where Congress determines
policies and theoretically takes the initiative, it should direct the tariff
commission, yet the constitution of the board and its line of action
should be so fixed as to provide for efficiency and fairness. This would
require more or less continuity of membership, of purpose and of
action, and more or less harmony and co-operation between the legisla-
tive and administrative departments of the government.
It is often objected that investigations of costs of production and
52 1 ] CONCLUSION 263
But even if this step shall be taken, we cannot expect too
rapid improvement. Most frequently " practical " consid-
erations will carry the day. The best theoretical and scien-
other matters afifecting tariff legislation are of no use because of the
impossibility of securing complete and accurate data and also because
the facts are as various as the individual matters investigated. It
would be just as logical to argue against the fixing of railroad rates
by a state as to contend for this. Again, if business men or a corpora-
tion contemplating engaging in some line of manufacture went upon
the theory that they could not form any workable estimate of the cost
of production of their own plants or of those of their competitors, and
on that account refused to do anything, they would never get anywhere.
If any information is necessary for certain action, the best obtainable
is desirable. In any matter involving such complex forces, much judg-
ment and considerable guessing are often necessary; but the less the
guessing and the more exact the information, the greater the proba-
bility of a successful undertaking.
Again, it may very properly be objected that, under our system of
government, no continuous policy can be carried out. This contention
has much practical force, but the same argument is applicable to all
legislation. Generally, in the long run, the best thought-out and really
most scientific legislation in the interest of the general welfare should
have the best chance of being adopted as a continuous policy in a rep-
resentative nation with an intelligent electorate. (Though recognizing
the existence of many exceptions, lack of space forbids their discus-
sion.) On the whole, it is probable that the uncertainty regarding
tariff changes is as disastrous to business and, ultimately, to the public,
as are actual changes. This becomes more and more true with the
increase in investments of fixed capital. Hence the desirability of a
fairly continuous policy.
All arguments for an expert and honest tariff board are upon the
assumption that legislators are willing to work in the open and in the
interest of the general welfare. The real reason we have not had
more scientific legislation heretofore and that we shall probably have a
difficult and tedious time yet before we get it is just because the most
powerful interests shaping legislation have not been willing that the
public should know just what special privileges they were getting
through government subsidies. The public and the corporations have
made considerable advances in recent years regarding recognition of
the quasi-public nature of the operations of many of the latter, and of
the consequent desirability of publicity, and even of government in-
spection and regulation in some cases. A similar step, which we have
264 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [522
tific plan of action will be that which fits in with " prac-
tical " considerations in such a way as to bring about sub-
stantial reforms gradually instead of defeating its own
ends by over-zealous and over-radical changes. It has been
pointed out ^ that the tariff policies of most countries have
been dominated by the producers and not by the consumers,
the reasons for which are very evident. The excesses to
which such interests carry their measures are limited by
the opposition of producers with antagonistic interests and
the greatest changes will take place when there are great-
est changes in the interests of the opposing producers. For
example, the English policy of free trade has provided
cheap food for laborers and cheap raw materials for manu-
facturing, thus allowing the English producers to manu-
facture at low cost and to compete in the markets of the
world; whereas, in the United States and Germany, where
there has been a greater abundance of food and raw ma-
terial, the manufacturing and commercial interests have
favored a protective policy which would shut out foreign
competition. During the past century, the foreign market
has been the important one determining English commer-
cial policy and during the same time the home market has
been more important for the United States and German
producers. With the relative decrease in food supplies and
raw materials and the increase of manufactures in the
United States and the consequent growing importance of
not made, should be taken in the case of protected industries. Every
interest desiring to retain or receive a public subsidy, in the form of
a protective tariff or otherwise, should be made to accept the burden
of proof in showing that such legislation is in the public interest. Its
books should be open to properly authorized government agents, as
in the case of national banks and railroads, and its claims should be
investigated and reported upon by the tariff commission and passed
upon by a Congress adequately informed.
* By Prof. E. R. A. Seligman and others.
523] CONCLUSION 265
the foreign market, our tariff policy has just begun to ex-
perience fundamental reactions which are bound to grow
with further developments. Not that these economic
changes will be revolutionary and rapid in the near future,
but they seem destined to be certain and cumulative.
In conclusion, it may be said that the domestic beet-sugar
industry is not a simple, isolated, economic problem but
that it is involved with others that are economic, social or
political in their primary aspects. There are phases of this
problem which cannot be settled properly if no attention is
paid to trust operations and railroad rates. There are other
phases which are intimately involved with questions of im-
migration and racial amalgamation or stratification. There
are others which are involved with policies of foreign trade,
colonial development and administration; there are others
of great fiscal importance and there are still others of
practical politics and party advantage. The proper solu-
tion of questions regarding the domestic beet-sugar in-
dustry, therefore, involves the contemporaneous solution of
these related problems, the intricacies of which are exceed-
ingly great.
The crux of the immediate problem of producing beet-
sugar in the United States is in the agricultural labor cost.
The difference in stages of development between the United
States and Europe, and differences due to climate, as re-
gards the tropics, are such that there is no probability that
the United States can, in the near future, entirely over-
come its disadvantages in this particular if our direct costs
of producing domestic sugar are to be compared with our
direct costs of buying the imported product. However,
the probable improvements and indirect advantages which
a thorough investigation might establish would very prob-
ably show a net gain in producing beet-sugar in this coun-
try. On the other hand, it does not appear to be to the
266 THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY [524
interests of the people as a whole, considered both as con-
sumers and as producers, to continue indefinitely the pres-
ent high rate of protection to the domestic sugar indus-
tries.
Finally, it may be said that the United States beet-sugar
industry is an excellent example of both the advantages and
disadvantages of legislative encouragement. It illustrates
the intricate problems involved in such legislation and
shows the small amount of progress which we have made
in arriving at adequate solutions. We shall probably deal
more scientifically with such matters in the future as we
are forced to do so by the development of economic and in-
dustrial conditions. We have already reached a stage such
as to justify a step forward at this time.^
1 After practically all of this study, including the conclusion, had
been written, there appeared in the Quarterly Journal of Economics
(Feb. 1912, pp. 189-214) an article by Professor F. W. Taussig on
" Beet Sugar and the Tariff," His main conclusions are very similar
to those of the present writer, though he appears to advocate some-
what more immediate radical reductions in duties than the facts seem
to justify. Of several minor errors of fact and emphasis in his article,
the most serious is the statement that, up to 1890, high protection had
resulted in no beet-sugar production in the United States, " while yet
on the continent of Europe the beet-sugar industry had long held its
own against cane sugar without any protection whatever" (p. 190.
Italics mine). See pp. 20-31, supra.
Appendix i — Agricultural Costs
In the following pages we present some additional data
and references relative to the costs of growing beets, which
are illustrative of the material upon which we have based our
statements in the main part of the study. First, we present
some further details and explanations relative to the costs
coming more directly under the management of the writer.^
The remainder of the data are from published sources.
In the cases of the crops grown by the writer on a farm
near Fowler, Colorado, the wages of hands, boys and teams,
have been put as nearly as possible at exact cost. The wages
of home forces have been put at the same as those of hired
hands, a record of which was kept. In the case of boys, they
have been put at what the writer estimates their due propor-
tion according to work done. In the case of horses, they have
been based upon a careful estimate of costs, the amount and
price of feed being actually recorded for a considerable part
of the items, though by nature of the facts, estimates have to
be used considerably in separating items of joint costs. The
wages used in this calculation of costs correspond very closely
to those reported by the U. S. Department of Agriculture,
cited elsewhere,^ though they were so used before the latter
were available.
1 See pp. 123-129, supra. 2 Table XXVII, p. 132, supra.
525] 267
268
APPENDIX I
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527] APPENDIX I
Table LIV. Further Analysis of Labor Costs
(1905 crop.)
269
; Hand labor,
I without team.
I
Hand labor, [
with team.^ i
Team.
Per
Cost in cent of j Cost in
dollars. I whole | dollars.
cost.
Preparatory to plowing. . .
Plowing
Leveling and harrowing . .
Drilling
Cultivating
Thinning (regular labor).
Thinning (Mexican labor).
Hoeing
Irrigating
Pulling
Topping (regular labor) . j
Topping (Mexican labor) .
Siloing
Hauling
Loading '
Per I i Per
cent of Cost inlcent of
whole [dollars,
cost.
^5^29.20
15.00
19.15
12.15
Totals
25.65
17.00
1.90
9.73
5.00
6.38
4.05
6.65
8.55
5.67
.63
6.65
5-70
2.85
19.63
2.06 j
2.22
1.90
•95!
6.54
j^4.20
6.30
5.60
2.10
6.30
whole ,
cost.
1.40
2.10
1.87
.70
2.10
Sum of
previous,
per cent.
:
;
1.90
5^70
•63
1.90
.70
7.70
.23
2.57
.......
18.05
6.02
25.90
8.63
3-46
4.32
3.77
1.65
8.64
9.73
5.00
6.38
4.91
4^47
8.55
5-67
.63
14.65
$126,701 42.23 $66.65 22.22 $58.80 19.60 84.05
1 But not counting expense of team work which is an additional cost
shown in the next pair of columns.
^ Wages of extra hand, only. Division from hauling expense esti-
mated.
270
APPENDIX I
[528
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529] APPENDIX I 271
Notes to Table LV
OTHER EXPENSES (1907 CROP)
61 acres. Average per acre.
Paid to Sugar Co. —
1423 lbs. seed at 10 cents (13 lbs. for $1.50) $142.50 $2.34
Use of dump at 5 cents a ton 47-69 .78
Blacksmithing and repairs —
Remodeling 2 beet beds ^ 42.50 -69
Wagon tongues 24.75 .41
Shoeing horses 8.50 .14
Miscellaneous repairs 38.20 .63
Hiie of roller 9-55 -16
Miscellaneous expenses i5-7o .35
Estimated expenses —
Implement depreciation 100.00 z.64
Interest, crop investment 80.00 1.3X
Totals $50939 $8-35
Labor costs 2868.81 47-03
Total coht $3378.20 $55.38
1 To adapt to new style of dump erected by company.
Table LVI. Further Analysis of Labor Costs (1907 Crop)
Hand labor.
Team.
Totals.
Without team.
With team.
Plowing
Hauling manure ( loading and un-
loading by hand)
Harrowing
Dragging and leveling
Seeding
Cultivating
Irrigating
Thinning (contract labor, white) . .
*' ( " ** Japanese)
" ( " " Mexican)
Hoeing (regular labor)
" (contract " Japanese).
" ( " " Mexican).
" 1 " " Indian) . .
Topping (miscellaneous)
" (contract labor, Mexican)
Pulling.
Hauling (regular labor)
Loading (div, est.) .......
" (contract labor, white) . .
Loading (div. est. )
Siloing ^ (contract, white)
$19.00
154.85
12.00 I
359.25 \ \
72.71) j
40.35) I
23.25 y
90.00 1 1
50.00 J I
4.59
.36
10.64
2.15
1.19
.69
2.63
1.48
.s
$96.90
57.15
23.75
15.20
121.68
15-20
«~ o
o^
584.10 { 17.30 1
70.00 I 2.07 I
14.00 .
136.90
.42
4-05
Totals $1626.41 148.14
Supervision, $34-95
60.80
137.97"
26.00 I
$560.35
2.87
$110.60
i".69
.70
^&
•45
14.00
64.40
32.20
9.80
83.30
11.20
....
• •
.17
3.50
1.80
4.08
86.10
178.50 1
:!'
53.50 r
16.58
$647.10
3.28
42
91
95
29
47
33
19-15
6.15
.99
3.60
1.65
.74
6.08
5.36
.36
10.64 (
2.15 ]
1.19I
.69
2.63
1.48
.27
17.30
4 35
9-351
.07 1
-35 [
.42 J
4.05
83.87
1.03
84.90
* Includes i day at $1.90 not contract.
• Hardly comes under either class of labor.
Only part of such cost.
272 APPENDIX I [530
Table LVII. Cost of Growing Sugar Beets,
COMPARISON OF THREE CROPS, FOWLER, COLO.
(Average costs per acre of various items expressed as % of whole cost per acre)
1905 ! 1906 1907
(6 acres). I (37 acres). (61 acres).
Average of
3 previous
columns.
Labor costs.
Preparatory to plowing
Plowing
Harrowing 1
Leveling and dragging • • • J
Removing alfalfa roots
Seeding
Cultivating
Irrigating
Spraying
Thinning
Hoeing . •
Topping
Pulling
Hauling
Siloing
Special supervision
Subtotals
Other costs.
Seed
Dump
Blacksmithing and repairs . .
Miscellaneous expenses
Implement depreciation
Interest, crop investment . . .
Subtotals
3-46
4.32
3-77
1.65
8.64
4.91
14.73
6.38
14.22
4-47
16.87
.63
3-33
1.20
.94
1. 16
6.66
2.66
(15-95)
Totals
8.23
4-24
1-37
•93
.90
6.13
3.4S
1.22
14.40
4.48
»7-57
3.50
16.92
1.70
(84.05) I (85.08)
3.05
1.76
2.10
.32
5.12
2.56
(14.92)
.98)
6.15/
3.60)
1.65 I
•74
6.07
5.36
13.14
5-99
17.57
4.35
14.19
4.05
1.03
(84.90)
4.23
1.41
3.38
.74
2.96
2.37
(15.10)
7.71
5.18
1. 10
6.95
4.58
.41
14.09
5.62
16.45
4.11
15-99
2.16
•34
(84.68)
3.54
1.46
2.14
•74
4.91
2.53
(15-32)
100
531]
APPENDIX I
273
Table LVIII. Costs of Growing Beets, Actual and Estimated
Labor costs.
Plowing and preparation for same
Harrowing, leveling, etc
Seeding
Cultivating
Irrigating
Spraying *
Thinning
Hoeing
Topping,
Pulling .
Hauling
Siloing
Other costs.
Seed . •
Dump
Blacksmithing and repairs
Miscellaneous expenses
Implement depreciation (estimated)
Interest, crop mvestment " . . . .
Subtotals
Water rates
Management and supervision (estimated)
Totals 1
1905-07.
Actual crops,
3-year average.
J^4.o6
2.75
•57
3-64
2.42
.22
7.42
2.96
8.70
2.16
8.41
I-I5
1.87
.77
I-I5
•39
2.56
1.33
(52.53)
1.40
3.19
$57.12
Estimated
normal
average
after this
experience.
;^4.oo
2.50
•45
3-25
2.25
7.25
2.85
8.00
2.00
7-50
1. 00
1.85
•75
1. 00
.50
2.00
1.30
(48.45)
1.40
2.50
H2.ZS
^Does not include rent, interest on money invested in; land, or taxes.
However, this would produce more than the normal yield for the country.
The following are two detailed statements of some farming
operations conducted by the Great Western Sugar Co., as re-
ported by this company.^
^ Hardwick Committee Hearings, p. 3724. These statements v^rere
published after most of this study was written. The results are con-
siderably above the average. There is no explanation in the testimony
regarding the tables, and No. LIX is not clear as regards the last two
columns. (Tables LIX and LX).
274 APPENDIX I [532
Table LIX. Report of Company Farming Operations for Year Ending
February 28, 191 2 (Secor Farm)
[The Great Western Sugar Co., Longmont, Colorado factory]
Beet crop (185.8 acres).
Extra water
Fertilizing
Plowing
Harrowing and leveling
Seed, 3,957 pounds, at 10 cents . .
Planting
Thinning, first and second hoeing
Cultivating
Furrowing out and irrigating . . . •
Plowing out
Pulling, topping, etc
Hauling
Miscellaneous expenses
Superintendence
Land rental
Maintenance :
Tools, implements
Buildings and fences
Ditches, etc
Harness and wagons
Miscellaneous expense
Total
Add for hauling 3.54 tons, at 50 cents
Difference
Credits :
3,028.1335 tons beets, at #5.55.
173 acres beet tops, at ;^2 . . . . .
Total credits
Net profits ..
Amount.
Cost per acre.
^993.37
440.14
318.51
395.70
103.32
1,858.00
321.85
232.70
311.69
1,858.00
1,141.51
40.00
459-30
1,858.00
107.58
100.70
97.36
16.80
95.13
^10,749.66
^5.346
2.369
1.714
2.130
.556
10.000
1.732
1.252
1.678
lO.OCO
6.144
.215
2.472
10.000
.579
.542
.524 1
.091 i
.512
^6.66
2.50
1.30
1.70
.50
2.60
5.70
2.50
20.00
6.37
20.00
$57,856 i $69.83
! 1-77
$71.60
$16,450.23
346.00
^13.71
$88.54
1.86
$16,796.23 i $90.40
$6,046.57 I $32.54
On the next page is another statement showing operations
of the same farm for a period of six years :
533]
APPENDIX I
^7S
Table LX. Condensed Report of Beet-farming Operations on the
Secor Farm
[The Great Western Sugar Co., Longmont, Colorado factory]
Number of acres . . .
Yield per acre, tons.
Total cost
Cost per acre
Total revenue
Revenue per acre . .
Cost per ton
Revenue per ton. .-
Profit
Total profit
Profit per acre. ...
Land rental per acre
not included in
above amounts • .
1906.
1907.
314
374
17.42
i4:?5
^19,110.66
$21,268.92
60.86
56.86
29,346.60
29,053.56
9346
77.68
349
3.80
s-f
5-19
1.87
1-39
10,233.94
7,784-^4
32.59
20.82
10.00
10.00
1908.
325
".53
j5J 1 7,844.87 $15,206.43
1909.
325
13.7^
54.91
19,410.90
59.73I
4.751
$0.42\
1,566.03]
4.82
10.00
46.79
23,128.82
71.17
341
5-19
1.78
7,922.39
24.38
10.00
[910.
5?
16.45
1911.
185.8
16.29
$8,879.96 $8,891.66
56.20
i4»734-i5
93.25
342
5-67
2.25
5^854- '9
37-05
10.00
47.86
[6,796.23
90.40
2.94
5.55
2.6j
7^90457
42.54
Profit shown in italics.
Each year from 90 to 175 acres were manured at an expense of $15 per acre, cost
of which is included in total cost.
Irrigated in 1911, 3 times; cultivated in 19 11, 5 times; ditched in 191 1, i time.
Following is a partial list of references to costs, not cited
heretofore, which have been consulted as a basis for state-
ments made in the text regarding agricultural costs:
Arizona :
Ariz. Agricultural Experiment Station, Bulletin no. 30, p. 214
(1898).
California :
Ore. Agr. Exp. Sta., Bui. no. 44, p. 29 (1897).
American Sugar Industry, Jan. 1912, pp. 34, 35.
Colorado :
U. S. Dept. of Agr., manuscript report of L. A. Morehouse, Table
5, p. 33 (iQii).
Colo. A. E. S., Bui. 63, p. 12 (1901).
Colo. Report for 1896, pp. 66-167.
Pamphlet by C. S. Faurot, Practical Talk to Practical Farmers
(1903).
Mont. A. E. S., Bui. 52, p. 31.
276 APPENDIX I [534
Illinois :
111. A. E. S., Bui. 49, p. 27 (1898).
ICansas :
U. S. Dept. of Agr., Report 84, p. 121 (1906).
U. S. Dept. of Agr., Report 86, p. 16 (1907).
Michigan :
U. S. Dept. of Agr., Report 86, p. 16 (1907).
Minnesota :
Minn. A. E. S., Bui. no. 50, p. 332 (1896).
Minn. A. E. S., Bui. no. 56, p. 388 (1898).
Montana :
Mont. A. E. S., Bui. 52, p. 35 (1904).
Reprint from Fifth Annual Report, Montana Farmers' Institutes,,
p. 27 (1906-7).
Nebraska :
Neb. A. E. S., Bui. 38, pp. 120-122 (1894).
Neb. A. E. S., Bui. 72, (1902).
New York:
Geneva A. E. S., Bui. no. 135 (1897) ; Bui. no. 155, pp. 352,.
353 et seq. (1898).
Cornell A. E. S., Bui. no. 166, pp. 428-433 (1899).
Ohio:
Ohio A. E. S., Bui. no. 99, pp. 110-117 (1898).
Utah:
Utah A. E. S., Bui. 86, p. 89 (1903).
Colo. A. E. S., Bui. no. 6z, p. 12 (1897).
Wisconsin :
Wis. A. E. S., Bui. no. 26, pp. 6 et seq. (1891) ; Bui. no. 30,
p. 5 (1892) ; Bui. no. 71, p. 23 (1898) ; Bui. no. 123, p. 39 (1904)-
U. S. Dept. of Agr., Report no. 86, p. 15 (1907).
Miscellaneous reports and authorities covering various states:
Progress of the Beet Sugar Industry (1903), pp. 6z, 110-112, U. S.
Dept. of Agr. (Costs in Michigan, New York and Colorado).
57th Cong., ist Sess., Senate Doc. 316, p. 57 (1901).
56th Cong., 1st Sess., House Doc. 699, p. 14 (1899).
55th Cong., 2d Sess., House Doc. 396, pp. 198, 199 (1898).
Hardwick Committee Hearings (1911, 1912), pp. 3173 et seq.; 3456-
3540, 3616-3724, 3863-3923. (Most of these costs are for Colo-
rado, Michigan and California.)
Appendix 2 — Foreign Labor
The great amount of disagreeable hand labor required in
beet growing and the difficulty of getting native Americans to
perform it is a matter worthy of more consideration than
available statistics enable us to give it. This is particularly
true in view of the fact that Asiatics and other foreign laborers
have been brought into numerous sections by the sugar com-
panies.
We have no complete statistics of wages and laborers in the
beet-sugar industry, nor of foreign laborers engaged in it.
The accompanying statement is the most comprehensive re-
garding this matter that we have been able to get, but it is
partial as it includes only part of the factories and does not
include such foreign labor as Mexicans and Russians. It is
compiled by a representative of the beet-sugar interests.
Though it is not known what proportion of the total the
foreign labor forms in any locality, the Asiatics are most
numerous in California and a considerable number have
worked in the Rocky Mountain states in various years. How-
ever, the most numerous foreign element in Arizona and
Southern Colorado is the Mexican,^ while in Northern Colo-
rado and Nebraska, the Russians form probably the larger
part of the foreign laborers. A considerable number of Rus-
sians, Belgians and other foreigners work in the beet fields of
Michigan.
There are many Germans and Scandinavians who grow
beets in some sections, but they are usually proprietors or
renters and are not considered as foreigners in the sense that
1 See "Mexican Labor in the United States," V. S. Clark, U. S.
Bureau of Labor, Bui, 78, pp. 466-522, particularly pp. 482, 483, 496-
506, 519 (1908).
535] 277
278
APPENDIX II
[536
Table LXI.
White and Asiatic Labor and Wage Rates in Western Beet-Sugar
Territory ^
Names of companies or
locations of factories.
Number of
laborers em-
f)loyed in
actories.
White. Asiatic.
Average wage paid to common
labor.
White.
Asiatic.
Per
day.
Per
hour.
i Per
I day.
Per
hour.
Alameda, Cal
Betteravia, Cal....
Oxnard, Cal
Chino, Cal
Spreckels, Cal. • . .
Los Alamitos, Cal.
Hamilton, Cal. . . .
Santa Ana, Cal. . .
$2.10:
^200 None, i $2.25
'170 30I 2.50
700 None, i 2.40 1 j
300 None. I 2.50 ! I
300 16; $0.25; j $o.i6-$o.25
200 None. I .20
300 12, 2.75 1 2.40
200 None. I 2.00
Laborers sup-
plied to farmers.
White. Asiatic.
None. I None.
None. I None.
None. ] None.
None. I None.
None. None.
None. None.
None.
140
None.
Total
Ogden,
Amalgamated,
Utah
Utah-Idaho, Salt Lake,
Utah
Great Western, Colo. • .
Holly, Colo..
Grand Junction, Colo. .
Sugar City, Colo
Garden City, Kans
58
900' None.
None.
*i,8oo
3»3oo
500
250
$2.50
2.50
None. !
350, None, i .
400 None. 1.
$0.20
$2.50
$0.
2.75
350
100;
500
34
50
Total
34
7,800
.18 i None. None.
.30 I i 1,500 None.
78
1,970
924
Names of companies or
locations of factories.
Alameda, Cal.
Betteravia, Cal
Oxnard, Cal. . .
Asiatic labor employed in
vicinity.
Average wage paid for field work.
Proportion to white.
33 per cent.
Number.
White.
Asiatic.
200 $1.65 to $2 $1.65 to $2.
350
600
SI. 90 to $2.50 $1.90 to $2.50.
Piecework; make $3. Piece work; make $3.
Japanese, 81 per cent.
Hindus, 9 per cent. i
Chino, Cal 25 per cent 250 $1.75 to $2 $1.75 to $2.50.
Spreckels, Cal 20 per cent | 500-1,200 $40 to $45 per month. 16 to 25 cents per hour.
Los Alamitos, Cal Practically none 20 '
Hamilton, Cal I 25 per cent 140 $2.25 $2.40.
Santa Ana, Cal i Small Paid by the acre Paid by the acre.
Amalgamated, Ogden, I
Utah 1(6) $2^
Utah-Tdaho, Salt Lake, !
Utah I $2 to $2.50
Great Western, Colo. ... 5.2 per cent 1,226 (*) ... (®).
Holly, Colo I per cent $1 $1
Grand Junction, Colo. . . 25 out of 500 (") (®).
Sugar City, Colo.
Garden City, Kans.
None j "25 cents per hour
None.
^ Hardwick Com, Hearings^ pp, 2677, 2678. [Notes by T. G. P.] Compiled by Truman G, Palmer,
from reports received direct from sugar companies. '^ 35 during idle season. ^ Idle season:
55 white, 5 Japanese. * Estimated by Truman G. Palmer (since confirmed by wire). '^ Practically
none. "* At Logan, ^; Lewiston, %; La Grande, J^; Ogden, none. 7 Contract work, $17.50 per
acre. ^ Contract work, $20 per acre. * Contract work. i°" There are 25 to 30 Japanese dis-
tributed amongst 60,000 acres of agricultural lands on our side of the Arkansas Valley."
537] APPENDIX II 279
Table LXII. White and Asiatic Labor and Wage Rates, etc. — Continued
Names of companies or
locations of factories.
Alameda, Cal
Betteravia, Cal. . . .
Oxnard, Cal
Chino, Cal
Spreckels, Cal
Los Alamitos, Cal.
Hamilton, Cal. • . .
What furnished in addition to wage.
White.
Asiatic.
Santa Ana, Cal
Amalgamated, Ogden,
Utah
Utah-Idaho, Salt Lake,
Utah
Great Western, Colo. ...
Holly, Colo
Grand Junction, Colo. . •
Sugar Citv, Colo
Garden City, Kans
Sleeping accommodations.
Sleeping accommodations.
Firewood
Nothmg
Board and lodging
Nothing
^2.25 covers board at 60
cents per day
House rent and fuel
House and water .
Board
Labor houses to live in.
Sleeping accommodations.
Sleeping accommodations.
Firewood.
Nothing.
Sleeping accommodations.
No board.
Camping place and fuel.
House and water.
Board.
the others are. However, there are a number of Indians who
work in Colorado who are considered foreigners, much the
same as Mexicans.
As a rule the small farmers employ a smaller proportion
of labor, and hence of foreign labor, than the larger ones.
The proportion of foreign labor producing beets in the states
east of the Missouri River is relatively small and the writer
doubts if foreigners perform half of the total labor employed
in raising beets west of that boundary.
Appendix 3 — Bibliography ^
I. General Bibliographies
Select List of References on Sugar, H. H. B. Meyer. (Chief Bibliog-
rapher, Library of Congress, Washington, 1910.)
References to the Literature of the Sugar Beet (exclusive of works in
foreign languages), Claribel Ruth Barnett, U. S. Dept. of Agr.,
Library Bui. 16. (Washington, 1897.)
A Guide to the Literature of Sugar, Henry Ling Roth. (London, 1890.)
2. European Beet-Sugar Industry — Development — Bounties and
THE Brussels Convention
Culture of the Sugar Beet, W. McMurtrie, U. S. Dept. of Agr. (1880.)
The Sugar Beet, L. S. Ware. (Philadelphia and London, 1880.)
International Sugar Situation, F. R. Rutter, U. S. Dept. of Agr., Bureau
of Statistics, Bui. no. 30. (1904.)
" Sugar Industry and Legislation in Europe," C. S. Griffin, Quar. Jour,
of Econ., vol. 17, pp. 1-43. (1902.)
" The Brussels Sugar Convention," George Martineau, Econ. Jour., vol.
14 (Mar. 1904), pp. 34-46.
" The Sugar Industry on the Continent," Yves Guyot, Journal, Royal
Statistical Society. (London, 1902.)
"The Sugar Question in Europe," Yves Guyot, North American Re-
view, vol. 174 (Jan. 1902), pp. 85-94.
* This bibliography is selected from the works which the writer has
found most helpful and which appear most likely to be of aid to those
wanting to use such a list. In some cases, a work listed in one group
is also one of the best authorities upon another phase of the subject.
As regards several phases, it is impossible to make separate groups
without repeating practically every title, but, wherever possible, there
has been a rough grouping within the group upon the basis of primary
subject treated. However, in a few cases, the importance of an au-
thority in more than one field has demanded its repetition under more
than one head. Works in English have been put first, though in mat-
ters regarding European phases and indirect agricultural effects, the
German and French authorities are much superior. Generally speaking,
the more helpful works have been put among the first in each group
and sub-group. No investigator should fail to get a copy of Meyer's
bibliography; it makes an extensive one here superfluous.
280 [538
539] APPENDIX III 281
Report of the Tariff Commission, vol. 7. (London, 1907.)
" Sugar Conference at Brussels," Parliament, Sessional Papers, 1902,
vol. 104, cd. 1003.
"Correspondence" (referring to Amended Convention), Parliament,
Sessional Papers, 1907, cd. 3780, and 1908, cd. 3877.
Die Bedeutung der BrUsseler Zucker-Konvention fiir Deutschland,
Hermann Birschel. (Berlin, 1909.)
Uber die wirkungen der BrUsseler Zucker-Konvention, Adolph Herz-
feld. (Borna-Leipzig, 1906.)
Le regime des sucres; la convention de Bruxelles, Edgar Paris (Caen,
1905).
Histoire de la legislation des sucres, E. Boizard and H. Tardieu.
(Paris, 1891.)
Le Sucre de betterave en France, Jules Helot. (Cambrai, 1900.)
Les cartels sucriers, Georges Bureau. (Clermont, Oise, 1902.)
3. United States Beet-Sugar Industry
United States Census Reports, 1880-1910.
Annual Reports on the Progress of the Beet-Sugar Industry, C. F.
Saylor, U. S. Dept. of Agr. (Washington, 1898-1909.)
Beet-Sugar Industry of the United States, Letter from the Secretary of
Agr., Jas. Wilson, 6ist Cong., ist Sess., Senate Doc. no. 22. (Wash-
ington, 1909.)
Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletins of the various states.
Works of McMurtrie and Ware cited under " European Beet-Sugar "
bibliography.
Hardwick and other Hearings cited under tariff bibliography.
The Sugar Industry of the United States, H. W. Wiley, U. S. Dept. of
Agr., Chem. Div., Bui. no. 5. (Washington, 1885.)
" The Sugar Question in the United States," F. R. Rutter, Quar. Jour.
of Econ., vol. 17, pp. 44-81. (1902.)
Beet Sugar. A Brief History, T. G. Palmer, 57th Cong., 2d Sess.,
Senate Doc. no. 204. (1903.)
Beet-Sugar Industry of the United States, T. G. Palmer, 60th Cong.,
1st Sess., Senate Doc. no. 530. (1908.)
4. Agricultural Costs — Possible Improvements and Indirect
Advantages ^
" Methods of Reducing the Cost of Producing Beet-Sugar," C. O.
Townsend, Yearbook, U. S. Dept. of Agr. (1906.)
1 Most of the data concerning these phases of the study, both as re-
gards the United States, Europe and all other countries, are scattered
throughout the works, hearings and reports cited under other heads.
282 APPENDIX III [540
" By-products of the Sugar Beet and Their Uses," C. O. Townsend,
Yearbook, U. S. Dept of Agr. (1908).
" Relation of Sugar Beets to General Farming," C. O. Townsend, Year-
hook, U. S. Dept. of Agr. (1903.)
" Sugar-Beet Seed Breeding," J. E. W. Tracy. Ihid,
InUuence of Environment upon the Composition of the Sugar Beet,
H. W. Wiley, U. S. Dept. of Agr., Bureau of Chem., Buls. 64, 78,
95» 96. (1901-1905. Many other bulletins by the same authority.)
" Conditions Affecting Sugar-Beet Culture in the United States," H. C.
Taylor, Annals Amer. Acad. Polit, and Soc. Sci., vol. 22 (July,
1903), pp. 179-187-
The Sugar-Beet Industry as Affecting American Agriculture, T. G.
Palmer. (Chicago, 1909. Pamphlet.)
Indirect Beneiits of Sugar-Beet Culture, T. G. Palmer, 62d Cong., ist
Sess., Senate Doc. no. 76. (1911. Pamphlet.)
Beet Sugar, T. G. Palmer, 61 st Cong., ist Sess., Senate Doc. no. 121.
(1909. Pamphlet.)
"Agrarstatistische Untersuchungen iiber den Einfluss des Zuckerriiben-
baues auf die Land- und Volkwirtschaft," Gustav Humbert, in
Sammlung national ok onomischer und statisticher Abhandlungen,
vol. for 1877. (Jena, 1877- 1893.)
Einfluss des Zuckerriibenbaues auf die Landwirtschaft, Richard Woge.
( Leipzig- Reudnitz, 1892.)
Uber den Einiiuss des Zuckerriibenbaues auf die Hohe der landwirt-
schaftlichen Kapitalien, Hugo Roth. (Leipzig-Reudnitz, 1892.)
Bedeutung des Hackfruchtbaues, namentlich des Zuckerriibenbaues fiir
die Steigerung der Getreide- und Viehproduktion in Deutschland,
Wilhelm Lilienthal. (Jena, 1895.)
Die volkswirtschaftliche Bedeutung der technischen Entwicklung der
deutschen Zuckerindustrie, Theodor Schuchart. (Leipzig, 1908.)
Die Produktionskosten unserer wichtigsten Feldfriichte, W. H. How-
ard. (BerHn, 1908.)
Die Zuckerindustrie, Chr. Grotewold. (Stuttgart, 1907.)
La question des sucres envisagee au triple point de vue, industriel,
financier et economique, Joseph Lapeyrade. (Paris, 1901.)
De I'influence des reglementations sur la production et la consomnm-
tion du Sucre, A. Roederer. (Paris, 1909.)
The publications given here are to be taken as a few additions which
have some special references. See also references on agricultural
costs in Appendix I, supra.
541 ] APPENDIX III 283
5. Cane Sugar — Early History
History of Sugar as a Commodity, E. D. Ellis. (Phila., 1905.)
" Sketch of the History of Sugar in the Early Times and Through the
Middle Ages," W. Falconer. Memoirs of the Literary and Philo-
sophical Society of Manchester, vol. 4, pt. i. (Manchester, 1793.)
Sugar Cane, W. C. Stubbs. (Savannah, 1900.)
History of Sugar, W. Reed. (London, 1866.)
Geschichte des Zuckers, E. O, von Lippmann. (Leipzig, 1890.)
" Geographische Verbreitung des Zuckerrohrs," Karl Ritter, in Akad-
emie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, philologische und historische
Ahhandlungen, 1839, pp. 303-412. (Berlin, 1841.)
6. Cane Sugar as a Competitor of the United States
Beet-Sugar Industry
(a) CUBA
Commercial Cuba in 1905, V, S. Clark, U. S. Dept. of Commerce and
Labor.
Industrial Cuba, Robt. P. Porter. (Washington, 1899.)
"Labor Conditions in Cuba," V. S. Clark, U. S. Bureau of Labor,
Bui. no. 41. (1902.)
Commercial Cuba, W. J. Clark. (N. Y., 1898.)
Hearings. The various hearings cited under " Tariff and Cost " bib-
liography, infra, particularly those on Cuban Reciprocity.
Censo de la Republica de Cuba. (Washington, 1907.)
Der deutsch-amerikanische Handelsvertrag ; die kubanische Zucket-
produktion und die Zukunft der Zuckerindustrie, Julius Wolf.
(Jena, 1906.)
{b) PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
Sugar Industry of the Island of Negros, H. S. Walker, Div. of Chem.,
Gov't Sugar Laboratory at Iloilo, P. L (Manila, 1910.)
"Labor Conditions in the Philippines," V. S. Clark, U. S. Bureau of
Labor, Bui. no. 58. (1905-)
Census of the Philippine Islands, U. S. Bureau of the Census. (Wash-
ington, 1905.)
Hearings. Various hearings cited under "Tariff" bibliography, par-
ticularly Philippine Revenue Hearings.
Handbook on the Sugar Industry of the Philippine Islands, G. E.
Nesom, Herbert S. Walker. (Manila, 1911.)^
1 The writer has not seen this and the following publication, but they
are listed in the American Sug. Ind., Feb. 1912, p. 75. They should be
the best authorities yet published, the .former especially.
284 APPENDIX III [^42
The Sugar Industry of the Philippine Islands, G. E. Nesom. (Manila,
1911.)
(c) JAVA
" Labor Conditions in Java," V. S. Clark, U. S. Bureau of Labor, Bui.
no. 58 (1905).
" Progress and Present Condition of the Cane-Sugar Industry," H. C.
Prinsen Geerligs, Amer. Sugar hid., July, 191 1, pp. 303 et seq.
"The 191 1 Java Sugar Crop," H. C. Prinsen Geerligs, International
Sugar Journal, Jan., 1912, pp. 16-23. (Article by same authority
in same Journal for Jan. and Feb., 191 1.)
Das Zuckerrohr und seine Kultur, mit hesonderer Berucksichtigung
der Verhdltnisse und Untersuchungen auf Java, Wilh. Kriiger.
(Magdeburg, 1899.)
{d) HAWAII
Commercial Hawaii. (Forthcoming publication of the U. S. Dept. of
Commerce and Labor.)
Annual Reports of the Governors of Hawaii, U. S. Dept. of the In-
terior.
Bulletins of the U. S. Bureau of Labor, 1901, 1902, 1905, 1911.
" Sugar : Its Status and Development," Lorin A. Thurston, Pacific
Commercial Advertiser. (Honolulu, July 2, 1906.)
*' History of the Progress of the Sugar Industry of Hawaii," Royal
D. Mead, Hawaiian Planters' Monthly. (Dec, 1908, and Jan.,
1909.)
{e) PORTO RICO
Commercial Porto Rico, U. S. Dept. of Commerce and Labor. (Forth-
coming.)
Commercial Porto Rico, U. S. Dept. of Commerce and Labor (1906).
Census of Porto Rico, 1910. U. S. Bureau of the Census.^ (Forth-
coming.)
" Labor Conditions in Porto Rico," Walter E. Weyl, U. S. Bureau of
Labor, Bui. no. 61. (1905.)
Sugar Cane in Porto Rico, D. W. May, Porto Rico, Agr. Exp. Sta.,
Bui. no. 9. (Mayaguez, 1910.)
Reports of the Governors of Porto Rico, U. S. Depts. of War and In-
terior.
" Supplement " on Porto Rico, C. F. Saylor, in the Progress of the
U. S. Beet-Sugar Industry, U. S. Dept. of Agriculture. (1898.)
Census of Porto Rico, U. S. War Dept. (1899.)
^ Form or title of this publication not known. The writer used office
manuscript as in the case of other forthcoming publications cited.
543] APPENDIX III 285
7. Tariff, Prices, Costs, Trust, Freight 'Rates ^
Hearings, Special Committee (Hardwick Committee) on the Investi-
gation of the Amer. Sugar Refin. Co. and Others.
Tariff Hearings, 1908-9, Schedule E.
Hearings, Reciprocity with Cuba. (1902.)
Hearings, Revenue for the Philippine Islands. (1906.)
Hearings, Philippine Tariff. (Dec, 1905.)
Hearings, Duties on Philippine Products. (Jan. and Feb., 1905.)
Hearings, in the Philippines, U. S. War Dept. (Aug., 1905.)
Tariff Hearings, 1896-97, Schedule E.
Tariff Acts, 1789-1909, 6ist Cong., 2d Sess., House Doc. no. 671. (1909.)
"Beet-Sugar and the Tariff," F. W. Taussig, Quar. Jour. Econ.
(Feb., 1912), pp. 189-214.
" Sugar : A Lesson in Reciprocity and the Tariff," F. W. Taussig,
Atlantic Monthly, vol. loi. (Mar., 1908), pp. 33/^-/1/1/1.
"The Burden of the Sugar Duty," F. W. Taussig, Quar. Jour, of
Econ., vol. 23. (May, 1909), pp. 548-553-
The Sugar Industry of the United States, and the Tariff, A. D.
Wells. (N. Y., 1878.)
Weekly Statistical Sugar Trade Journal, Willett & Gray. (New
York. Best on Prices. Cited under " Sugar Periodicals," also.)
Wholesale Prices of Sugar in the Principal Markets, 626. Cong., ist
Sess., Sen. Doc. 55. (Washington, 1911.) (Best on prices as far
as it goes.)
The Sugar Refining Industry in the United States, Paul L. Vogt,
Pubs, of Univ. of Penn. (Philadelphia, 1908.)
Original Petition and Answer, U. S. of Amer. v. Amer. Sug. Refin.
Co., et al., in the Circuit Court of the U. S. for the So. Dist. of
N. Y. (i9io.)2
" Die Verarbeitungskosten und die Verwertung der Zuckerriiben in
Deutschland," Ernst Glanz in Verein der deut. Zucker. Ind. Zeit-
schrift, vol. 1, pp. 10, 402; vol. Hi, p. 31; vol. liii, p. 119; vol. Iv,
P- 35; vol. Ivii, p. 45. (Berlin, 1907, and previous years.)
" Zuckerfabrikation," H. Claassen and W. Bartz, in Die Zuckerindus-
trie. (Leipzig and Berlin, 1905.)
^ All of these matters are so interrelated and so frequently discussed
in the same connection that most of the materials regarding one con-
tain data regarding the others. All of the Hearings cited are U. S.
Congressional hearings, with one exception, which is noted. The
Hardwick Hearings are the latest and cover more phases of the sub-
ject than any other. The Hearings of the Senate Finance Committee
are in progress but are not available as we go to press.
* Trial in progress as this goes to press.
286 APPENDIX III [^44
8. Statistical ^ and General
Production and Commercial Movement of Sugar, U. S. Dept. of Com-
merce and Labor, Bureau of Stat. (1906.)
The World's Sugar Production and Consumption, from the Sum-
mary of Commerce and Finance for Nov., 1902. U. S. Treas.
Dept. (Washington.) 2
Statistical Abstract of the U. S. (Washington. Annual.)
Story of Sugar, G. T. Surface. (N. Y., 1910.)
Common Commodities of Commerce — Sugar, Geo. S. Martineau. (Lon^
don, 1911.)
Quarterlies of the German Imperial Statistical Office. (Berlin.)
Zuckerproduktion der Welt, H. Paasche. (Leipzig and Berlin, 1905.)
Jahr- und Adressenbuch der Zuckerfabriken und RaMnerien Oster-
reich-Ungarns. (Wien. Annual.)
ZabeVs Jahr- und Adressbuch der Zuckerfabriken Europa's. (Magde-
burg. Annual.)
Official Bulletins de Statistique published by the French Minister of
Finance. (Paris. Annual.)
9. Sugar Periodicals
Weekly Statistical Sugar Trade Journal. (Willett & Gray, N. Y.)
American Sugar Industry and Beet-Sugar Gazette. (Chicago,
monthly. Present title, American Sugar Industry.)
Louisiana Planter. (New Orleans, monthly.)
International Sugar Journal. (Altrincham, Eng., monthly.)
Sugar Beet. (Philadelphia, quarterly.)
Deutsche Zuckerindustrie. (Berlin, weekly.)
Zeitschrift, Verein der deutschen Zuckerindustrie. (Berlin, monthly.)
Osterreich-Ungarische Zeitschrift fiir Zuckerindustrie und Landwirt-
schaft. (Wien.)
Zentralverein fUr Riibenzucker-Industrie, Wochenschrift. (Wien.)
Journal des Fabricants de Sucre. (Paris, weekly.)
^ See Willett & Gray's Journal under " Sugar Periodicals," infra.
^ Through the courtesy of Mr. M. L. Jacobson, the writer obtained
much information from the manuscript of a similar work in prepara-
tion in 191 1. Part of this work is set up but the matter of publica-
tion is undecided as we go to press.
Studies in History, Economics and Public Law
Edited by the
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