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THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY
FOUNDED BY JAMES LOEB, LL.D.
EDITED BY
fT. E. PAGE, c.h., lttt.d.
|E. CAPPS, ph.d., ll.d. |W. H. D. ROUSE, litt.d.
L. A. POST, l.h.d. E. H. WARMINGTON, m.a., f.b.hist.soc.
ARISTOTLE
POLITICS
AEISTOTLE
POLITICS
WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY
H. RACKHAM, M.A.
FSLLOW OF CHRIST'S COLLEGE AND LATE
ONITBR3ITT LECTURER, CAMBRIDGE
LONDON
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LTD
CAMBRIDGE. MASSACHUSETTS
HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS
MCMLLX
First prinled 1932
Reprinted with some corrections 1944
Reprinted 1950, 1959
Printed in Great Britain
CONTENTS
Introduction :
1. Practical Prolegomena
vii
2. Mss. and Text of Politics
ix
3. Editions .....
ix
4. Life of Aristotle ....
X
5. Aristotle's Writings
xi
6. Politics and Ethics . . . .
xii
7. Other Aristotelian Works on Politics
xiv
8. Date of Composition of Politics
xiv
9. Structure of the Work
XV
10. Outline of Contents
xvi
Book I ......
2
Book II ......
68
Book III
172
Book IV, J^| » jj* * 7* t • . • ^W
276
Book V . i«? ^\, .
370
ψ
CONTENTS
05 .
Book VI .
Book VII . pXQOiro
Book VIII . pODOnv,
Index I. — Subjects
Index II.
-Persons and Places
PACK
484
532
6S4
677
681
" It is an amazing book. It seems to me to show a Shake-
spearian understanding of human beings and their ways,
together with a sublime good sense." — Henry Jackson,
Letters.
vi
INTRODUCTION
1. Practical Prolegomena
In this edition of Politics the Books are in the MS.
order ; the division into chapters and sections is that
of Schneider (1809) 5 also, to facilitate reference,
there are indicated in the margin the pages, columns
and lines of Bekker's Berlin text (1831), which with
its volumes of scholia (1836) and Bonitz's index (1870)
has rendered invaluable service to students (its lines
are numbered, and its two columns denoted by later
editors by a and b, so that it affords a reference to
every line of the extant works of Aristotle except The
Athenian Constitution, only rediscovered in 1890).
Some modern editors have reaiTanged the Books,
placing the 7th and 8th as 4th and 5th, and the 4th,
5th and 6th either as 6th, 7th and 8th, or as 6th, 8th and
7th. Also some number them by the Greek alphabet,
but others by the Greek numerals, using ς-, ζ, η
instead of Ζ, Η, θ to denote 6, 7, 8. Moreover, two
modes of dividing the Books into chapters are in
vogue, and with one of these two different divisions
of the chapters into sections have been used. The
result is that such a reference as ' Politics, Z, v. 6 '
might denote twelve different passages in twelve
different editions.
The arguments for the two different rearrange-
ments of the order of the Books are based on their
contents, and editors have made conjectural altera-
tions of the cross-references in the text to suit these
INTRODUCTION
rearrangements ; but the reasons, based on these
cross-references and on the general contents, in
favour of retaining the traditional order seem to me
almost or quite as strong, while the reasons of con-
venience (vigorously stated by Immisch in his
edition, pp. vi f.) are overwhelming.
It also seems desirable to explain that this transla-
tion is designed primarily to serve as an assistance
to readers of the Greek, not as a substitute for it ;
it aims at being explanatory, so far as is possible
without expanding into mere paraphrase. A version
intended to be read instead of the Greek might well
be on different lines. It might be quite literal and
non-committal, keeping as close as possible to the
form of the Greek and reproducing even its gaps of
expression and what are or seem to our ignorance
to be its ambiguities, and leaving the student to go
for explanation to the commentators ; or, on the
other hand, it might render the meaning but ignore
the form, and substitute terse and finished English
for Aristotle's great variety of styles — for he ranges
from mere jottings and notes to passages of ample
discourse, not devoid of eloquence, though hardly
models of Attic distinction and grace.
A rendering on the latter lines was provided for
English readers once and for all by Jowett, whose
translation with notes and essays (1885) is an English
classic. This version, revised by Ross (1921), is of
the greatest service to the student who wants to
know the things that Aristotle said, but not the way
he had of saying them.
2. Mss. and Text of Politics
The mss. are not very old nor very good. The
viii
INTRODUCTION
oldest evidence for the text is a translation in bar-
barous Latin by a Dominican monk of the thirteenth
century, William of Moeibeke in Flanders. It is
occasionally quoted here as Guil., and when the
readings of its lost Greek original can be inferred
from it, they are given as L. a The five best extant
Greek copies are of the fifteenth century : one at
Berlin, Hamiltonianus (H), one at Milan (M), and
three at Paris (P 1 , P a , P 3 ). Of these Η represents
an older text than any other ; Μ and P 1 form a
family with L ; P 2 and P 3 group with various inferior
mss., and are usually considered less reliable than
the other family. 6 The text of Politics is thus very
uncertain in detail, although uncertainties affect-
ing the meaning are fortunately not very numerous.
Some inaccuracies of expression attested by all the
mss. are precisely similar to inaccuracies in other
places attested by some mss. and avoided by others ;
but as to how far the former inaccuracies are to be
accredited to the author and how far to his trans-
mitters, no two scholars will agree.
In this edition room has only been found for the
most interesting variant readings.
3. Editions
The commentary of Newman on the whole work
(4 vols., 1887-1902) and that of Susemihl and Hicks
on five Books (1894) are most valuable collections
of information. The Teubner edition of Susemihl
revised by Immisch (2nd ed., 1929) gives a useful
brief presentation of the evidence for the text.
" Also the version of Aretinus (Leonardo Bruno of Arezzo)
1438, is once or twice cited as Ar.
* Codd. cet. in the critical notes of this edition.
INTRODUCTION
4. Life of Aristotle
Diogenes Laertius's Lives of the Philosophers, supple-
mented from other sources, gives us a fairly detailed
knowledge of Aristotle's life. His father was an
hereditary member of the medical profession, and
physician to the king of Macedon, Amyntas II.
Aristotle was born in 384 b.c. at the little colonial
city of Stagirus, on the Gulf of the Strymon, of
which he remained a citizen all his life, although he
passed half of it at Athens. Perhaps it is possible
to find some trace of his northern origin in his
writings ; if in some details of his thought he is more
Athenian than the Athenians, his style has little
Attic neatness, fluency or grace, even though his
vocabulary has no definitely non-Attic features.
He came to Athens at the age of seventeen to pursue
his education, and became a pupil of Plato, remaining
a member of the Academy for twenty years, till
Plato's death. Speusippus then became head of the
school, and Aristotle left Athens for Atarneus in
Asia Minor, where his former fellow-pupil Hermeias
was now ' tyrant.' He entertained Aristotle for
three years, and gave him his niece as wife ; but then
he fell into the hands of the Persians. Aristotle fled
to the neighbouring island of Lesbos, and in 342 was
invited by King Philip to return to Macedon and
become the tutor of Alexander, now thirteen years
old. At sixteen the prince became regent, Philip
being engaged in war with Byzantium. His tutor
retired to Stagirus, which had been destroyed by
Philip in the Olynthian war, but which Aristotle
had been allowed to restore. But he returned to
Athens when Alexander succeeded to his father's
INTRODUCTION
throne in 336 B.C., and set up as a professor of philo-
sophy, breaking away from the Academy and estab-
lishing a kind of college in the Lyceum. This was a
precinct of Apollo and the Muses just outside the
city, and its -epi -ατος or walks, in which Aristotle
taught, gave the new school its name of Peripatetic ;
he equipped it with a large library and a natural
history museum.
Aristotle's professorship lasted till 322 B.C., when
on Alexander's death Athens led a Greek revolt
against Macedon. Aristotle, an alien, a protege of
the court and friend of the viceroy Antipater, and
a critic of democracy, fell a victim to anti-Macedonian
feeling ; like Socrates before him, he was prosecuted
for impiety. Saying that he would not let Athens
' sin twice against philosophy,' he withdrew to his
estate at Chalcis in Euboea, and died in the same
year.
His body was taken to Stagirus for burial, and his
memory was honoured there by a yearly festival.
He left his library and the originals of his own
writings to his pupil Theophrastus, who succeeded
him as head of the Lyceum.
5. Aristotle's Writings
Aristotle's writings were partly more or less
popular works on philosophical subjects, and partly
scientific treatises. The former were published
(εκ&δομό'οι λόγοι), and are doubtless included
among the ' exoteric discourses ' referred to in his
extant works (e.g. Pol. 1323 a 32), though that term
seems to cover the writings of other philosophers also.
They are all lost, unless The Athenian Constitution
INTRODUCTION
is held to belong to this group. No doubt they had
the charm and flow of style which Cicero and Quin-
tilian praise in Aristotle. To the latter group belong
the extant works, and these are for the most part
singularly devoid of those qualities of style. They
are called ' lectures ' (άκροατικοι λόγοι), and in
fact each consists of a collection of separate dis-
courses on different parts of a subject, loosely put
together to form a treatise on the whole, with transi-
tional passages of summary and preface, and cross-
references, often untraceable. Some passages are
mere outlines of the argument, others set it out fully
but baldly, and others are copious and even eloquent,
as if written to be read by the professor to his class.
Doubtless they are actual drafts for courses of
lectures, put together by Aristotle or his pupils to
form treatises, and kept in the library of the school
as an encyclopaedia for the use of students. It is to
them that Cicero refers when in another passage he
speaks of Aristotle's writings as ' notes ' (commentarii).
6. Politics and Ethics
For Aristotle Political Science is the second half of
a subject of which Ethics is the first half; indeed in
the opening chapters of The Nicomachean Ethics the
term Politike is applied to the whole subject. It is
the science of human affairs, of man's happiness or
good. This consists in a certain mode of life, and
man's life is shaped for him by his social environment,
the laws, customs and institutions of the community
to which he belongs. Aristotle describes man in
biological terms as ' by nature a political animal ' ; he
only develops his capacities in society, rightly organ-
INTRODUCTION
ized for his welfare. The aim of Politike is to dis-
cover first in what mode of life man's happiness
consists, then by what form of government and what
social institutions that mode of life can be secured.
The former question requires the study of man's
ethos or character, which occupies The Nicomachean
Ethics ; the latter is the subject of the constitution
of the state, which is treated in Politics. Politics
is a sequel to Ethics, the second half of a single
treatise, although it bears the title that in the preface
has been given to the whole subject ; this subject
is covered by Plato in the single dialogue of The
Republic.
In Aristotle's whole scheme of science, Politike
belongs to the group of Practical Sciences, which
seek knowledge as a means to action, whereas the
Theoretic Sciences (such as theology, metaphysics,
pure mathematics and astronomy) seek knowledge
for its own sake. The Practical Sciences fall into two
groups again ; the ' Poietic ' or Productive Sciences,
which tell us how to make things, and the Practical
Sciences in the narrower sense of the term, which
tell us how to do things : the former aim at some
product or result, of the latter the actual practice
of the art is itself the end. The former include the
professions and the handicrafts, the latter the fine
arts, like dancing and music, which are pursued for
their own sake (though in Greek the term τεχν^,
1 art ' or craft, is sometimes confined to the former
group — compare the English word ' technology ').
The supreme Practical Science is Politike ; it is
the science of man's welfare or happiness as a whole.
It is practical in the wider sense of the term, because
it studies not only what happiness is (the topic of
xiii
INTRODUCTION
Ethics), but also how it is to be secured (that of Poli-
tics) ; and it is also practical in the narrower sense,
because happiness is found (in Ethics) not to be a
product of action but itself to consist in action of a
certain sort.
7. Other Aristotelian Works on Politics
The short essay Oeconomicus included among the
works of Aristotle is certainly by one or more
Peripatetics of a later date. Other political works of
Aristotle recorded are Πολιτικό? (a dialogue), Περί
'Pi/Topos η Πολιτικοί•, Ilepl Βασιλειαϊ, ΆλίξανΒρος ~η
"Ύπερ 'Αποικιών (a dialogue on colonization), Δικαιώ-
ματα Πόλεων (formal pleadings on points of difference
submitted by the Greek states to the arbitration of
Philip), Νόμιμα or Νόμιμα Βαρβαρικά (an account of
the institutions of non-Hellenic peoples, including
the Etruscans), and most important of all, Πολιτεΐαι
(a series of accounts of the constitutions of a large
number of Greek states, enlivened with legends, local
proverbs, and even anecdotes). This last work,
until the discovery of The Athenian Constitution in
1890, was only known to us from a number of quota-
tions and references in later writers. It was a collec-
tion of materials upon which Politics was based, and
is referred to as such at the conclusion of The Nico-
machean Ethics.
8. Date of Composition of Politics
The latest event mentioned in Politics (V. viii.
10, 1311 b 2) is the death of Philip of Macedon,
336 b.c. The work is not finished, and Aristotle died
in 322 b.c.
INTRODUCTION
9. Structure of the Work
Most of Aristotle's extant works look like com-
pilations of several logoi or discourses dealing with
different parts of the subject, and somewhat loosely
put together to form a treatise on the whole. This
applies to Politics more than to any other ; it
seems to consist of three sets of lectures, not com-
pletely finished, not systematically connected, and
partly overlapping : viz. (1) Books I.-IIL, Prole-
gomena — the theory of the state in general and a
classification of the varieties of constitution ; (2)
Books IV., V., VI., Practical Politics — the nature of
existing constitutions, and principles for their good
government ; (3) Books VII., VIII., Ideal Politics —
the structure of the best state (unfinished).
A probable view ° is that the work was begun on
one plan and later finished on another. Book I., a
prefatory treatise on domestic economy, was prob-
ably written for the first plan ; it is unfinished, and
clumsily fitted on to its present sequel. Book II.
also looks like part of the first plan, kept to form part
of the second one ; the same applies to Book III.,
perhaps the oldest part of all, which shows signs of
incomplete revision to fit the new plan. Books IV.,
V., VI. are the newer work, and contemporary with
the conclusion of The Nicomachean Ethics. Books
VII.. VIII., the Best State, are the earlier work, put
aside unfinished when the plan was changed, and
their substitute was never written.
a Stocks in Classical Quarterly, xxi M partly following von
Arnim and Jaeger. Barker in Classical Review, xlv. p. 162,
discusses the point in relation to Aristotle's life and political
experiences.
XV
INTRODUCTION
10. Outline of Contents
(1) Prolegomena, Books L, II., III.
Book I. The Family. — The state (c. i.) is not merely
a large family (a retort to Plato's communism), but
different in kind, yet it is a natural outgrowth from
an aggregation of villages, as the village is from
an aggregation of families. The family (c. ii.) is a
partnership of master and slave, husband and wife,
father and children ; it involves the business of pro-
vision. Mastership (c. ii. continued) : the slave is a
live tool, and slavery is natural — the division into ruler
and ruled permeates nature (soul and body, reason
and appetites, man and animals, male and female),
and some men have only bodily capacities. Criticism
really hits ' legal slavery ' ; ' natural slavery ' is
recognized by common sense, and there is community
of interest and friendship between master and slave.
But the acquisition of slaves and the direction of
their tasks are not part of mastership proper. The
business of provision (c. iii.) — is it part of family
economy, or subsidiary ? Nature supplies food for
animals, and animals for the food and service of man ;
so one kind of acquisition — the supply of the limited
wealth needed for the good life — does belong to family
economy. But another kind uses goods for exchange,
aided by the invention of money, which led to com-
merce ; hence the mistaken beliefs that money is the
sole wealth and that the good life is bodily enjoyment.
The natural and necessary art of provision is sub-
sidiary to family economy ; the other kind is justly
disliked, especially usury — money breeding money.
The branches of natural and unnatural provision are
INTRODUCTION
outlined (c. iv.), with a third intermediate kind, the ap-
propriation of the uncultivated gifts of the soil ; and
reference is made to former treatises, dealing in
particular with monopoly. The relation of the head
of the family (c. v.) to the wife resembles republi-
can government, and that to the children royalty.
All three classes of household subjects have their
virtues, the slaves' imparted by the master's ad-
monition, the women's and children's by education
directed in the interest of the state.
Book II., The best Constitutions known, theoretical
and actual (c. i.). — Plato's Republic aims at unity
by communism ; but complete unity of the state is
not desirable, his system (c. ii.) will not produce it,
his account is incomplete, and there are other minor
objections. The communism of Laws (c. iii.) is less
thorough-going. The equalitarian constitution of
Phaleas and that of Hippodamus (cc. iv., v.) are criti-
cized, with a short essay on the dangers of political
innovation ; then the constitution of Sparta (c. vi.),
that of Crete, said to have been its model (c. vii.), and
that of Carthage (c. viii.). There follow notes on
Solon and a few other law-givers (c. ix.).
Book III., The Nature of the State. — Political Science
(cc. i.-iii.) asks ' What is a citizen ? ' and ' Is the good-
ness of a citizen the same as the goodness of a man ? '
(in other words, What share in government constitutes
citizenship and what classes should possess it ? and
in order to perform its duties, must one possess all
the moral virtues or only special political abilities ?).
Citizenship means at least membership of the
judiciary and the assembly, and therefore requires
some property and leisure ; and manual work and
trade are incompatible with the necessary mental
INTRODUCTION
qualities. On this basis the. forms of government
are classified (cc. iv., v.). They vary according as
the sovereign is one man or a few or the many, and
according as these govern for the common good or for
their own ; this gives three Correct Constitutions
— Royalty, Aristocracy, Constitutional Government ;
and three Deviations — Tyranny, Oligarchy, Demo-
cracy (i.e., essentially, the rule of the poor and un-
leisured, not the rule of the many). The distribution
of power (c. vi.) : the state is a partnership for
the good life, and in principle those who contribute
most to this have most right to power. In practice,
perhaps, the laws should be sovereign ; but they may
be bad. The rule of the many is a simple solution —
they have at least collective wisdom and wealth ;
but they should not share the highest offices, only elect
to and control them. The subject is treated afresh
(cc. vii., viii.) : education and virtue are the best
claims to power — wealth, birth and numbers have
relative but not absolute claims. Supereminence
puts a man or group of men above the law : hence
the value of ostracism, for even in the ideal state
supereminence would be dangerous — except super-
eminence in virtue, which should make a man
monarch. Royalty (c. ix.) — Spartan, oriental, elective
(the aesymnete), that of heroic times, and (c. x.)
absolute monarchy. It calls for supreme virtue in an
individual ; but royalty passed into aristocracy as
virtue spread, and aristocracy degenerated into
oligarchy ; this was overthrown by tyrants, and these
put down by democracy. Truly (c. xi.) the law
should rule, i.e. reason ; and the monarch must have
helpers, which points to aristocracy. But surpassing
individual excellence does occur, and then absolute
INTRODUCTION
monarchy is justified. Recapitulation on Royalty
(c. xii.)•
(Of the other five constitutions, four are treated,
though not on a symmetrical plan, in Books IV., V.,
VI. Aristocracy was touched on as a variant to Royalty
in III. x., xi., and actual cases of it are alluded to in
IV. vii., but it is replaced by the Best Constitution,
the unfinished essay on which forms Books VII. and
VIII. The substitution of αρίστη πολιτεία as an
equivalent for αριστοκρατία and βασιλεία is justified
in IV. iii. 1 (1289 a 31 if.) : is this an interpolation ?)
(2) Practical Politics, Books IV., V., VI.
Book IV. Existing Constitutions. — Science (c. i.)
must study not only the ideally best form of state
but the best under given conditions. Monarchy
and Aristocracy (c. ii.) have been dealt with ; there
remain Constitutional Government, and the Devia-
tions (in descending order of merit), Democracy,
Oligarchy, Tyranny — their varieties and their suit-
ability to various peoples, their establishment and
their preservation against revolution (the contents
of Books IV., V., VI). Constitutions (c. iii.) vary
in the distribution of power according to rank and
wealth. Democracy and Oligarchy are usually
thought the chief forms ; they really differ (c. iv.)
not merely as the rule of the free and of the wealthy,
but as that of the free majority and the wealthy
minority. The necessary classes are farmers, arti-
sans, shopkeepers, labourers, soldiers, councillors
and judges, rich men, magistrates (Plato wrongly
omitted the last three). Some may overlap, but
rich and poor are distinct, so that Oligarchy and
INTRODUCTION
Democracy are the normal forms of government.
Democracy (c. iv.) has four varieties, according as
the qualifications of property and citizen-birth, and
the supremacy of law over decrees of the assembly,
are in force or are not. Oligarchy (c. v.) also has four
varieties, according as power goes by a moderate or
a high property-qualification, or by heredity, or is
the arbitrary rule of powerful families called a
Dynasty. The normal historical succession of the
four varieties of Democracy and of Oligarchy are
traced. Aristocracy, in a secondary sense, is a blend
of these two, based on merit and numbers, or on
merit, numbers and wealth. Constitutional Govern-
ment (cc. vi., vii.) is also a blend of Oligarchy and
Democracy (approximating more to the latter), being
based on numbers and wealth ; it is brought about
by the institution of pay for service in the courts,
and of either a moderate property-qualification
for the assembly or else election without property-
qualification of magistrates ; it brings contentment,
and so is stable. Tyranny (c. viii.) is monarchy based
on force, irresponsible and selfish. Constitutional
Government (c. ix.), based on the virtues of the
middle class, is best on the average. But (c. x.)
the best constitution for a given state depends
on the relative numbers of the free, the middle
class and the wealthy. Citizenship should be
limited to those who bear arms, with a property-
qualification admitting a majority. Classification
of constitutions (cc. xi., xii.) is based on the
distribution of deliberative, judicial and executive
functions, the tenure and numbers of the executive,
and their mode of election (fourteen modes are
enumerated). The functions of the judiciary
INTRODUCTION
(c. xiii.), eight in number, are stated, and various
modes of its appointment.
Book V. Revolutions — their causes and their pre-
vention. — Revolution (c. i.) springs from a desire of
the many or the rich for more power (though de-
mocracy is less liable to it than oligarchy). The
various motives and circumstances that lead to it
are set out (c. ii.), with historical instances of its
arising from quite petty events (c. iii.) ; and special
causes that operate in democracies, oligarchies and
aristocracies (cc. iv., v., vi.). It is prevented (c. vii.)
by the opposite causes and measures, which are
discussed in general, and for oligarchy and democracy
in particular, as well as (c. viii.) for monarchies,
royalty and tyranny being contrasted : a variety of
personal motives cause attacks on tyrants, but the
monarchy of old days was only endangered by dis-
cord in the reigning house or by excessively harsh
rule. Royalty is preserved (c. ix.) by moderation ;
tyranny by two opposite methods, harsh repression
or conciliatory public spirit (historical examples).
Criticism (c. x.) of Plato's treatment of revolution
in The Republic, with his theory of a regular cycle of
constitutional changes.
Book VI. (a) Democracy and Oligarchy. — Democracy
(c. i.) varies in form with the prevalent industries of
the people, its basis being liberty and equality (not
' proportional equality,' balancing wealth against
numbers). Agricultural democracy (c. ii.) is the
best, pastoral next ; traders and labourers are too
fond of politics and a field for demagogy. Devices
to safeguard democracy (c. iii.), especially coloniza-
tion. Oligarchy (c. iv.) — the more tyrannical its
form the more protection it needs, an elaborate
xxi
INTRODUCTION
military system and placation of the people by public
benefactions. (6) The various Offices of Government
are enumerated and discussed (c. v.).
(3) Ideal Politics, Books VII., VIII.
Book VII. The Best Constitution : external condi-
tions, population. — The writer begins (cc. i.-iii.) with
a resume of Ethics : the best life for the state
as for the man is the life of virtue with enough
external goods for virtuous action ; the highest form
of this for a man is the inner life of thought, and
similarly for the state external dominion is inferior
to the internal activity of politics. The necessary
conditions of the ideal but practicable state (iv., v.)
are a population not too small nor too large for the
best common life, a country large enough for the
temperate maintenance of this population and easily
defensible, a suitable city site (the advantages and
disadvantages of a sea-port are set out). The
citizens (c. vi.) should be of a race like the Greek,
at once spirited and intelligent. Of the necessary
classes (c. vii.), the artisans and farmers (c. viii.)
are unfit for citizenship, which must carry military,
political, judicial and priestly functions ; they should
be slaves or alien serfs. The history of the caste-
system (c. ix.) is discussed. The land must be
partly public, to support religion and the public
meals, partly private ; each citizen is to have one
farm near the city and another near the frontier.
The site and plan of the city (cc. x., xi.), water-
supply, fortifications, temples, state agora, market
agora, and guard-posts and shrines in the country.
The discipline and education of the citizens
INTRODUCTION
(c. xii.) ; to natural gifts must be added training of
habit and reason (c. xiii.),the psychology and objects
of which are discussed ; and the life of leisure is the
ultimate aim. To produce the finest human material
(c. xiv.) the state must regulate marriage, and the
training of infancy and childhood. Education proper
(c. xv.) falls into two parts, for the ages 7 to 14 and
14 to 21.
Book VIII. The Best Constitution continued. —
Education must be systematic, universal and public
(c. i.). Studies (c. ii.) should be edifying, and useful
studies should be pursued with a liberal tone. Gym-
nastics (c. iii.) are to train spirit ; for children (cc.
iv., v.) they should be gentle, then three years of
study should follow, then a period of rigorous bodily
training. Music is not merely a harmless amusement
or a rational pastime ; it is morally educative — it
exercises and refines the emotions. Moderate
skill in performance on the lyre (c. vi.) should be
acquired, but the flute and cithara are too profes-
sional, and the flute too emotional ; and so (c. vii.)
is the Phrygian mode — the ethical Dorian mode is
more suited for education.
(The treatise here breaks off.)
xxiii
ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS
APISTOTEAOT2
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ A
Ι. Επειδή πάσαν πόλιν όρώμεν κοινωνίαν τινά 1
οΖσαν, και πάσαν κοινωνίαν άγαθοΰ τίνος ένεκεν
συνεστηκυΐαν (του γαρ είναι, δοκοΰντος αγαθόν
χάριν πάντα πράττουσι πάντες), δηλον ώς 7τασαι
5 μέν άγαθοΰ τίνος στοχάζονται, μάλιστα δέ και
τον κνριωτάτου πάντων η πασών κνριωτάτη και
πάσας περιέχουσα τάς άλλα?• αΰτη δ' εστίν ή
καλούμενη πόλις και η κοινωνία η πολιτική, όσοι 2
μεν ονν οΐονται πολιτικόν και βασιλικόν και
οίκονομικον και δεσποτικόν είναι τον αυτόν, ου
καλώς λεγουσιν πλήθει γαρ και όλιγότητι νομί-
ιο ζονσι διαφερειν αλλ ουκ εΐδει τούτων εκαστον,
οίον αν μεν ολίγων, δεσπότην, άν δε πλειόνων,
οίκονόμον, άν δ' ετι πλειόνων, πολιτικόν τ) βασι-
λικόν, ώς ουδέν διαφερουσαν μεγάλην οίκίαν η
μικράν πόλιν και πολιτικόν δε και βασιλικόν,
15 όταν μεν αυτός εφεστήκγ), βασιλικόν, όταν δε
° The Greek word had not acquired a specially political
connotation as the English word ' community ' has.
6 Socrates and Plato.
2
ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS
BOOK I
1 I. Every state is as we see a sort of partnership,* Book L
and every partnership is formed with a view to some family.
good (since all the actions of all mankind are done with
a view to what they think to be good). It is therefore The state
evident that, while all partnerships aim at some good, ^"caiiy
the partnership that is the most supreme of all and from the
includes all the others does so most of all, and aims y "
at the most supreme of all goods ; and this is the
partnership entitled the state, the political associa-
2 tion. Those δ then who think that the natures of
the statesman, the royal ruler, the head of an estate °
and the master of a family are the same, are mista-
ken ; they imagine that the difference between these
various forms of authority is one of greater and smaller
numbers, not a difference in kind — that is, that the
ruler over a few people is a master, over more the
head of an estate, over more still a statesman or
royal ruler, as if there were no difference between
a large household and a small city ; and also as to
the statesman and the royal ruler, they think that
one who governs as sole head is royal, and one who,
β οικονόμος denoting a higher grade than Se<TTOn)s is
unusual. For their ordinary use see c. ii. § I fin.
3
ARISTOTLE
1252 a
κατά λόγους της επιστήμης της τοιαύτης κατά.
μέρος άρχων και αρχόμενος, πολιτικόν ταύτα δ'
ουκ βστιν αληθή, δήλον δ' έσται το λεγόμενον 3
επισκοποΰσι κατά την ύφηγημένην μέθοδον ώσπερ
γαρ iv τοις άλλοις το σύνθετον μέχρι των άσνν-
20 θέτων ανάγκη διαιρεΐν (ταΰτα γάρ ελάχιστα μόρια
του παντός), οΰτω και πόλιν εζ ων σύγκειται
σκοποΰντες όφόμεθα και περί τούτων μάλλον τι
τ€ διαφέρουσιν αλλήλων και ει τι τεχνικόν εν-
δέχεται λαβείν περί έκαστον των ρηθέντων.
Ει δη τις εξ αρχής 1 τά πράγματα φυόμενα βλέ-
25 φειεν, ώσπ€ρ iv τοις άλλοις και iv τούτοις κάλλιστ
άν οΰτω θεωρησειεν. ανάγκη δή πρώτον συν- 4
δυάζεσθαι τους άνευ αλλήλων μη δυναμένους
etvat, οίον θήλυ μεν και άρρεν τής γενέσεως 2
ένεκεν {και τούτο ουκ εκ προαιρέσεως, αλλ' ώσπερ
και εν τοις άλλοις ζωοις και φυτοΐς φυσικόν το
80 εφίεσθαι οίον αύτο τοιούτον καταλιπεΐν έτερον),
άρχον δε και άρχόμενον φύσει, 3 δια την σωτηρίαν
(το μεν γάρ δυνάμενον τή διάνοια προοράν άρχον
φύσει και δεσπόζον φύσει, το δε δυνάμενον τω
σώματι ταΰτα ποιεΐν* άρχόμενον και φύσει δοΰλον
διό δεσπότη και δούλω ταύτό συμφέρει) . φύσει 5
\252 b μεν ουν διώρισται το θήλυ και το δοΰλον (ούθεν
γάρ ή φύσις ποιεί τοιοΰτον οίον χαλκοτύποι την
Αελφικήν μάχαιραν πενιχρώς , αλλ' εν προς εν
1 αρχής <ets> Richards. 2 yevvr/aews Stobaeus.
3 φύσει ante και codd. cet. et Aid.
4 ταΰτα iroielv {ταΰτα ante τφ σώματι MP 1 ) : διαπονεΐν
Gomperz.
A probable emendation gives ' that can carry out labour.'
* A dagger and carving-knife or knife and spoon in one ?
4
POLITICS, Ι. ι. 2-5
while the government follows the principles of the
science of royalty, takes turns to govern and be
governed is a statesman ; but these views are not
3 true. And a proof of what we assert will appear if
we examine the question in accordance with our
regular method of investigation. In every other
matter it is necessary to analyse the composite whole
down to its uncompounded elements (for these are
the smallest parts of the whole) ; so too with the
state, by examining the elements of which it is com-
posed we shall better discern in relation to these
different kinds of rulers what is the difference be-
tween them, and whether it is possible to obtain any
scientific precision in regard to the various statements
made above.
In this subject as in others the best method of The Family
investigation is to study things in the process of ^^ΰοη'
4 development from the beginning. The first coupling for the
together of persons then to which necessity gives rise f uife.
is that between those who are unable to exist without
one another, namely the union of female and male
for the continuance of the species (and this not of
deliberate purpose, but with man as with the other
animals and with plants there is a natural instinct to
desire to leave behind one another being of the same
sort as oneself), and the union of natural ruler and
natural subject for the sake of security (for one that
can foresee with his mind is naturally ruler and
naturally master, and one that can do these things α
with his body is subject and naturally a slave ; so
5 that master and slave have the same interest). Thus
the female and the slave are by nature distinct (for
nature makes nothing as the cutlers make the Delphic
knife, 6 in a niggardly way, but one thing for one
ARISTOTLE
1252 b
ούτω γαρ αν αποτελοΐτο κάλλιστα τών οργάνων
5 εκαστον, μη πολλοίς εργοις αλλ' ivl δουλεΰον) . iv
δε τοις βαρβάροις το θήλυ και το 1 δοΰλον την αυτιών
έχει ταζιν αίτιον δ' ότι το φύσει αρχον ουκ εχου-
σιν, άλλα γίνεται η κοινωνία αυτών Βουλής και
δούλου, διό φασιν οι ποιηται
βαρβάρων δ' "Έλληνας άρχειν εικός,
ώς ταύτό φύσει βάρβαρον και δοΰλον όν. εκ μεν 6
ίο οΰν τούτων των δυο κοινωνιών οικία πρώτη, και
ορθώς Ησίοδος είπε ποιησας
οίκον μεν πρώτιστα γυναικά τε βοΰν τ' άροτηρα•
6 γαρ βοΰς άντ οίκετου τοις πενησίν εστίν, η
μεν οΰν εις πάσαν ημεραν συνεστηκυΐα κοινωνία
κατά φύσιν οΐκός εστίν, ους Χαρώνδα? μεν καλεί
15 όμοσιπύους , 'Έ,πιμενίδης δε 6 Κρης όμοκάπους. 2
Ή δ' εκ πλειόνων οικιών κοινωνία πρώτη 7
χρήσεως ένεκεν μη εφήμερου κώμη. μάλιστα δε
κατά φύσιν εοικεν ή κώμη αποικία? οικίας είναι,
ους καλοΰσί τίνες όμογάλακτας [παϊδάς τε και
παίδων παΐδας~\. Χ διό και το πρώτον εβασιλεύοντο
•20 at πόλεις και νυν ετι τα έθνη• εκ βασιλευομενων
1 τό add. edd. 2 όμοκάπνον: ΓΜΡ 1 .
* άποικίαι ? ed. 4 [παΐδάς τε — παΐδας] Susemihl.
° Euripides, LA. 1400. * Works and Days 405.
e A lawgiver of Catana in Sicily, 6th century b.c. or earlier.
d A poet and prophet invited to Athens 596 b.c. to purify
it of plague.
' Or Doric, ' with a joint holding.' The variant όμοκάτπΌν$,
4 smoke-sharers,' seems to mean ' hearth-fellows.'
' Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give ' consists of
colonies from.'
6
POLITICS, Ι. ι. 5-7
purpose ; for so each tool will be turned out in the
finest perfection, if it serves not many uses but one).
Yet among barbarians the female and the slave have
the same rank ; and the cause of this is that bar-
barians have no class of natural rulers, but with them
the conjugal partnership is a partnership of female
slave and male slave. Hence the saying of the
poets —
Tis meet that Greeks should rule barbarians," —
implying that barbarian and slave are the same in
6 nature. From these two partnerships then is first
composed the household, and Hesiod b was right when
he wrote :
First and foremost a house and a wife and an ox for the
ploughing —
for the ox serves instead of a servant for the poor.
The partnership therefore that comes about in the
course of nature for everyday purposes is the ' house,'
the persons whom Charondas c speaks of as ' meal-tub-
fellows ' and the Cretan Epimenides d as ' manger-
fellows.' e
7 On the other hand the primary partnership made Related
up of several households for the* satisfaction of not '*"^ s
mere daily needs is the village. The village accord- Village.
ing to the most natural account seems to be a colony
from f a household, formed of those whom some
people speak of as ' fellow-nurslings,' sons and sons'
sons." It is owing to this that our cities were at
first under royal sway and that foreign races are so
still, because they were made up of parts that were
» The words ' sons and sons' sons ' are probably an inter-
polated note.
ARISTOTLE
1252 b
yap συνηλθον, πάσα γαρ οικία βασιλεύεται υπό
του πρεσβυτατου, ώστε και αί άποικίαι διά την
σνγγένειαν. και τοϋτ εστίν ο λέγει "Ομηρος,
θεμιστεύει δε έκαστος
παιοων ηο αλοχων
σποράοες γάρ• και ούτω το άρχαΐον ωκουν. και
85 τους θεούς οέ δια τούτο πάντες φασι /?ασιλευεσ(?αι,
οτι και αύτοι οι μεν έτι και νΰν οι δε το άρχαΐον
εβασιλεύοντο' ώσπερ δε και τά εΐδη εαυτοΐς άφ-
ομοιοΰσιν οι άνθρωποι, ούτω και τους βίους των
θεών.
Ή δ* εκ πλειόνων κωμών κοινωνία τέλειος 8
πόλις, ήδη πάσης έχουσα πέρας της αυτάρκειας
80 ως έπος ειπείν, γινομένη 1 μεν οΰν τοϋ ζην ένεκεν,
ούσα δε τού ευ ζην. διό πάσα πόλις φύσει εστίν,
εΐπερ και αϊ πρώται κοινωνίαι• τέλος γαρ αύτη
εκείνων, η δε φύσις τέλος εστίν, οίον γαρ έκαστόν
έστι της γενέσεως τελεσθείσης, ταύτην φαμεν
την φύσιν είναι εκάστου, ώσπερ ανθρώπου, Ιππου,
1253 a οικίας, ετι το ου ένεκα και το τέλος βέλτιστον
η δ' αυτάρκεια τέλος και βέλτιστον. εκ τούτων 9
ούν φανερόν οτι τών φύσει η πόλις εστί, και οτι 6
άνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικόν ζώον, καΐ 6 άπολις διά
φύσιν και ου διά τύχην ήτοι φαύλος εστίν η
δ κρείττων η άνθρωπος (ώσπερ και ό ύφ' Όμηρου
λοώορηθεις
άφρητωρ, άθέμιστος, ανέστιος,
1 yevouivir) ? ed.
° Odyssey, ix, 1 14 f. of the Cyclopes : the passage goes on :
εστίν eicewos \ &s πολέμου ίραται.
b A reminiscence of Xenophanes fr. 14. ° Iliad ix. 63.
8
POLITICS, Ι. ι. 7-9
under royal rule ; for every household is under the
roval rule of its eldest member, so that the colonies
from the household were so too, because of the kin-
ship of their members. And this is what Homer*
means :
And each one giveth law
To sons and eke to spouses —
for his Cyclopes live in scattered families ; and that
is the way in which people used to live in early times.
Also this explains why all races speak of the gods
as ruled by a king, because they themselves too are
some of them actually now so ruled and in other cases
used to be of old ; and as men imagine the gods in
human form, so also they suppose their manner of
life to be like their own. b
8 The partnership finally composed of several villages Neighbour-
is the city-state ; it has at last attained the limit of {S^S^f*
virtually complete self-sufficiency, and thus, while it City-stat«,
comes into existence for the sake of life, it exists for good nf e .
the good life. Hence every city-state exists by nature,
inasmuch as the first partnerships so exist ; for the
city-state is the end of the other partnerships, and
nature is an end, since that which each thing is when
its growth is completed we speak of as being the
nature of each thing, for instance of a man, a horse,
a household. Again, the object for which a thing
exists, its end, is its chief good ; and self-sufficiency
9 is an end, and a chief good. From these things
therefore it is clear that the city-state is a natural
growth, and that man is by nature a political animal,
and a man that is by nature and not merely by
fortune citiless is either low in the scale of humanity
or above it (like the ' clanless, lawless, hearthless '
man reviled by Homer, c for he is by nature citiless
β 9
ARISTOTLE
1253 a
άμα γαρ φύσει τοιούτος και πολέμου επιθυμη-
τής) άτε ων ώσπερ άζυξ 1 εν πεττοΐς. διότι δε 10
πολιτικον 6 άνθρωπος ζώον 2 πάσης μελίττης και
παντός άγελαίου ζώου μάλλον, δηλον. ούθεν yap,
ίο ως φαμεν, μάτην ή φύσις ποιεί' λόγον δε μόνον
άνθρωπος έχει των ζωών. η μεν ουν φωνή του
λυπηρού και ηδέος εστί σημεΐον, διό και τοις
άλλοι? υπάρχει ζώοις (μέχρι γαρ τούτου η φύσις
αυτών ελήλυθεν, του εχειν αισθησιν λυπηρού και
ηδεος και ταύτα σημαίνειν άλλτ^λοι?), ό δε λόγος
15 επι τω δηλοΰν εστί το συμφέρον και το βλαβερόν,
ώστε και το δίκαιον και τό άδικον τούτο γαρ 11
προς τάλλα ζώα τοις άνθρώποις 'ίδιον, το μόνον 3
αγαθού και κακού και δικαίου και αδίκου και τών
άλλων αισθησιν εχειν, η δε τούτων κοινωνία ποιεί
οίκίαν και πόλιν.
Και πρότερον δη τη φύσει πόλις η οικία και
20 έκαστος ημών εστίν. τό γαρ όλον πρότερον
άναγκαΐον είναι τοΰ μέρους• αναιρουμένου γαρ τού
όλου ουκ εσται πους ούδε χειρ ει μη όμωνύμως,
ώσπερ ε'ί τι? λέγει την λιθίνην διαφθαρεΐσα γαρ*
εσται τοιαύτη, πάντα δε τω €ργω ώρισται και
τη δυνάμει, ώστε μηκετι τοιαύτα Οντα ού λεκτεον
25 τα αυτά είναι αλλ' ομώνυμα, ότι μεν ουν η πόλις 12
και φύσει 5 πρότερον η έκαστος, δηλον ει γαρ
μη αυτάρκης έκαστος χωρισθείς, ομοίως τοις
άλλοις μερεσιν εζει προς τό όλον, ό δε μη δυνα-
1 sic ? Richards : &re irep &ξνξ &ι> ώο -irep.
2 [ffiov] ? ed. 3 [μόνον] ? edd.^
4 yap ούκ Scholl. s καϊ φύσα /cat codd. plurimi.
β Or ' a hand thus spoiled will not be a hand at all.'
10
POLITICS, Ι. ι. 9-12
and also a lover of war) inasmuch as he resembles
10 an isolated piece at draughts. And why man is a
political animal in a greater measure than any bee
or any gregarious animal is clear. For nature, as
we declare, does nothing without purpose ; and man
alone of the animals possesses speech. The mere
voice, it is true, can indicate pain and pleasure, and
therefore is possessed by the other animals as well
(for their nature has been developed so far as to have
sensations of what is painful and pleasant and to
signify those sensations to one another), but speech
is designed to indicate the advantageous and the
harmful, and therefore also the right and the wrong ;
11 for it is the special property of man in distinction
from the other animals that he alone has perception
of good and bad and right and wrong and the other
moral qualities, and it is partnership in these things
that makes a household and a city-state.
Thus also the city-state is prior in nature to the The state
household and to each of us individually. For the nature?
whole must necessarily be prior to the part ; since
when the whole body is destroyed, foot or hand will
not exist except in an equivocal sense, like the sense
in which one speaks of a hand sculptured in stone as
a hand ; because a hand in those circumstances will
be a hand spoiled, and all things are defined by their
function and capacity, so that when they are no
longer such as to perform their function they must
not be said to be the same things, but to bear their
12 names in an equivocal sense. It is clear therefore
that the state is also prior by nature to the individual ;
for if each individual when separate is not self-
sufficient, he must be related to the whole state as
other parts are to their whole, while a man who is
11
ARISTOTLE
μένος κοινωνεΐν η μηθέν δομένος δι' αύτάρκειαν
ούθέν μέρος πόλεως, ώστε η θηρίον η θεός.
30 Φύσει μεν ουν η όρμη εν πάσιν επι την τοιαυ-
την κοινωνίαν 6 δε πρώτος συστήσας μεγίστων
αγαθών αίτιος- ώσπερ γαρ καΐ τελεωθέν 1 βελτιστον
τών ζωών ό 2 άνθρωπος εστίν, οϋτω καΐ χωρισθέν
νόμου και δίκης 3 χείριστον πάντων, χαλεπωτάτη
γαρ αδικία έχουσα όπλα, ό δ' άνθρωπος όπλα
35 έχων φύεται φρονήσει και άρετ -ff οΐς επι ταναντια
εστί χρησθαι μάλιστα, διό άνοσιώτατον και άγριώ-
τατον άνευ αρετής και προς αφροδίσια και εδωδην
χείριστον. η δε δικαιοσύνη πολιτικόν ή γαρ
δίκη 6 πολιτικής κοινωνίας τά^ι? εστίν, η δέ δίκη
του δικαίου κρίσις.
1253 b II. Έττει δε φανερόν εξ ων μορίων η πόλις συν- 1
έστηκεν, άναγκαΐον πρώτον περί οικονομίας ει-
πεΐν πάσα γαρ σύγκειται πόλις εξ οικιών, οικο-
νομίας δέ μέρη εξ ων πάλιν οικία συνεστηκεν οικία
5 δε τέλειος εκ δούλων και ελευθέρων, επει δ' εν
τοις ελαχίστοις πρώτον εκαστον ζητητεον, πρώτα
δε και ελάχιστα μέρη οικίας δεσπότης και δούλος,
και πόσις και άλοχος, και πατήρ και τέκνα, περί
τριών αν τούτων σκεπτεον εΐη τι εκαστον και ποιον
δει ειΐ'αι, ταΰτα δ' εστί δεσποτική και γαμικη 2
1 τελβωθέν seel. Jackson.
1 ό om. codd. cet. et Aid.
* χωρισθέν — δίκης seel. Jackson.
4 apery <,έπιτήδΐΐα> ? Pearson.
5 τό -yap δίκαιον Richards.
a The Greek word properly denotes the marriage cere-
mony, not the married state.
12
POLITICS, Ι. ι. 12—n. 2
incapable of entering into partnership, or who is so
self-sufficing that he has no need to do so, is no part
of a state, so that he must be either a lower animal
or a god.
Therefore the impulse to form a partnership of and the
this kind is present in all men by nature : but the η^η^ί chief
man who first united people in such a partnership good.
was the greatest of benefactors. For as man is the
best of the animals when perfected, so he is the
worst of all when sundered from law and justice.
For unrighteousness is most pernicious when pos-
sessed of weapons, and man is born possessing
weapons for the use of wisdom and virtue, which
it is possible to employ entirely for the opposite
ends. Hence when devoid of virtue man is the most
unscrupulous and savage of animals, and the worst in
regard to sexual indulgence and gluttony. Justice
on the other hand is an element of the state ; for
judicial procedure, which means the decision of what
is just, is the regulation of the political partnership.
1 II. And now that it is clear what are the component The head o»
parts of the state, we have first of all to discuss house- ^^^γ*
hold management ; for every state is composed of husband,
households. Household management falls into de- an a '
partments corresponding to the parts of which the
household in its turn is composed ; and the household
in its perfect form consists of slaves and freemen.
The investigation of everything should begin with
its smallest parts, and the primary and smallest parts
of the household are master and slave, husband
and wife, father and children ; we ought therefore
to examine the proper constitution and character
2 of each of these three relationships, I mean that
of mastership, that of marriage ° (there is no exact
13
ARISTOTLE
1253 b
10 (ανώνυμον γάρ η γυναικός και ανδρός σύζευζις)
και τρίτον τεκνοποιητικη 1 (και γαρ αύτη ουκ
ώνόμασται ίδίω ονόματι) ■ εστωσαν δη 2 αύται τρεις
άς εΐπομεν. εστί δε τι 3 μέρος ο δοκεΐ τοις μεν
etrat οικονομία τοις δε μεγιστον μέρος αύτης,
όπως δ' έχει, θεωρητεον λέγω δε περί της κάλου- .
μένη ς χρηματιστικής.
15 ΥΙρώτον δέ περί δεσπότου και δούλου εΐπωμεν,
ίνα τα τε προς την άναγκαιαν χρείαν ΐδωμεν, καν
ει τι προς το είδεναι περί αυτών δυναίμεθα λαβείν
βελτιον των νυν ύπολαμβανομενων . τοις μεν γαρ 3
δοκεΐ επιστήμη τε τις eti^at η δεσποτεία, και η
αύτη οικονομία και δεσποτεία και πολιτική και
20 βασιλική, καθάπερ εΐπομεν αρχόμενοι• τοις δε
παρά φύσιν το δεσπόζειν, νόμω γαρ τον μεν
δοϋλον είναι τον δ ελεύθερον, φύσει δ ούθεν δια-
φερειν, διόπερ ούδε δίκαιον, βίαιον γάρ.
Έπεί οΰν ή κτησις μέρος της οικίας εστί και η
κτητική μέρος της οικονομίας* (άνευ γάρ των
25 αναγκαίων αδύνατον και ζην και ευ ζην 6 ), ώσπερ 4
δέ 6 ταΐς ώρισμεναις τεχναις άναγκαΐον αν ε'ίη
ύπάρχειν τά οικεία όργανα ει με?0\.ει άποτελε-
σθησεσθαι το έργον, ούτω και τω οικονομικω,
των δ' οργάνων τά μεν άφυχα τά δ' εμφυχα (οίον
1 τεκνοττοιητική : πατρική Αγ.
2 δη Susemihl : δ' codd.
• ίστι δ' <?τι τέταρτον τι (i.e. δ τι) Schmidt.
4 κα'ι — οικονομίας seel. Susemihl.
6 [καϊ et ξην] ? ed. ; om. ΓΜΙ' 1 .
β δη Susemihl.
° No English word covers all the associations of the
Greek, which means ' dealing in χρήματα,' ' things,' — goods,
property, money — and so ' business.'
14
POLITICS, I. ii. 2-4
term denoting the relation uniting wife and husband),
and thirdly the progenitive relationship (this too
has not been designated by a special name). Let
us then accept these three relationships that we have
mentioned. There is also a department which some and as man
people consider the same as household management
and others the most important part of it, and the
true position of which we shall have to consider :
I mean what is called the art of getting wealth."
Let us begin by discussing the relation of master Mastership
and slave, in order to observe the facts that have a an v
bearing on practical utility, and also in the hope that
we may be able to obtain something better than the
notions at present entertained, with a view to a theo-
3 retic knowledge of the subject. For some thinkers various
hold the function of the master to be a definite eones -
science, and moreover think that household manage-
ment, mastership, statesmanship and monarchy are
the same thing, as we said at the beginning of the
treatise ; others however maintain that for one man
to be another man's master is contrary to nature,
because it is only convention that makes the one
a slave and the other a freeman and there is no
difference between them by nature, and that there-
fore it is unjust, for it is based on force.
Since therefore property is a part of a household The slave a
and the art of acquiring property a part of household s e ™. j^L^
management (for without the necessaries even life, for pro-
4 as well as the good life, b is impossible), and since, ' uctlon ^
just as for the definite arts it would be necessarv for
the proper tools to be forthcoming if their work is to
be accomplished, so also the manager of a household
must have his tools, and of tools some are lifeless and
b ' As well as the good life ' is probably an interpolation.
15
ARISTOTLE
1253 b
τω κυβερνήτη ο μεν ο'ίαζ άφυχον 6 δε πρωμεύς
so εμφυχον, 6 γαρ υπηρέτης εν οργάνου εΐδει ταΐς
τεχναις εστίν), οϋτω και το κτήμα όργανον προς
ζωην εστί, και ή κτησις πλήθος οργάνων εστί,
και ο δούλος κτημά τι εμφυχον. καΐ ωσπερ
όργανον προ οργάνων πας υπηρέτης• ει γαρ 5
ηδύνατο εκαστον των οργάνων κελευσθεν η προ-
85 αισθανομενον άποτελεΐν το αύτοΰ έργον, ωσπερ τα
Δαιδάλου φασίν η τους του Ηφαίστου τρίποδας,
ους φησιν ο ποιητής αυτομάτους θείον 8υεσθαι
aycDva, ούτως αι κερκίδες εκερκιζον αύται και τά
πλήκτρα εκιθάριζεν, ούδεν αν έδει ούτε τοις
1254 a αρχιτεκτοσιν υπηρετών ούτε τοις δεσπόταις δούλων.
τα μεν ούν λεγόμενα όργανα ποιητικά 'όργανα εστί,
το δε κτήμα πρακτικόν από μεν γαρ της κερκίδας
έτερον τι γίνεται παρά την χρησιν αύτης, από δε
5 της εσθητος και της κλίνης η χρήσις μόνον, ετι β
δ επει διαφέρει η ποίησις εϊδει και η πράζις,
δέονται δ' άμφότεραι οργάνων, ανάγκη και ταϋτα
την αύτην εχειν διαφοράν. ο δε βίος πράζις, ου
ποιησίς εστίν διό και 6 δούλος υπηρέτης 1 των
προς την πράζιν.
Τό δε κτήμα λέγεται ωσπερ και το μόριον το*
ίο γάρ μόριον ού μόνον άλλου εστί μόριον, αλλά
και απλώς 3 άλλου, ομοίως δε και τό κτήμα, διό
6 μεν δεσπότης του δούλου δεσπότης μόνον,
1 [ΰττηρΙτη<;] ? gloss ed. ; cf. 1253 b 30.
* τό ed. : τό re codd. 3 άπλώ? Γ, απλώς όλω$ Μ 1 , ΰλως cet.
" This legendary sculptor first represented the eyes as
open and the limbs as in motion, so his statues had to be
16
POLITICS, Ι. π. 4-6
others living (for example, for a helmsman the rudder
is a lifeless tool and the look-out man a live tool — for
an assistant in the arts belongs to the class of tools),
so also an article of property is a tool for the purpose
of life, and property generally is a collection of tools,
6 and a slave is a live article of property. And every
assistant is as it were a tool that serves for several
tools ; for if every tool could perform its own work
when ordered, or by seeing what to do in advance,
like the statues of Daedalus in the story , a or the
tripods of Hephaestus which the poet says ' enter
self-moved the company divine,' b — if thus shuttles
wove and quills played harps of themselves, master-
craftsmen would have no need of assistants and
masters no need of slaves. Now the tools mentioned
are instruments of production, whereas an article of
property is an instrument of action"; for from a
shuttle we get something else beside the mere use
of the shuttle, but from a garment or a bed we get
β only their use. And also inasmuch as there is a
difference in kind between production and action,
and both need tools, it follows that those tools also
must possess the same difference. But life is doing
things, not making things ; hence the slave is an
assistant in the class of instruments of action.
And the term ' article of property ' is used in the belonging
same way as the term ' part ' : a thing that is a part ^nemL'ter.
is not only a part of another thing but absolutely
belongs to another thing, and so also does an article
of property. Hence whereas the master is merely
the slave's master and does not belong to the slave,
chained to prevent them from running away (Plato, Meno
97 d). * Iliad, xviii. 369.
e i.e. with it we do not make something but do something
{e.g. wear a dress, lie in a bed).
17
ARISTOTLE
εκείνου δ ουκ εστίν 6 δε δούλος ου μόνον δεσπότον
δούλος εστίν, αλλά καί όλως εκείνον.
Τις μεν ούν η φύσις του δούλου καί τις η Βύναμις, 7
15 εκ τούτων δηλον 6 γαρ μη αυτού φύσει αλλ' άλλου
άνθρωπος ών, ούτος φύσει δούλος εστίν, άλλου δ
εστίν άνθρωπος ος αν κτήμα η άνθρωπος ών, κτήμα
δε όργανον πρακτικον και χωριστόν ./ πότερον δ
εστί τις φύσει τοιούτος η ου, και πότερον βελτιον
και δίκαιον τινι δουλεύειν η ου, αλλά πάσα δουλεία
20 πάρα φύσιν εστί, μετά ταύτα σκεπτεον . ου 8
χαλεπόν δέ και τω λόγω θεωρήσαι και εκ των
γινομένων καταμαθεΐν. το γάρ άρχειν και άρχεσθαι
ου μόνον των αναγκαίων αλλά και των συμφερόντων
εστί, και ευθύς εκ γενετής eVia διεστηκε τά μεν
επί το άρχεσθαι τά δ' επί το άρχειν. και εΐδη
25 πολλά και αρχόντων και αρχομένων εστίν (και
αεί βελτίων η άρχη η των βελτιόνων αρχομένων,
οΐον ανθρώπου η θηρίου, το γάρ άποτελούμενον
από των βελτιόνων βελτιον έργον, Οπου δε το μεν
άρχει το δ' άρχεται, εστί τι τούτων έργον)' οσα 9
γάρ εκ πλειόνων συνεστηκε καί γίνεται εν τι
30 κοινόν, είτε εκ συνεχών είτ εκ διηρημενων, εν
α,7τασ<.ν εμφαίνεται το άρχον καί το άρχομενον,
και τούτο εκ της άπάσης φύσεως ενυπάρχει τοις
εμφύχοις• καί γάρ εν τοις μη μετεχουσι ζωής εστί
18
POLITICS, I. ii. 6-9
the slave is not merely the slave of the master but
wholly belongs to the master.
' These considerations therefore make clear the The
nature of the slave and his essential qualitv : one ofmier
who is a human being belonging bv nature not to and "ΐ 1 •* 1
himself but to another is by nature a slave, and a ail nature
person is a human being belonging to another if andUfe •
being a man he is an article of property, and an
article of property is an instrument for action separ-
able from its owner. But we must next consider
whether or not anyone exists who is by nature of
this character, and whether it is advantageous and
just for anyone to be a slave, or whether on the
8 contrary all slavery is against nature. And it is not
difficult either to discern the answer by theory or to
learn it empirically. Authority and subordination
are conditions not only inevitable but also expedient ;
in some cases things are marked out from the moment
of birth to rule or to be ruled. And there are many
varieties both of rulers and of subjects (and the
higher the type of the subjects, the loftier is the
nature of the authority exercised over them, for
example to control a human being is a higher thing
than to tame a wild beast ; for the higher the type
of the parties to the performance of a function, the
higher is the function, and when one party rules
and another is ruled, there is a function performed
9 between them) — because in every composite thing,
where a plurality of parts, whether continuous or
discrete, is combined to make a single common
whole, there is always found a ruling and a subject
factor, and this characteristic of living things is
present in them as an outcome of the whole of nature,
since even in things that do not partake of life there
19
ARISTOTLE
τις αρχή, οίον αρμονίας. άλλα ταύτα μεν ίσως
εξωτερικωτερας εστί σκεφεως. το δέ ζώον πρώτον 10
85 συνεστηκεν εκ φυχης καϊ σώματος, ων το μεν
άρχον εστί φύσει το δ' άρχόμενον . δει δε σκοπεΐν
ev τοις κατά φύσιν εχουσι μάλλον το φύσει, και
μη εν τοις οιεφθαρμενοις. διό και τον βέλτιστα
διακείμενον και κατά σώμα και κατά φνχΐ/ν άν-
θρωπον θεωρητεον, iv ω τοϋτο δήλον τών γαρ
1254 b μοχθηρών η μοχθηρώς 2 εχόντων δόξειεν αν άρχειν
πολλάκις το σώμα της φνχης δια το φαύλως και'
παρά φύσιν εχειν. εστί δ' ουν, ώσπερ λεγομεν, 11
πρώτον iv ζωω θεωρησαι και οεσποτικην άρχην
6 και πολιτικήν η μεν γάρ φνχη του σώματος
άρχει οεσποτικην άρχην, ό δε νους της ορέξεως
πολιτικήν και βασιλικήν iv οΐς φανερόν εστίν οτι
κατά φύσιν και 4 συμφέρον το άρχεσθαί τω σώματι
υπό της φνχης καϊ τω παθητικώ μορίω ύπο του
νου και του μορίου του λόγον έχοντος, το δ εξ
ίο ίσου η άνάπαλιν βλαβερόν πάσιν. πάλιν εν 12
άνθρώπω και τοις άλλοις ζωοις ωσαύτως• τά μεν
γάρ ήμερα τών αγρίων βελτίω την φύσιν, τούτοις
δε πάσι βελτιον άρχεσθαι υπ' ανθρώπου, τυγχάνει
γάρ σωτηρίας ούτως, ετι δε το άρρεν προς το
θήλυ φύσει το μεν κρεΐττον το δέ χείρον, το μεν
15 άρχον το δ' άρχόμενον. τον αυτόν δε τρόπον
άναγκαΐον είναι και επι πάντων ανθρώπων όσοι 13
μεν ουν τοσούτον διεστάσιν όσοι-' φυχη σώματος
1 άρμονίαις vel έν αρμονίας Richards.
2 μοχθηρών : φαύλων (Γ ?) Buecheler.
» φαύλων καϊ seel. idem. 4 τ) ? Richards.
β Each ' mode ' (Dorian, the modern minor scale, Phrygian
and Lydian, two forms of major) was ruled by its key-note.
20
POLITICS, Ι. π. 9-13
is a ruling principle, as in the case of a musical scale."
However, this matter perhaps belongs to an investi-
10 gation lying somewhat outside our subject. But in
the first place an animal consists of soul and body, of
which the former is by nature the ruling and the
latter the subject factor. And to discover what is
natural we must study it preferably in things that are
in a natural state, and not in specimens that are de-
generate. Hence in studying man we must consider
a man that is in the best possible condition in regard
to both body and soul, and in him the principle stated
will clearly appear, — since in those that are bad or in
a bad condition it might be thought that the body
often rules the soul because of its vicious and un-
11 natural condition. But to resume — it is in a living
creature, as we say, that it is first possible to discern
the rule both of master and of statesman : the soul
rules the body with the sway of a master, the intelli-
gence the appetites with constitutional or royal rule ;
and in these examples it is manifest that it is natural
and expedient for the body to be governed bv the
soul and for the emotional part to be governed by
the intellect, the part possessing reason, whereas
for the two parties to be on an equal footing or in the
12 contrary positions is harmful in all cases. Again, the
same holds good between man and the other animals :
tame animals are superior in their nature to wild
animals, yet for all the former it is advantageous to
be ruled by man, since this gives them security.
Also, as between the sexes, the male is by nature
superior and the female inferior, the male ruler and
the female subject. And the same must also neces-
sarily apply in the case of mankind generally ;
13 therefore all men that differ as widely as the soul
21
ARISTOTLE
1254 b χ
και άνθρωπος θηρίου (διάκεινται δε τούτοι τον
τρόπον όσων εστίν έργον ή του σώματος χρήσις και
τοΰτ εστ απ' αυτών βελτιστον) , ούτοι μεν είσι
20 φύσει δούλοι, οΐς βελτιόν εστίν άρχεσθαι ταύτην
την αρχήν, ε'ίπερ και τοις είρημενοις. εστί γαρ
φύσει δούλος 6 δυνάμενος άλλου είναι (διό και
άλλου εστίν) και 6 κοινωνών λόγου τοσούτον όσον
αίσθάνεσθαι άλλα μη εχειν τα γαρ άλλα ζώα
ου λόγω αισ^ανό/χενα 1 άλλα παθήμασιν υπηρετεί.
25 και ή χρεία οέ παραλλάττει μικρόν ή γαρ προς 14
τάνα^καια τω σώ/χατι βοήθεια γίνεται παρ
άμφοΐν, παρά τε τών δούλων και παρά τών
ήμερων ζώων. βούλεται μεν ουν ή φύσις και τα
σώματα διαφέροντα ποιεΐν τα τών ελευθέρων και
τών δούλων, τα μεν ισχυρά προς την άναγκαίαν
so χρήσιν, τά δ' ορθά και άχρηστα προς τάς τοιαύτας
εργασίας , αλλά χρήσιμα προς πολιτικόν βίον (οΰτος
δε και γίνεται διηρημενος εις τε την πολεμικήν
χρείαν και την είρηνικήν), συμβαίνει δε πολλάκις
και τουναντίον, τους μεν τά σώματ εχειν ελευθέρων
τους δε τάς φυχάς μόνον 2 • επει τοΰτό γε φανερόν, 15
85 ως ει τοσούτον γενοιντο διάφοροι το σώμα όσον
αι τών θεών εικόνες, τους υπολειπόμενους πάντες
φαΐεν αν άξιους είναι τούτοις δουλεύειν. ει δ'
επι του σώματος τοΰτ αληθές, πολύ δικαιό-
τερον επι της φυχής τούτο διωρίσθαι• αλλ' ούχ
ομοίως ράδιον ίδεϊν τό τε της φυχής κάλλος και
1255 ατό του σώματος, ότι μεν τοίνυν είσι φύσει τίνες
1 τταθόμενα Richards.
* μόνον hie ed. ; post σώμα codd.
22
POLITICS, I. ii. 13-15
does from the body and the human being from the some men
lower animal (and this is the condition of those ^d and
whose function is the use of the body and from whom body for
this is the best that is forthcoming) — these are by s avery >
nature slaves, for whom to be governed by this kind
of authority is advantageous, inasmuch as it is ad-
vantageous to the subject things already mentioned.
For he is by nature a slave who is capable of belonging
to another (and that is why he does so belong), and
who participates in reason so far as to apprehend it
but not to possess it ; for the animals other than man
are subservient not to reason, by apprehending it,
14 but to feelings. And also the usefulness of slaves
diverges little from that of animals ; bodily service
for the necessities of life is forthcoming from both,
from slaves and from domestic animals alike. The
intention of nature therefore is to make the bodies
also of freemen and of slaves different — the latter
strong for necessary sendee, the former erect and
unserviceable for such occupations, but serviceable
for a life of citizenship (and that again divides into the
employments of war and those of peace) ; though as a althon n
matter of fact often the very opposite comes about — because
slaves have the bodies of freemen and freemen the ^curlte
15 souls only ; since this is certainly clear, that if free- justice is
men were born as distinguished in body as are the cr
statues of the gods, everyone would say that those
who were inferior deserved to be these men's slaves ;
and if this is true in the case of the body, there is
far juster reason for this rule being laid down in the
case of the soul, but beauty of soul is not so easy
to see as beauty of body. It is manifest therefore
that there are cases of people of whom some are
23
ARISTOTLE
οί μεν ελεύθεροι οί δε δούλοι, φανερόν, οΐς και
συμφέρει το δουλεύειν και δίκαιον εστίν.
"Οτι δε και οί τάναντία φάσ κοντές τρόπον τίνα. 16
λεγουσιν ορθώς, ου χαλεπόν ιδεΐν. διχώς γαρ
6 λέγεται το δουλεύειν και ο δούλος• εστί γάρ τις
και κατά νόμον δοΰλος και δουλεύων , 6 γάρ νόμος
ομολογία τις εστίν εν ή 1 τα κατά πόλεμον κρατού-
μενα των κρατούντων είναι φασιν? τοΰτο δη το
δίκαιον πολλοί των εν τοις νόμοις ώσπερ ρήτορα
γράφονται παρανόμων, ως δεινόν ει του /3ιάσασί?αι
ίο δυνάμενου και κατά δύναμιν κρείττονος εσται
δοΰλον και άρχόμενον το βιασθεν και τοις μεν
οΰτω δοκεΐ τοις δ' έκείνως και των σοφών, αίτιον π
δε ταύτης της αμφισβητήσεως , και ο ποιεί τους
λόγους επαλλάττειν, ότι τρόπον τινά άρετη τυγ-
χάνουσα "χορηγίας και βιάζεσθαι δύναται μάλιστα,
15 και εστίν άει τό κρατούν εν υπέροχη αγαθού τινός,
ώστε δοκεΐν μη άνευ αρετής eirai την βίαν, αλλά
περί τοΰ δικαίου μόνον etvat την άμφισβητησιν
(διά γάρ το τοις μεν εύνοιαν δοκεΐν 3 το δίκαιον
etrai, τοις δ αύτο τούτο δίκαιον, το τον κρείττονα
άρχειν)• επει διαστάντων γε χωρίς τούτων τών
20 λόγων ούτ ίσχυρόν ούθέν εχουσιν ούτε πιθανόν
άτεροι λόγοι, ως ού δει το βέλτιον κατ' άρετην
άρχειν και δεσπόζειν. όλως δ' άντεχόμενοί τίνες 18
ως οΐόν τε* δικαίου τινός (ο γάρ νόμος δίκαιον τι)
1 -ξ ed. Basil. : φ codd. (ίψ' ω Bernays).
2 [φασίν] Bernays.
* τό — εϋνοιαν δοκεΐν Ross : τοΰτο — εύνοια δοκεΐ codd.
* οΐόν τε ed. : οΐονται codd.
° The difficulty turns on the ambiguity of αρετή, (a) moral
goodness, virtue, (6) goodness of any kind, e.g. strength.
24
POLITICS, Ι. π. 15-18
freemen and the others slaves by nature, and for
these slavery is an institution both expedient and
just.
16 But at the same time it is not difficult to see that
those who assert the opposite are also right in a
manner. The fact is that the terms ' slaverv ' and
' slave ' are ambiguous ; for there is also such a
thing as a slave or a man that is in slavery by law,
for the law is a sort of agreement under which the
things conquered in war are said to belong to their
conquerors. Now this conventional right is arraigned
by many jurists just as a statesman is impeached for
proposing an unconstitutional measure ; they say
that it is monstrous if the person powerful enough to
use force, and superior in power, is to have the victim
of his force as his slave and subject ; and even among
the learned some hold this view, though others
17 hold the other. But the reason of this dispute and
what makes the theories overlap is the fact that in
a certain manner virtue when it obtains resources
has in fact very great power to use force, and the
stronger party always possesses superiority in some-
thing that is good, a so that it is thought that force
cannot be devoid of goodness, but that the dispute
is merely about the justice of the matter (for it is
due to the one party holding that the justification of
authority is good -will, while the other identifies
justice with the mere rule of the stronger) ; because
obviously if these theories be separated apart, the
other theories have no force or plausibility at all,
implying that the superior in goodness has no claim
18 to rule and be master. But some persons, doing Criticism
their best to cling to some principle of justice (for ^""^f med
the law is a principle of justice), assert that the slavery;
25
ARISTOTLE
1255 a
την κατά πόλεμον δουλείαν τι#6ασι δικαίαν άμα
δ' ου φασιν, την τ€ γαρ αρχήν ενδέχεται μη δι-
25 καίαν είναι των πολέμων και τον άνάζιον δου-
λεύειν ουδαμώς αν φαίη τις δοΰλον είναι• ει δε
μη, συμβήσεται τους ευγενέστατους eimi Βοκοΰντας
δούλους e?vai και εκ δούλων εάν συμβή πραθήναι
— ; ληφθεντας . διόπερ αυτούς ου βούλονται λέγειν
δούλου?, άλλα τους βαρβάρους, καίτοι όταν τούτο
30 λεγωσιν, ούθεν άλλο ζητοΰσιν η το φύσει δοΰλον
όπερ εξ αρχής εΐπομεν ανάγκη γαρ είναι nras"
φάναι τους μεν πανταχού δούλους τους δ' ούδαμοΰ.
τον αυτόν δέ τρόπον και περί ευγενείας' αυτούς μεν 19
γαρ ου μόνον παρ αύτοΐς ευγενείς άλλα πανταχού
85 νομίζουσιν , τους δέ βαρβάρους οϊκοι μόνον, ως
ον τι το μεν απλώς ευγενές καΐ ελεύθερον το δ'
ούχ απλώς, ώσπερ ή Θεοδεκτου 'Κλενη φησί
θείων δ' απ' άμφοΐν εκγονον ριζωμάτων
τίς αν προσειπεΐν άζιώσειεν λάτριν;
όταν δέ τούτο λεγωσιν, ούθενϊ αλλ' η αρετή και
40 κακία διορίζουσι το δούλον και ελεύθερον και τους
1255 b ευγενείς και τους δυσγενεΐς• α^ιοΰσι γάρ, ώσπερ
εζ άνθρωπου άνθρωπον και εκ θηρίων γίνεαθαι
θηρίον, ούτω καϊ εζ αγαθών αγαθόν ή δέ φύσις
βούλεται μέν τούτο ποιεΐν πολλάκις, ου μεντοι
δύναται.
"Οτι μέν οΰν έχει τινά λόγον ή άμφισβήτησις ,
° A tragic poet, a friend of Aristotle.
26
POLITICS, Ι. π. 18-19
enslavement of prisoners of war is just ; yet at the natural
same time they deny the assertion, for there is the implicitly
possibility that wars may be uniust in their origin recognized
and one would by no means admit that a man that sense.
does not deserve slavery can be realh• a slave —
otherwise we shall have the result that persons
reputed of the highest nobility are slaves and the
descendants of slaves if they happen to be taken
prisoners of war and sold. Therefore they do not
mean to assert that Greeks themselves if taken
prisoners are slaves, but that barbarians are. Yet
when they say this, they are merely seeking for the
principles of natural slavery of which we spoke at the
outset ; for they are compelled to say that there exist
certain persons who are essentially slaves everywhere
19 and certain others who are so nowhere. And the
same applies also about nobility : our nobles consider
themselves noble not only in their own country but
everywhere, but they think that barbarian noblemen
are only noble in their own country — which implies
that there are two kinds of nobility and of freedom,
one absolute and the other relative, as Helen says
in Theodectes":
But who would dare to call me menial,
The scion of a twofold stock divine ?
Yet in so speaking they make nothing but virtue
and vice the distinction between slave and free, the
noble and the base-born; for they assume that just
as from a man springs a man and from brutes a brute,
so also from good parents comes a good son ; but as
a matter of fact nature frequently while intending
to do this is unable to bring it about.
It is clear therefore that there is some reason for
27
ARISTOTLE
1255 b
5 /cat ουκ εισι τινε? ot μεν φύσει δούλοι οι ο
ελεύθεροι, δηλον και ότι εν τισι διώρισται το 20
τοιούτον, ων συμφέρει τω μεν το δουλευειν τω δε
το οεσπόζειν, και δίκαιον καϊ δει το μεν αρχεσθαι
το δ' αρχειν ην πεφύκασιν αρχήν άρχειν, ώστε
και δεσπόζειν το δε κακώς άσυμφόρως εστίν
ίο άμφοΐν (το γαρ αυτό συμφέρει τω μέρει και τω
όλω και σώματι και ψυχή, ό δε δούλος μέρος τι
του δεσπότου, οίον εμφυχόν τι του σώματος
κεχωρισμενον δε μέρος• διό και συμφέρον εστί 21
τι και φιλία δούλω και δεσπότη προς άλλτ^λου?
τοΓ? φύσει τούτων ηζιωμενοις , τοις δε μη τούτον
15 τον τρόπον άλλα κατά. νόμον και βιασθεισι του-
ναντίον) .
Φανερόν δε και εκ τούτων ότι ου ταύτόν εστί
δεσποτεια και πολιτική ούδε ττάσαι άλλτ^λαι? at
άρχαί, ώσπερ τίνες φασιν. η μεν γαρ ελευθέρων
φύσει η δε δούλων εστίν, και η μέν οικονομική
20 μοναρχία (μοναρχεΐται γαρ πάς οίκος), η δε πολι-
τική ελευθέρων και ίσων αρχή. ο μεν ούν δεσπό- 22
της ου λέγεται κατ' επιστημην αλλά τω τοιόσδ'
ε«>αι, ομοίως δε και ό δούλος και ο ελεύθερος,
επιστήμη δ' αν εΐη και δεσποτική και δουλική,
1 είσί τινε? ed. : eiciv codd.
28
POLITICS, Ι. π. 19-22
this dispute, and that in some instances it is not the Recapitaia-
case that one set are slaves and the other freemen tlon "
20 by nature ; and also that in some instances such a
distinction does exist, when slavery for the one and
mastership for the other are advantageous, and it is
just and proper for the one party to be governed and
for the other to govern by the form of government
for which they are by nature fitted, and therefore
bv the exercise of mastership, while to govern badly
is to govern disadvantageously for both parties (for
the same thing is advantageous for a part and for
the whole body or the whole soul, and the slave is a
part of the master — he is, as it were, a part of the
21 body, alive but yet separated from it; hence there
is a certain community of interest and friendship
between slave and master in cases when they have
been qualified by nature for those positions, although
when they do not hold them in that way but by law
and by constraint of force the opposite is the case).
And even from these considerations it is clear that Mastership
the authority of a master over slaves is not the same JjiJg^
as the authority of a magistrate in a republic, nor are from
,, „ /* .ι _t government
all forms of government the same, as some assert. of free men
Republican government controls men who are by ™^ a r ™i on
nature free, the master's authority men who are by tasks, and
nature slaves ; and the government of a household HffiSJJ"
is monarchy (since every house is governed by a
single ruler), whereas statesmanship is the govern-
■2-2 ment of men free and equal. The term ' master '
therefore denotes the possession not of a certain
branch of knowledge but of a certain character, and
similarly also the terms ' slave ' and ' freeman.' \ et
there might be a science of mastership and a slave's
science — the latter being the sort of knowledge that
29
ARISTOTLE
1255 b s \ χ ν β < > ν ' ' '?
οουλικη μεν οιαν περ ο εν λ,υρακουσαις επαιοευεν
25 {εκεί γαρ λαμβάνων τις μισθόν εδίδασκε τά
εγ κύκλια διακονήματα τους παΐδα?)• εΐη δ' αν και
επι πλεΐον των τοιούτων μάθησις, οίον όφοποιική
και τάλλα τά τοιαύτα γένη της διακονίας' εστί γαρ
έτερα έτερων τά μέν εντιμότερα έργα τά δ' αναγ-
καιότερα, και κατά την παροιμίαν
80 δούλος προ δούλου, δεσπότης προ δεσπότου.
αί μεν οΰν τοιαΰται πάσαι δονλικαι επιστημαί' είσι , 23
δεσποτική δ' επιστήμη εστίν η χρηστική δούλων
ο γαρ δεσπότης ουκ εν τω κτάσθαι τους δούλους,
άλλ' εν τω χρησθαι δούλοις. εστί δ' αύτη η
επιστήμη ουδέν μέγα έχουσα ουδέ σεμνόν α γαρ
τον δοΰλον επίστασθαι δει ποιεΐν, εκείνον δει
85 ταύτα επίστασθαι επιτάττειν. διό οσοις εξουσία
μη αυτούς κακοπαθεΐν, επίτροπος J\ayu,/?aWi ταυτην
την τιμήν, αύτοι δέ πολιτεύονται η φιλοσοφοΰσιν.
η δέ κτητική έτερα αμφοτέρων τούτων η δικαία,
οΐον 1 πολεμική τι? ούσα η θηρευτικη. περί μέν
οΰν δούλου και δεσπότου τούτον διωρίσθω τον
40 τρόπον.
1256a ΠΙ. "Ολως δέ περί πάσης κτήσεως και χρη- 1
ματιστικης θεωρησωμεν κατά τον ύφηγημενον
τρόπον, επείπερ και ο δούλος της κτήσεως μέρος
τι ην. πρώτον μέν οΰν άπορήσειεν αν τις ποτερον
5 ή χρηματιστική η αύτη τη οικονομική εστίν η
μέρος τι η υπηρετική, και εί υπηρετική, πότερον
1 Richards : οίον ή δίκαια codd.
β Probably from a comedy of Aristotle's contemporary
Philemon.
SO
POLITICS, Ι. π. 22— in. 1
used to be imparted by the professor at Syracuse
(for there used to be a man there who for a fee gave
lessons to servants in their ordinary duties) ; and
indeed there might be more advanced scientific study
of such matters, for instance a science of cookery
and the other such kinds of domestic service — for
different servants have different functions, some
more honourable and some more menial, and as the
proverb says,
Slave before slave and master before master.*
23 The slave's sciences then are all the various branches
of domestic work ; the master's science is the science
of employing slaves — for the master's function
consists not in acquiring slaves but in employing
them. This science however is one of no particular
importance or dignity : the master must know how
to direct the tasks which the slave must know how
to execute. Therefore all people rich enough to be
able to avoid personal trouble have a steward who
takes this office, while they themselves engage in
politics or philosophy. The science of acquiring
slaves is different both from their ownership and their
direction — that is. the just acquiring of slaves, being
like a sort of warfare or hunting. Let this then stand
as our definition of slave and master.
1 III. But let us follow our normal method and in- Business, or
vestigate generally the nature of all kinds of property f good?•/
and the art of getting wealth, inasmuch as we saw j^usehoM
the slave to be one division of property. In the first ma nage-
place therefore one might raise the question whether ment -
the art of getting wealth is the same as that of house-
hold management, or a part of it, or subsidiary to it ;
and if subsidiary, whether it is so in the sense in which
31
ARISTOTLE
1256 s
ώς η κερκιδοποιική τή υφαντική ή ώς ή χαλκουρ-
γικη τή άνδριαντοποιία (ου γαρ ωσαύτως υπηρε-
τοΰσιν, αλλ' η μεν όργανα παρέχει, ή δε την ΰλην
λέγω δε ΰλην το ΰποκείμενον εξ οΰ τι αποτελείται
ίο έργον, οίον ύφάντη μεν έρια, άνδριαντοποιώ 8ε
χαλκόν) .
Οτι μεν ονν ούχ ή αυτή η οικονομική τή χρη- 2
ματιστική , δήλον, της μεν γαρ το πορίσασθαι, της
Βε το χρησασθαι — τις γαρ έσται η χρησομένη τοις
κατά την οικ'ιαν παρά την οίκονομικην ; πότερον
δε μέρος αυτής εστί τι η έτερον είδος, έχει διαμ-
15 φισβήτησιν. ει γάρ έστι του χρηματιστικού θεω-
ρήσαι πόθεν χρήματα και κτησις έσται, . . . , 1
η δε κτησις 77θλλά περιείληφε μέρη και ό πλούτος,
ώστε πρώτον η γεωργική πότερον μέρος τι της
οικονομικής 9 ή έτερον τι γένος; και καθόλου ή
περί την τροφην επιμέλεια και κτήσις.
20 'Αλλά μην ε'ίδη γε πολλά τροφής, διό και βίοι 3
πολλοί και των ζώων και τών ανθρώπων είσίν
ου γάρ οΐόν τε ζήν άνευ τροφής, ώστε αί διαφοραί
της τροφής τους βίους πεποιήκασι διαφέροντας
τών ζώων. τών τε γάρ θηρίων τα μεν αυλαία
τά δε σποραδικά έστιν, όποτέρως συμφέρει προς
25 την τροφην αύτοΐς διά το τά μεν ζωοφάγα τά δε
καρποφάγα τά δε παμφάγα αυτών εΐναν ώστε
1 lacunam ? Susemihl.
2 οικονομικής Garvey : χρηματιστικής codd.
Some words seem to have fallen out in the Creek.
32
POLITICS, I. in. 1-3
the art of making shuttles is subsidiary to the art of
weaving or in that in which the art of casting bronze
is subsidiary to the making of statues (for the two
are not subsidiary in the same way, but shuttle-
making supplies tools whereas bronze-founding
supplies material — and by material I mean the sub-
stance out of which certain work is produced, for
example fleeces are material for a weaver and bronze
for a statuary).
Now it is clear that wealth-getting is not the same
art as household management, for the function of the
former is to provide and that of the latter to use —
for what will be the art that will use the contents of
the house if not the art of household management ?
but whether wealth-getting is a part of the art
of household management, or a different sort of
science, is open to debate. For if it is the function
of the getter of wealth to study the source from which
money and property are to be procured, . . . . a
But property and riches comprise many divisions :
hence first of all is husbandry a division of the house- Husbandry
hold art, or is it a different kind of science ? and so
in general of the superintendence and acquisition
of articles of food.
But furthermore, there are many sorts of food, Food is
owing to which both animals and men have many by°nlture;
modes of life ; for it is impossible to live without
food, so that the differences of food have
made the lives of animals different. Among wild
animals some are nomadic and others solitary,
according to whichever habit is advantageous for
their supplv of food, because some of them are
carnivorous, others graminivorous, and others eat
all kinds of food ; so that nature has differentiated
33
ARISTOTLE
προς τας ραστωνας και την αιρεσιν την τούτων
η φύσις τους βίους αυτών διώρισεν. err** δ' ου
ταύτό εκάστω ηδύ κατά φύσιν αλλ' έτερα ετεροις,
και αυτών τών ζωοφάγων και τών καρποφάγων
οι βίοι προς άλληλα διεστάσιν. ομοίως δε και 4
30 τών ανθρώπων, πολύ γαρ διαφερουσιν οι τούτων
βίοι. οι μεν ουν άργότατοι νομάδες είσίν (ή γαρ
απο τών ήμερων τροφή ζωών άνευ πόνου γίνεται
σχολάζουσιν, αναγκαίου δ' οντος μεταβάλλειν τοις
κτηνεσι δια τάς νομάς και αυτοί αναγκάζονται
86 συνακολουθεΐν, ώσπερ γεωργίαν ζώσαν γεωργοΰν-
τες)• οι δ' απο θήρας ζώσι, και θήρας έτεροι ετέ-
ρας, οΐον οι μεν από ληστείας, οι δ' αφ* άλιεια?
όσοι λίμνας και ελη και ποταμούς η θαλατταν
τοιαύτην προσοικοΰσιν, οι δ' απ' ορνίθων η θηρίων
αγρίων το δε πλείστον γένος τών ανθρώπων από
40 της γης ζη και τών ήμερων καρπών, οι μεν ουν 5
βίοι τοσούτοι σχεδόν eiati', όσοι γε αύτόφυτον
εχουσι την εργασίαν και μη δι' ά?ίλαγής και κα-
1256b πηλείας πορίζονται την τροφην, νομαδικός γεωρ-
γικός ληστρικός αλιευτικός θηρευτικός• οι δε και
μιγνύντες εκ τούτων ηδεως ζώσι, προσαναπληροΰν-
τες τον ενδεεστερον βίον η τυγχάνει ελλείπων προς
δ το αυτάρκης efrai, οΐον οι μεν νομαδικόν άμα και
ληστρικόν, οι δέ γεωργικόν και θηρευτικόν, ομοίως
δέ καΐ περί τους άλλους — ως άν η χρεία συν-
αναγκάζη, τούτον τον τρόπον διάγουσιν. η μεν 6
α Perhaps 'slave-raiding,' cf. § 9, the appropriation of the
' live tools ' that are a part of nature's supplies ; but Thucy-
dides (i. 5) speaks of brigandage and piracy as common in
earlier times, and as still deemed respectable professions in
Northern Greece.
34
POLITICS, I. in. 3-6
their modes of life to suit their facilities and their
predilection for those articles of food. And as
different kinds of animals by nature relish different
sorts of food, and not each kind the same, even
within the classes of carnivorous and graminivorous
animals their modes of life differ from one another.
4 And similarly in the human race also, for there are
wide differences of life among mankind. The idlest
men are nomads (for to procure food from domesti-
cated animals involves no toil or industry, but as it is
necessary for the herds to move from place to place
because of the pastures, the people themselves are
forced to follow along with them, as though they
were farming a live farm). Other men live from
hunting, and different people from different kinds
of hunting, for instance some from brigandage,
others from fishing — these are those that dwell on
the banks of lakes, marshes and rivers or of a sea
suitable for fishing, — and others five on wild birds and
animals. But the largest class of men live from the
5 land and the fruits of cultivation. This then virtu-
ally completes the list of the various modes of life,
those at least that have their industry sprung from
themselves and do not procure their food by barter
and trade — the lives of the herdsman, the husband-
man, the brigand, the fisherman, the hunter. Others
also live pleasantly by combining some of these
pursuits, supplementing the more deficient life
where it happens to fall short in regard to being
self-sufficing : for instance, some combine a pastoral
life and brigandage, others husbandry and hunting,
and similarly with the others — they pass their time
in such a combination of pursuits as their need
6 compels. Property of this sort then seems to be
35
ARISTOTLE
»256b ,,,„,, „ ,,
ουι•» τοιαύτη κτήσις υπ αυτής φαίνεται της φύσεως
διδομένη πάσιν, ωσπερ κατά την πρώτην γενεσιν
ίο ευθύς, ούτω και τελειωθεΐσιν. και γαρ κατά την
εξ αρχής γενεσιν τά μέν σννεκτίκτει των ζώων
τοσαύτην τροφην ώς ικανην ε}ναι μέχρις ου αν
δύνηται αυτό αύτώ πορίζειν το γεννηθεν, οίον δσα
σκωληκοτοκεΐ η ώοτοκεΐ• οσα δέ ζωοτοκεΐ, τοις
γεννωμενοις 1 έχει τροφήν εν αύτοΐς μέχρι τινός,
15 την του καλουμένου γάλακτος φύσιν. ώστε ομοίως 7
δήλον οτι και γενομενοις οίητεον τά τε φυτά των
ζωών ένεκεν είναι και τάλλα ζώα των ανθρώπων
χάριν, τά μέν ήμερα και δια την χρήσιν και διά
την τροφην, των δ' αγρίων ει μη πάντα αλλά τά
γε πλείστα της τροφής και ά?(λης βοηθείας ένεκεν,
20 ϊνα και εσθής και άλλα όργανα γίνηται εζ αυτών.
ει οΰν ή φύσις μηθέν μήτε ατελές ποιεΐ μήτε μάτην,
άναγκαΐον τών ανθρώπων ένεκεν αυτά πάντα
πεποιηκεναι την φύσιν. διό και ή πολεμική φύσει 8
κτητική πως εσται (ή γάρ θηρευτική μέρος αυτής)
25 ή δει χρήσθαι προς τε τά θηρία και τών ανθρώπων
όσοι πεφυκότες άρχεσθαι μή θελουσιν, ώς φύσει
δίκαιον τούτον οντά τον πόλεμον.
*Έγ μέν οΰν είδος κτητικής κατά φύσιν τής οικο-
νομικής μέρος εστίν, καθό 2 δει ήτοι ύπάρχειν ή
πορίζειν αυτήν όπως ύπάρχη ων εστί θησαυρισμός
1 •γενομίνοι$ codd. cet.
2 καθό Bernays : δ codd., δ'τί (quia) Richards, & (et & δεί —
ύπάρχειν post 30 οϊ /ctas tr.) Rassow.
° Rassow would transpose the clause (with a slight altera-
tion) to give ' of the household art, that is, the acquisition of
those goods capable of accumulation that are necessary for
life and useful for the community of city and household, a
36
POLITICS, I. πι. ft-8
bestowed by nature herself upon all, as immediately
upon their first coming into existence, so also when
they have reached maturity. For even at the
original coming into existence of the young some
kinds of animals bring forth with them at birth
enough sustenance to suffice until the offspring can
provide for itself, for example all the species that bear
their voung in the form of larvae or in e££s. The
C? CO
viviparous species have sustenance for their offspring
inside themselves for a certain period, the substance
called milk. So that clearly we must suppose that
nature also provides for them in a similar way when
grown up, and that plants exist for the sake of animals
and the other animals for the good of man, the
domestic species both for his service and for his food,
and if not all at all events most of the Mild ones for
the sake of his food and of his supplies of other kinds,
in order that they may furnish him both with clothing
and with other appliances. If therefore nature makes
nothing without purpose or in vain, it follows that
nature has made all the animals for the sake of
men. Hence even the art of war will by nature be
in a manner an art of acquisition (for the art of
hunting is a part of it) that is properly employed
both against wild animals and against such of mankind
as though designed by nature for subjection refuse
to submit to it, inasmuch as this warfare is by
nature just.
One kind of acquisition therefore in the order of so moderate
nature is a part of the household art,° in accordance Supplies
with which either there must be forthcoming or else ', s the
that art must procure to be forthcoming a supply of the
house-
supply of which must be forthcoming or else the art must h° lder •
procure it to be forthcoming.'
37
ARISTOTLE
1256 b
χρημάτων προς ζωην αναγκαίων καί χρησίμων
80 εις κοινωνίαν πόλεως η οικίας, καϊ εοικεν 6 y 9
αληθινός πλούτος εκ τούτων είναι, η γαρ της
τοιαύτης κτήσεως αυτάρκεια προς άγαθην ζωην
ουκ άπειρος εστίν, ώσπερ Σόλων φησί ποιησας
πλούτου δ' ούθεν τέρμα πεφασμενον άνδράσι κείται'
85 κείται γαρ ωσπερ και ταΐς αλλαι? τεχναις• ούοεν
γαρ όργανον άπειρον ουδεμιάς εστί τέχνης οϋτε
πλήθει ούτε μεγεθει, ο δε πλοΰτος οργάνων πλήθος
εστίν οικονομικών και πολιτικών, ότι μεν τοίνυν
εστί τις κτητική κατά φύσιν τοις οικονόμοις και
τοις πολιτικοΐς , και δι' ην αίτίαν, δήλον.
40 Εστί δε γένος άλλο κτητικής ην μάλιστα καλοΰσι, 10
και δίκαιον αυτό καλεΐν, χρηματιστικην, δι' ην
1257a ούδεν δοκεΐ πέρας eimi πλούτου και κτήσεως• ην
ώς μίαν και την αύτην τη λεχθείση πολλοί νομί-
ζουσι δια την γειτνίασιν εστί δ' οϋτε ή αυτί) τη
ειρημενη οϋτε πόρρω εκείνης, εστί δ η μεν φύσει
δ η δ' ου φύσει αυτών, αλλά δι εμπειρίας τινός καϊ
τέχνης γίνεται μάλλον, λάβωμεν δε περί αυτής
την αρχήν εντεύθεν εκάστου γαρ κτήματος διττή Π
η χρήσίς εστίν, άμφότεραι δέ καθ* αύτο μεν αλλ'
ούχ ομοίως καθ' αυτό, άλλ' η μεν οικεία η δ
ουκ οικεία του πράγματος, οίον υποδήματος η
• Fragment 13 1. 71.
38
POLITICS, Ι. πι. 8-11
of those goods, capable of accumulation, which are
necessary for life and useful for the community of
9 city or household. And it is of these goods that
riches in the true sense at all events seem to consist.
For the amount of such property sufficient in itself
for a good life is not unlimited, as Solon α says that
it is in the verse
But of riches no bound has been fixed or revealed to men ;
for a limit has been fixed, as with the other arts,
since no tool belonging to any art is without a limit
whether in number or in size, and riches are a collec-
tion of tools for the householder and the statesman.
Therefore that there is a certain art of acquisition
belonging in the order of nature to householders and
to statesmen, and for what reason this is so, is clear.
1° But there is another kind of acquisition that is Trade
specially called wealth-getting, and that is so called ^™ η8
with justice ; and to this kind it is due that there barter of
is thought to be no limit to riches and property, supplies.
Owing to its affinity to the art of acquisition of which
we spoke, it is supposed by many people to be one
and the same as that ; and as a matter of fact, while
it is not the same as the acquisition spoken of, it is
not far removed from it. One of them is natural,
the other is not natural, but carried on rather by
means of a certain acquired skill or art. We may
take our starting-point for its study from the follow-
11 ing consideration : with every article of property
there is a double way of using it ; both uses are
related to the article itself, but not related to it in
the same manner — one is peculiar to the thing and
the other is not peculiar to it. Take for example a
shoe — there is its wear as a shoe and there is its use
39
ARISTOTLE
10 τε ύπόδεσις και ή μεταβλητική• άμφότεραι γάρ
υποδήματος χρήσεις, καΐ γαρ 6 άλλαττόμενος τω
δεομενω υποδήματος αντί νομίσματος ή τροφής
χρήται τω ύποδήματι fj υπόδημα, αλλ ου την
οίκείαν χρήσιν, ου γαρ άλλα^/η? ένεκεν γεγονεν.
τον αυτόν δε τρόπον έχει καΐ π€ρΙ των άλλων
15 κτημάτων εστί γαρ ή μεταβλητική πάντων,
άρζαμενη το μεν πρώτον εκ του κατά φύσιν, τω
τα μεν πλείω τά δε ελάττω των ικανών εχειν τους
ανθρώπους, fj και δήλον οτι ουκ εστί φύσει της 12
χρηματιστικής 1 ή καπηλική• όσον γαρ ίκανον αυτοΐς,
άναγκαΐον ην ποιεΐσθαι την άλλαγήν εν μεν ούν
20 τή πρώτη κοινωνία (τοΰτο δ' εστίν οικία) φανερον
οτι ούδεν εστίν έργον αυτής, αλλ' ήδη πλειόνων 2
τής κοινωνίας οϋσης. οι μεν γαρ τών αυτών
εκοινώνουν πάντων, οι δε κεχωρισμενοι* πολλών
πάλιν και έτερων, ων κατά τάς δεήσεις άναγκαΐον 5
ποιεΐσθαι τάς μεταδόσεις, καθάπερ ετι πολλά
25 ποιεί και τών βαρβαρικών εθνών, κατά την άλλα-
γήν αυτά γάρ τά χρήσιμα προς αυτά καταλλάτ-
τονται, επί πλέον δ' ούθεν, οίον οΐνον προς σΐτον
δίδοντες και λαμβάνοντες, και τών άλλων τών
τοιούτων εκαστον. ή μεν οΰν τοιαύτη μεταβλη- 13
τική ούτε παρά φύσιν ούτε χρηματιστικής εστίν
80 είδος ούδεν, εις άναπλήρωσιν γάρ τής κατά φύσιν
αυτάρκειας ην εκ μεντοι ταύτης εγενετ εκείνη
1 χρηματιστικής] μεταβλητική? Bernays.
2 πλειόνων Richards : πλείονος codd.
3 αυτών Immisch : αυτών codd.
4 κεχωρισμένων Immisch.
6 άνα-γκαΐον <$ν> Coraes.
POLITICS, I. in. 11-13
as an article of exchange ; for both are ways of using
a shoe, inasmuch as even he that barters a shoe for
money or food with the customer that wants a shoe
uses it as a shoe, though not for the use proper to a
shoe, since shoes have not come into existence for
the purpose of barter. And the same also holds good
about the other articles of property ; for all of them
have a use in exchange related to them, which began
in the first instance from the natural order of things,
because men had more than enough of some things
12 and less than enough of others. This consideration
also shows that the art of trade is not by nature a
part of the art of wealth-getting α ; for the practice
of barter was necessary only so far as to satisfy
men's own needs. In the primary association there-
fore (I mean the household) there is no function for
trade, but it only arises after the association has
become more numerous. For the members of the
primitive household used to share commodities that
were all their own, whereas on the contrary a group
divided into several households participated also in
a number of commodities belonging to their neigh-
bours, according to their needs for which they were
forced to make their interchanges by way of barter,
as also many barbarian tribes do still ; for such tribes
do not go beyond exchanging actual commodities for
actual commodities, for example giving and taking
wine for corn, and so with the various other things
13 of the sort. Exchange on these lines therefore is not
contrary to nature, nor is it any branch of the art of
wealth-getting, for it existed for the replenishment of
natural self-sufficiency ; yet out of it the art of business
β Perhaps Aristotle wrote ' of the art of exchange ' : see
note 1 on opposite page.
c 41
ARISTOTLE
1267a f ■
κατά Aoyov. ξενικωτερας γαρ γ€νομ€νης της
βοηθείας τω είσάγεσθαι ών ενδεείς και εκπεμπειν
ών επλεόναζον, εζ ανάγκης η του νομίσματος
επορίσθη χρησις. ου γαρ εύβάστακτον εκαστον
35 των κατά φύσιν αναγκαίων διό προς τάς aAAayas - 14
τοιούτον τι συνεθεντο προς σφάς αυτούς διδόναι
καΐ λαμβάνειν δ των χρησίμων αυτό δν είχε την
χρείαν εύμεταχείριστον προς το ζην, οίον σίδηρος
και άργυρος καν ει τι τοιούτον έτερον, το μεν πρώ-
τον απλώς ορισθέν μεγεθει και σταθμώ, το δέ
40 τελευταΐον και χαρακτήρα επιβαλλόντων ίνα από-
λυση της μετρήσεως αυτούς' 6 γαρ χαράκτη ρ
1257 b ετέθη του ποσού σημεΐον. πορισθεντος ουν ηδη 15
νομίσματος εκ της αναγκαίας aAAayrJ? θατερον
είδος της χρηματιστικής εγενετο, το καπηλικον,
τό μεν πρώτον απλώς ίσως γινόμενον, είτα δι'
εμπειρίας ηδη τεχνικώτερον, πόθεν και πώς μετα-
5 βαλλόμενον πλείστον ποιήσει κέρδος, διό δοκεΐ
ή χρηματιστική μάλιστα περί τό νό/ζισ/Αα eimi,
και έργον αύτης τό δυνασ^αι θεωρησαι πόθεν
εσται πλήθος, 2 ποιητική γαρ 3 είναι πλούτου* και
χρημάτων και γαρ τον πλοΰτον πολλάκις τιθεασι 16
νομίσματος πλήθος, δια τό περί τοϋτ eirai την
10 χρηματιστικην και την καπηλικήν. ότε δε πάλιν
ληρος είναι δοκεΐ τό νό/χισ/χα, και νόμος παντάπασι
φύσει δ' ούθεν, ότι μεταθεμένων τε τών χρωμενων
ούθενός άξιον, ούτε χρησιμον προς ουδέν τών
1 ^νομένητ Coraes : •γινομένη'; codd.
* πλήθος χρημάτων codd. : gloss, excisit Gifanius : πλήθοτ
αύτοΰ ? Richards•
* yap : δ' Bernays. * πλούτου Μ, τον πλούτου cet.
42
POLITICS, I. in. 13-16
in due course arose. For when they had come to supply
themselves more from abroad by importing things in
which they were deficient and exporting those of
which they had a surplus, the employment of money
necessarily came to be devised. For the natural
necessaries are not in every case readily portable ;
14 hence for the purpose of barter men made a Money,
mutual compact to give and accept some substance f^"^*
of such a sort as being itself a useful commodity exchange,
was easy to handle in use for general life, iron commerce.
for instance, silver and other metals, at the first
stage defined merely by size and weight, but finally
also by impressing on it a stamp in order that this
might relieve them of having to measure it ; for the
15 stamp was put on as a token of the amount. So
when currency had been now invented as an outcome
of the necessary interchange of goods, there came
into existence the other form of wealth -getting,
trade, which at first no doubt went on in a simple
form, but later became more highly organized as
experience discovered the sources and methods of
exchange that would cause most profit. Hence
arises the idea that the art of wealth-getting deals
specially with money, and that its function is to be
able to discern from what source a large supply can
be procured, as this art is supposed to be creative of
16 wealth and riches ; indeed wealth is often assumed to
consist of a quantity of money, because monev is the
thing with which business and trade are employed. Natural
But at other times, on the contrary, it is thought that u^id to
:h~
money is nonsense, and entirely a convention but by needs ? f
nature nothing, because when those who use it have (not bodily
changed the currency it is worth nothing, and because enjoyme 114 )•
it is of no use for any of the necessary needs of life
43
ARISTOTLE
αναγκαίων can και νομίσματος πλούτων πολ-
λάκις απόρησα της αναγκαίας τροφής, καίτοι
15 άτοπον τοιούτον eirai πλοΰτον ου εύπορων Χιμώ
άπολεΐται, καθάπερ και τον Μιδαι> εκείνον μνθο-
λογοΰσι διά τ?)ν άπληστίαν της ευχής πάντων αυτώ
γιγνομενων των παρατιθεμενων χρυσών, διό ζη- 17
τοΰσιν έτερον τι τον πλοΰτον και την χρηματιστικην ,
ορθώς ζητοΰντες• εστί γαρ έτερα ή χρηματιστική
20 και 6 πλούτος ο κατά φύσιν, και αυτή μεν
οικονομική, ή δε καπηλική, ποιητική πλούτου
ου πάντως άλλα 2 δια χρημάτων μεταβολής• και
οοκεΐ περί το νόμισμα αϋτη eirai, το γαρ νόαισ/χα
στοιχεΐον και πέρας τής άλλα•)/^? εστίν. και
άπειρος δη ούτος 6 πλούτος ο από ταύτης τής
25 χρηματιστικής• ώσπερ γαρ ή ιατρική τού ύγιαινειν
εις άπειρον εστί και εκάστη τών τεχνών τού τέλους
εις άπειρον (ότι μάλιστα γαρ εκείνο βούλονται
ποιεΐν), τών δέ προς το τέλος ουκ εις άπειρον
(πέρας γαρ το τέλος πάσαι?), ούτω και ταύτης
τής χρηματιστικής ουκ εστί τού τέλους πέρας,
30 τέλος δε 6 τοιούτος πλούτος και χρημάτων κτήσις.
τής δ' οικονομικής χρηματιστικής 3 εστί πέρας• ου 18
γαρ τούτο τής οικονομικής έργον, διό τή μεν
φαίνεται άναγκαΐον είναι παντός πλούτου πέρας,
επι 8ε τών γινομένων όρώμεν* συμβαίνον τού-
1 Richards : χρημάτων codd. 2 Richards : άλλ' ή codd.
8 χρηματιστικής Bojesen : οΰ χρ. codd., αΰ χρ. Bernays.
4 όρΖμαν Sylburg : δρω codd.
e.g. on a desert island.
b i.e. a trader cannot get too much of his goods, any more
than a doctor can make his patient too healthy.
44*
POLITICS, I. in. 16-18
and a man well supplied with money may often a be
destitute of the bare necessities of subsistence, yet
it is absurd that wealth should be of such a kind
that a man may be well supplied 'with it and yet
die of hunger, like the famous Midas in the storv,
when owing to the insatiable covetousness of his
prayer all the viands served up to him turned into
17 gold. Hence people seek for a different definition
of riches and the art of getting wealth, and rightly ;
for natural wealth-getting and natural riches are
different : natural wealth-getting belongs to house-
hold management, whereas the other kind belongs
to trade, producing wealth not indiscriminately but
by the method of exchanging goods. It is this art
of wealth-getting that is thought to be concerned
with money, for money is the first element and limit
of commerce. And these riches, that are derived
from this art of wealth-getting, are truly unlimited b ;
for just as the art of medicine is without limit in
respect of health, and each of the arts is without
limit in respect of its end (for they desire to produce
that in the highest degree possible), whereas they
are not without limit as regards the means to their
end (for with all of them the end is a limit to
the means), so also this wealth-getting has no limit
in respect of its end, and its end is riches and the
18 acquisition of goods in the commercial sense. But
the household branch of wealth-getting has a
limit, inasmuch as the acquisition of money is not
the function of household management. Hence
from this point of view it appears necessary that there
should be a limit to all riches, yet in actual fact
we observe that the opposite takes place ; for all
45
ARISTOTLE
πάντες γάρ εις άπειρον αύζουσιν οί
35 χρηματιζόμενοι το νόμισμα, αίτιον δέ το σύνεγγυς
αυτών, επαλλάττει γαρ ή χρήσις του αύτοϋ ούσα
εκατερας 1 τής χρηματιστικής• της γαρ αυτής εστί
κτήσεως χρήσις, 2 αλλ' ου κατά ταύτόν, άλλα της
μεν έτερον τέλος, της δ' η αύ'^σι?. ώστε So κει
τισι τοΰτ* ει^αι της οικονομικής έργον, και δια-
40 τελοΰσιν ή σωζειν οΐόμενοι δεΐν ή αύ'^ειν την του
νομίσματος ούσίαν εις άπειρον, αίτιον δέ ταύτης \q
της διαθέσεως το σπουδάζειν περί το ζήν άλλα
1258 a Ζ-"? το € ν ζή ν ' e 'S" άπειρον οΰν εκείνης τής επιθυμίας
ούσης, και των ποιητικών απείρων επιθυμοΰσιν.
όσοι δέ και του ευ ζήν επιβάλλονται, το προς τάς
απολαύσεις τάς σωματικάς ζητοΰσιν, ώστ' ε'πει
5 και τοΰτ εν τή κτήσει φαίνεται ύπάρχειν* πάσα
ή διατριβή περί τον χρηματισμόν εστί, και το
έτερον είδος τής χρηματιστικής διά τοΰτ ελήλυθεν.
εν υπερβολή γάρ ούσης τής άπολαύσεως , την τής
απολαυστικής υπερβολής ποιητικήν ζητοΰσιν καν
μη διά τής χρηματιστικής δύνωνται πορίζειν, δι'
10 άλλης αιτίας τοϋτο πειρώνται, εκάστη χρώμενοι
τών δυνάμεων ου κατά φύσιν. ανδρείας γάρ ου 20
χρήματα ποιεΐν εστίν άλλα θάρσος, ουδέ στρα-
τηγικής και ιατρικής, αλλά τής μεν νίκην τής δ'
υ^ιειαν. οί δέ πάσας ποιοΰσι χρηματιστικάς, ως
1 έκατέρας Ar. : -τέρα cett.
2 κτήσεως χρήσις Goettling : χρήσεως κτήσις codd.
3 υπάρχον Coraes.
46
POLITICS, I. in. 18-20
men engaged in wealth-getting try to increase their
money to an unlimited amount. The reason of this
is the close affinity of the two branches of the art of
business. Their common ground is that the thing
that each makes use of is the same ; they use the
same property, although not in the same way — the
one has another end in view, the aim of the other
is the increase of the property. Consequently some
people suppose that it is the function of household
management to increase property, and they are
continually under the idea that it is their duty to
be either safeguarding their substance in money or
19 increasing it to an unlimited amount. The cause of
this state of mind is that their interests are set upon
life but not upon the good life ; as therefore the
desire for life is unlimited, they also desire without
limit the means productive of life. And even those
who fix their aim on the good life seek the good life
as measured by bodily enjoyments, so that inasmuch
as this also seems to be found in the possession of
property, all their energies are occupied in the
business of getting wealth ; and owing to this the
second kind of the art of wealth-getting has arisen.
For as their enjoyment is in excess, they try to dis-
cover the art that is productive of enjoyable excess ;
and if they cannot procure it by the art of wealth-
getting, they try to do so by some other means,
employing each of the faculties in an unnatural way.
20 For it is not the function of courage to produce wealth,
but to inspire daring ; nor is it the function of the
military art nor of the medical art, but it belongs to
the former to bring victory and to the latter to cause
health. Yet these people make all these faculties
means for the business of providing wealth, in the
47
ARISTOTLE
1258 a
τοΰτο τέλος ov, προς δε το τέλος άπαντα Seov
άπαντάν.
16 Περί μεν ούν της τε μή αναγκαίας χρηματιστικής ,
και τις και δι' αίτίαν nVa εν χρεία, εσμεν αυτής,
εΐρηται, και περί της αναγκαίας, οτι έτερα μεν
αυτής οικονομική οε κατά φύσιν η περί την
τροφήν, ούχ ώσπερ αϋτη 1 άπειρος αλλ' έχουσα
ορον.
Αήλον δε και το άπορούμενον εζ αρχής, πότερον 21
20 του οικονομικού και πολιτικού εστίν η χρημα-
τιστική ή ου, αλλά δει τοΰτο μεν ύπάρχειν (ώσπερ
γάρ και ανθρώπους ου ποιεί ή πολιτική αλλά
λαβοΰσα παρά τής φύσεως χρήται αύτοΐς, οΰτω και
τροφήν* τήν φύσιν δει παραδοΰναι γήν ή θάλατ-
25 ταν ή άλλο τι), εκ δε τούτων ως δει ταύτα οιαθεΐναι
προσήκει τον οικονόμον. ου γάρ τής υφαντικής
ερια ποιήσαι αλλά χρήσασθαι αύτοΐς, και yvcwai
δε το ποιον χρηστόν και επιτήοειον ή φαΰλον και
άνεπιτήδειον. και γάρ άπορήσειεν αν τις δια τι 22
ή μεν χρηματιστική μόριον τής οικονομίας η δ
80 ιατρική ού μόριον, καίτοι δει ύγιαίνειν τους κατά
τήν οίκίαν, ώσπερ ζήν ή άλλο τι των αναγκαίων,
επει δ' εστί μεν ως τοΰ οικονόμου και τοϋ άρχοντος
και περί ύγιείας ιδείν, εστί 3 δ' ως ου, αλλά τοΰ
Ιατρού, ούτω και περί των χρημάτων εστί μεν ως
1 αϋτη Welldon : αυτί; codd.
1 <7r/)os> τροφην ? Richards. 3 <βστίν,> ίστι Welldon.
α See c. iii. § 1.
48
47
POLITICS, Ι. πι. 20-22
belief that wealth is the end and that everything
must conspire to the end.
We have therefore discussed both the unneces-
sary branch of wealth-getting, denning it and also
explaining the cause why we require it, and the
necessary branch, showing that this branch which
has to do with food is different from the unnecessary
branch and is by nature a part of household manage-
ment, not being like that branch unlimited but
having a limit.
21 And we can also see the answer to the question Natural
raised at the beginning, whether the art of wealth- n e " s e '" S a S r s y a
getting belongs to the householder and the states- subsidiary
man, or whether on the contrary supplies ought to °oid° USe "
be provided already, since just as statesmanship does Manage-
not create human beings but having received
them from nature makes use of them, so also it is
the business of nature to bestow food by bestowing
land or sea or something else, while the task of the
householder is, starting with these supplies given, to
dispose of them in the proper way. For it does not
belong to the art of weaving to make fleeces, but to
use them, and also to know what sort of fleece is good
22 and suitable or bad and unsuitable. Otherwise the
question might be raised, why the getting of wealth
is a part of the household art whereas the art of
medicine is not a part of it, although the members
of the household ought to be healthy, just as they
must be alive or fulfil any of the other essential
conditions. But inasmuch as although in a way it
does belong to the householder and the ruler to see
even to health, yet in a way it does not belong to
them but to the physician, so also with regard to
wealth, although in a way it is the affair of the house-
49
ARISTOTLE
1258 a Λ , , νΐϊ>» » >\\ \ ~ t
του οικονόμου, εστί ο ως ου, αΛΛα της υπηρετικής.
85 μάλιστα δε, καθάπερ εΐρηται πρότερον, δει φύσει
τοΰτο ύπάρχειν. φύσεως γάρ εστίν έργον τροφην
τω γεννηθεντι παρεχειν παντι γάρ, εξ ού γίνεται,
τροφή το λειπόμενόν εστίν, διό κατά φυσιν εστίν
η χρηματιστική πάσιν από των καρπών και των
ζωών.
Αιπλής δ' ούσης αυτής, ώσπερ εΐπομεν, και της 23
40 μεν καπηλικής της δ* οικονομικής, και ταύτης μεν
1258 b αναγκαίας και επαινουμενης, της δε μεταβλητικής
φεγομενης δικαίως (ού γάρ κατά φύσιν αλλ απ
αλλ^λω^ εστίν), εύλογώτατα μισείται η όβολο-
στατικη δια το απ' 2 αύτοϋ του νομίσματος eimi
την κτησιν και ούκ εφ* όπερ επορισθη• μεταβολής
β γάρ εγενετο χάριν, 6 δε τόκος αυτό ποιεί πλέον
(όθεν και τούνομα τοΰτ είληφεν όμοια γάρ τά
τικτόμενα τοις γεννώσιν αυτά εστίν, 6 δε τόκος
γίνεται νό/χισ//.α εκ νομίσματος)• ώστε και μά-
λιστα παρά φύσιν ούτος των χρηματισμών εστίν.
IV. Έπεί δε τά προς την γνώσιν διωρίκαμεν 1
10 ίκανώς, τά προς την χρησιν δει διελθεΐν πάντα δε
τά τοιαύτα την μεν θεωριαν ελεύθερον έχει, την δ'
εμπειρίαν άναγκαίαν. εστί δε της χρηματιστικής
μέρη χρήσιμα το περί τά κτήματα 3 εμπειρον είναι,
ποια λυσιτελεστατα και πού και πώς, οΐον ίππων
κτήσις ποία τις η βοών η προβάτων, ομοίως δε
1 <έστίν,•> ίστι Welldon.
1 ύπ' Bekker : έπ Jackson. 3 κτήνη Bernays.
α i.e. animals are made of earth and water and live on the
products of earth and water.
50
POLITICS, I. in. 22— iv. 1
holder, in a way it is not, but is a matter for the
subsidiary art. But best of all, as has been said
before, this provision ought to be made in advance
by nature. For it is the work of nature to supply
nourishment for her offspring, since every creature
has for nourishment the residue of the substance
from which it springs. Hence the business of draw-
ing provision from the fruits of the soil and from
animals is natural to all.
23 But, as we said, this art is twofold, one branch Trade
being of the nature of trade while the other belongs ^g^j .
to the household art ; and the latter branch is Usury
necessary and in good esteem, but the branch con- unna
nected with exchange is justly discredited (for it is
not in accordance with nature, but involves men's
taking things from one another). As this is so, usury
is most reasonably hated, because its gain comes from
money itself and not from that for the sake of which
money was invented. For money was brought into
existence for the purpose of exchange, but interest
increases the amount of the money itself (and this
is the actual origin of the Greek word : offspring re-
sembles parent, and interest is money born of money) ;
consequently this form of the business of getting
wealth is of all forms the most contrary to nature.
1 IV. And since we have adequately defined the Outline of
scientific side of the subject, we ought to discuss it fr^Yse on
from the point of view of practice ; although, whereas Trade:
the theory of such matters is a liberal study, the
practical pursuit of them is narrowing. The practi-
cally useful branches of the art of wealth-getting are
first, an expert knowledge of stock, what breeds are
most profitable and in what localities and under what
conditions, for instance what particular stock in
51
ARISTOTLE
1258b , Λ ν ,.,.,, s „ xw r ,
15 και των λοιπών ί,ωων [οει γαρ εμπειρον είναι προς
άλληλα τε τούτων τίνα λυσιτελεστατα, και ποία εν
ποίοις τόποις, άλλα γαρ iv άλλαις εύθηνεΐ χώραις)•
είτα π€ρί γεωργίας, και ταύτης ηδη φίλης τ€ και
πεφυτευμενης, και μελιττουργίας, και των άλλων
20 ζώων των πλωτών η πτηνών αφ* όσων εστί τνγ-
χάνειν βοηθείας, της μεν ονν οίκειοτάτης χρη- 2
ματιστικής ταύτα μόρια και πρώτα 1 • της δε μετα-
βλητικης μεγιστον μεν εμπορία (και ταύτης μέρη
τρία, ναυκληρία φορτηγία παράστασις' διαφέρει 6ε
τούτων έτερα έτερων τω τα μεν ασφαλέστερα eimi
25 τα δε πλείω πορίζειν την επικαρπίαν) , δεύτερον δε
τοκισμός, τρίτον δε μισθαρνία (ταύτης δ η μεν
τών βάναυσων τεχνών, 2 η δέ τών άτεχνων και τω
=^ σώματι μόνω χρησίμων)• τρίτον δε είδος χρημα-
τιστικής μεταξύ ταύτης και της πρώτης (έχει γαρ
και της κατά φύσιν τι μέρος και της μεταβλητικης) ,
30 ό'σα 3 άπο γης και τών άπο γης γινομένων άκαρπων
μεν χρησίμων δε, οΐον υλοτομία* τε και πάσα
μεταλλευτική• αύτη δε πολλά ηδη περιείληφε γένη,
πολλά γάρ είδη τών εκ γης μεταλλευο μένων εστίν,
είσι δε* τεχνικώταται μεν τών εργασιών οπού 3
ελάχιστον της τύχης, βαναυσόταται δ' ev af? τα
1 πρώτης (cf. 25) ? Richards. 2 τεχνιτών Vermehren.
3 οΐισα Bernays. * ή λατομία Thomas Aquinas.
s eiai oe — aperrjs post 39 ΐνδιατρίβειν codd. : tr. (et 33 δη
pro 5e) Montecatino auctore Susemihl.
a βάναυσος (said to be from βαΰνοτ ' furnace,' αϋω ' to dry '),
' artisan ' (ranged with farmers, traders, and labourers, as
forming the common people 1321 a 6) ; it acquires the senses
of 'cramped in body' (1341 a 7) and 'vulgar in taste'
(1337 b 8).
6 A very probable variant gives ' the quarrying of stone.'
52
POLITICS, I. iv. 1-3
horses or cattle or sheep, and similarly of the other
animals also (for the farmer must be an expert as to
which of these animals are most profitable compared
with one another, and also as to what breeds are most
profitable on what sorts of land, since different breeds
thrive in different places) ; secondly, the subject
of agriculture, and this again is divided into corn-
growing and fruit-farming ; also bee-keeping, and
the breeding of the other creatures finned and
feathered which can be used to furnish supplies.
2 These then are the branches and primary parts of its three
wealth-getting in the most proper sense. Of the ranchei
kind that deals with exchange, the largest branch
is commerce (which has three departments, ship-
owning, transport and marketing : these depart-
ments differ from each other in the fact that some
are safer and others carry larger profits) ; the second
branch is money-lending, and the third labour for
hire, one department of which is that of the mechanic"
arts and the other that of unskilled labourers who
are useful only for bodily service. And there is a Quarries
third form of wealth-getting that lies between the anlnter"
latter and the one placed first, since it possesses mediate
an element both of natural wealth-getting and of
the sort that employs exchange ; it deals with all
the commodities that are obtained from the earth
and from those fruitless but useful things that come
from the earth — examples are the felling of timber b
and all sorts of mining ; and of mining itself there are
many classes, since there are many sorts of metals
3 obtained out of the earth. The c most scientific of
these industries are those which involve the smallest
element of chance, the most mechanic those in which
e In the mss. this sentence follows the next one.
53
ARISTOTLE
1258 b
35 σώματα λωβώνται μάλιστα, δουλικώταται 8ε δπου
του σώματος πλεΐσται χρήσεις, άγεννεσταται δέ
δπου ελάχιστον προσ8εΐ αρετής, περί εκάστου δε
τούτων καθόλου μεν εΐρηται και νυν, το 8ε κατά
μέρος άκριβολογεΐσθαι χρήσιμον μεν προς τάς ερ-
γασίας, φορτικδν δε το ενδιατρίβειν. επει δ' εστίν 4
40 ενίοις γεγραμμενα περί τούτων, οίον ΧαρητίΒγ) τω
1259a Παριω και Απολλο8ώρω τω Αημνίω περί γεωρ-
γίας και φίλης και πεφυτευμενης , ομοίως 8ε και
άλλοις περί άλλων, ταΰτα μεν εκ τούτων θεωρείτω
δτω επιμελές' ετι δε και τα λεγόμενα σπορά8ην
6 δι' ων επιτετυχήκασιν ενιοι χρηματιζόμενοι 8εΐ
συλλεγειν πάντα γαρ ωφέλιμα ταΰτ* εστί τοις
τιμώσι την χρηματιστικήν, οίον καΐ το θάλεω του 5
Μιλησίου• τοΰτο γάρ εστί κατανόημά τι χρημα-
τιστικόν, αλλ' εκείνω μεν 8ιά την σοφίαν προσ-
άπτουσι, τυγχάνει δε καθόλου τι 6ν. όνει8ιζόντων
ίο γάρ αύτώ δια την πενίαν ως ανωφελούς της
φιλοσοφίας ούσης, κατανοήσαντά φασιν αυτόν
ελαίων φοράν εσομενην εκ της αστρολογίας ετι
χειμώνος οντος, εύπορησαντα χρημάτων ολίγων
αρραβώνας 8ια8οΰναι τών ελαιουργίων τών τ' εν
Μιλτ^τω και Χι'ω πάντων, ολίγου μισθωσάμενον άτ
15 ούθενός επιβάλλοντος' επει8ή 8 ό καιρός ήκε,
πολλών ζητουμένων άμα και εξαίφνης, εκμισθοΰντα
δν τρόπον ήβούλετο πολλά χρήματα συλλεζαντα,
• Otherwise unknown.
* Also mentioned by Varro and Pliny.
c The author of the Second Book of the pseudo-Aristotelian
Oeconomica seems to have taken this hint.
d The founder of Greek philosophy and mathematics,
and one of the Seven Sages, 6th-5th cent. b.c.
54
POLITICS, I. iv. 3-5
the operatives undergo the greatest amount of bodily
degradation, the most servile those in which the most
uses are made of the body, and the most ignoble
those in which there is the least requirement of virtue
as an accessory. But while we have even now given
a general description of these various branches, yet
a detailed and particular account of them, though
useful for the practice of the industries, would be
4 illiberal as a subject of prolonged study. There are other
books on these subjects by certain authors, for industries!
example Charetides a of Paros and Apollodorus b of
Lemnos have written about both agriculture and fruit-
farming, and similarly others also on other topics,
so these subjects may be studied from these authors
by anybody concerned to do so ; but in addition a
collection ought also to be made c of the scattered
accounts of methods that have brought success in
business to certain individuals. All these methods
are serviceable for those who value wealth-getting, Thaies and
5 for example the plan of Thaies d of Miletus, which is a Mon °P° 1 y•
device for the business of getting wealth, but which,
though it is attributed to him because of his wisdom,
is really of universal application. Thaies, so the
story goes, because of his poverty was taunted with
the uselessness of philosophy ; but from his knowledge
of astronomy he had observed while it was still winter
that there was going to be a large crop of olives,
so he raised a small sum of money and paid round
deposits for the whole of the olive-presses in Miletus
and Chios, which he hired at a low rent as nobody
was running him up ; and when the season arrived,
there was a sudden demand for a number of presses
at the same time, and by letting them out on
what terms he liked he realized a large sum of
55
ARISTOTLE
1259 a
επιδεΐζαι ότι ράδιόν εστί πλοντίΐν τοις φιλοσόφοις
αν βούλωνται, αλλ' ου τοΰτ εστί περί δ σπουδά-
ζουσιν. Θαλής μεν οΰν λέγεται τούτον τον τρόπον 6
επίδειζιν ποιήσασθαι της σοφίας• έστι δ' ωσπερ
20 ε'ιπομεν, καθόλου το τοιούτον χρηματιστικόν, εάν
τις δύνηται μονοπωλίαν αύτω κατασκευάζειν διό
και των πόλεων ένιαι τούτον ποιούνται τον πόρον
όταν απορώσι χρημάτων, μονοπωλίαν γαρ των
ώνίων ποιοΰσιν. εν Σικελία δε τι? τεθέντος παρ' 7
αύτω νομίσματος συνεπρίατο πάντα τον σίδηρον εκ
25 των σιδηρείων, μετά δε ταΰτα ως άφίκοντο εκ των
εμπορίων οι έμποροι, επώλει μόνος, ου πολλην
ποιησας ύπερβολην της τιμής, αλλ' όμως επι τοις
30 πεντήκοντα ταλάντοις επελαβεν εκατόν, τοΰτο μεν 8
οΰν ο Διονύσιο? αισθόμ,ενος τά μεν χρήματα εκε-
λευσεν εκκομίσασθαι, μη μεντοι γ έτι μενειν εν
Σ,υρακούσαις , ώς πόρους εύρίσκοντα τοις αύτοΰ 1
πράγμασιν ασύμφορους, το μεντοι όραμα 2 θάλεω
και τοΰτο 3 ταύτόν εστίν αμφότεροι γαρ εαυτοΐς
35 ετεχνασαν yei^eV^ai μονοπωλίαν. χρήσιμον δε γνω-
ρίζειν ταΰτα και τοις πολιτικοΐς• πολλαΐς γαρ
πόλεσι δει χρηματισμού και τοιούτων πόρων, ωσπερ
οικία, μάλλον δέ• διοπερ τίνες και πολιτεύονται
των πολιτευόμενων ταΰτα μόνον.
V. Έπει δε τρία μέρη της οικονομικής ην, εν 1
μεν δεσποτική, περί ης εΐρηται πρότερον, εν δε
πατρική, τρίτον δε γαμική* — και γαρ γυναικός
1 αντον Susemihl : αύτοΰ codd.
2 ενρημα, θεώρημα, δράμα edd.
* θάλ-η καΐ τούτω Γ. * lacunam Conring.
α The talent was about £240.
6 Dionysius the elder, tyrant of Syracuse 405-367 b.c.
Cf. Thucydides οι δ' ούκέτι έμειναν άλλα . . .
56
POLITICS, Ι. ιν. δ— v. 1
money, so proving that it is easy for philosophers
to be rich if they choose, but this is not what they
6 care about. Thales then is reported to have thus
displayed his wisdom, but as a matter of fact this Government
device of taking an opportunity to secure a monopoly mono P oUes -
is a universal principle of business ; hence even
some states have recourse to this plan as a method
of raising revenue when short of funds : they intro-
7 duce a monopoly of marketable goods. There was a
man in Sicily who used a sum of money deposited with
him to buy up all the iron from the iron foundries,
and afterwards when the dealers came from the
trading-centres he was the only seller, though he
did not greatly raise the price, but all the same he
made a profit of a hundred talents α on his capital
8 of fifty. When Dionysius b came to know of it he
ordered the man to take his money with him but clear
out of Syracuse on the spot, c since he was inventing
means of profit detrimental to the tvrant's own
affairs. Yet really this device is the same as the
discovery of Thales, for both men alike contrived
to secure themselves a monopoly. An acquaintance
with these devices is also serviceable for statesmen, for
many states need financial aid and modes of revenue
like those described, just as a household may, but
in greater degree ; hence some statesmen even
devote their political activity exclusively to finance.
1 y. And since, as we saw,** the science of household The
management has three divisions, one the relation of h HL sband ' s
master to slave, of which we have spoken before,' one political,
the paternal relation, and the third the conjugal' — royjd- ther '*
d C. ii. init. • C. iii. ./?«., iv.
' The construction of the sentence is interrupted, and never
completed.
57
ARISTOTLE
1259 a .
40 άρχειν και τέκνων (ως ελευθέρων μεν άμφοΐν, ου 2
1259 b τον αυτόν δε τρόπον της αρχής, αλλά γυναικός μεν
πολιτικώς, τέκνων δε βασιλικώς)' τό τε γαρ άρρεν
φύσει του θήλεος ήγεμονικώτερον (ει μη που συν-
εστηκε πάρα φύσιν) και τό πρεσβύτερον και τελειον
του νεωτέρου και ατελούς, εν μεν ουν ταϊς πολι-
5 τικαΐς άρχαΐς τοις πλείσταις μεταβάλλει τό άρχον
και το άρχόμενον (εξ 'ίσου γαρ είναι βούλεται την
φύσιν και οιαφερειν μηθεν), όμως 8ε όταν τό μεν
άρχη το δ άρχηται ζητεί διαφοράν είναι και
σχήμασι και λόγοις και τιμαίςί ώσπερ και "Αμ,ασι?
είπε τον περί του ποδανιπτήρος λόγον το δ' άρρεν
ίο aet προς τό θήλυ τούτον έχει τον τρόπον, η δέ
των τέκνων αρχή βασιλική• τό γαρ γέννησαν και
κατά. φιλιαν άρχον και κατά πρεσβε'ιαν εστίν, όπερ
εστί βασιλικής είδος αρχής (διό καλώς "Ομηρος
τον Δια προσηγόρευσεν ειπών
πατήρ ανδρών τε θεών τε
15 τον βασιλέα τούτων απάντων) . φύσει γάρ τον
)8ασιλβα διαφερειν μεν δει, τω γένει δ' eimi τον
αύτον όπερ πεπονθε τό πρεσβύτερον προς τό
νεώτερον και 6 γεννήσας προς τό τεκνον.
Φανερόν τοίνυν ότι πλείων ή σπουδή τής οίκο- 3
νομιας περί τους ανθρώπους ή περί τήν τών άφύχων
SO κτήσιν και περί τήν άρετήν τούτων ή περί τήν
τής κτήσεως, ον καλοΰμεν πλοΰτον, και τών
ελευθέρων μάλλον ή δούλων.
" i.e. of the free and equal, 1255 b 20.
* Herodotus ii. 1 72. Amasis king of Egypt was despised
by his subjects for his low birth, so he had a statue made out
of a gold foot-bath and set it up for them to worship, after-
wards explaining to them its lowly origin. c II. i. '< It.
58
POLITICS, I. v. 1-3
for it is a part of the household science to rule over
2 wife and children (over both as over freemen, yet not
with the same mode of government, but over the
wife to exercise republican government and over the
children monarchical) ; for the male is by nature better
fitted to command than the female (except in some
cases where their union has been formed contrarv to
nature) and the older and fully developed person than
the younger and immature. It is true that in most
cases of republican government the ruler and the
ruled interchange in turn (for they tend to be on
an equal level in their nature and to have no difference
at all), although nevertheless during the period when
one is ruler and the other ruled they seek to have
a distinction by means of insignia and titles and
honours, just as Amasis made his speech about the
foot-bath b ; but the male stands in this relationship
to the female continuously. The rule of the father
over the children on the other hand is that of a king ;
for the male parent is the ruler in virtue both of
affection and of seniority, which is characteristic
of royal government (and therefore Homer c finely
designated Zeus by the words ' father of men and
gods,' as the king of them all). For though in nature
the king must be superior, in race he should be the
same as his subjects, and this is the position of the
elder in relation to the younger and of the father in
relation to the child.
3 It is clear then that household management takes and more
more interest in the human members of the household "h^"* 111 '
than in its inanimate property, and in the excellence ownership
of these than in that of its property, which we style ° g
riches, and more in that of its free members than in
that of slaves.
59
ARISTOTLE
1259 b . , . - .
ΙΙρώτον /xev ow 7repi δούλων άπορήσειεν άν τις,
πότερόν εστίν αρετή τις δούλου παρά τάς όργανικάς
και διαΚονικας άλλη τιμιωτερα τούτων, οίον
σωφροσύνη και ανδρεία και δικαιοσύνη και 1 των
25 αλλω^ των τοιούτων έ'ζεων, ή ουκ εστίν ουδεμία
παρά τάς σωματικάς υπηρεσίας, έχει γάρ άπορίαν
άμφοτερως. ε'ίτε γάρ εστί, τί διοίσουσι των ελευ-
θέρων; εΐτε μη εστίν, όντων ανθρώπων και λόγου
κοινωνούντων άτοπον, σχεδόν δέ ταύτόν εστί το 4
so ζητούμενον και περί γυναικός και τταιδό?, πότερα
και τούτων είσιν αρεταί, και δει την γυναίκα eirai
σώφρονα και άνδρείαν και δικαίαν, και 7ταί? εστί
και ακόλαστος και σώφρων, η ου; και καθόλου
δη τούτ εστίν επισκεπτεον περί αρχομένου φύσει
και άρχοντος, πότερον η αύτη αρετή ή έτερα, ει
35 μεν γάρ δει αμφότερους μετεχειν καλοκαγαθίας,
διά τί τον μεν άρχειν δεοι άν τον δε άρχεσθαι
καθάπαζ ; ουδέ γάρ τω μάλλον και ήττον οΐόν τε
διαφερειν το μεν γάρ άρχεσθαι και άρχειν εΐδει
διαφέρει, το δε μάλλον και ήττον ούδεν. ει δέ τον 5
μέν δει τον δέ μή, θαυμαστόν ε'ίτε γάρ ό άρχων
40 μή εσται σώφρων και δίκαιος, πώς άρζει καλώς ;
1260 a ε'ίθ' ο αρχόμενος, πώς άρχθήσεται καλώς; ακό-
λαστος γάρ ων και δειλό? ούθέν ποιήσει τών
προσηκόντων. φανερόν τοίνυν ότι ανάγκη μέν
μετεχειν αμφότερους αρετής, ταύτης δ' είναι
διαφοράς (ώσπερ και τών φύσει αρχομένων).*
1 και <έκάστη> ? Spengel.
2 ώσπερ — αρχομένων interpolatum ed. (φύσει αρχόντων καϊ
αρχομένων cod. Oxon. marg.).
° Καλοκά-γαθος, ' fine gentleman,' connotes social as well as
moral distinction.
60
POLITICS, I. v. 3-5
First of all then as to slaves the difficulty might His
be raised, does a slave possess any other excellence, ^"ave^— '
besides his merits as a tool and a servant, more w ^ e d and _
valuable than these, for instance temperance, have their
courage, justice and any of the other moral virtues, owllvirtue *
or has he no excellence beside his bodily service ?
For either way there is difficulty ; if slaves do possess
moral virtue, wherein will they differ from freemen ?
or if they do not. this is strange, as they are human
4 beings and participate in reason. And nearly the
same is the question also raised about the woman and
the child : have they too virtues, and ought a woman
to be temperate, brave and just, and can a child
be intemperate or temperate, or not ? This point
therefore requires general consideration in relation
to natural ruler and subject: is virtue the same for
ruler and ruled, or different ? If it is proper for both
to partake in nobility of character, how could it be
proper for the one to rule and the other to be ruled
unconditionally ? we cannot say that the difference
is to be one of degree, for ruling and being ruled
differ in kind, and difference of degree is not a differ-
δ ence in kind at all. Whereas if on the contrarv it is
proper for the one to have moral nobility but not
for the other, this is surprising. For if the ruler is
not temperate and just, how will he rule well ? And
if the ruled, how will he obey well ? If intemperate
and cowardly he will not perform any of the duties
of his position. It is evident therefore that both
must possess virtue, but that there are differences in
their virtue (as also there are differences between
those who are by nature ruled). 6 And of this we
6 This clause seems to have been interpolated ; one ms. has
a marginal correction, ' by nature rulers and ruled.'
61
ARISTOTLE
1280 a
5 και τοΰτο ευθύς ύφήγηται περί την ψνχήν εν
ταύτη γάρ εστί φύσει το μεν άρχον το δε άρχό-
μενον, ων έτερον φαμεν είναι άρετήν, οίον του
λόγον έχοντος και του αλόγου. δηλον τοίνυν οτι 6
τον αύτον τρόπον έχει και επί των άλλων, ώστε
φύσει πλείω τά 1 άρχοντα και αρχόμενα, άλλον γάρ
ίο τρόπον το ελεύθερον του δούλου άρχει και το άρρεν
του θήλεος και άνηρ παώός. και πάσιν ενυπάρχει
μεν τα μόρια της φνχής, αλλ' ενυπάρχει δια-
φερόντως• 6 μεν γάρ δούλος όλως ουκ έχει το
βουλευτικόν , το δέ θήλυ έχει μεν, αλλ' άκυρον, 6
δε τται? έχει μεν, αλλ' ατελές, διό 2 τον μεν 7
15 άρχοντα τελεαν εχειν δει την διανοητικην 3 άρετήν
(το γάρ έργον εστίν απλώς του άρχιτεκτονος, ο δε
λόγος αρχιτέκτων), των δ' άλλων εκαστον όσον
επιβάλλει αύτοΐς.* ομοίως τοίνυν άναγκαίως εχειν
και περί τάς ήθικας αρετάς ύποληπτεον, δεΐν μεν
μετεχειν πάντας, αλλ ου τον αυτόν τρόπον, αλλ'
2ο όσον εκάστω προς το αύτοΰ έργον, ώστε φάνε- 8
ρόν ότι εστίν ηθική αρετή τών ειρημενων πάντων,
και ούχ η αύτη σωφροσύνη γυναικός και ανδρός
οι)δ' ανδρεία και δικαιοσύνη , καθάπερ ώετο Σω-
κράτης, αλλ' η μεν αρχική ανδρεία, η δ' υπηρετική,
ομοίως δ' έχει και περί τάς άλλα?, δηλον δε τοΰτο
25 και κατά μέρος μάλλον επισκοποΰσιν καθόλου γάρ
οι λέγοντες εζαπατώσιν εαυτούς οτι το ευ εχειν
1 πλείω τα Ramus : τα πλείω codd.
1 hio —αύτοϊς hie Thurot, infra post το αύτοΰ έργον codd.
3 διανοητικην Thurot : ηθικην codd.
4 αύτοϊί <ίκανόν> ? Richards.
° In the mss. this sentence follows the next one, ' We must
suppose — function,' and begins ' Hence the ruler must possess
moral virtue.'
62
POLITICS, I. v. 5-8
straightway find an indication in connexion with the
soul ; for the soul by nature contains a part that
rules and a part that is ruled, to which we assign
different virtues, that is, the virtue of the rational
6 and that of the irrational. It is clear then that the
case is the same also with the other instances of ruler
and ruled. Hence there are by nature various classes
of rulers and ruled. For the free rules the slave, the
male the female, and the man the child in a different
way. And all possess the various parts of the soul,
but possess them in different ways ; for the slave has
not got the deliberative part at all, and the female
has it, but without full authority, while the child has
7 it, but in an undeveloped form. Hence ° the ruler
must possess intellectual virtue in completeness (for
any work, taken absolutely, belongs to the master-
craftsman, and rational principle is a master-crafts-
man) ; while each of the other parties must have that
share of this virtue which is appropriate to them. We
must suppose therefore that the same necessarily holds
good of the moral virtues : all must partake of them,
but not in the same way, but in such measure as is
8 proper to each in relation to his own function. Hence
it is manifest that all the persons mentioned have a
moral virtue of their own, and that the temperance
of a woman and that of a man are not the same, nor
their courage and justice, as Socrates thought, 6 but
the one is the courage of command, and the other
that of subordination, and the case is similar with the
other virtues. And this is also clear when we examine
the matter more in detail, for it is misleading to give
a general definition of virtue, as some do, who say
that virtue is being in good condition as regards the
» Plato, Meno 74 β ff.
63
ARISTOTLE
1260 a
την φυχην αρετή ή το όρθοπραγεΐν η τι των
τοιούτων πολύ γαρ άμεινον λέγουσιν οι έζαριθ-
μούντες τάς άρετάς, ώσπερ Τοργίας, των ούτως
οριζομένων, διό δει, ωσπερ ο ποιητής ε'ίρηκε περί
so γυναικός, ούτω νομίζειν έχειν περί πάντων
γυναικί κόσμον ή σιγή φέρει —
αλλ' άνδρι ούκέτι τοϋτο. έπει δ' 6 παις ατελής, 9
δήλον οτι τούτου μεν και ή αρετή ουκ αύτοΰ προς
αυτόν εστίν , άλλα προς τον τέλειον και τον ηγου-
μενον. ομοίως δε και δούλου προς δεσπότην.
"Έιθεμεν δε προς τάναγκαΐα χρήσιμον etmi τον
85 δοΰλον, ώστε δήλον οτι και αρετής δεΐται μικράς,
και τοσαύτης όπως μήτε δι άκολασίαν μήτε διά
δειλιαν έλλείφει των έργων, (άπορήσειε δ' αν τι?, 10
το νυν είρημένον ει αληθές, άρα και τους τεχνιτας
δεήσει έχειν άρετήν πολλάκις γαρ δι ακολασιαν
έλλείπουσι των έργων, ή διαφέρει τούτο πλείστον;
40 ό μεν γαρ δούλος κοινωνός ζθ}ής, ό δε πορρώτερον,
και τοσούτον επιβάλλει αρετής όσον περ καϊ
1260 b δουλείας• ο γαρ βάναυσος τεχνίτης άφωρισμένην
τινά έχει δουλείαν, και ό μεν δούλος των φύσει,
σκυτοτόμος δ' ούθεις ουδέ των άλλων τεχνιτών.)
φανερόν τοίνυν ότι της τοιαύτης αρετής αίτιον είναι 11
Set τω δουλω τον δεσπότην, αλλ' ου 1 τήν διδα-
5 σκαλικήν έχοντα τών έργων δεσποτικήν. διό
1 °νχ <5> Richards.
. •. , , .
α i.e. in Me.no (vide § 7 above), where this sophist
figures as a ;., . cter in the dialogue ; see also p. 178, note 6.
6 Sophocles, Ajax 293.
e i.e. his excellences as an artisan are the qualities of a
subordinate (his virtues as a human being, apart from his
trade, are not considered).
64
POLITICS, I. v. 8-11
soul or acting uprightly or the like ; those who
enumerate the virtues of different persons separately,
as Gorgias does," are much more correct than those
who define virtue in that way. Hence we must hold
that all of these persons have their appropriate
virtues, as the poet said of woman :
Silence gives grace to woman * —
though that is not the case likewise with a man.
9 Also the child is not completely developed, so that
manifestly his virtue also is not personal to himself,
but relative to the fully developed being, that is, the
person in authority over him. And similarly the
slave's virtue also is in relation to the master.
And we laid it down that the slave is serviceable The slave
for the mere necessaries of life, so that clearly he relatively
needs only a small amount of virtue, in fact just the artisan)
enough to prevent him from failing in his tasks f 0r his
10 owing to intemperance and cowardice. (But the ^ sk! '• *" d ,
question might be raised, supposing that what has admonition
just been said is true, will artisans also need to have su PP lieslt -
virtue ? for they frequently fall short in their tasks
owing to intemperance. Or is their case entirely
different ? For the slave is a partner in his master's
life, but the artisan is more remote, and only so much
of virtue falls to his share as of slavery e — for the
mechanic artisan is under a sort of limited slavery,
and whereas the slave is one of the natural classes,
no shoemaker or other craftsman belongs his trade
11 by nature.) It is manifest therefore th* '• master
ought to be the cause to the slave of the virtue
proper to a slave, but not as possessing that art of
mastership which teaches a slave his tasks. Hence
65
ARISTOTLE
1260 b
λεγουσιν ου καλώς οι λόγου τους δούλους άπο-
στεροΰντες και φάσ κοντές επιτάξει χρήσθαι μόνον
νουθετητεον γαρ μάλλον τους δούλους η τους
τταΐδας.
Άλλα περί μεν τούτων διωρίσθω τον τρόπον
τούτον περί δε ανδρός και γυναικός και τέκνων
ίο και πατρός, της τε περί εκαστον αυτών αρετής,
και της προς σφάς αυτούς ομιλίας, τι το καλώς
και μη καλώς εστί και πώς δει το μεν ευ διώκειν
το δε κακώς φεύγειν, εν τοις περί τας πολιτείας
αναγκαΐον επελθεΐν, επει γαρ οικία μεν πάσα μέρος \%
πόλεως, ταύτα δ' οικίας, την δε τοΰ μέρους προς
ΐδ την τού όλου δει βλεπειν άρετην, αναγκαΐον προς
την πολιτείαν βλέποντας 7rcu8eJeiv και τους παΐδας
και τάς γυναίκας, εΐπερ τι διαφέρει προς το την
πόλιν είναι σπουδαίαν και τους παΐδας eirai
σπουδαίους και τάς γυναίκας σπουδαίας, αναγ-
καΐον δε διαφερειν αϊ μεν γαρ γυναίκες ήμισυ
20 μέρος τών ελευθέρων, εκ δε τών παίδων οι κοινωνοί 1
γίνονται της πολιτείας, ώστ επει περί μεν τούτων
διώρισται, περί δε τών λοιπών εν άλλοι? λεκτεον,
αφέντες ως τέλος έχοντας τους νυν λόγους, αλλην
αρχήν ποιησάμενοι λεγωμεν, και πρώτον επισκεφώ-
μεθα περί τών άποφηναμενων περί της πολιτείας
της αρίστης.
1 οί κοινωνοί : οικονόμοι Susemihl (dispensatores Guil.).
° Plato, Laws 777 ε.
* As a matter of fact in Books VII., VIII. dealing with
the best constitution this subject is not reached.
66
POLITICS, I. v. 11-12
those persons are mistaken who deprive the slave of
reasoning and tell us to use command only α ; for
admonition is more properly employed with slaves
than with children.
But on these subjects let us conclude our decisions Ethics of
in this manner ; while the question of the virtue a nd'educ*•
severally belonging to man and woman and children tl . . n , of
and father, and of the right and wrong mode of con- women
ducting their mutual intercourse and the proper way deferred •
of pursuing the good mode and avoiding the bad one,
are matters that it will be necessary to follow up in
the part of our treatise dealing with the various forms
12 of constitution. 6 For since every household is part
of a state, and these relationships are part of the
household, and the excellence of the part must have
regard to that of the whole, it is necessary that the
education both of the children and of the women
should be carried on with a regard to the form of the
constitution, if it makes any difference as regards
the goodness of the state for the children and the
women to be good. And it must necessarily make a
difference ; for the women are a half of the free
population, and the children grow up to be the
partners in the government of the state. So that
as these questions have been decided, and those that
remain must be discussed elsewhere, let us relinquish
the present subjects as completed, and make a fresh
start in our discourse, and first let us consider those
thinkers who have advanced news about the Ideal
State.
67
Β
1260 b
I. Επει δε προαιρούμεθα θεωρησαι περί της \
κοινωνίας της πολιτικής η κρατίστη πασών τοις
δυναμενοις ζην δτι μάλιστα κατ' εύχην, δει και
so τα? άλλα? επισκεφασθαι πολιτείας αΐς τ€ χρώνταί
τίνες των πόλεων των εύνομεΐσθαι λεγομένων καν
ε'ί τίνες ετεραι τυγχάνωσιν υπό τινών ειρημεναι
και δοκονσαι καλώς εχειν, ίνα τό τ' ορθώς έχον
όφθη και τό χρησιμον, ετι δε τό ζητεΐν τι παρ'
αύτάς έτερον μη δοκη πάντως ει^αι σοφίζεσθαι
S5 βουλομενων, άλλα δια τό μη καλώς εχειν ταύτας
τάς νυν υπάρχουσας, δια τοϋτο ταύτην δοκώμεν
επιβαλεσθαι την μεθοδον.
' Αρχήν δέ πρώτον ποιητεον ηπερ πεφυκεν άρχη 2
ταύτης της σκεφεως. ανάγκη γαρ ήτοι ττάντα?
πάντων κοινωνεΐν τους πολιτας, η μηδενός, η τινών
μεν τινών δε μη. τό μεν ουν μηδενός κοινωνεΐν
40 φανερόν ως αδύνατον (η γαρ πολιτεία κοινωνία τις
εστί, και πρώτον ανάγκη του τόπου κοινωνεΐν , ο
μεν γαρ τόπος εις ό της /ηα? πόλεω?, οι δέ πολΐται
1261a κοινωνοί της /ζιά? πόλεως)• άλλα πότερον όσων
68
BOOK II
1 I. And since we take for our special consideration Book 11.
the study of the form of political community that is conS'itc-
the best of all the forms for a people able to pursue τιοχϋ. ideal
the most ideal mode of life, we must also examine A>DACTCAU
the other constitutions actually employed by certain
of the states said to be well governed, as well as any
others propounded bv certain thinkers and reputed
to be of merit, in order that we may discern what
there is in them that is right and expedient, and also
in order that it may not be thought that to seek for
something different from them springs entirely from
a desire to display ingenuity, but that we may be
thought to enter upon this inquiry because these
forms of constitution that already exist are not
satisfactory.
2 We must first adopt as a starting-point that which
is the natural point of departure for this inquiry.
There are three possible systems of property : either
all the citizens must own everything in common, or
they must own nothing in common, or some things
must be common property and others not. To have
nothing in common is clearly impossible ; for the
state is essentially a form of community, and it must
at any rate have a common locality : a single city
occupies a single site, and the single city belongs
to its citizens in common. But is it better for a citv
69
ARISTOTLE
1261 a
ενδέχεται κοινωνησαι πάντων βέλτιον κοινωνεΐν την
μέλλουσαν οίκησεσθαι πάλιν καλώς, η τινών μεν
τινών δ' ου βέλτιον; ενδέχεται γάρ και τέκνων
6 και γυναικών και κτημάτων κοινωνεΐν τους πολίτας
άλλήλοις, ώσπερ έν τη Πολιτεία τη ΥΙλάτωνος•
εκεί γαρ ο Σωκράτης φησι δεΐν κοινά τά τέκνα
και τάς γυναίκας ει^αι και τάς κτήσεις, τούτο δη
πότερον ως νυν οΰτω βέλτιον έχειν, η κατά τον έν
τη Πολιτεία γεγραμμένον νόμον;
10 Έχει δε δυσχέρεια? άλλα? τε πολλάς το πάντων 3
ειι^αι τά? γυναίκας κοινάς, και δι' ην αίτίαν φησι
δεΐν νενομοθετησθαι τον τρόπον τούτον 6 Σωκράτης
ου φαίνεται συμβαίνον έκ τών λόγων έτι δε προς
το τέλος δ φησι τη πόλει δεΐν ύπάρχειν, ως μεν
εϊρηται νυν, αδύνατον, πώς δέ δει διελεϊν, 1 ουδέν
15 διώρισταΐ' λέγω δέ το μίαν ειι^αι την πόλιν πάσαν
ως άριστον οτι μάλιστα, λα^άνει γάρ ταύτην
ύπόθεσιν 6 Σωκράτης.
Καίτοι φανερόν έστιν ως προϊούσα και γινομένη 4
μία μάλλον ουδέ πόλις έσται• πλήθος γάρ τι την
φύσιν έστιν η πόλις, γινομένη τε μία μάλλον οικία
20 μεν έκ πόλεως, άνθρωπος δ' έζ οικίας έσται,
μάλλον γάρ μίαν την οίκίαν της πόλεως φαιημεν
αν και τον ένα της οικίας• ώστ ει και δυνατός
τις εΐη τοΰτο δράν, ου ποιητέον, άναιρησει γάρ
την πόλιν. ου μόνον δ έκ πλειόνων ανθρώπων
έστιν η πόλις, άλλα και έζ είδει διαφερόντων, ου
1 ΜδίίΧθεϊν MP 2 : διβλεΐν Γ.
α On the following criticisms see Grote, Plato, iii. pp.
21 1-223.
» (1) §§ 3-7 ; (2) § 8-c. ii. § 11 ; (3) c. ii. §§ 11 mid.-13;
also (4) other objections c. ii. §§ 15-16.
70
;;
POLITICS, Π. ι. 2τΛ
that is to be well ordered to have community in every-
thing which can possibly be made common property,
or is it better to have some things in common and
others not ? For example, it is possible for the citizens Plato's
to have children, wives and possessions in common with monistic
each other, as in Plato's Republic, in which Socrates Republic,
says that there must be community of children, women
and possessions. Well then, which is preferable, the
system that now obtains, or one conforming with
the regulation described in The Republic a ?
3 Now for all the citizens to have their wives in
common involves a variety of difficulties ; in par-
ticular, 6 (1) the object which Socrates advances as
the reason why this enactment should be made
clearly does not follow from his arguments ; also
(2) as a means to the end which he asserts should be
the fundamental object of the city, the scheme as
actually set forth in the dialogue is not practicable ;
yet (3) how it is to be further worked out has been
nowhere definitely stated. I refer to the ideal of
the fullest possible unity of the entire state, which
Socrates takes as his fundamental principle.
4 Yet it is clear that if the process of unification n) Unity of
advances beyond a certain point, the city will not f^^bie'
be a city at all ; for a state essentially consists because
of a multitude of persons, and if its unification is plurality is
carried beyond a certain point, city will be reduced essential,
to family and family to individual, for we should
pronounce the family to be a more complete unity
than the city, and the single person than the family ;
so that even if any lawgiver were able to unify the
state, he must not do so, for he will destroy it in the
process. And not only does a city consist of a multi-
tude of human beings, it consists of human beings
71
ARISTOTLE
γάρ yiverai πόλις εζ ομοίων, έτερον γαρ συμ-
25 μαχία καΐ πόλις' το μεν γαρ τω ποσω χρήσιμον,
καν η τ ο αυτό τω εί'δει {βοηθείας γαρ χάριν ή
συαααχια πεφυκεν), ώσπερ αν ει σταθμός πλεΐον
ελκύσειε, 1 εζ 2 ών δε δει ev γζνέΌθαί εΐδει δει
διαφερειν 3 (διοίσει δε τω τοιουτω καΐ πόλις έθνους
80 όταν μη κατά κώμας ώσι κεχωριρισμενοι τό πλήθος 5
άλλ' οίον Άρκάδες). διόπερ τό 'ίσον* τό άντι-
πεπονθός σώζει τάς πόλεις, ώσπερ εν τοις 'Ή,θικοΐς
εΐρηται πρότερον. επει και εν τοις ελευθεροις και
ΐσοις ανάγκη τούτ είναι• άμα γάρ ούχ οΐόν τε
πάντας άρχειν, αλλ' ή κατ' ενιαυτον ή κατά τίνα
85 άλλην τάζιν ή χρόνον και συμβαίνει δη τον τρόπον
τούτον ώστε πάντας άρχειν, ώσπερ αν ει μετεβαλ-
λον οι σκυτεΐς και οι τεκτονες και μη οι αύτοι άει
σκυτοτόμοι και τεκτονες ήσαν. επει δε βελτιον
οΰτως ^χειν και τά περί την κοινωνίαν την πολι- 6
τικήν, δήλον ώς τους αυτούς άει βελτιον άρχειν, ει
1261b δυνατόν εν οΐς δε μή δυνατόν δια τό την φύσιν Ίσους
εΐναι πάντας, άμα δε 5 και δίκαιον, είτ aya^ov είτε
φαύλον τό άρχειν, πάντας αυτού μετεχειν, τούτο
δε μιμείται τό εν μέρει τους 'ίσους ε'ικειν το αν-
όμοιους 6 είναι εζ αρχής• οι μεν γάρ άρχουσιν οι δ'
1 ελκύσειε Coraes : ελκύσει, έλκύσγι codd.
2 (ξ — διαφερειν infra post Άρκάδες codd. : tr. ed.
3 εΐδει δε'ι διαφερειν Buecheler: εΐδει διαφέρει codd. (δια-
φερειν Μ).
* [τό ίσον] ?(cf. Ν.Ε. 1132b 33) ed.
6 δη Susemihl.
8 τό ανόμοιους Susemihl : τό δ' ώς όμοιους, όμοιους τοις, ομοίως
τοις codd. Locum desperatissimum rescripsit Richards
μιμείται τό iv μέρει άρχειν τό μη ίσους καΐ ομοίους είναι έξ
άρχης.
72
POLITICS, II. ι. 4-6
differing in kind. A collection of persons all alike classes are
, ° . τ-. * . , ,1 necessary,
does not constitute a state, ror a city is not the
same thing as a league ; a league is of value by its
quantity, even though it is all the same in kind (since
the essential object of the league is military strength),
just as a weight would be worth more if it weighed
more, whereas ° components which are to make up a
δ unity must differ in kind (and it is by this character
istic that a city will also surpass a tribe of which
the population is not scattered among villages but
organized like the Arcadians). Hence reciprocal
equality ° is the preservative of states, as has been
said before in Ethics. For even among the free
and equal this principle must necessarily obtain,
since all cannot govern at once : they must hold
office for a year at a time or by some other arrange-
ment or period ; and in this manner it does actually
come about that all govern, just as all shoemakers
would be also carpenters if the shoemakers and the
carpenters kept on changing trades instead of the
same persons being shoemakers and carpenters
6 always. But since such permanence of function is
better for the political community also, it is clear
that it is better for the same persons to govern
always, if possible ; and among peoples where it is
impossible because all the citizens are equal in their
nature, yet at the same time it is only just, whether
governing is a good thing or a bad, that all should
partake in it, then for equals thus to submit to
authority in turn imitates their being originally dis-
similar c ; for some govern and others are governed
In the mss. of the Greek ' whereas — kind ' comes below
after ' Arcadian.' b See Additional Note, p. 170.
c See Additional Note, p. 171.
D 73
ARISTOTLE
1261b v (
6 άρχονται πάρα μ€ρος, ωσπερ αν άλλοι γενόμενοι,
και τον αύτον δη τρόπον αρχόντων έτεροι ετέρας
αρχουσιν αρχάς, φανερόν τοίνυν εκ τούτων ως 7
οντε πέφυκε μίαν όντως είναι την πόλιν ώσπερ
λέγουσί τίνες, και το λεχθέν ως μεγιστον αγαθόν
εν ται? πόλεσιν οτι τάς πόλεις αναιρεί• καίτοι τό
ίο γε έκαστου αγαθόν σώζει εκαστον. — εστί δε και
κατ άλλον τρόπον φανερόν οτι τό λίαν ένοΰν ζη-
τεΐν την πόλιν ουκ εστίν άμεινον. οικία μεν γαρ
αύταρκεστερον ενός, πόλις δ' οικίας, και βονλεταί
γ ηοη τότε efrnt πόλις όταν αυτάρκη συμβαύητ}
την κοινωνίαν eirat του πλήθους• εΐπερ οΰν αίρε-
τωτερον το αύταρκεστερον, καΐ τό ήττον εν του
15 μάλλον αίρετώτερον.
Αλλά μην ουδ' ει τοΰτο άριστον εστί, τό μίαν 8
οτι μάλιστ eimi την κοινωνίαν, ούδε τοϋτ άπο-
οείκνυσθαι φαίνεται κατά τον λόγον ' εάν πάντες
άμα λεγωσι τό εμόν και τό μη εμόν ' • τοΰτο γάρ
20 οΐεται ο Σωκράτης σημεΐον efi^ai του την πόλιν
τελεως είναι μίαν. τό γάρ πάντες οιττόν. εϊ μεν
οΰν ως έκαστος, τάχ αν εϊη μάλλον ο βούλεται
ποιεΐν ό Σωκράτης (έκαστος γάρ υίόν εαυτού φήσει
τον αυτόν και γυναίκα δη την αυτήν, και περί της
ουσίας και περί εκάστου δη των συμβαινόντων
25 ωσαύτως)• νυν δ' ούχ ούτω φήσουσιν οι κοιναΐς g
χρώμενοι ταΐς ywat^t και τοις τέκνοις, άλλα 7τάι^-
τες μεν, ούχ ως έκαστος δ' αυτών, ομοίως δε και
° The reference is to Plato, Republic 462 c. Unity is
secured when everyone thinks that everything belongs
equally to him and to everybody else, i.e. everything is
common property.
74
POLITICS, II. ι. 6-9
bv turn, as though becoming other persons ; and also
when they hold office in the same way different persons
7 hold different offices. It is clear then from these
considerations that it is not an outcome of nature
for the state to be a unity in the manner in which
certain persons say that it is, and that what has
been said to be the greatest good in states really
destroys states ; yet surely a thing's particular good
acts as its preservative. — Another line of considera- and
tion also shows that to seek to unify the state ex- give in-
cessively is not beneficial. In point of self-sufficiency dependence.
the individual is surpassed by the family and the
family by the state, and in principle a state is fully
realized only when it comes to pass that the com-
munity of numbers is self-sufficing ; if therefore the
more self-sufficing a community is, the more desir-
able is its condition, then a less degree of unity is
more desirable than a greater.
8 Again, even granting that it is best for the com- (2) Unity
not secured
munity to be as complete a unity as possible, complete ( a j either
unity does not seem to be proved bv the formula ' if b - v c ? m " ,
n ΐ • • κ » τ• >» ι ii xt »> i_ nmnism of
all the citizens say Mine and Not mine at the the family,
same time,' which Socrates α thinks to be a sign of the
city's being completely one. ' All ' is an ambiguous
term. If it means ' each severally,' very likely this because
would more fully realize the state of things which property
Socrates wishes to produce (for in that case every «-in be
citizen will call the same boy his son and also the te y '
same woman his wife, and will speak in the same way
of property and indeed of everything that falls to
9 his lot) ; but ex hypothesi the citizens, having com-
munity of women and children, will not call them
' theirs ' in this sense, but will mean theirs collectively
and not severally, and similarly they will call property
75
ARISTOTLE
την ουσιαν πάντες μεν, ουχ ως έκαστος
οτι μεν τοίνυν παραλογισμός τις εστί το λέγειν
πάντας, φανερόν (το γαρ πάντες και αμφότερα και
80 περιττά και άρτια 8ιά το διττόν και εν τοις λόγοις
εριστικούς ποιεί συλλογισμούς)• διό εστί το πάν-
τας το αυτό λέγειν ώδι μεν καλόν αλλ' ου δυνατόν,
ώδι δ' ουδέν όμονοητικόν. προς δέ τούτοις ετεραν 10
έχει βλάβην το λεγόμενον . ηκιστα γαρ επιμελείας
τυγχάνει το πλείστων κοινόν των γαρ ιδίων
85 μάλιστα φροντίζουσιν, των δέ κοινών ήττον, η όσον
εκάστω επιβάλλει• προς γαρ τοις άλλοις ως έτερου
φροντίζοντος όλιγωροΰσι μάλλον, ωσπερ εν ταΐς
οικετικαΐς διακονίαις οι πολλοί θεράποντες ενίοτε
χείρον ύπηρετοΰσι των ελαττόνων. γίνονται δ' 11
εκάστω χίλιοι των πολιτών υιοί, και ούτοι ούχ
1262 a ως εκάστου άλλα του τυχόντος ο τυχών ομοίως
εστίν υιός, ώστε πάντες ομοίως όλιγωρήσουσιν.
Έτι οΰτως έκαστος εμος λέγει τον ευ πράττοντα
τών πολιτών η κακώς όπόστος τυγχάνει τον αριθ-
μόν ών, οίον εμός η του δεινός, τούτον τον τρόπον
δ λέγων καθ* εκαστον τών χιλίων η όσων η πόλις
εστί, και τούτο διστάζων άδηλον γαρ ω συνέβη
ye^eff^cu τεκνον και σωέ^αι γενόμενον. καίτοι 12
πότερον ούτω κρεΐττον το εμόν λέγειν, εκαστον το
76
POLITICS, II. ι. 9-12
' theirs ' meaning the property of them all, not of
each of them severally. We see then that, the phrase
' all say ' is equivocal (in fact the words ' all,' ' both,'
1 odd,' ' even,' owing to their ambiguity, occasion
argumentative quibbling even in philosophical dis-
cussions) ; hence really for ' all ' to say the same
thing is in one sense admirable, although impracti-
cable, but in another sense is not at all a sign of
10 concord. And furthermore, the proposal has another common
disadvantage. Property that is common to the dutie° d
greatest number of owners receives the least atten- win be
tion ; men care most for their private possessions, neg ^
and for what they own in common less, or only so
far as it falls to their own individual share ; for in
addition to the other reasons, they think less of it on
the ground that someone else is thinking about it,
just as in household service a large number of
domestics sometimes give worse attendance than a
11 smaller number. And it results in each citizen's
having a thousand sons, and these do not belong to
them as individuals but any child is equally the son
of anyone, so that all alike will regard them with
indifference.
Again, each speaks of one of his fellow-citizens who
is prospering or getting on badly as ' my son ' only
in the sense of the fractional part which he forms
of the whole number, meaning ' mine or so-and-so's,*
indicating by ' so-and-so ' each of the thousand citizens
or whatever the number be of which the state consists,
and even this dubiously, for it is uncertain who has
chanced to have had a son born to him and when born
12 safely reared. Yet which is the better way to use the
word ' mine ' — this way, each of two thousand or ten
77
ARISTOTLE
1262 a
αυτό έμόν 1 προσαγορεύοντα 2 δισχιλίων και μυρίων,
η μάλλον ως νυν iv ταΐς πόλεσι το έμόν λέγουσιν ;
ίο ο μεν γαρ υίόν αύτοΰ ο δ' άδελφόν αύτοΰ προσ-
αγορεύει τον αυτόν, ο δ' άνεφιόν η κατ άλλην τινά
συγγένειαν η προς αίματος η κατ οικειότητα και
κηδείαν αύτοΰ πρώτον η των αύτοΰ, προς δε τούτοις
έτερος 3 φράτορα η φυλέτην. κρεΐττον γαρ ίδιον
άνεφιόν etvai η τον τρόπον τοΰτον υίόν. ου μην 13
ι 5 αλλ' ουδέ διαφυγεΐν δυνατόν το μη τίνα? ύπολαμ-
βάνειν εαυτών αδελφούς τε και 7ταΓδα? και πατέρας
και μητέρας • κατά γαρ τάς ομοιότητας αΐ γίνονται
τοις τέκνοις προς τους γεννησαντας άναγκαΐον λαμ-
βάνειν περί αλλήλων τάς πίστεις, όπερ φασι και
συμβαίνειν τινε? των τάς της γης περιόδους πραγ-
20 ματευομένων eimi γάρ τισι των άνω Α,ιβύων
κοινάς τάς γυναίκας, τά μεντοι γινόμενα* τέκνα
διαιρεισ^αχ κατά τάς ομοιότητας, είσι δέ τίνες
και γυναίκες και των άλλων ζώων, οίον ίπποι και
βόες, at σφόδρα πεφύκασιν όμοια αποδιδόναι τά
τέκνα τοις γονεΰσιν, ώσπερ η εν Φαρσάλω κληθεΐσα
Δι /caia ίππος.
2δ "Ετι δε και τάς τοιαύτας δυσχέρειας ου ράδιον 14
εύλαβηθηναι τοις ταύτην κατασκευάζουσι την
κοινωνίαν, οίον αίκίας και φόνους ακουσίους , τους
δέ εκουσίους, και μάχας και λοιδορίας• ων ουδέν
δσιόν έστι yiWa^ai προς πατέρας και μητέρας καΐ
1 έμόν Bornemann : Ονομα Bonitz, μεν codd.
2 Bernays : -ovras codd.
8 Zrepos Lindau : 'έτερον codd.
4 -γινόμενα (cf. infra b 25) Richards : -γενόμενα codd.
78
POLITICS, Π. ι. 12-14
thousand people applying it to the same thing,
or rather the way in which they say ' mine ' in the
actual states now ? for the same person is called
' mv son ' by one man and ' my brother ' by another,
and another calls him ' nephew,' or by some other
relationship, whether of blood or by affinity and
marriage, the speaker's own in the first place, or that
of his relations ; and in addition someone else calls
him ' fellow-clansman ' or ' fellow-tribesman.' For
it is better for a boy to be one's own private nephew
13 than one's son in the way described. Moreover it family
would also be impossible to avoid men's supposing w jh betray
certain persons to be their real brothers and sons and parentage,
fathers and mothers ; for they would be bound to
form their belief about each other by the resemblances
which occur between children and parents. This
indeed is said by some of those who write of travels
round the world α actually to occur; they say that
some of the people of Upper Libya have their wives
in common, yet the children born are divided among
them according to their personal resemblances. And
there are some females both of the human race and
of the other animals, for instance horses and cattle,
who have a strong natural tendency to produce off-
spring resembling the male parents, as was the case
with the mare at Pharsalus named Honest Lady. &
14 Moreover it is not easy for those who institute assaults
this communism to guard against such objectionable wufowur;
occurrences as outrage, involuntary and in some
cases voluntary homicide, fights, abusive language ;
all of which are violations of piety when committed
° Books of geography, founded on travellers' reports — a
famous one by Hecataeus, scoffed at by Herodotus, iv. 36.
* Or possibly ' Docile ' (Jackson), cf. Xen. Cyneget. 7. 4.
79
ARISTOTLE
1262a , . . , * , -
του? μ?) πόρρω της συγγένειας οντάς ωσπερ προς
30 τους άπωθεν αλλά και πλεΐον συμβαίνειν άναγ-
καΐον άγνοούντων η γνωριζόντων, και γενομένων
των μεν γνωριζόντων ενδέχεται τα? νομιζομενας
γίνβσθαί λύσεις, των δε μηδεμίαν. άτοπον δε και 15
το κοινούς ποιήσαντα τους υιούς το συνείναι μόνον
άφελεΐν των ερώντων, το δ' εράν μη κωλΰσαι,
85 μηδέ τάς χρήσεις τάς άλλας, ας πατρι προς υιόν
είναι πάντων εστίν άπρεπεστατον και άδελφώ προς
άδελφόν, επει και το εράν μόνον, άτοπον δε και
το την συνουσίαν άφελεΐν δι' αλλτ^ν μεν αιτίαν
μηδεμίαν, ως λίαν δ' ίσχυράς της ηδονής γινο-
μένης• οτι δ' ό μεν πατήρ η υιός ol ο* αδελφοί
αλλήλων, μηθεν οΐεσθαι διαφερειν. εοικε δε μάλλον
40 τοις γεωργοΐς είναι χρησιμον το κοινάς είναι τάς
1262 b γυναίκας και τους παιδα? η τοις φύλαζιν ήττον
γάρ εσται φιλία κοινών όντων των τέκνων και των
γυναικών, δει δε τοιούτους είναι τους αρχόμενους
προς το πειθαρχεΐν και μη νεωτερίζειν. όλως δε 16
συμβαίνειν ανάγκη τουναντίον δια τον τοιούτον
5 νόμον ων προσήκει τους ορθώς κείμενους νόμους
αιτίους γίνεσθαι, και δι ην αιτίαν ό Σωκράτης
ούτως οΐεται δεΐν τάττειν τα περί τά τέκνα και
τάς γυναίκας, φιλίαν τε 1 γάρ οίόμεθα μεγιστον
είναι τών aya^cDv ταΐς πόλεσιν (ούτω γάρ αν ήκιστα
στασιάζοιεν) , και το μίαν είναι την πόλιν ε'παινεΐ
χο μάλισθ* ό Σωκράτης, ο και δοκεΐ κάκεΐνος εΐναί
1 re om. MP, quidem (? ye) Guil.
80
POLITICS, II. ι. 14-16
against fathers, mothers and near relatives as if they
were not relatives ; but these are bound to occur more
frequently when people do not know their relations
than when they do, and also, when they do occur,
if the offenders know their relationship it is possible
for them to have the customary expiations performed,
but for those who do not no expiation is possible.
15 Also it is curious that a theorist who makes the sons risk of
common property only debars lovers from intercourse in '
and does not prohibit love, nor the other familiar-
ities, which between father and son or brother
and brother are most unseemly, since even the fact
of love between them is unseemly. And it is also
strange that he deprives them of intercourse for no
other reason except because the pleasure is too
violent ; and that he thinks it makes no difference
that the parties are in the one case father or son
and in the other case brothers of one another. And m unUsm m "
it seems more serviceable for the Farmers to have might be
this community of wives and sons than the Guardians ; "he Farmer
for there will be less friendship among them if class )
their children and women are in common, and
unfriendliness in the subject classes is a good thing
with a view to their being submissive to authority
16 and not making revolution. But speaking generally bond of
affection
such a law is bound to bring about the opposite weakened ;
state of things to that which rightly enacted
laws ought properly to cause, and because of which
Socrates thinks it necessary to make these regulations
about the children and women. For we think that
friendship is the greatest of blessings for the state,
since it is the best safeguard against revolution, and
the unity of the state, which Socrates praises most
highly, both appears to be and is said by him to be
81
ARISTOTLE
12 b
φησι της φιλίας έργον, καθάπερ εν τοις έρωτικοΐς
λόγοις ϊσμεν λέγοντα τον Άριστοφάνην ώς των
έρώντων δια το σφόδρα φιλ€Ϊν επιθυμούντων συμ-
φΰναι 1 καΐ yeveadai εκ δυο όντων αμφότερους ever
ενταύθα μεν ουν ανάγκη αμφότερους εφθάρθαι η 17
16 τον eva, iv δε τη πόλ€ΐ την φιλίαν άναγκαΐον
υδαρή yiveodai δια την κοινωνίαν την τοιαύτην,
και ηκιστα λέγειν 2 τον έμόν η υίόν πατέρα η
πατέρα υίόν. ώσπερ γαρ μικρόν γλυκύ εις πολύ
ϋδωρ μιχθέν άναίσθητον ποιεί την κράσιν, ούτω
συμβαίνει και 3 την οικειότητα την προς αλλήλους
«0 την από των ονομάτων τούτων, διαφροντίζειν
ηκιστα άναγκαΐον ον εν τη πολιτεία, τη τοιαύτη η
πατέρα ώς υιών η υίόν ώς πατρός η ώς αδελφούς
αλλήλων, δύο γάρ έστιν α μάλιστα ποιεί κήδεσθαι
τους ανθρώπους και φιλεΐν, τό τε ίδιον και το
άγαπητόν , ων ούδέτερον οΐόν τε ύπαρχειν τοις ούτω
25 πολιτευομένοις . άλλα μην και περί του μεταφέρειν 18
τά yivo/ieva τέκνα τα μεν εκ τών γεωργών και
τεχνιτών εις τους φύλακας τά δ' εκ τούτων εις
εκείνους, πολλήν έχει ταραχην τίνα εσται τρόπον
και* γινώσκειν άναγκαΐον τους δίδοντας και μετα-
φέροντας τίσι τίνας διδόασιν. έτι δε και τα πάλαι
ΒΟ λεχθέντα μάλλον επί τούτων άναγκαΐον συμβαίνειν,
οίον αίκίας έρωτας φόνους' ου γαρ ετι προσ-
αγορεύσουσιν 6 αδελφούς και τέκνα και πατέρας
1 σνμφυηραι ΜΡΗ.
* διώκειν Η : an δη οίκεωΰν pro λέ-γΐΐν τόν έμύν ? Immisch.
8 κατά Lambinus, καΐ κατά Bernays.
* και <γάρ> Bernays.
Β π ροσ ay ο ρεύσονο ιν Coraes : -εύουσιν codd.
" The comic poet, figuring as a character in Plato's
Symposium, see especially 192 c ff.
82
POLITICS, II. ι. 16-18
the effect of friendship, just as we know that Aristo-
phanes ° in the discourses on love describes how the
lovers owing to their extreme affection desire to
grow together and both become one instead of being
17 two. In such a union both personalities, or at least
one, would be bound to be obliterated ; and in the
state friendship would inevitably become diluted
in consequence of such association, and the expres-
sions ' my father ' and ' my son ' would quite go out.
For just as putting a little sugar into a quantity of
water makes the mixture imperceptible, so it also
must come about that the mutual relationship based
on these names must become imperceptible, since
in the republic described by Plato there will be the
least possible necessity for people to care for one
another as father for sons or as son for father or as
brother for brother. For there are two motives that
most cause men to care for things and be fond of them,
the sense of ownership and the sense of preciousness ;
and neither motive can be present with the citizens
18 of a state so constituted. Again, as to the trans- reciassing
ference of some of the children at birth from the 2L^« im
infants lm-
r armers and Artisans to the Guardians b and of others practicable,
from the Guardians to the Farmers and Artisans,
there is much confusion as to how it is to be done ;
and the parents who give the children and the officials
who transfer them are bound to know which they
give to whom. And again, the things spoken of and would
above are bound to occur even more with these un^amrai
transferred children, such as outrage, love-making crime.
and murder ; for the children of the Guardians
transferred to the other citizens will no longer speak
* The three classes in Plato's Republic.
83
ARISTOTLE
και μητέρας όΐ τε εις τους άλλους πολίτας δοθέντες
τους φύλακας 1 και πάλιν οί παρά τοις φύλαζιν τους 2
άλλους πολίτας, ώστ €ΐ)λα/?€ίσ#αι των τοιούτων
35 τι πράττειν δια την συγγένειαν.
Τίερι μεν οΰν της περί τά τέκνα και τάς γυναίκας
κοινωνίας διωρίσθω τον τρόπον τούτον.
II. 'Έιχόμενον δε τούτων εστίν έπισκέφασθαι 1
περί της κτήσεως, τίνα τρόπον δει κατασκευα-
ζεσ0αι τοις μέλλουσι πολιτεύεσθαι την άρίστην
40 πολιτείαν, πότερον κοινην η μη κοινην είναι την
κτησιν. τούτο δ' αν τις κα\ χωρίς σκέφαιτο από
των περί τά τέκνα και τάς γυναίκας νενομοθετη-
1263 a μένων λέγω [δε τά περί την κτησιν] 3 πότερον,
καν η εκείνα χωρίς καθ' ον νυν τρόπον έχει πάσι,
τάς τε κτήσεις κοινάς είναι βέλτιον και τάς
χρήσεις . . .,* οίον τά μεν γήπεδα χωρίς τους δε
καρπούς εις το κοινόν φέροντας άναλίσκειν (όπερ
5 eVia ποιεί των εθνών), η τουναντίον την μεν γην
κοινην είναι και γεωργεΐν κοινή, τους δε καρπούς
διαιρεϊσθαι προς τάς Ιδίας χρήσεις (λέγονται δέ
τιΐ'ε? και τούτον τον τρόπον κοινωνεΐν των βαρ-
βάρων), η και τά γήπεδα και τους καρπούς κοινούς,
ετέρων μεν ουν όντων των γεωργούντων άλλος αν 2
ίο εΐη τρόπος και ράων, αυτών δ' αύτοΐς διαπονούν-
των τά περί τάς κτήσεις πλείους αν παρέχοι
δυσκολίας' και γάρ εν ταΐς άπολαύσεσι και εν τοις
έργοις μη γινομένων 'ίσων άναγκαΐον εγκλήματα
1 τους φύλακας hie Guil. : ante οί re codd. (om. MP).
2 τούϊΓΜΡ: eis tovs cet.
3 Susemihl. * lacunam Busse.
Something has clearly been lost here, signifying 'or
should there be some limited form of communism? '
84
POLITICS, Π. ι. 18— π. 2
of the Guardians as brothers and children and fathers
and mothers, nor yet will those living among the
Guardians so speak of the other classes, so as to be
careful not to commit any such offence because of
their relationship.
Such therefore may be our decision as to com-
munity of children and women.
1 II. In connexion with this we have to consider the 0>) nor is
due regulation of property in a community that secure.)
is to have the best political institutions: should ^ u ^' of
propertv be owned in common or privately ? This propeity:
question might indeed be considered separately from formsot
the system laid down by law with regard to the tllis -
children and the women : I mean, even if there be
separate families as is now the case with all nations, is
it better for both the ownership and the employment
of property to be in common . . .," for example,
should the farms be separate property but the farm-
produce be brought into the common stock for con-
sumption (as is the practice with some non-Greek
races) ; or on the contrary should the land be common
and farmed in common, but the produce be divided
for private use (and this form of communism also is
said to prevail among some of the barbarians) ; or
should both farms and produce be common property ?
2 Now if the tillers of the soil be of a different class b
it would work differently and be easier, but if the
citizens do the work for themselves, the regulations
for the common ownership of property would give
more causes for discontent ; for if both in the enjoy- Under-work
ment of the produce and in the work of production consume
they prove not equal but unequal, complaints are *">»»•
1 As in Plato's Republic, or like the Helots at Sparta.
85
ARISTOTLE
*263a , , , , _
γινεσσαι προς τους απολαύοντας μεν η λαμ-
βάνοντας 7τολλά ολίγα δέ πονονντας τοΐς ελάττω
15 μεν λαμβάνουσι πλείω δέ πονοΰσιν. όλως δέ το 3
συζην καί κοινωνεΐν των άνθρωπικών πάντων
χαλεπόν, καϊ μάλιστα των τοιούτων, δηλοΰσι δ
at των συναποδήμων κοινωνίαι, σχεδόν γαρ οι
πλείστοι διαφέρονται 1 εκ των εν ποσι και εκ
μικρών προσκρούοντες άλλήλοις' έτι δε των θερα-
2ο πόντων τούτοις μάλιστα προσκρούομεν οΐς πλείστα
προσχρώμεθα προς τάς διακονίας τάς εγκυκλίους,
το μεν οΰν κοινάς είναι τάς κτήσεις ταύτας τε και 4
άλλα? τοιαύτας έχει δυσχέρειας, ον δε νυν τρόπον
έχει καϊ 1 έπικοσμηθέν ήθεσι και τάζει νόμων ορθών
ου μικρόν αν διενεγκαι• εζει γαρ το εζ αμφοτέρων
25 aya#oV, λέγω δε το εξ αμφοτέρων το εκ του
κοινάς etvat τάς κτήσεις και το εκ του ίδια?• δει
γάρ πώς μεν είναι κοινάς, όλως δ ίδια?, at μεν
γαρ eVi/xAeiat διηρημέναι τά εγκλήματα προς
αλλήλους ου ποιήσουσιν, μάλλον δ' 3 έπιδώσουσιν
ως προς ϊδιον εκάστου προσεδρεύοντος' δι αρετην
80 δ' έσται προς το χρήσθαι κατά την παροιμιαν
κοινά τά φίλων, εστί δέ και νυν τον τρόπον τούτον 5
εν ei^tats" πόλεσιν ούτως ύπογεγραμμένον ως ουκ
ον αδύνατον, και μάλιστα εν ταΐς καλώς οικου-
ueWis• τά μεν εστί τά δε γένοιτ αν ιδίαν γαρ
έκαστος την κτησιν έχων τά μεν χρήσιμα ποιεί
85 τοΐς φίλοις τοΐς δέ χρήται κοινοΐς,* οίον και εν
1 διαφέρονται Coraes : διαφ€ρόμΐνοι codd.
2 καϊ om. ΓΜΡΉ.
3 re ? Susemihl.
* κοινοί* cum 36 ίδιου transponendum ? Richards.
° The saying was ascribed to Pythagoras.
86
POLITICS, II. ιι. 2-5
bound to arise between those who enjoy or take
much but work little and those who take less but
3 work more. And in general to live together and
share all our human affairs is difficult, and especi-
ally to share such things as these. And this is shown
in the partnerships of fellow-travellers, for it may
be said that most of them quarrel because thay
come into collision with one another as a result
of ordinary matters and trifles ; and also we come
into collision most with those of our servants whom
we employ most often for ordinary attendance.
4 Community of property therefore involves these
and other similar difficulties ; and the present system, Private
if further improved by good morals and by the and^nendiy
regulation of correct legislation, would be greatly ίη *^£]^ β
superior. For it will possess the merit of both
systems, by which I mean the advantage of property
being common and the advantage of its being private.
For property ought to be common in a sense but
private speaking generally. For the superintend-
ence of properties being divided among the owners
will not cause these mutual complaints, and will
improve the more because each will apply himself
to it as to private business of his own ; while on the
other hand virtue will result in making ' friends'
goods common goods,' as the proverb a goes, for the
6 purpose of use. Such a system exists even now
in outline in some states, so it is not deemed im-
practicable, and especially in the ones that are well-
administered parts of it are realized already and
parts might be realized ; for individuals while owning
their property privately put their own possessions
at the service of their friends and make use of their
friends' possessions as common property ; for in-
87
ARISTOTLE
Αακεδαίμονι τοΐς τε δούλοις χρώνται τοΐς αλλήλων
ώς ειπείν ίδιοι?, ετι δ Ιπποις και κυσίν, καν
δεηθώσιν εφοδίων iv τοΐς άγροΐς 1 κατά την χώραν. 2
<f>avepov τοίνυν οτί βελτιον eirai μεν ιδίας τάς
κτήσεις τη δε χρήσει ποιεΐν κοινάς• όπως δε
40 γίνωνται τοιούτοι, του νομοθέτου τοϋτ έργον
ϊδιόν εστίν, ετι δε και προς ήδονην άμύθητον 6
όσον διαφέρει το νομίζειν ΐδιόν τι• μη γαρ ου
1263 b μάτην την προς αυτόν αύτος έχει φιλίαν έκαστος
αλλ' εστί τούτο φυσικόν. το δε φίλαυτον eimi
φεγεται δικαίως• ουκ εστί δε τοΰτο το φιλεΐν
εαυτόν άλλα το μάλλον ή δει φιλεΐν, καθάπερ και
τον φιλοχρήματον, επει φιλοΰσί γε πάντες ώς
6 ειπείν εκαστον των τοιούτων, αλλά μην και το
χαρίσασθαι και βοηθήσαι φίλοις ή ζενοις ή εταίροις
ήδιστον δ γίνεται της κτήσεως ίδια? οϋσης.
ταύτα τε δη ου συμβαίνει τοΐς λίαν εν ποιοΰσι την η
πάλιν, και προς τούτοις άναιροΰσιν έργα δυοΐν
άρεταΐν φανερώς, σωφροσύνης μεν το περί τάς
ίο γυναίκας (έργον γάρ καλόν αλλότριας οϋσης άπ-
ε^βσσαι δια σωφροσύνην), ελευθεριότητας δε το
^ περί τάς κτήσεις (ούτε γάρ εσται φανερός ελευ-
θέριος ων ούτε πράξει πράξιν ελευθεριον ούδεμίαν
εν γάρ τη χρήσει τών κτημάτων το της ελευθεριότη-
τος έργον εστίν).
15 Ευπρόσωπος μεν ούν ή τοιαύτη νομοθεσία, και 8
φιλάνθρωπος αν είναι δόξειεν 6 γαρ άκροώμενος
άσμενος αποδέχεται, νομίζων εσεσ^αι φιλίαν τινά
θαυμαστήν πάσι προς απαντάς, άλλως τε και όταν
1 reus aypaU Busse. ' θήραν Buecheler.
88
POLITICS, II. π. 5-8
stance in Sparta people use one another's slaves as
virtually their own, as well as horses and hounds,
and also use the produce in the fields throughout the
country if they need provisions on a journey. It
is clear therefore that it is better for possessions to
be privately owned, but to make them common
property in use ; and to train the citizens to this is
6 the special task of the legislator. And moreover
to feel that a thing is one's private property makes
an inexpressibly great diiference in one's pleasure ;
for the universal feeling of love for oneself is surely
not purposeless, but a natural instinct. Selfishness
on the other hand is justly blamed ; but this is
not to love oneself but to love oneself more than one
ought, just as covetousness means loving money to
excess — since some love of self, money and so on is
practically universal. Moreover, to bestow favours
and assistance on friends or visitors or comrades is
a great pleasure, and a condition of this is the private
7 ownership of property. These advantages therefore («) Com-
do not come to those who carry the unification of the wouid'de-
state too far ; and in addition to this they manifestly str °y tem-
do away with the practice of two virtues, temperance liberality"
in relation to women (for it is a noble deed to refrain ^.p ? ot
from one through temperance when she belongs to and
another) and liberality in relation to possessions (for
one will not be able to show one's liberality nor per-
form a single liberal action, since the active exercise
of liberality takes place in the use of possessions).
Such legislation therefore has an attractive appear-
ance, and might be thought to be humane ; for he
who is told about it welcomes it with gladness,
thinking that it will result in a marvellous friendliness
of everybody towards everybody, especially when
8P
covetous•
De.se.
ARISTOTLE
1263 b
κατηγορη τις τών νυν υπαρχόντων εν ταΐς ττολι-
20 τείαις κακών ώς γινομένων διά το μή κοινην είναι
την ούσίαν, λέγω δε $ίκας τε προς αλλήλους περί
συμβολαίων και ψευδομαρτυριών κρίσεις και
πλουσίων κολακείας, ων ουδέν y /νεται δια την 9
άκοινωνησίαν αλλά δια την μοχθηρίαν, επει και
τους κοινά κεκτημένους και κοινωνοΰντας πολλώ
25 οιαφερομένους μάλλον όρώμεν η τους χωρίς τας
ουσία? έχοντας' αλλά θεωροΰμεν ολίγους τους εκ
τών κοινωνιών οΊαφερο μένους προς πολλούς συμ-
βάλλοντες τους κεκτημένους ίδια τάς κτήσεις,
ετι δε δίκαιον μη μόνον λέγειν δσων στερήσονται
κακών κοινωνήσαντες , αλλά και όσων ayafltDv
φαίνεται δ' είναι πάμπαν αδύνατο? ό βίος.
30 Αίτιον δε τω Έωκράτει της παρακρούσεως χρη
νομίζειν την ύπόθεσιν ουκ ουσαν όρθήν. δει μεν
γάρ είναι πως μίαν και την οίκίαν και την πάλιν,
άλλ' ου πάντως, έστι μεν γάρ ώς ουκ εσται
προϊούσα πόλις, εστί δ' ώς εσται μέν, εγγύς δ'
ούσα του μή πόλις είναι 1 χειρών πόλις, ώσπερ καν
6 ει τις την συμφωνίαν ποιήσειεν όμοφωνίαν η τον
ρυθμον βάσιν μίαν. άλλα δει πλήθος 6ν, ώσπερ 10
εΐρηται πρότερον, διά την παιδείαν 2 κοινην και
μίαν ποιειν και τόν γε μέλλοντα παιδείαν είσά^ειν,
και νομίζοντα διά ταύτης εσεσ^αι την πόλιν σπου-
οαίαν, άτοπον τοις τοιοΰτοις οΐεσθαι Βιορθοΰν*
40 αλλά μή τοις έθεσι και τη φιλοσοφία και τοις
νόμοις, ώσπερ τά περί τάς κτήσεις εν Αακεοαίμονι
1 efrcu <&rrcu> Victorius.
■ τψ iraideias (cf. 38) ? Richards.
8 <δ«><> δίορθονν ? Richards.
90
POLITICS, II. ιι. 8-10
somebody denounces the evils at present existing in
states as due to the fact that wealth is not owned in
common — I mean lawsuits between citizens about
breach of contract, and trials for perjury, and the
β flattery of the rich. But the real cause of all these
evils is not the absence of communism, but wicked-
ness, since we see far more quarrels occurring among
those who own or use property in common than among
those who have their estates separate ; but we
notice that those who quarrel as a result of their
partnerships are few when compared with the total
number of private owners. And again it is just
to state not only all the evils that men will lose by
adopting communism, but also all the good things ;
and life in such circumstances is seen to be utterly
impossible.
The cause of Socrates' error must be deemed to (d) General
be that his fundamental assumption was incorrect. no tfi : .
It is certain that in a way both the household and formed by
the state should be a unit," but they should not be so ^^
in every way. For in one way the state as its unifica- ^ never
tion proceeds will cease to be a state, and in another tried,
way, though it continues a state, yet by coming near
to ceasing to be one it will be a worse state, just as if
one turned a harmony into unison or a rhythm into a
10 single foot. The proper thing is for the state, while
being a multitude, to be made a partnership and a
unity by means of education, as has been said before ; i26iaie.
and it is strange that the very philosopher who intends
to introduce a system of education and thinks that
this will make the city morally good should fancy
that he can regulate society by such measures as
have been mentioned instead of by manners and
culture and laws, just as the legislator introduced
91
ARISTOTLE
1264 a και Κρήτη τοΐς συσσιτίοις 6 νομοθέτης εκοίνωσεν.
δει δέ μηδέ τούτο αυτό 1 άγνοεΐν, δτι χρή προσέχειν
τω πολλοί χρόνω και τοΐς πολλοίς ετεσιν* εν οΐς
ουκ αν έλαθεν ει ταύτα, καλώς ειχεν πάντα γαρ
σχεδόν εύρηται μεν, άλλα τα μεν ου συνήκται τοΐς
δ δ ου χρώνται γινώσκοντες. μάλιστα δ αν γένοιτο 11
φανερον €ΐ τις τοΐς εργοις Γδοι την τοιαύτην πολι-
τείαν κατασκευαζομενην ου γαρ δυνήσεται μη
μερίζων αυτά και χωρίζων ποιησαι την πάλιν, τα
μεν εις συσσίτια τά δε εις φρατρίας και φυλάς.
ώστε ουδέν άλλο συμβήσεται νενομοθετημένον πλην
ίο μη γεωργεΐν τους φύλακας' όπερ και νυν Λακεδαι-
μόνιοι ποιεΐν έπιχειροϋσιν.
Ου μην αλλ' ουδέ ο τρόπος της δλης πολιτείας
τις εσται τοΐς κοινωνοΰσιν ούτ εΐρηκεν ο Σωκράτης
ούτε ράοιον ειπείν, καίτοι σχεδόν τό γε πλήθος 3
της πόλεως τό των άλλων πολιτών γίνεται πλήθος,
15 ττερι ων ουδέν διώρισται, πότερον και τοΐς γεωργοΐς
κοινάς είναι δει τάς κτήσεις η και* καθ' έκαστον
ίδια?, έτι δέ και γυναίκας και παιδα? ιδίους η
κοινούς, ει μεν γαρ τον αύτον τρόπον κοινά πάντα 12
πάντων, τ'ι διοίσουσιν ούτοι εκείνων τών φυλά-
κων; η τί πλεΐον αύτοΐς 6 ύπομενουσι την αρχήν
20 αυτών; ή τί αα^οντε? ύπομενουσι την αρχήν, εάν
1 αυτόν ? Richards. * Ιθεσιν Αγ., ίθνεσιν Bernays.
3 πλήρωμα ? Richards. 4 και seel. Susemihl.
5 Richards : rois codd. (reus Ζχονσι τψ Greenwood).
92
POLITICS, II. ιι. 10-12
community of property in Sparta and Crete by the
institution of public messes. And this very point
also must not be ignored, that attention must be paid
to length of time and to the long period of years, in
which it would not have escaped notice if these
measures were good ones ; for nearly all of them
have been discovered already, although some of
them have not been collected together and others
though brought to knowledge are not put into practice.
11 And their value would become most manifest if one
could see such a constitution in actual process of
formation ; for one will only be able to construct
Plato's state by introducing its partitions and divid-
ing up the community into common messes and
also into brotherhoods and tribes. So that in the
upshot no other regulation will have been enacted
except the exemption of the Guardians from the
work of agriculture, which is a measure that even now
the Spartans attempt to introduce.
Moreover, the working of the constitution as a (3) Plato's
whole in regard to the members of the state has also ?J^l n i,„.„
. . ο _ _ incomplete.
not been described by aocrates, nor is it easy to say Doescom-
what it will be. Yet the general mass of the citizens ^p"y S>
of the other classes make almost the bulk of the the
state, and about these no definite regulations are objections
laid down, as to whether the Farmers also are to eitheT wa y•
have their property in common or to hold it in private
ownership, and also whether community of wives and
12 children is to apply to them or not. For if the Farmers
are to have the same complete communism, what will
be the difference between them and the Guardian
class ? or what advantage will they gain by sub-
mitting to their government ? or what consideration
will induce them to submit to the government, unless
93
ARISTOTLE
1264 a
μη τι σοφίζωνται τοιούτον οίον Κρήτες; εκείνοι
γάρ ταλλα ταύτα, τοις δούλοις εφεντες μόνον άπ-
€ψήκασι τά γυμνάσια και την των οπλών κτησιν.
el δε καθάπερ εν ταΐς αλλαις πόλεσι και παρ'
εκεινοις εσται τα τοιαύτα, τις ο τρόπος εσται της
25 κοινωνίας ; iv μια γαρ πόλει 8ΰο πόλεις άναγκαΐον
είναι, και ταύτας ύπεναντίας άλληλαις. ποιεί γαρ
τους μεν φύλακας οΐον φρουρούς, τους δε γεωργούς
και τους 1 τεχνίτας και τους άλλους πολίτας.
εγκλήματα δε και δι /cat και Οσα άλλα ταΐς πόλεσιν 13
ύπάρχειν φησϊ κακά πάνθ ύπάρζει και τούτοις.
so καίτοι λέγει ο Σωκράτης ως ου πολλών δεήσονται
νομίμων δια την παιδείαν οΐον αστυνομικών και
αγορανομικών και τών άλλων τών τοιούτων, άπο-
διδούς μόνον την παιοείαν τοις φύλαζιν. ετι δε
κυρίους ποιεί τών κτημάτων τους γεωργούς άπο-
φοράν φέροντας' αλλά πολύ μάλλον εικός είναι
35 χαλεπούς και φρονημάτων πλήρεις η τάς παρ*
ενίοις ειλωτείας τε και πενεστείας και δουλείας,
άλλα γαρ ε'ίτ αναγκαία ταΰθ* ομοίως είτε μη, νυν 14
γ 1 ούδεν διώρισται, και περί τών εχομενων, τις η
τούτων τε πολιτεία και παιδεία και νόμοι τίνες,
εστί δ' ούθ' εύρεΐν ράδιον, ούτε το διαφερον μικρόν,
40 το ποιους τινας είναι 2 τούτους προς το σωζεσ^αι
1264 b την τών φυλάκων κοινωνίαν. άλλα μην ει γε τάς
μεν γυναίκας ποιήσει κοινάς τάς δε κτήσεις ιδίας,
1 [τους] ? ed. 2 ποίους rivas elvai <5et> Scaliger.
° Or (omitting rovs before τεχνίτας) ' For Socrates makes
one set of men guardians, a sort of garrison, and another
set farmers and artisans and citizens of the other sorts.'
94
POLITICS, II. π. 12-14
the Guardians adopt some clever device like that of
the Cretans ? These have conceded to their slaves
all the same rights as they have themselves except
that they are forbidden gymnastic exercises and the
possession of arms. But if the family life and property
of the Farmers are to be such as they are in other
states, what will be the form of their community ?
There will inevitably be two states in one, and these
antagonistic to one another. For Socrates makes the
Guardians a sort of garrison, while the Farmers,
13 Artisans and other classes are the citizens. 3 But
quarrels and lawsuits and all the other evils which
according to Socrates exist in actual states will all be
found among his citizens too. Yet he says that owing
to their education they will not need many regulations
such as city and market by-laws and the other
regulations of that sort, although he assigns his
education only to the Guardians. Again, he makes
the Farmers the masters of the estates, for which
they pay rent ; but they are likely to be far more
unmanageable and rebellious than the classes of
helots, serfs and slaves in certain states to-day.
14 However, whether this communism is to be com-
pulsory for the Farmers in the same way as for the
Guardians or whether it is not, has as a matter of
fact not been definitely stated anywhere, nor is
there any information about the connected questions,
what are to be the political functions and the educa-
tion of the lower classes, and the laws affecting them.
But it is not easy to discover the answers to these
questions, yet the character of the lower classes is
of no small importance for the preservation of the
community of the Guardians. But again, if Socrates
intends to make the Farmers have their wives in
95
ARISTOTLE
τις οικονομήσει ώσπερ τά επι τών αγρών οι άνδρες
αυτών; καν ει κοιναϊ αί κτήσεις και αι τών
γεωργών γυναίκες . . . . ι
"Ατοπον δε και το εκ τών θηρίων ποιεΐσθαι την 15
5 παραβολήν, δτι δει τά αυτά επιτηδεύειν τας
γυναίκας τοις άνδράσιν, οΐς οικονομίας ούδεν μετ-
εστιν. επισφαλές δε και τους άρχοντας ως καθ-
ίστησιν ο Σωκράτης• άει γαρ ποιεί τους αυτούς
άρχοντας, τούτο δε στάσεως αίτιον γίνεται και
παρά τοΐς μηδέν άξ ίωμα κεκτημενοις, ή που δήθεν 2
ίο παρά γε θυμοειδεσι και πολεμικοΐς άνδράσιν. οτι
δ' άναγκαΐον αύτώ ποιεΐν τους αυτούς άρχοντας
φανερόν, ου γαρ ότε μεν άλλοις ότε δε άλλοις
μεμικται ταί? φυχαΐς 6 παρά του θεοϋ χρυσός,
αλλ' άει τοις αύτοΐς, φησι δε τοΐς μεν ευθύ γινο-
μενοις /^ί^αι χρυσόν, τοΐς δ' άργυρον, χαλκόν δε
ΐδ και σίδηρον τοΐς τεχνίταις μελλουσιν εσεσθαι και
γεωργοΐς. ετι δε και την εύδαιμονίαν αφαιρούμενος 16
τών φυλάκων, δλην φησι δεΐν εύδαίμονα ποιεΐν την
πόλιν τον νομοθετην. αδύνατον δε εύδαιμονεΐν
δλην, μη τών πλείστων ή 3 μη πάντων μερών ή
τινών εχόντων την εύδαιμονίαν. ου γαρ τών
20 αυτών το εύδαιμονεΐν ώνπερ το αρτιον τούτο μεν
γαρ ενδέχεται τω ολω ύπάρχειν τών δε μερών
μηδετερω, το δε εύδαιμονεΐν αδύνατον, άλλα μην
ει οι φύλακες μη εύδαίμονες, τίνες έτεροι; ού γαρ
δη οι γε τεχνΐται και το πλήθος το τών βάναυ-
σων.
1 lacunam Thurot.
1 ^ που δήθεν Goettling: ήπονθεν δη, έίπονθεν δη codd.
3 ei Victorius.
A passage has been lost here.
96
POLITICS, II. π. 14-16
common but their property private, who is to manage
the household in the way in which the women's
husbands will carry on the work of the farms ? And
if the property and the wives of the Farmers are to
be common . . . a
15 It is also strange that Socrates employs the com- (4) Minor
parison of the lower animals to show that the women ° Jec lon3,
are to have the same occupations as the men, con-
sidering that animals have no households to manage.
Also Socrates' method of appointing the magistrates
is not a safe one. For he makes the same persons
hold office always ; but this occasions rebellion even
among people of no special distinction, much more so
then among high-spirited and warlike men. But it
is clear that he is compelled to make the same
persons govern always, for the god-given admixture
of gold in the soul is not bestowed on some at one
time and others at another time, but is always in the
same men, and Socrates says that at the moment of
birth some men receive an admixture of gold and
others of silver and those who are to be the
Artisans and Farmers an admixture of copper and
16 iron. And again, although he deprives the Guardians what class
of happiness, he says that it is the duty of the law- J^lLy"?
giver to make the whole city happy. But it is not
possible for the whole to be happy unless most or all
of its parts, or some of them, possess happiness. For
happiness is not a thing of the same sort as being
an even number : that may belong to a whole but
not to either of its parts, but happiness cannot belong
to the whole and not to its parts. But yet, if the
Guardians are not happy, what other class is ? For
clearly the Artisans and the general mass of the
vulgar classes are not.
97
ARISTOTLE
1264 b
Η μεν ουν πολιτεία περί ης 6 Σωκράτης εΐρηκεν
25 ταύτα? τε τάς απορίας έχει καί τούτων ούκ
έλάττους ετέρας.
III. Σχεδόν δε παραπλησίως και περί τους 1
Νόμους έχει τους ύστερον γραφέντας, διό /cat περί
της ενταύθα πολιτείας έπισκέφασθαι μικρά βέλτιον.
και γάρ εν τη Π ολιτε ία περί ολίγων πάμπαν
80 διώρικεν 6 Σωκράτης, περί τε γυναικών και τέκνων
κοινωνίας , πώς έχειν δει, και περί κτήσεως, και
της πολιτείας την τάζιν (διαιρείται γάρ εις δυο
μέρη το πλήθος των οικούντων, το μεν εις τους
γεωργούς το δε εις το προπολεμοϋν μέρος, τρίτον
δ' εκ τούτων το βουλευόμενον και κύριον της
πόλεως), περί δε των γεωργών καί τών τεχνιτών,
85 πότερον ουδεμιάς η μετέχουσί τίνος άρχης, και
πότερον όπλα δει κεκτησθαι και τούτους και
συμπολεμεΐν η μη, περί τούτων ουδέν διώρικεν 6
Σωκράτης, άλλα τάς μεν γυναίκας οιεται δεΐν
συμπολεμεΐν και παιδεία? μετέχειν της αυτής τοις
φύλαζιν, τά δ' άλλα τοις έξωθεν λόγοις πεπλήρωκε
40 τον λόγον και 1 περί της παιδεία?, ποίαν τινά δει
1265 a yiWai?ai τών φυλάκων, τών δε Νόμων το μεν 2
πλείστον μέρος νόμοι τυγχάνουσιν οντες, ολίγα δε
περί της πολιτείας εΐρηκεν, και ταύτην βουλόμενος
κοινοτέραν ποιεΐν ταΐς πόλεσι κατά μικρόν περιάγει
5 πάλιν προς την έτέραν Πολιτεία^, έξω γάρ της
τών γυναικών κοινωνίας και της κτήσεως, τά
άλλα ταύτα άποδίδωσιν άμφοτέραις ταΐς πολιτείαις'
1 καί — φυλάκων supra post 30 κτήσεως Susemihl.
α The last clause, ' and about — to have,' has almost cer-
tainly been misplaced by a copyist, and should come near
the beginning of the sentence, after ' about property.'
98
POLITICS, II. π. 16— in. 2
The republic discussed by Socrates therefore pos-
sesses these difficulties and also others not smaller
than these.
1 III. And almost the same holds good of Laws piato's
also, which was written later, so that it will be ad- Laws J
' „ , constitution
vantageous to make some small examination ot the comparable
constitution described in that book as well. For in ^ ^
The Republic Socrates has laid down details about Republic
very few matters — regulations about community
of wives and children and about property, and the
structure of the constitution (for the mass of the
population is divided into two parts, one forming
the Farmer class and the other the class that defends
the state in war, and there is a third class drawn from
these latter that forms the council and governs the
state), but about the Farmers and the Artisans,
whether they are excluded from government or have
some part in it, and whether these classes also are to
possess arms and to serve in Avar with the others or
not, on these points Socrates has made no decision,
but though he thinks that the women ought to serve
in war with the Guardians and share the same educa-
tion, the rest of the discourse he has filled up with
external topics, and about the sort of education which
2 it is proper for the Guardians to have." Laws on the
other hand is mostly a collection of statutes, but
the author has said a little about the form of the
constitution, and though wishing to make this more
suitable for adoption by actual states he brings it
round by degrees back to the other form, that of
The Republic. For except community in wives and
property, he assigns all his other regulations in the
same form to both states, for he prescribes for both
99
ARISTOTLE
12653 * ι •/ Ι , / Ι , β „
/cat ya/) παι,οβιαν την αυτήν, και το των €ργων
των αναγκαίων άπεχομενους ζην, καΐ περί συσ-
σιτίων ώσαυτω?, πλην εν ταύτη φησί δεΐν etvai
ίο συσσίτια και γυναικών, και την μεν χιλίων των
όπλα κεκτημένων, ταύτην δέ πεντακισχιλίων.
Τό μεν οΰν περιττόν εχουσι πάντες οι του Σω- 3
κράτους λόγοι και τό κομφόν και το καινοτόμον
και τό ζητητικόν, καλώς δε πάΊτα ΐσως χαλεπόν
επει και τό νυν ειρημενον πλήθος δει μη λανθάνειν
15 οτι χώρας δεήσει τοις τοσούτοις Έαβυλωνίας ή
τίνος άλλης απέραντου τό πλήθος, εξ ης άργοι
πεντακισχίλιοι θρέφονται και περί τούτους γυναι-
κών και θεραπόντων έτερος όχλος πολλαπλάσιος,
δει μεν ουν ύποτίθεσθαι κατ* εύχήν, μηδέν μεντοι
αδύνατον, λέγεται δ' ως δει τον νομοθετην προς 4
20 δύο βλέποντα τιθεναι τους νόμους, προς τε την
χώραν και τους ανθρώπους, ετι δε καλώς έχει
προσθεΐναι και προς τους γειτνιώντας τόπους,
ει δει την πόλιν ζήν βίον πολιτικόν 1 (ου γαρ μόνον
άναγκαΐόν εστίν αυτήν τοιούτοις χρήσθαι προς τον
πόλεμον οπλοις α χρήσιμα κατά την οίκείαν χώραν
25 εστίν αλλά και προς τους εζω τόπους)' ει δε τις
μη τοιούτον αποδέχεται βίον μήτε τον ίδιον μήτε
τον κοινόν της πόλεως, όμως ουδέν ήττον δει
φοβερούς etvat τοις πολεμίοις μή μόνον ελθοΰσιν
εις την χώραν αλλά και άπελθοΰσιν. 2 και τό 5
1 πολιτικόν μη μονωτικόν codd. plerique.
2 άπ[ε\θ]οΰσιν Bender.
" A euphemism for an aggressive policy, cf. 1327 b 5.
Some mss. add ' not one of isolation ' ; this looks like an
explanatory note interpolated.
6 Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give ' when they
are away from it.'
100
POLITICS, II. in. 2-5
the same scheme of education, and a life detached
from menial tasks, and similarly as regards common
meals, except that in the state described in Laws
he says there are to be common meals for women
also, and he makes the Republic consist of a class
possessing arms that numbers a thousand, but the
state of Latvs has five thousand.
3 Now it is true that all the discourses of Socrates Criticism,
possess brilliance, cleverness, originality and keen- potation
ness of inquirv, but it is no doubt difficult to be right needs vast
ι * ' <-> territory.
about everything : for instance with regard to the
size of population just mentioned it must not be over-
looked that a territory as large as that of Babylon
will be needed for so many inhabitants, or some other
country of unlimited extent, to support five thousand
men in idleness and another swarm of women and
servants around them many times as numerous. It
is proper no doubt to assume ideal conditions, but
4 not to go bevond all bounds of possibilitv. And it Neighbour.
• ii . ι . τ ii • ι • ." ι . in g powers
is said that in laying down the laws the legislator ignored.
must have his attention fixed on two things, the
territory and the population. But also it would be
well to add that he must take into account the
neighbouring regions also, if the city is to live a life
of active policy," as it will have to use for war not
only such arms as are serviceable within its own
territory but also such as are serviceable against
places outside it ; and if one does not accept such
a description whether for the life of the individual
or for the common life of the state, yet it is none
the less necessary for the citizens to be formidable
to their enemies not only when they have entered
5 the country but also when they have left it. 6 Also
101
ARISTOTLE
πλήθος δε τής κτήσεως όράν δει, μήποτε βελτιον
ετερως οιορίσαι τω σαφώς μάλλον τοσαντην γαρ
80 είναι φησι οεΐν ώστε ζην σωφρόνως , ώσπερ αν ει
τις εΐπεν ώστ€ ζην εΰ• τοΰτο δ' άρ η εστί καθόλου
μάλλον, επειδή 2 εστί σωφρόνως μεν ταλαιπώρως
δε ζην. άλλα βελτίων ορός το σωφρόνως και
ελευθερίως (χωρίς γαρ εκάτερον το μεν τω τρνφάν
ακολουθήσει, το δε τω επιπόνως), επει μοναι γ
35 βίσΙν έξεις αίρεται 3 περί την της ουσίας χρήσιν
αύται, οίον ουσία πράως η άνορείως χρήσθαι ουκ
εστίν, σωφρόνως δε και ελευθέρια»? εστίν, ώστε
και τάς έξεις 4 άναγκαΐον περί αυτήν είναι ταύτας,
άτοπον δε και το τάς κτήσεις ίσάζοντα το περί 6
40 τό πλήθος των πολιτών μη κατασκευάζειν, αλλ
άφεΐναι την τεκνοποιίαν αόριστον ως ικανώς
1265 b άνομαλισθησομενην είς τό αυτό πλήθος δια τα?
άτεκνίας όσωνοΰν γεννωμένων, οτι οοκεΐ τοΰτο
και νυν συμβαίνειν περί τάς πόλεις, δει δε
τοΰτ ούχ ομοίως ακριβώς εχειν περί τάς πόλεις 6
τότε και νυν νυν μεν γάρ ουδει? απορεί δια το
6 μερίζεσθαι τάς ουσίας είς όποσονοΰν πλήθος, τότε
δ' αδιαίρετων ούσών ανάγκη τους παράζυγας
μηοεν εχειν, εάν τ ελάττους ωσι τό πλήθος εαν
τε πλείους. μάλλον δέ δεΐν ύπολάβοι τις αν 7
ώρίσθαι της ουσίας την τεκνοποιίαν, ώστε αριθμού
τινο? μή πλείονα γενναν, τούτο οε τισεναι το
πλήθος αποβλέποντα προς τάς τιίχα?, αν συαβαιντ;
1 δ' &ρ' ed. : yhp codd.
2 επειδή Susemihl : eVt δ' codd.
3 αίρεται Vettori: άρεται codd.
* έξεις Susemihl : χρήσεις codd.
5 [περί τάϊ πόλεις] Bender.
102
POLITICS, II. in. 5-7
the amount of property requires consideration : Wealth
would it not perhaps be better to define it differently,
by a clearer formula ? The writer says that it ought
to be sufficiently large for the citizens ' to live a
temperate life ' — as if one were to say ' to live a good
life ' ; but really that phrase is too general, since it
is possible to five temperately yet miserably. But a
better definition would be ' to live temperately and
liberally ' (for if the two are separated a liberal mode
of life is liable to slip into luxury and a temperate
one into a life of hardship), since surely these are
the only desirable qualities relating to the use of
wealth — for instance you cannot use wealth gently
or bravely, but you can use it temperately and
liberally, so that it follows that these are the qualities
6 that have to do with wealth. And it is also strange Birth-
that although equalizing properties the writer does omitted.
not regulate the number of the citizens, but leaves
the birth-rate uncontrolled, on the assumption that
it will be sufficiently levelled up to the same total
owing to childless marriages, however many children
are begotten, because this seems to take place in
the states at present. But this ought to be regulated
much more in the supposed case than it is now, for
now nobody is destitute, because estates are divided
among any number, but then, as division of estates
will not be allowed, the extra children will necessarily
have nothing, whether they are fewer in number or
7 more. And one might think that restriction ought
to be put on the birth-rate rather than on propertv,
so as not to allow more than a certain number of
children to be produced, and that in fixing their
number consideration should be paid to the chances
of its happening that some of the children born
103
ARISTOTLE
1265b , .
ίο τελευταν τινας των γεννηθέντων, και προς την των
άλλων άτεκνίαν το δ άφεΐσθαι, καθάπερ εν ταί?
πλείσταις πόλεσι, πενίας άναγκαΐον αίτιον γίν€θθαι
τοις πολίταις, η δε πενία στάσιν εμποιεΐ και
κακονργίαν. Φείδων μεν ονν ο Κορίνθιος, ων
νομοθέτης των αρχαιοτάτων, τους οίκους ισονς
ωήθη δεΐν διαμενειν και το πλήθος των πολιτών,
15 και el το πρώτον τους κλήρους άνισους ειχον
πάντες κατά μέγεθος• εν δε τοις Νόμοι? τούτοις
τουναντίον εστίν, άλλα περί μεν τούτων πώς
οίόμεθα βελτιον αν εχειν, λεκτεον ύστερον ελλε- 8
λειπται δέ τοις Νόαοι? τούτοις και τα περί τους
άρχοντας, όπως έσονται διαφέροντες τών αρχο-
20 μένων φησϊ γάρ δεΐν, ώσπερ εξ έτερου το
στημόνιον ερίου γίνεται της κρόκης, ούτω και
τους άρχοντας εχειν 1 προς τους αρχόμενους, επει
δε την πάσαν ούσίαν εφίησι γίνεσθαι μείζονα
μέχρι πενταπλάσιας , διά τι τοΰτ* ουκ αν ειη επι
της γης μέχρι τίνος; και την των οικοπεοων οε
25 διαίρεσιν δει σκοπεΐν, μη ποτ' ου συμφερη προς
οίκονομίαν δύο γάρ οικόπεδα εκάστω ενειμε
διελών χωρίς, χαλεπόν δε οικίας δύο οίκεΐν. ή δε 9
σύνταζις ολη βούλεται μεν είναι μήτε δημοκρατία
μήτε ολιγαρχία, μέση δε τούτων ην καλοϋσι
πολιτείαν, εκ γάρ τών όπλιτευόντων εστίν, ει
80 μεν ούν ως κοινοτάτην ταύτην κατασκευάζει ταΐ?
1 ed. : ΐχει-ν δεΐν aut 5et codd.
Otherwise unknown.
6 i.e. the estates are equal, and the number of households
fixed, but not the number of citizens.
c Laws 734 ε f . In weaving cloth the warp (the threads
set up first) must be of strong wool, the woof (the threads
woven across the warp) must be softer.
104
POLITICS, II. in. 7-9
may die, and to the absence of children in the other
marriages ; but for the matter to be left alone, as
it is in most states, is bound to lead to poverty
among the citizens, and poverty produces sedition
and crime. The Corinthian Phidon a in fact, one
of the most ancient lawgivers, thought that the house-
holds and the citizen population ought to remain
at the same numbers, even though at the outset the
estates of all were unequal in size ; but in Plato's
harts the opposite is the case. 6 However, we must
say later what we think would be a better system in
8 these matters ; but another question omitted in the Difficulties
Lmvs is how the rulers will be different from the S^nd 8
classes ruled ; the writer prescribes that the rulers as to
are to stand in the same relation to the ruled as the {S^erty,
warp of cloth stands to the woof by being made of and farms •
different wool. c And inasmuch as he allows a man's
total property to be increased up to five times its
original value, for what reason should not an increase
in his landed estate be allowed up to a certain point ?
Also it must be considered whether the proposed
separation of homesteads is not inexpedient for
household economy — for the writer allotted two
homesteads separate from one another to each
citizen ; but it is difficult to manage two households. 4
9 And the whole constitution is intended, it is true, Really an
to be neither a democracy nor an oligarchy, but of oligarehy •
the form intermediate between them which is termed
a republic, for the government is constituted from
the class that bears arms. If therefore he introduces
this constitution as the one most commonlv existing
* The object was to provide a separate establishment for a
married son. Laws 776 a.
E 105
ARISTOTLE
1265 b ,s . »u s , \ ~ » »
πολεσι των άλλων πολιτειαν, καλώς ειρηκεν ίσως,
ει δ' ώς άρίστην μετά την πρώτην πολιτειαν, ου
καλώς• τάχα γαρ την των Αακώνων αν τι,ς eirai-
νεσειε μάλλον, η καν άλλην τίνα. άριστοκρατικω-
τεραν. ενιοι μεν ουν λεγουσιν ώς δει την άρίστην 10
πολιτειαν εζ άπασών είναι τών πολιτ€ΐών μεμιγ-
35 μενην, διό και την τών Αακεδαιμονίων επαινοΰσιν
{είναι γαρ αύτην οι μεν εξ ολιγαρχίας και μοναρχίας
και δημοκρατίας φασίν, λέγοντες την μεν jSaaiAeiW
μοναρχίαν , την δε τών γερόντων άρχην όλιγαρχίαν,
δημοκρατεΐσθαι δε κατά την τών εφόρων άρχην
40 δια το εκ του δήμου efmi τους εφόρους, οι δε την
μεν εφορείαν etvai τυραννίδα, δημοκρατεΐσθαι δε
t266a κατά τε τα συσσίτια και τον άλλον βίον τον καθ
ημεραν)• εν δε τοις Νό/χοι? εΐρηται τούτοις ώς δέον \]
συγκεΐσθαι την άρίστην πολιτειαν εκ δημοκρατίας
και τυραννίδος, άς η το παράπαν ουκ αν τις θειη
πολιτείας η χειρίστας πασών, βελτιον ουν λεγουσιν
5 οι πλείους μιγνΰντες• η γάρ εκ πλειόνων συγ-
κείμενη πολιτεία βελτίων. επειτ ούδ έχουσα
φαίνεται μοναρχικόν ούδεν, άλΧ ολιγαρχικά και
δημοκρατικά, μάλλον δ' εγκλίνειν βούλεται προς
την όλιγαρχίαν. δήλον δ' εκ της τών αρχόντων
καταστάσεως' το μεν γάρ εξ αιρετών κληρωτούς
' Plato wrote ' monarchy,' Laws 693 d (cf. here § 13, 1. 23).
106
POLITICS, II. πι. 9-ll
of all forms of constitution in the actual states, he
has perhaps made a good proposal, but if he intro-
duces it as the next best to the first form of con-
stitution, it is not a good proposal ; for very likely
one might approve the Spartan constitution more
highly, or perhaps some other form nearer to an
10 aristocracy. In fact some people assert that the best different
constitution must be a combination of all the forms toSpan*u
of constitution, and therefore praise the constitution ^P 1 ^ 111 "*
of Sparta (for some people say that it consists of
oligarchy, monarchy and democracy, meaning that
the kingship is monarchy and the rule of the ephors
oligarchv, but that an element of democracy is
introduced by the rule of the ephors because the
ephors come from the common people ; while others
pronounce the ephorate a tyranny but find an
element of democracy in the public mess-tables and
11 in the other regulations of daily life). In Plato's
Larvs on the other hand it is stated that the best
constitution must consist of a combination of demo-
cracy and tyranny," which one might refuse to count
as constitutional governments at all, or else rank
as the worst of all constitutions. A better theory
therefore is put forward by those who intermingle
a larger number of forms, for the constitution com-
posed of a combination of a larger number of forms
is better. In the next place, the constitution in the
Larrs proves as a matter of fact not to contain any
element of monarchy at all, but its factors are taken
from oligarchy and democracy, and for the most part
it tends to incline towards oligarchy. This appears
from the regulations for the appointment of the
magistrates ; for their selection by lot from a list
previously elected by vote is a feature common to
107
ARISTOTLE
12ββ a < > ι ~ * S^ - i ' I
ίο κοινον αμφοιν, το οε τοις μεν ευπορωτεροις
επάναγκες εκκλησιάζειν eirai και φερειν άρχοντας
η τι ποιεΐν άλλο των πολιτικών, τους δ' άφεΐσθαι,
τοΰτο δ ολιγαρχικόν, και το πειράσθαι πλείους
εκ των ευπόρων είναι τους άρχοντας και τάς
μεγίστας εκ των μεγίστων τιμημάτων, όλιγαρχι- 12
15 κην δε ποιεΐ και την της βουλής αΐρεσιν αιροΰν-
ται μεν γαρ πάντες επάναγκες, αλλ' εκ 1 του
πρώτου τιμήματος, είτα πάλιν ίσους εκ του
δευτέρου, είτ* εκ τών τρίτων, πλην ου πάσιν
επάναγκες ην τοις εκ τών τρίτων η τέταρτων,
εκ οέ του τετάρτου 2 μόνοις επάναγκες τοις
πρώτοις και τοις δευτεροις• ε?τ' εκ τούτων
20 ίσον αφ* εκάστου τιμήματος άποδειζαί φησι δεΐν
αριθμόν, έσονται δη πλείους οι εκ τών μεγίστων
τιμημάτων και βελτίους διά το ενιους μη αιρεΐσθαι
τών δημοτικών διά το μη επάναγκες. ως μεν οΰν 13
ουκ εκ δημοκρατίας και μοναρχίας δει συνιστάναι
την τοιαύτην πολιτείαν, εκ τούτων φανερόν και
2δ τών ύστερον ρηθησομενων όταν επιβάλλη περί της
τοιαύτης πολιτείας η σκέφις• έχει δε και περί την
αΐρεσιν τών αρχόντων το εξ αιρετών αιρετούς
επικίνδυνον, ει γάρ τίνες συστηναι θελουσι και
μέτριοι το πλήθος, αεί κατά την τούτων αίρε-
θησονται βούλησιν.
Τα μεν οΰν περί την πολιτείαν την εν τοις Νόμοις
30 τούτον έχει τον τρόπον.
1 άλλα <πρωτον> έ~κ Lambinus.
2 Engelhardt : τον τετάρτου τών τετάρτων codd.
" i.e. a better elective body because representative of all
classes.
h i.e. from voting for the preliminary list from the third and
fourth classes.
108
POLITICS, II. m. 11-13
both oligarchy and democracy, but the compulsion
put upon the richer citizens to attend the assembly
and vote for magistrates or perform any other
political function, while the others are allowed to do
as they like, is oligarchical, as is the endeavour to
secure that a majority of the magistrates shall be
drawn from the wealthy and that the highest offices
shall be filled from the highest of the classes assessed
12 by wealth. But the writer also makes the election
of the council oligarchical ; for everybody is com-
pelled to elect, but from the first property-class, and
then again an equal number from the second class,
and then from the members of the third class, except
that it was not to be compulsory for all to vote for
those to be elected from the members of the third
or the fourth class, and to elect from the fourth class
was only compulsory for the members of the first
and second classes ; and afterwards from those thus
selected he says that they are to appoint an equal
number from each class. Thus those who elect the
members from the highest property classes will be
more numerous and better, because some of the
lower orders will abstain from voting 6 as it is not
13 compulsory. Accordingly that it is not proper to indirect
establish a constitution of this character from a election •
blend of democracy and monarchy appears clearly
from these considerations, and from what will be said
later when our inquiry comes to deal with this class
of constitution ; also the provision for the election of
the rulers from among candidates chosen at a prelim-
inary election is dangerous, for if even a moderate
number of people choose to combine into a party,
the elections will always go according to their wish.
Such are the points as to the constitution in theLaws.
109
ARISTOTLE
1266 a
IV. Εισί δε' rives πολιτεΐαι και αλλαι, at μεν 1
ιδιωτών αι δε φιλοσόφων και πολιτικών, ττασαι
δε των καθεστηκυιών και καθ' ας πολιτεύονται
νυν εγγύτερόν εισι τούτων αμφοτέρων ovSels γαρ
55 ούτε την irepi τα τέκνα κοινότητα και τάς γυναίκας
άλλος κεκαινοτόμηκεν οϋτ€ περί τα συσσίτια των
γυναικών , άλλ' από τών αναγκαίων άρχονται
μάλλον. δοκεΐ γάρ τισι το περί τάς ουσίας είναι
μεγιστον τετάχθαι καλώς• περί γάρ τούτων ποιεΐ-
σθαί φασι τάς στάσεις πάντας. διό Φαλέα? ό 2
40 Χ,αλκτφόνιος τοΰτ εισήνεγκε πρώτος' φησι γάρ
δεΐν ΐσας είναι τα? κτήσζις τών πολιτών τούτο
1266 b oe κατοικιζομεναις μεν ευθύς ου χαλεπόν ωετο
ποιεΐν, τάς δ' ήδη κατοικουμενας εργωδεστερον
μεν, όμως δε τάχιστ αν ο/^αλισ^ναι τω τάς
προίκας τους μεν πλουσίους διδόναι μεν λαμβάνειν
δ δε μη, τους δε πένητας μη διδοναι μεν λαμβάνειν
δε'. Πλάτων δε τους Νόμους γράφων μέχρι μεν
τίνος ωετο δεΐν εάν, πλεΐον δέ του πενταπλασίαν
είναι της ελαχίστης μηδενι τών πολιτών εζουσίαν
είναι κτήσασθαι, καθάπερ εΐρηται και πρότερον. 3
Δει δε μηδέ τοΰτο λανθάνειν τους ούτω νομο-
θετοΰντας, ο λανθάνει νυν, ότι το της ουσίας τάττον-
ιο τας πλήθος προσήκει και τών τέκνων το πλήθος
τάττειν εάν γάρ ΰπεραίρη τής ουσίας το μέγεθος
ό τών τέκνων αριθμός, ανάγκη τόν γε νόμον
λυεσ^αι, και χωρίς τής λύσεως φαϋλον το πολ-
λούς εκ πλουσίων ^ινεσ^αι πένητας• έργον γάρ μή
α Otherwise unknown.
110
POLITICS, II. ιν. 1-3
1 IV. There are also certain other constitutional
schemes, some drawn up by amateurs and others Non-
by philosophers and statesmen, but all of them are theories! 18 '
nearer to those which have been actually established
and by which states are governed at present than
are both of those which have been considered ; for
nobody else has introduced the innovation of com-
munity of children and women, nor that of public
meals for the women, but they start rather with the
absolute requisites. For some persons think that
the right regulation of property is the most important;
for the question of property, they say, is universally
the cause of party strife. Therefore the Chalcedonian Constitu-
Phaleas" was the first who introduced this expedient; ρ^ι°.[ 3 .
2 for he says that the citizens' estates ought to be equal, property
and he thought that this would not be difficult to secure regulating y
at the outset for cities in process of foundation, while dowries.
in those already settled, although it would be a more
irksome task, nevertheless a levelling would most easily
be effected by the rich giving dowries but not re-
ceiving them and the poor receiving but not giving
them. Plato when writing Laws thought that up
to a certain point inequality ought to be allowed,
but that no citizen should be permitted to acquire
more land than would make his estate five times the
size of the smallest, as has also been said before. c. m. §a.
3 But those who bring in legislation of this sort must
also not overlook this point, which is overlooked at
present, that when regulating the amount of property
legislators ought also to regulate the size of the family;
for if the number of children becomes too large for
the total propertv, the law is quite sure to be re-
pealed, and apart from the repeal it is a bad thing
that many citizens who were rich should become poor,
111
ARISTOTLE
1266 b , , , ,
νεωτεροποιους eirai του? τοιούτου?, οιοτι μεν ούν 4
15 έχει τινά Swa/zii/ ei? τήν πολιτικην κοινωνίαν η
της ουσίας όμαλότης, και των πάλαι τινε? φαίνον-
ται διεγνωκότες, οίον και Σόλων ένομοθέτησεν,
και παρ* άλλοις εστί νόμος ος κωλύει κτάσθαι
γην όπόσην αν βούληταί τις' ομοίως δε και την
ούσίαν πωλεϊν οι νόμοι 1 κωλύουσιν, ώσπερ εν
20 Αοκροΐς νόμος εστί μη πωλεΐν εάν μη φανεράν
άτνχίαν δείξη συμβεβηκυΐαν ετι δε τους παλαιούς
κλήρους διασωζειν, τούτο δε λυθεν και περί
Αευκάδα δημοτικην εποίησε λίαν την πολιτείαν
αυτών, ου yap ετι συνεβαινεν από των ώρισμενων
τιμημάτων εις τάς αρχάς βαδίζειν. αλλ' εστί την 5
25 ισότητα μεν ύπάρχειν της ουσίας, ταυτην δ' η
λίαν είναι πολλην, ώστε τρυφάν, η λίαν όλίγην,
ώστε ζην γλίσχρως• δηλον οΰν ως ούχ ίκανόν το
τάς ουσίας ΐσας ποιησαι τον νομοθετην, αλλά του
μέσου στοχαστεον. ετι δ ει τις και την μετρίαν
τάζειεν ούσίαν πάσιν, ούδεν όφελος' μαΧλον γάρ
so δει τάς επιθυμίας όμαλίζειν η τάς ουσίας, τούτο
δ' ούκ εστί μη παιδευομένοις Ίκανώς υπό των g
νόμων, αλλ 'ίσως ε'ίποι αν ο Φαλέα? ότι ταύτα
τυγχάνει λέγων αυτός• οιεται γάρ δυοΐν τούτοιν
ισότητα δεΐν ύπάρχειν ταις πόλεσιν, κτήσεως και
35 παιδεία?, άλλα την [τε] 2 παιδειαν ήτις εσται δει
λέγειν, και το μίαν είναι και την αύτην ούδεν
όφελος, εστί γάρ την αύτην μεν είναι και μίαν
άλλα ταυτην είναι τοιαύτην εξ ης έσονται προ-
1 ol νόμοι: ίνιοι Buecheler: <^ίου$> ol νόμοι Richards.
2 ed.
112
POLITICS, II. ιν. 3-6
for it is difficult for such men not to be advocates
4 of a new order. That a level standard of property
affects the community of the citizens in an important
manner some men even in old times clearly have
recognized ; for example there is the legislation of
Solon, and other states have a law prohibiting the
acquisition of land to any amount that the individual
may desire ; and similarly there is legislation to
prevent the sale of estates, as at Locri there is a law Historic
that a man shall not sell unless he can prove that ^^ e *
manifest misfortune has befallen him ; and also there
is legislation to preserve the old allotments, and the
repeal of this restriction at Leucas made the Leu-
cadian constitution excessively democratic, for it came
about that the offices were no longer filled from the
δ established property-qualifications. But it is possible
that equality of estates may be maintained, but their
size may be either too large and promote luxury, or
too small, causing a penurious standard of living ;
it is clear therefore that it is not enough for the law-
giver to make the estates equal, but he must aim at
securing a medium size. And again, even if one
prescribed a moderate property for all, it would be
of no avail, since it is more needful to level men's
desires than their properties, and this can only be
done by an adequate system of education enforced
6 by law. But perhaps Phaleas would say that he Equali-
himself actually prescribes this, as he considers it ^™j£ tion
fundamentally necessary for states to have equality
in these two things, property and education. But
the nature of the education needs to be defined : it
is no use merely for it to be one and the same for all,
for it is possible for all to have one and the same
education but for this to be of such a nature as to
IIS
ARISTOTLE
aip€TLKOL του πλεονεκτειν η χρημάτων η τιμής η
συναμφοτερων ετι 1 στασιάζουσιν ου μόνον δια τήν 7
ανισότητα της κτήσεως, άλλα και δια τήν των
40 τιμών, τουναντίον δε 7repi εκάτερον οι μεν γαρ
1267 a πολλοί δια τό περί τάς κτήσεις ανισον, οι ok
χαρίεντες περί των τιμών εάν ισαι* όθεν και
εν δε ίη τιμή η μεν κακός ηοέ και εσθλός.
ου μόνον δ' οι άνθρωποι δια τάναγκαΐα άδικοΰσιν,
ών άκος eirai νομίζει την ισότητα της ουσίας,
5 ώστε μη λωποδυτεΐν δια τό ριγούν η πεινην, άλλα
και όπως χαίρωσι και μη επιθυμώσιν εάν γάρ
μείζω εχωσιν επιθυμίαν τών αναγκαίων, δια την
ταύτης ίατρείαν άοικησουσιν ου τοίνυν δια ταύτην
μόνον, άλλα και [αν επιθυμοΐεν] 2 ίνα χαίρωσι ταΐς
άνευ λυπών ηδοναΐς. τί οΰν άκος τών τριών 8
ίο τούτων; τοις μεν ουσία βραχεία και εργασία, τοις
δε σωφροσύνη' τρίτον δ', ει τινβ? βούλοιντο δι
αυτών χαίρειν, ουκ αν επιζητοΐεν ει μη πάρα
φιλοσοφίας άκος, αϊ γάρ άλλαι ανθρώπων δέονται.
επει 3 άδικοΰσί γε τα μέγιστα δια τα? ύπερβολάς,
αλλ* ου δια τά αναγκαία (οίον τυραννοΰσιν ούχ
15 ίνα μη ριγώσιν, διό και αϊ τιμαι /χεγάλαι αν άπο-
κτείνη τις ου κλεπτην άλλα τύραννον)• ώστε προς
τάς μικράς αδικίας βοηθητικός μόνον ό τρόπος
της Φαλεου πολιτείας, ετι τά ττολλά βούλεται 9
1 (τι : έπΐϊ Spengel.
8 Bernays : άνευ επιθυμιών Bojesen.
3 67Γ6Ϊ <δ'> vel ίτι Rassow.
α Probably the Greek should be altered to give ' because '
instead of ' moreover.'
6 Iliad ix. 319.
114
POLITICS, II. ιν. 6-9
make them desirous of getting more than their share
7 of money or honour or both ; moreover α civil strife Equaii-
is caused not only by inequality of property, but also j^ores
bv inequality of honours, though the two motives human
J *■ . . * . ι j• passions
operate in opposite ways — the masses are discon- and
tented if possessions are unequally distributed, the οο 1 ™? 4 "»•
upper classes if honours are equally distributed,
bringing it about that
Noble or base in the like honour stand.*
Nor do men do wrong for the sake of the bare necessi-
ties onlv, the sort of wrongdoing for which Phaleas
thinks that equality of substance is a cure — prevent-
ing highway robbery by removing the motive of cold
or hunger ; men also do wrong to gain pleasure and
to satisfy desire. For if they have a desire above the
bare necessities of existence, they will transgress to
cure this desire ; and moreover not because of desire
only, but in order that they may enjoy the pleasures
8 that are not associated with pains, ^"hat remedy
then is there for these three classes of offences ?
For the first class, a modest competence and work ;
for the second, temperance ; and as for the third
sort, any people who desired pleasures depending
on themselves could seek no cure for their desires
save that which is derived from philosophy, for the
other pleasures require the aid of fellow-creatures.
Since clearly the greatest transgressions spring from
a desire for superfluities, not for bare necessaries
(for example, men do not become tyrants in order
to avoid shivering with cold, and accordingly high
honours are awarded to one who kills a tyrant, but
not to one who kills a thief) ; so that the method of
the constitution of Phaleas is efficacious only against
θ the minor social disorders. Again, Phaleas desires to
115
ARISTOTLE
12678 , Y U Τ , . , χ χ ,
κατασκευαί,ειν ες ων τα προς αυτούς πολιτευσονται
καλώς, δει δε καΐ προς τους γειτνιώντας και τους
20 έξωθεν πάντας. άναγκαΐον άρα την πολιτ€ίαν
συντετάχθαι προς την πολεμικήν ίσχύν, περί ης
εκείνος ούδεν ε'ίρηκεν. ομοίως δε και περί της
κτήσεως- δει γαρ ου μόνον προς τας πολιτικάς
χρήσεις Ικανήν ύπάρχειν, αλλά και προς τους
έζωθεν κινδύνους• διόπερ ούτε τοσούτον δει πλήθος
25 ύπάρχειν ων οι πλησίον και κρείττους επι-
θυμήσουσιν οι δ' έχοντες άμυνειν ου δυνήσονται
τους επιοντας, οϋθ' ούτως όλίγην ώστε μή δύνα-
σίλχι πόλεμον ύπενεγκεΐν μηδέ τών ίσων και τών
ομοίων, εκείνος μεν οΰν ουδέν διώρικεν, δει δε 10
τοϋτο μη λανθάνειν δ τι 1 συμφέρει πλήθος ουσίας.
30 Ίσως ουν άριστος ορός το μή λυσιτελεΐν τοις
κρειττοσι δια. τήν ύπερβολήν πολεμεΐν, αλλ' ούτως
ως αν και μή εχόντων τοσαύτην ούσίαν. οίον
Έιϋβουλος Αύτοφραοάτου μέλλοντος Άταρνεα πολι-
ορκεΐν εκελευσεν αυτόν σκεφάμενον εν πόσω χρόνω
λήφεται το χωρίον λογίσασθαι του χρόνου τούτου
85 τήν δαπάνην, εθελειν γαρ ελαττον τούτου λαβών
εκλιπεΐν ήδη τον Άταρνεα - ταύτα δ' ειπών εποίησε
τον Αύτοφραδάτην σύννουν γενόμενον 77αυσασ<?αι
της πολιορκίας . εστί μεν ουν τι τών συμφερόντων 11
το τας ουσίας ειι^αι ΐσας τοις πολίταις προς το
μη στασιάζειν προς αλλήλους, ου μήν μέγ* ουδέν
1 δ τι Stahr : ΰτι codd.
" A stronghold on the coast of Asia Minor acquired by
Eubulus, a Bithynian banker, when the Persian empire was
breaking up, middle 4th century b.c. ; Autophradates was a
Persian general.
116
POLITICS, II. ιν. 9-11
frame institutions for the most part which will lead to Riches
a right state of affairs in the internal relations of the attack but
citizens, but the legislator should also have reeard poverty
to relations with the neighbouring peoples and with defence»
all foreign nations. It is essential therefore for the
constitution to be framed with a view to military
strength, about which Phaleas has said nothing.
And the same is true also about property ; for the
citizens should not only possess enough to meet their
requirements in civic life, but also to encounter the
perils that face them from outside ; hence they
should possess neither so large an amount of wealth
that it will be coveted by their neighbours and by
stronger states while its possessors will be unable to
repel their assailants, nor yet so small an amount as
not to be capable of sustaining a war even against
10 equal and similar states. Phaleas, it is true, has laid
down no rule at all, but the question must not be
overlooked, what amount of wealth is advantageous.
Perhaps therefore the best limit to prescribe is that
it must not profit a stronger people to make war upon
the state because of its excessive wealth, but only
just as it might do even if the citizens had not got so
much property. For example, when Autophradates
was about to lay siege to Atarneus, Eubulus bade
him consider how long it would take him to capture
the place, and then calculate what his expenditure
would be for that period, for he himself was willing
for the payment of a smaller sum than that to
evacuate Atarneus at once ; these words caused Covetous-
Autophradates to ponder and led him to abandon the c-lirbed'by*
11 siege. Now equality of property among the citizens education,
is certainly one of" the factors" that contribute to ^^ι."" 1
the avoidance of party faction ; it is not however
117
ARISTOTLE
1287 a , , \ \ μ » / >
40 ως ειπείν, και γαρ αν οι χαριεντες αγανακτοΐεν
ώς 1 ουκ ίσων οντες άζιοι, διό και φαίνονται πολ-
1267 b λάκις επιτιθέμενοι και στασιάζοντας- ετι δ' ή
πονηρία των ανθρώπων άπληστον, καΐ το πρώτον
μεν ίκανόν διωβολία μόνον, όταν δ' ήδη tout' η
πάτριον, άει δέονται του πλείονος, εως εις άπειρον
ελθωσιν άπειρος γαρ ή της επιθυμίας φύσις, ής
5 προς την άναπλήρωσιν οι πολλοί ζώσιν. τών οΰν 12
τοιούτων αρχή* μάλλον του τάς ουσίας όμαλίζειν,
το τους μεν επιεικείς τη φύσει τοιούτους παρα-
σκευάζειν ώστε μη βούλεσθαι πλεονεκτεΐν, τους
δέ φαύλους ώστε μη ούνασθαΐ' τούτο δ' εστίν αν
ηττους τε ώσι και μη άδικώνται. ου καλώς ο
ίο ουδέ την ισότητα της ουσίας εΐρηκεν περί γαρ την
της γης κτησιν ίσάζει μόνον, εστί δε και δούλων
και βοσκημάτων πλούτος και νομίσματος, και
κατασκευή πολλή τών καλουμένων επίπλων ή
πάντων οΰν τούτων ισότητα ζητητεον ή τάζιν τίνα
μετρίαν, ή πάντα εατεον. φαίνεται δ' εκ της 13
1δ νομοθεσίας κατασκευάζων τήν πάλιν μικράν, ει γ
οι τεχνΐται πάντες δημόσιοι έσονται και μή πλή-
ρωμα τι παρέχονται της πόλεως, αλλ' ειπερ δει
δημοσίους eimi, τους τά κοινά εργαζομένους δει
(καθάπερ εν Έπιδάμνω τε και ώς 3 Αιόφαντός ποτέ
κατεσκεύαζεν Άθήνησι) τούτον εχειν τον τρόπον.
so ΪΙερι μεν οΰν της Φαλεου πολιτείας σχεδόν εκ
1 ώί MP: hv ώ$ cet.
* &kos Schneider : άρω-γη Vermehren.
3 καΐ ώ? Morel: και codd.
" Twopence-halfpenny for a seat in the theatre at Athens
paid for citizens by the State after the time of Pericles.
118
POLITICS, II. ιν. 11-13
a particularly important one. For the upper classes
may resent it on the ground that their merits are not
equal, owing to which we actually see them often
attacking the government and rebelling ; and also
the baseness of human beings is a thing insatiable,
and though at the first a dole of only two obols a is
enough, yet when this has now become an established
custom, they always want more, until thev get to
an unlimited amount ; for appetite is in its nature
unlimited, and the majority of mankind live for the
12 satisfaction of appetite. The starting-point in such
matters therefore, rather than levelling estates, is to
train those that are respectable by nature so that
they may not wish for excessive wealth, and to con-
trive that the base may not be able to do so, and
this is secured if they are kept inferior, while not
unjustly treated. And also we cannot approve what
Phaleas has said about equality of property, for he Personal
makes the citizens equal in respect of landed estate uf^yj,
only, but wealth also consists in slaves and cattle and landed
money, and there is an abundance of property in the control
shape of what is called furniture ; we must therefore
either seek to secure equality or some moderate regu-
lation as regards all these things, or we must permit
13 all forms of wealth. And it is clear from Phaleas's
legislation that he makes the citizen-population a
small one, inasmuch as all the artisans are to be
publicly owned slaves and are not to contribute to
the complement of the state. But if it is proper to
have public slaves, it is the labourers emploved upon
the public works who ought to be of that status (as is
the case at Epidamnus and as Diophantus once tried
to institute at Athens).
These remarks may serve fairly well to indicate
Π9
ARISTOTLE
1267 b
τούτων αν τις θεωρησειεν ε'ί τι τνγχάνει καλώς
είρηκώς η μη καλώς.
V. Ίππόδαμος δέ Έιύρυφώντος Μιλησιος (ος καΐ 1
την τών πόλεων οιαίρεσιν ενρε και τον Πειραιά
κατετεμεν, γ€νόμ€νος και περί τον άλλον βίον
25 περιττότερος διά φιλοτιμίαν όντως ώστε δοκεΐν
ενίοις ζην περιεργότερον τριχών τε πληθει και
κόσμω πολντελεΐ, 1 en δε εσθήτος* εντελούς μεν
άλεεινης δε ονκ εν τω χειρ,ώνι μόνον αλλά και
περί τονς θερινούς χρόνονς, λόγιος δέ και περί
την δλην φνσιν είναι βονλόμενος) πρώτος τών μη
so πολιτενομενων ενεχείρησε τι περί πολιτεία? ειπείν
της αρίστης, κατεσκεναζε δέ την πόλιν τω πλήθει 2
μεν μνρίανδρον, εις τρία δέ μέρη οιηρημενην
εποίει γάρ εν μεν μέρος τεχνίτας, εν δέ γεωργούς,
τρίτον δέ το προπολεμονν και τα. όπλα έχον.
Βιηρει δ' εις τρία μέρη την χώραν, την μεν ιεράν
85 την δέ δημόσιον την δ ιδίαν όθεν μεν τα νομι-
ζόμενα ποιησονσι προς τονς θεονς, ίεράν, αφ ών ο
οι προπολεμονντες βιώσονται, κοινην, την δέ τών
γεωργών ιδίαν, ωετο δ' είδη και τών νόμων είναι
τρία μόνον περί ών γάρ αϊ δίκαι γίνονται, τρία
ταντ είναι τον αριθμόν, νβριν βλάβην θάνατον.
40 ενομοθετει δέ και οικαστηριον εν το κνριον εις ο 3
πάσας άνάγεσθαι δεϊν τάς μη καλώς κεκρισθαι
δοκονσας δίκας, τοΰτο δέ κατεσκεναζεν εκ τινών
1268a γερόντων αιρετών, τάς δέ κρίσεις εν τοις δι/αχ -
στηρίοις ον διά ψηφοφορίας ωετο γινεσθαι οεΐν,
1 κόσμφ πο\υτ€λ€Ϊ codd. aliqui : κόμης ΓΜΡ 1 .
2 ϊσθ-ητο* <χρήσ€ΐ> ? Richards.
° Architect and town-planner (see 1330 b 24), c. 475 b.c.
This personal sketch anticipates the manner of Theophrastus.
120
POLITICS, II. ιν. 13— v. 3
such merits and defects as may be contained in the
constitution of Phaleas.
1 V. Hippodamus α son of Euryphon, a Milesian Constitn
(who invented the division of cities into blocks and Hippo-
cut up Piraeus, and who also became somewhat d »nius.
eccentric in his general mode of life owing to a desire
for distinction, so that some people thought that he
lived too fussily, with a quantity of hair b and expen-
sive ornaments, and also a quantity of cheap yet
warm clothes not only in winter but also in the
summer periods, and who wished to be a man of
learning in natural science generally), was the first
man not engaged in politics who attempted to speak
2 on the subject of the best form of constitution. His Three
system was for a city with a population of ten
thousand, divided into three classes ; for he made
one class of artisans, one of farmers, and the third
the class that fought for the state in war and was the
armed class. He divided the land into three parts, «*"*
one sacred, one public and one private : sacred land n '
to supply the customary offerings to the gods, com-
mon land to provide the warrior class with food, and
private land to be owned by the farmers. He thought three
that there are only three divisions of the law, since naw 0I1S
the matters about which lawsuits take place are
3 three innumber — outrage, damage, homicide. Healso Judicial
proposed to establish one supreme court of justice, system •
to which were to be carried up all the cases at law
thought to have been decided wrongly, and this
court he made to consist of certain selected elders.
He held that the verdicts in the courts ought not to
be given by ballot, but that each juryman should
* At Sparta men wore their hair long, but at Athens this
was the mark of a dandy.
121
ARISTOTLE
άλλα φερειν εκαστον πινάκιον, εν ω γράφειν, ει
καταδικάζοι απλώς, την δίκην, ει δ' άπολύοι
6 απλώς, κενόν, 1 ει δε το μεν το δε μη, τοΰτο δι-
οριζειν νυν γαρ ουκ ωετο νενομοθετησθαι καλώς,
άναγκάζειν γαρ επιορκεΐν η ταύτα η ταϋτα δικά-
ζοντας, ετίθει δε νόμον π€ρΙ τών εύρισκόντων τι 4
τη πόλ€ΐ συμφέρον, όπως τυγχάνωσι τιμής, και
τοις παισι τών εν τω πολεμώ τελευτώντων εκ
δημοσίου γίνεσΒαι την τροφην, ώς ούπω τοΰτο
ίο παρ άλλοις νενομοθετημενον εστί δε και ev
'Α#7ραι? οΰτος 6 νόμος νυν και ev έτεραις τών
πόλεων, τους δ' άρχοντας αίρ€τούς υπό του δήμου
είναι πάντας, δήμον δ' εποίει τά τρία μέρη της
πόλεως• τους δ' αίρεθεντας επιμελεΖσθαι κοινών
και ξενικών και όρφανικών. τά μεν ουν πλ€Ϊστα
ΐδ και τά μάλιστα αξιόλογα της Ίπποδάμου τάξεως
ταϋτ εστίν. άπορήσ€ΐ€ δ' άν τις πρώτον μεν την 5
διαίρεσιν του πλήθους τών πολιτών, οι τ€ γάρ
τ€χνΐται και οι γεωργοί και οι τά όπλα έχοντες
κοινωνοΰσι της πολιτεία? πάντες, οι μεν γεωργοί
ουκ έχοντες όπλα, οι δε τεχνΐται ούτε γην οϋτ€
20 όπλα, ώστε γίνονται σχεδόν δοΰλοι τών τά όπλα
κεκτημένων, μετέχειν μεν ουν πασών τών τιμών
αδύνατον {ανάγκη γάρ εκ τών τά όπλα εχόντων
καθίστασθαι και στρατηγούς και πολιτοφύλακας
και τάς κυριωτάτας αρχάς ώς είπεΐν)• μη μετ-
έχοντας δε της πολιτείας πώς οΐόν τε φιλικώς εχειν
1 κενόν <έαν> Meier.
122
POLITICS, II. v. 3-6
bring a tablet on which if he found a simple verdict
of guilty he should write the penalty, and if simply
not guilty leave a blank, but if he found the prisoner
guilty on some counts but not on others he should
state this ; for the present state of the law he thought
unsatisfactory, since it forces jurors to commit perjury
4 by giving either the one verdict or the other. He pro- Rewards for
posed a law that those who discovered something of ^gir^aity.
advantage to the state should receive honour, and
that the children of those who died in war should war-
have their maintenance from the state, in the belief or P han8 •
that this had never yet been provided by law among
other people — but as a matter of fact this law exists
at present both at Athens and in others of the cities.
The governing officials were all to be chosen by the Electing
assembly of the people, and this he made to consist assem ly '
of the three classes of the city ; and the officials
elected were to superintend the business of the
community and the affairs of foreign residents and
of orphans. These then are the greatest number and
the most noteworthy of the provisions in the system
5 of Hippodamus. But doubt might be raised first of Criticism
all about the division of the general mass of the statTitioiToi
citizens. The artisans, the farmers and the military Hippo-
class all participate in the government, though the soldiers
farmers have not got arms and the artisans neither ^the sole
arms nor land, which makes them almost the slaves citizens ;
of those who possess the arms. Therefore for them
to share in all the offices is impossible (for it is inevi-
table that both military commanders and civic guards
and in general the most important offices should be
appointed from those that have the arms) ; but if
they do not share in the government of the state,
how is it possible for them to be friendly towards the
123
ARISTOTLE
Μ προς την πολιτειαν ; αλλά δει κρείττους είναι τους q
τα όπλα γε κεκτημένους αμφοτέρων των μερών,
τοϋτο δ' ου ράδιον μη πο?ίλούς οντάς, ει δε τοΰτ
εσται, τι δει τους άλλους μετεχειν της πολιτείας
καΐ κυρίους είναι της των αρχόντων καταστάσεως ;
ετι οι γεωργοί τι χρήσιμοι τη πόλει; τεχνίτας
80 μεν γαρ άναγκαιον είναι (πάσα γαρ δειται πόλις
τεχνιτών), και δύνανται οιαγίγνεσθαι καθάπερ εν
ταΐς αλλαι? πόλεσιν από της τέχνης• οι δε γεωργοί
πορίζοντες μεν τοις τα όπλα κεκτημενοις την
τροφην ευλόγως αν ήσαν τι της πόλεως μέρος, νυν
as δ' ιδίαν εχουσιν και ταύτην Ιδία γεωργοΰσιν. ετι 7
δε την κοινήν, άφ' ής οι π ροπολε μουντές εζουσι
την τροφην, ει μεν αυτοί γεωργήσουσιν , ουκ αν
εΐη το μάχιμον έτερον και το γεωργοΰν, βούλεται
δ' ό νομοθέτης• ει δ έτεροι τίνες έσονται τών τε
τα ίδια γεωργουντων και τών μαχίμων, τέταρτον
40 αυ μόριον εσται τοΰτο της πόλεως, ούδενός μετ-
εχον αλλ' αλλότριοι της πολιτείας, άλλα μην ει
τις τους αυτούς θήσει τους τε την ιδίαν και τους
την κοινην γεωργοΰντας, τό τε πλήθος άπορον
1268 b εσται τών καρπών εζ ων έκαστος γεωργήσει δύο
οίκίαις, 1 και τίνος ένεκεν ουκ ευθύς άπό τής γής και
τών αυτών κλήρων αύτοΐς τε την τροφην λήφονται
και τοΐς μαχίμοις παρεζουσιν ; ταύτα δη πάντα g
πολλήν έχει ταραχήν. ου καλώς δ' ουδ' ο περί
δ τής κρίσεως έχει νόμος, τό κρίνειν άζιοΰν διαιρούντα
1 Ross : οικία? codd.
β As military posts must be filled by the military class,
civilians will feel excluded and be disaffected ; and the
military class may not be strong enough to control them.
Better, then, not to give full citizenship to civilians.
124
POLITICS, II. v. 6-8
6 constitution ? But it may be said that the ruling
class as possessing the arms is bound to be stronger
than both classes. But this is not easy if they are
not numerous ; and if this be the case, why should
the other classes participate in the government and
control the appointment of the rulers a ? Again, what
use are the farmers to the state ? artisans there must
necessarily be (for every state requires artisans), and
thev can make a living as in the other states from
the practice of their craft ; but as for the farmers,
although it would have been reasonable for them
to be a portion of the state if they provided the class
possessing the arms with its food, as it is they have
private land of their own and farm it for themselves.
7 And again, if the common land from which those who land-tenure
fight for the state are to have their food is to be farmed ° "" '
by themselves, the military class would not be different
from the agricultural, but the legislator intends it to
be ; while if the cultivators of the common land are
to be a different set of people from both those who
cultivate the private farms and the soldiers, this will
be yet a fourth section of the state, holding no part
in it but quite estranged from the government. But
yet if one is to make those who cultivate the private
and the common land the same people, the amount
of the produce from the farms which each man will
cultivate will be scanty for two households, and
moreover why are they not both to take food for
themselves and to supply it to the soldiers direct
g from the land and from the same allotments ? All qualified
these points therefore involve much confusion. Also unworkable,•
the law about trials is unsatisfactory — the permission
for a qualified verdict though the charge in the indict-
125
ARISTOTLE
1268 b „ , < \ ~ ι \ ι a !
της κρίσεως απλώς γεγραμμενης, και γινεσυαι τον
δικαστήν διαιτητήν. τοΰτο δ εν μεν τη οιοατΎ)
και πλείοσιν ενδέχεται {κοινολογούνται γαρ άλλή-
λοις περί της κρίσεως), εν δε τοις δικασιτηριοις
ουκ εστίν, άλλα και τουναντίον τούτω των νομο-
10 θετών οι πολλοί παρασκενάζονσιν όπως οι δικασται
μη κοινολογώνται προς αλλήλους . έπειτα πώς ουκ 9
εσται ταραχώδης η κρίσις όταν όφείλειν μεν ο
δικαστής οΐηται μη τοσούτον δ' όσον 6 δικαζόμενος ;
6 μεν γαρ είκοσι μνας, ο δε δικαστής κρίνει 1 δέκα
μνας (η 6 μεν πλέον 6 δ' έλασσον), άλλος δε
15 πέντε, 6 δε τετταρας [και τούτον δη τον τρόπον
δηλον οτι μεριοϋσιν) , οι δε πάντα καταδικάσουσιν ,
οι δ' ούδεν τις οΰν 6 τρόπος εσται της διαλογής
τών ψήφων; ετι δ' ούδει? επιορκεΐν αναγκάζει
τον απλώς άποδικάσαντα ή καταδικάσαντα, ειπερ
απλώς το έγκλημα γεγραπται, δικαίως 2 ' ου γαρ
20 μηδέν όφείλειν ο άποδικάσας κρίνει άλλα τάς
είκοσι μνάς• άλλ' εκείνος ηδη επιορκεΐ ο κατα-
δικάσας μη νομίζων όφείλειν τάς είκοσι μνας.
περί δε του τοις εύρίσκουσί τι τη πόλει συμφέρον 10
ως δει γίνεσθαί τίνα τιμήν, ουκ εστίν ασφαλές το
νομοθετεΐν, άλλ' εύόφθαλμον άκοΰσαι μόνον έχει
25 γάρ συκοφαντίας και κινήσεις, αν τύχη, πολιτείας,
εμπίπτει δ' εις άλλο πρόβλημα και σκεφιν ετεραν
1 κρίνει Bekker : κρίνα codd. 2 [δικαίως] ? Greenwood.
The mina, 100 drachmas, may be put at £4• (gold).
126
POLITICS, II. v. &-10
ment is unqualified, and the conversion of the juror
into an arbitrator. A qualified verdict is practicable
in an arbitration even when there are several arbi-
trators , for they confer with one another about their
verdict; but it is not practicable in the law-courts,
in fact the contrary to this is provided for bv most
lawgivers, who prohibit consultation between the
9 jurymen. Then the verdict will inevitablv be a con-
fused one when the juror thinks that the defendant
is liable for damages but not in so large an amount
as the plaintiff claims ; for the plaintiff will sue for
twenty minae α and the juror will adjudge ten minae
(or the former some larger and the latter some
smaller sum), and another juror five minae, and vet
another four (and they obviously make fractions
like this), while others will award the whole sum,
and others nothing ; what then will be the method
of counting the votes ? Again, nobody compels
the juror to commit perjury who, as the indictment
has been drawn in simple form, gives a simple ver-
dict of acquittal or condemnation, if he gives it
justly ; for the juror who gives a verdict of acquittal
does not give judgement that the defendant
owes nothing, but that he does not owe the
twenty minae for which he is sued ; it is only the
juror who gives a verdict condemning the defendant
when he does not think that he owes twentv minae
10 who commits perjury. As for the view that an reward tot
honour ought to be awarded to those who invent S^ntToM
something advantageous to the state, legislation to dangerous,
this effect is not safe, but only specious to the ear ;
for it involves malicious prosecutions and, it mav even
happen, constitutional upheavals. And the matter conserva-
leads to another problem and a different inquiry : *j s ™ "• .
127 genera1 •
ARISTOTLE
αποροΰσι γάρ τίνες πότερον βλαβερόν η συμφέρον
ταΐς πόλεσι το κινεΐν τους πατρίους νόμους αν $
τις άλλος βελτίων. διόπερ ου ράοιον τω λεχθεντι
30 ταχύ συγχωρεΐν, εΐπερ μη συμφέρει Kiveiv ενδέ-
χεται δ είσηγεΐσθαί τινας νόμων λύσιν η πολιτείας
ώς κοινόν ά}/α#όΐΛ επει δε πεποιημεθα μνείαν, ετι 1]
μικρά περί αύτοΰ διαστείλασθαι βελτιον, έχει yap,
ώσπερ εΐπομεν, άττορίαν. και δόζειεν αν βελτιον
eimi το κινεΐν επί γοΰν των άλλων επιστημών
35 τούτο συνενηνοχεν , οΐον ιατρική κινηθείσα παρά τά
πάτρια και γυμναστική και δλως αϊ re^mi πάσαι
καΐ αϊ δυνάμεις• ωστ επει μίαν τούτων θετεον
και την πολιτικήν, δηλον δτι και περί ταύτην
άναγκαΐον ομοίως εχειν. σημεΐον δ' αν γεγονεναι
φαίη τις επ* αυτών των έργων, τους γάρ αρχαίους
ιο νόμους λίαν άπλοΰς είναι και βαρβαρικούς• εσι-
δηροφοροϋντό τε γάρ οι "Ελληνες και τάς γυναίκας
εωνοϋντο παρ αλλήλων, οσα τε λοιπά των αρχαίων 12
1269 a εστί που νομίμων εύήθη πάμπαν εστίν, οΐον εν
Κύμη περί τά φονικά νόμος εστίν, αν πληθός τι
παράσχηται μαρτύρων ο διώκων τον φόνον των
αύτοΰ συγγενών, ενοχον είναι τω φόνω τον φεύ-
γοντα. ζητοΰσι δ' δλως ου το πάτριον άλλα
5 Taya^ov' πάντες• εικός τε τους πρώτους, είτε
128
POLITICS, II. v. 10-12
some persons raise the question whether to alter the
traditional laws, supposing another law is better, is
harmful or advantageous to states. Hence it is not
easy to give a speedy agreement to the above
proposal to honour reformers, if really it is disadvan-
tageous to alter the laws ; and a revolutionary legal
or constitutional proposal in the interest of the com-
11 munity is quite possible. And since we have made
mention of this question, it will be better if we set
out a few further details about it, for, as we said, it
involves difficulty. And it might be thought that it
would be better for alteration to take place ; at all
events in the other fields of knowledge this has proved
beneficial — for example, medicine has been improved
by being altered from the traditional system, and
gymnastic training, and in general all the arts and
faculties ; so that since statesmanship also is to be
counted as one of these, it is clear that the same thing
necessarily holds good in regard to it as well. And it
might be said that a sign of this has occurred in the
actual events of history, for (one might argue) the laws
of ancient times were too simple and uncivilized : the
Hellenes, for instance, used both to carry arms and to
12 purchase their wives from one another, and all the
survivals of the customs of antiquity existing any-
where are utterly foolish, as for example at Cyme
there is a law relating to trials for murder, that if
the prosecutor on the charge of murder produces a
certain number of his own relatives as witnesses, the
defendant is guilty of the murder. And in general
all men really seek what is good, not what was
customary with their forefathers ; and it is probable
that primitive mankind, whether sprung from the
129
ARISTOTLE
1269 a
γηγενείς ήσαν είτ εκ φθοράς τινός εσώθησαν,
όμοιους €lvcll και τους τυχόντας και τους ανόητους,
ώσπερ και λέγεται κατά των γηγενών, ώστ'
άτοπον το μενειν εν τοις τούτων δόγμασιν. προς
δε τούτοις ούοε τους γεγραμμενους εάν ακίνητους
βελτιον. ώσπερ γαρ και περί τάς άλλας τεχνας,
ίο και την πολιτικην τάξιν αδύνατον ακριβώς πάντα
γραφηι>αι• καθόλου γαρ άναγκαΐον γραφηναι, αϊ δε
πράξεις περί τών καθ* εκαστόν είσιν. εκ μεν ούν
τούτων φανερόν δτι κινητεοι και τίνες και ποτέ
τών νόμων εισιν. άλλον δε τρόπον επισκοποΰσιν 13
15 ευλάβειας αν δόξειεν είναι πολλής, όταν γαρ η το
μεν βελτιον μικρόν, το δ' εθίζειν ευχερώς λύειν
τους νόμους φαΰλον, φανερόν ως εατεον ενίας
αμαρτίας και τών νομοθετών και τών αρχόντων
ου γαρ τοσούτον ωφελήσεται κινησας όσον βλα-
/Jrjaerai τοις άρχουσιν άπειθεΐν εθισθείς, φεύδος δε 14
και το παράδειγμα το περί τών τεχνών ου γαρ
20 όμοιον το κινεϊν τεχνην και νόμον 6 γαρ νόμος
ισχύν ούδεμίαν έχει προς το πείθεσθαι πλην παρά
το εθος , τούτο δ' ου γίνεται ει μη δια χρόνου
πλήθος, ώστε το ραδίως μεταβάλλειν εκ τών
υπαρχόντων νόμων εις έτερους νόμους καινούς
25 ασθενή ποιεΐν εστί την τοΰ νόμου δυνα/χιν. ετι
δ ει και κινητεοι, πότερον και πάντες και εν
πάση πολιτεία, η ου; και πότερον τω τυχόντι
η τισίν; ταύτα γάρ έχει μεγάλην διαφοράν. διό
α So Hesiod, W.D. 108, Pindar, Nem. 6. 1.
» So Plato, Laws 676 ff., Timaeus 22 ff. Aristotle believed
that man had existed for ever, and that the world had ex-
perienced only local cataclysms.
130
POLITICS, II. v. 12-14
earth a or the survivors of some destructive cataclysm,
were just like ordinary foolish people, as indeed is
actually said of the earth-born race, so that would be
absurd for us to abide by their notions. Moreover
even written codes of law may with advantage not be
left unaltered. For just as in the other arts as well,
so with the structure of the state it is impossible that
it should have been framed aright in all its details ;
for it must of necessity be couched in general terms,
but our actions deal with particular things. These
considerations then do seem to show that it is proper
13 for some laws sometimes to be altered. But if we
consider the matter in another way, it would seem
to be a thing that needs much caution. For in
cases when the improvement would be small, while
it is a bad thing to accustom men to repeal the laws
lightlv, it is clear that some mistakes both of the
legislator and of the magistrate should be passed
over ; for the people will not be as much benefited
bv making an alteration as they will be harmed
by becoming accustomed to distrust their rulers.
14 Also the example from the case of the arts is fal-
lacious, as to change the practice of an art is a
different thing from altering a law ; for the law has
no power to compel obedience beside the force of
c ustom , and custom only grows up in long lapse of
time, so that lightly to change from the existing laws
to other new laws is to weaken the power of the law.
Again, even if alteration of the laws is proper, are
all the laws to be open to alteration, and in every
form of constitution, or not ? and is any chance person
to be competent to introduce alterations or only
certain people ? for there is a great difference between
these alternatives. Therefore let us abandon this
131
ARISTOTLE
νυν μεν άφώμεν ταύτην την σκέφιν άλλων γαρ
έστι καιρών.
VI. Περί δε της Κακοδαιμονιών πολιτείας και 1
so της Κρητικής, σχεδόν δε και περί των άλλων
πολιτειών, δυο είσϊν αϊ σκέφεις, αια μεν ει τι
καλώ? η μη καλώς προς την άρίστην νενομοθετηται
τάζιν, έτερα δ' et τι προς την ύπόθεσιν και τον
τρόπον ύπεναντίως 1 της προκείμενης αντοΐς
πολιτείας.
"Οτι μεν οΰν δει τή μελλονση καλώς πολιτεύε- 2
85 σ0αι την τών αναγκαίων ύπάρχειν σχολην όμολογον-
μενόν εστίν tiW 8ε τρόπον νπάρχειν, ον ράδιον
λαβεΐν. η τε γαρ Θετταλών πενεστεία πολλάκις
επεθετο τοις θετταλοΐς, ομοίως δέ και τοις
Αάκωσιν οί Έιΐλωτες (ώσπερ γαρ έφεδρεύοντες
τοις άτνχημασι διατελοΰσιν) • περί δέ τους Κρήτας 3
40 ουδέν πω τοιούτον σνμβέβηκεν. αίτιον δ' ίσως το
i269 b τάς γειτνιώσας πόλεις, καίπερ πόλε μούσας άλλη-
λαις, μηδεμίαν είναι σύμμαχον τοις άφισταμε-
νοις δια το μη συμφέρειν και ανταΐς κεκτημεναις
περιοίκους• τοις δε Αάκωσιν οί γειτνιώντες εχθροί
πάντες ήσαν, Άργεΐοι και Μεσσηνιοι και Άρ-
5 κάδες' επεί και τοις Θετταλοΐς κατ αρχάς άφ-
ίσταντο διά το πολεμεΐν έτι τοις προσχώροις,
Άχαιοΐς και ΐίερραιβοΐς και Μάγνησιν. έοικε δέ 4
και ει μηδέν έτερον, άλλα τό γε της επιμελείας
εργώδες είναι, nVa δει προς αυτούς ομιλήσαι
τρόπον άνιέμενοί τε γαρ ύβρίζουσι και τών ίσων
ίο άξιοίσιν εαυτούς τοις κυρίοις, και κακοπαθώς
1 <#> ύπει/αντίω* Scaliger.
132
POLITICS, II. v. 14— νι. 4
inquiry for the present, since it belongs to other
occasions.
1 VI. On the subject of the constitution of Sparta Spartan
and that of Crete, and virtually in regard to the other ti0IU
forms of constitution also, the questions that arise for
consideration are two, one whether their legal struc-
ture has anv feature that is admirable or the reverse
in comparison with the best system, another whether
it contains any provision that is really opposed to
the fundamental principle and character of the con-
stitution that the founders had in view.
2 Xow it is a thing admitted that a state that is to Social
be well governed must be provided with leisure from Η β ίοο 8 "
menial occupations ; but how this is to be provided system
it is not easy to ascertain. The serf class in Thessaly badly.
repeatedly rose against its masters, and so did the
Helots at Sparta, where they are like an enemy con-
stantly sitting in wait for the disasters of the Sparti-
3 ates. Nothing of the kind has hitherto occurred
in Crete, the reason perhaps being that the neigh-
bouring cities, even when at war with one another,
in no instance ally themselves with the rebels, be-
cause as they themselves also possess a serf class this
would not be for their interest ; whereas the Laco-
nians were entirely surrounded by hostile neighbours,
Argives, Messenians and Arcadians. For with the
Thessalians too the serf risings originally began
because they were still at war with their neighbours,
4 the Achaeans, Perrhaebi and Magnesians. Also,
apart from other drawbacks, the mere necessity of
policing their serf class is a troublesome matter —
the problem of how intercourse with them is to be
carried on : if allowed freedom they grow insolent
and claim to be as good as their masters, and if
133
ARISTOTLE
1289 b γ „ > ο λ / ^ - c.~\ τ»
ςω^τβ? επιρουλευουσι και μισουσιν. οηλον ουν ως
ουκ εξευρίσκουσι τον βελτιστον τρόπον οΐς τοΰτο
συμβαίνει περί την είλωτείαν. ετι δ' ή wept τάς 5
γυναίκας άνεσις καΐ προς την προαίρεσιν της
πολιτείας βλαβερά και προς εύδαιμονίαν πόλεως•
15 ωσπερ γαρ οικίας μέρος άνηρ και γυνή, δήλον δτι
και πολιν εγγύς του δίχα διηρήσθαι δει νομίζειν
εις τε το των ανδρών πλήθος και το των γυναικών,
ωστ εν οσαις πολιτειαις φαύλως έχει το περί τάς
γυναίκας το ήμισυ της πόλεως etVcu δει νομίζειν
ανομοθετητον. όπερ εκεί συμβεβι^κεν δλην γάρ
20 την πόλιν ο νομοθέτης είναι βουλόμενος καρτερικήν,
κατά μεν τους άνδρας φανερός εστί τοιούτος ων,
επι δε τών γυναικών εζημεληκεν ζώσι γάρ άκο-
λάστως 1 προς άπασαν άκολασίαν και τρυφερώς.
ωστ άναγκαΐον εν τη τοιαύτη πολιτεία, τι/χασ^αι 6
25 τον πλοΰτον, άλλως τε καν τύχωσι γυναικο κρατού-
μενοι, καθάπερ τα πολλά τών στρατιωτικών και
πολεμικών γενών, εξω Κελτών ή καν ει τίνες
έτεροι φανερώς τετιμηκασι την προς τους άρρενας
συνουσιαν. εοικε γάρ ο μυθολογησας πρώτος ουκ
άλόγως συζεΰξαι τον "Αρη προς την Άφροδίτην
so η γάρ προς την τών αρρένων ομιλίαν η προς την
τών γυναικών φαίνονται κατακώχιμοι πάντες οι
τοιούτοι, διό παρά τοις Αάκωσι τοΰθ' ύπήρχεν, Τ
και 7τολλά διωκεΐτο υπό τών γυναικών επι της
αρχής αυτών καίτοι τι διαφέρει γυναίκας άρχειν
η τους άρχοντας υπό τών γυναικών άρχεσθαι;
1 άνΐίμένως ? Richards.
β The textual emendation giving ' live without restraint ' is
probably correct.
134
POLITICS, II. νι. 4-7
made to live a hard life they plot against them and
hate them. It is clear therefore that those whose
helot-system works out in this way do not discover
5 the best mode of treating the problem. Again, the Freedom
freedom in regard to women is detrimental both in tneir
regard to the purpose of the constitution and in licence,
o * * ji . undue
regard to the happiness of the state. For just as influence,
man and wife are part of a household, it is clear that fawieeenesit
the state also is divided nearly in half into its male
and female population, so that in all constitutions in
which the position of the women is badly regulated
one half of the state must be deemed to have been
neglected in framing the law. And this has taken
place in the state under consideration, for the law-
giver wishing the whole community to be hardy
displays his intention clearly in relation to the men,
but in the case of the women has entirely neglected
the matter ; for they live dissolutely a in respect of
6 every sort of dissoluteness, and luxuriously. So that
the inevitable result is that in a state thus constituted
wealth is held in honour, especially if it is the
case that the people are under the sway of their
women, as most of the military and warlike races are,
except the Celts and such other races as have openly
held in honour attachments between males. For
it appears that the original teller of the legend
had good reason for uniting Ares with Aphrodite,
for all men of martial spirit appear to be attracted
to the companionship either of male associates or
7 of women. Hence this characteristic existed among
the Spartans, and in the time of their empire many
things were controlled by the women ; yet what
difference does it make whether the women rule or
the rulers are ruled by the women ? The result is
135
ARISTOTLE
1269 b > \ > η , > S > u
&> ταυτο γαρ συμραινει. χρήσιμου ο ονσης της
θρασύτητος προς ού8εν τών εγκυκλίων, αλλ' ε'ίπερ,
προς τον πόλ€μον, βλαβ€ρώταται καΐ προς ταυ#
αϊ των Αακώνων ήσαν ε8ήλωσαν δ' επί της των 1
Θηβαίων εμβολής, χρήσιμοι μεν γαρ ού8εν ήσαν,
ωσπερ εν ετεραις πόλεσιν, θόρυβον 8ε παρεΐχον
40 πλειω των πολεμίων. εζ αρχής μεν ουν εοικε 8
συμβεβηκεναι τοις Αάκωσιν ευλόγως ή των γυ-
1270 a ναικών άνεσις, εζω γαρ τής οικείας δια τάς
στρατείας άπεζενοΰντο πολύν χρόνον, πολεμοΰντες
τον τε προς Άργείους πόλεμον και πάλιν τον προς
'Αρκάδα? και Μεσσηνίους• σχολάσαντες 8ε αυτούς
6 μεν παρεΐχον τω νομοθέτη προω8οπεποιημενους
οιά τον στρατιωτικών β'ιον (πολλά γάρ έχει μέρη
τής αρετής), τάς 8ε γυναίκας φασι μεν άγειν επι-
χειρήσαι τον Αυκοΰργον υπό τους νόμους, ως ο
άντεκρουον, άποστήναι πάλιν. αίτίαι μεν ουν 9
είσιν αύται των γενομένων, ώστε 8ήλον οτι και
ίο ταύτης τής αμαρτίας• αλλ' ημείς ου τοϋτο σκοπού -
μεν, τίνι 8εΐ συγγνώμην εχειν ή μη εχειν, άλλα
περί του ορθώς και μη ορθώς, τα 8ε περί τάς
γυναίκας έχοντα μη καλώς εοικεν, ώσπερ ελέχθη
και πρότερον, ου μόνον άπρεπειάν τίνα ποιεΐν τής
πολιτείας αυτής καθ' αυτήν, άλλα συμβάΧλεσθαι
τι προς την φιλοχρηματίαν. μετά γάρ τα νυν 10
ρηθεντα τοις περί την άι^ωααλιαν τής κτήσεως
επιτιμήσειεν αν τι?, τοις μεν γάρ αυτών συμ-
βεβηκε κεκτήσθαι πολλήν λίαν ούσίαν, τοις 8ε
ττάμπαν μικράν 8ιόπερ εις ολίγους ήκεν ή χώρα.
1 των om. codd. plurimi.
° Under Epaminondas, 369 B.C.
136
POLITICS, II. νι. 7-10
the same. And although bravery is of service for
none of the regular duties of life, but if at all, in war,
even in this respect the Spartans' women were most
harmful ; and they showed this at the time of the
Theban invasion, for they rendered no useful service,
like the women in other states, while they caused
8 more confusion than the enemy. It is true therefore
that at the outset the freedom allowed to women
at Sparta seems to have come about with good
reason, for the Spartans used to be away in exile
abroad for long periods on account of their military
expeditions, both when righting the war against
the Argives and again during the war against the
Arcadians and Messenians, and when they had
turned to peaceful pursuits, they handed over them-
selves to the lawgiver already prepared for obedience
by military life (for this has many elements of virtue),
but as for the women, though it is said Lycurgus
did attempt to bring them under the laws, yet since
9 they resisted he gave it up. So the Spartan women
are, it is true, to blame for what took place then
and therefore manifestly for the present defect ; al-
though for our own part we are not considering who
deserves excuse or does not, but what is right or
wrong in the constitution as it is. But, as was also
said before, errors as regards the status of women
seem not onlv to cause a certain unseemliness
in the actual conduct of the state but to contri-
10 bute in some degree to undue love of money. For concentra-
next to the things just spoken of one might cen- p°°J?rtv
sure the Spartan institutions with respect to the and decline
unequal distribution of wealth. It has come about °ion? P *"
that some of the Spartans own too much property
and some extremely little ; owing to which the land
f 137
ARISTOTLE
1270 a ~£\ \£\~ / / ι /\
τούτο oe και οια των νομών τετακται φαυλως•
20 ων€Ϊσθαι μεν γαρ ή πωλεΐν την ύπάρχονσαν
έποίησεν ου καλόν, ορθώς ποιήσας, διδοναι δε
καΐ καταλείπειν έζουσίαν έδωκε τοις βουλομενοις'
καίτοι, τούτο συμβαίνειν άναγκαΐον εκείνως τ€ και
οϋτως. εστί δε και των γυναικών σχεδόν της πάσης 11
χώρας τών πέντε μερών τα. δυο, τών τ' έπικληρων
25 πολλών γινομένων και δια τό προίκας διδοναι
μεγάλας• καίτοι βέλτιον ην μηδεμίαν η όλίγην
η και μετρίαν τετάχθαι. 1 νυν δ' έξεστι δοΰναί
Τ€ την έπικληρον οτω αν βούληται, καν αποθάνη
μη διαθεμένος, ον αν καταλίπη κληρονόμον , οΰτος
ω αν θέλη δίδωσιν. τοιγαροΰν δυναμένης της
so χώρας χίλιους ιππείς τρέφειν και πεντακόσιους
και όπλίτας τρισμυρίους, ουδέ χίλιοι τό πλήθος
ήσαν. γέγονε δε δια τών έργων αυτών δήλον ότι 12
φαύλως αύτοΐς είχε τα περί την τάζιν ταύτην
μίαν γαρ πληγην ούχ ύπήνεγκεν ή πόλις, αλλ'
άπώλετο δια την όλιγανθρωπίαν. λέγουσι δ ως
85 επι μεν τών προτέρων /?ασιλε'α)ν μετεδίδοσαν της
πολιτείας, ωστ ου )/ινεσθαι τότε όλιγανθρωπίαν
πολεμούντων πολύν χρόνον και φασιν εΐναί ποτέ
τοις Έπαρτιάταις 2 και μύριους, ου μην αλλ' ειτ'
έστιν αληθή ταύτα είτε μη, βέλτιον τό δια τής
κτήσεως ώμαλισμένης πληθύειν ανδρών την πόλιν.
1 hie lacunam Buecheler.
* rods Σπαρτιάταί Buecheler.
° A clause seems to have been lost: 'Also it would have
been better to regulate by law the marriage of heiresses.'
6 i.e. the consequent fall in the number of men rich enough
138
POLITICS, II. νι. 10-12
has fallen into few hands, and this has also been
badly regulated by the laws ; for the lawgiver made
it dishonourable to sell a familv's existing estate,
and did so rightly, but he granted liberty to alienate
land at will by gift or bequest ; yet the result that
has happened was bound to follow in the one case
11 as well as in the other. And also nearly two- fifths
of the whole area of the country is owned by women,
because of the number of women who inherit estates
and the practice of giving large dowries ; yet it
would have been better if dowries had been pro-
hibited by law or limited to a small or moderate
amount ° ; whereas in fact he is allowed to give an
heiress in marriage to whomever he likes, and if he
dies without having made directions as to this by
will, whoever he leaves as his executor bestows her
upon whom he chooses. As a result of this b although
the country is capable of supporting fifteen hundred
cavalry and thirty thousand heavy-armed troopers,
12 they numbered not even a thousand. And the
defective nature of their system of land-tenure has
been proved by the actual facts of history : the
state did not succeed in enduring a single blow, c but
perished owing to the smallness of its population.
They have a tradition that in the earlier reigns they
used to admit foreigners to their citizenship, with
the result that dearth of population did not occur in
those days, although they were at war for a long
period ; and it is stated that at one time the Spar-
tiates numbered as many as ten thousand. However,
whether this is true or not, it is better for a state's
male population to be kept up by measures to equalize
to keep a horse or even to provide themselves with heavy
arms. ■ The battle of Leuctra, 37 1 b.c.
139
ARISTOTLE
1270» f , , t χ χ
40 υπεναντιος δε και ο περί την τεκνοποιιαν νομός 13
1270 b προς ταύτην την διόρθωσιν. βουλόμενος γαρ 6
νομοθέτης ώς πλείστους eirai τους Σ,παρτιάτας,
προάγεται, 1 τους πολιτας δτι πλείστους ποιεΐσθαι
παιδα?• εστί γαρ αύτοΐς νόμος τον μεν γεννήσαντα
τρεΐς υιούς άφρουρον είναι, τον δε τετταρας ατελή
5 πάντων, καίτοι φανερόν οτι πολλών γινομένων,
της 8ε χώρας ούτω διηρημενης, άναγκαΐον πολλούς
yit'ea^at πένητας .
Άλλα μην και τά περί την εφορείαν έχει φαύλως' 14
η γαρ αρχή κυρία μεν αύτη τών μεγίστων αύτοΐς
εστίν, γίνονται δ εκ του δήμου παντός, 2 ώστε
10 πολλάκις εμπίπτουσιν άνθρωποι σφόδρα πένητες
εις το άρχεΐον, οι δια την άπορίαν ώνιοι ήσαν. 3
εδήλωσαν δε πολλάκις μεν και πρότερον, και νυν
δέ εν τοΐς Άνδρίοις• διαφθαρεντες γαρ άργυρίω
τίνες όσον εφ' εαυτοΐς δλην την πάλιν απώλεσαν,
και δια το την αρχήν είναι λίαν μεγάλην και
15 ίσοτύραννον δημαγωγεΐν [αυτού?] 4 ηναγκάζοντο
καΐ οι βασιλείς, ώστε και ταύτη συνεπιβλάπτεσθαι
την πολιτείαν δημοκρατία γαρ εζ αριστοκρατίας
συνεβαινεν . συνέχει μεν οΰν την πολιτείαν το 15
άρχεΐον τούτο — ησυχάζει γαρ ό δήμος δια το
μετεχειν τής μεγίστης αρχής, ώστ είτε διά τον
20 νομοθετην είτε διά τύχην τούτο συμπεπτωκεν, συμ-
1 προά -yei Spengel. 2 wavrot Sauppe : πάντα codd.
* ύσίν Richards. 4 Oncken.
α The five Ephors, elected for a year by the people, were
the real rulers of Sparta. The two kings were hereditary;
the senate of twenty-eight nobles advised them, and the
Ephors presided at the Assembly of citizens over thirty years
old, who voted on the measures of the Kings and Ephors but
140
POLITICS, II. νι. 13-15
13 property. The law in relation to parentage is also
somewhat adverse to the correction of this evil. For
the lawgiver desiring to make the Spartiates as
numerous as possible holds out inducements to the
citizens to have as many children as possible : for
thev have a law releasing the man who has been
father of three sons from military service, and ex-
empting the father of four from all taxes. Yet it is
clear that if a number of sons are born and the land
is correspondingly divided there will inevitably come
to be many poor men.
14 Moreover the regulations for the Ephorate α are Political
also bad. For this office has absolute control over J^ 60 * 8 :
their most important affairs, but the Ephors are Ephorate,
appointed from the entire people, so that quite poor
men often happen to get into the office, who owing
to their poverty used to be 6 easily bought. This
was often manifested in earlier times, and also lately
in the affair c at Andros ; for certain Ephors were
corrupted with money and so far as lay in their power
ruined the whole state. And because the office was
too powerful, and equal to a tyranny, the kings also
were compelled to cultivate popular favour, so that
in this way too the constitution was jointly injured,
for out of an aristocracy came to be evolved a
15 democracy. Thus this office does, it is true, hold
together the constitution — for the common people
keep quiet because thev have a share in the highest
office of state, so that owing to the lawgiver's fore-
sight, or else to accident, the Ephorate is advanta-
could not discuss them. The small fleet was commanded by
a single admiral appointed for a year by the Ephors and not
allowed to hold office twice.
* Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give ' are.'
' Unknown.
141
ARISTOTLE
1270 b
φερόντως έχει τοις πράγμασιν, δεΐ γάρ την
πολιτείαν την μέλλουσαν σφζεσθαι πάντα βού-
λεσθαι τα. μέρη της πόλεως είναι και διαμένειν
κατά ταύτα 1 • οι μεν ονν βασιλείς διά την αυτών
τιμήν οΰτως έχουσιν, οι δέ κάλοι κάγαθοι διά την
25 γερουσίαν (άθλον γάρ η άρχη αϋτη της αρετής
εστίν), 6 δε δήμος διά την έφορείαν καθίσταται
γάρ εξ απάντων — αλλ' αίρετην έδει την άρχην 16
eimi ταύτην εξ απάντων μεν, μη τον τρόπον δε
τούτον ον νυν, παιδαριώδης γάρ εστί λίαν. έτι
δε και κρίσεων είσι μεγάλων κύριοι, οντες οι
80 τυχόντες, διόπερ ούκ αύτογνώμονας βέλτιον κρίνειν
άλλα κατά τα γράμματα καϊ τους νόμους, εστί
δέ και η δίαιτα των εφόρων ούχ όμολογουμένη
τω βουληματι της πόλεως 2 • αύτη 3 μεν γάρ άν-
ειμένη λίαν εστίν, εν δέ τοις άλλοις μάλλον υπερ-
βάλλει επι το σκληρόν, ώστε μη δύνασθαι καρ-
85 τερεΐν άλλα λάθρα τον νόμον άποδιδράσκοντας
απόλαυε ιν των σωματικών ηδονών, έχει δέ και Π
τά περί την τών γερόντων άρχην ού καλώς αύτοΐς.
επιεικών μέν γάρ όντων και πεπαιδευμένων ίκανώς
προς άνδραγαθίαν τάχ αν ε'ίπειέ τις σνμφέρειν τη
πόλει, καίτοι τό γε διά βίου κυρίους είναι κρίσεων
40 μεγάλων άμφισβητησιμον (εστί γάρ, ώσπερ και
1271a σώματος, και διανοίας γήρας)' τον τρόπον δέ
τούτον πεπαιδευμένων ώστε και τον νομοθέτην
αυτόν άπιστεΐν ως ούκ άγαθοΐς άνδράσιν, ούκ
ασφαλές, φαίνονται δέ και καταδωροδοκούμενοι 18
και καταχαριζόμενοι πολλά τών κοινών οι κεκοι-
1 κατά ταύτα Bernays : ταύτα, ταντα, αυτά codd.
2 iroXtre/as Scaliger. * αϋτη ΓΜΡΉ.
α There is no clear evidence what the method was.
142
POLITICS, II. νι. 15-18
geous for the conduct of affairs ; for if a constitu-
tion is to be preserved, all the sections of the state
must wish it to exist and to continue on the same
lines ; so the kings are in this frame of mind owing to
their own honourable rank, the nobility owing to the
office of the Elders, which is a prize of virtue, and
the common people because of the Ephorate, which
16 is appointed from the whole population — but yet the
Ephorate, though rightly open to all the citizens,
ought not to be elected as it is now. for the method
is too childish. And further the Ephors have juris-
diction in lawsuits of high importance, although they
are any chance people, so that it would be better
if they did not decide cases on their own judgement
but by written rules and according to the laws. Also
the mode of life of the Ephors is not in conformity
with the aim of the state, for it is itself too luxurious,
whereas in the case of the other citizens the pre-
scribed life goes too far in the direction of harshness,
so that they are unable to endure it, and secretly
desert the law and enjoy the pleasures of the body.
17 Also their regulations for the office of the Elders are the Senate :
not good ; it is true that if these were persons of a
high class who had been adequately trained in manly
valour, one might perhaps say that the institution
was advantageous to the state, although their life-
tenure of the judgeship in important trials is indeed
a questionable feature (for there is old age of mind
as well as of body) ; but as their education has been
on such lines that even the lawgiver himself cannot
trust in them as men of virtue, it is a dangerous
18 institution. And it is known that those who have
been admitted to this office take bribes and betray
many of the public interests by favouritism ; so that
143
ARISTOTLE
1271 a
5 νωνηκότες της άρχης ταύτης• διόπερ βελτιόν αυτούς
μη ανεύθυνους είναι, νυν δ' είσίν. δόζειε δ' αν η
τών εφόρων αρχή πάσας εύθύνειν τάς αρχάς' τούτο
δε τη εφορεία μέγα λίαν το δώρον, καΐ τον τρόπον
ου τούτον λεγομεν διδόναι δεΐν τα? εύθύνας. έ'τι
δε και την αίρεσιν ην ποιούνται των γερόντων
ίο κατά τε την κρίσιν εστί παιδαριώδης , και το αυτόν
αίτεΐσθαι τον άζιωθησόμενον της άρχης ουκ ορθώς
έχει• δει γαρ και βουλόμενον και μη βουλόμενον
άρχειν τον άξιον της άρχης. νυν δ' όπερ και περί 19
την άλλην πολιτείαν ο νομοθέτης φαίνεται ποιών
15 φιλότιμους γαρ κατασκευάζων τους πολίτας τούτω
κεχρηται προς την αίρεσιν τών γερόντων, ουδείς
γαρ αν άρχειν αίτησαιτο μη φιλότιμος ων καίτοι
τών αδικημάτων τών γ' 1 εκουσίων τα πλείστα συμ-
βαίνει σχεδόν δια. φιλοτιμίαν και δια φιλοχρηματίαν
τοις άνθρώποις. περί δε βασιλείας, ει μεν μη 20
20 βελτιόν εστίν ύπάρχειν ταΐς πόλεσιν η βελτιόν,
άλλος έστω λόγος• άλλα μην βελτιόν γε μη
καθαπερ νυν, άλλα κατά τον αύτοΰ βίον εκαστον
κρίνεσθαι τών βασιλέων, ότι δ' ό νομοθέτης ουδ'
αύτος οιεται διή'ασ^αι ποιεΐν καλούς κάγαθους,
δηλον άπιστει γοϋν ως ουκ ούσιν ικανώς άγαθοΐς
25 άνδράσιν διόπερ εζεπεμπον συμπρεσβευτάς τους
εχθρούς, και σωτηρίαν ενόμιζον τη πόλει eirai το
στασιάζει^ τους βασιλείς, ου καλώς δ' ούδε περί 2
τά συσσίτια τά καλούμενα φιδίτια νενομοθετηται
1 ed. : τών y αδικημάτων τών aut τών y αδικημάτων codd.
° i.e. the Ephors, two of whom went with the Kings.
144
POLITICS, Π. νι. 18-21
it would be better if they were not exempt from
having to render an account of their office., but at
present thev are. And it might be held that the
magistracv of the Ephors serves to hold all the offices
to account ; but this gives altogether too much to
the Ephorate, and it is not the way in which, as
we maintain, officials ought to be called to account.
Again, the procedure in the election of the Elders
as a mode of selection is not only childish, but it is
wrong that one who is to be the holder of this honour-
able office should canvass for it, for the man worthy
of the office ought to hold it whether he wants to or
19 not. But as it is the lawgiver clearly does the same
here as in the rest of the constitution : he makes the
citizens ambitious and has used this for the election
of the Elders, for nobody would ask for office if he
were not ambitious ; yet surely ambition and love
of money are the motives that bring about almost
the greatest part of the voluntary wrongdoing that
20 takes place among mankind. As to monarchy, the the Kings;
question whether it is not or is an advantageous
institution for states to possess may be left to another
discussion : but at all events it would be advantageous
that kings should not be appointed as they are now,
but chosen in each case with regard to their own life
and conduct. But it is clear that even the lawgiver
himself does not suppose that he can make the kings
men of high character : at all events he distrusts
them as not being persons of sufficient worth ; owing
to which the Spartans used to send their enemies a
with them as colleagues on embassies, and thought
that the safety of the state depended on division
21 between the kings. Also the regulations for the Λβ Messes ■
public mess-tables called Phiditia have been badly
U5
ARISTOTLE
12718 - / - vc; χ > »
τω καταστησαντι πρώτον, εοει γαρ απο κοινού
μάλλον είναι την σύνοδον, καθάπ€ρ iv Υ^ρητη'
80 παρά δέ τοΐς Αάκωσιν εκαστον δει φερειν, και
σφόδρα π€νήτων εν ίων όντων και τούτο το ανα-
λωμα ου δυναμένων οαπανάν, ώστε συμβαινειν
τουναντίον τω νομοθέτη της προαιρέσεως, βου-
λεται μεν γαρ δημοκρατικον etvai το κατα-
σκεύασμα των συσσιτίων, γίν€ται δ' ήκιστα δημο-
85 κρατικόν ούτω νενομοθετημενον μετεχειν μεν γαρ
ου ράδιον τοΐς λίαν πενησιν, ορός δε της πολιτ€ΐας
ουτός εστίν αύτοΐς 6 πάτριος, τον μη δυναμενον
τούτο το τέλος φερειν μη μετεχειν αυτής, τω δε 22
πepl τους ναυάρχους νόμω και έτεροι τιν€ς επι-
TeT^^Kaoiv, ορθώς επιτιμώντες• στάσεως γαρ
40 γίνεται α'ίτιος, επι γαρ τοΐς βασιλεΰσα> ουσι
στρατηγοΐς άΐοιος η ναυαρχία σχεδόν έτερα βασιλεία,
καθεστηκεν . και ώδι δε τη υποθέσει του νομο-
1271 b θετού επιτιμησειεν άν τί.?, όπερ και Πλάτων εν
τοΐς Νοαοι? επκτετίμηκεν. προς γαρ μέρος αρετής
η πάσα σύνταζις των νομών εστί, την πολεμικην
αυτή γαρ χρήσιμη προς το κρατεΐν. τοιγαροΰν
εσωζοντο μεν πολεμοΰντες, άπώλλυντο δε άρξαντες
5 δια το μη επίστασθαι σχολάζειν μηδέ ήσκηκεναι
μηδεμίαν άσκησιν ετεραν κυριωτεραν της πολε-
μικής, τούτου δέ αμάρτημα ουκ ελαττον νομί- 23
ζουσι μεν γαρ yiVeo^at τάγαθά τα περιμάχητα
δι* αρετής μάλλον ή κακίας, και τοΰτο μεν καλώς,
ίο οτι μεντοι ταύτα κρείττω τής αρετής ύπολαμ-
βάνουσιν, ου καλώς, φαύλως δ' έχει και περί τα
κοινά χρήματα τοΐς Σπαρτιάταις' οϋτε γαρ εν τω
146
POLITICS, Π. νι. 21-23
laid down by their originator. The revenue for
these ought to come rather from public funds, as in
Crete ; but among the Spartans everybody has to
contribute, although some of them are very poor and
unable to find money for this charge, so that the
result is the opposite of what the lawgiver purposed.
For he intends the organization of the common
tables to be democratic, but when regulated by the
law in this manner it works out as by no means
democratic ; for it is not easy for the very poor to
participate, yet their established regulation for
citizenship is that it is not to belong to one who is
22 unable to pay this tax. The law about the Admirals the
has been criticized by some other writers also, and A mira
rightly criticized ; for it acts as a cause of sedition,
since in addition to the kings who are military com-
manders the office of Admiral stands almost as
another kingship. Another criticism that may be General
made against the fundamental principle of the law- f^f^f :
giver is one that Plato has made in the Laws. The training
entire system of the laws is directed towards one orpeace *
part of virtue only, military valour, because this is
serviceable for conquest. Owing to this they re-
mained secure while at war, but began to decline
when they had won an empire, because thev did not
know how to five a peaceful life, and had been
trained in no other form of training more important
23 than the art of war. And another error no less
serious than that one is this : they think that the
coveted prizes of life are won by valour more than
by cowardice, and in this they are right, yet they
imagine wrongly that these prizes are worth more
than the valour that wins them. The public finance bad financial
of Sparta is also badly regulated : when compelled systenL
147
ARISTOTLE
κοινώ της πόλεως εστίν ουδέν πολέμους μεγάλους
άναγκαζομενοις πολεμεΐν, είσφέρουσί τε κακώς,
δια γαρ το των Σπαρτιατών efrai την πλείστην
1δ γην ουκ εξετάζουσιν αλλήλων τάς εισφοράς, άπο-
βεβηκε τε τουναντίον τω νομοθέτη του συμ-
φέροντος• την μεν γαρ πάλιν πεποίηκεν άχρήματον,
τους δ ίδιώτας φιλοχρήματους.
Τίερι μεν ουν της Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας επι
τοσούτον ειρήσθω• ταΰτα γάρ εστίν α μάλιστ' αν
τις επιτιμήσειεν.
20 VII. Η δε Κρητική πολιτεία πάρεγγυς μεν εστί 1
ταύτης, έχει δε μικρά μεν ου χείρον, το δε πλεΐον
ήττον γλαφυρώς. και γάρ εοικε και λέγεται δε
τά πλείστα /xe/xt/xiya^ai την Κρητικήν πολιτείαν ή
των Αακώνων, τά δε πλείστα των αρχαίων ήττον
25 διήρθρωται των νεωτέρων, φασι γάρ τον Αυκοΰρ-
γον, δτε τήν επιτροπείαν τήν Χαριλάου 1 του βασι-
λέως καταλιπών άπεδήμησεν, τότε τον πλείστον
διατρΐφαι χρόνον περί τήν Κρήτην διά τήν συγ-
yeveiav άποικοι γάρ οι Αύκτιοι των Αακώνων
ήσαν, κατελαβον δ' οι προς τήν άποικίαν ελθόντες
30 την τά^ιν τών νόμων ύπάρχουσαν εν τοις τότε
κατοικοϋσιν διό και νυν οι περίοικοι τον αυτόν
τρόπον χρώνται αύτοΐς, ώς κατασκευάσαντος Μ,ίνω
πρώτου την τά^ιν τών νόμων, δοκεΐ δ' ή νήσος 2
και προς τήν αρχήν τήν Έλληνικήν πεφυκεναι και
κεΐσθαι καλώς• πάση γάρ επίκειται τη θαλασσή,
1 Χαριλάου cod. inf., cf. 1316 a 34 : Χορ/λλου hie cet.
° e.g. by Herodotus i. 65.
" Posthumous son of Lycurgus's elder brother King Poly-
dectes; cf. 1316 a 34.
c Lyctus was an inland city in the east of Crete, not far
from Cnossus.
148
Constitu-
tion.
POLITICS, II. vi. 23— vii. 2
to carry on wars on a large scale she ha? nothing in
the state treasury, and the Spartiates pay war taxes
badly because, as most of the land is owned by them,
they do not scrutinize each other's contributions.
And the lawgiver has achieved the opposite result
to what is advantageous — he has made the state poor
and the individual citizen covetous.
So much for a discussion of the constitution of
Sparta : for these are the main points in it for
criticism.
1 VII. The Cretan constitution approximates to Cretan
that of Sparta, but though in a few points it is not
worse framed, for the larger part it has a less perfect
finish. For the Spartan constitution appears and
indeed is actually stated a to have been copied in most
of its provisions from the Cretan ; and as a rule old
things have been less fully elaborated than newer
ones. For it is said that when Lycurgus relinquished Model for
his post as guardian of King Charilaus b and went ycurgUi
abroad, he subsequently passed most of his time in
Crete because of the relationship between the
Cretans and the Spartans ; for the Lyctians c were
colonists from Sparta, and the settlers that went
out to the colony found the system of laws already
existing among the previous inhabitants of the place ;
owing to which the neighbouring villagers even now
use these laws in the same manner, in the belief that
2 Minos d first instituted this code of laws. Also Geogiaphi-
the island appears to be designed by nature and sfierationa.
well situated to be the imperial state, as it lies
across the whole of the sea, round which almost
d Legendary ruler of Crete, son of Zeus and Europa, and
after death a judge in the lower world.
U9
ARISTOTLE
35 σχεδόν των Ελλήνων ιδρυμένων περί την θάλασσαν
πάντων απέχει γαρ τη μεν της ΐίελοποννήσου
μικρόν, τη δε της Άσια? του περί Ύριόπιον τόπου
και 'Ρόδου, διό και την της θαλάσσης αρχήν
κατεσχεν ό Μίνως, και τάς νήσους τάς μεν εχειρω-
σατο τάς δ' ωκισεν, τέλος δε επιθεμενος τη Σικελία
40 τον βίον ετελεύτησεν εκεί περί Κάμικον.
Έχει δ' άνάλογον ή Κρητική τά^-ι? προς τήν 3
1272 a Αακωνικήν. γεωργοΰσί Τ€ γαρ τοις μεν οι 1 είλωτες
τοις δε Κρησίν οι περίοικοι, και συσσίτια παρ
άμφοτεροις εστίν, και τό γε άρχαΐον εκάλουν οι
Αάκωνες ου φιδίτια αλλ' άνδρια, καθάπερ οι
Κρήτες, ή και δήλον ότι εκείθεν ελήλυθεν. ετι δε
δ της πολιτείας ή τά^ι?' οι μεν γαρ έφοροι τήν
αυτήν εχουσι δυνααιν' τοις εν τη Κρήτη καλου-
μένοις κόσμοις, πλην οι μεν έφοροι πέντε τον αρι-
θμόν οι δε κόσμοι δέκα εισίν οι δε γέροντες τοις
γερουσιν ους καλοΰσιν οι Κρήτες βουλην ίσοι•
βασίλεια δε πρότερον μεν ήν, είτα κατάλυσαν οι
ίο Κρήτες, και τήν ήγεμονίαν οι κόσμοι τήν κατά
πόλεμον εχουσιν εκκλησίας δε μετεχουσι πάντες, 4
κυρία δ' ούδενός εστίν αλλ' η συνεπιφηφίσαι τα
δό^αντα τοις γερουσι και τοις κόσμοις.
Τά μεν οΰν των συσσιτίων έχει βελτιον τοις
Κρησίν ή τοις Αάκωσιν εν μεν γάρ Αακεδαίμονι
15 κατά κεφαλήν έκαστος εισφέρει τό τεταγμενον,
ει δε μη, /χ,ετεχειν νόμος κωλύει της πολιτείας,
καθάπερ εΐρηται και πρότερον, εν δε Κρήτη κοινο-
1 μ£ι> οι (vel μϊν Αάκωσιν oi) ed. ; μϊν codd.
150
POLITICS, Π. νιι. 2-4
all the Greeks are settled ; for Crete is only a short
distance from the Peloponnese in one direction, and
from the part of Asia around Triopium and from
Rhodes in the other. Owing to this Minos won the
empire of the sea,° and made some of the islands
subject to him and settled colonies in others, but
finally when making an attack on Sicily he ended
his life there near Camicus.
3 The Cretan institutions are on the same lines as Resem-
those of Sparta : in Sparta the land is tilled by the gJJS^ 10
Helots and in Crete by the serfs ; and also both have system.
public mess-tables, and in old days the Spartans called
them not 'phiditia' but 'men's messes,' as the Cretans
do, which is a proof that they came from Crete. And
so also is the system of government ; for the
Ephors have the same power as the magistrates
called Cosmi in Crete, except that the Ephors are
five in number and the Cosmi ten ; and the Elders
at Sparta are equal in number to the Elders whom
the Cretans call the Council ; and monarchy existed
in former times, but then the Cretans abolished
4 it, and the Cosmi hold the leadership in war ; and
all are members of the Assembly, which has no
powers except the function of confirming by vote
the resolutions already formed by the Elders and
the Cosmi.
Now the Cretan arrangements for the public mess- Messee
tables are better than the Spartan ; for at Sparta j^^l^,
each citizen pays a fixed poll-tax, failing which he is
prevented by law from taking part in the government,
as has been said before ; but in Crete the system is
more communal, for out of all the crops and cattle
β See Thucydides i. 4 and 8. The tradition of the wealth
of Minos is supported by the recent excavations at Cnossus.
151
ARISTOTLE
1272 a
τερως• από πάντων γάρ των γινομένων καρπών
τε και βοσκημάτων δημοσίων καΐ εκ των 1 φόρων
ους φερουσιν οι περίοικοι τετακται μέρος τό μεν
20 προς τους θεούς και τάς κοινάς λειτουργίας, το δε
τοις συσσιτίοις, ώστ εκ κοινού τρεφεσθαι πάντας,
και γυναίκας και παΐ8ας και άνδρας• προς δε την 5
όλιγοσιτίαν ως ώφελιμον 77θλλά πεφιλοσόφηκεν
6 νομοθέτης , και προς την διάζευζιν των γυναι-
κών Ινα μη πολυτεκνώσι, την προς τους άρρενας
25 ποιησας ομιλίαν, περί ης ει φαύλως η μη φαυλως
έτερος εσται του διασκεφασθαι καιρός, δτι δη 2
τά περί τά συσσίτια βελτιον τετακται τοις Κρησιν
η τοις Αάκωσι, φανερόν τά δέ περί τους κόσμους
ετι χείρον τών εφόρων, δ μεν γαρ έχει κακόν το
30 τών εφόρων άρχεΐον, υπάρχει και τούτοις, γίνονται
γάρ οι τυχόντες• ο δ' εκεί συμφέρει προς την
πολιτείαν, ενταΰθ* ουκ εστίν, εκεί μεν γάρ διά
τό την αιρεσιν εκ πάντων etrai μετέχων 6 δήμος
της μεγίστης άρχης βουλεται μενειν την πολιτείαν
ενταύθα δ' ουκ εξ απάντων αίροΰνται τους κόσμους
85 άλλ' εκ τινών γενών, και τους γέροντας εκ τών
κεκοσμηκότων , περί ων τους αυτούς άν τις εΐπειε 6
λόγους και περί τών εν Αακεδαίμονι γινομένων 3 •
τό γάρ άνυπευθυνον και τό διά βίου μείζον εστί
γέρας της αξίας αύτοΐς, και τό μη κατά γράμ-
ματα άρχειν αλλ' αύτογνώμονας επισφαλές, τό δ
40 ήσυχάζειν μη μετέχοντα τον δημον ούδεν σημεΐον
1 έκ των ante φόρων Richards, ante δημοσίων codd.
* δη Lambinus : δέ codd. 3 ytpovruv Congreve.
" This promise is not fulfilled.
152
POLITICS, Π. νιι. 4-6
produced from the public lands, and the tributes paid
by the serfs, one part is assigned for the worship of the
gods and the maintenance of the public services, and
the other for the public mess-tables, so that all the
citizens are maintained from the common funds,
5 women and children as well as men ; and the law-
giver has devised many wise measures to secure the
benefit of moderation at table, and the segregation
of the women in order that they may not bear many
children, for which purpose he instituted association
with the male sex, as to which there will be another
occasion ° to consider whether it was a bad thing or
a good one. That the regulations for the common
mess-tables therefore are better in Crete than at
Sparta is manifest ; but the regulations for the Cosmi
are even worse than those regarding the Ephors.
For the evil attaching to the office of the Ephors censorship
belongs to the Cosmi also, as the post is filled by any worse -
chance persons, while the benefit conferred on the
government by this office at Sparta is lacking in Crete.
At Sparta, as the election is made from all the citizens,
the common people sharing in the highest office
desire the maintenance of the constitution, but in
Crete they do not elect the Cosmi from all the citizens
but from certain clans, and the Elders from those who The Eiders.
6 have held the office of Cosmos, about which regulations
the same comments might be made as about what
takes place at Sparta : their freedom from being
called to account and their tenure for life gives them
greater rank than their merit deserves, and their
administration of their office at their own discretion
and not under the guidance of a written code is
dangerous. And the fact that the common people
quietly tolerate their exclusion is no proof that the
153
ARISTOTLE
1272 a
τον τετάχθαι καλώς' ονδεν γάρ λήμματος εστί 1
1272 b τοΐς κόσμοις ώσπερ τοις εφόροις, πόρρω γ απ-
οικοΰσιν εν νήσω των διαφθερούντων. ην δε ποι-
ούνται της αμαρτίας ταύτης ίατρείαν, άτοπος καϊ
ου πολιτική άλλα δυναστευτική• πολλάκις γαρ η
εκβάλλουσι σνστάντ€ς τινές τους κόσμους η των
5 συναρχόντων αι/τών η των ιδιωτών εζεστι δε και
μεταζύ τοΐς κόσμοις άπειπεΐν την αρχήν, ταύτα
δη 7Γ(Χΐτα βελτιον ytVea^at κατά νόμον η κατ
ανθρώπων βούλησιν ου γάρ ασφαλής ο κανών,
πάντων δέ φαυλότατον το της άκοσμίας, ην
καθιστάσι πολλάκις οι αν 2 μή δικά? βουλωνται
δοΰναι τών δυνατών 3 ' η* και δήλον ως έχει τι
ίο ττολιτεια? ή τά^ι?, αλλ' ου πολιτεία εστίν άλλα
δυναστεία μάλλον. ^Ιώθασι δε διαλαμβάνοντ€ς
τον δήμον και τους φίλους άναρχίαν* ποιεΐν και
στασιάζειν και μάχεσθαι προς αλλήλους, καίτοι 8
τι διαφέρει το τοιούτον ή διά τίνος χρόνου μηκετι
15 πόλιν είναι την τοιαύτην, άλλα λιίεσ#αι την πολι-
τικήν κοινωνίαν ;
"Εστί δ' επικίνδυνος οϋτως έχουσα πόλις, τών
βουλομενων επιτίθεσθαι και δυνάμενων, άλλα
καθάπερ εϊρηται, σώζεται διά τον τόπον ξενηλασίας
γάρ το πόρρω πεποίηκεν. διό και το τών περίοι-
κων μένει τοΐς Κ,ρησίν, οι δ' είλωτες αφίστανται
20 πολλάκις• ούτε γάρ εξωτερικής άρχης κοινωνοϋσιν
1 Richards : λήμματος τι codd.
2 ol αν Coraes : όταν codd.
3 των δννατων post 8 άκοσμίας codd. (alii hie sed δυναστών
vel δικαστών.) * άναρχίαν Bernays : μοναρχίαν codd.
" i.e. the defect of the undue restriction of the office.
6 See 1292 b 10 n.
c The mss. give ' bring about a monarchy.'
154
POLITICS, II. νπ. β-8
arrangement is a sound one ; for the Cosmi unlike stability
the Ephors make no sort of profit, as they live in an position,
island remote from any people to corrupt them. ?°**°
Also the remedy which they employ for this defect a
is a curious one, and less characteristic of a republic
7 than of a dynasty b : often the Cosmi are expelled
by a conspiracy formed among some of their actual
colleagues or the private citizens ; also the Cosmi
are allowed to resign during their term of office.
Now it would be preferable for all these matters to
be regulated by law rather than to be at the discre-
tion of individuals, for that is a dangerous principle.
And the worst expedient of all is that of the suspension
of the office of Cosmi, which is often brought about
by members of the powerful class who wish to escape
being punished ; this proves that the constitution
has a republican element, although it is not actually
a republic but rather a dynasty. 6 And the nobles
frequently form parties among the common people
and among their friends and so bring about a suspen-
sion of government, and form factions and engage
8 in war with one another. Yet such a condition of
things really means that for a time such a state is
a state no longer, but the bonds of civil society are
loosened.
And it is a precarious position for a state to be in, Weakness
when those who wish to attack it also have the power h£tory by
to do so. But, as has been said, it is saved by its
locality ; for distance has had the same effect as
alien-acts. d A result of this is that with the Cretans
the serf population stands firm, whereas the Helots
often revolt ; for the Cretans take no part in foreign
d Aliens required special permission to reside at Sparta, and
the ephors had powers to expel them for undesirable conduct.
155
ARISTOTLE
οι Κρήτες, νεωστί τε πόλεμος ξενικός διαβεβηκεν
εις τήν νησον ος πεποιηκε φανερον την aadeveiav
των εκεί νόμων.
ΙΙερι μεν ονν ταύτης ειρήσθω τοσαΰθ* ήμΐν της
πολιτείας.
VIII. ΐίολιτεύεσθαι δε δοκοΰσι και Καρχηδόνιοι 1
26 καλώ? και πολλά περιττώς προς τους άλλους,
μάλιστα δ' eVia παραπλησίως τοις Αακωσιν.
αύται γάρ αϊ πολιτεΐαι τρεις αλλ^λαι? τε σύνεγγυς
πώς είσι και των άλλων πολύ διαφερουσιν, η τε
Κρητική και η Αακωνικη και τρίτη τούτων η
Καρχηδονίων, και πολλά των τεταγμένων έχει
so παρ' αύτοΐς καλώς• σημεΐον δε πολιτείας συν-
τεταγμένης το τον δήμον εκουσίον 1 διαμενειν εν τη
τάξει της πολιτείας, και μήτε στάσιΐ' ο τι και άξιον
ειπείν γεγενησθαι μήτε τύραννον.
Έχει δε παραπλήσια τη Αακωνικη πολιτεία τα 2
μεν συσσίτια τών εταιριών τοις φιδιτίοις, την δε
35 τών εκατόν και τεττάρων αρχήν τοις εφόροις
(πλην ο ου 2 χείρον, οι μεν 3 εκ τών τυχόντων
είσί, ταύτην δ' αίροΰνται την αρχήν άριστίνδην),
τους δε βασιλείς και τήν γερουσίαν άνάλογον τοις
εκεί ^ασιλευσι και γερουσιν, και βελτιον δε τους
/ίασιλεί? μήτε κατά το αυτό etmi γένος, μηδέ
*ο τούτο το τυχόν, είτε διαφερον . . .* εκ τούτων
αιρετούς μάλλον ή καθ* ήλικίαν μεγάλων γάρ
1273a κύριοι καθεστώτες, αν ευτελείς ώσι μεγάλα βλά-
1 ϊκούσων Spengel : ϊχονσαν codd.
* ί οϋ Bernays : ού codd. 3 μίν yap codd. cet. plurimi.
* lacunam Con ring.
" Clauses seem to have been lost concluding the account
156
POLITICS, II. νιι. 8— νπι. 2
empire, and also the island has only lately been in-
vaded by warfare from abroad, rendering manifest
the weakness of the legal system there.
Let this suffice for our discussion of this form of
constitution.
VIII. Carthage also appears to have a good consti- Constitu-
tion of
tution, with many outstanding features as compared Carthage.
with those of other nations, but most nearly resem-
bling the Spartan in some points. For these three
constitutions are in a way near to one another and
are widely different from the others — the Cretan, the
Spartan and, thirdly, that of Carthage. Many regula-
tions at Carthage are good ; and a proof that its
constitution is well regulated is that the populace
willingly remain faithful to the constitutional system,
and that neither civil strife has arisen in any degree
worth mentioning, nor yet a tyrant.
I Points in which the Carthaginian constitution Resem-
resembles the Spartan are the common mess-tables sparta.
of its Comradeships corresponding to the Phiditia, and
the magistracy of the Hundred and Four correspond-
ing to the Ephors (except one point of superiority —
the Ephors are drawn from any class, but the Cartha-
ginians elect this magistracy by merit) ; the kings
and the council of Elders correspond to the kings and
Elders at Sparta, and it is another superior feature
that the Carthaginian kings are not confined to the
same family and that one of no particular distinction,
and also that if any family distinguishes itself . . . a
the Elders are to be chosen from these rather than
by age ; for as they are put in control of important
matters, if they are men of no value they do great
of the appointment of the Kings and turning to the Elders
and their selection on grounds of merit and wealth.
157
ARISTOTLE
1273 a
πτουσι, και εβλαφαν ήδη τήν πόλιν την των Αακε-
δαιμονίων .
Τα μεν ουν 77λείστα των επιτιμηθεντων αν διά 3
τάς παρεκβάσεις κοινά, τυγχάνει ττάσαις οντά ταΐς
είρημεναις πολιτείαις• των δε προς την ύπόθεσιν
δ της αριστοκρατίας και της πολιτείας τα μεν εις
δήμον εκκλίνει μάλλον τά δ' εις όλιγαρχίαν. τον
μεν γάρ το μεν προσάγειν το δε μη προσάγειν προς
τον δήμον οι βασιλείς κύριοι μετά των γερόντων
αν όμογνωμονώσι πάντες, ει δε μη, και τούτων
ίο 6 δήμος• α δ' αν είσφερωσιν ούτοι, ου διακοϋσαι
μόνον άποδιδόασι τω δήμω τά δόζαντα τοις άρ-
χουσιν, αλλά κύριοι κρ'ινειν είσί, και τω βονλομενω
τοις είσφερομενοις άντειπεΐν εζεστιν, όπερ εν ταΐς
ετέραις πολιτείαις ουκ εστίν. 1 το δε τάς πενταρχίας 4
κυρίας ούσας πολλών και μεγάλων ύφ' αυτών
15 αίρετάς είναι, και την τών εκατόν ταύτας αίρεΐσθαι
την μεγίστην αρχήν, ετι δε ταύτας πλείονα άρχειν
χρόνον τών άλλων (και γάρ εξεληλυθότες άρχουσι
και μέλλοντες) όλιγαρχικόν το δ' άμισθους και
μή κληρωτάς άριστοκρατικόν θετεον, και ει τι
τοιούτον έτερον, και το τάς δίκας υπό τών 1 αρχείων
20 δικάζεσθαι πάσας (και μή άλλας υπ* άλλων καθάπερ
εν Αακεδαίμονι) . παρεκβαίνει δε της άριστο- 5
κρατίας ή τάξις τών Καρχηδονίων μάλιστα προς
1 6wep — οΰκ έστι post δήμος 10 tr. Wade-Gery.
2 τινών Coraes.
a i.e. both parties agree to refer or not to refer.
b i.e. even when the Kings only or the Elders only desire
reference, it takes place.
158
POLITICS, II. νπι. 2-5
harm, and they have already injured the Spartan
State.
3 Now most of the points in the Carthaginian
system that would be criticized on the ground of
their defects happen to be common to all the
constitutions of which we have spoken ; but the
features open to criticism as judged by the principle
of an aristocracy or republic are some of them de-
partures in the direction of democracy and others in
the direction of oligarchy. The reference of some
matters and not of others to the popular assembly
rests with the kings in consultation with the Elders Democratic
in case they agree unanimously, but failing that, ea ure8 '
these matters also lie with the people b ; and when the
kings introduce business in the assembly, they do not
merely let the people sit and listen to the decisions
that have been taken by their rulers, but the people
have the sovereign decision and anybody who wishes
may speak against the proposals introduced, a right
that does not exist under the other constitutions.
4 The appointment by co-optation of the Boards of oligarchic
Five which control many important matters, and the fe * tures •
election by these boards of the supreme magistracy
of the Hundred, and also their longer tenure of
authority than that of any other officers (for they are
in power after they have gone out of office and before
they have actually entered upon it) are oligarchical
features ; their receiving no pay and not being
chosen by lot and other similar regulations must be
set down as aristocratic, and so must the fact that
the members of the Boards are the judges in all law-
suits, instead of different suits being tried bv different
6 courts as at Sparta. But the Carthaginian system Plutocracy,
deviates from aristocracy in the direction of oligarchy
159
ARISTOTLE
1273 " * ' s ι a -
τήν» ολιγαρχιαν κατά τίνα. οιανοιαν η συνοοκει
τοις πολλοίς• ου γαρ μόνον άριστίνδην άλλα και
πλουτίνδην οΐονται δεΐν αιρεΐσθαι τους άρχοντας,
25 αδύνατον γαρ τον άποροΰντα καλώς άρχειν και
σχόλαζαν . εΐπερ ουν το μεν αίρ€Ϊσθαι πλουτίνδην
ολιγαρχικόν το δε κατ' άρετήν άριστοκρατικόν,
αϋτη τις αν εΐη τάζις τρίτη καθ* ήνπερ συντετακται
και τοις Καρχηδονίοις τά περί την πολιτείαν
αιροΰνται γαρ εις δυο ταύτα βλέποντες, και μά-
80 λίστα τά? μεγίστας, τους τε ^ασιλεί? και τους
στρατηγούς . δει δε νομίζειν αμάρτημα νομοθέτου β
την παρεκβασιν efvai της αριστοκρατίας ταύτην
εζ αρχής γαρ τοϋθ' όράν εστί των αναγκαιοτάτων,
όπως ο'ι βέλτιστοι δύνωνται σχολάζειν και μηδέν
35 άσχημονεΐν, μη μόνον άρχοντες αλλά μηδ* ίδιω-
τεύοντες. ει δέ δει βλεπειν και προς εύπορίαν
χάριν σχολής, φαΰλον το τάς μεγίστας ώνητάς
eirat των αρχών, την τε ^ασιλει'αι•' και την στρατη-
yia^. εντιμον γαρ 6 νόμος οΰτος ποιεί τον πλοΰτον
μάλλον της αρετής και την πόλιν δλην φιλοχρή-
40 ματον δ τι δ' αν ύπολάβη τίμιον eivat το κύριον, η
ανάγκη και την τών άλλων πολιτών δόζαν άκολου-
θεϊν τούτοις' οπού δε μη μάλιστα άρετη τιμάται,
1273 b ταύτην ούχ οΐόν τ' είναι βεβαίως άριστοκρατικην
πολιτείαν. εθίζεσθαι δ' εΰλογον κερδαίνειν τους
ώνουμένους, όταν δαπανήσαντες άρχωσιν άτοπον
γαρ ει πένης μεν ων επιεικής δε βουλήσεται
κερδαίνειν, φαυλότερος δ' ων ου βουλήσεται δα-
160
POLITICS, II. νιιι. 5-7
most signally in respect of a certain idea that is
shared by most people ; they think that the rulers
should be chosen not only for their merit but also
for their wealth, as it is not possible for a poor man
to govern well — he has not leisure for his duties. If
therefore election by wealth is oligarchical and elec-
tion by merit aristocratic, this will be a third sys-
tem, exhibited for instance in the constitution of
Carthage, for there elections are made with an eye
to these two qualifications, and especially elections
to the most important offices, those of the kings and
6 of the generals. But it must be held that this
divergence from aristocracy is an error on the part
of a lawgiver ; for one of the most important points
to keep in view from the outset is that the best
citizens may be able to have leisure and may not
have to engage in any unseemly occupation, not only
when in office but also when living in private life.
And if it is necessary to look to the question of means
for the sake of leisure, it is a bad thing that the
greatest offices of state, the kingship and the general-
ship, should be for sale. For this law makes wealth
more honoured than worth, and renders the whole
7 state avaricious ; and whatever the holders of supreme
power deem honourable, the opinion of the other
citizens also is certain to follow them, and a state in
which virtue is not held in the highest honour cannot
be securely governed by an aristocracy. And it is
probable that those who purchase office will learn by
degrees to make a profit out of it, when they hold
office for money spent ; for it would be odd if a
man of small means but respectable should want to
make a profit but an inferior person when he has
spent money to get elected should not want to.
l6l
ARISTOTLE
1273 b
5 τταντισας. διό δει τους δυνάμενους άριστ άρχειν, 1
τούτους άρχειν. βέλτιον δ', ει και προεΐτο την
άπορίαν των επιεικών 6 νομοθέτης, αλλ' αρχόντων
γε €πι.μ€λ€Ϊσθαί της σχολής.
Φαύλοι δ' αν δό£ eiev elvai και το πλείους αρχάς 8
τον αυτόν άρχειν, όπερ ευδοκιμεί παρά τοΐς
ίο Καρχηδόνιοι?. εν γάρ ύφ* ενός έργον αριστ'
αποτελείται, δει δ' όπως γίνηται τοΰθ' όράν τον
νομοθέτην, και μη προστάττειν τον αύτον αύλεΐν
και σκυτοτομεΐν. ώσθ' οπού μη μικρά πόλις,
πολιτικώτερον πλείονας μετεχειν των άρχων και
δημοτικώτερον κοινότερόν τε γάρ καθάπερ ε'ίπο-
15 μev, και κάλλιον έκαστον αποτελείται των αυτών
και θάττον. δήλον δε τοΰτο επι των πολεμικών
και τών ναυτικών εν τούτοις γάρ άμφοτεροις δια
πάντων ως ειπείν διελήλυθε το άρχειν και το
άρχεσθαι.
'Ολιγαρχικής δ ούσης της πολιτείας άριστα 2 9
έκφεύγουσι τω πλουτεΐν, άεί τι του δήμου μέρος
20 εκπέμποντες επι τάς πόλεις' τούτω γάρ ίώνται
και ποιοϋσι μόνιμον την πολιτείαν. αλλά τουτί
εστί τύχης έργον, δει δε άστασιάστους είναι διά
τον νομοθέτην νυν δ , αν ατυχία γένηται τις και
το πλήθος άποστή τών αρχομένων, ουδέν εστί
φάρμακον διά τών νόμων τής ησυχίας.
κ ΙΙερι μεν ούν τής Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας και
Κρητικής και τής Καρχηδονίων, αιπερ δικαίως
εύδοκιμοΰσι, τούτον έχει τον τρόπον.
1 άριστ ά,ρχΐΐν Spengel : άρισταρχύν codd. (άριστα σχοΚάζην
Richards). * άριστα <,στάσιν> Bernays.
Or ' functions remaining the same, each is done better
and more quickly.'
162
POLITICS, II. νπι. 7-9
Hence the persons who should be in office are those
most capable . of holding office. And even if the
lawgiver neglected to secure comfortable means for
respectable people, it would at all events be better
that he should provide for their leisure while in office.
And it might also be thought a bad thing for the Official
same person to hold several offices, which is con- P luralism •
sidered a distinction at Carthage. One man one job
is the best rule for efficiency, and the lawgiver ought
to see that this may be secured, and not appoint the
same man to play the flute and make shoes. Hence
except in a small city it is better for the state for
a larger number to share in the offices and more
democratic, for it is fairer to all, as we said, and also
functions are performed better and more quickly
when separate than when in the same hands. 3 This
is clear in military and naval matters ; for in both of
these departments command and subordination pene-
trate throughout almost the whole body. b
But the constitution being oligarchical they best Emigration
escape the dangers by being wealthy, as they con- enclefT" 1 '
stantlv send out a portion of the common people to safety-valve
appointments in the cities ; by this means they cure
this defect in their system and make it stable. How-
ever, this is the achievement of fortune, whereas
freedom from civil strife ought to be secured by the
lawgiver ; but as it is, suppose some misfortune
occurs and the multitude of the subject class revolts,
there is no remedy provided by the laws to restore
tranquillity.
This then is the character of the Spartan, Cretan and
Carthaginian constitutions, which are justly famous.
* i.e. everyone in command (except the commander-in-
chief) has someone of higher rank over him.
163
ARISTOTLE
IX. Τών δέ άποφηναμένων τι περί πολιτείας 1
ενιοι μεν ουκ εκοινώνησαν πράξεων πολιτικών
ουδ' ώντινωνοΰν άλλα διετέλεσαν ιδιωτεύσατε? τον
30 βίον πβρι ων εί' τι άξίόλογον , ε'ίρηται σχεδόν
περί πάντων, ενιοι δε νομοθέται γεγόνασιν, οι
μεν ταΐς οίκείαις πόλεσιν οί δε και των όθνειων
τισι, πολιτευθέντες αυτοί' και τούτων οί μεν νόμων
εγενοντο δημιουργοί μόνον, οί δε και πολιτείας,
οΐον και Αυκοΰργος και Σόλων ούτοι γαρ και
35 νόμους και πολιτείας κατέστησαν . περί μεν οΰν
της Αακεδαιμονίων εΐρηται. Σόλωνα δ' ενιοι μεν %
οΐονται νομοθετην < ^ενε'σί?αι σπουοαΐον, όλιγαρχιαν
τε γαρ καταλΰσαι λίαν άκρατον οΰσαν και δου-
λευοντα τον δήμον 7ταΰσαι και δημοκρατιαν κατα-
στησαι την πάτριον μίζαντα καλώς την πολιτείαν
40 είναι γαρ την μεν εν Άρείω πάγω βουλην όλιγαρ-
χικόν, το δέ τάς αρχάς αιρετά? άριστοκρατικόν ,
τά δε δικαστήρια δημοτικόν. έ'οικε δέ Σόλων
1274 a εκείνα μεν υπάρχοντα πρότερον ου καταλΰσαι,
την τε βουλην και την τών άρχων αΐρεσιν, τον δέ
δήμον καταστησαι τά δικαστήρια ποιήσας εκ
πάντων, διό και μέμφονται τίνες αύτώ' λΰσαι 3
5 γαρ θάτερα, 1 κυριον ποιήσαντα το δικαστήριον
πάντων, κληρωτον 6ν. επεί γάρ τουτ ίσχυσεν,
ώσπερ τυραννώ τω δήμω χαριζόμενοι την πολιτείαν
εις την νυν δημοκρατίαν κατέστησαν , και την μεν
εν Άρείω πάγω βουλην Εφιάλτης έκόλουσε και
1 Koraes : θάτεραν, θάπρον codd.
164
POLITICS, II. ιχ. 1-3
1 IX. Of those that have put forward views about Solon's
politics, some have taken no part in any political tion.
activities whatever but have passed their whole life
as private citizens ; and something has been said
about almost all the writers of this class about whom
there is anything noteworthy. Some on the other
hand have been lawgivers, either for their native
cities or even for certain foreign peoples, after having
themselves been actively engaged in government ;
and of these some have been framers of laws only,
and others of a constitution also, for instance Solon
and Lycurgus, who instituted both laws and constitu-
tions. The Spartan constitution has been discussed.
2 As for Solon, he is considered by some people to have
been a good lawgiver, as having put an end to
oligarchy when it was too unqualified and having
liberated the people from slavery and established
our traditional democracy with a skilful blending of
the constitution : the Council on the Areopagus being
an oligarchic element, the elective magistracies
aristocratic and the law-courts democratic. And
although really in regard to certain of these features,
the Council and the election of magistrates, Solon
seems merely to have abstained from destroying insti-
tutions that existed already, he does appear to have
founded the democracy by constituting the jury-
3 courts from all the citizens. For this he is actually
blamed by some persons, as having dissolved the
power of the other parts of the community by
making the law-court, which was elected by lot,
all-powerful. For as the law-court grew strong,
men courted favour with the people as with a tyrant,
and so brought the constitution to the present
democracy ; and Ephialtes and Pericles docked the
165
ARISTOTLE
ΙΙερικλής, τα δε δικαστήρια μισθοφόρα κατέστησε
ι° Περικλής, και τούτον δη τον τρόπον έκαστος
των δημαγωγών προήγαγαν αύξων εις την νυν
δημοκρατίαν. φαίνεται δ' ου κατά την Έόλωνος
yeveV^ai τούτο προαίρεσιν, αλλά μάλλον από συ μ- 4
πτώματος (της ναυαρχίας 1 γαρ εν τοΐς Μηδικοΐς ο
δήμος αίτιος γενόμενος εφρονηματίσθη καΐ δημα-
15 γωγούς έλαβε φαύλους αντιπολιτευομένων τών
επιεικών)• επει Σόλωΐ' γε εοικε την άναγκαιοτατην
άποδιδόναι τω δήμω δύναμιν, το τάς αρχάς αιρεΐ-
σ^αι και εύθυνειν (μηδέ γάρ τούτου κύριος ων 6
δήμος δούλος άν εΐη και πολέμιος) , τάς δ' αρχάς
εκ τών γνωρίμων και τών ευπόρων κατέστησε
20 πάσας, εκ τών πεντακοσιομεδίμνων καΐ ^efyiTCUJ-»
και τρίτου τέλους τής καλούμενης ίππάδος' το δε
τέταρτον θητικόν, οΐς ουδεμιάς αρχής μετήν.
Νομοθεται δ' εγενοντο Ζάλευκός τε Αοκροΐς 5
τοΐς 'Έπιζεφυρίοις, και Χαρώνδας ό Καταναίο?
τοΐς αύτοΰ πολίταις καΐ ταΐς άλλαι? ταΐς Χαλ/α-
25 δικαΐς πόλεσι ταΐς περί Ίταλιαν και Σιΐκελιαν.
πειρώνται δε rt^e? και συνάγειν, ως Όνομακριτου
μεν γενομένου πρώτου δεινοΰ περί νομοθεσιαν,
yi>jU.raCT^rpai δ' αυτόν εν Κρήτη Αοκρόν οντά και
επιδημοϋντα κατά τέχνην μαντικήν, τούτου δε
yevea^at Θαλήτα εταΐρον, θάλητος δ' άκροατην
so Αυκοΰργον και Ζ,άλευκον, Χαλεύκου δε Χαρώνδαν.
1 ναυμαχία? Powell.
α Or ' of the sea-fight,' Salamis.
* For Solon's classification of the citizens by the annual
income of their estates see Athenian Constitution, c. vii.
c Perhaps 664 b.c.
d Zephyrium, a promontory in S. Italy.
166
POLITICS, Π. ιχ. 3-5
power of the Council on the Areopagus, while Pericles
instituted payment for serving in the law-courts, and
in this manner finally the successive leaders of the
people led them on by growing stages to the present
democracy. But this does not seem to have come
about in accordance with the intention of Solon,
4 but rather as a result of accident (for the common
people having been the cause of naval victory ° at
the time of the Persian invasion became proud and
adopted bad men as popular leaders when the re-
spectable classes opposed their policy) ; inasmuch
as Solon for his part appears to bestow only the
minimum of power upon the people, the function of
electing the magistrates and of calling them to
account (for if even this were not under the control
of the populace it would be a mere slave and a
foreign enemy), whereas he appointed all the offices
from the notable and the wealthy, the Five-hundred-
bushel class and the Teamsters and a third property-
class called the Knighthood ; while the fourth class,
the Thetes, were admitted to no office. 6
5 Laws were given" by Zaleucus to the Epizephyrian*' Notes on
Locrians and by Charondas e of Catana to his fellow- lawgivers,
citizens and to the other Chalcidic cities f on the coasts
of Italy and Sicily. Some persons try to connect
Zaleucus and Charondas together 9 : they say that
Onomacritus first arose as an able lawgiver, and that
he was trained in Crete, being a Locrian and travel-
ling there to practise the art of soothsaying, and
Thales became his companion, and Lycurgus and
Zaleucus were pupils of Thales, and Charondas of
e See 1252 b 14.
' Colonies from Chalcis in Euboea.
• Or ' try to make a series of legislators.*
167
ARISTOTLE
1274 s
αΛΛα ταύτα μεν Λεγονσιν ασκεπτοτερον των χρονών
έχοντες. 1 έγένετο δε καϊ Φιλόλαο? 6 Κορίνθιος 6
νομοθέτης θηβαίοις. ή*ν δ' 6 Φιλόλαο? το μεν
γένος των Βακχιάδων, εραστής δε γενόμενος
Αιοκλέους τον νικήσαντος Όλυμπίασιν, ως εκείνος
35 την πάλιν έλιπε οιαμισησας τον έρωτα τον της
μητρός 'Αλκυόνης , άπήλθεν εις Θήβας, κάκεΐ τον
βίον ετελεύτησαν αμφότεροι, και νυν ετι δεικνυουσι
τους τάφους αυτών, άλλήλοις μεν ευσύνοπτους
οντάς προς δε την των Κορινθίων χώραν τον μεν
συνοπτον τον δ' ου συνοπτον 2 • μυθολογοΰσι γαρ η
40 αυτού? ούτω τά£ασ#αι την ταφήν, τον μεν Διοκλέα
δια την άπέχθειαν του πάθους όπως μη άποπτος
έσται ή Κορινθία από του χώματος, τον δε Φιλό-
1274b λαον όπως άποπτος. ωκησαν μεν ουν διά την
τοιαυτην αΐτίαν παρά τοις θηβαίοις, νομοθέτης
δ' αύτοι? έγένετο Φιλόλαο? περί τ' άλλων τινών
και περί της παιδοποιίας, ους καλοΰσιν εκείνοι
νόμους θετικούς' και τοΰτ' έστιν ιδίως υ7Γ εκείνου
6 νενομοθετημένον , όπως ό αριθμός σωζηται τών
κλήρων. Χαρώνδου δ' ίδιον μεν ουδέν eon πλην 8
αί δίκαι τών φευδο μαρτυριών (πρώτος γαρ εποιησε
την επίσκηφιν), τη δ' ακρίβεια τών νόμων εστί
γλαφυρώτερος και τών νυν νομοθετών. (Φαλέου
δ' ίδιον ή τών ουσιών άνομάλωσις, Πλάτωνο? δ
ίο η τε τών γυναικών και παίδων και της ουσίας
κοινότης και τα συσσίτια τών γυναικών, έτι δ ό
περί την μέθην νόμος, το τους νήφοντας συμ-
ποσιαρχεΐν, και την εν τοις πολεμικοΐς άσκησιν
1 των χρόνων ΐχοντεϊ Susemihl : τφ χρόνω Xtyovres codd.
2 τόν — συνοπτον bis Richards (duce partim Ross) : του —
cwotttov bis codd.
168
POLITICS, II. ιχ. 5-8
Zaleucus ; but these stories give too little attention
6 to the dates. Philolaus of Corinth also arose as
lawgiver at Thebes. Philolaus belonged by birth
to the Bacchiad family ; he became the lover of
Diocles the winner at Olympia, but when Diocles
quitted the city because of his loathing for the passion
of his mother Alcyone, he went away to Thebes, and
there they both ended their life. Even now people
still show their tombs, in full view of each other and
one of them fully open to view in the direction of
7 the Corinthian country but the other one not ; for
the story goes that they arranged to be buried in
this manner, Diocles owing to his hatred for his
misfortune securing that the land of Corinth might
not be visible from his tomb, and Philolaus that it
might be from his. It was due then to a reason
of this nature that they went to live at Thebes ; but
Philolaus became the Thebans' lawgiver in regard
to various matters, among others the size of families,
— the laws called by the Thebans laws of adoption ;
about this Philolaus enacted special legislation, in
order that the number of the estates in land might
8 be preserved. There is nothing special in the code
of Charondas except the trials for false witness (for
he was the first to introduce the procedure of de-
nunciation), but in the accuracy of his laws he is
a more finished workman even than the legislators
of to-dav. (Peculiar to Phaleas b is the measure for
equalizing properties ; to Plato, c community of wives
and children and of property, and the common meals
for the women, and also the law about drunkenness,
enacting that sober persons are to be masters of
the drinking-bouts, and the regulation for military
■ In 7-2$ b.c. * See c. iv. e Above, cc. i.-iii.
ο 169
ARISTOTLE
δπως άμφιδέξιοι γίνωνται κατά την μελετην, ως
δέον μη την μεν χρησιμον eu>ou τοίν χεροΐν την δε
15 άχρηστον.) Δράκοντος δε νόμοι μεν είσι, πολιτεία 9
δ' ύπαρχούση τους νόμους εθηκεν, 'ίδιον δ' iv τοις
νόμοις ουδέν εστίν ο τι και μνείας άζιον, πλην ή
χαλεπότης δια το της ζη^αα? μέγεθος, εγενετο
δε και ΐΐιττακός νόμων δημιουργός αλλ' ου
πολιτείας• νόμος δ' ίδιος αύτοΰ το τους μεθύοντας,
20 αν τυπτησωσι, πλείω ζημίαν αποτινειν των νη-
φόντων διά γαρ το πλείους ύβρίζειν μεθύοντας
η νηφοντας ου προς την συγγνώμην άπεβλεφεν,
οτι δει μεθύουσιν εχειν μάλλον, αλλά προς το
συμφέρον, εγενετο δε και Άνδροδάμα? 'Ρηγΐνος
νομοθέτης Χαλκιδεΰσι τοις επι Θράκης, οΰ τα 1
25 περί τε τά φονικά και τάς επικληρους εστίν ου μην
αλλ' 'ίδιον γε ούδεν αύτοΰ λέγειν εχοι τι? αν.
Τά μεν ούν περί τάς πολιτείας τάς τε κυρίας
και τάς υπό τινών ειρημενας έστω τεθεο>ρημενα
τον τρόπον τούτον.
1 τά Η : om. cet.
° Author of the first written code at Athens, 621 b.c.
(though in the Athenian Constitution, c. iv., his legislation is
hardly mentioned; he appears there as the framer of the
constitution).
6 Of Mitylene in Lesbos, one of the Seven Sages, dictator
589-579 b.c. ' Otherwise unknown.
d Chalcidice, the peninsula in the N. Aegean, was colonized
from Chalcis in Euboea.
Additional Notes
II. i. 5, 1261 a 31. As the best state consists of different
classes, its unity is secured by each citizen giving services
to society and receiving in return benefits proportionate to
his services. Probably τό ίσον is an interpolation (though
Newman explains it as ' the reciprocal rendering of an
170
POLITICS, II. i.x. 3-9
training to make men by practice ambidextrous, on
the ground that it is a mistake to have one of the
9 two hands useful but the other useless.) There are
laws of Draco, a but he legislated for an existing con-
stitution, and there is nothing peculiar in his laws
that is worthy of mention, except their severity in
imposing heavy punishment. Pittacus b also was a
framer of laws, but not of a constitution ; a special
law of his is that if men commit an assault when
drunk they are to pay a larger fine than those who
offend when sober ; because since more men are
insolent when drunk than when sober he had regard
not to the view that drunken offenders are rightly
held less guilty, but to expediency. Androdamas e
of Rhegium also became lawgiver to the Chalcidians
in the direction of Thrace,'* and to him belong the
laws dealing with cases of murder and with heiresses ;
however one cannot mention any provision that is
peculiar to him.
Let such be our examination of the constitutional
schemes actually in force and of those that have been
proposed by certain persons.
equal amount of dissimilar things ') : omitting το Ισον, we
render ' reciprocity ' and not ' reciprocal equality ' ; cf. N.E.
1132 b 33, 'In the interchange of services Justice in the
form of Reciprocity is the bond that maintains the associa-
tion : reciprocity, that is, on the basis of proportion, not on
the basis of equality.'
II. i. 6, 1261 a 38 ff. The best form of constitution is
where there is a superior class that governs continuously
— an aristocracy; so where there are no class-distinctions,
the next best thing is for all the citizens to take turns in
governing and being governed, those in office for the time
being forming a sort of aristocracy. Richards's alteration
of the text gives ' to take turns to govern is an imitation of
original inequality and class-distinction.'
17J
1274 b , , , Λ ■ '"'•
Ι. Τω περί πολιτείας επισκοποΰντι, και τις 1
εκάστη και ποία τις, σχεδόν πρώτη σκεφις περί
πόλεως ίδεΐν, τι ποτ' εστίν η πόλις. νυν γαρ
35 άμφισβητοΰσιν , οι μεν φάσκοντες την πόλιν
πεπραχεναι την πράζιν, οι ο' ου την πόλιν άλλα
την όλιγαρχίαν η τον τνραννον του δε πολιτικού
και του νομοθέτου πάσαν όρώμεν την πραγματείαν
οΰσαν περί πόλιν, η δε πολιτεία των την πόλιν
οίκουντων εστί τάζις τις. επει ο η πόλις των 2
40 συγκείμενων καθάπερ άλλο τι των όλων μεν
συνεστώτων δ' εκ πολλών μορίων, δηλον δτι
πρότερον ο πολίτης ζητητεος• η γαρ πόλις πολιτών
1275 a τι πληθός εστίν, ώστε τίνα χρή καλεΐν πολίτην
και τις ο πολίτης εστί σκεπτεον. και γαρ ο
πολίτης αμφισβητείται πολλάκις• ου γαρ τον αυτόν
όμολογοϋσι πάντες είναι πολίτην εστί γαρ όστις
εν δημοκρατία πολίτης ων εν ολιγαρχία πολλάκις
6 ουκ εστί πολίτης, τους μεν οΰν άλλως πως τυγ- 3
χάνοντας ταύτης της προσηγορίας, οίον τους
ποιητούς πολίτας, άφετεον ό δε πολίτης ου τω
1 Richards : yap rtt Ss codd.
° So we speak of an action planned and carried by the
party in power as an Act of Parliament, and technically as
an act of the sovereign.
172
BOOK III
1 I. For the student of government, and of the Book m.
nature and characteristics of the various forms of xItcre
constitution, almost the first question to consider is °/' THE
in regard to the state : what exactly is the essential
nature of a state ? As it is, this is a matter of dispute : The
a public act is spoken of by some people as the thTstate°
action of the state, others speak of it as the action »« citizens,
not of the state but of the oligarchy or the tyrant in
power a ; and we see that the activity of the statesman
and lawgiver is entirely concerned with a state as
its object, and a constitution is a form of organiza-
2 tion of the inhabitants of a state. But a state is a
composite thing, in the same sense as any other of
the things that are wholes but consist of many parts ;
it is therefore clear that we must first inquire into
the nature of a citizen ; for a state is a collection of
citizens, so that we have to consider who is entitled citizenship
to the name of citizen, and what the essential nature ™™ϊ» "h
of a citizen is. For there is often a difference of of the
opinion as to this : people do not all agree that the and^udici^
same person is a citizen ; often somebody who would bodies
be a citizen in a democracy is not a citizen under an
3 oligarchy. We need not here consider those who
acquire the title of citizen in some exceptional manner,
for example those who are citizens by adoption ;
and citizenship is not constituted by domicile in a
173
ARISTOTLE
1275 a t ,
οικεΐν που πολίτης εστίν (και γαρ μέτοικοι και
δούλοι κοινωνοΰσι της οίκησεως), ονδ* οι τών δί-
καιων μετέχοντες οϋτως ώστε καΐ δίκην ύπεχειν
ίο και δικάζεσθαι (τοΰτο γαρ υπάρχει 1 και τοις άπό
συμβόλων κοινωνοΰσιν, και γαρ ταύτα τούτοις
υπάρχει — πολλαχοΰ μεν ουν ουδέ τούτων τελεως
οι μέτοικοι μετεχουσιν , άλλα νεμειν ανάγκη προ-
στάτην, διό ατελώς πως μετεχουσι της τοιαύτης
κοινωνίας) , άλλα 2 καθάπερ και 7Γαίδας• τους μηπω 4
15 δι' ηλικίαν εγγεγραμμένους και τους γέροντας
τους άφειμενους φατεον eirai μεν πως πολίτας,
ούχ απλώς δε λίαν άλλα προστιθεντας τους μεν
ατελείς τους δε παρηκμακότας η τι τοιούτον έτερον
(ουδέν γαρ διαφέρει, δηλον γαρ το λεγόμενον).
ζητοΰμεν γαρ τον απλώς πολίτην και μηδέν έχοντα
20 τοιούτον έγκλημα διορθώσεως δεόμενον, επει και
περί τών άτιμων και φυγάδων εστί τα τοιαύτα και
διαπορεΐν και λύειν. πολίτης δ' απλώς ούδενι τών
άλλων ορίζεται μάλλον η τω μετεχειν κρίσεως και
άρχης. τών δ' άρχων αί μεν είσι διηρημεναι κατά
25 χρόνον, ώστ ενίας μεν όλως δις τον αυτόν ουκ
εζεστιν άρχειν, η διά τίνων ώρισμενων χρόνων ο
δ' αόριστος, οίον ό δικαστής και εκκλησιαστής,
τάχα μεν ουν αν φαίη τι? ούδ' άρχοντας efvai τους 5
1 οΰτω yap αν ύπαρχοι (sc. τό πολίτην dvai) Richards.
8 [άλλα] ? Richards.
β This implies that aged citizens were excused attendance
at the assembly and law-courts, as well as military service.
174
POLITICS, III. ι. 3-5
certain place (for resident aliens and slaves share
the domicile of citizens), nor are those citizens who
participate in a common system of justice, conferring
the right to defend an action and to bring one in the
law-courts (for this right belongs also to the parties
under a commercial treaty, as they too can sue and
be sued at law, — or rather, in many places even the
right of legal action is not shared completely by
resident aliens, but they are obliged to produce a
patron, so that they only share in a common legal
4 procedure to an incomplete degree), but these are
only citizens in the manner in which children who
are as yet too young to have been enrolled in the
list and old men who have been discharged a must be
pronounced to be citizens in a sense, yet not quite
absolutely, but with the added qualification of
' under age ' in the case of the former and ' super-
annuated ' or some other similar term (it makes no
difference, the meaning being clear) in that of the
latter. For we seek to define a citizen in the ab-
solute sense, and one possessing no disqualification
of this nature that requires a correcting term, since
similar difficulties may also be raised, and solved,
about citizens who have been disfranchised or exiled.
A citizen pure and simple is defined by nothing else
so much as by the right to participate in judicial
functions and in office. But some offices of govern-
ment are definitely limited in regard to time, so that
some of them are not allowed to be held twice by the
same person at all, or only after certain fixed intervals
of time ; other officials are without limit of tenure,
for example the juryman and the member of the
5 assembly. It might perhaps be said that such
persons are not officials at all, and that the exercise
1T5
ARISTOTLE
1275 a
τοιούτους, ούδε μετεχειν διά ταΰτ αρχής• καίτοι
γελοΐον τους κυριωτάτονς άποστερεΐν αρχής. 1
50 άλλα διαφερετω μηδέν περί ονόματος γαρ ο λόγος•
άνώνυμον γαρ το κοινόν επι δικαστού και εκκλησια-
στοϋ τι δει ταντ άμφω καλεΐν. έστω δη διορισμού
χάριν αόριστος αρχή. τίθεμεν δη πολίτας τους
οΰτω μετέχοντας.
Ό μεν ουν μάλιστ αν εφαρμόσας πολίτης 2 επί
πάντας τους λεγόμενους πολίτας σχεδόν τοιούτος
35 εστίν, δει δε μή λανθάνειν ότι των πραγμάτων 6
εν οΐς τα. υποκείμενα διαφέρει τω εΐδει, και το
μεν αυτών εστί πρώτον το δε δεύτερον το δ
εχόμενον, ή το παράπαν ουδ' ενεστιν, 3 ή τοιαύτα,
το κοινόν, ή γλίσχρως. τάς δε πολιτείας όρώμεν
εϊδει διαφέρουσας άλλτ^λα»ν, καΐ τάς μεν υστέρας
1275 bras' δε προτερας οϋσας• τάς γάρ ήμαρτημενας και
παρεκβεβηκυίας άναγκαΐον υστέρας eivat των άν-
αμαρτήτων (τάς δέ παρεκβεβηκυίας πώς λεγομεν
ύστερον εσται φανερόν). ώστε και τον πολίτην
6 έτερον άναγκαΐον είναι τον καθ' εκάστην πολιτείαν .
διόπερ ό λεχθείς εν μεν δημοκρατία μάλιστ εστί
πολίτης, εν δε ταΐς αλλαι? ενδέχεται μεν, ου μην 7
άναγκαΐον. εν eVtais"* γάρ ουκ εστί δήμος, ουδ'
εκκλησίαν νομίζουσιν άλλα 5 συγκλήτους, και τάς
1 [apxijs] ? (sc. τοΰ πολίτας dixit.) ed. 2 διορισμοί Richards.
3 ονδ' evcanv Madvig : ουδέν έστιν.
* έν tv'iais Coraes : eviais codd. s άλλ' τ) Richards.
β Or, amending the text, ' and yet that it is absurd to deny
the title of citizen to those — '
b The meaning of this abstract principle is most easily seen
from its application here : if states are generically different
from one another, membership of a state, citizenship, can
hardly be a single thing, and come under a single definition.
176
POLITICS, III. ι. 5-7
of these functions does not constitute the holding
of office ; a and yet it is absurd to deny the title of
official to those who have the greatest power in
the state. But it need not make any difference,
as it is only the question of a name, since there is
no common name for a juryman and a member of
the assembly that is properly applied to both. For
the sake of distinction therefore let us call the
combination of the two functions ' office ' without
limitation. Accordingly we lay it down that
those are citizens who ' participate in office ' in this
manner.
Such more or less is the definition of ' citizen ' (though for
that would best fit with all of those to whom the democratic
6 name is applied. But it must not be forgotten that !££•■ F his
i_ . . , * , . , , , . & , . , definition
things m the case ot which the things to which must be
they are related differ in kind, one of them being modlfied >•
primary, another one secondary and so on, either
do not contain a common nature at all, as being
what they are, or barely do so. 6 Now we see
that constitutions differ from one another in kind,
and that some are subsequent and others prior ;
for erroneous and divergent forms are necessarily
subsequent to correct forms (in what sense we employ
the terms ' divergent ' of constitutions will appear
later). Hence the citizen corresponding to each
form of constitution will also necessarily be different.
Therefore the definition of a citizen that we have
given applies especially to citizenship in a democracy;
under other forms of government it may hold good,
7 but will not necessarily do so. For in some states
there is no bodv of common citizens, and the ν do
not have the custom of a popular assembly but
councils of specially convened members, and the
177
ARISTOTLE
δικας δικάζουσι κατά μέρος, οίον εν Αακεδαίμονι
ίο τα? τών συμβολαίων δικάζει των εφόρων άλλος
άλλας, οί δε γέροντες τάς φονικάς, ετέρα δ' ΐσως
α ΡΧν TL $ ετέρας, ου τον 1 αυτόν δε τρόπον και περί
Καρχηδόνα• πάσας γαρ άρχαί τίνες κρίνουσι τάς
δικας. αλλ' έχει γάρ διόρθωσιν ο του πολίτου
διορισμός, εν γάρ ταΐς αλλαι? πολιτείαις ούχ ό 8
15 αόριστος άρχων εκκλησιαστής εστί και δικαστής,
αλλ 6 κατά την αρχήν ώρισμένος• τούτων γάρ
η πάσιν η τισιν άποδέδοται το βουλεύεσθαι και
δικάζειν ή περί πάντων ή περί τΐΓώι•\ τις μεν οΰν
εστίν ο πολίτης, εκ τούτων φανερόν ω γάρ εξουσία
κοινωνεΐν αρχής βουλευτικής ή 2 κριτικής, πολίτην
20 ήδη λέγομεν είναι ταύτης της πόλεως, πόλιν δε
το των τοιούτων πλήθος ίκανόν προς αύτάρκειαν
ζωής, ως απλώς ειπείν.
'Ορίζονται δε 3 προς την χρήσιν πολίτην τον εξ g
αμφοτέρων πολιτών και μη θατερου μόνον, οίον
πατρός ή μητρός, οι δε και τοΰτ επί πλέον ζητοΰ-
σιν, οίον επί πάππους δύο ή τρεις ή πλείους. ούτω
25 δη οριζομένων πολιτικώς και ταχέως,* άποροΰσί
τίνες τον τρίτον εκείνον ή τέταρτον, πώς έσται
πολίτης. Υ οργιάς μεν οΰν ο Αεοντΐνος, τά μεν
'ίσως άπορων τά δ' είρωνευόμενος , έφη καθάπερ
όλμους είναι τους ΰπό τών όλμοποιών πεποιη-
μένους, ούτω και Ααρισαίους τους υπό τών
so δημιουργών πεποιημένους• etrai γάρ τινας λαρισο-
1 οϋ τον Coraes : τον codd. 2 και Αγ.
8 δέ Γ : δη codd. * πάχβω? Camerarius.
α The negative is a conjectural insertion, cf. 1273 a 20.
b Sicilian orator and nihilistic philosopher, visited Athens
427 b.c.
178
POLITICS, III. ι. 7-9
office of trying law-suits goes by sections — for
example at Sparta suits for breach of contract are
tried by different ephors in different cases, while
cases of homicide are tried by the ephors and doubt-
less other suits by some other magistrate. The same
method is not a followed at Carthage, where certain
8 magistrates judge all the law-suits. But still, our
definition of a citizen admits of correction. For
under the other forms of constitution a member of
the assembly and of a jury-court is not ' an official*
without restriction, but an official defined according
to his office ; either all of them or some among them
are assigned deliberative and judicial duties either in
all matters or in certain matters. What constitutes
a citizen is therefore clear from these considerations :
we now declare that one who has the right to par-
ticipate in deliberative or judicial office is a citizen
of the state in which he has that right, and a state is i
a collection of such persons sufficiently numerous,/
speaking broadly, to secure independence of life.
9 But in practice citizenship is limited to the child Citizenship
of citizens on both sides, not on one side only, necessarily
that is, the child of a citizen father or of a citizen depend on
mother ; and other people carry this requirement
further back, for example to the second or the third
preceding generation or further. But given this as
a practical and hasty definition, some people raise
the difficultv, How will that ancestor three or four
generations back have been a citizen ? Gorgias b of
Leontini therefore, partly perhaps in genuine per-
plexity but partly in jest, said that just as the ves-
sels made by mortar-makers were mortars, so the
citizens made by the magistrates were Larisaeans,
since some of the magistrates were actually larisa-
179
ARISTOTLE
1275 b
ποιους. 1 εστί δ' απλούν ει γαρ μετεΐχον κατά
τον ρηθεντα διορισμον της πολιτεία?, ήσαν αν
πολΐται• καί γαρ ου δυνατόν εφαρμόττειν το εκ
πολίτου η εκ πολίτιδος επί των πρώτων οίκησάντων
η 2 κτισάντων.
'Αλλ' ίσως εκείνοι μάλλον εχουσιν άπορίαν όσοι 10
35 μετεσχον μεταβολής γενομένης πολιτείας, οίον 3
> Κθηνησιν εποίησε Κλεισθένης μετά την των
τυράννων εκβολην πολλούς γάρ εφυλετευσε ξένους
και δούλους μετοίκους, το δ' άμφισβητημα προς
τούτους εστίν ου τις πολίτης, άλλα πότερον αδίκως
η δικαίως, καίτοι καν τοΰτό τις ετι προσ-
1276 a απορησειεν, άρ' ει μη δικαίως πολίτης, ου πολίτης,
ως ταύτό δυνάμενου του τ αδίκου και του φευδοΰς.
επει δ' όρώμεν και άρχοντας τινας αδίκως, ους
άρχειν μεν φησομεν αλλ' ου δικαίως, ο δε πολίτης
άρχη τινι διωρισμενος εστίν (6 γάρ κοινωνών της
δ τοιάσδε άρχης πολίτης εστίν, ως εφαμεν), δηλον
οτι πολίτας μεν είναι φατεον και τούτους, περί δε
του δικαίως η μη δικαίως συνάπτει προς την
είρημενην πρότερον άμφισβητησιν. αποροΰσι γαρ
τίνες πόθ* η πόλις έπραξε και πότε ούχ η πόλις,
οΐον όταν εξ ολιγαρχίας η τυραννίδος γενηται
ίο δημοκρατία, τότε γάρ ούτε τα σιγχ/3όλαια ένιοι
βούλονται διαλυειν (ως ου της πόλεως αλλά του
1 λαρισαιοποιούί Camerarius. * /cat Richards.
3 οίον <o3s> Richards.
α Larisa, a city in Thessaly, was famous for the manu-
facture of a kind of kettle called a ' larisa.'
6 In 509 b.c.
c The question, What is a state ? 1274 b 34.
180
POLITICS, III. ι. 9-10
makers.** But it is really a simple matter ; for if they
possessed citizenship in the manner stated in our
definition of a citizen, thev were citizens — since it is
clearly impossible to apply the qualification of de-
scent from a citizen father or mother to the original
colonizers or founders of a city.
10 But perhaps a question rather arises about those but does
who were admitted to citizenship when a revolution breaking"*
had taken place, for instance such a creation of the
citizens as that carried out b at Athens by Cleisthenes destroy the
after the expulsion of the tyrants, when he enrolled ^"state /
in his tribes many resident aliens who had been
foreigners or slaves. The dispute as to these is not
about the fact of their citizenship, but whether they
received it wrongly or rightly. Yet even as to this
one might raise the further question, whether, if a
man is not rightly a citizen, he is a citizen at all,
as * wrongly ' means the same as ' not trulv.' But
we sometimes see officials governing wronglv, as to
whom we shall not deny that they do govern, but
shall say that they do not do it rightly, and a citizen
is defined by a certain function of government (a
citizen, as we said, is one who shares in such and
such an office) ; therefore it is clear that even persons
wrongly admitted to citizenship are to be pronounced
to be citizens, although the question whether they
are so rightly or not rightly is connected with the
question that was propounded before. For some
persons raise the question, When is an occurrence the
act of the state and when is it not ? for example,
when the government has been altered from oligarchv
or tyranny to democracy. In such circumstances some
people claim that the new government should not dis-
charge public debts, on the ground that the money
181
ARISTOTLE
1276 a
τυράννου λαβόντος) ούτ* άλλα πολλά των τοιούτων,
ως ενιας των πολιτειών τω κρατεΐν ούσας άλλ' ου
διά το Koivfj συμφέρον. είπερ οΰν και δημοκρα- 11
15 τοΰνται τίνες κατά τον τρόπον τούτον, ομοίως της
πόλεως φατέΌν etvat ταύτης τάς της πολιτείας
ταύτης πράξεις και τάς εκ της ολιγαρχίας και της
τυραννίδος. εοικε δ' οικείος ό λόγος eirai της
απορίας ταύτης, πώς ποτέ 1 χρη λέγειν την πάλιν
etrai την αύτι^ η μη την αυτήν αλλ' ετέραν. η
20 μεν οΰν επιπολαιοτάτη της απορίας ζητησις περί
τον τόπον και τους ανθρώπους εστίν ενδέχεται
γάρ διαζβιτ^ί^αι τον τόπον και τους ανθρώπους, 1
και τους μεν έτερον τους δ έτερον οίκησαι τόπον,
ταύτην μεν ουν πραοτεραν θετεον την άπορίαν,
πολλαχώς γάρ της πόλεως λεγομένης εστί πως
25 ευμάρεια της τοιαύτης ζητήσεως• ομοίως δε και 12
τών τον αυτόν τόπον κατοικούντων ανθρώπων
πότε δει νομίζειν jLuav είναι την πόλιν; ου γάρ
δη τοις τείχεσιν, εΐη γάρ αν Π ελοποννησω περι-
βαλεΐν εν τείχος• τοιαύτη δ' ϊσως εστί και
Βαβυλών και πάσα ήτις έχει περιγραφην μάλλον
έθνους η πόλεως• ης γε φασιν εαλωκυίας τρίτην
30 ημεραν ουκ αίσθεσθαι τι μέρος της πόλεως, αλλά
περί μεν ταύτης της απορίας εις άλλον καιρόν
χρήσιμος η σκεφις (περί γαρ μεγέθους της πόλεως,
τό τε πόσον καΐ πότερον έθνος εν η πλείω συμ-
1 otYeios πω? — ταύτη';, πότε Richards.
2 τον — άνθρωπου? seel. Susemihl.
° i.e. ττόλ(5 means both (1) ' city ' (and also ' citadel ') and
(2) ' state,' a collection of citizens ; and if the citizens divide
and settle in two different ' cities ' with different governments,
they are clearly not the same ' state ' as before.
182
POLITICS, III. ι. 10-12
was borrowed by the tyrant and not by the state,
and should repudiate many other similar claims also,
because some forms of government rest upon force
and are not aimed at the welfare of the community.
11 If therefore some democracies also are governed in
that manner, the acts of the authorities in their case
can only be said to be the acts of the state in the
same sense as the public acts emanating from an
oligarchy or a tyranny are said to be. Akin to this
controversy seems to be the subject, What exactly is
the principle on which we ought to pronounce a city
to be the same city as it was before, or not the same
but a different city ? The most obvious mode of
inquiring into this difficulty deals with place and
people : the place and the people may have been
divided, and some may have settled in one place,
and some in another. In this form the question must
be considered as easier of solution ; for, as ' city ' has
several meanings, the inquiry so put is in a wav
12 not difficult. But it may similarly be asked,
Suppose a set of men inhabit the same place, in what
circumstances are we to consider their city to be a
single city ? Its unity clearly does not depend on
the walls, for it would be possible to throw a single
wall round the Peloponnesus ; and a case in point
perhaps is Babylon, and any other city that has the
circuit of a nation rather than of a city ; for it is said
that when Babylon was captured a considerable part
of the city was not aware of it three days later. But
the consideration of this difficulty will be serviceable
for another occasion, as the student of politics must
not ignore the question, What is the most advantage-
ous size for a city, and should its populations be of one
183
ARISTOTLE
φέρει, δει μη λανθάνειν τον πολιτικόν)• άλλα τών 13
35 αυτών 1 κατοικουντων τον αύτον τόπον, ποτ€ρον
έως αν η το γένος ταύτό των κατοικονντων την
αύτην είναι φατέον πόλιν, καίπερ άε\ των μεν
φθειρομενων των δε γινομένων, ώσπερ και ποτα-
μούς είώθαμεν λέγειν τους αυτούς και κρηνας
τάς αυτά? καίπερ άει του μεν έπιγινομένου νάματος
40 του δ' ύπεζιόντος, η τους μεν ανθρώπους φατέον
eivai τους αυτούς δια την τοιαύτην αίτίαν την δε
1276 b πάλιν έτέραν; ε'ίπερ γάρ έστι κοινωνία τις η
πόλις, ε'στι δε κοινωνία πολιτών πολιτείας, γιγ-
νομένης ετέρας τω ε'ίδει και οιαφερουσης της
πολιτείας άναγκαΐον είναι δόζειεν αν και την πόλιν
c είναι μη την αύτην, ώσπερ γε καΐ χορόν ότέ μεν
κωμικόν ότέ δε τραγικον έτερον είναι φαμεν τών
αυτών πολλάκις ανθρώπων όντων, ομοίως δε και 24
7τάσαν άλλην κοινωνίαν και σύνθεσιν έτέραν αν
είδος έτερον η της συνθέσεως, οίον άρμονίαν τών
αυτών φθόγγων έτέραν εΐναι λέγομεν 3 αν ότέ μεν
ίο fj Αώριος ότέ δε Φρύγιος. ει δη τούτον έχει τον
τρόπον, φανερόν οτι μάλιστα λεκτέον την αύτην
πόλιν εις την πολιτείαν βλέποντας• όνομα δε κα-
λεΐν έτερον η ταύτόν έζεστι και τών αυτών κατ-
οικούντων αύτην και πάμπαν ετέρων ανθρώπων,
ει δε δίκαιον διαλυειν η μη διαλύειν όταν εις
15 έτέραν μεταβάλλη πολιτείαν η πόλις, λόγος έτερος.
II. Τών δε νυν είρημένων έχόμενόν έστιν έπι- 1
1 τών ανθρώπων Richards.
2 πολιτ6ί'α Congreve.
3 \ί-γομ€ν Alb. : \έ~,οιμ€ν codd. (έτέραν αν eivai λεΎΟΐμίν ?
Newman).
184.
POLITICS, III. ι. 13—n. 1
13 race or of several ? But are we to pronounce a city,
where the same population inhabit the same place,
to be the same city so long as the population are of
the same race, in spite of the fact that all the time
some are dying and others being born, just as it is
our custom to say that a river or a spring is the same
river or spring although one stream of water is always
being added to it and another being- withdrawn from
it, or are we to say that though the people are the
same people for the similar reason of continuity, yet
the city is a different city ? For inasmuch as a state
is a kind of partnership, and is in fact a partnership
of citizens in a government, when the form of the
government has been altered and is different it
would appear to follow that the state is no longer the
same state, just as we say that a chorus which on
one occasion acts a comedy and on another a tragedy
is a different chorus although it is often composed
14 of the same persons, and similarly with any other
common whole or composite structure we say it is
different if the form of its structure is different — for
instance a musical tune consisting of the same notes
we call a different tune if at one time it is played
in the Dorian mode and at another in the Phrygian.
Therefore if this is the case, it is clear that we must
speak of a state as being the same state chiefly with
regard to its constitution ; and it is possible for it to
be called by the same or by a different designation
both when its inhabitants are the same and when
they are entirely different persons. But whether a
state is or is not bound in justice to discharge its
engagements when it has changed to a different
constitution, is another subject.
1 II. The next thing to consider after what has now
185
ARISTOTLE
1278 b
σκεφασθαι πότερον τήν αυτήν άρετήν ανδρός
άγαθοΰ και πολίτου σπουδαίου θετεον ή μή τήν
αυτήν, άλλα μην ει ye τοΰτο τυχεΐν Set ζητήσεως ,
•20 την του πολίτου τύπω τινι πρώτον ληπτεον.
ώσπερ οΰν 6 πλοιτήρ εΐς τις των κοινωνών εστίν,
ούτω καΐ τον πολίτην φαμεν. τών δέ πλωτήρων
καιπερ ανόμοιων όντων την δύναμιν (ο μεν γάρ
εστίν ερετης, ο δε κυβερνήτης, 6 δε πρωρεύς, 6 δ'
άλλην τιν έχων τοιαύτην επωνυμιαν) δήλον ώς ο
25 μεν ακριβέστατος εκάστου λόγος 'ίδιος εσται της
αρετής, ομοίως δε και κοινός τις εφαρμόσει πάσιν
η γάρ σωτήρια της ναυτιλίας έργον εστίν αυτών
πάντων, τούτου γάρ έκαστος ορέγεται τών πλω-
τήρων. ομοίως τοινυν και τών πολιτών, καίπερ 2
ανόμοιων όντων, ή σωτηρία της κοινωνίας έργον
so εστί, κοινωνία δ' εστίν ή πολιτεία, διό την άρετήν
άναγκαΐον eirai του πολίτου προς την πολιτείαν.
είπε ρ οΰν εστί πλείω πολιτείας εΐδη, δήλον ώς ουκ
ενδέχεται του σπουδαίου πολίτου μίαν άρετήν
eimi τήν τελείαν τον δ' αγαθόν άνδρα φαμεν κατά
μίαν άρετήν efrai τήν τελείαν. 1 ότι μεν οΰν
30 ενδέχεται πολίτην όντα σπουδαΐον μή κεκτήσθαι
τήν άρετήν καθ* ην σπουδαίος άνήρ, φανερόν. ου 3
μήν άλλα και κατ' άλλον τρόπον εστί διαποροΰντας
επελθεΐν τον αύτον λόγον περί της άριστης πολι-
τείας, εί γάρ αδύνατον* εξ απάντων σπουδαίων
όντων eivai πόλιν, δει δ εκαστον το καθ' αυτόν
1 rbv 8 — reKeiav ΓΡ 1 : om. cet.
1 δυνατόν Bernays.
α Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give ' possible ' :
see Additional Note on p. 275.
186
POLITICS, III. π. 1-3
been said is the question whether we are to hold that Mu st a good
the goodness of a good man is the same as that of gcodman?
a good citizen, or not the same. However, if this
point really is to receive investigation, we must first
ascertain in some general outline what constitutes
the excellence of a citizen. Now a citizen we pro- Xot uncon-
nounced to be one sort of partner in a community, ?£ civic J :
as is a sailor. And although sailors differ from each virtue
other in function — one is an oarsman, another helms- under
man, another look-out man, and another has some riiffer ent
other similar special designation — and so clearly the tions,
most exact definition of their excellence will be
special to each, yet there will also be a common
definition of excellence that will apply alike to all
of them ; for security in navigation is the business
of them all, since each of the sailors aims at that.
>- 2 Similarly therefore with the citizens, although they
are dissimilar from one another, their business is the
security of their community, and this community
is the constitution, so that the goodness of a citizen
must necessarily be relative to the constitution
of the state. If therefore there are various forms
of constitution, it is clear that there cannot be one
single goodness which is the perfect goodness of the
good citizen ; but when we speak of a good man we
mean that he possesses one single goodness, perfect
goodness. Hence it is manifestly possible to be a
good citizen without possessing the goodness that
3 constitutes a good man. Moreover it is also feasible and even
to pursue the same topic by raising the question in in the
another manner in relation to the best form of con- ^ute^aii
stitution. If it is impossible a for a state to consist ^i*?• 1
entirely of good men, and if it is necessary for each are not
person to perform well the work of his position, and good men '
187
ARISTOTLE
1276 b „ T ji > > . « >S*i
40 έργον ευ ποιειν, τούτο ο απ αρετής, επειοη
αδύνατον όμοιους είναι παντας τους πολίτας, ουκ
1277 a αν εΐη μία αρετή πολίτου και ανδρός άγαθοΰ' την
μεν γαρ του σπουδαίου πολίτου δεΐ πάσιν ύπάρχειν
(οϋτω γαρ άρίστην άναγκαΐον είναι την πάλιν), την
δέ του ανδρός του άγαθοΰ αδύνατον , ει μη πάντας
5 άναγκαΐον αγαθούς είναι τους εν τη σπουδαία
πάλει πολίτας. ετι έπε ι εξ ανόμοιων η πόλις — 4
ώσπερ ζώον εύθυς εκ ψυχής και σώματος, και
ψυχή εκ λόγου και ορέξεως, και οικία εξ ανδρός
και γυναικός και κτησις 2 εκ δεσπότου και δούλου,
τον αυτόν τρόπον και πόλις εξ απάντων τε τούτων
ίο καΐ προς τούτοις εξ άλλων ανόμοιων συνεστηκεν
ειδών—, ανάγκη μη μίαν είναι την τών πολιτών
πάντων άρετήν, ώσπερ ούδε τών χορευτών κορυ-
φαίου και παραστάτου . διότι μεν τοίνυν απλώς 5
ούχ ή αύτη, φανερόν εκ τούτων αλλ' άρα εσται
τινός ή αύτη αρετή πολίτου τε σπουδαίου και
ανδρός σπουδαίου; φαμεν δή τον άρχοντα τον
15 σπουδαΐον dya^o^ eirai και φρόνιμον, τον δε πολι-
τικόν άναγκαΐον etrai φρόνιμον. και τήν παιδείαν
δ' ευθύς ετεραν eirai λεγουσί τίνες του άρχοντος ,
ώσπερ και φαίνονται οι τών ^ασιλεω^ υίεΐς
ιππικήν και πολεμικήν παιδευόμενοι, και Έιύρι-
πίδης φησι
20 μη μοι τα κόμψ' , αλλ ων πάλει δει,
ώς ούσάν τίνα άρχοντος 7ταιδειαν. ει δε η αύτη 6
1 έπαδη ΓΜ : eireiSr) δέ Ρ 1 : έπεί δέ cet. : έπίΐ Spengel.
2 [κτ^σ-ί?] Bernays.
• These words in the Greek are probably an interpolation.
6 Fragment 16, from Aeolus.
188
POLITICS, III. π. 3-5
to do this springs from goodness, then because it is
impossible for all the citizens to be alike, the good-
ness of a good citizen would not be one and the same
as the goodness of a good man ; for all ought to
possess the goodness of the good citizen (that is a
necessary condition of the state's being the best
possible), but it is impossible that all should possess
the goodness of a good man, if it is not necessary that
all the citizens in a good state should be good men.
* Asrain, since the state consists of unlike persons — and different
o * ι citizens
just as an animal (to take this instance first) consists have
of soul and body, and a soul of reason and appetite, ^^L•.
and a household of husband and wife and [ownership
involves] a master and slave, in the same manner
a state consists of all of these persons and also of
others of different classes in addition to these, —
it necessarily follows that the goodness of all the
citizens is not one and the same, just as among
dancers the skill of a head dancer is not the same as
5 that of a subordinate leader. It is clear then from
these considerations that the goodness of a good
citizen and that of a good man are not the same in
general ; but will the goodness of a good citizen of
a particular sort be the same as that of a good man ?
Now we say that a good ruler is virtuous and wise, But a good
and that a citizen taking part in politics must be wise, ^^^d"
Also some people say that even the education of a man,
ruler must be different, as indeed we see that the
sons of kings are educated in horsemanship and
military exercises, and Euripides says b
No subtleties for me, but what the state
Requireth —
implying that there is a special education for a ruler.
180
ARISTOTLE
αρετή άρχοντος τε άγαθοΰ και ανδρός αγαθόν,
πολίτης δ' εστί και ο αρχόμενος, ούχ η αύτη
απλώς αν εΐη πολίτου και ανδρός, τινός μίντοι
πολίτου• ου γαρ η αύτη άρχοντος και πολίτου, και
διά τοΰτ 'ίσως Ιάσων εφη πεινην οτε μη τύραννοι,
25 ως ούκ επισταμένος ιδιώτης είναι, αλλά μην!
επαινείται γε το ούνασθαι άρχειν και άρχεσθαι,
και πολίτου δοκεΐ που 1 η άρετη etrai το δυ^ασ&η
και άρχειν και άρχεσθαι καλώς, ει οΰν την μεν
του άγαθοΰ ανδρός τίθεμεν άρχικην, την δε του
πολίτου άμφω, ούκ αν ε'ίη άμφω επαινετά ομοίως.
30 επεί οΰν ποτέ δοκεΐ 2 αμφότερα, 3 και ού ταύτα
δεΐν τον άρχοντα μανθάνειν και τον άρχόμενον, τον
δε πολίτην άμφότερ* επίστασθαι και μετεχειν
άμφοΐν, . . . .* κάντεΰθεν αν κατίδοι τις• εστί γάρ
αρχή δεσποτική• ταύτην δε την περί τάναγκαΐα 8
λεγομεν, α ποιεΐν €7Γΐστασί?αι τον άρχοντ ούκ
35 άναγκαιον , άλλα χρησθαι μάλλον θάτερον δε και
άνδραποδώδες, λέγω δε θάτερον το δυ^ασ^αι και
ύπηρετεΐν τάς διακονικός πράξεις, δούλου δ' εΐδη
πλείω λεγομεν, αϊ γάρ εργασίαι πλείους. ων εν
μέρος κατεχουσιν οι χερνητες• οΰτοι δ' εισίν, ώσπερ
1277 b σημαίνει καΐ τοΰνομ αυτούς, 6 οι ζώντες από τών
χειρών, εν οΐς ο βάναυσος τεχνίτης εστίν, διό
1 δοκεΐ που Jackson : δοκίμου codd.
* ποτέ δοκεΐ corruptum : άποδέχεσθαι δει Susemihl,
3 άμφω έτερα Bernays : έτερα Coraes.
4 lacunam Susemihl.
5 αυτό Montecatinus.
• Tyrant of Pherae in Thessaly, assassinated 370 b.c.
b Some words seem to have been lost, conveying ' we must
consider how this dual fitness can be acquired,' or possibly
190
POLITICS, III. π. 6-8
6 And if the goodness of a good ruler is the same as the
goodness of a good man, yet the person ruled is also
a citizen, so that the goodness of a citizen in general
will not be the same as that of a man, although that
of a particular citizen will ; for gr>nrtnp.«t«t a.g. a. nj1pr is
rjyatihe eame-as-^oodxiess^S- a citizen, and no doubt
this is the reason why Jason ° said that whenever he
was not tyrant he felt hungry, meaning that he did
7 not know the art of being a private person. Another and must
point is that we praise the ability to rule and to be j^rnt to
ruled, and it is doubtless held that the goodness of a ο** 5 ?, ■■ a
citizen consists in ability both to rule and to be ruled
well. If then we lay it down that the goodness of
the good man is displayed in ruling, whereas that
of the citizen is shown in both capacities, the two
capacities cannot be equally laudable. Since there-
fore both views are sometimes accepted, and it is
thought that the ruler and the subject do not have
to learn the same arts but that the citizen must know
both arts and share in both capacities, . . . . b And
it may be discerned from the following illustration :
8 one form of authority is that of a master ; by this
we mean the exercise of authority in regard to the
necessary work of the house, which it is not necessary
for the master to know how to execute, but rather
how to utilize ; the other capacity, I mean the ability
actually to serve in these menial tasks, is indeed
a slave's quality. But we distinguish several kinds
of slave, as their employments are several. One
department belongs to the handicraftsmen, who as
their name implies are the persons that live by their
hands, a class that includes the mechanic artisan.
considerably more. But the text at the beginning of the
sentence is also corrupt.
191
ARISTOTLE
1277 b
τταρ' ένίοις ου μετεΐχον οι δημιουργοί το παλαιον
αρχών, πριν δήμον γενέσθαι τον έσχατον. τα μεν 9
οΰν έργα των αρχομένων οϋτως ου δει τον αγαθόν
5 ουδέ τον πολιτικόν ουδέ τον πολίτην 1 τον αγαθόν
μανθάνειν, ει μη ποτέ χρείας χάριν αύτώ προς
αυτόν (ου γαρ έτι συμβαίνει yiVea(?cu τον 2 μέν
δεσπότην τον 2 δέ δοΰλον). άλλ' εστί τις αρχή
καθ* •ην άρχει των ομοίων τω γένει και των
ελευθέρων (ταύτην γαρ λέγομεν eirai την πολι-
ιο τικήν αρχήν), ην δει τον άρχοντα άρχόμενον μαθεΐν,
οίον Ίππαρχεΐν ιππαρχηθέντα, στρατηγεΐν στρατη-
γηθέντα και ταζιαρχήσαντα και λοχαγήσαντα. διό
και λέγεται και τούτο καλώς, ως ουκ έστιν εΰ
άρζαι μη άρχθέντα. τούτων δέ αρετή μέν έτερα, 10
δει δέ τον πολίτην τον αγαθόν έπίστασθαι και
is δΛ'ασ^αι και άρχεσθαι και άρχειν, και αυτή αρετή
πολίτου, το τήν τών ελευθέρων αρχήν έπίστασθαι
έπ* αμφότερα, και ανδρός δή άγαθοΰ άμφω, και
ει έτερον είδος σωφροσύνης και δικαιοσύνης αρχι-
κής• και γάρ αρχομένου μέν ελευθέρου δέ δήλον
οτι ου μία αν ε'ίη του αγαθού αρετή, οίον δίκαιο -
20 σύνη, άλλ' είδη έχουσα καθ* α άρζει και άρξεται,
ώσπερ ανδρός και γυναικός έτερα σωφροσύνη και
ανδρεία (δο^αι γαρ αν είναι δβιλό? ανηρ ει οϋτως
ανδρείος εΐη ώσπερ γυνή ανδρεία, και γυνή λάλος 3
1 [ά-/αθον ουδέ τον] πολιτικόν [ουδέ τον πολίτην] Thurot.
2 τότ€ pro τον bis Riese, 6τ€ Richards.
3 άλλος, άλαλο?, άλλως codd. inf. : ακόλαστος Susemihl.
192
POLITICS, III. π. 8-10
Hence in some states manual labourers were not
admitted to office in old times, before the develop-
9 ment of extreme democracy. The tasks of those who
are under this form of authority therefore it is not
proper for the good man or the man fit for citizen-
ship or the good citizen to learn, except for his own
private use occasionally (for then it ceases to be a
case of the one party being master and the other
slave). But there exists a form of authority by
which a man rules over persons of the same race as
himself, and free men (for that is how we describe
political authority), and this the ruler should learn
by being ruled, just as a man should command cavalry
after having served as a trooper, command a regi-
ment after having served in a regiment and been in
command of a company and of a platoon. Hence
there is much truth in the saying that it is impossible
to become a good ruler without having been a subject.
10 And although the goodness of a ruler and that of a
subject are different, the good citizen must have the
knowledge and the ability both to be ruled and to rule,
and the merit of the good citizen consists in having
a knowledge of the government of free men on both
sides. And therefore both these virtues are char-
acteristic of a good man, even if temperance and
justice in a ruler are of a different kind from temper-
ance and justice in a subject ; for clearly a good
man's virtue, for example his justice, will not be one
and the same when he is under government and when
he is free, but it will be of different kinds, one fitting
him to rule and one to be ruled, just as temperance Male and
and courage are different in a man and in a woman (f^ 1 *
(for a man would be thought a coward if he were only
as brave as a brave woman, and a woman a chatterer
193
ARISTOTLE
1277 b , „ , „ „ , , v t y a , , λ
ει ούτω κοσμία ειη ωσπερ ο ανηρ ο αγασος• επει
καί οικονομία ετέρα ανδρός καί γυναικός, του μεν
25 γαρ κτασθαι της δε φυλάττειν έργον εστίν), η δε 11
φρόνησις άρχοντος ίδιος αρετή μόνη• τάς γαρ άλλας
εοικεν άναγκαΐον είναι κοινά? καί των αρχομένων
και των αρχόντων, αρχομένου δε γε ουκ εστίν
αρετή φρόνησις, άλλα οόζα αληθής' ωσπερ αύλο-
80 ποιος γαρ 6 αρχόμενος , ο δ' άρχων αυλητής ο
χρω μένος.
Πότερο ν μεν ουν ή αυτή αρετή ανδρός αγαθού
και πολίτου σπουδαίου ή έτερα, και πώς ή αυτή
και πώς έτερα, φανερόν εκ τούτων.
III. Περί δε τον πολίτην έτι λείπεταί τι? τών 1
αποριών, ως αληθώς γαρ πότερον πολίτης εστίν
BS ω κοινωνειν έζεστιν αρχής, ή και τους βάναυσους
πολίτας θετεον ; ει μεν ουν και τούτους θετεον οΐς
μή μετεστιν αρχών, ούχ οΐόν τε παντός είναι πολίτου
τήν τοιαύτην άρετήν, οΰτος γαρ πολίτης• ει δε
μη8είς τών τοιούτων πολίτης, εν τίνι μέρει θετεος
έκαστος; ουδέ γαρ μέτοικος ουδέ ξένος, ή δια γε
1278a τούτον τον λόγον ουδέν φήσομεν συμβαίνειν άτοπο?'';
ουδέ γαρ οι δούλοι τών ειρημενων ουδέν, ούδ* οι
απελεύθεροι, τοϋτο γαρ αληθές, ως ου πάντας 2
θετεον πολίτας ων άνευ ουκ αν ε'ίη πόλις, έπει
ούδ' οί παίδες ώσαυτω? 77θλίται και οι άνδρες, αλλ'
6 οί μεν απλώς οί δ' εξ υποθέσεως 1 • πολϊται μεν
γάρ είσιν, αλλ' ατελείς, ε'ν μεν ουν τοις άρχαίοις
1 έκ προσθίσΐως Casaubon.
" Or perhaps ' for the working-man is a citizen ' : see
Additional Note p. 275.
6 Or, with Casaubon's probable correction of the Greek,
'only with a qualification.'
194
POLITICS, III. ii. 10— in. 2
if she were only as modest as a good man ; since even
the household functions of a man and of a woman
are different — his business is to get and hers to keep).
11 And practical wisdom alone of the virtues is a virtue
peculiar to a ruler ; for the other \artues seem to be
necessarv alike for both subjects and rulers to possess,
but wisdom assuredly is not a subject's virtue, but
only right opinion : the subject corresponds to the
man who makes flutes and the ruler to the flute-
player who uses them.
The question whether the goodness of a good man
is the same as that of a good citizen or different, and
how they are the same and how different, is clear
from these considerations.
1 III. But one of the difficulties as to what constitutes Therefore
a citizen is still left. Is it truly the case that a citizen %££?££*
is a person who has the right to share office in the citizens in
government, or are the working classes also to be state. L
counted citizens ? If these persons also are to be * h ^ d ° nofc
counted who have no share in offices, it is not possible
for every citizen to possess the citizen's virtue ; for
the true citizen is the man capable of governing. e
If on the other hand no one of the working people
is a citizen, in what class are the various workers to
be ranked ? for they are neither resident aliens nor
foreigners. Or shall we say that so far as that argu-
ment goes no inconsistency results ? for slaves also
are not in one of the classes mentioned, nor are freed-
2 men. For it is true that not all the persons indispens-
able for the existence of a state are to be deemed
citizens, since even the sons of citizens are not
citizens in the same sense as the adults : the latter
are citizens in the full sense, the former only by
presumption b — they are citizens, but incomplete ones.
195
ARISTOTLE
1278 a
χρονοις παρ ενιοις ην δοΰλον το βάναυσον η
ζενικόν, διόπερ ol πολλοί τοιούτοι και νυν η δε
β€λτίστη πόλις ου ποιήσει βάναυσον πολίτην. ει
δε και ούτος πολίτης, άλλα πολίτου άρετην ην
ίο εϊπομεν λεκτέον ου παντός, ουδ' ελευθέρου μόνον,
αλλ' όσοι των έργων είσιν άφειμένοι των αναγκαίων .
των δ' αναγκαίων 1 οι μεν ένι λειτουργούντες τα. 3
τοιαύτα δούλοι, οι 8έ κοινοί βάναυσοι και θητες.
φανερόν δ' εντεύθεν μικρόν έπισκεφαμένοις πώς
έχει περί αυτών[• αύτο γαρ φανέν το λεχθέν ποιεί
ΐδ δηλον]. 2 έπει γαρ πλείους είσιν αϊ πολιτεΐαι, και
εϊδη πολίτου αναγκαΐον etWn πλείω, και μάλιστα
του αρχομένου πολίτου, ωστ εν μέν τινι πολιτεία
τον βάναυσον αναγκαΐον είναι και τον θητα πολίτας,
εν τισι δ' αδύνατον, οίον ε'ί τις εστίν ην καλοΰσιν
20 άριστοκρατικην και εν η κατ' άρετην αϊ τιμαι
δίδονται και κατ* άζίαν ου γαρ οΐόν τ' έπιτηδεϋ-
σαι τά της αρετής ζώντα βίον βάναυσον η θητικόν.
εν δε ταΐς όλιγαρχίαις θητα μέν ουκ ενδέχεται είναι 4
πολίτην {από τιμημάτων γαρ μακρών αϊ μεθέξεις
τών αρχών), βάναυσον δ ενδέχεται• πλουτοΰσι γαρ
25 και οι πολλοί τών τεχνιτών, εν Θτ^αι? δε νόμος
ην τον διά 3 δέκα ετών μη άπεσχημένον της αγοράς
μη μετέχειν άρχης. εν πολλαΐς δε πολιτείαις προσ-
1 άλλων Bernays.
2 [αυτό — δήλορ] ed. : [^apey] vel <τό> φανίν [rb λεχθεν]
Richards.
3 δια add. Newman {ίτη Richards).
The ill-expressed clause ' for what — clear ' seems almost
certainly to be an interpolation.
196
POLITICS, III. in. 2-4
In ancient times in fact the artisan class in some
states consisted of slaves or aliens, owing to which
the great mass of artisans are so even now ; and the
best-ordered state will not make an artisan a citizen.
While if even the artisan is a citizen, then what we
said to be the citizen's virtue must not be said to
belong to every citizen, nor merely be defined as the
virtue of a free man, but will only belong to those
3 who are released from menial occupations. Among
menial occupations those who render such services to
an individual are slaves, and those who do so for the
community are artisans and hired labourers. The
state of the case about them will be manifest from
what follows when we consider it a little further[, for
what has been said when made known itself makes it
clear]. As there are several forms of constitution,
it follows that there are several kinds of citizen, and
especially of the citizen in a subject position ; hence
under one form of constitution citizenship will
necessarily extend to the artisan and the hired
labourer, while under other forms this is impossible,
for instance in any constitution that is of the form
entitled aristocratic and in which the honours are
bestowed according to goodness and to merit, since
a person living a life of manual toil or as a hired
labourer cannot practise the pursuits in which good-
4 ness is exercised. In oligarchies on the other hand,
though it is impossible for a hired labourer to be a
citizen (since admission to office of various grades is
based on high property-assessments), it is possible
for an artisan ; for even the general mass of the
craftsmen are rich. At Thebes there was a law that
no one who had not kept out of trade for the last ten
years might be admitted to office. But under many
197
ARISTOTLE
1278 3 Ι /Λ Χ ~ f , < <•
εφελκεται και των ξένων ο νομός' ο γαρ εκ
πολίτιδος εν τισι δημοκρατίαις πολίτης εστίν, τον 5
αυτόν δε τρόπον έχει, και τα περί τους νόθους
3ο παρά πολλοίς, ου μην άλλ' επει δι' ενΒειαν των
γνησίων πολιτών ποιούνται πολιτας τους τοιούτους
(δια γαρ όλιγανθρωπίαν ούτω χρώνται τοις νόμοις),
εύποροΰντες δη 1 δχλου κατά μικρόν παραιροΰνται
τους εκ δούλου πρώτον η δούλης, εΐτα τους απο
γυναικών τέλος δε μόνον τους εζ άμφοΐν αστών
35 πολίτας ποιοΰσιν. δτι μεν ουν ε'ίδη πλείω πολίτου, 6
φανερόν εκ τούτων, και δτι λέγεται μάλιστα
πολίτης ο μετέχων τών τιμών, ώσπερ και "Ομηρος
εποίησεν
ώσεί τιν άτίμητον μετανάστην
ωσπερ μέτοικος γάρ εστίν 6 τών τιμών μη μετέχων.
άλλ' εστίν 2 δπου το τοιούτον επικεκρυμμΛνον εστίν
40 απάτης χάριν τών συνοικούντων .
1278 b ΥΙότερον μεν ουν ετέραν η την αύτην θετεον καθ*
ην άνηρ αγαθός εστί και πολίτης σπουδαίος , δηλον
εκ τών είρημενων, δτι τινο? μεν πόλεως ο αυτός
τινός δ' έτερος, κάκεΐνος ου πας άλλ' ο πολιτικός
και κύριος η δυνάμενος eirai κύριος, η καθ αυτόν
5 η μετ αΧλων, της τών κοινών επιμελείας .
IV. ΚπεΙ δε ταύτα διώρισται, το μετά ταύτα 1
1 δη Susemihl : δ' codd.
* εστίν hie Welldon, post συνοικούντων codd.
α Iliad ix. 648, xvi. 59.
b The mss. give ' But where such exclusion is disguised, it
(this concealment) is for the purpose of deceiving ' etc.
198
POLITICS, III. πι. 4^-iv. 1
constitutions the law draws recruits even from
foreigners ; for in some democracies the son of a
5 citizen-mother is a citizen, and the same rule holds
good as to base-born sons in many places. Neverthe-
less, inasmuch as such persons are adopted as citizens
owing to a lack of citizens of legitimate birth (for
legislation of this kind is resorted to because of
under-pop ulation), when a state becomes well ο if for
numbers it gradually divests itself first of the sons of
a slave father or mother, then of those whose mothers
only were citizens, and finally only allows citizenship
6 to the children of citizens on both sides. These facts
then show that there are various kinds of citizen, and
that a citizen in the fullest sense means the man who
shares in the honours of the state, as is implied in
the verse of Homer :
Like to some alien settler without honour, —
since a native not admitted to a share in the public
honours is like an alien domiciled in the land. But
in some places this exclusion is disguised, for the
purpose of deceiving those who are a part of the
population. 6
The answer therefore to the question, Is the
goodness that makes a good man to be deemed
the same as that which makes a worthy citizen, or
different ? is now clear from what has been said : in
one form of state the good man and the good citizen
are the same, but in another they are different,
and also in the former case it is not every citizen
but only the statesman, the man who controls or is
competent to control, singly or with colleagues,
the administration of the commonwealth, that is
essentially also a good man.
I IV. And since these points have been determined,
199
ARISTOTLE
1278 b
σκεπτεον ποτερον μίαν θετεον πολιτείαν ή πλειους,
καν ει πλείους, rives και πόσαι καΐ διαφοραϊ rives
αυτών eiGLV. εστί he πολιτεία πόλεως τάζις των
ίο re άλλων άρχων καί μάλιστα τής κυρίας πάντων,
κυριον μεν γαρ πανταχού το πολίτευμα της πόλεως,
πολίτευμα δ' εστίν ή πολιτεία, λέγω δ' οίον εν
μεν ταΐς δημοκρατικαΐς κύριος 6 δήμος, οι δ
ολίγοι τουναντίον εν ταΐς όλιγαρχίαις• φαμεν 8ε
και πολιτείαν ετεραν είναι τούτων, τον αυτόν δε
15 τούτον εροΰμεν λόγον και περί των άλλων.
'Ύποθετεον δε πρώτον τίνος χάριν συνεστηκε 2
πόλις και της αρχής εΐδη πόσα της περί άνθρωπον
και 1 την κοινωνίαν της ζωής.
Έιΐρηται δη κατά τους πρώτους λόγους, εν οις
περί οικονομίας διωρίσθη και δεσποτειας, ότι
20 φύσει μεν εστίν άνθρωπος ζώον πολιτικόν διο και
μηδέν δεόμενοι τής παρ* αλλήλων βοηθείας ουκ
ελαττον ορέγονται του συζήν. ου μην άλλα και 3
τό κοινή συμφέρον συνάγει, καθ' όσον επιβάλλει
μέρος εκάστω του ζήν καλώς, αάλιστα μεν οΰν
τουτ εστί τέλος, και κοινή πάσι και χωρίς-
συνέρχονται δε και του ζήν ένεκεν αύτοΰ και
25 συνεχουσι την πολιτικήν κοινωνίαν, 2 'ίσως γάρ ενεστί
τι του καλοΰ μόριον και κατά το ζήν αυτό μόνον
άν μη τοις χαλεποΐς κατά τον βίον ύπερβάλλτ)
λίαν, δήλον δ' ως καρτεροΰσι πολλην κακοπάθειαν
1 και: κατά Bernays.
2 καί — κοινωνίαν post 26 μόριον codd. cet.
° 1253 a 1 foil.
200
POLITICS, III. iv. 1-3
the next question to be considered is whether we are to Constitu-
lav it down that there is only one form of constitution S^fiei
or several, and if several, what they are and how
many and what are the differences between them.
Now a constitution is the ordering of a state in respect
of its various magistracies, and especially the magis-
tracv that is supreme over all matters. For the They vary
government is everywhere supreme over the state to\heir ng
and the constitution is the government. I mean that sovereign,
in democratic states for example the people are
supreme, but in oligarchies on the contrary the few
are : and we say that they have a different constitu-
tion. And we shall use the same language about the
other forms of government also.
2 We have therefore to determine first the funda-
mental points, what is the object for which a state
exists and how many different kinds of system there
are for governing mankind and for controlling the
common life.
Now it has been said in our first discourses,* 1 in The true
which we determined the principles concerning house- "Estate
hold management and the control of slaves, that man is the
is by nature a political animal ; and so even when men ™ β ι 1Γ ^
have no need of assistance from each other they none of its
3 the less desire to live together. At the same time they
are also brought together by common interest, so far
as each achieves a share of the good life. The good life
then is the chief aim of society, both collectively for
all its members and individually ; but they also come
together and maintain the political partnership for
the sake of life merely, for doubtless there is some
element of value contained even in the mere state
of being alive, provided that there is not too great
an excess on the side of the hardships of life, and it
η 201
ARISTOTLE
ol πολλοί τών ανθρώπων γλιχόμενοι του ζήν, ως
30 ενούσης τίνος ευημερίας iv αύτώ και γλυκύτητος
φυσικής.
Αλλά μην και της αρχής τους λεγόμενους 4•
τρόπους ράδιον διελεΐν και γαρ iv τοις εξωτερικοΐς
λογοις διοριζόμεθα περί αυτών πολλάκις, ή μεν
γαρ δεσποτεία, καίπερ δντος κατ άλτ^ιαν τω τ€
φύσει δούλω καϊ τω φύσει δεσπότη ταύτοΰ συμ-
36 φέροντος, όμως άρχει προς το του δεσπότου συμ-
φέρον ουδέν ήττον, προς δε το του δούλου κατά
συμβεβηκός, ου γαρ ενδέχεται φθειρομενου του
δούλου σωί,εσθαι την δεσποτείαν. ή δε τέκνων δ
αρχή και γυναικός [και τής οικίας πάσης, ην δη
καλοΰμεν οίκονομικήν] 1 ήτοι τών αρχομένων χάριν
40 εστίν ή κοινού τίνος άμφοΐν — καθ* αυτό μεν τών
1279 a αρχομένων, ώσπερ όρώμεν και τάς άλλα? τεχνας,
οίον ίατρικήν και γυμναστικήν, κατά συμβεβηκός
δε καν αυτών εΐεν ουδέν γάρ κωλύει τον παιδο-
τρίβην ενα τών γυμναζομενων ενίοτ eimi και
αυτόν, ώσπερ ό κυβερνήτης εις εστίν άει τών
5 πλωτήρων ό μεν ούν παιδοτρίβης ή κυβερνήτης
σκοπεί το τών αρχομένων aya^ov, Οταν δέ τούτων
εΐς γενηται και αυτός, κατά συμβεβηκος μετέχει
τής ωφελείας, ο μέν γάρ πλωτήρ, ό δε τών γυμνα-
1 καϊ — πάσης seclusit, ήν—οίκονομικήν suspexit Susemihl.
α Mentioned at 1323 a 22 (and also six times in other
books) ; they are there appealed to for the tripartite classifica-
tion of foods which in Ethics 1098 b 12 is ascribed to ' current
opinion of long standing and generally accepted by students
of philosophy.' The term may there predenote doctrines
not peculiar to the Peripatetic school.
202
POLITICS, III. iv. 3-5
is clear that the mass of mankind cling to life at the
cost of enduring much suffering, which shows that
life contains some measure of well-being and of
sweetness in its essential nature.
4 And again, the several recognized varieties of varieties of
government can easily be defined ; in fact we private life!
frequently discuss them in our external discourses.
The authority of a master over a slave, although in
truth when both master and slave are designed by
nature for their positions their interests are the
same, nevertheless governs in the greater degree
with a view to the interest of the master, but in-
cidentally with a view to that of the slave, for if the
slave deteriorates the position of the master cannot
5 be saved from injury. Authority over children and
wife [and over the whole household, which we call
the art of household management 6 ] is exercised
either in the interest of those ruled or for some
common interest of both parties, — essentially, in
the interest of the ruled, as we see that the other
arts also, like medicine and athletic training, are
pursued in the interest of the persons upon whom
they are practised, although' incidentally they may
also be in the interest of the practitioners themselves ;
for nothing prevents the trainer from being on
occasions himself also one of the persons in training,
j ust as the pilot is always a member of the crew ; so
although the trainer or pilot studies the good of
those under his authority, when he himself also
becomes one among them he incidentally shares the
benefit, for the pilot is a sailor in the ship and the
trainer can become one of the persons in training
* Aristotle can hardly have written this clause, as it in-
cludes mastership over slaves.
203
ARISTOTLE
1279 a
ζομενων εις γίνεται παιδοτρίβης ων. διό καί τάς 6
πολιτικός αρχάς, όταν rj κατ ισότητα των πολιτών
ίο συνεστηκυια και καθ' ομοιότητα, κατά μέρος
άζιοϋσιν άρχειν, πρότερον μεν, fj πεφυκεν, άζιοϋν-
τες εν μέρει λειτουργεΐν, και σκοπεΐν τινά πάλιν
το αύτοΰ αγαθόν ώσπερ πρότερον αυτός άρχων
εσκόπει το εκείνον συμφέρον νυν 8ε διά τάς
ωφελείας τάς από των κοινών και τάς εκ της
15 αρχής βούλονται συνεχώς άρχειν, οίον ει συνεβαινεν
i3yiaiWt.v αεί τοις άρχουσι νοσακεροΐς ουσιν και
γάρ αν οΰτως ΐσως εοίωκον τάς αρχάς.
Φανερόν τοίνυν ως οσαι μεν πολιτεΐαι το κοινή η
συμφέρον σκοποΰσιν , αύται μεν ορθαι τυγχάνουσιν
οΰσαι κατά το απλώς δίκαιον, οσαι δε το σφετερον
20 μόνον τών αρχόντων, ήμαρτημεναι 77ασαι και
παρεκβάσεις τών ορθών πολιτειών δεσποτικαί
γάρ, ή δε πόλις κοινωνία τών ελευθέρων εστίν.
Διωρισμενων δε τούτων εχομενον εστί τάς
πολιτείας επισκεφασθαι, 77οσαι τον αριθμόν και
τίνες είσί, και πρώτον τάς ορθάς αυτών και γάρ
25 at παρεκβάσεις έσονται φανεροί τούτων διορι-
σθεισών. V. επεί δε πολιτεία μεν και πολίτευμα ι
ση /xaiVei ταύτόν, πολίτευμα δ εστί το κύριον τών
πόλεων, ανάγκη δ' είναι κύριον ή ενα ή ολίγους ή
τους πολλούς, όταν μεν ό εις ή οι ολίγοι ή οι
πολλοί προς το κοινόν συμφέρον αρχωσι, ταύτας
so μεν όρθάς άναγκαΐον είναι τάς πολιτείας, τάς δε
προς το ίδιον ή του ενός ή τών ολίγων ή του
204
POLITICS, III. iv. 6— v. 1
6 under his own direction. Hence in regard to the
political offices also, when the state is constituted
on the principle of equality and of similarity between
the citizens, these claim to hold office by turn — in
earlier times, under the natural system, claiming
to do public services in turn, and for somebody in
return to look after their own welfare just as previ-
ously they looked after his interest when in office
themselves ; but nowadays owing to the benefits
to be got from public sources and from holding office
people wish to be in office continuously, just as if it
were the case that those in office although sickly
people always enjoyed good health — in which case
office would no doubt be much run after by invalids.
7 It is clear then that those constitutions that aim
at the common advantage are in effect rightly framed
in accordance with absolute justice, while those that
aim at the rulers' own advantage only are faulty,
and are all of them deviations from the right con-
stitutions ; for they have an element of despotism,
whereas a city is a partnership of free men.
These matters having been determined the next Constitu-
step is to consider how many forms of constitution t ! ons Λ , u
ι -ι ι " f classified by
there are and what they are ; and first to study the number
the right forms of constitution, since the deviations sovereign
will also become manifest when these are defined, ^.y. and
1 V. But inasmuch as ' constitution ' means the same selfish or
as ' government,' and the government is the supreme unseltish
power in the state, and this must be either a single
ruler or a few or the mass of the citizens, in cases
when the one or the few or the many govern with an
eye to the common interest, these constitutions must
necessarily be right ones, while those administered
with an eye to the private interest of either the one
205
ARISTOTLE
πλήθους παρεκβάσεις, η γάρ ου πολίτας φατεον
είναι τους μετέχοντας, 1 η δει κοινωνεΐν του συμ-
φέροντος, καλεΐν δ' εΐώθαμεν των μεν μοναρ- 2
χιών την προς το κοινον άποβλεπουσαν συμφέρον
36 /^ασιλειαν, την δέ των ολίγων μεν πλειόνων δ'
ενός άριστοκρατιαν (η δια το τους αρίστους άρχειν
η δια το προς το άριστον τη πάλει και τοις
κοινωνουσιν αυτής), όταν δε το πλήθος προς το
κοινον πολιτεύηται συμφέρον, καλείται το κοινον
όνομα πασών τών πολιτειών, πολιτεία, {συ μ- 3
40 /3cuWi δ ευλόγως' ενα μεν γαρ διαφερειν κατ*
άρετην η ολίγους ενδέχεται, πλείους δ' ηδη χαλεπόν
1279 b ήκριβώσθαι προς πάσαν αρετην, αλλά μάλιστα την
πολεμικην, αΰτη γαρ εν πληθει γίγνεταν διόπερ
κατά ταύτην την πολιτειαν κυριώτατον το προ-
πολεμουν , και μετεχουσιν αύτης οί κεκτημένοι τά
5 όπλα.) παρεκβάσεις δε τών είρημενων τυραννις 4
μεν βασίλεια? ολιγαρχία δε αριστοκρατίας δημο-
κρατία δε πολιτείας• η μεν γάρ τυραννίς εστί
μοναρχία προς το συμφέρον το του μοναρχοΰντος,
η δ' ολιγαρχία προς το τών ευπόρων, η δε δημο-
κρατία προς το συμφέρον το τών άπορων, προς
10 δε το τω κοινώ λυσιτελοΰν ουδεμία αυτών.
Αεί δε μικρώ διά μακροτερων ειπείν τις εκάστη
τούτων τών πολιτειών εστίν και γάρ έχει τι^α?
απορίας, τω δε περί εκάστην μεθοδον φιλοσοφοΰντι
1 ζμη> μετέχοντας Bernays.
206
POLITICS, III. v. 1-4
or the few or the multitude are deviations. For
either we must not say that those who are part of
the state are citizens, or those who are part of the
state must share in the advantage of membership.
2 Our customary designation for a monarchy that aims
at the common advantage is ' kingship ' ; for a
government of more than one yet only a few ' aristo-
cracy ' (either because the best men rule or because
they rule with a view to what is best for the state
and for its members) ; while when the multitude
govern the state with a view to the common advan-
tage, it is called by the name common to all the forms
3 of constitution, ' constitutional government.' (And
this comes about reasonably, since although it is
possible for one man or a few to excel in virtue, when
the number is larger it becomes difficult for them
to possess perfect excellence in respect of every
form of virtue, but they can best excel in military
valour, for this is found with numbers ; and therefore
with this form of constitution the class that fights
for the state in war is the most powerful, and it is
those who possess arms who are admitted to the
4 government.) Deviations from the constitutions
mentioned are tyranny corresponding to kingship,
oligarchy to aristocracy, and democracy to constitu-
tional government ; for tyranny is monarchy ruling
in the interest of the monarch, oligarchy government
in the interest of the rich, democracy government in
the interest of the poor, and none of these forms
governs with regard to ihe profit of the community.
But it is necessary to say at a little greater oii<?archy
length what each of these constitutions is ; for the Democracy
question involves certain difficulties, and it is the ^sentiaHy
special mark of one who studies any subject philo- egovern •
207
ARISTOTLE
1279 b \ \ / > o\ ' 11 /
και μη μόνον απορλεποντι προς το πραττειν
15 οικεΐόν εστί το μη παροράν μηδέ τι καταλείπειν
αλλά δηλοΰν την περί εκαστον άληθειαν. εστί δε 5
τνραννις μεν μοναρχία, καθάπερ ε'ίρηται, δεσπο-
τική της πολιτικής κοινωνίας, ολιγαρχία δ' όταν
ώσι κύριοι της πολιτείας οι τάς ουσίας έχοντες,
δημοκρατία δέ τουναντίον όταν οι μη κεκτημένοι
20 πλήθος ουσίας αλλ' άποροι, πρώτη δ' απορία προς
τον διορισμόν εστίν, ει γαρ εΐεν οι πλείους οντες
εύποροι κύριοι της πόλεως, δημοκρατία δ' εστίν
όταν η κύριον το πλήθος, ομοίως δέ πάλιν καν ε'ί
που συμβαίνοι 1 τους απόρους ελάττους μεν είναι
των ευπόρων κρείττους δ' οντάς κυρίους eirai της
26 πολιτείας , οπού δ' ολίγον κύριον πλήθος όλιγαρ-
χίαν εΐναί φασιν, ουκ αν καλώς δόξειεν διωρίσθαι
περί των πολιτειών, άλλα μην καν ε'ί 2 τις 6
συνθεις τη μεν εύπορία την ολιγότητα τη δ'
απορία το πλήθος ούτω προσαγορεύοι τάς πολι-
τείας, ολιγαρχίαν μεν εν η τάς αρχάς εχουσιν οι
so εύποροι ολίγοι το πλήθος οντες, δημοκρατίαν δε
εν fj οι άποροι πολλοί το πλήθος οντες, άλλην
άπορίαν έχει. τίνας γάρ εροΰμεν τάς άρτι λεχ-
θείσας πολιτείας, την εν fj πλείους οί εύποροι και
την εν 3 η ελάττους οί άποροι, κύριοι δ' εκάτεροι
τών πολιτειών, ε'ίπερ μηδεμία άλλη πολιτεία πάρα
85 τάς είρημενας εστίν; εοικε τοίνυν ό λόγος ποιεΐν 7
δηλον οτι το μεν ολίγους η πολλούς eivai κυρίους
1 Schneider: συμβαίνει, -η codd.
* καν €Ϊ Susemihl : κ&ν codd. 3 την ίν ed. : ev codd.
β i.e. it would be absurd to term government by the people
democracy if the people happened to be very rich, or govern-
ment by a few oligarchy if the few were poor and the many
whom they governed rich.
208
POLITICS, III. v. 4-7
sophically, and not solely with regard to its practical ments of
aspect, that he does not overlook or omit any point, an ,i ροΟΓι
5 but brings to light the truth about each. Now not of "j he
tyranny, as has been said, is monarchy exerting many.
despotic power over the political community ;
oligarchy is when the control of the government is
in the hands of those that own the properties ;
democracy is when on the contrary it is in the hands
of those that do not possess much property, but are
poor. A first difficulty is with regard to the defini-
tion. If the majority of the citizens were wealthy
and were in control of the state, yet when the multi-
tude is in power it is a democracy, and similarly, to
take the other case, if it were to occur somewhere
that the poor were fewer than the rich but were
stronger than they and accordingly were in control
of the government, yet where a small number is in
control it is said to be an oligarchy, then it would
seem that our definition of the forms of constitution
6 was not a good one. a And once again, if one assumed
the combination of small numbers with wealth and
of multitude with poverty, and named the constitu-
tions thus — one in which the rich being few in number
hold the offices, oligarchv : one in which the poor
being many in number hold the offices, democracy,
— this involves another difficulty. What names are
we to give to the constitutions just described — the
one in which there are more rich and the one in
which the poor are the fewer, and these control their
respective governments — if there exists no other
7 form of constitution beside those mentioned ? The
argument therefore seems to make it clear that for
few or many to have power is an accidental feature
209
ARISTOTLE
1279 b
συμβεβηκός εστίν, τό μεν ταΓ? όλιγαρχίαις τό δε
ταΐς δημοκρατίαις, δια το τους μεν εύπορους
ολίγους πολλούς δ' etvai τους απόρους πανταχού
(διό και ού συμβαίνει τάς ρηθείσας αίτιας γίνεσΒαι
40 διαφοράς) , ω δε διαφερουσιν η τε δημοκρατία και
1280 a η ολιγαρχία αλλήλων πενία και πλούτος εστίν
και άναγκαΐον μεν οπού αν άρχωσι δια πλούτον,
αν τ ελαττους αν τε πλειους, eiWxi ταύτην όλιγ-
αρχίαν, οπού δ' οι άποροι, δημοκρατίαν, αλλά συμ-
βαίνει, καθάπερ εϊπομεν, τους μεν ολίγους eiWu
6 τους δε πολλούς, εύποροΰσι μεν γαρ ολίγοι της δ'
ελευθερίας μετεχουσι πάντες, δι' ας αιτίας άμφι-
σβητούσιν αμφότεροι της πολιτείας.
Ληπτεον δε πρώτον τίνας ορούς λεγουσι της 8
ολιγαρχίας και δημοκρατίας, και τι το δίκαιον τό
τε ολιγαρχικόν και δημοκρατικόν . πάντες γαρ
ίο άπτονται δικαίου τινός, άλλα μέχρι τινός προ-
έρχονται, και λεγουσιν ού πάν τό κυρίως δίκαιον,
οΐον δοκεΐ Ισον τό δίκαιον 1 eirai, και εστίν, άλλ' ού
πάσιν άλλα τοις ισοις' και το ανισον δοκεΐ δίκαιον
είναι, και γάρ εστίν, αλλ' ού πάσιν άλλα τοις
άνίσοις• οι δέ τοΰτ' άφαιροΰσι, το οΐς, και κρίνουσι
15 κακώς, τό δ' αίτιοι ότι περί αυτών η κρίοις,
σχεδόν δ' οι πλείστοι φαύλοι κριταϊ περί τών
οικείων, ώστ' επει τό δίκαιον τισίν, και δι- 9
ηρηται τον αυτόν τρόπον επί τε τών πραγμάτων
1 τ6 (σον δίκαιον Victorius.
210
POLITICS, III. v. 7-9
of oligarchies in the one case and democracies in the
other, due to the fact that the rich are few and the
poor are many everywhere (so that it is not really
the case that the points mentioned constitute a
specific difference), but that the real thing in which
democracy and oligarchy differ from each other is
poverty and wealth ; and it necessarily follows that
wherever the rulers owe their power to wealth,
whether they be a minority or a majority, this is an
oligarchy, and when the poor rule, it is a democracy,
although it does accidentally happen, as we said,
that where the rulers hold power bv wealth they are
few and where they hold power by poverty they are
many, because few men are rich but all men possess
freedom, and wealth and freedom are the grounds
on which the two classes lay claim to the government.
8 And first we must ascertain what are stated to be The
the determining qualities of oligarchy and democracy, f p"wer.
and what is the principle of justice under the one form Ja * t '? e fa
of government and under the other. For all men lay equality of
hold on justice of some sort, but they only advance ^^
to a certain point, and do not express the principle
of absolute justice in its entirety. For instance, it is
thought that justice is equality, and so it is, though
not for everybody but only for those who are equals ;
and it is thought that inequality is just, for so indeed
it is, though not for everybody, but for those who are
unequal ; but these partisans strip away the qualifica-
tion of the persons concerned, and judge badly. And
the cause of this is that they are themselves concerned
in the decision, and perhaps most men are bad judges
9 when their own interests are in question. Hence
inasmuch as ' just ' means just for certain persons,
and it is divided in the same way in relation to the
211
ARISTOTLE
1280 a ' ι .
και οΐς, καθάπερ εΐρηται πρότερον εν τοις ηθικοΐς,
την μεν τοΰ πράγματος Ισότητα όμολογοΰσι, την
20 δε οΐς άμφισβητοΰσι, μάλιστα μεν διά το λεχθεν
άρτι, διότι κρίνουσι τά nepi αυτούς κακώς, έπειτα
δέ και δια το λέγειν μέχρι τινός εκατερους δίκαιον
τι νομίζουσι 1 δίκαιον λέγειν απλώς, οι μεν γαρ
αν κατά τι άνισοι ώσιν, οίον χρημασιν, όλως οί-
ονται άνισοι eirai, οι δ' αν κατά τι ίσοι, οίον ελευ-
25 θερία, 2 όλως 'ίσοι. το δε κυριώτατον ου λεγουσιν. 10
ει μεν γαρ των κτημάτων χάριν εκοινωνησαν και
συνηλθον, τοσούτον μετεχουσι της πόλεως οσον-
περ και της κτήσεως, ώσθ' 6 τών ολιγαρχικών
λόγος δόζειεν αν ισχύειν (ου γαρ είναι δίκαιον
ίσον μετεχειν τών εκατόν μνών 3 τον είσενεγ-
80 καντα μίαν μνάν τω δόντι το λοιπόν πάν, ούτε
τών εξ αρχής ούτε τών επιγινομενων)' ει δε μήτε
τοΰ ζην μόνον ένεκεν άλλα μάλλον τοΰ ευ ζην (και
γαρ αν δούλων και τών άλλων ζώων ην πόλις,
νύν δ' ουκ εστί δια το μη μετεχειν ευδαιμονίας
μηδέ τοΰ ζην κατά προαίρεσιν), μήτε οαγΑ/χαχια?
ένεκεν όπως υπό μηδενός άδικώνται, μήτε δια τας
1 νομίζουσι <τό> Spengel.
* Sepulveda : ελεύθεροι, ελευθέριοι codd.
3 εκατόν ταλάντων Γ.
» Cf. Ν.Ε. v. iii., 1131 a 14-24.
6 See 1268 b 14 η. ; or read ' 100 talents,' say £24,000
(gold).
212
POLITICS, III. v. 9-10
things to be distributed and the persons that receive
them, as has been said before in Etkicsf the two
parties agree as to what constitutes equality in the
thing, but dispute as to what constitutes equality in
the person, chiefly for the reason just now stated,
because men are bad judges where they themselves
are concerned, but also, inasmuch as both parties
put forward a plea that is just up to a certain point,
they think that what they say is absolutely just. For
the one side think that if they are unequal in some
respects, for instance in wealth, they are entirely
unequal, and the other side think that if they are
equal in some respects, for instance in freedom, they
10 are entirely equal. But the most important thing for the state
they do not mention. If men formed the community thereof
and came together for the sake of wealth, their share the good
in the state is proportionate to their share in the l ^
property, so that the argument of the champions of
oligarchy would appear to be valid— namely that in
a partnership with a capital of 100 minae b it would
not be just for the man who contributed one mina to
have a share whether of the principal or of the profits
accruing equal to the share of the man who supplied
the whole of the remainder ; but if on the other hand
the state was formed not for the sake of life only but
rather for the good life (for otherwise a collection of
slaves or of lower animals would be a state, but as it
is, it is not a state, because slaves c and animals have
no share in well-being or in purposive life), and if its
object is not military alliance for defence against
injury by anybody, and it does not exist for the
e See 1260 a 12, and X.E. x. vi., 1 177 a 8, ' but no one allows
a slave any measure of happiness, any more than a life of
his own.'
213
ARISTOTLE
άλλαγάς και την χρήσιν την προς αλλήλους• και
γαρ αν Ύυρρηνοι καϊ Καρχηδόνιοι, και πάντες οΐς
€στι σύμβολα προς αλλήλους, ώς αιά? aV πολΐται
πόλεως ήσαν είσι γοΰν αύτοΐς συνθήκαι περί των 11
εισαγώγιμων και σύμβολα περί του μη άοικεΐν
40 και γραφαι περί συμμαχίας• αλλ' ούτ άρχαι πάσιν
lE80b επ\ τούτοις κοινοί καθεστασιν, αλλ* ετεραι παρ'
εκατεροις, ούτε του ποίους τινά? efvai δει φρον-
τίζουσιν άτεροι τους ετέρους, ουδ' όπως μηδεις
άδικος έσται των υπό τάς συνθήκας μηδέ μο-
χθηρίαν έζει μηδεμίαν, άλλα μόνον όπως μηδέν
6 άδικήσουσιν αλλήλους, περί δ' αρετής και κακίας
πολιτικής διασκοποΰσιν όσοι φροντίζουσιν ευνομίας,
τ} και φανερόν οτι δει περί αρετής επιμελές είναι
τή γ ώς αληθώς ονομαζόμενη πόλει, μη λογού
χάριν γίνεται γαρ ή κοινωνία συμμαχία, τών
ίο άλλων 1 τόπω διαφέρουσα μόνον τών άποθεν συμ-
μάχων* και ο νόμος συνθήκη και, καθάπερ εφη
Αυκόφρων ο σοφιστής, εγγυητής άλλήλοις τών
δικαίων, αλλ ούχ οίος ποιεΐν αγαθούς και δικαίους
τους πολίτας. οτι δε τούτον έχει τον τρόπον 12
φανερόν. εί γάρ τις και συναγάγοι τους τόπους
εις εν, ώστε άπτεσθαι την Μεγαρέων πολιν και
15 Κορινθίων τοις τείχεσιν, όμως ου μία πόλις• ουδ'
€ΐ προς αλλήλους επιγαμίας ποιήσαιντο, καίτοι
τούτο τών ιδίων ταΐς πόλεσι κοινωνημάτων εστίν.
1 τών άλλων : &\\ω$ ? Immisch. 2 συμμαχιών Conring.
° The sentence here breaks off ; the inference that should
have formed its conclusion is given in § 15.
* Probably a pupil of Gorgias, see 1275 b 26 n.
214,
POLITICS, III. v. 10-12
sake of trade and of business relations — for if so,
Etruscans and Carthaginians and all the people that
have commercial relations with one another would
11 be virtually citizens of a single state; at all events
they have agreements about imports and covenants
as to abstaining from dishonesty and treaties of
alliance for mutual defence ; but they do not have
officials common to them all appointed to enforce
these covenants, but different officials with either
party, nor yet does either party take any concern
as to the proper moral character of the other, nor
attempt to secure that nobody in the states under
the covenant shall be dishonest or in any way immoral,
but only that they shall not commit any wrong
against each other. All those on the other hand who
are concerned about good government do take chic
virtue and vice into their purview. Thus it is also
clear that any state that is truly so called and is not
a state merely in name must pay attention to virtue ;
for otherwise the community becomes merely an not merely
alliance, differing only in locality from the other [ectkm and
alliances, those of allies that live apart. And the intercourse
law is a covenant or, in the phrase of the sophist
Lycophron, 6 a guarantee of men's just claims on one
another, but it is not designed to make the citizens
12 virtuous and just. And that this is how the matter
stands is manifest. For if one were actually to bring
the sites of two cities together into one, so that the
city-walls of Megara and those of Corinth were con-
tiguous, even so they would not be one city ; nor
would they if they enacted rights of intermarriage
with each other, although intermarriage between
citizens is one of the elements of community which are
characteristic of states. And similarly even if certain
215
ARISTOTLE
ομοίως δ' ουδ' ei rives οίκοΐεν χωρίς μεν, μη
μεντοι τοσούτον άποθεν ώστε μη κοινωνεΐν , αλλ'
ε'ίησαν αύτοΐς νόμοι τον μη σφάς αυτούς άδικεΐν
20 περί τάς μεταδόσεις — οίον ει ό μεν είη τεκτων 6
δε γεωργός ο δε σκυτοτόμος ό δ' άλλο τι τοιούτον — ,
και το πλήθος εΐεν μνρίοι, μη μεντοι κοινωνοΐεν
άλλου μηδενός η των τοιούτων οίον αλλαγής καΐ
συμμαχίας, ουδ' ούτω πω πόλις. διά τίνα δη 13
ττοτ αίτίαν; ου γαρ δη διά το μη σύνεγγυς της
25 κοινωνίας' ει γαρ και συνελθοιεν ούτω κοινω-
νοΰντες (έκαστος μεντοι χρώτο τή ίδια οικία ώσπερ
πόλει) και σφίσιν αύτοΐς ως β^ι/χαχια? ούσης
βοηθοΰντες επί τους άδικοΰντας μόνον, οι)δ' ούτως
αν ewai δόζειε πόλι? τοις ακριβώς θεωροΰσιν,
εΐπε ρ ομοίως όμιλοΐεν συνελθόντες και χωρίς.
80 φανερόν τοίνυν ότι η πόλις ουκ εστί κοινωνία
τόπου και του μη άδικεΐν σφας αυτούς και της
μεταδόσεως χάριν αλλά ταύτα μεν άναγκαΐον
ύπάρχειν ε'ίπερ εσται πόλις, ού μην ούδ' υπ-
αρχόντων τούτων απάντων ηδη πόλις, αλλ' η του
ευ ζην κοινωνία και ταΐς οικιαις και τοις γενεσι,
35 ζωής τελείας χάριν και αυτάρκους . ουκ εσται 1 4
μεντοι τούτο μη τον αυτόν και ενα κατοικούντων
τόπον και χρωμενων επιγαμίαις• διό κηδεΐαί τ'
εγενοντο κατά τάς πόλεις και φρατρίαι και θυσίαι
και διαγωγαι του συζήν. το δε τοιούτον φιλίας
216
POLITICS, III. v. 12-14
people lived in separate places yet not so far apart
as not to have intercourse, but had laws to prevent
their wronging one another in their interchange of
products — for instance, if one man were a carpenter,
another a farmer, another a shoemaker and another
something else of the kind, — and the whole population
numbered ten thousand, but nevertheless they had no
mutual dealings in anything else except such things
as exchange of commodities and military alliance,
13 even then this would still not be a state. What then
exactly is the reason for this ? for clearly it is not
because their intercourse is from a distance ; since
even if they came together for intercourse of this
sort (each nevertheless using his individual house as
a city) and for one another's military aid against
wrongful aggressors only, as under a defensive alli-
ance, not even then would they seem to those who
consider the matter carefully to constitute a state, if
they associated on the same footing when they came
together as they did when they were apart. It is
manifest therefore that a state is not merely the
sharing of a common locality for the purpose of
preventing mutual injury and exchanging goods.
These are necessary pre-conditions of a state's exist-
ence, yet nevertheless, even if all these conditions
are present, that does not therefore make a state,
but a state is a partnership of families and of clans
in living well, and its object is a full and independent
14 life. At the same time this will not be realized unless
the partners do inhabit one and the same locality
and practise intermarriage ; this indeed is the reason
why family relationships have arisen throughout the
states, and brotherhoods and clubs for sacrificial rites
and social recreations. But such organization is pro-
217
ARISTOTLE
«sob B k , , 4 La
έργον, η γαρ του συζην προαιρεσις φιλία- τέλος
40 μεν οΰν πόλεως το εΰ ζην, ταύτα δε του τέλους
1281 a χάριν, πόλις δε η γενών και κωμών κοινωνία
ζωής τελείας και αυτάρκους , 1 τούτο δ' εστίν, ως
φαμεν, το ζην εύδαιμόνως και καλώς• τών καλών
άρα πράξεων 2 χάριν θετεον είναι την πολιτικην
κοινωνίαν, αλλ' ου του συζήν διόπερ όσοι συμ- 15
δ βάλλονται πλείστον εις την τοιαυτην κοινωνίαν,
τούτοις της πόλεως μετεστι πλεΐον η τοις κατά
μεν ελευθερίαν και γένος ϊσοις η μείζοσι κατά δε
την πολιτικην άρετην άνίσοις, η τοις κατά πλοΰτον
ύπερεχουσι κατ* άρετην ο' ύπερεχομενοις.
"Οτι μεν οΰν πάντες οι περί τών πολιτειών
ίο αμφισβητούντες μέρος τι του δικαίου λεγουσι,
φανερόν εκ τών είρημενων.
VI. Έχει δ' άπορίαν τί δει το κΰριον είναι της 1
πόλεως, η γάρ τοι το πλήθος, η τους πλουσίους,
η τους επιεικείς, η τον βελτιστον ενα πάντων, η
τύραννον. αλλά ταϋτα πάντα εχειν φαίνεται δυσκο-
15 λίαν. τί γάρ; αν οι πένητες διά το πλείους είναι
διανεμωνται τά τών πλουσίων, tout' ουκ άδικόν
εστίν; εδοζε γάρ νη Δια τω κυρίω δικαίως, την
οΰν άδικίαν τί χρη λέγειν την εσχάτην; πάλιν τε,
πάντων ληφθέντων, οι πλείους τά τών ελαττόνων
άν διανεμωνται, φανερόν ότι φθείρουσι την πάλιν
20 άλλα μην ούχ η γ' άρετη φθείρει το έχον αντην,
οΰδε το δίκαιον πόλεως φθαρτικόν, ώστε δήλον
οτι και τον νόμον τούτον ούχ οΐόν τ' είναι δίκαιον.
1 αυτάρκους <χάριν~> Scaliger.
2 πράξεων om. ΓΜΡ 1 .
218
POLITICS, III. v. 14— vi. 1
duced by the feeling of friendship, for friendship is
the motive of social life ; therefore, while the object
of a state is the good life, these things are means to
that end. And a state is the partnership of clans and
villages in a full and independent life, which in our
view constitutes a happy and noble life ; the political
fellowship must therefore be deemed to exist for ™ ere K for ? fa
ι/•ιι ι /• ν • • the absolute
the sake of noble actions, not merely tor living in right to
15 common. Hence those who contribute most to such gj^fc,
fellowship have a larger part in the state than those contribute
who are their equals or superiors in freedom and birth u ° e θ 8
but not their equals in civic virtue, or than those who
surpass them in wealth but are surpassed by them
in virtue.
It is therefore clear from what has been said that
all those who dispute about the forms of constitution
a--ert a part of the just principle.
I VI. But it is a matter of question what ought to be in practice,
ι . .ι #-ti 1 1 •. . where is
the sovereign power in the state. Clearly it must ^oven-ignty
be either the multitude, or the rich, or the good, or ^^^
the one man who is best of all, or a tyrant. But all questioned.
of these arrangements appear to involve disagree-
able consequences. For instance, if the poor take
advantage of their greater numbers to divide up the
property of the rich, is not this unjust ? No, it may
be said, for it was a resolution made by the supreme
authority in just form. Then what must be pro-
nounced to be the extreme of injustice ? And again,
when everybody is taken into account, suppose the
majority share out among themselves the property
of the minority, it is manifest that they are destroy-
ing the state ; but assuredly virtue does not destroy
its possessor, and justice is not destructive of the
state, so that it is clear that this principle also cannot
219
ARISTOTLE
1281a „ . ; , , m t
en και τα? πραςεις όσας ο τύραννος επραςεν 2
άναγκαΐον είναι πάσας δίκαια?, βιάζεται γαρ ών
κρείττων, ώσπερ και το πλήθος τους πλουσίους.
25 άλλ άρα τους ελάττους δίκαιον άρχειν και τους
πλουσίους; αν οΰν κάκεΐνοι ταύτα ποιώσι και
διαρπάζωσι και άφαιρώνται τά κτήματα} του
πλήθους, τουτ εστί δίκαιον; και θάτερον άρα.
ταύτα μεν τοίνυν δτι πάντα φαΰλα και ου δίκαια
φανερόν. άλλα τους επιεικείς άρχειν δει και κυρίους 3
80 είναι πάντων; ούκοΰν ανάγκη τους άλλου? άτι-
μους είναι πάντας, μη τιμωμένους ταΐς πολιτικαΐς
άρχαΐς• τιμάς γαρ λεγομεν είναι τά? αρχάς, αρχόν-
των δ' αιει των αυτών άναγκαΐον eivai τους άλλους
άτιμους, άλλ' ενα τον σπουδαιότατον άρχειν βελ-
τιον; άλλ' ετι τούτο ολιγαρχικώτερον , οι γάρ
85 άτιμοι πλείους. άλλ' ΐσω? φαίη τις αν το κύριον
όλως άνθρωπον είναι άλλα μη νόμον φαϋλον, εχοντά
γε τά συμβαίνοντα πάθη περί την φυχην. αν οΰν
fj νόμος μεν ολιγαρχικός δε η δημοκρατικός, τι
διοίσει περί των ηπορημενων; συμβησεται γάρ
ομοίως τά λεχθέντα πρότερον.
Περί μεν οΰν των άλλων έστω τις έτερος λόγος•
40 οτι δέ δει κύριον είναι μάλλον το πλήθος η τους 4
αρίστους μεν ολίγους δε, δό^ειεν αν λυεσ#αι 2 και
τιν' εχειν άπορίαν, 3 τάχα δε καν άληθειαν. τους
1281 b γάρ πολλούς, ων έκαστος εστίν ου σπουδαίος
άνήρ, όμως ενδέχεται συνελθόντας eivai βελτίους
1 Richards : τα κτήματα άφαιρωνται,οοάά.
2 αν εΰ λ^γεσ&χι Richards. s άπο\ο•γίαι> Wilamowitz.
β Technical term for disfranchisement and loss of civic rights.
220
POLITICS, III. vi. 2-4
2 be just. Also it follows from it that all the actions
done by a tyrant are just, for his use of force is based
upon superior strength, as is the compulsion exerted
by the multitude against the rich. But is it just that
the minority and the rich should rule ? Suppose
therefore they also act in the same way and plunder
and take away the property of the multitude, is this
just ? If it is, so also is the plunder of the rich by
the multitude. It is clear therefore that all these
3 things are bad and not just. But ought the good to
rule, and be in control of all classes ? If so, then it
follows that all the other classes will be dishonoured,
if they are not honoured by holding the offices of
government ; for we speak of offices as honours, and
if the same persons are always in office the rest must
necessarily be excluded from honour. But is it
better for the most virtuous individual to be the
ruler ? But that is still more oligarchical, for the
people excluded from honour will be more numerous.
But perhaps some one would say that in any case it
is a bad thing for a human being, having in his soul
the passions that are the attributes of humanity, to be
sovereign, and not the law. Suppose therefore that
law is sovereign, but law of an oligarchic or demo-
cratic nature, what difference will it make as regards
the difficulties that have been raised ? for the results
described before will come about just the same.
Most of these points therefore must be discussed on
4 another occasion ; but the view that it is more proper Qualified
for the multitude to be sovereign than the few of united*
greatest virtue might be thought to be explicable, democracy.
and to raise some difficulty but probably to be
true. For it is possible that the many, though
not individually good men, yet when they come
221
ARISTOTLE
1281 b , , . ., . , 1V ,
εκείνων ουχ ως εκαστον αλλ ως συμπαντας, οίον
τά σνμφορητά δείπνα των εκ μιας δαπάνης χορη-
γηθέντων πολλών γαρ όντων εκαστον μόριον εχειν
δ αρετής καΐ φρονησεως , καϊ γίνεσθαί συνελθοντας
ώσπερ ενα 1 άνθρωπον το πλήθος πολύποδα και
πολύχειρα και πολλάς εχοντ αίσθΐ]σεις , ούτω και
περί τά ηθη και την διάνοιαν. διο και κρινουσιν
άμεινον οι πολλοί και τά της μουσικής έργα και
τά των ποιητών άλλοι γάρ άλλο τι μόριον, πάντα
ίο δέ πάντες, αλλά τούτω διαφερουσιν οι σπουδαίοι 5
τών ανδρών εκάστου 2 τών πολλών, ώσπερ και τών
μη καλών τους καλούς φασι καϊ τά γεγραμμενα
δια τέχνης τών αληθινών, τω συνηχθαι τά διεσπαρ-
μένα χωρίς εις εν, επει κεχωρισμενων γε κάλλιον
15 εχειν του γεγραμμενου τουδι μεν τον όφθαλμόν
έτερου δε τίνος έτερον μόριον. ει μεν οΰν περί
7τάντα δημον και περί παν πλήθος ενδέχεται ταύτην
βιναι την διαφοράν τών πολλών προς τους ολίγους
σπουδαίους, άδηλον, 'ίσως δε νη Δία δηλον ότι
περί ενίων αδύνατον — ό γάρ αύτος καν επι τών
20 θηρίων άρμόσειε λόγος, καίτοι τι διαφερουσιν ενιοι
τών θηρίων ως έπος ειπείν; — άλλα περί τι πλήθος
ούδεν είναι κωλύει το λεχθέν αληθές, διό καϊ την 6
πρότερον είρημενην άπορίαν λύσειεν αν τις δια
1 καϊ ώσπερ ylveadai cvvekdelv οίον ίνα Richards.
* έκαστοι Thurot.
222
POLITICS, III. vi. 4-6
together may be better, not individually but collec-
tively, than those who are so, just as public dinners
to which many contribute are better than those
supplied at one man's cost ; for where there are
many, each individual, it may be argued, has some
portion of virtue and wisdom, and when they have
come together, just as the multitude becomes a
single man with many feet and many hands and
many senses, so also it becomes one personality as
regards the moral and intellectual faculties. This
is why the general public is a better judge of the
works of music and those of the poets, because
different men can judge a different part of the
6 performance, and all of them all of it. But the
superiority of good men over the mass of men in-
dividually, like that of handsome men, so it is said,
over plain men and of the works of the painter's art
over the real objects, really consists in this, that a
number of scattered good points have been collected
together into one example ; since if the features
be taken separately, the eye of one real person is
more beautiful than that of the man in the picture,
and some other feature of somebody else. It is not
indeed clear whether this collective superiority of
the many compared with the few good men can
possibly exist in regard to every democracy and
every multitude, and perhaps it may be urged that
it is manifestly impossible in the case of some — for
the same argument would also apply to animals, yet
what difference is there, practically, between some
multitudes and animals? — but nothing prevents what
has been said from being true about some particular
6 multitude. One might therefore employ these con-
siderations to solve not only the previously stated
223
ARISTOTLE
1281 b
τούτων και την έχομένην αυτής, τίνων δει κυρίους
etvai τους ελευθέρους και το πλήθος των πολιτών
ν> {τοιούτοι δ' εισίν όσοι μήτε πλούσιοι μήτε άζίωμα
εχουσιν αρετής μηδέν), το μεν γαρ /xere^etP'
αυτού? των αρχών τών μεγίστων ουκ ασφαλές
(διά τε γαρ άδικίαν και δι' άφροσύνην τα μεν
αδικεΐν ανάγκη 1 τα δ' άμαρτάνειν αυτούς), το δε
μη μεταδιδόναι μηδέ μετέχειν φοβερόν όταν γάρ
80 άτιμοι πολλοί και πένητες ύπάρχωσι, πολεμίων
αναγκαΐον eimi πλήρη την πόλιν ταύτην. λείπεται
δη του βουλεύεσθαι και κρίνειν μετέχειν αυτούς,
διόπερ και Σόλωι^ και τών άλλων τινές νομοθετών 7
ταττουσιν επι τε 2 τάς αρχαιρεσίας και τάς εύθύνας
τών αρχόντων, άρχειν δε κατά μάνας ουκ έώσιν.
85 πάντες μεν γάρ έχουσι συνελθόντες ικανήν αίσθησιν,
και μιγνύμενοι τοις βελτίοσι τάς πόλεις ώφελοΰσιν,
καθαπερ ή μη καθαρά τροφή μετά τής καθαράς
την πάσαν ποιεί χρησιμωτέραν τής όλίγης• χωρίς
δ έκαστος ατελής περί το κρίνειν εστίν, έχει 8
δ ή τάζις αύτη τής πολιτείας άπορίαν πρώτην
40 μεν οτι δόζειεν αν του αυτού et^at το κρϊναι τις
ορθώς ίάτρευκεν ουπερ και το ίατρεΰσαι και
ποιήσαι ύγιά τον κάμνοντα τής νόσου τής παρούσης,
~S82 a ούτος δ έστιν ιατρός• ομοίως δε τούτο και περί
τας άλλας εμπειρίας και τέχνας. ώσπερ οΰν ίατρόν
δει διδόναι τάς εύθύνας εν ίατροΐς, ούτω και τους
1 ava -γκη Rassow : hv codd.
* έττί re ζταΰτα αυτούς καΐ iwi> Wilamowitz.
α Probably words meaning ' these functions and to ' have
fallen out.
6 i.e., especially, bran mixed with pure flour.
224
POLITICS, III. vi. 6-8
difficulty but also the related question, over what
matters is the authority of the freemen, the mass of
the citizens, to extend (using that expression to
denote those who are not rich nor possessed of any
distinguishing excellence at all) ? For it is not safe
for them to participate in the highest offices (for
injustice and folly would inevitably cause them to
act unjustly in some things and to make mistakes in
others), but vet not to admit them and for them not
to participate is an alarming situation, for when there
are a number of persons without political honours and
in poverty, the city then is bound to be full of enemies.
It remains therefore for them to share the delibera-
7 tive and judicial functions. For this reason Solon
and certain other lawgivers appoint the common
citizens to a the election of the magistrates and the
function of calling them to audit, although they do
not allow them to hold office singly. For all when
assembled together have sufficient discernment, and
by mingling with the better class are of benefit to
the state, just as impure food mixed with what is
pure b makes the whole more nourishing than the
small amount of pure food alone ; but separately the
8 individual is immature in judgement. This arrange-
ment of the constitution is however open to question The people
in the first place on the ground that it might be held JjjJ^j^
that the best man to judge which phvsician has given wisdom and
the right treatment is the man that is himself capable w '
of treating and curing the patient of his present
disease, and this is the man who is himself a physician;
and that this is the case similarly with regard to
the other arts and crafts. Hence just as a court
of physicians must judge the work of a physician,
so also all other practitioners ought to be called
225
ARISTOTLE
1282 a „... , . . - , . 5 , w ,
άλλους εν τοις ομοιοις. ιατρός ο ο τε δημιουργός
και 6 αρχιτεκτονικός και τρίτος 6 πεπαιδευμένος
5 περί την τεχνην (είσι γάρ TtJ/e? τοιούτοι και περί
πάσας ώς ειπείν τάς Terras - , άποδίδομεν ok το
κρίνειν ούδεν ήττον τοις πεπαιδευμενοις η τοις
είδόσιν) . €7Γ6ΐτα και περί την αΐρεσιν τον αυτόν αν 9
δόξειεν εχειν τρόπον και γάρ το eXiaOai ορθώς
των ειδυτων έργον εστίν, οίον γεωμετρην τε των
ίο γεωμετρικών και κυβερνητην τών κυβερνητικών
ει γάρ και περί ενίων έργων και τεχνών μετεχουσι
και τών ιδιωτών Tti^e?, αλλ' ου τι τών είοότων γε
μάλλον, ώστε κατά μεν τούτον τον λόγον ουκ
άν εΐη το πλήθος ποιητεον κΰριον οϋτε τών αρχ-
αιρεσιών οϋτε τών ευθυνών, αλλ' ΐσως ου πάντα 10
15 ταύτα λέγεται καλώς διά τε τον ττάλαι λόγον, άν
η το πλήθος μη λίαν άνδραποδώδες (εσται γάρ
έκαστος μεν χειρών κριτής τών είδότων, άπαντες
δέ συνελθόντες η βελτίους η ου χείρους), και οτι
περί ενίων οϋτε μόνον ο ποιησας οΰτ άριστ άν
κρίνειεν, όσων τάργα γιγνώσκουσι /cat οι μη
80 έχοντες την τεχνην, οίον οίκίαν ου μόνον εστί
yvcDmi του ποιησαντος, αλλά και βελτιον ό χρώ-
μενος αύτη κρίνει (χρηται δ 6 οικονόμος), και
πηδάλιον κυβερνήτης τεκτονος, και θοίνην ο δαιτϋ-
μών αλλ' ούχ ο μάγειρος.
Ύαύτην μεν ουν την άπορίαν τάχα δόζειε τις άν
See § 4.
226
POLITICS, III. vi. 8-10
to account before their fellows. But ' physician '
means both the ordinary practitioner, and the master
of the craft, and thirdly, the man who has studied
medicine as part of his general education (for in
almost all the arts there are some such students, and
we assign the right of judgement just as much to
9 cultivated amateurs as to experts). Further the
same might be thought to hold good also of the
election of officials, for to elect rightly is a task for
experts — for example, it is for experts in the science
of mensuration to elect a land-surveyor and for
experts in navigation to choose a pilot; for even
though in some occupations and arts some lavmen
also have a voice in appointments, yet they certainlv
do not have more voice than the experts. Hence
according to this argument the masses should not
be put in control over either the election of magis-
10 trates or their audit. But perhaps this statement
is not entirely correct, both for the reason stated
above," in case the populace is not of too slavish a
character (for although each individual separately
will be a worse judge than the experts, the whole of
them assembled together will be better or at least
as good judges), and also because about some things
the man who made them would not be the only nor
the best judge, in the case of professionals whose
products come within the knowledge of laymen also :
to judge a house, for instance, does not belong only
to the man who built it, but in fact the man who uses
the house (that is, the householder) will be an even
better judge of it, and a steersman judges a rudder
better than a carpenter, and the diner judges a
banquet better than the cook.
This difficulty then might perhaps be thought to be
227
ARISTOTLE
1282 a
ούτω λύειν ίκανώς. άλλη δ' εστίν εχομένη ταύτης• 11
25 δοκεΐ γάρ άτοπον eirai το μειζόνων €Ϊναί κυρίους
τους φαύλους των επιεικών, αϊ δ' εύθϋναι καΐ αί
τώι/ αρχών αιρέσεις είσι μεγιστον, ας iv ενίαις
πολιτείαις, ώσπερ εΐρηται, τοις δήμοις άποδιδόασιν,
η γαρ εκκλησία κυρία πάντων των τοιούτων εστίν
so καίτοι της μεν εκκλησίας μετεχουσι και βουλεύουσι
και δικάζουσιν από μικρών τιμημάτων και της
τυχούσης ηλικίας, ταμιεύουσι δε και στρατηγοΰσι
και τας μεγίστας αρχάς άρχουσιν από μεγάλων,
ομοίως δη τις άν λύσειε και ταύτην την άπορίαν — 12
ίσως γαρ έχει και ταϋτ ορθώς, ου γάρ 6 δικαστής
35 ουο ο βουλευτής ουδ' ο εκκλησιαστής άρχων εστίν,
άλλα το δικαστηριον και ή βουλή και 6 δήμος,
τών οέ ρηθεντων έκαστος μόριόν εστί τούτων
(λέγω δέ μόριον 1 τον βουλευτην και τον εκκλησια-
στών και τον δικαστην) . ώστε δικαίως κύριον μει-
ζόνων το πλήθος, εκ γάρ πολλών ο δήμος και η
40 βουλή και το δικαστηριον, και το τι/χ^αα δε
πλεΐον το πάντων τούτων η το τών καθ ενα και
κατ' ολίγους μεγάλας αρχάς αρχόντων.
1282 b Ταύτα μεν ουν διωρίσθω τούτον τον τρόπον η 13
δε πρώτη λεχθεΐσα απορία ποιεί φανερόν ούδεν
ούτως έτερον ώς ότι δει τους νόμους etWu κυρίους
κείμενους ορθώς, τον άρχοντα δε, άν τε εις άν τε
πλείους ώσι, περί τούτων eimi κυρίους περί
5 όσων εζαδυνατοΰσιν οι νομοί λέγειν ακριβώς διά
το μη ράδιον etvat καθόλου δτ^λώσαι περί πάντων.
1 [μόρων] ? Richards.
° Viz. that under any plan some hardships will result, § 1.
228
POLITICS, III. vi. 11-13
11 satisfactorily solved in this way. But there is another and the
one connected with it : it is thought to be absurd ^raJd elect
that the base should be in control over more important a " d control
matters than the respectable ; but the audits and magistrate»;
elections of magistrates are a very important matter,
vet in some constitutions, as has been said, they are
assigned to the common people, for all such matters
are under the control of the assembly, yet persons
of a low property-assessment and of any age take
part in the assembly and the council and sit on juries,
whereas treasury officials, generals and the holders
of the highest magistracies are drawn from among
12 persons of large property. Now this difficulty also
may be solved in a similar way ; for perhaps these
regulations also are sound, since it is not the individual
juryman or councillor or member of the assembly in
whom authoritv rests, but the court, the council and
the people, while each of the individuals named (I
mean the councillor, the members of assembly and
the juryman) is a part of those bodies. Hence justly
the multitude is sovereign in greater matters, for the
popular assembly, the council and the jurv-court are
formed of a number of people, and also the assessed
property of all these members collectively is mure than
that of the magistrates holding great offices individu-
ally or in small groups.
13 Let these points therefore be decided in this but the
manner. But the difficulty first mentioned α proves ^gufded 1 **
nothing else so clearly as that it is proper for the laws by good
when rightly laid down to be sovereign, while the
ruler or rulers in office should have supreme powers
over matters as to which the laws are quite unable to
pronounce with precision because of the difficulty of
making a general rule to cover all cases. We have
229
ARISTOTLE
1282 b
οποίους μεντοι τινάς elvai δει τους ορθώς κλιμένους
νόμους, ούδεν πω δήλον, αλλ' ετι μένει το πάλαι
διαπορηθεν άμα 1 γαρ καΐ ομοίως ταΐς πολιτεί-
αις ανάγκη καΐ τους νόμους φαύλους η σπου-
10 δαιους είναι και δικαίους η αδίκους (πλην τοΰτό
γε φανερόν, οτι δει προς την πολιτείαν κεΐσθαι
τους νομούς)• αλλά μην el τοΰτο, δηλον οτι τους
μεν κατά τάς όρθάς πολιτείας άναγκαΐον efmi
δικαίους τους δε κατά τάς παρεκβεβηκυίας ου
δικαίους.
VII. Κπει δ εν πάσαι? μεν ταΐς επιστημαις 1
15 και τεχναις aya^ov το τέλος, μεγιστον δε και
μάλιστα εν τη κυριωτάτη πασών, αύτη δ' εστίν η
πολιτική δυναμις, εστί δε το 2 πολιτικόν ayai?o>
το δίκαιον, τοΰτο δ' εστί το κοινή συμφέρον, δοκεΐ
δη 3 πάσιν ίσον τι το δίκαιον είναι, και μ^χρι γε
τίνος όμολογοΰσι τοις κατά φιλοσοφίαν λόγοις εν
20 οίς διώρισται περί τών ηθικών τι γάρ και τισι το
δίκαιον, και δεΐν τοΐς ΐσοις 'ίσον εΐναί φασιν.
ποίων δ ίσότης εστί και ποίων άνισότης δει μη
λανθάνειν έχει γάρ tout' άπορίαν και φιλοσοφίαν
πολιτικην . ίσως γάρ αν φαίη τις κατά παντός 2
ύπεροχην αγαθού δεΐν άνίσως νενεμησθαι τάς άρ-
25 χάς, ει* πάντα τά λοιπά μηδέν διαφεροιεν αλλ
1 άμα Bernays : άλλα codd., άλλα yap . . . άδίκουί post 12
νόμους Congreve. 2 δέ το Susemihl : oe codd.
3 δη Immisch: δέ codd. 4 el <και> ? ed.
° See 1281 a 36.
6 Probably this clause should stand after the next, ' though
— constitution ' (which will be a parenthesis), and should run
' but <the difficulty is there> for necessarily — states.'
c The usual rendering is ' perverted,' but the Greek term
is more neutral.
230
POLITICS, III. vi. 13— vn. 2
not however vet ascertained at all what particular
character a code of laws correctly laid down ought to
possess, but the difficulty raised at the start still
remains ; 6 for necessarily the laws are good or bad,
just or unjust, simultaneously with and similarly to the
constitutions of states (though of course it is obvious
that the laws are bound to be adapted to the
constitution) ; yet if so, it is clear that the laws
in conformity with the correct constitutions must
necessarily be just and those in conformity with the
divergent c forms of constitution unjust.
1 VII. d And inasmuch as in all the sciences and arts claims to
the End is a good, and the greatest good and good ^" *"
in the highest degree in the most authoritative !**■£*;
of all, which is the political faculty, and the good a nd above
in the political field, that is, the general advantage, aU virtue;
is justice, it is therefore thought by all men that
justice is some sort of equality, and up to a certain
point at all events they agree with the philosophical
discourses in which conclusions have been reached
about questions of ethics e ; for justice is a quality
of a thing in relation to persons/ and they hold that
for persons that are equal the thing must be equal.
But equalitv in what characteristics does this mean,
and inequality in what ? This must be made clear,
since this too raises a difficulty, and calls for political
2 philosophy. For perhaps someone might say that the
offices of state ought to be distributed unequally
according to superiority in every good quality, even
if the candidates in all other respects did not differ
d What follows is a summary of yicomachean Ethics,
I. ec. i., ii. * See also NJE. Y. c. iii.
' Literally, ' the just is (a just) something and (something
just) for somebody.'
231
ARISTOTLE
1282b „ , „ ,
όμοιοι τυγχανοιεν οντες• τοις yap οιαφερουσιν
έτερον eivai το δίκαιον «rat το κατ άζίαν. αλλά
μην « tout' αληθές, εσται και κατά χρώμα και
κατά μέγεθος και καθ' ότιοΰν των αγαθών πλεον-
80 e^ia τις τών πολιτικών δίκαιων τοι? ύπερεχουσιν.
η τοΰτο επιπόλαιον το φεΰδος; φανερόν δ επι
τών άλλων επιστημών και δυνάμεων τών γάρ
όμοιων αυλητών την τεχνην ου δοτεον πλεονεζίαν
τών αυλών τοις εύγενεστεροις• ουδέν γάρ αύλησουσι
βελτιον, δει δε τω κατά το έργον ύπερεχοντι διδοναι
35 και τών οργάνων την ύπεροχην. εΐ δε μηπω δήλον
το λεγόμενον , ετι μάλλον αυτό προαγαγοΰσιν εσται
φανερόν. ει γαρ εΐη τις υπερέχων μεν κατά την
αύλητικήν πολύ δ' ελλείπων κατ εύγενειαν η κάλ-
λος, ει και μείζον εκαστον εκείνων αγαθόν εστί
της αύλητικης (λέγω δε την τ εύγενειαν και το
40 κάλλος) και κατά την άναλογίαν ύπερεχουσι πλέον
της αύλητικης η εκείνος κατά την αύλητικήν, όμως
1283 a τούτω δοτεον τους διαφέροντας τών αυλών δει
γάρ εις το έργον συμβάλλεσθαι την ύπεροχην και
του πλούτου και της ευγενείας, συμβάλλονται δ'
ούδεν. ετι κατά γε τούτον τον λόγον πάν αγαθόν 4
προς πάν αν εΐη συμβλητόν. ει γάρ μάλλον 2 το τι
δ μέγεθος, και όλως αν το μέγεθος ενάμιλλον εΐη
και προς πλοΰτον και προς ελευθερίαν ώστ ει
πλεΐον όδι διαφέρει κατά μέγεθος η όδι κατ'
αρετην, και πλεΐον υπερέχει 3 όλως αρετής μέγεθος,
1 <ώδε> διαφέρονσιν ? ed.
2 ένάμ.ϊ\\ον Ingram: καλοί' Richards.
3 ϋπερίχειν (ενδέχεται} ? Susemihl (<e/> καϊ πλεΐον υπερέχει
Ολως αρετή με•/έθονί Bernays).
232
POLITICS, III. vii. 2-4
at all but were exactly alike, because men that are
different a have different rights and merits. Yet if
this is true, those who are superior in complexion or
stature or any good quality will have an advantage
in respect of political rights. But surely the error here
is obvious, and it comes out clearly if we consider the
other sciences and faculties. Among flute-players
equally good at their art it is not proper to give an
advantage in respect of the flutes to those of better
birth, for they will not play any better, but it is
the superior performers who ought to be given the
3 superior instruments. And if our meaning is not yet
plain, it will become still clearer when we have carried
the matter further. Suppose someone is superior in
playing the flute but much inferior in birth or in good
looks, then, even granting that each of these things —
birth and beauty — is a greater good than ability to
play the flute, and even though they surpass flute-
playing proportionately more than the best flute-
player surpasses the others in flute-plaving, even so
the best flute-player ought to be given the outstand-
ingly good flutes ; for otherwise superiority both
in wealth and in birth ought to contribute to the
excellence of the performance, but they do not do
4 so at all. Moreover on this theory even• good thing
would be commensurable with even other. For if
to be of some particular height gave more claim,
then height in general would be in competition with
wealth and with free birth ; therefore if A excels
in height more than Β does in virtue, and speaking
generally size gives more superiority than virtue, 6
• i.e. different in some good quality.
* Perhaps we should rewrite the Greek tu give ' even though
speaking generally virtue gives more superiority than size.'
ι 233
ARISTOTLE
1283 a
ε'ιη αν συμβλητά πάντα• τοσόνδε γαρ [μέγεθος] 1
ει κρεΐττον τοσοΰδε, 2 τοσόνδε δηλον ως Ισον.
ίο επει δε τουτ αδύνατον, δηλον ώς και επι των 5
πολιτικών ευλόγως ου κατά πάσαν άνισότητ άμφι-
σβητοΰσι των αρχών — ει γαρ οι μεν βραδεΐς οι
δε ταχείς, ούδεν δια τοΰτο δεΐ τους μεν πλεΐον
τους δ ελαττον εχειν, αλλ' εν τοις γυμνικοΐς άγώσιν
η τούτων διαφορά λα^άι^ει την τιμήν αλλ' εζ
16 cov πόλις συνεστηκεν , εν τούτοις άναγκαΐον ποιεΐ-
σ^αι την άμφισβητησιν . διόπερ ευλόγως αντι-
ποιούνται της τιμής οι ευγενείς και ελεύθεροι και
πλούσιοι• δεΐ γάρ ελευθέρους τ' είναι και τίμημα
φέροντας, ου γάρ αν εΐη πόλις εξ απόρων πάντων,
ωσπερ ούδ εκ δούλων, αλλά μην ει δεΐ τούτων, β
20 δηλον οτι και δικαιοσύνης και της πολιτικής 3
αρετής, ούδε γάρ άνευ τούτων οίκεΐσθαι πάλιν
δυνατόν πλην άνευ μεν τών προτέρων αδύνατον
είναι πόλιν, άνευ δε τούτων οίκεΐσθαι καλώς.
Προ? μεν οΰν το πόλιν είναι δόζειεν αν η πάντα
η ενιά γε τούτων ορθώς άμφισβητεΐν, προς μεντοι
25 ζωην άγαθην η παιδεία και η άρετη μάλιστα
δικαίως αν άμφισβητοίησαν, καθάπερ εΐρηται και
πρότερον. επει δ' ούτε πάντων ίσον εχειν* δεΐ 7
τους ίσους εν τι μόνον οντάς ούτε άνισον τους
άνισους καθ' εν, ανάγκη πάσας είναι τάς τοιαύτας
πολιτείας παρεκβάσεις, εΐρηται μεν οΰν και πρό-
80 τερον οτι διαμφισβητοϋσι τρόπον τινά δικαίως
1 [μέ~/€θος] Susemihl : αγαθόν ? Newman.
2 τοσοΰδε ζττλούτον^ Richards.
3 πολΐμικψ codd. plerique.
4 ζμβτ>έχΐΐι> Wallies.
Doubtless the author meant the other way round, ' for
the slow having less and the fast more political power.'
234
POLITICS, III. vn. 4-7
all things would be commensurable ; for if such-and-
such an amount of one thing is better than such-and-
such an amount of another, it is clear that such-and-
such an amount of the one is equal to that amount of
5 another. But since this is impossible, it is clear that
in politics with good reason men do not claim a right to
office on the ground of inequality of every kind — if one
set of men are slow runners and another fast, this is
no good ground for the one set having more and the
other less α political power, but the latter's superiority
receives its honour in athletic contests ; but the
claim to office must necessarily be based on superiority
in those things which go to the making of the state.
Hence it is reasonable for the well-born, free and
wealthy to lay claim to honour ; for there must be
free men and tax-payers, since a state consisting
entirely of poor men would not be a state, any more
6 than one consisting of slaves. But then, granting
there is need of these, it is clear that there is also
need of justice and civic virtue, for these are also
indispensable in the administration of a state ; except
that wealth and freedom are indispensable for a
state's existence, whereas justice and civic virtue are
indispensable for its good administration.
As a means therefore towards a state's existence all for
or at all events some of these factors would seem to jj^virtue
make a good claim, although as means to a good life form the
education and virtue would make the most just claim, g
7 as has been said also before. On the other hand since c. v. | is.
those who are equal in one thing only ought not to
have equality in all things nor those unequal as
regards one thing inequality in all, it follows that all
these forms of constitution must be deviations.
Now it has been said before that all make a claim c v. Η 8 a.
235
ARISTOTLE
1283 a
πάντ€ς, απλώς δ' ου πάντες 1 δικαίως, οι πλούσιοι
μεν οτι πλεΐον μετεστι της χώρας αύτοΐς, η δε
χώρα κοινόν, ετι 2 προς τά συ/χ^όλαια πιστοί μάλ-
λον ώς επι το πλέον, οι δ' ελεύθεροι και ευγενείς
35 ώς εγγύς αλλήλων (πολΐται γαρ μάλλον οι γεν-
ναιότεροι τών άγεννών, η δ ευγένεια παρ έκα-
στοι? οΐκοι τίμιος), ετι διότι βελτίους εικός τους
εκ βελτιόνων, ewyeVeia γαρ εστίν άρετη γένους•
ομοίως δε 3 φησομεν δικαίως και την άρετην άμφι- 8
σβητεΐν, κοινωνικην γαρ άρετην εΐναί φαμεν την
40 δικαιοσύνη, $ πάσας άναγκαΐον άκολουθεΐν τάς
άλλα?• άλλα μην και οι πλείους προς τους ελάτ-
τους, και γαρ κρείττους και πλουσιώτεροι και
βελτίους εισιν ώς λαμβανομένων τών πλειόνων
1283 b προς τους ελάττους. αρ' ουν ει πάντες ειεν εν uia
πάλει, λέγω δ' οίον οι τ' aya#oi και οι πλούσιοι
και ευγενείς, ετι δε πλήθος άλλο τι πολιτικόν,
πότερον άμφισβητησις εσται τίνας άρχειν δει η
ουκ εσται; καθ* εκάστην μεν ουν πολιτείαν τών g
6 είρημενων αναμφισβήτητος η κρίσις τίνας άρχειν
δει (τοις γαρ κυρίοις διαφερουσιν άλλ^λω^, οίον η
μεν τω δια πλουσίων η δε τω διά τών σπουδαίων
ανδρών ειι^αι, και τών άλλων εκάστη τον αύτον
τρόπον)' αλλ' όμως σκοποΰμεν, όταν περί τον
αυτόν ταΰθ' ύπάρχη χρόνον, πώς διοριστεον.
10 Ει δη τον αριθμόν ειεν ολίγοι πάμπαν οι την \ο
άρετην έχοντες, τίνα δει διελεΓν τον τρόπον; η το
ολίγοι προς το έργον δει σκοπεΐν ει δυνατοί
1 [wavres] Richards. * ir'i <ibs> ? ed. * 5e Γ : δη codd.
236
POLITICS, III. vii. 7-10
that is in a manner just, though not all a claim that is
absolutely just ; the rich claiming because they have
a larger share of the land, and the land is common
property, and also as being for the most part more but wealth,
faithful to their covenants ; the free and well-born numbers
as being closely connected together (for the better- a ^° have
born are citizens to a greater degree than those of claims, and
low birth, and good birth is in even' community held ^^j, .
in honour at home), and also because it is prob- and
able that the children of better parents will be better, government
8 for good birth means goodness of breed ; and we
shall admit that virtue also makes an equally just
claim, for we hold that justice is social virtue, which
necessarily brings all the other virtues in its train ; \
but moreover the majority have a just claim as com-
pared with the minority, since they are stronger and
richer and better if their superior numbers are taken
in comparison with the others' inferior numbers.
Therefore supposing all were in one city, I mean,
that is, the good and the wealthy and noble and also
an additional mass of citizens, will there be a dispute,
9 or will there not, as to who ought to govern ? It is
true that under each of the forms of constitution that
have been mentioned the decision as to who ought to
govern is undisputed (for the difference between them
lies in their sovereign classes — one is distinguished by
being governed by the rich men, one by being governed
by the good men, and similarly each of the others) ;
but nevertheless we are considering the question how
we are to decide between these classes supposing that
they all exist in the state at the same period.
10 If then the possessors of virtue should be quite Difficulties :
few in number, how is the decision to be made ? the good'*
ought we to consider their fewness in relation to the of the
ο community
237
ARISTOTLE
1283 b^ m , f * a ~ * \~Q at
οιοικειν την πολιν η τοσούτοι το πληυος ωστ
εΐναι πόλιν εζ αυτών; εστί δέ απορία τι? προς
απαντάς τους διαμφισβητοϋντας περί των πολι-
15 τικών τιμών. ο~όζαΐ€ν γαρ αν 1 ουδέν λέγειν
δίκαιον οι διά τον πλοΰτον άζιοΰντες άρχειν,
ομοίως δέ και οι κατά γένος• δήλον γαρ ώς ει τις
πάλιν εις πλουσιώτερος απάντων εστί, δηλονότι
κατά το αυτό δίκαιον τούτον άρχειν τον ενα απάν-
των δεήσει, ομοίως δε και τον ευγένεια διαφέροντα
20 των αμφισβητούντων δι' ελευθερίαν. ταντό δε 11
tout' ΐσως συμβήσεται και περί τάς αριστο-
κρατίας επί της αρετής' ει γάρ τις εις άμείνων
άνηρ ειη των άλλων των εν τω πολιτεύματι
σπουδαίων όντων, τούτον etrai δει κύριον κατά
ταύτό δίκαιον, ούκοΰν ει και το πλήθος είναι γε 2
25 δει κύριον διότι κρείττους είσι των ολίγων, καν
εις η πλείους μεν του ενός ελάττους δε των πολλών
κρείττους ώσι τών άλλων, τούτους αν δεοι κυρίους
etvat μάλλον η το πλήθος, πάντα δη ταυτ εοικε 12
φανερόν ποιεΐν δτι τούτων τών ορών ουδείς ορθός
εστί καθ* δν 3 άζιοΰσιν αυτοί μεν άρχειν τους δ'
30 άλλου? υπό σφών άρχεσθαι πάντας. και γάρ δη
και προς τους κατ* άρετήν άζιοΰντας κυρίους eirai
του πολιτεύματος , ομοίως δε και τους κατά πλοΰ-
τον, εχοιεν αν λέγειν τά πλήθη λόγον τινά δίκαιον
ουδέν γάρ κωλύει ποτέ το πλήθος etrai βελτιον τών
ολίγων και πλουσιώτερον , ούχ ώς καθ' εκαστον
85 αλλ' ώς αθρόους.
Διό και προς την άπορίαν ην ζητοΰσι και προ- 13
1 γάρ αι> Coraes : yap codd.
* y είναι (vel supra κατά ye) Richards. 3 oOs ? ed.
238
POLITICS, III. vii. 10-13
task, and whether they are able to administer the
state, or sufficiently numerous to constitute a state ? not of the
And there is some difficulty as regards all the rival many.
claimants to political honours. Those who claim to
rule because of their wealth might seem to have no
justice in their proposal, and similarly also those who
claim on the score of birth ; for it is clear that if, to
go a step further, a single individual is richer than all
the others together, according to the same principle
of justice it will obviously be right for this one man to
rule over all, and similarly the man of outstanding
nobilitv among the claimants on the score of free
11 birth. And this same thing will perhaps result in
the case of aristocratic government based on virtue ;
for if there be some one man who is better than the
other virtuous men in the state, by the same principle
of justice that man must be sovereign. Accordingly
if it is actually proper for the multitude to be
sovereign because they are better than the few, then
also, if one person or if more than one but fewer
than the many are better than the rest, it would be
proper for these rather than the multitude to be
12 sovereign. All these considerations therefore seem
to prove the incorrectness of all of the standards
on which men claim that they themselves shall
govern and everybody else be governed by them.
For surely even against those who claim to be
sovereign over the government on account of virtue,
and similarly against those who claim on account of
wealth, the multitudes might be able to advance a
just plea ; for it is quite possible that at some time
the multitude may be collectively better and richer
than the few, although not individually.
13 Hence it is also possible to meet in this way the
239
ARISTOTLE
1283 b fl/ .. , , s , , , ,
ραλλουσι rives ewe^erai τούτον τον τρόπον απανταν
(αποροΰσι γάρ τίνες πότερον τω νομοθέτη νομο-
θετητέον, βουλομένω τίθεσθαι τους ορθότατους
νομούς, προς το των βελτιόνων συμφέρον η προς
40 το των πλειόνων) όταν συμβαίνη το λεχθέν. το δ'
ορθόν ληπτέΌν Ισως, το δ' Ισως ορθόν προς το της
πόλεως όλης συμφέρον και προς το κοινόν το των
πολιτών πολίτης δε κοινή μεν 6 μετέχων του
\2%i & αρχειν και άρχεσθαί εστί, καθ* εκάστην δε πολι-
τειαν έτερος, προς δε την άρίστην ό δυνάμενος και
προαιρούμενος άρχεσθαί και άρχειν προς τον βίον
τον κατ' άρετην.
VIII. Ει δε τις εστίν εις τοσούτον διαφέρων 1
κατ' αρετής ύπερβολην , η πλείους μεν ενός μη
5 μέντοι δυνατοί πλήρωμα παρασχεσθαι πόλεως,
ώστε μη συμβλητην etrai την των άλλων άρετην
πάντων μηδέ την δυ^ααιν αυτών την πολιτικην
προς την εκείνων ει πλείους, ει δ' εις την εκείνου
μόνον, ούκέτι θετεον τούτους μέρος πόλεως• άδι-
κήσονται γάρ άξιούμενοι τών ίσων, άνισοι τοσούτον
ίο κατ' άρετην όντες και την πολιτικην δυ^α/Λυ-»•
ώσπερ γαρ θεόν εν άνθρώποις εικός είναι τον
τοιούτον, όθεν δηλον ότι και την νομοθεσίαν 2
άναγκαιον είναι περί τους 'ίσους και τω γένει και
τη δυνάμει, κατά δε τών τοιούτων ουκ έστι νόμος,
αύτοι γάρ είσι νόμος• και γάρ γελοίος αν εΐη
15 νομοθετεΐν τις πειρώμενος κατ' αυτών λέγοιεν
γάρ αν 'ίσως άπερ 'Αντισθένης έφη τους λέοντας
α At the end of the last sentence, § 12.
6 Pupil of Socrates and founder of the Cynic sect of
philosophers.
e ' Where are your claws and teeth ? '
2 iO
POLITICS, III. vii. 13— vm. 2
question which some persons investigate and put
forward (for some raise the question whether the
legislator desiring to lay down the rightest laws
should legislate with a view to the advantage of the
better people or that of the larger number) in cases
when the situation mentioned α occurs. And ' right '
must be taken in the sense of ' equally right,' and
this means right in regard to the interest of the
whole state and in regard to the common welfare of
the citizens ; and a citizen is in general one who shares
in governing and being governed, although he is
different according to each form of constitution, but
in relation to the best form a citizen is one who has
the capacity and the will to be governed and to govern
with a view to the life in accordance with virtue.
VIII. But if there is any one man so greatly dis- The safety.
tinsruished in outstanding virtue, or more than one ostracism •
but not enough to be able to make up a complete its history,
state, so that the virtue of all the rest and their prevalence
political ability is not comparable with that of the »» all the
men mentioned, if they are several, or if one, with forms ot
his alone, it is no longer proper to count these ex- state -
ceptional men a part of the state ; for they will be
treated unjustly if deemed worthy of equal status,
being so widely unequal in virtue and in their political
ability : since such a man will naturally be as a god
among men. Hence it is clear that legislation also
must necessarily be concerned with persons who are
equal in birth and in ability, but there can be no law
dealing with such men as those described, for they
are themselves a law ; indeed a man would be
ridiculous if he tried to legislate for them, for prob-
ably they would say what in the story of Antisthenes 6
the lions said c when the hares made speeches in
241
ARISTOTLE
1284 a
δημηγορούντων τών δασυπόδων και το Ισον άζιούν-
των πάντας έχειν. διό και τίθενται τον οστρα-
κισμόν αϊ δημοκρατούμεναι πόλεις δια την τοιαύ-
την αιτίαν αύται γαρ δη δοκοΰσι διώκειν την
20 ισότητα μάλιστα πάντων, ώστε τους δοκοΰντας
ύπερέχειν δυνάμει δια πλοΰτον η πολυφιλίαν η τίνα
άλλην πολιτικην ίσχύν ώστράκιζον και μεθίστασαν
εκ της πόλεως χρόνους ώρισμένους. μυθολογεΐται 3
δε και τους Άργοναύτας τον Ήρακλεα κατα-
λιπεΐν δια τοιαύτην αιτίαν ου γαρ έθέλειν αύτον
25 ayeiv την 'Αργώ μετά των πλωτηρων 1 των άλλων
ώς υπερβάλλοντα πολύ. διό και τους φέγοντας
την τυραννίδα και την ΤΙεριάνδρου Θρασυβούλω
συμβουλίαν ούχ απλώς οίητέον ορθώς επιτιμάν
(φασι γαρ τον ΤΙερίανδρον ειπείν μεν ούδεν προς
τον πεμφθέντα κήρυκα περί της συμβουλίας, άφ-
30 αιροΰντα δε τους υπερέχοντας τών σταχυών
o/mAurai την άρουραν όθεν άγνοοΰντος μεν του
κηρυκος του γινομένου την αιτίαν, άπαγγείλαντος
δε το συμπεσόν, συννοησαι τον θρασύβουλον δτι
δει τους υπερέχοντας άνδρας άναιρεΐν) • τοΰτο γαρ 4
ου μόνον συμφέρει τοις τυράννοις ουδέ μόνον οι
35 τύραννοι ποιοΰσιν, αλλ' ομοίως έχει και περί τα?
ολιγαρχίας και τάς δημοκρατίας• ο γαρ οστρα-
κισμός την αυτήν έχει δυνααιν τρόπον τίνα τω
κολούειν τους υπερέχοντας και φυγαδεύειν. το δ
αυτό καΐ περί τάς πόλεις και τα έθνη ποιοΰσιν
οι κύριοι της δυνάμεως, οίον 'Αθηναίοι μεν περί
1 των πλωτήρωι• hie Richards, post πολύ codd.
α Cf. Apollodorus, Β ibliotheca i. 9. 19 ttjs Ά /ryoOs φθΐ-/ξαμ.ένητ
μη δύνασθαι (pepeiv το τούτον βάρος. Argo was a live creature,
and Athena had built a ' talking timber ' into her cutwater.
242
POLITICS, III. viii. 2-4
the assembly and demanded that all should have
equality. This is why democratically governed states
institute the system of ostracism, because of a reason
of this nature ; for these are the states considered
to pursue equality most of all things, so that they
used to ostracize men thought to be outstandingly
powerful on account of wealth or popularity or some
other form of political strength, and used to banish
3 them out of the city for fixed periods of time. And
there is a mythical story that the Argonauts left
Heracles behind for a similar reason ; for the Argo °
refused to carry him with the other voyagers be-
cause he was so much heavier. Hence also those
who blame tyranny and Periander's advice to
Thrasybulus 6 must not be thought to be absolutely
right in their censure (the story is that Periander
made no reply to the herald sent to ask his advice,
but levelled the corn-field by plucking off the ears
that stood out above the rest ; and consequently,
although the herald did not know the reason for
what was going on, when he carried back news of
what had occurred, Thrasybulus understood that he
4 was to destroy the outstanding citizens) ; for this
policy is advantageous not only for tyrants, nor is
it only tyrants that use it, but the same is the case
with oligarchies and democracies as well ; for ostracism
has in a way the same effect as docking off the out-
standing men by exile. And the same course is
adopted in regard to cities and races by the holders
of sovereign power, for example the Athenians so
* Periander was tyrant of Corinth circa 626-585 b.c. ;
Thrasybulus was tyrant of Miletus. Herodotus v. 92 tells
the story with their parts reversed.
24-3
ARISTOTLE
40 Σαμίους και Χίους και Λεσβίους (επει γάρ θάττον
εγκρατώς εσχον την αρχήν, εταπείνωσαν αυτούς
1284 b παρά τάς συνθήκας), 6 δε ΐίερσών βασιλβνς Μτ^δου?
και Βαβυλώνιους καΐ των άλλων τους πεφρονη-
ματισμενους διά το ytviaQai ποτ επ* αρχής επ-
εκοπτε πολλάκις, το δε πρόβλημα καθόλου περί δ
77aaas• εστί τάς πολιτείας, και τα? όρθάς• αϊ μεν
b γαρ παρεκβεβηκυΐαι προς το ίδιον άποσκοποΰσαι
τοϋτο Βρώσιν, ου μην αλλά περί τάς το κοινον
αγαθόν επισκοπούσας τον αυτόν έχει τρόπον,
δήλον δε τούτο και επί των άλλων τεχνών και
επιστημών οϋτε γάρ γραφεύς εάσειεν αν τον υπερ-
βάλλοντα πόδα τής συμμετρίας εχειν το ζώον, ούδ'
ίο et διαφεροι το κάλλος, ούτε ναυπηγός πρύμναν ή
τών άλλων τι μορίων τών τής νεώς, ούδε δη
χοροδιδάσκαλος τον μείζον και κάλλιον του παντός
χοροΰ φθεγγόμενον εάσει συγχορεύειν. ώστε δια 6
τοΰτο μεν ούδεν κωλύει τους μονάρχους συμφωνεΐν
15 ταΐς πόλεσιν, ει τής οικείας αρχής ωφελίμου ταΐς
πόλεσιν οΰσης τοΰτο δρώσιν. διό κατά τάς όμο-
λογουμενας ύπεροχάς έχει τι δίκαιον πολιτικόν ο
λόγος ο περί τον όστρακισμόν. βελτιον μεν ουν
τον νομοθετην εζ αρχής οϋτω συστήσαι την πολι-
τείαν ώστε μη δεΐσθαι τοιαύτης ιατρείας' δεύτερος
20 δέ πλους, αν σνμβή, πειράσθαι τοιούτω τινι διορ-
θώματι διορθοΰν. όπερ ουκ εγίγνετο περί τάς
πόλεις, ου γάρ εβλεπον προς το τής πολιτείας τής
α In 4 tO, 424 and 427 b.c. respectively.
244
POLITICS, III. viii. 4-β
dealt with the Samians and Chians and Lesbians"
(for no sooner did they get a strong hold of their
empire than they humbled them in contravention
of their covenants), and the king of the Persians
frequently used to cut down the numbers of the
Medes and Babylonians and the other races that
had waxed proud because they had once been head
δ of an empire. And the problem applies universally How far
to all the forms of constitution, even the right forms ; uTth/ideai
for while the divergent forms of government do this state?
because their regard is fixed on their private advan-
tage, nevertheless with the constitutions directed to
the common good the same is the case. And this is
also clear in the field of the other arts and sciences ;
a painter would not let his animal have its foot of
disproportionately large size, even though it was an
exceptionally beautiful foot, nor would a shipbuilder
make the stern or some other part of a ship dispro-
portionately big, nor yet will a trainer of choruses
allow a man who sings louder and more beautifully
6 than the whole band to be a member of it. Hence
as far as this practice goes nothing prevents monarchs
from being in harmony with the cities the ν rule, if
they resort to it when their own personal rule is
beneficial to the cities. Therefore in relation to
acknowledged superiorities the argument for ostra-
cism has a certain element of political justice. True,
it is better for the lawgiver so to constitute the state
at the outset that it does not need this medicine ;
but the next best course to steer, if occasion arises,
is to endeavour to correct the constitution by some
such method of rectification. But this was not what
happened with the states, for thev were not looking
at what was advantageous for their proper constitu-
246
ARISTOTLE
1284 b
οικείας συμφέρον, αλλά στασιαστικώς έχρώντο
τοις οστρακισμοΐς . εν μεν ούν ταΐς παρεκβεβη-
κυίαις πολιτείαις οτι μεν tola συμφέρει και δίκαιον
25 ion, φανερόν, Ισως δε και οτι ούχ 1 απλώς δίκαιον,
και τοΰτο φανερόν αλλ' έπι της αρίστης πολιτείας "
έχει πολλήν άπορίαν, ου κατά των άλλων ayai?oV
την ύπεροχήν, οίον ισχύος και πλούτου και πολυ-
φιλίας, άλλ' άν τι? yeVr^Tai διαφέρων κατ' άρετήν,
τί χρή ποιόν ; ου yap δη φαΐεν άν δεΐν έκβάλΧειν
so και μεθιστάναι τον τοιούτον αλλά μην ούδ' άρχ€ΐν
γε τοΰ τοιούτου, παραπλησιον γαρ καν el του Διό?
άρχειν άξιοΐεν, μερίζοντες τάς αρχάς, λείπεται
τοίνυν, όπερ έοικε πεφυκέναι, πείθεσθαι τω τοιούτω
πάντας ασμένως, ώστε βασιλέας e?mi τους τοιού-
τους άιδίους εν ταΐς πόλεσιν.
3 s IX. "Ισως δε καλώς έχει μετά τους είρημένους 1
λόγους μεταβήναι και σκέφασθαι περί βασιλείας'
φαμέν γάρ τών ορθών πολιτειών μίαν eft-ai ταύτην.
σκεπτέον δε πότερον συμφέρει τη μελλούση καλώς
οίκήσεσθαι και πόλει και χώρα /^ασιλβυβσ^αι, η
40 ου, αλλ' άλλη τι? πολιτεία μάλλον, η τισι μεν
συμφέρει τισι δ ου συμφέρει, δει δε πρώτον
διελέσθαι πότερον εν το γένος εστίν αυτής η
1285 a πλείους έχει διαφοράς.
'Ράδιον δη τούτο γε καταμαθεΐν, οτι πλείω τε 2
γένη περιέχει και της αρχής ο τρόπος έστιν ούχ
εις πασών, ή γάρ εν τή Λακωνική πολιτεία δοκεΐ
1 [ούχ] Bernays.
Perhaps ' not ' should be struck out ; but if it stands, the
clause refers to § 5 init. — in these cases ostracism is practised
only in the interest of those in power.
246
POLITICS, III. viii. &— ix. 2
tion, but their acts of ostracism were done in a revolu-
tionary spirit. In the divergent forms of constitution
therefore it is evident that ostracism is advantageous
and j ust under the special constitution, though perhaps
7 it is also evident that it is not a just absolutely ; but
in the case of the best constitution there is much
doubt as to what ought to be done, not as regards
superiority in the other things of value, such as
strength and wealth and popularity, but in the case
of a person becoming exceptionally distinguished for
virtue. It certainly would not be said that such a
man must be banished and got out of the way ; yet
nevertheless no doubt men would not think that they
ought to rule over such a man, for that would be
the same as if they claimed to rule over Zeus, dividing
up his spheres of government. It remains therefore,
and this seems to be the natural course, for all to
obev such a man gladly, so that men of this sort may
be kings in the cities for all time.
1 IX. And perhaps it is well after the subjects that Royalty:
have been discussed to pass over to consider royal ' vane iee '
government ; for we pronounce this to be one of the
correct constitutions. And it has to be considered
whether it is advantageous for a city or a country that
is to be well administered to be ruled by a king, or
whether it is not so but some other constitution is
more expedient, or whether royal rule is expedient for
some states and not for others. But it is needful to
decide first whether there is only one sort of kingship
or whether it has several varieties.
2 Now it is at all events easy to discern that kingship (i) the
includes several kinds, and that the mode of govern- ^^ n
ment is not the same in all. For the kingship in the
Spartan constitution, which is held to be a typical
247
ARISTOTLE
1285 a \ * q \ / /\ ~ ^ / »
μ,εν είναι ρασιλεια μάλιστα των κατά νομον, ουκ
5 εστί δέ κυρία πάντων, αλλ' όταν έζέλθη την χώραν
ηγεμών εστί των προς τον πόλεμον, ετι δέ τα
προς τους θ€θύς άποδέδοται τοις βασιλεΰσιν.
αΰτη μέν οΰν η βασίλεια οίον στρατηγία τις αυτο-
κρατόρων και άΐδιός εστίν κτεΐναι γαρ ου κύριος,
el μη εν τινι καιρώ, 1 καθάπ€ρ επί των αρχαίων
ίο dv ταΐς πολεμικαΐς εξόδοις iv χειρός νόμω• δηλοΐ
δ' "Ομηρος, 6 γαρ Αγαμέμνων κακώς μεν άκούων
ηνείχετο iv ταΐς έκκλησίαις, εξελθόντων δε και
KTeivai κύριος ήν λέγει γοΰν
ον δε κ* εγών άπάνευθε μάχης . . .
. . . ου οι
άρκιον έσσεΐται φνγέειν κύνας ηδ' οιωνούς'
παρ γαρ έμοι θάνατος.
is ev μεν οΰν τουτ είδος βασίλεια?, στρατηγία διά 3
βίου, τούτων δ' αϊ μεν κατά γένος είσιν αϊ δ'
αίρεται' παρά ταυτην δ άλλο μοναρχίας ειδο?,
οίαι παρ' ενίοις είσι βασιλεΐαι τών βαρβάρων,
εχουσι δ' αύται την δυναμιν 7τασαι παραπλησιαν
τυραννίσιν, είσι δε και 2 κατά νόμον και πατρικαί•
20 δια γάρ το δουλικώτεροι είναι τα ηθη φύσει οι
μεν βάρβαροι τών 'Ελλήνων οι δε περί την Άσίαν
τών περί την Κύρώπην, ύπομένουσι την δεσποτικην
άρχην ουδέν δυσχεραίνοντες. τυραννικά! μεν οΰν
διά το τοιούτον είσιν, ασφαλείς δε δια το πάτριαι
1 καιρψ (vel ανάγκη) Richards : βασιλεία (e βασιλεία supra)
codd. (non vertit Ar.).
2 τυραννίσιν — και Susemihl : lacunas et fragmenta varia
codd.
248
POLITICS, III. ix. 2-3
royalty of the kind guided by law, does not carry
sovereignty in all matters, though when a king goes
on a foreign expedition he is the leader in all matters
relating to the war ; and also matters relating to
religion have been assigned to the kings. This
kingship therefore is a sort of military command
vested in generals with absolute powers and held
for life ; for the king has not authoritv to put a
subject to death, except in some emergency, as in
ancient times kings on their military expeditions
could kill an offender out of hand, as Homer proves,
for Agamemnon endured being reviled in the as-
semblies but when they were on an expedition had
authority to put a man to death : at all events he
says
But whomsoe'er I see far from the fray . . .
Shall have no hope to fly from dogs and vultures,
For death is in my hands ! "
3 This then is one sort of kingship, a lifelong general- (2) Oriental
ship, and some of the kingships of this kind are monarch > ί
hereditary, others elective ; and by its side there is
another sort of monarchy, examples of which are
kingships existing among some of the barbarians.
The power possessed by all of these resembles that
of tyrannies, but they govern according to law and
are hereditary ; for because the barbarians are more
servile in their nature than the Greeks, and the
Asiatics than the Europeans, they endure despotic
rule without any resentment. These kingships there-
fore are for these reasons of a tyrannical nature, but
they are secure because they are hereditary and
• Quoted from Iliad ii. 391, but the last line is not in our
Homer.
249
ARISTOTLE
1285 a
25 και κατά νόμον είναι, /cat η φυλακή δε βασιλική 4
/cat ου τυραννική δια. τήν αυτήν αίτιον ' οι yap
πολιται φυλάττουσιν οπλοις τους βασιλείς, τους δέ
τυράννους ζενικόν οι μεν γαρ κατά νόμον και
εκόντων οι δ' ακόντων άρχουσιν, ώσθ* οι μεν παρά
των πολιτών οι δ επί τους πολίτας εχουσι την
ζοφυλακήν. δυο μεν ουν είδη ταύτα μοναρχίας- δ
έτερον δ' όπερ ην εν τοις άρχαίοις "Έιλλησιν, ους
καλοΰσιν αίσυμνήτας. εστί δέ τοΰθ* ως απλώς
ειπείν αιρετή τυραννίς, διαφέρουσα δε της βαρ-
βαρικής ου τω μή κατά νόμον άλλα τω μή πάτριος
είναι μόνον, ήρχον δ' ot μεν δια βίου τήν αρχήν
35 ταύτην, ol δε μέχρι τινών ώρισμενων χρόνων ή
πράξεων, οίον ειλοντό ποτέ Μιτυλτ^ναΐοι Πιττα-
κόν προς τους φυγάδας ων προειστήκεσαν Αντι-
μενίδης και Αλκαίος 6 ποιητής, δηλοΐ δ' 'Αλκαίο? 6
οτι τύραννον εΐλοντο τον Πιττακον εν τινι τών
σκόλιων μελών επίτιμα γάρ οτι
τον κακοπάτριδα 1
Πιττακον πόλιο?* τα? άχόλω 3 και βαρυδαίμονος
1285 b εστάσαντο τύραννον μεγ' επαινεοντες άολλεες.
αύται μεν ουν είσί τε και ήσαν διά μεν το δεσποτι-
κά! είναι τυραννικαι/ διά δέ το αίρεται και εκόντων
βασιλικαί' τέταρτον δ' είδος μοναρχίας βασιλικής 7
5 at κατά τους ηρωικούς χρόνους εκουσιαί τε και
7raVoiai yiyvd /χεναι κατά νόμον. διά γάρ το τους
πρώτους •νενε'σί?αι του πλήθους εύεργετας κατά
1 κακοπατρίδαν Wackernagel.
* ιόλιοϊ Schneidewin : πόλεως codd.
* διχόλω Schmidt.
* τνραννικαι elvat δισποτικαί codd. : tr. Sepulveda.
250
POLITICS, III. ix. 4-7
4 rule by law. Also their bodyguard is of a royal
and not a tyrannical type for the same reason ; for
kings are guarded by the citizens in arms, whereas
tyrants have foreign guards, for kings rule in accord-
ance with law and over willing subjects, but tyrants
rule over unwilling subjects, owing to which kings
take their guards from among the citizens but
tyrants have them to guard against the citizens.
5 These then are two kinds of monarchy ; while another
is that which existed among the ancient Greeks, the (3) the
type of rulers called aesymnetae. This, to put it 1 " -3 r *
simply, is an elective tyranny, and it differs from
the monarchy that exists among barbarians not in
governing without the guidance of law but only in
not being hereditary. Some holders of this type of
monarchy ruled for life, others until certain fixed
limits of time or until certain undertakings were
ended, as for example the people of Mitylene once
elected Pittacus to resist the exiles under the leader-
6 ship of Antimenides and the poet Alcaeus. That they
elected Pittacus β as tyrant is proved by Alcaeus in
one of his catches ; for he rebukes the people because
The base-born Pittacus they did set up
As tyrant of the meek and luckless city,
And all did greatly praise him.
These monarchies therefore now and in the past are
of the nature of tyrannies because they are autocratic,
but of the nature of kingships because they are elec-
7 tive and rule over willing subjects. A fourth class of (4) heroic
royal monarchy consists of the hereditary legal king- monarch J' i
ships over willing subjects in the heroic period. For
because the first of the line had been benefactors of
a Pittacus held the office 587-579 b.c. He was one of the
Seven Sages. Antimenides and Alcaeus were brothers.
251
ARISTOTLE
1285b / « >\ a 5 » ! «a /
τεχνας η πολεμον η οια το avvaryayziv η πορισαι
χώραν, εγίγνοντο βασιλείς £ κοντών και τοις παρα-
λαμβάνουσι πάτριοι . κύριοι δ' ήσαν της τε κατά
ίο πόλεμον ηγεμονίας και των θυσιών οσαι μη
ιερατικαι, και προς τούτοις τάς δίκας εκρινον
τοΰτο δ' εποίουν οί μεν ουκ ομνύοντες οι δ'
ομνύοντες, ο δ όρκος ην του σκήπτρου επανάτασις .
οί μεν οΰν επι των αρχαίων χρόνων και τα κατά$
πόλιν και τά ενδημα και τα ύπερόρια συνεχώς
15 ηρχον ύστερον 8ε τά μεν αυτών παριεντων τών
βασιλέων τά δε τών όχλων παραιρουμενων , εν μεν
ταΐς άλλαι? πόλεσι Βυσίαι κατελείφθησαν τοις
/ίασιλεΰσι μόνον, οπού δ' άξιον ειπείν eii^ai /ϊασι-
λείαν, εν τοις ύπερορίοις τών πολεμικών την ηγε-
μον'ιαν μόνον εΐχον.
20 Χ. Βασίλεια? μεν οΰν είδη ταύτα, τέτταρα τον 1
αριθμόν, μία μεν η περί τους ηρωικούς χρόνους
[αύτη δ' ην εκόντων μεν, επί τισι δ' ώρισμενοις,
στρατηγός γαρ ην και δικαστής ο ^ασιλευ? και
τών προς τους θεούς κύριος), δευτέρα δ η βαρ-
βαρική (αύτη δ' εστίν εκ γένους άρχη δεσποτική
25 κατά νόμον), τρίτη δ' ην αίσυμνητείαν προσαγο-
ρεύουσιν (αύτη δ' εστίν αιρετή τυραννίς), τετάρτη
δ' η Λακωνική τούτων (αύτη δ' εστίν ως ειπείν
απλώς στρατηγία κατά γένος αιδιο?). αύται μεν
ούν τούτον τον τρόπον διαφερουσιν αλλήλων.
80 πέμπτον δ' είδος βασίλεια? όταν η πάντων κύριος 2
εις ων ώσπερ εκαστον έθνος και πόλις εκάστη
τών κοινών, τεταγμένη κατά την οικονομικην
α This ritual is mentioned in Iliad i. 234, vii. 412, x. 328.
6 The monarchy was reduced to a priesthood at Cyrene
(Herod, iv. 161) and at Ephesus.
252
POLITICS, III. ix. 7— χ. 2
the multitude in the arts or in war, or through having
drawn them together or provided them with land,
these kings used to come to the throne with the con-
sent of the subjects and hand it on to their successors
by lineal descent. And they had supreme command
in war and control over all sacrifices that were not
in the hands of the priestly class, and in addition to
these functions they were judges in law-suits ; some
gave judgement not on oath and some on oath — the
8 oath was taken by holding up the sceptre. These
kings then of ancient times used to govern continu-
ously in matters within the city and in the country
and across the frontiers ; but later on when gradually
the kings relinquished some of their powers and had
others taken from them by the multitudes, in the
cities in general only the sacrifices were left to the
kings, 6 while where anything that deserves the name
of royalty survived the kings only had the command
in military expeditions across the frontiers.
1 X. There are then these kinds of kingship, four
in number : one belonging to the heroic times, which
was exercised over willing subjects, but in certain
limited fields, for the king was general and judge and
master of religious ceremonies ; second, the barbarian
monarchy, which is an hereditarv despotism govern-
ing in conformity with law ; third, the rule of the
functionarv called an aesymnetes. which is an elective
tyranny ; and fourth among these is the Spartan
kingship, which may be described simply as an
hereditary generalship held for life. These kingships
2 then differ from one another in this manner. But a (5) absolute
fifth kind of kingship is when a single ruler is sovereign monarc ,y •
over all matters in the way in which each race and
each city is sovereign over its common affairs ; this
253
ARISTOTLE
1285 b w \ t i \ η \ > * *
ωσπερ γαρ η Οικονομική ρασιΑεια τις οικίας
εστίν, όντως ή τταμβασιΧεια 1 πόλεως και έθνους
ενός ή πλειόνων οικονομία.
Σχεδόν δή δυο εστίν ώς ειπείν εΐδη βασίλεια?
35 π?ρί ων σκεπτεον, αΰτη τε και ή Λακωνική . των
γαρ άλλων αϊ πολλαΐ μεταξύ τούτων εισίν ελατ-
τόνων μεν γαρ κύριοι της παμβασιλείας, πλειόνων
δ' είσι της Λακωνικής, ώστε το σκεμμα σχεδόν
περί δυοΐν εστίν, εν μεν πότερον συμφέρει ταΐς
πόλεσι στρατηγόν αιδιον etvat, και τούτον η κατά
1286 a γένος η κατά μέρος, ζ η ου συμφέρει, εν δε πότερον
ενα συμφέρει κύριον etvai πάντων η ου συμφέρει,
το μεν ουν περί της τοιαύτης στρατηγιας επι- 3
σκοπεΐν νόμων έχει μάλλον είδος η πολιτείας (εν
άπάσαι? γαρ ενδέχεται γίγνεσθαι τοΰτο ταΐς πολι-
6 τείαις), ωστ άφείσθω την πρώτην 6 δε λοιπός
τρόπος της ^ασιλβια? πολιτείας εΐδός εστίν, ώστε
περί τούτου δει θεωρήσαι και τάς απορίας επι-
δραμεΐν τάς ενούσας.
'Αρχή δ' εστί της ζητήσεως αύτη, πότερον συμ-
φέρει μάλλον υπό του άριστου ανδρός άρχεσθαι η
ίο υπό των αρίστων νόμων, δοκοΰσι δη τοις νομι- 4
ζουσι συμφερειν βασιλεύεσθαι το καθόλου μόνον
οι νόμοι λέγειν αλλ' ου προς τα προσπίπτοντα
επιτάττειν ωστ εν όποιαούν τέχνη το κατά
γράμματ άρχειν ήλίθιον (και 3 εν Αίγύπτω μετά
τήν τετρήμερον κινεΐν εζεστι τοις ίατρόις, εάν δε
1 παμβασι\ΐ'ια Susemihl (cf. 36): βασιλεία codd.
2 μέρος: α'ίρΐσιν codd. aliqui (cf. a 16).
3 και πως, και ως codd. nonnulli (ήλίθιόν πως και ? Richards).
β Some mss. give ' or by election.'
* Cf. 1289 all foil. ; but the promise of a full discussion
of law is not fulfilled.
254
POLITICS, III. χ. 2-4
monarchy ranges with the rule of a master over a
household, for just as the master's rule is a sort of
monarchy in the home, so absolute monarchy is
domestic mastership over a city, or over a race or
several races.
There are therefore, we may say, virtually two The list
kinds of kingship that have been examined, this one ^ t ^£
and the Spartan. For most of the others he between
these, since with them the king is sovereign over
fewer things than under absolute monarchy, but over
more than under the Spartan kingship. Hence our
inquiry is virtually about two questions, one whether
it is expedient or inexpedient for states to have a
military commander holding office for life, and that
either by descent or by class," and one whether it is
expedient or inexpedient for one man to be sovereign
3 over everything. Now the study of a military com- The
mand of the kind mentioned has more the aspect of r^y 3 "
a legal than of a constitutional inquiry (for it is possible military
for this form of office to exist under all constitutions),
so let it be dismissed at the first stage b ; but the remain-
ing mode of kingship is a kind of constitution, so that
it is necessary to consider this one and to run over
the difficulties that it involves.
And the starting-point of the inquiry is the question Absolute
whether it is more advantageous to be ruled by the J^icizeZ
4 best men or by the best laws. Those of the opinion
that it is advantageous to be governed by a king
think that laws enunciate only general principles but Government
do not give directions for dealing with circumstances guided by
as they arise ; so that in an art of anv kind it is foolish Uw ω , a
ι ι ■ -i'/i.-i-i. general
to govern procedure by written rules (and indeed in principle.
Egypt physicians have the right to alter their prescrip-
tion after four days, although if one of them alters it
255
ARISTOTLE
1286 s / ><„>« 2 ' \ J I '
προτερον, επι τω αυτού κινουνω)• ψανερον τοιννν
15 ώς ουκ εστίν ή κατά γράμματα καΐ νόμους άριστη
πολιτεία διά την αυτήν αίτίαν. άλλα μήν κάκεΐνον
δει ύπάρχειν τον λόγον τον καθόλου τοις άρχουσιν.
κρεΐττον δ' ω μή ττρόσεστι το παθητικόν όλως ή
ω συμφυές• τω μεν οΰν νόμω τοΰτο ούχ υπάρχει,
20 φυχήν δ' άνθρωπίνην ανάγκη τοΰτ €χειν πάσαν.
αλλ' Ισως αν φαίη τις ώς άντι τούτου βουλεύσεται 5
περί των καθ' έκαστα κάλλιον. ότι μεν το'ινυν
ανάγκη νομοθετην αυτόν είναι, δήλον, και κεΐσθαι
νόμους, αλλά μή κυρίους ή* παρεκβαίνουσιν , επει
περί των y' άλλων eimi δει κυρίους• δσα δέ μή
25 δυνατόν τον νόμον κρίνειν ή όλως ή ευ, πότερον
ενα τον άριστον δει άρχειν ή πάντας; και γάρ
νυν συνιόντες δικάζουσι και βουλεύονται και κρί-
νουσιν, αύται δ* αϊ κρίσεις είσι πασαι περί των
καθ' εκαστον. καθ* ενα μεν ουν συμβαλλόμενος
όστισοΰν ίσως χείρων άλλ' εστίν ή πόλις εκ
30 πολλών, ώσπερ δ' 1 εστίασις συμφορητός καλλιων
jLuas - και απλής, διά τοΰτο και κρίνει άμεινον
όχλος 7τολλά ή εις όστισοΰν. ετι μάλλον άδιά- 6
φθορον το πολύ — καθάπερ 2 ύδωρ το πλεΐον, ούτω
και το πλήθος τών ολίγων άδιαφθορώτερον τοΰ
δ' ενός ύπ' οργής κρατηθεντος ή τίνος έτερου
35 πάθους τοιούτου άναγκαίον διεφθάρθαι τήν κρίσιν,
εκεί δ' έργον άμα πάντας όργισθήναι και άμαρτειν.
τπερ δ' ed. : ώσπερ codd.
καθάπερ <.yap> Bekker.
i.e. unalterably binding, and not be set aside by special
dispensation of the ruler when deemed to be unjust in some
particular case.
256
POLITICS, III. χ. 4-6
before he does so at his own risk) ; it is clear therefore
that government according to written rules, that is
laws, is not the best, for the same reason. At the
same time, however, rulers ought to be in possession
of the general principle before mentioned as well.
And a thing that does not contain the emotional
element is generally superior to a thing in which it
is innate ; now the law does not possess this factor,
5 but every human soul necessarily has it. But perhaps Law t*st
someone might say that in compensation for this a j^co?. by
single ruler will decide better about particular cases, lective
Therefore it is clear that on the one hand the ruler ^J* ^liie
must necessarily be a legislator, and that there must or fne •
be laws laid down, although these must not be
sovereign where they go astray — admittedly in all
other cases they ought to be sovereign ; but on the
other hand in matters which it is impossible for the
law either to decide at all or to decide well, ought
the one best man to govern or all the citizens ? As
it is, the citizens assembled hear lawsuits and deliber-
ate and give judgements, but these judgements are
all on particular cases. Now no doubt any one of
them individually is inferior compared with the best
man, but a state consists of a number of individuals,
and just as a banquet to which many contribute
dishes is finer than a single plain dinner, for this
reason in many cases a crowd judges better than
6 any single person. Also the multitude is more incor-
ruptible — just as the larger stream of water is purer,
so the mass of citizens is less corruptible than the few ;
and the individual's judgement is bound to be cor-
rupted when he is overcome by anger or some other
such emotion, whereas in the other case it is a difficult
thing for all the people to be roused to anger and go
257
ARISTOTLE
ΐώοο a „ ?>*\~/ί ' >λ ά s* » •«
έστω οε το πληοος οι ελευσεροι, μηοεν πάρα τον
νόμον πράττοντας αλλ' η π€ρΙ ων εκλείπειν άναγ-
καΐον αυτόν, ει δέ δη τοΰτο μη ράδιον εν πολ-
λοίς, αλλ' ει πλείους είεν αγαθοί καΐ άνδρες και
40 πολιται, πότερον ό €Ϊς άδιαφθορώτερος άρχων η
\2ZS\s μάλλον οί πλείους μεν τον αριθμόν αγαθοί δε
πάντες; η δηλον ως οί πλείους; αλλ' οι μεν
στασιάζουσιν, ό δ' εις άστασίαστος. αλλά προς
τοϋτ αντιθετεον ίσως δτι σπουδαίοι την φυχην
ωσπερ κάκεΐνος 6 εις. ει 8η την μεν των πλειόνων 7
6 άρχην άγα^ώ^ δ' ανδρών πάντων άριοτοκρατίαν
θετεον, την δε του ενός βασιλβι'αν, αιρετώτερον αν
ειη ταΐς πόλεσιν αριστοκρατία βασίλεια?, και μετά
δυνάμεως και χωρίς δυνάμεως ούσης της άρχης,
άν η λαβείν πλείους όμοιους, και διά τοϋτ ΐσως
εβασιλευοντο πρότερον, ότι σπάνιον ην εύρεΐν
άνδρας πολύ 1 διαφέροντας κατ άρετην, άλλως τε
10 και τότε μικράς οίκοΰντας πόλεις, έτι δ' απ'
ευεργεσίας καθίστασαν τους βασιλείς, όπερ εστίν
έργον των αγαθών ανδρών, επει δε συνέβαινε
γίγνεσθαι πολλούς ομοίους προς άρετην, ούκέτι
ύπέμενον αλλ' έζητουν κοινόν τι και πολιτείαν
καθίστασαν. επει δε χείρους γιγνόμενοι εχρημα- 8
15 τίζοντο από τών κοινών, εντεύθεν πόθεν εύλογον
yei^ea^at τάς ολιγαρχίας• έντιμον γαρ εποίησαν
1 xoWovs (plures Ar.) Sylburg.
258
POLITICS, III. χ. 6-8
wrong together. But the multitude must consist of
the freemen, doing nothing apart from the law
except about matters as to which the law must of
necessity be deficient. And if this is not indeed
easy to ensure in the case of many men, yet if there
were a majority of good men and good citizens, would
an individual make a more incorruptible ruler or
rather those who though the majority in number
yet are all good ? The majority, is it not obvious ?
But it will be said that they will split up into factions,
whereas with a single ruler this cannot happen. But
against this must perhaps be set the fact that thev
7 are as virtuous in soul as the single ruler. If then Normal
the rule of the majority when these are all good men f ^ < ι> Ι0Π
is to be considered an aristocracy, and that of the stitutions
one man kingship, aristocracy would be preferable 1D I7 '
for the states to kingship, whether the royal office be
conjoined with military force or without it, if it be
possible to get a larger number of men than one who
are of similar quality. And it was perhaps onlv
owing to this that kingships existed in earlier times,
because it was rare to find men who greatly excelled
in virtue, especially as in those days they dwelt in
small cities. Moreover they used to appoint their
kings on the ground of public service, and to per-
form this is a task for the good men. But as it
began to come about that many men arose who were
alike in respect of virtue, they would no longer
submit to royalty, but sought for some form of
commonwealth, and set up a republican constitution.
8 And as men becoming baser began to make money
out of the community, it is reasonable to suppose
that some such cause as this occasioned the rise of
oligarchies; for they brought wealth into honour.
25Q
ARISTOTLE
τον πλούτον. εκ δε τούτων πρώτον εις τυραν-
νίδας μετεβαλλον, εκ δε των τυραννίδων (Ις δημο-
κρατιαν aet γαρ εις ελάττους άγοντες δι' αίσχρο-
κερδειαν, ίσχυρότ€ρον το πλήθος κατέστησαν, ώστ
20 €7τι^€σ^αι και yeveadaL δημοκρατίας. επει δε και
μείζους eivai συμβεβηκε τάς πόλεις, ίσως ούδε
ράδιον ετι γίγνεσθαι πολιτείαν έτερον παρά δημο-
κρατιαν. ει δε δη τις άριστον θείη το βασιλεύεσθαι 9
ταΐς πόλεσιν, πώς εζει τά περί τών τέκνων;
ποτερον και το γένος δει βασίλευε»'; αλλά γιγνο-
25 μένων οποίοι τίνες ετυχον βλαβερόν. αλλ' ου
παραδώσει κύριος ων τοις τέκνοις, αλλ' ουκ ετι
τούτο ράδιον πιστεΰσαι• χαλεπόν γάρ, και μείζονος
αρετής ή κατ* άνθρωπίνην φύσιν. έχει δ' άπορίαν 10
και περί τής δυνάμεως, πότερον εχειν δει τον
μέλλοντα βασιλεύειν ίσχύν τίνα περί αυτόν ή δυνή-
80 σεται /?ιάζεσί?αι τους μη βουλομενους πειθαρχεΐν ;
ή πώς ενδέχεται την αρχήν διοικεΐν; ει γάρ και
κατά νόμον είη κύριος, μηδέν πράττων κατά την
αυτού βούλησιν παρά τον νόμον, όμως άναγκαΐον
ύπάρχειν αύτώ δυι^ψ,ιν ή φυλάξει τους νόμους,
τάχα μεν ούν τα περί τον βασιλέα τον τοιούτον ου
35 χαλεπόν διόρισαν δει γάρ αυτόν μεν εχειν 1 ίσχύν,
eirai δε τοσαύτην τήν ίσχύν ώστε εκάστου μεν
και ενός και συμπλειόνων κρείττω, τού δέ πλήθους
ήττω, καθάπερ όί τ αρχαίοι τάς φύλακας εδίδοσαν
1 ίχην μέν (vel ίσχύν μϊν ίχαν) Richards.
β i.e. more men of consideration went over to the opposition.
2tf0
POLITICS, III. χ. 8-10
And from oligarchies they first changed to tyrannies,
and from tyrannies to democracy ; for by constantly
bringing the government into fewer hands owing to a
base love of gain, they made the multitude stronger,*
so that it set upon the oligarchs, and democracies
came into existence. But now that the states have
come to be even greater than they were, perhaps it
is not easy for yet another form of constitution beside
9 democracy to come into existence. And even if one Heredity
held that royal government is best for states, what is may ω '
to be the position as regards the king's children ? is
the sovereignty to be hereditary ? But this will be
disastrous if the king's sons turn out to be like what
some have been. It may be said that the king being
sovereign will not in that case bequeath the throne
to his children. But that is too much to be easy to
believe : it would be difficult for a king to disinherit
his sons, and an act of virtue above the level of human
10 nature. And there is a difficulty also about the royal x ? ed of
power : ought the man who is to reign as king to force, but
have an armed force about him, by means of which lts dln 8 eri
he will have power to compel those who may be
unwilling to obey, or if not, how is it possible for
him to administer his office ? For even if he were a
law-abiding sovereign and never acted according to
his own will against the law, nevertheless it would
be essential for him to have power behind him whereby
to safeguard the laws. Probably therefore it is not
difficult to define the regulations for a king of this
sort : he must have a force of his own, but the force
must be only so large as to be stronger than a single
individual or even several individuals banded together,
but weaker than the multitude, on the principle on
which the men of old times used to assign bodyguards
261
ARISTOTLE
1286 " * Λ ,Λ « , ,Λ
οτβ καοισταιεν τίνα της πόλεως ον εκαλουν αισυμνη-
την η τύραννον, 1 και Διονυσίω τις, ότ ητει τους
40 φύλακας, συνεβούλευε τοις Συρακουσίοις δίδομαι
τοσούτους τους φύλακας.
1287 a XI. ΙΙερι δέ του βασιλέως του κατά την αΰτοΰ 1
βούλησιν πάντα πράττοντος δ τ€ λόγος εφεστηκε
νυν και ποιητεον την σκεφιν. 6 μεν γαρ κατά
νόμον λεγόμενος βασιλεύς ουκ εστίν είδος, καθάπερ
6 εϊπομεν, πολιτείας (εν πάσαι? γάρ ύπάρχειν εν-
θέτεται στρατηγίαν άΐδιον, οίον εν δημοκρατία και
αριστοκρατία, και πολλοί ποιοΰσιν ενα κύριον της
διοικήσεως• τοιαύτη γάρ άρχη τις εστί και περί
Έιπίδαμνον, και περί > Οποΰντα δε κατά τι μέρος
ελαττον) ■ περί δε της παμβασιλείας καλούμενης, 2
ίο αύτη δ εστί καθ' ην άρχει πάντων 2 κατά την
εαυτού βούλησιν ο βασιλεύς. δοκεΐ δε τισιν ουδέ
κατά φύσιν είναι το κύριον ενα πάντων είναι των
πολιτών οπού συνεστηκεν εζ όμοιων η πόλις' τοις
γάρ όμοίοις φύσει το αυτό δίκαιον άναγκαΐον και
την αύτην άζίαν κατά φύσιν ειΐ'αι, ώστ ε'ίπερ και
16 τό ΐσην εχειν τους άνισους τροφην η εσθήτα
βλαβερόν τοις σώ/,ιασι^, ούτως εχειν 3 και τό περί
τας τιμάς• ομοίως τοίνυν και τό άνισον τους ίσους, 3
διοπερ ούδενα* μάλλον άρχειν η άρχεσθαι δίκαιον,
και τό ανά μέρος τοίνυν ωσαύτως, τούτο δ' ηδη
νόμος• η γάρ τάξις νόμος, τον άρα νόμον άρχειν
1 [τ) τύραννον] Susemihl. 2 πάντων Jul. : πάντα codd.
3 ίχειν Schneider : ίχει codd.
4 ούδένα Bernays : ουδέν codd.
" ' Or tyrant' looks like an incorrect note, see 1285 b 25.
b See 1259 a 39 n. c See c. x. § 3.
d Durazzo, on the Adriatic.
262
POLITICS, III. χ. 10— χι. 3
whenever they appointed somebody as what they
termed aesymnetes or tyrant α of the state, and also,
when Dionysius 6 asked for his guards, somebody
advised him to give the same number of guards to
the citizens of Syracuse.
1 XI. Our discussion has now reached the case of -natural for
the king who acts in all matters according to his own adminis-
will, and we must examine this type of rovaltv. For trafc ? d b3 L.
J r J J magistrates
the so-called constitutional monarchy, as we said, c is and supple-
not a special kind of constitution (since it is possible j!^^ y
for a life-long generalship to exist under all constitu-
tions, for example under a democracy and an aristo-
cracy, and many people make one man sovereign
over the administration, for instance there is a govern-
ment of this sort in Epidamnus, d and also at Opus β to
2 a certain smaller extent) ; but we have now to discuss
what is called Absolute Monarchy, which is the
monarchy under which the king governs all men
according to his own will Some people think that
it is entirely contrary to nature for one person to
be sovereign over all the citizens where the state
consists of men who are alike ; for necessarily
persons alike in nature must in accordance with
nature have the same principle of justice and the
same value, so that inasmuch as for persons who are
unequal to have an equal amount of food or clothing
is harmful for their bodies, the same is the case also
3 in regard to honours ; similarly therefore it is wrong
for those who are equal to have inequality, owing to
which it is just for no one person to govern or be
governed more than another, and therefore for every-
body to govern and be governed alike in turn. And
this constitutes law ; for regulation is law. Therefore
• Chief town of Locri, near the Straits of Euboea.
263
ARISTOTLE
12873 r A* . « ν . .
αιρζτωτερον μάλλον η των πολιτών eva τίνα, κατά
τον αυτόν δε Aoyor τούτον, καν ei τίνα? άρχειν
βελτιον, τούτους καταστατίον νομοφυλακας καΐ
ύπηρέτας τοις νόμοις• άναγκαΐον γαρ elvai τινας
αρχάς, αλλ' ούχ eva τούτον είναι φασι δίκαιον
ομοίων ye όντων πάντων, αλλά μην δσα ye μη 4
8οκ€Ϊ δυνασθαι διορίζειν ο νόμος, ούδ* άνθρωπος
25 αν δυναιτο γνωρίζειν. αλλ' επίτηδες παιδεύσας 6
νόμος εφίστησι τά λοιπά ' ττ? δικαιότατη γνώμη '
κρίνειν /cat διοι /ceiv του? άρχοντας, en δ' Ιπανορ-
θοΰσθαι δίδωσιν δ τι αν δόξη πειρωμενοις άμ€ΐνον
efvai των κείμενων, ό μεν οΰν τον νουν κελεύων
άρχειν δοκεΐ κελευειν άρχειν τον θεόν και τον
νουν μόνους, 1 ο δ' άνθρωπον κελεύων προστιθησι
και θηρίον η re γαρ 67Η#ιγ«α τοιούτον, και ο
θυμός άρχοντας διαστρέφει και τους άριστους
άνδρας. διόπερ άνευ ορέξεως νους ό νόμος εστίν,
το δε των τ€χνών eivai δοκεΐ παράδειγμα ψευδός, 5
δτι το κατά γράμματα ιατρευεσθαι φαΰλον, άλλα 2
αιρετώτερον χρησθαι τοις έχουσι τάς τέχνας. οι
μεν γαρ ούδεν δια φιλίαν παρά τον λόγον ποιοΰσιν,
αλλ' άρνυνται τον μισθόν τους κάμνοντας i5yia-
σαντ€ς, οι δ' εν ταΐς πολιτικαΐς άρχαΐς πολλά προς
επηρειαν και χάριν είώθασι πράττειν, επει και
τους ιατρούς όταν ύποπτεύωσι πιστευθεντας 3 τοις
*ο εχθροΐς διαφθείρειν διά κέρδος, τότε την εκ των
1 rbv νουν μόνους cod. Voss. Iul. : τους νόμους cet.
2 άλλα καί eodd. plurimi.
3 πΐΐσθέντας Schneider.
° This formula came in the oath taken by the dicasts at
Athens.
6 i.e. the practical sciences, of which medicine is taken as
an example.
POLITICS, III. χι. 3-5
it is preferable for the law to rule rather than any one
of the citizens, and according to this same principle,
even if it be better for certain men to govern, they
must be appointed as guardians of the laws and in
subordination to them ; for there must be some
government, but it is clearly not just, men say, for
one person to be governor when all the citizens are
4 alike. It may be objected that any case which the
law appears to be unable to define, a human being
also would be unable to decide. But the law first
specially educates the magistrates for the purpose
and then commissions them to decide and administer
the matters that it leaves over ' according to the best
of their judgement,' α and furthermore it allows them
to introduce for themselves any amendment that ex-
perience leads them to think better than the estab-
lished code. He therefore that recommends that Law free
the law shall govern seems to recommend that God ^"ο^™ 311
and reason alone shall govern, but he that would
have man govern adds a wild animal also ; for
appetite is like a wild animal, and also passion warps
the rule even of the best men. Therefore the law
5 is wisdom without desire. And there seems to be no Physicians
truth in the analogy which argues from the arts b ^les jiuT
that it is a bad thing to doctor oneself by book, but they ar «
preferable to employ the experts in the arts. For bias. ° m
they never act contrary to principle from motives of
friendship, but earn their fee when (for instance)
they have cured their patients, whereas holders of
political office usually do many things out of spite
and to win favour ; since when people suspect even
the physicians of being in the confidence of their
enemies and of trying to make away with them for
gain, in that case they would sooner look up the treat-
κ 265
ARISTOTLE
γραμμάτων θεραπείαν ζητησαιεν αν μάλλον, αλλά 6
1287 b μην εισάγονται γ εφ εαυτούς οι Ιατροί κάμνοντας
άλλους Ιατρούς και οι παιδοτρίβαι γυμναζόμενοι
παιδοτρίβας, ώς ου δυνάμενοι κρίνειν το αληθές
δια το κρ'ινειν περί τε οικείων και εν πάθει δντες.
ώστε δήλον δτι το δίκαιον ζητοΰντες το μέσον
δ ζητοΰσιν 6 γαρ 1 νόμος το μέσον, ετι κυριώτεροι
και περί κυριωτερων των κατά γράμματα νόμων
οι κατά τά εθη βισι^, ωστ ει των κατά γράμματα
άνθρωπος άρχων ασφαλέστερος , αλλ' ου των κατά
το εθος. αλλά μην ουδέ ράδιον εφοράν πολλά τον 7
ένα δεήσει άρα πλείονας et^at τους υπ* αύτοΰ
10 καθιστάμενους άρχοντας, ώστε τί διαφέρει τοΰτο
εζ άρχης ευθύς ύπάρχειν η τον ενα καταστησαι
τούτον τον τρόπον ; ετι, δ και πρότερον είρημενον
εστίν, εΐπερ ο άνηρ ο σπουδαίος, διότι βελτίων,
άρχειν δίκαιος, του δε ενός οι δύο αγαθοί βελτίους'
τοΰτο γάρ εστί το
συν τε δυ' έρχομένω
και η εύχη του 'Αγαμέμνονος ,
16 τοιούτοι δέκα μοι συμφράδμονες.
etot δε και νυν περί ένίων αϊ άρχαι κύριαι κρίνειν,
ώσπερ 6 δικαστής, περί ων ο νόμος αδυνατεί
διορίζειν, έπει περί ων γε δυνατός, ουδείς αμφισβη-
τεί περί τούτων ώς ουκ αν άριστα ο νομός άρζειε
1 δε Thurot.
° Perhaps this should be ' and.'
6 i.e. the rules of duty and of manners that are customary
but not embodied in legislation : cf. 1319 b 40.
• Iliad x. 224 : the passage goes on και τε προ δ rod
ivo -ησεν \ δππως κέρδος it), ' then one discerneth | Before the
other how advantage lieth.' d Iliad ii. 372.
266
POLITICS, III. χι. 6-7
6 ment in the books. Yet certainly physicians them-
selves call in other physicians to treat them when
they are ill, and gymnastic trainers put themselves
under other trainers when they are doing exercises,
believing: that the ν are unable to judge trulv because Customary
j -11 law safer
they are judging about their own cases and when tnanpnvat*
they are under the influence of feeling. Hence it is judgement.
clear that when men seek for what is just they seek
for what is impartial ; for a the law is that which is
impartial. Again, customary laws b are more sovereign
and deal with more sovereign matters than written
laws, so that if a human ruler is less liable to error
than written laws, yet he is not less liable to error
7 than the laws of custom. But also it is certainly not To suppie-
easy for the single ruler to oversee a multitude of |^ w nt se verai
things ; it will therefore be necessary for the officials heads bettei
appointed by him to be numerous ; so that what
difference does it make whether this has been the
arrangement immediately from the outset or the
single ruler appoints them in this manner ? Again,
a thing that has also been said before, if the virtuous c . x. g 6 fin.
man justly deserves to rule because he is better,
yet two good men are better than one : for that is
the meaning of the line c
When two together go —
and of the prayer of Agamemnon d
May ten such fellow-councillors be mine.
And even now the magistrates, like the Athenian
dicast, have power to judge certain cases about which
the law is unable to give a clear declaration, since
nobody disputes that in matters about which it can
do so the law would be the best ruler and judge.
267
ARISTOTLE
1287 b
και κρίνειεν. αλλ' επειδή τα μεν ενδέχεται περί- 8
20 ληφθήναι τοις νόμοις τά δ' αδύνατα, ταύτ έστιν
α ποιεί διαπορεΐν και ζητεΐν πότερον τον άριστον
νομον αρχειν αιρετώτερον ή τον άνδρα τον άριστον,
περί ων γάρ βουλεύονται νομοθετήσαι των αδυ-
νάτων εστίν, ου τοινυν τοΰτό γ* άντιλέγουσιν, ως
ουκ αναγκαΐον άνθρωπον elvai τον κρινοϋντα περί
2δ τών τοιούτων, αλλ' δτι ούχ 'ένα μόνον αλλά πολλούς.
Kpivei γαρ έκαστος άρχων πεπαιδευμένος υπό του
νόμου καλώς, άτοπον δ' ΐσως αν eiWu δόξειεν ει 9
βελτιον ΐδοι 1 τις δυοΐν ομμασι και δυσιν άκοαΐς
κρίνων και πράττων 2 δυσι ποσϊ και χερσίν ή πολλοί
πολλοίς, επει και νυν οφθαλμούς πολλούς οί
so μοναρχοι ποιοΰσιν αυτών και ώτα και χείρας και
πόδας, τους γάρ τή αρχή και αύτοΐς 3 φίλους ποιούν-
ται συναρχους. μη φίλοι μεν οΰν όντες ού ποιή-
σουσι κατά την του μονάρχου προαίρεσιν ει δε
φίλοι κάκείνου και της αρχής, δ γε φίλος ΐσος και
όμοιος, ωστ ει τούτους οϊεται δεΐν άρχειν, τους
36 ίσους και ομοίους άρχειν οΐεται δεΐν ομοίως.
Α μεν ουν οι διαμφισβητούντες προς την βασι-
λείαν λεγουσι, σχεδόν ταυτ' εστίν.
Αλλ ίσως ταύτ επι μεν τινών έχει τον τρόπον 10
τούτον, επι δε τινών ούχ ούτως. εστί γάρ τι
φύσει δεσποστον και άλλο βασιλευτόν και άλλο
πολιτικόν, και δίκαιον και συμφέρον ά?ίλο άλλοις*•
40 τυραννικόν δ' ούκ εστί κατά φύσιν, ουδέ τών άλλων
1 ίχοι Susemihl.
a πράττοι Conring.
* aUTOis Mus. : αύτοΰ, αυτούς codd.
* Λλλο dXXots add. Richards.
268
POLITICS, III. χι. 8-10
8 But since, although some things can be covered by and to
the laws, other things cannot, it is the latter that colleagues
cause doubt and raise the question whether it is j^ r thaD
preferable for the best law to rule or the best man. ordinate*.
For to lay down a law about things that are subjects
for deliberation is an impossibility. Therefore men
do not deny that it must be for a human being to
judge about such matters, but they say that it ought
not to be a single human being only but a number.
For the individual official judges well when he has
9 been instructed by the law, and it would doubtless
seem curious if a person saw better when judging
with two eyes and two organs of hearing and acting
with two feet and hands than many persons with
many, since even as it is monarchs make many eyes
and ears and hands and feet their own, for they adopt
persons that are friendly to their rule and to them-
selves as their fellow-rulers. Although therefore
if these assistants are not friendly they will not act
in conformity with the monarch's policy, if they are
friends of him and of his rule, well, a friend is one's
equal and like, so that if the monarch thinks that
his friends ought to rule he thinks that people who are
equal to and like himself ought to rule like himself.
This then more or less is the case advanced by
those who argue against kingship.
10 But perhaps, although this is a true account of the ButRoyaitj
matter in some cases, it does not apply in others. For ca ses of
there is such a thing as being naturally fitted to be exceptional
ο & J excellence.
controlled by a master, and in another case, to be
governed by a king, and in another, to exercise citi-
zenship, and a different government is just and
expedient for different people ; but there is no such
thing as natural fitness for tyranny, nor for any other
269
ARISTOTLE
1287b „ „
πολιτ€ΐων οσαι παρεκρασβις eioiv, ταύτα γαρ
γιγν€ται πάρα φύσιν. αλλ έκ των €ΐρημένων
1288 a ye φανερον ώς ev μέν τοις όμοίοις καΐ ίσοι? οντ€
συμφέρον εστίν οντε δίκαιον eva κύριον etvai
πάντων, οϋτ€ μη νόμων όντων, αλλ' αυτόν ώς οντά
νόμον, οΰτε νόμων όντων, οϋτ€ αγαθόν αγαθών
oxjtc μη αγαθών μη αγαθόν, ούδ αν κατ άρ€τήν
5 άμείνων η, el μη τρόπον τινά. τις δ' ό τρόπος,
λβκτέΌν ζΐρηται δέ πως ηδη καΐ πρότ€ρον. πρώτον 11
δε διοριστέον τι το βασιλ€υτόν και τι το άριστο -
κρατικόν και τι το πολιτικόν. βασι^υτόν μέν
οΰν το τοιούτον εστί πλήθος ο πέφυκ€ φέρειν
γένος ύπ€ρέχον κατ' apeT -ην προς ηγ€μονίαν
ίο πολιτικην, άριστοκρατικόν δε 1 ο πέφυκ€ φέρ€ΐν
πλήθος άρ^σθαι δυνάμ€νον την τών έλ€υθέρων
άρχην υπό τών κατ άρ€την ηγ€μονικών προς
πολιτικην άρχην, πολιτικόν δε 2 ev ω πέφυκ€ν
eγγίveσθaι πλήθος πολ€μικόν δυνάμ€νον άρχ€σθαι
και ap^eiv κατά νόμον τον κατ* άζίαν δια-
ΐδ νέμοντα τοις €υπόροις τάς αρχάς. όταν οΰν η 12
γένος όλον η και τών άλλων eva τινά συμβη
διαφέροντα γβνέσθαι κατ' άρ€την τοσούτον ώσθ'
ύπ€ρέχ€ΐν την έκ€ΐνου της τών άλλων πάντων, τότ€
δίκαιον το γένος elvai τοΰτο βασιλικον και κύριον
πάντων και /βασιλέα τον eva τούτον. καθάπ€ρ γάρ
20 ^ίρηται πρότζρον, ου μόνον ούτως €χ€ΐ κατά το
δίκαιον ο προφέρ€ΐν ειώ#ασιι; οι τάς πολιτ€ΐας
1 δβ ed. : δέ πλήθος codd. (θ — πλήθος seel. \ r ictorius).
* δι ed. : δέ πλήθος codd. (iv φ — πολ€μικόν seel. Hercher).
The clause translated ' that — populace ' some editors
excise as a superfluous insertion.
6 They also excise ' in which — populace.'
270
POLITICS, III. χι. 10-12
of the forms of government that are divergences,
for these come about against nature. But merely
from what has been said, it is clear that among people
who are alike and equal it is neither expedient nor
just for one to be sovereign over all — neither when
there are no laws, but he himself is in the place of
law, nor when there are laws, neither when both
sovereign and subjects are good nor when both are
bad, nor yet when the sovereign is superior in
virtue, except in a certain manner. What this
manner is must be stated ; and in a way it has been
11 stated already even before. But first we must define
what constitutes fitness for royal government, what
fitness for aristocracy, and what for a republic. A
fit subject for royal government is a populace of such
a sort as to be naturally capable of producing a family
of outstanding excellence for political leadership ;
a community fit for aristocracy is one that naturally
produces a populace" capable of being governed under
the form of government fit for free men by those who
are fitted by virtue for taking the part of leaders in
constitutional government ; a republican community,
one in which there naturally grows up a military
populace b capable of being governed and of govern-
ing under a law that distributes the offices among the
12 well-to-do in accordance with merit. When there-
fore it comes about that there is either a whole family
or even some one individual that differs from the
other citizens in virtue so greatly that his virtue
exceeds that of all the others, then it is just for this
family to be the royal family or this individual king,
and sovereign over all matters. For, as has been said
before, this holds good not only in accordance with
the right that is usually brought forward by those
271
ARISTOTLE
12888 a / - ν , , , ,
κασισταντες οι τε τα? αριστοκρατικας και οι τας
όλιγαρχικάς, και πάλιν οι τάς δημοκρατικάς
{πάντες γαρ καθ* ύπεροχην άζιουσιν άλλ' ύπεροχην
ου την αυτήν), άλλα <και> Χ κατά. το πρότερον
2β λεχθέν. ούτε γαρ κτείνειν η φυγαδεΰειν ουδ' 13
οστρακιζειν δη που τον τοιούτον πρέπον εστίν,
οΰτ άξιοΰν άρχεσθαι κατά μέρος' ου γάρ πέφυκε
το μέρος ύπερεχειν του τται^τό?, τω δε τηλικαύτην
ύπερβολήν εχοντι τοΰτο συμβέβηκεν. ώστε λείπεται
μόνον το πείθεσθαι τω τοιούτω, και κύριον etrat
μη κατά μέρος τούτον αλλ' απλώς.
30 ΪΙερι μεν οδν βασίλεια?, τίνας έχει διαφοράς,
και πότερον ου συμφέρει ταΐς πόλεσιν η συμφέρει,
και τισι, και πώς, διωρίσθω τον τρόπον τούτον.
XII. Έπει δε τρεις φαμέν efrai τα? όρθάς 1
πολιτείας, τούτων δ' άναγκαΐον άρίστην είναι την
υπό τών αρίστων οίκονομουμένην , τοιαύτη δ' εστίν
86 εν η συμβέβηκεν η ένα τινά συμπάντων η γένος
όλον η πλήθος ύπερέχον efrai κατ' άρετήν, τών
μεν άρχεσθαι δυναμένων τών δ' άρχειν προς την
αίρετωτάτην ζωήν, εν δε τοις πρώτοις έδείχθη
λόγοις ότι την αύτην άναγκαΐον ανδρός άρετην
εΐναι και πολίτου της πόλεως της αρίστης, φανερόν
40 οτι τον αύτον τρόπον και διά τών αυτών άνήρ τε
γίνεται σπουδαίος και πόλιν συστήσειεν αν τις
άριστοκρατουμένην 2 η βασιλευομένην , ώστ έσται 2
1 άλλα καί ? Γ (immo Gui).).
* ζ&ριστ ή> άριστοκρατουμ.ίνην Buecheler.
i.e. the right of merit, c. viii. § 7.
» Bk. III. cc. ii., iii.
c Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give ' establish a
272
POLITICS, III. χι. 12— xii. 2
who are founding aristocratic and oligarchic con-
stitutions, and from the other side by those who are
founding democratic ones (for they all make their
claim on the ground of superiority, though not the
same superiority), but it also holds good in accordance
13 with the right spoken of before." For it is not seemly
to put to death or banish, nor yet obviously to ostra-
cize, such a man, nor is it seemly to call upon him
to take his turn as a subj ect ; for it is not in the order
of nature for the part to overtop the whole, but the
man that is so exceptionally outstanding has come
to overtop the whole community. Hence it only
remains for the community to obey such a man, and
for him to be sovereign not in turn but absolutely.
Let this be our answer to the questions as regards
kingship, what are its varieties, and whether it is
disadvantageous for states or advantageous, and for
what states, and under what conditions.
1 XII. And since we pronounce the right constitutions Recapitui»
to be three, and of these the one governed by the best tlon *
men must necessarily be the best, and such is the
one in which it has come about either that some one
man or a whole family or a group of men is superior
in virtue to all the citizens together, the latter being
able to be governed and the former to govern on the
principles of the most desirable life, and since in the
first part of the discourse b it was proved that the virtue
of a man and that of a citizen in the best state must
of necessity be the same, it is evident that a man
becomes good in the same way and by the same
means as one might establish an aristocratically or
2 monarchically governed state, 6 so that it will be
state governed in the best way by an aristocracy or a
monarchy.'
273
ARISTOTLE
1288 b και παιδεία και ϋθη ταύτα σχεδόν τα ποιοΰντα
σπουδαΐον άνδρα καϊ τά ποιοΰντα πολιτικον και
βασιλικόν.
Αιωρισμένων δε τούτων περί της πολιτείας ηδη
π€ΐρατ€ον λ4γ€ΐν της αρίστης, τίνα πεφυκβ yivzoftai
6 τρόπον και καθίστασθαι πώς. [ανάγκη οη τον
μέλλοντα περί αντης ποιησασθαι την προσήκουσαν
σκέφιν. . . , 1 ]
1 partem exordii libri VII. admodum uariatam hue trans-
tulerunt codd.
° The concluding sentence, by whomever written, clearly
leads on to the Book that is No. VII. in the mss. and in
this edition ; and after it the mss. add half the first sentence of
that Book, slightly altered. Some editors therefore transfer
Books VII. and VIII. here and put Books IV., V. and VI.
after them ; opinions vary as to the proper order of Books IV.,
V. and VI. among themselves.
274
POLITICS, III. xii. 2
almost the same education and habits that make a
man good and that make him capable as a citizen
or a king.
These conclusions having been laid down, we must
now endeavour to discuss the best form of constitu-
tion and to say in what way it is natural for it to come
into existence and how it is natural for it to be
organized.
Additional Notts
III. ii. 3, 1276 b 38. If we emend the text with Bernays
to ei yap δυνατόν έξ απάντων σπουδαίων δντων ΐΐναι πόλιν,
the sense is : assuming the possibility of a perfect state,
with all its factors the best of their kind, this means
that all the population will be good citizens, not that they
will all be perfect specimens of the human race, because the
state needs citizens of the working classes, etc., and these
cannot in the nature of things be perfect human beings.
III. iii. 1, 1277 b 38 οντος yap πολίτης. The translation
takes πολίτης as subject and ovtos as predicate (meaning Ζχων
την τοιαίτην άρ(τήν, possessing capacity to govern). But
possibly the predicate is πολίτης and the subject ovtos, which
then stands for ό βάκαυσοϊ ; if so, the whole sentence means
that if the non-official classes are citizens, not all the citizens
will possess civic virtue (which is capacity to govern), for
the working-man will be a citizen (and he is not capable of
governing).
275
1288 b
ίο Ι. Εν άττάσαις ταί? τβχναις και ταΐς επιστήμαις 1
ταΐς μη κατά μόριον γινομεναις άλλα περί γένος
εν τι τελείαις οϋσαις, μιας εστί θεωρήσαι το περί
εκαστον γένος 1 άρμόττον , οίον άσκησις σώματι
ποια τ€ ποιώ συμφέρει και τις αρίστη (τω γαρ
κάλλιστα πεφυκότι και κεχορηγημενω την άρίστην
15 άναγκαΐον άρμόττειν) , και τίς τοις πλείστοις μία
πάσιν (και γαρ τούτο της γυμναστικής εστίν), έτι
δ' εάν τι? μη της ίκνουμένης έπιθυμη μήθ* έζεως
μητ επιστήμης των περί την άγωνίαν, μηδέν 2
ήττον του παιδοτρίβου και του γυμναστικού παρα-
σκευάσαι ye 3 και ταύτην εστί την ούναμιν ομοίως 2
20 δε τούτο και περί Ιατρικην και περί ναυπηγίαν και
έσθήτα και περί πάσαν άλλην τέγνην όρώμεν συμ-
βαίνον, ώστε δήλον δτι και πολιτειαν της αύτης
εστίν επιστήμης την άριστην θεωρήσαι τίς έστι
και ποία τις αν ούσα μάλιστ' ειη κατ' εύχήν μηδε-
νός έμποδίζοντος των εκτός, και τίς τίσιν άρμότ-
1 ytvos seel. Spengel.
* ούδίν Bk 2 (μηδέν ήττον cum praecedentibus Immisch, tr.
infra post δύναμιν Richards).
3 ye Coraes (tr. supra, τον ye παιδοτρίβον Richards) : recodd.
° Transposed as Book VI. by some editors : see p. 274 n.
6 Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give ' to each
individual.'
276
BOOK IV
1 I. In all the arts and the sciences that are not
merely sectional but that in relation to some one existis-o
class of subject are complete, it is the function of a Co * STITD -
single art or science to study what is suited to each
class, 6 for instance what sort of gymnastic exercise Science
is beneficial for what sort of bodily frame, and what only q) the
is the best sort (for the best must naturally suit the i( } eal J> nt t
person ot the finest natural endowment and equip- best under
ment), and also what one exercise taken by all is the conditions
best for the largest number (for this is also a ques- of character
tion for gymnastic science), and in addition, in case resources ot
someone desires a habit of body and a knowledge < 4 > th ?. b ?f t
of athletic exercises that are not the ones adapted to on the
him. it is clearly the task of the trainer and gymnastic avera s 9 -
master to produce this capacity c also just as much ;
2 and we notice this also happening similarly in regard
to medicine, and ship-building, and the making of
clothes, and every other craft. Hence it is clear
that in the case of the constitution as well it is the
(1) business of the same science to stud ν which is the
best constitution and what character it must have to
be the most ideal if no external circumstance stands
(2) in the way, and what constitution is adapted to what
■ i.e. a bodily bearing and athletic skill that are not the
ones most suited to the pupil's particular physique.
277
ARISTOTLE
1288 b
25 τουσα (πολλοίς γαρ της αρίστης τυχεΐν ίσως
αδύνατον, ώστ€ την κρατίστην τ€ απλώς καΐ την
εκ των υποκειμένων άρίστην ου δει λεληθεναι τον
νομοθετην και τον ως αληθώς πολιτικόν), ετι δε
τρ'ιτην την εξ υποθέσεως (δει γαρ και την δοθεΐσαν
δι^ασ^αι θεωρεΐν, εξ αρχής τε πώς αν γένοιτο και
80 γενομένη too. τρόπον αν σωζοιτο πλείστον χρόνον
λέγω δ' οίον ει τινΊ πάλει συμβεβηκε μήτε την
άρίστην πολιτευεσθαι πολιτείαν άχορηγητόν τε
efrai /cat τών αναγκαίων, μήτε την ενδεχομενην εκ
τών υπαρχόντων, αλλά rira φαυλοτέραν) ' παρά 3
πάντα δε ταύτα την μάλιστα πάσαι? ταί? πόλεσιν
85 άρμόττουσαν δει γνωρίζειν, ως οι πλείστοι τών
αποφαινομένων περί πολιτείας, και ει τάλλα λεγουσι
καλώς, τών γε χρησίμων διαμαρτάνουσιν . ου γαρ
μόνον την άρίστην δει θεωρεΐν, άλλα και την
δυνατην, ομοίως δε και την ράω και κοινοτεραν
άττάσαι?. νυν δ' οι μεν την άκροτάτην και δεο-
40 μενην πολλής χορηγίας ζητοΰσι μόνον οι δε μάλ-
λον κοινην τίνα λέγοντες τάς υπάρχουσας arai-
1289 a ροϋντες πολιτείας την Αακωνικην η τίνα άλλην
επαινοΰσιν χρη δε τοιαύτην είσηγεΐσθαι τάξιν 4
ής 1 ρα,δίως εκ τών υπαρχόντων 2 και πεισθησονται
και δυνήσονται κοινωνεΐν, 3 ως εστίν ουκ ελαττον
έργον το επανορθώσαι πολιτείαν η κατασκευάζειν
1 fjs ed. : ήν codd.
* υπαρχόντων Wilamowitz : ύπαρχουσών codd.
3 KLVfh MP 1 .
The fourfold classification given just before is repeated
in rather loose terms in this sentence.
b The word originally denoted the duty of the wealthy
citizen holding the office of Choregus to supply dresses, etc.,
for the chorus and actors in a drama.
278
POLITICS, IV. ι. 2-4
people (since for many it is doubtless impossible to
attain the best one, so that the good lawgiver and
the true statesman must be acquainted with both
the form of constitution that is the highest absolutely
and that which is best under assumed conditions),
(3) and also thirdly the form of constitution based on a
certain supposition (for he must be also capable
of considering both how some given constitution
could be brought into existence originally and also
in what way having been brought into existence it
could be preserved for the longest time : I mean for
example if it has befallen some state not only not
to possess the best constitution and to be unprovided
even with the things necessary for it, but also not to
have the constitution that is practicable under the
3 circumstances but an inferior one) ; and beside all
( 4 ) these matters he must ascertain the form of con-
stitution most suited to all states, since most of those
who make pronouncements about the constitution,
even if the rest of what they say is good, entirely
miss the points of practical utility. For it is proper
(1) to consider ° not only what is the best constitution but
(3) also what is the one possible of achievement, and
(2) likewise also what is the one that is easier and more
(4) generally shared by all states. But as it is, some
students inquire which is the highest form of all
even though requiring much material equipment , b
while those who rather state some general form
sweep aside the constitutions actually existing and
4 praise that of Sparta or some other ; but the proper
course is to bring forward an organization of such a
sort that men will easily be persuaded and be able
in the existing circumstances to take part in it, since
to reform a constitution is no less a task than to frame
279
ARISTOTLE
5 εζ αρχής, ώσπερ και το μεταμανθάνειν του μαν-
θάνειν εζ αρχής• διό προς τοις είρημενοις καΐ ταΓ?
ύπαρχούσαις πολιτείαις δει δύνασθαι βοηθεΐν τον
πολιτικόν, καθάπερ ελέχθη και πρότερον. τοΰτο
δε αδυνάτου άγνοοΰντα πόσα πολιτείας εστίν εΐδη'
νυν δε μίαν δημοκρατιαν οΐονταί τίνες είναι και
ίο μίαν όλιγαρχίαν, ουκ εστί δε τοΰτ αληθές, ώστε 5
δει τάς διαφοράς μη λανθάνειν τάς των πολιτειών,
πόσαι, και συντίθενται ποσαχώς. μετά δε ταύτα 1
τής αυτής φρονήσεως ταύτης και νόμους τους
αρίστους ίδεΐν και τους εκάστη των πολιτειών
άρμόττοντας . προς γάρ τάς πολιτείας τους νόμους
δει τίθεσθαι και τίθενται πάντες, αλλ' ου τάς πο-
15 λιτείας προς τους νόμους• πολιτεία μεν γάρ εστί
τάξις ταί? πόλεσιν ή περί τάς αρχάς, τίνα τρόπον
νενεμηνται, καΐ τι το κυριον τής πολιτείας και τί
το τέλος εκάστης τής κοινωνίας εστίν, νόμοι δέ
κεχωρισμενοι τών δηλούντων την πολιτείαν, καθ*
ους δεϊ τους άρχοντας άρχειν και φυλάττειν τους
20 παραβαίνοντας αυτούς, ώστε δήλον οτι τάς δια- 6
φοράς άναγκαΐον και τον αριθμόν εχειν τής πολι-
τείας εκάστης και προς τάς τών νόμων θέσεις•
ού γάρ οΐόν τε τους αυτούς νόμους συμφερειν ταΐς
όλιγαρχίαις ούδε ταί? δημοκρατιαις πάσαι?, εϊπερ
δη πλείους 2 και μη μία δημοκρατία μηδέ ολιγαρχία
25 μόνον εστίν.
II. Έίτει δ' εν τή πρώτη μεθόδω περί τών πολι- 1
τειών διειλοαεθα τρεις μεν τάς όρθάς πολιτείας,
1 uera δέ ταΰτα anon, apud Stahr : μετά. δέ codd.
2 πλβίω codd. cet. (eiwep είδη πλείω Spengel).
° Book III. c. v.
280
POLITICS, IV. ι. 4— ii. 1
one from the beginning, just as to re-learn a science
is just as hard as to learn it originally ; in addition
therefore to the things mentioned the student of
politics must also be able to render aid to the con-
stitutions that exist already, as was also said before. §3 *A»i 3 •
But this is impossible if he does not know how many
kinds of constitution there are ; but at present some
people think that there is only one kind of democracy
δ and one kind of oligarchy, but this is not true. Hence
he must take in view the different varieties of the
constitutions, and know how many there are and
how many are their combinations. And after this
it needs this same discrimination also to discern the
laws that are the best, and those that are suited to
each of the forms of constitution. For the laws
should be laid down, and all people lay them down,
to suit the constitutions — the constitutions must not
be made to suit the laws ; for a constitution is the
regulation of the offices of the state in regard to the
mode of their distribution and to the question what
is the sovereign power in the state and what is the
object of each community, but laws are distinct
from the principles of the constitution, and regulate
how the magistrates are to govern and to guard
6 against those who transgress them. So that clearly
it is necessary to be in possession of the different
varieties of each form of constitution, and the
number of these, even for the purpose of legisla-
tion ; for it is impossible for the same laws to be
expedient for all oligarchies or democracies if there
are really several kinds of them, and not one sort
of democracy or oligarchy only.
1 II. And inasmuch as in our first inquiry" about contents of
the forms of the constitution we classified the right ^°°yj ιν •>
281
ARISTOTLE
1289 a
βασιλΐίαν άριστοκρατίαν πολιτείαν, τρεις δε τάς
τούτων παρεκβάσεις, τυραννίδα μεν βασίλεια?
go όλιγαρχίαν δε αριστοκρατίας δημοκρατίαν δε
πολιτείας, και περί μεν αριστοκρατίας και βασί-
λεια? εΐρηται (το γαρ περί της αρίστης πολιτείας
θεωρησαι ταντό και περί τούτων εστίν ειπείν των
ονομάτων, βούλεται γαρ εκατερα κατ αρετην
σννεστάναι κεχορηγημενην) , ετι δέ τι διαφέρονσιν
85 αλλήλων αριστοκρατία και βασίλεια και πότε δει
/?ασιλειαν νομίζειν διώρισται πρότερον, λοιπόν
περί πολιτείας διελθεΐν της τω κοινώ προσ-
αγορευομενης ονόματι, και περί των άλλων πολι-
τειών, ολιγαρχίας τε και δημοκρατίας και τυραν-
νίδος. φανερόν μεν οΰν και τούτων των παρεκ- 2
βάσεων τις χειρίστη και δευτέρα τις. ανάγκη
40 γαρ την μεν της πρώτης και θειοτάτης παρεκβασιν
είναι χειρίστην, την δε /?ασιλειαν άναγκαΐον η
1289 b τούνομα μόνον εχειν ουκ ουσαν η διά πολλην
ύπεροχην είναι την του βασιλεύοντος' ώστε την
τυραννίδα χειρίστην ουσαν πλείστον άπεχειν πολι-
τείας, δεύτερον δε την όλιγαρχίαν (η γαρ αριστο-
κρατία διεστηκεν από ταύτης πολύ της πολιτείας) ,
δ μετριωτάτην δε την δημοκρατίαν. ηδη μεν ουν 3
τις άπεφηνατο και τών πρότερον ούτως, ου μην
εις ταύτό βλεψας ήμΐν εκείνος μεν γαρ έκρινε
πασών μεν ούσών επιεικών, οίον ολιγαρχίας τε
α i.e. 7roXtreia, ' polity,' which denotes not only a constitu-
tion of any form, but also (like our term 'constitutional
government') a particular form, viz., a republic, cf. Bk. III.
c. v. § 2.
b The three forms of constitution last mentioned.
* Corruptio optimi pessima, a Socratic notion: 'the men
282
POLITICS, IV. ii. 1-3
constitutions as three, kingship, aristocracy and f<?ur con-
constitutional government, and the deviations from remain to be
these as three, tyranny from kingship, oligarchy from discussed.
aristocracy and democracy from constitutional govern-
ment, and about aristocracv and kingship we have
spoken (for to study the best constitution is the same Book in.
thing as to speak about the forms that bear those cc ' 1X- ' XU "
names, since each of them means a system based on
the qualification of virtue equipped with means),
and as also the question what constitutes the differ-
ence between aristocracy and kingship and when a
royal government is to be adopted has been de-
cided before, it remains to discuss the form of con- in. xi. 2.
stitution designated by the name α common to them
all, and the other forms, oligarchy, democracy and
2 tyranny. Now it is manifest also which of these Their order
deviations b is the worst and which the second worst. ° merl
For necessarily the deviation from the first and most
divine must be the worst, c and kingship must of
necessity either possess the name only, without
really being kingship, or be based on the outstanding
superiority of the man who is king ; so that tyranny
being the worst form must be the one farthest
removed from constitutional government, and olig-
archy must be the second farthest (for aristocracy
is widely separated from that constitution), while
3 democracy must be the most moderate. An account
of their relative merits has indeed already been
given also by one of the former writers , d though not
on the same principle as ours ; for he inclined to
judge that there were good varieties of all the forms,
of the best natural gifts, when uneducated, are the worst,'
Xen. Mem. to, 1. 3.
* Plato, Politicua 302 a ff.
283
ARISTOTLE
1389 b
χρήστης και τών άλλων, χειρίστην δημοκρατίαν,
φαύλων δέ άρίστην, ημείς δέ όλως ταύτας εζημαρτη- 4
ίο μένας είναι φαμεν, καΐ βελτίω μέν όλιγαρχίαν άλλην
άλλης ου καλώς εχειν 1 λέγειν, ήττον δέ φαύλην.
άλλα περί μεν της τοιαύτης κρίσεως άφείσθω
τά νυν ημΐν δέ πρώτον μεν διαιρετεον πόσαι δια-
φοραι τών πολιτειών, εΐπερ εστίν εΐδη πλείονα της
τε δημοκρατίας και της ολιγαρχίας, έπειτα τις
ΐδ κοινότατη, και τις αίρετωτάτη μετά την άρίστην
πολιτείαν , καν ει τις αλλτ/ τετύχηκεν αριστοκρατική
και συνεστώσα καλώς, αλλ' ου 2 τοις πλείσταις άρ-
μόττουσα πόλεσι, τις εστίν, έπειτα και τών άλλων 5
τις τίσιν αιρετή (τάχα γαρ τοΐς μεν αναγκαία δημο-
κρατία μάλλον ολιγαρχίας, τοΐς δ' αύτη μάλλον
20 εκείνης), μετά δέ ταύτα TiVa τρόπον δει καθιστάναι
τον βουλόμενον ταύτας τάς πολιτείας, λέγω δε
δημοκρατίας τε καθ* εκαστον είδος και πάλιν ολιγ-
αρχίας, τέλος δε, πάντων τούτων όταν ποιησώμεθα
συντόμως την ενδεχομενην uveia.l•', πειρατεον επ-
ελθεΐν τίνες φθοραι και τίνες σωτηρίαι τών πολι-
25 retail' και κοινή και χωρίς εκάστης, και διά τίνας
αιτίας ταύτα μάλιστα ytVea^at πεφυκεν.
III. Του μεν ούν eivcu πλείους πολιτείας αίτιον 1
οτι πάσης εστί μέρη πλείω πόλεως τον αριθμόν,
πρώτον μεν γάρ εζ οικιών συγκειμενας πάσας
ίο όρώμεν τάς πόλεις, έπειτα πάλιν τούτου τοΰ
πλήθους τους μεν εύπορους άναγκαΐον είναι τους
1 Richards : ?χει codd. * ού add. Coraes (cf. 1295 a 31 ff.).
284
POLITICS, IV. π. 3— in. 1
for instance a good sort of oligarchy and so on. and
that democracy was the worst among these, but the
4 best among the bad varieties, whereas we say that
the deviations are wholly wrong, and that it is not
right to speak of one form of oligarchy as better than
another, but only as less bad. But let us for the
present dismiss the question of a classification of this
nature. Our business is first to distinguish how many Contents
different forms of the constitutions there are, assum- iv. r v., vi.
ing that there do exist several kinds of democracy
and of oligarchy ; next, which form is most general, iv. hl-tBI
and which most desirable after the best constitution, n ■ 1X •
and also if there exists some other form that is
aristocratic in nature and well constructed but not
fitted to the largest number of cities, which this
5 is ; next, which of the other forms too is desirable
for what people (since probably for some democracy IV - «-Ά
is necessary more than oligarchy, and for others
oligarchy more than democracy) ; and after this,
in what way should one proceed who wishes to set Book v •
up these constitutions, I mean the various forms of
democracy and of oligarchy ; and finally, when as
far as possible we have concisely touched upon all
these questions, we must endeavour to review what
are the agencies that destroy and what are those
that preserve constitutions generally and each variety
of constitution in particular, and what are the causes
by which it is most natural for these events to be
brought about.
1 III. Now the reason of there being several forms
of constitution is that every citv has a considerable 9 0nstit,1 *
/• -r• • ι η " l• tions vary
number ot parts, ror in the first place we see that in their
all the cities are composed of households, and then Grower by
again that of this multitude some must necessarily rank and
& J wealth.
285
ARISTOTLE
1289 b λ, , / \ ο. \ / \~ >/ λ \
ο άπορους τους οε μέσους, και των ευπόρων οε
καΐ των απόρων το μεν όπλιτικον το δε άνοπλον.
και τον μεν γεωργικόν δημον όρώμεν οντά, τον δ'
άγοραΐον, τον δε βάναυσον. και των γνωρίμων
είσι διαφοραι και κατά τον πλοΰτον καί τα. μεγέθη
35 της ουσίας (οίον ιπποτροφίας, τοΰτο γαρ ου
ράδιον μη πλουτοΰντας ποιεΐν διόπερ επι των 2
αρχαίων χρόνων δσαι? πόλεσιν εν τοΐς ιπποις η
δύναμις ην, όλιγαρχίαι παρά τούτοις ήσαν εχρώντο
δε προς τους πολέμους 1 ϊπποις προς 2 τους άστυ-
γείτονας, οίον 'Έ,ρετριεΐς καί Χαλκιδεί? και
40 Μαγνήτες οι επι Μαιά^δρω καϊ των άλλων πολλοί
περί την Άσιαν). ετι προς ταΐς κατά πλοΰτον δια-
1290 a φοραΐς εστίν η μεν κατά γένος η δε κατ' άρετήν,
καν ει τι δη τοιούτον έτερον εΐρηται πόλεως είναι
μέρος εν τοΐς περί την άριστοκρατιαν {εκεί γαρ
8ιειλόμεθα εκ πόσων μερών αναγκαίων εστί πάσα
πόλις)' τούτων γάρ των μερών ότε μεν πάντα μετ-
5 €χει της πολιτείας ότε δ' ελάττω ότε δε πλείω.
φανερόν τοίνυν ότι πλείους άναγκαΐον eirai πολι- 3
τείας εΐδει διαφέρουσας αλλήλων και γάρ ταΰτ
εΐδει διαφέρει τά μέρη σφών αυτών, πολιτεία μεν
γάρ η τών αρχών τάξις εστί, ταύτας* δε διανέμον-
ται πάντες η κατά την δυ^α^ιν τών μετεχόντων η
ίο κατά τιν αυτών ισότητα κοινην, λέγω δ' οίον τών
απόρων η τών ευπόρων η κοινην τιν* άμφοΐν.*
άναγκαΐον άρα πολιτείας cuou τοσαύτας οσαι περ
1 πολέμους Γ (cf. 1330 a 18) : πολίμίους codd.
2 [irpbs] Immisch (cf. ibid.).
3 Pilchards : ταύτην codd. * [τ) — άμφοΐν] Ramus.
This clause looks like an interpolation.
286
POLITICS, IV. in. 1-3
be rich and some poor and some between the two,
and also of the rich and the poor the former class is
heavy-armed and the latter without armour. And
we see that one portion of the common people is
agricultural, another engaged in trade and another
mechanic. And the upper classes have distinctions
also corresponding to their wealth and the amounts
of their property (for example in a stud of horses —
for it is not easy to rear horses without being rich,
2 and this is why in ancient times there were oligarchies
in all the states whose strength lay in their cavalry,
and they used to use horses for their wars against
their neighbours, as for instance did the Eretrians 1306 a sb.
and Chalcidians and the people of Magnesia on the
Maeander and many of the other Asiatic peoples).
Moreover in addition to diiferences in wealth there is
the difference of birth, and that in regard to virtue,
and indeed any other similar distinction that in the
discussion of aristocracy has been stated to constitute
a part of the state (for there we distinguished how
many necessary parts there are of which every state
must consist) ; for sometimes all of these parts parti-
cipate in the constitution and sometimes a smaller or
3 a larger number of them. It is clear therefore that
there must necessarily be several forms of constitu-
tion differing in kind from one another, inasmuch as
these parts differ in kind among themselves. For a
constitution means the arrangement of the magistra-
cies, and these all people distribute either according
to the power of those who share political rights, or
according to some common equality between them,
I mean for example between the poor or between the
rich, or some equality common to them both." It
follows therefore that there are as many forms of
287
ARISTOTLE
1290 a ,. , , , , , ,
τάξεις κατά τας υπεροχας εισι και κατά τας δια-
φοράς των μορίων, μάλιστα δε δοκοΰσιν είναι δύο, 4
καθάπερ επι των πνευμάτων λέγεται τά μεν βόρεια
35 τα δε νοτιά, τά δ άλλα τούτων παρεκβάσεις, ούτω
και των πολιτειών δυο, δήμος και ολιγαρχία• την
γαρ αριστοκρατίαν της ολιγαρχίας είδος τιθεασιν
ως οΰσαν όλιγαρχίαν τιι^ά, και την καλουμενην
πολιτείαν δημοκρατίαν, 1 ώσπερ εν τοις 7π/6υ/Αασι
τον μεν ζεφυρον του βορεου, του δε νότου τον
20 ευρον. ομοίως δ' έχει και περί τάς αρμονίας, ως
φασί τίνες• και γάρ εκεί τίθενται είδη δυο, την
δωριστι και την φρυγιστί, τά δε άλλα συντάγματα
τα μεν Δώρια τά δε Φρυγία καλοϋσιν. μάλιστα μεν δ
ούν ειώθασιν ούτως ύπολαμβάνειν περί των πολι-
τειών άληθεστερον δε και βελτιον ως ημείς διείλο-
25 μεν, δυοΐν η jLttas* ούσης της καλώς συνεστηκυίας
τας άλλας είναι παρεκβάσεις, τάς μεν της ευ κε-
κραμενης [αρμονίας] 2 τάς δε της αρίστης πολιτείας,
ολιγαρχικάς μεν τάς συντονωτερας και δεσποτικω-
τερας τα? δ άνειμενας και μαλάκας δημοτικάς.
80 Ου δει δε τιθεναι δημοκρατίαν, καθάπερ είώθασί 6
τίνες νυν, απλώς ούτως, οπού κύριον το πλήθος
(και γαρ εν ταΐς όλιγαρχίαις και πανταχού το
πλέον μέρος κύριον), oύδ , όλιγαρχίαν οπού κύριοι
ολίγοι της πολιτείας. ει γάρ εΐησαν οι πάντες
«5 χίλιοι και τριακόσιοι, και τούτων οι χίλιοι πλούσιοι,
1 δημοκρατία? Richards : <tt;s> δημ. ? ed.
2 αρμονίας seel. Immisch.
" Aristotle refers to this view in Meteorologica 364 a 19,
saying that west winds are classed with north and east winds
with south, because wind from the setting sun is cooler and
from the rising sun warmer. He notes that north and south
288
POLITICS, IV. πι. 3-6
constitution as there are modes of arrangement
according to the superiorities and the differences of
■4 the sections. But the forms mostly are thought to be Usual
two — just as in the case of the winds we speak of some t ion
as north and some as south and regard the rest as criticized,
deviations from these. so also of constitutions there
are held to be two forms, democracy and oligarchy ;
for men reckon aristocracy as a kind of oligarchy
because it is oligarchy of a sort, and what is called
constitutional government as democracy, just as in
the case of the winds they reckon the west Mind
as a kind of north wind and the east wind as a
kind of south wind. And the case is similar with
musical modes, as some people say : for there too they
posit two kinds, the Dorian mode and the Phrygian,
and call the other scales some of them Dorian
5 and the others Phrygian. For the most part there-
fore they are accustomed to think in this way about
the constitutions ; but it is truer and better to class
them as we did, and assuming that there are two well- c. u.
constructed forms, or else one, to say that the others
are deviations, some from the well-blended constitu-
tion and the others from the best one, the more tense
and masterful constitutions being oligarchic and the
relaxed and soft ones demotic.
6 But it is not right to define democracy, as some Democracy
people are in the custom of doing now, merely as the oligarchy
constitution in which the multitude is sovereign (for defined,
even in oligarchies and everywhere the majority is
sovereign) nor oligarchy as the constitution in which
a few are sovereign over the government. For if the
whole number were thirteen hundred, and a thousand
winds are the most frequent, ιό. 361 a 6 ; this may have sug-
gested the idea that they were the typical winds.
289
ARISTOTLE
1290 a κ \ ο. p. ~ > Λ „ / <
/cat μη μεταοιοοιεν αρχής τοις τριακόσιους και
πενησιν ελευθεροις ουσι και τάλλα όμοίοις, ούθεις
αν φαίη δημοκρατεΐσθαι τούτους• ομοίως δε και
€ΐ πένητες μεν ολίγοι εΐεν, κρείττους δε των
ευπόρων πλειόνων όντων, ουδείς αν όλιγαρχίαν
προσαγορεύσειεν ούδε την τοιαύτην ει τοις άλλοι? 1
40 ουσι πλουσίοις μη μετείη των τι/χών. μάλλον 7
1290 b τοίνυν λεκτεον ότι δήμος μεν εστίν όταν οι ελεύ-
θεροι κύριοι ώσιν ολιγαρχία δ' όταν οι πλούσιοι,
άλλα συμβαίνει τους μεν πολλούς eirai τους δ'
ολίγους, ελεύθεροι μεν γαρ πολλοί πλούσιοι δ
ολίγοι, και γαρ αν ει κατά μέγεθος διενεμοντο
5 τα? αρχάς, ώσπερ εν Κιθιοπία φασι τίνες, 2 η κατά
κάλλος, ολιγαρχία ην αν, ολίγον γαρ το πλήθος
και το των καλών και το των μεγάλων, ου μην 8
άλλ' ούδε τούτοις μόνον ικανώς έχει διωρίσθαι
τάς πολιτείας ταύτας' αλλ' επει πλείονα μόρια
και του δήμου και τής ολιγαρχίας είσίν, ετι δια-
ιο ληπτεον ως οΰτ* αν οι ελεύθεροι ολίγοι όντες
πλειόνων και μη ελευθέρων άρχωσι δήμος, οίον
εν ' Απολλωνία τή εν τω Ίονίω και εν θήρα (εν τού-
των γάρ εκατερα των πόλεων εν ταΐς τι/χαί? ήσαν
οι διαφέροντες κατ' εύγενειαν και πρώτοι κατα-
σχόντες τάς αποικίας, ολίγοι όντες πολλών) , ουτ αν
15 οι πλούσιοι διά το κατά πλήθος ύπερέχειν, δήμος, 3
οίον εν Κ,ολοφώνι το παλαιό^ (εκεί γάρ εκεκτηντο
μακράν ούσίαν ol πλείους πριν yevea^ai τον πο-
1 πολλοίς Richards. 2 tools ? Susemihl.
8 ολιγαρχία Bojesen.
α e.g. Herodotus iii. 20.
* i.e. those of citizen birth.
290
POLITICS, IV. in. fr-8
of these were rich and did not give the three hundred
poor a share in the government although they were
free-born and like themselves in all other respects,
no one would say that this people was governed
democratically ; and similarly also if there were few
poor, but these more powerful than the rich who were
more numerous, no one would call such a government
a democracy either, if the other citizens being rich
7 had no share in the honours. Rather therefore ought
we to say that it is a democracy when the free are
sovereign and an oligarchy when the rich are, but
that it comes about that the sovereign class in a
democracy is numerous and that in an oligarchy
small because there are many men of free birth and
few rich. For otherwise, suppose people assigned
the offices by height, as some persons a say is done in
Ethiopia, or by beauty, that would be an oligarchy,
because both the handsome and the tall are few in
8 number. Nevertheless it is not enough to define
these constitutions even by wealth and free birth
only ; but inasmuch as there are more elements than
one both in democracy and in oligarchy, we must add
the further distinction that neither is it a democracy
if the free b being few govern the majority who are
not of free birth, as for instance at Apollonia on the
Ionian Gulf and at Thera (for in each of these cities
the offices of honour were filled by the specially
noble families who had been the first settlers of the
colonies, and these were few out of many), nor is it
a democracy c if the rich rule because they are in a
majority, as in ancient times at Colophon (for there
the majority of the population owned large property
c Perhaps the Greek should be altered here to give ' an
oligarchy.'
291
ARISTOTLE
1290 b
λεμον τον προς Αυδούς), άλλ' Ιστι δημοκρατία
μεν όταν οι ελεύθεροι και άποροι πλείους οντες
κύριοι της αρχής ώσιν, ολιγαρχία δ όταν οι
20 πλούσιοι και ευγενέστεροι ολίγοι οντες.
"Οτι μεν οΰν πολιτεΐαι πλείους, και δι' ην αίτιας, 9
εϊρηται- διότι δε πλείους των είρη μένων, και Tires'
και διά τι, λεγωμεν αρχήν λαβόντες την είρημενην
πρότερον. όμολογοΰμεν γαρ ούχ εν μέρος άλλα
2S πλείω πάσαν εχειν πάλιν, ώσπερ οΰν ει ζώου
προηρουμεθα λαβείν ε'ίδη, πρώτον αν άποδιωρι-
ζομεν όπερ άναγκαΐον παν εχειν ζώον (οίον ενιά
τε των αισθητηρίων και το της τροφής εργαστικον
και δεκτικόν, οίον στόμα και κοιλίαν, προς δε
τούτοις, οΐς κινείται μορίοις εκαστον αυτών), ει 10
30 δε 1 τοσαΰτα εΐη* μόνον, τούτων δ' εΐεν διαφοραι
(λέγω δ' οίον στόματος τίνα πλείω γένη και κοιλίας
και τών αισθητηρίων, ετι δε και τών κινητικών
μορίων), ο τής συζεύζεως τής τούτων αριθμός εζ
ανάγκης ποιήσει πλείω γένη ζώων (ου γαρ οΐόν
τε ταύτόν ζώον εχειν πλείους στόματος διαφοράς,
35 ομοίως δε ούδ ώτων), ώσθ όταν- ληφθώσι τούτων
πάντες οι ενδεχόμενοι συνδυασμοί ποιήσουσιν εΐδη
ζώου, και τοσαυτ ε'ίδη του ζώου όσαιπερ αϊ
συζεύξεις τών αναγκαίων μορίων είσίν — τον αυτόν 11
δη 3 τρόπον και τών είρημενων πολιτειών, και γαρ
αϊ πόλεις ουκ εζ ενός αλλ' εκ πολλών σύγκεινται
1 δέ Thurot : δη aut δβϊ codd.
a ΐίη Newman : εΐδη codd. 3 δη Coraes : δέ codd.
See § 1.
292
POLITICS, IV. πι. &-11
before the war against the Lydians took place), but
it is a democracy when those who are free are in the
majority and have sovereignty over the government,
and an oligarchy when the rich and more well born
are few and sovereign.
9 It has then been stated that there are several forms Eight
of constitution, and what is the cause of this ; but ^ s ^ s (not
let us take the starting-point that was laid down Plato)
before α and say that there are more forms than those thes^te.
mentioned, and what these forms are, and why they
vary. For we agree that every state possesses not
one part but several. Therefore just as, in case we
intended to obtain a classification of animals, we
should first define the properties necessarily belonging
to every animal (for instance some of the sense-
organs, and the machinery for masticating and for
receiving food, such as a mouth and a stomach,
and in addition to these the locomotive organs of
10 the various species), and if there were only so many
necessary parts, but there were different varieties
of these (I mean for instance certain various kinds
of mouth and stomach and sensory organs, and also
of the locomotive parts as well), the number of poss-
ible combinations of these variations will necessarily
produce a variety of kinds of animals (for it is not
possible for the same animal to have several different
sorts of mouth, nor similarly of ears either), so that
when all the possible combinations of these are taken
they will all produce animal species, and there will
be as many species of the animal as there are com-
11 binations of the necessary parts : — so in the same
way also we shall classify the varieties of the con-
stitutions that have been mentioned. For states
also are composed not of one but of several parts, as
293
ARISTOTLE
1290 b
μ€ρών, ώσπ€ρ εΐρηται πολλάκις, εν μεν ούν εστί
το περί την τροφήν πλήθος, οί καλούμενοι γεωρ-
1291 a γοι, δεύτερον δέ το καλούμενον βάναυσον (εστί δέ
τοϋτο περί τάς τέχνας ών άνευ πάλιν αδύνατον οί-
κεΐσθαι, τούτων δε των τεχνών τάς μεν εξ ανάγκης
υπαρχειν δει, τάς δέ εις τρυφην η το καλώς ζην),
6 τρίτον δ' άγοραΐον (λέγω δ' άγοραϊον το περί τάς
πρασεις και τάς ώνάς και τάς εμπορίας και
καπηλείας διατρϊβον), τέταρτον δε το θητικόν,
πέμπτον δε γένος τό π ροπολεμήσον , ο τούτων ούθεν
ήττον εστίν άναγκαΐον ύπάρχειν ει μέλλουσι μη
δουλεύσειν τοις επιοϋσιν μη γάρ εν τών αδυνάτων
η πάλιν άξιον είναι καλεΐν την φύσει οούλην,
ίο αυτάρκης γάρ ή πάλις τό δέ δοΰλον ουκ αύταρκες.
όιόπερ εν τη πολιτεία, κομφώς τοϋτο, ούχ ίκανώς 12
δε εΐρηται. φησι γάρ ο Σιωκράτης εκ τεττάρων
τών αναγκαιοτάτων πάλιν συγκεΐσθαι, λέγει δε
τούτους ύφάντην και γεωργον και σκυτοτόμον και
15 οίκοδόμον πάλιν δέ προστίθησιν, ως ούχ αυταρκών
τούτων, χαλκέα και τους επι τοις άναγκαιοις
βοσκημασιν, έτι δ' έμπορόν τε και κάπηλον. και
ταύτα πάντα γίνεται πλήρωμα της πρώτης πόλεως,
ώς τών αναγκαίων γε χάριν πάσαν πόλιν συν-
εστηκυΐαν αλλ* ού του καλού μάλλον, ίσον τε
δεομένην σκυτέων τε και γεωργών τό δέ προ- 13
20 πολεμούν ού πρότερον άποδίδωσι μέρος πριν ή της
χώρας αύζομένης και της τών πλησίον απτομενης
α Plato, Rep. ii. 369 β-371 ε.
* i.e. the first sketch of the City-state, loc. cit.
294
POLITICS, IV. πι. 11-13
has been said often. One of these parts therefore
is the mass of persons concerned with food who are
called farmers, and second is what is called the
mechanic class (and this is the group engaged in the
arts without which it is impossible for a city to be
inhabited, and some of these arts are indispensably
necessary, while others contribute to luxury or noble
living), and third is a commercial class (by which I
mean the class that is engaged in selling and buying
and in wholesale and retail trade), and fourth is the
class of manual labourers, and the fifth class is the
one to defend the state in war, which is no less in-
dispensable than the others if the people are not to
become the slaves of those who come against them ;
for surely it is quite out of the question that it should
be proper to give the name of state to a community
that is by nature a slave, for a state is self-sufficient,
12 but that which is a slave is not self-sufficient. There-
fore the statement made in the Republic a is witty
but not adequate. For Socrates says that the most
necessary elements of which a state is composed are
four, and he specifies these as a weaver, a farmer, a
shoemaker and a builder ; and then again he adds,
on the ground that these are not self-sufficient, a
copper-smith and the people to look after the neces-
sary live-stock, and in addition a merchant and a
retail trader. These elements together constitute
the full complement of his first city, 6 implying that
every city is formed for the sake of the necessaries of
life and not rather for the sake of what is noble, and
that it has equal need of both shoemakers and farmers ;
13 but the warrior class he does not assign to it until as
the territory is increased and comes into contact
with that of the neighbours they are brought into
295
ARISTOTLE
1291 "
εις πόλεμον καταστώσιν. άλλα μην και εν τοις
τέτταρσι και τοις όποσοισοΰν κοινωνοις άναγκαΐον
elvai τίνα τον άποδώσοντα και κρινούντα το
δίκαιον εΐπερ οΰν και φυχην αν τις θείη ζώου
25 μόριον μάλλον η σώμα, και πόλεων τά τοιαύτα
μάλλον θετέον των εις την άναγκαίαν χρήσιν συν-
τεινόντων, το πολεμικόν και το μετέχον δικαιοσύνης
δικαστικής, προς δε τούτοις το βουλευόμενον,
όπερ εστί συνέσεως πολιτικής έργον, και ταΰτ*
είτε κεχωρισμένως 1 υπάρχει τισιν είτε τοις αύτοΐς,
80 ούθέν διαφέρει προς τον λόγον και γαρ όπλιτεύειν \±
και γεωργεΐν συμβαίνει τοις αύτοΐς ποσάκις,
ώστε ε'ίπερ και ταύτα και εκείνα θετέα μόρια της
πόλεως, φανερόν οτι τό γε όπλιτικόν άναγκαΐον
εστί μόριον της πόλεως, έβδομον δε το ταΐς ούσίαις
λειτουργούν, ο καλούμεν εύπορους, ογδοον δε τό
85 δημιουργικόν και το περί τάς αρχάς λειτουργούν,
ε'ίπερ άνευ αρχόντων αδύνατον etmi πάλιν άναγ-
καΐον οΰν εΐναί τινας τους δυναμένους άρχειν και
λειτουργούντας η συνεχώς η κατά μέρος τη πάλει
ταύτην την λειτουργίαν. λοιπά δε περί ων τυγ-
χάνομεν διωρικότες άρτίως, τό βουλευόμενον και
40 τό 2 κρίνον περί τών δικαίων τοις άμφισβητούσιν .
εΐπερ οΰν ταύτα δει γίνεσθαι 3 ταΐς πόλεσι και
1291 b καλώ? γίνεσθαι 3 και δικαίως, άναγκαΐον και μετ-
1 κΐχιορισμέροις ? Richards. 2 και το ed. : καΐ codd.
3 yiveadai ed. : yeveadai codd.
β The first four classes and the military and judicial.
296
POLITICS, IV. πι. 13-14
war. But yet even among the four partners or what-
ever their number be there must necessarily be some-
body to assign justice and to judge their claims ;
inasmuch therefore as one would count the soul of
an animal to be more a part of it than the body, so
also the factors in states corresponding to the soul
must be deemed to be parts of them more than those
factors which contribute to necessary utility. — the
former being the military class and the class that
plays a part in judicial justice, and in addition to
these the deliberative class, deliberation being a
function of political intelligence. And it makes no
difference to the argument whether these functions
are held by special classes separately or by the same
14 persons ; for it often happens for the same men to
be both soldiers and farmers. Hence inasmuch as
both groups ° of classes must be counted parts of the
state, it is clear that the heavy- armed soldiery at
any rate b must be a part of the state. And a seventh
class is the one that serves the community by means
of its property, the class that we call the rich. And an
eighth is the class of public servants, that is, those
who serve in the magistracies, inasmuch as without
rulers it is impossible for a city to exist ; it is there-
fore necessary that there should be some men who
are able to govern and who render this service to the
state either continuously or in turn. And there
remain the classes which we happen to have denned
just before, the deliberative class and the one that
judges the claims of litigants. If therefore it is
proper for the states to have these functions per-
formed, and well and justly performed, it is necessary
b Lower grades of the forces may be excluded from citizen-
ship, e.g. the rowers of the triremes (see below, 1376 b 15).
L 297
ARISTOTLE
1291b
έχοντας eivcu πνας αρετής της 1 των πολιτικών. 2
τάς μεν οΰν άλλα? δυνάμεις τοις αύτοΐς ύπάρχειν 15
ενδεχεσθαι δοκεΐ πολλοίς, οίον τους αυτούς είναι
τους προπολεμούντας και γεωργοΰντας και τεχ-
5 νιτα?, ετι δε τους βουλευομενους τε και κρίνοντας,
αντιποιούνται δε και της αρετής πάντες και τάς
πλείστας αρχάς άρχειν οΐονται δυνασ^αι• αλλά
7reWa^ai και πλουτεΐν τους αυτούς αδύνατον,
διό ταΰτα μέρη μάλιστα eirax δοκεΐ πόλεως, οι
εύποροι καΐ οι άποροι, ετι δε διά το ως επι το
ίο πολύ τους μεν ολίγους είναι τους δε πολλούς,
ταύτα ivavria μέρη* φαίνεται των της πόλεως
μορίων ώστε και τάς πολιτείας κατά τάς ύπεροχάς
τούτων καθιστάσι, και δύο πολιτεΐαι δοκοΰσιν
είναι, δημοκρατία και ολιγαρχία.
IV. "Οτι μεν οΰν είσι πολιτεΐαι πλείους, και διά 1
15 τίνας αίτια?, εΐρηται πρότερον δτι δ' εστί και
δημοκρατίας εΐδη πλείω και ολιγαρχίας, λεγωμεν.
φανερόν δε τούτο και εκ των είρη μένων, εΐδη
γάρ πλείω τοΰ τε δήμου και των λεγομένων
γνωρίμων εστίν, οίον δήμου μεν εΐδη εν μεν οι
γεωργοί, έτερον δε το περί τάς τεχνας, άλλο δε το
20 άγορα.ΐον το περί ώνην και πράσιν διατρΐβον, άλλο
δε το περί θάλατταν, καΐ τούτου το μεν πολεμικον
το δε χρηματιστικόν το δέ πορθμευτικον το δ
άλιευτικόν (πολλαχοΰ γάρ έκαστα τούτων πολύοχλα,
1 aperi?s ttjs Richards : αρετής codd.
' πολιτών ? Richards. 3 μόνα Wilamowitz.
β Cf. in. 11, 12 fin.
298
POLITICS, IV. ιπ. 14— iv. 1
for there also to be some men possessing virtue in the
15 form of political excellence. Now as to the other Some
capacities many people think that it is possible for S^Aafpjjut
them to be possessed in combination, for example, n °t rich
* ' r ' and poor r
for the same men to be the soldiers that defend the hence
state in war and the farmers that till the land and ^JP"**'
the artizans, and also the councillors and judges, and Democracy
indeed all men claim to possess virtue and think c ^^
themselves capable of filling most of the offices of forma
state ; but it is not possible for the same men to
be poor and rich. Hence these seem to be in the
fullest sense the parts of the state, the rich and the
poor. And also the fact that the rich are usually
few and the poor many makes these two among the
parts of the state appear as opposite sections ; so
that the superior claims α of these classes are even
made the guiding principles upon which constitutions
are constructed, and it is thought that there are two
forms of constitution, democracy and oligarchy.
1 IV. That there are then several forms of constitu- Varieties of
tion, and what are the reasons for this, has been aJf* 10 y
stated before ; let us now say that there are several Democracy
varieties both of democracy and of oligarchy. And
this is clear even from what has been said already.
For there are several classes both of the people and
of those called the notables ; for instance classes of
the people are, one the farmers, another the class
dealing with the arts and crafts, another the com-
mercial class occupied in buying and selling and
another the one occupied with the sea — and this
is divided into the classes concerned with naval
warfare, with trade, with ferrving passengers and
with fishing (for each of these classes is extremely
numerous in various places, for instance fishermen
299
ARISTOTLE
1291 b
οΐον αλιείς μέν εν Ύάραντι και Βυζαντίω, τριηρικόν
δέ ^ Κθηνησιν , εμπορικόν δέ iv Αίγίνη και Χι'ω,
^πορθμευτικόν δ' iv 1 Ύενεδω), προς δε τούτοις
το χερνητικον και το μικράν έχον ούσίαν ώστε μη
δϋί^ασ^αι σχολάζειν, ετι το μη εξ αμφοτέρων
πολιτών ελεύθερον, καν ει τι τοιούτον έτερον 2
πλήθους ειδο?' των δε γνωρίμων πλούτος, ευγένεια,
αρετή, παιοεία και τά τούτοις λεγόμενα κατά την
30 αύτην διαφοράν.
Αημοκρατία μεν οΰν εστί πρώτη μεν η λεγομένη 2
μάλιστα κατά το ίσον. ίσον γάρ φησιν ό νόμος
ο της τοιαύτης δημοκρατίας το μηδέν μάλλον
υπερεχειν 3 τους απόρους η τους εύπορους μηδέ
κυρίους είναι όποτερουσοΰν άλλ' ομοίους αμφό-
τερους• εΐπερ γάρ ελευθέρια μάλιστ' εστίν εν
35 δημοκρατία, καθάπερ ύπολαμβάνουσί τίνες, και
ίσότης, ούτως αν ειη μάλιστα κοινωνούντων
απάντων μάλιστα 4, της πολιτείας ομοίως, επει δε
πλείων 6 δήμος, κύριον δέ το δόζαν τοις πλείοσιν,
ανάγκη δημοκρατίαν είναι ταύτην. εν μεν οΰν 3
είδος δημοκρατίας τούτο, τό 5 τάς αρχάς από
40 τιμημάτων είναι, βραχέων δε τούτων όντων δει
δέ τω κτωμενω εζουσιαν είναι μετεχειν και
1292a τον άποβάλλοντα μη μετεχειν. έτερον δ' είδος
δημοκρατίας το μετεχειν απαντάς τους πολίτας
όσοι άνυπεύθυνοι, άρχειν δέ τον νόμον έτερον δέ
εΐδος δημοκρατίας το πάσι μετεΐναι τών αρχών
1 δ' iv Susemihl (autem in Guil.): eV codd.
2 Sylburg: έτερου codd.
3 ϋττάρχαν codd. plerique, άρχειν Victorius (cf. 1318 a 7).
4 seel. Coraes.
s τό Schlosser (cf. 1318 b 6 seq., ed.): άλλο δέ τό codd.
30U
POLITICS, IV. ιν. 1-3
at Tarentum and Byzantium, navy men at Athens
the mercantile class at Aegina and Chios, and the
ferryman-class at Tenedos), and in addition to these
the hand-working class and the people possessing
little substance so that they cannot live a life of
leisure, also those that are not free men of citizen
parentage on both sides, and any other similar class
of common people ; while among the notables
wealth, birth, virtue, education, and the distinctions
that are spoken of in the same group as these, form
the classes.
The first kind of democracy therefore is the one Four
which receives the name chiefly in respect of equality . p^^acy
For the law of this sort of democracy ascribes equality
to the state of things in which the poor have no more
prominence than the rich, and neither class is sovereign,
but both are alike ; for assuming that freedom is
chiefly found in a democracv, as some persons suppose,
and also equality, this would be so most fully when to
the fullest extent all alike share equally in the govern-
ment. And since the people are in the majority, and
a resolution passed by a majority is paramount, this
must necessarily be a democracy. This therefore is
one kind of democracy, where the offices are held on
property-qualifications, but these low ones, although
it is essential that the man who acquires the specified
amount should have the right to hold office, and the
man who loses it should not hold office. And another
kind of democracv is for all the citizens that are not
open to challenge* 1 to have a share in office, but for the
law to rule ; and another kind of democracy is for all
to share in the offices on the mere qualification of
• i.e. on the score of birth, cf. c. v. § 4.
301
ARISTOTLE
1292 a
εαν μόνον η πολίτης, άρχειν δε τον νόμον. έτερον
6 δ είδος δημοκρατίας τάλλα μεν elvai ταυτά, κύριον
ο είναι το πλήθος και μη τον νόμον τοΰτο δε 4
γίνεται όταν τά φηφίσματα κύρια η άλλα μη 6
νομός, συμβαίνει δε τοΰτο δια τους δημαγωγούς.
ev μεν γαρ ταΐς κατά νόμον δημοκρατουμεναις ου
γίνεται δημαγωγός, αλλ' οι βέλτιστοι των πολιτών
ίο εισίΓ εν προεδρία.• οπού δ' οι νόμοι μη είσι κύριοι,
ενταύθα γίνονται δημαγωγοί• μόναρχος γάρ 6
δήμος γίνεται σύνθετος εις εκ πολλών, οι γάρ
πολλοί κύριοι είσιν ούχ ως έκαστος άλλα πάντες.
Ομηρος δε ποίαν λέγει ουκ αγαθόν ει^αι πολυ-
κοιρανίην, πότερον ταύτην ή όταν πλείους ώσιν
15 οι άρχοντες ως έκαστος, άδηλον. ό δ' οΰν τοιούτος β
δήμος άτε μόναρχος ων ζητεί μοναρχεΐν διά το
μη άρχεσθαι υπό νόμου και γίνεται δεσποτικός,
ώστε οι κόλακες έντιμοι, και εστίν ο τοιούτος
δήμος άνάλογον τών μοναρχιών τή τυραννίδι,
διότι 1 και το ήθος το αυτό, και άμφω δεσποτικά
20 τών βελτιόνων, και τά φηφίσματα ώσπερ εκεί τά
επιτάγματα, και 6 δημαγωγός και ο κόλαξ οι
αυτοί και άνάλογον, και μάλιστα δ' εκάτεροι παρ
εκατεροις ίσχύουσιν, οι μεν κόλακες παρά τυράν-
νοις, οι δε δημαγωγοί παρά τοις δήμοις τοις τοιού-
τοις. αίτιοι δ' είσι τοΰ eirai τά φηφίσματα κύρια 6
2δ άλλα μη τους νόμους ούτοι, πάντα άνάγοντες εις
τον δήμον συμβαίνει γάρ αύτοΐς yiWai?ai μεγάλοις
διά το τον μεν δήμον πάντων ει^αι κύριον τής δε
1 ed. : διό codd.
• Iliad, π. 204.
302
POLITICS, IV. ιν. 3-6
being a citizen, but for the law to rule. Another
kind of democracy is where all the other regulations
are the same, but the multitude is sovereign and not
4 the law ; and this comes about when the decrees of
the assembly over-ride the law. This state of things
is brought about by the demagogues ; for in the
♦ states under democratic government guided by law
a demagogue does not arise, but the best classes of
citizens are in the most prominent position ; but
where the laws are not sovereign, then demagogues
arise ; for the common people become a single com-
posite monarch, since the many are sovereign not as
individuals but collectively. Yet what kind of demo-
cracy Homer α means by the words ' no blessing is
the lordship of the many ' — whether he means this
kind or when those who rule as individuals are more
5 numerous, is not clear. However, a people of this
sort, as being monarch, seeks to exercise monarchic
rule through not being ruled by the law, and becomes
despotic, so that flatterers are held in honour. And Demagogy.
a democracy of this nature is comparable to the
tyrannical form of monarchy, because their spirit is
the same, and both exercise despotic control over the
better classes, and the decrees voted by the assembly
are like the commands issued in a tyranny, and the
demagogues and the flatterers are the same people
or a corresponding class, and either set has the
very strongest influence with the respective ruling
power, the flatterers with the tyrants and the dem-
6 agogues with democracies of this kind. And these
men cause the resolutions of the assembly to be
supreme and not the laws, by referring all things to
the people ; for they owe their rise to greatness to
the fact that the people is sovereign over all things
303
ARISTOTLE
1292 a
του δήμου δόξης τούτους, πείθεται γαρ το πλήθος
τούτοις. ετι δ' οι ταΐς άρχαΐς εγκαλούντες τον
δημόν φασι δεΐν κρίνειν, 6 δέ ασμένως δέχεται την
30 πρόκλησιν, ώστε καταλύονται πασαι at άρχαί.
ευλόγως δε άν δόζειεν επιτιμάν ό φάσκων την 7
τοιαύτην είναι δημοκρατίαν ου πολιτείαν. οπού
γαρ μη νόμοι άρχουσιν, ουκ εστί πολιτεία, δει γαρ
τον μεν νόμον άρχειν πάντων 1 των δε καθ έκαστα
τάς αρχάς, και ταύτην 2 πολιτείαν κρίνειν ωστ
86 εΐπερ εστί δημοκρατία μία των πολιτειών, φανερόν
ως ή τοιαύτη κοττάστασις, εν fj φηφίσμασι πάντα
διοικείται, ουδέ δημοκρατία κυρίως, ουδέν γαρ
ζνδεχεται φήφισμα eimt καθόλου.
Τά μεν ουν της δημοκρατίας είδη διωρίσθω τον
τρόπον τούτον.
V. 'Ολιγαρχίας δέ είδη εν μεν το από τιμημάτων 1
40 είναι τάς αρχάς τηλικούτων ώστε τους απόρους μη
^tere^etv πλείους Οντας, εζειναι δε τω κτωμενω
1292 b μετεχειν της πολιτείας, άλλο δε όταν από τιμημά-
των μακρών ώσιν at άρχαι και α'ιρώνται αύτοι
τους ελλείποντας (άν μεν ουν εκ πάντων τούτων
τούτο ποιώσι, δοκεϊ τοϋτ efvat μάλλον άριστο-
κρατικόν, εάν δε εκ τινών άφωρισμενων, όλιγαρ-
6 χικόν) • έτερον δ' 3 είδος ολιγαρχίας όταν παις άντι
πατρός είσίη, τέταρτον δ' όταν ύπάρχη τε το* νυν
1 <χών καθόλου} πάντων Richards.
Madvig: την codd.
8 ϊτερον ο ed. : 'έτερον codd.
4 τ€ τό ed. : τό re codd.
304
POLITICS, IV. ιν. 6— v. 1
while they are sovereign over the opinion of the
people, for the multitude believes them. Moreover
those who bring charges against the magistrates say
that the people ought to judge the suits, and the
people receive the invitation gladly, so that all the
7 magistracies are put down. And it would seem to
be a reasonable criticism to say that such a demo-
cracy is not a constitution at all ; for where the laws
do not govern there is no constitution, as the law
ought to govern all things while the magistrates
control particulars, and we ought to judge this to be
constitutional government ; if then democracy really
is one of the forms of constitution, it is manifest that
an organization of this kind, in which all things are
administered by resolutions of the assembly, is not
even a democracy in the proper sense, for it is
impossible for a voted resolution to be a universal
rule.
Let this be our discussion of the different kinds of
democracy.
1 V. Of the kinds of oligarchy, one is for the magis- Four
tracies to be appointed from property-assessments so on^chv
high that the poor who are the majority have no
share in the government, but for the man who
acquires the requisite amount of property to be
allowed to take part in it ; another is when the
magistracies are filled from high assessments and the
magistrates themselves elect to fill vacancies (so that
if they do so from all the citizens of this assessment,
this appears rather to be of the nature of an aristo-
cracy, but if from a particular section of them, it is
oligarchical) ; another variety of oligarchv is when
son succeeds father in office ; and a fourth kind is
when the hereditary system just mentioned exists
305
ARISTOTLE
1292 b
λεχθεν και άρχη μη 6 νόμος αλλ οί άρχοντες, και
eariv αντίστροφος αύτη εν ταΐς όλιγαρχίαις ώσπερ
η τυραννις iv ταΐς μοναρχίαις καΐ περί ης τελευ-
ταία? εΐπαμεν δημοκρατίας iv ταΐς δημοκρατίαις ,
ίο και καλοΰσι δη την τοιαντην όλιγαρχίαν δυναστείαν.
'' 'Ολιγαρχίας μεν ούν εϊδη τοσαΰτα και δημοκρα- 2
τια?. ου δει δε λανθάνειν δτι πολλαχοΰ συμ-
βεβηκεν ώστε την μεν πολιτείαν την κατά τους
νόμους μη δημοτικην ει^αι, δια δε το ήθος και την
ΐδ άγωγην πολιτεύεσθαι δημοτικώς, ομοίως δε πάλιν
παρ άλλοις την μεν κατά τους νόμους είναι πολι-
τείαν δημοτικωτεραν , τη δ' άγωγη και τοις εθεσιν
ολιγαρχεΐσθαι μάλλον, συμβαίνει δέ τοΰτο μά-
λιστα μετά τάς μεταβολάς των πολιτειών ου γάρ
ευθύς μεταβαίνουσιν αλλ aya770>ai τα πρώτα
20 μικρά πλεονεκτοΰντες παρ αλλήλων, ώσθ' οί μεν
νόμοι διαμενουσιν οί προϋπάρχοντες κρατοΰσι δ'
οί μεταβαλόντες 1 την πολιτείαν.
"Οτι δ' εστί τοσαΰτα είδη δημοκρατίας και 3
ολιγαρχίας , εξ αυτών τών είρημενων φανερόν εστίν,
ανάγκη γάρ η πάντα τά είρημενα μέρη του δήμου
26 κοινωνεΐν της πολιτείας , η τά μεν τά δε μη. όταν
μεν ουν το γεωργικόν και το κεκτημενον μετρίαν
ούσίαν κυριον fj της πολιτείας, πολιτεύονται κατά
νόμους' εχουσι γάρ εργαζόμενοι ζην ου δύνανται
δε σχολάζειν, ώστε τον νόμον επιστησαντες εκ-
1 Richards : μεταβάλλοντες.
° Government controlled by a few powerful families. Cf.
Thuc. iii. 62. 4, where the Thebans say, ' In those days our
state was not governed by an oligarchy that granted equal
justice to all, nor yet by a democracy ; the power was in the
hands of a small cabal {δυναστεία όλί-γων ανδρών), than which
306
POLITICS, IV. v. 1-3
and also the magistrates govern and not the law.
This among oligarchies is the form corresponding to
tyranny among monarchies and to the form of demo-
cracy about which we spoke last among democracies,
and indeed oligarchy of this sort has the special name
of dynasty.
So many therefore are the kinds of oligarchy and Non-
of democracy ; but it must not escape notice that in perversion*
many places it has come about that although the con- due *» cir -
!•• f iiii • i.• j. cumstances.
stitution as framed by the laws is not democratic, yet
owing to custom and the social system it is democrati-
cally administered, and similarly by a reverse process
in other states although the legal constitution is more
democratic, yet by means of the social system and
customs it is carried on rather as an oligarchy. This
occurs chiefly after alterations of the constitutions
have taken place ; for the people do not change over
to the new system immediately but are content at
the first stages to gain small advantages from the
other party, so that the previously existing laws con-
tinue although power is in the hands of the party
that changed the constitution.
And that these various kinds of democracy and Process of
oligarchy exist is manifest from the actual things mlntai
that have been said. For necessarily either all the i e / ou ^
parts of the population that have been mentioned Democracy,
must have a share in the government, or some and
not others. When therefore the farmer class and
the class possessed of moderate property is sovereign
over the government, they govern according to laws ;
for they have a livelihood if they work, but are not
able to be at leisure, so that they put the law in
nothing is more opposed to law or to true political order, or
more nearly resembles a tyranny ' (Jowett).
307
ARISTOTLE
1292 b
κλησιάζουσι τάς αναγκαίας 1 εκκλησίας' τοις δε
30 άλλοι? μετεχειν e^eanv όταν κτήσωνται το τίμημα
το διωρισμενον υπό των νόμων, 2 διό πασι τοις
κτησαμενοις 3 εζεστι μετεχειν δλως μεν γαρ το
μεν μη εζεΐναι πάσιν όλιγαρχικόν , το δε δη i^elvai*
σχολάζειν αδύνατον μη προσόδων ούσών. τοΰτο
μεν ονν είδος εν δημοκρατίας δια ταύτας τάς
35 αίτια?, έτερον δε είδος δια την εχομενην διαίρεσιν 5 • 4
«στι γαρ και ττασιν εξειναι τοις άνυπευθύνοις κατά
το γένος, μετεχειν μεντοι 6 δυνάμενους σχολάζειν
διόπερ εν τη τοιαύτη δημοκρατία οι νόμοι άρχουσι,
δια τό μη είναι ττρόσοδον. τρίτον δ' είδος το ττασιν
e^eiVai όσοι aV ελεύθεροι ωσι μετεχειν της ττολι-
40 τείας, μη μεντοι μετεχειν διά την προειρημενην
αίτίαν, ωστ άναγκαΐον και εν ταύτη άρχειν τον
1293 a νόμον. τέταρτον δε είδος δημοκρατίας η τελευταία 5
τοις χρόνοις εν ταΐς ττόλεσι γεγενημενη. διά
γάρ τό μείζους γεγονεναι πολύ τάς πόλεις των
εζ ύπαρχής και προσόδων ύπάρχειν εύπορίας, μετ-
εχουσι μεν πάντες της πολιτείας διά την ύπεροχην
δ του πλήθους, κοινωνοϋσι δε και πολιτεύονται διά
το δυ^ασ^αι σχολάζειν και τους απόρους λαμ-
βάνοντας μισθόν. και μάλιστα δέ σχολάζει τό
τοιούτον πλήθος• ου γάρ εμποδίζει αυτούς ούθεν
η των ιδίων επιμέλεια, τους δε πλουσίους εμποδίζει,
1 άνα-γκαιοτάτας Γ. 2 δω — μ€τέχείν om. ΓΜΡ 1 .
3 κ(κτημένοι$ ? ed. : κτώμενοι^ Victorius.
4 [ei-eii>ai\ Thurot. 5 Spengel : α'ίρεσι,ν codd.
6 μεντοι τού% Richards.
β i.e. revenues from abroad; the poor can only attend often
if paid for attendance, and this can only be financed if the
state has income from tribute or foreign property.
308
POLITICS, IV. v. 3-5
control and hold the minimum of assemblies neces-
sary ; and the other persons have the right to take
part when they have acquired the property-assessment
fixed by the laws, so that to take part in the govern-
ment is open to all who have got that amount of
property ; since for it not to be open to everybody
on any terms at all is a characteristic of oligarchy,
but then on the other hand it is impossible for it to
be open to them to have leisure if there are no
revenues. This then is one kind of democracy for these
4 reasons. Another kind is due to the distinction that
comes next : it is possible that all the citizens not
liable to objection on the score of birth may have
the right to take part in the assembly, but may
actually take part only when they are able to be at
leisure ; hence in a democracy of this nature the
laws govern because there is no revenue. A third
kind is when all those who are free men have the
right to take part in the government yet do not
do so because of the aforesaid reason, so that it
follows that in this form of democracy also the law
6 governs. And a fourth kind of democracy is the one
that has been the last in point of time to come into
existence in the states. Because the states have
become much greater than the original ones and
possess large supplies of revenue, while all the
citizens have a share in the government because of
the superiority b of the multitude, all actually take
part in it and exercise their citizenship because even
the poor are enabled to be at leisure by receiving
pay. Indeed the multitude in this kind of state has
a very great deal of leisure, for they are not hampered
at all by the care of their private affairs, but the rich
» Cf. 1288 a 20 ff.
309
ARISTOTLE
1293 a
ωστε πολλάκις ού κοινωνούσι της εκκλησίας ούδε
ίο του δικάζειν. διό yiVerat το των απόρων πλήθος
κύριον της πολιτείας αλλ' ούχ οι νόμοι. τα. μεν οΰν
της δημοκρατίας είδη τοσαΰτα και τοιαύτα διά
ταύτας τάς άνάγκας εστίν τά Be της ολιγαρχίας , Q
όταν μεν πλείους εχωσιν ούσίαν, ελάττω δε και
μη πολλην λια^, το της πρώτης ολιγαρχίας εΐδός
15 εστίν ποιοΰσι γαρ εζονσίαν μετεχειν τω κτωμενω,
και διά το πλήθος eit'cu των μετεχόντων του
πολιτεύματος ανάγκη μη τους ανθρώπους άλλα τον
νόμον eirai κύριον (ρσω γαρ άν πλεΐον άπεχωσι
της μοναρχίας , και μήτε τοσαύτην εχωσιν ούσίαν
ώστε σχολάζειν άμελοΰντες 1 μηθ ούτως όλίγην
20 ώστε τρεφεσθαι άπό της πόλεως, ανάγκη τον
νόμον άζιοϋν αύτοΐς άρχειν άλλα μη αυτούς) . εάν 7
δε 8η ελάττους ώσιν οι τάς ουσίας έχοντες η οι το
πρότερον, πλείω δε, το της δευτέρας ολιγαρχίας
γίνεται ειδο?• μάλλον γάρ ισχύοντες πλεονεκτεΐν
άζιοΰσιν, διό αυτοί μεν αιροΰνται εκ των άλλων
25 του? €ΐ? το πολίτευμα βαδίζοντας, διά δέ το μηπω
ούτως ισχυροί είναι ώστ άνευ νόμου άρχειν, τον
νόμον τίθενται τοιούτον, εαν δ επιτείνωσι τω 8
ελάττονες οντες μείζονας ουσίας εχειν, η τρίτη
επίδοσις γίνεται της ολιγαρχίας, το δι' αυτών μεν
τάς αρχάς ^χειν, κατά νόμον δε τον κελεύοντα
30 τών τελευτώντων διαδεχεσ^αι τους υίεΐς. όταν
δε ηδη πολύ ύπερτείνωσι ταΐς ούσιαις και ταΐς
πολυφιλίαις, εγγύς η τοιαύτη δυναστεία μοναρχίας
εστίν, και κύριοι γίνονται οι άνθρωποι άλλ' ούχ
1 άμελονντα Spengel : •τα<; codd.
° i.e. they legalize the recruiting of the ruling class by co-
optation ; or the words may mean ' they make the law ruler.'
S10
POLITICS, IV. v. 5-8
are, so that often they take no part in the assembly
nor in judging lawsuits. Owing to this the multitude
of the poor becomes sovereign over the government,
instead of the laws. Such in number and in nature
are the kinds of democracy that these causes neces-
6 sarily bring into existence. To turn to the varieties and of the
of oligarchy, when more men possess property, but oligarchy.
less of it and not a very large amount, this is the first
form of oligarchy ; for they allow the man that
acquires property the right to participate, and be-
cause there is a large number of persons participating
in the government it necessarily follows that not the
men but the law is sovereign (for the farther removed
they are from monarchy, and as they have not so
much property as to be idle and neglect it, nor yet
so little as to be kept at the expense of the state,
they are compelled to call upon the law to rule in-
7 stead of ruling themselves). But then if the owners
of the properties are fewer than those who owned
them previously, and own more, the second form of
oligarchy comes into being ; for as they become
stronger they claim to have a larger share, and there-
fore they themselves select those from among the rest
of the citizens who go into the government, but as
they are not yet strong enough to rule without law
8 they make the law conform with this." And if they
carry matters further by becoming fewer and holding
larger properties, there comes about the third advance
in oligarchy, which consists in their keeping the offices
in their own hands, but under a law enacting that
they are to be hereditary. And when finally they
attain very great pre-eminence by their wealth
and their multitude of friends, a dynasty of this
nature is near to monarchy, and men become
311
ARISTOTLE
1293 a
ο νόμος' και το τέταρτον είδος της ολιγαρχίας
τοΰτ εστίν, άντίστροφον τω τελευταία» της δημο-
κρατίας.
85 "Ετι δ €ΐσί δυο πολιτεΐαι παρά δημοκρατίαν τε 9
καΐ όλιγαρχίαν, ων την μεν έτέραν λέγουσί τ€
πάντες και εΐρηται των τεττάρων πολιτ€ΐών είδος
εν (λέγουσι δε τέτταρας μοναρχίαν όλιγαρχίαν
δημοκρατίαν τέταρτον δε την καλουμένην άριστο -
40 κρατίαν)' πέμπτη δ' εστίν η προσαγορεύεται το
κοινόν όνομα πασών (πολιτείαν γάρ καλοΰσιν),
αλλά δια το μη ποσάκις γίνεσθαι λαι^ά^ει τους
πειρωμένους άριθμεΐν τά των πολιτειών είδη, και
1293 b χρώνται ταΐς τέτταρσι μόνον (ώσπερ Πλάτων) εν
ταΐς πολιτείαις. άριστοκρατίαν μεν οΰν καλώς 10
e^et καλεΐν περί ης διηλθομεν εν τοις πρώτοις
λόγοις (την γάρ εκ τών αρίστων απλώς κατ
άρετην πολιτείαν και μη προς ύπόθεσίν τίνα
5 αγαθών ανδρών μόνην δίκαιον προσαγορευειν άρι-
στοκρατίαν, εν μόνη γάρ απλώς ο αυτός άνηρ και
πολίτης αγαθός εστίν, οι δ' εν ταΐς ά'λλαι? aya#ot
προς την πολιτείαν είσι την αυτών)' ου μην αλλ'
είσί τίνες αΐ προς τε τάς όλιγαρχουμένας εχουσι
διαφοράς [/cat καλούνται άριστοκρατιαι] 1 και προς
ίο την καλουμένην πολιτείαν , όπου γε μη μόνον
πλουτίνδην αλλά /cat άριστίνδην αιροΰνται τάς
αρχάς• αΰτη η πολιτεία διαφέρει τε άμφοΐν και
αριστοκρατική καλείται, και γάρ εν ταΐς μη ι\
ποιουμέναις κοινην επιμέλειαν αρετής εισιν όμως
1 seel. Jackson.
β We now pass from the varieties of Oligarchy and of
Democracy to those of the other actually existing constitu-
tions, Aristocracy so-called and Constitutional Government.
S12
POLITICS, IV. v. 8-11
supreme instead of the law ; and this is the fourth
kind of oligarchy, the counterpart of the last kind of
democracy.
9 Furthermore ° there are two constitutions by the Constato-
side of democracy and oligarchy, one b of which is Government
counted by everybody and has been referred to as really a fifth
one of the four forms of constitution (and the four of constitn-
meant are monarchy, oligarchy, democracy and fourth ^9^26).
the form called aristocracy), but there is a fifth,
entitled by the common name of them all (for it is
called constitutional government), but as it does not
often occur it is overlooked by those who try to
ennumerate the forms of constitution, and they use
the four names only (as does Plato) in the list of
10 constitutions. Now the name of aristocracy is secondary
indeed properly given to the constitution that we ^jjftocracy
discussed in our first discourses 6 (for it is right to
apply the name '- aristocracy ' — ' government of the
best ' — only to the constitution of which the citizens
are best in virtue absolutely and not merely good
men in relation to some arbitrary standard, for
under it alone the same person is a good man and a
good citizen absolutely, whereas those who are good
under the other constitutions are good relatively to
their own form of constitution) ; nevertheless there
are also some constitutions that have differences
both in comparison with oligarchically governed
states and with what is termed constitutional govern-
ment, inasmuch as in them they elect the officials
11 not only by wealth but also by goodness ; this form
of constitution differs from both and is called aristo-
cratic. For even in the states that do not pav any
public attention to virtue there are nevertheless
» i.e. aristocracy. ■ Bk. III. 1279 a 35 ff., 12S6 b 3 ft".
313
ARISTOTLE
1283 b
τινές οι εύδοκιμούντες και δοκούντες etvai επιεικείς.
is οπού ουν ή πολιτεία βλέπει εις τε πλοΰτον και
άρετην και δήμον, οίον εν Καρχηδόνι, αΰτη αρι-
στοκρατική εστίν και εν αΐς εις τα δύο μόνον, οίον
η Αακεδαιμονίων , εις τε 1 άρετήν και δήμον, και
εστί μίξις των δύο τούτων, δημοκρατίας τε καΐ
αρετής, αριστοκρατίας μεν ουν πάρα την πρωτην
20 την άρίστην πολιτείαν ταΰτα δύο είδη, και τρίτον
οσαι της καλούμενης πολιτείας ρεπουσι προς την
όλιγαρχίαν μάλλον.
VI. Λοιποί δ' εστίν ημΐν περί τε της όνομα- 1
ζομενης πολιτείας ειπείν και περί τυραννίδος.
ετάζαμεν δ' ούτως ουκ οΰσαν ούτε ταύτην παρεκ-
βασιν ούτε τάς άρτι ρηθείσας αριστοκρατίας, οτι
25 το μεν αληθές 7τάσαι διημαρτήκασι της ορθότατης
πολιτείας, έπειτα καταριθμούνται μετά τούτων,
εισί τ' αυτών αύται παρεκβάσεις, ώσπερ εν τοις
κατ αρχήν εΐπομεν. τελευταΐον δέ περί τυραννίδος
εύλογόν εστί ποιησασθαι μνείαν διά το πασών
so ηκιστα ταύτην eivai πολιτείαν, ημΐν δέ την μεθοδον
είναι περί πολιτείας.
Δι' ην μεν οΰν αίτίαν τετακται τον τρόπον τού-
τον, εΐρηται• νυν δέ δεικτεον ημΐν περί πολιτείας,
φανερωτερα γαρ ό δύναμις αυτής διωρισμενων τών 2
περί ολιγαρχίας και δημοκρατίας• εστί γάρ η
πολιτεία ως απλώς ειπείν μίξις ολιγαρχίας και
85 δημοκρατίας, ειώ^ασι δέ καλεΐν τάς μέν άπο-
1 re post άρετψ codd. cet. (sed cf. 1. 14 et 1296 b 17).
a See 1279 b 4 ff . Actual aristocracies are a falling-off
from the Aristocracy and Polity is a decline from Monarchy
and Aristocracy; but they are not deviations in the technical
sense.
314
POLITICS, IV. v. 11— νι. 2
some men that are held in high esteem and are
thought worthy of respect. Where then the con-
stitution takes in view wealth and virtue as well as
the common people, as for instance at Carthage, this
is of the nature of an aristocracy ; and so also are
the states, in which the constitution, like that of
Sparta, takes in view two of these things only, virtue
and the common people, and there is a mingling of
these two factors, democracy and virtue. These
then are two kinds of aristocracy beside the first,
which is the best constitution, and a third kind is
those instances of what is called constitutional
government that incline more in the direction of
oligarchy.
1 VI. It remains for us to speak about what is termed
constitutional government and also about tyranny.
Though neither the former nor the aristocracies
spoken of just now are really deviations, we have
classed them thus because in actual truth they have
all fallen away from the most correct constitution,
and consequently are counted with the deviation-
forms, and those are deviations from them, as we
said in our remarks at the beginning." Tyranny is
reasonably mentioned last because it is the least
constitutional of all governments, whereas our investi-
gation is about constitutional government.
Having then stated the reason for this mode of Constitu
classification, we have now to set forth our view Government
2 about constitutional government. For its meaning a blend of
is clearer now that the characteristics of oligarchy and*™ y
and democracy have been defined ; since constitu- Democrac y,
tional government is, to put it simply, a mixture of
oligarchy and democracy. But people customarily
315
ARISTOTLE
1298 b . , f
κλινουσας ως προς την δημοκρατίαν πολιτείας , τάς
δε προς την ολιγαρχίαν μάλλον αριστοκρατίας, διά
το μάλλον άκολουθεΐν παιοείαν και εύγενειαν τοις
εύπορωτεροις, ετι δε δοκοΰσιν εχειν οι εύποροι
ών ένεκεν οι άδικοΰντες άοικοΰσιν όθεν και καλούς
40 κάγαθούς και γνωρίμους τούτους προσαγορεύουσιν.
επει οΰν η αριστοκρατία βούλεται την ύπεροχην 3
άπονεμειν τοις άρίστοις των πολιτών 1 και τάς
ολιγαρχίας είναι φασιν εκ των καλών κάγαθών
1294» μάλλον. δοκεΐ ο* είναι των αδυνάτων το εύ-
νομβΐσθαι την μη 1 άριστοκρατουμενην πόλιν άλλα
πονηροκρατουμενην , ομοίως δε καϊ άριστοκρατεΐ-
σ^αι την μη εύνομουμενην. ουκ εστί δε ευνομία
το ευ Κ€ΐσθαι τους νόμους μη πείθεσθαι δε. διό
6 μίαν μεν εύνομίαν ύποληπτεον είναι το πείθεσθαι
τοις κειμενοις νόμοις, ετεραν δε το καλώς κεΐσθαι
τους νόμους οΐς εμμενουσιν (εστί γαρ πείθεσθαι
και κακώς κειμενοις). τοΰτο δ' ενδέχεται διχώς'
η γαρ τοις άρίστοις τών ενδεχομένων αύτοΐς η τοις
απλώς άρίστοις. δοκεΐ δέ αριστοκρατία μεν είναι 4
ίο μάλιστα το τάς τιμάς νενεμησθαι κατ* άρετήν
αριστοκρατίας μεν γάρ ορός άρετη, ολιγαρχίας δε
πλούτος, δήμου δ' ελευθερία (το δ' ο τι αν δόζη
τοις πλείοσιν εν πάσαις υπάρχει, και γάρ εν ολιγ-
αρχία και εν αριστοκρατία και εν δημοις ο τι αν
δόζη τω πλείονι μέρει τών μετεχόντων της πολι-
15 τεια? τοΰτ' εστί κύριον) . εν μεν ουν ταις πλείσταις
1 μη hie Thurot : post τό codd.
S16
POLITICS, IV. vi. 2-4
give the name of constitutional government only to
those among such mixed constitutions that incline
towards democracy, and entitle those that incline
more towards oligarchy aristocracies, because educa-
tion and good birth go more with the wealthier
classes, and also the wealthy are thought to have
already the things to get which wrongdoers commit
wrong ; owing to which people apply the terms
' gentry ' and ' notabilities ' to the rich. Since and akin to
therefore aristocracy means the assignment of the 1S ocr * cy •
highest place to the best of the citizens, oligarchies
also are said to be drawn rather from the gentry.
And it seems an impossibility for a city governed
not by the aristocracy but by the base to have well-
ordered government, and similarly also for a city that
has not a well-ordered government to be governed
aristocratically. But to have good laws enacted but
not obey them does not constitute well-ordered
government. Hence one form of good government
must be understood to consist in the laws enacted
being obeyed, and another form in the laws which
the citizens keep being well enacted (for it is possible
to obey badly enacted laws). And for laws to be
well enacted is possible in two ways : they must
either be the best laws possible for the given people
or the best absolutely. But aristocracy in the fullest
sense seems to consist in the distribution of the honours
according to virtue ; for virtue is the denning factor
of aristocracy, as wealth is of oligarchy, and freedom
of democracy (while the principle that a decision of
the majority is supreme is found in them all : for
in both oligarchy and aristocracy and democracies
whatever the larger part of those who have a share
in the government decides is supreme). In most
317
ARISTOTLE
1294 a
πόλεσι τοΰτο 1 της πολιτεία? είδος καλείται, μόνον γαρ
η μιζις στοχάζεται των ευπόρων και των απόρων,
πλούτου και ελευθερίας (σχεδόν γαρ 2 παρά τοις
πλείστοις οι εύποροι των 3 καλών κάγαθών δοκοΰσι
κατεχειν χώραν) • επει δε τρία εστί τα άμφισ- 5
20 βητοΰντα της ίσότητος της πολιτείας, ελευθερία
πλούτος αρετή (το γαρ τέταρτον, ο καλοΰσιν
ευγενειαν , ακολουθεί τοις δυσίν, η γαρ ευγένεια
εστίν αρχαίος πλούτος και αρετή), φανερόν δτι την
μεν τοΐν δυοΐν μίζιν, των ευπόρων και των απόρων,
πολιτείαν λεκτεον, την δε των τριών άριστοκρατίαν
25 μάλιστα τών άλλων παρά την άληθινην και πρώτην.
"Οτι μεν οΰν εστί και έτερα πολιτείας είδη παρά
μοναρχίαν τε και δημοκρατίαν και όλιγαρχίαν,
εϊρηται, και ποια ταΰτα, και τί διαφερουσιν
αλλήλων αϊ τ' άριστοκρατίαι και αϊ πολιτεΐαι [της
αριστοκρατίας]*' και δτι ου πόρρω αύται αλλήλων,
φανερόν.
30 VII. TiVa δε τρόπον γίνεται παρά δημοκρατίαν 1
και ολιγαρχιαν ή καλούμενη πολιτεία, και πώς
αύτην δει καθιστάναι, λεγωμεν εφεξής τοις είρη-
μενοις. άμα δε δήλον εσται και οΐς ορίζονται την
δημοκρατίαν και την όλιγαρχίαν ληπτεον γάρ
την τούτων διαίρεσιν, είτα εκ τούτων αφ' εκατερας
35 ωσπερ σύμβολον λαμβάνοντας συνθετεον. είσι δε 2
όροι τρεις της συνθέσεως και μίζεως. ή γάρ
αμφότερα ληπτεον ων εκάτεραι νομοθετοΰσιν, οίον
1 τοΰτο ed. (cf. 1292 a 33): το codd. 2 yap: δί Immisch.
* ζτην> των Coraes. 4 [τής αριστοκρατία^] ed.
" i.e. in most states that are considered aristocracies.
* i.e. the more oligarchical form, 1293 b 36.
318
POLITICS, IV. νι. 4— νπ. 2
states a then the name of aristocracy is given to that
form of constitutional government, 6 for the com-
bination aims only at the well-off and the poor,
wealth and freedom (since in almost the largest
number of states the rich seem to occupy the place
5 of the gentry) ; but as there are three things that
claim equal participation in the constitution, freedom,
wealth and virtue (for the fourth, what is called
nobility, accompanies the two latter — nobility means
ancient wealth and virtue), it is manifest that the
mixture of the two factors, the rich and the poor, c
ought to be termed constitutional government, while
the mixture of the three factors deserves the name
of aristocracy most of all the various forms of aristo-
cracy beside the true and best form.
It has then been stated that other forms of con-
stitution also exist besides monarchy, democracy and
oligarchy, and what their characteristics are, and how
the various sorts of aristocracy and of constitutional
government differ from one another ; and it is manifest
that aristocracy and constitutional government are
not widely apart from one another.
1 VII. Next to what has been said let us state the
way in which what is called constitutional government
comes into existence by the side of democracy and
oligarchy, and how it is proper to establish it. At
the same time the defining characteristics of demo-
cracy and oligarchy will also be clear ; for we must
grasp the distinction between these and then make
a combination out of them, taking, so to say, a contri-
bution from each. And there are three principles
2 determining this combination or mixture. Under Three
one plan we must adopt both features from the legis- tws^iend.
* Loosely put for ' wealth and free birth.'
319
ARISTOTLE
1294 a χ t
περί τοΰ δικάζειν — εν μεν γαρ ταΐς όλιγαρχιαις τοις
εύπόροις ζημίαν τάττουσιν αν μη δικάζωσι τοις
40 δ άπόροίς ούδενα μισθόν, εν δε ταΐς δημοκρατίαις
τοις μεν άπόροις μισθόν τοις δ' εύπόροις ούδεμίαν
ζημίαν, κοινον δε και μέσον τούτων αμφότερα
1294 b ταύτα, διό και πολιτικόν, μεμικται γαρ εζ άμφοΐν.
εις μεν ονν οΰτος του συνδυασμού τροττος• έτερος 3
δε το μέσον λαμβάνειν ων εκάτεροι τάττουσιν , οίον
εκκλησιάζειν οι μεν άπό τιμήματος ούθενός η
μικρού πάμπαν, οι δ' από μακρού τιμήματος,
5 κοινον δε γε ούδετερον άλλα το μέσον εκατερου
τιμήματος τούτων, τρίτον δ' εκ δυοΐν ταγμάτοιν,
τα μεν εκ τοΰ ολιγαρχικού νόμου τα δ εκ τοΰ
δημοκρατικού- λέγω δ' οίον δοκεΐ δημοκρατικόν
μεν είναι το κληρωτός είναι τάς άρχας το δ'
αιρετός όλιγαρχικόν , και δημοκρατικόν μεν το μη
ίο από τιμήματος όλιγαρχικόν δε το από τιμήματος•
άριστοκρατικόν τοίνυν και πολιτικόν τό εξ εκα-
τερας εκάτερον λαβείν, εκ μεν της ολιγαρχίας τό
αιρετός ποιεΐν τας άρχας εκ δε της δημοκρατίας
τό μη άπό τιμήματος. 6 μεν ούν τρόπος της
μίξεως οΰτος• τοΰ δ' ευ /Αε^ιιχ^αι δημοκρατίαν και 4
15 όλιγαρχίαν ορός όταν ενδέχηται λέγειν την αύτην
πολιτείαν δημοκρατίαν και όλιγαρχίαν δηλον γαρ
Οτι τούτο πάσχουσιν οι λέγοντες 1 δια τό μεμΐχθαι
1 [οι \4yovres] ? ed.
β Perhaps ' the speakers feel ' should be excised.
320
POLITICS, IV. νιι. 2-4
lative schemes of the two different constitutions :
for example, in regard to the administration of justice,
in oligarchies thev institute a fine for the rich if
they do not serve on juries but no pay for the poor
for serving, while in democracies they assign pay for
the poor but no fine for the rich, but a common and
intermediate principle is to have both payment and
fine, and therefore this is a mark of a constitutional
government, since it is a mixture of elements from
3 both oligarchy and democracy. This then is one mode
of combining the two. Another is to take the middle
course between the regulations of each : for example,
democracies permit membership of the assemblv on
no property-qualification at all or a quite small one,
oligarchies on a large property-qualification, but the
combination clearly is to have neither principle, but
one which lies in the middle between either of these
two qualifications. In the third place is a combination
of the two systems, taking some features from the
oligarchical law and some from the democratic ; I
mean, for example, that it is thought to be democratic
for the offices to be assigned by lot, for them to be
elected oligarchic, and democratic for them not to
have a property-qualification, oligarchic to have one ;
therefore it is aristocratic and constitutional to take
one feature from one form and the other from the
other, from oligarchy that offices are to be elected,
and from democracy that this is not to be on a
property-qualification. This then is the mode of
4 the mixture ; and the mark of a good mixture of Test of
democracy and oligarchy is when it is possible to lts ment
speak of the same constitution as a democracy and
as an oligarchy ; for manifestly the speakers feel α
this is so because the mixture is complete, and this is
321
ARISTOTLE
καλώς, πεπονθε δε τοΰτο και το μέσον, εμφαίνεται
γαρ εκατερον εν αύτώ των άκρων, όπερ σνμ- 5
βαίνει περί την Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείαν. πολλοί
20 γαρ εγχειροΰσι λέγειν ώς δημοκρατίας ούσης διά
το δημοκρατικά πολλά την τάξιν εχειν, οίον πρώ-
τον το περί την τροφην τών παίδων, ομοίως γάρ
οι τών πλουσίων τρέφονται τοις τών πενήτων, και
παιδεύονται τον τρόπον τούτον ον αν δύναιντο και
τών πενήτων οι παίδες, ομοίως δε και επι της
25 εχομενης ηλικίας, και όταν άνδρες γένωνται, τον
αυτόν τρόπον, ούθέν γάρ διάδηλος 6 πλούσιος και
ο πένης — ούτω τά περί την τροφην ταύτα πάσιν εν
τοις συσσιτιοις, και την εσθητα οι πλούσιοι
τοιαυτην οιαν αν τις παρασκευάσαι δύναιτο και
τών πενήτων όστισοΰν, ετι τω δύο τάς /LteytWa?
30 αρχάς την μεν αίρεΐσθαι τον δημον, της δε μετ-
εχειν (τους μεν γάρ γέροντας αίροΰνται, της δ'
εφορείας μετεχουσιν)• οι δ' όλιγαρχίαν, διά το
πολλά εχειν ολιγαρχικά, οίον το πάσας αίρετάς
είναι και μηδεμίαν κληρωτην, και ολίγους eivat
κυρίους θανάτου και φυγής, και άλλα τοιαύτα
86 πολλά, δει δ' εν τη πολιτεία, τη μεμιγμενη καλώς 6
αμφότερα δοκεΐν etrai και μηδετερον, 1 και σφ-
ζεσίλχι δι' αύτης και μη έξωθεν, και δι αύτης μη
τω πλείους έξωθεν 2 είναι τους βουλομενους (εϊη
γάρ αν και πονηρά πολιτεία τοΰθ' υπάρχον) αλλά
τω μηδ άν βούλεσθαι πολιτείαν ετεραν μηθεν τών
40 της πόλεως μορίων δλως.
1 μηδέτΐρον : μη θάτερον Boltenstern. * [ίξωθεν] Thurot.
° A conjectural emendation removes this mysterious epi-
gram, giving ' and not one of the two (only).'
b Or, if ΐζωθεν is an interpolation, ' not merely because
322
POLITICS, IV. νπ. 4-6
the case with the form that lies in the middle, for
each of the two extreme forms can be seen in it.
5 This is the case with the constitution of Sparta.
For many people endeavour to describe it as being a
democracy, because its system has many democratic
features, for instance first of all its regulation for the
rearing of boys, since the sons of the rich are brought
up in the same way as those of the poor, and are
educated in a manner in which the sons of the poor also
could be educated, and they are also treated similarly
at the next age, and in the same manner when they are
grown up, for there is nothing that distinguishes the
rich man from the poor man — thus the arrangements
for food are the same for all at the common messes,
and the rich wear clothes such as even any poor man
could procure, and also because of the two greatest
offices the common people elect to one and share in
the other (they elect the Elders and share in the
Ephorate) ; but others call it an oligarchy, because
it has many oligarchical features, for instance that all
the offices are elective and none appointed by lot
and few persons have the power to sentence to death
6 and exile, and a number of other such matters. But
in a well-constructed mixed constitution both of the
two factors, and neither of them, should seem to be
present, and it should be kept safe by its own means
and not by outside aid, and by its own means not
because those who desire its security are more
numerous outside it b (for even a bad constitution
might possess this quality), but because no section
of the state whatever would even wish for another
constitution.
those (citizens) who wish it to survive are more numerous
(than those who do not).'
323
ARISTOTLE
1294 b v , /
Tira μεν ούν τρόπον δει καθισταναι πολιτείαν,
ομοίως δε και τάς όνομαζομενας αριστοκρατίας ,
νυν εΐρηται.
1295a VIII. ΥΙερι δε τυραννίδος ην ήμΐν λοιπόν ειπείν, 1
ούχ ώς ενούσης πολυλογίας περί αυτήν, αλλ' όπως
λάβη της μεθόδου το μέρος, επειδή και ταύτην
τίθεμεν των πολιτειών τι μέρος, περί μεν οΰν
δ βασιλείας οιωρίσαμεν εν τοις πρώτοις λόγοις, εν
οΐς περί της μάλιστα λεγομένης βασιλείας εποιού-
μεθα την σκεφιν, πότερον άσύμφορον ή συμφέρει
ταί? πόλεσιν, και τίνα και πόθεν δει καθισταναι' 2
και πώς τυραννίδος 8' €1817 δύο μεν διείλομεν εν
οΐς περί βασιλείας επεσκοποΰμεν, διά το την
10 δυμαμ,α> επαλλάττειν πως αυτών και προς την
^ασιλβιαν', δια το κατά νόμον tirai άμφοτερας ταύτας
τάς αρχάς (εν τε γαρ τών βαρβάρων τισίν αίροΰιται
αυτοκράτορας μονάρχους, και το παλαιον εν τοις
άρχαίοις "Έιλλησιν εγίγνοντό τίνες μόναρχοι τον
τρόπον τούτον, ους εκάλουν αίσυμνήτας), εχουσι δε
15 τινας προς άλληλα? αύται διαφοράς, ήσαν δε δια
μεν το κατά νόμον βασιλικοί και διά το μοναρχεΐν
εκόντων, τυραννικά! δε διά το δεσποτικώς άρχειν
και κατά 1 την αυτών γνώμην. τρίτον δέ είδος 3
τυραννίδος ήπερ μάλιστ* είναι δοκεΐ τνραννίς,
αντίστροφος οΰσα τη παμβασιλεία.' τοιαύτην δ'
άναγκαΐον etrat τυραννίδα την μοναρχίαν ήτις
άνυπεύθυνος άρχει τών όμοιων και βελτιόνων
1 και κατά. Susemihl (et secundum suam Guil.) : κατά codd.
• Bk. III. cc. ix.-xii.
324
POLITICS, IV. νιι. 6— νιπ. 3
The proper way therefore to establish a constitu-
tional government, and similarly also the governments
named aristocracies, has now been stated.
1 VIII. It remained for us to speak of tyranny, not Tyranny,
because there is much that can be said about it, but
in order that it may receive its part in our inquiry,
since we rank this also as one among the kinds
of constitution. The nature of kingship wp have
de fined in our first discourses, in which we exa mined
the^j^ uestion in relation to the constitution most
commo nly denoted by the term ' kingship,' whether
ft is disadvantageous or an advantage to states, and.
2 y vhat person ought to be set up as king, and from,
what source, and by what procedure ; and in the Heroic
i.i ■*■ i i ι !■ I I Monaichs
passage in which we were considering kingship we and Aesyn
distinguished two kinds of tyranny, because thei r netae.
power in η rpanner^ porrie.rs upon royalty, because
both_t hese forms of rule are in accordance with law
(for among some of the barbarians they elect mon-
archic rulers with autocratic powers, and also in old
times among the ancient Greeks some men used ^
to become monarchs of this sort, the rulers called
aesymnetae), but these two forms of tyranny have
certain differences from one another, although they
were on the one hand of the nature of royalty be-
cause they were in accordance with law and because
they exercised monarchic rule o ver willing subjects,
anH on the ot her hand ot' the nature ot a tyranny
h^aiic/:. they rnleH d espotically and~according to
3 their own judgement, But there is a third kind of Tyranny
tyranny which is thought to be tyranny in the fullest P r °P er -
degree, being the counterpart of universal kingship ;
to this sort of tyranny must necessaril y belong
a monarchy that exercises irresponsible ru le_over
325
ARISTOTLE
12953 I I JL' Uj ι, >u.
πάντων προ? το σφετερον αυτής συμφέρον αΛΛα
μ,ή ποό? το των αρχομένων. διόπερ ακούσιος'
ούθεις γαρ εκών υπομένει των ελευθέρων την
τοιαΰτην αρχήν.
Ύυραννίδος μεν οΰν είδη ταύτα κα\ τοσαϋτα δια
τας είρημένας αίτιας.
25 IX. Ύίς δ' αρίστη πολιτεία καΐ τις άριστος βίος 1
ταΐς πλείσταις πόλεσι και τοις πλείστοις των
ανθρώπων, μήτε προς άρετην συγκρίνουσι 1 την υπέρ
τους ίδιώτας μήτε προς παιδειαν ή φύσεως δεΐται
και χορηγίας τυχηράς μήτε προς πολιτείαν την κατ*
so εύχήν γινομένην, άλλα βίον τε τον τοις πλείστοις
κοινωνήσαι δυνατόν και πολιτείαν ής τάς πλείστας
πόλεις ενδέχεται μετασχεΐν ; και γαρ ας καλοϋσιν 2
αριστοκρατίας, περί ων νυν ε'ίπομεν, τα μεν έζωτέρω
πίπτουσι ταί? πλείσταις των πόλεων, τα δε γειτνιώσι
τη καλούμενη πολιτεία., διό περί άμφοΐν ως μιας
S6 λεκτέον. ή δε δη κρίσις περί απάντων τούτων εκ
των αυτών στοιχείων εστίν, ει γαρ καλώς εν τοις
ήθικοΐς εϊρηται το τον εύδαίμονα βίον etvcu τον κατ*
άρετην άνεμπόδιστον , μεσότητα δε την άρετήν, τον
μέσον άναγκαιον βίον eivai βέλτιστον, της εκάστοις
ενδεχομένης τυχεΐν μεσότητος . τους δε αυτούς 3
40 τούτου? ορούς άναγκαιον etvai και πόλεως αρετής
1295 b και κακίας και πολιτείας , ή γαρ πολιτεία βίος τις
έστι πόλεως. εν άπάσαι? δη ταί? πόλεσίν εστί
τρία μέρη της πόλεως, οι μεν εύποροι σφόδρα, οι
1 σνντύνονσί Richards.
α Or ' if we do not aim at.'
b See 1293 b 7-21, cf. ib. 36—1294 a 25.
c N.E. 1101 a 14.
326
POLITICS, IV. νπι. 3— ιχ. 3
subjects all of the sam p or of a higher class with a
view to its own private interest and not in the interest
of the persons ruled . Hence it is held against the
will of the subjects, since ruj^f£ee__man willingly
endur es such rul e.
^These then are the kinds of tyranny and such is
their number, for the reasons stated.
1 IX. But what is the best constitution and what Middie-cias»
is the best mode of life for most cities and most of fhe best" en
mankind, if we do not judge by the standard of α a practicable,
virtue that is above the level of private citizens or
of an education that needs natural gifts and means
supplied by fortune, nor by the standard of the ideal
constitution, but of a mode of life able to be shared
by most men and a constitution possible for most
2 states to attain ? For the constitutions called
aristocracies, of which we spoke just now, 6 in some
cases fall somewhat out of the scope of most states,
and in others approximate to what is called constitu-
tional government, so that it is proper to speak of
these two forms as if they were one. And indeed
the decision in regard to all these questions is based
on the same elementary principles. For if it has
been rightly said in Ethics c that the happy life
is the life tha tjs lived without. impedirnenj-jTyarrord-
ance with virtue, and that virtue is a m iddl** pn " TSp 1
it necessarily follows that the, middle course o f life
is the besi =such] a middle course as it is possible
3-flor -each class of men to attain. And these same
criteria must also necessarily apply to the goodness
and badness of a state, and of a constitution — for a
constitution is a certain mode of life of a state. In
all states therefore theje exisj^hre^jliyjgjf^s^of^ri^
s^tate^theyery rich, theverv joor^ an d thirdly th^f
ARISTOTLE
1295 b ~ λν , ,~ t ς.\ , t / /
oe άποροι σφοορα, ol οε τρίτοι οι μέσοι τούτων,
επει τοινυν ομολογείται το μετριον άριστον και το
6 μέσον, φανερόν δτι και των ευτυχημάτων ή κτήσις -
η μέση βέλτιστη πάντων, ράστη γαρ τω λόγω 4
πειθαρχεΐν, ύπερκαλον δε η ύπερίσχυρον η ύπερ-
ευγενή η ύπερπλούσιον, η τάναντ'ια τούτοις, ύπερ-
πτωχον η ύπερασθενή και σφόδρα άτιμον, χαλεπόν
τω λόγω άκολουθεΐν γ'ιγνονται γαρ οι μεν ύβρισται
ίο και μεγαλοπόνηροι μάλλον οι δε κακούργοι και
μικροπόνηροι λίαν, των δ' αδικημάτων τα μεν
γίγνεται δι' ϋβριν τα δε διά κάκου ργ'ιαν. ετι δ'
ηκισθ ούτοι φυγαρχοΰσι 1 και σπουδαρχοΰσιν, 2 ταύτα
δ αμφότερα βλαβερά ταΐς πόλεσιν. προς δε τούτοις 5
οι μεν εν ύπεροχαΐς ευτυχημάτων οντες, ισχύος και
15 πλούτου και φίλων και των άλλων των τοιούτων,
άρχεσθαι ούτε βούλονται ούτε επίστανται (και τούτ
ευθύς οίκοθεν υπάρχει τταισιν ουσιι^, διά γαρ την
τρυφην ουδ' εν τοις διδασκαλείοις άρχεσθαι σύν-
ηθες αύτοΐς), οι δε καθ* ύπερβολην εν ενδεία
τούτων ταπεινοί λίαν • ώσθ* οι μεν άρχειν ούκ
20 επίστανται αλλ' άρχεσθαι δουλικήν αρχήν, οί δ'
άρχεσθαι μεν ουδεμία αρχή, άρχειν δε δεσποτικην
αρχήν, γίνεται ούν και δούλων και δεσποτών 6
πόλις, αλλ' ούκ ελευθέρων, και των μεν φθονούντων
των δέ καταφρονούντων . α. πλείστον απέχει φίλιας,
και κοινωνίας πολιτικής, ή γαρ κοινωνία φιλικόν,
1 Bernays : φιλαρχονσι, φυλαρχοΰσι codd.
2 Coraes : βουλαρχονσι codd.
° The text is an emendation ; some mss. give ' to rule the
tribe and to rule the council,' but most have ' to love office
and rule the council,' apparently thinking that the verb
translated ' rule the council ' meant ' wish office.'
328
POLITICS, IV. ιχ. 3-6
who are b etween the two. Since then it is admitted
that what is moderate or in the middle is best, it is
manifest that the middle amount of all of the good
4 things of fortune is the best amount to possess. For
this degree of wealth is the readiest to obey reason,
whereas for a person who is exceedingly beautiful
or strong or nobly born or rich, or the opposite —
exceedingly poor or weak or of very mean station, it
is difficult to follow the bidding of reason ; for the
former turn more to insolence and grand wickedness,
and the latter overmuch to malice and petty wicked-
ness, and the motive of all wrongdoing is either
insolence or malice. And moreover the middle class
are the least inclined to shun office and to covet
office," and both these tendencies are injurious to
5 states. And in addition to these points, those who!
have an excess of fortune's goods, strength, wealth,!
friends and the like, are not willing to be governed
and do not know how to be (and they have acquired
this quality even in their boyhood from their home-
life, which was so luxurious that they have not got
used to submitting to authority even in school),
while those who are excessively in need of these
things are too humble. Hence the latter class doj
not know how to govern but know how to submit to
government of a servile kind, while the former class
do not know how to submit to any government, and
only know how to govern in the manner of a master.
6 The result is a state consisting of slaves anrl masters,
not, of free, m en, and of one class envious and ano thex.
contemptuous of their fellows. This condition of
affairs is very far removed from friendliness, and from
political partnership — for friendliness is an element
329
ARISTOTLE
25 ούδε γαρ όδοΰ βούλονται κοινωνεΐν τοις εχθροΐς.
βούλεται δε γε η πόλις εξ ΐσων είναι και ομοίων
οτι μάλιστα, τοϋτο δ υπάρχει μάλιστα τοις μεσοις'
ώστ άναγκαΐον άριστα πολιτεύεσθαι ταύτην την
πόλιν εστί!^ 1 εζ ών φαμεν φύσει την σύστασιν είναι
της πόλεως, και σώζονται δ' εν ταΐς πόλεσιν ούτοι 7
so μάλιστα των πολιτών ούτε γαρ αυτοί τών αλλότριων
ωσπερ οι πένητες επιθυμοϋσιν, ούτε της τούτων
έτεροι καθάπερ της τών πλουσίων οι πένητες επι-
θυμονσιν καΐ διά το μητ επιβουλεύεσθαι μητ
επιβουλεύειν ακινδύνως διάγουσιν. διά τοϋτο καλώς
ηύζατο Φωκυλίδης —
πολλά μεσοισιν άριστα' μέσος θέλω εν πόλει
εΐναι.
85 δήλον άρα οτι και η κοινωνία η πολιτική αρίστη η 8
διά τών μέσων, και τάς τοιαύτας ενδέχεται ευ
πολιτεύεσθαι πόλεις εν αΐς δη πολύ το μέσον και
κρεΐττον μάλιστα μεν άμφοΐν, ει δέ μη, θατερου
μέρους, προστιθεμενον γαρ ποιεί ροπην και κωλύει
yiWo -^αι τάς εναντίας ύπερβολάς. διόπερ ευτυχία
40 μεγίστη τους πολιτευόμενους ούσίαν εχειν μεσην
1296 a κα [ Ικανην, ως οπού οι μεν πολλά σφόδρα κεκτηνται
οι δε μηθεν, η δήμος έσχατος γίγνεται ή ολιγαρχία
άκρατος ή τυραννις δι' άμφοτερας τάς ύπερβολάς•
και γάρ εκ δημοκρατίας της νεανικωτάτης και εζ
6 ολιγαρχίας γίνεται τυραννίς, εκ δε τών μέσων και
1 εστίν om. ΓΜ 8 : ή συνέστ-η Lambinus.
° Probably Lambinus's alteration of the Greek should be
accepted, giving ' hence that state will necessarily be best
governed which consists of those elements — .'
* A gnomic poet of Miletus, born 560 b.c
* i.e. extreme democracy and very limited oligarchy.
330
POLITICS, IV. ιχ. 6-8
of partnership, since men are not willing to be
partners with their enemies even on a journey. But
surely the ideal of the state is to consist as much
as possible of persons that are equal and alike, and
this similarity is most found in the middle classes ;
therefore the middle-class state will necessarily be
best constituted in respect of those elements of
which we say that the state is by nature composed.
7 And also this class of citizens have the greatest
security in the states ; for they do not themselves
covet other men's goods as do the poor, nor do the
other classes covet their substance as the poor covet
that of the rich ; and because they are neither plotted
against nor plotting they live free from danger. Be-
cause of this it was a good prayer of Phocylides 6 —
In many things the middle have the best ;
Be mine a middle station.
8 It is clear therefore also that the political community \j ff^^j^
administered by the middle class is the best, and that cX
it is possible for those states to be well governed that
are of the kind in which the middle class is numerous,
and preferably stronger than both the other two
classes, or at all events than one of them, for by
throwing in its weight it sways the balance and
prevents the opposite extremes c from coming into
existence. Hence it is the greatest ^ ood fortune if*
the men that have political power possess a moderate
arid sufficienLsubstance. since where some own a very
grea t deal of pr operty and others none there comes
about cither an extreme democracy or an unmixed
oligarchy, or a tvranny may result from both of the
two extreme?, for tyranny springs from both demo-
cracy and oligarchy of -the most unbridled kind, but
much less often from the middle forms of constitu-
331
ARISTOTLE
1296 a
τών σύνεγγυς πολύ ήττον, την δ' αιτίαν ύστερον
εν τοις περί τάς μεταβολάς των πολιτειών έροΰμεν.
οτι δ η μέση βέλτιστη, φανερόν μόνη γαρ άστα- 9
σιαστος, οπού γαρ πολύ το δια μέσου, ηκιστα
στάσεις και διαστάσεις γ'ιγνονται των πολιτειών.
ίο και αι /ieyaAcu πόλεις άστασιαστότβραι δια την
αύτην αιτίαν, οτι πολύ το μέσον εν δε ταΐς μικραΐς
ραδιόν τε διαλαβεΐν εις δύο πάντας ώστε μηθέν
καταλιπεΐν μέσον, και πάντες σχεδόν άποροι η
εύποροι είσιν. και αϊ δημοκρατίαι δε άσφαλεστεραι
τών ολιγαρχιών είσι και πολυχρονιώτεραι διά τους
15 μέσους (πλείους τε γάρ είσι και μάλλον μετεχουσι
τών τιμών εν ταΐς δημοκρατίαις η ταΓ? όλιγαρχίαις) ,
επει όταν άνευ τούτων τω πληθει ύπερτείνωσιν οι
άποροι, κακοπραγία γίνεται και άπόλλυνται ταχέως,
σημεΐον δέ δει νομίζειν και το τους βέλτιστους 10
νομοθέτας etrai τών μέσων πολιτών Σόλων τε γάρ
20 ην τούτων (δηλοΐ δ' εκ της ποιησεως) και Αυκοΰργος
(ού γάρ ην βασιλεύς) και Χαρώνδας και σχεδόν οι
πλείστοι τών άλλων.
Φανερόν δ' εκ τούτων και διότι αϊ πλεΐσται
πολιτεΐαι αί μεν δημοκρατικαί είσιν αϊ δ' όλιγ-
αρχικαί' διά γάρ το εν ταύταις πολλάκις ολίγον
25 efrai το μέσον, atet όπότεροι αν ύπερέχωσιν, εϊθ'
οι τάς ουσίας έχοντες εϊθ* ο δήμος, οι το μέσον έκ-
βαίνοντες καθ' αυτούς άγουσι την πολιτειαν, ώστε
η δήμος γίγνεται η ολιγαρχία, προς δε τούτοις 11
διά το στάσεις yiVea^at και μάχας προς αλλήλους
τω δήμω και τοις εύπόροις, όποτέροις αν μάλλον
332
POLITICS, IV. ιχ. 8-11
tion and those near to them. The cause of this we
will speak of later in our treatment of political 1308 a ι - 4
9 revolutions. That the middle form of constitution
is the best is evident ; for it alone is free from faction,
since where the middle class is numerous, factions
and party divisions among the citizens are least likely
to occur. And the great states are more free from
faction for the same reason, because the middle class
is numerous, whereas in the small states it is easy to
divide the whole people into two parties leaving
nothing in between, and also almost everybody is
needy or wealthy. Also democ racies are more secure £^ v -*XiZjC'
and more long-lived than oligarchies owing_to_the
citizens" of rhe middle class (for they are more numer-
ous and have a larger share of the honours in demo-
cracies than in oligarchies), srpc.e. when the poor
are in a majority without the middle class, adversity
10 sets in an d they are soon ruined. And it must be
deemeoTa sigmncahfTact that the best lawgivers are
from among the middle citizens ; for Solon was of that
class, as appears from his poetry, and so was Lycurgus 1252 b 14.
(for he was not a king) and Charondas and almost the ltti b 25.
greatest number of the other lawgivers.
And these considerations also show the reason why Democracy
the constitutions of most states are either demo- oifgarchy
cratic or oligarchical ; owing to the middle class in the most
these states being often a small one, the classes govern-
diverging from the middle status — whichever of the ments •
two, the owners of the estates or the people, from
time to time has the upper hand — conduct the
government on their own lines, so that it becomes
11 either a democracy or an oligarchy. And in addition
to this, because factions occur and fights between
the people and the wealthy, whichever party happens
333
ARISTOTLE
30 συμρη κρατησαι των ενάντιων, ου κασιστασι κοινην
πολίτείαν ουδ' ϊσην, άλλα της νίκης άθλον την
ύπεροχήν της πολιτείας λαμβάνουσιν , και οι μεν
δημοκρατίαν οι δ όλιγαρχίαν ποιοϋσιν. ετι δε /cat
των εν ηγεμονία γενομένων της 'Ελλάδος προς την
παρ* αύτοΐς εκάτεροι πολίτείαν αποβλέποντες οι
35 μεν δημοκρατίας εν ταί? πόλεσι καθίστασαν οι δ'
ολιγαρχίας, ου προς το των πόλεων συμφέρον
σκοποΰντες αλλά προς το σφετερον αυτών, ώστε 12
δια ταύτας τάς atria? η μηδεποτε την μεσην
ytvea^at πολίτείαν η όλιγάκις και παρ' ολίγοις• εις
γάρ άνηρ συνεπείσθη μόνος τών πρότερον εφ'
40 ηγεμονία γενομένων ταύτην άποδοΰναι την τάζιν,
1296 b ή$η δε και τοις εν ταΐς πόλεσιν εθος καθεστηκε
μηδέ βούλεσθαι το 'ίσον, αλλ' η άρχειν ζητεΐν ή
κρατουμένους ύπομενειν.
Τις μεν οΰν άριστη πολιτεία, και δια τίν αίτίαν,
εκ τούτων φανερόν τών δ' άλλων πολιτειών 13
(επειδή πλείους δημοκρατίας και πλείους όλιγ-
6 αρχίας φαμεν efvat) ποίον πρώτην θετεον και
δεύτερον και τούτον δη τον τρόπον εχομενην τω
την μεν etrai βελτίω την δε χείρω, διωρισμενης της
άριστης ου χαλεπόν ίδεΐν. άει 1 γάρ άναγκαΐον
είναι βελτίω την εγγύτατα ταύτης, χείρω δέ την
άφεστηκυϊαν του μέσου πλεΐον, αν μη προς ύπόθεσιν
ίο κρίνη τις. λέγω δε το προς ύπόθεσιν, δτι πολλάκις
1 del Spengel : δει coda.
α It is quite uncertain who is meant, possibly Solon or
Theramenes.
334
POLITICS, IV. ιχ. 11-13
to gain the upper hand over its opponents does not
establish a common or equal government, but takes
the superior share in the government as a prize of
victory, and makes it a democracy in the one case
and an oligarchy in the other. Moreover each of the
two states that in the past held the leadership of
Greece took as a pattern the form of government
that existed among themselves and set up in the one
case democracies and in the other oligarchies in the
cities, not considering the interest of the cities but
12 their own advantage. Hence owing to these causes
the middle form of constitution either never comes
into existence or seldom and in few places ; for one
man a only among the states that have formerly
held the leadership was induced to grant this form
of organization, and by this time it has become a
fixed habit with the people of the separate cities also
not even to desire equality, but either to seek to rule
or to endure being under a master. _
These considerations therefore make it clear whichy* ι
13 is the best constitution, and why it is the best ; and
now that the best has been defined, it is not difficult
to see, among the other forms of constitution (inas-
much as we pronounce that there are various forms
of democracy and various oligarchies), what kind is
to be placed first, what second, and what next in this
order, by reason of one being better and another
worse. For at each stage the form nearest to the best
one must necessarily be superior, and the form that
is more remote from the middle must be inferior
— unless one is judging relatively to given condi-
tions : I make this reservation because it is quite
possible that although one form of constitution is
335
ARISTOTLE
1296 b ν >/\\ \ / r ι 11 >Q\
ούσης άλλης πολιτείας αιρετωτερας ενιοις ουυεν
κωλύσει συμφέρειν έτέραν μάλλον etvai πολιτείαν.
Χ. Ύίς δε πολιτεία τίσι και ποία συμφέρει ποίοις, 1
έχόμενόν εστί τών είρημένων διελθεΐν. ληπτέον δη
15 πρώτον περί πασών καθόλου ταύτόν Set γάρ
κρεΐττον elvat το βουλόμενον μέρος της πόλεως του
μη βουλομένου μένειν την πολιτείαν. εστί δε πάσα
πόλις εκ τ€ του ποιου και ποσοϋ• λέγω δε ποιον
μεν έλευθερίαν πλοϋτον παιδεία^ εύγένβιαν, ποσόν
δε την του πλήθους ύπεροχην . ενδέχεται δε το 2
20 μεν ποιόν ύπάρχειν έτέρω μέρει της πόλεως, εξ
(ον συνέστηκε μερών η πόλις, άλλω δε μέρει το
ποσόν, οίον πλείους τον αριθμόν ειί-αι τών γενναίων
τους άγεννεΐς η τών πλουσίων τους απόρους, μη
μέντοι τοσούτον ύπερέχειν τω ποσώ όσον λεί-
πεσ^αι τω ποιώ. διο ταύτα προς άλληλα συγ-
κριτέον.
25 "Οπου μεν οΰν υπερέχει το τών απόρων πλήθος
την είρημένην άναλογίαν, ενταύθα πέφυκεν είναι
δημοκρατίαν, και έκαστον εΐδος δημοκρατίας κατά
την ύπεροχην του δήμου εκάστου, οίον εάν μεν το
τών γεωργών ύπερτείνη πλήθος, την πρώτην
δημοκρατίαν, εάν δε το τών βάναυσων και μισθ-
30 αρνούντων , την τελευταίαν , ομοίως δε και τάς άλλας
τάς μεταζύ τούτων οπού δε το τών ευπόρων και 3
γνωρίμων μάλλον ύπερτεινει τω ποιώ η λείπεται
τώ ποσώ, ενταύθα δε όλιγαρχίαν, και της ολιγαρχίας
τον αυτόν τρόπον έκαστον είδος κατά την ύπεροχην
α i.e. so as to outbalance their inferiority in quality.
b i.e. superiority in quality.
836
POLITICS, IV. ιχ. 13— χ. 3
preferable it may often be more advantageous for
certain people to have another form. —*
1 X. The next thing after what has been said is to Constitn-
discuss which constitution is advantageous for which (Respond
people, and what sort of constitution for what sort in s to
of people. Now we must first grasp a general prin- character.
ciple that applies equally to all sorts of constitution :
it is essential that the part of the state that wishes
the constitution to remain should be stronger than
the part that does not wish it. But every state
consists of both quality and quantity : by quality
I mean freedom, wealth, education, good birth, and
by quantity the superior numbers of the multitude.
2 And it is possible that, while the quality of the state
belongs to one among the parts of which the state
consists and its quantity to another part — for example
the low-born may be more numerous than the noble
or the poor than the rich, — yet the more numerous
class may not exceed in quantity as much as they fall
behind in quality. Hence these two factors have to
be judged in comparison with one another.
Where therefore the multitude of the poor exceeds
in the proportion stated, here it is natural for there to
be democracy, and each kind of democracy in accord-
ance with the superior number of the common people
of each sort, for example if the number of the farming
class exceeds, the first sort of democracy, but if that
of the common labourers and wage-earners, the last
sort, and similarly also with the other sorts that lie
3 between these two ; but where the class of the well-
to-do and notable exceeds in quality more than it
falls behind in quantity, here it is natural for there
to be an oligarchy, and likewise the various kinds
of oligarchy according to the degree of superiority 6
337
ARISTOTLE
85 τον ολιγαρχικού πλήθους. δει δ' άει τον νομοθέτην
εν τή πολιτεία π ροσλαμβάνειν τους μέσους• αν τ€
γάρ ολιγαρχικούς τους νόμους τιθή, στοχάζ€σθαι
χρή των μέσων, εάν τε δημοκρατικούς , προσάγεσθαι
τοΐς νόμοις τούτους, οπού δε το των μέσων 4
ύπερτείνει πλήθος ή συναμφοτέρων των άκρων ή
και θατέρου μόνον, ένταΰθ* ενδέχεται πολιτείαν
1297 a elvai μόνιμον ούθεν γάρ φοβερόν μή ποτ€
συμφωνήσωσιν οι πλούσιοι τοΐς πένησιν επι
τούτους• ουδέποτε γάρ άτεροι βουλήσονται δου-
λεύειν τοΐς έτέροις, κοινοτέραν δ , aV ζητώσιν,
ούδεμίαν εύρήσουσιν άλλην ταύτης, iv μέρει γάρ
5 άρχειν ουκ αν ύπομείνειαν δια την απιστίας την
προς αλλήλους• πανταχού δε πιστότατος ό δι-
αιτητής, διαιτητής δ' ό μέσος, οσω δ' αν άμεινον
ή πολιτεία μιχθή, τοσούτω μονιμωτέρα' δια- 5
μαρτάνουσι δε πολλοί και των τάς άριστο κ ρατικάς
βουλομένων ποιεΐν πολιτείας ου μόνον εν τω
ίο πλεΐον νέμειν τοΐς εύπόροις αλλά και εν τω παρα-
κρούεσθαι τον δήμον ανάγκη γάρ χρονω ποτέ εκ
των φευδών αγαθών αληθές συ/χ/^αι κακόν, αϊ
γάρ πλεονεζίαι των πλουσίων άπολλύουσι μάλλον
την πολιτείαν ή αϊ του δήμου.
"Εστί δ' οσα προφάσεως χάριν εν ταΐς πολι- 6
15 retatj σοφίζονται προς τον δήμον πέντε τον
αριθμόν, περί έκκλησίαν, περί τάς αρχάς, περί
δικαστήρια, περί οπλισιν, περί γυμνασίαν περί
έκκλησίαν μεν το e^etvat εκκλησιάζειν πάσι,
ζημίαν δε επικεΐσθαι τοΐς εύπόροις εάν μή εκκλη-
σιάζωσα' ή μόνοις ή μείζω πολλω• περί δε τάς
20 αρχάς το τοΐς μεν εχουσι τίμημα μή έξεΐναι
° The word is loosely used of this small class.
338
POLITICS, IV. χ. 3-6
of the oligarchical multitude. But the lawgiver in
his constitution must always take in the middle class ;
if he is making the laws of an oligarchical char-
acter he must keep the middle class in view, and if
democratic, he must legislate so as to bring them in.
4 And where the number of the middle class exceeds
both the extreme classes together, or even one of
them only, here it is possible for a constitutional
government to be lasting ; for there is no fear of
the rich ever coming to terms with the poor against
this numerous middle class ; for neither class will
ever wish to be subject to the other, and if they look
for another constitution fairer to both than this
they will not find one, for they would not endure to
take turns to govern because they distrust each other :
everywhere it is the arbitrator that is most trusted,
and the man in the middle is an arbitrator. And the a mixed
better the constitution is mixed, the more permanent m 3 o S s t t,tutlon
5 it is ; and many even of those who want to establish permanent.
aristocratic forms of constitution make a great mis-
take not only in giving too large a share to the well-
to-do but also in cheating the people ; for false
benefits inevitably result ultimately in true evil, as
the encroachments of the rich ruin the constitution
more than those of the people.
6 The artifices employed in constitutions as a pre- Safeguards
text in regard to the people are five in number, and oligarchy.
are concerned with the assembly, the magistracies, Democracy,
the law-courts, the bearing of heavy arms, and Mixed Con-
gymnastic exercises ; in relation to the assembly, * uu,Uu *•
the granting to all of the right to attend but the
imposition of a fine for non-attendance on the well-to-
do only, or a much larger fine on them than others ;
in relation to the magistracies, the denial to the
339
ARISTOTLE
1297 a , t , s , , , M , x λ
εςομνυσσαι τοις ο αποροις ejeivai• και περί τα
δικαστήρια τοΐς μεν εύπόροις είναι ζημίαν αν μη
δικάζωσι τοΐς δ' άπόροις άδειας, ή τοΐς μεν
μεγάλην τοΐς δε μικράν, ωσπερ iv τοΐς Χαρών-
δον νόμοις. ενιαχοΰ δ' εζεστι μεν πάσιν άπο- 7
26 γραφαμενοις εκκλησιάζειν και δικάζειν, εάν δε απο-
γραφάμενοι μήτ εκκλησιάζωσι μήτε δικάζωσιν
επίκεινται //.eyctAcu ζτ7//,ιαι τούτοις, ίνα δια μεν
την ζημίαν φεύγωσι το άπογράφεσθαι δια δε το
μη άπογράφεσθαι μή δικάζωσι μηδ* εκκλησιάζωσιν .
τον αυτόν δε τρόπον και περί του όπλα κεκτησθαι
80 και του γυμνάζεσθαι νομοθετοΰσιν τοΐς μεν γαρ
άπόροις εζεστι μή κεκτησθαι τοΐς δ εύποροις
επιζήμιον μή κεκτημενοις, καν μή γυμνάζωνται
τοΐς μεν ουδεμία ζημία τοΐς δ' εύπόροις επιζήμιον ,
όπως οι μεν δια τήν ζημίαν μετεχωσιν οι δε δια
w το μή φοβεΐσθαι μή μετεχωσιν. ταΰτα μεν ουν
ολιγαρχικά σοφίσματα της νομοθεσίας, εν δε 8
ταΐς δημοκρατίαις προς ταϋτ άντισοφίζονται• τοΐς
μεν γάρ άπόροις μισθόν πορίζουσιν εκκλησιάζουσι
και δικάζουσιν, τοΐς δ' εύπόροις ούδεμιαν τάττουσι
ζημίαν. ώστε φανερόν ότι ει τι? βούλεται /xiyvwai
40 δικαίως, δει τά παρ* εκατεροις συνάγειν και τοΐς
μεν μισθόν πορίζειν τοΐς δέ ζημίαν ούτω γαρ αν
κοινωνοΐεν άπαντες, εκείνως δ' ή πολιτεία yiyverat
1297 b Τ (χ>ν έτερων μόνον, δει δέ τήν πολιτείαν είναι μεν
340
POLITICS, IV. χ. 6-8
owners of rated property of the right to swear off
serving, while the poor have this right ; in relation
to the law-courts, the imposition of a fine on the
well-to-do if they do not serve on a jury, but no
penalty for the poor, or else a large fine for the one
class and a small one for the others, as in the laws of
7 Charondas. In some places all have the right to 1251 b 14.
serve in the assembly and on juries after having
their names put on a register, but large fines are
imposed on those who after so registering fail to
attend in either capacity, in order that the fine may
cause them to avoid registration and that owing to
their not registering they may not serve on juries or
in the assembly. They also legislate in the same
manner about owning heavy arms and engaging in
gymnastic exercises : the poor are not allowed to
possess arms, but the well-to-do are liable to a fine
if they have not got them, and there is no fine for the
former class if they abstain from gymnastics, but the
well-to-do are liable to a fine, in order that the one
class because of the fine may take part in them and
the other because they have no penalty to fear
may not. These artifices of legislation then are of
8 an oligarchic nature ; in democracies they introduce
contrary devices in regard to these matters : they
provide pay for the poor for serving in the assembly
and on juries and impose no fine upon the well-to-do
for abstaining. Hence it is manifest that if anybody
wishes to make a just blend, he must bring together
the regulations existing in each of the two forms of
constitution, and provide pay for attendance and a
fine for non-attendance ; for thus all would participate,
whereas in the other way the government comes to
be in the hands of only one of the two classes. And
341
ARISTOTLE
1297 b
εκ τών τά όπλα εχόντων μόνον, τον δε τιμήματος
το πλήθος απλώς μεν όρισαμενους ουκ εστίν
ειπείν τοσούτον ύπάρχειν, αλλά σκεφαμενους το
5 ποιον 1 επιβάλλει μακρότατον ώστε τους μετέχοντας
της πολιτείας είναι πλείους τών μή μετεχόντων,
τοΰτο τάττειν. εθελουσι γάρ οι πένητες και μή 9
μετέχοντες τών τιμών ήσυχίαν εχειν εάν μή
ύβρίζη τις αυτούς μήτε άφαιρήται μηθέν της
ουσίας• άλλα τοΰτο ου paSiov, ου γάρ άει σιγ^αι-
ιο νει χαρίεντας είναι τους μετέχοντας του πολιτεύμα-
τος, και είώθασι οε όταν πόλεμος ή όκνεΐν αν μή
λαμβάνωσι τροφήν άποροι δε ώσιν εάν οε πορίζη
τι? τροφήν, βούλονται πολεμεΐν. εστί δ' ή πολιτεία 10
παρ εν'ιοις ου μόνον εκ τών όπλιτευόντων αλλά
και εκ τών ώπλιτευκότων εν Μαλιευσι δε ή μεν
15 πολιτεία ην εκ τούτων τάς δε αρχάς ήροΰντο εκ
τών στρατευομένων, και ή πρώτη δε πολιτεία εν
τοις "Έλλησιν εγένετο μετά τάς βασίλεια? εκ τών
πολεμούντων , ή μεν εξ αρχής εκ τών ιππέων (την
γάρ ίσχύν και τήν ύπεροχήν εν τοις ίππεΰσιν 6
20 πόλεμος εΐχεν, άνευ μεν γάρ συντάξεως άχρηστον
το όπλιτικόν, αϊ δε περί τών τοιούτων εμπειριαι
και τάξεις εν τοις άρχαίοις ούχ ύπήρχον, ώστ εν
τοις ίππεΰσιν είναι τήν ίσχύν), αυξανομένων δε
τών πόλεων και τών εν τοις δπλοις ϊσχυσάντων
μάλλον πλείους μετεΐχον της πολιτείας, οιόπερ
25 ας νΰν καλοΰμεν πολιτείας οι πρότερον εκάλονν
1 πόσον Lindau.
842
POLITICS, IV. χ. g-io
although it is proper that the government should be
drawn only from those who possess heavy armour,
yet it is not possible to define the amount of the
property-qualification absolutely and to say that they
must possess so much, but only to consider what sort
of amount is the highest that is compatible with
making those who have a share in the constitution
more numerous than those who have not, and to fix
9 that limit. For those who are poor and have no share
in the honours are willing to keep quiet if no one
insults them or takes away any part of their substance;
but this is not easy to secure, for it does not always
happen that those who are in the governing class
are gentlemen. Also people have a way of being
reluctant to serve when there is a war if they do not
get rations and are poor men ; but if somebody pro-
10 vides food they want to fight. In some states the
citizen-body consists not only of those who are serv-
ing as heavy-armed soldiers, but also of those who
have so served : and at Malea the citizen-bodv con-
sisted of these, while the magistrates were elected
from those who were actually on service. And indeed
the earliest form of constitution among the Greeks
after the kingships consisted of those who were
actually soldiers, the original form consisting of the
cavalry (for war had its strength and its pre-eminence
in cavalry, since without orderly formation heavy-
armed infantry is useless, and the sciences and
systems dealing with tactics did not exist among the
men of old times, so that their strength lay in their
cavalry) ; but as the states grew and the wearers of
heavy armour had become stronger, more persons
came to have a part in the government. Hence what
we now call constitutional governments the men of
MB
ARISTOTLE
δημοκρατίας' ήσαν δε αί άρχαΐαί πολιτεΐαι ευλόγως 11
ολιγαρχικοί και βασιλικαί, δι* όλιγανθρωπίαν γαρ
ουκ εϊχον πολύ το μέσον, ώστ ολίγοι τε οντες το
πλήθος και κατά την σύνταζιν μάλλον ΰπεμενον
το άρχεσθαι.
Δια τίνα μεν ουν είσϊν αίτίαν αί πολιτεΐαι πλείους,
so και δια. τι παρά τάς λεγομενας ετεραι (δημοκρατία
τε γάρ ου μία τον αριθμόν εστί, και των άλλων
ομοίως), en δε τίνες αί διάφοροι και διά τίνα
αίτίαν συμβαίνει, προς δε τούτοις τις αρίστη των
πολιτειών ως επι το πλείστον ειπείν, και των
άλλων ποια ποιοις άρμοττει των πολιτειών, εΐρηται.
85 XI. Πάλιν δέ και κοινή και χωρίς περί εκάστης j
λεγωμεν περί τών εφεζής, λαβόντες αρχήν τηι
προσήκουσαν αυτών, εστί δη τρία μόρια τών
πολιτειών πασών περί ων δει θεωρεΐν τον σπουδαΐον
νομοθετην εκάστη το συμφέρον ων εχόντων καλώς
ανάγκη την πολιτείαν εχειν καλώς, και τάς
40 πολιτείας αλλήλων διαφερειν εν τω διαφερειν
εκαστον τούτων, εστί δε τών τριών τούτων εν
1298 a μεν τι 1 το βουλευόμενον περί τών κοινών, δεύτερον
δε το περί τάς αρχάς, τοϋτο δ' εστί τίνος 2 δει και 3
τίνων eirai κυρίας, και ποίαν τινά δει γίγνεσθαι
την αιρεσιν αυτώρ', τρίτον δε τι το δικάζον.
Υ^ύριον δ' εστί το βουλευόμενον περί πολέμου
1 μέν τι Congreve : μέι* τι, μέν τοι codcl.
1 έστι rivas Wilson : έστϊν &s codd.
8 δίΐ <ehai> καΐ ? ed.
S44
POLITICS, IV. χ. 11— χι. 1
11 former times called democracies ; but the constitu-
tional governments of early days were naturally
oligarchical and royal, for owing to the smallness of
the populations their middle class was not numerous,
so that because of their small numbers as well as in
conformity with the structure of the state the middle
class more readily endured being in a subject position.
It has then been said what is the reason of there
being several forms of constitution, and why there
are others besides those designated by name (for
there is not one single democracy only, and similarly
there are more than one of the other forms), and also
what are the differences between them and what is
the reason why these differences occur, and in addition
to these points, which is the best of the constitutions
speaking generally, and of the other constitutions
which sort is suited to which sort of people.
1 XI. And again, let us speak about the points that The three
come next, both generally and with reference to each o 1 /^^.
constitution separately, taking their appropriate start- ment:
ing-point. All forms of constitution then have three
factors in reference to which the good lawgiver has to
consider what is expedient for each constitution ; and
if these factors are well-ordered the constitution must
of necessity be well-ordered, and the superiority of one
constitution over another necessarily consists in the
superiority of each of these factors. Of these three
factors one is, wh at is to be the body that deliberates
about the common interests, second the one connected
. rath the magistracies , that is, what there are to be
and what matters they are to control, and what is to
be the method of their election, and a third is. wha t
i s tq be the judiciary.
The deliberative factor is sovereign about war and
345
ARISTOTLE
δ και ειρήνης και συμμαχίας και διαλύσεως, και
περί νόμων, και περί θανάτου και φυγής και
δημεύσεως, και των ευθυνών. άναγκαΐον δ' ήτοι 2
ττασι τοις πολίταις άποδεδόσθαι πάσας ταύτα? τα?
κρίσεις η τισΐ πάσας (οίον αρχή τινϊ /ζια ή πλείοσιν)
η έτέραις ετέρας ή τινάς μεν αυτών πάσι τινάς δε
τισύ\
ίο Το μεν ουν πάντας και περί απάντων δημοτικόν,
την τοιαύτην γαρ Ισότητα ζητεί ό δήμος. είσι δέ 3
οι τρόποι του πάντας πλείους, εις μεν το κατά
μέρος άλλα μη πάντας αθρόους (ώσπερ εν τη
πολιτεία, τη Ύηλεκλέους εστί του Μιλησίου, και
εν άλλαις δέ πολιτείαις βουλεύονται αί συναρχίαι
15 συνιοΰσαι εις δε τάς αρχάς βαδίζουσι πάντες κατά
μέρος εκ τών φυλών και τών μορίων τών ελάχιστων
παντελώς έως αν διέλθη δια πάντων), συνιέναι δέ
μόνον περί τε νόμων θέσεως και τών περί της
πολιτείας και τά παραγγελλόμενα άκουσομένους
20 υπο τών αρχόντων άλλο? δε τρόπος το πάντας 4
αθρόους, owieVai δε μόνον προς τε τάς αρχ-
αιρεσίας [αίρησομένους] 1 και προς τάς νομοθεσίας
και περί πολέμου και ειρήνης και προς εύθύνας,
τά δ' άλλα τάς αρχάς βουλεύεσθαι τάς εφ' έκάστοις
τεταγμένας, αιρετά? ούσας εξ απάντων η κλήρω-
ν, τάς• άλλος δε τρόπος το περί τάς αρχάς και τάς
εύθύνας άπαντάν τους πολίτας, και περί πολέμου
1 Susemihl.
346
β Otherwise unknown.
POLITICS, IV. χι. 1-4
peace and the formation and dissolution of alliances, (i) The
and about laws, and about sentences of death and tire: Ha
exile and confiscation of property, and about the factions
2 audits of magistrates. And necessarily either all democracy,
these decisions must be assigned to all the citizens, aristocracy
or all to some of them (for instance to some one and
magistracy or to several), or different ones to different govem-
magistracies, or some of them to all the citizens and ment -
some to certain persons.
For all the citizens to be members of the delibera-
tive body and to decide all these matters is a mark
of a popular government, for the common people
3 seek for equality of this nature. But there are
several modes of such universal membership. One
is for the citizens to serve in rotation and not all in a
body (as is enacted in the constitution of the Milesian
Telecles, and in other constitutions also the boards
of magistrates deliberate in joint assemblies but all
the citizens enter into the magistracies from the
tribes or from the very smallest sections of the citizen-
body in rotation until office has gone through the
whole body), and for there to be joint assemblies
only to consider legislation and reforms of the con-
stitution and to hear the reports submitted by the
magistrates. Another mode is for all to assemble
\n a body, but only for the purpose of electing magis-
trates, enacting laws, considering the declaration of
war and the conclusion of peace and holding the audit
of magistrates, but for all other matters to be con-
sidered by the magistrates appointed to deal with
each respectively and elected by suffrage or by lot
from all the citizens. Another mode is for the
citizens to meet about the magistracies and the
audits and in order to deliberate about declaring war
S47
ARISTOTLE
βουλευσο μένους και συμμαχίας, τα δ' άλλα τα?
αρχάς διοικεΐν αιρετάς ούσας, όσας ενδέχεται,
τοιαυται δ' είσιν όσας άρχειν άναγκαΐον τους
επισταμένους, τέταρτος δε τρόπος το -π-άντα? περί 5
s πάντων βουλεύεσθαι συνιόντας , τάς δ αρχάς περί
μηθ€νός κρίνειν αλλά μόνον προανακρίνειν, όνπερ
η τελευταία δημοκρατία νυν διοικείται τρόπον, ην
άνάλογόν φαμ€ν είναι ολιγαρχία τε δυναστευτικη
και μοναρχία τυραννική . ούτοι μεν ουν οι τρόποι β
δημοκρατικοί πάντες, το δε τινά? περί πάντων
85 ολιγαρχικό ν. έχει δε και τούτο διαφοράς πλείους.
όταν μεν γάρ από τιμημάτων μετριωτέρων αιρετοί
τε ωσι και πλείους δια την μετριότητα του τιμή-
ματος, και περί ων 6 νόμος απαγορεύει μη κινώσιν
άλλ' άκολουθώσι, και εζη κτωμένω το τίμημα
μετέχειν, ολιγαρχία μέν πολιτική δ' εστίν η
40 τοιαύτη διά το μετριάζειν όταν δε μη πάντες
1298 b του βουλεύεσθαι μετέχωσιν αλλά πρόκριτοι, 1 κατά
νόμον δ' άρχωσιν ώσπερ και πρότερον, όλιγαρχι-
κόν όταν δε και α'ιρώνται αυτοί αυτούς οι κύριοι
του βουλεύεσθαι, και όταν παις αντί πατρός
είσίη και κύριοι των νόμων ώσιν, όλιγαρχικην*
b άναγκαΐον είναι την τά£ιν ταύτην. όταν δε τινών 7
1 άλλα πρόκριτοι Immisch : άλλ' αιρετοί codd.
1 όλι-γαρχικωτέραν Garvey, <μαλ\οι>')> όλΐΎαρχικην Spengel.
" i.e. in an advanced democracy.
348
POLITICS, IV. χι. 4-7
and concluding an alliance, but for all other matters
to be dealt with by the magistrates, elected by
suffrage in as many cases as circumstances allow,**
and such magistracies are all those which must of
δ necessity be rilled by experts. A fourth mode is for
all to meet in council about all matters, and for the
magistracies to decide about nothing but only to make
preliminary decisions ; this is the mode in which
democracy in its last form is administered at the
present day — the form of democracy which we pro-
nounce to correspond to dynastic oligarchy and to
6 tyrannical monarchy. These modes then are all of
them democratic. On the other hand for some
persons to deliberate upon all matters is oligarchic.
But this also has several variations. For when the
members of the deliberative body are elected on
comparatively moderate property-qualifications, and
the eligible persons are comparatively numerous
because of the moderateness of the qualification,
and when they do not make changes in things in
which the law forbids it but follow the law, and
when anybody acquiring the property-qualification is
allowed to become a member, a constitution of this
sort is indeed an oligarchy, but one of the nature of
constitutional government, because of its modera-
tion. When on the other hand not everybody thus
qualified participates in deliberation but only certain
persons previously chosen by election, and these
govern in accordance with law as in the former case,
this is oligarchical ; and also when the deliberative
officials are elected by co-optation, and when the
office is hereditary and has supreme control over the
7 laws, this system is bound to be oligarchical. But
when certain persons control certain matters, for
S19
ARISTOTLE
1298 b / ι t> \ / ν χ > / < »λ
τίνες, οίον πολέμου μεν και ειρήνης και ευσυνων
πάντες των 8ε άλλων άρχοντες και ούτοι αιρετοί
μη κληρωτοί, 2 αριστοκρατία η πολιτεία• εάν
δ' ενίων μεν αιρετοί ενίων δε κληρωτοί, και
κληρωτοί η απλώς η εκ προκρίτων, η κοινή
ίο αιρετοί και κληρωτοί, τα μεν πολιτείας αριστοκρα-
τικής εστί τούτων, τά 8ε πολιτείας αυτής.
Αιηρηται μεν οΰν το βουλενόμενον προς τάς
πολιτείας τούτον τον τρόπον, και 8ιοικεΐ 3 εκάστη
πολιτεία κατά τον είρημενον διορισμόν συμφέρει
δέ δημοκρατία τη 4, μάλιστ' eti>ai οοκούση δημο-
15 κρατια νυν (λέγω δε τοιαύτην εν fj κύριος 6 δήμος
και των νόμων εστίν) προς το βουλεύεσθαι βελτιον
το αυτό ποιεΐν όπερ επι των δικαστηρίων εν ταις
ολιγαρχίαις (τάττουσι γάρ ζημίαν τούτοις ους
βούλονται δικάζειν ίνα δικάζωσιν, οι δέ δημοτικοί
μισθον τοις άπόροις), τοΰτο δέ και περί τάς
20 εκκλησίας ποιεΐν (βουλεύσονται γάρ βελτιον κοινή
βουλευόμενοι πάντες, ό μέν δήμος μετά των
γνωρίμων, ούτοι δε μετά του πλήθους)• συμ-
φέρει δέ και το αιρετούς etrai τους βουλευομενους
ή κληρωτούς "ίσως εκ των μορίων, συμφέρει δέ καν
ύπερβάλλωσι πολύ κατά το πλήθος οι δημοτικοί
2ό των πολιτικών 6 ή μη πάσι δίδομαι μισθον αλλ'
1 Tives seel. Camerarius (cum Guilelmi codd. plerisque).
2 μη κληρωτοί ? Newman : η κλ. codd. (seel. Brandis).
3 disponitur (διοικείται ?) Guil. : δωίσ€ί Congreve.
1 ttj Coraes : τη re codd. 5 πολιτών ? Richards.
The mss. give ' or by lot.'
350
POLITICS, IV. χι. 7-8
instance when all the citizens control decisions as
to war and peace and the audit of officials while
everything else is controlled by magistrates and
these are elected by vote, not by lot," the constitution
is an aristocracy ; while if some matters are con-
trolled by magistrates elected by vote and others by
magistrates chosen by lot, and this either directly or
from a list previously selected by vote, or if magis-
trates elected by vote and by lot sit in a joint
body, some of these regulations are features of an
aristocratic constitution and others of constitutional
government itself.
We have then in this way distinguished the Advantages
different kinds of deliberative body in relation to const/tu-
the forms of constitution, and each form of constitu- tion •
tion carries on the administration in accordance with
the distinction stated. But for a democracy of the
form that at the present day is considered to be de-
mocracy in the fullest degree (and I mean one of the
sort in which the people is sovereign even over the
laws) it is advantageous for the improvement of its
deliberative function for it to do the same as is done
in oligarchies in the matter of the law-courts (for
they enact a fine to compel the attendance on juries
of those whom they want to attend, whereas de-
mocratic states institute payment for attendance
for the benefit of the poor), and also to do this in
respect of the assemblies (for they will deliberate
better when all are deliberating jointly, the common
people when with the notables and these when with
the masses'), and it is also advantageous for those who
deliberate to be elected by vote or by lot equally from
the different sections, and, if the men of the people far
exceed the political class in number, it is advantageous
351
ARISTOTLE
1298b , , , . , ._,
όσοι σύμμετροι προς το των γνωρίμων πληυος η
άποκληροΰν τους πλείους. εν δε ταΓ? ολιγαρχιαις 9
ί) προσαιρεΐσθαί 1 τινας εκ τον πλήθους, η, κατα-
σκευάσαντας άρχεΐον οίον iv ενίαις πολιτειαις
εστίν ους καλοΰσι προβούλους και νομοφύλακας ,*
80 περί τούτων χρηματίζειν περί ων αν ούτοι
προβουλεύσωσιν (ούτω γαρ μεθέζει 6 δήμος του
βουλεΰεσθαι και λύειν ούθεν δυνήσεται των περί
την πολιτείαν), ετι η ταύτα φηφίζεσθαι τον δήμον
η μηθεν εναντίον τοις είσφερομενοις, η της
συμβουλής μεν μεταδιδόναι πάσι βουλεΰεσθαι 8ε
85 τους άρχοντας, και το άντικείμενον δε του εν 10
τοις πολιτείαις γιγνομενου δει ποιεΐν άποφηφιζο-
μενον μεν γαρ κΰριον δει ποιεΐν το πλήθος, κατα-
φηφιζόμενον δε μη κΰριον, αλλ' επαναγεσθω
πάλιν επί τοις άρχοντας• εν γαρ ταΐς πολιτειαις
άντεστραμμενως ποιοΰσιν, οι γαρ ολίγοι απο-
40 φηφισάμενοι μεν κύριοι, καταφηφισάμενοι δε ου
1299 a κύριοι, αλλ' επανάγεται εις τους πλείστους αιει.
Περί μεν οΰν του βουλευομενου και του κυρίου
δη της πολιτείας τούτον διωρισθω τον τρόπον.
XII. *Έιχομενη δε τούτων εστίν η περί τας 1
αρχάς διαίρεσις (έχει γαρ και τούτο το μοριον της
β πολιτείας πολλάς διαφοράς), πόσαι τε αρχαι και
1 Susemihl: προαιρ. codd. 2 Coraes: -κα% και codd.
There were πρύβουλοι at Corinth as well as a βουλή and
an εκκλησία ; and νομοφύλακΐ% at Sparta, Athens and else-
where : at Athens they sat with the presidents of the βουλή
and εκκλησία to check illegal procedure.
352
POLITICS, IV. χι. 8— χπ. 1
either not to give pay to all but only to as many as
are commensurate with the number of the notables,
or to discard by lot those who exceed this number.
9 In olig archies on the other hand it is flrh-fl nta genns
either to cn - npt iini ii » parrrmc fVnm thf> mu l titude,
or to institute an offi ce ^~ p **"* """ that e xists in _
Cert ain constitutional governments under the nam e
nf Preliminary Γηηηρι11ηΓ<; nr ("marrHang nf th e Law,
_and deal with the matters abou t whi^h th«^e ^ffHals
jhave held a preliminar y Heliheratirm (for thus the
common people will have a share in deliberation and
will not have the power to abolish any part of the
constitution), and then for the people by their vote
either to confirm or at all events not to pass anything
contrary to the resolutions brought before them, or
to allow all to take part in debate but only the
10 magistrates to frame resolutions ; and in fact it
is proper to do just the opposite of what takes
place in constitutionally governed states ; for the
common people ought to be given power to vote the
rejection of a measure, but not to vote its ratifica-
tion, but it should be referred back to the magis-
trates. In constitutional governments the procedure
is the reverse ; the few are competent to vote
the rejection of a resolution but are not competent
to vote its ratification, this being always referred
back to the most numerous body.
Let us then decide in this manner about the de-
liberative body, which in fact is the sovereign power
in the constitution.
1 XII. Connected with this subject is the determina- (2) Th•
tion in regard to the magistracies (for this part of ExecutIve •
the constitution also has many varieties), how man ν
magistracies there are to be, and what are to be their
333
ARISTOTLE
12OT»
κύριαι τίνων, και περί χρόνου, πόσος έκαστης
αρχής (οί μεν γαρ εξάμηνους, οι δε δι' ελάττονος,
ol δ ενιαυσίας, οί δε πολυχρονιωτερας ποιοΰσι
τάς αρχάς), και πότερον eimi δει τάς αρχάς άι-
δίους η πολυχρονίους, η μηδετερον αλλά πλεονά-
ιο κις τους αυτούς, ή μη τον αυτόν δις αλλ' άπαξ
μόνον ετι 8ε περί την κατάστασιν των αρχών, εκ 2
τίνων δεΐ ytVea^ai και υπό τίνων και πώς. περί
πάντων γαρ τούτων δει δυνασ^αι διελεΐν κατά
πόσους ενδέχεται yei^ea^at τρόπους, κάπειτα προσ-
αρμοσαι ποιαις ποιοι 1 πολιτείαις συμφερουσιν.
15 εστί δε ούδε τοΰτο διορίσαι ράδιον, ποίας δει καλεΐν
αρχάς• πολλών γάρ επιστατών ή πολιτική κοινωνία
δεΐται, διόπερ ου 2 πάντας ούτε τους αιρετούς
ούτε τους κληρωτούς άρχοντας θετεον, οίον τους
ίερεΐς πρώτον (τοΰτο γάρ ετερόν τι παρά τάς
πολιτικός αρχάς θετεον), ετι δε χορηγοί και
20 κήρυκες, αίροϋνται δε και πρεσβευταί. είσι δε 3
at μεν πολιτικοί τών επιμελειών , ή πάντων τών
πολιτών προς τίνα πράζιν, οίον στρατηγός
στρατευομένων, η κατά μέρος, οίον ο γυναικο-
νόμος η παιδονόμος- αϊ δ' οίκονομικαί (πολλάκις
γάρ αίροϋνται σιτομετρας)' αϊ δ' ύπηρετικαί και
25 προς ας, αν εύπορώσι, τάττουσι δούλους, μάλιστα
ώδ' s απλώς ειπείν αρχάς λεκτέον ταύτας οσαι?
άποδεδοται βουλεύσασθαί τε περί τινών και κρΐναι
1 Αγ. : ποΐαι codd. (et nonnulli πολιτεϊαι).
2 ού suppleuit Rassow.
Distributions of corn were made at times of scarcity, or
when the state had received a present of corn.
354
POLITICS, IV. χπ. 1-3
powers, and what their various periods of tenure (for
some people make their magistracies tenable for six
months, others for less, others for a year and others
for a longer period) — shall the magistracies be for life
or for a long period, or if for a shorter term shall the
same people be allowed to hold them several times
2 or not the same man twice but once only ? and also
as to the appointment of magistrates, who shall be
eligible, who the electors, and what the mode of
election ? For on all these points it is needful to be
able to determine how many modes of procedure are
possible, and then to settle what modes are expedient
for what sorts of constitution. Nor is it easy to decide
to what kinds of office the name of magistracy ought
to be applied ; for the political community requires
a great many officials, owing to which it is not proper
to reckon all of them magistrates, whether elected
by vote or by lot, — for instance first the priests (for
this office must be considered as something different
from the political magistracies), and again there are
leaders of choruses, and heralds, and persons are
3 also elected as ambassadors. And of the offices
exercising superintendence some are political, and
are exercised either over the whole of the citizens in
regard to some operation — for instance a general
superintends them when serving as soldiers, or over
a section — for instance the superintendent of women
or of children ; while others are economic (for states
often elect officers to dole out corn e ) ; and others
are subordinate, and are the sort of services to which
people when well off appoint slaves. But the title
of magistracy, to put it simply, is chiefly to be applied
to all those offices to which have been assigned the
duties of deliberating about certain matters and of
355
ARISTOTLE
1299 a
και €ττιτάζαι, και μάλιστα τούτο, το γάρ έπι-
ταττειν άρχικώτερόν εστίν, αλλά ταύτα διαφέρει
προς μεν τάς χρήσεις ονθεν ως ειπείν (ού yap πω
30 κρίσις γεγονεν αμφισβητούντων περί τον ονόματος),
έχει δε τιν άλλην διανοητικην πραγματείαν.
ποΐαι δ άρχαι και πόσαι άναγκαΐαι ει εσται \
πόλις, και ποΐαι άναγκαΐαι μεν ον χρήσιμοι δε
προς σπονδαίαν πολιτείαν, μάλλον αν τις άπορη -
σείε προς άπασαν τε δη πολιτείαν και δη και τάς
85 μικράς πόλεις, εν μεν γάρ δη ταΐς μεγάλαις
ενδέχεται τε και δει μίαν τετάχθαι προς εν έργον
(πολλονς τε γάρ εις τά αρχεία ενδέχεται βαδί-
ζειν διά το πολλονς etrai του? πολίτας, ώστε
τας μεν διαλειπβι»' πολύν χρόνον τάς δ' άπαξ
άρχειν, και βέλτιον έκαστον έργον τνγχάνει της
1299 b επιμελείας μονοπραγματονσης η πολνπραγματον-
σης) ' εν δέ ταΐς μικραΐς ανάγκη σννάγειν εις 5
όλίγονς πολλάς αρχάς (διά γάρ όλιγανθρωπίαν ον
ράδιόν εστί πολλονς εν ταΐς άρχαΐς etrar τίνες
γάρ οι τοντονς έσονται διαδεχόμενοι πάλιν;)
5 δέονται δ' ενίοτε των αντών άρχων και νόμων
αϊ μικραι ταΐς μεγάλαις• πλην αϊ μεν δέονται
πολλάκις των αντών, ταΐς δ εν πολλώ χρόνω
τοντο σνμβαίνει. διόπερ ονθεν κωλύει πολλάς
επιμελείας άμα προστάττειν (ον γάρ εμποδιονσιν
άλλ-^λαι?), και προς την όλιγανθρωπίαν άναγκαΐον
10 τά αρχεία οίον όβελισκολύχνια ποιεΐν. εάν ονν 6
° An implement (its exact shape does not appear to be
known), used by soldiers on campaign, here mentioned as
an illustration of one tool serving two purposes, cf. 1252 b 1.
356
POLITICS, IV. χιι. S -β
acting as judges and of issuing orders, and especially
the last, for to give orders is most characteristic of
authority. But this question is of virtually no prac-
tical importance (for no decision has yet been given,
our discussion being merely about the name), although
it does admit of some further inquiry of a speculative
4 kind. On the other hand the questions what kinds Number and
and what number of magistracies are necessary to £^! οη3
constitute a state at all, and what kinds although not Executive
necessary are advantageous for a good constitution, constitu-" 1
are questions that might preferably be discussed, tlon3 •
both indeed as regards every form of constitution and
particularly in regard to the small states. For it is
true that in the large states it is possible and proper
for one magistracy to be assigned to one function (for
the large number of the citizens makes it possible for
many people to enter on an official career, so as to
intermit their tenure of some offices for a long time
and to hold others only once, and also every task is
better attended to if the attention is directed to one
5 thing only than if it is busy with many) ; but in the
small states it is inevitable that many offices must be
gathered into few hands (for owing to shortage of
man-power it is not easy for many people to be in
office, since who will take over the posts as their
successors ?). But sometimes small states require the
same magistracies and laws as large ones ; except
that the latter require the same persons to serve
often, but in the former this only occurs after a long
interval. Hence it is possible to assign several duties
to one man at the same time (since they will not
interfere with one another), and to meet the shortage
of man-power it is necessary to make the magistracies
6 like spit-lampholders. If therefore we are able to
357
ARISTOTLE
1299 b
εχωμεν λέγειν πόσας άναγκαΐον ύπάρχειν πάστ)
πόλει και πόσας ούκ άναγκαΐον μεν δεΐ δ' ύπ-
άρχειν, ραον αν τις είδώς ταΰτα συνίδοι 1 ποίας
άρμόττει σννάγ€ΐν αρχάς εις μίαν αρχήν, άρ-
μόττει δε και τούτο μή λεληθεναι, ποίων 2 δει
15 κατά τόπον αρχεία πολλά 3 επιμελεΐσθαι καΐ ποιων
πανταχού μίαν αρχήν εΐναι κνρίαν, οίον εύκοσμίας
πότερον έν άγορα μεν άγορανόμον άλλον» δε κατ'
άλλον τόπον, ή πανταχού τον αυτόν και πότερον
κατά το πράγμα δεΐ διαιρεΐν ή κατά τους ανθρώ-
πους, λέγω δ οίον ενα της εύκοσμίας, ή παίδων
20 άλλον καΐ γυναικών και κατά τάς πολιτείας δε, 7
πότερον διαφέρει καθ* εκάστην και το τών αρχών
γένος ή ούθεν, οίον εν δημοκρατία καΐ ολιγαρχία
και αριστοκρατία και μοναρχία πότερον αϊ αύται
μεν είσιν άρχαι κύριαι, ουκ εζ ίσων δ' ουδ' εζ
25 όμοιων, αλλ' ετεραι εν ετεραις (οίον εν μεν ταΐς
άριστοκρατίαις εκ πεπαιδευμένων εν δε ταί?
όλιγαρχίαις εκ τών πλουσίων εν δε ταΐς δημο-
κρατίαις εκ τών ελευθέρων) ή τυγχάνουσι μεν τίνες
ούσαι και κατ αύτάς τάς διαφοράς τών αρχών,
εστί δ' όπου συμφερουσιν αί αύται και όπου
διαφερουσιν (ένθα μεν γάρ άρμόττει μεγάλας,
so ένθα δ' είναι μικράς τάς αύτάς) . ου μήν αλλά καϊ 8
1 Bojesen : συνά*/οι codd. (vvvayot o't'aj ? ed.).
2 Thurot : ποΐα codd.
8 Thurot : πολλών codd.
358
POLITICS, IV. χιι. β-8
say how many magistracies every state must neces-
sarily possess and how many, though not absolutely
necessary, it ought to possess, knowing these points
one might more easily realize what kinds of magis-
tracies are of a suitable nature to be combined into a
single office. And it is suitable for the further ques-
tion not to be overlooked, what kinds of matters
ought to be attended to by a number of officials
locally distributed and what ought to be under
the authority of one magistrate for all localities,
for example should good order be seen to in the
market-place by a Controller of the Market and else-
where by another official, or everywhere by the same
one r and ought the offices to be divided according to
the function or according to the persons concerned —
I mean, for instance, should there be a single official
in control of good order, or a different one for children
7 and for women ? and also under the various constitu-
tions does the nature of the magistracies vary in
accordance with each or does it not vary at all — for
example in democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy and
monarchy are the magistracies the same in their
powers, although they are not filled from equal ranks
nor from similar classes but are different in different
constitutions (for example in aristocracies drawn
from the educated, in oligarchies from the wealthy,
and in democracies from the free), or although some
constitutions happen to be correspondent with the
actual differences of their magistracies, yet in other
cases are the same magistracies advantageous even
where the constitutions differ (for in some places it
is suitable for the same magistracies to have large
8 functions and in other places small ones) ? Not but
what there are also some offices peculiar to special
359
ARISTOTLE
1299 b
Ί'διαι τινές είσιν, οίον ή των προβούλων. αύτη
γαρ ου δημοκρατική, βουλή δέ δημοτικόν, δει
μεν γαρ εΐναί τι τοιούτον ω επιμελές εσται τον
δήμου προβουλεύειν, όπως άσχολών εσται• τοΰτο
δ', εάν ολίγοι τον αριθμόν ώσιν, όλιγαρχικόν,
85 του? δε προβούλους ολίγους άναγκαΐον eivat το
πλήθος, ώστ όλιγαρχικόν. άλλ' οπού άμφω
αύται at άρχαί, οί πρόβουλοι καθεστασιν επί τοις
βουλευταΐς• ο μεν γαρ βουλευτής δημοτικόν, 6
δε πρόβουλος όλιγαρχικόν . καταλύεται δε και 9
τής βουλής ή δύναμις εν ταΐς τοιαύταις δημο-
1300 a κρατίαις εν αΐς αυτός συνιών ό δήμος χρηματίζει
περί πάντων. τοΰτο δε συμβαίνειν εϊωθεν όταν
εύπορία τις ή μισθού* τοις έκκλησιάζουσιν , σχολά-
ζοντες γαρ συλλέγονται τε πολλάκις και άπαντα
αύτοι κρίνουσιν. παιδονόμος δέ καΐ γυναικονόμος
β και ει τις άλλος άρχων κύριος εστί τοιαύτης
επιμελείας άριστοκρατικόν, δημοκρατικόν δ' ου
(πώς γαρ οΐόν τε κωλύειν efteVat τα? των απόρων;)
ούδ' όλιγαρχικόν (τρυφώσι γαρ at των όλιγ-
αρχούντων). άλλα περί μεν τούτων επι τοσούτον
10 ειρήσθω νυν, περί δε τάς των αρχών καταστάσεις 10
πειρατεον εξ αρχής διελθεΐν. είσι δ' at διαφοραι
εν τρισιν όροις, ων συντιθέμενων άναγκαΐον
πάντας είλήφθαι τους τρόπους, εστί δέ τών τριών
τούτων εν μεν τίνες οί καθιστάντες τάς αρχάς,
δεύτερον δ εκ τίνων, λοιπόν δέ τίνα τρόπον.
1 μισθού Spengel : ή μισθός codd.
° See 1298 b 29 η.
6 Or possibly ' from going in processions ' : Solon made
regulations reus έξοδοι? των -γυναικών και rots ιτένθΐσι και rah
ioprah (Plutarch, Solon 21).
360
POLITICS, IV. χπ. 8-10
forms of constitution, for instance the office of Pre-
liminary Councillors. a This is undemocratic, although
a Council is a popular body, for there is bound to be
some body of this nature to have the duty of prepar-
ing measures for the popular assembly, in order that
it may be able to attend to its business ; but a
preparatory committee, if small, is oligarchical, and
Preliminary Councillors must necessarily be few in
number, so that they are an oligarchical element.
But where both of these magistracies exist, the Pre-
liminary Councillors are in authority over the Coun-
cillors, since a councillor is a democratic official, but a
9 preliminary councillor is an oligarchic one. Also the
power of the Council is weakened in democracies of
the sort in which the people in assembly deals with
everything itself; and this usually happens when
there is a plentiful supply of pav for those who attend
the assembly, for being at leisure they meet fre-
quently and decide all things themselves. But a
Superintendent of Children and a Superintendent of
Women, and any other magistrates that exercise a
similar sort of supervision, are an aristocratic feature,
and not democratic (for how is it possible to prevent
the wives of the poor from going out of doors b ?)
nor yet oligarchic (for the wives of oligarchic rulers
10 are luxurious). But let the discussion of these matters Appoint-
go no further at present, and let us attempt to go Executive:
through from the beginning the question of the ways 12 'nodes
of appointing the magistrates. The varieties here variations.
depend on three determinants, the combinations of
which must give all the possible modes. One of these
three determining points is, who are the persons who
appoint the magistrates ? the second is, from whom ?
ν 361
ARISTOTLE
1300 a
€κάστον δε τών τριών τούτων διαφοραι τρεις
15 είσίν η γαρ πάντες οι πολΐται καθιστάσιν η
τίνες, και η εκ πάντων η εκ τινών άφωρισμενων
(οΐον η τιμήματι η γένει η αρετή η τινι τοιουτω
άλλω, ώσπερ iv Ήίεγάροις εκ τών συγ κατ ελΒ όντων
και συμμαχεσαμενων προς τον δήμον), και ταύτα
20 77 αιρεσει η κληρω• πάλιν ταύτα συνδυαζόμενα, 11
λέγω δέ τα? μεν τινές τάς δέ πάντες, και τάς
μεν εκ πάντων τάς δ' εκ Tt^oV, «rat τάς μέν
αιρεσει τάς δε κληρω. τούτων δ' εκάστης
έσονται της διαφοράς τρόποι τέσσαρες. 1 η γάρ
πάντες εκ πάντων αιρεσει, η πάντες εκ πάντων
25 κληρω — και [η] 2 εξ απάντων η ως άνά μέρος, οΐον
κατά φυλάς και δήμους και φρατρίας εως άν
διελθη δια πάντων τών πολιτών, 3 η αεί εζ απάν-
των, — η και* τά μέν ούτω τά δε εκείνως' πάλιν ει
τινές οι καθιστάντες, η εκ πάντων αιρεσει η εκ
πάντων κληρω, η εκ τινών αιρεσει η εκ τινών
30 κληρω, η τά μέν ούτω τά δ' εκείνως, λέγω δέ τά
μέν [εκ πάντων] 5 αιρεσει τά δε κληρω. ώστε
δώδεκα οι τρόποι γίνονται χωρίς τών δυο συν-
δυασμών, τούτων δ' αϊ μέν δύο καταστάσεις 12
δημοτικαί, το πάντας εκ πάντων 6 αιρεσει η κληρω
[γίνεσθαι] 7 η άμφοΐν, τάς μέν κληρω τάς δ
αιρεσει τών αρχών το δέ μη πάντας άμα μεν
1 1300 a 23-b 5 locum vertiginosum viri docti ad libidinem
quisque suam rescripserunt.
2 Thurot. 3 πολιτών Ar. : πολιτικών.
4 τ? και Rabe: και τ), και codd. s Hayduck.
8 post πάντων add. και τό πάντας 4κ τίνων Rabe.
7 Thurot.
β It is quite uncertain when this event took place and
362
POLITICS, IV. xii. 10-12
and last, in what manner ? And of each of these
three determinants there are three variations : either
all the citizens appoint or some, and either from
all or from a certain class (defined for instance by
property-assessment or birth or virtue or some other
such qualification, as at Megara only those were
eligible who returned in a body from exile and fought
together against the common people)," and the mode
of appointment may be either by vote or by lot ;
11 again, these systems may be coupled together — I
mean that some citizens may appoint to some offices
but all to others, and to some offices all citizens may
be eligible but to others only a certain class, and to
some appointment may be by vote but to others by
lot. And of each variation of these determinants
there will be four modes : either all citizens may
appoint from all by vote, or all from all by lot — and
from all either section by section, for instance by
tribes or demes or brotherhoods until the procedure
has gone through all the citizens, or from the whole
number even, 7 time, — or else partly in one way and
partly in the other. Again, if the electors are some
of the citizens, they must either appoint from all by
vote, or from all by lot, or from some by vote, or
from some by lot, or partly in one way and partly in
the other — I mean partly by vote and partly by lot.
Hence the modes prove to be twelve, apart from the
12 two combinations. And among these, two ways of
appointment are democratic — for all to appoint from
all by vote, or by lot, or by both — some offices by lot
and others by vote ; but for not all to be the electors
and for them to appoint simultaneously, and either
whether it is the same as those referred to at 1302 b 30 f .
and 1304 b 34 ff.
36S
ARISTOTLE
1300 a
85 καθιστάναι, εζ απάντων δ' ή εκ τινών, ή κλήρω ή
αιρεσει ή άμφοΐν, ή τάς μεν εκ πάντων τάς δ'
εκ τινών άμφοΐν (το δέ άμφοΐν λέγω τάς μεν
κλήρω τάς δ' αιρεσει) πολιτικόν. και το τινάς
εκ πάντων τάς μεν αιρεσει καθιστάναι τάς δε
40 κλήρω ή άμφοΐν (τάς μεν κλήρω τάς δ' αιρεσει)
ολιγαρχικόν ολιγαρχικώτερον δε και το εξ άμφοΐν.
το δε τα? μεν εκ πάντων τάς δ' εκ τινών πολι- 13
1300 b τικον άριστο κ ρατικώς, ή τάς μεν αιρεσει τα? δε
κλήρω. το δε τιι^ά? εκ τινών <αίρεσει> Χ ολιγ-
αρχικό^, και το Tim? εκ τιΐ'ώΐ' κλήρω (μη
γενομενον δ ομοίως), και το τινάς εκ τινών άμφοΐν.
το δέ τινάς εξ απάντων τότε 2 δέ εκ τι^ώ^ alpeaei
δ παντας άριστοκρατικόν .
Οι μεν ουν τρόποι τών περί τάς αρχάς το-
σούτοι τον αριθμόν είσι, και διήρηνται κατά τάς
πολιτείας οϋτως• τίνα δέ τισι συμφέρει και πώς
δεΓ γίνεσθαι τάς καταστάσεις άμα ταΐς ουνάμεσι
τών αρχών [και] 3 τι^ε? εισιν εσται φανερόν. λέγω
!0 δέ δυναμι^ αρχής οίον την κυρίαν τών προσόδων
και την κυρίαν της φυλακής• άλλο γάρ είδο?
δυνάμεως οίον στρατηγίας και της τών περί την
αγοράν συμβολαίων κυρίας.
XIII. Λοιπόν δέ τών τριών το δικαστικοί ειπείν, 1
ληπτεον δέ και τούτων τους τρόπους κατά την
1 Lambinus. 2 τότε Ρ 2 : τό cet. 3 [και] om. ΓΜΡ 1 .
α Perhaps the Greek should be rewritten to give ' for some
to appoint from all either by vote or by lot or by both.'
6 This insertion by Lambinus seems certain.
364
POLITICS, IV. χπ. 12— χιπ. 1
from all or from some either by lot or by vote or by
both, or some offices from all and others from some
by both (by which I mean some by lot and others by ι
vote) is constitutional. And for some to appoint
from all, to some offices by vote and to others by lot
or by both α (to some by lot and to others by vote)
is oligarchical ; and it is even more oligarchical to
13 appoint from both classes. But to appoint some
offices from all and the others from a certain class is
constitutional with an aristocratic bias ; or to appoint
some by vote and others by lot. And for a certain
class to appoint from a certain class <by vote> & is
oligarchical, and so it is for a certain class to appoint
from a certain class by lot (although not working out
in the same way), and for a certain class to appoint
from a certain class by both methods. And for a
certain class to make a preliminary selection from
the whole body and then for all to appoint from
among certain persons (thus selected) is aristocratic.
So many in number therefore are the modes of
appointing to the magistracies, and this is how the
modes are classified according to the different con-
stitutions ; and what regulations are advantageous
for what people and how the appointments ought to
be conducted will be made clear at the same time
as we consider what are the powers of the offices.
By the power of an office I mean for instance the
control of the revenues and the control of the guard ;
since a different sort of power belongs for example
to a generalship and to the office that controls market
contracts.
1 XIII. Of the three factors of a constitution it (3) The
remains to speak of the judiciary, and of judicial ^'suitl"
bodies also we must consider the various modes, in classified.
365
ARISTOTLE
1300 b
is αυτήν ύπόθεσιν. έστι δε διαφορά τών δικαστηρίων
iv τρισιν όροις, εξ ών τε και περί ών και πώς.
λέγω δε εξ ών μεν, πότερον εκ πάντων η εκ
τινών περί ών δε, πόσα είδη δικαστηρίων το
δε πώς, πότερον κληρω η αίρεσει. πρώτον οΰν
διαιρείσθω πόσα ε'ίδη δικαστηρίων, εστί δε τον
20 αριθμόν οκτώ, εν μεν εύθυντικόν, άλλο δε el τίς τι
τών κοινών αδικεί, έτερον όσα εις την πολιτείαν
φέρει, τέταρτον και άρχουσι και ίδιώταις οσα
περί ζημιώσεων άμφισβητοΰσιν, πέμπτον το περί
τών ιδίων συναλλαγμάτων και 1 εχόντων μέγεθος,
και παρά ταΰτα τό τε φονικόν και το ξενικόν
25 {φονικού μεν οΰν είδη, αν τ εν τοις αύτοΐς δικά- 2
σταΐς αν τ' εν άλλοις, περί τε τών εκ προνοίας και
περί τών ακουσίων και όσα ομολογείται μεν
αμφισβητείται δε περί του δίκαιου, τέταρτον δε
όσα τοις φεύγουσι φόνου επι καθόδω επιφέρεται,
οίον 'Κθήνησι λέγεται και τό εν Φρεαττοΐ δικα-
30 στήριον, συμβαίνει δε τά τοιαύτα εν τω παντί
χρόνω ολίγα και εν ταΓ? μ-εγάλαχ? πόλεσιν του
δε ξενικού εν μεν ξενοις προς ξένους, άλλο δε 2
ξενοις προς αστούς)• ετι δε παρά πάντα ταΰτα
περί τών μικρών συναλλαγμάτων , όσα δραχμιαΐα
και πεντάδραχμα και μικρώ πλείονος• δει μεν
36 γάρ και περί τούτων γίνεσθαι κρίσιν, ουκ εμπίπτει
δε εις δικαστών πλήθος, αλλά περί μεν τούτων 3
1 <τ«ι»> και Richards. 2 άλλο δ<? Richards : άλλο codd.
α i.e. men that had been allowed to flee the country when
charged with accidental homicide, and on their return were
accused of another homicide, a wilful murder.
366
POLITICS, IV. χπι. 1-3
accordance with the same plan. And a difference
among judicial courts rests upon three determinants
— constituents, sphere of action, and mode of appoint-
ment. As to their constituents I mean are the
courts drawn from all the citizens or from a certain
class ? as to sphere of action, how many kinds of
courts are there ? and as to mode of appointment,
are they appointed by lot or by vote ? First then
let us distinguish how many kinds of courts there are.
They are eight in number, one a court of audit,
another to deal with offenders against any public
interest, another with matters that bear on the
constitution, a fourth for both magistrates and private
persons in disputes about penalties, fifth the court
dealing with private contracts that are on an im-
portant scale, and beside these there is (6) the court
that tries homicide, and (7) that which hears alien suits
2 (of courts of homicide there are four kinds, whether
the jury is the same or different — namelv, for cases
of deliberate homicide, of involuntary homicide, of
homicide admitted but claimed to be justifiable, and
fourth to deal with charges of homicide brought
against men that have fled from the country for
homicide, upon their return, 8 such as at Athens for
instance the Court at Phreatto is said to be, although
such cases are of rare occurrence in the whole course
of history, even in the great states ; and of the aliens'
court one branch hears suits of aliens against aliens
and another of aliens against citizens) ; and also
beside all of these there are (8) courts to try cases of
petty contracts, involving sums of one drachma, five
drachmas or a little more — for even these cases have
to be tried, though they are not suitable for a numerous
3 jury. But let us dismiss the subject of these petty
367
ARISTOTLE
1300 b
άφείσθω καί τών φονικών και των ξενικών, περί
δέ των πολιτικών λέγωμεν, περί ων μη γινομένων
καλώς διαστάσει? γίνονται και τών πολιτειών αϊ
κινήσεις, ανάγκη ο ήτοι πάντας περί πάντων
40 κρίνειν τών διηρη μένων αίρεσει η κληρω, η
πάντας περί πάντων τά μεν κληρω τά δ' αίρεσει,
η περί ενίων τών αυτών τους μεν κληρω τους ο*
1301a αιρετούς, οΰτοι μεν οΰν οι τρόποι τετταρες τον
αριθμόν, τοσούτοι δ έτεροι και οι κατά μέρος'
πάλιν γαρ εκ τινών και οι δικάζοντες περί πάντων
αίρεσει, η εκ τινών περί πάντων κληρω, η τά μεν
6 κληρω τά δε αίρεσει, η έϊ-ια οικαστήρια περί τών
αυτών εκ κληρωτών και αιρετών, ούτοι μεν οΰν,
ώσπερ ελέχθησαν, οι τρόποι αντίστροφοι 1 τοις
είρημενοις. έτι δέ τα αυτά συνδυαζόμενα, λέγω δ' 4
οίον τά μεν εκ πάντων τά δ' εκ Tii/aw τά δ' εξ
άμφοΐν, οΐον ει του αύτοϋ δικαστηρίου εΐεν οι μεν
ίο εκ πάντων οι δ' εκ τινών, και η κληρω η αίρεσει
η άμφοΐν. όσους μεν οΰν ενδέχεται τρόπους ε?ναι
τά οικαστήρια, εΐρηται• τούτων δε τα μεν πρώτα
δημοτικά, όσα εκ πάντων περί 2 πάντων, τά δέ
δευτέρα ολιγαρχικά, όσα εκ τινών περί πάντων, τά
δέ τρίτα αριστοκρατικά καί πολιτικά, όσα τά μεν
15 εκ πάντων τά δ' εκ τινών.
1 αντίστροφοι suppleuit Newman.
2 wepi Susemihl : ί) wepi codd.
S68
POLITICS, IV. xiii. 3-4
suits, and the courts for homicide and those for aliens, Lawcourts
and let us speak about political trials, which when various
not well conducted cause party divisions and revolu- constitu-
tionary disturbances. And necessarily either all
the judges of all the cases that have been classified
will be appointed by vote, or by lot, or all in all cases
partly by lot and partly by vote, or in some cases some
judges will be appointed by lot and others by vote
for the same case. These modes then are four in
number, and the sectional modes also make as many
others ; for here again the judges for all cases may
be drawn by vote from a certain class, or for all cases
by lot from a certain class, or some courts may be
appointed by lot and others by vote, or some courts
may be composed of judges chosen by lot and by
vote for the same cases. These then are the modes,
4 as was said, corresponding to those mentioned. And
there are also the same courts in combination — I mean
for example some drawn from the whole body and
some from a class and some from both, as for instance
if the same court contained some members from the
whole body and others from a class, and appointed
either by lot or by vote or both. We have then
stated all the modes in which it is possible for the
courts to be composed ; and of these the first set,
drawn from all the citizens and dealing with all cases,
are popular, the second, drawn from a certain class
to deal with all cases, are oligarchic, and the third,
drawn partly from all and partly from a certain class,
are suited to an aristocracy and to a constitutional
government.
369
Ε
1301a
I. ΥΙερι μεν οΰν τών άλλων ων προειλόμεθα 1
20 σχεδόν εΐρηται περί πάντων εκ τίνων δε μετα-
βάλλουσα• αϊ πολιτεΐαι και ποσών καΐ ποίων, καΐ
τίνες εκάστης πολιτείας φθοραί, και εκ ποίων
εις ποίας μάλιστα μεθιστανται, ετι δε σωτηρίαι
τίνες και κοινή και χωρίς εκάστης είσίν, ετι δε διά
τίνων αν μάλιστα σωζοιτο των πολιτειών εκάστη,
25 σκεπτεον εφεξής τοις είρημενοις.
Αεί δε πρώτον νπολαβεΐν την άρχην, οτι πολλαι 2
γεγενηνται πολιτεΐαι πάντων μεν όμολογούντων το
δίκαιον και το κατ' άναλογίαν 'ίσον τούτου δ'
άμαρτανόντων (ώσπερ εϊρηται και πρότερον).
δήμος μεν γαρ εγενετο εκ του ΐσους ότιοΰν οντάς
30 οΐεσθαι απλώς Ισους είναι {οτι γαρ ελεύθεροι πάντες
ομοίως, απλώς ίσοι είναι νομίζουσιν) , ολιγαρχία δέ
εκ του άνισους εν τι οντάς όλως είναι άνισους
ύπολαμβάνειν (κατ' ούσίαν γαρ άνισοι οντες
απλώς άνισοι ύπολαμβάνουσιν είναι) . είτα οι μεν 3
ώς 'ίσοι οντες πάντων τών ίσων άζιοΰσι μετεχειν,
α Book V. is placed as Book VII. by some editors, as
Book VIII. by others, see Book Ill.^n. note.
6 For this distinction between broad methods of guarding
against revolution and the practical means by which those
methods can be put into effect Newman compares c. ix. §§ 2 f.,
10 f,, iv. ii. 5 fin., vi. i. 1.
370
BOOK V•
1 I. Almost all the other subjects which we intended Book v.
to treat have now been discussed. There must ^o™^ 7 "
follow the consideration of the questions, what are its causes
the number and the nature of the causes that give PRE veji-
rise to revolutions in constitutions, and what are Τ10>ί •
the causes that destroy each form of constitution,
and out of what forms into what forms do they
usually change, and again what are the safeguards
of constitutions in general and of each form in par-
ticular, and what are the means by which the safe-
guarding of each may best be put into effect. 6
2 And we must first assume the starting-point, that Sources of
many forms of constitution have come into exist-
ence with everybody agreeing as to what is just,
that is proportionate equality, but failing to attain
it (as has also been said before). Thus democracy 12S0 a 9 ff -
arose from men's thinking that if they are equal in
any respect they are equal absolutely (for they sup- 12S2 b u ff.
pose that because they are all alike free they are
equal absolutely), oligarchy arose from their assum-
ing that if they are unequal as regards some one
thing they are unequal wholly (for being unequal
in property they assume that they are unequal
3 absolutely) ; and then the democrats claim as
being equal to participate in all things in equal
371
ARISTOTLE
1301 Β
35 ol δ' ώς άνισοι οντες πλεονεκτεΐν ζητοΰσιν, το γάρ
πλεΐον άνισον. εχουσι μεν ουν τι 7τάσαι δίκαιον,
ημαρτημεναι δ' απλώς είσίν και δια ταύτην την
αίτίαν, όταν μη κατά την ύπόληφιν ην εκάτεροι
τνγχάνονσιν έχοντες μετέχωσι της πολιτείας,
στασιάζουσιν. πάντων δε δικαιότατα μεν αν στα-
40 σιάζοιεν, ηκιστα ok τούτο πράττονσιν, οι κατ
1201 b άρετην διαφέροντες' μάλιστα γαρ εϋλογον άνισους
απλώς είναι τούτους μόνον 1 , είσι δε τίνες οι κατά
γένος υπερέχοντες ουκ άζιοΰσι τών Ισων αυτούς
δια την ανισότητα ταύτην ευγενείς γάρ είναι
δοκοϋσιν οΐς υπάρχει προγόνων άρετη και πλούτος.
δ Άρχαι μεν ουν ώς ειπείν 2 αύται και πηγαι τών 4
στάσεων εϊσιν όθεν στασιάζουσιν (διό και αί μετα-
βολαΐ γίγνονται διχώς• ότε μεν γάρ προς την
πολιτείαν, όπως εκ της καθεστηκυίας άλλην μετα-
στησωσιν, οίον εκ δημοκρατίας όλιγαρχίαν η
δημοκρατίαν εξ ολιγαρχίας, η πολιτείαν και
ίο άριστοκρατίαν εκ τούτων, η ταύτας εξ εκείνων
ότε δ' ου προς την καθεστηκυΐαν πολιτείαν, αλλά
την μεν κατάστασιν προαιρούνται την αύτην, δι*
αυτών δ' ει^αι βούλονται ταύτην, οίον την όλιγ-
αρχίαν η την μοναρχίαν. ετι περί του μάλλον και 5
ήττον, οίον η όλιγαρχίαν οΰσαν εις το μάλλον
15 όλιγαρχεΐσθαι η εις το ήττον, η δημοκρατίαν
οΰσαν εις το μάλλον δημοκρατεΐσθαι η εις το
ήττον, ομοίως δε και επι τών λοιπών πολιτειών, η
1 μ6νου$ ? ed.
2 <7τασώ^> ws ειπείν vel ώί βΙπ(ΐι> post nyyal Richards.
372
POLITICS, V. ι. 3-5
shares, while the oligarchs as being unequal seek
to have a larger share, for a larger share is unequal.
All these forms of constitution then have some
element of justice, but from an absolute point of
view they are erroneous ; and owing to this cause,
when each of the two parties has not got the share
in the constitution which accords with the funda-
mental assumption that they happen to entertain,
class war ensues. And of all men those who excel in
virtue would most justifiably stir up faction, though
they are least given to doing so ; for they alone
can with the fullest reason be deemed absolutely
unequal. And there are some men who being
superior in birth claim unequal rights because of
this inequality ; for persons who have ancestral virtue
and wealth behind them are thought to be noble.
4 These then roughly speaking are the starting- Aims of
points and sources of factions, which give rise to party revolution,
strife (and revolutions due to this take place in two
ways : sometimes they are in regard to the constitu-
tion, and aim at changing from the one established
to another, for instance from democracy to oligarchy,
or to democracy from oligarchy, or from these to
constitutional government and aristocracy, or from
those to these ; but sometimes the revolution is not
in regard to the established constitution, but its
promoters desire the same form of government,
for instance oligarchy or monarchy, but wish it to be
5 in their own control. Again it may be a question of
degree ; for instance, when there is an oligarchy the
object may be to change to a more oligarchical
government or to a less, or when there is a democracy
to a more or to a less democratic government, and
similarly in the case of the remaining constitutions.
373
ARISTOTLE
1801 b «
ίνα επιταθώσιν ή άνεθώσιν. ετι προς το μέρος τι
κινησαι της πολιτείας, οΐον αρχήν τίνα καταστήσαι
ή ανελεΐν, ώσπερ iv Αακεδαίμονί φασι Αύσανδρόν
20 τινβ? επιχειρήσαι καταλΰσαι την βασιλείαν καί
ΪΙαυσανίαν τον βασιλέα την εφορείαν καί iv 6
Έπιδάμνω δε μετεβαλεν ή πολιτεία κατά μόριον,
αντί γαρ των φνλάρχων βονλήν εποίησαν, εις 8ε
την ηλιαιαι* επάναγκες εστίν ετι των εν τω
25 πολιτεύματι βαδίζεις τα? αρχάς όταν επιφηφίζηται
αρχή τις• όλιγαρχικόν δε και 6 άρχων ο εις ην εν
τη πολιτεία ταύτη) . πανταχού γάρ διά το άνισον
ή στάσις, ου μη 1 τοις άνίσοις υπάρχει άνάλογον
(άίδιος γάρ βασίλεια άνισος εάν η εν ΐσοις)' όλως
γάρ το ϊσον ζητοΰντες στασιάζουσιν. εστί δε 7
80 διττον το ίσον, το μεν γάρ αριθμώ το δε κατ
άζίαν εστίν — λέγω δε αριθμώ μεν το πλήθει ή
μεγεθει ταύτό και Ισον, κατ άξίαν δε το τω
λόγω• οΐον υπερέχει κατ' αριθμόν μεν ΐσω τά
τρία τοΐν δυοΐν και ταύτα του ενός, λόγω δε
τετταρα τοΐν δυοΐν και ταύτα του ενός, ϊσον γάρ
ββ μέρος τά δύο των τεττάρων και το εν των δυοΐν,
άμφω γάρ ήμίση. όμολογοΰντες δε το απλώς
είναι δίκαιον το κατ άζίαν, διαφερονται (καθαπερ
ελέχθη πρότερον) οί μεν ότι εάν κατά τι ίσοι
ωσιν όλως ίσοι νομίζουσιν είναι, οί δ' ότι εάν κατά
τι άνισοι πάντων άνισων άζιοϋσιν εαυτούς, διό 8
ίο και μάλιστα δύο γίνονται πολιτεΐαι, δήμος και
1 aut οδ μη aut ού μην el schol. Η : ον μην codd.
β See 1307 a 34 η.
b This ethical arithmetic is helped out in Greek by the
fact that, even without the qualification κατ ά£ίαν, icros often
means ' equal to desert,' fair, just.
e See 1301 a 27 ff. and note.
374
POLITICS, V. ι. 5-8
the aim may be either to tighten them up or to relax
them. Or again the aim mav be to change a certain
part of the constitution, for example to establish
or abolish a certain magistracy, as according to some
accounts Lysander attempted to abolish the kingship
at Sparta and the king Pausanias the ephorate a ;
6 and also at Epidamnus the constitution was altered
in part, for they set up a council instead of the tribal
rulers, and it is still compulsory for the magistrates
alone of the class that has political power to come
to the popular assembly when an appointment to
a magistracy is put to the vote ; and the single
supreme magistrate was also an oligarchical feature
in this constitution). For party strife is every where
due to inequality, where classes that are unequal do
not receive a share of power in proportion (for a life-
long monarchy is an unequal feature when it exists
among equals) ; for generally the motive for factious
7 strife is the desire for equality. But equality is
of two kinds, numerical equality and equality ac-
cording to worth — by numerically equal I mean
that which is the same and equal in number or
dimension, by equal according to worth that which
is equal by proportion b ; for instance numerically
3 exceeds 2 and 2 exceeds 1 by an equal amount,
but by proportion 4 exceeds 2 and 2 exceeds 1
equally, since 2 and 1 are equal parts of -i and 2,
both being halves. But although men agree that the
absolutely just is what is according to worth, they
disagree (as was said before c ) in that some think
that if they are equal in something they are wholly
equal, and others claim that if they are unequal in
something they deserve an unequal share of all things.
8 Owing to this two principal varieties of constitution
375
ARISTOTLE
1302a ολιγαρχία• euyeVeia γαρ καί αρετή εν ολίγοις,
ταΰτα 1 δ' iv πλείοσιν ευγενείς γαρ και αγαθοί
ούδαμοΰ εκατόν, εύποροι 2 δε πο?ίλαχοΰ. 3 τό δε
απλώς πάντη καθ* εκατεραν τετάχθαι την ισότητα
φαΰλον. φανερον δ εκ του συμβαίνοντος• ουδεμία
6 γαρ μόνιμος εκ των τοιούτων πολιτειών . τούτου
δ' αίτιον ότι αδύνατον από του πρώτου και του εν
άρχη ήμαρτημενου μη απαντάν εις το τέλος κακόν
τι. διό δει τα μεν αριθμητική ισότητι χρήσθαι,
τά δε τη κατ ά£ιαι\ όμως δε ασφαλέστερα και 9
άστασίαστος μάλλον ή δημοκρατία της ολιγαρχίας•
ίο εν μεν γάρ ταΐς όλιγαρχίαις εγγίνονται δύο, ή τε
προς αλλήλους στάσις και ετι ή προς τον δήμον,
εν δέ ταΐς δημοκρατίαις ή προς την όλιγαρχίαν
μόνον, αύτώ δε προς αυτόν ο τι και αζιον ειπείν
ουκ εγγίγνεται τω δήμω στάσις. ετι δε ή εκ τών
μέσων πολιτεία εγγυτέρω του δήμου ή [ή]* τών
15 ολίγων, ήπερ εστίν ασφαλέστατη τών τοιούτων
πολιτειών.
II. Έττει δε σκοποΰμεν εκ τίνων αι τε στάσεις 1
γίγνονται και αϊ μεταβολαι περί τάς πολιτείας,
ληπτεον καθόλου πρώτον τάς αρχάς και τάς αιτίας
αυτών, είσι δη σχεδόν ως ειπείν τρεις τον αριθμόν,
20 ας διοριστεον καθ αύτας τύπω πρώτον, δει γάρ
λαβείν πώς τε έχοντες στασιάζουσι και τίνων
1 τάναι—ία Lambinus.
8 άποροι Γ : εϋπομοι δέ <καϊ &ποροι> Stahr.
3 πολλοί πολλαχοΰ codd. det.
4 ή om. p a : τήί Victorius.
α That is, numbers and wealth.
" Perhaps the text should be emended to give ' there are
many rich men and poor men in many places.'
376
POLITICS, V. ι. 8— π. 1
come into existence, democracy and oligarchy ; for
noble birth and virtue are found in few men, but the
qualifications specified α in more : nowhere are there
a hundred men nobly born and good, but there are
rich men b in many places. But for the constitution
to be framed absolutely and entirely according to
either kind of equality is bad. And this is proved
by experience, for not one of the constitutions formed
on such lines is permanent. And the cause of this
is that it is impossible for some evil not to occur
ultimately from the first and initial error that has
been made. Hence the proper course is to employ
numerical equality in some things and equality
9 according to worth in others. But nevertheless
democracy is safer and more free from civil strife
than oligarchy ; for in oligarchies two kinds of strife
spring up, faction between different members of the
oligarchy and also faction between the oligarchs and
the people, whereas in democracies only strife between
the people and the oligarchical party occurs, but party
strife between different sections of the people itself
does not occur to any degree worth mentioning. And
again the government formed of the middle classes is
nearer to the people than to the few, and it is the
safest of the kinds of constitution mentioned.
1 II. And since we are considering what circum- Causes of
stances give rise to party factions and revolutions revoiutlon;
in constitutions, we must first ascertain their origins
and causes generally. They are, speaking roughly,
three in number , c which we must first define in out-
line separately. For we must ascertain what state
of affairs gives rise to party strife, and for what
c Viz. the material, final and efficient causes of revolutions
(Jowett).
377
ARISTOTLE
1302 a
ένεκεν και τρίτον τίνες άρχαΐ γίνονται των πολιτι-
κών ταραχών και τών προς αλλήλους στάσεων.
Τον μεν ουν αυτούς εχειν πως προς την μεταβολην
αίτίαν καθόλου μάλιστα θετεον περί ης ηδη τυγ-
25 χανομεν ειρηκοτες. οι μεν γαρ ίσότητος εφιεμενοι
στασιάζουσιν αν νομίζωσιν ελαττον εχειν οντες
ίσοι τοις πλεονεκτοΰσιν , οι 8ε της άνισότητος και
της υπεροχής αν ύπολαμβάνωσιν οντες άνισοι μη
πλέον εχειν αλλ' 'ίσον η ελαττον {τούτων δ' εστί 2
μεν όρεγεσθαι δικαίως, εστί δε και αδίκως)' ελάτ-
30 τους τε γαρ οντες όπως 'ίσοι ώσι στασιάζουσι,
και 'ίσοι οντες όπως μείζους. πώς μεν ουν έχοντες
στασιάζουσιν, ε'ίρηται.
ΐίερι ων δε στασιάζουσιν, εστί κέρδος και τιμή,
και τάναντία τούτοις, και γαρ άτιμίαν φεύγοντες
και ζημίαν ή ύπερ αυτών η τών φίλων στασιάζουσιν
εν ταί? πόλεσιν.
35 Αι δ' atrial και άρχαι τών κινήσεων, όθεν αυτοί 3
τε διατίθενται τον είρημενον τρόπον καΐ περί τών
λεχθέντων, εστί μεν ως τον αριθμόν επτά τυγχά-
νουσιν ουσαι, εστί δ' ως πλείους. ων δύο μεν εστί
ταύτα τοις είρημενοις, αλλ' ούχ ωσαύτως• δια
κέρδος γαρ και δια τι/ζι^ και 1 παροξύνονται
40 προς άλλ^λου? ούχ ίνα κτησωνται σφίσιν αύτοΐς,
i:02b ώσπερ ε'ίρηται πρότερον, αλλ' έτερους ορώντες
τους μεν δικαίως τους δ' αδίκως πλεονεκτοΰντας
τούτων, ετι δια ϋβριν, δια φόβον, δια ύπεροχην,
1 και suppleuit Immisch.
378
POLITICS, V. π. 1-3
objects it is waged, and thirdly what are the origins
of political disorders and internal party struggles.
Now the principal cause, speaking generally, ofn)statp*of
the citizens being themselves disposed in a certain fee lDg '
manner towards revolution is the one about which we c. i. §§ 3,
happen to have spoken already. Those that desire ' ^ 7l "
equality enter on party strife if they think that they
have too little although they are the equals of those
who have more, while those that desire inequality or
superiority do so if they suppose that although they
are unequal they have not got more but an equal
amount or less (and these desires may be felt justly,
and they may also be felt unjustly) ; for when inferior,
people enter on strife in order that they may be equal,
and when equal, in order that they may be greater.
We have therefore said what are the states of feeling
in which men engage in party strife.
The objects about which it is waged are gain and (2) objects
honour, and their opposites, for men carry on party
faction in states in order to avoid dishonour and loss,
either on their own behalf or on behalf of their friends.
And the causes and origins of the disturbances (S) cans•»*
which occasion the actual states of feeling described ^ η ^ Γ 8 οαιη '
and their direction to the objects mentioned, accord-
ing to one account happen to be seven in number,
though according to another they are more. Two
of them are the same as those spoken of before ξ 2 fin.
although not operating in the same way : the
motives of gain and honour also stir men up against
each other not in order that they may get them for
themselves, as has been said before, but because
they see other men in some cases justly and in
other cases unjustly getting a larger share of
them. Other causes are insolence, fear, excessive
379
ARISTOTLE
1802 b
διά καταφρόνησιν, διά αύ'^σιν την παρά το άνά-
λογον, ετι δε άλλον τρόπον δι εριθείαν, δι' ολι-
5 γωρίαν, δια μικρότητα, δι ανομοιότητα, τούτων 4
δέ ύβρις μεν καΐ κέρδος τίνα εχουσι Βνναμίν καΐ
πώς αίτια σχεδόν εστί φανερόν υβριζόντων τε
γάρ των εν ταις άρχαΐς και πλεονεκτούντων
στασιάζουσι και προς αλλήλους 1 και προς τάς
πολιτείας τάς δίδουσα? την έζουσιαν η δε πλεονεξία
ίο γίνεται ότε μεν από των Ιδίων, ότε δε από των
κοινών. δηλον δέ και ή τιμή και τι δύναται και
πώς αιτία στάσεως• και γάρ αύτοι άτιμαζόμενοι
και άλλους όρώντες τιμωμένους στασιάζουσιν
ταύτα δέ αδίκως μεν γίνεται όταν παρά την ά£ιαι>
η τιμώνται τινε? η ατιμάζωνται, δικαίως δε όταν
15 κατά την άζίαν. δι ύπεροχην δε, όταν τις η τη
δυνάμει μείζων (η εις η πλείους) η κατά την πάλιν
και την δυναμ.ιν του πολιτεύματος' •)/ινεσί?αι γάρ
εϊωθεν εκ τών τοιούτων μοναρχία η δυναστεία,
διό ένιαχοΰ εΐώθασιν όστρακίζειν, οίον εν "Αργεί 5
και Άθήνησιν καίτοι βελτιον εζ άρχης όράν όπως
20 μη ένέσονται τοσούτον υπερέχοντες, η εάσαντας
)/ενε'σ^αι ίασθαι ύστερον, διά δε φόβον στασιά-
ζουσιν οι τε ηδικηκότες, δεδιότες μη δώσι δίκην,
και οι μέλλοντες άδικεΐσθαι, βουλόμενοι φθάσαι
πριν άδικηθηναι, ώσπερ εν Ροδω συνέστησαν οι
γνώριμοι επί τον δημον διά τάς επιφερομένας
1 αλλήλους: αυτούς Niemeyer.
β The four causes now mentioned are those alluded to just
above (a 38) as in addition to the seven enumerated above,
a 38-b 5.
* Of. 1284 a 18.
• Perhaps in 390 b.c, cf. 1. 32 f. and 1304 b 27 if.
380
POLITICS, V. ιι. 3-5
predominance, contempt, disproportionate growth
of power ; and also other modes of cause α are elec-
tion intrigue, carelessness, pettiness, dissimilarity.
4 Among these motives the power possessed by
insolence and gain, and their mode of operation, is
almost obvious ; for when the men in office show
insolence and greed, people rise in revolt against
one another and against the constitutions that
afford the opportunity for such conduct ; and greed
sometimes preys on private property and sometimes
on common funds. It is clear also what is the power
of honour and how it can cause party faction ; for
men form factions both when they are themselves
dishonoured and when they see others honoured ;
and the distribution of honours is unjust when persons
are either honoured or dishonoured against their
deserts, just when it is according to desert. Ex-
cessive predominance causes faction, when some
individual or body of men is greater and more power-
ful than is suitable to the state and the power of the
government ; for such are the conditions that usually
5 result in the rise of a monarchy or dynasty. Owing
to this in some places they have the custom of
temporary banishment, 6 as at Argos and Athens ; yet
it would be better to provide from the outset that
there may be no persons in the state so greatly
predominant, than first to allow them to come into
existence and afterwards to apply a remedy. Fear
is the motive of faction with those who have
inflicted wrong and are afraid of being punished,
and also with those who are in danger of suffering
a wrong and wish to act in time before the wrong is
inflicted, as the notables at Rhodes banded together c
against the people because of the law-suits that were
381
ARISTOTLE
1302 b
25 Βίκας. Βιά καταφρόνησιν Βε και στασιάζονσι και β
επιτίθενται, οίον εν τε ταΐς όλιγαρχίαις όταν
πλείους ώσιν οι μη μετέχοντες της πολιτείας
(κρείττους γαρ ο'ίονται εΐναή, /cat εν ταΐς Βημο-
κρατιαις οι εύποροι, καταφρονησαντες της αταξίας
/cat αναρχίας, οίον /cat ev Θι^αι? μετά την εν
30 Οίνοφύτοις μάχην κακώς πολιτευόμενων η δημο-
κρατία Βιεφθάρη, και η Ήίεγαρεων δι' άταξίαν και
αναρχιαν ηττηθεντων, και εν Έυρακούσαις προ της
Τελωνος τυραννίΒος, και εν 'Ρόδω ό Βημος προ
της επαναστάσεως . γίνονται Βε και δι' αύξησιν 7
την πάρα το άνάλογον μεταβολαι των πολιτειών
85 ώσπερ γαρ σώμα εκ μερών σύγκειται και Βεΐ
αύζάνεσθαι άνάλογον ίνα μένη συμμετρία, ει Βε
μη, φθείρεται, όταν 6 μεν πους τεττάρων πηχών
η το Β άλλο σώμα Βυοΐν σπιθαμαΧν, ενίοτε Βε καν
εις άλλου ζώου μεταβάλλοι μορφην ει μη μόνον
40 «-ατά το ποσόν αλλά και κατά το ποιόν αύζάνοιτο
1303 a παρά το άνάλογον , ούτω και πόλις σύγκειται εκ
μερών, ων πολλάκις λανθάνει τι αύζανόμενον, οίον
το τών άπορων πλήθος εν ταΐς Βημοκρατίαις και
πολιτείαις. συμβαίνει δ' ενίοτε τούτο και δια 8
τύχας, οίον εν Ύάραντι ηττηθεντων και άπολο-
6 μένων πολλών γνωρίμων υπό τών Ίαπύγων μικρόν
ύστερον τών ΜηΒικών Βημοκρατία εγενετο εκ
πολιτείας, και εν "Αργεί τών εν τη εβΒόμη άπ-
° Against Athens, 456 b.c. " See 1300 a 18 η.
c 485 b.c. d See 1. 23 n.
• It is not clear whether what follows refers to a work of
art (cf. 1284 b 8) or is an exaggerated account of a disease;
Galen describes one called σατιψίασα, in which the bones of
the temple swell out like satyrs' horns.
' i.e. if, for example, the foot became as hard as a hoof.
382
POLITICS, V. ιι. 6-8
6 being brought against them. Contempt is a cause
of faction and of actual attacks upon the govern-
ment, for instance in ohgarchies when those who
have no share in the government are more numerous
(for they think themselves the stronger party),
and in democracies when the rich have begun to feel
contempt for the disorder and anarchy that prevails,
as for example at Thebes the democracy was de-
stroyed owing to bad government after the battle
of Oenophyta, a and that of the Megarians was
destroyed when they had been defeated owing to
disorder and anarchy , b and at Syracuse before the
tyranny c of Gelo, and at Rhodes d the common people
had fallen into contempt before the rising against
7 them. Revolutions in the constitutions also take
place on account of disproportionate growth ; for
just as the body e is composed of parts, and needs to
grow proportionately in order that its symmetry
may remain, and if it does not it is spoiled, when the
foot is four cubits long and the rest of the body two
spans, and sometimes it might even change into the
shape of another animal if it increased dispropor-
tionately not only in size but also in quality/ so
also a state is composed of parts, one of which often
grows without its being noticed, as for example the
number of the poor in democracies and constitutional
8 states. And sometimes this is also brought about by
accidental occurrences, as for instance at Tarentum
when a great many notables were defeated and killed
by the Iapygians a short time after the Persian
wars a constitutional government was changed to
a democracy, and at Argos when those in the seventh
383
ARISTOTLE
1303»
ολο μένων υπό Κλεομένους του Λάκωνος ηναγκά-
σθΎ/σαν παραδβζασθαί τών περίοικων τινάς, και iv
Α,θιηναις άτυχούντων πεζή οι γνώριμοι ελάττους
ίο εγενοντο δια το εκ καταλόγου στρατευεσθαι υπό
τον Αακωνικόν πόλεμον. συμβαίνει δε τοΰτο και 1
εν τσ.ΐς δημοκρατίαις, ήττον 8ε• πλειόνων γαρ των
ευπόρων 1 γινομένων η των ουσιών αυξανομένων
μεταβάλλουσιν εις ολιγαρχίας και δυναστείας,
μεταβάλλουσι δ' at πολιτεΐαι και άνευ στάσεως 9
15 οιά τε τάς εριθείας, ώσπερ εν 'Ηραία (εζ αιρετών
γαρ Sta. τοΰτο εποίησαν κληρωτάς Οτι ηροΰντο τους
εριθευομενους), και δι' όλιγωρίαν, όταν εάσωσιν
εις τάς αρχάς τάς κυρίας παριέναί τους μη της
πολιτείας φίλους, ωσπερ εν Ω.ρεώ κατελυθη η
ολιγαρχία τών άρχόντο^ν γενομένου ' Ιϊρακλεοδώρου,
20 δς εζ ολιγαρχίας πολιτείαν και δημοκρατίαν κατ-
εσκεύασεν. ετι δια το παρά μικρόν λέγω οέ
παρά μικρόν, οτι πολλάκις λανθάνει μεγάλη γινο-
μένη μετάβασις τών νομίμων, όταν παρορώσι το
μικρόν, ώσπερ εν 'Αμβρακία μικρόν ην το τίμημα
τέλος δ άπ' 3 ούθενός ηρχον, ως εγγιον* η μηθεν
25 Βιαφερον του μηθεν το μικρόν, στασιωτικόν δε 10
και το μη όμόφυλον, εως αν συμπνευση• ωσπερ
γάρ ουδ' εκ του τυχόντος πλήθους πόλις γίγνεται,
1 και τούτο Susemihl. 2 άπορων ΓΜ.
8 δ' άπ Aretinus: δ' codd.
4 eyyvs δν ϊ vel (yyi^ov ? immisch (tanquam propinquum
sit Guil.).
° The word to be understood here may be φυλή, or possibly
ημέρα : the seventh day of the month was sacred to Apollo,
especially at Sparta, and one account assigns Cleomenes'
victory to that day, in which case the casualties may well
have been known afterwards as ' those who fell on the
seventh.'
384
POLITICS, V. ιι. 8-10
tribe α had been destroyed by the Spartan Cleo-
menes the citizens were compelled to admit some of
the surrounding people, and at Athens when they
suffered disasters by land the notables became fewer
because at the time of the war against Sparta the
army was drawn from a muster-roll. 6 And this
happens also in democracies, though to a smaller
extent ; for when the wealthy become more numer-
ous or their properties increase, the governments
9 change to oligarchies and dynasties. And revolu-
tions in constitutions take place even without factious
strife, owing to election intrigue, as at Heraea d
(for they made their magistrates elected by lot
instead of by vote for this reason, because the people
used to elect those who canvassed) ; and also owing
to carelessness, when people allow men that are not
friends of the constitution to enter into the sovereign
offices, as at Oreus e oligarchy was broken up when
Heracleodorus became one of the magistrates, who
in place of an oligarchy formed a constitutional
government, or rather a democracy. Another cause
is alteration by small stages ; by this I mean that
often a great change of institutions takes place un-
noticed when people overlook a small alteration, as
in Ambracia the property-qualification was small,
and finally men hold office with none at all, as a little
10 is near to nothing, or practically the same. Also
difference of race is a cause of faction, until harmony
of spirit is reached ; for just as any chance multitude
of people does not form a state, so a state is not
6 i.e. was made up of citizens and not of mercenaries.
e See 1292 b 10 n.
d On the Alpheus, in Arcadia.
• In Euboea ; its secession from Sparta to Athens, 377 b.c,
was perhaps the occasion of this revolution.
385
ARISTOTLE
όντως ovo εν τω τυχοντί χρονω. οιο όσοι ηδη
συνοίκους εδεζαντο η εποίκους οί πλείστοι εστα-
σίασαν, οίον Ύροιζηνίοις Αχαιοί συνώκησαν Συ-
εο βαριν, είτα πλείους οι 'Αχαιοί γενόμενου εξεβαλον
τους Ύροιζηνίους, όθεν το άγος συνέβη τοις
Έυβαριταις• και εν Θουριοις Συβαρΐται τοις συν-
οικησασιν , πλεονεκτεΐν γαρ άζιοΰντες ώς σφετερας
της χώρας εζεπεσον καϊ Ί^υζαντίοις οί έποικοι,
επιβουλευοντες φωραθεντες εζεπεσον δια μάχης'
85 και Αντισσάίοι τους "Χ,ίων φυγάδας εισδεζάμενοι
διά μάχης εζεβαλον Ζ,αγκλαΐοι δε Σαμίους 11
ΰποδεξάμενοι εζέπεσον καϊ αυτοί' και Άπολ-
λωνιάται οί εν τω Έύξεινω πόντω έποικους επ-
αγαγόμενοι εστασίασαν και Συρακούσιοι μετά τα
1303 b τυραννικά τους ξένους και τους μισθοφόρους
πολίτας ποιησάμενοι εστασίασαν και εις μάχην
ηλθον και Άμφιπολίται δεξάμενοι Χαλκιδεων
εποίκους 1 εζέπεσον υπό τούτων οι πλείστοι αυτών.
(Στασιάζουσι δ' εν μεν ταΐς όλιγαρχίαις οί
5 πολλοί, ώς αδικούμενοι οτι ου μετεχουσι τών
'ίσων, καθάπερ εΐρηται πρότερον, 'ίσοι οντες, εν δε
ταΐς δημοκρατίαις οί γνώριμοι, οτι μετεχουσι τών
ίσων ουκ 'ίσοι οντες.)
1 Spengel : άποικους codd.
" i.e. colonists not from the mother-city, admitted either
at the foundation of the colony or later.
6 Sybaris, founded 720 B.C., became very wealthy. The
Troezenian population when expelled were received at Croton,
which made war on Sybaris and destroyed it 510 b.c. To
what exactly to ayos refers is unknown.
c In Lesbos. d Later Messana, Messina.
e Thrasybulus succeeded his brother Hiero as tyrant in
467 b.c. and fell within a year.
386
POLITICS, V. π. 10-11
formed in any chance period of time. Hence most
of the states that have hitherto admitted joint
settlers or additional settlers α have split into fac-
tions ; for example Achaeans settled at Sybaris 6
jointly with Troezenians, and afterwards the
Achaeans having become more numerous expelled
the Troezenians, which was the cause of the curse
that fell on the Sybarites ; and at Thurii Sybarites 1.307 ■ 27,
quarrelled with those who had settled there with them, b 7 •
for they claimed to have the larger share in the
country as being their own, and were ejected; and
at Byzantium the additional settlers were discovered
plotting against the colonists and were expelled by
force of arms ; and the people of Antissa c after
admitting the Chian exiles expelled them by arms ;
11 and the people of Zancle d after admitting settlers
from Samos were themselves expelled ; and the
people of Apollonia on the Euxine Sea after bring-
ing in additional settlers fell into faction ; and the
Syracusans after the period of the tyrants e conferred
citizenship on their foreign troops and mercenaries
and then faction set in and they came to battle ;
and the Amphipolitans having received settlers from
Chalcis were most of them driven out by them/
(And in oligarchies civil strife is raised by the
many, on the ground that they are treated unjustly
because they are not admitted to an equal share
although they are equal, as has been said before, but
in democracies it begins with the notables, because
they have an equal share although they are not equal.)*
f Cf. 1306 a 2. The exact circumstances are unknown ;
Amphipolis was colonized from Athens 437 b.c.
" This sentence is out of place here, and would fit in better
if placed (as it is by Newman) above at 1301 a 39, after
στασιάζονσι, or (with other editors) ib. b 26.
387
ARISTOTLE
Έτασιάζουσι δε ενίοτε αί πόλεις και διά τους 12
τόπους, όταν μη εύφυώς εχη η χώρα προς το μίαν
είναι πολιν, οίον iv Κλαζομεναΐς οι επί Χυτοω 1
ίο προς τους iv νήσω, και Κολοφώνιοι και Nonet?•
και Άθήνησιν ούχ ομοίως είσίν αλλά μάλλον
δημοτικοί οι τον Πειραιά οίκοΰντβς των το άστυ.
ωσπβρ γάρ iv τοις πολεμοις αί οιαβάσ^ις των
οχετών, και των πάνυ σμικρών, διασπώσι τάς
φάλαγγας, οϋτως εοικε πάσα διαφορά ποιεΐν
15 διάστασιν. μεγίστη μεν ουν Ισως διάστασις άρετη
και μοχθηρία, είτα πλούτος και π€νία, και οΰτω
δη ετέρα ετέρας μάλλον, ων μία και η είρημενη
εστίν.
III. Γίνονται μεν ουν at στάσεις ου περί 1
μικρών άλΧ εκ μικρών, στασιάζουσι δε περί
μεγάλων, μάλιστα δέ και αί μικροί ίσχύουσιν
20 όταν εν τοις κυριοις γενωνται, οίον συνέβη και εν
Συρακουσαις εν τοις άρχαίοις χρόνοις. μετέβαλε
γάρ η πολιτεία εκ δύο νεανίσκων στασιασάντων,
τών* εν ταΐς άρχαΐς όντων, περί ερωτικην αίτίαν
θατερου γάρ άποδημοΰντος άτερος 3 εταίρος ων
τον* ερώμενον αύτοΰ ύπεποιησατο, πάλιν δ'
25 εκείνος τούτω χαλεπηνας την γυναίκα αύτοΰ άν-
επεισεν ως αυτόν ελθεΐν όθεν προσλαμβάνοντες
τους εν τω πολιτεύματι διεστασίασαν πάντας.
1 Χυτψ Sylburg. 2 των suppleuit Richards.
3 arepos suppleuit Coraes.
4 rbv Coraes : rts τον codd.
° Topography uncertain : Clazomenae near Smyrna was
partly on a small island, which Alexander joined to the
mainland with a causeway.
388
POLITICS, V. ιι. 12— πι. 1
12 Also states sometimes enter on faction for geo-
graphical reasons, when the nature of the country
is not suited for there being a single city, as for
example at Clazomenae a the people near Chytrum
are in feud with the inhabitants of the island, and
the Colophonians and the Xotians b ; and at Athens
the population is not uniformly democratic in spirit,
but the inhabitants of Piraeus are more so than those
of the city. For just as in wars the fording of water-
courses, even quite small ones, causes the formations
to lose contact, so every difference seems to cause
division. Thus perhaps the greatest division is
that between virtue and vice, next that between
wealth and poverty, and so with other differences
V in varying degree, one of which is the one men-
tioned/
1| III. Factions arise therefore not about but out of Revolutions
small matters ; but they are carried on about great c^TelT ty
matters. And even the small ones grow extremely
violent when they spring up among men of the ruling
class, as happened for example at Syracuse in ancient
times. For the constitution underwent a revolution
as a result of a quarrel that arose d between two young
men, who belonged to the ruling class, about a love
affair. While one of them was abroad the other who
was his comrade won over the vouth with whom he
was in love, and the former in his anger against him
retaliated by persuading his wife to come to him ;
owing to which they stirred up a party struggle
among all the people in the state, enlisting them on
* Xotium was the port of Colophon.
e i.e. difference of locality.
d Perhaps under the oligarchy of the Gamori, overthrown
by the people and followed by Gelo's tyranny, 485 b.c.
389
ARISTOTLE
διόπερ αρχομένων €υλαβεΐσθαι δει των τοιούτων, 2
καλ διαλύει^ τάς των ηγεμόνων και δυνάμενων
στάσεις• εν άρχη γαρ γ'ιγνεται το αμάρτημα, η δ
so άρχη λέγεται ήμισυ etrai παντός, ώστε και το εν
αύτη μικρόν αμάρτημα άνάλογον εστί προς τα εν
τοις άλλοις μερεσιν. δλως 8ε αί των γνωρίμων
στάσει? συναπολαύειν ποιοΰσι και την δλην πόλιν,
οΐον εν Έστιαια συνέβη μετά τα Μηδικά, δυο
αδελφών περί της πατρώας 1 νομής διενεχθεντων
85 6 μεν γαρ άπορώτερος, ως ούκ άποφαίνοντος
θατερου την ούσίαν ούδε τον θησαυρον δν εΰρεν ο
πατήρ, προσηγάγετο 2 τους δημοτικούς, 6 δ' έτερος
έχων ούσίαν πολλην τους εύπορους. και εν 3
Δελφοΐς εκ κηδείας γενομένης διαφοράς άρχη
1304 a πασών εγενετο τών στάσεων τών ύστερον ο μεν
γαρ, οίωνισάμενός τι σύμπτωμα ως ηλθεν επι την
νύμφην, ού λαβών άπηλθεν, οί δ' ως ύβρισθεντες
ενεβαλον τών ιερών χρημάτων θύοντος κάπειτα
ώς Ίερόσυλον άπεκτειναν. και περί Μιτυληνην δε
5 εζ επικληρων στάσεως γενομένης πολλών εγενετο
άρχη κακών, και του πολέμου του προς Αθηναίους
εν ω ΐΐάχης έλαβε την πόλιν αυτών Ύιμοφάνους
γαρ τών ευπόρων τινός καταλιπόντος δύο θυγα-
τέρας, ό περιωσθεις και ού λαβών τοις υιεσιν αύτοΰ
Δόξανδρος ηρζε της στάσεως και τους 'Αθηναίους
1 πατρψων codd. cet. (των π. Victorius).
2 ed. : irpoarjyeTo codd.
a i.e. the ratio of being a half to the whole : a bad start
does as much harm as all the later mistakes put together.
390
POLITICS, V. πι. 2-3
2 their sides. On account of this it is necessary to
guard against such affairs at their beginning, and to
break up the factions of the leaders and powerful
men ; for the error occurs at the beginning, and the
beginning as the proverb says is half of the whole,
so that even a small mistake at the beginning stands
in the same ratio α to mistakes at the other stages.
And in general the faction quarrels of the notables
involve the whole state in the consequences, as
happened at Hestiaea b after the Persian wars, when
two brothers quarrelled about the division of their
patrimony : for the poorer of the two, on the ground
that the other would not make a return of the estate
and of the treasure that their father had found, got the
common people on his side, and the other possessing
3 much property was supported by the rich. And at
Delphi the beginning of all the factions that occurred
afterwards was when a quarrel arose out of a mar-
riage ; the bridegroom interpreted some chance
occurrence when he came to fetch the bride as a bad
omen and went away without taking her, and her
relatives thinking themselves insulted threw some
articles of sacred property into the fire when he was
performing a sacrifice and then put him to death as
guilty of sacrilege. And also at Mitylene c a faction
that arose out of some heiresses was the beginning of
many misfortunes, and of the war with the Athenians «s-7 aa.
in which Paches captured the city of Mitylene : a
wealthy citizen named Timophanes left two daughters,
and a man who was rejected in his suit to ob-
tain them for his own sons, Doxander, started the
* Also called Oreus, see a 18.
■ The revolt of Mitylene 428 b.c. is ascribed to purely
political causes by Thucydides (iii. 1-30).
391
ARISTOTLE
1304 ,« >t it >\ > » Λ
ίο παρωςυνε , πρόξενος ων της πόλεως, και εν 4
Φωκεΰσιν εζ em κλήρου στάσεως γενομένης περί
MraaeW τον Μνάσωνος πάτερα και Έιύθυκράτη
τον Ονόμαρχου, ή στάσις αύτη αρχή του ίεροΰ
πολέμου κατέστη τοις Φωκεΰσιν. μετέβαλε δε
και εν Έιπιδάμνω ή πολιτεία εκ γαμικών ύπο-
15 μνηστευσάμενος yap τις θυγατέρα, 1 ως έζημίωσεν
αυτόν ο του ύπομνηστευθέντος πατήρ γενόμενος
των αρχόντων, άτερος συμπαρέλαβε τους έκτος
της πολιτείας ως επηρεασθείς, μεταβάλλουσι δε 5
και εις ολιγαρχίαν και εις δήμον και εις πολιτείαν
εκ του εύδοκιμήσαί τι ή αύζηθηναι η άρχειον ή
20 μοριον της πόλεως• οίον ή εν Άρείω πάγω βουλή
εύδοκιμήσασα εν τοις ΝΙηδικοΐς έδοζε συντονω-
τέραν ποιήσαι τήν πολιτείαν , και πάλιν ο ναυτικός
όχλος γενόμενος αίτιος της περί Σαλα /nra νίκης
και δια ταύτης της ηγεμονίας δια τήν κατά θάλατ-
ταν δύναμιν τήν δημοκρατίαν ίσχυροτέραν εποίησεν
25 και εν 'Αργεί οι γνώριμοι εύδοκιμήσαντες περί τήν
εν Μαντινεία μάχην τήν προς Λακεδαιμονίους
επεχείρησαν καταλύειν τον δήμον και εν Συρα- β
κουσαις ό δήμος αίτιος γενόμενος της νίκης του
πολέμου του προς Αθηναίους εκ πολιτείας εις
δημοκρατίαν μετέβαλεν και εν Χαλ/αδι Φόξον
80 τον τυραννον μετά τών γνωρίμων ο δήμος άνελών
ευθύς ε'ίχετο της πολιτείας' και εν Αμβρακία
πάλιν ωσαύτως ΐίερίανδρον συνεκβαλών τοις έπι-
1 Ovyarepa om. codd. fere omnes.
° i.e. the fathers of the two suitors for the heiress's hand
turned the quarrel into a faction fight.
* Perhaps the same event as that referred to 1301 b 21.
c Unknown.
S92
POLITICS, V. πι. 3-6
faction and kept on stirring up the Athenians, whose
4 consul he was at Mitylene. And among the Phocians
when a faction arising out of an heiress sprang up in
connexion with Mnaseas the father of Mnason and
Euthykrates the father of Onomarchus, this faction
proved to be the beginning for the Phocians of the
Holy War. At Epidamnus also circumstances re-
lating to a marriage gave rise to a revolution in
the constitution b ; somebody had betrothed his
daughter, and the father of the man to whom he
had betrothed her became a magistrate, and had
to sentence him to a fine ; the other thinking that
he had been treated with insolence formed a party
ο of the unenfranchised classes to assist him. And and from
also revolutions to oligarchy and democracy and predomin-
constitutional government arise from the growth in ance •
reputation or in power of some magistracy or some
section of the state ; as for example the Council on
the Areopagus having risen in reputation during
the Persian wars was believed to have made the
constitution more rigid, and then again the naval
multitude, having been the cause of the victory off
Salamis and thereby of the leadership of Athens due
to her power at sea, made the democracy stronger ;
and at Argos the notables having risen in repute in
connexion with the battle against the Spartans at
Mantinea took in hand to put down the people ; «8 b.c.
6 and at Syracuse the people having been the cause of
the victory in the war against Athens made a revolu-
tion from constitutional government to democracy ; 412 b.c.
and at Chalcis the people with the aid of the notables
overthrew the tyrant Phoxus c and then immediately
seized the government ; and again at Ambracia
similarly the people joined with the adversaries
393
ARISTOTLE
νεμενοις ο οημος τον τυραννον εις εαυτόν περι-
εστησε την πολιτείαν. και όλως δη δβΓ τούτο μη 7
35 λανθάνειν, ώς οι δυνάμεως αίτιοι γενόμενοι, και
ίδιώται και άρχαι /cat φυλαι και δλως μέρος και
οποιονοΰν 1 πλήθος, στάσιν κινοΰσιν η γαρ οι τού-
τοις φθονοΰντες τιμωμενοις άρχουσι της στάσεως,
η ούτοι δια την ύπεροχην ου θελουσι μενειν επι
των ΐσων. κινούνται δ' αί πολιτεΐαι και όταν
τάναντία είναι δοκούντα μέρη της πόλεως ίσάζη
1304 b άλλήλοις, οίον οι πλούσιοι και ό δήμος, μέσον δ'
η μηθεν η μικρόν πάμπαν αν γαρ πολύ ύπερεχη
όποτερονοΰν των μερών, προς το φανερώς κρεΐττον
το λοιπόν ου θέλει κινδυνεύειν. διό και οι κατ
5 άρετην διαφέροντες ού ποιούσι στάσιν ώς ειπείν,
ολίγοι γαρ γίγνονται προς ποίους, καθόλου μεν
οΰν περί πάσας τάς πολιτείας αί άρχαι και αίτίαι
τών στάσεων και τών μεταβολών τούτον εχουσι
τον τρόπον.
Κινοΰσι δέ τάς πολιτείας ότε μεν δια βίας ότε 8
δε δι απάτης• δια βίας μεν η ευθύς εξ αρχής
ίο ή ύστερον άναγκάζοντες• και γαρ η άττάτ^ διττή•
ότε μεν γαρ εζαπατησαντες το πρώτον εκόν-
των μεταβάλλουσι την πολιτείαν, εΐθ* ύστερον βία.
κατεχουσιν ακόντων, οίον επι τών τετρακοσίων
τον δήμον εξηπάτησαν φάσκοντες τον /?ασιλβα
1 οποσονοϋν Richards.
α 580 B.C. ; cf. 1311 a 39 ff.
* The oligarchy at Athens 41 1 b.c.
S94
POLITICS, V. πι. β-8
of the tyrant Periander in expelling him and then
brought the government round to themselves. 3
7 And indeed in general it must not escape notice
that the persons who have caused a state to win
power, whether private citizens or magistrates or
tribes, or in general a section or group of any kind,
stir up faction ; for either those who envy these men
for being honoured begin the faction, or these men
owing to their superiority are not willing to remain
in a position of equality. And constitutions also or from
undergo revolution when what are thought of as equality.
opposing sections of the state become equal to one
another, for instance the rich and the people, and
there is no middle class or only an extremely small
one ; for if either of the two sections becomes much
the superior, the remainder is not willing to risk an
encounter with its manifestly stronger opponent.
Owing to this men who are exceptional in virtue
generally speaking do not cause faction, because they
find themselves few against many. Universally then
in connexion with all the forms of constitution the
origins and causes of factions and revolutions are of
this nature.
8 The means used to cause revolutions of constitu- Modes of
t- j .. /» j revolution.
tions are sometimes force and sometimes traud.
Force is employed either when the revolutionary
leaders exert compulsion immediately from the start
or later on — as indeed the mode of using fraud
is also twofold : sometimes the revolutionaries after
completely deceiving the people at the first stage
alter the constitution with their consent, but then at
a later stage retain their hold on it by force against
the people's will : for instance, at the time of the
Four Hundred, 6 they deceived the people by saying
395
ARISTOTLE
χρήματα παρεςειν προς τον πολεμον τον προς
15 Λακεδαιμονίους , φευσάμενοι δε κατέχειν επειρώντο
την πολιτείαν ότε 8e εζ αρχής τε πείσαντες και
ύστερον πάλιν πεισθέντων εκόντων άρχουσιν αυτών.
Απλώς μεν ουν περί πάσας τάς πολιτείας εκ
τών είρημένων συμβέβηκε γίγνεσθαι τάς μεταβολάς :
IV. Κα.0 εκαστον δ' εϊδος πολιτείας εκ τούτων 1
20 μερίζοντας τά συμβαίνοντα δει θεωρεΐν. αϊ μεν
ουν δημοκρατίαι μάλιστα μεταβάλλουσι διά την
τών δημαγωγών άσελγειαν τά μεν γάρ ιδία,
συκοφαντοΰντες τους τάς ουσίας έχοντας συστρε-
φουσιν αυτούς (συνάγει γάρ και τους εχθίστους
ο κοινός φόβος), τά δε κοινή το πλήθος επάγοντες.
25 και τοΰτο επί πολλών αν τις ΐδοι γιγνόμενον ούτως,
και γάρ εν Κω ή δημοκρατία μετέβαλε πονηρών 2
εγγενομενων δημαγωγών, οι γαρ γνώριμοι συν-
έστησαν και εν 'Ρόδω, μισθοφοράν τε γάρ οι
δημαγωγοί επόριζον και εκώλυον άποδιδοναι τα
οφειλόμενα τοις τριηράρχοις, οι δε διά τάς επιφερο-
30 μενας δίκας ήναγκάσθησαν συστάντες καταλΰσαι
τον δήμον. κατελύθη δέ και εν Ηράκλεια, ό
δήμος μετά τον άποικισμόν ευθύς διά τους δημ-
αγωγούς• αδικούμενοι γάρ υπ' αυτών οι γνώριμοι
εξεπιπτον, έπειτα άθροισθεντες οι εκπίπτοντες
και κατελθόντες κατ έλυσαν τον δήμον. πάρα- 3
° Date unknown. b See 1302 b 23 η.
c i.e. owed for repairs to the ships, and perhaps also for
advances of pay to the crews.
d Probably the Pontic Heraclea (c/. 1305 b 5, 36, 1306 a
37), founded middle of 6th century B.C., not the Trachinian.
396
-.'Q.-rues,
POLITICS, V. πι. 8— iv. 2
that the Persian King would supply money for the
war against the Spartans, and after telling them this
falsehood endeavoured to keep a hold upon the
government ; but in other cases they both persuade
the people at the start and afterwards repeat the
persuasion and govern them with their consent.
Speaking generally therefore in regard to all the
forms of constitution, the causes that have been stated
are those from which revolutions have occurred.
1 IV. But in the light of these general rules we must Revolution!
consider the usual course of events as classified j?
according to each different kind of constitution. In caused by
democracies the principal cause of revolutions is the de
insolence of the demagogues ; for they cause the
owners of property to band together, partly by
malicious prosecutions of individuals among them
(for common fear brings together even the greatest
enemies), and partly by setting on the common people
2 against them as a class. And one may see this
taking place in this manner in many instances. In
Cos the democracy was overthrown α when evil dem-
agogues had arisen there, for the notables banded
themselves together ; and also in Rhodes, 6 for the
demagogues used to provide pay for public services,
and also to hinder the payment of money owed c
to the naval captains, and these because of the law-
suits that were brought against them were forced to
make common cause and overthrow the people.
And also at Heraclea d the people were put down
immediately after the foundation of the colony
because of the people's leaders ; for the notables
being unjustly treated by them used to be driven
out, but later on those who were driven out collect-
ing together effected their return and put down the
397
ARISTOTLE
35 πλησίως δε και ή εν Μεγάροις κατελυθη δημο-
κρατία• οι γαρ δημαγωγοί, ίνα χρήματα εχωσι
δημευειν, εζεβαλλον πολλούς των γνωρίμων, εως
πολλούς εποίησαν τους φεύγοντας , οι δε κατιόντες
ενίκησαν μαχόμενοι τον δήμον και κατέστησαν
την όλιγαρχίαν. συνέβη δε ταύτόν και περί
1305 a Κυμην επι της δημοκρατίας ην κατέλυσε Θρασύ-
μαχος. σχεδόν δε και επι των άλλων αν τις ϊδοι
θεωρών τάς μεταβολάς τούτον έχουσας τον τρόπον,
ότε μεν γαρ ίνα χαρίζωνται άδικοΰντες τους
5 γνωρίμους συνιστάσιν , η τάς ουσίας άναδάστους
ποιοϋντες η τάς προσόδους ταΐς λειτουργίαις, ότε
δε διαβάλλοντες , ΐν* εχωσι δημευειν τά κτήματα
των πλουσίων, επι δε των αρχαίων, ότε γένοιτο 4
ό αυτός δημαγωγός και στρατηγός, εις τυραννίδα
μετεβαλΧον σχεδόν γάρ οι πλείστοι των αρχαίων
ίο τυράννων εκ δημαγωγών γεγόνασιν . αίτιον δε του
τότε μεν γίγνεσθαι νυν δε μή, ότι τότε μεν οι
δημαγωγοί ήσαν εκ τών στρατηγούντων (ου γάρ
πω δεινοί ήσαν λέγειν), νυν δε της ρητορικής
ηύζημενης οι δυνάμενοι λέγειν δημαγωγοΰσι μεν,
δι άπειρίαν δέ τών πολεμικών ουκ επιτίθενται,
15 πλην ει που βραχύ τι γεγονε τοιούτον, εγίγνοντο 5
δε τυραννίδες πρότερον μάλλον ή νυν και διά το
μεγάλας αρχάς εγχειρίζεσθαί τισιν, ώσπερ εν
Μιλτ^τω εκ της πρυτανείας (πολλών γάρ ην και
α See 1300 a 18 ff. η.
6 An event otherwise unknown.
c Perhaps that of Thrasybulus (Hdt. i. 20), 612 B.c.
398
POLITICS, V. rv. 3-5
3 people. And also the democracy at Megara was
put down in a similar manner ° ; the people's leaders resulting in
in order to have money to distribute to the people oUgarcn - v -
went on expelling many of the notables, until they
made the exiles a large body, and these came back
and defeated the people in a battle and set up the
oligarchy. And the same thing happened also at
Cyme in the time of the democracy which Thrasy-
machus put down, 6 and in the case of other states
also examination would show that re\*olutions take
place very much in this manner. Sometimes they
make the notables combine by wronging them in
order to curry favour, causing either their estates to
be divided up or their revenues by imposing public
services, and sometimes by so slandering them that
they may have the property of the wealthy to con-
4 fiscate. And in old times whenever the same man
became both leader of the people and general, they
used to change the constitution to a tyranny ; for
almost the largest number of the tyrants of early
days have risen from being leaders of the people.
And the reason why this used to happen then but
does not do so now is because then the leaders of
the people were drawn from those who held the
office of general (for they were not yet skilled in
oratory), but now when rhetoric has developed the
able speakers are leaders of the people, but owing to
their inexperience in military matters they are not
put in control of these, except in so far as something
of the kind has taken place to a small extent in some
5 places. And tyrannies also used to occur in former
times more than they do now because important
offices were entrusted to certain men, as at Miletus a
tyranny c arose out of the presidency (for the president
S99
ARISTOTLE
1305 a ,. , , , \ r' , w__r * ν *» » » ι
μεγάλων κνριος ο πρυτανις). ετι be όια to μή
μεγάλας etrai rare τάς πόλεις αλλ' επί τών αγρών
20 οίκεΐν τον δήμον άσχολον οντά προς τοις εργοις,
ol προστάται τον δήμου, οτε πολεμικοί γενοιντο,
τυραννίδι επετίθεντο. πάντες δε τοΰτο εδρών
υπό του δήμου πιστευθεντες, ή δε πίστις -ην ή
απέχθεια ή προς τους πλουσίους, οίον Άθήνησί
τε Πεισίστρατο? στασιασας προς τους πεδιακους,
25 και Θεαγένης εν Meyctpois* των ευπόρων τα κτήνη
άποσφάξας , λαβών παρά τον ποταμόν επινεμοντας,
και Αιονύσιος κατηγορών Ααφναίου και τών
πλουσίων ηξιώθη της τυραννίδος, διά την εχθραν
πιστευτείς ως δημοτικός ων. μεταβάλλουσι δε 6
και εκ της πάτριας δημοκρατίας εις την νεωτάτην
so οπού γαρ αίρεται μεν αί άρχαί, μη από τιμημάτων
δε, αιρεΐται δε ό δήμος, δημαγωγοΰντες οι σπουδ-
αρχιώντες εις τοΰτο καθιστάσιν ώστε 1 κύριον
tirai τον δήμον και τών νόμων, άκος δε του ή
μή ytVea^ai ή του yiWa^ai ήττον το τάς φυλάς
φερειν τους άρχοντας αλλά μή πάντα τον δήμον.
86 Ύών μεν ούν δημοκρατιών αί μεταβολαί γίγνονται
πασαι σχεδόν διά ταύτας τάς αιτίας.
V. At δ' όλιγαρχίαι μεταβάλλουσι διά 2 δυο 1
μάλιστα τρόπους τους φανερωτάτους, ενα μεν εάν
άδικώσι το πλήθος• πας γάρ ικανός γίνεται προ-
40 στάτης, μάλιστα δ' οτα^ εξ αυτής συμβή τής
ολιγαρχίας yi^ea^ai τον ηγεμόνα, καθάπερ εν
Νά£ω Αύγδαμις , ός και ετυράννησεν ύστερον τών
1305 b Να£ιωι>. έχει δε και ή εξ άλλων αρχή στάσεως 2
1 ώστβ ed. : ώ$ codd. 2 κατά Richards.
° Dion3 T sius the elder, see 1259 a 29 η.
400
POLITICS, V. ιν. 5— v. 2
had control of many important matters). And more-
over, because the cities in those times were not large
but the common people lived on their farms busily
engaged in agriculture, the people's champions when
they became warlike used to aim at tyranny. And
they all used to do this when they had acquired the
confidence of the people, and their pledge of confi-
dence was their enmity towards the rich, as at Athens
Pisistratus made himself tyrant by raising up a party 650 rc.
against the men of the plain, and Theagenes at
Megara by slaughtering the cattle of the well-to-do ess b.c
which he captured grazing bv the river, and Diony-
sius α established a claim to become tyrant when he
accused Daphnaeus and the rich, since his hostility
to them caused him to be trusted as a true man of the
6 people. And revolutions also take place from the or in
ancestral form of democracy to one of the most democracy.
modern kind ; for where the magistracies are elec-
tive, but not on property-assessments, and the people
elect, men ambitious of office by acting as popular
leaders bring things to the point of the people's
being sovereign even over the laws. A remedy to
prevent this or to reduce its extent is for the tribes to
elect the magistrates, and not the people collectively.
These then are the causes through which almost
all the revolutions in democracies take place.
1 V. Oligarchies undergo revolution principally Revolutions
through two ways that are the most obvious. One in . . .
• τ ι. ι_ • r• it oligarchies .
is it they treat the multitude unjustly ; tor anybody (i.) caused
makes an adequate people's champion, and especi- outside •
ally so when their leader happens to come from the
oligarchy itself, like Lygdamis at Naxos, who after-
wards actually became tyrant of the Naxians. c. οίο a.c.
2 Faction originating with other people also has
4-01
ARISTOTLE
1305 b s J ' t » I s ->t ' η - » ' ι
οιαφορας. οτε μεν γαρ ες αυτών των ευπόρων, ου
των όντων δ' iv ταΐς άρχαΐς, γίγνεται κατάλνσις,
όταν ολίγοι σφόδρα ώσιν οι iv ταΐς τιμαΐς, οίον
δ iv Μασσαλία και iv "Ιστρω καΐ iv Ηράκλεια και
ev αλλαι? πόλεσι συμβεβηκεν οι γαρ μη μετέχοντες
των αρχών εκίνουν, εως μετελαβον οι πρεσβύτεροι
πρότερον των αδελφών, ύστερον δ' οι νεώτεροι
πάλιν (ου γαρ άρχουσιν ενιαχοΰ μεν άμα πατήρ
τε και υιός, ενιαχοΰ δε ό πρεσβύτερος και ο νεώ-
10 τερος αδελφός) . καΐ ένθα μεν πολιτικωτερα εγε-
νετο η ολιγαρχία, εν "Ιστρω δ' εις δήμον άπ-
ετελεύτησεν, εν Ήρακλεία δ' εξ ελαττόνων εις εξα-
κόσιους ηλθεν. μετέβαλε δε και εν Κνιδω η ολιγαρχία 3
στασιασαντων τών γνωρίμων αυτών προς αυτούς δια.
το ολίγους μετεχειν και καθάπερ εΐρηται, ει πατήρ,
15 υίόν μη μετεχειν, μηδ' , ει πλείους αδελφοί, αλλ' η
τον πρεσβύτατον επιλαβόμενος γαρ στασιαζόντων
ό δήμος και λαβών προστάτην εκ τών γνωρίμων, επι-
θεμενος εκράτησεν ασθενές γαρ το στασιάζον. και 4
ev Έ,ρυθραΐς δε επι της τών Βασιλίδων ολιγαρχίας εν
20 τοις άρχαίοις χρόνοις, καίπερ καλώς επιμελομενων
τών εν τη πολιτεία, όμως δια το υπ' ολίγων άρχε-
σ^αι άγανακτών ό δήμος μετέβαλε την πολιτείαν.
Κ,ινοΰνται δ αϊ όλιγαρχιαι εξ αυτών και δια
φιλονεικίαν δημαγωγούντων (ή δημαγωγία δέ
α The contrasted case, of dissolution of oligarchy arising
from the people, should follow, but is omitted.
6 Cf. 1321 a 29 if.
• Near the mouth of the Danube. d See 1304 b 31 n.
" Perhaps not the same as the one mentioned at 1306 b 3.
' Just west of Smyrna. The family name implies a claim
to royal ancestry.
' This sentence is interrupted by a parenthesis and is
resumed in § 6, 'And revolutions in oligarchy also — '.
402
POLITICS, V. v. 2-4
various ways of arising. Sometimes when the
honours of office are shared by very few, dissolution
originates from the wealthy themselves," but not
those that are in office, as for example has occurred
at Marseilles, 6 at Istrus, c at Heraclea, d and in other
states ; for those who did not share in the magis-
tracies raised disturbances until as a first stage the
older brothers were admitted, and later the younger
ones again (for in some places a father and a son
may not hold office together, and in others an elder
and a younger brother may not). At Marseilles
the oligarchy became more constitutional, while at
Istrus it ended in becoming democracy, and in
Heraclea the government passed from a smaller
3 number to six hundred. At Cnidus also there was a
revolution* of the oligarchy caused by a faction formed
by the notables against one another, because few
shared in the government, and the rule stated held, 1. 8 ft
that if a father was a member a son could not be, nor if
there were several brothers could any except the
eldest ; for the common people seized the oppor-
tunity of their quarrel and, taking a champion from
among the notables, fell upon them and conquered
them, for a party divided against itself is weak.
4 Another case was at Erythrae/ where at the time
of the oligarchy of the Basilidae in ancient days,
although the persons in the government directed
affairs well, nevertheless the common people were
resentful because they were governed bv a few, and
brought about a revolution of the constitution.
On the other hand, oligarchies are overthrown ( 2 ) arising
from within themselves both ? when from motives o r wίϋgto' U1,
of rivalry they play the demagogue (and this dem- dem ag<«y•
403
ARISTOTLE
οιττη, η μεν εν αυτοις τοις ολίγοις, εγγινεται γαρ
25 Βημαγωγός καν πάνυ ολίγοι ώσιν — οίον εν τοις
τριάκοντα Άθήνησιν οι περί ^Καρικλεα 'ίσχυσαν
τους τριάκοντα Βημαγωγοΰντες , και εν τοις τετρα-
κοσιοις οι περί Φρύνιχον τον αυτόν τρόπον — , η δ' 1 5
όταν τον οχλον Βημαγωγώσιν οι iv τη ολιγαρχία
οντες, οίον iv Λαρίστ) οι πολιτοφύλακες Βιά το
δο αιρεΐσθαι αυτούς τον οχλον εδημαγώγουν, και iv
οσαις ολιγαρχίαις ούχ ούτοι 2 αίροΰνται τάς αρχάς
εξ ων οι άρχοντες είσιν άλλ' αϊ μεν άρχαι εκ
τιμημάτων μεγάλων είσιν η εταιριών αίροΰνται
δ' οι όπλΐται η ο Βημος, όπερ εν ΆβύΒω συν-
εβαινεν, και όπου τα Βικαστηρια μη εκ του πολι-
85 τεύματός εστίν — Βημαγωγοΰντες γαρ προς τάς
κρίσεις μεταβάλλουσι την πολιτείαν , όπερ και εν
Ηράκλεια εγενετο τη εν τω ΐΐόντω — , ετι δ' 6
όταν ενιοι εις ελάττους ελκωσι την όλιγαρχίαν,
οι γάρ το 'ίσον ζητοΰντες αναγκάζονται βοηθόν
επαγαγεσθαι τον Βημον). γίγνονται 8ε μεταβολαι
40 της ολιγαρχίας και όταν άναλώσωσι τά ίδια
ζώντες ασελγώς• και γάρ οι τοιούτοι καινοτομεΐν
ζητοΰσι, και η τυραννίΒι επιτίθενται αύτοι η
1306 a κατασκευάζουσιν έτερον (ώσπερ Ίππαρΐνος Διο-
νύσιον εν Συρακούσαις, και εν Άμφιπόλει ω
όνομα ην Κλεότιμος τους εποίκους τους Χαλ/αδεων
ηγαγε και ελθόντων διεστασίασεν αυτούς προς
τους εύπορους, και iv ΑΙγίνη δ την πράζιν την
1 ή δ' ed. : ή codd. 2 αύτοι ? Richards.
" See 1304 b 12 η. » See 1275 b 29 η.
e i.e. (apparently) where membership is not confined to the
class eligible for the magistracies. d See 1304 b 31 n.
e See 1259 a 29 n. ' See 1303 b 2 n.
404
POLITICS, V. v. 4-6
asrogv is of two sorts, one among the oligarchs
themselves, for a demagogue can arise among them
even when they are a very small body, — as for instance
in the time of the Thirty at Athens, the party of 404 rc.
Charicles rose to power by currying popularity with
the Thirty, and in the time of the Four Hundred a the
5 party of Phryniehus rose in the same way, — the other
when the members of the oligarchy curry popularity
with the mob, as the Civic Guards at Larisa 6 courted
popularitv with the mob because it elected them,
and in all the oligarchies in which the magistracies
are not elected by the class from which the magis-
trates come but are filled from high property-
grades or from political clubs while the electors
are the heavy-armed soldiers or the common people,
as used to be the case at Abydos, and in places where
the jury-courts are not made up from the govern-
ment c — for there members of the oligarchy by
courting popular favour with a view to their trials
cause a revolution of the constitution, as took place
9 at Heraclea on the Euxine d ; and a further instance
is when some men try to narrow down the oligarchy
to a smaller number, for those who seek equality
are forced to bring in the people as a helper.)
And revolutions in oligarchy also take place when or to ex-
they squander their private means by riotous living ; rava 8 anL&
for also men of this sort seek to bring about a new
state of affairs, and either aim at tyranny themselves
or suborn somebody else (as Hipparinus put forward
Dionysius e at Syracuse, and at Amphipolis * a man
named Cleotimus led the additional settlers that
came from Chalcis and on their arrival stirred them
up to sedition against the wealthy, and in Aegina
405
ARISTOTLE
1306 a, v/ f/ . , , Ω . Λ ,
s προς Χαρητα πραςας ενεχειρησε μεταραλειν την
πολιτείαν διά τοιαύτην αίτίαν) ' ότε μεν οΰν επι- 7
χειρούσί τι κινεΐν, ότε δε κλεπτουσι τά κοινά, όθεν
■προς αυτούς στασιάζονσιν ή ούτοι ή 1 οι προς τού-
τους μαχόμενοι κλέπτοντας, όπερ εν Απολλωνία
ίο συνέβη τη εν τω ΐΐόντω. ομονοούσα δε ολιγαρχία
ουκ εύδιάφθορος εξ αυτής' σημεΐον δε η εν Φάρ-
σαλα» πολιτεία, εκείνοι γαρ ολίγοι δντες πολλών
κύριοι είσι διά το χρήσθαι σφίσιν αύτοΐς καλώς,
καταλύονται δε και όταν εν τή ολιγαρχία ετεραν 8
όλιγαρχίαν εμποιώσιν. τούτο δ' εστίν όταν του
ι» παντός πολιτεύματος ολίγου οντος τών μεγίστων
αρχών μη μετεχωσιν οι ολίγοι πάντες- όπερ εν
"Ηλιδι συνέβη ποτέ, της πολιτείας γαρ δι ολίγων
ούσης τών γερόντων ολίγοι πάμπαν εγίνοντο διά
το άϊδίους eirai ενενήκοντα οντάς, την δ' αΐρεσιν
δυναστευτικην είναι και όμοίαν τη τών εν Α,ακε-
δαίμονι γερόντων.
£0 Τίγνεται δε μεταβολή τών ολιγαρχικών και εν 9
πολεμώ και εν ειρήνη' εν μεν πολεμώ διά την προς
τον δήμον άπιστίαν στρατιώταις άναγκαζομενων
χρήσθαι (ω γάρ αν εγχειρίσωσιν, οΰτος πολλάκις
γίγνεται τύραννος, ώσπερ εν Κορίνθω Ύιμοφάνης,
αν δε πλείους, ούτοι αύτοΐς περιποιούνται δυνα-
25 στείαν), ότε δε ταύτα δεδιότες μεταδιδόασι τω
1 οθΐν τ) αύτοϊ 7rpos αυτούς στασιάζονσιν r) Richards.
α i.e. he had squandered his fortune in riotous living ; this
deal with the Athenian general may have been in 367 b.c.
6 i.e. both of the lower classes and of the subject cities.
6 i.e. the small governing body.
d i.e. like a dynasteia, favourable to the interest of a few
very wealthy families ; see 1292 b 10 n.
• Corinth was at war with Argos c. 350 b«c. Timophanes
406
POLITICS, V. v. 6-9
the man who carried out the transactions with
Chares attempted to cause a revolution in the con-
7 stitution for a reason of this sort a ) ; so sometimes
they attempt at once to introduce some reform, at
other times they rob the public funds and in conse-
quence either they or those who fight against them
in their peculations stir up faction against the govern-
ment, as happened at Apollonia on the Black Sea.
On the other hand, harmonious oligarchy does not
easily cause its own destruction ; and an indication
of this is the constitutional government at Phar-
salus, for there the ruling class though few are
masters of many men 6 because on good terms with
8 one another. Also oligarchical governments break r to
up when they create a second oligarchy within the further ex.
oligarchy. This is when, although the whole citizen
class is small, its few members are not all admitted to
the greatest offices ; this is what once occurred in
Elis, for the government being in the hands of a few,
very few men used to become members of the Elders,•
because these numbering ninety held office for life,
and the mode of election was of a dynastic type d and
resembled that of the Elders at Sparta.
9 Revolutions of oligarchies occur both during war internal
and in time of peace — during war since the oligarchs weaknessee •
are forced by their distrust of the people to employ
mercenary troops (for the man in whose hands they
place them often becomes tyrant, as Timophanes
did at Corinth,* and if they put several men in
command, these win for themselves dynastic power),
and when through fear of this they give a share in
the constitution to the multitude, the oligarchy falls
was killed by his brother the famous Timoleon, in order to
restore constitutional government.
407
ARISTOTLE
1306 a
πληθει της πολιτείας, διά τό άναγκάζεσθαι τω
δήμω χρήσθαι• εν δε τή ειρήνη δια την άπιστίαν
την προς αλλήλους έγχειρίζουσι την φυλακην
στρατιώταις και άρχοντι μεσιδίω, δς ενίοτε γίνεται
30 κύριος αμφοτέρων , όπερ συνέβη εν Λαρίση έπι
της των Κλευαδών αρχής των 1 περί Έΐμον καΐ εν
Αβυδω έπι των εταιριών ων ην μία η Ίφιάδου.
γίνονται δε στάσει? και έκ του περιωθεΐσθαι 10
έτερους ύφ ετέρων των εν τη ολιγαρχία, αυτών
και καταστασιάζεσθαι κατά γάμους η δίκας, οίον
85 έκ γα,μικής μεν αιτίας αϊ είρημέναι πρότερον, και
την ev Ερέτρια δ ολιγαρχίαν την τών ιππέων
Αιαγόρας κατέλυσεν αδικηθείς περί γάμον, εκ
δε δικαστηρίου κρίσεως η εν 'Ηράκλεια στάσις
έγένετο και η 2 εν Θτ^αις - , έπ' αιτία μοιχείας
δικαίως μεν στασιωτικώς δε ποιησαμένων την
1306b κόλασιν τών μεν εν 'Ηράκλεια κατ' Έιύρυτίωνος
τών δ' εν θηβαις κατ* , Αρχίου• έφιλονείκησαν γάρ
αυτούς 3 οι εχθροί ώστε δεί^αι εν αγορά εν τω
κύφωνι. πολλαι δε και διά το άγαν δεσποτικάς 11
είναι τάς ολιγαρχίας ύπο τών εν τη πολιτεία, τινών
6 δυσχερανάντων κατελΰθησαν, ωσπερ η εν Κ^ιδω
και η εν Χιω ολιγαρχία, γίγνονται δε και απο
συμπτώματος μεταβολαι και της καλούμενης
πολιτείας και τών ολιγαρχιών εν οσαις άπο τιμή-
1 τωρ non vertit Guil. : rots Niemeyer.
2 και <ή> ? Newman : κα.1 codd.
3 αϋτοΐ.% L. & S. : avrovs codd. (tr. post δΐθψαι Richards).
α A probable emendation of the Greek gives ' happened
at Larisa to Simus and his party at the time of the govern-
ment of the Aleuadae.' This family were hereditary rulers
of Larisa (see also 1275 b 29 if. n., and 1305 b 29 ff.).
408
POLITICS, V. v. 9-11
because they are compelled to make use of the
common people ; during peace, on the other hand,
because of their distrust of one another they place
their protection in the hands of mercenary troops
and a magistrate between the two parties, who some-
times becomes master of both, which happened at
Larisa in the time of the government of the Aleuadae
led by Simus," and at Abydos in the time of the 1305 b 33
political clubs of which that of Iphiades was one.
10 And factions arise also in consequence of one set of internal
the members of the oligarchy themselves being pushed
aside by another set and being driven into party
strife in regard to marriages or law-suits ; examples
of such disorders arising out of a cause related to
marriage are the instances spoken of before, and also 1303 b 38 ft
the oligarchy of the knights at Eretria was put down b
by Diagoras when he had been wronged in respect
of a marriage, while the faction at Heraclea and that
at Thebes arose out of a judgement of a law-court,
when the people at Heraclea justly but factiously
enforced the punishment against Eurytion on a charge
of adultery and those at Thebes did so against
Archias ; for their personal enemies stirred up party
feeling against them so as to get them bound in
11 the pillory in the market-place. Also many govern-
ments have been put down by some of their members
who had become resentful because the oligarchies
were too despotic ; this is how the oligarchies fell
at Cnidus c and at Chios. And revolutions also occur Fail in value
from an accident, both in what is called a consti- °
tutional government and in those oligarchies in
* Possibly before the Persian wars. See 1289 b 36 ff.
The two following cases are unrecorded elsewhere.
' See 1305 b 13 n.
409
ARISTOTLE
1806b Ω ϊ ' \ S Ύ I I v„
ματος ρουλευουσι και οικαζουσι και τας άλλα?
αρχάς άρχουσιν. πολλάκις γάρ 1 το ταχθέν πρώτον
ίο τίμημα προς τους παρόντας καιρούς, ώστε μετ-
εχειν εν μέν τή ολιγαρχία ολίγους εν δε τή πολιτεία
τους μέσους, εύετηρίας 2 γιγνομενης δι' είρήνην ή
δι' άλλ^ τιν εύτυχίαν συμβαίνει πολλαπλασίου
γίγνεσθαι τιμήματος αξίας τάς αύτάς κτήσεις,
ώστε παντας πάντων μετεχειν, ότέ μεν εκ προσ-
15 αγωγής και κατά μικρόν γινομένης της μεταβολής
και λανθανούσης, ότέ δε και θάττον.
Αί μέν οΰν όλιγαρχίαι μεταβάλλουσι και στασιά- 12
ζουσι δια. τοιαύτας αιτίας (όλως δε και αϊ δημο-
κρατιαι και ολιγαρχιαι εξίστανται ενίοτε ουκ εις τάς
εναντίας πολιτείας αλλ' εις τάς εν τω αύτώ γένει,
20 οίον εκ των εννόμων δημοκρατιών και ολιγαρχιών
εις τάς κυρίους και εκ τούτων εις εκείνας).
VI. Έ>ν 8ε ταΐς άριστο κ ρατίαις γίγνονται αϊ 1
στάσεις αί μέν διά το ολίγους τών τιμών μετεχειν
(όπερ εϊρηται κινεΐν και τάς ολιγαρχίας, διά το
25 και την άριστοκρατιαν ολιγαρχίαν είναι πως, εν
άμφοτεραις γάρ ολίγοι οι άρχοντες — ου μεντοι
διά ταύτόν ολίγοι — επει δοκεΐ γε διά ταύτα και ή
αριστοκρατία ολιγαρχία είναι), μάλιστα δέ τούτο
συμβαίνειν άναγκαΐον όταν η τι 3 πλήθος τών
πεφρονηματισμενων ως όμοιων* κατ άρετήν (οΐον
80 εν Αακεδαίμονι οι λεγόμενοι ΤΙαρθενίαι — εκ τών
1 yap <ei καΐ Ίκανόι>> Richards.
* ΐύεττηρίας <δέ> Immisch.
* τι Congreve : το codd.
* ομοίων Lambinus : ομοιον codd.
See 1306 a 13 ff.
410
POLITICS, V. v. 11— νι. 1
which membership of the council and the law-courts
and tenure of the other offices are based on a pro-
perty-qualification. For often the qualification first
having been fixed to suit the circumstances of the
time, so that in an oligarchy a few may be members
and in a constitutional government the middle
classes, when peace or some other good fortune
leads to a good harvest it comes about that the
same properties become worth many times as large
an assessment, so that all the citizens share in all the
rights, the change sometimes taking place gradually
and little by little and not being noticed, but at
other times more quickly.
12 Such then are the causes that lead to revolutions
and factions in oligarchies (and generally, both
democracies and oligarchies are sometimes altered
not into the opposite forms of constitution but into
ones of the same class, for instance from legitimate
democracies and oligarchies into autocratic ones and
from the latter into the former).
1 VI. In aristocracies factions arise in some cases Faction in
because few men share in the honours (which has a "y t o (i)*
also been said α to be the cause of disturbances in m "lopoiy
i.i.i • . . e• "f honours,
oligarchies, because an aristocracy too is a sort ot
oligarchy, for in both those who govern are few —
although the reason for this is not the same in both
— since this does cause it to be thought that aristo-
cracy is a form of oligarchy). And this is most
bound to come about when there is a considerable
number of people who are proud-spirited on the
ground of being equals in virtue (for example
the clan called the Maidens' Sons b at Sparta — for
6 Said to be descended from irregular unions authorized in
order to keep up the population during the First Messenian
War. They founded Taranto 708 b.c.
411
ARISTOTLE
130eb » / \ ■? « ι / ' ο -\ '
ομοίων γαρ ήσαν, — ου? ψωρασαντες επψουλευσαν-
τας απέστειλαν Ύάραντος οικιστάς)• η orav Tire? 2
άτιμάζωνται μεγάλοι οντες καΐ μηθενός ηττους
κατ άρετην υπό τινών εντιμότερων (οίον Αύσανδρος
υπό των βασιλέων)' η όταν άνδρώδης τι? ων μη
35 μετέχη των τι/χών (οίον Κινάδων ο την έπ* 'Αγη-
σιλάου 1 συστησας επίθεσιν επι τους Σπαοτιάτα?) .
έτι όταν οι μεν άπορώσι λίαν οι δ' εύπορώσιν
(και μάλιστα iv τοις πολέμοις τοΰτο γίνεται,
συνέβη δέ καΐ τοΰτο iv Αακεδαίμονι υπό τον
Μεσσηνιακόν πόλεμον — οηλον δε [/cat τοΰτο] 2 εκ
1307a τ ή ς Τυρταίου ποιησεως της καλούμενης Ευνομίας•
θλιβόμενοι γάρ τίνες δια, τον πόλεμον ηζίουν
ανάδαστον ποιεΐν την χώραν). έτι iav τις μέγας
η και δυνάμενος έτι μείζων eirai, ίνα μονάρχη
(ώσπερ εν Αακεδαίμονι δοκεΐ ΐίαυσανίας 6 στρα-
5 τηγησας κατά τον Μηδικόν πόλεμον και εν
Έ^αρχηδόνι "Αννων).
Αυονται δε μάλιστα αϊ τε πολιτεΐαι και αι 3
αριστοκρατίαι δια την εν αύτη τη πολιτεία τοΰ
δικαίου παρέκβασιν . άρχη γάρ το μη μεμΐχθαι
καλώς εν μεν τη πολιτεία, δημοκρατίαν καΐ dAiy-
αρχίαν εν δέ τη αριστοκρατία ταΰτά τε και την
\0 άρετήν, μάλιστα δε τά δύο (λέγω δέ τά δύο δήμον
1 ΆγησιΚάον Schneider : -\άφ codd.
' Verrall (και non vertit Guil.).
α King Pausanias II. checked Lysander after his conquest
of Athens in 403 b.c, and King Agesilaus thwarted him on
the expedition into Asia Minor in 396.
6 His conspiracy against the "Ομοιοι in 398 b,c. was dis-
covered and he was executed.
412
POLITICS, V. νι. 1-3
they were descended from the Equals — whom the
Spartans detected in a conspiracy and sent away
2 to colonize Tarentum) ; or when individuals although
great men and inferior to nobody in virtue are
treated dishonourably by certain men in higher
honour (for example Lysander by the kings °) ; or
when a person of manly nature has no share in the
honours (for example Cinadon, 6 who got together the
attack upon the Spartans in the reign of Agesilaus).
Faction in aristocracies also arises when some of the (•:) or of
well-born are too poor and others too rich (which wealth >
happens especially during wars, and this also oc-
curred at Sparta at the time of the Messenian War
— as appears from the poem of Tyrtaeus entitled
Law and Order ; for some men being in distress
because of the war put forward a claim to carry out
a re-division of the land of the country). Also if a (3) or one
man is great and capable of being yet greater, he a n fc an ainung
stirs up faction in order that he may be sole ruler monarchy,
(as Pausanias who commanded the army through
the Persian war seems to have done at Sparta, and
Hanno c at Carthage).
3 But the actual overthrow of both constitutional Revolutions
governments and aristocracies is mostly due to a ^ing 1 ' 1 ' 08
deviation from justice in the actual framework of oligarchy,
the constitution. For what starts it in the case of a "i-acies de-
constitutional government is that it does not contain mocracy.
a good blend of democracy and oligarchy ; and in the
case of an aristocracy it is the lack of a good blend
of those two elements and of virtue, but chiefly of
the two elements (I mean popular government and
e Perhaps Hanno who fought in Sicily against the elder
Dionysius c. 400 b.c.
413
ARISTOTLE
1307 a x , . *_-«
και oAtyap^tav) , ταύτα yap at ποΛιτειαι re
πειρώνται μιγννναι και at πολλαι τώι> καλουμένων
αριστοκρατιών, διαφερουσι γαρ των ονομαζο- 4
μένων πολιτειών αϊ άριστοκρατίαι τούτω, και δια
τουτ είσϊν at μεν ήττον αϊ δε μάλλον μόνιμοι
15 αυτώι; ' τάς γαρ αποκλίνουσας μάλλον προς την
όλιγαρχίαν αριστοκρατίας καλοΰσιν, τάς δε προς
το πλήθος πολιτείας, διόπερ άσφαλεστεραι at
τοιαΰται τών έτερων είσίν, κρεΐττον τε γαρ το
πλεΐον και μάλλον άγαπώσιν 'ίσον έχοντες, οι δ
εν ταΐς εύπορίαις, αν η πολιτεία δίδω την ύπεροχην,
20 ύβρίζειν ζητοΰσι και πλεονεκτεΐν . όλως δ' εφ 5
όπότερον αν εγκλίνη η πολιτεία, επι τοΰτο 1
μεθίσταται εκατερων το σφετερον αυξανόντων,
οΐον η μεν πολιτεία εις δημον αριστοκρατία δ
εις όλιγαρχίαν, η εις τάναντία, οΐον η μεν αριστο-
κρατία εις δημον (ως αδικούμενοι γαρ περισπώσιν
25 εις τουναντίον οι άπορώτεροι) αϊ δε πολιτεΐαι
εις όλιγαρχίαν (μόνον γαρ μόνιμον το κατ' άζίαν
'ίσον και το €χειν τά αυτών) . συνέβη δε το 6
είρημενον εν Θουρίοις• δια μεν γάρ το από πλείονος
τιμήματος είναι τάς αρχάς εις ελαττον μετέβη και
so εις αρχεία πλείω, διά δε το την χώραν δλην τους
γνωρίμους συγκτήσασθαι πάρα τον νομον (η γαρ
1 τοΰτο (uel όπότερα) Spengel : ταΰτα codd.
α i.e. their mode of blending oligarchy and democracy.
6 The writer loosely speaks of aristocracies and polities
as a single class, differing only in degree of concentration of
power in the hands of the upper classes.
c i.e. from aristocracy to democracy. Possibly these
events occurred after the defeat of Athens at Syracuse in
413 b.c, when the Athenian party at Thurii was banished
414
POLITICS, V. νι. 3-β
oligarchy), for both constitutional governments and
most of the constitutions that are called aristocracies
4 aim at blending these. For this a is the point of dis-
tinction between aristocracies and what are called
constitutional governments, and it is owing to this
that some of them 6 are less and others more
stable ; for the constitutions inclining more towards
oligarchy men call aristocracies and those inclining
more to the side of the multitude constitutional
governments, owing to which those of the latter sort
are more secure than the others, for the greater
number is the stronger, and also men are more con-
tent when they have an equal amount, whereas the
owners of wealthy properties, if the constitution
gives them the superior position, seek to behave
δ insolently and to gain money. And speaking
broadly, to whichever side the constitution leans,
that is the side to which it shifts as either of the two
parties increases its own side — a constitutional
government shifts to democracy and an aristocracy
to oligarchy, or to the opposite extremes, that is,
aristocracy to democracy (for the poorer people
feeling they are unjustly treated pull it round to
the opposite) and constitutional governments to
oligarchy (for the only lasting thing is equality in
accordance with desert and the possession of what is
6 their own). And the change mentioned c came about
at Thurii, for because the property-qualification for
honours was too high, the constitution was altered to
a lower property-qualification and to a larger number
of official posts, but because the notables illegally
bought up the whole of the land (for the constitution
(Lysias 835 d). The events in § 8 were perhaps in the
fourth century.
415
ARISTOTLE
1307 ϋ
πολιτεία όλιγαρχικωτέρα ην, ώστε εδύναντο πλεον-
εκτεΐν). . . , 1 6 δε δήμος γυμνασθείς εν τω πολεμώ
τών φρουρών έγένετο κρείττων, έως άφεΐσαν της
χώρας όσοι πλείω ήσαν έχοντες.
"Ετι διά το πάσας τάς άριστο κ ρατικάς πολιτείας 7
ίδ ολιγαρχικάς είναι μάλλον πλεονεκτοΰσιν οι γνώ-
ριμοι (οΐον και εν Αακεδαίμονι εις ολίγους αί
ούσιαι έρχονται)' και εζεστι ποιεΐν ο τι αν θέλωσι
τοις γνωρίμοις μάλλον, καΐ κηδευειν οτω θέλωσιν
(διό και η Αοκρών πόλις άπώλετο εκ της προς
Αιονύσιον κηδείας, ο εν δημοκρατία ουκ αν
40 έγένετο, ουδ' άν εν αριστοκρατία ευ μεμιγμενη).
1307 b μάλιστα δε λανθάνουσιν αί άριστοκρατίαι μετα-
βάλλουσαι τω λιίεσ^αι κατά μικρόν, όπερ εΐρηται
εν τοις πρότερον καθόλου κατά πασών τών
πολιτειών, δτι αίτιον τών μεταβολών και το
μικρόν εστίν όταν γάρ τι προώνται τών προς
5 την πολιτείαν , μετά τοϋτο και άλλο μικρώ μείζον
εύχερεστερον κινοΰσιν, εως άν πάντα κινησωσι
τον κόσμον. συνέβη οε τοϋτο και επι της Θου- 8
ρίων πολιτείας, νόμου γάρ οντος διά πέντε ετών
στρατηγεΐν, γενόμενοι τίνες πολεμικοί τών
νεωτέρων και παρά τω πληθει τών φρουρών
ίο εύδοκιμοΰντες , καταφρονήσαντες τών εν τοις πραγ-
μασι και νομίζοντες ραδίως κατασχησειν , τούτον
τον νόμον λύειν επεχείρησαν πρώτον, ώστ έζείναι
τους αυτούς συνεχώς στρατηγεΐν, όρώντες τον
δημον αυτούς χειροτονησοντα προθύμως. οι δ'
1 lacunam vel vitium Schneider.
" Probably a clause meaning ' civil strife ensued ' has been
lost.
416
POLITICS, V. νι. 6-8
was too oligarchical, so that they were able to grasp
at wealth) . . . a And the people having been trained
in the war overpowered the guards, until those who
were in the position of having too much land re-
linquished it.
7 Besides, as all aristocratic constitutions are in-
clined towards oligarchy, the notables grasp at
wealth (for example at Sparta the estates are coming
into a few hands) ; and the notables have more power
to do what they like, and to form marriage connexions
with whom they like (which was the cause of the
fall of the state of Locri, as a result of the marriage
with Dionysius, 6 which would not have taken place
in a democracy, nor in a well-blended aristocracy), small
And aristocracies are most liable to undergo revolu- F^ /™ 8
. . ill . lea,i to
tion unobserved, through gradual relaxation, just as revolution
it has been said in what has gone before about all 1303 a 20 «
forms of constitution in general, that even a small
change may cause a revolution. For when they give
up one of the details of the constitution, afterwards
they also make another slightly bigger change more
8 readily, until they alter the whole system. This
occurred for instance with the constitution of Thurii.
There was a law that the office of general could be
held at intervals of four years, but some of the
younger men, becoming warlike and winning high
repute with the mass of the guards, came to despise
the men engaged in affairs, and thought that they
would easily get control ; so first they tried to repeal
the law referred to, so as to enable the same persons
to serve as generals continuously, as they saw that
the people would vote for themselves with enthusiasm.
* See 1259 a 28 n. He married in 397 b.c. the daughter
of a Locrian citizen, who bore him the younger Dionysius.
417
ARISTOTLE
1807b , . , , Λ , , , ,
επι τούτω τεταγμένοι των αρχόντων , οι καλούμενοι
15 σύμβουλοι , όρμήσαντες το πρώτον εναντιοΰσθαι
σννεπείσθησαν, ύπολαμβάνοντες τούτον κίνησαν -
τας τον νόμον εάσειν την άλλην πολιτείαν ,
ύστερον δε βουλόμενοι κώλυαν άλλων κινουμένων
ούκετι πλέον έποίουν ούθεν, άλλα. μετεβαλεν η
τάξις πάσα της πολιτείας εις δυναστείαν των
επιχειρησάντων νεωτεριζειν.
20 Πάσαι δ' at πολιτεΐαι λύονται ότε μεν εξ 9
αυτών ότε δ' έξωθεν, όταν εναντία πολιτεία η η
πλησίον η πόρρω μεν έχουσα δε δυνα/χιν. όπερ
συνεβαινεν επ' ^Κθηναιων και Αακεδαιμονιων οι
μεν γαρ Αθηναίοι πανταχού τάς ολιγαρχίας οι
δε Αάκωνες τους δήμους κατελυον.
κ "Οθεν μεν οΰν αί μεταβολαι γίγνονται των
πολιτειών και αί στάσεις, εϊρηται σχεδόν.
VII. Περί δε σωτηρίας και κοινή και χωρίς 1
εκάστης πολιτείας εχόμενόν εστίν ειπείν, πρώτον
μεν ουν δηλον ότι εϊπερ εχομεν δι ων φθείρονται
αί πολιτεΐαι εχομεν και δι' ων σώζονται• τών γαρ
so εναντίων τάναντια ποιητικά, φθορά δε σωτήρια,
εναντίον, εν μεν ουν ταΐς ευ κεκραμεναις πολι-
τείαις, είπερ 1 άλλο τι δει τηρεΐν όπως μηθέν
παρανομώσι, και μάλιστα το μικρόν φυλάττειν
λανθάνει γαρ παραδυομενη η παρανομία, 2 ωσπερ 2
τάς ουσίας αί μικραι δαπάναι οαπανώσι πολλάκις
85 yivo /Αεναι• λα^άνει γαρ ή δαπάνη* δια το μη
1 εΐπβρ Richards : ωσπερ codd.
2 παραδυομενη ή παρανομία (ex Plat, de rep. -t24 d) M'P 1 :
ΰπεισδύονσα η παράβαση cet.
3 δαπάνη : απάτη λΐ 8 , μΐτάβα<η$ Par.
418
POLITICS, V. νι. 8— νιι. 2
And though the magistrates in charge of this matter,
called the Councillors, at first made a movement to
oppose them, they were won over, believing that after
repealing this law they would allow the rest of the
constitution to stand ; but later, though they wished
to prevent them when other laws were being re-
pealed, they could no longer do anything more, but
the whole system of the constitution was converted
into a dynasty of the men who had initiated the
innovations.
9 And constitutions of all forms are broken up some- Foreign
times from movements initiating from within them- [° ^ Λβη "
selves, but sometimes from outside, when there is an
opposite form of constitution either near by or a long
way off yet possessed of power. This used to happen
in the days of the Athenians and the Spartans ;
the Athenians used to put down oligarchies every-
where and the Spartans democracies.
We have then approximately stated the causes
that give rise to revolutions in the constitutions of
states and to party factions.
1 VII. The next thing to speak about is security stability of
both in general and for each form of constitution t° n S s tltU
separately. First then it is clear that if we know the General
causes by which constitutions are destroyed we also 8afegua ""
know the causes by which they are preserved ; for
opposites create opposites, and destruction is the
opposite of security. In well-blended constitutions
therefore, if care must be taken to prevent men from
committing any other breach of the law, most of all
2 must a small breach be guarded against, for trans-
gression of the law creeps in unnoticed, just as
a small expenditure occurring often ruins men's
estates ; for the expense is not noticed because it
419
ARISTOTLE
αθρόα γίγνεσθαι, παραλογίζεται γαρ ή διάνοια
υπ αυτών, ωσπερ 6 σοφιστικός λόγος ' ei έκαστον
μικρόν, και πάντα.' τοΰτο δ' έστι μεν ώς, έ'στι
δ' ώς οϋ' το γαρ δλον και τά πάντα ου μικρόν
άλλα σύγκειται εκ μικρών, μίαν μεν οΰν φυλα-
40 κήν προς ταύτην την αρχήν δει ποιεΐσθαι, έπειτα
1308 a μη πιστεύειν τοις σοφίσματος χάριν προς το πλήθος
συγκειμένοις, εξελέγχεται γαρ υπό τών έργων
(ποια δέ λέγομεν τών πολιτειών σοφίσματα, προ-
τερον εΐρηται). έτι δ' όράν ότι ενιαι μένουσιν ου 3
μόνον άριστοκρατίαι άλλα και όλιγαρχίαι ου δια
5 το ασφαλείς eimi τάς πολιτείας άλλα δια το εύ
χρησθαι τους εν ται? άρχαΐς γινόμενους και τοις
έξω της πολιτείας και τοις εν τω πολιτευματι, τους
μεν μη μετέχοντας τω μη άοικείν και τω τους
ηγεμονικούς αυτών είσάγειν εις την πολιτειαν και
τους μεν φιλότιμους μη άδικεΐν εις άτιμιαν τους
ίο δέ πολλούς εις κέρδος, προς αυτούς δέ και τους
μετέχοντας τω χρησθαι άλλτ^λοι? δημοτικώς. ο
γαρ επι του πλήθους ζητοΰσιν οι δημοτικοί το
ΐσον, τούτ επι τών ομοίων ου μόνον δίκαιον αλλά
και συμφέρον εστίν, διό εάν πλείους ώσιν εν τω 4
πολιτευματι, πολλά συμφέρει τών δημοτικών νομο-
15 θετημάτων, οίον το εξαμήνους τάς αρχάς eirai,
ίνα πάντες οι όμοιοι μετέχωσιν έστι γάρ ωσπερ
δήμος ήδη οι όμοιοι (διό και εν τούτοις έγγίγνονται
δημαγωγοί πολλάκις, ώσπερ εΐρηται πρότερον),
επειθ* ήττον εις δυναστείας εμπίπτουσιν αι ολιγ-
See Additional Note on p. 483.
420
POLITICS, V. νιι. 2-4
does not come all at once, for the mind is led astray
by the repeated small outlays, just like the sophistic
puzzle, ' if each is little, then all are a little.' α This is
true in one way but in another it is not ; for the
whole or total is not little, but made up of little
parts. One thing therefore that we must guard
against is this beginning ; and the next point is that
we must not put faith in the arguments strung to-
gether for the sake of tricking the multitude, for they
are refuted by the facts (and what sort of constitutional
3 sophistries we refer to has been said before). And l -"* » l * ff
again we must observe that not only some aristo-
cracies but also some oligarchies endure not because
the constitutions are secure but because those who
get in the offices treat both those outside the con-
stitution and those in the government well, on the
one hand by not treating those who are not members
of it unjustly and by bringing their leading men into
the constitution and not wronging the ambitious
ones in the matter of dishonour or the multitude in
the matter of gain, and on the other hand, in relation
to themselves and those who are members, by treating
one another in a democratic spirit. For that equality
which men of democratic spirit seek for in the case
of the multitude is not only just but also expedient
4 in the case of their compeers. Hence if there are
a greater number in the governing class, many of
the legislative enactments of a democratic nature
are advantageous, for example for the offices to be
tenable for six months, to enable all the compeers to
participate in them ; for the compeers in this case are
as it were the people (owing to which demagogues often
arise even among them, as has been said already), i3o<5a2•*.
and also oligarchies and aristocracies fall into dyn-
421
ARISTOTLE
18088 t \ > / / » X t I t /CV
αρχιαί και αριστοκρατιαι [ου γαρ ομοίως ραοιον
20 κακουργησαι ολίγον χρόνον άρχοντας και πολύν,
επει διά τοΰτο εν ταΐς όλιγαρχίαις και δημο-
κρατίαις γίγνονταί τυραννίδες' η γαρ οι μέγιστοι
iv εκατερα επιτίθενται τυραννίδι, ένθα μεν οι δημ-
αγωγοί ένθα δ' οι δυνάσται, η οι τάς μεγιστας
έχοντες αρχάς, όταν πολύν χρόνον άρχωσιν). σω- 5
25 ζονται δ' αί πολιτεΐαι ου μόνον διά το πόρρω
eivai των διαφθειρόντων αλλ' ενίοτε και δια το
εγγύς, φοβούμενοι γαρ διά χειρών εχουσι μάλλον
την πολιτείαν ώστε δει τους της πολιτείας
φροντίζοντας φόβους παρασκευάζειν, ΐνα φυλάτ-
τωσι και μη καταλυωσιν ώσπερ νυκτερινην φυλα-
80 κην την της πολιτείας τήρησιν, και το πόρρω
εγγύς ποιεΐν. ετι τάς τών γνωρίμων φιλονεικιας
και στάσβι? και διά τών νόμων πειράσθαι δει
φυλάττειν, και τους εζω της φιλονεικιας οντάς
πριν παρειληφεναι και αυτούς, ως το εν αρχή
γινόμενον κακόν yrtorai ου του τυχόντος άλλα
85 πολιτικοί; ανδρός, προς δε την διά τά τιατ^ατα 6
γιγνομενην μεταβολήν εξ ολιγαρχίας και πολιτείας,
όταν συμβαίνη τοΰτο μενόντων μεν τών αυτών
τιμημάτων εύπορίας δε νομίσματος γιγνομενης,
συμφέρει του τιμήματος επισκοπεΐν του κοινού το
40 πλήθος προς το παρελθόν, εν οσαις μεν πόλεσι
τιμώνται κατ ενιαυτον, κατά τούτον τον χρονον,
1308 b e V δε ταΐς μείζοσι διά τριετηρίδας η πενταετηρίδος ,
καν η πολλαπλάσιον η πολλοστημοριον του προ-
τερον εν ω αϊ τιμήσεις κατέστησαν της πολι-
• This modifies 1207 a 31.
422
POLITICS, V. νπ. 4-6
asties less (for it is not so easy to do wrongs when in
office for a short time as when in for a long time, since
it is long tenure of office that causes tyrannies to
spring up in oligarchies and democracies ; for either
those who are the greatest men in either sort of state
aim at tyranny, in the one sort the demagogues and
in the other the dynasts, or those who hold the
greatest offices, when they are in office for a long time).
5 And constitutions are kept secure not only through
being at a distance from destroyers but sometimes also
through being near them, a for when they are afraid
the citizens keep a closer hold on the government ;
hence those who take thought for the constitution
must contrive causes of fear, in order that the citizens
may keep guard and not relax their vigilance for the
constitution like a watch in the night, and they must
make the distant near. Again, they must also
endeavour to guard against the quarrels and party
struggles of the notables by means of legislation,
and to keep out those who are outside the quarrel
before they too have taken it over ; since to
discern a growing evil at the commencement is not
any ordinary person's work but needs a statesman.
6 And to deal -with the revolution from oligarchy and
constitutional government that arises because of the
property-qualifications, when this occurs while the
rates of qualification remain the same but money is
becoming plentiful, it is advantageous to examine the
total amount of the rated value of the community
as compared with the past amount, in states where
the assessment is made yearly, over that period, and
three years or five years ago in the larger states, and
if the new total is many times larger or many times
smaller than the former one at the time when
423
ARISTOTLE
1308 b
τειας, νόμον είναι και τά τιμήματα επιτείνειν η
5 ανιεναι, lav μεν ύπερβάλλη επιτείνοντας κατά την
πολλαπλασίωσιν, εάν δ' ελλείπη άνιεντας και
ελάττω ποιοΰντας την τίμησιν. εν 1 γάρ ταΐς η
ολιγαρχίαις και ταΐς πολιτείαις μη ποιούντων ,
όντως μεν 2 ένθα μεν όλιγαρχίαν ένθα δε δυναστείαν
γίγνεσθαι σιγζ/ίαιρ'ει, εκείνως δε εκ μεν πολιτείας
ίο δημοκρατίαν εκ δ' ολιγαρχίας πολιτείαν η δημον.
κοινόν δε και εν δήμω και ολιγαρχία [και εν
μοναρχία] 3 και πάση πολιτεία μητ αύζάνειν 4, λίαν
μηθενα παρά την σνμμετρίαν αλλά μάλλον πει-
ράσθαι μικράς και πολυχρονίους διδόναι τι/χά? η
ταχύ 5 μεγάλας (διαφθείρονται γάρ, και φέρειν ου
15 παντός ανδρός εύτνχίαν), ει δε μη, μη τοί y
αθρόας δόντας άφαιρεΐσθαι πάλιν αθρόας αλλ' εκ
προσαγωγής• και μάλιστα μεν πειράσθαι τοις 8
νομοις ούτως άγειν ώστε μηθενα εγγίγνεσθαι πολύ
υπερέχοντα δυνάμει μήτε φίλων μήτε χρημάτων ,
ει δε μη, άποδημητικάς ποιείσθαι τάς παραστάσεις
20 αυτών, επει δε και δια, τους ιδίους βίους νεωτερι-
ζουσιν, δει εμποιεΐν άρχην τίνα την εποφομενην
τους ζώντας άσυμφόρως προς την πολιτείαν, εν
μεν δημοκρατία προς την δημοκρατίαν, εν δε
ολιγαρχία προς την όλιγαρχίαν, ομοίως δε και
τών άλλων πολιτειών εκάστη, και το ευημερούν
1 h Susemihl : έν μέι> codd.
• Niemeyer: μλν ovrws codd.
8 om. codd. cet. * αύξάν€ΐν <5eic> ? ed.
6 ταχύ vix sanum : breriter et Guil., βραχύ και Susemihl,
βραχυχρόνιους και Sepulveda.
° i.e. if the total valuation has decreased.
b i.e. if the total has increased.
e Some mss. and many editors omit these words.
424
POLITICS, V. νιι. 6^8
the rates qualifying for citizenship were fixed, it is
advantageous that there should be a law for the
magistrates correspondingly to tighten up or to relax
the rates, tightening them up in proportion to the
ratio of increase if the new total rated value exceeds
the old, and relaxing them and making the qualifica-
7 tion lower if the new total falls below the old. For
in oligarchies and constitutional states, when they
do not do this, in the one case ° the result is that in
the latter an oligarchy comes into existence and in
the former a dynasty, and in the other case b a
constitutional government turns into a democracy
and an oligarchy into a constitutional government or
a government of the people. But it is a policy common
to democracy and oligarchy [and to monarchy],*
and every form of constitution not to raise up any
man too much beyond due proportion, but rather
to try to assign small honours and of long tenure or
great ones quickly d (for officials grow corrupt, and
not every man can bear good fortune), or if not, at
all events not to bestow honours in clusters and take
them away again in clusters, but by a gradual process ;
8 and best of all to try so to regulate people by the law
that there may be nobodv among them specially
pre-eminent in power due to friends or wealth, or,
failing this, to cause their periods out of office to be
spent abroad. And since men also cause revolutions
through their private lives, some magistracy must be
set up to inspect those whose mode of living is un-
suited to the constitution — unsuited to democracy
in a democracy, to oligarchy in an oligarchy, and
similarly for each of the other forms of constitution.
d The text should probably be emended ' with a short
tenure.'
p 425
ARISTOTLE
25 δε της πόλεως ανά μέρος φυλάττεσθαι διά τάς
αντας αιτίας' τούτου δ άκος το αίει τοις άντικει-
μενοις μορίοις εγχειρίζειν τάς πράζεις καΐ τάς αρχάς
(λέγω δ' άντικεΐσθαι τους επιεικείς τω πληθει
καΐ τους απόρους τοις εύπορους), και τό πει-
ράσθαι η συμμιγνύναι το των απόρων πλήθος
80 και τό των ευπόρων η τό μέσον αύζειν (τοΰτο
γάρ διαλύει τάς δια την ανισότητα στάσεις),
μεγιστον δε εν πάση πολιτεία τό και τοις νομοις 9
και τη άλλη οικονομία ούτω τετάχθαι ώστε μη
eirai τάς αρχάς κερδαίνειν. τοΰτο δε μάλιστα εν
ταΓ? όλιγαρχικ αΐς δει τηρεΐν ού γάρ ούτως ayava-
85 κτούσιν είργόμενοι του άρχειν οι πολλοί (άλλα
και χαίρουσιν εάν τις εα προς τοις ιδίοις σχολά-
ζειν) ως εάν οιωνται τά κοινά κλεπτειν τους
άρχοντας, τότε δ' αμφότερα λυπεί, τό τε των
τιμών μη μετεχειν και τό των κερδών, μοναχώς 10
δε και ενδέχεται άμα eirai δημοκρατιαν και
40 άριστοκρατίαν, ει τοΰτο κατασκευάσειε τις• εν-
1309 a δεχοιτο γάρ αν και τους γνωρίμους και τό πλήθος
εχειν α βούλονται αμφότερους• τό μεν γάρ e^eiVai
πάσιν άρχειν δημοκρατικόν τό δε τους γνωρίμους
είναι εν ταϊς άρχαϊς άριστοκρατικόν, τοΰτο δ
εσται όταν μη η κερδαίνειν από τών αρχών οι
5 γάρ άποροι ού βουλησονται άρχειν τω μηδέν
κερδαίνειν, αλλά προς τοις ιδίοις efrai μάλλον, οί
δ' εύποροι δυνήσονται διά τό μηδέν προσδεΐσθαι
τών κοινών ώστε συμβησεται τοις μεν αποροις γι-
α i.e. render it impossible to make money out of office.
426
POLITICS, V. νιι. 8-10
And also sectional prosperity in the state must be
guarded against for the same reasons ; and the way
to avert this is always to entrust business and office
to the opposite sections (I mean that the respectable
are opposite to the multitude and the poor to the
wealthy), and to endeavour either to mingle together
the multitude of the poor and that of the wealthy
or to increase the middle class (for this dissolves party
9 factions due to inequality). And in every form of
constitution it is a very great thing for it to be so
framed both by its laws and by its other institutions
that it is impossible for the magistracies to make a
profit. And this has most to be guarded against in
oligarchies ; for the many are not so much annoyed
at being excluded from holding office (but in fact
they are glad if somebody lets them have leisure to
spend on their own affairs) as they are if they think
that the magistrates are stealing the common funds,
but then both things annoy them, exclusion from
the honours of office and exclusion from its profits.
10 And indeed the sole way in which a combination of
democracy and aristocracy is possible is if someone
could contrive this arrangement α ; for it would then
be possible for the notables and also the multitude
both to have what they want ; for it is the democratic
principle for all to have the right to hold office and
the aristocratic one for the offices to be filled by
the notables, and this will be the case when it is
impossible to make money from office ; for the poor
will not want to hold office because of making nothing
out of it, but rather to attend to their own affairs,
while the wealthy will be able to hold office because
they have no need to add to their resources from the
public funds ; so that the result will be that the poor
427
ARISTOTLE
γν€σθαί εύπόροις διά το διατρίβειν προς τοις εργοις,
τοις δε γνωρίμοις μη άρχεσθαι υπό των τυχόντων.
ίο τον μεν οΰν μη κλεπτεσθαι τά κοινά η παράδοσις 11
γιγνεσθω των χρημάτων παρόντων πάντων των
πολιτών, και αντίγραφα κατά φρατρίας και λόχους
και φυλάς τώεσθωσαν του δε άκερδώς άρχειν
τιμάς είναι δει νενομοθετημενας τοις εύδοκιμοϋσιν.
15 δει δ' iv μέν ταΐς δημοκρατίαις των εύπορων
φείδεσθαι, μη μόνον τω τάς κτήσεις μη ποΐ€ΐν
άναδάστους, αλλά μηδέ τους καρπούς (ο εν ενιαι?
των πολιτειών λανθάνει γιγνόμενον) , βελτιον δε και
βουλομενους κωλύειν λειτουργεΐν τάς δαπανηρας
20 μεν μη χρησίμους δε λειτουργίας, οίον χορηγίας
και λαμπαδαρχίας και δσαι ά'λλαι τοιαΰται• εν 12
δ' ολιγαρχία των απόρων ε77ΐ;ΐιε'λειαν ποιεΐσθαι
πολλήν, και τάς αρχάς ά^' ων λήμματα τούτοις
άπονεμειν, καν τις ύβρίση των ευπόρων εις τνυ-
τους, μείζω τά επιτίμια είναι η αν σφών αυτών,
και τάς κληρονομιάς μη κατά δόσιν είναι άλλα
25 κατά γένος, μηδέ πλειόνων ή /Aid? τον αυτόν
κληρονομεΐν, ούτω γάρ αν όμαλώτεραι αι ουσιαι
εΐεν και τών απόρων εις εύπορίαν αν καθισταιντο
πλείους. συμφέρει δε και εν δημοκρατία και εν 13
ολιγαρχία τών άλλων η ισότητα η προεδριαν
νεμειν τοις ήττον κοινωνοΰσι της πολιτείας, εν
30 μεν δήμω τοις εύπόροις εν δ' ολιγαρχία τοις
άπόροις, πλην δσαι άρχαι κυριαι της πολιτείας,
" Groups of citizens normally three to a tribe, supposed
to be based on relationship.
* Originally a military, later a civil classification.
428
POLITICS, V. νπ. 10-13
will become well-off through spending their time upon
their work, and the notables will not be governed by
11 any casual persons. Therefore to prevent peculation
of the public property, let the transfer of the funds
take place in the presence of all the citizens, and let
copies of the lists be deposited for each brotherhood,
company b and tribe ; and to get men to hold office
without profit there must be honours assigned by law
to officials of good repute. And in democracies it is Constitu-
necessary to be sparing of the wealthy not only by ^^.,^
not causing properties to be divided up, but not demoeraciw
incomes either (which under some constitutions takes oiigarchie
place unnoticed), and it is better to prevent men from
undertaking costly but useless public services like
equipping choruses and torch-races c and all other
12 similar services, even if they wish to ; in an oligarchy
on the other hand it is necessary to take much care
of the poor, and to allot to them the offices of profit,
and the penalty if one of the rich commits an outrage
against them must be greater than if it is done by
one of themselves/* and inheritance must not go by
bequest but by family, and the same man must not
inherit more than one estate, for so estates would
be more on a level, and more of the poor would
13 establish themselves as prosperous. And it is ex-
pedient both in a democracy and in an oligarchy to
assign to those who have a smaller share in the govern-
ment — in a democracy to the wealthy and in an olig-
archy to the poor — either equality or precedence in all
other things excepting thesupreme officesof state; but
e Equipping the chorus and actors for tragedies and
comedies and providing for the ceremonial torch-races were
public services borne by individuals at Athens.
d Or possibly ' than if he does it against one of his own
class.'
429
ARISTOTLE
1309 a . ξΝ\ Λ » Λ \ / * ,<, ,
ταντας οε τοις εκ τής πολιτείας εγχειριζειν μονοις
η πλείοσιν.
Τρία δε τίνα χρη εχειν τους μέλλοντας άρξειν 14
τα? κυρίας αρχάς, πρώτον μεν φιλίαν προς την
35 καθεστώσαν πολιτείαν, έπειτα δυνα/ζιν μεγίστην
των έργων της αρχής, τρίτον δ' άρετην και
δικαιοσύνην εν εκάστη πολιτεία την προς την
πολιτείαν (ει γαρ μη ταύτόν το δίκαιον κατά
πάσας τάς πολιτείας, ανάγκη και της δικαιοσύνης
efvat διαφοράς) . έχει δ' άπορίαν, όταν μη συμβαίνη
40 ταύτα πάντα περί τον αυτόν, πώς χρη ποιεΐσθαι
1309 b την αΐρεσιν 1 • οίον ει στρατηγικός μεν τις εΐη
πονηρός δε και μη τη πολιτεία φίλος, ο δε δίκαιος
και φίλος, 2 πώς δει ποιεΐσθαι την αΐρεσιν; εοικε 15
δε δεΐν βλεπειν εις δύο, τίνος πλεΐον μετεχουσι
πάντες και τίνος ελαττον. διό εν στρατηγία μεν
β εις την εμπειρίαν μάλλον της αρετής, ελαττον γαρ
στρατηγίας μετεχουσι, τής δ' επιεικείας πλεΐον
εν δε φυλακή και ταμιεία τάναντία, πλείονος γαρ
αρετής δεΐται ή δσην οι πολλοί εχουσιν, η δε
επιστήμη κοινή πάσιν. άπορήσειε 8' αν τι? καν
ίο δυ^α/ζι? ύπάρχη και τής πολιτείας 3 φιλία, τι δει
τής αρετής; ποιήσει γαρ τα συμφέροντα και τά
δύο. ή οτι ενδέχεται τους τά δύο ταύτα έχοντας
ακρατείς είναι, ώστε καθάπερ και αύτοΐς ούχ
ύπηρετοΰσιν είδότες καϊ φιλοΰντες αυτούς, ούτω
1 αϊρεσιν corr. cod. inferior : διαίρεσα> cet.
* φίλο? μη στρατη-γικός δέ codd. nonnulli.
8 καϊ post πολίτίΐα,ς codd., tr. Stahr.
430
POLITICS, V. νιι. 13-15
these should be entrusted to those prescribed by the
constitution exclusively, or to them for the most part.
14 There are some three qualities which those who are character of
to hold the supreme magistracies ought to possess, ° cials '
first, loyalty to the established constitution, next,
very great capacity to do the duties of the office, and
third, virtue and justice — in each constitution the
sort of justice suited to the constitution (for if the rules
of justice are not the same under all constitutions,
it follows that there must be differences in the nature
of justice also). It is a difficult question how the
choice ought to be made when it happens that all
these qualities are not found in the same person ;
for instance, if one man is a good military com-
mander but a bad man and no friend of the constitu-
tion, and the other is just and loyal, how should
15 the choice be made ? It seems that two things
ought to be considered, what is the quality of which
all men have a larger share, and what the one of
which all have a smaller share ? Therefore in the
case of military command one must consider experi-
ence more than virtue, for men have a smaller share
of military experience and a larger share of moral
goodness ; but in the case of a trusteeship or a
stewardship the opposite, for these require more
virtue than most men possess, but the knowledge
required is common to all men. And somebody
might raise the question, why is virtue needed if
both capacity and loyalty to the constitution are
forthcoming, as even these two qualities will do
what is suitable ? May not the answer be, because
those who possess these two qualities may possibly
lack self-control, so that just as they do not serve
themselves well although they know how to and
431
ARISTOTLE
1309 b
και προς το κοινόν ούθέν κωλύει έχειν ένίους,
απλώς δε, δσα εν τοις νόμοις ώς συμφέροντα λέ- 16
15 γομεν ταΐς πολιτείαις, άπαντα ταΰτα σώζει τάς
πολιτείας, και το πολλάκις είρημένον μεγιστον
στοιχεΐον, το τηρεΐν όπως κρεΐττον εσται το
βονλόμενον την πολιτείαν πλήθος του μη βουλο-
μένου. παρά πάντα δε ταΰτα δει μη λανθάνειν,
ο νυν λαι^άνΐΐ τάς παρεκβεβηκυίας πολιτείας, το
20 μέσον πολλά γάρ τών δοκοΰντων δημοτικών λύει
τάς δημοκρατίας και τών ολιγαρχικών τάς ολιγ-
αρχίας, οι δ , οίόμενοι ταύτην είναι μίαν άρετην, 17
ελκουσιν εις την ύπερβολην, άγνοοΰντες οτι
καθάπερ ρις εστί παρεκβεβηκυΐα μεν την ευθύτητα
την καλλίστην προς το γρυπόν η το σιμόν αλλ'
25 όμως ετι καλή και χάριν έχουσα προς την όψιν,
ου μην αλλ' εάν επιτείνη τις en μάλλον εις την
ύπερβολην, πρώτον μεν αποβάλει την μετριότητα
του μορίου τέλος δ' ούτως ώστε μηδέ ρίνα
ποιήσει φαίνεσθαι δια την ύπεροχην και την
ελλειφιν τών ενάντιων (τον αύτον δε τρόπον έχει
30 και περί τών άλλων μορίων), συμβαίνει δη τοΰτο
και περί τάς άλλα? πολιτείας• και γάρ όλιγαρχίαν 18
και δημοκρατίαν εστίν ώστ έχειν ικανώς, καιπερ
εξεστηκυίας της βέλτιστης τάξεως, εάν δε τις
επιτείνη μάλλον εκατεραν αυτών, πρώτον μεν
χείρω ποιήσει την πολιτείαν, τέλος δ ουδέ πολι-
35 τείαν. διό δει τοΰτο μη άγνοεΐν τον νομοθέτην
β See 1279 a 20.
432
POLITICS, V. νιι. 15-18
although they love themselves, so possibly in some
cases they may behave in this way in regard to the
16 community also ? And broadly, whatever provisions
in the laws we describe as advantageous to con-
stitutions, these are all preservative of the constitu-
tions, and so is the supreme elementary principle
that has been often stated, that of taking precau-
tions that the section desirous of the constitution
shall be stronger in number than the section not
desirous of it. And beside all these matters one moderate
thing must not be overlooked which at present is f^eahh*
overlooked by the deviation-forms a of constitution
— the middle party ; for many of the institutions
thought to be popular destroy democracies, and many
of those thought oligarchical destroy oligarchies.
IT But the adherents of the deviation-form, thinking that
this form is the only right thing, drag it to excess, not
knowing that just as there can be a nose that al-
though deviating from the most handsome straight-
ness towards being hooked or snub nevertheless is still
beautiful and agreeable to look at, yet all the same,
if a sculptor carries it still further in the direction of
excess, he «ill first lose the symmetry of the feature
and finally will make it not even look like a nose at
all, because of its excess and deficiency in the two
opposite qualities (and the same is the case also
in regard to the other parts of the body), so this is
18 what happens about constitutions likewise ; for it is
possible for an oligarchy and a democracy to be satis-
factory although they have diverged from the best
structure, but if one strains either of them further,
first he will make the constitution worse, and finally
he will make it not a constitution at all. Therefore
the legislator and the statesman must not fail to
433
ARISTOTLE
1809 b , , ν , > s- <■> 2: - !
και τον πολιτικον, ποια σωί,ει των δημοτικών και
ποια φθείρει την δημοκρατίαν, και ποια των
ολιγαρχικών την όλιγαρχίαν ούδετεραν μεν γαρ
ενδέχεται αυτών eimi και δια /zeVeiv άνευ τών
ευπόρων και του πλήθους, αλλ' όταν όμαλοτης
40 γενηται της ουσίας, άλλην ανάγκη elvai ταύτην
1310 a την πολιτείαν , ώστε φθείροντες τοις καθ ύπεροχην
νόμοις φθείρουσι τάς πολιτείας, άμαρτάνουσι δε 19
και εν ταΐς δημοκρατίαις και εν ταΐς όλιγαρχιαις,
iv μεν ταΐς δημοκρατίαις οι δημαγωγοί, οπού το
δ πλήθος κύριον τών νόμων δυο γαρ ποιοΰσιν αει
την πάλιν μαχόμενοι τοις εύπόροις, δει δε τουναν-
τίον cuet δοκεΐν λέγειν νπερ εύπορων, 1 iv δε ταΐς
όλιγαρχίαις ύπερ του δήμου τους ολιγαρχικούς,
και τους όρκους εναντίους η νυν ομνύναι τους
ολιγαρχικούς, νυν μεν γαρ εν eVicti? όμνύουσι "και
ίο τω δήμω κακόνους εσομαι και βουλευσω δ τι αν
εχω κακόν," χρή δε και ύπολαμβάνειν και ύπο-
κρίνεσθαι τουναντίον, επισημαινομενους εν τοις
όρκοις οτι "ουκ αδικήσω τον δήμον.' μεγιστον 20
δε πάντων τών είρημενων προς το δια/χεΊ'ειΐ' τάς
πολιτείας, ου νυν όλιγωροϋσι πάντες, το παίδευε -
σ^αι προς τάς πολιτείας, όφελος γάρ ούθέν τών
15 ώφελιμωτάτων νόμων και συνδεδοζασμενων υπό
πάντων τών πολιτευόμενων, ει μη έσονται είθι-
σμενοι και πεπαιδευμένοι εν τη πολιτεία, ει μεν
οι νόμοι δημοτικοί, δημοτικώς, ει δ' ολιγαρχικοί,
1 των ευπόρων cod. inferior.
° The ' scoffing anapaestic cadence ' of this oath has been
noted. In 411 b.c. the democratic reaction at Athens swore
434
POLITICS, V. νιι. 18-20
know what sort of democratic institutions save and
what destroy a democracy, and what sort of oligarchical
institutions an oligarchy ; for neither constitution
can exist and endure without the well-to-do and
the multitude, but when an even level of property
comes about, the constitution resulting must of
necessity be another one, so that when men destroy
these classes by laws carried to excess they destroy
19 the constitutions. And a mistake is made both in
democracies and in oligarchies — in democracies by
the demagogues, where the multitude is supreme
over the laws ; for they always divide the state into
two by fighting with the well-to-do, but they ought
on the contrary always to pretend to be speaking on
behalf of men that are well-to-do, while in demo-
cracies the oligarchical statesmen ought to pretend
to be speaking on behalf of the people, and the
oligarchies ought to take oath in terms exactly
opposite to those which they use now, for at present
in some oligarchies they swear, ' And I will be hostile
to the people and will plan whatever evil I can
against them," but they ought to hold, and to act
the part of holding, the opposite notion, declaring
20 in their oaths, " I will not wrong the people." But and
the greatest of all the means spoken of to secure the j^UOn.
stability of constitutions is one that at present all
people despise : it is a system of education suited to
the constitutions. For there is no use in the most
valuable laws, ratified by the unanimousjudgementof
the whole body of citizens, if these are not trained and
educated in the constitution, popularly if the laws
are popular, oligarchically if they are oligarchical ;
' to be enemies of the Four Hundred and to hold no parley
with them.'
435
ARISTOTLE
1310 a „ *.. .» >/>fi> /
ολιγαρχικούς• ειπερ γαρ εστίν εφ ενο? ακρασια,
20 εστί /cat €7τι πόλεως•. εστί δε το ττβτταιΒΐΰσθαί 21
77/30? ττ)ν πολιτείαν ου τούτο, το ποιεΐν οίς χαιρουσιν
οί όλιγαρχοΰντες η οι δημοκρατίαν βουλόμενοι,
άλΧ οίς δυνχίσονται οί μεν ολιγαρχεΐν οί δέ δημο-
κρατεΐσθαι. νυν δ' iv μεν ταΐς όλιγαρχίαις οι
των αρχόντων υιοί τρυφώσιν, οί δε των άπορων
2ο γίγνονται γεγυμνασμενοι και πεπονηκοτες, ώστε
καΐ βούλονται μάλλον και δύνανται νεωτερίζει ν
iv δέ ταΐς δημοκρατίαις ταΐς μάλιστα είναι 22
Βοκούσαις δημοκρατικαΐς τουναντίον του συμ-
φέροντος καθεστηκεν. αίτιον δε τούτου ότι κακώς
ορίζονται το ελεύθερον (δυο γάρ εστίν οίς η
δημοκρατία δοκεΐ ώρίσθαι, τω το πλεΐον είναι
80 κύριον και τη ελευθερία)' το μεν γάρ δίκαιον
ίσον 1 δοκεΐ είναι, ίσον δ' ο τι αν δό^ τω πληθει
τοϋτ* είναι κύριον, ελεύθερον δε [και ίσον] 2 το ο τι
αν βούληταί τις ποιεΐν ώστε ζη εν ταΐς τοιαύταις
δημοκρατίαις έκαστος ως βούλεται, και εις ο
χρηζων, ως φησιν Ευριπίδης, τούτο δ εστί
85 φαύλον ου γάρ δει οίεσθαι δουλείαν είναι το ζην
προς την πολιτείαν άλλα σωτηριαν.
Έ£ ων μεν οΰν αϊ πολιτεΐαι μεταβάλλουσι και
φθείρονται και διά τίνων σώζονται και διαμενουσιν ,
ώς απλώς ειπείν τοσαϋτά εστίν.
VIII. Αείπεται δ' επελθεΐν και περί μοναρχίας, 1
40 εζ ων τε φθείρεται και δι' ων σώζεοθαι πεφυκεν.
1310 b σχεδόν δε παραπλήσια τοις είρημενοις περί τάς
πολιτείας ε'στί και τα συμβαίνοντα περί τάς
1 'ίσον ante δίκαιον Richards.
2 Spengel.
β Fragment 883, from an unknown play.
436
POLITICS, V. νπ. 20— viii. 1
for there is such a thing as want of self-discipline
21 in a state, as well as in an individual. But to
have been educated to suit the constitution does
not mean to do the things that give pleasure to
the adherents of oligarchy or to the supporters of
democracy, but the things that will enable the former
to govern oligarchically and the latter to govern
themselves democratically. But at present in the
oligarchies the sons of the rulers are luxurious, and the
sons of the badly-off become trained by exercise and
labour, so that they are both more desirous of reform
22 and more able to bring it about ; while in the de-
mocracies thought to be the most democratic the
opposite of what is expedient has come about. And
the cause of this is that they define liberty wrongly
(for there are two things that are thought to be
defining features of democracy, the sovereignty of the
majority and liberty) ; for justice is supposed to be
equality, and equality the sovereignty of what-
ever may have been decided by the multitude, and
liberty doing just what one likes. Hence in demo-
cracies of this sort everybody lives as he likes, and
' unto what end he listeth,' as Euripides a says. But
this is bad ; for to live in conformity with the constitu-
tion ought not to be considered slavery but safety.
This therefore, speaking broadly, is a list of the
things that cause the alteration and the destruction
of constitutions, and of those that cause their security
and continuance.
1 VIII. It remains to speak of monarchy, the causes stability of
that destroy it and the natural means of its pre- monarchies •
servation. And the things that happen about
royal governments and tyrannies are almost similar
to those that have been narrated about constitu-
437
ARISTOTLE
βασίλεια? και τα? τυραννίδας, ή μεν γαρ βασίλεια
κατά την άριστοκρατίαν εστίν, η δε τυραννίς εξ
ολιγαρχίας της ύστατης σύγκειται και δημοκρατίας,
5 διό δη και βλαβερωτάτη τοις άρχομενοις εστίν,
άτ€ εκ δυοΐν συγκειμένη κακών και τάς παρεκ-
βάσεις και τάς αμαρτίας έχουσα τάς παρ* αμφο-
τέρων των πολιτειών, υπάρχει δ η γενεσις ευθύς 2
εξ εναντίων εκατερα τών μοναρχιών η μεν γαρ
βασίλεια προς βοηθειαν την από του δήμου 1 τοις
ίο επιεικεσι γεγονεν, και καθίσταται βασιλει)? εκ τών
επιεικών καθ' ύπεροχην αρετής η πράξεων τών
άπο της αρετής, η καθ* ύπεροχην τοιούτου γένους, 6
δε τύραννος εκ του δήμου και του πλήθους επί
τους γνωρίμους, όπως 6 δήμος άδικηται μηθεν
ύπ* αυτών, φανερόν δ εκ τών συμβεβηκότων 3
15 σχεδόν γαρ οι πλείστοι τών τυράννων γεγόνασιν
εκ δημαγωγών ως ειπείν, πιστευθεντες εκ τοΰ
διαβάλλειν τους γνωρίμους. αϊ μεν γαρ τούτον
τον τρόπον κατέστησαν τών τυραννίδων ηδη τών
πόλεων ηύξημενων, αϊ δε προ τούτων εκ [τε] 2
τών βασιλέων παρεκβαινόντων τά πάτρια και
20 δεσποτικωτερας άρχης όρεγομενων, αϊ δ' εκ τών
αιρετών επι τάς κυρίας άρχας (το γαρ άρχαΐον οι
δήμοι καθίστασαν πολυχρονίους τας δημιουργίας
και τάς θεωρίας), αϊ δ' εκ τών ολιγαρχιών αίρου-
μενων ενα τινά κύριον επι τάς μεγίστας αρχάς,
πάσι γάρ ύπηρχε τοις τρόποις τούτοις το κάτεργα- 4
25 ζεσ#αι ραδίως, ει μόνον βουληθεΐεν, δια το δύναμίν
1 έιτί τον δημον Rassow. 2 [re] om. cod. inferior.
a Cf. 1296 a 3, 1312 b 35.
6 Here δημιονρ-γία means ' magistracy ' generally ; δ-ημιουρ-γός
was the title of a special officer in some Peloponnesian states.
438
POLITICS, V. νιπ. 1-4
tional governments. For royal government corre- Royalty and
sponds with aristocracy, while tyranny is a combina- yranny •
tion of the last form of oligarchy a and of democracy ;
and for that very reason it is most harmful to
its subjects, inasmuch as it is a combination of two
bad things, and is liable to the deviations and errors
2 that spring from both forms of constitution. And
these two different sorts of monarchy have their
origins from directly opposite sources ; royalty has
come into existence for the assistance of the dis-
tinguished against the people, and a king is appointed
from those distinguished by superiority in virtue
or the actions that spring from virtue, or by superi-
ority in coming from a family of that character, while
a tyrant is set up from among the people and the
multitude to oppose the notables, in order that the
3 people may suffer no injustice from them. And this
is manifest from the facts of history. For almost the
greatest number of tyrants have risen, it may be said,
from being demagogues, having won the people's
confidence by slandering the notables. For some
tyrannies were set up in this manner when the states
had already grown great, but others that came
before them arose from kings departing from the
ancestral customs and aiming at a more despotic
rule, and others from the men elected to fill the
supreme magistracies (for in old times the peoples
used to appoint the popular officials b and the sacred
embassies c for long terms of office), and others from
oligarchies electing some one supreme official for
4 the greatest magistracies. For in all these methods
they had it in their power to effect their purpose
easily, if only they wished, because they already
c Official missions to religious games and to oracles.
439
ARISTOTLE
1810 b , „ N/D \~>« -£*
προυπαρχειν τοις μεν βασιλικής αρχής τοις δε
την της τιμής, οίον Φειδων μεν περί "Αργός και
έτεροι τύραννοι κατάστησαν βασίλεια? ύπαρχούσης,
οι δέ περί την Ίωνιαν και Φάλαρις εκ των
τιμών, Π αναίτιο? δ' iv Λεοντινοι? και Κύψελος iv
so Κορίνθω και Πεισίστρατο? Άθηνησι και Διονύσιος
iv Συρακούσαις και έτεροι τον αύτον τρόπον εκ
δημαγωγίας . καθάπερ οΰν εΐπομεν, η βασίλεια 5
τετακται κατά την άριστοκρατίαν κατ' ά^ιαν
γάρ εστίν, η κατ ιδίαν άρετην η κατά γένους η
κατ' ευεργεσίας η κατά ταΰτά τε και δυναμ,ιν.
35 άπαντες γάρ εύεργετήσαντες η δυνάμενοι τα?
πόλει? η τά έθνη εύεργετεΐν ετύγχανον της τιμής
ταύτης, οι μεν κατά πόλεμον κωλύσαντες δουλεύειν,
ώσπερ Κόδρο?, οι δ' ελευθερώσαντες , ώσπερ
Κΰρος, η κτίσαντες η κτησάμενοι χώραν, ωσπερ
οι Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεί? και Μακεδόνων και
40 Μολοττών. βούλεται δ' ό βασιλεύ? είναι φύλαξ, 6
1311a όπως οι μεν κεκτημένοι τάς ουσίας μηθεν αδικον
πάσχωσιν 6 δε δήμος μη ύβρίζηται μηθεν, ή δέ
τυραννίς, ώσπερ εϊρηται πολλάκις, προς ούοεν
αποβλέπει κοινόν ει μη της ιδίας ωφέλειας χάριν
5 έ'στι δέ σκοπός τυραννικός μεν το ηδύ βασιλικός
δέ το καλόν. διό και τών πλεονεκτημάτων τα
μεν χρήματα 1 τυραννικά τά δ' ει? τιμήν βασιλικά
μάλλον και φυλακή βασιλική μεν πολιτική, τυραν-
1 χρημάτων Γ : <eis> χρήματα ? Susemihl.
α Perhaps c. 750 b.c.
* e.g. Thrasybulus, tyrant of Miletus, 612 b.c.
" Tyrant of Agrigentum 572 b.c.
* See 1305 a 23 n. ' See 1259 a 28 n.
440
POLITICS. V. νιιι. 4-β
possessed the power of royal rule in the one set of
cases and of their honourable office in the other,
for example Phidon in Argos ° and others became
tvrants when they possessed royal power already,
while the Ionian tyrants & and Phalaris c rose from
offices of honour, and Panaetius at Leontini and 608 BC -
Cypselus at Corinth and Pisistratus d at Athens and 655 b.c.
Dionysius f at Syracuse and others in the same manner
5 from the position of demagogue. Therefore, as we
said, rovaltv is ranged in correspondence with aristo- § i•
cracy, for it goes by merit, either by private virtue
or by family or by services or by a combina-
tion of these things and ability. For in every
instance this honour fell to men after they had
conferred benefit or because they had the ability to
confer benefit on their cities or their nations, some
having prevented their enslavement in war, for instance
Codrus/ others having set them free, for instance
Cyrus, 3 or having settled or acquired territory, for
instance the kings of Sparta and Macedon and the
6 Molossians. 71 And a king wishes to be a guardian,
to protect the owners of estates from suffering
injustice and the people from suffering insult, but
tyranny, as has repeatedly been said, pays regard to
no common interest unless for the sake of its private
benefit ; and the aim of tyranny is what is pleasant,
that of royalty what is noble. Hence even in their
requisitions money is the aim of tyrants but rather
marks of honour that of kings ; and a king's body-
guard consists of citizens, a tyrant's of foreign
f The usual tradition was that Codrus was already king
when he saved Athens by sacrificing his life.
' Cyrus liberated Persia from the Median empire 559 b.c.
* Neoptolemus, son of Achilles, conquered the Molossi and
became their king.
441
ARISTOTLE
νίκη όε οία ξένων, οτι ο η τυραννις έχει κακά 7
και τα της δημοκρατίας και τά της ολιγαρχίας,
ίο φανερόν εκ μεν ολιγαρχίας το το τέλος είναι
πλοΰτον (οϋτω γαρ και δια /xeWiv άναγκαΐον μόνως
την τε φυλακην και την τρυφην) και το τω πληθει
μηδέν πιστεύειν (διό και την παραίρεσιν ποιούνται
των δπλων, και το κακοΰν τον δχλον και το εκ
του άστεος άπελαύνειν και διοικίζειν αμφοτέρων
15 κοινον, και της ολιγαρχίας και της τνραννίδος) ,
εκ δημοκρατίας δέ το πολεμεΐν τοις γνωρίμοις και
διαφθείρειν λάθρα και φανερώς και φυγαδεύειν ως
άντιτέχνους και προς την άρχην έμποδίους. έκ
γαρ τούτων συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι και τάς έπιβουλάς,
των μεν άρχειν αυτών βουλομένων , των δέ μη
20 δουλεύειν . όθεν και το ΐίεριάνδρου προς Θρασύ-
βουλον συμβούλευμά έστιν, η των υπερεχόντων
σταχυών κόλουσις, ως δέον άει τους υπερέχοντας
των πολιτών άναιρεΐν. καθάπερ οΰν σχεδόν 8
ελέχθη, 1 τάς αυτά? αρχάς δει νομίζειν περί τε τάς
πολιτείας eirai τών μεταβολών και περί τάς
26 μοναρχίας• δια τε γάρ άδικίαν και διά φοβον καΐ
δια καταφρόνησιν επιτίθενται πολλοί τών αρχο-
μένων ταΐς μοναρχίαις, της δέ αδικίας μάλιστα 2
δι ύβριν, ενίοτε δέ και δια την τών ιδίων στέρησιν.
έστι δε και τά τέλη ταύτα καθάπερ κάκεΐ και περί
80 τάς τυραννίδας και τάς βασίλεια? - μέγεθος γάρ
υπάρχει πλούτου και τιμής τοις μονάρχοις, ων
1 σχεδόν post ελέχθη Spengel (om. ΓΜΡ 1 ).
2 μάλιστα <μ.έ>> ? ed.
α See 1284 a 26 η.
442
POLITICS, V. νπι. 7-8
7 mercenaries. And it is manifest that tyranny has
the evils of both democracy and oligarchy ; it copies
oligarchy in making wealth its object (for inevitably
that is the only way in which the tyrant's body-
guard and his luxury can be kept up) and in putting
no trust in the multitude (which is why they resort to
the measure of stripping the people of arms, and why
ill-treatment of the mob and its expulsion from the
city and settlement in scattered places is common
to both forms of government, both oligarchy and
tyranny), while it copies democracy in making war
on the notables and destroying them secretly and
openly and banishing them as plotting against it
and obstructive to its rule. For it is from them that
counter-movements actually spring, some of them
wishing themselves to rule, and others not to be
slaves. Hence comes the advice of Periander to
Thrasybulus, his docking of the prominent corn-
stalks, meaning that the prominent citizens must
always be made away with.
8 Therefore, as was virtually stated, 6 the causes of Attacks oi
revolutions in constitutional and in royal governments from 1 s
must be deemed to be the same ; for subjects p^ 11 * 1
, τ . , „ ■» . motives.
in many cases attack monarchies because ot unjust
treatment and fear and contempt, and among the
forms of unjust treatment most of all because of
insolence, and sometimes the cause is the seizure
of private property. Also the objects aimed at by
the revolutionaries in the case both of tyrannies and
of royal governments are the same as in revolts
against constitutional government ; for monarchs
possess great wealth and great honour, which are
6 This has not been stated, but can be inferred from what
precedes.
443
ARISTOTLE
1311a ,., , _ ~, , a , t \ y \ n
εφιενται πάντες, των ο επιθέσεων at μεν επι 9
το σώμα γίγνονται των αρχόντων αϊ δ' επι την
αρχήν, αϊ μεν οΰν δι ϋβριν επι το σώμα• της δ'
ύβρεως ούσης πολυμερούς, εκαστον αυτών α'ίτιον
35 γίγνεται της οργής, τών ο' όργιζομενων σχεδόν
ol πλείστοι τιμωρίας χάριν επιτίθενται αλλ' ούχ
υπέροχης' οίον η μεν τών ΥΙεισιστρατιδών διά
το προπηλακίσαι μεν την 'Αρμοδίου άδελφήν, επ-
ηρεάσαι ο Άρμόδιον (ό μεν 1 γαρ 'Αρμόδιος διά την
άδελφήν 6 δ' 'Αριστογείτων διά τον 'Αρμόδιον,
40 επεβούλευσαν δέ και ΐίεριάνδρω τω εν 'Αμβρακία.
1311 b τυραννώ διά το συμπινοντα μετά τών παιδικών
ερωτησαι αυτόν ει ήδη εξ αυτοϋ κύει), ή δε Φιλίππου 10
ύπο Τίαυσανίου διά το βάσαι ύβρισθήναι αύτον
υπό τών περί ' Ατταλον, και ή Άμύντου του
μικρού υπό Αερδα 2 διά το καυχήσασθαι εις την
5 ήλικίαν αυτοϋ, και ή του ευνούχου Ευαγόρα τω
Κυπρίω, διά γάρ το την γυναίκα παρελεσθαι τον
υίόν αύτοΰ άπεκτεινεν ώς υβρισμένος. πολλαι 11
δ' επιθέσεις γεγενηνται και διά το εις το σώμα
αίσχύνεσθαι τών μοναρχών τινάς• οίον και ή
Κραταιού εις Άρχελαον άει γάρ βαρέως είχε προς
ίο την ouiAiW, ώστε ικανή και ελάττων εγένετο
πρόφασις, ή διότι τών θυγατέρων ούδεμίαν εδωκεν
όμολογήσας αύτώ, αλλά τήν μεν προτεραν κατ-
εχόμενος υπό πολέμου προς Έιρραν 3 και ' Αρράβαιον
έδωκε τω /?aaiAei τω της Έιλιμείας, τήν δέ νεω-
1 μεν om. mg. Η.
2 Άμύντου ύπο Αέρδα [του μικρού] Thompson.
3 "Ιρραν Paton (sic Plutarchus et Strabo).
° See 1304 a 31 n.
• A Macedonian youth of family, who murdered Philip
336 b.c. Attalus was the uncle of Philip's wife Cleopatra.
4-44
POLITICS, V. νπι. 9-11
9 desired by all men. And in some cases the attack
is aimed at the person of the rulers, in others at their
office. Risings provoked by insolence are aimed
against the person ; and though insolence has many
varieties, each of them gives rise to anger, and
when men are angry they mostly attack for the
sake of revenge, not of ambition. For example the
attack on the Pisistratidae took place because they 010 bc.
outraged Harmodius's sister and treated Harmodius
with contumely (for Harmodius attacked them be-
cause of his sister and Aristogiton because of Har-
modius, and also the plot was laid against Periander
the tyrant in Ambracia a because when drinking with
his favourite he asked him if he was yet with child
10 by him), and the attack on Philip by Pausanias b was
because he allowed him to be insulted by Attalus
and his friends, and that on Amyntas the Little c by
Derdas because he mocked at his youth, and the
attack of the eunuch on Evagoras of Cyprus was for
revenge, for he murdered him as being insulted, 3»r β,α
because Evagoras 's son had taken away his wife.
11 And many risings have also occurred because of
shameful personal indignities committed by certain
monarchs. One instance is the attack of Crataeas on
Archelaus d ; for he was always resentful of the associ-
ation, so that even a smaller excuse became sufficient,
or perhaps it was because he did not give him the
hand of one of his daughters after agreeing to do so,
but gave the elder to the king of Elimea when hard
pressed in a war against Sirras and Arrabaeus, and
c Perhaps the adjective should be transferred to Derdas
and expunged as an interpolated note. The persons referred
to are uncertain.
d King of Macedon 413-399 b.c. Euripides went to reside
at his court 408 b.c. and died there 406 b.c. at the age of 75.
445
ARISTOTLE
τεραν τω υίεΐ 'Αμύντα οίόμενος όντως αν εκείνον
15 ηκιστα διαφερεσθαι και τον εκ της Κλεοπάτρας•
άλλα της γε άλλοτριότητος ύπήρχεν άρχη το
βαρέως φερειν προς την άφροδισιαστικήν χάριν,
συνεπεθετο δε καϊ Έλλανοκράτης 6 ΑαρισαΖος 12
δια την αυτήν αΐτίαν ως γαρ χρώμενος αύτοΰ τη
ηλικία, ου κατήγεν υποσχόμενος, δι' ϋβριν και ου
20 δι' ερωτικήν επιθυμίαν ωετ είναι την γεγενημενην
ομιλίαν. ΐΐύθων δε και Ηρακλείδης ol Αΐνιοι
Κότυν διεφθειραν τω πατρϊ τιμωροΰντες, Άδάμας
δ' άπεστη Κότυος διά το εκτμηθηναι παι? ων υπ
αύτοΰ, ως υβρισμένος, πολλοί 1 δε και δια το εις 13
το σώμα αίκ ισθηναι πληγαΐς όργισθεντες οι μεν
25 διεφθειραν οι δ' ενεχείρησαν ως ύβρισθεντες, και
των περί τάς αρχάς και βασιλικάς δυναστείας, οίον
iv Μιτυλήνη τους ΙΙενθιλίδας Μεγακλής περαόντας
και τύπτοντας ταΐς κορυναις επιθεμενος μετά των
φίλων άνεϊλεν, και ύστερον Έμέρδις Τίενθιλον
30 πληγάς λαβών και παρά της γυναικός εξελκυσθεις
διέφθειρεν. και της 'Αρχελάου δ' επιθέσεως
Δεκάμνιχος ήγεμών εγενετο, παροξύνων τους
επιθεμενους πρώτος' αίτιον δε της οργής οτι
αυτόν εξεδωκε μαστιγώσαι Ευριπίδη τω ποιητή•
ό δ' Ευριπίδης εχαλε'τταινεΐ' είπόντος τι αύτοΰ εις
3 5 δυσωδίαν τοΰ στόματος, και άλλοι δέ 77θλλοι δια 14
τοιαύτα? αιτίας οι μεν άνηρεθησαν οί δ' επεβου-
λεύθησαν. ομοίως δε και δια φόβον εν γαρ τι
1 πολλού? Richards.
β King of Thrace 382-358 b.c.
* The ruling family in the early oligarchy there, claiming
descent from Penthilus, an illegitimate son of Orestes.
446
POLITICS, V. νιπ. 11-14
the younger to his son Amyntas, thinking that thus
Amyntas would be least likely to quarrel with his son
by Cleopatra ; but at all events Crataeas's estrange-
ment was primarily caused by resentment because
12 of the love affair. And Hellanocrates of Larisa
also joined in the attack for the same reason ; for
because while enjoying his favours Archelaus
would not restore him to his home although he had
promised to do so, he thought that the motive of
the familiarity that had taken place had been in-
solence and not passionate desire. And Pytho and
Heraclides of Aenusmade away with Cotys a to avenge
their father, and Adamas revolted from Cotys be-
cause he had been mutilated by him when a boy,
13 on the ground of the insult. And also many men
when enraged by the indignity of corporal chastise-
ment have avenged the insult by destroying or
attempting to destroy its author, even when a magis-
trate or member of a royal dynasty. For example
when the Penthilidae δ at Mitylene went about strik-
ing people with their staves Megacles with his friends
set on them and made away with them, and after-
wards Smerdis when he had been beaten and
dragged out from his wife's presence killed Pen-
thilus. Also Decamnichus took a leading part in § n above,
the attack upon Archelaus, being the first to stir
on the attackers ; and the cause of his anger
was that he had handed him over to Euripides the
poet to flog, Euripides being angry because he had
14 made a remark about his breath smelling. And
many others also for similar reasons have been made
away with or plotted against. And similarly also
from the motive of fear ; for this was one of the
447
ARISTOTLE
1311 b Λ ~ > / ? » x , ι Λ
τοντο των αιηων ην, ωσπερ και περί τας πολι-
τείας, και περί 1 τάς μοναρχίας• οίον Έέρξην
Αρταπάνης φοβούμενος την διαβολήν την περί
Α,αρεΐον, οτι εκρεμασεν ου κελεύσαντος Ή,ερξου
40 αλλ οίόμενος συγγνώσεσθαι ως άμνημονοΰντα διά
1312 a το δειπνεΐν. αϊ δε δια καταφρόνησιν , ωσπερ
Σαρδανάπαλλον ίδών τις βαίνοντα μετά των γυ-
ναικών (ει αληθή ταύτα οι μυθολογοΰντες λεγουσιν,
ei οε μη εττ εκείνου, αλλ επ άλλου γε αν γένοιτο
αληθές), και Αιονυσίω τω υστερώ Αίων επεθετο
5 δια το καταφρονεΐν, όρων τους τε πολίτας οϋτως
έχοντας και αυτόν άει μεθύοντα. και των φίλων 15
δε τίνες επιτίθενται διά καταφρόνησιν δια γαρ το
πιστεΰεσθαι καταφρονοϋσιν ως λησοντες. και οι
οίόμενοι διί^ασ^αι κατασχεΐν την αρχήν τρόπον
ίο τινά διά το καταφρονεΐν επιτίθενται• ως δυνάμενοι
γάρ και καταφρονοΰντες του κινδύνου διά την δύ-
ναμιν επιχειροΰσι ραδίως, ώσπερ οι στρατηγοΰντες
τοις μονάρχοις , οίον Κΰρος Αστυάγη και του βίου
καταφρονών και της δυνάμεως διά το την μεν
δυνααι^ εζηργηκεναι αυτόν δε τρυφάν, και Σεύ-
15 θης ο θράζ . Αμαδόκω στρατηγός ων. οί δε και
διά πλείω τούτων επιτίθενται, οίον και κατα-
φρονοΰντες και διά κέρδος, ωσπερ Άριοβαρζάνη
1 και περί ed. : και codd.
β Captain of Xerxes' body-guard.
6 Last king of the Assyrian empire at Nineveh.
• Tyrant of Syracuse 367-356 and 346-343 B.C., cf. 1312 a
34 ff.
d The last king of Media, reigned 594-559 b.c.
448
POLITICS, V. νιπ. 14-15
causes we mentioned in the case of monarchies, § β.
as also in that of constitutional governments ; c. u.
for instance Artapanes ° killed Xerxes fearing the
charge about Darius, because he had hanged him
when Xerxes had ordered him not to but he had
thought that he would forgive him because he would
forget, as he had been at dinner. And other attacks
on monarchs have been on account of contempt,
as somebody killed Sardanapallus 6 when he saw him
combing his hair with his women (if this story told
by the narrators of legends is true — and if it did not
happen with Sardanapallus, it might quite well be
true of somebody else), and Dion attacked the
younger Dionysius c because he despised him, when he
saw the citizens despising him and the king himself
15 alwavs drunk. And contempt has led some even
of the friends of monarchs to attack them, for they
despise them for trusting them and think they will
not be found out. And contempt is in a manner the
motive of those who attack monarchs thinking that
they are able to seize the government ; for they
make the attempt with a light heart, feeling that
they have the power and because of their power
despising the danger, as generals commanding the
armies attack their monarchs ; for instance Cvrus
attacked Astyages d when he despised both his
mode of life and his power, because his power had
waned and he himself was living luxuriously, and
the Thracian Seuthes attacked Amadocus ■ when his
general. Others again attack monarchs for more
than one of these motives, for instance both because
they despise them and for the sake of gain, as
4 Both these Thracian kings became allies of Athens
390 b.c, but the event referred to may be later.
449
ARISTOTLE
Μιθριδάτης. μάλιστα 1 δε δια ταυτην την αΐτίαν
εγχειροΰσιν οι την φύσιν μεν θρασ€Ϊς τιμήν δ'
έχοντες πολεμικην παρά τοις μονάρχοις• ανδρεία
20 γάρ ονναμιν έχουσα θράσος εστίν, δι' ας άμφοτερας
ώς ραδίως κρατησοντες ποιούνται τάς επιθέσεις,
των δε δια φιλοτιμίαν επιτιθέμενων έτερος τρόπος 16
εστί της αιτίας παρά τους είρημενους πρότερον
ου γάρ ωσπερ ενιοι τοις τυράννοις επιχειρούσιν
όρώντες κέρδη τε μεγάλα και τιμά? μεγάλας οΰσας
26 αυτοί?, ούτω και των δια φιλοτιμίαν επιτιθέμενων
έκαστος προαιρείται κινδυνεύειν αλλ εκείνοι μεν
διά την είρημενην αίτίαν, ούτοι δ', ωσπερ καν
άλλης τινός γενομένης πράξεως περιττής και δι'
ην ονομαστοί γίγνονται και γνώριμοι τοις άλλοις,
οϋτω και τοις μονάρχοις εγχειροΰσιν ου κτησασθαι
so βουλόμενοι μοναρχίαν αλλά δόξαν. ου μην αλλ 17
ελάχιστοι γε τον αριθμόν είσιν οι δ<ά ταυτην την
αίτίαν όρμώντες' ύποκεΐσθαι γάρ δει το του
σω^ηναι μηδέν φροντίζειν άν μη μελλη κατα-
σχησειν την πράζιν οΐς άκολουθεΐν μεν δει την
Αιώνος υπόληφιν, ου ράδιον δ' αύτην εγγενεσθαι
86 πολλοίς• εκείνος γάρ μετ ολίγων εστράτευσεν επί
Αιονύσιον οϋτως εχειν φάσκων ώς δποι 2 περ άν
δύνηται προελθεΐν ικανόν αύτω τοσούτον μετασχεΐν
της πράξεως, οίον ει μικρόν επιβάντα της γης
ευθύς συμβαίη τελευτησαι τούτον 3 καλώς εχειν
αύτω τον θάνατον.
40 Φθείρεται δε τυραννίς ενα μεν τρόπον, ωσπερ 18
1 μάλιστα — 20 tiridiaeis post 6 μΐθύοντα traicienda Newman.
2 οποί Thompson : 'όπου codd. * rbv βίον, τούτον Ρ 1 .
" Perhaps Mithridates II.. who succeeded his father
Ariobarzanes as satrap of Pontus 336 b.c.
450
POLITICS, V. νιπ. 15-18
Mithridates ° attacked Ariobarzanes. b And it is men
of bold nature and who hold a military office with
monarchs who most often make the attempt for this
reason ; for courage possessing power is boldness,
and they make their attacks thinking that with
16 courage and power they will easily prevail. But
with those whose attack is prompted by ambition
the motive operates in a different way from those
spoken of before : some men attack tyrants because
they see great profits and great honours belonging
to them, but that is not the reason that in each
case leads the persons who attack from motives of
ambition to resolve on the venture ; those others are
led by the motive stated, but these attack monarchs
from a wish to gain not monarchy but glory, just as
they would wish to take part in doing any other
uncommon deed that makes men famous and known
17 to their fellows. Not but what those who make the
venture from this motive are very few indeed in
number, for underlying it there must be an utter dis-
regard of safety, if regard for safety is not to check
the enterprise ; they must always have present in
their minds the opinion of Dion, although it is not a 4 above,
easy for many men to have it ; Dion marched with
a small force against Dionysuis, saying that his feel-
ing was that, whatever point he might be able to
get to, it would be enough for him to have had
that much share in the enterprise — for instance,
if it should befall him to die as soon as he had
just set foot in the country, that death would satisfv
him.
18 And one way in which tyranny is destroyed, as is
* This sentence may have been shifted by mistake from
the end of § 14 above.
451
ARISTOTLE
1312 b και τών άλλων εκάστη πολιτειών, εζωθεν, εάν
εναντία τι? fj πολιτεία κρείττων (το μεν γαρ
βούλεσθαι δήλον ώς υπάρξει διά την εναντιότητα
της προαιρέσεως, ά δε βονλονται, δυνάμενοι πράτ-
τοΰσι πάντες), εναντ'ιαι δ' at πολιτειαι, δήμος μεν
5 τυραννίδι καθ' Ήσίοδον ώς ' κεραμεΐ κεραμεύς '
(και γαρ η δημοκρατία η τελευταία τυραννίς
εστίν), βασίλεια δε και αριστοκρατία διά την
εναντιότητα της πολιτείας (διό Αακεδαιμόνιοι
πλείστας κατελυσαν τυραννίδας και Συρακούσιοι
κατά τον χρόνον δν επολιτεύοντο καλώς) • ενα δ εξ 19
ίο αύτη?, όταν οι μετέχοντες στασιάζωσιν, ώσπερ
η τών περί Τελωνα και νυν η τών περί Διονυσιον,
η μεν Τελωνος Θρασυβούλου του Ιέρωνος αδελφού
τον υίόν του Τελωνος δημαγωγοϋντος και προς
ηδονάς όρμώντος ιν' αυτός ά,ρχη, τών δ' οικείων
συστησάντων 1 ίνα μη η 2 τυραννις όλως καταλυθη .
ΐδ άλλα Θρασύβουλος, οι δε συστάντες αυτών 3 ώς
καιρόν έχοντες εξέβαλον απαντάς αυτούς• Διονυσιον
δε Αίων στρατεύσας κηδεστης ών, και προσλαβών
τον δήμον, εκείνον εκβολών διεφθάρη. δύο δε 20
ούσών αιτιών δι' άς μάλιστ επιτίθενται ταΐς
τυραννίσι, μίσους και καταφρονησεως , θατερον
20 μεν άει τούτων υπάρχει* τοις τυράννοις, το μίσος,
1 σνστάντων ΓΜΡ 2 : στασιασάντων Richards.
2 μη ή ed. : μη codd.
3 <μετ'> αυτών Susemihl : tr. post 13 <Ji>TvpawU Richards.
4 del τούτων υπάρχει Richards : del τ. ύπάρχειν codd.
° Works and Days 25 καΐ κβραμεύς κεραμΐΐ κοτέει και τέκτονι
τέκτων, ' two of a trade never agree.'
* Tyrant of Syracuse 485-478 B.C., succeeded by his
452
POLITICS, V. νπι. 18-20
each of the other forms of constitution also, is from Foreign
without, if some state with an opposite constitution f ttac ^ on
,f ι .1 ι . -n ii tyrants.
is stronger (tor the wish to destroy it will clearly be
present in such a neighbour because of the opposition
of principle, and all men do what they wish if they
have the power) — and the constitutions opposed to
tyranny are, on the one hand democracy, which is
opposed to it as (in Hesiod's phrase ) 'potter to
potter,' because the final form of democracy is tyranny,
and on the other hand royalty and aristocracy are
opposed to tyranny because of the opposite nature
of their constitutional structure (owing to which the
Spartans put down a very great many tyrannies, and
so did the Syracusans at the period when they were
19 governed well). But one way is from within itself, Famiij
when the partners in it fall into discord, as the eu '
tyranny of the family of Gelo & was destroyed, and
in modern times c that of the family of Dionysius d —
Gelo's, when Thrasybulus the brother of Hiero paid
court to the son of Gelo and urged him into indul-
gences in order that he himself might rule, and the
son's connexions banded together a body of con-
federates in order that the tyranny might not be put
down entirely but only Thrasybulus, but their con-
federates seizing the opportunity expelled them all ;
Dionysius was put down by Dion, his relative, who got
the people on to his side and expelled him, but was
20 afterwards killed. There are two causes that chiefly Motives.
lead men to attack tyranny, hatred and contempt ; the
former, hatred, attaches to tyrants always, but it is
brother Hiero who died 467. Gelo's son is unknown. Cf.
1315 b 35 ff.
e 356 b.c, a good many years before this book was written.
* See 1312 a 4 n.
453
ARISTOTLE
εκ δε τον καταφρονεΐσθαι πολλαϊ γίνονται των
καταλύσεων, ση μείον δε• των μεν γαρ κτησα-
μενων οι πλείστοι και διεφύλαζαν τάς αρχάς, ol
δε παραλαβόντες ευθύς ως ειπείν άπολλύασι
πάντες, άπολαυστικώς γαρ ζώντες ευκαταφρόνητοι
25 Τ€ γνγνονται και πολλούς καιρούς παραοιδόασι τοις
επιτιθεμενοις. μόριον δε τι του μίσους και την 21
οργην δει τιθεναι, τρόπον γάρ τίνα των αυτών
αίτια γίνεται πράζεων. πολλάκις δε και πρακτικώ-
τερον του μίσους• συντονώτερον γάρ επιτίθενται
διά το μη χρησθαι λογισμώ το πάθος (μάλιστα
30 §6 συμβαίνει τοις θυμοΐς άκολουθεΐν διά την ύβριν,
δι' ην αϊτίαν η τε των Υίεισιστρατιδών κατελύθη
τνραννις και πολλαι των άλλων), αλλά μάλλον το
μΐσος• η μεν γάρ όργη μετά λύπης πάρεστιν, ώστε
ου ράδιον λογίζεσθαι, ή δ' έχθρα άνευ λύπης, ως
δ' εν κεφαλαίοις ειπείν, όσας αιτίας είρηκαμεν
35 γης Τ ε ολιγαρχίας της ακράτου και τελευταίας και
της δημοκρατίας της εσχάτης, τοσαύτας και της
τυραννίδος θετεον και γάρ αύται τυγχάνουσιν
ούσαι διαιρεταϊ 1 τυραννίδες. /?ασιλβια δ' υπό μεν 22
τών έξωθεν ηκιστα φθείρεται, διό και πολυχρόνιος
40 εστίν εξ αύτης δ' αϊ πλεΐσται φθοραι συμβαίνουσιν.
1313 a φθείρεται δέ κατά δύο τρόπους, ενα μεν στα-
σιασάντων τών μετεχόντων της ^SaatAetas•, άλλον
δε τρόπον τυραννικώτερον πειρωμενων διοικεΐν,
όταν είναι κύριοι πλειόνων ά^ιώσι και παρά τον
νόμον. ου γίγνονται δ' ετι /?ασιλείαι νυν, αλλ'
5 αν περ γίγνωνται μοναρχίαι, 2 τυραννίδες μάλλον,
1 aiperai codd. nonnulli.
* μοναρχίαι Spengel : μοναρχίαι καΐ codd.
4.54
POLITICS, V. νπι. 20-22
their being despised that causes their downfall in
many cases. A proof of this is that most of those
that have won tvrannies have also kept their offices
to the end, but those that have inherited them almost
all lose them at once ; for they live a life of indul-
gence, and so become despicable and also give many
21 opportunities to their attackers. And also anger
must be counted as an element in the hatred felt for
them, for in a way it occasions the same actions. And
often it is even more active than hatred, since angry
men attack more vigorously because passion does not
employ calculation (and insolence most frequently
causes men to be led by their angry tempers, which
was the cause of the fall of the tyranny of the mi a 87.
Pisistratidae and many others), but hatred calculates
more ; for anger brings with it an element of pain,
making calculation difficult, but enmity is not accom-
panied by pain. And to speak summarily, all the
things that we have mentioned as causing the down-
fall of unmixed and extreme oligarchy and of the
last form of democracy must be counted as destructive
of tyranny as well, since extreme oligarchy and
democracy are in reality divided 3 tyrannies. Royal
22 government on the other hand is very seldom Fail of
destroyed by external causes, so that it is long- kmg8 '
lasting ; but in most cases its destruction arises out
of itself. And it is destroyed in two ways, one when
those who participate in it quarrel, and another
when the kings try to administer the government too
tyrannically, claiming to exercise sovereignty in more
things and contrary to the law. Royal governments
do not occur any more now, but if ever monarchies
" i.e. divided among several persons, ' put into com-
mission.'
155
ARISTOTLE
1313 a 5^^^^D^' < > Ν > \ ♦
οια το την ρασιλειαν εκουσιον μεν αρχήν είναι
μειζόνων δε κυρίαν, πολλούς δ' elvcu τους ομοίους
και μηδένα διαφέροντα τοσούτον ώστε άπαρτίζειν
προς το μέγεθος και το άζίωμα της αρχής' ώστε
διά μεν τούτο εκόντες ούχ ύπομενουσιν, αν δε δι'
ίο απάτης άρζη τις η βίας, ηδη δοκεΐ τούτο είναι
τυραννίς. εν δε ταΐς κατά γένος ^ασιλειαι? τιθεναι 23
οεΐ τής φθοράς αιτίαν προς ταΐς είρημέναις και το
yivea^ai πολλούς ευκαταφρόνητους και το δυνα/χιν
μη κεκτημένους τυραννικην άλλα βασιλικην τιμήν
ύβρίζειν ράδια γάρ εγίνετο ή κατάλυσις, ' μη
15 βουλομενων γάρ ευθύς ουκ εσται βασιλεύς, αλλ'
ο τύραννος και μη βουλομενων.
Φθείρονται μεν ούν αϊ μοναρχίαι δια ταύτας και
τοιαύτας ετέρας αιτίας.
IX. Σώζονται 8ε δήλον 1 ως απλώς μεν ειπείν ]
εκ των εναντίων, ως δε καθ* εκαστον, τω τάς μεν
20 βασίλεια ? άγειν επι το μετριώτερον. δσω γάρ αν
ελαττόνων ώσι κύριοι, πλείω χρόνον άναγκαΐον
μενειν πάσαν την άρχην, αυτοί τε γάρ ήττον γίνον-
ται δεσποτικοί και τοις ηθεσιν ΐσοι μάλλον και
υπό τών αρχομένων φθονούνται ήττον, διά γάρ
τούτο και η περί Μολοττούς πολύν χρόνον βα-
σίλεια διεμεινεν, και η Αακεδαιμονίων διά το εξ
1 δήλον <3rt> Vahlen.
*56
POLITICS, V. νιπ. 22— ιχ. 1
do occur they are rather tyrannies, because royalty
is government over willing subjects but with
sovereignty over greater matters, but men of equal
quality are numerous and no one is so outstanding
as to fit the magnitude and dignity of the office ;
so that for this reason the subjects do not submit
willingly, and if a man has made himself ruler by
deception or force, then this is thought to be a tyranny.
23 In cases of hereditary royalty we must also set down
as a cause of their destruction, in addition to those
mentioned, the fact that hereditary kings often
become despicable, and that although possessing
not the power of a tyrant but the dignity of a king
they commit insolent outrages ; for the deposition of
kings used to be easy, since a king will at once cease
to be king if his subjects do not wish him to be,
whereas a tyrant will still be tyrant even though his
subjects do not wish it.
These causes then and others of the same nature
are those that bring about the destruction of
monarchies.
1 IX. On the other hand it is clear that monarchies, Preserv»
speaking generally, are preserved in safety as a royalty-
result of the opposite causes to those by which thev
are destroyed. But taking the different sorts of
monarchy separately — royalties are preserved by
bringing them into a more moderate form ; for the
fewer powers the kings have, the longer time the
office in its entirety must last, for they themselves
become less despotic and more equal to their subjects
in temper, and their subjects envy them less. For
this was the cause of the long persistence of the
Molossian royalty, and that of Sparta has continued
because the office was from the beginning divided
<3 457
ARISTOTLE
1313 a , Λ »?/ ' s Ω" \ » / *
αρχής τε εις ουο μέρη οιαιρεσηναι την αρχήν, και
τταλιν θεοπόμπου μετριάσαντος τοις τε άλλοις και
την των εφόρων αρχήν επικαταστησαντος• της γαρ
δυνάμεως αφελών ηύζησε τω χρόνω την βασιλείαν,
ώστε τρόπον τινά εποίησεν ουκ ελάττονα αλλά
so μείζονα αυτήν, όπερ και προς τήν γυναίκα άπο-
κρινασθαι φασιν αυτόν, ειποΰσαν ει μηδέν αί-
σχύνεται την /JaoiAeiW ελάττω παραδιδούς τοις
υιεσιν η παρά του πατρός παρελαβεν " ου δήτα '
φάναι• " παραδίδωμι γάρ πολυχρονιωτεραν."
At δε τυραννίδες σώζονται κατά δυο τρόπους 2
35 τους εναντιωτάτους . ων άτερός εστίν ο παραδεδο-
μενος και καθ ον διοικοϋσιν οι πλείστοι των τυ-
ράννων την αρχήν τούτων δέ τά πολλά φασι
καταστήσαι Τίερίανδρον τον Υίορίνθιον, πολλά δε
και παρά της των Περσών αρχής εστί τοιαύτα
λαβείν. εστί δέ τά τε 7τάλαι λεχθέντα προς
40 σωτηρίαν, ως οΐόν τε, 1 της τυραννίδος, το τους
υπερέχοντας κολούειν και τους φρονηματίας άν-
1313b αιρειν, και μήτε συσσίτια εάν μήτε εταιρ'ιαν μήτε
7ταιδειαν μήτε άλλο μηθέν τοιούτον, αλλά πάντα
φυλάττειν όθεν εΐωθε γίνεσθαι δύο, φρόνημα τε
και πίστις, και μήτε σχολάς μήτε άλλους συλλόγους
επιτρεπειν yiVea^ai σχολαστικοί??, και πάντα
5 ποιεΐν εξ ων ότι μάλιστα άγνώτες άλλ^λοι? έσονται
πάντες (ή γάρ γνώσις π'ιστιν ποιεί μάλλον προς
αλλήλους) ■ και το τους επιδημοΰντας άει φανερούς 3
1 ω? οΐονται ? Bekker (ώί οΐόν re post 41 υπερέχοντα.! vel
alio transp. Richards).
° King of Sparta c. 770-720 b.c. " See 1284 a 26 n.
c The phrases cover Plato's gatherings in the Academy,
Aristotle's in the Peripatos of the Lyceum, and other meet-
458
POLITICS, V. ιχ. 1-3
into two halves, and because it was again limited in
various ways by Theopompus, a in particular by his
instituting the office of the ephors to keep a check
upon it ; for by taking away some of the kings' power
he increased the permanence of the royal office, so
that in a manner he did not make it less but greater.
This indeed as the story goes is what he said in reply
to his wife, when she asked if he felt no shame in
bequeathing the royal power to his sons smaller
than he had inherited it from his father : " Indeed
I do not," he is said to have answered, " for I hand
it on more lasting."
2 Tyrannies on the other hand are preserved in two Preserva-
extremely opposite ways. One of these is the tra- f^nnLj •
ditional way and the one in which most tyrants («) repres-
administer their office. Most of these ordinary safe- prwautions
guards of tyranny are said to have been instituted
by Periander b of Corinth, and also many such devices
may be borrowed from the Persian empire. These
are both the measures mentioned some time back i3i3aieff.
to secure the safety of a tyranny as far as possible —
the lopping off of outstanding men and the destruction
of the proud, — and also the prohibition of common
meals and club-fellowship and education and all other
things of this nature, in fact the close watch upon
all things that usually engender the two emotions
of pride and confidence, and the prevention of the
formation of study-circles and other conferences for
debate, and the employment of every means that
will make people as much as possible unknown to
one another (for familiarity increases mutual con-
3 fidence) ; and for the people in the city to be always
ingrs for the intellectual use of leisure in gymnasia, palaestrae
and leschae.
459
ARISTOTLE
είναι και διατρίβειν περί θύρας (ούτω γαρ αν
ηκιστα λανθάνουν τι πράττονσι, και φρονεΐν αν
εθίζοιντο μικρόν aUl δουλεύοντες) • και τάλλα όσα
ίο τοιαύτα ΐίερσικά και βάρβαρα τυραννικά εστίν
(πάντα γαρ ταύτόν δύναται)' και το μη λανθάνβιν
πειράσθαι όσα τυγχάνει τι? λέγων η πράττων των
αρχομένων , αλλ' eimi κατασκόπους, οίον περί
Έυρακούσας αϊ ποταγωγίδες καλούμεναι, και ους 1
ωτακουστας εζεπεμπεν Ίέρων Οπου τις εΐη συν-
15 ουσία και σύλλογος (παρρησιάζονταί τε γαρ ήττον
φοβούμενοι τους τοιούτους , καν παρρησιάζωνται
λανθάνουσιν ήττον) • και το διαβάλλειν άλλτ^λοι? 4
και συγκρούειν και φίλους φίλοις και τον δημον
τοις γνωρίμοις και τους πλουσίους εαυτοΐς. και
το πένητας ποιεΐν τους αρχόμενους τυραννικόν,
20 όπως μήτε 2 φυλακή 3 τρέφηται και προς τω καθ'
ημέραν όντ€ς άσχολοι ώσιν επιβουλεύειν. παρά-
δειγμα δε τούτου αϊ τ€ πυραμίδες αϊ περί Αΐγυπτον
και τα αναθήματα* των Κυφελιδών και του
Όλυμπιείου 5 ή οίκοδόμησις υπό των Πεισι-
στρατιδών, και των περί Σάμον, έργα 6 ΙΙολυκράτεια
25 (πάντα γαρ ταΰτα δύναται ταύτόν, άσχολίαν και
πενίαν των αρχομένων) • και η εισφορά των τελών, 5
οίον εν Έυρακούσαις (εν πέντε γαρ έτεσιν επι
1 ous Coraes : tovs codd. (ώτακουστάϊ ous Μ 1 ).
2 μήτε : ή τε Victorius (μήτε — καί seel. Richards).
3 φυλακή : δύναμι? Thurot. * τό ανάθημα τό Cobet.
5 Όλυμπιείον anonymus : 'Ολυμπίου codd.
6 tpyidv τα Coraes.
° Apparently this means a citizen force side by side with
the tyrant's mercenaries ; a variant gives ' in order that the
(tyrant's) guard may be kept.'
460
POLITICS, V. ix. a-5
visible and to hang about the palace-gates (for thus
there would be least concealment about what they
are doing, and they would get into a habit of being
humble from always acting in a servile way) ; and all
the other similar devices of Persian and barbarian
tyranny (for all have the same effect) ; and to try
not to be uninformed about any chance utterances
or actions of any of the subjects, but to have spies
like the women called ' provocatrices ' at Syracuse and
the ' sharp-ears ' that used to be sent out by Hiero
wherever there was any gathering or conference (for
when men are afraid of spies of this sort they keep a
check on their tongues, and if they do speak freely
4 are less likely not to be found out) ; and to set men
at variance with one another and cause quarrels
between friend and friend and between the people
and the notables and among the rich. And it is a
device of tyranny to make the subjects poor, so that
a guard a may not be kept, and also that the people
being busy with their daily affairs may not have
leisure to plot against their ruler. Instances of this
are the pyramids in Egypt and the votive offerings
of the Cypselids, b and the building of the temple of
Olympian Zeus by the Pisistratidae c and of the
temples at Samos, works of Polycrates d (for all these
undertakings produce the same effect, constant
occupation and poverty among the subject people) ;
5 and the levying of taxes, as at Syracuse (for in the
* Cypselus and his son Periander (1310 b 29 n., 1284 a -26 n.)
dedicated a colossal statue of Zeus at Olympia and other
monuments there and at Delphi.
e Pisistratus is said to have begun the temple of Olympian
Zeus at Athens, not finished till the time of Hadrian.
* Tyrant of Samos, d. 522 b.c.
461
ARISTOTLE
1313 b A < \ ■> , <t > /
Διονυσίου την ουσιαν άπασαν εισενηνοχεναι συν-
εβαινεν). εστί δε και πολεμοποιός 6 τύραννος,
όπως άσχολοί τε ώσι και ηγεμόνος εν χρεία δια-
30 τελώσιν 6ντ€ς. και η μεν βασίλεια σώζεται δια
των φίλων, τυραννικόν δε το μάλιστ άπιστεΐν τοις
φίλοις, ώς βουλομενων μεν πάντων δυναμένων δέ
μάλιστα τούτων. 1 και τα περί την δημοκρατίαν 6
δε γιγνόμενα την τελευταίαν τυραννικά πάντα,
γυναικοκρατία τε περί τά? οικίας ίν' εζαγγελλωσι
35 κατά των ανδρών, και δούλων ανεσι? δια την αύτην
αΐτίαν ούτε γαρ επιβουλεύουσιν οι δούλοι και αϊ
γυναίκες τοις τυράννοις, εύημεροϋντάς τε avay-
καίον εύνους είναι και ταΐς τνρανν'ισι και τοις
δημοκρατίαις (και γαρ 6 δήμος είναι βούλεται
μόναρχος). διό και ό κόλαζ παρ αμφοτέροις
40 έντιμος, παρά μεν τοις δημοις 6 δημαγωγός (εστί
γάρ 6 δημαγωγός του δήμου κόλαζ), παρά δε τοις
1314 a τυράννοις οι ταπεινώς ομιλούντες, όπερ εστίν
έργον κολακείας, και γάρ διά τούτο πονηρόφιλον"
η τυραννίς• κολακευόμενοι γάρ χαίρουσιν, τοΰτο
δ' ούδ* αν ει? ποι^σειε φρόνημα έχων ελεύθερον,
αλλά φιλοΰσιν οι επιεικείς, η ου κολακεύουσιν.
6 και χρήσιμοι οί πονηροί εις τά πονηρά, ηλω γάρ
6 ήλος, ώσπερ η παροιμία, και το μηδενι χαίρειν 7
σεμνω μηδ* ελευθερω τυραννικόν αυτόν γάρ είναι
μόνον άζιοΐ τοιούτον ό τύραννος, ό δ' άντισεμνυ-
1 τούτων αυτόν καθελίΐν codd. nonnulli.
* φιλοπόνηρον Immisch.
See 1259 a 28 η. 6 Cf. 1309 b 27 ff.
c The proverb ήλψ ?j\os έκκρούεται usually meant driving
out something by a thing of the same kind (' set a thief to
462
POLITICS, V. ιχ. 5-7
reign of Dionysius ° the result of taxation used to be
that in five years men had contributed the whole
of their substance). Also the tyrant is a stirrer-up
of Avar, with the deliberate purpose of keeping the
people busy and also of making them constantly in
need of a leader. Also whereas friends are a means
of security to royalty, it is a mark of a tyrant to be
extremely distrustful of his friends, on the ground
that, while all have the wish, these chiefly have the
6 power. Also the things that occur in connexion with
the final form of democracy b are all favourable to
t\ranny — dominance of women in the homes, in order
that they may carry abroad reports against the men,
and lack of discipline among the slaves, for the same
reason ; for slaves and women do not plot against
tyrants, and also, if they prosper under tyrannies,
must feel well-disposed to them, and to democracies
as well (for the common people also wishes to be
sole ruler). Hence also the flatterer is in honour
with both — with democracies the demagogue (for the
demagogue is a flatterer of the people), and with the
tyrants those who associate with them humbly, which
is the task of flattery. In fact owing to this tyranny
is a friend of the base ; for tyrants enjoy being
flattered, but nobody would ever flatter them if he
possessed a free spirit — men of character love their
ruler, or at all events do not flatter him. And the
base are useful for base business, for nail is driven
7 out by nail, as the proverb goes. And it is a mark
of a tyrant to dislike anyone that is proud or
free-spirited ; for the tyrant claims for himself alone
the right to bear that character, and the man who
catch a thief), not as here the execution of evil designs by
appropriate agents.
463
ARISTOTLE
νομβνος και ελευθεριάζων αφαιρείται τήν ύπεροχήν
και το δεσποτικόν της τυραννίδος• μισοΰσιν ουν
ίο ωσπερ καταλύοντας την αρχήν, και το χρήσθαι
σνσσίτοις και συνημερευταΐς ζενικοΐς μάλλον η
πολιτικοΐς τυραννικόν, ώς τους μεν πολεμίους
τους δ' ουκ άντιποιουμενους. ταύτα και τα
τοιαύτα τυραννικά, μεν και σωτήρια της αρχής,
ούθέν δ' ελλείπει μοχθηρίας, εστί δ' ώς ειπείν 8
ΐδ πάντα ταύτα περιειλημμενα τρισίν εΐδεσιν στο-
χάζεται γάρ ή τυραννίς τριών, ενός μεν του μικρά,
φρονεΐν τους αρχόμενους (ούδενί γάρ αν μικρό -
φυχος επιβουλεύσειεν) , δευτέρου δε του διαπιστείν
άλλήλοις (ου καταλύεται γάρ πρότερον τυραννίς
πριν η πιστεύσουσί τίνες αύτοΐς, διό και τοις
20 επιεικεσι πολεμοΰσιν ώς βλαβεροΐς προς την αρχήν
ου μόνον διά το μη άζιοΰν άρχεσθαι δεσποτικώς
αλλά και διά το πιστούς και εαυτοΐς και τοις
άλλοις είναι και μή καταγορεύειν μήτε εαυτών μήτε
τών άλλων)• τρίτον δ' αδυναμία τών πραγμάτων
(ούθεις γάρ επιχειρεί τοις άδυνάτοις, ώστε ουδέ
25 τυραννίδα καταλύειν μή δυνάμεως ύπαρχούσης) .
εις ους μέν ουν ορούς ανάγεται τά βουλεύματα 1 τών 9
τυράννων, ούτοι τρεις τυγχάνουσιν όντες• 7τάντα
γάρ άναγάγοι τι? αν τά τυραννικά προς ταύτας
τάς υποθέσεις, τά μεν όπως μή πιστεύωσιν άλλη-
λοις, τά δ' όπως μή δύνωνται, τά δ' όπως μικρόν
φρονώσιν.
30 Ό μεν ουν εις τρόπος δι' οΰ γίνεται σωτηρία 10
ταΓ? τυραννίσι τοιούτος εστίν, ό δ έτερος σχεδόν
εξ εναντίας έχει τοις είρημενοις τήν επιμελειαν.
1 Richards : βονλήματα. codd.
β i.e. do not claim to be respected as his equals.
464
POLITICS, V. ιχ. 7-10
meets his pride with pride and shows a free spirit
robs tyranny of its superiority and position of
mastery ; tyrants therefore hate the proud as under-
mining their authority. And it is a mark of a tyrant
to have men of foreign extraction rather than
citizens as guests at table and companions, feeling
that citizens are hostile but strangers make no claim
against him. e These and similar habits are char-
acteristic of tyrants and preservative of their office,
8 but they lack no element of baseness. And broadly
speaking, they are all included under three heads ;
for tyranny aims at three things, one to keep its
subjects humble (for a humble-spirited man would
not plot against anybody), second to have them
continually distrust one another (for a tyranny is not
destroyed until some men come to trust each other,
owing to which tyrants also make war on the respect-
able, as detrimental to their rule not only because
of their refusal to submit to despotic rule, but also
because they are faithful to one another and to the
other citizens, and do not inform against one another
nor against the others) ; and the third is lack of
power for political action (since nobody attempts
impossibilities, so that nobody tries to put down a
9 tyranny if he has not power behind him). These
then in fact are the three aims to which the plans
of tyrants are directed ; for all the measures taken
by tyrants one might class under these principles —
some are designed to prevent mutual confidence
among the subjects, others to curtail their power,
and others to make them humble-spirited.
10 Such then is the nature of one method by which n>) concilia-
security is obtained for tyrannies. The other tries methods.
to operate in a manner almost the opposite of the
465
ARISTOTLE
έστι δε λαβείν αυτόν εκ της φθοράς της τών βασι-
λειών, ώσπερ γαρ της βασίλεια? εις τρόπος της
φθοράς το ποιεΐν την αρχήν τυραννικωτέραν , ούτω
85 Τ ης τυραννίδος σωτηρία ποιεΐν αυτήν βασιλικω-
τέραν, εν φνλάττοντα μόνον, την δύναμιν, όπως
άρχη μη μόνον βουλομένων άλλα και μη βουλο-
μένων προϊε μένος γαρ και τοΰτο προιεται και
το τυραννεΐν. αλλά τοΰτο μεν ώσπερ νποθεσιν
δει μενειν, τα δ' άλλα τα μεν ποιεΐν τα 8ε δοκεΐν
40 ύποκρινόμενον το 1 βασιλικόν καλώς, πρώτον μεν 11
1314b [του δοκεΐν] 2 φροντίζειν τών κοινών, μήτε δα-
πανώντα δωρεάς τοιαύτας εφ' αΐς τά πλήθη χαλε-
παίνονσιν, όταν απ* αυτών μεν λαμβάνωσιν εργαζο-
μένων και πονούντων γλίσχρως , διδώσι δ εταίραις
δ και ξένοις και τεχνίταις άφθόνως, λόγον τε απο-
δίδοντα τών λαμβανομένων και δαπανωμενων,
όπερ ήδη πεποιήκασί τινε? τών τυράννων (ούτω
γάρ αν τις διοικών οικονόμος άλλ' ου τύραννος
είναι δόζειεν, ου δει δε φοβεΐσθαι μη ποτέ απορηση
χρημάτων κύριος ων της πόλεως• άλλα τοις γ 12
ίο έκτοπίζουσι τυράννοις άπο της οικείας και συμφέρει
τοΰτο μάλλον η καταλιπεΐν άθροισαντας, ήττον
γάρ αν οί φυλάττοντες επιτιθεΐντο τοις πραγμασιν
είσι δε φοβερώτεροι τών τυράννων τοις απο-
δημοΰσιν οί φυλάττοντες τών πολιτών, οι μεν
γάρ συναποδημοΰσιν οί δέ ύπομενουσιν)' έπειτα
15 τάς εισφοράς και τάς λειτουργίας δει φαίνεσθαι της
τε οικονομίας ένεκα συνάγοντα καν ποτέ δεηθί}
χρήσθαι προς τους πολεμικούς καιρούς, όλως τε
1 τό ΓΗ : rbv cet.
2 Spengel (δοκεΐν codd. nonnulli).
466
POLITICS, V. κ. 10-12
devices mentioned. And it can be ascertained from
considering the downfall of royal governments. For
just as one mode of destroying royalty is to make its
government more tyrannical, so a mode of securing
tyranny is to make it more regal, protecting one
thing only, its power, in order that the ruler
may govern not only with the consent of the sub-
jects but even without it ; for if he gives up this, he
also gives up his position as tyrant. But while this
must stand as a fundamental principle, in all his
other actions real or pretended he should cleverly
11 play the part of royalty. The first step is to
be careful of the public funds, not squandering
presents such as the multitudes resent, when ty-
rants take money from the people themselve 
