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Full text of "Politics"




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THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY 

FOUNDED BY JAMES LOEB, LL.D. 
EDITED BY 

fT. E. PAGE, c.h., lttt.d. 
|E. CAPPS, ph.d., ll.d. |W. H. D. ROUSE, litt.d. 

L. A. POST, l.h.d. E. H. WARMINGTON, m.a., f.b.hist.soc. 



ARISTOTLE 

POLITICS 



AEISTOTLE 

POLITICS 

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY 
H. RACKHAM, M.A. 

FSLLOW OF CHRIST'S COLLEGE AND LATE 
ONITBR3ITT LECTURER, CAMBRIDGE 




LONDON 

WILLIAM HEINEMANN LTD 

CAMBRIDGE. MASSACHUSETTS 

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS 

MCMLLX 



First prinled 1932 

Reprinted with some corrections 1944 

Reprinted 1950, 1959 



Printed in Great Britain 



CONTENTS 



Introduction : 




1. Practical Prolegomena 


vii 


2. Mss. and Text of Politics 


ix 


3. Editions ..... 


ix 


4. Life of Aristotle .... 


X 


5. Aristotle's Writings 


xi 


6. Politics and Ethics . . . . 


xii 


7. Other Aristotelian Works on Politics 


xiv 


8. Date of Composition of Politics 


xiv 


9. Structure of the Work 


XV 


10. Outline of Contents 


xvi 


Book I ...... 


2 


Book II ...... 


68 


Book III 


172 


Book IV, J^| » jj* * 7* t • . • ^W 


276 


Book V . i«? ^\, . 


370 




ψ 



CONTENTS 

05 . 



Book VI . 

Book VII . pXQOiro 

Book VIII . pODOnv, 

Index I. — Subjects 



Index II. 



-Persons and Places 



PACK 

484 
532 
6S4 

677 
681 



" It is an amazing book. It seems to me to show a Shake- 
spearian understanding of human beings and their ways, 
together with a sublime good sense." — Henry Jackson, 
Letters. 



vi 



INTRODUCTION 

1. Practical Prolegomena 

In this edition of Politics the Books are in the MS. 
order ; the division into chapters and sections is that 
of Schneider (1809) 5 also, to facilitate reference, 
there are indicated in the margin the pages, columns 
and lines of Bekker's Berlin text (1831), which with 
its volumes of scholia (1836) and Bonitz's index (1870) 
has rendered invaluable service to students (its lines 
are numbered, and its two columns denoted by later 
editors by a and b, so that it affords a reference to 
every line of the extant works of Aristotle except The 
Athenian Constitution, only rediscovered in 1890). 

Some modern editors have reaiTanged the Books, 
placing the 7th and 8th as 4th and 5th, and the 4th, 
5th and 6th either as 6th, 7th and 8th, or as 6th, 8th and 
7th. Also some number them by the Greek alphabet, 
but others by the Greek numerals, using ς-, ζ, η 
instead of Ζ, Η, θ to denote 6, 7, 8. Moreover, two 
modes of dividing the Books into chapters are in 
vogue, and with one of these two different divisions 
of the chapters into sections have been used. The 
result is that such a reference as ' Politics, Z, v. 6 ' 
might denote twelve different passages in twelve 
different editions. 

The arguments for the two different rearrange- 
ments of the order of the Books are based on their 
contents, and editors have made conjectural altera- 
tions of the cross-references in the text to suit these 



INTRODUCTION 

rearrangements ; but the reasons, based on these 
cross-references and on the general contents, in 
favour of retaining the traditional order seem to me 
almost or quite as strong, while the reasons of con- 
venience (vigorously stated by Immisch in his 
edition, pp. vi f.) are overwhelming. 

It also seems desirable to explain that this transla- 
tion is designed primarily to serve as an assistance 
to readers of the Greek, not as a substitute for it ; 
it aims at being explanatory, so far as is possible 
without expanding into mere paraphrase. A version 
intended to be read instead of the Greek might well 
be on different lines. It might be quite literal and 
non-committal, keeping as close as possible to the 
form of the Greek and reproducing even its gaps of 
expression and what are or seem to our ignorance 
to be its ambiguities, and leaving the student to go 
for explanation to the commentators ; or, on the 
other hand, it might render the meaning but ignore 
the form, and substitute terse and finished English 
for Aristotle's great variety of styles — for he ranges 
from mere jottings and notes to passages of ample 
discourse, not devoid of eloquence, though hardly 
models of Attic distinction and grace. 

A rendering on the latter lines was provided for 
English readers once and for all by Jowett, whose 
translation with notes and essays (1885) is an English 
classic. This version, revised by Ross (1921), is of 
the greatest service to the student who wants to 
know the things that Aristotle said, but not the way 
he had of saying them. 

2. Mss. and Text of Politics 
The mss. are not very old nor very good. The 
viii 



INTRODUCTION 

oldest evidence for the text is a translation in bar- 
barous Latin by a Dominican monk of the thirteenth 
century, William of Moeibeke in Flanders. It is 
occasionally quoted here as Guil., and when the 
readings of its lost Greek original can be inferred 
from it, they are given as L. a The five best extant 
Greek copies are of the fifteenth century : one at 
Berlin, Hamiltonianus (H), one at Milan (M), and 
three at Paris (P 1 , P a , P 3 ). Of these Η represents 
an older text than any other ; Μ and P 1 form a 
family with L ; P 2 and P 3 group with various inferior 
mss., and are usually considered less reliable than 
the other family. 6 The text of Politics is thus very 
uncertain in detail, although uncertainties affect- 
ing the meaning are fortunately not very numerous. 
Some inaccuracies of expression attested by all the 
mss. are precisely similar to inaccuracies in other 
places attested by some mss. and avoided by others ; 
but as to how far the former inaccuracies are to be 
accredited to the author and how far to his trans- 
mitters, no two scholars will agree. 

In this edition room has only been found for the 
most interesting variant readings. 

3. Editions 

The commentary of Newman on the whole work 
(4 vols., 1887-1902) and that of Susemihl and Hicks 
on five Books (1894) are most valuable collections 
of information. The Teubner edition of Susemihl 
revised by Immisch (2nd ed., 1929) gives a useful 
brief presentation of the evidence for the text. 

" Also the version of Aretinus (Leonardo Bruno of Arezzo) 
1438, is once or twice cited as Ar. 

* Codd. cet. in the critical notes of this edition. 



INTRODUCTION 



4. Life of Aristotle 



Diogenes Laertius's Lives of the Philosophers, supple- 
mented from other sources, gives us a fairly detailed 
knowledge of Aristotle's life. His father was an 
hereditary member of the medical profession, and 
physician to the king of Macedon, Amyntas II. 
Aristotle was born in 384 b.c. at the little colonial 
city of Stagirus, on the Gulf of the Strymon, of 
which he remained a citizen all his life, although he 
passed half of it at Athens. Perhaps it is possible 
to find some trace of his northern origin in his 
writings ; if in some details of his thought he is more 
Athenian than the Athenians, his style has little 
Attic neatness, fluency or grace, even though his 
vocabulary has no definitely non-Attic features. 
He came to Athens at the age of seventeen to pursue 
his education, and became a pupil of Plato, remaining 
a member of the Academy for twenty years, till 
Plato's death. Speusippus then became head of the 
school, and Aristotle left Athens for Atarneus in 
Asia Minor, where his former fellow-pupil Hermeias 
was now ' tyrant.' He entertained Aristotle for 
three years, and gave him his niece as wife ; but then 
he fell into the hands of the Persians. Aristotle fled 
to the neighbouring island of Lesbos, and in 342 was 
invited by King Philip to return to Macedon and 
become the tutor of Alexander, now thirteen years 
old. At sixteen the prince became regent, Philip 
being engaged in war with Byzantium. His tutor 
retired to Stagirus, which had been destroyed by 
Philip in the Olynthian war, but which Aristotle 
had been allowed to restore. But he returned to 
Athens when Alexander succeeded to his father's 



INTRODUCTION 

throne in 336 B.C., and set up as a professor of philo- 
sophy, breaking away from the Academy and estab- 
lishing a kind of college in the Lyceum. This was a 
precinct of Apollo and the Muses just outside the 
city, and its -epi -ατος or walks, in which Aristotle 
taught, gave the new school its name of Peripatetic ; 
he equipped it with a large library and a natural 
history museum. 

Aristotle's professorship lasted till 322 B.C., when 
on Alexander's death Athens led a Greek revolt 
against Macedon. Aristotle, an alien, a protege of 
the court and friend of the viceroy Antipater, and 
a critic of democracy, fell a victim to anti-Macedonian 
feeling ; like Socrates before him, he was prosecuted 
for impiety. Saying that he would not let Athens 
' sin twice against philosophy,' he withdrew to his 
estate at Chalcis in Euboea, and died in the same 
year. 

His body was taken to Stagirus for burial, and his 
memory was honoured there by a yearly festival. 
He left his library and the originals of his own 
writings to his pupil Theophrastus, who succeeded 
him as head of the Lyceum. 

5. Aristotle's Writings 

Aristotle's writings were partly more or less 
popular works on philosophical subjects, and partly 
scientific treatises. The former were published 
(εκ&δομό'οι λόγοι), and are doubtless included 
among the ' exoteric discourses ' referred to in his 
extant works (e.g. Pol. 1323 a 32), though that term 
seems to cover the writings of other philosophers also. 
They are all lost, unless The Athenian Constitution 



INTRODUCTION 

is held to belong to this group. No doubt they had 
the charm and flow of style which Cicero and Quin- 
tilian praise in Aristotle. To the latter group belong 
the extant works, and these are for the most part 
singularly devoid of those qualities of style. They 
are called ' lectures ' (άκροατικοι λόγοι), and in 
fact each consists of a collection of separate dis- 
courses on different parts of a subject, loosely put 
together to form a treatise on the whole, with transi- 
tional passages of summary and preface, and cross- 
references, often untraceable. Some passages are 
mere outlines of the argument, others set it out fully 
but baldly, and others are copious and even eloquent, 
as if written to be read by the professor to his class. 
Doubtless they are actual drafts for courses of 
lectures, put together by Aristotle or his pupils to 
form treatises, and kept in the library of the school 
as an encyclopaedia for the use of students. It is to 
them that Cicero refers when in another passage he 
speaks of Aristotle's writings as ' notes ' (commentarii). 

6. Politics and Ethics 

For Aristotle Political Science is the second half of 
a subject of which Ethics is the first half; indeed in 
the opening chapters of The Nicomachean Ethics the 
term Politike is applied to the whole subject. It is 
the science of human affairs, of man's happiness or 
good. This consists in a certain mode of life, and 
man's life is shaped for him by his social environment, 
the laws, customs and institutions of the community 
to which he belongs. Aristotle describes man in 
biological terms as ' by nature a political animal ' ; he 
only develops his capacities in society, rightly organ- 



INTRODUCTION 

ized for his welfare. The aim of Politike is to dis- 
cover first in what mode of life man's happiness 
consists, then by what form of government and what 
social institutions that mode of life can be secured. 
The former question requires the study of man's 
ethos or character, which occupies The Nicomachean 
Ethics ; the latter is the subject of the constitution 
of the state, which is treated in Politics. Politics 
is a sequel to Ethics, the second half of a single 
treatise, although it bears the title that in the preface 
has been given to the whole subject ; this subject 
is covered by Plato in the single dialogue of The 
Republic. 

In Aristotle's whole scheme of science, Politike 
belongs to the group of Practical Sciences, which 
seek knowledge as a means to action, whereas the 
Theoretic Sciences (such as theology, metaphysics, 
pure mathematics and astronomy) seek knowledge 
for its own sake. The Practical Sciences fall into two 
groups again ; the ' Poietic ' or Productive Sciences, 
which tell us how to make things, and the Practical 
Sciences in the narrower sense of the term, which 
tell us how to do things : the former aim at some 
product or result, of the latter the actual practice 
of the art is itself the end. The former include the 
professions and the handicrafts, the latter the fine 
arts, like dancing and music, which are pursued for 
their own sake (though in Greek the term τεχν^, 
1 art ' or craft, is sometimes confined to the former 
group — compare the English word ' technology '). 

The supreme Practical Science is Politike ; it is 
the science of man's welfare or happiness as a whole. 
It is practical in the wider sense of the term, because 
it studies not only what happiness is (the topic of 

xiii 



INTRODUCTION 

Ethics), but also how it is to be secured (that of Poli- 
tics) ; and it is also practical in the narrower sense, 
because happiness is found (in Ethics) not to be a 
product of action but itself to consist in action of a 
certain sort. 

7. Other Aristotelian Works on Politics 

The short essay Oeconomicus included among the 
works of Aristotle is certainly by one or more 
Peripatetics of a later date. Other political works of 
Aristotle recorded are Πολιτικό? (a dialogue), Περί 
'Pi/Topos η Πολιτικοί•, Ilepl Βασιλειαϊ, ΆλίξανΒρος ~η 
"Ύπερ 'Αποικιών (a dialogue on colonization), Δικαιώ- 
ματα Πόλεων (formal pleadings on points of difference 
submitted by the Greek states to the arbitration of 
Philip), Νόμιμα or Νόμιμα Βαρβαρικά (an account of 
the institutions of non-Hellenic peoples, including 
the Etruscans), and most important of all, Πολιτεΐαι 
(a series of accounts of the constitutions of a large 
number of Greek states, enlivened with legends, local 
proverbs, and even anecdotes). This last work, 
until the discovery of The Athenian Constitution in 
1890, was only known to us from a number of quota- 
tions and references in later writers. It was a collec- 
tion of materials upon which Politics was based, and 
is referred to as such at the conclusion of The Nico- 
machean Ethics. 

8. Date of Composition of Politics 

The latest event mentioned in Politics (V. viii. 
10, 1311 b 2) is the death of Philip of Macedon, 
336 b.c. The work is not finished, and Aristotle died 
in 322 b.c. 



INTRODUCTION 



9. Structure of the Work 

Most of Aristotle's extant works look like com- 
pilations of several logoi or discourses dealing with 
different parts of the subject, and somewhat loosely 
put together to form a treatise on the whole. This 
applies to Politics more than to any other ; it 
seems to consist of three sets of lectures, not com- 
pletely finished, not systematically connected, and 
partly overlapping : viz. (1) Books I.-IIL, Prole- 
gomena — the theory of the state in general and a 
classification of the varieties of constitution ; (2) 
Books IV., V., VI., Practical Politics — the nature of 
existing constitutions, and principles for their good 
government ; (3) Books VII., VIII., Ideal Politics — 
the structure of the best state (unfinished). 

A probable view ° is that the work was begun on 
one plan and later finished on another. Book I., a 
prefatory treatise on domestic economy, was prob- 
ably written for the first plan ; it is unfinished, and 
clumsily fitted on to its present sequel. Book II. 
also looks like part of the first plan, kept to form part 
of the second one ; the same applies to Book III., 
perhaps the oldest part of all, which shows signs of 
incomplete revision to fit the new plan. Books IV., 
V., VI. are the newer work, and contemporary with 
the conclusion of The Nicomachean Ethics. Books 
VII.. VIII., the Best State, are the earlier work, put 
aside unfinished when the plan was changed, and 
their substitute was never written. 

a Stocks in Classical Quarterly, xxi M partly following von 
Arnim and Jaeger. Barker in Classical Review, xlv. p. 162, 
discusses the point in relation to Aristotle's life and political 
experiences. 

XV 



INTRODUCTION 

10. Outline of Contents 

(1) Prolegomena, Books L, II., III. 

Book I. The Family. — The state (c. i.) is not merely 
a large family (a retort to Plato's communism), but 
different in kind, yet it is a natural outgrowth from 
an aggregation of villages, as the village is from 
an aggregation of families. The family (c. ii.) is a 
partnership of master and slave, husband and wife, 
father and children ; it involves the business of pro- 
vision. Mastership (c. ii. continued) : the slave is a 
live tool, and slavery is natural — the division into ruler 
and ruled permeates nature (soul and body, reason 
and appetites, man and animals, male and female), 
and some men have only bodily capacities. Criticism 
really hits ' legal slavery ' ; ' natural slavery ' is 
recognized by common sense, and there is community 
of interest and friendship between master and slave. 
But the acquisition of slaves and the direction of 
their tasks are not part of mastership proper. The 
business of provision (c. iii.) — is it part of family 
economy, or subsidiary ? Nature supplies food for 
animals, and animals for the food and service of man ; 
so one kind of acquisition — the supply of the limited 
wealth needed for the good life — does belong to family 
economy. But another kind uses goods for exchange, 
aided by the invention of money, which led to com- 
merce ; hence the mistaken beliefs that money is the 
sole wealth and that the good life is bodily enjoyment. 
The natural and necessary art of provision is sub- 
sidiary to family economy ; the other kind is justly 
disliked, especially usury — money breeding money. 
The branches of natural and unnatural provision are 



INTRODUCTION 

outlined (c. iv.), with a third intermediate kind, the ap- 
propriation of the uncultivated gifts of the soil ; and 
reference is made to former treatises, dealing in 
particular with monopoly. The relation of the head 
of the family (c. v.) to the wife resembles republi- 
can government, and that to the children royalty. 
All three classes of household subjects have their 
virtues, the slaves' imparted by the master's ad- 
monition, the women's and children's by education 
directed in the interest of the state. 

Book II., The best Constitutions known, theoretical 
and actual (c. i.). — Plato's Republic aims at unity 
by communism ; but complete unity of the state is 
not desirable, his system (c. ii.) will not produce it, 
his account is incomplete, and there are other minor 
objections. The communism of Laws (c. iii.) is less 
thorough-going. The equalitarian constitution of 
Phaleas and that of Hippodamus (cc. iv., v.) are criti- 
cized, with a short essay on the dangers of political 
innovation ; then the constitution of Sparta (c. vi.), 
that of Crete, said to have been its model (c. vii.), and 
that of Carthage (c. viii.). There follow notes on 
Solon and a few other law-givers (c. ix.). 

Book III., The Nature of the State. — Political Science 
(cc. i.-iii.) asks ' What is a citizen ? ' and ' Is the good- 
ness of a citizen the same as the goodness of a man ? ' 
(in other words, What share in government constitutes 
citizenship and what classes should possess it ? and 
in order to perform its duties, must one possess all 
the moral virtues or only special political abilities ?). 
Citizenship means at least membership of the 
judiciary and the assembly, and therefore requires 
some property and leisure ; and manual work and 
trade are incompatible with the necessary mental 



INTRODUCTION 

qualities. On this basis the. forms of government 
are classified (cc. iv., v.). They vary according as 
the sovereign is one man or a few or the many, and 
according as these govern for the common good or for 
their own ; this gives three Correct Constitutions 
— Royalty, Aristocracy, Constitutional Government ; 
and three Deviations — Tyranny, Oligarchy, Demo- 
cracy (i.e., essentially, the rule of the poor and un- 
leisured, not the rule of the many). The distribution 
of power (c. vi.) : the state is a partnership for 
the good life, and in principle those who contribute 
most to this have most right to power. In practice, 
perhaps, the laws should be sovereign ; but they may 
be bad. The rule of the many is a simple solution — 
they have at least collective wisdom and wealth ; 
but they should not share the highest offices, only elect 
to and control them. The subject is treated afresh 
(cc. vii., viii.) : education and virtue are the best 
claims to power — wealth, birth and numbers have 
relative but not absolute claims. Supereminence 
puts a man or group of men above the law : hence 
the value of ostracism, for even in the ideal state 
supereminence would be dangerous — except super- 
eminence in virtue, which should make a man 
monarch. Royalty (c. ix.) — Spartan, oriental, elective 
(the aesymnete), that of heroic times, and (c. x.) 
absolute monarchy. It calls for supreme virtue in an 
individual ; but royalty passed into aristocracy as 
virtue spread, and aristocracy degenerated into 
oligarchy ; this was overthrown by tyrants, and these 
put down by democracy. Truly (c. xi.) the law 
should rule, i.e. reason ; and the monarch must have 
helpers, which points to aristocracy. But surpassing 
individual excellence does occur, and then absolute 



INTRODUCTION 

monarchy is justified. Recapitulation on Royalty 
(c. xii.)• 

(Of the other five constitutions, four are treated, 
though not on a symmetrical plan, in Books IV., V., 
VI. Aristocracy was touched on as a variant to Royalty 
in III. x., xi., and actual cases of it are alluded to in 
IV. vii., but it is replaced by the Best Constitution, 
the unfinished essay on which forms Books VII. and 
VIII. The substitution of αρίστη πολιτεία as an 
equivalent for αριστοκρατία and βασιλεία is justified 
in IV. iii. 1 (1289 a 31 if.) : is this an interpolation ?) 

(2) Practical Politics, Books IV., V., VI. 

Book IV. Existing Constitutions. — Science (c. i.) 
must study not only the ideally best form of state 
but the best under given conditions. Monarchy 
and Aristocracy (c. ii.) have been dealt with ; there 
remain Constitutional Government, and the Devia- 
tions (in descending order of merit), Democracy, 
Oligarchy, Tyranny — their varieties and their suit- 
ability to various peoples, their establishment and 
their preservation against revolution (the contents 
of Books IV., V., VI). Constitutions (c. iii.) vary 
in the distribution of power according to rank and 
wealth. Democracy and Oligarchy are usually 
thought the chief forms ; they really differ (c. iv.) 
not merely as the rule of the free and of the wealthy, 
but as that of the free majority and the wealthy 
minority. The necessary classes are farmers, arti- 
sans, shopkeepers, labourers, soldiers, councillors 
and judges, rich men, magistrates (Plato wrongly 
omitted the last three). Some may overlap, but 
rich and poor are distinct, so that Oligarchy and 



INTRODUCTION 

Democracy are the normal forms of government. 
Democracy (c. iv.) has four varieties, according as 
the qualifications of property and citizen-birth, and 
the supremacy of law over decrees of the assembly, 
are in force or are not. Oligarchy (c. v.) also has four 
varieties, according as power goes by a moderate or 
a high property-qualification, or by heredity, or is 
the arbitrary rule of powerful families called a 
Dynasty. The normal historical succession of the 
four varieties of Democracy and of Oligarchy are 
traced. Aristocracy, in a secondary sense, is a blend 
of these two, based on merit and numbers, or on 
merit, numbers and wealth. Constitutional Govern- 
ment (cc. vi., vii.) is also a blend of Oligarchy and 
Democracy (approximating more to the latter), being 
based on numbers and wealth ; it is brought about 
by the institution of pay for service in the courts, 
and of either a moderate property-qualification 
for the assembly or else election without property- 
qualification of magistrates ; it brings contentment, 
and so is stable. Tyranny (c. viii.) is monarchy based 
on force, irresponsible and selfish. Constitutional 
Government (c. ix.), based on the virtues of the 
middle class, is best on the average. But (c. x.) 
the best constitution for a given state depends 
on the relative numbers of the free, the middle 
class and the wealthy. Citizenship should be 
limited to those who bear arms, with a property- 
qualification admitting a majority. Classification 
of constitutions (cc. xi., xii.) is based on the 
distribution of deliberative, judicial and executive 
functions, the tenure and numbers of the executive, 
and their mode of election (fourteen modes are 
enumerated). The functions of the judiciary 



INTRODUCTION 

(c. xiii.), eight in number, are stated, and various 
modes of its appointment. 

Book V. Revolutions — their causes and their pre- 
vention. — Revolution (c. i.) springs from a desire of 
the many or the rich for more power (though de- 
mocracy is less liable to it than oligarchy). The 
various motives and circumstances that lead to it 
are set out (c. ii.), with historical instances of its 
arising from quite petty events (c. iii.) ; and special 
causes that operate in democracies, oligarchies and 
aristocracies (cc. iv., v., vi.). It is prevented (c. vii.) 
by the opposite causes and measures, which are 
discussed in general, and for oligarchy and democracy 
in particular, as well as (c. viii.) for monarchies, 
royalty and tyranny being contrasted : a variety of 
personal motives cause attacks on tyrants, but the 
monarchy of old days was only endangered by dis- 
cord in the reigning house or by excessively harsh 
rule. Royalty is preserved (c. ix.) by moderation ; 
tyranny by two opposite methods, harsh repression 
or conciliatory public spirit (historical examples). 
Criticism (c. x.) of Plato's treatment of revolution 
in The Republic, with his theory of a regular cycle of 
constitutional changes. 

Book VI. (a) Democracy and Oligarchy. — Democracy 
(c. i.) varies in form with the prevalent industries of 
the people, its basis being liberty and equality (not 
' proportional equality,' balancing wealth against 
numbers). Agricultural democracy (c. ii.) is the 
best, pastoral next ; traders and labourers are too 
fond of politics and a field for demagogy. Devices 
to safeguard democracy (c. iii.), especially coloniza- 
tion. Oligarchy (c. iv.) — the more tyrannical its 
form the more protection it needs, an elaborate 

xxi 



INTRODUCTION 

military system and placation of the people by public 
benefactions. (6) The various Offices of Government 
are enumerated and discussed (c. v.). 

(3) Ideal Politics, Books VII., VIII. 

Book VII. The Best Constitution : external condi- 
tions, population. — The writer begins (cc. i.-iii.) with 
a resume of Ethics : the best life for the state 
as for the man is the life of virtue with enough 
external goods for virtuous action ; the highest form 
of this for a man is the inner life of thought, and 
similarly for the state external dominion is inferior 
to the internal activity of politics. The necessary 
conditions of the ideal but practicable state (iv., v.) 
are a population not too small nor too large for the 
best common life, a country large enough for the 
temperate maintenance of this population and easily 
defensible, a suitable city site (the advantages and 
disadvantages of a sea-port are set out). The 
citizens (c. vi.) should be of a race like the Greek, 
at once spirited and intelligent. Of the necessary 
classes (c. vii.), the artisans and farmers (c. viii.) 
are unfit for citizenship, which must carry military, 
political, judicial and priestly functions ; they should 
be slaves or alien serfs. The history of the caste- 
system (c. ix.) is discussed. The land must be 
partly public, to support religion and the public 
meals, partly private ; each citizen is to have one 
farm near the city and another near the frontier. 
The site and plan of the city (cc. x., xi.), water- 
supply, fortifications, temples, state agora, market 
agora, and guard-posts and shrines in the country. 
The discipline and education of the citizens 



INTRODUCTION 

(c. xii.) ; to natural gifts must be added training of 
habit and reason (c. xiii.),the psychology and objects 
of which are discussed ; and the life of leisure is the 
ultimate aim. To produce the finest human material 
(c. xiv.) the state must regulate marriage, and the 
training of infancy and childhood. Education proper 
(c. xv.) falls into two parts, for the ages 7 to 14 and 
14 to 21. 

Book VIII. The Best Constitution continued. — 
Education must be systematic, universal and public 
(c. i.). Studies (c. ii.) should be edifying, and useful 
studies should be pursued with a liberal tone. Gym- 
nastics (c. iii.) are to train spirit ; for children (cc. 
iv., v.) they should be gentle, then three years of 
study should follow, then a period of rigorous bodily 
training. Music is not merely a harmless amusement 
or a rational pastime ; it is morally educative — it 
exercises and refines the emotions. Moderate 
skill in performance on the lyre (c. vi.) should be 
acquired, but the flute and cithara are too profes- 
sional, and the flute too emotional ; and so (c. vii.) 
is the Phrygian mode — the ethical Dorian mode is 
more suited for education. 

(The treatise here breaks off.) 



xxiii 



ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS 



APISTOTEAOT2 
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ A 

Ι. Επειδή πάσαν πόλιν όρώμεν κοινωνίαν τινά 1 
οΖσαν, και πάσαν κοινωνίαν άγαθοΰ τίνος ένεκεν 
συνεστηκυΐαν (του γαρ είναι, δοκοΰντος αγαθόν 
χάριν πάντα πράττουσι πάντες), δηλον ώς 7τασαι 

5 μέν άγαθοΰ τίνος στοχάζονται, μάλιστα δέ και 
τον κνριωτάτου πάντων η πασών κνριωτάτη και 
πάσας περιέχουσα τάς άλλα?• αΰτη δ' εστίν ή 
καλούμενη πόλις και η κοινωνία η πολιτική, όσοι 2 
μεν ονν οΐονται πολιτικόν και βασιλικόν και 
οίκονομικον και δεσποτικόν είναι τον αυτόν, ου 
καλώς λεγουσιν πλήθει γαρ και όλιγότητι νομί- 

ιο ζονσι διαφερειν αλλ ουκ εΐδει τούτων εκαστον, 
οίον αν μεν ολίγων, δεσπότην, άν δε πλειόνων, 
οίκονόμον, άν δ' ετι πλειόνων, πολιτικόν τ) βασι- 
λικόν, ώς ουδέν διαφερουσαν μεγάλην οίκίαν η 
μικράν πόλιν και πολιτικόν δε και βασιλικόν, 

15 όταν μεν αυτός εφεστήκγ), βασιλικόν, όταν δε 

° The Greek word had not acquired a specially political 
connotation as the English word ' community ' has. 

6 Socrates and Plato. 
2 



ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS 
BOOK I 

1 I. Every state is as we see a sort of partnership,* Book L 
and every partnership is formed with a view to some family. 
good (since all the actions of all mankind are done with 

a view to what they think to be good). It is therefore The state 
evident that, while all partnerships aim at some good, ^"caiiy 
the partnership that is the most supreme of all and from the 
includes all the others does so most of all, and aims y " 
at the most supreme of all goods ; and this is the 
partnership entitled the state, the political associa- 

2 tion. Those δ then who think that the natures of 
the statesman, the royal ruler, the head of an estate ° 
and the master of a family are the same, are mista- 
ken ; they imagine that the difference between these 
various forms of authority is one of greater and smaller 
numbers, not a difference in kind — that is, that the 
ruler over a few people is a master, over more the 
head of an estate, over more still a statesman or 
royal ruler, as if there were no difference between 
a large household and a small city ; and also as to 
the statesman and the royal ruler, they think that 
one who governs as sole head is royal, and one who, 

β οικονόμος denoting a higher grade than Se<TTOn)s is 
unusual. For their ordinary use see c. ii. § I fin. 

3 



ARISTOTLE 

1252 a 

κατά λόγους της επιστήμης της τοιαύτης κατά. 

μέρος άρχων και αρχόμενος, πολιτικόν ταύτα δ' 

ουκ βστιν αληθή, δήλον δ' έσται το λεγόμενον 3 

επισκοποΰσι κατά την ύφηγημένην μέθοδον ώσπερ 

γαρ iv τοις άλλοις το σύνθετον μέχρι των άσνν- 

20 θέτων ανάγκη διαιρεΐν (ταΰτα γάρ ελάχιστα μόρια 
του παντός), οΰτω και πόλιν εζ ων σύγκειται 
σκοποΰντες όφόμεθα και περί τούτων μάλλον τι 
τ€ διαφέρουσιν αλλήλων και ει τι τεχνικόν εν- 
δέχεται λαβείν περί έκαστον των ρηθέντων. 

Ει δη τις εξ αρχής 1 τά πράγματα φυόμενα βλέ- 

25 φειεν, ώσπ€ρ iv τοις άλλοις και iv τούτοις κάλλιστ 
άν οΰτω θεωρησειεν. ανάγκη δή πρώτον συν- 4 
δυάζεσθαι τους άνευ αλλήλων μη δυναμένους 
etvat, οίον θήλυ μεν και άρρεν τής γενέσεως 2 
ένεκεν {και τούτο ουκ εκ προαιρέσεως, αλλ' ώσπερ 
και εν τοις άλλοις ζωοις και φυτοΐς φυσικόν το 

80 εφίεσθαι οίον αύτο τοιούτον καταλιπεΐν έτερον), 
άρχον δε και άρχόμενον φύσει, 3 δια την σωτηρίαν 
(το μεν γάρ δυνάμενον τή διάνοια προοράν άρχον 
φύσει και δεσπόζον φύσει, το δε δυνάμενον τω 
σώματι ταΰτα ποιεΐν* άρχόμενον και φύσει δοΰλον 
διό δεσπότη και δούλω ταύτό συμφέρει) . φύσει 5 
\252 b μεν ουν διώρισται το θήλυ και το δοΰλον (ούθεν 
γάρ ή φύσις ποιεί τοιοΰτον οίον χαλκοτύποι την 
Αελφικήν μάχαιραν πενιχρώς , αλλ' εν προς εν 

1 αρχής <ets> Richards. 2 yevvr/aews Stobaeus. 

3 φύσει ante και codd. cet. et Aid. 

4 ταΰτα iroielv {ταΰτα ante τφ σώματι MP 1 ) : διαπονεΐν 
Gomperz. 

A probable emendation gives ' that can carry out labour.' 
* A dagger and carving-knife or knife and spoon in one ? 
4 



POLITICS, Ι. ι. 2-5 

while the government follows the principles of the 
science of royalty, takes turns to govern and be 
governed is a statesman ; but these views are not 

3 true. And a proof of what we assert will appear if 
we examine the question in accordance with our 
regular method of investigation. In every other 
matter it is necessary to analyse the composite whole 
down to its uncompounded elements (for these are 
the smallest parts of the whole) ; so too with the 
state, by examining the elements of which it is com- 
posed we shall better discern in relation to these 
different kinds of rulers what is the difference be- 
tween them, and whether it is possible to obtain any 
scientific precision in regard to the various statements 
made above. 

In this subject as in others the best method of The Family 
investigation is to study things in the process of ^^ΰοη' 

4 development from the beginning. The first coupling for the 
together of persons then to which necessity gives rise f uife. 
is that between those who are unable to exist without 

one another, namely the union of female and male 
for the continuance of the species (and this not of 
deliberate purpose, but with man as with the other 
animals and with plants there is a natural instinct to 
desire to leave behind one another being of the same 
sort as oneself), and the union of natural ruler and 
natural subject for the sake of security (for one that 
can foresee with his mind is naturally ruler and 
naturally master, and one that can do these things α 
with his body is subject and naturally a slave ; so 

5 that master and slave have the same interest). Thus 
the female and the slave are by nature distinct (for 
nature makes nothing as the cutlers make the Delphic 
knife, 6 in a niggardly way, but one thing for one 



ARISTOTLE 

1252 b 

ούτω γαρ αν αποτελοΐτο κάλλιστα τών οργάνων 
5 εκαστον, μη πολλοίς εργοις αλλ' ivl δουλεΰον) . iv 
δε τοις βαρβάροις το θήλυ και το 1 δοΰλον την αυτιών 
έχει ταζιν αίτιον δ' ότι το φύσει αρχον ουκ εχου- 
σιν, άλλα γίνεται η κοινωνία αυτών Βουλής και 
δούλου, διό φασιν οι ποιηται 

βαρβάρων δ' "Έλληνας άρχειν εικός, 

ώς ταύτό φύσει βάρβαρον και δοΰλον όν. εκ μεν 6 
ίο οΰν τούτων των δυο κοινωνιών οικία πρώτη, και 
ορθώς Ησίοδος είπε ποιησας 

οίκον μεν πρώτιστα γυναικά τε βοΰν τ' άροτηρα• 

6 γαρ βοΰς άντ οίκετου τοις πενησίν εστίν, η 
μεν οΰν εις πάσαν ημεραν συνεστηκυΐα κοινωνία 
κατά φύσιν οΐκός εστίν, ους Χαρώνδα? μεν καλεί 

15 όμοσιπύους , 'Έ,πιμενίδης δε 6 Κρης όμοκάπους. 2 

Ή δ' εκ πλειόνων οικιών κοινωνία πρώτη 7 
χρήσεως ένεκεν μη εφήμερου κώμη. μάλιστα δε 
κατά φύσιν εοικεν ή κώμη αποικία? οικίας είναι, 
ους καλοΰσί τίνες όμογάλακτας [παϊδάς τε και 
παίδων παΐδας~\. Χ διό και το πρώτον εβασιλεύοντο 

•20 at πόλεις και νυν ετι τα έθνη• εκ βασιλευομενων 

1 τό add. edd. 2 όμοκάπνον: ΓΜΡ 1 . 

* άποικίαι ? ed. 4 [παΐδάς τε — παΐδας] Susemihl. 

° Euripides, LA. 1400. * Works and Days 405. 

e A lawgiver of Catana in Sicily, 6th century b.c. or earlier. 

d A poet and prophet invited to Athens 596 b.c. to purify 
it of plague. 

' Or Doric, ' with a joint holding.' The variant όμοκάτπΌν$, 
4 smoke-sharers,' seems to mean ' hearth-fellows.' 

' Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give ' consists of 
colonies from.' 

6 



POLITICS, Ι. ι. 5-7 

purpose ; for so each tool will be turned out in the 
finest perfection, if it serves not many uses but one). 
Yet among barbarians the female and the slave have 
the same rank ; and the cause of this is that bar- 
barians have no class of natural rulers, but with them 
the conjugal partnership is a partnership of female 
slave and male slave. Hence the saying of the 
poets — 

Tis meet that Greeks should rule barbarians," — 

implying that barbarian and slave are the same in 

6 nature. From these two partnerships then is first 
composed the household, and Hesiod b was right when 
he wrote : 

First and foremost a house and a wife and an ox for the 
ploughing — 

for the ox serves instead of a servant for the poor. 
The partnership therefore that comes about in the 
course of nature for everyday purposes is the ' house,' 
the persons whom Charondas c speaks of as ' meal-tub- 
fellows ' and the Cretan Epimenides d as ' manger- 
fellows.' e 

7 On the other hand the primary partnership made Related 
up of several households for the* satisfaction of not '*"^ s 
mere daily needs is the village. The village accord- Village. 
ing to the most natural account seems to be a colony 
from f a household, formed of those whom some 
people speak of as ' fellow-nurslings,' sons and sons' 
sons." It is owing to this that our cities were at 

first under royal sway and that foreign races are so 
still, because they were made up of parts that were 

» The words ' sons and sons' sons ' are probably an inter- 
polated note. 



ARISTOTLE 

1252 b 

yap συνηλθον, πάσα γαρ οικία βασιλεύεται υπό 
του πρεσβυτατου, ώστε και αί άποικίαι διά την 
σνγγένειαν. και τοϋτ εστίν ο λέγει "Ομηρος, 

θεμιστεύει δε έκαστος 
παιοων ηο αλοχων 

σποράοες γάρ• και ούτω το άρχαΐον ωκουν. και 
85 τους θεούς οέ δια τούτο πάντες φασι /?ασιλευεσ(?αι, 
οτι και αύτοι οι μεν έτι και νΰν οι δε το άρχαΐον 
εβασιλεύοντο' ώσπερ δε και τά εΐδη εαυτοΐς άφ- 
ομοιοΰσιν οι άνθρωποι, ούτω και τους βίους των 
θεών. 

Ή δ* εκ πλειόνων κωμών κοινωνία τέλειος 8 
πόλις, ήδη πάσης έχουσα πέρας της αυτάρκειας 
80 ως έπος ειπείν, γινομένη 1 μεν οΰν τοϋ ζην ένεκεν, 
ούσα δε τού ευ ζην. διό πάσα πόλις φύσει εστίν, 
εΐπερ και αϊ πρώται κοινωνίαι• τέλος γαρ αύτη 
εκείνων, η δε φύσις τέλος εστίν, οίον γαρ έκαστόν 
έστι της γενέσεως τελεσθείσης, ταύτην φαμεν 
την φύσιν είναι εκάστου, ώσπερ ανθρώπου, Ιππου, 

1253 a οικίας, ετι το ου ένεκα και το τέλος βέλτιστον 

η δ' αυτάρκεια τέλος και βέλτιστον. εκ τούτων 9 
ούν φανερόν οτι τών φύσει η πόλις εστί, και οτι 6 
άνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικόν ζώον, καΐ 6 άπολις διά 
φύσιν και ου διά τύχην ήτοι φαύλος εστίν η 
δ κρείττων η άνθρωπος (ώσπερ και ό ύφ' Όμηρου 
λοώορηθεις 

άφρητωρ, άθέμιστος, ανέστιος, 

1 yevouivir) ? ed. 

° Odyssey, ix, 1 14 f. of the Cyclopes : the passage goes on : 
εστίν eicewos \ &s πολέμου ίραται. 

b A reminiscence of Xenophanes fr. 14. ° Iliad ix. 63. 

8 



POLITICS, Ι. ι. 7-9 

under royal rule ; for every household is under the 
roval rule of its eldest member, so that the colonies 
from the household were so too, because of the kin- 
ship of their members. And this is what Homer* 
means : 

And each one giveth law 
To sons and eke to spouses — 

for his Cyclopes live in scattered families ; and that 
is the way in which people used to live in early times. 
Also this explains why all races speak of the gods 
as ruled by a king, because they themselves too are 
some of them actually now so ruled and in other cases 
used to be of old ; and as men imagine the gods in 
human form, so also they suppose their manner of 
life to be like their own. b 

8 The partnership finally composed of several villages Neighbour- 
is the city-state ; it has at last attained the limit of {S^S^f* 
virtually complete self-sufficiency, and thus, while it City-stat«, 
comes into existence for the sake of life, it exists for good nf e . 
the good life. Hence every city-state exists by nature, 
inasmuch as the first partnerships so exist ; for the 
city-state is the end of the other partnerships, and 
nature is an end, since that which each thing is when 

its growth is completed we speak of as being the 
nature of each thing, for instance of a man, a horse, 
a household. Again, the object for which a thing 
exists, its end, is its chief good ; and self-sufficiency 

9 is an end, and a chief good. From these things 
therefore it is clear that the city-state is a natural 
growth, and that man is by nature a political animal, 
and a man that is by nature and not merely by 
fortune citiless is either low in the scale of humanity 
or above it (like the ' clanless, lawless, hearthless ' 
man reviled by Homer, c for he is by nature citiless 

β 9 



ARISTOTLE 

1253 a 

άμα γαρ φύσει τοιούτος και πολέμου επιθυμη- 
τής) άτε ων ώσπερ άζυξ 1 εν πεττοΐς. διότι δε 10 
πολιτικον 6 άνθρωπος ζώον 2 πάσης μελίττης και 
παντός άγελαίου ζώου μάλλον, δηλον. ούθεν yap, 

ίο ως φαμεν, μάτην ή φύσις ποιεί' λόγον δε μόνον 
άνθρωπος έχει των ζωών. η μεν ουν φωνή του 
λυπηρού και ηδέος εστί σημεΐον, διό και τοις 
άλλοι? υπάρχει ζώοις (μέχρι γαρ τούτου η φύσις 
αυτών ελήλυθεν, του εχειν αισθησιν λυπηρού και 
ηδεος και ταύτα σημαίνειν άλλτ^λοι?), ό δε λόγος 

15 επι τω δηλοΰν εστί το συμφέρον και το βλαβερόν, 
ώστε και το δίκαιον και τό άδικον τούτο γαρ 11 
προς τάλλα ζώα τοις άνθρώποις 'ίδιον, το μόνον 3 
αγαθού και κακού και δικαίου και αδίκου και τών 
άλλων αισθησιν εχειν, η δε τούτων κοινωνία ποιεί 
οίκίαν και πόλιν. 

Και πρότερον δη τη φύσει πόλις η οικία και 

20 έκαστος ημών εστίν. τό γαρ όλον πρότερον 
άναγκαΐον είναι τοΰ μέρους• αναιρουμένου γαρ τού 
όλου ουκ εσται πους ούδε χειρ ει μη όμωνύμως, 
ώσπερ ε'ί τι? λέγει την λιθίνην διαφθαρεΐσα γαρ* 
εσται τοιαύτη, πάντα δε τω €ργω ώρισται και 
τη δυνάμει, ώστε μηκετι τοιαύτα Οντα ού λεκτεον 

25 τα αυτά είναι αλλ' ομώνυμα, ότι μεν ουν η πόλις 12 
και φύσει 5 πρότερον η έκαστος, δηλον ει γαρ 
μη αυτάρκης έκαστος χωρισθείς, ομοίως τοις 
άλλοις μερεσιν εζει προς τό όλον, ό δε μη δυνα- 

1 sic ? Richards : &re irep &ξνξ &ι> ώο -irep. 

2 [ffiov] ? ed. 3 [μόνον] ? edd.^ 

4 yap ούκ Scholl. s καϊ φύσα /cat codd. plurimi. 

β Or ' a hand thus spoiled will not be a hand at all.' 
10 



POLITICS, Ι. ι. 9-12 

and also a lover of war) inasmuch as he resembles 

10 an isolated piece at draughts. And why man is a 
political animal in a greater measure than any bee 
or any gregarious animal is clear. For nature, as 
we declare, does nothing without purpose ; and man 
alone of the animals possesses speech. The mere 
voice, it is true, can indicate pain and pleasure, and 
therefore is possessed by the other animals as well 
(for their nature has been developed so far as to have 
sensations of what is painful and pleasant and to 
signify those sensations to one another), but speech 
is designed to indicate the advantageous and the 
harmful, and therefore also the right and the wrong ; 

11 for it is the special property of man in distinction 
from the other animals that he alone has perception 
of good and bad and right and wrong and the other 
moral qualities, and it is partnership in these things 
that makes a household and a city-state. 

Thus also the city-state is prior in nature to the The state 
household and to each of us individually. For the nature? 
whole must necessarily be prior to the part ; since 
when the whole body is destroyed, foot or hand will 
not exist except in an equivocal sense, like the sense 
in which one speaks of a hand sculptured in stone as 
a hand ; because a hand in those circumstances will 
be a hand spoiled, and all things are defined by their 
function and capacity, so that when they are no 
longer such as to perform their function they must 
not be said to be the same things, but to bear their 

12 names in an equivocal sense. It is clear therefore 
that the state is also prior by nature to the individual ; 
for if each individual when separate is not self- 
sufficient, he must be related to the whole state as 
other parts are to their whole, while a man who is 

11 



ARISTOTLE 

μένος κοινωνεΐν η μηθέν δομένος δι' αύτάρκειαν 
ούθέν μέρος πόλεως, ώστε η θηρίον η θεός. 
30 Φύσει μεν ουν η όρμη εν πάσιν επι την τοιαυ- 
την κοινωνίαν 6 δε πρώτος συστήσας μεγίστων 
αγαθών αίτιος- ώσπερ γαρ καΐ τελεωθέν 1 βελτιστον 
τών ζωών ό 2 άνθρωπος εστίν, οϋτω καΐ χωρισθέν 
νόμου και δίκης 3 χείριστον πάντων, χαλεπωτάτη 
γαρ αδικία έχουσα όπλα, ό δ' άνθρωπος όπλα 
35 έχων φύεται φρονήσει και άρετ -ff οΐς επι ταναντια 
εστί χρησθαι μάλιστα, διό άνοσιώτατον και άγριώ- 
τατον άνευ αρετής και προς αφροδίσια και εδωδην 
χείριστον. η δε δικαιοσύνη πολιτικόν ή γαρ 
δίκη 6 πολιτικής κοινωνίας τά^ι? εστίν, η δέ δίκη 
του δικαίου κρίσις. 
1253 b II. Έττει δε φανερόν εξ ων μορίων η πόλις συν- 1 
έστηκεν, άναγκαΐον πρώτον περί οικονομίας ει- 
πεΐν πάσα γαρ σύγκειται πόλις εξ οικιών, οικο- 
νομίας δέ μέρη εξ ων πάλιν οικία συνεστηκεν οικία 
5 δε τέλειος εκ δούλων και ελευθέρων, επει δ' εν 
τοις ελαχίστοις πρώτον εκαστον ζητητεον, πρώτα 
δε και ελάχιστα μέρη οικίας δεσπότης και δούλος, 
και πόσις και άλοχος, και πατήρ και τέκνα, περί 
τριών αν τούτων σκεπτεον εΐη τι εκαστον και ποιον 
δει ειΐ'αι, ταΰτα δ' εστί δεσποτική και γαμικη 2 

1 τελβωθέν seel. Jackson. 

1 ό om. codd. cet. et Aid. 

* χωρισθέν — δίκης seel. Jackson. 

4 apery <,έπιτήδΐΐα> ? Pearson. 

5 τό -yap δίκαιον Richards. 

a The Greek word properly denotes the marriage cere- 
mony, not the married state. 

12 



POLITICS, Ι. ι. 12—n. 2 

incapable of entering into partnership, or who is so 
self-sufficing that he has no need to do so, is no part 
of a state, so that he must be either a lower animal 
or a god. 

Therefore the impulse to form a partnership of and the 
this kind is present in all men by nature : but the η^η^ί chief 
man who first united people in such a partnership good. 
was the greatest of benefactors. For as man is the 
best of the animals when perfected, so he is the 
worst of all when sundered from law and justice. 
For unrighteousness is most pernicious when pos- 
sessed of weapons, and man is born possessing 
weapons for the use of wisdom and virtue, which 
it is possible to employ entirely for the opposite 
ends. Hence when devoid of virtue man is the most 
unscrupulous and savage of animals, and the worst in 
regard to sexual indulgence and gluttony. Justice 
on the other hand is an element of the state ; for 
judicial procedure, which means the decision of what 
is just, is the regulation of the political partnership. 

1 II. And now that it is clear what are the component The head o» 
parts of the state, we have first of all to discuss house- ^^^γ* 
hold management ; for every state is composed of husband, 
households. Household management falls into de- an a ' 
partments corresponding to the parts of which the 
household in its turn is composed ; and the household 

in its perfect form consists of slaves and freemen. 
The investigation of everything should begin with 
its smallest parts, and the primary and smallest parts 
of the household are master and slave, husband 
and wife, father and children ; we ought therefore 
to examine the proper constitution and character 

2 of each of these three relationships, I mean that 
of mastership, that of marriage ° (there is no exact 

13 



ARISTOTLE 

1253 b 

10 (ανώνυμον γάρ η γυναικός και ανδρός σύζευζις) 

και τρίτον τεκνοποιητικη 1 (και γαρ αύτη ουκ 

ώνόμασται ίδίω ονόματι) ■ εστωσαν δη 2 αύται τρεις 

άς εΐπομεν. εστί δε τι 3 μέρος ο δοκεΐ τοις μεν 

etrat οικονομία τοις δε μεγιστον μέρος αύτης, 

όπως δ' έχει, θεωρητεον λέγω δε περί της κάλου- . 

μένη ς χρηματιστικής. 

15 ΥΙρώτον δέ περί δεσπότου και δούλου εΐπωμεν, 
ίνα τα τε προς την άναγκαιαν χρείαν ΐδωμεν, καν 
ει τι προς το είδεναι περί αυτών δυναίμεθα λαβείν 
βελτιον των νυν ύπολαμβανομενων . τοις μεν γαρ 3 
δοκεΐ επιστήμη τε τις eti^at η δεσποτεία, και η 
αύτη οικονομία και δεσποτεία και πολιτική και 

20 βασιλική, καθάπερ εΐπομεν αρχόμενοι• τοις δε 
παρά φύσιν το δεσπόζειν, νόμω γαρ τον μεν 
δοϋλον είναι τον δ ελεύθερον, φύσει δ ούθεν δια- 
φερειν, διόπερ ούδε δίκαιον, βίαιον γάρ. 

Έπεί οΰν ή κτησις μέρος της οικίας εστί και η 
κτητική μέρος της οικονομίας* (άνευ γάρ των 

25 αναγκαίων αδύνατον και ζην και ευ ζην 6 ), ώσπερ 4 
δέ 6 ταΐς ώρισμεναις τεχναις άναγκαΐον αν ε'ίη 
ύπάρχειν τά οικεία όργανα ει με?0\.ει άποτελε- 
σθησεσθαι το έργον, ούτω και τω οικονομικω, 
των δ' οργάνων τά μεν άφυχα τά δ' εμφυχα (οίον 

1 τεκνοττοιητική : πατρική Αγ. 

2 δη Susemihl : δ' codd. 

• ίστι δ' <?τι τέταρτον τι (i.e. δ τι) Schmidt. 

4 κα'ι — οικονομίας seel. Susemihl. 

6 [καϊ et ξην] ? ed. ; om. ΓΜΙ' 1 . 

β δη Susemihl. 

° No English word covers all the associations of the 
Greek, which means ' dealing in χρήματα,' ' things,' — goods, 
property, money — and so ' business.' 
14 



POLITICS, I. ii. 2-4 

term denoting the relation uniting wife and husband), 

and thirdly the progenitive relationship (this too 

has not been designated by a special name). Let 

us then accept these three relationships that we have 

mentioned. There is also a department which some and as man 

people consider the same as household management 

and others the most important part of it, and the 

true position of which we shall have to consider : 

I mean what is called the art of getting wealth." 

Let us begin by discussing the relation of master Mastership 
and slave, in order to observe the facts that have a an v 
bearing on practical utility, and also in the hope that 
we may be able to obtain something better than the 
notions at present entertained, with a view to a theo- 
3 retic knowledge of the subject. For some thinkers various 
hold the function of the master to be a definite eones - 
science, and moreover think that household manage- 
ment, mastership, statesmanship and monarchy are 
the same thing, as we said at the beginning of the 
treatise ; others however maintain that for one man 
to be another man's master is contrary to nature, 
because it is only convention that makes the one 
a slave and the other a freeman and there is no 
difference between them by nature, and that there- 
fore it is unjust, for it is based on force. 

Since therefore property is a part of a household The slave a 
and the art of acquiring property a part of household s e ™. j^L^ 
management (for without the necessaries even life, for pro- 
4 as well as the good life, b is impossible), and since, ' uctlon ^ 
just as for the definite arts it would be necessarv for 
the proper tools to be forthcoming if their work is to 
be accomplished, so also the manager of a household 
must have his tools, and of tools some are lifeless and 

b ' As well as the good life ' is probably an interpolation. 

15 



ARISTOTLE 

1253 b 

τω κυβερνήτη ο μεν ο'ίαζ άφυχον 6 δε πρωμεύς 
so εμφυχον, 6 γαρ υπηρέτης εν οργάνου εΐδει ταΐς 
τεχναις εστίν), οϋτω και το κτήμα όργανον προς 
ζωην εστί, και ή κτησις πλήθος οργάνων εστί, 
και ο δούλος κτημά τι εμφυχον. καΐ ωσπερ 
όργανον προ οργάνων πας υπηρέτης• ει γαρ 5 
ηδύνατο εκαστον των οργάνων κελευσθεν η προ- 
85 αισθανομενον άποτελεΐν το αύτοΰ έργον, ωσπερ τα 
Δαιδάλου φασίν η τους του Ηφαίστου τρίποδας, 
ους φησιν ο ποιητής αυτομάτους θείον 8υεσθαι 
aycDva, ούτως αι κερκίδες εκερκιζον αύται και τά 
πλήκτρα εκιθάριζεν, ούδεν αν έδει ούτε τοις 

1254 a αρχιτεκτοσιν υπηρετών ούτε τοις δεσπόταις δούλων. 

τα μεν ούν λεγόμενα όργανα ποιητικά 'όργανα εστί, 
το δε κτήμα πρακτικόν από μεν γαρ της κερκίδας 
έτερον τι γίνεται παρά την χρησιν αύτης, από δε 
5 της εσθητος και της κλίνης η χρήσις μόνον, ετι β 
δ επει διαφέρει η ποίησις εϊδει και η πράζις, 
δέονται δ' άμφότεραι οργάνων, ανάγκη και ταϋτα 
την αύτην εχειν διαφοράν. ο δε βίος πράζις, ου 
ποιησίς εστίν διό και 6 δούλος υπηρέτης 1 των 
προς την πράζιν. 

Τό δε κτήμα λέγεται ωσπερ και το μόριον το* 

ίο γάρ μόριον ού μόνον άλλου εστί μόριον, αλλά 

και απλώς 3 άλλου, ομοίως δε και τό κτήμα, διό 

6 μεν δεσπότης του δούλου δεσπότης μόνον, 

1 [ΰττηρΙτη<;] ? gloss ed. ; cf. 1253 b 30. 
* τό ed. : τό re codd. 3 άπλώ? Γ, απλώς όλω$ Μ 1 , ΰλως cet. 

" This legendary sculptor first represented the eyes as 
open and the limbs as in motion, so his statues had to be 

16 









POLITICS, Ι. π. 4-6 

others living (for example, for a helmsman the rudder 
is a lifeless tool and the look-out man a live tool — for 
an assistant in the arts belongs to the class of tools), 
so also an article of property is a tool for the purpose 
of life, and property generally is a collection of tools, 

6 and a slave is a live article of property. And every 
assistant is as it were a tool that serves for several 
tools ; for if every tool could perform its own work 
when ordered, or by seeing what to do in advance, 
like the statues of Daedalus in the story , a or the 
tripods of Hephaestus which the poet says ' enter 
self-moved the company divine,' b — if thus shuttles 
wove and quills played harps of themselves, master- 
craftsmen would have no need of assistants and 
masters no need of slaves. Now the tools mentioned 
are instruments of production, whereas an article of 
property is an instrument of action"; for from a 
shuttle we get something else beside the mere use 
of the shuttle, but from a garment or a bed we get 

β only their use. And also inasmuch as there is a 
difference in kind between production and action, 
and both need tools, it follows that those tools also 
must possess the same difference. But life is doing 
things, not making things ; hence the slave is an 
assistant in the class of instruments of action. 

And the term ' article of property ' is used in the belonging 
same way as the term ' part ' : a thing that is a part ^nemL'ter. 
is not only a part of another thing but absolutely 
belongs to another thing, and so also does an article 
of property. Hence whereas the master is merely 
the slave's master and does not belong to the slave, 

chained to prevent them from running away (Plato, Meno 
97 d). * Iliad, xviii. 369. 

e i.e. with it we do not make something but do something 
{e.g. wear a dress, lie in a bed). 

17 



ARISTOTLE 

εκείνου δ ουκ εστίν 6 δε δούλος ου μόνον δεσπότον 
δούλος εστίν, αλλά καί όλως εκείνον. 

Τις μεν ούν η φύσις του δούλου καί τις η Βύναμις, 7 

15 εκ τούτων δηλον 6 γαρ μη αυτού φύσει αλλ' άλλου 
άνθρωπος ών, ούτος φύσει δούλος εστίν, άλλου δ 
εστίν άνθρωπος ος αν κτήμα η άνθρωπος ών, κτήμα 
δε όργανον πρακτικον και χωριστόν ./ πότερον δ 
εστί τις φύσει τοιούτος η ου, και πότερον βελτιον 
και δίκαιον τινι δουλεύειν η ου, αλλά πάσα δουλεία 

20 πάρα φύσιν εστί, μετά ταύτα σκεπτεον . ου 8 
χαλεπόν δέ και τω λόγω θεωρήσαι και εκ των 
γινομένων καταμαθεΐν. το γάρ άρχειν και άρχεσθαι 
ου μόνον των αναγκαίων αλλά και των συμφερόντων 
εστί, και ευθύς εκ γενετής eVia διεστηκε τά μεν 
επί το άρχεσθαι τά δ' επί το άρχειν. και εΐδη 

25 πολλά και αρχόντων και αρχομένων εστίν (και 
αεί βελτίων η άρχη η των βελτιόνων αρχομένων, 
οΐον ανθρώπου η θηρίου, το γάρ άποτελούμενον 
από των βελτιόνων βελτιον έργον, Οπου δε το μεν 
άρχει το δ' άρχεται, εστί τι τούτων έργον)' οσα 9 
γάρ εκ πλειόνων συνεστηκε καί γίνεται εν τι 

30 κοινόν, είτε εκ συνεχών είτ εκ διηρημενων, εν 
α,7τασ<.ν εμφαίνεται το άρχον καί το άρχομενον, 
και τούτο εκ της άπάσης φύσεως ενυπάρχει τοις 
εμφύχοις• καί γάρ εν τοις μη μετεχουσι ζωής εστί 

18 



POLITICS, I. ii. 6-9 

the slave is not merely the slave of the master but 
wholly belongs to the master. 
' These considerations therefore make clear the The 
nature of the slave and his essential qualitv : one ofmier 
who is a human being belonging bv nature not to and "ΐ 1 •* 1 
himself but to another is by nature a slave, and a ail nature 
person is a human being belonging to another if andUfe • 
being a man he is an article of property, and an 
article of property is an instrument for action separ- 
able from its owner. But we must next consider 
whether or not anyone exists who is by nature of 
this character, and whether it is advantageous and 
just for anyone to be a slave, or whether on the 

8 contrary all slavery is against nature. And it is not 
difficult either to discern the answer by theory or to 
learn it empirically. Authority and subordination 
are conditions not only inevitable but also expedient ; 
in some cases things are marked out from the moment 
of birth to rule or to be ruled. And there are many 
varieties both of rulers and of subjects (and the 
higher the type of the subjects, the loftier is the 
nature of the authority exercised over them, for 
example to control a human being is a higher thing 
than to tame a wild beast ; for the higher the type 
of the parties to the performance of a function, the 
higher is the function, and when one party rules 
and another is ruled, there is a function performed 

9 between them) — because in every composite thing, 
where a plurality of parts, whether continuous or 
discrete, is combined to make a single common 
whole, there is always found a ruling and a subject 
factor, and this characteristic of living things is 
present in them as an outcome of the whole of nature, 
since even in things that do not partake of life there 

19 



ARISTOTLE 

τις αρχή, οίον αρμονίας. άλλα ταύτα μεν ίσως 
εξωτερικωτερας εστί σκεφεως. το δέ ζώον πρώτον 10 
85 συνεστηκεν εκ φυχης καϊ σώματος, ων το μεν 
άρχον εστί φύσει το δ' άρχόμενον . δει δε σκοπεΐν 
ev τοις κατά φύσιν εχουσι μάλλον το φύσει, και 
μη εν τοις οιεφθαρμενοις. διό και τον βέλτιστα 
διακείμενον και κατά σώμα και κατά φνχΐ/ν άν- 
θρωπον θεωρητεον, iv ω τοϋτο δήλον τών γαρ 
1254 b μοχθηρών η μοχθηρώς 2 εχόντων δόξειεν αν άρχειν 
πολλάκις το σώμα της φνχης δια το φαύλως και' 
παρά φύσιν εχειν. εστί δ' ουν, ώσπερ λεγομεν, 11 
πρώτον iv ζωω θεωρησαι και οεσποτικην άρχην 
6 και πολιτικήν η μεν γάρ φνχη του σώματος 
άρχει οεσποτικην άρχην, ό δε νους της ορέξεως 
πολιτικήν και βασιλικήν iv οΐς φανερόν εστίν οτι 
κατά φύσιν και 4 συμφέρον το άρχεσθαί τω σώματι 
υπό της φνχης καϊ τω παθητικώ μορίω ύπο του 
νου και του μορίου του λόγον έχοντος, το δ εξ 
ίο ίσου η άνάπαλιν βλαβερόν πάσιν. πάλιν εν 12 
άνθρώπω και τοις άλλοις ζωοις ωσαύτως• τά μεν 
γάρ ήμερα τών αγρίων βελτίω την φύσιν, τούτοις 
δε πάσι βελτιον άρχεσθαι υπ' ανθρώπου, τυγχάνει 
γάρ σωτηρίας ούτως, ετι δε το άρρεν προς το 
θήλυ φύσει το μεν κρεΐττον το δέ χείρον, το μεν 
15 άρχον το δ' άρχόμενον. τον αυτόν δε τρόπον 
άναγκαΐον είναι και επι πάντων ανθρώπων όσοι 13 
μεν ουν τοσούτον διεστάσιν όσοι-' φυχη σώματος 

1 άρμονίαις vel έν αρμονίας Richards. 

2 μοχθηρών : φαύλων (Γ ?) Buecheler. 

» φαύλων καϊ seel. idem. 4 τ) ? Richards. 



β Each ' mode ' (Dorian, the modern minor scale, Phrygian 
and Lydian, two forms of major) was ruled by its key-note. 

20 



POLITICS, Ι. π. 9-13 

is a ruling principle, as in the case of a musical scale." 
However, this matter perhaps belongs to an investi- 

10 gation lying somewhat outside our subject. But in 
the first place an animal consists of soul and body, of 
which the former is by nature the ruling and the 
latter the subject factor. And to discover what is 
natural we must study it preferably in things that are 
in a natural state, and not in specimens that are de- 
generate. Hence in studying man we must consider 
a man that is in the best possible condition in regard 
to both body and soul, and in him the principle stated 
will clearly appear, — since in those that are bad or in 
a bad condition it might be thought that the body 
often rules the soul because of its vicious and un- 

11 natural condition. But to resume — it is in a living 
creature, as we say, that it is first possible to discern 
the rule both of master and of statesman : the soul 
rules the body with the sway of a master, the intelli- 
gence the appetites with constitutional or royal rule ; 
and in these examples it is manifest that it is natural 
and expedient for the body to be governed bv the 
soul and for the emotional part to be governed by 
the intellect, the part possessing reason, whereas 
for the two parties to be on an equal footing or in the 

12 contrary positions is harmful in all cases. Again, the 
same holds good between man and the other animals : 
tame animals are superior in their nature to wild 
animals, yet for all the former it is advantageous to 
be ruled by man, since this gives them security. 
Also, as between the sexes, the male is by nature 
superior and the female inferior, the male ruler and 
the female subject. And the same must also neces- 
sarily apply in the case of mankind generally ; 

13 therefore all men that differ as widely as the soul 

21 



ARISTOTLE 

1254 b χ 

και άνθρωπος θηρίου (διάκεινται δε τούτοι τον 

τρόπον όσων εστίν έργον ή του σώματος χρήσις και 

τοΰτ εστ απ' αυτών βελτιστον) , ούτοι μεν είσι 

20 φύσει δούλοι, οΐς βελτιόν εστίν άρχεσθαι ταύτην 
την αρχήν, ε'ίπερ και τοις είρημενοις. εστί γαρ 
φύσει δούλος 6 δυνάμενος άλλου είναι (διό και 
άλλου εστίν) και 6 κοινωνών λόγου τοσούτον όσον 
αίσθάνεσθαι άλλα μη εχειν τα γαρ άλλα ζώα 
ου λόγω αισ^ανό/χενα 1 άλλα παθήμασιν υπηρετεί. 

25 και ή χρεία οέ παραλλάττει μικρόν ή γαρ προς 14 
τάνα^καια τω σώ/χατι βοήθεια γίνεται παρ 
άμφοΐν, παρά τε τών δούλων και παρά τών 
ήμερων ζώων. βούλεται μεν ουν ή φύσις και τα 
σώματα διαφέροντα ποιεΐν τα τών ελευθέρων και 
τών δούλων, τα μεν ισχυρά προς την άναγκαίαν 

so χρήσιν, τά δ' ορθά και άχρηστα προς τάς τοιαύτας 
εργασίας , αλλά χρήσιμα προς πολιτικόν βίον (οΰτος 
δε και γίνεται διηρημενος εις τε την πολεμικήν 
χρείαν και την είρηνικήν), συμβαίνει δε πολλάκις 
και τουναντίον, τους μεν τά σώματ εχειν ελευθέρων 
τους δε τάς φυχάς μόνον 2 • επει τοΰτό γε φανερόν, 15 

85 ως ει τοσούτον γενοιντο διάφοροι το σώμα όσον 
αι τών θεών εικόνες, τους υπολειπόμενους πάντες 
φαΐεν αν άξιους είναι τούτοις δουλεύειν. ει δ' 
επι του σώματος τοΰτ αληθές, πολύ δικαιό- 
τερον επι της φυχής τούτο διωρίσθαι• αλλ' ούχ 
ομοίως ράδιον ίδεϊν τό τε της φυχής κάλλος και 
1255 ατό του σώματος, ότι μεν τοίνυν είσι φύσει τίνες 

1 τταθόμενα Richards. 
* μόνον hie ed. ; post σώμα codd. 
22 



POLITICS, I. ii. 13-15 

does from the body and the human being from the some men 
lower animal (and this is the condition of those ^d and 
whose function is the use of the body and from whom body for 
this is the best that is forthcoming) — these are by s avery > 
nature slaves, for whom to be governed by this kind 
of authority is advantageous, inasmuch as it is ad- 
vantageous to the subject things already mentioned. 
For he is by nature a slave who is capable of belonging 
to another (and that is why he does so belong), and 
who participates in reason so far as to apprehend it 
but not to possess it ; for the animals other than man 
are subservient not to reason, by apprehending it, 

14 but to feelings. And also the usefulness of slaves 
diverges little from that of animals ; bodily service 
for the necessities of life is forthcoming from both, 
from slaves and from domestic animals alike. The 
intention of nature therefore is to make the bodies 
also of freemen and of slaves different — the latter 
strong for necessary sendee, the former erect and 
unserviceable for such occupations, but serviceable 
for a life of citizenship (and that again divides into the 
employments of war and those of peace) ; though as a althon n 
matter of fact often the very opposite comes about — because 
slaves have the bodies of freemen and freemen the ^curlte 

15 souls only ; since this is certainly clear, that if free- justice is 
men were born as distinguished in body as are the cr 
statues of the gods, everyone would say that those 

who were inferior deserved to be these men's slaves ; 
and if this is true in the case of the body, there is 
far juster reason for this rule being laid down in the 
case of the soul, but beauty of soul is not so easy 
to see as beauty of body. It is manifest therefore 
that there are cases of people of whom some are 

23 



ARISTOTLE 

οί μεν ελεύθεροι οί δε δούλοι, φανερόν, οΐς και 
συμφέρει το δουλεύειν και δίκαιον εστίν. 

"Οτι δε και οί τάναντία φάσ κοντές τρόπον τίνα. 16 
λεγουσιν ορθώς, ου χαλεπόν ιδεΐν. διχώς γαρ 
6 λέγεται το δουλεύειν και ο δούλος• εστί γάρ τις 
και κατά νόμον δοΰλος και δουλεύων , 6 γάρ νόμος 
ομολογία τις εστίν εν ή 1 τα κατά πόλεμον κρατού- 
μενα των κρατούντων είναι φασιν? τοΰτο δη το 
δίκαιον πολλοί των εν τοις νόμοις ώσπερ ρήτορα 
γράφονται παρανόμων, ως δεινόν ει του /3ιάσασί?αι 

ίο δυνάμενου και κατά δύναμιν κρείττονος εσται 
δοΰλον και άρχόμενον το βιασθεν και τοις μεν 
οΰτω δοκεΐ τοις δ' έκείνως και των σοφών, αίτιον π 
δε ταύτης της αμφισβητήσεως , και ο ποιεί τους 
λόγους επαλλάττειν, ότι τρόπον τινά άρετη τυγ- 
χάνουσα "χορηγίας και βιάζεσθαι δύναται μάλιστα, 

15 και εστίν άει τό κρατούν εν υπέροχη αγαθού τινός, 
ώστε δοκεΐν μη άνευ αρετής eirai την βίαν, αλλά 
περί τοΰ δικαίου μόνον etvat την άμφισβητησιν 
(διά γάρ το τοις μεν εύνοιαν δοκεΐν 3 το δίκαιον 
etrai, τοις δ αύτο τούτο δίκαιον, το τον κρείττονα 
άρχειν)• επει διαστάντων γε χωρίς τούτων τών 

20 λόγων ούτ ίσχυρόν ούθέν εχουσιν ούτε πιθανόν 
άτεροι λόγοι, ως ού δει το βέλτιον κατ' άρετην 
άρχειν και δεσπόζειν. όλως δ' άντεχόμενοί τίνες 18 
ως οΐόν τε* δικαίου τινός (ο γάρ νόμος δίκαιον τι) 

1 -ξ ed. Basil. : φ codd. (ίψ' ω Bernays). 

2 [φασίν] Bernays. 

* τό — εϋνοιαν δοκεΐν Ross : τοΰτο — εύνοια δοκεΐ codd. 

* οΐόν τε ed. : οΐονται codd. 

° The difficulty turns on the ambiguity of αρετή, (a) moral 
goodness, virtue, (6) goodness of any kind, e.g. strength. 
24 






POLITICS, Ι. π. 15-18 

freemen and the others slaves by nature, and for 
these slavery is an institution both expedient and 
just. 

16 But at the same time it is not difficult to see that 
those who assert the opposite are also right in a 
manner. The fact is that the terms ' slaverv ' and 
' slave ' are ambiguous ; for there is also such a 
thing as a slave or a man that is in slavery by law, 
for the law is a sort of agreement under which the 
things conquered in war are said to belong to their 
conquerors. Now this conventional right is arraigned 
by many jurists just as a statesman is impeached for 
proposing an unconstitutional measure ; they say 
that it is monstrous if the person powerful enough to 
use force, and superior in power, is to have the victim 
of his force as his slave and subject ; and even among 
the learned some hold this view, though others 

17 hold the other. But the reason of this dispute and 
what makes the theories overlap is the fact that in 
a certain manner virtue when it obtains resources 
has in fact very great power to use force, and the 
stronger party always possesses superiority in some- 
thing that is good, a so that it is thought that force 
cannot be devoid of goodness, but that the dispute 
is merely about the justice of the matter (for it is 
due to the one party holding that the justification of 
authority is good -will, while the other identifies 
justice with the mere rule of the stronger) ; because 
obviously if these theories be separated apart, the 
other theories have no force or plausibility at all, 
implying that the superior in goodness has no claim 

18 to rule and be master. But some persons, doing Criticism 
their best to cling to some principle of justice (for ^""^f med 
the law is a principle of justice), assert that the slavery; 

25 



ARISTOTLE 

1255 a 

την κατά πόλεμον δουλείαν τι#6ασι δικαίαν άμα 

δ' ου φασιν, την τ€ γαρ αρχήν ενδέχεται μη δι- 

25 καίαν είναι των πολέμων και τον άνάζιον δου- 

λεύειν ουδαμώς αν φαίη τις δοΰλον είναι• ει δε 

μη, συμβήσεται τους ευγενέστατους eimi Βοκοΰντας 

δούλους e?vai και εκ δούλων εάν συμβή πραθήναι 

— ; ληφθεντας . διόπερ αυτούς ου βούλονται λέγειν 

δούλου?, άλλα τους βαρβάρους, καίτοι όταν τούτο 

30 λεγωσιν, ούθεν άλλο ζητοΰσιν η το φύσει δοΰλον 

όπερ εξ αρχής εΐπομεν ανάγκη γαρ είναι nras" 

φάναι τους μεν πανταχού δούλους τους δ' ούδαμοΰ. 

τον αυτόν δέ τρόπον και περί ευγενείας' αυτούς μεν 19 

γαρ ου μόνον παρ αύτοΐς ευγενείς άλλα πανταχού 

85 νομίζουσιν , τους δέ βαρβάρους οϊκοι μόνον, ως 

ον τι το μεν απλώς ευγενές καΐ ελεύθερον το δ' 

ούχ απλώς, ώσπερ ή Θεοδεκτου 'Κλενη φησί 

θείων δ' απ' άμφοΐν εκγονον ριζωμάτων 
τίς αν προσειπεΐν άζιώσειεν λάτριν; 

όταν δέ τούτο λεγωσιν, ούθενϊ αλλ' η αρετή και 

40 κακία διορίζουσι το δούλον και ελεύθερον και τους 

1255 b ευγενείς και τους δυσγενεΐς• α^ιοΰσι γάρ, ώσπερ 

εζ άνθρωπου άνθρωπον και εκ θηρίων γίνεαθαι 

θηρίον, ούτω καϊ εζ αγαθών αγαθόν ή δέ φύσις 

βούλεται μέν τούτο ποιεΐν πολλάκις, ου μεντοι 

δύναται. 

"Οτι μέν οΰν έχει τινά λόγον ή άμφισβήτησις , 

° A tragic poet, a friend of Aristotle. 
26 






POLITICS, Ι. π. 18-19 

enslavement of prisoners of war is just ; yet at the natural 
same time they deny the assertion, for there is the implicitly 
possibility that wars may be uniust in their origin recognized 
and one would by no means admit that a man that sense. 
does not deserve slavery can be realh• a slave — 
otherwise we shall have the result that persons 
reputed of the highest nobility are slaves and the 
descendants of slaves if they happen to be taken 
prisoners of war and sold. Therefore they do not 
mean to assert that Greeks themselves if taken 
prisoners are slaves, but that barbarians are. Yet 
when they say this, they are merely seeking for the 
principles of natural slavery of which we spoke at the 
outset ; for they are compelled to say that there exist 
certain persons who are essentially slaves everywhere 
19 and certain others who are so nowhere. And the 
same applies also about nobility : our nobles consider 
themselves noble not only in their own country but 
everywhere, but they think that barbarian noblemen 
are only noble in their own country — which implies 
that there are two kinds of nobility and of freedom, 
one absolute and the other relative, as Helen says 
in Theodectes": 

But who would dare to call me menial, 
The scion of a twofold stock divine ? 

Yet in so speaking they make nothing but virtue 
and vice the distinction between slave and free, the 
noble and the base-born; for they assume that just 
as from a man springs a man and from brutes a brute, 
so also from good parents comes a good son ; but as 
a matter of fact nature frequently while intending 
to do this is unable to bring it about. 

It is clear therefore that there is some reason for 

27 



ARISTOTLE 

1255 b 

5 /cat ουκ εισι τινε? ot μεν φύσει δούλοι οι ο 

ελεύθεροι, δηλον και ότι εν τισι διώρισται το 20 

τοιούτον, ων συμφέρει τω μεν το δουλευειν τω δε 

το οεσπόζειν, και δίκαιον καϊ δει το μεν αρχεσθαι 

το δ' αρχειν ην πεφύκασιν αρχήν άρχειν, ώστε 

και δεσπόζειν το δε κακώς άσυμφόρως εστίν 

ίο άμφοΐν (το γαρ αυτό συμφέρει τω μέρει και τω 
όλω και σώματι και ψυχή, ό δε δούλος μέρος τι 
του δεσπότου, οίον εμφυχόν τι του σώματος 
κεχωρισμενον δε μέρος• διό και συμφέρον εστί 21 
τι και φιλία δούλω και δεσπότη προς άλλτ^λου? 
τοΓ? φύσει τούτων ηζιωμενοις , τοις δε μη τούτον 

15 τον τρόπον άλλα κατά. νόμον και βιασθεισι του- 
ναντίον) . 

Φανερόν δε και εκ τούτων ότι ου ταύτόν εστί 
δεσποτεια και πολιτική ούδε ττάσαι άλλτ^λαι? at 
άρχαί, ώσπερ τίνες φασιν. η μεν γαρ ελευθέρων 
φύσει η δε δούλων εστίν, και η μέν οικονομική 

20 μοναρχία (μοναρχεΐται γαρ πάς οίκος), η δε πολι- 
τική ελευθέρων και ίσων αρχή. ο μεν ούν δεσπό- 22 
της ου λέγεται κατ' επιστημην αλλά τω τοιόσδ' 
ε«>αι, ομοίως δε και ό δούλος και ο ελεύθερος, 
επιστήμη δ' αν εΐη και δεσποτική και δουλική, 

1 είσί τινε? ed. : eiciv codd. 
28 



POLITICS, Ι. π. 19-22 

this dispute, and that in some instances it is not the Recapitaia- 
case that one set are slaves and the other freemen tlon " 

20 by nature ; and also that in some instances such a 
distinction does exist, when slavery for the one and 
mastership for the other are advantageous, and it is 
just and proper for the one party to be governed and 
for the other to govern by the form of government 
for which they are by nature fitted, and therefore 
bv the exercise of mastership, while to govern badly 
is to govern disadvantageously for both parties (for 
the same thing is advantageous for a part and for 
the whole body or the whole soul, and the slave is a 
part of the master — he is, as it were, a part of the 

21 body, alive but yet separated from it; hence there 
is a certain community of interest and friendship 
between slave and master in cases when they have 
been qualified by nature for those positions, although 
when they do not hold them in that way but by law 
and by constraint of force the opposite is the case). 

And even from these considerations it is clear that Mastership 
the authority of a master over slaves is not the same JjiJg^ 
as the authority of a magistrate in a republic, nor are from 

,, „ /* .ι _t government 

all forms of government the same, as some assert. of free men 
Republican government controls men who are by ™^ a r ™i on 
nature free, the master's authority men who are by tasks, and 
nature slaves ; and the government of a household HffiSJJ" 
is monarchy (since every house is governed by a 
single ruler), whereas statesmanship is the govern- 
■2-2 ment of men free and equal. The term ' master ' 
therefore denotes the possession not of a certain 
branch of knowledge but of a certain character, and 
similarly also the terms ' slave ' and ' freeman.' \ et 
there might be a science of mastership and a slave's 
science — the latter being the sort of knowledge that 

29 



ARISTOTLE 

1255 b s \ χ ν β < > ν ' ' '? 

οουλικη μεν οιαν περ ο εν λ,υρακουσαις επαιοευεν 
25 {εκεί γαρ λαμβάνων τις μισθόν εδίδασκε τά 
εγ κύκλια διακονήματα τους παΐδα?)• εΐη δ' αν και 
επι πλεΐον των τοιούτων μάθησις, οίον όφοποιική 
και τάλλα τά τοιαύτα γένη της διακονίας' εστί γαρ 
έτερα έτερων τά μέν εντιμότερα έργα τά δ' αναγ- 
καιότερα, και κατά την παροιμίαν 

80 δούλος προ δούλου, δεσπότης προ δεσπότου. 

αί μεν οΰν τοιαΰται πάσαι δονλικαι επιστημαί' είσι , 23 
δεσποτική δ' επιστήμη εστίν η χρηστική δούλων 
ο γαρ δεσπότης ουκ εν τω κτάσθαι τους δούλους, 
άλλ' εν τω χρησθαι δούλοις. εστί δ' αύτη η 
επιστήμη ουδέν μέγα έχουσα ουδέ σεμνόν α γαρ 
τον δοΰλον επίστασθαι δει ποιεΐν, εκείνον δει 

85 ταύτα επίστασθαι επιτάττειν. διό οσοις εξουσία 
μη αυτούς κακοπαθεΐν, επίτροπος J\ayu,/?aWi ταυτην 
την τιμήν, αύτοι δέ πολιτεύονται η φιλοσοφοΰσιν. 
η δέ κτητική έτερα αμφοτέρων τούτων η δικαία, 
οΐον 1 πολεμική τι? ούσα η θηρευτικη. περί μέν 
οΰν δούλου και δεσπότου τούτον διωρίσθω τον 

40 τρόπον. 
1256a ΠΙ. "Ολως δέ περί πάσης κτήσεως και χρη- 1 
ματιστικης θεωρησωμεν κατά τον ύφηγημενον 
τρόπον, επείπερ και ο δούλος της κτήσεως μέρος 
τι ην. πρώτον μέν οΰν άπορήσειεν αν τις ποτερον 
5 ή χρηματιστική η αύτη τη οικονομική εστίν η 
μέρος τι η υπηρετική, και εί υπηρετική, πότερον 

1 Richards : οίον ή δίκαια codd. 

β Probably from a comedy of Aristotle's contemporary 
Philemon. 
SO 



POLITICS, Ι. π. 22— in. 1 

used to be imparted by the professor at Syracuse 
(for there used to be a man there who for a fee gave 
lessons to servants in their ordinary duties) ; and 
indeed there might be more advanced scientific study 
of such matters, for instance a science of cookery 
and the other such kinds of domestic service — for 
different servants have different functions, some 
more honourable and some more menial, and as the 
proverb says, 

Slave before slave and master before master.* 

23 The slave's sciences then are all the various branches 
of domestic work ; the master's science is the science 
of employing slaves — for the master's function 
consists not in acquiring slaves but in employing 
them. This science however is one of no particular 
importance or dignity : the master must know how 
to direct the tasks which the slave must know how 
to execute. Therefore all people rich enough to be 
able to avoid personal trouble have a steward who 
takes this office, while they themselves engage in 
politics or philosophy. The science of acquiring 
slaves is different both from their ownership and their 
direction — that is. the just acquiring of slaves, being 
like a sort of warfare or hunting. Let this then stand 
as our definition of slave and master. 
1 III. But let us follow our normal method and in- Business, or 
vestigate generally the nature of all kinds of property f good?•/ 
and the art of getting wealth, inasmuch as we saw j^usehoM 
the slave to be one division of property. In the first ma nage- 
place therefore one might raise the question whether ment - 
the art of getting wealth is the same as that of house- 
hold management, or a part of it, or subsidiary to it ; 
and if subsidiary, whether it is so in the sense in which 

31 



ARISTOTLE 

1256 s 

ώς η κερκιδοποιική τή υφαντική ή ώς ή χαλκουρ- 

γικη τή άνδριαντοποιία (ου γαρ ωσαύτως υπηρε- 

τοΰσιν, αλλ' η μεν όργανα παρέχει, ή δε την ΰλην 

λέγω δε ΰλην το ΰποκείμενον εξ οΰ τι αποτελείται 

ίο έργον, οίον ύφάντη μεν έρια, άνδριαντοποιώ 8ε 
χαλκόν) . 

Οτι μεν ονν ούχ ή αυτή η οικονομική τή χρη- 2 
ματιστική , δήλον, της μεν γαρ το πορίσασθαι, της 
Βε το χρησασθαι — τις γαρ έσται η χρησομένη τοις 
κατά την οικ'ιαν παρά την οίκονομικην ; πότερον 
δε μέρος αυτής εστί τι η έτερον είδος, έχει διαμ- 

15 φισβήτησιν. ει γάρ έστι του χρηματιστικού θεω- 
ρήσαι πόθεν χρήματα και κτησις έσται, . . . , 1 
η δε κτησις 77θλλά περιείληφε μέρη και ό πλούτος, 
ώστε πρώτον η γεωργική πότερον μέρος τι της 
οικονομικής 9 ή έτερον τι γένος; και καθόλου ή 
περί την τροφην επιμέλεια και κτήσις. 

20 'Αλλά μην ε'ίδη γε πολλά τροφής, διό και βίοι 3 
πολλοί και των ζώων και τών ανθρώπων είσίν 
ου γάρ οΐόν τε ζήν άνευ τροφής, ώστε αί διαφοραί 
της τροφής τους βίους πεποιήκασι διαφέροντας 
τών ζώων. τών τε γάρ θηρίων τα μεν αυλαία 
τά δε σποραδικά έστιν, όποτέρως συμφέρει προς 

25 την τροφην αύτοΐς διά το τά μεν ζωοφάγα τά δε 

καρποφάγα τά δε παμφάγα αυτών εΐναν ώστε 

1 lacunam ? Susemihl. 
2 οικονομικής Garvey : χρηματιστικής codd. 

Some words seem to have fallen out in the Creek. 
32 



POLITICS, I. in. 1-3 

the art of making shuttles is subsidiary to the art of 
weaving or in that in which the art of casting bronze 
is subsidiary to the making of statues (for the two 
are not subsidiary in the same way, but shuttle- 
making supplies tools whereas bronze-founding 
supplies material — and by material I mean the sub- 
stance out of which certain work is produced, for 
example fleeces are material for a weaver and bronze 
for a statuary). 

Now it is clear that wealth-getting is not the same 
art as household management, for the function of the 
former is to provide and that of the latter to use — 
for what will be the art that will use the contents of 
the house if not the art of household management ? 
but whether wealth-getting is a part of the art 
of household management, or a different sort of 
science, is open to debate. For if it is the function 
of the getter of wealth to study the source from which 
money and property are to be procured, . . . . a 
But property and riches comprise many divisions : 
hence first of all is husbandry a division of the house- Husbandry 
hold art, or is it a different kind of science ? and so 
in general of the superintendence and acquisition 
of articles of food. 

But furthermore, there are many sorts of food, Food is 
owing to which both animals and men have many by°nlture; 
modes of life ; for it is impossible to live without 
food, so that the differences of food have 
made the lives of animals different. Among wild 
animals some are nomadic and others solitary, 
according to whichever habit is advantageous for 
their supplv of food, because some of them are 
carnivorous, others graminivorous, and others eat 
all kinds of food ; so that nature has differentiated 

33 



ARISTOTLE 

προς τας ραστωνας και την αιρεσιν την τούτων 
η φύσις τους βίους αυτών διώρισεν. err** δ' ου 
ταύτό εκάστω ηδύ κατά φύσιν αλλ' έτερα ετεροις, 
και αυτών τών ζωοφάγων και τών καρποφάγων 
οι βίοι προς άλληλα διεστάσιν. ομοίως δε και 4 

30 τών ανθρώπων, πολύ γαρ διαφερουσιν οι τούτων 
βίοι. οι μεν ουν άργότατοι νομάδες είσίν (ή γαρ 
απο τών ήμερων τροφή ζωών άνευ πόνου γίνεται 
σχολάζουσιν, αναγκαίου δ' οντος μεταβάλλειν τοις 
κτηνεσι δια τάς νομάς και αυτοί αναγκάζονται 

86 συνακολουθεΐν, ώσπερ γεωργίαν ζώσαν γεωργοΰν- 
τες)• οι δ' απο θήρας ζώσι, και θήρας έτεροι ετέ- 
ρας, οΐον οι μεν από ληστείας, οι δ' αφ* άλιεια? 
όσοι λίμνας και ελη και ποταμούς η θαλατταν 
τοιαύτην προσοικοΰσιν, οι δ' απ' ορνίθων η θηρίων 
αγρίων το δε πλείστον γένος τών ανθρώπων από 

40 της γης ζη και τών ήμερων καρπών, οι μεν ουν 5 
βίοι τοσούτοι σχεδόν eiati', όσοι γε αύτόφυτον 
εχουσι την εργασίαν και μη δι' ά?ίλαγής και κα- 
1256b πηλείας πορίζονται την τροφην, νομαδικός γεωρ- 
γικός ληστρικός αλιευτικός θηρευτικός• οι δε και 
μιγνύντες εκ τούτων ηδεως ζώσι, προσαναπληροΰν- 
τες τον ενδεεστερον βίον η τυγχάνει ελλείπων προς 

δ το αυτάρκης efrai, οΐον οι μεν νομαδικόν άμα και 
ληστρικόν, οι δέ γεωργικόν και θηρευτικόν, ομοίως 
δέ καΐ περί τους άλλους — ως άν η χρεία συν- 
αναγκάζη, τούτον τον τρόπον διάγουσιν. η μεν 6 

α Perhaps 'slave-raiding,' cf. § 9, the appropriation of the 
' live tools ' that are a part of nature's supplies ; but Thucy- 
dides (i. 5) speaks of brigandage and piracy as common in 
earlier times, and as still deemed respectable professions in 
Northern Greece. 
34 



POLITICS, I. in. 3-6 

their modes of life to suit their facilities and their 
predilection for those articles of food. And as 
different kinds of animals by nature relish different 
sorts of food, and not each kind the same, even 
within the classes of carnivorous and graminivorous 
animals their modes of life differ from one another. 

4 And similarly in the human race also, for there are 
wide differences of life among mankind. The idlest 
men are nomads (for to procure food from domesti- 
cated animals involves no toil or industry, but as it is 
necessary for the herds to move from place to place 
because of the pastures, the people themselves are 
forced to follow along with them, as though they 
were farming a live farm). Other men live from 
hunting, and different people from different kinds 
of hunting, for instance some from brigandage, 
others from fishing — these are those that dwell on 
the banks of lakes, marshes and rivers or of a sea 
suitable for fishing, — and others five on wild birds and 
animals. But the largest class of men live from the 

5 land and the fruits of cultivation. This then virtu- 
ally completes the list of the various modes of life, 
those at least that have their industry sprung from 
themselves and do not procure their food by barter 
and trade — the lives of the herdsman, the husband- 
man, the brigand, the fisherman, the hunter. Others 
also live pleasantly by combining some of these 
pursuits, supplementing the more deficient life 
where it happens to fall short in regard to being 
self-sufficing : for instance, some combine a pastoral 
life and brigandage, others husbandry and hunting, 
and similarly with the others — they pass their time 
in such a combination of pursuits as their need 

6 compels. Property of this sort then seems to be 

35 



ARISTOTLE 

»256b ,,,„,, „ ,, 

ουι•» τοιαύτη κτήσις υπ αυτής φαίνεται της φύσεως 

διδομένη πάσιν, ωσπερ κατά την πρώτην γενεσιν 

ίο ευθύς, ούτω και τελειωθεΐσιν. και γαρ κατά την 
εξ αρχής γενεσιν τά μέν σννεκτίκτει των ζώων 
τοσαύτην τροφην ώς ικανην ε}ναι μέχρις ου αν 
δύνηται αυτό αύτώ πορίζειν το γεννηθεν, οίον δσα 
σκωληκοτοκεΐ η ώοτοκεΐ• οσα δέ ζωοτοκεΐ, τοις 
γεννωμενοις 1 έχει τροφήν εν αύτοΐς μέχρι τινός, 

15 την του καλουμένου γάλακτος φύσιν. ώστε ομοίως 7 
δήλον οτι και γενομενοις οίητεον τά τε φυτά των 
ζωών ένεκεν είναι και τάλλα ζώα των ανθρώπων 
χάριν, τά μέν ήμερα και δια την χρήσιν και διά 
την τροφην, των δ' αγρίων ει μη πάντα αλλά τά 
γε πλείστα της τροφής και ά?(λης βοηθείας ένεκεν, 

20 ϊνα και εσθής και άλλα όργανα γίνηται εζ αυτών. 
ει οΰν ή φύσις μηθέν μήτε ατελές ποιεΐ μήτε μάτην, 
άναγκαΐον τών ανθρώπων ένεκεν αυτά πάντα 
πεποιηκεναι την φύσιν. διό και ή πολεμική φύσει 8 
κτητική πως εσται (ή γάρ θηρευτική μέρος αυτής) 

25 ή δει χρήσθαι προς τε τά θηρία και τών ανθρώπων 
όσοι πεφυκότες άρχεσθαι μή θελουσιν, ώς φύσει 
δίκαιον τούτον οντά τον πόλεμον. 

*Έγ μέν οΰν είδος κτητικής κατά φύσιν τής οικο- 
νομικής μέρος εστίν, καθό 2 δει ήτοι ύπάρχειν ή 
πορίζειν αυτήν όπως ύπάρχη ων εστί θησαυρισμός 

1 •γενομίνοι$ codd. cet. 

2 καθό Bernays : δ codd., δ'τί (quia) Richards, & (et & δεί — 
ύπάρχειν post 30 οϊ /ctas tr.) Rassow. 

° Rassow would transpose the clause (with a slight altera- 
tion) to give ' of the household art, that is, the acquisition of 
those goods capable of accumulation that are necessary for 
life and useful for the community of city and household, a 

36 



POLITICS, I. πι. ft-8 

bestowed by nature herself upon all, as immediately 
upon their first coming into existence, so also when 
they have reached maturity. For even at the 
original coming into existence of the young some 
kinds of animals bring forth with them at birth 
enough sustenance to suffice until the offspring can 
provide for itself, for example all the species that bear 
their voung in the form of larvae or in e££s. The 

C? CO 

viviparous species have sustenance for their offspring 
inside themselves for a certain period, the substance 
called milk. So that clearly we must suppose that 
nature also provides for them in a similar way when 
grown up, and that plants exist for the sake of animals 
and the other animals for the good of man, the 
domestic species both for his service and for his food, 
and if not all at all events most of the Mild ones for 
the sake of his food and of his supplies of other kinds, 
in order that they may furnish him both with clothing 
and with other appliances. If therefore nature makes 
nothing without purpose or in vain, it follows that 
nature has made all the animals for the sake of 
men. Hence even the art of war will by nature be 
in a manner an art of acquisition (for the art of 
hunting is a part of it) that is properly employed 
both against wild animals and against such of mankind 
as though designed by nature for subjection refuse 
to submit to it, inasmuch as this warfare is by 
nature just. 

One kind of acquisition therefore in the order of so moderate 
nature is a part of the household art,° in accordance Supplies 
with which either there must be forthcoming or else ', s the 

that art must procure to be forthcoming a supply of the 

house- 
supply of which must be forthcoming or else the art must h° lder • 
procure it to be forthcoming.' 

37 



ARISTOTLE 

1256 b 

χρημάτων προς ζωην αναγκαίων καί χρησίμων 

80 εις κοινωνίαν πόλεως η οικίας, καϊ εοικεν 6 y 9 

αληθινός πλούτος εκ τούτων είναι, η γαρ της 

τοιαύτης κτήσεως αυτάρκεια προς άγαθην ζωην 

ουκ άπειρος εστίν, ώσπερ Σόλων φησί ποιησας 

πλούτου δ' ούθεν τέρμα πεφασμενον άνδράσι κείται' 

85 κείται γαρ ωσπερ και ταΐς αλλαι? τεχναις• ούοεν 
γαρ όργανον άπειρον ουδεμιάς εστί τέχνης οϋτε 
πλήθει ούτε μεγεθει, ο δε πλοΰτος οργάνων πλήθος 
εστίν οικονομικών και πολιτικών, ότι μεν τοίνυν 
εστί τις κτητική κατά φύσιν τοις οικονόμοις και 
τοις πολιτικοΐς , και δι' ην αίτίαν, δήλον. 

40 Εστί δε γένος άλλο κτητικής ην μάλιστα καλοΰσι, 10 
και δίκαιον αυτό καλεΐν, χρηματιστικην, δι' ην 
1257a ούδεν δοκεΐ πέρας eimi πλούτου και κτήσεως• ην 
ώς μίαν και την αύτην τη λεχθείση πολλοί νομί- 
ζουσι δια την γειτνίασιν εστί δ' οϋτε ή αυτί) τη 
ειρημενη οϋτε πόρρω εκείνης, εστί δ η μεν φύσει 
δ η δ' ου φύσει αυτών, αλλά δι εμπειρίας τινός καϊ 
τέχνης γίνεται μάλλον, λάβωμεν δε περί αυτής 
την αρχήν εντεύθεν εκάστου γαρ κτήματος διττή Π 
η χρήσίς εστίν, άμφότεραι δέ καθ* αύτο μεν αλλ' 
ούχ ομοίως καθ' αυτό, άλλ' η μεν οικεία η δ 
ουκ οικεία του πράγματος, οίον υποδήματος η 

• Fragment 13 1. 71. 
38 



POLITICS, Ι. πι. 8-11 

of those goods, capable of accumulation, which are 
necessary for life and useful for the community of 
9 city or household. And it is of these goods that 
riches in the true sense at all events seem to consist. 
For the amount of such property sufficient in itself 
for a good life is not unlimited, as Solon α says that 
it is in the verse 

But of riches no bound has been fixed or revealed to men ; 

for a limit has been fixed, as with the other arts, 
since no tool belonging to any art is without a limit 
whether in number or in size, and riches are a collec- 
tion of tools for the householder and the statesman. 
Therefore that there is a certain art of acquisition 
belonging in the order of nature to householders and 
to statesmen, and for what reason this is so, is clear. 

1° But there is another kind of acquisition that is Trade 
specially called wealth-getting, and that is so called ^™ η8 
with justice ; and to this kind it is due that there barter of 
is thought to be no limit to riches and property, supplies. 
Owing to its affinity to the art of acquisition of which 
we spoke, it is supposed by many people to be one 
and the same as that ; and as a matter of fact, while 
it is not the same as the acquisition spoken of, it is 
not far removed from it. One of them is natural, 
the other is not natural, but carried on rather by 
means of a certain acquired skill or art. We may 
take our starting-point for its study from the follow- 

11 ing consideration : with every article of property 
there is a double way of using it ; both uses are 
related to the article itself, but not related to it in 
the same manner — one is peculiar to the thing and 
the other is not peculiar to it. Take for example a 
shoe — there is its wear as a shoe and there is its use 

39 



ARISTOTLE 

10 τε ύπόδεσις και ή μεταβλητική• άμφότεραι γάρ 
υποδήματος χρήσεις, καΐ γαρ 6 άλλαττόμενος τω 
δεομενω υποδήματος αντί νομίσματος ή τροφής 
χρήται τω ύποδήματι fj υπόδημα, αλλ ου την 
οίκείαν χρήσιν, ου γαρ άλλα^/η? ένεκεν γεγονεν. 
τον αυτόν δε τρόπον έχει καΐ π€ρΙ των άλλων 

15 κτημάτων εστί γαρ ή μεταβλητική πάντων, 
άρζαμενη το μεν πρώτον εκ του κατά φύσιν, τω 
τα μεν πλείω τά δε ελάττω των ικανών εχειν τους 
ανθρώπους, fj και δήλον οτι ουκ εστί φύσει της 12 
χρηματιστικής 1 ή καπηλική• όσον γαρ ίκανον αυτοΐς, 
άναγκαΐον ην ποιεΐσθαι την άλλαγήν εν μεν ούν 

20 τή πρώτη κοινωνία (τοΰτο δ' εστίν οικία) φανερον 
οτι ούδεν εστίν έργον αυτής, αλλ' ήδη πλειόνων 2 
τής κοινωνίας οϋσης. οι μεν γαρ τών αυτών 
εκοινώνουν πάντων, οι δε κεχωρισμενοι* πολλών 
πάλιν και έτερων, ων κατά τάς δεήσεις άναγκαΐον 5 
ποιεΐσθαι τάς μεταδόσεις, καθάπερ ετι πολλά 

25 ποιεί και τών βαρβαρικών εθνών, κατά την άλλα- 
γήν αυτά γάρ τά χρήσιμα προς αυτά καταλλάτ- 
τονται, επί πλέον δ' ούθεν, οίον οΐνον προς σΐτον 
δίδοντες και λαμβάνοντες, και τών άλλων τών 
τοιούτων εκαστον. ή μεν οΰν τοιαύτη μεταβλη- 13 
τική ούτε παρά φύσιν ούτε χρηματιστικής εστίν 

80 είδος ούδεν, εις άναπλήρωσιν γάρ τής κατά φύσιν 
αυτάρκειας ην εκ μεντοι ταύτης εγενετ εκείνη 

1 χρηματιστικής] μεταβλητική? Bernays. 

2 πλειόνων Richards : πλείονος codd. 

3 αυτών Immisch : αυτών codd. 

4 κεχωρισμένων Immisch. 

6 άνα-γκαΐον <$ν> Coraes. 



POLITICS, I. in. 11-13 

as an article of exchange ; for both are ways of using 
a shoe, inasmuch as even he that barters a shoe for 
money or food with the customer that wants a shoe 
uses it as a shoe, though not for the use proper to a 
shoe, since shoes have not come into existence for 
the purpose of barter. And the same also holds good 
about the other articles of property ; for all of them 
have a use in exchange related to them, which began 
in the first instance from the natural order of things, 
because men had more than enough of some things 

12 and less than enough of others. This consideration 
also shows that the art of trade is not by nature a 
part of the art of wealth-getting α ; for the practice 
of barter was necessary only so far as to satisfy 
men's own needs. In the primary association there- 
fore (I mean the household) there is no function for 
trade, but it only arises after the association has 
become more numerous. For the members of the 
primitive household used to share commodities that 
were all their own, whereas on the contrary a group 
divided into several households participated also in 
a number of commodities belonging to their neigh- 
bours, according to their needs for which they were 
forced to make their interchanges by way of barter, 
as also many barbarian tribes do still ; for such tribes 
do not go beyond exchanging actual commodities for 
actual commodities, for example giving and taking 
wine for corn, and so with the various other things 

13 of the sort. Exchange on these lines therefore is not 
contrary to nature, nor is it any branch of the art of 
wealth-getting, for it existed for the replenishment of 
natural self-sufficiency ; yet out of it the art of business 

β Perhaps Aristotle wrote ' of the art of exchange ' : see 
note 1 on opposite page. 

c 41 



ARISTOTLE 

1267a f ■ 

κατά Aoyov. ξενικωτερας γαρ γ€νομ€νης της 

βοηθείας τω είσάγεσθαι ών ενδεείς και εκπεμπειν 
ών επλεόναζον, εζ ανάγκης η του νομίσματος 
επορίσθη χρησις. ου γαρ εύβάστακτον εκαστον 
35 των κατά φύσιν αναγκαίων διό προς τάς aAAayas - 14 
τοιούτον τι συνεθεντο προς σφάς αυτούς διδόναι 
καΐ λαμβάνειν δ των χρησίμων αυτό δν είχε την 
χρείαν εύμεταχείριστον προς το ζην, οίον σίδηρος 
και άργυρος καν ει τι τοιούτον έτερον, το μεν πρώ- 
τον απλώς ορισθέν μεγεθει και σταθμώ, το δέ 
40 τελευταΐον και χαρακτήρα επιβαλλόντων ίνα από- 
λυση της μετρήσεως αυτούς' 6 γαρ χαράκτη ρ 
1257 b ετέθη του ποσού σημεΐον. πορισθεντος ουν ηδη 15 
νομίσματος εκ της αναγκαίας aAAayrJ? θατερον 
είδος της χρηματιστικής εγενετο, το καπηλικον, 
τό μεν πρώτον απλώς ίσως γινόμενον, είτα δι' 
εμπειρίας ηδη τεχνικώτερον, πόθεν και πώς μετα- 
5 βαλλόμενον πλείστον ποιήσει κέρδος, διό δοκεΐ 
ή χρηματιστική μάλιστα περί τό νό/ζισ/Αα eimi, 
και έργον αύτης τό δυνασ^αι θεωρησαι πόθεν 
εσται πλήθος, 2 ποιητική γαρ 3 είναι πλούτου* και 
χρημάτων και γαρ τον πλοΰτον πολλάκις τιθεασι 16 
νομίσματος πλήθος, δια τό περί τοϋτ eirai την 
10 χρηματιστικην και την καπηλικήν. ότε δε πάλιν 
ληρος είναι δοκεΐ τό νό/χισ/χα, και νόμος παντάπασι 
φύσει δ' ούθεν, ότι μεταθεμένων τε τών χρωμενων 
ούθενός άξιον, ούτε χρησιμον προς ουδέν τών 

1 ^νομένητ Coraes : •γινομένη'; codd. 

* πλήθος χρημάτων codd. : gloss, excisit Gifanius : πλήθοτ 
αύτοΰ ? Richards• 

* yap : δ' Bernays. * πλούτου Μ, τον πλούτου cet. 

42 



POLITICS, I. in. 13-16 

in due course arose. For when they had come to supply 
themselves more from abroad by importing things in 
which they were deficient and exporting those of 
which they had a surplus, the employment of money 
necessarily came to be devised. For the natural 
necessaries are not in every case readily portable ; 

14 hence for the purpose of barter men made a Money, 
mutual compact to give and accept some substance f^"^* 
of such a sort as being itself a useful commodity exchange, 
was easy to handle in use for general life, iron commerce. 
for instance, silver and other metals, at the first 

stage defined merely by size and weight, but finally 
also by impressing on it a stamp in order that this 
might relieve them of having to measure it ; for the 

15 stamp was put on as a token of the amount. So 
when currency had been now invented as an outcome 
of the necessary interchange of goods, there came 
into existence the other form of wealth -getting, 
trade, which at first no doubt went on in a simple 
form, but later became more highly organized as 
experience discovered the sources and methods of 
exchange that would cause most profit. Hence 
arises the idea that the art of wealth-getting deals 
specially with money, and that its function is to be 
able to discern from what source a large supply can 
be procured, as this art is supposed to be creative of 

16 wealth and riches ; indeed wealth is often assumed to 
consist of a quantity of money, because monev is the 
thing with which business and trade are employed. Natural 
But at other times, on the contrary, it is thought that u^id to 



:h~ 



money is nonsense, and entirely a convention but by needs ? f 
nature nothing, because when those who use it have (not bodily 
changed the currency it is worth nothing, and because enjoyme 114 )• 
it is of no use for any of the necessary needs of life 

43 



ARISTOTLE 

αναγκαίων can και νομίσματος πλούτων πολ- 
λάκις απόρησα της αναγκαίας τροφής, καίτοι 

15 άτοπον τοιούτον eirai πλοΰτον ου εύπορων Χιμώ 
άπολεΐται, καθάπερ και τον Μιδαι> εκείνον μνθο- 
λογοΰσι διά τ?)ν άπληστίαν της ευχής πάντων αυτώ 
γιγνομενων των παρατιθεμενων χρυσών, διό ζη- 17 
τοΰσιν έτερον τι τον πλοΰτον και την χρηματιστικην , 
ορθώς ζητοΰντες• εστί γαρ έτερα ή χρηματιστική 

20 και 6 πλούτος ο κατά φύσιν, και αυτή μεν 
οικονομική, ή δε καπηλική, ποιητική πλούτου 
ου πάντως άλλα 2 δια χρημάτων μεταβολής• και 
οοκεΐ περί το νόμισμα αϋτη eirai, το γαρ νόαισ/χα 
στοιχεΐον και πέρας τής άλλα•)/^? εστίν. και 
άπειρος δη ούτος 6 πλούτος ο από ταύτης τής 

25 χρηματιστικής• ώσπερ γαρ ή ιατρική τού ύγιαινειν 
εις άπειρον εστί και εκάστη τών τεχνών τού τέλους 
εις άπειρον (ότι μάλιστα γαρ εκείνο βούλονται 
ποιεΐν), τών δέ προς το τέλος ουκ εις άπειρον 
(πέρας γαρ το τέλος πάσαι?), ούτω και ταύτης 
τής χρηματιστικής ουκ εστί τού τέλους πέρας, 

30 τέλος δε 6 τοιούτος πλούτος και χρημάτων κτήσις. 
τής δ' οικονομικής χρηματιστικής 3 εστί πέρας• ου 18 
γαρ τούτο τής οικονομικής έργον, διό τή μεν 
φαίνεται άναγκαΐον είναι παντός πλούτου πέρας, 
επι 8ε τών γινομένων όρώμεν* συμβαίνον τού- 

1 Richards : χρημάτων codd. 2 Richards : άλλ' ή codd. 

8 χρηματιστικής Bojesen : οΰ χρ. codd., αΰ χρ. Bernays. 

4 όρΖμαν Sylburg : δρω codd. 

e.g. on a desert island. 

b i.e. a trader cannot get too much of his goods, any more 
than a doctor can make his patient too healthy. 

44* 



POLITICS, I. in. 16-18 

and a man well supplied with money may often a be 
destitute of the bare necessities of subsistence, yet 
it is absurd that wealth should be of such a kind 
that a man may be well supplied 'with it and yet 
die of hunger, like the famous Midas in the storv, 
when owing to the insatiable covetousness of his 
prayer all the viands served up to him turned into 

17 gold. Hence people seek for a different definition 
of riches and the art of getting wealth, and rightly ; 
for natural wealth-getting and natural riches are 
different : natural wealth-getting belongs to house- 
hold management, whereas the other kind belongs 
to trade, producing wealth not indiscriminately but 
by the method of exchanging goods. It is this art 
of wealth-getting that is thought to be concerned 
with money, for money is the first element and limit 
of commerce. And these riches, that are derived 
from this art of wealth-getting, are truly unlimited b ; 
for just as the art of medicine is without limit in 
respect of health, and each of the arts is without 
limit in respect of its end (for they desire to produce 
that in the highest degree possible), whereas they 
are not without limit as regards the means to their 
end (for with all of them the end is a limit to 
the means), so also this wealth-getting has no limit 
in respect of its end, and its end is riches and the 

18 acquisition of goods in the commercial sense. But 
the household branch of wealth-getting has a 
limit, inasmuch as the acquisition of money is not 
the function of household management. Hence 
from this point of view it appears necessary that there 
should be a limit to all riches, yet in actual fact 
we observe that the opposite takes place ; for all 



45 



ARISTOTLE 

πάντες γάρ εις άπειρον αύζουσιν οί 
35 χρηματιζόμενοι το νόμισμα, αίτιον δέ το σύνεγγυς 
αυτών, επαλλάττει γαρ ή χρήσις του αύτοϋ ούσα 
εκατερας 1 τής χρηματιστικής• της γαρ αυτής εστί 
κτήσεως χρήσις, 2 αλλ' ου κατά ταύτόν, άλλα της 
μεν έτερον τέλος, της δ' η αύ'^σι?. ώστε So κει 
τισι τοΰτ* ει^αι της οικονομικής έργον, και δια- 
40 τελοΰσιν ή σωζειν οΐόμενοι δεΐν ή αύ'^ειν την του 
νομίσματος ούσίαν εις άπειρον, αίτιον δέ ταύτης \q 
της διαθέσεως το σπουδάζειν περί το ζήν άλλα 
1258 a Ζ-"? το € ν ζή ν ' e 'S" άπειρον οΰν εκείνης τής επιθυμίας 
ούσης, και των ποιητικών απείρων επιθυμοΰσιν. 
όσοι δέ και του ευ ζήν επιβάλλονται, το προς τάς 
απολαύσεις τάς σωματικάς ζητοΰσιν, ώστ' ε'πει 
5 και τοΰτ εν τή κτήσει φαίνεται ύπάρχειν* πάσα 
ή διατριβή περί τον χρηματισμόν εστί, και το 
έτερον είδος τής χρηματιστικής διά τοΰτ ελήλυθεν. 
εν υπερβολή γάρ ούσης τής άπολαύσεως , την τής 
απολαυστικής υπερβολής ποιητικήν ζητοΰσιν καν 
μη διά τής χρηματιστικής δύνωνται πορίζειν, δι' 
10 άλλης αιτίας τοϋτο πειρώνται, εκάστη χρώμενοι 
τών δυνάμεων ου κατά φύσιν. ανδρείας γάρ ου 20 
χρήματα ποιεΐν εστίν άλλα θάρσος, ουδέ στρα- 
τηγικής και ιατρικής, αλλά τής μεν νίκην τής δ' 
υ^ιειαν. οί δέ πάσας ποιοΰσι χρηματιστικάς, ως 

1 έκατέρας Ar. : -τέρα cett. 

2 κτήσεως χρήσις Goettling : χρήσεως κτήσις codd. 

3 υπάρχον Coraes. 

46 



POLITICS, I. in. 18-20 

men engaged in wealth-getting try to increase their 
money to an unlimited amount. The reason of this 
is the close affinity of the two branches of the art of 
business. Their common ground is that the thing 
that each makes use of is the same ; they use the 
same property, although not in the same way — the 
one has another end in view, the aim of the other 
is the increase of the property. Consequently some 
people suppose that it is the function of household 
management to increase property, and they are 
continually under the idea that it is their duty to 
be either safeguarding their substance in money or 

19 increasing it to an unlimited amount. The cause of 
this state of mind is that their interests are set upon 
life but not upon the good life ; as therefore the 
desire for life is unlimited, they also desire without 
limit the means productive of life. And even those 
who fix their aim on the good life seek the good life 
as measured by bodily enjoyments, so that inasmuch 
as this also seems to be found in the possession of 
property, all their energies are occupied in the 
business of getting wealth ; and owing to this the 
second kind of the art of wealth-getting has arisen. 
For as their enjoyment is in excess, they try to dis- 
cover the art that is productive of enjoyable excess ; 
and if they cannot procure it by the art of wealth- 
getting, they try to do so by some other means, 
employing each of the faculties in an unnatural way. 

20 For it is not the function of courage to produce wealth, 
but to inspire daring ; nor is it the function of the 
military art nor of the medical art, but it belongs to 
the former to bring victory and to the latter to cause 
health. Yet these people make all these faculties 
means for the business of providing wealth, in the 

47 



ARISTOTLE 

1258 a 

τοΰτο τέλος ov, προς δε το τέλος άπαντα Seov 
άπαντάν. 

16 Περί μεν ούν της τε μή αναγκαίας χρηματιστικής , 
και τις και δι' αίτίαν nVa εν χρεία, εσμεν αυτής, 
εΐρηται, και περί της αναγκαίας, οτι έτερα μεν 
αυτής οικονομική οε κατά φύσιν η περί την 
τροφήν, ούχ ώσπερ αϋτη 1 άπειρος αλλ' έχουσα 
ορον. 

Αήλον δε και το άπορούμενον εζ αρχής, πότερον 21 

20 του οικονομικού και πολιτικού εστίν η χρημα- 
τιστική ή ου, αλλά δει τοΰτο μεν ύπάρχειν (ώσπερ 
γάρ και ανθρώπους ου ποιεί ή πολιτική αλλά 
λαβοΰσα παρά τής φύσεως χρήται αύτοΐς, οΰτω και 
τροφήν* τήν φύσιν δει παραδοΰναι γήν ή θάλατ- 

25 ταν ή άλλο τι), εκ δε τούτων ως δει ταύτα οιαθεΐναι 
προσήκει τον οικονόμον. ου γάρ τής υφαντικής 
ερια ποιήσαι αλλά χρήσασθαι αύτοΐς, και yvcwai 
δε το ποιον χρηστόν και επιτήοειον ή φαΰλον και 
άνεπιτήδειον. και γάρ άπορήσειεν αν τις δια τι 22 
ή μεν χρηματιστική μόριον τής οικονομίας η δ 

80 ιατρική ού μόριον, καίτοι δει ύγιαίνειν τους κατά 
τήν οίκίαν, ώσπερ ζήν ή άλλο τι των αναγκαίων, 
επει δ' εστί μεν ως τοΰ οικονόμου και τοϋ άρχοντος 
και περί ύγιείας ιδείν, εστί 3 δ' ως ου, αλλά τοΰ 
Ιατρού, ούτω και περί των χρημάτων εστί μεν ως 

1 αϋτη Welldon : αυτί; codd. 
1 <7r/)os> τροφην ? Richards. 3 <βστίν,> ίστι Welldon. 

α See c. iii. § 1. 
48 

47 



POLITICS, Ι. πι. 20-22 

belief that wealth is the end and that everything 
must conspire to the end. 

We have therefore discussed both the unneces- 
sary branch of wealth-getting, denning it and also 
explaining the cause why we require it, and the 
necessary branch, showing that this branch which 
has to do with food is different from the unnecessary 
branch and is by nature a part of household manage- 
ment, not being like that branch unlimited but 
having a limit. 

21 And we can also see the answer to the question Natural 
raised at the beginning, whether the art of wealth- n e " s e '" S a S r s y a 
getting belongs to the householder and the states- subsidiary 
man, or whether on the contrary supplies ought to °oid° USe " 
be provided already, since just as statesmanship does Manage- 
not create human beings but having received 

them from nature makes use of them, so also it is 
the business of nature to bestow food by bestowing 
land or sea or something else, while the task of the 
householder is, starting with these supplies given, to 
dispose of them in the proper way. For it does not 
belong to the art of weaving to make fleeces, but to 
use them, and also to know what sort of fleece is good 

22 and suitable or bad and unsuitable. Otherwise the 
question might be raised, why the getting of wealth 
is a part of the household art whereas the art of 
medicine is not a part of it, although the members 
of the household ought to be healthy, just as they 
must be alive or fulfil any of the other essential 
conditions. But inasmuch as although in a way it 
does belong to the householder and the ruler to see 
even to health, yet in a way it does not belong to 
them but to the physician, so also with regard to 
wealth, although in a way it is the affair of the house- 

49 



ARISTOTLE 

1258 a Λ , , νΐϊ>» » >\\ \ ~ t 

του οικονόμου, εστί ο ως ου, αΛΛα της υπηρετικής. 

85 μάλιστα δε, καθάπερ εΐρηται πρότερον, δει φύσει 
τοΰτο ύπάρχειν. φύσεως γάρ εστίν έργον τροφην 
τω γεννηθεντι παρεχειν παντι γάρ, εξ ού γίνεται, 
τροφή το λειπόμενόν εστίν, διό κατά φυσιν εστίν 
η χρηματιστική πάσιν από των καρπών και των 
ζωών. 

Αιπλής δ' ούσης αυτής, ώσπερ εΐπομεν, και της 23 

40 μεν καπηλικής της δ* οικονομικής, και ταύτης μεν 
1258 b αναγκαίας και επαινουμενης, της δε μεταβλητικής 
φεγομενης δικαίως (ού γάρ κατά φύσιν αλλ απ 
αλλ^λω^ εστίν), εύλογώτατα μισείται η όβολο- 
στατικη δια το απ' 2 αύτοϋ του νομίσματος eimi 
την κτησιν και ούκ εφ* όπερ επορισθη• μεταβολής 
β γάρ εγενετο χάριν, 6 δε τόκος αυτό ποιεί πλέον 
(όθεν και τούνομα τοΰτ είληφεν όμοια γάρ τά 
τικτόμενα τοις γεννώσιν αυτά εστίν, 6 δε τόκος 
γίνεται νό/χισ//.α εκ νομίσματος)• ώστε και μά- 
λιστα παρά φύσιν ούτος των χρηματισμών εστίν. 
IV. Έπεί δε τά προς την γνώσιν διωρίκαμεν 1 

10 ίκανώς, τά προς την χρησιν δει διελθεΐν πάντα δε 
τά τοιαύτα την μεν θεωριαν ελεύθερον έχει, την δ' 
εμπειρίαν άναγκαίαν. εστί δε της χρηματιστικής 
μέρη χρήσιμα το περί τά κτήματα 3 εμπειρον είναι, 
ποια λυσιτελεστατα και πού και πώς, οΐον ίππων 
κτήσις ποία τις η βοών η προβάτων, ομοίως δε 

1 <έστίν,•> ίστι Welldon. 
1 ύπ' Bekker : έπ Jackson. 3 κτήνη Bernays. 

α i.e. animals are made of earth and water and live on the 
products of earth and water. 

50 



POLITICS, I. in. 22— iv. 1 

holder, in a way it is not, but is a matter for the 
subsidiary art. But best of all, as has been said 
before, this provision ought to be made in advance 
by nature. For it is the work of nature to supply 
nourishment for her offspring, since every creature 
has for nourishment the residue of the substance 
from which it springs. Hence the business of draw- 
ing provision from the fruits of the soil and from 
animals is natural to all. 
23 But, as we said, this art is twofold, one branch Trade 
being of the nature of trade while the other belongs ^g^j . 
to the household art ; and the latter branch is Usury 
necessary and in good esteem, but the branch con- unna 
nected with exchange is justly discredited (for it is 
not in accordance with nature, but involves men's 
taking things from one another). As this is so, usury 
is most reasonably hated, because its gain comes from 
money itself and not from that for the sake of which 
money was invented. For money was brought into 
existence for the purpose of exchange, but interest 
increases the amount of the money itself (and this 
is the actual origin of the Greek word : offspring re- 
sembles parent, and interest is money born of money) ; 
consequently this form of the business of getting 
wealth is of all forms the most contrary to nature. 
1 IV. And since we have adequately defined the Outline of 
scientific side of the subject, we ought to discuss it fr^Yse on 
from the point of view of practice ; although, whereas Trade: 
the theory of such matters is a liberal study, the 
practical pursuit of them is narrowing. The practi- 
cally useful branches of the art of wealth-getting are 
first, an expert knowledge of stock, what breeds are 
most profitable and in what localities and under what 
conditions, for instance what particular stock in 

51 



ARISTOTLE 

1258b , Λ ν ,.,.,, s „ xw r , 

15 και των λοιπών ί,ωων [οει γαρ εμπειρον είναι προς 
άλληλα τε τούτων τίνα λυσιτελεστατα, και ποία εν 
ποίοις τόποις, άλλα γαρ iv άλλαις εύθηνεΐ χώραις)• 
είτα π€ρί γεωργίας, και ταύτης ηδη φίλης τ€ και 
πεφυτευμενης, και μελιττουργίας, και των άλλων 

20 ζώων των πλωτών η πτηνών αφ* όσων εστί τνγ- 
χάνειν βοηθείας, της μεν ονν οίκειοτάτης χρη- 2 
ματιστικής ταύτα μόρια και πρώτα 1 • της δε μετα- 
βλητικης μεγιστον μεν εμπορία (και ταύτης μέρη 
τρία, ναυκληρία φορτηγία παράστασις' διαφέρει 6ε 
τούτων έτερα έτερων τω τα μεν ασφαλέστερα eimi 

25 τα δε πλείω πορίζειν την επικαρπίαν) , δεύτερον δε 
τοκισμός, τρίτον δε μισθαρνία (ταύτης δ η μεν 
τών βάναυσων τεχνών, 2 η δέ τών άτεχνων και τω 
=^ σώματι μόνω χρησίμων)• τρίτον δε είδος χρημα- 
τιστικής μεταξύ ταύτης και της πρώτης (έχει γαρ 
και της κατά φύσιν τι μέρος και της μεταβλητικης) , 

30 ό'σα 3 άπο γης και τών άπο γης γινομένων άκαρπων 
μεν χρησίμων δε, οΐον υλοτομία* τε και πάσα 
μεταλλευτική• αύτη δε πολλά ηδη περιείληφε γένη, 
πολλά γάρ είδη τών εκ γης μεταλλευο μένων εστίν, 
είσι δε* τεχνικώταται μεν τών εργασιών οπού 3 
ελάχιστον της τύχης, βαναυσόταται δ' ev af? τα 

1 πρώτης (cf. 25) ? Richards. 2 τεχνιτών Vermehren. 

3 οΐισα Bernays. * ή λατομία Thomas Aquinas. 

s eiai oe — aperrjs post 39 ΐνδιατρίβειν codd. : tr. (et 33 δη 
pro 5e) Montecatino auctore Susemihl. 

a βάναυσος (said to be from βαΰνοτ ' furnace,' αϋω ' to dry '), 
' artisan ' (ranged with farmers, traders, and labourers, as 
forming the common people 1321 a 6) ; it acquires the senses 
of 'cramped in body' (1341 a 7) and 'vulgar in taste' 
(1337 b 8). 

6 A very probable variant gives ' the quarrying of stone.' 

52 



POLITICS, I. iv. 1-3 

horses or cattle or sheep, and similarly of the other 
animals also (for the farmer must be an expert as to 
which of these animals are most profitable compared 
with one another, and also as to what breeds are most 
profitable on what sorts of land, since different breeds 
thrive in different places) ; secondly, the subject 
of agriculture, and this again is divided into corn- 
growing and fruit-farming ; also bee-keeping, and 
the breeding of the other creatures finned and 
feathered which can be used to furnish supplies. 

2 These then are the branches and primary parts of its three 
wealth-getting in the most proper sense. Of the ranchei 
kind that deals with exchange, the largest branch 

is commerce (which has three departments, ship- 
owning, transport and marketing : these depart- 
ments differ from each other in the fact that some 
are safer and others carry larger profits) ; the second 
branch is money-lending, and the third labour for 
hire, one department of which is that of the mechanic" 
arts and the other that of unskilled labourers who 
are useful only for bodily service. And there is a Quarries 
third form of wealth-getting that lies between the anlnter" 
latter and the one placed first, since it possesses mediate 
an element both of natural wealth-getting and of 
the sort that employs exchange ; it deals with all 
the commodities that are obtained from the earth 
and from those fruitless but useful things that come 
from the earth — examples are the felling of timber b 
and all sorts of mining ; and of mining itself there are 
many classes, since there are many sorts of metals 

3 obtained out of the earth. The c most scientific of 
these industries are those which involve the smallest 
element of chance, the most mechanic those in which 

e In the mss. this sentence follows the next one. 

53 



ARISTOTLE 

1258 b 

35 σώματα λωβώνται μάλιστα, δουλικώταται 8ε δπου 
του σώματος πλεΐσται χρήσεις, άγεννεσταται δέ 
δπου ελάχιστον προσ8εΐ αρετής, περί εκάστου δε 
τούτων καθόλου μεν εΐρηται και νυν, το 8ε κατά 
μέρος άκριβολογεΐσθαι χρήσιμον μεν προς τάς ερ- 
γασίας, φορτικδν δε το ενδιατρίβειν. επει δ' εστίν 4 

40 ενίοις γεγραμμενα περί τούτων, οίον ΧαρητίΒγ) τω 
1259a Παριω και Απολλο8ώρω τω Αημνίω περί γεωρ- 
γίας και φίλης και πεφυτευμενης , ομοίως 8ε και 
άλλοις περί άλλων, ταΰτα μεν εκ τούτων θεωρείτω 
δτω επιμελές' ετι δε και τα λεγόμενα σπορά8ην 

6 δι' ων επιτετυχήκασιν ενιοι χρηματιζόμενοι 8εΐ 
συλλεγειν πάντα γαρ ωφέλιμα ταΰτ* εστί τοις 
τιμώσι την χρηματιστικήν, οίον καΐ το θάλεω του 5 
Μιλησίου• τοΰτο γάρ εστί κατανόημά τι χρημα- 
τιστικόν, αλλ' εκείνω μεν 8ιά την σοφίαν προσ- 
άπτουσι, τυγχάνει δε καθόλου τι 6ν. όνει8ιζόντων 

ίο γάρ αύτώ δια την πενίαν ως ανωφελούς της 
φιλοσοφίας ούσης, κατανοήσαντά φασιν αυτόν 
ελαίων φοράν εσομενην εκ της αστρολογίας ετι 
χειμώνος οντος, εύπορησαντα χρημάτων ολίγων 
αρραβώνας 8ια8οΰναι τών ελαιουργίων τών τ' εν 
Μιλτ^τω και Χι'ω πάντων, ολίγου μισθωσάμενον άτ 

15 ούθενός επιβάλλοντος' επει8ή 8 ό καιρός ήκε, 
πολλών ζητουμένων άμα και εξαίφνης, εκμισθοΰντα 
δν τρόπον ήβούλετο πολλά χρήματα συλλεζαντα, 

• Otherwise unknown. 

* Also mentioned by Varro and Pliny. 

c The author of the Second Book of the pseudo-Aristotelian 
Oeconomica seems to have taken this hint. 

d The founder of Greek philosophy and mathematics, 
and one of the Seven Sages, 6th-5th cent. b.c. 
54 



POLITICS, I. iv. 3-5 

the operatives undergo the greatest amount of bodily 
degradation, the most servile those in which the most 
uses are made of the body, and the most ignoble 
those in which there is the least requirement of virtue 
as an accessory. But while we have even now given 
a general description of these various branches, yet 
a detailed and particular account of them, though 
useful for the practice of the industries, would be 

4 illiberal as a subject of prolonged study. There are other 
books on these subjects by certain authors, for industries! 
example Charetides a of Paros and Apollodorus b of 
Lemnos have written about both agriculture and fruit- 
farming, and similarly others also on other topics, 

so these subjects may be studied from these authors 
by anybody concerned to do so ; but in addition a 
collection ought also to be made c of the scattered 
accounts of methods that have brought success in 
business to certain individuals. All these methods 
are serviceable for those who value wealth-getting, Thaies and 

5 for example the plan of Thaies d of Miletus, which is a Mon °P° 1 y• 
device for the business of getting wealth, but which, 
though it is attributed to him because of his wisdom, 

is really of universal application. Thaies, so the 
story goes, because of his poverty was taunted with 
the uselessness of philosophy ; but from his knowledge 
of astronomy he had observed while it was still winter 
that there was going to be a large crop of olives, 
so he raised a small sum of money and paid round 
deposits for the whole of the olive-presses in Miletus 
and Chios, which he hired at a low rent as nobody 
was running him up ; and when the season arrived, 
there was a sudden demand for a number of presses 
at the same time, and by letting them out on 
what terms he liked he realized a large sum of 

55 



ARISTOTLE 

1259 a 

επιδεΐζαι ότι ράδιόν εστί πλοντίΐν τοις φιλοσόφοις 

αν βούλωνται, αλλ' ου τοΰτ εστί περί δ σπουδά- 

ζουσιν. Θαλής μεν οΰν λέγεται τούτον τον τρόπον 6 

επίδειζιν ποιήσασθαι της σοφίας• έστι δ' ωσπερ 

20 ε'ιπομεν, καθόλου το τοιούτον χρηματιστικόν, εάν 
τις δύνηται μονοπωλίαν αύτω κατασκευάζειν διό 
και των πόλεων ένιαι τούτον ποιούνται τον πόρον 
όταν απορώσι χρημάτων, μονοπωλίαν γαρ των 
ώνίων ποιοΰσιν. εν Σικελία δε τι? τεθέντος παρ' 7 
αύτω νομίσματος συνεπρίατο πάντα τον σίδηρον εκ 

25 των σιδηρείων, μετά δε ταΰτα ως άφίκοντο εκ των 
εμπορίων οι έμποροι, επώλει μόνος, ου πολλην 
ποιησας ύπερβολην της τιμής, αλλ' όμως επι τοις 

30 πεντήκοντα ταλάντοις επελαβεν εκατόν, τοΰτο μεν 8 
οΰν ο Διονύσιο? αισθόμ,ενος τά μεν χρήματα εκε- 
λευσεν εκκομίσασθαι, μη μεντοι γ έτι μενειν εν 
Σ,υρακούσαις , ώς πόρους εύρίσκοντα τοις αύτοΰ 1 
πράγμασιν ασύμφορους, το μεντοι όραμα 2 θάλεω 
και τοΰτο 3 ταύτόν εστίν αμφότεροι γαρ εαυτοΐς 

35 ετεχνασαν yei^eV^ai μονοπωλίαν. χρήσιμον δε γνω- 

ρίζειν ταΰτα και τοις πολιτικοΐς• πολλαΐς γαρ 

πόλεσι δει χρηματισμού και τοιούτων πόρων, ωσπερ 

οικία, μάλλον δέ• διοπερ τίνες και πολιτεύονται 

των πολιτευόμενων ταΰτα μόνον. 

V. Έπει δε τρία μέρη της οικονομικής ην, εν 1 

μεν δεσποτική, περί ης εΐρηται πρότερον, εν δε 

πατρική, τρίτον δε γαμική* — και γαρ γυναικός 

1 αντον Susemihl : αύτοΰ codd. 

2 ενρημα, θεώρημα, δράμα edd. 

* θάλ-η καΐ τούτω Γ. * lacunam Conring. 

α The talent was about £240. 

6 Dionysius the elder, tyrant of Syracuse 405-367 b.c. 

Cf. Thucydides οι δ' ούκέτι έμειναν άλλα . . . 

56 



POLITICS, Ι. ιν. δ— v. 1 

money, so proving that it is easy for philosophers 
to be rich if they choose, but this is not what they 

6 care about. Thales then is reported to have thus 
displayed his wisdom, but as a matter of fact this Government 
device of taking an opportunity to secure a monopoly mono P oUes - 
is a universal principle of business ; hence even 

some states have recourse to this plan as a method 
of raising revenue when short of funds : they intro- 

7 duce a monopoly of marketable goods. There was a 
man in Sicily who used a sum of money deposited with 
him to buy up all the iron from the iron foundries, 
and afterwards when the dealers came from the 
trading-centres he was the only seller, though he 
did not greatly raise the price, but all the same he 
made a profit of a hundred talents α on his capital 

8 of fifty. When Dionysius b came to know of it he 
ordered the man to take his money with him but clear 
out of Syracuse on the spot, c since he was inventing 
means of profit detrimental to the tvrant's own 
affairs. Yet really this device is the same as the 
discovery of Thales, for both men alike contrived 
to secure themselves a monopoly. An acquaintance 
with these devices is also serviceable for statesmen, for 
many states need financial aid and modes of revenue 
like those described, just as a household may, but 
in greater degree ; hence some statesmen even 
devote their political activity exclusively to finance. 

1 y. And since, as we saw,** the science of household The 
management has three divisions, one the relation of h HL sband ' s 
master to slave, of which we have spoken before,' one political, 
the paternal relation, and the third the conjugal' — royjd- ther '* 

d C. ii. init. • C. iii. ./?«., iv. 

' The construction of the sentence is interrupted, and never 
completed. 

57 



ARISTOTLE 

1259 a . 

40 άρχειν και τέκνων (ως ελευθέρων μεν άμφοΐν, ου 2 
1259 b τον αυτόν δε τρόπον της αρχής, αλλά γυναικός μεν 
πολιτικώς, τέκνων δε βασιλικώς)' τό τε γαρ άρρεν 
φύσει του θήλεος ήγεμονικώτερον (ει μη που συν- 
εστηκε πάρα φύσιν) και τό πρεσβύτερον και τελειον 
του νεωτέρου και ατελούς, εν μεν ουν ταϊς πολι- 
5 τικαΐς άρχαΐς τοις πλείσταις μεταβάλλει τό άρχον 
και το άρχόμενον (εξ 'ίσου γαρ είναι βούλεται την 
φύσιν και οιαφερειν μηθεν), όμως 8ε όταν τό μεν 
άρχη το δ άρχηται ζητεί διαφοράν είναι και 
σχήμασι και λόγοις και τιμαίςί ώσπερ και "Αμ,ασι? 
είπε τον περί του ποδανιπτήρος λόγον το δ' άρρεν 
ίο aet προς τό θήλυ τούτον έχει τον τρόπον, η δέ 
των τέκνων αρχή βασιλική• τό γαρ γέννησαν και 
κατά. φιλιαν άρχον και κατά πρεσβε'ιαν εστίν, όπερ 
εστί βασιλικής είδος αρχής (διό καλώς "Ομηρος 
τον Δια προσηγόρευσεν ειπών 

πατήρ ανδρών τε θεών τε 

15 τον βασιλέα τούτων απάντων) . φύσει γάρ τον 
)8ασιλβα διαφερειν μεν δει, τω γένει δ' eimi τον 
αύτον όπερ πεπονθε τό πρεσβύτερον προς τό 
νεώτερον και 6 γεννήσας προς τό τεκνον. 

Φανερόν τοίνυν ότι πλείων ή σπουδή τής οίκο- 3 
νομιας περί τους ανθρώπους ή περί τήν τών άφύχων 

SO κτήσιν και περί τήν άρετήν τούτων ή περί τήν 
τής κτήσεως, ον καλοΰμεν πλοΰτον, και τών 
ελευθέρων μάλλον ή δούλων. 

" i.e. of the free and equal, 1255 b 20. 

* Herodotus ii. 1 72. Amasis king of Egypt was despised 
by his subjects for his low birth, so he had a statue made out 
of a gold foot-bath and set it up for them to worship, after- 
wards explaining to them its lowly origin. c II. i. '< It. 

58 



POLITICS, I. v. 1-3 

for it is a part of the household science to rule over 

2 wife and children (over both as over freemen, yet not 
with the same mode of government, but over the 
wife to exercise republican government and over the 
children monarchical) ; for the male is by nature better 
fitted to command than the female (except in some 
cases where their union has been formed contrarv to 
nature) and the older and fully developed person than 
the younger and immature. It is true that in most 
cases of republican government the ruler and the 
ruled interchange in turn (for they tend to be on 
an equal level in their nature and to have no difference 
at all), although nevertheless during the period when 
one is ruler and the other ruled they seek to have 
a distinction by means of insignia and titles and 
honours, just as Amasis made his speech about the 
foot-bath b ; but the male stands in this relationship 
to the female continuously. The rule of the father 
over the children on the other hand is that of a king ; 
for the male parent is the ruler in virtue both of 
affection and of seniority, which is characteristic 
of royal government (and therefore Homer c finely 
designated Zeus by the words ' father of men and 
gods,' as the king of them all). For though in nature 
the king must be superior, in race he should be the 
same as his subjects, and this is the position of the 
elder in relation to the younger and of the father in 
relation to the child. 

3 It is clear then that household management takes and more 
more interest in the human members of the household "h^"* 111 ' 
than in its inanimate property, and in the excellence ownership 
of these than in that of its property, which we style ° g 
riches, and more in that of its free members than in 

that of slaves. 

59 



ARISTOTLE 

1259 b . , . - . 

ΙΙρώτον /xev ow 7repi δούλων άπορήσειεν άν τις, 
πότερόν εστίν αρετή τις δούλου παρά τάς όργανικάς 
και διαΚονικας άλλη τιμιωτερα τούτων, οίον 
σωφροσύνη και ανδρεία και δικαιοσύνη και 1 των 

25 αλλω^ των τοιούτων έ'ζεων, ή ουκ εστίν ουδεμία 
παρά τάς σωματικάς υπηρεσίας, έχει γάρ άπορίαν 
άμφοτερως. ε'ίτε γάρ εστί, τί διοίσουσι των ελευ- 
θέρων; εΐτε μη εστίν, όντων ανθρώπων και λόγου 
κοινωνούντων άτοπον, σχεδόν δέ ταύτόν εστί το 4 

so ζητούμενον και περί γυναικός και τταιδό?, πότερα 
και τούτων είσιν αρεταί, και δει την γυναίκα eirai 
σώφρονα και άνδρείαν και δικαίαν, και 7ταί? εστί 
και ακόλαστος και σώφρων, η ου; και καθόλου 
δη τούτ εστίν επισκεπτεον περί αρχομένου φύσει 
και άρχοντος, πότερον η αύτη αρετή ή έτερα, ει 

35 μεν γάρ δει αμφότερους μετεχειν καλοκαγαθίας, 
διά τί τον μεν άρχειν δεοι άν τον δε άρχεσθαι 
καθάπαζ ; ουδέ γάρ τω μάλλον και ήττον οΐόν τε 
διαφερειν το μεν γάρ άρχεσθαι και άρχειν εΐδει 
διαφέρει, το δε μάλλον και ήττον ούδεν. ει δέ τον 5 
μέν δει τον δέ μή, θαυμαστόν ε'ίτε γάρ ό άρχων 

40 μή εσται σώφρων και δίκαιος, πώς άρζει καλώς ; 
1260 a ε'ίθ' ο αρχόμενος, πώς άρχθήσεται καλώς; ακό- 
λαστος γάρ ων και δειλό? ούθέν ποιήσει τών 
προσηκόντων. φανερόν τοίνυν ότι ανάγκη μέν 
μετεχειν αμφότερους αρετής, ταύτης δ' είναι 
διαφοράς (ώσπερ και τών φύσει αρχομένων).* 

1 και <έκάστη> ? Spengel. 

2 ώσπερ — αρχομένων interpolatum ed. (φύσει αρχόντων καϊ 
αρχομένων cod. Oxon. marg.). 

° Καλοκά-γαθος, ' fine gentleman,' connotes social as well as 
moral distinction. 

60 



POLITICS, I. v. 3-5 

First of all then as to slaves the difficulty might His 
be raised, does a slave possess any other excellence, ^"ave^— ' 
besides his merits as a tool and a servant, more w ^ e d and _ 
valuable than these, for instance temperance, have their 
courage, justice and any of the other moral virtues, owllvirtue * 
or has he no excellence beside his bodily service ? 
For either way there is difficulty ; if slaves do possess 
moral virtue, wherein will they differ from freemen ? 
or if they do not. this is strange, as they are human 

4 beings and participate in reason. And nearly the 
same is the question also raised about the woman and 
the child : have they too virtues, and ought a woman 
to be temperate, brave and just, and can a child 
be intemperate or temperate, or not ? This point 
therefore requires general consideration in relation 
to natural ruler and subject: is virtue the same for 
ruler and ruled, or different ? If it is proper for both 
to partake in nobility of character, how could it be 
proper for the one to rule and the other to be ruled 
unconditionally ? we cannot say that the difference 
is to be one of degree, for ruling and being ruled 
differ in kind, and difference of degree is not a differ- 

δ ence in kind at all. Whereas if on the contrarv it is 
proper for the one to have moral nobility but not 
for the other, this is surprising. For if the ruler is 
not temperate and just, how will he rule well ? And 
if the ruled, how will he obey well ? If intemperate 
and cowardly he will not perform any of the duties 
of his position. It is evident therefore that both 
must possess virtue, but that there are differences in 
their virtue (as also there are differences between 
those who are by nature ruled). 6 And of this we 

6 This clause seems to have been interpolated ; one ms. has 
a marginal correction, ' by nature rulers and ruled.' 

61 



ARISTOTLE 

1280 a 

5 και τοΰτο ευθύς ύφήγηται περί την ψνχήν εν 

ταύτη γάρ εστί φύσει το μεν άρχον το δε άρχό- 

μενον, ων έτερον φαμεν είναι άρετήν, οίον του 

λόγον έχοντος και του αλόγου. δηλον τοίνυν οτι 6 

τον αύτον τρόπον έχει και επί των άλλων, ώστε 

φύσει πλείω τά 1 άρχοντα και αρχόμενα, άλλον γάρ 

ίο τρόπον το ελεύθερον του δούλου άρχει και το άρρεν 
του θήλεος και άνηρ παώός. και πάσιν ενυπάρχει 
μεν τα μόρια της φνχής, αλλ' ενυπάρχει δια- 
φερόντως• 6 μεν γάρ δούλος όλως ουκ έχει το 
βουλευτικόν , το δέ θήλυ έχει μεν, αλλ' άκυρον, 6 
δε τται? έχει μεν, αλλ' ατελές, διό 2 τον μεν 7 

15 άρχοντα τελεαν εχειν δει την διανοητικην 3 άρετήν 
(το γάρ έργον εστίν απλώς του άρχιτεκτονος, ο δε 
λόγος αρχιτέκτων), των δ' άλλων εκαστον όσον 
επιβάλλει αύτοΐς.* ομοίως τοίνυν άναγκαίως εχειν 
και περί τάς ήθικας αρετάς ύποληπτεον, δεΐν μεν 
μετεχειν πάντας, αλλ ου τον αυτόν τρόπον, αλλ' 

2ο όσον εκάστω προς το αύτοΰ έργον, ώστε φάνε- 8 
ρόν ότι εστίν ηθική αρετή τών ειρημενων πάντων, 
και ούχ η αύτη σωφροσύνη γυναικός και ανδρός 
οι)δ' ανδρεία και δικαιοσύνη , καθάπερ ώετο Σω- 
κράτης, αλλ' η μεν αρχική ανδρεία, η δ' υπηρετική, 
ομοίως δ' έχει και περί τάς άλλα?, δηλον δε τοΰτο 

25 και κατά μέρος μάλλον επισκοποΰσιν καθόλου γάρ 
οι λέγοντες εζαπατώσιν εαυτούς οτι το ευ εχειν 

1 πλείω τα Ramus : τα πλείω codd. 

1 hio —αύτοϊς hie Thurot, infra post το αύτοΰ έργον codd. 

3 διανοητικην Thurot : ηθικην codd. 

4 αύτοϊί <ίκανόν> ? Richards. 

° In the mss. this sentence follows the next one, ' We must 
suppose — function,' and begins ' Hence the ruler must possess 
moral virtue.' 
62 






POLITICS, I. v. 5-8 

straightway find an indication in connexion with the 
soul ; for the soul by nature contains a part that 
rules and a part that is ruled, to which we assign 
different virtues, that is, the virtue of the rational 

6 and that of the irrational. It is clear then that the 
case is the same also with the other instances of ruler 
and ruled. Hence there are by nature various classes 
of rulers and ruled. For the free rules the slave, the 
male the female, and the man the child in a different 
way. And all possess the various parts of the soul, 
but possess them in different ways ; for the slave has 
not got the deliberative part at all, and the female 
has it, but without full authority, while the child has 

7 it, but in an undeveloped form. Hence ° the ruler 
must possess intellectual virtue in completeness (for 
any work, taken absolutely, belongs to the master- 
craftsman, and rational principle is a master-crafts- 
man) ; while each of the other parties must have that 
share of this virtue which is appropriate to them. We 
must suppose therefore that the same necessarily holds 
good of the moral virtues : all must partake of them, 
but not in the same way, but in such measure as is 

8 proper to each in relation to his own function. Hence 
it is manifest that all the persons mentioned have a 
moral virtue of their own, and that the temperance 
of a woman and that of a man are not the same, nor 
their courage and justice, as Socrates thought, 6 but 
the one is the courage of command, and the other 
that of subordination, and the case is similar with the 
other virtues. And this is also clear when we examine 
the matter more in detail, for it is misleading to give 
a general definition of virtue, as some do, who say 
that virtue is being in good condition as regards the 

» Plato, Meno 74 β ff. 

63 



ARISTOTLE 

1260 a 

την φυχην αρετή ή το όρθοπραγεΐν η τι των 

τοιούτων πολύ γαρ άμεινον λέγουσιν οι έζαριθ- 
μούντες τάς άρετάς, ώσπερ Τοργίας, των ούτως 
οριζομένων, διό δει, ωσπερ ο ποιητής ε'ίρηκε περί 
so γυναικός, ούτω νομίζειν έχειν περί πάντων 
γυναικί κόσμον ή σιγή φέρει — 

αλλ' άνδρι ούκέτι τοϋτο. έπει δ' 6 παις ατελής, 9 
δήλον οτι τούτου μεν και ή αρετή ουκ αύτοΰ προς 
αυτόν εστίν , άλλα προς τον τέλειον και τον ηγου- 
μενον. ομοίως δε και δούλου προς δεσπότην. 
"Έιθεμεν δε προς τάναγκαΐα χρήσιμον etmi τον 

85 δοΰλον, ώστε δήλον οτι και αρετής δεΐται μικράς, 
και τοσαύτης όπως μήτε δι άκολασίαν μήτε διά 
δειλιαν έλλείφει των έργων, (άπορήσειε δ' αν τι?, 10 
το νυν είρημένον ει αληθές, άρα και τους τεχνιτας 
δεήσει έχειν άρετήν πολλάκις γαρ δι ακολασιαν 
έλλείπουσι των έργων, ή διαφέρει τούτο πλείστον; 

40 ό μεν γαρ δούλος κοινωνός ζθ}ής, ό δε πορρώτερον, 
και τοσούτον επιβάλλει αρετής όσον περ καϊ 
1260 b δουλείας• ο γαρ βάναυσος τεχνίτης άφωρισμένην 
τινά έχει δουλείαν, και ό μεν δούλος των φύσει, 
σκυτοτόμος δ' ούθεις ουδέ των άλλων τεχνιτών.) 
φανερόν τοίνυν ότι της τοιαύτης αρετής αίτιον είναι 11 
Set τω δουλω τον δεσπότην, αλλ' ου 1 τήν διδα- 
5 σκαλικήν έχοντα τών έργων δεσποτικήν. διό 

1 °νχ <5> Richards. 

. •. , , . 

α i.e. in Me.no (vide § 7 above), where this sophist 

figures as a ;., . cter in the dialogue ; see also p. 178, note 6. 

6 Sophocles, Ajax 293. 

e i.e. his excellences as an artisan are the qualities of a 
subordinate (his virtues as a human being, apart from his 
trade, are not considered). 
64 



POLITICS, I. v. 8-11 

soul or acting uprightly or the like ; those who 
enumerate the virtues of different persons separately, 
as Gorgias does," are much more correct than those 
who define virtue in that way. Hence we must hold 
that all of these persons have their appropriate 
virtues, as the poet said of woman : 

Silence gives grace to woman * — 

though that is not the case likewise with a man. 
9 Also the child is not completely developed, so that 
manifestly his virtue also is not personal to himself, 
but relative to the fully developed being, that is, the 
person in authority over him. And similarly the 
slave's virtue also is in relation to the master. 

And we laid it down that the slave is serviceable The slave 
for the mere necessaries of life, so that clearly he relatively 
needs only a small amount of virtue, in fact just the artisan) 
enough to prevent him from failing in his tasks f 0r his 

10 owing to intemperance and cowardice. (But the ^ sk! '• *" d , 
question might be raised, supposing that what has admonition 
just been said is true, will artisans also need to have su PP lieslt - 
virtue ? for they frequently fall short in their tasks 

owing to intemperance. Or is their case entirely 
different ? For the slave is a partner in his master's 
life, but the artisan is more remote, and only so much 
of virtue falls to his share as of slavery e — for the 
mechanic artisan is under a sort of limited slavery, 
and whereas the slave is one of the natural classes, 
no shoemaker or other craftsman belongs his trade 

11 by nature.) It is manifest therefore th* '• master 
ought to be the cause to the slave of the virtue 
proper to a slave, but not as possessing that art of 
mastership which teaches a slave his tasks. Hence 

65 



ARISTOTLE 

1260 b 

λεγουσιν ου καλώς οι λόγου τους δούλους άπο- 
στεροΰντες και φάσ κοντές επιτάξει χρήσθαι μόνον 
νουθετητεον γαρ μάλλον τους δούλους η τους 
τταΐδας. 

Άλλα περί μεν τούτων διωρίσθω τον τρόπον 
τούτον περί δε ανδρός και γυναικός και τέκνων 

ίο και πατρός, της τε περί εκαστον αυτών αρετής, 
και της προς σφάς αυτούς ομιλίας, τι το καλώς 
και μη καλώς εστί και πώς δει το μεν ευ διώκειν 
το δε κακώς φεύγειν, εν τοις περί τας πολιτείας 
αναγκαΐον επελθεΐν, επει γαρ οικία μεν πάσα μέρος \% 
πόλεως, ταύτα δ' οικίας, την δε τοΰ μέρους προς 

ΐδ την τού όλου δει βλεπειν άρετην, αναγκαΐον προς 
την πολιτείαν βλέποντας 7rcu8eJeiv και τους παΐδας 
και τάς γυναίκας, εΐπερ τι διαφέρει προς το την 
πόλιν είναι σπουδαίαν και τους παΐδας eirai 
σπουδαίους και τάς γυναίκας σπουδαίας, αναγ- 
καΐον δε διαφερειν αϊ μεν γαρ γυναίκες ήμισυ 

20 μέρος τών ελευθέρων, εκ δε τών παίδων οι κοινωνοί 1 
γίνονται της πολιτείας, ώστ επει περί μεν τούτων 
διώρισται, περί δε τών λοιπών εν άλλοι? λεκτεον, 
αφέντες ως τέλος έχοντας τους νυν λόγους, αλλην 
αρχήν ποιησάμενοι λεγωμεν, και πρώτον επισκεφώ- 
μεθα περί τών άποφηναμενων περί της πολιτείας 
της αρίστης. 

1 οί κοινωνοί : οικονόμοι Susemihl (dispensatores Guil.). 

° Plato, Laws 777 ε. 

* As a matter of fact in Books VII., VIII. dealing with 
the best constitution this subject is not reached. 



66 



POLITICS, I. v. 11-12 

those persons are mistaken who deprive the slave of 
reasoning and tell us to use command only α ; for 
admonition is more properly employed with slaves 
than with children. 

But on these subjects let us conclude our decisions Ethics of 
in this manner ; while the question of the virtue a nd'educ*• 
severally belonging to man and woman and children tl . . n , of 
and father, and of the right and wrong mode of con- women 
ducting their mutual intercourse and the proper way deferred • 
of pursuing the good mode and avoiding the bad one, 
are matters that it will be necessary to follow up in 
the part of our treatise dealing with the various forms 
12 of constitution. 6 For since every household is part 
of a state, and these relationships are part of the 
household, and the excellence of the part must have 
regard to that of the whole, it is necessary that the 
education both of the children and of the women 
should be carried on with a regard to the form of the 
constitution, if it makes any difference as regards 
the goodness of the state for the children and the 
women to be good. And it must necessarily make a 
difference ; for the women are a half of the free 
population, and the children grow up to be the 
partners in the government of the state. So that 
as these questions have been decided, and those that 
remain must be discussed elsewhere, let us relinquish 
the present subjects as completed, and make a fresh 
start in our discourse, and first let us consider those 
thinkers who have advanced news about the Ideal 
State. 



67 



Β 

1260 b 

I. Επει δε προαιρούμεθα θεωρησαι περί της \ 
κοινωνίας της πολιτικής η κρατίστη πασών τοις 
δυναμενοις ζην δτι μάλιστα κατ' εύχην, δει και 

so τα? άλλα? επισκεφασθαι πολιτείας αΐς τ€ χρώνταί 
τίνες των πόλεων των εύνομεΐσθαι λεγομένων καν 
ε'ί τίνες ετεραι τυγχάνωσιν υπό τινών ειρημεναι 
και δοκονσαι καλώς εχειν, ίνα τό τ' ορθώς έχον 
όφθη και τό χρησιμον, ετι δε τό ζητεΐν τι παρ' 
αύτάς έτερον μη δοκη πάντως ει^αι σοφίζεσθαι 

S5 βουλομενων, άλλα δια τό μη καλώς εχειν ταύτας 
τάς νυν υπάρχουσας, δια τοϋτο ταύτην δοκώμεν 
επιβαλεσθαι την μεθοδον. 

' Αρχήν δέ πρώτον ποιητεον ηπερ πεφυκεν άρχη 2 
ταύτης της σκεφεως. ανάγκη γαρ ήτοι ττάντα? 
πάντων κοινωνεΐν τους πολιτας, η μηδενός, η τινών 
μεν τινών δε μη. τό μεν ουν μηδενός κοινωνεΐν 

40 φανερόν ως αδύνατον (η γαρ πολιτεία κοινωνία τις 

εστί, και πρώτον ανάγκη του τόπου κοινωνεΐν , ο 

μεν γαρ τόπος εις ό της /ηα? πόλεω?, οι δέ πολΐται 

1261a κοινωνοί της /ζιά? πόλεως)• άλλα πότερον όσων 

68 



BOOK II 

1 I. And since we take for our special consideration Book 11. 
the study of the form of political community that is conS'itc- 
the best of all the forms for a people able to pursue τιοχϋ. ideal 
the most ideal mode of life, we must also examine A>DACTCAU 
the other constitutions actually employed by certain 

of the states said to be well governed, as well as any 
others propounded bv certain thinkers and reputed 
to be of merit, in order that we may discern what 
there is in them that is right and expedient, and also 
in order that it may not be thought that to seek for 
something different from them springs entirely from 
a desire to display ingenuity, but that we may be 
thought to enter upon this inquiry because these 
forms of constitution that already exist are not 
satisfactory. 

2 We must first adopt as a starting-point that which 
is the natural point of departure for this inquiry. 
There are three possible systems of property : either 
all the citizens must own everything in common, or 
they must own nothing in common, or some things 
must be common property and others not. To have 
nothing in common is clearly impossible ; for the 
state is essentially a form of community, and it must 
at any rate have a common locality : a single city 
occupies a single site, and the single city belongs 
to its citizens in common. But is it better for a citv 

69 



ARISTOTLE 

1261 a 

ενδέχεται κοινωνησαι πάντων βέλτιον κοινωνεΐν την 

μέλλουσαν οίκησεσθαι πάλιν καλώς, η τινών μεν 

τινών δ' ου βέλτιον; ενδέχεται γάρ και τέκνων 

6 και γυναικών και κτημάτων κοινωνεΐν τους πολίτας 

άλλήλοις, ώσπερ έν τη Πολιτεία τη ΥΙλάτωνος• 

εκεί γαρ ο Σωκράτης φησι δεΐν κοινά τά τέκνα 

και τάς γυναίκας ει^αι και τάς κτήσεις, τούτο δη 

πότερον ως νυν οΰτω βέλτιον έχειν, η κατά τον έν 

τη Πολιτεία γεγραμμένον νόμον; 

10 Έχει δε δυσχέρεια? άλλα? τε πολλάς το πάντων 3 
ειι^αι τά? γυναίκας κοινάς, και δι' ην αίτίαν φησι 
δεΐν νενομοθετησθαι τον τρόπον τούτον 6 Σωκράτης 
ου φαίνεται συμβαίνον έκ τών λόγων έτι δε προς 
το τέλος δ φησι τη πόλει δεΐν ύπάρχειν, ως μεν 
εϊρηται νυν, αδύνατον, πώς δέ δει διελεϊν, 1 ουδέν 

15 διώρισταΐ' λέγω δέ το μίαν ειι^αι την πόλιν πάσαν 
ως άριστον οτι μάλιστα, λα^άνει γάρ ταύτην 
ύπόθεσιν 6 Σωκράτης. 

Καίτοι φανερόν έστιν ως προϊούσα και γινομένη 4 
μία μάλλον ουδέ πόλις έσται• πλήθος γάρ τι την 
φύσιν έστιν η πόλις, γινομένη τε μία μάλλον οικία 

20 μεν έκ πόλεως, άνθρωπος δ' έζ οικίας έσται, 
μάλλον γάρ μίαν την οίκίαν της πόλεως φαιημεν 
αν και τον ένα της οικίας• ώστ ει και δυνατός 
τις εΐη τοΰτο δράν, ου ποιητέον, άναιρησει γάρ 
την πόλιν. ου μόνον δ έκ πλειόνων ανθρώπων 
έστιν η πόλις, άλλα και έζ είδει διαφερόντων, ου 
1 ΜδίίΧθεϊν MP 2 : διβλεΐν Γ. 

α On the following criticisms see Grote, Plato, iii. pp. 
21 1-223. 

» (1) §§ 3-7 ; (2) § 8-c. ii. § 11 ; (3) c. ii. §§ 11 mid.-13; 
also (4) other objections c. ii. §§ 15-16. 

70 



;; 



POLITICS, Π. ι. 2τΛ 

that is to be well ordered to have community in every- 
thing which can possibly be made common property, 
or is it better to have some things in common and 
others not ? For example, it is possible for the citizens Plato's 
to have children, wives and possessions in common with monistic 
each other, as in Plato's Republic, in which Socrates Republic, 
says that there must be community of children, women 
and possessions. Well then, which is preferable, the 
system that now obtains, or one conforming with 
the regulation described in The Republic a ? 

3 Now for all the citizens to have their wives in 
common involves a variety of difficulties ; in par- 
ticular, 6 (1) the object which Socrates advances as 
the reason why this enactment should be made 
clearly does not follow from his arguments ; also 
(2) as a means to the end which he asserts should be 
the fundamental object of the city, the scheme as 
actually set forth in the dialogue is not practicable ; 
yet (3) how it is to be further worked out has been 
nowhere definitely stated. I refer to the ideal of 
the fullest possible unity of the entire state, which 
Socrates takes as his fundamental principle. 

4 Yet it is clear that if the process of unification n) Unity of 
advances beyond a certain point, the city will not f^^bie' 
be a city at all ; for a state essentially consists because 
of a multitude of persons, and if its unification is plurality is 
carried beyond a certain point, city will be reduced essential, 
to family and family to individual, for we should 
pronounce the family to be a more complete unity 

than the city, and the single person than the family ; 
so that even if any lawgiver were able to unify the 
state, he must not do so, for he will destroy it in the 
process. And not only does a city consist of a multi- 
tude of human beings, it consists of human beings 

71 



ARISTOTLE 

γάρ yiverai πόλις εζ ομοίων, έτερον γαρ συμ- 
25 μαχία καΐ πόλις' το μεν γαρ τω ποσω χρήσιμον, 
καν η τ ο αυτό τω εί'δει {βοηθείας γαρ χάριν ή 
συαααχια πεφυκεν), ώσπερ αν ει σταθμός πλεΐον 
ελκύσειε, 1 εζ 2 ών δε δει ev γζνέΌθαί εΐδει δει 
διαφερειν 3 (διοίσει δε τω τοιουτω καΐ πόλις έθνους 
80 όταν μη κατά κώμας ώσι κεχωριρισμενοι τό πλήθος 5 
άλλ' οίον Άρκάδες). διόπερ τό 'ίσον* τό άντι- 
πεπονθός σώζει τάς πόλεις, ώσπερ εν τοις 'Ή,θικοΐς 
εΐρηται πρότερον. επει και εν τοις ελευθεροις και 
ΐσοις ανάγκη τούτ είναι• άμα γάρ ούχ οΐόν τε 
πάντας άρχειν, αλλ' ή κατ' ενιαυτον ή κατά τίνα 
85 άλλην τάζιν ή χρόνον και συμβαίνει δη τον τρόπον 
τούτον ώστε πάντας άρχειν, ώσπερ αν ει μετεβαλ- 
λον οι σκυτεΐς και οι τεκτονες και μη οι αύτοι άει 
σκυτοτόμοι και τεκτονες ήσαν. επει δε βελτιον 
οΰτως ^χειν και τά περί την κοινωνίαν την πολι- 6 
τικήν, δήλον ώς τους αυτούς άει βελτιον άρχειν, ει 
1261b δυνατόν εν οΐς δε μή δυνατόν δια τό την φύσιν Ίσους 
εΐναι πάντας, άμα δε 5 και δίκαιον, είτ aya^ov είτε 
φαύλον τό άρχειν, πάντας αυτού μετεχειν, τούτο 
δε μιμείται τό εν μέρει τους 'ίσους ε'ικειν το αν- 
όμοιους 6 είναι εζ αρχής• οι μεν γάρ άρχουσιν οι δ' 

1 ελκύσειε Coraes : ελκύσει, έλκύσγι codd. 

2 (ξ — διαφερειν infra post Άρκάδες codd. : tr. ed. 

3 εΐδει δε'ι διαφερειν Buecheler: εΐδει διαφέρει codd. (δια- 
φερειν Μ). 

* [τό ίσον] ?(cf. Ν.Ε. 1132b 33) ed. 

6 δη Susemihl. 

8 τό ανόμοιους Susemihl : τό δ' ώς όμοιους, όμοιους τοις, ομοίως 
τοις codd. Locum desperatissimum rescripsit Richards 
μιμείται τό iv μέρει άρχειν τό μη ίσους καΐ ομοίους είναι έξ 
άρχης. 

72 



POLITICS, II. ι. 4-6 
differing in kind. A collection of persons all alike classes are 

, ° . τ-. * . , ,1 necessary, 

does not constitute a state, ror a city is not the 
same thing as a league ; a league is of value by its 
quantity, even though it is all the same in kind (since 
the essential object of the league is military strength), 
just as a weight would be worth more if it weighed 
more, whereas ° components which are to make up a 

δ unity must differ in kind (and it is by this character 
istic that a city will also surpass a tribe of which 
the population is not scattered among villages but 
organized like the Arcadians). Hence reciprocal 
equality ° is the preservative of states, as has been 
said before in Ethics. For even among the free 
and equal this principle must necessarily obtain, 
since all cannot govern at once : they must hold 
office for a year at a time or by some other arrange- 
ment or period ; and in this manner it does actually 
come about that all govern, just as all shoemakers 
would be also carpenters if the shoemakers and the 
carpenters kept on changing trades instead of the 
same persons being shoemakers and carpenters 

6 always. But since such permanence of function is 
better for the political community also, it is clear 
that it is better for the same persons to govern 
always, if possible ; and among peoples where it is 
impossible because all the citizens are equal in their 
nature, yet at the same time it is only just, whether 
governing is a good thing or a bad, that all should 
partake in it, then for equals thus to submit to 
authority in turn imitates their being originally dis- 
similar c ; for some govern and others are governed 

In the mss. of the Greek ' whereas — kind ' comes below 
after ' Arcadian.' b See Additional Note, p. 170. 

c See Additional Note, p. 171. 

D 73 



ARISTOTLE 

1261b v ( 

6 άρχονται πάρα μ€ρος, ωσπερ αν άλλοι γενόμενοι, 
και τον αύτον δη τρόπον αρχόντων έτεροι ετέρας 
αρχουσιν αρχάς, φανερόν τοίνυν εκ τούτων ως 7 
οντε πέφυκε μίαν όντως είναι την πόλιν ώσπερ 
λέγουσί τίνες, και το λεχθέν ως μεγιστον αγαθόν 
εν ται? πόλεσιν οτι τάς πόλεις αναιρεί• καίτοι τό 

ίο γε έκαστου αγαθόν σώζει εκαστον. — εστί δε και 
κατ άλλον τρόπον φανερόν οτι τό λίαν ένοΰν ζη- 
τεΐν την πόλιν ουκ εστίν άμεινον. οικία μεν γαρ 
αύταρκεστερον ενός, πόλις δ' οικίας, και βονλεταί 
γ ηοη τότε efrnt πόλις όταν αυτάρκη συμβαύητ} 
την κοινωνίαν eirat του πλήθους• εΐπερ οΰν αίρε- 
τωτερον το αύταρκεστερον, καΐ τό ήττον εν του 

15 μάλλον αίρετώτερον. 

Αλλά μην ουδ' ει τοΰτο άριστον εστί, τό μίαν 8 
οτι μάλιστ eimi την κοινωνίαν, ούδε τοϋτ άπο- 
οείκνυσθαι φαίνεται κατά τον λόγον ' εάν πάντες 
άμα λεγωσι τό εμόν και τό μη εμόν ' • τοΰτο γάρ 

20 οΐεται ο Σωκράτης σημεΐον efi^ai του την πόλιν 
τελεως είναι μίαν. τό γάρ πάντες οιττόν. εϊ μεν 
οΰν ως έκαστος, τάχ αν εϊη μάλλον ο βούλεται 
ποιεΐν ό Σωκράτης (έκαστος γάρ υίόν εαυτού φήσει 
τον αυτόν και γυναίκα δη την αυτήν, και περί της 
ουσίας και περί εκάστου δη των συμβαινόντων 

25 ωσαύτως)• νυν δ' ούχ ούτω φήσουσιν οι κοιναΐς g 
χρώμενοι ταΐς ywat^t και τοις τέκνοις, άλλα 7τάι^- 
τες μεν, ούχ ως έκαστος δ' αυτών, ομοίως δε και 

° The reference is to Plato, Republic 462 c. Unity is 
secured when everyone thinks that everything belongs 
equally to him and to everybody else, i.e. everything is 
common property. 

74 






POLITICS, II. ι. 6-9 

bv turn, as though becoming other persons ; and also 
when they hold office in the same way different persons 

7 hold different offices. It is clear then from these 
considerations that it is not an outcome of nature 
for the state to be a unity in the manner in which 
certain persons say that it is, and that what has 
been said to be the greatest good in states really 
destroys states ; yet surely a thing's particular good 
acts as its preservative. — Another line of considera- and 
tion also shows that to seek to unify the state ex- give in- 
cessively is not beneficial. In point of self-sufficiency dependence. 
the individual is surpassed by the family and the 

family by the state, and in principle a state is fully 
realized only when it comes to pass that the com- 
munity of numbers is self-sufficing ; if therefore the 
more self-sufficing a community is, the more desir- 
able is its condition, then a less degree of unity is 
more desirable than a greater. 

8 Again, even granting that it is best for the com- (2) Unity 

not secured 

munity to be as complete a unity as possible, complete ( a j either 
unity does not seem to be proved bv the formula ' if b - v c ? m " , 

n ΐ • • κ » τ• >» ι ii xt »> i_ nmnism of 

all the citizens say Mine and Not mine at the the family, 
same time,' which Socrates α thinks to be a sign of the 
city's being completely one. ' All ' is an ambiguous 
term. If it means ' each severally,' very likely this because 
would more fully realize the state of things which property 
Socrates wishes to produce (for in that case every «-in be 
citizen will call the same boy his son and also the te y ' 
same woman his wife, and will speak in the same way 
of property and indeed of everything that falls to 

9 his lot) ; but ex hypothesi the citizens, having com- 
munity of women and children, will not call them 
' theirs ' in this sense, but will mean theirs collectively 
and not severally, and similarly they will call property 

75 



ARISTOTLE 

την ουσιαν πάντες μεν, ουχ ως έκαστος 

οτι μεν τοίνυν παραλογισμός τις εστί το λέγειν 

πάντας, φανερόν (το γαρ πάντες και αμφότερα και 

80 περιττά και άρτια 8ιά το διττόν και εν τοις λόγοις 
εριστικούς ποιεί συλλογισμούς)• διό εστί το πάν- 
τας το αυτό λέγειν ώδι μεν καλόν αλλ' ου δυνατόν, 
ώδι δ' ουδέν όμονοητικόν. προς δέ τούτοις ετεραν 10 
έχει βλάβην το λεγόμενον . ηκιστα γαρ επιμελείας 
τυγχάνει το πλείστων κοινόν των γαρ ιδίων 

85 μάλιστα φροντίζουσιν, των δέ κοινών ήττον, η όσον 
εκάστω επιβάλλει• προς γαρ τοις άλλοις ως έτερου 
φροντίζοντος όλιγωροΰσι μάλλον, ωσπερ εν ταΐς 
οικετικαΐς διακονίαις οι πολλοί θεράποντες ενίοτε 
χείρον ύπηρετοΰσι των ελαττόνων. γίνονται δ' 11 
εκάστω χίλιοι των πολιτών υιοί, και ούτοι ούχ 
1262 a ως εκάστου άλλα του τυχόντος ο τυχών ομοίως 
εστίν υιός, ώστε πάντες ομοίως όλιγωρήσουσιν. 

Έτι οΰτως έκαστος εμος λέγει τον ευ πράττοντα 
τών πολιτών η κακώς όπόστος τυγχάνει τον αριθ- 
μόν ών, οίον εμός η του δεινός, τούτον τον τρόπον 

δ λέγων καθ* εκαστον τών χιλίων η όσων η πόλις 
εστί, και τούτο διστάζων άδηλον γαρ ω συνέβη 
ye^eff^cu τεκνον και σωέ^αι γενόμενον. καίτοι 12 
πότερον ούτω κρεΐττον το εμόν λέγειν, εκαστον το 






76 






POLITICS, II. ι. 9-12 

' theirs ' meaning the property of them all, not of 
each of them severally. We see then that, the phrase 
' all say ' is equivocal (in fact the words ' all,' ' both,' 
1 odd,' ' even,' owing to their ambiguity, occasion 
argumentative quibbling even in philosophical dis- 
cussions) ; hence really for ' all ' to say the same 
thing is in one sense admirable, although impracti- 
cable, but in another sense is not at all a sign of 

10 concord. And furthermore, the proposal has another common 
disadvantage. Property that is common to the dutie° d 
greatest number of owners receives the least atten- win be 
tion ; men care most for their private possessions, neg ^ 
and for what they own in common less, or only so 

far as it falls to their own individual share ; for in 
addition to the other reasons, they think less of it on 
the ground that someone else is thinking about it, 
just as in household service a large number of 
domestics sometimes give worse attendance than a 

11 smaller number. And it results in each citizen's 
having a thousand sons, and these do not belong to 
them as individuals but any child is equally the son 
of anyone, so that all alike will regard them with 
indifference. 

Again, each speaks of one of his fellow-citizens who 
is prospering or getting on badly as ' my son ' only 
in the sense of the fractional part which he forms 
of the whole number, meaning ' mine or so-and-so's,* 
indicating by ' so-and-so ' each of the thousand citizens 
or whatever the number be of which the state consists, 
and even this dubiously, for it is uncertain who has 
chanced to have had a son born to him and when born 

12 safely reared. Yet which is the better way to use the 
word ' mine ' — this way, each of two thousand or ten 

77 



ARISTOTLE 

1262 a 

αυτό έμόν 1 προσαγορεύοντα 2 δισχιλίων και μυρίων, 

η μάλλον ως νυν iv ταΐς πόλεσι το έμόν λέγουσιν ; 

ίο ο μεν γαρ υίόν αύτοΰ ο δ' άδελφόν αύτοΰ προσ- 
αγορεύει τον αυτόν, ο δ' άνεφιόν η κατ άλλην τινά 
συγγένειαν η προς αίματος η κατ οικειότητα και 
κηδείαν αύτοΰ πρώτον η των αύτοΰ, προς δε τούτοις 
έτερος 3 φράτορα η φυλέτην. κρεΐττον γαρ ίδιον 
άνεφιόν etvai η τον τρόπον τοΰτον υίόν. ου μην 13 

ι 5 αλλ' ουδέ διαφυγεΐν δυνατόν το μη τίνα? ύπολαμ- 
βάνειν εαυτών αδελφούς τε και 7ταΓδα? και πατέρας 
και μητέρας • κατά γαρ τάς ομοιότητας αΐ γίνονται 
τοις τέκνοις προς τους γεννησαντας άναγκαΐον λαμ- 
βάνειν περί αλλήλων τάς πίστεις, όπερ φασι και 
συμβαίνειν τινε? των τάς της γης περιόδους πραγ- 

20 ματευομένων eimi γάρ τισι των άνω Α,ιβύων 
κοινάς τάς γυναίκας, τά μεντοι γινόμενα* τέκνα 
διαιρεισ^αχ κατά τάς ομοιότητας, είσι δέ τίνες 
και γυναίκες και των άλλων ζώων, οίον ίπποι και 
βόες, at σφόδρα πεφύκασιν όμοια αποδιδόναι τά 
τέκνα τοις γονεΰσιν, ώσπερ η εν Φαρσάλω κληθεΐσα 
Δι /caia ίππος. 

2δ "Ετι δε και τάς τοιαύτας δυσχέρειας ου ράδιον 14 
εύλαβηθηναι τοις ταύτην κατασκευάζουσι την 
κοινωνίαν, οίον αίκίας και φόνους ακουσίους , τους 
δέ εκουσίους, και μάχας και λοιδορίας• ων ουδέν 
δσιόν έστι yiWa^ai προς πατέρας και μητέρας καΐ 

1 έμόν Bornemann : Ονομα Bonitz, μεν codd. 

2 Bernays : -ovras codd. 

8 Zrepos Lindau : 'έτερον codd. 

4 -γινόμενα (cf. infra b 25) Richards : -γενόμενα codd. 

78 









POLITICS, Π. ι. 12-14 

thousand people applying it to the same thing, 
or rather the way in which they say ' mine ' in the 
actual states now ? for the same person is called 
' mv son ' by one man and ' my brother ' by another, 
and another calls him ' nephew,' or by some other 
relationship, whether of blood or by affinity and 
marriage, the speaker's own in the first place, or that 
of his relations ; and in addition someone else calls 
him ' fellow-clansman ' or ' fellow-tribesman.' For 
it is better for a boy to be one's own private nephew 
13 than one's son in the way described. Moreover it family 
would also be impossible to avoid men's supposing w jh betray 
certain persons to be their real brothers and sons and parentage, 
fathers and mothers ; for they would be bound to 
form their belief about each other by the resemblances 
which occur between children and parents. This 
indeed is said by some of those who write of travels 
round the world α actually to occur; they say that 
some of the people of Upper Libya have their wives 
in common, yet the children born are divided among 
them according to their personal resemblances. And 
there are some females both of the human race and 
of the other animals, for instance horses and cattle, 
who have a strong natural tendency to produce off- 
spring resembling the male parents, as was the case 
with the mare at Pharsalus named Honest Lady. & 
14 Moreover it is not easy for those who institute assaults 
this communism to guard against such objectionable wufowur; 
occurrences as outrage, involuntary and in some 
cases voluntary homicide, fights, abusive language ; 
all of which are violations of piety when committed 

° Books of geography, founded on travellers' reports — a 
famous one by Hecataeus, scoffed at by Herodotus, iv. 36. 
* Or possibly ' Docile ' (Jackson), cf. Xen. Cyneget. 7. 4. 

79 



ARISTOTLE 

1262a , . . , * , - 

του? μ?) πόρρω της συγγένειας οντάς ωσπερ προς 

30 τους άπωθεν αλλά και πλεΐον συμβαίνειν άναγ- 
καΐον άγνοούντων η γνωριζόντων, και γενομένων 
των μεν γνωριζόντων ενδέχεται τα? νομιζομενας 
γίνβσθαί λύσεις, των δε μηδεμίαν. άτοπον δε και 15 
το κοινούς ποιήσαντα τους υιούς το συνείναι μόνον 
άφελεΐν των ερώντων, το δ' εράν μη κωλΰσαι, 

85 μηδέ τάς χρήσεις τάς άλλας, ας πατρι προς υιόν 
είναι πάντων εστίν άπρεπεστατον και άδελφώ προς 
άδελφόν, επει και το εράν μόνον, άτοπον δε και 
το την συνουσίαν άφελεΐν δι' αλλτ^ν μεν αιτίαν 
μηδεμίαν, ως λίαν δ' ίσχυράς της ηδονής γινο- 
μένης• οτι δ' ό μεν πατήρ η υιός ol ο* αδελφοί 
αλλήλων, μηθεν οΐεσθαι διαφερειν. εοικε δε μάλλον 

40 τοις γεωργοΐς είναι χρησιμον το κοινάς είναι τάς 
1262 b γυναίκας και τους παιδα? η τοις φύλαζιν ήττον 
γάρ εσται φιλία κοινών όντων των τέκνων και των 
γυναικών, δει δε τοιούτους είναι τους αρχόμενους 
προς το πειθαρχεΐν και μη νεωτερίζειν. όλως δε 16 
συμβαίνειν ανάγκη τουναντίον δια τον τοιούτον 
5 νόμον ων προσήκει τους ορθώς κείμενους νόμους 
αιτίους γίνεσθαι, και δι ην αιτίαν ό Σωκράτης 
ούτως οΐεται δεΐν τάττειν τα περί τά τέκνα και 
τάς γυναίκας, φιλίαν τε 1 γάρ οίόμεθα μεγιστον 
είναι τών aya^cDv ταΐς πόλεσιν (ούτω γάρ αν ήκιστα 
στασιάζοιεν) , και το μίαν είναι την πόλιν ε'παινεΐ 

χο μάλισθ* ό Σωκράτης, ο και δοκεΐ κάκεΐνος εΐναί 
1 re om. MP, quidem (? ye) Guil. 
80 



POLITICS, II. ι. 14-16 

against fathers, mothers and near relatives as if they 
were not relatives ; but these are bound to occur more 
frequently when people do not know their relations 
than when they do, and also, when they do occur, 
if the offenders know their relationship it is possible 
for them to have the customary expiations performed, 
but for those who do not no expiation is possible. 

15 Also it is curious that a theorist who makes the sons risk of 
common property only debars lovers from intercourse in ' 
and does not prohibit love, nor the other familiar- 
ities, which between father and son or brother 

and brother are most unseemly, since even the fact 
of love between them is unseemly. And it is also 
strange that he deprives them of intercourse for no 
other reason except because the pleasure is too 
violent ; and that he thinks it makes no difference 
that the parties are in the one case father or son 
and in the other case brothers of one another. And m unUsm m " 
it seems more serviceable for the Farmers to have might be 
this community of wives and sons than the Guardians ; "he Farmer 
for there will be less friendship among them if class ) 
their children and women are in common, and 
unfriendliness in the subject classes is a good thing 
with a view to their being submissive to authority 

16 and not making revolution. But speaking generally bond of 

affection 

such a law is bound to bring about the opposite weakened ; 
state of things to that which rightly enacted 
laws ought properly to cause, and because of which 
Socrates thinks it necessary to make these regulations 
about the children and women. For we think that 
friendship is the greatest of blessings for the state, 
since it is the best safeguard against revolution, and 
the unity of the state, which Socrates praises most 
highly, both appears to be and is said by him to be 

81 



ARISTOTLE 

12 b 

φησι της φιλίας έργον, καθάπερ εν τοις έρωτικοΐς 
λόγοις ϊσμεν λέγοντα τον Άριστοφάνην ώς των 
έρώντων δια το σφόδρα φιλ€Ϊν επιθυμούντων συμ- 
φΰναι 1 καΐ yeveadai εκ δυο όντων αμφότερους ever 
ενταύθα μεν ουν ανάγκη αμφότερους εφθάρθαι η 17 

16 τον eva, iv δε τη πόλ€ΐ την φιλίαν άναγκαΐον 
υδαρή yiveodai δια την κοινωνίαν την τοιαύτην, 
και ηκιστα λέγειν 2 τον έμόν η υίόν πατέρα η 
πατέρα υίόν. ώσπερ γαρ μικρόν γλυκύ εις πολύ 
ϋδωρ μιχθέν άναίσθητον ποιεί την κράσιν, ούτω 
συμβαίνει και 3 την οικειότητα την προς αλλήλους 

«0 την από των ονομάτων τούτων, διαφροντίζειν 
ηκιστα άναγκαΐον ον εν τη πολιτεία, τη τοιαύτη η 
πατέρα ώς υιών η υίόν ώς πατρός η ώς αδελφούς 
αλλήλων, δύο γάρ έστιν α μάλιστα ποιεί κήδεσθαι 
τους ανθρώπους και φιλεΐν, τό τε ίδιον και το 
άγαπητόν , ων ούδέτερον οΐόν τε ύπαρχειν τοις ούτω 

25 πολιτευομένοις . άλλα μην και περί του μεταφέρειν 18 
τά yivo/ieva τέκνα τα μεν εκ τών γεωργών και 
τεχνιτών εις τους φύλακας τά δ' εκ τούτων εις 
εκείνους, πολλήν έχει ταραχην τίνα εσται τρόπον 
και* γινώσκειν άναγκαΐον τους δίδοντας και μετα- 
φέροντας τίσι τίνας διδόασιν. έτι δε και τα πάλαι 

ΒΟ λεχθέντα μάλλον επί τούτων άναγκαΐον συμβαίνειν, 
οίον αίκίας έρωτας φόνους' ου γαρ ετι προσ- 
αγορεύσουσιν 6 αδελφούς και τέκνα και πατέρας 

1 σνμφυηραι ΜΡΗ. 

* διώκειν Η : an δη οίκεωΰν pro λέ-γΐΐν τόν έμύν ? Immisch. 

8 κατά Lambinus, καΐ κατά Bernays. 

* και <γάρ> Bernays. 

Β π ροσ ay ο ρεύσονο ιν Coraes : -εύουσιν codd. 

" The comic poet, figuring as a character in Plato's 
Symposium, see especially 192 c ff. 

82 



POLITICS, II. ι. 16-18 

the effect of friendship, just as we know that Aristo- 
phanes ° in the discourses on love describes how the 
lovers owing to their extreme affection desire to 
grow together and both become one instead of being 

17 two. In such a union both personalities, or at least 
one, would be bound to be obliterated ; and in the 
state friendship would inevitably become diluted 
in consequence of such association, and the expres- 
sions ' my father ' and ' my son ' would quite go out. 
For just as putting a little sugar into a quantity of 
water makes the mixture imperceptible, so it also 
must come about that the mutual relationship based 
on these names must become imperceptible, since 
in the republic described by Plato there will be the 
least possible necessity for people to care for one 
another as father for sons or as son for father or as 
brother for brother. For there are two motives that 
most cause men to care for things and be fond of them, 
the sense of ownership and the sense of preciousness ; 
and neither motive can be present with the citizens 

18 of a state so constituted. Again, as to the trans- reciassing 
ference of some of the children at birth from the 2L^« im 

infants lm- 

r armers and Artisans to the Guardians b and of others practicable, 

from the Guardians to the Farmers and Artisans, 

there is much confusion as to how it is to be done ; 

and the parents who give the children and the officials 

who transfer them are bound to know which they 

give to whom. And again, the things spoken of and would 

above are bound to occur even more with these un^amrai 

transferred children, such as outrage, love-making crime. 

and murder ; for the children of the Guardians 

transferred to the other citizens will no longer speak 

* The three classes in Plato's Republic. 

83 



ARISTOTLE 

και μητέρας όΐ τε εις τους άλλους πολίτας δοθέντες 
τους φύλακας 1 και πάλιν οί παρά τοις φύλαζιν τους 2 
άλλους πολίτας, ώστ €ΐ)λα/?€ίσ#αι των τοιούτων 

35 τι πράττειν δια την συγγένειαν. 

Τίερι μεν οΰν της περί τά τέκνα και τάς γυναίκας 
κοινωνίας διωρίσθω τον τρόπον τούτον. 

II. 'Έιχόμενον δε τούτων εστίν έπισκέφασθαι 1 
περί της κτήσεως, τίνα τρόπον δει κατασκευα- 
ζεσ0αι τοις μέλλουσι πολιτεύεσθαι την άρίστην 

40 πολιτείαν, πότερον κοινην η μη κοινην είναι την 
κτησιν. τούτο δ' αν τις κα\ χωρίς σκέφαιτο από 
των περί τά τέκνα και τάς γυναίκας νενομοθετη- 
1263 a μένων λέγω [δε τά περί την κτησιν] 3 πότερον, 
καν η εκείνα χωρίς καθ' ον νυν τρόπον έχει πάσι, 
τάς τε κτήσεις κοινάς είναι βέλτιον και τάς 
χρήσεις . . .,* οίον τά μεν γήπεδα χωρίς τους δε 
καρπούς εις το κοινόν φέροντας άναλίσκειν (όπερ 
5 eVia ποιεί των εθνών), η τουναντίον την μεν γην 
κοινην είναι και γεωργεΐν κοινή, τους δε καρπούς 
διαιρεϊσθαι προς τάς Ιδίας χρήσεις (λέγονται δέ 
τιΐ'ε? και τούτον τον τρόπον κοινωνεΐν των βαρ- 
βάρων), η και τά γήπεδα και τους καρπούς κοινούς, 
ετέρων μεν ουν όντων των γεωργούντων άλλος αν 2 

ίο εΐη τρόπος και ράων, αυτών δ' αύτοΐς διαπονούν- 
των τά περί τάς κτήσεις πλείους αν παρέχοι 
δυσκολίας' και γάρ εν ταΐς άπολαύσεσι και εν τοις 
έργοις μη γινομένων 'ίσων άναγκαΐον εγκλήματα 

1 τους φύλακας hie Guil. : ante οί re codd. (om. MP). 

2 τούϊΓΜΡ: eis tovs cet. 

3 Susemihl. * lacunam Busse. 

Something has clearly been lost here, signifying 'or 
should there be some limited form of communism? ' 

84 



POLITICS, Π. ι. 18— π. 2 

of the Guardians as brothers and children and fathers 
and mothers, nor yet will those living among the 
Guardians so speak of the other classes, so as to be 
careful not to commit any such offence because of 
their relationship. 

Such therefore may be our decision as to com- 
munity of children and women. 

1 II. In connexion with this we have to consider the 0>) nor is 
due regulation of property in a community that secure.) 

is to have the best political institutions: should ^ u ^' of 
propertv be owned in common or privately ? This propeity: 
question might indeed be considered separately from formsot 
the system laid down by law with regard to the tllis - 
children and the women : I mean, even if there be 
separate families as is now the case with all nations, is 
it better for both the ownership and the employment 
of property to be in common . . .," for example, 
should the farms be separate property but the farm- 
produce be brought into the common stock for con- 
sumption (as is the practice with some non-Greek 
races) ; or on the contrary should the land be common 
and farmed in common, but the produce be divided 
for private use (and this form of communism also is 
said to prevail among some of the barbarians) ; or 
should both farms and produce be common property ? 

2 Now if the tillers of the soil be of a different class b 
it would work differently and be easier, but if the 
citizens do the work for themselves, the regulations 
for the common ownership of property would give 

more causes for discontent ; for if both in the enjoy- Under-work 
ment of the produce and in the work of production consume 
they prove not equal but unequal, complaints are *">»»• 

1 As in Plato's Republic, or like the Helots at Sparta. 

85 



ARISTOTLE 

*263a , , , , _ 

γινεσσαι προς τους απολαύοντας μεν η λαμ- 
βάνοντας 7τολλά ολίγα δέ πονονντας τοΐς ελάττω 

15 μεν λαμβάνουσι πλείω δέ πονοΰσιν. όλως δέ το 3 
συζην καί κοινωνεΐν των άνθρωπικών πάντων 
χαλεπόν, καϊ μάλιστα των τοιούτων, δηλοΰσι δ 
at των συναποδήμων κοινωνίαι, σχεδόν γαρ οι 
πλείστοι διαφέρονται 1 εκ των εν ποσι και εκ 
μικρών προσκρούοντες άλλήλοις' έτι δε των θερα- 

2ο πόντων τούτοις μάλιστα προσκρούομεν οΐς πλείστα 
προσχρώμεθα προς τάς διακονίας τάς εγκυκλίους, 
το μεν οΰν κοινάς είναι τάς κτήσεις ταύτας τε και 4 
άλλα? τοιαύτας έχει δυσχέρειας, ον δε νυν τρόπον 
έχει καϊ 1 έπικοσμηθέν ήθεσι και τάζει νόμων ορθών 
ου μικρόν αν διενεγκαι• εζει γαρ το εζ αμφοτέρων 

25 aya#oV, λέγω δε το εξ αμφοτέρων το εκ του 
κοινάς etvat τάς κτήσεις και το εκ του ίδια?• δει 
γάρ πώς μεν είναι κοινάς, όλως δ ίδια?, at μεν 
γαρ eVi/xAeiat διηρημέναι τά εγκλήματα προς 
αλλήλους ου ποιήσουσιν, μάλλον δ' 3 έπιδώσουσιν 
ως προς ϊδιον εκάστου προσεδρεύοντος' δι αρετην 

80 δ' έσται προς το χρήσθαι κατά την παροιμιαν 
κοινά τά φίλων, εστί δέ και νυν τον τρόπον τούτον 5 
εν ei^tats" πόλεσιν ούτως ύπογεγραμμένον ως ουκ 
ον αδύνατον, και μάλιστα εν ταΐς καλώς οικου- 
ueWis• τά μεν εστί τά δε γένοιτ αν ιδίαν γαρ 
έκαστος την κτησιν έχων τά μεν χρήσιμα ποιεί 

85 τοΐς φίλοις τοΐς δέ χρήται κοινοΐς,* οίον και εν 

1 διαφέρονται Coraes : διαφ€ρόμΐνοι codd. 

2 καϊ om. ΓΜΡΉ. 

3 re ? Susemihl. 

* κοινοί* cum 36 ίδιου transponendum ? Richards. 

° The saying was ascribed to Pythagoras. 
86 



POLITICS, II. ιι. 2-5 

bound to arise between those who enjoy or take 
much but work little and those who take less but 

3 work more. And in general to live together and 
share all our human affairs is difficult, and especi- 
ally to share such things as these. And this is shown 
in the partnerships of fellow-travellers, for it may 
be said that most of them quarrel because thay 
come into collision with one another as a result 
of ordinary matters and trifles ; and also we come 
into collision most with those of our servants whom 
we employ most often for ordinary attendance. 

4 Community of property therefore involves these 

and other similar difficulties ; and the present system, Private 
if further improved by good morals and by the and^nendiy 
regulation of correct legislation, would be greatly ίη *^£]^ β 
superior. For it will possess the merit of both 
systems, by which I mean the advantage of property 
being common and the advantage of its being private. 
For property ought to be common in a sense but 
private speaking generally. For the superintend- 
ence of properties being divided among the owners 
will not cause these mutual complaints, and will 
improve the more because each will apply himself 
to it as to private business of his own ; while on the 
other hand virtue will result in making ' friends' 
goods common goods,' as the proverb a goes, for the 
6 purpose of use. Such a system exists even now 
in outline in some states, so it is not deemed im- 
practicable, and especially in the ones that are well- 
administered parts of it are realized already and 
parts might be realized ; for individuals while owning 
their property privately put their own possessions 
at the service of their friends and make use of their 
friends' possessions as common property ; for in- 

87 



ARISTOTLE 

Αακεδαίμονι τοΐς τε δούλοις χρώνται τοΐς αλλήλων 
ώς ειπείν ίδιοι?, ετι δ Ιπποις και κυσίν, καν 
δεηθώσιν εφοδίων iv τοΐς άγροΐς 1 κατά την χώραν. 2 
<f>avepov τοίνυν οτί βελτιον eirai μεν ιδίας τάς 
κτήσεις τη δε χρήσει ποιεΐν κοινάς• όπως δε 

40 γίνωνται τοιούτοι, του νομοθέτου τοϋτ έργον 
ϊδιόν εστίν, ετι δε και προς ήδονην άμύθητον 6 
όσον διαφέρει το νομίζειν ΐδιόν τι• μη γαρ ου 
1263 b μάτην την προς αυτόν αύτος έχει φιλίαν έκαστος 
αλλ' εστί τούτο φυσικόν. το δε φίλαυτον eimi 
φεγεται δικαίως• ουκ εστί δε τοΰτο το φιλεΐν 
εαυτόν άλλα το μάλλον ή δει φιλεΐν, καθάπερ και 
τον φιλοχρήματον, επει φιλοΰσί γε πάντες ώς 
6 ειπείν εκαστον των τοιούτων, αλλά μην και το 
χαρίσασθαι και βοηθήσαι φίλοις ή ζενοις ή εταίροις 
ήδιστον δ γίνεται της κτήσεως ίδια? οϋσης. 
ταύτα τε δη ου συμβαίνει τοΐς λίαν εν ποιοΰσι την η 
πάλιν, και προς τούτοις άναιροΰσιν έργα δυοΐν 
άρεταΐν φανερώς, σωφροσύνης μεν το περί τάς 

ίο γυναίκας (έργον γάρ καλόν αλλότριας οϋσης άπ- 
ε^βσσαι δια σωφροσύνην), ελευθεριότητας δε το 

^ περί τάς κτήσεις (ούτε γάρ εσται φανερός ελευ- 
θέριος ων ούτε πράξει πράξιν ελευθεριον ούδεμίαν 
εν γάρ τη χρήσει τών κτημάτων το της ελευθεριότη- 
τος έργον εστίν). 

15 Ευπρόσωπος μεν ούν ή τοιαύτη νομοθεσία, και 8 
φιλάνθρωπος αν είναι δόξειεν 6 γαρ άκροώμενος 
άσμενος αποδέχεται, νομίζων εσεσ^αι φιλίαν τινά 
θαυμαστήν πάσι προς απαντάς, άλλως τε και όταν 

1 reus aypaU Busse. ' θήραν Buecheler. 

88 



POLITICS, II. π. 5-8 

stance in Sparta people use one another's slaves as 
virtually their own, as well as horses and hounds, 
and also use the produce in the fields throughout the 
country if they need provisions on a journey. It 
is clear therefore that it is better for possessions to 
be privately owned, but to make them common 
property in use ; and to train the citizens to this is 
6 the special task of the legislator. And moreover 
to feel that a thing is one's private property makes 
an inexpressibly great diiference in one's pleasure ; 
for the universal feeling of love for oneself is surely 
not purposeless, but a natural instinct. Selfishness 
on the other hand is justly blamed ; but this is 
not to love oneself but to love oneself more than one 
ought, just as covetousness means loving money to 
excess — since some love of self, money and so on is 
practically universal. Moreover, to bestow favours 
and assistance on friends or visitors or comrades is 
a great pleasure, and a condition of this is the private 
7 ownership of property. These advantages therefore («) Com- 
do not come to those who carry the unification of the wouid'de- 
state too far ; and in addition to this they manifestly str °y tem- 
do away with the practice of two virtues, temperance liberality" 
in relation to women (for it is a noble deed to refrain ^.p ? ot 
from one through temperance when she belongs to and 



another) and liberality in relation to possessions (for 
one will not be able to show one's liberality nor per- 
form a single liberal action, since the active exercise 
of liberality takes place in the use of possessions). 

Such legislation therefore has an attractive appear- 
ance, and might be thought to be humane ; for he 
who is told about it welcomes it with gladness, 
thinking that it will result in a marvellous friendliness 
of everybody towards everybody, especially when 

8P 



covetous• 
De.se. 



ARISTOTLE 

1263 b 

κατηγορη τις τών νυν υπαρχόντων εν ταΐς ττολι- 

20 τείαις κακών ώς γινομένων διά το μή κοινην είναι 
την ούσίαν, λέγω δε $ίκας τε προς αλλήλους περί 
συμβολαίων και ψευδομαρτυριών κρίσεις και 
πλουσίων κολακείας, ων ουδέν y /νεται δια την 9 
άκοινωνησίαν αλλά δια την μοχθηρίαν, επει και 
τους κοινά κεκτημένους και κοινωνοΰντας πολλώ 

25 οιαφερομένους μάλλον όρώμεν η τους χωρίς τας 
ουσία? έχοντας' αλλά θεωροΰμεν ολίγους τους εκ 
τών κοινωνιών οΊαφερο μένους προς πολλούς συμ- 
βάλλοντες τους κεκτημένους ίδια τάς κτήσεις, 
ετι δε δίκαιον μη μόνον λέγειν δσων στερήσονται 
κακών κοινωνήσαντες , αλλά και όσων ayafltDv 
φαίνεται δ' είναι πάμπαν αδύνατο? ό βίος. 

30 Αίτιον δε τω Έωκράτει της παρακρούσεως χρη 
νομίζειν την ύπόθεσιν ουκ ουσαν όρθήν. δει μεν 
γάρ είναι πως μίαν και την οίκίαν και την πάλιν, 
άλλ' ου πάντως, έστι μεν γάρ ώς ουκ εσται 
προϊούσα πόλις, εστί δ' ώς εσται μέν, εγγύς δ' 
ούσα του μή πόλις είναι 1 χειρών πόλις, ώσπερ καν 
6 ει τις την συμφωνίαν ποιήσειεν όμοφωνίαν η τον 
ρυθμον βάσιν μίαν. άλλα δει πλήθος 6ν, ώσπερ 10 
εΐρηται πρότερον, διά την παιδείαν 2 κοινην και 
μίαν ποιειν και τόν γε μέλλοντα παιδείαν είσά^ειν, 
και νομίζοντα διά ταύτης εσεσ^αι την πόλιν σπου- 
οαίαν, άτοπον τοις τοιοΰτοις οΐεσθαι Βιορθοΰν* 

40 αλλά μή τοις έθεσι και τη φιλοσοφία και τοις 

νόμοις, ώσπερ τά περί τάς κτήσεις εν Αακεοαίμονι 

1 efrcu <&rrcu> Victorius. 
■ τψ iraideias (cf. 38) ? Richards. 
8 <δ«><> δίορθονν ? Richards. 

90 












POLITICS, II. ιι. 8-10 

somebody denounces the evils at present existing in 
states as due to the fact that wealth is not owned in 
common — I mean lawsuits between citizens about 
breach of contract, and trials for perjury, and the 

β flattery of the rich. But the real cause of all these 
evils is not the absence of communism, but wicked- 
ness, since we see far more quarrels occurring among 
those who own or use property in common than among 
those who have their estates separate ; but we 
notice that those who quarrel as a result of their 
partnerships are few when compared with the total 
number of private owners. And again it is just 
to state not only all the evils that men will lose by 
adopting communism, but also all the good things ; 
and life in such circumstances is seen to be utterly 
impossible. 

The cause of Socrates' error must be deemed to (d) General 
be that his fundamental assumption was incorrect. no tfi : . 
It is certain that in a way both the household and formed by 
the state should be a unit," but they should not be so ^^ 
in every way. For in one way the state as its unifica- ^ never 
tion proceeds will cease to be a state, and in another tried, 
way, though it continues a state, yet by coming near 
to ceasing to be one it will be a worse state, just as if 
one turned a harmony into unison or a rhythm into a 

10 single foot. The proper thing is for the state, while 
being a multitude, to be made a partnership and a 
unity by means of education, as has been said before ; i26iaie. 
and it is strange that the very philosopher who intends 
to introduce a system of education and thinks that 
this will make the city morally good should fancy 
that he can regulate society by such measures as 
have been mentioned instead of by manners and 
culture and laws, just as the legislator introduced 

91 



ARISTOTLE 

1264 a και Κρήτη τοΐς συσσιτίοις 6 νομοθέτης εκοίνωσεν. 
δει δέ μηδέ τούτο αυτό 1 άγνοεΐν, δτι χρή προσέχειν 
τω πολλοί χρόνω και τοΐς πολλοίς ετεσιν* εν οΐς 
ουκ αν έλαθεν ει ταύτα, καλώς ειχεν πάντα γαρ 
σχεδόν εύρηται μεν, άλλα τα μεν ου συνήκται τοΐς 

δ δ ου χρώνται γινώσκοντες. μάλιστα δ αν γένοιτο 11 
φανερον €ΐ τις τοΐς εργοις Γδοι την τοιαύτην πολι- 
τείαν κατασκευαζομενην ου γαρ δυνήσεται μη 
μερίζων αυτά και χωρίζων ποιησαι την πάλιν, τα 
μεν εις συσσίτια τά δε εις φρατρίας και φυλάς. 
ώστε ουδέν άλλο συμβήσεται νενομοθετημένον πλην 

ίο μη γεωργεΐν τους φύλακας' όπερ και νυν Λακεδαι- 
μόνιοι ποιεΐν έπιχειροϋσιν. 

Ου μην αλλ' ουδέ ο τρόπος της δλης πολιτείας 
τις εσται τοΐς κοινωνοΰσιν ούτ εΐρηκεν ο Σωκράτης 
ούτε ράοιον ειπείν, καίτοι σχεδόν τό γε πλήθος 3 
της πόλεως τό των άλλων πολιτών γίνεται πλήθος, 

15 ττερι ων ουδέν διώρισται, πότερον και τοΐς γεωργοΐς 
κοινάς είναι δει τάς κτήσεις η και* καθ' έκαστον 
ίδια?, έτι δέ και γυναίκας και παιδα? ιδίους η 
κοινούς, ει μεν γαρ τον αύτον τρόπον κοινά πάντα 12 
πάντων, τ'ι διοίσουσιν ούτοι εκείνων τών φυλά- 
κων; η τί πλεΐον αύτοΐς 6 ύπομενουσι την αρχήν 

20 αυτών; ή τί αα^οντε? ύπομενουσι την αρχήν, εάν 

1 αυτόν ? Richards. * Ιθεσιν Αγ., ίθνεσιν Bernays. 

3 πλήρωμα ? Richards. 4 και seel. Susemihl. 

5 Richards : rois codd. (reus Ζχονσι τψ Greenwood). 

92 






POLITICS, II. ιι. 10-12 

community of property in Sparta and Crete by the 
institution of public messes. And this very point 
also must not be ignored, that attention must be paid 
to length of time and to the long period of years, in 
which it would not have escaped notice if these 
measures were good ones ; for nearly all of them 
have been discovered already, although some of 
them have not been collected together and others 
though brought to knowledge are not put into practice. 

11 And their value would become most manifest if one 
could see such a constitution in actual process of 
formation ; for one will only be able to construct 
Plato's state by introducing its partitions and divid- 
ing up the community into common messes and 
also into brotherhoods and tribes. So that in the 
upshot no other regulation will have been enacted 
except the exemption of the Guardians from the 
work of agriculture, which is a measure that even now 
the Spartans attempt to introduce. 

Moreover, the working of the constitution as a (3) Plato's 
whole in regard to the members of the state has also ?J^l n i,„.„ 

. . ο _ _ incomplete. 

not been described by aocrates, nor is it easy to say Doescom- 
what it will be. Yet the general mass of the citizens ^p"y S> 
of the other classes make almost the bulk of the the 
state, and about these no definite regulations are objections 
laid down, as to whether the Farmers also are to eitheT wa y• 
have their property in common or to hold it in private 
ownership, and also whether community of wives and 

12 children is to apply to them or not. For if the Farmers 
are to have the same complete communism, what will 
be the difference between them and the Guardian 
class ? or what advantage will they gain by sub- 
mitting to their government ? or what consideration 
will induce them to submit to the government, unless 

93 



ARISTOTLE 

1264 a 

μη τι σοφίζωνται τοιούτον οίον Κρήτες; εκείνοι 

γάρ ταλλα ταύτα, τοις δούλοις εφεντες μόνον άπ- 

€ψήκασι τά γυμνάσια και την των οπλών κτησιν. 

el δε καθάπερ εν ταΐς αλλαις πόλεσι και παρ' 

εκεινοις εσται τα τοιαύτα, τις ο τρόπος εσται της 

25 κοινωνίας ; iv μια γαρ πόλει 8ΰο πόλεις άναγκαΐον 
είναι, και ταύτας ύπεναντίας άλληλαις. ποιεί γαρ 
τους μεν φύλακας οΐον φρουρούς, τους δε γεωργούς 
και τους 1 τεχνίτας και τους άλλους πολίτας. 
εγκλήματα δε και δι /cat και Οσα άλλα ταΐς πόλεσιν 13 
ύπάρχειν φησϊ κακά πάνθ ύπάρζει και τούτοις. 

so καίτοι λέγει ο Σωκράτης ως ου πολλών δεήσονται 
νομίμων δια την παιδείαν οΐον αστυνομικών και 
αγορανομικών και τών άλλων τών τοιούτων, άπο- 
διδούς μόνον την παιοείαν τοις φύλαζιν. ετι δε 
κυρίους ποιεί τών κτημάτων τους γεωργούς άπο- 
φοράν φέροντας' αλλά πολύ μάλλον εικός είναι 

35 χαλεπούς και φρονημάτων πλήρεις η τάς παρ* 
ενίοις ειλωτείας τε και πενεστείας και δουλείας, 
άλλα γαρ ε'ίτ αναγκαία ταΰθ* ομοίως είτε μη, νυν 14 
γ 1 ούδεν διώρισται, και περί τών εχομενων, τις η 
τούτων τε πολιτεία και παιδεία και νόμοι τίνες, 
εστί δ' ούθ' εύρεΐν ράδιον, ούτε το διαφερον μικρόν, 

40 το ποιους τινας είναι 2 τούτους προς το σωζεσ^αι 

1264 b την τών φυλάκων κοινωνίαν. άλλα μην ει γε τάς 

μεν γυναίκας ποιήσει κοινάς τάς δε κτήσεις ιδίας, 

1 [τους] ? ed. 2 ποίους rivas elvai <5et> Scaliger. 

° Or (omitting rovs before τεχνίτας) ' For Socrates makes 
one set of men guardians, a sort of garrison, and another 
set farmers and artisans and citizens of the other sorts.' 

94 



POLITICS, II. π. 12-14 

the Guardians adopt some clever device like that of 
the Cretans ? These have conceded to their slaves 
all the same rights as they have themselves except 
that they are forbidden gymnastic exercises and the 
possession of arms. But if the family life and property 
of the Farmers are to be such as they are in other 
states, what will be the form of their community ? 
There will inevitably be two states in one, and these 
antagonistic to one another. For Socrates makes the 
Guardians a sort of garrison, while the Farmers, 

13 Artisans and other classes are the citizens. 3 But 
quarrels and lawsuits and all the other evils which 
according to Socrates exist in actual states will all be 
found among his citizens too. Yet he says that owing 
to their education they will not need many regulations 
such as city and market by-laws and the other 
regulations of that sort, although he assigns his 
education only to the Guardians. Again, he makes 
the Farmers the masters of the estates, for which 
they pay rent ; but they are likely to be far more 
unmanageable and rebellious than the classes of 
helots, serfs and slaves in certain states to-day. 

14 However, whether this communism is to be com- 
pulsory for the Farmers in the same way as for the 
Guardians or whether it is not, has as a matter of 
fact not been definitely stated anywhere, nor is 
there any information about the connected questions, 
what are to be the political functions and the educa- 
tion of the lower classes, and the laws affecting them. 
But it is not easy to discover the answers to these 
questions, yet the character of the lower classes is 
of no small importance for the preservation of the 
community of the Guardians. But again, if Socrates 
intends to make the Farmers have their wives in 

95 



ARISTOTLE 

τις οικονομήσει ώσπερ τά επι τών αγρών οι άνδρες 
αυτών; καν ει κοιναϊ αί κτήσεις και αι τών 
γεωργών γυναίκες . . . . ι 
"Ατοπον δε και το εκ τών θηρίων ποιεΐσθαι την 15 

5 παραβολήν, δτι δει τά αυτά επιτηδεύειν τας 
γυναίκας τοις άνδράσιν, οΐς οικονομίας ούδεν μετ- 
εστιν. επισφαλές δε και τους άρχοντας ως καθ- 
ίστησιν ο Σωκράτης• άει γαρ ποιεί τους αυτούς 
άρχοντας, τούτο δε στάσεως αίτιον γίνεται και 
παρά τοΐς μηδέν άξ ίωμα κεκτημενοις, ή που δήθεν 2 

ίο παρά γε θυμοειδεσι και πολεμικοΐς άνδράσιν. οτι 
δ' άναγκαΐον αύτώ ποιεΐν τους αυτούς άρχοντας 
φανερόν, ου γαρ ότε μεν άλλοις ότε δε άλλοις 
μεμικται ταί? φυχαΐς 6 παρά του θεοϋ χρυσός, 
αλλ' άει τοις αύτοΐς, φησι δε τοΐς μεν ευθύ γινο- 
μενοις /^ί^αι χρυσόν, τοΐς δ' άργυρον, χαλκόν δε 

ΐδ και σίδηρον τοΐς τεχνίταις μελλουσιν εσεσθαι και 
γεωργοΐς. ετι δε και την εύδαιμονίαν αφαιρούμενος 16 
τών φυλάκων, δλην φησι δεΐν εύδαίμονα ποιεΐν την 
πόλιν τον νομοθετην. αδύνατον δε εύδαιμονεΐν 
δλην, μη τών πλείστων ή 3 μη πάντων μερών ή 
τινών εχόντων την εύδαιμονίαν. ου γαρ τών 

20 αυτών το εύδαιμονεΐν ώνπερ το αρτιον τούτο μεν 
γαρ ενδέχεται τω ολω ύπάρχειν τών δε μερών 
μηδετερω, το δε εύδαιμονεΐν αδύνατον, άλλα μην 
ει οι φύλακες μη εύδαίμονες, τίνες έτεροι; ού γαρ 
δη οι γε τεχνΐται και το πλήθος το τών βάναυ- 
σων. 

1 lacunam Thurot. 
1 ^ που δήθεν Goettling: ήπονθεν δη, έίπονθεν δη codd. 
3 ei Victorius. 

A passage has been lost here. 

96 



POLITICS, II. π. 14-16 

common but their property private, who is to manage 
the household in the way in which the women's 
husbands will carry on the work of the farms ? And 
if the property and the wives of the Farmers are to 
be common . . . a 

15 It is also strange that Socrates employs the com- (4) Minor 
parison of the lower animals to show that the women ° Jec lon3, 
are to have the same occupations as the men, con- 
sidering that animals have no households to manage. 

Also Socrates' method of appointing the magistrates 
is not a safe one. For he makes the same persons 
hold office always ; but this occasions rebellion even 
among people of no special distinction, much more so 
then among high-spirited and warlike men. But it 
is clear that he is compelled to make the same 
persons govern always, for the god-given admixture 
of gold in the soul is not bestowed on some at one 
time and others at another time, but is always in the 
same men, and Socrates says that at the moment of 
birth some men receive an admixture of gold and 
others of silver and those who are to be the 
Artisans and Farmers an admixture of copper and 

16 iron. And again, although he deprives the Guardians what class 
of happiness, he says that it is the duty of the law- J^lLy"? 
giver to make the whole city happy. But it is not 
possible for the whole to be happy unless most or all 

of its parts, or some of them, possess happiness. For 
happiness is not a thing of the same sort as being 
an even number : that may belong to a whole but 
not to either of its parts, but happiness cannot belong 
to the whole and not to its parts. But yet, if the 
Guardians are not happy, what other class is ? For 
clearly the Artisans and the general mass of the 
vulgar classes are not. 

97 



ARISTOTLE 

1264 b 

Η μεν ουν πολιτεία περί ης 6 Σωκράτης εΐρηκεν 

25 ταύτα? τε τάς απορίας έχει καί τούτων ούκ 
έλάττους ετέρας. 

III. Σχεδόν δε παραπλησίως και περί τους 1 
Νόμους έχει τους ύστερον γραφέντας, διό /cat περί 
της ενταύθα πολιτείας έπισκέφασθαι μικρά βέλτιον. 
και γάρ εν τη Π ολιτε ία περί ολίγων πάμπαν 

80 διώρικεν 6 Σωκράτης, περί τε γυναικών και τέκνων 
κοινωνίας , πώς έχειν δει, και περί κτήσεως, και 
της πολιτείας την τάζιν (διαιρείται γάρ εις δυο 
μέρη το πλήθος των οικούντων, το μεν εις τους 
γεωργούς το δε εις το προπολεμοϋν μέρος, τρίτον 
δ' εκ τούτων το βουλευόμενον και κύριον της 
πόλεως), περί δε των γεωργών καί τών τεχνιτών, 

85 πότερον ουδεμιάς η μετέχουσί τίνος άρχης, και 
πότερον όπλα δει κεκτησθαι και τούτους και 
συμπολεμεΐν η μη, περί τούτων ουδέν διώρικεν 6 
Σωκράτης, άλλα τάς μεν γυναίκας οιεται δεΐν 
συμπολεμεΐν και παιδεία? μετέχειν της αυτής τοις 
φύλαζιν, τά δ' άλλα τοις έξωθεν λόγοις πεπλήρωκε 

40 τον λόγον και 1 περί της παιδεία?, ποίαν τινά δει 

1265 a yiWai?ai τών φυλάκων, τών δε Νόμων το μεν 2 

πλείστον μέρος νόμοι τυγχάνουσιν οντες, ολίγα δε 
περί της πολιτείας εΐρηκεν, και ταύτην βουλόμενος 
κοινοτέραν ποιεΐν ταΐς πόλεσι κατά μικρόν περιάγει 
5 πάλιν προς την έτέραν Πολιτεία^, έξω γάρ της 
τών γυναικών κοινωνίας και της κτήσεως, τά 
άλλα ταύτα άποδίδωσιν άμφοτέραις ταΐς πολιτείαις' 
1 καί — φυλάκων supra post 30 κτήσεως Susemihl. 

α The last clause, ' and about — to have,' has almost cer- 
tainly been misplaced by a copyist, and should come near 
the beginning of the sentence, after ' about property.' 

98 



POLITICS, II. π. 16— in. 2 

The republic discussed by Socrates therefore pos- 
sesses these difficulties and also others not smaller 
than these. 

1 III. And almost the same holds good of Laws piato's 
also, which was written later, so that it will be ad- Laws J 

' „ , constitution 

vantageous to make some small examination ot the comparable 
constitution described in that book as well. For in ^ ^ 
The Republic Socrates has laid down details about Republic 
very few matters — regulations about community 
of wives and children and about property, and the 
structure of the constitution (for the mass of the 
population is divided into two parts, one forming 
the Farmer class and the other the class that defends 
the state in war, and there is a third class drawn from 
these latter that forms the council and governs the 
state), but about the Farmers and the Artisans, 
whether they are excluded from government or have 
some part in it, and whether these classes also are to 
possess arms and to serve in Avar with the others or 
not, on these points Socrates has made no decision, 
but though he thinks that the women ought to serve 
in war with the Guardians and share the same educa- 
tion, the rest of the discourse he has filled up with 
external topics, and about the sort of education which 

2 it is proper for the Guardians to have." Laws on the 
other hand is mostly a collection of statutes, but 
the author has said a little about the form of the 
constitution, and though wishing to make this more 
suitable for adoption by actual states he brings it 
round by degrees back to the other form, that of 
The Republic. For except community in wives and 
property, he assigns all his other regulations in the 
same form to both states, for he prescribes for both 

99 



ARISTOTLE 

12653 * ι •/ Ι , / Ι , β „ 

/cat ya/) παι,οβιαν την αυτήν, και το των €ργων 
των αναγκαίων άπεχομενους ζην, καΐ περί συσ- 
σιτίων ώσαυτω?, πλην εν ταύτη φησί δεΐν etvai 

ίο συσσίτια και γυναικών, και την μεν χιλίων των 
όπλα κεκτημένων, ταύτην δέ πεντακισχιλίων. 

Τό μεν οΰν περιττόν εχουσι πάντες οι του Σω- 3 
κράτους λόγοι και τό κομφόν και το καινοτόμον 
και τό ζητητικόν, καλώς δε πάΊτα ΐσως χαλεπόν 
επει και τό νυν ειρημενον πλήθος δει μη λανθάνειν 

15 οτι χώρας δεήσει τοις τοσούτοις Έαβυλωνίας ή 
τίνος άλλης απέραντου τό πλήθος, εξ ης άργοι 
πεντακισχίλιοι θρέφονται και περί τούτους γυναι- 
κών και θεραπόντων έτερος όχλος πολλαπλάσιος, 
δει μεν ουν ύποτίθεσθαι κατ* εύχήν, μηδέν μεντοι 
αδύνατον, λέγεται δ' ως δει τον νομοθετην προς 4 

20 δύο βλέποντα τιθεναι τους νόμους, προς τε την 
χώραν και τους ανθρώπους, ετι δε καλώς έχει 
προσθεΐναι και προς τους γειτνιώντας τόπους, 
ει δει την πόλιν ζήν βίον πολιτικόν 1 (ου γαρ μόνον 
άναγκαΐόν εστίν αυτήν τοιούτοις χρήσθαι προς τον 
πόλεμον οπλοις α χρήσιμα κατά την οίκείαν χώραν 

25 εστίν αλλά και προς τους εζω τόπους)' ει δε τις 

μη τοιούτον αποδέχεται βίον μήτε τον ίδιον μήτε 

τον κοινόν της πόλεως, όμως ουδέν ήττον δει 

φοβερούς etvat τοις πολεμίοις μή μόνον ελθοΰσιν 

εις την χώραν αλλά και άπελθοΰσιν. 2 και τό 5 

1 πολιτικόν μη μονωτικόν codd. plerique. 
2 άπ[ε\θ]οΰσιν Bender. 

" A euphemism for an aggressive policy, cf. 1327 b 5. 
Some mss. add ' not one of isolation ' ; this looks like an 
explanatory note interpolated. 

6 Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give ' when they 
are away from it.' 

100 



POLITICS, II. in. 2-5 

the same scheme of education, and a life detached 
from menial tasks, and similarly as regards common 
meals, except that in the state described in Laws 
he says there are to be common meals for women 
also, and he makes the Republic consist of a class 
possessing arms that numbers a thousand, but the 
state of Latvs has five thousand. 

3 Now it is true that all the discourses of Socrates Criticism, 
possess brilliance, cleverness, originality and keen- potation 
ness of inquirv, but it is no doubt difficult to be right needs vast 

ι * ' <-> territory. 

about everything : for instance with regard to the 
size of population just mentioned it must not be over- 
looked that a territory as large as that of Babylon 
will be needed for so many inhabitants, or some other 
country of unlimited extent, to support five thousand 
men in idleness and another swarm of women and 
servants around them many times as numerous. It 
is proper no doubt to assume ideal conditions, but 

4 not to go bevond all bounds of possibilitv. And it Neighbour. 

• ii . ι . τ ii • ι • ." ι . in g powers 

is said that in laying down the laws the legislator ignored. 
must have his attention fixed on two things, the 
territory and the population. But also it would be 
well to add that he must take into account the 
neighbouring regions also, if the city is to live a life 
of active policy," as it will have to use for war not 
only such arms as are serviceable within its own 
territory but also such as are serviceable against 
places outside it ; and if one does not accept such 
a description whether for the life of the individual 
or for the common life of the state, yet it is none 
the less necessary for the citizens to be formidable 
to their enemies not only when they have entered 

5 the country but also when they have left it. 6 Also 

101 



ARISTOTLE 

πλήθος δε τής κτήσεως όράν δει, μήποτε βελτιον 
ετερως οιορίσαι τω σαφώς μάλλον τοσαντην γαρ 

80 είναι φησι οεΐν ώστε ζην σωφρόνως , ώσπερ αν ει 
τις εΐπεν ώστ€ ζην εΰ• τοΰτο δ' άρ η εστί καθόλου 
μάλλον, επειδή 2 εστί σωφρόνως μεν ταλαιπώρως 
δε ζην. άλλα βελτίων ορός το σωφρόνως και 
ελευθερίως (χωρίς γαρ εκάτερον το μεν τω τρνφάν 
ακολουθήσει, το δε τω επιπόνως), επει μοναι γ 

35 βίσΙν έξεις αίρεται 3 περί την της ουσίας χρήσιν 
αύται, οίον ουσία πράως η άνορείως χρήσθαι ουκ 
εστίν, σωφρόνως δε και ελευθέρια»? εστίν, ώστε 
και τάς έξεις 4 άναγκαΐον περί αυτήν είναι ταύτας, 
άτοπον δε και το τάς κτήσεις ίσάζοντα το περί 6 

40 τό πλήθος των πολιτών μη κατασκευάζειν, αλλ 
άφεΐναι την τεκνοποιίαν αόριστον ως ικανώς 
1265 b άνομαλισθησομενην είς τό αυτό πλήθος δια τα? 
άτεκνίας όσωνοΰν γεννωμένων, οτι οοκεΐ τοΰτο 
και νυν συμβαίνειν περί τάς πόλεις, δει δε 
τοΰτ ούχ ομοίως ακριβώς εχειν περί τάς πόλεις 6 
τότε και νυν νυν μεν γάρ ουδει? απορεί δια το 
6 μερίζεσθαι τάς ουσίας είς όποσονοΰν πλήθος, τότε 
δ' αδιαίρετων ούσών ανάγκη τους παράζυγας 
μηοεν εχειν, εάν τ ελάττους ωσι τό πλήθος εαν 
τε πλείους. μάλλον δέ δεΐν ύπολάβοι τις αν 7 
ώρίσθαι της ουσίας την τεκνοποιίαν, ώστε αριθμού 
τινο? μή πλείονα γενναν, τούτο οε τισεναι το 
πλήθος αποβλέποντα προς τάς τιίχα?, αν συαβαιντ; 

1 δ' &ρ' ed. : yhp codd. 

2 επειδή Susemihl : eVt δ' codd. 

3 αίρεται Vettori: άρεται codd. 
* έξεις Susemihl : χρήσεις codd. 

5 [περί τάϊ πόλεις] Bender. 

102 



POLITICS, II. in. 5-7 

the amount of property requires consideration : Wealth 
would it not perhaps be better to define it differently, 
by a clearer formula ? The writer says that it ought 
to be sufficiently large for the citizens ' to live a 
temperate life ' — as if one were to say ' to live a good 
life ' ; but really that phrase is too general, since it 
is possible to five temperately yet miserably. But a 
better definition would be ' to live temperately and 
liberally ' (for if the two are separated a liberal mode 
of life is liable to slip into luxury and a temperate 
one into a life of hardship), since surely these are 
the only desirable qualities relating to the use of 
wealth — for instance you cannot use wealth gently 
or bravely, but you can use it temperately and 
liberally, so that it follows that these are the qualities 

6 that have to do with wealth. And it is also strange Birth- 
that although equalizing properties the writer does omitted. 
not regulate the number of the citizens, but leaves 

the birth-rate uncontrolled, on the assumption that 
it will be sufficiently levelled up to the same total 
owing to childless marriages, however many children 
are begotten, because this seems to take place in 
the states at present. But this ought to be regulated 
much more in the supposed case than it is now, for 
now nobody is destitute, because estates are divided 
among any number, but then, as division of estates 
will not be allowed, the extra children will necessarily 
have nothing, whether they are fewer in number or 

7 more. And one might think that restriction ought 
to be put on the birth-rate rather than on propertv, 
so as not to allow more than a certain number of 
children to be produced, and that in fixing their 
number consideration should be paid to the chances 
of its happening that some of the children born 

103 



ARISTOTLE 

1265b , . 

ίο τελευταν τινας των γεννηθέντων, και προς την των 

άλλων άτεκνίαν το δ άφεΐσθαι, καθάπερ εν ταί? 

πλείσταις πόλεσι, πενίας άναγκαΐον αίτιον γίν€θθαι 

τοις πολίταις, η δε πενία στάσιν εμποιεΐ και 

κακονργίαν. Φείδων μεν ονν ο Κορίνθιος, ων 

νομοθέτης των αρχαιοτάτων, τους οίκους ισονς 

ωήθη δεΐν διαμενειν και το πλήθος των πολιτών, 

15 και el το πρώτον τους κλήρους άνισους ειχον 
πάντες κατά μέγεθος• εν δε τοις Νόμοι? τούτοις 
τουναντίον εστίν, άλλα περί μεν τούτων πώς 
οίόμεθα βελτιον αν εχειν, λεκτεον ύστερον ελλε- 8 
λειπται δέ τοις Νόαοι? τούτοις και τα περί τους 
άρχοντας, όπως έσονται διαφέροντες τών αρχο- 

20 μένων φησϊ γάρ δεΐν, ώσπερ εξ έτερου το 
στημόνιον ερίου γίνεται της κρόκης, ούτω και 
τους άρχοντας εχειν 1 προς τους αρχόμενους, επει 
δε την πάσαν ούσίαν εφίησι γίνεσθαι μείζονα 
μέχρι πενταπλάσιας , διά τι τοΰτ* ουκ αν ειη επι 
της γης μέχρι τίνος; και την των οικοπεοων οε 

25 διαίρεσιν δει σκοπεΐν, μη ποτ' ου συμφερη προς 
οίκονομίαν δύο γάρ οικόπεδα εκάστω ενειμε 
διελών χωρίς, χαλεπόν δε οικίας δύο οίκεΐν. ή δε 9 
σύνταζις ολη βούλεται μεν είναι μήτε δημοκρατία 
μήτε ολιγαρχία, μέση δε τούτων ην καλοϋσι 
πολιτείαν, εκ γάρ τών όπλιτευόντων εστίν, ει 

80 μεν ούν ως κοινοτάτην ταύτην κατασκευάζει ταΐ? 
1 ed. : ΐχει-ν δεΐν aut 5et codd. 

Otherwise unknown. 

6 i.e. the estates are equal, and the number of households 
fixed, but not the number of citizens. 

c Laws 734 ε f . In weaving cloth the warp (the threads 
set up first) must be of strong wool, the woof (the threads 
woven across the warp) must be softer. 
104 



POLITICS, II. in. 7-9 

may die, and to the absence of children in the other 
marriages ; but for the matter to be left alone, as 
it is in most states, is bound to lead to poverty 
among the citizens, and poverty produces sedition 
and crime. The Corinthian Phidon a in fact, one 
of the most ancient lawgivers, thought that the house- 
holds and the citizen population ought to remain 
at the same numbers, even though at the outset the 
estates of all were unequal in size ; but in Plato's 
harts the opposite is the case. 6 However, we must 
say later what we think would be a better system in 

8 these matters ; but another question omitted in the Difficulties 
Lmvs is how the rulers will be different from the S^nd 8 
classes ruled ; the writer prescribes that the rulers as to 

are to stand in the same relation to the ruled as the {S^erty, 
warp of cloth stands to the woof by being made of and farms • 
different wool. c And inasmuch as he allows a man's 
total property to be increased up to five times its 
original value, for what reason should not an increase 
in his landed estate be allowed up to a certain point ? 
Also it must be considered whether the proposed 
separation of homesteads is not inexpedient for 
household economy — for the writer allotted two 
homesteads separate from one another to each 
citizen ; but it is difficult to manage two households. 4 

9 And the whole constitution is intended, it is true, Really an 
to be neither a democracy nor an oligarchy, but of oligarehy • 
the form intermediate between them which is termed 

a republic, for the government is constituted from 
the class that bears arms. If therefore he introduces 
this constitution as the one most commonlv existing 

* The object was to provide a separate establishment for a 
married son. Laws 776 a. 

E 105 



ARISTOTLE 

1265 b ,s . »u s , \ ~ » » 

πολεσι των άλλων πολιτειαν, καλώς ειρηκεν ίσως, 
ει δ' ώς άρίστην μετά την πρώτην πολιτειαν, ου 
καλώς• τάχα γαρ την των Αακώνων αν τι,ς eirai- 
νεσειε μάλλον, η καν άλλην τίνα. άριστοκρατικω- 
τεραν. ενιοι μεν ουν λεγουσιν ώς δει την άρίστην 10 
πολιτειαν εζ άπασών είναι τών πολιτ€ΐών μεμιγ- 

35 μενην, διό και την τών Αακεδαιμονίων επαινοΰσιν 
{είναι γαρ αύτην οι μεν εξ ολιγαρχίας και μοναρχίας 
και δημοκρατίας φασίν, λέγοντες την μεν jSaaiAeiW 
μοναρχίαν , την δε τών γερόντων άρχην όλιγαρχίαν, 
δημοκρατεΐσθαι δε κατά την τών εφόρων άρχην 

40 δια το εκ του δήμου efmi τους εφόρους, οι δε την 
μεν εφορείαν etvai τυραννίδα, δημοκρατεΐσθαι δε 
t266a κατά τε τα συσσίτια και τον άλλον βίον τον καθ 

ημεραν)• εν δε τοις Νό/χοι? εΐρηται τούτοις ώς δέον \] 
συγκεΐσθαι την άρίστην πολιτειαν εκ δημοκρατίας 
και τυραννίδος, άς η το παράπαν ουκ αν τις θειη 
πολιτείας η χειρίστας πασών, βελτιον ουν λεγουσιν 
5 οι πλείους μιγνΰντες• η γάρ εκ πλειόνων συγ- 
κείμενη πολιτεία βελτίων. επειτ ούδ έχουσα 
φαίνεται μοναρχικόν ούδεν, άλΧ ολιγαρχικά και 
δημοκρατικά, μάλλον δ' εγκλίνειν βούλεται προς 
την όλιγαρχίαν. δήλον δ' εκ της τών αρχόντων 
καταστάσεως' το μεν γάρ εξ αιρετών κληρωτούς 

' Plato wrote ' monarchy,' Laws 693 d (cf. here § 13, 1. 23). 
106 



POLITICS, II. πι. 9-ll 

of all forms of constitution in the actual states, he 
has perhaps made a good proposal, but if he intro- 
duces it as the next best to the first form of con- 
stitution, it is not a good proposal ; for very likely 
one might approve the Spartan constitution more 
highly, or perhaps some other form nearer to an 

10 aristocracy. In fact some people assert that the best different 
constitution must be a combination of all the forms toSpan*u 
of constitution, and therefore praise the constitution ^P 1 ^ 111 "* 
of Sparta (for some people say that it consists of 
oligarchy, monarchy and democracy, meaning that 

the kingship is monarchy and the rule of the ephors 
oligarchv, but that an element of democracy is 
introduced by the rule of the ephors because the 
ephors come from the common people ; while others 
pronounce the ephorate a tyranny but find an 
element of democracy in the public mess-tables and 

11 in the other regulations of daily life). In Plato's 
Larvs on the other hand it is stated that the best 
constitution must consist of a combination of demo- 
cracy and tyranny," which one might refuse to count 
as constitutional governments at all, or else rank 
as the worst of all constitutions. A better theory 
therefore is put forward by those who intermingle 
a larger number of forms, for the constitution com- 
posed of a combination of a larger number of forms 
is better. In the next place, the constitution in the 
Larrs proves as a matter of fact not to contain any 
element of monarchy at all, but its factors are taken 
from oligarchy and democracy, and for the most part 
it tends to incline towards oligarchy. This appears 
from the regulations for the appointment of the 
magistrates ; for their selection by lot from a list 
previously elected by vote is a feature common to 

107 






ARISTOTLE 

12ββ a < > ι ~ * S^ - i ' I 

ίο κοινον αμφοιν, το οε τοις μεν ευπορωτεροις 
επάναγκες εκκλησιάζειν eirai και φερειν άρχοντας 
η τι ποιεΐν άλλο των πολιτικών, τους δ' άφεΐσθαι, 
τοΰτο δ ολιγαρχικόν, και το πειράσθαι πλείους 
εκ των ευπόρων είναι τους άρχοντας και τάς 
μεγίστας εκ των μεγίστων τιμημάτων, όλιγαρχι- 12 

15 κην δε ποιεΐ και την της βουλής αΐρεσιν αιροΰν- 
ται μεν γαρ πάντες επάναγκες, αλλ' εκ 1 του 
πρώτου τιμήματος, είτα πάλιν ίσους εκ του 
δευτέρου, είτ* εκ τών τρίτων, πλην ου πάσιν 
επάναγκες ην τοις εκ τών τρίτων η τέταρτων, 
εκ οέ του τετάρτου 2 μόνοις επάναγκες τοις 
πρώτοις και τοις δευτεροις• ε?τ' εκ τούτων 

20 ίσον αφ* εκάστου τιμήματος άποδειζαί φησι δεΐν 
αριθμόν, έσονται δη πλείους οι εκ τών μεγίστων 
τιμημάτων και βελτίους διά το ενιους μη αιρεΐσθαι 
τών δημοτικών διά το μη επάναγκες. ως μεν οΰν 13 
ουκ εκ δημοκρατίας και μοναρχίας δει συνιστάναι 
την τοιαύτην πολιτείαν, εκ τούτων φανερόν και 

2δ τών ύστερον ρηθησομενων όταν επιβάλλη περί της 
τοιαύτης πολιτείας η σκέφις• έχει δε και περί την 
αΐρεσιν τών αρχόντων το εξ αιρετών αιρετούς 
επικίνδυνον, ει γάρ τίνες συστηναι θελουσι και 
μέτριοι το πλήθος, αεί κατά την τούτων αίρε- 
θησονται βούλησιν. 

Τα μεν οΰν περί την πολιτείαν την εν τοις Νόμοις 

30 τούτον έχει τον τρόπον. 

1 άλλα <πρωτον> έ~κ Lambinus. 
2 Engelhardt : τον τετάρτου τών τετάρτων codd. 

" i.e. a better elective body because representative of all 
classes. 

h i.e. from voting for the preliminary list from the third and 
fourth classes. 
108 






POLITICS, II. m. 11-13 

both oligarchy and democracy, but the compulsion 
put upon the richer citizens to attend the assembly 
and vote for magistrates or perform any other 
political function, while the others are allowed to do 
as they like, is oligarchical, as is the endeavour to 
secure that a majority of the magistrates shall be 
drawn from the wealthy and that the highest offices 
shall be filled from the highest of the classes assessed 

12 by wealth. But the writer also makes the election 
of the council oligarchical ; for everybody is com- 
pelled to elect, but from the first property-class, and 
then again an equal number from the second class, 
and then from the members of the third class, except 
that it was not to be compulsory for all to vote for 
those to be elected from the members of the third 
or the fourth class, and to elect from the fourth class 
was only compulsory for the members of the first 
and second classes ; and afterwards from those thus 
selected he says that they are to appoint an equal 
number from each class. Thus those who elect the 
members from the highest property classes will be 
more numerous and better, because some of the 
lower orders will abstain from voting 6 as it is not 

13 compulsory. Accordingly that it is not proper to indirect 
establish a constitution of this character from a election • 
blend of democracy and monarchy appears clearly 
from these considerations, and from what will be said 
later when our inquiry comes to deal with this class 
of constitution ; also the provision for the election of 
the rulers from among candidates chosen at a prelim- 
inary election is dangerous, for if even a moderate 
number of people choose to combine into a party, 
the elections will always go according to their wish. 

Such are the points as to the constitution in theLaws. 

109 






ARISTOTLE 

1266 a 

IV. Εισί δε' rives πολιτεΐαι και αλλαι, at μεν 1 
ιδιωτών αι δε φιλοσόφων και πολιτικών, ττασαι 
δε των καθεστηκυιών και καθ' ας πολιτεύονται 
νυν εγγύτερόν εισι τούτων αμφοτέρων ovSels γαρ 

55 ούτε την irepi τα τέκνα κοινότητα και τάς γυναίκας 
άλλος κεκαινοτόμηκεν οϋτ€ περί τα συσσίτια των 
γυναικών , άλλ' από τών αναγκαίων άρχονται 
μάλλον. δοκεΐ γάρ τισι το περί τάς ουσίας είναι 
μεγιστον τετάχθαι καλώς• περί γάρ τούτων ποιεΐ- 
σθαί φασι τάς στάσεις πάντας. διό Φαλέα? ό 2 

40 Χ,αλκτφόνιος τοΰτ εισήνεγκε πρώτος' φησι γάρ 
δεΐν ΐσας είναι τα? κτήσζις τών πολιτών τούτο 
1266 b oe κατοικιζομεναις μεν ευθύς ου χαλεπόν ωετο 
ποιεΐν, τάς δ' ήδη κατοικουμενας εργωδεστερον 
μεν, όμως δε τάχιστ αν ο/^αλισ^ναι τω τάς 
προίκας τους μεν πλουσίους διδόναι μεν λαμβάνειν 
δ δε μη, τους δε πένητας μη διδοναι μεν λαμβάνειν 
δε'. Πλάτων δε τους Νόμους γράφων μέχρι μεν 
τίνος ωετο δεΐν εάν, πλεΐον δέ του πενταπλασίαν 
είναι της ελαχίστης μηδενι τών πολιτών εζουσίαν 
είναι κτήσασθαι, καθάπερ εΐρηται και πρότερον. 3 

Δει δε μηδέ τοΰτο λανθάνειν τους ούτω νομο- 
θετοΰντας, ο λανθάνει νυν, ότι το της ουσίας τάττον- 

ιο τας πλήθος προσήκει και τών τέκνων το πλήθος 
τάττειν εάν γάρ ΰπεραίρη τής ουσίας το μέγεθος 
ό τών τέκνων αριθμός, ανάγκη τόν γε νόμον 
λυεσ^αι, και χωρίς τής λύσεως φαϋλον το πολ- 
λούς εκ πλουσίων ^ινεσ^αι πένητας• έργον γάρ μή 

α Otherwise unknown. 
110 






POLITICS, II. ιν. 1-3 

1 IV. There are also certain other constitutional 
schemes, some drawn up by amateurs and others Non- 

by philosophers and statesmen, but all of them are theories! 18 ' 
nearer to those which have been actually established 
and by which states are governed at present than 
are both of those which have been considered ; for 
nobody else has introduced the innovation of com- 
munity of children and women, nor that of public 
meals for the women, but they start rather with the 
absolute requisites. For some persons think that 
the right regulation of property is the most important; 
for the question of property, they say, is universally 
the cause of party strife. Therefore the Chalcedonian Constitu- 
Phaleas" was the first who introduced this expedient; ρ^ι°.[ 3 . 

2 for he says that the citizens' estates ought to be equal, property 
and he thought that this would not be difficult to secure regulating y 
at the outset for cities in process of foundation, while dowries. 

in those already settled, although it would be a more 
irksome task, nevertheless a levelling would most easily 
be effected by the rich giving dowries but not re- 
ceiving them and the poor receiving but not giving 
them. Plato when writing Laws thought that up 
to a certain point inequality ought to be allowed, 
but that no citizen should be permitted to acquire 
more land than would make his estate five times the 
size of the smallest, as has also been said before. c. m. §a. 

3 But those who bring in legislation of this sort must 
also not overlook this point, which is overlooked at 
present, that when regulating the amount of property 
legislators ought also to regulate the size of the family; 
for if the number of children becomes too large for 
the total propertv, the law is quite sure to be re- 
pealed, and apart from the repeal it is a bad thing 
that many citizens who were rich should become poor, 

111 



ARISTOTLE 

1266 b , , , , 

νεωτεροποιους eirai του? τοιούτου?, οιοτι μεν ούν 4 

15 έχει τινά Swa/zii/ ei? τήν πολιτικην κοινωνίαν η 
της ουσίας όμαλότης, και των πάλαι τινε? φαίνον- 
ται διεγνωκότες, οίον και Σόλων ένομοθέτησεν, 
και παρ* άλλοις εστί νόμος ος κωλύει κτάσθαι 
γην όπόσην αν βούληταί τις' ομοίως δε και την 
ούσίαν πωλεϊν οι νόμοι 1 κωλύουσιν, ώσπερ εν 

20 Αοκροΐς νόμος εστί μη πωλεΐν εάν μη φανεράν 
άτνχίαν δείξη συμβεβηκυΐαν ετι δε τους παλαιούς 
κλήρους διασωζειν, τούτο δε λυθεν και περί 
Αευκάδα δημοτικην εποίησε λίαν την πολιτείαν 
αυτών, ου yap ετι συνεβαινεν από των ώρισμενων 
τιμημάτων εις τάς αρχάς βαδίζειν. αλλ' εστί την 5 

25 ισότητα μεν ύπάρχειν της ουσίας, ταυτην δ' η 
λίαν είναι πολλην, ώστε τρυφάν, η λίαν όλίγην, 
ώστε ζην γλίσχρως• δηλον οΰν ως ούχ ίκανόν το 
τάς ουσίας ΐσας ποιησαι τον νομοθετην, αλλά του 
μέσου στοχαστεον. ετι δ ει τις και την μετρίαν 
τάζειεν ούσίαν πάσιν, ούδεν όφελος' μαΧλον γάρ 

so δει τάς επιθυμίας όμαλίζειν η τάς ουσίας, τούτο 
δ' ούκ εστί μη παιδευομένοις Ίκανώς υπό των g 
νόμων, αλλ 'ίσως ε'ίποι αν ο Φαλέα? ότι ταύτα 
τυγχάνει λέγων αυτός• οιεται γάρ δυοΐν τούτοιν 
ισότητα δεΐν ύπάρχειν ταις πόλεσιν, κτήσεως και 

35 παιδεία?, άλλα την [τε] 2 παιδειαν ήτις εσται δει 
λέγειν, και το μίαν είναι και την αύτην ούδεν 
όφελος, εστί γάρ την αύτην μεν είναι και μίαν 
άλλα ταυτην είναι τοιαύτην εξ ης έσονται προ- 



1 ol νόμοι: ίνιοι Buecheler: <^ίου$> ol νόμοι Richards. 
2 ed. 



112 



POLITICS, II. ιν. 3-6 

for it is difficult for such men not to be advocates 
4 of a new order. That a level standard of property 
affects the community of the citizens in an important 
manner some men even in old times clearly have 
recognized ; for example there is the legislation of 
Solon, and other states have a law prohibiting the 
acquisition of land to any amount that the individual 
may desire ; and similarly there is legislation to 
prevent the sale of estates, as at Locri there is a law Historic 
that a man shall not sell unless he can prove that ^^ e * 
manifest misfortune has befallen him ; and also there 
is legislation to preserve the old allotments, and the 
repeal of this restriction at Leucas made the Leu- 
cadian constitution excessively democratic, for it came 
about that the offices were no longer filled from the 
δ established property-qualifications. But it is possible 
that equality of estates may be maintained, but their 
size may be either too large and promote luxury, or 
too small, causing a penurious standard of living ; 
it is clear therefore that it is not enough for the law- 
giver to make the estates equal, but he must aim at 
securing a medium size. And again, even if one 
prescribed a moderate property for all, it would be 
of no avail, since it is more needful to level men's 
desires than their properties, and this can only be 
done by an adequate system of education enforced 
6 by law. But perhaps Phaleas would say that he Equali- 
himself actually prescribes this, as he considers it ^™j£ tion 
fundamentally necessary for states to have equality 
in these two things, property and education. But 
the nature of the education needs to be defined : it 
is no use merely for it to be one and the same for all, 
for it is possible for all to have one and the same 
education but for this to be of such a nature as to 

IIS 



ARISTOTLE 

aip€TLKOL του πλεονεκτειν η χρημάτων η τιμής η 
συναμφοτερων ετι 1 στασιάζουσιν ου μόνον δια τήν 7 
ανισότητα της κτήσεως, άλλα και δια τήν των 
40 τιμών, τουναντίον δε 7repi εκάτερον οι μεν γαρ 
1267 a πολλοί δια τό περί τάς κτήσεις ανισον, οι ok 
χαρίεντες περί των τιμών εάν ισαι* όθεν και 

εν δε ίη τιμή η μεν κακός ηοέ και εσθλός. 

ου μόνον δ' οι άνθρωποι δια τάναγκαΐα άδικοΰσιν, 
ών άκος eirai νομίζει την ισότητα της ουσίας, 
5 ώστε μη λωποδυτεΐν δια τό ριγούν η πεινην, άλλα 
και όπως χαίρωσι και μη επιθυμώσιν εάν γάρ 
μείζω εχωσιν επιθυμίαν τών αναγκαίων, δια την 
ταύτης ίατρείαν άοικησουσιν ου τοίνυν δια ταύτην 
μόνον, άλλα και [αν επιθυμοΐεν] 2 ίνα χαίρωσι ταΐς 
άνευ λυπών ηδοναΐς. τί οΰν άκος τών τριών 8 

ίο τούτων; τοις μεν ουσία βραχεία και εργασία, τοις 
δε σωφροσύνη' τρίτον δ', ει τινβ? βούλοιντο δι 
αυτών χαίρειν, ουκ αν επιζητοΐεν ει μη πάρα 
φιλοσοφίας άκος, αϊ γάρ άλλαι ανθρώπων δέονται. 
επει 3 άδικοΰσί γε τα μέγιστα δια τα? ύπερβολάς, 
αλλ* ου δια τά αναγκαία (οίον τυραννοΰσιν ούχ 

15 ίνα μη ριγώσιν, διό και αϊ τιμαι /χεγάλαι αν άπο- 
κτείνη τις ου κλεπτην άλλα τύραννον)• ώστε προς 
τάς μικράς αδικίας βοηθητικός μόνον ό τρόπος 
της Φαλεου πολιτείας, ετι τά ττολλά βούλεται 9 

1 (τι : έπΐϊ Spengel. 
8 Bernays : άνευ επιθυμιών Bojesen. 
3 67Γ6Ϊ <δ'> vel ίτι Rassow. 

α Probably the Greek should be altered to give ' because ' 
instead of ' moreover.' 
6 Iliad ix. 319. 

114 



POLITICS, II. ιν. 6-9 

make them desirous of getting more than their share 

7 of money or honour or both ; moreover α civil strife Equaii- 
is caused not only by inequality of property, but also j^ores 
bv inequality of honours, though the two motives human 

J *■ . . * . ι j• passions 

operate in opposite ways — the masses are discon- and 
tented if possessions are unequally distributed, the οο 1 ™? 4 "»• 
upper classes if honours are equally distributed, 
bringing it about that 

Noble or base in the like honour stand.* 
Nor do men do wrong for the sake of the bare necessi- 
ties onlv, the sort of wrongdoing for which Phaleas 
thinks that equality of substance is a cure — prevent- 
ing highway robbery by removing the motive of cold 
or hunger ; men also do wrong to gain pleasure and 
to satisfy desire. For if they have a desire above the 
bare necessities of existence, they will transgress to 
cure this desire ; and moreover not because of desire 
only, but in order that they may enjoy the pleasures 

8 that are not associated with pains, ^"hat remedy 
then is there for these three classes of offences ? 
For the first class, a modest competence and work ; 
for the second, temperance ; and as for the third 
sort, any people who desired pleasures depending 
on themselves could seek no cure for their desires 
save that which is derived from philosophy, for the 
other pleasures require the aid of fellow-creatures. 
Since clearly the greatest transgressions spring from 
a desire for superfluities, not for bare necessaries 
(for example, men do not become tyrants in order 
to avoid shivering with cold, and accordingly high 
honours are awarded to one who kills a tyrant, but 
not to one who kills a thief) ; so that the method of 
the constitution of Phaleas is efficacious only against 

θ the minor social disorders. Again, Phaleas desires to 

115 



ARISTOTLE 

12678 , Y U Τ , . , χ χ , 

κατασκευαί,ειν ες ων τα προς αυτούς πολιτευσονται 
καλώς, δει δε καΐ προς τους γειτνιώντας και τους 

20 έξωθεν πάντας. άναγκαΐον άρα την πολιτ€ίαν 
συντετάχθαι προς την πολεμικήν ίσχύν, περί ης 
εκείνος ούδεν ε'ίρηκεν. ομοίως δε και περί της 
κτήσεως- δει γαρ ου μόνον προς τας πολιτικάς 
χρήσεις Ικανήν ύπάρχειν, αλλά και προς τους 
έζωθεν κινδύνους• διόπερ ούτε τοσούτον δει πλήθος 

25 ύπάρχειν ων οι πλησίον και κρείττους επι- 
θυμήσουσιν οι δ' έχοντες άμυνειν ου δυνήσονται 
τους επιοντας, οϋθ' ούτως όλίγην ώστε μή δύνα- 
σίλχι πόλεμον ύπενεγκεΐν μηδέ τών ίσων και τών 
ομοίων, εκείνος μεν οΰν ουδέν διώρικεν, δει δε 10 
τοϋτο μη λανθάνειν δ τι 1 συμφέρει πλήθος ουσίας. 

30 Ίσως ουν άριστος ορός το μή λυσιτελεΐν τοις 
κρειττοσι δια. τήν ύπερβολήν πολεμεΐν, αλλ' ούτως 
ως αν και μή εχόντων τοσαύτην ούσίαν. οίον 
Έιϋβουλος Αύτοφραοάτου μέλλοντος Άταρνεα πολι- 
ορκεΐν εκελευσεν αυτόν σκεφάμενον εν πόσω χρόνω 
λήφεται το χωρίον λογίσασθαι του χρόνου τούτου 

85 τήν δαπάνην, εθελειν γαρ ελαττον τούτου λαβών 
εκλιπεΐν ήδη τον Άταρνεα - ταύτα δ' ειπών εποίησε 
τον Αύτοφραδάτην σύννουν γενόμενον 77αυσασ<?αι 
της πολιορκίας . εστί μεν ουν τι τών συμφερόντων 11 
το τας ουσίας ειι^αι ΐσας τοις πολίταις προς το 
μη στασιάζειν προς αλλήλους, ου μήν μέγ* ουδέν 

1 δ τι Stahr : ΰτι codd. 



" A stronghold on the coast of Asia Minor acquired by 
Eubulus, a Bithynian banker, when the Persian empire was 
breaking up, middle 4th century b.c. ; Autophradates was a 
Persian general. 

116 



POLITICS, II. ιν. 9-11 

frame institutions for the most part which will lead to Riches 
a right state of affairs in the internal relations of the attack but 
citizens, but the legislator should also have reeard poverty 
to relations with the neighbouring peoples and with defence» 
all foreign nations. It is essential therefore for the 
constitution to be framed with a view to military 
strength, about which Phaleas has said nothing. 
And the same is true also about property ; for the 
citizens should not only possess enough to meet their 
requirements in civic life, but also to encounter the 
perils that face them from outside ; hence they 
should possess neither so large an amount of wealth 
that it will be coveted by their neighbours and by 
stronger states while its possessors will be unable to 
repel their assailants, nor yet so small an amount as 
not to be capable of sustaining a war even against 

10 equal and similar states. Phaleas, it is true, has laid 
down no rule at all, but the question must not be 
overlooked, what amount of wealth is advantageous. 
Perhaps therefore the best limit to prescribe is that 
it must not profit a stronger people to make war upon 
the state because of its excessive wealth, but only 
just as it might do even if the citizens had not got so 
much property. For example, when Autophradates 
was about to lay siege to Atarneus, Eubulus bade 
him consider how long it would take him to capture 
the place, and then calculate what his expenditure 
would be for that period, for he himself was willing 
for the payment of a smaller sum than that to 
evacuate Atarneus at once ; these words caused Covetous- 
Autophradates to ponder and led him to abandon the c-lirbed'by* 

11 siege. Now equality of property among the citizens education, 
is certainly one of" the factors" that contribute to ^^ι."" 1 
the avoidance of party faction ; it is not however 

117 



ARISTOTLE 

1287 a , , \ \ μ » / > 

40 ως ειπείν, και γαρ αν οι χαριεντες αγανακτοΐεν 

ώς 1 ουκ ίσων οντες άζιοι, διό και φαίνονται πολ- 

1267 b λάκις επιτιθέμενοι και στασιάζοντας- ετι δ' ή 

πονηρία των ανθρώπων άπληστον, καΐ το πρώτον 

μεν ίκανόν διωβολία μόνον, όταν δ' ήδη tout' η 

πάτριον, άει δέονται του πλείονος, εως εις άπειρον 

ελθωσιν άπειρος γαρ ή της επιθυμίας φύσις, ής 

5 προς την άναπλήρωσιν οι πολλοί ζώσιν. τών οΰν 12 
τοιούτων αρχή* μάλλον του τάς ουσίας όμαλίζειν, 
το τους μεν επιεικείς τη φύσει τοιούτους παρα- 
σκευάζειν ώστε μη βούλεσθαι πλεονεκτεΐν, τους 
δέ φαύλους ώστε μη ούνασθαΐ' τούτο δ' εστίν αν 
ηττους τε ώσι και μη άδικώνται. ου καλώς ο 

ίο ουδέ την ισότητα της ουσίας εΐρηκεν περί γαρ την 
της γης κτησιν ίσάζει μόνον, εστί δε και δούλων 
και βοσκημάτων πλούτος και νομίσματος, και 
κατασκευή πολλή τών καλουμένων επίπλων ή 
πάντων οΰν τούτων ισότητα ζητητεον ή τάζιν τίνα 
μετρίαν, ή πάντα εατεον. φαίνεται δ' εκ της 13 

1δ νομοθεσίας κατασκευάζων τήν πάλιν μικράν, ει γ 
οι τεχνΐται πάντες δημόσιοι έσονται και μή πλή- 
ρωμα τι παρέχονται της πόλεως, αλλ' ειπερ δει 
δημοσίους eimi, τους τά κοινά εργαζομένους δει 
(καθάπερ εν Έπιδάμνω τε και ώς 3 Αιόφαντός ποτέ 
κατεσκεύαζεν Άθήνησι) τούτον εχειν τον τρόπον. 

so ΪΙερι μεν οΰν της Φαλεου πολιτείας σχεδόν εκ 

1 ώί MP: hv ώ$ cet. 

* &kos Schneider : άρω-γη Vermehren. 

3 καΐ ώ? Morel: και codd. 

" Twopence-halfpenny for a seat in the theatre at Athens 
paid for citizens by the State after the time of Pericles. 

118 



POLITICS, II. ιν. 11-13 

a particularly important one. For the upper classes 
may resent it on the ground that their merits are not 
equal, owing to which we actually see them often 
attacking the government and rebelling ; and also 
the baseness of human beings is a thing insatiable, 
and though at the first a dole of only two obols a is 
enough, yet when this has now become an established 
custom, they always want more, until thev get to 
an unlimited amount ; for appetite is in its nature 
unlimited, and the majority of mankind live for the 

12 satisfaction of appetite. The starting-point in such 
matters therefore, rather than levelling estates, is to 
train those that are respectable by nature so that 
they may not wish for excessive wealth, and to con- 
trive that the base may not be able to do so, and 
this is secured if they are kept inferior, while not 
unjustly treated. And also we cannot approve what 
Phaleas has said about equality of property, for he Personal 
makes the citizens equal in respect of landed estate uf^yj, 
only, but wealth also consists in slaves and cattle and landed 
money, and there is an abundance of property in the control 
shape of what is called furniture ; we must therefore 
either seek to secure equality or some moderate regu- 
lation as regards all these things, or we must permit 

13 all forms of wealth. And it is clear from Phaleas's 
legislation that he makes the citizen-population a 
small one, inasmuch as all the artisans are to be 
publicly owned slaves and are not to contribute to 
the complement of the state. But if it is proper to 
have public slaves, it is the labourers emploved upon 
the public works who ought to be of that status (as is 
the case at Epidamnus and as Diophantus once tried 
to institute at Athens). 

These remarks may serve fairly well to indicate 

Π9 



ARISTOTLE 

1267 b 

τούτων αν τις θεωρησειεν ε'ί τι τνγχάνει καλώς 

είρηκώς η μη καλώς. 

V. Ίππόδαμος δέ Έιύρυφώντος Μιλησιος (ος καΐ 1 

την τών πόλεων οιαίρεσιν ενρε και τον Πειραιά 

κατετεμεν, γ€νόμ€νος και περί τον άλλον βίον 

25 περιττότερος διά φιλοτιμίαν όντως ώστε δοκεΐν 
ενίοις ζην περιεργότερον τριχών τε πληθει και 
κόσμω πολντελεΐ, 1 en δε εσθήτος* εντελούς μεν 
άλεεινης δε ονκ εν τω χειρ,ώνι μόνον αλλά και 
περί τονς θερινούς χρόνονς, λόγιος δέ και περί 
την δλην φνσιν είναι βονλόμενος) πρώτος τών μη 

so πολιτενομενων ενεχείρησε τι περί πολιτεία? ειπείν 
της αρίστης, κατεσκεναζε δέ την πόλιν τω πλήθει 2 
μεν μνρίανδρον, εις τρία δέ μέρη οιηρημενην 
εποίει γάρ εν μεν μέρος τεχνίτας, εν δέ γεωργούς, 
τρίτον δέ το προπολεμονν και τα. όπλα έχον. 
Βιηρει δ' εις τρία μέρη την χώραν, την μεν ιεράν 

85 την δέ δημόσιον την δ ιδίαν όθεν μεν τα νομι- 
ζόμενα ποιησονσι προς τονς θεονς, ίεράν, αφ ών ο 
οι προπολεμονντες βιώσονται, κοινην, την δέ τών 
γεωργών ιδίαν, ωετο δ' είδη και τών νόμων είναι 
τρία μόνον περί ών γάρ αϊ δίκαι γίνονται, τρία 
ταντ είναι τον αριθμόν, νβριν βλάβην θάνατον. 

40 ενομοθετει δέ και οικαστηριον εν το κνριον εις ο 3 

πάσας άνάγεσθαι δεϊν τάς μη καλώς κεκρισθαι 

δοκονσας δίκας, τοΰτο δέ κατεσκεναζεν εκ τινών 

1268a γερόντων αιρετών, τάς δέ κρίσεις εν τοις δι/αχ - 

στηρίοις ον διά ψηφοφορίας ωετο γινεσθαι οεΐν, 

1 κόσμφ πο\υτ€λ€Ϊ codd. aliqui : κόμης ΓΜΡ 1 . 
2 ϊσθ-ητο* <χρήσ€ΐ> ? Richards. 

° Architect and town-planner (see 1330 b 24), c. 475 b.c. 
This personal sketch anticipates the manner of Theophrastus. 

120 



POLITICS, II. ιν. 13— v. 3 

such merits and defects as may be contained in the 
constitution of Phaleas. 

1 V. Hippodamus α son of Euryphon, a Milesian Constitn 
(who invented the division of cities into blocks and Hippo- 
cut up Piraeus, and who also became somewhat d »nius. 
eccentric in his general mode of life owing to a desire 

for distinction, so that some people thought that he 
lived too fussily, with a quantity of hair b and expen- 
sive ornaments, and also a quantity of cheap yet 
warm clothes not only in winter but also in the 
summer periods, and who wished to be a man of 
learning in natural science generally), was the first 
man not engaged in politics who attempted to speak 

2 on the subject of the best form of constitution. His Three 
system was for a city with a population of ten 
thousand, divided into three classes ; for he made 
one class of artisans, one of farmers, and the third 

the class that fought for the state in war and was the 
armed class. He divided the land into three parts, «*"* 
one sacred, one public and one private : sacred land n ' 
to supply the customary offerings to the gods, com- 
mon land to provide the warrior class with food, and 
private land to be owned by the farmers. He thought three 
that there are only three divisions of the law, since naw 0I1S 
the matters about which lawsuits take place are 

3 three innumber — outrage, damage, homicide. Healso Judicial 
proposed to establish one supreme court of justice, system • 
to which were to be carried up all the cases at law 
thought to have been decided wrongly, and this 
court he made to consist of certain selected elders. 

He held that the verdicts in the courts ought not to 
be given by ballot, but that each juryman should 

* At Sparta men wore their hair long, but at Athens this 
was the mark of a dandy. 

121 



ARISTOTLE 

άλλα φερειν εκαστον πινάκιον, εν ω γράφειν, ει 
καταδικάζοι απλώς, την δίκην, ει δ' άπολύοι 
6 απλώς, κενόν, 1 ει δε το μεν το δε μη, τοΰτο δι- 
οριζειν νυν γαρ ουκ ωετο νενομοθετησθαι καλώς, 
άναγκάζειν γαρ επιορκεΐν η ταύτα η ταϋτα δικά- 
ζοντας, ετίθει δε νόμον π€ρΙ τών εύρισκόντων τι 4 
τη πόλ€ΐ συμφέρον, όπως τυγχάνωσι τιμής, και 
τοις παισι τών εν τω πολεμώ τελευτώντων εκ 
δημοσίου γίνεσΒαι την τροφην, ώς ούπω τοΰτο 

ίο παρ άλλοις νενομοθετημενον εστί δε και ev 
'Α#7ραι? οΰτος 6 νόμος νυν και ev έτεραις τών 
πόλεων, τους δ' άρχοντας αίρ€τούς υπό του δήμου 
είναι πάντας, δήμον δ' εποίει τά τρία μέρη της 
πόλεως• τους δ' αίρεθεντας επιμελεΖσθαι κοινών 
και ξενικών και όρφανικών. τά μεν ουν πλ€Ϊστα 

ΐδ και τά μάλιστα αξιόλογα της Ίπποδάμου τάξεως 
ταϋτ εστίν. άπορήσ€ΐ€ δ' άν τις πρώτον μεν την 5 
διαίρεσιν του πλήθους τών πολιτών, οι τ€ γάρ 
τ€χνΐται και οι γεωργοί και οι τά όπλα έχοντες 
κοινωνοΰσι της πολιτεία? πάντες, οι μεν γεωργοί 
ουκ έχοντες όπλα, οι δε τεχνΐται ούτε γην οϋτ€ 

20 όπλα, ώστε γίνονται σχεδόν δοΰλοι τών τά όπλα 
κεκτημένων, μετέχειν μεν ουν πασών τών τιμών 
αδύνατον {ανάγκη γάρ εκ τών τά όπλα εχόντων 
καθίστασθαι και στρατηγούς και πολιτοφύλακας 
και τάς κυριωτάτας αρχάς ώς είπεΐν)• μη μετ- 
έχοντας δε της πολιτείας πώς οΐόν τε φιλικώς εχειν 

1 κενόν <έαν> Meier. 
122 



POLITICS, II. v. 3-6 

bring a tablet on which if he found a simple verdict 
of guilty he should write the penalty, and if simply 
not guilty leave a blank, but if he found the prisoner 
guilty on some counts but not on others he should 
state this ; for the present state of the law he thought 
unsatisfactory, since it forces jurors to commit perjury 

4 by giving either the one verdict or the other. He pro- Rewards for 
posed a law that those who discovered something of ^gir^aity. 
advantage to the state should receive honour, and 

that the children of those who died in war should war- 
have their maintenance from the state, in the belief or P han8 • 
that this had never yet been provided by law among 
other people — but as a matter of fact this law exists 
at present both at Athens and in others of the cities. 
The governing officials were all to be chosen by the Electing 
assembly of the people, and this he made to consist assem ly ' 
of the three classes of the city ; and the officials 
elected were to superintend the business of the 
community and the affairs of foreign residents and 
of orphans. These then are the greatest number and 
the most noteworthy of the provisions in the system 

5 of Hippodamus. But doubt might be raised first of Criticism 
all about the division of the general mass of the statTitioiToi 
citizens. The artisans, the farmers and the military Hippo- 
class all participate in the government, though the soldiers 
farmers have not got arms and the artisans neither ^the sole 
arms nor land, which makes them almost the slaves citizens ; 
of those who possess the arms. Therefore for them 

to share in all the offices is impossible (for it is inevi- 
table that both military commanders and civic guards 
and in general the most important offices should be 
appointed from those that have the arms) ; but if 
they do not share in the government of the state, 
how is it possible for them to be friendly towards the 

123 



ARISTOTLE 

Μ προς την πολιτειαν ; αλλά δει κρείττους είναι τους q 
τα όπλα γε κεκτημένους αμφοτέρων των μερών, 
τοϋτο δ' ου ράδιον μη πο?ίλούς οντάς, ει δε τοΰτ 
εσται, τι δει τους άλλους μετεχειν της πολιτείας 
καΐ κυρίους είναι της των αρχόντων καταστάσεως ; 
ετι οι γεωργοί τι χρήσιμοι τη πόλει; τεχνίτας 

80 μεν γαρ άναγκαιον είναι (πάσα γαρ δειται πόλις 
τεχνιτών), και δύνανται οιαγίγνεσθαι καθάπερ εν 
ταΐς αλλαι? πόλεσιν από της τέχνης• οι δε γεωργοί 
πορίζοντες μεν τοις τα όπλα κεκτημενοις την 
τροφην ευλόγως αν ήσαν τι της πόλεως μέρος, νυν 

as δ' ιδίαν εχουσιν και ταύτην Ιδία γεωργοΰσιν. ετι 7 
δε την κοινήν, άφ' ής οι π ροπολε μουντές εζουσι 
την τροφην, ει μεν αυτοί γεωργήσουσιν , ουκ αν 
εΐη το μάχιμον έτερον και το γεωργοΰν, βούλεται 
δ' ό νομοθέτης• ει δ έτεροι τίνες έσονται τών τε 
τα ίδια γεωργουντων και τών μαχίμων, τέταρτον 

40 αυ μόριον εσται τοΰτο της πόλεως, ούδενός μετ- 
εχον αλλ' αλλότριοι της πολιτείας, άλλα μην ει 
τις τους αυτούς θήσει τους τε την ιδίαν και τους 
την κοινην γεωργοΰντας, τό τε πλήθος άπορον 
1268 b εσται τών καρπών εζ ων έκαστος γεωργήσει δύο 
οίκίαις, 1 και τίνος ένεκεν ουκ ευθύς άπό τής γής και 
τών αυτών κλήρων αύτοΐς τε την τροφην λήφονται 
και τοΐς μαχίμοις παρεζουσιν ; ταύτα δη πάντα g 
πολλήν έχει ταραχήν. ου καλώς δ' ουδ' ο περί 

δ τής κρίσεως έχει νόμος, τό κρίνειν άζιοΰν διαιρούντα 
1 Ross : οικία? codd. 

β As military posts must be filled by the military class, 
civilians will feel excluded and be disaffected ; and the 
military class may not be strong enough to control them. 
Better, then, not to give full citizenship to civilians. 
124 



POLITICS, II. v. 6-8 

6 constitution ? But it may be said that the ruling 
class as possessing the arms is bound to be stronger 
than both classes. But this is not easy if they are 
not numerous ; and if this be the case, why should 
the other classes participate in the government and 
control the appointment of the rulers a ? Again, what 
use are the farmers to the state ? artisans there must 
necessarily be (for every state requires artisans), and 
thev can make a living as in the other states from 
the practice of their craft ; but as for the farmers, 
although it would have been reasonable for them 
to be a portion of the state if they provided the class 
possessing the arms with its food, as it is they have 
private land of their own and farm it for themselves. 

7 And again, if the common land from which those who land-tenure 
fight for the state are to have their food is to be farmed ° "" ' 
by themselves, the military class would not be different 

from the agricultural, but the legislator intends it to 
be ; while if the cultivators of the common land are 
to be a different set of people from both those who 
cultivate the private farms and the soldiers, this will 
be yet a fourth section of the state, holding no part 
in it but quite estranged from the government. But 
yet if one is to make those who cultivate the private 
and the common land the same people, the amount 
of the produce from the farms which each man will 
cultivate will be scanty for two households, and 
moreover why are they not both to take food for 
themselves and to supply it to the soldiers direct 
g from the land and from the same allotments ? All qualified 
these points therefore involve much confusion. Also unworkable,• 
the law about trials is unsatisfactory — the permission 
for a qualified verdict though the charge in the indict- 

125 



ARISTOTLE 

1268 b „ , < \ ~ ι \ ι a ! 

της κρίσεως απλώς γεγραμμενης, και γινεσυαι τον 

δικαστήν διαιτητήν. τοΰτο δ εν μεν τη οιοατΎ) 

και πλείοσιν ενδέχεται {κοινολογούνται γαρ άλλή- 

λοις περί της κρίσεως), εν δε τοις δικασιτηριοις 

ουκ εστίν, άλλα και τουναντίον τούτω των νομο- 

10 θετών οι πολλοί παρασκενάζονσιν όπως οι δικασται 
μη κοινολογώνται προς αλλήλους . έπειτα πώς ουκ 9 
εσται ταραχώδης η κρίσις όταν όφείλειν μεν ο 
δικαστής οΐηται μη τοσούτον δ' όσον 6 δικαζόμενος ; 
6 μεν γαρ είκοσι μνας, ο δε δικαστής κρίνει 1 δέκα 
μνας (η 6 μεν πλέον 6 δ' έλασσον), άλλος δε 

15 πέντε, 6 δε τετταρας [και τούτον δη τον τρόπον 
δηλον οτι μεριοϋσιν) , οι δε πάντα καταδικάσουσιν , 
οι δ' ούδεν τις οΰν 6 τρόπος εσται της διαλογής 
τών ψήφων; ετι δ' ούδει? επιορκεΐν αναγκάζει 
τον απλώς άποδικάσαντα ή καταδικάσαντα, ειπερ 
απλώς το έγκλημα γεγραπται, δικαίως 2 ' ου γαρ 

20 μηδέν όφείλειν ο άποδικάσας κρίνει άλλα τάς 
είκοσι μνάς• άλλ' εκείνος ηδη επιορκεΐ ο κατα- 
δικάσας μη νομίζων όφείλειν τάς είκοσι μνας. 
περί δε του τοις εύρίσκουσί τι τη πόλει συμφέρον 10 
ως δει γίνεσθαί τίνα τιμήν, ουκ εστίν ασφαλές το 
νομοθετεΐν, άλλ' εύόφθαλμον άκοΰσαι μόνον έχει 

25 γάρ συκοφαντίας και κινήσεις, αν τύχη, πολιτείας, 
εμπίπτει δ' εις άλλο πρόβλημα και σκεφιν ετεραν 

1 κρίνει Bekker : κρίνα codd. 2 [δικαίως] ? Greenwood. 

The mina, 100 drachmas, may be put at £4• (gold). 
126 



POLITICS, II. v. &-10 

ment is unqualified, and the conversion of the juror 
into an arbitrator. A qualified verdict is practicable 
in an arbitration even when there are several arbi- 
trators , for they confer with one another about their 
verdict; but it is not practicable in the law-courts, 
in fact the contrary to this is provided for bv most 
lawgivers, who prohibit consultation between the 

9 jurymen. Then the verdict will inevitablv be a con- 
fused one when the juror thinks that the defendant 
is liable for damages but not in so large an amount 
as the plaintiff claims ; for the plaintiff will sue for 
twenty minae α and the juror will adjudge ten minae 
(or the former some larger and the latter some 
smaller sum), and another juror five minae, and vet 
another four (and they obviously make fractions 
like this), while others will award the whole sum, 
and others nothing ; what then will be the method 
of counting the votes ? Again, nobody compels 
the juror to commit perjury who, as the indictment 
has been drawn in simple form, gives a simple ver- 
dict of acquittal or condemnation, if he gives it 
justly ; for the juror who gives a verdict of acquittal 
does not give judgement that the defendant 
owes nothing, but that he does not owe the 
twenty minae for which he is sued ; it is only the 
juror who gives a verdict condemning the defendant 
when he does not think that he owes twentv minae 

10 who commits perjury. As for the view that an reward tot 
honour ought to be awarded to those who invent S^ntToM 
something advantageous to the state, legislation to dangerous, 
this effect is not safe, but only specious to the ear ; 
for it involves malicious prosecutions and, it mav even 
happen, constitutional upheavals. And the matter conserva- 
leads to another problem and a different inquiry : *j s ™ "• . 

127 genera1 • 



ARISTOTLE 

αποροΰσι γάρ τίνες πότερον βλαβερόν η συμφέρον 
ταΐς πόλεσι το κινεΐν τους πατρίους νόμους αν $ 
τις άλλος βελτίων. διόπερ ου ράοιον τω λεχθεντι 

30 ταχύ συγχωρεΐν, εΐπερ μη συμφέρει Kiveiv ενδέ- 
χεται δ είσηγεΐσθαί τινας νόμων λύσιν η πολιτείας 
ώς κοινόν ά}/α#όΐΛ επει δε πεποιημεθα μνείαν, ετι 1] 
μικρά περί αύτοΰ διαστείλασθαι βελτιον, έχει yap, 
ώσπερ εΐπομεν, άττορίαν. και δόζειεν αν βελτιον 
eimi το κινεΐν επί γοΰν των άλλων επιστημών 

35 τούτο συνενηνοχεν , οΐον ιατρική κινηθείσα παρά τά 
πάτρια και γυμναστική και δλως αϊ re^mi πάσαι 
καΐ αϊ δυνάμεις• ωστ επει μίαν τούτων θετεον 
και την πολιτικήν, δηλον δτι και περί ταύτην 
άναγκαΐον ομοίως εχειν. σημεΐον δ' αν γεγονεναι 
φαίη τις επ* αυτών των έργων, τους γάρ αρχαίους 

ιο νόμους λίαν άπλοΰς είναι και βαρβαρικούς• εσι- 
δηροφοροϋντό τε γάρ οι "Ελληνες και τάς γυναίκας 
εωνοϋντο παρ αλλήλων, οσα τε λοιπά των αρχαίων 12 
1269 a εστί που νομίμων εύήθη πάμπαν εστίν, οΐον εν 
Κύμη περί τά φονικά νόμος εστίν, αν πληθός τι 
παράσχηται μαρτύρων ο διώκων τον φόνον των 
αύτοΰ συγγενών, ενοχον είναι τω φόνω τον φεύ- 
γοντα. ζητοΰσι δ' δλως ου το πάτριον άλλα 

5 Taya^ov' πάντες• εικός τε τους πρώτους, είτε 



128 






POLITICS, II. v. 10-12 

some persons raise the question whether to alter the 
traditional laws, supposing another law is better, is 
harmful or advantageous to states. Hence it is not 
easy to give a speedy agreement to the above 
proposal to honour reformers, if really it is disadvan- 
tageous to alter the laws ; and a revolutionary legal 
or constitutional proposal in the interest of the com- 

11 munity is quite possible. And since we have made 
mention of this question, it will be better if we set 
out a few further details about it, for, as we said, it 
involves difficulty. And it might be thought that it 
would be better for alteration to take place ; at all 
events in the other fields of knowledge this has proved 
beneficial — for example, medicine has been improved 
by being altered from the traditional system, and 
gymnastic training, and in general all the arts and 
faculties ; so that since statesmanship also is to be 
counted as one of these, it is clear that the same thing 
necessarily holds good in regard to it as well. And it 
might be said that a sign of this has occurred in the 
actual events of history, for (one might argue) the laws 
of ancient times were too simple and uncivilized : the 
Hellenes, for instance, used both to carry arms and to 

12 purchase their wives from one another, and all the 
survivals of the customs of antiquity existing any- 
where are utterly foolish, as for example at Cyme 
there is a law relating to trials for murder, that if 
the prosecutor on the charge of murder produces a 
certain number of his own relatives as witnesses, the 
defendant is guilty of the murder. And in general 
all men really seek what is good, not what was 
customary with their forefathers ; and it is probable 
that primitive mankind, whether sprung from the 



129 



ARISTOTLE 

1269 a 

γηγενείς ήσαν είτ εκ φθοράς τινός εσώθησαν, 
όμοιους €lvcll και τους τυχόντας και τους ανόητους, 
ώσπερ και λέγεται κατά των γηγενών, ώστ' 
άτοπον το μενειν εν τοις τούτων δόγμασιν. προς 
δε τούτοις ούοε τους γεγραμμενους εάν ακίνητους 
βελτιον. ώσπερ γαρ και περί τάς άλλας τεχνας, 

ίο και την πολιτικην τάξιν αδύνατον ακριβώς πάντα 
γραφηι>αι• καθόλου γαρ άναγκαΐον γραφηναι, αϊ δε 
πράξεις περί τών καθ* εκαστόν είσιν. εκ μεν ούν 
τούτων φανερόν δτι κινητεοι και τίνες και ποτέ 
τών νόμων εισιν. άλλον δε τρόπον επισκοποΰσιν 13 

15 ευλάβειας αν δόξειεν είναι πολλής, όταν γαρ η το 
μεν βελτιον μικρόν, το δ' εθίζειν ευχερώς λύειν 
τους νόμους φαΰλον, φανερόν ως εατεον ενίας 
αμαρτίας και τών νομοθετών και τών αρχόντων 
ου γαρ τοσούτον ωφελήσεται κινησας όσον βλα- 
/Jrjaerai τοις άρχουσιν άπειθεΐν εθισθείς, φεύδος δε 14 
και το παράδειγμα το περί τών τεχνών ου γαρ 

20 όμοιον το κινεϊν τεχνην και νόμον 6 γαρ νόμος 
ισχύν ούδεμίαν έχει προς το πείθεσθαι πλην παρά 
το εθος , τούτο δ' ου γίνεται ει μη δια χρόνου 
πλήθος, ώστε το ραδίως μεταβάλλειν εκ τών 
υπαρχόντων νόμων εις έτερους νόμους καινούς 

25 ασθενή ποιεΐν εστί την τοΰ νόμου δυνα/χιν. ετι 
δ ει και κινητεοι, πότερον και πάντες και εν 
πάση πολιτεία, η ου; και πότερον τω τυχόντι 
η τισίν; ταύτα γάρ έχει μεγάλην διαφοράν. διό 

α So Hesiod, W.D. 108, Pindar, Nem. 6. 1. 

» So Plato, Laws 676 ff., Timaeus 22 ff. Aristotle believed 
that man had existed for ever, and that the world had ex- 
perienced only local cataclysms. 
130 






POLITICS, II. v. 12-14 

earth a or the survivors of some destructive cataclysm, 
were just like ordinary foolish people, as indeed is 
actually said of the earth-born race, so that would be 
absurd for us to abide by their notions. Moreover 
even written codes of law may with advantage not be 
left unaltered. For just as in the other arts as well, 
so with the structure of the state it is impossible that 
it should have been framed aright in all its details ; 
for it must of necessity be couched in general terms, 
but our actions deal with particular things. These 
considerations then do seem to show that it is proper 

13 for some laws sometimes to be altered. But if we 
consider the matter in another way, it would seem 
to be a thing that needs much caution. For in 
cases when the improvement would be small, while 
it is a bad thing to accustom men to repeal the laws 
lightlv, it is clear that some mistakes both of the 
legislator and of the magistrate should be passed 
over ; for the people will not be as much benefited 
bv making an alteration as they will be harmed 
by becoming accustomed to distrust their rulers. 

14 Also the example from the case of the arts is fal- 
lacious, as to change the practice of an art is a 
different thing from altering a law ; for the law has 
no power to compel obedience beside the force of 
c ustom , and custom only grows up in long lapse of 
time, so that lightly to change from the existing laws 
to other new laws is to weaken the power of the law. 
Again, even if alteration of the laws is proper, are 
all the laws to be open to alteration, and in every 
form of constitution, or not ? and is any chance person 
to be competent to introduce alterations or only 
certain people ? for there is a great difference between 
these alternatives. Therefore let us abandon this 

131 



ARISTOTLE 

νυν μεν άφώμεν ταύτην την σκέφιν άλλων γαρ 
έστι καιρών. 

VI. Περί δε της Κακοδαιμονιών πολιτείας και 1 

so της Κρητικής, σχεδόν δε και περί των άλλων 
πολιτειών, δυο είσϊν αϊ σκέφεις, αια μεν ει τι 
καλώ? η μη καλώς προς την άρίστην νενομοθετηται 
τάζιν, έτερα δ' et τι προς την ύπόθεσιν και τον 
τρόπον ύπεναντίως 1 της προκείμενης αντοΐς 
πολιτείας. 

"Οτι μεν οΰν δει τή μελλονση καλώς πολιτεύε- 2 

85 σ0αι την τών αναγκαίων ύπάρχειν σχολην όμολογον- 
μενόν εστίν tiW 8ε τρόπον νπάρχειν, ον ράδιον 
λαβεΐν. η τε γαρ Θετταλών πενεστεία πολλάκις 
επεθετο τοις θετταλοΐς, ομοίως δέ και τοις 
Αάκωσιν οί Έιΐλωτες (ώσπερ γαρ έφεδρεύοντες 
τοις άτνχημασι διατελοΰσιν) • περί δέ τους Κρήτας 3 

40 ουδέν πω τοιούτον σνμβέβηκεν. αίτιον δ' ίσως το 
i269 b τάς γειτνιώσας πόλεις, καίπερ πόλε μούσας άλλη- 
λαις, μηδεμίαν είναι σύμμαχον τοις άφισταμε- 
νοις δια το μη συμφέρειν και ανταΐς κεκτημεναις 
περιοίκους• τοις δε Αάκωσιν οί γειτνιώντες εχθροί 
πάντες ήσαν, Άργεΐοι και Μεσσηνιοι και Άρ- 
5 κάδες' επεί και τοις Θετταλοΐς κατ αρχάς άφ- 
ίσταντο διά το πολεμεΐν έτι τοις προσχώροις, 
Άχαιοΐς και ΐίερραιβοΐς και Μάγνησιν. έοικε δέ 4 
και ει μηδέν έτερον, άλλα τό γε της επιμελείας 
εργώδες είναι, nVa δει προς αυτούς ομιλήσαι 
τρόπον άνιέμενοί τε γαρ ύβρίζουσι και τών ίσων 

ίο άξιοίσιν εαυτούς τοις κυρίοις, και κακοπαθώς 

1 <#> ύπει/αντίω* Scaliger. 
132 



POLITICS, II. v. 14— νι. 4 

inquiry for the present, since it belongs to other 
occasions. 

1 VI. On the subject of the constitution of Sparta Spartan 
and that of Crete, and virtually in regard to the other ti0IU 
forms of constitution also, the questions that arise for 
consideration are two, one whether their legal struc- 
ture has anv feature that is admirable or the reverse 

in comparison with the best system, another whether 
it contains any provision that is really opposed to 
the fundamental principle and character of the con- 
stitution that the founders had in view. 

2 Xow it is a thing admitted that a state that is to Social 
be well governed must be provided with leisure from Η β ίοο 8 " 
menial occupations ; but how this is to be provided system 
it is not easy to ascertain. The serf class in Thessaly badly. 
repeatedly rose against its masters, and so did the 
Helots at Sparta, where they are like an enemy con- 
stantly sitting in wait for the disasters of the Sparti- 

3 ates. Nothing of the kind has hitherto occurred 
in Crete, the reason perhaps being that the neigh- 
bouring cities, even when at war with one another, 
in no instance ally themselves with the rebels, be- 
cause as they themselves also possess a serf class this 
would not be for their interest ; whereas the Laco- 
nians were entirely surrounded by hostile neighbours, 
Argives, Messenians and Arcadians. For with the 
Thessalians too the serf risings originally began 
because they were still at war with their neighbours, 

4 the Achaeans, Perrhaebi and Magnesians. Also, 
apart from other drawbacks, the mere necessity of 
policing their serf class is a troublesome matter — 
the problem of how intercourse with them is to be 
carried on : if allowed freedom they grow insolent 
and claim to be as good as their masters, and if 

133 



ARISTOTLE 

1289 b γ „ > ο λ / ^ - c.~\ τ» 

ςω^τβ? επιρουλευουσι και μισουσιν. οηλον ουν ως 

ουκ εξευρίσκουσι τον βελτιστον τρόπον οΐς τοΰτο 

συμβαίνει περί την είλωτείαν. ετι δ' ή wept τάς 5 

γυναίκας άνεσις καΐ προς την προαίρεσιν της 

πολιτείας βλαβερά και προς εύδαιμονίαν πόλεως• 

15 ωσπερ γαρ οικίας μέρος άνηρ και γυνή, δήλον δτι 
και πολιν εγγύς του δίχα διηρήσθαι δει νομίζειν 
εις τε το των ανδρών πλήθος και το των γυναικών, 
ωστ εν οσαις πολιτειαις φαύλως έχει το περί τάς 
γυναίκας το ήμισυ της πόλεως etVcu δει νομίζειν 
ανομοθετητον. όπερ εκεί συμβεβι^κεν δλην γάρ 

20 την πόλιν ο νομοθέτης είναι βουλόμενος καρτερικήν, 
κατά μεν τους άνδρας φανερός εστί τοιούτος ων, 
επι δε τών γυναικών εζημεληκεν ζώσι γάρ άκο- 
λάστως 1 προς άπασαν άκολασίαν και τρυφερώς. 
ωστ άναγκαΐον εν τη τοιαύτη πολιτεία, τι/χασ^αι 6 

25 τον πλοΰτον, άλλως τε καν τύχωσι γυναικο κρατού- 
μενοι, καθάπερ τα πολλά τών στρατιωτικών και 
πολεμικών γενών, εξω Κελτών ή καν ει τίνες 
έτεροι φανερώς τετιμηκασι την προς τους άρρενας 
συνουσιαν. εοικε γάρ ο μυθολογησας πρώτος ουκ 
άλόγως συζεΰξαι τον "Αρη προς την Άφροδίτην 

so η γάρ προς την τών αρρένων ομιλίαν η προς την 
τών γυναικών φαίνονται κατακώχιμοι πάντες οι 
τοιούτοι, διό παρά τοις Αάκωσι τοΰθ' ύπήρχεν, Τ 
και 7τολλά διωκεΐτο υπό τών γυναικών επι της 
αρχής αυτών καίτοι τι διαφέρει γυναίκας άρχειν 
η τους άρχοντας υπό τών γυναικών άρχεσθαι; 

1 άνΐίμένως ? Richards. 

β The textual emendation giving ' live without restraint ' is 
probably correct. 

134 



POLITICS, II. νι. 4-7 

made to live a hard life they plot against them and 
hate them. It is clear therefore that those whose 
helot-system works out in this way do not discover 

5 the best mode of treating the problem. Again, the Freedom 
freedom in regard to women is detrimental both in tneir 
regard to the purpose of the constitution and in licence, 

o * * ji . undue 

regard to the happiness of the state. For just as influence, 
man and wife are part of a household, it is clear that fawieeenesit 
the state also is divided nearly in half into its male 
and female population, so that in all constitutions in 
which the position of the women is badly regulated 
one half of the state must be deemed to have been 
neglected in framing the law. And this has taken 
place in the state under consideration, for the law- 
giver wishing the whole community to be hardy 
displays his intention clearly in relation to the men, 
but in the case of the women has entirely neglected 
the matter ; for they live dissolutely a in respect of 

6 every sort of dissoluteness, and luxuriously. So that 
the inevitable result is that in a state thus constituted 
wealth is held in honour, especially if it is the 
case that the people are under the sway of their 
women, as most of the military and warlike races are, 
except the Celts and such other races as have openly 
held in honour attachments between males. For 
it appears that the original teller of the legend 
had good reason for uniting Ares with Aphrodite, 
for all men of martial spirit appear to be attracted 
to the companionship either of male associates or 

7 of women. Hence this characteristic existed among 
the Spartans, and in the time of their empire many 
things were controlled by the women ; yet what 
difference does it make whether the women rule or 
the rulers are ruled by the women ? The result is 

135 



ARISTOTLE 

1269 b > \ > η , > S > u 

&> ταυτο γαρ συμραινει. χρήσιμου ο ονσης της 
θρασύτητος προς ού8εν τών εγκυκλίων, αλλ' ε'ίπερ, 
προς τον πόλ€μον, βλαβ€ρώταται καΐ προς ταυ# 
αϊ των Αακώνων ήσαν ε8ήλωσαν δ' επί της των 1 
Θηβαίων εμβολής, χρήσιμοι μεν γαρ ού8εν ήσαν, 
ωσπερ εν ετεραις πόλεσιν, θόρυβον 8ε παρεΐχον 

40 πλειω των πολεμίων. εζ αρχής μεν ουν εοικε 8 
συμβεβηκεναι τοις Αάκωσιν ευλόγως ή των γυ- 

1270 a ναικών άνεσις, εζω γαρ τής οικείας δια τάς 

στρατείας άπεζενοΰντο πολύν χρόνον, πολεμοΰντες 
τον τε προς Άργείους πόλεμον και πάλιν τον προς 
'Αρκάδα? και Μεσσηνίους• σχολάσαντες 8ε αυτούς 
6 μεν παρεΐχον τω νομοθέτη προω8οπεποιημενους 
οιά τον στρατιωτικών β'ιον (πολλά γάρ έχει μέρη 
τής αρετής), τάς 8ε γυναίκας φασι μεν άγειν επι- 
χειρήσαι τον Αυκοΰργον υπό τους νόμους, ως ο 
άντεκρουον, άποστήναι πάλιν. αίτίαι μεν ουν 9 
είσιν αύται των γενομένων, ώστε 8ήλον οτι και 
ίο ταύτης τής αμαρτίας• αλλ' ημείς ου τοϋτο σκοπού - 
μεν, τίνι 8εΐ συγγνώμην εχειν ή μη εχειν, άλλα 
περί του ορθώς και μη ορθώς, τα 8ε περί τάς 
γυναίκας έχοντα μη καλώς εοικεν, ώσπερ ελέχθη 
και πρότερον, ου μόνον άπρεπειάν τίνα ποιεΐν τής 
πολιτείας αυτής καθ' αυτήν, άλλα συμβάΧλεσθαι 
τι προς την φιλοχρηματίαν. μετά γάρ τα νυν 10 
ρηθεντα τοις περί την άι^ωααλιαν τής κτήσεως 
επιτιμήσειεν αν τι?, τοις μεν γάρ αυτών συμ- 
βεβηκε κεκτήσθαι πολλήν λίαν ούσίαν, τοις 8ε 
ττάμπαν μικράν 8ιόπερ εις ολίγους ήκεν ή χώρα. 

1 των om. codd. plurimi. 

° Under Epaminondas, 369 B.C. 
136 



POLITICS, II. νι. 7-10 

the same. And although bravery is of service for 
none of the regular duties of life, but if at all, in war, 
even in this respect the Spartans' women were most 
harmful ; and they showed this at the time of the 
Theban invasion, for they rendered no useful service, 
like the women in other states, while they caused 

8 more confusion than the enemy. It is true therefore 
that at the outset the freedom allowed to women 
at Sparta seems to have come about with good 
reason, for the Spartans used to be away in exile 
abroad for long periods on account of their military 
expeditions, both when righting the war against 
the Argives and again during the war against the 
Arcadians and Messenians, and when they had 
turned to peaceful pursuits, they handed over them- 
selves to the lawgiver already prepared for obedience 
by military life (for this has many elements of virtue), 
but as for the women, though it is said Lycurgus 
did attempt to bring them under the laws, yet since 

9 they resisted he gave it up. So the Spartan women 
are, it is true, to blame for what took place then 
and therefore manifestly for the present defect ; al- 
though for our own part we are not considering who 
deserves excuse or does not, but what is right or 
wrong in the constitution as it is. But, as was also 
said before, errors as regards the status of women 
seem not onlv to cause a certain unseemliness 
in the actual conduct of the state but to contri- 

10 bute in some degree to undue love of money. For concentra- 
next to the things just spoken of one might cen- p°°J?rtv 
sure the Spartan institutions with respect to the and decline 
unequal distribution of wealth. It has come about °ion? P *" 
that some of the Spartans own too much property 
and some extremely little ; owing to which the land 

f 137 



ARISTOTLE 

1270 a ~£\ \£\~ / / ι /\ 

τούτο oe και οια των νομών τετακται φαυλως• 

20 ων€Ϊσθαι μεν γαρ ή πωλεΐν την ύπάρχονσαν 
έποίησεν ου καλόν, ορθώς ποιήσας, διδοναι δε 
καΐ καταλείπειν έζουσίαν έδωκε τοις βουλομενοις' 
καίτοι, τούτο συμβαίνειν άναγκαΐον εκείνως τ€ και 
οϋτως. εστί δε και των γυναικών σχεδόν της πάσης 11 
χώρας τών πέντε μερών τα. δυο, τών τ' έπικληρων 

25 πολλών γινομένων και δια τό προίκας διδοναι 
μεγάλας• καίτοι βέλτιον ην μηδεμίαν η όλίγην 
η και μετρίαν τετάχθαι. 1 νυν δ' έξεστι δοΰναί 
Τ€ την έπικληρον οτω αν βούληται, καν αποθάνη 
μη διαθεμένος, ον αν καταλίπη κληρονόμον , οΰτος 
ω αν θέλη δίδωσιν. τοιγαροΰν δυναμένης της 

so χώρας χίλιους ιππείς τρέφειν και πεντακόσιους 
και όπλίτας τρισμυρίους, ουδέ χίλιοι τό πλήθος 
ήσαν. γέγονε δε δια τών έργων αυτών δήλον ότι 12 
φαύλως αύτοΐς είχε τα περί την τάζιν ταύτην 
μίαν γαρ πληγην ούχ ύπήνεγκεν ή πόλις, αλλ' 
άπώλετο δια την όλιγανθρωπίαν. λέγουσι δ ως 

85 επι μεν τών προτέρων /?ασιλε'α)ν μετεδίδοσαν της 
πολιτείας, ωστ ου )/ινεσθαι τότε όλιγανθρωπίαν 
πολεμούντων πολύν χρόνον και φασιν εΐναί ποτέ 
τοις Έπαρτιάταις 2 και μύριους, ου μην αλλ' ειτ' 
έστιν αληθή ταύτα είτε μη, βέλτιον τό δια τής 
κτήσεως ώμαλισμένης πληθύειν ανδρών την πόλιν. 

1 hie lacunam Buecheler. 
* rods Σπαρτιάταί Buecheler. 

° A clause seems to have been lost: 'Also it would have 
been better to regulate by law the marriage of heiresses.' 
6 i.e. the consequent fall in the number of men rich enough 

138 



POLITICS, II. νι. 10-12 

has fallen into few hands, and this has also been 
badly regulated by the laws ; for the lawgiver made 
it dishonourable to sell a familv's existing estate, 
and did so rightly, but he granted liberty to alienate 
land at will by gift or bequest ; yet the result that 
has happened was bound to follow in the one case 

11 as well as in the other. And also nearly two- fifths 
of the whole area of the country is owned by women, 
because of the number of women who inherit estates 
and the practice of giving large dowries ; yet it 
would have been better if dowries had been pro- 
hibited by law or limited to a small or moderate 
amount ° ; whereas in fact he is allowed to give an 
heiress in marriage to whomever he likes, and if he 
dies without having made directions as to this by 
will, whoever he leaves as his executor bestows her 
upon whom he chooses. As a result of this b although 
the country is capable of supporting fifteen hundred 
cavalry and thirty thousand heavy-armed troopers, 

12 they numbered not even a thousand. And the 
defective nature of their system of land-tenure has 
been proved by the actual facts of history : the 
state did not succeed in enduring a single blow, c but 
perished owing to the smallness of its population. 
They have a tradition that in the earlier reigns they 
used to admit foreigners to their citizenship, with 
the result that dearth of population did not occur in 
those days, although they were at war for a long 
period ; and it is stated that at one time the Spar- 
tiates numbered as many as ten thousand. However, 
whether this is true or not, it is better for a state's 
male population to be kept up by measures to equalize 

to keep a horse or even to provide themselves with heavy 
arms. ■ The battle of Leuctra, 37 1 b.c. 

139 



ARISTOTLE 

1270» f , , t χ χ 

40 υπεναντιος δε και ο περί την τεκνοποιιαν νομός 13 

1270 b προς ταύτην την διόρθωσιν. βουλόμενος γαρ 6 

νομοθέτης ώς πλείστους eirai τους Σ,παρτιάτας, 

προάγεται, 1 τους πολιτας δτι πλείστους ποιεΐσθαι 

παιδα?• εστί γαρ αύτοΐς νόμος τον μεν γεννήσαντα 

τρεΐς υιούς άφρουρον είναι, τον δε τετταρας ατελή 

5 πάντων, καίτοι φανερόν οτι πολλών γινομένων, 

της 8ε χώρας ούτω διηρημενης, άναγκαΐον πολλούς 

yit'ea^at πένητας . 

Άλλα μην και τά περί την εφορείαν έχει φαύλως' 14 

η γαρ αρχή κυρία μεν αύτη τών μεγίστων αύτοΐς 

εστίν, γίνονται δ εκ του δήμου παντός, 2 ώστε 

10 πολλάκις εμπίπτουσιν άνθρωποι σφόδρα πένητες 
εις το άρχεΐον, οι δια την άπορίαν ώνιοι ήσαν. 3 
εδήλωσαν δε πολλάκις μεν και πρότερον, και νυν 
δέ εν τοΐς Άνδρίοις• διαφθαρεντες γαρ άργυρίω 
τίνες όσον εφ' εαυτοΐς δλην την πάλιν απώλεσαν, 
και δια το την αρχήν είναι λίαν μεγάλην και 

15 ίσοτύραννον δημαγωγεΐν [αυτού?] 4 ηναγκάζοντο 
καΐ οι βασιλείς, ώστε και ταύτη συνεπιβλάπτεσθαι 
την πολιτείαν δημοκρατία γαρ εζ αριστοκρατίας 
συνεβαινεν . συνέχει μεν οΰν την πολιτείαν το 15 
άρχεΐον τούτο — ησυχάζει γαρ ό δήμος δια το 
μετεχειν τής μεγίστης αρχής, ώστ είτε διά τον 

20 νομοθετην είτε διά τύχην τούτο συμπεπτωκεν, συμ- 

1 προά -yei Spengel. 2 wavrot Sauppe : πάντα codd. 

* ύσίν Richards. 4 Oncken. 

α The five Ephors, elected for a year by the people, were 
the real rulers of Sparta. The two kings were hereditary; 
the senate of twenty-eight nobles advised them, and the 
Ephors presided at the Assembly of citizens over thirty years 
old, who voted on the measures of the Kings and Ephors but 
140 



POLITICS, II. νι. 13-15 

13 property. The law in relation to parentage is also 
somewhat adverse to the correction of this evil. For 
the lawgiver desiring to make the Spartiates as 
numerous as possible holds out inducements to the 
citizens to have as many children as possible : for 
thev have a law releasing the man who has been 
father of three sons from military service, and ex- 
empting the father of four from all taxes. Yet it is 
clear that if a number of sons are born and the land 
is correspondingly divided there will inevitably come 
to be many poor men. 

14 Moreover the regulations for the Ephorate α are Political 
also bad. For this office has absolute control over J^ 60 * 8 : 
their most important affairs, but the Ephors are Ephorate, 
appointed from the entire people, so that quite poor 

men often happen to get into the office, who owing 
to their poverty used to be 6 easily bought. This 
was often manifested in earlier times, and also lately 
in the affair c at Andros ; for certain Ephors were 
corrupted with money and so far as lay in their power 
ruined the whole state. And because the office was 
too powerful, and equal to a tyranny, the kings also 
were compelled to cultivate popular favour, so that 
in this way too the constitution was jointly injured, 
for out of an aristocracy came to be evolved a 

15 democracy. Thus this office does, it is true, hold 
together the constitution — for the common people 
keep quiet because thev have a share in the highest 
office of state, so that owing to the lawgiver's fore- 
sight, or else to accident, the Ephorate is advanta- 

could not discuss them. The small fleet was commanded by 
a single admiral appointed for a year by the Ephors and not 
allowed to hold office twice. 

* Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give ' are.' 

' Unknown. 

141 



ARISTOTLE 

1270 b 






φερόντως έχει τοις πράγμασιν, δεΐ γάρ την 
πολιτείαν την μέλλουσαν σφζεσθαι πάντα βού- 
λεσθαι τα. μέρη της πόλεως είναι και διαμένειν 
κατά ταύτα 1 • οι μεν ονν βασιλείς διά την αυτών 
τιμήν οΰτως έχουσιν, οι δέ κάλοι κάγαθοι διά την 

25 γερουσίαν (άθλον γάρ η άρχη αϋτη της αρετής 
εστίν), 6 δε δήμος διά την έφορείαν καθίσταται 
γάρ εξ απάντων — αλλ' αίρετην έδει την άρχην 16 
eimi ταύτην εξ απάντων μεν, μη τον τρόπον δε 
τούτον ον νυν, παιδαριώδης γάρ εστί λίαν. έτι 
δε και κρίσεων είσι μεγάλων κύριοι, οντες οι 

80 τυχόντες, διόπερ ούκ αύτογνώμονας βέλτιον κρίνειν 
άλλα κατά τα γράμματα καϊ τους νόμους, εστί 
δέ και η δίαιτα των εφόρων ούχ όμολογουμένη 
τω βουληματι της πόλεως 2 • αύτη 3 μεν γάρ άν- 
ειμένη λίαν εστίν, εν δέ τοις άλλοις μάλλον υπερ- 
βάλλει επι το σκληρόν, ώστε μη δύνασθαι καρ- 

85 τερεΐν άλλα λάθρα τον νόμον άποδιδράσκοντας 
απόλαυε ιν των σωματικών ηδονών, έχει δέ και Π 
τά περί την τών γερόντων άρχην ού καλώς αύτοΐς. 
επιεικών μέν γάρ όντων και πεπαιδευμένων ίκανώς 
προς άνδραγαθίαν τάχ αν ε'ίπειέ τις σνμφέρειν τη 
πόλει, καίτοι τό γε διά βίου κυρίους είναι κρίσεων 

40 μεγάλων άμφισβητησιμον (εστί γάρ, ώσπερ και 
1271a σώματος, και διανοίας γήρας)' τον τρόπον δέ 
τούτον πεπαιδευμένων ώστε και τον νομοθέτην 
αυτόν άπιστεΐν ως ούκ άγαθοΐς άνδράσιν, ούκ 
ασφαλές, φαίνονται δέ και καταδωροδοκούμενοι 18 
και καταχαριζόμενοι πολλά τών κοινών οι κεκοι- 






1 κατά ταύτα Bernays : ταύτα, ταντα, αυτά codd. 
2 iroXtre/as Scaliger. * αϋτη ΓΜΡΉ. 

α There is no clear evidence what the method was. 
142 






POLITICS, II. νι. 15-18 

geous for the conduct of affairs ; for if a constitu- 
tion is to be preserved, all the sections of the state 
must wish it to exist and to continue on the same 
lines ; so the kings are in this frame of mind owing to 
their own honourable rank, the nobility owing to the 
office of the Elders, which is a prize of virtue, and 
the common people because of the Ephorate, which 

16 is appointed from the whole population — but yet the 
Ephorate, though rightly open to all the citizens, 
ought not to be elected as it is now. for the method 
is too childish. And further the Ephors have juris- 
diction in lawsuits of high importance, although they 
are any chance people, so that it would be better 
if they did not decide cases on their own judgement 
but by written rules and according to the laws. Also 
the mode of life of the Ephors is not in conformity 
with the aim of the state, for it is itself too luxurious, 
whereas in the case of the other citizens the pre- 
scribed life goes too far in the direction of harshness, 
so that they are unable to endure it, and secretly 
desert the law and enjoy the pleasures of the body. 

17 Also their regulations for the office of the Elders are the Senate : 
not good ; it is true that if these were persons of a 
high class who had been adequately trained in manly 
valour, one might perhaps say that the institution 
was advantageous to the state, although their life- 
tenure of the judgeship in important trials is indeed 
a questionable feature (for there is old age of mind 
as well as of body) ; but as their education has been 
on such lines that even the lawgiver himself cannot 
trust in them as men of virtue, it is a dangerous 

18 institution. And it is known that those who have 
been admitted to this office take bribes and betray 
many of the public interests by favouritism ; so that 

143 



ARISTOTLE 

1271 a 

5 νωνηκότες της άρχης ταύτης• διόπερ βελτιόν αυτούς 

μη ανεύθυνους είναι, νυν δ' είσίν. δόζειε δ' αν η 

τών εφόρων αρχή πάσας εύθύνειν τάς αρχάς' τούτο 

δε τη εφορεία μέγα λίαν το δώρον, καΐ τον τρόπον 

ου τούτον λεγομεν διδόναι δεΐν τα? εύθύνας. έ'τι 

δε και την αίρεσιν ην ποιούνται των γερόντων 

ίο κατά τε την κρίσιν εστί παιδαριώδης , και το αυτόν 
αίτεΐσθαι τον άζιωθησόμενον της άρχης ουκ ορθώς 
έχει• δει γαρ και βουλόμενον και μη βουλόμενον 
άρχειν τον άξιον της άρχης. νυν δ' όπερ και περί 19 
την άλλην πολιτείαν ο νομοθέτης φαίνεται ποιών 

15 φιλότιμους γαρ κατασκευάζων τους πολίτας τούτω 
κεχρηται προς την αίρεσιν τών γερόντων, ουδείς 
γαρ αν άρχειν αίτησαιτο μη φιλότιμος ων καίτοι 
τών αδικημάτων τών γ' 1 εκουσίων τα πλείστα συμ- 
βαίνει σχεδόν δια. φιλοτιμίαν και δια φιλοχρηματίαν 
τοις άνθρώποις. περί δε βασιλείας, ει μεν μη 20 

20 βελτιόν εστίν ύπάρχειν ταΐς πόλεσιν η βελτιόν, 
άλλος έστω λόγος• άλλα μην βελτιόν γε μη 
καθαπερ νυν, άλλα κατά τον αύτοΰ βίον εκαστον 
κρίνεσθαι τών βασιλέων, ότι δ' ό νομοθέτης ουδ' 
αύτος οιεται διή'ασ^αι ποιεΐν καλούς κάγαθους, 
δηλον άπιστει γοϋν ως ουκ ούσιν ικανώς άγαθοΐς 

25 άνδράσιν διόπερ εζεπεμπον συμπρεσβευτάς τους 
εχθρούς, και σωτηρίαν ενόμιζον τη πόλει eirai το 
στασιάζει^ τους βασιλείς, ου καλώς δ' ούδε περί 2 
τά συσσίτια τά καλούμενα φιδίτια νενομοθετηται 

1 ed. : τών y αδικημάτων τών aut τών y αδικημάτων codd. 

° i.e. the Ephors, two of whom went with the Kings. 
144 



POLITICS, Π. νι. 18-21 

it would be better if they were not exempt from 
having to render an account of their office., but at 
present thev are. And it might be held that the 
magistracv of the Ephors serves to hold all the offices 
to account ; but this gives altogether too much to 
the Ephorate, and it is not the way in which, as 
we maintain, officials ought to be called to account. 
Again, the procedure in the election of the Elders 
as a mode of selection is not only childish, but it is 
wrong that one who is to be the holder of this honour- 
able office should canvass for it, for the man worthy 
of the office ought to hold it whether he wants to or 

19 not. But as it is the lawgiver clearly does the same 
here as in the rest of the constitution : he makes the 
citizens ambitious and has used this for the election 
of the Elders, for nobody would ask for office if he 
were not ambitious ; yet surely ambition and love 
of money are the motives that bring about almost 
the greatest part of the voluntary wrongdoing that 

20 takes place among mankind. As to monarchy, the the Kings; 
question whether it is not or is an advantageous 
institution for states to possess may be left to another 
discussion : but at all events it would be advantageous 

that kings should not be appointed as they are now, 
but chosen in each case with regard to their own life 
and conduct. But it is clear that even the lawgiver 
himself does not suppose that he can make the kings 
men of high character : at all events he distrusts 
them as not being persons of sufficient worth ; owing 
to which the Spartans used to send their enemies a 
with them as colleagues on embassies, and thought 
that the safety of the state depended on division 

21 between the kings. Also the regulations for the Λβ Messes ■ 
public mess-tables called Phiditia have been badly 

U5 



ARISTOTLE 

12718 - / - vc; χ > » 

τω καταστησαντι πρώτον, εοει γαρ απο κοινού 
μάλλον είναι την σύνοδον, καθάπ€ρ iv Υ^ρητη' 

80 παρά δέ τοΐς Αάκωσιν εκαστον δει φερειν, και 
σφόδρα π€νήτων εν ίων όντων και τούτο το ανα- 
λωμα ου δυναμένων οαπανάν, ώστε συμβαινειν 
τουναντίον τω νομοθέτη της προαιρέσεως, βου- 
λεται μεν γαρ δημοκρατικον etvai το κατα- 
σκεύασμα των συσσιτίων, γίν€ται δ' ήκιστα δημο- 

85 κρατικόν ούτω νενομοθετημενον μετεχειν μεν γαρ 
ου ράδιον τοΐς λίαν πενησιν, ορός δε της πολιτ€ΐας 
ουτός εστίν αύτοΐς 6 πάτριος, τον μη δυναμενον 
τούτο το τέλος φερειν μη μετεχειν αυτής, τω δε 22 
πepl τους ναυάρχους νόμω και έτεροι τιν€ς επι- 
TeT^^Kaoiv, ορθώς επιτιμώντες• στάσεως γαρ 

40 γίνεται α'ίτιος, επι γαρ τοΐς βασιλεΰσα> ουσι 
στρατηγοΐς άΐοιος η ναυαρχία σχεδόν έτερα βασιλεία, 
καθεστηκεν . και ώδι δε τη υποθέσει του νομο- 
1271 b θετού επιτιμησειεν άν τί.?, όπερ και Πλάτων εν 
τοΐς Νοαοι? επκτετίμηκεν. προς γαρ μέρος αρετής 
η πάσα σύνταζις των νομών εστί, την πολεμικην 
αυτή γαρ χρήσιμη προς το κρατεΐν. τοιγαροΰν 
εσωζοντο μεν πολεμοΰντες, άπώλλυντο δε άρξαντες 
5 δια το μη επίστασθαι σχολάζειν μηδέ ήσκηκεναι 
μηδεμίαν άσκησιν ετεραν κυριωτεραν της πολε- 
μικής, τούτου δέ αμάρτημα ουκ ελαττον νομί- 23 
ζουσι μεν γαρ yiVeo^at τάγαθά τα περιμάχητα 
δι* αρετής μάλλον ή κακίας, και τοΰτο μεν καλώς, 

ίο οτι μεντοι ταύτα κρείττω τής αρετής ύπολαμ- 
βάνουσιν, ου καλώς, φαύλως δ' έχει και περί τα 
κοινά χρήματα τοΐς Σπαρτιάταις' οϋτε γαρ εν τω 

146 



POLITICS, Π. νι. 21-23 

laid down by their originator. The revenue for 
these ought to come rather from public funds, as in 
Crete ; but among the Spartans everybody has to 
contribute, although some of them are very poor and 
unable to find money for this charge, so that the 
result is the opposite of what the lawgiver purposed. 
For he intends the organization of the common 
tables to be democratic, but when regulated by the 
law in this manner it works out as by no means 
democratic ; for it is not easy for the very poor to 
participate, yet their established regulation for 
citizenship is that it is not to belong to one who is 

22 unable to pay this tax. The law about the Admirals the 
has been criticized by some other writers also, and A mira 
rightly criticized ; for it acts as a cause of sedition, 
since in addition to the kings who are military com- 
manders the office of Admiral stands almost as 
another kingship. Another criticism that may be General 
made against the fundamental principle of the law- f^f^f : 
giver is one that Plato has made in the Laws. The training 
entire system of the laws is directed towards one orpeace * 
part of virtue only, military valour, because this is 
serviceable for conquest. Owing to this they re- 
mained secure while at war, but began to decline 

when they had won an empire, because thev did not 
know how to five a peaceful life, and had been 
trained in no other form of training more important 

23 than the art of war. And another error no less 
serious than that one is this : they think that the 
coveted prizes of life are won by valour more than 
by cowardice, and in this they are right, yet they 
imagine wrongly that these prizes are worth more 

than the valour that wins them. The public finance bad financial 
of Sparta is also badly regulated : when compelled systenL 

147 



ARISTOTLE 

κοινώ της πόλεως εστίν ουδέν πολέμους μεγάλους 
άναγκαζομενοις πολεμεΐν, είσφέρουσί τε κακώς, 
δια γαρ το των Σπαρτιατών efrai την πλείστην 

1δ γην ουκ εξετάζουσιν αλλήλων τάς εισφοράς, άπο- 
βεβηκε τε τουναντίον τω νομοθέτη του συμ- 
φέροντος• την μεν γαρ πάλιν πεποίηκεν άχρήματον, 
τους δ ίδιώτας φιλοχρήματους. 

Τίερι μεν ουν της Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας επι 
τοσούτον ειρήσθω• ταΰτα γάρ εστίν α μάλιστ' αν 
τις επιτιμήσειεν. 

20 VII. Η δε Κρητική πολιτεία πάρεγγυς μεν εστί 1 
ταύτης, έχει δε μικρά μεν ου χείρον, το δε πλεΐον 
ήττον γλαφυρώς. και γάρ εοικε και λέγεται δε 
τά πλείστα /xe/xt/xiya^ai την Κρητικήν πολιτείαν ή 
των Αακώνων, τά δε πλείστα των αρχαίων ήττον 

25 διήρθρωται των νεωτέρων, φασι γάρ τον Αυκοΰρ- 
γον, δτε τήν επιτροπείαν τήν Χαριλάου 1 του βασι- 
λέως καταλιπών άπεδήμησεν, τότε τον πλείστον 
διατρΐφαι χρόνον περί τήν Κρήτην διά τήν συγ- 
yeveiav άποικοι γάρ οι Αύκτιοι των Αακώνων 
ήσαν, κατελαβον δ' οι προς τήν άποικίαν ελθόντες 

30 την τά^ιν τών νόμων ύπάρχουσαν εν τοις τότε 
κατοικοϋσιν διό και νυν οι περίοικοι τον αυτόν 
τρόπον χρώνται αύτοΐς, ώς κατασκευάσαντος Μ,ίνω 
πρώτου την τά^ιν τών νόμων, δοκεΐ δ' ή νήσος 2 
και προς τήν αρχήν τήν Έλληνικήν πεφυκεναι και 
κεΐσθαι καλώς• πάση γάρ επίκειται τη θαλασσή, 

1 Χαριλάου cod. inf., cf. 1316 a 34 : Χορ/λλου hie cet. 

° e.g. by Herodotus i. 65. 

" Posthumous son of Lycurgus's elder brother King Poly- 
dectes; cf. 1316 a 34. 

c Lyctus was an inland city in the east of Crete, not far 
from Cnossus. 
148 



Constitu- 
tion. 



POLITICS, II. vi. 23— vii. 2 

to carry on wars on a large scale she ha? nothing in 
the state treasury, and the Spartiates pay war taxes 
badly because, as most of the land is owned by them, 
they do not scrutinize each other's contributions. 
And the lawgiver has achieved the opposite result 
to what is advantageous — he has made the state poor 
and the individual citizen covetous. 

So much for a discussion of the constitution of 
Sparta : for these are the main points in it for 
criticism. 

1 VII. The Cretan constitution approximates to Cretan 
that of Sparta, but though in a few points it is not 
worse framed, for the larger part it has a less perfect 
finish. For the Spartan constitution appears and 
indeed is actually stated a to have been copied in most 
of its provisions from the Cretan ; and as a rule old 
things have been less fully elaborated than newer 

ones. For it is said that when Lycurgus relinquished Model for 
his post as guardian of King Charilaus b and went ycurgUi 
abroad, he subsequently passed most of his time in 
Crete because of the relationship between the 
Cretans and the Spartans ; for the Lyctians c were 
colonists from Sparta, and the settlers that went 
out to the colony found the system of laws already 
existing among the previous inhabitants of the place ; 
owing to which the neighbouring villagers even now 
use these laws in the same manner, in the belief that 

2 Minos d first instituted this code of laws. Also Geogiaphi- 
the island appears to be designed by nature and sfierationa. 
well situated to be the imperial state, as it lies 

across the whole of the sea, round which almost 

d Legendary ruler of Crete, son of Zeus and Europa, and 
after death a judge in the lower world. 

U9 



ARISTOTLE 

35 σχεδόν των Ελλήνων ιδρυμένων περί την θάλασσαν 
πάντων απέχει γαρ τη μεν της ΐίελοποννήσου 
μικρόν, τη δε της Άσια? του περί Ύριόπιον τόπου 
και 'Ρόδου, διό και την της θαλάσσης αρχήν 
κατεσχεν ό Μίνως, και τάς νήσους τάς μεν εχειρω- 
σατο τάς δ' ωκισεν, τέλος δε επιθεμενος τη Σικελία 

40 τον βίον ετελεύτησεν εκεί περί Κάμικον. 

Έχει δ' άνάλογον ή Κρητική τά^-ι? προς τήν 3 
1272 a Αακωνικήν. γεωργοΰσί Τ€ γαρ τοις μεν οι 1 είλωτες 
τοις δε Κρησίν οι περίοικοι, και συσσίτια παρ 
άμφοτεροις εστίν, και τό γε άρχαΐον εκάλουν οι 
Αάκωνες ου φιδίτια αλλ' άνδρια, καθάπερ οι 
Κρήτες, ή και δήλον ότι εκείθεν ελήλυθεν. ετι δε 
δ της πολιτείας ή τά^ι?' οι μεν γαρ έφοροι τήν 
αυτήν εχουσι δυνααιν' τοις εν τη Κρήτη καλου- 
μένοις κόσμοις, πλην οι μεν έφοροι πέντε τον αρι- 
θμόν οι δε κόσμοι δέκα εισίν οι δε γέροντες τοις 
γερουσιν ους καλοΰσιν οι Κρήτες βουλην ίσοι• 
βασίλεια δε πρότερον μεν ήν, είτα κατάλυσαν οι 

ίο Κρήτες, και τήν ήγεμονίαν οι κόσμοι τήν κατά 
πόλεμον εχουσιν εκκλησίας δε μετεχουσι πάντες, 4 
κυρία δ' ούδενός εστίν αλλ' η συνεπιφηφίσαι τα 
δό^αντα τοις γερουσι και τοις κόσμοις. 

Τά μεν οΰν των συσσιτίων έχει βελτιον τοις 
Κρησίν ή τοις Αάκωσιν εν μεν γάρ Αακεδαίμονι 

15 κατά κεφαλήν έκαστος εισφέρει τό τεταγμενον, 

ει δε μη, /χ,ετεχειν νόμος κωλύει της πολιτείας, 

καθάπερ εΐρηται και πρότερον, εν δε Κρήτη κοινο- 

1 μ£ι> οι (vel μϊν Αάκωσιν oi) ed. ; μϊν codd. 
150 



POLITICS, Π. νιι. 2-4 

all the Greeks are settled ; for Crete is only a short 
distance from the Peloponnese in one direction, and 
from the part of Asia around Triopium and from 
Rhodes in the other. Owing to this Minos won the 
empire of the sea,° and made some of the islands 
subject to him and settled colonies in others, but 
finally when making an attack on Sicily he ended 
his life there near Camicus. 

3 The Cretan institutions are on the same lines as Resem- 
those of Sparta : in Sparta the land is tilled by the gJJS^ 10 
Helots and in Crete by the serfs ; and also both have system. 
public mess-tables, and in old days the Spartans called 

them not 'phiditia' but 'men's messes,' as the Cretans 
do, which is a proof that they came from Crete. And 
so also is the system of government ; for the 
Ephors have the same power as the magistrates 
called Cosmi in Crete, except that the Ephors are 
five in number and the Cosmi ten ; and the Elders 
at Sparta are equal in number to the Elders whom 
the Cretans call the Council ; and monarchy existed 
in former times, but then the Cretans abolished 

4 it, and the Cosmi hold the leadership in war ; and 
all are members of the Assembly, which has no 
powers except the function of confirming by vote 
the resolutions already formed by the Elders and 
the Cosmi. 

Now the Cretan arrangements for the public mess- Messee 
tables are better than the Spartan ; for at Sparta j^^l^, 
each citizen pays a fixed poll-tax, failing which he is 
prevented by law from taking part in the government, 
as has been said before ; but in Crete the system is 
more communal, for out of all the crops and cattle 

β See Thucydides i. 4 and 8. The tradition of the wealth 
of Minos is supported by the recent excavations at Cnossus. 

151 



ARISTOTLE 

1272 a 

τερως• από πάντων γάρ των γινομένων καρπών 

τε και βοσκημάτων δημοσίων καΐ εκ των 1 φόρων 

ους φερουσιν οι περίοικοι τετακται μέρος τό μεν 

20 προς τους θεούς και τάς κοινάς λειτουργίας, το δε 
τοις συσσιτίοις, ώστ εκ κοινού τρεφεσθαι πάντας, 
και γυναίκας και παΐ8ας και άνδρας• προς δε την 5 
όλιγοσιτίαν ως ώφελιμον 77θλλά πεφιλοσόφηκεν 
6 νομοθέτης , και προς την διάζευζιν των γυναι- 
κών Ινα μη πολυτεκνώσι, την προς τους άρρενας 

25 ποιησας ομιλίαν, περί ης ει φαύλως η μη φαυλως 
έτερος εσται του διασκεφασθαι καιρός, δτι δη 2 
τά περί τά συσσίτια βελτιον τετακται τοις Κρησιν 
η τοις Αάκωσι, φανερόν τά δέ περί τους κόσμους 
ετι χείρον τών εφόρων, δ μεν γαρ έχει κακόν το 

30 τών εφόρων άρχεΐον, υπάρχει και τούτοις, γίνονται 
γάρ οι τυχόντες• ο δ' εκεί συμφέρει προς την 
πολιτείαν, ενταΰθ* ουκ εστίν, εκεί μεν γάρ διά 
τό την αιρεσιν εκ πάντων etrai μετέχων 6 δήμος 
της μεγίστης άρχης βουλεται μενειν την πολιτείαν 
ενταύθα δ' ουκ εξ απάντων αίροΰνται τους κόσμους 

85 άλλ' εκ τινών γενών, και τους γέροντας εκ τών 
κεκοσμηκότων , περί ων τους αυτούς άν τις εΐπειε 6 
λόγους και περί τών εν Αακεδαίμονι γινομένων 3 • 
τό γάρ άνυπευθυνον και τό διά βίου μείζον εστί 
γέρας της αξίας αύτοΐς, και τό μη κατά γράμ- 
ματα άρχειν αλλ' αύτογνώμονας επισφαλές, τό δ 

40 ήσυχάζειν μη μετέχοντα τον δημον ούδεν σημεΐον 

1 έκ των ante φόρων Richards, ante δημοσίων codd. 
* δη Lambinus : δέ codd. 3 ytpovruv Congreve. 



" This promise is not fulfilled. 
152 



POLITICS, Π. νιι. 4-6 

produced from the public lands, and the tributes paid 
by the serfs, one part is assigned for the worship of the 
gods and the maintenance of the public services, and 
the other for the public mess-tables, so that all the 
citizens are maintained from the common funds, 

5 women and children as well as men ; and the law- 
giver has devised many wise measures to secure the 
benefit of moderation at table, and the segregation 
of the women in order that they may not bear many 
children, for which purpose he instituted association 
with the male sex, as to which there will be another 
occasion ° to consider whether it was a bad thing or 
a good one. That the regulations for the common 
mess-tables therefore are better in Crete than at 
Sparta is manifest ; but the regulations for the Cosmi 
are even worse than those regarding the Ephors. 

For the evil attaching to the office of the Ephors censorship 
belongs to the Cosmi also, as the post is filled by any worse - 
chance persons, while the benefit conferred on the 
government by this office at Sparta is lacking in Crete. 
At Sparta, as the election is made from all the citizens, 
the common people sharing in the highest office 
desire the maintenance of the constitution, but in 
Crete they do not elect the Cosmi from all the citizens 
but from certain clans, and the Elders from those who The Eiders. 

6 have held the office of Cosmos, about which regulations 
the same comments might be made as about what 
takes place at Sparta : their freedom from being 
called to account and their tenure for life gives them 
greater rank than their merit deserves, and their 
administration of their office at their own discretion 
and not under the guidance of a written code is 
dangerous. And the fact that the common people 
quietly tolerate their exclusion is no proof that the 

153 



ARISTOTLE 

1272 a 

τον τετάχθαι καλώς' ονδεν γάρ λήμματος εστί 1 

1272 b τοΐς κόσμοις ώσπερ τοις εφόροις, πόρρω γ απ- 
οικοΰσιν εν νήσω των διαφθερούντων. ην δε ποι- 
ούνται της αμαρτίας ταύτης ίατρείαν, άτοπος καϊ 
ου πολιτική άλλα δυναστευτική• πολλάκις γαρ η 
εκβάλλουσι σνστάντ€ς τινές τους κόσμους η των 
5 συναρχόντων αι/τών η των ιδιωτών εζεστι δε και 
μεταζύ τοΐς κόσμοις άπειπεΐν την αρχήν, ταύτα 
δη 7Γ(Χΐτα βελτιον ytVea^at κατά νόμον η κατ 
ανθρώπων βούλησιν ου γάρ ασφαλής ο κανών, 
πάντων δέ φαυλότατον το της άκοσμίας, ην 
καθιστάσι πολλάκις οι αν 2 μή δικά? βουλωνται 
δοΰναι τών δυνατών 3 ' η* και δήλον ως έχει τι 

ίο ττολιτεια? ή τά^ι?, αλλ' ου πολιτεία εστίν άλλα 
δυναστεία μάλλον. ^Ιώθασι δε διαλαμβάνοντ€ς 
τον δήμον και τους φίλους άναρχίαν* ποιεΐν και 
στασιάζειν και μάχεσθαι προς αλλήλους, καίτοι 8 
τι διαφέρει το τοιούτον ή διά τίνος χρόνου μηκετι 

15 πόλιν είναι την τοιαύτην, άλλα λιίεσ#αι την πολι- 
τικήν κοινωνίαν ; 

"Εστί δ' επικίνδυνος οϋτως έχουσα πόλις, τών 
βουλομενων επιτίθεσθαι και δυνάμενων, άλλα 
καθάπερ εϊρηται, σώζεται διά τον τόπον ξενηλασίας 
γάρ το πόρρω πεποίηκεν. διό και το τών περίοι- 
κων μένει τοΐς Κ,ρησίν, οι δ' είλωτες αφίστανται 

20 πολλάκις• ούτε γάρ εξωτερικής άρχης κοινωνοϋσιν 

1 Richards : λήμματος τι codd. 

2 ol αν Coraes : όταν codd. 

3 των δννατων post 8 άκοσμίας codd. (alii hie sed δυναστών 
vel δικαστών.) * άναρχίαν Bernays : μοναρχίαν codd. 

" i.e. the defect of the undue restriction of the office. 

6 See 1292 b 10 n. 

c The mss. give ' bring about a monarchy.' 

154 



POLITICS, II. νπ. β-8 

arrangement is a sound one ; for the Cosmi unlike stability 
the Ephors make no sort of profit, as they live in an position, 
island remote from any people to corrupt them. ?°**° 
Also the remedy which they employ for this defect a 
is a curious one, and less characteristic of a republic 

7 than of a dynasty b : often the Cosmi are expelled 
by a conspiracy formed among some of their actual 
colleagues or the private citizens ; also the Cosmi 
are allowed to resign during their term of office. 
Now it would be preferable for all these matters to 
be regulated by law rather than to be at the discre- 
tion of individuals, for that is a dangerous principle. 
And the worst expedient of all is that of the suspension 
of the office of Cosmi, which is often brought about 
by members of the powerful class who wish to escape 
being punished ; this proves that the constitution 
has a republican element, although it is not actually 
a republic but rather a dynasty. 6 And the nobles 
frequently form parties among the common people 
and among their friends and so bring about a suspen- 
sion of government, and form factions and engage 

8 in war with one another. Yet such a condition of 
things really means that for a time such a state is 
a state no longer, but the bonds of civil society are 
loosened. 

And it is a precarious position for a state to be in, Weakness 
when those who wish to attack it also have the power h£tory by 
to do so. But, as has been said, it is saved by its 
locality ; for distance has had the same effect as 
alien-acts. d A result of this is that with the Cretans 
the serf population stands firm, whereas the Helots 
often revolt ; for the Cretans take no part in foreign 

d Aliens required special permission to reside at Sparta, and 
the ephors had powers to expel them for undesirable conduct. 

155 



ARISTOTLE 

οι Κρήτες, νεωστί τε πόλεμος ξενικός διαβεβηκεν 
εις τήν νησον ος πεποιηκε φανερον την aadeveiav 
των εκεί νόμων. 

ΙΙερι μεν ονν ταύτης ειρήσθω τοσαΰθ* ήμΐν της 
πολιτείας. 

VIII. ΐίολιτεύεσθαι δε δοκοΰσι και Καρχηδόνιοι 1 

26 καλώ? και πολλά περιττώς προς τους άλλους, 
μάλιστα δ' eVia παραπλησίως τοις Αακωσιν. 
αύται γάρ αϊ πολιτεΐαι τρεις αλλ^λαι? τε σύνεγγυς 
πώς είσι και των άλλων πολύ διαφερουσιν, η τε 
Κρητική και η Αακωνικη και τρίτη τούτων η 
Καρχηδονίων, και πολλά των τεταγμένων έχει 

so παρ' αύτοΐς καλώς• σημεΐον δε πολιτείας συν- 
τεταγμένης το τον δήμον εκουσίον 1 διαμενειν εν τη 
τάξει της πολιτείας, και μήτε στάσιΐ' ο τι και άξιον 
ειπείν γεγενησθαι μήτε τύραννον. 

Έχει δε παραπλήσια τη Αακωνικη πολιτεία τα 2 
μεν συσσίτια τών εταιριών τοις φιδιτίοις, την δε 

35 τών εκατόν και τεττάρων αρχήν τοις εφόροις 
(πλην ο ου 2 χείρον, οι μεν 3 εκ τών τυχόντων 
είσί, ταύτην δ' αίροΰνται την αρχήν άριστίνδην), 
τους δε βασιλείς και τήν γερουσίαν άνάλογον τοις 
εκεί ^ασιλευσι και γερουσιν, και βελτιον δε τους 
/ίασιλεί? μήτε κατά το αυτό etmi γένος, μηδέ 

*ο τούτο το τυχόν, είτε διαφερον . . .* εκ τούτων 

αιρετούς μάλλον ή καθ* ήλικίαν μεγάλων γάρ 

1273a κύριοι καθεστώτες, αν ευτελείς ώσι μεγάλα βλά- 

1 ϊκούσων Spengel : ϊχονσαν codd. 
* ί οϋ Bernays : ού codd. 3 μίν yap codd. cet. plurimi. 

* lacunam Con ring. 



" Clauses seem to have been lost concluding the account 
156 



POLITICS, II. νιι. 8— νπι. 2 

empire, and also the island has only lately been in- 
vaded by warfare from abroad, rendering manifest 
the weakness of the legal system there. 

Let this suffice for our discussion of this form of 
constitution. 

VIII. Carthage also appears to have a good consti- Constitu- 

tion of 

tution, with many outstanding features as compared Carthage. 
with those of other nations, but most nearly resem- 
bling the Spartan in some points. For these three 
constitutions are in a way near to one another and 
are widely different from the others — the Cretan, the 
Spartan and, thirdly, that of Carthage. Many regula- 
tions at Carthage are good ; and a proof that its 
constitution is well regulated is that the populace 
willingly remain faithful to the constitutional system, 
and that neither civil strife has arisen in any degree 
worth mentioning, nor yet a tyrant. 

I Points in which the Carthaginian constitution Resem- 
resembles the Spartan are the common mess-tables sparta. 
of its Comradeships corresponding to the Phiditia, and 
the magistracy of the Hundred and Four correspond- 
ing to the Ephors (except one point of superiority — 
the Ephors are drawn from any class, but the Cartha- 
ginians elect this magistracy by merit) ; the kings 
and the council of Elders correspond to the kings and 
Elders at Sparta, and it is another superior feature 
that the Carthaginian kings are not confined to the 
same family and that one of no particular distinction, 
and also that if any family distinguishes itself . . . a 
the Elders are to be chosen from these rather than 
by age ; for as they are put in control of important 
matters, if they are men of no value they do great 

of the appointment of the Kings and turning to the Elders 
and their selection on grounds of merit and wealth. 

157 



ARISTOTLE 

1273 a 

πτουσι, και εβλαφαν ήδη τήν πόλιν την των Αακε- 

δαιμονίων . 

Τα μεν ουν 77λείστα των επιτιμηθεντων αν διά 3 

τάς παρεκβάσεις κοινά, τυγχάνει ττάσαις οντά ταΐς 

είρημεναις πολιτείαις• των δε προς την ύπόθεσιν 

δ της αριστοκρατίας και της πολιτείας τα μεν εις 

δήμον εκκλίνει μάλλον τά δ' εις όλιγαρχίαν. τον 

μεν γάρ το μεν προσάγειν το δε μη προσάγειν προς 

τον δήμον οι βασιλείς κύριοι μετά των γερόντων 

αν όμογνωμονώσι πάντες, ει δε μη, και τούτων 

ίο 6 δήμος• α δ' αν είσφερωσιν ούτοι, ου διακοϋσαι 
μόνον άποδιδόασι τω δήμω τά δόζαντα τοις άρ- 
χουσιν, αλλά κύριοι κρ'ινειν είσί, και τω βονλομενω 
τοις είσφερομενοις άντειπεΐν εζεστιν, όπερ εν ταΐς 
ετέραις πολιτείαις ουκ εστίν. 1 το δε τάς πενταρχίας 4 
κυρίας ούσας πολλών και μεγάλων ύφ' αυτών 

15 αίρετάς είναι, και την τών εκατόν ταύτας αίρεΐσθαι 
την μεγίστην αρχήν, ετι δε ταύτας πλείονα άρχειν 
χρόνον τών άλλων (και γάρ εξεληλυθότες άρχουσι 
και μέλλοντες) όλιγαρχικόν το δ' άμισθους και 
μή κληρωτάς άριστοκρατικόν θετεον, και ει τι 
τοιούτον έτερον, και το τάς δίκας υπό τών 1 αρχείων 

20 δικάζεσθαι πάσας (και μή άλλας υπ* άλλων καθάπερ 
εν Αακεδαίμονι) . παρεκβαίνει δε της άριστο- 5 
κρατίας ή τάξις τών Καρχηδονίων μάλιστα προς 

1 6wep — οΰκ έστι post δήμος 10 tr. Wade-Gery. 
2 τινών Coraes. 



a i.e. both parties agree to refer or not to refer. 
b i.e. even when the Kings only or the Elders only desire 
reference, it takes place. 

158 



POLITICS, II. νπι. 2-5 

harm, and they have already injured the Spartan 
State. 

3 Now most of the points in the Carthaginian 
system that would be criticized on the ground of 
their defects happen to be common to all the 
constitutions of which we have spoken ; but the 
features open to criticism as judged by the principle 
of an aristocracy or republic are some of them de- 
partures in the direction of democracy and others in 
the direction of oligarchy. The reference of some 
matters and not of others to the popular assembly 

rests with the kings in consultation with the Elders Democratic 
in case they agree unanimously, but failing that, ea ure8 ' 
these matters also lie with the people b ; and when the 
kings introduce business in the assembly, they do not 
merely let the people sit and listen to the decisions 
that have been taken by their rulers, but the people 
have the sovereign decision and anybody who wishes 
may speak against the proposals introduced, a right 
that does not exist under the other constitutions. 

4 The appointment by co-optation of the Boards of oligarchic 
Five which control many important matters, and the fe * tures • 
election by these boards of the supreme magistracy 

of the Hundred, and also their longer tenure of 
authority than that of any other officers (for they are 
in power after they have gone out of office and before 
they have actually entered upon it) are oligarchical 
features ; their receiving no pay and not being 
chosen by lot and other similar regulations must be 
set down as aristocratic, and so must the fact that 
the members of the Boards are the judges in all law- 
suits, instead of different suits being tried bv different 
6 courts as at Sparta. But the Carthaginian system Plutocracy, 
deviates from aristocracy in the direction of oligarchy 

159 



ARISTOTLE 

1273 " * ' s ι a - 

τήν» ολιγαρχιαν κατά τίνα. οιανοιαν η συνοοκει 

τοις πολλοίς• ου γαρ μόνον άριστίνδην άλλα και 

πλουτίνδην οΐονται δεΐν αιρεΐσθαι τους άρχοντας, 

25 αδύνατον γαρ τον άποροΰντα καλώς άρχειν και 
σχόλαζαν . εΐπερ ουν το μεν αίρ€Ϊσθαι πλουτίνδην 
ολιγαρχικόν το δε κατ' άρετήν άριστοκρατικόν, 
αϋτη τις αν εΐη τάζις τρίτη καθ* ήνπερ συντετακται 
και τοις Καρχηδονίοις τά περί την πολιτείαν 
αιροΰνται γαρ εις δυο ταύτα βλέποντες, και μά- 

80 λίστα τά? μεγίστας, τους τε ^ασιλεί? και τους 
στρατηγούς . δει δε νομίζειν αμάρτημα νομοθέτου β 
την παρεκβασιν efvai της αριστοκρατίας ταύτην 
εζ αρχής γαρ τοϋθ' όράν εστί των αναγκαιοτάτων, 
όπως ο'ι βέλτιστοι δύνωνται σχολάζειν και μηδέν 

35 άσχημονεΐν, μη μόνον άρχοντες αλλά μηδ* ίδιω- 
τεύοντες. ει δέ δει βλεπειν και προς εύπορίαν 
χάριν σχολής, φαΰλον το τάς μεγίστας ώνητάς 
eirat των αρχών, την τε ^ασιλει'αι•' και την στρατη- 
yia^. εντιμον γαρ 6 νόμος οΰτος ποιεί τον πλοΰτον 
μάλλον της αρετής και την πόλιν δλην φιλοχρή- 

40 ματον δ τι δ' αν ύπολάβη τίμιον eivat το κύριον, η 
ανάγκη και την τών άλλων πολιτών δόζαν άκολου- 
θεϊν τούτοις' οπού δε μη μάλιστα άρετη τιμάται, 
1273 b ταύτην ούχ οΐόν τ' είναι βεβαίως άριστοκρατικην 
πολιτείαν. εθίζεσθαι δ' εΰλογον κερδαίνειν τους 
ώνουμένους, όταν δαπανήσαντες άρχωσιν άτοπον 
γαρ ει πένης μεν ων επιεικής δε βουλήσεται 
κερδαίνειν, φαυλότερος δ' ων ου βουλήσεται δα- 

160 



POLITICS, II. νιιι. 5-7 

most signally in respect of a certain idea that is 
shared by most people ; they think that the rulers 
should be chosen not only for their merit but also 
for their wealth, as it is not possible for a poor man 
to govern well — he has not leisure for his duties. If 
therefore election by wealth is oligarchical and elec- 
tion by merit aristocratic, this will be a third sys- 
tem, exhibited for instance in the constitution of 
Carthage, for there elections are made with an eye 
to these two qualifications, and especially elections 
to the most important offices, those of the kings and 

6 of the generals. But it must be held that this 
divergence from aristocracy is an error on the part 
of a lawgiver ; for one of the most important points 
to keep in view from the outset is that the best 
citizens may be able to have leisure and may not 
have to engage in any unseemly occupation, not only 
when in office but also when living in private life. 
And if it is necessary to look to the question of means 
for the sake of leisure, it is a bad thing that the 
greatest offices of state, the kingship and the general- 
ship, should be for sale. For this law makes wealth 
more honoured than worth, and renders the whole 

7 state avaricious ; and whatever the holders of supreme 
power deem honourable, the opinion of the other 
citizens also is certain to follow them, and a state in 
which virtue is not held in the highest honour cannot 
be securely governed by an aristocracy. And it is 
probable that those who purchase office will learn by 
degrees to make a profit out of it, when they hold 
office for money spent ; for it would be odd if a 
man of small means but respectable should want to 
make a profit but an inferior person when he has 
spent money to get elected should not want to. 

l6l 



ARISTOTLE 

1273 b 

5 τταντισας. διό δει τους δυνάμενους άριστ άρχειν, 1 
τούτους άρχειν. βέλτιον δ', ει και προεΐτο την 
άπορίαν των επιεικών 6 νομοθέτης, αλλ' αρχόντων 
γε €πι.μ€λ€Ϊσθαί της σχολής. 

Φαύλοι δ' αν δό£ eiev elvai και το πλείους αρχάς 8 
τον αυτόν άρχειν, όπερ ευδοκιμεί παρά τοΐς 

ίο Καρχηδόνιοι?. εν γάρ ύφ* ενός έργον αριστ' 
αποτελείται, δει δ' όπως γίνηται τοΰθ' όράν τον 
νομοθέτην, και μη προστάττειν τον αύτον αύλεΐν 
και σκυτοτομεΐν. ώσθ' οπού μη μικρά πόλις, 
πολιτικώτερον πλείονας μετεχειν των άρχων και 
δημοτικώτερον κοινότερόν τε γάρ καθάπερ ε'ίπο- 

15 μev, και κάλλιον έκαστον αποτελείται των αυτών 
και θάττον. δήλον δε τοΰτο επι των πολεμικών 
και τών ναυτικών εν τούτοις γάρ άμφοτεροις δια 
πάντων ως ειπείν διελήλυθε το άρχειν και το 
άρχεσθαι. 

'Ολιγαρχικής δ ούσης της πολιτείας άριστα 2 9 
έκφεύγουσι τω πλουτεΐν, άεί τι του δήμου μέρος 

20 εκπέμποντες επι τάς πόλεις' τούτω γάρ ίώνται 
και ποιοϋσι μόνιμον την πολιτείαν. αλλά τουτί 
εστί τύχης έργον, δει δε άστασιάστους είναι διά 
τον νομοθέτην νυν δ , αν ατυχία γένηται τις και 
το πλήθος άποστή τών αρχομένων, ουδέν εστί 
φάρμακον διά τών νόμων τής ησυχίας. 

κ ΙΙερι μεν ούν τής Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας και 
Κρητικής και τής Καρχηδονίων, αιπερ δικαίως 
εύδοκιμοΰσι, τούτον έχει τον τρόπον. 

1 άριστ ά,ρχΐΐν Spengel : άρισταρχύν codd. (άριστα σχοΚάζην 
Richards). * άριστα <,στάσιν> Bernays. 

Or ' functions remaining the same, each is done better 
and more quickly.' 

162 



POLITICS, II. νπι. 7-9 

Hence the persons who should be in office are those 
most capable . of holding office. And even if the 
lawgiver neglected to secure comfortable means for 
respectable people, it would at all events be better 
that he should provide for their leisure while in office. 

And it might also be thought a bad thing for the Official 
same person to hold several offices, which is con- P luralism • 
sidered a distinction at Carthage. One man one job 
is the best rule for efficiency, and the lawgiver ought 
to see that this may be secured, and not appoint the 
same man to play the flute and make shoes. Hence 
except in a small city it is better for the state for 
a larger number to share in the offices and more 
democratic, for it is fairer to all, as we said, and also 
functions are performed better and more quickly 
when separate than when in the same hands. 3 This 
is clear in military and naval matters ; for in both of 
these departments command and subordination pene- 
trate throughout almost the whole body. b 

But the constitution being oligarchical they best Emigration 
escape the dangers by being wealthy, as they con- enclefT" 1 ' 
stantlv send out a portion of the common people to safety-valve 
appointments in the cities ; by this means they cure 
this defect in their system and make it stable. How- 
ever, this is the achievement of fortune, whereas 
freedom from civil strife ought to be secured by the 
lawgiver ; but as it is, suppose some misfortune 
occurs and the multitude of the subject class revolts, 
there is no remedy provided by the laws to restore 
tranquillity. 

This then is the character of the Spartan, Cretan and 
Carthaginian constitutions, which are justly famous. 

* i.e. everyone in command (except the commander-in- 
chief) has someone of higher rank over him. 

163 



ARISTOTLE 

IX. Τών δέ άποφηναμένων τι περί πολιτείας 1 
ενιοι μεν ουκ εκοινώνησαν πράξεων πολιτικών 
ουδ' ώντινωνοΰν άλλα διετέλεσαν ιδιωτεύσατε? τον 

30 βίον πβρι ων εί' τι άξίόλογον , ε'ίρηται σχεδόν 
περί πάντων, ενιοι δε νομοθέται γεγόνασιν, οι 
μεν ταΐς οίκείαις πόλεσιν οί δε και των όθνειων 
τισι, πολιτευθέντες αυτοί' και τούτων οί μεν νόμων 
εγενοντο δημιουργοί μόνον, οί δε και πολιτείας, 
οΐον και Αυκοΰργος και Σόλων ούτοι γαρ και 

35 νόμους και πολιτείας κατέστησαν . περί μεν οΰν 
της Αακεδαιμονίων εΐρηται. Σόλωνα δ' ενιοι μεν % 
οΐονται νομοθετην < ^ενε'σί?αι σπουοαΐον, όλιγαρχιαν 
τε γαρ καταλΰσαι λίαν άκρατον οΰσαν και δου- 
λευοντα τον δήμον 7ταΰσαι και δημοκρατιαν κατα- 
στησαι την πάτριον μίζαντα καλώς την πολιτείαν 

40 είναι γαρ την μεν εν Άρείω πάγω βουλην όλιγαρ- 
χικόν, το δέ τάς αρχάς αιρετά? άριστοκρατικόν , 
τά δε δικαστήρια δημοτικόν. έ'οικε δέ Σόλων 
1274 a εκείνα μεν υπάρχοντα πρότερον ου καταλΰσαι, 
την τε βουλην και την τών άρχων αΐρεσιν, τον δέ 
δήμον καταστησαι τά δικαστήρια ποιήσας εκ 
πάντων, διό και μέμφονται τίνες αύτώ' λΰσαι 3 
5 γαρ θάτερα, 1 κυριον ποιήσαντα το δικαστήριον 
πάντων, κληρωτον 6ν. επεί γάρ τουτ ίσχυσεν, 
ώσπερ τυραννώ τω δήμω χαριζόμενοι την πολιτείαν 
εις την νυν δημοκρατίαν κατέστησαν , και την μεν 
εν Άρείω πάγω βουλην Εφιάλτης έκόλουσε και 

1 Koraes : θάτεραν, θάπρον codd. 
164 






POLITICS, II. ιχ. 1-3 

1 IX. Of those that have put forward views about Solon's 
politics, some have taken no part in any political tion. 
activities whatever but have passed their whole life 

as private citizens ; and something has been said 
about almost all the writers of this class about whom 
there is anything noteworthy. Some on the other 
hand have been lawgivers, either for their native 
cities or even for certain foreign peoples, after having 
themselves been actively engaged in government ; 
and of these some have been framers of laws only, 
and others of a constitution also, for instance Solon 
and Lycurgus, who instituted both laws and constitu- 
tions. The Spartan constitution has been discussed. 

2 As for Solon, he is considered by some people to have 
been a good lawgiver, as having put an end to 
oligarchy when it was too unqualified and having 
liberated the people from slavery and established 
our traditional democracy with a skilful blending of 
the constitution : the Council on the Areopagus being 
an oligarchic element, the elective magistracies 
aristocratic and the law-courts democratic. And 
although really in regard to certain of these features, 
the Council and the election of magistrates, Solon 
seems merely to have abstained from destroying insti- 
tutions that existed already, he does appear to have 
founded the democracy by constituting the jury- 

3 courts from all the citizens. For this he is actually 
blamed by some persons, as having dissolved the 
power of the other parts of the community by 
making the law-court, which was elected by lot, 
all-powerful. For as the law-court grew strong, 
men courted favour with the people as with a tyrant, 
and so brought the constitution to the present 
democracy ; and Ephialtes and Pericles docked the 

165 



ARISTOTLE 

ΙΙερικλής, τα δε δικαστήρια μισθοφόρα κατέστησε 

ι° Περικλής, και τούτον δη τον τρόπον έκαστος 
των δημαγωγών προήγαγαν αύξων εις την νυν 
δημοκρατίαν. φαίνεται δ' ου κατά την Έόλωνος 
yeveV^ai τούτο προαίρεσιν, αλλά μάλλον από συ μ- 4 
πτώματος (της ναυαρχίας 1 γαρ εν τοΐς Μηδικοΐς ο 
δήμος αίτιος γενόμενος εφρονηματίσθη καΐ δημα- 

15 γωγούς έλαβε φαύλους αντιπολιτευομένων τών 
επιεικών)• επει Σόλωΐ' γε εοικε την άναγκαιοτατην 
άποδιδόναι τω δήμω δύναμιν, το τάς αρχάς αιρεΐ- 
σ^αι και εύθυνειν (μηδέ γάρ τούτου κύριος ων 6 
δήμος δούλος άν εΐη και πολέμιος) , τάς δ' αρχάς 
εκ τών γνωρίμων και τών ευπόρων κατέστησε 

20 πάσας, εκ τών πεντακοσιομεδίμνων καΐ ^efyiTCUJ-» 
και τρίτου τέλους τής καλούμενης ίππάδος' το δε 
τέταρτον θητικόν, οΐς ουδεμιάς αρχής μετήν. 

Νομοθεται δ' εγενοντο Ζάλευκός τε Αοκροΐς 5 
τοΐς 'Έπιζεφυρίοις, και Χαρώνδας ό Καταναίο? 
τοΐς αύτοΰ πολίταις καΐ ταΐς άλλαι? ταΐς Χαλ/α- 

25 δικαΐς πόλεσι ταΐς περί Ίταλιαν και Σιΐκελιαν. 
πειρώνται δε rt^e? και συνάγειν, ως Όνομακριτου 
μεν γενομένου πρώτου δεινοΰ περί νομοθεσιαν, 
yi>jU.raCT^rpai δ' αυτόν εν Κρήτη Αοκρόν οντά και 
επιδημοϋντα κατά τέχνην μαντικήν, τούτου δε 
yevea^at Θαλήτα εταΐρον, θάλητος δ' άκροατην 

so Αυκοΰργον και Ζ,άλευκον, Χαλεύκου δε Χαρώνδαν. 

1 ναυμαχία? Powell. 

α Or ' of the sea-fight,' Salamis. 

* For Solon's classification of the citizens by the annual 
income of their estates see Athenian Constitution, c. vii. 
c Perhaps 664 b.c. 
d Zephyrium, a promontory in S. Italy. 

166 



POLITICS, Π. ιχ. 3-5 

power of the Council on the Areopagus, while Pericles 
instituted payment for serving in the law-courts, and 
in this manner finally the successive leaders of the 
people led them on by growing stages to the present 
democracy. But this does not seem to have come 
about in accordance with the intention of Solon, 

4 but rather as a result of accident (for the common 
people having been the cause of naval victory ° at 
the time of the Persian invasion became proud and 
adopted bad men as popular leaders when the re- 
spectable classes opposed their policy) ; inasmuch 
as Solon for his part appears to bestow only the 
minimum of power upon the people, the function of 
electing the magistrates and of calling them to 
account (for if even this were not under the control 
of the populace it would be a mere slave and a 
foreign enemy), whereas he appointed all the offices 
from the notable and the wealthy, the Five-hundred- 
bushel class and the Teamsters and a third property- 
class called the Knighthood ; while the fourth class, 
the Thetes, were admitted to no office. 6 

5 Laws were given" by Zaleucus to the Epizephyrian*' Notes on 
Locrians and by Charondas e of Catana to his fellow- lawgivers, 
citizens and to the other Chalcidic cities f on the coasts 

of Italy and Sicily. Some persons try to connect 
Zaleucus and Charondas together 9 : they say that 
Onomacritus first arose as an able lawgiver, and that 
he was trained in Crete, being a Locrian and travel- 
ling there to practise the art of soothsaying, and 
Thales became his companion, and Lycurgus and 
Zaleucus were pupils of Thales, and Charondas of 

e See 1252 b 14. 

' Colonies from Chalcis in Euboea. 

• Or ' try to make a series of legislators.* 

167 



ARISTOTLE 

1274 s 

αΛΛα ταύτα μεν Λεγονσιν ασκεπτοτερον των χρονών 
έχοντες. 1 έγένετο δε καϊ Φιλόλαο? 6 Κορίνθιος 6 
νομοθέτης θηβαίοις. ή*ν δ' 6 Φιλόλαο? το μεν 
γένος των Βακχιάδων, εραστής δε γενόμενος 
Αιοκλέους τον νικήσαντος Όλυμπίασιν, ως εκείνος 

35 την πάλιν έλιπε οιαμισησας τον έρωτα τον της 
μητρός 'Αλκυόνης , άπήλθεν εις Θήβας, κάκεΐ τον 
βίον ετελεύτησαν αμφότεροι, και νυν ετι δεικνυουσι 
τους τάφους αυτών, άλλήλοις μεν ευσύνοπτους 
οντάς προς δε την των Κορινθίων χώραν τον μεν 
συνοπτον τον δ' ου συνοπτον 2 • μυθολογοΰσι γαρ η 

40 αυτού? ούτω τά£ασ#αι την ταφήν, τον μεν Διοκλέα 
δια την άπέχθειαν του πάθους όπως μη άποπτος 
έσται ή Κορινθία από του χώματος, τον δε Φιλό- 
1274b λαον όπως άποπτος. ωκησαν μεν ουν διά την 
τοιαυτην αΐτίαν παρά τοις θηβαίοις, νομοθέτης 
δ' αύτοι? έγένετο Φιλόλαο? περί τ' άλλων τινών 
και περί της παιδοποιίας, ους καλοΰσιν εκείνοι 
νόμους θετικούς' και τοΰτ' έστιν ιδίως υ7Γ εκείνου 
6 νενομοθετημένον , όπως ό αριθμός σωζηται τών 
κλήρων. Χαρώνδου δ' ίδιον μεν ουδέν eon πλην 8 
αί δίκαι τών φευδο μαρτυριών (πρώτος γαρ εποιησε 
την επίσκηφιν), τη δ' ακρίβεια τών νόμων εστί 
γλαφυρώτερος και τών νυν νομοθετών. (Φαλέου 
δ' ίδιον ή τών ουσιών άνομάλωσις, Πλάτωνο? δ 

ίο η τε τών γυναικών και παίδων και της ουσίας 
κοινότης και τα συσσίτια τών γυναικών, έτι δ ό 
περί την μέθην νόμος, το τους νήφοντας συμ- 
ποσιαρχεΐν, και την εν τοις πολεμικοΐς άσκησιν 

1 των χρόνων ΐχοντεϊ Susemihl : τφ χρόνω Xtyovres codd. 

2 τόν — συνοπτον bis Richards (duce partim Ross) : του — 
cwotttov bis codd. 

168 



POLITICS, II. ιχ. 5-8 

Zaleucus ; but these stories give too little attention 

6 to the dates. Philolaus of Corinth also arose as 
lawgiver at Thebes. Philolaus belonged by birth 
to the Bacchiad family ; he became the lover of 
Diocles the winner at Olympia, but when Diocles 
quitted the city because of his loathing for the passion 
of his mother Alcyone, he went away to Thebes, and 
there they both ended their life. Even now people 
still show their tombs, in full view of each other and 
one of them fully open to view in the direction of 

7 the Corinthian country but the other one not ; for 
the story goes that they arranged to be buried in 
this manner, Diocles owing to his hatred for his 
misfortune securing that the land of Corinth might 
not be visible from his tomb, and Philolaus that it 
might be from his. It was due then to a reason 
of this nature that they went to live at Thebes ; but 
Philolaus became the Thebans' lawgiver in regard 
to various matters, among others the size of families, 
— the laws called by the Thebans laws of adoption ; 
about this Philolaus enacted special legislation, in 
order that the number of the estates in land might 

8 be preserved. There is nothing special in the code 
of Charondas except the trials for false witness (for 
he was the first to introduce the procedure of de- 
nunciation), but in the accuracy of his laws he is 
a more finished workman even than the legislators 
of to-dav. (Peculiar to Phaleas b is the measure for 
equalizing properties ; to Plato, c community of wives 
and children and of property, and the common meals 
for the women, and also the law about drunkenness, 
enacting that sober persons are to be masters of 
the drinking-bouts, and the regulation for military 

■ In 7-2$ b.c. * See c. iv. e Above, cc. i.-iii. 

ο 169 



ARISTOTLE 

δπως άμφιδέξιοι γίνωνται κατά την μελετην, ως 
δέον μη την μεν χρησιμον eu>ou τοίν χεροΐν την δε 

15 άχρηστον.) Δράκοντος δε νόμοι μεν είσι, πολιτεία 9 
δ' ύπαρχούση τους νόμους εθηκεν, 'ίδιον δ' iv τοις 
νόμοις ουδέν εστίν ο τι και μνείας άζιον, πλην ή 
χαλεπότης δια το της ζη^αα? μέγεθος, εγενετο 
δε και ΐΐιττακός νόμων δημιουργός αλλ' ου 
πολιτείας• νόμος δ' ίδιος αύτοΰ το τους μεθύοντας, 

20 αν τυπτησωσι, πλείω ζημίαν αποτινειν των νη- 
φόντων διά γαρ το πλείους ύβρίζειν μεθύοντας 
η νηφοντας ου προς την συγγνώμην άπεβλεφεν, 
οτι δει μεθύουσιν εχειν μάλλον, αλλά προς το 
συμφέρον, εγενετο δε και Άνδροδάμα? 'Ρηγΐνος 
νομοθέτης Χαλκιδεΰσι τοις επι Θράκης, οΰ τα 1 

25 περί τε τά φονικά και τάς επικληρους εστίν ου μην 
αλλ' 'ίδιον γε ούδεν αύτοΰ λέγειν εχοι τι? αν. 

Τά μεν ούν περί τάς πολιτείας τάς τε κυρίας 
και τάς υπό τινών ειρημενας έστω τεθεο>ρημενα 
τον τρόπον τούτον. 

1 τά Η : om. cet. 

° Author of the first written code at Athens, 621 b.c. 
(though in the Athenian Constitution, c. iv., his legislation is 
hardly mentioned; he appears there as the framer of the 
constitution). 

6 Of Mitylene in Lesbos, one of the Seven Sages, dictator 
589-579 b.c. ' Otherwise unknown. 

d Chalcidice, the peninsula in the N. Aegean, was colonized 
from Chalcis in Euboea. 

Additional Notes 

II. i. 5, 1261 a 31. As the best state consists of different 
classes, its unity is secured by each citizen giving services 
to society and receiving in return benefits proportionate to 
his services. Probably τό ίσον is an interpolation (though 
Newman explains it as ' the reciprocal rendering of an 

170 



POLITICS, II. i.x. 3-9 

training to make men by practice ambidextrous, on 
the ground that it is a mistake to have one of the 
9 two hands useful but the other useless.) There are 
laws of Draco, a but he legislated for an existing con- 
stitution, and there is nothing peculiar in his laws 
that is worthy of mention, except their severity in 
imposing heavy punishment. Pittacus b also was a 
framer of laws, but not of a constitution ; a special 
law of his is that if men commit an assault when 
drunk they are to pay a larger fine than those who 
offend when sober ; because since more men are 
insolent when drunk than when sober he had regard 
not to the view that drunken offenders are rightly 
held less guilty, but to expediency. Androdamas e 
of Rhegium also became lawgiver to the Chalcidians 
in the direction of Thrace,'* and to him belong the 
laws dealing with cases of murder and with heiresses ; 
however one cannot mention any provision that is 
peculiar to him. 

Let such be our examination of the constitutional 
schemes actually in force and of those that have been 
proposed by certain persons. 

equal amount of dissimilar things ') : omitting το Ισον, we 
render ' reciprocity ' and not ' reciprocal equality ' ; cf. N.E. 
1132 b 33, 'In the interchange of services Justice in the 
form of Reciprocity is the bond that maintains the associa- 
tion : reciprocity, that is, on the basis of proportion, not on 
the basis of equality.' 

II. i. 6, 1261 a 38 ff. The best form of constitution is 
where there is a superior class that governs continuously 
— an aristocracy; so where there are no class-distinctions, 
the next best thing is for all the citizens to take turns in 
governing and being governed, those in office for the time 
being forming a sort of aristocracy. Richards's alteration 
of the text gives ' to take turns to govern is an imitation of 
original inequality and class-distinction.' 

17J 



1274 b , , , Λ ■ '"'• 

Ι. Τω περί πολιτείας επισκοποΰντι, και τις 1 

εκάστη και ποία τις, σχεδόν πρώτη σκεφις περί 
πόλεως ίδεΐν, τι ποτ' εστίν η πόλις. νυν γαρ 

35 άμφισβητοΰσιν , οι μεν φάσκοντες την πόλιν 
πεπραχεναι την πράζιν, οι ο' ου την πόλιν άλλα 
την όλιγαρχίαν η τον τνραννον του δε πολιτικού 
και του νομοθέτου πάσαν όρώμεν την πραγματείαν 
οΰσαν περί πόλιν, η δε πολιτεία των την πόλιν 
οίκουντων εστί τάζις τις. επει ο η πόλις των 2 

40 συγκείμενων καθάπερ άλλο τι των όλων μεν 
συνεστώτων δ' εκ πολλών μορίων, δηλον δτι 
πρότερον ο πολίτης ζητητεος• η γαρ πόλις πολιτών 

1275 a τι πληθός εστίν, ώστε τίνα χρή καλεΐν πολίτην 

και τις ο πολίτης εστί σκεπτεον. και γαρ ο 

πολίτης αμφισβητείται πολλάκις• ου γαρ τον αυτόν 

όμολογοϋσι πάντες είναι πολίτην εστί γαρ όστις 

εν δημοκρατία πολίτης ων εν ολιγαρχία πολλάκις 

6 ουκ εστί πολίτης, τους μεν οΰν άλλως πως τυγ- 3 

χάνοντας ταύτης της προσηγορίας, οίον τους 

ποιητούς πολίτας, άφετεον ό δε πολίτης ου τω 

1 Richards : yap rtt Ss codd. 

° So we speak of an action planned and carried by the 

party in power as an Act of Parliament, and technically as 

an act of the sovereign. 

172 



BOOK III 

1 I. For the student of government, and of the Book m. 
nature and characteristics of the various forms of xItcre 
constitution, almost the first question to consider is °/' THE 
in regard to the state : what exactly is the essential 
nature of a state ? As it is, this is a matter of dispute : The 

a public act is spoken of by some people as the thTstate° 
action of the state, others speak of it as the action »« citizens, 
not of the state but of the oligarchy or the tyrant in 
power a ; and we see that the activity of the statesman 
and lawgiver is entirely concerned with a state as 
its object, and a constitution is a form of organiza- 

2 tion of the inhabitants of a state. But a state is a 
composite thing, in the same sense as any other of 
the things that are wholes but consist of many parts ; 
it is therefore clear that we must first inquire into 
the nature of a citizen ; for a state is a collection of 
citizens, so that we have to consider who is entitled citizenship 
to the name of citizen, and what the essential nature ™™ϊ» "h 
of a citizen is. For there is often a difference of of the 
opinion as to this : people do not all agree that the and^udici^ 
same person is a citizen ; often somebody who would bodies 

be a citizen in a democracy is not a citizen under an 

3 oligarchy. We need not here consider those who 
acquire the title of citizen in some exceptional manner, 
for example those who are citizens by adoption ; 
and citizenship is not constituted by domicile in a 

173 



ARISTOTLE 

1275 a t , 

οικεΐν που πολίτης εστίν (και γαρ μέτοικοι και 

δούλοι κοινωνοΰσι της οίκησεως), ονδ* οι τών δί- 
καιων μετέχοντες οϋτως ώστε καΐ δίκην ύπεχειν 

ίο και δικάζεσθαι (τοΰτο γαρ υπάρχει 1 και τοις άπό 
συμβόλων κοινωνοΰσιν, και γαρ ταύτα τούτοις 
υπάρχει — πολλαχοΰ μεν ουν ουδέ τούτων τελεως 
οι μέτοικοι μετεχουσιν , άλλα νεμειν ανάγκη προ- 
στάτην, διό ατελώς πως μετεχουσι της τοιαύτης 
κοινωνίας) , άλλα 2 καθάπερ και 7Γαίδας• τους μηπω 4 

15 δι' ηλικίαν εγγεγραμμένους και τους γέροντας 
τους άφειμενους φατεον eirai μεν πως πολίτας, 
ούχ απλώς δε λίαν άλλα προστιθεντας τους μεν 
ατελείς τους δε παρηκμακότας η τι τοιούτον έτερον 
(ουδέν γαρ διαφέρει, δηλον γαρ το λεγόμενον). 
ζητοΰμεν γαρ τον απλώς πολίτην και μηδέν έχοντα 

20 τοιούτον έγκλημα διορθώσεως δεόμενον, επει και 
περί τών άτιμων και φυγάδων εστί τα τοιαύτα και 
διαπορεΐν και λύειν. πολίτης δ' απλώς ούδενι τών 
άλλων ορίζεται μάλλον η τω μετεχειν κρίσεως και 
άρχης. τών δ' άρχων αί μεν είσι διηρημεναι κατά 

25 χρόνον, ώστ ενίας μεν όλως δις τον αυτόν ουκ 
εζεστιν άρχειν, η διά τίνων ώρισμενων χρόνων ο 
δ' αόριστος, οίον ό δικαστής και εκκλησιαστής, 
τάχα μεν ουν αν φαίη τι? ούδ' άρχοντας efvai τους 5 

1 οΰτω yap αν ύπαρχοι (sc. τό πολίτην dvai) Richards. 
8 [άλλα] ? Richards. 

β This implies that aged citizens were excused attendance 
at the assembly and law-courts, as well as military service. 

174 



POLITICS, III. ι. 3-5 

certain place (for resident aliens and slaves share 
the domicile of citizens), nor are those citizens who 
participate in a common system of justice, conferring 
the right to defend an action and to bring one in the 
law-courts (for this right belongs also to the parties 
under a commercial treaty, as they too can sue and 
be sued at law, — or rather, in many places even the 
right of legal action is not shared completely by 
resident aliens, but they are obliged to produce a 
patron, so that they only share in a common legal 

4 procedure to an incomplete degree), but these are 
only citizens in the manner in which children who 
are as yet too young to have been enrolled in the 
list and old men who have been discharged a must be 
pronounced to be citizens in a sense, yet not quite 
absolutely, but with the added qualification of 
' under age ' in the case of the former and ' super- 
annuated ' or some other similar term (it makes no 
difference, the meaning being clear) in that of the 
latter. For we seek to define a citizen in the ab- 
solute sense, and one possessing no disqualification 
of this nature that requires a correcting term, since 
similar difficulties may also be raised, and solved, 
about citizens who have been disfranchised or exiled. 
A citizen pure and simple is defined by nothing else 
so much as by the right to participate in judicial 
functions and in office. But some offices of govern- 
ment are definitely limited in regard to time, so that 
some of them are not allowed to be held twice by the 
same person at all, or only after certain fixed intervals 
of time ; other officials are without limit of tenure, 
for example the juryman and the member of the 

5 assembly. It might perhaps be said that such 
persons are not officials at all, and that the exercise 

1T5 



ARISTOTLE 

1275 a 



τοιούτους, ούδε μετεχειν διά ταΰτ αρχής• καίτοι 
γελοΐον τους κυριωτάτονς άποστερεΐν αρχής. 1 

50 άλλα διαφερετω μηδέν περί ονόματος γαρ ο λόγος• 
άνώνυμον γαρ το κοινόν επι δικαστού και εκκλησια- 
στοϋ τι δει ταντ άμφω καλεΐν. έστω δη διορισμού 
χάριν αόριστος αρχή. τίθεμεν δη πολίτας τους 
οΰτω μετέχοντας. 

Ό μεν ουν μάλιστ αν εφαρμόσας πολίτης 2 επί 
πάντας τους λεγόμενους πολίτας σχεδόν τοιούτος 

35 εστίν, δει δε μή λανθάνειν ότι των πραγμάτων 6 
εν οΐς τα. υποκείμενα διαφέρει τω εΐδει, και το 
μεν αυτών εστί πρώτον το δε δεύτερον το δ 
εχόμενον, ή το παράπαν ουδ' ενεστιν, 3 ή τοιαύτα, 
το κοινόν, ή γλίσχρως. τάς δε πολιτείας όρώμεν 
εϊδει διαφέρουσας άλλτ^λα»ν, καΐ τάς μεν υστέρας 
1275 bras' δε προτερας οϋσας• τάς γάρ ήμαρτημενας και 
παρεκβεβηκυίας άναγκαΐον υστέρας eivat των άν- 
αμαρτήτων (τάς δέ παρεκβεβηκυίας πώς λεγομεν 
ύστερον εσται φανερόν). ώστε και τον πολίτην 
6 έτερον άναγκαΐον είναι τον καθ' εκάστην πολιτείαν . 
διόπερ ό λεχθείς εν μεν δημοκρατία μάλιστ εστί 
πολίτης, εν δε ταΐς αλλαι? ενδέχεται μεν, ου μην 7 
άναγκαΐον. εν eVtais"* γάρ ουκ εστί δήμος, ουδ' 
εκκλησίαν νομίζουσιν άλλα 5 συγκλήτους, και τάς 

1 [apxijs] ? (sc. τοΰ πολίτας dixit.) ed. 2 διορισμοί Richards. 

3 ονδ' evcanv Madvig : ουδέν έστιν. 

* έν tv'iais Coraes : eviais codd. s άλλ' τ) Richards. 

β Or, amending the text, ' and yet that it is absurd to deny 
the title of citizen to those — ' 

b The meaning of this abstract principle is most easily seen 
from its application here : if states are generically different 
from one another, membership of a state, citizenship, can 
hardly be a single thing, and come under a single definition. 

176 



POLITICS, III. ι. 5-7 

of these functions does not constitute the holding 
of office ; a and yet it is absurd to deny the title of 
official to those who have the greatest power in 
the state. But it need not make any difference, 
as it is only the question of a name, since there is 
no common name for a juryman and a member of 
the assembly that is properly applied to both. For 
the sake of distinction therefore let us call the 
combination of the two functions ' office ' without 
limitation. Accordingly we lay it down that 
those are citizens who ' participate in office ' in this 
manner. 

Such more or less is the definition of ' citizen ' (though for 
that would best fit with all of those to whom the democratic 

6 name is applied. But it must not be forgotten that !££•■ F his 

i_ . . , * , . , , , . & , . , definition 

things m the case ot which the things to which must be 
they are related differ in kind, one of them being modlfied >• 
primary, another one secondary and so on, either 
do not contain a common nature at all, as being 
what they are, or barely do so. 6 Now we see 
that constitutions differ from one another in kind, 
and that some are subsequent and others prior ; 
for erroneous and divergent forms are necessarily 
subsequent to correct forms (in what sense we employ 
the terms ' divergent ' of constitutions will appear 
later). Hence the citizen corresponding to each 
form of constitution will also necessarily be different. 
Therefore the definition of a citizen that we have 
given applies especially to citizenship in a democracy; 
under other forms of government it may hold good, 

7 but will not necessarily do so. For in some states 
there is no bodv of common citizens, and the ν do 
not have the custom of a popular assembly but 
councils of specially convened members, and the 

177 



ARISTOTLE 

δικας δικάζουσι κατά μέρος, οίον εν Αακεδαίμονι 

ίο τα? τών συμβολαίων δικάζει των εφόρων άλλος 
άλλας, οί δε γέροντες τάς φονικάς, ετέρα δ' ΐσως 
α ΡΧν TL $ ετέρας, ου τον 1 αυτόν δε τρόπον και περί 
Καρχηδόνα• πάσας γαρ άρχαί τίνες κρίνουσι τάς 
δικας. αλλ' έχει γάρ διόρθωσιν ο του πολίτου 
διορισμός, εν γάρ ταΐς αλλαι? πολιτείαις ούχ ό 8 

15 αόριστος άρχων εκκλησιαστής εστί και δικαστής, 
αλλ 6 κατά την αρχήν ώρισμένος• τούτων γάρ 
η πάσιν η τισιν άποδέδοται το βουλεύεσθαι και 
δικάζειν ή περί πάντων ή περί τΐΓώι•\ τις μεν οΰν 
εστίν ο πολίτης, εκ τούτων φανερόν ω γάρ εξουσία 
κοινωνεΐν αρχής βουλευτικής ή 2 κριτικής, πολίτην 

20 ήδη λέγομεν είναι ταύτης της πόλεως, πόλιν δε 
το των τοιούτων πλήθος ίκανόν προς αύτάρκειαν 
ζωής, ως απλώς ειπείν. 

'Ορίζονται δε 3 προς την χρήσιν πολίτην τον εξ g 
αμφοτέρων πολιτών και μη θατερου μόνον, οίον 
πατρός ή μητρός, οι δε και τοΰτ επί πλέον ζητοΰ- 
σιν, οίον επί πάππους δύο ή τρεις ή πλείους. ούτω 

25 δη οριζομένων πολιτικώς και ταχέως,* άποροΰσί 
τίνες τον τρίτον εκείνον ή τέταρτον, πώς έσται 
πολίτης. Υ οργιάς μεν οΰν ο Αεοντΐνος, τά μεν 
'ίσως άπορων τά δ' είρωνευόμενος , έφη καθάπερ 
όλμους είναι τους ΰπό τών όλμοποιών πεποιη- 
μένους, ούτω και Ααρισαίους τους υπό τών 

so δημιουργών πεποιημένους• etrai γάρ τινας λαρισο- 

1 οϋ τον Coraes : τον codd. 2 και Αγ. 

8 δέ Γ : δη codd. * πάχβω? Camerarius. 

α The negative is a conjectural insertion, cf. 1273 a 20. 
b Sicilian orator and nihilistic philosopher, visited Athens 
427 b.c. 

178 



POLITICS, III. ι. 7-9 

office of trying law-suits goes by sections — for 
example at Sparta suits for breach of contract are 
tried by different ephors in different cases, while 
cases of homicide are tried by the ephors and doubt- 
less other suits by some other magistrate. The same 
method is not a followed at Carthage, where certain 

8 magistrates judge all the law-suits. But still, our 
definition of a citizen admits of correction. For 
under the other forms of constitution a member of 
the assembly and of a jury-court is not ' an official* 
without restriction, but an official defined according 
to his office ; either all of them or some among them 
are assigned deliberative and judicial duties either in 
all matters or in certain matters. What constitutes 
a citizen is therefore clear from these considerations : 
we now declare that one who has the right to par- 
ticipate in deliberative or judicial office is a citizen 
of the state in which he has that right, and a state is i 
a collection of such persons sufficiently numerous,/ 
speaking broadly, to secure independence of life. 

9 But in practice citizenship is limited to the child Citizenship 
of citizens on both sides, not on one side only, necessarily 
that is, the child of a citizen father or of a citizen depend on 
mother ; and other people carry this requirement 
further back, for example to the second or the third 
preceding generation or further. But given this as 

a practical and hasty definition, some people raise 
the difficultv, How will that ancestor three or four 
generations back have been a citizen ? Gorgias b of 
Leontini therefore, partly perhaps in genuine per- 
plexity but partly in jest, said that just as the ves- 
sels made by mortar-makers were mortars, so the 
citizens made by the magistrates were Larisaeans, 
since some of the magistrates were actually larisa- 

179 



ARISTOTLE 

1275 b 

ποιους. 1 εστί δ' απλούν ει γαρ μετεΐχον κατά 
τον ρηθεντα διορισμον της πολιτεία?, ήσαν αν 
πολΐται• καί γαρ ου δυνατόν εφαρμόττειν το εκ 
πολίτου η εκ πολίτιδος επί των πρώτων οίκησάντων 
η 2 κτισάντων. 

'Αλλ' ίσως εκείνοι μάλλον εχουσιν άπορίαν όσοι 10 

35 μετεσχον μεταβολής γενομένης πολιτείας, οίον 3 

> Κθηνησιν εποίησε Κλεισθένης μετά την των 

τυράννων εκβολην πολλούς γάρ εφυλετευσε ξένους 

και δούλους μετοίκους, το δ' άμφισβητημα προς 

τούτους εστίν ου τις πολίτης, άλλα πότερον αδίκως 

η δικαίως, καίτοι καν τοΰτό τις ετι προσ- 

1276 a απορησειεν, άρ' ει μη δικαίως πολίτης, ου πολίτης, 

ως ταύτό δυνάμενου του τ αδίκου και του φευδοΰς. 

επει δ' όρώμεν και άρχοντας τινας αδίκως, ους 

άρχειν μεν φησομεν αλλ' ου δικαίως, ο δε πολίτης 

άρχη τινι διωρισμενος εστίν (6 γάρ κοινωνών της 

δ τοιάσδε άρχης πολίτης εστίν, ως εφαμεν), δηλον 

οτι πολίτας μεν είναι φατεον και τούτους, περί δε 

του δικαίως η μη δικαίως συνάπτει προς την 

είρημενην πρότερον άμφισβητησιν. αποροΰσι γαρ 

τίνες πόθ* η πόλις έπραξε και πότε ούχ η πόλις, 

οΐον όταν εξ ολιγαρχίας η τυραννίδος γενηται 

ίο δημοκρατία, τότε γάρ ούτε τα σιγχ/3όλαια ένιοι 

βούλονται διαλυειν (ως ου της πόλεως αλλά του 

1 λαρισαιοποιούί Camerarius. * /cat Richards. 

3 οίον <o3s> Richards. 

α Larisa, a city in Thessaly, was famous for the manu- 
facture of a kind of kettle called a ' larisa.' 
6 In 509 b.c. 
c The question, What is a state ? 1274 b 34. 

180 



POLITICS, III. ι. 9-10 

makers.** But it is really a simple matter ; for if they 
possessed citizenship in the manner stated in our 
definition of a citizen, thev were citizens — since it is 
clearly impossible to apply the qualification of de- 
scent from a citizen father or mother to the original 
colonizers or founders of a city. 
10 But perhaps a question rather arises about those but does 
who were admitted to citizenship when a revolution breaking"* 
had taken place, for instance such a creation of the 
citizens as that carried out b at Athens by Cleisthenes destroy the 
after the expulsion of the tyrants, when he enrolled ^"state / 
in his tribes many resident aliens who had been 
foreigners or slaves. The dispute as to these is not 
about the fact of their citizenship, but whether they 
received it wrongly or rightly. Yet even as to this 
one might raise the further question, whether, if a 
man is not rightly a citizen, he is a citizen at all, 
as * wrongly ' means the same as ' not trulv.' But 
we sometimes see officials governing wronglv, as to 
whom we shall not deny that they do govern, but 
shall say that they do not do it rightly, and a citizen 
is defined by a certain function of government (a 
citizen, as we said, is one who shares in such and 
such an office) ; therefore it is clear that even persons 
wrongly admitted to citizenship are to be pronounced 
to be citizens, although the question whether they 
are so rightly or not rightly is connected with the 
question that was propounded before. For some 
persons raise the question, When is an occurrence the 
act of the state and when is it not ? for example, 
when the government has been altered from oligarchv 
or tyranny to democracy. In such circumstances some 
people claim that the new government should not dis- 
charge public debts, on the ground that the money 

181 



ARISTOTLE 

1276 a 

τυράννου λαβόντος) ούτ* άλλα πολλά των τοιούτων, 
ως ενιας των πολιτειών τω κρατεΐν ούσας άλλ' ου 
διά το Koivfj συμφέρον. είπερ οΰν και δημοκρα- 11 

15 τοΰνται τίνες κατά τον τρόπον τούτον, ομοίως της 
πόλεως φατέΌν etvat ταύτης τάς της πολιτείας 
ταύτης πράξεις και τάς εκ της ολιγαρχίας και της 
τυραννίδος. εοικε δ' οικείος ό λόγος eirai της 
απορίας ταύτης, πώς ποτέ 1 χρη λέγειν την πάλιν 
etrai την αύτι^ η μη την αυτήν αλλ' ετέραν. η 

20 μεν οΰν επιπολαιοτάτη της απορίας ζητησις περί 
τον τόπον και τους ανθρώπους εστίν ενδέχεται 
γάρ διαζβιτ^ί^αι τον τόπον και τους ανθρώπους, 1 
και τους μεν έτερον τους δ έτερον οίκησαι τόπον, 
ταύτην μεν ουν πραοτεραν θετεον την άπορίαν, 
πολλαχώς γάρ της πόλεως λεγομένης εστί πως 

25 ευμάρεια της τοιαύτης ζητήσεως• ομοίως δε και 12 
τών τον αυτόν τόπον κατοικούντων ανθρώπων 
πότε δει νομίζειν jLuav είναι την πόλιν; ου γάρ 
δη τοις τείχεσιν, εΐη γάρ αν Π ελοποννησω περι- 
βαλεΐν εν τείχος• τοιαύτη δ' ϊσως εστί και 
Βαβυλών και πάσα ήτις έχει περιγραφην μάλλον 
έθνους η πόλεως• ης γε φασιν εαλωκυίας τρίτην 

30 ημεραν ουκ αίσθεσθαι τι μέρος της πόλεως, αλλά 
περί μεν ταύτης της απορίας εις άλλον καιρόν 
χρήσιμος η σκεφις (περί γαρ μεγέθους της πόλεως, 
τό τε πόσον καΐ πότερον έθνος εν η πλείω συμ- 

1 otYeios πω? — ταύτη';, πότε Richards. 
2 τον — άνθρωπου? seel. Susemihl. 

° i.e. ττόλ(5 means both (1) ' city ' (and also ' citadel ') and 
(2) ' state,' a collection of citizens ; and if the citizens divide 
and settle in two different ' cities ' with different governments, 
they are clearly not the same ' state ' as before. 
182 



POLITICS, III. ι. 10-12 

was borrowed by the tyrant and not by the state, 
and should repudiate many other similar claims also, 
because some forms of government rest upon force 
and are not aimed at the welfare of the community. 

11 If therefore some democracies also are governed in 
that manner, the acts of the authorities in their case 
can only be said to be the acts of the state in the 
same sense as the public acts emanating from an 
oligarchy or a tyranny are said to be. Akin to this 
controversy seems to be the subject, What exactly is 
the principle on which we ought to pronounce a city 
to be the same city as it was before, or not the same 
but a different city ? The most obvious mode of 
inquiring into this difficulty deals with place and 
people : the place and the people may have been 
divided, and some may have settled in one place, 
and some in another. In this form the question must 
be considered as easier of solution ; for, as ' city ' has 
several meanings, the inquiry so put is in a wav 

12 not difficult. But it may similarly be asked, 
Suppose a set of men inhabit the same place, in what 
circumstances are we to consider their city to be a 
single city ? Its unity clearly does not depend on 
the walls, for it would be possible to throw a single 
wall round the Peloponnesus ; and a case in point 
perhaps is Babylon, and any other city that has the 
circuit of a nation rather than of a city ; for it is said 
that when Babylon was captured a considerable part 
of the city was not aware of it three days later. But 
the consideration of this difficulty will be serviceable 
for another occasion, as the student of politics must 
not ignore the question, What is the most advantage- 
ous size for a city, and should its populations be of one 



183 



ARISTOTLE 

φέρει, δει μη λανθάνειν τον πολιτικόν)• άλλα τών 13 

35 αυτών 1 κατοικουντων τον αύτον τόπον, ποτ€ρον 
έως αν η το γένος ταύτό των κατοικονντων την 
αύτην είναι φατέον πόλιν, καίπερ άε\ των μεν 
φθειρομενων των δε γινομένων, ώσπερ και ποτα- 
μούς είώθαμεν λέγειν τους αυτούς και κρηνας 
τάς αυτά? καίπερ άει του μεν έπιγινομένου νάματος 

40 του δ' ύπεζιόντος, η τους μεν ανθρώπους φατέον 
eivai τους αυτούς δια την τοιαύτην αίτίαν την δε 
1276 b πάλιν έτέραν; ε'ίπερ γάρ έστι κοινωνία τις η 
πόλις, ε'στι δε κοινωνία πολιτών πολιτείας, γιγ- 
νομένης ετέρας τω ε'ίδει και οιαφερουσης της 
πολιτείας άναγκαΐον είναι δόζειεν αν και την πόλιν 
c είναι μη την αύτην, ώσπερ γε καΐ χορόν ότέ μεν 
κωμικόν ότέ δε τραγικον έτερον είναι φαμεν τών 
αυτών πολλάκις ανθρώπων όντων, ομοίως δε και 24 
7τάσαν άλλην κοινωνίαν και σύνθεσιν έτέραν αν 
είδος έτερον η της συνθέσεως, οίον άρμονίαν τών 
αυτών φθόγγων έτέραν εΐναι λέγομεν 3 αν ότέ μεν 

ίο fj Αώριος ότέ δε Φρύγιος. ει δη τούτον έχει τον 
τρόπον, φανερόν οτι μάλιστα λεκτέον την αύτην 
πόλιν εις την πολιτείαν βλέποντας• όνομα δε κα- 
λεΐν έτερον η ταύτόν έζεστι και τών αυτών κατ- 
οικούντων αύτην και πάμπαν ετέρων ανθρώπων, 
ει δε δίκαιον διαλυειν η μη διαλύειν όταν εις 

15 έτέραν μεταβάλλη πολιτείαν η πόλις, λόγος έτερος. 
II. Τών δε νυν είρημένων έχόμενόν έστιν έπι- 1 

1 τών ανθρώπων Richards. 

2 πολιτ6ί'α Congreve. 

3 \ί-γομ€ν Alb. : \έ~,οιμ€ν codd. (έτέραν αν eivai λεΎΟΐμίν ? 
Newman). 

184. 



POLITICS, III. ι. 13—n. 1 

13 race or of several ? But are we to pronounce a city, 
where the same population inhabit the same place, 
to be the same city so long as the population are of 
the same race, in spite of the fact that all the time 
some are dying and others being born, just as it is 
our custom to say that a river or a spring is the same 
river or spring although one stream of water is always 
being added to it and another being- withdrawn from 
it, or are we to say that though the people are the 
same people for the similar reason of continuity, yet 
the city is a different city ? For inasmuch as a state 
is a kind of partnership, and is in fact a partnership 
of citizens in a government, when the form of the 
government has been altered and is different it 
would appear to follow that the state is no longer the 
same state, just as we say that a chorus which on 
one occasion acts a comedy and on another a tragedy 
is a different chorus although it is often composed 

14 of the same persons, and similarly with any other 
common whole or composite structure we say it is 
different if the form of its structure is different — for 
instance a musical tune consisting of the same notes 
we call a different tune if at one time it is played 
in the Dorian mode and at another in the Phrygian. 
Therefore if this is the case, it is clear that we must 
speak of a state as being the same state chiefly with 
regard to its constitution ; and it is possible for it to 
be called by the same or by a different designation 
both when its inhabitants are the same and when 
they are entirely different persons. But whether a 
state is or is not bound in justice to discharge its 
engagements when it has changed to a different 
constitution, is another subject. 

1 II. The next thing to consider after what has now 

185 



ARISTOTLE 

1278 b 

σκεφασθαι πότερον τήν αυτήν άρετήν ανδρός 
άγαθοΰ και πολίτου σπουδαίου θετεον ή μή τήν 
αυτήν, άλλα μην ει ye τοΰτο τυχεΐν Set ζητήσεως , 

•20 την του πολίτου τύπω τινι πρώτον ληπτεον. 
ώσπερ οΰν 6 πλοιτήρ εΐς τις των κοινωνών εστίν, 
ούτω καΐ τον πολίτην φαμεν. τών δέ πλωτήρων 
καιπερ ανόμοιων όντων την δύναμιν (ο μεν γάρ 
εστίν ερετης, ο δε κυβερνήτης, 6 δε πρωρεύς, 6 δ' 
άλλην τιν έχων τοιαύτην επωνυμιαν) δήλον ώς ο 

25 μεν ακριβέστατος εκάστου λόγος 'ίδιος εσται της 
αρετής, ομοίως δε και κοινός τις εφαρμόσει πάσιν 
η γάρ σωτήρια της ναυτιλίας έργον εστίν αυτών 
πάντων, τούτου γάρ έκαστος ορέγεται τών πλω- 
τήρων. ομοίως τοινυν και τών πολιτών, καίπερ 2 
ανόμοιων όντων, ή σωτηρία της κοινωνίας έργον 

so εστί, κοινωνία δ' εστίν ή πολιτεία, διό την άρετήν 
άναγκαΐον eirai του πολίτου προς την πολιτείαν. 
είπε ρ οΰν εστί πλείω πολιτείας εΐδη, δήλον ώς ουκ 
ενδέχεται του σπουδαίου πολίτου μίαν άρετήν 
eimi τήν τελείαν τον δ' αγαθόν άνδρα φαμεν κατά 
μίαν άρετήν efrai τήν τελείαν. 1 ότι μεν οΰν 

30 ενδέχεται πολίτην όντα σπουδαΐον μή κεκτήσθαι 
τήν άρετήν καθ* ην σπουδαίος άνήρ, φανερόν. ου 3 
μήν άλλα και κατ' άλλον τρόπον εστί διαποροΰντας 
επελθεΐν τον αύτον λόγον περί της άριστης πολι- 
τείας, εί γάρ αδύνατον* εξ απάντων σπουδαίων 
όντων eivai πόλιν, δει δ εκαστον το καθ' αυτόν 

1 rbv 8 — reKeiav ΓΡ 1 : om. cet. 
1 δυνατόν Bernays. 

α Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give ' possible ' : 
see Additional Note on p. 275. 

186 



POLITICS, III. π. 1-3 

been said is the question whether we are to hold that Mu st a good 
the goodness of a good man is the same as that of gcodman? 
a good citizen, or not the same. However, if this 
point really is to receive investigation, we must first 
ascertain in some general outline what constitutes 
the excellence of a citizen. Now a citizen we pro- Xot uncon- 
nounced to be one sort of partner in a community, ?£ civic J : 
as is a sailor. And although sailors differ from each virtue 
other in function — one is an oarsman, another helms- under 
man, another look-out man, and another has some riiffer ent 
other similar special designation — and so clearly the tions, 
most exact definition of their excellence will be 
special to each, yet there will also be a common 
definition of excellence that will apply alike to all 
of them ; for security in navigation is the business 
of them all, since each of the sailors aims at that. 
>- 2 Similarly therefore with the citizens, although they 
are dissimilar from one another, their business is the 
security of their community, and this community 
is the constitution, so that the goodness of a citizen 
must necessarily be relative to the constitution 
of the state. If therefore there are various forms 
of constitution, it is clear that there cannot be one 
single goodness which is the perfect goodness of the 
good citizen ; but when we speak of a good man we 
mean that he possesses one single goodness, perfect 
goodness. Hence it is manifestly possible to be a 
good citizen without possessing the goodness that 
3 constitutes a good man. Moreover it is also feasible and even 
to pursue the same topic by raising the question in in the 
another manner in relation to the best form of con- ^ute^aii 
stitution. If it is impossible a for a state to consist ^i*?• 1 
entirely of good men, and if it is necessary for each are not 
person to perform well the work of his position, and good men ' 

187 



ARISTOTLE 

1276 b „ T ji > > . « >S*i 
40 έργον ευ ποιειν, τούτο ο απ αρετής, επειοη 

αδύνατον όμοιους είναι παντας τους πολίτας, ουκ 

1277 a αν εΐη μία αρετή πολίτου και ανδρός άγαθοΰ' την 

μεν γαρ του σπουδαίου πολίτου δεΐ πάσιν ύπάρχειν 
(οϋτω γαρ άρίστην άναγκαΐον είναι την πάλιν), την 
δέ του ανδρός του άγαθοΰ αδύνατον , ει μη πάντας 
5 άναγκαΐον αγαθούς είναι τους εν τη σπουδαία 
πάλει πολίτας. ετι έπε ι εξ ανόμοιων η πόλις — 4 
ώσπερ ζώον εύθυς εκ ψυχής και σώματος, και 
ψυχή εκ λόγου και ορέξεως, και οικία εξ ανδρός 
και γυναικός και κτησις 2 εκ δεσπότου και δούλου, 
τον αυτόν τρόπον και πόλις εξ απάντων τε τούτων 

ίο καΐ προς τούτοις εξ άλλων ανόμοιων συνεστηκεν 
ειδών—, ανάγκη μη μίαν είναι την τών πολιτών 
πάντων άρετήν, ώσπερ ούδε τών χορευτών κορυ- 
φαίου και παραστάτου . διότι μεν τοίνυν απλώς 5 
ούχ ή αύτη, φανερόν εκ τούτων αλλ' άρα εσται 
τινός ή αύτη αρετή πολίτου τε σπουδαίου και 
ανδρός σπουδαίου; φαμεν δή τον άρχοντα τον 

15 σπουδαΐον dya^o^ eirai και φρόνιμον, τον δε πολι- 
τικόν άναγκαΐον etrai φρόνιμον. και τήν παιδείαν 
δ' ευθύς ετεραν eirai λεγουσί τίνες του άρχοντος , 
ώσπερ και φαίνονται οι τών ^ασιλεω^ υίεΐς 
ιππικήν και πολεμικήν παιδευόμενοι, και Έιύρι- 
πίδης φησι 

20 μη μοι τα κόμψ' , αλλ ων πάλει δει, 

ώς ούσάν τίνα άρχοντος 7ταιδειαν. ει δε η αύτη 6 

1 έπαδη ΓΜ : eireiSr) δέ Ρ 1 : έπεί δέ cet. : έπίΐ Spengel. 
2 [κτ^σ-ί?] Bernays. 

• These words in the Greek are probably an interpolation. 
6 Fragment 16, from Aeolus. 

188 



POLITICS, III. π. 3-5 

to do this springs from goodness, then because it is 
impossible for all the citizens to be alike, the good- 
ness of a good citizen would not be one and the same 
as the goodness of a good man ; for all ought to 
possess the goodness of the good citizen (that is a 
necessary condition of the state's being the best 
possible), but it is impossible that all should possess 
the goodness of a good man, if it is not necessary that 
all the citizens in a good state should be good men. 
* Asrain, since the state consists of unlike persons — and different 

o * ι citizens 

just as an animal (to take this instance first) consists have 
of soul and body, and a soul of reason and appetite, ^^L•. 
and a household of husband and wife and [ownership 
involves] a master and slave, in the same manner 
a state consists of all of these persons and also of 
others of different classes in addition to these, — 
it necessarily follows that the goodness of all the 
citizens is not one and the same, just as among 
dancers the skill of a head dancer is not the same as 
5 that of a subordinate leader. It is clear then from 
these considerations that the goodness of a good 
citizen and that of a good man are not the same in 
general ; but will the goodness of a good citizen of 
a particular sort be the same as that of a good man ? 
Now we say that a good ruler is virtuous and wise, But a good 
and that a citizen taking part in politics must be wise, ^^^d" 
Also some people say that even the education of a man, 
ruler must be different, as indeed we see that the 
sons of kings are educated in horsemanship and 
military exercises, and Euripides says b 

No subtleties for me, but what the state 
Requireth — 

implying that there is a special education for a ruler. 

180 



ARISTOTLE 

αρετή άρχοντος τε άγαθοΰ και ανδρός αγαθόν, 
πολίτης δ' εστί και ο αρχόμενος, ούχ η αύτη 
απλώς αν εΐη πολίτου και ανδρός, τινός μίντοι 
πολίτου• ου γαρ η αύτη άρχοντος και πολίτου, και 
διά τοΰτ 'ίσως Ιάσων εφη πεινην οτε μη τύραννοι, 

25 ως ούκ επισταμένος ιδιώτης είναι, αλλά μην! 
επαινείται γε το ούνασθαι άρχειν και άρχεσθαι, 
και πολίτου δοκεΐ που 1 η άρετη etrai το δυ^ασ&η 
και άρχειν και άρχεσθαι καλώς, ει οΰν την μεν 
του άγαθοΰ ανδρός τίθεμεν άρχικην, την δε του 
πολίτου άμφω, ούκ αν ε'ίη άμφω επαινετά ομοίως. 

30 επεί οΰν ποτέ δοκεΐ 2 αμφότερα, 3 και ού ταύτα 
δεΐν τον άρχοντα μανθάνειν και τον άρχόμενον, τον 
δε πολίτην άμφότερ* επίστασθαι και μετεχειν 
άμφοΐν, . . . .* κάντεΰθεν αν κατίδοι τις• εστί γάρ 
αρχή δεσποτική• ταύτην δε την περί τάναγκαΐα 8 
λεγομεν, α ποιεΐν €7Γΐστασί?αι τον άρχοντ ούκ 

35 άναγκαιον , άλλα χρησθαι μάλλον θάτερον δε και 
άνδραποδώδες, λέγω δε θάτερον το δυ^ασ^αι και 
ύπηρετεΐν τάς διακονικός πράξεις, δούλου δ' εΐδη 
πλείω λεγομεν, αϊ γάρ εργασίαι πλείους. ων εν 
μέρος κατεχουσιν οι χερνητες• οΰτοι δ' εισίν, ώσπερ 
1277 b σημαίνει καΐ τοΰνομ αυτούς, 6 οι ζώντες από τών 
χειρών, εν οΐς ο βάναυσος τεχνίτης εστίν, διό 

1 δοκεΐ που Jackson : δοκίμου codd. 

* ποτέ δοκεΐ corruptum : άποδέχεσθαι δει Susemihl, 

3 άμφω έτερα Bernays : έτερα Coraes. 

4 lacunam Susemihl. 

5 αυτό Montecatinus. 

• Tyrant of Pherae in Thessaly, assassinated 370 b.c. 
b Some words seem to have been lost, conveying ' we must 
consider how this dual fitness can be acquired,' or possibly 

190 



POLITICS, III. π. 6-8 

6 And if the goodness of a good ruler is the same as the 
goodness of a good man, yet the person ruled is also 
a citizen, so that the goodness of a citizen in general 
will not be the same as that of a man, although that 
of a particular citizen will ; for gr>nrtnp.«t«t a.g. a. nj1pr is 
rjyatihe eame-as-^oodxiess^S- a citizen, and no doubt 
this is the reason why Jason ° said that whenever he 
was not tyrant he felt hungry, meaning that he did 

7 not know the art of being a private person. Another and must 
point is that we praise the ability to rule and to be j^rnt to 
ruled, and it is doubtless held that the goodness of a ο** 5 ?, ■■ a 
citizen consists in ability both to rule and to be ruled 

well. If then we lay it down that the goodness of 
the good man is displayed in ruling, whereas that 
of the citizen is shown in both capacities, the two 
capacities cannot be equally laudable. Since there- 
fore both views are sometimes accepted, and it is 
thought that the ruler and the subject do not have 
to learn the same arts but that the citizen must know 
both arts and share in both capacities, . . . . b And 
it may be discerned from the following illustration : 

8 one form of authority is that of a master ; by this 
we mean the exercise of authority in regard to the 
necessary work of the house, which it is not necessary 
for the master to know how to execute, but rather 
how to utilize ; the other capacity, I mean the ability 
actually to serve in these menial tasks, is indeed 
a slave's quality. But we distinguish several kinds 
of slave, as their employments are several. One 
department belongs to the handicraftsmen, who as 
their name implies are the persons that live by their 
hands, a class that includes the mechanic artisan. 

considerably more. But the text at the beginning of the 
sentence is also corrupt. 

191 



ARISTOTLE 

1277 b 

τταρ' ένίοις ου μετεΐχον οι δημιουργοί το παλαιον 

αρχών, πριν δήμον γενέσθαι τον έσχατον. τα μεν 9 

οΰν έργα των αρχομένων οϋτως ου δει τον αγαθόν 

5 ουδέ τον πολιτικόν ουδέ τον πολίτην 1 τον αγαθόν 

μανθάνειν, ει μη ποτέ χρείας χάριν αύτώ προς 

αυτόν (ου γαρ έτι συμβαίνει yiVea(?cu τον 2 μέν 

δεσπότην τον 2 δέ δοΰλον). άλλ' εστί τις αρχή 

καθ* •ην άρχει των ομοίων τω γένει και των 

ελευθέρων (ταύτην γαρ λέγομεν eirai την πολι- 

ιο τικήν αρχήν), ην δει τον άρχοντα άρχόμενον μαθεΐν, 
οίον Ίππαρχεΐν ιππαρχηθέντα, στρατηγεΐν στρατη- 
γηθέντα και ταζιαρχήσαντα και λοχαγήσαντα. διό 
και λέγεται και τούτο καλώς, ως ουκ έστιν εΰ 
άρζαι μη άρχθέντα. τούτων δέ αρετή μέν έτερα, 10 
δει δέ τον πολίτην τον αγαθόν έπίστασθαι και 

is δΛ'ασ^αι και άρχεσθαι και άρχειν, και αυτή αρετή 
πολίτου, το τήν τών ελευθέρων αρχήν έπίστασθαι 
έπ* αμφότερα, και ανδρός δή άγαθοΰ άμφω, και 
ει έτερον είδος σωφροσύνης και δικαιοσύνης αρχι- 
κής• και γάρ αρχομένου μέν ελευθέρου δέ δήλον 
οτι ου μία αν ε'ίη του αγαθού αρετή, οίον δίκαιο - 

20 σύνη, άλλ' είδη έχουσα καθ* α άρζει και άρξεται, 
ώσπερ ανδρός και γυναικός έτερα σωφροσύνη και 
ανδρεία (δο^αι γαρ αν είναι δβιλό? ανηρ ει οϋτως 
ανδρείος εΐη ώσπερ γυνή ανδρεία, και γυνή λάλος 3 

1 [ά-/αθον ουδέ τον] πολιτικόν [ουδέ τον πολίτην] Thurot. 

2 τότ€ pro τον bis Riese, 6τ€ Richards. 
3 άλλος, άλαλο?, άλλως codd. inf. : ακόλαστος Susemihl. 

192 



POLITICS, III. π. 8-10 

Hence in some states manual labourers were not 
admitted to office in old times, before the develop- 

9 ment of extreme democracy. The tasks of those who 
are under this form of authority therefore it is not 
proper for the good man or the man fit for citizen- 
ship or the good citizen to learn, except for his own 
private use occasionally (for then it ceases to be a 
case of the one party being master and the other 
slave). But there exists a form of authority by 
which a man rules over persons of the same race as 
himself, and free men (for that is how we describe 
political authority), and this the ruler should learn 
by being ruled, just as a man should command cavalry 
after having served as a trooper, command a regi- 
ment after having served in a regiment and been in 
command of a company and of a platoon. Hence 
there is much truth in the saying that it is impossible 
to become a good ruler without having been a subject. 

10 And although the goodness of a ruler and that of a 
subject are different, the good citizen must have the 
knowledge and the ability both to be ruled and to rule, 
and the merit of the good citizen consists in having 
a knowledge of the government of free men on both 
sides. And therefore both these virtues are char- 
acteristic of a good man, even if temperance and 
justice in a ruler are of a different kind from temper- 
ance and justice in a subject ; for clearly a good 
man's virtue, for example his justice, will not be one 
and the same when he is under government and when 
he is free, but it will be of different kinds, one fitting 
him to rule and one to be ruled, just as temperance Male and 
and courage are different in a man and in a woman (f^ 1 * 
(for a man would be thought a coward if he were only 
as brave as a brave woman, and a woman a chatterer 

193 



ARISTOTLE 

1277 b , „ , „ „ , , v t y a , , λ 

ει ούτω κοσμία ειη ωσπερ ο ανηρ ο αγασος• επει 

καί οικονομία ετέρα ανδρός καί γυναικός, του μεν 

25 γαρ κτασθαι της δε φυλάττειν έργον εστίν), η δε 11 

φρόνησις άρχοντος ίδιος αρετή μόνη• τάς γαρ άλλας 

εοικεν άναγκαΐον είναι κοινά? καί των αρχομένων 

και των αρχόντων, αρχομένου δε γε ουκ εστίν 

αρετή φρόνησις, άλλα οόζα αληθής' ωσπερ αύλο- 

80 ποιος γαρ 6 αρχόμενος , ο δ' άρχων αυλητής ο 

χρω μένος. 

Πότερο ν μεν ουν ή αυτή αρετή ανδρός αγαθού 

και πολίτου σπουδαίου ή έτερα, και πώς ή αυτή 

και πώς έτερα, φανερόν εκ τούτων. 

III. Περί δε τον πολίτην έτι λείπεταί τι? τών 1 

αποριών, ως αληθώς γαρ πότερον πολίτης εστίν 

BS ω κοινωνειν έζεστιν αρχής, ή και τους βάναυσους 

πολίτας θετεον ; ει μεν ουν και τούτους θετεον οΐς 

μή μετεστιν αρχών, ούχ οΐόν τε παντός είναι πολίτου 

τήν τοιαύτην άρετήν, οΰτος γαρ πολίτης• ει δε 

μη8είς τών τοιούτων πολίτης, εν τίνι μέρει θετεος 

έκαστος; ουδέ γαρ μέτοικος ουδέ ξένος, ή δια γε 

1278a τούτον τον λόγον ουδέν φήσομεν συμβαίνειν άτοπο?''; 

ουδέ γαρ οι δούλοι τών ειρημενων ουδέν, ούδ* οι 

απελεύθεροι, τοϋτο γαρ αληθές, ως ου πάντας 2 

θετεον πολίτας ων άνευ ουκ αν ε'ίη πόλις, έπει 

ούδ' οί παίδες ώσαυτω? 77θλίται και οι άνδρες, αλλ' 

6 οί μεν απλώς οί δ' εξ υποθέσεως 1 • πολϊται μεν 

γάρ είσιν, αλλ' ατελείς, ε'ν μεν ουν τοις άρχαίοις 

1 έκ προσθίσΐως Casaubon. 

" Or perhaps ' for the working-man is a citizen ' : see 
Additional Note p. 275. 

6 Or, with Casaubon's probable correction of the Greek, 
'only with a qualification.' 

194 



POLITICS, III. ii. 10— in. 2 

if she were only as modest as a good man ; since even 
the household functions of a man and of a woman 
are different — his business is to get and hers to keep). 
11 And practical wisdom alone of the virtues is a virtue 
peculiar to a ruler ; for the other \artues seem to be 
necessarv alike for both subjects and rulers to possess, 
but wisdom assuredly is not a subject's virtue, but 
only right opinion : the subject corresponds to the 
man who makes flutes and the ruler to the flute- 
player who uses them. 

The question whether the goodness of a good man 
is the same as that of a good citizen or different, and 
how they are the same and how different, is clear 
from these considerations. 

1 III. But one of the difficulties as to what constitutes Therefore 

a citizen is still left. Is it truly the case that a citizen %££?££* 
is a person who has the right to share office in the citizens in 
government, or are the working classes also to be state. L 
counted citizens ? If these persons also are to be * h ^ d ° nofc 
counted who have no share in offices, it is not possible 
for every citizen to possess the citizen's virtue ; for 
the true citizen is the man capable of governing. e 
If on the other hand no one of the working people 
is a citizen, in what class are the various workers to 
be ranked ? for they are neither resident aliens nor 
foreigners. Or shall we say that so far as that argu- 
ment goes no inconsistency results ? for slaves also 
are not in one of the classes mentioned, nor are freed- 

2 men. For it is true that not all the persons indispens- 
able for the existence of a state are to be deemed 
citizens, since even the sons of citizens are not 
citizens in the same sense as the adults : the latter 
are citizens in the full sense, the former only by 
presumption b — they are citizens, but incomplete ones. 

195 



ARISTOTLE 

1278 a 

χρονοις παρ ενιοις ην δοΰλον το βάναυσον η 

ζενικόν, διόπερ ol πολλοί τοιούτοι και νυν η δε 

β€λτίστη πόλις ου ποιήσει βάναυσον πολίτην. ει 

δε και ούτος πολίτης, άλλα πολίτου άρετην ην 

ίο εϊπομεν λεκτέον ου παντός, ουδ' ελευθέρου μόνον, 
αλλ' όσοι των έργων είσιν άφειμένοι των αναγκαίων . 
των δ' αναγκαίων 1 οι μεν ένι λειτουργούντες τα. 3 
τοιαύτα δούλοι, οι 8έ κοινοί βάναυσοι και θητες. 
φανερόν δ' εντεύθεν μικρόν έπισκεφαμένοις πώς 
έχει περί αυτών[• αύτο γαρ φανέν το λεχθέν ποιεί 

ΐδ δηλον]. 2 έπει γαρ πλείους είσιν αϊ πολιτεΐαι, και 
εϊδη πολίτου αναγκαΐον etWn πλείω, και μάλιστα 
του αρχομένου πολίτου, ωστ εν μέν τινι πολιτεία 
τον βάναυσον αναγκαΐον είναι και τον θητα πολίτας, 
εν τισι δ' αδύνατον, οίον ε'ί τις εστίν ην καλοΰσιν 

20 άριστοκρατικην και εν η κατ' άρετην αϊ τιμαι 
δίδονται και κατ* άζίαν ου γαρ οΐόν τ' έπιτηδεϋ- 
σαι τά της αρετής ζώντα βίον βάναυσον η θητικόν. 
εν δε ταΐς όλιγαρχίαις θητα μέν ουκ ενδέχεται είναι 4 
πολίτην {από τιμημάτων γαρ μακρών αϊ μεθέξεις 
τών αρχών), βάναυσον δ ενδέχεται• πλουτοΰσι γαρ 

25 και οι πολλοί τών τεχνιτών, εν Θτ^αι? δε νόμος 
ην τον διά 3 δέκα ετών μη άπεσχημένον της αγοράς 
μη μετέχειν άρχης. εν πολλαΐς δε πολιτείαις προσ- 

1 άλλων Bernays. 

2 [αυτό — δήλορ] ed. : [^apey] vel <τό> φανίν [rb λεχθεν] 
Richards. 

3 δια add. Newman {ίτη Richards). 

The ill-expressed clause ' for what — clear ' seems almost 
certainly to be an interpolation. 

196 



POLITICS, III. in. 2-4 

In ancient times in fact the artisan class in some 
states consisted of slaves or aliens, owing to which 
the great mass of artisans are so even now ; and the 
best-ordered state will not make an artisan a citizen. 
While if even the artisan is a citizen, then what we 
said to be the citizen's virtue must not be said to 
belong to every citizen, nor merely be defined as the 
virtue of a free man, but will only belong to those 

3 who are released from menial occupations. Among 
menial occupations those who render such services to 
an individual are slaves, and those who do so for the 
community are artisans and hired labourers. The 
state of the case about them will be manifest from 
what follows when we consider it a little further[, for 
what has been said when made known itself makes it 
clear]. As there are several forms of constitution, 
it follows that there are several kinds of citizen, and 
especially of the citizen in a subject position ; hence 
under one form of constitution citizenship will 
necessarily extend to the artisan and the hired 
labourer, while under other forms this is impossible, 
for instance in any constitution that is of the form 
entitled aristocratic and in which the honours are 
bestowed according to goodness and to merit, since 
a person living a life of manual toil or as a hired 
labourer cannot practise the pursuits in which good- 

4 ness is exercised. In oligarchies on the other hand, 
though it is impossible for a hired labourer to be a 
citizen (since admission to office of various grades is 
based on high property-assessments), it is possible 
for an artisan ; for even the general mass of the 
craftsmen are rich. At Thebes there was a law that 
no one who had not kept out of trade for the last ten 
years might be admitted to office. But under many 

197 



ARISTOTLE 

1278 3 Ι /Λ Χ ~ f , < <• 

εφελκεται και των ξένων ο νομός' ο γαρ εκ 
πολίτιδος εν τισι δημοκρατίαις πολίτης εστίν, τον 5 
αυτόν δε τρόπον έχει, και τα περί τους νόθους 

3ο παρά πολλοίς, ου μην άλλ' επει δι' ενΒειαν των 
γνησίων πολιτών ποιούνται πολιτας τους τοιούτους 
(δια γαρ όλιγανθρωπίαν ούτω χρώνται τοις νόμοις), 
εύποροΰντες δη 1 δχλου κατά μικρόν παραιροΰνται 
τους εκ δούλου πρώτον η δούλης, εΐτα τους απο 
γυναικών τέλος δε μόνον τους εζ άμφοΐν αστών 

35 πολίτας ποιοΰσιν. δτι μεν ουν ε'ίδη πλείω πολίτου, 6 
φανερόν εκ τούτων, και δτι λέγεται μάλιστα 
πολίτης ο μετέχων τών τιμών, ώσπερ και "Ομηρος 
εποίησεν 

ώσεί τιν άτίμητον μετανάστην 

ωσπερ μέτοικος γάρ εστίν 6 τών τιμών μη μετέχων. 

άλλ' εστίν 2 δπου το τοιούτον επικεκρυμμΛνον εστίν 

40 απάτης χάριν τών συνοικούντων . 

1278 b ΥΙότερον μεν ουν ετέραν η την αύτην θετεον καθ* 

ην άνηρ αγαθός εστί και πολίτης σπουδαίος , δηλον 

εκ τών είρημενων, δτι τινο? μεν πόλεως ο αυτός 

τινός δ' έτερος, κάκεΐνος ου πας άλλ' ο πολιτικός 

και κύριος η δυνάμενος eirai κύριος, η καθ αυτόν 

5 η μετ αΧλων, της τών κοινών επιμελείας . 

IV. ΚπεΙ δε ταύτα διώρισται, το μετά ταύτα 1 

1 δη Susemihl : δ' codd. 
* εστίν hie Welldon, post συνοικούντων codd. 



α Iliad ix. 648, xvi. 59. 

b The mss. give ' But where such exclusion is disguised, it 
(this concealment) is for the purpose of deceiving ' etc. 

198 



POLITICS, III. πι. 4^-iv. 1 

constitutions the law draws recruits even from 
foreigners ; for in some democracies the son of a 

5 citizen-mother is a citizen, and the same rule holds 
good as to base-born sons in many places. Neverthe- 
less, inasmuch as such persons are adopted as citizens 
owing to a lack of citizens of legitimate birth (for 
legislation of this kind is resorted to because of 
under-pop ulation), when a state becomes well ο if for 
numbers it gradually divests itself first of the sons of 
a slave father or mother, then of those whose mothers 
only were citizens, and finally only allows citizenship 

6 to the children of citizens on both sides. These facts 
then show that there are various kinds of citizen, and 
that a citizen in the fullest sense means the man who 
shares in the honours of the state, as is implied in 
the verse of Homer : 

Like to some alien settler without honour, — 
since a native not admitted to a share in the public 
honours is like an alien domiciled in the land. But 
in some places this exclusion is disguised, for the 
purpose of deceiving those who are a part of the 
population. 6 

The answer therefore to the question, Is the 
goodness that makes a good man to be deemed 
the same as that which makes a worthy citizen, or 
different ? is now clear from what has been said : in 
one form of state the good man and the good citizen 
are the same, but in another they are different, 
and also in the former case it is not every citizen 
but only the statesman, the man who controls or is 
competent to control, singly or with colleagues, 
the administration of the commonwealth, that is 
essentially also a good man. 
I IV. And since these points have been determined, 

199 



ARISTOTLE 

1278 b 

σκεπτεον ποτερον μίαν θετεον πολιτείαν ή πλειους, 

καν ει πλείους, rives και πόσαι καΐ διαφοραϊ rives 

αυτών eiGLV. εστί he πολιτεία πόλεως τάζις των 

ίο re άλλων άρχων καί μάλιστα τής κυρίας πάντων, 
κυριον μεν γαρ πανταχού το πολίτευμα της πόλεως, 
πολίτευμα δ' εστίν ή πολιτεία, λέγω δ' οίον εν 
μεν ταΐς δημοκρατικαΐς κύριος 6 δήμος, οι δ 
ολίγοι τουναντίον εν ταΐς όλιγαρχίαις• φαμεν 8ε 
και πολιτείαν ετεραν είναι τούτων, τον αυτόν δε 

15 τούτον εροΰμεν λόγον και περί των άλλων. 

'Ύποθετεον δε πρώτον τίνος χάριν συνεστηκε 2 
πόλις και της αρχής εΐδη πόσα της περί άνθρωπον 
και 1 την κοινωνίαν της ζωής. 

Έιΐρηται δη κατά τους πρώτους λόγους, εν οις 
περί οικονομίας διωρίσθη και δεσποτειας, ότι 

20 φύσει μεν εστίν άνθρωπος ζώον πολιτικόν διο και 
μηδέν δεόμενοι τής παρ* αλλήλων βοηθείας ουκ 
ελαττον ορέγονται του συζήν. ου μην άλλα και 3 
τό κοινή συμφέρον συνάγει, καθ' όσον επιβάλλει 
μέρος εκάστω του ζήν καλώς, αάλιστα μεν οΰν 
τουτ εστί τέλος, και κοινή πάσι και χωρίς- 
συνέρχονται δε και του ζήν ένεκεν αύτοΰ και 

25 συνεχουσι την πολιτικήν κοινωνίαν, 2 'ίσως γάρ ενεστί 

τι του καλοΰ μόριον και κατά το ζήν αυτό μόνον 

άν μη τοις χαλεποΐς κατά τον βίον ύπερβάλλτ) 

λίαν, δήλον δ' ως καρτεροΰσι πολλην κακοπάθειαν 

1 και: κατά Bernays. 
2 καί — κοινωνίαν post 26 μόριον codd. cet. 

° 1253 a 1 foil. 
200 



POLITICS, III. iv. 1-3 

the next question to be considered is whether we are to Constitu- 
lav it down that there is only one form of constitution S^fiei 
or several, and if several, what they are and how 
many and what are the differences between them. 
Now a constitution is the ordering of a state in respect 
of its various magistracies, and especially the magis- 
tracv that is supreme over all matters. For the They vary 
government is everywhere supreme over the state to\heir ng 
and the constitution is the government. I mean that sovereign, 
in democratic states for example the people are 
supreme, but in oligarchies on the contrary the few 
are : and we say that they have a different constitu- 
tion. And we shall use the same language about the 
other forms of government also. 

2 We have therefore to determine first the funda- 
mental points, what is the object for which a state 
exists and how many different kinds of system there 
are for governing mankind and for controlling the 
common life. 

Now it has been said in our first discourses,* 1 in The true 
which we determined the principles concerning house- "Estate 
hold management and the control of slaves, that man is the 
is by nature a political animal ; and so even when men ™ β ι 1Γ ^ 
have no need of assistance from each other they none of its 

3 the less desire to live together. At the same time they 
are also brought together by common interest, so far 
as each achieves a share of the good life. The good life 
then is the chief aim of society, both collectively for 
all its members and individually ; but they also come 
together and maintain the political partnership for 
the sake of life merely, for doubtless there is some 
element of value contained even in the mere state 
of being alive, provided that there is not too great 
an excess on the side of the hardships of life, and it 

η 201 



ARISTOTLE 

ol πολλοί τών ανθρώπων γλιχόμενοι του ζήν, ως 

30 ενούσης τίνος ευημερίας iv αύτώ και γλυκύτητος 
φυσικής. 

Αλλά μην και της αρχής τους λεγόμενους 4• 
τρόπους ράδιον διελεΐν και γαρ iv τοις εξωτερικοΐς 
λογοις διοριζόμεθα περί αυτών πολλάκις, ή μεν 
γαρ δεσποτεία, καίπερ δντος κατ άλτ^ιαν τω τ€ 
φύσει δούλω καϊ τω φύσει δεσπότη ταύτοΰ συμ- 

36 φέροντος, όμως άρχει προς το του δεσπότου συμ- 
φέρον ουδέν ήττον, προς δε το του δούλου κατά 
συμβεβηκός, ου γαρ ενδέχεται φθειρομενου του 
δούλου σωί,εσθαι την δεσποτείαν. ή δε τέκνων δ 
αρχή και γυναικός [και τής οικίας πάσης, ην δη 
καλοΰμεν οίκονομικήν] 1 ήτοι τών αρχομένων χάριν 

40 εστίν ή κοινού τίνος άμφοΐν — καθ* αυτό μεν τών 
1279 a αρχομένων, ώσπερ όρώμεν και τάς άλλα? τεχνας, 
οίον ίατρικήν και γυμναστικήν, κατά συμβεβηκός 
δε καν αυτών εΐεν ουδέν γάρ κωλύει τον παιδο- 
τρίβην ενα τών γυμναζομενων ενίοτ eimi και 
αυτόν, ώσπερ ό κυβερνήτης εις εστίν άει τών 

5 πλωτήρων ό μεν ούν παιδοτρίβης ή κυβερνήτης 
σκοπεί το τών αρχομένων aya^ov, Οταν δέ τούτων 
εΐς γενηται και αυτός, κατά συμβεβηκος μετέχει 
τής ωφελείας, ο μέν γάρ πλωτήρ, ό δε τών γυμνα- 

1 καϊ — πάσης seclusit, ήν—οίκονομικήν suspexit Susemihl. 



α Mentioned at 1323 a 22 (and also six times in other 
books) ; they are there appealed to for the tripartite classifica- 
tion of foods which in Ethics 1098 b 12 is ascribed to ' current 
opinion of long standing and generally accepted by students 
of philosophy.' The term may there predenote doctrines 
not peculiar to the Peripatetic school. 

202 



POLITICS, III. iv. 3-5 

is clear that the mass of mankind cling to life at the 
cost of enduring much suffering, which shows that 
life contains some measure of well-being and of 
sweetness in its essential nature. 

4 And again, the several recognized varieties of varieties of 
government can easily be defined ; in fact we private life! 
frequently discuss them in our external discourses. 

The authority of a master over a slave, although in 
truth when both master and slave are designed by 
nature for their positions their interests are the 
same, nevertheless governs in the greater degree 
with a view to the interest of the master, but in- 
cidentally with a view to that of the slave, for if the 
slave deteriorates the position of the master cannot 

5 be saved from injury. Authority over children and 
wife [and over the whole household, which we call 
the art of household management 6 ] is exercised 
either in the interest of those ruled or for some 
common interest of both parties, — essentially, in 
the interest of the ruled, as we see that the other 
arts also, like medicine and athletic training, are 
pursued in the interest of the persons upon whom 
they are practised, although' incidentally they may 
also be in the interest of the practitioners themselves ; 
for nothing prevents the trainer from being on 
occasions himself also one of the persons in training, 
j ust as the pilot is always a member of the crew ; so 
although the trainer or pilot studies the good of 
those under his authority, when he himself also 
becomes one among them he incidentally shares the 
benefit, for the pilot is a sailor in the ship and the 
trainer can become one of the persons in training 

* Aristotle can hardly have written this clause, as it in- 
cludes mastership over slaves. 

203 



ARISTOTLE 

1279 a 

ζομενων εις γίνεται παιδοτρίβης ων. διό καί τάς 6 

πολιτικός αρχάς, όταν rj κατ ισότητα των πολιτών 

ίο συνεστηκυια και καθ' ομοιότητα, κατά μέρος 
άζιοϋσιν άρχειν, πρότερον μεν, fj πεφυκεν, άζιοϋν- 
τες εν μέρει λειτουργεΐν, και σκοπεΐν τινά πάλιν 
το αύτοΰ αγαθόν ώσπερ πρότερον αυτός άρχων 
εσκόπει το εκείνον συμφέρον νυν 8ε διά τάς 
ωφελείας τάς από των κοινών και τάς εκ της 

15 αρχής βούλονται συνεχώς άρχειν, οίον ει συνεβαινεν 
i3yiaiWt.v αεί τοις άρχουσι νοσακεροΐς ουσιν και 
γάρ αν οΰτως ΐσως εοίωκον τάς αρχάς. 

Φανερόν τοίνυν ως οσαι μεν πολιτεΐαι το κοινή η 
συμφέρον σκοποΰσιν , αύται μεν ορθαι τυγχάνουσιν 
οΰσαι κατά το απλώς δίκαιον, οσαι δε το σφετερον 

20 μόνον τών αρχόντων, ήμαρτημεναι 77ασαι και 
παρεκβάσεις τών ορθών πολιτειών δεσποτικαί 
γάρ, ή δε πόλις κοινωνία τών ελευθέρων εστίν. 

Διωρισμενων δε τούτων εχομενον εστί τάς 
πολιτείας επισκεφασθαι, 77οσαι τον αριθμόν και 
τίνες είσί, και πρώτον τάς ορθάς αυτών και γάρ 

25 at παρεκβάσεις έσονται φανεροί τούτων διορι- 
σθεισών. V. επεί δε πολιτεία μεν και πολίτευμα ι 
ση /xaiVei ταύτόν, πολίτευμα δ εστί το κύριον τών 
πόλεων, ανάγκη δ' είναι κύριον ή ενα ή ολίγους ή 
τους πολλούς, όταν μεν ό εις ή οι ολίγοι ή οι 
πολλοί προς το κοινόν συμφέρον αρχωσι, ταύτας 

so μεν όρθάς άναγκαΐον είναι τάς πολιτείας, τάς δε 
προς το ίδιον ή του ενός ή τών ολίγων ή του 
204 



POLITICS, III. iv. 6— v. 1 

6 under his own direction. Hence in regard to the 
political offices also, when the state is constituted 
on the principle of equality and of similarity between 
the citizens, these claim to hold office by turn — in 
earlier times, under the natural system, claiming 
to do public services in turn, and for somebody in 
return to look after their own welfare just as previ- 
ously they looked after his interest when in office 
themselves ; but nowadays owing to the benefits 
to be got from public sources and from holding office 
people wish to be in office continuously, just as if it 
were the case that those in office although sickly 
people always enjoyed good health — in which case 
office would no doubt be much run after by invalids. 

7 It is clear then that those constitutions that aim 
at the common advantage are in effect rightly framed 
in accordance with absolute justice, while those that 
aim at the rulers' own advantage only are faulty, 
and are all of them deviations from the right con- 
stitutions ; for they have an element of despotism, 
whereas a city is a partnership of free men. 

These matters having been determined the next Constitu- 
step is to consider how many forms of constitution t ! ons Λ , u 

ι -ι ι " f classified by 

there are and what they are ; and first to study the number 
the right forms of constitution, since the deviations sovereign 
will also become manifest when these are defined, ^.y. and 
1 V. But inasmuch as ' constitution ' means the same selfish or 
as ' government,' and the government is the supreme unseltish 
power in the state, and this must be either a single 
ruler or a few or the mass of the citizens, in cases 
when the one or the few or the many govern with an 
eye to the common interest, these constitutions must 
necessarily be right ones, while those administered 
with an eye to the private interest of either the one 

205 



ARISTOTLE 

πλήθους παρεκβάσεις, η γάρ ου πολίτας φατεον 
είναι τους μετέχοντας, 1 η δει κοινωνεΐν του συμ- 
φέροντος, καλεΐν δ' εΐώθαμεν των μεν μοναρ- 2 
χιών την προς το κοινον άποβλεπουσαν συμφέρον 

36 /^ασιλειαν, την δέ των ολίγων μεν πλειόνων δ' 
ενός άριστοκρατιαν (η δια το τους αρίστους άρχειν 
η δια το προς το άριστον τη πάλει και τοις 
κοινωνουσιν αυτής), όταν δε το πλήθος προς το 
κοινον πολιτεύηται συμφέρον, καλείται το κοινον 
όνομα πασών τών πολιτειών, πολιτεία, {συ μ- 3 

40 /3cuWi δ ευλόγως' ενα μεν γαρ διαφερειν κατ* 
άρετην η ολίγους ενδέχεται, πλείους δ' ηδη χαλεπόν 
1279 b ήκριβώσθαι προς πάσαν αρετην, αλλά μάλιστα την 
πολεμικην, αΰτη γαρ εν πληθει γίγνεταν διόπερ 
κατά ταύτην την πολιτειαν κυριώτατον το προ- 
πολεμουν , και μετεχουσιν αύτης οί κεκτημένοι τά 
5 όπλα.) παρεκβάσεις δε τών είρημενων τυραννις 4 
μεν βασίλεια? ολιγαρχία δε αριστοκρατίας δημο- 
κρατία δε πολιτείας• η μεν γάρ τυραννίς εστί 
μοναρχία προς το συμφέρον το του μοναρχοΰντος, 
η δ' ολιγαρχία προς το τών ευπόρων, η δε δημο- 
κρατία προς το συμφέρον το τών άπορων, προς 

10 δε το τω κοινώ λυσιτελοΰν ουδεμία αυτών. 

Αεί δε μικρώ διά μακροτερων ειπείν τις εκάστη 
τούτων τών πολιτειών εστίν και γάρ έχει τι^α? 
απορίας, τω δε περί εκάστην μεθοδον φιλοσοφοΰντι 

1 ζμη> μετέχοντας Bernays. 

206 



POLITICS, III. v. 1-4 

or the few or the multitude are deviations. For 
either we must not say that those who are part of 
the state are citizens, or those who are part of the 
state must share in the advantage of membership. 

2 Our customary designation for a monarchy that aims 
at the common advantage is ' kingship ' ; for a 
government of more than one yet only a few ' aristo- 
cracy ' (either because the best men rule or because 
they rule with a view to what is best for the state 
and for its members) ; while when the multitude 
govern the state with a view to the common advan- 
tage, it is called by the name common to all the forms 

3 of constitution, ' constitutional government.' (And 
this comes about reasonably, since although it is 
possible for one man or a few to excel in virtue, when 
the number is larger it becomes difficult for them 
to possess perfect excellence in respect of every 
form of virtue, but they can best excel in military 
valour, for this is found with numbers ; and therefore 
with this form of constitution the class that fights 
for the state in war is the most powerful, and it is 
those who possess arms who are admitted to the 

4 government.) Deviations from the constitutions 
mentioned are tyranny corresponding to kingship, 
oligarchy to aristocracy, and democracy to constitu- 
tional government ; for tyranny is monarchy ruling 
in the interest of the monarch, oligarchy government 
in the interest of the rich, democracy government in 
the interest of the poor, and none of these forms 
governs with regard to ihe profit of the community. 

But it is necessary to say at a little greater oii<?archy 
length what each of these constitutions is ; for the Democracy 
question involves certain difficulties, and it is the ^sentiaHy 
special mark of one who studies any subject philo- egovern • 

207 



ARISTOTLE 

1279 b \ \ / > o\ ' 11 / 

και μη μόνον απορλεποντι προς το πραττειν 

15 οικεΐόν εστί το μη παροράν μηδέ τι καταλείπειν 
αλλά δηλοΰν την περί εκαστον άληθειαν. εστί δε 5 
τνραννις μεν μοναρχία, καθάπερ ε'ίρηται, δεσπο- 
τική της πολιτικής κοινωνίας, ολιγαρχία δ' όταν 
ώσι κύριοι της πολιτείας οι τάς ουσίας έχοντες, 
δημοκρατία δέ τουναντίον όταν οι μη κεκτημένοι 

20 πλήθος ουσίας αλλ' άποροι, πρώτη δ' απορία προς 
τον διορισμόν εστίν, ει γαρ εΐεν οι πλείους οντες 
εύποροι κύριοι της πόλεως, δημοκρατία δ' εστίν 
όταν η κύριον το πλήθος, ομοίως δέ πάλιν καν ε'ί 
που συμβαίνοι 1 τους απόρους ελάττους μεν είναι 
των ευπόρων κρείττους δ' οντάς κυρίους eirai της 

26 πολιτείας , οπού δ' ολίγον κύριον πλήθος όλιγαρ- 
χίαν εΐναί φασιν, ουκ αν καλώς δόξειεν διωρίσθαι 
περί των πολιτειών, άλλα μην καν ε'ί 2 τις 6 
συνθεις τη μεν εύπορία την ολιγότητα τη δ' 
απορία το πλήθος ούτω προσαγορεύοι τάς πολι- 
τείας, ολιγαρχίαν μεν εν η τάς αρχάς εχουσιν οι 

so εύποροι ολίγοι το πλήθος οντες, δημοκρατίαν δε 
εν fj οι άποροι πολλοί το πλήθος οντες, άλλην 
άπορίαν έχει. τίνας γάρ εροΰμεν τάς άρτι λεχ- 
θείσας πολιτείας, την εν fj πλείους οί εύποροι και 
την εν 3 η ελάττους οί άποροι, κύριοι δ' εκάτεροι 
τών πολιτειών, ε'ίπερ μηδεμία άλλη πολιτεία πάρα 

85 τάς είρημενας εστίν; εοικε τοίνυν ό λόγος ποιεΐν 7 

δηλον οτι το μεν ολίγους η πολλούς eivai κυρίους 

1 Schneider: συμβαίνει, -η codd. 
* καν €Ϊ Susemihl : κ&ν codd. 3 την ίν ed. : ev codd. 

β i.e. it would be absurd to term government by the people 
democracy if the people happened to be very rich, or govern- 
ment by a few oligarchy if the few were poor and the many 
whom they governed rich. 
208 



POLITICS, III. v. 4-7 

sophically, and not solely with regard to its practical ments of 
aspect, that he does not overlook or omit any point, an ,i ροΟΓι 

5 but brings to light the truth about each. Now not of "j he 
tyranny, as has been said, is monarchy exerting many. 
despotic power over the political community ; 
oligarchy is when the control of the government is 

in the hands of those that own the properties ; 
democracy is when on the contrary it is in the hands 
of those that do not possess much property, but are 
poor. A first difficulty is with regard to the defini- 
tion. If the majority of the citizens were wealthy 
and were in control of the state, yet when the multi- 
tude is in power it is a democracy, and similarly, to 
take the other case, if it were to occur somewhere 
that the poor were fewer than the rich but were 
stronger than they and accordingly were in control 
of the government, yet where a small number is in 
control it is said to be an oligarchy, then it would 
seem that our definition of the forms of constitution 

6 was not a good one. a And once again, if one assumed 
the combination of small numbers with wealth and 
of multitude with poverty, and named the constitu- 
tions thus — one in which the rich being few in number 
hold the offices, oligarchv : one in which the poor 
being many in number hold the offices, democracy, 
— this involves another difficulty. What names are 
we to give to the constitutions just described — the 
one in which there are more rich and the one in 
which the poor are the fewer, and these control their 
respective governments — if there exists no other 

7 form of constitution beside those mentioned ? The 
argument therefore seems to make it clear that for 
few or many to have power is an accidental feature 

209 



ARISTOTLE 

1279 b 

συμβεβηκός εστίν, τό μεν ταΓ? όλιγαρχίαις τό δε 

ταΐς δημοκρατίαις, δια το τους μεν εύπορους 

ολίγους πολλούς δ' etvai τους απόρους πανταχού 

(διό και ού συμβαίνει τάς ρηθείσας αίτιας γίνεσΒαι 

40 διαφοράς) , ω δε διαφερουσιν η τε δημοκρατία και 

1280 a η ολιγαρχία αλλήλων πενία και πλούτος εστίν 

και άναγκαΐον μεν οπού αν άρχωσι δια πλούτον, 
αν τ ελαττους αν τε πλειους, eiWxi ταύτην όλιγ- 
αρχίαν, οπού δ' οι άποροι, δημοκρατίαν, αλλά συμ- 
βαίνει, καθάπερ εϊπομεν, τους μεν ολίγους eiWu 
6 τους δε πολλούς, εύποροΰσι μεν γαρ ολίγοι της δ' 
ελευθερίας μετεχουσι πάντες, δι' ας αιτίας άμφι- 
σβητούσιν αμφότεροι της πολιτείας. 

Ληπτεον δε πρώτον τίνας ορούς λεγουσι της 8 
ολιγαρχίας και δημοκρατίας, και τι το δίκαιον τό 
τε ολιγαρχικόν και δημοκρατικόν . πάντες γαρ 

ίο άπτονται δικαίου τινός, άλλα μέχρι τινός προ- 
έρχονται, και λεγουσιν ού πάν τό κυρίως δίκαιον, 
οΐον δοκεΐ Ισον τό δίκαιον 1 eirai, και εστίν, άλλ' ού 
πάσιν άλλα τοις ισοις' και το ανισον δοκεΐ δίκαιον 
είναι, και γάρ εστίν, αλλ' ού πάσιν άλλα τοις 
άνίσοις• οι δέ τοΰτ' άφαιροΰσι, το οΐς, και κρίνουσι 

15 κακώς, τό δ' αίτιοι ότι περί αυτών η κρίοις, 
σχεδόν δ' οι πλείστοι φαύλοι κριταϊ περί τών 
οικείων, ώστ' επει τό δίκαιον τισίν, και δι- 9 
ηρηται τον αυτόν τρόπον επί τε τών πραγμάτων 

1 τ6 (σον δίκαιον Victorius. 
210 



POLITICS, III. v. 7-9 

of oligarchies in the one case and democracies in the 
other, due to the fact that the rich are few and the 
poor are many everywhere (so that it is not really 
the case that the points mentioned constitute a 
specific difference), but that the real thing in which 
democracy and oligarchy differ from each other is 
poverty and wealth ; and it necessarily follows that 
wherever the rulers owe their power to wealth, 
whether they be a minority or a majority, this is an 
oligarchy, and when the poor rule, it is a democracy, 
although it does accidentally happen, as we said, 
that where the rulers hold power bv wealth they are 
few and where they hold power by poverty they are 
many, because few men are rich but all men possess 
freedom, and wealth and freedom are the grounds 
on which the two classes lay claim to the government. 

8 And first we must ascertain what are stated to be The 
the determining qualities of oligarchy and democracy, f p"wer. 
and what is the principle of justice under the one form Ja * t '? e fa 
of government and under the other. For all men lay equality of 
hold on justice of some sort, but they only advance ^^ 
to a certain point, and do not express the principle 

of absolute justice in its entirety. For instance, it is 
thought that justice is equality, and so it is, though 
not for everybody but only for those who are equals ; 
and it is thought that inequality is just, for so indeed 
it is, though not for everybody, but for those who are 
unequal ; but these partisans strip away the qualifica- 
tion of the persons concerned, and judge badly. And 
the cause of this is that they are themselves concerned 
in the decision, and perhaps most men are bad judges 

9 when their own interests are in question. Hence 
inasmuch as ' just ' means just for certain persons, 
and it is divided in the same way in relation to the 

211 



ARISTOTLE 

1280 a ' ι . 

και οΐς, καθάπερ εΐρηται πρότερον εν τοις ηθικοΐς, 

την μεν τοΰ πράγματος Ισότητα όμολογοΰσι, την 

20 δε οΐς άμφισβητοΰσι, μάλιστα μεν διά το λεχθεν 

άρτι, διότι κρίνουσι τά nepi αυτούς κακώς, έπειτα 

δέ και δια το λέγειν μέχρι τινός εκατερους δίκαιον 

τι νομίζουσι 1 δίκαιον λέγειν απλώς, οι μεν γαρ 

αν κατά τι άνισοι ώσιν, οίον χρημασιν, όλως οί- 

ονται άνισοι eirai, οι δ' αν κατά τι ίσοι, οίον ελευ- 

25 θερία, 2 όλως 'ίσοι. το δε κυριώτατον ου λεγουσιν. 10 

ει μεν γαρ των κτημάτων χάριν εκοινωνησαν και 

συνηλθον, τοσούτον μετεχουσι της πόλεως οσον- 

περ και της κτήσεως, ώσθ' 6 τών ολιγαρχικών 

λόγος δόζειεν αν ισχύειν (ου γαρ είναι δίκαιον 

ίσον μετεχειν τών εκατόν μνών 3 τον είσενεγ- 

80 καντα μίαν μνάν τω δόντι το λοιπόν πάν, ούτε 

τών εξ αρχής ούτε τών επιγινομενων)' ει δε μήτε 

τοΰ ζην μόνον ένεκεν άλλα μάλλον τοΰ ευ ζην (και 

γαρ αν δούλων και τών άλλων ζώων ην πόλις, 

νύν δ' ουκ εστί δια το μη μετεχειν ευδαιμονίας 

μηδέ τοΰ ζην κατά προαίρεσιν), μήτε οαγΑ/χαχια? 

ένεκεν όπως υπό μηδενός άδικώνται, μήτε δια τας 

1 νομίζουσι <τό> Spengel. 

* Sepulveda : ελεύθεροι, ελευθέριοι codd. 

3 εκατόν ταλάντων Γ. 

» Cf. Ν.Ε. v. iii., 1131 a 14-24. 

6 See 1268 b 14 η. ; or read ' 100 talents,' say £24,000 
(gold). 
212 



POLITICS, III. v. 9-10 

things to be distributed and the persons that receive 
them, as has been said before in Etkicsf the two 
parties agree as to what constitutes equality in the 
thing, but dispute as to what constitutes equality in 
the person, chiefly for the reason just now stated, 
because men are bad judges where they themselves 
are concerned, but also, inasmuch as both parties 
put forward a plea that is just up to a certain point, 
they think that what they say is absolutely just. For 
the one side think that if they are unequal in some 
respects, for instance in wealth, they are entirely 
unequal, and the other side think that if they are 
equal in some respects, for instance in freedom, they 
10 are entirely equal. But the most important thing for the state 
they do not mention. If men formed the community thereof 
and came together for the sake of wealth, their share the good 
in the state is proportionate to their share in the l ^ 
property, so that the argument of the champions of 
oligarchy would appear to be valid— namely that in 
a partnership with a capital of 100 minae b it would 
not be just for the man who contributed one mina to 
have a share whether of the principal or of the profits 
accruing equal to the share of the man who supplied 
the whole of the remainder ; but if on the other hand 
the state was formed not for the sake of life only but 
rather for the good life (for otherwise a collection of 
slaves or of lower animals would be a state, but as it 
is, it is not a state, because slaves c and animals have 
no share in well-being or in purposive life), and if its 
object is not military alliance for defence against 
injury by anybody, and it does not exist for the 

e See 1260 a 12, and X.E. x. vi., 1 177 a 8, ' but no one allows 
a slave any measure of happiness, any more than a life of 
his own.' 

213 



ARISTOTLE 

άλλαγάς και την χρήσιν την προς αλλήλους• και 
γαρ αν Ύυρρηνοι καϊ Καρχηδόνιοι, και πάντες οΐς 
€στι σύμβολα προς αλλήλους, ώς αιά? aV πολΐται 
πόλεως ήσαν είσι γοΰν αύτοΐς συνθήκαι περί των 11 
εισαγώγιμων και σύμβολα περί του μη άοικεΐν 

40 και γραφαι περί συμμαχίας• αλλ' ούτ άρχαι πάσιν 
lE80b επ\ τούτοις κοινοί καθεστασιν, αλλ* ετεραι παρ' 
εκατεροις, ούτε του ποίους τινά? efvai δει φρον- 
τίζουσιν άτεροι τους ετέρους, ουδ' όπως μηδεις 
άδικος έσται των υπό τάς συνθήκας μηδέ μο- 
χθηρίαν έζει μηδεμίαν, άλλα μόνον όπως μηδέν 
6 άδικήσουσιν αλλήλους, περί δ' αρετής και κακίας 
πολιτικής διασκοποΰσιν όσοι φροντίζουσιν ευνομίας, 
τ} και φανερόν οτι δει περί αρετής επιμελές είναι 
τή γ ώς αληθώς ονομαζόμενη πόλει, μη λογού 
χάριν γίνεται γαρ ή κοινωνία συμμαχία, τών 

ίο άλλων 1 τόπω διαφέρουσα μόνον τών άποθεν συμ- 
μάχων* και ο νόμος συνθήκη και, καθάπερ εφη 
Αυκόφρων ο σοφιστής, εγγυητής άλλήλοις τών 
δικαίων, αλλ ούχ οίος ποιεΐν αγαθούς και δικαίους 
τους πολίτας. οτι δε τούτον έχει τον τρόπον 12 
φανερόν. εί γάρ τις και συναγάγοι τους τόπους 
εις εν, ώστε άπτεσθαι την Μεγαρέων πολιν και 

15 Κορινθίων τοις τείχεσιν, όμως ου μία πόλις• ουδ' 
€ΐ προς αλλήλους επιγαμίας ποιήσαιντο, καίτοι 
τούτο τών ιδίων ταΐς πόλεσι κοινωνημάτων εστίν. 

1 τών άλλων : &\\ω$ ? Immisch. 2 συμμαχιών Conring. 

° The sentence here breaks off ; the inference that should 
have formed its conclusion is given in § 15. 

* Probably a pupil of Gorgias, see 1275 b 26 n. 

214, 



POLITICS, III. v. 10-12 

sake of trade and of business relations — for if so, 
Etruscans and Carthaginians and all the people that 
have commercial relations with one another would 

11 be virtually citizens of a single state; at all events 
they have agreements about imports and covenants 
as to abstaining from dishonesty and treaties of 
alliance for mutual defence ; but they do not have 
officials common to them all appointed to enforce 
these covenants, but different officials with either 
party, nor yet does either party take any concern 
as to the proper moral character of the other, nor 
attempt to secure that nobody in the states under 
the covenant shall be dishonest or in any way immoral, 
but only that they shall not commit any wrong 
against each other. All those on the other hand who 
are concerned about good government do take chic 
virtue and vice into their purview. Thus it is also 
clear that any state that is truly so called and is not 
a state merely in name must pay attention to virtue ; 

for otherwise the community becomes merely an not merely 
alliance, differing only in locality from the other [ectkm and 
alliances, those of allies that live apart. And the intercourse 
law is a covenant or, in the phrase of the sophist 
Lycophron, 6 a guarantee of men's just claims on one 
another, but it is not designed to make the citizens 

12 virtuous and just. And that this is how the matter 
stands is manifest. For if one were actually to bring 
the sites of two cities together into one, so that the 
city-walls of Megara and those of Corinth were con- 
tiguous, even so they would not be one city ; nor 
would they if they enacted rights of intermarriage 
with each other, although intermarriage between 
citizens is one of the elements of community which are 
characteristic of states. And similarly even if certain 

215 



ARISTOTLE 

ομοίως δ' ουδ' ei rives οίκοΐεν χωρίς μεν, μη 
μεντοι τοσούτον άποθεν ώστε μη κοινωνεΐν , αλλ' 
ε'ίησαν αύτοΐς νόμοι τον μη σφάς αυτούς άδικεΐν 

20 περί τάς μεταδόσεις — οίον ει ό μεν είη τεκτων 6 
δε γεωργός ο δε σκυτοτόμος ό δ' άλλο τι τοιούτον — , 
και το πλήθος εΐεν μνρίοι, μη μεντοι κοινωνοΐεν 
άλλου μηδενός η των τοιούτων οίον αλλαγής καΐ 
συμμαχίας, ουδ' ούτω πω πόλις. διά τίνα δη 13 
ττοτ αίτίαν; ου γαρ δη διά το μη σύνεγγυς της 

25 κοινωνίας' ει γαρ και συνελθοιεν ούτω κοινω- 
νοΰντες (έκαστος μεντοι χρώτο τή ίδια οικία ώσπερ 
πόλει) και σφίσιν αύτοΐς ως β^ι/χαχια? ούσης 
βοηθοΰντες επί τους άδικοΰντας μόνον, οι)δ' ούτως 
αν ewai δόζειε πόλι? τοις ακριβώς θεωροΰσιν, 
εΐπε ρ ομοίως όμιλοΐεν συνελθόντες και χωρίς. 

80 φανερόν τοίνυν ότι η πόλις ουκ εστί κοινωνία 
τόπου και του μη άδικεΐν σφας αυτούς και της 
μεταδόσεως χάριν αλλά ταύτα μεν άναγκαΐον 
ύπάρχειν ε'ίπερ εσται πόλις, ού μην ούδ' υπ- 
αρχόντων τούτων απάντων ηδη πόλις, αλλ' η του 
ευ ζην κοινωνία και ταΐς οικιαις και τοις γενεσι, 

35 ζωής τελείας χάριν και αυτάρκους . ουκ εσται 1 4 
μεντοι τούτο μη τον αυτόν και ενα κατοικούντων 
τόπον και χρωμενων επιγαμίαις• διό κηδεΐαί τ' 
εγενοντο κατά τάς πόλεις και φρατρίαι και θυσίαι 
και διαγωγαι του συζήν. το δε τοιούτον φιλίας 

216 



POLITICS, III. v. 12-14 

people lived in separate places yet not so far apart 
as not to have intercourse, but had laws to prevent 
their wronging one another in their interchange of 
products — for instance, if one man were a carpenter, 
another a farmer, another a shoemaker and another 
something else of the kind, — and the whole population 
numbered ten thousand, but nevertheless they had no 
mutual dealings in anything else except such things 
as exchange of commodities and military alliance, 

13 even then this would still not be a state. What then 
exactly is the reason for this ? for clearly it is not 
because their intercourse is from a distance ; since 
even if they came together for intercourse of this 
sort (each nevertheless using his individual house as 
a city) and for one another's military aid against 
wrongful aggressors only, as under a defensive alli- 
ance, not even then would they seem to those who 
consider the matter carefully to constitute a state, if 
they associated on the same footing when they came 
together as they did when they were apart. It is 
manifest therefore that a state is not merely the 
sharing of a common locality for the purpose of 
preventing mutual injury and exchanging goods. 
These are necessary pre-conditions of a state's exist- 
ence, yet nevertheless, even if all these conditions 
are present, that does not therefore make a state, 
but a state is a partnership of families and of clans 
in living well, and its object is a full and independent 

14 life. At the same time this will not be realized unless 
the partners do inhabit one and the same locality 
and practise intermarriage ; this indeed is the reason 
why family relationships have arisen throughout the 
states, and brotherhoods and clubs for sacrificial rites 
and social recreations. But such organization is pro- 

217 



ARISTOTLE 

«sob B k , , 4 La 

έργον, η γαρ του συζην προαιρεσις φιλία- τέλος 

40 μεν οΰν πόλεως το εΰ ζην, ταύτα δε του τέλους 

1281 a χάριν, πόλις δε η γενών και κωμών κοινωνία 

ζωής τελείας και αυτάρκους , 1 τούτο δ' εστίν, ως 

φαμεν, το ζην εύδαιμόνως και καλώς• τών καλών 

άρα πράξεων 2 χάριν θετεον είναι την πολιτικην 

κοινωνίαν, αλλ' ου του συζήν διόπερ όσοι συμ- 15 

δ βάλλονται πλείστον εις την τοιαυτην κοινωνίαν, 

τούτοις της πόλεως μετεστι πλεΐον η τοις κατά 

μεν ελευθερίαν και γένος ϊσοις η μείζοσι κατά δε 

την πολιτικην άρετην άνίσοις, η τοις κατά πλοΰτον 

ύπερεχουσι κατ* άρετην ο' ύπερεχομενοις. 

"Οτι μεν οΰν πάντες οι περί τών πολιτειών 

ίο αμφισβητούντες μέρος τι του δικαίου λεγουσι, 
φανερόν εκ τών είρημενων. 

VI. Έχει δ' άπορίαν τί δει το κΰριον είναι της 1 
πόλεως, η γάρ τοι το πλήθος, η τους πλουσίους, 
η τους επιεικείς, η τον βελτιστον ενα πάντων, η 
τύραννον. αλλά ταϋτα πάντα εχειν φαίνεται δυσκο- 

15 λίαν. τί γάρ; αν οι πένητες διά το πλείους είναι 
διανεμωνται τά τών πλουσίων, tout' ουκ άδικόν 
εστίν; εδοζε γάρ νη Δια τω κυρίω δικαίως, την 
οΰν άδικίαν τί χρη λέγειν την εσχάτην; πάλιν τε, 
πάντων ληφθέντων, οι πλείους τά τών ελαττόνων 
άν διανεμωνται, φανερόν ότι φθείρουσι την πάλιν 

20 άλλα μην ούχ η γ' άρετη φθείρει το έχον αντην, 
οΰδε το δίκαιον πόλεως φθαρτικόν, ώστε δήλον 
οτι και τον νόμον τούτον ούχ οΐόν τ' είναι δίκαιον. 

1 αυτάρκους <χάριν~> Scaliger. 
2 πράξεων om. ΓΜΡ 1 . 

218 









POLITICS, III. v. 14— vi. 1 

duced by the feeling of friendship, for friendship is 
the motive of social life ; therefore, while the object 
of a state is the good life, these things are means to 
that end. And a state is the partnership of clans and 
villages in a full and independent life, which in our 
view constitutes a happy and noble life ; the political 
fellowship must therefore be deemed to exist for ™ ere K for ? fa 

ι/•ιι ι /• ν • • the absolute 

the sake of noble actions, not merely tor living in right to 
15 common. Hence those who contribute most to such gj^fc, 
fellowship have a larger part in the state than those contribute 
who are their equals or superiors in freedom and birth u ° e θ 8 
but not their equals in civic virtue, or than those who 
surpass them in wealth but are surpassed by them 
in virtue. 

It is therefore clear from what has been said that 
all those who dispute about the forms of constitution 
a--ert a part of the just principle. 
I VI. But it is a matter of question what ought to be in practice, 

ι . .ι #-ti 1 1 •. . where is 

the sovereign power in the state. Clearly it must ^oven-ignty 
be either the multitude, or the rich, or the good, or ^^^ 
the one man who is best of all, or a tyrant. But all questioned. 
of these arrangements appear to involve disagree- 
able consequences. For instance, if the poor take 
advantage of their greater numbers to divide up the 
property of the rich, is not this unjust ? No, it may 
be said, for it was a resolution made by the supreme 
authority in just form. Then what must be pro- 
nounced to be the extreme of injustice ? And again, 
when everybody is taken into account, suppose the 
majority share out among themselves the property 
of the minority, it is manifest that they are destroy- 
ing the state ; but assuredly virtue does not destroy 
its possessor, and justice is not destructive of the 
state, so that it is clear that this principle also cannot 

219 



ARISTOTLE 

1281a „ . ; , , m t 

en και τα? πραςεις όσας ο τύραννος επραςεν 2 

άναγκαΐον είναι πάσας δίκαια?, βιάζεται γαρ ών 

κρείττων, ώσπερ και το πλήθος τους πλουσίους. 

25 άλλ άρα τους ελάττους δίκαιον άρχειν και τους 
πλουσίους; αν οΰν κάκεΐνοι ταύτα ποιώσι και 
διαρπάζωσι και άφαιρώνται τά κτήματα} του 
πλήθους, τουτ εστί δίκαιον; και θάτερον άρα. 
ταύτα μεν τοίνυν δτι πάντα φαΰλα και ου δίκαια 
φανερόν. άλλα τους επιεικείς άρχειν δει και κυρίους 3 

80 είναι πάντων; ούκοΰν ανάγκη τους άλλου? άτι- 
μους είναι πάντας, μη τιμωμένους ταΐς πολιτικαΐς 
άρχαΐς• τιμάς γαρ λεγομεν είναι τά? αρχάς, αρχόν- 
των δ' αιει των αυτών άναγκαΐον eivai τους άλλους 
άτιμους, άλλ' ενα τον σπουδαιότατον άρχειν βελ- 
τιον; άλλ' ετι τούτο ολιγαρχικώτερον , οι γάρ 

85 άτιμοι πλείους. άλλ' ΐσω? φαίη τις αν το κύριον 
όλως άνθρωπον είναι άλλα μη νόμον φαϋλον, εχοντά 
γε τά συμβαίνοντα πάθη περί την φυχην. αν οΰν 
fj νόμος μεν ολιγαρχικός δε η δημοκρατικός, τι 
διοίσει περί των ηπορημενων; συμβησεται γάρ 
ομοίως τά λεχθέντα πρότερον. 

Περί μεν οΰν των άλλων έστω τις έτερος λόγος• 

40 οτι δέ δει κύριον είναι μάλλον το πλήθος η τους 4 

αρίστους μεν ολίγους δε, δό^ειεν αν λυεσ#αι 2 και 

τιν' εχειν άπορίαν, 3 τάχα δε καν άληθειαν. τους 

1281 b γάρ πολλούς, ων έκαστος εστίν ου σπουδαίος 

άνήρ, όμως ενδέχεται συνελθόντας eivai βελτίους 

1 Richards : τα κτήματα άφαιρωνται,οοάά. 
2 αν εΰ λ^γεσ&χι Richards. s άπο\ο•γίαι> Wilamowitz. 

β Technical term for disfranchisement and loss of civic rights. 
220 



POLITICS, III. vi. 2-4 

2 be just. Also it follows from it that all the actions 
done by a tyrant are just, for his use of force is based 
upon superior strength, as is the compulsion exerted 
by the multitude against the rich. But is it just that 
the minority and the rich should rule ? Suppose 
therefore they also act in the same way and plunder 
and take away the property of the multitude, is this 
just ? If it is, so also is the plunder of the rich by 
the multitude. It is clear therefore that all these 

3 things are bad and not just. But ought the good to 
rule, and be in control of all classes ? If so, then it 
follows that all the other classes will be dishonoured, 
if they are not honoured by holding the offices of 
government ; for we speak of offices as honours, and 
if the same persons are always in office the rest must 
necessarily be excluded from honour. But is it 
better for the most virtuous individual to be the 
ruler ? But that is still more oligarchical, for the 
people excluded from honour will be more numerous. 
But perhaps some one would say that in any case it 
is a bad thing for a human being, having in his soul 
the passions that are the attributes of humanity, to be 
sovereign, and not the law. Suppose therefore that 
law is sovereign, but law of an oligarchic or demo- 
cratic nature, what difference will it make as regards 
the difficulties that have been raised ? for the results 
described before will come about just the same. 

Most of these points therefore must be discussed on 

4 another occasion ; but the view that it is more proper Qualified 
for the multitude to be sovereign than the few of united* 
greatest virtue might be thought to be explicable, democracy. 
and to raise some difficulty but probably to be 

true. For it is possible that the many, though 
not individually good men, yet when they come 

221 



ARISTOTLE 

1281 b , , . ., . , 1V , 

εκείνων ουχ ως εκαστον αλλ ως συμπαντας, οίον 

τά σνμφορητά δείπνα των εκ μιας δαπάνης χορη- 
γηθέντων πολλών γαρ όντων εκαστον μόριον εχειν 
δ αρετής καΐ φρονησεως , καϊ γίνεσθαί συνελθοντας 
ώσπερ ενα 1 άνθρωπον το πλήθος πολύποδα και 
πολύχειρα και πολλάς εχοντ αίσθΐ]σεις , ούτω και 
περί τά ηθη και την διάνοιαν. διο και κρινουσιν 
άμεινον οι πολλοί και τά της μουσικής έργα και 
τά των ποιητών άλλοι γάρ άλλο τι μόριον, πάντα 

ίο δέ πάντες, αλλά τούτω διαφερουσιν οι σπουδαίοι 5 
τών ανδρών εκάστου 2 τών πολλών, ώσπερ και τών 
μη καλών τους καλούς φασι καϊ τά γεγραμμενα 
δια τέχνης τών αληθινών, τω συνηχθαι τά διεσπαρ- 
μένα χωρίς εις εν, επει κεχωρισμενων γε κάλλιον 

15 εχειν του γεγραμμενου τουδι μεν τον όφθαλμόν 
έτερου δε τίνος έτερον μόριον. ει μεν οΰν περί 
7τάντα δημον και περί παν πλήθος ενδέχεται ταύτην 
βιναι την διαφοράν τών πολλών προς τους ολίγους 
σπουδαίους, άδηλον, 'ίσως δε νη Δία δηλον ότι 
περί ενίων αδύνατον — ό γάρ αύτος καν επι τών 

20 θηρίων άρμόσειε λόγος, καίτοι τι διαφερουσιν ενιοι 
τών θηρίων ως έπος ειπείν; — άλλα περί τι πλήθος 
ούδεν είναι κωλύει το λεχθέν αληθές, διό καϊ την 6 
πρότερον είρημενην άπορίαν λύσειεν αν τις δια 



1 καϊ ώσπερ ylveadai cvvekdelv οίον ίνα Richards. 
* έκαστοι Thurot. 



222 



POLITICS, III. vi. 4-6 

together may be better, not individually but collec- 
tively, than those who are so, just as public dinners 
to which many contribute are better than those 
supplied at one man's cost ; for where there are 
many, each individual, it may be argued, has some 
portion of virtue and wisdom, and when they have 
come together, just as the multitude becomes a 
single man with many feet and many hands and 
many senses, so also it becomes one personality as 
regards the moral and intellectual faculties. This 
is why the general public is a better judge of the 
works of music and those of the poets, because 
different men can judge a different part of the 

6 performance, and all of them all of it. But the 
superiority of good men over the mass of men in- 
dividually, like that of handsome men, so it is said, 
over plain men and of the works of the painter's art 
over the real objects, really consists in this, that a 
number of scattered good points have been collected 
together into one example ; since if the features 
be taken separately, the eye of one real person is 
more beautiful than that of the man in the picture, 
and some other feature of somebody else. It is not 
indeed clear whether this collective superiority of 
the many compared with the few good men can 
possibly exist in regard to every democracy and 
every multitude, and perhaps it may be urged that 
it is manifestly impossible in the case of some — for 
the same argument would also apply to animals, yet 
what difference is there, practically, between some 
multitudes and animals? — but nothing prevents what 
has been said from being true about some particular 

6 multitude. One might therefore employ these con- 
siderations to solve not only the previously stated 

223 



ARISTOTLE 

1281 b 

τούτων και την έχομένην αυτής, τίνων δει κυρίους 

etvai τους ελευθέρους και το πλήθος των πολιτών 

ν> {τοιούτοι δ' εισίν όσοι μήτε πλούσιοι μήτε άζίωμα 
εχουσιν αρετής μηδέν), το μεν γαρ /xere^etP' 
αυτού? των αρχών τών μεγίστων ουκ ασφαλές 
(διά τε γαρ άδικίαν και δι' άφροσύνην τα μεν 
αδικεΐν ανάγκη 1 τα δ' άμαρτάνειν αυτούς), το δε 
μη μεταδιδόναι μηδέ μετέχειν φοβερόν όταν γάρ 

80 άτιμοι πολλοί και πένητες ύπάρχωσι, πολεμίων 
αναγκαΐον eimi πλήρη την πόλιν ταύτην. λείπεται 
δη του βουλεύεσθαι και κρίνειν μετέχειν αυτούς, 
διόπερ και Σόλωι^ και τών άλλων τινές νομοθετών 7 
ταττουσιν επι τε 2 τάς αρχαιρεσίας και τάς εύθύνας 
τών αρχόντων, άρχειν δε κατά μάνας ουκ έώσιν. 

85 πάντες μεν γάρ έχουσι συνελθόντες ικανήν αίσθησιν, 
και μιγνύμενοι τοις βελτίοσι τάς πόλεις ώφελοΰσιν, 
καθαπερ ή μη καθαρά τροφή μετά τής καθαράς 
την πάσαν ποιεί χρησιμωτέραν τής όλίγης• χωρίς 
δ έκαστος ατελής περί το κρίνειν εστίν, έχει 8 
δ ή τάζις αύτη τής πολιτείας άπορίαν πρώτην 

40 μεν οτι δόζειεν αν του αυτού et^at το κρϊναι τις 
ορθώς ίάτρευκεν ουπερ και το ίατρεΰσαι και 
ποιήσαι ύγιά τον κάμνοντα τής νόσου τής παρούσης, 
~S82 a ούτος δ έστιν ιατρός• ομοίως δε τούτο και περί 
τας άλλας εμπειρίας και τέχνας. ώσπερ οΰν ίατρόν 
δει διδόναι τάς εύθύνας εν ίατροΐς, ούτω και τους 

1 ava -γκη Rassow : hv codd. 
* έττί re ζταΰτα αυτούς καΐ iwi> Wilamowitz. 

α Probably words meaning ' these functions and to ' have 
fallen out. 

6 i.e., especially, bran mixed with pure flour. 
224 



POLITICS, III. vi. 6-8 

difficulty but also the related question, over what 
matters is the authority of the freemen, the mass of 
the citizens, to extend (using that expression to 
denote those who are not rich nor possessed of any 
distinguishing excellence at all) ? For it is not safe 
for them to participate in the highest offices (for 
injustice and folly would inevitably cause them to 
act unjustly in some things and to make mistakes in 
others), but vet not to admit them and for them not 
to participate is an alarming situation, for when there 
are a number of persons without political honours and 
in poverty, the city then is bound to be full of enemies. 
It remains therefore for them to share the delibera- 

7 tive and judicial functions. For this reason Solon 
and certain other lawgivers appoint the common 
citizens to a the election of the magistrates and the 
function of calling them to audit, although they do 
not allow them to hold office singly. For all when 
assembled together have sufficient discernment, and 
by mingling with the better class are of benefit to 
the state, just as impure food mixed with what is 
pure b makes the whole more nourishing than the 
small amount of pure food alone ; but separately the 

8 individual is immature in judgement. This arrange- 
ment of the constitution is however open to question The people 
in the first place on the ground that it might be held JjjJ^j^ 
that the best man to judge which phvsician has given wisdom and 
the right treatment is the man that is himself capable w ' 
of treating and curing the patient of his present 
disease, and this is the man who is himself a physician; 

and that this is the case similarly with regard to 
the other arts and crafts. Hence just as a court 
of physicians must judge the work of a physician, 
so also all other practitioners ought to be called 

225 



ARISTOTLE 

1282 a „... , . . - , . 5 , w , 

άλλους εν τοις ομοιοις. ιατρός ο ο τε δημιουργός 
και 6 αρχιτεκτονικός και τρίτος 6 πεπαιδευμένος 
5 περί την τεχνην (είσι γάρ TtJ/e? τοιούτοι και περί 
πάσας ώς ειπείν τάς Terras - , άποδίδομεν ok το 
κρίνειν ούδεν ήττον τοις πεπαιδευμενοις η τοις 
είδόσιν) . €7Γ6ΐτα και περί την αΐρεσιν τον αυτόν αν 9 
δόξειεν εχειν τρόπον και γάρ το eXiaOai ορθώς 
των ειδυτων έργον εστίν, οίον γεωμετρην τε των 

ίο γεωμετρικών και κυβερνητην τών κυβερνητικών 
ει γάρ και περί ενίων έργων και τεχνών μετεχουσι 
και τών ιδιωτών Tti^e?, αλλ' ου τι τών είοότων γε 
μάλλον, ώστε κατά μεν τούτον τον λόγον ουκ 
άν εΐη το πλήθος ποιητεον κΰριον οϋτε τών αρχ- 
αιρεσιών οϋτε τών ευθυνών, αλλ' ΐσως ου πάντα 10 

15 ταύτα λέγεται καλώς διά τε τον ττάλαι λόγον, άν 
η το πλήθος μη λίαν άνδραποδώδες (εσται γάρ 
έκαστος μεν χειρών κριτής τών είδότων, άπαντες 
δέ συνελθόντες η βελτίους η ου χείρους), και οτι 
περί ενίων οϋτε μόνον ο ποιησας οΰτ άριστ άν 
κρίνειεν, όσων τάργα γιγνώσκουσι /cat οι μη 

80 έχοντες την τεχνην, οίον οίκίαν ου μόνον εστί 
yvcDmi του ποιησαντος, αλλά και βελτιον ό χρώ- 
μενος αύτη κρίνει (χρηται δ 6 οικονόμος), και 
πηδάλιον κυβερνήτης τεκτονος, και θοίνην ο δαιτϋ- 
μών αλλ' ούχ ο μάγειρος. 

Ύαύτην μεν ουν την άπορίαν τάχα δόζειε τις άν 

See § 4. 
226 



POLITICS, III. vi. 8-10 

to account before their fellows. But ' physician ' 
means both the ordinary practitioner, and the master 
of the craft, and thirdly, the man who has studied 
medicine as part of his general education (for in 
almost all the arts there are some such students, and 
we assign the right of judgement just as much to 
9 cultivated amateurs as to experts). Further the 
same might be thought to hold good also of the 
election of officials, for to elect rightly is a task for 
experts — for example, it is for experts in the science 
of mensuration to elect a land-surveyor and for 
experts in navigation to choose a pilot; for even 
though in some occupations and arts some lavmen 
also have a voice in appointments, yet they certainlv 
do not have more voice than the experts. Hence 
according to this argument the masses should not 
be put in control over either the election of magis- 
10 trates or their audit. But perhaps this statement 
is not entirely correct, both for the reason stated 
above," in case the populace is not of too slavish a 
character (for although each individual separately 
will be a worse judge than the experts, the whole of 
them assembled together will be better or at least 
as good judges), and also because about some things 
the man who made them would not be the only nor 
the best judge, in the case of professionals whose 
products come within the knowledge of laymen also : 
to judge a house, for instance, does not belong only 
to the man who built it, but in fact the man who uses 
the house (that is, the householder) will be an even 
better judge of it, and a steersman judges a rudder 
better than a carpenter, and the diner judges a 
banquet better than the cook. 

This difficulty then might perhaps be thought to be 

227 



ARISTOTLE 

1282 a 

ούτω λύειν ίκανώς. άλλη δ' εστίν εχομένη ταύτης• 11 

25 δοκεΐ γάρ άτοπον eirai το μειζόνων €Ϊναί κυρίους 
τους φαύλους των επιεικών, αϊ δ' εύθϋναι καΐ αί 
τώι/ αρχών αιρέσεις είσι μεγιστον, ας iv ενίαις 
πολιτείαις, ώσπερ εΐρηται, τοις δήμοις άποδιδόασιν, 
η γαρ εκκλησία κυρία πάντων των τοιούτων εστίν 

so καίτοι της μεν εκκλησίας μετεχουσι και βουλεύουσι 
και δικάζουσιν από μικρών τιμημάτων και της 
τυχούσης ηλικίας, ταμιεύουσι δε και στρατηγοΰσι 
και τας μεγίστας αρχάς άρχουσιν από μεγάλων, 
ομοίως δη τις άν λύσειε και ταύτην την άπορίαν — 12 
ίσως γαρ έχει και ταϋτ ορθώς, ου γάρ 6 δικαστής 

35 ουο ο βουλευτής ουδ' ο εκκλησιαστής άρχων εστίν, 
άλλα το δικαστηριον και ή βουλή και 6 δήμος, 
τών οέ ρηθεντων έκαστος μόριόν εστί τούτων 
(λέγω δέ μόριον 1 τον βουλευτην και τον εκκλησια- 
στών και τον δικαστην) . ώστε δικαίως κύριον μει- 
ζόνων το πλήθος, εκ γάρ πολλών ο δήμος και η 

40 βουλή και το δικαστηριον, και το τι/χ^αα δε 
πλεΐον το πάντων τούτων η το τών καθ ενα και 
κατ' ολίγους μεγάλας αρχάς αρχόντων. 
1282 b Ταύτα μεν ουν διωρίσθω τούτον τον τρόπον η 13 
δε πρώτη λεχθεΐσα απορία ποιεί φανερόν ούδεν 
ούτως έτερον ώς ότι δει τους νόμους etWu κυρίους 
κείμενους ορθώς, τον άρχοντα δε, άν τε εις άν τε 
πλείους ώσι, περί τούτων eimi κυρίους περί 
5 όσων εζαδυνατοΰσιν οι νομοί λέγειν ακριβώς διά 
το μη ράδιον etvat καθόλου δτ^λώσαι περί πάντων. 
1 [μόρων] ? Richards. 

° Viz. that under any plan some hardships will result, § 1. 
228 



POLITICS, III. vi. 11-13 

11 satisfactorily solved in this way. But there is another and the 
one connected with it : it is thought to be absurd ^raJd elect 
that the base should be in control over more important a " d control 
matters than the respectable ; but the audits and magistrate»; 
elections of magistrates are a very important matter, 

vet in some constitutions, as has been said, they are 
assigned to the common people, for all such matters 
are under the control of the assembly, yet persons 
of a low property-assessment and of any age take 
part in the assembly and the council and sit on juries, 
whereas treasury officials, generals and the holders 
of the highest magistracies are drawn from among 

12 persons of large property. Now this difficulty also 
may be solved in a similar way ; for perhaps these 
regulations also are sound, since it is not the individual 
juryman or councillor or member of the assembly in 
whom authoritv rests, but the court, the council and 
the people, while each of the individuals named (I 
mean the councillor, the members of assembly and 
the juryman) is a part of those bodies. Hence justly 
the multitude is sovereign in greater matters, for the 
popular assembly, the council and the jurv-court are 
formed of a number of people, and also the assessed 
property of all these members collectively is mure than 
that of the magistrates holding great offices individu- 
ally or in small groups. 

13 Let these points therefore be decided in this but the 
manner. But the difficulty first mentioned α proves ^gufded 1 ** 
nothing else so clearly as that it is proper for the laws by good 
when rightly laid down to be sovereign, while the 

ruler or rulers in office should have supreme powers 
over matters as to which the laws are quite unable to 
pronounce with precision because of the difficulty of 
making a general rule to cover all cases. We have 

229 



ARISTOTLE 

1282 b 

οποίους μεντοι τινάς elvai δει τους ορθώς κλιμένους 

νόμους, ούδεν πω δήλον, αλλ' ετι μένει το πάλαι 

διαπορηθεν άμα 1 γαρ καΐ ομοίως ταΐς πολιτεί- 

αις ανάγκη καΐ τους νόμους φαύλους η σπου- 

10 δαιους είναι και δικαίους η αδίκους (πλην τοΰτό 
γε φανερόν, οτι δει προς την πολιτείαν κεΐσθαι 
τους νομούς)• αλλά μην el τοΰτο, δηλον οτι τους 
μεν κατά τάς όρθάς πολιτείας άναγκαΐον efmi 
δικαίους τους δε κατά τάς παρεκβεβηκυίας ου 
δικαίους. 

VII. Κπει δ εν πάσαι? μεν ταΐς επιστημαις 1 

15 και τεχναις aya^ov το τέλος, μεγιστον δε και 
μάλιστα εν τη κυριωτάτη πασών, αύτη δ' εστίν η 
πολιτική δυναμις, εστί δε το 2 πολιτικόν ayai?o> 
το δίκαιον, τοΰτο δ' εστί το κοινή συμφέρον, δοκεΐ 
δη 3 πάσιν ίσον τι το δίκαιον είναι, και μ^χρι γε 
τίνος όμολογοΰσι τοις κατά φιλοσοφίαν λόγοις εν 

20 οίς διώρισται περί τών ηθικών τι γάρ και τισι το 
δίκαιον, και δεΐν τοΐς ΐσοις 'ίσον εΐναί φασιν. 
ποίων δ ίσότης εστί και ποίων άνισότης δει μη 
λανθάνειν έχει γάρ tout' άπορίαν και φιλοσοφίαν 
πολιτικην . ίσως γάρ αν φαίη τις κατά παντός 2 
ύπεροχην αγαθού δεΐν άνίσως νενεμησθαι τάς άρ- 

25 χάς, ει* πάντα τά λοιπά μηδέν διαφεροιεν αλλ 

1 άμα Bernays : άλλα codd., άλλα yap . . . άδίκουί post 12 
νόμους Congreve. 2 δέ το Susemihl : oe codd. 

3 δη Immisch: δέ codd. 4 el <και> ? ed. 

° See 1281 a 36. 

6 Probably this clause should stand after the next, ' though 
— constitution ' (which will be a parenthesis), and should run 
' but <the difficulty is there> for necessarily — states.' 

c The usual rendering is ' perverted,' but the Greek term 
is more neutral. 
230 



POLITICS, III. vi. 13— vn. 2 

not however vet ascertained at all what particular 
character a code of laws correctly laid down ought to 
possess, but the difficulty raised at the start still 
remains ; 6 for necessarily the laws are good or bad, 
just or unjust, simultaneously with and similarly to the 
constitutions of states (though of course it is obvious 
that the laws are bound to be adapted to the 
constitution) ; yet if so, it is clear that the laws 
in conformity with the correct constitutions must 
necessarily be just and those in conformity with the 
divergent c forms of constitution unjust. 

1 VII. d And inasmuch as in all the sciences and arts claims to 
the End is a good, and the greatest good and good ^" *" 
in the highest degree in the most authoritative !**■£*; 
of all, which is the political faculty, and the good a nd above 
in the political field, that is, the general advantage, aU virtue; 
is justice, it is therefore thought by all men that 
justice is some sort of equality, and up to a certain 

point at all events they agree with the philosophical 
discourses in which conclusions have been reached 
about questions of ethics e ; for justice is a quality 
of a thing in relation to persons/ and they hold that 
for persons that are equal the thing must be equal. 
But equalitv in what characteristics does this mean, 
and inequality in what ? This must be made clear, 
since this too raises a difficulty, and calls for political 

2 philosophy. For perhaps someone might say that the 
offices of state ought to be distributed unequally 
according to superiority in every good quality, even 
if the candidates in all other respects did not differ 

d What follows is a summary of yicomachean Ethics, 
I. ec. i., ii. * See also NJE. Y. c. iii. 

' Literally, ' the just is (a just) something and (something 
just) for somebody.' 

231 



ARISTOTLE 

1282b „ , „ , 

όμοιοι τυγχανοιεν οντες• τοις yap οιαφερουσιν 
έτερον eivai το δίκαιον «rat το κατ άζίαν. αλλά 
μην « tout' αληθές, εσται και κατά χρώμα και 
κατά μέγεθος και καθ' ότιοΰν των αγαθών πλεον- 

80 e^ia τις τών πολιτικών δίκαιων τοι? ύπερεχουσιν. 
η τοΰτο επιπόλαιον το φεΰδος; φανερόν δ επι 
τών άλλων επιστημών και δυνάμεων τών γάρ 
όμοιων αυλητών την τεχνην ου δοτεον πλεονεζίαν 
τών αυλών τοις εύγενεστεροις• ουδέν γάρ αύλησουσι 
βελτιον, δει δε τω κατά το έργον ύπερεχοντι διδοναι 

35 και τών οργάνων την ύπεροχην. εΐ δε μηπω δήλον 
το λεγόμενον , ετι μάλλον αυτό προαγαγοΰσιν εσται 
φανερόν. ει γαρ εΐη τις υπερέχων μεν κατά την 
αύλητικήν πολύ δ' ελλείπων κατ εύγενειαν η κάλ- 
λος, ει και μείζον εκαστον εκείνων αγαθόν εστί 
της αύλητικης (λέγω δε την τ εύγενειαν και το 

40 κάλλος) και κατά την άναλογίαν ύπερεχουσι πλέον 
της αύλητικης η εκείνος κατά την αύλητικήν, όμως 
1283 a τούτω δοτεον τους διαφέροντας τών αυλών δει 
γάρ εις το έργον συμβάλλεσθαι την ύπεροχην και 
του πλούτου και της ευγενείας, συμβάλλονται δ' 
ούδεν. ετι κατά γε τούτον τον λόγον πάν αγαθόν 4 
προς πάν αν εΐη συμβλητόν. ει γάρ μάλλον 2 το τι 
δ μέγεθος, και όλως αν το μέγεθος ενάμιλλον εΐη 
και προς πλοΰτον και προς ελευθερίαν ώστ ει 
πλεΐον όδι διαφέρει κατά μέγεθος η όδι κατ' 
αρετην, και πλεΐον υπερέχει 3 όλως αρετής μέγεθος, 

1 <ώδε> διαφέρονσιν ? ed. 

2 ένάμ.ϊ\\ον Ingram: καλοί' Richards. 

3 ϋπερίχειν (ενδέχεται} ? Susemihl (<e/> καϊ πλεΐον υπερέχει 
Ολως αρετή με•/έθονί Bernays). 

232 



POLITICS, III. vii. 2-4 

at all but were exactly alike, because men that are 
different a have different rights and merits. Yet if 
this is true, those who are superior in complexion or 
stature or any good quality will have an advantage 
in respect of political rights. But surely the error here 
is obvious, and it comes out clearly if we consider the 
other sciences and faculties. Among flute-players 
equally good at their art it is not proper to give an 
advantage in respect of the flutes to those of better 
birth, for they will not play any better, but it is 
the superior performers who ought to be given the 

3 superior instruments. And if our meaning is not yet 
plain, it will become still clearer when we have carried 
the matter further. Suppose someone is superior in 
playing the flute but much inferior in birth or in good 
looks, then, even granting that each of these things — 
birth and beauty — is a greater good than ability to 
play the flute, and even though they surpass flute- 
playing proportionately more than the best flute- 
player surpasses the others in flute-plaving, even so 
the best flute-player ought to be given the outstand- 
ingly good flutes ; for otherwise superiority both 
in wealth and in birth ought to contribute to the 
excellence of the performance, but they do not do 

4 so at all. Moreover on this theory even• good thing 
would be commensurable with even other. For if 
to be of some particular height gave more claim, 
then height in general would be in competition with 
wealth and with free birth ; therefore if A excels 
in height more than Β does in virtue, and speaking 
generally size gives more superiority than virtue, 6 

• i.e. different in some good quality. 

* Perhaps we should rewrite the Greek tu give ' even though 
speaking generally virtue gives more superiority than size.' 

ι 233 



ARISTOTLE 

1283 a 

ε'ιη αν συμβλητά πάντα• τοσόνδε γαρ [μέγεθος] 1 

ει κρεΐττον τοσοΰδε, 2 τοσόνδε δηλον ως Ισον. 

ίο επει δε τουτ αδύνατον, δηλον ώς και επι των 5 
πολιτικών ευλόγως ου κατά πάσαν άνισότητ άμφι- 
σβητοΰσι των αρχών — ει γαρ οι μεν βραδεΐς οι 
δε ταχείς, ούδεν δια τοΰτο δεΐ τους μεν πλεΐον 
τους δ ελαττον εχειν, αλλ' εν τοις γυμνικοΐς άγώσιν 
η τούτων διαφορά λα^άι^ει την τιμήν αλλ' εζ 

16 cov πόλις συνεστηκεν , εν τούτοις άναγκαΐον ποιεΐ- 
σ^αι την άμφισβητησιν . διόπερ ευλόγως αντι- 
ποιούνται της τιμής οι ευγενείς και ελεύθεροι και 
πλούσιοι• δεΐ γάρ ελευθέρους τ' είναι και τίμημα 
φέροντας, ου γάρ αν εΐη πόλις εξ απόρων πάντων, 
ωσπερ ούδ εκ δούλων, αλλά μην ει δεΐ τούτων, β 

20 δηλον οτι και δικαιοσύνης και της πολιτικής 3 
αρετής, ούδε γάρ άνευ τούτων οίκεΐσθαι πάλιν 
δυνατόν πλην άνευ μεν τών προτέρων αδύνατον 
είναι πόλιν, άνευ δε τούτων οίκεΐσθαι καλώς. 

Προ? μεν οΰν το πόλιν είναι δόζειεν αν η πάντα 
η ενιά γε τούτων ορθώς άμφισβητεΐν, προς μεντοι 

25 ζωην άγαθην η παιδεία και η άρετη μάλιστα 
δικαίως αν άμφισβητοίησαν, καθάπερ εΐρηται και 
πρότερον. επει δ' ούτε πάντων ίσον εχειν* δεΐ 7 
τους ίσους εν τι μόνον οντάς ούτε άνισον τους 
άνισους καθ' εν, ανάγκη πάσας είναι τάς τοιαύτας 
πολιτείας παρεκβάσεις, εΐρηται μεν οΰν και πρό- 

80 τερον οτι διαμφισβητοϋσι τρόπον τινά δικαίως 

1 [μέ~/€θος] Susemihl : αγαθόν ? Newman. 

2 τοσοΰδε ζττλούτον^ Richards. 

3 πολΐμικψ codd. plerique. 

4 ζμβτ>έχΐΐι> Wallies. 

Doubtless the author meant the other way round, ' for 
the slow having less and the fast more political power.' 

234 



POLITICS, III. vn. 4-7 

all things would be commensurable ; for if such-and- 
such an amount of one thing is better than such-and- 
such an amount of another, it is clear that such-and- 
such an amount of the one is equal to that amount of 

5 another. But since this is impossible, it is clear that 
in politics with good reason men do not claim a right to 
office on the ground of inequality of every kind — if one 
set of men are slow runners and another fast, this is 
no good ground for the one set having more and the 
other less α political power, but the latter's superiority 
receives its honour in athletic contests ; but the 
claim to office must necessarily be based on superiority 
in those things which go to the making of the state. 
Hence it is reasonable for the well-born, free and 
wealthy to lay claim to honour ; for there must be 
free men and tax-payers, since a state consisting 
entirely of poor men would not be a state, any more 

6 than one consisting of slaves. But then, granting 
there is need of these, it is clear that there is also 
need of justice and civic virtue, for these are also 
indispensable in the administration of a state ; except 
that wealth and freedom are indispensable for a 
state's existence, whereas justice and civic virtue are 
indispensable for its good administration. 

As a means therefore towards a state's existence all for 
or at all events some of these factors would seem to jj^virtue 
make a good claim, although as means to a good life form the 
education and virtue would make the most just claim, g 

7 as has been said also before. On the other hand since c. v. | is. 
those who are equal in one thing only ought not to 

have equality in all things nor those unequal as 
regards one thing inequality in all, it follows that all 
these forms of constitution must be deviations. 
Now it has been said before that all make a claim c v. Η 8 a. 

235 



ARISTOTLE 

1283 a 

πάντ€ς, απλώς δ' ου πάντες 1 δικαίως, οι πλούσιοι 

μεν οτι πλεΐον μετεστι της χώρας αύτοΐς, η δε 
χώρα κοινόν, ετι 2 προς τά συ/χ^όλαια πιστοί μάλ- 
λον ώς επι το πλέον, οι δ' ελεύθεροι και ευγενείς 

35 ώς εγγύς αλλήλων (πολΐται γαρ μάλλον οι γεν- 
ναιότεροι τών άγεννών, η δ ευγένεια παρ έκα- 
στοι? οΐκοι τίμιος), ετι διότι βελτίους εικός τους 
εκ βελτιόνων, ewyeVeia γαρ εστίν άρετη γένους• 
ομοίως δε 3 φησομεν δικαίως και την άρετην άμφι- 8 
σβητεΐν, κοινωνικην γαρ άρετην εΐναί φαμεν την 

40 δικαιοσύνη, $ πάσας άναγκαΐον άκολουθεΐν τάς 
άλλα?• άλλα μην και οι πλείους προς τους ελάτ- 
τους, και γαρ κρείττους και πλουσιώτεροι και 
βελτίους εισιν ώς λαμβανομένων τών πλειόνων 
1283 b προς τους ελάττους. αρ' ουν ει πάντες ειεν εν uia 
πάλει, λέγω δ' οίον οι τ' aya#oi και οι πλούσιοι 
και ευγενείς, ετι δε πλήθος άλλο τι πολιτικόν, 
πότερον άμφισβητησις εσται τίνας άρχειν δει η 
ουκ εσται; καθ* εκάστην μεν ουν πολιτείαν τών g 
6 είρημενων αναμφισβήτητος η κρίσις τίνας άρχειν 
δει (τοις γαρ κυρίοις διαφερουσιν άλλ^λω^, οίον η 
μεν τω δια πλουσίων η δε τω διά τών σπουδαίων 
ανδρών ειι^αι, και τών άλλων εκάστη τον αύτον 
τρόπον)' αλλ' όμως σκοποΰμεν, όταν περί τον 
αυτόν ταΰθ' ύπάρχη χρόνον, πώς διοριστεον. 

10 Ει δη τον αριθμόν ειεν ολίγοι πάμπαν οι την \ο 
άρετην έχοντες, τίνα δει διελεΓν τον τρόπον; η το 
ολίγοι προς το έργον δει σκοπεΐν ει δυνατοί 
1 [wavres] Richards. * ir'i <ibs> ? ed. * 5e Γ : δη codd. 

236 



POLITICS, III. vii. 7-10 

that is in a manner just, though not all a claim that is 
absolutely just ; the rich claiming because they have 
a larger share of the land, and the land is common 
property, and also as being for the most part more but wealth, 
faithful to their covenants ; the free and well-born numbers 
as being closely connected together (for the better- a ^° have 
born are citizens to a greater degree than those of claims, and 
low birth, and good birth is in even' community held ^^j, . 
in honour at home), and also because it is prob- and 
able that the children of better parents will be better, government 

8 for good birth means goodness of breed ; and we 
shall admit that virtue also makes an equally just 
claim, for we hold that justice is social virtue, which 
necessarily brings all the other virtues in its train ; \ 
but moreover the majority have a just claim as com- 
pared with the minority, since they are stronger and 
richer and better if their superior numbers are taken 

in comparison with the others' inferior numbers. 
Therefore supposing all were in one city, I mean, 
that is, the good and the wealthy and noble and also 
an additional mass of citizens, will there be a dispute, 

9 or will there not, as to who ought to govern ? It is 
true that under each of the forms of constitution that 
have been mentioned the decision as to who ought to 
govern is undisputed (for the difference between them 
lies in their sovereign classes — one is distinguished by 
being governed by the rich men, one by being governed 
by the good men, and similarly each of the others) ; 
but nevertheless we are considering the question how 
we are to decide between these classes supposing that 
they all exist in the state at the same period. 

10 If then the possessors of virtue should be quite Difficulties : 
few in number, how is the decision to be made ? the good'* 
ought we to consider their fewness in relation to the of the 

ο community 

237 



ARISTOTLE 

1283 b^ m , f * a ~ * \~Q at 

οιοικειν την πολιν η τοσούτοι το πληυος ωστ 

εΐναι πόλιν εζ αυτών; εστί δέ απορία τι? προς 
απαντάς τους διαμφισβητοϋντας περί των πολι- 

15 τικών τιμών. ο~όζαΐ€ν γαρ αν 1 ουδέν λέγειν 
δίκαιον οι διά τον πλοΰτον άζιοΰντες άρχειν, 
ομοίως δέ και οι κατά γένος• δήλον γαρ ώς ει τις 
πάλιν εις πλουσιώτερος απάντων εστί, δηλονότι 
κατά το αυτό δίκαιον τούτον άρχειν τον ενα απάν- 
των δεήσει, ομοίως δε και τον ευγένεια διαφέροντα 

20 των αμφισβητούντων δι' ελευθερίαν. ταντό δε 11 
tout' ΐσως συμβήσεται και περί τάς αριστο- 
κρατίας επί της αρετής' ει γάρ τις εις άμείνων 
άνηρ ειη των άλλων των εν τω πολιτεύματι 
σπουδαίων όντων, τούτον etrai δει κύριον κατά 
ταύτό δίκαιον, ούκοΰν ει και το πλήθος είναι γε 2 

25 δει κύριον διότι κρείττους είσι των ολίγων, καν 
εις η πλείους μεν του ενός ελάττους δε των πολλών 
κρείττους ώσι τών άλλων, τούτους αν δεοι κυρίους 
etvat μάλλον η το πλήθος, πάντα δη ταυτ εοικε 12 
φανερόν ποιεΐν δτι τούτων τών ορών ουδείς ορθός 
εστί καθ* δν 3 άζιοΰσιν αυτοί μεν άρχειν τους δ' 

30 άλλου? υπό σφών άρχεσθαι πάντας. και γάρ δη 
και προς τους κατ* άρετήν άζιοΰντας κυρίους eirai 
του πολιτεύματος , ομοίως δε και τους κατά πλοΰ- 
τον, εχοιεν αν λέγειν τά πλήθη λόγον τινά δίκαιον 
ουδέν γάρ κωλύει ποτέ το πλήθος etrai βελτιον τών 
ολίγων και πλουσιώτερον , ούχ ώς καθ' εκαστον 
85 αλλ' ώς αθρόους. 

Διό και προς την άπορίαν ην ζητοΰσι και προ- 13 

1 γάρ αι> Coraes : yap codd. 
* y είναι (vel supra κατά ye) Richards. 3 oOs ? ed. 

238 



POLITICS, III. vii. 10-13 

task, and whether they are able to administer the 
state, or sufficiently numerous to constitute a state ? not of the 
And there is some difficulty as regards all the rival many. 
claimants to political honours. Those who claim to 
rule because of their wealth might seem to have no 
justice in their proposal, and similarly also those who 
claim on the score of birth ; for it is clear that if, to 
go a step further, a single individual is richer than all 
the others together, according to the same principle 
of justice it will obviously be right for this one man to 
rule over all, and similarly the man of outstanding 
nobilitv among the claimants on the score of free 

11 birth. And this same thing will perhaps result in 
the case of aristocratic government based on virtue ; 
for if there be some one man who is better than the 
other virtuous men in the state, by the same principle 
of justice that man must be sovereign. Accordingly 
if it is actually proper for the multitude to be 
sovereign because they are better than the few, then 
also, if one person or if more than one but fewer 
than the many are better than the rest, it would be 
proper for these rather than the multitude to be 

12 sovereign. All these considerations therefore seem 
to prove the incorrectness of all of the standards 
on which men claim that they themselves shall 
govern and everybody else be governed by them. 
For surely even against those who claim to be 
sovereign over the government on account of virtue, 
and similarly against those who claim on account of 
wealth, the multitudes might be able to advance a 
just plea ; for it is quite possible that at some time 
the multitude may be collectively better and richer 
than the few, although not individually. 

13 Hence it is also possible to meet in this way the 

239 



ARISTOTLE 

1283 b fl/ .. , , s , , , , 

ραλλουσι rives ewe^erai τούτον τον τρόπον απανταν 

(αποροΰσι γάρ τίνες πότερον τω νομοθέτη νομο- 

θετητέον, βουλομένω τίθεσθαι τους ορθότατους 

νομούς, προς το των βελτιόνων συμφέρον η προς 

40 το των πλειόνων) όταν συμβαίνη το λεχθέν. το δ' 
ορθόν ληπτέΌν Ισως, το δ' Ισως ορθόν προς το της 
πόλεως όλης συμφέρον και προς το κοινόν το των 
πολιτών πολίτης δε κοινή μεν 6 μετέχων του 
\2%i & αρχειν και άρχεσθαί εστί, καθ* εκάστην δε πολι- 
τειαν έτερος, προς δε την άρίστην ό δυνάμενος και 
προαιρούμενος άρχεσθαί και άρχειν προς τον βίον 
τον κατ' άρετην. 

VIII. Ει δε τις εστίν εις τοσούτον διαφέρων 1 
κατ' αρετής ύπερβολην , η πλείους μεν ενός μη 
5 μέντοι δυνατοί πλήρωμα παρασχεσθαι πόλεως, 
ώστε μη συμβλητην etrai την των άλλων άρετην 
πάντων μηδέ την δυ^ααιν αυτών την πολιτικην 
προς την εκείνων ει πλείους, ει δ' εις την εκείνου 
μόνον, ούκέτι θετεον τούτους μέρος πόλεως• άδι- 
κήσονται γάρ άξιούμενοι τών ίσων, άνισοι τοσούτον 

ίο κατ' άρετην όντες και την πολιτικην δυ^α/Λυ-»• 
ώσπερ γαρ θεόν εν άνθρώποις εικός είναι τον 
τοιούτον, όθεν δηλον ότι και την νομοθεσίαν 2 
άναγκαιον είναι περί τους 'ίσους και τω γένει και 
τη δυνάμει, κατά δε τών τοιούτων ουκ έστι νόμος, 
αύτοι γάρ είσι νόμος• και γάρ γελοίος αν εΐη 

15 νομοθετεΐν τις πειρώμενος κατ' αυτών λέγοιεν 
γάρ αν 'ίσως άπερ 'Αντισθένης έφη τους λέοντας 

α At the end of the last sentence, § 12. 
6 Pupil of Socrates and founder of the Cynic sect of 
philosophers. 

e ' Where are your claws and teeth ? ' 

2 iO 



POLITICS, III. vii. 13— vm. 2 

question which some persons investigate and put 
forward (for some raise the question whether the 
legislator desiring to lay down the rightest laws 
should legislate with a view to the advantage of the 
better people or that of the larger number) in cases 
when the situation mentioned α occurs. And ' right ' 
must be taken in the sense of ' equally right,' and 
this means right in regard to the interest of the 
whole state and in regard to the common welfare of 
the citizens ; and a citizen is in general one who shares 
in governing and being governed, although he is 
different according to each form of constitution, but 
in relation to the best form a citizen is one who has 
the capacity and the will to be governed and to govern 
with a view to the life in accordance with virtue. 

VIII. But if there is any one man so greatly dis- The safety. 
tinsruished in outstanding virtue, or more than one ostracism • 
but not enough to be able to make up a complete its history, 
state, so that the virtue of all the rest and their prevalence 
political ability is not comparable with that of the »» all the 
men mentioned, if they are several, or if one, with forms ot 
his alone, it is no longer proper to count these ex- state - 
ceptional men a part of the state ; for they will be 
treated unjustly if deemed worthy of equal status, 
being so widely unequal in virtue and in their political 
ability : since such a man will naturally be as a god 
among men. Hence it is clear that legislation also 
must necessarily be concerned with persons who are 
equal in birth and in ability, but there can be no law 
dealing with such men as those described, for they 
are themselves a law ; indeed a man would be 
ridiculous if he tried to legislate for them, for prob- 
ably they would say what in the story of Antisthenes 6 
the lions said c when the hares made speeches in 

241 



ARISTOTLE 

1284 a 

δημηγορούντων τών δασυπόδων και το Ισον άζιούν- 

των πάντας έχειν. διό και τίθενται τον οστρα- 

κισμόν αϊ δημοκρατούμεναι πόλεις δια την τοιαύ- 

την αιτίαν αύται γαρ δη δοκοΰσι διώκειν την 

20 ισότητα μάλιστα πάντων, ώστε τους δοκοΰντας 
ύπερέχειν δυνάμει δια πλοΰτον η πολυφιλίαν η τίνα 
άλλην πολιτικην ίσχύν ώστράκιζον και μεθίστασαν 
εκ της πόλεως χρόνους ώρισμένους. μυθολογεΐται 3 
δε και τους Άργοναύτας τον Ήρακλεα κατα- 
λιπεΐν δια τοιαύτην αιτίαν ου γαρ έθέλειν αύτον 

25 ayeiv την 'Αργώ μετά των πλωτηρων 1 των άλλων 
ώς υπερβάλλοντα πολύ. διό και τους φέγοντας 
την τυραννίδα και την ΤΙεριάνδρου Θρασυβούλω 
συμβουλίαν ούχ απλώς οίητέον ορθώς επιτιμάν 
(φασι γαρ τον ΤΙερίανδρον ειπείν μεν ούδεν προς 
τον πεμφθέντα κήρυκα περί της συμβουλίας, άφ- 

30 αιροΰντα δε τους υπερέχοντας τών σταχυών 
o/mAurai την άρουραν όθεν άγνοοΰντος μεν του 
κηρυκος του γινομένου την αιτίαν, άπαγγείλαντος 
δε το συμπεσόν, συννοησαι τον θρασύβουλον δτι 
δει τους υπερέχοντας άνδρας άναιρεΐν) • τοΰτο γαρ 4 
ου μόνον συμφέρει τοις τυράννοις ουδέ μόνον οι 

35 τύραννοι ποιοΰσιν, αλλ' ομοίως έχει και περί τα? 
ολιγαρχίας και τάς δημοκρατίας• ο γαρ οστρα- 
κισμός την αυτήν έχει δυνααιν τρόπον τίνα τω 
κολούειν τους υπερέχοντας και φυγαδεύειν. το δ 
αυτό καΐ περί τάς πόλεις και τα έθνη ποιοΰσιν 
οι κύριοι της δυνάμεως, οίον 'Αθηναίοι μεν περί 
1 των πλωτήρωι• hie Richards, post πολύ codd. 

α Cf. Apollodorus, Β ibliotheca i. 9. 19 ttjs Ά /ryoOs φθΐ-/ξαμ.ένητ 
μη δύνασθαι (pepeiv το τούτον βάρος. Argo was a live creature, 
and Athena had built a ' talking timber ' into her cutwater. 

242 



POLITICS, III. viii. 2-4 

the assembly and demanded that all should have 
equality. This is why democratically governed states 
institute the system of ostracism, because of a reason 
of this nature ; for these are the states considered 
to pursue equality most of all things, so that they 
used to ostracize men thought to be outstandingly 
powerful on account of wealth or popularity or some 
other form of political strength, and used to banish 

3 them out of the city for fixed periods of time. And 
there is a mythical story that the Argonauts left 
Heracles behind for a similar reason ; for the Argo ° 
refused to carry him with the other voyagers be- 
cause he was so much heavier. Hence also those 
who blame tyranny and Periander's advice to 
Thrasybulus 6 must not be thought to be absolutely 
right in their censure (the story is that Periander 
made no reply to the herald sent to ask his advice, 
but levelled the corn-field by plucking off the ears 
that stood out above the rest ; and consequently, 
although the herald did not know the reason for 
what was going on, when he carried back news of 
what had occurred, Thrasybulus understood that he 

4 was to destroy the outstanding citizens) ; for this 
policy is advantageous not only for tyrants, nor is 
it only tyrants that use it, but the same is the case 
with oligarchies and democracies as well ; for ostracism 
has in a way the same effect as docking off the out- 
standing men by exile. And the same course is 
adopted in regard to cities and races by the holders 
of sovereign power, for example the Athenians so 

* Periander was tyrant of Corinth circa 626-585 b.c. ; 
Thrasybulus was tyrant of Miletus. Herodotus v. 92 tells 
the story with their parts reversed. 

24-3 



ARISTOTLE 

40 Σαμίους και Χίους και Λεσβίους (επει γάρ θάττον 
εγκρατώς εσχον την αρχήν, εταπείνωσαν αυτούς 
1284 b παρά τάς συνθήκας), 6 δε ΐίερσών βασιλβνς Μτ^δου? 
και Βαβυλώνιους καΐ των άλλων τους πεφρονη- 
ματισμενους διά το ytviaQai ποτ επ* αρχής επ- 
εκοπτε πολλάκις, το δε πρόβλημα καθόλου περί δ 
77aaas• εστί τάς πολιτείας, και τα? όρθάς• αϊ μεν 
b γαρ παρεκβεβηκυΐαι προς το ίδιον άποσκοποΰσαι 
τοϋτο Βρώσιν, ου μην αλλά περί τάς το κοινον 
αγαθόν επισκοπούσας τον αυτόν έχει τρόπον, 
δήλον δε τούτο και επί των άλλων τεχνών και 
επιστημών οϋτε γάρ γραφεύς εάσειεν αν τον υπερ- 
βάλλοντα πόδα τής συμμετρίας εχειν το ζώον, ούδ' 

ίο et διαφεροι το κάλλος, ούτε ναυπηγός πρύμναν ή 
τών άλλων τι μορίων τών τής νεώς, ούδε δη 
χοροδιδάσκαλος τον μείζον και κάλλιον του παντός 
χοροΰ φθεγγόμενον εάσει συγχορεύειν. ώστε δια 6 
τοΰτο μεν ούδεν κωλύει τους μονάρχους συμφωνεΐν 

15 ταΐς πόλεσιν, ει τής οικείας αρχής ωφελίμου ταΐς 
πόλεσιν οΰσης τοΰτο δρώσιν. διό κατά τάς όμο- 
λογουμενας ύπεροχάς έχει τι δίκαιον πολιτικόν ο 
λόγος ο περί τον όστρακισμόν. βελτιον μεν ουν 
τον νομοθετην εζ αρχής οϋτω συστήσαι την πολι- 
τείαν ώστε μη δεΐσθαι τοιαύτης ιατρείας' δεύτερος 

20 δέ πλους, αν σνμβή, πειράσθαι τοιούτω τινι διορ- 
θώματι διορθοΰν. όπερ ουκ εγίγνετο περί τάς 
πόλεις, ου γάρ εβλεπον προς το τής πολιτείας τής 

α In 4 tO, 424 and 427 b.c. respectively. 
244 



POLITICS, III. viii. 4-β 

dealt with the Samians and Chians and Lesbians" 
(for no sooner did they get a strong hold of their 
empire than they humbled them in contravention 
of their covenants), and the king of the Persians 
frequently used to cut down the numbers of the 
Medes and Babylonians and the other races that 
had waxed proud because they had once been head 

δ of an empire. And the problem applies universally How far 
to all the forms of constitution, even the right forms ; uTth/ideai 
for while the divergent forms of government do this state? 
because their regard is fixed on their private advan- 
tage, nevertheless with the constitutions directed to 
the common good the same is the case. And this is 
also clear in the field of the other arts and sciences ; 
a painter would not let his animal have its foot of 
disproportionately large size, even though it was an 
exceptionally beautiful foot, nor would a shipbuilder 
make the stern or some other part of a ship dispro- 
portionately big, nor yet will a trainer of choruses 
allow a man who sings louder and more beautifully 

6 than the whole band to be a member of it. Hence 
as far as this practice goes nothing prevents monarchs 
from being in harmony with the cities the ν rule, if 
they resort to it when their own personal rule is 
beneficial to the cities. Therefore in relation to 
acknowledged superiorities the argument for ostra- 
cism has a certain element of political justice. True, 
it is better for the lawgiver so to constitute the state 
at the outset that it does not need this medicine ; 
but the next best course to steer, if occasion arises, 
is to endeavour to correct the constitution by some 
such method of rectification. But this was not what 
happened with the states, for thev were not looking 
at what was advantageous for their proper constitu- 

246 



ARISTOTLE 

1284 b 

οικείας συμφέρον, αλλά στασιαστικώς έχρώντο 

τοις οστρακισμοΐς . εν μεν ούν ταΐς παρεκβεβη- 
κυίαις πολιτείαις οτι μεν tola συμφέρει και δίκαιον 

25 ion, φανερόν, Ισως δε και οτι ούχ 1 απλώς δίκαιον, 
και τοΰτο φανερόν αλλ' έπι της αρίστης πολιτείας " 
έχει πολλήν άπορίαν, ου κατά των άλλων ayai?oV 
την ύπεροχήν, οίον ισχύος και πλούτου και πολυ- 
φιλίας, άλλ' άν τι? yeVr^Tai διαφέρων κατ' άρετήν, 
τί χρή ποιόν ; ου yap δη φαΐεν άν δεΐν έκβάλΧειν 

so και μεθιστάναι τον τοιούτον αλλά μην ούδ' άρχ€ΐν 
γε τοΰ τοιούτου, παραπλησιον γαρ καν el του Διό? 
άρχειν άξιοΐεν, μερίζοντες τάς αρχάς, λείπεται 
τοίνυν, όπερ έοικε πεφυκέναι, πείθεσθαι τω τοιούτω 
πάντας ασμένως, ώστε βασιλέας e?mi τους τοιού- 
τους άιδίους εν ταΐς πόλεσιν. 

3 s IX. "Ισως δε καλώς έχει μετά τους είρημένους 1 
λόγους μεταβήναι και σκέφασθαι περί βασιλείας' 
φαμέν γάρ τών ορθών πολιτειών μίαν eft-ai ταύτην. 
σκεπτέον δε πότερον συμφέρει τη μελλούση καλώς 
οίκήσεσθαι και πόλει και χώρα /^ασιλβυβσ^αι, η 

40 ου, αλλ' άλλη τι? πολιτεία μάλλον, η τισι μεν 
συμφέρει τισι δ ου συμφέρει, δει δε πρώτον 
διελέσθαι πότερον εν το γένος εστίν αυτής η 

1285 a πλείους έχει διαφοράς. 

'Ράδιον δη τούτο γε καταμαθεΐν, οτι πλείω τε 2 
γένη περιέχει και της αρχής ο τρόπος έστιν ούχ 
εις πασών, ή γάρ εν τή Λακωνική πολιτεία δοκεΐ 

1 [ούχ] Bernays. 

Perhaps ' not ' should be struck out ; but if it stands, the 
clause refers to § 5 init. — in these cases ostracism is practised 
only in the interest of those in power. 

246 



POLITICS, III. viii. &— ix. 2 

tion, but their acts of ostracism were done in a revolu- 
tionary spirit. In the divergent forms of constitution 
therefore it is evident that ostracism is advantageous 
and j ust under the special constitution, though perhaps 
7 it is also evident that it is not a just absolutely ; but 
in the case of the best constitution there is much 
doubt as to what ought to be done, not as regards 
superiority in the other things of value, such as 
strength and wealth and popularity, but in the case 
of a person becoming exceptionally distinguished for 
virtue. It certainly would not be said that such a 
man must be banished and got out of the way ; yet 
nevertheless no doubt men would not think that they 
ought to rule over such a man, for that would be 
the same as if they claimed to rule over Zeus, dividing 
up his spheres of government. It remains therefore, 
and this seems to be the natural course, for all to 
obev such a man gladly, so that men of this sort may 
be kings in the cities for all time. 

1 IX. And perhaps it is well after the subjects that Royalty: 
have been discussed to pass over to consider royal ' vane iee ' 
government ; for we pronounce this to be one of the 
correct constitutions. And it has to be considered 
whether it is advantageous for a city or a country that 

is to be well administered to be ruled by a king, or 
whether it is not so but some other constitution is 
more expedient, or whether royal rule is expedient for 
some states and not for others. But it is needful to 
decide first whether there is only one sort of kingship 
or whether it has several varieties. 

2 Now it is at all events easy to discern that kingship (i) the 
includes several kinds, and that the mode of govern- ^^ n 
ment is not the same in all. For the kingship in the 
Spartan constitution, which is held to be a typical 

247 



ARISTOTLE 

1285 a \ * q \ / /\ ~ ^ / » 

μ,εν είναι ρασιλεια μάλιστα των κατά νομον, ουκ 

5 εστί δέ κυρία πάντων, αλλ' όταν έζέλθη την χώραν 
ηγεμών εστί των προς τον πόλεμον, ετι δέ τα 
προς τους θ€θύς άποδέδοται τοις βασιλεΰσιν. 
αΰτη μέν οΰν η βασίλεια οίον στρατηγία τις αυτο- 
κρατόρων και άΐδιός εστίν κτεΐναι γαρ ου κύριος, 
el μη εν τινι καιρώ, 1 καθάπ€ρ επί των αρχαίων 
ίο dv ταΐς πολεμικαΐς εξόδοις iv χειρός νόμω• δηλοΐ 
δ' "Ομηρος, 6 γαρ Αγαμέμνων κακώς μεν άκούων 
ηνείχετο iv ταΐς έκκλησίαις, εξελθόντων δε και 
KTeivai κύριος ήν λέγει γοΰν 

ον δε κ* εγών άπάνευθε μάχης . . . 

. . . ου οι 
άρκιον έσσεΐται φνγέειν κύνας ηδ' οιωνούς' 
παρ γαρ έμοι θάνατος. 

is ev μεν οΰν τουτ είδος βασίλεια?, στρατηγία διά 3 
βίου, τούτων δ' αϊ μεν κατά γένος είσιν αϊ δ' 
αίρεται' παρά ταυτην δ άλλο μοναρχίας ειδο?, 
οίαι παρ' ενίοις είσι βασιλεΐαι τών βαρβάρων, 
εχουσι δ' αύται την δυναμιν 7τασαι παραπλησιαν 
τυραννίσιν, είσι δε και 2 κατά νόμον και πατρικαί• 

20 δια γάρ το δουλικώτεροι είναι τα ηθη φύσει οι 
μεν βάρβαροι τών 'Ελλήνων οι δε περί την Άσίαν 
τών περί την Κύρώπην, ύπομένουσι την δεσποτικην 
άρχην ουδέν δυσχεραίνοντες. τυραννικά! μεν οΰν 
διά το τοιούτον είσιν, ασφαλείς δε δια το πάτριαι 

1 καιρψ (vel ανάγκη) Richards : βασιλεία (e βασιλεία supra) 
codd. (non vertit Ar.). 

2 τυραννίσιν — και Susemihl : lacunas et fragmenta varia 
codd. 



248 



POLITICS, III. ix. 2-3 

royalty of the kind guided by law, does not carry 
sovereignty in all matters, though when a king goes 
on a foreign expedition he is the leader in all matters 
relating to the war ; and also matters relating to 
religion have been assigned to the kings. This 
kingship therefore is a sort of military command 
vested in generals with absolute powers and held 
for life ; for the king has not authoritv to put a 
subject to death, except in some emergency, as in 
ancient times kings on their military expeditions 
could kill an offender out of hand, as Homer proves, 
for Agamemnon endured being reviled in the as- 
semblies but when they were on an expedition had 
authority to put a man to death : at all events he 
says 

But whomsoe'er I see far from the fray . . . 
Shall have no hope to fly from dogs and vultures, 
For death is in my hands ! " 

3 This then is one sort of kingship, a lifelong general- (2) Oriental 
ship, and some of the kingships of this kind are monarch > ί 
hereditary, others elective ; and by its side there is 
another sort of monarchy, examples of which are 
kingships existing among some of the barbarians. 
The power possessed by all of these resembles that 
of tyrannies, but they govern according to law and 
are hereditary ; for because the barbarians are more 
servile in their nature than the Greeks, and the 
Asiatics than the Europeans, they endure despotic 
rule without any resentment. These kingships there- 
fore are for these reasons of a tyrannical nature, but 
they are secure because they are hereditary and 

• Quoted from Iliad ii. 391, but the last line is not in our 
Homer. 

249 



ARISTOTLE 

1285 a 

25 και κατά νόμον είναι, /cat η φυλακή δε βασιλική 4 

/cat ου τυραννική δια. τήν αυτήν αίτιον ' οι yap 

πολιται φυλάττουσιν οπλοις τους βασιλείς, τους δέ 

τυράννους ζενικόν οι μεν γαρ κατά νόμον και 

εκόντων οι δ' ακόντων άρχουσιν, ώσθ* οι μεν παρά 

των πολιτών οι δ επί τους πολίτας εχουσι την 

ζοφυλακήν. δυο μεν ουν είδη ταύτα μοναρχίας- δ 
έτερον δ' όπερ ην εν τοις άρχαίοις "Έιλλησιν, ους 
καλοΰσιν αίσυμνήτας. εστί δέ τοΰθ* ως απλώς 
ειπείν αιρετή τυραννίς, διαφέρουσα δε της βαρ- 
βαρικής ου τω μή κατά νόμον άλλα τω μή πάτριος 
είναι μόνον, ήρχον δ' ot μεν δια βίου τήν αρχήν 

35 ταύτην, ol δε μέχρι τινών ώρισμενων χρόνων ή 
πράξεων, οίον ειλοντό ποτέ Μιτυλτ^ναΐοι Πιττα- 
κόν προς τους φυγάδας ων προειστήκεσαν Αντι- 
μενίδης και Αλκαίος 6 ποιητής, δηλοΐ δ' 'Αλκαίο? 6 
οτι τύραννον εΐλοντο τον Πιττακον εν τινι τών 
σκόλιων μελών επίτιμα γάρ οτι 

τον κακοπάτριδα 1 
Πιττακον πόλιο?* τα? άχόλω 3 και βαρυδαίμονος 
1285 b εστάσαντο τύραννον μεγ' επαινεοντες άολλεες. 

αύται μεν ουν είσί τε και ήσαν διά μεν το δεσποτι- 
κά! είναι τυραννικαι/ διά δέ το αίρεται και εκόντων 
βασιλικαί' τέταρτον δ' είδος μοναρχίας βασιλικής 7 
5 at κατά τους ηρωικούς χρόνους εκουσιαί τε και 
7raVoiai yiyvd /χεναι κατά νόμον. διά γάρ το τους 
πρώτους •νενε'σί?αι του πλήθους εύεργετας κατά 

1 κακοπατρίδαν Wackernagel. 

* ιόλιοϊ Schneidewin : πόλεως codd. 

* διχόλω Schmidt. 

* τνραννικαι elvat δισποτικαί codd. : tr. Sepulveda. 

250 



POLITICS, III. ix. 4-7 

4 rule by law. Also their bodyguard is of a royal 
and not a tyrannical type for the same reason ; for 
kings are guarded by the citizens in arms, whereas 
tyrants have foreign guards, for kings rule in accord- 
ance with law and over willing subjects, but tyrants 
rule over unwilling subjects, owing to which kings 
take their guards from among the citizens but 
tyrants have them to guard against the citizens. 

5 These then are two kinds of monarchy ; while another 

is that which existed among the ancient Greeks, the (3) the 
type of rulers called aesymnetae. This, to put it 1 " -3 r * 
simply, is an elective tyranny, and it differs from 
the monarchy that exists among barbarians not in 
governing without the guidance of law but only in 
not being hereditary. Some holders of this type of 
monarchy ruled for life, others until certain fixed 
limits of time or until certain undertakings were 
ended, as for example the people of Mitylene once 
elected Pittacus to resist the exiles under the leader- 

6 ship of Antimenides and the poet Alcaeus. That they 
elected Pittacus β as tyrant is proved by Alcaeus in 
one of his catches ; for he rebukes the people because 

The base-born Pittacus they did set up 
As tyrant of the meek and luckless city, 
And all did greatly praise him. 

These monarchies therefore now and in the past are 
of the nature of tyrannies because they are autocratic, 
but of the nature of kingships because they are elec- 

7 tive and rule over willing subjects. A fourth class of (4) heroic 
royal monarchy consists of the hereditary legal king- monarch J' i 
ships over willing subjects in the heroic period. For 
because the first of the line had been benefactors of 

a Pittacus held the office 587-579 b.c. He was one of the 
Seven Sages. Antimenides and Alcaeus were brothers. 

251 



ARISTOTLE 

1285b / « >\ a 5 » ! «a / 

τεχνας η πολεμον η οια το avvaryayziv η πορισαι 

χώραν, εγίγνοντο βασιλείς £ κοντών και τοις παρα- 
λαμβάνουσι πάτριοι . κύριοι δ' ήσαν της τε κατά 

ίο πόλεμον ηγεμονίας και των θυσιών οσαι μη 
ιερατικαι, και προς τούτοις τάς δίκας εκρινον 
τοΰτο δ' εποίουν οί μεν ουκ ομνύοντες οι δ' 
ομνύοντες, ο δ όρκος ην του σκήπτρου επανάτασις . 
οί μεν οΰν επι των αρχαίων χρόνων και τα κατά$ 
πόλιν και τά ενδημα και τα ύπερόρια συνεχώς 

15 ηρχον ύστερον 8ε τά μεν αυτών παριεντων τών 
βασιλέων τά δε τών όχλων παραιρουμενων , εν μεν 
ταΐς άλλαι? πόλεσι Βυσίαι κατελείφθησαν τοις 
/ίασιλεΰσι μόνον, οπού δ' άξιον ειπείν eii^ai /ϊασι- 
λείαν, εν τοις ύπερορίοις τών πολεμικών την ηγε- 
μον'ιαν μόνον εΐχον. 

20 Χ. Βασίλεια? μεν οΰν είδη ταύτα, τέτταρα τον 1 
αριθμόν, μία μεν η περί τους ηρωικούς χρόνους 
[αύτη δ' ην εκόντων μεν, επί τισι δ' ώρισμενοις, 
στρατηγός γαρ ην και δικαστής ο ^ασιλευ? και 
τών προς τους θεούς κύριος), δευτέρα δ η βαρ- 
βαρική (αύτη δ' εστίν εκ γένους άρχη δεσποτική 

25 κατά νόμον), τρίτη δ' ην αίσυμνητείαν προσαγο- 
ρεύουσιν (αύτη δ' εστίν αιρετή τυραννίς), τετάρτη 
δ' η Λακωνική τούτων (αύτη δ' εστίν ως ειπείν 
απλώς στρατηγία κατά γένος αιδιο?). αύται μεν 
ούν τούτον τον τρόπον διαφερουσιν αλλήλων. 

80 πέμπτον δ' είδος βασίλεια? όταν η πάντων κύριος 2 
εις ων ώσπερ εκαστον έθνος και πόλις εκάστη 
τών κοινών, τεταγμένη κατά την οικονομικην 

α This ritual is mentioned in Iliad i. 234, vii. 412, x. 328. 

6 The monarchy was reduced to a priesthood at Cyrene 
(Herod, iv. 161) and at Ephesus. 
252 



POLITICS, III. ix. 7— χ. 2 

the multitude in the arts or in war, or through having 
drawn them together or provided them with land, 
these kings used to come to the throne with the con- 
sent of the subjects and hand it on to their successors 
by lineal descent. And they had supreme command 
in war and control over all sacrifices that were not 
in the hands of the priestly class, and in addition to 
these functions they were judges in law-suits ; some 
gave judgement not on oath and some on oath — the 
8 oath was taken by holding up the sceptre. These 
kings then of ancient times used to govern continu- 
ously in matters within the city and in the country 
and across the frontiers ; but later on when gradually 
the kings relinquished some of their powers and had 
others taken from them by the multitudes, in the 
cities in general only the sacrifices were left to the 
kings, 6 while where anything that deserves the name 
of royalty survived the kings only had the command 
in military expeditions across the frontiers. 

1 X. There are then these kinds of kingship, four 
in number : one belonging to the heroic times, which 
was exercised over willing subjects, but in certain 
limited fields, for the king was general and judge and 
master of religious ceremonies ; second, the barbarian 
monarchy, which is an hereditarv despotism govern- 
ing in conformity with law ; third, the rule of the 
functionarv called an aesymnetes. which is an elective 
tyranny ; and fourth among these is the Spartan 
kingship, which may be described simply as an 
hereditary generalship held for life. These kingships 

2 then differ from one another in this manner. But a (5) absolute 
fifth kind of kingship is when a single ruler is sovereign monarc ,y • 
over all matters in the way in which each race and 

each city is sovereign over its common affairs ; this 

253 



ARISTOTLE 

1285 b w \ t i \ η \ > * * 

ωσπερ γαρ η Οικονομική ρασιΑεια τις οικίας 
εστίν, όντως ή τταμβασιΧεια 1 πόλεως και έθνους 
ενός ή πλειόνων οικονομία. 

Σχεδόν δή δυο εστίν ώς ειπείν εΐδη βασίλεια? 
35 π?ρί ων σκεπτεον, αΰτη τε και ή Λακωνική . των 
γαρ άλλων αϊ πολλαΐ μεταξύ τούτων εισίν ελατ- 
τόνων μεν γαρ κύριοι της παμβασιλείας, πλειόνων 
δ' είσι της Λακωνικής, ώστε το σκεμμα σχεδόν 
περί δυοΐν εστίν, εν μεν πότερον συμφέρει ταΐς 
πόλεσι στρατηγόν αιδιον etvat, και τούτον η κατά 

1286 a γένος η κατά μέρος, ζ η ου συμφέρει, εν δε πότερον 

ενα συμφέρει κύριον etvai πάντων η ου συμφέρει, 
το μεν ουν περί της τοιαύτης στρατηγιας επι- 3 
σκοπεΐν νόμων έχει μάλλον είδος η πολιτείας (εν 
άπάσαι? γαρ ενδέχεται γίγνεσθαι τοΰτο ταΐς πολι- 
6 τείαις), ωστ άφείσθω την πρώτην 6 δε λοιπός 
τρόπος της ^ασιλβια? πολιτείας εΐδός εστίν, ώστε 
περί τούτου δει θεωρήσαι και τάς απορίας επι- 
δραμεΐν τάς ενούσας. 

'Αρχή δ' εστί της ζητήσεως αύτη, πότερον συμ- 
φέρει μάλλον υπό του άριστου ανδρός άρχεσθαι η 
ίο υπό των αρίστων νόμων, δοκοΰσι δη τοις νομι- 4 
ζουσι συμφερειν βασιλεύεσθαι το καθόλου μόνον 
οι νόμοι λέγειν αλλ' ου προς τα προσπίπτοντα 
επιτάττειν ωστ εν όποιαούν τέχνη το κατά 
γράμματ άρχειν ήλίθιον (και 3 εν Αίγύπτω μετά 
τήν τετρήμερον κινεΐν εζεστι τοις ίατρόις, εάν δε 
1 παμβασι\ΐ'ια Susemihl (cf. 36): βασιλεία codd. 
2 μέρος: α'ίρΐσιν codd. aliqui (cf. a 16). 
3 και πως, και ως codd. nonnulli (ήλίθιόν πως και ? Richards). 

β Some mss. give ' or by election.' 

* Cf. 1289 all foil. ; but the promise of a full discussion 
of law is not fulfilled. 
254 



POLITICS, III. χ. 2-4 

monarchy ranges with the rule of a master over a 
household, for just as the master's rule is a sort of 
monarchy in the home, so absolute monarchy is 
domestic mastership over a city, or over a race or 
several races. 

There are therefore, we may say, virtually two The list 
kinds of kingship that have been examined, this one ^ t ^£ 
and the Spartan. For most of the others he between 
these, since with them the king is sovereign over 
fewer things than under absolute monarchy, but over 
more than under the Spartan kingship. Hence our 
inquiry is virtually about two questions, one whether 
it is expedient or inexpedient for states to have a 
military commander holding office for life, and that 
either by descent or by class," and one whether it is 
expedient or inexpedient for one man to be sovereign 

3 over everything. Now the study of a military com- The 
mand of the kind mentioned has more the aspect of r^y 3 " 
a legal than of a constitutional inquiry (for it is possible military 
for this form of office to exist under all constitutions), 

so let it be dismissed at the first stage b ; but the remain- 
ing mode of kingship is a kind of constitution, so that 
it is necessary to consider this one and to run over 
the difficulties that it involves. 

And the starting-point of the inquiry is the question Absolute 
whether it is more advantageous to be ruled by the J^icizeZ 

4 best men or by the best laws. Those of the opinion 
that it is advantageous to be governed by a king 

think that laws enunciate only general principles but Government 
do not give directions for dealing with circumstances guided by 
as they arise ; so that in an art of anv kind it is foolish Uw ω , a 

ι ι ■ -i'/i.-i-i. general 

to govern procedure by written rules (and indeed in principle. 
Egypt physicians have the right to alter their prescrip- 
tion after four days, although if one of them alters it 

255 



ARISTOTLE 

1286 s / ><„>« 2 ' \ J I ' 

προτερον, επι τω αυτού κινουνω)• ψανερον τοιννν 

15 ώς ουκ εστίν ή κατά γράμματα καΐ νόμους άριστη 
πολιτεία διά την αυτήν αίτίαν. άλλα μήν κάκεΐνον 
δει ύπάρχειν τον λόγον τον καθόλου τοις άρχουσιν. 
κρεΐττον δ' ω μή ττρόσεστι το παθητικόν όλως ή 
ω συμφυές• τω μεν οΰν νόμω τοΰτο ούχ υπάρχει, 

20 φυχήν δ' άνθρωπίνην ανάγκη τοΰτ €χειν πάσαν. 
αλλ' Ισως αν φαίη τις ώς άντι τούτου βουλεύσεται 5 
περί των καθ' έκαστα κάλλιον. ότι μεν το'ινυν 
ανάγκη νομοθετην αυτόν είναι, δήλον, και κεΐσθαι 
νόμους, αλλά μή κυρίους ή* παρεκβαίνουσιν , επει 
περί των y' άλλων eimi δει κυρίους• δσα δέ μή 

25 δυνατόν τον νόμον κρίνειν ή όλως ή ευ, πότερον 
ενα τον άριστον δει άρχειν ή πάντας; και γάρ 
νυν συνιόντες δικάζουσι και βουλεύονται και κρί- 
νουσιν, αύται δ* αϊ κρίσεις είσι πασαι περί των 
καθ' εκαστον. καθ* ενα μεν ουν συμβαλλόμενος 
όστισοΰν ίσως χείρων άλλ' εστίν ή πόλις εκ 

30 πολλών, ώσπερ δ' 1 εστίασις συμφορητός καλλιων 
jLuas - και απλής, διά τοΰτο και κρίνει άμεινον 
όχλος 7τολλά ή εις όστισοΰν. ετι μάλλον άδιά- 6 
φθορον το πολύ — καθάπερ 2 ύδωρ το πλεΐον, ούτω 
και το πλήθος τών ολίγων άδιαφθορώτερον τοΰ 
δ' ενός ύπ' οργής κρατηθεντος ή τίνος έτερου 

35 πάθους τοιούτου άναγκαίον διεφθάρθαι τήν κρίσιν, 
εκεί δ' έργον άμα πάντας όργισθήναι και άμαρτειν. 



τπερ δ' ed. : ώσπερ codd. 
καθάπερ <.yap> Bekker. 



i.e. unalterably binding, and not be set aside by special 
dispensation of the ruler when deemed to be unjust in some 



particular case. 
256 



POLITICS, III. χ. 4-6 

before he does so at his own risk) ; it is clear therefore 
that government according to written rules, that is 
laws, is not the best, for the same reason. At the 
same time, however, rulers ought to be in possession 
of the general principle before mentioned as well. 
And a thing that does not contain the emotional 
element is generally superior to a thing in which it 
is innate ; now the law does not possess this factor, 

5 but every human soul necessarily has it. But perhaps Law t*st 
someone might say that in compensation for this a j^co?. by 
single ruler will decide better about particular cases, lective 
Therefore it is clear that on the one hand the ruler ^J* ^liie 
must necessarily be a legislator, and that there must or fne • 
be laws laid down, although these must not be 
sovereign where they go astray — admittedly in all 

other cases they ought to be sovereign ; but on the 
other hand in matters which it is impossible for the 
law either to decide at all or to decide well, ought 
the one best man to govern or all the citizens ? As 
it is, the citizens assembled hear lawsuits and deliber- 
ate and give judgements, but these judgements are 
all on particular cases. Now no doubt any one of 
them individually is inferior compared with the best 
man, but a state consists of a number of individuals, 
and just as a banquet to which many contribute 
dishes is finer than a single plain dinner, for this 
reason in many cases a crowd judges better than 

6 any single person. Also the multitude is more incor- 
ruptible — just as the larger stream of water is purer, 
so the mass of citizens is less corruptible than the few ; 
and the individual's judgement is bound to be cor- 
rupted when he is overcome by anger or some other 
such emotion, whereas in the other case it is a difficult 
thing for all the people to be roused to anger and go 

257 



ARISTOTLE 

ΐώοο a „ ?>*\~/ί ' >λ ά s* » •« 

έστω οε το πληοος οι ελευσεροι, μηοεν πάρα τον 

νόμον πράττοντας αλλ' η π€ρΙ ων εκλείπειν άναγ- 
καΐον αυτόν, ει δέ δη τοΰτο μη ράδιον εν πολ- 
λοίς, αλλ' ει πλείους είεν αγαθοί καΐ άνδρες και 

40 πολιται, πότερον ό €Ϊς άδιαφθορώτερος άρχων η 
\2ZS\s μάλλον οί πλείους μεν τον αριθμόν αγαθοί δε 
πάντες; η δηλον ως οί πλείους; αλλ' οι μεν 
στασιάζουσιν, ό δ' εις άστασίαστος. αλλά προς 
τοϋτ αντιθετεον ίσως δτι σπουδαίοι την φυχην 
ωσπερ κάκεΐνος 6 εις. ει 8η την μεν των πλειόνων 7 
6 άρχην άγα^ώ^ δ' ανδρών πάντων άριοτοκρατίαν 
θετεον, την δε του ενός βασιλβι'αν, αιρετώτερον αν 
ειη ταΐς πόλεσιν αριστοκρατία βασίλεια?, και μετά 
δυνάμεως και χωρίς δυνάμεως ούσης της άρχης, 
άν η λαβείν πλείους όμοιους, και διά τοϋτ ΐσως 
εβασιλευοντο πρότερον, ότι σπάνιον ην εύρεΐν 
άνδρας πολύ 1 διαφέροντας κατ άρετην, άλλως τε 

10 και τότε μικράς οίκοΰντας πόλεις, έτι δ' απ' 
ευεργεσίας καθίστασαν τους βασιλείς, όπερ εστίν 
έργον των αγαθών ανδρών, επει δε συνέβαινε 
γίγνεσθαι πολλούς ομοίους προς άρετην, ούκέτι 
ύπέμενον αλλ' έζητουν κοινόν τι και πολιτείαν 
καθίστασαν. επει δε χείρους γιγνόμενοι εχρημα- 8 

15 τίζοντο από τών κοινών, εντεύθεν πόθεν εύλογον 
yei^ea^at τάς ολιγαρχίας• έντιμον γαρ εποίησαν 

1 xoWovs (plures Ar.) Sylburg. 
258 



POLITICS, III. χ. 6-8 

wrong together. But the multitude must consist of 
the freemen, doing nothing apart from the law 
except about matters as to which the law must of 
necessity be deficient. And if this is not indeed 
easy to ensure in the case of many men, yet if there 
were a majority of good men and good citizens, would 
an individual make a more incorruptible ruler or 
rather those who though the majority in number 
yet are all good ? The majority, is it not obvious ? 
But it will be said that they will split up into factions, 
whereas with a single ruler this cannot happen. But 
against this must perhaps be set the fact that thev 

7 are as virtuous in soul as the single ruler. If then Normal 
the rule of the majority when these are all good men f ^ < ι> Ι0Π 
is to be considered an aristocracy, and that of the stitutions 
one man kingship, aristocracy would be preferable 1D I7 ' 
for the states to kingship, whether the royal office be 
conjoined with military force or without it, if it be 
possible to get a larger number of men than one who 

are of similar quality. And it was perhaps onlv 
owing to this that kingships existed in earlier times, 
because it was rare to find men who greatly excelled 
in virtue, especially as in those days they dwelt in 
small cities. Moreover they used to appoint their 
kings on the ground of public service, and to per- 
form this is a task for the good men. But as it 
began to come about that many men arose who were 
alike in respect of virtue, they would no longer 
submit to royalty, but sought for some form of 
commonwealth, and set up a republican constitution. 

8 And as men becoming baser began to make money 
out of the community, it is reasonable to suppose 
that some such cause as this occasioned the rise of 
oligarchies; for they brought wealth into honour. 

25Q 



ARISTOTLE 

τον πλούτον. εκ δε τούτων πρώτον εις τυραν- 
νίδας μετεβαλλον, εκ δε των τυραννίδων (Ις δημο- 
κρατιαν aet γαρ εις ελάττους άγοντες δι' αίσχρο- 
κερδειαν, ίσχυρότ€ρον το πλήθος κατέστησαν, ώστ 

20 €7τι^€σ^αι και yeveadaL δημοκρατίας. επει δε και 
μείζους eivai συμβεβηκε τάς πόλεις, ίσως ούδε 
ράδιον ετι γίγνεσθαι πολιτείαν έτερον παρά δημο- 
κρατιαν. ει δε δη τις άριστον θείη το βασιλεύεσθαι 9 
ταΐς πόλεσιν, πώς εζει τά περί τών τέκνων; 
ποτερον και το γένος δει βασίλευε»'; αλλά γιγνο- 

25 μένων οποίοι τίνες ετυχον βλαβερόν. αλλ' ου 
παραδώσει κύριος ων τοις τέκνοις, αλλ' ουκ ετι 
τούτο ράδιον πιστεΰσαι• χαλεπόν γάρ, και μείζονος 
αρετής ή κατ* άνθρωπίνην φύσιν. έχει δ' άπορίαν 10 
και περί τής δυνάμεως, πότερον εχειν δει τον 
μέλλοντα βασιλεύειν ίσχύν τίνα περί αυτόν ή δυνή- 

80 σεται /?ιάζεσί?αι τους μη βουλομενους πειθαρχεΐν ; 
ή πώς ενδέχεται την αρχήν διοικεΐν; ει γάρ και 
κατά νόμον είη κύριος, μηδέν πράττων κατά την 
αυτού βούλησιν παρά τον νόμον, όμως άναγκαΐον 
ύπάρχειν αύτώ δυι^ψ,ιν ή φυλάξει τους νόμους, 
τάχα μεν ούν τα περί τον βασιλέα τον τοιούτον ου 

35 χαλεπόν διόρισαν δει γάρ αυτόν μεν εχειν 1 ίσχύν, 
eirai δε τοσαύτην τήν ίσχύν ώστε εκάστου μεν 
και ενός και συμπλειόνων κρείττω, τού δέ πλήθους 
ήττω, καθάπερ όί τ αρχαίοι τάς φύλακας εδίδοσαν 

1 ίχην μέν (vel ίσχύν μϊν ίχαν) Richards. 
β i.e. more men of consideration went over to the opposition. 
2tf0 



POLITICS, III. χ. 8-10 

And from oligarchies they first changed to tyrannies, 
and from tyrannies to democracy ; for by constantly 
bringing the government into fewer hands owing to a 
base love of gain, they made the multitude stronger,* 
so that it set upon the oligarchs, and democracies 
came into existence. But now that the states have 
come to be even greater than they were, perhaps it 
is not easy for yet another form of constitution beside 
9 democracy to come into existence. And even if one Heredity 
held that royal government is best for states, what is may ω ' 
to be the position as regards the king's children ? is 
the sovereignty to be hereditary ? But this will be 
disastrous if the king's sons turn out to be like what 
some have been. It may be said that the king being 
sovereign will not in that case bequeath the throne 
to his children. But that is too much to be easy to 
believe : it would be difficult for a king to disinherit 
his sons, and an act of virtue above the level of human 
10 nature. And there is a difficulty also about the royal x ? ed of 
power : ought the man who is to reign as king to force, but 
have an armed force about him, by means of which lts dln 8 eri 
he will have power to compel those who may be 
unwilling to obey, or if not, how is it possible for 
him to administer his office ? For even if he were a 
law-abiding sovereign and never acted according to 
his own will against the law, nevertheless it would 
be essential for him to have power behind him whereby 
to safeguard the laws. Probably therefore it is not 
difficult to define the regulations for a king of this 
sort : he must have a force of his own, but the force 
must be only so large as to be stronger than a single 
individual or even several individuals banded together, 
but weaker than the multitude, on the principle on 
which the men of old times used to assign bodyguards 

261 



ARISTOTLE 

1286 " * Λ ,Λ « , ,Λ 

οτβ καοισταιεν τίνα της πόλεως ον εκαλουν αισυμνη- 
την η τύραννον, 1 και Διονυσίω τις, ότ ητει τους 

40 φύλακας, συνεβούλευε τοις Συρακουσίοις δίδομαι 
τοσούτους τους φύλακας. 
1287 a XI. ΙΙερι δέ του βασιλέως του κατά την αΰτοΰ 1 
βούλησιν πάντα πράττοντος δ τ€ λόγος εφεστηκε 
νυν και ποιητεον την σκεφιν. 6 μεν γαρ κατά 
νόμον λεγόμενος βασιλεύς ουκ εστίν είδος, καθάπερ 
6 εϊπομεν, πολιτείας (εν πάσαι? γάρ ύπάρχειν εν- 
θέτεται στρατηγίαν άΐδιον, οίον εν δημοκρατία και 
αριστοκρατία, και πολλοί ποιοΰσιν ενα κύριον της 
διοικήσεως• τοιαύτη γάρ άρχη τις εστί και περί 
Έιπίδαμνον, και περί > Οποΰντα δε κατά τι μέρος 
ελαττον) ■ περί δε της παμβασιλείας καλούμενης, 2 

ίο αύτη δ εστί καθ' ην άρχει πάντων 2 κατά την 
εαυτού βούλησιν ο βασιλεύς. δοκεΐ δε τισιν ουδέ 
κατά φύσιν είναι το κύριον ενα πάντων είναι των 
πολιτών οπού συνεστηκεν εζ όμοιων η πόλις' τοις 
γάρ όμοίοις φύσει το αυτό δίκαιον άναγκαΐον και 
την αύτην άζίαν κατά φύσιν ειΐ'αι, ώστ ε'ίπερ και 

16 τό ΐσην εχειν τους άνισους τροφην η εσθήτα 
βλαβερόν τοις σώ/,ιασι^, ούτως εχειν 3 και τό περί 
τας τιμάς• ομοίως τοίνυν και τό άνισον τους ίσους, 3 
διοπερ ούδενα* μάλλον άρχειν η άρχεσθαι δίκαιον, 
και τό ανά μέρος τοίνυν ωσαύτως, τούτο δ' ηδη 
νόμος• η γάρ τάξις νόμος, τον άρα νόμον άρχειν 

1 [τ) τύραννον] Susemihl. 2 πάντων Jul. : πάντα codd. 

3 ίχειν Schneider : ίχει codd. 

4 ούδένα Bernays : ουδέν codd. 

" ' Or tyrant' looks like an incorrect note, see 1285 b 25. 

b See 1259 a 39 n. c See c. x. § 3. 

d Durazzo, on the Adriatic. 

262 



POLITICS, III. χ. 10— χι. 3 

whenever they appointed somebody as what they 
termed aesymnetes or tyrant α of the state, and also, 
when Dionysius 6 asked for his guards, somebody 
advised him to give the same number of guards to 
the citizens of Syracuse. 

1 XI. Our discussion has now reached the case of -natural for 
the king who acts in all matters according to his own adminis- 
will, and we must examine this type of rovaltv. For trafc ? d b3 L. 

J r J J magistrates 

the so-called constitutional monarchy, as we said, c is and supple- 
not a special kind of constitution (since it is possible j!^^ y 
for a life-long generalship to exist under all constitu- 
tions, for example under a democracy and an aristo- 
cracy, and many people make one man sovereign 
over the administration, for instance there is a govern- 
ment of this sort in Epidamnus, d and also at Opus β to 

2 a certain smaller extent) ; but we have now to discuss 
what is called Absolute Monarchy, which is the 
monarchy under which the king governs all men 
according to his own will Some people think that 
it is entirely contrary to nature for one person to 
be sovereign over all the citizens where the state 
consists of men who are alike ; for necessarily 
persons alike in nature must in accordance with 
nature have the same principle of justice and the 
same value, so that inasmuch as for persons who are 
unequal to have an equal amount of food or clothing 
is harmful for their bodies, the same is the case also 

3 in regard to honours ; similarly therefore it is wrong 
for those who are equal to have inequality, owing to 
which it is just for no one person to govern or be 
governed more than another, and therefore for every- 
body to govern and be governed alike in turn. And 
this constitutes law ; for regulation is law. Therefore 

• Chief town of Locri, near the Straits of Euboea. 

263 



ARISTOTLE 

12873 r A* . « ν . . 

αιρζτωτερον μάλλον η των πολιτών eva τίνα, κατά 
τον αυτόν δε Aoyor τούτον, καν ei τίνα? άρχειν 
βελτιον, τούτους καταστατίον νομοφυλακας καΐ 
ύπηρέτας τοις νόμοις• άναγκαΐον γαρ elvai τινας 
αρχάς, αλλ' ούχ eva τούτον είναι φασι δίκαιον 
ομοίων ye όντων πάντων, αλλά μην δσα ye μη 4 
8οκ€Ϊ δυνασθαι διορίζειν ο νόμος, ούδ* άνθρωπος 

25 αν δυναιτο γνωρίζειν. αλλ' επίτηδες παιδεύσας 6 
νόμος εφίστησι τά λοιπά ' ττ? δικαιότατη γνώμη ' 
κρίνειν /cat διοι /ceiv του? άρχοντας, en δ' Ιπανορ- 
θοΰσθαι δίδωσιν δ τι αν δόξη πειρωμενοις άμ€ΐνον 
efvai των κείμενων, ό μεν οΰν τον νουν κελεύων 
άρχειν δοκεΐ κελευειν άρχειν τον θεόν και τον 
νουν μόνους, 1 ο δ' άνθρωπον κελεύων προστιθησι 
και θηρίον η re γαρ 67Η#ιγ«α τοιούτον, και ο 
θυμός άρχοντας διαστρέφει και τους άριστους 
άνδρας. διόπερ άνευ ορέξεως νους ό νόμος εστίν, 
το δε των τ€χνών eivai δοκεΐ παράδειγμα ψευδός, 5 
δτι το κατά γράμματα ιατρευεσθαι φαΰλον, άλλα 2 
αιρετώτερον χρησθαι τοις έχουσι τάς τέχνας. οι 
μεν γαρ ούδεν δια φιλίαν παρά τον λόγον ποιοΰσιν, 
αλλ' άρνυνται τον μισθόν τους κάμνοντας i5yia- 
σαντ€ς, οι δ' εν ταΐς πολιτικαΐς άρχαΐς πολλά προς 
επηρειαν και χάριν είώθασι πράττειν, επει και 
τους ιατρούς όταν ύποπτεύωσι πιστευθεντας 3 τοις 

*ο εχθροΐς διαφθείρειν διά κέρδος, τότε την εκ των 

1 rbv νουν μόνους cod. Voss. Iul. : τους νόμους cet. 
2 άλλα καί eodd. plurimi. 
3 πΐΐσθέντας Schneider. 

° This formula came in the oath taken by the dicasts at 
Athens. 

6 i.e. the practical sciences, of which medicine is taken as 
an example. 



POLITICS, III. χι. 3-5 

it is preferable for the law to rule rather than any one 
of the citizens, and according to this same principle, 
even if it be better for certain men to govern, they 
must be appointed as guardians of the laws and in 
subordination to them ; for there must be some 
government, but it is clearly not just, men say, for 
one person to be governor when all the citizens are 

4 alike. It may be objected that any case which the 
law appears to be unable to define, a human being 
also would be unable to decide. But the law first 
specially educates the magistrates for the purpose 
and then commissions them to decide and administer 
the matters that it leaves over ' according to the best 
of their judgement,' α and furthermore it allows them 
to introduce for themselves any amendment that ex- 
perience leads them to think better than the estab- 
lished code. He therefore that recommends that Law free 
the law shall govern seems to recommend that God ^"ο^™ 311 
and reason alone shall govern, but he that would 

have man govern adds a wild animal also ; for 
appetite is like a wild animal, and also passion warps 
the rule even of the best men. Therefore the law 

5 is wisdom without desire. And there seems to be no Physicians 
truth in the analogy which argues from the arts b ^les jiuT 
that it is a bad thing to doctor oneself by book, but they ar « 
preferable to employ the experts in the arts. For bias. ° m 
they never act contrary to principle from motives of 
friendship, but earn their fee when (for instance) 

they have cured their patients, whereas holders of 
political office usually do many things out of spite 
and to win favour ; since when people suspect even 
the physicians of being in the confidence of their 
enemies and of trying to make away with them for 
gain, in that case they would sooner look up the treat- 

κ 265 



ARISTOTLE 

γραμμάτων θεραπείαν ζητησαιεν αν μάλλον, αλλά 6 
1287 b μην εισάγονται γ εφ εαυτούς οι Ιατροί κάμνοντας 
άλλους Ιατρούς και οι παιδοτρίβαι γυμναζόμενοι 
παιδοτρίβας, ώς ου δυνάμενοι κρίνειν το αληθές 
δια το κρ'ινειν περί τε οικείων και εν πάθει δντες. 
ώστε δήλον δτι το δίκαιον ζητοΰντες το μέσον 
δ ζητοΰσιν 6 γαρ 1 νόμος το μέσον, ετι κυριώτεροι 
και περί κυριωτερων των κατά γράμματα νόμων 
οι κατά τά εθη βισι^, ωστ ει των κατά γράμματα 
άνθρωπος άρχων ασφαλέστερος , αλλ' ου των κατά 
το εθος. αλλά μην ουδέ ράδιον εφοράν πολλά τον 7 
ένα δεήσει άρα πλείονας et^at τους υπ* αύτοΰ 

10 καθιστάμενους άρχοντας, ώστε τί διαφέρει τοΰτο 
εζ άρχης ευθύς ύπάρχειν η τον ενα καταστησαι 
τούτον τον τρόπον ; ετι, δ και πρότερον είρημενον 
εστίν, εΐπερ ο άνηρ ο σπουδαίος, διότι βελτίων, 
άρχειν δίκαιος, του δε ενός οι δύο αγαθοί βελτίους' 
τοΰτο γάρ εστί το 

συν τε δυ' έρχομένω 
και η εύχη του 'Αγαμέμνονος , 

16 τοιούτοι δέκα μοι συμφράδμονες. 

etot δε και νυν περί ένίων αϊ άρχαι κύριαι κρίνειν, 
ώσπερ 6 δικαστής, περί ων ο νόμος αδυνατεί 
διορίζειν, έπει περί ων γε δυνατός, ουδείς αμφισβη- 
τεί περί τούτων ώς ουκ αν άριστα ο νομός άρζειε 
1 δε Thurot. 

° Perhaps this should be ' and.' 

6 i.e. the rules of duty and of manners that are customary 
but not embodied in legislation : cf. 1319 b 40. 

• Iliad x. 224 : the passage goes on και τε προ δ rod 
ivo -ησεν \ δππως κέρδος it), ' then one discerneth | Before the 
other how advantage lieth.' d Iliad ii. 372. 

266 



POLITICS, III. χι. 6-7 

6 ment in the books. Yet certainly physicians them- 
selves call in other physicians to treat them when 
they are ill, and gymnastic trainers put themselves 
under other trainers when they are doing exercises, 
believing: that the ν are unable to judge trulv because Customary 

j -11 law safer 

they are judging about their own cases and when tnanpnvat* 
they are under the influence of feeling. Hence it is judgement. 
clear that when men seek for what is just they seek 
for what is impartial ; for a the law is that which is 
impartial. Again, customary laws b are more sovereign 
and deal with more sovereign matters than written 
laws, so that if a human ruler is less liable to error 
than written laws, yet he is not less liable to error 

7 than the laws of custom. But also it is certainly not To suppie- 
easy for the single ruler to oversee a multitude of |^ w nt se verai 
things ; it will therefore be necessary for the officials heads bettei 
appointed by him to be numerous ; so that what 
difference does it make whether this has been the 
arrangement immediately from the outset or the 

single ruler appoints them in this manner ? Again, 

a thing that has also been said before, if the virtuous c . x. g 6 fin. 

man justly deserves to rule because he is better, 

yet two good men are better than one : for that is 

the meaning of the line c 

When two together go — 

and of the prayer of Agamemnon d 

May ten such fellow-councillors be mine. 

And even now the magistrates, like the Athenian 
dicast, have power to judge certain cases about which 
the law is unable to give a clear declaration, since 
nobody disputes that in matters about which it can 
do so the law would be the best ruler and judge. 

267 



ARISTOTLE 

1287 b 

και κρίνειεν. αλλ' επειδή τα μεν ενδέχεται περί- 8 

20 ληφθήναι τοις νόμοις τά δ' αδύνατα, ταύτ έστιν 
α ποιεί διαπορεΐν και ζητεΐν πότερον τον άριστον 
νομον αρχειν αιρετώτερον ή τον άνδρα τον άριστον, 
περί ων γάρ βουλεύονται νομοθετήσαι των αδυ- 
νάτων εστίν, ου τοινυν τοΰτό γ* άντιλέγουσιν, ως 
ουκ αναγκαΐον άνθρωπον elvai τον κρινοϋντα περί 

2δ τών τοιούτων, αλλ' δτι ούχ 'ένα μόνον αλλά πολλούς. 
Kpivei γαρ έκαστος άρχων πεπαιδευμένος υπό του 
νόμου καλώς, άτοπον δ' ΐσως αν eiWu δόξειεν ει 9 
βελτιον ΐδοι 1 τις δυοΐν ομμασι και δυσιν άκοαΐς 
κρίνων και πράττων 2 δυσι ποσϊ και χερσίν ή πολλοί 
πολλοίς, επει και νυν οφθαλμούς πολλούς οί 

so μοναρχοι ποιοΰσιν αυτών και ώτα και χείρας και 
πόδας, τους γάρ τή αρχή και αύτοΐς 3 φίλους ποιούν- 
ται συναρχους. μη φίλοι μεν οΰν όντες ού ποιή- 
σουσι κατά την του μονάρχου προαίρεσιν ει δε 
φίλοι κάκείνου και της αρχής, δ γε φίλος ΐσος και 
όμοιος, ωστ ει τούτους οϊεται δεΐν άρχειν, τους 

36 ίσους και ομοίους άρχειν οΐεται δεΐν ομοίως. 

Α μεν ουν οι διαμφισβητούντες προς την βασι- 
λείαν λεγουσι, σχεδόν ταυτ' εστίν. 

Αλλ ίσως ταύτ επι μεν τινών έχει τον τρόπον 10 
τούτον, επι δε τινών ούχ ούτως. εστί γάρ τι 
φύσει δεσποστον και άλλο βασιλευτόν και άλλο 
πολιτικόν, και δίκαιον και συμφέρον ά?ίλο άλλοις*• 

40 τυραννικόν δ' ούκ εστί κατά φύσιν, ουδέ τών άλλων 

1 ίχοι Susemihl. 

a πράττοι Conring. 

* aUTOis Mus. : αύτοΰ, αυτούς codd. 

* Λλλο dXXots add. Richards. 

268 



POLITICS, III. χι. 8-10 

8 But since, although some things can be covered by and to 
the laws, other things cannot, it is the latter that colleagues 
cause doubt and raise the question whether it is j^ r thaD 
preferable for the best law to rule or the best man. ordinate*. 
For to lay down a law about things that are subjects 

for deliberation is an impossibility. Therefore men 
do not deny that it must be for a human being to 
judge about such matters, but they say that it ought 
not to be a single human being only but a number. 
For the individual official judges well when he has 

9 been instructed by the law, and it would doubtless 
seem curious if a person saw better when judging 
with two eyes and two organs of hearing and acting 
with two feet and hands than many persons with 
many, since even as it is monarchs make many eyes 
and ears and hands and feet their own, for they adopt 
persons that are friendly to their rule and to them- 
selves as their fellow-rulers. Although therefore 
if these assistants are not friendly they will not act 
in conformity with the monarch's policy, if they are 
friends of him and of his rule, well, a friend is one's 
equal and like, so that if the monarch thinks that 
his friends ought to rule he thinks that people who are 
equal to and like himself ought to rule like himself. 

This then more or less is the case advanced by 
those who argue against kingship. 
10 But perhaps, although this is a true account of the ButRoyaitj 
matter in some cases, it does not apply in others. For ca ses of 
there is such a thing as being naturally fitted to be exceptional 

ο & J excellence. 

controlled by a master, and in another case, to be 
governed by a king, and in another, to exercise citi- 
zenship, and a different government is just and 
expedient for different people ; but there is no such 
thing as natural fitness for tyranny, nor for any other 

269 



ARISTOTLE 

1287b „ „ 

πολιτ€ΐων οσαι παρεκρασβις eioiv, ταύτα γαρ 
γιγν€ται πάρα φύσιν. αλλ έκ των €ΐρημένων 
1288 a ye φανερον ώς ev μέν τοις όμοίοις καΐ ίσοι? οντ€ 
συμφέρον εστίν οντε δίκαιον eva κύριον etvai 
πάντων, οϋτ€ μη νόμων όντων, αλλ' αυτόν ώς οντά 
νόμον, οΰτε νόμων όντων, οϋτ€ αγαθόν αγαθών 
oxjtc μη αγαθών μη αγαθόν, ούδ αν κατ άρ€τήν 
5 άμείνων η, el μη τρόπον τινά. τις δ' ό τρόπος, 
λβκτέΌν ζΐρηται δέ πως ηδη καΐ πρότ€ρον. πρώτον 11 
δε διοριστέον τι το βασιλ€υτόν και τι το άριστο - 
κρατικόν και τι το πολιτικόν. βασι^υτόν μέν 
οΰν το τοιούτον εστί πλήθος ο πέφυκ€ φέρειν 
γένος ύπ€ρέχον κατ' apeT -ην προς ηγ€μονίαν 

ίο πολιτικην, άριστοκρατικόν δε 1 ο πέφυκ€ φέρ€ΐν 
πλήθος άρ^σθαι δυνάμ€νον την τών έλ€υθέρων 
άρχην υπό τών κατ άρ€την ηγ€μονικών προς 
πολιτικην άρχην, πολιτικόν δε 2 ev ω πέφυκ€ν 
eγγίveσθaι πλήθος πολ€μικόν δυνάμ€νον άρχ€σθαι 
και ap^eiv κατά νόμον τον κατ* άζίαν δια- 

ΐδ νέμοντα τοις €υπόροις τάς αρχάς. όταν οΰν η 12 
γένος όλον η και τών άλλων eva τινά συμβη 
διαφέροντα γβνέσθαι κατ' άρ€την τοσούτον ώσθ' 
ύπ€ρέχ€ΐν την έκ€ΐνου της τών άλλων πάντων, τότ€ 
δίκαιον το γένος elvai τοΰτο βασιλικον και κύριον 
πάντων και /βασιλέα τον eva τούτον. καθάπ€ρ γάρ 

20 ^ίρηται πρότζρον, ου μόνον ούτως €χ€ΐ κατά το 
δίκαιον ο προφέρ€ΐν ειώ#ασιι; οι τάς πολιτ€ΐας 

1 δβ ed. : δέ πλήθος codd. (θ — πλήθος seel. \ r ictorius). 
* δι ed. : δέ πλήθος codd. (iv φ — πολ€μικόν seel. Hercher). 

The clause translated ' that — populace ' some editors 
excise as a superfluous insertion. 

6 They also excise ' in which — populace.' 
270 



POLITICS, III. χι. 10-12 

of the forms of government that are divergences, 
for these come about against nature. But merely 
from what has been said, it is clear that among people 
who are alike and equal it is neither expedient nor 
just for one to be sovereign over all — neither when 
there are no laws, but he himself is in the place of 
law, nor when there are laws, neither when both 
sovereign and subjects are good nor when both are 
bad, nor yet when the sovereign is superior in 
virtue, except in a certain manner. What this 
manner is must be stated ; and in a way it has been 

11 stated already even before. But first we must define 
what constitutes fitness for royal government, what 
fitness for aristocracy, and what for a republic. A 
fit subject for royal government is a populace of such 
a sort as to be naturally capable of producing a family 
of outstanding excellence for political leadership ; 
a community fit for aristocracy is one that naturally 
produces a populace" capable of being governed under 
the form of government fit for free men by those who 
are fitted by virtue for taking the part of leaders in 
constitutional government ; a republican community, 
one in which there naturally grows up a military 
populace b capable of being governed and of govern- 
ing under a law that distributes the offices among the 

12 well-to-do in accordance with merit. When there- 
fore it comes about that there is either a whole family 
or even some one individual that differs from the 
other citizens in virtue so greatly that his virtue 
exceeds that of all the others, then it is just for this 
family to be the royal family or this individual king, 
and sovereign over all matters. For, as has been said 
before, this holds good not only in accordance with 
the right that is usually brought forward by those 

271 



ARISTOTLE 

12888 a / - ν , , , , 

κασισταντες οι τε τα? αριστοκρατικας και οι τας 

όλιγαρχικάς, και πάλιν οι τάς δημοκρατικάς 

{πάντες γαρ καθ* ύπεροχην άζιουσιν άλλ' ύπεροχην 

ου την αυτήν), άλλα <και> Χ κατά. το πρότερον 

2β λεχθέν. ούτε γαρ κτείνειν η φυγαδεΰειν ουδ' 13 
οστρακιζειν δη που τον τοιούτον πρέπον εστίν, 
οΰτ άξιοΰν άρχεσθαι κατά μέρος' ου γάρ πέφυκε 
το μέρος ύπερεχειν του τται^τό?, τω δε τηλικαύτην 
ύπερβολήν εχοντι τοΰτο συμβέβηκεν. ώστε λείπεται 
μόνον το πείθεσθαι τω τοιούτω, και κύριον etrat 
μη κατά μέρος τούτον αλλ' απλώς. 

30 ΪΙερι μεν οδν βασίλεια?, τίνας έχει διαφοράς, 
και πότερον ου συμφέρει ταΐς πόλεσιν η συμφέρει, 
και τισι, και πώς, διωρίσθω τον τρόπον τούτον. 

XII. Έπει δε τρεις φαμέν efrai τα? όρθάς 1 
πολιτείας, τούτων δ' άναγκαΐον άρίστην είναι την 
υπό τών αρίστων οίκονομουμένην , τοιαύτη δ' εστίν 

86 εν η συμβέβηκεν η ένα τινά συμπάντων η γένος 
όλον η πλήθος ύπερέχον efrai κατ' άρετήν, τών 
μεν άρχεσθαι δυναμένων τών δ' άρχειν προς την 
αίρετωτάτην ζωήν, εν δε τοις πρώτοις έδείχθη 
λόγοις ότι την αύτην άναγκαΐον ανδρός άρετην 
εΐναι και πολίτου της πόλεως της αρίστης, φανερόν 

40 οτι τον αύτον τρόπον και διά τών αυτών άνήρ τε 
γίνεται σπουδαίος και πόλιν συστήσειεν αν τις 
άριστοκρατουμένην 2 η βασιλευομένην , ώστ έσται 2 

1 άλλα καί ? Γ (immo Gui).). 
* ζ&ριστ ή> άριστοκρατουμ.ίνην Buecheler. 

i.e. the right of merit, c. viii. § 7. 

» Bk. III. cc. ii., iii. 

c Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give ' establish a 

272 



POLITICS, III. χι. 12— xii. 2 

who are founding aristocratic and oligarchic con- 
stitutions, and from the other side by those who are 
founding democratic ones (for they all make their 
claim on the ground of superiority, though not the 
same superiority), but it also holds good in accordance 
13 with the right spoken of before." For it is not seemly 
to put to death or banish, nor yet obviously to ostra- 
cize, such a man, nor is it seemly to call upon him 
to take his turn as a subj ect ; for it is not in the order 
of nature for the part to overtop the whole, but the 
man that is so exceptionally outstanding has come 
to overtop the whole community. Hence it only 
remains for the community to obey such a man, and 
for him to be sovereign not in turn but absolutely. 

Let this be our answer to the questions as regards 
kingship, what are its varieties, and whether it is 
disadvantageous for states or advantageous, and for 
what states, and under what conditions. 

1 XII. And since we pronounce the right constitutions Recapitui» 
to be three, and of these the one governed by the best tlon * 
men must necessarily be the best, and such is the 

one in which it has come about either that some one 
man or a whole family or a group of men is superior 
in virtue to all the citizens together, the latter being 
able to be governed and the former to govern on the 
principles of the most desirable life, and since in the 
first part of the discourse b it was proved that the virtue 
of a man and that of a citizen in the best state must 
of necessity be the same, it is evident that a man 
becomes good in the same way and by the same 
means as one might establish an aristocratically or 

2 monarchically governed state, 6 so that it will be 

state governed in the best way by an aristocracy or a 
monarchy.' 

273 



ARISTOTLE 

1288 b και παιδεία και ϋθη ταύτα σχεδόν τα ποιοΰντα 

σπουδαΐον άνδρα καϊ τά ποιοΰντα πολιτικον και 

βασιλικόν. 

Αιωρισμένων δε τούτων περί της πολιτείας ηδη 

π€ΐρατ€ον λ4γ€ΐν της αρίστης, τίνα πεφυκβ yivzoftai 

6 τρόπον και καθίστασθαι πώς. [ανάγκη οη τον 

μέλλοντα περί αντης ποιησασθαι την προσήκουσαν 

σκέφιν. . . , 1 ] 

1 partem exordii libri VII. admodum uariatam hue trans- 
tulerunt codd. 

° The concluding sentence, by whomever written, clearly 
leads on to the Book that is No. VII. in the mss. and in 
this edition ; and after it the mss. add half the first sentence of 
that Book, slightly altered. Some editors therefore transfer 
Books VII. and VIII. here and put Books IV., V. and VI. 
after them ; opinions vary as to the proper order of Books IV., 
V. and VI. among themselves. 



274 



POLITICS, III. xii. 2 

almost the same education and habits that make a 
man good and that make him capable as a citizen 
or a king. 

These conclusions having been laid down, we must 
now endeavour to discuss the best form of constitu- 
tion and to say in what way it is natural for it to come 
into existence and how it is natural for it to be 
organized. 

Additional Notts 

III. ii. 3, 1276 b 38. If we emend the text with Bernays 
to ei yap δυνατόν έξ απάντων σπουδαίων δντων ΐΐναι πόλιν, 
the sense is : assuming the possibility of a perfect state, 
with all its factors the best of their kind, this means 
that all the population will be good citizens, not that they 
will all be perfect specimens of the human race, because the 
state needs citizens of the working classes, etc., and these 
cannot in the nature of things be perfect human beings. 

III. iii. 1, 1277 b 38 οντος yap πολίτης. The translation 
takes πολίτης as subject and ovtos as predicate (meaning Ζχων 
την τοιαίτην άρ(τήν, possessing capacity to govern). But 
possibly the predicate is πολίτης and the subject ovtos, which 
then stands for ό βάκαυσοϊ ; if so, the whole sentence means 
that if the non-official classes are citizens, not all the citizens 
will possess civic virtue (which is capacity to govern), for 
the working-man will be a citizen (and he is not capable of 
governing). 



275 



1288 b 

ίο Ι. Εν άττάσαις ταί? τβχναις και ταΐς επιστήμαις 1 
ταΐς μη κατά μόριον γινομεναις άλλα περί γένος 
εν τι τελείαις οϋσαις, μιας εστί θεωρήσαι το περί 
εκαστον γένος 1 άρμόττον , οίον άσκησις σώματι 
ποια τ€ ποιώ συμφέρει και τις αρίστη (τω γαρ 
κάλλιστα πεφυκότι και κεχορηγημενω την άρίστην 

15 άναγκαΐον άρμόττειν) , και τίς τοις πλείστοις μία 
πάσιν (και γαρ τούτο της γυμναστικής εστίν), έτι 
δ' εάν τι? μη της ίκνουμένης έπιθυμη μήθ* έζεως 
μητ επιστήμης των περί την άγωνίαν, μηδέν 2 
ήττον του παιδοτρίβου και του γυμναστικού παρα- 
σκευάσαι ye 3 και ταύτην εστί την ούναμιν ομοίως 2 

20 δε τούτο και περί Ιατρικην και περί ναυπηγίαν και 
έσθήτα και περί πάσαν άλλην τέγνην όρώμεν συμ- 
βαίνον, ώστε δήλον δτι και πολιτειαν της αύτης 
εστίν επιστήμης την άριστην θεωρήσαι τίς έστι 
και ποία τις αν ούσα μάλιστ' ειη κατ' εύχήν μηδε- 
νός έμποδίζοντος των εκτός, και τίς τίσιν άρμότ- 

1 ytvos seel. Spengel. 

* ούδίν Bk 2 (μηδέν ήττον cum praecedentibus Immisch, tr. 
infra post δύναμιν Richards). 

3 ye Coraes (tr. supra, τον ye παιδοτρίβον Richards) : recodd. 

° Transposed as Book VI. by some editors : see p. 274 n. 

6 Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give ' to each 
individual.' 
276 



BOOK IV 

1 I. In all the arts and the sciences that are not 
merely sectional but that in relation to some one existis-o 
class of subject are complete, it is the function of a Co * STITD - 
single art or science to study what is suited to each 
class, 6 for instance what sort of gymnastic exercise Science 

is beneficial for what sort of bodily frame, and what only q) the 
is the best sort (for the best must naturally suit the i( } eal J> nt t 
person ot the finest natural endowment and equip- best under 
ment), and also what one exercise taken by all is the conditions 
best for the largest number (for this is also a ques- of character 
tion for gymnastic science), and in addition, in case resources ot 
someone desires a habit of body and a knowledge < 4 > th ?. b ?f t 
of athletic exercises that are not the ones adapted to on the 
him. it is clearly the task of the trainer and gymnastic avera s 9 - 
master to produce this capacity c also just as much ; 

2 and we notice this also happening similarly in regard 
to medicine, and ship-building, and the making of 
clothes, and every other craft. Hence it is clear 
that in the case of the constitution as well it is the 

(1) business of the same science to stud ν which is the 
best constitution and what character it must have to 
be the most ideal if no external circumstance stands 

(2) in the way, and what constitution is adapted to what 

■ i.e. a bodily bearing and athletic skill that are not the 
ones most suited to the pupil's particular physique. 

277 



ARISTOTLE 

1288 b 

25 τουσα (πολλοίς γαρ της αρίστης τυχεΐν ίσως 

αδύνατον, ώστ€ την κρατίστην τ€ απλώς καΐ την 
εκ των υποκειμένων άρίστην ου δει λεληθεναι τον 
νομοθετην και τον ως αληθώς πολιτικόν), ετι δε 
τρ'ιτην την εξ υποθέσεως (δει γαρ και την δοθεΐσαν 
δι^ασ^αι θεωρεΐν, εξ αρχής τε πώς αν γένοιτο και 

80 γενομένη too. τρόπον αν σωζοιτο πλείστον χρόνον 
λέγω δ' οίον ει τινΊ πάλει συμβεβηκε μήτε την 
άρίστην πολιτευεσθαι πολιτείαν άχορηγητόν τε 
efrai /cat τών αναγκαίων, μήτε την ενδεχομενην εκ 
τών υπαρχόντων, αλλά rira φαυλοτέραν) ' παρά 3 
πάντα δε ταύτα την μάλιστα πάσαι? ταί? πόλεσιν 

85 άρμόττουσαν δει γνωρίζειν, ως οι πλείστοι τών 
αποφαινομένων περί πολιτείας, και ει τάλλα λεγουσι 
καλώς, τών γε χρησίμων διαμαρτάνουσιν . ου γαρ 
μόνον την άρίστην δει θεωρεΐν, άλλα και την 
δυνατην, ομοίως δε και την ράω και κοινοτεραν 
άττάσαι?. νυν δ' οι μεν την άκροτάτην και δεο- 

40 μενην πολλής χορηγίας ζητοΰσι μόνον οι δε μάλ- 
λον κοινην τίνα λέγοντες τάς υπάρχουσας arai- 

1289 a ροϋντες πολιτείας την Αακωνικην η τίνα άλλην 

επαινοΰσιν χρη δε τοιαύτην είσηγεΐσθαι τάξιν 4 

ής 1 ρα,δίως εκ τών υπαρχόντων 2 και πεισθησονται 

και δυνήσονται κοινωνεΐν, 3 ως εστίν ουκ ελαττον 

έργον το επανορθώσαι πολιτείαν η κατασκευάζειν 

1 fjs ed. : ήν codd. 
* υπαρχόντων Wilamowitz : ύπαρχουσών codd. 

3 KLVfh MP 1 . 

The fourfold classification given just before is repeated 
in rather loose terms in this sentence. 

b The word originally denoted the duty of the wealthy 
citizen holding the office of Choregus to supply dresses, etc., 
for the chorus and actors in a drama. 

278 



POLITICS, IV. ι. 2-4 

people (since for many it is doubtless impossible to 
attain the best one, so that the good lawgiver and 
the true statesman must be acquainted with both 
the form of constitution that is the highest absolutely 
and that which is best under assumed conditions), 

(3) and also thirdly the form of constitution based on a 
certain supposition (for he must be also capable 
of considering both how some given constitution 
could be brought into existence originally and also 
in what way having been brought into existence it 
could be preserved for the longest time : I mean for 
example if it has befallen some state not only not 
to possess the best constitution and to be unprovided 
even with the things necessary for it, but also not to 
have the constitution that is practicable under the 

3 circumstances but an inferior one) ; and beside all 

( 4 ) these matters he must ascertain the form of con- 
stitution most suited to all states, since most of those 
who make pronouncements about the constitution, 
even if the rest of what they say is good, entirely 
miss the points of practical utility. For it is proper 

(1) to consider ° not only what is the best constitution but 

(3) also what is the one possible of achievement, and 

(2) likewise also what is the one that is easier and more 

(4) generally shared by all states. But as it is, some 
students inquire which is the highest form of all 
even though requiring much material equipment , b 
while those who rather state some general form 
sweep aside the constitutions actually existing and 

4 praise that of Sparta or some other ; but the proper 
course is to bring forward an organization of such a 
sort that men will easily be persuaded and be able 
in the existing circumstances to take part in it, since 
to reform a constitution is no less a task than to frame 

279 



ARISTOTLE 

5 εζ αρχής, ώσπερ και το μεταμανθάνειν του μαν- 
θάνειν εζ αρχής• διό προς τοις είρημενοις καΐ ταΓ? 
ύπαρχούσαις πολιτείαις δει δύνασθαι βοηθεΐν τον 
πολιτικόν, καθάπερ ελέχθη και πρότερον. τοΰτο 
δε αδυνάτου άγνοοΰντα πόσα πολιτείας εστίν εΐδη' 
νυν δε μίαν δημοκρατιαν οΐονταί τίνες είναι και 

ίο μίαν όλιγαρχίαν, ουκ εστί δε τοΰτ αληθές, ώστε 5 
δει τάς διαφοράς μη λανθάνειν τάς των πολιτειών, 
πόσαι, και συντίθενται ποσαχώς. μετά δε ταύτα 1 
τής αυτής φρονήσεως ταύτης και νόμους τους 
αρίστους ίδεΐν και τους εκάστη των πολιτειών 
άρμόττοντας . προς γάρ τάς πολιτείας τους νόμους 
δει τίθεσθαι και τίθενται πάντες, αλλ' ου τάς πο- 

15 λιτείας προς τους νόμους• πολιτεία μεν γάρ εστί 
τάξις ταί? πόλεσιν ή περί τάς αρχάς, τίνα τρόπον 
νενεμηνται, καΐ τι το κυριον τής πολιτείας και τί 
το τέλος εκάστης τής κοινωνίας εστίν, νόμοι δέ 
κεχωρισμενοι τών δηλούντων την πολιτείαν, καθ* 
ους δεϊ τους άρχοντας άρχειν και φυλάττειν τους 

20 παραβαίνοντας αυτούς, ώστε δήλον οτι τάς δια- 6 
φοράς άναγκαΐον και τον αριθμόν εχειν τής πολι- 
τείας εκάστης και προς τάς τών νόμων θέσεις• 
ού γάρ οΐόν τε τους αυτούς νόμους συμφερειν ταΐς 
όλιγαρχίαις ούδε ταί? δημοκρατιαις πάσαι?, εϊπερ 
δη πλείους 2 και μη μία δημοκρατία μηδέ ολιγαρχία 

25 μόνον εστίν. 

II. Έίτει δ' εν τή πρώτη μεθόδω περί τών πολι- 1 
τειών διειλοαεθα τρεις μεν τάς όρθάς πολιτείας, 

1 uera δέ ταΰτα anon, apud Stahr : μετά. δέ codd. 
2 πλβίω codd. cet. (eiwep είδη πλείω Spengel). 



° Book III. c. v. 



280 



POLITICS, IV. ι. 4— ii. 1 

one from the beginning, just as to re-learn a science 
is just as hard as to learn it originally ; in addition 
therefore to the things mentioned the student of 
politics must also be able to render aid to the con- 
stitutions that exist already, as was also said before. §3 *A»i 3 • 
But this is impossible if he does not know how many 
kinds of constitution there are ; but at present some 
people think that there is only one kind of democracy 

δ and one kind of oligarchy, but this is not true. Hence 
he must take in view the different varieties of the 
constitutions, and know how many there are and 
how many are their combinations. And after this 
it needs this same discrimination also to discern the 
laws that are the best, and those that are suited to 
each of the forms of constitution. For the laws 
should be laid down, and all people lay them down, 
to suit the constitutions — the constitutions must not 
be made to suit the laws ; for a constitution is the 
regulation of the offices of the state in regard to the 
mode of their distribution and to the question what 
is the sovereign power in the state and what is the 
object of each community, but laws are distinct 
from the principles of the constitution, and regulate 
how the magistrates are to govern and to guard 

6 against those who transgress them. So that clearly 
it is necessary to be in possession of the different 
varieties of each form of constitution, and the 
number of these, even for the purpose of legisla- 
tion ; for it is impossible for the same laws to be 
expedient for all oligarchies or democracies if there 
are really several kinds of them, and not one sort 
of democracy or oligarchy only. 

1 II. And inasmuch as in our first inquiry" about contents of 
the forms of the constitution we classified the right ^°°yj ιν •> 

281 



ARISTOTLE 

1289 a 

βασιλΐίαν άριστοκρατίαν πολιτείαν, τρεις δε τάς 
τούτων παρεκβάσεις, τυραννίδα μεν βασίλεια? 

go όλιγαρχίαν δε αριστοκρατίας δημοκρατίαν δε 
πολιτείας, και περί μεν αριστοκρατίας και βασί- 
λεια? εΐρηται (το γαρ περί της αρίστης πολιτείας 
θεωρησαι ταντό και περί τούτων εστίν ειπείν των 
ονομάτων, βούλεται γαρ εκατερα κατ αρετην 
σννεστάναι κεχορηγημενην) , ετι δέ τι διαφέρονσιν 

85 αλλήλων αριστοκρατία και βασίλεια και πότε δει 
/?ασιλειαν νομίζειν διώρισται πρότερον, λοιπόν 
περί πολιτείας διελθεΐν της τω κοινώ προσ- 
αγορευομενης ονόματι, και περί των άλλων πολι- 
τειών, ολιγαρχίας τε και δημοκρατίας και τυραν- 
νίδος. φανερόν μεν οΰν και τούτων των παρεκ- 2 
βάσεων τις χειρίστη και δευτέρα τις. ανάγκη 

40 γαρ την μεν της πρώτης και θειοτάτης παρεκβασιν 
είναι χειρίστην, την δε /?ασιλειαν άναγκαΐον η 
1289 b τούνομα μόνον εχειν ουκ ουσαν η διά πολλην 
ύπεροχην είναι την του βασιλεύοντος' ώστε την 
τυραννίδα χειρίστην ουσαν πλείστον άπεχειν πολι- 
τείας, δεύτερον δε την όλιγαρχίαν (η γαρ αριστο- 
κρατία διεστηκεν από ταύτης πολύ της πολιτείας) , 
δ μετριωτάτην δε την δημοκρατίαν. ηδη μεν ουν 3 
τις άπεφηνατο και τών πρότερον ούτως, ου μην 
εις ταύτό βλεψας ήμΐν εκείνος μεν γαρ έκρινε 
πασών μεν ούσών επιεικών, οίον ολιγαρχίας τε 

α i.e. 7roXtreia, ' polity,' which denotes not only a constitu- 
tion of any form, but also (like our term 'constitutional 
government') a particular form, viz., a republic, cf. Bk. III. 
c. v. § 2. 

b The three forms of constitution last mentioned. 

* Corruptio optimi pessima, a Socratic notion: 'the men 

282 



POLITICS, IV. ii. 1-3 

constitutions as three, kingship, aristocracy and f<?ur con- 
constitutional government, and the deviations from remain to be 
these as three, tyranny from kingship, oligarchy from discussed. 
aristocracy and democracy from constitutional govern- 
ment, and about aristocracv and kingship we have 
spoken (for to study the best constitution is the same Book in. 
thing as to speak about the forms that bear those cc ' 1X- ' XU " 
names, since each of them means a system based on 
the qualification of virtue equipped with means), 
and as also the question what constitutes the differ- 
ence between aristocracy and kingship and when a 
royal government is to be adopted has been de- 
cided before, it remains to discuss the form of con- in. xi. 2. 
stitution designated by the name α common to them 
all, and the other forms, oligarchy, democracy and 

2 tyranny. Now it is manifest also which of these Their order 
deviations b is the worst and which the second worst. ° merl 
For necessarily the deviation from the first and most 
divine must be the worst, c and kingship must of 
necessity either possess the name only, without 

really being kingship, or be based on the outstanding 
superiority of the man who is king ; so that tyranny 
being the worst form must be the one farthest 
removed from constitutional government, and olig- 
archy must be the second farthest (for aristocracy 
is widely separated from that constitution), while 

3 democracy must be the most moderate. An account 
of their relative merits has indeed already been 
given also by one of the former writers , d though not 
on the same principle as ours ; for he inclined to 
judge that there were good varieties of all the forms, 

of the best natural gifts, when uneducated, are the worst,' 
Xen. Mem. to, 1. 3. 

* Plato, Politicua 302 a ff. 

283 



ARISTOTLE 

1389 b 

χρήστης και τών άλλων, χειρίστην δημοκρατίαν, 

φαύλων δέ άρίστην, ημείς δέ όλως ταύτας εζημαρτη- 4 

ίο μένας είναι φαμεν, καΐ βελτίω μέν όλιγαρχίαν άλλην 
άλλης ου καλώς εχειν 1 λέγειν, ήττον δέ φαύλην. 
άλλα περί μεν της τοιαύτης κρίσεως άφείσθω 
τά νυν ημΐν δέ πρώτον μεν διαιρετεον πόσαι δια- 
φοραι τών πολιτειών, εΐπερ εστίν εΐδη πλείονα της 
τε δημοκρατίας και της ολιγαρχίας, έπειτα τις 

ΐδ κοινότατη, και τις αίρετωτάτη μετά την άρίστην 
πολιτείαν , καν ει τις αλλτ/ τετύχηκεν αριστοκρατική 
και συνεστώσα καλώς, αλλ' ου 2 τοις πλείσταις άρ- 
μόττουσα πόλεσι, τις εστίν, έπειτα και τών άλλων 5 
τις τίσιν αιρετή (τάχα γαρ τοΐς μεν αναγκαία δημο- 
κρατία μάλλον ολιγαρχίας, τοΐς δ' αύτη μάλλον 

20 εκείνης), μετά δέ ταύτα TiVa τρόπον δει καθιστάναι 
τον βουλόμενον ταύτας τάς πολιτείας, λέγω δε 
δημοκρατίας τε καθ* εκαστον είδος και πάλιν ολιγ- 
αρχίας, τέλος δε, πάντων τούτων όταν ποιησώμεθα 
συντόμως την ενδεχομενην uveia.l•', πειρατεον επ- 
ελθεΐν τίνες φθοραι και τίνες σωτηρίαι τών πολι- 

25 retail' και κοινή και χωρίς εκάστης, και διά τίνας 
αιτίας ταύτα μάλιστα ytVea^at πεφυκεν. 

III. Του μεν ούν eivcu πλείους πολιτείας αίτιον 1 
οτι πάσης εστί μέρη πλείω πόλεως τον αριθμόν, 
πρώτον μεν γάρ εζ οικιών συγκειμενας πάσας 

ίο όρώμεν τάς πόλεις, έπειτα πάλιν τούτου τοΰ 
πλήθους τους μεν εύπορους άναγκαΐον είναι τους 
1 Richards : ?χει codd. * ού add. Coraes (cf. 1295 a 31 ff.). 
284 



POLITICS, IV. π. 3— in. 1 

for instance a good sort of oligarchy and so on. and 
that democracy was the worst among these, but the 

4 best among the bad varieties, whereas we say that 
the deviations are wholly wrong, and that it is not 
right to speak of one form of oligarchy as better than 
another, but only as less bad. But let us for the 
present dismiss the question of a classification of this 
nature. Our business is first to distinguish how many Contents 
different forms of the constitutions there are, assum- iv. r v., vi. 
ing that there do exist several kinds of democracy 

and of oligarchy ; next, which form is most general, iv. hl-tBI 
and which most desirable after the best constitution, n ■ 1X • 
and also if there exists some other form that is 
aristocratic in nature and well constructed but not 
fitted to the largest number of cities, which this 

5 is ; next, which of the other forms too is desirable 

for what people (since probably for some democracy IV - «-Ά 
is necessary more than oligarchy, and for others 
oligarchy more than democracy) ; and after this, 
in what way should one proceed who wishes to set Book v • 
up these constitutions, I mean the various forms of 
democracy and of oligarchy ; and finally, when as 
far as possible we have concisely touched upon all 
these questions, we must endeavour to review what 
are the agencies that destroy and what are those 
that preserve constitutions generally and each variety 
of constitution in particular, and what are the causes 
by which it is most natural for these events to be 
brought about. 
1 III. Now the reason of there being several forms 
of constitution is that every citv has a considerable 9 0nstit,1 * 

/• -r• • ι η " l• tions vary 

number ot parts, ror in the first place we see that in their 
all the cities are composed of households, and then Grower by 
again that of this multitude some must necessarily rank and 

& J wealth. 

285 



ARISTOTLE 

1289 b λ, , / \ ο. \ / \~ >/ λ \ 

ο άπορους τους οε μέσους, και των ευπόρων οε 
καΐ των απόρων το μεν όπλιτικον το δε άνοπλον. 
και τον μεν γεωργικόν δημον όρώμεν οντά, τον δ' 
άγοραΐον, τον δε βάναυσον. και των γνωρίμων 
είσι διαφοραι και κατά τον πλοΰτον καί τα. μεγέθη 

35 της ουσίας (οίον ιπποτροφίας, τοΰτο γαρ ου 
ράδιον μη πλουτοΰντας ποιεΐν διόπερ επι των 2 
αρχαίων χρόνων δσαι? πόλεσιν εν τοΐς ιπποις η 
δύναμις ην, όλιγαρχίαι παρά τούτοις ήσαν εχρώντο 
δε προς τους πολέμους 1 ϊπποις προς 2 τους άστυ- 
γείτονας, οίον 'Έ,ρετριεΐς καί Χαλκιδεί? και 

40 Μαγνήτες οι επι Μαιά^δρω καϊ των άλλων πολλοί 
περί την Άσιαν). ετι προς ταΐς κατά πλοΰτον δια- 

1290 a φοραΐς εστίν η μεν κατά γένος η δε κατ' άρετήν, 

καν ει τι δη τοιούτον έτερον εΐρηται πόλεως είναι 
μέρος εν τοΐς περί την άριστοκρατιαν {εκεί γαρ 
8ιειλόμεθα εκ πόσων μερών αναγκαίων εστί πάσα 
πόλις)' τούτων γάρ των μερών ότε μεν πάντα μετ- 
5 €χει της πολιτείας ότε δ' ελάττω ότε δε πλείω. 
φανερόν τοίνυν ότι πλείους άναγκαΐον eirai πολι- 3 
τείας εΐδει διαφέρουσας αλλήλων και γάρ ταΰτ 
εΐδει διαφέρει τά μέρη σφών αυτών, πολιτεία μεν 
γάρ η τών αρχών τάξις εστί, ταύτας* δε διανέμον- 
ται πάντες η κατά την δυ^α^ιν τών μετεχόντων η 
ίο κατά τιν αυτών ισότητα κοινην, λέγω δ' οίον τών 
απόρων η τών ευπόρων η κοινην τιν* άμφοΐν.* 
άναγκαΐον άρα πολιτείας cuou τοσαύτας οσαι περ 

1 πολέμους Γ (cf. 1330 a 18) : πολίμίους codd. 

2 [irpbs] Immisch (cf. ibid.). 

3 Pilchards : ταύτην codd. * [τ) — άμφοΐν] Ramus. 

This clause looks like an interpolation. 
286 



POLITICS, IV. in. 1-3 

be rich and some poor and some between the two, 
and also of the rich and the poor the former class is 
heavy-armed and the latter without armour. And 
we see that one portion of the common people is 
agricultural, another engaged in trade and another 
mechanic. And the upper classes have distinctions 
also corresponding to their wealth and the amounts 
of their property (for example in a stud of horses — 
for it is not easy to rear horses without being rich, 

2 and this is why in ancient times there were oligarchies 
in all the states whose strength lay in their cavalry, 
and they used to use horses for their wars against 
their neighbours, as for instance did the Eretrians 1306 a sb. 
and Chalcidians and the people of Magnesia on the 
Maeander and many of the other Asiatic peoples). 
Moreover in addition to diiferences in wealth there is 

the difference of birth, and that in regard to virtue, 
and indeed any other similar distinction that in the 
discussion of aristocracy has been stated to constitute 
a part of the state (for there we distinguished how 
many necessary parts there are of which every state 
must consist) ; for sometimes all of these parts parti- 
cipate in the constitution and sometimes a smaller or 

3 a larger number of them. It is clear therefore that 
there must necessarily be several forms of constitu- 
tion differing in kind from one another, inasmuch as 
these parts differ in kind among themselves. For a 
constitution means the arrangement of the magistra- 
cies, and these all people distribute either according 
to the power of those who share political rights, or 
according to some common equality between them, 
I mean for example between the poor or between the 
rich, or some equality common to them both." It 
follows therefore that there are as many forms of 

287 



ARISTOTLE 

1290 a ,. , , , , , , 

τάξεις κατά τας υπεροχας εισι και κατά τας δια- 
φοράς των μορίων, μάλιστα δε δοκοΰσιν είναι δύο, 4 
καθάπερ επι των πνευμάτων λέγεται τά μεν βόρεια 

35 τα δε νοτιά, τά δ άλλα τούτων παρεκβάσεις, ούτω 
και των πολιτειών δυο, δήμος και ολιγαρχία• την 
γαρ αριστοκρατίαν της ολιγαρχίας είδος τιθεασιν 
ως οΰσαν όλιγαρχίαν τιι^ά, και την καλουμενην 
πολιτείαν δημοκρατίαν, 1 ώσπερ εν τοις 7π/6υ/Αασι 
τον μεν ζεφυρον του βορεου, του δε νότου τον 

20 ευρον. ομοίως δ' έχει και περί τάς αρμονίας, ως 
φασί τίνες• και γάρ εκεί τίθενται είδη δυο, την 
δωριστι και την φρυγιστί, τά δε άλλα συντάγματα 
τα μεν Δώρια τά δε Φρυγία καλοϋσιν. μάλιστα μεν δ 
ούν ειώθασιν ούτως ύπολαμβάνειν περί των πολι- 
τειών άληθεστερον δε και βελτιον ως ημείς διείλο- 

25 μεν, δυοΐν η jLttas* ούσης της καλώς συνεστηκυίας 
τας άλλας είναι παρεκβάσεις, τάς μεν της ευ κε- 
κραμενης [αρμονίας] 2 τάς δε της αρίστης πολιτείας, 
ολιγαρχικάς μεν τάς συντονωτερας και δεσποτικω- 
τερας τα? δ άνειμενας και μαλάκας δημοτικάς. 

80 Ου δει δε τιθεναι δημοκρατίαν, καθάπερ είώθασί 6 
τίνες νυν, απλώς ούτως, οπού κύριον το πλήθος 
(και γαρ εν ταΐς όλιγαρχίαις και πανταχού το 
πλέον μέρος κύριον), oύδ , όλιγαρχίαν οπού κύριοι 
ολίγοι της πολιτείας. ει γάρ εΐησαν οι πάντες 

«5 χίλιοι και τριακόσιοι, και τούτων οι χίλιοι πλούσιοι, 

1 δημοκρατία? Richards : <tt;s> δημ. ? ed. 
2 αρμονίας seel. Immisch. 

" Aristotle refers to this view in Meteorologica 364 a 19, 
saying that west winds are classed with north and east winds 
with south, because wind from the setting sun is cooler and 
from the rising sun warmer. He notes that north and south 
288 



POLITICS, IV. πι. 3-6 

constitution as there are modes of arrangement 
according to the superiorities and the differences of 
■4 the sections. But the forms mostly are thought to be Usual 
two — just as in the case of the winds we speak of some t ion 
as north and some as south and regard the rest as criticized, 
deviations from these. so also of constitutions there 
are held to be two forms, democracy and oligarchy ; 
for men reckon aristocracy as a kind of oligarchy 
because it is oligarchy of a sort, and what is called 
constitutional government as democracy, just as in 
the case of the winds they reckon the west Mind 
as a kind of north wind and the east wind as a 
kind of south wind. And the case is similar with 
musical modes, as some people say : for there too they 
posit two kinds, the Dorian mode and the Phrygian, 
and call the other scales some of them Dorian 

5 and the others Phrygian. For the most part there- 
fore they are accustomed to think in this way about 
the constitutions ; but it is truer and better to class 
them as we did, and assuming that there are two well- c. u. 
constructed forms, or else one, to say that the others 
are deviations, some from the well-blended constitu- 
tion and the others from the best one, the more tense 
and masterful constitutions being oligarchic and the 
relaxed and soft ones demotic. 

6 But it is not right to define democracy, as some Democracy 
people are in the custom of doing now, merely as the oligarchy 
constitution in which the multitude is sovereign (for defined, 
even in oligarchies and everywhere the majority is 
sovereign) nor oligarchy as the constitution in which 

a few are sovereign over the government. For if the 
whole number were thirteen hundred, and a thousand 

winds are the most frequent, ιό. 361 a 6 ; this may have sug- 
gested the idea that they were the typical winds. 

289 



ARISTOTLE 

1290 a κ \ ο. p. ~ > Λ „ / < 

/cat μη μεταοιοοιεν αρχής τοις τριακόσιους και 

πενησιν ελευθεροις ουσι και τάλλα όμοίοις, ούθεις 

αν φαίη δημοκρατεΐσθαι τούτους• ομοίως δε και 

€ΐ πένητες μεν ολίγοι εΐεν, κρείττους δε των 

ευπόρων πλειόνων όντων, ουδείς αν όλιγαρχίαν 

προσαγορεύσειεν ούδε την τοιαύτην ει τοις άλλοι? 1 

40 ουσι πλουσίοις μη μετείη των τι/χών. μάλλον 7 
1290 b τοίνυν λεκτεον ότι δήμος μεν εστίν όταν οι ελεύ- 
θεροι κύριοι ώσιν ολιγαρχία δ' όταν οι πλούσιοι, 
άλλα συμβαίνει τους μεν πολλούς eirai τους δ' 
ολίγους, ελεύθεροι μεν γαρ πολλοί πλούσιοι δ 
ολίγοι, και γαρ αν ει κατά μέγεθος διενεμοντο 
5 τα? αρχάς, ώσπερ εν Κιθιοπία φασι τίνες, 2 η κατά 
κάλλος, ολιγαρχία ην αν, ολίγον γαρ το πλήθος 
και το των καλών και το των μεγάλων, ου μην 8 
άλλ' ούδε τούτοις μόνον ικανώς έχει διωρίσθαι 
τάς πολιτείας ταύτας' αλλ' επει πλείονα μόρια 
και του δήμου και τής ολιγαρχίας είσίν, ετι δια- 

ιο ληπτεον ως οΰτ* αν οι ελεύθεροι ολίγοι όντες 
πλειόνων και μη ελευθέρων άρχωσι δήμος, οίον 
εν ' Απολλωνία τή εν τω Ίονίω και εν θήρα (εν τού- 
των γάρ εκατερα των πόλεων εν ταΐς τι/χαί? ήσαν 
οι διαφέροντες κατ' εύγενειαν και πρώτοι κατα- 
σχόντες τάς αποικίας, ολίγοι όντες πολλών) , ουτ αν 

15 οι πλούσιοι διά το κατά πλήθος ύπερέχειν, δήμος, 3 
οίον εν Κ,ολοφώνι το παλαιό^ (εκεί γάρ εκεκτηντο 
μακράν ούσίαν ol πλείους πριν yevea^ai τον πο- 

1 πολλοίς Richards. 2 tools ? Susemihl. 

8 ολιγαρχία Bojesen. 



α e.g. Herodotus iii. 20. 
* i.e. those of citizen birth. 



290 






POLITICS, IV. in. fr-8 

of these were rich and did not give the three hundred 
poor a share in the government although they were 
free-born and like themselves in all other respects, 
no one would say that this people was governed 
democratically ; and similarly also if there were few 
poor, but these more powerful than the rich who were 
more numerous, no one would call such a government 
a democracy either, if the other citizens being rich 

7 had no share in the honours. Rather therefore ought 
we to say that it is a democracy when the free are 
sovereign and an oligarchy when the rich are, but 
that it comes about that the sovereign class in a 
democracy is numerous and that in an oligarchy 
small because there are many men of free birth and 
few rich. For otherwise, suppose people assigned 
the offices by height, as some persons a say is done in 
Ethiopia, or by beauty, that would be an oligarchy, 
because both the handsome and the tall are few in 

8 number. Nevertheless it is not enough to define 
these constitutions even by wealth and free birth 
only ; but inasmuch as there are more elements than 
one both in democracy and in oligarchy, we must add 
the further distinction that neither is it a democracy 
if the free b being few govern the majority who are 
not of free birth, as for instance at Apollonia on the 
Ionian Gulf and at Thera (for in each of these cities 
the offices of honour were filled by the specially 
noble families who had been the first settlers of the 
colonies, and these were few out of many), nor is it 
a democracy c if the rich rule because they are in a 
majority, as in ancient times at Colophon (for there 
the majority of the population owned large property 

c Perhaps the Greek should be altered here to give ' an 
oligarchy.' 

291 



ARISTOTLE 

1290 b 

λεμον τον προς Αυδούς), άλλ' Ιστι δημοκρατία 
μεν όταν οι ελεύθεροι και άποροι πλείους οντες 
κύριοι της αρχής ώσιν, ολιγαρχία δ όταν οι 

20 πλούσιοι και ευγενέστεροι ολίγοι οντες. 

"Οτι μεν οΰν πολιτεΐαι πλείους, και δι' ην αίτιας, 9 
εϊρηται- διότι δε πλείους των είρη μένων, και Tires' 
και διά τι, λεγωμεν αρχήν λαβόντες την είρημενην 
πρότερον. όμολογοΰμεν γαρ ούχ εν μέρος άλλα 

2S πλείω πάσαν εχειν πάλιν, ώσπερ οΰν ει ζώου 
προηρουμεθα λαβείν ε'ίδη, πρώτον αν άποδιωρι- 
ζομεν όπερ άναγκαΐον παν εχειν ζώον (οίον ενιά 
τε των αισθητηρίων και το της τροφής εργαστικον 
και δεκτικόν, οίον στόμα και κοιλίαν, προς δε 
τούτοις, οΐς κινείται μορίοις εκαστον αυτών), ει 10 

30 δε 1 τοσαΰτα εΐη* μόνον, τούτων δ' εΐεν διαφοραι 
(λέγω δ' οίον στόματος τίνα πλείω γένη και κοιλίας 
και τών αισθητηρίων, ετι δε και τών κινητικών 
μορίων), ο τής συζεύζεως τής τούτων αριθμός εζ 
ανάγκης ποιήσει πλείω γένη ζώων (ου γαρ οΐόν 
τε ταύτόν ζώον εχειν πλείους στόματος διαφοράς, 

35 ομοίως δε ούδ ώτων), ώσθ όταν- ληφθώσι τούτων 
πάντες οι ενδεχόμενοι συνδυασμοί ποιήσουσιν εΐδη 
ζώου, και τοσαυτ ε'ίδη του ζώου όσαιπερ αϊ 
συζεύξεις τών αναγκαίων μορίων είσίν — τον αυτόν 11 
δη 3 τρόπον και τών είρημενων πολιτειών, και γαρ 
αϊ πόλεις ουκ εζ ενός αλλ' εκ πολλών σύγκεινται 

1 δέ Thurot : δη aut δβϊ codd. 
a ΐίη Newman : εΐδη codd. 3 δη Coraes : δέ codd. 

See § 1. 
292 



POLITICS, IV. πι. &-11 

before the war against the Lydians took place), but 
it is a democracy when those who are free are in the 
majority and have sovereignty over the government, 
and an oligarchy when the rich and more well born 
are few and sovereign. 
9 It has then been stated that there are several forms Eight 
of constitution, and what is the cause of this ; but ^ s ^ s (not 
let us take the starting-point that was laid down Plato) 
before α and say that there are more forms than those thes^te. 
mentioned, and what these forms are, and why they 
vary. For we agree that every state possesses not 
one part but several. Therefore just as, in case we 
intended to obtain a classification of animals, we 
should first define the properties necessarily belonging 
to every animal (for instance some of the sense- 
organs, and the machinery for masticating and for 
receiving food, such as a mouth and a stomach, 
and in addition to these the locomotive organs of 

10 the various species), and if there were only so many 
necessary parts, but there were different varieties 
of these (I mean for instance certain various kinds 
of mouth and stomach and sensory organs, and also 
of the locomotive parts as well), the number of poss- 
ible combinations of these variations will necessarily 
produce a variety of kinds of animals (for it is not 
possible for the same animal to have several different 
sorts of mouth, nor similarly of ears either), so that 
when all the possible combinations of these are taken 
they will all produce animal species, and there will 
be as many species of the animal as there are com- 

11 binations of the necessary parts : — so in the same 
way also we shall classify the varieties of the con- 
stitutions that have been mentioned. For states 
also are composed not of one but of several parts, as 

293 



ARISTOTLE 

1290 b 

μ€ρών, ώσπ€ρ εΐρηται πολλάκις, εν μεν ούν εστί 
το περί την τροφήν πλήθος, οί καλούμενοι γεωρ- 

1291 a γοι, δεύτερον δέ το καλούμενον βάναυσον (εστί δέ 

τοϋτο περί τάς τέχνας ών άνευ πάλιν αδύνατον οί- 
κεΐσθαι, τούτων δε των τεχνών τάς μεν εξ ανάγκης 
υπαρχειν δει, τάς δέ εις τρυφην η το καλώς ζην), 
6 τρίτον δ' άγοραΐον (λέγω δ' άγοραϊον το περί τάς 
πρασεις και τάς ώνάς και τάς εμπορίας και 
καπηλείας διατρϊβον), τέταρτον δε το θητικόν, 
πέμπτον δε γένος τό π ροπολεμήσον , ο τούτων ούθεν 
ήττον εστίν άναγκαΐον ύπάρχειν ει μέλλουσι μη 
δουλεύσειν τοις επιοϋσιν μη γάρ εν τών αδυνάτων 
η πάλιν άξιον είναι καλεΐν την φύσει οούλην, 

ίο αυτάρκης γάρ ή πάλις τό δέ δοΰλον ουκ αύταρκες. 
όιόπερ εν τη πολιτεία, κομφώς τοϋτο, ούχ ίκανώς 12 
δε εΐρηται. φησι γάρ ο Σιωκράτης εκ τεττάρων 
τών αναγκαιοτάτων πάλιν συγκεΐσθαι, λέγει δε 
τούτους ύφάντην και γεωργον και σκυτοτόμον και 

15 οίκοδόμον πάλιν δέ προστίθησιν, ως ούχ αυταρκών 
τούτων, χαλκέα και τους επι τοις άναγκαιοις 
βοσκημασιν, έτι δ' έμπορόν τε και κάπηλον. και 
ταύτα πάντα γίνεται πλήρωμα της πρώτης πόλεως, 
ώς τών αναγκαίων γε χάριν πάσαν πόλιν συν- 
εστηκυΐαν αλλ* ού του καλού μάλλον, ίσον τε 
δεομένην σκυτέων τε και γεωργών τό δέ προ- 13 

20 πολεμούν ού πρότερον άποδίδωσι μέρος πριν ή της 
χώρας αύζομένης και της τών πλησίον απτομενης 

α Plato, Rep. ii. 369 β-371 ε. 
* i.e. the first sketch of the City-state, loc. cit. 

294 



POLITICS, IV. πι. 11-13 

has been said often. One of these parts therefore 
is the mass of persons concerned with food who are 
called farmers, and second is what is called the 
mechanic class (and this is the group engaged in the 
arts without which it is impossible for a city to be 
inhabited, and some of these arts are indispensably 
necessary, while others contribute to luxury or noble 
living), and third is a commercial class (by which I 
mean the class that is engaged in selling and buying 
and in wholesale and retail trade), and fourth is the 
class of manual labourers, and the fifth class is the 
one to defend the state in war, which is no less in- 
dispensable than the others if the people are not to 
become the slaves of those who come against them ; 
for surely it is quite out of the question that it should 
be proper to give the name of state to a community 
that is by nature a slave, for a state is self-sufficient, 

12 but that which is a slave is not self-sufficient. There- 
fore the statement made in the Republic a is witty 
but not adequate. For Socrates says that the most 
necessary elements of which a state is composed are 
four, and he specifies these as a weaver, a farmer, a 
shoemaker and a builder ; and then again he adds, 
on the ground that these are not self-sufficient, a 
copper-smith and the people to look after the neces- 
sary live-stock, and in addition a merchant and a 
retail trader. These elements together constitute 
the full complement of his first city, 6 implying that 
every city is formed for the sake of the necessaries of 
life and not rather for the sake of what is noble, and 
that it has equal need of both shoemakers and farmers ; 

13 but the warrior class he does not assign to it until as 
the territory is increased and comes into contact 
with that of the neighbours they are brought into 

295 



ARISTOTLE 

1291 " 

εις πόλεμον καταστώσιν. άλλα μην και εν τοις 

τέτταρσι και τοις όποσοισοΰν κοινωνοις άναγκαΐον 

elvai τίνα τον άποδώσοντα και κρινούντα το 

δίκαιον εΐπερ οΰν και φυχην αν τις θείη ζώου 

25 μόριον μάλλον η σώμα, και πόλεων τά τοιαύτα 
μάλλον θετέον των εις την άναγκαίαν χρήσιν συν- 
τεινόντων, το πολεμικόν και το μετέχον δικαιοσύνης 
δικαστικής, προς δε τούτοις το βουλευόμενον, 
όπερ εστί συνέσεως πολιτικής έργον, και ταΰτ* 
είτε κεχωρισμένως 1 υπάρχει τισιν είτε τοις αύτοΐς, 

80 ούθέν διαφέρει προς τον λόγον και γαρ όπλιτεύειν \± 
και γεωργεΐν συμβαίνει τοις αύτοΐς ποσάκις, 
ώστε ε'ίπερ και ταύτα και εκείνα θετέα μόρια της 
πόλεως, φανερόν οτι τό γε όπλιτικόν άναγκαΐον 
εστί μόριον της πόλεως, έβδομον δε το ταΐς ούσίαις 
λειτουργούν, ο καλούμεν εύπορους, ογδοον δε τό 

85 δημιουργικόν και το περί τάς αρχάς λειτουργούν, 
ε'ίπερ άνευ αρχόντων αδύνατον etmi πάλιν άναγ- 
καΐον οΰν εΐναί τινας τους δυναμένους άρχειν και 
λειτουργούντας η συνεχώς η κατά μέρος τη πάλει 
ταύτην την λειτουργίαν. λοιπά δε περί ων τυγ- 
χάνομεν διωρικότες άρτίως, τό βουλευόμενον και 

40 τό 2 κρίνον περί τών δικαίων τοις άμφισβητούσιν . 

εΐπερ οΰν ταύτα δει γίνεσθαι 3 ταΐς πόλεσι και 

1291 b καλώ? γίνεσθαι 3 και δικαίως, άναγκαΐον και μετ- 

1 κΐχιορισμέροις ? Richards. 2 και το ed. : καΐ codd. 

3 yiveadai ed. : yeveadai codd. 

β The first four classes and the military and judicial. 
296 



POLITICS, IV. πι. 13-14 

war. But yet even among the four partners or what- 
ever their number be there must necessarily be some- 
body to assign justice and to judge their claims ; 
inasmuch therefore as one would count the soul of 
an animal to be more a part of it than the body, so 
also the factors in states corresponding to the soul 
must be deemed to be parts of them more than those 
factors which contribute to necessary utility. — the 
former being the military class and the class that 
plays a part in judicial justice, and in addition to 
these the deliberative class, deliberation being a 
function of political intelligence. And it makes no 
difference to the argument whether these functions 
are held by special classes separately or by the same 
14 persons ; for it often happens for the same men to 
be both soldiers and farmers. Hence inasmuch as 
both groups ° of classes must be counted parts of the 
state, it is clear that the heavy- armed soldiery at 
any rate b must be a part of the state. And a seventh 
class is the one that serves the community by means 
of its property, the class that we call the rich. And an 
eighth is the class of public servants, that is, those 
who serve in the magistracies, inasmuch as without 
rulers it is impossible for a city to exist ; it is there- 
fore necessary that there should be some men who 
are able to govern and who render this service to the 
state either continuously or in turn. And there 
remain the classes which we happen to have denned 
just before, the deliberative class and the one that 
judges the claims of litigants. If therefore it is 
proper for the states to have these functions per- 
formed, and well and justly performed, it is necessary 

b Lower grades of the forces may be excluded from citizen- 
ship, e.g. the rowers of the triremes (see below, 1376 b 15). 

L 297 



ARISTOTLE 

1291b 

έχοντας eivcu πνας αρετής της 1 των πολιτικών. 2 
τάς μεν οΰν άλλα? δυνάμεις τοις αύτοΐς ύπάρχειν 15 
ενδεχεσθαι δοκεΐ πολλοίς, οίον τους αυτούς είναι 
τους προπολεμούντας και γεωργοΰντας και τεχ- 
5 νιτα?, ετι δε τους βουλευομενους τε και κρίνοντας, 
αντιποιούνται δε και της αρετής πάντες και τάς 
πλείστας αρχάς άρχειν οΐονται δυνασ^αι• αλλά 
7reWa^ai και πλουτεΐν τους αυτούς αδύνατον, 
διό ταΰτα μέρη μάλιστα eirax δοκεΐ πόλεως, οι 
εύποροι καΐ οι άποροι, ετι δε διά το ως επι το 

ίο πολύ τους μεν ολίγους είναι τους δε πολλούς, 
ταύτα ivavria μέρη* φαίνεται των της πόλεως 
μορίων ώστε και τάς πολιτείας κατά τάς ύπεροχάς 
τούτων καθιστάσι, και δύο πολιτεΐαι δοκοΰσιν 
είναι, δημοκρατία και ολιγαρχία. 

IV. "Οτι μεν οΰν είσι πολιτεΐαι πλείους, και διά 1 

15 τίνας αίτια?, εΐρηται πρότερον δτι δ' εστί και 
δημοκρατίας εΐδη πλείω και ολιγαρχίας, λεγωμεν. 
φανερόν δε τούτο και εκ των είρη μένων, εΐδη 
γάρ πλείω τοΰ τε δήμου και των λεγομένων 
γνωρίμων εστίν, οίον δήμου μεν εΐδη εν μεν οι 
γεωργοί, έτερον δε το περί τάς τεχνας, άλλο δε το 

20 άγορα.ΐον το περί ώνην και πράσιν διατρΐβον, άλλο 

δε το περί θάλατταν, καΐ τούτου το μεν πολεμικον 

το δε χρηματιστικόν το δέ πορθμευτικον το δ 

άλιευτικόν (πολλαχοΰ γάρ έκαστα τούτων πολύοχλα, 

1 aperi?s ttjs Richards : αρετής codd. 
' πολιτών ? Richards. 3 μόνα Wilamowitz. 

β Cf. in. 11, 12 fin. 
298 



POLITICS, IV. ιπ. 14— iv. 1 

for there also to be some men possessing virtue in the 
15 form of political excellence. Now as to the other Some 
capacities many people think that it is possible for S^Aafpjjut 
them to be possessed in combination, for example, n °t rich 

* ' r ' and poor r 

for the same men to be the soldiers that defend the hence 
state in war and the farmers that till the land and ^JP"**' 
the artizans, and also the councillors and judges, and Democracy 
indeed all men claim to possess virtue and think c ^^ 
themselves capable of filling most of the offices of forma 
state ; but it is not possible for the same men to 
be poor and rich. Hence these seem to be in the 
fullest sense the parts of the state, the rich and the 
poor. And also the fact that the rich are usually 
few and the poor many makes these two among the 
parts of the state appear as opposite sections ; so 
that the superior claims α of these classes are even 
made the guiding principles upon which constitutions 
are constructed, and it is thought that there are two 
forms of constitution, democracy and oligarchy. 
1 IV. That there are then several forms of constitu- Varieties of 
tion, and what are the reasons for this, has been aJf* 10 y 
stated before ; let us now say that there are several Democracy 
varieties both of democracy and of oligarchy. And 
this is clear even from what has been said already. 
For there are several classes both of the people and 
of those called the notables ; for instance classes of 
the people are, one the farmers, another the class 
dealing with the arts and crafts, another the com- 
mercial class occupied in buying and selling and 
another the one occupied with the sea — and this 
is divided into the classes concerned with naval 
warfare, with trade, with ferrving passengers and 
with fishing (for each of these classes is extremely 
numerous in various places, for instance fishermen 

299 



ARISTOTLE 

1291 b 

οΐον αλιείς μέν εν Ύάραντι και Βυζαντίω, τριηρικόν 

δέ ^ Κθηνησιν , εμπορικόν δέ iv Αίγίνη και Χι'ω, 

^πορθμευτικόν δ' iv 1 Ύενεδω), προς δε τούτοις 
το χερνητικον και το μικράν έχον ούσίαν ώστε μη 
δϋί^ασ^αι σχολάζειν, ετι το μη εξ αμφοτέρων 
πολιτών ελεύθερον, καν ει τι τοιούτον έτερον 2 
πλήθους ειδο?' των δε γνωρίμων πλούτος, ευγένεια, 
αρετή, παιοεία και τά τούτοις λεγόμενα κατά την 

30 αύτην διαφοράν. 

Αημοκρατία μεν οΰν εστί πρώτη μεν η λεγομένη 2 
μάλιστα κατά το ίσον. ίσον γάρ φησιν ό νόμος 
ο της τοιαύτης δημοκρατίας το μηδέν μάλλον 
υπερεχειν 3 τους απόρους η τους εύπορους μηδέ 
κυρίους είναι όποτερουσοΰν άλλ' ομοίους αμφό- 
τερους• εΐπερ γάρ ελευθέρια μάλιστ' εστίν εν 

35 δημοκρατία, καθάπερ ύπολαμβάνουσί τίνες, και 
ίσότης, ούτως αν ειη μάλιστα κοινωνούντων 
απάντων μάλιστα 4, της πολιτείας ομοίως, επει δε 
πλείων 6 δήμος, κύριον δέ το δόζαν τοις πλείοσιν, 
ανάγκη δημοκρατίαν είναι ταύτην. εν μεν οΰν 3 
είδος δημοκρατίας τούτο, τό 5 τάς αρχάς από 

40 τιμημάτων είναι, βραχέων δε τούτων όντων δει 
δέ τω κτωμενω εζουσιαν είναι μετεχειν και 
1292a τον άποβάλλοντα μη μετεχειν. έτερον δ' είδος 
δημοκρατίας το μετεχειν απαντάς τους πολίτας 
όσοι άνυπεύθυνοι, άρχειν δέ τον νόμον έτερον δέ 
εΐδος δημοκρατίας το πάσι μετεΐναι τών αρχών 

1 δ' iv Susemihl (autem in Guil.): eV codd. 

2 Sylburg: έτερου codd. 

3 ϋττάρχαν codd. plerique, άρχειν Victorius (cf. 1318 a 7). 

4 seel. Coraes. 

s τό Schlosser (cf. 1318 b 6 seq., ed.): άλλο δέ τό codd. 

30U 



POLITICS, IV. ιν. 1-3 

at Tarentum and Byzantium, navy men at Athens 
the mercantile class at Aegina and Chios, and the 
ferryman-class at Tenedos), and in addition to these 
the hand-working class and the people possessing 
little substance so that they cannot live a life of 
leisure, also those that are not free men of citizen 
parentage on both sides, and any other similar class 
of common people ; while among the notables 
wealth, birth, virtue, education, and the distinctions 
that are spoken of in the same group as these, form 
the classes. 

The first kind of democracy therefore is the one Four 
which receives the name chiefly in respect of equality . p^^acy 
For the law of this sort of democracy ascribes equality 
to the state of things in which the poor have no more 
prominence than the rich, and neither class is sovereign, 
but both are alike ; for assuming that freedom is 
chiefly found in a democracv, as some persons suppose, 
and also equality, this would be so most fully when to 
the fullest extent all alike share equally in the govern- 
ment. And since the people are in the majority, and 
a resolution passed by a majority is paramount, this 
must necessarily be a democracy. This therefore is 
one kind of democracy, where the offices are held on 
property-qualifications, but these low ones, although 
it is essential that the man who acquires the specified 
amount should have the right to hold office, and the 
man who loses it should not hold office. And another 
kind of democracv is for all the citizens that are not 
open to challenge* 1 to have a share in office, but for the 
law to rule ; and another kind of democracy is for all 
to share in the offices on the mere qualification of 

• i.e. on the score of birth, cf. c. v. § 4. 

301 



ARISTOTLE 

1292 a 

εαν μόνον η πολίτης, άρχειν δε τον νόμον. έτερον 

6 δ είδος δημοκρατίας τάλλα μεν elvai ταυτά, κύριον 

ο είναι το πλήθος και μη τον νόμον τοΰτο δε 4 

γίνεται όταν τά φηφίσματα κύρια η άλλα μη 6 

νομός, συμβαίνει δε τοΰτο δια τους δημαγωγούς. 

ev μεν γαρ ταΐς κατά νόμον δημοκρατουμεναις ου 

γίνεται δημαγωγός, αλλ' οι βέλτιστοι των πολιτών 

ίο εισίΓ εν προεδρία.• οπού δ' οι νόμοι μη είσι κύριοι, 

ενταύθα γίνονται δημαγωγοί• μόναρχος γάρ 6 

δήμος γίνεται σύνθετος εις εκ πολλών, οι γάρ 

πολλοί κύριοι είσιν ούχ ως έκαστος άλλα πάντες. 

Ομηρος δε ποίαν λέγει ουκ αγαθόν ει^αι πολυ- 

κοιρανίην, πότερον ταύτην ή όταν πλείους ώσιν 

15 οι άρχοντες ως έκαστος, άδηλον. ό δ' οΰν τοιούτος β 

δήμος άτε μόναρχος ων ζητεί μοναρχεΐν διά το 

μη άρχεσθαι υπό νόμου και γίνεται δεσποτικός, 

ώστε οι κόλακες έντιμοι, και εστίν ο τοιούτος 

δήμος άνάλογον τών μοναρχιών τή τυραννίδι, 

διότι 1 και το ήθος το αυτό, και άμφω δεσποτικά 

20 τών βελτιόνων, και τά φηφίσματα ώσπερ εκεί τά 

επιτάγματα, και 6 δημαγωγός και ο κόλαξ οι 

αυτοί και άνάλογον, και μάλιστα δ' εκάτεροι παρ 

εκατεροις ίσχύουσιν, οι μεν κόλακες παρά τυράν- 

νοις, οι δε δημαγωγοί παρά τοις δήμοις τοις τοιού- 

τοις. αίτιοι δ' είσι τοΰ eirai τά φηφίσματα κύρια 6 

2δ άλλα μη τους νόμους ούτοι, πάντα άνάγοντες εις 

τον δήμον συμβαίνει γάρ αύτοΐς yiWai?ai μεγάλοις 

διά το τον μεν δήμον πάντων ει^αι κύριον τής δε 

1 ed. : διό codd. 

• Iliad, π. 204. 
302 



POLITICS, IV. ιν. 3-6 

being a citizen, but for the law to rule. Another 
kind of democracy is where all the other regulations 
are the same, but the multitude is sovereign and not 

4 the law ; and this comes about when the decrees of 
the assembly over-ride the law. This state of things 
is brought about by the demagogues ; for in the 

♦ states under democratic government guided by law 
a demagogue does not arise, but the best classes of 
citizens are in the most prominent position ; but 
where the laws are not sovereign, then demagogues 
arise ; for the common people become a single com- 
posite monarch, since the many are sovereign not as 
individuals but collectively. Yet what kind of demo- 
cracy Homer α means by the words ' no blessing is 
the lordship of the many ' — whether he means this 
kind or when those who rule as individuals are more 

5 numerous, is not clear. However, a people of this 
sort, as being monarch, seeks to exercise monarchic 
rule through not being ruled by the law, and becomes 
despotic, so that flatterers are held in honour. And Demagogy. 
a democracy of this nature is comparable to the 
tyrannical form of monarchy, because their spirit is 

the same, and both exercise despotic control over the 
better classes, and the decrees voted by the assembly 
are like the commands issued in a tyranny, and the 
demagogues and the flatterers are the same people 
or a corresponding class, and either set has the 
very strongest influence with the respective ruling 
power, the flatterers with the tyrants and the dem- 

6 agogues with democracies of this kind. And these 
men cause the resolutions of the assembly to be 
supreme and not the laws, by referring all things to 
the people ; for they owe their rise to greatness to 
the fact that the people is sovereign over all things 

303 



ARISTOTLE 

1292 a 

του δήμου δόξης τούτους, πείθεται γαρ το πλήθος 

τούτοις. ετι δ' οι ταΐς άρχαΐς εγκαλούντες τον 

δημόν φασι δεΐν κρίνειν, 6 δέ ασμένως δέχεται την 

30 πρόκλησιν, ώστε καταλύονται πασαι at άρχαί. 
ευλόγως δε άν δόζειεν επιτιμάν ό φάσκων την 7 
τοιαύτην είναι δημοκρατίαν ου πολιτείαν. οπού 
γαρ μη νόμοι άρχουσιν, ουκ εστί πολιτεία, δει γαρ 
τον μεν νόμον άρχειν πάντων 1 των δε καθ έκαστα 
τάς αρχάς, και ταύτην 2 πολιτείαν κρίνειν ωστ 

86 εΐπερ εστί δημοκρατία μία των πολιτειών, φανερόν 
ως ή τοιαύτη κοττάστασις, εν fj φηφίσμασι πάντα 
διοικείται, ουδέ δημοκρατία κυρίως, ουδέν γαρ 
ζνδεχεται φήφισμα eimt καθόλου. 

Τά μεν ουν της δημοκρατίας είδη διωρίσθω τον 
τρόπον τούτον. 

V. 'Ολιγαρχίας δέ είδη εν μεν το από τιμημάτων 1 

40 είναι τάς αρχάς τηλικούτων ώστε τους απόρους μη 
^tere^etv πλείους Οντας, εζειναι δε τω κτωμενω 
1292 b μετεχειν της πολιτείας, άλλο δε όταν από τιμημά- 
των μακρών ώσιν at άρχαι και α'ιρώνται αύτοι 
τους ελλείποντας (άν μεν ουν εκ πάντων τούτων 
τούτο ποιώσι, δοκεϊ τοϋτ efvat μάλλον άριστο- 
κρατικόν, εάν δε εκ τινών άφωρισμενων, όλιγαρ- 

6 χικόν) • έτερον δ' 3 είδος ολιγαρχίας όταν παις άντι 

πατρός είσίη, τέταρτον δ' όταν ύπάρχη τε το* νυν 

1 <χών καθόλου} πάντων Richards. 
Madvig: την codd. 



8 ϊτερον ο ed. : 'έτερον codd. 
4 τ€ τό ed. : τό re codd. 



304 



POLITICS, IV. ιν. 6— v. 1 

while they are sovereign over the opinion of the 
people, for the multitude believes them. Moreover 
those who bring charges against the magistrates say 
that the people ought to judge the suits, and the 
people receive the invitation gladly, so that all the 

7 magistracies are put down. And it would seem to 
be a reasonable criticism to say that such a demo- 
cracy is not a constitution at all ; for where the laws 
do not govern there is no constitution, as the law 
ought to govern all things while the magistrates 
control particulars, and we ought to judge this to be 
constitutional government ; if then democracy really 
is one of the forms of constitution, it is manifest that 
an organization of this kind, in which all things are 
administered by resolutions of the assembly, is not 
even a democracy in the proper sense, for it is 
impossible for a voted resolution to be a universal 
rule. 

Let this be our discussion of the different kinds of 
democracy. 

1 V. Of the kinds of oligarchy, one is for the magis- Four 
tracies to be appointed from property-assessments so on^chv 
high that the poor who are the majority have no 
share in the government, but for the man who 
acquires the requisite amount of property to be 
allowed to take part in it ; another is when the 
magistracies are filled from high assessments and the 
magistrates themselves elect to fill vacancies (so that 
if they do so from all the citizens of this assessment, 
this appears rather to be of the nature of an aristo- 
cracy, but if from a particular section of them, it is 
oligarchical) ; another variety of oligarchv is when 
son succeeds father in office ; and a fourth kind is 
when the hereditary system just mentioned exists 

305 



ARISTOTLE 

1292 b 

λεχθεν και άρχη μη 6 νόμος αλλ οί άρχοντες, και 
eariv αντίστροφος αύτη εν ταΐς όλιγαρχίαις ώσπερ 
η τυραννις iv ταΐς μοναρχίαις καΐ περί ης τελευ- 
ταία? εΐπαμεν δημοκρατίας iv ταΐς δημοκρατίαις , 

ίο και καλοΰσι δη την τοιαντην όλιγαρχίαν δυναστείαν. 

'' 'Ολιγαρχίας μεν ούν εϊδη τοσαΰτα και δημοκρα- 2 

τια?. ου δει δε λανθάνειν δτι πολλαχοΰ συμ- 

βεβηκεν ώστε την μεν πολιτείαν την κατά τους 

νόμους μη δημοτικην ει^αι, δια δε το ήθος και την 

ΐδ άγωγην πολιτεύεσθαι δημοτικώς, ομοίως δε πάλιν 
παρ άλλοις την μεν κατά τους νόμους είναι πολι- 
τείαν δημοτικωτεραν , τη δ' άγωγη και τοις εθεσιν 
ολιγαρχεΐσθαι μάλλον, συμβαίνει δέ τοΰτο μά- 
λιστα μετά τάς μεταβολάς των πολιτειών ου γάρ 
ευθύς μεταβαίνουσιν αλλ aya770>ai τα πρώτα 

20 μικρά πλεονεκτοΰντες παρ αλλήλων, ώσθ' οί μεν 
νόμοι διαμενουσιν οί προϋπάρχοντες κρατοΰσι δ' 
οί μεταβαλόντες 1 την πολιτείαν. 

"Οτι δ' εστί τοσαΰτα είδη δημοκρατίας και 3 
ολιγαρχίας , εξ αυτών τών είρημενων φανερόν εστίν, 
ανάγκη γάρ η πάντα τά είρημενα μέρη του δήμου 

26 κοινωνεΐν της πολιτείας , η τά μεν τά δε μη. όταν 
μεν ουν το γεωργικόν και το κεκτημενον μετρίαν 
ούσίαν κυριον fj της πολιτείας, πολιτεύονται κατά 
νόμους' εχουσι γάρ εργαζόμενοι ζην ου δύνανται 
δε σχολάζειν, ώστε τον νόμον επιστησαντες εκ- 

1 Richards : μεταβάλλοντες. 

° Government controlled by a few powerful families. Cf. 
Thuc. iii. 62. 4, where the Thebans say, ' In those days our 
state was not governed by an oligarchy that granted equal 
justice to all, nor yet by a democracy ; the power was in the 
hands of a small cabal {δυναστεία όλί-γων ανδρών), than which 

306 



POLITICS, IV. v. 1-3 

and also the magistrates govern and not the law. 
This among oligarchies is the form corresponding to 
tyranny among monarchies and to the form of demo- 
cracy about which we spoke last among democracies, 
and indeed oligarchy of this sort has the special name 
of dynasty. 

So many therefore are the kinds of oligarchy and Non- 
of democracy ; but it must not escape notice that in perversion* 
many places it has come about that although the con- due *» cir - 

!•• f iiii • i.• j. cumstances. 

stitution as framed by the laws is not democratic, yet 
owing to custom and the social system it is democrati- 
cally administered, and similarly by a reverse process 
in other states although the legal constitution is more 
democratic, yet by means of the social system and 
customs it is carried on rather as an oligarchy. This 
occurs chiefly after alterations of the constitutions 
have taken place ; for the people do not change over 
to the new system immediately but are content at 
the first stages to gain small advantages from the 
other party, so that the previously existing laws con- 
tinue although power is in the hands of the party 
that changed the constitution. 

And that these various kinds of democracy and Process of 
oligarchy exist is manifest from the actual things mlntai 
that have been said. For necessarily either all the i e / ou ^ 
parts of the population that have been mentioned Democracy, 
must have a share in the government, or some and 
not others. When therefore the farmer class and 
the class possessed of moderate property is sovereign 
over the government, they govern according to laws ; 
for they have a livelihood if they work, but are not 
able to be at leisure, so that they put the law in 

nothing is more opposed to law or to true political order, or 
more nearly resembles a tyranny ' (Jowett). 

307 



ARISTOTLE 

1292 b 

κλησιάζουσι τάς αναγκαίας 1 εκκλησίας' τοις δε 
30 άλλοι? μετεχειν e^eanv όταν κτήσωνται το τίμημα 
το διωρισμενον υπό των νόμων, 2 διό πασι τοις 
κτησαμενοις 3 εζεστι μετεχειν δλως μεν γαρ το 
μεν μη εζεΐναι πάσιν όλιγαρχικόν , το δε δη i^elvai* 
σχολάζειν αδύνατον μη προσόδων ούσών. τοΰτο 
μεν ονν είδος εν δημοκρατίας δια ταύτας τάς 
35 αίτια?, έτερον δε είδος δια την εχομενην διαίρεσιν 5 • 4 
«στι γαρ και ττασιν εξειναι τοις άνυπευθύνοις κατά 
το γένος, μετεχειν μεντοι 6 δυνάμενους σχολάζειν 
διόπερ εν τη τοιαύτη δημοκρατία οι νόμοι άρχουσι, 
δια τό μη είναι ττρόσοδον. τρίτον δ' είδος το ττασιν 
e^eiVai όσοι aV ελεύθεροι ωσι μετεχειν της ττολι- 
40 τείας, μη μεντοι μετεχειν διά την προειρημενην 
αίτίαν, ωστ άναγκαΐον και εν ταύτη άρχειν τον 

1293 a νόμον. τέταρτον δε είδος δημοκρατίας η τελευταία 5 

τοις χρόνοις εν ταΐς ττόλεσι γεγενημενη. διά 
γάρ τό μείζους γεγονεναι πολύ τάς πόλεις των 
εζ ύπαρχής και προσόδων ύπάρχειν εύπορίας, μετ- 
εχουσι μεν πάντες της πολιτείας διά την ύπεροχην 
δ του πλήθους, κοινωνοϋσι δε και πολιτεύονται διά 
το δυ^ασ^αι σχολάζειν και τους απόρους λαμ- 
βάνοντας μισθόν. και μάλιστα δέ σχολάζει τό 
τοιούτον πλήθος• ου γάρ εμποδίζει αυτούς ούθεν 
η των ιδίων επιμέλεια, τους δε πλουσίους εμποδίζει, 

1 άνα-γκαιοτάτας Γ. 2 δω — μ€τέχείν om. ΓΜΡ 1 . 

3 κ(κτημένοι$ ? ed. : κτώμενοι^ Victorius. 

4 [ei-eii>ai\ Thurot. 5 Spengel : α'ίρεσι,ν codd. 

6 μεντοι τού% Richards. 

β i.e. revenues from abroad; the poor can only attend often 
if paid for attendance, and this can only be financed if the 
state has income from tribute or foreign property. 

308 



POLITICS, IV. v. 3-5 

control and hold the minimum of assemblies neces- 
sary ; and the other persons have the right to take 
part when they have acquired the property-assessment 
fixed by the laws, so that to take part in the govern- 
ment is open to all who have got that amount of 
property ; since for it not to be open to everybody 
on any terms at all is a characteristic of oligarchy, 
but then on the other hand it is impossible for it to 
be open to them to have leisure if there are no 
revenues. This then is one kind of democracy for these 

4 reasons. Another kind is due to the distinction that 
comes next : it is possible that all the citizens not 
liable to objection on the score of birth may have 
the right to take part in the assembly, but may 
actually take part only when they are able to be at 
leisure ; hence in a democracy of this nature the 
laws govern because there is no revenue. A third 
kind is when all those who are free men have the 
right to take part in the government yet do not 
do so because of the aforesaid reason, so that it 
follows that in this form of democracy also the law 

6 governs. And a fourth kind of democracy is the one 
that has been the last in point of time to come into 
existence in the states. Because the states have 
become much greater than the original ones and 
possess large supplies of revenue, while all the 
citizens have a share in the government because of 
the superiority b of the multitude, all actually take 
part in it and exercise their citizenship because even 
the poor are enabled to be at leisure by receiving 
pay. Indeed the multitude in this kind of state has 
a very great deal of leisure, for they are not hampered 
at all by the care of their private affairs, but the rich 

» Cf. 1288 a 20 ff. 

309 



ARISTOTLE 

1293 a 

ωστε πολλάκις ού κοινωνούσι της εκκλησίας ούδε 

ίο του δικάζειν. διό yiVerat το των απόρων πλήθος 
κύριον της πολιτείας αλλ' ούχ οι νόμοι. τα. μεν οΰν 
της δημοκρατίας είδη τοσαΰτα και τοιαύτα διά 
ταύτας τάς άνάγκας εστίν τά Be της ολιγαρχίας , Q 
όταν μεν πλείους εχωσιν ούσίαν, ελάττω δε και 
μη πολλην λια^, το της πρώτης ολιγαρχίας εΐδός 

15 εστίν ποιοΰσι γαρ εζονσίαν μετεχειν τω κτωμενω, 
και διά το πλήθος eit'cu των μετεχόντων του 
πολιτεύματος ανάγκη μη τους ανθρώπους άλλα τον 
νόμον eirai κύριον (ρσω γαρ άν πλεΐον άπεχωσι 
της μοναρχίας , και μήτε τοσαύτην εχωσιν ούσίαν 
ώστε σχολάζειν άμελοΰντες 1 μηθ ούτως όλίγην 

20 ώστε τρεφεσθαι άπό της πόλεως, ανάγκη τον 
νόμον άζιοϋν αύτοΐς άρχειν άλλα μη αυτούς) . εάν 7 
δε 8η ελάττους ώσιν οι τάς ουσίας έχοντες η οι το 
πρότερον, πλείω δε, το της δευτέρας ολιγαρχίας 
γίνεται ειδο?• μάλλον γάρ ισχύοντες πλεονεκτεΐν 
άζιοΰσιν, διό αυτοί μεν αιροΰνται εκ των άλλων 

25 του? €ΐ? το πολίτευμα βαδίζοντας, διά δέ το μηπω 
ούτως ισχυροί είναι ώστ άνευ νόμου άρχειν, τον 
νόμον τίθενται τοιούτον, εαν δ επιτείνωσι τω 8 
ελάττονες οντες μείζονας ουσίας εχειν, η τρίτη 
επίδοσις γίνεται της ολιγαρχίας, το δι' αυτών μεν 
τάς αρχάς ^χειν, κατά νόμον δε τον κελεύοντα 

30 τών τελευτώντων διαδεχεσ^αι τους υίεΐς. όταν 

δε ηδη πολύ ύπερτείνωσι ταΐς ούσιαις και ταΐς 

πολυφιλίαις, εγγύς η τοιαύτη δυναστεία μοναρχίας 

εστίν, και κύριοι γίνονται οι άνθρωποι άλλ' ούχ 

1 άμελονντα Spengel : •τα<; codd. 

° i.e. they legalize the recruiting of the ruling class by co- 
optation ; or the words may mean ' they make the law ruler.' 

S10 



POLITICS, IV. v. 5-8 

are, so that often they take no part in the assembly 
nor in judging lawsuits. Owing to this the multitude 
of the poor becomes sovereign over the government, 
instead of the laws. Such in number and in nature 
are the kinds of democracy that these causes neces- 

6 sarily bring into existence. To turn to the varieties and of the 
of oligarchy, when more men possess property, but oligarchy. 
less of it and not a very large amount, this is the first 

form of oligarchy ; for they allow the man that 
acquires property the right to participate, and be- 
cause there is a large number of persons participating 
in the government it necessarily follows that not the 
men but the law is sovereign (for the farther removed 
they are from monarchy, and as they have not so 
much property as to be idle and neglect it, nor yet 
so little as to be kept at the expense of the state, 
they are compelled to call upon the law to rule in- 

7 stead of ruling themselves). But then if the owners 
of the properties are fewer than those who owned 
them previously, and own more, the second form of 
oligarchy comes into being ; for as they become 
stronger they claim to have a larger share, and there- 
fore they themselves select those from among the rest 
of the citizens who go into the government, but as 
they are not yet strong enough to rule without law 

8 they make the law conform with this." And if they 
carry matters further by becoming fewer and holding 
larger properties, there comes about the third advance 
in oligarchy, which consists in their keeping the offices 
in their own hands, but under a law enacting that 
they are to be hereditary. And when finally they 
attain very great pre-eminence by their wealth 
and their multitude of friends, a dynasty of this 
nature is near to monarchy, and men become 

311 



ARISTOTLE 

1293 a 

ο νόμος' και το τέταρτον είδος της ολιγαρχίας 
τοΰτ εστίν, άντίστροφον τω τελευταία» της δημο- 
κρατίας. 

85 "Ετι δ €ΐσί δυο πολιτεΐαι παρά δημοκρατίαν τε 9 
καΐ όλιγαρχίαν, ων την μεν έτέραν λέγουσί τ€ 
πάντες και εΐρηται των τεττάρων πολιτ€ΐών είδος 
εν (λέγουσι δε τέτταρας μοναρχίαν όλιγαρχίαν 
δημοκρατίαν τέταρτον δε την καλουμένην άριστο - 

40 κρατίαν)' πέμπτη δ' εστίν η προσαγορεύεται το 

κοινόν όνομα πασών (πολιτείαν γάρ καλοΰσιν), 

αλλά δια το μη ποσάκις γίνεσθαι λαι^ά^ει τους 

πειρωμένους άριθμεΐν τά των πολιτειών είδη, και 

1293 b χρώνται ταΐς τέτταρσι μόνον (ώσπερ Πλάτων) εν 

ταΐς πολιτείαις. άριστοκρατίαν μεν οΰν καλώς 10 
e^et καλεΐν περί ης διηλθομεν εν τοις πρώτοις 
λόγοις (την γάρ εκ τών αρίστων απλώς κατ 
άρετην πολιτείαν και μη προς ύπόθεσίν τίνα 

5 αγαθών ανδρών μόνην δίκαιον προσαγορευειν άρι- 
στοκρατίαν, εν μόνη γάρ απλώς ο αυτός άνηρ και 
πολίτης αγαθός εστίν, οι δ' εν ταΐς ά'λλαι? aya#ot 
προς την πολιτείαν είσι την αυτών)' ου μην αλλ' 
είσί τίνες αΐ προς τε τάς όλιγαρχουμένας εχουσι 
διαφοράς [/cat καλούνται άριστοκρατιαι] 1 και προς 

ίο την καλουμένην πολιτείαν , όπου γε μη μόνον 
πλουτίνδην αλλά /cat άριστίνδην αιροΰνται τάς 
αρχάς• αΰτη η πολιτεία διαφέρει τε άμφοΐν και 
αριστοκρατική καλείται, και γάρ εν ταΐς μη ι\ 
ποιουμέναις κοινην επιμέλειαν αρετής εισιν όμως 
1 seel. Jackson. 

β We now pass from the varieties of Oligarchy and of 
Democracy to those of the other actually existing constitu- 
tions, Aristocracy so-called and Constitutional Government. 

S12 



POLITICS, IV. v. 8-11 

supreme instead of the law ; and this is the fourth 
kind of oligarchy, the counterpart of the last kind of 
democracy. 
9 Furthermore ° there are two constitutions by the Constato- 
side of democracy and oligarchy, one b of which is Government 
counted by everybody and has been referred to as really a fifth 
one of the four forms of constitution (and the four of constitn- 
meant are monarchy, oligarchy, democracy and fourth ^9^26). 
the form called aristocracy), but there is a fifth, 
entitled by the common name of them all (for it is 
called constitutional government), but as it does not 
often occur it is overlooked by those who try to 
ennumerate the forms of constitution, and they use 
the four names only (as does Plato) in the list of 

10 constitutions. Now the name of aristocracy is secondary 
indeed properly given to the constitution that we ^jjftocracy 
discussed in our first discourses 6 (for it is right to 

apply the name '- aristocracy ' — ' government of the 
best ' — only to the constitution of which the citizens 
are best in virtue absolutely and not merely good 
men in relation to some arbitrary standard, for 
under it alone the same person is a good man and a 
good citizen absolutely, whereas those who are good 
under the other constitutions are good relatively to 
their own form of constitution) ; nevertheless there 
are also some constitutions that have differences 
both in comparison with oligarchically governed 
states and with what is termed constitutional govern- 
ment, inasmuch as in them they elect the officials 

11 not only by wealth but also by goodness ; this form 
of constitution differs from both and is called aristo- 
cratic. For even in the states that do not pav any 
public attention to virtue there are nevertheless 

» i.e. aristocracy. ■ Bk. III. 1279 a 35 ff., 12S6 b 3 ft". 

313 



ARISTOTLE 

1283 b 

τινές οι εύδοκιμούντες και δοκούντες etvai επιεικείς. 

is οπού ουν ή πολιτεία βλέπει εις τε πλοΰτον και 
άρετην και δήμον, οίον εν Καρχηδόνι, αΰτη αρι- 
στοκρατική εστίν και εν αΐς εις τα δύο μόνον, οίον 
η Αακεδαιμονίων , εις τε 1 άρετήν και δήμον, και 
εστί μίξις των δύο τούτων, δημοκρατίας τε καΐ 
αρετής, αριστοκρατίας μεν ουν πάρα την πρωτην 

20 την άρίστην πολιτείαν ταΰτα δύο είδη, και τρίτον 
οσαι της καλούμενης πολιτείας ρεπουσι προς την 
όλιγαρχίαν μάλλον. 

VI. Λοιποί δ' εστίν ημΐν περί τε της όνομα- 1 
ζομενης πολιτείας ειπείν και περί τυραννίδος. 
ετάζαμεν δ' ούτως ουκ οΰσαν ούτε ταύτην παρεκ- 
βασιν ούτε τάς άρτι ρηθείσας αριστοκρατίας, οτι 

25 το μεν αληθές 7τάσαι διημαρτήκασι της ορθότατης 
πολιτείας, έπειτα καταριθμούνται μετά τούτων, 
εισί τ' αυτών αύται παρεκβάσεις, ώσπερ εν τοις 
κατ αρχήν εΐπομεν. τελευταΐον δέ περί τυραννίδος 
εύλογόν εστί ποιησασθαι μνείαν διά το πασών 

so ηκιστα ταύτην eivai πολιτείαν, ημΐν δέ την μεθοδον 
είναι περί πολιτείας. 

Δι' ην μεν οΰν αίτίαν τετακται τον τρόπον τού- 
τον, εΐρηται• νυν δέ δεικτεον ημΐν περί πολιτείας, 
φανερωτερα γαρ ό δύναμις αυτής διωρισμενων τών 2 
περί ολιγαρχίας και δημοκρατίας• εστί γάρ η 
πολιτεία ως απλώς ειπείν μίξις ολιγαρχίας και 

85 δημοκρατίας, ειώ^ασι δέ καλεΐν τάς μέν άπο- 
1 re post άρετψ codd. cet. (sed cf. 1. 14 et 1296 b 17). 

a See 1279 b 4 ff . Actual aristocracies are a falling-off 
from the Aristocracy and Polity is a decline from Monarchy 
and Aristocracy; but they are not deviations in the technical 
sense. 
314 



POLITICS, IV. v. 11— νι. 2 

some men that are held in high esteem and are 
thought worthy of respect. Where then the con- 
stitution takes in view wealth and virtue as well as 
the common people, as for instance at Carthage, this 
is of the nature of an aristocracy ; and so also are 
the states, in which the constitution, like that of 
Sparta, takes in view two of these things only, virtue 
and the common people, and there is a mingling of 
these two factors, democracy and virtue. These 
then are two kinds of aristocracy beside the first, 
which is the best constitution, and a third kind is 
those instances of what is called constitutional 
government that incline more in the direction of 
oligarchy. 

1 VI. It remains for us to speak about what is termed 
constitutional government and also about tyranny. 
Though neither the former nor the aristocracies 
spoken of just now are really deviations, we have 
classed them thus because in actual truth they have 
all fallen away from the most correct constitution, 
and consequently are counted with the deviation- 
forms, and those are deviations from them, as we 
said in our remarks at the beginning." Tyranny is 
reasonably mentioned last because it is the least 
constitutional of all governments, whereas our investi- 
gation is about constitutional government. 

Having then stated the reason for this mode of Constitu 
classification, we have now to set forth our view Government 

2 about constitutional government. For its meaning a blend of 
is clearer now that the characteristics of oligarchy and*™ y 
and democracy have been defined ; since constitu- Democrac y, 
tional government is, to put it simply, a mixture of 
oligarchy and democracy. But people customarily 

315 



ARISTOTLE 

1298 b . , f 

κλινουσας ως προς την δημοκρατίαν πολιτείας , τάς 

δε προς την ολιγαρχίαν μάλλον αριστοκρατίας, διά 
το μάλλον άκολουθεΐν παιοείαν και εύγενειαν τοις 
εύπορωτεροις, ετι δε δοκοΰσιν εχειν οι εύποροι 
ών ένεκεν οι άδικοΰντες άοικοΰσιν όθεν και καλούς 

40 κάγαθούς και γνωρίμους τούτους προσαγορεύουσιν. 
επει οΰν η αριστοκρατία βούλεται την ύπεροχην 3 
άπονεμειν τοις άρίστοις των πολιτών 1 και τάς 
ολιγαρχίας είναι φασιν εκ των καλών κάγαθών 
1294» μάλλον. δοκεΐ ο* είναι των αδυνάτων το εύ- 
νομβΐσθαι την μη 1 άριστοκρατουμενην πόλιν άλλα 
πονηροκρατουμενην , ομοίως δε καϊ άριστοκρατεΐ- 
σ^αι την μη εύνομουμενην. ουκ εστί δε ευνομία 
το ευ Κ€ΐσθαι τους νόμους μη πείθεσθαι δε. διό 

6 μίαν μεν εύνομίαν ύποληπτεον είναι το πείθεσθαι 
τοις κειμενοις νόμοις, ετεραν δε το καλώς κεΐσθαι 
τους νόμους οΐς εμμενουσιν (εστί γαρ πείθεσθαι 
και κακώς κειμενοις). τοΰτο δ' ενδέχεται διχώς' 
η γαρ τοις άρίστοις τών ενδεχομένων αύτοΐς η τοις 
απλώς άρίστοις. δοκεΐ δέ αριστοκρατία μεν είναι 4 

ίο μάλιστα το τάς τιμάς νενεμησθαι κατ* άρετήν 
αριστοκρατίας μεν γάρ ορός άρετη, ολιγαρχίας δε 
πλούτος, δήμου δ' ελευθερία (το δ' ο τι αν δόζη 
τοις πλείοσιν εν πάσαις υπάρχει, και γάρ εν ολιγ- 
αρχία και εν αριστοκρατία και εν δημοις ο τι αν 
δόζη τω πλείονι μέρει τών μετεχόντων της πολι- 

15 τεια? τοΰτ' εστί κύριον) . εν μεν ουν ταις πλείσταις 
1 μη hie Thurot : post τό codd. 
S16 



POLITICS, IV. vi. 2-4 

give the name of constitutional government only to 
those among such mixed constitutions that incline 
towards democracy, and entitle those that incline 
more towards oligarchy aristocracies, because educa- 
tion and good birth go more with the wealthier 
classes, and also the wealthy are thought to have 
already the things to get which wrongdoers commit 
wrong ; owing to which people apply the terms 
' gentry ' and ' notabilities ' to the rich. Since and akin to 
therefore aristocracy means the assignment of the 1S ocr * cy • 
highest place to the best of the citizens, oligarchies 
also are said to be drawn rather from the gentry. 
And it seems an impossibility for a city governed 
not by the aristocracy but by the base to have well- 
ordered government, and similarly also for a city that 
has not a well-ordered government to be governed 
aristocratically. But to have good laws enacted but 
not obey them does not constitute well-ordered 
government. Hence one form of good government 
must be understood to consist in the laws enacted 
being obeyed, and another form in the laws which 
the citizens keep being well enacted (for it is possible 
to obey badly enacted laws). And for laws to be 
well enacted is possible in two ways : they must 
either be the best laws possible for the given people 
or the best absolutely. But aristocracy in the fullest 
sense seems to consist in the distribution of the honours 
according to virtue ; for virtue is the denning factor 
of aristocracy, as wealth is of oligarchy, and freedom 
of democracy (while the principle that a decision of 
the majority is supreme is found in them all : for 
in both oligarchy and aristocracy and democracies 
whatever the larger part of those who have a share 
in the government decides is supreme). In most 

317 



ARISTOTLE 

1294 a 

πόλεσι τοΰτο 1 της πολιτεία? είδος καλείται, μόνον γαρ 
η μιζις στοχάζεται των ευπόρων και των απόρων, 
πλούτου και ελευθερίας (σχεδόν γαρ 2 παρά τοις 
πλείστοις οι εύποροι των 3 καλών κάγαθών δοκοΰσι 
κατεχειν χώραν) • επει δε τρία εστί τα άμφισ- 5 

20 βητοΰντα της ίσότητος της πολιτείας, ελευθερία 
πλούτος αρετή (το γαρ τέταρτον, ο καλοΰσιν 
ευγενειαν , ακολουθεί τοις δυσίν, η γαρ ευγένεια 
εστίν αρχαίος πλούτος και αρετή), φανερόν δτι την 
μεν τοΐν δυοΐν μίζιν, των ευπόρων και των απόρων, 
πολιτείαν λεκτεον, την δε των τριών άριστοκρατίαν 

25 μάλιστα τών άλλων παρά την άληθινην και πρώτην. 
"Οτι μεν οΰν εστί και έτερα πολιτείας είδη παρά 
μοναρχίαν τε και δημοκρατίαν και όλιγαρχίαν, 
εϊρηται, και ποια ταΰτα, και τί διαφερουσιν 
αλλήλων αϊ τ' άριστοκρατίαι και αϊ πολιτεΐαι [της 
αριστοκρατίας]*' και δτι ου πόρρω αύται αλλήλων, 
φανερόν. 

30 VII. TiVa δε τρόπον γίνεται παρά δημοκρατίαν 1 
και ολιγαρχιαν ή καλούμενη πολιτεία, και πώς 
αύτην δει καθιστάναι, λεγωμεν εφεξής τοις είρη- 
μενοις. άμα δε δήλον εσται και οΐς ορίζονται την 
δημοκρατίαν και την όλιγαρχίαν ληπτεον γάρ 
την τούτων διαίρεσιν, είτα εκ τούτων αφ' εκατερας 

35 ωσπερ σύμβολον λαμβάνοντας συνθετεον. είσι δε 2 
όροι τρεις της συνθέσεως και μίζεως. ή γάρ 
αμφότερα ληπτεον ων εκάτεραι νομοθετοΰσιν, οίον 

1 τοΰτο ed. (cf. 1292 a 33): το codd. 2 yap: δί Immisch. 
* ζτην> των Coraes. 4 [τής αριστοκρατία^] ed. 

" i.e. in most states that are considered aristocracies. 
* i.e. the more oligarchical form, 1293 b 36. 

318 



POLITICS, IV. νι. 4— νπ. 2 

states a then the name of aristocracy is given to that 
form of constitutional government, 6 for the com- 
bination aims only at the well-off and the poor, 
wealth and freedom (since in almost the largest 
number of states the rich seem to occupy the place 
5 of the gentry) ; but as there are three things that 
claim equal participation in the constitution, freedom, 
wealth and virtue (for the fourth, what is called 
nobility, accompanies the two latter — nobility means 
ancient wealth and virtue), it is manifest that the 
mixture of the two factors, the rich and the poor, c 
ought to be termed constitutional government, while 
the mixture of the three factors deserves the name 
of aristocracy most of all the various forms of aristo- 
cracy beside the true and best form. 

It has then been stated that other forms of con- 
stitution also exist besides monarchy, democracy and 
oligarchy, and what their characteristics are, and how 
the various sorts of aristocracy and of constitutional 
government differ from one another ; and it is manifest 
that aristocracy and constitutional government are 
not widely apart from one another. 

1 VII. Next to what has been said let us state the 
way in which what is called constitutional government 
comes into existence by the side of democracy and 
oligarchy, and how it is proper to establish it. At 
the same time the defining characteristics of demo- 
cracy and oligarchy will also be clear ; for we must 
grasp the distinction between these and then make 
a combination out of them, taking, so to say, a contri- 
bution from each. And there are three principles 

2 determining this combination or mixture. Under Three 
one plan we must adopt both features from the legis- tws^iend. 

* Loosely put for ' wealth and free birth.' 

319 



ARISTOTLE 

1294 a χ t 

περί τοΰ δικάζειν — εν μεν γαρ ταΐς όλιγαρχιαις τοις 
εύπόροις ζημίαν τάττουσιν αν μη δικάζωσι τοις 

40 δ άπόροίς ούδενα μισθόν, εν δε ταΐς δημοκρατίαις 
τοις μεν άπόροις μισθόν τοις δ' εύπόροις ούδεμίαν 
ζημίαν, κοινον δε και μέσον τούτων αμφότερα 
1294 b ταύτα, διό και πολιτικόν, μεμικται γαρ εζ άμφοΐν. 
εις μεν ονν οΰτος του συνδυασμού τροττος• έτερος 3 
δε το μέσον λαμβάνειν ων εκάτεροι τάττουσιν , οίον 
εκκλησιάζειν οι μεν άπό τιμήματος ούθενός η 
μικρού πάμπαν, οι δ' από μακρού τιμήματος, 
5 κοινον δε γε ούδετερον άλλα το μέσον εκατερου 
τιμήματος τούτων, τρίτον δ' εκ δυοΐν ταγμάτοιν, 
τα μεν εκ τοΰ ολιγαρχικού νόμου τα δ εκ τοΰ 
δημοκρατικού- λέγω δ' οίον δοκεΐ δημοκρατικόν 
μεν είναι το κληρωτός είναι τάς άρχας το δ' 
αιρετός όλιγαρχικόν , και δημοκρατικόν μεν το μη 

ίο από τιμήματος όλιγαρχικόν δε το από τιμήματος• 
άριστοκρατικόν τοίνυν και πολιτικόν τό εξ εκα- 
τερας εκάτερον λαβείν, εκ μεν της ολιγαρχίας τό 
αιρετός ποιεΐν τας άρχας εκ δε της δημοκρατίας 
τό μη άπό τιμήματος. 6 μεν ούν τρόπος της 
μίξεως οΰτος• τοΰ δ' ευ /Αε^ιιχ^αι δημοκρατίαν και 4 

15 όλιγαρχίαν ορός όταν ενδέχηται λέγειν την αύτην 
πολιτείαν δημοκρατίαν και όλιγαρχίαν δηλον γαρ 
Οτι τούτο πάσχουσιν οι λέγοντες 1 δια τό μεμΐχθαι 

1 [οι \4yovres] ? ed. 

β Perhaps ' the speakers feel ' should be excised. 
320 



POLITICS, IV. νιι. 2-4 

lative schemes of the two different constitutions : 
for example, in regard to the administration of justice, 
in oligarchies thev institute a fine for the rich if 
they do not serve on juries but no pay for the poor 
for serving, while in democracies they assign pay for 
the poor but no fine for the rich, but a common and 
intermediate principle is to have both payment and 
fine, and therefore this is a mark of a constitutional 
government, since it is a mixture of elements from 

3 both oligarchy and democracy. This then is one mode 
of combining the two. Another is to take the middle 
course between the regulations of each : for example, 
democracies permit membership of the assemblv on 
no property-qualification at all or a quite small one, 
oligarchies on a large property-qualification, but the 
combination clearly is to have neither principle, but 
one which lies in the middle between either of these 
two qualifications. In the third place is a combination 
of the two systems, taking some features from the 
oligarchical law and some from the democratic ; I 
mean, for example, that it is thought to be democratic 
for the offices to be assigned by lot, for them to be 
elected oligarchic, and democratic for them not to 
have a property-qualification, oligarchic to have one ; 
therefore it is aristocratic and constitutional to take 
one feature from one form and the other from the 
other, from oligarchy that offices are to be elected, 
and from democracy that this is not to be on a 
property-qualification. This then is the mode of 

4 the mixture ; and the mark of a good mixture of Test of 
democracy and oligarchy is when it is possible to lts ment 
speak of the same constitution as a democracy and 

as an oligarchy ; for manifestly the speakers feel α 
this is so because the mixture is complete, and this is 

321 



ARISTOTLE 

καλώς, πεπονθε δε τοΰτο και το μέσον, εμφαίνεται 
γαρ εκατερον εν αύτώ των άκρων, όπερ σνμ- 5 
βαίνει περί την Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείαν. πολλοί 

20 γαρ εγχειροΰσι λέγειν ώς δημοκρατίας ούσης διά 
το δημοκρατικά πολλά την τάξιν εχειν, οίον πρώ- 
τον το περί την τροφην τών παίδων, ομοίως γάρ 
οι τών πλουσίων τρέφονται τοις τών πενήτων, και 
παιδεύονται τον τρόπον τούτον ον αν δύναιντο και 
τών πενήτων οι παίδες, ομοίως δε και επι της 

25 εχομενης ηλικίας, και όταν άνδρες γένωνται, τον 
αυτόν τρόπον, ούθέν γάρ διάδηλος 6 πλούσιος και 
ο πένης — ούτω τά περί την τροφην ταύτα πάσιν εν 
τοις συσσιτιοις, και την εσθητα οι πλούσιοι 
τοιαυτην οιαν αν τις παρασκευάσαι δύναιτο και 
τών πενήτων όστισοΰν, ετι τω δύο τάς /LteytWa? 

30 αρχάς την μεν αίρεΐσθαι τον δημον, της δε μετ- 
εχειν (τους μεν γάρ γέροντας αίροΰνται, της δ' 
εφορείας μετεχουσιν)• οι δ' όλιγαρχίαν, διά το 
πολλά εχειν ολιγαρχικά, οίον το πάσας αίρετάς 
είναι και μηδεμίαν κληρωτην, και ολίγους eivat 
κυρίους θανάτου και φυγής, και άλλα τοιαύτα 

86 πολλά, δει δ' εν τη πολιτεία, τη μεμιγμενη καλώς 6 
αμφότερα δοκεΐν etrai και μηδετερον, 1 και σφ- 
ζεσίλχι δι' αύτης και μη έξωθεν, και δι αύτης μη 
τω πλείους έξωθεν 2 είναι τους βουλομενους (εϊη 
γάρ αν και πονηρά πολιτεία τοΰθ' υπάρχον) αλλά 
τω μηδ άν βούλεσθαι πολιτείαν ετεραν μηθεν τών 

40 της πόλεως μορίων δλως. 

1 μηδέτΐρον : μη θάτερον Boltenstern. * [ίξωθεν] Thurot. 

° A conjectural emendation removes this mysterious epi- 
gram, giving ' and not one of the two (only).' 

b Or, if ΐζωθεν is an interpolation, ' not merely because 

322 



POLITICS, IV. νπ. 4-6 

the case with the form that lies in the middle, for 
each of the two extreme forms can be seen in it. 

5 This is the case with the constitution of Sparta. 
For many people endeavour to describe it as being a 
democracy, because its system has many democratic 
features, for instance first of all its regulation for the 
rearing of boys, since the sons of the rich are brought 
up in the same way as those of the poor, and are 
educated in a manner in which the sons of the poor also 
could be educated, and they are also treated similarly 
at the next age, and in the same manner when they are 
grown up, for there is nothing that distinguishes the 
rich man from the poor man — thus the arrangements 
for food are the same for all at the common messes, 
and the rich wear clothes such as even any poor man 
could procure, and also because of the two greatest 
offices the common people elect to one and share in 
the other (they elect the Elders and share in the 
Ephorate) ; but others call it an oligarchy, because 
it has many oligarchical features, for instance that all 
the offices are elective and none appointed by lot 
and few persons have the power to sentence to death 

6 and exile, and a number of other such matters. But 
in a well-constructed mixed constitution both of the 
two factors, and neither of them, should seem to be 
present, and it should be kept safe by its own means 
and not by outside aid, and by its own means not 
because those who desire its security are more 
numerous outside it b (for even a bad constitution 
might possess this quality), but because no section 
of the state whatever would even wish for another 
constitution. 

those (citizens) who wish it to survive are more numerous 
(than those who do not).' 

323 



ARISTOTLE 

1294 b v , / 

Tira μεν ούν τρόπον δει καθισταναι πολιτείαν, 

ομοίως δε και τάς όνομαζομενας αριστοκρατίας , 

νυν εΐρηται. 

1295a VIII. ΥΙερι δε τυραννίδος ην ήμΐν λοιπόν ειπείν, 1 

ούχ ώς ενούσης πολυλογίας περί αυτήν, αλλ' όπως 

λάβη της μεθόδου το μέρος, επειδή και ταύτην 

τίθεμεν των πολιτειών τι μέρος, περί μεν οΰν 

δ βασιλείας οιωρίσαμεν εν τοις πρώτοις λόγοις, εν 

οΐς περί της μάλιστα λεγομένης βασιλείας εποιού- 

μεθα την σκεφιν, πότερον άσύμφορον ή συμφέρει 

ταί? πόλεσιν, και τίνα και πόθεν δει καθισταναι' 2 

και πώς τυραννίδος 8' €1817 δύο μεν διείλομεν εν 

οΐς περί βασιλείας επεσκοποΰμεν, διά το την 

10 δυμαμ,α> επαλλάττειν πως αυτών και προς την 
^ασιλβιαν', δια το κατά νόμον tirai άμφοτερας ταύτας 
τάς αρχάς (εν τε γαρ τών βαρβάρων τισίν αίροΰιται 
αυτοκράτορας μονάρχους, και το παλαιον εν τοις 
άρχαίοις "Έιλλησιν εγίγνοντό τίνες μόναρχοι τον 
τρόπον τούτον, ους εκάλουν αίσυμνήτας), εχουσι δε 

15 τινας προς άλληλα? αύται διαφοράς, ήσαν δε δια 
μεν το κατά νόμον βασιλικοί και διά το μοναρχεΐν 
εκόντων, τυραννικά! δε διά το δεσποτικώς άρχειν 
και κατά 1 την αυτών γνώμην. τρίτον δέ είδος 3 
τυραννίδος ήπερ μάλιστ* είναι δοκεΐ τνραννίς, 
αντίστροφος οΰσα τη παμβασιλεία.' τοιαύτην δ' 
άναγκαΐον etrat τυραννίδα την μοναρχίαν ήτις 
άνυπεύθυνος άρχει τών όμοιων και βελτιόνων 

1 και κατά. Susemihl (et secundum suam Guil.) : κατά codd. 



• Bk. III. cc. ix.-xii. 

324 



POLITICS, IV. νιι. 6— νιπ. 3 

The proper way therefore to establish a constitu- 
tional government, and similarly also the governments 
named aristocracies, has now been stated. 

1 VIII. It remained for us to speak of tyranny, not Tyranny, 
because there is much that can be said about it, but 

in order that it may receive its part in our inquiry, 
since we rank this also as one among the kinds 
of constitution. The nature of kingship wp have 
de fined in our first discourses, in which we exa mined 
the^j^ uestion in relation to the constitution most 
commo nly denoted by the term ' kingship,' whether 
ft is disadvantageous or an advantage to states, and. 

2 y vhat person ought to be set up as king, and from, 
what source, and by what procedure ; and in the Heroic 

i.i ■*■ i i ι !■ I I Monaichs 

passage in which we were considering kingship we and Aesyn 
distinguished two kinds of tyranny, because thei r netae. 
power in η rpanner^ porrie.rs upon royalty, because 
both_t hese forms of rule are in accordance with law 
(for among some of the barbarians they elect mon- 
archic rulers with autocratic powers, and also in old 
times among the ancient Greeks some men used ^ 

to become monarchs of this sort, the rulers called 
aesymnetae), but these two forms of tyranny have 
certain differences from one another, although they 
were on the one hand of the nature of royalty be- 
cause they were in accordance with law and because 
they exercised monarchic rule o ver willing subjects, 
anH on the ot her hand ot' the nature ot a tyranny 
h^aiic/:. they rnleH d espotically and~according to 

3 their own judgement, But there is a third kind of Tyranny 
tyranny which is thought to be tyranny in the fullest P r °P er - 
degree, being the counterpart of universal kingship ; 

to this sort of tyranny must necessaril y belong 
a monarchy that exercises irresponsible ru le_over 

325 



ARISTOTLE 

12953 I I JL' Uj ι, >u. 

πάντων προ? το σφετερον αυτής συμφέρον αΛΛα 

μ,ή ποό? το των αρχομένων. διόπερ ακούσιος' 

ούθεις γαρ εκών υπομένει των ελευθέρων την 

τοιαΰτην αρχήν. 

Ύυραννίδος μεν οΰν είδη ταύτα κα\ τοσαϋτα δια 

τας είρημένας αίτιας. 

25 IX. Ύίς δ' αρίστη πολιτεία καΐ τις άριστος βίος 1 
ταΐς πλείσταις πόλεσι και τοις πλείστοις των 
ανθρώπων, μήτε προς άρετην συγκρίνουσι 1 την υπέρ 
τους ίδιώτας μήτε προς παιδειαν ή φύσεως δεΐται 
και χορηγίας τυχηράς μήτε προς πολιτείαν την κατ* 

so εύχήν γινομένην, άλλα βίον τε τον τοις πλείστοις 
κοινωνήσαι δυνατόν και πολιτείαν ής τάς πλείστας 
πόλεις ενδέχεται μετασχεΐν ; και γαρ ας καλοϋσιν 2 
αριστοκρατίας, περί ων νυν ε'ίπομεν, τα μεν έζωτέρω 
πίπτουσι ταί? πλείσταις των πόλεων, τα δε γειτνιώσι 
τη καλούμενη πολιτεία., διό περί άμφοΐν ως μιας 

S6 λεκτέον. ή δε δη κρίσις περί απάντων τούτων εκ 
των αυτών στοιχείων εστίν, ει γαρ καλώς εν τοις 
ήθικοΐς εϊρηται το τον εύδαίμονα βίον etvcu τον κατ* 
άρετην άνεμπόδιστον , μεσότητα δε την άρετήν, τον 
μέσον άναγκαιον βίον eivai βέλτιστον, της εκάστοις 
ενδεχομένης τυχεΐν μεσότητος . τους δε αυτούς 3 

40 τούτου? ορούς άναγκαιον etvai και πόλεως αρετής 

1295 b και κακίας και πολιτείας , ή γαρ πολιτεία βίος τις 

έστι πόλεως. εν άπάσαι? δη ταί? πόλεσίν εστί 

τρία μέρη της πόλεως, οι μεν εύποροι σφόδρα, οι 

1 σνντύνονσί Richards. 



α Or ' if we do not aim at.' 

b See 1293 b 7-21, cf. ib. 36—1294 a 25. 

c N.E. 1101 a 14. 

326 



POLITICS, IV. νπι. 3— ιχ. 3 



subjects all of the sam p or of a higher class with a 
view to its own private interest and not in the interest 
of the persons ruled . Hence it is held against the 
will of the subjects, since ruj^f£ee__man willingly 
endur es such rul e. 

^These then are the kinds of tyranny and such is 
their number, for the reasons stated. 

1 IX. But what is the best constitution and what Middie-cias» 
is the best mode of life for most cities and most of fhe best" en 
mankind, if we do not judge by the standard of α a practicable, 
virtue that is above the level of private citizens or 

of an education that needs natural gifts and means 
supplied by fortune, nor by the standard of the ideal 
constitution, but of a mode of life able to be shared 
by most men and a constitution possible for most 

2 states to attain ? For the constitutions called 
aristocracies, of which we spoke just now, 6 in some 
cases fall somewhat out of the scope of most states, 
and in others approximate to what is called constitu- 
tional government, so that it is proper to speak of 
these two forms as if they were one. And indeed 
the decision in regard to all these questions is based 
on the same elementary principles. For if it has 
been rightly said in Ethics c that the happy life 
is the life tha tjs lived without. impedirnenj-jTyarrord- 
ance with virtue, and that virtue is a m iddl** pn " TSp 1 
it necessarily follows that the, middle course o f life 
is the besi =such] a middle course as it is possible 

3-flor -each class of men to attain. And these same 
criteria must also necessarily apply to the goodness 
and badness of a state, and of a constitution — for a 
constitution is a certain mode of life of a state. In 
all states therefore theje exisj^hre^jliyjgjf^s^of^ri^ 
s^tate^theyery rich, theverv joor^ an d thirdly th^f 



ARISTOTLE 

1295 b ~ λν , ,~ t ς.\ , t / / 

oe άποροι σφοορα, ol οε τρίτοι οι μέσοι τούτων, 
επει τοινυν ομολογείται το μετριον άριστον και το 
6 μέσον, φανερόν δτι και των ευτυχημάτων ή κτήσις - 
η μέση βέλτιστη πάντων, ράστη γαρ τω λόγω 4 
πειθαρχεΐν, ύπερκαλον δε η ύπερίσχυρον η ύπερ- 
ευγενή η ύπερπλούσιον, η τάναντ'ια τούτοις, ύπερ- 
πτωχον η ύπερασθενή και σφόδρα άτιμον, χαλεπόν 
τω λόγω άκολουθεΐν γ'ιγνονται γαρ οι μεν ύβρισται 

ίο και μεγαλοπόνηροι μάλλον οι δε κακούργοι και 
μικροπόνηροι λίαν, των δ' αδικημάτων τα μεν 
γίγνεται δι' ϋβριν τα δε διά κάκου ργ'ιαν. ετι δ' 
ηκισθ ούτοι φυγαρχοΰσι 1 και σπουδαρχοΰσιν, 2 ταύτα 
δ αμφότερα βλαβερά ταΐς πόλεσιν. προς δε τούτοις 5 
οι μεν εν ύπεροχαΐς ευτυχημάτων οντες, ισχύος και 

15 πλούτου και φίλων και των άλλων των τοιούτων, 
άρχεσθαι ούτε βούλονται ούτε επίστανται (και τούτ 
ευθύς οίκοθεν υπάρχει τταισιν ουσιι^, διά γαρ την 
τρυφην ουδ' εν τοις διδασκαλείοις άρχεσθαι σύν- 
ηθες αύτοΐς), οι δε καθ* ύπερβολην εν ενδεία 
τούτων ταπεινοί λίαν • ώσθ* οι μεν άρχειν ούκ 

20 επίστανται αλλ' άρχεσθαι δουλικήν αρχήν, οί δ' 
άρχεσθαι μεν ουδεμία αρχή, άρχειν δε δεσποτικην 
αρχήν, γίνεται ούν και δούλων και δεσποτών 6 
πόλις, αλλ' ούκ ελευθέρων, και των μεν φθονούντων 
των δέ καταφρονούντων . α. πλείστον απέχει φίλιας, 
και κοινωνίας πολιτικής, ή γαρ κοινωνία φιλικόν, 

1 Bernays : φιλαρχονσι, φυλαρχοΰσι codd. 
2 Coraes : βουλαρχονσι codd. 

° The text is an emendation ; some mss. give ' to rule the 
tribe and to rule the council,' but most have ' to love office 
and rule the council,' apparently thinking that the verb 
translated ' rule the council ' meant ' wish office.' 

328 



POLITICS, IV. ιχ. 3-6 

who are b etween the two. Since then it is admitted 
that what is moderate or in the middle is best, it is 
manifest that the middle amount of all of the good 

4 things of fortune is the best amount to possess. For 
this degree of wealth is the readiest to obey reason, 
whereas for a person who is exceedingly beautiful 
or strong or nobly born or rich, or the opposite — 
exceedingly poor or weak or of very mean station, it 
is difficult to follow the bidding of reason ; for the 
former turn more to insolence and grand wickedness, 
and the latter overmuch to malice and petty wicked- 
ness, and the motive of all wrongdoing is either 
insolence or malice. And moreover the middle class 
are the least inclined to shun office and to covet 
office," and both these tendencies are injurious to 

5 states. And in addition to these points, those who! 
have an excess of fortune's goods, strength, wealth,! 
friends and the like, are not willing to be governed 
and do not know how to be (and they have acquired 
this quality even in their boyhood from their home- 
life, which was so luxurious that they have not got 
used to submitting to authority even in school), 
while those who are excessively in need of these 
things are too humble. Hence the latter class doj 
not know how to govern but know how to submit to 
government of a servile kind, while the former class 
do not know how to submit to any government, and 
only know how to govern in the manner of a master. 

6 The result is a state consisting of slaves anrl masters, 
not, of free, m en, and of one class envious and ano thex. 
contemptuous of their fellows. This condition of 
affairs is very far removed from friendliness, and from 
political partnership — for friendliness is an element 



329 



ARISTOTLE 

25 ούδε γαρ όδοΰ βούλονται κοινωνεΐν τοις εχθροΐς. 
βούλεται δε γε η πόλις εξ ΐσων είναι και ομοίων 
οτι μάλιστα, τοϋτο δ υπάρχει μάλιστα τοις μεσοις' 
ώστ άναγκαΐον άριστα πολιτεύεσθαι ταύτην την 
πόλιν εστί!^ 1 εζ ών φαμεν φύσει την σύστασιν είναι 
της πόλεως, και σώζονται δ' εν ταΐς πόλεσιν ούτοι 7 

so μάλιστα των πολιτών ούτε γαρ αυτοί τών αλλότριων 
ωσπερ οι πένητες επιθυμοϋσιν, ούτε της τούτων 
έτεροι καθάπερ της τών πλουσίων οι πένητες επι- 
θυμονσιν καΐ διά το μητ επιβουλεύεσθαι μητ 
επιβουλεύειν ακινδύνως διάγουσιν. διά τοϋτο καλώς 
ηύζατο Φωκυλίδης — 

πολλά μεσοισιν άριστα' μέσος θέλω εν πόλει 
εΐναι. 

85 δήλον άρα οτι και η κοινωνία η πολιτική αρίστη η 8 

διά τών μέσων, και τάς τοιαύτας ενδέχεται ευ 

πολιτεύεσθαι πόλεις εν αΐς δη πολύ το μέσον και 

κρεΐττον μάλιστα μεν άμφοΐν, ει δέ μη, θατερου 

μέρους, προστιθεμενον γαρ ποιεί ροπην και κωλύει 

yiWo -^αι τάς εναντίας ύπερβολάς. διόπερ ευτυχία 

40 μεγίστη τους πολιτευόμενους ούσίαν εχειν μεσην 

1296 a κα [ Ικανην, ως οπού οι μεν πολλά σφόδρα κεκτηνται 

οι δε μηθεν, η δήμος έσχατος γίγνεται ή ολιγαρχία 

άκρατος ή τυραννις δι' άμφοτερας τάς ύπερβολάς• 

και γάρ εκ δημοκρατίας της νεανικωτάτης και εζ 

6 ολιγαρχίας γίνεται τυραννίς, εκ δε τών μέσων και 

1 εστίν om. ΓΜ 8 : ή συνέστ-η Lambinus. 

° Probably Lambinus's alteration of the Greek should be 
accepted, giving ' hence that state will necessarily be best 
governed which consists of those elements — .' 

* A gnomic poet of Miletus, born 560 b.c 

* i.e. extreme democracy and very limited oligarchy. 

330 



POLITICS, IV. ιχ. 6-8 

of partnership, since men are not willing to be 
partners with their enemies even on a journey. But 
surely the ideal of the state is to consist as much 
as possible of persons that are equal and alike, and 
this similarity is most found in the middle classes ; 
therefore the middle-class state will necessarily be 
best constituted in respect of those elements of 
which we say that the state is by nature composed. 

7 And also this class of citizens have the greatest 
security in the states ; for they do not themselves 
covet other men's goods as do the poor, nor do the 
other classes covet their substance as the poor covet 
that of the rich ; and because they are neither plotted 
against nor plotting they live free from danger. Be- 
cause of this it was a good prayer of Phocylides 6 — 

In many things the middle have the best ; 
Be mine a middle station. 

8 It is clear therefore also that the political community \j ff^^j^ 
administered by the middle class is the best, and that cX 

it is possible for those states to be well governed that 
are of the kind in which the middle class is numerous, 
and preferably stronger than both the other two 
classes, or at all events than one of them, for by 
throwing in its weight it sways the balance and 
prevents the opposite extremes c from coming into 
existence. Hence it is the greatest ^ ood fortune if* 
the men that have political power possess a moderate 
arid sufficienLsubstance. since where some own a very 
grea t deal of pr operty and others none there comes 
about cither an extreme democracy or an unmixed 
oligarchy, or a tvranny may result from both of the 
two extreme?, for tyranny springs from both demo- 
cracy and oligarchy of -the most unbridled kind, but 
much less often from the middle forms of constitu- 

331 



ARISTOTLE 

1296 a 

τών σύνεγγυς πολύ ήττον, την δ' αιτίαν ύστερον 
εν τοις περί τάς μεταβολάς των πολιτειών έροΰμεν. 
οτι δ η μέση βέλτιστη, φανερόν μόνη γαρ άστα- 9 
σιαστος, οπού γαρ πολύ το δια μέσου, ηκιστα 
στάσεις και διαστάσεις γ'ιγνονται των πολιτειών. 

ίο και αι /ieyaAcu πόλεις άστασιαστότβραι δια την 
αύτην αιτίαν, οτι πολύ το μέσον εν δε ταΐς μικραΐς 
ραδιόν τε διαλαβεΐν εις δύο πάντας ώστε μηθέν 
καταλιπεΐν μέσον, και πάντες σχεδόν άποροι η 
εύποροι είσιν. και αϊ δημοκρατίαι δε άσφαλεστεραι 
τών ολιγαρχιών είσι και πολυχρονιώτεραι διά τους 

15 μέσους (πλείους τε γάρ είσι και μάλλον μετεχουσι 
τών τιμών εν ταΐς δημοκρατίαις η ταΓ? όλιγαρχίαις) , 
επει όταν άνευ τούτων τω πληθει ύπερτείνωσιν οι 
άποροι, κακοπραγία γίνεται και άπόλλυνται ταχέως, 
σημεΐον δέ δει νομίζειν και το τους βέλτιστους 10 
νομοθέτας etrai τών μέσων πολιτών Σόλων τε γάρ 

20 ην τούτων (δηλοΐ δ' εκ της ποιησεως) και Αυκοΰργος 
(ού γάρ ην βασιλεύς) και Χαρώνδας και σχεδόν οι 
πλείστοι τών άλλων. 

Φανερόν δ' εκ τούτων και διότι αϊ πλεΐσται 
πολιτεΐαι αί μεν δημοκρατικαί είσιν αϊ δ' όλιγ- 
αρχικαί' διά γάρ το εν ταύταις πολλάκις ολίγον 

25 efrai το μέσον, atet όπότεροι αν ύπερέχωσιν, εϊθ' 
οι τάς ουσίας έχοντες εϊθ* ο δήμος, οι το μέσον έκ- 
βαίνοντες καθ' αυτούς άγουσι την πολιτειαν, ώστε 
η δήμος γίγνεται η ολιγαρχία, προς δε τούτοις 11 
διά το στάσεις yiVea^at και μάχας προς αλλήλους 
τω δήμω και τοις εύπόροις, όποτέροις αν μάλλον 
332 



POLITICS, IV. ιχ. 8-11 

tion and those near to them. The cause of this we 
will speak of later in our treatment of political 1308 a ι - 4 
9 revolutions. That the middle form of constitution 
is the best is evident ; for it alone is free from faction, 
since where the middle class is numerous, factions 
and party divisions among the citizens are least likely 
to occur. And the great states are more free from 
faction for the same reason, because the middle class 
is numerous, whereas in the small states it is easy to 
divide the whole people into two parties leaving 
nothing in between, and also almost everybody is 
needy or wealthy. Also democ racies are more secure £^ v -*XiZjC' 
and more long-lived than oligarchies owing_to_the 
citizens" of rhe middle class (for they are more numer- 
ous and have a larger share of the honours in demo- 
cracies than in oligarchies), srpc.e. when the poor 
are in a majority without the middle class, adversity 

10 sets in an d they are soon ruined. And it must be 
deemeoTa sigmncahfTact that the best lawgivers are 
from among the middle citizens ; for Solon was of that 
class, as appears from his poetry, and so was Lycurgus 1252 b 14. 
(for he was not a king) and Charondas and almost the ltti b 25. 
greatest number of the other lawgivers. 

And these considerations also show the reason why Democracy 
the constitutions of most states are either demo- oifgarchy 
cratic or oligarchical ; owing to the middle class in the most 
these states being often a small one, the classes govern- 
diverging from the middle status — whichever of the ments • 
two, the owners of the estates or the people, from 
time to time has the upper hand — conduct the 
government on their own lines, so that it becomes 

11 either a democracy or an oligarchy. And in addition 
to this, because factions occur and fights between 
the people and the wealthy, whichever party happens 

333 



ARISTOTLE 

30 συμρη κρατησαι των ενάντιων, ου κασιστασι κοινην 
πολίτείαν ουδ' ϊσην, άλλα της νίκης άθλον την 
ύπεροχήν της πολιτείας λαμβάνουσιν , και οι μεν 
δημοκρατίαν οι δ όλιγαρχίαν ποιοϋσιν. ετι δε /cat 
των εν ηγεμονία γενομένων της 'Ελλάδος προς την 
παρ* αύτοΐς εκάτεροι πολίτείαν αποβλέποντες οι 

35 μεν δημοκρατίας εν ταί? πόλεσι καθίστασαν οι δ' 
ολιγαρχίας, ου προς το των πόλεων συμφέρον 
σκοποΰντες αλλά προς το σφετερον αυτών, ώστε 12 
δια ταύτας τάς atria? η μηδεποτε την μεσην 
ytvea^at πολίτείαν η όλιγάκις και παρ' ολίγοις• εις 
γάρ άνηρ συνεπείσθη μόνος τών πρότερον εφ' 

40 ηγεμονία γενομένων ταύτην άποδοΰναι την τάζιν, 
1296 b ή$η δε και τοις εν ταΐς πόλεσιν εθος καθεστηκε 
μηδέ βούλεσθαι το 'ίσον, αλλ' η άρχειν ζητεΐν ή 
κρατουμένους ύπομενειν. 

Τις μεν οΰν άριστη πολιτεία, και δια τίν αίτίαν, 
εκ τούτων φανερόν τών δ' άλλων πολιτειών 13 
(επειδή πλείους δημοκρατίας και πλείους όλιγ- 
6 αρχίας φαμεν efvat) ποίον πρώτην θετεον και 
δεύτερον και τούτον δη τον τρόπον εχομενην τω 
την μεν etrai βελτίω την δε χείρω, διωρισμενης της 
άριστης ου χαλεπόν ίδεΐν. άει 1 γάρ άναγκαΐον 
είναι βελτίω την εγγύτατα ταύτης, χείρω δέ την 
άφεστηκυϊαν του μέσου πλεΐον, αν μη προς ύπόθεσιν 

ίο κρίνη τις. λέγω δε το προς ύπόθεσιν, δτι πολλάκις 

1 del Spengel : δει coda. 

α It is quite uncertain who is meant, possibly Solon or 
Theramenes. 
334 



POLITICS, IV. ιχ. 11-13 

to gain the upper hand over its opponents does not 
establish a common or equal government, but takes 
the superior share in the government as a prize of 
victory, and makes it a democracy in the one case 
and an oligarchy in the other. Moreover each of the 
two states that in the past held the leadership of 
Greece took as a pattern the form of government 
that existed among themselves and set up in the one 
case democracies and in the other oligarchies in the 
cities, not considering the interest of the cities but 

12 their own advantage. Hence owing to these causes 
the middle form of constitution either never comes 
into existence or seldom and in few places ; for one 
man a only among the states that have formerly 
held the leadership was induced to grant this form 
of organization, and by this time it has become a 
fixed habit with the people of the separate cities also 
not even to desire equality, but either to seek to rule 
or to endure being under a master. _ 

These considerations therefore make it clear whichy* ι 

13 is the best constitution, and why it is the best ; and 
now that the best has been defined, it is not difficult 
to see, among the other forms of constitution (inas- 
much as we pronounce that there are various forms 
of democracy and various oligarchies), what kind is 
to be placed first, what second, and what next in this 
order, by reason of one being better and another 
worse. For at each stage the form nearest to the best 
one must necessarily be superior, and the form that 
is more remote from the middle must be inferior 
— unless one is judging relatively to given condi- 
tions : I make this reservation because it is quite 
possible that although one form of constitution is 



335 



ARISTOTLE 

1296 b ν >/\\ \ / r ι 11 >Q\ 

ούσης άλλης πολιτείας αιρετωτερας ενιοις ουυεν 
κωλύσει συμφέρειν έτέραν μάλλον etvai πολιτείαν. 

Χ. Ύίς δε πολιτεία τίσι και ποία συμφέρει ποίοις, 1 
έχόμενόν εστί τών είρημένων διελθεΐν. ληπτέον δη 

15 πρώτον περί πασών καθόλου ταύτόν Set γάρ 
κρεΐττον elvat το βουλόμενον μέρος της πόλεως του 
μη βουλομένου μένειν την πολιτείαν. εστί δε πάσα 
πόλις εκ τ€ του ποιου και ποσοϋ• λέγω δε ποιον 
μεν έλευθερίαν πλοϋτον παιδεία^ εύγένβιαν, ποσόν 
δε την του πλήθους ύπεροχην . ενδέχεται δε το 2 

20 μεν ποιόν ύπάρχειν έτέρω μέρει της πόλεως, εξ 
(ον συνέστηκε μερών η πόλις, άλλω δε μέρει το 
ποσόν, οίον πλείους τον αριθμόν ειί-αι τών γενναίων 
τους άγεννεΐς η τών πλουσίων τους απόρους, μη 
μέντοι τοσούτον ύπερέχειν τω ποσώ όσον λεί- 
πεσ^αι τω ποιώ. διο ταύτα προς άλληλα συγ- 
κριτέον. 

25 "Οπου μεν οΰν υπερέχει το τών απόρων πλήθος 
την είρημένην άναλογίαν, ενταύθα πέφυκεν είναι 
δημοκρατίαν, και έκαστον εΐδος δημοκρατίας κατά 
την ύπεροχην του δήμου εκάστου, οίον εάν μεν το 
τών γεωργών ύπερτείνη πλήθος, την πρώτην 
δημοκρατίαν, εάν δε το τών βάναυσων και μισθ- 

30 αρνούντων , την τελευταίαν , ομοίως δε και τάς άλλας 
τάς μεταζύ τούτων οπού δε το τών ευπόρων και 3 
γνωρίμων μάλλον ύπερτεινει τω ποιώ η λείπεται 
τώ ποσώ, ενταύθα δε όλιγαρχίαν, και της ολιγαρχίας 
τον αυτόν τρόπον έκαστον είδος κατά την ύπεροχην 

α i.e. so as to outbalance their inferiority in quality. 
b i.e. superiority in quality. 

836 






POLITICS, IV. ιχ. 13— χ. 3 

preferable it may often be more advantageous for 
certain people to have another form. —* 

1 X. The next thing after what has been said is to Constitn- 
discuss which constitution is advantageous for which (Respond 
people, and what sort of constitution for what sort in s to 

of people. Now we must first grasp a general prin- character. 
ciple that applies equally to all sorts of constitution : 
it is essential that the part of the state that wishes 
the constitution to remain should be stronger than 
the part that does not wish it. But every state 
consists of both quality and quantity : by quality 
I mean freedom, wealth, education, good birth, and 
by quantity the superior numbers of the multitude. 

2 And it is possible that, while the quality of the state 
belongs to one among the parts of which the state 
consists and its quantity to another part — for example 
the low-born may be more numerous than the noble 
or the poor than the rich, — yet the more numerous 
class may not exceed in quantity as much as they fall 
behind in quality. Hence these two factors have to 
be judged in comparison with one another. 

Where therefore the multitude of the poor exceeds 
in the proportion stated, here it is natural for there to 
be democracy, and each kind of democracy in accord- 
ance with the superior number of the common people 
of each sort, for example if the number of the farming 
class exceeds, the first sort of democracy, but if that 
of the common labourers and wage-earners, the last 
sort, and similarly also with the other sorts that lie 

3 between these two ; but where the class of the well- 
to-do and notable exceeds in quality more than it 
falls behind in quantity, here it is natural for there 
to be an oligarchy, and likewise the various kinds 
of oligarchy according to the degree of superiority 6 

337 



ARISTOTLE 

85 τον ολιγαρχικού πλήθους. δει δ' άει τον νομοθέτην 
εν τή πολιτεία π ροσλαμβάνειν τους μέσους• αν τ€ 
γάρ ολιγαρχικούς τους νόμους τιθή, στοχάζ€σθαι 
χρή των μέσων, εάν τε δημοκρατικούς , προσάγεσθαι 
τοΐς νόμοις τούτους, οπού δε το των μέσων 4 
ύπερτείνει πλήθος ή συναμφοτέρων των άκρων ή 
και θατέρου μόνον, ένταΰθ* ενδέχεται πολιτείαν 
1297 a elvai μόνιμον ούθεν γάρ φοβερόν μή ποτ€ 
συμφωνήσωσιν οι πλούσιοι τοΐς πένησιν επι 
τούτους• ουδέποτε γάρ άτεροι βουλήσονται δου- 
λεύειν τοΐς έτέροις, κοινοτέραν δ , aV ζητώσιν, 
ούδεμίαν εύρήσουσιν άλλην ταύτης, iv μέρει γάρ 
5 άρχειν ουκ αν ύπομείνειαν δια την απιστίας την 
προς αλλήλους• πανταχού δε πιστότατος ό δι- 
αιτητής, διαιτητής δ' ό μέσος, οσω δ' αν άμεινον 
ή πολιτεία μιχθή, τοσούτω μονιμωτέρα' δια- 5 
μαρτάνουσι δε πολλοί και των τάς άριστο κ ρατικάς 
βουλομένων ποιεΐν πολιτείας ου μόνον εν τω 

ίο πλεΐον νέμειν τοΐς εύπόροις αλλά και εν τω παρα- 
κρούεσθαι τον δήμον ανάγκη γάρ χρονω ποτέ εκ 
των φευδών αγαθών αληθές συ/χ/^αι κακόν, αϊ 
γάρ πλεονεζίαι των πλουσίων άπολλύουσι μάλλον 
την πολιτείαν ή αϊ του δήμου. 
"Εστί δ' οσα προφάσεως χάριν εν ταΐς πολι- 6 

15 retatj σοφίζονται προς τον δήμον πέντε τον 
αριθμόν, περί έκκλησίαν, περί τάς αρχάς, περί 
δικαστήρια, περί οπλισιν, περί γυμνασίαν περί 
έκκλησίαν μεν το e^etvat εκκλησιάζειν πάσι, 
ζημίαν δε επικεΐσθαι τοΐς εύπόροις εάν μή εκκλη- 
σιάζωσα' ή μόνοις ή μείζω πολλω• περί δε τάς 

20 αρχάς το τοΐς μεν εχουσι τίμημα μή έξεΐναι 
° The word is loosely used of this small class. 
338 



POLITICS, IV. χ. 3-6 

of the oligarchical multitude. But the lawgiver in 
his constitution must always take in the middle class ; 
if he is making the laws of an oligarchical char- 
acter he must keep the middle class in view, and if 
democratic, he must legislate so as to bring them in. 

4 And where the number of the middle class exceeds 
both the extreme classes together, or even one of 
them only, here it is possible for a constitutional 
government to be lasting ; for there is no fear of 
the rich ever coming to terms with the poor against 
this numerous middle class ; for neither class will 
ever wish to be subject to the other, and if they look 
for another constitution fairer to both than this 
they will not find one, for they would not endure to 
take turns to govern because they distrust each other : 
everywhere it is the arbitrator that is most trusted, 

and the man in the middle is an arbitrator. And the a mixed 
better the constitution is mixed, the more permanent m 3 o S s t t,tutlon 

5 it is ; and many even of those who want to establish permanent. 
aristocratic forms of constitution make a great mis- 
take not only in giving too large a share to the well- 
to-do but also in cheating the people ; for false 
benefits inevitably result ultimately in true evil, as 

the encroachments of the rich ruin the constitution 
more than those of the people. 

6 The artifices employed in constitutions as a pre- Safeguards 
text in regard to the people are five in number, and oligarchy. 
are concerned with the assembly, the magistracies, Democracy, 
the law-courts, the bearing of heavy arms, and Mixed Con- 
gymnastic exercises ; in relation to the assembly, * uu,Uu *• 
the granting to all of the right to attend but the 
imposition of a fine for non-attendance on the well-to- 
do only, or a much larger fine on them than others ; 

in relation to the magistracies, the denial to the 

339 



ARISTOTLE 

1297 a , t , s , , , M , x λ 

εςομνυσσαι τοις ο αποροις ejeivai• και περί τα 

δικαστήρια τοΐς μεν εύπόροις είναι ζημίαν αν μη 

δικάζωσι τοΐς δ' άπόροις άδειας, ή τοΐς μεν 

μεγάλην τοΐς δε μικράν, ωσπερ iv τοΐς Χαρών- 

δον νόμοις. ενιαχοΰ δ' εζεστι μεν πάσιν άπο- 7 

26 γραφαμενοις εκκλησιάζειν και δικάζειν, εάν δε απο- 
γραφάμενοι μήτ εκκλησιάζωσι μήτε δικάζωσιν 
επίκεινται //.eyctAcu ζτ7//,ιαι τούτοις, ίνα δια μεν 
την ζημίαν φεύγωσι το άπογράφεσθαι δια δε το 
μη άπογράφεσθαι μή δικάζωσι μηδ* εκκλησιάζωσιν . 
τον αυτόν δε τρόπον και περί του όπλα κεκτησθαι 

80 και του γυμνάζεσθαι νομοθετοΰσιν τοΐς μεν γαρ 
άπόροις εζεστι μή κεκτησθαι τοΐς δ εύποροις 
επιζήμιον μή κεκτημενοις, καν μή γυμνάζωνται 
τοΐς μεν ουδεμία ζημία τοΐς δ' εύπόροις επιζήμιον , 
όπως οι μεν δια τήν ζημίαν μετεχωσιν οι δε δια 

w το μή φοβεΐσθαι μή μετεχωσιν. ταΰτα μεν ουν 
ολιγαρχικά σοφίσματα της νομοθεσίας, εν δε 8 
ταΐς δημοκρατίαις προς ταϋτ άντισοφίζονται• τοΐς 
μεν γάρ άπόροις μισθόν πορίζουσιν εκκλησιάζουσι 
και δικάζουσιν, τοΐς δ' εύπόροις ούδεμιαν τάττουσι 
ζημίαν. ώστε φανερόν ότι ει τι? βούλεται /xiyvwai 

40 δικαίως, δει τά παρ* εκατεροις συνάγειν και τοΐς 

μεν μισθόν πορίζειν τοΐς δέ ζημίαν ούτω γαρ αν 

κοινωνοΐεν άπαντες, εκείνως δ' ή πολιτεία yiyverat 

1297 b Τ (χ>ν έτερων μόνον, δει δέ τήν πολιτείαν είναι μεν 



340 



POLITICS, IV. χ. 6-8 

owners of rated property of the right to swear off 
serving, while the poor have this right ; in relation 
to the law-courts, the imposition of a fine on the 
well-to-do if they do not serve on a jury, but no 
penalty for the poor, or else a large fine for the one 
class and a small one for the others, as in the laws of 

7 Charondas. In some places all have the right to 1251 b 14. 
serve in the assembly and on juries after having 

their names put on a register, but large fines are 
imposed on those who after so registering fail to 
attend in either capacity, in order that the fine may 
cause them to avoid registration and that owing to 
their not registering they may not serve on juries or 
in the assembly. They also legislate in the same 
manner about owning heavy arms and engaging in 
gymnastic exercises : the poor are not allowed to 
possess arms, but the well-to-do are liable to a fine 
if they have not got them, and there is no fine for the 
former class if they abstain from gymnastics, but the 
well-to-do are liable to a fine, in order that the one 
class because of the fine may take part in them and 
the other because they have no penalty to fear 
may not. These artifices of legislation then are of 

8 an oligarchic nature ; in democracies they introduce 
contrary devices in regard to these matters : they 
provide pay for the poor for serving in the assembly 
and on juries and impose no fine upon the well-to-do 
for abstaining. Hence it is manifest that if anybody 
wishes to make a just blend, he must bring together 
the regulations existing in each of the two forms of 
constitution, and provide pay for attendance and a 
fine for non-attendance ; for thus all would participate, 
whereas in the other way the government comes to 
be in the hands of only one of the two classes. And 

341 



ARISTOTLE 

1297 b 

εκ τών τά όπλα εχόντων μόνον, τον δε τιμήματος 
το πλήθος απλώς μεν όρισαμενους ουκ εστίν 
ειπείν τοσούτον ύπάρχειν, αλλά σκεφαμενους το 
5 ποιον 1 επιβάλλει μακρότατον ώστε τους μετέχοντας 
της πολιτείας είναι πλείους τών μή μετεχόντων, 
τοΰτο τάττειν. εθελουσι γάρ οι πένητες και μή 9 
μετέχοντες τών τιμών ήσυχίαν εχειν εάν μή 
ύβρίζη τις αυτούς μήτε άφαιρήται μηθέν της 
ουσίας• άλλα τοΰτο ου paSiov, ου γάρ άει σιγ^αι- 

ιο νει χαρίεντας είναι τους μετέχοντας του πολιτεύμα- 
τος, και είώθασι οε όταν πόλεμος ή όκνεΐν αν μή 
λαμβάνωσι τροφήν άποροι δε ώσιν εάν οε πορίζη 
τι? τροφήν, βούλονται πολεμεΐν. εστί δ' ή πολιτεία 10 
παρ εν'ιοις ου μόνον εκ τών όπλιτευόντων αλλά 
και εκ τών ώπλιτευκότων εν Μαλιευσι δε ή μεν 

15 πολιτεία ην εκ τούτων τάς δε αρχάς ήροΰντο εκ 
τών στρατευομένων, και ή πρώτη δε πολιτεία εν 
τοις "Έλλησιν εγένετο μετά τάς βασίλεια? εκ τών 
πολεμούντων , ή μεν εξ αρχής εκ τών ιππέων (την 
γάρ ίσχύν και τήν ύπεροχήν εν τοις ίππεΰσιν 6 

20 πόλεμος εΐχεν, άνευ μεν γάρ συντάξεως άχρηστον 
το όπλιτικόν, αϊ δε περί τών τοιούτων εμπειριαι 
και τάξεις εν τοις άρχαίοις ούχ ύπήρχον, ώστ εν 
τοις ίππεΰσιν είναι τήν ίσχύν), αυξανομένων δε 
τών πόλεων και τών εν τοις δπλοις ϊσχυσάντων 
μάλλον πλείους μετεΐχον της πολιτείας, οιόπερ 

25 ας νΰν καλοΰμεν πολιτείας οι πρότερον εκάλονν 

1 πόσον Lindau. 
842 



POLITICS, IV. χ. g-io 

although it is proper that the government should be 
drawn only from those who possess heavy armour, 
yet it is not possible to define the amount of the 
property-qualification absolutely and to say that they 
must possess so much, but only to consider what sort 
of amount is the highest that is compatible with 
making those who have a share in the constitution 
more numerous than those who have not, and to fix 
9 that limit. For those who are poor and have no share 
in the honours are willing to keep quiet if no one 
insults them or takes away any part of their substance; 
but this is not easy to secure, for it does not always 
happen that those who are in the governing class 
are gentlemen. Also people have a way of being 
reluctant to serve when there is a war if they do not 
get rations and are poor men ; but if somebody pro- 
10 vides food they want to fight. In some states the 
citizen-body consists not only of those who are serv- 
ing as heavy-armed soldiers, but also of those who 
have so served : and at Malea the citizen-bodv con- 
sisted of these, while the magistrates were elected 
from those who were actually on service. And indeed 
the earliest form of constitution among the Greeks 
after the kingships consisted of those who were 
actually soldiers, the original form consisting of the 
cavalry (for war had its strength and its pre-eminence 
in cavalry, since without orderly formation heavy- 
armed infantry is useless, and the sciences and 
systems dealing with tactics did not exist among the 
men of old times, so that their strength lay in their 
cavalry) ; but as the states grew and the wearers of 
heavy armour had become stronger, more persons 
came to have a part in the government. Hence what 
we now call constitutional governments the men of 

MB 



ARISTOTLE 

δημοκρατίας' ήσαν δε αί άρχαΐαί πολιτεΐαι ευλόγως 11 
ολιγαρχικοί και βασιλικαί, δι* όλιγανθρωπίαν γαρ 
ουκ εϊχον πολύ το μέσον, ώστ ολίγοι τε οντες το 
πλήθος και κατά την σύνταζιν μάλλον ΰπεμενον 
το άρχεσθαι. 

Δια τίνα μεν ουν είσϊν αίτίαν αί πολιτεΐαι πλείους, 

so και δια. τι παρά τάς λεγομενας ετεραι (δημοκρατία 
τε γάρ ου μία τον αριθμόν εστί, και των άλλων 
ομοίως), en δε τίνες αί διάφοροι και διά τίνα 
αίτίαν συμβαίνει, προς δε τούτοις τις αρίστη των 
πολιτειών ως επι το πλείστον ειπείν, και των 
άλλων ποια ποιοις άρμοττει των πολιτειών, εΐρηται. 

85 XI. Πάλιν δέ και κοινή και χωρίς περί εκάστης j 
λεγωμεν περί τών εφεζής, λαβόντες αρχήν τηι 
προσήκουσαν αυτών, εστί δη τρία μόρια τών 
πολιτειών πασών περί ων δει θεωρεΐν τον σπουδαΐον 
νομοθετην εκάστη το συμφέρον ων εχόντων καλώς 
ανάγκη την πολιτείαν εχειν καλώς, και τάς 

40 πολιτείας αλλήλων διαφερειν εν τω διαφερειν 
εκαστον τούτων, εστί δε τών τριών τούτων εν 
1298 a μεν τι 1 το βουλευόμενον περί τών κοινών, δεύτερον 
δε το περί τάς αρχάς, τοϋτο δ' εστί τίνος 2 δει και 3 
τίνων eirai κυρίας, και ποίαν τινά δει γίγνεσθαι 
την αιρεσιν αυτώρ', τρίτον δε τι το δικάζον. 

Υ^ύριον δ' εστί το βουλευόμενον περί πολέμου 

1 μέν τι Congreve : μέι* τι, μέν τοι codcl. 

1 έστι rivas Wilson : έστϊν &s codd. 

8 δίΐ <ehai> καΐ ? ed. 

S44 



POLITICS, IV. χ. 11— χι. 1 

11 former times called democracies ; but the constitu- 
tional governments of early days were naturally 
oligarchical and royal, for owing to the smallness of 
the populations their middle class was not numerous, 
so that because of their small numbers as well as in 
conformity with the structure of the state the middle 
class more readily endured being in a subject position. 

It has then been said what is the reason of there 
being several forms of constitution, and why there 
are others besides those designated by name (for 
there is not one single democracy only, and similarly 
there are more than one of the other forms), and also 
what are the differences between them and what is 
the reason why these differences occur, and in addition 
to these points, which is the best of the constitutions 
speaking generally, and of the other constitutions 
which sort is suited to which sort of people. 
1 XI. And again, let us speak about the points that The three 
come next, both generally and with reference to each o 1 /^^. 
constitution separately, taking their appropriate start- ment: 
ing-point. All forms of constitution then have three 
factors in reference to which the good lawgiver has to 
consider what is expedient for each constitution ; and 
if these factors are well-ordered the constitution must 
of necessity be well-ordered, and the superiority of one 
constitution over another necessarily consists in the 
superiority of each of these factors. Of these three 
factors one is, wh at is to be the body that deliberates 
about the common interests, second the one connected 
. rath the magistracies , that is, what there are to be 
and what matters they are to control, and what is to 
be the method of their election, and a third is. wha t 
i s tq be the judiciary. 

The deliberative factor is sovereign about war and 

345 



ARISTOTLE 

δ και ειρήνης και συμμαχίας και διαλύσεως, και 
περί νόμων, και περί θανάτου και φυγής και 
δημεύσεως, και των ευθυνών. άναγκαΐον δ' ήτοι 2 
ττασι τοις πολίταις άποδεδόσθαι πάσας ταύτα? τα? 
κρίσεις η τισΐ πάσας (οίον αρχή τινϊ /ζια ή πλείοσιν) 
η έτέραις ετέρας ή τινάς μεν αυτών πάσι τινάς δε 
τισύ\ 
ίο Το μεν ουν πάντας και περί απάντων δημοτικόν, 
την τοιαύτην γαρ Ισότητα ζητεί ό δήμος. είσι δέ 3 
οι τρόποι του πάντας πλείους, εις μεν το κατά 
μέρος άλλα μη πάντας αθρόους (ώσπερ εν τη 
πολιτεία, τη Ύηλεκλέους εστί του Μιλησίου, και 
εν άλλαις δέ πολιτείαις βουλεύονται αί συναρχίαι 
15 συνιοΰσαι εις δε τάς αρχάς βαδίζουσι πάντες κατά 
μέρος εκ τών φυλών και τών μορίων τών ελάχιστων 
παντελώς έως αν διέλθη δια πάντων), συνιέναι δέ 
μόνον περί τε νόμων θέσεως και τών περί της 
πολιτείας και τά παραγγελλόμενα άκουσομένους 
20 υπο τών αρχόντων άλλο? δε τρόπος το πάντας 4 
αθρόους, owieVai δε μόνον προς τε τάς αρχ- 
αιρεσίας [αίρησομένους] 1 και προς τάς νομοθεσίας 
και περί πολέμου και ειρήνης και προς εύθύνας, 
τά δ' άλλα τάς αρχάς βουλεύεσθαι τάς εφ' έκάστοις 
τεταγμένας, αιρετά? ούσας εξ απάντων η κλήρω- 
ν, τάς• άλλος δε τρόπος το περί τάς αρχάς και τάς 
εύθύνας άπαντάν τους πολίτας, και περί πολέμου 
1 Susemihl. 



346 



β Otherwise unknown. 



POLITICS, IV. χι. 1-4 

peace and the formation and dissolution of alliances, (i) The 
and about laws, and about sentences of death and tire: Ha 
exile and confiscation of property, and about the factions 

2 audits of magistrates. And necessarily either all democracy, 
these decisions must be assigned to all the citizens, aristocracy 
or all to some of them (for instance to some one and 
magistracy or to several), or different ones to different govem- 
magistracies, or some of them to all the citizens and ment - 
some to certain persons. 

For all the citizens to be members of the delibera- 
tive body and to decide all these matters is a mark 
of a popular government, for the common people 

3 seek for equality of this nature. But there are 
several modes of such universal membership. One 
is for the citizens to serve in rotation and not all in a 
body (as is enacted in the constitution of the Milesian 
Telecles, and in other constitutions also the boards 
of magistrates deliberate in joint assemblies but all 
the citizens enter into the magistracies from the 
tribes or from the very smallest sections of the citizen- 
body in rotation until office has gone through the 
whole body), and for there to be joint assemblies 
only to consider legislation and reforms of the con- 
stitution and to hear the reports submitted by the 
magistrates. Another mode is for all to assemble 
\n a body, but only for the purpose of electing magis- 
trates, enacting laws, considering the declaration of 
war and the conclusion of peace and holding the audit 
of magistrates, but for all other matters to be con- 
sidered by the magistrates appointed to deal with 
each respectively and elected by suffrage or by lot 
from all the citizens. Another mode is for the 
citizens to meet about the magistracies and the 
audits and in order to deliberate about declaring war 

S47 



ARISTOTLE 

βουλευσο μένους και συμμαχίας, τα δ' άλλα τα? 
αρχάς διοικεΐν αιρετάς ούσας, όσας ενδέχεται, 
τοιαυται δ' είσιν όσας άρχειν άναγκαΐον τους 
επισταμένους, τέταρτος δε τρόπος το -π-άντα? περί 5 

s πάντων βουλεύεσθαι συνιόντας , τάς δ αρχάς περί 
μηθ€νός κρίνειν αλλά μόνον προανακρίνειν, όνπερ 
η τελευταία δημοκρατία νυν διοικείται τρόπον, ην 
άνάλογόν φαμ€ν είναι ολιγαρχία τε δυναστευτικη 
και μοναρχία τυραννική . ούτοι μεν ουν οι τρόποι β 
δημοκρατικοί πάντες, το δε τινά? περί πάντων 

85 ολιγαρχικό ν. έχει δε και τούτο διαφοράς πλείους. 
όταν μεν γάρ από τιμημάτων μετριωτέρων αιρετοί 
τε ωσι και πλείους δια την μετριότητα του τιμή- 
ματος, και περί ων 6 νόμος απαγορεύει μη κινώσιν 
άλλ' άκολουθώσι, και εζη κτωμένω το τίμημα 
μετέχειν, ολιγαρχία μέν πολιτική δ' εστίν η 

40 τοιαύτη διά το μετριάζειν όταν δε μη πάντες 
1298 b του βουλεύεσθαι μετέχωσιν αλλά πρόκριτοι, 1 κατά 
νόμον δ' άρχωσιν ώσπερ και πρότερον, όλιγαρχι- 
κόν όταν δε και α'ιρώνται αυτοί αυτούς οι κύριοι 
του βουλεύεσθαι, και όταν παις αντί πατρός 
είσίη και κύριοι των νόμων ώσιν, όλιγαρχικην* 

b άναγκαΐον είναι την τά£ιν ταύτην. όταν δε τινών 7 

1 άλλα πρόκριτοι Immisch : άλλ' αιρετοί codd. 
1 όλι-γαρχικωτέραν Garvey, <μαλ\οι>')> όλΐΎαρχικην Spengel. 

" i.e. in an advanced democracy. 
348 



POLITICS, IV. χι. 4-7 

and concluding an alliance, but for all other matters 
to be dealt with by the magistrates, elected by 
suffrage in as many cases as circumstances allow,** 
and such magistracies are all those which must of 
δ necessity be rilled by experts. A fourth mode is for 
all to meet in council about all matters, and for the 
magistracies to decide about nothing but only to make 
preliminary decisions ; this is the mode in which 
democracy in its last form is administered at the 
present day — the form of democracy which we pro- 
nounce to correspond to dynastic oligarchy and to 

6 tyrannical monarchy. These modes then are all of 
them democratic. On the other hand for some 
persons to deliberate upon all matters is oligarchic. 
But this also has several variations. For when the 
members of the deliberative body are elected on 
comparatively moderate property-qualifications, and 
the eligible persons are comparatively numerous 
because of the moderateness of the qualification, 
and when they do not make changes in things in 
which the law forbids it but follow the law, and 
when anybody acquiring the property-qualification is 
allowed to become a member, a constitution of this 
sort is indeed an oligarchy, but one of the nature of 
constitutional government, because of its modera- 
tion. When on the other hand not everybody thus 
qualified participates in deliberation but only certain 
persons previously chosen by election, and these 
govern in accordance with law as in the former case, 
this is oligarchical ; and also when the deliberative 
officials are elected by co-optation, and when the 
office is hereditary and has supreme control over the 

7 laws, this system is bound to be oligarchical. But 
when certain persons control certain matters, for 

S19 



ARISTOTLE 

1298 b / ι t> \ / ν χ > / < »λ 

τίνες, οίον πολέμου μεν και ειρήνης και ευσυνων 

πάντες των 8ε άλλων άρχοντες και ούτοι αιρετοί 

μη κληρωτοί, 2 αριστοκρατία η πολιτεία• εάν 

δ' ενίων μεν αιρετοί ενίων δε κληρωτοί, και 

κληρωτοί η απλώς η εκ προκρίτων, η κοινή 

ίο αιρετοί και κληρωτοί, τα μεν πολιτείας αριστοκρα- 
τικής εστί τούτων, τά 8ε πολιτείας αυτής. 

Αιηρηται μεν οΰν το βουλενόμενον προς τάς 
πολιτείας τούτον τον τρόπον, και 8ιοικεΐ 3 εκάστη 
πολιτεία κατά τον είρημενον διορισμόν συμφέρει 
δέ δημοκρατία τη 4, μάλιστ' eti>ai οοκούση δημο- 

15 κρατια νυν (λέγω δε τοιαύτην εν fj κύριος 6 δήμος 
και των νόμων εστίν) προς το βουλεύεσθαι βελτιον 
το αυτό ποιεΐν όπερ επι των δικαστηρίων εν ταις 
ολιγαρχίαις (τάττουσι γάρ ζημίαν τούτοις ους 
βούλονται δικάζειν ίνα δικάζωσιν, οι δέ δημοτικοί 
μισθον τοις άπόροις), τοΰτο δέ και περί τάς 

20 εκκλησίας ποιεΐν (βουλεύσονται γάρ βελτιον κοινή 
βουλευόμενοι πάντες, ό μέν δήμος μετά των 
γνωρίμων, ούτοι δε μετά του πλήθους)• συμ- 
φέρει δέ και το αιρετούς etrai τους βουλευομενους 
ή κληρωτούς "ίσως εκ των μορίων, συμφέρει δέ καν 
ύπερβάλλωσι πολύ κατά το πλήθος οι δημοτικοί 

2ό των πολιτικών 6 ή μη πάσι δίδομαι μισθον αλλ' 

1 Tives seel. Camerarius (cum Guilelmi codd. plerisque). 

2 μη κληρωτοί ? Newman : η κλ. codd. (seel. Brandis). 

3 disponitur (διοικείται ?) Guil. : δωίσ€ί Congreve. 

1 ttj Coraes : τη re codd. 5 πολιτών ? Richards. 

The mss. give ' or by lot.' 
350 



POLITICS, IV. χι. 7-8 

instance when all the citizens control decisions as 
to war and peace and the audit of officials while 
everything else is controlled by magistrates and 
these are elected by vote, not by lot," the constitution 
is an aristocracy ; while if some matters are con- 
trolled by magistrates elected by vote and others by 
magistrates chosen by lot, and this either directly or 
from a list previously selected by vote, or if magis- 
trates elected by vote and by lot sit in a joint 
body, some of these regulations are features of an 
aristocratic constitution and others of constitutional 
government itself. 

We have then in this way distinguished the Advantages 
different kinds of deliberative body in relation to const/tu- 
the forms of constitution, and each form of constitu- tion • 
tion carries on the administration in accordance with 
the distinction stated. But for a democracy of the 
form that at the present day is considered to be de- 
mocracy in the fullest degree (and I mean one of the 
sort in which the people is sovereign even over the 
laws) it is advantageous for the improvement of its 
deliberative function for it to do the same as is done 
in oligarchies in the matter of the law-courts (for 
they enact a fine to compel the attendance on juries 
of those whom they want to attend, whereas de- 
mocratic states institute payment for attendance 
for the benefit of the poor), and also to do this in 
respect of the assemblies (for they will deliberate 
better when all are deliberating jointly, the common 
people when with the notables and these when with 
the masses'), and it is also advantageous for those who 
deliberate to be elected by vote or by lot equally from 
the different sections, and, if the men of the people far 
exceed the political class in number, it is advantageous 

351 



ARISTOTLE 

1298b , , , . , ._, 

όσοι σύμμετροι προς το των γνωρίμων πληυος η 

άποκληροΰν τους πλείους. εν δε ταΓ? ολιγαρχιαις 9 

ί) προσαιρεΐσθαί 1 τινας εκ τον πλήθους, η, κατα- 

σκευάσαντας άρχεΐον οίον iv ενίαις πολιτειαις 

εστίν ους καλοΰσι προβούλους και νομοφύλακας ,* 

80 περί τούτων χρηματίζειν περί ων αν ούτοι 
προβουλεύσωσιν (ούτω γαρ μεθέζει 6 δήμος του 
βουλεΰεσθαι και λύειν ούθεν δυνήσεται των περί 
την πολιτείαν), ετι η ταύτα φηφίζεσθαι τον δήμον 
η μηθεν εναντίον τοις είσφερομενοις, η της 
συμβουλής μεν μεταδιδόναι πάσι βουλεΰεσθαι 8ε 

85 τους άρχοντας, και το άντικείμενον δε του εν 10 
τοις πολιτείαις γιγνομενου δει ποιεΐν άποφηφιζο- 
μενον μεν γαρ κΰριον δει ποιεΐν το πλήθος, κατα- 
φηφιζόμενον δε μη κΰριον, αλλ' επαναγεσθω 
πάλιν επί τοις άρχοντας• εν γαρ ταΐς πολιτειαις 
άντεστραμμενως ποιοΰσιν, οι γαρ ολίγοι απο- 

40 φηφισάμενοι μεν κύριοι, καταφηφισάμενοι δε ου 
1299 a κύριοι, αλλ' επανάγεται εις τους πλείστους αιει. 

Περί μεν οΰν του βουλευομενου και του κυρίου 
δη της πολιτείας τούτον διωρισθω τον τρόπον. 

XII. *Έιχομενη δε τούτων εστίν η περί τας 1 
αρχάς διαίρεσις (έχει γαρ και τούτο το μοριον της 
β πολιτείας πολλάς διαφοράς), πόσαι τε αρχαι και 

1 Susemihl: προαιρ. codd. 2 Coraes: -κα% και codd. 

There were πρύβουλοι at Corinth as well as a βουλή and 
an εκκλησία ; and νομοφύλακΐ% at Sparta, Athens and else- 
where : at Athens they sat with the presidents of the βουλή 
and εκκλησία to check illegal procedure. 
352 



POLITICS, IV. χι. 8— χπ. 1 

either not to give pay to all but only to as many as 
are commensurate with the number of the notables, 
or to discard by lot those who exceed this number. 
9 In olig archies on the other hand it is flrh-fl nta genns 
either to cn - npt iini ii » parrrmc fVnm thf> mu l titude, 
or to institute an offi ce ^~ p **"* """ that e xists in _ 
Cert ain constitutional governments under the nam e 

nf Preliminary Γηηηρι11ηΓ<; nr ("marrHang nf th e Law, 

_and deal with the matters abou t whi^h th«^e ^ffHals 
jhave held a preliminar y Heliheratirm (for thus the 
common people will have a share in deliberation and 
will not have the power to abolish any part of the 
constitution), and then for the people by their vote 
either to confirm or at all events not to pass anything 
contrary to the resolutions brought before them, or 
to allow all to take part in debate but only the 
10 magistrates to frame resolutions ; and in fact it 
is proper to do just the opposite of what takes 
place in constitutionally governed states ; for the 
common people ought to be given power to vote the 
rejection of a measure, but not to vote its ratifica- 
tion, but it should be referred back to the magis- 
trates. In constitutional governments the procedure 
is the reverse ; the few are competent to vote 
the rejection of a resolution but are not competent 
to vote its ratification, this being always referred 
back to the most numerous body. 

Let us then decide in this manner about the de- 
liberative body, which in fact is the sovereign power 
in the constitution. 
1 XII. Connected with this subject is the determina- (2) Th• 
tion in regard to the magistracies (for this part of ExecutIve • 
the constitution also has many varieties), how man ν 
magistracies there are to be, and what are to be their 

333 



ARISTOTLE 

12OT» 

κύριαι τίνων, και περί χρόνου, πόσος έκαστης 
αρχής (οί μεν γαρ εξάμηνους, οι δε δι' ελάττονος, 
ol δ ενιαυσίας, οί δε πολυχρονιωτερας ποιοΰσι 
τάς αρχάς), και πότερον eimi δει τάς αρχάς άι- 
δίους η πολυχρονίους, η μηδετερον αλλά πλεονά- 

ιο κις τους αυτούς, ή μη τον αυτόν δις αλλ' άπαξ 
μόνον ετι 8ε περί την κατάστασιν των αρχών, εκ 2 
τίνων δεΐ ytVea^ai και υπό τίνων και πώς. περί 
πάντων γαρ τούτων δει δυνασ^αι διελεΐν κατά 
πόσους ενδέχεται yei^ea^at τρόπους, κάπειτα προσ- 
αρμοσαι ποιαις ποιοι 1 πολιτείαις συμφερουσιν. 

15 εστί δε ούδε τοΰτο διορίσαι ράδιον, ποίας δει καλεΐν 
αρχάς• πολλών γάρ επιστατών ή πολιτική κοινωνία 
δεΐται, διόπερ ου 2 πάντας ούτε τους αιρετούς 
ούτε τους κληρωτούς άρχοντας θετεον, οίον τους 
ίερεΐς πρώτον (τοΰτο γάρ ετερόν τι παρά τάς 
πολιτικός αρχάς θετεον), ετι δε χορηγοί και 

20 κήρυκες, αίροϋνται δε και πρεσβευταί. είσι δε 3 
at μεν πολιτικοί τών επιμελειών , ή πάντων τών 
πολιτών προς τίνα πράζιν, οίον στρατηγός 
στρατευομένων, η κατά μέρος, οίον ο γυναικο- 
νόμος η παιδονόμος- αϊ δ' οίκονομικαί (πολλάκις 
γάρ αίροϋνται σιτομετρας)' αϊ δ' ύπηρετικαί και 

25 προς ας, αν εύπορώσι, τάττουσι δούλους, μάλιστα 
ώδ' s απλώς ειπείν αρχάς λεκτέον ταύτας οσαι? 
άποδεδοται βουλεύσασθαί τε περί τινών και κρΐναι 

1 Αγ. : ποΐαι codd. (et nonnulli πολιτεϊαι). 
2 ού suppleuit Rassow. 

Distributions of corn were made at times of scarcity, or 
when the state had received a present of corn. 

354 



POLITICS, IV. χπ. 1-3 

powers, and what their various periods of tenure (for 
some people make their magistracies tenable for six 
months, others for less, others for a year and others 
for a longer period) — shall the magistracies be for life 
or for a long period, or if for a shorter term shall the 
same people be allowed to hold them several times 

2 or not the same man twice but once only ? and also 
as to the appointment of magistrates, who shall be 
eligible, who the electors, and what the mode of 
election ? For on all these points it is needful to be 
able to determine how many modes of procedure are 
possible, and then to settle what modes are expedient 
for what sorts of constitution. Nor is it easy to decide 
to what kinds of office the name of magistracy ought 
to be applied ; for the political community requires 
a great many officials, owing to which it is not proper 
to reckon all of them magistrates, whether elected 
by vote or by lot, — for instance first the priests (for 
this office must be considered as something different 
from the political magistracies), and again there are 
leaders of choruses, and heralds, and persons are 

3 also elected as ambassadors. And of the offices 
exercising superintendence some are political, and 
are exercised either over the whole of the citizens in 
regard to some operation — for instance a general 
superintends them when serving as soldiers, or over 
a section — for instance the superintendent of women 
or of children ; while others are economic (for states 
often elect officers to dole out corn e ) ; and others 
are subordinate, and are the sort of services to which 
people when well off appoint slaves. But the title 
of magistracy, to put it simply, is chiefly to be applied 
to all those offices to which have been assigned the 
duties of deliberating about certain matters and of 

355 



ARISTOTLE 

1299 a 

και €ττιτάζαι, και μάλιστα τούτο, το γάρ έπι- 
ταττειν άρχικώτερόν εστίν, αλλά ταύτα διαφέρει 
προς μεν τάς χρήσεις ονθεν ως ειπείν (ού yap πω 

30 κρίσις γεγονεν αμφισβητούντων περί τον ονόματος), 
έχει δε τιν άλλην διανοητικην πραγματείαν. 
ποΐαι δ άρχαι και πόσαι άναγκαΐαι ει εσται \ 
πόλις, και ποΐαι άναγκαΐαι μεν ον χρήσιμοι δε 
προς σπονδαίαν πολιτείαν, μάλλον αν τις άπορη - 
σείε προς άπασαν τε δη πολιτείαν και δη και τάς 

85 μικράς πόλεις, εν μεν γάρ δη ταΐς μεγάλαις 
ενδέχεται τε και δει μίαν τετάχθαι προς εν έργον 
(πολλονς τε γάρ εις τά αρχεία ενδέχεται βαδί- 
ζειν διά το πολλονς etrai του? πολίτας, ώστε 
τας μεν διαλειπβι»' πολύν χρόνον τάς δ' άπαξ 
άρχειν, και βέλτιον έκαστον έργον τνγχάνει της 
1299 b επιμελείας μονοπραγματονσης η πολνπραγματον- 
σης) ' εν δέ ταΐς μικραΐς ανάγκη σννάγειν εις 5 
όλίγονς πολλάς αρχάς (διά γάρ όλιγανθρωπίαν ον 
ράδιόν εστί πολλονς εν ταΐς άρχαΐς etrar τίνες 
γάρ οι τοντονς έσονται διαδεχόμενοι πάλιν;) 

5 δέονται δ' ενίοτε των αντών άρχων και νόμων 
αϊ μικραι ταΐς μεγάλαις• πλην αϊ μεν δέονται 
πολλάκις των αντών, ταΐς δ εν πολλώ χρόνω 
τοντο σνμβαίνει. διόπερ ονθεν κωλύει πολλάς 
επιμελείας άμα προστάττειν (ον γάρ εμποδιονσιν 
άλλ-^λαι?), και προς την όλιγανθρωπίαν άναγκαΐον 

10 τά αρχεία οίον όβελισκολύχνια ποιεΐν. εάν ονν 6 

° An implement (its exact shape does not appear to be 
known), used by soldiers on campaign, here mentioned as 
an illustration of one tool serving two purposes, cf. 1252 b 1. 

356 



POLITICS, IV. χιι. S -β 

acting as judges and of issuing orders, and especially 
the last, for to give orders is most characteristic of 
authority. But this question is of virtually no prac- 
tical importance (for no decision has yet been given, 
our discussion being merely about the name), although 
it does admit of some further inquiry of a speculative 

4 kind. On the other hand the questions what kinds Number and 
and what number of magistracies are necessary to £^! οη3 
constitute a state at all, and what kinds although not Executive 
necessary are advantageous for a good constitution, constitu-" 1 
are questions that might preferably be discussed, tlon3 • 
both indeed as regards every form of constitution and 
particularly in regard to the small states. For it is 

true that in the large states it is possible and proper 
for one magistracy to be assigned to one function (for 
the large number of the citizens makes it possible for 
many people to enter on an official career, so as to 
intermit their tenure of some offices for a long time 
and to hold others only once, and also every task is 
better attended to if the attention is directed to one 

5 thing only than if it is busy with many) ; but in the 
small states it is inevitable that many offices must be 
gathered into few hands (for owing to shortage of 
man-power it is not easy for many people to be in 
office, since who will take over the posts as their 
successors ?). But sometimes small states require the 
same magistracies and laws as large ones ; except 
that the latter require the same persons to serve 
often, but in the former this only occurs after a long 
interval. Hence it is possible to assign several duties 
to one man at the same time (since they will not 
interfere with one another), and to meet the shortage 
of man-power it is necessary to make the magistracies 

6 like spit-lampholders. If therefore we are able to 

357 



ARISTOTLE 

1299 b 

εχωμεν λέγειν πόσας άναγκαΐον ύπάρχειν πάστ) 
πόλει και πόσας ούκ άναγκαΐον μεν δεΐ δ' ύπ- 
άρχειν, ραον αν τις είδώς ταΰτα συνίδοι 1 ποίας 
άρμόττει σννάγ€ΐν αρχάς εις μίαν αρχήν, άρ- 
μόττει δε και τούτο μή λεληθεναι, ποίων 2 δει 

15 κατά τόπον αρχεία πολλά 3 επιμελεΐσθαι καΐ ποιων 
πανταχού μίαν αρχήν εΐναι κνρίαν, οίον εύκοσμίας 
πότερον έν άγορα μεν άγορανόμον άλλον» δε κατ' 
άλλον τόπον, ή πανταχού τον αυτόν και πότερον 
κατά το πράγμα δεΐ διαιρεΐν ή κατά τους ανθρώ- 
πους, λέγω δ οίον ενα της εύκοσμίας, ή παίδων 

20 άλλον καΐ γυναικών και κατά τάς πολιτείας δε, 7 
πότερον διαφέρει καθ* εκάστην και το τών αρχών 
γένος ή ούθεν, οίον εν δημοκρατία καΐ ολιγαρχία 
και αριστοκρατία και μοναρχία πότερον αϊ αύται 
μεν είσιν άρχαι κύριαι, ουκ εζ ίσων δ' ουδ' εζ 

25 όμοιων, αλλ' ετεραι εν ετεραις (οίον εν μεν ταΐς 
άριστοκρατίαις εκ πεπαιδευμένων εν δε ταί? 
όλιγαρχίαις εκ τών πλουσίων εν δε ταΐς δημο- 
κρατίαις εκ τών ελευθέρων) ή τυγχάνουσι μεν τίνες 
ούσαι και κατ αύτάς τάς διαφοράς τών αρχών, 
εστί δ' όπου συμφερουσιν αί αύται και όπου 
διαφερουσιν (ένθα μεν γάρ άρμόττει μεγάλας, 

so ένθα δ' είναι μικράς τάς αύτάς) . ου μήν αλλά καϊ 8 

1 Bojesen : συνά*/οι codd. (vvvayot o't'aj ? ed.). 
2 Thurot : ποΐα codd. 
8 Thurot : πολλών codd. 
358 



POLITICS, IV. χιι. β-8 

say how many magistracies every state must neces- 
sarily possess and how many, though not absolutely 
necessary, it ought to possess, knowing these points 
one might more easily realize what kinds of magis- 
tracies are of a suitable nature to be combined into a 
single office. And it is suitable for the further ques- 
tion not to be overlooked, what kinds of matters 
ought to be attended to by a number of officials 
locally distributed and what ought to be under 
the authority of one magistrate for all localities, 
for example should good order be seen to in the 
market-place by a Controller of the Market and else- 
where by another official, or everywhere by the same 
one r and ought the offices to be divided according to 
the function or according to the persons concerned — 
I mean, for instance, should there be a single official 
in control of good order, or a different one for children 

7 and for women ? and also under the various constitu- 
tions does the nature of the magistracies vary in 
accordance with each or does it not vary at all — for 
example in democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy and 
monarchy are the magistracies the same in their 
powers, although they are not filled from equal ranks 
nor from similar classes but are different in different 
constitutions (for example in aristocracies drawn 
from the educated, in oligarchies from the wealthy, 
and in democracies from the free), or although some 
constitutions happen to be correspondent with the 
actual differences of their magistracies, yet in other 
cases are the same magistracies advantageous even 
where the constitutions differ (for in some places it 
is suitable for the same magistracies to have large 

8 functions and in other places small ones) ? Not but 
what there are also some offices peculiar to special 

359 



ARISTOTLE 

1299 b 

Ί'διαι τινές είσιν, οίον ή των προβούλων. αύτη 
γαρ ου δημοκρατική, βουλή δέ δημοτικόν, δει 
μεν γαρ εΐναί τι τοιούτον ω επιμελές εσται τον 
δήμου προβουλεύειν, όπως άσχολών εσται• τοΰτο 
δ', εάν ολίγοι τον αριθμόν ώσιν, όλιγαρχικόν, 
85 του? δε προβούλους ολίγους άναγκαΐον eivat το 
πλήθος, ώστ όλιγαρχικόν. άλλ' οπού άμφω 
αύται at άρχαί, οί πρόβουλοι καθεστασιν επί τοις 
βουλευταΐς• ο μεν γαρ βουλευτής δημοτικόν, 6 
δε πρόβουλος όλιγαρχικόν . καταλύεται δε και 9 
τής βουλής ή δύναμις εν ταΐς τοιαύταις δημο- 

1300 a κρατίαις εν αΐς αυτός συνιών ό δήμος χρηματίζει 

περί πάντων. τοΰτο δε συμβαίνειν εϊωθεν όταν 
εύπορία τις ή μισθού* τοις έκκλησιάζουσιν , σχολά- 
ζοντες γαρ συλλέγονται τε πολλάκις και άπαντα 
αύτοι κρίνουσιν. παιδονόμος δέ καΐ γυναικονόμος 
β και ει τις άλλος άρχων κύριος εστί τοιαύτης 
επιμελείας άριστοκρατικόν, δημοκρατικόν δ' ου 
(πώς γαρ οΐόν τε κωλύειν efteVat τα? των απόρων;) 
ούδ' όλιγαρχικόν (τρυφώσι γαρ at των όλιγ- 
αρχούντων). άλλα περί μεν τούτων επι τοσούτον 
10 ειρήσθω νυν, περί δε τάς των αρχών καταστάσεις 10 
πειρατεον εξ αρχής διελθεΐν. είσι δ' at διαφοραι 
εν τρισιν όροις, ων συντιθέμενων άναγκαΐον 
πάντας είλήφθαι τους τρόπους, εστί δέ τών τριών 
τούτων εν μεν τίνες οί καθιστάντες τάς αρχάς, 
δεύτερον δ εκ τίνων, λοιπόν δέ τίνα τρόπον. 

1 μισθού Spengel : ή μισθός codd. 

° See 1298 b 29 η. 

6 Or possibly ' from going in processions ' : Solon made 
regulations reus έξοδοι? των -γυναικών και rots ιτένθΐσι και rah 
ioprah (Plutarch, Solon 21). 
360 



POLITICS, IV. χπ. 8-10 

forms of constitution, for instance the office of Pre- 
liminary Councillors. a This is undemocratic, although 
a Council is a popular body, for there is bound to be 
some body of this nature to have the duty of prepar- 
ing measures for the popular assembly, in order that 
it may be able to attend to its business ; but a 
preparatory committee, if small, is oligarchical, and 
Preliminary Councillors must necessarily be few in 
number, so that they are an oligarchical element. 
But where both of these magistracies exist, the Pre- 
liminary Councillors are in authority over the Coun- 
cillors, since a councillor is a democratic official, but a 

9 preliminary councillor is an oligarchic one. Also the 
power of the Council is weakened in democracies of 
the sort in which the people in assembly deals with 
everything itself; and this usually happens when 
there is a plentiful supply of pav for those who attend 
the assembly, for being at leisure they meet fre- 
quently and decide all things themselves. But a 
Superintendent of Children and a Superintendent of 
Women, and any other magistrates that exercise a 
similar sort of supervision, are an aristocratic feature, 
and not democratic (for how is it possible to prevent 
the wives of the poor from going out of doors b ?) 
nor yet oligarchic (for the wives of oligarchic rulers 

10 are luxurious). But let the discussion of these matters Appoint- 
go no further at present, and let us attempt to go Executive: 
through from the beginning the question of the ways 12 'nodes 
of appointing the magistrates. The varieties here variations. 
depend on three determinants, the combinations of 
which must give all the possible modes. One of these 
three determining points is, who are the persons who 
appoint the magistrates ? the second is, from whom ? 

ν 361 



ARISTOTLE 

1300 a 

€κάστον δε τών τριών τούτων διαφοραι τρεις 

15 είσίν η γαρ πάντες οι πολΐται καθιστάσιν η 
τίνες, και η εκ πάντων η εκ τινών άφωρισμενων 
(οΐον η τιμήματι η γένει η αρετή η τινι τοιουτω 
άλλω, ώσπερ iv Ήίεγάροις εκ τών συγ κατ ελΒ όντων 
και συμμαχεσαμενων προς τον δήμον), και ταύτα 

20 77 αιρεσει η κληρω• πάλιν ταύτα συνδυαζόμενα, 11 
λέγω δέ τα? μεν τινές τάς δέ πάντες, και τάς 
μεν εκ πάντων τάς δ' εκ Tt^oV, «rat τάς μέν 
αιρεσει τάς δε κληρω. τούτων δ' εκάστης 
έσονται της διαφοράς τρόποι τέσσαρες. 1 η γάρ 
πάντες εκ πάντων αιρεσει, η πάντες εκ πάντων 

25 κληρω — και [η] 2 εξ απάντων η ως άνά μέρος, οΐον 
κατά φυλάς και δήμους και φρατρίας εως άν 
διελθη δια πάντων τών πολιτών, 3 η αεί εζ απάν- 
των, — η και* τά μέν ούτω τά δε εκείνως' πάλιν ει 
τινές οι καθιστάντες, η εκ πάντων αιρεσει η εκ 
πάντων κληρω, η εκ τινών αιρεσει η εκ τινών 

30 κληρω, η τά μέν ούτω τά δ' εκείνως, λέγω δέ τά 
μέν [εκ πάντων] 5 αιρεσει τά δε κληρω. ώστε 
δώδεκα οι τρόποι γίνονται χωρίς τών δυο συν- 
δυασμών, τούτων δ' αϊ μέν δύο καταστάσεις 12 
δημοτικαί, το πάντας εκ πάντων 6 αιρεσει η κληρω 
[γίνεσθαι] 7 η άμφοΐν, τάς μέν κληρω τάς δ 
αιρεσει τών αρχών το δέ μη πάντας άμα μεν 

1 1300 a 23-b 5 locum vertiginosum viri docti ad libidinem 
quisque suam rescripserunt. 

2 Thurot. 3 πολιτών Ar. : πολιτικών. 
4 τ? και Rabe: και τ), και codd. s Hayduck. 

8 post πάντων add. και τό πάντας 4κ τίνων Rabe. 
7 Thurot. 

β It is quite uncertain when this event took place and 
362 



POLITICS, IV. xii. 10-12 

and last, in what manner ? And of each of these 
three determinants there are three variations : either 
all the citizens appoint or some, and either from 
all or from a certain class (defined for instance by 
property-assessment or birth or virtue or some other 
such qualification, as at Megara only those were 
eligible who returned in a body from exile and fought 
together against the common people)," and the mode 
of appointment may be either by vote or by lot ; 

11 again, these systems may be coupled together — I 
mean that some citizens may appoint to some offices 
but all to others, and to some offices all citizens may 
be eligible but to others only a certain class, and to 
some appointment may be by vote but to others by 
lot. And of each variation of these determinants 
there will be four modes : either all citizens may 
appoint from all by vote, or all from all by lot — and 
from all either section by section, for instance by 
tribes or demes or brotherhoods until the procedure 
has gone through all the citizens, or from the whole 
number even, 7 time, — or else partly in one way and 
partly in the other. Again, if the electors are some 
of the citizens, they must either appoint from all by 
vote, or from all by lot, or from some by vote, or 
from some by lot, or partly in one way and partly in 
the other — I mean partly by vote and partly by lot. 
Hence the modes prove to be twelve, apart from the 

12 two combinations. And among these, two ways of 
appointment are democratic — for all to appoint from 
all by vote, or by lot, or by both — some offices by lot 
and others by vote ; but for not all to be the electors 
and for them to appoint simultaneously, and either 

whether it is the same as those referred to at 1302 b 30 f . 
and 1304 b 34 ff. 

36S 



ARISTOTLE 

1300 a 

85 καθιστάναι, εζ απάντων δ' ή εκ τινών, ή κλήρω ή 

αιρεσει ή άμφοΐν, ή τάς μεν εκ πάντων τάς δ' 

εκ τινών άμφοΐν (το δέ άμφοΐν λέγω τάς μεν 

κλήρω τάς δ' αιρεσει) πολιτικόν. και το τινάς 

εκ πάντων τάς μεν αιρεσει καθιστάναι τάς δε 

40 κλήρω ή άμφοΐν (τάς μεν κλήρω τάς δ' αιρεσει) 
ολιγαρχικόν ολιγαρχικώτερον δε και το εξ άμφοΐν. 
το δε τα? μεν εκ πάντων τάς δ' εκ τινών πολι- 13 
1300 b τικον άριστο κ ρατικώς, ή τάς μεν αιρεσει τα? δε 
κλήρω. το δε τιι^ά? εκ τινών <αίρεσει> Χ ολιγ- 
αρχικό^, και το Tim? εκ τιΐ'ώΐ' κλήρω (μη 
γενομενον δ ομοίως), και το τινάς εκ τινών άμφοΐν. 
το δέ τινάς εξ απάντων τότε 2 δέ εκ τι^ώ^ alpeaei 
δ παντας άριστοκρατικόν . 

Οι μεν ουν τρόποι τών περί τάς αρχάς το- 
σούτοι τον αριθμόν είσι, και διήρηνται κατά τάς 
πολιτείας οϋτως• τίνα δέ τισι συμφέρει και πώς 
δεΓ γίνεσθαι τάς καταστάσεις άμα ταΐς ουνάμεσι 
τών αρχών [και] 3 τι^ε? εισιν εσται φανερόν. λέγω 

!0 δέ δυναμι^ αρχής οίον την κυρίαν τών προσόδων 
και την κυρίαν της φυλακής• άλλο γάρ είδο? 
δυνάμεως οίον στρατηγίας και της τών περί την 
αγοράν συμβολαίων κυρίας. 

XIII. Λοιπόν δέ τών τριών το δικαστικοί ειπείν, 1 
ληπτεον δέ και τούτων τους τρόπους κατά την 

1 Lambinus. 2 τότε Ρ 2 : τό cet. 3 [και] om. ΓΜΡ 1 . 

α Perhaps the Greek should be rewritten to give ' for some 
to appoint from all either by vote or by lot or by both.' 
6 This insertion by Lambinus seems certain. 

364 



POLITICS, IV. χπ. 12— χιπ. 1 

from all or from some either by lot or by vote or by 

both, or some offices from all and others from some 

by both (by which I mean some by lot and others by ι 

vote) is constitutional. And for some to appoint 

from all, to some offices by vote and to others by lot 

or by both α (to some by lot and to others by vote) 

is oligarchical ; and it is even more oligarchical to 

13 appoint from both classes. But to appoint some 
offices from all and the others from a certain class is 
constitutional with an aristocratic bias ; or to appoint 
some by vote and others by lot. And for a certain 
class to appoint from a certain class <by vote> & is 
oligarchical, and so it is for a certain class to appoint 
from a certain class by lot (although not working out 
in the same way), and for a certain class to appoint 
from a certain class by both methods. And for a 
certain class to make a preliminary selection from 
the whole body and then for all to appoint from 
among certain persons (thus selected) is aristocratic. 
So many in number therefore are the modes of 
appointing to the magistracies, and this is how the 
modes are classified according to the different con- 
stitutions ; and what regulations are advantageous 
for what people and how the appointments ought to 
be conducted will be made clear at the same time 
as we consider what are the powers of the offices. 
By the power of an office I mean for instance the 
control of the revenues and the control of the guard ; 
since a different sort of power belongs for example 
to a generalship and to the office that controls market 
contracts. 

1 XIII. Of the three factors of a constitution it (3) The 
remains to speak of the judiciary, and of judicial ^'suitl" 
bodies also we must consider the various modes, in classified. 

365 



ARISTOTLE 

1300 b 

is αυτήν ύπόθεσιν. έστι δε διαφορά τών δικαστηρίων 

iv τρισιν όροις, εξ ών τε και περί ών και πώς. 

λέγω δε εξ ών μεν, πότερον εκ πάντων η εκ 

τινών περί ών δε, πόσα είδη δικαστηρίων το 

δε πώς, πότερον κληρω η αίρεσει. πρώτον οΰν 

διαιρείσθω πόσα ε'ίδη δικαστηρίων, εστί δε τον 

20 αριθμόν οκτώ, εν μεν εύθυντικόν, άλλο δε el τίς τι 
τών κοινών αδικεί, έτερον όσα εις την πολιτείαν 
φέρει, τέταρτον και άρχουσι και ίδιώταις οσα 
περί ζημιώσεων άμφισβητοΰσιν, πέμπτον το περί 
τών ιδίων συναλλαγμάτων και 1 εχόντων μέγεθος, 
και παρά ταΰτα τό τε φονικόν και το ξενικόν 

25 {φονικού μεν οΰν είδη, αν τ εν τοις αύτοΐς δικά- 2 
σταΐς αν τ' εν άλλοις, περί τε τών εκ προνοίας και 
περί τών ακουσίων και όσα ομολογείται μεν 
αμφισβητείται δε περί του δίκαιου, τέταρτον δε 
όσα τοις φεύγουσι φόνου επι καθόδω επιφέρεται, 
οίον 'Κθήνησι λέγεται και τό εν Φρεαττοΐ δικα- 

30 στήριον, συμβαίνει δε τά τοιαύτα εν τω παντί 
χρόνω ολίγα και εν ταΓ? μ-εγάλαχ? πόλεσιν του 
δε ξενικού εν μεν ξενοις προς ξένους, άλλο δε 2 
ξενοις προς αστούς)• ετι δε παρά πάντα ταΰτα 
περί τών μικρών συναλλαγμάτων , όσα δραχμιαΐα 
και πεντάδραχμα και μικρώ πλείονος• δει μεν 

36 γάρ και περί τούτων γίνεσθαι κρίσιν, ουκ εμπίπτει 
δε εις δικαστών πλήθος, αλλά περί μεν τούτων 3 

1 <τ«ι»> και Richards. 2 άλλο δ<? Richards : άλλο codd. 

α i.e. men that had been allowed to flee the country when 
charged with accidental homicide, and on their return were 
accused of another homicide, a wilful murder. 

366 



POLITICS, IV. χπι. 1-3 

accordance with the same plan. And a difference 
among judicial courts rests upon three determinants 
— constituents, sphere of action, and mode of appoint- 
ment. As to their constituents I mean are the 
courts drawn from all the citizens or from a certain 
class ? as to sphere of action, how many kinds of 
courts are there ? and as to mode of appointment, 
are they appointed by lot or by vote ? First then 
let us distinguish how many kinds of courts there are. 
They are eight in number, one a court of audit, 
another to deal with offenders against any public 
interest, another with matters that bear on the 
constitution, a fourth for both magistrates and private 
persons in disputes about penalties, fifth the court 
dealing with private contracts that are on an im- 
portant scale, and beside these there is (6) the court 
that tries homicide, and (7) that which hears alien suits 

2 (of courts of homicide there are four kinds, whether 
the jury is the same or different — namelv, for cases 
of deliberate homicide, of involuntary homicide, of 
homicide admitted but claimed to be justifiable, and 
fourth to deal with charges of homicide brought 
against men that have fled from the country for 
homicide, upon their return, 8 such as at Athens for 
instance the Court at Phreatto is said to be, although 
such cases are of rare occurrence in the whole course 
of history, even in the great states ; and of the aliens' 
court one branch hears suits of aliens against aliens 
and another of aliens against citizens) ; and also 
beside all of these there are (8) courts to try cases of 
petty contracts, involving sums of one drachma, five 
drachmas or a little more — for even these cases have 
to be tried, though they are not suitable for a numerous 

3 jury. But let us dismiss the subject of these petty 

367 



ARISTOTLE 

1300 b 

άφείσθω καί τών φονικών και των ξενικών, περί 

δέ των πολιτικών λέγωμεν, περί ων μη γινομένων 

καλώς διαστάσει? γίνονται και τών πολιτειών αϊ 

κινήσεις, ανάγκη ο ήτοι πάντας περί πάντων 

40 κρίνειν τών διηρη μένων αίρεσει η κληρω, η 
πάντας περί πάντων τά μεν κληρω τά δ' αίρεσει, 
η περί ενίων τών αυτών τους μεν κληρω τους ο* 
1301a αιρετούς, οΰτοι μεν οΰν οι τρόποι τετταρες τον 
αριθμόν, τοσούτοι δ έτεροι και οι κατά μέρος' 
πάλιν γαρ εκ τινών και οι δικάζοντες περί πάντων 
αίρεσει, η εκ τινών περί πάντων κληρω, η τά μεν 
6 κληρω τά δε αίρεσει, η έϊ-ια οικαστήρια περί τών 
αυτών εκ κληρωτών και αιρετών, ούτοι μεν οΰν, 
ώσπερ ελέχθησαν, οι τρόποι αντίστροφοι 1 τοις 
είρημενοις. έτι δέ τα αυτά συνδυαζόμενα, λέγω δ' 4 
οίον τά μεν εκ πάντων τά δ' εκ Tii/aw τά δ' εξ 
άμφοΐν, οΐον ει του αύτοϋ δικαστηρίου εΐεν οι μεν 

ίο εκ πάντων οι δ' εκ τινών, και η κληρω η αίρεσει 
η άμφοΐν. όσους μεν οΰν ενδέχεται τρόπους ε?ναι 
τά οικαστήρια, εΐρηται• τούτων δε τα μεν πρώτα 
δημοτικά, όσα εκ πάντων περί 2 πάντων, τά δέ 
δευτέρα ολιγαρχικά, όσα εκ τινών περί πάντων, τά 
δέ τρίτα αριστοκρατικά καί πολιτικά, όσα τά μεν 

15 εκ πάντων τά δ' εκ τινών. 

1 αντίστροφοι suppleuit Newman. 
2 wepi Susemihl : ί) wepi codd. 



S68 



POLITICS, IV. xiii. 3-4 

suits, and the courts for homicide and those for aliens, Lawcourts 
and let us speak about political trials, which when various 
not well conducted cause party divisions and revolu- constitu- 
tionary disturbances. And necessarily either all 
the judges of all the cases that have been classified 
will be appointed by vote, or by lot, or all in all cases 
partly by lot and partly by vote, or in some cases some 
judges will be appointed by lot and others by vote 
for the same case. These modes then are four in 
number, and the sectional modes also make as many 
others ; for here again the judges for all cases may 
be drawn by vote from a certain class, or for all cases 
by lot from a certain class, or some courts may be 
appointed by lot and others by vote, or some courts 
may be composed of judges chosen by lot and by 
vote for the same cases. These then are the modes, 
4 as was said, corresponding to those mentioned. And 
there are also the same courts in combination — I mean 
for example some drawn from the whole body and 
some from a class and some from both, as for instance 
if the same court contained some members from the 
whole body and others from a class, and appointed 
either by lot or by vote or both. We have then 
stated all the modes in which it is possible for the 
courts to be composed ; and of these the first set, 
drawn from all the citizens and dealing with all cases, 
are popular, the second, drawn from a certain class 
to deal with all cases, are oligarchic, and the third, 
drawn partly from all and partly from a certain class, 
are suited to an aristocracy and to a constitutional 
government. 



369 



Ε 

1301a 

I. ΥΙερι μεν οΰν τών άλλων ων προειλόμεθα 1 

20 σχεδόν εΐρηται περί πάντων εκ τίνων δε μετα- 
βάλλουσα• αϊ πολιτεΐαι και ποσών καΐ ποίων, καΐ 
τίνες εκάστης πολιτείας φθοραί, και εκ ποίων 
εις ποίας μάλιστα μεθιστανται, ετι δε σωτηρίαι 
τίνες και κοινή και χωρίς εκάστης είσίν, ετι δε διά 
τίνων αν μάλιστα σωζοιτο των πολιτειών εκάστη, 

25 σκεπτεον εφεξής τοις είρημενοις. 

Αεί δε πρώτον νπολαβεΐν την άρχην, οτι πολλαι 2 
γεγενηνται πολιτεΐαι πάντων μεν όμολογούντων το 
δίκαιον και το κατ' άναλογίαν 'ίσον τούτου δ' 
άμαρτανόντων (ώσπερ εϊρηται και πρότερον). 
δήμος μεν γαρ εγενετο εκ του ΐσους ότιοΰν οντάς 

30 οΐεσθαι απλώς Ισους είναι {οτι γαρ ελεύθεροι πάντες 
ομοίως, απλώς ίσοι είναι νομίζουσιν) , ολιγαρχία δέ 
εκ του άνισους εν τι οντάς όλως είναι άνισους 
ύπολαμβάνειν (κατ' ούσίαν γαρ άνισοι οντες 
απλώς άνισοι ύπολαμβάνουσιν είναι) . είτα οι μεν 3 
ώς 'ίσοι οντες πάντων τών ίσων άζιοΰσι μετεχειν, 

α Book V. is placed as Book VII. by some editors, as 
Book VIII. by others, see Book Ill.^n. note. 

6 For this distinction between broad methods of guarding 
against revolution and the practical means by which those 
methods can be put into effect Newman compares c. ix. §§ 2 f., 
10 f,, iv. ii. 5 fin., vi. i. 1. 
370 



BOOK V• 

1 I. Almost all the other subjects which we intended Book v. 
to treat have now been discussed. There must ^o™^ 7 " 
follow the consideration of the questions, what are its causes 
the number and the nature of the causes that give PRE veji- 
rise to revolutions in constitutions, and what are Τ10>ί • 
the causes that destroy each form of constitution, 

and out of what forms into what forms do they 
usually change, and again what are the safeguards 
of constitutions in general and of each form in par- 
ticular, and what are the means by which the safe- 
guarding of each may best be put into effect. 6 

2 And we must first assume the starting-point, that Sources of 
many forms of constitution have come into exist- 
ence with everybody agreeing as to what is just, 

that is proportionate equality, but failing to attain 
it (as has also been said before). Thus democracy 12S0 a 9 ff - 
arose from men's thinking that if they are equal in 
any respect they are equal absolutely (for they sup- 12S2 b u ff. 
pose that because they are all alike free they are 
equal absolutely), oligarchy arose from their assum- 
ing that if they are unequal as regards some one 
thing they are unequal wholly (for being unequal 
in property they assume that they are unequal 

3 absolutely) ; and then the democrats claim as 
being equal to participate in all things in equal 

371 



ARISTOTLE 

1301 Β 

35 ol δ' ώς άνισοι οντες πλεονεκτεΐν ζητοΰσιν, το γάρ 
πλεΐον άνισον. εχουσι μεν ουν τι 7τάσαι δίκαιον, 
ημαρτημεναι δ' απλώς είσίν και δια ταύτην την 
αίτίαν, όταν μη κατά την ύπόληφιν ην εκάτεροι 
τνγχάνονσιν έχοντες μετέχωσι της πολιτείας, 
στασιάζουσιν. πάντων δε δικαιότατα μεν αν στα- 

40 σιάζοιεν, ηκιστα ok τούτο πράττονσιν, οι κατ 
1201 b άρετην διαφέροντες' μάλιστα γαρ εϋλογον άνισους 
απλώς είναι τούτους μόνον 1 , είσι δε τίνες οι κατά 
γένος υπερέχοντες ουκ άζιοΰσι τών Ισων αυτούς 
δια την ανισότητα ταύτην ευγενείς γάρ είναι 
δοκοϋσιν οΐς υπάρχει προγόνων άρετη και πλούτος. 
δ Άρχαι μεν ουν ώς ειπείν 2 αύται και πηγαι τών 4 
στάσεων εϊσιν όθεν στασιάζουσιν (διό και αί μετα- 
βολαΐ γίγνονται διχώς• ότε μεν γάρ προς την 
πολιτείαν, όπως εκ της καθεστηκυίας άλλην μετα- 
στησωσιν, οίον εκ δημοκρατίας όλιγαρχίαν η 
δημοκρατίαν εξ ολιγαρχίας, η πολιτείαν και 

ίο άριστοκρατίαν εκ τούτων, η ταύτας εξ εκείνων 
ότε δ' ου προς την καθεστηκυΐαν πολιτείαν, αλλά 
την μεν κατάστασιν προαιρούνται την αύτην, δι* 
αυτών δ' ει^αι βούλονται ταύτην, οίον την όλιγ- 
αρχίαν η την μοναρχίαν. ετι περί του μάλλον και 5 
ήττον, οίον η όλιγαρχίαν οΰσαν εις το μάλλον 

15 όλιγαρχεΐσθαι η εις το ήττον, η δημοκρατίαν 
οΰσαν εις το μάλλον δημοκρατεΐσθαι η εις το 
ήττον, ομοίως δε και επι τών λοιπών πολιτειών, η 

1 μ6νου$ ? ed. 
2 <7τασώ^> ws ειπείν vel ώί βΙπ(ΐι> post nyyal Richards. 

372 



POLITICS, V. ι. 3-5 

shares, while the oligarchs as being unequal seek 
to have a larger share, for a larger share is unequal. 
All these forms of constitution then have some 
element of justice, but from an absolute point of 
view they are erroneous ; and owing to this cause, 
when each of the two parties has not got the share 
in the constitution which accords with the funda- 
mental assumption that they happen to entertain, 
class war ensues. And of all men those who excel in 
virtue would most justifiably stir up faction, though 
they are least given to doing so ; for they alone 
can with the fullest reason be deemed absolutely 
unequal. And there are some men who being 
superior in birth claim unequal rights because of 
this inequality ; for persons who have ancestral virtue 
and wealth behind them are thought to be noble. 

4 These then roughly speaking are the starting- Aims of 
points and sources of factions, which give rise to party revolution, 
strife (and revolutions due to this take place in two 

ways : sometimes they are in regard to the constitu- 
tion, and aim at changing from the one established 
to another, for instance from democracy to oligarchy, 
or to democracy from oligarchy, or from these to 
constitutional government and aristocracy, or from 
those to these ; but sometimes the revolution is not 
in regard to the established constitution, but its 
promoters desire the same form of government, 
for instance oligarchy or monarchy, but wish it to be 

5 in their own control. Again it may be a question of 
degree ; for instance, when there is an oligarchy the 
object may be to change to a more oligarchical 
government or to a less, or when there is a democracy 
to a more or to a less democratic government, and 
similarly in the case of the remaining constitutions. 

373 



ARISTOTLE 

1801 b « 

ίνα επιταθώσιν ή άνεθώσιν. ετι προς το μέρος τι 
κινησαι της πολιτείας, οΐον αρχήν τίνα καταστήσαι 
ή ανελεΐν, ώσπερ iv Αακεδαίμονί φασι Αύσανδρόν 

20 τινβ? επιχειρήσαι καταλΰσαι την βασιλείαν καί 

ΪΙαυσανίαν τον βασιλέα την εφορείαν καί iv 6 

Έπιδάμνω δε μετεβαλεν ή πολιτεία κατά μόριον, 

αντί γαρ των φνλάρχων βονλήν εποίησαν, εις 8ε 

την ηλιαιαι* επάναγκες εστίν ετι των εν τω 

25 πολιτεύματι βαδίζεις τα? αρχάς όταν επιφηφίζηται 
αρχή τις• όλιγαρχικόν δε και 6 άρχων ο εις ην εν 
τη πολιτεία ταύτη) . πανταχού γάρ διά το άνισον 
ή στάσις, ου μη 1 τοις άνίσοις υπάρχει άνάλογον 
(άίδιος γάρ βασίλεια άνισος εάν η εν ΐσοις)' όλως 
γάρ το ϊσον ζητοΰντες στασιάζουσιν. εστί δε 7 

80 διττον το ίσον, το μεν γάρ αριθμώ το δε κατ 
άζίαν εστίν — λέγω δε αριθμώ μεν το πλήθει ή 
μεγεθει ταύτό και Ισον, κατ άξίαν δε το τω 
λόγω• οΐον υπερέχει κατ' αριθμόν μεν ΐσω τά 
τρία τοΐν δυοΐν και ταύτα του ενός, λόγω δε 
τετταρα τοΐν δυοΐν και ταύτα του ενός, ϊσον γάρ 

ββ μέρος τά δύο των τεττάρων και το εν των δυοΐν, 
άμφω γάρ ήμίση. όμολογοΰντες δε το απλώς 
είναι δίκαιον το κατ άζίαν, διαφερονται (καθαπερ 
ελέχθη πρότερον) οί μεν ότι εάν κατά τι ίσοι 
ωσιν όλως ίσοι νομίζουσιν είναι, οί δ' ότι εάν κατά 
τι άνισοι πάντων άνισων άζιοϋσιν εαυτούς, διό 8 

ίο και μάλιστα δύο γίνονται πολιτεΐαι, δήμος και 

1 aut οδ μη aut ού μην el schol. Η : ον μην codd. 

β See 1307 a 34 η. 

b This ethical arithmetic is helped out in Greek by the 
fact that, even without the qualification κατ ά£ίαν, icros often 
means ' equal to desert,' fair, just. 

e See 1301 a 27 ff. and note. 
374 



POLITICS, V. ι. 5-8 

the aim may be either to tighten them up or to relax 
them. Or again the aim mav be to change a certain 
part of the constitution, for example to establish 
or abolish a certain magistracy, as according to some 
accounts Lysander attempted to abolish the kingship 
at Sparta and the king Pausanias the ephorate a ; 

6 and also at Epidamnus the constitution was altered 
in part, for they set up a council instead of the tribal 
rulers, and it is still compulsory for the magistrates 
alone of the class that has political power to come 
to the popular assembly when an appointment to 
a magistracy is put to the vote ; and the single 
supreme magistrate was also an oligarchical feature 
in this constitution). For party strife is every where 
due to inequality, where classes that are unequal do 
not receive a share of power in proportion (for a life- 
long monarchy is an unequal feature when it exists 
among equals) ; for generally the motive for factious 

7 strife is the desire for equality. But equality is 
of two kinds, numerical equality and equality ac- 
cording to worth — by numerically equal I mean 
that which is the same and equal in number or 
dimension, by equal according to worth that which 
is equal by proportion b ; for instance numerically 
3 exceeds 2 and 2 exceeds 1 by an equal amount, 
but by proportion 4 exceeds 2 and 2 exceeds 1 
equally, since 2 and 1 are equal parts of -i and 2, 
both being halves. But although men agree that the 
absolutely just is what is according to worth, they 
disagree (as was said before c ) in that some think 
that if they are equal in something they are wholly 
equal, and others claim that if they are unequal in 
something they deserve an unequal share of all things. 

8 Owing to this two principal varieties of constitution 

375 



ARISTOTLE 

1302a ολιγαρχία• euyeVeia γαρ καί αρετή εν ολίγοις, 
ταΰτα 1 δ' iv πλείοσιν ευγενείς γαρ και αγαθοί 
ούδαμοΰ εκατόν, εύποροι 2 δε πο?ίλαχοΰ. 3 τό δε 
απλώς πάντη καθ* εκατεραν τετάχθαι την ισότητα 
φαΰλον. φανερον δ εκ του συμβαίνοντος• ουδεμία 

6 γαρ μόνιμος εκ των τοιούτων πολιτειών . τούτου 
δ' αίτιον ότι αδύνατον από του πρώτου και του εν 
άρχη ήμαρτημενου μη απαντάν εις το τέλος κακόν 
τι. διό δει τα μεν αριθμητική ισότητι χρήσθαι, 
τά δε τη κατ ά£ιαι\ όμως δε ασφαλέστερα και 9 
άστασίαστος μάλλον ή δημοκρατία της ολιγαρχίας• 

ίο εν μεν γάρ ταΐς όλιγαρχίαις εγγίνονται δύο, ή τε 
προς αλλήλους στάσις και ετι ή προς τον δήμον, 
εν δέ ταΐς δημοκρατίαις ή προς την όλιγαρχίαν 
μόνον, αύτώ δε προς αυτόν ο τι και αζιον ειπείν 
ουκ εγγίγνεται τω δήμω στάσις. ετι δε ή εκ τών 
μέσων πολιτεία εγγυτέρω του δήμου ή [ή]* τών 

15 ολίγων, ήπερ εστίν ασφαλέστατη τών τοιούτων 
πολιτειών. 

II. Έττει δε σκοποΰμεν εκ τίνων αι τε στάσεις 1 
γίγνονται και αϊ μεταβολαι περί τάς πολιτείας, 
ληπτεον καθόλου πρώτον τάς αρχάς και τάς αιτίας 
αυτών, είσι δη σχεδόν ως ειπείν τρεις τον αριθμόν, 

20 ας διοριστεον καθ αύτας τύπω πρώτον, δει γάρ 
λαβείν πώς τε έχοντες στασιάζουσι και τίνων 

1 τάναι—ία Lambinus. 

8 άποροι Γ : εϋπομοι δέ <καϊ &ποροι> Stahr. 

3 πολλοί πολλαχοΰ codd. det. 

4 ή om. p a : τήί Victorius. 

α That is, numbers and wealth. 

" Perhaps the text should be emended to give ' there are 
many rich men and poor men in many places.' 
376 



POLITICS, V. ι. 8— π. 1 

come into existence, democracy and oligarchy ; for 
noble birth and virtue are found in few men, but the 
qualifications specified α in more : nowhere are there 
a hundred men nobly born and good, but there are 
rich men b in many places. But for the constitution 
to be framed absolutely and entirely according to 
either kind of equality is bad. And this is proved 
by experience, for not one of the constitutions formed 
on such lines is permanent. And the cause of this 
is that it is impossible for some evil not to occur 
ultimately from the first and initial error that has 
been made. Hence the proper course is to employ 
numerical equality in some things and equality 

9 according to worth in others. But nevertheless 
democracy is safer and more free from civil strife 
than oligarchy ; for in oligarchies two kinds of strife 
spring up, faction between different members of the 
oligarchy and also faction between the oligarchs and 
the people, whereas in democracies only strife between 
the people and the oligarchical party occurs, but party 
strife between different sections of the people itself 
does not occur to any degree worth mentioning. And 
again the government formed of the middle classes is 
nearer to the people than to the few, and it is the 
safest of the kinds of constitution mentioned. 

1 II. And since we are considering what circum- Causes of 
stances give rise to party factions and revolutions revoiutlon; 
in constitutions, we must first ascertain their origins 
and causes generally. They are, speaking roughly, 
three in number , c which we must first define in out- 
line separately. For we must ascertain what state 
of affairs gives rise to party strife, and for what 

c Viz. the material, final and efficient causes of revolutions 
(Jowett). 

377 



ARISTOTLE 

1302 a 

ένεκεν και τρίτον τίνες άρχαΐ γίνονται των πολιτι- 
κών ταραχών και τών προς αλλήλους στάσεων. 

Τον μεν ουν αυτούς εχειν πως προς την μεταβολην 
αίτίαν καθόλου μάλιστα θετεον περί ης ηδη τυγ- 

25 χανομεν ειρηκοτες. οι μεν γαρ ίσότητος εφιεμενοι 
στασιάζουσιν αν νομίζωσιν ελαττον εχειν οντες 
ίσοι τοις πλεονεκτοΰσιν , οι 8ε της άνισότητος και 
της υπεροχής αν ύπολαμβάνωσιν οντες άνισοι μη 
πλέον εχειν αλλ' 'ίσον η ελαττον {τούτων δ' εστί 2 
μεν όρεγεσθαι δικαίως, εστί δε και αδίκως)' ελάτ- 

30 τους τε γαρ οντες όπως 'ίσοι ώσι στασιάζουσι, 
και 'ίσοι οντες όπως μείζους. πώς μεν ουν έχοντες 
στασιάζουσιν, ε'ίρηται. 

ΐίερι ων δε στασιάζουσιν, εστί κέρδος και τιμή, 
και τάναντία τούτοις, και γαρ άτιμίαν φεύγοντες 
και ζημίαν ή ύπερ αυτών η τών φίλων στασιάζουσιν 
εν ταί? πόλεσιν. 

35 Αι δ' atrial και άρχαι τών κινήσεων, όθεν αυτοί 3 
τε διατίθενται τον είρημενον τρόπον καΐ περί τών 
λεχθέντων, εστί μεν ως τον αριθμόν επτά τυγχά- 
νουσιν ουσαι, εστί δ' ως πλείους. ων δύο μεν εστί 
ταύτα τοις είρημενοις, αλλ' ούχ ωσαύτως• δια 
κέρδος γαρ και δια τι/ζι^ και 1 παροξύνονται 

40 προς άλλ^λου? ούχ ίνα κτησωνται σφίσιν αύτοΐς, 

i:02b ώσπερ ε'ίρηται πρότερον, αλλ' έτερους ορώντες 

τους μεν δικαίως τους δ' αδίκως πλεονεκτοΰντας 

τούτων, ετι δια ϋβριν, δια φόβον, δια ύπεροχην, 

1 και suppleuit Immisch. 
378 



POLITICS, V. π. 1-3 

objects it is waged, and thirdly what are the origins 
of political disorders and internal party struggles. 

Now the principal cause, speaking generally, ofn)statp*of 
the citizens being themselves disposed in a certain fee lDg ' 
manner towards revolution is the one about which we c. i. §§ 3, 
happen to have spoken already. Those that desire ' ^ 7l " 
equality enter on party strife if they think that they 
have too little although they are the equals of those 
who have more, while those that desire inequality or 
superiority do so if they suppose that although they 
are unequal they have not got more but an equal 
amount or less (and these desires may be felt justly, 
and they may also be felt unjustly) ; for when inferior, 
people enter on strife in order that they may be equal, 
and when equal, in order that they may be greater. 
We have therefore said what are the states of feeling 
in which men engage in party strife. 

The objects about which it is waged are gain and (2) objects 
honour, and their opposites, for men carry on party 
faction in states in order to avoid dishonour and loss, 
either on their own behalf or on behalf of their friends. 

And the causes and origins of the disturbances (S) cans•»* 
which occasion the actual states of feeling described ^ η ^ Γ 8 οαιη ' 
and their direction to the objects mentioned, accord- 
ing to one account happen to be seven in number, 
though according to another they are more. Two 
of them are the same as those spoken of before ξ 2 fin. 
although not operating in the same way : the 
motives of gain and honour also stir men up against 
each other not in order that they may get them for 
themselves, as has been said before, but because 
they see other men in some cases justly and in 
other cases unjustly getting a larger share of 
them. Other causes are insolence, fear, excessive 

379 



ARISTOTLE 

1802 b 

διά καταφρόνησιν, διά αύ'^σιν την παρά το άνά- 

λογον, ετι δε άλλον τρόπον δι εριθείαν, δι' ολι- 

5 γωρίαν, δια μικρότητα, δι ανομοιότητα, τούτων 4 
δέ ύβρις μεν καΐ κέρδος τίνα εχουσι Βνναμίν καΐ 
πώς αίτια σχεδόν εστί φανερόν υβριζόντων τε 
γάρ των εν ταις άρχαΐς και πλεονεκτούντων 
στασιάζουσι και προς αλλήλους 1 και προς τάς 
πολιτείας τάς δίδουσα? την έζουσιαν η δε πλεονεξία 

ίο γίνεται ότε μεν από των Ιδίων, ότε δε από των 
κοινών. δηλον δέ και ή τιμή και τι δύναται και 
πώς αιτία στάσεως• και γάρ αύτοι άτιμαζόμενοι 
και άλλους όρώντες τιμωμένους στασιάζουσιν 
ταύτα δέ αδίκως μεν γίνεται όταν παρά την ά£ιαι> 
η τιμώνται τινε? η ατιμάζωνται, δικαίως δε όταν 

15 κατά την άζίαν. δι ύπεροχην δε, όταν τις η τη 
δυνάμει μείζων (η εις η πλείους) η κατά την πάλιν 
και την δυναμ.ιν του πολιτεύματος' •)/ινεσί?αι γάρ 
εϊωθεν εκ τών τοιούτων μοναρχία η δυναστεία, 
διό ένιαχοΰ εΐώθασιν όστρακίζειν, οίον εν "Αργεί 5 
και Άθήνησιν καίτοι βελτιον εζ άρχης όράν όπως 

20 μη ένέσονται τοσούτον υπερέχοντες, η εάσαντας 
)/ενε'σ^αι ίασθαι ύστερον, διά δε φόβον στασιά- 
ζουσιν οι τε ηδικηκότες, δεδιότες μη δώσι δίκην, 
και οι μέλλοντες άδικεΐσθαι, βουλόμενοι φθάσαι 
πριν άδικηθηναι, ώσπερ εν Ροδω συνέστησαν οι 
γνώριμοι επί τον δημον διά τάς επιφερομένας 

1 αλλήλους: αυτούς Niemeyer. 

β The four causes now mentioned are those alluded to just 
above (a 38) as in addition to the seven enumerated above, 
a 38-b 5. 

* Of. 1284 a 18. 

• Perhaps in 390 b.c, cf. 1. 32 f. and 1304 b 27 if. 

380 



POLITICS, V. ιι. 3-5 

predominance, contempt, disproportionate growth 
of power ; and also other modes of cause α are elec- 
tion intrigue, carelessness, pettiness, dissimilarity. 

4 Among these motives the power possessed by 
insolence and gain, and their mode of operation, is 
almost obvious ; for when the men in office show 
insolence and greed, people rise in revolt against 
one another and against the constitutions that 
afford the opportunity for such conduct ; and greed 
sometimes preys on private property and sometimes 
on common funds. It is clear also what is the power 
of honour and how it can cause party faction ; for 
men form factions both when they are themselves 
dishonoured and when they see others honoured ; 
and the distribution of honours is unjust when persons 
are either honoured or dishonoured against their 
deserts, just when it is according to desert. Ex- 
cessive predominance causes faction, when some 
individual or body of men is greater and more power- 
ful than is suitable to the state and the power of the 
government ; for such are the conditions that usually 

5 result in the rise of a monarchy or dynasty. Owing 
to this in some places they have the custom of 
temporary banishment, 6 as at Argos and Athens ; yet 
it would be better to provide from the outset that 
there may be no persons in the state so greatly 
predominant, than first to allow them to come into 
existence and afterwards to apply a remedy. Fear 
is the motive of faction with those who have 
inflicted wrong and are afraid of being punished, 
and also with those who are in danger of suffering 
a wrong and wish to act in time before the wrong is 
inflicted, as the notables at Rhodes banded together c 
against the people because of the law-suits that were 

381 



ARISTOTLE 

1302 b 

25 Βίκας. Βιά καταφρόνησιν Βε και στασιάζονσι και β 
επιτίθενται, οίον εν τε ταΐς όλιγαρχίαις όταν 
πλείους ώσιν οι μη μετέχοντες της πολιτείας 
(κρείττους γαρ ο'ίονται εΐναή, /cat εν ταΐς Βημο- 
κρατιαις οι εύποροι, καταφρονησαντες της αταξίας 
/cat αναρχίας, οίον /cat ev Θι^αι? μετά την εν 

30 Οίνοφύτοις μάχην κακώς πολιτευόμενων η δημο- 
κρατία Βιεφθάρη, και η Ήίεγαρεων δι' άταξίαν και 
αναρχιαν ηττηθεντων, και εν Έυρακούσαις προ της 
Τελωνος τυραννίΒος, και εν 'Ρόδω ό Βημος προ 
της επαναστάσεως . γίνονται Βε και δι' αύξησιν 7 
την πάρα το άνάλογον μεταβολαι των πολιτειών 

85 ώσπερ γαρ σώμα εκ μερών σύγκειται και Βεΐ 
αύζάνεσθαι άνάλογον ίνα μένη συμμετρία, ει Βε 
μη, φθείρεται, όταν 6 μεν πους τεττάρων πηχών 
η το Β άλλο σώμα Βυοΐν σπιθαμαΧν, ενίοτε Βε καν 
εις άλλου ζώου μεταβάλλοι μορφην ει μη μόνον 

40 «-ατά το ποσόν αλλά και κατά το ποιόν αύζάνοιτο 

1303 a παρά το άνάλογον , ούτω και πόλις σύγκειται εκ 

μερών, ων πολλάκις λανθάνει τι αύζανόμενον, οίον 
το τών άπορων πλήθος εν ταΐς Βημοκρατίαις και 
πολιτείαις. συμβαίνει δ' ενίοτε τούτο και δια 8 
τύχας, οίον εν Ύάραντι ηττηθεντων και άπολο- 
6 μένων πολλών γνωρίμων υπό τών Ίαπύγων μικρόν 
ύστερον τών ΜηΒικών Βημοκρατία εγενετο εκ 
πολιτείας, και εν "Αργεί τών εν τη εβΒόμη άπ- 

° Against Athens, 456 b.c. " See 1300 a 18 η. 

c 485 b.c. d See 1. 23 n. 

• It is not clear whether what follows refers to a work of 
art (cf. 1284 b 8) or is an exaggerated account of a disease; 
Galen describes one called σατιψίασα, in which the bones of 
the temple swell out like satyrs' horns. 

' i.e. if, for example, the foot became as hard as a hoof. 
382 



POLITICS, V. ιι. 6-8 

6 being brought against them. Contempt is a cause 
of faction and of actual attacks upon the govern- 
ment, for instance in ohgarchies when those who 
have no share in the government are more numerous 
(for they think themselves the stronger party), 
and in democracies when the rich have begun to feel 
contempt for the disorder and anarchy that prevails, 
as for example at Thebes the democracy was de- 
stroyed owing to bad government after the battle 
of Oenophyta, a and that of the Megarians was 
destroyed when they had been defeated owing to 
disorder and anarchy , b and at Syracuse before the 
tyranny c of Gelo, and at Rhodes d the common people 
had fallen into contempt before the rising against 

7 them. Revolutions in the constitutions also take 
place on account of disproportionate growth ; for 
just as the body e is composed of parts, and needs to 
grow proportionately in order that its symmetry 
may remain, and if it does not it is spoiled, when the 
foot is four cubits long and the rest of the body two 
spans, and sometimes it might even change into the 
shape of another animal if it increased dispropor- 
tionately not only in size but also in quality/ so 
also a state is composed of parts, one of which often 
grows without its being noticed, as for example the 
number of the poor in democracies and constitutional 

8 states. And sometimes this is also brought about by 
accidental occurrences, as for instance at Tarentum 
when a great many notables were defeated and killed 
by the Iapygians a short time after the Persian 
wars a constitutional government was changed to 
a democracy, and at Argos when those in the seventh 

383 



ARISTOTLE 

1303» 

ολο μένων υπό Κλεομένους του Λάκωνος ηναγκά- 
σθΎ/σαν παραδβζασθαί τών περίοικων τινάς, και iv 
Α,θιηναις άτυχούντων πεζή οι γνώριμοι ελάττους 

ίο εγενοντο δια το εκ καταλόγου στρατευεσθαι υπό 
τον Αακωνικόν πόλεμον. συμβαίνει δε τοΰτο και 1 
εν τσ.ΐς δημοκρατίαις, ήττον 8ε• πλειόνων γαρ των 
ευπόρων 1 γινομένων η των ουσιών αυξανομένων 
μεταβάλλουσιν εις ολιγαρχίας και δυναστείας, 
μεταβάλλουσι δ' at πολιτεΐαι και άνευ στάσεως 9 

15 οιά τε τάς εριθείας, ώσπερ εν 'Ηραία (εζ αιρετών 
γαρ Sta. τοΰτο εποίησαν κληρωτάς Οτι ηροΰντο τους 
εριθευομενους), και δι' όλιγωρίαν, όταν εάσωσιν 
εις τάς αρχάς τάς κυρίας παριέναί τους μη της 
πολιτείας φίλους, ωσπερ εν Ω.ρεώ κατελυθη η 
ολιγαρχία τών άρχόντο^ν γενομένου ' Ιϊρακλεοδώρου, 

20 δς εζ ολιγαρχίας πολιτείαν και δημοκρατίαν κατ- 
εσκεύασεν. ετι δια το παρά μικρόν λέγω οέ 
παρά μικρόν, οτι πολλάκις λανθάνει μεγάλη γινο- 
μένη μετάβασις τών νομίμων, όταν παρορώσι το 
μικρόν, ώσπερ εν 'Αμβρακία μικρόν ην το τίμημα 
τέλος δ άπ' 3 ούθενός ηρχον, ως εγγιον* η μηθεν 

25 Βιαφερον του μηθεν το μικρόν, στασιωτικόν δε 10 
και το μη όμόφυλον, εως αν συμπνευση• ωσπερ 
γάρ ουδ' εκ του τυχόντος πλήθους πόλις γίγνεται, 
1 και τούτο Susemihl. 2 άπορων ΓΜ. 

8 δ' άπ Aretinus: δ' codd. 

4 eyyvs δν ϊ vel (yyi^ov ? immisch (tanquam propinquum 
sit Guil.). 

° The word to be understood here may be φυλή, or possibly 
ημέρα : the seventh day of the month was sacred to Apollo, 
especially at Sparta, and one account assigns Cleomenes' 
victory to that day, in which case the casualties may well 
have been known afterwards as ' those who fell on the 
seventh.' 
384 



POLITICS, V. ιι. 8-10 

tribe α had been destroyed by the Spartan Cleo- 
menes the citizens were compelled to admit some of 
the surrounding people, and at Athens when they 
suffered disasters by land the notables became fewer 
because at the time of the war against Sparta the 
army was drawn from a muster-roll. 6 And this 
happens also in democracies, though to a smaller 
extent ; for when the wealthy become more numer- 
ous or their properties increase, the governments 
9 change to oligarchies and dynasties. And revolu- 
tions in constitutions take place even without factious 
strife, owing to election intrigue, as at Heraea d 
(for they made their magistrates elected by lot 
instead of by vote for this reason, because the people 
used to elect those who canvassed) ; and also owing 
to carelessness, when people allow men that are not 
friends of the constitution to enter into the sovereign 
offices, as at Oreus e oligarchy was broken up when 
Heracleodorus became one of the magistrates, who 
in place of an oligarchy formed a constitutional 
government, or rather a democracy. Another cause 
is alteration by small stages ; by this I mean that 
often a great change of institutions takes place un- 
noticed when people overlook a small alteration, as 
in Ambracia the property-qualification was small, 
and finally men hold office with none at all, as a little 
10 is near to nothing, or practically the same. Also 
difference of race is a cause of faction, until harmony 
of spirit is reached ; for just as any chance multitude 
of people does not form a state, so a state is not 

6 i.e. was made up of citizens and not of mercenaries. 
e See 1292 b 10 n. 
d On the Alpheus, in Arcadia. 

• In Euboea ; its secession from Sparta to Athens, 377 b.c, 
was perhaps the occasion of this revolution. 

385 



ARISTOTLE 

όντως ovo εν τω τυχοντί χρονω. οιο όσοι ηδη 
συνοίκους εδεζαντο η εποίκους οί πλείστοι εστα- 
σίασαν, οίον Ύροιζηνίοις Αχαιοί συνώκησαν Συ- 
εο βαριν, είτα πλείους οι 'Αχαιοί γενόμενου εξεβαλον 
τους Ύροιζηνίους, όθεν το άγος συνέβη τοις 
Έυβαριταις• και εν Θουριοις Συβαρΐται τοις συν- 
οικησασιν , πλεονεκτεΐν γαρ άζιοΰντες ώς σφετερας 
της χώρας εζεπεσον καϊ Ί^υζαντίοις οί έποικοι, 
επιβουλευοντες φωραθεντες εζεπεσον δια μάχης' 
85 και Αντισσάίοι τους "Χ,ίων φυγάδας εισδεζάμενοι 
διά μάχης εζεβαλον Ζ,αγκλαΐοι δε Σαμίους 11 
ΰποδεξάμενοι εζέπεσον καϊ αυτοί' και Άπολ- 
λωνιάται οί εν τω Έύξεινω πόντω έποικους επ- 
αγαγόμενοι εστασίασαν και Συρακούσιοι μετά τα 
1303 b τυραννικά τους ξένους και τους μισθοφόρους 
πολίτας ποιησάμενοι εστασίασαν και εις μάχην 
ηλθον και Άμφιπολίται δεξάμενοι Χαλκιδεων 
εποίκους 1 εζέπεσον υπό τούτων οι πλείστοι αυτών. 
(Στασιάζουσι δ' εν μεν ταΐς όλιγαρχίαις οί 
5 πολλοί, ώς αδικούμενοι οτι ου μετεχουσι τών 
'ίσων, καθάπερ εΐρηται πρότερον, 'ίσοι οντες, εν δε 
ταΐς δημοκρατίαις οί γνώριμοι, οτι μετεχουσι τών 
ίσων ουκ 'ίσοι οντες.) 

1 Spengel : άποικους codd. 

" i.e. colonists not from the mother-city, admitted either 
at the foundation of the colony or later. 

6 Sybaris, founded 720 B.C., became very wealthy. The 
Troezenian population when expelled were received at Croton, 
which made war on Sybaris and destroyed it 510 b.c. To 
what exactly to ayos refers is unknown. 

c In Lesbos. d Later Messana, Messina. 

e Thrasybulus succeeded his brother Hiero as tyrant in 
467 b.c. and fell within a year. 
386 



POLITICS, V. π. 10-11 

formed in any chance period of time. Hence most 
of the states that have hitherto admitted joint 
settlers or additional settlers α have split into fac- 
tions ; for example Achaeans settled at Sybaris 6 
jointly with Troezenians, and afterwards the 
Achaeans having become more numerous expelled 
the Troezenians, which was the cause of the curse 
that fell on the Sybarites ; and at Thurii Sybarites 1.307 ■ 27, 
quarrelled with those who had settled there with them, b 7 • 
for they claimed to have the larger share in the 
country as being their own, and were ejected; and 
at Byzantium the additional settlers were discovered 
plotting against the colonists and were expelled by 
force of arms ; and the people of Antissa c after 
admitting the Chian exiles expelled them by arms ; 
11 and the people of Zancle d after admitting settlers 
from Samos were themselves expelled ; and the 
people of Apollonia on the Euxine Sea after bring- 
ing in additional settlers fell into faction ; and the 
Syracusans after the period of the tyrants e conferred 
citizenship on their foreign troops and mercenaries 
and then faction set in and they came to battle ; 
and the Amphipolitans having received settlers from 
Chalcis were most of them driven out by them/ 

(And in oligarchies civil strife is raised by the 
many, on the ground that they are treated unjustly 
because they are not admitted to an equal share 
although they are equal, as has been said before, but 
in democracies it begins with the notables, because 
they have an equal share although they are not equal.)* 

f Cf. 1306 a 2. The exact circumstances are unknown ; 
Amphipolis was colonized from Athens 437 b.c. 

" This sentence is out of place here, and would fit in better 
if placed (as it is by Newman) above at 1301 a 39, after 
στασιάζονσι, or (with other editors) ib. b 26. 

387 



ARISTOTLE 

Έτασιάζουσι δε ενίοτε αί πόλεις και διά τους 12 
τόπους, όταν μη εύφυώς εχη η χώρα προς το μίαν 
είναι πολιν, οίον iv Κλαζομεναΐς οι επί Χυτοω 1 

ίο προς τους iv νήσω, και Κολοφώνιοι και Nonet?• 
και Άθήνησιν ούχ ομοίως είσίν αλλά μάλλον 
δημοτικοί οι τον Πειραιά οίκοΰντβς των το άστυ. 
ωσπβρ γάρ iv τοις πολεμοις αί οιαβάσ^ις των 
οχετών, και των πάνυ σμικρών, διασπώσι τάς 
φάλαγγας, οϋτως εοικε πάσα διαφορά ποιεΐν 

15 διάστασιν. μεγίστη μεν ουν Ισως διάστασις άρετη 
και μοχθηρία, είτα πλούτος και π€νία, και οΰτω 
δη ετέρα ετέρας μάλλον, ων μία και η είρημενη 
εστίν. 

III. Γίνονται μεν ουν at στάσεις ου περί 1 
μικρών άλΧ εκ μικρών, στασιάζουσι δε περί 
μεγάλων, μάλιστα δέ και αί μικροί ίσχύουσιν 

20 όταν εν τοις κυριοις γενωνται, οίον συνέβη και εν 
Συρακουσαις εν τοις άρχαίοις χρόνοις. μετέβαλε 
γάρ η πολιτεία εκ δύο νεανίσκων στασιασάντων, 
τών* εν ταΐς άρχαΐς όντων, περί ερωτικην αίτίαν 
θατερου γάρ άποδημοΰντος άτερος 3 εταίρος ων 
τον* ερώμενον αύτοΰ ύπεποιησατο, πάλιν δ' 

25 εκείνος τούτω χαλεπηνας την γυναίκα αύτοΰ άν- 
επεισεν ως αυτόν ελθεΐν όθεν προσλαμβάνοντες 
τους εν τω πολιτεύματι διεστασίασαν πάντας. 

1 Χυτψ Sylburg. 2 των suppleuit Richards. 

3 arepos suppleuit Coraes. 
4 rbv Coraes : rts τον codd. 



° Topography uncertain : Clazomenae near Smyrna was 
partly on a small island, which Alexander joined to the 
mainland with a causeway. 

388 



POLITICS, V. ιι. 12— πι. 1 

12 Also states sometimes enter on faction for geo- 
graphical reasons, when the nature of the country 
is not suited for there being a single city, as for 
example at Clazomenae a the people near Chytrum 
are in feud with the inhabitants of the island, and 
the Colophonians and the Xotians b ; and at Athens 
the population is not uniformly democratic in spirit, 
but the inhabitants of Piraeus are more so than those 
of the city. For just as in wars the fording of water- 
courses, even quite small ones, causes the formations 
to lose contact, so every difference seems to cause 
division. Thus perhaps the greatest division is 
that between virtue and vice, next that between 
wealth and poverty, and so with other differences 
V in varying degree, one of which is the one men- 
tioned/ 
1| III. Factions arise therefore not about but out of Revolutions 
small matters ; but they are carried on about great c^TelT ty 
matters. And even the small ones grow extremely 
violent when they spring up among men of the ruling 
class, as happened for example at Syracuse in ancient 
times. For the constitution underwent a revolution 
as a result of a quarrel that arose d between two young 
men, who belonged to the ruling class, about a love 
affair. While one of them was abroad the other who 
was his comrade won over the vouth with whom he 
was in love, and the former in his anger against him 
retaliated by persuading his wife to come to him ; 
owing to which they stirred up a party struggle 
among all the people in the state, enlisting them on 

* Xotium was the port of Colophon. 
e i.e. difference of locality. 

d Perhaps under the oligarchy of the Gamori, overthrown 
by the people and followed by Gelo's tyranny, 485 b.c. 

389 



ARISTOTLE 

διόπερ αρχομένων €υλαβεΐσθαι δει των τοιούτων, 2 
καλ διαλύει^ τάς των ηγεμόνων και δυνάμενων 
στάσεις• εν άρχη γαρ γ'ιγνεται το αμάρτημα, η δ 
so άρχη λέγεται ήμισυ etrai παντός, ώστε και το εν 
αύτη μικρόν αμάρτημα άνάλογον εστί προς τα εν 
τοις άλλοις μερεσιν. δλως 8ε αί των γνωρίμων 
στάσει? συναπολαύειν ποιοΰσι και την δλην πόλιν, 
οΐον εν Έστιαια συνέβη μετά τα Μηδικά, δυο 
αδελφών περί της πατρώας 1 νομής διενεχθεντων 
85 6 μεν γαρ άπορώτερος, ως ούκ άποφαίνοντος 
θατερου την ούσίαν ούδε τον θησαυρον δν εΰρεν ο 
πατήρ, προσηγάγετο 2 τους δημοτικούς, 6 δ' έτερος 
έχων ούσίαν πολλην τους εύπορους. και εν 3 
Δελφοΐς εκ κηδείας γενομένης διαφοράς άρχη 
1304 a πασών εγενετο τών στάσεων τών ύστερον ο μεν 
γαρ, οίωνισάμενός τι σύμπτωμα ως ηλθεν επι την 
νύμφην, ού λαβών άπηλθεν, οί δ' ως ύβρισθεντες 
ενεβαλον τών ιερών χρημάτων θύοντος κάπειτα 
ώς Ίερόσυλον άπεκτειναν. και περί Μιτυληνην δε 
5 εζ επικληρων στάσεως γενομένης πολλών εγενετο 
άρχη κακών, και του πολέμου του προς Αθηναίους 
εν ω ΐΐάχης έλαβε την πόλιν αυτών Ύιμοφάνους 
γαρ τών ευπόρων τινός καταλιπόντος δύο θυγα- 
τέρας, ό περιωσθεις και ού λαβών τοις υιεσιν αύτοΰ 
Δόξανδρος ηρζε της στάσεως και τους 'Αθηναίους 

1 πατρψων codd. cet. (των π. Victorius). 
2 ed. : irpoarjyeTo codd. 

a i.e. the ratio of being a half to the whole : a bad start 
does as much harm as all the later mistakes put together. 

390 



POLITICS, V. πι. 2-3 

2 their sides. On account of this it is necessary to 
guard against such affairs at their beginning, and to 
break up the factions of the leaders and powerful 
men ; for the error occurs at the beginning, and the 
beginning as the proverb says is half of the whole, 
so that even a small mistake at the beginning stands 
in the same ratio α to mistakes at the other stages. 
And in general the faction quarrels of the notables 
involve the whole state in the consequences, as 
happened at Hestiaea b after the Persian wars, when 
two brothers quarrelled about the division of their 
patrimony : for the poorer of the two, on the ground 
that the other would not make a return of the estate 
and of the treasure that their father had found, got the 
common people on his side, and the other possessing 

3 much property was supported by the rich. And at 
Delphi the beginning of all the factions that occurred 
afterwards was when a quarrel arose out of a mar- 
riage ; the bridegroom interpreted some chance 
occurrence when he came to fetch the bride as a bad 
omen and went away without taking her, and her 
relatives thinking themselves insulted threw some 
articles of sacred property into the fire when he was 
performing a sacrifice and then put him to death as 
guilty of sacrilege. And also at Mitylene c a faction 
that arose out of some heiresses was the beginning of 
many misfortunes, and of the war with the Athenians «s-7 aa. 
in which Paches captured the city of Mitylene : a 
wealthy citizen named Timophanes left two daughters, 

and a man who was rejected in his suit to ob- 
tain them for his own sons, Doxander, started the 

* Also called Oreus, see a 18. 

■ The revolt of Mitylene 428 b.c. is ascribed to purely 
political causes by Thucydides (iii. 1-30). 

391 



ARISTOTLE 

1304 ,« >t it >\ > » Λ 

ίο παρωςυνε , πρόξενος ων της πόλεως, και εν 4 

Φωκεΰσιν εζ em κλήρου στάσεως γενομένης περί 

MraaeW τον Μνάσωνος πάτερα και Έιύθυκράτη 

τον Ονόμαρχου, ή στάσις αύτη αρχή του ίεροΰ 

πολέμου κατέστη τοις Φωκεΰσιν. μετέβαλε δε 

και εν Έιπιδάμνω ή πολιτεία εκ γαμικών ύπο- 

15 μνηστευσάμενος yap τις θυγατέρα, 1 ως έζημίωσεν 
αυτόν ο του ύπομνηστευθέντος πατήρ γενόμενος 
των αρχόντων, άτερος συμπαρέλαβε τους έκτος 
της πολιτείας ως επηρεασθείς, μεταβάλλουσι δε 5 
και εις ολιγαρχίαν και εις δήμον και εις πολιτείαν 
εκ του εύδοκιμήσαί τι ή αύζηθηναι η άρχειον ή 

20 μοριον της πόλεως• οίον ή εν Άρείω πάγω βουλή 
εύδοκιμήσασα εν τοις ΝΙηδικοΐς έδοζε συντονω- 
τέραν ποιήσαι τήν πολιτείαν , και πάλιν ο ναυτικός 
όχλος γενόμενος αίτιος της περί Σαλα /nra νίκης 
και δια ταύτης της ηγεμονίας δια τήν κατά θάλατ- 
ταν δύναμιν τήν δημοκρατίαν ίσχυροτέραν εποίησεν 

25 και εν 'Αργεί οι γνώριμοι εύδοκιμήσαντες περί τήν 
εν Μαντινεία μάχην τήν προς Λακεδαιμονίους 
επεχείρησαν καταλύειν τον δήμον και εν Συρα- β 
κουσαις ό δήμος αίτιος γενόμενος της νίκης του 
πολέμου του προς Αθηναίους εκ πολιτείας εις 
δημοκρατίαν μετέβαλεν και εν Χαλ/αδι Φόξον 

80 τον τυραννον μετά τών γνωρίμων ο δήμος άνελών 
ευθύς ε'ίχετο της πολιτείας' και εν Αμβρακία 
πάλιν ωσαύτως ΐίερίανδρον συνεκβαλών τοις έπι- 

1 Ovyarepa om. codd. fere omnes. 

° i.e. the fathers of the two suitors for the heiress's hand 
turned the quarrel into a faction fight. 

* Perhaps the same event as that referred to 1301 b 21. 

c Unknown. 
S92 



POLITICS, V. πι. 3-6 

faction and kept on stirring up the Athenians, whose 
4 consul he was at Mitylene. And among the Phocians 
when a faction arising out of an heiress sprang up in 
connexion with Mnaseas the father of Mnason and 
Euthykrates the father of Onomarchus, this faction 
proved to be the beginning for the Phocians of the 
Holy War. At Epidamnus also circumstances re- 
lating to a marriage gave rise to a revolution in 
the constitution b ; somebody had betrothed his 
daughter, and the father of the man to whom he 
had betrothed her became a magistrate, and had 
to sentence him to a fine ; the other thinking that 
he had been treated with insolence formed a party 
ο of the unenfranchised classes to assist him. And and from 
also revolutions to oligarchy and democracy and predomin- 
constitutional government arise from the growth in ance • 
reputation or in power of some magistracy or some 
section of the state ; as for example the Council on 
the Areopagus having risen in reputation during 
the Persian wars was believed to have made the 
constitution more rigid, and then again the naval 
multitude, having been the cause of the victory off 
Salamis and thereby of the leadership of Athens due 
to her power at sea, made the democracy stronger ; 
and at Argos the notables having risen in repute in 
connexion with the battle against the Spartans at 
Mantinea took in hand to put down the people ; «8 b.c. 
6 and at Syracuse the people having been the cause of 
the victory in the war against Athens made a revolu- 
tion from constitutional government to democracy ; 412 b.c. 
and at Chalcis the people with the aid of the notables 
overthrew the tyrant Phoxus c and then immediately 
seized the government ; and again at Ambracia 
similarly the people joined with the adversaries 

393 



ARISTOTLE 

νεμενοις ο οημος τον τυραννον εις εαυτόν περι- 
εστησε την πολιτείαν. και όλως δη δβΓ τούτο μη 7 

35 λανθάνειν, ώς οι δυνάμεως αίτιοι γενόμενοι, και 
ίδιώται και άρχαι /cat φυλαι και δλως μέρος και 
οποιονοΰν 1 πλήθος, στάσιν κινοΰσιν η γαρ οι τού- 
τοις φθονοΰντες τιμωμενοις άρχουσι της στάσεως, 
η ούτοι δια την ύπεροχην ου θελουσι μενειν επι 
των ΐσων. κινούνται δ' αί πολιτεΐαι και όταν 
τάναντία είναι δοκούντα μέρη της πόλεως ίσάζη 
1304 b άλλήλοις, οίον οι πλούσιοι και ό δήμος, μέσον δ' 
η μηθεν η μικρόν πάμπαν αν γαρ πολύ ύπερεχη 
όποτερονοΰν των μερών, προς το φανερώς κρεΐττον 
το λοιπόν ου θέλει κινδυνεύειν. διό και οι κατ 
5 άρετην διαφέροντες ού ποιούσι στάσιν ώς ειπείν, 
ολίγοι γαρ γίγνονται προς ποίους, καθόλου μεν 
οΰν περί πάσας τάς πολιτείας αί άρχαι και αίτίαι 
τών στάσεων και τών μεταβολών τούτον εχουσι 
τον τρόπον. 

Κινοΰσι δέ τάς πολιτείας ότε μεν δια βίας ότε 8 
δε δι απάτης• δια βίας μεν η ευθύς εξ αρχής 

ίο ή ύστερον άναγκάζοντες• και γαρ η άττάτ^ διττή• 
ότε μεν γαρ εζαπατησαντες το πρώτον εκόν- 
των μεταβάλλουσι την πολιτείαν, εΐθ* ύστερον βία. 
κατεχουσιν ακόντων, οίον επι τών τετρακοσίων 
τον δήμον εξηπάτησαν φάσκοντες τον /?ασιλβα 
1 οποσονοϋν Richards. 

α 580 B.C. ; cf. 1311 a 39 ff. 
* The oligarchy at Athens 41 1 b.c. 

S94 



POLITICS, V. πι. β-8 

of the tyrant Periander in expelling him and then 
brought the government round to themselves. 3 

7 And indeed in general it must not escape notice 
that the persons who have caused a state to win 
power, whether private citizens or magistrates or 
tribes, or in general a section or group of any kind, 
stir up faction ; for either those who envy these men 
for being honoured begin the faction, or these men 
owing to their superiority are not willing to remain 

in a position of equality. And constitutions also or from 
undergo revolution when what are thought of as equality. 
opposing sections of the state become equal to one 
another, for instance the rich and the people, and 
there is no middle class or only an extremely small 
one ; for if either of the two sections becomes much 
the superior, the remainder is not willing to risk an 
encounter with its manifestly stronger opponent. 
Owing to this men who are exceptional in virtue 
generally speaking do not cause faction, because they 
find themselves few against many. Universally then 
in connexion with all the forms of constitution the 
origins and causes of factions and revolutions are of 
this nature. 

8 The means used to cause revolutions of constitu- Modes of 

t- j .. /» j revolution. 

tions are sometimes force and sometimes traud. 
Force is employed either when the revolutionary 
leaders exert compulsion immediately from the start 
or later on — as indeed the mode of using fraud 
is also twofold : sometimes the revolutionaries after 
completely deceiving the people at the first stage 
alter the constitution with their consent, but then at 
a later stage retain their hold on it by force against 
the people's will : for instance, at the time of the 
Four Hundred, 6 they deceived the people by saying 

395 



ARISTOTLE 

χρήματα παρεςειν προς τον πολεμον τον προς 

15 Λακεδαιμονίους , φευσάμενοι δε κατέχειν επειρώντο 

την πολιτείαν ότε 8e εζ αρχής τε πείσαντες και 

ύστερον πάλιν πεισθέντων εκόντων άρχουσιν αυτών. 

Απλώς μεν ουν περί πάσας τάς πολιτείας εκ 

τών είρημένων συμβέβηκε γίγνεσθαι τάς μεταβολάς : 

IV. Κα.0 εκαστον δ' εϊδος πολιτείας εκ τούτων 1 

20 μερίζοντας τά συμβαίνοντα δει θεωρεΐν. αϊ μεν 
ουν δημοκρατίαι μάλιστα μεταβάλλουσι διά την 
τών δημαγωγών άσελγειαν τά μεν γάρ ιδία, 
συκοφαντοΰντες τους τάς ουσίας έχοντας συστρε- 
φουσιν αυτούς (συνάγει γάρ και τους εχθίστους 
ο κοινός φόβος), τά δε κοινή το πλήθος επάγοντες. 

25 και τοΰτο επί πολλών αν τις ΐδοι γιγνόμενον ούτως, 
και γάρ εν Κω ή δημοκρατία μετέβαλε πονηρών 2 
εγγενομενων δημαγωγών, οι γαρ γνώριμοι συν- 
έστησαν και εν 'Ρόδω, μισθοφοράν τε γάρ οι 
δημαγωγοί επόριζον και εκώλυον άποδιδοναι τα 
οφειλόμενα τοις τριηράρχοις, οι δε διά τάς επιφερο- 

30 μενας δίκας ήναγκάσθησαν συστάντες καταλΰσαι 
τον δήμον. κατελύθη δέ και εν Ηράκλεια, ό 
δήμος μετά τον άποικισμόν ευθύς διά τους δημ- 
αγωγούς• αδικούμενοι γάρ υπ' αυτών οι γνώριμοι 
εξεπιπτον, έπειτα άθροισθεντες οι εκπίπτοντες 
και κατελθόντες κατ έλυσαν τον δήμον. πάρα- 3 

° Date unknown. b See 1302 b 23 η. 

c i.e. owed for repairs to the ships, and perhaps also for 
advances of pay to the crews. 

d Probably the Pontic Heraclea (c/. 1305 b 5, 36, 1306 a 
37), founded middle of 6th century B.C., not the Trachinian. 

396 



-.'Q.-rues, 



POLITICS, V. πι. 8— iv. 2 

that the Persian King would supply money for the 
war against the Spartans, and after telling them this 
falsehood endeavoured to keep a hold upon the 
government ; but in other cases they both persuade 
the people at the start and afterwards repeat the 
persuasion and govern them with their consent. 

Speaking generally therefore in regard to all the 
forms of constitution, the causes that have been stated 
are those from which revolutions have occurred. 

1 IV. But in the light of these general rules we must Revolution! 
consider the usual course of events as classified j? 
according to each different kind of constitution. In caused by 
democracies the principal cause of revolutions is the de 
insolence of the demagogues ; for they cause the 
owners of property to band together, partly by 
malicious prosecutions of individuals among them 
(for common fear brings together even the greatest 
enemies), and partly by setting on the common people 

2 against them as a class. And one may see this 
taking place in this manner in many instances. In 
Cos the democracy was overthrown α when evil dem- 
agogues had arisen there, for the notables banded 
themselves together ; and also in Rhodes, 6 for the 
demagogues used to provide pay for public services, 
and also to hinder the payment of money owed c 
to the naval captains, and these because of the law- 
suits that were brought against them were forced to 
make common cause and overthrow the people. 
And also at Heraclea d the people were put down 
immediately after the foundation of the colony 
because of the people's leaders ; for the notables 
being unjustly treated by them used to be driven 
out, but later on those who were driven out collect- 
ing together effected their return and put down the 

397 



ARISTOTLE 

35 πλησίως δε και ή εν Μεγάροις κατελυθη δημο- 
κρατία• οι γαρ δημαγωγοί, ίνα χρήματα εχωσι 
δημευειν, εζεβαλλον πολλούς των γνωρίμων, εως 
πολλούς εποίησαν τους φεύγοντας , οι δε κατιόντες 
ενίκησαν μαχόμενοι τον δήμον και κατέστησαν 
την όλιγαρχίαν. συνέβη δε ταύτόν και περί 
1305 a Κυμην επι της δημοκρατίας ην κατέλυσε Θρασύ- 
μαχος. σχεδόν δε και επι των άλλων αν τις ϊδοι 
θεωρών τάς μεταβολάς τούτον έχουσας τον τρόπον, 
ότε μεν γαρ ίνα χαρίζωνται άδικοΰντες τους 
5 γνωρίμους συνιστάσιν , η τάς ουσίας άναδάστους 
ποιοϋντες η τάς προσόδους ταΐς λειτουργίαις, ότε 
δε διαβάλλοντες , ΐν* εχωσι δημευειν τά κτήματα 
των πλουσίων, επι δε των αρχαίων, ότε γένοιτο 4 
ό αυτός δημαγωγός και στρατηγός, εις τυραννίδα 
μετεβαλΧον σχεδόν γάρ οι πλείστοι των αρχαίων 

ίο τυράννων εκ δημαγωγών γεγόνασιν . αίτιον δε του 
τότε μεν γίγνεσθαι νυν δε μή, ότι τότε μεν οι 
δημαγωγοί ήσαν εκ τών στρατηγούντων (ου γάρ 
πω δεινοί ήσαν λέγειν), νυν δε της ρητορικής 
ηύζημενης οι δυνάμενοι λέγειν δημαγωγοΰσι μεν, 
δι άπειρίαν δέ τών πολεμικών ουκ επιτίθενται, 

15 πλην ει που βραχύ τι γεγονε τοιούτον, εγίγνοντο 5 
δε τυραννίδες πρότερον μάλλον ή νυν και διά το 
μεγάλας αρχάς εγχειρίζεσθαί τισιν, ώσπερ εν 
Μιλτ^τω εκ της πρυτανείας (πολλών γάρ ην και 

α See 1300 a 18 ff. η. 
6 An event otherwise unknown. 
c Perhaps that of Thrasybulus (Hdt. i. 20), 612 B.c. 

398 



POLITICS, V. rv. 3-5 

3 people. And also the democracy at Megara was 

put down in a similar manner ° ; the people's leaders resulting in 
in order to have money to distribute to the people oUgarcn - v - 
went on expelling many of the notables, until they 
made the exiles a large body, and these came back 
and defeated the people in a battle and set up the 
oligarchy. And the same thing happened also at 
Cyme in the time of the democracy which Thrasy- 
machus put down, 6 and in the case of other states 
also examination would show that re\*olutions take 
place very much in this manner. Sometimes they 
make the notables combine by wronging them in 
order to curry favour, causing either their estates to 
be divided up or their revenues by imposing public 
services, and sometimes by so slandering them that 
they may have the property of the wealthy to con- 

4 fiscate. And in old times whenever the same man 
became both leader of the people and general, they 
used to change the constitution to a tyranny ; for 
almost the largest number of the tyrants of early 
days have risen from being leaders of the people. 
And the reason why this used to happen then but 
does not do so now is because then the leaders of 
the people were drawn from those who held the 
office of general (for they were not yet skilled in 
oratory), but now when rhetoric has developed the 
able speakers are leaders of the people, but owing to 
their inexperience in military matters they are not 
put in control of these, except in so far as something 
of the kind has taken place to a small extent in some 

5 places. And tyrannies also used to occur in former 
times more than they do now because important 
offices were entrusted to certain men, as at Miletus a 
tyranny c arose out of the presidency (for the president 

S99 



ARISTOTLE 

1305 a ,. , , , \ r' , w__r * ν *» » » ι 

μεγάλων κνριος ο πρυτανις). ετι be όια to μή 

μεγάλας etrai rare τάς πόλεις αλλ' επί τών αγρών 

20 οίκεΐν τον δήμον άσχολον οντά προς τοις εργοις, 
ol προστάται τον δήμου, οτε πολεμικοί γενοιντο, 
τυραννίδι επετίθεντο. πάντες δε τοΰτο εδρών 
υπό του δήμου πιστευθεντες, ή δε πίστις -ην ή 
απέχθεια ή προς τους πλουσίους, οίον Άθήνησί 
τε Πεισίστρατο? στασιασας προς τους πεδιακους, 

25 και Θεαγένης εν Meyctpois* των ευπόρων τα κτήνη 
άποσφάξας , λαβών παρά τον ποταμόν επινεμοντας, 
και Αιονύσιος κατηγορών Ααφναίου και τών 
πλουσίων ηξιώθη της τυραννίδος, διά την εχθραν 
πιστευτείς ως δημοτικός ων. μεταβάλλουσι δε 6 
και εκ της πάτριας δημοκρατίας εις την νεωτάτην 

so οπού γαρ αίρεται μεν αί άρχαί, μη από τιμημάτων 
δε, αιρεΐται δε ό δήμος, δημαγωγοΰντες οι σπουδ- 
αρχιώντες εις τοΰτο καθιστάσιν ώστε 1 κύριον 
tirai τον δήμον και τών νόμων, άκος δε του ή 
μή ytVea^ai ή του yiWa^ai ήττον το τάς φυλάς 
φερειν τους άρχοντας αλλά μή πάντα τον δήμον. 

86 Ύών μεν ούν δημοκρατιών αί μεταβολαί γίγνονται 
πασαι σχεδόν διά ταύτας τάς αιτίας. 

V. At δ' όλιγαρχίαι μεταβάλλουσι διά 2 δυο 1 
μάλιστα τρόπους τους φανερωτάτους, ενα μεν εάν 
άδικώσι το πλήθος• πας γάρ ικανός γίνεται προ- 

40 στάτης, μάλιστα δ' οτα^ εξ αυτής συμβή τής 
ολιγαρχίας yi^ea^ai τον ηγεμόνα, καθάπερ εν 
Νά£ω Αύγδαμις , ός και ετυράννησεν ύστερον τών 
1305 b Να£ιωι>. έχει δε και ή εξ άλλων αρχή στάσεως 2 

1 ώστβ ed. : ώ$ codd. 2 κατά Richards. 

° Dion3 T sius the elder, see 1259 a 29 η. 
400 



POLITICS, V. ιν. 5— v. 2 

had control of many important matters). And more- 
over, because the cities in those times were not large 
but the common people lived on their farms busily 
engaged in agriculture, the people's champions when 
they became warlike used to aim at tyranny. And 
they all used to do this when they had acquired the 
confidence of the people, and their pledge of confi- 
dence was their enmity towards the rich, as at Athens 
Pisistratus made himself tyrant by raising up a party 650 rc. 
against the men of the plain, and Theagenes at 
Megara by slaughtering the cattle of the well-to-do ess b.c 
which he captured grazing bv the river, and Diony- 
sius α established a claim to become tyrant when he 
accused Daphnaeus and the rich, since his hostility 
to them caused him to be trusted as a true man of the 
6 people. And revolutions also take place from the or in 
ancestral form of democracy to one of the most democracy. 
modern kind ; for where the magistracies are elec- 
tive, but not on property-assessments, and the people 
elect, men ambitious of office by acting as popular 
leaders bring things to the point of the people's 
being sovereign even over the laws. A remedy to 
prevent this or to reduce its extent is for the tribes to 
elect the magistrates, and not the people collectively. 
These then are the causes through which almost 
all the revolutions in democracies take place. 

1 V. Oligarchies undergo revolution principally Revolutions 
through two ways that are the most obvious. One in . . . 

• τ ι. ι_ • r• it oligarchies . 

is it they treat the multitude unjustly ; tor anybody (i.) caused 
makes an adequate people's champion, and especi- outside • 
ally so when their leader happens to come from the 
oligarchy itself, like Lygdamis at Naxos, who after- 
wards actually became tyrant of the Naxians. c. οίο a.c. 

2 Faction originating with other people also has 

4-01 



ARISTOTLE 

1305 b s J ' t » I s ->t ' η - » ' ι 

οιαφορας. οτε μεν γαρ ες αυτών των ευπόρων, ου 

των όντων δ' iv ταΐς άρχαΐς, γίγνεται κατάλνσις, 

όταν ολίγοι σφόδρα ώσιν οι iv ταΐς τιμαΐς, οίον 

δ iv Μασσαλία και iv "Ιστρω καΐ iv Ηράκλεια και 

ev αλλαι? πόλεσι συμβεβηκεν οι γαρ μη μετέχοντες 

των αρχών εκίνουν, εως μετελαβον οι πρεσβύτεροι 

πρότερον των αδελφών, ύστερον δ' οι νεώτεροι 

πάλιν (ου γαρ άρχουσιν ενιαχοΰ μεν άμα πατήρ 

τε και υιός, ενιαχοΰ δε ό πρεσβύτερος και ο νεώ- 

10 τερος αδελφός) . καΐ ένθα μεν πολιτικωτερα εγε- 
νετο η ολιγαρχία, εν "Ιστρω δ' εις δήμον άπ- 
ετελεύτησεν, εν Ήρακλεία δ' εξ ελαττόνων εις εξα- 
κόσιους ηλθεν. μετέβαλε δε και εν Κνιδω η ολιγαρχία 3 
στασιασαντων τών γνωρίμων αυτών προς αυτούς δια. 
το ολίγους μετεχειν και καθάπερ εΐρηται, ει πατήρ, 

15 υίόν μη μετεχειν, μηδ' , ει πλείους αδελφοί, αλλ' η 
τον πρεσβύτατον επιλαβόμενος γαρ στασιαζόντων 
ό δήμος και λαβών προστάτην εκ τών γνωρίμων, επι- 
θεμενος εκράτησεν ασθενές γαρ το στασιάζον. και 4 
ev Έ,ρυθραΐς δε επι της τών Βασιλίδων ολιγαρχίας εν 

20 τοις άρχαίοις χρόνοις, καίπερ καλώς επιμελομενων 
τών εν τη πολιτεία, όμως δια το υπ' ολίγων άρχε- 
σ^αι άγανακτών ό δήμος μετέβαλε την πολιτείαν. 

Κ,ινοΰνται δ αϊ όλιγαρχιαι εξ αυτών και δια 
φιλονεικίαν δημαγωγούντων (ή δημαγωγία δέ 

α The contrasted case, of dissolution of oligarchy arising 
from the people, should follow, but is omitted. 

6 Cf. 1321 a 29 if. 

• Near the mouth of the Danube. d See 1304 b 31 n. 

" Perhaps not the same as the one mentioned at 1306 b 3. 

' Just west of Smyrna. The family name implies a claim 
to royal ancestry. 

' This sentence is interrupted by a parenthesis and is 
resumed in § 6, 'And revolutions in oligarchy also — '. 
402 






POLITICS, V. v. 2-4 

various ways of arising. Sometimes when the 
honours of office are shared by very few, dissolution 
originates from the wealthy themselves," but not 
those that are in office, as for example has occurred 
at Marseilles, 6 at Istrus, c at Heraclea, d and in other 
states ; for those who did not share in the magis- 
tracies raised disturbances until as a first stage the 
older brothers were admitted, and later the younger 
ones again (for in some places a father and a son 
may not hold office together, and in others an elder 
and a younger brother may not). At Marseilles 
the oligarchy became more constitutional, while at 
Istrus it ended in becoming democracy, and in 
Heraclea the government passed from a smaller 

3 number to six hundred. At Cnidus also there was a 
revolution* of the oligarchy caused by a faction formed 
by the notables against one another, because few 
shared in the government, and the rule stated held, 1. 8 ft 
that if a father was a member a son could not be, nor if 
there were several brothers could any except the 
eldest ; for the common people seized the oppor- 
tunity of their quarrel and, taking a champion from 
among the notables, fell upon them and conquered 
them, for a party divided against itself is weak. 

4 Another case was at Erythrae/ where at the time 
of the oligarchy of the Basilidae in ancient days, 
although the persons in the government directed 
affairs well, nevertheless the common people were 
resentful because they were governed bv a few, and 
brought about a revolution of the constitution. 

On the other hand, oligarchies are overthrown ( 2 ) arising 
from within themselves both ? when from motives o r wίϋgto' U1, 
of rivalry they play the demagogue (and this dem- dem ag<«y• 



403 



ARISTOTLE 

οιττη, η μεν εν αυτοις τοις ολίγοις, εγγινεται γαρ 

25 Βημαγωγός καν πάνυ ολίγοι ώσιν — οίον εν τοις 
τριάκοντα Άθήνησιν οι περί ^Καρικλεα 'ίσχυσαν 
τους τριάκοντα Βημαγωγοΰντες , και εν τοις τετρα- 
κοσιοις οι περί Φρύνιχον τον αυτόν τρόπον — , η δ' 1 5 
όταν τον οχλον Βημαγωγώσιν οι iv τη ολιγαρχία 
οντες, οίον iv Λαρίστ) οι πολιτοφύλακες Βιά το 

δο αιρεΐσθαι αυτούς τον οχλον εδημαγώγουν, και iv 
οσαις ολιγαρχίαις ούχ ούτοι 2 αίροΰνται τάς αρχάς 
εξ ων οι άρχοντες είσιν άλλ' αϊ μεν άρχαι εκ 
τιμημάτων μεγάλων είσιν η εταιριών αίροΰνται 
δ' οι όπλΐται η ο Βημος, όπερ εν ΆβύΒω συν- 
εβαινεν, και όπου τα Βικαστηρια μη εκ του πολι- 

85 τεύματός εστίν — Βημαγωγοΰντες γαρ προς τάς 
κρίσεις μεταβάλλουσι την πολιτείαν , όπερ και εν 
Ηράκλεια εγενετο τη εν τω ΐΐόντω — , ετι δ' 6 
όταν ενιοι εις ελάττους ελκωσι την όλιγαρχίαν, 
οι γάρ το 'ίσον ζητοΰντες αναγκάζονται βοηθόν 
επαγαγεσθαι τον Βημον). γίγνονται 8ε μεταβολαι 

40 της ολιγαρχίας και όταν άναλώσωσι τά ίδια 
ζώντες ασελγώς• και γάρ οι τοιούτοι καινοτομεΐν 
ζητοΰσι, και η τυραννίΒι επιτίθενται αύτοι η 
1306 a κατασκευάζουσιν έτερον (ώσπερ Ίππαρΐνος Διο- 
νύσιον εν Συρακούσαις, και εν Άμφιπόλει ω 
όνομα ην Κλεότιμος τους εποίκους τους Χαλ/αδεων 
ηγαγε και ελθόντων διεστασίασεν αυτούς προς 
τους εύπορους, και iv ΑΙγίνη δ την πράζιν την 
1 ή δ' ed. : ή codd. 2 αύτοι ? Richards. 

" See 1304 b 12 η. » See 1275 b 29 η. 

e i.e. (apparently) where membership is not confined to the 
class eligible for the magistracies. d See 1304 b 31 n. 

e See 1259 a 29 n. ' See 1303 b 2 n. 

404 



POLITICS, V. v. 4-6 

asrogv is of two sorts, one among the oligarchs 
themselves, for a demagogue can arise among them 
even when they are a very small body, — as for instance 
in the time of the Thirty at Athens, the party of 404 rc. 
Charicles rose to power by currying popularity with 
the Thirty, and in the time of the Four Hundred a the 

5 party of Phryniehus rose in the same way, — the other 
when the members of the oligarchy curry popularity 
with the mob, as the Civic Guards at Larisa 6 courted 
popularitv with the mob because it elected them, 
and in all the oligarchies in which the magistracies 
are not elected by the class from which the magis- 
trates come but are filled from high property- 
grades or from political clubs while the electors 
are the heavy-armed soldiers or the common people, 
as used to be the case at Abydos, and in places where 
the jury-courts are not made up from the govern- 
ment c — for there members of the oligarchy by 
courting popular favour with a view to their trials 
cause a revolution of the constitution, as took place 

9 at Heraclea on the Euxine d ; and a further instance 
is when some men try to narrow down the oligarchy 
to a smaller number, for those who seek equality 
are forced to bring in the people as a helper.) 
And revolutions in oligarchy also take place when or to ex- 
they squander their private means by riotous living ; rava 8 anL& 
for also men of this sort seek to bring about a new 
state of affairs, and either aim at tyranny themselves 
or suborn somebody else (as Hipparinus put forward 
Dionysius e at Syracuse, and at Amphipolis * a man 
named Cleotimus led the additional settlers that 
came from Chalcis and on their arrival stirred them 
up to sedition against the wealthy, and in Aegina 

405 



ARISTOTLE 

1306 a, v/ f/ . , , Ω . Λ , 

s προς Χαρητα πραςας ενεχειρησε μεταραλειν την 

πολιτείαν διά τοιαύτην αίτίαν) ' ότε μεν οΰν επι- 7 
χειρούσί τι κινεΐν, ότε δε κλεπτουσι τά κοινά, όθεν 
■προς αυτούς στασιάζονσιν ή ούτοι ή 1 οι προς τού- 
τους μαχόμενοι κλέπτοντας, όπερ εν Απολλωνία 

ίο συνέβη τη εν τω ΐΐόντω. ομονοούσα δε ολιγαρχία 
ουκ εύδιάφθορος εξ αυτής' σημεΐον δε η εν Φάρ- 
σαλα» πολιτεία, εκείνοι γαρ ολίγοι δντες πολλών 
κύριοι είσι διά το χρήσθαι σφίσιν αύτοΐς καλώς, 
καταλύονται δε και όταν εν τή ολιγαρχία ετεραν 8 
όλιγαρχίαν εμποιώσιν. τούτο δ' εστίν όταν του 

ι» παντός πολιτεύματος ολίγου οντος τών μεγίστων 
αρχών μη μετεχωσιν οι ολίγοι πάντες- όπερ εν 
"Ηλιδι συνέβη ποτέ, της πολιτείας γαρ δι ολίγων 
ούσης τών γερόντων ολίγοι πάμπαν εγίνοντο διά 
το άϊδίους eirai ενενήκοντα οντάς, την δ' αΐρεσιν 
δυναστευτικην είναι και όμοίαν τη τών εν Α,ακε- 
δαίμονι γερόντων. 

£0 Τίγνεται δε μεταβολή τών ολιγαρχικών και εν 9 
πολεμώ και εν ειρήνη' εν μεν πολεμώ διά την προς 
τον δήμον άπιστίαν στρατιώταις άναγκαζομενων 
χρήσθαι (ω γάρ αν εγχειρίσωσιν, οΰτος πολλάκις 
γίγνεται τύραννος, ώσπερ εν Κορίνθω Ύιμοφάνης, 
αν δε πλείους, ούτοι αύτοΐς περιποιούνται δυνα- 

25 στείαν), ότε δε ταύτα δεδιότες μεταδιδόασι τω 
1 οθΐν τ) αύτοϊ 7rpos αυτούς στασιάζονσιν r) Richards. 

α i.e. he had squandered his fortune in riotous living ; this 
deal with the Athenian general may have been in 367 b.c. 

6 i.e. both of the lower classes and of the subject cities. 

6 i.e. the small governing body. 

d i.e. like a dynasteia, favourable to the interest of a few 
very wealthy families ; see 1292 b 10 n. 

• Corinth was at war with Argos c. 350 b«c. Timophanes 

406 



POLITICS, V. v. 6-9 

the man who carried out the transactions with 
Chares attempted to cause a revolution in the con- 

7 stitution for a reason of this sort a ) ; so sometimes 
they attempt at once to introduce some reform, at 
other times they rob the public funds and in conse- 
quence either they or those who fight against them 
in their peculations stir up faction against the govern- 
ment, as happened at Apollonia on the Black Sea. 
On the other hand, harmonious oligarchy does not 
easily cause its own destruction ; and an indication 
of this is the constitutional government at Phar- 
salus, for there the ruling class though few are 
masters of many men 6 because on good terms with 

8 one another. Also oligarchical governments break r to 

up when they create a second oligarchy within the further ex. 
oligarchy. This is when, although the whole citizen 
class is small, its few members are not all admitted to 
the greatest offices ; this is what once occurred in 
Elis, for the government being in the hands of a few, 
very few men used to become members of the Elders,• 
because these numbering ninety held office for life, 
and the mode of election was of a dynastic type d and 
resembled that of the Elders at Sparta. 

9 Revolutions of oligarchies occur both during war internal 
and in time of peace — during war since the oligarchs weaknessee • 
are forced by their distrust of the people to employ 
mercenary troops (for the man in whose hands they 

place them often becomes tyrant, as Timophanes 
did at Corinth,* and if they put several men in 
command, these win for themselves dynastic power), 
and when through fear of this they give a share in 
the constitution to the multitude, the oligarchy falls 

was killed by his brother the famous Timoleon, in order to 
restore constitutional government. 

407 



ARISTOTLE 

1306 a 

πληθει της πολιτείας, διά τό άναγκάζεσθαι τω 

δήμω χρήσθαι• εν δε τή ειρήνη δια την άπιστίαν 

την προς αλλήλους έγχειρίζουσι την φυλακην 

στρατιώταις και άρχοντι μεσιδίω, δς ενίοτε γίνεται 

30 κύριος αμφοτέρων , όπερ συνέβη εν Λαρίση έπι 
της των Κλευαδών αρχής των 1 περί Έΐμον καΐ εν 
Αβυδω έπι των εταιριών ων ην μία η Ίφιάδου. 
γίνονται δε στάσει? και έκ του περιωθεΐσθαι 10 
έτερους ύφ ετέρων των εν τη ολιγαρχία, αυτών 
και καταστασιάζεσθαι κατά γάμους η δίκας, οίον 

85 έκ γα,μικής μεν αιτίας αϊ είρημέναι πρότερον, και 
την ev Ερέτρια δ ολιγαρχίαν την τών ιππέων 
Αιαγόρας κατέλυσεν αδικηθείς περί γάμον, εκ 
δε δικαστηρίου κρίσεως η εν 'Ηράκλεια στάσις 
έγένετο και η 2 εν Θτ^αις - , έπ' αιτία μοιχείας 
δικαίως μεν στασιωτικώς δε ποιησαμένων την 
1306b κόλασιν τών μεν εν 'Ηράκλεια κατ' Έιύρυτίωνος 
τών δ' εν θηβαις κατ* , Αρχίου• έφιλονείκησαν γάρ 
αυτούς 3 οι εχθροί ώστε δεί^αι εν αγορά εν τω 
κύφωνι. πολλαι δε και διά το άγαν δεσποτικάς 11 
είναι τάς ολιγαρχίας ύπο τών εν τη πολιτεία, τινών 
6 δυσχερανάντων κατελΰθησαν, ωσπερ η εν Κ^ιδω 
και η εν Χιω ολιγαρχία, γίγνονται δε και απο 
συμπτώματος μεταβολαι και της καλούμενης 
πολιτείας και τών ολιγαρχιών εν οσαις άπο τιμή- 

1 τωρ non vertit Guil. : rots Niemeyer. 

2 και <ή> ? Newman : κα.1 codd. 

3 αϋτοΐ.% L. & S. : avrovs codd. (tr. post δΐθψαι Richards). 

α A probable emendation of the Greek gives ' happened 
at Larisa to Simus and his party at the time of the govern- 
ment of the Aleuadae.' This family were hereditary rulers 
of Larisa (see also 1275 b 29 if. n., and 1305 b 29 ff.). 

408 



POLITICS, V. v. 9-11 

because they are compelled to make use of the 
common people ; during peace, on the other hand, 
because of their distrust of one another they place 
their protection in the hands of mercenary troops 
and a magistrate between the two parties, who some- 
times becomes master of both, which happened at 
Larisa in the time of the government of the Aleuadae 
led by Simus," and at Abydos in the time of the 1305 b 33 
political clubs of which that of Iphiades was one. 

10 And factions arise also in consequence of one set of internal 
the members of the oligarchy themselves being pushed 
aside by another set and being driven into party 
strife in regard to marriages or law-suits ; examples 

of such disorders arising out of a cause related to 
marriage are the instances spoken of before, and also 1303 b 38 ft 
the oligarchy of the knights at Eretria was put down b 
by Diagoras when he had been wronged in respect 
of a marriage, while the faction at Heraclea and that 
at Thebes arose out of a judgement of a law-court, 
when the people at Heraclea justly but factiously 
enforced the punishment against Eurytion on a charge 
of adultery and those at Thebes did so against 
Archias ; for their personal enemies stirred up party 
feeling against them so as to get them bound in 

11 the pillory in the market-place. Also many govern- 
ments have been put down by some of their members 
who had become resentful because the oligarchies 
were too despotic ; this is how the oligarchies fell 

at Cnidus c and at Chios. And revolutions also occur Fail in value 
from an accident, both in what is called a consti- ° 
tutional government and in those oligarchies in 

* Possibly before the Persian wars. See 1289 b 36 ff. 
The two following cases are unrecorded elsewhere. 
' See 1305 b 13 n. 

409 



ARISTOTLE 

1806b Ω ϊ ' \ S Ύ I I v„ 

ματος ρουλευουσι και οικαζουσι και τας άλλα? 
αρχάς άρχουσιν. πολλάκις γάρ 1 το ταχθέν πρώτον 

ίο τίμημα προς τους παρόντας καιρούς, ώστε μετ- 
εχειν εν μέν τή ολιγαρχία ολίγους εν δε τή πολιτεία 
τους μέσους, εύετηρίας 2 γιγνομενης δι' είρήνην ή 
δι' άλλ^ τιν εύτυχίαν συμβαίνει πολλαπλασίου 
γίγνεσθαι τιμήματος αξίας τάς αύτάς κτήσεις, 
ώστε παντας πάντων μετεχειν, ότέ μεν εκ προσ- 

15 αγωγής και κατά μικρόν γινομένης της μεταβολής 
και λανθανούσης, ότέ δε και θάττον. 

Αί μέν οΰν όλιγαρχίαι μεταβάλλουσι και στασιά- 12 
ζουσι δια. τοιαύτας αιτίας (όλως δε και αϊ δημο- 
κρατιαι και ολιγαρχιαι εξίστανται ενίοτε ουκ εις τάς 
εναντίας πολιτείας αλλ' εις τάς εν τω αύτώ γένει, 

20 οίον εκ των εννόμων δημοκρατιών και ολιγαρχιών 
εις τάς κυρίους και εκ τούτων εις εκείνας). 

VI. Έ>ν 8ε ταΐς άριστο κ ρατίαις γίγνονται αϊ 1 
στάσεις αί μέν διά το ολίγους τών τιμών μετεχειν 
(όπερ εϊρηται κινεΐν και τάς ολιγαρχίας, διά το 

25 και την άριστοκρατιαν ολιγαρχίαν είναι πως, εν 
άμφοτεραις γάρ ολίγοι οι άρχοντες — ου μεντοι 
διά ταύτόν ολίγοι — επει δοκεΐ γε διά ταύτα και ή 
αριστοκρατία ολιγαρχία είναι), μάλιστα δέ τούτο 
συμβαίνειν άναγκαΐον όταν η τι 3 πλήθος τών 
πεφρονηματισμενων ως όμοιων* κατ άρετήν (οΐον 

80 εν Αακεδαίμονι οι λεγόμενοι ΤΙαρθενίαι — εκ τών 



1 yap <ei καΐ Ίκανόι>> Richards. 
* ΐύεττηρίας <δέ> Immisch. 
* τι Congreve : το codd. 
* ομοίων Lambinus : ομοιον codd. 



See 1306 a 13 ff. 



410 






POLITICS, V. v. 11— νι. 1 

which membership of the council and the law-courts 
and tenure of the other offices are based on a pro- 
perty-qualification. For often the qualification first 
having been fixed to suit the circumstances of the 
time, so that in an oligarchy a few may be members 
and in a constitutional government the middle 
classes, when peace or some other good fortune 
leads to a good harvest it comes about that the 
same properties become worth many times as large 
an assessment, so that all the citizens share in all the 
rights, the change sometimes taking place gradually 
and little by little and not being noticed, but at 
other times more quickly. 
12 Such then are the causes that lead to revolutions 
and factions in oligarchies (and generally, both 
democracies and oligarchies are sometimes altered 
not into the opposite forms of constitution but into 
ones of the same class, for instance from legitimate 
democracies and oligarchies into autocratic ones and 
from the latter into the former). 
1 VI. In aristocracies factions arise in some cases Faction in 
because few men share in the honours (which has a "y t o (i)* 
also been said α to be the cause of disturbances in m "lopoiy 

i.i.i • . . e• "f honours, 

oligarchies, because an aristocracy too is a sort ot 
oligarchy, for in both those who govern are few — 
although the reason for this is not the same in both 
— since this does cause it to be thought that aristo- 
cracy is a form of oligarchy). And this is most 
bound to come about when there is a considerable 
number of people who are proud-spirited on the 
ground of being equals in virtue (for example 
the clan called the Maidens' Sons b at Sparta — for 
6 Said to be descended from irregular unions authorized in 
order to keep up the population during the First Messenian 
War. They founded Taranto 708 b.c. 

411 



ARISTOTLE 

130eb » / \ ■? « ι / ' ο -\ ' 

ομοίων γαρ ήσαν, — ου? ψωρασαντες επψουλευσαν- 

τας απέστειλαν Ύάραντος οικιστάς)• η orav Tire? 2 

άτιμάζωνται μεγάλοι οντες καΐ μηθενός ηττους 

κατ άρετην υπό τινών εντιμότερων (οίον Αύσανδρος 

υπό των βασιλέων)' η όταν άνδρώδης τι? ων μη 

35 μετέχη των τι/χών (οίον Κινάδων ο την έπ* 'Αγη- 
σιλάου 1 συστησας επίθεσιν επι τους Σπαοτιάτα?) . 
έτι όταν οι μεν άπορώσι λίαν οι δ' εύπορώσιν 
(και μάλιστα iv τοις πολέμοις τοΰτο γίνεται, 
συνέβη δέ καΐ τοΰτο iv Αακεδαίμονι υπό τον 
Μεσσηνιακόν πόλεμον — οηλον δε [/cat τοΰτο] 2 εκ 
1307a τ ή ς Τυρταίου ποιησεως της καλούμενης Ευνομίας• 
θλιβόμενοι γάρ τίνες δια, τον πόλεμον ηζίουν 
ανάδαστον ποιεΐν την χώραν). έτι iav τις μέγας 
η και δυνάμενος έτι μείζων eirai, ίνα μονάρχη 
(ώσπερ εν Αακεδαίμονι δοκεΐ ΐίαυσανίας 6 στρα- 
5 τηγησας κατά τον Μηδικόν πόλεμον και εν 
Έ^αρχηδόνι "Αννων). 

Αυονται δε μάλιστα αϊ τε πολιτεΐαι και αι 3 
αριστοκρατίαι δια την εν αύτη τη πολιτεία τοΰ 
δικαίου παρέκβασιν . άρχη γάρ το μη μεμΐχθαι 
καλώς εν μεν τη πολιτεία, δημοκρατίαν καΐ dAiy- 
αρχίαν εν δέ τη αριστοκρατία ταΰτά τε και την 

\0 άρετήν, μάλιστα δε τά δύο (λέγω δέ τά δύο δήμον 

1 ΆγησιΚάον Schneider : -\άφ codd. 
' Verrall (και non vertit Guil.). 



α King Pausanias II. checked Lysander after his conquest 
of Athens in 403 b.c, and King Agesilaus thwarted him on 
the expedition into Asia Minor in 396. 

6 His conspiracy against the "Ομοιοι in 398 b,c. was dis- 
covered and he was executed. 

412 



POLITICS, V. νι. 1-3 

they were descended from the Equals — whom the 
Spartans detected in a conspiracy and sent away 

2 to colonize Tarentum) ; or when individuals although 
great men and inferior to nobody in virtue are 
treated dishonourably by certain men in higher 
honour (for example Lysander by the kings °) ; or 
when a person of manly nature has no share in the 
honours (for example Cinadon, 6 who got together the 
attack upon the Spartans in the reign of Agesilaus). 
Faction in aristocracies also arises when some of the (•:) or of 
well-born are too poor and others too rich (which wealth > 
happens especially during wars, and this also oc- 
curred at Sparta at the time of the Messenian War 

— as appears from the poem of Tyrtaeus entitled 
Law and Order ; for some men being in distress 
because of the war put forward a claim to carry out 
a re-division of the land of the country). Also if a (3) or one 
man is great and capable of being yet greater, he a n fc an ainung 
stirs up faction in order that he may be sole ruler monarchy, 
(as Pausanias who commanded the army through 
the Persian war seems to have done at Sparta, and 
Hanno c at Carthage). 

3 But the actual overthrow of both constitutional Revolutions 
governments and aristocracies is mostly due to a ^ing 1 ' 1 ' 08 
deviation from justice in the actual framework of oligarchy, 
the constitution. For what starts it in the case of a "i-acies de- 
constitutional government is that it does not contain mocracy. 

a good blend of democracy and oligarchy ; and in the 
case of an aristocracy it is the lack of a good blend 
of those two elements and of virtue, but chiefly of 
the two elements (I mean popular government and 

e Perhaps Hanno who fought in Sicily against the elder 
Dionysius c. 400 b.c. 

413 



ARISTOTLE 

1307 a x , . *_-« 

και oAtyap^tav) , ταύτα yap at ποΛιτειαι re 

πειρώνται μιγννναι και at πολλαι τώι> καλουμένων 

αριστοκρατιών, διαφερουσι γαρ των ονομαζο- 4 

μένων πολιτειών αϊ άριστοκρατίαι τούτω, και δια 

τουτ είσϊν at μεν ήττον αϊ δε μάλλον μόνιμοι 

15 αυτώι; ' τάς γαρ αποκλίνουσας μάλλον προς την 
όλιγαρχίαν αριστοκρατίας καλοΰσιν, τάς δε προς 
το πλήθος πολιτείας, διόπερ άσφαλεστεραι at 
τοιαΰται τών έτερων είσίν, κρεΐττον τε γαρ το 
πλεΐον και μάλλον άγαπώσιν 'ίσον έχοντες, οι δ 
εν ταΐς εύπορίαις, αν η πολιτεία δίδω την ύπεροχην, 

20 ύβρίζειν ζητοΰσι και πλεονεκτεΐν . όλως δ' εφ 5 
όπότερον αν εγκλίνη η πολιτεία, επι τοΰτο 1 
μεθίσταται εκατερων το σφετερον αυξανόντων, 
οΐον η μεν πολιτεία εις δημον αριστοκρατία δ 
εις όλιγαρχίαν, η εις τάναντία, οΐον η μεν αριστο- 
κρατία εις δημον (ως αδικούμενοι γαρ περισπώσιν 

25 εις τουναντίον οι άπορώτεροι) αϊ δε πολιτεΐαι 
εις όλιγαρχίαν (μόνον γαρ μόνιμον το κατ' άζίαν 
'ίσον και το €χειν τά αυτών) . συνέβη δε το 6 
είρημενον εν Θουρίοις• δια μεν γάρ το από πλείονος 
τιμήματος είναι τάς αρχάς εις ελαττον μετέβη και 

so εις αρχεία πλείω, διά δε το την χώραν δλην τους 
γνωρίμους συγκτήσασθαι πάρα τον νομον (η γαρ 

1 τοΰτο (uel όπότερα) Spengel : ταΰτα codd. 

α i.e. their mode of blending oligarchy and democracy. 

6 The writer loosely speaks of aristocracies and polities 
as a single class, differing only in degree of concentration of 
power in the hands of the upper classes. 

c i.e. from aristocracy to democracy. Possibly these 
events occurred after the defeat of Athens at Syracuse in 
413 b.c, when the Athenian party at Thurii was banished 
414 



POLITICS, V. νι. 3-β 

oligarchy), for both constitutional governments and 
most of the constitutions that are called aristocracies 

4 aim at blending these. For this a is the point of dis- 
tinction between aristocracies and what are called 
constitutional governments, and it is owing to this 
that some of them 6 are less and others more 
stable ; for the constitutions inclining more towards 
oligarchy men call aristocracies and those inclining 
more to the side of the multitude constitutional 
governments, owing to which those of the latter sort 
are more secure than the others, for the greater 
number is the stronger, and also men are more con- 
tent when they have an equal amount, whereas the 
owners of wealthy properties, if the constitution 
gives them the superior position, seek to behave 

δ insolently and to gain money. And speaking 
broadly, to whichever side the constitution leans, 
that is the side to which it shifts as either of the two 
parties increases its own side — a constitutional 
government shifts to democracy and an aristocracy 
to oligarchy, or to the opposite extremes, that is, 
aristocracy to democracy (for the poorer people 
feeling they are unjustly treated pull it round to 
the opposite) and constitutional governments to 
oligarchy (for the only lasting thing is equality in 
accordance with desert and the possession of what is 

6 their own). And the change mentioned c came about 
at Thurii, for because the property-qualification for 
honours was too high, the constitution was altered to 
a lower property-qualification and to a larger number 
of official posts, but because the notables illegally 
bought up the whole of the land (for the constitution 

(Lysias 835 d). The events in § 8 were perhaps in the 
fourth century. 

415 



ARISTOTLE 

1307 ϋ 

πολιτεία όλιγαρχικωτέρα ην, ώστε εδύναντο πλεον- 
εκτεΐν). . . , 1 6 δε δήμος γυμνασθείς εν τω πολεμώ 
τών φρουρών έγένετο κρείττων, έως άφεΐσαν της 
χώρας όσοι πλείω ήσαν έχοντες. 

"Ετι διά το πάσας τάς άριστο κ ρατικάς πολιτείας 7 

ίδ ολιγαρχικάς είναι μάλλον πλεονεκτοΰσιν οι γνώ- 
ριμοι (οΐον και εν Αακεδαίμονι εις ολίγους αί 
ούσιαι έρχονται)' και εζεστι ποιεΐν ο τι αν θέλωσι 
τοις γνωρίμοις μάλλον, καΐ κηδευειν οτω θέλωσιν 
(διό και η Αοκρών πόλις άπώλετο εκ της προς 
Αιονύσιον κηδείας, ο εν δημοκρατία ουκ αν 

40 έγένετο, ουδ' άν εν αριστοκρατία ευ μεμιγμενη). 
1307 b μάλιστα δε λανθάνουσιν αί άριστοκρατίαι μετα- 
βάλλουσαι τω λιίεσ^αι κατά μικρόν, όπερ εΐρηται 
εν τοις πρότερον καθόλου κατά πασών τών 
πολιτειών, δτι αίτιον τών μεταβολών και το 
μικρόν εστίν όταν γάρ τι προώνται τών προς 
5 την πολιτείαν , μετά τοϋτο και άλλο μικρώ μείζον 
εύχερεστερον κινοΰσιν, εως άν πάντα κινησωσι 
τον κόσμον. συνέβη οε τοϋτο και επι της Θου- 8 
ρίων πολιτείας, νόμου γάρ οντος διά πέντε ετών 
στρατηγεΐν, γενόμενοι τίνες πολεμικοί τών 
νεωτέρων και παρά τω πληθει τών φρουρών 

ίο εύδοκιμοΰντες , καταφρονήσαντες τών εν τοις πραγ- 
μασι και νομίζοντες ραδίως κατασχησειν , τούτον 
τον νόμον λύειν επεχείρησαν πρώτον, ώστ έζείναι 
τους αυτούς συνεχώς στρατηγεΐν, όρώντες τον 
δημον αυτούς χειροτονησοντα προθύμως. οι δ' 

1 lacunam vel vitium Schneider. 

" Probably a clause meaning ' civil strife ensued ' has been 
lost. 
416 



POLITICS, V. νι. 6-8 

was too oligarchical, so that they were able to grasp 
at wealth) . . . a And the people having been trained 
in the war overpowered the guards, until those who 
were in the position of having too much land re- 
linquished it. 

7 Besides, as all aristocratic constitutions are in- 
clined towards oligarchy, the notables grasp at 
wealth (for example at Sparta the estates are coming 
into a few hands) ; and the notables have more power 
to do what they like, and to form marriage connexions 
with whom they like (which was the cause of the 
fall of the state of Locri, as a result of the marriage 
with Dionysius, 6 which would not have taken place 

in a democracy, nor in a well-blended aristocracy), small 

And aristocracies are most liable to undergo revolu- F^ /™ 8 
. . ill . lea,i to 

tion unobserved, through gradual relaxation, just as revolution 

it has been said in what has gone before about all 1303 a 20 « 

forms of constitution in general, that even a small 

change may cause a revolution. For when they give 

up one of the details of the constitution, afterwards 

they also make another slightly bigger change more 

8 readily, until they alter the whole system. This 
occurred for instance with the constitution of Thurii. 
There was a law that the office of general could be 
held at intervals of four years, but some of the 
younger men, becoming warlike and winning high 
repute with the mass of the guards, came to despise 
the men engaged in affairs, and thought that they 
would easily get control ; so first they tried to repeal 
the law referred to, so as to enable the same persons 
to serve as generals continuously, as they saw that 
the people would vote for themselves with enthusiasm. 

* See 1259 a 28 n. He married in 397 b.c. the daughter 
of a Locrian citizen, who bore him the younger Dionysius. 

417 



ARISTOTLE 

1807b , . , , Λ , , , , 

επι τούτω τεταγμένοι των αρχόντων , οι καλούμενοι 

15 σύμβουλοι , όρμήσαντες το πρώτον εναντιοΰσθαι 
σννεπείσθησαν, ύπολαμβάνοντες τούτον κίνησαν - 
τας τον νόμον εάσειν την άλλην πολιτείαν , 
ύστερον δε βουλόμενοι κώλυαν άλλων κινουμένων 
ούκετι πλέον έποίουν ούθεν, άλλα. μετεβαλεν η 
τάξις πάσα της πολιτείας εις δυναστείαν των 
επιχειρησάντων νεωτεριζειν. 

20 Πάσαι δ' at πολιτεΐαι λύονται ότε μεν εξ 9 
αυτών ότε δ' έξωθεν, όταν εναντία πολιτεία η η 
πλησίον η πόρρω μεν έχουσα δε δυνα/χιν. όπερ 
συνεβαινεν επ' ^Κθηναιων και Αακεδαιμονιων οι 
μεν γαρ Αθηναίοι πανταχού τάς ολιγαρχίας οι 
δε Αάκωνες τους δήμους κατελυον. 

κ "Οθεν μεν οΰν αί μεταβολαι γίγνονται των 
πολιτειών και αί στάσεις, εϊρηται σχεδόν. 

VII. Περί δε σωτηρίας και κοινή και χωρίς 1 
εκάστης πολιτείας εχόμενόν εστίν ειπείν, πρώτον 
μεν ουν δηλον ότι εϊπερ εχομεν δι ων φθείρονται 
αί πολιτεΐαι εχομεν και δι' ων σώζονται• τών γαρ 

so εναντίων τάναντια ποιητικά, φθορά δε σωτήρια, 
εναντίον, εν μεν ουν ταΐς ευ κεκραμεναις πολι- 
τείαις, είπερ 1 άλλο τι δει τηρεΐν όπως μηθέν 
παρανομώσι, και μάλιστα το μικρόν φυλάττειν 
λανθάνει γαρ παραδυομενη η παρανομία, 2 ωσπερ 2 
τάς ουσίας αί μικραι δαπάναι οαπανώσι πολλάκις 

85 yivo /Αεναι• λα^άνει γαρ ή δαπάνη* δια το μη 

1 εΐπβρ Richards : ωσπερ codd. 

2 παραδυομενη ή παρανομία (ex Plat, de rep. -t24 d) M'P 1 : 
ΰπεισδύονσα η παράβαση cet. 

3 δαπάνη : απάτη λΐ 8 , μΐτάβα<η$ Par. 



418 



POLITICS, V. νι. 8— νιι. 2 

And though the magistrates in charge of this matter, 
called the Councillors, at first made a movement to 
oppose them, they were won over, believing that after 
repealing this law they would allow the rest of the 
constitution to stand ; but later, though they wished 
to prevent them when other laws were being re- 
pealed, they could no longer do anything more, but 
the whole system of the constitution was converted 
into a dynasty of the men who had initiated the 
innovations. 
9 And constitutions of all forms are broken up some- Foreign 
times from movements initiating from within them- [° ^ Λβη " 
selves, but sometimes from outside, when there is an 
opposite form of constitution either near by or a long 
way off yet possessed of power. This used to happen 
in the days of the Athenians and the Spartans ; 
the Athenians used to put down oligarchies every- 
where and the Spartans democracies. 

We have then approximately stated the causes 
that give rise to revolutions in the constitutions of 
states and to party factions. 

1 VII. The next thing to speak about is security stability of 
both in general and for each form of constitution t° n S s tltU 
separately. First then it is clear that if we know the General 
causes by which constitutions are destroyed we also 8afegua "" 
know the causes by which they are preserved ; for 
opposites create opposites, and destruction is the 
opposite of security. In well-blended constitutions 
therefore, if care must be taken to prevent men from 
committing any other breach of the law, most of all 

2 must a small breach be guarded against, for trans- 
gression of the law creeps in unnoticed, just as 
a small expenditure occurring often ruins men's 
estates ; for the expense is not noticed because it 

419 



ARISTOTLE 

αθρόα γίγνεσθαι, παραλογίζεται γαρ ή διάνοια 
υπ αυτών, ωσπερ 6 σοφιστικός λόγος ' ei έκαστον 
μικρόν, και πάντα.' τοΰτο δ' έστι μεν ώς, έ'στι 
δ' ώς οϋ' το γαρ δλον και τά πάντα ου μικρόν 
άλλα σύγκειται εκ μικρών, μίαν μεν οΰν φυλα- 

40 κήν προς ταύτην την αρχήν δει ποιεΐσθαι, έπειτα 
1308 a μη πιστεύειν τοις σοφίσματος χάριν προς το πλήθος 
συγκειμένοις, εξελέγχεται γαρ υπό τών έργων 
(ποια δέ λέγομεν τών πολιτειών σοφίσματα, προ- 
τερον εΐρηται). έτι δ' όράν ότι ενιαι μένουσιν ου 3 
μόνον άριστοκρατίαι άλλα και όλιγαρχίαι ου δια 
5 το ασφαλείς eimi τάς πολιτείας άλλα δια το εύ 
χρησθαι τους εν ται? άρχαΐς γινόμενους και τοις 
έξω της πολιτείας και τοις εν τω πολιτευματι, τους 
μεν μη μετέχοντας τω μη άοικείν και τω τους 
ηγεμονικούς αυτών είσάγειν εις την πολιτειαν και 
τους μεν φιλότιμους μη άδικεΐν εις άτιμιαν τους 

ίο δέ πολλούς εις κέρδος, προς αυτούς δέ και τους 
μετέχοντας τω χρησθαι άλλτ^λοι? δημοτικώς. ο 
γαρ επι του πλήθους ζητοΰσιν οι δημοτικοί το 
ΐσον, τούτ επι τών ομοίων ου μόνον δίκαιον αλλά 
και συμφέρον εστίν, διό εάν πλείους ώσιν εν τω 4 
πολιτευματι, πολλά συμφέρει τών δημοτικών νομο- 

15 θετημάτων, οίον το εξαμήνους τάς αρχάς eirai, 
ίνα πάντες οι όμοιοι μετέχωσιν έστι γάρ ωσπερ 
δήμος ήδη οι όμοιοι (διό και εν τούτοις έγγίγνονται 
δημαγωγοί πολλάκις, ώσπερ εΐρηται πρότερον), 
επειθ* ήττον εις δυναστείας εμπίπτουσιν αι ολιγ- 

See Additional Note on p. 483. 
420 



POLITICS, V. νιι. 2-4 

does not come all at once, for the mind is led astray 
by the repeated small outlays, just like the sophistic 
puzzle, ' if each is little, then all are a little.' α This is 
true in one way but in another it is not ; for the 
whole or total is not little, but made up of little 
parts. One thing therefore that we must guard 
against is this beginning ; and the next point is that 
we must not put faith in the arguments strung to- 
gether for the sake of tricking the multitude, for they 
are refuted by the facts (and what sort of constitutional 

3 sophistries we refer to has been said before). And l -"* » l * ff 
again we must observe that not only some aristo- 
cracies but also some oligarchies endure not because 

the constitutions are secure but because those who 
get in the offices treat both those outside the con- 
stitution and those in the government well, on the 
one hand by not treating those who are not members 
of it unjustly and by bringing their leading men into 
the constitution and not wronging the ambitious 
ones in the matter of dishonour or the multitude in 
the matter of gain, and on the other hand, in relation 
to themselves and those who are members, by treating 
one another in a democratic spirit. For that equality 
which men of democratic spirit seek for in the case 
of the multitude is not only just but also expedient 

4 in the case of their compeers. Hence if there are 
a greater number in the governing class, many of 
the legislative enactments of a democratic nature 
are advantageous, for example for the offices to be 
tenable for six months, to enable all the compeers to 
participate in them ; for the compeers in this case are 
as it were the people (owing to which demagogues often 

arise even among them, as has been said already), i3o<5a2•*. 
and also oligarchies and aristocracies fall into dyn- 

421 



ARISTOTLE 

18088 t \ > / / » X t I t /CV 

αρχιαί και αριστοκρατιαι [ου γαρ ομοίως ραοιον 

20 κακουργησαι ολίγον χρόνον άρχοντας και πολύν, 
επει διά τοΰτο εν ταΐς όλιγαρχίαις και δημο- 
κρατίαις γίγνονταί τυραννίδες' η γαρ οι μέγιστοι 
iv εκατερα επιτίθενται τυραννίδι, ένθα μεν οι δημ- 
αγωγοί ένθα δ' οι δυνάσται, η οι τάς μεγιστας 
έχοντες αρχάς, όταν πολύν χρόνον άρχωσιν). σω- 5 

25 ζονται δ' αί πολιτεΐαι ου μόνον διά το πόρρω 
eivai των διαφθειρόντων αλλ' ενίοτε και δια το 
εγγύς, φοβούμενοι γαρ διά χειρών εχουσι μάλλον 
την πολιτείαν ώστε δει τους της πολιτείας 
φροντίζοντας φόβους παρασκευάζειν, ΐνα φυλάτ- 
τωσι και μη καταλυωσιν ώσπερ νυκτερινην φυλα- 

80 κην την της πολιτείας τήρησιν, και το πόρρω 
εγγύς ποιεΐν. ετι τάς τών γνωρίμων φιλονεικιας 
και στάσβι? και διά τών νόμων πειράσθαι δει 
φυλάττειν, και τους εζω της φιλονεικιας οντάς 
πριν παρειληφεναι και αυτούς, ως το εν αρχή 
γινόμενον κακόν yrtorai ου του τυχόντος άλλα 

85 πολιτικοί; ανδρός, προς δε την διά τά τιατ^ατα 6 
γιγνομενην μεταβολήν εξ ολιγαρχίας και πολιτείας, 
όταν συμβαίνη τοΰτο μενόντων μεν τών αυτών 
τιμημάτων εύπορίας δε νομίσματος γιγνομενης, 
συμφέρει του τιμήματος επισκοπεΐν του κοινού το 

40 πλήθος προς το παρελθόν, εν οσαις μεν πόλεσι 

τιμώνται κατ ενιαυτον, κατά τούτον τον χρονον, 

1308 b e V δε ταΐς μείζοσι διά τριετηρίδας η πενταετηρίδος , 

καν η πολλαπλάσιον η πολλοστημοριον του προ- 

τερον εν ω αϊ τιμήσεις κατέστησαν της πολι- 



• This modifies 1207 a 31. 
422 



POLITICS, V. νπ. 4-6 

asties less (for it is not so easy to do wrongs when in 
office for a short time as when in for a long time, since 
it is long tenure of office that causes tyrannies to 
spring up in oligarchies and democracies ; for either 
those who are the greatest men in either sort of state 
aim at tyranny, in the one sort the demagogues and 
in the other the dynasts, or those who hold the 
greatest offices, when they are in office for a long time). 

5 And constitutions are kept secure not only through 
being at a distance from destroyers but sometimes also 
through being near them, a for when they are afraid 
the citizens keep a closer hold on the government ; 
hence those who take thought for the constitution 
must contrive causes of fear, in order that the citizens 
may keep guard and not relax their vigilance for the 
constitution like a watch in the night, and they must 
make the distant near. Again, they must also 
endeavour to guard against the quarrels and party 
struggles of the notables by means of legislation, 
and to keep out those who are outside the quarrel 
before they too have taken it over ; since to 
discern a growing evil at the commencement is not 
any ordinary person's work but needs a statesman. 

6 And to deal -with the revolution from oligarchy and 
constitutional government that arises because of the 
property-qualifications, when this occurs while the 
rates of qualification remain the same but money is 
becoming plentiful, it is advantageous to examine the 
total amount of the rated value of the community 
as compared with the past amount, in states where 
the assessment is made yearly, over that period, and 
three years or five years ago in the larger states, and 
if the new total is many times larger or many times 
smaller than the former one at the time when 

423 



ARISTOTLE 

1308 b 

τειας, νόμον είναι και τά τιμήματα επιτείνειν η 

5 ανιεναι, lav μεν ύπερβάλλη επιτείνοντας κατά την 

πολλαπλασίωσιν, εάν δ' ελλείπη άνιεντας και 

ελάττω ποιοΰντας την τίμησιν. εν 1 γάρ ταΐς η 

ολιγαρχίαις και ταΐς πολιτείαις μη ποιούντων , 

όντως μεν 2 ένθα μεν όλιγαρχίαν ένθα δε δυναστείαν 

γίγνεσθαι σιγζ/ίαιρ'ει, εκείνως δε εκ μεν πολιτείας 

ίο δημοκρατίαν εκ δ' ολιγαρχίας πολιτείαν η δημον. 
κοινόν δε και εν δήμω και ολιγαρχία [και εν 
μοναρχία] 3 και πάση πολιτεία μητ αύζάνειν 4, λίαν 
μηθενα παρά την σνμμετρίαν αλλά μάλλον πει- 
ράσθαι μικράς και πολυχρονίους διδόναι τι/χά? η 
ταχύ 5 μεγάλας (διαφθείρονται γάρ, και φέρειν ου 

15 παντός ανδρός εύτνχίαν), ει δε μη, μη τοί y 
αθρόας δόντας άφαιρεΐσθαι πάλιν αθρόας αλλ' εκ 
προσαγωγής• και μάλιστα μεν πειράσθαι τοις 8 
νομοις ούτως άγειν ώστε μηθενα εγγίγνεσθαι πολύ 
υπερέχοντα δυνάμει μήτε φίλων μήτε χρημάτων , 
ει δε μη, άποδημητικάς ποιείσθαι τάς παραστάσεις 

20 αυτών, επει δε και δια, τους ιδίους βίους νεωτερι- 

ζουσιν, δει εμποιεΐν άρχην τίνα την εποφομενην 

τους ζώντας άσυμφόρως προς την πολιτείαν, εν 

μεν δημοκρατία προς την δημοκρατίαν, εν δε 

ολιγαρχία προς την όλιγαρχίαν, ομοίως δε και 

τών άλλων πολιτειών εκάστη, και το ευημερούν 

1 h Susemihl : έν μέι> codd. 
• Niemeyer: μλν ovrws codd. 

8 om. codd. cet. * αύξάν€ΐν <5eic> ? ed. 

6 ταχύ vix sanum : breriter et Guil., βραχύ και Susemihl, 
βραχυχρόνιους και Sepulveda. 

° i.e. if the total valuation has decreased. 
b i.e. if the total has increased. 
e Some mss. and many editors omit these words. 
424 



POLITICS, V. νιι. 6^8 

the rates qualifying for citizenship were fixed, it is 
advantageous that there should be a law for the 
magistrates correspondingly to tighten up or to relax 
the rates, tightening them up in proportion to the 
ratio of increase if the new total rated value exceeds 
the old, and relaxing them and making the qualifica- 

7 tion lower if the new total falls below the old. For 
in oligarchies and constitutional states, when they 
do not do this, in the one case ° the result is that in 
the latter an oligarchy comes into existence and in 
the former a dynasty, and in the other case b a 
constitutional government turns into a democracy 
and an oligarchy into a constitutional government or 
a government of the people. But it is a policy common 
to democracy and oligarchy [and to monarchy],* 
and every form of constitution not to raise up any 
man too much beyond due proportion, but rather 
to try to assign small honours and of long tenure or 
great ones quickly d (for officials grow corrupt, and 
not every man can bear good fortune), or if not, at 
all events not to bestow honours in clusters and take 
them away again in clusters, but by a gradual process ; 

8 and best of all to try so to regulate people by the law 
that there may be nobodv among them specially 
pre-eminent in power due to friends or wealth, or, 
failing this, to cause their periods out of office to be 
spent abroad. And since men also cause revolutions 
through their private lives, some magistracy must be 
set up to inspect those whose mode of living is un- 
suited to the constitution — unsuited to democracy 
in a democracy, to oligarchy in an oligarchy, and 
similarly for each of the other forms of constitution. 

d The text should probably be emended ' with a short 
tenure.' 

p 425 



ARISTOTLE 

25 δε της πόλεως ανά μέρος φυλάττεσθαι διά τάς 
αντας αιτίας' τούτου δ άκος το αίει τοις άντικει- 
μενοις μορίοις εγχειρίζειν τάς πράζεις καΐ τάς αρχάς 
(λέγω δ' άντικεΐσθαι τους επιεικείς τω πληθει 
καΐ τους απόρους τοις εύπορους), και τό πει- 
ράσθαι η συμμιγνύναι το των απόρων πλήθος 

80 και τό των ευπόρων η τό μέσον αύζειν (τοΰτο 
γάρ διαλύει τάς δια την ανισότητα στάσεις), 
μεγιστον δε εν πάση πολιτεία τό και τοις νομοις 9 
και τη άλλη οικονομία ούτω τετάχθαι ώστε μη 
eirai τάς αρχάς κερδαίνειν. τοΰτο δε μάλιστα εν 
ταΓ? όλιγαρχικ αΐς δει τηρεΐν ού γάρ ούτως ayava- 

85 κτούσιν είργόμενοι του άρχειν οι πολλοί (άλλα 
και χαίρουσιν εάν τις εα προς τοις ιδίοις σχολά- 
ζειν) ως εάν οιωνται τά κοινά κλεπτειν τους 
άρχοντας, τότε δ' αμφότερα λυπεί, τό τε των 
τιμών μη μετεχειν και τό των κερδών, μοναχώς 10 
δε και ενδέχεται άμα eirai δημοκρατιαν και 

40 άριστοκρατίαν, ει τοΰτο κατασκευάσειε τις• εν- 
1309 a δεχοιτο γάρ αν και τους γνωρίμους και τό πλήθος 
εχειν α βούλονται αμφότερους• τό μεν γάρ e^eiVai 
πάσιν άρχειν δημοκρατικόν τό δε τους γνωρίμους 
είναι εν ταϊς άρχαϊς άριστοκρατικόν, τοΰτο δ 
εσται όταν μη η κερδαίνειν από τών αρχών οι 
5 γάρ άποροι ού βουλησονται άρχειν τω μηδέν 
κερδαίνειν, αλλά προς τοις ιδίοις efrai μάλλον, οί 
δ' εύποροι δυνήσονται διά τό μηδέν προσδεΐσθαι 
τών κοινών ώστε συμβησεται τοις μεν αποροις γι- 

α i.e. render it impossible to make money out of office. 
426 



POLITICS, V. νιι. 8-10 

And also sectional prosperity in the state must be 
guarded against for the same reasons ; and the way 
to avert this is always to entrust business and office 
to the opposite sections (I mean that the respectable 
are opposite to the multitude and the poor to the 
wealthy), and to endeavour either to mingle together 
the multitude of the poor and that of the wealthy 
or to increase the middle class (for this dissolves party 

9 factions due to inequality). And in every form of 
constitution it is a very great thing for it to be so 
framed both by its laws and by its other institutions 
that it is impossible for the magistracies to make a 
profit. And this has most to be guarded against in 
oligarchies ; for the many are not so much annoyed 
at being excluded from holding office (but in fact 
they are glad if somebody lets them have leisure to 
spend on their own affairs) as they are if they think 
that the magistrates are stealing the common funds, 
but then both things annoy them, exclusion from 
the honours of office and exclusion from its profits. 

10 And indeed the sole way in which a combination of 
democracy and aristocracy is possible is if someone 
could contrive this arrangement α ; for it would then 
be possible for the notables and also the multitude 
both to have what they want ; for it is the democratic 
principle for all to have the right to hold office and 
the aristocratic one for the offices to be filled by 
the notables, and this will be the case when it is 
impossible to make money from office ; for the poor 
will not want to hold office because of making nothing 
out of it, but rather to attend to their own affairs, 
while the wealthy will be able to hold office because 
they have no need to add to their resources from the 
public funds ; so that the result will be that the poor 

427 



ARISTOTLE 

γν€σθαί εύπόροις διά το διατρίβειν προς τοις εργοις, 
τοις δε γνωρίμοις μη άρχεσθαι υπό των τυχόντων. 

ίο τον μεν οΰν μη κλεπτεσθαι τά κοινά η παράδοσις 11 
γιγνεσθω των χρημάτων παρόντων πάντων των 
πολιτών, και αντίγραφα κατά φρατρίας και λόχους 
και φυλάς τώεσθωσαν του δε άκερδώς άρχειν 
τιμάς είναι δει νενομοθετημενας τοις εύδοκιμοϋσιν. 

15 δει δ' iv μέν ταΐς δημοκρατίαις των εύπορων 
φείδεσθαι, μη μόνον τω τάς κτήσεις μη ποΐ€ΐν 
άναδάστους, αλλά μηδέ τους καρπούς (ο εν ενιαι? 
των πολιτειών λανθάνει γιγνόμενον) , βελτιον δε και 
βουλομενους κωλύειν λειτουργεΐν τάς δαπανηρας 

20 μεν μη χρησίμους δε λειτουργίας, οίον χορηγίας 
και λαμπαδαρχίας και δσαι ά'λλαι τοιαΰται• εν 12 
δ' ολιγαρχία των απόρων ε77ΐ;ΐιε'λειαν ποιεΐσθαι 
πολλήν, και τάς αρχάς ά^' ων λήμματα τούτοις 
άπονεμειν, καν τις ύβρίση των ευπόρων εις τνυ- 
τους, μείζω τά επιτίμια είναι η αν σφών αυτών, 
και τάς κληρονομιάς μη κατά δόσιν είναι άλλα 

25 κατά γένος, μηδέ πλειόνων ή /Aid? τον αυτόν 
κληρονομεΐν, ούτω γάρ αν όμαλώτεραι αι ουσιαι 
εΐεν και τών απόρων εις εύπορίαν αν καθισταιντο 
πλείους. συμφέρει δε και εν δημοκρατία και εν 13 
ολιγαρχία τών άλλων η ισότητα η προεδριαν 
νεμειν τοις ήττον κοινωνοΰσι της πολιτείας, εν 

30 μεν δήμω τοις εύπόροις εν δ' ολιγαρχία τοις 
άπόροις, πλην δσαι άρχαι κυριαι της πολιτείας, 

" Groups of citizens normally three to a tribe, supposed 
to be based on relationship. 

* Originally a military, later a civil classification. 

428 



POLITICS, V. νπ. 10-13 

will become well-off through spending their time upon 
their work, and the notables will not be governed by 

11 any casual persons. Therefore to prevent peculation 
of the public property, let the transfer of the funds 
take place in the presence of all the citizens, and let 
copies of the lists be deposited for each brotherhood, 
company b and tribe ; and to get men to hold office 
without profit there must be honours assigned by law 

to officials of good repute. And in democracies it is Constitu- 
necessary to be sparing of the wealthy not only by ^^.,^ 
not causing properties to be divided up, but not demoeraciw 
incomes either (which under some constitutions takes oiigarchie 
place unnoticed), and it is better to prevent men from 
undertaking costly but useless public services like 
equipping choruses and torch-races c and all other 

12 similar services, even if they wish to ; in an oligarchy 
on the other hand it is necessary to take much care 
of the poor, and to allot to them the offices of profit, 
and the penalty if one of the rich commits an outrage 
against them must be greater than if it is done by 
one of themselves/* and inheritance must not go by 
bequest but by family, and the same man must not 
inherit more than one estate, for so estates would 
be more on a level, and more of the poor would 

13 establish themselves as prosperous. And it is ex- 
pedient both in a democracy and in an oligarchy to 
assign to those who have a smaller share in the govern- 
ment — in a democracy to the wealthy and in an olig- 
archy to the poor — either equality or precedence in all 
other things excepting thesupreme officesof state; but 

e Equipping the chorus and actors for tragedies and 
comedies and providing for the ceremonial torch-races were 
public services borne by individuals at Athens. 

d Or possibly ' than if he does it against one of his own 
class.' 

429 



ARISTOTLE 

1309 a . ξΝ\ Λ » Λ \ / * ,<, , 

ταντας οε τοις εκ τής πολιτείας εγχειριζειν μονοις 

η πλείοσιν. 

Τρία δε τίνα χρη εχειν τους μέλλοντας άρξειν 14 

τα? κυρίας αρχάς, πρώτον μεν φιλίαν προς την 

35 καθεστώσαν πολιτείαν, έπειτα δυνα/ζιν μεγίστην 
των έργων της αρχής, τρίτον δ' άρετην και 
δικαιοσύνην εν εκάστη πολιτεία την προς την 
πολιτείαν (ει γαρ μη ταύτόν το δίκαιον κατά 
πάσας τάς πολιτείας, ανάγκη και της δικαιοσύνης 
efvat διαφοράς) . έχει δ' άπορίαν, όταν μη συμβαίνη 

40 ταύτα πάντα περί τον αυτόν, πώς χρη ποιεΐσθαι 
1309 b την αΐρεσιν 1 • οίον ει στρατηγικός μεν τις εΐη 
πονηρός δε και μη τη πολιτεία φίλος, ο δε δίκαιος 
και φίλος, 2 πώς δει ποιεΐσθαι την αΐρεσιν; εοικε 15 
δε δεΐν βλεπειν εις δύο, τίνος πλεΐον μετεχουσι 
πάντες και τίνος ελαττον. διό εν στρατηγία μεν 
β εις την εμπειρίαν μάλλον της αρετής, ελαττον γαρ 
στρατηγίας μετεχουσι, τής δ' επιεικείας πλεΐον 
εν δε φυλακή και ταμιεία τάναντία, πλείονος γαρ 
αρετής δεΐται ή δσην οι πολλοί εχουσιν, η δε 
επιστήμη κοινή πάσιν. άπορήσειε 8' αν τι? καν 

ίο δυ^α/ζι? ύπάρχη και τής πολιτείας 3 φιλία, τι δει 
τής αρετής; ποιήσει γαρ τα συμφέροντα και τά 
δύο. ή οτι ενδέχεται τους τά δύο ταύτα έχοντας 
ακρατείς είναι, ώστε καθάπερ και αύτοΐς ούχ 
ύπηρετοΰσιν είδότες καϊ φιλοΰντες αυτούς, ούτω 

1 αϊρεσιν corr. cod. inferior : διαίρεσα> cet. 
* φίλο? μη στρατη-γικός δέ codd. nonnulli. 
8 καϊ post πολίτίΐα,ς codd., tr. Stahr. 
430 



POLITICS, V. νιι. 13-15 

these should be entrusted to those prescribed by the 
constitution exclusively, or to them for the most part. 

14 There are some three qualities which those who are character of 
to hold the supreme magistracies ought to possess, ° cials ' 
first, loyalty to the established constitution, next, 

very great capacity to do the duties of the office, and 
third, virtue and justice — in each constitution the 
sort of justice suited to the constitution (for if the rules 
of justice are not the same under all constitutions, 
it follows that there must be differences in the nature 
of justice also). It is a difficult question how the 
choice ought to be made when it happens that all 
these qualities are not found in the same person ; 
for instance, if one man is a good military com- 
mander but a bad man and no friend of the constitu- 
tion, and the other is just and loyal, how should 

15 the choice be made ? It seems that two things 
ought to be considered, what is the quality of which 
all men have a larger share, and what the one of 
which all have a smaller share ? Therefore in the 
case of military command one must consider experi- 
ence more than virtue, for men have a smaller share 
of military experience and a larger share of moral 
goodness ; but in the case of a trusteeship or a 
stewardship the opposite, for these require more 
virtue than most men possess, but the knowledge 
required is common to all men. And somebody 
might raise the question, why is virtue needed if 
both capacity and loyalty to the constitution are 
forthcoming, as even these two qualities will do 
what is suitable ? May not the answer be, because 
those who possess these two qualities may possibly 
lack self-control, so that just as they do not serve 
themselves well although they know how to and 

431 



ARISTOTLE 

1309 b 

και προς το κοινόν ούθέν κωλύει έχειν ένίους, 
απλώς δε, δσα εν τοις νόμοις ώς συμφέροντα λέ- 16 

15 γομεν ταΐς πολιτείαις, άπαντα ταΰτα σώζει τάς 
πολιτείας, και το πολλάκις είρημένον μεγιστον 
στοιχεΐον, το τηρεΐν όπως κρεΐττον εσται το 
βονλόμενον την πολιτείαν πλήθος του μη βουλο- 
μένου. παρά πάντα δε ταΰτα δει μη λανθάνειν, 
ο νυν λαι^άνΐΐ τάς παρεκβεβηκυίας πολιτείας, το 

20 μέσον πολλά γάρ τών δοκοΰντων δημοτικών λύει 
τάς δημοκρατίας και τών ολιγαρχικών τάς ολιγ- 
αρχίας, οι δ , οίόμενοι ταύτην είναι μίαν άρετην, 17 
ελκουσιν εις την ύπερβολην, άγνοοΰντες οτι 
καθάπερ ρις εστί παρεκβεβηκυΐα μεν την ευθύτητα 
την καλλίστην προς το γρυπόν η το σιμόν αλλ' 

25 όμως ετι καλή και χάριν έχουσα προς την όψιν, 
ου μην αλλ' εάν επιτείνη τις en μάλλον εις την 
ύπερβολην, πρώτον μεν αποβάλει την μετριότητα 
του μορίου τέλος δ' ούτως ώστε μηδέ ρίνα 
ποιήσει φαίνεσθαι δια την ύπεροχην και την 
ελλειφιν τών ενάντιων (τον αύτον δε τρόπον έχει 

30 και περί τών άλλων μορίων), συμβαίνει δη τοΰτο 
και περί τάς άλλα? πολιτείας• και γάρ όλιγαρχίαν 18 
και δημοκρατίαν εστίν ώστ έχειν ικανώς, καιπερ 
εξεστηκυίας της βέλτιστης τάξεως, εάν δε τις 
επιτείνη μάλλον εκατεραν αυτών, πρώτον μεν 
χείρω ποιήσει την πολιτείαν, τέλος δ ουδέ πολι- 

35 τείαν. διό δει τοΰτο μη άγνοεΐν τον νομοθέτην 



β See 1279 a 20. 
432 



POLITICS, V. νιι. 15-18 

although they love themselves, so possibly in some 
cases they may behave in this way in regard to the 

16 community also ? And broadly, whatever provisions 
in the laws we describe as advantageous to con- 
stitutions, these are all preservative of the constitu- 
tions, and so is the supreme elementary principle 
that has been often stated, that of taking precau- 
tions that the section desirous of the constitution 
shall be stronger in number than the section not 
desirous of it. And beside all these matters one moderate 
thing must not be overlooked which at present is f^eahh* 
overlooked by the deviation-forms a of constitution 
— the middle party ; for many of the institutions 
thought to be popular destroy democracies, and many 
of those thought oligarchical destroy oligarchies. 

IT But the adherents of the deviation-form, thinking that 
this form is the only right thing, drag it to excess, not 
knowing that just as there can be a nose that al- 
though deviating from the most handsome straight- 
ness towards being hooked or snub nevertheless is still 
beautiful and agreeable to look at, yet all the same, 
if a sculptor carries it still further in the direction of 
excess, he «ill first lose the symmetry of the feature 
and finally will make it not even look like a nose at 
all, because of its excess and deficiency in the two 
opposite qualities (and the same is the case also 
in regard to the other parts of the body), so this is 

18 what happens about constitutions likewise ; for it is 
possible for an oligarchy and a democracy to be satis- 
factory although they have diverged from the best 
structure, but if one strains either of them further, 
first he will make the constitution worse, and finally 
he will make it not a constitution at all. Therefore 
the legislator and the statesman must not fail to 

433 



ARISTOTLE 

1809 b , , ν , > s- <■> 2: - ! 

και τον πολιτικον, ποια σωί,ει των δημοτικών και 

ποια φθείρει την δημοκρατίαν, και ποια των 

ολιγαρχικών την όλιγαρχίαν ούδετεραν μεν γαρ 

ενδέχεται αυτών eimi και δια /zeVeiv άνευ τών 

ευπόρων και του πλήθους, αλλ' όταν όμαλοτης 

40 γενηται της ουσίας, άλλην ανάγκη elvai ταύτην 
1310 a την πολιτείαν , ώστε φθείροντες τοις καθ ύπεροχην 
νόμοις φθείρουσι τάς πολιτείας, άμαρτάνουσι δε 19 
και εν ταΐς δημοκρατίαις και εν ταΐς όλιγαρχιαις, 
iv μεν ταΐς δημοκρατίαις οι δημαγωγοί, οπού το 
δ πλήθος κύριον τών νόμων δυο γαρ ποιοΰσιν αει 
την πάλιν μαχόμενοι τοις εύπόροις, δει δε τουναν- 
τίον cuet δοκεΐν λέγειν νπερ εύπορων, 1 iv δε ταΐς 
όλιγαρχίαις ύπερ του δήμου τους ολιγαρχικούς, 
και τους όρκους εναντίους η νυν ομνύναι τους 
ολιγαρχικούς, νυν μεν γαρ εν eVicti? όμνύουσι "και 

ίο τω δήμω κακόνους εσομαι και βουλευσω δ τι αν 
εχω κακόν," χρή δε και ύπολαμβάνειν και ύπο- 
κρίνεσθαι τουναντίον, επισημαινομενους εν τοις 
όρκοις οτι "ουκ αδικήσω τον δήμον.' μεγιστον 20 
δε πάντων τών είρημενων προς το δια/χεΊ'ειΐ' τάς 
πολιτείας, ου νυν όλιγωροϋσι πάντες, το παίδευε - 
σ^αι προς τάς πολιτείας, όφελος γάρ ούθέν τών 

15 ώφελιμωτάτων νόμων και συνδεδοζασμενων υπό 
πάντων τών πολιτευόμενων, ει μη έσονται είθι- 
σμενοι και πεπαιδευμένοι εν τη πολιτεία, ει μεν 
οι νόμοι δημοτικοί, δημοτικώς, ει δ' ολιγαρχικοί, 

1 των ευπόρων cod. inferior. 

° The ' scoffing anapaestic cadence ' of this oath has been 
noted. In 411 b.c. the democratic reaction at Athens swore 

434 



POLITICS, V. νιι. 18-20 

know what sort of democratic institutions save and 
what destroy a democracy, and what sort of oligarchical 
institutions an oligarchy ; for neither constitution 
can exist and endure without the well-to-do and 
the multitude, but when an even level of property 
comes about, the constitution resulting must of 
necessity be another one, so that when men destroy 
these classes by laws carried to excess they destroy 

19 the constitutions. And a mistake is made both in 
democracies and in oligarchies — in democracies by 
the demagogues, where the multitude is supreme 
over the laws ; for they always divide the state into 
two by fighting with the well-to-do, but they ought 
on the contrary always to pretend to be speaking on 
behalf of men that are well-to-do, while in demo- 
cracies the oligarchical statesmen ought to pretend 
to be speaking on behalf of the people, and the 
oligarchies ought to take oath in terms exactly 
opposite to those which they use now, for at present 
in some oligarchies they swear, ' And I will be hostile 
to the people and will plan whatever evil I can 
against them," but they ought to hold, and to act 
the part of holding, the opposite notion, declaring 

20 in their oaths, " I will not wrong the people." But and 
the greatest of all the means spoken of to secure the j^UOn. 
stability of constitutions is one that at present all 
people despise : it is a system of education suited to 

the constitutions. For there is no use in the most 
valuable laws, ratified by the unanimousjudgementof 
the whole body of citizens, if these are not trained and 
educated in the constitution, popularly if the laws 
are popular, oligarchically if they are oligarchical ; 

' to be enemies of the Four Hundred and to hold no parley 
with them.' 

435 



ARISTOTLE 

1310 a „ *.. .» >/>fi> / 

ολιγαρχικούς• ειπερ γαρ εστίν εφ ενο? ακρασια, 

20 εστί /cat €7τι πόλεως•. εστί δε το ττβτταιΒΐΰσθαί 21 
77/30? ττ)ν πολιτείαν ου τούτο, το ποιεΐν οίς χαιρουσιν 
οί όλιγαρχοΰντες η οι δημοκρατίαν βουλόμενοι, 
άλΧ οίς δυνχίσονται οί μεν ολιγαρχεΐν οί δέ δημο- 
κρατεΐσθαι. νυν δ' iv μεν ταΐς όλιγαρχίαις οι 
των αρχόντων υιοί τρυφώσιν, οί δε των άπορων 

2ο γίγνονται γεγυμνασμενοι και πεπονηκοτες, ώστε 
καΐ βούλονται μάλλον και δύνανται νεωτερίζει ν 
iv δέ ταΐς δημοκρατίαις ταΐς μάλιστα είναι 22 
Βοκούσαις δημοκρατικαΐς τουναντίον του συμ- 
φέροντος καθεστηκεν. αίτιον δε τούτου ότι κακώς 
ορίζονται το ελεύθερον (δυο γάρ εστίν οίς η 
δημοκρατία δοκεΐ ώρίσθαι, τω το πλεΐον είναι 

80 κύριον και τη ελευθερία)' το μεν γάρ δίκαιον 
ίσον 1 δοκεΐ είναι, ίσον δ' ο τι αν δό^ τω πληθει 
τοϋτ* είναι κύριον, ελεύθερον δε [και ίσον] 2 το ο τι 
αν βούληταί τις ποιεΐν ώστε ζη εν ταΐς τοιαύταις 
δημοκρατίαις έκαστος ως βούλεται, και εις ο 
χρηζων, ως φησιν Ευριπίδης, τούτο δ εστί 

85 φαύλον ου γάρ δει οίεσθαι δουλείαν είναι το ζην 
προς την πολιτείαν άλλα σωτηριαν. 

Έ£ ων μεν οΰν αϊ πολιτεΐαι μεταβάλλουσι και 
φθείρονται και διά τίνων σώζονται και διαμενουσιν , 
ώς απλώς ειπείν τοσαϋτά εστίν. 

VIII. Αείπεται δ' επελθεΐν και περί μοναρχίας, 1 

40 εζ ων τε φθείρεται και δι' ων σώζεοθαι πεφυκεν. 

1310 b σχεδόν δε παραπλήσια τοις είρημενοις περί τάς 

πολιτείας ε'στί και τα συμβαίνοντα περί τάς 

1 'ίσον ante δίκαιον Richards. 
2 Spengel. 

β Fragment 883, from an unknown play. 
436 



POLITICS, V. νπ. 20— viii. 1 

for there is such a thing as want of self-discipline 

21 in a state, as well as in an individual. But to 
have been educated to suit the constitution does 
not mean to do the things that give pleasure to 
the adherents of oligarchy or to the supporters of 
democracy, but the things that will enable the former 
to govern oligarchically and the latter to govern 
themselves democratically. But at present in the 
oligarchies the sons of the rulers are luxurious, and the 
sons of the badly-off become trained by exercise and 
labour, so that they are both more desirous of reform 

22 and more able to bring it about ; while in the de- 
mocracies thought to be the most democratic the 
opposite of what is expedient has come about. And 
the cause of this is that they define liberty wrongly 
(for there are two things that are thought to be 
defining features of democracy, the sovereignty of the 
majority and liberty) ; for justice is supposed to be 
equality, and equality the sovereignty of what- 
ever may have been decided by the multitude, and 
liberty doing just what one likes. Hence in demo- 
cracies of this sort everybody lives as he likes, and 
' unto what end he listeth,' as Euripides a says. But 
this is bad ; for to live in conformity with the constitu- 
tion ought not to be considered slavery but safety. 

This therefore, speaking broadly, is a list of the 
things that cause the alteration and the destruction 
of constitutions, and of those that cause their security 
and continuance. 
1 VIII. It remains to speak of monarchy, the causes stability of 
that destroy it and the natural means of its pre- monarchies • 
servation. And the things that happen about 
royal governments and tyrannies are almost similar 
to those that have been narrated about constitu- 

437 



ARISTOTLE 

βασίλεια? και τα? τυραννίδας, ή μεν γαρ βασίλεια 
κατά την άριστοκρατίαν εστίν, η δε τυραννίς εξ 
ολιγαρχίας της ύστατης σύγκειται και δημοκρατίας, 

5 διό δη και βλαβερωτάτη τοις άρχομενοις εστίν, 
άτ€ εκ δυοΐν συγκειμένη κακών και τάς παρεκ- 
βάσεις και τάς αμαρτίας έχουσα τάς παρ* αμφο- 
τέρων των πολιτειών, υπάρχει δ η γενεσις ευθύς 2 
εξ εναντίων εκατερα τών μοναρχιών η μεν γαρ 
βασίλεια προς βοηθειαν την από του δήμου 1 τοις 

ίο επιεικεσι γεγονεν, και καθίσταται βασιλει)? εκ τών 
επιεικών καθ' ύπεροχην αρετής η πράξεων τών 
άπο της αρετής, η καθ* ύπεροχην τοιούτου γένους, 6 
δε τύραννος εκ του δήμου και του πλήθους επί 
τους γνωρίμους, όπως 6 δήμος άδικηται μηθεν 
ύπ* αυτών, φανερόν δ εκ τών συμβεβηκότων 3 

15 σχεδόν γαρ οι πλείστοι τών τυράννων γεγόνασιν 
εκ δημαγωγών ως ειπείν, πιστευθεντες εκ τοΰ 
διαβάλλειν τους γνωρίμους. αϊ μεν γαρ τούτον 
τον τρόπον κατέστησαν τών τυραννίδων ηδη τών 
πόλεων ηύξημενων, αϊ δε προ τούτων εκ [τε] 2 
τών βασιλέων παρεκβαινόντων τά πάτρια και 

20 δεσποτικωτερας άρχης όρεγομενων, αϊ δ' εκ τών 
αιρετών επι τάς κυρίας άρχας (το γαρ άρχαΐον οι 
δήμοι καθίστασαν πολυχρονίους τας δημιουργίας 
και τάς θεωρίας), αϊ δ' εκ τών ολιγαρχιών αίρου- 
μενων ενα τινά κύριον επι τάς μεγίστας αρχάς, 
πάσι γάρ ύπηρχε τοις τρόποις τούτοις το κάτεργα- 4 

25 ζεσ#αι ραδίως, ει μόνον βουληθεΐεν, δια το δύναμίν 

1 έιτί τον δημον Rassow. 2 [re] om. cod. inferior. 

a Cf. 1296 a 3, 1312 b 35. 

6 Here δημιονρ-γία means ' magistracy ' generally ; δ-ημιουρ-γός 
was the title of a special officer in some Peloponnesian states. 

438 



POLITICS, V. νιπ. 1-4 

tional governments. For royal government corre- Royalty and 
sponds with aristocracy, while tyranny is a combina- yranny • 
tion of the last form of oligarchy a and of democracy ; 
and for that very reason it is most harmful to 
its subjects, inasmuch as it is a combination of two 
bad things, and is liable to the deviations and errors 

2 that spring from both forms of constitution. And 
these two different sorts of monarchy have their 
origins from directly opposite sources ; royalty has 
come into existence for the assistance of the dis- 
tinguished against the people, and a king is appointed 
from those distinguished by superiority in virtue 
or the actions that spring from virtue, or by superi- 
ority in coming from a family of that character, while 
a tyrant is set up from among the people and the 
multitude to oppose the notables, in order that the 

3 people may suffer no injustice from them. And this 
is manifest from the facts of history. For almost the 
greatest number of tyrants have risen, it may be said, 
from being demagogues, having won the people's 
confidence by slandering the notables. For some 
tyrannies were set up in this manner when the states 
had already grown great, but others that came 
before them arose from kings departing from the 
ancestral customs and aiming at a more despotic 
rule, and others from the men elected to fill the 
supreme magistracies (for in old times the peoples 
used to appoint the popular officials b and the sacred 
embassies c for long terms of office), and others from 
oligarchies electing some one supreme official for 

4 the greatest magistracies. For in all these methods 
they had it in their power to effect their purpose 
easily, if only they wished, because they already 

c Official missions to religious games and to oracles. 

439 



ARISTOTLE 

1810 b , „ N/D \~>« -£* 

προυπαρχειν τοις μεν βασιλικής αρχής τοις δε 
την της τιμής, οίον Φειδων μεν περί "Αργός και 
έτεροι τύραννοι κατάστησαν βασίλεια? ύπαρχούσης, 
οι δέ περί την Ίωνιαν και Φάλαρις εκ των 
τιμών, Π αναίτιο? δ' iv Λεοντινοι? και Κύψελος iv 

so Κορίνθω και Πεισίστρατο? Άθηνησι και Διονύσιος 
iv Συρακούσαις και έτεροι τον αύτον τρόπον εκ 
δημαγωγίας . καθάπερ οΰν εΐπομεν, η βασίλεια 5 
τετακται κατά την άριστοκρατίαν κατ' ά^ιαν 
γάρ εστίν, η κατ ιδίαν άρετην η κατά γένους η 
κατ' ευεργεσίας η κατά ταΰτά τε και δυναμ,ιν. 

35 άπαντες γάρ εύεργετήσαντες η δυνάμενοι τα? 
πόλει? η τά έθνη εύεργετεΐν ετύγχανον της τιμής 
ταύτης, οι μεν κατά πόλεμον κωλύσαντες δουλεύειν, 
ώσπερ Κόδρο?, οι δ' ελευθερώσαντες , ώσπερ 
Κΰρος, η κτίσαντες η κτησάμενοι χώραν, ωσπερ 
οι Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεί? και Μακεδόνων και 

40 Μολοττών. βούλεται δ' ό βασιλεύ? είναι φύλαξ, 6 
1311a όπως οι μεν κεκτημένοι τάς ουσίας μηθεν αδικον 
πάσχωσιν 6 δε δήμος μη ύβρίζηται μηθεν, ή δέ 
τυραννίς, ώσπερ εϊρηται πολλάκις, προς ούοεν 
αποβλέπει κοινόν ει μη της ιδίας ωφέλειας χάριν 
5 έ'στι δέ σκοπός τυραννικός μεν το ηδύ βασιλικός 
δέ το καλόν. διό και τών πλεονεκτημάτων τα 
μεν χρήματα 1 τυραννικά τά δ' ει? τιμήν βασιλικά 
μάλλον και φυλακή βασιλική μεν πολιτική, τυραν- 

1 χρημάτων Γ : <eis> χρήματα ? Susemihl. 

α Perhaps c. 750 b.c. 
* e.g. Thrasybulus, tyrant of Miletus, 612 b.c. 
" Tyrant of Agrigentum 572 b.c. 
* See 1305 a 23 n. ' See 1259 a 28 n. 

440 



POLITICS. V. νιιι. 4-β 

possessed the power of royal rule in the one set of 
cases and of their honourable office in the other, 
for example Phidon in Argos ° and others became 
tvrants when they possessed royal power already, 
while the Ionian tyrants & and Phalaris c rose from 
offices of honour, and Panaetius at Leontini and 608 BC - 
Cypselus at Corinth and Pisistratus d at Athens and 655 b.c. 
Dionysius f at Syracuse and others in the same manner 

5 from the position of demagogue. Therefore, as we 
said, rovaltv is ranged in correspondence with aristo- § i• 
cracy, for it goes by merit, either by private virtue 

or by family or by services or by a combina- 
tion of these things and ability. For in every 
instance this honour fell to men after they had 
conferred benefit or because they had the ability to 
confer benefit on their cities or their nations, some 
having prevented their enslavement in war, for instance 
Codrus/ others having set them free, for instance 
Cyrus, 3 or having settled or acquired territory, for 
instance the kings of Sparta and Macedon and the 

6 Molossians. 71 And a king wishes to be a guardian, 
to protect the owners of estates from suffering 
injustice and the people from suffering insult, but 
tyranny, as has repeatedly been said, pays regard to 
no common interest unless for the sake of its private 
benefit ; and the aim of tyranny is what is pleasant, 
that of royalty what is noble. Hence even in their 
requisitions money is the aim of tyrants but rather 
marks of honour that of kings ; and a king's body- 
guard consists of citizens, a tyrant's of foreign 

f The usual tradition was that Codrus was already king 
when he saved Athens by sacrificing his life. 

' Cyrus liberated Persia from the Median empire 559 b.c. 

* Neoptolemus, son of Achilles, conquered the Molossi and 
became their king. 

441 



ARISTOTLE 

νίκη όε οία ξένων, οτι ο η τυραννις έχει κακά 7 
και τα της δημοκρατίας και τά της ολιγαρχίας, 

ίο φανερόν εκ μεν ολιγαρχίας το το τέλος είναι 
πλοΰτον (οϋτω γαρ και δια /xeWiv άναγκαΐον μόνως 
την τε φυλακην και την τρυφην) και το τω πληθει 
μηδέν πιστεύειν (διό και την παραίρεσιν ποιούνται 
των δπλων, και το κακοΰν τον δχλον και το εκ 
του άστεος άπελαύνειν και διοικίζειν αμφοτέρων 

15 κοινον, και της ολιγαρχίας και της τνραννίδος) , 
εκ δημοκρατίας δέ το πολεμεΐν τοις γνωρίμοις και 
διαφθείρειν λάθρα και φανερώς και φυγαδεύειν ως 
άντιτέχνους και προς την άρχην έμποδίους. έκ 
γαρ τούτων συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι και τάς έπιβουλάς, 
των μεν άρχειν αυτών βουλομένων , των δέ μη 

20 δουλεύειν . όθεν και το ΐίεριάνδρου προς Θρασύ- 
βουλον συμβούλευμά έστιν, η των υπερεχόντων 
σταχυών κόλουσις, ως δέον άει τους υπερέχοντας 
των πολιτών άναιρεΐν. καθάπερ οΰν σχεδόν 8 
ελέχθη, 1 τάς αυτά? αρχάς δει νομίζειν περί τε τάς 
πολιτείας eirai τών μεταβολών και περί τάς 

26 μοναρχίας• δια τε γάρ άδικίαν και διά φοβον καΐ 
δια καταφρόνησιν επιτίθενται πολλοί τών αρχο- 
μένων ταΐς μοναρχίαις, της δέ αδικίας μάλιστα 2 
δι ύβριν, ενίοτε δέ και δια την τών ιδίων στέρησιν. 
έστι δε και τά τέλη ταύτα καθάπερ κάκεΐ και περί 

80 τάς τυραννίδας και τάς βασίλεια? - μέγεθος γάρ 
υπάρχει πλούτου και τιμής τοις μονάρχοις, ων 

1 σχεδόν post ελέχθη Spengel (om. ΓΜΡ 1 ). 
2 μάλιστα <μ.έ>> ? ed. 

α See 1284 a 26 η. 
442 



POLITICS, V. νπι. 7-8 

7 mercenaries. And it is manifest that tyranny has 
the evils of both democracy and oligarchy ; it copies 
oligarchy in making wealth its object (for inevitably 
that is the only way in which the tyrant's body- 
guard and his luxury can be kept up) and in putting 
no trust in the multitude (which is why they resort to 
the measure of stripping the people of arms, and why 
ill-treatment of the mob and its expulsion from the 
city and settlement in scattered places is common 
to both forms of government, both oligarchy and 
tyranny), while it copies democracy in making war 
on the notables and destroying them secretly and 
openly and banishing them as plotting against it 
and obstructive to its rule. For it is from them that 
counter-movements actually spring, some of them 
wishing themselves to rule, and others not to be 
slaves. Hence comes the advice of Periander to 
Thrasybulus, his docking of the prominent corn- 
stalks, meaning that the prominent citizens must 
always be made away with. 

8 Therefore, as was virtually stated, 6 the causes of Attacks oi 
revolutions in constitutional and in royal governments from 1 s 
must be deemed to be the same ; for subjects p^ 11 * 1 

, τ . , „ ■» . motives. 

in many cases attack monarchies because ot unjust 
treatment and fear and contempt, and among the 
forms of unjust treatment most of all because of 
insolence, and sometimes the cause is the seizure 
of private property. Also the objects aimed at by 
the revolutionaries in the case both of tyrannies and 
of royal governments are the same as in revolts 
against constitutional government ; for monarchs 
possess great wealth and great honour, which are 

6 This has not been stated, but can be inferred from what 
precedes. 

443 



ARISTOTLE 

1311a ,., , _ ~, , a , t \ y \ n 

εφιενται πάντες, των ο επιθέσεων at μεν επι 9 
το σώμα γίγνονται των αρχόντων αϊ δ' επι την 
αρχήν, αϊ μεν οΰν δι ϋβριν επι το σώμα• της δ' 
ύβρεως ούσης πολυμερούς, εκαστον αυτών α'ίτιον 

35 γίγνεται της οργής, τών ο' όργιζομενων σχεδόν 
ol πλείστοι τιμωρίας χάριν επιτίθενται αλλ' ούχ 
υπέροχης' οίον η μεν τών ΥΙεισιστρατιδών διά 
το προπηλακίσαι μεν την 'Αρμοδίου άδελφήν, επ- 
ηρεάσαι ο Άρμόδιον (ό μεν 1 γαρ 'Αρμόδιος διά την 
άδελφήν 6 δ' 'Αριστογείτων διά τον 'Αρμόδιον, 

40 επεβούλευσαν δέ και ΐίεριάνδρω τω εν 'Αμβρακία. 
1311 b τυραννώ διά το συμπινοντα μετά τών παιδικών 
ερωτησαι αυτόν ει ήδη εξ αυτοϋ κύει), ή δε Φιλίππου 10 
ύπο Τίαυσανίου διά το βάσαι ύβρισθήναι αύτον 
υπό τών περί ' Ατταλον, και ή Άμύντου του 
μικρού υπό Αερδα 2 διά το καυχήσασθαι εις την 

5 ήλικίαν αυτοϋ, και ή του ευνούχου Ευαγόρα τω 
Κυπρίω, διά γάρ το την γυναίκα παρελεσθαι τον 
υίόν αύτοΰ άπεκτεινεν ώς υβρισμένος. πολλαι 11 
δ' επιθέσεις γεγενηνται και διά το εις το σώμα 
αίσχύνεσθαι τών μοναρχών τινάς• οίον και ή 
Κραταιού εις Άρχελαον άει γάρ βαρέως είχε προς 

ίο την ouiAiW, ώστε ικανή και ελάττων εγένετο 
πρόφασις, ή διότι τών θυγατέρων ούδεμίαν εδωκεν 
όμολογήσας αύτώ, αλλά τήν μεν προτεραν κατ- 
εχόμενος υπό πολέμου προς Έιρραν 3 και ' Αρράβαιον 
έδωκε τω /?aaiAei τω της Έιλιμείας, τήν δέ νεω- 
1 μεν om. mg. Η. 
2 Άμύντου ύπο Αέρδα [του μικρού] Thompson. 
3 "Ιρραν Paton (sic Plutarchus et Strabo). 

° See 1304 a 31 n. 

• A Macedonian youth of family, who murdered Philip 
336 b.c. Attalus was the uncle of Philip's wife Cleopatra. 
4-44 



POLITICS, V. νπι. 9-11 

9 desired by all men. And in some cases the attack 
is aimed at the person of the rulers, in others at their 
office. Risings provoked by insolence are aimed 
against the person ; and though insolence has many 
varieties, each of them gives rise to anger, and 
when men are angry they mostly attack for the 
sake of revenge, not of ambition. For example the 
attack on the Pisistratidae took place because they 010 bc. 
outraged Harmodius's sister and treated Harmodius 
with contumely (for Harmodius attacked them be- 
cause of his sister and Aristogiton because of Har- 
modius, and also the plot was laid against Periander 
the tyrant in Ambracia a because when drinking with 
his favourite he asked him if he was yet with child 

10 by him), and the attack on Philip by Pausanias b was 
because he allowed him to be insulted by Attalus 
and his friends, and that on Amyntas the Little c by 
Derdas because he mocked at his youth, and the 
attack of the eunuch on Evagoras of Cyprus was for 
revenge, for he murdered him as being insulted, 3»r β,α 
because Evagoras 's son had taken away his wife. 

11 And many risings have also occurred because of 
shameful personal indignities committed by certain 
monarchs. One instance is the attack of Crataeas on 
Archelaus d ; for he was always resentful of the associ- 
ation, so that even a smaller excuse became sufficient, 
or perhaps it was because he did not give him the 
hand of one of his daughters after agreeing to do so, 
but gave the elder to the king of Elimea when hard 
pressed in a war against Sirras and Arrabaeus, and 

c Perhaps the adjective should be transferred to Derdas 
and expunged as an interpolated note. The persons referred 
to are uncertain. 

d King of Macedon 413-399 b.c. Euripides went to reside 
at his court 408 b.c. and died there 406 b.c. at the age of 75. 

445 



ARISTOTLE 

τεραν τω υίεΐ 'Αμύντα οίόμενος όντως αν εκείνον 

15 ηκιστα διαφερεσθαι και τον εκ της Κλεοπάτρας• 
άλλα της γε άλλοτριότητος ύπήρχεν άρχη το 
βαρέως φερειν προς την άφροδισιαστικήν χάριν, 
συνεπεθετο δε καϊ Έλλανοκράτης 6 ΑαρισαΖος 12 
δια την αυτήν αΐτίαν ως γαρ χρώμενος αύτοΰ τη 
ηλικία, ου κατήγεν υποσχόμενος, δι' ϋβριν και ου 

20 δι' ερωτικήν επιθυμίαν ωετ είναι την γεγενημενην 
ομιλίαν. ΐΐύθων δε και Ηρακλείδης ol Αΐνιοι 
Κότυν διεφθειραν τω πατρϊ τιμωροΰντες, Άδάμας 
δ' άπεστη Κότυος διά το εκτμηθηναι παι? ων υπ 
αύτοΰ, ως υβρισμένος, πολλοί 1 δε και δια το εις 13 
το σώμα αίκ ισθηναι πληγαΐς όργισθεντες οι μεν 

25 διεφθειραν οι δ' ενεχείρησαν ως ύβρισθεντες, και 
των περί τάς αρχάς και βασιλικάς δυναστείας, οίον 
iv Μιτυλήνη τους ΙΙενθιλίδας Μεγακλής περαόντας 
και τύπτοντας ταΐς κορυναις επιθεμενος μετά των 
φίλων άνεϊλεν, και ύστερον Έμέρδις Τίενθιλον 

30 πληγάς λαβών και παρά της γυναικός εξελκυσθεις 
διέφθειρεν. και της 'Αρχελάου δ' επιθέσεως 
Δεκάμνιχος ήγεμών εγενετο, παροξύνων τους 
επιθεμενους πρώτος' αίτιον δε της οργής οτι 
αυτόν εξεδωκε μαστιγώσαι Ευριπίδη τω ποιητή• 
ό δ' Ευριπίδης εχαλε'τταινεΐ' είπόντος τι αύτοΰ εις 

3 5 δυσωδίαν τοΰ στόματος, και άλλοι δέ 77θλλοι δια 14 
τοιαύτα? αιτίας οι μεν άνηρεθησαν οί δ' επεβου- 
λεύθησαν. ομοίως δε και δια φόβον εν γαρ τι 

1 πολλού? Richards. 



β King of Thrace 382-358 b.c. 

* The ruling family in the early oligarchy there, claiming 
descent from Penthilus, an illegitimate son of Orestes. 

446 



POLITICS, V. νιπ. 11-14 

the younger to his son Amyntas, thinking that thus 
Amyntas would be least likely to quarrel with his son 
by Cleopatra ; but at all events Crataeas's estrange- 
ment was primarily caused by resentment because 

12 of the love affair. And Hellanocrates of Larisa 
also joined in the attack for the same reason ; for 
because while enjoying his favours Archelaus 
would not restore him to his home although he had 
promised to do so, he thought that the motive of 
the familiarity that had taken place had been in- 
solence and not passionate desire. And Pytho and 
Heraclides of Aenusmade away with Cotys a to avenge 
their father, and Adamas revolted from Cotys be- 
cause he had been mutilated by him when a boy, 

13 on the ground of the insult. And also many men 
when enraged by the indignity of corporal chastise- 
ment have avenged the insult by destroying or 
attempting to destroy its author, even when a magis- 
trate or member of a royal dynasty. For example 
when the Penthilidae δ at Mitylene went about strik- 
ing people with their staves Megacles with his friends 
set on them and made away with them, and after- 
wards Smerdis when he had been beaten and 
dragged out from his wife's presence killed Pen- 
thilus. Also Decamnichus took a leading part in § n above, 
the attack upon Archelaus, being the first to stir 

on the attackers ; and the cause of his anger 
was that he had handed him over to Euripides the 
poet to flog, Euripides being angry because he had 

14 made a remark about his breath smelling. And 
many others also for similar reasons have been made 
away with or plotted against. And similarly also 
from the motive of fear ; for this was one of the 



447 



ARISTOTLE 

1311 b Λ ~ > / ? » x , ι Λ 

τοντο των αιηων ην, ωσπερ και περί τας πολι- 
τείας, και περί 1 τάς μοναρχίας• οίον Έέρξην 
Αρταπάνης φοβούμενος την διαβολήν την περί 
Α,αρεΐον, οτι εκρεμασεν ου κελεύσαντος Ή,ερξου 
40 αλλ οίόμενος συγγνώσεσθαι ως άμνημονοΰντα διά 

1312 a το δειπνεΐν. αϊ δε δια καταφρόνησιν , ωσπερ 

Σαρδανάπαλλον ίδών τις βαίνοντα μετά των γυ- 
ναικών (ει αληθή ταύτα οι μυθολογοΰντες λεγουσιν, 
ei οε μη εττ εκείνου, αλλ επ άλλου γε αν γένοιτο 
αληθές), και Αιονυσίω τω υστερώ Αίων επεθετο 
5 δια το καταφρονεΐν, όρων τους τε πολίτας οϋτως 
έχοντας και αυτόν άει μεθύοντα. και των φίλων 15 
δε τίνες επιτίθενται διά καταφρόνησιν δια γαρ το 
πιστεΰεσθαι καταφρονοϋσιν ως λησοντες. και οι 
οίόμενοι διί^ασ^αι κατασχεΐν την αρχήν τρόπον 

ίο τινά διά το καταφρονεΐν επιτίθενται• ως δυνάμενοι 
γάρ και καταφρονοΰντες του κινδύνου διά την δύ- 
ναμιν επιχειροΰσι ραδίως, ώσπερ οι στρατηγοΰντες 
τοις μονάρχοις , οίον Κΰρος Αστυάγη και του βίου 
καταφρονών και της δυνάμεως διά το την μεν 
δυνααι^ εζηργηκεναι αυτόν δε τρυφάν, και Σεύ- 

15 θης ο θράζ . Αμαδόκω στρατηγός ων. οί δε και 
διά πλείω τούτων επιτίθενται, οίον και κατα- 
φρονοΰντες και διά κέρδος, ωσπερ Άριοβαρζάνη 
1 και περί ed. : και codd. 

β Captain of Xerxes' body-guard. 

6 Last king of the Assyrian empire at Nineveh. 

• Tyrant of Syracuse 367-356 and 346-343 B.C., cf. 1312 a 
34 ff. 

d The last king of Media, reigned 594-559 b.c. 
448 



POLITICS, V. νιπ. 14-15 

causes we mentioned in the case of monarchies, § β. 
as also in that of constitutional governments ; c. u. 
for instance Artapanes ° killed Xerxes fearing the 
charge about Darius, because he had hanged him 
when Xerxes had ordered him not to but he had 
thought that he would forgive him because he would 
forget, as he had been at dinner. And other attacks 
on monarchs have been on account of contempt, 
as somebody killed Sardanapallus 6 when he saw him 
combing his hair with his women (if this story told 
by the narrators of legends is true — and if it did not 
happen with Sardanapallus, it might quite well be 
true of somebody else), and Dion attacked the 
younger Dionysius c because he despised him, when he 
saw the citizens despising him and the king himself 
15 alwavs drunk. And contempt has led some even 
of the friends of monarchs to attack them, for they 
despise them for trusting them and think they will 
not be found out. And contempt is in a manner the 
motive of those who attack monarchs thinking that 
they are able to seize the government ; for they 
make the attempt with a light heart, feeling that 
they have the power and because of their power 
despising the danger, as generals commanding the 
armies attack their monarchs ; for instance Cvrus 
attacked Astyages d when he despised both his 
mode of life and his power, because his power had 
waned and he himself was living luxuriously, and 
the Thracian Seuthes attacked Amadocus ■ when his 
general. Others again attack monarchs for more 
than one of these motives, for instance both because 
they despise them and for the sake of gain, as 

4 Both these Thracian kings became allies of Athens 
390 b.c, but the event referred to may be later. 

449 



ARISTOTLE 

Μιθριδάτης. μάλιστα 1 δε δια ταυτην την αΐτίαν 
εγχειροΰσιν οι την φύσιν μεν θρασ€Ϊς τιμήν δ' 
έχοντες πολεμικην παρά τοις μονάρχοις• ανδρεία 

20 γάρ ονναμιν έχουσα θράσος εστίν, δι' ας άμφοτερας 
ώς ραδίως κρατησοντες ποιούνται τάς επιθέσεις, 
των δε δια φιλοτιμίαν επιτιθέμενων έτερος τρόπος 16 
εστί της αιτίας παρά τους είρημενους πρότερον 
ου γάρ ωσπερ ενιοι τοις τυράννοις επιχειρούσιν 
όρώντες κέρδη τε μεγάλα και τιμά? μεγάλας οΰσας 

26 αυτοί?, ούτω και των δια φιλοτιμίαν επιτιθέμενων 
έκαστος προαιρείται κινδυνεύειν αλλ εκείνοι μεν 
διά την είρημενην αίτίαν, ούτοι δ', ωσπερ καν 
άλλης τινός γενομένης πράξεως περιττής και δι' 
ην ονομαστοί γίγνονται και γνώριμοι τοις άλλοις, 
οϋτω και τοις μονάρχοις εγχειροΰσιν ου κτησασθαι 

so βουλόμενοι μοναρχίαν αλλά δόξαν. ου μην αλλ 17 
ελάχιστοι γε τον αριθμόν είσιν οι δ<ά ταυτην την 
αίτίαν όρμώντες' ύποκεΐσθαι γάρ δει το του 
σω^ηναι μηδέν φροντίζειν άν μη μελλη κατα- 
σχησειν την πράζιν οΐς άκολουθεΐν μεν δει την 
Αιώνος υπόληφιν, ου ράδιον δ' αύτην εγγενεσθαι 

86 πολλοίς• εκείνος γάρ μετ ολίγων εστράτευσεν επί 
Αιονύσιον οϋτως εχειν φάσκων ώς δποι 2 περ άν 
δύνηται προελθεΐν ικανόν αύτω τοσούτον μετασχεΐν 
της πράξεως, οίον ει μικρόν επιβάντα της γης 
ευθύς συμβαίη τελευτησαι τούτον 3 καλώς εχειν 
αύτω τον θάνατον. 

40 Φθείρεται δε τυραννίς ενα μεν τρόπον, ωσπερ 18 

1 μάλιστα — 20 tiridiaeis post 6 μΐθύοντα traicienda Newman. 
2 οποί Thompson : 'όπου codd. * rbv βίον, τούτον Ρ 1 . 

" Perhaps Mithridates II.. who succeeded his father 
Ariobarzanes as satrap of Pontus 336 b.c. 
450 



POLITICS, V. νιπ. 15-18 

Mithridates ° attacked Ariobarzanes. b And it is men 
of bold nature and who hold a military office with 
monarchs who most often make the attempt for this 
reason ; for courage possessing power is boldness, 
and they make their attacks thinking that with 

16 courage and power they will easily prevail. But 
with those whose attack is prompted by ambition 
the motive operates in a different way from those 
spoken of before : some men attack tyrants because 
they see great profits and great honours belonging 
to them, but that is not the reason that in each 
case leads the persons who attack from motives of 
ambition to resolve on the venture ; those others are 
led by the motive stated, but these attack monarchs 
from a wish to gain not monarchy but glory, just as 
they would wish to take part in doing any other 
uncommon deed that makes men famous and known 

17 to their fellows. Not but what those who make the 
venture from this motive are very few indeed in 
number, for underlying it there must be an utter dis- 
regard of safety, if regard for safety is not to check 
the enterprise ; they must always have present in 

their minds the opinion of Dion, although it is not a 4 above, 
easy for many men to have it ; Dion marched with 
a small force against Dionysuis, saying that his feel- 
ing was that, whatever point he might be able to 
get to, it would be enough for him to have had 
that much share in the enterprise — for instance, 
if it should befall him to die as soon as he had 
just set foot in the country, that death would satisfv 
him. 

18 And one way in which tyranny is destroyed, as is 

* This sentence may have been shifted by mistake from 
the end of § 14 above. 

451 



ARISTOTLE 

1312 b και τών άλλων εκάστη πολιτειών, εζωθεν, εάν 
εναντία τι? fj πολιτεία κρείττων (το μεν γαρ 
βούλεσθαι δήλον ώς υπάρξει διά την εναντιότητα 
της προαιρέσεως, ά δε βονλονται, δυνάμενοι πράτ- 
τοΰσι πάντες), εναντ'ιαι δ' at πολιτειαι, δήμος μεν 
5 τυραννίδι καθ' Ήσίοδον ώς ' κεραμεΐ κεραμεύς ' 
(και γαρ η δημοκρατία η τελευταία τυραννίς 
εστίν), βασίλεια δε και αριστοκρατία διά την 
εναντιότητα της πολιτείας (διό Αακεδαιμόνιοι 
πλείστας κατελυσαν τυραννίδας και Συρακούσιοι 
κατά τον χρόνον δν επολιτεύοντο καλώς) • ενα δ εξ 19 

ίο αύτη?, όταν οι μετέχοντες στασιάζωσιν, ώσπερ 
η τών περί Τελωνα και νυν η τών περί Διονυσιον, 
η μεν Τελωνος Θρασυβούλου του Ιέρωνος αδελφού 
τον υίόν του Τελωνος δημαγωγοϋντος και προς 
ηδονάς όρμώντος ιν' αυτός ά,ρχη, τών δ' οικείων 
συστησάντων 1 ίνα μη η 2 τυραννις όλως καταλυθη . 

ΐδ άλλα Θρασύβουλος, οι δε συστάντες αυτών 3 ώς 
καιρόν έχοντες εξέβαλον απαντάς αυτούς• Διονυσιον 
δε Αίων στρατεύσας κηδεστης ών, και προσλαβών 
τον δήμον, εκείνον εκβολών διεφθάρη. δύο δε 20 
ούσών αιτιών δι' άς μάλιστ επιτίθενται ταΐς 
τυραννίσι, μίσους και καταφρονησεως , θατερον 

20 μεν άει τούτων υπάρχει* τοις τυράννοις, το μίσος, 

1 σνστάντων ΓΜΡ 2 : στασιασάντων Richards. 
2 μη ή ed. : μη codd. 
3 <μετ'> αυτών Susemihl : tr. post 13 <Ji>TvpawU Richards. 
4 del τούτων υπάρχει Richards : del τ. ύπάρχειν codd. 



° Works and Days 25 καΐ κβραμεύς κεραμΐΐ κοτέει και τέκτονι 
τέκτων, ' two of a trade never agree.' 

* Tyrant of Syracuse 485-478 B.C., succeeded by his 

452 



POLITICS, V. νπι. 18-20 

each of the other forms of constitution also, is from Foreign 
without, if some state with an opposite constitution f ttac ^ on 

,f ι .1 ι . -n ii tyrants. 

is stronger (tor the wish to destroy it will clearly be 
present in such a neighbour because of the opposition 
of principle, and all men do what they wish if they 
have the power) — and the constitutions opposed to 
tyranny are, on the one hand democracy, which is 
opposed to it as (in Hesiod's phrase ) 'potter to 
potter,' because the final form of democracy is tyranny, 
and on the other hand royalty and aristocracy are 
opposed to tyranny because of the opposite nature 
of their constitutional structure (owing to which the 
Spartans put down a very great many tyrannies, and 
so did the Syracusans at the period when they were 

19 governed well). But one way is from within itself, Famiij 
when the partners in it fall into discord, as the eu ' 
tyranny of the family of Gelo & was destroyed, and 

in modern times c that of the family of Dionysius d — 
Gelo's, when Thrasybulus the brother of Hiero paid 
court to the son of Gelo and urged him into indul- 
gences in order that he himself might rule, and the 
son's connexions banded together a body of con- 
federates in order that the tyranny might not be put 
down entirely but only Thrasybulus, but their con- 
federates seizing the opportunity expelled them all ; 
Dionysius was put down by Dion, his relative, who got 
the people on to his side and expelled him, but was 

20 afterwards killed. There are two causes that chiefly Motives. 
lead men to attack tyranny, hatred and contempt ; the 
former, hatred, attaches to tyrants always, but it is 

brother Hiero who died 467. Gelo's son is unknown. Cf. 
1315 b 35 ff. 

e 356 b.c, a good many years before this book was written. 

* See 1312 a 4 n. 

453 



ARISTOTLE 

εκ δε τον καταφρονεΐσθαι πολλαϊ γίνονται των 
καταλύσεων, ση μείον δε• των μεν γαρ κτησα- 
μενων οι πλείστοι και διεφύλαζαν τάς αρχάς, ol 
δε παραλαβόντες ευθύς ως ειπείν άπολλύασι 
πάντες, άπολαυστικώς γαρ ζώντες ευκαταφρόνητοι 

25 Τ€ γνγνονται και πολλούς καιρούς παραοιδόασι τοις 
επιτιθεμενοις. μόριον δε τι του μίσους και την 21 
οργην δει τιθεναι, τρόπον γάρ τίνα των αυτών 
αίτια γίνεται πράζεων. πολλάκις δε και πρακτικώ- 
τερον του μίσους• συντονώτερον γάρ επιτίθενται 
διά το μη χρησθαι λογισμώ το πάθος (μάλιστα 

30 §6 συμβαίνει τοις θυμοΐς άκολουθεΐν διά την ύβριν, 
δι' ην αϊτίαν η τε των Υίεισιστρατιδών κατελύθη 
τνραννις και πολλαι των άλλων), αλλά μάλλον το 
μΐσος• η μεν γάρ όργη μετά λύπης πάρεστιν, ώστε 
ου ράδιον λογίζεσθαι, ή δ' έχθρα άνευ λύπης, ως 
δ' εν κεφαλαίοις ειπείν, όσας αιτίας είρηκαμεν 

35 γης Τ ε ολιγαρχίας της ακράτου και τελευταίας και 
της δημοκρατίας της εσχάτης, τοσαύτας και της 
τυραννίδος θετεον και γάρ αύται τυγχάνουσιν 
ούσαι διαιρεταϊ 1 τυραννίδες. /?ασιλβια δ' υπό μεν 22 
τών έξωθεν ηκιστα φθείρεται, διό και πολυχρόνιος 

40 εστίν εξ αύτης δ' αϊ πλεΐσται φθοραι συμβαίνουσιν. 
1313 a φθείρεται δέ κατά δύο τρόπους, ενα μεν στα- 
σιασάντων τών μετεχόντων της ^SaatAetas•, άλλον 
δε τρόπον τυραννικώτερον πειρωμενων διοικεΐν, 
όταν είναι κύριοι πλειόνων ά^ιώσι και παρά τον 
νόμον. ου γίγνονται δ' ετι /?ασιλείαι νυν, αλλ' 
5 αν περ γίγνωνται μοναρχίαι, 2 τυραννίδες μάλλον, 

1 aiperai codd. nonnulli. 
* μοναρχίαι Spengel : μοναρχίαι καΐ codd. 

4.54 



POLITICS, V. νπι. 20-22 

their being despised that causes their downfall in 
many cases. A proof of this is that most of those 
that have won tvrannies have also kept their offices 
to the end, but those that have inherited them almost 
all lose them at once ; for they live a life of indul- 
gence, and so become despicable and also give many 

21 opportunities to their attackers. And also anger 
must be counted as an element in the hatred felt for 
them, for in a way it occasions the same actions. And 
often it is even more active than hatred, since angry 
men attack more vigorously because passion does not 
employ calculation (and insolence most frequently 
causes men to be led by their angry tempers, which 

was the cause of the fall of the tyranny of the mi a 87. 
Pisistratidae and many others), but hatred calculates 
more ; for anger brings with it an element of pain, 
making calculation difficult, but enmity is not accom- 
panied by pain. And to speak summarily, all the 
things that we have mentioned as causing the down- 
fall of unmixed and extreme oligarchy and of the 
last form of democracy must be counted as destructive 
of tyranny as well, since extreme oligarchy and 
democracy are in reality divided 3 tyrannies. Royal 

22 government on the other hand is very seldom Fail of 
destroyed by external causes, so that it is long- kmg8 ' 
lasting ; but in most cases its destruction arises out 

of itself. And it is destroyed in two ways, one when 
those who participate in it quarrel, and another 
when the kings try to administer the government too 
tyrannically, claiming to exercise sovereignty in more 
things and contrary to the law. Royal governments 
do not occur any more now, but if ever monarchies 

" i.e. divided among several persons, ' put into com- 
mission.' 

155 



ARISTOTLE 

1313 a 5^^^^D^' < > Ν > \ ♦ 

οια το την ρασιλειαν εκουσιον μεν αρχήν είναι 
μειζόνων δε κυρίαν, πολλούς δ' elvcu τους ομοίους 
και μηδένα διαφέροντα τοσούτον ώστε άπαρτίζειν 
προς το μέγεθος και το άζίωμα της αρχής' ώστε 
διά μεν τούτο εκόντες ούχ ύπομενουσιν, αν δε δι' 

ίο απάτης άρζη τις η βίας, ηδη δοκεΐ τούτο είναι 
τυραννίς. εν δε ταΐς κατά γένος ^ασιλειαι? τιθεναι 23 
οεΐ τής φθοράς αιτίαν προς ταΐς είρημέναις και το 
yivea^ai πολλούς ευκαταφρόνητους και το δυνα/χιν 
μη κεκτημένους τυραννικην άλλα βασιλικην τιμήν 
ύβρίζειν ράδια γάρ εγίνετο ή κατάλυσις, ' μη 

15 βουλομενων γάρ ευθύς ουκ εσται βασιλεύς, αλλ' 
ο τύραννος και μη βουλομενων. 

Φθείρονται μεν ούν αϊ μοναρχίαι δια ταύτας και 
τοιαύτας ετέρας αιτίας. 

IX. Σώζονται 8ε δήλον 1 ως απλώς μεν ειπείν ] 
εκ των εναντίων, ως δε καθ* εκαστον, τω τάς μεν 

20 βασίλεια ? άγειν επι το μετριώτερον. δσω γάρ αν 
ελαττόνων ώσι κύριοι, πλείω χρόνον άναγκαΐον 
μενειν πάσαν την άρχην, αυτοί τε γάρ ήττον γίνον- 
ται δεσποτικοί και τοις ηθεσιν ΐσοι μάλλον και 
υπό τών αρχομένων φθονούνται ήττον, διά γάρ 
τούτο και η περί Μολοττούς πολύν χρόνον βα- 
σίλεια διεμεινεν, και η Αακεδαιμονίων διά το εξ 

1 δήλον <3rt> Vahlen. 

*56 



POLITICS, V. νιπ. 22— ιχ. 1 

do occur they are rather tyrannies, because royalty 
is government over willing subjects but with 
sovereignty over greater matters, but men of equal 
quality are numerous and no one is so outstanding 
as to fit the magnitude and dignity of the office ; 
so that for this reason the subjects do not submit 
willingly, and if a man has made himself ruler by 
deception or force, then this is thought to be a tyranny. 
23 In cases of hereditary royalty we must also set down 
as a cause of their destruction, in addition to those 
mentioned, the fact that hereditary kings often 
become despicable, and that although possessing 
not the power of a tyrant but the dignity of a king 
they commit insolent outrages ; for the deposition of 
kings used to be easy, since a king will at once cease 
to be king if his subjects do not wish him to be, 
whereas a tyrant will still be tyrant even though his 
subjects do not wish it. 

These causes then and others of the same nature 
are those that bring about the destruction of 
monarchies. 
1 IX. On the other hand it is clear that monarchies, Preserv» 
speaking generally, are preserved in safety as a royalty- 
result of the opposite causes to those by which thev 
are destroyed. But taking the different sorts of 
monarchy separately — royalties are preserved by 
bringing them into a more moderate form ; for the 
fewer powers the kings have, the longer time the 
office in its entirety must last, for they themselves 
become less despotic and more equal to their subjects 
in temper, and their subjects envy them less. For 
this was the cause of the long persistence of the 
Molossian royalty, and that of Sparta has continued 
because the office was from the beginning divided 

<3 457 



ARISTOTLE 

1313 a , Λ »?/ ' s Ω" \ » / * 

αρχής τε εις ουο μέρη οιαιρεσηναι την αρχήν, και 

τταλιν θεοπόμπου μετριάσαντος τοις τε άλλοις και 

την των εφόρων αρχήν επικαταστησαντος• της γαρ 

δυνάμεως αφελών ηύζησε τω χρόνω την βασιλείαν, 

ώστε τρόπον τινά εποίησεν ουκ ελάττονα αλλά 

so μείζονα αυτήν, όπερ και προς τήν γυναίκα άπο- 
κρινασθαι φασιν αυτόν, ειποΰσαν ει μηδέν αί- 
σχύνεται την /JaoiAeiW ελάττω παραδιδούς τοις 
υιεσιν η παρά του πατρός παρελαβεν " ου δήτα ' 
φάναι• " παραδίδωμι γάρ πολυχρονιωτεραν." 

At δε τυραννίδες σώζονται κατά δυο τρόπους 2 

35 τους εναντιωτάτους . ων άτερός εστίν ο παραδεδο- 
μενος και καθ ον διοικοϋσιν οι πλείστοι των τυ- 
ράννων την αρχήν τούτων δέ τά πολλά φασι 
καταστήσαι Τίερίανδρον τον Υίορίνθιον, πολλά δε 
και παρά της των Περσών αρχής εστί τοιαύτα 
λαβείν. εστί δέ τά τε 7τάλαι λεχθέντα προς 

40 σωτηρίαν, ως οΐόν τε, 1 της τυραννίδος, το τους 
υπερέχοντας κολούειν και τους φρονηματίας άν- 
1313b αιρειν, και μήτε συσσίτια εάν μήτε εταιρ'ιαν μήτε 
7ταιδειαν μήτε άλλο μηθέν τοιούτον, αλλά πάντα 
φυλάττειν όθεν εΐωθε γίνεσθαι δύο, φρόνημα τε 
και πίστις, και μήτε σχολάς μήτε άλλους συλλόγους 
επιτρεπειν yiVea^ai σχολαστικοί??, και πάντα 
5 ποιεΐν εξ ων ότι μάλιστα άγνώτες άλλ^λοι? έσονται 
πάντες (ή γάρ γνώσις π'ιστιν ποιεί μάλλον προς 
αλλήλους) ■ και το τους επιδημοΰντας άει φανερούς 3 

1 ω? οΐονται ? Bekker (ώί οΐόν re post 41 υπερέχοντα.! vel 
alio transp. Richards). 

° King of Sparta c. 770-720 b.c. " See 1284 a 26 n. 

c The phrases cover Plato's gatherings in the Academy, 
Aristotle's in the Peripatos of the Lyceum, and other meet- 

458 



POLITICS, V. ιχ. 1-3 

into two halves, and because it was again limited in 
various ways by Theopompus, a in particular by his 
instituting the office of the ephors to keep a check 
upon it ; for by taking away some of the kings' power 
he increased the permanence of the royal office, so 
that in a manner he did not make it less but greater. 
This indeed as the story goes is what he said in reply 
to his wife, when she asked if he felt no shame in 
bequeathing the royal power to his sons smaller 
than he had inherited it from his father : " Indeed 
I do not," he is said to have answered, " for I hand 
it on more lasting." 

2 Tyrannies on the other hand are preserved in two Preserva- 
extremely opposite ways. One of these is the tra- f^nnLj • 
ditional way and the one in which most tyrants («) repres- 
administer their office. Most of these ordinary safe- prwautions 
guards of tyranny are said to have been instituted 

by Periander b of Corinth, and also many such devices 

may be borrowed from the Persian empire. These 

are both the measures mentioned some time back i3i3aieff. 

to secure the safety of a tyranny as far as possible — 

the lopping off of outstanding men and the destruction 

of the proud, — and also the prohibition of common 

meals and club-fellowship and education and all other 

things of this nature, in fact the close watch upon 

all things that usually engender the two emotions 

of pride and confidence, and the prevention of the 

formation of study-circles and other conferences for 

debate, and the employment of every means that 

will make people as much as possible unknown to 

one another (for familiarity increases mutual con- 

3 fidence) ; and for the people in the city to be always 

ingrs for the intellectual use of leisure in gymnasia, palaestrae 
and leschae. 

459 



ARISTOTLE 

είναι και διατρίβειν περί θύρας (ούτω γαρ αν 
ηκιστα λανθάνουν τι πράττονσι, και φρονεΐν αν 
εθίζοιντο μικρόν aUl δουλεύοντες) • και τάλλα όσα 

ίο τοιαύτα ΐίερσικά και βάρβαρα τυραννικά εστίν 
(πάντα γαρ ταύτόν δύναται)' και το μη λανθάνβιν 
πειράσθαι όσα τυγχάνει τι? λέγων η πράττων των 
αρχομένων , αλλ' eimi κατασκόπους, οίον περί 
Έυρακούσας αϊ ποταγωγίδες καλούμεναι, και ους 1 
ωτακουστας εζεπεμπεν Ίέρων Οπου τις εΐη συν- 

15 ουσία και σύλλογος (παρρησιάζονταί τε γαρ ήττον 
φοβούμενοι τους τοιούτους , καν παρρησιάζωνται 
λανθάνουσιν ήττον) • και το διαβάλλειν άλλτ^λοι? 4 
και συγκρούειν και φίλους φίλοις και τον δημον 
τοις γνωρίμοις και τους πλουσίους εαυτοΐς. και 
το πένητας ποιεΐν τους αρχόμενους τυραννικόν, 

20 όπως μήτε 2 φυλακή 3 τρέφηται και προς τω καθ' 
ημέραν όντ€ς άσχολοι ώσιν επιβουλεύειν. παρά- 
δειγμα δε τούτου αϊ τ€ πυραμίδες αϊ περί Αΐγυπτον 
και τα αναθήματα* των Κυφελιδών και του 
Όλυμπιείου 5 ή οίκοδόμησις υπό των Πεισι- 
στρατιδών, και των περί Σάμον, έργα 6 ΙΙολυκράτεια 

25 (πάντα γαρ ταΰτα δύναται ταύτόν, άσχολίαν και 
πενίαν των αρχομένων) • και η εισφορά των τελών, 5 
οίον εν Έυρακούσαις (εν πέντε γαρ έτεσιν επι 

1 ous Coraes : tovs codd. (ώτακουστάϊ ous Μ 1 ). 

2 μήτε : ή τε Victorius (μήτε — καί seel. Richards). 

3 φυλακή : δύναμι? Thurot. * τό ανάθημα τό Cobet. 

5 Όλυμπιείον anonymus : 'Ολυμπίου codd. 

6 tpyidv τα Coraes. 

° Apparently this means a citizen force side by side with 
the tyrant's mercenaries ; a variant gives ' in order that the 
(tyrant's) guard may be kept.' 
460 



POLITICS, V. ix. a-5 

visible and to hang about the palace-gates (for thus 
there would be least concealment about what they 
are doing, and they would get into a habit of being 
humble from always acting in a servile way) ; and all 
the other similar devices of Persian and barbarian 
tyranny (for all have the same effect) ; and to try 
not to be uninformed about any chance utterances 
or actions of any of the subjects, but to have spies 
like the women called ' provocatrices ' at Syracuse and 
the ' sharp-ears ' that used to be sent out by Hiero 
wherever there was any gathering or conference (for 
when men are afraid of spies of this sort they keep a 
check on their tongues, and if they do speak freely 

4 are less likely not to be found out) ; and to set men 
at variance with one another and cause quarrels 
between friend and friend and between the people 
and the notables and among the rich. And it is a 
device of tyranny to make the subjects poor, so that 
a guard a may not be kept, and also that the people 
being busy with their daily affairs may not have 
leisure to plot against their ruler. Instances of this 
are the pyramids in Egypt and the votive offerings 
of the Cypselids, b and the building of the temple of 
Olympian Zeus by the Pisistratidae c and of the 
temples at Samos, works of Polycrates d (for all these 
undertakings produce the same effect, constant 
occupation and poverty among the subject people) ; 

5 and the levying of taxes, as at Syracuse (for in the 

* Cypselus and his son Periander (1310 b 29 n., 1284 a -26 n.) 
dedicated a colossal statue of Zeus at Olympia and other 
monuments there and at Delphi. 

e Pisistratus is said to have begun the temple of Olympian 
Zeus at Athens, not finished till the time of Hadrian. 

* Tyrant of Samos, d. 522 b.c. 

461 



ARISTOTLE 

1313 b A < \ ■> , <t > / 

Διονυσίου την ουσιαν άπασαν εισενηνοχεναι συν- 

εβαινεν). εστί δε και πολεμοποιός 6 τύραννος, 
όπως άσχολοί τε ώσι και ηγεμόνος εν χρεία δια- 

30 τελώσιν 6ντ€ς. και η μεν βασίλεια σώζεται δια 
των φίλων, τυραννικόν δε το μάλιστ άπιστεΐν τοις 
φίλοις, ώς βουλομενων μεν πάντων δυναμένων δέ 
μάλιστα τούτων. 1 και τα περί την δημοκρατίαν 6 
δε γιγνόμενα την τελευταίαν τυραννικά πάντα, 
γυναικοκρατία τε περί τά? οικίας ίν' εζαγγελλωσι 

35 κατά των ανδρών, και δούλων ανεσι? δια την αύτην 
αΐτίαν ούτε γαρ επιβουλεύουσιν οι δούλοι και αϊ 
γυναίκες τοις τυράννοις, εύημεροϋντάς τε avay- 
καίον εύνους είναι και ταΐς τνρανν'ισι και τοις 
δημοκρατίαις (και γαρ 6 δήμος είναι βούλεται 
μόναρχος). διό και ό κόλαζ παρ αμφοτέροις 

40 έντιμος, παρά μεν τοις δημοις 6 δημαγωγός (εστί 
γάρ 6 δημαγωγός του δήμου κόλαζ), παρά δε τοις 

1314 a τυράννοις οι ταπεινώς ομιλούντες, όπερ εστίν 

έργον κολακείας, και γάρ διά τούτο πονηρόφιλον" 
η τυραννίς• κολακευόμενοι γάρ χαίρουσιν, τοΰτο 
δ' ούδ* αν ει? ποι^σειε φρόνημα έχων ελεύθερον, 
αλλά φιλοΰσιν οι επιεικείς, η ου κολακεύουσιν. 
6 και χρήσιμοι οί πονηροί εις τά πονηρά, ηλω γάρ 
6 ήλος, ώσπερ η παροιμία, και το μηδενι χαίρειν 7 
σεμνω μηδ* ελευθερω τυραννικόν αυτόν γάρ είναι 
μόνον άζιοΐ τοιούτον ό τύραννος, ό δ' άντισεμνυ- 

1 τούτων αυτόν καθελίΐν codd. nonnulli. 
* φιλοπόνηρον Immisch. 



See 1259 a 28 η. 6 Cf. 1309 b 27 ff. 

c The proverb ήλψ ?j\os έκκρούεται usually meant driving 
out something by a thing of the same kind (' set a thief to 

462 



POLITICS, V. ιχ. 5-7 

reign of Dionysius ° the result of taxation used to be 
that in five years men had contributed the whole 
of their substance). Also the tyrant is a stirrer-up 
of Avar, with the deliberate purpose of keeping the 
people busy and also of making them constantly in 
need of a leader. Also whereas friends are a means 
of security to royalty, it is a mark of a tyrant to be 
extremely distrustful of his friends, on the ground 
that, while all have the wish, these chiefly have the 

6 power. Also the things that occur in connexion with 
the final form of democracy b are all favourable to 
t\ranny — dominance of women in the homes, in order 
that they may carry abroad reports against the men, 
and lack of discipline among the slaves, for the same 
reason ; for slaves and women do not plot against 
tyrants, and also, if they prosper under tyrannies, 
must feel well-disposed to them, and to democracies 
as well (for the common people also wishes to be 
sole ruler). Hence also the flatterer is in honour 
with both — with democracies the demagogue (for the 
demagogue is a flatterer of t