The philosophy and psychology of Pietro Pomponazzi

THE PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY

OF

PIETRO POMPONAZZI

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THE PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY

OF

PIETRO POMPONAZZI

BY

ANDREW HALLIDAY DOUGLAS

SOMETIME PROFESSOR OF APOLOGETICS AND PASTORAL THEOLOGY
IN KNOX COLLEGE, TORONTO

EDITED BY
CHARLES DOUGLAS

AND

R. P. HARDIE

Cambridge :

at the University Press
1910

•I'v.

1

(fTambrttocje :

PRINTED BY JOHN CLAY, M.A.
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS

PREFACE

" I ^HE following essay on the philosophy of Pietro
-A- Pomponazzi — or Petrus Pomponatius — was origi
nally written by its author as a thesis for the Degree
of Bachelor of Arts in the University of Cambridge.
He did not publish it, because he intended it to form
part of a more general and complete account of the
movement of opinion to which Pomponazzi's writings
contributed — an account in which more positive results
would have supplemented the negative phase which
dominates Pomponazzi's thought. His too early death
prevented the execution of this project ; and now, after
consultation with those well able to advise, the present
volume is published. It need hardly be said that it is a
purely historical study of a phase and stage of opinion
remote from that of its author.

The first three chapters were regarded by him rather
as an introductory restatement of results obtained and
accredited by other scholars than as a direct or original
research. The remaining chapters embody the fruits of
a direct examination of the writings of Pomponazzi.

vi PREFACE

The editors are responsible for the division into

chapters, for the translations in the text, and for such

alterations and amendments as fell to be made in
preparing and publishing- the manuscript.

C. D.
R. P. H.

June 1910.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTORY NOTE . p. i

CHAPTER I

ARISTOTLE IN THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES

Pomponazzi illustrative of the dissolution of mediaeval philosophy. — Pomponazzi
and the Greek Commentators. — His positive psychology. — Aristotle's doctrine of the
intellectual soul. — His psychology generally. — Dualism of Aristotelian commentators.
— The Soul as Substance. — The conception of Spirit. — Hebrew influences. — Philo. —
Neo-Platonism. — Its influence on patristic psychology. — Early mediaeval miscon
ceptions of Aristotle. — Their persistent influence on psychology. — Alexander of
Aphrodisias p. 3

CHAPTER II

THE ARABIANS AND ST THOMAS

Alexandrian Peripateticism and Persian study of Aristotle. — Neo- Platonic influences
in the Arab schools. — Arabian philosophy and the unity of Intelligence. — Averroes'
relation to Alexander. — His extreme dualism self-destructive. — Superseded by Pom-
ponazzi's positive analysis of thought. — A return to Aristotelian method. — Influence
of Arabian interpretation of Aristotle upon Western schools. — Dominican criticism of
Averroes. — St Thomas and the doctrine of the unity of Intelligence. — St Thomas's
psychological method of discussion. — His conception of a separate intellectual soul. —
The point of departure for Pomponazzi p. 29

viii CONTENTS

CHAPTER III

POMPON AZZI AS AN ARISTOTELIAN

The influence of Averroes in Italy. — Italian Averroists. — Decay of Averroism. —
Pomponazzi's return to Aristotle. — Influence of Alexander. — Of Averroes and
St Thomas. — Pomponazzi's interest in Aristotelian psychology. — His denial of
immortality. — Averroism and immortality. — Pomponazzi's controversies. — His com
mentary on Aristotle's De Anima. — Publication of his writings. — His contemporary
influence and its explanation P- 57

CHAPTER IV

POMPONAZZI'S PSYCHOLOGY

Pomponazzi's problem the soul's relation to reason. — Averroist dualism. —
St Thomas's conception of "separate" intelligence. — Pomponazzi's criticism. — The
idea of " participation." — Pomponazzi's classification of possible theories of human
nature. — His criticism of Averroes. — Developed in the De Immortalitate. — Criticism
of "Platonism." — Of St Thomas.— The Thomist psychology and its relation to
Aristotle. — The Thomist argument for immortality. — Pomponazzi's criticism p. 74

CHAPTER V

THE SOUL

Pomponazzi's doctrine of the Soul. — Mortality and materiality. — Thought,
abstraction, and sense. — Arguments for immateriality. — Pomponazzi's view of them. —
Thought and matter. — The intermediate position of the soul as intelligence embodied.
— Man's intermediate position in the universe. — Its significance in Pomponazzi's
conception of the soul. — Ideal Intelligence. — Thought as sui generis. — Pomponazzi
not a materialist p. 98

CHAPTER VI

INTELLIGENCE

Relation of Soul and Reason. — Pomponazzi's general conception of Human
Nature. — Three orders of beings. — Three sorts of souls. — Three ways of knowledge.
— Man as microcosm. — Pomponazzi's estimate of intelligence. — Depreciation of actual
human powers and human life. — Of human as compared with absolute reason. —
Participation in the immaterial. — Mind and body in man. — Body essential to human
knowledge. — The intellectual soul one with the vegetative and sensitive soul. — Body
as a whole the instrument of mind. Note on the words " subject " and "object "

p. 120

CONTENTS ix

CHAPTER VII

SENSE

Problem of the relation of sense and reason. — The passivity of sense. — Pom
ponazzi's interpretation. — Difficulties of the doctrine for the mediaeval mind. — Species
sensibilis and its ambiguities. — The conditions and the object of sensation. — The
Aristotelian view and mediaeval misconceptions of it. — Albert's psychology. —
Arguments against the passivity of sense. — Pomponazzi's answers. — His physical
explanations. — His recognition of the distinctive and non-physical character of mind.
— His dismissal of the categories of activity and passivity. — Criticism of Aristotle. —
Communia sensibilia. — Their relation to the senses. — Figure and magnitude. —
Number, motion, rest.- — -Significance in psychological analysis of the idea of common
sensibles. — Conditions of sense-perception.— Idea of common sense. — Development of
Aristotelian doctrine. — Pomponazzi's conception of a synthetic element in sensation

p. 140

CHAPTER VIII

REASON

Confidence in sense-experience. — Illusions of the senses. — Pomponazzi's account
of substance. — Criticism of the Averroist idea of a direct sense of substance. —
Pomponazzi's problem the origin of the idea of substance. — Derivation by a process
of discursive thought.— Substance as abstract. — Idea of sensus interior. — Various
interpretations. — Function of imagination — Sense, imagination, and reason.- — Order
in existence and in knowledge. — Intellectus agens. — Species and intelkctio. — Form
and faculty. — Arguments against an element added in intellectio. — Pomponazzi's
relation to them. — His relation to the Scotist doctrine. — Ipsa intellectio added not
nova species, — Agency in intellection. — Thought as immanently constitutive p. 171

CHAPTER IX

KNOWLEDGE

The three " powers " of sensus interior. — - The function of imagination and
memory. — The hierarchy of nature and human faculties. — The idea of vis cogitativa.
— Its inadequacy as an escape from dualism. — Its function in knowledge. — Partly a
psychological fiction. — Apprehension of an individual in general relations as distinct
from an abstract general notion. — Cogitativa and sense. — Pomponazzi's more concrete
psychology. — His denial of the intuitive character of thought. — And of the intuitive
knowledge of thought by itself. — The nature of knowledge and predication. —
Nominalism and realism. — Pomponazzi's criticisms. — His intermediate position. — The
distinction between particular and universal not one of content. — The meaning, and
knowledge, of the individual. — Argument for intuitive knowledge of universals from
the nature of intelligence. — Pomponazzi's criticism.— Thought in man knows the
singular and the universal. — Mediated knowledge.— Summary of Pomponazzi's view.
His account of the act of conception. — His general position. — His idea of Truth

p. 202

X CONTENTS

CHAPTER X

THE NATURE OF VIRTUE

Pomponazzi's interest in the ethical aspect of his theories. — Moral arguments
against his doctrine of mortality. — The attainment by man of the end of his being. —
The insufficiency of human life. — The desire for immortality. — Pomponazzi's estimate
of man's intermediate position. — As determining his end. — And limiting the proper
range of his desires. — Pomponazzi's view of man's realisation of his end. — In the
human race as an organism. — In the moral nature. — Which is more characteristic of
man than either speculation or mechanical skill. — The moral vocation of man proper
to his place in the universe. — The harmony of virtue. — The sufficiency of human life.
— The degree and nature of human happiness. — The moral value of life. — The motive
and worth of virtue. — Rewards and punishments in relation to virtue. — Virtue as an
end in itself p. 248

CHAPTER XI

NATURAL LAW IN HUMAN LIFE AND RELIGION

Pomponazzi's search for natural causes. — De Incantationibus. — Astrological pre
suppositions and the idea of an order of nature. — Nature and magic. — The explanation
of the marvellous. — Evidence for marvels. — Apparitions and their causes. — Portents
and omens. — Sequences and symbols in nature. — Metamorphoses and their significance.
— The gift of prophecy. — Its nature and causes. — Answers to prayer. — Natural
explanations. — Pomponazzi's view of prayer. — Its true use religious. — Visions in
answer to prayer. — The natural history of religions. — Origin, growth, and decline. —
Special manifestations at the origin of religions. — Decline and periodicity . p. 270

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

PlETRO POMPONAZZI is a unique figure in the history of the
last phase of scholasticism.

Born at Mantua in 1462, he studied philosophy and medicine
in Padua, and taught first there and afterwards at Ferrara and
Bologna. At Bologna he died in 1524. His life was wholly
that of a student; and his disinterested pursuit of truth subjected
him to constant censure and even to persecution.

His singularity consists in the fact that, while he lived in
the very heart of the Renaissance period, and while his work
forms an integral part of the intellectual change which the
revival of learning produced, he is himself apparently unin
fluenced by the spiritual circumstances of his time. He is
unaffected by the new discovery of Plato which inspires Plethon
and Ficino, and Pico della Mirandola. The repudiation of
Aristotle as a pagan Oriental finds no echo in his thought.
He is not led away from the subtleties of scholastic theology
by the enlarging influence of classical learning which withholds
Erasmus, his contemporary, from doctrinal controversy. 'He is
not confronted with the fresh spiritual realities which in the
same years possess the mind of Savonarola. He becomes neither
scholar nor saint, but remains an Aristotelian student in the
direct line of the scholastic tradition, occupied with the problems
of the schoolmen and inheriting their instrument of thought —
the Aristotelian logic.

In others we perceive scholasticism and the old intellectual
world undergoing change from without, through the intrusion of
new interests or the discovery of new realms of knowledge. In

D. i

2 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

Pomponazzi we see a different spectacle. We see scholasticism,
unmixed with streams from any source except its own, under
going inward changes not less complete and not less significant
than those which, in other minds, are brought upon it from
elsewhere.

To the contemporaries of Pomponazzi, the main interest of
his writings was in his conclusions — in his refusal to accept the
reasoning either of the argument for individual immortality which
St Thomas drew from Aristotle, or of the more subtle construc
tion put by Averroes upon the Master, to prove for humanity in
the abstract an immortality denied to individual men.

But to us the transient phase of a perennial problem —
the dead controversy and all its vanished presuppositions — the
denial by thought of that which is yet yielded to faith — these
are less interesting than the emergence in Pomponazzi of a new
comprehension and use of Aristotelian philosophy. The vital
fact is not that he refuses the conclusions of St Thomas and
the Arabians, but that he changes their methods, and reverts to
simpler and clearer ways of thinking which he finds for himself
in Aristotle.

This is really the end of scholasticism. Pomponazzi, the
last of the schoolmen, is, in a sense, the first of the Aristotelians.

C. D.
R. P. H.

CHAPTER I

ARISTOTLE IN THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES

MEDIAEVAL thought is not easy to understand, either in its
strength or in its weakness. In its earlier stages especially it
eludes our comprehension, and baffles every effort of a modern
mind to grasp its presuppositions or follow its processes with
anything like sympathy or intelligence. Perhaps we shall best
be enabled to comprehend it by approaching it, not at its obscure
beginnings, but backwards from its end ; and by observing the
fabric in its dissolution. It is not unreasonable to expect that
a great deal may be learned about the scholastic period by
taking our stand with those who stood upon its nearer verge.
They may reveal to us whatever was true and valuable in
mediaeval ideas by expressing them in language that is closer
to our own. We shall also be helped to unravel the fallacies
of a scholasticism which still clings at many points to popular
thought, by the experience of those who were undergoing a
personal emancipation from its grosser errors.

In Pomponazzi we have precisely that admixture of the
old and the new which from this point of view it is interesting
to study. In various parts of his works we are able to perceive
the dawn of ideas and methods of thought which have since
prevailed. On one page he is occupied with questions and
controversies whose interest has long ago perished and whose
presuppositions have disappeared with the change of the stand
point of thought ; on the next, he employs and even expounds
positive and empirical methods of reasoning which are the
permanent foundation of science. And, once again, in the
application even of true methods, he is misled by meagre or

4 PIETKO POMPONAZZI

erroneous information, and remains the victim of innumerable
superstitions. Pomponazzi may be called one of the earliest
of the moderns ; but it is even more instructive to observe that
he was one of the last of the schoolmen.

Pomponazzi is especially memorable as one of the first to
receive Aristotle's doctrine of the Soul in its simplicity, and
to escape from the monstrous shadows of Averroism. For
a priori speculations as to the nature of intelligence and of
spiritual substances, speculations which had attained to mytho
logical dimensions, he substituted an attempt, imperfect yet
genuine, at direct observation and analysis of the character of
intelligence in man.

The change which he made is not sufficiently accounted
for by the influence upon him of the Greek commentators
on Aristotle, since in his conception of human intelligence
Pomponazzi rose almost as far above Alexander as above
Averroes ; and it is on this account completely misleading to
represent the controversy which divided the Italian universities
in the i6th century, simply as a dispute between the followers
of Averroes and those of Alexander of Aphrodisias in the
interpretation of Aristotle1. We shall see upon closer examina
tion that this account of the matter is altogether too simple.
Meanwhile two observations may be made. On the one hand,
many or most of those who invoked the authority of Averroes
had introduced a garbled Averroism which really travestied the
doctrine of the Arabian and turned it upside down. Not only
did they employ his dogma of an eternal Intelligence of collective
humanity to support individual immortality, which Averroes
probably did not profess to hold, and at any rate could not hold
consistently ; but, in order to do this, they had abandoned the

1 As is done, for example, by J. A. Symonds, Renaissance in Italy, Vol. v.
p. 472: "There were two ways of regarding Aristotle's doctrine of the active
intellect. The one was to view the Nous as a development from the soul, which
in its turn should be conceived as a development from the senses. The other was to
recognise it as separate from the soul and imported from without.... The latter found
able expression at the hands of his Arabic commentator Averroes. The former was
maintained by the fullest and latest of the Greek Peripatetics, Alexander of
Aphrodisias." (It is difficult to see in what sense Alexander can be called the latest of
the Greek Peripatetics ; but to ascribe to him the view, that the Nous is not imported
from without, is to affirm the exact opposite of the truth.)

ARISTOTLE IN THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES 5

most characteristic tenet of Averroism, namely that individual
men do not naturally possess true reason, but receive it by
" union " with the common Intelligence. On the other hand
Pomponazzi was not merely a follower of Alexander. While
largely influenced by Alexander, he presented that commen
tator's doctrine of the soul with a difference of which he may
himself have been more or less unconscious, but which is of
material consequence to the comparison of ancient and modern
thought. Pomponazzi's doctrine of man's participation in in
telligence is something quite different from Alexander's doctrine
of Divine " assistance " — of the vovs TTOITITIKOS in a theological
sense, acting from without upon the human soul : Pomponazzi
is less dualistic and theological, more positive and humanistic
than Alexander. And corresponding to this difference, there is
a different conception of the soul ; since to Alexander no more
than to Averroes did the human soul naturally or in itself
possess true intelligence.

The psychology of Pomponazzi, accordingly, had in reality a
deeper root than his reading of Alexander, since in an essential
point he refused Alexander's guidance and indeed on that issue
diverged alike from Alexander and from Averroes in a manner
which is of the greatest interest to those who seek to trace the
growth and origin of modern modes of thought. The truth is
that Pomponazzi, largely neglecting baseless speculations, con
cerned himself with intelligence as it exists in man. Abandoning
the search after " separate substances," at least so far as man is
concerned, he examined intelligence as it is actually manifested
in human nature. It was in virtue of this method of positive
analysis that he approximated so closely to the original doctrine
of Aristotle. Following Alexander, he held that such an analysis
discovered no soul existing in separation from the body ; but
then he did not, like Alexander, distinguish true intelligence
from the soul of man as something above it, and only visiting
it from without ; on the contrary, he held that the " intellectual
soul " of man was possessed of true intelligence.

This way of approaching the issues concerning intelligence
and the soul seems, when compared with mediaeval modes of
thought, to indicate a new standpoint and a new mental attitude.

6 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

In reality it was an old standpoint that had been recovered
again — the original standpoint of Aristotle.

It is true that Pomponazzi still speaks of the soul's " par
ticipation " in intelligence, and so far uses the language of
dualism which was the legacy of the Middle Ages. It is
true also that he adopts, though only after a conventional
and perfunctory manner, in relation to a mythical world of
superior Intelligences, the notion of intelligence as " separate
substance" independent of body and matter. But these are
not the elements in Pomponazzi's mind which are of most
interest to the historian tracing in him the onward movement
of thought. They are part of the furniture of his mind, not
without historical significance ; but it is not in these traditional
features of his belief, but in more personal mental activities
exercised apart from them and in spite of them, that we find
the spirit of the time expressed, and that immanent logic
at work, to trace which is to write the history of philosophy.
It is in the spirit of Aristotle that Pomponazzi considers human
intelligence, which is the real subject of his interest and of
his personal contribution to thought. He finds by a positive
analysis that the soul of man is possessed of intelligence ; and
the soul is known to us in body, is never manifested to us except
in body, and is indeed but the highest aspect and true being of
that body. There is, he contends, no evidence of any " separate "
existence of the soul. We have no knowledge of any other
mode of being for a soul, which thus, and only thus, presents
itself to us.

Now, whatever we are to think of the conclusions at which
Pomponazzi arrived as to the constitution of the human being,
and as to the worth, significance, and prospect of human life,
this is the only scientific method of approaching the study of
man.

Every mediaeval and every later Alexandrian interpretation
of Aristotle had been coloured by Neo-Platonism. The idea of
the individual soul as a substance, separate and self-existent,
which prevailed with practical uniformity in the orthodox schools
from patristic down to modern times, can be traced historically
through the theology of Augustine back to the influence of the

ARISTOTLE IN THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES 7

Alexandrian thinkers who first expressed Platonic conceptions
in the forms of the Aristotelian logic. So also with that separa
tion of intelligence from the soul, which is so characteristic of
the Arabians, and which gave rise to the fantastic speculations
as to the real nature of human intelligence conceived as sub
stantially separate from the soul of man, and to the interminable,
because fictitious, question about the soul's participation in
intelligence. This false abstraction was likewise derived from
the Neo- Platonic metaphysics of those early discussions in which
Arab Peripateticism took its rise. And certainly, among the
commentators on Aristotle, Alexander of Aphrodisias was no
exception to this rule: although a predecessor of Neo-Platonism
in the official sense, he interpreted Aristotle in accordance with
the postulates of a metaphysical dualism.

It cannot of course be said that the original doctrine of
Aristotle about the intellectual soul of man (tywxf) VOIJTIKIJ} is
free from obscurity or even from ambiguity. The contradictions,
at least in appearance, of that doctrine have been abundantly
illustrated by Zeller1 and others. The soul of man is the "form"
of his body ; that is the standpoint from which Aristotle's
investigation of human nature starts ; and within the conception
thus determined the whole enquiry moves. Soul and body are
one as the wax and the form into which it is impressed are one ;
the body is what it is only in virtue of the soul, as an eye is an
eye only in virtue of the power of seeing, and an axe is an axe
only in virtue of its power of cutting : the eye is " the pupil and
the vision." But then Reason (1/01)9), which is the faculty of the
soul as intellectual (VOIJTIK^), is spoken of as something essentially
separate from the body. It does not first come into existence
when it " enters into " the body ; nor does it perish with the
body ; although of its previous or subsequent existence we,
whose thought is conditioned by sense and sensuous representa
tion, can form no idea. Yet is reason as in man not to be
identified with a Divine or extramundane Reason ; it is a true
part of the human soul. Again, there seems to be a contra
diction between the conceptions of "active" and "passive"
reason; and although the process described as "passive reason"

1 Zeller, Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, II. pp. 98 ff.

8 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

— the operation of thought upon the data of sense — is psycho
logically verifiable, and it was important that it should thus be
signalised, it is not easy to reconcile the actual facts of that
process with the definition given of thought under the name of
"active reason." Finally, there is on this view of reason no
ground for the determination of personality. Personal identity
cannot be supposed to be determined by the lower faculties of
the soul ; but reason as defined is essentially impersonal, its
imperishability, for instance, by no means implying personal
immortality1.

When Aristotle comes to the most difficult point, the transi
tion namely from particular data of sense to the unity of a
" thought," he introduces a principle of thought to explain the
change; thought, he simply says, brings the universal conception
from its potentiality (in "sense" and "imagination") to actuality.
Psychologically, of course, this is no explanation. It does not
explain for example why thought emerges in human experience
only gradually, and at a certain stage.

Such was the deficiency of Aristotle's attempt at a psycho
logical account of human thought as thought. The distinction
and proper correlation of a metaphysical and a psychological or
historical view of thought, were achievements not to be expected
of ancient philosophy2. At the same time, even if he could not
properly account for reason in the soul of man, or say why in
him reason has just this history, Aristotle preferred to leave
this difficulty standing, rather than, with Democritus and

1 Cf. Zeller, op. cit. n. pp. 125 ff. Siebeck (Geschichte der Psychologic, I. 2,
pp. 122, 126) describes this ambiguity in Aristotle's doctrine of the Nous as the
intrusion of a metaphysical conception into his psychological account of human
nature. This point (Siebeck remarks) was early brought to light by the question
of Theophrastus : — " Why then is thought not present in its full activity in the
child?" A principle of thought entering in "from without" — why should it not
shew itself at once ? Why should such a faculty of thought be delayed by any
conditions, why should it be subject to any necessity of growth and development
at all? Aristotle was doubtless perfectly conscious that he did not offer any ex
planation of the emergence of the various powers of the soul. He did not suggest
any derivation, for example, from one another or from any source, of the vegetative
and sensitive powers of the soul, any more than of its thinking power. It would
probably have seemed sufficient, for him, to refer to the macrocosmic organism, and
in particular to the place Thought was believed to hold there.

8 Siebeck, op. cit., I. 2, p. 127.

ARISTOTLE IN THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES 9

Epicurus, to underestimate the rational factor in human life1.
He determined fully to recognise the peculiar character of
thought as such in the soul of man.

The achievement of Aristotle with reference to the soul of
man may be summed up in three particulars.

(a) In advance on Plato he substituted science — a method
of empirical observation and genetic biological analysis — for
mythology in psychology2.

(b) He recognised at the same time the true nature of
thought and of thought as it exists in man3.

In his view of reason Aristotle remained an idealist4. His
failure to balance his doctrine of universal and timeless reason
with any deduction of personality has already been referred to.

(c) He attributes the power of thought, so understood, to
the essential nature of man. The vovs TTOIIJTIKOS is a part of the
soul — of that soul which is the " form of the body " of man.
It is neither a separate substance existing outside of the man as
man, nor an emanation or communication of a superior spiritual
being not himself. It is ev rfj "^v^y. The distinction between
active and potential reason is a distinction within the soul
itself. Reason is a part of the soul (popiov rfjs tyv%ij<;) : it is
said to be a higher aspect or kind of the soul — ^1^779 7^0?
erepov (which does not in reality mean another soul) : and this
although in another point of view it is ^apia-ros. Whether the

1 Siebeck, op. tit. \. -2, p. 123.

2 "Aus diesen Ursachen bedingt Avistoteles in der Psychologic eine Fortbildung
des alten hylozoistischen Standpunktes, der allein geeignet erschien, liber den Dualis-
mus, der bei Plato iibrig blieb, hinauszufiihren." Siebeck, op. cit. I. 2, p. 126.

3 "Aristoteles mit gutem Bedacht einen Standpunkt sucht, welcher der genetisch-
organischen Entwickelung des Geistigen innerhalb der Natur ebenso gerecht wird, als
der eigenartigen Verschiedenheit, die dasselbe in seinen ausgepragtesten Leistungen
gegeniiber den Bewegungsgesetzen der Materie an den Tag legt." Siebeck, op. cit.
I. 2, p. 126. Cf. p. 473: "Den voOs, dessen Leistungen sein gescharfter Blick als in
gewissem Sinne mit dem Lebensprocessen unvergleichbar erkannte."

4 " Hatte doch Aristoteles selbst im Grunde der Sache nicht auf der naturalistischen
sondern auf der platonischen Seite gestanden. Wenn er namentlich in seiner Psycho
logic sich als Empiriker zeigte, so war dies bei ihm mehr durch das Interesse an
wissenschaftlicher Methode und sorgfaltiger Beobachtung bedingt, und er selbst hatte
gerade an der bedeutungsvollsten Stelle jener Untersuchungen, in der Lehre von der
Vernunft, durch das Abbrechen der naturalistischen Entwicklungsreihe die Schranke
des Naturalismus deutlich hervortreten lassen." Siebeck, op. cit. I. 2, p. 298.

IO PIETRO POMPONAZZI

apparent contradiction in these terms is really a contradiction,
and whether in ascribing reason to the soul of man Aristotle
passed beyond the scope of his original enquiry into man as a
natural being, is the question to which all philosophy seeks an
answer. It may. be repeated again that Aristotle's affirmation
of reason in man was to a large extent a dogmatic affirma
tion1.

Aristotle, however, cannot at any rate be held responsible for
the notion of the soul as a "separate substance" or for the
separation of " intelligence " from the soul, although both these
corruptions of his doctrine soon sprang up within his school, and
both may partly be attributed to the dogmatic introduction of a
timeless principle of reason into the nature of man, and to the
abrupt juxtaposition of intelligence beside the lower powers of
the soul2. On the one hand the soul being identified with reason
might be separated from the physical nature of man ; or, on the
other hand, if the soul were still regarded as the form of body,
" reason " might be distinguished from the " soul " : and as a
matter of fact the doctrine of Aristotle came to be perverted in
both of these directions by those who considered themselves his
followers. Under various influences the idea took shape of the
soul, the organ of intelligence, as a separate substance meta
physically distinguished from the body; and this conception
prevailed largely throughout the Middle Ages, even when com
bined with a nominal adherence to the Aristotelian formula that
soul is the "form" of body. In other minds the Aristotelian
language about i/oO?, reinforced by more or less of Platonic

1 Cf. Siebeck, op, cit. I. i, pp. 122, 123 : "Da er die unteren Seelenvermogen nur
empirisch beschreibt und von nirgends her ableitet, so bleibt die Nothwendigkeit
unerklart, derzufolge der Geist als seine anthropologische Unterlage und Bedingung
seines bewussten Wirkens sich gerade diese Stufen des Seelenlebens in diesem
bestimmten Verhaltnisse zu einander geschaffen hat. Hierbei mag dem Philosophen
immerhin die Anerkennung dafiir unversagt bleiben, dass er sich lieber dazu entschloss,
diese Schwierigkeit, deren er sich voll und ganz bewusst ist, bestehen zu lassen, als
die Thatsache der Eigenartigkeit des denkenden Factors, wie Demokrit und Epikur
thaten, zu unterschatzen."

2 Cf. Siebeck, op. cit. \. 2, p. 473 : " Den poDs, dessen Leistungen sein geschiirfter
Klick als in gewissem Sinne mit dem Lebensprocessen unvergleichbar erkannte, Hess
er von aussen dem biologischen Processe sich an» und einfiigen, und half dadurch die
Vorstellung, dass das Seelische iiberhaupt ein zu der Materie ausserlich Tlinzutretendes
sei, wieder bestiirken."

ARISTOTLE IN THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES II

influence, suggested a metaphysical separation of intelligence
and the natural soul. A tendency to this mode of dualism
shewed itself very early among would-be interpreters of Aristotle;
it was essentially characteristic of Alexander of Aphrodisias';
and it reached its full development in the speculations of the
Arabians. To Alexander the Intelligence productive of true
knowledge in the human soul might be the Divine Reason, to
Averroes an intermediate intellectual Power ; both alike, while
holding with more or less comprehension and consistency that
" soul " was the ." form of body," denied to soul as such the
natural possession of " intelligence."

The earliest disciples of Aristotle began, like him, with man
as a physical being ; but they failed to follow him further, and,
missing the impulse which urged their master to unify the life
of man and to attribute to the soul which was all the while the
" form of the body " the possession of reason (^L»%>) vorjTitcrj),
they relapsed into a practical materialism. Even they however
could not ignore the vov? ^CO/MO-TO? of the master's system,
though they relegated it as far as possible to a higher sphere
and denied its part in the actual life of the soul of man1. Stoic
influences doubtless co-operated in this early materialistic
tendency.

With the reaction against such an interpretation of Aristotle
began the development of the two dualistic theories that have
been referred to — the theory of the separateness from the body
of the soul in its higher functions, and the theory of the separa
tion of intelligence from the soul. Yet each of these attempts
to escape from materialism was also a natural outgrowth from
what had gone before ; for the doctrine of an " assisting" Intelli
gence, in the simple form in which it was held by thinkers like
Alexander, was only a more consistent application of the
dualistic scheme which lay behind the naturalism of the earliest
Peripatetics ; and, on the other hand, the corporeal notion of

1 Cf. Ravaisson, Metaphysique d'Aristote, II. pp. 50, 51: "Dans Theophraste,
dans ses contemporains Clearque, Aristoxene, et Dicearque, clans Straton, une double
tendance se manifeste de plus en plus, d'une part a delaisser dans sa solitude le
principe hyperphysique de 1'acte et de la pensee pure, unique objet de la philosophic
premiere ; de 1'autre, dans la physique, a unir intimement la pensee, Tame, la forme
intelligible avec le mouvement, la matiere, la puissance."

12 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

soul current in the Stoic schools was a large factor in the con
ception of the soul as a " spiritual " substance.

The physical and quasi-physical theories of the Stoics, and
of those who mingled Stoicism with the doctrines of Aristotle,
helped the formation of the " substantial " notion of the soul.

The conception was widely current and popularly influential
which regarded soul as one form or manifestation of " spirit "
(Trvev/Aa) — body being another. This was in intention an effort
to distinguish soul from body, while at the same time accounting
for the connection between the two. The use thus made of
the conception of irvev^a might be traced back to its remote
origin in the primitive notion of a peculiar power residing in
air, wind, and breath, and exercised both in the universe
generally and in the body of man. This primitive idea under
went an interesting theological development in Hebrew thought ;
among the Greeks it played a great part in physiological
theory. Hence the universal role in the mechanics of life
assigned by early medicine to breath, which was in the body
as it were the organising power. Aristotle himself gives this
place to TTvevfjia in the mechanism of the body, connecting it
especially with vital heat : it was used by him, and still more
by his successors, as a convenient explanation of unknown
physiological processes (such, for example, as the functions of
the nerves or the arteries). There had also been an early idea
of a connection between Trvevpa and soul as mind, and early
theories of air or breath connecting soul and body1.

But it was in the Stoic philosophy of nature that the idea of
Trvevpa reached its fullest development, as an explanation of
vital and psychical phenomena. In working out their half
materialistic and half mystical pantheism, the Stoics made large
use of the primitive notion of a universal fire-force and of the
later medical theories of irvevfia. They avoided the materialism
into which a section of the Peripatetic school fell : soul, they
said, could not be simply a product of body. Yet as compared
with the idealism of Aristotle's doctrine — that body found in its

1 Siebeck, op. cit. \. i, pp. 140, 141.

ARISTOTLE IN THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES 13

psychical (and intellectual) aspect its true being and meaning —
the Trvevfia of the Stoics was essentially a physical principle,
although it was intended to be something more, and, as the
common source of body and soul, to combine in its potentialities
the qualities of both.

" Spirit " then originally entered into psychology in a theory
of the nature of the soul. It was not first introduced as a faculty
or part of the soul, but by way of explaining its substantial
nature. It may be said that to ancient thought ^rv^yj was the
fact to be explained — organised matter, that is, and life, and the
thinking being ; and irvev^a represented a theory of that fact.
Originally, it stood for a physical explanation ; and it was by
a curious course of changes in language and thought that the
" spiritual " came at last to mean precisely that which is not
physical, which is purely immaterial.

This conception of " spirit," devised to form a common basis
for soul and body, sprang from a sense of an antithesis between
the two. From Aristotle's standpoint it was unnecessary to
seek this basis of union, since in concrete reality soul and body
were already one as form and matter. But the " pneumatic "
theory proposed to harmonise them in a common derivation
from a single universal force — which should be at once, as it
were, matter attenuated to the point of immateriality and soul
on a physical basis. Really, the separation supposed was not
overcome by this means ; soul and body remained two different
manifestations of the original principles. Accordingly, as has
been suggested above, the TrveO/ia doctrine effectually prepared
the way for the dualistic notion of body and soul as separate
substances. On the other hand, the explanation given was in
reality a physical one, and soul was reduced to terms of body.
A dualistic account of soul and body cannot in fact be con
sistently maintained ; soul and body are actually united ; and if
the true nature of their union be not discerned by a philosophical
criticism like Aristotle's of the two ideas in correlation, one will
always be merged theoretically in the other. The "spiritual" or
"pneumatic" theory really merged soul in body.

It was, however, through various refinements that the original
"pneumatic" theory of the soul passed into the doctrine of the

!4 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

"separate spiritual substance." A combination of influences,
proceeding from very different sources, led to the gradual
sublimation of the irvev^a ^TV^IKOV into something essentially
immaterial.

There began, for example, very early, by reaction against
the materialistic aspect of Stoicism, that reversion to Platonic
modes of thought which eventually culminated in Neo-Platonism.
A revived recollection of the Aristotelian doctrine of vovs %o>-
/ot(7To<? operated in the same direction, especially when Aristotle's
language was interpreted in a Platonic sense.

To this was added the influence of the Hebrew conception
of " Spirit" when Hebrew thought, mainly through the Jewish
and subsequently the Christian writers of Alexandria, found its
way into the main stream of Western philosophy. Originally,
no doubt, the conception of Ruach corresponded closely with
that of irvevfjia in the primitive stage of Greek thought. But as
it presents itself within the historical period, the Hebrew doctrine
has a distinctive stamp upon it. It is probable that from very
early times, in accordance with the Hebrew's conception of the
relation between God and Nature, the breath was to him some
thing dynamic, separate from the matter into which it was
breathed. It was of course derived from God. There remained,
indeed, a marked physical colouring in the conception of this
derivation : first, in so far as Spirit was represented mytho-
logically as a substance intermediate between God and the
world, and, as it were, hyper-physical ; and secondly, in the
imaginations that were formed of the manner of its emergence
from the Divine Being. Over against this, however, was a
strongly ethical delineation of the Spirit's fruits and operation,
and in general of the nature of God and man, especially in the
New Testament. The ethical emphasis of Hebrew and Christian
anthropology wrought powerfully towards the metaphysical con
ception of the " spirit " of man1.

1 The whole Biblical doctrine of " Spirit," and especially that of the New Testa
ment, is more theological and ethical than psychological. St Paul's doctrine of
Trixvua, in so far as it is a new doctrine, is theological and ethical. St Paul and
other New Testament writers employ the language of the psychology accepted in
their day, as indeed they could not but do ; and in that language we may trace
the survival of many Hebrew and Greek and indeed primitive ideas. (See Siebeck,

ARISTOTLE IN THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES 15

Speaking generally, theological ideas reacted on psychology.
In the system of the Stoics, Trvev/j,a had constituted the substance
not only of the world, physical and psychical, but of God as
well ; for indeed the two were in substance indistinguishable.
Consequently, when a reviving Platonism and a Christian theo
logy conceived in the Platonic spirit substituted for this idea
of God that of a Being separated from matter, the new idea of
God came to be read into the meaning of Trvev/j,a, and affected
directly the conception of the nature of the soul as TrvevfjuariK-rj.
Thus we see the physical giving place to the immaterial signifi
cation of the words " spirit " and " spiritual."

The ideas of Philo represent a well-marked stage in this
development. Subject as he was to all of the various influences
which have just been enumerated, he combined all the main
ideas of antiquity upon the subjects of the Universal Spirit and
the soul of man in a syncretism which, while possessing the
least possible positive value, is nevertheless of extraordinary
historical interest. The Jewish Alexandrian philosophy may
be said in a word to have combined the Greek with the Hebrew

op. cit. I. 2, pp. 156, 157.) But in so far as in his declarations about irvev/j.a
St Paul develops a specific doctrine, it is a doctrine of man's relation to God — of
the relation to God, in particular, as the creative and indwelling Spirit, of those
new and distinctive ethical experiences which he has as a Christian. Of physical
effects of the Divine wvev^a. he traces none. Nay, further, it is the very point of
all his assertions about the life of the Trvevfia in man that it has no relation at all to
either '/'I'x7? or vovs. His Trvevfj.0,, then, is a religious dogma ; it is his expression for
a reference to God of the higher religious life of man. Whether St Paul in
this theology altogether escaped the physical associations of the word wveuna is a
question of great historical interest ; it is certain that those who followed him in the
doctrine of the Divine co-operation, and of grace, did not succeed in eliminating from
it the physical element. (Cf. Hampden, Bainpton Lectures, pp. 231, 235.) In St Paul's
case it is to be observed that the union of man with God is not described in physical
terms : it is " by faith " ; its effects also, the " fruits of the Spirit," are ethical in their
character. In conclusion it may be said that the New Testament doctrine of TrvfufJM
had not much to do with the subsequent development of ideas about the soul of man,
except in so far as these were influenced by theology. Indirectly, it will be gathered
from the text that theological influence played a considerable part— the ethical
deepening, for example, produced by Christianity, and the new value set upon the
individual soul, accentuating the problem presented by man's complex nature and
requiring an analysis which should' do justice to its higher elements; the Neo-Platonic
theology, again, of the early Church corroborating the dogma of a "substantial"
soul ; or, once more, physical conceptions of grace or of the Divine Being, falling in
with the physical aspect which those "spiritual " substances always retained.

1 6 PTETRO POMPONAZZI

idea of spirit, and to have found in both at once the Platonic
and the Aristotelian reason (vovs). Philo adopts both the
physical and the incorporeal conception of spirit (Trvevpa), just
as he seeks to combine in his own thought the \6yos of the
Stoics and of Plato : Trvevpa, in grosser or in finer form, is
the nature of man as a living soul. The soul (^rv^rj) Philo
derives, following Aristotle on his naturalistic side, from the
seed, but from a " pneumatic " element there. Again the 1/01)9
is implanted from without, and is not a part of the soul, having
its ovala in the Divine Nature ; but it also is Trvev^a in the
finest form. This Trvevpa Philo now attempts to explain in
Stoic fashion as matter refined to the point of immateriality,
and again treats as essentially immaterial. He attempts to
mediate between the two notions by means of such conceptions
as those of invisibility and infinite extensibility. But the truth
is that Philo represents the stage of transition between the Stoic
idea of the materiality of the substance of the soul and the
Platonic idea of its immateriality.

The Divine Logos, for example, of which the you? is an
image, is immaterial and transcendent. The vov? itself (which
is TTvevpa in its finest form) he speaks of in opposition to matter
as incorporeal, but in comparison with Divine spirituality as
"ethereal" — that is something intermediate between the material
and the immaterial1.

Philo's position at all events illustrates the development of
the conception of a substance of the soul as separate from
body. It is true that it is the z/oO?, which is not part of the
soul, that attains or approaches most nearly to the attribute
of immateriality ; and that Philo, in whom we find everything of
this sort, illustrates also that other corruption of Aristotle which
metaphysically distinguishes soul from reason. But it is also
evident that in Philo we make the transition to a Platonic or
hyper-physical determination of the soul, with the final sublima
tion or rarefaction of Trvevpa, of which •frw%jj is a mode. The
conception which begins to shew itself in Philo is at least some
thing perfectly different from the Tri/eO/xa -^V^IKOV of writers of

1 Siebeck considers (op. cit. I. 2, p. 155) that, in advance upon the Stoics, Philo
regarded the irpcG/xa as essentially immaterial.

ARISTOTLE IN THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES 17

the school of Galen. If irvev^a was still in a theoretical sense
physical, the features of materiality had altogether disappeared
from it : it had the attributes of immateriality.

It only needed the outbreak of Neo-Platonism to complete
the process. Plotinus, with both subtlety and justice, argued
against the possibility of explaining either life or thought by
means of a physical (" pneumatic ") principle1. He held himself
bound indeed, in refusing a physical account of soul, to reject
Aristotle's doctrine that soul is the form of body. Certainly this
was the exact opposite of the hypothesis of a separate physical
substance ; and it especially forbade a description of that sub
stance in physical terms — of soul in terms of soul-less matter.
The Neo-Platonist, however, turned the logical distinction be
tween soul as such, and soul-less matter, into a metaphysical
kypostasis of the informing soul. He changed a logical into
an ontological question ; and whereas in concrete reality soul
and body are one being, he made an affirmation in the field
of actual reality of that which could never possibly be verified
as a fact — of the soul existing in abstract separation from the
body.

Later Neo-Platonists declined into metaphysical and mytho
logical speculations. The soul being abstractly conceived as
independent of body, intermediate beings were invented to

1 The following summary of his arguments is given by Siebeck : (i) Matter and
body being essentially in flux require for any unity or intelligible form in them a
unifying principle which cannot be material : (2) Every body has a definite way of
working; "soul" can work equally in opposite effects: (3) The quality of soul is
independent of quantity, e.g. in the living seed : (4) The distinction, comparison,
and unification involved in perception imply an independent principle : (5) This
principle cannot be corporeal ; for if corporeal it would have parts, and then either
the different parts of the thing perceived would impress the parts of the perceiving
thing and the former would never be perceived as a whole ; or, if perceived as a
whole by each part of the perceiving soul, the thing perceived would give rise to as
many perceptions, of itself as a whole, as the soul had parts : (6) If memory consisted
only of the repetition of an impression on a corporeal substance, it could never come
to pass ; for the second impression would never be, physically, the same as the first :
(7) Consciousness is a psychical fact with no physical concomitant : (8) The un-
quantified can be conceived by us : (9) If soul, itself physical, ran " through " body
as was alleged, its evident separateness would be quite unaccounted for ; besides that
the whole idea of one physical substance penetrating another is unthinkable: (10) The
ethical categories are inapplicable to soul in a merely " pneumatic " sense, and ethical
qualities have no physiological analogue. Op. fit. I. 2, pp. 316 — 318.

D. 2

1 8 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

connect the two — for example, a "pneumatic" or ethereal body, or
a material as well as an immaterial " part " of the soul. Similarly,
the vow TroirjTiKos being separated from the individual soul, inter
mediate beings were ranged between the two.

Neo-Platonism appeared as a reaction against the irvevpa
theory ; and Plotinus even declares that the relation of indi
vidual souls to the universal soul is not to be expressed in
physical terms as a division and a relation of parts to a
whole, but in logical terms as a relation of species and
genus : so that the whole World-Soul is in every individual,
and in all multiplication remains itself. Nevertheless there
remained a largely physical element in the conception of souls
as separate spiritual substances, which Neo-Platonism did so
much to foster.

This was in itself inevitable ; for the very antithesis of soul
and body implies a fundamentally physical conception of the
former ; to conceive of the two as entities, distinct yet related,
is to imply some community of nature between them and to
put them in some sense upon a level. To speak of the soul
as " separate " from the body is to use a mechanical category ;
to call it a " substance " is to employ physical associations. As
a matter of history, the conception of the soul as a separate
substance, although finally shaped under Platonic influence, was
also largely suggested by that physical account of the soul as
a mode of irvev^a, whose history we have been occupied in
tracing.

A dualism which was a fundamental departure from the
Aristotelian standpoint had originally suggested the irvev^a
speculation ; and that dualism continued to characterise the
resultant doctrine of the nature of the soul. The duality of
soul and body was only more definitely affirmed by Neo-
Platonism. And finally, the view that the denial of the
concrete unity of soul and body involves the merging of one
in the nature of the other is vindicated in the fact that the
idea of soul as a separate substance was a really mechanical
and physical conception of it.

This idea, however, dominated the orthodox schools in the
Middle Ages. Among the early Christian fathers we find the

ARISTOTLE IN THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES 19

theory much in evidence, with the customary confusion
of the physical and metaphysical meanings of the term ; and
writers like Lactantius and Tertullian definitely adopt the
notion of the soul as refined matter, its rational part being the
most refined of all. Augustine remained the ruling authority
on the nature of the soul ; and Augustine, while avoiding
mythological extremes, was essentially a Neo-Platonist in this
part of his doctrine. He follows the arguments of Plotinus for
the immateriality of the soul ; although still accepting the
"pneumatic" physiology, and with it the belief in a refined
physical medium through which soul acts on body. In itself,
the soul is to him a single substance, with powers or faculties.
He does not separate soul and reason. The soul as attached to
body has sensitive and vegetative powers ; as superior to body it
exercises reason. How soul is united to body, it is impossible
to explain : it is God's appointment. There is no fresh refer
ence on Augustine's part to the original doctrine of Aristotle.

The emphasis laid by Christian belief upon the ethical side
of life, and its estimate of the value of the individual soul,
brought into view higher aspects of human nature of which a
complete philosophy of man must take account. These interests
naturally at that time led Christian thinkers to an alliance with
Platonism, and generally, in the neglect of the true Aristotelian
distinctions, tended towards dualism and an abstract isolation of
the moral and reasonable soul. A great variety of influences
also, of which Platonism was only one, betrayed the Church
into the error of an ethical contrast between spirit and matter ;
and this again suggested a mutual independence of the two
as substantial existences. The ethical value of matter in the
development of spirit had not yet come into view for any one,
although it might be unconsciously implied in the primitive
spirit and characteristic genius of Christianity. Meanwhile, a
common suspicion of matter formed a link between the Church
and Platonism.

The earlier scholastic psychology was largely traditional, and
inherited through Augustine a strong Platonic or Neo-Platonic
cast. It is affirmed by Siebeck that in spite of the lapse of
nearly a thousand years the development of thirteenth century

2 — 2

20 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

from patristic psychology is almost continuous, as if there had
been no break1; and this was mainly due to the influence of
Augustine'2.

Throughout the earlier Middle Ages, Aristotle was known
only in some of his logical writings. His name occurs in lists
of the masters of the sciences, simply as that of the authoritative
writer on dialectic3. It is after the thirteenth century that he
is " Princeps philosophorum4." The use, therefore, which was
made of Aristotle in the earlier Middle Ages was chiefly
formal. The question so persistently discussed, on the basis of
a passage of Porphyry, about the real nature of " universals "
no doubt involved far-reaching logical and ontological issues.
But the prevalence of a crude "realism," and the strong influence
of certain Neo-Platonic writers, such as the Pseudo-Dionysius,
confined the influence of Aristotelian method to narrow limits.
In psychological thought, as in theology, the Platonising ten
dency prevailed ; and the forms of the Aristotelian logic were
employed in the expression of a system whose conceptions
were essentially Platonic or Neo-Platonic. No better illustra-

1 Siebeck, op. cit, I. 2, 401, 402.

2 Jourdain (Kecherches stir les traductions Latines d'Aristote, Paris, 1843, p. 212)
fixes on 1220 or 1225 as the date at which a general knowledge of the works of
Aristotle began to be diffused in the West. The books prohibited to the University
of Paris in 1209 and 1215 under the name of Aristotle he considers to have been
Arabian commentaries or possibly even apocryphal works like the De Causis. The
original account of the transaction of 1209 speaks only of books on natural philo
sophy, and commentaries ("nee libri Aristotelis de natural! philosophia, nee commenta,
legantur Parisiis publice vel secreto"); Roger Bacon in referring to the controversy
speaks rather of expositions by Avicenna and Averroes than of original works of
Aristotle ; and we know that there was in existence an abridgement of the Physics
of Arabian or Jewish origin (Jourdain, op. cit. p. 194), and the fact that the works
in question were condemned expressly as the source of the heresies of Almaric and
David of Dinant, both suggests that they were not original Aristotelian writings and
illustrates the ignorance of Aristotle's real teaching which prevailed at that time
(Jourdain, op. cit. pp. 187—199, 210—212).

3 Jourdain, op. cit. p. 28.

4 Haureau (De la philosophic scolastique, I. pp. 86—98 : cf. Rousselot, Etudes
sur la philosophic dans le moyen age, I. pp. 31, 32; Jourdain, op. cit. chap. I.)
mentions as the only sources of the knowledge of Aristotle before the twelfth century
the Isagogf of Porphyry, in Boethius's commentary on it ; the translation by Boethius
with commentary of the Peri Hermeneias ; and at a later date the same writer's
translation with commentary of the Categories. These writings were the only genuine
representations of Aristotle to the mediaeval mind until the translation of the Arabians
began to be known in the eleventh and especially in the twelfth century.

ARISTOTLE IN THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES 21

tion of this could be taken than the scholastic conceptions of
the soul ; for even after the language of Aristotle about the
soul had been recovered, it was understood in a Platonic sense.
Like their Alexandrian predecessors, the schoolmen professed
to be, and supposed themselves to be, Peripatetics ; while they
were only cutting into Aristotelian shapes a Platonic fabric of
thought1.

To this must be added the positive misrepresentations of
Aristotle which prevailed before the thirteenth century. We
need not perhaps attach much importance to the fact that the
principal source of the earliest knowledge of Aristotle was a
Neo-Platonist like Porphyry, since Porphyry's Platonism was
never suspected by those who received at his hands the problem
of universals2 ; but we can hardly forget that Boethius had set
before himself the object of reconciling Plato and Aristotle ;
and the fact is never to be lost sight of that the anonymous
De Causis ascribed by Albert to a Jewish author — a compilation
from late Greek and Arab sources, with a Nee-Platonic character
so marked that St Thomas pronounced it to be extracted from
Proclus — was long and generally ascribed to Aristotle3. The
identification with the name of Aristotle of the emanationist
pantheism of Almaric and David of Dinant — which Rousselot,
following Albert, traces to Arabian influences, and Jourdain in
particular derives from the De Causis and the Fans Vitae of
Avicebron — also illustrates the obscuring of the real Aristotle4.

The confusion as to Aristotle's true doctrines did not
of course pass away even after his writings had been fully
translated and circulated. Another illustration will shew the
persistency of the misunderstanding which had attributed to
Aristotle the De Causis and the doctrines of Master David.

1 The parallel has been drawn by Schultze (Philosophic der Renaissance, p. 10).
" Wie Proklos den gesammelten Inhalt des Neuplatonismus, so hat auch die Scholastik
den der Kirchenlehre systematisch zu ordnen, und gerade vvie Proklos sieht deshalb
auch sie aus formalen Grtinden sich genothigt, den Aristoteles wieder zu Rathe zu
ziehen. Das Interesse an Aristoteles ist logischer Natur."

2 See Haureau, op. cit. \. pp. 86, 87.

3 See Jourdain, op. cit. p. 196; Rousselot, op. cit. \\. pp. 130 — 140; Haureau, op.
cit. I. pp. 382 ff.

4 Jourdain says, " Rien ne preuve mieux la connaissance imparfaite qu'on avail
d'Aristote, que le don qu'on lui faisait de semblables doctrines." Op. cit. p. 196.

22 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

The apocryphal Theologia Aristotelis, although plainly a late
Alexandrian composition and reflecting faithfully the doctrines
of Plotinus, had been translated and circulated by the Arabian
Peripatetics as a work of Aristotle. A reference to it by
St Thomas shews that it had also gained acceptance in the
West1. As he remarks that it had not yet been translated
into Latin (whether it were the original Greek, now lost, or
an Arabic or Hebrew version that he had seen), it is not to
be taken in evidence of the earlier Platonising interpretation
of Aristotle in the European schools. But perhaps even more
worthy of attention as illustrating a misapprehension of Aristotle's
real meaning, prolonged over centuries, is the fact that such a
writing should have passed for Aristotle's, not only in the time
of Aquinas but even till the sixteenth century, when it was
translated and presented to Leo X as a genuine work of
Aristotle2.

In so far as the question of universals was really a question
between Plato and Aristotle (although the schoolmen themselves
were very far from recognising that such was the issue), it may
be said to have been decided by Abelard for Aristotle. But
amid all the discussions about Ideas, the question of the soul

1 De imitate intellectus contra Averroistas (St Thomas, Opera, 1593, Vol. xvn.
f. 99 d l) : " Hujusmodi autem quaestiones certissime colligi potest Aristotelem solvisse
in his libris, quos patet eum scripsisse de substantiis separatis...quos etiam libros
vidimus numero 14, licet nondum translates in lingua nostra." The books of the
Latin version of the Theologia Aristotelis number fourteen.

2 See Munk, Melanges de Philosophic jiiive et arabe, pp. 281 — 259; Ravaisson,
Mitapkysiqitc d'Aristote, 11. pp. 542 — 555.

The relation of these facts to the development of the mediaeval doctrine of the soul
may be most simply illustrated by a couple of quotations from the Theologia Aristotelis
upon that subject, which I borrow from the two authorities above referred to, namely
Munk and Ravaisson respectively. The following words declare for the existence of
separate or immaterial substances '. " Rationes, quod omnes substantiae citra primam
constant ex materia et forma quodque animus non intelligat nisi materialia, sunt falsae;
siquidem plurimae substantiae sunt abstractae a materia, quarum numerum nos etiam
prius in metaphysicis probavimus, ubi etiam collegimus quod hujusmodi substantiae
existunt perpetuae et incorruptibiles, quum sint immateriales." (T/ieol. Arist. vers.
lat. lib. XII. cap. /, f. 66 b ; Munk, op. cit. p. 252, note 3.) Secondly, this notion
of a "substantial form" — form without matter — is applied to the soul: the soul of
man is such a " separable " form, self-subsistent, and existing in permanent in
dependence of the body: " Quare essentia animae procul dubio restat superstes,
corrupto corpore." (Theol. Arist. lib. ill. cap. 7; Ravaisson, op. cit. 11. p. 544).
The difference between this conception and that of Aristotle is apparent.

ARISTOTLE IN THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES 2j

had never been raised in a manner resembling that of Aristotle ;
and the great Dominican schoolmen, who were the most sober
"conceptualists," and in many points understood Aristotle well,
retained with reference to the soul the views which they had
inherited from the Platonising fathers and which had had their
birth in Alexandria. It cannot be denied, besides, that the long
predominance, in the schools, of " realism " with regard to Ideas
had created an intellectual atmosphere favourable to abstract
spiritualism in psychology, and to the development of such an
hypostasised abstraction as the " separable form," the " separate
spiritual substance."

Accordingly the recovery in the thirteenth century of the
true Aristotle did not alter rapidly the received ideas about the
soul1 ; though a gradual infiltration can be traced of the Aristo
telian idea of the soul into the thought of the thirteenth century
scholastics. William of Auvergne draws the connection of soul
and body closer than his predecessors, in so far as he makes the
body a real part of man as a rational being ; at the same time
he refuses the Peripatetic doctrine of Avicebron with reference
to form and matter, assigning to the soul, as immaterial, an
independent and substantial existence. The localising of the soul
(in the heart) is the stamp of this dualistic conception. Still, a
transition is begun. Alfred had still earlier perhaps given a
quasi vitalist account of the influence of soul, and described both
soul and body as being what they are only in their conjunction ;
while still soul had a mode of being — indeterminate, however—
previous to and apart from its embodiment ; and, correlatively,
had its special organ in the body — the heart, from which all

1 Europe received the complete Aristotle almost simultaneously from two different
quarters. On the one hand, the Arabian translations and commentaries began to be
diffused by their Jewish and Spanish translators and expositors in the twelfth, and
still more largely in the thirteenth century. On the other hand, the fall of Con
stantinople and the ransacking of the treasures of the East were soon followed by
the circulation and translation of the original Greek texts.

The long process that followed is thus summed up by Siebeck (Gesch. d. Psych.
\. 2, p. 426): " Der Uebergang von dem mehr platonischen zu dem entschieden
peripatetischen Standpunkte lasst sich bei Wilhelm von Auvergne (1249) deutlich
beobachten. Die aristotelische Auffassung von der Seele als Lebenskraft vermischt
sich hier (wie ubrigens auch bei spateren Aristotelikern) mit der platonischen von dem
Leibe als dem Werkzeuge der Seele."

24 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

bodily motion, set up by the immaterial soul, proceeded by the
agency of the pneuma. Finally Alexander of Hales (ob. 1245)
brings us in sight of the doctrine established in the schools by
Albert and Thomas. Alexander calls soul the "form of body";
but on the one hand the body has its lower or natural form as
well, so that it is not the soul that makes the body what it is ;
and on the other hand, while there are actions of the " whole
man " there are also activities which belong to the intellectual
soul as such, and are not in the body. If the soul has no longer
a specific organ, this is indeed partly because it is in a sense the
" form " of the whole body, but partly also because it is essen
tially separate from all that is corporeal. The dualism of the
conception appears in Alexander's occupying himself with
intermediate degrees of fineness (moisture, breath, and so on)
between matter and soul ; this is not a tendency to materialise
the soul, but the very contrary. Soul as such is abstractly con
ceived as incorporeal1.

Albert and Thomas were in some respects more faithful to
the letter of Aristotle ; but in substance their famous doctrine is
a development of these ideas, and presents the same combination
of Aristotelian formulas with the traditional " spiritualistic "
psychology. Meanwhile another influence had been at work —
the influence of the Arabians.

Here we must go back to trace the history of that other
perversion of Aristotelian doctrine, specified a few pages back,
according to which intelligence in man is something meta
physically distinct from soul. Men were confronted by the
difficulty of accounting for reason in the physical being man,
and of relating the natural and the spiritual aspects of the
human being; and while some were led into the supposition
of soul as a substantial entity separate from the body, others
retained the word ' soul ' to describe (in its higher aspect) the
physical being, but denied to that soul and that being the
possession of intelligence : intelligence they regarded as a
separate entity, "assisting" the physical and psychical man
or even in a sense inhabiting in him, yet separate from him
in the ground of its existence. This mode of conceiving man's

1 Cf. Siebeck, op. cit. \. 2, pp. 426—429.

ARISTOTLE IN THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES 25

composite being might justly claim to follow, more faithfully
than the other, Aristotle's doctrine of the soul ; while, if not
true to his real intention to ascribe reason as such to man as
a natural being, it plainly was not without support from some
of his language about vovs %&>pto-T09.

It lies wholly beyond the design of this sketch in outline to
trace the various and innumerable influences from both Greek
and Oriental systems of thought which helped to inspire this
particular form of dualism, or to describe the differences in
detail of the countless shapes in which it embodied itself. We
have already noticed that the earliest followers of Aristotle, who
carried the empirical side of his thought almost to the point of
materialism (defining the soul as a " movement " or as a
" harmony " of physical elements) left a place still in their
system for a transcendent and creative Reason ; and that pre
cisely in proportion as they diminished its part in the actual
psychology of man they relegated it to a higher sphere. But
the most instructive early example of this tendency to a dualistic
theory of human reason within the Peripatetic school is presented
by Alexander of Aphrodisias1.

Alexander, who represents an intelligent and conscious
reaction of Peripatetic principles against the grossness and
confusion of Stoicism, handled firmly the physical and quasi-
physical theories of the soul. He exposed the impossibility of
one physical substance being really interpenetrated by another,
as involving the inconceivable supposition of two bodies occupy
ing the same space. A " mixture," he argued, means one of two
things ; either that the elements mingled, preserving their own
nature, exist side by side ; or that the elements cease to exist as
they were, and in their mixture become something different from
either. Neither of these modes of co-existence is appropriate to
body and soul ; for the soul does not exist alongside and outside
of the body, seeing it is the body that is animated, and the whole
body; while on the other hand body and soul both evidently retain
their characteristic qualities — the co-existence of the two being

1 The following observations on Alexander of Aphrodisias are based mainly on
the account given of him, with illustrative extracts, by Nourrisson (Alexandre d"1 Aphro
disias, Paris, 1870) and Ravaisson (Metaphysiqtie d'Aristote, II. pp. 295 — 319).

26 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

the very problem before us. The Stoics had sought to escape
this dilemma by imagining an inconceivable and impossible sort
of " mixture," according to which the two elements retained
their distinctive qualities, yet interpenetrated or suffused one
another in a physical manner. Alexander pressed home the
contradictions of this whole mode of conception, and called for
the entire abandonment of all physical notions of soul and all
mechanical explanations of its union with body in favour of the
true Aristotelian conception of form and matter1. He states
that conception accurately ; the body, he says, would not be the
body apart from the soul ; the body is not mere matter ; it is
matter in this " form " of animation. It follows from this con
ception that the soul is not separable from the body except
in thought2, and Alexander believed that the soul came into
existence and perished with the body".

When, however, he comes to the subject of Reason, Alexander
shows signs of the influences that had been at work since
Aristotle's day. The soul in its highest form, the soul of man,
exercises the function of rational thought. But instead of simply
attributing this rational activity to man as man (as Aristotle had
done, however dogmatically), Alexander ascribes it to influence
from without and to the agency of a higher power. The 1/01)9
TroirjTiKos he attributes to the Divine Being ; 6 Oelos vovs he
calls it, and in its relation to us compares it to light. To the
human soul he allows only the potentiality of rational thought —
6 vXitcos vovs ; but this V\IKOS vov$ is, strictly, but the capability
of thought, a mere disposition or potentiality (eViT^Seidr?;?) ;
actually it is nothing4.

Simultaneously with this cardinal modification of Aristotle's
notion of reason in man we have to notice in Alexander a

1 et 5e Kara fjmjS^va TWV irpoetprjfj.ei'dJi' Tpbiruv ol6v re elvai TJ]V ^vxjr)v ev ry <rw,ucm,
Xe^Trotr' ay TO elvai avryv eV avrtp ws d$os. Alex. Aphrod. De Anima, ed. I. Bruns,
p. 15. ^

• rfj tTrivoia xai rat \6yif> TTJV v\r)v TOU etSous \wpi^ofj.f.v. Op. fit. p. 6.

3 el Sf tffTif flSos TI i/'t'X7?' ws dedfiKTai, dvayKatof avriji' axupiffrov elcat rov (TU/JLO,-
TOS ou fffrtv ...... TO fj.ev yap att>/j,a. <jvvafj.((>6Ttp6v re KO.L i'<$e<TTos Ka#' airo, r6 5e ci5os d'XXoi)

ov (TOIOVTOV yap 77 eVreX^etd re Kal TeXet6r7;s) ovx olov re avev tKeivov ou fffriv elvai,
ws ov8£ TO Trtpas TOV ov ir^pas e<rri, W<TT ovdf TTJV ^VX^IV °^ov T€ f'^at

Kai Kad' a\jTTr]v v<t>e<?Tavai. Op. cit. p. 17.

4 See Nourrisson, op. cit. pp. 87 — 101 ; Kavaisson, op. cit. n. p. 302.

ARISTOTLE IN THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES 2/

lowering of the doctrine of the soul. Those who had preceded
him — Theophrastus, Dicaearchus, Strato — had more and more
tended to regard the soul as a result, rather than as the inform
ing principle, of the bodily organisation. Although rising nearer
to Aristotle's original conception, Alexander was infected by
this tendency ; it is illustrated by his calling the soul, in lan
guage unknown to Aristotle and foreign to his mind, a "power"
(SvvafAi?) of the body1.

These two features of Alexander's interpretation of Aristotle
are of the greatest interest in view of the developments that
followed, especially in the Arabian schools. On the one hand,
while following the essential Peripatetic doctrine of soul and
body, he somewhat disturbs the balance of it, leaning to the
materialistic side. On the other hand he adopts the dualistic
and theological interpretation of Aristotle's ambiguous language
about the vovs. Two tendencies thus appear which were destined
to react upon each other. In proportion as a lower view was
taken of the soul of man as it actually is, and as it reveals itself
to psychological analysis, it became the more necessary to
introduce from without the principle which should explain the
rational element in human nature; while conversely, as in course
of time the supra-human and extra-psychical principle came to
bulk more largely in men's minds, and at the same time to ac
quire, through various speculations about its nature, a seeming
authenticity, the natural soul grew less, and an ever widening
gulf was set between the "soul" as such and "intelligence" in
the proper meaning of the name.

Meanwhile it is important to record the dualism of
Alexander's theory of human mental action. The human soul
in itself possessed for him only a capacity or disposition for
rational thought, while the Divine Reason brought the " assist
ance " necessary to its real exercise. But the " participation "
of the human soul in superior reason was but a passing relation3.

The analogy between the active reason of the Aristotelians

1 " D'un mot entierement etranger au langage et contraire a la philosophic
d'Aristote, il 1'appelle frequemment une puissance du corps." Ravaisson, op. cit.
n. p. 301.

~ e/cetvos fj.fi> yap (scilicet 6 I}\IKOS vovs) avv r-fj •fivxy, fa fffTi SiW/tus, <f>6eipo/ifi>rj
(ptteipfrai. Alex. Aphrod. op, cit. p. 90.

28 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

and the Stoic World-Soul is superficially evident, although the
difference between the two is as profound as the difference
between the two philosophies. The doctrine of an " assisting "
Reason presents itself also in one form or another in almost all
the Alexandrian systems. We have observed that Philo, in his
comprehensive syncretism, even while he was sublimating the
soul as Trvev/j,a into pure immateriality, had drawn the distinction
which was implied in declaring that 1/01)9 (which also was Trvevpa
at the highest grade of refinement) was not a part of the soul.
Later the Neo-Platonists regarded all the exercise of reason
in human souls as the operation of the one Divine Reason,
acting through the intermediary agency of the World-Soul.

This marked the introduction of an element which was not
present to the minds of men of Alexander's school. To
Alexander the "assisting" Intelligence was the Divine Intelli
gence simpliciter (6 #eto9 i>oO<?). Plotinus imagined the Divine
Reason as an intermediate Being, from whom reason proceeded,
first to the World-Soul, and secondly, through its mediation, to
individual human souls1. This prepares us for what we shall
find among the Arabians.

1 " Die Erkenntniss der Ideen von der iiberirdischen Vernunft her ist der Einzel-
seele auch erst durch die jener naherstehende Weltseele vermittelt, so dass, wie die
Einselseele sich zur Weltseele, so die in jeder Seele enthaltene einselne Vernunftkraft
sich zu der gemeinsamen und einen uberweltlichen Vernunft verhalt und durch sie
bedingt ist." (Siebeck, op. dt. \. 2, p. 315.) Similarly in the Neo-Platonic writings
current among the Arabians. See Munk, Melanges, pp. 247, 250.

CHAPTER II

THE ARABIANS AND ST THOMAS

THE powerful influence of the Arab philosophers upon the
Western schools from the thirteenth to the fifteenth century
makes it highly important to trace the sources of their doctrines,
and especially to investigate the character of their interpretation
of Aristotle. The rise of the Mohammedan so-called " Peri
patetic" school in Bagdad and Damascus, Africa, and Spain,
between the tenth and twelfth centuries may be rightly described
by Renan as an incident in the history of Oriental thought1 ; but

1 Averroes et faverroisme, 3rd ed. pp. 89 — 91 : "On ne doit pas d'ailleurs se
faire illusion sur Fimportance qu'ont eu chez les Arabes les hommes specialement
&plpe\&s pAttosopAes. La philosophic n'a etc qu'un episode dans Phistoire de 1'esprit
arabe. Le veritable mouvement philosophique de I'islamisme doit se chercher dans
les sectes theologiques — Or les musulmans n'ont jamais donne a cet ordre de dis
cussions le nom de philosophic (filsafet). Ce nom ne designe pas chez eux la recherche
de la verite en general, mais une secte, une ecole particuliere, la philosophic grecqjte
et ceux qui 1'etudient. ...Ce qu'on appelle philosophic arabe n'est qu'une section assez
restreinte du mouvement philosophique dans 1'islamisme, a tel point que les musul
mans eux-memes en ignoraient presque l'existence....Disons plutot que ce n'est que
par une tres-decevante equivoque, que 1'on applique le nom de philosophic arabe a
un ensemble de travaux entrepris par reaction centre 1'arabisme, dans les parties de
1'empire musulman les plus eloignees de la peninsule, Samarkand, Bokhara, Cordoue,
Maroc. Cette philosophic est ecrite en arabe, parceque cette idiome etait devenue
la langue savante et sacree de tous les pays musulmans ; voila tout. Le veritable
genie arabe, caracterise par la poesie des Kasidas et 1'eloquence du Coran, etait abso-
lument antipathique a la philosophic grecque. Renfermes, comme tous les peuples
semitiques, dans le cercle etroit du lyrisme et du prophetisme, les habitants de la
peninsule arabique n'ont jamais eu la moindre idee de ce qui pent s'appeler science
ou rationalisme. C'est lorsque 1'esprit persan, represente par la dynastic des Ab-
basides, 1'emporte sur 1'esprit arabe, que la philosophic grecque penetre dans

1'islam Les origines de la philosophic arabe se rattachent ainsi a une opposition

contre 1'islam, et voila pourquoi la philosophic est toujours restee chez les musul
mans une intrusion etrangere, un essai avorte et sans consequence pour 1'education
intellectuelle des peuples de 1'Orient."

30 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

it became also a factor of the first consequence in the develop
ment of the European mind1.

It is not to be supposed however that the translation into
Latin of the Aristotelian writings of the Arabians and of their
versions of the master constituted a genuine introduction of the
Western mind to the original philosophy of Aristotle. The
Arabians had from the first, in their reading of Aristotle, been
subject to strong influences proceeding from Alexandria, and
had besides given to Alexandrian Peripateticism a further bent
characteristic of themselves. The peculiar direction of their
thought may be traced back to the time when a Platonic inter
pretation was put upon Aristotle's doctrine of the vovs by
Alexander, or when that doctrine was associated with a Neo-
Platonic hypostasis by Plotinus, and when each combined with
those foreign elements an Aristotelian logic and (up to a certain
point) an Aristotelian doctrine of the soul2.

The acquaintance of the Mohammedans with Greek philo
sophy dates from their contact with Persian culture under the
Abbasides from the eighth to the tenth centuries. The ruling
family, who had long been exiled in Persia, and their famous
Persian ministers, the Barmecides, looked with favour upon
foreign learning. Almansour, Haroun-al-Raschid, and Mah-
mound are all mentioned by various authorities as having
fostered not only Greek but Persian and Indian philosophy".
The translation of Aristotle into Arabic soon began ; and the

1 Jourdain (Recherches, pp. 214 — 216) considers the influence of the Arabians to
be at least co-ordinate in importance with the fall of Constantinople, so far as the
philosophical treasures of antiquity are concerned, and their effect upon the modern
world.

2 "On pent dire," says Kenan, in summing up the evidence on this point, " que
1'origine de la philosophic arabe, aussi bien que de la scolastique, doit etre cherchee
dans le mouvement qui porte la seconde generation de 1'ecole d'Alexandrie vers le
peripatetisme....C'est sur ce prolongement peripatetique de 1'ecole d'Alexandrie qu'il
faut chercher le point de jonction de la philosophic arabe avec la philosophic
grecque." (Of. cit. pp. 92, 93.) Accordingly, and since it was characteristic of the
Arabian school that the main features of its doctrine remained unchanged throughout
its history, Munk remarks of Averroes, its last and most truly representative master :
"Comme les autres philosophies arabes, Ibn-Roschd a vu les doctrines d'Aristote par
le prisme des commentateurs neoplatoniciens." Melanges, p. 441.

3 See Munk, op. cit. p. 312 ; Jourdain, op. cit. p. 81 ; Kenan, of. cit. p. 91.

THE ARABIANS AND ST THOMAS 31

chief agents in the work were Nestorian Christians, many of
whom the caliphs had about their court as mathematicians and
astronomers1. Their translations were in some cases — though
by no means in all — made from Syriac versions ; such transla
tions seem also sometimes to have been revised, not much later,
from the Greek originals ; and those who have seen the trans
lations in the Arabic pronounce them much more correct than
the garbled translations into Latin through a Hebrew inter
mediary which afterwards were current as the Arabian versions
of Aristotle. Very many of such translations were made in the
ninth century, their authors being always of Persian origin and
generally Nestorians in religion.

It is equally to our present purpose to notice that the labours
of the Persian translators included the Alexandrian commen
tators on Aristotle — Porphyry, Alexander, Themistius, John
Philoponus.

Munk asked the question why the Arabians should have
preferred Aristotle to Plato, and supposed an affinity between
the former and the Arab mind2; but the truth is, as Renan has
pointed out, that they had no choice :l Nominally, although not
in its true spirit, the Peripatetic mode of thought had been
adopted by the schools of Alexandria; while, on the other hand,
the suggestion of an affinity between the Arabians and Aristotle
rather loses its point when we observe how far from the original
meaning of Aristotle was the system which they received in his
name. The logic of Aristotle doubtless had a value to the
Persians, in relation to their scientific and practical interest in
nature ; but in the so-called Aristotelianism of that late day
there were also other elements claiming kinship with an alto
gether different side of the Eastern mind — namely, with its
mysticism. It was, however, nominally Aristotelianism that the

1 "On traduisit d'aborcl des ouvrages de mathematiques, de medecine et d'astro-
nomie, puis on en vint aux traites de Logique et de Metaphysique. Aristote ne put
etre oublie, car depuis longtemps les nestoriens s'etaient rendu ses ecrits familiers,
et y puisaient des armes pour combattre les decisions des conciles d'Ephese et de
Chalcedoine." Jourdain, op. fit. p. 85.

- Munk, op. cit. pp. 312, 313.

3 Renan, op. cit. p. 93. " Les Arabes ont accepte la culture grecque telle qu'elle
leur est arrivee."

32 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

Persians received, as at that time the dominant philosophy of
the Greek schools.

The influence of the Alexandrian commentators in general
and of Neo-Platonists in particular upon the Arabian Peripatetic
school can be traced from the beginning to the end of its history.
From first to last it was concerned with the problem of " union "
or " conjunction " with the " active intellect " ; and from first to
last " active intelligence " was conceived as a separate and inter
mediary real Being.

It is true that there were not found among the Arabians any
professed followers of Plato on the one hand or of Plotinus or
Proclus on the other. Indeed the works of Plotinus were never
translated for them, and his very name seems to have been
unknown *, or was even possibly confounded with that of Plato2.
But Munk has established the existence of a large body of
pseudonymous writings, attributed to various ancient philo
sophers, but of a uniformly Neo-Platonic cast, which circulated
among the Arabians in the early days of Greek influence.
These compositions, of which the Theologia Aristotelis was only
one, have been traced by him generally to an Alexandrian
origin, and were in truth simply Neo-Platonic compilations.
They bore the names of Empedocles, Pythagoras, Plato and
Aristotle ; but Munk has abundantly proved the Neo-Platonic
affinities of these apocryphal writings, including the Theologia
Aristotelis. It is true that they were superseded in the esteem
of the learned East by the more genuine Aristotelianism of
Alfarabi and Avicenna ; but it is still remarkable that a book of
the character of the Theologia Aristotelis should so long have
passed for a work of Aristotle ; and the persistency of the in
fluence of pure Neo-Platonism in the Arab schools is also
vividly brought to light in the instance of the Jew Avicebron
(Jlor. 1054), who was professedly a Peripatetic, and whose Fans
Vitae exercised a powerful influence on thirteenth century
scholasticism, but whose doctrines are substantially those of
Proclus3.

These facts prepare us to find that even the Peripateticism

1 Munk, op. cit. p. 240. " Op. fit. p. 72, note 4.

3 Of. cit. pp. i — 261 ; and especially pp. 235 — 240.

33

of the leading Arab masters, while more faithful to the letter of
Aristotle, contained elements foreign to his system and breathed
a spirit very different from his.

Renan is doubtless right also in discovering in the genius of
the Arabian philosophy the influence of Oriental mysticism, and
especially of Persian Sufism, which readily combined with the
influences of Alexandria to determine the doctrine of Unio1.

It has frequently been remarked that the Arabian philosophy,
throughout the three centuries of its history, remained substan
tially consistent with itself, and presents on the whole a singular
uniformity of outline2. All its representatives are at one in
considering the human act of thought in the light of union or
conjunction with a superior Intelligence (intellectus agens}. It is
not possible here to compare the successive modifications which
this general idea received among them, or the scheme of mental
discipline by which they sought to guide the soul into union
with intelligence — for example, in Ibn-Badja's (Avempace)
Discipline of a Solitary, or the PhilosopJius autodidactus of Ibn-
Tofail (Abubacer). It is sufficient to say that in general they
conceived Unio to be effected by the proper exercise of intelli
gence in man, and through study, education, and speculative
science rather than through mystic ecstasy. Consequently the
notion of complete absorption, which was the crown of their
system as of every dualistic theory of human reason, had with
them a peculiar shade of meaning.

The one-ness of all true intelligence had become the common
place of the later Greek schools3, and was certainly a fixed point
with the Arabians. In the earliest of their writers of whose

1 " On ne peut douter que le soufisme, qu'on le tienne pour originaire de la Perse
cm de I'lnde, n'ait eu sa part dans la formation des theories de 1'union avec 1'intellect
actif et de 1'absorption finale." Renan, op. cit. p. 94.

2 The only exception is Gazali's curious reaction, and sceptical confounding of
reason in the interests of mysticism. Averroes, who stands as the chief representative
of Arab thought, really only summed up, and passed on to the Western world, with
doubtless some individual modifications, the system which had been handed down by
his predecessors. Cf. Renan, op. cit. p. 2, "le Boece de la philosophic arabe";
p. 88, "reste seul en vue comme representant de la philosophic arabe, Ibn-Roschd eut
la fortune des derniers venus."

3 For example, in Plotinus: " Uabei soil aber die Vernunft in alien Seelen als
dem Wesen und der Substanz nach eine betrachtet werden, die sich nicht in den

D. 1

34 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

views we have any certain knowledge, Alfarabi (pb. 950), the
active intelligence occupies the same place as in all later develop
ments of the school1 ; and he approaches the further deduction
from the unity of intelligence, which was afterwards drawn by
Avempace and Averroes, namely the unity of intellectual souls-.
Avicenna (980 — 1037), on many points the most sober Aristo
telian of them all, yet held most definitely the view of vovs
TToirjriKos characteristic of his school3 ; and while he made the
concession to orthodoxy — how far in good faith is perhaps
doubtful — that the human soul was an individual substance,
and immortal, this did not of course affect the unity of
intelligence or reason which was distinguished from the soul ;
in all exercise of intelligence the soul depended upon an assist
ance from, a union with, intelligence as outside and above itself.
Avempace, a Spanish Arab-philosopher of the early twelfth
century (pb. 1138), taught the doctrine of the unity of intel
lectual souls usually associated with the name of Averroes4.

Several of the Arab philosophers wrote treatises expressly
"On the possibility of union" between the soul and intelli
gence5.

The universal Intelligence acting in human thought was, to
the Arabians, one of a hierarchy of intermediate beings, between
God and the world of matter. We have already seen how the
Neo-Platonists, distinguishing after their manner the Divine
Reason from the Divine Being, differed from Alexander in
conceiving of the "universal" assisting Reason as an intermediate
being ; and the Arabians developed this conception further, in
connection with their doctrine of the Intelligences of the

Korpern spaltet, in derselben Weise, wie trotz der Individualisirung die Allseele in
den vielen doch eine Substanz bildet, ahnlich wie die Wissenschaft trotz ihrer
Spaltung in eine Vielheit von Satzen doch in jedem derselben als die eine und
einheitliche vorhanden sein soil." (Siebeck, Gesch. d. Psych. \. 2, p. 316.)

1 Munk, Melanges, p. 345.

2 Munk, op. cit. pp. 346 — 9.

3 Munk, op. cit. pp. 364, 365 ; Siebeck, op. cit. \. 2, p. 437.

4 Munk, op. cit. p. 387.

5 For example, Avempace (Munk, in Diet, des Sc. Phil. ill. p. 154) and Averroes
(Kenan, Averroes, p. 67 : " Qualiter intellectus materialis conjungatur intelligentiae
abstractae "). Cf. Avicenna (Munk, Melanges, p. 365) ; Avicebron, Pans Vitae, III.
(Munk, op. cit. p. 16).

THE ARABIANS AND ST THOMAS 35

spheres1. In their hands the passage about the stars, in the
Twelfth Book (A) of Aristotle's Metaphysics^ had grown into an
elaborate cosmology. They invented reasons to prove that each
of the celestial spheres (that is, the spheres of the seven planets,
the sphere of the fixed stars, and the circumambient sphere)
was the seat of a particular Intelligence ; their circular motion,
it was said, implied directing intelligence, and purposive will,
while the differences among them revealed a separate agent in
each, distinct from the one First Mover, the Supreme Intelli
gence ; and this First Intelligence was himself distinguished
from God2. The last of these "separate Intelligences," that
namely which presided over the sphere next to us, the sphere
of the moon, was usually identified with the intellectus agens
operative in human thought.

Thus originated the perplexing terminology of the schools
with reference to the various intellectus. Alexander had distin
guished three uses of the word z/oO? ; vovs uX,i*o9 or potential
reason ; vov$ TTOIIJTIKOS which was not a power of our soul at all ;
and vovs tca6' e£tz/ or eVt/cTT/ro? which was thought exercised by
us through the assistance of vovs TroiijTiKos3. The Latin equiva
lents of the names, by which the Arabians represented these
distinctions, were ( I ) intellectus materialis (kylicus) or passivus ;
(2) intellectus agens, activus, or actualis ; and (3) intellectus in
actu or habittialis. Two remarks should be added. First,
intelligence in exercise in the human mind (habitualis, in actu)
is frequently referred to as intellectus agens : and this is in strict
accordance with the theory of the real agency in human thought
and the unity of intelligence. Secondly, the Arabians introduced
a further distinction : when thought in man (in actu} attains its
perfection it becomes acquisitus or adeptus\ and the words reflect
perfectly the governing conception of the nature of knowledge
in the human soul, as the soul's participation in, possession of,

1 "Dans la theorie des Intelligences separees, telle qu'elle est presentee par les
philosophies arabes, on reconnait un melange des theories aristoteliques sur le mouve-
ment des spheres celestes et de la doctrine neoplatonicienne de 1'emanation et des
hypostases." Munk, op. cit. p. 331.

2 Renan, op. cit. p. 118.

3 Nourrisson, Alex. <f Aphrod. p. 87.

3—2

36 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

and possession by, a metaphysical principle of reason outside
of itself1.

The distinction of " intelligence " from the " soul," and the
conception of an " action " by intelligence on the soul, thus
dominated this whole school of speculation ; and these thoughts
were brought to their clearest expression, and carried out to their
logical issue, by Averroes. His famous doctrine was the final
denial of intelligence to man as an individual, and the absolute
metaphysical separation of reason from the natural soul.

The formula in which the view of Averroes was expressed
by himself, and discussed by the succeeding age, was that of
"the unity of the passive intellect"; and this meant the denial
of any exercise of intelligence in the individual human being
which was not the work of the common Intelligence2.

Averroes defined his own position, as eventually determined
by him, in a criticism on the one hand of Alexander, and on
the other of more orthodox commentators like Theophrastus
and Themistius. It was the well-known doctrine of Alexander
that the potential or passive intellect alone belonged to human
nature, the active or actual intelligence being Divine, and outside
of the soul of man. The abstract distinction made by Aristotle
between potential and actual intelligence, although expressly
said by him to be a distinction within the soul of man, was
used by Alexander to express a metaphysical distinction between
the human soul and the Divine Intelligence. He conceived of
the process of thought, and supposed Aristotle to have conceived
of it, as the action of Divine Intelligence operating in the non-
rational human soul. Consequently there was in man as man
only a disposition for, or capability of, intelligence ; the bringing
of that potentiality to realisation was the work of Divine In
telligence ; and real Intelligence there was none, save and until
the active Intelligence, not a power of human nature, operated
on that nature from without. Averroes accepts this doctrine
very much in its original sense. His mediaeval predecessors

1 Munk, op. cit. pp. 127 (note 2), 332, 450 (note i); Siebeck, Gesch. d. Psych.
'. 2, p. 438.

2 Cf. Dante, Purg. xxv., referring to Averroes, " The soul disjoined from passi%-e
intellect."

THE ARABIANS AND ST THOMAS 37

had corrupted it : after their manner of translating logical terms
into metaphysical entities, they had made the " potential in
tellect " a real existence, just as " active intellect " was another.
But this was not the original meaning of Alexander ; and
Averroes apprehended the difference.

The commentators who followed more closely Aristotle's
original meaning, attributing active and actualised intelligence
to each man as a thinking being, claimed that a capability
of reason in man implied a reasonable nature in him. They
pointed out that a capability or disposition must be the capa
bility or disposition of some subject', but obviously the lower
or non-rational faculties of the soul, or the soul as possessed
of those faculties, cannot be the subject of a capability of
rational tJiought ; therefore reason itself — "active intelligence" —
must be the subject of that capability in each man. Averroes
accepts this argument also, but he accepts it in a sense of his
own ; for him the required " subject " of the potential thought
in each soul is not the soul itself but a common thinking prin
ciple (his intellectiis agens}1.

In this way Averroes goes back to what he recognises as
the original meaning of Alexander, namely that the intellectual
power does not belong to the nature of man at all. For a
" mere disposition " is in itself equal to nothing ; and the
" potential intellect " is of itself nothing real, being a mere
abstraction.

He admits the force of the contention that a capability for
rational thought means a rational subject of that capability, and
therefore cannot be attributed to the soul in so far as it is non-
rational. In particular he lays stress on thought's consciousness
of itself; the apprehension of the objects of knowledge might
be regarded as a faculty to apprehend them, in the sense of

1 Renan, Averroes, pp. 133 ff., followed by Nourrisson, Alex. d^Aphrod. pp. 112,
1 1 3. Renan, noticing Averroes' use of the argument for a subjectum, assumed that
he rejected the doctrines of Alexander. In fact, he did the very contrary. And
Munk is able to quote his formal retractation of opinions, previously expressed,
and final assertion that the passive intelligence is pure potentiality (op. cit. p. 442) ;
and to supply us with translations from the (unpublished) Arabic version of the
" medium " commentary on the De Anima which are at present the most authentic
account of Averroes' attitude towards this fundamental question of his philosophy
(pp. 445—9)-

38 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

a mere potentiality of knowledge; that which is conscious
of the apprehending power as well as, and in distinction from,
the objects must itself be more than a mere capability ; it is
a subject.

But what is that subject ? Not, he says, the individual soul
as such, in any sense. He denies the inference of the com
mentators, that there is a principle of rational thought in the
individual. No, he says — and undoubtedly he can claim the
authority of Alexander — the subject of all rational thought is
intellectus agens.

Alexander was the real father of the Arab notion of a
separate Intelligence. And now, in a stricter interpretation of
Alexander, Averroes can carry the doctrine of " separation "
a stage further. He has grasped the purely logical and abstract
character of Aristotle's distinction; "passive intellect," he says, in
itself is no real thing1. Therefore, he concludes, the individual
soul, in this mere potentiality, possesses, in the way of intelligence,
nothing ; intelligence cannot be attributed to the soul in any
sense, or to any part of it, as its subjectum.

The extreme absurdity of this conclusion was disguised by
the Averroist from himself through the attribution to the natural
soul of man of various mental powers to which a " rational "
character was not allowed — imagination, memory, vis cogitativa —
of all, in a word, that came short of the power of forming a pure
abstract notion. Such was the psychology of the schools. But
it is to be remembered that when intellectus was denied to the
soul as such, the soul was understood to be deprived of every
thing that characteristically distinguishes man from the brutes.

On the hypothesis that intellectual agency resides outside of

1 One of the passages quoted by Munk makes this clear. His further examina
tion of the words of Aristotle, he says, has convinced him that the potential intellect
cannot be anything actual — cannot be a substance with attributes, a thing in ac
tuality, one particular "form among others." Munk is surely wrong in translating
" 1'intellect hylique, considere comme une substance recevant une faculte, ne saurait

etre une chose en acte, etc." The words DVy.1 iVrVK> 1K>DX N 'JN ^Vnn ^DKTI

nmVH p mi¥ b"1 ^3 "?yD3 im 13 -ItW n3^ bapon surely mean rather: "The
potential intellect cannot possibly be the substance endowed with (lit. receiving)
attributes, in which consists (lit. is) a thing in perfect actualization — that is to say a
form among forms." Op. cit. pp. 442, 443.

THE ARABIANS AND ST THOMAS 39

man, man must eventually be deprived of every shred of reason.
To this conclusion Averroes was forced, when he recognised the
logical nature of the distinction of actual and potential thought.
What was this intellectus passivust It was no longer a semi-
rational attribute allowed to man ; it was in reality nothing.
When the thinking principle came into " conjunction " with the
soul as potentially disposed to thought, in that conjunction
lay "potential intellect." In so far as separate, intelligence
was active; in that conjunction, passive. For Averroes, active
and passive intelligence were one and identical; as active,
intelligence created intelligible forms; as passive, it received
them.

Averroes' doctrine, then, of the unity of "passive intelligence"
was the logical completion of the idea of an external and
" assisting " reason. Such was his use of Alexander's doctrine ;
and such was his application of the argument for a subjectum.
The subject of the activity of thought, he said, is the thinking
principle and not the individual.

This doctrine presents two aspects. On one side it was the
extreme development of the dualistic view of human nature —
of anima and intellectus, of man as a natural being and as
possessed of reason — whose history we have been tracing. In
another aspect, it was the last step towards the abolition of
that dualism.

Certainly Averroes absolutely distinguished Reason from the
soul, as the metaphysical principle from the natural being. He
denied the possession of reason to the individual soul — save
as joined to the metaphysical entity, " intelligence." And he
emphasised his intention of doing so by laying it down that
the conjunction of the real or "active intelligence" with the
capability or potentiality of intelligence in the individual was
only per accidens1. Lest it should be supposed that reason
was in any sense the attribute of the individual soul as such,
he made it clear that the relation of the soul to reason was
neither essential nor permanent. The orthodox commentators
might believe in a multiplicity of rational souls, holding as they
did that a rational principle in each individual was the subject

1 Munk, op. cit. p. 448.

4O TIETRO POMPONAZZI

of rational thought in him. To Alexander individual souls
were many, but did not participate in true and eternal Reason.
Averroes followed Alexander with respect to the soul ; and
his doctrine of conjunction implied no individual reason or
individual immortality ; for man as man, human intelligence
as human intelligence, was no spiritual being ; but a spiritual
being (intellectus activus) was joined to man — and that not in
a necessary unity, but in a casual and external and temporary
conjunction (per accidens).

This analysis of human thought and human nature, which
not only erects the thinking principle in man into a separate
entity, but absolutely distinguishes it from the individual soul
in which it is manifested, and of whose phenomena it was
originally intended as the explanation, might well seem the
very extravagance of metaphysical abstraction. Yet this ex
treme development prepared for a transition to an exactly
opposite mode of thought, and marked the conclusion of the
dualism of which it was the final expression.

In words, Averroes affirmed that universal reason was the
only reason, denying to the natural being — man — any share
therein, and assigning all the operation of thought in man to
a superhuman principle of thought. In effect, this amounted
to the identification of all actual human thought with reason
as such. For there could be, on these terms, no operation
of thought in man which was not Reason in the full sense of
the word.

Thus, in its extreme development, dualism had destroyed
itself. Logically it had already passed away ; and even practi
cally, it had prepared the way for its own abolition. So soon
as a fresh mind should take up the problem, Averroes' separa
tion of intelligence and the soul would drop out of sight, while
his identification of human thought with universal reason would
stand, and find acceptance.

This is what happened in Pomponazzi. Approaching the
problem of human nature from an empirical standpoint, he
easily dismissed Averroes' metaphysical distinction of intel
ligence from the individual soul, with its corollary of the unity
of individual minds ; but he made full use of Averroes'

THE ARABIANS AND ST THOMAS 4!

doctrine of human thought as rational — identifying it with the
original doctrine of Aristotle.

In a real sense Averroes had returned to Aristotle. He had
denied the fiction of an intellectus passivus really existing over
against intellectus activus\ and if his object in doing so had
been only more absolutely to separate between reason and the
individual soul, yet none the less the effect of his identification
of active and passive intellect was to assign to reason the
operation of thought in the individual soul. For him, indeed,
reason, even while in "conjunction" with the individual soul,
acted in entire independence of it so far as the metaphysical
substratum of the being of each was concerned. For Pom-
ponazzi, beginning anew with a positive analysis, and pursuing
the simple Aristotelian conception of the soul — animal or in
tellectual — as the " form " of body, Averroes' doctrine meant
the identity of intellectus in anima intellectiva with intellectus
as such. We shall find Pomponazzi using the very language of
Averroes, but with this changed application, and in support of a
philosophy far removed from Averroism1 !

The truth is that, with a change of method, the centre of
gravity in the system of thought came to be shifted. The
theme of Averroes was intelligence (intellectus separates) as a
metaphysical principle in a certain relation to the soul : that
of Pomponazzi was the concrete process of thought (anima in
tellectiva).

Pomponazzi returned to the spirit and method of Aristotle,
in that he pursued, not abstract speculations as to the nature of
intelligence, but a positive analysis of the living and thinking

1 De Lnm. x. p. 80 : " Ipsum intelligere quodam modo est in materia sed satis
accidentaliter, quoniam intellectui qua intellectus est accidit esse in materia." ix.

p. 66: "Intellectus etiam qua intellectus nullo modo est actus corpus organic! at

intellectus humanus qua humanus est actus corporis organic! ut objecti, et sic non sepa-
ratur, non autem ut subjecti et sic separatur." ix. p. 59: "qua intellectus est non
dependet a materia neque a quantitate ; quod si humanus intellectus ab ea dependet,
hoc est ut sensui conjunctus est, quare accidit sibi qua intellectus est a materia et
quantitate dependere." But intelligence, even in the higher sense thus distinguished,
in which it does not inhere in matter but has its subjectum in itself (" ipsum intelligere
esse in ipso intellectu ") is definitely attributed to the human soul', "Dicitur vere
secundum essentiam ipsum intelligere esse in ipso intellectu, juxta illud 3 De Anima,
anima est locus specierum, non tota sed intellectus." x. p. 79.

42 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

soul, and, in the result, attributed reason to the anima intel-
lectiva, to man as man. The summary of his conclusions is that
" Soul is the place of forms, not as a whole but as intellect1."

Still even when attributing intelligence thus to the soul of
man, in a theory that might be said to run directly counter to
the fundamental doctrine of Averroes if it did not move on a
different plane, he employed the language and the logic of the
Averroist school. Thus he defined the quality of thought, as
in the soul of man, by saying that it does not depend on matter
as its subjectum ; he adopted the argument of Averroes and his
predecessors, that thought as such cannot inhere in matter, or
in the non-rational powers of the soul2. This illustrates the
ultimate result of Averroes' extreme dualism. His criticism of
human rational thought was intended to remove reason alto
gether out of the field of human nature into the metaphysical
region. But since after all it was actually human thought to
which his argument referred, dualism in him over-reached itself;
and Pomponazzi, adopting Averroes' estimate of human thought,
found " active intelligence " in the soul of man.

It only remains to mark the influence of the Arabian inter
pretation of Aristotle upon the orthodox Western schools.

By the time of Averroes the scene of chief intellectual
activity among the Mohammedans had been removed to Spain
— a change of great moment to the history of European thought.
The intellectual movement which took place in the East under
the Abbasides early penetrated to the Arabs and Moors of
Spain, where learning was fostered and free thought allowed
by enlightened caliphs of the Ommiade dynasty. Frequent
communication was maintained with the East ; and, just as
the Christian mediaeval doctors itinerated among the European
schools, so the Arabs passed from East to West and West to
East, and the Spanish Mussulman earned his degree as a sage

1 See note i, p. 41.

2 Apol. I. 3, f. 59 b : " Non dependere a materia tanquam de subjecto ; immedia-
tum enim subjectum intellectionis et volitionis sunt intellectus et voluntas, quae non
sunt organicae." Or the same thought was turned to Pomponazzi's purpose in
another form of expression: "Etsi (intellectus) est in quantitate, tamen quantitas non
est principium illius operationis." De Imm. x. p. 78.

THE ARABIANS AND ST THOMAS 43

and teacher by visits to Egypt, Damascus and Bagdad1. In
the eleventh century Arab learning began to pass from Spain
to Europe.

Toleration in Moorish Spain, under the Ommiades, had been
almost complete. The Jews had long found in Spain "a second
fatherland " ; and the Christian subjects of the Moors, tolerated
in their own religion, profited by the learning and civilisation
of their conquerors. Jews, Christians, and Moors, meanwhile,
maintained friendly relations with the towns of Southern France,
and occasionally emigrated thither2; and the Jewish schools of that
region of Europe played a great part in introducing to Christen
dom the learning of the East. Simultaneously many wandering
Arab scholars found their way into Europe from Sicily and the
other Mediterranean islands ; the Norman counts of Sicily were
known to patronise them. Thus it came to pass that, at the
very time when the Spanish-Arabian philosophers were begin
ning to experience the violence of the theological fanaticism
which eventually brought their labours to an untimely end, their
works and those of their predecessors were being translated into
Hebrew and into Latin. The earliest translations date from the
eleventh and twelfth centuries, and were at first mainly confined
to medical and mathematical writings. But during the twelfth
and thirteenth centuries there were in circulation many transla
tions of the writings of Arabian philosophers and of parts of
their versions of Aristotle, translations executed in some cases
by Jews, in some cases by Christian ecclesiastics. As time
went on, these translations did much to enlarge the schoolmen's
acquaintance with Aristotle. But meanwhile the history of Arab
Peripateticism was drawing to a close. The rule of the Ommi
ades was over; and as early as 1013 the usurper Almansour
found it politic to yield to popular religious prejudice against
the philosophers. The extreme obscurantism of the theological
sect called Ascharites3 had already prevailed in the East and
was soon to be victorious in Spain as well. When the Almo-
hades first came to the throne (i 150), a lull in the persecution of

1 Jourdain, Recherches, p. 89.

2 Jourdain, op. cit. p. 92.

3 See Munk, Melanges, pp. 320 — 326.

44 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

rational thought permitted the appearance of the brightest orna
ments of the Spanish schools — Avempace, Abubacer, Avenzoar,
and Averroes ; but Averroes himself experienced the fickleness
of the third Almohade ruler, Yakoub Almansour (1184); and
after him Mohammedanism relapsed into darkness, and a sug
gestive and hopeful movement of thought came to an abrupt
conclusion just when it had reached an intensely interesting
point in its development. The further history of the Arabian
philosophy is to be sought in the Jewish and Christian schools.

The Christian schoolmen readily acknowledged their debt
to the Arabians ; and Avicenna and Averroes especially were
held in the highest esteem among them. Averroes was " the
Commentator "par excellence; and he who came afterwards to
be regarded as the very father of infidelity, and whom the
painters used to paint in the lowest pit of hell, was seen by
Dante among the noble heathen in the Elysian fields —

"great spirits, by whose sight
I am exalted in my own esteem." (Inferno, IV.)

In this estimate Dante followed his master, St Thomas.

The great Dominicans, however, occupied themselves in
confuting the Arabian doctrine of intelligence. Without an
attempt to reproduce their argument, some illustrations of it
may be given which will at the same time shew the reflection,
in their own conceptions of the soul, of the doctrine which they
disputed. St Thomas's treatise, De imitate intellectus contra
Averroistas'1, may be taken as a compendious summary of the
reasonings of Albert, Thomas, and their followers upon this
subject. Here the doctrine of Averroes, of the unity of the
" passive " or " potential " intellect, is distinctly understood to
be a separation between "intelligence" and "the soul2"; and
St Thomas meets this conception in limine by insisting that
intelligence as in man is the very fact to be explained3. Con
sequently his criticism of Averroes' hypothesis of an independent

1 St Thomas, Opera, 1593, Vol. XVII.

• "Intellectum non esse animam quae est nostri corporis forma, neque partem
ipsius, sed aliquid secundum substantiam separatum." St Thomas, op. fit. f. 102 c o.

3 " Nunquam enim de intellectu quaereremus, nisi intelligeremus : nee cum
quaerimus de intellectu, de alio principle quaerimus, quam de eo quo nos intelli-
gimus." Op. cit. f. 101 a E.

THE ARABIANS AND ST THOMAS 45

intellectual principle which thinks in our thinking1 is that this
is irrelevant as an account of human knowledge. A scientific
account of man must explain man as he is, that is, as a thinking
being. To deny the possession of intelligence to the nature
of man is to abandon the attempt at a scientific account of the
man as he is ; and Averroes, by introducing a metaphysical
principle, outside the nature of man, to explain thought in man,
passed beyond the bounds of scientia naturalis'1. Further, the
action of the supposed intellectual principle is no explanation
of the actual exercise of intelligence by any particular man.
The individual's sense-presentations were supposed to be pre
sented to the common Intelligence ; and the " union " of the
individual with intelligence was illustrated by the relation of
an object (say a man) reflected in a mirror to the reflection
there3 ; but it was easy for St Thomas to reply that although a
man be in a sense " united " with his reflection in a mirror, you
do not therefore attribute to the man the property of the mirror,
namely to reflect. Neither, in like manner, on the theory of
" union " with intelligence, is intelligence attributable to the in
dividual whose sense-experiences are the contents of thought4 ;
yet actually the thought in question is that man's thought. Once
more, to say that the sense-experiences of a certain man are
apprehended in thought, is not to say that that man thinks. A
wall is seen, but it does not see ; the animal possessing the
power of vision sees the wall. But the relation (copidatio, unio]
of the individual man whose sense-data are received in thought
to the supposed thinking power is exactly that of the wall whose
visible qualities, size, colour, and so forth are seen, to the visual
power that sees. So again, it is not the man that thinks5. Thus

1 " Intellectus possibilis continuatur nobis per formam suam." Op. cit. f. 101 b B.

2 " Manifestum est autem quod terminus considerationis naturalis est intellectus ;
secundum autem dictum Averrois intellectus non continuatur homini secundum suam
generationem, sed secundum operationem sensus." Op. cit. f. 101 b c.

3 " Sicut speculatum continuatur homini cujus species resultat in speculo."

4 " Unde nee actio intellectus possibilis propter praedictam copulationem posset
attribui huic homini... ut hie homo intelligeret." Op. cit. f. 101 b E.

5 " Manifestum est enim quod per speciem intelligibilem aliquid intelligitur, sed
per potentiam intellectivam aliquid intelligit ; sicut etiam per speciem sensibilem
aliquid sentitur, per potentiam autem sensitivam aliquis sentit : unde paries, in quo
est color, cujus species sensibilis in actu est, in visu videtur, non videt ; animal autem
habens potentiam visivam in qua est tails species, videt. Talis autem est praedicta

46 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

St Thomas exposes the dualism of the Averroist theory, and
its real irrelevance to the problem of intelligence in man.

On the contrary, he insists that intelligence in man must be
taken as it really is in man — that is, as constituting the true
nature of his soul1. Even if we suppose that an external power
or principle does act in producing human intelligence, it holds
true equally that that which is in the human soul, and belongs
to it characteristically — making it what it is— is intelligence2.
Whatever we may think of the ultimate nature of intelligence or
the ultimate relations and metaphysical basis of intelligence in
man, the presence of intelligence in man, and in the human soul
as such, is a psychological fact3.

The denial of intelligence to the soul of man had involved
Averroes in the affirmation of the unity of intelligence, in that
absolute sense expressed by his formula of the " unity of
potential intelligence." St Thomas, who attributes intelligence to
individual souls, combats this position. He does so mainly by
displaying its logical consequences, and the absurd extreme to

copulatio intellectus possibilis ad hominem, in quo sunt phantasmata, quorum species
sunt in intellectu possibili, qualis est copulatio parietis, in quo est color, ad visum, in
quo est species sui coloris. Sicut igitur paries non videt, sed videtur eius color, ita
sequeretur quod homo non intelligent, sed quod eius phantasmata intelligerentur ab
intellectu possibili. Impossibile est ergo salvari quod hie homo intelligat, secundum
positionem Averroys. Op. cit. f. 101 b E, c v.

" Manifestum est enim quod hie homo singularis intelligit. Numquam enim de
intellectu quaereremus, nisi intelligeremus, nee cum quaerimus de intellectu, de alio
principio quaerimus, quam de eo quo nos intelligimus, unde et Aristoteles dicit,
' Dico autem intellectum quo intelligit anima.' Concludit autem sic Aristoteles,
' Quod si aliquid est primum principium quo intelligimus, oportet illud esse formam
corporis,' quia ipse prius manifestavit ; quod illud quo primo aliquid operatur, est
forma." Op. cit. f. 101, a E b A.

' " Detur ergo quod intellectus moveat animam Sortis (an imaginary person — the
'John Doe' or ' Richard Roe' of scholastic discussions), vel illustrando, vel quocumque
modo, hoc quod est relictum ab impressione intellectus in Sorte est primum quo Sortes
intelligit." Op. cit. f. 101 d E.

3 St Thomas's meaning may be illustrated by the following sentence from the
Sttmiiia (quoted by Rousselot, xi. p. 252) : " Intellectus noster possibilis reducitur
de potentia ad actum per aliquod ens actu, id est per intellectum agentem qui est
virtus quaedam animae nostrae, ut dictum est : non autem per aliquem intellectum
separatum, sicut per causam proximam ; sed forte sicut per causam remotam." And
so he concludes in the passage under examination — " Dato ergo quod sit aliquis
intellectus separatus movens Sortem, tamen oportet quod ille intellectus possibilis
de quo Aristoteles loquitur sit in anima Sortis, sicut et sensus qui est in potentia ad
omnia sensibilis, quo Sortes sentit." Op. cit. f. 102 a A.

THE ARABIANS AND ST THOMAS 47

which it leads. Clearly distinguishing the Platonic, the Aristo
telian, and the Averroist theories, he reminds us that, while the first
laid down the unity of active intelligence, only the last supposed
that unity of potential intelligence or denied a multiplicity of
intellectual souls. Employing a figure, he says : the Platonists
hold one sun but many eyes; the Aristotelians, many lights
and many eyes ; the Averroists, one sun, one visual power.
Now certainly many agents can employ the same instrument,
and remain many. But if the instrument (the " eye " as he
calls it, following his illustration) be that which constitutes the
nature of the agent, then " one instrument " implies " one
agent1." But intelligence is that which makes man what he
is — an intelligent soul ; therefore the Averroist doctrine of the
unity of intellectual powers leads to the intolerable extreme
of identifying all mankind and contradicting the multiplicity of
human personalities2.

The act of knowledge by which two men apprehend the
same object at the same time is one and the same. For, so far
as " intellectual " action is concerned, nothing belongs to the
individual3 ; and the fact that the sense-presentations involved
differ for different individuals, as Averroes allowed, does not
affect the identity of the act of knowledge ; since, for Averroes,
thought and sense are wholly separate4.

St Thomas adds that this doctrine is inconsistent with in
dividual freedom and responsibility, and logically destructive
of morality.

1 " Si oculus esset principale in homine, qui uteretur omnibus potentiis animae et
partibus corporis quasi instruments, multi habentes unum oculum essent unus videns."
St Thomas, op. cit. f. 102 d E, G.

2 " Manifestum est autem quod intellectus est id quod est principale in homine, et
quod utitur omnibus potentiis animae et membris corporis tanquam organis : propter
hoc Aristoteles subtiliter dixit, quod homo est intellectus maxime. Si igitur sit unus
intellectus omnium, ex necessitate sequitur quod sit unus intelligens, et per consequens
unus volens, etc." Op. cit. f. 102 d G.

3 " Si intellectus sit unus omnium, sequitur quod omnium hominum idem intelli-
gentium eodem tempore sit una actio intellectualis tantum, et praecipue cum nihil
eorum, secundum quae ponuntur homines differre ab invicem, in operatione intellectual!
diversificetur." Op. cit. f. 102 d i.

4 " Phantasmata enim preambula sunt actioni intellectus, sicut colores actioni
visus : unde per eorum diversitatem non diversificatur actio intellectus — Sed in
duobus qui idem sciunt et intelligunt ipsa operatio intellectualis per diversitatem
phantasmatum nullatenus djversificari potest." Op. cit. f. 102 d K-

48 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

It is easy for him to shew that to deny potential intellect to
the individual and assign it to the race is in effect to contradict
Aristotle's conception of potential intellect as a tabula rasa ; for
an intellectus possibilis that is common has been intellectus in actu
from all eternity1, and thus "potential intellect" is deprived of
all its meaning as a term in Aristotle's analysis of knowledge.

Finally he returns to the point that those activities of a
so-called separate intelligence, having no relation to the sense-
presentations in our (sensitive) souls to which they are supposed
to bring the unity of thought, are irrelevant as an explanation
of intelligence in us and have no relation to our experience2.

St Thomas's own view, which he holds to be also that of
Aristotle, is that not only is the soul capable of true thought
("possessed of potential intellect"), but active intellect is a
power of the soul — of the soul which is the " form " of the body.
The intellect is not, indeed, according to him, related to the
body precisely as are the inferior powers of the soul ; but in
telligence is an attribute of the soul ; and the soul is the form
of the body. Such is the formula of St Thomas3.

It is the great merit of Albert and St Thomas in relation to
the questions about human reason and the human soul that they
followed a psychological instead of a speculative and meta
physical mode of thought. We have already seen how the
Aristotelian doctrine of soul and body as correlative aspects
of one being had begun to make its way into the Christian
schools, although in a confused and corrupted form. Simul
taneously the schoolmen made acquaintance with a speculative
system which had widely diverged from the primitive Peripatetic

1 " Per phantasmata nullius species intelligibiles sunt acquisitae intellects possibili,
sed sunt species intelligibiles intellectus possibilis aeternae." St Thomas, op, cit.
f. 103 a E.

2 " Omnino disparatae, et nihil proportionale habentes." Op. cit. f. 103 b p.

3 "Sic igitur per ea quae ex verbis Aristotelis accipere possumus usuque hue
manifestum est quod ipse voluit intellectum esse partem animae, quae est actus
corporis physici." (Op. cit. f. 98 c G, H.) " Non solum Latini...sed et Graeci et
Arabes hoc senserunt quod intellectus sit pars, vel potentia sive virtus animae quae
est corporis forma.. ..Intellectus est potentia animae quae est corporis forma, licet
ipsa potentia quae est intellectus non sit alicujus organi actus, quia nihil ipsius opera-
tioni communicat corporalis operatic." (f. 101 a c, D.) " Oportet igitur ipsum
intellectum uniri corpori ut formam, non quidem ita quod ipsa intellectiva potentia
sit alicujus organi actus, sed quia est virtus animae, quae est actus corporis physici
organici." (f. 102 b A.) Cf. Su/tima, Qu. 84, Art. 2.

THE ARABIANS AND ST THOMAS 49

standpoint, in the Arab commentaries, which were constantly in
their hands. It was the Aristotelian psychology, in so far as
they understood it — and not, it must be confessed, without the
admixture of a traditional and Neo-Platonic " spiritualism " —
that they employed against the metaphysical dualism of the
Arabians.

We have just seen how St Thomas, by changing the venue
of the discussion, and assuming the empirical and psychological
point of view, swept away the speculative structure of Averroism.

The Dominicans of the thirteenth century followed Aristotle
in considering the whole being of man as a unity. Corpus
animatum was to them one concrete being, in which form and
matter were mutually correlative. Analysing, with Aristotle, the
human soul they found it to be at once "vegetative," "sensitive,"
and " intellectual " ; but while these three powers (virtutes} were
distinguishable in it, it remained for them one soul. It is true,
however, that they did not carry out this method of thought
with complete consistency ; and, in attributing it to them, re
servation must be made of their conception of the relation of
virtus intellective to the body1.

The metaphysical dualism of the Arabians was further super
seded by a positive analysis of the various phases of human
experience and a discovery of rational elements throughout it.
Instead of abruptly distinguishing thought from sense-presenta
tion, Albert and St Thomas traced the action of intelligence
through all the activities of the mind in graduated stages — which
to them, characteristically, were stages of more and more complete
abstraction. Thus " common sense " brought the data of sense
to a first unity of presentation ; next, imagination wrought upon
sense-presentations; a preliminary act of generalisation followed,

1 Rousselot, Etudes, II. p. 203: "En general, toute cette psychologic qu'Albert-
le-Grand emprunte a Aristote, et surtout a ses commentateurs arabes, est beaucoup
plus vicieuse dans la forme que pour le fond ; elle a du moins le merite d'indiquer
une etude complete de 1'homme, de 1'observer dans son physique comme dans tous
les autres rapports, non seulement comme un etre doue d'intelligence et d'activite,
mais comme un etre qui croit, qui se nourrit, qui se meut et se rattache ainsi a la
serie des etres qui lui sont inferieurs; ce point de vue large et rationel, si different
de la psychologic spiritualiste introduite clepuis, est remarquable dans les theologiens
du moyen age, en cela bien plus fideles aux grandes traditions de la science que
les hommes qui ont renverse la scolastique."

D.

50 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

known as cogitatio or compreJiensio, which was a comparison and
a recognition of similarity (simile] without the formation of a
logical notion (universale) ; finally, general notions were formed
in an ascending scale of abstractness, up to pure " forms," in-
tellecta speculate*.

It was mainly, then, by a psychological method of enquiry
in the Aristotelian sense2 that the school of St Thomas reached
their own doctrine of intelligence and of the intellectual soul
in man. What, finally, was this doctrine ?

In terms, the Dominicans adopted the Aristotelian formula,
that the soul is the reality or essential being of body (forma
corporis). And, up to a certain point, the Aristotelian conception
was firmly grasped and cordially endorsed ; the body could not
be without the soul, nor the soul — in so far as it is the form of
the body — apart from the body3.

But this was not the whole of their doctrine. The soul was
more than the form of the body. Or it was a " form " in an
altogether singular and unique sense — in short, a " separate "
form. Here evidently was a conception foreign to the spirit
of Aristotle, and arrived at by some method other than that of
empirical analysis4.

In similar terms Albert had taught that intelligence was
essentially constitutive of the soul ; the soul again was the

1 Cf. Siebeck, Gesch. d. Psych. \. 2, pp. 441, 442.

2 This did not, of course, mean the method of introspection. Introspection was
not altogether neglected by the Peripatetic and mediaeval psychologists. But it
was not sufficiently employed by them ; nor had its nature and use been defined
by analysis. It is perhaps one of the merits of their psychology that it did not make
introspection the exclusive instrument of psychological enquiry.

3 " Nulla pars corporis potest diffiniri sine parte aliqua' animae, et recedente
anima nee oculus nee caro dicitur nisi aequivoce." (St Thomas, op. cit. f. 102 a D.)
And again — " Forma corporis non potest esse sine corpore." Op. cit. f. 99 b D.

4 It was as possessed of intelligence that soul was to St Thomas something more
than the form of body. Anima was forma corporis, but not qtta intellectiva. On the
contrary, intelligence was a power (virtus) of the soul (which was the form of body),
but itself in no sense a power of body. This was the distinction; "Non enim
dicimus animam humanam esse formam corporis secundum intellectivam potentiam"
(op. cit. f. io2bD); " Oportet ipsum (intellectum) uniri corpori ut formam, non
quidem ita quod ipsa intellectiva potentia sit alicuius organi actus, sed quia est virtus
animae, quae est actus corporis physici organici" (op. cit. f. 102 b A); "Ultima
formarum.quae est anima humana, habet virtutem totaliter supergredientem materiam
corporalem, scilicet intellectum. Sic ergo intellectus separatus est, quia non est virtus
in corpore, sed est virtus in anima: anima autem est actus corporis." Op. cit. f. 99 a E.

THE ARABIANS AND ST THOMAS 51

form of the body, but a " form " having a separate existence
from that body ; consequently, intelligence might be and was
entirely independent of the body1.

In this metaphysical realisation of the i/ou? ^w/ato-ro? we may
with some confidence trace the influence of the Arabian dualism.
The Dominican school had defended against the Arabians the
rational nature of the soul of man. The principle of thought,
they had said, must not be so separated from the nature of the
human individual that man, as man, should cease to be regarded
as a thinking being. Intelligence (intellectus agens} was to them
a " part " of the soul. But still they stopped short of attributing
reason to man regarded as a natural being. The soul, so far as
possessed of reason (gua intellective* or seamdum potentiam in-
tellectivam}, was no longer the " form of body." Now Aristotle
never ceases to regard the soul as the form of body. This
interpretation, therefore, of his description of intelligence as
" separate,1' namely, that the intellectual soul is not the form of
body, was contrary both to the letter and to the spirit of
Aristotle. It was contrary to his spirit and intention, which
was to attribute to man as naturally existing and as empirically
observable the possession of rational thought. But it was also
contrary to his language, for he plainly calls the soul, as in
tellectual (fyvyri voi]TiKTf]\ the form and realisation of body. The
express intention of St Thomas was to separate intelligence
from the body (" Sic ergo intellectus separatus est "). And his
conception of the separateness of intelligence was still, like that
of the Arabians, although in a different form, the conception of
a real metaphysical separateness — of a substantial something,
existing separate from the body. For the Arabians, this sub
stantial existence had been a cosmical being or principle —
intellectus agens ; for St Thomas, it was the individual soul, as a
substance possessing intellectus agens. The " separation " was
in each case a real metaphysical separation. We see, then,
that he did not mean exactly what Aristotle meant, in arguing
against Averroes that intelligence is the " proper nature of man2. '

1 See Siebeck, Gesch. d. Psych. \. i, p. 442.

2 " Propria autem operatic hominis, in quantum est homo, est intelligere. Per
hoc enim differt ah aliis animalibus, et immo in hac operatione Aristoteles felicitatem

52 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

If St Thomas's conception of a " separate " intellectual soul
shewed the influence of the metaphysical dualism of the
Arabians, his descriptions of the nature of the soul as a
"separable form" recall another set of ideas — namely those
which had been traditional in the schools from Neo-Platonic
times and which were focussed in the notion of " spiritual
substances." The origin of this conception has already been
traced, and in particular its physical associations. Its pre
valence throughout the Middle Ages has been indicated, for
instance, in the Theologia Aristotelis. We have also seen the
attempts that were made, even after the true Aristotelian
doctrine of soul and body had begun to be known, to combine
with it the notion of the independent and substantial soul. The
soul, it was said, while the form of body, has also a mode of
being, and specific activities, apart from body ; the body again,
while informed by the soul, has also its own " lower form " as
well, and consequent separate existence. Finally Albert had
regarded the soul as a substantial being separate from the body1.

This combination of the essentially Platonic doctrine of the
separate soul, in the Neo-Platonic shape of a "spiritual sub
stance," with the Aristotelian thought of the soul as form of
body, is represented in St Thomas's conception of a " separable
form " as applied to the intellectual soul of man2.

ultimam constituit. Principium autem, quo intelligimus, est intellectus, ut Aristoteles
dicit. Oportet igitur ipsum uniri corpori ut formam, non quidem ita quod ipsa
intellectiva potentia sit alicuius organi actus, sed quia est virtus animae, quae est
actus corporis physici organici." St Thomas, op. cit. f. 102 b A.

1 See Siebeck, Gesch. d. Psych. I. i, p. 442.

2 St Thomas distinguishes two kinds of "forms." (o) "Formae... quae nullam
operationem habent sine conjunctione suae materiae, ipsae non operantur, sed com-
positum est, quod operatur per formam. Unde hujusmodi formae ipsae quidem pro-
prie loquendo non sunt, sed eis aliquid est." ()3) " Forma., quae habet operationem
secundum aliquam sui potentiam, vel virtutem absque communicatione suae materiae,
ipsa est quae habet esse ; nee est per esse compositi tantum, sicut aliae formae, sed
magis compositum est per esse ejus : et ideo destructo composite destruitur ilia
forma quae est esse compositi ; non autem oportet quod destruatur ad compositi
destructionem ilia forma per cuius esse est compositum, et non ipsa per esse com
positi." Op. cit. f. 99 c I K, d F.

Now the first (a) is "form" in Aristotle's sense — in the sense in which "soul is
the form of body." And St Thomas rightly says that forms in that sense "are not"
(" non sunt, sed eis aliquid est ") ; for " form " without matter is an abstraction, and
as an abstraction does not really exist,

THE ARABIANS AND ST THOMAS 53

St Thomas expressly admits that this is a metaphysical view
of man's being1 ; and this separate substantial existence is, to his
mind, the postulate of man's possession of intelligence (" major
est dignitas hujus formae quam capacitas materiae"). He assumes
an antagonism between matter and thought. Man's soul could
not possess the power of thought if it were the form of body2.
Therefore it must be a self-subsistent, "separate" spiritual being.

Now in all this there is a fundamental departure from
Aristotle, who had made no such assumption as is here con
tained ; and there is also an abandonment of Aristotle's
empirical method of enquiry about the soul3. It was Pompo-
nazzi, taking up again in earnest Aristotle's thought of anima
intellectiva as still forma corporis, who first called St Thomas's
conclusions in question.

Two aspects of St Thomas's doctrine in which Pomponazzi
felt a special interest may be noted. His conception of self-sub
sistent forms afforded a ready escape from the ambiguity and
obscurity in which Aristotle had left the question of the immor
tality of the soul. It is true that that question was not settled,
even if it were determined that soul was more than the form

As to the " form " (/3), " quae habet esse," and which exists " destructo composite,"
this is a platonising hypostasis. If there could be evidence for the existence of such
a "spiritual substance," it would in any case be incorrect to call it in Aristotelian
language a " form."

1 " Physicus considerat formam in quantum est in materia — Naturalis in tantum
considerat formam, in quantum est in materia.... Forma ergo hominis est in materia, et
est separata. In materia quidem secundum esse quod dat corpori ;... separata autem
secundum virtutem, quae est propria homini, scilicet secundum intellectum." Op.
cit. f. 99 b B c.

2 " Si essentia animae humanae sic esset forma materiae, quod non per esse suum
esset, sed per esse compositi sicut est de aliis formis." Op, cit. f. 102 b E.

3 Cf. Siebeck : "In der That ist der Aristotelismus des Thomas ihm selbst
unbewusst unterdem christlichen Einflusse nicht unbetrachtlich nach dem platonischen
Dualismus hin abgebogen. Thomas glaubt in seiner Grundansicht liber das Ver-
haltniss von Leib und Seele nichts anderes als Aristoteliker zu sein....Aber er ist
ersichtlich geneigt, die aristotelische Fassung des Seelenbegriffes der Bedeutung des
Geistigen im Sinne Plato's anzunahern. Sie soil als Form doch zugleich eine durch
sich selbst bestehende und wirkende Substanz sein, um der hohern Stufe gemass,
welche sie unter den Daseinsformen einnimmt, die Materie zu beherrschen und zu
iibersteigen. Eine Abweichung von Aristoteles, fiir den es eine Vielheit von Formen
ohne Materie nicht giebt, liegt namentlich in seiner Unterscheidung von subsistenten
und inharenten Formen." Siebeck, Gesch. d. Psych, p. 450. Cp. p. 472.

54 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

of a perishable body ; for after all, the soul was in this life
dependent for knowledge upon its corporeal instrument, and
especially upon the presentation of the data of sense in imagina
tion ; and, besides, the individual soul only came into existence
with the formation of the body. The further theory was there
fore devised that the soul formed a " habit " of existence, during
its embodied life, which persisted after its separation from the
body. It was also easy, if not satisfactory, to imagine the
possibility of some entirely different mode in which the soul
should acquire knowledge after separation from the body1.

This illustrates St Thomas's general conception of the
relation of the soul to the body. We must remember that he
nominally adhered to the formula — " Soul the form of body."
Accordingly, he conceded that " for its perfection " soul should
be in union with body2. But relation to a body was not
essential to the intellectual soul3 ; and St Thomas therefore ex
pressed the relation of the soul, as intellectual, to body by the
notion of aptitudo ; it is capable of relation to body, and tends
(so to speak) towards that relation ; but it exists in its essential
nature, even while that capability is not realised. It was not
difficult for Pomponazzi to shew the difference between this idea
and a definition of the soul by its relation to body as actus
corporis.

Pomponazzi followed St Thomas in dismissing the theory of
a unity of souls in the unity of intelligence, while maintaining
the latter in a sense which neither of them analysed. In calling
the soul the form of body he again had the great authority
with him ; and, once more, even to St Thomas, the soul which
was forma corporis was the "intellectual soul," since the soul —
vegetative, sensitive, intellectual — was one. But Pomponazzi
made soul the form of body qua intellectiva ; and in this he left
St Thomas and returned to Aristotle. At the least, if a taint

1 Levi-ben-Gerson proposed to reconcile the Aristotelian doctrine of knowledge
through the senses with the immortality of the soul by the supposition that know
ledge and all growth are entirely stationary after death. (Cf. Franck, Journal des
Savants, March, 1869.)

2 " Concedimus quod anima humana a corpore separata non habet ultimam per-
fectionem suae naturae." St Thomas, of. cit. f. 104 b D.

3 " Non est animae humanae finis movere corpus, sed intelligere." Ibid.

THE ARABIANS AND ST THOMAS 55

of Averroism still clung to him, and the suspicion of an external
union between intelligence and man, he denied the separate
substantial existence of anima qua intellectiva.

There is a passage in the De imitate intellectus which exactly
presents the point of departure for the discussions of Pomponazzi.

St Thomas is contending that the act of intelligence is not
the act of the composite being man, but the act of the soul —
of the soul, that is, in its separation as intellectiva from the body;
and he says : " Thought is said to be the act of the composite
being, not per se but per accidens, namely, in so far as its object,
which is an image, is in an organ of the body, not because the
act is performed by means of an organ of the body1."

Now in the first place we shall find Pomponazzi agreeing with
St Thomas that intelligence, as such, is somehow independent
of matter. We shall find him also saying, as we have already
seen: "Intellectui qua intellectus est accidit esse in materia," etc.
We shall find him asserting "intellectum non dependere a corpore
tanquam de subjecto " ; but " secundum essentiam ipsum in-
telligere esse in ipso intellectu."

On the other hand, St Thomas and Pomponazzi agree in
accepting the Aristotelian doctrine that the objects of human
knowledge are derived from sense through the medium of
imagination. On every page of Pomponazzi we shall read
" intellectum humanum dependere a corpore tanquam de ob-
jecto," " intelligere non esse sine phantasia."

Both also recognise the peculiar quality of thought as such,
and its transcendence of all material limitations. Both express
this in terms coloured by Averroism ; and, with the whole
Middle Ages, hold that the exercise of thought comes near
to its perfection in proportion as it dispenses with a physical
organ, and abstracts from all material contents.

But Pomponazzi and St Thomas differ in their conclusion as
to the nature of the human soul. St Thomas argues that the
soul must have some mode of being in which it has no essential
connection with matter — that, even while embodied, and de-

1 " Intelligere dicitur esse actus conjunct! non per se, sed per accidens, in quantum
scilicet ejus objectum, quod est phantasma, est in organo corporali, non quod iste
actus per organum corporale exerceatur." Op. cit. f. 99 d G.

56 PIETRO POMPON AZZI

pendent upon sense and imagination, it must be a separate
intellectual substance as well. Pomponazzi says : " The human
soul must have one and only one mode of being ; it is as it is
determined to be." Like Aristotle, he attributes timeless in
telligence to the soul which is the form of body. He might
have quoted St Thomas's own words ; for his is only a further
application of the same positive and empirical method of analysis
which St Thomas employed with effect against Averroes : " We
should never investigate the nature of the intellect if we had
not the power of thought ; and when we investigate the nature of
the intellect, what we investigate is simply the principle by which
we think1." We know no other soul, he says in effect, than that
which we know as embodied and, while embodied, as possessed
of thought. We know no other human intelligence than that
which depends de objecto on the data and the avenues of sense.

While denying that the soul now has more than one mode
of being, Pomponazzi saw no reason to suppose that it should
or could ever have any other. St Thomas had said : " But if
any one enquire further, if the intellect cannot act without an
image, how then will it operate as an intelligence, after the
soul has been separated from the body, the objector should
understand that the solution of that question does not belong to tlie
physicist*" ; and these words contain the germ of Pomponazzi's
argument against the immortality of the soul. The difficulty
which really appeared formidable to him was the difficulty of
conceiving the possibility that a soul, which was defined to be,
and was only known as forma corporis, should exist in a dis
embodied state. That such a conclusion was on grounds of
reason unprovable, and unthinkable, was all he ever expressly
affirmed ; although his reservation of other grounds on which
it might be established was probably not meant in such good
faith as that of St Thomas here.

" Nunquam de intellectu quaereremus, nisi intelligeremus : nee cum quaerimus
de intellect!!, de alio principio quaerimus, quam de eo quo nos intelligimus." Op.
cit. f. 101 a E.

"Si quis autem quaerat ulterius, si intellectus sine phantasmate non intelligit,
quomodo ergo habebit operationem intellectualem, postquam fuerit anima corpore
separata, scire debet qui haec objicit quod istam quaestionem solvere non pertinet ad
naturalem." Op. cit. f. 99 d 11.

CHAPTER III

POMPONAZZI AS AN ARISTOTELIAN

IT would not be difficult to trace the historical connection
between Pomponazzi at the beginning of the sixteenth century
and the great schoolmen of the thirteenth and Arabians of the
twelfth centuries. The enduring influence of St Thomas, not
only through his supreme authority in the great Dominican
schools, but indirectly over all European thought during several
generations, needs no illustration. Meanwhile, and in Northern
Italy especially, the doctrines of Averroes were much in vogue
during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries ; and in particular
the points at issue between him and St Thomas were perpetually
under discussion.

The school of Padua " prolonged the Middle Ages." And
the name of Padua, at this period, stands for the whole of
north-eastern Italy. Padua, Bologna, Ferrara, Venice, were at
this time in the closest academic literary relationship to one
another ; they had for two hundred years a common intellectual
life, and one bearing a very distinctive stamp1.

Cousin long ago called for a history of the school of Padua ;
but it has not yet been written. On the philosophical side, it
would be a history of the discussion of the problems raised by
Averroism.

1 " Les universites de Padoue et de Bologne n'en font reellement qu'une, au moins
pour 1'enseignement philosophique et medical. C'etaient les memes professeurs qui,
presque tous les ans, emigraient de 1'une a 1'autre pour obtenir une augmentation de
salaire. Padoue, d'un autre cote, n'est que le quartier latin de Venise ; tout ce qui
s'enseignait a Padoue s'imprimait a Venise. II est done bien entendu que sous le
nom d'e'cole de Padoue on comprend ici tout le developpement philosophique du nord-
est de PItalie." Kenan, Averrots, p. 325.

58 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

Averroes entered Italy, as he entered Europe generally,
through his medical writings ; and it was through the Italian
physicians that his name came to be identified with infidelity
and materialism. But his philosophical works also were early
known in Italy, and were quoted (1303) by Pietro d' Abano1.
Philosophy, indeed, was closely connected in the Italian
universities with medical and physical studies ; teachers of
philosophy used to graduate in medicine- ; and Pomponazzi
all his life taught both "natural" and "moral" philosophy'.

From the first half of the fourteenth century onwards, we
find a number of professed Averroists in Northern Italy, many
of whom, however, toned down the distinctive features of the
Averroist doctrine. It is a Frenchman, John of Jandun (Gan-
davensis : fior. 1330), who has perhaps the best claim to be
called the father of Italian "orthodox" Averroism. Although
himself engaged as a teacher in Paris, he was in close com
munication with the Italian Averroists, and corresponded with
Marsilius of Padua4 ; and certainly his writings exercised a great
influence on the subsequent development of the school5. While
calling himself an Averroist, he declined to believe in the unity
of human intelligence, denying the distinction of the intellectual
from the sensitive soul, and thus, in direct contradiction of
Averroes, making an intellectual soul the form of human nature6.
John, however, openly confessed that in this respect he departed
from the teaching of the master, whereas later clerical writers
tried to make out that Averroes himself was orthodox upon
the point7.

Some of the Italian Averroists of the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries were ecclesiastically; orthodox, following in the foot
steps of John of Jandun ; others were not. Of the former, the
most influential was Gaetano of Tiene (1387 — 1465), whose

1 Renan, op. cit. pp. 326, 327.

- Florentine, Pomponazzi, p. 10.

3 Florentine, op. cit. p. 27.

4 Kenan, op. cit. p. 339.

5 Pomponazzi often refers to him in his Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima.

B Werner, Scholastik des spateren Mittelalters, IV. Pt i, p. 141 ; Renan, op. cit.

P- 341-

7 Werner, op. cit. iv. Pt i, p. 143.

POMPONAZZI AS AN ARISTOTELIAN 59

library is at St Mark's. He also rejected the heretical con
sequences of Peripateticism ; but he was a professed Averroist,
claiming to represent the true Averroes and to defend him
against heretical misinterpretation. Thus in order to establish
intellectus agens as of the true nature of the human being, he
denied the doctrine of sensus agens by which popular Averroism
sought to make good the distinction of the sensitive from the
intellectual soul. This he declared, and probably with truth,
to be no part of the original scheme of Averroes ; he rejected,
as Pomponazzi also did, a compromise1 suggested by John of
Jandun, and came to the same conclusion which Pomponazzi
afterwards adopted. Apart, however, from the particular question
of sensus agens, there can be no doubt that Gaetano fatally com
promised Averroes' doctrine of soul and intelligence2.

Paul of Venice (pb. 1429), though an ecclesiastic, had boldly
accepted the whole doctrine of Averroes. Werner3 lays it down
as a general rule that the clerical Averroists remained orthodox,
while it was otherwise among the laity. To this rule, however,
there were evidently exceptions. Paul describes the "intellectual
soul" as the lowest of the spheral Intelligences, appropriated
to the human race ; whereas the natural soul of man, which he
denominates by an unusual and highly suggestive term, anima
spiritiva (Trvevfiari/ctj), is the same as in any other animal, of
natural origin and subject to corruption4. We perceive that
Pomponazzi did not need to go very far back to find in his
own country Averroism in its purest form5 ; and the comparison
of his notion of anima intellectiva with the doctrine of Paul
will shew the difference in fundamental principle between his
denial of the immortality of the soul and that of the ordinary
Averroist.

The so-called Averroists of Pomponazzi's own time in Italy
were much less consistent than Paul of Venice. They either ulti
mately withdrew their Averroist opinions, or altered Averroism

1 Co >n» i. de An. f. 86 r.

2 Werner, op. cit. iv. Pt i, p. 143; Kenan, op. fit. p. 349.

3 Werner, op. cit. iv. Pt i, p. 142.

4 Renan, op. cit. p. 345.

5 Pomponazzi cites Paulus Venetus more than once in his Commentary on the
De Anima.

60 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

beyond recognition. Vernias and, after him, his pupil, Niphus,
took the former course. Vernias (flor. 1480), who was the
immediate predecessor of Pomponazzi in Padua, had at first
expounded the doctrine of Averroes in all its extent, but after
wards yielded to ecclesiastical influence, and wrote in defence of
the plurality and immortality of souls1. -Niphus (1473 — 1546),
Pomponazzi's chief antagonist, appears to have been a discreet
time-server. In his first published work he maintained with
Averroes that, besides the heavenly Intelligences and a single
human Intelligence, there exist no spiritual beings2. But his
strictures upon the anti-Averroist arguments of Albert and
St Thomas brought him into trouble3 ; and he subsequently
fell back upon a modified and orthodox Averroism. He denied
that Averroes had taught, as his enemies made out, and as
John of Jandun had admitted, that intelligence was only forma
assistens in man. At the same time, he knew his Averroes well;
he prepared a standard edition of his works, and owed his own
reputation chiefly to his commentaries on the Arabian ; and
he could not credit Averroes with the opinion ascribed to him
by Gaetano of Tiene, Achillini, and the orthodox Averroists
generally, but really adopted by John in correction of Averroes —
namely, that intellectus was in man as forma substantialis. He
took refuge from this perplexity in the possibly disingenuous
suggestion that Averroes did not declare himself clearly on the
point, and attributed the confusion to his possessing only im
perfect translations of Aristotle4. Niphus was employed by the
Pope to answer Pomponazzi ; and his attack, which followed
no consistent line of reasoning, but utilised indiscriminately
Averroist, Platonic, or Thomist arguments, drew from Pom
ponazzi his Defensorium*, Niphus was a frivolous and probably
insincere writer.

Achillini in Pomponazzi's day, and Zimara (flor. 1530)
immediately after, maintained the effort to use the language
of Averroes while explaining away his meaning, and put an

1 See references in Nourrisson, Alexandre d'Aphrod. p. 142, n. 3 ; p. 143, n. i.
Cf. Werner, op. cit. iv. Pt i, p. 143 ; Kenan, op. at. p. 352.

2 Werner, op. cit. iv. Pt i, p. 146. 3 Renan, op. fit. p. 367.
4 Werner, op. cit. iv. Pt i, pp. 147, 148.

0 Fiorentino, Pomponazzi, cap. vi.

POMPONAZZI AS AN ARISTOTELIAN 6l

interpretation upon his doctrine of intelligence consistent with
the presence of a spiritual element in human nature. These
were the " Averroists " who defended the immortality of the
soul. Zimara aimed not at refuting Averroes, but at relieving
him of the charge of heresy1.

With the advance of the Classical Renaissance, and the
study of the Greek text of Aristotle, Averroism was gradually
discredited. An echo of the doctrine may be heard here or
there2. But the school of interpreters of whom Zabarella is the
chief representative^. 1589), while students of Averroes as a
commentator, returned in essentials to the original doctrine of
Aristotle.

Meanwhile Pomponazzi had broken fresh ground. He had
gone back to Aristotle ; and the master's profound and simple
doctrine of man began once more to exercise its native force
upon philosophy. Aristotle's conception of soul and body may
be said to have been a perennial fountain of vivifying influence
in human thought. Every time that men have caught sight of
his meaning, even in partial glimpses, it has been the occasion
of a new departure ; it has acted as an impulse and a corrective,
stimulating and clarifying speculation.

Partly as reflecting Aristotle, partly from their own freshness
and simplicity, the ideas of Pomponazzi had a great effect in
their day. Averroism had greatly decayed ; it had lost its
character and become a medley of inconsistent opinions, com
bined by a shallow verbal logic over whose ambiguous and
undefined terms the professional disputers held futile argument.
Pomponazzi went behind most of their controversies in returning
to the text of Aristotle. His startling, but plain and consecutive,
statements cleared the situation ; while the human interest of
his conclusion, and the constant references to life, history, and
conduct, by which he illustrated and defended it, came like a
refreshing breath of air into the stifling class-rooms of the
professors.

A reaction against Averroism was, in any case, at that time,

1 An account of this eviscerated Averroism will be found in Werner, op. cit. iv.
Pt i, p. 150, and Renan, op. cit. p. 37?-

2 e.g. Magister Calaber. See Renan, op. fit. pp. 405, 406.

62 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

a thing to be expected. Its formulae had doubtless grown weari
some. The Thomists had never ceased to keep alive a vigorous
opposition. And finally it became impossible, with a better
knowledge of Aristotle and some acquaintance with the views
of his earlier interpreters, to accept Averroism as the natural
sense of Aristotle's language1.

The appearance of Pomponazzi meant a reaction against
Averroism, and a reaction at the same time against the or
thodox doctrine of spiritual substances. History has associated
Pomponazzi's new departure with the name of Alexander of
Aphrodisias ; and the controversies in which he was the leading
figure have been represented as a conflict between Averroism and
Alexandrism. But it would be easy to exaggerate the influence
of Alexander upon Pomponazzi. Indeed, it is difficult to deter
mine how far he was familiar with the writings of Alexander
at all. He was no doubt fully acquainted with that writer's
general position, and with the outline of his arguments ; a few
leading names and characteristic reasonings were the common
stock of the scholastic debates ; and the disputants borrowed
their materials of this sort from one another for purposes of
comment and criticism. But just as Pomponazzi seems to
depend for his knowledge of Plato upon Aristotle's criticisms2,
so, in some at least of his references to Alexander, he is evi
dently quoting at second-hand3. Still there can be no question
that, to a large extent, he either borrowed from Alexander
(whether directly or through his various sources of information)
or welcomed his interpretations as coinciding with his own ; and
it is certain that he made large use of his name. There were,
no doubt, in a certain sense and at a certain point, an Averroist
and an Alexandrist faction in the school of Padua. Genuine
Averroism still had its advocates. And if the new interpretation

1 It is true that Pomponazzi was no Greek scholar himself; but in his own day
and university, Leonicus Thomaeus was expounding Aristotle and the Greek com
mentators from the original texts.

- E.g. Comm. tie An. f. 24 r : "Plato, ut bene recitat Aristoteles decimo libro
Metaphysicorum . "

3 E.g. De Imm. p. 68: "Alexandri responsionem quam ibi refert Commentator
ex relatione Themistii " ; p. t28, "Alexander Aphrodiseus, ut refert D. Thomas...
dixit."

POMPONAZZI AS AN ARISTOTELIAN 63

of Aristotle must have, according to the scholastic fashion, its
representative authority, no fitter name could be found than
Alexander's. "Pour couvrir cette tendance nouvelle, un nouveau
nom etait necessaire: on trouva celui d'Alexandre d'Aphrodisias1."
But we must not allow this theoretically clear issue to blind us
to the divisions of opinion which actually took place ; and we
need not forget, in relating Pomponazzi either to Averroes or
Alexander, the close metaphysical affinity between those two
which has already been noticed. In point of fact Pomponazzi
was no more an " Alexandrist," in regard to an " assisting In
telligence," than he was an "Averroist." Still less were Niphus
and Achillini consistent " Averroists," since they abandoned the
doctrines of the unity of souls and of collective immortality.

Instead of two parties, then, there were four at least ; while
various intermediate positions were also occupied with more or
less defmiteness and more or less consistency. There were the
Averroists proper. Then there were various attempts to recon
cile the " separateness " of intelligence with an individual anima
intellectiva, some of which were barely distinguishable from Aver-
roism. There was the orthodox doctrine of spiritual substances,
supported by the large and influential school of Thomists. There
were " Alexandrists " — those who accepted in a thoroughgoing
way Aristotle's doctrine of forma corporis but took little heed,
be it observed, of Alexander's theological conception of 1/01)9
7rot77Tt/co9 ; and of these Pomponazzi is the best known repre
sentative, unsparing in his rejection of " separable forms "
(spiritual substances), while yet, in his notion of intelligence,
retaining a dash of Averroism. There were others who were
certainly not " Alexandrists," who indeed claimed either in some
or all of their views to interpret the true mind of Averroes, and
who yet opposed as decidedly as the " Alexandrists " the popular
tenets of Averroism. They denied the common Intelligence
with its so-called "collective" immortality. Unlike the "Alex
andrists" however — for these were the "orthodox " Averroists —
they maintained the immortality of the individual, while some
of them made an altogether inadmissible use of Averroes's own
doctrine in support of this belief.

1 Renan, op. cit. p. 354.

64 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

Another way in which it has been sought to define Pom-
ponazzi's position has been to say that, as a follower of the
Greek commentators, he was an opponent on the one side of
Averroes and on the other of St Thomas1 ; and it is true
that in developing his own doctrine, he criticises both of those
authorities, each on one particular point. He attacks in Aver
roes the theory of the oneness of anima intellectiva : and in
St Thomas the notion of the soul as a " separable form," and as
immortal. But Pomponazzi could not fail to inherit the Aver-
roist tradition ; and we trace it in his conception of intelligence
inhering in itself, timeless and incorporeal, as its subjectum ;
while in one place we shall find him labouring to prove that his
own doctrine of anima intellectiva as forma corporis was not
foreign to the true intention of Averroes2. On the other hand,
so far from being simply an " opponent of St Thomas," there is
no writer by whom he is more largely influenced, or from whom
he borrows so much ; he takes over St Thomas's criticisms of
Averroes wholesale ; from St Thomas he learns his conceptualism,
his doctrine of knowledge, his idea of truth" ; and it is not un
likely that he learned more in the interpretation of Aristotle
from St Thomas than from Alexander.

The truth is that in Pomponazzi three streams met — the
Dominican scholastic Peripateticism, the Arabian Peripateticism,
and the stream from the Aristotelian fountain-head, a little
troubled, and coming partly by way of Alexander. In his
understanding of Aristotle he took the help of all the commen
tators, and was influenced by them all. He is perhaps more
profoundly affected by Averroes's doctrine of intelligence than by
St Thomas's doctrine of the soul ; for he has nothing whatever
to say of " spiritual substances." Yet even his use of Averroist
language proves to be rather conventional than indicative of
real agreement. The philosophical phraseology of the time had
become completely coloured by the Averroist notion of " separate
intelligence." Pomponazzi not only uses this language to ex
press his own meaning, but makes a vigorous attempt to impose
that meaning on Averroes4.

1 Florentine, Pomponazzi, cap. 4. - Comni. de An. ff. 140, 141.

:! Comm. de An. ff. 174, 175. 4 Conim. de An. ff. 140, 14 \.

POMPONAZZI AS AN ARISTOTELIAN 65

What was important in Pomponazzi was his return to
Aristotle, and to the simplicity of the early interpretations of
him. No doubt there was something in the Greek commentaries
that suited the spirit of the time and met its need. Whatever
the influence of Alexander over Pomponazzi may have amounted
to, his doctrine on its psychological side fell in with the move
ment and direction of Pomponazzi's mind.

It may be true that Alexander had given a dualistic, theo
logical interpretation to Aristotle ; and that Averroes, while
differing from Alexander on one point, merely developed and
perpetuated his doctrine in its essential character1. On the
other hand, apart from his doctrine of i/oO?, Alexander had faith
fully represented Aristotle's teaching on the soul ; and it was
this which commended him to the awakening modern mind of
the Renaissance.

It is not historically correct to say absolutely2 that Averroes
was the heir of the dualistic and supra-naturalistic element in
Aristotle, and Alexander of his empirical spirit and method.
Alexander had his deios vovs ; Averroes found a place for the
doctrine of anima forma corporis. Still, speaking broadly, the
general distinction of spirit and emphasis, in the two systems,
may be made. The centre of gravity in Alexander's Aristo-
telianism was his psychology, Jjjs^natural history of man ; the
centre of gravity in Averroism was the separateness of intelli
gence. Fiorentino aptly points out that, if the latter had a
natural affinity for the mediaeval mind, the former was equally
congenial to the Renaissance3. The fact that Pomponazzi and
the Renaissance Aristotelians generally ignored or overlooked
the theological aspect of Alexander's doctrine precisely illus
trates their attitude towards him, and the point at which his
writings appealed to them.

It will not be doubted that, in adopting the psychological
teaching of Alexander, Pomponazzi did return to the true

1 Nourrisson, Alex. cT Aphrod. p. no: "Ce fut Averroes qui, en contredisant
nommement Alexandre d'Aphrodisias, contribua le plus a fonder ou a propager son
autoriteV'

2 As Fiorentino does (Pomponazzi, pp. 108, 123).

3 Op, cit. pp. 123, 124.

D. q

66 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

Aristotle1. With Pomponazzi, accordingly, we reach the last
chapter in the chequered history of Aristotle in the Middle
Ages2. The work of Pomponazzi was an episode in the final
phase.

With regard to the place of reason in the soul, Pomponazzi
clearly recognises that there are two possible interpretations of
Aristotle — one which separates, the other which unites, reason
and the soul ; and he admits an appearance in Aristotle of self-
contradiction. He claims for his own doctrine, which allows the
absolute (x&>/3to"r6<?) and timeless character of reason and yet
attributes the possession of it to the natural soul of man, that it
reconciles the seeming inconsistency and accords with the true
teaching of Aristotle3.

The part of Pomponazzi's doctrine which made most stir in
his life-time, and has attracted most attention since, is of course
his inference, from the denial of a separate spiritual substance
in the soul, that the soul is not immortal. Supposing the
soul to have no separate existence apart from the body, there
is no reason, Pomponazzi argued, to hold that it survives the

1 " Aristotile, e vero, conteneva entrambi cotesti avviamenti, lo spirito come
sviluppo della natura, e lo spirito come fuori della natura ; ma tra cotesti niuna
dubita che la vera e feconda novita di Aristotile era nel primo ; e chi il secundo era
una reliquia della filosofia passata, un retaggio del misticismo platonico." Fiorentino,
Pomponazzi, p. 108.

2 "Celui qui le concile de Paris avait proscrit en 1209, et Gregoire IX en 1231,
que plus tard on avait voulu mettre au nombre des saints du calendrier, allait tomber
enfin sous la fausse reputation qu'on lui avait faite, tandis que ses ecrits aidaient
a la reaction qui approchait, en conduisant a la pratique de la vraie methode."
(Rousselot, Etudes, i, p. 23, cf. in, pp. 8 — n ; Jourdain, Recherches, pp. 20 — 24;
Haureau, De la Phil. Seal. pp. i — 12 ; Schultze, Philos. der Renaiss. pp. 12 — 16.)

3 " Ex quibus omnibus patere potest, quod multa quae dicuntur ab Aristotele de
intellectu videntur se invicem oppugnare cum minime oppugnent : dicit enim quando-
que quod est materialis et mixtus seu non separabilis, quandoque vero quod est
immaterialis et separabilis. In definitione namque dicitur quod est actus corporis
organici, quandoque vero dicitur quod nullius corporis est actus, haec vero pugnantia
videntur : quare in diversos tramites diversi declinaverunt, et aliqui existimant Aris-
totelem seipsum non intellexisse : verum omnia jam aperta sunt ex praedictis, neque
ulla est contrarietas ; intellectus enim absolute et qua intellectus est omnino immixtus
et separatus est, at humanus utrumque retinet, nam separatur a corpore ut subjecto,
non separatur vero ut objecto ; intellectus etiam qua intellectus nullo modo est actus
corporis organici, quoniam intelligentiae non indigent organo ad intelligendum, sed
tantum ad movendum : at intellectus humanus, qua humanus, est actus corporis
organici ut objecti et sic non separatur ; non autem ut subjecti, et sic separatur,
quare nullum repugnans." De 1mm. IX. p. 66.

POMPONAZZI AS AN ARISTOTELIAN 67

body. The only evidence, he urged, which could justify a
belief in its continued incorporeal existence would be evidence
of its having now some mode of existence independent of its
connection with the body. But there is no such evidence. On
the contrary, the soul has only one mode of existence ; and
this is, that while possessed of intelligence (which in itself is
incorporeal) it possesses it in a manner implying dependence
on the body. The human soul exercises reason always and
only in dependence on sense and imagination. The evidence,
then, is wanting. An incorporeal existence is impossible for
such a soul as this. If it could exist incorporeally it would be
something different from what it is. In the absence of evidence
of the sort required, it is arbitrary and gratuitous to assert that
in the future the soul will be capable of, and will enjoy, an
entirely different mode of being.

Such was the substance of Pomponazzi's argument. Curiously
enough, three years before his book De Immortalitate was pub
lished, that is in 1 5 13, the Pope sent out a bull against Averroism
as denying the immortality of the soul1. Pomponazzi and the
unbelieving Averroists, however, had reached the same conclu
sion upon different grounds. The Averroists denied immortality
to the individual soul because it did not possess the attribute of
intelligence. Pomponazzi only denied the possibility of the
soul's exercising intelligence independently of corporeal em
bodiment and sense-experience. The philosophical difference
had one odd result. Within six years of the decree of the
Lateran Council condemning Averroism the strange anomaly
was witnessed of the appearance of Niphus and Achillini to
defend the immortality of the soul in the name of Averroism.
We have seen that there were " Averroists " ready to employ
Averroes's doctrine of the eternal common Intelligence in sup
port of the immortality of individual souls. But Niphus and
Achillini did not hesitate to combine with an abundant use of
Averroist phraseology about "eternal intelligence" the eccle
siastical formula of separate intellectual substances or souls.

Pomponazzi did not much concern himself with the orthodox

1 See Conciliorum omnium collectio regia, Paris, 1644, Vol. xxxiv. p. 557.

5—2

68 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

Averroists. In writing the De Immortalitate he did not think
it worth while to notice their theories. He knew what Averroism
was, and devoted some attention to it1. But the corrupt Aver
roism of the ecclesiastical schools, which was, as Renan says, the
official philosophy of Italy in the sixteenth century, he seldom
noticed even in his lectures : and he does not name it in the De
Immortalitate. Eventually the attacks of Niphus stung him
into a somewhat contemptuous answer (the Defensorimri) ; or
prudence required him to defend himself. He treated Thomist
orthodoxy with much more respect, devoting to it the bulk of
his original volume and addressing an early and respectful reply
to the sincere and earnest Thomist criticisms of his friend and
pupil Contarini2.

Pomponazzi's book was received with a storm of indignant
criticism. Attempts were made to move the Pope against him ;
and Leo commissioned Niphus to prepare a reply. In the same
year in which this appeared (1518) a papal brief also was issued
against Pomponazzi3. Cardinal Bembo, who is said to have
agreed with Pomponazzi, protected him ; and the Pope, it may
be believed, was in no way disposed to go to extremes4.

It is not necessary to enter into the details of Pomponazzi's
personal history. The best account of these will be found in
the work of Florentine5. The only complete list of his works

1 Paul of Venice has already been mentioned. The fact is also worth noticing in
this connection — besides being an interesting historic link with the people and the
schools that had first introduced Averroes to Christendom — that there lived in Padua,
when Pomponazzi was a young man, a learned Jew named Elias del Medigo, who
taught in the university the doctrines of Averroism, doubtless in their purest form.
See Renan, Averroes, p. 197.

2 In the Apologia.

3 " Petrus de Mantua asseruit quod anima rationalis, secundum propria philo-
sophiae et mentem Aristotelis, sit seu videtur mortalis, contra determinationem
concilii Lateranensis : papa mandat ut dictus Petrus revocet ; alias contra ipsum
procedatur." See Ranke, History of the Popes, Engl. transl., I. p. 55.

4 " Ce n'est pas que, pour sauver les apparences, on ne se montrat severe par
moments. On condamnait Pomponat, et sous main on 1'appuyait. On payait Niphus
pour le refuter, et on encourageait Pomponat a repondre a Niphus. Que pouvait-
on attendre de serieux d'une bulle contre-signee Bembo, et ordonnant de croire a
l'immortalite?...(Leon) prenait trop d'interet au debat pour songer a briiler les
combatants." Renan, Averroes, pp. 363, 366.

5 Pietro Pomponazzi: Studi Storici su la Scuola Bolognese e Padovana. Firenze,
1868.

POMPONAZZI AS AN ARISTOTELIAN 69

is that given by Prof. Ferri1 in his Introduction to the Com
mentary on Aristotle's De Anima. Pomponazzi wrote a number
of treatises on physical subjects, there enumerated. His works
upon the soul were long supposed to be three in number — the
De hnmortalitate Animae (Bologna, 1516) and the two books
in defence of the same, first against Contarini {Apologia, 1518),
secondly against Niphus and others (Defensorium, 1519). His
most elaborate philosophical and psychological work remained
undiscovered until 1876, and is still practically unknown. It
is his Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle.

A seventeenth century writer professed to have seen a work
by Pomponazzi on the De Anima in a private library in Padua.
Only in 1876, however, Prof. Ferri of Rome presented to the
Accademia dei Lincei an account of two different manuscripts of
this work — an incomplete copy in a Florentine, and a complete
one in a Roman library. Prof. Ferri caused a large part of the
work to be transcribed, and printed it with a valuable intro
duction in the Atti della Reale Accademia dei Lincei for 1876
(Vol. III. Series ii.). It was subsequently published in a separate
form.

The Commentary is expressly described as having been
given in the course of public teaching, and, in the form in which
we have it, was probably compiled by a pupil. Allowances
being made for possible inaccuracies in detail, the authenticity
of the text is unquestionable, being established both by circum
stantial evidence, and still more certainly by its absolute agree
ment with the well-known opinions and language of Pomponazzi.
It consists of three parts, representing evidently three separate
courses of lectures, and embracing to some extent the same
subjects. The topics include all the questions about knowledge,
and about the nature and faculties of the soul, then discussed in
the schools. One of the sections (the second) bears the date
1520, five years before his death. It thus appears that here
we possess at once the fullest, and the latest and most mature,
expression of Pomponazzi's views on the subjects which had
always occupied him.

This work of Pomponazzi undoubtedly deserves somewhat

1 La Psicologia di P. Pomponazzi, Introd. p. 6.

70 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

fuller examination than it has yet received. It does not appear
to have been considered in any of even the more recent accounts
of Renaissance Aristotelianism, or of Pomponazzi himself.
Prof. Ferri published his extracts from the Commentary in
1876. Noack's Dictionary of 1878 in a full article on Pom-
ponatius did not mention it. J. A. Symonds in 1881, and
Weber and Hoffding in their recent Histories of Philosophy,
selected Pomponazzi as the representative Aristotelian and
psychologist of the Renaissance, and gave detailed accounts of
him and his writings ; yet none of them appears to have been
aware of the publication or existence of this, his principal work.
Weber's American translator has heard of Prof. Ferri's publi
cation and gives its title — La Psicologia di Pietro Pomponazzi
— as an addendum to a bibliographical note ; but manifestly
without any suspicion of its real contents1. Speaking generally
this Commentary may be said to take up, usually in a more
systematic manner, and in the most general terms, all the
questions raised by the De Immortalitate and many others
as well2.

The works De Fato, Libero Arbitrio, Praedestinatione et
Providentia Dei and De Naturalium Effectmim Causis, sive de
Incantationibus, are dated by Ferri 1520 — the year in which
they were written. The latter seems to have been published
for the first time at Basel in 1556; the former at the same
place in 1567. They are not included in the standard edition
of Pomponazzi's collected works, published at Venice in the
year of his death 1525.

A treatise Dubitationes in quartum Meteorologiconun Aris-
totelis librum was also printed for the first time subsequently
to the issue of that edition — at Venice in 1563.

The collected edition of 1525 contains three physical
treatises, the three companion pieces on the soul, and the last
work written by Pomponazzi — De Nutritione et Augmentatione.

1 Weber, Hist, of Phil., Engl. transl., p. 269.

2 For example, the question of an embodied intelligence ("anima intellectiva de
corpore dependens ") is treated in the most general form on ff. 126 to 130 ; and the
argument with respect to immortality is set out on both sides in order, resuming
the discussions of the De Immortalitate on ff. 130 — 150, 250, 251, 253, 254.

POMPONAZZI AS AN ARISTOTELIAN 71

There has been no later collection of his works ; and conse
quently no complete edition is in existence. The De Immortali-
tate, which was by far the most popular of his writings, and has
been called "il piu bel libro fra i filosofi del Risorgimento1," was
frequently reprinted during the sixteenth century, and was also
edited at Tubingen in 1791 by Bardili.

The accounts given of Pomponazzi in the Histories of
Philosophy have all a strong family likeness ; from Briacker
downwards, through Tennemann, Ritter, to more modern writers,
the same material is employed and the same general view taken.
The only works giving evidence of a fresh and thorough study
are those of Florentine and Ferri already referred to, of which
the second is much the better.

But Pomponazzi had a reputation in his own day, and has
exercised an influence quite out of proportion to this negligent
estimate of his significance.

He was a persistent and vigorous thinker. His whole
circle of ideas was governed by one or two leading prin
ciples. The denial of immortality would not of itself have
been sufficient to bring so much attention upon his book ; there
were many then in Italy who denied immortality; but the
position of Pomponazzi seemed so strong, and was so eagerly
assailed, because of what lay behind it. The impossibility of
a soul without a body was by him stringently connected, first,
with a clear consistent view of the nature of the soul ; secondly,
with a theory of knowledge which was steadily making way
as the true doctrine of Aristotle and had been accepted by
St Thomas himself — the theory, namely, that all human know
ledge is acquired through the bodily faculties of sense and
imagination ; and, thirdly, with a plausible theory of morals.
Materialism had usually been associated with moral laxity.
But Pomponazzi faced boldly the ethical consequences of his
position and laid down a moral doctrine compatible, as he held,
with his philosophical conclusion, which was not only lofty and
consistent with the dignity of human nature, but had the great
further advantage of being simple and intelligible. He claimed
that mortality rather than immortality harmonised with the

1 P. Ragnisco, Tommaso d'1 Aquino nella Universita di Padova, p. 14.

72 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

proper view of human destiny ; that the belief in the soul's
mortality, rather than the notion of future recompense, opened
the way and gave the opportunity to the highest and purest
goodness and virtue.

It was not, then, altogether without reason that he had in his
day so great a name. His influence was the less enduring as
the Reformation carried the stream of independent thought
away from Italy. That he continued, however, to be read and
regarded as an authority upon the subject of the soul may be
inferred from a reference to him by Kenelm Digby in his
Treatise of Mans Soul (1644), which shews not only a know
ledge, such as might be gathered from hearsay, of his main
conclusion, but a precise acquaintance with the grounds on
which he had reasoned : " But unawares I have engulphed
myselfe into a sea of contradiction, from no mean adversaries :
for Alexander Aphrodiseus, Pomponatius, and the learnedest of
the Peripatetike schoole, will all of them rise up in maine opposi
tion against this doctrine of mine : shewing how in the body all
our soul's knowledge is made by the working of our fansie ;
and that there is no act of our souls without speculation of
fantasmes residing in our memory : therefore, seeing that when
our body is gone, all those litle bodies of fantasmes are gone
with it ; what signe is there, that any operation can remaine ?
And hence they inferre, that seeing every substance hath its
Being for its operations sake, and by consequence were vaine
and superfluous in the world, if it could not enjoy and exercise
its operation ; there is no necessity or end, why the soule of a
man should survive his body : and consequently, there is no
reason to imagine other, than that it perisheth when the man
dyeth. This is the substance of their argument1."

The terms will also be remembered in which Descartes, in
the Epistle prefatory to his Meditations, refers to the denials
of the immortality of the soul. His particular mention of the
Decree of the Lateran Council (1513) suggests that he had the
Paduan school in his mind ; and the suggestion is corroborated
by an allusion to the opposition of reason and faith, of which
Pomponazzi in particular had made so much in this connection ;
1 Op. cit. pp. 428, 429.

POMPONAZZI AS AN ARISTOTELIAN 73

" Pour ce qui regarde 1'Ame, quoy que plusieurs ayent creu qu'il
n'est pas ayse d'en connoistre la nature, et que quelques-uns
ayent meme ose dire que les raisons humaines nous persuadoient
qu'elle mouroit avec le corps, et qu'il n'y avoit que la seule Foy
qui nous enseignast le contraire," etc.

To us however Pomponazzi will remain chiefly interesting
for an early criticism of the Averroist and Thomist systems and
as an illustration of the force and vitality of the philosophy of
Aristotle.

CHAPTER IV

POMPONAZZI'S PSYCHOLOGY

THE great question with which Pomponazzi concerned him
self was the question of the soul's relation to reason or
intelligence. This was the question of his time. Anima and
Intellectus were then the watchwords of the schools : their rela
tion, or the nature of anima intellectiva, was the point round
which discussion moved and on which was invoked the authority
of Averroes, Alexander, or St Thomas. When the audiences in
the Italian class-rooms called out "Quid de anima?" this was
the subject which they desired to hear treated1.

The prevailing tendency was towards a metaphysical dualism
of " Soul " and " Reason." Averroism had its professed ad
herents; but the spirit of Averroism had also deeply penetrated
the orthodox schools. Even among those who rejected the
Averroist doctrine of a common Intelligence, the "separateness"
of intelligence in some sense or other was a fixed presupposition,
a dogma that found expression in the character attributed to
superior Intelligences, angelic or astral, and which led to the
separation of the intellectual from the natural soul of man, or
of the soul qua intellectiva from the body. The doctrine of
Averroes continued to be seriously discussed, even if it was
rarely held in its primitive simplicity ; and men's minds were
haunted by the phantom of an impersonal Intelligence of
humanity.

1 See Symonds, Renaissance, v. p. 479.

POMPON AZZl'S PSYCHOLOGY 75

Pomponazzi was not occupied at all with physical specula
tions about the nature of the soul, such as have been agitated
before and since his day. He neither introduced irrelevant
physical enquiries as to the substance of the mind nor sought
the " seat of the soul " in the body. The reason is not that he
was superior to many of the superstitions of his age, but that he
was preoccupied with the question about intelligence and the
soul. Body and Soul were the simple terms of his thought of
man ; and Thought and Matter for him the poles of meta
physical speculation.

In the enquiry as to the nature of the human soul, and the
character of intelligence as in man, Pomponazzi substituted for
the method of abstract speculation a method of positive analysis.
The Arabians, going by what they conceived to be the necessary
nature of Reason, postulated a " separate " rational principle
(their intellectus agens). St Thomas was led partly by a similar
a priori conception of the nature of a thinking principle and
partly by a theological and ethical interest in the immortality of
the soul to affirm the existence of "separate" spiritual substances.
Pomponazzi, instead of pursuing a priori speculations as to what
the nature of an intellectual principle must be, proposed simply to
determine our conception of human intelligence by the actual
character of intelligence as exhibited by man.

St Thomas had recalled Averroes to the real problem of
intelligence as actually exercised by man the individual, and
shewn the irrelevancy to that problem of his theory of in
tellectual action in a separate principle. Pomponazzi deals in
the same way with St Thomas's own postulate of a separate
intellectual principle in the individual ; he asks for evidence
("naturale signum") of its existence, and contrasts the hypo
thesis with the fact that in man, as he actually is, intelligence is
always exercised in dependence on a bodily organisation.

He presses constantly against both Averroes and St Thomas,
and against every theory of a separate intellectual soul in man,
the Aristotelian definition of soul as the form of body1; and his

1 Comm. de An., ff. 251 — 253; 2ca&. passim.

76 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

assent to Aristotle's formula is more than a mere verbal agree
ment. He occupies Aristotle's standpoint of empirical observa
tion, and pursues his method of a positive analysis of the facts
before him. Doing so, he finds, as Aristotle did, that the soul
of man — yes, and his "intellectual" soul — exists in body. It is
known only there. We know nothing of it except in that
relation. So far as known to us it has no other mode of exist
ence. What is before us is corpus animatum.

Accordingly we find him arguing, whether against the
superior Intelligence of Averroism, the single anima intellectiva
operating in human intelligence — or against the " separate "
anima intellectiva of St Thomas, which is not (qua intellective?) the
actuality of body (actus corporis) at all — that human intelligence
exists as we actually discover it to be, and can have only one
mode of existence under the same conditions and at the same
time; and requiring for those other supposed modes of existence,
postulated by the one doctrine or the other, some evidence
(naturale signum} upon which they can be accepted as real.
Thus when the Averroists, in order to bring their hypothesis of
anima intellectiva into relation to human knowledge, have ex
plained that intelligence had one operation secundum se, and
another quoad nos — the former in metaphysical separation from,
the other in dependence upon, the body — Pomponazzi replies: "It
seems absurd to say that the intellectual soul, which is numeri
cally a single faculty, has two distinct modes of intellection —
one that depends on body and also one that is independent
of it — for thus it seems to have two beings.... In the soul two
forms of intellection are supposed to be united, one of which
depends on the body, while the other is entirely unrelated to it,
which seems at variance with reason, since of one and the same
thing with reference to a single operation there seems to be only
one mode of operation1." But it is no better he says with the
Thomist distinction of anima intellectiva qua intellectiva and

1 " Ridiculum videtur dicere animam intellectivam quae est una potentia numero
duos habere modos intelligendi, scilicet et dependentem et independentem a corpore ;
sic enim duo esse videtur habere. ...In anima autem ponuntur intellectiones quarum
una dependet a corpore, altera vero est simpliciter absoluta, quod non videtur con-
sonum rationi, cum unius operationis respectu unius et eiusdem non videatur esse nisi
unus modus operandi." De Imm. iv. p. 16.

POMPONAZZl'S PSYCHOLOGY 77

qua actus corporis^ ; and, frequently, in the De Immortalitate he
reiterates that human intelligence has and can have only one
mode of being : " Unius rei est tantum unus modus operandi
essentialis."

I call attention to this mode of argument ; for such a method
of enquiry is the basis of a science of human nature, and, if
consistently followed, will lead to a coherent conception of that
nature as a single reality.

It is true that in the expression of his result Pomponazzi did
not get beyond the word " participation " — the participation of
the human intellectual soul in intelligence as such — and the
distinction of intellectus qua intellects from intellectus qua
humanus. In so far as this language represented a dualistic
mode of thought he failed to give perfect expression to the
unity of human nature. But the conception of the unity of
human nature in reality was the practical result of his enquiry,
as it was the natural result of the method which he followed.

Indeed, the distinction he draws between intellectus qua
intellectus or intellectus separatns and intellectus humanus is
precisely (apart from the dogma of the " separate " superior
Intelligences) Aristotle's distinction of separate reason and
rational soul. What underlies it is the distinction between a
metaphysical and a psychological view of reason, which neither
Aristotle nor his mediaeval disciple had clearly drawn. But
they had both a sufficient inkling of it to hold, even if in a
somewhat dogmatic way, that the possession of reason which
in itself is timeless and absolute does not destroy the psycho
logical unity of human nature as existing in time and in
concrete reality.

Participatio is a term that betrays the spurious metaphysics
of the Arabians — which had turned the distinction between a
metaphysical and a psychological view of reason into an onto-
logical distinction between a thinking principle and the soul.
But Pomponazzi did not mean by it what Averroes had meant.
Practically, he regarded human nature as Aristotle did. And at
the least it may be said that his philosophy was an attempt to

1 " Si anima intellectiva, quatenus intellect! va est, non est actus (scil. corporis),
ideo, quatenus intellectiva sit, non erit anima." Comm. de An. f. 151 r.

/8 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

discard metaphysical presuppositions and to base a doctrine of
human nature on the hypothesis of its unity and the observation
of its phenomena ; while, once more, whatever we may think of
his analysis and construction of human nature, we may recognise
the substitution of an empirical for a speculative, and a positive
for a dogmatic method.

I have said that Pomponazzi's method is best illustrated by
his criticisms of the accepted philosophies of his time. He is
essentially a critic and a dialectician, and both expounds and
develops his own views by means of the examination of received
opinions. We are justified in ascribing to him such a method
as has been indicated when we find him applying the same
canons of credibility, and addressing the same criticisms, to
theories so diverse from one another in their conclusions
(while similar in their speculative method) as the Averroist,
the Platonic, and the orthodox spiritualistic doctrines of the
soul.

He divides1 the possible theories of human nature into six,
differentiated by their view of the " mortal " and " immortal "
nature of man. By " mortal " and " immortal " he means the
same as if he had said " material " and " intellectual " ; for in
telligence is in its essential nature timeless, and not subject to
change or decay, while the body evidently decays and dies.
That man's nature possesses these two aspects he considers
beyond question-: as in the body, or, if you will, using the
body as an instrument, man is at least in one sense mortal ; as
exercising intelligence he partakes of that which is immaterial
and imperishable. Now, 'it may be said either that there are
here two separate beings or that one being combines two
aspects.

If the physical and the intellectual elements in man be two
different beings, then either (i) there are as many physical
beings and as many spiritual beings as there are individual men
(the Platonic doctrine of the soul) ; or (2) the physical body is
multiplied and the intellectual element is one in all men (the

1 De hum. cap. il. z Op. cit. cap. I.

POMPONAZZIS PSYCHOLOGY 79

Averroist doctrine of the common Intelligence) ; or (3) the
intellectual beings are many and the physical body one. The
third supposition is dismissed, as never having been put forward
by any one and as absurd in itself1. The Platonic and Averroist
theories are left.

The other alternative was that the human being is one nature
with two aspects. Here Pomponazzi distinguishes his own view
from that of St Thomas. Either (4) man is an intellectual —
spiritual and immortal — being in an absolute sense, with an
accidental and temporary relation to the body (simpliciter im-
mortalis, et secundum quid mortalis}; or (5) the relation to the
body is of his essential nature and his participation in timeless
and imperishable reason is only such as is consistent with that
relation (simpliciter mortalis, secundum quid immortalis]. We
need not be too much deterred by the barbarism of secundum
quid mortalis and immortalis — as if there could be shades and
degrees of mortality and immortality. These words are Pom-
ponazzi's compendious formula for the material and perishable
on the one hand, the "intellectual" and imperishable on the
other. And the question, as between him and St Thomas, is
the simple and not irrelevant one — whether on the one hand the
relation to the body is essential to the existence of the soul
(which St Thomas denied), or, on the other, the possession of
timeless reason is compatible with a genuinely and essentially
physical mode of existence (as Pomponazzi affirmed).

To complete his scheme Pomponazzi adds the possibility
, (6) that the human being is in an equal sense spiritual and
material2. Logically this possibility is exhausted in the alterna
tives already stated. As Pomponazzi says, in his scholastic way,
" Nothing can be constituted equally of two contraries ; one
must always be the dominant factor3." This notion also, like
(3), is a "man of straw."

1 " Quoniam inimaginabile est imam rem corpoream esse in tot distinctis loco et
subjecto, et maxime si est corruptibilis." De Imm. in. p. 9.

2 " Utrumque secundum quid amplexa est, scil. secundum quid mortalis et se
cundum quid immortalis." Op. cit. II. p. 8.

3 " Nihil aequaliter potest constitui ex duobus contrariis, sed semper oportet
unum alteri praedominari." Op. cit. in. p. 9.

80 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

Four theories then are left clearly distinguishable. In criti
cising them Pomponazzi maintains the Aristotelian standpoint,
comparing each with the observed facts of human physical life,
and guided by the formula " soul is the form of body " (anima
forma corporis).

In the doctrine of Averroes there were two main points —
first, that the intellectual principle was something separate from
the soul of man ; second, that it was one in all men.

With regard to the second point, Pomponazzi professes that
he has nothing to add to the arguments of St Thomas, which he
commends in terms of the highest praise1. It is evident, indeed,
that this part of the doctrine of Averroes had begun to lose all
credit, in presence of a more accurate knowledge of Aristotle.
In the Commentary on the De Anima Pomponazzi shews that
he fully understands whither the Averroist conception tends and
that the anima intellectiva, which is supposed to be one in all
men, is that which makes each man what he is2, so that there is
no escape from the monstrous consequences drawn by St Thomas.
But he no longer feels it necessary to argue the point; and
occupies himself by preference with an attempt to bring out the
more reasonable side of Averroes's doctrine implied in his con
cession of a vis cogitativa to the individual soul3. In the
chapter of the De Immortalitate devoted to Averroism he is
content with a summary assertion that the notion of union with
a superhuman intellectual principle as the end of man is an
arbitrary invention (" figmentum in se") morally impracticable
(" sic finis hominis irritus est ") and contrary to Aristotle. He
hazards the opinion, which perhaps was not far from the mark,
that the belief in the unity of intellectual souls in Averroes's
sense had never really been more than an academic theory4.

He was much more concerned about the question of the
" separateness " of the intellectual principle. Through various

1 De hnm. IV. p. n.

2 " Dat esse." Cotnm. de An, f. 135 r.

3 Op. cit. ff. 140 — 144.

4 " Imo existimo quod tanta fatuitas fuerit nedum credita, verum excogitata."
De Imm. iv. p. n.

POMPON AZZl'S PSYCHOLOGY 8 1

modification's, and particularly through the orthodox theory of
the soul, this part of Averroism was living still in many minds.
It is obvious that in his examination of it Pomponazzi was
preparing the way for his attack upon the " separate forms " of
St Thomas.

Before quoting, therefore, his apt criticism of the Averroist
"separate intelligence," we notice the geheral principles which
he lays down at the beginning of the De Immortalitate, and
applies consistently throughout all his discussions of these
subjects.

The question is whether an intellectual principle can exist, in
the case of man, in such self-subsistence and separation from the
body as to be independent of the body, and to continue to exist
\vjTpp fh*» Krviy T's no longer there. Pomponazzi proposes to
answer this question by an examination of the actual nature of
intelligence in man — the actual facts regarding human know
ledge. And he recalls the canon of Aristotle, which was also
universally accepted in the schools, that all human knowledge,
as such, requires the presentation in imagination of the data
of sense1. This psychological necessity was the nerve of
Pomponazzi's thinking and the basis of his argument about the
soul2. He inferred from it that it was impossible for the intel
lectual principle in man to exist in any absolute separation
from the body.

The argument is developed in logical form in the De Immor-
talitate^. To establish the separability of human intelligence
from the body, says Pomponazzi, it is necessary to find it
independent of the body both in its own essential nature as
intelligence (tanquam de subjecto) and in its reception of the
objects of knowledge (tanquam de objecto). Now independent in
the latter sense human intelligence can never be, according to
the obvious fact and the canon of Aristotle. As Pomponazzi
puts it, two conditions have to be established before the
" separate " existence of the soul can be held as proved ; it must

1 "Intelligere aut esse phantasiam aut non esse sine phantasia." Delmm.\v.
p. 12.

2 Of. cit. cap. iv. wa&fttsrim ; Comm. de An. f. 250 and passim.

3 De hum. cap. iv.

D. 6

82 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

be independent of body in both the senses named above. If
it fail in either, the proof has fallen. If the corporeal embodi
ment be necessary either on the one ground or on the other, we
have no right to speak of a disembodied human intelligence.
The statement of the case against " separability" takes the form
of a disjunctive proposition, and can only be met by a conjunc
tive affirmation against both clauses1.

It is not sufficient to argue from the independence of in
telligence in itself (tanquam de subjecto]. All Averroists argued,
and Pomponazzi himself held, that the only subjectmn of thought
is thought ; but independence in this sense, he contended, was
not equivalent to absolute independence of the body ; for
dependence de subjecto was not the only way in which intelli
gence might be dependent on the body. Human intelligence
in its intrinsic and essential nature acts and exists only in its
reception of the objects of knowledge, and in respect of this
(tanquam de objecto} it is dependent on body2.

It might be thought that Aristotle made the intellectual soul
immaterial in an unqualified sense (simpliciter) when he ascribed
to it the reception of all material forms. But still the question
remains, after what manner does human intelligence receive
knowledge? And even to intelligence in man Aristotle at
tributed a passive attitude (" intellectus possibilis est virtus
passiva ") ; he likens it to sense in the mode of its operation
(" intelligere est sicut sentire"); and it depends for its operation,
and actual existence, on the senses and material things (" intel
lectus movetur a corpore...suum motivum est phantasma ").
All this, says Pomponazzi, looks rather in the direction of

1 " Disjunctivaque affirmativa contradicat copulativae affirmativae factae de par-
tibus oppositis. Si igitur ad inseparabilitatem sufficit alternative vel esse in organo
tanquam in subjecto vel ab ipso dependere tanquam ab objecto, igitur ad separabili-
tatem conjunctim requiritur, neque dependere ab organo tanquam a subjecto, neque
tanquam ab objecto." De Imm. IV. p. 17.

" Ad separabilitatem ambae conditiones requiruntur, quia copulativa affirmativa
opponitur disjunctivae factae ex partibus oppositis : ad sciendum ergo animam esse
separabilem oportet quod neque indigeat corpore tanquam subjecto, neque tanquam
objecto." Op. dt. vin. pp. 38, 39.

2 " Positio ponens organicum subjective et materiale convert!, et pariter opposita
eorum scilicet non organicum subjective et immateriale converti, falsa est." Op.
cit. IV. pp. 20, 21.

POMPONAZZl'S PSYCHOLOGY 83

materiality than of immateriality1. These are the thoughts
which Pomponazzi develops with every variety of application,
throughout his writings.

Meanwhile he is specially concerned with the Averroists and
their theory of intellectus separatus. How, he asks, is that theory
brought into relation with the actual fact of intellectual action
in individuals? How, in particular, if the intellectual soul be
a being metaphysically distinct from the sensitive individual
soul, can the action of the intellectual soul be conditioned as all
human thought is by sense-apprehension ?

The most plausible answer of the Averroists was that the
intellectual soul had a twofold mode of existence — secundnm se,
and quoad nos. The argument against total separateness from
body was allowed to hold good so far as the intellectual prin
ciple is "in man"; while "in itself" it was not subject to
Aristotle's rule2. The same idea is referred to in the Com
mentary on the De Anima, where after a contemptuous
reference to the self-styled Averroists of his own day, who
escaped the difficulty by abandoning the doctrine of their
master altogether3, Pomponazzi goes on : " Therefore others
give a different account more in accordance with the intention
of the Commentator : namely, that the intellectual soul has two
modes of intellection, one in relation to us, that is, for us only,
and that, in this aspect, it cannot think without the mediation of
an organ, and therefore that, in this aspect, the intellectual soul
is the actuality of body4." This theory was supported by the

1 De I»im. iv. p. 18.

2 " Non video aliam responsionem nisi quod argumentum ostendit de intelligere
humano et quatenus per eum intellecturn homo dicitur intelligens : sic enim verificatur
quod semper indiget phantasmate...verum si secundum se sumatur intellectus nequa-
quam a phantasmate dependet." Op. cit. IV. pp. 1-2, 13.

3 " Surrexit quaedam nova secta de novo incipientium philosophari dicentium, ad
mentem Averrois, quod anima intellectiva, in intelligendo, semper eget organo, non
tanquam subjecto, sed ut objecto, et ita anima intellectiva est actus corporis. De hoc
nihil vel parum dixi in mea quaestione, quia non credebam aliquem esse ita fatuum,
qui hoc diceret." Comm. de An. ff. -252 v, 253 r.

4 " Ideo aliter dicunt alii et magis ad mentem Commentatoris, quod anima in
tellectiva habet duas intellectiones, unam in ordine ad nos, scilicet quoad nos ; et,
ut sic, non potest intelligere nisi mediante organo, et ideo, ut sic, anima intellectiva
est actus corporis." Comm. de An. f. -253 r.

6—2

84 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

supposed analogy of the spheral Intelligences, which (it was
said) may be considered in two ways, in relation to their
spheres, or in se ; and are really separate from, and independent
of, their spheres. So, by analogy, might the " common Intelli
gence" of men be considered — " uno modo ut est infima intelli-
gentiarum," and also " alio modo in ordine ad suam sphaeram."
In the second aspect the human intelligence was the subject
of scientia naturalis ; in the former it was " the business of the
metaphysician." The canon of Aristotle held good for intelli
gence quoad nos, but not simpliciter*.
The original vice of Averroism

" Che per sua dottrina fe' disgiunto
Dall' anima il possibile intelletto2"

was dualism ; and, in a speculative system, the metaphysical
dualism which is caused by a false abstraction is always a flaw
which runs from top to bottom. The separation of reason from
the natural soul was repeated in a division within human nature
between intellect and sense ; and when the separated intellectual
principle was required to account for the actual facts of intelli
gence (from which it had originally been inferred !) it could only
do so on the hypothesis of its having a twofold existence and
twofold operation.

Pomponazzi had already signalised Averroism as a dualistic
theory3; and now he treats as arbitrary and unfounded this
supplementary hypothesis of a double mode of being for the
intellectual principle.

He brings the theory at once to the bar of the Aristotelian
definition4: " Soul is the actuality of a natural organic body, etc.
Therefore intellectual soul is the actuality of a natural organic
body." With regard to the analogy of the spheres, he insists
that the whole point lies in the difference between human
intelligence and the superior Intelligences (in which he himself

1 De Imm. iv. p. 14.

2 Dante, Purgatorio XXV.

3 Op. cit. cap. II. Cf. vii. p. 30: "Cum itaque universaliter rejectus sit modus
qui intellectivum et sensitivum in homine distingui realiter existimat," etc.

4 " Anima est actus corporis physici organici, etc. Ergo anima intellectiva est
actus corporis physici organici." Op. cit. iv. p. 13.

POMPONAZZl'S PSYCHOLOGY 85

of course believes). Aristotle, he says, did not discuss the
human soul with the spheral Intelligences in the Metaphysics,
but made it expressly a matter of " natural science." And while
the higher Intelligences (as was believed) required body only for
motion, being independent of sense and " separate " in thought,
this was precisely not the case with man1.

Thus Pomponazzi appeals to facts and to the actual nature
of human intelligence, which is only known to us as in a soul
which is forma corporis. Finally, he condemns the unreasonable
ness of supposing two modes of being for that which is only
known and only knowable in one. It may be possible to
conceive beings who in one operation (motion) require bodies,
in another (thought) do not. But in the case of man it is that
very operation which is in question, namely thought, in which
according to all our knowledge and observation of man he does
require the body. Such is Pomponazzi's argument2.

Since already in answer to Averroes he had devoted more
time to the "separability" of the intellectual soul than to its
unity, he passes rapidly over the second dualistic theory of
human nature, which he associates with the name of Plato, and
which differs from the former only in assigning a separate
intellectual soul to each individual man3. Such a conception,
however, which he represents by the formula4 " Man is soul that
uses a body," he declares to be completely opposed to the
Aristotelian doctrine of forma corporis. He criticises it as
destroying the unity of human nature, which after all is the
datum in these questions5 ; " Soul and body would have no
greater unity than the oxen and the plough." Putting the same
thing in Aristotelian language, he points out that two inde
pendent entities, such as body and soul were by this theory
supposed to be, do not make one composite being in the true

1 De hum. IV. p. 15.

2 See note i, p. 76.

3 " Intellectivum realiter distinguitur a sensitive... verum.-.secund urn numerum
sensitivorum ponit numerum intellectivorum." Op. cit. v. p. 27.

4 " Hominem esse animam utentem corpore." Op. cit. v. p. 28.

8 " Anima et corpus non haberent majorem unitatem quam boves et plaustrum."
Op. cit. vi. p. 28.

86 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

sense of the word. Herein, he says, is the difference between
the theory that relates soul and body to each other as correla
tive form and matter, and that which relates them externally
as motor and motum.

He carries this criticism a stage further by shewing the
absolute necessity in common sense and experience for finding
some relation between the soul as intellectual and the soul as
sensitive. I who feel am the same as I who think ; I feel pain,
say, and devise a remedy. (This is borrowed from St Thomas.)
On the theory of a separate self-subsisting intellectual soul, we
cannot, in short, construe human nature as a unity. Aristotle's
distinction between the sensitive and intellectual souls was not
this distinction of two separate real entities ; he spoke of one
soul in different aspects or functions1.

The orthodox scholastic or Thomist doctrine, while really
regarding the soul as a " spiritual substance," professed to differ
from " Platonism," as it understood Platonism, in that it
claimed at the same time to maintain the unity of body and
soul. To describe it roughly — it may be said to have taught
that the soul was both a separate substance and the " form of
the body."

Pomponazzi disputed this claim by shewing the inconsistency
of such a position. It was the point of his criticism of St Thomas,
that this combination of ideas ascribed to the soul — to the same
being and at the same time — two different modes of operation
and of existence ; the one verifiable by empirical observation
and the analysis of human nature, the other arbitrarily invented
on speculative grounds.

Pomponazzi's philosophical writings are one prolonged criti
cism of the Thomist doctrine. It may be said never to be out
of his sight for a moment. But without giving a complete
account of his argument against St Thomas, an attempt may
be made to distinguish its chief points.

St Thomas's doctrine of the soul consisted of two parts. In
the first place, it was an account of the present relation of the

1 Cf- Comm. tie An. f. 254 ; De Imm. cap. vi.

POMPONAZZl'S PSYCHOLOGY 87

soul to the body — as at once constituting the existence of the
body, organised and animated, and itself, in so far as anima
intellectiva, still independent of the body. In the second
place, he rested on this state of matters the inference of the
possibility of the soul's continued existence after the body has
ceased to be.

The various arguments of Pomponazzi against the Thomist
conception of soul and body may be analysed and arranged
somewhat as follows. First (a) he shewed it to be inconsistent
with the definition of the soul ; which meant really, inconsistent
with all our attainable verifiable knowledge of the soul.
Secondly (b} he pointed out that there was no more reason to
detach " intellectual soul " from the body and remove it from
the category of forma corporis, than there was in the case of
(say) the sensitive soul ; seeing that intelligence as human is
essentially dependent on a corporeal organisation. Next he
argued that the suggested notion of the substance of the soul
as a "separable form" was (c) inconceivable in itself; and
(d} incompatible with the unity of the human being. Finally
he insisted (e) that the "separate" subsistence of the soul,
whether in its present connection with the body, or, in a future
state, altogether without the body, really implied that the same
being should have two different natures, two opposite modes of
existence.

(a) The mixed notion of the Thomists was undoubtedly
different from the conception represented by the Aristotelian
definition of the soul ; but they themselves did not admit that
it was so. The definition was their own accepted standard for
all theorising about the soul ; and Pomponazzi's point against
them was that, if the human soul as endowed with the power of
thought (anima qua intellectivd) was no longer to be thought of
in conformity with the definition, it should no longer be de
nominated a " soul " at all. Now the schoolmen appreciated the
natural or biological doctrine of Aristotle about the soul, and
the positive and empirical method by which it was reached. It
was therefore a valid argument against them that, in such a
metaphysical notion of the rational soul of man as they had
framed, they had set the rational soul beyond the scope of

88 P1ETRO POMPONAZZI

Aristotle's thought and beyond the reach of his analytical
method1.

(b) Further, on positive grounds, the intellectual soul of
man was not to be removed from the scope of the definition,
since intelligence as it is in man acts by no means in independ
ence of the body, but, on the contrary, always and only in the
body. Accordingly, when in the De Immortalitate Pomponazzi
comes to deal with the Thomist notion of the " separable "
intellectual principle, he repeats and applies the identical
arguments which he had employed against the Averroist con
ception of it2.

Such an intelligence as man's is, depending for all its
operation on sense and sensuous imagination, and thus united
in the most inseparable way with those psychical powers which
are admittedly bound up in the body, does not by its nature
require a separate and peculiar mode of being. It is not
necessary, the argument is, to deny to the soul of man as
possessed of rational thought, the name of forma corporis, since
all human rational thought is exercised in dependence on the
body (if not tanquam de subjecto, yet tanquam de objectoY-

At the place in the De Immortalitate where he presses
the point that embodiment is of the very nature of intelli
gence as known in man, and also in the corresponding passage
of the Commentary on the De Anima, Pomponazzi examines

1 " Dicit ergo Thomas in prima parte, in Quaes'tionibus Disputatis, et in multis
aliis locis ubi pertractat hanc materiam semper dat hanc responsionem, dicendo quod
intellectus noster, quantum est de ratione sui et ratione potentiarum intellectivarum,
sic non est actus corporis, sed ratione sensitivarum sic est actus corporis. Quando
ergo dicitur 'intellectus nullius corporis est actus,' intelligitur de intellectu ratione
potentiarum intellectivarum. Sed contra hanc ratiocinationem arguo sic ; quia si
anima intellectiva, quatenus intellectiva est, non est actus, ideo quatenus intellectiva
est, non erit anima: quod est contra Aristotelem ponentem illam esse definitionem
communem omni animae, imo secundum Thomam, dictam univoce de omnibus anima-
bus." Comm. de An. ff. 251 v., 252 r.

"Sed hinc forte dicitur quod anima humana quantum ad intellectum non est actus
corporis organici, cum intellectus nullius corporis sit actus, sed solum quantum ad
opera sensitivae et vegetativae. Verum id videtur non posse stare ; in primis, quia
sic anima intellectiva non esset anima." De /mm, vm. pp. 39, 40.

2 See op. cit. cap. VI 1 1.; Comm. de Anima, f. 137, and passim.

3 " Ergo si anima est actus corporis organici quantum ad sensationem, hoc est pro
sua intellectione ; ergo in omni suo intelligere indiget phantasia. Sed si sic est, ipsa
est materialis ; ergo anima intellectiva est materialis." De /mm. vm. p. 40.

POMPONAZZI'S PSYCHOLOGY 89

a logical quibble by which it was sought to avoid his conclu
sion. Soul, it was said, might have a capability to be the form
of body (aptitudo\ and might be defined by that capability,
though the possibility was not realised ; just as " lightness," for
example, is defined as the capability of moving upward, while
yet the light object may not always so move. In replying that
a mere unrealised possibility would not suffice for a definition —
for then a thing might really possess none of the qualities by
which it was defined1 — Pomponazzi brings out clearly his point
that the definition of soul by its relation to body must be taken
seriously as the very description of its actual nature. It is, he
says, a definition, in the sense that the quality which it attributes
to the soul is that in virtue of which the soul is what it is. If
the soul were supposed not to be in relation to body, it would
not be known at all as we know it ; it would not be what we
find it to be. The soul is in relation to body. This belongs to
the definition of "the soul." And a thing cannot be only
potentially that which it is determined to be2.

(c) Again, Pomponazzi effectively criticises St Thomas's
perversion of the Aristotelian notion of form, in his doctrine of
" separate " or " substantial " forms. While allowing that the
soul, as " naturally " considered, is one aspect of a composite
being in the Aristotelian sense, characterised by " form and
matter," St Thomas pronounced the soul as rational or possessed
of intelligence (qua intellective?) to be a form in an altogether
different sense. Forms which have no separate subsistence, and
no operation except as conjoined with matter in a compositum,
strictly speaking do not exist ; but something exists in virtue of
them3. It is otherwise with "separable" forms; they are self-
subsistent (" sunt per esse suum ").

Pomponazzi altogether refuses to recognise this as a develop
ment of the Aristotelian conception. He denies the name of
" forms " to these " essences " ; and refuses to allow that if they
were what they were supposed to be — self-existing substances —

" Si sola aptitudo sufficeret in definitionibus, tune dici posset quod aliquid esset
homo, et tamen actu non esset animal rationale : sufficeret enim secundum respon-
sionem quod esset aptitudine." Op. cit. vm. p. 41.

- See loc. cit. ; and, almost in the same words, Comni. de An. f. 251 v.

3 " Proprie loquendo non sunt, sed eis aliquid est." St Thomas, De unitate
intellect™, f. 990 I.

9O PIETRO POMPONAZZI

they could in any sense be the " forms " of material bodies as
well. For a form in the latter sense, which is Aristotle's sense —
actus materiae — is not "an existent" (quod est\ but (as St Thomas
himself knew well) that " in virtue of which something exists "
(quo aliquid est}. This then is Pomponazzi's criticism. " It is
necessary that a form of this kind should be a ' this ' and subsist
through itself ; how then could it happen that it should be the
actuality and completion of what is material, since such a thing,
namely the actuality of what is material, is not an existent, but
that in virtue of which something exists1?" Similarly in the
Commentary he clearly apprehends, and applies to the same
effect, Aristotle's distinction of form and substance. " The
peculiarity of a substance is not to exist as dependent : the soul
is dependent: therefore etc.... The peculiarity of a substance is
to subsist per se and to be the ground of attributes : but the
soul does not subsist per se and is not the ground of attributes :
therefore etc.2"

Whatever therefore may be said of these self-subsistent
rational souls (essentiae per se stantes], they are not " forms " in
the Aristotelian sense. St Thomas no doubt would say that
the soul has a unique mode of existence and that when it is
called a " form " the word is used in a peculiar sense. But this
Pomponazzi justly characterises as arbitrary; and he pronounces
it unsatisfactory, in an attempt to explain the mode of existence
of the soul, to introduce the supposition of a unique and peculiar
mode of existence : this seems to be dogmatic and to bring
suspicion upon the whole hypothesis of substantial souls3.
Pomponazzi expresses surprise that St Thomas did not declare
for Platonism outright : Platonism is at least consistent, and
certainly preferable to this attempt to join with the doctrine of
Aristotle a conception wholly foreign to it4.

1 " Oportet talem essentiam esse hoc aliquid et per se stans ; quomodo igitur fieri
poterit ut sit actus et perfectio materiae, cum tale, scilicet actus materiae, sit non quod
est, sed quo aliquid est?" De I mm. vm. p. 46.

2 " Proprium est substantiae in subjecto non esse; anima est in subjecto: ergo....
Proprium est substantiae per se stare et accidentibus substare; sed anima non per se
stat, nee accidentibus substat: ergo." Comtn. de An. f. 48 v.

" Quod si dicitur hoc esse peculiare animae intellectivae ; hoc est valde sus-
pectum, et voluntarie dictum." De I mm. vin. p. 46.

4 "Quare sapienter mihi visus est Plato dicere ponens animam immortalem, quod

POMPON AZZI'S PSYCHOLOGY 9 1

Pomponazzi professes himself entirely unable to understand
the mode of being which it was thus proposed to assign to the
"substantial" souls; a being composed of matter and form he
understood, and a form quo aliquid est, but not this essence
which was both a form and a substance, or was neither1.

(d} But if the "separate" soul be thus something quite
different from the "form" of Aristotle's doctrine of soul and
body, all the ancient difficulties as to the relation of the two
return. Body as a self-subsisting substance, soul as a self-subsist
ing substance — how are they related ? We are reduced to the
Platonic dualism : we have lost the only clue to the interpreta
tion of human nature as a unity. Pomponazzi reproduces in his
Commentary the dialectic in which Alexander of Aphrodisias
had refuted the Stoical conception of the soul as a substance,
and by which he had shewn the inconceivability of two sub
stantial beings interpenetrating one another, and the impossibility
of relating soul and body on any other terms than those of form
and matter2. In another place he brings home to the Thomists,
on their master's own principles, that this last is the only way in
which the relation can be conceived3.

(e) But his most frequent criticism of St Thomas's doctrine
was that it assigned to the soul of man two modes of being. On
the one hand, the soul was to have that mode of being which is
described in the Aristotelian definition, and verified by all that
we can have in the way of observation and experience, in which
it is not properly an existence (quod est) but forma qua aliquid

verius homo est anima utens corpora quam compositum ex anima et corpore, et
verius eius motor scilicet corporis quam eius forma, cum anima sit illud quod vere
est et vere existit, et potest induere corpus et eo spoliari. Non video enim quin et
D. Thomas non habeat hoc dicere." Op. cit. vm. pp. 46, 47.

1 " Esset quoque difficultas de esse compositi quod ponitur distinctum ab esse
animae, quodnam est illud esse, et quodnam corrumpitur ; de quo etsi ipsi multa
dicant, fateor me eorum verba tenere, sed non sensum." Op. cit. vm. p. 46.

2 Comm. de An. ff. 134, 135.

3 " Sumo essentiam animae intellectivae in homine ; tune ipsa est substantia, vel
ergo forma, vel materia, vel compositum. Non compositum, quia sic non esset pars
hominis ; nee materia ut omnes concedunt ; ergo forma et non nisi corporis ; ideo
intellectiva, quatenus talis, non est forma nisi corporis. Item ipse dicit quod in
tellect! va est actu pars essentialis ipsius hominis; ideo oportet, quod cum ex ipsa et
corpore fecit (fiat) unum per se, quod ipsa sit actus et corpus potentia ; alUer non
fieret unum per se." Op. cit. f. 252 r.

p2 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

est (aliquid in this case being corpus animatinti), and in which it
is of course inseparable from a body. On the other hand it was
to exist as a separate substance — itself presumably constituted
of " form and matter " — already independent of the body, and in
a future state actually to be detached from it. Now to assign
thus to any object of knowledge two inconsistent and irre
concilable, yet, by the hypothesis, simultaneous modes of
existence, appeared to Pomponazzi strictly unreasonable1. The
nature of anything is only to be known as it shews itself to be.
We must take the soul and the nature of human intelligence as
they are given to us in actual experience ; and so they are
described in the definition. To ascribe any other nature to the
soul on a speculative ground is dogmatic and arbitrary. If there
fore we abandon Aristotle's definition we are plunged in hopeless
confusion ; if we leave the ground of actual experience, we can
have no sure knowledge about the soul at all2.

It was the same consideration which made the orthodox
idea of the condition of the individual soul in the future state so
inconceivable to Pomponazzi. It was in the future state that
the " separate " subsistence of the soul was to be fully realised.
For St Thomas and his followers perceived the difficulty of
maintaining its separateness in any absolute sense so far as the
present life was concerned. It is true that a certain theoretical
independence of the body even in the present life was entirely
necessary for their theory, and was the ultimate foundation of
the belief in a disembodied existence hereafter. But actually,
in the present, they admitted, the soul is not separate from the
body. It comes into existence along with the body (although,
as they held, by an act of special creation) : it continues to be
attached to the body ; and the exercise of even its highest or

1 " Tamque diversi modi operandi, scilicet per phantasma et sine phantasmate,
videntur arguere diversitatem essentiae." De Imm. vm. pp. 42, 43. Cf. ix. p. 71 :
" Neque plures modi cognoscendi ab Aristotele in aliquo loco sunt reperti, neque
consonat rationi." — IX. p. 56: "Neque apud Aristotelem fingendum est quod iste
modus intelligendi intellectus humani sit ei accidentalis, scilicet moveri ab objecto
et non indigere subjecto, turn quia unius rei est tantum unus modus operandi
essentialis."

2 "Nam hoc modo sublato nulla restat via probandi diversitatoin specificam inter
aliqua." Op, cit. vm. p. 43.

POMPONAZZl'S PSYCHOLOGY 93

intellectual powers is conditioned by the body and bodily
functions, just as the senses, the imagination, etc., were allowed
to be. Accordingly in the argument for immortality a new
element was introduced. The soul, it was suggested, during its
existence in attachment to the body acquires a " habit " of
existence in virtue of which it continues to exist after the bond
that united it to the body is dissolved. A figure employed by
the Thomists to illustrate this idea was that of water frozen in a
bottle, which, the bottle being broken, retains the shape into
which it has been congealed1.

By this supplementary explanation they escaped some of
the difficulties of their theory of the " separate " anima intel-
lectiva ; and they were able to assent to the definition of
Aristotle and to his doctrine of knowledge as truey^r the present
state of the soul2.

This was, as Pomponazzi says, their last resort ("ultima
ratiocinatio"); but in spite of this explanation he still urged his
objections. In the first place, the theory still depended on a
separate subsistence of the intellectual soul in the present life.
Metaphysically, and as it were de jure, the soul was independent,
and the Thomists clearly affirmed it to be so. And Pomponazzi
pressed the demand for evidence of such a mode of existence,
and insisted on its logical inconsistency with the conception of
soul as forma corporis, and the impossibility of reconciling it
with all the actual and verifiable experience in which we know
the soul.

In the second place, taking the Thomist theory on its own
terms, as referring the fully separate and independent condition
of the soul to its disembodied state after death, he still questioned
their right to ascribe to the same being two entirely opposite
modes of existence, or to the same name two different meanings.
For what, he asked, is the change that is supposed to pass upon

1 Florentine, Pomponazzi, p. 236.

2 " Ilia (sell. ' anima non est sine phantasia') secundum Thomam est vera in hoc
statu, non autem in alio in quo nostrum intelligere est sine phantasia." Comm, de
An. f. 250 v. "Expresse vult (Philosophus) quod inlelligere animae nostrae ortum
habeat a sensu. Ad hoc credo quod Thomas diceret, et est ultima ratiocinatio quam
possit dare, quod verum est quod intellectus eget corpore pro sua operatione, sed non
semper, sed pro statu isto; pro alio vero non." Op. cit. f. 252 v.

94 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

the human intelligence when, from a condition in which it is
known solely as the "form" of body, and finds exercise only in
virtue of sensuous experience, it enters a condition in which it
is disembodied, and the old avenues of knowledge are wholly
removed ? It is nothing less than a change of nature. " For to
say, as those wish to do who affirm that the human soul is
immortal in the full sense, that the intellect itself has two
modes of cognition, one entirely without the use of images, the
other accompanied by them, is to transmute human nature into
divine — Thus the human soul would be made divine, since it
would assume the mode of activity that belongs to Divine
beings, and thus we should commit ourselves to the legends of
Ovid, namely to the view that one nature can be transmuted
into another1."

What is implied is an essential alteration. The thing we
call human intelligence will no longer be the same ; for its
operations will be different : and a thing is what its essential
operations are2. There will be a different mode of intelligence ;
for the body and the senses are essential to human intelligence
as it is here, to human intelligence as Aristotle described it and
as we know it to be. There will be a different mode of being.

It is then expressly on these grounds that Pomponazzi rests
his denial of immortality, namely, that the soul cannot now have
simultaneously two incompatible modes of existence, and that it
is equally impossible to imagine it existing hereafter in a form
wholly different from all that we now know it to be. Accordingly,
speaking of his doctrine of mortality, he says " The whole root
of this theory is based on the ground that the human intellect
has only one mode of intellection3." And whatever on rational
or moral grounds may be expected in the future for conscious
ness as individually personified, Pomponazzi made it clear that

1 " Dicere enim ut volunt affirmantes intellectum humanum esse absolute im-
mortalem, ipsum intellectum duos habere modos cognoscendi, scilicet sine phantasmate
omnino, et aliimi cum phantasmate, est transmutare naturam humanam in divinam —
Sic anima humana simpliciter efficeretur divina, cum modum operandi Divinorum
sumeret, et sic poneremus fabulas Ovidii, scilicet naturam in alteram naturam trans-
mutari." De 1mm. IX. pp. 71, 72 ; cf. p. 56.

2 " Unius rei est tantum unus modus operandi essentialis." Op. cit. IX. p. 56.

3 "Tola radix hujus positionis innititur ei fundamento, scilicet quod intellectus
humanus non habet nisi unum modum intelligendi." Op. cit. XI. p. 86.

POMPONAZZIS PSYCHOLOGY 95

a doctrine of immortality cannot safely rest upon the theory of
self-existing spiritual substances. The leap from the " soul " of
experience (forma corporis} to the " disembodied spirit " of theo
logical speculation is beyond the power of reason. Pomponazzi
therefore states his conclusion : " Wherefore since all these state
ments seem irrational and contrary to Aristotle, it seems more
rational to suppose that the human soul, being the highest and
most complete of material forms, is really that by means of
which a substantial existence exists and in no sense itself a
substantial existence; so that it really is a form which begins to
exist and ceases to exist at the same time as the body, and
which on no terms can operate or exist apart from it, and has
only one mode of existing or operating1."

In such arguments, then, Pomponazzi's method is to depend
on experience. If we are not to hold human intelligence to be
as it is actually determined, all certainty is taken from us. He
asks for evidence before we can believe in any other mode of
being. " If this method be rejected, there is no way of proving
specific difference between things2." "By no evidence of expe
rience is it possible to be convinced that the human intellect has
any other mode of intellection, as we see by trial, since we
always need an image3." He firmly holds to it that the mode of
human existence which we know is its essential mode. Other
modes of existence there may be. The animals have a different
being from man's: the higher Intelligences another being still:
but man is man. One nature is not changed into another4.

1 "Quapropter cum haec omnia irrationabilia et ab Aristotele aliena esse vide-
antur, ideo rationabilius videtur quod aninia humana cum sit suprema et perfectissima
materialium formarum, vere est quo aliquid est hoc aliquid, et nullo modo ipsa vere
est hoc aliquid, quare vere est forma simul incipiens et desinens esse cum corpore,
neque aliquo pacto potest operari vel esse sine eo, unumque tantum modum essendi
vel operandi habet." Op. cit. ix. pp. 61, 63.

2 "Hoc modo sublato nulla restat via probandi diversitatem specificam inter
aliqua." Op. cit. vm. p. 43.

3 "Pernullum naturale signum cognosci potest intellectum humanum habere alium
modum intelligendi ut experimento comprehendimus, quoniam semper indigemus
phantasmate." Op. cit. ix. p. 56.

4 "Neque apud Aristotelem fingendum est quod iste modus intelligendi intellectus
humani sit ei accidentalis, scilicet moveri ab objecto et non indigere subjecto ; turn
quia unius rei est tantum unus modus operandi essentialis ; turn quia sicut modus
sensitivi nunquam transmutatur in modum intelligentiae vel intellectus humani, ne-

g6 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

Repeatedly he insists upon this point, that to allow the
existence of the soul as a separate substantial being, whether
now in temporary conjunction with the body, or in an imagined
future self-subsistence, is to assign to man a nature other than
his own, other than that which essentially distinguishes him and
makes him what he is. It is to confound things that differ, to
transform the human into the Divine1.

The whole mode of thought, he concludes, which is repre
sented by the notion of " separate soul," is not that of empirical
analysis and observation, but that of a priori speculation. And
this is true both of the Averroist and of St Thomas's form of the
doctrine. The common intellectual principle, the spiritual sub
stances, are affirmed not on scientific but on metaphysical and
theological grounds2.

que modus intelligentiae in modum humani vel sensitivi, ita pariter modus humanus
intelligendi non videtur posse transmutari in modum intelligentiae, quod esset si
intelligent absque indigentia corporis ut subject! et objecti ; hoc etiam firmatur,
quia sic natura transmutaretur in alteram naturam, cum operationes essentiales
transmutarentur. Amplius per nullum naturale signum cognosci potest intellectual
humanum habere alium modum intelligendi ut experimento comprehendimus, quo-
niam semper indigemus phantasmate : Quare concluditur quod hie modus intelligendi
per phantasma est essentialis homini." Op. cit. IX. p. 56.

1 " Tamque diversi modi operand!, scilicet per phantasma et sine phantasmate,
videntur arguere diversitatem essentiae." De Imm. vm. p. 43. Pomponazzi quotes
with approval the saying of Averroes, " Quod si qui essent homines qui non eodem
modo cognoscerent sicut nos, non essent ejusdem generis nobiscum." Op. cit. vm.

P- 43-

" " Anima nostra in aliqua operatione per se non egeret materia et sic quantum
ad istam operationem qua, secundum Averroem, intelligit semper, vel secundum
Thomam, pro alio statu, non consideraretur (a physico) sed a metaphysico, ex quo
non eget corpore in ista operatione, et sic dictum Aristotelis in secundo (primo?)
de anima plus non esset verum quia consideratio naturalis stat usque ad animam."
Comt/i. de An. f. 251 r.

A concise summary of Pomponazzi's criticism of Averroes and St Thomas is
found in the Commentary on the De Anima, ff. 250 to 254, where he states in clear
terms the result he has arrived at. The soul is not "separate" from the body here,
and there is " no reason " (" non est ratio ") to suppose it will so exist hereafter.
"Concerning the intellectual soul I hold in accordance with Aristotle that it essentially
depends on body, both for its existence and for its intellection, and can neither exist
without body nor operate without a corporeal organ. There is no reason to sup
pose that we think after death (through a corporeal organ), but there is reason
for supposing that in this world we do think through a corporeal organ in respect
of (he object... our soul — in so far as it is a concrete intellectual soul— uses in in
tellection a corporeal organ, and is not altogether independent of a corporeal organ.
Yet it does not altogether and in every way need a corporeal organ, since it does not

POMPONAZZl'S PSYCHOLOGY 97

need it as the ground of its existence — In its operation it does not need a body in this
way, but in reference to the object of thought it does, because whatever is thought by our
mind is thought by means of something corporeal."

"De intellectiva (scil. anima) autemdico quod, secundum Aristotelem, essentialiter
et in essendo et in intelligendo dependet a corpora, neque potest esse sine corpore,
neque intelligere sine organo corporeo ; quod enim post mortem intelligamus non est
ratio, sed in hoc mundo quod intelligamus per organum corporeum tanquam per
objectum est ratio. ...Anima autem nostra secundum quod est intellectiva realis (utitur)
in intelligendo organo corporeo, nee ex toto absolvitur ab organo corporeo; nee
enim ex toto et omni modo in intelligendo eget organo corporeo, quia non eget eo ut
subjecto — In ista sua operatione non eget corpore ut subjecto sed bene ut objecto,
quia quidquid intelligatur ab anima nostra intelligitur per aliquid corporeum." Comm,
de An. ff. 253 v, 254 r.

D.

CHAPTER V

THE SOUL

IT has by this time appeared that the doctrine of the
mortality of the human soul, by which the name of Pomponazzi
is best known, was but a consequence of his general view of the_
soul's nature. The question of the mortality or immortality of
the soul was the question whether the soul were separable or
inseparable from the body, whether, that is, it were in its nature
"material" or "immaterial." In all Pomponazzi's discussions,
these three questions were treated as convertible : they were the
same question in different forms. It was upon this question
that he took up that curious and interesting middle position,
that the soul is "material and immaterial" — that conception of
" mind in matter " which is the characteristic feature of his
philosophy. Meanwhile the arguments on which he most relies
to prove the mortality of the soul, although he avails himself
also of various ethical and cosmological considerations, are argu
ments drawn from the nature of intelligence as in man1.

His conception of the problem of immortality found expres
sion, accordingly, in words like these: "Pomponazzi enquires
whether the soul be mortal or no ; and it must first be asked
whether it be material ; for if it be material, it is mortal ; if it
be immaterial, it is immortal2."

1 Cf. De hum. cc. vm. and IX. ; Comin. de An. ff. 130, 131, 137; Apologia,
Lib. I. cap. iii.

2 " Quaerit Pomponatius utrum anima sit mortalis, vel non; et primum quaerendum
est utrum sit materialis ; si enim est materialis est mortalis, si est immaterialis est
immortalis." Comm. de An. f. i3or.

THE SOUL 99

Holding firmly to his idea that the human soul has and can
have but one mode of existence, that human intelligence has not
and never can have any other than one way of knowing, he
enquires what this nature is, and this mode of operation ; pro
posing so to determine whether a disembodied and post-mundane
existence be compatible with the nature of the soul.

He does not find this question determined by any organic
unity of body and mind, any subsistence of mind in body, which
should make mind a merely physical or material product. On
the contrary he holds that in its highest, its truly characteristic
functions, mind does not employ any specific physical organ
at all1.

But two opposite aspects of mental action equally impressed
Pomponazzi ; and the fact of their combination was the problem
which he set himself to solve. He found the characteristic
quality of thought as such, and thus of human thought, to be
the possibility of abstraction from all particulars, in indepen
dence of every limitation of hie et mine and with absolute
transcendence of all material conditions. On the other hand,
following Aristotle, he noticed the dependence of thought on its
object, the acquisition of all knowledge through sense-expe
rience, and the apprehension of the universal, by us, only in
the particular instance2.

The customary arguments for the "immateriality" of intelli
gence were three in number: (a) the power to receive the "forms"
of material things, implying indifference to those or to any
particular forms3 ; (b} the power to think in universals* and

1 De Imm. X. p. 80. " Intellectui, qua intellectus est, accidit esse in materia,
non tamen in aliqua parte ponitur corporis ipsum intelligere, sed in toto categore-
matice sumpto ; non enim in aliqua parte, quoniam sic esset organicus intellectus, et
vel non omnia cognosceret, vel si omnia cognosceret ut cogitativa, tantum singulariter
et non universaliter cognosceret — Quamquam autem sic totum corpus ponatur instru-
mentum intellectus, quasi ut subjectum, non tamen est vere ut subjectum, quoniam
intelligere non recipitur in eo modo corporali."

• This he designated the mind's dependence on the body "tanquam de objecto."

3 " Anima est receptiva omnium formarum materialium.-.Recipiens debet esse de-
nudatum a natura rei receptae." De Imm. VII. p. 32. Cf. X. p. 78 ; Comtn. de An.
f. 130; Apol. I. ii. 56 b; iii. 57 c.

4 "Si intelligit omnia necesse est immixtum esse." (Comm. de An. f. 130 v.)
"Cum ipse intellectus sit in hac quantitate, quomodo igitur species in eo recepta
poterit universaliter repraesentare ? " De Imm. x. p. 78.

7—2

100 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

contemplate abstractions of which the senses have no cognisance,
such, for example, as the mathematical point or line, the indivis
ible, the infinite1, or immaterial beings such as God and the
higher Intelligences2 ; and (c) the mind's power of reflection upon
itself \

Pomponazzi admits the force of all these considerations, but
not, in its full scope, the inference that was drawn from them.
Admitting that the human soul is possessed of intelligence, and
of intelligence exercising these "higher" functions just specified,
which belong to it as intelligence — he yet could not forget that
as a matter of fact human intelligence is known to us only as
residing in the body ; that its whole known history is a corporeal
history, and its only observed exercise takes place under corporeal
conditions — at least in so far as all the objects of human thought,
the materials on which human intelligence is exercised, are drawn
from a material world (" dependere tanquam de objecto "). To
affirm any other mode of existence for the human soul, or for
intelligence as in man, was not only to go beyond the warrant
of experience ; it was to contradict all that we know of the
soul, and every idea of human nature with which experience
supplies us.

Pomponazzi accordingly set himself to discover and to
express a conception of the human soul, and of intelligence
or reason as in man (anima intellectiva), which should embrace
these seemingly contrary aspects of it. He conceived himself to
have arrived at it in the formula : Anima humana de immateria-
litate participat. Or rather, this was one of the many ways in
which he sought to express the idea of an intelligence, material,
in a sense, in its origin, material certainly in the mode of its
existence, yet possessed of the essential attributes of intelligence
and therefore in another sense immaterial : an intelligence, whose
existence before or survival after its embodiment in matter was
inconceivable, and so far as reason shows, impossible, yet
exercising functions which could by no means be ascribed to
matter. Two points may be regarded as fixed in Pomponazzi's

1 Comm. de An. f. 130 v.

2 Op. cit. f. 130 v. ; cf. De Imm. x. p. 82 ; Apol. I. ii. f. 56 b ; iii. ff. 58, 59.

3 Comm. de An. f. 130 v. ; De Imm. X. p. 76 ; Apol. I. iii. 59 d.

THE SOUL 101

theory of the soul. One is, that there is and can be no evidence
for any existence of the soul as disembodied, for any exercise of
human intelligence except with reference, direct or indirect, to a
material subject-matter (pbjectum as he calls it). The other
certain thing is that human intelligence is itself, for Pomponazzi,
always something immaterial; nothing could be further from the
mark than to call him, as he has been called, a materialist.

The position of Pomponazzi may be defined, in a preliminary
way, in the terms of his own thought, by saying that he denied
the " separability " of soul from body without denying , its
"immateriality." The current formula was that "inseparability"
meant materiality and corruptibility; while immateriality implied
" separability " and potential immortality. Pomponazzi holding
the inseparability of the soul from the body (namely, tanqnam
de objecto] and denying in consequence the soul's immortality,
yet regarded the soul — qua intellectiva — as immaterial.

To return then to the accepted proofs of the immateriality of
intelligence we have to note Pomponazzi's attitude towards them
in view of his peculiar conception of human intelligence. As I
have already said, he admits in a general way their validity.
But he seeks to define or limit, in the interest of his own theory,
the inference to be drawn from them. He does not allow that
they imply, in the case of human intelligence, absolute "im
materiality " in the sense of the soul's entire independence of
matter or its possible separation from the body ; and seeks to
find room within their scope for his own conception of a relative
independence and a soul immaterial yet not separable. Accept
ing the received marks of an " immaterial " intelligence he seeks
so to interpret them — at least in the manner and degree in which
they characterise human intelligence — as to permit and even
justify his view of the soul as de immaterialitate, or de immortali-
tate, participans.

Thus with reference to the argument from the soul's recep
tion, in cognition, of material forms, he points out that if in one
part of it the soul thus " receives " matter in knowledge, in other
aspects of its nature it is not capable of any such action1; and

1 " Ipsa materialiter operatur ut vegetativa, non omnes formas recipit ut sensitiva."
De Imm. vm. p. 36.

102 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

thus far may with equal reason be concluded to be material or
immaterial. He also argues that the conjunction of intelligence
with matter does not forbid its exercising this power of cogni
tion, and that it is not necessary that soul should be absolutely
independent of matter in order to apprehend matter1.

He clears up the point by reference to an analogy which had
been drawn in favour of absolute immateriality, from the case of
sensation. The organ of sense, it had been said, must itself be
clear of the particular sensible property which it is to apprehend ;
thus, if various colours are to be perceived, the eye must be in a
neutral condition in relation to all colour. Pomponazzi pointed
out in reply that the sense organ has nevertheless other physical
properties, and is itself physical2. So, on this analogy, the mind
may apprehend material things in knowledge and yet itself be
in a real way dependent upon matter3.

In the Apologia Pomponazzi quotes the case of sense-percep
tion as that of an admittedly physical power which nevertheless
" receives " material objects in cognition. Wherefore, he says, it
cannot be maintained that cognition of material things implies
an organ independent of matter4.

1 De 1mm. cap. X.

2 " Materiale universaliter non impeditur per coexistentiam alterius materialis a
cognitione ; sic enim visus non cognosceret colores, cum visui sint conjunctae primae
qualitates ; sed bene per coexistentiam alicujus illorum quorum ipse est perceptivus
impeditur ; per rubedinem enim impeditur a cognitione aliorum colorum quorum et
rubedinis est perceptivus." Op. cit. x. p. 77.

3 " Si intellectus esset pura forma materialis, cum omnium formarum materialium
est perceptivus, impediretur ab earum cognitione : at ipsum esse immaterialem proba-
tum est, licet non simpliciter immaterialis sit ; quapropter per coexistentiam forma
rum materialium non impeditur." The result of this discussion is a clear distinction
between knowledge and the conditions of knowledge, between the physical aspect of
the act of knowledge and its cognitive value, in the case both of sense-perception and
of knowledge generally. " Revera intellectus humanus non potest intelligere nisi in
materia sint quale et quantum sensibile, cum non possit operari nisi ipse sit, ipseque
esse non potest nisi cum dispositione convenient! ; non tamen sequitur quod per tales
dispositiones intelligat, imo ut satis liquet non sequitur in sensu ; nam virtus visiva
non videt nisi oculus sit calidus, non tamen per caliditatem vel aliquam aliam quali-
tatem realem videt, sed per speciem visibilem." Op. cit. x. p. 77. Cf. Comm. de
An. ff. 126 — 9.

4 " Primum autem quod adducebatur erat, quoniam ex eo quod humanus animus
omnia materialia intelligit inferebatur ipsum esse omnino immaterialem. Ad quod
imprimis dicimus non esse verum materiam, qualitercumque acceptam, materialium
cognitionem impedire. Etenim unusquisque sensus exterior... sua objecta, quae mate-

THE SOUL 103

But he does not take up a merely defensive attitude on this
point, or rest satisfied with maintaining, negatively, that his
view of the mind is consistent with the possibility of knowledge
— that knowledge is not impossible to an essentially embodied
intelligence. He claims expressly that since human knowledge
is by presentation of sensible objects, it is only as the mind is
related to matter tanqnam de objecto that knowledge takes place
at all1.

So, too, in considering the second supposed note of imma
teriality, the mind's power of abstraction, and of forming general
conceptions, he insists upon the distinction that general con
ceptions, as entertained by human intelligence, are mediated
through a knowledge of particulars — that is, ultimately through
sense-perception. For the human mind, Pomponazzi uniformly
maintains, general conceptions are formed by an induction from
particulars and the universal considered as realised in particulars.
And thus cognition through sense, and the embodiment of intelli
gence, are not only consistent with the fact of human intelligence,
but are inseparable characteristics of thought as it exists in man2.

rialia sunt, cognoscit. Ratio ilia nulla est, si quidem virtus materialis omnia materialia

potest cognoscere Quare si sensus omnia sensibilia cognoscit, virtus materialis omnia

materialia cognoscere potest ; non igitur ex eo quod omnia materialia cognoscit,
arguenda est immaterialitas." Apol. I. iii. f. 57 c, d ; and passim. Cf. Fiorentino,
Pomponazzi, pp. 200, 201.

1 " Anima humana sic potens recipere omnes species formarum materialium duas
habet conditiones : unam scilicet quod secundum se est immaterialis et non indigens
organo tanquam subjecto pro quanto recipit et intelligit ilia, quod nos concedimus :
verum alteram habet quoniam formas illas non recipit nisi mota a phantasmatibus
sicut plane ibi docet Aristoteles, quare indiget organo tanquam objecto." De hum.
X. p. 75.

2 " Ea quae sunt in intelligentiis (scil. superioribus) sunt simpliciter actu in-
tellecta, et penitus a materia denudata ; quae autem sunt in sensu sunt mere intellecta
in potentia ; quae vero sunt in intellectu humano medio modo se habent, quoniam
species primo universaliter repraesentat, secundario vero ut in supposito, quando-
quidem ex toto absolvi non potest a materia, cum intellectus pro quacunque sui
cognitione moveatur ab objecto et in singular! speculetur universale, sicut dictum est."
(De Imm. X. p. 78.) " Per intellectum in naturam elephantis ascendimus universaliter
quae neque est signati individui neque particularis cognitio...sed quanquam ita sit hoc
tamen fieri nequit absque adminiculo sensuum, quum sine phantasmate hoc fieri non
potest, velut in nobis experiri possumus. Semper etenim in quacunque nostra in-
tellectione, quantumcunque abstracta sit, aliquid corporeum ante intellectum ponimus.
Quare nos immaterialia materialiter, intemporalia temporaliter cognoscimus, e con-
trario modo intelligentiis se habentibus," etc. {Apol. I. iii. f. 59 a.) "Cum dicitur

104 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

Pomponazzi's view is that man's power of universal thought
is in this respect deficient, and that human thought falls short of
the ideal of thought as such1. Fiorentino considers that he was
hampered by the Aristotelian doctrine of imagination, while
denying himself the resources of the Nous by means of which
Aristotle escaped into the region of absolute thought ; and that
he really failed to allow to the human mind the possession of
universal conceptions2. But the truth rather seems to be that
while, in his investigation of human knowledge, Pomponazzi
approximated to a truer view of the nature of thought, he was
still haunted by the mediaeval idea of absolute thought which
made it consist in pure abstraction, and placed the " universal "
in antagonism with the "particular." He did attribute to human
intelligence universal thought in the only real meaning of the
term — removing, in the human instance, the opposition of
universal and particular, of thought and sense. While this is
our chief interest in his speculative position, we need not over
look the survival in him of an older mode of thought ; and his
ascription to the Divine and to the superior Intelligences of an

quod cognoscit universalia, dicit Alexander quod cognoscit universale comparando
unam rem alteri; sed non fit hoc per virtutem immaterialem, sed materialem." Comm.
de An. f. 137 v. Cf. ff. 151 — 155.

1 Cf. the allusions to superior intelligence in the passages quoted in the last note ;
see especially Apol. I. iii. f. 59 a : "...e contrario modo intelligentiis se habentibus,

nam materialia imroaterialiter et temporalia intemporaliter cognoscunt Quare ipsae

solae sincerum universale cognoscunt, et sine alicujus sensus vel corporis adminiculo;
quum et ipsae solae vere et proprie sunt immateriales." Cf. De Imm. XII. p. 90 :
" Participat (animus humanus) de proprietatibus immortalitatis, cum universale cog-
noscat, tametsi ejusmodi cognitio valde tenuis et obscura est."

Of God and of the infinite, in particular, says Pomponazzi, we have only vague
and inadequate conceptions. " Cum dicis quod Deum intelligit, dicit (Alexander)
quod Deum anima non cognoscit nisi caecutiendo, ex eo quod non intelligit nisi per
phantasmata ; et hoc non arguit earn esse immaterialem, imo opponitur ex eo quod
non bene cognoscit. Et similiter dico quod non intelligit infinitum nisi caecutiendo
et confuse." "Dico," concludes Pomponazzi in the same passage, "quod intellectus
indiget abstractione, sed non omnimodo, quia per phantasmata intelligit ; imo arguit
nostram sententiam quod, cum per phantasmata intelligat, partim sit abstractus et
partim non, non ex toto." Comm. de An. f. 137 v.

2 " Ei si fa forte dei detti di Aristotile, che sensa 1' intelletto passive non si pu6
pensare, che il conoscere non e sensa fantasmi ; ma Aristotile seppe disvilupparsi
da questo legame, a contemplare 1' universale col Noo speculativo. II Pomponazzi,
volendo schivare ogni incongruenza, restrinsi soverchiamente 1' importanza e 1' attivit^
dell' intelletto umano." Fiorentino, Pomponazzi^ p. -203.

THE SOUL 105

apprehension of universals apart from any process of experience,
and of universals in pure abstraction, need no more surprise us
than his belief in the mythological "Intelligences" themselves.
The fact to be observed, as suggestive of the immanent move
ment of his thought, is his relegating such imagined modes of
reason to a transcendent realm, and, as the result of his analysis
of human experience and human modes of knowledge, attribut
ing to reason in this sublunary sphere an altogether opposite
character.

While holding thus that intelligence, as human, derives all
knowledge and all the materials for general conceptions from
the data of sense through imagination, he does not consider that
an intelligence so placed is either incapable of abstract thought,
or itself material.

In the first place he does not allow that the capacity for
abstract thought implies absolute immateriality, or that the sort
of " dependence " on the body in which he defines the soul of
man to stand is inconsistent with its possession of the power of
thought1.

His general position in this respect is brought into view by
an argumentum ad hominem which he employs in the Apologia,
in support of his idea of an intelligence " immersed " in matter.
A common feature in the mediaeval psychology of knowledge
was the vis cogitativa, whose function was an act of generalisa
tion which did not amount to pure abstraction, and was therefore
not assigned to intellectus as such, but which mediated between
the data of sense presented in imagination and the proper act
of thought. Now this power of cogitare was classed among the
potencies of the animal soul, and allowed to reside in matter.
Yet it was a power of receiving in knowledge the forms of
things ; the drawing of inference came within its scope ; it was,
in a sense, a power of thought2. If "thought" then, in this
sense, is not incompatible with a physical origin and a physical

1 See De Imm. ix. pp. 58 ff., X. pp. 78 ff.

2 " Ponit (Averroes) cogitativam exspoliare substantias ab omni sensibili communi
et proprio ; quare et sine quantitate cognoscit eas ; idemque Thomas et Aegidius
Romanus in quampluribus locis affirmant ; dicuntque ipsam cogitativam discurrere,
quum appellant ipsam rationem particularem." Apol. I. iii. f. 59 c.

106 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

basis, why should absolute immateriality be predicated even of
the highest exercise of thought possible to man1?

On this analogy, and on general grounds, he does not see
why the power of thought should not be actually physical in its
natural source and organ even as cogitativa was supposed to be.
So far from the capacity of abstraction implying total indepen
dence of matter, he does not see that it must necessarily exclude
the physical nature of the thinking power ; although for his own
part he is not disposed to adopt that hypothesis2.

For the power of thought is not, he ultimately decides,
itself to be regarded as a product and quality of matter. The
characteristic distinction drawn by him is that, " as human,"
intelligence is inseparably connected with matter (per quandam
concoinitantiam), but that this connection does not affect its
proper nature as intelligence3. What he denies is that thought

1 " Advertendum autem esthumanum animum rationabiliter poni habere potentias
non affixas organo, et ipsum existentem materialem ; narn ex communi omnium con-
sensu cogitativa cognoscit omnia materialia, syllogizat et particulariter, quum est in
confinio intellectus, et participat de intellectu ; quid igitur vetat et humanum in-
tellectum...paululum plus elevari quam cogitativa, sic quod et universaliter cognoscit
et syllogizat, non excedendo tamen limites materiae, quum semper a phantasmate
dependet, cum continue et tempore ? Nam rationalis dicitur et non vere intelligens.
Quare cum discursu cognoscit et temporaliter ; si namque ab hujuscemodi liberaretur

non amplius rationalis esset, et sic natura sua periret Cogitativa virtus extensa est,

quum omnes affirmant ipsam esse virtutem sensitivam ; ipsaque potest sequestrare
substantias a quantitate, quamvis sit in quantitate. Quid igitur obstat et ipsum
intellectum existentem materialem et extensum, secundum quendam altiorem gradum
quam sit cogitativa ipsa, infra tamen limites materiae, et universaliter cognoscere et
universaliter syllogizare ; non discedendo tamen penitus a materia quum in omni tali
cognitione dependet a phantasmate ? Puto itaque quod qui tenet cogitativam esse
talem ut diximus, multum probabiliter habet tenere et de intellectu."

After stating the theory of the Arabians of the manner in which the (immaterial)
"intellectus agens " acted on the (physical) "virtus imaginativa" to produce "cogi
tativa," he explains that something of the same sort is his idea of intelligence in man :
" Sicut enim apud dictos cogitativa etsi sit extensa non tamen afficitur ab extensione,
sic et apud nos intellectus ; vero non absolute ut materialis est sed quatemis de im-
materialitate participat et ab intellectu agente illustratur." Apol. I. iii. f. 59 c, d. Cf.
Comtn. de An. f. 128.

2 " Sic itaque existimo quod sive intellectus ponatur indivisibilis, sive extensus,
nihil cogit ipsum esse simpliciter immateriale ; verum mihi magis placet ipsum
ponere inextensum." Apol. \. iii. f. 59 d.

3 " Intellectus humanus est in materia quasi per quandam concomitantiam ; et
ipsum intelligere quodam modo est in materia sed satis accidentaliter ; quoniam
intellectui, qua intellectus est, accidit esse in materia." De /mm. x. pp. 79, 80.

THE SOUL lO/

is material in the sense that it can be quantitatively regarded ;
since it cannot be so regarded it is not "material1." So far,
then, he admits the argument that the power of abstraction
cannot be attributed to matter. He does so, because he dis
tinguishes between matter and thought as such. He draws the
distinction — which was by far the best legacy left by Averroism
to after generations — between the physical conditions and the
essential nature of human thought, between the physical condi
tions of human thought and the nature of thought as thought.
While intelligence, he thus distinguishes, exists in man only as
embodied, intelligence as such is by no means of the nature of
body2.

The precise deductions thus drawn by Pomponazzi from the
power of abstract thought as possessed by the mind of man are
summarised in the following passage from the Apologia. After
explaining the manner in which the human mind knows uni-
versals, he continues — " Since our knowledge of the universal is as
I have described, it is worth while to see how that can take place
suitably to the nature of the soul. I would say therefore : Since
every soul — or at least every complete soul — is indivisible in
respect of its essence (I mean 'indivisible' not in the sense in
which a point in a line is indivisible but in virtue of being the
negation of the category of quantity, as we say a sound is in
divisible), such indivisibility belongs most appropriately to the
human soul, which is nearest to the Intelligences, and exists as

1 " Non esse in organo, sive subjective eo non indigere, est vel non esse in
corpore vel in eo non esse modo quantitative ; unde dicimus intellectum non indigere
corpore ut subjecto in sui intellectione, non quia intellectio nullo modo sit in corpore
...sed pro tanto intellectio dicitur non esse in organo et in corpore, quoniam modo
quantitative et corporali non est in eo." De hum. IX. p. 58.

2 "Si dicitur, cum ipse intellectus sit in hac quantitate, quomodo igitur species in
eo recepta poterit universaliter repraesentare? Cui dicitur hoc nihil prohibere; primo
quia accidit sibi qua intellectus est ut sit in quantitate ; secundo quoniam etsi est in
quantitate tamen quantitas non est principium illius operationis, neque in eo opere
ea per se utitur." De hum. x. p. 78. Cf. Apol. I. iii. 59 b. Again : " Intellectus
humanus non potest intelligere nisi in materia sint quale et quantum sensibile, cum
non possit operari nisi ipse sit, ipseque esse non potest nisi cum dispositione con-
venienti ; non tamen sequitur quod per tales dispositiones intelligat, imo ut satis
liquet non sequitur in sensu ; nam virtus visiva non videt nisi oculus sit calidus, non
tamen per caliditatem vel aliquam aliam qualitatem realem videt, sed per speciem
visibilem." De /mm. x. p. 77.

IO8 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

intermediate between material and immaterial beings. Hence,
by reason of its homogeneity with material beings, though in
respect of its substance it is itself indivisible, nevertheless it
has all those extended and organic faculties that subserve the
percipient and vegetative soul. But in so far as the human
soul itself participates in immateriality, and is in the neigh
bourhood of immaterial beings and coterminous with them, it
has intellect and will, which are faculties that do not imply
extension. Wherefore the form received in it is received as
unextended ; whence it comes to pass that such a form represents
its object universally. But since this form both in coming into
existence and in continuing to exist depends on an image which
is extended and determinate, it does not represent the universal
in complete purity, but only points out the universal in the
individual1."

Towards the argument for the soul's absolute independence
of matter derived from the capacity of self-knowledge, Pom-
ponazzi adopts an exactly similar attitude. The human mind,
he says, does not possess such a self-knowledge as he imagines
to belong to superior intelligences and to be the ideal or perfect
self-knowledge — namely a direct or intuitive consciousness of
self. Human self-consciousness, he remarks, is essentially
mediated through some particular experience ; self-knowledge

1 "Cum itaque nostra cognitio de universal! talis sit qualem diximus, operae
pretium est videre quam convenienter istud fiat. Dicam igitur; Cum omnis anima
saltern perfecta indivisibilis sit secundum essentiam (dico autem indivisibile non veluti
punctum in linea, verum secundum privationem generis quantitatis, qualiter sonum
dicimus esse indivisibilem), talis indivisibilitas niaxime convenit animae humanae, quae
est propinquissima intelligentiis, mediaque existit inter materialia et immaterialia.
Unde [not 'universal!' as Ferri has transcribed the contraction un, Introd. p. 72]
ratione unigeneitatis cum materialibus tametsi ipsa secundum substantiam indivisibilis
est, habet tamen omnes illas vires extensas et organicas quae sensitivae et vegetativae
deserviunt ; at qua ipsa humana anima de immaterialitate participat, estque in con-
vicinio sive confinio immaterialium, habet intellectum et voluntatem quae sunt vires
non extensae. Quare species in ea recepta inextense recipitur; unde fit ut talis species
universaliter repraesentet. At cum dicta species et in fieri et in conservari dependet a
phantasmate quod extensum et signatum est ; idcirco non sincere omnimodo universale
repraesentat, sed universale in singulari demonstrat." Apol. I. iii. f. 59 a.

Cf. Comm. de Anima, f. 137 v. : "...quod cum per phantasmata intelligat, partim sit

abstractus et partim non: non ex toto Non omnimodo abstrahitur a corpore, quia

eget eo ut phantasmate ; et argumentum non concludit nisi quod secundum eas partes
per quas anima intelligit non sit materialis, sed a materia abstracta, non tola anima."

THE SOUL 109

always takes place, in us, on the occasion of some other specific
act of knowledge, and the human mind only knows itself in
knowing something else1. The self-consciousness which was
supposed to imply independence of matter was really an
" absolute " self-consciousness, self-moved to the knowledge of
itself. And Pomponazzi had not much difficulty in shewing
that this was not the nature of self-consciousness in man, though
(as he still conceded) it might well be its character in higher
beings2.

Once more, also in the Apologia, Pomponazzi argues from
the analogy of the admittedly physical powers of human or
animal nature, inferring that a knowledge of self, at least in the
degree and manner in which it exists in man, does not imply
" separability " from matter. Thus he ascribes to the senses a
perception of their own operations3 and traces a rudimentary
form of self-consciousness in the lower animals4.

Thus by a criticism of the received marks of "immateriality"
and a comparison of them with the facts of human nature as he
saw it, Pomponazzi defended his conclusion that the soul is
partly material and partly immaterial, simpliciter materialis and
immaterialis secundum quid ; or, as he otherwise expresses it, de
immaterialitate participat.

On this conclusion as to the soul's nature, rigorously main
tained, and coupled with a refusal to entertain any hypothesis of
the soul's changing, under other conditions, what he conceives
to be its fundamental nature, Pomponazzi bases his denial of
immortality. It is indeed a little disconcerting to find him
embodying his doctrine on that subject in the strange formula

1 "Licet non cognoscat se per speciem propriam sed aliorum... secundum tamen
illud esse potest quoquo modo supra seipsum reflectere et cognoscere actus suos, licet
non primo et ita perfecte sicut intelligentiae." De hum. x. p. 76. Cf. Apol. I. iii.
f. 59 d, 60 a : " Intellectus intelligendo alia se intelligit," etc.

2 " In eis (rationalibus, i.e. hominibus) idem non est primo movens et primum
motum, veluti est in intelligentiis, unde in eis non est perfectus circulus." Apol.
I. iii. f. 60 a.

3 " Sensum sentire se sentire....Quis autem ambiget sensum esse virtutem or-
ganicam ?" Op. cit. I. iii. f. 59 d.

4 " Neque negandum est bestias se cognoscere. Omnino enim fatuum et sine
ratione videtur dicere ipsas se non cognoscere, cum diligant se, et suas species.
Omne namque animal diligit suum simile," etc. Op. cit. I. iii. f. 60 a.

1 10 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

that the soul is simpliciter mortalis et immortalis secundum quid
(as against the opposite doctrine of simpliciter immortalis et
mortalis secundum quid), since the question of the soul's exist
ence seems to admit only of the alternative answers — Yes and
No ; and the phrase de immortalitate participat seems merely
unintelligible. But we have to remember once more how the
question of the immortality and the immateriality of the soul
were for Pomponazzi bound together. De immaterialitate
participat is what he means ; and he frequently expresses
himself in this more accurate form of words1. He does not
hesitate to draw the inference of the soul's mortality — so far
that is as reason and philosophy carry him, and with all due
reserve. Since the soul is "partly" material, and at the same
time is one and indivisible, its perishability is for Pomponazzi
an inevitable inference. Partly immaterial, doubtless, the soul
is also; but immaterial absolutely, or "separable," it certainly
is not.

On a review of Pomponazzi's reasonings we find that three
considerations principally impressed him. The first was the
patent fact of the embodiment of human intelligence. The soul
of man, in the Aristotelian meaning of the term, was in some
at least of its operations plainly physical (anima vegetativa^
sensitivd). Even as intellectual (anima intellectiva), therefore,
since the soul is one, it had its corporeal aspect2 ; and thought

1 E.g. Apol. i. iii. f. 59 a.

2 See Comm. de An. ff. 253 v., 254 r. : " (Intellectus) quatenus intellectus non
eget corpore — Anima autem nostra secundum quod est intellectiva realis (utitur) in
intelligendo organo corporeo...nec ex toto et omni modo in intelligendo eget organo
corporeo quia non eget eo ut subjecto — Anima autem nutritiva secundum quod
realiter eadem est cum vegetativa et sensitiva et sic in suis operationibus, quae sunt
pertinentes ad vegetationem et sensationem, indiget corpore ut subjecto, quia omnes
tales operationes fiunt cum conditionibus materiae, quae sunt hie et nunc ; ideo in
talibus operationibus anima intellectiva, quatenus sensitiva aut vegetativa, indiget
corpore ut subjecto ; modo cum operatio eiusdem animae intellectivae, quatenus in
tellectiva est, quae est intelligere, fiat sine conditionibus materiae, quae sunt hie et
nunc ; ideo in ista sua operatione non eget corpore ut subjecto, sed bene ut objecto,
quia quidquid intelligatur ab anima nostra intelligitur per aliquid corporeum." Cf.
De Nutritione, I. xxiii. f. i3ob: " Quamquam id quod est anima intellectiva sit
extensum — est enim sensitivum et nutritivum ut supponimus, quae sunt extensa —
ut tamen intelligit et recipit species intelligibiles non utitur corpore, neque ut sic
afficitur quantitate....Nam intellectus qua intelligit est immaterialis ad modum ex-
pressum ; cum quo tamen stat quod et sit materialis."

THE SOUL III

in man, although not corporeal in its nature, acted only on
occasion of physical impressions, and in permanent connection
with, if not in dependence on, a bodily organisation.

These facts, taken in connection with the admittedly in
corporeal nature of intelligence and the consequent incorporeal
aspect of anima intellectiva, presented a problem. And early in
the De Immortalitate, weighing against one another the con
siderations that suggested the corporeity and mortality or the
immateriality and immortality of the soul, Pomponazzi treated
the question provisionally as dubious or at least unconcluded1.
Subsequently however, and in his writings generally, he defined
the human soul as both material and immaterial', although
being one, and in one aspect material, it is therefore mortal, and
its participation in immateriality does not guarantee its actual
immortality2.

A " part " of the soul might indeed be in a certain sense
immaterial3, for this was Pomponazzi's belief about the anima
intellectiva*. While the human intelligence derived all its
knowledge through the bodily organisation, it was not a product
of the organisation, did not depend on it for its existence5.
Thus so far as thought qua thought was concerned, the bodily
organisation was the condition, and not the cause either of its
existence or of its operation8.

1 " Ex eo namque quod talis essentia formas omnes materiales recipit, quia recepta
in ea sunt actu intellecta ; quod non utitur organo corporeo ; quod aeternitatem et
superna affectat ; ideo concludebatur quod ipsa sit immortalis. Sed pariter cum ipsa
materialiter operatur ut vegetativa, non omnes formas recipit tit sensitiva, et eadem
organo corporeo utitur, temporalia et caduca affectat ; probabitur quod ipsa vere et
simpliciter sit mortalis, verum ex ea parte qua intelligit secundum quid erit immortalis,
turn quia intellectus non conjunctus materiae est incorruptibilis, sed materiae con-
junctus est corruptibilis, turn quia in tali opere non fungitur instrumento corporali,
sicut etiam ipse (Thomas) dicit quod taliter est per accidens et secundum quid mate-
rialis ; non enim major ratio de uno quam de altero videtur." De Imm. vm. p. 36.

2 De Imm. cap. ix. and/auzYn ; Comm. de An. f. 137 v.

3 "Ex ea parte qua intelligit, secundum quid erit immortalis." De Imm. vm.
p. 56. "Secundum eas partes per quas anima intelligit, non est materialis. " Comm.
de An. f. 137 v. " Intellectus... qua intellectus est, non dependet a materia, neque a
quantitate." De Imm. vm. p. 59.

4 " Mihi magis placet ipsum (scil., intell. hum.) ponere inextensum." Apol. i. iii.
f. 59 d. 5 See De Imm. cap. x.

6 "Intellectus humanus...esse non potest nisi cum dispositione convenient!, non
tamen sequitur quod per tales dispositiones intelligat." De Imm. X. p. 77.

112 . PIETRO POMPONAZZI

But again the soul was "partly material1," and human
intelligence (anima intellective?) so far dependent on matter as to
be inseparable from it. How this should be, must depend upon
the nature of matter and of intelligence respectively.

The second fact on which the mind of Pomponazzi dwelt was
the character of intelligence as human.

The intermediate position occupied by man in the universe,
between purely spiritual beings on the one hand and material or
merely animal existences on the other, was a leading idea with
Pomponazzi as with so many of his predecessors. It finds
expression on almost every page of his writings. His mind
dwelt upon it so habitually that it moulded his thoughts on
every subject. But especially did it determine his doctrine of
human nature, which was perhaps the most thorough-going and
logical application made by any of the mediaeval thinkers of the
theory of a hierarchy of beings and the intermediate nature of
man.

Intelligence, as has been said, was for Pomponazzi the
" immaterial part " of the human soul. But this superior part
of man was itself of an intermediate nature and grade. For
the intermediate nature of man did not mean, for Pomponazzi,
simply a nature compounded of both body and soul ; the idea,
in his mind, referred to an intermediate position occupied by
man's soul (the " form " of his existence) among the hierarchy
of beings2.

Now Pomponazzi's conception of human intelligence, of the
degree and manner in which the higher power of thought existed
in man, was affected in two respects by his idea of man as an
intermediate being ; or, alternatively, it may be said that his
general idea of man was corroborated by his conception of
human intelligence. The dogma of man's intermediate place in
nature is reflected in a twofold modification of the theory of
human intelligence ; its influence acted in two opposite direc
tions to produce the same effect. On the one hand we find

1 " Partim abstractus et partim non, non ex toto." Comm. de An. f. 137 v.

2 "Visa itaque multiplici ancipitique hominis natura, non ea quidem quae ex
compositione materiae et formae resultat, sed ea quae ex parte ipsius formae seu
animae," etc. De Imm. n. p. 7.

THE SOUL 113

Pomponazzi lessening the distance between man and the lower
orders of being, and on the other hand emphasising the distinc
tion between mind in man and a supposed absolute Intelligence.
We have already seen that Pomponazzi laboured to trace
analogies between thought and the lower powers of the soul.
He sought to find parallels to what were supposed to be the
unique and peculiar operations of the intellectual power, in the
senses or in other supposed powers of the mind that were
admitted to have a physical basis and origin. He aimed at
diminishing the distance between attributes which were supposed
to be the distinguishing property of man, alone among all mun
dane existences, and those capacities which were ascribed to his
physical nature or allowed to be shared in, to a greater or less
degree, by lower animals. The express design of Pomponazzi
was of course to shew that the intermediate nature of man
meant an inseparable relation in him between body and soul,
and thus his mortality. Apart from that particular deduction
from the premises, these psychological comparisons of Pom
ponazzi have a twofold interest. In the first place they mark
the tendency of his mind towards a more scientific psychology
based on a prevailing sense of the unity of mental life. Secondly
we see here a real attempt to relate man to nature and especially
to forms of life below him in the scale of being, and thus witness
an early beginning of the comparative and historical method
through which alone a science of human nature is possible,
and by which an intelligible account of man and of reason
is substituted for dogmatic conceptions alike of body and of
soul.

We have also to note on the other hand the contrast which
Pomponazzi drew, and which was never absent from his mind,
between the mode of intelligence observed in man and that
which was supposed to characterise a superior order of thinking
beings. The human mind was constantly regarded by him in
the light of a comparison with those Intelligences which filled
so large a place in the world of mediaeval thought, and which,
although they were by no means a primary interest to Pompo
nazzi, yet occupied always the background of his theory. In
them, and in the Deity, the perfection of intelligence was supposed
D. 8

114 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

to be realised. Space and time were in their thought absolutely
transcended and all things considered in pure and abstract
generality. Their general conceptions also were not formed by
induction from concrete and particular reality, but by a direct
intuition addressed to the universal as such, and as opposed to
the particular. I do not enter upon the discussion of the value
of such an ideal of thought — implying as it does that things
considered as in space and time are not considered truly, and by
a logical fiction distinguishing the universal from the particular
as a real object of thought But it is evident that such an ideal
has little bearing on the actual process of human knowledge,
and involves the condemnation of all that presents itself as
truth to the human mind. Pomponazzi has at least the credit
of perceiving this clearly ; and it was significant of his position
as a pioneer of a naturalistic view of man and a humanistic
view of reason that he drew the distinction between thought in
man and that ideal of absolute thought which tradition had
handed down to him. He deferred to that ideal : it had a real
place in his belief. Yet at the same time he felt its irrelevancy
to the problem of thought which actually presented itself to him
in man. And even if (as may be admitted) his doctrine of the
Intelligences was more than a merely perfunctory homage to
received beliefs in theology and cosmology, it remains true that
the chief energies of his mind were given to the new questions
about human thought which were opening up before him, and
to the analysis of the real process of experience.

Accordingly he defines intelligence in man by contrast with
the supposed perfect Intelligences1.

The third consideration by which Pomponazzi's mind was
governed was the idea of intelligence or thought as something
sui generis. The relation of thought to its object in the act of

1 See Apol. I. iii. f. 59 a. Cf. f. 59 c : " Intellectum humanum...paululum plus ele-
vari quam cogitativa, sic quod et universaliter cognoscit et syllogizat, non excedendo
tamen limites materiae, quum semper a phantasmate dependet, cum continue et
tempore. Nam rationalis dicitur, et non vere intelligens. Quare cum discursu
cognoscit et temporal iter "; and De Imm. xii. p. 90: "Non enim vere (anima)
appellatur intellectualis sed rationalis ; intellectus enim simplici intuitu omnia in-
tuetur ; at ratiocinatio discursu, compositione, et cum tempore, quae omnia attes-
tantur super imperfectione et materialitate ejus."

THE SOUL 115

knowledge was clearly distinguished by him, as indeed by
mediaeval thinkers generally, from any physical relation
whatever1.

For the maintenance of this distinction, the Middle Ages
were largely indebted to Averroes. The Averroist metaphysics
was in many respects a hindrance to mental progress ; but it
was a powerful barrier against materialism, and was largely
instrumental in protecting from it mediaeval philosophy, and
perhaps, indirectly, modern philosophy as well.

Pomponazzi also attributed thought as such, in its essential
and peculiar nature, to the soul of man. In this he went against
Averroism, at least in the letter, although even in distinguishing
so absolutely as he did, in a metaphysical sense, between the
soul of man and the intellectual principle, Averroes came near
to abolishing his own distinction ; since just in so doing he
ipso facto attributed every actual exercise of reason in man to
intelligence in the proper sense of the word ; and thus the
metaphysical dualism, at its extreme, wrought its own destruction.
So soon as a thinker appeared, like Pomponazzi, starting from
an empirical and psychological rather than a metaphysical point
of view, a transition was rapidly accomplished ; and Averroism
was one of the principal influences which led Pomponazzi at
once to apprehend the essential nature of thought and to
recognise the activity of thought in the mental processes of
man.

The language which Pomponazzi uses in constantly speaking
of the subjectum of human thought shews the influence of
Averroist discussions upon his mind. The question of the
nature of human thought, as it presented itself to him, was the
question of what should be considered to be the subjectum or
metaphysical substrate of intelligence in man; and his character
istic position was that, while the human mind depends on matter
and on a corporeal instrument for the objects of its thought, it
does not depend on matter subjective. Now the precise meaning
of this distinction is not, as has usually been supposed, that the
higher or rational powers of man act in independence of a
corporeal organ. In a sense, Pomponazzi holds they do so ; in

1 See Comm. de An. ff. 126 — 129.

8—2

Il6 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

another sense they use the body, the " whole body," as an
instrument. But what Pomponazzi denies is that matter is the
subjectum of mind, that mind subsists in matter1.

Intelligence is, in its nature, independent of matter. Its
independence, according to Pomponazzi, is perfectly realised only
in the higher Intelligences. But in the case of human intelligence
also the independence of thought is to be maintained quatenus
ad subjectum ; or, as he also expresses it, human intelligence is
independent of matter qua intellectus, though not qua huma
nus*. Thought in man has the quality of thought as such,
and stands above the category of quantity and physical cate
gories generally. This idea of human reason distinguishes the
doctrine of Pomponazzi absolutely from materialism. It is
expressed in an important paragraph : — " Not to be in an organ
or not to need it as a substrate of existence, means either not to
be in body, or not to be in it in a quantitative way. Hence we
say that intellect does not need body as a substrate, in its
intellection of itself, not because intellection is in no sense in
body... but that in so far as it is called 'intellection' it is not in

1 " Quamquam...totum corpus ponatur instrumentum intellectus quasi ut subjectum,
non tamen vere est ut subjectum, quoniam intelligere non recipitur in eo modo cor-
porali." De Imm. x. p. 80. (See the whole passage in note 2, p. 135.)

2 See Apol. \. iii. f. 59 b : " Ex his autem patere potest qualiter intellectus nullius
corporis est actus. Illud enim universaliter verum est de quocunque intellectu, sed
non eodem modo ; quum et intellectus dicitur fere equivoce de diis et nobis ; intellectus
enim deorum, qui vere intellectus est, penitus nullius corporis actus est, quum in
intelligendo non indiget corpore veluti subjecto vel veluti objecto. Quare simpliciter
et vere illud dictum verificatur de diis, et de intellectu secundum se, quoniam in
tellectus qua intellectus non indiget corpore. At noster intellectus, ut visus est,
quamvis non indigeat corpore ut subjecto, indiget tamen ut objecto. Quare non
ex toto noster intellectus nullius est corporis actus. Unde propositio assumpta, si
referatur ad humanum intellectum, restringenda est quantum ad subjectum, et non
quantum ad objectum. ...Exponi etiam potest, et melius, veluti dictum est, quod
humanus intellectus nullius corporis est actus, qua scilicet intellectus est, licet non
qua humanus." In another place (De Nutritione, I. xxiii. f. 130 b) he clearly states
that the subjectum of thought as human is intelligence — intelligence as timeless and
unquantified ; it is this, he says, which Aristotle had in view when he spoke of
intelligence coming from without. " Dicimus Aristotelem per ea verba voluisse
ostendere gradum intellectivum in hominibus convenire cum separatis a materia
quantum ad aliquas conditiones : utpote quod non indiget materia vel organo ut
subjecto ; quare quasi extrinsecus venire videtur, et quoniam sic operando non con-
tinetur neque quanto neque tempore ; ut sic videtur esse aeternus, quanquam re vera
non sit aeternus," etc. Cf- De Imm. passim.

THE SOUL 117

an organ and in body, since it is not in that in a quantitative
and corporeal way. Wherefore the intellect can have itself as
its object, can reason, and have universal conceptions, which
faculties that use material organs and are extended cannot do.
All this arises from the essential nature of intellect, since in so
far as it is intellect it does not depend on matter or on quantity,
because if the human intellect is said to depend on it, this is true
in so far as it is conjoined with sense, so that it is an accident
to it qua intellect to depend on matter and quantity. Whence
also its operation is not more separate from matter than its
essential nature, for unless intellect had an element which in
virtue of itself could exist apart from matter, the operation
itself could not take place except in a quantitative and corporeal
way. But although the human intellect, as has been held, does
not in its operation of thinking employ quantity, nevertheless
since it is conjoined with sense, it cannot be separated alto
gether from matter and quantity1."

The subjectum, in short, of the operations of intelligence, is
intelligence itself. This is the metaphysical meaning of Pom-
ponazzi's denial of mind's dependence on body tanquam de
subjecto*.

1 " Non esse in organo, sive subjective eo non indigere, est vel non esse in
corpore, vel in eo non esse modo quantitative ; uncle dicimus intellectum non indigere
corpore ut subjecto in sui intellectione, non quia intellectio nullo modo sit in corpore...
sed pro tanto intellectio dicitur non esse in organo et in corpore, quoniam modo
quantitative et corporali non est in eo ; quapropter potest intellectus reflectere supra
seipsum, discurrere, et universaliter comprehendere, quod virtutes organicae etextensae
minime facere queunt; hoc autem totum provenit ex essentia intellectus, quoniam qua
intellectus est non dependet a materia, neque a quantitate, quod si humanus intellectus
ab ea dependet, hoc est ut sensui conjunctus est, quare accidet sibi qua intellectus est
a materia et quantitate dependere ; unde et eius operatic non est magis abstracta quam
essentia, nisi enim intellectus haberet quod ex se posset esse sine materia, intellectio
ipsa non posset exerceri nisi modo quantitative et corporali. At quamvis intellectus
humanus, ut habitum est, intelligendo non fungatur quantitate ; attamen quoniam sensui
conjunctus est, ex toto a materia et quantitate absolvi non potest." (De I mm. IX.
p. 58.) Again he says, " Intellectus humanus est in materia quasi per quandam con-
comitantiam et ipsum intelligere quodam modo est in materia sed satis accidentaliter,
quoniam intellectui, qua intellectus est, accidit esse in materia." (Op. cit. x. p. 79.)
The distinction of thought from matter is for Pomponazzi axiomatic.

2 u Vere secundum essentiam ipsum intelligere esse in ipso intellectu juxta illud
3 de anima, ' anima est locus specierum, non tola sed intellectus '." (De Imm.
x. p. 79.) " Immediatum enim subjectum intellectionis et volitionis sunt intellectus
et voluntas, quae non sunt organicae potentiae... quoniam omne organicum est quan-

tlS METRO POMPONAZZI

The strength of this position is in its signalising the peculiar
nature of intelligence. Its weakness is the metaphysical con
ception of thought as subjection — a mechanical category from
which it would be impossible to deduce personality. Still, in a
sense, under the guidance of Averroes, an attempt is here made
to formulate the problem which Aristotle had ignored — the
metaphysical question of the nature of thought and its relation
to the individual human soul, to which Aristotle had attributed
its possession.

Pomponazzi, meanwhile, following Aristotle, also attributed
thought in that true and immaterial sense to the individual soul
of man.

The mind of man, while in a sense it is in body, is not so in
a physical sense. To deny that mind subsists physically in
matter (de subjecto) does not necessarily mean to separate mind
from matter. Mind would be said to be independent of matter
(intellectum non indigere corpore ut subjecto), if it were not " in
matter" at all : it is so, however, also if it be not in matter in a
physical or quantitative sense. Non esse in organo, sive subjective
eo non indigere may, says Pomponazzi, have either of these
meanings ; and while he does not hold the existence of human
intelligence apart from body, he yet is not shut up to its physical
subsistence in body1.

This is further expressed in his ascribing to the human mind,
in its rational or intellectual aspect, "indivisibility," which he
explains to mean its exemption from the category of quan

tum... Ipsae vero solae sunt indivisibiles. Et secundum istum modum verificatur illud
Aristotelis 3 de anima, scil. ' anima est locus specierum, non tota sed intellectus'."
Apol. I. iii. f. 59 b.

1 "Non esse in organo, sive subjective eo non indigere, est vel non esse in
corpore vel in eo non esse modo quantitative : unde dicimus intellectum (scil. huma-
num) non indigere corpore ut subjecto — non quia intellectio nullo modo fit in corpore
— sed pro tanto intellectio dicitur non esse in organo et in corpore, quoniam modo
quantitativo et corporali non est in eo." (De Imm. ix. p. 58.) Cf. Apol. i. iii.
f. 59b; " Dicimus. ..humanam intellectionem non esse in corpore, non quoniam non
sit in materia; quandoquidem hoc fieri inimaginabile est, cum enim anima sit in materia
impossibile est quin et accidens ejus non sit in materia... sed pro tanto dicitur in
tellectionem non esse in corpore, quum ipsa non dicitur esse in materia modo
quantitativo, sed inextense ; et nullo pacto in organo recipitur, veluti sensatio et
omnis operatio vegetativae."

THE SOUL 119

tity1. Thus his conclusion with regard to man is : — " The human
intellect cannot think unless a qualified and a quantified sensible
object exist in matter, since it cannot operate unless it itself
exists, and it itself cannot exist without an appropriate modifica
tion (of body): nevertheless it does not follow that it thinks
by means of these modifications.... Although its existence implies
quantity, yet quantity is not the ground of its operation-"

On the one hand, that is to say, Pomponazzi affirms the
embodiment of human intelligence, on the other the difference
between thought and all that is physical. All the operations of
the human mind, he constantly maintains, take place through
the apprehension of physical objects by the bodily senses ; and
he never appears concerned to establish an activity of human
thought, even in its highest functions of self-consciousness or
the apprehension of universal ideas, that is unaccompanied by
bodily organisation. But thought cannot be physical in its
nature : the subjectum of intelligence cannot be the body or
matter in any form3.

Accepting the antiquated form of expression, we may take
this as an affirmation that thought is sni generis. And it is
interesting to note that, instead of endeavouring to find specific
operations of thought independent of a physical concomitant,
Pomponazzi rests upon the distinction of the physical and the
intellectual. He is not concerned with a question of fact, but
with the nature of intelligence.

1 " Dico autem indivisibile non veluti punctum in linea verum secundum priva-
tionem generis ejus." Apol. I. iii. f. 59 a.

These views are maintained by Pomponazzi with substantial uniformity in all his
writings. Florentine {Pomponazzi, pp. 173 — 175) laboured to shew that Pomponazzi's
standpoint changed with the advance of his thought, and that he moved gradually
towards a professed materialism. Prof. Ferri has abundantly shewn that the facts
do not bear out this theory. In the De Immortalitatt it is unflinchingly maintained
that the soul is inseparable from the body ; in the De Nutritione it is equally made
plain that intelligence is to be considered as " immaterial " in its nature (" Intellectus
qua intelligit est immaterialis ad modum expressum "). See De Nutr. I. xxiii. f. i3ob.

2 "Intellectus humanus non potest intelligere, nisi in materia sunt quale et
quantum sensibile, cum non operari potest nisi ipse sit, ipseque esse non potest nisi
cum dispositione convenienti : non tamen sequitur quod per tales dispositiones in-
telligat....Etsi est (intellectus) in quantitate, tamen quantitas non est principium illius
operationis." De Im»i. x. pp. 77, 78.

3 " Quanquam totum corpus ponatur instrumentum...non tamen vere est ut sub
jectum." De Imm. x. p. 80.

CHAPTER VI

INTELLIGENCE

WE are now in a position to understand what Pomponazzi
meant by the "participation" of the human soul in intelligence.

His conclusions may be summarised under three heads, as
follows: — (i) Relation of Soul and Reason (anima and intel-
lectus] ; (2) General conception of Human Nature ; (3) Con
nection of Mind and Body in man.

(i) Relation of Soul and Reason.

In attributing Reason to the soul of man Pomponazzi
followed Aristotle. The rationalistic side of Aristotle's doctrine,
we have seen, was well to the front in the Middle Ages. The
orthodox schools emphasised it to the prejudice of his naturalistic
doctrine of the soul. And Averroes, while not assigning the
possession of reason, in a metaphysical sense, to the natural
soul, nevertheless maintained the rational character of human
mental life. Pomponazzi in this respect fully profited by the
mediaeval tradition1.

Two criticisms are commonly made upon the doctrine of
vov$ in Aristotle. One refers to the absence of a metaphysical
analysis of the nature of reason ; the other to the lack of a
psychological derivation of rational thought in man — reason as
a cosmological or ontological principle being introduced, it is

1 Cf. " Dicimus Aristotelem...voluisse ostendere gradum intellectivum in hominibus
convenire cum separatis a materia, quantum ad aliquas conditiones ; utpote quod non
indiget materia vel organo ut subjecto " etc. (De Nutr. I. xxiii. f. 130 b.) " Quam-
quam... corpus ponatur instrumentum intellectus quasi ut subjectum, non tamen vere
est ut subjectum." (De Imm. x. p. 80.) " Secundum essentiam ipsum intelligere
esse in ipso intellectu." Op. cit. x. p. 79.

INTELLIGENCE 121

said, with some violence into the account of the psychical
process. The result of the former defect is traced in the meta
physical dualism of the later Peripatetics ; and of the latter, in
a corresponding psychological dualism, which isolates " reason "
in the sense of the power of abstract thought, and fails to
recognise its derivation from " lower " powers and its organic
connection with them in the unity of mental life. Both these
complaints against the Aristotelian doctrine are indicated when
it is said that he did not distinguish between a metaphysical and
a psychological view of reason.

It may be asked then, first, whether Pomponazzi correctly
apprehended the meaning of Aristotle, and, further, whether he
is to be credited with any advance upon Aristotle in either or
both of the aspects of his doctrine which have been mentioned.

These questions can perhaps best be answered, and answered
together, by a comparison of Pomponazzi with the Averroist
and the ecclesiastical interpretation of Aristotle. It will be
generally agreed that, in rejecting the superhuman intellectual
principle of Averroes, and what may fairly be called the extra-
physical intellectual principle (anima intellectivd) of St Thomas,
represented as a " separate form " or spiritual substance, Pom
ponazzi came nearer to the original doctrine of Aristotle than
either of those thinkers. He attributed reason to the human
soul as such, and to that soul as embodied, or in its observed
character of forma corporis ; and in these respects returned to
the original standpoint and belief of Aristotle.

Was, then, the affirmation of reason in the natural soul of
man as dogmatic as the same affirmation had been in the case
of Aristotle ? Perhaps not quite. The reference of the actual
reason in man to reason regarded as a subjectum shews that
Pomponazzi felt at least the need for some further explanation.
This conception, gained from Averroism, was in no sense itself
a metaphysical explanation of reason ; but it may be said to
have expressed the need for a true metaphysic as distinct from
those spurious ontological constructions, which Pomponazzi
partly rejected (in the case, that is, of man) and partly permitted
to remain.

In the same way, we cannot indeed say that Pomponazzi's

122 PIETRO POMPON AZZI

distinction of intellect qua humanus and intellectus qua intel-
lectus is a distinction between a psychological and a meta
physical view of reason. A conscious and intentional distinction
of that sort it certainly is not. Still we note with interest the
words in which he develops the Aristotelian suggestion of a
vov$ %&>pto-To?. On the one hand, intelligence as in man is in an
indissoluble relationship with a material body ; on the other, it
is " immaterial " in the sense of being timeless and unquantified :
"Though that which is an intellectual soul is extended... never
theless qua thinking and receiving intelligible forms it does
not use body, and in thus operating it is not affected with
quantity." Again he says : " Since every soul — at least every
complete soul — is indivisible in its essential nature (I mean
indivisible... in the sense of exemption from the category of
quantity)," etc. And again, " It is an accident of intellect qua
intellect to be in matter," and, " Intellect does not need matter or
an organ as its substrate : wherefore it seems to come, as it were,
from without, and since in so operating it is not limited or in
time, in this reference it seems to be eternal1."

Actually, he says, it is not eternal ("quanquam re vera non
sit aeternus"). But it thus appears as Pomponazzi's view of the
soul of man, that as possessed of intelligence ("qua intelligit,"
"qua intellectus est") its being is constituted by eternal, timeless
Reason. This is his alternative to the Averroist theory of its
being acted upon by a thinking principle outside itself, or to the
orthodox hypothesis of a thinking substance apart from, and
independent of, the body.

It is still in vague and uncertain terms that Pomponazzi
attributes reason to the soul of man. This is undoubtedly
owing to the dualistic tendency to confine the name of reason
to pure abstract thought, and to the vain imagination of a direct

1 " Quamquam id quod est anima intellecttva sit extensum...ut tamen intelligit
et recipit species intelligibiles non utitur corpore neque ut sic afficitur quantitate."
" Cum omnis anima saltern perfecta indivisihilis sit secundum essentiam (dico autem
indivisibile...secundum privationem generis quantitatis)," etc. " Intellectui qua in
tellectus est accidit esse in materia." " (Intellectus) non indiget materia vel organo
ut subjecto ; quare quasi extrinsecus venire videtur et quoniam sic operando non
continetur neque quanto neque tempore, ut sic videtur esse aeternus." De Nutr. III.
xxiii. f. 130 b ; Apol. I. iii. f. 59 a ; DC I mm. X. p. 80 ; De Nutr., ibidem.

INTELLIGENCE 123

intuition of universal truths without particular experiences. So
long as this was the ideal of rational thought, it formed an
additional barrier to the attribution of reason to man. It was
the recollection of the superior Intelligences, in whom reason
wrought without discursus, and without sensuous experience,
that forbade Pomponazzi to follow the natural tendency of all
his thought and to attribute intellectus in the proper sense to
man. It was by this idea of the nature of intelligence that he
was obliged to use ambiguous and unmeaning qualifications like
per accidens and per quondam concomitantiam in assigning intelli
gence to an embodied and a sensuous " soul."

Yet in his psychology Pomponazzi is not without attempts
to overcome the dualism of sense and reason, reason and the
" lower faculties," and in this respect, once more, to advance
upon the doctrine of his master. The schoolmen had already
done something in this direction, seeking, in opposition to
Averroism, to bridge the imagined gulf between reason and
the natural soul of man. Pomponazzi in a striking passage
of the Commentary on the De Animal endeavours at once
to shew that Averroism had not been so unreasonable upon
the point as was supposed and to develop his own concep
tion of the soul of man as a unity. He recalls on the one
hand Averroes' doctrine that the intellectual soul makes man
what he is (an illustration of the fact that in Averroes dualism
had over-reached itself and was felt by Pomponazzi to have
done so) ; on the other hand, the concession to the natural soul
of virtus cogitativa. Cogitativa was assigned to the power of
sense, or of the lower and natural soul, and represented the
highest aspect of psychical life short of true thought or reason
itself. And on his own account Pomponazzi suggests that cogi
tativa and intellectus are really not the disparate and twofold
natures they were supposed to be, but different stages in the
development or in the perfection of man as a rational being2.

1 Ff. 141, 142.

2 " Ideo dico quod ex anima intellectiva et corpore informato per cogitativam fit
per se unum, quia cogitativa non est hominis essentia per se complens, sed adhuc
corpus tale est in potentia ad intellectum ; et si dicitur...'impossibile est idem hahere
duo esse,' dico quod est verum de duobus esse ultimatis, et aeque perfectis." "Alias
ego dixi quod anima intellectiva realiter est idem quod sensitiva." Comm. de An.
ff. 142 r., 141 v. Cf. Apol. I. iii. f. 58 d.

124 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

(2) General conception of Human Nature.

Reference has already been made to the ruling position
occupied in Pomponazzi's system of thought by the conception
of an order and hierarchy of beings in nature1. The corollary
of this general doctrine was the intermediate place and character
of man.

There were, according to this scheme, three orders of beings —
the immaterial and the imperishable, including the Deity and
(in their essential nature and true being) the spheral Intelli
gences ; at the other extreme, material and mortal, all sublunary
beings with the exception of man ; intermediate between the
two, and sharing the attributes of both, the composite nature of
man.

Pomponazzi combined, however, with the threefold division
of existence the more general conception of a universal hierarchy
in being. Between the three outstanding points of the one
scheme came the innumerable gradations of the other. The
one was, as it were, imposed upon the other. So between Deity
at the one extreme and man the intermediary — and again
between man and the lowest point of being which was " formless
matter" — intervened an indefinite variety of beings in a (theoreti
cally) completely graduated scale. Thus the Intelligences, while
all alike belonging to the superior order, were relatively subor
dinate to the Divine intelligence, besides having a gradation
among themselves. Man, next, was essentially the possessor of
diverse powers, graduated in excellence, and in their approxima
tion to the immaterial and enduring. Among lower creatures
finally we find Pomponazzi signalising those which are tran
sitional and intermediate in their character, such as the sponge,
which is intermediate between the plant and the animal, or the
ape, which bridges the gulf between man and brute2 ; or dis-

1 " Recte autem et ordinate sic processit natura." (De Imm. IX. p. 60.) "Ut decor
et naturae ordo servetur." {Apol. \. iii. f. 59 a.) " Natura gradatim procedit." {De
Imm. ix. p. 64.)

2 " Sunt enim quaedam animalia media inter plantas et animalia, ut spungiae
marinae, quae habent de natura plantarum ; quae sunt affixae terrae, habent etiam
de natura animali pro quanto sentiunt. Similiter inter animalia est simia, de qua
est dubiuni an sit homo an animal brutum ; et ita anima intellectiva est media inter
aeterna et non aeterna. " Comm. de An. f. 1 1 r.

INTELLIGENCE 125

languishing, among the lower animals, some which lead a merely
sensuous life, with almost no power of reasoning, from others
which rival man in mechanical skill and even in the civil virtues1.
Belonging to the three orders of being, there were three sorts
of "souls." For the superior Intelligences were also to be
regarded as in a sense the informing souls of the spheres to
which they belonged. Only the difference between them and
the human soul was that the act of intelligence in them did not
depend in any way upon the physical spheres to which they
were related only as the motor is to that which is moved ;
knowledge in them was a direct intuition and contemplation of
abstract and immaterial objects ; whereas the soul of man is
dependent for the exercise of intelligence upon matter tanqnam
de objecto, and the sensitive soul, or the soul of the lower animal,
resides in matter tanquam de subjecto as well'2. All however

1 " (Natura) gradatim procedit ; vegetabilia enim aliquid animae habent, cum
in seipsis operentur, at multum materialiter, cum suis non fungatur officiis nisi per
qualitates primas, et ad esse reale earum operationes terminantur. Deinde succedunt
animalia solum tactum et gustum habentia et indeterminatam imaginationem ; post
quae sunt animalia quae ad tantam perfectionem perveniunt ut intellectum habere
existimemus, nam multa mechanice operantur, ut construendo casas ; multa civiliter
ut apes ; multa omnes fere virtutes morales, ut patet inspicienti libros De Historia
Animalium in quibus miranda ponuntur quae referre nimis esset prolixum ; imo infiniti
fere homines minus videntur habere de intellectu quam multae bestiae." De Iinm.
IX. p. 64.

2 " Istis autem omnibus gradibus cognoscitivis secundum Aristotelem et Platonem
competit esse animas ; quare saltern secundum Aristotelem quodlibet cognoscens est
actus corporis physici organici, verum aliter et aliter. Nam intelligentiae non sunt
actus corporis qua intelligentiae sunt, quoniam in suo intelligere et desiderare nullo
pacto indigent corpore, sed qua actuant et movent corpora coelestia, sic animae
sunt....Anima autem sensitiva simpliciter est actus corporis physici organici, quia
et indiget corpore tanquam subjecto, cum non fungatur suo officio nisi in organo, et
indiget corpore tanquam objecto. Media vero quae est intellectus humanus in nullo
suo opere totaliter absolvitur a corpore, neque totaliter immergitur ; quare non in-
digebit corpore tanquam subjecto, sed tanquam objecto, et sic medio modo inter
abstracta et non abstracta erit actus corporis organici. Nam intelligentiae qua
intelligentiae non sunt animae, quia nullo modo ut sic dependent a corpore, sed
qua movent corpora coelestia. At intellectus humanus in omni suo opere est
actus corporis organici, cum semper dependeat a corpore tanquam objecto. Est
et differentia inter intelligentiam et intellectum humanum in dependenrlo ab organo ;
quoniam humanus recipit et perficitur per objectum corporale, cum ab eo moveatur ;
at intelligentia nihil recipit a corpore coelesti sed tantum tribuit. A sensitiva autem
virtute differt intellectus humanus in dependendo a corpore, quia sensitiva subjective
et objective dependet, humanus autem intellectus objective tantum. Et sic medio
modo humanus intellectus inter materialia et immaterialia est actus corporis organici.

126 PIETRO POMPON AZZI

might equally be regarded as " souls," though non uno modo, but
aliter et aliter1.

Corresponding to the three sorts of souls there were three
ways of knowledge. The Divine and superior Intelligences were
supposed to apprehend universal truth by an immediate intuition2.
The sensitive powers, whether as in man or possessed by brute
beasts, had also their proper mode of knowledge3; they were
considered not to give general knowledge, but only knowledge
of " singulars." Between these two extremes again came man,
in whom mind was dependent upon the physical organisation
for the objects of its apprehension, yet was not confined to the
particularity proper to matter but grasped general relations ;
these general relations, however, being apprehended in the
particular, and the knowledge of them acquired only through
particular experiences — a condition which was supposed to
constitute a limitation upon human thought and to remove it
from the rank of perfect knowledge4. Within human nature

Quapropter non uno modo corpora coelestia, homines, et bestiae animalia sunt, cum
non uno modo eorum animae sunt actus corporis physici organic! ;.ut visum est."
De hum. ix. pp. 54, 55.

1 " Sunt itaque in universum tres modi animalium, cumque omne animal cognoscit,
sunt et tres modi cognoscendi : sunt enim animalia omnino aeterna, sunt et omnino
mortalia, sunt et media inter haec ; prima sunt corpora coelestia. ..alia vero sunt
bestiae... intermedia vero sunt homines." Op. cit. ix. p. 71. " Universaliter enim
corpora coelestia, homines, bestiae et plantae animata sunt, eorumque animae sub
universali definitione animae continentur : verum non uno modo." Op. cit. x. p. 82.

2 "In quibus neque discursus, neque compositio, neque aliquis motus reperitur."
Op. cit. IX. p. 52.

3 Cf. De Imm. IX. pp. 52, 53, where it is said that these powers of the soul,
although bound up in matter (" indigent corpore et tanquam subjecto et tanquam
objecto") are yet truly capable of knowledge (" spirit uales "; "quendam modum
immaterialitatis induunt ") ; for they are related to things not physically, but in the
representative relation of knowledge ("non cognoscant per qualitates sensibiles,
sed per earum species").

4 " (Intellectus humanus) non intelligit sine phantasmate, quanquam non sicut
phantasia cognoscit ; quoniam medius existens inter aeterna et bestias universale
cognoscit, secundum quod cum aeternis convenit, et differt a bestiis : tamen uni
versale in singulari speculatur, quod differt ab aeternis, et convenit quoquo modo
cum bestiis. Bestiae autem ipsae in fine cognoscentium constitutae neque simpliciter
universale neque universale in singulari, sed tantum singulare singulariter compre-
hendunt. Sunt itaque in universum tres modi animalium, cumque omne animal
cognoscit, sunt et tres modi cognoscendi : sunt enim animalia omnino aeternae, sunt
et omnino mortalia, sunt et media inter haec ; prima corpora coelestia, et haec nullo
modo in cognoscendo dependent a corpore ; alia vero sunt bestiae, quae a corpore

INTELLIGENCE I2/

itself, finally, there is the same hierarchy of powers. Man is the
microcosm1. The various grades of existence are reflected, are
repeated, in man. He participates in immaterial intelligence.
He partakes also of corporeal existence. Avoiding the fiction
of separate souls, Pomponazzi lays it down that the human soul
is vegetative, is sensitive, is intellectual2. Thus is man the
microcosm, embodying the grades of existence. The powers
lower than the intellectual are themselves graduated3. For
example, the vis cogitativa, among the vires sensitivae, stands
next to the intellect4, as human intellect itself stands next to
the superior Powers5.

dependent ut subjecto et objecto, quare tantum singulare cognoscunt ; intermedia
vero sunt homines, non dependentes a corpore ut subjecto sed tantum ut objecto,
quare neque universale simpliciter, ut aeterna, neque singulariter tantum, ut bestiae,
sed universale in singulari contemplantur." De /mm. IX. pp. 70, 71.

" Quoniam (intellectus humanus) sensui conjunctus est, ex toto a materia et
quantitate absolvi non potest, cum nunquam cognoscat sine phantasmate, dicente
Aristotele 3. De Anima, 'nequaquam sine phantasmate intelligit anima. ' Unde sic
indigens corpore ut objecto, neque simpliciter universale cognoscere potest, sed
semper universale in singulari speculatur, ut unusquisque in seipso experiri potest.
In omni namque quantumcunque abstracta cognitione idolum aliquod corporale sibi
format, propter quod humanus intellectus primo et directe non intelligit se, com-
ponitque, et discurrit. Quare suum intelligere est cum continuo et tempore, cujus
totum oppositum contigit in intelligentiis quae sunt penitus liberatae a materia. Ipse
igitur intellectus sic medius existens inter immaterialia et materialia, neque ex toto
est hie et nunc, neque ex toto ab hie et nunc absolvitur, quapropter neque sua
operatio ex toto est universalis, neque ex toto est particularis, neque ex toto subjicitur
tempori, neque ex toto a tempore removetur. Recte autem et ordinate sic processit
natura, ut a primis ad extrema per media deveniat. Intelligentiae enim cum sim
pliciter abstractae sint nullo modo intelligendo indigent corpore ut subjecto, vel ut
objecto ; quare simpliciter naturam cognoscunt, primo se intelligentes, et simplici
intuitu ; quapropter et a tempore et a continuo absolutae sunt. Virtutes autem
sensitivae, cum immersae sint materiae, tantum singulariter cognoscunt, non re-
flectentes supra seipsas, neque discurrentes. At humanus intellectus sicut medius
existit in esse, sic et in operari." Op. cit. ix. pp. 59, 60.

1 " Non immerito homo dictus est microcosmus sen parvus mundus." Op. cit.
xiv. p. 140.

2 See e.g. Comm. de An. f. 254 r. ; Apol. I. iii. f. 58 d.

3 " Haec sunt omnes vires sensitivae, licet aliquae illarum sunt magis spirituales."
De /mm. ix. p. 53.

4 " Ponitur et cogitativa inter vires sensitivas." Op. cit. IX. p. 64.

5 " Si parum ascendamus, humanum intellectum ponemus immediate supra cogi-
tativam, et infra immaterialia, de utroque participantem. " (Op. cit. ix. p. 65.)
Cf. Apol. I. iii. f. 59 a : " Omnis nostra intellectio duabus perficitur virtutibus : in-
tellectu videlicet tanquam subjecto et phantasia tanquam movente. At abstractorum
intellectio, una sola, scilicet intellectus virtute, perficitur, ut decor et naturae ordo

128 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

Pomponazzi conceives man as the highest of all terrestrial
and mortal things, the lowest, on the other hand, of beings
having the immaterial and imperishable principle of thought
(intellectusY . Possessed of the very principle — namely the time
less element of thought — which is the secret of the imperishable-
ness of the Divine Intelligence, the soul of man nevertheless, so
far as we can see, has its existence bound up with its embodi
ment in matter ; sharing the attribute of " immateriality," it is
not (so far as reason and philosophy shew) in point of fact
immortal2.

In many passages marked by freshness and eloquence of
thought and expression Pomponazzi describes the mixed
characteristics and conditions of man ; the diverse and almost
contradictory qualities in his nature ; the mingled elements in
his lot of greatness and insignificance, glory and misery.

There is, in all these meditations, a uniform bias or tendency;
it is to bring out the preponderance of the sensual over the
intellectual, of the earthly over what we may fairly call the
supernatural element in human life. Yet this did not imply,
practically, a low view of human life, any more than, philo
sophically, it meant materialism. The truth is, on the contrary,
that Pomponazzi's conception of "intelligence" was so high that
he needed to bring in some counterbalancing considerations in
order to preserve the level of his general view of human nature.
The power of thought was an element in the soul and life of

servetur. Cum namque intelligence in supremo cognitionis cardine collocentur,
neque materia, neque ejus conditionibus, aliqua ex parte, in earum cognitione
indigent ; quandoquidem materia est cognitionis impeditiva. Quo fit si maxime
cognoscentes sint, maxime sint liberatae a materia, veluti egregie dixit Averroes in
commento tertii De Anima : quare in intelligendo neque indigeant corpore ut subjecto
neque ut objecto. Anima autem bestialis in infimo ordine cognoscentium reponitur.
Quare inter cognoscentia minime liberata est a materia : uncle et in sui cognitione
dependent a corpore ut subjecto et objecto. Humana autem anima inter haec media
existens, non tantum absolvitur a materia veluti intelligentia, neque tantum immergitur
ut anima bestialis. Quare medio modo se habet in cognitione." Cf. Cotnm. de
Anima, ff. 253 v., 254 v.

1 This intermediate position is frequently depicted in words like these : " Cum
ipsa (anima humana) sit materialium nobilissima, in confinioque immaterialium, aliquid
immaterialitatis odorat." De Imm. ix. p. 63.

2 " Animus humanus etsi improprie dicatur immortalis, quia vere mortalis est,
participat tamen de proprietatibus immortalitatis; cum universale cognoscat, tametsi
ejusmodi cognitio valde tennis et obscura sit." Op. cit. xn. p. 90.

INTELLIGENCE I2Q

man so high as to be almost supernatural. The possession of it
almost raised man to an equality with God and the celestial
Intelligences. In words, Pomponazzi constantly seems to labour
to belittle man. But it is not a paradox to say that his sense of
man's littleness was stimulated by his fundamental conviction
of man's greatness. It was his belief in the transcendent worth
of reason which led him to lay such stress on the irrational
elements in human life and the limitations of intelligence in
man. He was compelled to bring this side of the case into
clear relief, in order to set man, as he believed, in his true
position. Possessing such a power of thought, Pomponazzi
seems to have reasoned, man must possess it subject to qualifica
tions in its degree and hindrances to its full exercise, if he is to
remain in that " middle place " which it is his nature to occupy.

We find accordingly in Pomponazzi a curious balancing of
the higher against the lower attributes of human nature, and
comparison of the spiritual with the sensual aspects of human
life, in order to discover which bulks more largely or outweighs
the other in the scale. He indulges in such considerations as
that the transcendent and immaterial powers in man are few —
intellect and will ; the merely sensitive and animal attributes
many. Comparing again the various races of men, we find that
the savage outnumber the civilised, and that many of those which
are described as civilised are so only in comparison with others
utterly barbarous. Indeed in one place Pomponazzi suggests
that many men are in intelligence below the level of the brutes.
How small a part of time, again, is given to the cultivation of
the intellect, in proportion to that which is devoted to the
exercise of lower powers and satisfaction of lower needs ! And
how small a section of mankind is occupied with intellectual
pursuits ! Among many thousands you will find scarcely one
thinking man. The light of reason, also, is in man so dim, the
power of thought so weak, that his so-called knowledge rather
deserves the name of ignorance, and his intelligence is not so
much intelligence as its shadow and pale reflection1.

1 " Cum in ista essentia sint quaedam quae dant ipsam esse mortalem, et quaedam
immortalem, cum multo plura promoveant ad mortalitatem quam ad immortalitatem...
magis pronuncianda est mortalis quam immortalis....Nam si in homine numerum po-

130

PIETRO POMPONAZZI

Elsewhere Pomponazzi dwells on the various burdens and
ills of our mortal condition. Although man, he says, be superior
by the participation of intelligence to all other mortal creatures,
he is yet possessed of the feeblest of bodies and exposed to
innumerable infirmities. Or, glancing at man's social state, he
instances the evils of tyrannical misgovernment, and declares it
an open question whether the tyrant or those over whom he
tyrannises have the more miserable lot1.

He concludes, therefore, that while human life has its two
sides, it looks more towards what is mortal and material than
towards what is spiritual and enduring.

In particular the intellectual principle, by possession of
which, certainly, man " partakes " of the nature of that which is
abiding, is present in him in so imperfect and rudimentary
a form that it cannot raise him after all above the sphere of the
perishable2.

tentiarum consideremus, duas tantum invenimus quae attestantur super immortalitatem,
scilicet intellectum et voluntatem, innumeras vero turn sensititum vegetatitum quae
omnes attestantur super mortalitatem. Amplius si climata habitabilia conspexerimus,
multo plures homines assimilantur feris quam hominibus ; interque climata habitabilia
perrarissimos invenies qui rationales sunt, inter quoque rationales si considerabimus
hi simpliciter irrationales nuncupari possunt ; verum appellati sunt rationales in
comparatione ad alios maxime bestiales, sicut fertur de mulieribus quod nulla est
sapiens nisi in comparatione ad alias maxime fatuas. Amplius si ipsam intellectionem
inspexeris maxime earn quae de Diis est, quid de Diis? imo de ipsis naturalibus et
quae subjacent sensui, adeo obscura adeoque debilis est, ut verius utraque ignorantia,
scilicet negationis et dispositionis, nuncupanda sit quam cognitio. Adde quantum
modicum temporis apponant circa intellectum, et quamplurimum circa alias potentias,
quo fit ut vere hujusmodi essentia corporalis et corruptibilis sit, vixque sit umbra
intellectus ; haec etiam videtur esse causa cur ex tot mille hominibus vix unus studiosus
reperiatur, et deditus intellectuali ; causa quidem naturalis, nam semper sic fuit, licet
secundum magis et minus ; causa (inquam) est quia natura homo plus sensualis quam
immortalis existit." (De Imm. vm. pp. 36 ff.) " Virtutesque habet (anima) organicas
et simpliciter materiales scilicet sensitivae et vegetativae, verum cum ipsa sit materi-
alium nobilissima, in confinioque immaterialium, aliquid immaterialitatis odorat ; sed
non simpliciter ; uncle habet intellectum et voluntatem, in quibus cum Diis convenit,
verum satis imperfecte et aequivoce, quandoquidem Dii ipsi totaliter nbstrahunt a
materia, ipsa vero semper cum materia, quoniam cum phantasmate, cum continue,
cum tempore, cum discursu, cum obscuritate cognoscit ; quare in nobis intellectus et
voluntas non sunt sincere immaterialia, sed secundum quid et diminute, unde verius
ratio quam intellectus appellari dicitur, non enim ut ita dixerim intellectus est, sed
vestigium et umbra intellectus." (Of. cit. ix. p. 63.) " Infiniti fere homines minus
videntur habere de intellectu quam multae bestiae." Op. cit. ix. p. 64.

1 Op. cit. xn. p. 90.

2 " Habet intellectum et voluntatem in quibus cum Diis convenit, verum satis

INTELLIGENCE 13!

The human reason is definitely distinguished from the
absolute reason, as acting by discursus and not by simplex
intuitus. From this point of view it is not properly to be called
intellectus1. And this disadvantageous comparison of human
thought with the supposed ideal of reason is summed up in
words like these: — "If it be said that we have spoken much
ill of the human intellect since we assert it to be scarcely
the shadow of intellect, it is because it truly is a shadow in
comparison with the Intelligences... .It is not truly called
' intellectual ' but only ' rational ' : for intellect grasps all things
in a simple intuition ; reasoning by means of discursive thought,
synthesis, and a process in time, all of which are evidences of its
imperfection and materiality ; for these are the conditions of
material existence. But if you compare human intellect with
the rest of created and corruptible existences, it will obtain
the highest rank of excellence2."

To conclude, then, the human soul is participant in the
Divine ; but, that being granted, the precise mode of its partici
pation remains to be determined. Participation in the Divine,
for instance, does not necessarily imply imperishability. For all
things in some sense partake of the Divine nature3. Again
all things that propagate their kind partake in a sense of

imperfecte et aequivoce...quoniam cum phantasmate, cum continue, cum tempore,
cum discursu, cum obscuritate cognoscit ; quare in nobis intellectus et voluntas non
sunt sincere immaterialia, sed secundum quid et diminute, unde verius ratio quam
intellectus appellari dicitur ; non enim, ut ita dixerim, intellectus est, sed vestigium et
umbra intellectus." (Op. dt. IX. p. 63.) Not only with regard to the highest realities
but in its apprehension of earthly objects, is human thought thus inadequate. "Si
ipsam intellectionem inspexeris maxime earn quae de Diis est, quid de Diis? imo
de ipsis naturalibus, et quae subjacent sensui, adeo obscura adeoque debilis est, ut
verius utraque ignorantia, scilicet negationis et dispositions, nuncupanda sit quam
cognitio." Op. cit. VIII. p. 37.

1 "Nam rationalis dicitur, et non vere intelligens. Quare cum discursu cognoscit
et temporaliter." Apol. \. iii. f. 59 c.

2 " Si dicatur nos multum vilificare intellectum humanum, cum ipsum vix umbram
intellectus affirmamus, hinc quidem dicitur, quod vere comparando ipsum intelligentiis

umbra est Non enim vere appellatur intellectualis, sed rationalis: intellectus enim

simplici intuitu omnia intuetur ; at ratiocinatio discursu, compositione, et cum tempore,
quae omnia attestantur super imperfectione et materialitate ejus ; sunt enim hae con-
ditiones materiae. Si vero ipsum humanum intellectum comparaveris ad cetera gene-
rabilia et corruptibilia primum gradum nobilitatis obtinebit." De 7mm. xn. p. 90.

3 " Caetera mortalia de divinitate participant ; nam in omnibus naturae numen est,
ut idem dicit Aristoteles ex Heracliti sententia i. De Part. cap. ult." Op. cit. xn. p. 88.

9—2

132 PIETRO POMPON AZZI

immortality1. The sense, then, in which the soul of man
partakes of the Divine nature, or of immortality, needs to be
determined. It has at least a pre-eminent share in the Divine
nature2.

The most precise statement of Pomponazzi's conclusion upon
this subject is that " however much man thus partakes of the
material and of the immaterial, nevertheless strictly he is said to
participate in the immaterial because he falls far short of im
materiality, and is not strictly described as participating in the
lower animals and in plants, but as including them3."

(3) Mind and Body in Man.

It has been found that, for Pomponazzi, the "intellectual
soul " of man possesses " intelligence " in the full sense of the
term, which to him means something essentially immaterial
in its nature. On the other hand Pomponazzi recognises the
embodiment of the human soul, as a fact, and as, indeed, a
necessary condition of its existence ; without which it would not
be what it is, without which it cannot (philosophically speaking)
be imagined as existing.

I do not attempt here to penetrate more deeply into the
conceptions of Thought and Matter as they presented them
selves to a mind like Pomponazzi's. I only note that there was
in his view nothing abhorrent in the notion of a corporeal being
possessed of the power of thought. Various passages that have
been quoted make this abundantly clear ; I add only the full
text of one from the De Ntitritione, which as the latest of his
writings may be taken to express the thoughts in which his
mind finally came to rest. I may remark in passing that the
clear recognition in this passage of the immateriality of thought

1 " Omne productivum sibi similis est sic immortalitatis particeps." De Imm.
xn. p. 89.

2 "Homo divinitatis et immortalitatis est particeps, vel maxime....Caetera mortalia
de divinitate participant, nam in omnibus naturae numen est....Verum caetera mortalia
non tantum sicut homo." Op. cit. XII. p. 88.

3 " Quantumcunque homo sic de materiali et immateriali participet, tamen proprie
dicitur de immateriali participare, quia multum deficit ab immaterialitate, sed non
proprie dicitur brutis et vegetabilibus participare, verum ea continere." Of. cit.
XIV. p. 141. Cf. viil. pp. 37, 38: " Multo plura promoveant ad mortalitatem quarn
ad immortalitatem....Homo plus sensualis quam immortalis existit."

INTELLIGENCE 133

effectually disposes of Fiorentino's attempt to make out in
Pomponazzi's successive writings a progress towards materialism
culminating in the De Nutritione.

"Quamquam id quod est anima intellectiva sit extensum — est enim sensi-
tivum et nutritivum ut supponimus, quae sunt extensa — ut tamen intelligit et
recipit species intelligibiles non utitur corpora neque ut sic afficitur quantitate
(si enim virtus cogitativa quae est in parte sensitiva et organica...potest
particulariter discurrere...et sequestrare substantiam a quantitate, quanto
magis virtus intellectiva potest...facere operationes tales...) ...Intellectus...
non utitur organo neque corpore ut subjecto.... Nam intellectus qua
intelligit est immaterialis ad modum expressum : cum quo tamen stat quod
et sit materialis : imo unaquaeque anima est materialis et immaterialis,
divisibilis et indivisibilis1."

Embodiment in a material body, he had always maintained,
was not incompatible with the cognitive apprehension of material
things, or with the power of abstract thought. Knowledge itself,
however, at the same time, was not a physical relation, not realis,
but spiritualis^. If intelligence be in body it is not so in a
physical sense : if it act there, the " principle '-' of its operation is
nevertheless other than physical ; if the physical conditions
(dispositions) must be present, they do not cause or explain the
intellectual process. Yet, once more, the characteristics of
thought as human are determined by the embodied condition
of human intelligence3.

But I content myself with presenting Pomponazzi's own
account of the relations between anima intellectiva and the
body in which it exists.

1 De Nutr. \. xxiii. f. f3ob. 2 See Comm. de An. f. 128.

3 " Qua intellectus est non dependet a materia, neque a quantitate ; quod si
humanus intellectus ab ea dependet, hoc est ut sensui conjunctus est....Quoniam
sensui conjunctus est, ex toto a materia et quantitate absolvi non potest, cum nun-
quam cognoscat sine phantasmate, dicente Aristotele 3. De Anima, 'nequaquam sine
phantasmate intelligit anima.' Unde sic indigens corpore ut objecto, neque sim-
pliciter universale cognoscere potest, sed semper universale in singular! speculatur,
ut unusquisque in seipso experiri potest. In omni namque quantumcunque abstracta
cognitione idolum aliquod corporale sibi format ; propter quod humanus intellectus
primo et directe non intelligit se, componitque, et discurrit. Quare suum intelligere
est cum continue et tempore, cujus totum oppositum contigit in intelligentiis quae
sunt penitus liberatae a materia. Ipse igitur intellectus sic medius existens inter
immaterialia et materialia, neque ex toto est hie et nunc, neque ex toto ab hie et
nunc absolvitur, quapropter neque sua operatic ex toto est universalis, neque ex toto
est particularis ; neque ex toto subjicitur tempori, neque ex toto a tempore removetur."
De Imm. IX. pp. 59, 60.

!34 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

In the first place, as a matter of fact, the mind of man is in
body. It is in permanent connection with a physical organisa
tion which is the necessary condition of its action and without
which, as Pomponazzi so frequently insists, it would no longer
act as we know it to act, or be what we know it to be1.

There are, further, two reasons why, according to Pom-
ponazzi's system of thought, the human mind is thus bound up
with body. One is the law of human knowledge, accepted by
Pomponazzi from the Aristotelian psychology, that all human
knowledge is primarily derived from the senses, and hence
presented by imagination to thought : so that thought in man
has no contents (objecta), and the mind of man no objects of
knowledge or intellectual consideration, which are not received
from this source2. The instrumentality of the body is thus
necessary to thought as human. This is what Pomponazzi
means by affirming the dependence of the human soul on the
body tanquaui de objecto.

But secondly the human soul is bound to the body because
the intellectual soul is one with the sensitive and vegetative
soul. It is the same soul under different aspects. And since
in its lower aspects it is obviously inseparable from body, the
soul as a whole must be so also. Intelligence in man may
still have its true snbjectnm, its subsistence, in intelligence
itself, and not in anything material ; the soul as sensitive and
vegetative subsists in matter simply. There is no reason to
postulate any other substratum for the sensitive soul, no possible
ground for supposing it separate from matter. And the " intel
lectual " soul, while having elsewhere the ground of its existence

1 See De Imm. ix. p. 58 : "Dicimus intellectum non indigere corpora ut subjecto
...non quia intellectio nullo modo sit in corpore, cum fieri nequit si intellectus est in
corpora ut sua immanens operatic quoquo modo non sit in eo...sed pro tanto intellectio
dicitur non esse in organo et in corpore," etc.: x. p. 77 : " Intellectus humanus non
potest intelligere nisi in materia sint quale et quantum sensibile : cum non possit
operari nisi ipse sit, ipseque esse non potest nisi cum dispositione convenienti ;
non tamen sequitur, quod per tales dispositiones intelligat," etc.: Apol. I. iii. f. 59 b:
" Dicimus... humanam intellectionem non esse in corpore, non quoniam non sit in
materia, quandoquidem hoc fieri inimaginabile est. ..sed pro tanto dicitur," etc.

" Cum nunquam cognoscat sine phantasmate, dicente Aristotele 3. De Anima,
'nequaquam sine phantasmate intelligit anima.'...In omni namque quantumcunque
abstracta cognitione idolum aliquod corporale sibi format," etc. De Imm. ix. p. 59.

INTELLIGENCE 135

(lion indigere corpore nt subjecto}, yet, as being one with that
which subsists in matter and inseparable from it, is also itself
actually inseparable from matter. This statement concentrates
the pervading contradiction in Pomponazzi's metaphysics ; but
it is on these grounds that he affirms the soul of man, while
" intellectual," and as intellectual independent of matter tanquam
de subjecto, to be nevertheless actually inseparable from the
body3.

In so far as the body of man is the organ of his intellect —
and that is as far as the objects of his thought are concerned — it
is, in the opinion of Pomponazzi, the whole body that is so.
There is, he says, no specific organ for thought as such : for if
the action of thought were tied to a particular physical instru
mentality, or the data of thought received only through a
particular avenue, thought would lose its comprehensive power,
its neutrality and universality2.

1 " (Intellectus noster) quatenus intellectus, non eget corpore — Anima autem
nostra secundum quod est intellectiva realis utitur in intelligendo organo corporeo...
nee ex toto et omni modo in intelligendo eget organo corporeo, quia non eget eo ut
subjecto — Ar.ima autem nutritiva secundum quod realiter eadem est cum vegetativa
et sensitiva, et sic in suis operationibus, quae sunt pertinentes ad vegetationem et
sensationem, indiget corpore ut subjecto, quia omnes tales operationes fiunt cum
conditionibus materiae, quae sunt hie et nunc ; ideo in talibus operationibus aninia
intellectiva, quatenus sensitiva aut vegetativa, indiget corpore ut subjecto; modo cum
operatio eiusdem animae intellectivae, quatenus intellectiva est, quae est intelligere,
fiat sine conditionibus materiae, quae sunt hie et nunc : ideo in ista sua operatione
non eget corpore ut subjecto, sed bene ut objecto, quia quidquid intelligatur ab
anima nostra intelligitur per aliquid corporeum." Comm. de Anima, ff. 253 v, 254 r.
Cf. De Nntritione, I. xxiii. 130 b: " Quamquam id quod est anima intellectiva sit
extensum — est enim sensitivum et nutritivum supponimus, quae sunt extensa — ut tamen
intelligit et recipit species intelligibiles non utitur corpore, neque ut sic afficitur
quantitate....Nam intellectus qua intelligit est immaterialis ad modum expressum :
cum quo tamen stat quod et sit materialis."

2 " Non tamen in aliqua parte corporis ponitur ipsum intelligere, sed in toto
categorematice sumpto. Non enim in aliqua parte, quoniam sic esset organicus
intellectus : et vel non omnia cognosceret, vel si omnia cognosceret ut cogitativa
tantum singulariter et non universaliter cognosceret. Quare sicut intellectus est in
toto, ita et intelligere. Non inconvenienter igitur Alexander posuit totum corpus
esse instrumentum intellectus, quoniam intellectus omnes vires comprehendit, et non
aliquam partem determinatam, quoniam sic non omnia cognosceret, sicut neque
aliqua virtutum sensitivarum. Quanquam autem sic totum corpus ponatur instru
mentum intellectus quasi ut subjectum, non tamen vere est ut subjectum, quoniam
intelligere non recipitur in eo modo corporal! , ut prius dictum est. Et si amplius
quaeratur, an humanus intellectus indivisibiliter recipiat : dicitur quod qua intelligit
indivisibiliter recipit: qua vero sentit, vel vegetat, divisibiliter." De Imm. X. p. 80.

136 PIETRO POMPON AZZI

It is to be particularly remarked that while allowing that the
body is necessary to the human mind as its organ, he keeps
himself as far as ever from a materialistic view of mind. He
will not allow that thought is derivable from matter, or that
a physical explanation can be given of the fact of intelligence in
man. Body may be mind's organ ; a condition it may be of
the existence of the human soul as such ; but matter can never
be the subjectum of mind1.

But as dependent upon the bodily organisation for the
materials of knowledge and thought (tanquam de objecto) human
intelligence employs for its instrument in this sense the body as
a whole. This is, so far as it goes, a position at once self-con
sistent and philosophically sound. From a physiological point
of view the statement may be inadequate ; since much remains
to be said, as the result of physiological observation, with regard
to the relation between various activities of thought and certain
parts of the body — in particular, the brain. But if we distinguish
the act of thought as such, and the relation in knowledge, as
sui generis (actio spiritualis), and if then we enquire further as to
the total physical concomitant or instrument of mental action,
it is certainly true that it is the body as a whole which is to be
so regarded.

Pomponazzi's view, then, of the relation of mind and body
is an interesting one and not inconsistent with itself.

On the one hand he held, as the general principle of his
conception of intelligence, that thought as such does not
" subsist " in matter. Consequently it is not the product of
some particular part of the body. Had thought been a function
of matter, it must have had its proper bodily organ. Since it is
not so, and although it is inseparably connected with the body,
its connection is with the body as a whole. (And that the whole
body is the instrument of knowledge is true, whatever be the
particular offices in relation to knowledge of its several parts.)
But the inseparable connection of human intelligence with body,
and of human knowledge with bodily experiences, did not for

1 " Quamquam autem sic totum corpus ponatur instrumentum intellectus quasi ut
subjectum, non tamen vere est ut subjectum, quoniam intelligere non recipitur in eo
modo corporali." Ibid,

INTELLIGENCE 137

Pomponazzi determine the question as to the real nature of
thought.

On the other hand he did not contend for any activity of
(human) intelligence that was unconnected with the bodily
organisation. Where he speaks of human intelligence as
" immaterial," he refers to the nature of thought as not physical
or subsisting in matter. It is because he holds this view of
thought that he is exempted from the necessity of establishing
specific activities of thought in man that should be independent
of the bodily frame. On the contrary, the human mind —
thought as in man — is in all its operations conjoined to the
body ; first, as being in fact always connected with it, and
secondly, as in its intrinsic nature and constitution depending
on contact through a material instrument with a world of
material objects.

NOTE ON THE WORDS " SUBJECT " AND " OBJECT."

Pomponazzi describes human thought as being dependent on
the body objective, or tanquam de objecto ; but not dependent on
the body subjective or tanquam de subjecto.

If we accept the modern use of these terms, this would
appear to mean that the mind is dependent on the body in
reality (" objectively " speaking) but independent of it as regards
the exercise of thought — if such a meaning could be supposed
to be intelligible. What Pomponazzi actually means is of
course the opposite — that the mind depends on the body in the
act of knowledge, namely for the contents of knowledge ; but
that in its real nature — per suam cssentiani, as he puts it else
where — it is not so dependent.

Hamilton and others have shewn clearly how in the
mediaeval schools the terms " subject " and " object " were used
in a sense almost exactly the opposite of that which they now
bear.

There was indeed an early usage according to which
" subject " had an alternative sense akin to its modern meaning
of the thinking mind with its states and activities, ra rj

138 PIETRO POMPON AZZI

distinction was drawn between subjectum occupations, and sub-
jectum inJiaesionis or praedicationis. But the latter was the use
that prevailed : and subjectum was employed to denote the
vTroKeifjLevov, the substratum of any given phenomenon, whether
mental or physical. It is its use in the former alternative, as
the inrotcei/jievov of mental states and acts, which has determined
the modern meaning of the term. But subjectum thus, in its
first meaning, belonged to ra (frvo-ei.

The content (or, as we should say, the " subject ") of thought
was called objectum, as that which is set before the mind. (" Qua-
tenus objicitur intellectui " — Descartes. Cf. Pomponazzi, Comm.
de Anima, f. 26 v. : " Objectum alicujus potentiae semper pre-
cedit operationem illius potentiae " ; and the schoolmen passim.
See also Prantl, Gescli. d. Logik, III. 208.) And any matter of
knowledge was said to be objectum as present to a knowing
mind, and to be "objectively" as it might appear to the mind.
The objectum was the intentiouale as opposed to the reale.
Repraesentativum was the same as objectivum (see Descartes,
Princ. I. xvii.).

Hamilton enumerates the following synonyms for objective
and subjective respectively in the scholastic use : objectivum •=•
intentionale, repraesentativum, vicarium, rationale, intellcctuale, in
intellectu, prout cognitum, ideate ; subjectivum = rcale, proprium,
formate, prout in se ipso. (Hamilton's Reid, p. 806, note.) Again
Gerson drew a distinction between esse essentials, and esse
objectale, sen repraesentativum in ordine ad intcllectum crcatum vet
increatum (see Rousselot, Etudes, III. p. 321).

It is always to be remembered, at the same time, that there
was also a subjectum of the mind. (Cf. Pomponazzi, Comm. de
Anima, f. 86 v. : "Si species sensibilis sit in sensu depauperate
spiritibus, tune non est cognita, et hoc quia subjectum non est
bene dispositum.") Eucken (GescJiiclite der pJdlosopliiscJien Ter-
minologie, p. 203, note 5) quotes from Leibnitz the words,
subjectum; ou Vdme meme, which present to us the point of
transition from the old to the modern usage. According to
the former, however, to repeat Hamilton's illustrations, the
imagination (say) was subjective in mind, its images objective ;
a horse was subjective out of the mind, objective in the mind.

INTELLIGENCE 139

Every notion had its esse subjectivmn, in the mind, as a
psychological fact (we should say) ; and its esse objectivum, as
looking towards reality, and representative.

Thus understood Pomponazzi's language is plain. The
human intelligence, according to Aristotle's doctrine of know
ledge, derived all the contents of its thought, all its " representa
tive ideas," from the bodily senses, through the presentations
of imagination — also, as was held, a bodily power : therefore it
depended on the body objective. But the ground of the being
(subjectuvi) of human intelligence was, according to Pomponazzi,
simply intelligence as such : intelligence, not body, was the
subjectum of human thought — -per cssentitwi suain.

In the use by some later schoolmen of objcctivus, Hamilton
notes a curious parallel with Locke's double use of " idea," for
idea or for ideatum. These schoolmen distinguished conceptus
fornialis (= representative notion) from conceptus objectivus.
Now if the latter was really distinguishable from the former it
was not a conceptus at all, but an object conceived. Here the
new meaning of ' object ' begins to shew itself, as possibly the
occasion of the confusion.

During the i/th century the change gradually took place.
But Descartes explicitly adheres to the older usage (Princ. \.
xvii.): "Totum enim artificium quod in idea ilia objective
tantum, sive tanquam in itnaginatione continetur, debet in ejus
causa... non tantum objective sive representative, saltern in
prima et praecipua, sed re ipsa formaliter aut eminenter con-
tineri " : and there could hardly be a more apt illustration of
it than this from Berkeley : " Natural phaenomena are only
natural appearances. They are, therefore, such as we see and
perceive them. Their real and objective natures are, therefore,
the same." (Siris, sect. 292.)

CHAPTER VII

SENSE

THE great schoolmen, and especially Albert and St Thomas,
had made an effort to relate Sense and Reason, arbitrarily
sundered by Averroism. The Aristotelian doctrine of imagina
tion in its relation to sense lent itself to this endeavour. So did
the notion of a " cogitative faculty " (virtus cogitativa\ by which
the Arabians had sought to cover the nakedness of the non-
rational soul.

Pomponazzi in his psychological enquiries had the same
interest at heart. We shall find him on the one hand drawing
as close as possible the relations of sensus exterior (i.e. sense
proper) and sensus interior (imagination, memory, cogitativii);
and on the other exalting the functions of the natural faculty
of cogitativa, so as to bring it nearer to intellectus, which the
Averroists separated from man and the Thomists detached from
the body, but which he himself sought to see in an integral
relation to both.

In his analysis of sense- perception Pomponazzi accepts with
a certain hesitation the orthodox Aristotelian doctrine of the
" passivity " or " receptivity " of the mind in sensation. At first
sight it appears as if he adopted it simpliciter, as it was adopted
by St Thomas. But at the close of each of two elaborate dis
cussions we find him looking with favour upon the theory which
assigned a certain contribution from the mind itself even to the
simple sensation. As at the same time he does not deny the

SENSE 141

passivity of sense, we may conclude that he was influenced by
a regard to the wider psychological question raised by sense-
perception — the question of the relations of sense and thought —
but intended to hold a view of sensation in its cognitive aspect
which did not involve the abandonment of the Aristotelian
position with regard to sensation as such. And as a matter of
fact we shall find him explaining, on each occasion, in his last
word upon the doctrine of Albert, the place that was reserved in
it for the passive reception of impressions.

He begins then, by expressly adhering to the authority of
Aristotle. Sense " receives," he says, the sensible impression
(species sensibilis), which again is produced by the really existing
object1.

He seems at first clearly to distinguish the psychological
from the physical aspect of sense. He does not deny to the
sense-organ, he says, its own physical relations — what he calls
its (physical) agency. The question is a different one: "Whether
in perceiving it is passive and acted on2."

This question, then, Pomponazzi discusses in two sections of
his Commentary on the De Anima* and also in a section of the
Supplementa*. He defends the Aristotelian position doubtless
in good faith, against various alternative hypotheses, which set
up in one form or other the theory of an " activity " in sense.
In the first Quaestio, whether sense is active, he is occupied with
theories of a metaphysical or, as we should say, mythological
character, professed in the Averroist schools ; in the second,
whether the sensible form and the sensation are identical5 in
existence (" Utrum species sensibilis et sensatio sint idem
realiter"), with psychological constructions, of which that of
Albert is regarded as the most favourable example.

1 " Dico quod (sensus) est passivus. ...Videndum est modo quid recipiant sensus ut
puta oculus aut auris. Peripatetic! antiqui dicunt quod recipit speciem sensibilem,
quae est repraesentativa objecti, de qua...dicit Aristoteles quod sensus est susceptivus

specierum sine materia Viso quod sensus recipiat speciem sensibilem, videndum est

modo quid sit illud quod producit speciem sensibilem, et brevi dicendum est quod
objecta sunt quae producunt species sensibiles." Comm. de An. ff. 83 v., 84 r. Cf.
ff. 88 v., 89 r. : "Sensus exterior non potest moveri nisi ab eo quod actu existit. ...Mover!
est pati ; omne autem quod patitur, patitur ab eo quod est in actu." Cf. also f. 22 r r.

- " Sed quaestio est utrum in sentiendo patiatur vel agatur." Op. cit. f. 83 v.

3 Ff. 83—87. 4 Ff. 257, 258. 5 Or, "inseparable."

142 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

The doctrine of the passivity of the soul in sensation
presented great difficulties to the mediaeval mind. The essential
correlativity, from the Aristotelian point of view, of alaQ^v^
and alcrOrfrov having been lost sight of, great difficulty was felt
in relating the physical object, regarded as the occasion or cause
of sensation, with the psychic fact of sensation itself. And
especially was it repugnant to the ideas then in vogue, that a
material cause — the sensible thing — should produce a "spiritual"
effect, the sensation1.

This difficulty was increased by a confusion between the
physical object of sense-perception and the physical cause of
sensation, illustrated by the peculiar scholastic use of the term
species scnsibilis (sensible form or impression). The early in
terpreters of Aristotle had soon translated his doctrine of the
impression of the forms of sensible things upon sensitive soul2
into a notion of a physical impression by the sensible thing on
the physical organ of sense ; and where the species sensibilis did
not actually mean a certain quasi-physical something between
the sensible thing and the sensitive soul, it was in most cases
understood to stand for this physical impression on the sense-
organ, corresponding to the sensible thing which " caused " the
sensation3. At a later period, after Averroes and St Thomas
and their schools had recovered some apprehension of the logical
intention of Aristotle's original language, the phrase species
sensibilis might be employed in both senses at once — to denote

1 Thus, f. 84 r. : "Tune est dubitatio quae est mota ab Averroe...quomodo est
possibile ut sensibile ad extra, quod habet esse in materia, producat speciem sensi-
bilem, quae est perfectior objecto : cum tamen nihil producat aliquid perfectius se."
Again in f. 851. : "Quod sentit est perfectius eo quod non sentit....Si ergo sensus
concurrit passive ad sensationem creandam, et objectum active, quum sit nobilius
concurrere active quam passive, tune sensibile erit perfectius."

2 Aristotle, De Anit/ia, n. xii. 424 a 17—19 : Ka96\ov de irepl Trcunjs alffff-f/fffw 3e?
\afieiv &TI i] fj.tv afoffrjcris e<m rb SfKTiKbv T&V alffByruv dS&v avev T^S iiXijs, olov 6

K1)p6s, K.T.X.

3 Speaking generally of these species intentionales (whether sensibiles or intelligi-
biles) it may be said with Hamilton that they involved an hypothesis of representative
perception in which "the immediate object was something different from the mind,"
in contrast with the modern idea of representative perception "in which the vicarious
object was held only for a modification of the mind itself" (Hamilton, Reid, pp.
95 1 — 960). The distinction, however, does not hold good for St Thomas and the
later schoolmen generally, to whom the species was something in the mind itself.

SENSE 143

a physical or a mental fact — with a somewhat confusing effect.
We find this in Pomponazzi. Thus on the one hand, following
Averroes, he asks : — " How is it possible that an external object
of sense, which lias a material existence, should produce a sensible
form, which has a higher mode of existence than its object1?"
species sensibilis being thus regarded as a mental fact. But,
again, in describing the case in which the object of sense is
present to the sense-organ, and yet there is no sensation, he
speaks of the species sensibilis as being then present2. Now on
Aristotelian principles where there is no sensation there is no
species sensibilis, and can be none3. But species sensibilis meant
in this case the physical impression on the sense-organ4. And
we have the twofold interpretation of species sensibilis, almost in
so many words, in the doctrine ascribed to Albert and adopted
by Pomponazzi: — "Albert would seem to hold that every form,
in so far as it is form, acts spiritually, but that in so far as it is
in matter, it acts physically. This opinion, rightly understood,
has truth, as, I think, the sensible form effects an alteration in the
medium, and acts on the eye'"

The survival of the old misinterpretation in a physical sense
of the species sensibilis explains the peculiar terms in which, in
his second Qnaestio*, Pomponazzi states the question as to the
passivity of sense : " Whether the sensible form and the sensation
are identical in existence." This was really intended as a re
statement of the main question, whether the sensible thing be

1 " Quomodo est possibile ut sensibile ad extra, quod habet esse in materia,
producat speciem sensibilem, quae est perfectior objecto." Comm. de An. f. 84 r.

2 "Aliquando in sensu est species sensibilis, non tamen tune sentimus ; aliquando
enim delata sub oculis non videmus...nec tamen est credendum tune speciem non esse
in sensu, quum istae species agunt mere materialiter. " Op. cit. f. 85 r. This indeed
is not put forward as Pomponazzi's own view ; but in a subsequent criticism of the
point, he says in his own name — "Si species sensibilis sit in sensu depauperate
spiritibus, tune non est cognitio. " Op. cit. f. 86 v.

3 See De Anima, III. ii. 425 b 26 : ^ 3£ TOV alcr0r]Tov ei^/ryeta *ai rrjs atV0?j<reu>s ?;
avri] /j.tv fffri Kal /jda, rb 5' eZi/at ov ravrb aimus K.T.\.

4 " Credendum tune speciem esse in sensu, quum istae species agunt mere
materialiter." Comm. de An. f. 85 r.

5 " Albertus videretur tenere quod omnis forma, ut forma est, agit spiritualiter ;
ut vero est in materia, realiter agit. Quae opinio bene intellecta habet veritatem
quum, ego puto, species sensibilis alteret medium et agat in oculum." Op. at. f. 84 v.

6 Op. cit. ff. 85—87.

144 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

the "cause" of the sensation. Is the species sensibilis, he asks,
a sufficient cause of the mental fact of sensation, or must some
other cause also intervene ? In these words he paraphrases his
original question : — " The question is whether for sensation there
is needed some other thing in addition to tJie organ and the form :
and this is to ask whether the sensible form and the sensation
are identical in existence1."

That he intends in this new formula to ask the old question
appears plainly when he treats the "causation" of sensation by
organum et species as synonymous with its causation by objcctum
or sensibile*.

But it is evident that what he here means by species sensibilis
is not the sensible thing in its relation to sensation as a mental
fact — the sensible thing as object of sense-perception (alaQijTov)
— but the physical impression of the thing on the organ of sense.

For on the other, the Aristotelian, understanding of species
sensibilis, there could be no meaning in the question, " Whether
for sensation there is needed some other thing in addition to the
organ and the form" : the species sensibilis would imply sensation ;
and nothing further could conceivably be required in order that
there should be sensation, if -the species sensibilis were there.
Nor, in that sense, could there be any question of the identity
of sensatio and species sensibilis ; for neither existed, in reality,
apart from the other. Nor certainly in the case supposed,
where there was no cognition, could the species sensibilis in the
Aristotelian sense, the mental sense, be present as was alleged :i.

1 "Quaeritur utrum ad talem sensationem requiratur aliquid alterum praeter
organum et speciem ; et hoc est quaerere utrum species sensibilis et sensatio sint
idem realiter." Op. cit. f. 85 r.

2 " Si solae species cum sensu (i.e. in this connection, the organ of sense) essent
sufficientes causae sensationis, tune sensibile esset perfectius sensu. ...Si sensus con-
currit passive ad sensationem creandam, et objectum active," etc. Ibid.

3 Cf. Arist. DC Anima, II. v. 417 a 6 : Sr[\ov ovv on r6 aiffOrjTiKW OVK £<TTIV
evepyda, dXXci 5wd/xet n&vov.... 418 a 3: TO 5' a.iadriTiKbv 5vi>d/4ei eariv olov TO
aiffQ-riTOV TJdt] evTeXexet?) KaOdirfp fiprjTai. Trdcrxei fti? o$i> oi>x O/J.OLOV 6v, irtwovObs
o' Wyuot'wrcu Kal ZffTiv olov tKftvo. III. u. 425 b 16 : T] 8£ Tov alcrdijTov fvtpyeia /cat r^y
aartfijcrews ij avrij ^v ecrri K<d /MO., rb 5' elvai ov ravrbv ai/raly X^yw 8' olov i^60os 6 /COT'
tvtpyeiav Kal a.Kor) 77 /car' frtpyeiav ' tffri yap d.Koi]v ZXOVTO. /t?j aKOveiv, Kal rb ?X°"
tpb^ov OVK del \f/o<f>e'i. OTOLV 5' evepyrj rb dwdfievov aKOveiv Kal ^o<f>rj TO dvi>d/J.tt>ov
\l/o<f>e'iv, Tore TJ Kar' tvtpyeiav d/co?j d'/xa yiverai Kal 6 Kar' tvtpyeiav ^6^>os, uv e'treitv
av TIJ TO n^v flvan aKOVffiv TO de \f/6(f)ri(nv 426 a 15 : firel 5e ^.ia /JL^V eo~Tiv i] tvtpyeta

SENSE 145

But it has already been shewn that when Pomponazzi speaks
of species sensibilis in his second Quaestio he has in his mind the
physical effect of the object first on the medium and then on the
organ of sense. This meaning was implied in his assertion that
formae act realiter as well as spiritualiter. It is necessarily
understood in his talk of a species sensibilis present in sense
where there is by hypothesis no cognition ; and if he speaks of
the species sensibilis at one time as that in the tiling which affects
the medium and the organ of sense1, at another as the effect
produced in the organ2, the order of existence ascribed to it is
the same : it is the physical nexus between the thing and
the organ. Above all, the mere statement of the question : —
" Whether for sensation something is needed in addition to the
organ and the form " — declares that the species in question is not
the correlative of sensation as such, in the mental relation ; and
is of the order of organum, the physical order.

We shall see that Pomponazzi does something to distinguish
the physical conditions of sensation from the object of sensation,
the effect of the sensible thing as a physical cause from its
apprehension through sensation in mind : and so to extricate the
real problem of sensation as a mental fact.

Meanwhile, in spite of his employment of the Peripatetic
terminology, he is so far only restating the mediaeval problem
of the "causation" by a material thing, the object, of a
psychical fact, the sensation. And it is curious to notice as
a final illustration of the confusion that had come into the use
of species sensibilis, that while species sensibilis is spoken of as the
mental fact, the fact of sensation, which cannot be attributed to
a physical cause3, it is also the name given to that very physical
agency (the effect, namely, in the sense organ) whose adequacy
to the production of sensation is being denied4.

77 roO aiffOrjTOv Kai r/ roO alffOyTiKov, TO 5' elvai Zrepov, dvdyKTj a/jia <f>Qeipeff6cu /cat
ffw£effdai TTJV oftrw \cyoflfrliv dKor/v /cat tptxpov, /cat 'xyfi.bv Si) KO.I yevviv /cat ra #\Aa
6/xotws' ra 5e Kara dtivafjLiv \eyo/J.fi>a OVK dvdyKrj.

"Species sensibilis alterat medium et agit in oculum." Comm. de An. f. 84 v.

2 " Speciem esse in sensu " — i.e. in the organ (e.g. "in sensu depauperate spiritibus ").

3 " Est dubitatio quae est mota ab Averroe...quomodo est possibile ut sensibile ad
extra, quod habet esse in materia, producat speciem sensibilem, quae est perfectior
objecto. " Op. cit. f. 84 r.

"Si solae species cum sensu essent sufficientes causae sensationis, tune sensibile
(scil. objectum) esset perfectius sensu." Op. cit. f. 85 r.

D. 10

146 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

Doubtless, also, the perversion of the phrase species sensibilis
from its true meaning did something to hinder the correct
apprehension of sensation as a mental fact. The Aristotelian
conception of the relation between sensation and the object of
sense-perception being thus lost, the meaning of Aristotle's
assertion of the passivity of sense was altogether misunderstood.
What was intended as a psychological account of the mental
fact — of the receptivity, or passivity, of sense in the perception
of the sensible object — was read as an assertion of physical
causation. Aristotle's description of the relation of sense to the
sensible thing in cognition was similarly mis-read as affirming a
physical equivalence, and in that sense denied. The truth of
course was that this time-honoured and hackneyed phrase, " the
identity of the perception and the thing perceived," had become
meaningless on the lips of those who had missed the point of
view of its original author. And certainly if the species sensibilis
was the physical effect of an object on the organ of sense, or the
qualities in the object causing that particular effect, sensatio and
species sensibilis were not identical in existence. It was in this
sense that the Aristotelian formula was denied by Albert and
others, and a new " cause " required to account for sensation.
But finally those who denied the sufficiency of the physical and
organic nexus as an explanation of sensation as such, but yet
moved within the physical circle of thought and failed to raise
the psychological problem in psychological terms, introduced
a really physical conception of the " agency " of the faculty of
sense — of sense acting, in combination with the physical causality
of the object and the effects on the medium and organ of sense,
to produce the result, sensation.

It must be regarded as a considerable achievement, if
Pomponazzi, out of so much confusion of thought, and such
unconsidered blending of the physical and psychological points
of view, emerges with something like a coherent physical history
of the conditions of sensation on the one hand, and on the other
a recognition of the distinctive peculiarity of the cognitive relation
as such.

I have said that Pomponazzi examines in these two Quaes-
tiones the alternatives to the Aristotelian doctrine of the passivity
of sense in perception, and that in each he is occupied with a

SENSE 147

distinct type of theory. There were two ways in which it might
be asserted that sense is active. It might be done by postulat
ing in the operations of sense some metaphysical power, some
"agency" in the special meaning in which the term was then
understood ; or by devising a psychology, an account of the
operation of the soul itself in sense, which introduced some
specific agency of sense and contradicted its supposed purely
passive and receptive character. The former alternative to the
orthodox doctrine Pomponazzi dismisses in a few words ; the
latter he discusses more at length, giving special attention to the
theory of Albert; and while he criticises adversely the argu
ments that had been employed in its favour, developing the
while his own understanding of the Aristotelian position, he ends
by the practical admission that there is more to be said on the
subject, as a matter of psychology, than simply that sense is
passive.

In view of the difficulty1 of attributing a mental fact like
sensation to the agency of a material cause — the sensible thing
— Averroes and his school postulated the action of a higher
Intelligence. According to some this was the Deity who, in
relation to the activity of intellect, was called intellectus agens,
in relation to sense, sensus agens ; others identified the sensus
agens with some lower Intelligence postulated for this special
purpose ; others again attributed to the organ of sense a power
to produce the sensible presentation — of which, says Pomponazzi,
there is and can be no evidence2.

Pomponazzi, following Albert and St Thomas, dismisses these
hypothetical intermediary powers, and explains the possibility
of sensation, as caused by a sensible object, simply by reference
to "spiritual action," and to the proved nature and powers of
the human mind. There is, he says, such a thing as " spiritual "
action as well as physical ; that is to say, there is a cognitive
relation, between mind and its object, besides the physical rela-

1 "Quomodo est possibile ut sensibile ad extra, quod habet esse in materia,
producat speciem sensibilem." Comm. de An. f. 84 r.

2 "Aliqui dixerunt propter dictum Averrois, quod quum objectum...producit
speciem sensibilem, quod producit in virtute unius intelligentiae appropriatae ad hoc.
...Aliqui dixerunt esse Deum, qui est idem quod intellectus agens — Aliqui tenuerunt
quod sit una virtus quae sit in organo, et per illud organum agat...P]go quaero, quae
sit ista actio. " Ibid.

148 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

tion between one material thing and another1. The production
of sensation is an instance of such mental action — of a "spiritual"
action of an object on the mind. The soul need not be the active
member of this relation ; nor need it on the other hand be argued
that because the soul is passive in sensation there is therefore no
activity in thought: for it is the distinguishing characteristic of
soul in man to combine an active and a passive element'2.

It is true that Pomponazzi traces in the occurrence of this
spiritual action, this sensation, the influence of the celestial
powers. For him, as for the ordinary mind of his time, such
influence accompanied and governed every action and every
event3. The point however is, that he dismisses the specific
agency of sensus agens ; and teaches that, subject to the co
operation of the higher powers, the object and the mind have a
natural relation, and that in this relation, in the case of sense,
the mind is passive4. " Every form, in so far as it is form, acts

spiritually Objects act spiritually by virtue of the higher

powers It should not excite wonder that the object produces

tJte form by virtue of the higher powers."

In the second Quaestio, "Whether the sensible form and
sensation are identical in existence," Pomponazzi alludes again
to the metaphysical explanations of an "agency" in sense5, but
he does no more than mention them, and devotes his attention
now to theories of a different character. He refers here, and also
in the Supplemental, to attempts that had been made on more
psychological lines to ascribe an agency to sense, psychological
constructions of sense-perception inconsistent with the passive

1 "Albertus videretur tenere quod omnis forma, ut forma est, agit spiritualiter ;
ut vero in materia, realiter agit — Sed tune est dubitatio quum res imperfecta producit
rem perfectiorem se ; Thomas et Aegidius dicunt quod in virtute superiorum agunt

spiritualiter; ut vero sunt entia realia agunt realiter Quare non est mirandum

objectum producere species in virtute superiorum." Comm. de An. f. 84 v.

2 "Si replicatur : Pariter non dabitur intellectus agens, quum ego dicam objectum
in virtute superiorum producere species intelligibiles ; respondeo quod ex perfect ione
hominis est ut activum sit conjunctum passivo." Ibid.

3 "In virtute superiorum agunt spiritualiter... non tamen nego quod in virtute
corporum coelestium agant (res) actione reali." Ibid.

4 "Omnis forma, ut forma est, agit spiritualiter — In virtute superiorum agunt
(objecta) spiritualiter.... Non est mirandum objectum producere species in virtute
superiorum." Ibid.

5 Op. dt. f. 85 v. 6 Op. cit. ff. 257, 258.

SENSE 149

and receptive character assigned to sense by orthodox Aris-
totelianism. He distinguishes clearly himself, in the course of
this discussion, between the two types of theory, which had this
only in common that both denied the passivity of sense: "Some
say that a sensus agens of this kind is the primary concurrent
cause of sensation, whether it be God or some other Intelligence,
or a power in sense. Others do not accept this view because it
would not explain how sensation should be an immanent activity,
if the mind is not a concurrent cause of sensation : so others give
a different account (and among them is Albert) to the effect
that sensation is produced by sense through the mediation of the
sensible form1." Albert had already, in the previous section,
been quoted in opposition to the metaphysical sensus agens'2' ;
and is now named among those who had definitely rejected that
hypothesis in favour of another sort of " agency " in sense. The
ground on which he and those who thought with him rejected
sensus agens, in the Averroist sense, is also clearly stated to have
been that upon such an hypothesis sensation would be no longer
an act of the soul itself at all. While holding still, that is to
say, the necessity for an " agency " in sensation, they aimed at
giving a psychological account of it ; they required that it should
be an agency of the soul itself. Albert accordingly suggested
(and others propounded the same theory, in various modifications
of it) that the sense itself as a power of the soul was, after a
fashion which he tried to explain, the cause of its own sensations :
" The sensation is produced by sense through the mediation of
the sensible form, for the form is received in sense and the form
thus received and the sense together cause sensation. And he
holds this view in order to explain how the mind concurs as an
efficient cause in its operations, and how sensation itself is an
immanent activity3."

1 "Aliqui dicunt...quod talis sensus agens principaliter concurrit ad sensationem,
sive modo illud sit Deus, aut aliqua alia intelligent, aut una virtus in sensu. Aliis
non placet hoc, quia tune non solveretur, si anima non concurrit ad sensationem,
quomodo sensatio sit actus immanens ; ideo alii aliter dicunt, et (inter eos) est
Albertus, quod sensatio producitur a sensu, mediante specie sensibili." Comm. de
An. f. 85 v.

2 "Albertus videretur tenere quod omnis forma, ut forma est, agit spiritualiter."
Op. cit. f. 84 v.

3 "Sensatio producitur a sensu, mediante specie sensibili: in sensu enim

150 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

Such then was the theory of Albert, in which Pomponazzi
found at least the strong suggestion of a truth. Albert had
considered the standing question of the relation of sensation to
the sensible thing. Not content with Aristotle's psychological
solution of the question in its psychological aspect, he turned
aside into the enquiry as to the physical cause of sensation, and
the physical relations of the sensation to its object. He then
mixed the two aspects of the question, misled by the physical
interpretation of species sensibilis. Failing to see that the
physical history was one thing and the psychical fact another,
and that the psychical fact was only to be accounted for by the
analysis of the cognitive act as such, and of the relation of
sensation to the sensible therein — he was yet unable to regard
sensation as the result of a chain of physical causes. This was
why in answer to the question, " Whether the sensible form
and sensation are inseparable in existence," which Pomponazzi
paraphrases to mean, " Whether for sensation something is
needed in addition to the organ and the form," Albert
answered that something more was required. The physical
nexus, starting from the external object and proceeding (by the
production of the species sensibilis as physically understood)
through the medium and the organ of sense, was not a sufficient
cause of sensation. Something more was required, which Albert
declared to be the " action " of the mental faculty of sense itself
concomitant, with the effects of the object upon the organ of
sense1. In this way was avoided the incongruity of attributing
the psychical fact to a material cause ("to explain how the
mind concurs as an efficient cause in its operations") while
still sensation was essentially a psychical fact (an immanent
activity).

Pomponazzi mentions two attempts to improve upon Albert's
theory — that of John of Jandun, who supposed " two powers " in

recipitur species, quae species recepta et sensus causant sensationem ; et hoc dicit ut
solvet quomodo anima concurrat effective ad operationes suas, et quomodo est actio
immanens ipsa sensatio." Comm. de An. f. 85 v.

1 Cf. op. fit. f. 87 r. : " Sensus ut nudus concurrit passive ad sensationem : ut
informatus specie sensibili concurrit active": and f. 258 v. : "Quod species sensibilis
disponat animam sensitivam ut reducat se de potentia ad actum — Sensibile solummodo
dispositive concurrit, sensus autem est principale efficiens. "

SENSE 151

sense, one passive, to receive sensations, the other active, to
cause them1, and that of a Thomist of his own day, who tried to
distinguish the species as species from the species as cognitio,
assigning the former to the causality of the sensible thing, but
finding in the latter an activity of the mind itself2. The former
suggestion Pomponazzi estimates at its true value and briefly
dismisses. The second distinction he treats with more respect
and criticises at some length ; the substance of his criticism
being that if the two " actions " specified are distinct, then either
the mental action is the controlling element, and sensible things
are under the control of the human senses, which is absurd : or
the effect of the sensible thing governs the senses, which is the
doctrine disputed ; (besides that in sensation there are certainly
not two successive acts of the kind supposed) ; while if the two
are not distinct there is no difference between this new doctrine
and the old position of Albert — "The sensible form modifies the
sentient soul so that it transforms itself from potentiality to
actuality3."

Pomponazzi seems to have attached some weight to the
suggestion of these theories, that there is more in sensation than
mere passivity. At the same time he does not accept the
arguments by which they are supported : nor is he prepared to
abandon the essential point of the Aristotelian position.

The mediaeval mind did not, indeed, easily accept the idea
of the passivity of the soul. One of its ruling conceptions
was that of the " agency " of intelligence ; and accordingly we
find the advocates of an agency in sense appealing to the analogy
of intelligence4, or again claiming the authority of Aristotle for
the canon that the soul is the cause of all its own operations in
the body. Specially did they lay stress on the consideration

1 "Quod in omni sensu sunt duae potentiae, una passiva et altera activa, et quod
per passivam recipit sensationem, et per activam earn causal." Op. dt. f. 86 r.

2 "Quod species, ut species, producitur effective a sensibili ; ut autem ista species
est cognitio, producitur ab anima : et sic objectum concurrit mere effective ad sensa
tionem, anima vero active producendo cognitionem et passive recipiendo speciem. "
Op. at. f. 257 r.

3 " Species sensibilis disponat animam sensitivam ut reducat se de potentia ad
actum." Op. dt. f. 258 v. Cf. ff. 257, 258.

4 "Ad creandam intellectionem requiritur aliquid alterum praeter intellectual et
speciem intelligibilem ; ergo ita est in sensu." Op. cit. f. 85 r.

152 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

that what feels is higher (perfectiiis) than what does not feel ;
and therefore, they argued, the thing felt cannot " act upon " the
feeling mind, cannot produce feeling1.

The other main argument against the passivity of sense was
that the sensible object — the supposed cause of sensation — may
be present to the sense organ, acting physically upon it (and
producing there the species sensibilis}, while yet sensation does
not take place. The inference was that in order to produce
sensation there is needed some specific action of the power of
sense, which in the case supposed has not come into play —
hence the absence of sensation.

In answer to these arguments Pomponazzi first denies the
analogy between sense and intelligence. He does so on the
ground, characteristic of mediaeval thought, that sense has for
its object a real thing, intellect only the presentation of a thing2;
and whatever may be thought of this conception of intellect and
of its relation to sense, the answer is to the point as regards
sense-perception itself.

The case of an object present to the sense-organ without
sensation is capable, Pomponazzi goes on, of explanation without
recourse to the supposition of an intermittent " agency " in sense.
The occurrence or non-occurrence of cognition by the senses is
to be explained by the presence or absence of attention*.

What is particularly interesting is that Pomponazzi proposes
a physical explanation of this case, and of the facts of attention
generally. We saw that Albert, following a physical line of

1 Comm. de An. f. 85 r.

2 " Aliter potest dici negando similitudinem, et ratio est quia sensatio est cognitio
quae immediate terminatur ad rem ; sed intellectio terminatur ad aliquid alterum a re,
scilicet ad speciem intelligibilem." Op. cit. f. 86 r.

3 "Beatus Augustinus dicit hoc esse quia ad sentiendum oportet ut intentio sit
copulata cum virtute ; id est oportet ut anima advertat et velit sentire objectum."
Ibid. Pomponazzi offers the same explanation in the Supplementa : " Item multoties
est imaginatio in oculo, et tamen non est visio, scilicet cum non est intentio ad
illud, sed ad aliquid aliud ; cum vero advertis subito fit cognitio et sensatio." The
senses, he goes on, do not determine attention ; nor, on the theory he is examining,
do they alter the object as presented (simulacrum) ; therefore the change from non-
cognition is not due to an agency in sense : " Aut ergo aliquid est genitum de novo in
imagine, vel intentio ipsius simulacri, vel aliquid aliud. Non intentionem imaginis
nee aliquid aliud general sensus in simulacro : quomodo ergo concurrit effective sensus
ad sensationem, cum recepto simulacro nihil in eo generet?" Op. cit. f. 258 v.

SENSE 153

enquiry into the relations of sensation and the sensible thing
(illustrated by his reading of species sensibilis as an effect upon
the medium and the organ of sense), inserted a non-physical
cause (sensus) into the sequence in order to explain the fact of
sensation. Pomponazzi offers a complete account in physical
terms of the whole mental process, both of the occurrence and
of the non-occurrence of sensation. When it is added that he
immediately goes on to distinguish the physical from the cogni
tive relation, to disclaim the categories of actio and passio in
reference to a mental fact as irrelevant, and in short to define
the act of cognition as, in comparison with physical relations,
something sni generis — we are in a position to estimate Pompo-
nazzi's contribution to the problem of sense-perception.

Pomponazzi attempts a physical account of the phenomena
of attention, and of the fact that cognition sometimes occurs
and sometimes does not occur when the organ of sense is equally
affected. He does so, it need hardly be said, in terms of the
physiology of his own day, such as it was.

There is, he says, a limited amount of physical energy (for
this is the nearest possible equivalent for what Pomponazzi
meant by spiritus} upon which the various powers of the mind
have to draw1. In this way he explains the fact that when the
attention of the mind is fixed in one direction it is removed
from another, and when one faculty is in active operation others
are at rest2.

Thus when the attention of the mind is fixed elsewhere, the
sensible object may be present to the senses, and yet sensation
does not take place. Pomponazzi explains the presence or
absence of sensation by the supply or deficiency of spiritus for
the sensitive powers : " For if the sensible form is in sense when
it is depleted of energy, there is no cognition, and this because
the recipient is not in the right condition3." It will be noticed

1 " Omnes virtutes habent spiritus determinatos per quos operantur." Com in. de
An. f. 86 v.

2 "Virtutes interiores sunt rectae, et una operante altera non operari potest."
Op. cit. f. 86 v.

3 " Si enim species sensibilis sit in sensu depauperate spiritihus, tune non est
cognitio, et hoc quia subjectum non est bene depositum." Ibid. Cf. Op. cit.

154 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

that he is still embarrassed by the physical conception of species
sensibilis ; for referring to the case where there is no cognitio
(no ai(rdr}(ri<}, and therefore in Aristotle's sense no alaOijTov) he
says — "The sensible form is in sense which is depleted of
energy"; and speaks of the effect of the object upon the organ,
unperceived, as a kind of sentire: " I say that the sensible form is
not the same as sensation, howsoever the sensible form may be
felt1." But this only serves to emphasise the fact that he intends
to follow out, more thoroughly than Albert, a physical view of
the facts, and to give a complete physical history of the different
processes in question, both where there is a mental cognitio, and
where there is not.

We have also to notice, in striking contrast with this, and as
complementary to it, Pomponazzi's answer to the argument
against the "action" of matter upon mind. He disarms this
objection, in effect, by pointing out the peculiar and unique
character of the cognitive relation. The categories of actio and
passio, he says, are irrelevant to cognition ; the relation of the
mind to its object (thus clearly distinguished from the physical
cause or condition of mental action) is not to be considered
under those terms or under the physical ideas they represent.
And if there be a sense in which cognition may be considered
under the analogy of " passivity," and the material object called
the " cause " of knowledge, in this case what " receives " is the
superior and what "•acts" the inferior element.

All this calls for little in the way of explanation or com
mentary. " We note that sensation, in the aspect in which it is
cognition, does not mean activity or passivity ; but it is an
accident of sensation that it is accompanied by activity or
passivity2." This is Pomponazzi's true answer to all the questions
about sensation. Knowledge as such, he explains, knowledge
properly regarded, is neither action nor passion : it is knowledge.

f. 221 r. : " Sensatio nihil aliud est quam illud simulacrum existens in potentia
sensitiva debite et sufficienter dispositum (Pdisposita) per sanguinem et per spiritus. "

1 There are cases, i.e., where species sensibilis sentitur, and yet there is no sensatio —
which is contrary to Aristotle and plainly implies that species sensibilis is physically
conceived. See Comni. de An. f. 86 v.

2 " Notamus quod sensatio ex ea parte qua est cognitio non dicit actionem aut
passionem ; sed accidit cognition! quod sit cum actione aut passione.'' Ibid.

SENSE 155

He refers to the Divine knowledge as the perfection or type of
knowledge. " The intellection of God is not accompanied by
activity or passivity : nor is the intellection of God in its
essential nature activity1."

There is, it is true, an aspect of human knowledge in which
it may be considered under the category of actio and passio* ;
and from this point of view our knowledge is to be considered
rather under the analogy of passio. " Granted that it is supposed
that intellection and sensation are activities grammatically
speaking, nevertheless philosophically speaking they are rather
passivities ; and this because what receives sensation or in
tellection is said to be ' sentient ' or ' intelligent,' not what
effects it3." The soul, accordingly, if the cause of its own
operations, is not the efficient cause of them and need not be4.
" Sensation is not activity, it is rather passivity than activity :
though in its essential nature it is neither*"

If in this sense the mind is passive, it by no means follows
that it is inferior to that which, in this sense, acts upon it ; nor
is there, in this view of sensation and of knowledge generally,
any contradiction of the canon that " what feels is superior to
what does not feel." Nay, as he had just said, in cognition that
which " receives " sensation or thought is the " sentient " or
" intelligent " ; and not that which " causes " them. Accordingly
he adopts the dictum of St Thomas : " TJiougJi the object of sense
acts on sense, nevertheless it is not more perfect than it, for sense

1 "Intellectio Dei non est cum actione aut passione, nee intellectio Dei formaliter
est actio." Op. cit. f. 86 v.

2 " Accidit cognitioni quod sit cum actione aut passione.... In nobis qui de
novo intelligimus, accidit quod nostra cognitio sit cum actione aut passione."
Ibid.

3 "Licet existimetur quod intellectio et sensatio sint actiones grammatice lo-
quendo, philosophice tamen loquendo sunt magis passiones, et quia ita est quod illud
quod recipit sensationem aut intellectionem dicatur sentiens vel intelligens, non autem
illud quod efficit illam." Ibid.

4 " Stante ergo hoc, quod intellectio formaliter non dicat actionem vel passionem,
dico quod revera est ita quod anima non est causa effectiva omnium suarum opera-
tionum....Existimatur quod sit causa suarum operationum, non tamen est ita quod sit
causa effectiva earum." Ibid.

5 "Sensatio non est actio, imo potius est passio, quam actio; licet formaliter
nullum horum sit." Op. cit. f. 87 v.

156 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

has a more perfect mode of operation than the object1": and
adds a statement of his own which concludes and sums up
his argument : " When it is said ' the object concurs actively to
produce the sensation,' I reply that sensation, qua cognition, does
not essentially mean activity or passivity : and granted that the
object, in so far as it acts, is more perfect than sense, which is
acted on, nevertheless it is not more perfect without qualification,
because sense perceives, whereas the object does not : but what
perceives is more perfect than what does not perceive2."

This, then, was Pomponazzi's final answer to the arguments
against the "passivity" of the mind in sense-experience. He
asks that the question should be treated not as physical, but
as psychological3. But while the act of knowledge is essenti
ally removed from the categories of "active" and "passive,"
or, as we should say, of cause and effect, there is a relative or
analogical sense in which the human mind is passive in sensa
tion ; yet without prejudice to the characteristic superiority of
consciousness to the unconscious.

We have still, however, to notice the fact that Pomponazzi
refers favourably to Albert's theory of something in sensation

1 "Licet sensibile agat in sensum, non tamen est eo perfectius, quia (habet?)
tarn (?) perfectiorem operationem quam ipsum sensibile." Op. cit. f. 87 r.

" Quando dicitur 'objectum concurrit active ad sensationem' dico quod sensatio,
prout est cognitio, non dicit formaliter actionem aut passionem ; et licet objectum, in
quantum agit, sit perfectius sensu, qui patitur, non tamen absolute est perfectius, quia
sensus sentit, objectum autem non sentit ; quod autem sentit est perfectius eo quod
non sentit." It ought to be added, that Pomponazzi also supplements St Thomas by
another argument not so convincing to the modern mind, but too characteristic of
himself to be omitted. We shall see (below, Chapter xi.) how he was accustomed
to invoke the celestial powers, much as a modern scientific thinker refers to the order
or the laws of nature, on behalf of the data of experience ; how by this sanction he
defended the possibility of all things acting according to their own nature, and as
they are actually found to do : and thus, in a curious chapter of the history of the
human mind, what seemed to be an appeal beyond the court of reason altogether was
in its real intention an appeal from a priori and dogmatic views of nature to the
"nature of things " ; and the most baseless superstition became a shelter of intellectual
progress, and an excuse and argument for the scientific observation of facts. Here
accordingly, in defence of an empirical psychology, Pomponazzi appeals in the language
of astrology from a dogmatic prepossession to the illimitable possibilities of nature :
" Licet sensibile agat in sensum, non tamen est eo nobilius, quum non agit in sensum
in virtute ejus; sed in virtute superiorum." Comnt. de An. f. 87 r.

3 "Sensatio ex ea parte qua est cognitio non dicit actionem aut passionem."
Op. cit. f. 86 v.

SENSE 157

over and above passivity, even after he has seemed to dispose of
the arguments on which that view was based : " The opinion of
Albert is commonly held, and anyone who wishes to adopt it
can easily reply to the objections brought forward1." Again, at
the close of the re-discussion in the Supplementa, he hints at the
possibility of Aristotle's being in error2.

Ferri3 interprets these expressions of Pomponazzi as im
plying " a concession to those who would make the mind
sole author of its own operations," and recalls the names of
" Leibnitz, Herbart, and Wolf." But this is an exaggeration,
and Pomponazzi belongs, in the spirit of his theory, to quite
another school.

To perceive this we have only to notice two points. One is
the precise nature of that correction of Aristotle, the suggestion
of which is the extreme limit of Pomponazzi's movement in
this direction. Aristotle, he says, makes the sensible thing the
primary cause of sensation. Albert, on the other hand, or the
theory identified with his name, makes the mind's power of
sense the primary, and the sensible thing the disposing, cause.
And, says Pomponazzi, Aristotle may here be in the wrong :
" Nevertheless Aristotle had often erred in this way in attributing
operation to an efficient disposing cause instead of to an efficient
primary cause4." We can thus measure exactly the extent of
Pomponazzi's self-contradiction : in arguing for the passivity of
sense he had defined the part of the mind in sensation in the
words, " It is thought that the mind is the cause of its operations,
but not in the sense that it is the efficient cause of them5"; while
here he leans so far to the more transcendental philosophy of
Albert as to suggest that the mind may be the primary and the
object the disposing cause of sensation. The object thus still
remains a cause.

1 He refers, however, here only to the arguments brought against Albert by John
of Jandun, and his attempted improvement of the theory. Op. cit. f. 87 r.

2 Op. cit. f. 258 v.
8 Introd. p. 28.

4 " Ita tamen saepe errasset Aristoteles in attribuendo operationes efficienti dis-
ponenti quae debebant attribui efficienti principal!." Op. cit. f. 258 v.

5 "Existimatur quod (anima) sit causa suarum actionum, non tamen est ita quod
sit causa effectiva earum." Comm. de An. f. 86 v.

158 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

Secondly, Pomponazzi is careful to insist that on Albert's
theory, even if it were to be adopted, the mind is in a real sense
passive in sensation. There is no need, he argues, for John's
invention of a passive and an active power in sense : " For sense
as unmodified concurs passively in the production of sensation,
as modified by the sensible form it concurs actively1." And
again : " The form (i.e. in this case the object) concurs effectively
not as a primary, but as a disposing, cause2.

Thus on the one hand Pomponazzi keeps room, even on the
more idealistic theory, for a passivity in sense (in so far, he
stipulates, as " passivity " can be attributed to a cognitive act).
On the other hand he is certainly inclined to find more in sense-
perception than mere passivity, and hints, as above, at a mental
factor in the constitution of sense-experience.

As so stated by him, Pomponazzi's doctrine seems only the
combination of two inconsistent positions, or even an attitude of
indecision between them. It may, however, fairly be assumed
that he had a purpose in taking up this two-sided position.

In leaning towards the theory of a "concurrency" and
constitutive activity of the mind, he probably had an eye to the
relation between sense and thought, and the part of thought in
sense-perception. We have already seen how attention was, for
Pomponazzi, a factor in the occurrence of the simplest sensation :
" But when you attend, suddenly there arises cognition and
sensation3." And if Pomponazzi did not distinguish " sensation "
from " perception," the words in which he states the theory of
mental action almost correspond to that distinction, and at any
rate express his final conclusion, as nearly as we can discover it,
on the passivity of sensation and the part of the mind in sense-
experience : " Sense as unmodified concurs passively in the
production of sensation, as modified by the sensible form it
concurs actively."

"Sense as unmodified concurs passively": this interpretation
of Albert ought not to have been for him irreconcilable with

1 "Sensus enim, ut nudus, concurrit passive ad sensationem, ut informatus specie
sensibili concurrit active." Comm. de An. f. 87 v.

2 " Species concurrit effective non principaliter sed dispositive." Op. cit. f. 87 r.

3 " Cum vero advertis, subito fit cognitio et sensatio. " Op. cit. f. 258 v.

SENSE 159

the Aristotelian, " Sense receives the sensible form," and we
need not assume that Pomponazzi departed from his deliberate
finding — that "sensation is not an activity, rather it is passivity ;
in its essential nature, it is neither."

Omitting what Pomponazzi, following Aristotle, had to say
about the special senses, we may pass to his discussion of
communia sensibilia (KOIIHZ alaO^rd1).

In tracing the intellectual activity of the human soul from
its foundations in sense, Pomponazzi dwells upon the "common
sensibles" — those qualities, namely, which are perceived by the
different senses and at the same time are not the direct object
of any one of them — as the first objects which lie beyond the
pure particularity of mere sensation. He quotes the Aristotelian
enumeration of motion, rest, number, figure, and magnitude.

The first question which Pomponazzi asks about the " common
sensibles " is : " How many, and which, are they ? " Aristotle's
enumeration of them is well known: was it to be accepted ? Are
all the communia sensibilia enumerated by him true communia
sensibilia, in the sense that they are common to all the senses
alike? By this mark — of being a common element in the
sensation of all the senses — is the true commune sensibile to be
determined. The question accordingly, Which are the common
elements in sense-experience ? is expressed by Pomponazzi by
allusion to the enumeration of Aristotle, in this form : " Whether
the common sensibles (i.e. Aristotle's) are apprehended by all
the senses2."

In the section bearing this title, he discusses two questions.
First, he seeks to vindicate the claim of two disputed items of
Aristotle's list, viz. magnitude and figure, to rank as common
sensibles ; then, secondly, in the case of the other three (number,
motion, rest) he raises the whole question of the nature of
common sensibles as such, which he then follows out in the
succeeding section3.

1 See Aristotle, De Anima, II. cap. vi.; in. capp. i., ii.

" " Utrum sensibilia communia comprehendantur ab omnibus sensibus." Cotntn,
de An. ff. 87 r.— 89 r.

3 Op. cit. ff. 89 r.— 90 r.

l6o PIETRO POMPONAZZI

The right of magnitude and figure to a place among common
sensibles had been questioned. Averroes, says Pomponazzi, had
found fault with the Aristotelian scheme in the reproduction of
it by Themistius, on the ground that magnitude and figure are
only apprehended by sight and touch. He proceeds to contest
this point1.

He enters therefore upon the question whether the "lower
senses," hearing and smelling, have any apprehension of magni
tude2. He first weighs the argument from their apprehension of
number: "It seems first that they do apprehend magnitude,
because number is perceived by hearing, and number results
from division of the continuous : therefore if hearing apprehends
number, it seems that it apprehends the continuous, namely
magnitude3."

He finds, however, two objections against this argument.
First : " Granted that number which is perceived by hearing
results from the division of the continuous, nevertheless it does
not result from the division of magnitude ; for number which
results from the division of the continuous that persists is not
perceived by hearing, though certainly number which results
from the division of the continuous which is successive, e.g. of

1 Prof. Ferri has here rather seriously misrepresented the position of the parties.
By a curious blunder he has altogether overlooked the mention of Averroes, and
assigns the Arabian's criticism to Themistius himself (Introd. pp. 30, 31), thus
precisely reversing the historical situation. In support of the misinterpretation of
Themistius he quotes (p. 30, note) a passage from the translation by Hermolaus
Barbaras as the probable source of Pomponazzi's information. But in that passage
Themistius only says — "Magnitude et figura visui et tactui praecipua sunt"; which
is no more than Pomponazzi himself allows just below — "Aristoteles videtur appro-
priare comprehensionem figurae tactui et visui, non tamen ita, quod alii non compre-
hendant." (Comm. de An. f. 88 r.) It is really the divergence of Averroes from
Aristotle and Themistius with which Pomponazzi sets himself to deal : "Averroes in
commento sexagesimoquarto reprehendit Themistium dicentem ab omnibus sensibus
comprehendi, et dicit ipse quod tria eorum, motus, quies, et numerus, ab omnibus
comprehenduntur, alia vero duo, scil. magnitudo et figura, a visu tantum et tactu "
(f. 87v.); and again: "Dicit Arist. quod omnia sensibilia communia sunt omnibus
sensibus communia, ut bene dixit ibi Themistius " (f. 88 r.).

2 An analysis of taste is found in the Commentary on the Third Book, ff. 224 v. —
229 r.

3 "Videtur primo quod sic, quia numerus percipitur ab auditu, et numerus causatur
ex divisione continui ; ergo, si auditus comprehendit numerum, videtur etiam quod
comprehendat continuum scil. magnituclinem." Comm. de An. f. 87 r.

SENSE l6l

motion, is perceived by hearing1." The second objection rests
on the part played by memory, by " internal " as distinct from
external sense, in the perception of number : to which he pre
sently returns as affecting the general question of the nature of
communia sensibilia : " If anyone perceives number which results
from the division of the continuous, this is not to be credited to
hearing, but is due to internal sense, namely the faculty of
memory.... But to this extent it is called a common sensible,
because memory, through the mediation of hearing, apprehends
number of this kind : but then the question arises, how number
as such is perceived2." So too in the case of smelling: "The
question arises whether smell apprehends number. It seems
that it does not. For if smell apprehends two odours in the
same time it seems to apprehend them in combination, not as
two : but if it apprehends them in different times, this does
not seem to be the work of smell, but of memory which retains
what is past3."

Pomponazzi relies rather on the proof that by hearing and
smell we can distinguish direction, implying the apprehension of
space : " Hearing apprehends whether a sound comes from the
right or the left, from before or behind, from above or below4."
And the additional remark is worthy of quotation : "And if
it be said that in this it deceives, I concede the point : never
theless it does not follow that it does not apprehend those
distinctions5." In general, position in space is a condition of all

1 "Numerus qui sentitur ab auditu, licet causetur ex divisione continui, non tamen
causatur ex divisione magnitudinis ; numerus enim qui causatur ex divisione continui
permanentis non sentitur ab auditu, sed bene numerus qui causatur ex divisione
continui successivi, ut puta motus, sentitur ab auditu." Op. cit. f. 87 v.

2 " Si quis sentit numerum qui est ex divisione continui hoc non est merito auditus,
sed est propter sensum interiorem, scil. propter memorativam — Sed pro tanto dicitur
sensibile commune quia memorativa, mediante auditu, cognoscit talem numerum ; sed
tune est dubitatio, quomodo numerus per se sentitur." Ibid.

:i "Est dubitatio utrum olfactus cognoscat numerum: et videtur quod non: si
enim olfactus cognoscat duos odores in eodem tempore videtur quod cognoscat eos ut
unum non autem duo ; si vero cognoscat eos in diversis temporibus, hoc non videtur
officium olfactus sed memorativae, quae recordatur praeteritorum." Ibid.

4 "Cognoscit utrum sonus veniat a dextris vel a sinistris, ab ante vel a retro, a
sursum vel deorsum." Ibid.

5 "Et si dicitur decipere circa hoc, concedo ; non tamen sequitur ut non cognoscat
istas differentias." Ibid.

D. II

l62 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

sense-experience: "Sense perceives only under the conditions
'here' and 'now': but magnitude involves these conditions1."
So too for smelling: "A similar argument is made about smell,
that the sense itself apprehends magnitude2."

Therefore, " In this view it seems necessary to say that all the
senses apprehend magnitude : and therefore Aristotle says that
all the common sensibles are common to all the senses, as
Themistius has well said in this place3."

Yet only touch and sight apprehend magnitude perfectly:
" But I think, as is said in the De Sensu et Sensato, that magni
tude is completely apprehended by touch and by sight : for they
apprehend with certainty what the magnitude is, and how great
it is. The other senses have not this faculty : and therefore
Aristotle seems to assign the apprehension of figure specially
to touch and sight, but nevertheless not in the sense that the
others do not apprehend it at all4."

Having disposed of the difficulty felt, in the case of the
lower senses, about magnitude and figure, Pomponazzi turns to
the three other common sensibles in Aristotle's enumeration,
namely number, motion, rest. Now even here, he says, there
seems to be a difficulty in affirming that these are " apprehended
by all the senses." On the contrary, it might be maintained that
none of them is apprehended by the senses at all. In regard
to number, for example, he had already shewn in the case of
hearing and smelling how it is only apprehended through the
action of memory5. As for motion : the senses only appre
hend what is here and now, and cannot of their own power

1 "Sensus non cognoscit nisi cum hie et nunc ; magnitude autem est cum hie et
nunc." Ibid.

2 "Similiter etiam arguitur de olfactu quod ipse cognoscit magnitudinem." Ibid.

3 "In ista positione videtur esse necessarium dicere quod omnes sensus cognoscant
magnitudinem ; et ideo dicit Aristoteles quod omnia sensibilia communia sunt omnibus
sensibus communia, ut bene dixit ibi Themistius." Op. cit. f. 88 r.

4 " Sed puto, ut dicitur in De Sensu et Sensato, quod magnitude perfecte
cognoscitur a tactu et a visu ; certitudinaliter enim comprehendant quae et quanta
sit magnitudo ; alii autem sensus non habent hoc : et ideo Aristoteles videtur
appropriare comprehensionem figurae tactui et visui, non tamen ita quod alii non
comprehendant." Ibid.

6 "Non merito (sensus) exterioris sed propter sensum interiorem, scil. propter
memorativam." Op. cit. f. 87 v.

SENSE 163

grasp the succession involved in motion1. Lastly of rest he
says : " A similar account may be given of rest, since rest is
measured by time, but the time as a whole is not simultaneous2."

But these difficulties raise the whole question as to the
nature of the common sensibles. In what meaning of the word
are they "sensible"? The argument against their being direct
objects of perception by the senses is, says Pomponazzi, perfectly
valid : they are not so : " The arguments prove the truth of the
view that external sense in its essential and special nature cannot
apprehend motion or rest3."

Thus the result is that all sense-perceptions are accompanied
by apprehensions which are not the work of sense. This is the
outcome of the first step in the analysis of sense-experience.

He had noticed the fact in relation to hearing and the
apprehension of number : memory was observed coming into
play: "To that extent (number) is called a common sensible,
because memory, by the mediation of hearing, apprehends
number of this kind : but then the question arises how number
per se is perceived4." It is exactly the same with respect to
motion and rest : " The fact that I see a man in this or that
place, and then in another place, is apprehended by sense :
but what compares being in this place with being in that is
the inner faculty. Similarly in the case of rest : to know that
this thing is at present not moved, belongs to external sense :
to compare its previous state with its present belongs to the inner
faculty5."

1 "Motus est de numero successivorum ; sed successiva non possunt a sensu com-
prehendi." For "sensus exterior non potest moveri nisi ab eo quod actu existit " ;
for "moveri est pati ; omne autem quod patitur, patitur ab eo quod est in actu."
But "successiva non actu existunt"; for " de ratione successivorum est quod pars sit
praeterita, parsque futura sit ; si ergo sic est, totum non poterit esse simul in actu ;
quare non poterit movere sensum." Op. cil. f. 88.

2 "Similiter etiam dicatur de quiete, quum quies mensuratur tempore, tempus
autem non totum simul est." Ibid.

3 "Argumenta concludunt veritatem, quod sensus exterior formaliter et proprie
non potest cognoscere motum aut quietem." Ibid.

4 " Pro tanto dicitur (numerus) sensibile commune, quia memorativa, mediante
auditu, cognoscit talem numerum ; sed tune est dubitatio quomodo numerus per se
sentitur." Op. at. f. 87 v.

5 "Quod video hunc esse in tali vel tali loco, deinde in alio esse loco, com-
prehenditur a sensu ; quod autem componit esse in hoc loco cum esse in alio loco,

164 PIETRO POMPON AZZI

All that Aristotle meant in calling magnitude, motion, rest,
sensibilia per se, was that no sensible quality is perceptible apart
from magnitude, motion, rest. They are in short the inseparable
conditions of sense-perception, and belong to every sensible
object. "When you say that Aristotle numbers them among
things that are sensible per se, I reply that they are so in the
sense that internal sense cannot apprehend what is sensible
per se apart from motion and rest1."

He describes in the case of number the psychological process
by which the indeterminate data of sense are determined in the
form of number (or, it might be, of magnitude or shape, or
motion or rest): "A complete and perfect apprehension of
number belongs to internal sense, but it originates in external
sense. Hence boys and slow people who have bad memories
perceive correctly the passage of the hours, but nevertheless
cannot count them2."

Thus the communia sensibilia are not real things, peculiar
objects of sense-perception, impressing themselves by their own
qualities on the senses.

Nor was it to be maintained, as by Alexander, and many
mediaeval Aristotelians, that "common sense" was a faculty
directly perceiving the " common sensibles," as the special senses
perceive particular sensible qualities.

The relation of the common sensibles to particular objects
of sense-perception depends on the answer to two questions : the
first, whether the common sensibles have any way of impressing
themselves directly upon sense3; and the second, which is really
the same in another form, whether there can be an apprehension

est virtus interior. Similiter etiam et quies ; cognoscere enim quod hoc nunc non
moveatur, est sensus exterioris : componere autem prius cum posteriori pertinet ad
virtutem interiorem." Of. cit. f. 88 v.

1 " Cum dicis, Aristoteles numeral ea inter sensibilia per se, dico quod sunt per se
ad mine sensum, quia sensus interior non potest ea (sell, sensibilia per se) cognoscere
sine motu et quiete." Ibid.

2 "Completa et perfecta comprehensio numeri est virtutis interioris, sed initiative
est in sensu exteriori : unde pueri et lethargici, qui non habent bonam memoriam,
bene sentiunt horas, non tamen possunt eas numerare. " Op. cit. f. 88 r.

3 " Utrum sensibilia communia comprebendantur per proprias species." Op. cit
f. 8qr.

SENSE 165

of magnitude, motion, etc., without the medium of particular
sensible qualities1.

On the first question, which concerns the view of Alexander
above referred to, " The common sensibles belong specially to
common sense, just as the special sensibles belong specially to
the separate senses2," Pomponazzi adds nothing to the argu
ments of St Thomas or to his conclusion that the " common
sensibles" are concerned with the mode and not with the
contents of sense-perception — "Sensible qualities affect sense
in a material and spatial way : hence they affect it in different
ways according as they are in a larger or smaller body, and
according to their different positions, namely at a distance or
near, in the same or a different place:)" — except that he suggests
a possible discrimination between magnitude and figure on the
one hand, which are certainly in some sense simpler, and
number, motion, and rest on the other, as more complex and
more abstractly conceived.

The companion question introduces an investigation of certain
alleged instances of the perception of magnitude or movement
without specific sensations. In disposing of them Pomponazzi
combats the notion that those general characteristics of sensible
objects, which in an abstract analysis figure as magnitude,
motion, number, are real independent objects of sense-perception.
Thus if one grasps a hand at precisely the same temperature as
his own he does not perceive heat or cold in the hand, yet he
perceives magnitude. Again, if a man be cut with a sword he
may not perceive the coldness or other qualities of the steel ;
yet " he perceives division of the continuous — which is number,
and number is a common sensible4." The answer of course is
that some specific quality must be perceived before there can be
perception of size or motion — as the consistency or hardness of

1 " Utrum sensibilia communia percipiantur non percepto sensibili proprio."
Op. cit. ff. 89, 90.

2 "Sensibilia communia sunt propria sensui communi, sicut sensibilia propria sunt
propria singulis sensibus." St Thomas quoted by Ferri, Introduction, p. 32.

3 " Qualitates enim sensibiles movent sensum corporaliter et situaliter : unde aliter
movent, secundum quod sunt in majori vel minori et secundum quod sunt in diverso
situ, scil. vel propinquo vel remote, vel eodem vel diverso." Ibid.

4 "Iste sentit solutionem continui, quae est numerus ; numerus autem est sensibile
commune." Comin, de An. f. 89 v.

1 66 METRO POMPONAZZI

the hand or of the sword, or possibly the visible and palpable
effects of the blow1.

In another place he refutes Averroes's idea that the im
pressions of weight and lightness are derived from an idea of
motion, which would imply that the perception of motion in the
abstract came before, and not in dependence on, the specific
sense-impressions. Not so, says Pomponazzi ; the impressions
in question are preceded by a motion, it is true, in nature ; but
not by a perception of motion, in us2.

We have already seen in what sense alone Pomponazzi
assigns to sensus communis the apprehension of the common
sensibles. He does so, but not in Alexander's sense that the
common sensibles are apprehensible by interior sense as par
ticular sensible qualities by exterior sense. He is aware that
Aristotle had described them as perceptible in themselves by
common sense (jwv 8e KOIVWV rjBtj €%o/jiev aicrdrjcriv KOLVTJV ov
Kara o-u/i/Se/S^/co?), whereas the special senses only perceive them
incidentally (Kara a-v/jufiefiiiKos). But he regards the apprehension
of the common sensibles as part of a general synthetic function
(conipositio) which belongs to interior sense. Without pro
nouncing an opinion upon the vexed question of what precisely
Aristotle meant by Koivr] ala-Qria-is, it may be said that the
mediaeval thinkers had extended its signification.

Pomponazzi, in particular, assigns to this synthetic faculty
a function which Aristotle had been content to assign to the
particular senses — namely, that of distinguishing between the con
trasts in each particular form of sensible quality, for example, in
colour, sound, or tangible quality. It is with respect to touch that
he makes this point, but he extends the view to the other senses
as well. He has been anxious to prove that " touch " cannot be
properly described as a single sense, since it perceives so many

1 "Cum dicitur ' non percipitur sensibile proprium' nego; imo percipitur darkies
quia est proprium sensibile a sensu tactus ; ex eo enim quod percipio quod manus
non cedit tangenti sentitur durities ; et ex consequent! sentitur quantitas." (Ibid.)
Again — "Non sentitur solutio continui nisi prius sentiamus duritiem et compres-
sionem ensis " (op. (it. f. 90 v.) — which is, however, not quite accurate.

2 "Licet motus sit prior natura quam perceptio illarum qualitatum, prius tamen
illae a sensu cognoscuntur quam talis motus." Op. cit. f. 231 v.

SENSE 167

different qualities and different contrasts — as hot and cold, rough
and smooth, wet and dry. But the answer was made that, if a
sense can distinguish one contrast and remain a single faculty, it
may equally well, as a single sense, distinguish among various
contrasts. To which Pomponazzi replied that it is not the special
sense, touch, which apprehends any contrast of tangible qualities,
but the common sense acting on occasion of touch. " To this
we may reply that it is not touch which declares the difference
between the contrarieties of tangible things, nor is there any
single tactual faculty which pronounces judgment on more than a
single contrariety of tangible things, but it is common sense which
judges all those objects. But we are deceived and think that
what judges all those objects is the sense of touch, since tactual
faculties concur as the initiating causes, though not as the
primary causes, of this judgment. For since each faculty perceives
its own contrariety, they act as the occasions on whicli common sense,
comprehending all tJiese contrarieties, pronounces judgment on them1!'
He then applies this principle to the senses generally, though not
without hesitation : " But again one of our disputants will object
to my statement that it is not sight which judges of those colours,
but that it is common sense that makes the judgment, and
declares the difference between the one colour and the other....
But according to the general opinion, it is sight that judges
those colours, therefore also touch will judge... and thus we
shall hold that it is a single faculty of touch which etc. ...One
could reply first by conceding that it is not sight which judges
of colours, but common sense : sight only concurs as the
initiatory condition of this judgment, as was said about touch.
Or otherwise you may reply that... there is a difference between
the case of sight and the case of touch : but do you reflect on
this2."

1 " Ad hoc dicatur quod non est tactus qui ponit differentiam inter tangibilium
contrarietates, neque est una aliqua potentia tactiva, quae afferat judicium de pluribus
quam de una contrarietate tangibilium, sed sensus communis est qui de omnibus illis
judicat. Decipimur autem nos et credimus quod sit sensus tactus (illud) quod de
omnibus illis judicet, quum potentiae tactivae concurrunt initiative, sed non prin-
cipaliter, ad hoc judicium. Cum enim unaquaeque potentia percipit suam contrarie-
tatem, sunt occasiones sensui communi ut omnes illas contrarietates comprehendens
de illis judicat." Op. cit. f. 237 r.

2 "Sed nirsus instabit quis nostrum, quando ita dicam quod visus non est qui
judicat de istis coloribus, sed dicam quod est sensus communis qui affert hoc judicium

1 68 PIETRO POMPON AZZI

Thus, developing the suggestion of the Aristotelian doctrine,
Pomponazzi carries the synthetic function of sensus communis
down to the simplest act of sensation.

The importance of the emphasis thus laid on sensus communis,
and of the essential part assigned to it in the simplest sense-
perception, appears when we consider all that was then included
in sensus interior. Aristotle had explained the representative or
reproductive powers, imagination and memory, as the sequel of
sensation, and attributed them to the sensitive soul. And the
mediaeval interpreters of Aristotle's doctrine of reason, having
confined the name of reason to the formation of abstract notions,
were compelled by this psychological scheme to assign all the
other powers and activities of the mind to its sensuous part.
Imagination, memory, and that virtus cogitativa to which was
attributed a certain apprehension of universals, and (as we should
say) a true though imperfect power of thought — all were ascribed
to the sensitive soul and to sensus interior. " By the external
senses we apprehend only the particular and that only when the
sensible object is present — at least by the direct action of those
senses ; but by the internal senses we apprehend in some sort the
universal ; for though we cannot reach abstract universality by
the internal senses, yet we can reach a certain indeterminate
knowledge, intermediate as it were between particular and
universal, which is called knowledge of the vague individual1."

It will fall to us later to observe the relation between
" indeterminate knowledge " and " universal knowledge," between
cogitativa and intellcctus. Meanwhile, in illustration of the
suggestion that we may find in Pomponazzi a systematic
psychology, and an endeavour to regard human mental life as

et ponit differentiam inter unum colorem et alterum...sed secundum communem
existimationem visus est quod judicat de istis coloribus ; ergo et tactus judicabit...
et sic tenebimits quod sit una potentia tactiva quae. ...Dici possit primo concedendo
quod verum est quod non est visus qui judicat de coloribus sed est sensus communis ;
visus autem solum initiative concurrit ad hoc judicium sicut quod dicebatur de tactu.
Vel aliter dicatis quod... est aliqua differentia in visit et tactu : sed super hoc considera
tu." Ibid.

1 Apol. I. iii. f. 58 d : "Per sensus exteriores cognoscimus tantum singulare et in
praesentia sensibilis, saltern actione directa ; per sensus vero interiores quoquo modo
universale cognoscimus ; nam licet ad universalitatem puram per sensus interiores
devenire non possumus, ad quandam tamen indeterminatam cognitionem pervenimus,
quasi median! inter singulare et universale, quae individui vagi cognitio nuncupatur."

SENSE 169

having a certain unity, we record his recognition of a synthetic
power at the bottom of the mental scale, in the simplest unit of
conscious life — the direct perception by the special sense of the
sensible quality appropriate to it.

Pomponazzi's conception of a synthetic element in sensation,
or (to come nearer to his own way of thinking) a synthetic
power in sense, is further illustrated by the manner in which,
following a suggestion of Aristotle's, he attributes to a " faculty
of sense," namely sensus commitnis, the consciousness of sensation.
It is, I think, doubtful whether Aristotle so far represented com
mon sense as a " faculty " as to assign to it this function ; he
certainly did not do so with any distinctness in the De Anima
(Book in. Ch. 2). He noticed however the fact of a conscious
ness of sensation, and ascribed it in some way to sense. " For
certainly it is not with sight in the strict sense that the mind
'sees' that it sees... but with some organ common to all the
sensoria1" And Pomponazzi follows this language pretty closely,
except that he identifies the " faculty of sense " expressly with
sensus communis : " For the sensitive soul is conscious of itself,
wherefore by one part it is conscious of another part, and by
common sense is aware of the external senses2."

Now in attributing this particular fact of the consciousness
of sensation to sensus communis, Pomponazzi definitely implied
that sensus communis was a power beyond and above mere
sensation. For to sense as such (sensus exterior} he denies the
possible capacity of such a consciousness — on the ground that it
is not spiritualis. The power of self-reflection is outside of the
nature of the physical : it is a power of thought. Consequently,
in so far as it is possessed by sensus communis, that name must
designate something spiritualis, " The characteristic of repre
senting both itself and its object implies a high degree of
spirituality... but sense (i.e. external), just because it is least
spiritual and very imperfect, cannot be conscious of itself V

1 Aristotle, De Somno, 455 a 17.

2 " Anima enim sensitiva cognoscit se ipsam, quare per unam partem cognoscit
etiam aliam partem et per sensum communem exteriores." Comiii, de An. f. isov.

3 "Quod repraesentat se et suum objectum, hoc arguit magnam spiritualitatem...
sed sensus (scil. exterior) eo quia est minime spiritualis et multum imperfectus, ideo
non potest se ipsum cognoscere." Op. cit. f.

170 PIETRO POMPON AZZI

Accordingly that " part " of the sensitive soul which gives the
consciousness in question is more than a merely physical power.
In sensus communis Pomponazzi arrives at the first of those
stages by which in his psychology he bridges the distance
between sense and " reason " in the strict meaning of abstraction.
Already in the simplest act of sensation, in the consciousness
which accompanies every perception, he discovers the first of the
intermediate powers.

CHAPTER VIII

REASON

POMPONAZZI, like Aristotle, put unquestioning confidence in
sense-experience. The senses may be deceived, they said, when
the conditions of accurate sense-perception are not present ; but
that the impressions (species) made by outside realities upon the
senses correspond with those realities, there need be no doubt
whatever1.

Of illusions of the senses, Pomponazzi gives a perfectly
correct account. It may happen, he says, that the usual course
of events whereby the sensible thing acts on the external sense
and the external sense on the " interior " sense and imagination,
is reversed ; and the sense is affected by the imagination without
the presence of a real sensible object2. But all the senses are
not deceived simultaneously; thus, for example, when we see a
stick in water and it appears to be broken, the eye is deceived,
but the other senses correct the false impression. Again, such

1 For Aristotle's views on this point see Zeller's Aristotle, Eng. trans., I. pp. 206 —
211, and notes; cf. Pomp., Coiiun. de Anima, f. 84 r. : "Visoquod sensus recipiat
speciem sensibilem, videndum est modo quid sit illud quod producit speciem sensi-
bilem ; et brevi dicendum est quod objecta sunt, quae producunt species sensibiles " ;
p. 221 r. : "Hoc modo fit sensatio, scilicet, quod sensibile imprimit suum simulacrum
in ipsum sensum," etc.

- "Natura primo sensibile agit in sensum exteriorem imprimendo in ilium suum
simulacrum, demum sensus exterior imprimit simulacrum quod in se habet in sensum
communem, sensus vero communis eodem modo agit in imaginativam, et in imagina-
tiva reservatur ipsa species et hoc fit in ordine recto. In ordine vero retrograde fit
modo contrario. Imaginativa enim quae sibi reservavit speciem sensibilem, earn
imprimit in sensum exteriorem, et sic sensus exterior movetur iterum a specie sensibili,
licet ipsum sensibile actu non existat, et non sit praesens." Coiiun. ile An. f. 221 v.

1/2 PIETRO POMPON AZZI

illusions do not affect a number of persons together, and the
individual aberration is rectified by the experience of others1.

But now the question arises, how the mind forms the notion
of an individual being, regarded as a substance or " subject " in
which sensible qualities inhere.

If the common conditions of sense-perception had been
investigated before Kant by Aristotle, the notion of substance
had been examined before Locke, and with much greater success
than attended his efforts in this direction. And in analysing the
nature of the sensibilc per accidens (Kara o-u/uySe^/co?), the follower
of Aristotle was discovering the true nature of knowledge and
the part taken by the mind in the perceptions of sense.

Pomponazzi's account of the role of sensus interior — imagina
tion, memory, cogitativa — in passing from the sensibile per se to
the sensibile per accidens, and arriving at the notion of substance,
is a characteristic part of his psychology. His cue is to deny
that substance is sensibile per se, and to affirm that it is sensibile
per accidens — that is, properly, not an object of sense-perception
at all, but a notion arrived at by the mind through a process of
discursiis or ratiocinatio. Thus in the course of this discussion
he carries a stage further his theory of the mind's activity in
sense-perception.

The sections of the Commentary on the De Auima dealing
with substance and the sensibile per accidens'- shew that the

1 "Quod unus sensus decipiatur cst possibile, sicut oculus in visione baculi
existentis in aqua, quia judicat ipsum esse fractum et in rei veritate non est
fractus ; sed quod omnes aut plures sensus dectpiantur circa idem objectum non
contingit, quia (unus) certificat alterum sicut tactus certificat nos de baculo quod
non sit fractus, quum per visum judicatus est esse fractus.... Remus videtur nobis
fractus et non dicimus quod est fractus, et sic verum est quod nihil vere sentitur
nisi illud sit existens praesens." Op. cit. ft". 222 v., 223 v. Cf. ft". 90, 91.

- (i) "Utrum accidens ducat in cognitionem substantiae," ff. 33 — 35 ;

(2) A section only partly transcribed in Ferri's edition, ff. 91 — 93 ;

(3) "Utrum substantia materialis intelligatur per propriam speciem," ff. 187 —

189;

(4) Not transcribed in Ferri's edition. " Utrum species substantiae sit substantia

an accidens," f. 189 ;

(5) "Utrum substantia producat speciem substantiae in phantasia, an aliud,"

f. 190 r. ;

(6) "Utrum cogitativa denudit speciem substantiae a sensibilibus propriis et

communibus," ft". 223, 224;

(7) "Utrum grave et leve sint substantiae," ff. 229 — 231.

REASON 173

whole subject was in Pomponazzi's day much perplexed by
forgotten controversies ; and it is not very easy to extricate his
own thought of it, which was really sufficiently clear, and in its
way interesting.

We find Pomponazzi occupied as usual with various con
troversies. Against Averroes he denies that there is a power
in sense to approach and apprehend substance directly. This
negation broadens into a general denial of any sort of intuition
or immediate apprehension of substance. Presently these con
tradictions appear as the negative aspect of his own thesis, that
the conception of substance is formed — or, as he would say
(realistically), the apprehension of substance is reached — by an
act or process of discursive thought.

These discussions were of course carried on under the in
fluence of scholastic hypostasising of abstract substance. The
notion of the logical correlativity of substance and attribute, had
it been clear to any of the controversialists or to Pomponazzi
himself, would have greatly simplified the issue and proved a
safe guide in the psychological analysis. Those who believed
that the substance, as substance, could be approached by a
specific act of the mind and apprehended per speciem propriam,
supposed so because they believed the substance somehow
existed in itself as apart from its attributes. The attributes,
then, made their " impression " on the mind ; the substance, by
an equal right, could make its own.

It would not be easy to determine exactly how far Pom
ponazzi was emancipated from this fallacious mode of thought,
or comprehended the true conception of Aristotle.

The truth is that he was not occupied with substance as
concrete, in the modern meaning of that distinction ; nor even,
directly, with substance existing as a reality outside the mind.
It never occurred to him to question that real existence. The
question before him, suggested by the Aristotelian analysis, was
the psychological question how the idea of that substance (which
might be supposed to exist) came into the mind.

That substance existed, he never doubted, any more than
any other schoolman. Whether he imagined it as existing out
side of its attributes, is not an easy question : the fact of his

174 PIETRO POMPON AZZT

holding that it could be known only in its attributes may suggest
that he did not. The point of interest, certainly, in the history
of thought is that according to him the substance or subject um
was not to be apprehended by any mental act appropriated to it
as a separate entity, but through induction from the knowledge
of the attributes: "Substance is known through an act of dis
cursive thought, from a mutual comparison of a number of
attributes1."

Every schoolman was a " realist " in the modern sense —
albeit a " representative realist " : to the thinker of that age the
correspondence of thought and reality was not so much a postu
late as an unquestioned and unconscious assumption. By the
time of Pomponazzi every schoolman was also something of a
psychologist. The only question was whether he should be a
realist in the way of " common-sense " — that is, broadly, in the
" scientific " way — or a realist in his own special and technical
sense of hypostasising logical abstracts: the question was whether
he should be a serious or a fantastic psychologist.

To the essentially psychological question which he set before
him, Pomponazzi gave an unambiguous answer. In his polemic
against the Averroist and quasi-Averroist theories of a direct
intuition of substance he exploded a venerable psychological
superstition. He assigned the abstract idea of substance — the
matter before him — to a process of discursive thought, by induc
tion from the knowledge of the attributes. Finally, we hear him
affirm that neither can the attributes be known without the
substance nor the substance without the attributes.

One limitation of his view and of the scope of his psycho
logical enquiries, was characteristic of his time and his environ
ment. The subject which he set before him was simply the
abstract idea of substance ; how, he asked, and by what stages,
does the mind arrive at this conception of substance in the
abstract ? He did not enquire into substance as an objective
category of thought constituting experience, but into the single
phenomenon in consciousness of the subjective idea — substance.
He did not distinguish correctly — as it was not given to that

1 " Suhstantia cognoscitur per discursum ex collatione plurium accidentium ad
invicem." Of.cit.L 189 r.

REASON 175

clay to distinguish — between the idea of substance considered
merely as an abstract conception, and substance regarded as
concrete in particular sensible qualities. Yet his acute observa
tion, as we shall see, did not fail to notice the deeper question ;
and he treated it with the respect it deserves.

First of all, then, he denies the intuitive perception of a
substance as such by sense. This seems to us an altogether
extravagant supposition ; but it was not by any means so in
conceivable to those who imagined the substance as a somewhat
existing separately beneath its attributes.

He presses1 the language of Averroes closely to convict him
of this monstrous doctrine. But he is eventually obliged to
admit that this is rather to force Averroes's meaning2.

Two explanations were given of what Averroes meant by
" sense " in this connection. One was that he referred to
" interior sense," which as we know included imagination and
even cogitativa; and that the perceptions of exterior sense (sense
proper) were only the occasion on which the interior sense
proceeded to the apprehension of substance3. Once more it was
even said on behalf of Averroes that he intended to include a
possible action of intellect, and that in ascribing to sensus a
perception of substance he meant not sensus ut sensus est, but
ut est sensus animalis intelligentis*.

Pomponazzi is not disposed5 to admit that these suggestions
harmonise with the language actually used by Averroes. In his
later reference6 however he concedes to Scotus another inter
pretation of that language which is more feasible, and in which
it cannot lightly be dismissed : Sense (so this interpretation ran)
in so far " apprehends substance " as substance is inextricably
bound up with its own sensible qualities7. Pomponazzi attaches
great weight to this aspect of the matter, and suggests that it
may be reconciled with his own view8.

1 Op. cit. f. 92.

- "Dictum illucl possit extorqueri." Op. cit. f. 189 v.

:i "Per sensum exteriorem sensus interior deveniat in notitiam substantiae."
Op. cit. f. 91 v.

4 Ibid. Cf. f. 230. 5 Op. cit. f. 92. G Op. cit. f. 189 v.

7 "Sed ejus sententiam veram esse ita concedit Scotus, quod sensus quomodo et
involute cum ipsis sensibilibus cognoscit substantiam." Ibid.

8 "Forte quod isti possent simul conciliari." Ibid.

176 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

I shall return to this point presently. Meanwhile, with
respect to the other explanations of the action of sensits
interior or even intellect on the data of sense to produce the
conception of substance, Pomponazzi justly claims that they
surrender the whole position. For as apprehended by sensus
interior^ or by "sense as the sense of a thinking being," substance
is no longer sensibile per se — no longer an object of sense properly
speaking at all1. On this shewing, the apprehension of substance,
so far from being possible to external sense, involves a certain
process of the mind. This is implied in its being, as thus
admitted, sensibile per accidens. For this is, says Pomponazzi,
the whole point2. If that be what Averroes meant, in short, by
attributing the apprehension to sense, then the conception of
substance is present in sense, but tacitly and as it were uncon
sciously there ; and only comes to apprehension in imagination.
According to others, the species substantiate is in no way present
to sense at all, but is apprehended by imagination. They hold
"that substance is thought by means of its special form... but as
to how imagination apprehends substance, and not the external
senses, different views are held. Some say that the sensible object
produces its form, and that with its form the form of substance
is involved, and that it first produces it in external sense, then in
common sense, lastly in imagination : and they say that though
the form of substance is present in special and common sense,
yet sense itself does not apprehend it, but that of all the faculties
imagination alone apprehends //....There are others however who
say that the form of substance is not in sense, either special or
common, yet that it is in imagination... They say that from the
external senses the form of substance is produced in imagination.
Those people therefore hold that substance is apprehended by
imagination by means of its special form, whether the manner of

1 "Et ita est sensibile per accidens, quia per sensibile proprium sensus interior
devenit in ejus notitiam ; non tamen ita est quod sensus exterior cognoscat sub-

stantiam Si enim ex cognitione coloris vel figurae cognoscatur substantia ut sub-

stantia est, hoc non est sensus ut sensus est sed ut est sensus animalis intelligentis."
Op. cit. f. 91 v.

2 "Totum ergo stat in hoc, quod si dicat sensum exteriorem cognoscere substan-
tiam, debet intelligi per accidens." Ibid.

REASON 177

its apprehension is according to the first opinion or to the second :
and they hold that there is a special image of each material
substance1."

Pomponazzi in reply, while denying that substance is appre
hended per propriam speciem^ recognises the part of imagination
in the formation of the idea of substance. " I say that it is the
special function of imagination to receive the form of substance,
provided that it is properly predisposed, and receives the special
attributes of the substance. For instance, if I wish to apprehend
' endive,' it is not only necessary to apprehend it by sense, but
also to connect together a number of sensible qualities, for
instance that it possesses a certain smell, taste, colour, multi
plicity, substance, mode of action, and the like ; and this seems
to be what Aristotle expresses in the first book of the De Anima
...when he says that, when we know a number of the special
attributes, we can then apprehend something of the ultimate

specific nature of the substance This view necessarily admits

that substance is apprehended through an act of discursive thought,
from a mutual comparison of a number of attributes, special
namely and common2."

1 " Putant substantiam intelligi per propriam speciem....Quomodo autem phantasia
cognoscat substantiam et non sensus exteriores, de hoc sunt diversae opiniones. Aliqui
dicunt quod sensibile producit speciem suam et cum sua specie est immixta species
substantiae et primo producit earn in sensu exteriori, deinde in communi, demum in
phantasia ; et dicunt quod species substantiae licet sit in sensu particulari et communi,
ipse tamen non cognoscit earn, sed sola phantasia inter omnes virtutes earn cognoscit —
Alii vero sunt dicentes speciem substantiae non esse in sensu proprio aut communi
tamen esse in phantasia... dicunt quod ex sensibus exterioribus creatur species sub
stantiae in phantasia. Isti ergo tenent substantiam cognosci per propriam speciem a
phantasia, sive modo sit secundum primam opinionem, sive secundum secundam ;
et tenent uniuscujusque substantiae materialis esse proprium phantasma." Op. cit.
ff. 187 v., i88r.

a "Dico quod proprium est phantasiae recipere speciem substantiae dummodoipsa
sit bene disposita et recipiat accidentia propria istius substantiae. V. gr. si volo
cognoscere endiviam, non oportet tantum cognoscere earn per sensum, sed oportet
multa sensibilia congregare ad invicem, ut quod sit talis odoris, saporis, coloris,
numeri, substantiae, operationis, et similia ; et ista videtur esse expressa mens
Philosophi primo hujus, textu commend undecimi, quando dicit quod quando cog-
noverimus multa accidentia propria, tune de substantia habebimus aliquid ultimae
differentiae. ...Isti tandem necessario confitentur quod substantia cognoscitur per
discursum ex collatione plurium accidentium ad invicem, propriorum scilicet et
communium." Op. cit. ff. i88v., 189 r.

D, 12

178 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

In another discussion1 he appears to have in view certain
incomplete theories of the action of intellectus in this connection.
He describes a theory which assigns the apprehension of sub
stance to intellectus in somewhat vague and general terms :
"Attribute leads to the knowledge of substance.... Our intellect
from a perceived form elicits the unperceived form of substance....
No sense rises to the conception of substance, but it is the intellect
which apprehends it, after its attributes have first been appre
hended by sense2...." He accepts this as so far satisfactory.
He regards it however as insufficient, and in reviewing it along
with the other explanations here quoted, says that none of them
is a correct interpretation of Aristotle. At the same time on
stating the theory he adds, " But I do not wish to accept the
criticism that John makes here3."

With the same provisional acceptance he seems to quote the
further, or alternative, doctrine that intellectus creates the con
ception of substance when " predisposed " by the conceptions of
the accidents4. This is indeed in general accord with his own
view as already quoted : " The special function of imagination
is to receive the form of substance, provided the imagination is
properly predisposed and receives the special attributes of the
substance5."

But the question still remains, how the idea of substance
comes into thought — whether by a process of discursive thought,
or by some immediate intuition of, and impression by, a species
substantiate as distinct from the accidents. " Though many
agree in this view " (i.e. as above in assigning the apprehension
of substance to intellect), " nevertheless they differ as to the
mode of production of the form in intellect6."

1 op. dt. ff. 33, 34.

2 "Accidens ducit in cognitionem substantiae.... Intellectus noster ex specie sen-
sata accidentis elicit speciem insensatam substantiae — Nullus sensus profundat se ad
substantiam, sed intellectus est qui earn cognoscit cognitis primis accidentibus per
sensum...." Op. dt. f. 33 r.

3 "Nolo recipere impugnationem quam facit hie Joannes." Ibid.

4 "Intellectus non potest causare conceptum substantiae nisi prius disponatur per
conceptus accidentium." Op. dt. f. 33 v.

5 " Proprium est phantasiae recipere speciem substantiae, dummodo ipsa sit bene
disposita et recipiat accidentia propria istius substantiae." Op. dt. f. 188 v.

6 " Etsi multi sunt Concordes in hoc modo dicendi, sunt tamen adhuc diversi de
generatione speciei in intellectu." Op. dt. f. 33 v.

REASON 179

Here then is the last point which Pomponazzi, following
Scotus, desires to make good — namely that the idea of substance
is the result of a process of discursive reasoning. He quotes
under the name of John (Philoponus ? or Gandavensis ?) a theory
satisfactory on all but this one point ; " John supposes that the
forms of the substance and the attribute are present simultane
ously in the faculty of imagination, and that the intellect cannot
receive the form of substance unless it has first received the
form of the attribute which predisposes and prepares for the
reception of the form of substance : yet even in this view the
form of the substance produces knowledge of the substance,
though through the mediation of the attribute1." This possible
hypothesis of a direct action of a distinct (and abstract) species
substantiae on intellect — of an immediate intuition (as it would
practically come to be) by intellect of substance as distinct from
attributes — this was what Pomponazzi wished finally to guard
against. As leaving this point undetermined, the general assign
ment of the idea of substance to intellectus, and the general
admission of a predisposition through the conception of the
attributes, were not sufficient ; nor could those statements be
accepted as the full doctrine of Aristotle. Every form of " intui
tion," even on the part of intellectus itself, must be excluded.
" None of these is a correct interpretation of Aristotle, be
cause... he does not speak of an intuitive knowledge without
discursive thought, but of knowledge accompanied by discursive
thought2."

Every doctrine of " intuition of substance " is rejected in the
most formal manner. Pomponazzi also notices in passing the
contradiction which such a notion would imply of the accepted
doctrine of "representative perception." "This kind of knowledge
of substance, John, Caietanus and Apollinaris call intuitive, but
most improperly and wrongly, because intuitive knowledge is in

1 "Joannes imaginatur quod in virtute phantastica sit simul species substantiae et
accidentis, et quod intellectus non potest recipere speciem substantiae nisi prius
recipiat speciem accidentis disponentem et preparantem pro receptione speciei sub
stantiae ; tamen cum hoc etiam species substantiae general notitiam substantiae,
mediante tamen specie accidentis." Ibid.

2 "Nullus istorum est ad mentem Philosophi, quia...non loquitur de ista cognitione
intuitiva sine discursu, sed loquitur de cognitione cum discursu. " Op. cit. f. 34 r.

12 — 2

I SO PIETRO POMPON AZZI

direct relation with reality. We have no such knowledge in this
world, but we shall have it in heaven1."

The doctrine of Pomponazzi himself on this subject has
already appeared in various statements. A word or two may
be added by way of summary.

(a) He fully recognises the function of sense as supplying
the particulars on which the mind proceeds to the idea of
substantial unity. He formally accepts the modification of
the Averroist theory according to which the apprehension of
substance was assigned, not to " sense in so far as it is sense" but
to " sense in so far as it is the sense of an intelligent animal " ;
remarking that, on this or a similar view, " by means of external
sense, internal sense arrives at the idea of substance." And
finally, in leaving the subject, he adopts the concession of Scotus
to Averroes: "In a way and as bound up with the sensible
qualities themselves, sense apprehends substance." The signifi
cance of this admission, which in words seems like the abandon
ment of his own position, will be pointed out below.

(b) Secondly, phantasia plays its part. " It is the special
function of imagination to receive the form of substance in so
far as it is properly predisposed and receives the attributes
peculiar to that substance."

(c) With regard to cogitativa, it was defined as the function
of cogitativa to receive the form of substance apart from quantita
tive determinations — to conceive of substance, that is to say, in
a partial, but not an absolute, abstraction from sensible attributes.

(d) One account of the act of thought in the appre
hension of the idea of substance is summed up in the words
" Substantia cognoscitur per discursum, ex collatione plurium
accidentium." The ideas of substance and accident are dis
cussed somewhat fully, in their logical relation, on ff. 34 and
35. Not only, it is there said, do we pass from the knowledge

1 "Talem cognitionem substantiae Joannes, Caietanus, et Apollinaris appellant
intuitivam, sed valde improprie et male, quia notitia intuitiva terminatur ad rem :
nullam autem talem habemus in hoc mundo, sed habebimus in patria." Op. cit. f. 33 v.
The sentence that follows, however, serves to remind us that the scholastic repre-
sentationism was dogmatic and not sceptical, a "realism" and not "sensationalism":
"Quod si in hac vita cognitio terminatur ad rem, quia phantasma formaliter ter
minatur ad rem, non propter hoc est intuitiva." Ibid.

REASON l8l

of accidents to the knowledge of substance, but conversely a
perfect knowledge of substance conveys the knowledge of the
accidents as well1. A "perfect" knowledge of an accident is
only given through a perfect knowledge of the substance, and
that means, as above, of the other accidents as well2. Thus
Pomponazzi develops the psychological history of the idea of
substance. The passage, however, quoted above, in which
he seems almost to abandon his characteristic doctrine of the
relation of sense to the idea of substance, is too significant
of the limitations of this whole mode of thought to be passed
over without more particular notice. The passage is as follows :
" But Scotus admits the truth of Averroes's view in so far as it
maintains that, in some way and as bound up with the sensible
qualities themselves, sense apprehends substance. For by its
apprehension of a kind of aggregate resulting from a number of
attributes, it apprehends also substance itself, just as there are
rustics who know lettuce and other herbs by the simultaneous
presence of a number of attributes3."

The case which he has in view is evidently the case in which
the abstract idea of substance has not been formed in thought,
but in which the logical notion " substance " is practically and
implicitly though unconsciously present. This is what is implied
in the reference to rustics — unreflecting persons, or persons in
capable of abstract ideas.

The significant thing is his seeming to allow that in such a

1 "Cognitio accidentis confert ad cognitionem substantiae et e contra." (Op. cit.
f. 34V.) " Non solum accidens ducit in cognitionem substantiae, sed etiam e con-
verso." (Op. cit. f. 34 r.) "Dicit Averroes quod definitiones et declarationes quae
non declarant accidentia sunt vanae ; quod eodem modo contingit quum accidentia
declarantia ipsam substantiam sunt maxime propria; quae vero non sic, non sunt
propria saltern eodem modo. Sic enim perfectissima definitio declarat omnia acci
dentia.'' (Op. cit. f. 35 v.) "Substantia ducit in cognitionem accidentis et e contra via
discursiva et demonstrativa." (Op. cit. f. 35 r.) " Non enim per speciem substantiae
ducimur in cognitionem accidentis." Op. cit. f. 34 r.

2 "Perfecta enim cognitio accidentis non potest haberi nisi post cognitionem
substantiae." Op. cit. f. 34 v.

3 "Sed ejus sententiam veram esse ita concedit Scotus, quod sensus aliquo modo
et involute cum ipsis sensibilibus cognoscit substantiam. Cognoscendo enim aliquid
aggregatum ex multis accidentibus, et ipsam substantiam cognoscit : sicut sunt rustici
qui cognoscunt lactucam et alias herbas ex aggregatione multorum accidentium simul."
Op. cit. f. 189 v.

182 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

case Averroes was right in seeing no action of thought at all.
Yet he says, there is an apprehension of substance, obscure, but
real1.

We have already seen that in his enquiry into the conception
of substance Pomponazzi has before his mind the abstract idea
of substance. He is concerned simply to trace the emergence
of that idea, and to shew the psychological process by which it
is reached. In the passage before us, he stands in the presence
of another order of facts, and on the threshold of a different
enquiry, into which however he does not enter.

The fact which he here describes — "that in a way, and as
bound up with the sensible attributes themselves, sense appre
hends substance " — is the characteristic fact of human experience.
Psychologically, it is correctly observed by Pomponazzi. He
stumbles, however, in his attempted explanation of it — that is,
in referring it simpliciter (if we are to take the literal meaning of
his words) to sense.

This explanation may be viewed in two ways. Critically
regarded, it must be considered a self-contradiction on Pom-
ponazzi's part; revealing the inadequacy of his method of
thought, and incidentally of every merely psychological expla
nation of the fact of knowledge. Pomponazzi had of course no
notion of the distinction between the logical prius, or prins de
jure, and the psychological prius, or prius de facto. For want
of this distinction he was at a loss.

In his oscillation between the two poles — sense or reason,
reason or sense— and his falling back in the critical instance, on
account of the absence of the explicit abstract notion of substance,
upon sense as the alternative, we are forcibly reminded of the
course of subsequent controversy. We are in presence of the
issue which came to be discussed between the Intuitionalist and
the Sense Empiricist. The advocates of a rational element in
human experience set up an hypothesis of Ideas and Principles
of Reason present to consciousness and explicitly recognised.
These, however, had to be verified by psychological observa
tion as facts. The opposite school, failing to discover rational
principles in such an explicit and abstract form, and dismissing

1 " Ipsam substantiam coguoscit." Ibid.

REASON 183

them as, psychologically speaking, fictions, referred all knowledge
to the data furnished by sense.

The language of Pomponazzi, however, may also be interpreted
in a more sympathetic spirit. He may be said to have stated the
problem with insight and sincerity, even though in stating it he
contradicted his own formal theory. He perceives that there is
an apprehension of substance witJiout the express and explicit idea
of substance. He admits the part of sense in that apprehension,
without withdrawing his repeated contention that sense is not
by itself adequate to the task. With a broader and more com
prehensive psychological observation than that of his age, he
turns from the analysis of the ideas of the philosopher to the
explanation of the experience of the plain man. At the same
time he at least describes in words — even if unconscious of the
problem his words raise — those facts which an accurate psy
chology can indicate, but which the observation of them does
nothing to explain. In such phrases as, " Sense in so far as
it is the sense of an intelligent animal," and " Substance the
knowledge of which is implied in its sensible qualities," we may
imagine a prophetic anticipation of the problem of modern
philosophy.

In developing this theory of the formation of the idea of
substance, Pomponazzi definitely broke with the mechanical
explanation of mental action. That explanation was that there
must be something in the mind as it were physically correspon
dent to the outward thing which produces an impression on the
mind. Pomponazzi escapes from the bondage of this conception
by a distinction, firmly grasped and applied, between actio realis
and actio spiritualis.

(a) When, for example, the mechanical conception was
invoked in favour of an immediate action of substance on the
mind, as a real entity making its correspondent impression
there, Pomponazzi replied by means of that distinction.

We notice this in that early discussion " Whether accident
leads to the knowledge of substance" and "Whether the form of
substance produces the knowledge of substance" of which an
account has already been given. One of the modes of reasoning
which Pomponazzi has constantly in view there is that "spiritual

1 84 PIETRO POMPON AZZI

activity ought to correspond to material activity," and " as it is
in real and material action so is it in spiritual1."

Now substance, in the sphere of reality, according to the
scholastic mind, exists apart from, and prior to, its accidents :
therefore, the argument was supposed to run, the conception of
substance should be prior to, and separate from, that of the
accident. To this analogy Pomponazzi answers : " The principle
that ' the relation of the thing to the physical action holds also

in the spiritual sphere' is not universally true The exact

opposite is the case in spiritual activity, as has been said. In
material things substance is prior to modification; in the spiritual
sphere in many cases the exact opposite is true, as when the
substance is unknown to us, while the modification is known :
and in this way it is true of imperfect knowledge2."

Still more generally does he express himself, to the same
effect, in his last utterance on the subject3. The Averroist
argument was: "The stone is not in the mind, but its form...
the intellect receives all forms4/' therefore the mind is impressed
by the " form " of substance as such. Pomponazzi, in denying
this immediate effect or impression of substance on the mind,
distinguished the effect in question as a logical one (conceptus),
the logical notion of the substance stone, the " action " that is,
not as realis, but as spiritualis. " When it is said ' the stone is
not in the mind ' and ' intellect is potentially all forms,' I reply
that though substance of this kind has no special form, yet it
has a special conception that in a way represents the thing, by
means of which conception the intellect arrives at knowledge of
the substance5."

1 "Actio spiritualis debet proportionari actioni materiali." Op. cit. f. 33 v.
" Ita est in actione spiritual! ut in reali et materiali." Op. cit. f. 33 r.

2 " Ille modus dicendi non est universaliter verus, ' Sicut res se habet ad actionem
realem ita ad spiritualem.'...Stat autem totum oppositum in actione spirituali, ut
dictum est. In materialibus prius est substantia quam passio ; in spiritualibus
multoties est totum oppositum, ut quando substantia esset nobis ignota, passione
existente nota ; et hoc modo est verum de imperfecta notitia." Op. cit. f. 351.

s Op. cit. f. 189.

4 "Lapis non est in anima, sed species lapidis....Intellectus recipit omnes formas."
Op. cit. f. iSyr.

5 "Cum dicitur, Mapis non est in anima'; et 'intellectus est in potentia ad omnes
formas,' dico quod etsi tails (substantia) non habeat propriam speciem, habet tamen

REASON 185

(3) But the mediaeval theory of mental action also met
Pomponazzi in another form — namely in the highly characteristic
difficulty about accidents producing the idea of substance. Those
who denied the separate and immediate " action " of substance
found themselves in a fresh difficulty. " Substance," they
reasoned, "does not act directly." But "how can accident
produce the form of the substance ? " Hence the perplexity of
some whom Pomponazzi calls aliqui Thomistarum, and the futile
expedient to which they had resort. They could not allow that
"substance produces the form of substance1." Yet neither could
they understand, on their theory of the action of reality on the
mind, accident " producing " anything but the species corre
sponding to itself, that namely of accident ; or the species of
substance being " produced " by anything but substance itself.
So they had taken refuge in the exquisitely illusory explanation,
a typical verbalism — " the form of the special attribute produces
in the intellect the form of each, and produces the form of sub
stance by virtue of substance"."

It is interesting to notice that Pomponazzi escapes from this
characteristic scholastic puzzle by the distinction between mental
and physical "action." In the act of knowledge, he says, there
is a direct relation between the mind and substance ; though a
physical or mechanical impression of the mind by substance is what
he has all through denied. " The proposition ' substance does
not act directly' can be interpreted as holding only as regards
physical action : but the action in question is purely spiritual3."

The intellectus agens of St Thomas or of Pomponazzi bore
no relation to the common Intelligence of Averroes, or the

proprium conceptum qui quoquo modo reputat rem, quo conceptu intellectus devenit
in notitiam substantiae." Op. cit. f. 189 v.

1 The view which Pomponazzi again refers to here is that of Joannes (Philo-
ponus?) — "Aliqui putant quod, praeparato intellectu per speciem accidentis proprii,
introducatur species substantiae ab ipsa substantia ; et hoc tenet Joannes ; et concedit
ipse substantiam immediate agere." Op. cit. f. 190 r. Cf. f. 33: " Species substantiae
generat notitiam substantiae, mediante tamen specie accidentis."

"Species accidentis proprii producat in intellectu speciem utriusque, sed producit
speciem substantiae in virtute substantiae." Op. cit. f. 190 r.

3 " Potest glosari ilia propositio, quod substantia non agit immediate, quod sit
vera tantum in actione reali : ista autem actio non est nisi spiritualis." Ibid.

1 86 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

Divine Reason of Alexander influencing the human soul
from without. The distinction of " active " and " passive "
intellect they understood to be an abstract and logical dis
tinction1, and "active intellect" to be a part of the human soul2.
Averroes had indeed recognised the identity of active and passive
intellect, and in his case that meant that he did not allow the
latter any more than the former to belong to the nature of the
soul of man.

By intellectus agens St Thomas and his followers understood
the independence in which intelligence "begets in itself" by ab
straction the logical notions of things1'. To trace the "action"
of intellectus agens, then, was to discover the contribution of
thought itself to the conceptions of things in knowledge. It is
probable that we should still speak, if we used ordinary popular
language, of the constitutive " action " of thought.

Pomponazzi was mainly concerned with two interests4. On
the one hand, like every mediaeval writer, he must maintain
the " activity " of thought. The form in which this necessity
presented itself to him was that of maintaining a distinction
between intellect™, as the act of thought, and species intelligibilis,
which was supposed to be produced and presented to thought
by the intermediate powers (sensus interior) "preserving" and
" composing " the data of sense (exterior).

The other interest with which Pomponazzi was concerned
was the psychological interest, the scientific interest of tracing
and distinguishing the operations of these various powers.

1 "Tenet ergo haec nostra opinio quod ex intellectu agente et possibili continuatur

verum unum sicut ex materia et forma, ex actu et potentia Intellectus possibilis est

sicut materia, agens vero sicut forma." Op. cit. f. 163 v. (Ferri, Introduction, p. 53.)

* "Alexander... tenet intellectum agentem esse deum et primam causam, nee
parteni esse animae nostrae. Aristoteles autem vult...quod sit pars animae nostrae."
Op. cit. f. i38v.

3 See Siebeck, Gesch. d. Psych. I. 2, p. 456.

4 The principal sections dealing with the nature of thought (ff. 158 — 170) have
not been transcribed in Ferri's edition. Of one important part of the discussion,
however, to which reference will presently be made ("Utrum intellectio et species
intelligibilis sint idem realiter," ff. 172 — 174), the text is given. The titles of the
omitted sections are these : " Utrum intellectus agens et potentialis sint duae res
realiter distinctae et quid sint" ; " Utrum sit necessarium ponere intellectum agentem
et quomodo" ; "Utrum sit necesse ponere intellectum agentem propter intellectionem
causandam stante priori necessitate."

REASON 187

It must always be remembered that intellectio was the act of
abstract thought, of forming an abstract idea. In distinguishing
(say) the virtus cogitativa from intellectus, it was the act of pure
abstraction that was denied to the former.

For the most part, Pomponazzi is hampered by the traditional
separation of the intellectual from the sensitive powers. We shall
find him, however, gradually and by a dialectical process arriving
at the conception that there is no real difference between the
intellectio and the species intelligibilis ; that what intellect, by its
agency, adds to the material presented by the lower powers is
not a nova species but the intellectio itself as such — the fact of
intellectual apprehension. And this conception of the relation
between intelligence in its characteristic exercise and the lower
powers opens the way to a tentative conception of these as in
some sense stages in the development of intelligence.

Besides the apprehension by sense of sensible qualities,
objects are determined in general relations. But the two forms
of apprehension are by no means on one footing. For the
sensible qualities really exist previous to their apprehension.
But this is exactly what we cannot say of that which thought
apprehends, namely general relations and universal notions.

How then do they begin to be ? The significant feature of
Pomponazzi's reasoning is that for him the alternative to an
" agency " of intellect itself was the real existence and agency
of the general conceptions of intellect — universalia ante rent,
The analogy of sense was always before him. The objects of
intelligence are different from the objects of sense : the data
of sense were not sufficient, he felt, to call the conceptions of
the mind into being. Was then the mind to be considered after
the analogy of sense? Sense was purely passive, purely recep
tive: it was brought from potentiality to realisation by the action
on it of its real objects outside itself. Was the actualisation of
intelligence (this was the question) to be accounted for in the
same way ? If intelligence was purely receptive — if it had no
" agency " of its own — its actualisation was explained by its
objects, considered as real existences, acting on it.

But this was not the nature of the objects of thought. Such
a supposition would restore the baseless, the exploded fiction

188 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

of universalia ante rem. For the objects of thought were " uni-
versals."

Such then was the ground on which Pomponazzi demanded
an "agency" in thought as such. For if that hypothesis of
universalia realia were dismissed, and it were also assumed, as
Pomponazzi professed to prove, that the faculties lower than
intellectus are inadequate to the production of truly abstract and
universal ideas, the conclusion followed that the actual exercise
of intellectus is due to the " agency " of intellectus itself — i.e. to
intellectus agens.

This was the argument of Pomponazzi : it indicates in a
cumbrous manner and in obsolete language the difference
between sense and thought. The affirmation on the one hand
of a contribution of thought itself to the actuality and by con
sequence to the objects of thought ; the denial on the other of
the absolute existence, as independently real, of the terms of
thought, of what thought attributes to its objects (of universalia
ante rem) — amount to a designation in scholastic language of
the peculiar relation between thought and its objects.

I do not dwell on the abstract and unreal psychological
presuppositions which run through this argument. Intellectus
is considered as in absolute psychological isolation ; and the
verbal cogency of the argument depends upon an artificial
distinction between intellectus on the one hand and imagination,
memory, vis cogitativa, on the other. The inadequacy of "lower
powers," as they are called, to the production of the contents of
thought (universals) is constantly affirmed. We shall return to
this point immediately.

In a parallel course of reasoning1 Pomponazzi enquires what
is the productive cause of the intermittent action of intelligence
— of its reduction, in the Peripatetic phraseology, from possibility
to actuality. It cannot be, he says, following the same logic as
we have just analysed, intellectus itself ?& possibilis; for intellecttis
possibilis is by its very definition inadequate to actual intelligence,
since it is the mere expression of the potentiality of thought, and
logically nothing but a passivity, a receptivity: thought potential,
but essentially not actual. Nor, he goes on, can the cause of

1 Op. cit. ff. 166 — 169; Ferri, Introduction, p. 53.

REASON 189

intellectio be the bare form (species nudd). What does he intend
to deny here? The action of intelligence, he seems to say, can
not be produced by the object acting through lower powers
which are not thought itself : the object presented to those lower
powers is not the same as the object of thought and their action
is not thought's action, nor capable by itself of producing the
action of thought. This is what Pomponazzi means by denying
the production of thought to species nuda, or (what is the same
thing) to vis cogitativa and imagination. For the species nuda
is the object of knowledge as it presents itself to vis cogitativa, a
faculty lower than intellectus. Vis cogitativa, it appears, was not
capable of apprehending universals. Species accordingly, as
present to cogitativa, was, in Prof. Ferri's words, " 1' obbietto
ideato, senza 1' universalita1." Something more than species in
that sense — some other "agent" as they said then — was required
before there should be thought proper.

Pomponazzi denies the sufficiency of species to cause intellectio
on two grounds, (i) because species as apprehended by cogitativa
is \QSS perfect than intellectio, and (2) because in so far as intelligi-
bilis it is the object of intellectio, and therefore, in this respect,
only itself comes into existence with the actualisation of intellectio.

Species being thus excluded, phantasma is dismissed by an
argument a fortiori — for it is the sole office of phantasia to
present such species, and " if it is not present in the more likely
case, it is not present in the less likely2." Once more, then, an
essential link in the argument for the " action " of intellectus as
such is the absolute separation of intellectns from the other
powers of the mind. This unpsychological division of powers
led to a highly artificial treatment of mental action. It was
partly imposed on Pomponazzi by the metaphysical interest in
intellectus agens, and largely confirmed by the exigencies of the
reasoning which has been described, in favour of the agency of
intelligence (as abstractly understood) in its own processes.
That reasoning, as we have seen, did not proceed by the analysis
of the facts of mental action, which would have revealed the

1 Ferri, ibid.

a "De quo magis videtur inesse et non est, ergo nee de quo minus." Comm. de
An. p. i68r. (Ferri, ibid.)

IQO PIETRO POMPONAZZI

unity of the whole mental process. The object was to discover
the agency of intellectus as such ; an abstract view of intellectus
was implied in the whole method of enquiry ; and intellect
being once defined or considered as essentially distinct from
imagination, cogitativa, etc., these must be consistently excluded
from that " intellectual " action in which it was sought to trace
" intellectual " agency. Thus the abstract and artificial psy
chology, which gave its peculiar form to the theory of intelligence,
was itself stereotyped and confirmed in the course of arguments
which were essentially abstract and verbal in their character.

This difference in kind between universal thought and all
other activities of the mind is accordingly maintained by Pom-
ponazzi, though not with perfect consistency. He expresses it
by the formula that the species nuda — which as the product of
pJiantasia and vis cogitativa is the highest product of mental
action short of intcllectio — " concurs in the cognition of the
intelligible form, not as an efficient but as a predisposing cause1."
Ferri seems to find indications of waverings from this rigid
distinction, which if they were real would mean a tendency
towards a truer because a less abstract psychology: "Another
account can be given, namely that image and active intellect
both concur as efficient causes of the production of the form as if
they were a single complete agent2": and again: "I hold that
there is no incongruity in supposing that the same thing concurs
both as an efficient and as a predisposing cause*." How far
Pomponazzi really moved in this direction, it is not easy to say :
it is probable that he was carried a little way by an unconscious
logic, without actually facing an alternative which would have
meant the revision of his whole theory and the abandonment of
his presuppositions. His conclusion at any rate is thus given :
" The whole necessity for supposing an active intellect is to
produce the intelligible form — which is the view of Alexander4."

1 " Concurrit ad speciem intelligendam non effective sed dispositive." Ferri,
ibid.

2 " Aliter potest dici quod phantasma et intellectus agens ambo concurrunt effective
ad speciem causandam sicut unum totale agens." Ibid.

3 "Dico quod non inconvenit idem concurrere effective et dispositive." Ibid.

4 "Necessitas igitur tota intellectus agentis ponitur ad speciem intelligibilem
causandam, quae est sententia Alexandri." Ibid.

REASON IQI

The same elements appear, as the factors in Pomponazzi's
theory of intellectio, in the discussion of the Quaestio, " Whether
intellect and the intelligible form are identical in existence1."
The section is a piece of dialectic, very characteristic of
Pomponazzi ; of its details, however, the interest is for us
completely extinct. Its plain drift is towards the establishment
of an " agency " in intellectus as before. Species intelligibilis is
evidently, as before, the work of phantasia, memorativa, and
cogitativa-. It is "received" in intellectus] it is the object of
intellectus*. But there is something added to species intelligibilis
in actual intellectio. " Intellection is received in the intellect as
modified by the form*."

We must not overlook the significance of the designation
species intelligibilis. The regular name for the object of thought
here takes the place of the negative designation above noted,
species nnda. The latter was intended to indicate a difference
between species as the work of cogitativa, etc., and intellectio.
The title, species intelligibilis, marks the relation between species
and intellectio, of which species is the content.

While Pomponazzi intends to distinguish by means of
" species " and " intellectio " between the work of lower powers
and that of intellectus proper, he yet considers species as intel
ligibilis. It is, in short, a " representation " by imagination
and vis cogitativa — retained also in memory — of the contents
(objectum) of a notion. Therefore it is intelligibilis. It is in
one aspect a stage in the formation of the notion ; in another,
it supplies thought with its object5. Both aspects are included
in the reference of St Thomas's dictum, which Pomponazzi

1 "Utrum intellectio et species intelligibilis sint idem realiter." Comm. de An.

ff. 172—174-

2 E.g. " Dormiens non habet intellectionem et tamen habet speciem ; aliter enim
si species non remaneret in intellectu hominis (docti?) non esset rememoratio."
Op. cit. f. 1731".

3 "In puro intellectu recipitur species." (Op. cit. f. 173 v.) "Intellectio...
terminate ad speciem intelligibilem." Op. cit. f. 173 r.

4 "Intellectio recipitur in intellectu specie informato." Op. cit. f. 173 v.

5 "Ita se habet intellectus ad intelligibile sicut sensus ad sensibile, quia utraque
cognitio terminate ad objectum proprium.... Intellectio. ..terminate ad speciem in
telligibilem." Op. cit. f. i73r.

IQ2 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

follows : " The cognition of the thing results from the form and
the faculty1."

It is of course to be remembered, as the essential character
of the species, that it was "representative." It was representative
of the object — that is, in the case of species intelligibilis, of the
object of which thought was the apprehension2. The species
sensibilis represented the objectum proprium sensus ; the species
intelligibilis the objectum proprium intellectus. The word objectum
did not, of course, imply real existence (" objective " existence
in the modern meaning of the word), except in a psychological
reference, as the real existence of the notion with its contents.
This is clearly illustrated in the course of the discussion under
review, where Pomponazzi expressly argues for species intelligibilis
as the true correlate (terminus) of intellectio y on the ground that
the objectum may have no real existence. " I can have intellec
tion of things that exist and of things that do not exist and
cannot exist. What then I ask is the correlate of the intellection
of the non-existent ? Not the object, because the object neither
exists nor can exist... Therefore the intelligible form3."

At the same time it is always to be borne in mind that the
mediaeval thinker never questioned the validity of knowledge.
The species, while representative, certainly conveyed the know
ledge of reality. This unquestioning confidence of scholasticism
in the human mind, and the absence of all suspicion of the
relativity of knowledge, does more even than the errors of its
logic to shake its title to the name of philosophy. Subjective in
the highest degree in its theory of knowledge, it was yet perfectly
innocent of scepticism ; and we might take as a concise formula
of mediaeval representative realism the words, " The cognition
of the thing results from the form and the faculty."

The ruling idea, meanwhile, of intellectus agens finds a new
expression in the theory of a difference between intellectio and

1 "Ex specie et potentia fit cognitio rei." Ibid.

2 " Nulli est dubium quod different (species et intellectio) ratione, quum species
representet tantum ipsum objectum, non autem intellectio." Op. cit. f. 1721-.

3 "Possum intelligere existentia et non existentia, nee possibilia existere. Tune
quaero ad quod terminatur ista intellectio non-entis : non ad objectum quia objectum
nee est nee potest esse...ergo ad speciem intelligibilem." Op. cit. f. 173 r.

REASON 193

species intelligibilis — of something added, as before, on the part
of intellectiis to bring the species intelligibilis to actual intellect™ :
" Intellect would add to the form either something independent
or something relative1."

Pomponazzi quotes first the arguments against this view ;
mention of these may be deferred until we come to give his
answers to them.

Then follow the arguments in its favour, stated by Pom
ponazzi with his usual baffling impartiality, which makes it
difficult to say how far he commits himself to them.

The first reason for affirming something " additional "
in intellectio, plus the species intelligibilis, is that the species
continues to exist even while there is no activity of intelligence ;
therefore, it is argued, where there is actual intellectio, some
further agency must be at work. This permanent existence of
the species (scil. species nuda) was implied in the received psycho
logical theory that species resided somehow in the lower powers —
in memory and the virtus cogitativa (or comprehensive?) — before
the action of intellectus and in the intervals of its activity2.

The second argument is that the species is the efficient cause
of intellectio; the third, that it is its object (using the word in the
modern sense : terminus, ad quod terminatur). On both grounds,
Pomponazzi argues, the two must be distinguished3.

An opinion of Avicenna which he quotes as bearing on the
first or psychological argument might have pointed him towards
a truer psychology. "Avicenna held that the intelligible form
and intellection are entirely the same and that when intellection

1 "Vel intellectus adderet aliquid ahsolutum vel respectivum ipsi speciei." Op.
cit. f. 172 v.

2 "Ilia non sunt eadem realiter quorum, uno non existente, alterum remanet. Sed
species et intellectio tali modo se habent inter se quod unum remanet altero non
existente.... Dormiens non habet intellectiones et tamen habet speciem ; aliter enim si
species non remaneret in intellectu hominis (docti?) non esset rememoratio." Op.
cit. f. i73r.

3 "Ilia non sunt eadem quorum unum ab altero efficitur, sed species et intellectio

hoc modo se habent Est dictum Angelici quod ex specie et potentia fit cognitio

rei." (Ibid.} " Item quia ita se habet intellectus ad intelligibile sicut sensus ad sensibile,
quia utraque cognitio terminatur ad objectum proprium... .Necessario dabitur species in
telligibilis ad quam cum terminelur intellectio erit ab eadistincta sicut species sensibilis
est distincta a sensatione." Ibid.

D. 13

194 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

stops, the intelligible form also ceases to exist, since he could not
see how it could be in the cogitative faculty while there was no
cognition of the thing1." These words might have suggested
the fictitious character, psychologically, of both the species
intelligibilis and virtus comprehensiva as distinguished from
intellectus ; and indeed the concrete unity of mental action
generally. Pomponazzi does not seem, however, to have
accepted this view.

It does not appear likely that Pomponazzi, who elsewhere
shews some comprehension of Peripatetic principles, accepted as
his own the second and third arguments savouring so strongly
as they do of scholastic " Realism " ; and it is doubtless with
reference to them that he quotes and, I imagine, adopts the
finding of the later and better schoolmen : " The forms and the
acts of intellection are not separable in existence2."

To the question, then, "whether intellection and form are
inseparable in existence " (idem realiter), he seems to return a
qualified answer. He follows a middle course, maintaining on
the one hand a difference between species and intellect™, so as to
allow for the agency of intellectus, but defining the difference on
the other hand as not a difference realiter. "Almost all the
Latin writers held that the forms and the acts of intellection are
not separable in existence : but, if they differ, it is not clear what
the intellection adds to the form3." And as to this last point,
characteristically, he takes in the end an attitude of indecision —
leaving the question open, as we shall see, between a modifica
tion of a view held by Scotus and another formula hesitatingly
ascribed to St Thomas.

Practically, Pomponazzi seems to adopt the view of Scotus,
in a sense which he proceeds to explain. He certainly holds

1 " Avicenna tenuit quod species intelligibilis et intellectio sint penitus idem, et
quod cessante intellectione cesset species intelligibilis, quum ipse non potuit videre
qualiter sit in virtute comprehensiva et non sit cognitio rei." Ibid.

2 "Species et intellectiones non distingui realiter." Op. cit. f. 173 v. We are
not able at present to reproduce Pomponazzi's criticisms on these last two arguments,
which would have been instructive, on account of a gap in Ferri's edition at this
point ; and for the same reason it is only by the use of a little conjecture that we
arrive at the commentator's own mind on the subject.

3 " Omnes fere Latini posuerunt species et intellectiones non distingui realiter;
sed dubium est, si differunt, quid superaddat intellectio speciei." Ibid.

REASON 195

firmly that species and intellectio differ — intellectus adding some
thing to mere species : " But if they differ it is not clear what in
tellection adds to the form." He lays it down, with Scotus, as we
have already seen, that intellectio is " more complete" {perfectior}
than species, and that intellectus, as agens, while receiving species,
adds something to it1.

But now we come to the most characteristic part of the
theory of Pomponazzi, that part of it which is personal to him
self. It is introduced in the form of a modification of the
doctrine of Scotus. He proposes to correct that doctrine in two
points. These points are related to each other ; and the modifi
cation which Pomponazzi proposes with reference to them, and
which constitutes his independent contribution to the subject, is
another stage in emancipation from scholastic fictions and a
great stride towards a more rational psychology.

The two objectionable features of which Pomponazzi desires
to rid the Scotist doctrine are (i) the proposition, " Intellection
adds to the form something that is not relative2,'' and (2) the
consequence, " Intellection is another form that is clearer and
more lucid than the original form3." In explicit correction of
the former he says: "Since it adds either something independent
or something relative, it is said that intellection in itself is
independent; yet I say, and it is agreed, that it is relative4": and
with manifest reference to the second: "When there is talk of
an independent addition to the form, I say that that is intel
lection itself5."

What Pomponazzi thus denies is the abstract scholastic

1 "Tenet Scotus quod species et intellectio non sint una et eadem res formaliter, sed
tenet quod species sit imperfectior intellectione, ita quod intellectio sit altera species
multo clarior et lucidior ipsa specie prima — Si dicatur quod est necessitas ponendi
species intelligibiles, dicunt quod intellectio terminatur ad speciem sicut supra diximus.
Ulterius cum dicitur unde causatur ilia diversitas speciei ab intellectione, dicunt pro-
venire hoc ex agente et passo melius disposito, et etiam quia in puro intellectu recipitur
species, intellectio vero recipitur in intellectu specie informato." Ibid.

2 "Intellectio addit speciei aliquid absolutum." Op. cit. f. 172 v.

3 "Intellectio sit altera species clarior et lucidior ipsa specie prima." Op.
cit. f. 1 73V.

4 "Cum vel addit aliquid absolutum vel relativum dicitur quod intellectio in se est
absolutum : dico tamen, et constat, relativum." Ibid.

5 "Cum dicitur quoad istud absolutum superadditum speciei, dico quod est ipsa
intellectio." Op. cit. f. I74r.

13—2

196 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

fiction of the intellectual power possessing, and bringing to the
formation of the notion, specific content of its own, apart from
that which is furnished to it by experience, from sense primarily
and subsequently by the operation of memory, imagination, and
rudimentary thought. He denies that intellect™ adds anything
absolutum, independent, de novo (so to speak), holding instead
that it invests with a universal meaning contents already
furnished in experience. And he puts the same thing in
another way when he denies that intellect™ is or introduces a
new species (species intelligibilis perfectior} ; instead, he con
sistently maintains that species intelligibilis as such — the pro
duct, be it observed, of mental activity below the level (as
he would have said) of thought — is the object and contents
of thought.

If we recall the arguments cited against the special agency
of intellectus^, we shall see the meaning, and the reason to
Pomponazzi's mind, of the concession which he makes later.
He divides these counter arguments into two classes — (a) those
against the " addition " by intellectus to species of aliquid ab
solutum; and (b} those (of Scotus) against the addition of aliquid
relativum. It is obvious that neither set of objections alone will
be conclusive against the agency of intellectus, if the other can
be got over. Accordingly, when accepting later Scotus's doctrine
of intellect™, he quietly ignores his objections to aliquid relativum.
And when he introduces his correction of the Scotist position,
the grounds of his rejection of absolutum are precisely those
which he had begun by setting out. He concedes then the
objections to absolutum ; and in allowing the addition by intel
lectus declares for relativum.

We quote therefore his own reasonings against the absolute
interference of intellectus. " If intellection added something in
dependent, a new act of intellection would not result from the
form unless something independent were acquired de novo^T The
contents supplied by experience, that is, would not be sufficient ;
a specific new experience would be required. Now, he goes on,

1 At the beginning of the section, op. cit. f. 172 v.

2 "Si intellectio adderet aliquid absolutum, per speciem non acquireretur nova
intellectio nisi aliquid absolutum de novo acquireretur." Op. cit. f. 172 v.

REASON 197

it would be impossible to imagine the form such an experience
should take ; because it would be contrary to all the conditions
of experience as we have it. " Only it is impossible to conjecture
the nature of an absolute addition of this kind which intellection
should make to the form. Also it does not seem to be the case
that intellection is something absolute... because intellection as
intellection is intellection of something1."

In the sentence that follows we see the significance he
attached to the second point on which he corrected Scotus,
and its connection with the first. " Also it would be well
to see that if intellection is something independent it will be
simply a more complete intelligible form*? Under this phraseo
logy he exposes the absurdity of supposing that intellect™,
abstractly considered, introduces fresh content into thought in
giving it universal form. This new species must be either the
same as the species intelligibilis, or not. If it be the same, one
or other is superfluous. If the two be different, under which
presentation is the object to be thought? It is impossible to see
what the difference between the two could be : " It is impossible
to see in what respect they differ, since they are of the same
substance and content, as e.g. the thought of an ass and the form
of an ass3." But in truth species intelligibilis and intellectio are
correlatives in the act of knowledge, and a new species (as sup
posed by Scotus) in the actual intellectio is of all things most
superfluous. " One of them would be useless, either the form or
the intellection, since the form is that by which the thing is
known and the intellection is that by which the thing is thought.
It has therefore been proved that intellection does not add
anything independent over and above the form itself4."

It is in the light of this discussion, then, that we are to

1 " Modo non est fingere tale absolutum quod intellectio superaddat ipsi speciei.
Item non videtur quod intellectio sit aliquid absolutum... quia intellectio, ut intellectio,
est alicujus intellectio." Ibid.

2 " Item pulchrum esset videre quod si intellectio est quid absolutum, non erit
aliud nisi species intelligibilis perfection " Ibid.

3 "Non est videre penes quod distinguantur, cum sint ejusdem substantiae et
object!, sicut intellectio asini et species asini." Ibid.

4 "In vanum esset unum istorum vel species vel intellectio, quum species est ilia
per quam res cognoscitur, et intellectio est etiam per quam res intelligitur. Probatum
est ergo quod intellectio non addat aliquid absolutum super ipsam speciem." Ibid.

198 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

understand the words of Pomponazzi when he says, referring
directly to these objections, that what intellect™ adds is ipsa
intellectio : ipsa intellect™, not nova species^.

We may now understand the intention with which Pom
ponazzi, just before leaving the matter, goes back to those
counter arguments : it is to introduce, by a concession to them,
his profound modification of the Scotist doctrine of intellect™.
" Then in reply to the counter arguments : to the first, which
says that intellection in itself is independent, since it adds either
something absolute or something relative, I reply, and this is
agreed, that it is relative : to the second, which speaks of an
independent addition, I reply that that is intellection itself*."

In the sense thus explained, Pomponazzi maintains his
doctrine of an agency in intellectus ; and, in this sense only, the
difference between species intelligibilis and intellect™. " Intellec
tion is essentially more complete than the form When it is

said, what is the cause of the difference? I reply that it is caused
by what is active and by the passive factor which is better
disposed.... When it is said that one of those (i.e. form and
intellection) is a useless assumption, the reply is No, for the
form alone cannot effect what intellection effects, since the form
is less complete than the intellection3." Intellectus agens is thus
plainly affirmed. At the same time place is left for the operation
of the various factors in mental life, in the allowance for passive
mind that is melius dispositus*.

Finally, there is yet another modification of the theory of
intellectual action, which if it is only suggested is yet strongly

1 "Quoad istud absolutum superadditum speciei, dico quod est ipsa intellectio."
Op. cit. f. 1 74 r.

2 "Tune ad rationes in oppositum dicitur : ad primam, cum vel addit aliquid
absolutum vel relativum, dicitur quod intellectio in se est absolutum ; dico tamen, et
constat, relativum. Ad aliam, cum dicitur quoad istud absolutum superadditum
speciei, dico quod est ipsa intellectio." Ibid.

3 "Intellectio est essentialiter perfectior specie. ...Cum dicitur, unde causatur ista
diversitas (dico) hoc quod causatur ab agente et melius disposito. ...Cum dicitur in
vanum poneretur una istorum (scil., species et intellectio) dicitur quod non, quia
species sola non potest facere istud quod facit intellectio quum species sit imperfectior
intellectione." Ibid.

4 " Cum dicitur unde causatur ilia diversitas speciei ab intellectione, dicunt pro-
venire hoc ex agente et passo melius disposito ; et etiam quia in puro intellectu recipitur
species, intellectio vero recipitur in intelleclu specie informato." Op. cit. f. 173 v.

REASON 199

indicative of the direction in which, in a mind like Pomponazzi's,
thought was moving.

Just at the end of the same Quaestio he mentions another
theory of this actio intellectus, this additio super speciem, besides
that of Scotus which he had been engaged in expounding and
amending. The characteristic of this theory, which he doubtfully
ascribes to St Thomas1, was a somewhat different view of species,
bringing it nearer to intellectio, and making the action of
intellectus upon it a matter easier of explanation. " Form," it
was said, on this view (form as the product of memory and
cogitativa), " is a kind of incomplete intellection." " They differ
as the more and the less complete." Or again even more
strongly : " And it is called form in so far as it represents an
external object, but it is called intellection in so far as the object
by means of it is thought in the mind. ...This view differs from
the first, since the first does not assume that the form is the same
in quality as the intellection2." Here then was the basis for a
different theory of the additio intellectus. " Almost all the Latin
writers," Pomponazzi had said, " held that the form and the act
of intellection are not separate in existence, but if they differ it
is not clear what the intellection adds to the form3." If, now,
we take species to be quaedam intellectio, eadem qualitate cum
intellectione, the additio is simply the change from the "less
perfect" to the "more perfect" in intellectio ; "So it seems that
there is a certain addition, involving a change not to another
form, but from one mode of existence to another4." The
difficulties, that is to say, about the " action " of intellectus —
that it seemed to add specific contents while forming the notion,
and to import a new species* — on this view disappear, and with

1 " Ita videtur dicere semper Thomas ; non assevero hanc esse sententiam
Thomae." Op. cit. f. 1 74 r.

2 "Differunt (species et intellectio) ut magis perfectum et minus perfectum.
Species enim est quaedam intellectio imperfecta. ...Et dicitur species pro quanto
repraesentat objectum ad extra, dicitur vero intellectio pro quanto per earn ad intra
intelligitur. Differt autem haec opinio a prinaa, quum prima non ponit speciem
esse eaclem qualitate cum intellectione." Ibid.

3 See note 3, p. 194.

4 "Ita videtur esse quaedam additio non in alteram speciem sed in unum ab alio
esse." Ibid.

6 "Acquirere aliquid absolutum de novo," "altera species." Op. cit. f. 172 v.

200 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

them the objections to the action of intellectus on species as now
understood. For so far from intellect™ introducing new content
(altera species), intellectio and species are on this view absolutely
correlative : " It is called form in so far as it represents an
external object, but it is called intellection in so far as by that
form an object is thought in the mind. So it seems that there
is a certain addition, involving a change not to another form, but
from one mode of existence to another."

We may resent the tantalising indecisiveness with which
Pomponazzi simply states this theory alongside of the other,
without pronouncing for either. Or we may welcome this fresh
example of the suggestive and dialectical method of his thinking,
so faithfully revealing the movement of thought in his time.
From this point of view we may regard this suggested alter
native, along with his dissent from the "absolute" intellectio of
Scotus, as indicating a tendency towards a truer because a more
concrete psychology. The intellectual power, he had already
stipulated (against Scotus), must receive the contents of its
notions from experience, and through the other powers of the
mind. He began to seek unity in mental action and a partial
loosening of the shackles in which a system of abstractions and
logical fictions had bound psychology. And the suggestion that
" form is in a sense intellection, and is called form in so far as it
represents an external object... intellection in so far as by that
form the object is thought in the mind " — this suggestion in so
far as Pomponazzi contemplated it led him one step nearer to
the realities of mental history, and prepared the way still further
for the breaking down of the artificial partitions of Averroist
psychology.

For if species, the product of sensus interior and cogitativa, be
quaedam intellectio imperfecta, then there is no longer a difference
in kind between thought and the lower powers. And that the
notion of really relating them, and reducing cogitativa and
intellectus to a common denominator as stages in a single
development, had definitely entered Pomponazzi's mind, appears
plainly from his words in another place : " I say that from the
intelligent soul and body modified by the cogitative faculty there
results an essential unity, because the cogitative faculty is not

REASON 201

the complete essence of a man. And if it be said... that it is
impossible for the same thing to have two forms of being, I
reply that that is true only in the case of two forms of being
that are ultimate and equally perfect1."

A question is raised by Ferri which is not so much a
psychological as a metaphysical question — namely how far,
according to Pomponazzi, thought is immanently constitutive
of the human intelligence. As it is doubtful whether this
question presented itself to Pomponazzi, and since, if it did, the
passages bearing on it have not been transcribed for us, I content
myself with quoting Prof. Ferri's words on the point : " Quanto
all' esercizio dell' intelletto agente il Pomponazzi o il suo Com-
mento non si spiega molto chiaramente sul punto delicato di
sapere se si debba ammettere in esso un atto immanente oltre
i suoi modi transitorii ; ma dell' insieme di questa parte della
trattazione e delle altre ancora di tutta questa dottrina sembra
risultare sicuramente che '1 atto immanente dell' intelletto umano
non differisca da un atto costitutivo della sua materia e della
sua forma o funzione, potenza e atto che per se stessi son tutto
e non son nulla, in quanto '1 una per ricevere e '1 altro per fare '1
intellezione determinata, abbisognano del lavoro delle funzioni
inferiori, della cogitativa, della fantasia, della memoria, e dei
sensi2."

1 "Dico quod ex anima intellectiva et corpora informato per cogitativam fit per se
unum, quia cogitativa non est hominis essentia per se complens....Et si dicitur...
impossibile est idem habere duo esse, dico quod est verum de duobus esse ultimatis,
et aeque perfectis." Op. cit. f. 142 r.

2 Ferri, Introduction, p. 54.

CHAPTER IX

KNOWLEDGE

THERE were, according to the received psychology of
Pomponazzi's day, three powers (virtutes) which lay between
external sense and reason (intellects), namely imagination,
memory, and a certain power of comprehension which was
called vis or virtus cogitativa or sometimes comprehensive?.
These powers were all included under sensus interior-.

We have already seen what great stress Pomponazzi lays on
the element of imaginative presentation in human knowledge,
making it the distinctive mark of intelligence as human that it
should operate always and only through imagination. It is the
necessity for a presentation of sense-data through imagination
which stamps the human mind as a receptive and not a creative
intelligence — " moved," as they said then, and not self-moving.
The superior Intelligences, whose thought is self-moved, and
not suggested from without, do not, according to him, employ
phantasia ; " Since in the third book of the De Anima imagina
tion is defined as a change produced by sense in operation3."
It is otherwise with human intelligence : " But the intellect of
man... cannot be freed from images, since it thinks only when it
undergoes modification : for thinking consists in a kind of passivity:
but it is the image that affects the intellect, as is proved in the
third book of the De Anima : wherefore it does not think with
out an image, though the kind of knowledge it has is not identical

1 "Cum sint tres virtutes interiores, imaginativa, cogitativa, et memorativa."
Comm. de An. f. 191 v.

2 See Apologia, I. iii. f. 58 d.

3 "Quum tertio De Anima phantasia sit motus factus a sensu secundum actum."
De Imm. IX. p. 70.

KNOWLEDGE 2O3

with imagination1." These then are the elements of Pomponazzi's
doctrine of phantasia, in which he claims to follow Aristotle :
(i) "Imagination is a change produced by sense," (2) "the
image moves the imagination," (3) " the intellect of man thinks
only when it undergoes modification : it does not think without
images, though the kind of knowledge it has is not identical
with imagination."

We have already, in defining the function of memorativa in
the apprehension of common sensibles, noted the language in
which memory is spoken of as sensus interior'2.

Imaginativa and memorativa are co-ordinate powers, com
posing from the data of sense the material on which thought
shall act — i.e. the species intclligibilis. It is as the products of
imagination, with or without the aid of memory, that the objects
of human thought are described as presentations or species
(intelligibiles'}. Imagination "preserves" and presents to thought
the immediate data of sense ; memory, itself working through
imagination, preserves those presentations whose sense-equiva
lents are no longer in existence3.

But these two were not of themselves sufficient to bridge the
gulf between exterior sense and thought. It was the act of
thought that had to be accounted for, by the array of hypothetical
" powers " and " actions." It was the intelligible form that was
to be brought into being, for intellectus to act upon. Something

1 "At humanus intellectus... non potest absolvi a phantasmate, quum non intelligit
nisi motus ; nam intelligere in quodam pati consistit ; movens autem intellectual est
phantasma, ut probatur tertio De Anima ; quare non intelligit sine phantasmate,
quanquam non sicut phantasia cognoscit." De limn. IX. p. 70 and passim.

2 "Si quis sentit numerum, qui est ex divisione continui, hoc non est merito
auditus, sed est propter sensum interiorem scilicet propter memorativam — Memora
tiva, mediante auditu, cognoscit talem numerum." So for motion and rest : " Ex eo
enim quod video hunc esse in tali vel tali loco deinde in alio esse in tali loco,
comprehenditur (motus) a sensu ; quod autem componit esse in hoc loco cum esse in
alio loco, est virtus interior. Similiter etiam et quies : cognoscere enim quod hoc
nunc non moveatur, est sensus exterioris ; componere autem prius cum posteriori
pertinet ad virtutem interiorem." Comm. de An. ff. 87 v., 88 v.

3 " Cogitativa est in medio imaginativae, quae servat species sensatas, et
memorativae, quae conservat species insensatas — Dicendum quod virtus serviens
intellectui sit memorativa respectu specierum insensatarum aut imaginativa respectu
specierum sensatarum. ...Illud quod immediate ministrat intellectui, quoad causandas
species intelligibiles, est virtus imaginativa aut memorativa: memorativa quoad species
insensatas, imaginativa quoad species sensatas." Op. cit. ff. 191 v., 192 r.

204 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

must be produced that should be as near thought as possible
(such was the implied logic of these theoretical constructions),
without being itself the product of thought ; then at last the
action of thought could come in. Some such unconscious logic
produced those crowning fictions of an abstract and a priori
psychology — creations in which the ineradicable contradiction,
the dualism of the original false abstraction, became almost a
contradiction in terms — the species intelligibilis which was not
intellect™, and the virttis comprehensive^ which was in no sense
intellectus.

It was not thought that was gradually realising itself from
stage to stage of the process of knowledge ; since in the ultimate
act of thought (intellectid) no lower power could have a part.
But meanwhile the data of sense must be duly prepared for the
agency of thought upon them; and for every stage in the process
there must be a " power." The last and highest of the prepara
tory powers must be all but thought — virtus cogitativa. To it
was assigned the crucial and determining part in the production
of the species nuda, the species intelligibilis'1.

The place which vis cogitativa occupied in the human mind,
and the order of mental powers generally, are illustrated by the
account given of the successive grades of living beings and their
respective powers. The analogy between the hierarchy of Nature
generally and the ascending scale of powers and faculties in the
nature of man, was of course a characteristic mediaeval thought.
The macrocosm Nature was supposed to repeat itself, with the
successive powers, in the order of their rank, within the microcosm
Man. It is therefore instructive to notice the place occupied by
cogitativa in the scale of life; and still more instructive to observe

1 "Tenet Joannes quod . . . illucl quod immediate ministrat intellectui, quoad
causandas species intelligibiles, est virtus imaginativa aut memorativa...et quia hoc
non videtur sufficere pro intellectione causanda ideo pro hoc ponit alium actum
specialiorem actu imaginativae aut memorativae, qui actus est sicut dispositio neces-
sario acquisita ad intellectiones, et quoad istum actum immediate dependet a cogita
tiva." Op. cit. f. 192 r. Or Pomponazzi's own alternative explanation : "Vel aliter
quod cogitativa sit immediate serviens intellectui.... Dico quoad conservari, species
pendent ab imaginativa aut memorativa : quo vero ad produci pendent a cogitativa,
nunquam enim intellectus posset intelligere aliquid quod sit in memorativa aut
imaginativa, nisi cogitativa prius illud cogitaret." Op. cit. f. 192 v.

KNOWLEDGE 205

some uncertainty and vacillation on Pomponazzi's part upon this
point.

A leading passage in which Pomponazzi sets forth his view
of the gradation of living beings with reference to the various
mental powers, and in analogy with the human mind — what one
may by an anachronism call his "Comparative Psychology" — is
the following: " Nature... advances gradually.... Plants have a
psychical element though of a very material kind.... Then follow
animals that have only touch and taste and vague imagination.
After these there are animals that reach such perfection that
we regard them as having intelligence.... A cogitative faculty too
is reckoned among the perceptive powers — Many distinguished
men have thought that it is intellect. If we proceed a little
higher we shall reach the intellect of man, just above tfte
cogitative faculty and below purely spiritual being, participating
in both1."

The conception of vis cogitativa was attended by the
difficulties which always beset such intermediating devices.
When two terms are set over against one another by a vicious
abstraction, the intermediary which is intended to link them
together only contains within itself the contradiction it was
devised to reconcile. Either it must be identified with one or
other of the supposed opposites, or it must inconsistently partake
of the nature of both. In the former case, the false logic which
is being followed will go on to the creation of a new intermediary
between the first and that term of the original dualism from
which it has been removed ; and so on ad infinitum.

The gulf which mediaeval logic set between thought and
sense was not to be bridged by an intermediate term like vis
cogitativa. That power would now be regarded as a mode of
thought, and now as a power akin to sense ; and where the
former view prevailed, a new intermediary was invented to form

1 " Natura . . . gradatim procedit. ...Vegetabilia enim aliquid animae habent...at
multum materialiter....Deinde succedunt animalia solum tactum et gustum habentia
et indeterminatam imaginationem. Post quae sunt animalia quae ad tantam perfec-
tionem perveniunt ut intellectum habere existimemus — Ponitur et cogitativa inter
vires sensitivas....Multi excellentes viri ipsam esse intellectum existimaverunt ; quod
si parum ascendamus, humanum intellectum ponemus immediate supra cogitativam
et infra immaterialia, de utroque participantem." De Imm. ix. p. 64.

206 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

a link with sense and complete (as was supposed) the chain of
powers. Thus in the passage last quoted cogitativa is ranged on
the side of sense. The cogitative faculty is reckoned among the
sensitive powers ; cogitativa is expressly said not to be of the
nature of intellect, and the possession of it is consequently
ascribed to the animals lower than man. With cogitativa there
fore we are still, be it noted, on the lower side of the imaginary
dividing line : the line that separates the sensuous from the
intellectual powers is in effect still uncrossed, the gulf unbridged.
And yet cogitativa must help to bridge the gulf, since this is the
very purpose for which, really, it has been called into being, the
whole motive of the conception of such a virtus. Accordingly
we have only to turn to another part of Pomponazzi's own
writings for a description of cogitativa in the opposite terms :
" The cogitative faculty... is peculiar to man as man ; for by this
power man differs from the other animals, since they are without
the cogitative faculty, though they have memory and imagina
tion1." The contradiction is direct and explicit, and illustrates
the impossibility of escaping from an artificial dualism by the
imagination of an intermediary which merely embodies the
original gratuitous contradiction. And the illustration of this
sort of speculation is completed when Pomponazzi adduces a
new intermediary, to stand between cogitativa and the powers of
sense. In so far as cogitativa leaned towards intellectus, or was
regarded as a characteristically human faculty, a new distinction
was drawn between cogitativa and existimativa, and a new faculty
devised — vis existimativa — which should serve animals in the
place of the cogitative faculty.

The artificial nature of the virtus cogitativa as a faculty
intermediate between sense and thought appears also in the
difficulty which was experienced in giving any account of its
actual operation in the process of knowledge. In so far as the
action of cogitativa was likened to intellectio its special action
seemed to disappear (so to speak) in one direction ; in so far as
it was placed on a par with imagination and memory, its action

1 " Cogitativa... est propria hominis in quantum homo; per earn enim virtutem
homo differt ab aliis animalibus, cum ipsa careant cogitativa, licet memorativam et
imaginativam habeant." Comm. de An. f. 192 r.

KNOWLEDGE 2O?

again seemed to become superfluous, since intelligence appeared
able to act directly upon the data of imagination and memory.

Pomponazzi notices the former difficulty in the course of his
attempt to make out a special " action " of intellectus upon the
material presented by imagination, memory, and cogitativa (i.e.
the species intelligibilis). The point has already been referred to
as illustrating the abstract and psychologically unreal conception
of the action of thought.

It was the special office of cogitativa, it will be remembered,
to produce the species intelligibilis, on which intellectus should
act. But in what sense (Pomponazzi attributes the question to
Avicenna) could the species intelligibilis be said to exist without
the action of intellectus! How (to turn the same question round)
could there be any apprehension of a species intelligibilis (i.e., as
supposed, by cogitativa) which was not actual knowledge? If
this question had been pressed, the action of vis cogitativa in
forming a species intelligibilis would have run into intellectio
proper ; and the distinction of intellectus and cogitativa in
reference to species intelligibilis, and, with that, the whole
distinctive office of cogitativa, would have disappeared1. Pom
ponazzi, however, does not yield to the force of this argument ;
he has his own account to give, as we shall see, of the difference
between cogitatio and intellectio ; and the virtus cogitativa, pre
paring the species intelligibilis previous to intellectio, remains a
leading idea of his psychology, as of that of his predecessors.

He has more trouble in finding a role for cogitativa in the
presentation to thought of material, over and above that of
imagination and memory. Imagination, memory, and cogitativa
(the theory was) presented the data of sense to intellectus, wrought
into the fitting shape of species intelligibilis. But it almost seemed
(Pomponazzi states the objection very pointedly) as if thought
might act directly upon the data of imagination on the one hand
or of memory on the other. " It seems that cogitativa is not the
faculty that is the immediate instrument of the operation of
intellect, for it does not preserve images, but that that faculty

1 "Avicenna tenuit quod species intelligibilis et intellectio sint penitus idem, et
quod cessante intellectione cesset species intelligibilis, quum ipse non potuit videre
qualiter sit in virtute comprehensiva et non sit cognitio rei." Op. cit. f. 1731:.

208 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

lies between imagination, which preserves forms that are per
ceived, and memory, which preserves forms that are not perceived.
...It seems that we must say that the faculty instrumental to
intellect is memory with reference to unperceived forms or
imagination with reference to perceived forms1."

It would not be worth while to follow closely the reasonings
of Pomponazzi on this point. He proceeds throughout upon his
own psychological assumptions, in particular upon the assump
tion of the three powers preparatory to thought. " It is known
that the operation of intellect depends on those powers2." Cogi-
tativa remains an unquestioned item in his scheme. But it is
interesting to observe his difficulty in fitting cogitativa (so to
speak) into the account of the mental process ; in inserting it, as
it were, between sense, as mediated by imagination and memory,
and thought as such ; and to see in the solutions proposed by
him how small and nominal is the part which in the end he is
able, with the best will in the world, to reserve for it as a faculty
distinct from thought.

He proposes two solutions of the difficulty. Not only is the
difference between the two only verbal ; but both are in fact
merely verbal solutions. In both he admits in effect that
imagination and memory, acting on the data of sense, supply
the material to thought ; the consequence of which should be
that those two, plus the action of intellectus, are sufficient to
bring about true knowledge. The necessity of finding some
function for cogitativa is met in one answer by the naively
scholastic assumption of a dispositio : a " disposition " to thought,
it is said, is needed before thought can act3, which disposition
is provided by the action of cogitativa. The second answer
amounts to no more than the dogmatic assertion that cogitativa
is necessary to the production of the species intelligibilis ; that

1 "Videtur quod cogitativa non sit ilia quae immediate serviat intellectual! opera
tion!, quia cogitativa non servat phantasmata, sed est in medio imaginativae, quae
servat species sensatas, et memorativae, quae conservat species insensatas. ...Videtur
dicendum quod virtus serviens intellectui sit memorativa respectu specierum insen-
satarum, aut imaginativa respectu specierum sensatarum." Op. cil. f. 191 v.

2 "Notum est operationem intellectus dependere ab istis virtutibus." Ibid.

3 " Dispositio necessario acquisita ad intellectiones" ; again, "dispositio necessario
requisita ad creandam intellectionem." Op. cit. f. 192 r.

KNOWLEDGE 209

while imagination preserves the presentations as given in sense,
and memory the same from the past, cogitativa is necessary
quoad product speciem.

The first solution Pomponazzi does not, it is true, put
forward on his own authority, but on that of "Joannes"
(Philoponus? or Gandavensis ?). However, he attaches weight
to it, and lets it stand as an alternative solution : "John... seems
rather ingeniously to hold that for the production of intellection,
not only is the intelligible form necessary, but also an operation
of the cogitative faculty : for its operation is as it were the pre
disposition necessary for the production of intellection. But that
operation is not necessary for producing this intelligible form,
namely as a direct condition for the form that depends on the

faculty of memory John holds that, for the production of the

intelligible form in the intellect, that operation of the cogitative
faculty is not required : at least it effects nothing towards this :
but the immediate instrument of intellect in producing intelligible
forms is the faculty of imagination or of memory... and because
this seems insufficient to produce intellection, therefore for this
purpose he postulates another operation more specific than that
of imagination or memory, which is as it were the disposition
necessary for acts of intellection : and with respect to that
operation there is a direct dependence on the cogitative faculty,
and when its action ceases, actual intellection too comes to an end,
Thus he would say that, with respect to what remains in the
intellect, there is dependence on memory, and with respect to
the acts of intellect, on the cogitative faculty^"

"Joannes... satis ingeniose videtur dicere quod ad creandam intellectionem non
solum requiritur species intelligibilis sed etiam actus virtutis cogitativae ; quia actus
est sicut dispositio necessario requisita ad creandam intellectionem. Sed ad hanc
speciem intelligibilem non requiritur iste actus, scilicet immediate quantum ad speciem
pendentem (?) a virtute memorativa — Tenet Joannes quod ad causandam speciem
intelligibilem in intellectu non requiritur iste actus virtutis cogitativae ; imo nihil
facit ad hoc ; sed illud quod immediate ministrat intellectui, quoad causandas species
intelligibiles, est virtus imaginativa aut memorativa.... Et quia hoc non videtur sufficere
pro intellectione causanda ideo pro hoc ponit alium actum specialiorem actu imagina-
tivae aut memorativae, qui actus est sicut dispositio necessario acquisita ad intellec-
tiones ; et quoad istum actum immediate dependet a cogitativa, et cessante ista actione
cogitativa cessat actualis intellectio. Et ita vult quod quoad ea quae remanent in
intellectu dependeat a memorativa, et quoad intellectiones a cogitativa." Cotnm. de
An. f. 192 r.

D. 14

210 PIETRO POMPON AZZ I

This of course is pure scholasticism : the theoretical agent
(cogitativa], the theoretical necessity for its action : the assump
tion of a dispositio previous to what actually takes place, and the
ascription of that hypothetical state of matters to an agency of
whose presence there is no other evidence.

The alternative theory of the action of cogitativa is no better.
" We must either explain the matter as John does, or otherwise
by saying that the cogitative faculty is the immediate instrument

of intellect As to their conservation, the forms depend on

imagination or memory : but as to their production, on the cogita
tive faculty, for the intellect can never think anything that is
in memory or imagination, unless the cogitative faculty first
apprehends it1."

Such were the difficulties occasioned by this established
psychological fiction of the virtus cogitativa mediating between
sense and thought. The conception formed of it oscillates
between that of a vis scnsitiva, common to man and the higher
animals, and that of a part of the proper endowment of man as
man. On the one hand it is difficult to maintain a distinction
between the action of cogitativa and the action of thought as
such ; on the other hand, when we analyse the presentation of
the data of sense for the action of thought upon them, it seems
a superfluous addition to imagination and memory. No better
justification of its existence can be found than an arbitrary
assertion of its necessity to the provision of the data on which
thought shall act, and which are already provided by imagination
and memory; or than the assumption of a dispositio ad intellec-
tionem — the necessity for which prior " disposition " is supposed,
after all, solely in order to bring cogitativa into play. Thus the
part so far assigned to vis cogitativa is an extremely small one.
What is more, it is a merely nominal part : its part, in short, is
made for it.

It is as well to see the logic of abstractions and faculties at
work. I may remark, by way of excuse for seeming to take

1 "Vel dicatur ut dicit Joannes, vel aliter quod cogitativa sit immediate serviens

intellectui Quoad conservari, species pendent ab imaginativa seu memorativa ; quo

vero ad produci, pendent a cogitativa, nunquam enim intellectus posset intelligere
aliquid quod sit in memorativa aut imaginativa, nisi cogitativa prius illud cogitaret."
Op. fit. f. 192 v.

KNOWLEDGE 211

these speculations so seriously, that we perceive by the verbal
logic of such arguments how psychological fiction was not
to be expelled by reasoning. Only when a more concrete
psychology, giving another account of the whole mental process,
was able to do without it, would it disappear. It was not so
much disproved, eventually, as dispensed with. The faculties,
the innate ideas, and other abstractions, the creations of a
speculative psychology, do not admit of disproof: they are
ignored, rather, by truer methods of observation ; they drop out
and are forgotten.

And what we observe with interest in the statements of
Pomponazzi is that cogitativa, which had played so prominent a
part in the psychology of three centuries, has already become
superfluous in its character of a distinct faculty. Such verbal
tours de force as we have noticed indicate that the need for a
faculty intermediate between sense and reason is no longer felt.
It is almost driven out, because it is almost superseded by a fresh
analysis of mental life.

Ignoring, however, as we may well do, the details of these
scholastic constructions, we may find underlying them a certain
residuum of psychological observation. And there is a passage
in which Pomponazzi improves upon the word-splitting explana
tions last quoted, and relates the notion of cogitativa to a real
basis of psychological fact.

A pure abstract general notion is one thing, say in the form
of a definition ; the apprehension of an actual individual in a
general relation is another. Now, by an extreme application of
their doctrine of intelligence, the schoolmen denied to the latter
act the name of intelligence. They did not recognise as the true
general notion, proper to intelligence, the general notion as
concrete in the individual instance, but only the explicit abstract
idea. Yet obviously, when an individual was regarded not in its
particular sensible qualities but as an individual possessed of the
attributes of a certain genus, here was an act of generalisation ;
even though there was not present to the mind the formal idea
of the genus as such in abstraction from all attributes.

Here then was an actual psychological fact. And this
particular act of generalisation, or as they said, " comprehension,"

14—2

212 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

was referred to the virtus cogitativa or comprehensiva. Certainly,
to our minds, there is no antithesis between this distinctive
moment of thought, and thought in pure abstractness ; between
thought as referring directly to an individual object, and thought
in the particular function of abstracting from all individuals the
pure abstract idea. Still less do we see any ground for postu
lating a specific faculty to account for the act in question. But
there is a fact here of which psychology takes notice, as well as
logic, and of which, we may say, the formula of vis cogitativa
was the natural expression in the mediaeval mind.

This at least is the doctrine formulated by Pomponazzi :
" You may say that though the cogitative faculty apprehends the
form apart from quantity and position, yet it does not follow
that it has a general conception, because its apprehension is of a
particular unit, though apart from quantitative character; if it is
asked how that form is a unit, I reply that it is a unit through
its own nature and not through quantity1." It was an accepted
canon that " the cogitative faculty abstracts the substantial form
from its sensible qualities both special and common2." Fastening,
then, upon the apprehension of an individual, divested of its
character as a particular individual in time and space, yet not
apprehended in full generality under an abstract general idea,
Pomponazzi assigns such an apprehension to vis cogitativa as
distinct from thought.

The distinction from intellect™ is the thing which in this place
he labours to maintain. He quotes the objection, " If the cogi
tative faculty abstracted the substantial form from the common
and special sensible, it would apprehend the substantial form
apart from quantity and space and likewise time and would then
have a general conception... and thus would be intellect*" And to

1 "Dicatis quod licet cogitativa apprehendat speciem substantiae sine quantitate
et situ, non tamen sequitur quod cogitativa ccgnoscat universaliter, quia ilia intentio
est una et singularis licet sit sine quantitate ; quod si quaeritur per quod talis species
sit una, dico quod est una per se ipsam et non per ipsam quantitatem." Op. eft.
{. 224 r.

2 "Quod cogitativa denudat speciem substantiae a sensibilibus propriis et com-
munibus." Op. cit. f. 223 v.

3 " Si cogitativa denudaret speciem substantiae a sensibili communi et proprio,
tune cognosceret speciem substantiae sine quantitate et loco, et similiter tempore, et
tune cogitativa cognosceret universaliter... et sic esset intellectus." Ibid.

KNOWLEDGE 213

this he answers as above by distinguishing cogitativa, with its
intentio una et singularis, from intellectus : " Granted that the
cogitative faculty apprehends the substantial form apart from
quantity and position, yet it does not follow that it has a general
conception, because its apprehension is of a particular unit,
though apart from quantity."

We may not accept the distinction, thus defined. We may
consider that the intermediary cogitativa, as thus interpreted,
has already by an immanent logic passed over into identification
with one of the terms it was intended to link together, namely,
thougJit ; and that Pomponazzi's distinction is no answer to the
objection of Avicenna " He held that when the intellection ceases
to exist so also does the intelligible form... he could not see how
the intelligible form should be in the comprehensive faculty,
while there was no knowledge of the thing1." We may hold that
the distinction between the apprehension of an individual in its
general character and the apprehension of an abstract general
idea is not a distinction between thought and something else
which is not thought, but between one act of thought and
another ; that thought is present in the whole process ; and in
particular that the apprehension which Pomponazzi thus assigns
to cogitativa, as its peculiar and distinguishing function, is
essentially an act of thought.

But we may also note that Pomponazzi observes a real
aspect of generalisation as a mental process, and signalises
it in his own way. The manner in which he expresses it is
determined on the one hand by a psychology of " powers" and
"faculties," on the other by the narrow identification of "thought"
with abstraction.

The doctrine of vis cogitativa, which had so firm a hold upon
his mind, was his inheritance — part of the doctrine of his school,
and of his mental environment; but it was his own work to
relate that doctrine to an original psychological observation;
and if perhaps the result was only to leave confusion worse con
founded, yet the more that cogitativa was permitted to discharge
the function of thought, the thinner did the partition become

1 See p. 194, note i.

214 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

that divided it from thought, and the nearer drew the time
when cogitativa as a power different from thought should dis
appear.

Pomponazzi raises a question about cogitativa as a faculty
of the sensitive and material nature of man, which brings up
the general question of thought and matter and prepares us for
the conception elsewhere developed by him of an embodied
intelligence.

There was no reason, said Pomponazzi, why cogitativa, although
a power really physical in its nature, should not apprehend an
object in the quasi-intellectual way in which it was supposed to
do so1.

A difficulty, however, stood in the way of this admission.
There was a canon of the schools, the application of which
to knowledge exemplified the mechanical mode of conceiving
mental "action": "Whatever is received is received in accordance
with the nature of the recipient2." This seemed to prohibit the
function which was assigned to vis cogitativa.

For cogitativa, it must be remembered, had been defined and
introduced as essentially a faculty of sense. In virtue of this
character it was to discharge its function of mediating the data
of sense to thought. So it was classed among the vires sensi-
tivae ; it was ascribed, though not with absolute consistency, to
others of the higher animals as well as to man. And in the
passage under notice it is plainly said : " The cogitative faculty
implies what is quantitative, since it is a faculty that is material
and extended3." The question then arose how, in accordance
with the maxim, " Whatever is received, etc.," it could act as it
was supposed to do. For Pomponazzi, following Averroes and
the received psychology, ascribed to cogitativa the power of ap
prehending objects in abstraction from all the forms of sense —
apart from both special sensible qualities and the common
sensibles (he specifies quantitas, numems, motus, situs), in short,

1 "Speciem substantiae sine quantitate et situ, non tamen...universaliter." Of. cit.

f. 224r.

2 "Omne receptum recipitur secundum naturam recipientis." Op. cit. f. 223 v.

3 "Cogitativa est cum quantitate, cum sit virtus materialis et extensa." Ibid.

KNOWLEDGE 21 5.

from space and time1. Was this then consistent with its being a
faculty of the physical nature of man and the higher animals
(vis sensitiva, virtus materialis et extensa) ?

Pomponazzi accordingly states this question : " What causes
a difficulty is that whatever is received is received in accordance
with the nature of the recipient ; but the cogitative faculty
involves quantity, since it is a faculty that is material and
extended ; therefore the substantial form will be received in
it according to its quantitative nature2."

The answer which he proceeds to suggest has twofold merit.
In the first place he dismisses the scholastic doctrine of " natures "
in favour of a more empirical mode of thought; in the second
place he shews an apprehension of the peculiar nature of the act
of knowledge.

The passage may be quoted in its entirety : " We shall say
that tho2tgh the substantial form is received in the cogitative faculty
through a modification of quantity and extension, yet it is not
necessary that we should think the object as extended and
quantified. Otherwise we could say, with Thomas and others,
that all the souls of the higher animals are indivisible, and
they reply to the argument brought forward against them
' whatever is received is received in accordance with the nature
of the recipient, but matter is quantitative and extended, there
fore the soul which is received in it is extended and divisible '-
they reply by denying the unqualified truth of the major
premise; for in their view, if anything is received in extended
matter, it is not necessary that it should be extended and divisible.
But they say that the principle in question that is current in
philosophy ought to be understood with the addition ' according
to capacity.' Thus therefore I say, in the present problem, that
it is not necessary that the substantial form should be received
as quantified, though it is received by a faculty that is material

1 "Dicebat Commentator quod cogitativa denudat speciem substantiae a sensi-
bilibus propriis et communibus....Tunc cognosceret speciem substantiae sine quantitate
et loco, et similiter tempore." (Op. cit. f. 223 v.) "Cogitativa apprehendit speciem
substantiae sine quantitate et situ." Op. cit. f. 224 r.

2 "Quod facit difficultatem est quia omne receptum recipitur secundum naturam
recipientis : sed cogitativa est cum quantitate, cum sit virtus materialis et extensa ;
ergo species substantiae recipietur in ea secundum quantitatem.'1 Op. cit. f. 223 v.

2l6 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

and extended, and to the proposition, 'whatever is received, etc.,'
(I add) 'according to capacity1'."

He borrows his formula from the Thomists, who, in main
taining the possibility of an immaterial and " unextended " soul
in extended matter, laid it down that matter "received" such an
immaterial soul secundiim capacitatem. Se, says Pomponazzi, a
physical faculty (cogitativd) receives an unquantified conception
of substance secundum capacitatem.

This might seem at first sight but the substituting of one
scholastic verbalism for another. But it is really a step towards
a more experiential and observational mode of thought. In
stead of speculative reasonings from "natures" conceived and
defined a priori, as to what is or what is not possible to them,
we are to go by the actual capacities of things as they are. The
word capacitas may not be very promising : it is a thoroughly
scholastic word, invested with misleading associations, with
misleading suggestions of immanent potencies, substantiated
"powers"; but the point is that the capacitas is to be determined
from actual facts. Whereas natura was a datum a priori from
which possible phenomena, possible combinations, were to be
deduced, by which the unsuitable were to be excluded; capacitas
is to be reckoned by the phenomena actually observed, the
conjunctions actually occurring. Once more, then, the shell of
scholastic thought is being broken, or its bonds stretched at
least to the breaking point.

This appears when we look at the case in point — the
case of cognitive apprehension by a material "power." "It is
not necessary that the substantial form should be received as

1 "Dicemus quod, licet species substantiae sit recepta in cogitativa per modutn
quantitatis et extensionis, non tamen oportet quod extense et per modum quantitatis
reputemus. Aliter possemus dicere, sicut Thomas et alii, quod omnes animae ani-
malium perfectorum sunt indivisibiles ; et dicunt ad illud argumentum quod tit contra
eos 'omne receptum recipitur secundum naturam recipientis, sed materia est quanta
et extensa, ergo anima quae in ea recipitur est extensa et divisibilis' — dicunt isti
negando anteriorem illam secundum quod sic absolute profertur ; quia secundum eos
non oportet si aliquid recipiatur in materia extensa, ut illud receptum sit extensum et
divisibile. Sed dicunt quod ilia anterior currens per ora philosophorum debet intelligi
secundum capacitatem. Sic dico ergo ego in proposito quod non oportet ut species
substantiae recipiatur cum quantitate, licet recipiatur in virtute materiali et extensa, et
ad illam propositionem 'omne receptum etc. '...secundum capacitatem." Op. cit.
f. 224 r.

KNOWLEDGE 2 1/

quantified, though it is received in a faculty that is material and
extended." " Granted that the substantial form is received in
the cogitative faculty through a modification of quantity and
extension, it is not necessary that we should think it as extended
and quantified."

The conception thus arrived at of the action of cogitativa, in so
far as it proceeds by abstraction to transmute the data of sense, is,
I suggest, substantially a true conception of the act of knowledge
in its relation on the one hand to the object, on the other to the
organ of knowledge.

The analogy of cogitativa (" virtus materialis et extensa,"
which nevertheless "apprehendit speciem substantiae sine quan-
titate et situ ") is elsewhere used by Pomponazzi to justify the
conception of an intellectus also, capable of intellectual appre
hension in the full sense and of truly abstract thought, yet
dependent on a bodily organ1.

In his account of the mind's knowledge of itself and of its
operations, of the thought, that is, of thought, Pomponazzi denies
that it is immediate or intuitive, and traces in it an act of dis-
cursus.

The point occurs in the course of the argument of the De
Immortalitate. He names as the characteristic of reason in
man, " Not to know itself by means of its special form, but by
that of other things2,'' contrasting it in this with the superior
Intelligences — with reason, we might say, as ideally perfect,
ideally possible. In support of his position that the soul of
man, in itself " material," participates in " immateriality3," he
adduces this conception of the mind's knowledge of itself in the
case of man. It was the accepted canon that the power supra

1 E.g. Apologia, I. iii. f. 59 c, d : "Cogitativa virtus extensa est, quum omnes
affirmant ipsam esse virtutem sensitivam, ipsaque potest sequestrate substantiam a
quantitate, quamvis sit in quantitate; quid igitur obstat et ipsum intellectum existentem
materialem et extensum, secundum quamdam altiorem gradum quam sit cogitativa
ipsa, infra tamen limites materiae, et universaliter cognoscere, et universaliter
syllogizare? non discedendo tamen penitus a materia, quum in omni tali cognitione
dependet a phantasmate. Puto itaque quod qui tenet cogitativam esse talem ut
dicimus multum probabiliter habet tenere et de intellectu."

2 "Non cognoscere se per speciem propriam sed aliorum." De Inim. x. p. 76.

3 " Simpliciter materiale et secundum quid immateriale." Op. cit. passim.

2l8 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

seipsum reflectere belonged to the " immaterial " and not to the
" material " being ; he therefore carefully defines the degree and
mode in which this power is possessed by the human soul, in
illustration and defence of his doctrine of man as an intermediate
being, and of man's soul as "material," while participant in "im
materiality." Thus: — "As to what participates in immateriality,
granted that it does not know itself by means of its special form,
but by that of other things, as is said in the third book of the
De Anima, yet in accordance with its nature it can in a way
reflect on itself and know its own operations, though not directly
or so perfectly as the Intelligences can1."

He seeks in the commentary on the De Anima to base this
view of the mind's knowledge of itself on psychological grounds ;
and it is another instance of the way in which his general
doctrine of man's place in nature leads him towards a correct
psychology. What he is concerned to deny is the Averroist
theory of an immediate intuition of abstract thought by itself
apart from particular experiences.

The passage2 referred to discusses the Quaestiones, "Whether
the intellect thinks itself by means of itself or by means of
another3,'' and, " Whether the intellect thinks its own opera
tions4." Pomponazzi finds in the first place that thought does
think itself: "About the fact itself there is no doubt, because
we have experience of it in our own case : but there is doubt as
to the means by which intellect thinks itself5." But he says
that it does so not by a presentation of thought as such, but on
the occasion of the presentation of some other object of thought. In
answer to the question whether intellect thinks itself by means
of itself or by means of another — the doubt as to the means by
which intellect thinks itself — Pomponazzi rejects the doctrine of
Averroes: " It is certainly not by means of its own essence, and

1 "Quantum ad id quod de immaterialitate participat, licet non cognoscat se per
speciem propriam sed aliorum, ut dicitur tertio De Anima, secundum tamen illud esse
potest quoquo modo supra seipsum reflectere et cognoscere actus suos, licet non primo
et ita perfecte sicut intelligentiae." De Itnm. X. p. 76.

2 Coniin. deAn.S. 150, 151.

3 "Utrum intellectus intelligat se per se an per aliud."

4 "Numquid intellectus suam operationem intelligat."

8 " De re in se non est dubitatio, quia in nobismet experimur hoc; sed est dubitatio
per quod intellectus intelligat se." Op. cit. f.

KNOWLEDGE 2 19

without having a conception distinct from itself, as Averroes
says1." The argument he uses is that, if there were such an
immediate intuition of thought by itself, there would be no
reason why it should not be permanently in operation, which it
is not: " If this were the case it would always think itself, which
is false — it must always first think some other thing2." In
point of fact, he says, any and every presentation affords tfte
occasion for tJie apprehension of itself by thought. " We must see
therefore whether one determinate form is needed rather than
another, one form or any form whatever enabling it to think
itself: and, as it seems to me, we must say that it can think
itself through any form whatever indifferently : and experience
shews this3." Pomponazzi, therefore, analyses the apprehen
sion by thought of itself and asks, What precisely is the act
of thought in which it apprehends itself as thought ? He puts
this question definitely, in the following form. " But a doubt
remains. If it is possible for intellect to think itself by means
of any form whatsoever, how is it possible that a single form,
e.g. of an ass, should bring the intellect to have knowledge both
of an ass and of the intellect itself* ? "

He discusses first the theory that every presentation of an
object gives immediately to thought the knowledge both of the
object and of itself as thought5. Two considerations were
adduced in favour of this account of self-consciousness as an
immediate act. The first was that presentations represent not
only their objects, but the subjects (thinking minds) in which

1 "Cerium est quod non per sui essentiam, non habendo conceptum distinctum a
se, ut habet Commentator." Op. cit. f. 150 r. Cf. De Imm. x. p. 76: "licet non
cognoscat se per speciem propriam sed aliorum."

2 "Si sic, semper intelligent se, quod est falsum nisi prius alia intellexerit."
Comm. de An. f. 150 r.

3 " Videndum est ergo an requiratur una species determinata magis quam alia, sic
quod solum per unam speciem vel per quamcunque possit se intelligere ; et quoad
mihi videtur, dicendum quod per quamcunque speciem indifferentem possit se ipsum
cognoscere ; et hoc docet experientia." Ibid.

4 "Sed stat tamen dubitatio : si per quamcunque speciem potest se intelligere,
quomodo est possibile quod una species, ut asini, ducat intellectum in cognitionem
asini et ipsius intellectus?" Ibid.

5 "Quod per speciem solam intellectus potest devenire in sui cognitionem quia
species habet duo repraesentare : primum illud a quo deciditur...secundario, subjectum
illius." Ibid.

220 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

they occur. We have here an illustration of the manner in which
the modern usage of " subject " is based on the original mediaeval
meaning of subjectum : subjectum or substrate might of course be
mental as well as material1. The other argument for the im
mediacy of thought's knowledge of itself was the naive one that
since, according to Aristotle, thought is identical with the object
thought, therefore, in thinking the object, thought thinks itself.
"Averroes says that in thinking an ass the mind in a way be
comes an ass2."

Pomponazzi does not make the criticisms which we should
naturally make upon these arguments; but he is fully conscious
of their irrelevancy to the matter in hand, which he proceeds
himself to treat as a matter of psychological fact. He might
have pointed out that although the presentation implies a subject,
it does not therefore involve the explicit apprehension of the
subject, which is the point in question ; that in short to assume
that the species " ought not to be unknown by its subject," is to
beg the question, to abandon the analysis of the fact of con
sciousness, and, besides, to go against experience. Again he
might have quoted Aristotle's language to shew that it was only
in the case of pure abstract thought that in his view intellectus
and intelligibile were actually identical ; that is, ultimately,
in thought's apprehension of itself, which was the very act of
which they were seeking the psychological history : the fact to
be explained was the emergence of this consciousness on occasion
of concrete presentations3 of which it was the very characteristic,
according to Aristotle, that the identity of thought and its
object was only potential and not actual. Thus such presenta
tions were no explanation of thought thinking of itself, and (as
was obvious) contributed nothing to the specific analysis of that
mental fact4.

1 "Species habet duo repraesentare : primum, illud a quo deciditur, et hoc per se
(patet?), secundario, subjectum illius, cum non debeat esse ignota suo subjecto. Sic
ergo per quamcunque speciem duo intelliguntur, subjectum et objectum." Op. cit.
f. 150 r.

2 "Dicit quod intelligendo asinum fit asinus aliquo modo." Op. cit. f. 150 v.

3 " Quomodo est possibile quod una species, ut asini, ducat intellectum in
cognitionem asini et ipsius intellectus?" Op. cit A. i.^or.

4 Aristotle, De Anima, 430 a 2 — 7. Ka.1 aurbs Si (scil. voOs) voijris tffriv wvirep

KNOWLEDGE 221

Pomponazzi does not enter upon the analysis of the difference
between thought simpliciter and thought plus the consciousness
of thought ; but he is clearly aware that the proposed explanation
contained nothing to account for the specific fact of thought's
consciousness of itself. He shews this by an argument parallel
to that which he had employed against the Averroist absolute
intuition of thought. If, he had said, the apprehension of
thought were not occasioned by some particular exercise of
thought, then it would be always in activity ; for it is im
possible to see what should call it into action. So now he says,
if the consciousness of thought be thus immediately given with
the presentation of an object to thought, it must be always
given. This was a way of saying that the analysis in question
had failed to explain the peculiar features of the particular case
in point1 or the reasons of its occurrence. And in fact it is not
true that consciousness of thought always accompanies thought.

Taking the question, then, on the ground of experience and
fact, he develops and amplifies this argument.

" If the intellect thinks itself by means of a form, this will be
either a voluntary act or purely natural : it is not voluntary
because we cannot always do it.... If it is natural... then rustics
when they think of an ass would also by means of the form of
' ass ' think their own intellect, and we whenever we think should
always think our intellect. Secondly... the intellect would ap
prehend itself and ' ass ' either by a single cognition or by two ;
if by one. then always when it thinks one cognition it would also
think another, etc.2" So in the next Quaestio. "The question is
raised as to how intellect thinks its own operations. About the
fact there is no doubt, but about the mode there is... Two ways
are possible : one, in which I should think the operations of

TO. vorjrd. eirl yuep yap T&V avev V\TJS rb avr6 ecrrt TO voovv KCLI TO vooti/mtvov i) yap
eTriffTrj/jir) 17 GfuprjTiKT) /ecu TO OVTWS eiruTTtiTov TO avrd effTiv...ev 5e rots Uxovtriv V\T!]V
8vvd/j.ei ixaffTov e<rrt TWC VOTJT&V.

1 See p. 220, n. 3.

2 "Si per speciem se intelligat, vel hoc est voluntarium, vel naturale: non volun-
tarium quia non semper hoc possumus ;...si naturale... rustici intelligentes asinum
per speciem asini etiam suum intellectual intelligerent, et nos quando aliquando
intelligeremus semper nostrum intellectual intelligeremus. Secundo...vel per unam
cognitionem intellectus cognosceret se et asinum, vel per duas: si per unam semper
quando unam intelligeret, aliud etiam intelligeret, etc." Comm. de An. f. 150 v.

222 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

thought by means of the same intellection by which I think the
object... But this I believe is untenable: because that operation
is either one or more than one ; if the first, when I think any
thing, / should always tJiink that I think, which is false ; but if
the operations are different, how do these operations differ from
each other1?"

Pomponazzi's own conclusion is that thought's consciousness
of thought, on occasion of particular activities of thought, is the
result of a discursive process and takes the form not of a species
but of a conceptus. Neither does thought apprehend itself by an
absolute or immediate act, apart from any particular presentation
of another object, nor is the apprehension given simpliciter in
the particular presentation. Thought frames, he says, not a
presentation (species} of itself, but a conceptus — a new and special
conceptus, formed by thought through a certain process (discursus\
and on occasion of the presentation of an object not itself (species
aliena) : " The form concurs as an efficient instrumental cause to
the production of the concept... Ass and intellect are thought
by means of two different conceptions. ...In virtue of its being
modified by the form, the intellect acts on itself by causing an
intellection of itself, different from the first intellection. ...Note
the difference between a concept and a form : — Of abstract
things we have a concept and not a form : of material things
we have a form and not a concept, for we have images of them2."

In the discussion, " Whether a particular thing is known by
the intellect and how3," to which this examination of thought's

1 " Quaeritur quomodo intellectus suam operationem intelligat. L)e re non est
dubitatio, sed de modo — Duo sunt dicendi modi: unus, quo, per eandem intellec-
tionem per quam intelligo objectum, intelligam etiam intellectiones. ...Sed credo hoc
esse falsum: quia vel ista actio est una, vel plures: si primum, cum aliquid intelligam,
semper intelligam me intelligere : quod est falsum ; si vero ita quod sint diversae,
quomodo differunt istae actiones inter se?" Op. cit. f. 151 r.

2 "Ad (conceptum) causandum concurrit species ut efficiens instrumentale...duobus
conceptibus distinctis intelligitur asinus et intellectus.... Ex eo quod intellectus est
informatus specie, agit in se ipsum, causando intellectionem sui aliam a prima. Nota
quod est differentia inter conceptum et speciem, quia de abstractis habemus conceptum
et non speciem ; de materialibus speciem et non conceptum, quia habemus de eis
phantasmata." Op. cit. ff. 150 v., 151 r.

3 "Utrum singulare cognoscatur ab intellectu, et quomodo." Op. cit. ff. 151 v. to

KNOWLEDGE 223

self-knowledge leads, Pomponazzi really investigates the nature
of predication. He describes and examines two views, which
are at once theories of knowledge and doctrines of the nature of
individuality, and which have this in common, that they set the
general conception and the individual object of knowledge, the
"common nature" and the individual being, in logical opposition
to each other — that which makes all knowledge rest on the
knowledge of particulars, as such, and as opposed to "universals,"
" the view of the Nominalists which seems also to be that of
Alexander1," and that which confines the name of knowledge to
general conceptions, and holds that the individual as such is to
be known only indirectly and by inference, "the view... which
Albert, Thomas and Scotus follow2."

The discussion is a characteristic example of Pomponazzi's
dialectical method. He first states the arguments usually em
ployed on behalf of the nominalist view. Next, after stating the
counter-arguments for the opposite view, he examines nominalism
from the standpoint which they suggest and makes various cor
rections and modifications of the argument for nominalism, thus
carrying the question on a stage. Finally, he criticises the case
against nominalism — partly admitting, partly rejecting it — and
suggests a combination of the two standpoints. Such a com
bination, fully carried out, would of course have given the true
solution of the problem ; but Pomponazzi again, characteristically,
while avoiding the two extremes, does not attempt to define the
middle line closely or follow its course in detail ; so that the
solution is not stated, but only foreshadowed.

First he states the case of those who derive all knowledge

o

from the knowledge of particulars, defining the particular as the
opposite of the universal. The abstract logical idea of the
particular which was here in question appears in the very first
words, "The particular is known by its special form3." The
force of this distinction may be gathered from the terms in
which Pomponazzi subsequently states the alternative view :

1 "Opinio...Nominalium, quae etiam videtur Alexandri." Op. cit. f. 152 r.

2 "Opinio...quam imitantur Albertus, Thomas, Scotus." Op. cit, f. 153 r.

3 "Singulare cognoscitur per propriam speciem." Op. cit. f. 152 r.

224 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

" What is received in the intellect is not received as a particular,
but under a general conception1." What was meant, then, by
the particular's being known per propriam speciem, was that the
mind had a conception of it distinct from, and not included
among, the general conceptions of its relations. Accordingly
the argument proceeds : " The first consideration is that the
singular is known by its special form, because the intellect posits
a distinct difference between the universal and the particular:
but this could not take place unless it had a distinct knowledge
of them, and this could not happen except through the concep
tion of the particular2."

Another phase of this mode of reasoning, from the logical
hypostasis of the abstract " particular " as such, was the argu
ment that the general notion, just because general, could give
no determinate knowledge of the individual being. To know
individuals, it was said, in communi, was to know them only
in confuso. " Either the particular is known by its special form
or by the form of the universal. If the first, the point is proved :
if the second, since that form brings us to a knowledge of all the
particulars as a whole or as blended together, I shall not be able
to have knowledge of a single determinate individual, e.g. of
Socrates or of Plato3."

To this, which may be called a logical, if spurious, argument,
Pomponazzi adds a psychological argument from the nature of
human knowledge as dependent upon sense and imagination,
which deal with particulars. " Our intelligence depends on

images Imagination is knowledge of the particular4." Further:

" The primary object of intellect is the primary object of

1 " Illud quod in intellectu recipitur non singulariter recipitur, sed sub conceptu
universal! recipitur." Op.cit.i. 153 r.

2 "Prima consideratio est quod singulare cognoscitur per propriam speciem, quia
intellectus ponit distinctam differentiam inter universale et particulare ; hoc autem non
potest esse nisi habeat distinctam cognitionem de illis, et hoc non potest fieri nisi per
ejus conceptum." Op. cil. f. 152 r.

3 "Vel cognoscitur (singulare) per propriam speciem, vel per speciem universalis.
Si primum, habeo intentum ; si secundum, cum ista species ducat nos in cognitionem
omnium singularium in communi vel in confuso non potero habere notitiam unius
determinati individui ut Socratis aut Platonis." Ibid.

4 "Intelligere nostrum dependet a phantasmatibus :...phantasia est singularis."
Ibid.

KNOWLEDGE 225

imagination: the particular is that; therefore it is the primary
object of intellect1."

He refers in corroboration to the fact that all general know
ledge of matters of fact is derived from particular experiences.
" The complex singular is known before the complex universal...
for thus I know that rhubarb purges cholera... therefore this holds
also in the case of what is not complex2"; and he quotes the
Aristotelian doctrine of the place of sense in knowledge : "When
sense is wanting, there is wanting also scientific knowledge of the
sensible which is known by that sense3."

The characteristic argument is added, that, since all general
knowledge is by abstraction from particulars, and there can only
be abstraction from what is known, therefore the particulars must
be. first given in knowledge4.

The third main argument on this side is that all general
notions are gained by a comparison of individuals. This in
itself seems undeniable ; but we gather from the exposition of
Pomponazzi the sense in which this principle was understood.
It was interpreted to mean that particulars are knowable and
known, in the first instance, as unrelated, and without any
general conception of them5, while it was understood further to
imply that the mind formed a conception of the particular as
such prior to, and distinct from, every conception of its relations,
of the "common nature" in it6.

1 " Illud primo intelligitur quod primo phantasiatur : singulare autem primo
phantasiatur, ergo primo intelligitur." Ibid.

- "Singulare complexum prius cognoscitur quam universale complexum...quia sic
cognosce quod reubarbarum purgat coleram....Ergo et ita est de incomplexo."
Op. cit. f. 152 r.

3 "Quod deficiente sensu deficit scientia illius sensibilis quod habetur per sensum
ilium." Op. cit. f. 152 v.

4 " Item est tertia ratio quod universale non cognoscitur nisi abstrahendo a
particularibus, sed abstractio non fit nisi a noto, ergo singulare prius fuit cognitum ab
intellectu." Ibid.

6 " Particulariter ab intellectu cognoscitur." Ibid.

6 "Tertia consideratio est quod universale non cognoscitur nisi ex comprehensione
multoruiu singularium, et ex similitudine reperta in singular! causatur universale :
sicut accipiendo Socratem et Platonem, ita maxima eorum similitudine, causant
conceptum specificum ; et videndo hominem et asinum ambos habere virtutem
sensitivam, causatur alius conceptus, ut puta genericus, quia non habet tantam
similitudinem quanta est in Socrate et Platone. Non ergo universale primo et

D. I5

226 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

The second theory with which Pomponazzi had to deal
claimed to be the logical application of the principle that
knowledge is the apprehension of general conceptions — of rela
tions. This implied that there could be no specific apprehension
of an unrelated individual, by means of its special form ; but it
was supposed to involve two further consequences — (i) that the
individual is known not directly in the general conception of it,
but indirectly, by inference from the general conception of it, and
(2) that the general conception is not acquired in, and through,
the knowledge of the particular (as, in short, the true knowledge
of it), but by some specific apprehension directed towards the
" universal " as such, and as distinct from the particular1. We
see, then, that we have here to do with another one-sided abstrac
tion ; with a theory of intellectual action psychologically un
founded ; and with an artificial abstraction of the " general "
from the " particular " aspect of thought and being, an artificial
hypostasis of the "common natures." This second doctrine
Pomponazzi also sums up in three arguments. The first is a
negative to the first position of the nominalists : " The particular
is not known by its special form2." This is argued from the fact
that it is the very nature of thought to think general conceptions.
" Intellect in this differs from sense, for intellect receives universals,
sense particulars; therefore what is received in the intellect is not
received as a particular, but under a general conception3." There
is no function for thought, it is said, except this. "If the particular

simpliciter fit, sed ex collatione multorum individuorum. ...Dicunt ergo (Alexander,
Themistius, Averroes) quod particulariter ab intellectu cognoscitur, et ratio est quod
nulla alia res videtur posse causare universale, et ista fuit opinio Buridani, etc....
quod scilicet cognoscatur singulare intellectu per propriam speciem ; istam tamen
speciem habet a sensu, non enim potest intelligere singulare nisi prius id senserit
sensus, et quod conceptus communis sit posterior conceptu particularium." Op. cit,
(. 152 v.

1 " Intellectus non intclligit primo singulare... intelligit reflexe, ergo non directe

Singulare per accidens intelligitur. ...Universale per speciem universalis primo cognos-
cirur, et singulare secundario cognoscitur." Of, cit. f. 153 r., v.

2 " Singulare non cognoscitur ab intellectu per propriam speciem." Op. cit.

f- i53r-

3 "Intellectus in hoc differt a sensu, quia intellectus universaliter, sensus
singulariter recipit. Ergo illud quod in intellectu recipitur non singulariter recipitur,
sed sub conceptu universal! recipitur." Ibid.

KNOWLEDGE 22?

is received in intellect, for what purpose should an activity of
intellect be postulated P1"

Pomponazzi quotes also the following argument: — If thought,
it was argued, had an immediate apprehension of individual
beings, as individuals, and apart from all elements of a "common
nature" in them2, then we should be able to distinguish between
two individuals between which there was no known specific
difference3: we should be able, that is, to distinguish between two
precisely similar objects presented to us at different times. But
we are not able to do so. The example is given of two eggs.
If one egg is shewn to me at one time, another at another, I
cannot say whether it is the same egg or not. But I should be
able to do so, had I a direct apprehension of each egg as an
individual thing, and apart from specific characteristics and
specific differences4. Therefore there is no such apprehension ;
but things are known, so far as they are known at all, only in
their specific characters5.

In the second place Pomponazzi expounds the manner in
which according to this theory the individual does come into
apprehension — that is, indirectly, by reflection, and tJirougk the
general conceptions. The consequence of this is that the indi
vidual in itself is not apprehended (as indeed the isolated and
abstract "individual" is not): which is expressed in scholastic
language by saying that it is known, not per se, but per accidens*.

1 "Si singulare recipitur in intellects, ad quid esset ponendus intellectus agens?"
Ibid.

2 "Si intellectus haberet conceptus singulares ipsorum singularium." Ibid.

3 "Sciret ponere differentiam inter duo individua ejusdem speciei." Ibid.

4 " Per propriam speciem," "sub conceptu singulari." Ibid.

5 "Si intellectus haberet conceptus singulares ipsorum singularium, sciret ponere
differentiam inter duo individua ejusdem speciei, et cognoscere differentiam quae est
inter talia individua : hoc autem est falsum de duobus repraesentatis, quorum unum
sit repraesentatum in una hora, aliud in alia. Verbi gratia pono hie unum ovum. Vel
habeo proprium conceptum hujus vel non. Si non, habeo intentum ; si sic, volo
quod aliud ponatur ; tu credis quod illud est idem ovum, ergo non scias ponere
differentiam." Ibid.

6 " Secunda consideratio est quod intellectus non intelligit primo singulare, quod
declaratur quia intelligit reflexe, ergo non directe — Universale per se, singulare per
accidens intelligitur ab intellectu. Item quod est primum objectum prius intelligitur ;
universale est primum objectum intellectus, ergo prius cognoscitur ab intellectu."
Ibid. " Quaeram, si particulariter non cognoscitur ab intellectu per speciem

15—2

228 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

In the third place, it was denied that universals are formed
by a collection and comparison of particulars. For, it is argued,
if the collection of particulars be the same as a universal concep
tion, then the supposed process implies that a universal conception
must exist before a universal conception can be formed (which is
absurd) ; and if the two be not the same, then the universal con
ception remains to be accounted for, namely by a specific
apprehension of the universal as such. And this last is in fact
required so long as the general is conceived of as the opposite of
the particular ; and until it is understood that the general is
given in the knowledge of the particular, and the particular truly
known just when known, and as known, in general relations1.

We now come to the interesting passage in which Pomponazzi
examines and criticises these reasonings. After his usual pro
fession of uncertainty-, he pronounces for the nominalist view ;
but he proceeds to correct the customary arguments in its behalf,
and in so doing to modify the theory itself in his own way. He
takes it up first for criticism, in order to develop his own position,
and, by clearing away a fallacious structure of argument, to base
it on a firm foundation ; and also as naturally continuing his
statement of all that could be said for the other view3.

To begin with, although he intends to conclude that thought
apprehends singulars, he flatly denies that there is any apprehen
sion of them qua singulars — in abstraction, that is, from general
determination, or apart from their relations.

It had been argued that because we distinguish between the

propriam, quomodo fiat intellectio singularium? Dicitur quod species, decisa ab
objecto, secundario repraesentat, vel per se primo (scil. intelligitur?) ; et quia est
imago decisa a phantasmate, repraesentat etiam singulare, licet non primo, sed
reflexe." Op. cit. f. i53v.

1 " Tertia consideratio est quam isti in sua tertia consideratione sibi condicunt,
quia singulare prius intelligitur, et universale non intelligitur nisi per comprehensionem
multorum singularium, et collectio singularium non est nisi universale. Ergo univer
sale cognoscitur ante universale ; quod est inconveniens. Restat ergo dicere quod
universale per speciem universalis primo cognoscitur, et singulare secundario cog
noscitur. " Ibid.

2 " Utraque harum partium potest teneri, et Deus de hoc scit veritatem, ego autem
nescio." Ibid.

3 "Dico tamen quod prima opinio mihi magis placet. Quia tamen sua argumenta
non concludunt, ad ilia respondebimus." Ibid.

KNOWLEDGE 22Q

universal and the particular, therefore there must be an appre
hension of the particular as distinct from the universal ; the
particular must be known by a definite act of thought directed
to it as such1, this being supposed to be the beginning of all
knowledge. Pomponazzi denies that there is any apprehension
of the particular in this sense ; denies, in effect, any knowledge
of an unrelated particular2.

What, then, is the distinction that we draw between particular
and universal ? It is certainly not, replies Pomponazzi, a distinc
tion in respect of specific content ; for the particular, in the
abstract sense in which it is here spoken of, is that which has
no specific content. Nor do we know such a particular at all,
except in abstract reflection ; for knowledge is only of relations3.

The explicitness with which he lays it down that only in
general conceptions is there knowledge at all, is worthy of
attention, since Pomponazzi also maintains that thought appre
hends individuals. Pledged to the apprehension of individuals,
he yet holds that knowledge is only of universals4.

He does not hesitate to draw the conclusion that there is no
distinction between particular and universal, in the sense in which
it had been asserted. Of a particular, as abstracted from all
specific content, there can be no intellectio. And referring to
the act of reflection which he had admitted as giving, in an
abstract sense, the knowledge of the particular as such and of its
distinction from the universal, he points out that this in no way
implies such distinction as had been suggested, or the possibility
of a " merely particular " object of thought5.

1 " Conceptus singularis per propriam speciem...per speciem particularem
distinctam a specie universalis." Ibid.

2 "Ad primum,quod intellectus ponat distinctionem inter universale et particulare,
hoc argumentum non est facile ; dico tamen quod ponit differentiam inter ea, non per
speciem particularem distinctam a specie universalis, quia non potest habere speciem
singularis." Ibid.

3 "Sed dices, unde est quod ponit differentiam inter ea? Dico quod in prima
operatione, quando directe intelligit universale, tantum universale cognoscit. Sic in
secunda, quando revertitur ad phantasmata (i.e. in reflection upon the presentations),
ponit differentiam inter universale et particulare." Ibid.

4 "In prima operatione... tantum universale cognoscit — cum tamen unum cog-
noscat, scilicet universale, quia ejus solius habet speciem." Ibid.

5 " In secunda, quando revertitur ad phantasmata, ponit differentiam inter
universale et particulare. Sed haec responsio non multum valet ; quia si non est

230 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

In answer to the second argument under this head, he admits
that the general concept does not as such give the apprehension
of the determinate individual ; but he says that, as caused by this
or that determinate individual, it gives (per accidens) knowledge
of it and of no other1.

To the argument that what is first in sense-presentation must
be first in thought (namely the particular), he answers that this
reasoning begs the question by ignoring the possible difference
in this respect between thought and sense-presentation2. He
also questions the analogy between the general notion (universaU
incomplexwri) and general knowledge of a matter of fact (universal*
complexuni). The universale complexum appears to mean a general
truth in nature, an empirical observation, what we should call
a law of nature or generalisation from experience3. Such a
generalisation rests on particular experiences ; so therefore, it
was argued, must every general notion (universale incomplexmri).
But Pomponazzi first raises the question whether every general
conception of matter of fact is based on particular experience ;
instancing first the general conceptions of geometry4, and secondly
(by a transparent fallacy) the case of second-hand information,
by means of which we form a general conception of (say) certain
animals, without personal sense-experience or even acquaintance
with particular details5. He then asks further whether the

diversitas specierum, ergo nee intellectionum, cum duae intellectiones non proveniant
ab eadem specie ; quare si non habebit speciem singularis non poterit inter ea differ-
entiam ponere; cum tamen unum cognoscat, scilicet universale, quia ejus solius habet
speciem." £>/. «V. f. 153 v.

1 " Ad secundum, quod species universalis causal confusam cognitionem particu-
larem, dicatur quod species universalis, quantum est de natura sua, non causal
distinctam cognitionem particularium ; per accidens autem, in quantum causatur ab
hoc vel ab hoc particular! determinate, ducil in cognitionem alicujus particulars el
non alterius, et ita per accidens causal distinctam cognitionem particularium." Ibid.

2 Op. cit. f. i54r.

3 The example given is "reubarbarum purgat coleram."

4 The dictum of Aristotle which had been appealed to referred only to particular
sense experience : " Quod autem dicitur de Arislolele, dico quod illud esl verum in
principiis quae habent orlum a sensu, non de principiis sicul accidil in geometria, ubi
aliquando habemus conceplum universalem alicujus considerationis, absque hoc quod
habeamus conceptum singularem suorum singularium." Op. cit. f. 154 r.

6 "El in lib. De Hisloria Animalium Arisloteles docel nos de moribus aliquorum
animalium ; lunc de his animalibus habemus conceptum communem, numquam lamen
habemus conceplus particulares istorum animalium." Ibid.

KNOWLEDGE 231

universale incomplexum is to be considered after the analogy of
the universale complexum. The one is purely a logical notion
(repraesentatur natura communis), the other affirms a matter of
fact (repraesentatur supposition). The feature of the former is its
universality, its absolute validity so far as it goes ; and when we
are investigating the source of that absolute character, it is not
relevant to bring a merely empirical rule into comparison. The
empirical rule, no doubt, such as, "All rhubarb purges cholera,"
may be invested with logical universality, by being introduced
into a definition; but in so far, its empirical character as a simple
generalisation from experience is altered. Such appears to be
the drift of a condensed and rather obscure statement of this
point1. The distinction thus suggested, between the generalisa
tion as derived from experience and the same in its logical
character8, looks towards the metaphysical question of the nature
of thought as such ; while it still remains true that, in tracing the
psychological history of every general conception, a method of
analysis must be employed, and the analogy of experience is the
only safe guide. We shall see, too, that Pomponazzi does not
really decline that method, or that analogy.

Another piece of verbal logic by which it had been sought
to establish the apprehension of an individual as particular, and
apart from general conceptions of it, had been that since the
general conception is reached by " abstraction " from the
particular — and there can be abstraction only from what is
known3 — therefore the particular must first be known, in itself.
Pomponazzi replies by distinguishing the " abstraction " which
is involved in forming a general conception of an object from an
explicit or formal act of abstraction4. In the general conception
of a particular object there does not take place an abstraction,

1 "Aliter potest dici negando assumptum et similitudinem illam : et ratio est quia
quando comprehenditur universale incomplexum repraesentatur natura communis, sed
comprehendendo universale complexum repraesentatur suppositum ratione de limita-
tione ' omnis ' ; quod si adjungitur, licet stet primo pro natura in communi, ut dicendo
omne reubarbarum purgat coleram, ratione de limitatione ' omnis ' repraesentatur
suppositum ; licet enim stet pro natura communi, inter tamen natural ia habet exer-
ceri in suis suppositis : et ita non valet similitudo." Ibid.

• " Ut stet pro natura in communi." Ibid.
3 " Abstractio non fit nisi a noto." Ibid.

* " Notum a noto." Ibid.

232 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

in the latter sense, of the general from the particular — the
particular, on the contrary, being conceived precisely in its
general aspect ; and so far from the particular being " known "
previous to the general conception of it, it is only in that general
conception that it comes to knowledge1.

So far Pomponazzi goes, in correction of the argument for
particular apprehensions. But he does not deny that general
notions come by comparison of particulars. Coming now to the
third argument, he abandons the attitude of antagonism, and
we see that he is preparing to draw the true distinction in this
matter.

His attitude at this point is a favourable example of his
thinking. We have already seen that he does not accept that
account of induction from particulars which he began by describ
ing. He does not admit the specific apprehension of a particular
as such2. From his account of conception also, in connection
with the point last discussed, it is plain that he does not suppose
it to start from an explicit recognition of the separate particular
and proceed thence to generalisation3. Yet he does not on
these grounds deny the inductive formation of general concep
tions. While rejecting those abstract and unreal interpretations
of the inductive process, he does not deny the fact.

This is the more noticeable, since he quotes an attempt which
had been made to explain it away, and find room for a direct
intuition of universals, by a distinction which he almost seems
himself, for a moment, to be on the verge of accepting. It was
proposed to admit the induction from particulars4 for the uni
versal which is secitnda intentio^ but to deny its necessity for the
universal that is prima intentio. The distinction between prima
and secunda intentio is elsewhere explained by Pomponazzi him
self to be the distinction between a general notion as held in

1 "Ad aliud ; universale abstrahitur, et ista abstractio non fit ab ignoto: dico quod
est aequivocatio de abstractione ; non enim abstrahitur eo modo quo argumentum
concludit, ut quando notum a noto abstrahitur. Sed est abstractio ad hunc sensum,
quia singulare quod est in potentia intellectus(m?) fit actu intellectus(m?)." Op, cit.
f. 1541-.

2 "Quod cognoscitur singulare ab intellectu per propriam speciem." Op, cit.
f. 152 v.

8 "Quod conceptus communis sit posterior conceptu particularium." Ibid.
4 " Collatio multorum individuorum." Op. cit. f. 154 v.

KNOWLEDGE 233

abstraction in the mind and the same as a determination of
particular things, considered in their species and genera^. It
was suggested, then, that the language of Alexander, Themistius,
and other authorities as to the formation of general notions ex
collation* individuorum might be applied to the conception in this
second meaning of concrete determination ; while in the case of
the abstract or " indifferent " notion there might be room for
some direct apprehension of it by thought without the mediation
of particulars2. Pomponazzi states the suggestion with his usual
impartial air ; but proceeds to dismiss it as contrary to the real
intention of the authorities, and to the truth. The simplest
general conception, he concludes, depends upon comparison3.

In rejecting this last scholastic subtlety, Pomponazzi definitely
decides for the apprehension of the particidar. So he repeats here
what he had said already in commencing his revision of the proof
of that position4. But he has now partly explained the sense in
which he holds this. He does not countenance the idea that the
particular is known apart from general conceptions or that the
apprehension of the particular through which the general con
ception is formed is an apprehension of an unrelated particular ;
still less, that it is an abstract idea of particulars that must come
first5. He argues against mis-statement of his own position, and
by means of an impartial criticism succeeds in rectifying his
foundations in a passage which is a triumph of dialectical

1 " Universale causatum ab intellectu duplex est, unum quod dicitur indifferens,
quod sumitur pro quadam natura communi indifferenter se habente ad omnia sua
singularia. Alio modo sumitur universale pro quanto non intelligitur ilia natura
communis indifferens, sed ultra hoc attribuitur huic naturae communi intentio.
Utrumque enim istorum fit per opus intellectus ; primum enim fit per intellectual
agentem, quando verbi gratia intelligo hominem indifferenter se habentem...et
communiter tale universale dicitur prima intentio. Secundum universale fit per
comparationem suorum singularium inter se, et collationem similitudinis inter sua
individua. Unde maxima similitudo ex comparatione individuorum inter se per opus
intellectus electa causat speciem specialissimam ; non ita magna causal genus
respectu illius speciei ; et ideo minima similitudo causat genus generalissimum."
Op. cit. f. 28 r.

2 See f. 154 v.

3 " Ista responsio non est ad intentionem Alexandri, quia Alexander ibi dicit de
albo et albo ; et ita non valet." Of. cit. f. 154 v.

4 "Quod intellectus intelligat singulare...mihi videtur esse tenendum." Ibid.

5 "Quod conceptus communis sit posterior conceptu particularium." Op. cit.
f. 152 v.

234 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

dexterity ; while the accuracy with which at this last point he
stops in time and turns, just when he seems to be committing
himself to a false position, reveals the real qualities of his mind.
By a seemingly hostile argument he has cleared the doctrine he
desires to maintain from the fallacies that had surrounded it ;
accepting the element of truth in an opposite theory, he refuses
to be led into a snare ; and while arriving by a method of con
cession at the ground he is to occupy, the two-sided position he
is to hold, he preserves the essential point in the empirical theory,
finding exactly the right place at which to draw the line. A case
like this leads us to believe that the openness of Pomponazzi's
mind was not a mere feeble eclecticism, and that his weighing
of alternatives did not mean simple inability to decide.

Finally it was incumbent on him from his corrected stand
point to deal with the arguments for an unmediated apprehension
of abstract universals.

He gives most attention to the argument which carries the
least possible weight for us, but which bulked so largely in the
thought of his time — the a priori argument from the nature of
intelligence : " Intellect receives universals, sense particulars1."
To us such an argument seems merely to beg the question ; but
we have only to glance over these pages to see how deeply the
absolute idea of intelligence had rooted itself in the general
mind ; and how seriously the preconceptions suggested by that
idea, and the fictitious difficulties it created, complicated every
psychological enquiry and vitiated every result. It was this
notion of the absoluteness of intelligence, with the consequent
dualism of thought and matter, general concept and particular
fact, which made it so difficult for a thinker of Pomponazzi's
time to give a psychological account of knowledge. It is not
without interest, however, to observe the scientific spirit emerging,
the scientific method partially extricating itself from mythological
shackles ; even although in the end we get no more than sugges
tions of true solutions, because the questions had never been
formulated in scientific terms, and the answers remain imprisoned
in dualistic forms of expression.

Meeting on its own ground, then, the argument from the

1 " Intellectus universaliter, sensus singulariter recipit." Op. cit. f. 1531".

KNOWLEDGE 235

nature of intelligence, Pomponazzi proposes once more his
characteristic conception of the nature of intelligence as in
man. Man, he repeats, is an intermediate being ; his nature
has a double aspect. Intellectus, as in man, is on the one hand
abstractus, qua intellcctus; on the other hand, it is forma materiae,
and as such apprehends particulars, through sense. Human
reason is intelligentia, but it is " the lowest of the intelligences1."

The distinction between sense and intellect (as in man) is
accordingly not so absolute as had been supposed. " Sense
receives only particulars, intellect both particulars and uni
versals2."

It need not be said that Pomponazzi's own account of human
intelligence, and indeed his every thought upon the subject, is
deeply coloured by the absolute theory of intelligence. The
dualism of that theory runs as a flaw through the thoughts of
every thinker of his time. He is really here in effect rejecting
it — rejecting it, that is, so far as the case in point is concerned,
the case of real interest, the case of intelligence as in man ; and
yet he can only find expression for his own doctrine in the terms
of dualism: "Intellect receives both universals and singulars, but
it thinks universals in so far as it is separate from material con
ditions, particulars in so far as its activity depends on material
conditions3."

He makes his customary concession to the absolute theory,
that it is true of the higher Intelligences, while not true of man
(or if true of man qua intellectus, not true of him qua humanus*}.

It is not the superstitions of Pomponazzi, however, that are
interesting, but the drift and tendency of his thought — and a
sort of unconscious logic in it. His formula is that thought in
man knows the singular and the universal. By means of this
formula he meets the objection that, if there were a knowledge

1 " Ultima intelligentiarum." Op. cit. f. 154 v.

" Sensus non recipit nisi singulare, intellectus vero singulare et universale."
Ibid.

3 " Intellectus (recipit) universale et singulare, sed intelligit universale pro quanto
est abstractus a materia, singulare vero in quantum a materia depenclet in operari."
Ibid.

4 "Quod intellectus intelligat singulare... accidit intellectui ut humanus est, non
tamen accidit ei ut intellectus est, quia ut humanus potest intelligere singularia, non
ut intellectus est." Op. cit. f. 155 r.

236 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

of the particular, there would be no occasion for the agency of
intellect. " If it apprehended only particulars, there would be
no necessity to postulate an active intellect : but because, in

addition to those, it apprehends also universals an active

intellect is postulated1."

Sense has its part in the apprehension of the particular
object ; but thought as such operates in it as well. " In addition
to these particulars, intellect apprehends also universals, and this
function is more appropriate to it than to apprehend particulars ;
...if you ask by what means it has cognition of particulars, I
reply, by sense2."

The illustration of the two eggs (noticed above) as an argu
ment against the apprehension of particulars, proves too much.
For the same case would prove that there is no apprehension
of particulars by the senses. The senses cannot distinguish
between two seemingly identical objects presented to them at
different times3. Yet if there had been any difference in the
original sensations, memory would have preserved it4. In such
a case, then, two objects individually different produce exactly
the same impression upon the senses. Are we to infer that the
senses have no apprehension of particulars ? Such an inference
would have been contrary to the axioms of the received psy
chology, to Aristotle, and to the definition of sense5.

Pomponazzi considers this sufficient as an argmneutum ad
hominem*. He might have gone on from this case of illusion to
shew that the knowledge of its relations is indispensable to any
knowledge of the individual, even as an individual. This is the

1 See of. cit. f. 153 r. Cf. "Si solum singulare intelligeret, non esset necesse ponere

ipsum (intellectual agentem) ; sed quia ultra hoc et universale cognoscit ideo

ponitur intellectus agens." Op. cit. f. 155 r.

2 " Intellectus ultra hoc (singulare) et universale cognoscit et hoc est magis
proprium ei quam singulare intelligere...si diceres a quo habet cognitionem singularis,
dico quod habet a sensu." Ibid.

3 "Virtus cogitativa nescit ponere differentiam inter ea." Ibid.

4 " Species potuerunt in memoria conservari." Ibid.

5 " Ad quartum de duobus ovis, dico quod si hoc argumentum concluderet, etiam
de sensu concluderet, quia non cognosceret sensus singulare ; quia virtus cogitativa
nescit ponere differentiam inter ea ; et tamen species potuerunt in memoria conservari.
Et ideo ad praesens aliter non dico." Ibid.

u " Ad praesens aliter non dico." Ibid.

KNOWLEDGE 237

reason why different individuals, apart from the knowledge of
any distinguishing features (i.e. in relation to things outside
themselves), are not distinguishable — either by judgment or (as
Pomponazzi here acutely remarks) by sense. Rightly interpreted,
this instance might have led him on towards that true conception
of what an individual is, to which by more abstract methods he
was working his way. Meanwhile all he has definitely asserted
is that thought knows both the individual and the universal —
whether in one act of thought or not he does not decide1.

Referring next to the accepted formula — "the particular is
thought mediately2" — Pomponazzi adopts it in his own sense:
this sense, however, as he briefly declares here, and as we can
see for ourselves from a fuller explanation in the De Immortali-
tate, was essentially different from that in which the phrase was
intended in the orthodox Thomist school. In the absence of a
clear distinction between the direct or primary apprehension of
an individual being — that is, in its relations, and in its specific
and generic character — and the abstract, secondary conception
of the particular as such, it had been laid down that the individual
was apprehended by " reflection " ; and this reflection had been
interpreted as an act of discursive thought. Pomponazzi, how
ever, is definitely and consciously applying himself to the primary
apprehension of the individual as concrete. And here also, he
says, there is in a sense a process of " reflection." It consists in
the two-fold (while simultaneous) action of sense and thought:
" We say that reflection is different from what our Latin writers
have imagined ; the intellect apprehends the particular by reflec
tion, because, as a reflected line is double, so is knowledge of the
particular, because it is effected by sense and intellect*? That is to
say, there is, besides the immediate activity of sense, an action

1 The reasoning of this passage affords an interesting illustration of Pomponazzi's
working theory of sense. The relation, practically so close, between sense on the one
hand, and memory and virtus cogitativa on the other, had evidently the effect in
concrete psychological reasoning of really bridging the gulf between sense and
thought ; and gave to the powers of sense, practically, a wider scope than was allowed
to them by the formal psychology of the school.

2 "Singulare reflexe intelligitur." Op. cit. f. 155 r.

3 " Dicimus quod ilia reflexio non est sicuti imaginati stint nostri Latini ; sed
cognoscit singulare reflexe, quia sicut linea reflexa est gemina, ita est cognitio
singularis, quia est per sensum et intellectum." Ibid.

238 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

of thought mediated through the sense-data ; and in that way
there takes place a rcflexio. That this is the correct interpretation
of a very difficult passage will appear from a comparison with
the latter part of the twelfth chapter of the De Immortalitate1.
Such a comparison will further establish three points: (i) that
Pomponazzi has clearly set before him the problem of the
apprehension of the individual as universally determined, and,
by consequence, of the universal in the particular2, (2) that for
him the apprehension of the particular is not prior in time to
the general conception, nor the general conception prior to the
apprehension of the particular3, (3) that the action of thought in
thus apprehending the universal in the particular, or forming a
general conception of a particular object, is something perfectly
distinct from the act of ratiocination which the schoolmen
postulated for the intellectual apprehension of the particular4.
The argument that it was impossible from particulars to
form a universal conception without the previous existence of
that conception (that is, the immediate apprehension of an
abstract universal), Pomponazzi meets with the very same con
sideration on account of which he had denied the necessity of a
previous apprehension of the abstract and unrelated particular —
namely, by the distinction between the potential and the realised

1 " Cumque dicebatur quod singulare non cognoscitur nisi reflexe...dicimus vere et
proprie talem iutellectionem esse reflectionem et conversionem ad phantasmata. . . .
Definit (D. Thomas) motum reflexum eum esse qui in idem terminatur a quo incepit ;
verum quum anima humana per cogitativam comprehendit singulare primo, deinde
eadem per intellectum universale comprehendat, quod tamen in eodem singular!
speculatur quod per phantasiam cognitum est, vere reditum facit, et per consequens
conversionem, quoniam ex singular! per phantasiam cognito eadem anima per
intellectum ad idem redit. Neque satis video quomodo syllogismus vel argumentatio
reflexio vel conversio commode nuncupari possunt, cum non ex eodem in idem,
verum ex diverse in diversum procedant. Eademque specie utrumque (scil. singulare
et universale) comprehenditur, licet non aeque primo." De Imtn. xil. pp. 94, 95,
and passim.

2 " (Universale) in eodem singular! speculatur (per intellectum) quod per
phantasiam cognitum est." " Ex singulari per phantasiam cognito... anima per intel
lectum ad idem redit." " Eademque specie utrumque (singulare et universale) com
prehenditur, licet non aeque primo." Op. cit. xil. p. 95.

3 " Dicitur quod simul tempore cognoscit (homo) universale et singulare."
Op. cit. xn. p. 94.

4 "Neque satis video quomodo syllogismus vel argumentatio reflexio vel con
versio commode nuncupari possunt." Op. cit. xil. p. 95.

KNOWLEDGE 239

universal conception. On the empirical side it had been argued
that, before a universal conception could be formed of a particular,
that particular must as such be " known " ; and Pomponazzi had
answered that the mental act of forming a conception was some
thing different from abstrahere notmn a noto, and that before
the conception there is no apprehension of the individual; the
particular as such is only potentially, and not really, conceived
in thought1. In the same spirit it was urged by those who
believed in an a priori apprehension of universal conceptions
("the universal is primarily known by the form of the universal,
and the particular secondarily2") that a collection of particulars
in thought, if it was to be competent to give rise to the general
notion, must itself be that general notion3. Pomponazzi once
more replies that the particulars as such are not the general
conception, but are its materials, are that general conception in
potentiality; therefore there is no "universal before a universal,"
and no reason to postulate an a priori universal conception
(a priori, that is, as was argued, in consciousness) in order to
explain the possibility of an empirical generalisation4.

The views of Pomponazzi on this subject may be thus
summarised : — "Intellect apprehends universals and particulars."
The manner in which it does so is as follows :

(i) Negatively speaking, he denies that either the universal
or the particular is apprehended in separation5. Abstractly he
admits that the two are distinguishable. But it is the great
merit of Pomponazzi's investigation of this point that he does
not fall into the common scholastic confusion of two distinct

1 " Singulare quod est in potentia intellectus(m ?) fit actu intellectus(m?)."
Comm. de An. f. I54r.

2 " Universale per speciem universalis primo cognoscitur, et singulare secundario."
Op. cit. f. 153 v.

3 "Collectio singularium non est nisi universale. Ergo universale cognoscitur
ante universale ; quod est inconveniens." Ibid.

4 "Ad quartum (? tertium — see f. 153 v.) quod ante universale cognosceret
universale : dico quod ista particularia, quamvis habeant causare conceptum
communem, non sunt universale nisi in materiali ; sicut sensus cognoscit duo alba,
quae possunt causare conceptum communem, et tamen non sequitur quod sensus
cognoscat universale : ita ista singularia, quamvis possint causare conceptum
communem et universalem, non tamen sequitur quod sit universale in actu ; et ita
non 'cognoscitur universale ante universale.'" Op. cit. f. 155 v.

5 " Per speciem propriam."

240 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

intellectual processes — namely, the secondary or reflective con
sideration of the general and particular aspects of an object of
knowledge on the one hand, and on the other the direct and
primary apprehension of a particular object in general relations,
or general conceptions of the object. He clearly conceives and
investigates the problem presented by this latter act of thought.
And, in it, he denies that the general and the particular are
separately apprehended. He denies that they are specifically
distinguishable at all1.

(2) But that individuals are the real objects of knowledge
he expressly affirms'2. On the other hand, in his deliberate
revision of the arguments for his own position, he affirms
that knowledge only takes place through general conceptions3.
Denying as he does that there can be any specific difference
between an individual and the general conceptions of it, he says
plainly — " The object of knowledge is a unity, namely the uni
versal4." This can mean nothing else but that the general
conception is realised in the individual, and the individual
known only in a general conception of it

(3) Pomponazzi holds with the " empirical " school that
general conceptions are derived from particular experiences, but
in a sense which he himself explains5.

(4) At the same time he adopts from the opposite school
the doctrine of an act of thought in conception, and accepts
their description of it as reflexio*.

1 See passages cited above, p. 229, notes 2, 3, 4, 5. " Ponit differentiam inter ea,
non per speciem particularem distinctam a specie universalis, quia non potest habere
speciem singularis....In prima operatione quando directe intelligit universale, tantum
universale cognoscit....In secunda quando revertitur ad phantasmata, ponit differen
tiam inter universale et particulare. Sed...si non habebit speciem singularis, non
poterit inter ea differentiam ponere, etc." Op. cit. f. 153 v. Cf. De Imm. xii.
p. 95. " Eadem specie utrumque comprehenditur, licet non aeque primo."

2 See Comm. de An. ff. I53V., I54V.

3 " Non potest habere speciem singularis. In prima operatione quando directe
intelligit (intellectus) universale, tantum universale cognoscit....Si non habebit
speciem singularis, non poterit inter ea differentiam ponere ; cum tamen unum
cognoscat, scilicet universale, quia ejus solius habet speciem." Op. cit. f. 153 v.

4 " Unum cognoscit scilicet universale." Ibid.

6 De Imm. xn. p. 94. Cf. " Particularia quamvis habeant causare conceptum
communem non sunt universale nisi in materiali." Comm. de An. f. 155 v.
6 " Dico quod singulare intelligitur reflexe." Op. cit. f. 155 r.

KNOWLEDGE 241

(5) This act of conception is the crux of the whole question.
Now while Pomponazzi nowhere undertakes formally to describe
it, at least in its logical character, yet from various indications,
and especially from the passage already cited on the psycholo
gical history of it, in the De Immortalitate, we gather how nearly
he had arrived at a true, because a concrete, notion of this act
of thought.

Thus while deriving the general notion (by a psychological
process to be explained below) from particular experiences, he
admits no knowledge of the particular previous to and apart
from the general conception itself1. We recall also in this
connection the distinction drawn by him between a general
conception as such and an empirical generalisation upon matter
of fact, which leads to a more fundamental distinction between
the nature of a conception in its logical character and the
history of its derivation.

On the other hand, the act of thought does not imply the
apprehension of a universal previous to the apprehension of the
individual. There is no nniversale ante universale. In particular,
the history of a conception is not that the induction of instances
makes one mental unity (a universal), to which thought adds a
second ; but the general conception of particulars is the action
of thought2. Pomponazzi meets the opposite fictions of an a
priori universal and of an unrelated individual with the same
illuminating suggestion that the abstract particular is poten
tially the universal.

The act of conception is imagined in accordance with these
views of the universal and the particular. On the one hand, that
act is regarded, on the suggestion of the empirical school, as
receiving its material from particular experiences through the
senses ; but the distinction is drawn that the general conception

1 "Tantum universale cognoscit." Op. dt. f. 153 v. "Singulare quod est in
potentia intellectus(m ?) fit actu intellectus^m?)." Op. cit. f. 1541-. " Ista particularia
quamvis habeant causare conceptum communem non sunt universale nisi in material!."
Op. cit. f. 155 v.

a " Singularia, quamvis possint causare conceptum communem et universalem,
non tamen sequitur quod sit universale in actu ; et ita non cognoscitur universale
ante universale," Ibid.

D. 1 6

242 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

of those particulars is not an act of reason, an act of abstraction
in the ordinary sense1.

On the other hand the act of thought which finds the universal
in the particular, and conceives the particular as an instance of
the universal, is named according to the received terminology
of those who held that the universal is apprehended a priori,
and the particular reached by thought through a deductive
process : it is called reflexio. But this reflexio is described as
something quite different from a process of ratiocination2; and
it is expressly denied that there are separate intellectiones of
the universal and the particular3.

The act of conception being so understood, there is no
question of temporal priority between the apprehension of the
universal and the apprehension of the particular. The universal
cannot be prior to the particular apprehension, because there is
no general conception which does not find its material in a
particular experience. The particular cannot be prior to the
universal, because there is no apprehension of a particular object
which is not a general conception of it — an apprehension of it,
as we should say, in some relation. And so we find Pomponazzi
saying — " It is said that the intellect apprehends simultaneously
the universal and the particular4."

(6) Pomponazzi's idea of the act of conception will be made
finally clear by an examination of his account of the mental
process through which it comes to pass. The Quaestio of the
Comm. de Anima contains suggestions of his view of this

1 "Non enim abstrahitur eo modo...ut notutn a noto abstrahitur. Sed est
abstractio ad hunc sensum, quia singulare quod est in potentia intellectus(m?) fit actu
intellectus(m?)." Op.cit.i. 1541-.

• " Neque satis video quomodo syllogismus vel argumentatio reflexio vel conversio
commode nuncupari possunt." De Imm. xn. p. 95, and cap. xil. passim. " Ilia reflexio
non est sicuti imaginati sunt nostri Latini:...cognitio singularis...est per sensum et
intellectum." Comm. de An. f. 155 r.

3 "Si non est diversitas specierum ergo nee intellectionum," etc. Op. (it. f. 153 v.

4 "Dicitur quod simul tempore cognoscit (intellectus) universale et singulare."
De Imm. XII. p. 44. Cf. Comm. de An. f. I55V. " Sicut linea reflexa est gemina
ita est cognitio singularis...per sensum et intellectum." An apparent expression in
the contrary sense (f. 29 v.) doubtless refers to the abstract idea of the particular as
secondary to that of the universal: " Dicimus hominem esse priorem Socrate ex parte
modi intelligendi,..quum res primo concipitur modo universal! quam modo particulari."

KNOWLEDGE 243

psychological aspect of the subject ; but it is fully worked out
in the De Immortalitate.

While it is laid down that there is no knowledge of the
particular save in the general conception1, the particular is
described as the " cause " of the general conception.

This causation takes place through the senses2.

The action of thought upon the presentations of sense,
forming a general conception of the particular, is thus described:
" When it was said that a particular is not known except by
reflection... we hold that truly and strictly intellection of this
kind is a reflection and turning towards the images.... St Thomas
defines reflex motion as that which terminates at the point
where it began ; but since the human mind in the first place
apprehends the particular by means of the cogitative faculty,
and then the same mind apprehends the universal by means of
the intellect, a universal which it grasps in the same particular as
was known by imagination, it really makes a return and conse
quently a turning, since the same mind from a particular known
by imagination returns by means of intellect to the same. Nor
do I clearly see how a syllogism or argument can accurately
be called a ' reflection ' or ' conversion,' since they proceed not
from and to the same point, but from one point to another. And
both are comprehended by the same form, though not equally
primarily. Nor is there any difficulty in more objects than one
being thought at the same time, if they are thought under one
form3."

1 Thus after concluding — " Unum (cognoscit) scilicet universale, quia ejus solius
habet speciem," he goes on — "Ad secundum quod species universalis causat con-
fusam cognitionem particularium, dicitur quod species universalis, quantum est de
natura sua, non causat distinctam cognitionem particularium ; per accidens auteni,
in quantum causatur ab hoc vel ab hoc particular! determinate, ducit in cognitio
nem alicujus particularis et non alterius." (Comm. de An. f. 153 v.) Again — " Ista

particularia quamvis habeant causare conceptum communem, etc sicut sensus

cognoscit duo alba quae possunt causare conceptum communem, et tamen non sequitur
quod sensus cognoscat universale." Op. cit. f. 155 v. Cf. De Itnm. cap. xn.

• " Sensus cognoscit duo alba quae possunt causare conceptum communem."
COIIDII. de An. f. i55v. " Si diceres a quo habet cognitionem singularis, dico quod
habet a sensu." Op. cit. f. 155 r.

3 "Cumque dicebatur quod singulare non cognoscitur nisi reflexe...dicimus vere
et proprie talem intellectionem esse reflectionem et conversionem ad phantasmata. ...
Definit (D. Thomas) motum reflexum eum esse qui in idem terminatur a quo incepit ;

1 6 2

244 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

The words that follow explain the difference between the
general conception as such, and the particular as given in sense,
while generally conceived: "But the mind apprehends this par
ticular rather than that, because it has an image of this, not of that.
Though from looking at this lion I have the thought of ' lion '
and of ' this lion,' yet I do not have the thought of ' lion ' more
from this lion than from that lion in the wilds : though if I were
to see him, I should no less have the thought of ' lion.' But I
have the thought of ' this lion,' and not of ' the lion in the wilds,'
because I have an image of the one and not of the other1!'

I do not enter further into Pomponazzi's theory of knowledge
and reality, partly because it would not in any case be possible
to give an exhaustive account of his Commentary on the De
Anima, and partly because an important section of it dealing
with the various theories of general ideas and reality, and
proposing a reconciliation of nominalism, realism, and the
doctrines of Scotus and Averroes, has not yet been published
for us2.

It may be sufficient to say that he discusses scholastic
realism with patience and care, especially in the reconstruction
of it by Scotus and his followers3, and rejects every hypothesis
of nniversalia ante rem. He expresses his own conclusion in
a formula which indicates conceptualism with a leaning to
nominalism : " The universal is a mode of thinking which in

verum cum anima humana per cogitativam comprehendit singulare primo, delude
eadem per intellectum universale comprehendat quod tamen in eodem singular! specu
lator quod per phantasiam cognitum est, vere reditum facit et per consequens
conversionem ; quoniam ex singular! per phantasiam cognito, eadem anima per intel
lectum ad idem redit. Neque satis video quomodo syllogismus vel argumentatio
reflexio vel conversio commode nuncupari possunt ; cum non ex eodem in idem
verum ex diverse in diversum procedant; eademque specie utrumque comprehenditur,
licet non aeque primo ; neque inconvenit plura simul intelligi dum per unam speciem
intelligantur." De Imm. xii. pp. 94, 95.

1 " Magis autem hoc quam illud singulare comprehendit, quoniam huius est
phantasma non illius. Etenim ex huius leonis inspectione leonem et hunc leonem
intelligo, non tamen magis leonem ex hoc quam ex illo qui moratur in sylvis ; etenim
si ilium inspicerem non minus leonem intelligerem, verum hunc intelligo et non eum
qui in sylvis, quia huius et non illius phantasma habeo." Op. cit. xn. p. 95. Cf.
Comm. de An. f. 155 r., " Cognoscit singulare reflexe, quia sicut- linea reflexa est
gemina, ita est cognitio singularis, quia est per sensum et intellectum."

2 See Ferri, Introd. pp. 58, 59.

3 Comm, de An. ff. 24 — 32 ; 194 — 202.

KNOWLEDGE 245

its essential nature is in the intellect, but refers to the thing
thought of1."

At the same time, his doctrine of the general conception
of individual things, above described, is far removed from
nominalism. And even conceptualism, he appears to have felt2,
is a solution only of one side of the problem, namely its psycho
logical side. The fact remains that there are resemblances
among (real) individual things, and that — concretely — the principle
of individuality, whatever it be, is united with the common nature.
His recognition of this datum of common sense, which after all
is the real problem, was probably what led Pomponazzi to regard
with some degree of favour the Scotist notion of Jiaecceitas ; for
this, although it is the expression of a false abstraction of singular
and general, and when subjected to analysis a purely negative
description of the individual (seeing it excludes all specific
differences), is yet an attempt to regard tlie individual in a
general aspect.

In the last resort, Pomponazzi stood with scholasticism
generally upon the ground of common sense. Failing a true
criticism of the meaning of Thought and Reality, his belief in
their correspondence was dogmatic. He lays it down, then,
finally, that there are two kinds of truth ; the correspondence
of things to the ideas in the Divine Mind, and the correspondence
of our thought to things. In the former sense thought is the
measure and reality the thing measured, in the latter reality is
the measure to which thought must conform in order to be
true.

" Truth is a kind of ' correspondence ' or ' measuring ' of the
object with the mind or of the mind with the object.... If an
object is compared with the practical reason, such an object is
true, in so far as it is referred to that kind of reason; and in
the same way all things are true in so far as they are referred
to the Divine Mind : for in so far as everything is an effect
of God, whether in the way of efficient or of final causation,
all things will have their idea in the Divine Mind, and objects

1 " Universale est modus considerandi qui formaliter est in intellectu sed denomi
native in re considerata." Op. cit. f. 33 r.

2 See Ferri, Introd. pp. 59, 61.

246 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

are true in so far as they agree with their ideas, and the more

like their ideas they are, the more they are true

" I have explained then how truth consists in the correspond
ence of an object with the mind : I must proceed to explain how
in some way truth consists in the correspondence of the mind with
the object. I maintain that this is so most of all in our case.
For our thoughts are true when they correspond to an external
object... In the first kind of truth, the object is measured and the
mind is the measure ; in the second, the object is the measure,
while the mind is measured. Yet we must note here that the
objects are not said to be true or false without qualification in
themselves, when referred to our intellect, for otherwise one and
the same object would be both true and false, if one man thought
of it in one way and another man in another.... But objects are
said to be ' true ' without qualification, when referred to the
Divine Mind, which is completely true. And thus the definition
of truth becomes plain, how it is the correspondence of the object
with the mind or of the mind with the object. But if it is asked
whether God is true, I reply that truth in every sense is present
in God, as Themistius says at this point with reference to the
active intellect, that it is true, not with reference to other things,
but simply by reference to itself, which is true intellect. How
more completely then will God in this way be one and true in
the highest degree, when He is true through Himself and not
through something external to Him, as in the case of human
truth! He is not only true, but true in every way, since in God
there is both correspondence of object with mind and of mind
with object. For His thought is in proportion to His nature,
and His nature to His thought, nor can He in any way be
deceived about Himself1."

i "Veritas est quaedam adaequatio vel commensuratio rei ad intellectum, vel
intellectus ad res.... Si res comparatur ad intellectum practicum, talis est vera pro
quanto comparatur ad talem intellectum, et sic omnia sunt vera pro quanto compa-
rantur ad intellectum divinum: ex quanto enim omnis res est effectus Dei, vel in
genere causae efficientis, vel finalis, omnia habebunt ideam suam in mente divina, et
res, secundum quod habent similitudinem ideae suae, sunt verae, et quanto magis as-
similabuntur suae ideae, tan to magis erunt verae — Dictum est igitur qualiter sit veritas
in adaequatione rei ad intellectum; dicendum est modo qualiter in aliquo veritas con-
sistat in adaequatione intellectus ad rem. Dico quod illud verificatur maxime quoad
nos. Nostrae enim intellectiones sunt verae quando conformantur rei ad extra... In

KNOWLEDGE 247

prima veritate res est mensurata, intellectus mensura, in secunda vero res est mensura,
intellectus autem mensuratum. Notamus tamen hie quod scilicet res non absolute
dicantur verae ant falsae in ordine ad nostrum intellectum ; aliter enim una et eadem
res esset vera et falsa, quum unus homo opinatur uno modo et alius alio modo — Sed
res absolute dicuntur verae in ordine ad intellectum divinum, qui maxime verus est,
et sic patet definitio veritatis, qualiter est adaequatio rei ad intellectum et intel
lectus ad ipsam rem. Si autem quaeratur utrum Deus sit verus, dico quod in Deo
omnibus modis est veritas, sicut dicit hie Themistius de agente quod est verus, non
quoad alia, sed quoad se tantum qui verus est intellectus. Quanto magis ergo Deus
hoc modo unus erit et maxime verus, quum ex se ipso verus est, et non ex alio
extrinseco sicut nostra veritas ! Est etiam verus omnibus modis, quum in Deo est
adaequatio rei ad intellectum et intellectus ad rem : tanta enim est sua essentia
quanta est sua intellectio, et tanta est sua intellectio quanta est sua essentia, nee
aliquo modo de se ipso potest facere aliquam deceptionem." Comm. de An. ff. 174,

CHAPTER X

THE NATURE OF VIRTUE

POMPONAZZI always shews a marked anxiety about the
ethical effect of his theories. It is characteristic of him that
he constantly desires to shew his philosophical conclusions to be
consistent with the highest views of moral life, and with the
binding obligation of moral duties. In particular he labours to
prove that his doctrine of the soul's mortality not only does not
deprive morality of any sanction, but even establishes morality
upon a better basis. The ground on which he rests this latter
claim for his doctrine is that it makes morality independent of
every consideration of rewards and punishments, and so places
it upon its true foundation.

But first he was obliged to meet a number of arguments by
which it was sought to prove his conclusion hostile to morality.
It was argued that to deny the future life was to deprive virtue
of its motives and sanctions : for how could men be induced to
prefer death to dishonour, or to die for duty, if death ended all?
Or would it be reasonable to ask them to do so ? Again, if the
Divine Government were represented only by its operation in
the present life, it seemed impossible to trace in it any principle
of justice, or to maintain the existence of a moral order at all.
Finally there was the most profound and fundamental objec
tion of all, that in this life man does not, and cannot, attain
his End : but a being for ever precluded from attaining its
natural end is an impossibility : therefore, it was argued, since

THE NATURE OF VIRTUE 249

for the attainment of the end of man a further existence is
required, that extension of existence must be given.

Pomponazzi accepts the issues thus offered to him. He ad
mits that his doctrine must be tried by these tests. He proposes,
on his own principles, salvare rationem virtutis. He will not
for a moment allow that his view of human life leads to
immoral conclusions, or lessens the sanctions and destroys the
motives for moral action. If it were to follow from the soul's
mortality that men should prefer dishonour to death, or fail to
persist in duty even to the point of death, that certainly would
be something contra naturam1, but by his determination of good
ness as a thing desirable for its own sake, he proposes to shew
that this does not follow. Similarly he vindicates Divine Justice
and the reality of a moral order, as something independent of
rewards and punishments in a future state.

But he deals most fully with the argument against him in
the most general form — namely as concerning the possibility of
man's attaining in this life the end of his being. He proposes
such a view of the nature and end of man, and of the possibilities
(however limited) of the present life, as shall permit man on earth
to reach a certain relative perfection — that perfection, Pomponazzi
would say, which is appropriate to his condition and place in the
universe — and to attain a measure of real happiness.

This is the question which Pomponazzi takes up first, in the
fourteenth chapter of the De Immortalitate.

He raises first the question, whether it be possible for man
in this life to attain the end of his being. And he admits
that if we suppose that " end " to be intellectual contemplation,
it can in no sense be attained within the bounds of mortality.
How few men have in this life ability, time, or opportunity for
philosophic thought ! How utterly imperfect and rudimentary
is the highest earthly knowledge — so that it is rather to be called
ignorance than knowledge, a guess rather than a certainty !
Again, the more one knows, one still desires to know the more.
Then there are so many arts, so many sciences, and life is all too
short to master even one. And how many obstructions there
are, and how many accidents may befall, to hinder the pursuit of

1 De Imm. xill. p. 99; cf. xiv. p. 117.

250 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

truth ; how difficult is the struggle ; how uncertain the outcome ;
how suddenly all may come to an end1 !

This is the negative case against the sufficiency of the present
life. But the positive argument, on which the thinkers of that
time depended to prove the immortality of the soul, was that
the soul of man desires and demands infinity. It is true that the
beasts also desire the prolongation of life, and have an instinct
of self-preservation; but they do not desire this like men appetitu
cognoscitivo, while " we know the eternal and desire that we too
should become eternal and immortal." This appetite belongs, it
was said, to the very constitution of our nature. It is in all
men: "but if it is in all, it will be natural2."

Similarly, quoting Augustine, Pomponazzi weighs in one
place the argument from the religious instinct in man. The soul
finds its happiness in the knowledge and love of God ; but if it
knew that that knowledge and love were to cease, its happiness
would be at an end. Hence the expectation of immortal life is
necessary to the felicity of man3.

Pomponazzi boldly meets here this issue, as to the end of
man's being. The true end of any particular being, he says, is
that which is appropriate to itself. It does not do to say — such
or such a condition is the highest, or the best conceivable: there
fore it must be the final end of such or such a being. But each
being has an end appropriate to itself4. For example, sentiency
is in an absolute sense " better " than insentiency ; yet is a stone
not sentient — " for if it were, it would cease to be a stone." So
we are not justified in attributing dogmatically to man what are
really Divine attributes5.

1 De fmm. xin. pp. 96 flf. and xiv. pp. 104 flf.

2 " Cognito aeterno cupimus et nos aeternos fieri et immortales." "Appetitus
iste...est a voluntate nostra intrinsece." "Si autem est in omni, erit naturalis."
Com»i. de An. f. 131 v.

3 Op. cit. f. 132 v.

" Unaquaeque res saltern perfecta hahet aliquem finem Non tamen quod est

magis bonum debet unicuique rei pro fine assignari, sed solum secundum quod convenit
illi naturae et ei proportionatur. " De Itnm. XIV. p. 104.

5 " Etsi sentire melius est quam non sentire, non tamen convenit lapidi sentire,
neque esset bonum lapidi, sic enim non amplius esset lapis." " Quare assignando
finem homini si talem qualem Deo et intelligentiis assignaremus non conveniens
foret assignatio, quandoquidem sic non esset homo." Ibid.

THE NATURE OF VIRTUE 251

As for the appetite or desire for immortality, he has simply
to say that it is an unreasonable desire. To the argument that
it is " natural," and therefore not to be disappointed, he had
already answered that such necessity may hold in the case of
unconscious instincts ; but where, as in this case, argument is
involved, there is always room for an incorrect process of reason
ing to creep in1. No doubt, if Divine conditions of being are set
before us, our will desires them : whether it is justified in so
doing, is another question. If our desires are not to be dis
appointed, they must be regulated by sound reason2.

It is true that in intelligence man partakes of the eternal
principle. But a mole has eyes, yet does not see (although
Aristotle compares human intelligence rather to an owl than to
a mole, for an owl sees a little). At any rate in considering
man's end he is to be rated as an intermediate being''.

It does not become the mortal, says Pomponazzi in the same
strain, towards the end of his book, to desire immortal felicity ;
and a wise man will not set his heart upon what is impossible.
It is not then the part of a man who has learned to control him
self and moderate his desires (homo temperatns) to yearn for

1 "In quod fertur voluntas sine cognitione, frustrari non potest : at si per
cognitionetn, frustrari potest nisi sit recta ratio." Op. cit. x. p. 81.

2 " Ad illud vero de experimento, in primis mirere quomodo Divus Thomas illud
adduxerit, cum Aristoteles 3 Ethic, dicat voluntatem esse impossibilium, veluti in
appetendo immortalitatem : unde si voluntas nostra non est nisi in anima intellectiva,
si appetendo immortalitatem per Aristotelem appetit impossibile ; non ergo anima
humana potest esse immortalis. Quare dicitur ad argumentum non esse evidens
signum illud, quoniam ut ibi dicit philosophus, voluntas naturaliter est impossibilium
cum in impossibili possit salvari ratio boni. Et quod ulterius dicebatur appetitum
naturalem non frustrari ; verum est sumendo naturale ut distinguitur ab intellective,
nam illud est opus intelligentiae non errantis ; unde in quod fertur voluntas sine
cognitione, frustrari non potest : at si per cognitionem, frustrari potest nisi sit recta
ratio. Praesentato enim summo bono etiam Diis conpetente, voluntas fertur in illud
esse impossibile ; quare ne frustretur oportet voluntatem esse regulatam per rationem
rectam." Op. cit. X. pp. 80, 81.

3 " Et talpa oculos habens non videt, sed in animali non frustrantur ut habetur (in)
lib. De Hist. Anim. Quare et humanus animus desiderat immortalitatem quam
consequi non potest absolute, sed sufficit quod separata simpliciter consequatur ; quare
Aristoteles 2 Metaphys. comparavit humanum intellectum noctuae et non talpae,
noctua enim aliqualiter videt, talpa autem nihil, unde et 9 Metaph. tex. ult. dixit
intellectum humanum in cognoscendo abstracta non esse caecum, sed caecutientem ;
quapropter aeternitatem affectat, sed non perfecto appetitu desiderat." Op. cit. x. p. 82.

252 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

immortality. " Nor ought what is mortal to seek immortal
happiness, since the immortal is not congruous with the mortal
...which is why at the beginning we laid down that to each
thing is assigned an end appropriate to it ; for if a man be
moderate he will not seek the impossible, nor will it be suitable
to him : for to have such happiness belongs to the Gods, who
are independent in every way of matter and mutation — the
opposite of which is the case of the human race, which holds an
intermediate position between mortal and immortal beings1."

It is not true then, Pomponazzi maintains, that men miss
their end in this life. He meets the allegation by two suggestions
which are perhaps the most original ideas to which his mind
gave birth. He offers a twofold correction of the accepted ideas
about a man's end. In the first place, he suggests the concep
tion of the human race as an organism, in which the different
parts combine to promote a common end. Individual men may
come to little, or do little in this world ; yet they may fill each a
place in the common life and do each a part in the common
work of the whole human race. He institutes an elaborate
comparison with the body2, and employs also the analogy of
a symphony of voices rendering different parts3. But for the
order produced, he says, by the variety of individual men and
individual fortunes, the individual himself could not exist ; as it
is each contributes to the other, and to the whole4. The passage
is a lively and interesting one ; but the special point at which
Pomponazzi aims in it has, I think, been generally overlooked.
It is a part of his answer to the argument that the ends of

1 " Neque mortalis immortalem felicitatem appetere debet, quoniam immortale
mortali non convenit...quare primo supposuimus quod unicuique rei proportionatus
finis assignetur ; si enim homo sit temperatus non impossihilia appetet, neque sibi
conveniunt ; talem enim habere felicitatem est proprium Deorum, qui nullo modo a
materia et transmutatione dependent : cujus oppositum contingit in humano genere
quod est medium inter mortalia et immortalia." De Imm. xiv. p. 1 14.

14 " Universum humanum genus est sicut unum corpus ex diversis membris
constitutum quae et diversa habent officia, in communem tamen utilitatem generis
humani ordinata," etc. Op. cit. XIV. p. 107.

3 "Sic commensurata diversitas inter homines perfectum, pulchrum, decorum, et
delectabile general." Ibid.

4 " Individuum minima constare posset Unumque tribuit alteri, et ab eodem cui

tribuit recipit, reciprocaque habent opera." Ibid.

THE NATURE OF VIRTUE 253

human beings are not attained in the present life, and that life
so far as this earth is concerned is meaningless and vain. He
proposes a point of view other than that of the individual mode
of reckoning, other than that which counts the gains of indi
vidual fortunes, taken in isolation. This is the use which he
makes of the conception of a real and living unity of the human
race. The design of this thought in his mind is, in measuring
the attainments of man's mortal state, to substitute for the review
of the mingled and often disappointing experiences of individuals
a contemplation of a large and harmonious development in the
race ; and thus to turn the point of the objection, that in this
life the ends of humanity are not attained1.

But in the second place, with reference to man's attaining the
ends of his being in this life, Pomponazzi raises the question of
what is the essential end of man, taken even as an individual.
He prepares to dispute the conventional belief, that the end of
man is intellectual attainment, intellectual contemplation.

He proceeds accordingly to examine the nature and the
powers of man, to ascertain in the exercise of which of them he
is to find his end.

The fact to which he has just referred, that all men work
together to a common end, implies the existence of a common
nature in men. This common nature he finds to consist in three
rational powers (intellectus) — the "speculative" or theoretical,
the " practical " or moral, and the " factive " or mechanical.
For there is no man, he says, of full age and in possession of all
his faculties, who does not share to a greater or less extent in
each of these three rational powers2.

In an interesting passage he traces the rudiments of the
theoretical understanding in all men, on the principle that the
"common sense" and ordinary perceptions of men are in essence
the same activities which in their full development make the
various sciences and arts. Thus even the axioms of metaphysics
are part of the common stock of mankind (for example, the

1 Ibid.

2 "Dicamus quod omnes homines ad hujusmodi finem communem consequendum
debent in tribus intellectibus communicare, scilicet speculativo, practice, et factivo :
nullus enim homo est non orbatus, et in aetate debita constitutus, qui aliquid horum
trium intellectuum non habeat." Ibid.

254 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

axiom of non-contradiction), and its objects matters of universal
apprehension (God, Being, the One, the True, the Good).
Similarly, in the case of the various branches of science, all men
possess and exercise the elements of mathematics and astro
nomy, of perspective and music, of rhetoric and dialectic1. It
is even more evident that all men exercise the practical reason,
and have some aptitude for moral, civic, and domestic life. A
certain degree of mechanical skill again is necessary for the very
preservation of life.

The question is, then, in the exercise of which of these powers
does man attain his true end as man ; in which does he realise
the specific and characteristic attributes of humanity and thus
fulfil his proper destiny ? Pomponazzi prepares to answer that
it is in the exercise of the practical or moral reason2.

First by a negative criticism he shews that the end of man is
not to be found in the exercise of either of the other powers he
has distinguished. In each case he adduces two arguments — a
general argument from the analogy of nature or the fitness of
things, and an empirical argument drawn from the facts and
necessities of actual life. Thus with regard to theoretical specu
lation he points out, first, that even in so far as it is vouchsafed
to men, it is rather a Divine gift than an endowment properly
belonging to the nature of man3; and secondly, that in its full
development it is not, and cannot be, the possession of more than
a very small proportion of mankind4, and the part of the human
race which gives itself wholly to intellectual pursuits as the end
of life, even allowing for all the variety of these pursuits, bears
the same proportion to the whole as the heart does to the body.
It is certainly quite different in this respect with the mechanical
arts ; for the greater part of mankind is wholly given over to
these, and the whole female sex occupied with almost nothing

1 Op. cit. xiv. p. 108.

2 " Hujusmodi intellectus (scil. qui est circa mores, respublicas et res domesticas)
vere et proprie humanus nuncupatur, ut Plato in De Republica et Aristoteles in Ethicis
testantur." Op. cit. xiv. p. 109.

3 " Speculativus intellectus non est hominis, sed deorum... maximum donuin
deorum est philosophia." Ibid.

4 "Etsi homines omnes aliquid hujus habent, exacte tamen et perfecte paucissimi
et habent et habere possunt. " Ibid.

THE NATURE OF VIRTUE 255

else. Yet still there are two reasons why the end of life cannot
be sought in these. In the first place, in correspondence with
his argument that speculative knowledge is more Divine than
human, is the argument that mechanical art cannot be the
attribute which marks out man in the system of nature, or that
which is distinctively human, since it is shared by man with the
lower animals. Secondly he refers to the impossibility, as a fact
in life, that one man should cultivate all the mechanical arts ;
each of these competes with and excludes the others, so that it
is laid down by all sound social thinkers, and proved in experi
ence, that he who attempts to excel in more than one shall not
excel in any1.

Proceeding then positively to establish his point, he makes
much of the fact that in common speech a man is called " good "
or " bad " absolutely, only in respect of moral qualities2.

Hence it is that a man does not take it amiss to be told that
he is no metaphysician, or physicist, or artisan ; but when he is
called a thief, or intemperate, or unjust, or imprudent, he feels
that he is being accused of not being what he ought to be, and
blamed for something that is within his power. " But to be a
philosopher, or to be a house-builder, is not within our power,
nor are such things absolutely incumbent upon man3."

Nay, he can go further, and say that to require of every man
the cultivation either of the theoretical understanding or of the
mechanical arts would be inconsistent with the general well-
being of the human race. For the common good of humanity
exactly requires that in these respects there should be differences
among men — that speculation, and mechanical labours, and the
various sub-divisions or departments of each of these, should be
attended to by different individuals. Returning to his concep
tion of a common life in humanity and a common end which all
the members of the race variously serve, he lays down, first, that
all men are one in the possession, to some extent, of the " three

1 Op. cit. xiv. p. no.

2 " Secundum namque virtutes et vitia homo dicitur bonus homo, et malus homo ;
at bonus metaphysicus non bonus homo dicitur, sed bonus metaphysicus : bonusque
domincator non bonus absolute, sed bonus domificator nuncupatur." Ibid.

? Op. cit. xiv. p. iii.

256 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

rational powers1": secondly, that moral virtue is absolutely
necessary to the fulfilment by each individual of his several
office, and to the well-being and indeed the very preservation
of the whole2 ; whereas, thirdly, this is so far from being the case
with the several vocations of men, whether speculative or practical
in their character, that on the contrary neither human society at
large nor the particular human being could stand, or even con
tinue to exist, but for the variety of tasks and functions among
men; all are necessary, while no one human being could possibly
overtake them all3.

The moral vocation of man, then, " qui proprie hominis est,"
is alone "fit to be law universal." It, and it alone, is binding on
every man and always4. Pomponazzi examines the faculties of
human nature in order to discover in the exercise of which of
them that nature is to find its end ; and he concludes that a
man's true end is to be found in the exercise of moral reason
and in the moral conduct of life. His other powers a man is to
cultivate in part, and in various proportions according to his
nature and his place in life ; but this with all his might and to
perfection ; absolutely and without limitation he is to be, in this
sense, a "good man5." And this view is verified by the criterion
which Pomponazzi had set up of a common aim of the race,
which its individual members are to serve : " For the universe
would be completely preserved, if all men were zealous and highly
moral, but not if they were all philosophers or smiths or builders6."

1 " Participare de illis tribus intellectibus secundum quos etiam homines inter se
communicant et vivunt." Op. cit. xiv. p. in.

2 "Quantum ad intellectum practicum qui proprie hominis est, quilibet homo
perfecte debet habere ; ad hoc enim ut genus humanum recte conservetur, quilibet
homo debet esse virtuosus moraliter et quantum possibile est carere vitio." Ibid.

3 " Non enim constaret mundus si quilibet esset speculativus, imo neque ipse, cum
impossibile sit unum genus hominum, utpote physic(or)um, sibi esse sufficiens; neque
esse tantum domificatorum genus, vel aliquid hujusmodi : neque fieri potest ut unus
perfecte exerceat opera alterius, nedum omnium, sicut contingit in membris." Op. cit.
xiv. p. 112.

4 " In quocunque statu reperiatur, sive egenus, sive pauper, sive dives, sive
mediocris, sive opulentus." find.

8 " Quare universalis finis generis humani est, secundum quid de speculative et
factivo participare, perfecte autem de practice." Ibid.

6 " Universum enim perfectissime conservaretur si omnes homines essent studiosi
et optimi, sed non si omnes essent philosophi vel fabri, vel domificatores." Ibid.

THE NATURE OF VIRTUE 257

This discrimination of the moral law as the one universal
rule in human life is the first point in Pomponazzi's ethical
doctrine which deserves the description of it by Ad. Franck1
as a " foreshadowing of the Critique of Practical Reason, for
which the world was still to wait 300 years."

Again, whereas it had been remarked that the various intel
lectual and practical pursuits in which men may engage impede
one another, and compete with one another, so that a man has
to choose among them and cannot possibly cultivate all to
perfection or even more than one, it is not so with the moral
virtues ; for moral life is a unity ; and the cultivation or attain
ment of one virtue, so far from hindering the pursuit of another,
puts us on the way to it : indeed the attainment in perfection
of one virtue would imply really the attainment of all. This
harmony in moral life, unique in human experience, fits it to
be the essential and all-incumbent life of man2.

Pomponazzi proceeds accordingly to draw his conclusion as
to man's attainment of his true end and excellence within the
limits of mortality3.

The ground on which he holds this is once more defined to
be that moral excellence is the only truly essential excellence
of man. Admitting that the intellectual part of mankind is in a
sense the highest part, he does not infer that every man should
attain to the excellence of that part, any more than that in the
body every member should exercise the functions of those which
are considered to be the highest parts of the body, such as the
heart or the eye4.

Nor, although a man comes short — as many a man will — of
perfection in the highest (intellectual) pursuits and of the peculiar

1 In the Journal des Savants for 1869 (p. 407).

2 " Ut dicitur in Ethicis, virtutes morales sunt connexae, et qui perfecte habet
unam habet omnes ; quare omnes debent esse studiosi et boni." De hum. xiv. p. 112.

3 " Quapropter ad rationem dicitur quod si homo mortalis est, quilibet homo
potest habere finem qui universaliter convenit homini." Op. dt. xiv. p. 113.

4 " Ad rationem dicitur quod si homo mortalis est, quilibet homo potest habere
finem qui universaliter convenit homini. Qui tamen competit parti perfectissimae
non potest, neque convenit ; sicut non quodlibet membrum potest habere perfectionem
cordis et oculi, imo non constaret animal ; sic si in quolibet homo esset speculativus,
non constaret communitas humana ;...felicitas igitur non stat in habitu speculativo
per demonstrationem tanquam conveniens universaliter generi humano, sed tan-
quam primae parti principali ejus." Ibid.

D. I7

258 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

" felicity " that belongs to them, need he be said to have missed
his end or his felicity ; for although poorly endowed in intel
lectual, or alternatively in " mechanical " powers, he may be
rich in moral attainment and moral worth, which are sufficient
to make him happy. Nay, only in these does true happiness
or success (felicitas) consist. For while a man may be called
" happy " on other grounds, such as mechanical success, or a
high degree of speculative attainment, he is only truly and
properly felix in so far as he is morally good. For this is that
which is within the poiver of all men1.

It is in the light then of this revised conception of the end of
man and of the most valuable elements in human life, that the
question of the sufficiency of the present life is to be asked and
answered. In this light Pomponazzi reconsiders the charge
against earthly life, that it is meagre and unsatisfying ; and he
claims to prove that it is enough to satisfy the needs of man's
nature, and does permit him, if he will, to realise his destiny.

The restriction, for example, and incompleteness of human
knowledge, of which so much is made by those who depreciate
earthly life, wear a different aspect from the changed point of
view. If intellectual contemplation were the very end of man's
existence, it could not be supposed to be so frustrated as it is
here ; and a future life would evidently be necessary to supply
the deficiencies, and carry on the poor beginnings, of this. But
as it is, the position of man with regard to knowledge may be
considered altogether appropriate to his condition ; for it may
fairly be maintained that in this life each man possesses know
ledge enough, and sufficient intellectual light, to enable him to
fulfil his moral vocation as a man. In relation to absolute truth,
and those matters which are the objects of the higher Intelli
gences, his light may in comparison be dim and his sight feeble,
while at the same time he may have sufficient knowledge for the
conduct of life ; and indeed it may well be that the degree of
knowledge vouchsafed to man is exactly that which is most
appropriate to the working out of his moral task2. In that case

1 " Agricola enim, et faber, egenus vel dives, si moralis sit, felix nuncupari potest,
et vere nuncupatur, sorteque sua contentus abit." Op. cit. Xiv. p. 114.
s " Inter res morales nihil excellentius haberi potest." Ibid.

THE NATURE OF VIRTUE 259

his position is suitable to his nature, and to his fulfilment of his
true end1.

The reference to those beings who enjoy a perfect exercise of
intelligence recalls the general consideration which Pomponazzi
had already brought forward earlier in the book, that the end of
man must be appropriate to his nature and to his position as a
being of intermediate rank in the hierarchy of things2.

It is remarkable that, while thus escaping the argument from
the necessity of intellectual perfection, by the substitution of a
moral for an intellectual ideal of life, Pomponazzi did not con
sider the argument which many would think the strongest
argument for immortality — the argument, namely, from the
necessity of moral perfection or at least of a higher degree of
moral progress than is here attained or attainable by man. His
was not the age or country for an enthusiastic moral idealism of
that kind ; and Pomponazzi's own moral feelings lacked the zeal
and intensity which should give wings to such aspirations.
Ethically, as a writer and a man, he was rather sober and
serious than fervent or enthusiastic. He would probably have
met this argument by another reminder of the natural limitations
of man, and by enjoining moderation and deprecating unattain
able ideals. He would have distinguished as usual between the
human and the superhuman. You ought not to attempt, he
would have said, to force human nature beyond its scope, or
pitch the standard of human virtue too high. And on a modest
and moderate view of what is in any case possible to a man, this
life might be considered sufficient for its attainment — by those
who make a reasonable effort, who do their best.

Meanwhile his belief is that man may find on earth a suitable,
an appropriate destiny, which it is his duty to accept as sufficient.
In a former argument, in answer to the claim that the desire for
immortality implied its actual attainment, he had urged that

1 " Quod ulterius addebatur, quoniam talis speculatio. non videtur posse facere
hominem felicem cum sit valde debilis et obscura ; huic dicitur quod tametsi in ordine
ad aeterna hujusmodi sit, et ad earn quae intelligentiarum, tamen inter res morales
nihil excellentius haberi potest, sicut Plato in Timaeo dixit." Ibid.

- " Unicuique rei proportionatus finis assignatur Talem enim habere felicitatem

(scil. immortalem) est proprium Deorum qui nullo modo a materia et transmutatione
dependent; cujus oppositum contingit in humano genere quod est medium inter
mortalia et immortalia. " Op. cit. xiv. pp. 114, 115.

17—2

26O PIETRO POMPONAZZI

every "appetite" needs to be corrected by "right reason." Here
he bases the same contention on moral grounds ; the acceptance
of the limitations of our state is treated as a matter of moral
obligation ; " for if a man is moderate, he will not desire what
is impossible, nor is that fitting to his nature1." It is not a
question of what we should like, but of what befits us.

He goes on, then, in justification of what he has suggested as
the true end of man — an end attainable within the limits of this
life — to show that peace and happiness are possible to man on
earth.

Certainly in fulfilling his true end a man ought to find peace
("finis debet quietare"). But it might be argued with a show of
reason that man cannot find peace or happiness if his existence
and his hopes are confined to the present life. It does not quite
appear, from a somewhat obscure passage, what the precise
difficulty is. Probably it is that this life is such a scene of
change and trouble. Or the suggestion may be, that earth is
not sufficient to satisfy the large desires of man, or bring his
mind to rest. Or it might be held, as Pomponazzi observes
elsewhere, that the fear of death poisons life and makes happi
ness, or at least rest, impossible.

Pomponazzi replies characteristically by defining the measure
and kind of the " peace " enjoyed by man. He quotes Aristotle's
teaching that human happiness is not inconsistent with many
changes, and many lesser misfortunes. He does not, of course,
forget how Aristotle finds in goodness the essence of happiness,
and in the permanency of moral attainments its true stability ;
so that the peace or security of the good man can survive even
great outward misfortunes, borne with a high spirit. This was
Pomponazzi's own conception of the security (stabilitas) of man.
But at present he is concerned with that suggestion of Aristotle's
doctrine, that human happiness can be real without being perfect,
" stable," yet not without disturbance : and that indeed an un
broken rest and unmingled happiness do not belong to the
human lot2.

"Si enim homo sit temperatus, non impossibilia appetet, neque sibi con-
veniunt." Op. cit. xiv. p. 114.

- Arist. Nic. Eth. Bk I, Chap. XI.

THE NATURE OF VIRTUE 26l

He compares man to a tree, whose leaves are always being
shaken, but which is not at every blast plucked up by the roots.
While always exposed to change and always in some degree of
trouble, he would say, man has nevertheless his deep-rooted
peace. If not a perfect happiness on earth, he has yet a real
happiness. While always in fear of death, again he might have
said, he does not every moment die. But if his happiness were
not a vexed and mingled happiness, his peace a " disturbed
stability," he would not be a man1.

Reverting to the matter of knowledge, he uses the happy
illustration of the different degrees of knowledge appropriate to
different times of life. The child has only a child's mind ; yet
he is happy. He does not possess the knowledge of a grown
man ; but he does not therefore make himself miserable nor
complain that he is harshly and unreasonably restricted. His
contentment arises from the fact that he has that which is proper
to his age : it is sufficient for his happiness2. So may man be
content with that which is appropriate to his nature ; nor need
he complain3. A man may not know all that is to be known,
nor so clearly but that his knowledge might be clearer ; but this
need not deprive him, as it was argued, of his peace of mind, if
he has all that is appropriate to his condition4.

In answer to the suggestion that all man's happiness is
poisoned by the fear of change and the certainty of ultimate
loss, which (it is said) make his condition one of misery rather
than of felicity, Pomponazzi says very finely — " Illiberalis

1 " Cum ulterius dicebatur quia finis debet quietare, hoc autem hominis in-
tellectum et voluntatem non quietare, huic dicitur quod Aristoteles in fine i Ethic, non
ponit felicitatem humanam tanquam perfecte quietantem ; imo ponit quod quantum-
cumque homo sit felix non tamen tarn stabilis est quin multa perturbent ipsum; non
enim esset homo ; verum non removent a felicitate, sicut non quivis ventus evellet
arborem, licet moveat folia. Quare in humana felicitate sufficit stabilitas non
removibilis, licet aliqualiter conturbabilis. " De Imm. xiv. p. 115..

2 " In juvenili enim si exactam non habet cognitionem, quae in virili congruit,
dummodo habeat juvenili congruentem contentus est pro ilia aetate, neque amplius
appetit quam sibi conveniat." Ibid.\

3 " Quare neque angustiabitur ut dicebatur." Ibid.

4 "Cum ulterius procedebatur quod nunquam tanta scit quanta scire potest,
nee tarn clare quin clarius ; dico quod hoc non tollit felicitatem eius, dummodo
tantum habeat quantum sibi pro illo statu convenit, et ex parte sui non deficiat."
Ibid.

262 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

hominis est non velle restituere quod gratis accepit." For
indeed mortality is man's appointed condition1. Even the
ancients teach us that, holding life as we do only on condition
of paying the debt to nature at the last2, we ought to give it up
with thanks to God and nature. To fear that which is inevitable
is folly3.

Nor is human life upon these terms, as it has been made out,
" worse than the life of the brutes." For, in virtue of that moral
worth which it may possess, it is far, even at the worst, from
being the miserable condition it is said to be ; and in any case it
is infinitely preferable to a merely animal existence. Mere dura
tion is not the test of a satisfying existence : " Who would
prefer the long life of a stone or of a stag to that of a man how
ever mean?4" In the worst bodily condition a thinking man
can possess a quiet mind. Nay, every wise man would prefer
to endure the worst hardships and tribulations rather than in an
opposite condition to be foolish, base, or vicious. For — so far
from its being true, that in view of the difficulty and unsatis-
factoriness of higher aims in this life (the labour, say, of the
pursuit of knowledge, the renunciation of bodily enjoyments,
and the dim knowledge which at the best we gain, with the
prospect of losing all we have acquired) reason would counsel
us, if this life were all, to decline upon bodily indulgence and
excess — the mere truth is that the smallest share in knowledge
and virtue is to be preferred to the total sum of bodily delights5.
So he prepares the way for his answer to the next argument.

It has been argued6 that, if death ended all, no man could
ever for any reason willingly seek death. In this way it was
sought to prove that the doctrine of mortality was inconsistent
with the obligation of duty and the necessities of moral life.
For, death being altogether evil, no man would then ever be

1 "Cum homo praesupponitur mortalis." Op. cil. XIV. p. 116.

2 "Cum ea lege receperit ut sciat naturae concessurum." Ibid,

3 Ibid,

4 "Quis mallet esse lapidem vel cervum longae vitae quam hominem quantum-
cunque vilem?" Ibid,

5 " Quaecumque modicula particula scientiae et virtutis praeponenda est omnibus
dekctationibus corpornlibus." Op. dt. XIV. p. 117.

6 O/>. cit. xm. p. 99.

THE NATURE OF VIRTUE 263

willing to die for duty. He would rather commit any baseness
than meet death ; nor would he die for his friend, his country,
or the public good. But such a conclusion is " against nature "
and repugnant to the universal feelings of mankind.

Pomponazzi met this argument, and deprived it of all its
force, by the fundamental consideration that virtue is in itself
desirable and vice hateful — virtue in itself preferable to all
things, and vice of all things the most to be feared and shunned.
Now, as Aristotle had said, of two evils we must choose the less.
And to die for others, or in order to escape an act of baseness,
is a gain to the individual — a gain in virtue, which is the most
precious of all things ; and it is a gain to the race, because it
harmonises with and confirms its right instincts. But a crime
injures the community, of which the criminal is also a part ;
and, still more, injures the criminal himself1. A soul marred by
baseness is a diseased soul2; and by it a man does injury to his
own humanity3. Even if by wrong a soul could escape death
for ever, sin would still be misery4. But the soul cannot live for
ever ; death follows at last in any case ; and for him who seeks
by crime to escape death there is no immortality except " an
immortality of shame and contempt." By doing right, again,
true happiness is secured ; which is something, however short its
duration may be5.

1 " Cum igitur in eligendo mortem pro patria, pro amicis, pro vitio evitando,
maxima virtus acquiratur, aliisque multum prosit, cum naturaliter homines hujusmodi
actum laudent nihilque pretiosius et felicius ipsa virtute, ideo hoc maxime eli-
gendum est. At scelus perpetrando communitati maxime nocet, quare et sibi, cum
ipse pars communitatis sit, vitiumque incurrit quo nihil infelicius, cum desinat esse
homo, ut Plato pluribus locis in De Republica dicit." Op. cit. xiv. p. 117.

2 " Anima cum peccato extirpanda est." Op. cit. XIV. p. 118.

3 " Desinit esse homo." See note i above.

4 " Animaque si aeterno viveret in peccato summa miseria est, quandoquidem ipsi
animae nihil deterius est ipso vitio." Op. cit. XIV. p. 118.

5 " Ad adeptionem etiam illius virtutis sequitur felicitas, vel magna pars
felicitatis, etsi parum duratura...neque magnum tempus vivere cum infamia est
praeponendum vivere tempore parvo cum laude. " Op. cit. xiv. pp. 117, 118.

Pomponazzi meets ingeniously the logical quibble of the schools, that no man
could willingly choose death, if death were the end of all, for death would then be
annihilation, and the will cannot choose "nothing" but must always move towards
some "good." " Neque per se in tali casu mors eligitur, cum nihil sit; verum actus
studiosus, licet ad eum sequatur mors : sicut non committendo vitium, non renuitur
vita, cum in se sit bona, sed vitium renuitur, ad cujus perpetrationem sequitur vita."
Op. cit. xiv. p. 1 18.

264 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

Pomponazzi does not deny that most men, if they thought
death were the end, would prefer even dishonour to death ;
wherefore wise legislators restrain the masses of mankind from
crime and incite them to courage by threats and promises for
the future life ; but those who need such influences are only
they who do not know the true nature of vice and virtue1.

By the same consideration, of the essential gain of goodness
and the loss inseparable from evil-doing, does Pomponazzi seek
to remove the difficulty that might be felt about the Divine
Government in view of the inequality of rewards and punish
ments in this life. Rewards and punishments, it was argued2,
fall in this life so irregularly ; so many crimes go undetected, so
many more unpunished, and so many good actions fail of their
reward, that if this life were all, it would be impossible to
believe in a righteous government of the universe : we should be
obliged to conclude either that God does not govern, is not
omnipotent (in which case he would be no longer God), or else
that he is unjust — either supposition being abhorrent and inad
missible. Wherefore, it was said, there must be another life in
which good and evil fortune shall be exactly proportioned to
desert.

Pomponazzi answers all this in the bold way which is
characteristic of him. He frankly admits the alleged inequalities
in the distribution of outward rewards and punishments. Never
theless he affirms that no good action goes unrewarded and no
evil action unpunished, in this life. He does so on the simple
ground that virtue is its own reward and vice its own sufficient
punishment.

We must distinguish, he says, between the " essential " and
the "accidental" reward or punishment3. He also expresses

1 "Ignorant excellentiam virtutis et ignobililatem vitii." Op. cit. XIV. p. 118.
Pomponazzi supports his argument by instances of irrational creatures dying for

one another and to preserve the species : they have no life after death, and yet it
must be worth while thus to die, for in so doing they are guided by instinct, which is
infallible : " Natura dirigitur ab intelligentia non errante; non ergo et in homine hoc
est contra rationem." Op. cit. xiv. p. 120.

2 Op. cit. xin. p. 100.

3 " Sciendum est quod praemium, et poena, duplex est, quoddam essentiale et
inseparable, quoddam vero accidentale et separabile." Op. cit. XIV. p. 120.

THE NATURE OF VIRTUE 265

this in the case of punishment as the distinction between the
inward guilt (poena culpae) and the outward loss (poena
damnt).

It is in respect of its " essential " consequences that conduct
never goes unrequited. Nothing better than goodness itself can
possibly be possessed by human nature1 : this is the best that
can befall ; and therefore in being good a man infallibly has his
reward. It is in this that the security and stability consist
which Aristotle ascribes to the good man2. On the other hand,
wickedness of itself implies unhappiness; for first of all, baseness
itself is of all things the most miserable3, while, further, all sorts
of outward dispeace attend it as well4.

Wherefore, he says, Aristotle, asking the question why prizes
are given in all other contests, but not in the efforts after virtue
and knowledge, answers that it is because a prize, to be a prize,
must be of more value than the game ; but nothing is of more
value than virtue or knowledge ; and therefore there is nothing
fit to be the reward of those efforts except the virtue and the
knowledge themselves.

The " separable " recompense of action is admittedly variable
and irregular. The reason of this he does not here enquire into5 :
the fact is undoubted, but that does not affect the essential con
nection between virtue and well-being, vice and calamity6. The

1 " Nihil enim majus natura humana habere potest ipsa virtute." Ibid.

2 See Arist. Nic. Eth. Bk I. Chap. xi. " Praemium essentiale virtutis est ipsarnet
virtus quae hominem felicem facit. Nihil enim majus natura humana habere potest
ipsa virtute, quandoquidem ipsa sola hominem securum facit et remotum ab omni
perturbatione : omnia namque in studioso consonant : nihil timens, nihil sperans, sed
in prosperis et adversis uniformiter se habens, sicut dicitur in fine i Ethic, et Plato in
Critone dixit, viro bono neque vivo neque defuncto potest aliquid malum contingere."
De Imm, xiv. p. 120.

3 " Poena namque vitiosi est ipsum vitium, quo nihil miserius, nihil infelicius, esse
potest." Ibid.

4 "Quod autem perversa sit vita vitiosi, et maxime fugienda, manifestat
Aristoteles 7 Ethic, ubi ostendit quod vitioso omnia dissonant : nemini fidus, neque
vigilans neque dormiens quiescit, diris corporis et animi cruciatibus angustiatur,"
etc. Op. cit. xiv. p. 121.

5 " Cur autem aliqui praemiantur vel puniuntur accidentaliter, aliqui vere non, non
est praesentis propositi." Op. cit. xiv. p. 122.

"Sic non omne bonum remuneratum est, et omne malum punitum ; neque hoc
inconvenit, cum accidentalia sunt." Op. cit. xiv. p. 121.

266 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

irregularity of the outward ("accidental ") reward or punishment
matters the less since the intrinsic or " essential " consequence is
in itself incomparably greater1.

Finally Pomponazzi goes one step further. The inward gain
or loss, he says, by virtue or vice respectively, is in each case
greater where there is no outward recompense, than where there
is such recompense. The outward reward (at any rate so far
as it was in view when the good action was done) actually
diminishes the real gain of the good action ; the suffering of
outward punishment lessens the inward loss by sin. This is put
crudely — that the incidence of the outward consequence positively
interferes with the development of the intrinsic consequence,
whether of gain or loss — in order by the paradox to emphasise
the main position, that the absence of external reward makes
absolutely no difference to a man's reaping the fruit of his
goodness ; that in escaping outward punishment a man is still
left to bear the utmost consequences of wrong-doing. So far
from the absolute gain or loss — whichever it be — being diminished
by the absence of material profit or detriment, he will assert that
it is positively increased.

He explains his meaning. It then appears that he did not
precisely intend that the happy outward consequences of good
ness diminish its real gains ; but only that if they are considered
as an inducement, if a man sets them before him as his end,
he is so much the less a good man, and makes so much the less
of the real gains of goodness. The man who does right without
hope of reward has a higher virtue than the man who has an
eye to that reward. He has more of that inward and intrinsic
reward which virtue itself is".

The application of the idea in the converse case is somewhat
different. In proportion as a man suffers outwardly through

1 " Accidentale praemium longe minus est essentiali praemio, poena namque
accidentalis... longe minor est poena essentiali... culpae poena longe deterior est poena
damni." Op. cit. XIV. pp. 121, 122.

2 " Sciendum est quod quando bonum accidentaliter praemiatur bonum essentiale
videtur diminui, neque remanet in sua perfectione. Exempli causa aliquis virtuose
operatur sine spe praemii : alter vero cum spe praemii. Actus secundi non ita
virtuosus habetur sicut primi. Quare magis essentialiter praemiatur qui non accidenta
liter praemiatur eo qui accidentaliter praemiatur." Op. cit. xiv. p. 122.

THE NATURE OF VIRTUE 267

his fault, it is suggested, his inward loss thereby (poena culpae)
is lessened. It does not appear whether this diminution is due
to a remedial power in the punishment, lessening sinfulness ; or
whether the idea is that, forensically speaking, his guilt is
reduced by expiation. So far, the argument is clear that if the
poena culpae (the inward and intrinsic loss through sin) be thus
diminished through the endurance of the poena damni (outward
loss), the absolute loss is lessened, and, speaking absolutely, the
man is a gainer. The ultimate standard of gain and loss is the
inward one, the standard of character, of more or less actual
goodness. As always, Pomponazzi maintains again that any
outward loss or suffering is well borne which makes the man a
better man ; while, on the other hand, the man who remains
" unpunished " is yet the loser by his sin, and perhaps loses
more, really because he has not suffered1.

Thus, once more, whatever be the history of outward rewards
and punishments, human action, Pomponazzi concludes, never
goes really unrequited2.

These applications of the idea of Virtue as an end in itself,
reminiscent as they are of the doctrines of Kant, find no
counterpart in Pomponazzi's immediate predecessors among
the schoolmen, or in the Arabians, or in the Renaissance
Platonists.

Two other difficulties in the way of his doctrine, and
Pomponazzi's manner of dealing with them, may be briefly
mentioned.

It was urged that if the soul be not immortal, almost all
mankind, believing in its immortality, has been deceived. Pom
ponazzi replied that this is not necessarily an inconceivable
supposition ; for in any case, since there are " three religions,"

1 " Eodem quoque modo qui vitiose operatur, et accidentaliter punitur, minus
videtur puniri eo qui accidentaliter non punitur. Nam poena culpae major et deterior
est poena damni. Et cum poena damni adjungitur culpae diminuit culpam. Quare
non punitus accidentaliter magis punitur essentialiter eo qui accidentaliter punitur."
Ibid.

2 " Dicitur nullum malum esse essentialiter impunitum, neque bonum essentialiter
irremuneratum esse....Omnis virtuosus virtute sua et felicitate praemiatur....At
contranum de vitio contingit, ideo nullus vitiosus impunitus relinquitur." Op. cit.
XIV. pp. 120, 121.

268 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

either all mankind or a majority of men have held erroneous
creeds1.

Here also we find the most deliberate statement of Pompo-
nazzi's frequently expressed opinion, of the right of prudent
legislators to impose upon their subjects useful and restraining
beliefs, although known by themselves to be untrue. Truth is
not the concern of the legislator, but good living only2; and
men have to be influenced, he says, according to their nature,
some by higher, some by lower considerations. " The legislator,
knowing that men's lives are prone to evil, and aiming at the
common weal, has sanctioned the belief that the soul is im
mortal, not caring about the truth of the belief, but about its
moral value3." He is justified, it is argued, in so doing on the
very same grounds on which a nurse is permitted to limit the
knowledge of a child, or a physician to deceive a sick person or
one of unsound mind4.

The last objection on moral grounds to his conclusion with
which Pomponazzi deals, is the allegation that the immortality
of the soul is the belief of all good men, and its mortality is held
only by those who desire to lead immoral and sensual lives.
He first denies the fact : " Nam manifeste videmus multos
pravos homines credere, verum passionibus seduci ; multos
etiam viros sanctos et justos scimus mortalitatem animarum
posuisse," and so forth ; and he enumerates the names of the
virtuous heathen. Besides, he says, it must be taken into
account that there have been many who have known the soul to
be mortal, but have dissembled their belief, by way of reserve or
as a moral precaution (" sicut medicus ad aegrum, et nutrix ad
puerum "). But, secondly, even if the case were so, it need not
be ; for all the duties of morality and religion (" Deum colere,
divina honorare, preces ad Deum fundere, sacrificia facere") are
on the theory of the soul's mortality fully binding : being right

1 Op. cit. xiv. p. 123.

2 " Politicus est medicus animorum ; propositumque politic! est facere hominem
magis studiosum quam scientem." Ibid.

3 " Respiciens legislator pronitatem viarum ad malum, intendens communi bono,
sanxit animam esse immortalem, non curans de veritate, sed tantum de probitate."
Op. cit. xiv. p. 124.

4 Op. cit. xiv. p. 138.

THE NATURE OF VIRTUE 269

in themselves1 they are to be sought and practised. And
finally, he repeats that all these things are even performed with
a more perfect, because a more disinterested, virtue by those who
have no hope of a future life and its rewards, and are not
actuated by fear of future punishment ; and so he concludes,
" quare perfectius asserentes animam mortalem melius videntur
salvare rationem virtutis quam asserentes ipsam immortalem2."

1 " Actus maxime virtuosi." Ibid.

2 Op. cit. XIV. p. 139.

CHAPTER XI

POMPONAZZI had formed a distinct idea of an order of nature
—of nature as a system, governed by pervading and uniform
principles. His work De Incantationibus is a deliberate attempt
to extend the conception of that order to all phenomena without
exception, by bringing all the marvellous events and powers
observed in experience or recorded in history within the scope
of principles common to all nature. He seeks to trace analogies
between the extraordinary and the familiar, and to interpret
what is most exceptional in terms of nature's common operations.
Hypothetically at least he includes all things within the natural
order as he understands it, and what we should call the reign of
law ; and he endeavours also as far as possible to discover the
actual causation of each event.

His avowed design is salvare experiment^ to account for
facts. Those marvellous phenomena, in nature and history, for
whose actual occurrence there appears to be sufficient evidence,
he includes among experimenta. And for these exceptional
parts of experience, as for its most usual elements, he desires
to find the simplest explanation, and an explanation infra
limites naturales. It is expressly on this ground that he rejects
the attempt to account for omens, portents, and wonders gene
rally, through the agency of angels and demons1. If a natural

"In rebus difficilibus et occultis, responsiones magis ab inconvenientibus re-
motae ac magis sensatis et rationibus consonae, sunt magis recipiendae quam oppositae
rationes....His modo sic suppositis, tentandum est sine daemonibus et angelis ad
objecta respondere." De Nat. E/. p. 131. Similarly in the De Immortalitate :
" Evident! ratione naturali hoc (i.e. the agency of spirits) videre meo monstrari non
potest; quare non stabimus infra limites naturales quod tamen polliciti sumus a prin-
cipio." De Imm. xiv. p. 128.

NATURAL LAW IN HUMAN LIFE AND RELIGION 271

explanation can be found, he says, we are exempted from the
necessity of seeking a supernatural one1. His intention to
discover a natural explanation of everything, even of that
which is most exceptional in experience, is sufficiently obvious.

His point of view is clearly illustrated by the title of the
book usually called the De Incantationibus. This is only a
secondary title ; the full title of the book is De Naturalium
Effectuum Admirandorum Causis, sive de Incantationibus. The
book certainly deals with magic, as it deals with all exceptional
and surprising effects in nature : with dreams, apparitions,
omens, portents ; spells, and charms ; necromancy, chiromancy ;
miracles (so-called) both within and outside of Scripture History;
miraculous answers to prayer and the like ; in short, de rebus
difficilibus et occultis. But the point is that the enquiry about
these things is de naturalium effectuum causis\ and that such are
the contents of a book bearing this title.

Of course, in the case of Pomponazzi, his idea of nature's
order and his attempts at natural explanation were governed by
his astrological presuppositions. It is impossible here to trace
the influences through which the conception of the spheres and
the celestial powers came so to pervade the mediaeval mind as
it did. In this respect Pomponazzi shared the ideas of his time;
in proportion as he was deeply read in the Arabians and in
Albert, must this whole side of things have bulked more largely
in his thoughts and occupied his imagination ; while in Aristotle,
as he read Aristotle, he would find nothing to correct him, since
it was from certain passages of Aristotle that the whole astro
logical scheme took its rise. In all natural and historical events,
at any rate, it was supposed that astral influences were at work —
not superseding ordinary physical and psychical causes, but
operating in and through all their sequences. Practically,
although not theoretically, this superior system of causes stood
for what we might call the universal complex of causes. Just
as we know that, along with a particular cause which we may
single out in its connection with a particular effect, there is

1 "Si sine ilia multiplicatione daemonum et geniorum salvare possumus, super •
vacuum videtur ilia ponere." Op. cit. xiv. p. 130.

2/2 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

working an infinite number of other factors, making in their
combination a universal system ; so for Pomponazzi there stood
behind each particular cause the general causation of the
celestial powers ; or rather, behind each " sequence " of events
(for this was his notion of causality) stood those powers deter
mining that this should follow that, and events fall out so and
not otherwise : standing thus behind, and working through,
every particular instance of sequence or causality. The two
ideas are very different, and indeed not strictly comparable,
expressing as they do two entirely different notions of nature;
but they may be compared in so far that when Pomponazzi,
besides pointing out a particular sequence of events in nature,
referred the effect at the same time to the heavenly powers, he
meant much the same as we do when we refer a fact to the
order of nature: he meant to establish the fact in a connected
system, to place it under an order uniformly working.

All events, all phenomena, were included within the sway of
the astral influences. The astral order was the other side of
nature.

It was therefore, to say the least, nothing inconsistent with
his astrology, if Pomponazzi sought to bring all events, even the
most exceptional, within the order of nature. But we may go
further and say that, for him, to refer wonders and miracles to
the astral powers was precisely to include them in the natural
order and refer them to the analogy of nature. This was what
the reference meant, to his own thought ; this was the very
motive and significance of the astrological explanation, from his
point of view.

. He expressly brings forward the astrological as a natural
explanation, contrasting it in this respect with the theory of
spiritual agency1. He brackets "nature and the heavenly
powers " together as the " efficient cause " of phenomena2, or, by

1 " Infra limites naturales stabimus," he says; and again, " Si sine ilia multipli-
catione daemonum et geniorum salvare possumus, supervacuum videtur ilia ponere...
corpora ergo coelestia secundum suas virtutes haec miranda producunt." De Imm.
xiv. p. 130.

2 " Dicimus talia (scilicet omina et auguria) esse effectus coelorum et naturae in
genere causae efficientis." De Nat. Eff. p. 169.

NATURAL LAW IN HUMAN LIFE AND RELIGION 2/3

a variation of the thought, combines with the celestial causation
a physical "disposing cause1."

The great reason why Pomponazzi brings wonders and magic
within the scope of the astral influences is just that universal
nature is subject to those influences. Thus the whole motive
and implication of this reference in the case of the marvellous
is that those exceptional phenomena are to be viewed according
to the analogy of nature generally. If, his argument is, the
celestial powers uphold and direct the whole frame of nature,
why should they not likewise be supposed to govern these
particular events ? Unusual these events may be ; it may lie
beyond our power to trace their causes in detail ; but why
remove them from the scope of those powers that govern all
other sublunary things, many of them also mysterious and
inexplicable, though in a less degree ? Considering the great and
innumerable concerns included in the realm of nature and
governed by the heavenly powers, why should we place beyond
their capability " effects " which are few in number after all, and
intrinsically small and unimportant, when compared with the
vastness and variety of universal nature2?

His attribution of marvels to the celestial powers, then, did
not mean that he made them exceptions to the order of nature,

" Dictum est vates, prophetas, et qui demoniaci vocantur et reliqua hujusmodi
generis pro causa effectiva habere corpora coelestia et pro materiali causa dispo-
sitiones ex parte suorum corporum." Op. cit. p. 210. (The " final cause" is "the
good of mankind." Op. cit. p. 169 : De Imm. xiv. p. 130.)

2 » Videtur valde derisibile quod corpora coelestia cum suis intelligentiis universum
gubernent et conservent, tantam rerum molem moveant, tot homines, tot diversa
animalia, tot plantas, tot metalla, tot lapides generent et transmutent ; tarn futiles
autem et inanes effectus facere non possint, cum rarissimi sint nulliusque fere momenti :
imo nihil sunt in comparatione ad ipsum universum : et pro his quasi nullius ponderis
rebus oporteat novos inducere deos et nova figmenta. Sic itaque introducens
daemones, videat subversiones tot regnorum, tot sublevationes imperiorum ex infinitis
praecipitiis, diluvia, incendia : et quum tot mirabilia respiciat in universe (quae fieri
a corporibus coelestibus nemo sanae mentis unquam negabit) et ipse non dicat hoc
fieri posse ab ipsis coelis ; certe hoc insaniam videtur arguere et nullam perspicaciam."
(De Nat. Eff. p. 303.) " Quid enim potest facere daemon vel angelus alterando vel
localiter movendo talia corpora generabilia, quod intelligentiae mediantibus corporibus
coelestibus facere non possint, cum universum ab ipsis gubernari conspiciamus ? "
(Op. cit. p. 306.) " Concludimus, quod si quis mirabilia et occulta naturae opera con-
sideraverit, virtutes corporum coelestium, Deum et intelligentias, humana et omnia
inferiora curantes, nihil opus esse daemonibus neque aliis intelligentiis videbit." Op.
cit. p. 198.

D. l8

274 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

but the very contrary. It was his way of affirming that they
were included in that order. The conception of an all-embracing
order was indeed the fundamental postulate of astrology.

Meanwhile Pomponazzi makes a laborious attempt to find,
for all the marvels which are to be accepted as worthy of
belief, parallels and analogies in nature which, if they do not
explain them, at least suggest conceivable explanations.

The sequences and conjunctions which seem magical and
supernatural are after all on the same footing as other observed
sequences and conjunctions in nature. We are not able to
explain, says Pomponazzi, why one phenomenon in nature
follows or accompanies another ; we simply observe the fact
that it is so. He thus compares the supposed sequence of an
omen and its fulfilment with any other observed sequence in
nature ; in particular with a case in which one event is the
recognised and authentic sign of another without being its
cause, as the rainbow for example is a sign of the end of rain.
Or if, again, we are to believe that one day is lucky, another
unlucky, it is a strange conjunction, an inexplicable repugnancy;
but not more inexplicable, intrinsically, he suggests, than the
attractions or repulsions observed by the chemist. The trans
formations and ' metamorphoses ' ascribed to magic or to super
natural power are similarly parallel with the more remarkable
and surprising natural alterations, such as the formation of
fossils, the petrifaction of wood and other objects in mineral
springs, or the metamorphosis of the caterpillar into the
butterfly.

The miracles that attend the beginnings of new religions,
the gifts of prophets and diviners, and the like, are brought in
the same way within the normal operations of nature and the
heavenly powers ; or it is suggested that they could be so
brought. The answers to prayer, seemingly miraculous, are
traced (in so far as they cannot be physically explained) to the
operation of a law, according to which acceptable prayers
precede the accomplishment of Divine purposes ; and thus even
the prayers themselves, and the religions out of which they arise,
are subject to a Divine government, and form parts and stages
of a cosmic purpose.

NATURAL LAW IN HUMAN LIFE AND RELIGION 275

We have here, then, the outline of a philosophy of nature
and of religion.

This whole mode of explanation of the marvellous in nature
and history is constantly pitted against the orthodox theory
which attributed magic and miracles to the agency of angels or
demons1. The book De Naturalium Effcctuum Causis is a
uniform polemic against that theory, as essentially a vulgar
superstition. It is the tendency of the vulgar mind, he says,
always to ascribe to diabolic or angelic agency events whose
causes it does not understand2.

While he thus seeks to refer all things to " natural "
causes, Pomponazzi is fully prepared to recognise many strange
effects in nature. His point of view is that there are many
surprising and even to us inexplicable things in nature, but all
doubtless capable of a natural explanation, had we sufficient
knowledge of nature and the heavenly powers. On the one
hand he insists that the ordinary sequences of nature are ulti-

1 "Peripatetic! ponunt haec fieri ah intelligentiis moventibus corpora coelestia,
et mediantibus ipsis corporibus coelestibus ; leges vero ponunt haec fieri ab angelis
vel daemonibus immediate et sine corporibus coelestibus." Op. cit. p. 306 and passim.

2 Thus with regard to the fluctuation of the prophetic afflatus, of which he had
been suggesting the astral and the physical conditions: " Et vulgares attribuebant
hoc numinibus iratis, cum veram causam ignorarent. Sed haec est consuetudo vulgi,
ascribere daemonibus vel angelis quorum causas non cognoscunt." Op, cit. p. 230.
Or in the case of answers to prayer: "Cum ignavum vulgus ista ignoraret, cum
succedunt vota, dicunt Deos vel Sanctos fuisse sibi propitios, et orationes sibi
fuisse gratas : cum vero non succedunt, Deos et Sanctos esse iratos : quandoquidem
haec talia habeant causam quam diximus." Op. cit. p. 240. In the case of magic, the
superstitious belief may be imposed upon the credulous by interested pretenders ; or
again the stigma of diabolic agency may be placed upon the magic to guard against
its abuse ; just as in the case of miracles and omens the vulgar are indulged in a
favourite superstition by those who know better than to believe it themselves :
" Fortassis quoniam harum scientiarum magis est abusus quam usus, hinc forte dictae
sunt esse daemoniacae, et ab eis daemonibus inventae, ut non desiderentur, et
abominabiles fiant : velut legitur de Mahumeto in Alcorano, qui dum vino et maxime
rubeo vellet gentibus suis interdicere, finxit in quolibet uvae rubeae grano habitare
unum diabolum. Potuit et hoc fingi, ut habentes eas artes essent in majori pretio,
et haberentur ut dii. Fortassis et isti daemones sive angeli introducti sunt, quoniam
cum talia quae retulimus multotiens visa sunt, veluti de oraculis, de omnibus in acre
apparentibus, et de reliquis recitatis, et rude vulgus veras causas non potest capere ;
nam homines isti non philosophi, qui revera sunt veluti bestiae, non possunt capere
Deum, Coelos, et Naturam haec posse operari, creduntque ita esse de intelligentiis,
veluti de hominibus (non enim nisi corporalia capere possunt); ideo propter vulgares
introducti sunt angeli et daemones, quanquam introducentes minime posse esse
illos sciebant." Op. cit. pp. 200, 201.

1 8— 2

2;6 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

mately inexplicable; they are simply given, imposed upon
experience, and are intrinsically incapable, or all but incapable,
of explanation ; there is an analogy of nature, a proportion and
a propriety in it ; but we are hardly able to discover what it is1.
On the other hand he holds to the belief that a process of
causation and an intelligible sequence (of a " sign," as he says,
and a " thing signified ") are to be found even in the case of that
which is most exceptional and therefore most surprising to us2.

His idea of what is possible in nature was of course in some
directions too wide, just as in other directions it would be found
too narrow ; because it was inexact. The astrological view, in
particular, of the order of nature was in a very high degree
vague and indefinite. It left room, no doubt, for marvellous and

o

unexplained phenomena, because it left room for the absurd
and the impossible. It is possible to know much more of the
analogy of nature than Pomponazzi thought possible ; much
more than he knew. Had he known more, he would at once
have dismissed much that he accepted as at least possible. Of
many things which he supposed to be vouched for by experience,
he would have been suspicious to the point of incredulity ; and
a sterner examination of the evidence would have disproved
them. But the things which we are now apt to feel in
stinctively to be outside of the possibilities of nature and beyond
the analogy of nature altogether, he did not feel to be so. For
him, not only miracles, both within and without Christianity, but
magic as well, came within at least the conceivable and credible
possibilities of nature.

We are perhaps learning even at the present moment to
extend our view of the possibilities of nature. It is quite
certain that these can never be arbitrarily limited, and that the
sixteenth century astrologer attained more nearly to the scientific
spirit than many a professed scientist of a later day, hidebound
by prejudice and dogmatism. In its two essentials, in short, he

1 " Proprietatem et proportionem...nobis intelligere aut difficillimum aut impossi
ble est....Sed stamus experimentis." De Nat. Eff. p. 171.

'2 " Non sunt miracula quia sint totaliter contra naturam et praeter ordinem
corporum coelestium ; sed pro tanto dicuntur miracula (i.e. things marvellous or
surprising), quia insueta et rarissime facta, et non secundum communem naturae
cursum, sed in longissimis periodis. " Op. cit. p. 294.

NATURAL LAW IN HUMAN LIFE AND RELIGION 277

possessed the scientific spirit — in an open mind, that is, to the
boundless and often unexpected possibilities of nature, and in a
dependence on experience ("stamus experimentis ").

I should not like to imply, however, that Pomponazzi was
altog-ether unsuspicious in the matter of evidence. On the con
trary, he was, for his time, noticeably cautious and sceptical.
While accepting too much, he rejects many fables ; and much
that he seems to treat too seriously he has only accepted hypo-
thetically, for a non-committal and provisional examination.

This spirit is illustrated in many details.

Pomponazzi for example constantly distinguishes, among
the marvellous stories that are current, those that are true
from those that are false. We must discriminate, he insists,
among the various marvels that are reported — the wonders
alleged by priests or others and the miraculous events related
in Scripture or by the poets. Some of these events and phe
nomena, though strange, are doubtless real ; and of those that
are so, he endeavours to find or to imagine a possible natural
explanation. But many of the stories that are told are as
indubitably false, and are the product either of fraud or of
delusion ; and he is prepared to call in this explanation in the
case of alleged events altogether beyond the possibility of
natural explanation.

Those who accept all such stories without examination and
those who will believe in nothing that seems strange or mys
terious are, he says, equally in the wrong ; and indeed fall into
the same error, of a refusal to discriminate.

In the first place he cannot agree with those who dismiss all
such stories as fraudulent inventions. They are, he says, in
many cases too well authenticated, and by too good authorities.
We must endeavour rather to separate the true from the false;
and in the case of facts which appear to be well established, we
must attempt to find the most feasible and the most natural
explanation1.

1 " Mihi autem non videtur tutum neque sine verecundia dictum, quod a plerisque
dici solet haec experimenta negantibus, haec scilicet esse ab hominibus conficta,
velut Aesopi apologi, ad plebis instructionem : vel quod sunt sacerdotum aucupia
ad subripiendas pecunias, et ut in honorem habeantur, quod si aliquid in his operibus
apparet perfecte, sunt praestigiationes et illusiones, veluti continue videmus in istis

278 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

In many cases, however, he is prepared to accept the
hypothesis of fraudulent or well-intentioned fiction. Thus many
alleged miracles are the inventions of priests for purposes of
gain1. Other marvellous narratives are of the nature of instruc
tive fables, invented by lawgivers or philosophers for an ignorant
and sensuous multitude only capable of learning by sensible
images and concrete representations ; and are imposed on them
for their moral benefit2. The anthropomorphic narratives of
the Old Testament are expressly brought within the scope of
this explanation.

In the same way the fancies of the poets are explained —
e.g. the "metamorphoses" — either as imaginative representations
of natural facts (e.g., the " birds of Diomede ") or as con
sciously intended to set forth moral truth in symbolic form (the
transformation of men into animals, e.g., representing a moral
condition or a moral change)3.

In the case of Scripture narratives, this admission of a
method of accommodation and figurative representation has the
consequence of a spiritual and secret sense in Scripture4.

percursoribus et praestigiatoribus, qui videntur miracula facere, cum re vera nihil
faciant nisi pecuniarum subreptionem a credulis et simplicibus hominibus : ego inquam
hanc sententiam non approbo, quandoquidem viri gravissimi, doctrina eminentissimi,
et novi et veteres, tarn Graeci quam Latini, ac barbari moribus, haec verissima esse
affirmant : quare sic dicentes, omnino audiendi non sunt. Verum hi decipiuntur, cum
aliquando haec fabulosa comperta sint, et aliquando visae sunt illusiones, ex particular!
universale intulerunt : quod ex Dialecticae imperitia provenire manifestum est : neque
enim si aliqua istorum talia sunt, falsa sunt omnia : neque si aliqua eorum quae
referuntur, vera comperiantur, existimandum est omnia esse vera. Utrumvis horum
ex eadem deceptione procedit. Supposito igitur haec fore vera in aliquibus, et maxime
ea quae a fide dignis authoribus referuntur, temptandum est addere absolutionem
istorum." Op. cit. pp. 113 — 115.

1 See e.g. De Imm. xiv. p. 126; De Nat. Eff. p. 146.

2 See op. cit. pp. 114 ; 201, 202 ; 269, etc,

3 Op. cit. pp. 268 — 270.

4 " In veteri lege multa feruntur quae vere non possunt intelligi ut litera sonat...
sed sunt sensus mystici et dicti propter ignavum vulgus quod incorporalia capere non
potest. Sermo enim legum, ut inquit Averroes in sua poesi, est similis sermoni
poetarum, nam quanquam poetae fmgunt quae ut verba sonant non sunt possibiles,
intus tamen veritatem continent. ..nam ilia fmgunt ut in veritatem veniamus, et rude
vulgus instruamus quod inducere oportet ad bonum et a malo retrahere, ut pueri
inducuntur et retrahuntur, scilicet, spe praemii et timore poenae ; et per haec
corporalia ducere in cognitionem incorporalium, veluti de cibo teneriori in cibum
solidiorem ducimus infantes." Op. cit. pp. 201, 202.

NATURAL LAW IN HUMAN LIFE AND RELIGION 279

We are not, however, entitled, merely because an alleged
occurrence is strange and inexplicable, to dismiss it as impossible
and fictitious. For, as Pomponazzi constantly repeats, there are
many things in nature which are marvellous and surprising, and
which are exceptions to ordinary rules.

Where we have reason to believe that the unusual event
did take place, our aim must be to find the simplest explanation
of it, and that which is most in accordance with the other opera
tions of nature. The question that presents itself is how to
account for the facts (salvare experimented)1.

It is characteristic of his sceptical and dialectical manner of
thought, and perhaps also of the vacillation and uncertainty in
his mind, that in very many cases Pomponazzi offers alternative
explanations : and suggests that either the marvellous story or
magical doctrine is untrue, or else, if it be true, that analogies
can be discovered in nature which make it not altogether incon
ceivable, and bring it within the compass of the regular powers
of nature and the astral influences2.

Thus, for example, he proposes to trace the natural
history of apparitions3. He begins by setting aside many
popular fables and priestly inventions. Next, he speaks of
cases in which the apparition is a matter of pure illusion due to
physical causes : the air, in places where there are many graves,
is supposed to be thick and cloudy4, and the appearances it
presents are mistaken by the ignorant and superstitious for
ghostly apparitions — the delusion being aided by imagination,
and terror, and accepted belief5. But certain facts remain as at
least probably authentic, when these causes are allowed for6.
Of this residuum of fact Pomponazzi offers his characteristic
explanation. Refusing to admit a real apparition of departed
spirits, declining also to refer the appearances to angelic or

1 "Supposito igitur haec fore vera in aliquibus, et maxime ea quae a fide dignis
authoribus referuntur, temptandum est addere absolutionem istorum." Op. cit. p. 115.

2 E.g. op. cit. pp. 146, 174, 191, 273—278.

3 Cf. a parallel passage in the De Immortalitate, xiv. p. 125.

4 " In locis sepulchrorum, ut in pluribus, aer est valde crassus, turn ex evapora-
tione cadaverum, turn ex frigiditate lapidum, ex multisque aliis, quae ae'ris spissitudinem
inducunt." Ibid. "Bless me! what damps are here! how stiff an air!" (Henry
Vaughan : The Charnel House).

5 " Adjuvat etiam ad haec imaginatio et universalis fama," etc. Op. cit. xiv. p. 126.

6 Op. cit. xiv. p. 128; De Nat. Eff. p. 159.

280 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

diabolic agency, he puts them down to certain powers in nature,
exercised of course by the astral agencies. As has already been
pointed out, for him the astral is the " natural " explanation.
In the De Naturalium Effectuum Causis he analyses somewhat
more minutely than in the De Immortalitate the manner in which,
on occasion of an apparition, the human mind is affected. In
the first place he refers to the analogy of dreams : if the higher
powers work on the mind in sleep (as was then universally
believed), why not in the waking state also1 ? Coming to the
waking state, he names first the condition most akin to sleep,
that namely of trance or ecstasy2, in which men believe that
they converse with spirits or with the dead, and through which,
he doubts not, divination may be given. Of apparitions in the
ordinary sense three explanations may be supposed. There
may in the first place be a purely subjective illusion: or, secondly,
there may be an objectively real operation — of astral origin ;
and, in the latter case, either an abnormal affection of the organ
of sense or an effect upon the external air. In the first place
what he supposes to happen is that the .thoughts and fancies of
the mind affect the senses, producing an illusory impression
there ; which is the reverse of the normal process3. But he
also admits the possibility of the physical senses being directly
affected by the secret agency of the heavenly powers4: the most
interesting point in the development of this idea is his illustra
tion of it by natural analogies, and by comparison of the mystic
intuitions of prophets with the presentiments of animals5 and
the weather-wisdom of sailors and husbandmen6. Finally, he

1 De Nat. Ef. pp. 157, 159 ff.

2 " Primo enim in raptu et dum extasim patiuntur." Op. cit. p. 163.

3 " Aliis autem haec simulachra a Diis ipsis non solum immittuntur in quiete sive
in somno, sed etiam in vigilia, et firmiter credunt ea vel videre vel audire. Quanquam
non tarn hoc fieri contingit ex simulachris habitis ab extra, verum etiam ab intra per
spiritus transmissos a virtutibus interioribus ad sensus exteriores, ut omnes Peripatetici
concorditer posuerunt." Op. cit. p. 158. " Possibile est etiam hoc accidens fieri in
vigilia, si contingat virtutes interiores reddere species et spiritum transmittere ad
sensus exteriores." Op. cit. p. 163.

4 " Tertio, idem potest contingere in vigilia (et hoc raro) per simulachra genita in
sensibus exterioribus a corporibus coelestibus." Ibid.

D " Ut gallus dicit mutationes temporum — delphin tempestates." Op. cit.
p. 164.

6 " Nautae et agricolae periti certius...judicant quam astrologi scientifici."
Ibid.

NATURAL LAW IN HUMAN LIFE AND RELIGION 281

supposes that a secret power may act directly on the air, causing
in it an unusual perturbation and producing an unusual ap
pearance1. Such are the four causes of apparitions2.

All this may doubtless appear to us fantastic and absurd in
the highest degree — an attempt to explain by imaginary causes
supposed facts which have no existence : yet it represents a real
movement, in an essentially mediaeval mind, towards a consistent
view of the universe, and an attempt to bring all known or
imagined facts within the scope of the powers of Nature in a
wide sense of the words.

That there are any real apparitions of the dead, Pomponazzi
altogether denies. We have in his theory a curiosity of the
history of superstition, namely, the belief in ghosts without
a belief in an existence after death. Necromancy in the strict
sense he declares impossible3, while allowing that, if we could
believe in the immortality of the soul, there would be no absolute
reason to deny the possibility of raising the dead. But real
apparitions of the sorts above described he holds to be possible ;
nor is there conclusive reason to doubt the possibility of their
being produced by human ingenuity, by those who should gain
sufficient knowledge of the conditions which regulate their
occurrence4.

Towards the belief in portents and omens the attitude of
Pomponazzi is much the same. Allowing for a large element of
invention in the stories that are told, he is yet not able to

1 " Quod si in sensibus tales imagines sive in quiete sive in vigilia generari
possunt...nihil est quod vetet quin et corpora coelestia talibus figuris possent aerem
figurare, ubi passum fuerit dispositum, neque hoc est extra experimenta." Op. cit.
p. 158. "Quarto potest et hoc contingere secundum modum quae diximus, videlicet,
quoniam a corporibus coelestibtts aer exterior sic fuerit in convenienti dispositione, et
agens fuerit etiam secundum convenientem dispositionem figurandi tales imagines,
veluti quando acies militum in acre apparent, vel aliquae aliae figurae, quae sint
futurorum praenunciae, ut ex historiis scimus." Op. (it. p. 164.

2 Enumerated in op. cit. pp. 163, 164.

3 Op. cit. pp. 161, 200.

" Si necromantia intelligatur per similitudinem, scilicet aliquid simile mortno...
apud Aristotelem est concedenda, et hoc fieri vi superum ; et fortassis quod ex arti-
ficio, sive hominum ingenio, fieri potest per virtutes herbarum, lapidum, vel harum
consimilium : hoc tamen non afftrmo, multa enim sunt possibilia, quae quoniam nobis
nota non sunt ea negamus ; talia enim non mihi impossibilia videntur." Op. cit.
pp. 161, 162.

282 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

disbelieve them altogether1 ; while at the same time he labours
to bring marvels of this kind also within the regular working of
nature and the heavenly powers. With regard to portents in
nature, and indeed to oracles, prophecies, and marvellous events
generally, he remarks that their occurrence is recorded in con
nection with great events in history, such as the rise and fall of
nations or dynasties, the changes of religions, the birth and death
of remarkable personages, and the like — appropriate occasions, he
suggests, for the special activity of the heavenly influences ; he
quotes, for example, the wonders which are said to have accom
panied the birth of Augustus, of Alexander, of the Saviour of
the world2. For the belief in omens and auguries also he
considers that there is a probable foundation, and he invokes for
it the respectable authority of Plato3. He is chiefly concerned,
however, to bring the connection of omens with their fulfilment
into analogy with the ordinary sequences of events in nature.
Omens are signs ; but so also are all events signs of those that
follow them ; and all natural objects signs of the properties
which are observed to belong to them. Even in the most
ordinary instances we cannot understand w/iy one thing should
thus be linked to another: we can only observe that it is so.
The sequence of omens with their fulfilments is simply another
case of the same kind — established, as Pomponazzi supposes, by
experience, but in itself neither more nor less comprehensible
than any other established sequence4.

He goes so far in this interpretation of nature as a language
of signs as to compare nature's sequences with the arbitrary
symbolism of human invention, as, for example, when a red flag
is taken to mean war and a white flag peace. There is no doubt
a certain natural appropriateness in all such emblems (the red
flag, e.g., being of the colour of blood, and the white suggesting
spotlessness and quiet), but this would not of itself be sufficient

1 De Nat. Eff. pp. 146, 147; 167 — 169.

2 Op. cit. pp. 146, 147; 169; 291 — 293.

3 " Quod plus est, Plato scientiis adnumeravit, voluitque respublicas bene ordinatas
procurare has artes esse in suis civitatibus." Op. cit. p. 168.

4 "Cur autem corvus malum signified, turtur aut grus bonum, hoc per iutellectum
humanum non est inquisibile; sed hoc scimus ex multis experimentis: sicut ignoramus
per quam naturam scammonium purget bilem." Op. cit. p. 170.

NATURAL LAW IN HUMAN LIFE AND RELIGION 283

to declare their meaning. We gather their meaning by
experience. Now herein, he says, " art follows nature " (" ars
imitatur naturam "). In nature, as in the case of an artificial
emblem, we learn by experience to infer from the sign the thing
signified1. If then, as he holds to be established by experience,
a certain omen is constantly followed by a certain event, happy
or unfortunate, the connection between the two is the same as
between any other two related events in nature.

This is not to say that the one is the cause of the other. And
here he adds the just and the relevant distinction that two events
may be constantly connected in experience, and consequently
suggest or " signify " each other, neither of which is either cause
or effect of the other, but which are both effects of the same
cause ; and so, when that cause comes into play, both appear
together2. He takes the example of the connection which we
see to exist between a rainbow and fair weather : we do not say
that the rainbow is the cause of the fair weather, but the rainbow
appears because the cloud grows thin, and the clearing of the
cloud causes the rain to cease. There is here, he remarks,
a double process of inference — from effect to cause and from
cause again to another effect: from the rainbow we may infer the
thinning of the cloud, and from that the cessation of the rain.
Of this sort, he says, must be the connection between an omen
and its fulfilment3.

" Existimandum est talis proprietatis signa ad signata habere quandam proprie-
tatem et proportionem eorum ad invicem, quas nobis intelligere aut difficillimum aut
impossibile est — Sed stamus experimentis, veluti in multis naturalibus ; quia hoc non
dissonat operibus naturae." Op. cit. pp. 170, 171.

2 "Scire tamen oportet, quod stat, per aliquid cognosci aliud, utpote per A
cognosci B, et tamen neque A est causa B, neque idem A est effectus ejusdem B ;
verum quoniam tarn A quam B ab eadem causa procedunt, ideo ex utriusque cognitione
utrumque cognosci potest." Op. cit. p. 171.

3 " Utpote quoniam iris et serenitas ae'ris ab eadem causa procedunt, ideo per irim
judicamus serenitatem futuram, sunt enim ibi quasi duo processus: primus est ab
effectu ad causam, cum ab iride procedamus supra nubis victoriam. Et quoniam
victoria super nubem est causa serenitatis ae'ris ideo ex tali nubis victoria procedimus
ad ae'ris serenitatem, tamquam ex causa super efFectum : quod autem ex iride
inferatur victoria super nubem, et ex victoria super nubem inferatur serenitas, sumitur
nunc tamquam notum quomodocunque illud fuerit notum. Quare in proposito dici
potest, per garritum corvi cognoscitur malum futurum, quoniam utrumque ab eadem
causa procedit : quo fit, ut per unum, alterum cognosci possit." Op. cit. pp. 171, 172.

284 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

The application of this to the omen is less interesting to us
than its application to the rainbow ; the argument than the illus
tration. The point to which I wish to call attention is Pompo-
nazzi's way of approaching the subject. He is wrong in his
facts, but right in his mode of reasoning. What he supposed to
be established in experience, we know to be a fancy altogether
remote from experience and fact. But the appeal to experience
is the main thing. " Stamus experimentis " said Pomponazzi,
and "hoc scimus ex multis experimentis."

He was right also in his view of the way in which nature's
" signs " are to be interpreted. We cannot learn nature's
sequences, which constitute her language of signs, by an a priori
perception of their necessity, but by an observation of them
a posteriori1. True, for us the action of a medicine has a
previous probability, which does not belong to the connection
between a crow and a calamity. But this anticipation of a
probability rests altogether on our larger acquaintance with
nature's language. A priori, or previous to all observation, one
sequence is as likely as another. And Pomponazzi's position was
that of one who, from a standpoint of most imperfect observation,
suggested the true canon for the interpretation of nature.

Palmistry (cliiromantia) he accepts only in so far as it is
possible to set it on a rational basis. He treats it as a branch of
physiognomy2.

If it is to be taken as a fact that there are lucky and unlucky
days, it is a conjunction of which we do not know the cause ; but
there are other repugnances and concurrences in nature which we
have to observe and accept as facts without being able to trace
the reason of them. The rule is thus once more appealed to,
that we must accept the data of experience, many of which will
be to us strange and inexplicable3.

1 " Proprietatem et proportionem (scilicet signorum et signatorum ad invicem)...
nobis intelligere aut difficillimum aut impossibile est....Sed stamus experimentis."
Op. cit. p. 171. " Cur autem corvus malum significet, turturaut grus bonum, hoc per
intellectual humanum non est inquisibile ; sed hoc scimus ex multis experimentis : sicut
ignoramus per quam naturam scammonium purget bilem." Op. cit. p. 170.

2 Op. cit. pp. 172, 173.

3 Thus for example in chemistry, " medici ponunt...aliqua simplicia esse invicem
componibilia, et aliqua non, quorum causas ignoramus : sed tantum in eis dicirr.us

NATURAL LAW IN HUMAN LIFE AND RELIGION 285

Love-philtres and charms he is more than inclined to doubt
altogether1, although he remarks, with probably unconscious
humour, that they are not more unreasonable or improbable than
the causes which actually do produce the amorous passion2. And
if the question be whether "words" can conjure up love —
" verba," a charm — in this sense " words " do so3. If, at any rate,
magic of this sort is to be admitted, it must be explained, says
Pomponazzi, "insequendo viam naturae, et absque daemonibus4."
He accordingly goes on to suggest possible analogies, and
physical modes of explanation, for the action of spells and
charms8.

Pomponazzi occupies himself a good deal with the legendary
transformations or " metamorphoses " of men into beasts — the
turning of the companions of Diomede into birds, of the com
panions of Ulysses into swine or of certain Arcadians into
wolves, as related by the poets. If these are not to be considered
as mere fiction, he first suggests explanations which are in the
technical sense "rationalistic." Thus he quotes Pliny's story
about the gulls or water-fowl called the birds of Diomede, which
cared for the shrine of Diomede on the island off Apulia, and
were alleged to be friendly towards Greeks and hostile to men of
other nations : improving upon it by an anecdote about the dogs
of Rhodes which fawn upon natives of the island but bite strangers,
and adducing the case of his own little dog which could not
abide rustic and poorly clad persons6. Similarly he supposes
the stories about the swine and wolves to have arisen from
metaphorical descriptions of a moral change and deterioration :
men might become like wolves or swine in nature ; and, he adds,
by a characteristic refinement, a physical change might also
attend the moral, and the men become wolfish or swinish in

quoniam talia : quare etiam sic existimo de talibus diebus esse dicendum, aliqua enim
dies convenit uni, quae alteri disconvenit." Op. fit. p. 174.

1 Op. cit. pp. 178, 191.

2 " Concedendum tamen est secundum veritatem, formositatem et dulcia hominis
verba ligare et in sui amorem inducere, ut omnes sciunt." Op. cit. pp. 189, 190.

3 " Isto enim modo verba ligant et verba solvunt." Op. cit. p. 191.

4 Ibid.

5 Op. cit. pp. 192 — 198; cf. 234 — 236.

6 Op. cit. p. 272.

286 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

countenance1. He brings the case of Nebuchadnezzar under
this rationalising explanation.

It is probable that even these suggestions are not more than
half serious, and that he was quite aware that he was dealing
here with fables. It was characteristic of his intellectual
Curiosity and dialectical habits, that he still could not resist
the temptation to bring forward natural analogies to these
metamorphoses. There are transformations in nature, he says,
little less marvellous. Plants and trees are turned into stone ;
for this, he says, is undoubtedly the origin of the stone called
" coral " ; and he quotes a story from Albert and Avicenna of a
tree which fell into the water and was metamorphosed, even a
nest in it being turned to stone, birds and all ! He instances
the power of mineral springs to petrify objects laid in them, and
goes the length of saying that drops of the water itself become
small stones. Again, petrified animals are found (fossils). A
caterpillar becomes a butterfly by a change than which hardly
any could be imagined greater — a worm becoming a flying
thing2.

Coming now to phenomena more properly connected with
religion, we find Pomponazzi maintaining the same attitude
of mind. The miraculous pretensions of priests of his own day
he places on a level of incredibility with such frauds in every

1 "Aliqui autem dixerunt haec intelligenda secundum mores: utpote Arcades
versos esse in lupos, non quod revera essent lupi, neque haberent vere figuram
luporum, sed vivebant more luporum ; et quod in effigie assimilarentur lupis : ut
homines voraces et immanes crudis vescentes carnibus, et fortassis humanis, non
tantum dicuntur lupi ratione morum, imo eis multum in facie horrenda assimilantur.
Et de sociis Ulyssis aliqui facti sunt porci, vel equi, vel quomodocunque fuerunt,
secundum mores et effigiem. Nam veluti effigies inclinat ad mores, sic non minus et
mores variant effigies, nos enim videmus aliquos prius fuisse mansuetos, et cum facie
agnina, et ipsos mutatos in crudeles, facies habere leoninas vel lupinas secundum
diversitatem morum. Imo unus et idem homo in pauca temporis mora sic in effigie
diversificari videtur. Unde quando sunt laeti, honestam et pulchram videntur habere
effigiem: et aliquando ex ira, vel aliqua alia perturbatione, adeo verti videntur et
mutari, ut vix illi primi crederentur. Tanta enim est morum vis et animi passionum."
Op. cit. pp. 270, 271.

2 " Haec autem pro tanto adducta sunt, ut videas contra communem cursum
aliquid in aliud transmutari." "Hoc autem," he adds in his cynical way, "quod
nunc dictum est, ad ingenia exercenda dictum sit." Op. cil. pp. 275, 278. The
passage nevertheless illustrates the bent of his mind.

NATURAL LAW IN HUMAN LIFE AND RELIGION 287

age1. The miracles related in Scripture he brings within the
scope of the same explanations by which he proposes to account
for similar portents in various times and lands2.

Let us take for example his enquiry into the nature of
prophecy, in the sense of the power of divination and miraculous
prediction.

This gift was actually ascribed to the action of a good or evil
spirit3. The argument of St Thomas was this. All men have not
the gift of prophecy : therefore a special cause must be assigned
for the gift where it occurs. From the same causes arise only
the same effects ; and of each specific effect a new and specific
cause must be found, in this case the demoniacal possession.
Again, the gift of prophecy was supposed to fluctuate, and
now to be in exercise and again not ; the variation had to be
accounted for, and was attributed to the arbitrary power of the
demon, giving or withholding the gift according as he was
pleased or displeased.

Pomponazzi met the demand for a causal explanation of these
phenomena, but proposed to refer them to natural causes.
A " natural " explanation for him meant an explanation partly
physical and partly astrological, or rather one that was both
simultaneously, in different aspects. Certain persons, he sug
gested, possess a disposition towards prophecy — a disposition of
course created by the universal powers of nature which he called
the " heavenly powers," and dependent for its exercise upon
these influences. Upon these lines he gave a natural history of
the prophetic gift4. The gift thus implanted is at first only
potential5. Besides that original and potential disposition, there
must also be an " immediate disposition," before the gift comes
into actual exercise. Of this actual exercise of the gift he names
two causes — one is that universal causality of nature which was

1 De hum. xiv. p. 126 ; De Nat. Eff. p. 146, etc.

2 Op. cit. pp. 169 ; 276, 277 ; and esp. 293.

3 True oracles were assigned to angelic aid ; the false oracles of the heathen were
the work of devils ; ",In oraculis homines non loquuntur neque aliquid faciunt, verum
daemones talia operantur ex idololatria commissa a cupientibus scire quod petunt."
Op. cit. p. 232.

4 " Dicitur primo tales homines... ex sua genitura esse taliter dispositos." Op. cit.
p- 225.

5 " Satis remote et quasi in potentia." Ibid.

288 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

conceived by him as the "heavenly powers," and to refer any
matter to which meant (as we should say) to refer it to natural
causes. The other is some immediate incitement calling the
innate power into exercise : such, for example, as the influence
of music upon Elisha, who, although endowed with the prophetic
gift, could not prophesy until the minstrel played1. Thus
instead of the accepted theory of demoniacal possession Pom-
ponazzi offers at once a natural and an astrological explanation2.
For he held that a gift could come into play only on occasion of
a certain celestial conjunction3.

It is true that all men have not the gift, and that, in those
who possess it, it is of variable exercise : human oracles, for
example, are not always true. But these variations are to be
accounted for, without reference to the agency of spirits, by the
variable operation of the causes named — that is, on the one hand,
of the proximate cause which is the particular incitement (acting
on the original endowment or dispositio in potentia and producing
the dispositio propinqua or ultima, the actual exercise of the gift);
and, on the other hand, of the remote or ultimate causality of the
heavenly powers4. He dwells particularly on the former, which
we should call the " natural " causation of the prophetic state5.

1 " Rogatus a rege vaticinari non potuit nisi prius manu imposita super
psalterium, ut deveniret ad ultimam dispositionem ; quamvis enim Elisaeus ex natura
esset vates, non deducebatur tamen ad actum ilium nisi ex ilia immediata dispositione."
Op. cit. p. 226.

2 "Cum quaeritur per quam dispositionem hujusmodi vaticinia operentur, in genere
causae materialis, dicendum est illam remotam et illam propinquam esse (i.e. the
original endowment and the particular incitement), de quibus diximus ; quantum vero
ad formalem et effectivam, est cognitio et similitudo rerum habita a corporibus
coelestibus." Op. cit. pp. 226, 227.

3 " Diversitas namque situum, utpote conjunctionum vel oppositionum in ejusmodi
effectibus, multum diversificat effectus." Op. cit. p. 226.

4 Thus, he says, we read of the Sibyl in Virgil that she could not give her oracle
without the divine afflatus: "Hoc autem erat ex ilia dispositione propinqua per
quam habilitantur ad suscipiendum divines afflatus. ..et inde provenit ut non semper
tales vates vaticinentur, cum non semper sint dispositi, et aliquando magis, aliquando
minus, secundum meliorem passi dispositionem, vel corporum coelestium : diversitas
namque situum, utpote conjunctionum vel oppositionum in ejusmodi effectibus, multum
diversificat effectus." Op. cit. pp. 225, 226.

" Cumque ulterius quaerebatur, an sit in sic vaticinantium potestate sic disponi
et vaticinari, huic dicitur quod non simpliciter : est enim deorum munus et corporum
coelestium. Dico tamen. ..sicut natura adjuvat artem, sic et ars naturam ; quare
multa consuetude et horum solicitudo et reliqua hujusmodi generis multum adjuvant

NATURAL LAW IN HUMAN LIFE AND RELIGION 289

There is thus no question, as St Thomas had implied, of the
same causes producing different effects — of the natural causes, as
he supposed, remaining unchanged while the new facts of the
prophetic state occur or its manifestations vary. On this ground
St Thomas had invoked spiritual agency. But, says Pomponazzi,
the natural causes do not remain unchanged : on the contrary it
is their variation which accounts for the facts1. He accordingly
dismisses the spirit theory as a vulgar superstition2. Combined,
then, with an astrological explanation, we have a natural history
of the prophetic afflatus. Its first condition is an original en
dowment of nature. The gift may take different forms, but it
has its basis in a certain temperament common to all who possess
it3. The melancholic was the poetic temperament ; and we
notice that Pomponazzi treats the endowment of the diviner as
practically identical with that of the poet. Each was to him
equally natural or equally supernatural4. Pomponazzi specifies
the varieties of the prophetic gift : some seers, he says, have
uttered oracles without understanding them, even like birds and
beasts that give omens ; others have had the power of inter
preting their own dreams and oracles ; others again, like Joseph
and Daniel, without themselves seeing visions or pronouncing

se : quare ambo simul conjuncta perficiuntur, ubi reperiantur cetera paria." Op. cit.
pp. 229, 230. And so he continues : " Quod autem dictum est, non omnino esse in
potestate vaticinantis sic vaticinari, manifestum est : cum multotiens volunt et non
possunt, sive sit ex indispositione ipsorum, sive ex diversitate situs corporum
coelestium. Unde fit, ut ilia oracula non semper reperiantur vera." Op. cit. p. 230.

1 "Deus enim non tantum unius est causa verum omnium, quare et omnium
vaticiniorum causa est : secundum tamen alteram et alteram dispositionem coelorum
et dispositionem passi dat unum vaticinium et secundum alteram alterum — Diversi
situs corporum coelestium continue variantur. Passi quoque dispositio, cum fluvibilis
sit, etiam in continua variatione — Modo quis est tarn philosophiae expers qui nesciat
secundum dispositionum (conditions) varietatem et efifectus variari?" Op. cit. pp. 230,
231.

2 " Vulgares autem hoc attribuunt Deo irato vel propitio. Existimant enim cum
non possunt vaticinari, tune daemonem esse iratum : cum abunde vaticinantur, tune
daemonem esse laetum : veluti essent homines ipsi spiritus, modo laeti, modo tristes. "
Op. cit. p. 226. "Vulgares attribuebant hoc (' ut oracula non semper reperiantur
vera ') numinibus iratis, cum veram causam ignorarent. Sed haec est consuetudo
vulgi ; ascribere daemonibus vel angelis quorum causas non cognoscunt." Op. cit,
p. 230.

3 " Isti vates valde similes in dispositionibus sunt ; fere enim omnes sunt melan-
cholici." Op. cit. p. 227.

4 Op. cit. p. 228.

D. 19

2QO PIETRO POMPONAZZI

oracles, have interpreted those of others1. Next, the gift is
capable of being stirred up and the power brought into exercise
by an external excitement, as Elisha's was by music. And,
speaking generally, the gift, although of Divine communication,
and not under the control of him who receives it, admits never
theless of cultivation by art and practice2. He does not enter
into detailed illustration of this fact, he says, but leaves that to
the enquirer ; he lays down clearly, however, a general law3.

A gift of nature, to Pomponazzi, does not necessarily mean a
congenital gift. Some poets and prophets display their power
from their birth. Others give evidence at least of its possession
only after a time, and in some sense seem to acquire it : here
Pomponazzi perhaps contradicts himself a little, having previously
spoken of an original, though only "potential," disposition. Now
he says, " multi efficiuntur vates post ortum, ubi prius erant ad
hoc valde indispositi," and instances some who had learned to be
poets. He goes the length of saying that such persons change
their nature, and from sanguinei become melancholici. It is
interesting to note that this extension of the conception of " gift
of nature " largely relieves it of its artificial and misleading
character. For Pomponazzi the poetic or prophetic endowment
still remained a gift of nature, not to be voluntarily controlled or
acquired by study.

For, finally, it is to him the outstanding characteristic of the
prophetic gift that it is not under the control of its possessor.
As a gift of nature, it is not to be acquired. It is likewise
largely incalculable in its action, a fact which Pomponazzi
explains at once by its own nature and by its dependence on
celestial combinations ; and probably in Pomponazzi's mind
these were not thought of as two different explanations4.

In the same place Pomponazzi discusses the subject of

1 Op. cit. pp. 227, 228.

2 " Ars adjuvat naturam;... consuetude, et horum solicitude et reliqua hujusmodi
generis, multum adjuvant se." Op. cit. pp. 229, 230.

3 " Multis et fere infinitis modis hoc contingere potest secundum diversitatem
situum corporum coelestium, et diversitatem dispositionis passi. Quod si sigillatim
narrare vellemus, neque utile esset, neque possemus : verum diligens inquisitor
secundum quod sibi fuerit conveniens et expediens indagabit, et secundum proprium
modum adaptabit." Op. cit. p. 229.

4 Op. cit. pp. 225, 229, 230,

NATURAL LAW IN HUMAN LIFE AND RELIGION 2QI

relics of the saints possessed (as was believed) of healing power.
In this case St Thomas had used the same argument for angelic
intervention as in the case of the gift of prophecy — the argument
namely from the necessity of finding a sufficient cause of the
varying effects produced through this means. If virtue resided,
said St Thomas, in the bones, etc., themselves, then all such ob
jects would possess the healing power ; and they would exercise
it upon all persons alike : neither of which consequences is in fact
true. Therefore, he concluded, an angelic visitation is the cause
of each act of healing. Pomponazzi denied the inference and
offered a natural explanation of the facts. His explanation is
twofold. First, he says, much may be assigned to the power of
imagination and belief1; and this will explain why some are
healed and not others2. Secondly, he accounts for the variation
observed in phenomena of this class by a purely physiological
explanation : persons differ in physical constitution ; and so, he
suggests, their bodies may have different effects, in relation, say,
to various diseases, or to the diseases of various persons. This
he says is a sufficient explanation, without resort to angelic
agency, of the supposed fact of the relics of some persons and
not of others possessing a healing property ; and of their healing
one person and not another3.

Pomponazzi next devotes a considerable space to the
subject of answers to prayer, and endeavours to discover a
possible explanation of the fact, which he is not prepared to
dispute, that prayers are answered.

The instance he selects is one recorded by Valerius Maximus,
of the inhabitants of Aquila whose prayers against long-continued
rain were followed by the cessation of the rain, and also by an
apparition of their patron saint, Celestinus. He also compares
with this case that of the Bolognesi to whom appeared their
patron saint, Petronius. He thus examines simultaneously

1 " Ex imaginatione credentis." Op. cit. p. 232.

2 " Visum estenim superius, et medici ac philosophi hoc sciunt, quantum operentur
fides et imaginatio sanandi et non sanandi. Unde si essent ossa canis, et tanta et tails
de eis haberetur imaginatio, non minus subsequeretur sanitas. Imo multa corpora
venerantur in terris, quorum animae patiuntur in inferno, juxta Augustini sententiam."
Ibid.

3 Op. cit. pp. 232, 233.

19 — 2

PIETRO POMPONAZZI

the question of the efficacy of prayer and that of visions of the
saints.

A direct causality in the act of prayer is of course out of the
question1. He also considers and dismisses the hypothesis of
chance coincidence2. He then suggests two possible explana
tions of the phenomena, the second in two slightly different
forms.

The first natural explanation suggested is a highly strained
theory of the power of the human mind over matter ascribed to
Avicenna3.

Although he does not himself accept this theory, Pomponazzi
develops it in his usual impartial way. In nature, he says, there
are material objects, such as certain herbs, trees, stones, etc.,
which have an influence upon the weather : then why not also
the " animal spirits " in men, especially in a large number of
men gathered together and desiring the same thing4? Thus the
human thought and wish should produce their own objects, not
by way of mere illusion, but in physical reality5. The effects
thus produced by the mind in nature will be proportionate to

1 " Si ex orationibus et precibus Aquilanorum remoti sive fugati sunt imbres, non
videtur in quo genere causae preces Aquilanorum hoc fecerint : nam non est dicere
orationes effective hoc fecisse, veluti sol fugat nebulas, hoc enim videtur purum esse
figmentum : nam non movenclo localiter neque alterando, utpote exsiccando : quoniam
istud nullam verisimilituclinem habet, veluti manifestum est." Op. cit. p. 214. Cf.
p. 243: "Neque propulsaverunt imbres."

2 Op. cit. pp. 236, 243, 245.

3 " Sustinendo itaque preces operatas fuisse, dicitur quod si via Avicennae
teneretur, manifesta est responsio : cum namque hominis animae voluntas et maxime
imaginativa fuerint vehementes, elementa, venti, et reliqua materialia sunt nata
obedire eis. Quo fit, cum Aquilanorum animae fuerint valde intentae, nihil est mirum
si imbres fugati sunt." Op. cit. p. 237.

4 "Etiam aliter et peripatetice dicendum est secundum ea quae in superioribus
adducta sunt : dictum est herbas, arbores, lapides, et multa alia reperiri, quorum aliqua
imbres inducunt, aliqua vero fugant, aliqua grandines, aliqua tonitrua et fulgura, ut
manifestum est. Una herba enim fugat epilepsiam,et altera promovit. Laurus adversatur
fulminibus et nux arbor dicitur eis convenire. Quare, nihil prohibet vapores tantos et
tales sic affectos (sunt enim taliter affecti qualiter spiritus infirmi) in tanta multitudine
fuisse potentes, ut imbres expellerent, nam repugnantiam habent ad imbres : si enim
possunt inducere sanitatem et languorem, nihil videtur obstare, quin et imbres possint
expellere : sunt enim veluti quaedam aegritudo : et tempore siccitatis velut sanitas. "
Op. cit. pp. 237, 238.

5 " Species siccitatis realiter causat siccitatem, et humiditas humiditatem."
Op. cit. p. 238.

NATURAL LAW IN HUMAN LIFE AND RELIGION 293

the force and intensity of the mind's desires, and this will be the
reason why the most earnest and heartfelt prayers are said to be
the most effectual1.

St Thomas had pressed the question why St Celestinus should
appear in the abbey dedicated to his name and St Petronius
in Bologna ; and he had argued from this discrimination the
really supernatural (i.e. angelic) character of the apparitions.
But Pomponazzi shows how this can be accounted for on the
physical theory; since, if the appearances in the air were due to
physical influences proceeding from the onlookers, the result
would naturally be in the case of those who looked to
St Celestinus a vision of that saint, but a vision of St Petronius
to those who held him as their patron2. Accordingly Pom
ponazzi contrasts such a natural mode of explanation, just as he
had done in the case of the gift of prophecy, with the theory of
spiritual agencies ; and he stigmatises the latter as a vulgar
superstition3.

Pomponazzi suggests further that this notion of the real
connection between prayers and their fulfilment can be sup
ported on astrological grounds. The bells, for example, rung
by the Aquilani, if made of certain metals or under certain
constellations, might have the same power over the weather
which through the same influences resided in certain natural

1 " Hujusmodi autem effectus non semper succedunt, quoniam vel agens non est
aeque potens, vel natura est magis rebellis, et multo validiora sunt promoventia ad
unam partem quam ad contrarium. Unde si preces Aquilanorum non fuissent aeque
potentes ut tune fuerunt, et si non provenissent ab imo corde, fortassis tarn cito imbres
non fuissent expulsi. Quare dici consuevit, ut preces valeant, ab imo corde debent
provenire, et esse ferventes : quoniam sic spiritus melius afficiuntur, et supra materiam
fiunt valid iores ; non ut flectant intelligentias (quoniam omnino sunt immutabiles) sed
ut magis afficiantur." Op. cit. pp. 238, 239.

- " Ex hoc ulterius patet quomodo potuit apparere Aquilae et in abbatia vel in
proximo abbatiae divo Coelestino dicatae imago eius ; nam illi vapores erant figurati
specie divi Coelestini, qui taliter affecti poterant eadem similitudine aerem figurare et
realiter et spiritualiter." Op. cit. p. 239. " Patet etiam ulterius, quare Aquilae non
apparuerit divus Petronius, et Bononiae divus Coelestinus, quoniam vapores et
spiritus Aquilanorum erant affecti similitudine Coelestini, et Bononiensium similitudine
Petronii." Op. cit. p. 240.

:J " Cum ignavum vulgus ista ignoraret, cum succedunt vota, dicunt Deos vel
Sanctos fuisse sibi propitios et orationes sibi fuisse gratas ; cum vero non succedunt
Deos et Sanctos esse iratos; quandoquidem haec talia habeant causam quam diximus."
Ibid.

294 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

objects. And similar power might reside in men (" ex dono
coeli "), just as certain men have the power of healing those that
are possessed1. This is offered as an enlargement or modification
of Avicenna's physical theory.

Eventually, however, he dismisses this whole explanation as
far-fetched and inapplicable to the facts in question2.

His own theory of the connection between prayers and their
fulfilment is a different one. It is that the prayers are included
with the fulfilment in one Divine purpose, as a stage in it or
incident of it — not indeed, in one sense, necessary to its ac
complishment, but ordained in the course of its execution " for
the good of men." It is not correct to say that prayers change
God's purpose ("preces nihil novi induxerunt in Deum "), still
less that the prayers cause their fulfilment (" neque preces in
duxerunt serenitatem "). It would be equally untrue to say that
the prayers are worthless, seeing they are part of the Divine
ordinance3. Media they are, but not causes of the fulfilment ;
an appointed step towards the execution of the Divine purpose4.

He lays stress on the idea that, while our prayers are media,
they are not necessary to the fulfilment of the Divine purpose.

1 "Juxta quoque hanc imaginationem non est incredibile aliquem hominern sub
tali constellatione natum, nt" imperet mari, ventibus, et tempestatibus. Si enim aliqua
herba vel lapis possunt hoc facere per virtutes a coelis impressas, ut concedunt
philosophi, et piscis tarn parvus retinere navim CC. pedum undique remis et ventis
agitatam, quare non et homo ? non sicut Avicennae ascribitur, sed alterando.
Considerentur virtutes occultae rerum, et apparebit haec esse possibilia. Item
contingit aliquem esse hominem ex dono coeli, qui sanet demoniacos ; nam et multae
herbae et lapides dicuntur tales ex coelorum munere." Op. cit. pp. 241, 242.

2 " Quod enim spiritus sive vapores affecti simulacro divi Coelestini talia operati
fuerint, videtur satis remotum et maxime quod sic in unum convenerint ut in tali aeris
parte et non in alia apparuerint. " Op. cit. pp. 253, 254.

3 "Nee tamen dicemus preces fuisse vanas neque non ordinatas ad finem... quoniam
sunt media a Deo ordinata ut serenitatem consequantur." Op. cit. p. 244.

4 " Preces nihil novi induxerunt in Deum, ut manifestum est : neque preces induxe
runt serenitatem, quando ex supposito solus Deus operatus est, cui cuncta ad nutum
parent. Nee tamen dicemus preces fuisse vanas neque non ordinatas ad finem.
Hoc igitur in hoc casu dicendum est, quod si quis recte consideraverit, videbit tamen
preces operatas fuisse, id scilicet, quoniam sunt media a Deo ordinata ut serenitatem
consequantur, nihil inducendo in Deo neque aliquid in acre, sive movendo localiter,
sive alterando, neque realiter neque spiritualiter. Aquilani itaque tantum executi sunt
voluntatem et ordinem Dei, qui vult talem effectum producere ipsis Aquilanis sic
precantibus : et tune dicitur Aquilanos fuisse exauditos, quoniam quod petebant
habuerunt, cum tamen nihil in Deo causarint neque effective concurrerint ad talem
effectum." Op. cit. pp. 244, 245.

NATURAL LAW IN HUMAN LIFE AND RELIGION 295

This determines his whole view of prayer, to which I shall refer
presently1. In this way he answers an objection which he
imagines might reasonably be brought forward — namely, that
the fulfilment of the prayer, as for example a change in the
weather, is a matter of necessity and due to necessary causes ;
whereas the offering of the prayer is contingent on the human
will. The answer is that the appointed connection, in the
Divine will, between the prayers and their fulfilment is not a
causal connection. The result is not produced by our prayers
and may be without our prayers ; as, on the other hand, the
prayers may be offered without being followed by a fulfilment.
For indeed, he goes so far as to say, the prayers do not exist,
are not offered, for the sake of the fulfilment. The true end and
object of prayer, his point is to affirm, is not the fulfilment, but
something elsea.

This brings us to the very interesting theory which Pom
ponazzi develops, of the nature and use of prayer. Prayer does
not secure its fulfilment by a necessary causation ; conversely
the 'obtaining of the fulfilment is not necessary to the utility and
benefit of prayer, for, as Pomponazzi puts it, the prayer does not
exist for the sake of that result. Prayers often go unfulfilled ;
yet they are not therefore useless (vanae). He distinguishes two
ends (fines) of prayer : a " separable " and an " inseparable " end.
The former is " ad obtinendum votum, utpote sanitatem " ; " et
hie finis est secundarius, et multotiens frustratur." The latter is
" pietas et in Deum religio " ; and " nunquam frustrari potest, si
ardenti menti sit." Whether therefore we obtain the things we
ask or not, we ought still to pray ; for indeed it may be better
for us to be refused than to be heard. This may be so in two
ways. In the first place, the refusal may exalt our piety to
a higher level; and in an argument that reminds us of the
De Immortalitate, Pomponazzi claims that it is a higher virtue to

1 "Posset etiam sine ipsis (Aquilanis) Deus illos effectus producere : verum cum
cuncta ordinet et disponat secunclum modum convenientissimum ideo pro hominum
bono ordinavit tale medium." Op. cit. p. 245.

2 "Pro hominum bono ordinavit tale medium." Cf. op. cit. p. 248, " Imbres
possunt fugari absque precibus nostris ; et nostrae preces possunt esse non sequentibus
propulsionibus imbrium, ut manifestum est ; neque sequitur preces ordinari ad talia,
esseque causales."

296 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

pray disinterestedly than to insist upon our desires. Again, it
may be better for us that our prayers should remain unanswered,
when we have asked for something that would do us harm. It is
in this sense that Plato and other philosophers have commanded
us to pray ; we are not, according to Plato, to say, "O God, give
us this," but in the words of the poet cited by him we are to
say — "Give, O God, both to those who pray and to all men
all that is good ; and avert all evil from them that seek of
Thee1."

In this sense prayers are a good thing2 and never useless or
vain3. They always fulfil their end where they are sincere (" si
ardenti mente sint "). But they are in a sense an end to them
selves as constituting in men piety and virtue4.

Pomponazzi takes the opportunity of vindicating the philoso
phers from the charge of impiety. On this view of prayer, he

1 " Imo scire debes saltern apud philosophos nunquam preces esse vanas. Unde
orationes et quasi omnes virtutes duos habent fines, unum scilicet per se, et insepara-
bilem ; alterum vero fere per accidens et separabilem. Exempli gratia, preces diis
factae duos habent fines, unum ad obtinendum votum, utpote sanitatem, et hie finis
est secundarius, et multotiens frustratur : alter vero est pietas et in Deum religio : et
hie finis est inseparabilis, ut nunquam frustrari possit, si ardenti mente fit. Quare
sive votum succedat, sive non succedat, nunquam debemus vacare ab orationibus.
Imo fortassis melius est ut vota non succedant quam ut succedant. Primo quidem
quoniam sic perfectior videtur esse virtus : ut amans sine spe praemii studiosior est
amante spe praemii, et persistens in amore, non consequente aliquo praemio, verius
amat persistente in amore ex consecutione praemii. Quare, cum apud physicos
felicitas consistat in actu virtutis, quanto major est virtus, tanto major est felicitas.
Cum itaque amor et reverentia sine praemio extrinseco sint majores quam cum tali
praemio, ergo sic perstans efficitur felicior. Secundo quoniam quae optamus, multo
tiens nobis non expediunt : quae natnque profutura credimus, multotiens obsunt, et e
converse : veluti saepissime experti sumus : cognovimusque ubi res non successit,
quod nobis magis conduxit, quam si successisset : et si successisset, fuisset in
perniciem. Quare preces apud philosophum nunquam sunt vanae, sed recte factae.
Unde Plato in 2 Alcibiade docet nos quomodo debemus orare. Non enim dicere
debemus, Deus da nobis hoc : quoniam fortassis illud non convenit nobis. Verum
secundum poetam ab eo citatum, talis esse debet : Jupiter, sive Deus, optima quidem
et voventibus et non voventibus tribue, mala autem, poscentibus quoque, abesse, jube.
Quod et concordat dicto Salvatoris nostri : scilicet, Nescitis quid petatis." Op. cit.
pp. 248 — 250.

2 "Optimae." Op. cit. p. 236.

3 "Nee tamen dicemus preces fuisse vanas neque non ordinatas in finem."
Op. cit. p. 244.

4 "Cum cuncta ordinet et disponat secundum mod urn convenientissimum, ideo
pro hominum bono ordinavit tale medium." Op. cit. p. 245.

NATURAL LAW IN HUMAN LIFE AND RELIGION

says, true prayer is never in vain. It is the common view, on
the other hand, which makes all those prayers vain that do not
obtain their request. As always, Pomponazzi is concerned to
claim the highest ethical worth and sanction for the view which
he believes to be the more scientific. And he finds in the
tendency to measure prayer by its visible results and identify
the efficacy of prayer with material fulfilments, only a fresh
instance of the earthly and materialistic habit of the vulgar
mind, which sees worth only in bodily satisfactions. It deems
that the inward and spiritual exist for the sake of the material,
while the truth is the exact contrary of this1.

Pomponazzi adds2 a further explanation of fulfilled prayers,
which he introduces as a third theory but treats as practically a
modification (which it is) of the theory just described. It is that
a certain state of mind, represented by devout prayer, constitutes
a condition or " disposition " upon which God can give his gifts
in answer. In this sense the prayer has a real part in its own
fulfilment.

This idea of prayer, and of religiousness in general, as a
dispositio which, without changing God or the heavenly powers,
yet introduces a condition on which an intended gift can be
given, brings religion itself more expressly within the operation
of the Divine purposes3.

This turn of his thought accordingly gives Pomponazzi the
first opportunity of introducing his characteristic conception of
the several religions as Divinely ordained and favoured by the
celestial influences. Each of them in its time and place might
constitute such a " recta et ordinata dispositio " as might afford
the occasion for a Divine response to prayers duly offered. He

1 "Ex his sequitur, falso philosophos criminari de impietate, et quod secundum
philosophos non debent Dii orari, quandoquidem non sint flexibiles, neque nostras
audiant preces : patet autem secundum philosophos Deos esse orandos, neque unquam
preces esse vanas, quandoquidem finis per se est inseparabilis qui longe praestantior
est fine per accidens. Verum, secundum vulgares, preces videntur esse vanae, si
quod petitur non impetratur. Existimant enim felicitatem consistere in bonis
corporalibus : creduntque virtutes et spiritualia ordinari in corporalia, quoniam tantum
ilia percipiunt. Non vera religio tenet hoc sed vulgus prophanum : et revera qui de
philosophia non participat, bestia est." Op. cit. pp. 250, 25 r.

2 Op. cit. p. 251.

3 " Intendens namque finem, intendit ea quae sunt ad finem." Ibid.

298 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

instances marvellous events occurring under the Christian, the
Hebrew, the Roman religions1.

In this connection (leaving the line of thought he had just
been following with regard to prayers unfulfilled, and returning
to the topic of portents and other recognised answers to prayer)
he reverts to the combined astrological and natural explanations
which we have already examined. In dreams, he says, the form
of Divine communication, the subject of the vision, differs
according to the particular religious belief of the time and
country : why not also in other communications ? These
differences of peoples and religions are of course referred to
astral influences. Simultaneously he relapses into the thoroughly
sceptical and rationalising supposition that the phenomena wit
nessed by the Aquilani and the Bolognesi might be physically
identical, although those affected by them interpreted them
according to their respective religious prepossessions2.

This last explanation, then, by the place each religion
occupies in the designs of the heavenly powers — " recta et
ordinata dispositio " — has the advantage of explaining not
answers to prayer only, but all the (so-called) supernatural or
abnormal phenomena connected with the religions3.

The view thus suggested, of the various religions of history,
was further developed by Pomponazzi in answer to another
question.

The question was asked — Why did the heathen oracles cease
at the coming of the Saviour? And this raised the previous
question — By what power were the oracles and miracles of pre-
Christian religion produced ? The accepted answer was that
heathen oracles and wonders were the work of demons, and that
at Christ's coming the devil was deprived of his power — "cast
out" and "bound4."

1 " Nam corpora coelestia faventia tali legi in hoc tempore, et durante tali influxu
pro tali lege, ordinant hoc medium ad consequendum talem effectum." Op. cit. p. 251.

2 " Possibile tamen est, ut effigies visa Aquilae vere non fuerit similis Coelestino :
sed Aquilani videntes tale simulachrum dixerunt illud fuisse Coelestini, et si
Bononienses tale interea vidissent, dixissent illud fuisse divi Petronii." Op. cit. p. 253.

3 " Uterque tamen modus stare potest ; et iste secundus modus dictus, est multum
conformis his quae visa sunt in aere...et reliquis quae facta fuerunt non intercedemibus
precibus." Ibid.

4 Op. cit. p. 218.

NATURAL LAW IN HUMAN LIFE AND RELIGION 299

This view of the matter naturally did not commend itself to
Pomponazzi. He sought instead to bring the history of religions,
with all other facts in experience, under the general laws of
nature. Ultimately of course for him this meant to refer the
facts in question to the Divine Will, working through the
celestial powers ; and, incidentally, he states with unusual clear
ness that the " celestial " agencies were really the instruments
of the Divine causality1. But besides this general assertion of
the Divine causality in them, he brings the whole phenomena of
religious history — the changes of religious belief, and the phases
of thaumaturgic power — under certain universal laws of nature.
Of these facts as of all others, he suggests, there is a natural and
a rational explanation ; in them the powers that are at work in
all nature are still operative ; and they are subject to the laws
and conditions that govern nature generally — the laws of change,
of development, of growth and decay, and transformation in
decay.

Accordingly, in undertaking to explain the cessation of the
heathen oracles, he sets out from some highly general considera
tions about the law of change in mortal things. Whatever has
begun, he says, must cease to be : its duration is limited, and it
has its appointed stages of growth and decay. Once more, every
mortal thing, when it passes away, generates in its decline some
thing different from itself2.

1 "Quod igitur ex aliquibus verbis vel signis factisque in alicuius Dei existimati
reverentia aliquando prosint, aliquando vero non prosint, non ex toto est extra
rationem. Secundum enim communiter mine opinantes hoc provenit ex arte
daemonum vel angelorum : verum verisimilius videntur haec fieri ex corporum
coelestium dispositione, in virtute tamen principali Dei et intelligentiarum moventium
talia corpora coelestia. " (Op. cit. pp. 288, 289.) "Cum continua et aeterna sit talis
vicissitude, habet causam aeternam per se. In nullam autem aliam causam reduci
potest, nisi in corpora coelestia, Deum, et intelligentias. Ergo ista naturaliter sunt
a corporibus coelestibus." Op. cit. pp. 290, 291.

2 " Unumquodque quod incipit, sive sit animatum, sive sit inanimatum, sive
substantia, sive accidens, sive unum per se sive unum per alligationem, sive sit natura,
sive ad placitum, habet et ilia tempora superius annumerata, videlicet, augmentum,
statum, et declinationem, licet in multis ipsorum non sit bene perceptibile, ut sunt ea
quae per longum tempus durant, quales sunt res inanimatae, ut flumina, maria, urbes,
leges et sic de reliquis hujusmodi." Op. cit. pp. 280, 281.

3OO PIETRO POMPONAZZI

With great deliberation he applies the law of origin, growth,
and decline to religions1.

Changes, then, in religion are appointed by the heavenly
powers, and accomplished according to the universal law of
natural mutation. We see the Divine Hand in the rise and fall
of empires, for instance Rome and Persia : why not then in the
succession of religious systems, which are both greater and more
enduring than earthly kingdoms2 ?

It is a consequence of this conception that the thaumaturgic
powers, which according to Pomponazzi depend upon certain
natural causes and certain astral influences, are transferred at
each epoch of change to that system of religious belief and
practice which holds the pre-eminence.

Here, also, as we have previously seen, we find the explana
tion of accepted and successful prayer. That prayer has power
with God which is offered according to the forms and in the
spirit of the religion which is in the ascendant at any particular
period of time — of the religion, I think we may say, interpreting
the spirit and intention of Pomponazzi's thought, although per
haps going beyond the letter, which is the highest that the world
has reached at each stage of its history3.

The same principle accounts for the validity of charms and

1 "Ex his suppositis respondetur ad dubitationem, quod cum oracula incoeperint
et oracula debebant finem capere : veluti et omne individuum generabile et corrupti-
bile. Si quod autem corrumpitur, alterum ex eo generatur, quod corrupto contraria-
tur." (Op. cit. p. 282.) "Lex habet augmentum et statum, veluti et caetera generabilia
et corruptibilia." Op. cit. p. 284.

2 "Videat aliquis quomodo Romulus ex pastore tarn cito ad tantum gloriae
culmen pervenerit. quomodo Roma tarn breviter mundi caput facta fuerit : si quis
enim moclum viderit, illud videbit factum fuisse deorum procuratione, modo pro ipsis
Romanis bellando, modo in somnis monendo, modo secundum diversas figuras
apparendo et per reliqua hujusmodi ingenia. Sic quoque licet inspicere de aliis
regnis. Videant, quaeso, quid de Cyro in primo libro, quae de Hierone in 23, quae
de Habide in 44 libro Justinus historicus scribit. Quare, cum magis Deus et corpora
coelestia habeant procurare de legibus et religionibus quam de ipsis regibus et regnis :
sunt enim diuturniores et longe nobiliores : quandoquidem et a regibus colantur et
instruantur." Op. cit. pp. 292, 293.

3 "Nam veluti mine orationes factae valent ad multa, sic tempore illorum deorum
hymni dicti in eorum laudem proficiebant tune : proficiebant autem quoniam tune
sidera illis favebant diis ; mine vero non favent, quoniam pro-pitia sunt istis qui mine
sunt." Op. cit. p. -288.

NATURAL LAW IN HUMAN LIFE AND RELIGION 301

exorcisms, and for the invalidity of the same things at other
times1. He applies this idea of a relative and temporary efficacy
to the crucifix of the Christian, as well as to the sacred symbols
of other faiths2.

It is a leading idea with Pomponazzi that the thaumaturgic
powers resident (under celestial influence) in man and in nature
have their most marked activity on occasion of the initiation of
a new religion. At such times men present themselves gifted
with unusual powers. And in this he sees a peculiar fitness and
Divine intention, seeing that the change from one religion to
another is so momentous in itself and so difficult to effect3.

He describes the powers possessed by such men, whom, he
says, we may justly call " sons of God." They reveal mysteries,
they predict the future ; they heal the sick, and have power even
over the winds and seas, and the elements of nature. Without
these powers, the great task of planting a new religion could not
be accomplished4. At the same time he sees in such powers
only what is natural — only a particular manifestation of forces
and potentialities permanently resident in different degrees in
various beings in nature5.

He lays stress on the vocation of the founders of religions.
But through the operation of the same powers by which they
exercise their office, such persons are predicted beforehand, and
followed afterwards by others who share their peculiar endow
ment. These successors, at least for a time, wield the same

1 See note i, p. 299.

2 " Crux ipsa ex se nihil potest nisi quatenus est signum Legiferi, quern tantum
curant nunc sidera ; et non solum ipsum sed omnia etiam consequentia tantum
extollunt." Op. cit. p. 290. "Nam tempore idolorum nihil niagis vilipendio ipsa
cruce erat ; tempore autem succedentis legis nihil magis in honore ipsa cruce : tempore
idolorum nihil honorabilius nomine Jovis ; tempore succedentis legis, nil detestabilius.
Quo fit, nihil inconvenire, si nunc nomini Jesu et signo crucis languores expellantur,
tune vero minime ; quoniam nondum venerat ejus hora." Op. cit. pp. 285, 286.

3 " Cum autem legum mutatio sit maxima mutatio, et difficile sit a consuetis ad
maxime inconsueta transire, ideo oportet pro secunda lege succedenda inconsueta
mirabilia et stupenda fieri. Quare a corporibus coelestibus in adventu novae legis
debent prodi homines miracula facientes." Op. cit. p. 283.

4 "Aliter enim non possunt novos usus et novos mores ita dissimiles inducere."
Ibid.

5 " Quod sparsum est in herbis, lapidibus, et animalibus rationalibus et irrationalibus
unitum videtur esse in eis, ex Dei et intelligentiarum munere." Ibid,

302 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

Divine power (deitatem} — either deriving it from their founder as
iron touched by a magnet becomes a magnet itself, or obtaining
it directly from the same source as the founder1.

Exceptional powers of this sort are not, in the belief of
Pomponazzi, confined to one religion ; but the like miracles as
are recorded of the beginning of the Christian religion attended
the foundation of the Mosaic and Pagan and Mohammedan
religions2. And it is in this connection that Pomponazzi explains
that what he means by a miracle is not anything contrary to
nature or to the orderly working of the heavenly powers, but
only an operation very rare and infrequent, and out of the usual
course of nature.

Besides a natural origin and growth, religions have also their
decay. The time comes to each to decline and give way to
another3. Religious systems may stand so long that this truth
has become obscured : the law of change seems not to apply to
them, and it looks as if they had always been and were to endure
for ever. But it is not really so4.

Finally, Pomponazzi applies this law of change and necessity
of decline to Christianity itself. It had its origin with signs and
portents, and marvellous powers persisting for a time ; but now,
he says, it is evident that these powers have declined, and a chill
and lethargy as of death are falling once more upon a religion

1 "Non solum unus talis primus est sed sunt etiam multi qui vel eandem
deitatem ab eodem primo recipiunt vel earn recipiunt a consimili influxu intendente
dictam legem perficere — Unde videmus tales legum conditores per multa vaticinia et
multos prophetas certitudinaliter praedici per niulta secula ante : videmus in eorum
ortu magna prodigia, in eorum vita stupendiora : et si lex ilia debet multum propagari,
ille legifer multos habet sequaces, qui vel deitatem ab illo recipiunt, sicut aliquod
ferrum, ex virtute quam recipit a magnete, ferrum aliud potest trahere, vel ab eadem
influentia, quae est pro illo legifero. " Op. cit. p. 284.

3 " Videat aliquis legem Moysi, legem gentilium, legem Mahumeti : in unaquaque
lege fieri miracula, qualia leguntur et memorantur in lege Christi : hoc autem videtur
consonum ; quoniam impossibile est tantam fieri transmutationem sine magnis prodigiis
et miraculis." Op. cit. pp. 293, 294.

3 " Cumque talis ambitus et coelorum influxus cessabit et declinabit, sic et lex
labefactari incipiet, donee in nihil convertatur ; veluti contingit et de caeteris genera-
bilibus et corruptibilibus." Op. cit. p. 285. Cf. p. 294: "Ilia oracula debebant
deficere quoniam et incoeperant."

4 " Propter brevitatem temporis in aliquibus non latet (sell, quod corruptibiles
sint leges), sed ob temporis longinquitatem latet in aliis ; quare existimatur sic semper
fuisse, et in aeternum duratura." Op. cit. p. 285.

NATURAL LAW IN HUMAN LIFE AND RELIGION 303

that has passed its prime and is moving towards the end of its
appointed period1.

A further idea, more obscurely indicated, is that of a returning
cycle of religious forms. Albert2 had spoken of a periodicity in
the gifts of heaven : Aristotle3 had remarked how philosophy
repeats itself and the same ideas recur. So the forms of religion,
while perpetually succeeding one another, and, as individuals, of
a possibly infinite number, are not infinite " secundum species."
They come " per circulum et vicissitudines." With regard to
religious forms it holds true that " nihil est quod simile non
fuerit, et consimile non erit : nihil erit quod non fuit, nihil
fuit quod non erit4." Although he does not illustrate these
remarks by examples, they show that Pomponazzi had observed
the common features and parallelisms of different religions.
But it is true at the same time that no individual perishable
thing can either last for ever or return identically the same a
second time ; no earthly existence or institution can escape the
law of change5. Thus, he says, it is proved by reason as well
as by history, that religions are subject to a natural law of
growth and decline.

1 " Signum autem hujus est, scilicet quod ita sit in legibus veluti in generabilibus
et corruptibilibus, videmus enim ista et sua miracula in principio esse debiliora, postea
augeri, deinde esse in culmine, deinde labefactari, donee in nihil revertantur. Quare
et nunc in fide nostra omnia frigescunt, miracula desinunt, nisi conficta et simulata :
nam propinquus videtur esse finis." Op. cit. p. 286.

2 Op. cit. p. 287.

3 Op. cit. p. 295.

4 Op. cit. p. 290.

5 " Quod autem haec, et si non vere, tamen consequenter ad dicta philosophorum
dicta sint, ratione et ex historiis probatur. Ratione quidem, quoniam secundum
philosophos, maxime secundum Platonem et Aristotelem, mundus est aeternus, neque
infinita secundum speciem esse possunt, neque unquam fuerunt, neque erunt unquam :
quandoquidem de istis corruptibilibus nihil secundum individuum potest perpetuari.
Unde ritus qui nunc sunt, infinities fuerunt secundum speciem, et infinities erunt,
nihilque est quod simile fuerit, et consimile non erit : nihil erit quod non fuit, nihil
fuit quod non erit. Quare, cum continua et aeterna sit talis vicissitude, habet causam
aeternam per se; in nullam autem aliam causam reduci potest, nisi in corpora coelestia,
Deum, et intelligentias ; ergo ista naturaliter sunt a corporibus caelestibus. Huic
autem consonat quod dicitur a Plutarcho in principio vitae Sertorii, sic enim scribit :
Non est fortasse mirandum per infinitum tempus, alibi aliter fortuna influente, res
humanas in eundem saepius casum deferri." Op. cit. pp. 290, 291.

INDEX OF REFERENCES

POMPONAZZI

Apologia (Venice, 152;;)

I. ii. 56 b.... 99, 100

iii 98

57c 103

57d 103

58 100

58d 123, 127, 168, 202

59 I0°

59a 103, 104, 108, no,

114, 119, 122, 124,
127

59b 107, 116, 118, 134

59 c 103, 105, 106, 114,

131, 217

59d 100, 103, 106, 109,

in, 217

6oa 109

Commentariiis in libros Aristotelis de
Anima, ed. by L. Ferri (Rome, 1876)

ii 124

24 62

26 138

28 233

29 242

33-35 i?2

33 178-180, 184, 185,

245

34 178, 179. 181

35 181, 184

48 90

83-87 141

84 i4i-H3» HS. 147-

149, 171

85-87 143

85 142-145. 148-152

86 59, 138, 143, 151-

157
87-89 159

D.

87 15°. i55-r58, 160-

163, 203

88 141, 160, 162-164,

203

89 141, 159, 164-166

9° 159. 165, 166, 172

9r~93 172

9' 172, 175. i?6

92 175

1 20 169

126-129 102, 115

126-130 70

128 1 06, 133

1 3°-' 50 70

130 98-100

13' 98, 250

132 250

'34 91

135 80, 91

J37 88, 98, 104, 108,

III, 112

138 1 86

140-144 80

140 64

141 64, 123

142 123, 201

150 218-222

151-155 104

151 2l8, 222

152 223-226, 232, 233

'53 223, 224, 226-230,

234, 236, 239-241,

243
'54 230-233, 235, 239-

241
*55 235, 237, 239-241,

243, 244
158-170 1 86

20

306 PIETRO POMPONAZZI

163 .......... 186 Cap.VI ............... 86

166-169 ......... 1 88 30 ............. 84

168 ............... 189, 190 32 .............. 99

172-174 ......... 186, 191 Cap. VIII ............... 98

172 ............... 192, 193, i95-!97» S^ff- ..... ---130

199 36 ............... 101. IIJ

177 ......... 191-195, 198, 207 37 ............... '31' J32

174 ............... 64, 195, 198, 199, 38 ............... 82, 132

247 39 ............... 82> 8*

175 ............... 64, 247 4° ............... »8

187-189 ......... 172 4i ............... 89

187 ............... 177,184 42 ............... 92

1 88 ............... 177, 178 43 ............... 92, 95, 96

189 ............... 172, 174, 175, 177, 44 ............... 242

181, 182, 184, 185 46 ............... 9°, 91

190 ............... 172, 185 47 ............... 91

191 ............... 202, 203, 208 Cap. IX ............... 98

!02 ............ 2O3,2O4,2O6,2O8- 52 ............... 126

210 53 ............... 127

1 94-202 ......... 244 54 ............... l 2°

221 .............. 141, 154, i7i 55 ............... 12&

222 ............... 172 56 ............... 92, 94-96' I"

223... ....172,212,214,215 58 ff. ......... 105

224-229 ......... 160 58 ............... i°7, "7, n8, 134

224 ............. 172, 212, 214-216 59 ............... 41, IIJ» I27, !33»

229-231 ......... 172 r34

230...'. ........... 175 60 ............... 124, 127, 133

«i ............... 166 62 ............... 95

237 ...... 167,168 63 ............... 95,128,130,131

Supplementa 64 ............... 124, 125, 127, 130,

250-254 ......... 96 ~S

250 ............... 70,81,93 65 ............... 127

251-253 ......... 75

251 .............. 70, 88, 96 68 ............... 62

252 ............... 77, 83, 88, 89, 91 70 ............... 127, 202, 203

253 ........ 70,83,97,110,128, 71 ............... 92,94,126,127

135 72 ............... 94

254 ............... 70,86,97,110, 127, Cap. X ............... 102, in

128, 135 75 ............... 103

257 ........ 141,148,151 76 ............... 100,109,217-219

258 ............... 141, 148, 150-152, 77 ............... 102> I07. "'• "9.

157, 158 '34

De Immortalitate Animae (1534) 78 ff. ......... 105

Cap. 1 ............... 78 78 ............... 42, 99, I03- 107,

Cap. II ............... 78,84 "9

7 ........ 112 79 .............. 41,106,117,120

8 79 80 ............... 41, 99- lo6' "6>

•;; "15 119,120,122,135,

ii ......... so '36, 251

12 ............... 8r,83 81 ............... 251

j, 83, 84 82 ............... ioo, 126, 251

'

ic ............ 85 8 ............... 131.132

16 ............... 76 89 ............... 132

I? 82 90 ............... 104> "4, 128, 130,

18 ............... 83 '3'

20 ............... 82 94 ............... 238, 244

21 ...... 82 95 ............... 238,240,244

24-32 ......... 244 9^ff- ......... 250

27.. ............ 85 99 ............... '49,262

28 ............... 85 I°° ............... 264

INDEX OF REFERENCES 307

I04ff. 250 218 298

107 252, 253 225 287, 288, 290

108 254 226 288, 289

109 254 227 288-290

no 255 228 289, 290

1" 255, 256 229 289, 290

112 256, 257 230 289, 290

"3 257 231 289

114 252, 258-260 232 287, 291

115 259, 261 233 291

1 1 6 262 234-236 285

117 249, 262, 263 236 292, 296

1 1 8 263-265 237 292

I2O 264,267 238 292, 293

121 265-267 239 293

122 265-267 240 275, 293

123 268 24! 294

124 268 242 294

125 279 243 292

126 278, 279, 287 244 294, 296

128 62, 270, 279 245 292, 294-296

I3O 271-273 248-250 296

138 268-269 248 295

1 39 269 250 297

140 127 251 297, 298

141 132 253 294, 298

De Naturalium Effecttium Admirandorum 254 294

Causis (Basel, 1567) 268-270 278

113-115 278 269 278

114 278 270 286

115 279 271 286

131 270 272 285

146 278, 279, 282, 287 273-278 279

147 282 275 286

157 280 276 287

158 280, 281 277 287

i59ff. 280 278 286

159 279 280 299

161 281 281 299

162 280 282 300

163 280, 281 283 301

164 280, 281 284 300, 302

167-169 282 285 301, 302

168 282 286 301, 303

169 272, 273, 282, 287 287 303

170 282-284 288 299, 300

171 276, 283, 284 289 299

172 283, 284 290 299, 301, 303

i73 284 291 299, 303

i?4 279, 285 291-293 282

178 285 292 300

189 285 293 287, 300, 302

19° 285 294 276, 302

I91 279, 285 295 303

192-198 285 299 301

198 273 303 273

200 275, 281 306 273

201 275, 278 De Nutrition* et Augmentatione (Venice,

202 278 1525)

210 273 I. xxiii. 130^,, .,..I1O, 116, 119, 120,

214 292 122, 133, 135

20 2

3o8

PIETRO POMPONAZZI

II

OTHER AUTHORS

Alexander Aphrodisiensis, De Aninia

(ed. I. Bruns, Berlin, 1887), 26, 27
Aristotle, Opera (ed. I. Bekker, Berlin,

183')

De Anima, 142, 143, 144, 159, 220
De Somno, 1 69
NIC. Eth., 260, 265
Berkeley, Siris, 139

Conciliorum omnium generalium et pro-
vincialium collectioregia (Paris, 1644),

67
Dante, Purgatorio, 36, 84

Inferno, 44
Descartes, Principia Philosophise, 138,

'39

Meditations, 72

Digby (Sir K.), Treatise of Man's Soul
(Paris, 1644), 72

Eucken (R. ), Geschichte der philosophischen
Terminologie (Leipsic, 1879), 138

Ferri (L.), La Psicologia di Pietro Pom-
ponazzi (Rome, 1876), Introduction,
69, 157, 160, 165, 186, 188, 189, 190,
201, 244, 245

Fiorentino (¥.}, Pietro Pomponazzi : Studi
Storici su la Scuola Bolognese e Pa-
dovana (Florence, 1868), 58, 60, 64,
65, 66, 93, 103, 104, 119

Franck (A.), Art. in Journal des Savants
(March, 1869), 54, 257

Hamilton (Sir W.), Collected Works of
Thomas Reid (Edinburgh, 1846-63),
138, 142

Hampden (R. D.), The Scholastic Philo
sophy considered in its relation to
Christian Theology (Bampton lec
tures, Oxford, 1833), 15

Haureau (B. ),/?<; la philosophic scolastique
(Paris, 1850), 20, 21, 66

Jourdain (A.), Recherches critiques sur
I'dge et I'origine des traductions
latines d'Aristote et sur les commen-
taires grecs on arabes employes par
les docteurs scolastiques (2nd ed.,
Paris, 1843), 20, 21, 30, 31, 43, 66

Munk (S.), Melanges de philosophic juive
et arabe (Paris, 1859), 22> *8' 3°~32>

34-39- 43

Nourrisson (J. F.), De la Liberte et du
Hasard: essai sur Alexander d'A-
phrodisias suivi du Traite du Destin
et du Libre Pouvoir aux Empereurs,
traduit en Francois pour la premiere
fois (Paris, 1870), 25, 26, 35, 37, 60,

65
Prantl (C.), Geschichte der Logik (Leipsic,

1855-7°). !38

Ragnisco (P.), rrommaso d'' Aquino nella
Universit^ di Padova (Padua, 1892),

7'
Ranke (L. von), History of the Popes

(English transl., London, 1843), 68
Ravaisson (F.), Essai sur la Metaphysique

d1 Aristote (Paris, 1837), n, 22, 25-

27
Renan (E.), Averroes et r averro'isme (3rd

ed., Paris, 1866), 29-31, 33-35, 37,

57-61, 63, 68
Rousselot (X.), Etudes sur la philosophic

dans le moyen age (Paris, 1840), 20,

21, 49, 66, 138
Schultze (F.), Geschichte der Philosophic

der Renaissance (Jena, 1874), 21, 66
Siebeck (H.), Geschichte der Psychologie

(Gotha, 1880-84), 8-10, 12, 14-17,

20, 23, 24, 28, 34, 36, 50-53, 1 86
Symonds (J. A.), Renaissance in Italy,

Vol. v., Italian literature (London,

1881), 4, 74
Thomas Aquinas (St), Opera (Venice,

1593), 22, 44-48, 50, 52-56, 89

Vaughan (H.), The Charnel Honse, 279

Weber (A.), History of Philosophy (Eng
lish transl., London, 1896), 70

Werner (K. ), Scholastik des spiiteren
Mittelalters (Vienna, 1881-87), 58-
61

Zeller (E.), Aristotle and the Earlier
Peripatetics ( English transl., London,
1897), 7, 8, 171

GENERAL INDEX

Abbasicles, 30, 42

Ahelard, 22

Absorption (= 'union'), 33

Abstraction, characteristic of thought,

49' 55, 99> 103> '°5> r/2r.> I22' l68>
187, 211-213, 242; of Deity and the
Intelligences, 114, 125; not implying
complete independence, 106; substance
an, 174, 175, 180-182; two kinds
distinguished, 231

Abubacer (Ibn-Tofail), 33, 44

Accademia dei Lincei, 69

Achillini, 60, 63, 67

Acquisitus, intellectus, 35

Actio, spiritualis, realis, 136, 145, 147,
148, 183-185; category of, 153-156

Activity, in sense, 141, 147, 172; of
intellect, 147, 186; immanent, sense
as, 149, 150; material and spiritual,
184

Activus, tntellectns, 35, 41

Actualis, intellectns, 35

Actus corporis, soul as, 54, 76, 77 ;
maferiae, form as, 90

Adeptus, intellecttts, 35

Africa, Mohammedan school in, 29

Agency, of intellect, 187-199, 203, 207,
208, 226 ; of sense organ, 141, 146,
147; metaphysical, 147, 151 ; of sense,
147-152, 172; of angels, demons, 270,
272, 275, 279, 280, 289, 291, 293, 298

Agens, intellectus. See Intellectus

afoOrjO'is and aiffdr)r6i> correlative, 142,
144, 154; KOLvri, 166; alffdrjTa Koivd,

159

Albert, 21, 271, 286, 303; doctrine of
soul and intelligence, 24, 44, 48-50,
52, 60, 140 ; of sense, 141, 146-150,
156-158; of universals, 223

Alexander (of Aphrodisias), 31 ; and
Averroes, 4, 36, 37; and P., 5, 62-65;
dualism of, 7 ; relation of soul and
reason, n, 26-28, 36, 40, 63, 65, 74,
1 86; criticism of Stoics, 25, 26, 91,
and Neo-Platonism, 34; on common

sense, 164-166; Reason, active intellect
of, 26-28, 186, 190; on universals, 233

Alexander (of Hales), 24

Alexandrian interpreters of Aristotle, 6,
7, 31 ; Christian writers, 14; Jewish
philosophy, 15 ; origin of Theologia
Aristotelis, 32 ; influence on doctrine
of unto, 33

Alexandrism, 4, 62, 63

Alfarabi, 32, 34

Alfred, 23

Almansour (Abbaside), 30

Almansour (vizier), 43

Almansour (Yakoub), 44

Almaric, 20, 21

Almohades, 43, 44

Analysis, positive, empirical method of,
9, 25, 41, 50, 56, 88, 220, 231

Angels, demons, agency of, 270, 272,
275> 279> 280, 289, 291, 293, 298

Anima, 65, 80; and intellectus, 39,41, 74

Anima intellectiva, as concrete process
of thought, 41, 42; how fur forma
corporis, 50, 51, 53-55. 64. 74. 76>
87, 93, 100, 112, 121, 133 ; P.'s con
ception of, 59, in, 133; one in all
men, 80 ; individual, 63 ; as part of
human soul, no, in

Anima sensitiva, -vegetativa, no

Anima spiritiva (irvfv/JiaTiKri), 59

Animal (natural) soul, 105, 125

Apparitions, explanation of, 271, 279-
281

Ape, intermediate between man and
brute, 124

Apollinaris, 179

Apologia (of P.), 68

Appetitus cognoscitivus, characteristic of
man, 251

Aptititdo of soul to body, 54, 89

Aquinas. See Thomas

Arabian separation of intelligence and
soul, 7, u, 24, 33, 34, 51, 75, 77;
doctrine of tinio, 33, 34, 106 ; Peri-
pateticism, 22, 30, 32, 42, 43; com-

3io

PIETRO POMPONAZZI

mentaries and translations, 20, 23, 30,
31' 37» 43 > doctrine of reason as
intermediate Being, 32, 34 ; ethics, 267

Aristotle, i, 8, 30, 64, 271, 303 ; stand
point, spirit, original doctrine, 6, 41,
50, 61, 62, 65, 76, 80, 142; Alexan
drian, Neo-Platonic interpretation of,
6, 21, 22, 65; doctrine of vovs, reason,
intelligence, 4, 5, 8-10, 24-26, 30, 47,
5i» 53. 65, 77, 80, 120, 121, 168;
empirical method of, 9, 25, 41, 50, 76,
88; doctrine of soul, 4, 10, 24, 25, 30,
41, 48-51, 53, 61, 65, 75, 76, 80, 84,
95, no; doctrine of imagination, 104,
134, 140, 168, 203; theory of know
ledge, 48, 71, 139, 220; logic of, i, 7,
2°> 3°i 31 5 doctrine of irvfv(j.a, 12 ;
writings of, 20, 61, 69; ethical views
of, 260, 263, 265 ; influence of, 20,
61, 73; versions of, 30, 31, 43, 60;
De Causis, 21 ; Theologia Aristotelis,
22 ; conception of form and matter,
26, 52, 53; P.'s interpretation of, 62,
64, 66, i2i ; doctrine of sense, 140-
M7» .'5'. JS8, 163, 168, 169, 225;
doctrine of communia sensibilia, 159,
166, 172; on apprehension of sub
stance, 177-179

Ascharites, 43

'Assistance,' doctrine of 5, u, 27, 28,

34, 39, 63

Assistens, forma, 60

Astrology, astral influences, 271-276,
279, 280, 298, 300

Attention, 152, 153, 158

Attribute and substance correlative, 173-
175, 180, 181

Augustine, 6, 19, 250

Avempace (Ibn-Badja), 33, 44

Avenzoar, 44

Averroes (Ibn-Roschd), 33, 60; on im
mortality, 2,4, 40; intelligence separate
from soul, 11,37,39-41,75, 185, 186;
commentator on Aristotle, 20, 44, 142;
Neo-Platonic influence on, 30 ; unity
of intellectual souls, 34 ; unity of
passive intellect, 36, 39, 44, 47, 186;
and P., 40-42, 56, 75 ; and Thomas,
44, 45, 47; knowledge not physical
relation, 115, 120; postulate of agency
of an Intelligence, 147; on common
sensibles, 160, 166; apprehension of
substance, 173-176, 180, 182; appre
hension of self, 217, 218, 221

Averroism, characteristic tenet, 5, 122,
140; conception of thought as abstract,
55 ; distinction of thought from its
conditions, 107; barrier against mate
rialism, 115; stibjectum of reason, 121;
intellectual soul essence of man, 123;
in Italy, 57-68, 73, 74, 76, 81, 84, 96

Avicebron, 21, 23, 32
Avicenna, 20, 32, 34, 44, 193, 207, 286,
292, 294

Bacon (Roger), 20

Bagdad, 29, 43

Bardili, 71

Barmecides, 30

Basel, 70

Beliefs, useful, true, 268

Bembo (Cardinal), 68

Body, and soul, 75, 91, 105; and in
telligence, 107, 116, 120, 134; whole =
organ of thought, 135, 136; compared
with organised humanity, 252

Boethius, 20, 2 1

Bologna, i, 57

Brain, 136

Briicker, 71

Caietanus, 1 79

Calaber (Magister), 61

Capadtas, scholastic term, 215, 216

Categories (of Aristotle), 20

Cause, predisposing, 190, 273; efficient,
T57, '58, '9°, '93, 222> 2725 primary,
157, 158; initiating, 157, 158, 167;
and effect, as sequence, 271, 272, 274,
275, 282 ; final, 273

XupiffTos vovs. See J»o0s

Chiromantia, 271, 284

Christian conception of irvev/jM, 14, 15,
19; emphasis on morality, 14, 19;
subjects of the Moors, 43; schoolmen,
44, 48, 49; miracles, 276, 277, 278,
301, 302

Christianity, 19, 23, 276, 298, 301, 302

Church, doctrine of spirit and matter, 19

Civilised races, 129

Clerical interpretation of Averroes, 58, 59

Cogitatio, lowest act of generalisation,
50, 207

Cogitativa (vis, virtus), faculty of natural
soul, 38, 123, 140, 168, 175, 188-
190, 205, 206, 210, 214, 215; con
ceded by Averroes to individual, 80,
140; generalisations, objects of, 105,
106, 123, 180, 187, 189, 190, 2ii-
213; intermediate faculty, 123, 127,
140, 172, 202-213; productive of
species nuda, intelligibilis, 189-193,
199, 200, 204, 207-210; and intellectus,
211-217, 243

Cognitive relation, unique, 154-156

Commentary on De Anima, P.'s, 69,
70, 88

Commune sensibile, 159-166

Comparative method, 113

Comparison, necessary for general no
tions, 225, 228, 232; not function
of special sense, 163

GENERAL INDEX

Compositio, synthetic function, 166
Comprehensio = cogitatio
Comprehensiva = cogitativa
Conceptualism, 23, 64, 244, 245
Conceptus, 184, 222 ;formalis, objectivus,

139; and form distinguished, 222
Concomitantiam, per quondam, of in
telligence and matter, 106, 123
Conjunction, of soul and intellect, 39-

41; of phenomena, 274
Consciousness of self, 37
Constantinople, 23, 30
Contarini, 68, 69
Continuous, the, 160, 161, 165
Contrariety in special sense, 166, 167
Copulatio = vx\\<ys\ of individual with in
telligence, 45

Corporeal aspect of intellectual soul,
no, n i ; organ of thought, 115,
116; existence, man partakes in,
127; existence, not incompatible with
thought, 132

Corpus animatum, 49, 76, 92
Cosmological arguments for mortality, 98
Cosmology of Arabians, 35
Critique of Practical Reason, 257
Cycle in religious history, 303

Damascus, 29, 43

Dante, 44

David (of Dinant), 20, 21

De Anima (of Aristotle), P. 's Com
mentary on, 69, 70, 88

De Causis, ascribed to Aristotle, 20, 21

De Fato, Libero Arbitrio, Predestina-
tione et Providentia Dei (of P.), 70

Defensorium (of P.), 60, 68, 69

De Immortalitate (of P.), 67-71, 77, 237,
280, 295

De hicantationibus. See De Nat. Eff.

Deity = ideal intelligence, 113, 124

Democritus, 8

Demons. See Angels

De Naturalium Effectuum admiran-
dorum causis sive tie Incantationibus
(of P.), 70, 270, 271, 275, 280

De Nutritione et Augmentation (of P.), 70

Dependence of soul on body, 67, 82; of
human thought on body, matter, 75,
76, 88, 117, 137; of human thought
on sense, 81, 82, 88, 99; on body,
not incompatible with thought, 105

Dependent, substance as such not, 90

Dialectic, 20

Dialectician, P. as, 78, 223, 234, 279

Dicaearchus, 27

Discipline of a Solitary (of Avempace), 33

Discursive thought, 173, 174, 177-179,
222, 237

Discursus, characteristic of human
thought, 131 ; not of the Intelligences,

123; process of apprehending sub
stance, self, 172, 180, 217, 218, 222
Disembodied soul, 92, 101 ; spirit, 95
Dispositio^ 208-210, 287, 288, 290, 297
Divine Reason of Alexander, 7, n, 26-
28; Reason of the Neo-Platonists,
34; apprehension of universals, 104;
nature, 131, 132; mind, 245, 246;
government, 249, 250, 267, 274;
purpose, 294, 295, 297, 299, 300, 301
Dogmatic method, discarded by P., 78,

"3 .

Dominicans, 44, 49, 64

Dualism of intelligence and soul, n, 19,

75, 115 ; of soul and body, n, 18, 91 ;

of Alexander Aphrod., 11, 25, 27, 121;

Platonic, Neo-Platonic, 18, 19, 85, 91;

of Alexander of Hales, 24; Averroistic,

39, 40, 42, 46, 49, 51, 52, 65, 84, 115,

234. 235; psychological, 121, 123, 189,

194, 204, 205
Dnbitationes in quartum Meteorologi-

conim Aristotelis librum (of P.), 70
5iW/us of body, soul as, 27
Duration, not test of life, 262, 263

Ecclesiastical orthodoxy, 58; interpre
tation of Aristotle, 121

End of man, 248-260

Elias del Medigo, 68

Embodiment of intelligence, essential to
man, 56, JOQ, 101, 103, 107, no,
128, 214; of soul, 121, 132, 133

•jj/iwj', rd, 137

Empedocles, 32

Empirical method, of P., 3, 56, 78, 96,
H5> 156; of Aristotle, 9, 25, 65, 76,
87 ; of Thomas, 49, 56 ; generalisa
tion, 230, 231, 239, 241

Empiricism, 182, 234, 240, 241

Epicurus, 9

eTrir^Setir^s, I)\<KOJ vovs as, 26

eiriKTrjTos vovs, 35

Esse essential?, objectale, 138; subjec-
tivum, objectivum, 139

Essentiae per se stantes, 89, 90

Ethical emphasis of Christianity, 14 ;
consequences of P.'s doctrines, 71, 72,
248-269; interests of Thomas, 75;
arguments for mortality, 98, 269

Eternal operation of intellect, 122

Eternity, man participant in, 251

Existence of soul, two modes of, im
possible, 83-87, 91-96, 99, 100

Existent, form not, but factor, 90

Existimativa (vis), faculty below cogita
tiva, 206

Experience, appeal to, 92, 95, 100, 156,
276, 277, 284; analysis of, 105, 114

Experimenta sai'vare, to account for
facts, 270, 279

312

TIETRO POMPONAZZI

Extension, 1 15, 216

Extensive faculties, 108, 117, 214-217

Extra-physical principle of Thomas, 121

Facts of human nature, appeal to, 80,
85, 109

Faculties, extensive, 108, 117, 214-217;
bound up with matter, 126, 215

Felicity, end of man, 250, 251, 258,
260, 261, 263, 265

Ferrara, i, 57

Ferri (L.), 69, 70, 71, 119

Figure, common sensible, 159, 160, 162

Fiorentino (F.), 68, 71, 133

Finis, separable, inseparable, 295, 296

First Mover, 35

Fans Vitae (of Avicebron), 21, 32

Form and matter correlative, 49, 86,
89-91 ; of body, soul as, 7, 50-54,
86; two kinds of, 52, 53, 89; self-
subsistent, separable, 53, 86, 89-91,
121 ; — species, 105, 108, 196; material,
82; sensible ^species sensibilis, 142,
143, 144, 158; special, 217, 218, 223,
224, 226; and concept, 222

Forma assistens, 60 ; substantialis, 60 ;
carports, soul as, 50, 53, 54, 56, 63-65,
80, 85, 88, 95, 121 ; qua aliquid est,
91, 92; realis and spiritualis, action
of, 145; mater iae, 235

Formale — subjeclivum, 138; (for/nalis)
conceptus, 139

France, Jewish schools in, 43

Fraud, some marvels due to, 277-279,
286

Gaetano of Tiene, 58-60

Gazali, 33

General conceptions, mediated by par
ticulars, 103, 105, 126; not mediated
in Intelligences, 114; relations, 187,
211, 225

Generalisation, 49, 211, 230. 231, 239, 241

Geometry, 230

Gerson, 138

God, 35, 100, 104, 129, 246

Greek text of Aristotle, 61 ; commen
tators, 64, 65

Habit of existence, formed by soul, 54, 93

Hamilton (Sir W.), 137, 139

Happiness. See Felicity

Haroun-al-Raschid, 30

Hearing, lower sense, 160-163

Heart, organ of soul, 23

Hebrew conception of 'spirit,' 12, 14,
15 ; translations of Arabian philo
sophy, 43 ; religion, 298

Herbart, 157

Heretical misinterpretation of Averroes,
supposed, 59, 61

Hie et mine, thought as such free from,
99 ; sense conditioned by, 162

Hierarchy of beings, 112, 124, 204, 205;
of powers in man, 127, 204, 205

Historical method, 113

History of religion, 298-303

Hoffding (H.), 70

Human nature, dignity of, 71 ; unity of,
77> 78, 85-87, 91 ; dualistic theories
of, 78-86; conception of, 123, 124-
132; thought, conditioned by sense,
83 ; soul, 121

Humanistic view of reason, 114

Humanity, Intelligence of collective, 2,
4, 63 ; as organism, 252-256

J\(/cos, vo\i<>,—intellectus hylicus, 35

Ibn-Badja (Avempace), 33

Ibn-Roschd. See Averroes

Ibn-Tofail (Abubacer), 33

Idealism, moral, 259

Ideas, Platonic, 22

Idem realiter= inseparable in existence,
141, 144, 191, 194

Illusion, 161, 171, 172, 236, 279, 280

Image, extended, 108; special, of sub
stance, 177; relation to thought, 189,
202; intelligence dependent on, 224

Imagination, rational faculty, 38, 49 ;
human intellect dependent on, 55, 67,
134, 224, 225, 243; distinct from
memory and cogitativa, 209, 210; Aris
totle's doctrine of, 104, 134, 140, 168,
203 ; relation to sensus communis and
vis cogitaliva, 105, 171, 175, 188 :
apprehension of substance, 176-178,
180; relation to thought, 189, 190;
productive of species nuda, 189-193,
196, 207, 208

Imaginativa virtus, 106

Immaterialis, secundum quid, simpli-
citer, 1 1 o

Immateriality of man, 78, 79, 82 ; of
the soul or human intelligence, 98,
100-102, 105, 108-112, 118, 119, 122,
124, 128, 132, 137, 217; absolute,
101, 102, 105, 106, 124, 132

Immortalis, secundum quid, simpliciler,

79' II0

Immortality, P.'s argument against, 2,
56, 59, 71, 94, 98-119, 128; Averroes'
denial of, 2, 59, 67 ; Aristotle on, 8 ;
defence of, 60-63, 67, 93 ; Thomas
on' 75> 93 5 possible theories of, 78 ;
by propagation, 131, 132: desire for,
250, 251, 259, 260: widespread belief
in, 267, 268

I mperishability = immateriality, 79> I24>

I31

Impression, sensible, 141 ; of substance,
184; physical, 142, 144

GENERAL INDEX

313

Incorporeality, 64, 67, in
Independent of body, matter, intelli
gence as, 81, 82, 137; soul as, 87,

IOI, IO2, IO7

Indivisibility, 101, 107, 118, 122
Individual soul and thought, 2, 118 ; uni
versal concrete in, 211, 212, 245;
nature of, 223, 224; unrelated, 226-
228, 236; apprehension of, 227, 228,
236. See also Particular
Induction from particulars, 103, 1 14,
232, 241 ; of substance from attributes,

'74. 177

Inference, power of animal soul, 105

Infidelity, ascribed to Averroes, 44, 58

Infinite, 100, 104; demanded by man,
250

Inseparable = material, mortal, 98, roi ;
from matter, intellectual soul as, 135,
136

Intellect, active, 36, 37, 48, 186, 190,
236; agency of, 187-199, 203, 207,
208, 226 ; passive, potential, 36-39,
1 86 ; unity of active, 47 ; unity of
passive, 36, 44, 48 ; apprehension of
its own operations, 221 ; apprehension
of substance, 175, 176, 178, 179, 182

Intellection, intellectio, 76, 83, 94, 95,
186-200, 204, 206, 207, 209, 212

Intellectiva, virlns, 49, 50. See Anima

Intellectual soul, has true intelligence,
5; (souls), unity of, 34, 80; = form
of human nature, 58, 76, 87, 96;
distinct from sensitive, 59, 74, 78, 86 ;
lowest of spheral Intelligences, 59 ;
as immaterial, 82 ; twofold existence
of, 76, 83, 84 ; agency, 190 ; con
templation as end, 249, 253; man
' rational ' not, 131

Intellect™, 28, 39, 60, 74, 75, 82, 105,
120, 122, 123, 131, 168, 188, 189, 190,
193, 196, 206, 213, 217, 220, 235;
agens, activus, actualis, 33, 35, 37, 38,
51, 59, 106, 147, 185, 186, 188, 189,
192, 195, 198; passivus, materialist
hylicus, possibilis, 35, 39, 82, 188 ;
habitualis, 35 ; separatus, 41, 83 ;
acquisitus, adept us, 35 ; speculative,
practical, factive, 253, 256

Intelligence, common, 5, 36, 45, 58, 63,
67. 74. 79> 84 ; active, unity of, 47 ;
potential, unity of, 46, 47 ; the 'assist
ing,' 28 ; divine, 36, 39 ; the First,
not = God, 35; as intermediate Being,
32, 84 ; the lowest, appropriated to man,
59 ; of collective humanity, 2, 4, 5,
63, 84; separate, 5, 7, 24, 36, 40, 41,
44, 48, 63-65, 74, 234 ; true, as such,
5, 27, 107, 129 ; as self-inherent, 64,
119: timeless, 78, 122; immaterial,
incorporeal, 101, 107, in, 112, 116,

122; absolute, 113, 234, 135; sni
generis, 114; supernatural, 128;
agency of, 147, 151; participation in,
union with, 5-7, 33-36, 39, 45, 63, 78,
130; two-fold operation of, 76, 94;
human, intermediate, 112, 235;
human, shadow of true, 129; as in
man, 4-6, 42, 44-46, 48, 67, 75, 76,
84, 87, 94, 100, 101, 112, 116, 122,
235 ; human, dependent on body,
sense, 87, 88, 100, 105-107, in, 112,
119, 122, 139, 202, 203, 214, 217

Intelligences, the higher, 6, 34, 35, 51,
59, 60, 74, 77, 84, 85, too, 124, 127,
119, 147, 235, 258; in se and ad
spheras, 84, 125 ; mode of apprehending
universals, 104, 105, 113, 114, 123, 125,
131, 202; indivisible, 107; postulated
to explain sensation, intellection, 147 :
apprehension of self intuitive, 217, 218

Intentio prit>ia, secunda, 232, 233

Intentionale, distinguished from reale,
'38

Intermediate beings, between soul and
body, 17 ; between God and human
soul, matter, 18, 28, 32, 34; human
soul as, 108, 112, 113, 124, 129, 218,
251, 252, 258, 259; powers, 170

Interpenetration of bodies, 25, 91

Introspection in mediaeval psychology, 50

IsagogS (of Porphyry), 20

Intuition of self, 108, 217, 218, 221 ; of
abstract universals, 114, 123,126, 131,
218; substance not apprehended by,

173; 175. I?8- J79
Intuitionalism, 182
Intuit us simplex, 131

Jews, 43

John (of Jandun, Gandavensis), 58-60,

150, 158
John (Philoponus), 31

Kant, 172, 267

Knowledge, same in all individuals, 47 ;
P.'s doctrine of, 64, 71, 153, 154, 192,
223, 244: relativity of, 192; human,
dependent on sense, 81, 103, 126, 224 ;
distinct from its conditions, 102 ; of
Intelligences, intuitive, 103, 125, 126;
of the brutes, of singulars only, 126;
not a physical relation, 114, 115, 126,
133. J36» I54'. Divine, 155; contri
bution of thought to, i 86

Lactantius, 19

Lateran Council, 67, 72

Latin translations of Arabian philosophy,

43

Law, moral, 256, 257
Lawgivers and popular beliefs, 268, 278

3H

PIETRO POMPONAZZI

Leibnitz, 138, 157

Leo X, 11, 68

Levi-ben-Gerson, 54

Line, mathematical, 100

Localisation of soul, 23

Locke, use of ' idea,' 139 ; on substance,

^172

\6yos of Stoics and Philo, 16
Lower mental powers, 113, 121, 123,
127, 188

Macrocosm, Nature as, 204

Magic, explanation of, 271-276, 285

Magnitude, common sensible, 159-165

Mahmound, 30

Man, intermediate position of, 79, 113,
124, 127-130, 218, 251, 252, 258-260;
as microcosm, 127, 204; uncertainty of
his life, 250, 260, 261 ; end of, 248-
260

Marsilius (of Padua), 58

Marvels. See Miracles

Material, = mortal, inseparable, 78, 98,
101 : man, in what sense, 79, 83, 99-
101, 109, in, 112, 124, 131, 217, 218;
conditions, human thought dependent
on, 99, 235 ; forms, cognition of, 99,
101, 133; cause incapable of explain
ing spiritual effect, 142, 143, 147, 154;
intelligence not, 107

Materialis, secundum quid, simpliciter,
109; virtus, 215, 217

Materialism of followers of Aristotle,
it ; of Stoics, 12, 16; ascribed to
Averroes, 58 ; associated with moral
laxity, 71 ; not ascribable to P., 101,
105, 116, 119, 128, 133, 136

Mathematical point, line, 100

Matter, ethical value of, 19; and
thought, 53, 75, 107, 112, 132 ; appre
hension of, 1 02

Mechanical conception of soul, 18, 26;
of mental action, 183; category, 118;
skill, intellect, 125, 254

Medical studies associated with philo
sophy, 58

Memorativa (vis), 191, 203

Memory, 161-163, '68, 172, 203, 207-
209

Mental life, unity of, 121

Metamorphoses, explanation of, 278,
285

Metaphysical separation of intelligence,
76, 77; dualism, 84; agency, 147,

'Si

Metaphysics (of Aristotle), 35

Method, empirical, of positive analysis,

9» 5°> S^, 88, 220, 231
Microcosm, man as, 127, 204
Middle Ages, conception of soul in, 10,

18; view of thought as abstract, 55,

104 ; ' prolonged ' in school of Padua,
57 ; Aristotle in, 20-28, 66 ; mind of,

65

Mind, not physical product, 99 ; not
efficient cause, 155, 157 ; powers of, 99,
100; Divine, 245; not subsisting in
matter, -116; knowledge of itself, 217,
218; and body, 132-137; contribution
of, in sense, 140, 158; relation of, to
object, 147, 154, 245

Miracles, explanation of, 270-279, 282,
286, 287, 298, 300-302

Mixture, Alexander Aphrod. on, 25;
Stoic view of, 25, 26

Mode of existence, only one essential,
56, 67, 76, 79, 83-87, 90-95, 99, ioo

Mohammedans, 29, 30, 42

Moors, 42

Morality, independent of reward, 249;
sanctions of, 250

Mortalis, secundum quid, simpliciter, 79,
no

Mortality = materiality, inseparability,
98; of soul, man, 71, 72, 78, 94, 98,
130; not inconsistent with morality,
248-250, 262, 263, 268; not incon
sistent with Divine government, 248,
249, 264 ; not inconsistent with man
attaining his end, 248-250, 258-262

Motion, operation implying body, 85 ;
common sensible, 159-166

Motor and motrttn, 86, 125

Mover, First, 35

Mysticism, 12, 31-33

Mythological explanations. 9, 14, 17, 19,
105, 141, 234

Natural soul, 59, 66; history of man, 65;
science, 85

Naturalism of early Peripatetics, 1 1 ; of
Aristotle, 16, 120; of P., 114, 275, 287

Nature, as macrocosm, 204; order of,
156, 270-276, 279, 281, 299

'Natures,' scholastic doctrine of, 215,
216, 223-227, 245

Necromancy, 271, 281

Neo-Platonic influence on interpretation
of Aristotle, 6, 7, 20, 32 ; reaction
against Stoicism, 14, 17, 18; meta
physical tendency, 17; separation of
reason from soul, 28; spiritualism, 49;
doctrine of spiritual substances, 52

Nestorian Christians, 31

New Testament, doctrine of 'spirit' in, 14

Niphus, 60, 63, 67, 68

Noack, 70

Nominalism, 223, 226, 228, 244, 245

Non-contradiction, axiom of, 254

roOy, 7, 10, 16, 28, 30, 65, 104, 120;
iroir)TtK6s, 5, 9, 18, 26, 34, 63;
Xup«rT6j, 9, n, 14, 25, 51, 66, 122;

GENERAL INDEX

315

0£?oj, 26, 18, 65 ; vXiicbs, 16, 35 ;
twlKT-riTos (KO.O' ^i-v), 35
Number, common sensible, 159-165

' Object,' modern sense of, 137
Objective, thought dependent on matter,

'37. 139

Objectivum—pro nt cognitum, etc., 138;
later scholastic use of, 139

Objectum = cor\\.e:r\\.s of thought, sensa
tion, 101, 134, 138, 144, 191, 192 ;
(objecto), tanquam de, 55, 56, 99-101,
103, 125, 134, 136, 137

Omens, portents, explanation of 271,
281-284

Ommiade dynasty, 42, 43

Ontological constructions, 121

Operation, one essential mode of, 86, 94,

95. 99

Organ of soul, 23 ; of intelligence, no
specific, 99, 135, 217 ; of sense,
physical, 102, 142, 143 ; faculties
using material, 117

Orthodox doctrine of soul, 58, 62, 63, 68,
74, 78, 86, 92, 120, 122; Averroism,
58, 60, 63, 67; Aristotelianism, 140,
147, 237; theory of miracles, 275

Padua, i, 57, 58, 60, 62, 68, 69

Pantheism, mystical, of Stoics, 12;
emanationist, 21

Paris, university of, 20

'Participation' ( partidpatio) of soul in
intelligence, 6, 27, 77, 120; in im
materiality, loo, 101, 109-111, (27,
130, 217, 218; in the Divine, 131,
132

Particular and universal, 99, 103, 104,
1 14, 123, 126, 223 ; experience necessary
for self-consciousness, 108, 126; appre
hension of, 222-239; unrelated, 226-
229, 232, 233, 238, 240

Passio, category of, 153-156

Passive intellect, intelligence, 36-39, 82

Passivity of sense, 140-143, 146, 151, 187

Patristic psychology, 6, 20

Paul (St), doctrine of irvev^a, 15

Paul (of Venice), 57, 68

Peace, characteristic of end, 260, 261, 265

Perception of perception, 109

Perfection, moral, 259

Peri Hermeneias (of Aristotle), 20

Peripateticism, Arab, 7, 22, 23, 29, 32,
43, 64; early, n; of schoolmen, 21,
64; of Alexander, 25; Alexandrian,
31; heretical consequences of, 59

Perishable. See Material

Persian, philosophy, 30-32 ; translators of
Aristotle, 31; Sufism, 33

Personality, not deducible from mechani
cal category, 1 1 8

Phantasia, phantasma. See Imagination,

Image

Philo (Judaeus), 15, 16, 28
Philoponus (John), 31
Philosophns atttodidactus (of Ibn-Tofail),

33

<f>\Jfffl, TO., 138

Physical theory of soul, 12-19; basis of
sense, 106, 1(3; conditions of thought,
IO7> '33> I34» relation, knowledge not,
114, 115, 126, 133, 136; categories, 116

Physicians, Italian, and Averroes, 58

Physics, limits of, 56, 84 ; associated with
philosophy, 58

Physics (of Aristotle), 20

Physiognomy, 284

Physiology, 12, 19, 136, 153

Pietro d' Abano, 58

Plato, i, 9, 32, 62, 282, 296

Platonism and Aristotelianism, 7, 14;
and Neo- Platonism, 14, 15 ; and
Christianity, 19, 23; and Realism,
20, 21 ; view of soul, intelligence, 47,
60, 78, 79, 85, 86, 90

Plotinus and physical views of soul,
17-19; and Theologia Aristotelis, 20;
doctrine of vous, 30, 33 ; unknown to
Arabians, 32

Plurality of souls, 60, 78

irvfu/j.a, 12-18, 28

'Pneumatic' theory of soul, 12-19

TTV evfjiariKri = spiriliva , 59

Pocna culpae, damni, 265-267

TroiT]TiK6$. See vovs

Point, mathematical, 100

Pomponazzi, relation to mediaeval
thought, 1-6, 40-42, 57 ; to St Thomas,
53-55; as Aristotelian, 57-73; De-
fensorium, 60, 68, 69; De Immortali-
tate, 67-71, 77, 280, 295; Comm. de
Anima, 69, 70, 88 ; Apologia, 69 ; De
Incantationibiis, 70, 270, 271, 275, 280;
other works, 70; doctrines of, 74-

3°3

Porphyry on universals, 20, 21
Positive analysis, method of, 5, 6, 56, 75,

76, 78, 87

Possibility, unrealised, 89
Powers, celestial, 148, 156, 271-273, 275,

280, 282, 287, 288, 299, 300
Practical, moral, intellect, 253, 254
Prayer, 274, 291-300
Predication, nature of, 223
Proclus, 21, 32
Prophecy, explanation of, 274, 280, 282,

287-291

Pseudo-Dionysius, 20
'/'^X1?' 9> '6; VO-TITIK-/!, 7, 1 1, 51
Psychological method of St Thomas, 49,

50; view of reason, 77, 121; basis of

P.'s view of soul, 81; problem of

PIETRO POMPONAZZI

substance, 174, 175; abstraction, fic
tion, 210, 211, 226

Psychology, central in Alexander, 65 ;
scientific, of P., 113; Aristotelian, 134

Punishment of vice, 264, 269 ; essential,
accidental, 264-267

Pythagoras, 32

Quantitative, thought not, 107, 116-118,

122

Quantity, 116-119, 212-217
Quod est = existent, 90, 91

Ratiocination (ratiocinatio], process of,
172, 238, -242

'Rational,' man, not 'intellectual,' 131

Rationalistic explanation, 285, 286

Realis— physical, relation, action, 133,
145, 183, 184; reale, distinguished from
intentionale, 138

Realism, 20, 23, 174; scholastic, 180,
199, 244

Reason, active and passive, 7-9 ; and
personality, 5, 8, 9 ; separate from
soul, 7, 9, 10, 16, 25, 36, 66, 74, 75,
84, 122; not separate from soul, 120,
121 ; Divine, 7, u, 26-28, 34, 186;
timeless, absolute, ideal, 9, 66, 77, 79,
122, 131, 217; human, dependent on
sense, 67 ; and faith, 72 ; P.'s doctrine
of, 116, 171-201; and sense, 140, 168,
170; faculty of abstract universals,
168, 170; practical, 255

Receptivity of sense, 140, 141

Reflexio, 237-243

Reformation, 72

Relations, general, 187, 211, 226, 228,
229, 239

Religion, 250, 267, 274, 275, 282, 286,
297-301

Renaissance, i, 61, 65, 70, 267

Representative perception, 142, 179;
realism, 192

Representativum — objeciivum, 138

Rest, common sensible, 159, 162- [65

Reward of virtue, 264, 269 ; essential,
accidental, 264-267

Ritter, 71

Ruach, Hebrew equivalent of irpeO/ua, 14

St Mark's, 59

Scholasticism, 1-3, 21, 62-64, 88, 173,

174, 192, 210, 211, 215, 245, 267;

later, 1 39, 1 40

Scientia naturalis, limits of, 45, 84
Scotus, 175, 179, 180, 194-196, 223, 244
Scripture, 271, 277, 278, 287
Self-consciousness, 119, 169, 217-219
Self-knowledge, 223 ; argument from,

108; absolute, and in lower animals,

109

Self-subsistence of intelligence, 81; of

soul, 96

Sensatio = operation of sense, 144, 146
Sensation, consciousness of, 169
Sense, 140-170; condition of human

thought, 49, 54, 55, 67, 103, 105, 134;

brought near thought by P., 113, 140,

170; Intelligences free from, 123;

passivity, receptivity, 140-143, 146-

148, 152, 156-158, 187; physical and
psychological aspects of, 141, 142, 145,
146, 149, 153; physical cause, condi
tions, of, 142, 144-146; as psychic
fact, 142, 145, 146; physical object
of, 142; physical organ of, 102, 142-
145, 152; object of, 126, 236; agency
of, 147, 148, 150, 152, 172; not
analogous to intelligence, 152; com
mon, internal, 161-171; external,
special, 161, 163, 166, 171 ; ac
companied by activity, passivity, 154

Sense-experience, common element in,

159, 162, 163
Sensibile = object of sense. 144; per

accidens, 172, 176; per se, 164, 172,

176; commune, 159-166
Sensibles, common, 159-166, 214
Sensitiva, virtus, 127. See Anima
Sensorium, 169

Sensual, predominant in man, 128
Sensus agens of Averroism, 59, 141, 147-

149, 202; exterior, 140, 169, 171, 175,
180, 186; interior, 140, 168, 171, 172,
175, 176, 180, 186, 200, 202, 203;
communis, 166-170

Separable, Separate, intelligence, reason
as, 63-66, 74-77, 80-88, 92, 96, 121 ;
soul as, 6, 7, 17, 52, 98, roi, 109;
form, or spiritual substance, 5, 50-52,
63, 64, 66, 67, 81, 86, 87, 89, 121

Separatns, intellectus, 83

Sequence. See Cause

Sicily, Arab schools in, 43

Sight, 162, 167

Sign, cause as, of effect, 274, 276, 282-284

Simile, recognition by cogitativa of, 50

Sin, 263, 207

Singular = object of sense, 126; complex,
»»5

Smelling, lower sense, 160-162

Soul, Aristotle's doctrine of, 4, 13, 63,
75, 87, 92, 93, 121 ; as separate, 6, 7,
17, 22, 23, 39, 44, 50-52, 64, 66, 75,
84, 86, 87, 92, 108; as form of body,
inseparable, 7, 10, 26, 48, 50, 54, 63,
75, 80, 86, 87, 89, 92, 93, 113, 121 ;
and intelligence, 28, 39, 66, 74, 115,
121, 123; human, as possessed of true
intelligence, 6, 66, 115, 121, 123; as
immaterial in qualified sense, 67, 107,
i 10, FIT, 132, 218; dependent on

GENERAL INDEX

317

matter, embodied, 125, 134; and body,
75, 86, 132; three types of, 125, 126;
vegetative, sensitive, intellectual, 127;
natural, sensitive, 38, 59, 66, 84, 105,
123, 134, 142; intellectual, 5, 7, 59,
132, 134, 135; one mode of existence
of, 86, 92; of the spheres, 125; indi
vidual, value of, 19; as harmony, 25;
seat, organ, of, 75; passivity of, 151

Space, transcended in absolute thought,
114; apprehension of, 161 ; particular
individual in, 212, 215

Spain, Mohammedan philosophy in, 29,

42, 43

Species sensibilis, 141, 143, 145, 146, 152,
171; sensibilis, ambiguity of, 142, 143,
145, 146, 150, 151, 154; intelligibilis,
142, 186, 187, 191-200, 203, 204, 207,
208, 220, 222, 223 ; propria, 224; inten-
tionalis, 142; substantiae, 176, 178,
179, 185; nuda, 189-193, 200; aliena,

222

Speculation, method of abstract, 75,

/8, 96

Speculative, theoretical, intellect, 253, 254
Spheres, 35, 84, 125
Spirit, soul as manifestation of, 12, 13;

Biblical doctrine of, 14, 15 ; and matter,

19

Spiritiva, anima, 59
Spiritual agency, 289; substance, soul as,

12, 14, 23, 52, 53; fact, not explicable

by material cause, 142, 143, 147
Spiritualis, knowledge as, 133, 136;

action, 145, 147, 148, 183-185 ; self-
reflection, 169

Spiritualism, Neo- Platonic, 49
Spirittts= physical energy of body, 153,

292
Sponge, intermediate between plant and

animal, 124
Stabilitas, characteristic of end, 260, 261,

*65.

Stars in Aristotle's cosmology, 35
Stoic materialism, u, 14, 25; notion of

soul, ii, 12, 16, 91; theory of mixture,

25, 26; World-Soul, 28
Strato, 27

'Subject,' modern sense of, 137, 220
Subjective, thought not dependent on

matter, 115, 137, 138
Subjcctivum=pro ut in se ipso, etc., 138
Subjcctiim, 220; occupationis, inhaesionis,

predicationis, 138; of intelligence, 37-

39, 42, 64, 82, 115-118, 121, 134, 136,

139; of sense, natural soul, 125, 134;

= substance, 174; (subjecto), tanquam

de, 55, 117, 125, 135, 137
Sublunary, 105, 124, 273
Subsistence of thought, 136, 137
Substance, soul as separate, spiritual, 12,

51, 56, 62-64, 66, 67, 78, 81, 86, 90,
96, 121 ; apprehension of, 172-184,
212-217; and attribute correlative,
173~175> 18o. 181; scholastic view of,
184, 185

Sitbstantialis, forma, 60, 89

Sufism, 33

Superhuman intellectual principle, 40, 121

Supernatural element in man, 128; ex
planation, 271, 274

Superstition, 156, 235, 275, 281, 289, 293

Symonds (J. A.), 70

Syncretism of Philo, 15, 28

Synthetic faculty, function, 166, 168, 169

Syriac versions of Aristotle, 31

Temperaments, the, 289, 290

Tennemann, 71

Terminus — correlate of mental operation,
192, 193

Tertullian, 19

ffelos. See vovs

Themistius, 31, 36, 160, 162, 233, 246

Theologia Arislotelis, 22, 32, 52

Theological interpretation of voCj, 63, 65

Theophrastus, 8, 27, 36

Thomas (St), 2, 21, 24, 121, 194, 199;
doctrine of soul, intelligence, 44-56,
64, 74, 75, 79-81, 86, 96, 140, 185,
1 86; and Averroism, 57, 60; and P.,
64 ; theory of knowledge, 71, 147, 155,
191, 192, 223; and Aristotle, 142; on
miracles, 287, 289, 291, 293

Thomists, 60, 62, 63, 68, 73, 76, 86, 87,
140, 151, 185, 237

Thought, principle of, in Aristotle, 8,
120; and matter, 75, 107, 132, 214,
234; independent of body, material
conditions, 85, 99, 106, in, 115, 119,
137; identical with its object, 220;
ideal, absolute, abstract, 104, 114, 121-
123, 126; of thought, 217-222; in
man, 9, 114, 119; human, dependent
on body, sense, 119, 136, 235; rela
tion to its object, 114, 115, 119, 136;
as such belongs to man, 115, 128;
contribution of, 188; and individual,
118; correspondence of, to reality,
174; and reality, 245; discursive, 173,

174. i77-!79> 222> ^37

Time, transcended in absolute thought,
9, 56, 64, 66, 114, 122, 128; apprehen
sion of, 163

Touch, 162, 166, 167

Truth, ideal, 114, 258; P.'s doctrine of,
64, 245, 246

Tubingen, 71

Union (unto), of individual with Intelli
gence, 5, 32-34, 45, 55, 80; of soul
and body, 13, 54

PIETRO POMPONAZZI

Unity of human intelligence, 58, 63, 80; Venice, 57, 70

of physical bodies, 79 ; of human Vernias, 60

nature, 86, 87, 91; of soul and body, Vicarium — objeclivum, 138

85; of mental life, action, no, 113, Vice, hateful in itself, 263-265

121, 123, 134, 169, 194, 200; of Virtue, desirable in itself, 263-267

human race, 252-256 ; of moral Virtus, vis cogitativa, etc. See Cogitativa

life, 257 etc.

Universale, object of intellectus, 50, 187, Vitalist conception of soul, 23
188, 240, 244; complexum, incom-

plexum, 230, 231 Will, not extensive faculty, 108, 124

Universals, nature of, 20-22, 187, 188; William (of Auvergne), 23

and particulars, 99, too, 103-105, 108, Wolf, 158

123, 211, 223-229, 231, 232, 235-244; World-Soul, 18, 28
complex, 225

viroKdnevov — subjectum, 138 Zabarella, 61

Zimara, 60

Vegetativa, anima. See Anima

CAMBRIDGE: PRINTED BY JOHN CLAY, M.A. AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS.

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